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United States - Japan and the Ryukyu Islands

by

Spencer H. Pratt

June 11, 1965

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SUMMARY

Facing a hostile Communist China, The Ryukyu Islands are of greater strategic significance today than when they were originally occupied as one of a group of allied powers surrounding a defeated Japan. We can continue to talk of Japanese residual sovereignty over the Ryukyus, but should not seriously consider their return to Japanese control in the foreseeable future. We must maintain strong United States forces on Okinawa so long as conditions in the Far East remain what they are. The freedom of action of these forces must never be impaired by any lessening of the degree of control we currently exercise. There are, however, certain actions that can be taken which will tend to make our continued stay there more acceptable to all concerned.

This examination of the policies of the United States and Japan towards the Ryukyu Islands involved travel by the author to Okinawa and Japan.

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PREFACE

The Ryukyu Islands were little known to anyone other than perhaps students of geography prior to 1 April 1945, at which time United States forces invaded Okinawa to begin one of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific. Since that time, the Ryukyuan archipelago, extending from Japan to Formosa, has assumed increasing strategic importance until today it is an essential part of our Pacific defense perimeter. Recognizing this to be so, it was considered of interest to examine if, when, and under what conditions the Ryukyu Islands could be returned to full Japanese sovereignty. While we profess to recognize Japanese "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyu Islands and express the hope that some day they can be returned to Japanese control, there appears to be no indication that such action can be considered in the foreseeable future. There might, then, be ways to make our continued stay there more palatable to the Ryukyans, the Japanese, and the Free World. I have examined the problem in this light and have attempted to show that the Ryukyus have increased in strategic value since they were originally occupied in 1945 to the extent that strong United States forces will be required there for the foreseeable future. In examining the problem there appeared to be certain areas in which improvements might be made in our relations with the people of the Far East. The more important of these are discussed herein.

A cursory study of a problem of such complexities as this produces no definite recommendations that will not be subject to attack from some quarter, and none, therefore, are included. There are conclusions, however, that emphasize the delicacy of the Ryukyuan issue and the dilemma of the Ryukyuan people.

My research of this subject was made considerably easier through the advice and assistance of personnel of the Department of State too numerous to

mention herein. However, appreciation is expressed to the kind reception I received at the Department of State in Washington, as well as the offices of the Commander-in-Chief-Pacific, the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, the United States Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands, and the American Embassy in Tokyo. I am also deeply indebted to the patience and kind assistance of the librarians of the Foreign Service Institute.

This study is classified because of the delicacy of the issue rather than the classification of much of the source material. It may be down graded to unclassified in three years.

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
CHAPTER I

OKINAWA - KEYSTONE OF THE PACIFIC



It is an irony of history that one of the last areas of the world still under American military occupation is the very area earliest suggested for American annexation. Commodore Perry, in a dispatch to the State Department in 1852, urged that we assume control of the Ryukyus (Lew Chew Islands) because of "strictest rules of moral law" and "laws of stern necessity."¹ The Ryukyuan archipelago, a chain of sixty-three tiny islands between southern Japan and Taiwan, is not precisely "America's Last Colony;" as it has frequently been termed, but it is in fact America's major military bastion in the Pacific. That the Ryukyus are of such current strategic value gives to the islands' problems and progress a considerable degree of international importance.²

This importance is in itself unusual in time of peace, for even a cursory glance at Ryukyuan history indicates that the islands have in the past been largely ignored except in times of war, when their very location tragically involved them in power politics of warring neighbors.³ However, considering the war aims of the United States and its allies as well as the mood and temper of the many peoples who had been arrayed against the Japanese during the war, the occupation of Okinawa and the other islands of the archipelago by the United States is understandable. Determined to destroy Japan as a military and naval power and to take precautions against the resurgence of Japanese might, the defeated nation was to be completely demilitarized. At the same time, it was hoped that the political changes in the Far East resulting from the war would contribute to the realization of this aim. With Russian power firmly established in Eastern Siberia, the Kuriles, and Sakhalin; with a free and independent Korea; with a Nationalist China supreme on the continent and on Formosa; and with



American power entrenched in the Ryukyus, Bonins, and Marianas; Japan, it was anticipated, would be hemmed in by a cordon of Western and Asian strength. In such a scheme of power, Okinawa could play an important role.

It is important to note that American control of Okinawa in 1945 was justified as a measure necessary to control Japan. . . .It was clear that no significant objections were raised against the policy, set forth at Potsdam, of restricting Japanese sovereignty to the home islands. American occupation of Okinawa was thus implementation of a war aim which commanded widespread sympathy and support.

During the period 1948-1950, there were sweeping political and military changes in the Far East. In Korea, Russian duplicity and intransigence had cemented the division of that unfortunate country and laid the seeds for strife and war. With the military victory of Mao Tse-tung in China and the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek to Formosa in late 1949, the non-communist position in East Asia had been reduced to a flimsy foothold in South Korea, to Nationalist Formosa, and to occupied Japan. In Southeast Asia, Communist parties had launched a whirlwind of terror and violence. In view of these developments in Eastern and Southeastern Asia, it is not surprising that the strategic importance of Okinawa was considered in a radically new light.

It was customary when Okinawa was originally occupied in 1945, and for several years thereafter, to evaluate the strategic position of the island in terms of air distances to key centers in Japan. With the revision of military thought concerning the function of Okinawa, however, a rapid build up of air strength on the island took place. Airfields previously constructed for the continent of Japan were now hurriedly strengthened and supplemented. Before long, there had been brought into being on Okinawa, one of the most powerful

complexes of airfields in the entire East; placing American air power, if necessary, in striking position against aggressive Communism throughout most of Asia. . . . From bases on Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines, it was possible to patrol the entire coast of the Asian continent from Kamchatka to Singapore.⁴

Since that time, the United States has become increasingly aware of the specific strategic value of Okinawa, and have continued to increase our strength there to the extent that today it includes not only air bases, but missile sites of many types, permanent bases for both Army and Marine Corps units, as well as naval bases and port facilities. A radius drawn from Okinawa dominates all Korea, much of Siberia, China's "Eastnorth provinces" (formerly called Manchuria), intermural China, Formosa, the Philippines, and. . . in the remote case of international treachery... Japan itself. As long as the United States remains on Okinawa, there will be no "China problem", because any problem the Chinese can think up, Okinawa can obliterate.⁵

On 26 October 1964 at a luncheon of the Okinawa Missionary Fellowship at the Castle Terrace Club, the High Commissioner said:

"In times past, colonies were part of the spoils of successful military action. This concept is as obsolete as the crossbow, as far as American political philosophy and its military posture is concerned. The main object of any power in seizing control of land not its own was always a profit motive. American political philosophy rejects this as unworthy of a democratic nation. It is obvious that no profit is gained by retention of American control of the Ryukyus, in fact, quite the reverse is true. The Ryukyus are maintained as a watch tower, a defensive bastion against those who are dedicated to increasing political power and economic strength by overt military action."

In his message to the twenty-eighth session of the legislature of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands on 1 February 1965, Lt. General Watson, the High Commissioner, said:

"Despite certain hopeful developments on the international scene during the past year, we continue to live in a dangerous and troubled world. The Communist powers remain committed to the so-called world revolution and to the use of force, if necessary, to achieve it. Especially is this true of the Chinese Communist regime, just 400 miles across the East China Sea from the Ryukyus. This regime is bent upon dominating its neighbors and forcing its political system on them. It is constantly belligerent and a persistent threat to all the freedom-loving people of Asia. Its attitudes and its expressed intentions are the primary reason why peace is now threatened in Asia.

"It is true today, as it has been true for decades, that this part of the world would be over-run by forces hostile to freedom except for the presence of Free World military forces spear-headed by the United States. We unfortunately live in the kind of a world where, while we negotiate agreements with adversaries of freedom to reduce the danger of war, we have to stand on guard - to maintain military forces in sufficient strength to convince the enemy that attack would be dangerous and unprofitable. The Free World bases, extending in an arc from the Aleutian Islands through Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the Philippines to Southeast Asia are a shield behind which the people of the Western Pacific, including the people of the Ryukyu Islands, are able to concentrate on building a better life for themselves and their children.

"For many years the Governments of Japan and the United States have agreed that the United States base in the Ryukyu Islands is essential

to the security of the Far East. That these two governments continue to agree on this matter was made evident in the joint communique issued on January 13 by President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato.

"The use of the Ryukyu Islands as a great Free World base in the defense of the Western Pacific has required and still requires sacrifice on the part of the Ryukyuan people, and you may rest assured that the Free World allies of Japan and the United States are grateful. But let us not forget that the people of all other areas of the Free World, including the United States, also are making sacrifices for a better future.

"While we maintain our guard against the forces of aggression, we shall continue to work for the well-being of the Ryukyuan people; to carry through the revolution of modernization that has been initiated here; and to keep these islands on the path of political, economic, and social advancement."

In an address at a reception sponsored by the United Okinawan Federation of Hawaii, in Honolulu, on 14 April 1965, the United States High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Lt. General Albert Weston, stated:

"It is important to remember that the United States is not in the Ryukyu Islands out of any desire to be there, or with any intention to exploit the islands in any way. We maintain military bases in the Ryukyus because now, as for two decades since the end of World War II, there are serious conditions of threat and tension in the Far East. I am sure that, if there were no threats or any state of tension, the United States would withdraw its military forces from the islands.

"There appears to be no question that, if the United States had withdrawn from the Far East immediately after World War II, the entire

Far East would long since have been overrun by forces hostile to the Free World. I have no doubt that, if the United States should move its forces out of the Far East today, the area would be overrun. We are the only nation in the Far East with the strength to maintain relative peace.

"Our presence in the Ryukyu Islands protects the Ryukyus, Japan and other Far East nations, as well as the United States."

The security of the United States depends in a large part on our ability to control the Pacific Ocean area. Control of this area to be effective must be complete. Our base system in the Pacific, of which Okinawa is a part, is a single strategic entity. Its retention facilitates the full exploitation of the inherent mobility of United States forces.

It cannot be overemphasized, however, that the basic philosophy and resulting decisions must be founded on the truth that the United States Armed Forces are in the Ryukyu Islands solely for a military reason. The foremost mission of each of the services in the Armed Forces of the United States is to preserve the peace of the world and prevent aggression. The United States has no territorial aims in the Ryukyus and does not desire to acquire permanently as much as one square foot of land in the Ryukyus. Finally, certain facts are evident. Present world conditions require the presence of strong United States military forces in the Ryukyus for the ready defense of the Far East nations of the Free World.⁶ There can be no question, then, that the conditions under which United States forces remain there must be based solely on military necessity.

Because of its increasingly important strategic location, its unique political status, the versatility and strength of the United States forces stationed there, Okinawa, in fact, remains the "Keystone of the Pacific."

CHAPTER II

THE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PAPERS

The legal basis for the presence of the United States in the Ryukus rests in the Potsdam and Cairo Declarations, the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, and the Peace Treaty with Japan. The Allied peace terms were laid down in the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, to which the United States, the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union expressly committed themselves. For one thing, that declaration stipulated that Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the four main islands of Japan and such minor islands as the Allied Powers might determine. The Cairo Declaration, issued 1 December 1943, had announced it to be the purpose of the "Three Great Allies" (China, United Kingdom and United States) to expel Japan from territories "which she had taken by violence and greed." No specific mention was made of the Ryukyus. In the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, signed 2 September 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam terms. Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan deals expressly with the Ryukyu Islands together with all other Japanese islands south of the 29th parallel of latitude. In that article, Japan agreed to concur in any proposal that the United States might make to the United Nations to place these islands under its trusteeship, with the United States as the sole administering authority. The article further provides that pending the making of such a proposal, the United States shall have the right to exercise the powers of administration and jurisdiction over the territory and the inhabitants of the islands. The treaty was signed on 8 September 1951 by the United States and forty-seven other members of the United Nations and by Japan. It was not signed by the Soviet Union, its satellites, and a few other member states including India and Indonesia.⁷

The rationale for the separation of the Ryukyu Islands from the rest of Japan is for the most part one of official silence and astute circumvention. The assumption seems to be that the Islands fall into the last of the three categories of territories described in the Declaration of the Cairo Conference:

. . . Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and. . . all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories she has taken by greed and violence. (underlining supplied)8.

The agreement signed at Yalta, 11 February 1945, dealing with the cession of territories to the Soviet Union made no mention of the Ryukyus. The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 reaffirmed the Cairo policy and specifically limited the sovereignty of Japan to the four main islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku and such minor islands as the Allies "may determine." It is noteworthy that the Ryukyus are nowhere mentioned in the three foregoing policy statements or in the subsequent surrender terms to which Japan agreed on 2 September 1945.⁹ It should also be noted, however, that any or all of the foregoing policy statements were sufficiently general in nature to provide for our eventual occupation of any areas other than the four main islands. It is apparent that, at the time the policies were established, in the mid-forties, it was evident that certain territories in the immediate vicinity of Japan would have to be occupied. The manner in which the policies were stated provided time for us to determine exactly which areas those were to be. If cession of the Kuriles to the Soviet Union is accepted, there certainly can be no question of the acceptance of the United States presence on Okinawa.

In examining Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed 8 September 1951 and entered into force 28 April 1952, it is more difficult to rationalize

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the terminology used therein. Article 3 states:

"Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gen (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters."

The Record of Proceedings of the Conference of 5 September 1951 for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan sets forth a statement by the delegate of the United States, John Foster Dulles, which tends to relate to but not clarify the wording of this Article:

Several of the Allied Powers urged that the treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of United States sovereignty. Others suggested that these islands should be restored completely to Japan.

In the face of this division of Allied opinion, the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority.

You will recall that the charter of the United Nations contemplates extension of the trusteeship system to "territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War" (article 77). The future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, determine the future civil status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan while affording the administering authority the possibility of carrying out article 84 of the charter which provides that "It shall be the

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duty of the Administering Authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security."¹⁰

The delegate of the Soviet Union, A. A. Gromyko, desired that Article 3 be amended to read as follows: "The sovereignty of Japan will extend to the territory consisting of the Islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, Hokkaido, as well as the Islands of Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcano, Parece Vela, Marcus Tsushima and other islands which formed part of Japan prior to December 7, 1941, except those territories and islands which are named in Article 2."¹¹

It should be noted that these latter islands and territories include the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, to which Japan renounced all right and claim and which were eventually to be ceded to the Soviet Union.

The negotiations at Yalta resulted in an agreement that South Sakhalin and the Kuriles should be handed over to the Soviet Union. This was a radical, not to say startling, departure from the rationale for territorial changes declared at Cairo. Neither of these territories, as Prime Minister Yoshida asserted with commendable restraint at the San Francisco Peace Conference, had been illicitly taken by Japan. Placed in a context of declared non-aggrandizement, this action of the Soviet Union can be regarded as territorial banditry, and the Allies at Yalta, if indeed they did concur, were accessories in the crime. However unjust the seizure, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles are part of the Soviet empire and, for the moment at least, are beyond recall.

The predicament of the Ryukyus cannot be so clearly described. Ambiguous though their status may be, this very imprecision distinguishes our territorial policy from that of the Soviet Union - a point made to good effect by John Foster Dulles at San Francisco. Obviously the islands have not been returned to Japan, but neither have they been ceded to any other nation. Japan's residual sover-

eighty is recognized in the Peace Conference minutes by both Dulles and Yoshida, although it is not spelled out in the Treaty document. Article 3 of the Peace Treaty requires that Japan consent in any proposal of the United States to place the islands under the trusteeship system of the United Nations, with the United States as the administering authority. Until then, United States is to exercise exclusive and paramount jurisdiction over the area.

Despite this formal declaration there is reason to believe that our real hope is the return of all or part of the area to Japan. This is suggested by the remarks of Dulles and Yoshida at the Peace Conference, by the increasingly articulate view of Japan that the islands be returned, and by our awareness of widespread desire among Ryukyans for return to Japan. It is also noteworthy that the United States has not yet proposed trusteeship and has encouraged official relations between the Japanese and Ryukyuan governments.¹²

It is not known whether or not the United States ever really anticipated proposing that the Ryukyus come under United Nations trusteeship. The Soviet Union would have certainly exercised its veto power when such a proposal came up for approval in the Security Council. To have made such a proposal knowing that in all probability it would have been vetoed, would have served no useful purpose and would have tended to weaken the recognition of Japanese residual sovereignty over the Ryukyus. This, in all probability, is the reason for the provision in Article 3 that pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon the United States will exercise jurisdiction over the area.

While this was all apparently well thought out at the time and appeared to be an extremely clever device for controlling the Ryukyus for an indefinite period, full consideration did not appear to be given to the time when Japan was to become a full member of the United Nations. Since the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Japan has become a member of the United Nations, a fact which makes

the placing of the Ryukyu Islands under United Nations trusteeship open to a question of legality.

The Central Executive Committee of the Japan Socialist Party stated in part in a Resolution of 9 February 1965:

"The United States occupation of Okinawa and the Bonin Islands started on the basis of Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, which provides that 'the United States shall have the right to exercise administrative authority over Okinawa and the Bonin Islands during and until it makes a proposal to the United Nations to place the islands under its trusteeship in the future.' [sic] Subsequently, it became clear that the United States had no intention of putting them under its trusteeship. Furthermore, Japan joined the United Nations in 1956. Article 78 of the United Nations Charter provides that the 'trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations.'

"In the light of the United Nations Charter, therefore, it is impossible for the United States to place Okinawa and the Bonin Islands, which are Japanese territories, under its trusteeship and there is no basis for Article 3 of the Treaty."

It is understood from knowledgeable sources in the Far East that the Japan Socialist Party has written both the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the United States for an official opinion in this regard. There is nothing, of course, that says that either party is required to reply to a query from any political party. The president of the United States can simply ignore it. The Secretary General of the United Nations can do likewise

except in the event that the question is picked up by a third country. Any Communist Block country could understandably do this and demand an explanation. If such an issue were raised in the United Nations it would be picked up by the "Committee of Twenty-four" on colonialization. This Committee has previously indicated interest in the United States relationship with Puerto Rico as well as the Trust Territories of the Pacific, so there is no reason to believe that an interest in the Ryukyus would be unthinkable.

With the help of a friendly Japan, such an issue in all probability could be dismissed. It would require a change in methods, however, over those used in dealing bilaterally with Japan. Japan's continued acceptance of our presence in the Ryukyus should in itself be sufficient to preclude third country or United Nations interest in the problem. If this should not prove to be so, we should, perhaps, tie our presence in the Ryukyus with Russian presence in the Kuriles and South Sakhalin as well as the reunification of Korea and Vietnam, the China problem and perhaps even the German issue. This would follow the Communist tactic of confusing the issue by the introduction of related but not necessarily germane issues. In other words, even though it may be questionable, the United States continued presence on Okinawa cannot be subject to successful challenge by an outside source.

At the present time, there is generally solid agreement within the United States government that we will have to maintain forces on Okinawa for as long as can be foreseen. There may be slight differences as to just how this best can be done, but there is unanimity of opinion that it must be done. There are those who would make no further concessions, what-so-ever, towards granting additional autonomy to the Ryukyu Islands, while at the other end of the scale, it may be suggested that now is the time to enter into a treaty arrangement with Japan and return the Islands to complete Japanese sovereignty. Perhaps, somewhere

between the two will be the most successful course.

We can do nothing which will jeopardize the degree of control and freedom of action which we now exercise on Okinawa. There is no other place in the world where we have forward deployed forces free to react to any crisis, of which there are many in that area, without the time consuming efforts of coordinating with another country. The freedom of action which we enjoy is equally as important as the strategic geographical location of the islands and must be preserved at all costs.

Were the problems of the islands' fate restricted to the interests and wishes of the United States, Japan and Okinawa, it would not be difficult to devise a mutually satisfactory solution. Okinawa, under these conditions, might well be restored to Japan with guarantees that the United States continue to maintain and operate its elaborate and expensive military installations. . . . There is little doubt, however, that this arrangement would arouse the opposition and criticism of many of the friendly governments of the Far East and Pacific.

It is difficult for many Americans to appreciate the trepidation of Asian nations when suggestions are made that the post-war restrictions against Japan be lifted. The primary enemy in Asia is considered by Americans to be Communism. Although many Asian governments share our concern, they are as greatly, if not more, frightened by the thought of militarism reborn in Japan. Having felt the direct impact of Japanese expansionism in the twentieth century, few of these nations are willing to relax their vigilance or to curb their fears. Any concessions to Japan which directly or indirectly bears upon the revival of her pre-war military and naval position can be counted upon to awaken protests from the Republic of Korea, Nationalist China, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. With all of these governments, save that of Chiang Kai-shek, the United States has concluded Mutual Security Pacts. Insofar as the United States

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is concerned, these pacts, as in the case of that with Japan, are designed to provide for defense against expanding Communism. Our Allies, however, consider them equally applicable against a distrusted Japan. Any disposition of Okinawa which ignores these real and living fears would thus only serve to arouse alarm among our Pacific Allies.¹³

It would appear, therefore, that any thought of a bilateral treaty with Japan relative to the Ryukyus is out of the question. If, as may be suggested, we could conclude a treaty which would include our retaining the precise degree of control we now exercise, it is not considered that such a treaty would be meaningful and would only lead to a desire for subsequent revisions to produce increased Japanese sovereignty. Further, the successful execution of such a treaty would be dependent on a somewhat unstable and not completely responsible political situation in Japan.

What does the average Japanese think of Tokyo's official promise to retain United States military bases on Okinawa in the event of reversion? Only 2% of a national sample thought the presence of United States bases on Okinawa was "natural under present conditions" in July 1956; 35% said it "couldn't be helped"; 39% were actively opposed to the bases; and the remainder had no opinion.

Could any opinion . . . be more discouraging to official circles in Tokyo and Washington than such strong popular hostility, even among Japanese conservatives to the one condition under which Okinawa reversion might be possible? The Pentagon can well use such anti-base sentiment to buttress its refusal to grant Japan administrative rights over the island.

Retention of bases as a price of regaining Okinawa was repugnant to over one-half of those interviewed in 1957-58; fewer than 20% (regionally) and 10% (nationally) wanted to pay that price.¹⁴

The heavy majority of Japanese desiring early reversion proves that continued United States retention of any southern island will be against the will of the Japanese public. The fact that Tokyo has given its official consent (originally under the pressure of the occupation) does not alter the fact that the United States presence in the islands has been very unpopular in Japan. If the United States elects to remain, it must admit this fact and also the desire of the subject Okinawans to be reunited with Japan.¹⁵

Failure of its public to support the official Tokyo promise to allow Okinawan bases to remain after reversion probably confirms Pentagon suspicions. Washington's policy of refusing to return administrative rights to Japan indicates lack of confidence that the Japanese government could maintain effective military security around Okinawan bases.¹⁶ It not only indicates that, however, but it also indicates that no further administrative rights can be given either the Okinawans or the Japanese without materially affecting the ability of the United States to perform our mission there. Okinawa cannot be looked at like many other countries in which United States forces are located. Because of its small size and the extremely large size and complexity of the United States bases located thereon, Okinawa must be viewed more as a military base containing scattered groups of civilians rather than a foreign area containing isolated military bases. The bases and related property occupy one fifth of the arable land of the island, geographically interwoven with the non-military areas. The bases are too intricately interwoven into the entire island economy and populated area to permit anything other than unilateral control. A control which must be maintained by the country having dominant interest in the area, which currently and for the foreseeable future is the United States.

In addition to the Peace Treaty with Japan and related papers which legalize the presence on Okinawa of United States forces, a brief examination of the document under which these forces operate is appropriate. Executive Order 10713 of 5 June 1957, as amended by Executive Order 11010 of 19 March 1962, Providing for the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands states, in part, that the powers reposed in the United States by Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, shall be exercised by the Secretary of Defense, subject to the direction and control of the President of the United States. Further, "The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the conduct of relations with foreign countries and international organizations with respect to the Ryukyu Islands." Despite the fact that the Department of State has established provisions for performing these functions, difficulties which seriously affect the Okinawan economy and people are experienced in dealing with foreign governments. These difficulties are directly related to the peculiar status of Okinawa in international affairs in that it is neither a colony nor Trust Territory of the United States, nor is it a prefecture of Japan, nor a sovereign state. On this basis, foreign governments are reluctant to enter into agreements establishing emigration quotas, giving the Ryukyu Islands "favored nation" treatment (which they badly need in many areas), including them in GATT discussions, etc. Many foreign countries do not recognize their travel documents as giving them any nationality what-so-ever and treat them accordingly. We will not issue them United States passports nor will we permit the Japanese to issue them Japanese passports. It appears increasingly difficult to rationalize what effect the issuance of such documents would have over continued United States occupation and absolute control in the Ryukyus.

In any event, Okinawan anxiety over their status in international affairs

is certainly understandable. It must be recognized too, however, that no other nations consider themselves to be as deeply involved, nor do they display any particular desire to fully understand or be of assistance in the Ryukyuan problem as does the United States. Therefore, we must intensify our efforts to establish a recognized position for the Ryukyu Islands in international affairs and to encourage other nations of the world to accept an appropriate degree of responsibility in assuring that such recognition is accepted.

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CHAPTER III

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Before looking into the governmental structure of the Ryukyu Islands, a brief examination of the United States organization for civil administration is desirable. The High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands is one of three hats worn by the senior Army Commander in the area. The other two being Commanding General United States Army, Ryukyu Islands/IX Corps, and Commander-in-Chief Pacific Representative for the Ryukyu Islands. One can hear the suggestion made, though not officially, that the High Commissioner should be a civilian. Because, however, of the purely military nature of our being in the Ryukyus, such a move would be most impractical and would not appear to be to our best national interests. Further, this is provided for by having a civilian in the position of Civil Administrator, the principal subordinate to the High Commissioner who is directly concerned with Ryukyuan civil affairs. This latter position was originally a military billet. However, the 19 March 1962 amendment to Executive Order provides that: "There shall be under the High Commissioner a civilian official who shall have the title of Civil Administrator. The Civil Administrator shall be designated by the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State and with the approval of the President, and shall have such powers and perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the High Commissioner."

The mission of the High Commissioner is to operate the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, which was established under the provisions of Section 4 of Executive Order No. 10713, as amended by Executive Order No. 11010, to assure that this strategic area will contribute most effectively to the peace and security of the free world.

In carrying out the mission, each department within the U.S. Civil Administration is charged with the responsibility of promoting the best interests of the United States and to assist in the development of a sound democracy in the Ryukyu Islands. It is proposed not only to foster the cultural heritage of the people and to encourage pride in their past, but additionally to include modern ideas consistent with their capabilities, both cultural and economic.

The basic operating objectives of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands are:

1. To promote and encourage the development of an effective and responsible Ryukyuan Government, based on democratic principles and supported by a sound financial structure.
2. To assist the Ryukyuan people in achieving a viable economy by encouraging all suitable forms of agriculture and fishing, and industry and commerce under a system of free competitive enterprise.
3. To motivate and encourage the Government of the people of the Ryukyu Islands in achieving constant improvement in the standard of living including housing, education, sanitation, health and welfare.¹⁷

Prior to World War II, Okinawa and the islands to the south constituted a prefecture of Japan and were an integral part of the Japanese homeland. Those islands to the north constituted a definite part of Kagashima Prefecture on Kyushu, the southernmost of the four main islands of Japan. In common with all other prefectures, Okinawa had an administration headed by a Chiji (Governor), who was appointed by the Prime Minister at Tokyo, was answerable to the Home Minister and, though enjoying a monopoly of political and administrative power within the prefecture, acted merely as a local representative of the central

government at Tokyo. He usually was a deserving party wheel-horse sent out from the capitol and rarely had extensive personal knowledge of local affairs on Okinawa. There had never been a Chiji who was native to the islands.

The battle for Okinawa caused such complete disruption of native life that no central government and virtually no local government remained on Okinawa at the end of hostilities. All high-ranking officials, most of whom were natives of the main island of Japan, had fled to the homeland. The complete destruction of the southern part of the island of Okinawa and the subsequent crowding of the majority of the island's population into the remote northern areas, made impossible an early reestablishment of governmental machinery along familiar lines. . . .With the establishment of district refugee camps, to which large groups of dispossessed Okinawans were brought and in which they lived for many months, local "mayors" were appointed by the Military Governor and were provided with councils whose members were charged with the supervision of such camp activities as sanitation, labor, land cultivation, rationing and the like.

In August of 1945, a nominating body of 125 prominent Okinawans were called together for the purpose of selecting an advisory council of 15 men, who would consult at regular intervals with the Military Government relative to the rehabilitation of Okinawa. . . .Having been duly selected, this Council, together with former district officials and mayors, were called together to nominate three men for governor or Chiji of Okinawa Gunto. While the Deputy Commander for Military Government made it clear that he would not necessarily be bound by the group's choices, he was satisfied with them and on 24 April 1946 appointed one of them as head of the newly established civilian administration.

The Chiji was made directly responsible to the Deputy Commander for Military Government for proper performance of all governmental functions in Okinawa Gunto,

in accordance with Military Government policies and directives. The functions previously performed by the Okinawa Advisory Council were thus transferred to the Chiji and his department heads; all of whom were previously members of that now defunct Council.

The initial step in the direction of self government for the Okinawan people was the election held early in 1948 for mayors and assemblymen of cities, towns and villages (shi, cho, and son). Pre-war voters in Okinawa Prefecture elected their municipal assemblies and these assemblies in turn elected the mayors. This was the first time in history that the Okinawa people elected their city, town, and village mayors directly.

Power of political parties was negligible at this time and the few party members who were elected were chosen on their personal qualifications and not because of their political stand.¹⁸ Even today, while voting pattern comparisons can be made on the basis of party labels carried to the polls, it would be erroneous to believe that party affiliation constitutes the single criterion for the success or failure in an election. More often than not, the popularity of the individual, his family relationship within the community, the non-political organizations and neighborhood associations to which he belongs, and the traditional values and systems inherent in the local body politic are as significant as the political banner under which the candidate chooses to run. Consequently, no analysis of voting patterns in the Ryukyus based solely on affiliation with political organizations can be considered wholly reliable.¹⁹ It must be recognized, however, that once elected the performance of an individual within the Legislature will normally be guided by the policies of the party he represents.

On 15 December 1950, the concept of military government ceased and Civil Administration was begun. New objectives were set forth, and of primary interest

from the standpoint of government was the fact that three responsible levels of government - municipal, provincial, and central - would be established. Two of these steps had already been accomplished. The third phase, a central government remained to be attained.

Consequently, on 1 April 1951, the Provisional Central Government was established. The members of the Interim Ryukyus Advisory Council recommended from among their members one to be the Chief Executive and one to be Deputy Chief Executive. These two men were duly appointed to their respective positions by the Deputy Military Governor, while the remaining nine members of the Council were appointed as the Legislature of the Provisional Central Government.

Thus a nucleus of the Provisional Central Government was created, and from this focal point through gradual stages a complete government was formed.

Among others, resolutions were passed for reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan, holding elections for the Chief Executive, to determine the status of the Ryukyu Islands, and participation by Ryukyuan land owners in determining rentals to be paid for lands used by the United States.²⁰

A Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) was established in April, 1952 after progressive changes in the native government, each change providing more responsibility. The Executive Branch is presidential rather than parliamentary in form. The Chief Executive is chosen by the Legislative Branch from among their members and is subject to the approval of the High Commissioner. This is as close to a popular election of the Chief Executive as the Ryukyuan have ever been, in that the Legislators are elected from single representative districts at a general election held during the month of November. To encourage any further participation by the electorate in the selection of a Chief Executive would open the door for the possible election of one who would be hostile to the United States presence on Okinawa and create a situation that could materially interfere

with the mission of United States forces there. Anyone, for example, could run for office on a reversion platform and probably be elected. If he were not friendly to our being there or wanted to exert pressure for reversion to Japan from the office of the Chief Executive, a climate could be created in which it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for United States forces on Okinawa to function properly. As long, therefore, as we remain on Okinawa the High Commissioner must exercise the right to approve the selection of the Chief Executive.

On 29 September 1964 at the regular dinner meeting of the Golden Gate Club, composed of a group of Ryukyans educated in the United States, the High Commissioner responded, in part, to a question concerning the election of a Chief Executive:

" . . .but as I understand now there is no law in the Ryukyus against the Communist party. I believe this is true. Some say why are you worried about the Communists? Well, I am worried about catching a cold. I just don't want to be sick. And Communism is a sickness and I don't think it should happen with such fine people as we have here. Now, this is a fact, there is no law against communism now. Now whether I am afraid of it or not is not important; I am not afraid of it, I intend to stay strong so they can be afraid of us. But Communism is a possible danger.

"I don't believe anyone here would like to have a Communist as Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands. Maybe a few would, but I don't believe you would hold up your hand if I asked you to do it in this group. Of course, each man is entitled to his opinion and I don't want to be critical of anyone who thoroughly believes this. On the other hand, I believe that the danger of having a Communist in the Chief Executive's position--while it may not be great or may hardly exist--the results of such a thing happening are so serious that we have to give considerable thought to such a possibility.

"All right now, let's drop the communist question entirely for a moment. In order for the great responsibility of selecting a Chief Executive to be turned over to the people of the Ryukyu Islands, there must be some indication that they have sufficient ability to properly execute this great responsibility. Now what is the picture that we have had--starting in June before I came here and sometime before that--what is the picture that we have had? We have had the --and I am not criticizing them--this is just a fact--I simply state this is a fact--

we have had a split amongst the elected representatives of these people who want to vote for the Chief Executive. These selected representatives have actually split so that there is no majority party in the Legislature at this time.

"Now I ask you for your opinion and you don't have to give it now as to whether this is an act of political responsibility or irresponsibility--whether you think that this is responsible or not. I would say that it is essential--certainly it would be required by my Government--that they first have a recommendation from me for a change in the Executive Order before my Government would consider a proposal to permit public election of the Chief Executive.

"Well, I find it very difficult--knowing the atmosphere that was in Washington when I left there to come here--I find it most difficult for me to believe that my Government would now be readily convinced that there is sufficient ability and a great enough sense of responsibility amongst the Ryukyuan people when their own representatives whom they have selected, have created and continued a situation of political instability in the Legislature.

"These are thoughts for you to consider when the question of election of the Chief Executive are raised. In other words, to put it very simply: I need to be convinced. I am open to be convinced. I have not closed my mind. I will listen to all voices that speak."

Even though the appointment of the Chief Executive is subject to the approval of the High Commissioner, the Ryukyuan are certainly better off today than they were as a Japanese prefecture, at which time their governor (Chiji) was appointed by the Prime Minister as a local representative of the Central Government in Tokyo. When such was the case, he rarely had extensive personal knowledge of local affairs and never had been a native Okinawan.

Today, popular elections are established throughout the Ryukyu Islands for the election of four categories of public officials:

a. Legislators of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands - the twenty-nine legislators are elected from single representative districts for terms of three years at a general election held during the month of November.

b. Municipal Mayors - the mayors of the fifty-nine municipalities throughout the Ryukyus are elected for four-year terms at a general election held on

the first Sunday of September. . . .When there is a vacancy in the office of mayor, a special election is held on the day set by the Electoral Administration Board of the respective municipality by giving public notice 45 days prior to the day of election.

c. Municipal Assemblies - Municipal assemblymen in the fifty-nine municipalities throughout the Ryukyus are elected for four year terms at a general election held on the second Sunday of September. . . .When the vacancies in the office of assemblymen exceed one-sixth the number of assemblymen authorized for a particular municipality, a special election is held on a day set by the Election Administration Board of the municipality concerned.

d. District School Boards - Election for members of district school boards are held for four year terms in March of every other year as of March 1959.²⁹

In examining the current governmental structure, it is to be noted that there is no political unit between the GRI at Naha and the 59 municipalities. A useless intermediate unit (Gunto) was abolished in July 1952.²²

Even so, it must be recognized that the GRI must completely finance the activities of both the Central Government as well as the Municipal Governments. If the Ryukyus were returned to Japan, the financing of the Central Government would be provided for 100% by the Japanese government, as would a percentage of the financing of the Municipal Governments. It appears, therefore, that in order to raise the standards of the GRI government worker to a more acceptable level, additional external financial assistance will be required.

Of particular significance in this area is the plight of the Okinawan school teachers, whose Association is probably the most powerful single political

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organization in the Ryukyus today. The Okinawa Teachers Association with a claimed membership of more than 4,000 is by far the most influential educational organization. Because, however, of their social standing in the community, this Association has a tendency to exert political pressure far out of proportion to the number of members it possesses. Further, the concept of the function of such an association seems to be that it is more of a labor union to fight for higher salaries and better working conditions for its members, than to look on it as an agency to promote professional training and to improve educational opportunities for the child.²³ At the present time, while their salaries are relatively comparable with those of their Japanese counterparts, the Ryukyuan teachers have no retirement benefits, medical care, hospitalization, nor those of continued schooling, etc., which are available to the teachers in the Japanese educational system and would be available to the Ryukyuan teachers if the Ryukyus were to revert to Japan. It is no wonder, then that the Okinawan teachers are strongly in favor of reversion, and, in addition to their political activities, reflect this feeling in their teachings to the Ryukyuan youth.

It would appear that the provision of increased funds to provide increased benefits for civil servants, including teachers, would be a small price to pay for the increased stability and understanding that would result.

Of the five registered political parties in the Ryukyus, only the Okinawa Prefectural Federated Branches of the Japan Socialist Party is considered to have direct ties with any political party in Japan. In the Ryukyus, the Democratic Party, which currently occupies 18 of the 29 seats in the Legislative Branch, maintains a close liaison with the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, which now controls the Japanese government, and invites their financial support, but it is not directly affiliated nor controlled by that party. It was apparently a

unilateral decision by the Japanese not to seek a more direct involvement.

This is considered to be a most desirable arrangement, because if the government party of Japan were any more involved, the apparent slowness of reversion could be a source of embarrassment to them and cause them to be more demanding in their efforts to speed up the process. As it is now, they can continue to support the reversion move, but disclaim any responsibility for the manner in which such is being accomplished.

CHAPTER IV


THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA



The Ryukyu Islands have always been, in modern times, a deficit area in food and other commodities. Although two-thirds of the people are engaged in agriculture, the crop yield is entirely inadequate to sustain the population. Sweet potatoes are the principal crop. Rice, white potatoes, small grains, millet, and soy beans are grown in much smaller quantities. The topography is exceedingly rugged and the soil infertile. Of the total land area of about 826,333 acres, only about a quarter is under cultivation. Even before the war 25% of the food requirements had to be imported. The surrounding ocean provides potentially good fishing grounds, but the Ryukyans lack the managerial skill and foresight necessary to provide fish to meet more than minimum food requirements in coastal villages. Under American aegis a modern refrigerated warehouse and ice plant with 1,000 tons storage capacity has been built. This plant, combined with improvements in harbor facilities and provision for fishing gear and supplies, should make it profitable to catch and freeze supplies of fish ample for domestic needs and even for export.

About 57% of the land area is forest, and forest products are an important form of cash income as well as a source of material for fuel and shelter. The rate of cut is twice the annual growth. A vigorous program to increase forest potential has been undertaken.²⁴

Okinawa is not now, and has never been self-sufficient. Before the war, the islands by every economic standard ranked last among Japanese prefectures - considerably beneath the others. The principal export was labor; poverty was endemic and almost universal. Today, the two basic products, sugar and pineapples could scarcely support half the population of the islands.



As a consequence, Okinawa requires financial assistance from without to support her people. The United States - through local employment, through military expenditures, through grants, in aid - contributes almost \$100 million to the Ryukyuan economy every year. We established a development loan corporation to provide millions for investment in housing and business. We created modern road, water and electric power systems, built thousands of classrooms, established the first university ever opened in the Ryukyus - with a student body of more than 2,500 - and put up health clinics where there were none before. We have provided training and breeding stock which has much improved Okinawa's agricultural production.

These developments have brought about substantial changes in Ryukyuan life, in great part for the better. The per capita income in Okinawa today is about \$314 - among the highest in Asia. Economic conditions on Okinawa compare now with those in the middle group of Japanese prefectures. ²⁵

However, top American officials fully agree on one point raised by critics - that there is insufficient direct economic aid.

"We are parsimonious," one told me on a not-for-attribution basis, I would say that we pay a pretty small insurance premium for what we have here - a billion-dollar base. There are certain things people expect in the modern world today in the way of social security and welfare programs. It's part and parcel of modern life and these people can't afford it.

"We can't buy friendship - here or elsewhere - but certain things can be done. Another \$4 or \$5 million a year would mean a lot.

"Don't forget this. The United States would get full value for each dollar because we handle the money in concert with the Okinawan government. We don't have to grease anybody's palm."

Another ranking official observed: "Ten years ago, \$5 million would do a lot here. Now the economy is rolling along pretty well. As an economy becomes more sophisticated, it takes more money to make an impact."

If the U.S. military forces ever pulled out of Okinawa, her economy would collapse like a straw house in the path of a typhoon.

For the fact is that Okinawa's material well being is highly dependent upon U.S. spending.

American dollars account for half the national income. The various services employ some 50,000 Okinawans. Thousands more work as domestic and gardners for American families.

Of Okinawa's \$93 million export-income gap, \$88 million is made up by U.S. spending.

.....

Okinawa's basic economic problems are the same as those with which her people have grappled for hundreds of years. They can be summarized this way: Too many people, too little land, meager resources.

Population density on Okinawa island - 1500 persons per square mile - is the world's highest. Furthermore, it is increasing by 15,000 people per year.

Arable land is scarce and much of it is being used for military installations. Mineral resources lack economic significance.

Human resources, too, one authority points out are still at a relatively low level of development in terms of labor skills, technical training, and administrative skills. There is inadequate venture capital to exploit such

resources as are available.

"These are the ingredients of poverty * * * and Okinawa has always been poor," this authority adds.

In a long run, there are three possible solutions for Okinawa's economic ills: increased industrialization with expanded trade and commerce, emigration, and birth control.²⁶

Currently, foreign trade is difficult because there are but few exportable items. Black sugar and tsumugi silk (specially dyed brocade silk) account for 75 percent of the total value of exports; which, before the war, averaged \$8 million a year. Although a balance of trade can never be achieved, American efforts are in the direction of encouraging new exportable manufactures.

As a matter of fact, a primary objective of the United States Civil administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, is to assist the Ryukyuan people in achieving the maximum utilization of all resources available to them to develop ^a sound and viable economy which will decrease reliance upon imports, expand earnings from exports, and support an adequate standard of living for all of the people of the Ryukyu Islands. The High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands and the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands welcome the entrance of foreign investments, together with Ryukyuan capital participation or alone, which will make an over-all positive contribution to the accomplishment of this objective and at the same time provide an adequate return to the investors. Encouragement is extended especially to sound investment proposals to establish new industries for the development of the resources or the productive capacity of the Ryukyu Islands. In addition to the free remittance of capital and profits through the use of United States dollars as the currency of the Ryukyu Islands and other incentives now provided, the United States Civil Administration and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands will endeavor to bring about continued improvement in the invest-

ment climate, to induce private enterprise, both foreign and domestic, to participate in the industrialization of the Ryukyuan economy.²⁷ Foreign investors are extremely difficult to find because of the relative absence of a clearly defined United States policy towards the Ryukyus and uncertainties as to just how long we intend to keep a sizeable force located on Okinawa.

The economic outlook is not brightened by analysis of population trends. The present population is slightly under a million and is increasing at the rate of two percent a year. The density in terms of cultivatable land is nearly the highest in the world. Emigration is out of the question. Resettlement on the islands is impossible since only 30 islands of the 140 in the archipelago are of any significant size. Of these, only four (Okinawa, Amami, Yaeyama, and Miyako) have more than a few villages. The economic destiny of the islands is worsened by the fact that appetites for material conveniences have been whetted by . . . years of contact with American culture. The result is aspiration for a living standard completely beyond the economic potential of the islands.²⁸ This is an area in which we must take a careful inventory in advocating continued improvement in the Ryukyuan standard of living. There is a standard beyond which their economy will not support, and this must be recognized. To talk, for example, of bringing the Ryukyuan standard up to that of the national Japanese average is to assume that the Ryukyus are an average Japanese prefecture with an average amount of resources and economic capabilities. This is not necessarily so. We should talk instead of bringing the living standards up to the highest level that a viable Ryukyuan economy will support. This level may or may not compare favorably with the Japanese national average, but would be all that could be hoped for. In a 1962 study prepared by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, comparing average per capita tax burdens, for example, the following eleven prefectures were selected as being

most comparable with the Ryukyu Islands: Kagoshima, Miyazaki, Kumamoto, Kochi, Saga, Tokushima, Shimane, Totori, Yamanashi, Iwate, and Aomori. The per capita income for those eleven prefectures for 1962 was \$275 (Kagoshima was \$218) as opposed to \$262 for the Ryukyus and \$418 for all of Japan. The Ryukyuan people today enjoy the highest living standard that they have ever enjoyed in the entire history of their islands.

In his message to the Twenty-Eighth Session of the Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, 1 February 1965, Lt. General Albert Watson, High Commissioner, said:

"Economic growth was in part due to substantial increases in external financial assistance. In Fiscal Year 1964, United States appropriated assistance rose to a new high of \$7.9 million. This was augmented by a \$290,000 appropriation from the United States Agency for International Development; \$9.5 million from the General Fund of the United States Civil Administration; \$2.6 million in abundant food products for welfare use from the United States under Title III of Public Law 480; \$3.4 million in long-term credit derived from the sale of United States food commodities under Title IV of Public Law 480; and a \$5.9 million loan from the United States Treasury to help finance the Kin Power Plant. The total of these figures reveals that direct United States assistance to the Ryukyus exceeded \$29 million during Fiscal Year 1964.

"Aid for the present fiscal year will continue at the same high level. United States appropriated assistance for Fiscal Year 1965 reached the \$12 million ceiling currently imposed by the Price Act. Added to this will be:

--Approximately \$12.2 million from the USCAR General Fund.

--About \$3 million in food for welfare use.

--Approximately \$4.5 million expected to be derived from the sale of food products and to be utilized for long-term, low-interest loans to productive enterprises.

--\$4.3 million in additional loans from the U.S. Treasury for the Kin Power Plant.

"Total direct United States assistance in Fiscal Year 1965 will amount to more than \$36 million. This figure does not include military surplus equipment in the value of \$850,000 per year made available

to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and the municipalities by the United States Civil Administration; nor does it include the extensive assistance rendered communities and institutions by the United States military forces under their community relations programs.

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"Aid from the Government of Japan was increased from \$5.0 million in Japan Fiscal Year 1963 to \$5.2 million in Japan Fiscal Year 1964, and will reach \$7.9 million in Japan Fiscal Year 1965. In addition, the Government of Japan has extended tariff and other preferences for Ryukyuan sugar and pineapple. This assistance amounted to \$20 million in Japan Fiscal Year 1963."

The Japanese financial participation in the Ryukyuan economy is another area which should be subject to continued scrutiny and re-evaluation. For while the Ryukyuan have a tendency to consider that the United States is not as generous in our financial assistance to them as we are towards such countries as Laos, South Vietnam, South Korea and Formosa, they should be encouraged to view our assistance in the proper perspective - in relation to that which is furnished by Japan. The entire external assistance program should be reexamined in an effort to determine a manner in which United States and Japanese contributions can be brought more closely into line. There are in all probability areas in the operation of the government, for example, where the cost of operation should be borne equally by the United States and Japan; others which should be divided equally between the United States, Japan, and GRI, while still others should probably be borne by the GRI, alone. So long as the current conditions prevail, it is considered desirable that Japanese contributions to the Ryukyuan economy closely approximate but not exceed those of the United States. To exceed at this time would only tend to increase pressures in the Japanese Diet for reversion. When and if the Ryukyuan economy more nearly comes into balance, Japan can take over the major portion or all of the external financial assistance.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The fact that the status of the Ryukyu Islands remains a complicated and delicate issue must be recognized. There is no other area in the world that occupies a similar status, nor are there any other peoples who are asked to remain more or less stateless. It is an issue that cannot be ignored, nor should it be ballooned out of proportion - we must continue to keep abreast of it and at the same time not overlook our moral obligations to the Ryukyuan people. It is a situation with which we will live for the foreseeable future, and one in which the Ryukyuan people should not be taken for granted.

The Ryukyu Islands, directly confronting a hostile communist China, are of greater strategic significance today than they were when originally occupied in 1945 as one of a group of allied powers surrounding a defeated Japan. It is generally accepted that were it not for the presence of United States forces on Okinawa, the area would have long since been overrun by the Communists and that Japan and the Philippines, if not also under Communist domination, would be seriously threatened. United States forces are on Okinawa, therefore, for purely military reasons and their continued presence must be governed by military necessity. The complete freedom of movement they enjoy is essential in order to ensure their being capable of immediate response to the continual crises to which this sector of the world appears to be doomed.

The legal basis for the United States presence in the Ryukyus is contained in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, and though the wording of it may expose it to interpretation, no successful challenge of its intent can be tolerated. The existing arrangements for our continued administration of the Ryukyus is the best that can be expected at the present time. No significant

changes can be foreseen that would not affect the degree of control which we must continue to exert and none, therefore, are considered desirable. The governments of both the United States and Japan recognize the necessity for maintaining United States forces on Okinawa and, while there may be some differences of opinion as to how this can be best accomplished, it is not considered that Japan has displayed sufficient political responsibility for us to consider returning complete sovereignty of the Ryukyu Islands to her now or in the foreseeable future. Further, there are but few, if any, limited areas in which increased autonomy can be granted the Government of the Ryukyu Islands.

The current relationship between the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) and the local Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) is considered to be satisfactory and functioning smoothly. USCAR continues to lean more towards an advisory role than one of direct supervision. So long as the United States remains in the Ryukyus for expressly military purposes, there is no reason to assume that the High Commissioner will be anyone other than the senior military officer in the area. Any suggestion that he be a civilian appears to be satisfied by having a civilian appointed to the former military position of Civil Administrator, the highest position under the High Commissioner most directly concerned with Ryukyuan affairs. Neither is there any reason to expect a change in the manner in which the Chief Executive of the GRI is placed into office; namely, by appointment of the High Commissioner of an individual recommended by the Ryukyuan Legislature. The only conditions under which popular election of the Chief Executive could be considered would be if it were subject to the approval of the High

Commissioner, and such a procedure would be either a meaningless exercise or serve to create greater complications in the event that the elected official was not approved. Under no conditions can there be a Chief Executive hostile to the United States.

Politically, the people of the Ryukyus are inexperienced and have not yet achieved the political responsibility so necessary to the functioning of a responsible government. While a direct relationship between the left wing parties of the Ryukyus and Japan may be noted, no such relationship exists between the governing parties of the two. While a liaison is maintained between the Ryukyuan Democratic Party and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and the financial assistance of the latter is encouraged, no closer relationship is considered necessary or desirable. To have a recognized direct relationship could prove a source of embarrassment to the JLDP because of the slowness of the reversion process which they profess to support.

The fact that in current times the Ryukyu Islands have always had a deficit economy and appear destined to have such in the future, added to the necessity for the GRI to finance the entire governmental operation of the islands, makes it clearly evident that the Ryukyuan economy requires external financial assistance now and always. Further, as the economy acquires increased sophistication, additional aid will be required to produce the desired impact. In supporting Ryukyuan economy, Japan should be encouraged to make increased contributions to the extent that her share is more in line with the contribution being made by the United States. We should make every effort to raise the Ryukyuan standard of living up to a level that can reasonably be expected to be supported by the

recognized limited Ryukyuan economy. There must, as a minimum, be provisions for increased security for the government workers and school teachers to include social security, medical payments and hospitalization.

In summary, there are many conclusions that can be drawn from a cursory examination of the relationship between the United States, Japan, and the Ryukyu Islands. Basically, they can be summed up in: (1) the Ryukyu Islands are of greater strategic significance today than when they were originally occupied, (2) the legality of our presence there is not open to question, (3) nothing must be done which will, in any way, lessen the degree of control which we currently exercise in the performance of assigned missions, and (4) throughout the remainder of our stay there, we must never forget our moral obligations to the Ryukyuans, the Japanese, and the peoples of the Free World.

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FOOTNOTES

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2. "The Ryukyu Islands, A U.S. Bastion in the Pacific," Royal Institute of International Affairs, The World Today, Vol. 17, No. 5, (May 1961), p. 187.
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4. Hayman Kublin, "Okinawa: A Key to the Western Pacific," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 80, No. 12, (December 1954), pp. 1362-1363.
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