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☒ **THE MANY VOICES OF PEIPING**

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CASE STUDY

by
Mr. Clyde G. Hess, USIA
and
Colonel Earl C. Acuff, U.S. Army

April 11, 1966

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THE EIGHTH SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

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This study deals with the techniques which Radio Peiping uses in tailoring its broadcasts to Japan, Korea, The Republic of China and Thailand. It discusses the predominating propaganda themes broadcast by the Chinese communist radio to these countries during 1965. It also points out the separate and discrete propaganda appeals that were made to target groups within each of these countries.

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PREFACE

For centuries nations have employed propaganda to gain short, intermediate and long term objectives. The effectiveness of any country's propaganda is usually difficult to measure, but this insidious form of communication between nations can certainly be credited, at various times in history, with creating and fostering such basic national attitudes as fear, hate, confidence, friendship, stability, sympathy, and many others less publicized.

That communist China is aware of the value of propaganda can be attested to by the fact that within ten years, this country has climbed from near the bottom of the field in international broadcasting to a position of number two in the world. If communist China can enhance its international stature as a great power bent on peaceful progress for its people, the tremendous increase of time, effort and funds spent on world-wide broadcasting may prove to be a very wise investment. Moreover, if China is able to reduce the credibility and effectiveness of United States policies among Asian nations, and raise questions as to its national resolve, it will have accomplished one of its major foreign policy objectives. Certainly few can deny that in the past ten years, many neutral and formerly pro-western nations have switched from a mild or a strong anti-communist attitude toward Red China to one of sympathy and concern for that nation's isolation in the international community. Additionally, they have served as apologists for China's frustrated overreaction in the world political arena.

It would, no doubt, be an overstatement to attribute this reversal in international attitudes directly to propaganda. Yet, who can measure the exact role that Chinese communist propaganda played in the "change of heart" of so many nations. With the attack on India and the continuous meddling in the internal affairs of some African nations, one might reasonably expect greater loss of prestige and increased isolation for communist China. In 1965, Chinese missions were expelled from six countries and relations were strained in four others. However, despite China's aberrant behavior more than forty nations voted in favor of admitting the Peiping regime into the United Nations.

About the only line emanating from Peiping that could conceivably be called universal and consistent, is the steady flow of anti-United States invective which is beamed to every region on earth. Although individuals within the various departments of the government examine Radio Peiping's propaganda on an individual country basis, few have studied the Chinese communist output to discern, if possible, separate appeals made to different countries. For this reason, it was decided that a study of this type might disclose some interesting and useful insights to the rationale behind Radio Peiping's international propaganda effort.

The objective of the case study was to investigate communist Chinese radio broadcasts to Japan, Korea, The Republic of China and Thailand. Specifically, an effort was made to determine the extent to which these propaganda themes were directed toward: 1) the internal preoccupations of these countries and to target groups within them and 2) the foreign policy preoccupations of these countries. It was also expected that certain propaganda themes would be identified as a result

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of Chinese communist international preoccupations.

In initial interviews, it appeared that there was no apparent tailoring of material and that the Chinese communists were too monotonous and unimaginative to be effective. To accurately measure the effectiveness of their propaganda effort would require a much more comprehensive study covering a period of more than one year. However, looking at Radio Peiping's propaganda from a statistical standpoint, there does appear to be a carefully thought-out plan for each of the countries studied.

Many factors favor China in its propaganda program. For example, their ethnological origins are similar to those of their neighbors, the countries they direct most of their radio broadcasts to are located nearby, and they are knowledgeable of Asian aspirations, capabilities and problems.

We are deeply indebted to many dedicated people, both United States Government and Asian foreign government employees, for assisting us in arranging interviews, and furnishing plausible answers to questions which could not have been explained by a mere study of records. Specifically, Miss Jean Hite, Research Section Foreign Broadcast Information Service; Mrs. Vivian T. Motsinger, Research and Reference Service, United States Information Agency; Mr. Kenneth R. Boyle, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Consulate, Hong Kong; Mr. Clyde L. Slaton, Deputy, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, Taipei, ROC, Mr. John R. O'Brien, Deputy, Public Affairs Officer, Bangkok, Thailand; Mr. Mark I. Miller, USIS, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan; Mr. Donald I. Colin, Assistant Political officer, U.S. Embassy, Seoul, Korea and Mr. Leslie Smith,

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British Information Service, Hong Kong are only a few of the many people who deserve special thanks for the outstanding assistance they so graciously provided. Needless to say, the opinions expressed and the conclusions reached in this paper are entirely our own.

Mrs. Clyde G. Hess deserves special thanks for typing the draft of this study.

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INTRODUCTION

If you're interested in new parlor games, try asking any group of reasonably well-informed Americans to make a list of the four or five countries most active in the field of international broadcasting. Chances are you'll get an answer something like this: first, the Soviet Union; second, the BBC; third, the Voice of America.

Here they begin to falter. Some people are inclined to rate the Voice of America ahead of the BBC. Some the reverse. Most aren't quite sure.

But the uncertainty really begins to set in when it comes to listing the fourth and fifth place nations. Some say China. Others say Cuba. Some even mention France or Germany. Very few say anything about the United Arab Republic.

What's the real answer? Expressed in terms of the number of hours per week that each country spends in broadcasting to other countries, the five great international competitors stacked up like this at the end of 1965: first, Radio Moscow with 1374 hours; second, Communist China with 1027 hours; third, the VOA with 838 hours; fourth, The United Arab Republic with 827 hours, and fifth the BBC with 725 hours. West Germany, incidentally, ranks sixth with 629 hours.¹

Such gross statistics are chilling enough when one takes the trouble to perform a little addition. They show that Chinese and Russian transmitters are three times as active as the Voice of America. And if you like pessimism of the carefully documented kind, the statistics

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can help there, too. ...Add to Chinese and Soviet air time the total number of hours per week broadcast by all other communist nations and the final figure swells to a scary 4,840 hours--almost five times the output of the VOA. Furthermore, this does not include clandestine transmitters operated by communist countries or controlled by pro-communist groups.

What is even more chilling, though, is the growth of Radio Peiping. Since 1955, China has added 869 net hours to its total schedule.² It now broadcasts in 34 languages and dialects from Hausa to Esperanto. Not surprisingly, the bulk of its air time is deployed toward Asia with Europe in second place. Africa and the Near East tie for third.

From a standpoint of language, Peiping devotes most of its Far East broadcasting hours to Mandarin and Amoy programs which include its output to its home audience, the audiences on Taiwan, Quemoy and Matsu, and other targets in South and Southeast Asia.

The major remaining Asian languages rank as follows in terms of hours per week broadcast: Japanese, Vietnamese, Indonesian, English (to The Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, India and Pakistan), Thai, Mongolian, Cantonese, Burmese, Korean, Malay, Laotian, and Cambodian.³ This is by no means a foolproof method of determining Peiping's assessment of each country's political importance. Too many other factors enter in. But it is an arresting list.

And in a much larger sense, mere figures do not even begin to tell the whole story. What is vastly more important, obviously, is what is said by Peiping in all of these languages. It is a rewarding--and essential--national exercise to examine closely and continuously

the content of programs beamed beyond any single nation's borders. This is especially true of the world's communist nations--and for several valid reasons.

In the first place, when one nation undertakes to broadcast to another nation in that nation's own language it is usually for the purposes of propaganda which is used here--and only for a moment--in the non-pejorative sense, meaning "the spreading abroad of anything".⁴ Even two propagandists can argue endlessly (and fruitlessly) about the purposes of propaganda, but in the broadest possible sense, its chief aim is to foster the formation of attitudes by the intended audience which will assist the originator of the propaganda in the attainment of his objectives.

Quite clearly, countries which engage in international broadcasting are attempting to foster the formation of a variety of attitudes by the audiences to which their programs are directed. The Voice of America, for example, expends hours of broadcast time yearly in an attempt to demonstrate the vigorous spiritual component of American life in the face of constant, hostile, and thoroughly tiresome foreign assertions that the United States is invincibly materialistic. Thus, a long-term objective is being served: building respect for and confidence in American society and, by extension, the United States itself. Again, countless hours of Peiping air time are, at this moment, being devoted to bludgeoning home the idea that the United States cannot possibly win the war in Vietnam. Here short-term objectives are being served; an attempt to reduce international support for U.S. policy in Vietnam and to get the U.S. out of the conflict altogether.

As a result of this implies, international broadcasting concerns itself with both foreign and domestic matters and with long, medium and short-term national objectives. But certain difficulties arise almost immediately since any country which engages in international broadcasting must be certain that it is projecting an understandable, consistent and credible image of its own society and an accurate, credible and appealing description of its posture in international affairs. To do this, it must be certain that its broadcasters are at all times aware of what precisely that image and description, in fact, are--or are supposed to be.

In the communications jargon of the free world, this is accomplished by what is called "the guidance mechanism". Whatever form it takes, the guidance mechanism is essentially a transmission belt made up of human beings through which what is called "the line" is passed down from those in positions of authority to those responsible for broadcast content.

More often than not, the guidance mechanism must work speedily, for of all media, radio is the most immediate. Frequently only minutes separate the occurrence of any event from its first auditory appearance on a broadcast. When the American Embassy in Saigon was bombed, for example, only forty minutes elapsed between the time the story showed up on the AP wire and the first gloating report of the blast emanated from Radio Peiping.

In societies organized according to the precepts of rigid, highly-articulated national doctrines or ideologies, a fast, smoothly-

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functioning guidance mechanism is an absolute necessity. This is especially true if maximum advantage is to be taken of radio's peculiarly immediate quality and the visceral, emotional appeal in which it specializes. The twin burdens of consistency and authoritative-ness, therefore, weigh especially heavily on communist broadcasters. What is said on the air must be "official". Radio is the horse's mouth--or should be.

A close study of what is said by communist broadcasting organizations frequently serves up valuable insights to the official state of mind within these societies. When something is said, how it is said, and, indeed, how often it is said, may provide additional clues. In the diplomatic art nouveau of China-watching, a study of just what and how Peiping broadcasts to its neighbors is an essential tool.

What then does Peiping say to its neighbors? More specifically, what does it say to South Korea, part of a nation which has existed in the past as a tightly-bound tributary to China and upon whose soil within living memory China has committed its own manhood? What does it say to Japan, its great rival in Asia and a visible, galling symbol of the hated American presence in the Far East? How does it speak to Taiwan, in its view a temporarily estranged part of the Chinese nation ruled by a renegade, bankrupt, puppet regime? And how does it speak to Thailand, so clearly identified as Peiping's next subject for the war-of-liberation treatment?

In general, to all of these countries, Peiping's style is depressingly the same. Its voice is shrill, its approach contentious, its argumentation iterative and extreme. With certain illuminating exceptions,

Peiping keeps it simple, stressing four basic themes⁵: the war in Vietnam; the dangers to which each country exposes itself by backing U.S. "aggression" in Asia, the social and economic ills which have been wrought by the "American occupation" of their country, and the profound corruption of their present rulers.

There are subtle differences in stress, approach, and content; subtle enough to suggest strongly that Peiping "tailors" its broadcasting to each country, that is, it employs separate and discrete appeals in trying to reach them. This and the known Chinese communist penchant for careful analysis and planning, also suggest that Peiping has studied each target exhaustively and designed its output to take into account their internal and external preoccupations, the vulnerabilities and points of stress within each society.

There are also strong reasons to doubt that Peiping is actually reaching the audiences for which its broadcasts seem, by theme and content, to be designed. Its news is frequently stale, its talks dull and repetitive, a positive triumph of doctrine over the merest essentials of effective propaganda. If communist China has ever heard of sugar-coating the pill it doesn't show it; at least in broadcasts to Asia.

A badly disillusioned, young, pro-Peiping Asian communist puts it this way--and with some heat, "Nobody listens to Peiping. It's just too damned dull. The only people who do listen are those who have to. Most of their junk is guidance for local party cadres, pure and simple".

There may be some grounds for believing that Peiping--with a few important exceptions--aims at a kind of dialogue with government leaders

in all target countries, a dialogue replete with the most thinly-
veiled kind of threat at every turning. But this emerges most
strikingly from a country-by-country analysis. So, let's look first
at Thailand.

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THAILAND

That Thailand has long been a primary target for Peiping's propaganda (to say nothing of its political attentions) is historically intimated by the fact that Thai language broadcasts were some of the earliest introduced into communist China's international schedule. Starting with a humble seven hours a week in 1955, Peiping now beams a total of 21 hours into Thailand. This is a new peak, attained in May of 1965.⁶

China's activities are far from the whole propaganda story, however. The Thais are also subjected to a constant bombardment of Peiping-oriented radio material from several transmitters sited outside mainland China. Most active is the Voice of the Thai People, a clandestine transmitter believed to be located in North Vietnam. A significant portion of Radio Hanoi's external broadcasting is also directed in Thai to Thailand, while a smaller but still significant amount of programming in Thai is directed from Radio Pathet Lao and Radio Pnom Penh.

Thai monitoring officials see an interesting division of roles and missions among these hostile broadcasters. In-depth comment and news on Thai internal affairs with heavy emphasis on the activities of Thai front groups, alleged internal corruption, and the evils of the U.S. "occupation" of Thailand are largely the preserve of the clandestine Voice of the Thai People. Radio Hanoi comes down heaviest on Peiping's line toward the fighting in Vietnam while Radio Peiping appears to be charged with the handling of more general, world-wide items.

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The question of credibility probably accounts for this division of labor more than anything else. The Voice of the Thai People is obviously an unimpeachable source of information on the activities of Thai front groups. Backed up by what appears to be fairly efficient intelligence reporting from within Thailand to Peiping and Hanoi, it can also lay implicit claim to credible accounts of what goes on inside Thailand, especially examples of alleged corruption within the present regime which go otherwise unreported to the general public. Radio Hanoi's claim to credibility in matters dealing with the war in Vietnam is a built-in factor, while Radio Peiping's larger resources and more catholic, worldwide interests make it a natural supplier of international news and commentary.

Communist China's targets in Thailand are difficult to determine from an examination of its broadcast material, with one disturbing exception. Broadcasts in the Lahu and Meo languages directed into northern Thailand are unmistakably aimed at the peasantry.

The Thai Government has historically neglected the people of this area. Until recently, communications into it were difficult, the people were illiterate and the primitive agricultural economy of the region provided a slim base for taxation. Moreover, the languages spoken were, in many instances, not Thai, but Meo, Lahu, and in some cases, Laotian.

Now, mingled with the standard propaganda fare monotonously served up by Peiping, are two themes specifically tailored to this audience: the long neglect of the region by Bangkok and the ulterior motives of

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the central government in bringing about what improvements have been wrought... Road construction into the area, for example, is represented by Peiping as merely an effort to improve the communications of the Thai police so that they may, with newly increased efficiency, continue to oppress the inhabitants.

More important in the Lahu and Meo broadcasts, however, is the unwonted amount of air time given by Peiping to programs of substantive value, in this case, programs designed to assist northern farmers in improving their agricultural methods. "They even tell the farmers how to raise better pigs," says one distressed Thai government official.

These broadcasts have Bangkok worried--and with justification. The central government does little by way of substantive broadcasting to the north, pleading lack of resources and language talent. Thus, Peiping fills a real and vital need.

For "the inner Kingdom" of Thailand, however, it is a fascinating exercise to try to determine just what groups Chinese broadcasts aim at. In September of 1965, for example, Peiping charged its output to Thailand with a heavy load of news and commentary recounting student demonstrations in Korea. The question naturally arises whether such emphasis was not designed to prod Thailand's notoriously docile student population into riotous emulation of their Korean brethren.

If Peiping has identified any target groups to which it consciously directs its appeals, most Thais and Americans in Bangkok agree that it is probably the enlisted men, non-coms and lower-ranking officers (company and possibly battalion commanders and below) of both the army and police--plus the country's intellectuals. The stress on internal

corruption and the evils of the American "occupation" Thai monitors cite as one example. Here the material is developed in such a way as to suggest that nobody in Thailand is getting "a piece of the action" save a tight coterie of high-ranking officers and politicians. Thus, Peiping's propagandistic heart bleeds touchingly for the poor and disadvantaged in Thailand's allegedly corruption-ridden society and a not-too-subtle materialistic wedge is driven between the haves and the have-nots.

Except for examples like these, though, there is a noticeable absence of Peiping concentration on any other identifiable targets. Why this is so seems to emerge when one examines the theme-stress pattern of the Chinese output.

After this has been done it is quite clear that Peiping is concentrating upon the activities of Thailand's front groups. This was true in 1965; it is even more true of the programs beamed so far during 1966. Next in frequency is a variety of themes which may, for the sake of convenience, be lumped under the simple heading of "the evils of Thailand's occupation by the U.S.". After that, the dangers of supporting U.S. aggression in Asia, government corruption, the "suppression" of Thai patriots in the northeast and America's iniquitous role in the Vietnam war are runners-up in the theme-stress pattern.

When dealing with the activities of Thai fronts, both Radio Peiping and the Voice of the Thai People use statements by individual front members and official front manifestoes as vehicles to voice these and almost all other themes employed in their over-all broadcasting.

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Several other aspects of the radio treatment accorded to Thai fronts, however, are worth pondering. First, there is a recognizable "bandwagon" theme throughout: the fronts are consolidating, they are attracting more members, their strength is growing. Parallel to this bandwagon technique, runs a constant hortatory effort: greater solidarity is needed in the struggle against suppression by the central government and for the effort to oust U.S. imperialists.

To American observers in Bangkok, Washington and Hong Kong, this suggests a concentrated Chinese effort to build a viable, attractive opposition movement in the suspected absence of a strong, indigenous, Peiping-oriented communist party within the "inner kingdom". Bringing Maoist doctrine to bear in the analysis tends to corroborate one current theory that the Chinese are attempting to establish a strong rural base in northeastern Thailand with eventual insurgency as the ultimate aim. In what Peiping apparently regards currently as a pre-insurgency situation in Thailand as a whole, the Thai rural base must be demonstrated both as a theoretical and political reality; hence the bandwagon technique and the reiterated call for greater solidarity within the front movement. A primitive level of insurgency already exists in Thailand--several Thai village officials have been assassinated--but the firm rural base must be established and widened before meaningful insurgency can be initiated: this is the way the Maoist-oriented reasoning goes.

A close examination of what Peiping does not say to Thailand, seems to corroborate still further most current political theorizing about Chinese intentions. Broadcasting designed to impress the Thais

with Peiping's military strength is close to nil. Advocacy of overthrow, Peiping also eschews, although it is far more threatening to Thailand than it is to South Korea or Japan. Still, no clear call for overthrow of the existing Thai government is ever uttered.

Added to this is the fact that the Peiping talk is always of suppression: the Thai government suppresses Thai patriots, suppresses the peasantry, suppresses the people.

What this hints is that Peiping wishes--at least by indirection--to give no encouragement to the notion that Chinese military strength will in any formal way be employed to back an eventual insurgency. As almost an advanced echo of the war-of-liberation doctrine, Peiping seems to be laying down the line that the struggle is indigenous and must remain indigenous, country-side to city, without external assistance. If this general doctrinal stance suggests to the China-watchers that Peiping will not intervene in Vietnam unless it feels its borders are definitely threatened, it appears to suggest with even greater strength that Thai insurgents will have to go it very much alone--even more alone than the Viet Cong or Hanoi.

But when all is analyzed that can be analyzed about Peiping's output to Thailand, one problem nags: the inability to identify Peiping's targets, save in the broadcasts to the northern region and in the stress on corruption within the government.

A hypothesis is possible and it is this: when Peiping hammers into Thailand--as it does with almost terrifying statistical intensity--the idea that Thailand exposes itself to "certain dangers" by permitting itself to become a base for U.S. aggression in Asia, and the idea that the U.S. "occupation" is destroying Thailand's culture, economy, woman-

hood--name anything, Peiping can make it fit--these appeals are, in reality, addressed to history-conscious government officials at all levels and, very probably, history-conscious Thai students. What Peiping may be saying--with what effect who knows?--to all these audiences is that, in the face of Thailand's demonstrably brilliant achievements with a non-involvement policy in the past, its present degree of commitment to the United States is a dangerous, national anomaly. And certainly unThai-like.

Such a hypothesis can be countered by any number of well-known arguments: that Thailand begged for British or French occupation before yielding to the Japanese as an exercise in self-preservation during World War II; that the current Thai involvement with the United States may not prove to be too great to repudiate at some future date, given exhibited Thai suppleness over the years.

But if Peiping is as free of real doctrinal compulsion, when the chips are down, as several aspects of its policy suggest, it might not be too much to imagine that it knows its broadcast targets in Asia may be limited because of the dull, public face that doctrine insists it wear. And it may be possible--as a study of Taiwan even more forcefully suggests, that it is really forcing a dialogue with the power structure of each target country--and possibly nobody else.

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THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Not surprisingly, Taiwan appears to rank as a special case with Peiping broadcasters. Evidence of this--if evidence is needed--emerges from even a routine statistical examination of the themes upon which Communist China lays heaviest stress in its broadcasts to the island.

The central, hard core, almost immutable, themes are there: Vietnam, U.S. occupation of Taiwan, corruption within the Kuomintang (KMT) government, U.S. imperialism and the dangers to which Taiwan exposes itself by backing it.

But these are not by any means what Peiping spends most of its broadcast hours on. Statistically, communist China devotes well over fifty percent of its total air time to a type of broadcasting which can only be classified as psychological warfare. This is the defector campaign.⁷

Essentially, Peiping appears to be encouraging defections from the Nationalist Army and the political cadres within it. However, toward Taiwan, more than toward South Korea, Thailand and Japan, Peiping's choice of targets could conceivably be indicated by language of broadcast.

To explain, if Peiping were interested in setting the local Taiwanese against the KMT government, one might assume that special appeals designed to bring this kind of alienation about, might be limited to broadcasts in the Amoy dialect which is almost identical with the Chinese commonly spoken on Taiwan before the arrival of the mainlanders. Mandarin, on the other hand, would be employed in appeals to Taiwan-dwelling Chinese ex-patriates.

This appears not to be the case. KMT monitors in Taipei insist that, with minor differences, the content of the Amoy and Mandarin dialect broadcasts to Taiwan have been almost identical since February of 1964.

Chinese Nationalist monitors feel the fact that appeals designed to encourage defection from Taiwan to the mainland are broadcast in both Amoy and Mandarin Chinese is merely Peiping's recognition of the fact that 85% of the Nationalist army on Taiwan is of Taiwanese origin.

What form do these appeals take?

Fundamentally, Peiping attempts to make three basic points:

1) you should defect to the mainland. As a true Chinese it is the only laudable course. Besides, everybody's doing it. (The number of defectors is broadcast periodically.) 2) Don't be afraid to defect. You will be well treated. If you doubt that, here is what _____ who defected last month and has now rejoined his relatives in _____ has to say about the treatment accorded him. 3) China is on the move. Internal living conditions are excellent. Here is a report from the village of _____ in _____ province. You will see how things have improved there.⁸

Is this appeal effective? There is no way of demonstrating that it is. Peiping's claimed rates of defection are undoubtedly inflated but there is no way of determining what the true situation is. Republic of China officials on Taiwan will not discuss the subject.

Effective or not, the defector program impresses many Chinese who are willing to talk about it. Moreover, it illustrates the subtlety with which Peiping approaches almost every aspect of its broadcasting.

One young Chinese in Hong Kong, scion of a wealthy Nationalist family, put it this way:

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"It's terribly clever, this kind of stuff." In the first place, most of the mainlanders on Taiwan are northerners and northerners get homesick more than any other Chinese.⁹ Imagine a northerner sitting there on Taiwan listening to a broadcast about the improvements the Communists have made to a little village. He says to himself, 'I know that village. It's near my own. How I'd love to go back and see it now'. He can't resist this kind of thing".

Peiping's defector campaign is interesting, doubtless made so by the fact that free world international broadcasting tends, as a rule, to avoid combining psychological warfare operations with normal international broadcasting. Equally fascinating, however, is the more classic radio effort.

As noted, the almost irreducible hard core constellation of themes broadcast to Thailand is also beamed to Taiwan. Statistically speaking--and leaving aside the defector campaign--Peiping spends more time talking about the war in Vietnam than anything else. Here the sub-themes are standard: the U.S. cannot win the war in Vietnam, international support is lacking and the American people are refusing to back the Johnson administration in its campaign against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Also distressingly familiar is the treatment given to U.S. imperialism, the U.S. occupation of Taiwan and alleged corruption within the local KMT government.

There are subtle differences, however, in the stresses given to various aspects of a single theme. Most noteworthy is the concentration on U.S. investment in Taiwan.

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Peiping's run-of-the-mill, hackneyed approach to the U.S. occupation theme--say, to Thailand or South Korea--focuses sharply on the social consequences: vice, miscegenation, etc. This is also present in broadcasts to Taiwan. But KMT monitors feel strongly that Peiping angles its material to Taiwan on this theme more toward the economic consequences of the U.S. occupation. They are also impressed with the extent to which Peiping harps on the dangers of continued U.S. investment on Taiwan to the entire economy of the island.

Straight-faced statistics emanate from Peiping purporting to list the number of "businesses and small enterprises" which have failed recently because of U.S. investment. In some instances, well-publicized cases of a Taiwanese business collapse are laid directly to the growth of U.S. investment, but the orders of magnitude involved strongly indicate that Peiping--even assuming it is honest--must be counting in its total of business failures all pedicab operators and street hawkers who have gone broke.

With typical Peiping argumentation, the U.S. investment theme is ornately orchestrated: it causes unemployment, social disorder, vice, prostitution, theft, housebreaking--one could go on. Similarly, Peiping takes a swipe at the local government for permitting U.S. investment and thus works a little additional mileage into its general thesis that the KMT government on Taiwan is inexhaustibly corrupt and inefficient.

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But what this all suggests is that Peiping has recognized the dangers inherent in the present investment law of Taiwan--one of the most generous in the world. Stand in front of any hotel on Taiwan waiting for a taxi, strike up a casual conversation with an American in a local bar. It takes very little time to discover that American money is moving into Taiwan almost as fast as U.S. businessmen can carry it. And not only American money. European capital is on the move toward Taiwan, too.

Taking into account Peiping's unblushing use of capitalist instrumentalities in Hong Kong and--to generalize dangerously about national character again--a very probable surviving commercial acuity within even top party leadership on the mainland, it seems evident that Peiping is concerned lest this flow of foreign investment make even more apparent to the world what is so obviously the case: Taiwan is doing well economically. Not so well that it is immune to serious setback, but certainly better than the non-market mainland economy.

KMT monitors seem, at this point, to conclude that Peiping is attempting to stifle U.S. investment chiefly because even relative Taiwanese affluence would give rise to comparisons with the mainland which could only be invidious.

They speculate in other interesting directions, too. The more intimate America's economic involvement becomes on Taiwan--and joint ventures tend to encourage a touching degree of intimacy--the more difficult it becomes for Peiping to get the U.S. out of Asia, one of its major foreign policy objectives. Again, a second generation of mainlanders conditioned to life in a successful capitalist society might prove difficult to re-orient to a communist way of life. ¹⁰

... Parenthetically, KMT monitors claim that Peiping broadcasts
essentially the same material to its home audience as it does to
Taiwan--evidence, they say, of the mainland desire to condition
both societies to roughly the same attitude and value structure so
that the path to ideological homogeneity will be made that much
smoother when Taiwan "rejoins" the mainland.¹¹

But KMT officials also divide on another line of argument which
runs that Peiping is concentrating heavily on undercutting U.S.
investment in Taiwan chiefly because it fears that the ultimate
political effect of a thriving economy on the island will be to
diminish the urge among second-generation mainlanders for a return
to China proper.¹²

Taken as a whole, however--and leaving aside the defector campaign--
communist China's broadcasts to Taiwan exhibit many of the same
qualities as those to Thailand: a kind of dialogue--admittedly one-
sided--with the leaders of the KMT.

Recently, for example, Peiping began to speak of the possibility
of renewed collaboration between Chinese communists and the KMT.
Such collaboration, they point out, has taken place in the past
(notably during World War II) why can't it happen again? The difficulty
is that Peiping rather stringently conditions the offer, chiefly
with the demand that all forms of collaboration between the U.S.
and the KMT must come to an end before the mainland leaders and those
on Taiwan can get together.

This new twist in the Peiping line seems to hold little attraction
for anyone in authority on Taiwan, but it also appears to fascinate them
considerably. Its effectiveness is next to impossible to evaluate.

DECLASSIFIED SOUTH KOREA

Like Thailand, South Korea is under the radio propaganda gun from more than one sector. In addition to the outpourings from Peiping, Radio Pyongyang beams a sizable number of program hours across the demilitarized zone into the southern portion of the peninsula.

As observed in the case of Thailand, there appears to be a division of roles and missions between Communist China and North Korea in the radio propaganda field; and the division looks as if the guiding principle behind it is that of credibility--again, a repeat of what was observed in Thailand.

South Korean monitors¹³ have made an interesting breakdown of Radio Pyongyang's content--not in the American tradition of analysis, but nevertheless, quite illuminating.

Their methodology establishes two general categories: 1) the essence of Pyongyang's content (i.e., whether military, political, cultural, economic or social) and 2) the probable goal of the output. In other words, is the broadcast intended to bring about an alienation between the Republic of Korea and the United States, a deterioration of South Korea's fighting spirit, an alienation of the government from the people, or agitation and propaganda activities?

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Here is a summary of the Korean findings:

THEME CATEGORIES

		%*
	(Political	40.5
	(Economic	22.5
By Essence	(Social	23.7
	(Cultural	6.7
	(Military	<u>6.6</u>
	Total	100.00
	(ROK-U.S. Alienation	4.2
	(Deterioration of ROK Fighting Spirit	10.6
By Goal	(Government-People Alienation	76.0
	(Agitprop	<u>9.2</u>
	Total	100.00

*Percentage of total broadcast hours devoted to themes in this category.

For the most part, it appears, Pyongyang concentrates on themes designed to: 1) split the government from the people; 2) build antagonisms against the United States; 3) make attractive the reunification of Korea; and 4) impress audiences with the social and economic progress allegedly being made under the communist regime of the north.

Peiping's share of the burden--at least during 1965--was, it seems, to expose the evils of the Japanese/ROK treaty, warn the South Koreans of the dangers which will befall them if they continue to back U.S. "aggression", detail the unfriendly acts of the Japanese government

toward other Asian nations, especially communist China, and to report on the steadily declining military fortunes of the United States in the Vietnam war.

An examination of both of these theme lists reveals that the principle of credibility very probably lies at the base of this, the division of effort, each country concentrating on those items for which it may be thought to be an acceptable, believable source.

To examine this output a little more closely, Peiping's heaviest concentration on any single theme came, during 1965, in the general area of the Japanese-ROK treaty. Drafts of this treaty were initialed on February 20. The instruments of ratification were passed in the lower house of the Japanese Diet on November 12. Almost all year long, but especially from April onward, Peiping rang the changes on the treaty, especially allegations that it represented a revival of Japanese militarism. News of "popular demonstrations" against the treaty in China was used again and again. Throughout this truly tremendous effort against ratification of the treaty, Peiping also accused the United States of manipulating both the Pak and Sato governments. America's ultimate aim, it said, was to establish a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization with aggressive intentions toward China and the peace of Asia.

Korean monitors find in this almost unceasing flow of invective against the Japanese-ROK treaty further corroboration of what U.S. analysts have called the Chinese "siege mentality". "What they fear most in the treaty", said one Korean analyst, "is the obvious additional

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strength which the Korean-Japanese combination gives to the U.S. effort to contain China. Broadcasting like this is a sign of weakness, something that proceeds from fear and weakness, not strength".

A bit overstated, maybe, but it is rather illuminating to compare the thematic emphasis given the treaty by Peiping to that accorded it by Pyongyang. China's treatment has already been described; in general, it is fundamentally international. Pyongyang, on the other hand, comes down heavily on the internal dangers of the treaty and ties it closely to other themes depicting the evil consequences of the U.S. "occupation" of South Korea and the deleterious effects of U.S. economic assistance. What appears to trouble Pyongyang most about the treaty are its economic provisions--especially reparations.

Broadcasts from the North on the subject of U.S. aid, to lay the groundwork for this argument, maintain that the United States is interested only in providing the barest necessities to South Korea and in maintaining U.S. army troops there. True and dynamic economic expansion, says Pyongyang, is not the purpose of the large American AID mission in Seoul.

Carrying the thesis one step further, into the discussion of the need for reunification of Korea, Pyongyang has allowed a steady creep of items which suggest a North Korean view that reunification is almost vital in order to bring together, into their former economically rational combination, the northern industrial portion with the southern

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raw materials and manpower base. Indeed, Seoul's present encouragement of manpower exportation comes in for some heavy digs from Pyongyang-- even to the extent of admitting that North Korea is manpower short and could make excellent use of the plane loads of Koreans currently leaving the south for jobs overseas.

Behind this kind of propaganda concentration on basic economic problems, South Korea's broadcast analysts see a recognition by Pyongyang that Japanese reparations and continued U.S. aid, if permitted to achieve economic viability for South Korea, will lessen the appeal of the reunification (If such an appeal really exists. There is considerable feeling in South Korea that reunification is the last thing anyone should want.)

In addition, one gifted South Korean content analyst notes a steady softening of the conditions for reunification as set forth by Pyongyang and the North Korean government since before the Korean War.

Another area in which Peiping and Pyongyang supplement one another's output is that dealing with the war in Vietnam. Peiping, as it does to other targets, tries to sell the belief that the United States is losing the war, cannot, in any case, win it, and has no support domestically or internationally for its military effort there. Pyongyang, on the other hand, plays heavily on the dispatch of Korean troops to the fighting, stresses the emotional side, family dislocations, the fear of loss of relatives, etc. This buttresses appeals by opposition elements in Seoul, too.

What is not said by either Peiping or Pyongyang to the South Korean audience is, as usual, very much worth noting. Chinese military

strength is downplayed--there is little evidence of Chinese "muscle" in the Peiping output; Koreans themselves point out the fact that Peiping--and Pyongyang, for that matter--face a haunting problem when they come to design their broadcasts to the south. This problem is simply that the north can hear them as well as the south. With a pro-Soviet wing of some apparent strength within the Pyongyang government, Peiping appears to avoid getting anyone in the north upset by a show of bellicosity toward the south.

Peiping's primary target in South Korea is probably the turbulent, ready-to-roll student population. Much of Peiping's output on the Japanese-ROK treaty seemed, during 1965, designed to get the students into the street--and may have succeeded. The next target is probably the lower ranks in the army--and certainly army families. Third, intellectuals especially those who may be wedded to the logic of a re-unified Korea and who resent the U.S. occupation or fail to discern the real purposes and benefits of U.S. aid.

Beyond these groups, there is also much evidence to suggest that the peculiar type of indirect dialogue which Peiping appears to carry on with government officials in other countries, may be attempted toward Korea, too. Certainly much of the broadcasting on the Japanese-ROK treaty was aimed at a generation which has lived through or may have memories of a Japanese occupation. Additionally, the familiar and almost transparent threats of the dangers to which Korea exposes itself by "backing U.S. aggression" are there most noticeably.

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Two conclusions just about sriping fully formed from the mass of statistical data summarizing Peiping's broadcasting to Japan. The first is that the Japanese are treated to a richer variety of themes and theme orchestration than any other audience in the Far East. The only target approached with greater generosity is the widespread group for whom Peiping's output in Mandarin to Southeast Asia is intended.

Equally conclusive is the evidence which suggests that Peiping meticulously tailors its output toward Japan; engages in the employment of separate and discrete appeals directed at the pre-occupations of the audience--and most of its identifiable fears as well.

In the face of all the subtleties which appear throughout Peiping's propaganda to Japan it is extremely difficult to resist concluding that Chinese propagandists have made a painstaking study of Japanese sensitivities.

And well they might, for here is a vigorous, imaginative, and talented society enjoying some of the most highly-developed mass media in the world. Several of the largest circulation newspapers on the face of the globe blanket Japan and vie for Japanese reader interest. Western and local motion pictures play to packed, eager houses almost every night of the week. Night clubs beckon. Both commercial and government radio stations can give almost any Japanese almost any kind of entertainment he wants. So can television. Japanese theater panders to the sex and sadism set as well as to the lover of classic

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formality. It's all there--Wickedness and wisdom, love and hate,
bare bosoms and the neck-to-toe coverage of tradition, national
tendencies to bouyance, depression, reason and emotion, culture and
vivid politics--all side by side and all jumbled together in a tight
pattern of interlocking appeals to passions and the mind, through
which Peiping must try to carve its way with the dull edge of a
blunt instrument known as communist propaganda.

Is it any wonder, then, that Peiping's broadcasts range so widely
in subject matter? To be sure, the four hard-core items are beamed
toward Japan as they are to Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan: the war
in Vietnam, the dangers of backing U.S. aggression in Asia, the evils
of the United States occupation of Japanese soil and the criminal
wickedness of the Japanese government. But even these are, more often
than not, given a garish twist.

When an American nuclear submarine calls at a Japanese port,
Peiping's treatment of the story sounds like a Reader's Digest condensation
of "On the Beach". Any description of life in the Chinese communes
could be reasonably confused with an account of Adam's Eden before the
fall. In the hands of Chinese broadcasters, the normalization treaty
between South Korea and Japan resembles nothing so much as a dark pact
between Satan and Baal. Listening to Peiping talk about the historical
friendship between China and Japan makes one wonder who mislaid the
Mukden Incident.

In addition, Peiping commented during 1965 on a bewildering variety
of topics: Premier Sato's visit to the United States, the inadequacies
of the UN as presently constituted, touring Chinese ping-pong players,

and a whole lot more.

Japanese student demonstrations against almost anything, celebrations of Okinawa Day, elections to the upper house of the Japanese Diet, the two Chinas policy, breaches of the Sino-Japanese trade agreement, American farmers and their plight, activities of Japanese businessmen on a good-will tour of China, rioting in Watts, the exposure of a secret Japanese defense plan said to designate Communist China and North Korea as "the enemy", France and NATO, the problems of the American worker, President Johnson, Vice-President Humphrey, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk, Mike Mansfield and Cassius Clay--the list is almost truly endless.

If Peiping's choice of subject matter was so catholic last year, the question naturally arises: what did they concentrate on--assuming that they concentrated on anything?

Statistics provide the answer. They did concentrate on something. Probably over 50% or more of Peiping's broadcast time was lavished on the activities of Japanese delegations visiting communist China.

This is a handy vehicle for any broadcaster. But the Chinese exploit it surpassingly well. When a delegation of Japanese youth, a group of Japanese businessmen or an entire Japanese dramatic troupe visits China, their progress is recorded in daily radio installments to Japan. If members of the delegation can be induced to appear before a microphone and state in the course of an interview that trade relations between communist China and Japan should be restored, so much the better. And some of them say this. If they can be induced to comment on the peaceful progress which they have observed within China, so much the better. And some of them say things like this, too.

...If they can be induced to rebel against the United States' stand in Vietnam or the Japanese-ROK treaty, this is undoubtedly a cause for celebration in Radio Peiping. But few of them say things like this so it becomes necessary for Peiping to foster visits by left-wing or pro-Communist groups to whom the Japanese government is occasionally willing to issue passports and exit visas. Failing this, it becomes necessary to invent such touring groups who will be quoted by Peiping as having lambasted Japan's policy of aligning itself with U.S. aggression in Asia, or any other damaging charge serving Peiping's propaganda objectives. This sort of invention takes place too, although how much is difficult to determine.

But the delegation technique is used and used extensively by Peiping. Here again, credibility is the aim. Hearing a Japanese support Chinese objectives is much more believable than listening to a tirade by a Radio Peiping, Japanese-speaking announcer with a known voice and delivery.

In utterances by delegation members and in its normal broadcast output, Peiping stresses a handful of themes hardest: the dangers and evils of the Japanese-ROK treaty, peaceful progress within China, the unfriendly attitude of the Japanese government toward the CPR, the need for the normalization of relations between Japan and China, the utter necessity of restoring trade between the two countries, the dangers of backing U.S. policy in Asia, and the evils of the American occupation of Japan.

Many sub-themes or variations on the main themes are also vigorously fabricated by Peiping. When dealing with the dangers of

the Japanese-ROK treaty, for example, Peiping in the latter half of 1965 orchestrated into its treatment, fear of a revival of Japanese militarism, charges that the United States was manipulating the Pak and Sato governments during the negotiations and the claim that this treaty was to be the nucleus of a new Northeast Asia Treaty Organization.

In elaborating on the unfriendliness of the Japanese government toward China, Peiping concentrated on attacking the Sato government, especially the Sato-Johnson visit and communique, and alleged collusion between U.S. and Japanese militarists. As a part of both the call for a restoration of trade and that for normal relations between China and Japan, Peiping carefully built in the general sub-theme that only the Sato government and the United States were blocking such a restoration. It was in this general area that heavy stress was put on the historic ties of friendship between the two countries.

All in all, one central conclusion emerges from a close study of these broadcasts and their timing, and it is this: whether or not the Chinese communists intend it, the net effect of their broadcasting could be to confuse the Japanese listener about the real aims of Peiping toward his country. There is a whipsawing effect observable in these broadcasts. While hitting the Japanese hardest on the revival of Japanese militarism for example, Peiping appeared also to be attempting the spread of peace and light by its handsome treatment of a Japanese youth delegation to the Chinese Friendship Forum. These youngsters were accorded a banquet by Chen Yi and fawned upon generally.

There are other examples of this peculiar ambivalence, the mixture of threat and blandishment at one and the same time. Moreover, it is

difficult to evaluate. Most Japanese officials give the appearance of being in no doubt about Chinese intentions toward Japan. While these intentions are not necessarily friendly, they seem to be saying, Japanese military ties to the United States are a sobering deterrent to any overt act of Chinese hostility. Trade is possible and should be encouraged but the Japanese should avoid being identified more closely with the United States by such national acts as a more intimate participation in the Vietnamese war or a greater visible support of U.S. containment of China. In short, the whipsaw effect may or may not be there and is probably unimportant in shaping Japanese attitudes at the governmental levels. It is difficult to tell.

Though various types of threat appear in China's output to Japan, the military threat is unmistakably absent. Once again, as in the case of the other countries studied, Peiping does not flex its military muscles. A part of this is probably its desire to serve the ends of its communist and socialist colleagues in Japan. But it also appears very possible that Peiping has taken dead aim at the pacifist orientation of Japanese society and deems it best not to frighten anybody. Especially not if this would suggest to the Japanese that any revision of the Security Treaty with the United States should avoid a watering-down of those military clauses providing the backbone of Japan's security.

As for targets, there is little evidence that Peiping is addressing its appeals to anyone in particular unless it be students, communist party members and sympathetic socialist elements. Businessmen are

a target of sorts, but one suspects that Peiping relies more on personal contacts when these businessmen visit China singly or as part of a delegation. There may be an attempted dialogue with the government of the kind noted in the case of Thailand, Taiwan and South Korea, but even this is questionable. Japan's official views toward China seem to have matured into an internally acceptable form for the moment. As for the rest of the potential Peiping audience on Japan, the competition for its attention is probably just too great. Aside from communist party cadres and Peiping's political confreres in Japan there is just too much to do for anyone to listen to Peiping.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

What then can we say about Communist China's employment of the radio propaganda weapon?

In the first place, Peiping's approach is highly tactical, as already seen, devoted to the fostering of attitudes by its targets which will assist in the achievement of the regime's short-term-- and perhaps some medium-term objectives. Indeed, in one instance, that of Taiwan, we have seen radio employed in direct psychological warfare, the most highly tactical use of all.

If there is any strategic component in China's total broadcast effort it probably occurs only in those items dealing with peaceful progress within China under the communist regime and a rather naive effort to demonstrate China's international standing by citing, among other things, whatever support it has obtained for its proposed world-wide disarmament conference and reformation of the United Nations. Even in the case of the "peaceful progress theme", this is frequently employed as a tactical backup in the defector campaign against Taiwan.

Broadcasting characterized by a highly tactical component is usually typical of revolutionary regimes or of unformed and unsettled societies. In the case of China, it may probably also be taken as reaffirmation of the Chinese siege mentality noted by several western observers.

It should be noted, too, that there may be a strategic/tactical mix in Peiping's approach to radio propaganda. To elaborate, the

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Chinese quite clearly wish to see the United States "out of Asia". This may be a goal which, in the Chinese view, is at one and the same time long, medium, and short-term. Thus, in almost all of its broadcasts relating to the internal political matters of a target as well as its broadcasts dealing directly with the United States (i.e., the war in Vietnam, U.S. "occupation" of the target country, etc.) Peiping is monotonously inventive: in one way or another, it identifies the United States as the sole source and engine of almost all Asia's current political, social and economic ills.

In the second place, the Chinese appear to have been at some pains to analyze their targets. They tailor their broadcasts--this is clear. And the tailoring takes into account both the internal and external preoccupations of its audiences. The lack of emphasis on Chinese military strength in broadcasts to Japan is one supporting argument. Another is the list of countries to which China does stress its military strength in radio propaganda--Vietnam, Mongolia, Laos and Cambodia--all countries which, in the Chinese view, need for one reason or another to be reminded of or comforted by China's military strength. Other instances of Peiping's sensitivities to internal preoccupations have already been noted--in Thailand, Taiwan and South Korea. The evidence of close and sometimes imaginative tailoring seems irrefutable.

Still, the real mystery about Peiping's radio propaganda, as has already been intimated, is the question of effectiveness: do the Chinese really believe that their broadcasts are listened to by the targets for which they appear, by theme and content, to be intended?

03172001000 SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

The research portion of this study aimed at trying to find out just what Radio Peiping says to Thailand, The Republic of China, South Korea and Japan, how it says it, how much it says it, and whether it says one thing to one country and something different--or slightly different to another.

As a time span, we chose the calendar year 1965 chiefly because full monitoring records of Radio Peiping existed for that period and because, in many ways it was the most interesting. It was over this period, after all, that Vietnamese insurgency graduated to full-scale conflict, that the problem of the Thai fronts came to the fore, and that Japan and South Korea successfully negotiated a normalization treaty. It was a period which saw the beginning of a decline in Peiping's international prestige, a decline which continues. It was, in short, a full and meaningful year for all of Asia. And it was a year that would still be fresh in the memory of those whom we might wish to interview as we traveled through the Far East.

As a first step, we reviewed monitoring records of all Peiping broadcasts to the four target countries. These records are maintained at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, a U.S. Government organization.

We restricted our attention to items of broadcast of two and a half minutes in length or more. This is an arbitrary figure designed to mark the breaking place between an item of news and a commentary--the commentary item being the longer.

We next attempted to categorize each item by its predominating theme. If, for example, what was said had to deal with the contribution of American troops in Thailand to the alleged decline of Thai cultural life, we considered that this item dealt with the theme "Evils of U.S. Occupation" and listed it under that theme heading. If the item described reports of dam or road construction on the Chinese mainland or claimed gains in the industrial or agricultural sectors of the Chinese economy, we listed it under the theme "Peaceful Progress Within China".

Next, an attempt was made to quantify the amount of air time Peiping devoted to each theme. This was done by totalling up the amount of time devoted by Peiping to each theme and comparing this, in some cases, to the total number of hours broadcast but, more often, to the frequency with which it appeared in broadcasts over the year. This gave us the "theme stress" and "theme frequency" pattern.

More often than not, Peiping deals with more than one theme in each item--especially if the item is a long one. In this case we consciously double counted to insure that we installed a constant error and so that stable comparative orders of magnitude would result. It proved virtually impossible to state themes in broad enough terms to avoid such a process of double counting.

Although this method of studying Peiping's radio propaganda was somewhat unorthodox, it did provide a quantitative statistical indication of communist China's principal propaganda themes and the frequency which they were broadcast. However, it did not present a truly accurate measure of Peiping's anti-U.S. propaganda. In this respect, the

~~"Dangers of Backing U.S. Imperialism"~~ theme consistently appeared.
~~It was obvious in their reports of the war in Vietnam, corruption~~
in local governments, the evils of U.S. occupation and nearly every
news item into which it could be integrated.

The second part of the methodology involved travel to the four target countries to discuss the statistical findings with foreign government officials as well as with staff members of the American embassies. When the information obtained from the records study was presented to foreign officials, they were oftentimes, quite surprised at the results. Although these officials were often helpful in corroborating certain information concerning Peiping's broadcasts, only in Korea had similar studies been made on communist China's propaganda. A Korean Ministry of Information official had made the studies and he proved to be the most knowledgeable person interviewed in the four countries under study.

The value of talking to foreign officials is inestimable. Many tangential insights were acquired which might not have been possible without these personal contacts. For example, there was no readily apparent reason why Radio Peiping had suddenly stopped talking about Lin Piao's famous speech. During the first three weeks of September, over 150 hours were devoted to this speech, and then suddenly, all references to it were dropped from Peiping's broadcasts. In Hong Kong, officials explained that one part of Lin Piao's speech had appeared in one of Mr. Aidit's speeches in 1963. It was thought that if the communists' attempted coup in Indonesia had been successful, it would have provided an excellent opportunity to make Mr. Aidit a

minor communist idealogue, and also prepare the groundwork for a communist China-Indonesia front. However, when the coop failed, the communists ceased all broadcasts of the famous speech.

Interviews with foreign nationals might have been more rewarding if we had been able to talk with more people who listened to Radio Peiping. In both the Republic of China and Korea, there are proscriptions against listening to communist China's broadcasts. Moreover, in Japan and Thailand, there were so many diversions that Radio Peiping was apparently unable to compete for the people's attention. As a result, most of the interviews in the four target countries were with government officials whose duties required them to deal with communist China's propaganda output. The list of personnel interviewed is in Appendix 1 of this section.

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THAILAND - United States Personnel - Bangkok

FOREIGN PERSONNEL

REPUBLIC OF CHINA - United States Personnel

FOREIGN PERSONNEL

JAPAN - United States Personnel

FOREIGN PERSONNEL

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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

KOREA - United States Personnel

Mr. Harry S. Hudson, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy
Mr. Donald I. Colin, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy
Mr. Ronald P. Myers, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy
Mr. Robbins, Research Section, U.S. Embassy
Lt. Colonel Berger, Psychological Warfare Section, Hqs. United Nations
Command

FOREIGN PERSONNEL

Brig. General Kang Du Hyong, Chief, Republic of Korea, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Yew, Senior official in the Republic of Korea Ministry of Information

HONG KONG - United States Personnel

Mr. Kenneth R. Boyle, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Consulate
Mr. Sheng Hya Hong, Radio Programs Officer, USIS, U.S. Consulate
Mr. William W. Wells, Political Officer, U.S. Consulate
Mr. Richard A. Gard, Political Officer, U.S. Consulate

FOREIGN PERSONNEL

Lt. General (Retired) Ho Shi Li, former Nationalist Army Officer,
now Publisher of Hong Kong newspaper.
Mr. Pyun, newspaper Editor of Kung Sheung Daily Evening News.
Mr. Robert H. N. Ho, Hong Kong newspaperman
Mr. Leslie Smith, British Information Service, Hong Kong

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FOOTNOTES

1. Source: Developments in International Broadcasting by Communist Countries in 1965, USIA (Research and Reference Service) March, 1966.
2. A net figure is given since Peiping (or any country, for that matter) may increase or decrease the number of hours allotted to any one language service in the course of a year; or over a period of years.
3. Source: USIA. op. cit.
4. The BBC would probably demur at this. Indeed, it would more than likely object heavily--and with good reason, for it is precisely what it purports to be, a "public corporation", free of government dictation, and, therefore, not truly "The Voice of Britain". Those who pretend to find the BBC's arguments on this score somewhat disingenuous, point out that the Overseas Service is, at least in part, financed out of public funds and provided with guidance by Whitehall. This makes little real difference. The BBC has often refused government guidance and resisted government dictation, most notably in a bruising encounter during the Suez crisis. On that occasion--and on others less memorable--the BBC has vigorously and successfully defended its prerogative of being the sole judge of its own broadcast content.
5. The jargon of content analysis now begins to appear in earnest. It would be wise to read our terminal essay on "Sources of Methodology" before going much further. This essay appears as an appendix.
6. Thai language broadcasts peaked early in 1961 at 17½ hours per week, dropped in 1962 to 14 hours per week and rose again in the 1964-65 period to 17½ hours a week. Recruitment of talent for Thai broadcasting among overseas Chinese has been actively pursued by Peiping of late.
7. For the purposes of this paper, psychological warfare broadcasting is defined as broadcasting designed chiefly to elicit action by the target (i.e., civil unrest, attempted overthrow, defection, etc.). Tactical broadcasting is assumed to eschew attempts to elicit action but rather to encourage the formation of attitudes by the target which will assist in the attainment of the short - and medium-term objectives of the broadcaster. Strategic broadcasting attempts to foster the formation of attitudes by the target which will aid in the attainment of some medium-term, but fundamentally, long-term objectives of the broadcaster. Free world broadcasting (BBC--in spite of what has already been said--and VOA) is a mix of tactical and strategic broadcasting with heaviest emphasis on the latter. Soviet broadcasting tends to be tactical but with a greater strategic component than these.

8. The Republic of China on Taiwan engages in essentially the same kind of defector broadcast activity. In fact, for almost every broadcast technique employed by the Chinese communists, there is a mirror-image technique emanating from Taiwan. It comes down to a matter of who got the idea first.
9. Two dubious generalizations. There is no available statistical evidence to demonstrate that the majority of mainland Chinese on Taiwan are northerners. Indeed, most respondents interviewed in this study felt that the majority comes from central China. And although these interviewees tend to agree that northerners are subject to home-sickness more than other Chinese, they are also loath to generalize in this way about national--or regional--character and tend to counter the argument with references to the younger generation of mainlanders on Taiwan whose feelings about the mainland are less pronounced. More of the second generation mainlander later.
10. Another example of the peculiar mirror-image relationship between Peiping and Taiwan. The second generation mainlander concerns Peiping, it is reliably stated, every bit as much as the post-Yunan leadership of mainland China worries the KMT.
11. Peiping, however, says almost nothing about the Sino-Soviet split to Taiwan although it does to the home audience.
12. KMT monitors are a complicated lot. Without real statistical back-up they tend (like anyone else) to become involved in subjectivities. One student of Peiping broadcasts on Taiwan, a devout China-watcher, tends to search for an internal motivation in almost all of Peiping's external output. Thus, on the subject of US investment, he feels strongly that Peiping's hammering at this theme is merely a reflection of the mainland's acknowledged difficulties with a "spontaneous return to capitalism" on the part of mainland peasants. By this reasoning, Peiping's attacks on US investment in Taiwan, broadcast (as they are) to the home audience as well as to Taiwan, constitute merely an attempt to deal with the "spontaneous return to capitalism" problem on the mainland. We cannot evaluate this notion.
13. A most realistic, efficient, and scientific group.

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