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
Blue Bonnets for Doctor Bunche

Some Aspects of Earmarked Military Forces for United Nations Duty

by

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June 11, 1965



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The contents of this paper deals with the earmarking of military forces by Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland for possible future use by the United Nations. It discusses the political and administrative features of the decision to earmark and outlines broadly the nature of the forces which these countries have determined to train for military and para-military operations by the United Nations if and when they respond affirmatively to a request for such forces.



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## PREFACE

The idea of doing a study of the earmarking of military forces for possible future use by the United Nations developed after a visit to the U.S. Mission in New York and a talk with the Doctor Ralph J. Bunche. Following a briefing given to Members of the Seventh Senior Seminar on the problems connected with raising and managing of UN military forces, Doctor Bunche mentioned that the concept of earmarking might make this task easier in the future.

Initial research revealed that, with the exception of a very few newspaper and magazine articles, almost nothing has appeared in print on the subject. Hundred of publications discuss the general problems involved in maintenance of peace and security and the work of the UN in this field. Dozens of works explain why the UN does not have the forces the Charter outlines and why they were not provided. There are numerous books which discuss what can be done about it, and which develop the philosophy of international peace-keeping. However, aside from the notes of the Ottawa Conference of November, 1964, and the Oslo Conference of February, 1964, both of which were called to study and evaluate the experience of the nations which had contributed military forces to UN peace-keeping operations, there is very little in writing on the subject of earmarking.

It appeared to me that a study of why certain countries

decided to earmark military forces might be of interest. What were the internal political and administrative implications? Just what was involved in earmarking? Beyond arriving at some personal understanding of what was involved, I had hoped to find that there were larger implications for the future capability of the UN to meet its responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security. In this last respect I have been disappointed for reasons which will become obvious to the reader.

Nevertheless, the earmarking of military forces by several of the Member States of the United Nations is, at this point in time, the only move of a permanent nature which even attempts to provide the Organization with information as to what military force may be available under a given set of circumstances. A country like the United States can take the position that if it supports a UN intervention its military forces are ample to the task of providing almost anything that the UN will require. This kind of planning does not, however, orient the thinking of the country's leaders towards utilization of the UN in the first instance for the preservation of international peace and security. That would not be practical politics. But earmarking also springs from practical politics. In this case it is the hard-headed realization on the part of middle and small nations that, in the general scheme of things, it is imperative that some means be found to keep the giants from

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colliding. In no case are the earmarked forces committed to the UN without restrictions; however, the political and military leaders involved in the earmarking of these forces are looking to the UN as offering the major and perhaps the last hope for peaceful solution of international disputes.

With little written material to draw from, this study has been developed largely from interviews and conversations with military men and political leaders in the countries involved. I am profoundly grateful to these men for freely giving of their valuable time to discuss the concepts, problems and development of earmarking within their respective countries. Beyond that, and personally far more rewarding than any results which I might accomplish in writing this paper, has been the opportunity which this study has afforded to meet some of the most fascinating and interesting individuals I have ever known. The dedication, intelligence, vision and obvious ability of these men, in six countries, is the best hope that the world has for its future. There are undoubtedly many more like them and the sooner they get together, the better for all of us.

My profound gratitude then must be expressed for the assistance and patience of the following: Mr. R. J. Barrett, Canadian Desk, U. S. Department of State; Mr. Elmore Jackson and Mr. Paul Jones, U. S. Department of State; Captain A. L. Collier, RCN; Group Captain Frank Shefields, RCAF; Squadron Leader J.A. La France, RCAF; Lieutenant Colonel F.J. McCauley, Canadian Army; and the

rest of the expert military officers who sat for several hours in a round table discussion for my benefit in Ottawa; Mr. Jeff Pearson, Mr. W. H. Barton and Mr. Ridel of the Ministry of External Affairs, Ottawa. In the Netherlands, to Mr. F.J.A. Terwischa van Scheltinga of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. A. Bos, Assistant Legal Adviser of that same Ministry; Lieutenant General J.G.M. Nass, Commandant of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps; Major S.J. Hameete, Major A. C. Lamers and the officers and men of the Royal Netherlands Marines at Van Braam Houckgeest Barracks, Doorn for their briefing and a review of a fine contingent of earmarked Marines in a driving rainstorm. In Denmark to Mr. Ole Bierring of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Ole Espersen of the Ministry of Justice; Lieutenant Colonel Marinus Sund and Major Goth of the Ministry of Defense; and to Lieutenant Colonel Otto K. Lind of the Army Command together with many other officers who briefed me. In Norway, my thanks to Major General R. Kaldager of the Defense Staff; Mr. P. Ravne of the Foreign Office; Lieutenant Colonel Arne Sorensen of the Ministry of Defense; Lieutenant Colonel G. C. Bowitz, Defense Staff, and Major Odd Oyen, M.D. attached to the military hospital, Aker Sykenhus; and to Lieutenant Colonel Bjorn Egge, who drove half the length of Norway to meet me and give me one of the most fascinating days of my entire trip. In Sweden to Mr. S. O. Hogsell of the Defense Ministry; Colonel C. H. Nordenskjold, Defense Staff and Lieutenant Colonel Sten Ljungqvist, and

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finally, in Finland to Colonel Uolevi Kettinen of the Defense Staff who seems to have everything at his fingertips. In each of the capitals visited it would not have been possible to accomplish anything without the very great assistance of the personnel of the U. S. Embassies. In each and every instance the advance preparations made and the care with which my every request was met left me with the feeling that I had finally arrived at the status of a VIP.

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## INTRODUCTION

The problem of maintaining law and order, through use of force, is part of the problem of maintaining international peace and security. The crucial and ever present questions are who will do the enforcing and how shall it be done? The twin reefs which have time and again destroyed men's best efforts and gutted the most skillfully devised schemes have been those of sovereignty and nationalism.

There have been significant efforts to provide for the enforcement of law and order in the international community. The history of such efforts goes back to the Age of Greece. Yet while the benefits of these brief ventures have often been demonstrable, tribes, city-states, states and nations have eventually so bridled under the yoke imposed upon their freedom of action that cooperative efforts have failed and coercive ones have been overthrown. It is inherent in the definition that the sovereign can recognize none but self-imposed limitations and the rule of law has never for long been conceived of as extending beyond national boundaries.

However, as wars have become increasingly more devastating the efforts of men to find some means of imposing restraints upon the freedom of states to act irresponsibly and in accordance with self-defined self-interest have been pursued with an

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increasing sense of urgency. The aftermath of the First World War brought the League of Nations. The more ambitious United Nations was formed even prior to the termination of the Second World War. The threat of and capability for thermonuclear destruction of civilization has spurred the efforts of many men to find practical ways to permit this last organization to fulfill its mission. Frustrations have been many and progress slow, but there have been some notable successes.

The future and the welfare of the small and large nations of the world are inextricably woven together. Small nations, are affected by the ebb and flow of world events set in motion by the great powers, try as they will to free themselves therefrom. Conversely power politics among small nations leads to involvement of the great powers when they see opportunities for realignments which will further their own interests or ideologies. Lacking sufficient military and economic stature to make significant changes in the policies and attitudes of the great powers, many small nations have found it beneficial or expedient to ally or associate themselves with one or more of the former, or, less successfully, to attempt to establish positions of neutrality. Since 1945 the Great Powers of World War II, the United States of America, Great Britain and France with Nationalist China on the one hand, and the Soviet Union with mainland China on the other, their wartime alliances dissolved, have polarized into opposite ideological camps. The small nations

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of the world, either by inclination, domination or geopolitics have found themselves caught up in or attracted to one or the other of these power blocs. Despite protestations of neutrality in the East-West struggle by some, in fact, all the nations of the world are today arranged somewhere between the philosophies of the contending giants. These latter hold preponderant and overwhelming power in political, economic and military fields.

But if small nations cannot significantly change the policies of the great powers, they are not without influence. Their very inability to control large events often makes them acceptable to these great powers for the management of lesser ones. When the great powers consider it to be in their mutual interest the field is cleared for smaller powers to act. When this time comes the means must be found. Often, in recent years, the means adopted have been military or para-military in nature. Often too, action has been taken under the aegis of the United Nations. The contribution to world peace which has thus been made by several of the small nations of the world has been incalculable. This paper is a study of one of the actions recently taken by certain of these nations in order to better prepare themselves for a role in peace-keeping when they are called upon by the United Nations. The action is called "ear-marking." This method of developing military forces for use by the United Nations is a far cry from the original plan for establishing the strength necessary to enforce the will of that



international body. It probably results from a realistic appraisal of the facts of international life and a decision to try to do something about them.

The title for this paper comes from an episode which occurred during one attempt to provide the United Nations with military forces to maintain international peace and security. In the last days of October and the first few of November 1955, the General Assembly resolved to police the uneasy armistice which it had called for to end the fighting in Egypt. The veto-induced paralysis of the Security Council was bypassed through the mechanism of the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The General Assembly gave the Secretary-General, the indomitable Dag Hammarskjold, forty-eight hours to present to it a plan for setting up a United Nations Emergency Force which could be used to police the armistice lines and, hopefully, prevent a renewal of the fighting. Within twelve hours the plan was partially completed and within two days Major E. L. M. Burns of the Canadian Army was appointed to command the as yet unassembled forces. By November 15, forty-five Danish soldiers had landed at Abu Suweir Airfield, ten miles west of Ismailia, Egypt, the first of over six thousand men at arms who were to come. Ultimately, some twenty-two nations were to offer contingents. As always, the Scandinavia nations and Canada were in the forefront.

As the various military units began to flow into Capodichino Airport in Italy, staging through for entry into Egypt, it became

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obvious that they must have distinctive uniforms, something must visually identify them as being with the United Nations Emergency Force. There were, of course, arm bands and small insignia, but these were not clearly observable, particularly to a sniper at long range. The decision was made to adopt a light blue beret as the distinctive feature. None were available. Attempts to dye brown and green berets were unsuccessful. Finally one thousand liners were removed from battle helmets provided from United States sources in Italy. These were painted the blue of the flag of the United Nations Organization. In the field, the Egyptians soon came to recognize the peacekeepers by this blue helmet. They coined a name which has stuck. They called them the "Blue Bonnets".

The man who has, from the first, been largely responsible for the organization and direction of national military contingents placed at the service of the United Nations has been Doctor Ralph J. Bunche. Doctor Bunche, winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace as a result of his work with these forces, has "commanded" the Blue Bonnets of the United Nations whenever they have been called forth. While it has remained for military men to provide the actual field direction, Doctor Bunche has directed the planning and policy making at UN headquarters. Over the years then, in many United Nations military activities, the problem has been to find "Blue Bonnets for Doctor Bunche".

The United Nations is man's most ambitious effort to date

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in the field of international organization. Its history since 1945 has been one of attempting to work out methods for insuring peace and security in a world of sovereign states. The task has not been an easy one, nor has it been entirely successful, but steps have been taken down paths which hopefully will not have to be retraced. Precedents have been established, experience gained and major contributions made towards the basic aim of the Charter: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of War".

Military or para-military forces established and operating under the United Nations' flag have been used in Greece, Indonesia, Palestine, Korea, Cambodia, Thailand, the Congo, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Yeman, Cyprus and now again in India and Pakistan. They have acted as observers, peacekeepers, policemen, arbitrators, fighters and in many other capacities. Three times they have had to fight to carry out their mandate, in Korea in 1950, in the Congo in 1960 and in Cyprus in 1963. The "presence" of United Nations military forces, no matter how small in number, has been a positive influence for pacification in many areas of a troubled world. The weight of that presence is immeasurable in the balance between war and peace.

The military forces provided to the United Nations from time to time have not been those envisaged by the drafters of the Charter. The Great Power veto in the Security Council has forced a change in the blueprint. Those articles of the Charter,

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in Chapter VII, which make provision for military forces to be placed at the disposal of the world organization are widely considered to be dead letters. However, the ingenuity of Member States who have recognized the necessity for the United Nations to have military strength from time to time has not permitted the Organization to be entirely frustrated. Almost since its inception the Organization has had control and direction of military units for purposes considered appropriate by its Members. Whenever and wherever these forces have been used experience has been gained in international peace-keeping. Although political considerations have often prevented using international forces, there is a considerable appreciation of the utility of such forces under United Nations auspices. Critics find many faults with these military and para-military activities, still they have, for the most part, been able to maintain peace whenever used. They have inhibited more warlike solutions to a large degree. United Nations forces may be tenants by sufferance, but seldom has the host nation suffered by such tenancy.

The procurement of military forces for use by the United Nations in the face of Great Power inaction under Article 43, and, in some instances, of Great Power hostility, has had an interesting history. The difficulties have been overwhelming, not only politically, but practically. The requirement has always been on short notice; the provision has always been ad


hoc. The history of United Nations' peace-keeping forces is still being written daily in half a dozen places in the world where such groups exist.

This is a study of one effort to meet the need of the United Nations for an international military force ready to act in response to mandates of that body. It deals with the only present day effort which appears to be politically feasible, the "earmarking" of military forces for possible duty with the United Nations.

Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland have plans for earmarking military contingents, eventually totalling over six thousand men, for indoctrination and training in the experiences gathered from past United Nations military activities. These forces will be held in conditional readiness for possible use by the United Nations. Specific military units are designated or will be raised. In accordance with a determination made by the particular nation at the time of a request by the United Nations these units will be ready for service as part of an international military force. To some extent these countries are exchanging views and experiences. Several of them, to a very limited degree, have coordinated their efforts. Their planners and military men have met in strictly apolitical conferences with those of other nations which participated in past UN military activities in order to discuss general experiences.

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
And so, despite the disagreement of the Great Powers, through the good will and determination of a few nations, a way may have been found to provide Doctor Bunche with Blue Bonnets in the future, better trained and more experienced. Perhaps they will be better able to maintain peace because of their training as international firefighters and policemen. The effort is being made by nations whose size and place in the scheme of things have made them clearly appreciate that in reality there is no such thing as unrestricted sovereignty in the nuclear age.



EARMARKED MILITARY FORCES - The Background

Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland have "earmarked" military forces for duty with the United Nations in peace-keeping activities. The reasons for this action are strikingly similar in each case. These nations are strong supporters of the United Nations and the principles of the Charter. They regard their commitment to support the organization as a real one. They take pride in their histories of providing military and para-military units at the call of the international body. Canada, for example, has not only been a leader in developing the concepts under which the United Nations may take action of a military nature in peace-keeping, but has participated in every major effort along these lines since the United Nations first acted.

The six nations appreciate that alone none of them are militarily or economically powerful enough to play a major role in world affairs. However, each of them does have adequate resources and experience upon which to draw to support a limited military commitment to the United Nations. Canada, the Netherlands and Norway, with Denmark are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and have a military obligation to that grouping of nations as well. The United Nations furnishes a stage upon which these nations can and have played an important



role. Given the Cold War climate which inhibits direct peace-keeping activities under United Nations auspices by the Great Powers, the role has been a vital one. The UN blue banner is a legitimate one to follow. The purposes for which UN military forces have been used, excepting always Korea and the later-day Congo activities, have been politically acceptable to the majority of the nations of the world and at least tolerated by the United States and the Soviet Union. The principles which apply before UN personnel are introduced into a disturbed area insure that UN forces will be acceptable even to the disputants.

In the background of the decision to earmark military forces there has been an appreciation of the role that can be played by participation in legitimate UN military and para-military activities. There is a uniform desire to avoid, in the future, the short notice ad hoc organization of military contingents at the last moment which has characterized past actions. The first Danish contingent was enroute to Gaza in twelve hours. Mounting extensive and complex operations in unfamiliar areas of the world, without advance planning of any kind is highly inefficient. Such action can be particularly disruptive to a country's own military planning, particularly as there is usually little if any forewarning of the nature and magnitude of the operation. The efficacy of at least minimum internal planning in advance, of training, of prepackaging urgent materials, is widely understood by military men in each of these six countries. This

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appreciation has inspired the decision to earmark. There is general recognition of the fact that the speed with which the UN can act once a mandate has been given by the Security Council or the General Assembly may well determine whether or not UN intervention will be successful. Earmarking permits quick reaction to an approved UN request for military forces. The UN is provided with at least an informal understanding of the forces it may expect to draw from each of the countries which has taken this step.

Canada acted as early as August, 1950. Prime Minister St. Laurent advised the UN that a Canadian Brigade was earmarked for NATO or UN duty as required. This was called the Canadian Army Special Force, and it served in Korea after training at Fort Lewis, Washington. Canada has consistently been a leader in placing military force at the disposal of the UN for purposes of maintenance of international peace and security. Over the years her political leaders have uniformly supported this policy. By 1964, the concept of an earmarked contingent was firmly entrenched in Canada's defense planning. The Canadian White Paper on Defense, of March 1964, cataloged support of UN peace-keeping activities as one of the three major roles for Canada's military forces within their overall mission.

As her experience with UN peace-keeping activities increased, Canada developed her role pragmatically. She recognizes that she is one of a small number of middle powers capable and

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largely eligible for UN service, with a diversified military establishment which qualifies her for participation in many kinds of situation.

In the Netherlands the decision to earmark military forces derives from much the same background as in Canada. The Netherlands too is a staunch supporter of the principles of the Charter. Her government believed that the act of earmarking might encourage other nations to take similar action. In a speech to the General Assembly on September 24, 1963, Mr. Luns, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, offered to earmark a contingent of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps for possible future duty with the UN. On October 1, the Secretary-General formally accepted this offer on behalf of the international body.

It no-wise detracts from this action of the Netherlands Government to point out that at this particular point in time a contingent of Royal Marines had just returned to the homeland from duty in New Guinea. Here was a highly trained, versatile military group, ready, available and uncommitted. The contingent could have been demobilized or provided to NATO. The cost of supporting it could have been eliminated. Earmarking for the UN provided a new mission for a particularly well qualified if small, force of exceptionally able military personnel.

The Danish, Norwegian and Swedish decisions to earmark military contingents for possible UN duty arose from a general plan. Development of this plan began about 1960. While

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earmarking in the case of each of the three countries represents a sovereign act of that country standing independently, still, in a sense which will laterly appear, the overall decision was part of a general course of action jointly agreed upon by these countries. With the decision of Finland to earmark a battalion the sum total of the decisions constituted a Nordic Plan as distinguished from a Scandanavian Plan. Hereafter, reference to the Nordic Force will include all four of these nations.

Like Canada, Norway, Sweden and Denmark have been steadfast supporters of the UN Charter. In an article written for Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup> Per Hakkerup, in July 1964, stated that early deliberations on a UN Standby Force go back to the Suez Crisis of 1956, with the initiative therefor arising in an increased appreciation of the UN as a potential keeper of the peace. The success of the UNEF operation inspired the thought that it might be desirable to establish more permanent arrangements rather than relying upon case by case improvisation. He points out that a key to realistic discussions was found in Mr. Hammar-skjold's outline of the principles for UN peace-keeping operations developed from the UNEF experience.<sup>2</sup> In June 1959 the Secretary-General requested that the Member Nations, and in particular those who had participated in the UN Force in Gaza, give consideration to possible future military contributions to the UN in their military planning. In September, 1960, this



request was placed on the agenda of the bi-annual meeting of the Ministers of Defense of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Discussions as to the feasibility of acceding to the Secretary-General's request continued in meetings in 1961 and 1962. Informal study groups were formed to report back on various aspects of the matter. Finally, a study group was directed to prepare a tentative plan for a more or less articulated force which might be established by these three nations.

In 1963, Finland associated herself with these discussions. She did not participate actively but ultimately announced her intention to contribute a battalion to the force as it was planned. A plan for a Scandanavian Standby Force thus became a plan for a Nordic Standby Force. It provided for each of these four nations to raise and earmark specified contingents which could be made available either from the nation individually to answer a UN request, or as part of a force of nearly brigade strength provided all four nations responded affirmatively to such a request. Comprised primarily of infantry, and totaling over 4500 officers and men, the plan for the Nordic Standby Force was accepted by the Ministers. It was decided that each of them would propose the Plan to their respective Governments and ~~as necessary~~ to their legislative bodies in order that ~~action~~ might be taken to implement the Plan.

This was the genesis of Denmark's decision to earmark a military contingent. In Norway, Sweden and Finland, there were

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certain additional considerations which influenced their action.

Norway's decision was, of course, officially taken by the Government. A good deal of the motivation seems to have come from a small group of extraordinary men bound together by their mutual experience with UN military activities in the field. They have the characteristics of unofficial politico-military planners. These men exercise influence through several media, including privately endowed organizations and semi-official publications. They have connections in high political and military circles where decisions can be made. The thrust of their effort is to eliminate the inefficiency of past UN military operations, controlled by political figures, with inadequate military advice. They have observed in the past operations of the utmost delicacy and seriousness entered into with little, if any, real advanced planning. Fully appreciating the unfortunate political situation which prevents the UN itself from establishing an adequate military planning staff and understanding the small likelihood of this situation changing, this group believes that the solution lies in action by individual Member States to provide what is needed outside the arena of political discussion.

But it is obvious that the enthusiasm of this group does not stem solely from an understanding of the shortcomings in past UN military operations. There is a deep-seated desire to develop an expanding capability for the UN to act to keep the

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peace. Motivation lies in the belief that in this capability lies the secret to prevention of future major wars.

Through the instrumentality of the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, these men were able to plan and call the first international conference of peace-keeping nations in Oslo in 1964. The results of the conference have recently appeared in a book edited by Per Frydenburg of the Institute, Peace-keeping Experience and Evaluation - The Oslo Papers.<sup>3</sup> Several of these men may be identified as contributors to this book: Lieutenant Colonel Bjorn Egge of the Norwegian Army; Mr. John Sanness of the Institute; Lieutenant Colonel Gustav Bowitz of the Defense Staff, and an associate for over two years of General Rikhye, Military Advisor to the Secretary-General. This group is determined to do for the UN what it cannot do for itself. Knowing that the UN is politically unable to undertake the studies which are necessary to benefit from the peace-keeping operations it has conducted, efforts are being made to have these studies made by independent scholars. The results will be available to the world. These men have arranged for private foundations to finance the research by various organizations when the results may contribute to the UN's ability to develop resources for peace-keeping. The Oslo Conference was one such undertaking. No Government at that time had felt that it could call such a conference because of the international political overtones. The UN could not act. Therefore, the Norwegian

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Institute obtained financial aid from the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace and undertook to sponsor the meeting as a private endeavor. There were no political repercussions and no muttered growls such as greeted the calling of the later Canadian conference in Ottawa by the Government of Canada.

Similarly, this group has proposed to the World Veterans' Federation that a peace-keeping library be established by that organization at its Paris headquarters. This library will serve as a central repository for the tons of papers which document the experience of many nations which have engaged in peace-keeping activities under UN auspices. They have proposed the indexing of all personnel with past experience in peace-keeping operations in order to provide a ready reference in the case of future need. The use of data computers is contemplated. These activities are straightforward and without political aims. The UN is prevented from engaging in them because certain Member States insist that they are political. Financing is a matter of great difficulty if not an impossibility.

In Sweden and Finland the basic decision to earmark was generated by the activities of the bi-annual council of Defense Ministers. Finland participated in these conferences as an observer only. The Finnish Government does not consider it politically expedient to permit development of too obvious a tie with countries whose general orientation is Western. Sweden, on the other hand, while very positively and definitely disassociating herself from any activities which might be interpreted

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

as an alliance with the NATO nations, Norway and Denmark, feels somewhat more free.

The determinative factors in Sweden were an understanding of the necessity for more orderly military planning, a belief that the UN should have some indication of the forces Sweden was prepared to provide, and a desire to eliminate or at least alleviate the difficulties in urgent, ad hoc, last minute assembly of military forces for UN operations. These reasons must be coupled with a felt sense of pride in Sweden's past participation in UN military activities and the knowledge that Sweden is looked upon as an experienced leader. No nation, except Canada, or if Korea is included, the United States, has provided larger forces more often to UN military and para-military activities than Sweden. Nearly twenty thousand Swedish officers and men have had experience in the Congo, Gaza and Cyprus and other less well known UN activities.

Finland found some inspiration for earmarking in the difficulties she had experienced in mounting forces for past and present UN activities. She has participated in Gaza, in Lebanon, Kashmir and now has a battalion in Cyprus. The improvisation necessary to meet these commitments has not been desirable. Considerable concern over the drain on officer talent has been experienced. Finland does not maintain a large standing military establishment. While she has universal military training, her continuing military establishment consists in the main of

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cadres of professional officers, non-commissioned officers and men required to furnish a training organization for the youth who are called up. Additionally, of course, she maintains small forces in order to man key military installations for her own defense. The 1946 Treaty of Peace limits the size of her Army to 48,600 under arms at any one time. To extract a peace-keeping force from this group requires grave consideration be given to the matter of security of the homeland. The earmarked battalion, therefore, will be recruited as a separate organization, and placed under the Minister of Defense, not the Army Command. In this way it will not count against the treaty restriction. The concept of a purely Nordic force has appeal in Finland, provided it is kept out of East-West politics.





POLITICAL ASPECTS

The decision to earmark military forces has caused no significant political repercussions in these six countries. This support of the basic UN commitment seems widely regarded as logical and reasonable. In Canada, no major political figure and no political party is on record as opposing either the basic decision or the concept. Questions raised in Parliament and political circles usually deal with specific activities rather than the pros and cons of earmarking. Canadians have had a long pre-conditioning by their leaders. The impression gained in discussions is that it is widely regarded as one of the measures all right thinking countries should take. Before publication of the current White Paper on Defense no one remembers a detailed study which would lead to earmarking as a conscious political step. Considerable impetus was provided by the profound desire on the part of Mr. Pearson, first as Minister for External Affairs and later as Prime Minister, that Canada play a leading role in efforts to preserve international peace and security through the instrumentality of the United Nations. Public statements have become official policy statements, and, in turn, these have found their way into governmental thinking and planning. As an example, the Training Directive for the Canadian Armed Forces for 1964-65 makes specific reference to

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preparation for UN duties. There is considerable idealism in evidence in political circles with respect to the possibilities for use of such a force in peace-keeping.

The political background of the decision in the Netherlands were much the same as those in Canada. No major political party or political figure opposes the action. News media do not take sides and appear apathetic, except of course when Netherlands forces are committed, and then interest centers about daily events and occurrences. There has been some limited indication among minority parties that they would like to see the Netherlands' activities expanded. The political climate is such that an informed source believes it quite possible that measures in this direction could be taken in the future.

Unquestionably the political decision in the Netherlands had the support of the military leaders. The Netherlands had disentangled herself from the Far East. Contingents of Royal Marines were returning to the homeland. A mission for these men would counter the usual incentive to reduce the overall military forces. The Royal Marines were not part of the Netherlands' commitment to NATO. Without such a mission maintenance of this contingent arguably would have constituted an unjustifiable financial drain. It is possible to surmise from the enthusiasm with which the Marines appear to have undertaken the role of an earmarked contingent that considerable pressure rose

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from the Marines themselves. The contingent, of course, provides a small but not inconsiderable increment to the national security forces.

In Denmark, the political situation so paralleled that in Canada that it is unnecessary to dwell upon it here. While this is also true in Norway, there are some additional aspects worthy of comment. Norwegians generally hold the UN in high esteem. UN activities have considerable popularity among the people and strong elements in both military and political organizations consider support of that body imperative. One evidence of this is found in the broadening of the plan for Norway's participation in the Nordic Force. The initial concept did not include provision of a Norwegian infantry battalion. The Defense Minister considered it to be the sense of public opinion that this additional contribution would have general support. Therefore, it was decided that in addition to her other contributions, Norway would furnish an earmarked battalion of infantrymen.

The decision in Sweden had no significant political reaction. There is an element present here which is not found in Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. Sweden is not a NATO country and she conceives her best position to be one of neutrality with respect to the East-West Cold War. This neutrality colors everything she does in the international arena. It is patently evident that Sweden has no intention of permitting her participation in the Nordic Plan to infringe her own concepts

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of this neutrality. In particular, she has no intention of becoming too closely involved with Denmark or Norway in this activity for so long as those two nations are allied with Western powers through the North Atlantic Treaty. Swedish politicians apparently believe that any marked integration of Sweden's earmarked forces with those of the western oriented Scandanavian countries would be interpreted as a departure from her historic neutrality. This concern has not prevented informal discussion of problems between working level officials, but it will prevent any very real steps towards creation of an integrated Nordic Force.

Finland regards herself as balanced on a knife edge between East and West. Every political act is closely examined to insure that this balance is maintained. With Russia on her eastern border, and a fierce desire to maintain her national integrity, Finland believes that any measures she takes in support of the UN must be absolutely above international politics. There is every evidence that she wants to be active in UN affairs provided this does not compromise her position of neutrality. The only basis upon which Finland would agree to participate in the Canadian or Norwegian conferences of peace-keeping powers was that the conferences be strictly apolitical and technical. Examination of the conference notes indicates that Finland's entry into discussion was very limited. This attitude will inhibit any participation by Finland in a closely coordinated

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Nordic Force, as is evidenced by her decision to participate only as an observer in the conferences of the Ministers of Defense from the other Nordic countries. Even in Finland, however, where the Communist Party is the second largest in the national parliament, the only effort made to adversely influence the Government's decision to earmark a battalion was an attempt to put the motion over to the next session. When the matter was pressed, the Government sponsored resolution passed easily.


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
POPULAR SUPPORT

Popular support for the decision to earmark in these six countries is difficult to evaluate. To the writer's best knowledge, no polls of public opinion are available. News media seem generally to support the decision with, perhaps understandably, more active comment in the Canadian press. Little attention is given to the subject by the press in other countries. Of course specific events of news interest receive considerable play when a force is actually committed to a UN operation. The Swedish press took an active interest in the Government's plans and policies in support of the contingents in the Congo and in Cyprus when the danger involved in these operations became evident. The Government was questioned as to contingency planning for evacuation and protection of Swedish military personnel in the event of open fighting. The first UN soldier killed in Cyprus was a Finnish lad. The press and other news media raised a general outcry as to whether or not the Government was doing enough to support these men when they were overseas. However, concern was with details of deployment and employment rather than with the decision to participate in the UN action.

All governmental sources quite naturally give the indication of being attuned to public reaction as it is read through the news media. Popular concern over the welfare of a national



contingent can have substantial political reaction. A fascinating tale deals with the accidental discovery during the Congo operation of a plan by rebel mercenary forces to kill a number of Swedish personnel. The avowed purpose was to create popular sentiment in the homeland for the withdrawal of these forces. The plot was aborted, however, it is interesting to speculate on what the reaction might have been.



OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

With the exception of Canada, where the sentiment is so strong in support of the UN that the Government might well continue to take up a considerable additional part of the costs of sending military units overseas, it is quite clear that the UN is looked to for financing of such ventures. If the UN is unable to raise the necessary money, it is doubtful that in the long run any of the five other countries under consideration will find it feasible to support these operations. In Norway, for example, it was flatly stated, that the inability of the UN to finance overseas operations of a military nature might be the one consideration which could reverse the earmarking decision. Scandanavian military forces are the most expensive used by the UN, because of the high allowances and other costs which are chargeable to that organization when these personnel are used. There is some concern within the countries themselves that these charges may well be so high that the UN will increasingly turn to other countries for its military forces. This too could adversely affect the decision to earmark.

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GOVERNMENTAL POLICY - RESERVATIONS ON USE OF EARMARKED FORCES

None of these countries has committed itself to provide a contingent to the UN without specific reservations. The most important reservation is the right to decide for itself, on a case by case basis, whether or not the country will respond affirmatively to a UN request when it is made. Without exception this political decision will be made at the time of the request and with due consideration by the individual Government as to the implication of its action. An assessment of the impact of participation in a UN operation upon its own security interests and those of its allies will certainly be part of any such decision. Canada, for instance, might find it awkward to participate under certain circumstances in a peace-keeping operation with Bloc countries. Finland has special international political problems stemming from her determination to maintain a delicate balance as uncommitted and neutral in any East-West dispute. The NATO alliance has special implications which affect the acceptability, from a "host" nation standpoint, not only of Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway in a UN operation, but of participation of these countries with other countries not part of NATO.

Perhaps characteristically the clearest, most concise and positive enunciation of governmental policy for the making of

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earmarked forces available, comes from the Danish Minister of Defense. When he placed the Government's request for a supporting resolution before the Folketing on 13 March 1964, he furnished amplifying statements which outlined the considerations which Denmark would examine before committing the force. He emphasized that, "a condition (was) that a request can only be met after an independent appraisal of the general situation inter alia that (it) is found warrantable to make the Force available in the given circumstances, having regard to the defense preparedness of Denmark."

In his July 1964 article in Foreign Affairs,<sup>4</sup> Mr. Hakkerup, the Danish Defense Minister went further and outlined certain additional conditions and considerations circumscribing any government decision to make Danish forces available. The importance of this statement lies in an appreciation that he was speaking with experience as a member of the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Nordic Countries which had determined to take the step in the first place. His pronouncements received general acceptance as having been at least tacitly agreed upon by this group.

Mr. Hakkerup spoke in the future tense. He stated that "when we notify the United Nations officially of the establishment of the Scandanavian Force we shall set out in detail the conditions for use of it."

1. "The Force shall assist only in peace-keeping

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operations." This rules out use of the Nordic Force in operations which might be conducted under Chapter VII of the Charter. It clearly distinguishes the act of earmarking and the act of tendering that earmarked force from the kind of agreement with the UN which was to be made under Article 43. Earmarking is the independent act of a sovereign nation.

As a corollary to this first principle, Mr. Hakkerup stated: "The assumption that the Scandanavian Standby Forces can assist only in the implementation of peace-keeping measures also implies that these forces can never take part in offensive fighting. It is evident that they must have the right to act in self defense."

2. "The country in which the forces are to be used shall have accepted the United Nations operation and our participation in it." This is made a condition in express recognition of the fact that under Chapter VI the UN has no authority to impose upon a member state the presence of an international executive organ in its territory against that state's will.

3. "UN requests can only be complied with after an independent appraisal of the general situation." Explicit note was made of Norway's "obligations towards our allies."

4. "The force will be placed under the exclusive control of the United Nations, except that it will remain under national jurisdiction in matters of penal law."

While not expressly stated in Per Hakkerup's article, two additional conditions were developed in discussions of the

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political restrictions on use of the force. Mr. Hakkerup announced them in an address to the Interparliamentary Union Conference on August 21, 1964. He was clarifying for the delegates and the press the concept of the Nordic Force. A "legal" decision of the UN is required in order to initiate the process of response to a request for use of a country's earmarked force. By this is meant that there must be a request from the General Assembly, the Security Council or from the Secretary-General pursuant to authority granted him to establish a UN force for mandated purposes.

Second, he described a consideration which hopefully represents an infiltration of military thinking into political circles, to wit: the total size of the UN force which will be committed to any given peace-keeping operation must be sufficient to present the probability that it can successfully execute its assigned mission.

One Norwegian source added a further limitation which is always implied, and that is the right of a country to withdraw its force in the event of a change of circumstances which makes participation contrary to the interests of that country. This is a dangerous limitation from the UN's standpoint, however, it is unavoidable. There is little question but that the changed complexion of the Congo operation in its later days, when it took on more of the aspects of an armed intervention than a peace-keeping operation, still disturbs the military and political

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leaders in all of these countries.

The foregoing reservations circumscribe the decision as to whether or not a national earmarked contingent will actually be committed in response to a UN request are consistent with the concept that such future activities as the UN may undertake in this sphere must be of a peace-keeping nature. They are conceptually consistent with earmarking as the independent act of a sovereign state. These restrictions make the earmarking decision more politically acceptable not only nationally but internationally. They may, to some extent, account for the lack of open opposition by the Soviets. Russia has taken the position that military forces for the UN must be placed under the exclusive control of the Security Council. Argument over this point is avoided by the unilateral nature of the act and the restrictions which hedge the use of these forces.

Restrictions upon the use of Canadian and Dutch earmarked forces are not so clear. While not publically stated they probably involve much the same considerations as those in the Nordic countries. Only Canada might feel sufficiently secure to commit her force to a UN operation which had more military than peace-keeping overtones. The possibility that there will ever be a sufficient uniformity of opinion in the forums of the UN to support a clearly military venture is remote. This, in itself, has probably cleared the path for the decision to earmark.

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EARMARKED FORCES - SIZE, NATURE, COMPOSITION

The purpose of this section is to outline broadly the size, nature and composition of the military forces which have been earmarked by Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. This is a deceptive statement. It must be borne in mind that, except in Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden, these forces are few in number and, indeed, in Finland, exist only in planning. This statement will be amplified below and in the section on recruiting and training. In the cases of Norway, Denmark, with several exceptions, and Finland, then, what will be discussed is largely the planned forces. Earmarking consists of the political decision and a military directive to raise the forces planned.

The Canadian force is a force in being, organized and in training. It has been formed by designating specific units of the Canadian Army for a given period of time. This is also the situation in the Netherlands. In Sweden, the table of organization of two battalions, the major part of her contribution to the Nordic Plan, is considered to be filled.

The expedient adopted is designation of the current Gaza and Cyprus Battalions as "earmarked." In a sense this is a bookkeeping manipulation for the initial intent was to raise these battalions as new units. It serves the purpose. The

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contract under which Swedish soldiers are now recruited for service in these UN operations is not the contract which will ultimately be used to form the battalions for the Nordic Force plan.

Canadian authorities recognize that the size and organization of their military establishment provides considerable flexibility when it comes to tailoring a force for UN action. Because of this, while there is now a specifically designated military unit which is earmarked, it is conceded that if a given operation required variation of units in order to accomplish its mission, this could and probably would be done. Expansion of her capabilities for peace-keeping is unquestionably one of the purposes behind Canada's creation of the new Special Service Force. Canada's ability to design a peace-keeping force for a specific action is increased by the roles which are assigned to the Navy and Air Force in UN activities involving Canadian troops.

Canadian earmarked forces, then, consist principally of a specially designated infantry battalion, an administrative increment to this battalion, a reconnaissance party, an advance base party and movement control staffs. Strictly speaking, the administrative increment, advanced base party and movement staffs are earmarked in the sense that a particular unit has been assigned. Depending upon the circumstances at the time Canada decides to respond to a UN request, these groups will be activated and formed as necessary to permit the deployment of the earmarked

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battalion. They are probably so essential a requirement as to be considered an intrinsic part of the earmarking process, and they have been included here because of that fact.

The Canadian Standby Battalion is a standard infantry battalion with specialized training. It is normally commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, has a battalion headquarters, a headquarters company, a support company composed of a heavy mortar platoon, machine gun platoon, anti-tank platoon and assault pioneer platoon. The battalion core is four rifle companies, each with three rifle platoons. The total strength averages about 865 officers and men.

Weapons are those typical of a highly mobile, lightly armed force, consisting of submachine guns, personal weapons, rifles, automatic rifles, medium and heavy mortars and anti-tank weapons. Transportation for materiel on the ground is provided by ¼ ton trucks (JEEPS), however, no ground transportation is provided for personnel with the limited exceptions of command and control, communications and medical personnel. Larger trucks and trailers handle heavier supplies, water tanks and logistics which are non man-transportable.

The contingent is expected to be ready to deploy a first increment on 48 hours notice, with follow-on contingents at a rate that will enable the entire battalion to be moved out in five days. It is to be self-supporting in the field for seven days, including POL for 150 miles per vehicle. Within seven

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days a logistics train must be established to support the troops in the field. Air-transportable supplies and stocks of required materiel have been assembled in strategic locales, however, to a considerable degree it is planned that resupply required from Canadian, as distinguished from UN military sources, will be drawn from regular supply activities.

Communications equipment is provided to establish the essential military command and control networks within the battalion. There is a capability for telephone communications with up to 20 miles of lines.

The Administrative increment is to provide for additional communications and administrative services which under normal circumstances would be provided by a brigade or division service unit. It will establish the communications link with the next higher UN headquarters. In this increment, which will be assembled as necessary from other sources in the Canadian Army, will be signals, supply, medical, dental, stores, technical and vehicle repair, postal, pay and finance, chaplain, military police, records, legal and public relations services.

The Reconnaissance and Advance Base Parties are, normally, organizationally combined to provide administrative and operational staff officers and enlisted personnel, together with limited signal, medical, finance, postal and other services. The role of the Reconnaissance Party is to proceed in advance of the main contingent assigned to a UN area of operations, and there

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to contact local and UN authorities in order to make necessary arrangements for the arrival of the battalion. Once the battalion has arrived, this Party may return to Canada or it may be absorbed in the UN headquarters in the field, or it may provide a National Military Representative to that Headquarters. The Senior Canadian Officer present normally will be with this group.

The Advance Base Party performs the mission which may be inferred from its name. It will establish an arrival base and facilitate the control and processing of the main military contingent.

Plans call for small Royal Canadian Air Force Movement Staffs to be located at each airfield which will be involved in the movement of the Standby UN Battalion. They will control and coordinate refueling, air safety, in-transit feeding and so forth of personnel being air-transported to the scene.

While the Canadian Standby Battalion is basically organized for a peace-keeping role, plans envisage modifications as necessary in order to play this role under varying field conditions. If it became evident that a higher range of weapons support was required than is now part of the earmarked battalion's organization, it undoubtedly would be provided.

Canada has not, insofar as is known, specifically earmarked naval or air units for UN duty; however, Force Headquarters and these service branches apparently anticipate that both the Navy and the Air Force will be involved to a degree in any UN activity

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which is of sufficient moment for Canada to commit her earmarked battalion. The role is one of support; to provide air transport, logistics supply lines, sea lift of heavier equipment and weapons, and possibly later, with the addition of certain resupply ships, a limited troop carrying capability. Both the Navy and Air Force have participated in training exercises with the Stand-by Battalion in order to insure their readiness for these activities.

In the Netherlands the earmarked contingent consists of a highly trained unit of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. The average strength of this contingent is maintained at approximately 335 officers and men. This is a force in being, trained and ready, stationed at the Marine Corps Barracks at Doorn. A similar contingent exists in the Netherlands Antilles and, while officially the earmarked contingent is the one in the homeland, should the location of the UN operation make it more feasible, the Antilles unit might be the one dispatched to the scene.

The organization includes a contingent staff with its headquarters personnel, administrative, signal, liaison, motor transport, military police groups and a Chaplain. The main strength consists of approximately one infantry company, three platoons with essential headquarters, supply, signal and medical sections together with supporting units consisting of a reconnaissance platoon, machine gun platoon, mortar and recoilless rifle sections.

The Netherlands Marine contingent is capable of independent

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operation as a unit or in several patrols; covering, surveillance and reconnaissance groups. It is kept ready for deployment on 24 hours notice, with the capability of being self-sustaining for approximately 20-30 days. The UN is looked to for resupply and logistics support after the initial period. The usual communications capability is provided to establish command nets. Armament consists of side arms, rifles, heavy and light machine guns and mortars with 75MM recoilless rifles mounted on ¼ ton trucks (JEEPS).

An unusual opportunity was furnished to evaluate the readiness of this contingent by an invitation to review the group at the Doorn Barracks and to witness a demonstration of crowd and riot control. The enthusiasm of the officers and men is evident. Morale was high. The Marines are well trained, efficient, tough and thorough. The officers and men are young but experienced. The range of training extends from air assault through amphibious operations to pioneer and normal infantry activities.

In the four Nordic countries the situation differs substantially from that in Canada and the Netherlands. A point to be made here is that, with the exception of Sweden's two battalions, and a few technical or supporting units in Norway and Denmark, the earmarked forces exist in planning only. Ultimately the ranks will be filled, it is hoped, by volunteers who have completed their required military service and returned to civilian life. These men will be offered contracts by the governments

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of each of the four Nordic countries. These contracts provide for individuals to hold themselves in readiness for urgent call-up for duty in a UN operation in which the Government has decided to participate. There are two basic reasons for adopting this method of providing earmarked forces. First, none of these countries maintains large standing military establishments. The professional army cadres consist of small numbers of officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel adequate to staff training and those military commands maintained for basic self defense. These countries depend upon universal military training and rapid mobilization to provide for general defense efforts in wartime. Second, there are, in all of these countries, legal restrictions on sending personnel of standing military establishments overseas for duty. In Finland, a treaty prohibits military operations from being conducted by her military forces outside the country's borders. These restrictions are circumvented by using volunteer forces.

Sweden provides a still further exception. The Swedish Government decided to raise two earmarked battalions as outlined in the Nordic Force Plan. Having done this the government then simply designated the Gaza and Cyprus Battalions as being "earmarked." There is little to quarrel with in this except for certain technicalities. In fact, these two battalions are raised under contracts which are very similar to the one which will be

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used to raise earmarked battalions when there is no particular UN operation in which Sweden is participating. The Gaza and Cyprus Battalions are composed of volunteers who sign contracts specifically for service in those countries and areas involved. They are brought on active duty given specialized orientation and training and rotated to these areas for a six months tour. Personnel who are not accepted for extended tours in these areas are rotated home when relieved and either discharged to civilian life or returned to other duties in the military forces if they are career personnel.

The Nordic Force consists of those units earmarked by the four Scandanavian countries. It is based on a loose agreement adopted by the Ministers of Defense of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and with which Finland has associated herself. In fact, the plan is little more than a document in which four independent countries have listed the military units they will earmark for possible duty with the UN. There is almost no likelihood that the plan will ever serve as a basis for a coordinated or integrated force, popular statements to that effect notwithstanding. The Nordic Force is nurtured by many informal contacts between working level military and government civilians across national borders. Some very limited joint training of officer personnel has been conducted. There is, significantly, no provision in the plan for an overall commander of the Force or any kind of joint staff. Surely both of these are essential even if only

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to conduct necessary planning for a truly joint force. The description which follows then is of the earmarked force which each of these countries intends to raise. In combination this is the Nordic Force.

Denmark has advised the Secretary-General of her intent to form a permanent Danish Military Standby Force which is to consist of one signal company, a staff and technical unit, a military police unit, a medical company and an infantry battalion of three rifle companies. The total strength of this organization will be approximately 929 officers and men. Weapons will be those normally associated with a lightly armed, highly mobile unit: rifles, machine guns and 81MM mortars. The Force will be organized for peace-keeping duties, reconnaissance, surveillance and will be provided with armored cars, light transport and limited supplies.

When not involved in an active UN operation, this Force will be in being only for brief training periods during the one year contract obligation. When sufficient volunteers have signed up, units will be called for a four weeks training period. One-sixth of the Standby Force will be called every second month, six times yearly. A reduced size battalion staff will be permanently established to handle organization, administration and training. Once trained, if a need arises during the contract period, the battalion is subject to being mobilized on short notice for duty. Volunteers contract to remain ready for call-up

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on three days notice. If called for overseas duty, the individual may be sent outside the country for a maximum of six months, with the privilege of extending, subject to approval by the contingent commander in the field. This call-up may come at any time in the year period during which the contract runs. Conceivably an individual could be obligated for up to eighteen months total contract time if called in the last month. As of May, 1965, approximately 75 young Danes had signed these contracts. The contracts are not popular.

Norway has earmarked for possible UN duty, and her contribution to the Nordic Force Plan, a UN Security Force which will consist of a staff and observer group of approximately 50 officers, largely volunteers from the professional Army. There will be a Harbor Command Unit consisting of technically trained personnel; a Norwegian frigate earmarked from the active fleet, manned by 160 officers and men; and the largest unit, an infantry battalion of approximately 921 officers and men. The majority of this last unit will be, as in the case of Denmark, young Norwegians who have completed their required military service and, as civilians, contracted with the Government to hold themselves in readiness for call and UN duty. The Norwegian contract has proven no more popular than the Danish one. In May 1965, about 55 men had signed up. Officers and non-commissioned officers are more easily obtained. Career military men are permitted to volunteer.

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Norway plans an Air Force unit consisting of a staff element of 8 officers and 13 enlisted regulars, a helicopter unit of 6 to 10 helicopters with 68 officers and men, and an air transport unit consisting of 4 transport planes with operating personnel. The air force contribution will be part of the regular Norwegian military establishment. For financial reasons the air units will not be activated prior to the 1967-68 period.

The Norwegian units have, to a limited degree, been planned to have a capability for acting jointly or in concert with similar contingents from the other Nordic countries. For example, there will be a maintenance company, a military police platoon, a movement control platoon and a surgical catastrophe unit so planned that they may supplement similar groups from Denmark, Finland and Sweden. In selection of personnel an attempt is being made to provide the necessary linguistic ability for cooperative effort.

Several of Norway's units are in being at the present time. The frigate has been designated, the surgical catastrophe unit has been organized and is in training.

The Swedish contribution to the Nordic Plan will be two infantry battalions and a technical staff. In the enabling legislation passed by the Riksdag in 1964, this is called a Swedish emergency force for UN service. Each battalion will have its headquarters staff and headquarters company, three rifle companies and a supply company, totaling 663 officers

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and men per battalion. A Military Police Platoon of about 43 officers and men will be attached to one of these battalions. The technical contingent will consist of 224 personnel, organized into a staff, an observer unit, a headquarters contingent, technical team, an air transport division and a movement control team. The overall total number originally planned for the Swedish Force is just under 1600 officers and men. Authority has been granted to proceed with the raising of this force; however, the Government has determined to limit the first effort to about 1043 officers and men, or approximately one battalion plus the technical contingent. This decision took into consideration the fact that at the present time Sweden has nearly 1600 personnel committed to overseas operations in support of the UN in various parts of the world: 1000 in Cyprus, 443 in Gaza, 97 at the UN Hospital at Rifah in Gaza, 16 in Palestine, 9 in Korea, 4 each in Kashmir and Yeman. In addition, there have begun to appear shortfalls in recruiting volunteers for training to relieve these overseas units. If these statements appear to reflect adversely on Sweden's capabilities, it is well to remember that she has an outstanding record of past contributions to UN activities and now numbers nearly 20,000 officers and men with overseas experience in UN operations. This represents not only a sizeable effort but provides a considerable reservoir of experience, particularly among the professional officer corps.

Weapons for these two battalions include side arms, rifles,

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machine guns, anti-aircraft machine guns, and recoilless rifles. There is provision for a sniper squad, motorcycle units and limited motor transport, however, uniquely, ground transport for soldiers is to be by bicycle, towed behind motor vehicles.

The Swedish Technical Contingent is interesting. It has been designed to permit it to cooperate with local civilian organizations as well as to provide support for military and para-military operations. In this contingent there will be construction engineers, sanitary squads, pipe-laying squads, electrical repairmen, refrigeration and telephone squads, road and bridge construction engineers.

The Air Transport Division of the Technical Contingent will include helicopters, air liaison teams and some maintenance personnel as well as an air transport squadron of about 30 pilots, navigators and mechanics. Finally, there will be a standard Movement Control Team.

An additional mission of the Technical Contingent is to provide for catastrophe relief. It may be used for this purpose in Sweden should the need arise, or sent elsewhere on assignments related to this kind of work whether or not under UN sponsorship.

Finland's share in the Nordic plan is an infantry battalion. At the present time she has limited activities to preparing plans. Officials frankly state that for so long as Finland provides a battalion on Cyprus they see no possibility attempting

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to create the earmarked force. Finland is very proud of her inclusion in the Cyprus operation but it has placed a strain upon the capabilities of her small training establishment to provide this force. The drain on officer and career enlisted personnel, although volunteers, has been considerable. Soldiers for the Cyprus Battalion are raised by contract from among young civilians who have completed their first tour of conscript duty. There has been no dearth of volunteers. However, Finnish military officials appreciate the difficulties which have been experienced in Denmark and Norway in creating earmarked contingents under this kind of contract when the stimulation of an actual operation does not exist. The Finnish Standby UN Battalion will be patterned after the unit now in Cyprus. It will be a standard infantry battalion, augmented by some increase in staff personnel and service units, much along the lines of those infantry units which have been described.

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RECRUITING AND TRAINING

As Lieutenant Colonel Bjorn Egge of Norway puts it, "What the United Nations wants is a nice, gentle, understanding soldier who is part diplomat, part politician and a fighter." The problem in recruiting and training personnel for UN earmarked forces is how to inculcate these qualities in a 19 or 20 year old youngster. In many cases the individual's sole previous experience with the military has been during his conscript term or, in the case of Canada and the Netherlands, a period with regular military forces. Without exception, the earmarking countries start with a man who has completed his basic military training. In every country there is agreement that additional training is needed, both officer and enlisted personnel who are to be part of a force which may operate under the UN.

The recruiting of personnel has been touched on from time to time in connection with other discussion in this paper. As has been pointed out, it differs markedly as between Canada and the Netherlands on the one hand, and the Nordic countries on the other. Canada does not recruit officers and enlisted personnel specifically for the UN Standby Battalion. The Canadian battalion, together with its supporting units, is designated from regular military forces. In the past it has been the practice to designate one battalion from the Third Brigade, a force

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usually in the homeland which has no NATO commitment. With Canada's current reorganization of her military forces, and the creation of a Special Service Force the UN Standby Battalion will be a part of that force.

The Canadian Army Annual Training Directive for 1964-65 states:

"The aims of training in Canada for the period 1 September 1964 - 31 August 1965 are:

- a. To insure that all field units and formations attain and maintain the standards required to engage in the following both winter and summer:
  - 1) Field operations under both non-nuclear conditions and under nuclear threat;
  - 2) UN peace-keeping and security operations.
- b. To train designated individuals and units to carry out some or all of the following specific tasks:
  - 1) Defense of Canada operations;
  - 2) Limited warfare including peace-keeping operations and security type operations;
  - 3) etc., etc."

Application of this directive is not restricted to the Standby Battalion. While full implication of this basic training directive is not known, however, considerable special training is provided not only to the Standby Battalion but to other segments of Canada's Armed Forces. Annually a one week orientation

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course is conducted for officers selected for UN or similar duties. All higher military schools are required to include in their curricula courses relating to training in UN peace-keeping and security operations. The Canadian army doctrine governing the instruction given at all schools is based upon the British publication, "Keeping the Peace."

Additional special training is provided for the UN Standby Battalion supplementing this generalized instruction. There are courses in physical fitness and endurance, leadership for junior officers and non-commissioned officers, weapons training, immediate action drills which include activities to prevent ambush, prepare assaults, etc. A good deal of emphasis is placed on riot control and crowd dispersal, escort of convoy and organization of road blocks. Infantry training includes methods of suppressing unlawful assembly and riots, use of tear gas and CS riot control agents, disarming of personnel, police duties, use of cordons and searches, special patrols, and the role of an infantry battalion in assisting civil authorities. Anti-terrorist and anti-guerrilla operations are included in Canada's broad training program for her earmarked battalion.

Annually Canada conducts a major training exercise simulating the operational deployment of this battalion. This involves the air-lifting to an area of operations, resupply and ground exercises in peace-keeping. The last of these exercises, conducted during the period 2-16 June 1964, was called Exercise

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QUE VIVE. A similar exercise is planned for the summer of 1965.

Of all the countries earmarking military forces, Canada has the most thorough and cohesive training program. She draws heavily upon actual field experience for the lessons to be learned. Training in air transportability is stressed and not only are personnel well exercised in this mode of transportation, but the details of materiel and supply loading are carefully taught and thoroughly drilled. Selected officers and non-commissioned officers are sent to various courses to teach them the planning necessary to conduct peace-keeping operations. Rotary and fixed wing aircraft loading procedures are taught and personnel within the battalion are trained to prepare vehicles and supplies for air transport.

Junior officers receive special instruction in cooperating with civilian authorities in suppression of unlawful assembly, riots and disturbances, and enlisted personnel are trained in the use of crowd control devices such as batons, wicker shields, tear gas, and so forth. The earmarked battalion is kept physically ready for tropical duty with shots and immunizations up to date.

In the Netherlands, as in Canada, the earmarked contingent is drawn from an active duty organization, the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. The officers are career professionals and the men have enlisted for specified periods of service. Recruiting follows the same channels that are used to raise the Netherlands'

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career Military forces. The earmarked Marine is a trained man. He is familiar with assault tactics, amphibious operations and infantry operations. The contingent at Doorn includes men trained as paratroopers and underwater demolition experts. They are provided with specialized training which fits them for UN peace-keeping activities. The curriculum is very similar in content to that in Canada, and draws upon the same British publications for material. English language training is provided for key officer and non-commissioned officer personnel and radio communications personnel in particular. Riot and crowd control procedures are highly developed. There are courses of instruction in UN organization, political economy and the geography of various areas of the world. Periodically, limited air transportability exercises are carried out using KLM civilian aircraft, although for the usual deployment the contingent would expect to be air-lifted by UN provided aircraft. Ultimately the Netherlands plans to include peace-keeping training in the curricula of her staff colleges in order to broaden the base of knowledge of the officer corps in general.

In Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, personnel for earmarked forces will come from two sources. Most of the officers and non-commissioned officers, experience indicates, will be volunteers drawn from the regular or standing military establishments. Current plans call for recruiting the majority of the soldiers from civilian life under specific contract. A third,

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much smaller group, will be composed of technically and professionally qualified individuals who, as civilians, will undertake specialist work of various kinds.

Recruiting in the Nordic countries is carried on through all the various news media, press, radio and television. Young men who are just completing or have completed their required military service are urged to sign voluntary contracts for duty with earmarked forces. Contracts differ only in small degree between these countries, and it is possible to describe them in generally applicable terms. The contract usually provides that the individual will hold himself in readiness for an urgent, short notice call to active duty as part of a UN force if and when the particular government has decided to commit such a force. The period of the contract is for one year in all the Nordic countries except Norway, where one, two or three year contract may be signed. In addition, the individual agrees to undertake a brief period of special training in an active duty status, usually consisting of three to four weeks at a designated location, during the contract period. Finally, he agrees to serve for a maximum period of six months in UN operations if called for such duty. The overseas period may commence at any time during the year's run of the contract, thus it may operate to extend the period of total obligation to just short of eighteen months if an individual is called towards the end of the contract year. A usual provision is that the contract

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expires in twelve months or upon completion of a six months deployment in UN service, whichever comes first.

The individual signing one of these contracts, except during the training period and during any period of UN service, remains a civilian free to go about his daily life as he sees fit, but subject to call at any time.

Norway offers no special incentive to attract volunteers to sign these contracts. In Denmark and Sweden a bonus of about \$100.00 is paid, however, in Denmark it is paid only if the individual is called for a UN operation. In Sweden, it is paid when one is called for a UN operation or at the end of the contract period whether called or not.

All of the Nordic countries provide reimbursement for time on active duty for training. Vacation accrual is protected. While on a UN operation, personnel are provided with disability and life insurance coverage matching that provided for regular military forces of the country. Dependents are guaranteed limited financial protection in the event of death or disability of a man while in UN service. These are highly socialized countries and much of this protection is provided for every individual. This decreases the necessity for providing this kind of benefit for the dependants of a man in military service. Denmark and Sweden have taken steps to prevent a man from losing his job because of UN service or because he signs a contract for such service. As yet, Norway does not provide this protection.

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One may well question whether a young man, just starting his civilian life, with his required military service behind him for the most part, can be expected to sign a contract which is seemingly so one-sided. The answer is that they do not sign. This has been a disturbing development and one of considerable surprise to the planners in these countries. It was expected that these contracts would attract numerous volunteers. Instead, they have had very limited appeal. While the planners may have been overly optimistic, they had good reason to expect better results. They were misled by the popularity of UN service and the ease with which volunteer forces have been raised for operations, in Gaza and Cyprus and elsewhere. Contracts for this service are similar in almost every respect to the ones used to raise earmarked forces. The one basic and major difference seems to be that the contract for duty with present UN forces overseas is specific and definite. The young man signing such a contract knows that he is going overseas and he knows when and where he is going. He also knows that by signing such a contract and becoming part of a UN force he is eligible for fairly high troop allowances in addition to his base pay. These additional allowances are paid by the UN and, together with the base pay of the average Nordic soldier, they make him the most expensive military man used by the UN.

Contracts for UN operations in Gaza and Cyprus have been relatively popular. Until recent months they have been over

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subscribed as much as three and four to one for replacement of personnel. Recently Sweden, heavily committed, has begun to have shortfalls in recruiting personnel. However, even among the Swedes a rather high percentage of the men request extensions for an additional six months period. In the Danish Battalion in Gaza, nearly 20% of the men at the last rotation period in the Spring of 1965 requested extensions. But volunteers are selective and Cyprus duty has not been as popular as duty in Gaza where the UN has operated for over ten years. Adequate living facilities, recreation and well developed rotation programs are provided for the troop personnel, while in Cyprus duty is taxing, military personnel are under considerable strain, housing accommodations are not as good as those in Gaza and operations are often long and tiresome. These facts are well known and have had their effects on recruiting.

As a result of the difficulties experienced in obtaining contract volunteers for their earmarked forces, Norway, Denmark and Sweden are currently re-examining the situation. Finland has not yet attempted to raise any personnel for her earmarked battalion, and does not plan to until she has completed her part of the UN Cyprus operation. In the meantime responsible planners are watching to see what changes are going to be made in these contracts in other countries to make them more attractive. It may be expected that she will adopt the best features when her contracts are drawn up.

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It does not appear necessary to dwell at length upon the training provided or planned for earmarked forces in the Nordic countries. Basically training for UN duty begins with a trained soldier and provides him with orientation in UN matters and the specialized techniques which the UN peace-keeper must know. The military men with whom training programs were discussed seemed to feel that the most important aspect of training of earmarked forces was the creation of a viable force. This requires bringing the contract volunteers together long enough to have the basic organization worked out and understood. Since it would be manifestly impossible to predetermine the area in which an earmarked unit might be called upon to serve, training officers plan last minute orientation in this regard after the force has been called for duty in a specific UN operation.

There has been almost no attempt to coordinate training between these countries. Canada and the Netherlands have established completely independent programs although they are similar in content. The Nordic countries exchange informal information, but there are no plans for joint training efforts at the troop level. In the Spring of 1965, a joint observer officer training course was conducted in Sweden, attended by a handful of officers from each of the Nordic countries. In 1966, it is planned to expand this course and to extend the curriculum to include training in general staff duties for UN operations. Canadian and Netherlands military planners have indicated an interest in

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joint training with other countries, but there have been no overt moves in this direction.

Overall, however, variations in training patterns are not great. Training in each of these countries derives from the experience of officers with past UN activities. The Oslo and Ottawa Conferences provided an opportunity for extensive exchanges of information as to training requirements. The advantage of joint training is recognized, but it is not likely to occur in the near future.

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VIII

COMMAND AND STAFF PROBLEMS

Earmarking countries universally agree that each shall command its own personnel at the contingent level and below. Above that level, where UN command may encompass military contingents of more than one country, the need for jointly organized staffs is recognized. It is considered uniformly desirable, if not mandatory, that there be country representation on all staffs which will be in a position to make decisions affecting a particular country's contingent. There is some indication in Canadian papers that participation on higher UN staffs should be on a proportionate basis related to the size of a country's contribution to the UN force in a given operation.

From a military standpoint, those with whom the matter was discussed recognize that country representation on senior staffs tends to enlarge them and create duplications with some loss of efficiency. Given the composition of UN forces and the highly varied and diverse problems which arise in an international military operation, any other method of organizing a staff is considered impractical. Language and logistic difficulties in planning and conducting operations make national representation almost mandatory. Joint staffs have administrative difficulties which arise from variations in staff training and basic staff organizations between countries. NATO countries have staffs designed





along certain basic lines while Sweden and Finland have substantial differences in their staff organizations. Mixing the two staff organizations creates some problems, but they are not insurmountable.

Earmarking countries agree that one of the most serious deficiencies in the entire UN organization from a military standpoint is the lack of a continuing, permanent, adequate military planning staff in the Secretariat. No one makes such a comment in an attempt to disparage the work of the present small military council which advises the Secretary-General. The comments stem from the factual recognition of difficulties inherent in complex military planning. Providing continuing high level guidance in UN operations is demanding and requires many experts on a full time basis. Given the extraordinary complications of these operations, one permanent senior officer with, at most, a hastily organized group of three or four assistants, cannot hope to cope with the problems as efficiently as the situation demands. The ability of this small group to conduct contingency planning, to develop necessary and vital intelligence information, to act as military advisors to the several political bodies and to the Secretary-General is severely limited. When it is appreciated that practically every question which will involve a military action in the field must be passed back to UN Headquarters in New York if there appears to be the slightest evidence of a political implication, then one gains some idea of the enormity

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of the problem.

The matter of international military command of earmarked forces has, for all practical purposes, not been addressed in planning. It is interesting to note that in each of these countries military men are thoroughly cognizant of this unfortunate situation. In the Nordic countries, there are some signs of informal attempts to cooperate to a limited degree in devising a solution. Still the plan for a Nordic Force, although accepted by the Defense Ministers and the Governments of each of these four countries, makes no provision for a military commander or for a joint staff, even as a planning agency. It is clear that the Norwegians would welcome the formation of such a staff. In fact, they have gone so far as to designate a few of the officers who would be appointed to positions on such a staff if it were to be organized. It is equally clear that Sweden has no presently evident intention of becoming involved in a joint organization. It is regarded as politically unacceptable because of the NATO ties of Denmark and Norway.

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LEGAL ASPECTS

Part of the inspiration for earmarking of military forces grew from recognition of the need for providing peace-keeping forces expeditiously. Establishment of a UN presence may be vital in the prevention of serious fighting or maintenance of order. When it is necessary to invoke legislative processes in decision making, the wheels of government grind exceedingly slowly. Before Norway could dispatch her force to Gaza, the Storting had to be called into emergency session, budgetary matters considered, and the Government thereby, if not actually authorized to act, at least provided with the necessary tools. In each earmarking country legislation has been passed to smooth the way for the government to act in case of future provision of military forces to the UN.

Because Canada and the Netherlands use regular military units, legislative action has presented little difficulty. Formal procedures followed by the Government are devised to keep the parliamentary bodies informed. In Canada, a UN force may be dispatched by a simple Government decision to do so. An Order in Council is deposited with the Parliament, prescribing the maximum size of the force which will participate and general details of the proposed action. Government Ministers are then open for questioning. In the Netherlands, the Government's

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decision is announced to Parliament then explained and defended if need be.

In the Nordic countries, the Governments have seen fit to request what might best be called enabling legislation or more accurately, supporting resolutions. In no instance has a Government seemed to regard it as the prerogative of the legislative body to say whether or not a UN force shall be raised. Voting of necessary funds for earmarked forces to provide for their continuing support and training remains of course, a prerogative of the legislative body.

In some of these countries there are interesting provisions of the laws or Constitutions of which may be mentioned. In the Netherlands, Article 195 of the Constitution provides that armed forces shall be raised for the protection of the interests of the State. This might be interpreted as prohibiting sending forces outside of the Netherlands. The counter-argument is that for so long as the UN is an instrument for maintenance of world peace, and Netherlands a member of the UN, it is in the interests of the State that world peace be maintained. The Constitutional provision therefore is not regarded as inhibiting the Government's decision to send volunteers to assist the UN in its efforts.

In Denmark, the Constitution provides that it is the duty of every male citizen to defend the country according to the laws. This has been interpreted as preventing the involuntary dispatch of men on UN operations and has required the raising of



such forces on a purely voluntary basis. Arguably it is illegal to send conscript personnel overseas in UN service.

In Finland, as has been stated, there are provisions in the Treaty of Peace of 1946 which not only stringently limit the number of men she may have in her Army at any given time, but also provide the Army may not undertake military activities outside the homeland. This has required placing the UN contingents under the Minister of Defense. The Minister of Defense is not actively involved in the direction and planning for the Finnish Armed Forces but is largely an administrative organization. In this manner, volunteer personnel for UN operations do not have to be counted against the treaty restriction, and they can be used overseas.

The bills passed by the Parliaments of the Nordic countries are set out verbatim in the appendix of Per Frydenberg's collection of papers on the Oslo Conference.<sup>5</sup> They will be only briefly discussed here. These bills do not read like legislative acts in the United States. Rather, they seem more to be recitations of what the Government has determined to do, with outlines of various details, histories of the steps leading to the decision, and statements of the forces to be earmarked in rather general terms.

On April 30, 1964, the Danish Parliament (Folketing) approved the establishment of a permanent Danish UN force. The basic resolution read as follows:

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"Folketinget consents to the establishment of a permanent Danish military stand-by force and agrees that on the request of the UN - and following an evaluation of the general situation - said force may be made available to the organization by the government for the purpose of assisting in the implementation of peace-keeping measures approved by the United Nations."

On May 26, 1964, the Finnish Riksdag in accordance with a Government request, resolved that an earmarked force might be raised. The law on a Finnish Surveillance Force begins:

"In accordance with the decision of Parliament it is resolved that:

1. The government, in consultation with the Riksdag Committee on Foreign Affairs, has agreed to the establishment of a Finnish surveillance force, composed of persons volunteering for service, which may be placed at the disposal of the United Nations for the purposes of maintaining peace and security."

The Norwegian bill is long and outlines in great detail the entire development and history of earmarking forces, together with a statement of the studies which have been conducted, the results of the conferences between the Ministers of Defense of the three Scandanavian countries and an outline of the Nordic Plan. It concludes:

"We, OLAV, King of Norway announce:



The Storting is requested to make the following decision:

- I. Norway shall maintain forces on a stand-by basis for the United Nations in conformity with the recommendation of the Minister of Defense dated January 10, 1964.
- II. The King is authorized to make the force available upon a request from the United Nations should the general situation permit this.

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- III. The Ministry of Defense is granted the authority to effectuate any changes in the composition of the force which may become necessary as a result of the possible cooperation with the stand-by forces of the other Nordic countries.
- IV. The Ministry of Defense is granted the authority, in conjunction with the Minister of Wages and Prices, to fix the remuneration for the personnel who shall service in the UN stand-by force.
- V. The King is granted the authority, to the extent required to order officers and enlisted men to serve the UN outside the borders of the country.
- VI. The Ministry of Defense is granted the authority to enter into possible cooperation with the other Nordic countries to effectuate the training and orientation considered necessary to make the personnel as fit as possible to serve in the stand-by force."

This Order in Council was signed on January 10, 1964 in Oslo.



TROOP DISCIPLINE

Somewhat related to the legal measures outlined above is the matter of troop discipline of forces assigned to UN activities overseas. None of the earmarking countries is prepared at the present stage of the game to authorize the disciplining of their military personnel by UN commanders who are not nationals of the contingent's homeland. Earmarked forces will, for the present, remain under national jurisdiction for disciplinary purposes. Because the measure of discipline, and punishment in particular, is often a function of the rank of the commanding officer, and commanders of UN contingents are usually fairly junior, this has posed several problems. The problem is to provide a junior contingent commander with disciplinary authority commensurate with his responsibilities. In several instances this has been done by legal action endowing him with the necessary authority. In other cases, for particular offenses, it is the custom to return the man or officer involved to his homeland for discipline. This is generally the practice when the offense is sufficiently severe to come to the attention of a command higher than the contingent level. It poses no particularly grave problem, and will probably continue to be the practice with earmarked forces in the future. The possibility devising a uniform code of discipline for all UN forces is





unlikely because of the great variation which exists in military disciplinary practices among the many Member States.

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LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORT

Earmarking countries recognize that an effective military force initially must be basically self-supporting for a limited period during which supply trains can be established. Logistics support is complicated by the necessity for moving with utmost rapidity to an area of operations, which, in turn, makes air transport a necessity. Air transport of military contingent requires that their arms and equipment be light and largely man-transportable. Pre-packaging is essential. Air transport creates complex problems of planning and logistics which must be solved in order to sustain the force once it is in the field. Early establishment of logistic lines of supply is essential. To complicate the matter still further, a UN force is usually made up of contingents from many nations. The resupply of UN force having widely variations in kinds of equipment, requirements for spare parts, differences in diet and standards of living, speaking several languages, and operating in unfamiliar areas, usually far from their own supply sources, is a staggering operation.

Each of the earmarking countries plans to mount a force with a capability for self-support for a minimum of about seven days. In some instances, the initial period will be longer, but in no case does it exceed about twenty days. Earmarking countries normally expect and plan to establish their own resupply lines

for many basic logistics requirements. While the UN is expected to ultimately establish and coordinate these efforts, none of these countries is prepared to rely solely upon the UN in this respect.

Canadian plans include a limited air transport capability, as do those of Norway and Sweden. By and large, however, earmarking countries look to the UN to get their contingents to the field of operations.


There have been conversations with respect to standardization of weapons. There has been no practical progress. Each of the earmarking countries uses its own equipment. This also complicates the spare parts resupply problem.

Pre-packaging and preparation of material for air transportability is well advanced in Canada and the Netherlands. In the remaining countries little seems to have been done in this respect. It is the general plan in the Nordic countries to issue basic uniforms and equipment, including arms, to each contract volunteer during his brief training period. These items will be kept ready for him during the period of the contract. If he is called up, his outfitting will be done in the departure assembly area. If he is not called during the contract period, the equipment will be recalled and reissued to another contract volunteer.

Transportation, and particularly light, rapid means of moving troops in the field is a problem which has not been squarely faced. It is recognized that there will be a need for



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light aircraft and helicopters. The high cost of these items, as well as the necessity for continuous upkeep, will probably inhibit earmarking countries in their procurement. While the Nordic Plan calls for units of transport planes and helos, only Sweden and Norway have any current procurement plans.



COMMENTS

Long before the final drafting of the Charter, the problem of providing military forces to execute the UN's mandate to preserve international peace and security was addressed. The method provided in Chapter VII was predestined to fail. It was either incredibly naive or unbelievably cynical for sophisticated statesmen to act as though they really believed the great powers of the world would create a military force which, under legitimate interpretation of its mandate, the international body might one day direct against the interest of one of the self-same great powers who would be the major contributors. Basic to the failure of the great powers to agree upon the nature and scope of the agreements which would be made under Chapter VII between the nations contributing military forces and the UN was the appreciation that no one of them would be able to control the thrust and direction of UN activities with respect to matters which might be regarded as within their sphere of vital interest. And, of course, it was this basic political consideration which emasculated the Charter's method for providing the UN with military forces. The long hours and weeks of preliminary negotiation and discussion of the essential agreements were fruitless. The fundamental and insoluble problem lies in political direction of the international body itself. As time has given increasing evidence that the UN may



act at the will of the majority, so it has made it increasingly evident that the great powers will not permit a permanent UN military force to be created, much less provide the continuing financial support that such a force would require.

Given this stalemate with respect to Chapter VII, the United Nations has been forced to operate on a case by case basis, picking up military forces whenever authorized to use them from almost any source offering them. It has become increasingly evident from past successes with this kind of operation that it can be made to work. Therefore, new roadblocks have been devised by some Member States to insure that even these measures are not available unless the control and direction of these pickup forces coincides with their own national interests.

The key question in connection with the earmarking of military forces is: "What does it contribute towards solution of the basic problem of providing military forces for the United Nations?" The answer is, very little.

Although this is surely the correct answer, it is not necessarily a disheartening answer. Earmarking is a mechanism which is more helpful to the country taking the action than to the United Nations. The restrictions which hedge about releasing of these forces to the United Nations are political. There is nothing automatic about it. Earmarking in no way clears the way for the UN to act with more dispatch or efficiency. Political considerations will still control whether

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the UN can make a request for forces in the first instance.

Earmarking is a benefit to the country that does it in several ways. First, it permits some cohesive planning with respect to the military force which the country has determined it will provide to the United Nations. The force can be planned. It can be recruited, even if briefly as in the Nordic countries. It can be trained, at least in general understanding of UN matters and in specific tactics for specialized operations which experience has indicated are useful. National financial plans can be made and budgets arranged. The stresses and strains of sudden, unanticipated demands on the regular military establishments called upon to provide ad hoc forces overnight can be avoided. This is most important in countries with small permanent military establishments. Special equipment can be procured and stored. In short, all those practical things which in the past have had to be taken care of on an urgent basis when the UN asks for forces now can be taken care of in a more orderly and leisurely manner, with greater care, and the force, when called up, will be able to move and operate with that much greater efficiency.

Beyond these practical aspects of earmarking, it is politically a sound move. When a government brings itself to the point of taking the step of earmarking a military force, and discovers that the measure is popular, or is supported by the people, or even that it simply does not raise anyone's hackles,

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this makes easier the next step which is to volunteer those forces when the UN needs them. Earmarking may possibly create a more receptive frame of mind among political leaders to the UN's requirements for military forces. This may redound to the advantage of the UN in the long run.

Obviously readiness within the country is increased by earmarking. It cannot so clearly be said that the UN's readiness to act is increased. But IF the UN empowers the Secretary-General to mount a force, and IF one or more of the earmarking countries is called upon, and IF that country or those countries meet all the requirements politically to be part of a UN force, and IF they agree to provide the forces which have been earmarked, and finally, IF the UN is ready, willing and able to pay the bills, THEN the fact that a country has earmarked may mean that the UN is more ready to act than in the past it has been. There are a lot of IFs.

Another decided advantage in earmarking is that it involves many people in different countries. They have mutual problems and they talk to each other about them. It also will eventually excite the increasing interest of writers and they will study and expound upon the subject. In short, it is good publicity in the best sense of the word, not only for the country, but for the UN too. The more important people that can be involved in some phase of the UN's problems, the more interest that can be generated, the greater the likelihood that there will be






increased and improved cooperation between countries developing similar thoughts on these matters.

Earmarking has its drawbacks too. Probably for the purpose of the UN one of the touted advantages is really a drawback. The earmarking of a military contingent does, in fact, give the UN some idea of what it can anticipate a given country will provide, if it provides anything. This should permit some planning, if the other obstacles to planning at the UN level were surmountable. But when a country earmarks, then for practical purposes, it is also saying in effect, "This is it." The corollary is that if the earmarked force does not fill the bill, then the question is, "Who else can be asked?" The Nordic Nations, Netherlands and Canada have been the most consistent, and what is more important, most acceptable, of the nations usually volunteering to support UN military operations. If the forces earmarked by them do not suit the case, the field has been narrowed by earmarking. If a country has not earmarked, then despite the stresses and strains, it might be able to come up with a force tailored to a particular job. But all this is not a very serious matter. The earmarking countries are drafting their plans based upon more experience with UN military field activities than exists anywhere else in the world. It is a pretty sure bet that they will cover the eventualities.

It is difficult to see why the Member States will not permit the Secretary-General to form a permanent military staff



within the Secretariat. This is one of the urgent needs of the UN. As usual, political differences, particularly among the most powerful Member States, account for failure of the UN to organize such a staff. It should be possible to fight out the political aspects of command and control elsewhere, and to turn over the purely military aspects of planning and administering UN military forces to a group of men who have no connection with the political decisions. Military staffs can be and normally are, at least in many countries, separate from the political problems of war and peace. Whether or not the Russians believe that only the Security Council should control UN forces is a political question. This goes perhaps to the issue when the decision is whether to raise and commit forces in the first instance. It is difficult to see, however, why this prevents the formation of a staff of military advisers and planners who will be at the disposal of whatever body ultimately is determined to control the political decision-making.

Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway are members of NATO. Given limited military resources, it is possible that under certain circumstances there might be conflicting demands between provision of men and material to earmarked units or to NATO commitments. At the present time, based upon the size of the forces earmarked this does not seem likely. In addition, Denmark and Norway have earmarked forces which otherwise would not be "in being" at all, and even now will be called up only

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for brief periods when not actually committed to a UN action. Of course, in the event of a major requirement which brought NATO forces into active combat, it must be assumed that the national interest of the country would be so involved that earmarking will go by the board. In other words, if it became necessary to mobilize the manpower of one of these countries because NATO was fighting, it is quite unlikely that earmarking would prevent the country's leaders from calling up these men for service.

In Canada and the Netherlands, where the earmarked forces are in being, the question is whether or not these forces might better be an addition to NATO. Why not increase the NATO commitment rather than earmark? One might possibly point to the fact that the larger commitment is to the UN. NATO is a regional alliance, recognized by and entered into under the UN Charter. These two countries see no wrong in supporting both. Whether, as a practical matter, NATO is more effective than the UN in preserving peace is a question which need not be answered here. One wonders, however, where the priorities should really lie if the world is serious about attempting to avoid future wars.

Finally, will earmarking catch on? Will the concept grow? I should think that the answer is yes. Iran has indicated her willingness to earmark a battalion. Italy has earmarked a number of military men with past UN experience, available for future duty. Great Britain has stated that she stands ready to provide

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transportation and logistics support for such forces. But the crucial question, again, is whether the fact that a number of nations have earmarked forces will really assist the UN in escaping its basic dilemma. The answer is, I very much fear, no. Earmarking is the independent and sovereign act of an individual nation. For the present it cannot be otherwise. If the earmarked forces were to be committed without reservation to the UN, it would be tantamount to entering an agreement under Article 43 of the Charter. This is not going to happen in the near future. On the surface there is nothing which prevents any Member State from making an agreement with the UN to provide forces. While it was assumed from the first that the Great Powers would determine the nature and size of forces to be raised under such agreements, and set the pattern for and contribute the majority of these forces, they were not necessarily expected to be the only Member States participating. The problem is that the agreements were to be made with the Security Council and the Members of that body are not prepared to reconcile their differences on the subject sufficiently to make the essential decision which is necessary in order to provide a permanent military force of "Blue Bonnets for Doctor Bunche."

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