

SIXTH SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

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NEGOTIATION

(The Beginnings of a Handbook  
For Beginners)

by



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FOREWORD

This is an effort at producing a handbook which may interest and stimulate some of our new and Junior FSOs in a necessary part of their future careers. It is what I hope may be the beginning of a future "Encyclopaedia of Negotiatinn." There has been a feeling often expressed, but hitherto not implemented, that such a compendium for the use and benefit of Junior officers would be desirable.

My hope for this effort is that, aside for what help it may be, those who have the patience to read it will be stimulated to contribute ideas or revisions. If it accomplishes this I will be most gratified.

While a number of my mentors and colleagues were most helpful in my preparing this treatise, it should be clearly understood that any mistaken guidance is my fault. The banal is all mine. The brilliance is from those whom I consulted. To mention some of them by name they were: Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker, Andrew V. Corry, Howard R. Cottam, Parker T. Hart, Henry R. Labouisse, Armin H. Meyer, Francis H. Russell, and Robert C. Strong. I borrowed the example and inspiration from many others too numerous to mention.

This "handbood" is deliberately written "on the light side" in the hope that it will prove readily readable and yet its advice will be rememberable. If it fails to achieve this purpose, I suggest that all credit is due to too many years of drafting and reading Departmental telegraphese.

Dedicated to the Memory of  
Eric Allen Johnston, 1895-1963  
An Able Negotiator for and Worthy Representative of  
His Country

ERIC ALLEN JOHNSTON

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ERIC ALLEN JOHNSTON

I

Ever since that famous Apple Episode in the Garden of Eden, Negotiation has been the standard means of people reaching some form of understanding with each other on their future relations or destiny. Thus, you who have come into the Foreign Service to assist in the conduct of the foreign relations and destiny of our country, will be engaging in an old, old art--but an essential one, for, your future and, more importantly, the destiny of our country depends upon it.

Actually, you have already had a great deal of negotiating experience. No doubt it all began when you cried loud enough and long enough to get your parents to do something for you or give you something to make you shut up. Of course, there were risks inherent in such negotiations and you, no doubt, early developed the judgmental capacity of determining when the crying technique could lead only to a spanking. Later on it was bargaining with your parents for the use of the car. And for most of you probably the most significant negotiation was marriage. I cite these instances less to prove that we all have certain experiences in common than to point out that you have already acquired a certain degree of judgment in how you go about getting an agreement or understanding satisfactory to your needs and to the needs of the persons with whom you have dealt. Given the negotiating situation, you learned the extent of give and take and the sense of timing necessary to make the deal. These are two essential attributes in any successful negotiator, but there

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are many more. Furthermore, while the negotiations referred to above were with people friendly to you and who wanted to reach agreement with you, it will not always be under such happy circumstances when you negotiate something on behalf of the United States and its citizens. You may well be confronted with hostility, suspicions, plain non-comprehension, language, legal and customs differences or any combination thereof. It will be your job to overcome these difficulties if you are to obtain the required understanding or agreement.

The purpose of this treatise is to suggest how you can best achieve the desired results in your negotiations. In its preparation I have imposed on the time, good nature, and memories of a number of our ablest Ambassadors and negotiators in what I hope will prove to be a worthwhile distillation of their wisdom on your behalf--and mine.

I add "and mine", because, although I have been privileged to witness and participate in a number of negotiations important to the United States I still consider myself a student in the art. The wiser of you, I trust, will always so feel.

Out of consideration for the status of the individuals whom I consulted and the possible sensitivity of some of the information they gave me, I have usually anonymized the advice and illustrations herein set forth. I feel I may be specific where and when I refer to two distinguished and extremely able negotiators for whom it was my privilege to serve and who are now dead: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Ambassador Eric Johnston.

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As for the method of presentation in this treatise, I am reminded of the comment of a wise old hand in diplomacy. He said, "Negotiation is the only triple-noun I know of: it is a 'person', 'place', and 'thing'!" It is my purpose first to set forth the requirements for and attributes of the person who negotiates; then to discuss how these personal requirements can best be applied in different avenues of negotiation i.e. bilateral, multilateral, and international organization; and then to see if different subject matters of negotiation require different emphases of the negotiator's talents.

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II

Before going into the specifics of our "triple-noun" certain caveats to you are perhaps in order here. The advice and experience of those I canvassed in preparing this study, plus other sources, and my own experience lead to submitting three "cautions" for your digestion and future guidance:

1. It is fortunate for your country and for you that you are not yet an Ambassador. If you are ever to become a worthy and successful negotiator for the United States gratefully accept the fact that it will take long hours, and probably years, of study, careful observation, and practice. There is little, if any, likelihood that you are going to be thrust into any substantial or important negotiation at the outset of your career. Be thankful for it, for inexperience where the future welfare of your country is concerned can be disasterous. Of the three normal attributes of inexperience--eagerness, confidence, and the desire to prevail--only confidence should remain untempered by mature experience. This doesn't mean that caution or over willingness to compromise are the essential attributes of a developed negotiator. The fact is that only time and experience will teach you how best to intermix your available and developed attributes to achieve some important agreement you may be charged with obtaining.

This selective mixing of such diverse attributes, for example, is essential at meetings of the UN General Assembly, where time is usually of the essence and where many delegations, often with opposite

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interests, must be approached, persuaded, cajoled, and alas, sometimes "arm-twisted" (as we UN artisans have described the maximum application of pressure!). Too much eagerness, speed, and pressure can often be counterproductive. Caution and an over-willingness to compromise on the other hand can frequently make it appear that the United States Delegation is uncertain as to what it wants or will accept. Thus, "lining up" votes or keeping votes "lined up" can become increasingly difficult.

There are no substitutes for careful observation or experience. Your first diplomatic negotiations will probably be with local officials over such matters as getting drunken Americans out of the local jail, arranging for the transfer of effects, customs clearances, or exit visas for transitting VIPs, etc. Nearly all the sources I have consulted cited these local problems as excellent training opportunities for those who want to learn. One particularly wise source in discussing these local level negotiations said the following: "Tell the young FSO to consider himself, in such local dealings, as a bridge rather than an advocate. Junior Officers far too often try to be tougher than necessary. Local officials may well comply with the requests or demands made, but as a result often don't like or respect these young Officers. Try to make the occasion one for friendship rather than argument. Don't make the local official remember the young officer as party in a wrestling match, and it will turn out to be good insurance for the future."

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2. The Impossible is Not Negotiable. The obvious aim of any negotiation at whatever level is to reach some satisfactory agreement or understanding with the Other Party. If either Party lacks the inclination or the authority for give-and-take in order to reach agreement, the exercise is no more than that: it is a waste of time in most instances. This is not to suggest that you may not or should not engage in such exercises. Some of you will have to sit across the table from the Communists someday. If you do, heed the words of Dennett and Johnson in their book, Negotiating with the Russians:

"If there is a lesson to be learned from the Soviet Union over a period of three years, it is this: that the word 'negotiation' should not be used to define meetings in which only one of the parties is actually attempting to negotiate. Such a 'negotiation' must inevitably fail, and it is not always easy to make it clear to the public who was to blame for the failure". (p. 236).

Most of you, however, will not have to engage in such frustrations--or as they are more sophisticatedly called, "probing sessions". However, you will quite likely run into occasions at any stage in your career where your Opposite does not have the inclination or possibly the authority to reach an agreement with you. It will be incumbent on you to ascertain when such situations govern him. (Actually, lack of inclination is most likely to occur when you are called upon to deal with one of higher rank or authority than you, or when your Opposite is preoccupied with matters other than those you are authorized to discuss.) Clearly any sort of a deal under these

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circumstances is unlikely unless you are foolish enough to manifest a willingness to play "give-away". If this is ever your inclination, resign from the Foreign Service before yielding to temptation. Your instructions and any limitations on your authority are for your protection as well as for the protection of your country. Thus, in situations where your Opposite won't or can't negotiate there will never be any stigma attached in so reporting to your superiors--unless or until you persistently fail to recognize or overcome the facade of disinclination of the Other Party. But the ability to detect or see through such a facade again takes those two essential elements: careful observation and experience. Apparent disinclination may well be the protective action of the Other Party when he lacks authority. But it might also be the means where by he draws you into discussing what other different matters he may have in mind so that his problem may be thrown into the balance with your problem. There may be times when this will be acceptable to you as within your authority but only experience can be your guide. For some time to come, a sound bit of advice to remember is: When you're sent out to bring home the bacon, don't bring home the whole hog!" Learn to recognize when you can't make a deal.

3. Power has Its Problems. It is my fervent hope and confident belief--just as I assume it is yours--that for the length of your career and that of your successors in the United States Foreign Service, you will be representing abroad the most powerful nation in the world. Obviously this will have tremendous advantages for you, both

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from the point of prestige and from the strength and confidence with which you will be able to deal with your foreign counterparts. It will mean that whatever you do or say in your official dealings (and in your unofficial deeds, for that matter) your counterparts will have to take careful note, whether they like it or not. So long as you faithfully and manifestly adhere to your instructions you will be respected--but this can be from fear, or resentment, as much as from friendship or admiration.

And this is the crux of the problem of power. On the one hand you can win friends yet lose influence for your country. On the other hand you cannot lose friends and expect to win influence for your country. Your viability as a representative of and negotiator for the United States requires that you quickly learn and astutely use the power you have and represent. Read again the advice I cited above that the young FSO should be "a bridge rather than an advocate....etc." Bear in mind the sarcastic wisdom of one who said: "You don't use an elephant to kill a fly. You use a fly-swatter. But you do have a better chance of knocking down a wall with an elephant than with a fly-swatter."

The illustration is extreme but the point is clear: judgment, developed by experience, is the essential element in the application of power. I will discuss later the necessity of understanding your Opposite and his problems. For now what is important is to appreciate that wherever and whenever you start your negotiating career, the over-application of "I am the United States speaking..." (while it may be

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necessary sometimes in the protection of legitimate American interests) will be resented and may be ultimately counter-productive in your future dealings with your Opposites who will be incapable of comparable power and persuasion. Generous restraint in the use of "I am the United States...etc." will usually be appreciated and produce maximum results. Yet if appropriate and subtle use is not made of it, contempt from your Opposite can be the ultimate consequence.

Most of you will be assigned to the less Developed Countries where the senses of inferiority and insecurity, however well disguised, will be omnipresent. It must be your good judgment and fortune to understand these feelings where you detect them and to encourage the feeling that we are strengthening each other through mutually satisfactory negotiations and relations. This will be the proper use of Power, however problematic the given individual situations.

Essential to your understanding and use of power is the fact that, regardless of where you may be assigned and what the problems are that we share with that country, the threat of the use of sanctions or force should never be the right or responsibility of a Junior Officer. At all costs, the United States cannot be put in the position of playing a bluffing game. Its role in World Power Politics absolutely requires that its word and intentions never be misunderstood or underestimated. The Cuban Crisis proved this. Even a seasoned Ambassador will be extremely careful in his use of implied sanctions or ultimate force. Although he is the personal representative of the President of the United States he must always bear in mind

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the possible inhibition which American democratic public opinion and Congressional action may impose upon the President, the Department of State, and him, and thus devalue his word. Under the circumstances, an Ambassador can hardly be expected to back up a subordinate's use of threats which he would himself be instinctively slow to use.

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So much, at least for now, for the caveats. With all due respect to the wit who said "Diplomacy survives on caviar and caveats," one of the able sources I consulted urged that Junior Officers have or develop the "Can Do" approach to negotiating. The study and careful practice of the positive personal talents that follow will develop the "Can Do".

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III

"Person"

(The personal attributes or talents which are to follow represent the accumulation of observations made to me by those experienced in negotiation whom I interviewed. Readings and my own observations and experiences also constitute part of the accumulation. The first few talents were uppermost in the minds of all interviewed although they did not all agree on the order in which listed.)

1. (A) A Thorough Knowledge of the Subject.

It is no idle joke that "If you don't do your homework, you won't pass the test." Whether you are involved in the most minor discussion with a local official over customs or visa procedures, or you are involved in a major matter like a Test-Ban treaty, you must make it your business before and during negotiations to be as thoroughly informed and conversant as possible with all facts, details, and background of the problem involved, including what may well appear be utter munutia. Even if it is the local law or regulations (i.e. the customary working hours) governing the local official with whom you are dealing, your thorough knowledge of them may well be very point of rapport with him; the basis for mutual discussion; or even the subtle means of indicating to him that you appreciate his limits of authority and action. If it is a negotiation so crucial to the welfare or prestige of your country as mediation, peace, or disarmament, ignorance of the facts of the problem is no excuse to your counterpart and inexcusable to your country.

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If you bear in mind what Ambassador Eric Johnston once observed to me: "Successful negotiation is gaining the maximum fraction with the minimum friction" then persuasion is an essential element in negotiation. If you're going to sell a product or a position you've got to know it and be able to answer the wary customer's questions. If you can't, you're lost.

In the Jordan River Valley Development negotiations which Ambassador Johnston conducted separately with the Israelis on one side and the interested Arab states on the other from 1953 through 1955, he was determined to persuade both sides that, as their friends, each side would get its fair share of the Jordan River system's meager waters.

He sought to persuade them through his knowledge of his subject--before, during, and after the intensive negotiations. He knew the political and technical problems of both sides. He knew the geography, topography, geology, meteorology (name it--he knew it) of the area affected. He could tell anyone how many million cubic meters of water would come to, be available at, lost by evaporation or customary usage at any given point, at any given time, in the River system. He knew the location, height, structure, cost, and potential of every conceivable diversion in the system. He knew what technical and international supervision and controls would be necessary, where they should be located, and how effective they would be.

I cite the above by way of illustration (not just admiration), for the point was that, because he knew his subject so thoroughly, he developed rapport and respect with those with whom we negotiated.

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He could say the same things to both sides with a confidence in his word being accepted. There is no other surer or quicker way of developing common ground between obvious antagonists, tough adversaries, or clever friends. (More on this point of Credibility later.) Furthermore, through his manifest knowledge of the whole problem he was able slowly but surely to wear down the persistent but weakening objections to and distrust of his proposals. If the objection were technical he wanted to and could explore it and where possible accept it. No technician could find fault with this approach. Were the objection political, he wanted it so identified, so that his Opposites would face the fact that political considerations, then interposed, might have unfavorable practical consequences later. Thus he was able through his superb knowledge of his subject to reduce a highly technical problem to pragmatic proportions in the only hope of a satisfactory political agreement from each side.

But, you may ask, how does this all apply to you? The answer is that despite Ambassador Johnston's thorough knowledge of his subject he always was certain to have his advisers with their various expertise immediately available, when, where, and if he needed them. He was never unwilling to accept advice or be corrected (when, and only when appropriate or tactically desirable--and, for a chief negotiator there are those moments!). He insisted on the latest facts, views, or conjectures from those who worked for him.

This will be your opportunity and obligation. You may be part of a special mission, or be an adviser to a negotiator, Special

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Representative, Ambassador, or Delegate of the United States. You have to know the subject of negotiation, even if your superior does not, cannot, or--God forbid--won't understand it. Depending on the talents or limitations of your superior, you must, to the absolute best of your ability, make him the manifest "U.S. Fountain of Knowledge" on the subject of the negotiation. (Fortunately, the United States and its political system is such that the occasion is seldom likely to occur when an American diplomatic superior of yours won't be inately smart, or sufficiently bright, to accept expert advice. The important thing is that in the latter case, you quickly develop the perceptiveness of how, when, where, and if to give advice, suggestions, facts, and strategy to him.) However, regardless of how much more your knowledge of the problem may be than that of your superior, remember never to create the impression to your Opposite that you are the Brain and your superior is merely the Body. It may be momentarily flattering to you, but ultimately deflating to your country's position.

Believe it or not, this is a discipline accepted by virtually all other diplomatic services, however weak, undermanned, poorly organized, or uninformed they may be. It is a fact of international diplomacy that the weaker the country, its Foreign Service, and foreign policy, the more readily and surely it looks for and detects weaknesses in ours. Through knowledge, but one voice, is our answer and ultimate negotiating advantage.

This does not mean that with members of the Other Party you should be a diplomatic and social sphynx. There will be times,

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particularly as your superior comes to appreciate your knowledge and judgment, when you can properly--and, hopefully, effectively--confer with members of the Other Party. A wise Ambassador or Head of Mission will have no desire or intention to do all the talking all the time. There will be many times when many things of relatively lesser importance, in his opinion, should be handled by subordinates. These occasions will usually be related to: matters of detail--particularly where technically intricate or obscure matters are involved; procedural rather than substantive matters; and social or protocol arrangements. Many of us have jokingly or wearily referred to these as "housekeeping details" but they are essential, must be faced and do require the junior and/or subordinate officers' having a thorough knowledge of the various problems involved in the negotiations in question, and having manifest good judgment.

Reverting again to Ambassador Johnston and the Jordan River negotiation's by way of illustration, he would instruct one of us subordinates to discuss some particularly detailed item with our Opposites of the moment--be they the Israelis or the Arabs. His basic approach was that: (1) where expertise was of the essence it was fairer to the Other Party and ultimately wiser for us to have lower level discussions subject to his higher level review--involving, as it might, concession or a "tougher line" on his part--and; (2) if the outstanding problems were ultimately to be proven political rather than technical, he wanted to be the one to say so, and then exercise his powers and persuasiveness as "The Personal Representative of the United States"--which he did with great effectiveness.

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One day in the critical negotiations with the Arab Delegations in 1955, Ambassador Johnston told me to call on the Chairman of the Arab Delegations "at his [Ambassador Johnston's] suggestion" to ascertain if the Arab Delegations would agree to specific proposals which we [the United States--as the go-between] had on the problems of an international supervisory control system for the entire River system. He was concerned that the Arabs--even with their Technical Experts (who were, to a man, extraordinarily able)--perhaps had not really thought out thoroughly all of the pro's and con's, and problems involved in any necessary international supervisory authority over the river system. The problems were many, usually intricate and detailed, but throughout required the highest degree of non-partisan (i.e. international) control. Our plan for the international control system, we knew, was technically sound, and totally efficient. It also provided the political insulation which was necessary for any Arab cooperation or acceptance of the over-all Plan.

I was instructed to give a brief oral summary of the control proposals; hand the written details to the Head of the Arab Delegations; ask for any comments he might have; answer any matters of fact; and, if he seemed receptive to our proposals, ask him if he thought they would be acceptable to all of his Arab colleagues. I was to express Ambassador Johnston's earnest hope that "this small but important" aspect of the negotiations could thus be gotten out of the way quickly.

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I did as I was told, discovering at the outset that I had awakened His Excellency from his afternoon nap. He was exceedingly peevish--rightly so--at first, and gave me a "hard time" for my "American thoughtlessness and bad manners". Thereafter, however, he became quite apologetic for his remarks; looked through the written details of the control plans; asked me one or two questions which I could answer; said they looked fine to him, and that I could tell Ambassador Johnston the Arab Delegations would agree to them.

The point in this illustration is that Ambassador Johnston had given me very precise though deliberately limited instructions: to present, to respond, if readily possible, and to report back to him. He knew that the subject matter was technical and that I was the one best able to answer with assurance what might be the Arabs' questions. If the questions were to prove more than technical we might be in for long and difficult negotiations. He was deliberately appearing to minimize his concern over possible difficulties with controls system by sending me rather than raising the matter himself. If my approach succeeded, fine: if I had run into difficulties, I could have been "the fall guy" as he took over at the higher political level, and smoothed out difficulties which he had "assumed were just technical".

There is incidentally, one other aspect of the possibility of being "a fall guy" for your superior. There may be a time or so in your career when your superior in the course of talking with the Other Party may make a misstatement of fact or of the United States position.

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Normally it is sounder for him--and ultimately lends greater credibility to him as a trustworthy individual vis-a-vis the Other Party--to concede his own mistake or fault. But there could be critical circumstances or a vital moment when it might be necessary for your superior to be able to blame you for his ignorance or blunder. Just remember that on him, not you, must rest the ultimate responsibility for the success of the negotiations, and that you may have to be a casualty of the campaign. Console yourself that it is the voice and position of the United States speaking through its authorized Representative--your superior--that is the important thing--not you or your humiliation. And the voice and position of the United States must be right regardless of individual consequences.

1. (B) A Thorough Knowledge of the Negotiators.

The people you will be dealing with are human beings like you. But, far from being identical in ideas, background, or political and economic status with you, they will probably more often appear to be your antithesis. They will be fellow-human beings representing countries which will want what you represent and have: social and political freedom, and economic and military power.

Your responsibility--to yourself and the Service-- will be to find out, study, and use what are the usual human traits, interests, complexes, and idiosyncracies which you will find in your Opposites.

While your first thought--and a natural one--may be to seek to learn your Opposite's individual foibles, the most productive approach

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to him is to find out his interests and abilities. Obviously at the higher levels of any country's foreign service the individual's skills, weaknesses, charms, and foibles are pretty well known. At your level, this probably will not be the case. Since, however, your Opposite will be interested in learning as much as he can about you--as a junior but rising representative of the United States--you owe it to your future career, and certainly to the United States, to acquaint yourself, through personal contact, inquiry, and study, with all those with whom you will be dealing.


If you will bear in mind your own personal research when you started "courting", or tried to figure out how to pass So-and-So's exam, you will be well on your way to "reading" your Opposite. Then you had an objective--however limited--in mind. In the Foreign Service, you will always have some comparable but increasingly more important objective assigned to you to achieve. You started then and you should continue to give priority consideration to the human elements involved.

In your early career, the selection of your Opposite for dealing with you will not be a deliberate choice by the Other Party. Thus, you--and your counterpart--will almost assuredly have diverse interests, but the common requirement for both of you will be to find common interests, for therein lies the likeliest means of ultimate, if not initial rapport. The common things may prove, at outset, to be extremely limited but they are means for continuing and growing conversation, enthusiasm, and ultimate effective association.

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My wife and I enjoy cooking, and I have so talked and waxed ecstatic on the subject with some of our diplomatic friends--and they with us--that we have, I suspect, often ended an evening with mutual mental indigestion. But it has also ended as an evening of mutual appreciation and understanding, which ultimately led to easier conversation on other subjects--including the subject of the negotiations. If you but start with the most elementary topics and interests i.e. the weather and the scenery, and what is it like in your Opposite's homeland (or what it is like in yours) you will learn quickly of your Opposite's interests, however varied or limited. Even ascertaining his dislikes can lead to conversation and common ground. Learn your Opposite's background, his interests (particularly cultural, social, and religious) and hobbies. Don't be afraid to reciprocate with yours, and even if they are never the subject for further conversation, you will have done much to achieve a mutual understanding or, at a minimum, an assessment of each other.

At your Junior level the importance of the information and understanding which you have achieved may be less to you than to your superior. To illustrate: The opening days of the UN General Assembly in 1960 were the nearest thing to an International Summit Meeting then experienced. You will recall that no less figures in history than Khrushchev, Nasser, Castro, and Nehru showed up. The main initial move in the Assembly, spear-headed by Messrs. Nehru and Nasser, was to adopt a resolution asking Mr. Khrushchev and President Eisenhower to meet on the Disarmament question. Neither





of the two leaders wanted such a shot-gun and inevitably abortive meeting. Mr. Nehru, under the malevolent influence of Mr. Krishna Menon, was exceedingly peeved with the United States' position. It was mutual. However, Secretary Herter wanted a private conversation with Mr. Nehru to discuss our position and a number of other items. It turned out that Mr. Nehru wanted an unnoticed meeting with Secretary Herter. If either, however, had asked the other it would have been "corridor gossip" within the hour. Fortunately, I had come to have a warm personal friendship with a man who should go far in India's service--Krishna Menon's then Personal Secretary. It was we who arranged the eventual unheralded meeting of the two men, with the clear understanding that the subordinates of both (e.g. Krishna Menon) should do no more than be present, if that were necessary.

I cite this illustration to stress the value of "knowing your man" however low the level may be, for such knowledge can and should be of value at the highest level of negotiation under some circumstances.

Just as you should know your Opposite's strengths, capabilities and interests, so also you should know his weaknesses. Surely, you should expect that he will be looking for yours. I see no need to comment on the most commented-upon weaknesses: "Gin, Sin, and Fin". You should expect one or more such weaknesses to be found in some of your Opposites. As a knowing friend once said: "The Puritans indulged, but that doesn't mean that you should either indulge or be a Puritan". Here, the cardinal rule to bear in mind is: Playing to a man's


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weakness will lead him to suspect your motives, and quite possibly to an ultimate denial of his agreement or understanding with you.

In short, such an approach might have been all right with Machiavelli, but there is no wisdom in your trying to follow his rules in the mid-20th Century. More on this later.

Other weaknesses, such as forgetfulness, temper, lying, etc. should be most carefully noted in your mental computer as traits for you to avoid but to exploit occasionally in others.



To illustrate: A distinguished former Foreign Minister, who had been a long-time friend of my father-in-law and a staunch friend of the United States, had a very quick temper. On virtually all issues at the UN we saw eye-to-eye, yet on one he was violently opposed. Since we had to deal with him and several of his fellow Foreign Ministers... in negotiating a resolution on this problem, I told my superior that the sooner said Foreign Minister got angry and left the meeting, the sooner we would get our resolution negotiated. My superior--a genial and suave, experienced "old-hand"--was startled at my information and suggestion, but he skillfully put it to use. The Foreign Minister stalked out in livid rage, the resolution was negotiated by us with his somewhat embarrassed colleagues in a very short time, after which my superior went to the Foreign Minister for an emotional scene of apologies, and the Foreign Minister abstained in the voting--which he always did anyway regardless of his haggling, stalling, lecturing, etc. in our many previous resolution negotiation sessions,



This above cited gambit is not set forth to serve as a model for eliminating unwanted obstructionists and thus shortening up negotiating sessions. It is to suggest that if you "know your man" and know the likely consequences of exploiting his weakness, you can achieve certain advantages in a negotiation.

"Refreshing one's memory" can be a very satisfactory basis for encouraging rapport with a truly forgetful fellow negotiator, but I would caution against its too liberal use. Most accomplished diplomats have developed excellent memories and need no refreshing thereof, and hence will merely become suspicious or resistant if you try to recollect for them too frequently. One extremely able Ambassador (not in our Foreign Service) whom I have known always used to want to "recapitulate" or "recall" the previous discussions. Inevitably he wouldn't have quite the same recollection of what had been discussed or agreed upon as I had had. This soon developed an awareness in me that it was deliberate on his part to develop his contention that we had agreed on something which wasn't the case-- a technique which someone once called "unnegotiating." If this is what you may want at the same time, too, that's fine, but if it isn't, then you had better seek the earliest appropriate moment to correct the "recapitulation", "recollection", or whatever the Other Party's negotiator may call it.

This is not a possible affront to him or impoliteness but a frank way of preventing mutual slippage from whatever area of agreement you ultimately wish to achieve. While some very few so-called "agreements"



may, for overriding political reasons, be reached in euphoric mistiness, normally it will be a serious disservice for your superior and you not to be absolutely sure that both sides clearly understand each other's position and the area of agreement deriving or derived therefrom.

As for lying, prevarication, romanticizing, etc. it may possibly seem to be a necessity for some of your Opposites but it will never be a necessity for you. You as the diplomatic representative of the United States, do not have to "go abroad to lie for the good of the country", as the old saw goes. At the outset of your career you will be so thoroughly instructed by directives from your superior, the Ambassador, the Department in Washington, etc. that the answer to any leading question after your presentation of any particular assigned problem will be simple: "I don't know"; "I'll find out"; or "I'll get the answer, if I can." Don't answer direct charges, allegations, insinuations, etc. glibly. Unless you are specifically instructed as to your answer--play it safe: Don't. The reason is simple: at your Junior level a quick answer may well be readily suspect (in which case you have damaged your credibility with your Opposite). A truthful, however, limited answer does far less damage to your viability, and, of course, to your government.

With regard to your experiencing these traits in your counterparts, the advice is clear: Agreement is based on trust: Distrust will never produce Agreement. If you cannot accept your Opposite's word, don't bind your country by it.

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To conclude: Perhaps there has herein been too much dwelling on how you acquire and how you apply your information about your fellow negotiators, but acquisition without application of knowledge is only a very small plus factor for your side. The point is that whether you sit across the table from him only once or for months, perhaps the cardinal factor in negotiating an agreement will be your understanding of him--if not his of you--as a person.

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In ending this discussion of the requirement for a thorough knowledge of your subject and the negotiators a final observation is in order: Remember the remark of Ambassador Johnston about gaining "the maximum fraction". There will never be a negotiation in which your Ambassador, your superior, or you gets everything. If this is ever the case it is no negotiation. The point is: Any negotiator with any authority must know the full dimensions of his subject--the outer limits within which he can maneuver in order to achieve the common ground that will ultimately constitute the negotiated agreement. He cannot know these dimensions or outer limits if he does not know the subject and his Opposite or is not thoroughly advised. It may be a long time before you are given broad discretion in negotiating a matter, but when that discretion is given you it will be with your government's confidence that you do know, will learn, or will be thoroughly advised on your Opposite and all aspects of the matter to be negotiated.



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
2. Empathy; the Capacity to Understand the Other's Position and Problems.

"Oh wad some power the giftie gie us  
To see oursel's as others see us!  
It wad frae mcnie a blunder tree us  
An' foolish notion."

So wrote Robert Burns nearly two hundred years ago. While these particular lines were dedicated to a louse, the view urged could usefully be considered by a higher form of animal life--the diplomat. The fact is, of course, the most successful diplomat-negotiator has, and must in his mind's eye, not only have a sound assessment of how he appears to the one sitting across the table from him, but also what, why, and how that Opposite of his is thinking; what his national and individual problems are; and how he proposes to achieve his country's objectives in the negotiations.

Someone once observed: "If you want to sell ice-boxes to the eskimos, the first thing to do is to try to live in an igloo". If you are going to negotiate a matter for your country you should understand your Opposite's reasons for negotiating with you. You should have some idea as to what he expects to obtain from you and how. The only way you can really hope to accomplish this is by the deliberate mental exercise of putting yourself in his place. Obviously with some nations and people this is far easier than with others, but even with those with whom we are most closely kin it is a worthwhile intellectual exercise.

Take, for example, the Arab World with which I have had a good deal of experience. The eye and hand travel in the exact opposite



direction from the way we read and write. The mores, the concepts of justice, and the conduct of business are so different from what we know here in this country, that mutual understanding is, at best, a long, hard process even with devotion and determination. A handshake or "a man's word" can be a better agreement than a signed piece of paper. For years, one of our airfields in an Arab Country remained ours despite increasing Arab nationalist--as well as Communist--pressure because the King had "promised" its use to the United States.

One of the area experts observed "'Conditions' is a dirty word to the Arabs." In an agreement each party never mentions nor implies the word. Rather, each party agrees to give something and/or do something for the other.

In a recent negotiation with the Prime Minister of one of the Arab States, one of our most experienced negotiators quite unintentionally used the words "on condition" in explaining what the United States was prepared to do. The translator dutifully so translated the words, where upon the Prime Minister hit the ceiling. Only the quickness and the excellent Arabic of our Ambassador present at the time saved the situation. He assured the Prime Minister that the translator had misunderstood what had been said.

The point here is not the language barrier alone although it can always be real. It is the predictable instant reaction to ancient doubts. Perhaps the greatest barrier by far in the area of the world is the ingrained suspicion of the big Western Powers--and this

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unhappily seems to include the United States. These people in this part of the world feel they have been exploited and are therefore often extremely dubious whenever we say we want to negotiate or work something out with them.

Actually their distrust has a far deeper foundation. The suspicions of each other go back to tribal days and compound our, and their, difficulties. More than just suffering from our identification with the former Colonial Powers, we are too often accused of acting at the behest of one country in the area against another, between which there is usually some quarrel, or long-standing feud. It is, for example, often difficult, if not impossible, to persuade our Arab friends, that we are acting in their and our interests--not Israel's. They will too frequently persist in their misinformation, prejudice, and suspicion that the United States is run by Zionist politicians, bankers, newspaper men, and movie magnates.

But suspicious are not peculiar to the Middle East. The Russians, for example, with their long history of misrule and oppression didn't have to read Lenin and Marx to make them deeply distrustful of the so-called "Capitalist" United States, the Western World, or even of their own kith and kin. Based on past history there is some past justification for our Latin American friends suspecting the United States' interests, policies, and objectives toward them. And the newly emerging nations of Africa--beginners in freedom and national government--inevitably will fear that the bigger and richer countries in



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

approaching them want to take these attributes of nationhood away from them.

Some suspicions can perhaps never be overcome but that will never justify your not trying. A number of the attributes of a negotiator yet to be discussed can be effectively applied in such an attempt. For now, it should suffice that: manifest, but not effusive, friendship; sincerity in stating your position; frankness--not bluntness--when necessary; and open confidence that you are offering something to your Opposite which is of mutual benefit--these are the things most likely to allay if not remove misgivings.

Closely associated with suspicion from your Opposite toward you may be a genuine feeling, however well concealed, of insecurity or inferiority. One hesitates to say this, particularly of friends. But, there is much that you must avoid lest you even inadvertently tramp on or arouse that sensitivity. If you start out with several presumptions in your own mind with regard to this problem you will go far in solving it--and in winning your Opposite's esteem if not his lasting friendship: (1) Friendly, neutral, or hostile--your Opposite respects, if not fears, the tremendous power of the United States--which you represent. He has nothing like it, nor is he ever likely to have it. (I have already discussed this problem. This is just a reminder). (2) As a representative of a sovereign country, and as your Opposite, he wants--and legitimately expects--to be treated as an equal. This point cannot be overstressed to you.



In the first place, with our tradition, and often boasting, of freedom and equality in ours "the greatest democracy on earth"--you should represent those virtues. Your Opposite is going to watch you to see if "this American" practices what all Americans preach. Egalitarian democracy is thus on trial, and, particularly those of the newly emerging nations with whom you will meet and be dealing will be assessing whether they like what they see in you in preference to some more authoritarian, possibly more efficient form of governmental philosophy. In the second place--and perhaps pragmatically more important for both you and your Opposite--if you do not treat him as an equal trying to work out something of mutual benefit, he may soon come to the conclusion that he will not get at least his fair share of the deal, and you may wind up with no agreement at all! (3) There is an excellent chance that your Opposite's Country is newer at the game of international negotiations than the United States--and this may also apply to him personally vis-a-vis you. His negotiating experience and that of his country may very well have been limited to the market-place, and that up until recent days. That experience, centuries old, is such excellent training for him that if you walked into the market place as an American tourist, and he were so minded, you would walk out with nothing for a lot. This is his fear reaction as he walks into a new market-place-- International Diplomacy. Carrying this imagery just a bit further, had you gone into the market-place with one experienced in the ways of bargaining therein you would have walked out with a lot for a



for a reasonable price, after hard bargaining. His problem in the same situation is that he quite likely does not have, does want, but won't ask for comparable friendly advice when he find himself in the new market-place.

Here is where you may help your Opposite and your country by finding quiet, friendly means and occasions to manifest your sensitivity to and appreciation of his difficulties. Your critical difficulty in getting started with him is to avoid any trace or appearance of condescension. This is not easy. Most of us--including the best--have been accused of it. But try--and be guided by the advice: Your condescension should end long before the tip of your nose!

Interestingly enough, aside from linguistic difficulties which you should always be willing to work out with maximum patience, your Opposite's concern is most likely to be "If I buy something in this new market place, can I convince my superiors and the other people back home that it was a good 'buy'?" If you sense this, bear in mind that many of us have been told by our Opposites on many occasions, "Yes, we know you've got to think about your Congress' wishes!" Many of us have been (and you may be yourself many times) in the same position as that of your Opposite with his worries.

If you understand your Opposite's problem you can perhaps help him devise means whereby he may rationalize to his people what he has agreed upon with you. Most frequently, particularly with our friends, and allies, the problem is not selling our objective but in devising ways and means whereby they may implement what they have



been willing to agree to. For example, in one country where the government in power was most understanding about our wishes to restrict international shipping to Cuba, the problem was the domestic political situation and the uncertainty of obtaining appropriate effective legislation. Our Ambassador cited the fact that some of our laws, while apparently quite general in nature, could be made to have specific applications. The Government devised and the parliament adopted a law having very broad terms, and then the government applied it specifically to Cuban shipping.

Whatever the objective you are seeking to obtain, and however much persuasion you want to apply, avoid creating in your Opposite's mind that you are "trying to dictate". If a little more time is necessary, take it in the interests of making your discussions with him an educational process rather than a forcing process. Encourage in him an interest in thinking about your problem by being interested in thinking about his. The end result may often be that he will produce as his idea the very thing that you wanted.

Secretary Dulles was quite effective at this despite the fact that he was more prone to the straight lawyer's approach of logical persuasion. On a number of occasions when I was present and he was talking to a Foreign Minister or an Ambassador he would start by stating fairly precisely what his position was and what he hoped his caller would agree to. After the Foreign Minister or Ambassador had demurred or suggested something else, the Secretary would explore a series of alternatives to his original proposal, all somewhat less attractive. The conversation would conclude with the Foreign

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Minister or Ambassador suggesting something along the lines of what the Secretary had originally proposed. The Secretary would thank his caller for having made such a helpful suggestion or provided such a satisfactory solution to the problem.

Speaking of Secretary Dulles' usual lawyer's logical approach to a problem, by contrast, you will frequently deal with the illogical or irrational as we too often see it in our Opposites. The Secretary with his incisive lawyer-like mind found it quite difficult sometimes to understand why the totally irrational was too frequently appealing to our foreign colleagues, and an appeal to reason was a waste of breath. Ambassador Johnston kept saying over and over during our last round of negotiations with the Arabs on the Jordan River Plan, "They can't turn it down. They have too much to lose if they say no." Well, the Arabs wouldn't say yes, and they were quite well aware of how much they were losing. Certainly their own very able technical experts told them. The point was that they preferred to lose the great economic gains rather than to appear to have made any concessions to Israel--however slight or indirect.

Among many of your counterparts you will find a non-comprehension, bordering on suspicion, of our interest in their actually benefitting from some agreement with us. Hence they have an almost instinctive tendency to want to reject what we are putting forward in good faith.

Rejection is the easiest form of diplomatic decision, particularly among the lesser developed countries. It is an exercise of national sovereignty readily gratifying to the doer, and somehow understood

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by him as elevating him at least, temporarily, to power equality with the receiver of the rejection. Rejection is the doer's defense against the unknown. It can serve as the easiest explanation to the doer's own constituency to justify his inaction or suspicion. And, what is most important, it can also serve as the starting point for future greater demands. Your Opposite, who will probably have had far more experience than you in bargaining in the local market place, may be operating on the presumption that neither your offer nor his rejection is final.


Your problem in the face of rejection will be to determine--by carefully analyzing your Opposite's reasoning--why he is rejecting your offer, or your line of reasoning. If it is the last mentioned reason i.e. bargaining, you can either "stay in business" with him or, by analogy, "walk out of his shop and see if he'll come running after you with a better price."

If, however, rejection is based on other political or irrational reasons, then "No" can be a large and perhaps permanent barrier to further negotiation, and hence should be avoided if possible.

Having dwelt at some length on the possibilities and reasons for your Opposite's saying "No", it should be pointed out the odds will be that in dealing with you--the representative of the United States--or you--his good friend--he may not want to say "No" or be forced into saying it.

This will take experience and the readiest perception on your part. Your Opposite may, on occasion, wish to move toward your position or offer but may be hesitant. If you sense this, try to


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try to make it easy for him to agree or accede gracefully. Words are wonderful things in situations such as these. Reformulate or rephrase what you have been discussing in such a way as to cover his cession of principle or point. As one negotiator put it:


"His cession of a point ideally should look like a demand which you are accepting." Occasions for such opportunities will be seldom, perhaps, but the advice should be constantly in your mind.

In discussions--particularly where there are a number of people present--learn to recognize your Opposite's signals and don't go plowing right ahead with your line of argument. Your Opposite may want to change his position or have an "out", quite possibly in the context of a diversion. This is not to suggest that you should be diverted by diversions, but if the signals are understood, a diversion may produce quicker and more satisfactory agreement from your Opposite than a continued direct approach however friendly an atmosphere.



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In all the discussion above, I have deliberately oversimplified the picture of your Opposite, his possible concealed inferiority, and the problems arising therefrom. You should--in justice to him and to yourself--assume a much higher sophistication in anyone with whom you are dealing than may ultimately prove to be the case. The reasons are: (1) It is usually better to go back over the same thing with your Opposite--several times if necessary--than to give him a "B follows A" lecture; and (2) while there are always exceptions, among the newer nations you are generally dealing with the intellectual



and political elite. They may often be quicker to understand and size you up than you them. Nevertheless, the overall advice should prove sound and helpful.

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Any discussion of your trying to understand your Opposite, his thinking and his problems, must, of necessity require the mention of a dread disease which occasionally--in fact, too frequently--overcomes the best of us: "Chentitis"--the acquired tendency to over-rationalize, over-compensate for, and out-defend your Opposite and his position. The only known preventive and cure for this ailment is the constant maintenance of objectivity. Of course, you are expected to portray and analyze your Opposite to your superiors, but you are not expected to become his mouthpiece or amplifier in his dealings with your government. Let him get his own P.A. system, and be his own salesman. Your obligation in portraying and analyzing your Opposite is that, in so doing, you are benefitting your country in its understanding of and negotiations with his. Objectivity is the essential requirement.

A doctor friend of mine once said "If a doctor becomes emotionally involved in the cure of a patient, the patient has a better of chance of dying, because the doctor may become uncritical in his diagnosis and treatment". By analogy, your relations or negotiations with your Opposite may die if you become uncritical in your diagnosis and treatment thereof.

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3. Credibility.

A few years ago during some customarily tough negotiations with the Soviets, our delegation was quite perplexed as to why, with quite a general area of agreement, they were sticking on some relatively minor wording. Of course, our delegation understood from past experience that if the Soviet intended to refuse to go along on the subject being negotiated, any little excuse however trivial would be enough to justify their refusal. On this particular occasion, however, it seemed reasonably certain that the Soviets were willing to come to some agreement on the item under discussion but appeared to be concerned about the precise wording. Therefore, between open meetings of the delegations, our most experienced negotiator with the Russians went to the head of the Soviet delegation and asked what was bothering them about the wording. The Soviet delegate replied that they felt the United States meant such-and-such. Our negotiator retorted, "We do not. Take my word for it." The Soviets took his word, and found no further objection to the wording when the delegations' meeting resumed.

Credibility was what carried the day here. The Soviets, even with their history and tradition of deep suspicion, had come to know our negotiator as a man of his word, as one who spoke with authority and in the confidence that he had the fullest backing from the highest sources of our government.

There are, of course, a number of things which are the ingredients of credibility, but for this discussion two things are most important:

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- (1) basic and manifest reliability on the man's word and honor and
- (2) well-established authority, or clear association therewith.

Analyzing these requirements, you may well ask how they can apply to you as a beginner. The answer, I trust, is obvious: You start establishing your credibility the day you are sworn into the Foreign Service. It is something that only time and experience can build up and the sooner you get started and stay at it, the sooner your credibility will be accepted and needed at increasingly higher levels of negotiation.

Reread what was previously said about lying and the consequences of distrust. Rethink the previous suggestions that: (1) it is better to say you don't know the answer when you don't; and (2) a glib, quick answer at your Junior level may be readily suspect.

What would you do, for example, if your Opposite in Country "A" asks you about the United States' policy towards a number of other countries in the alphabet. If you know precisely, and there is no security classification, tell him, but, even then, certain indications of personal limitations of knowledge would serve you well. If you don't know, don't guess, but if you do, tell him you're guessing. The best answer here would be to tell him what you know and can safely say and then explain to him that there are several thousand others like yourself in the Foreign Service--like you and much higher--who handle our relations with the well over one hundred nations in the world with which your country must and does have relations. Your Opposite, who may be a sizeable percentage of the total personnel of his Foreign Office, may hear in disbelief your

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mention of the size and diversity of your country's foreign office, but he can look up your information and finding you right, he will have that much more faith in your replies to his future questions. That is establishing your credibility.

The other aspect of credibility is that you are speaking with authority and the confidence of backing. Actually at the outset of your career if you are not speaking with the confidence of backing of your superiors or on specific instructions, you had better not speak at all. Only if you develop the assurance, in yourself first, and then in your Opposite that you are being backed in what you say, can you expect to develop in him the increasing confidence in you that you are speaking with authority. This element, as you go through your career, becomes more and more important if you are to become the effective plenipotentiary which you and we hope you will some day be.

But there is more in establishing credibility than by the true and authoritative word, and that is by your manner and the manifest interest--the sincerity, if you will--in which you approach and handle the problem under discussion or negotiation. If you do not manifest an interest in getting across to your Opposite what your government wants, and he is at all observant, he will "read you loud and clear." Or so he will think until you change his mind. And your credibility will be adversely affected accordingly: first, because you led him to believe that the matter was not important in the eyes of your government, and second because either you or he--and he will blame

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you--misread your government's interest, and he thus inaccurately reported it to his government. As a witty FSO once said: "Play your lines straight and leave the ad libbing to the Ambassador!" This is sound advice. His credibility is based largely on his close proximity to Authority--with a Capital "A". Your credibility is dependent on his backing of you, and your Opposite's understanding of you, your interest in the problem, and your ability to represent your country's position accurately.

Show an interest in your presentation and discussion of your subject with your Opposite and you may not only stimulate his interest in it but in your conviction and sincerity about it. Concentrate on the subject, and you are more likely to find your Opposite doing so too, instead of thinking up alternatives or diversions. Follow this advice and you may be a two-time winner: first, because your representation may be a success, and second because you may have increased your Opposite's respect for your credibility--his confidence in your word and authority and your sincerity.

Actually this advice is easier to give than to take--even by the highest and most experienced in our government's service. Once, for example, I had to discuss the matter of his credibility with Ambassador Johnston during one of our various trips to the Middle East on the Jordan River Plans. The Ambassador was an exceedingly active and restless man. He hated to wait around--which is one of the least attractive aspects of any full-fledged negotiation. One time he suddenly decided that he would go to Rome to see the Pope.

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It took a bit of talking to persuade him that his perfectly sincere visit to the Vatican would be interpreted, however wrongly, by the Area press--Arab and Israeli alike--as some secret effort to inject the status of Jerusalem into our negotiations. This was certainly farthest from his wishes in wanting to junket to Rome. He had painstakingly assured both sides that his sole interest and concern was the economical and equitable development of the Jordan River system--nothing more. He fervently meant what he had said, and while his credibility might well have survived his having gone to Rome, given his personal charm and persuasiveness, it would have suffered sufficiently to have set back severely the progress we had hitherto made during our negotiations.

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In summary, credibility must have an extremely high value for you and for your Opposite. Anything that you do to depreciate its value by your spoken word or your manner, may not only affect your value but short-change the country you represent.

4. Sense of Timing and Tactics.

Someone once suggested that if one were to paint a portrait of "The Negotiator" the subject would be wearing track shoes (for fast footwork), holding an epee in one hand (for thrusting and parrying), a chess-board in the other hand (for planning moves ahead), and he would be seated in a rocking-chair (for all the time-biding he has to do).

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Imagery aside, a person may have all the other attributes required and mentioned in this treatise, but if he does not know how, when, and where to use his best efforts, and know when to relax and when to step them up, the chances are he will never be a successful negotiator. To too many at your early stage of diplomatic service this may conjure up the personal qualities of craftiness and cleverness. I am not suggesting that these concepts be totally dismissed, but, you should dismiss the possible overtone of deviousness, for, as has been already observed, nothing of lasting worth is to be gained thereby in mid-20th Century negotiations.



A. The real experts know how to pace themselves with a thorough knowledge of their subject and of their Opposites, they go into negotiating with clear ideas as to where and when they want to end up. This means that before they start they have made as sound estimates as possible on what their optimum objectives are; what fall-back positions, if any, there will be; and how long it will take to arrive at a conclusion or agreement. The estimate of how long any negotiation is going to take is, of course, the hardest to arrive at, but if the negotiator is to make sound judgments as to the intensiveness of his presentation or the amount of reflection, or delaying, he is to want, or accept, he must have some idea of when the negotiations should end. After all, a good pitcher knows that he is supposed to survive nine innings and he will throw accordingly.

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Of course there have been some gorgeous goofs in estimating expected elapsed time. One of those who gave me of his wisdom and time recalls one negotiating assignment when he was assured that the positions of the two parties which he was asked to reconcile were so close that a quiet weekend away in the country would suffice. The quiet weekend turned into two weeks, the net result of which was agreement on how and when they would meet again some months later!

International conferences and bodies, like the UN General Assembly, usually set dates for their end so that the participants can allocate their attentions and energies in achieving whatever may be their objectives. Negotiating against a deadline such as one has at the General Assembly can produce ulcers and some horrible resolutions, but not infrequently it has the advantage of forcing decisions which some delegates or delegations would not like to make, and of ignoring or dropping some items of little but perennial significance.


Where your Ambassador, your superior, or especially you are concerned in bilateral dealings, dead lines will seldom be feasible unless required in your instructions. But you will find, even if only in your mind's eye, that estimating how much of your time will, or should be consumed, will help you set your approach and pace in carrying out your assignments. This is fair both to your mind and to your body.



The fact is, high level negotiation, in particular, requires a very high level of physical and mental energy. Whenever you are involved in such negotiations your responsibilities should be to conserve the energies of your superiors and to learn how they manage to pace themselves. I would point out--and you will discover it in those whom you observe--that this level of energy in the expert negotiators is self-sustained. In part this is due to their own self-confidence which has been built up in them through years of experience. In part it is due to the seldom-admitted, but essential, fact that they enjoy negotiating. But in largest measure, it is due to deliberate self-imposed mental and physical regimes.

Secretary Dulles had incredible physical and mental stamina, even despite his cancer which he at least outwardly chose to ignore. Yet when it would occasionally flag, he would go off to Duck Island to sail and cook--if only for a weekend--and come back revitalized and full of new ideas which would keep "the likes of me" busy for weeks after. When he wanted to switch from one subject to another, it was like turning over a record. The tune might be entirely different, but the player was turning at exactly the same speed.

Ambassador Johnston could be described as "a bit of a health fiend." He had inexhaustable energy: he had to be doing something or going somewhere all the time. For example, he liked to walk, and extremely fast (as I early had to learn, since he rather enjoyed trying to outpace unsuspecting security details). Yet when he was at the






negotiating table he could be sphynx-like. He could be a rapt attentive listener. He adhered to a remarkably rigid system of eating and sleeping. And when he relaxed, he relaxed. His mental energy was as great. He had an insatiable curiosity and interest in people and in numberable things, and he was forever thinking up new approaches to our negotiating problems--causing us on his staff to have far more irregular hours than he would permit himself!

I cite these two illustrations to suggest that more than ordinary physical and mental energy is absolutely necessary in an expert negotiator and it must be self-sustaining. It is not, however, to argue that negotiators have to be manifest human dynamoes, for I would hasten to vouch for the fact that most of the successful ones I know now--a number of whom were helpful in the preparation of this treatise--are externally composed (some almost to the point of apparent lethargy), and quite mild in manner and speech. Yet they meet the requirements.

All the above suggests the necessity of poise and will power, which will be discussed later. Here it is mentioned in the context of pacing negotiations and the tactics involved.

To illustrate what I mean by "pacing negotiation" consider the plan which Ambassador Johnston followed in the Jordan Valley Development Project. He realized that the basic political situation was, and probably would continue to be, extremely hostile and unstable. Therefore any sudden local flare-up could upset, stall, or destroy any



negotiations which might be planned for or going on in the area at the time. (He was right: it almost seemed as though Arab-Israeli border incidents coincided with our visits to the area). Time to change plans or adjust had to be, and were anticipated.

Because it was impossible to get the two sides within shouting distance of each other it was necessary to go to the area and shuttle between the two sides. The visits had to be sufficiently well spaced apart so that new ideas and technical studies could be produced by us and by them. Our main task between the <sup>trips</sup> for intensive negotiation was to devise proposals for bringing the diverse plans of the two sides into as much technical similarity and feasibility as possible.

The Ambassador started with the posture, which was persuasive and sincere throughout, that the achievement of an agreement on a Jordan Valley Plan was a key objective of United States foreign policy. He made it a cardinal rule to see and consult with President Eisenhower, and Secretary Dulles, (and UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold) before and after our trips to the area. He impressed upon those with whom he negotiated how interested in and conversant with our efforts these distinguished leaders were, and thereby quite successfully implied that their interest in the countries involved was and would be correlated with the progress in reaching an agreement.

The Ambassador so phased our negotiations as to start out with, as he described the first visit, "getting my foot in the door."

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To the leaders of the countries visited he gave copies of our initial proposals which had been prepared under TVA guidance and an excellent engineering firm. They were so carefully thought out and detailed that a quick reaction or rejection was impossible and this he stressed, saying that he would come back to see them in a few months after they had studied the plans, and come up with some ideas or counter-proposals of their own. By this initial move he minimized hostility to him and the plan, and gave them time for careful thinking. But he made clear that President Eisenhower backed his efforts and therefore he definitely would be returning for further negotiating.

The second visit which occurred a little over half a year later was primarily one for exploring counter-proposals. This was a time in which to show our receptivity to their proposals and to build up their receptiveness to our efforts--not necessarily to the plan which Ambassador Johnston had handed them on the first trip. By careful emphasis on economic and technical feasibility, he successfully deemphasized the political problems involved, and encouraged Arab organization and cooperation in counter-proposals.

The third trip was aimed at obtaining areas of specific agreement on such things as basic water allocations and the location and types of diversions. These reached near identity but necessitated a fourth trip which was centered on getting technical, political, and drafting language agreement between the Arabs and us on one side and between Israel and us on the other. For the record, we achieved

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the technical and drafting language agreements. Unhappily on the last day the Arab Prime and Foreign Ministers meeting in Cairo couldn't bring themselves to political agreement.

As for your own sense of timing or pacing, when the occasion arises for you to approach your Opposite to negotiate whatever matter it may be, an initially relaxed attitude-- however critical the matter--is a sine qua non for two reasons: (1) you want an agreement--something no one every gets in a rush; and (2) your Opposite may have different ideas as to the importance he attaches to your problem, or how much time he is prepared to devote to it.

Implicit in any initiative on your part is that you not only want to talk but are quite prepared to listen thoughtfully and patiently. And this takes time. It has long been my observation, as well as that of the many more expert, that most of your Opposites may have more time than anything else. Many of our friends throughout the world find American energy and zeal to get things done puzzling, if not exhausting, to them. They don't want to be pushed or rushed into a decision and frequently suspect that something may be "put over" on them if they yield to haste.

\* If this is the likely feeling of our friends, then those not friendly to us can be expected not only to be suspicious of haste, but also to be determined to stall, delay, consume time either as a means of avoiding or preventing agreement altogether, or as a technique whereby they may wear down our patience and perhaps gain



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greater concessions thereby. The Chinese Communists, for example, at the beginning of the Geneva Conference on Laos in May 1961 blandly announced that they had leased an entire hotel for six months when most delegations had indicated hopes that the conference wouldn't last more than a few weeks!

A relaxed attitude at the outset, however, is as fair to you as to your Opposite. Any agreement worth seeking requires a consistent level of interest being manifested by you and being sought from your Opposite. Too much zeal at the outset followed by an apparent let-down in your interest may quickly convince your Opposite that you are not serious in negotiating, or are unsure of your position, inclining him less and less to come to agreement with you.

The early period of any negotiation should be a time and in an atmosphere for frank, friendly, and thoughtful mutual assessment of your respective positions, and of each other. One of our most skillful negotiators combines an indicated ready availability to his Opposite at any time with "Please think it over. I don't want an answer tonight." This, he has found, tells his Opposite that he is always ready to proceed with the business before them while showing a willingness to proceed at a pace suitable to both.

The early period, most important of all, is that time when you are most likely to get across to your Opposite the clearest understanding of what it is you want from him. It is his same opportunity with you. History is too full of agreements that collapsed because of misunderstandings. It is a disservice, therefore, to your country and to yourself not to have made absolutely clear at the outset of



any negotiation what your respective positions are on the problem before you. This takes time. And if there is any initial misunderstanding that is not cleared up, the chances are excellent you will have no satisfactory meeting of minds--the essential element of a lasting agreement. Certainly in the ensuing discussions there may be enough differences of position or opinion which will need compromising, "rephrasing", or "fuzzing over" without you and your Opposite starting out in correctly presenting, reviewing, and assessing your extreme differences, and your area of possible agreement.

Once the general area of possible agreement has been identified sufficiently by both sides, and the initial offers and counter-proposals have given some inkling as to the chances or extent of "give" by either or both sides, then the opportunities for maneuver begin to open up. These can include: (1) stepping up or slowing down your pressure for agreement; (2) figuring out which items of interest will be concentrated on or relegated to later or lower level discussion; and (3) deciding on where you must stand firm and on what you may make concessions in the interest of ultimate agreement.

Regarding stepping up or slowing down pressure for agreement the advice is generally that, unless you have perceived your Opposite's position is so extremely divergent from yours you can't hope to achieve the prompt ascertainment of the possible area of agreement, you should maintain a consistent and friendly "all business" pressure. Relaxing such pressure should be considered: (1) when physical fatigue is a deterrent to worthwhile discussion;


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(2) where points of difference or difficulty begin to accumulate; or  
 (3) where you or your Opposite have "played out" your persuasive lines, are merely repeating yourselves, or become engaged in a marathon debate (something which is seldom, if ever, productive).

On points (1) and (3) just cited above, initiative to recess or adjourn to a specified time, "to rest", or "to think things over" may actually help you with your Opposite, provided you both understand that you are not saying a definite "no" to the other's position or breaking off the negotiations. The experts say under conditions (1) and (3) that relaxation of pressure is justified. They point out that you don't want to be too eager. Rather you should indicate you are prepared to wait. Too much pressure can "crowd your luck"; can get your Opposite's "back up", or can, erroneously, convince him that you are begging (in which case the price for agreement will go up). Weary negotiators have been known to agree, but seldom--if ever--has the sigh of satisfaction come from both sides!

As for slowing down in the face of accumulating points of difference, there are several possible ways of proceeding, all of which should start with you and your Opposite agreeing on the number and identity of these differences. If they can be "depoliticized", that is, described as "technical differences" so much the better. This, peculiarly enough, often lowers the political heat or interest in them. If you can accomplish this then: (1) you and your Opposite may refer these points to "experts"; (2) you may constitute yourselves as a sort of sub-committee with terms of reference limited

*P52 not missing  
 notes (mis-  
 numbered)*



to resolving these "technical" problems; or (3) you may jointly agree to refer the problems back to your governments or to your superiors for new guidance or resolution as they may see fit. By all three procedures you and your Opposite are agreeing on a changed pace and possibly a delay before recommencing negotiations. With regard to the third suggested procedure it should be borne in mind that in referring "technical" matters upward you are implying that you do not see how you can resolve them satisfactorily and that perhaps they are not of sufficient importance to warrant further haggling over. This can leave your superior in the position of "giving" if he decides to do so on some or all of these points of difference in the interests of "getting" some other matter more important to him.

If your superior and his Opposite should resort to the "expert" or "sub-committee" means of settling the itemized points of difference and you are tapped for the job, you should obtain guidance from him as to the importance he attaches to them and their resolution. It is quite likely that he may wish them discussed and possibly resolved quietly and in a low key. If so, you should not think of your negotiation as anything other than a cadenza in his total orchestration.

B. As earlier suggested, maneuver in negotiation is not limited to the problem of pace. Selection among points to be concentrated on as opposed to those to be deemphasized can become the critical element in successful agreement. Since negotiation involves "give" as well as "take", once you have established your wants, and your Opposite his, you will have to establish your priorities of things



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to be achieved and things to be ceded if necessary. Your Opposite will be doing the same. Actually at your level and for some years to come, they will have been clearly established for you in your instructions--or, more likely, in those of your superior. However, instructions or not, superior or not, you should learn, as a mental exercise, what the priorities among your various objectives in any negotiation should be. The capacity to develop and decide upon these priorities is one of the most important capabilities of any really successful negotiator--particularly since the occasions can arise when instructions don't exist, can't be gotten fast enough, or are inadequate to give him "on the spot" guidance.

Normally, whenever priorities are established the matters peripheral to the main objective or objectives of the negotiation will be deemed the expendable items, or the things you can "give" on. But you should anticipate that your Opposite goes through the same exercise and you both may be prepared to "give" on many of the same things. Depending on how numerous are the items under discussion, given this development you could consider "swapping" a point here for a point there, or agreeing with your Opposite that since you both low-rate the same item they be dropped or further consideration of them be postponed. If the over-all number of items under negotiation are few, however, you may want to make a mental note to up-grade one of your low-rated items in order to inject it into the bargaining equation later. What is important in handling low-rated items with your Opposite is that, if you agree on how they



are to be handled, you not don't reraise an item unless he does so first. Initiative of this sort can legitimately raise doubts in the mind of the other as to the good faith of the initiator in wanting an over-all agreement.

Having established your priorities you should then proceed to press for your main objectives. This involves decisions of how firm or flexible to be. While the number of objectives to be sought generally must govern and require flexibility, the clearest understanding of your Opposite's determination, and his negotiating techniques, is essential in deciding how firm you are going to be in maintaining your position.

Experts who have dealt with Soviet or Communist Chinese negotiators argue for great firmness in maintaining one's position. Johnson and Dennett in Negotiating with the Russians say: "Once a position has been worked out, the non-Soviet negotiator must be prepared to uphold it in detail, and for a long time. The technique of constantly trying out variant versions, which works well in the Western style of negotiations only confuses the Soviet representative, who suspects some new trick in each new variant and must subject each in turn to exhaustive interpretation. ....Even slight shifts in position or wording increase his belief that the adversary's position is a shaky one and thus encourage him to hold out that much longer for the full Soviet position." (p. 299)

Admiral Turner Joy in his book How Communists Negotiate, says "Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, merely to

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make progress. Make the Communists pay for your acceptance of their point of view. Require an equivalent concession to match yours. This will not only double the number of agreements you achieve in a given period of time, but will impress upon the Communists the conviction that you are neither soft-headed, gullible, nor weak. To a Communist, your ready acceptance of his proposed solution merely because it is logical and correct is a sign of at least undue haste, indicating a precarious basis on your part." (p. 170)

It may be said of our Western friends that while they may stoutly press for or defend their positions they generally have adequate flexibility to reach an agreement.

It has been my experience that our Middle Eastern friends have a high degree of flexibility (frequently I have had the feeling that they were under no instructions at all!) and as good bargainers want to be sure that the price is as high as possible for their agreement.

Obviously these comments on our Western and Middle Eastern friends are generalizations and as such can be misleading in individual cases or situations. Nevertheless, while dealing in generalizations it is worthwhile suggesting that: (1) where you are met with flexibility, you are expected by your Opposite to be flexible, and (2) where you are met with firmness, it is not expected to last but to ensure the highest quid pro quo for the concession to be made.

How do you deal with your Opposite's apparent flexibility?

It is reasonably safe to say that in a situation such as this you have a identifiable basis for agreement and you have probably reached "the drafting stage." Usually this will mean you or your





language, the avoidance of unnecessary emphasis of unpalatable truths, the approach through the recognition of common interests, these are sometimes as necessary as clarity of expression or logical process."

Despite the observations just made, the general sound advice remains: Stick to precision in your drafting. Otherwise you may have an embarrassing chapter or two in your autobiography! Precise understanding with your Opposite is absolutely essential if another language as well as English is to have official acceptance. Leave clever drafting or "fuzzing" to your superior, or do it only with his agreement.

Two final observations on the use of the "draft". First: a premature draft may force your Opposite to produce a counter-draft, the likely net effect of which is to rigidify your respective positions and to raise the problems of "pride of authorship" and "love of one's own words". While an early draft may occasionally be resorted to to elicit some sort of response from a reluctant Opposite (or one in need of new instructions), generally a draft should be the very natural result of mutual understanding that you both want to "put it down on paper and see what it looks like".

Second: once you have gone to drafting it is essential to stick at it. The decisions to stop can imply--if it does not in fact become explicit--you or your Opposite have decided that there is "No Deal". Actually, persistence--with manifest good-will--will carry the day, if not by you, then by your superior.

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Whether you propose to be "reluctant" or not, bracketing items definitely can make concessions easier in the interest of agreement, providing you have definitely decided in advance that the two items are of basically the same value and importance. If they aren't, you're almost certain to wind up making unnecessary concessions on the more important of the items or giving in completely on the other item to protect your interests in the more important.

So much for flexibility.

What about firmness in negotiation--on your part and from your Opposite?

At the outset, bear in mind: Unyielding firmness produces no agreement: conceivably, it could produce capitulation. Thus, if you, your Opposite, or both of you want an agreement, firmness is a phase of, not the condition for, agreement--notwithstanding all of the wisdom of all of the red-blooded orators, columnists, strategists, experts, etc.

Obviously, there can be occasions where you or your Opposite may decide that no agreement is better than agreeing on the terms or conditions then under discussion. In such a situation, taking a manifestly intransigent line or a tougher line than that with which you started will almost certainly insure no agreement. As a negotiator you should always bear in mind, especially where your Opposite has not proven trustworthy, that it is far better to remain alert with no agreement than relaxed in the false confidence that a worthwhile agreement has been made. Thus, the United States' firm insistence

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on adequate verification and safeguards has not produced a disarmament treaty, but we and the Free World are far better off than to have accepted something deceptive or unworkable from the Soviets.

Where firmness is to be a phase leading to agreement it should be used to protect or achieve the main or most important item being considered. Too broadly applied it will readily convince your Opposite that you really don't want an agreement. In being firm on your main item, judiciously repeated friendly and thoughtful persuasion as to the justice and validity of your stand is the best approach. Clearly this means that you must know your subject, for your knowledge of it is your best offense and defense.

If you are on the defensive, i.e. you have obviously been out-talked, out-argued, or otherwise out-maneuvered, you can ultimately fall back on "your instructions" or "the Department insists...etc." But this defense will usually imply to your Opposite that you want "to live to fight another day." It does have the virtue--also probably clear to your Opposite--that if you want to change your position it can be done by "changed instructions."

In multilateral negotiations, such as at the UN, firmness is easier and often more necessary than in bilateral relations. In the UN Councils and the General Assembly where our power and organizational abilities are still generally recognized, even groups of unsympathetic delegations are hesitant to fight too long or hard against a firm United States position. (Many delegations actually look to our leadership and under the circumstances firmness is an essential element.)

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This is not the case in the usual run of bilateral relations. No problem of leadership or looking to it is likely to be involved. Therefore, a firm line can run the risk of looking like dictation. You should always be acutely aware of your Opposite's sensitivity to this possibility. Thus, if you are required to persist in a firm position where this sensitivity can be aroused, where resentment--however concealed--can build up, you should try to devise or have ready some form of incentive or palliative for your Opposite's accepting your position. As one, who contributed his thoughts to this work, said: "Give them some orange juice with the castor oil."

How long you maintain a firm position with your Opposite is completely a matter of judgment or intuition. In a way, all of the elements of the negotiation are involved: the substance of what you are willing to "give" in order to "get"; any deadline or other timing problem you may be up against, and the physical and mental stamina--or lack thereof--of your Opposite (and yourself, for that matter!). Experience is the only real guide, and for you it will be careful observation first.



Essential in this entire discussion of "firmness as a phase" is that whenever you do change your line, presumably toward compromise, be sure your Opposite understands it as a victory and tribute to him and his position, and a great concession on your part. In the analogy of the market-place, you may well pick up some extraordinary bargains and even some free samples that way!

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Having thus far discussed firmness on your part, how do you overcome it in your Opposite? Five ways come to mind: (1) Amiably and patiently try to reason him out of his position, or toward yours; (2) stiffen your position vis-a-vis it or another point you know is important to him; (3) go around the problem or (and this is not advised except in unusual circumstances) around or over him; (4) use the "Do Nothing" technique; and (5) "conclude with regret."

The first two ways are presumably obvious; although a caveat should be mentioned with regard to the second. You should not so stiffen your position that you cannot unbend without embarrassment, or live with your stiffer position if you are suddenly "stuck with it." Also you should not attempt to reopen or reconsider your position on a point of his if you have already agreed to it. This could unhinge the whole negotiation by implying your bad faith.

With regard to going around the problem, this is probably the most effective technique and can logically follow from either of the first two methods cited for coping with firmness. A change of venue for the negotiations can be most helpful. Quite possibly your Opposite has so committed himself publicly--or his position is so publicly or generally known--that as a matter of pride etc. he cannot back down. Arrange for quiet informal discussions with him or with some trusted go-between to see if there are possible areas of agreement, some other item that could be considered while the "bone of contention" is postponed, or some face-saving procedure devised. The "two nuggets" approach previously referred to is a satisfactory a way of going around a problem.





As for going around or over your Opposite, this should have only one objective, and God help you if it fails. That objective is to remove your Opposite from the negotiation in order to reach an agreement with his government. It is the utmost wisdom to assume and act as though you accept the fact that your Opposite is his government's spokesman; is strictly following his instructions; and that ultimate agreement will come through him. Going around or over him implies that you no longer accept that estimate of him, and so far as your dialogue is concerned it is probably ended. It would be exceedingly unpleasant for you if he returned to the negotiating table with the obvious backing of his government!

An Opposite of mine once tried this on me and when my position and backing were reaffirmed and I returned to the negotiations it was exceedingly and mutually unpleasant. My Opposite, whom I considered (I still do) a good friend, had been talked into the move. The renewed meeting proved so deeply embarrassing to him that he quickly ceded most of his position to end the talks.

The tactic can work, though, particularly in multilateral negotiation, where, as someone once said, "Everybody eyes everybody. Everybody hears everybody. Everbody knows everbody." In such a situation persistent firmness can be hazardous to the one who persists, unless he has the power and votes behind him. "Corridor Gossip" can quite quickly and effectively lessen if not undermine a delegate's unyielding position.

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A number of years ago a very amiable and courtly--but extremely astute--negro lawyer was a member of the United States Delegation to the UN General Assembly. I was assigned as his adviser and we were given one of the General Assembly's hardest perennial problems-- the Palestine Refugees question. For a number of years, the "spokesman" for the Arab delegations had been a very articulate but absolutely arrogant member of one of their delegations. The United States, as the leading financial contributor to the welfare of the refugees, always had the unhappy task of negotiating a resolution with this "spokesman". Each year he became more impossible to do business with. Our lawyer-delegate had been determined to have a friendly session or two with him and come out with a satisfactory resolution. He had the sessions, with the friendliness all a one-way operation. The "spokesman" laid down a series of conditions which the United States had to accept if there were to be any negotiation on a resolution at all. This posture didn't surprise me but it infuriated our Delegate. After the "spokesman" had grandly reiterated his ultimatum and left, we decided on a strategy to get rid of the "spokesman". For the next three days we sat all day long in the Delegates' Lounge at the UN and appeared in relaxed conversation. Each day, our Delegate made a point of asking the "spokesman" when could we start negotiating a resolution? "Other delegations were inquiring"; "Time was getting embarrassingly short" etc. The "spokesman" became even stiffer and suggested that he was an extremely busy delegate, planning ahead on other problems since



we couldn't settle the refugee resolution negotiation on the terms he'd indicated as mandatory. To the other delegations, especially the individual Arab delegations, we cheerfully talked about everything but the refugee question. To direct questions as to how the resolution was coming along we merely said cryptically: "It isn't"; "It's out of our hands at the moment" etc.

After three days of the sitting game and compounding bewilderment for innumerable delegations, my Delegate told me to go to the head of one of the Arab delegations, who was a good friend of mine, and say: "When are we going to sit down and work out the resolution? We've been sitting, waiting, and available, but your 'spokesman' won't negotiate." What happened after that was among the Arabs-- which they handled in their own way. The next day my friend wanted to know how soon we could get together on a resolution drafting session. Later, I saw the "spokesman", who shot back at me, "I won't be attending your sessions. Don't you know I'm busy on the Algerian question?"

A fourth technique for handling your Opposite's firm stand is the so-called "Do Nothing" strategy. This consists literally of doing nothing, saying nothing, manifesting no reflex to your Opposite's stand or rejection of your position. This can be effective only once in any negotiation unless your Opposite is the volatile type, and the implication to him of your non-reaction to his emotional stand is shock or displeasure. This may lead him to apologize or soften his stand. The important thing in your non-reaction is non-reaction. You obviously have to have some means of leaving the negotiating table

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such as with a friendly "I'll think it over". But, that said and done, don't go back to the table: just stay apparently available should your Opposite want to take the initiative to restart the talks. And let him worry about you, what you're thinking, and how he can restart the dialogue.

This technique was once very skillfully used by one of our most experienced Ambassadors during a negotiation for an air-base. His Opposite wound up a statement of his government's position with an absolute refusal to consider a base agreement. Our Ambassador excused himself and returned to his residence where he stayed sphynx-like for a number of days. Finally his Opposite sent a subordinate to the residence one evening to "inquire when the Ambassador wished to resume the negotiations." We got the base agreement!

Having described this technique, I would assure you that there are genuine risks in its use. Your Opposite may decide that you have definitely terminated the negotiations with him by your apparent "walk-out". He may not have intended to do this, but be willing to accept the idea that the talks with you are over. If so, and you are under instructions to get an agreement you have failed and through your own misjudgment. If you have to take the initiative to restart the negotiations the price of agreement will undoubtedly be higher!

The essential element in your using the "Do Nothing" approach is your sure knowledge that your Opposite really wants an agreement. This means again: Know your Opposite and his problems.


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The fifth approach to your Opposite's firm stand is in some ways akin to the fourth. It is the "Conclude with regret" technique. The implication in this is that you have decided that no agreement is possible and further dialogue is a mutual waste of time. It should logically come after you have made a friendly and unemotional analysis--for the benefit of both of you--of your Opposite's apparently immutable position. You come to the regretful conclusion that, much as you had hoped to reach an agreement, it doesn't seem possible.

The summary and conclusion gives your Opposite an opportunity to "correct" your analysis i.e. change his position if he wishes, or accept onus for failure to reach agreement. The pressure is clearly on him to move from his firm stand, if he is going to do so, or to figure out some face-saving device for keeping the negotiations going.

There are, as with the other suggested techniques, risks in "Concluding with regret." Again, your Opposite may conclude that you are terminating the discussions; that you don't want an agreement; even though you say you do and want to go on. In any event, he will probably so rationalize your statement and action. Furthermore, if he evidences no reflex to your "Conclusions", and you do leave the negotiating table your position is far less enigmatic than under the "Do Nothing" approach and hence less likely to move him to subsequent softening of his stand.

The "Conclusion" approach, however, does have the advantage for your Opposite that it is somewhat less embarrassing to him to restart the dialogue, if he wants to, because he may do so on the basis of your last reflex rather than on your enigmatic silence.



C. No discussion of timing and tactics should be considered complete, in my opinion, without some mention of two other necessary elements: intuition and teamwork--the first an individually developed sense; and the second, a collectively developed sense.

In this treatise, intuition relates to the immediate aspects of timing and tactics. Advanced planning has been discussed. What is here suggested is something like the difference between playing good chess and good poker. As you become a more experienced negotiator you will develop that "poker" approach whereby you anticipate moments for decision with your Opposite, and will, so to speak, "play your cards accordingly." These passing moments of unique opportunity or astute inaction have not yet been "computerized", perhaps fortunately. They come when your Opposite is in any of myriad moods or situations--manifest or obscured. Since all negotiators are human and are to a certain extent, vis-a-vis their Opposites, being both obvious and inscrutable, your intuition is your helper in deciding momentarily when and how you gain your objective with your Opposite: when you leave him alone; or when you take a present loss for a future greater gain.

There is more than ample wit and wisdom on the subject of diplomatic intuition:

"You will never get a satisfactory agreement from a Latin in the presence of ladies; from an Englishman upset by the cricket match; from a Russian in the evening; or anybody the morning after."

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--"The Hunch may be before Lunch, but the Crunch comes after Lunch."

--"Don't guess what the other fellow has on his mind by what you have on yours: he may be able to think."

In resorting to intuition there is perhaps only one standard rule: You are trying to anticipate, not outsmart, your Opposite in the interests of gaining what you and he both want--an agreement.

Remember the story of my waking the Head of the Arab Delegation. To me the timing appeared to be completely wrong and the complicated matter of the international control system for the Jordan River so irritatingly difficult to discuss as to insure His Excellency's quite rightfully and wrathfully blasting me into Arab Outer Space. Ambassador Johnston, however, felt, had a hunch, guessed, call-it-what-you-will, that our Arab friends wanted to agree with us on something. Up to that time we had talked pleasantly but we hadn't agreed on anything. What I had to discuss was something somewhat out of the main stream of our unproductive talks so far. The Ambassador proved right on the moment, the man, and the subject.

I recall another occasion of excellent intuition when in the too early spring of 1956 the Arab-Israeli border situation was critical. It happened that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, on the regular rotational basis was President of the UN Security Council. The United States proposed that Mr. Hammarskjold go to the troubled area, survey the situation, and report back to the Council with recommendations. The Soviet Representative made it ominously apparent

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that he would veto the resolution we were proposing, particularly if Syria were unhappy with it. Ambassador Lodge presided over the sessions of the Council. With determined despatch, he drew out all of the Soviet amendments, had them swiftly voted down and then announced (as was his right as sponsor of the resolution) that our resolution would be voted on as a whole--thus preventing a partial or paragraph-by-paragraph veto by the Soviets. Despite the Soviet Representative's bluster, Ambassador Lodge suspected that the Soviets would not, on such short notice, veto the whole resolution when the Syrian Representative had spoken favorably of several sections of our resolution. He was right.

While the above are obviously dramatic illustrations of what is in reality a subtle talent, what you will want to bear in mind is that by developing and using your intuition, anything from a thoughtful word to your Opposite at the right moment to some sudden dramatic move in an international arena may produce the wanted agreement.

Teamwork, the collectively developed sense, can easily prove the difference between success and disaster in your timing and tactics. Obviously if your are teamed up with just yourself all you have to do is let your left hand know what your right hand is doing. But when you're on a mission, or working for your superior on some negotiation, you must learn to think together, work together, coordinate your plans, and speak as one. This may sound easy enough but, particularly if the mission is of any fair-sized number, and talents and tempers vary, it can be a very difficult thing. And, if a negotiation drags

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on with no discernable deadline teamwork can become a virtually super-human effort.

Here I speak with a certain degree of feeling. Between service on the Jordan River Valley mission, and on all but two US Delegations to the UN General Assembly as an adviser between 1950 and 1960, I can attest to the fact that people, with the best will in the world and under the finest leadership, can become collectively difficult with longer association. This can be because of personality problems or democratic differences. Whatever the cause, the result can be the same: A production involving decreasing talent and increasing temper.

I hereby recommend to you that, at whatever level you come into mission or group negotiations, you assign to yourself the quiet role of "Buffer": the guy who may ultimately have to be volunteer psychiatrist, court jester, conscience, pay-master, bartender, tour guide, Poobah, Jr. Grade. Take the assignment in trepidation, but perform it with the conviction that internal team-work excellence is external excellence so far as your country's posture and policy is concerned.

For teamwork there must be not only for the maintenance of your group's equilibrium, but also for insuring that you all are as one in dealing with your Opposites. I have discussed this before, but it needs to be repeated here when talking of time and tactics.

Nothing can throw your timing and tactics off more thoroughly than having your Opposite surmise or learn the lack of coordination,

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or division of council within your group. Your Opposite will either be confused by your group's lack of teamwork, or he may play upon it in the hope of weakening your position (a tactic which usually succeeds, I might add). In either case, your timing in trying to reach an agreement will be adversely affected.

I have known the diplomatic representatives of some countries who make deliberate efforts to approach as many of our representatives as they can in the hope of finding divisions of counsel so they could assess the firmness (or lack thereof) of our policy or position. In defense of the divisions of counsel that have been detected, it should be pointed out that total communication is increasingly unlikely, the larger the group involved in a negotiation.

Communication is essential to teamwork, and "the more the meritorious." A head of delegation should make it a cardinal requirement of all those working for him and should apply it to himself, too. If he doesn't and you are on his delegation, you see to it that it happens. He, of all people on the delegation, should be informed at all times of what has been planned, said, carried out, fulfilled, unfulfilled, won, lost, "where do we go from here" etc. This is not advocating your being the "eager-beaver" messenger. This is suggesting that, as quietly and effectively as you can, you work with your colleagues, superiors, etc. to see to it that the head of delegation always knows what is going on and that, at least, his immediate subordinates are "queued in" on as much as possible. If you bear in mind that the head of delegation is compromised when

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when something he has said or position he has taken is not similarly conveyed or verified by you at your level you--and he--will see the need for maximum coordination and communication.

I never had this so forcefully impressed upon me as when I was serving on Secretary Dulles' staff at the time of the special meetings of the UN Security Council in October 1956 on the Suez Canal crisis. On the last day of these meetings when (as usual) a draft resolution was required for debate and Council action, I was told to work on getting agreement on a draft with the Egyptians--a challenging assignment, I might suggest. I knew the Foreign Minister (and his Personal Assistant much better). I spent the entire day working away at a possibly mutually acceptable resolution with the Personal Assistant. Occasionally, he would check our draft with his Foreign Minister. I didn't check with my "front office", however, because I thought I had been "told" what to do and was doing it.

It may be one of those ironic vignettes of history that with all of the activity that crowded that day, I got tentative agreement from the Egyptians to wording that was obviously far more favorable to us than Mr. Dulles had ever expected. However, the problem was not so simple. His fundamental concern throughout the Council sessions had been to keep our British and French friends from precipitate action or ultimate hostilities in the settlement of the Canal crisis. Hence, to satisfy them he had, earlier the same day, agreed with them on a draft resolution which involved the Soviet's probably vetoing the very section of the resolution on which I had

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been so carefully laboring. The Egyptian Foreign Minister apparently was not so certain of a Soviet veto, nor did he want it as Egypt's only salvation. Hence, he was bewildered by my day-long drafting efforts with his Personal Assistant and wondered what the United States might be up to in perhaps trying to get agreement with Egypt to avoid a Soviet veto.

When the Secretary heard what I had been doing and what I had accomplished, he said: "For Heaven's Sake, tell Ludlow to stop! We've already agreed that that section of the resolution can be vetoed." The Soviets obliged, but not before there had been some genuine confusion as to how much farther the United States was prepared to go in getting agreement.

This incident is illustrative of a clear failure of communication. For my part, I had not checked earlier on what the Secretary had done, and to report what I was doing. It was also a communications failure for me not to have been told earlier in the day what the Secretary would settle for in the way of a resolution. (I would conclude this merely by saying that there was normally excellent interchange of information, and clear guidance from the Secretary.)

Teamwork is and must be one of your earliest developed senses if you are ever to be a good negotiator

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Throughout this lengthy section I have, if anything, made more dramatic than necessary what may be involved in your early negotiations.

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I have done so because I (along with those who have contributed to this instructional effort) feel deeply that the sooner you acquire a present appreciation for NEGOTIATION as a necessary and desirable part of your future career the better for you and your Country.

Your time for participation in negotiation will come, and quite possibly too soon.

### 5. Self-Possession

The dictionary describes Self-Possession as "The full possession of one's powers or faculties." For the purposes of this section I would describe the definition as inadequate. To it should be added: "and the manifest use and control thereof."

This is definitely a very large order for anyone. Yet in the business of diplomatic negotiation it is an essential requirement, for if a negotiator cannot control and use his various talents and tendencies it is quite likely that he will lose control of the negotiations.

What are these "powers and faculties", these talents and tendencies? Someone jokingly once observed that if you knew the Scout Laws you could be a good Scout, but if you actually practiced them you would be an excellent diplomat. This treatise is not aimed at proving that thesis, but, as will be seen, the list of essential attributes over which you might demonstrate your self-possession is about as long as the one most of us recited while standing at attention with right hand raised! Adaptability. Articulateness. Confidence. Dignity. Good Memory. Modesty. Objectiveness. Patience. Sense of Humor.

NEGOTIATION

**Sociability.** The experts agree that these are human attributes essential in any successful negotiation and are abilities which are always and solely under your control. Your Opposite has nothing to do with them except as he may upset your control over them. He should have some, if not all, of these same talents and, if you and he conceive of your respective self-possession as mutually advantageous, you should have a successful negotiation.

I do not propose to deal with the listed talents above in equal detail. Rather, I suggest that, however obvious all of them appear to be, some warrant particular attention, and comment.

A. Patience: By all odds this is the talent or virtue most necessary of all mentioned or imagined--so all the experts stress. Facetiously, Patience has been defined as "An infinite capacity for being pained" and "the ability to idle your motor when you feel like stripping your gears." (Howard W. Newton). Patience for a negotiator not only includes these concepts, but more. It is, first and foremost, a calmness in attitude and action in dealing with the subject and with your Opposite. It is a perceptive capacity to wait and use the appropriate or natural occasion or moment for making your point or using your controlled emotions. Since few successful negotiations are concluded in a single dialogue, any good negotiator should have a sense of equanimity sufficiently developed not only to see him through the intricacies and uncertainties of the subject matter under discussion but also to cope with the possible unpleasantness

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which differences of positions held, and personalities involved, can generate in a negotiation, particularly as it may become prolonged.

History books can recount the unfortunate results of lost tempers, and of hot or cold threats, whether spontaneous or planned. Tempers and threats have only one effect: the lessening or destruction of your position. Bilateral talks will normally be suspended if not stopped. Multilateral negotiations will almost certainly cause sides to be drawn in favor of the recipient of the temper blast or threat. The Soviets have learned this--although they are often apparently indifferent to the consequences of their conduct.

More frequently faced than temper or threats is the confused, irrational, or stupid Opposite, or his position. Almost certainly at some stage in your career, an Opposite will give you what he thinks is a carefully thought-out critique of how badly or stupidly you or the United States is conducting the negotiations or handling relations with his country. Or, he may really give you "both barrels" for some emotional satisfaction. It is one thing to have wrath and insults heaped upon you, yourself. But, I can assure you, it is nothing to the necessary exercise of self-control when the wrath and insults are directed against your country.

When such an unfortunate occasion comes, you have to "take it". unless the clear intent of your Opposite's display is to insure the termination of the dialogue. It is certainly not your right, and it is unlikely to be your function, to sever diplomatic relations. There is little wisdom in retorting in kind to your Opposite. Don't challenge

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emotion or alleged reason too directly. Sit and "take" in attentive silence and let your Opposite wonder what you're thinking. After all, in most situations he is definitely expecting some reaction--and a prompt one--otherwise he would not engage in the exercise. Even under provocation, you should give the minimum reaction and keep any response as limited and formal as possible.

The essential rule here is: The minimum reflex to maximum flux.

If your Opposite's performance is basically emotional, non-reflex on your part may induce subsequent compensating emotional out-pouring from him which will put the negotiations back on the track. If your Opposite's sounding off is from ignorance or stupidity, non-reflex will give you the opportunity to "ignore or forget diplomatically" what he has said or give you time to consider when and what sort of corrective reply to give him.

If by chance you have some idea, in advance, what sort of stormy weather you're heading into, the preparation of a reply, to be amiably given at an appropriate moment, might be considered.

One expert in such a situation knew that the Prime Minister was going to deliver him a long blast about how unreasonable, slow, and inefficient the United States was in its foreign relations--particularly foreign aid. Our Ambassador, therefore, had a long, long, fusty, factual essay prepared on the legislative process, the relations between the Legislative and Executive branches of the United States Government, and several other related items. When the Prime Minister had

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decision from your Opposite. I would immediately suggest that it seldom works since most Opposites are already convinced that Americans are too impatient any way, and, therefore, the trait need not be taken seriously.

Johnson and Dennett in their Negotiating with the Russians observe on this matter, "It is elementary that the American must have a controlled temper, perhaps to be displayed at the appropriate time (underscoring is mine), but subject to control so that it never appears at the wrong time or blinds the negotiator who lets it run free. It takes a mind untouched by temper or other dulling forces to deal with the usual competent Soviet official who approaches the table." (p. 45).

Histrionic impatience can work, however, if applied in a situation where your Opposite is uninstructed or isn't sure where he's going in his negotiations with you. It may also be tried if you are willing to risk ending the discussion, in the presumption that no progress is really likely. One time, Ambassador Johnston had sat through a whole morning of unhappily confused and conflicting comments from the members of the Arab Technical Committee. He sat silently, attentively, and with no change in his composure. Suddenly at the end of one long uneasy admission of uncertainty from one of the Committee members, he rose from his chair at the table and commenced a slow but clearly agitated pacing up and down the room on our side of the table. Hollywood couldn't have produced a better moment of tense silence. He quietly but suddenly stopped behind

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his rationale previously expounded. Time after time I have successfully gotten their agreement by reminding our Arab and Israeli friends that they were rationalizing their failures to live up to the various Armistice Agreements with the very arguments they had objected to the other side's using. Obviously, this approach has never brought about a peace treaty for the area, but over the years it has made both sides tend to see to it that their records of compliance were defensible before crying "foul" against the other.

The "explore and explore" approach must be considered most likely to produce satisfactory agreement since your Opposite, in effect, talks himself out of all objections to agreement and into accord with you. The only real danger in this technique is that you may lose sight of your original objective! Sir Charles Webster in his The Art and Practice of Diplomacy says "It may also at times be advisable to go a long way up what you know to be a blind alley, which someone has suggested, in order that when the time comes to turn back you may on a second venture be accepted as the guide" (p. 8).

Patience may now seem to you the least attractive attribute to have or develop when you have your whole career ahead of you. But, its importance cannot be underestimated. Fortunately, it is a talent which develops itself with the passage of time.

B. Confidence. This seems so obvious. Yet it needs comment, for if you have no faith in the position you're taking with your Opposite it may "show through." And if you have no confidence in yourself it will make your position transparent and demolishable by

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your Opposite however sound or important it may be.


You have seldom, if ever, bought anything from a salesman who was unsure of himself or his product. Conversely you undoubtedly can recall having bought more than you intended from some salesman because you were persuaded not only to have confidence in what he was selling but to have confidence in him and his judgment.

Confidence begets confidence which begets mutual understanding which begets agreement. It is normally a two-way proposition but energized by one party it can stimulate other parties to increasingly favorable reaction.

There is one easily assumed fallacy in thinking of confidence and that is that the better salesman one is the more favorable agreement he will get. The "big sell" or the "over-sell" can actually frighten the cautious Opposite. Rather, you should think of the analogy of the swimming instructor, who knows and proves that he can swim in order to teach and encourage the timid and doubtful that they can learn to swim. This concept is the one more conducive to the creation of mutual confidence which can lead to satisfactory agreement.

One final thought is that confidence in yourself is based on proof and experience. Your confidence in the position or view you are supporting in a negotiation may be based on neither proof nor experience but only on faith in your superiors and such knowledge of the subject as you may acquire. This will be the proving test of your self-confidence.

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C. Objectiveness. This has been described as "the ability to have one eye on Now and the other on Tomorrow." I have already discussed "Clientitis" so it need not be further labored here except to remind you of it. There is, however, another malady of the creeping kind and that is "Clientphobia". This is just as destructive of your objectiveness. It is born of petty peeves, bred by superciliousness, and blooms in lasting prejudice. The cure is prompt reassignment or retirement, but the preventive is your sense of objectiveness, fairness, and understanding. Part of that understanding should be the continuing thought in your mind that your effectiveness, Now and Tomorrow, as representative of and negotiator for the United States decreases in direct proportion to your loss of objectiveness.

Objectiveness, however, is involved in more than just dealing with people. It is dealing with problems, too. It is the ability to acquire and maintain a sense of proportion among problems; of knowing what is--not what you think should be--important to your country in its relations with the country to which you're assigned. At the outset of your career it will probably be made pretty clear to you the importance your country and your superior attaches to your assigned responsibilities. But as your career proceeds and responsibilities increase, the importance--or lack thereof--of what you are doing may not be at all clear. It is here that it will become difficult to determine what is important Now and what will be important Tomorrow, unless you have developed the discipline of objectiveness.

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It is a most natural human trait to assume that whatever you're doing is important, but when it becomes "of over-riding importance", watch out! Let someone else tell you it is. As it has been soothingly said: "You'll never be the fellow who can't see the woods for the trees. You can't see the trees for the bark!"

A good Ambassador or superior will certainly want to encourage you in your assignment and he should, within reason, see to it that you know where and to what extent your efforts and responsibilities fit into the scheme of things, and whether they may be important Now or Tomorrow. It will be his sense of objectiveness that will make these proper determinations. It will develop your sense of objectiveness to understand his determinations.

Even more essential than having an objective understanding of the relative importance of your work, is the avoidance of becoming emotionally involved in it. We've all seen some of the finest become so emotionally tied up in what they are doing that they become zealots, crusaders, bigots whose every action and judgment is to right a wrong, to uplift, or to tear down with increasingly less concern as to whether the United States' policy interests include or suffer from such subjective actions. Despite its much-criticized size, the United States Government--and the Department of State, as an integral part thereof--can permit and too often is moved by subjective zeal instead of the commonweal. This is fine to a certain extent, but not to the extent our commitments abroad are not rationally and objectively made and maintained.

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I am not suggesting that you should not have convictions and express them where appropriate, about your interests and responsibilities. Just be sure that they are arrived at objectively, not subjectively. You are a representative of, not The Government of the United States, and much too much can be adversely affected in a negotiation by subjective misjudgment.

D. Articulateness. Not everyone is blessed with this talent, but he who is in any negotiation can often carry the situation with ease. This is particularly true in multilateral negotiations where the one who states his case the clearest and most succinctly, inevitably acquires support and followers.

For the purposes of this discussion it is important not only to think in terms of your forensic abilities but of your being precise in what you say or write to your Opposite. The important thing is that you be clearly and quickly understood. It is no service to your cause not to be. With the best intention in the world your Opposite may misunderstand you and become confused, which can only set back your chances of an early and friendly agreement. With less good intentions, your Opposite may become suspicious of what it is you really want, and no satisfactory agreement is likely to result from such a mood.

Impreciseness almost certainly insures misunderstanding, and misunderstanding ensures the prevention or breakdown of agreements. For example, the Kashmir dispute has dragged on bitterly for years because India and Pakistan agreed to imprecise wording as to their

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respective responsibilities under the UN resolutions of August 23, 1948, and January 5, 1949. The Western New Guinea settlement of 1962 between the Netherlands and Indonesia almost blew up because of impreciseness over the apparently little matter of raising and lowering the two national flags involved.

These two illustrations especially emphasize the necessity for preciseness where sequences of events or responsibilities are to take place. In my opinion, the closest the Kashmir dispute came to being resolved was when Dr. Frank P. Graham, the UN Security Council's Representative for India and Pakistan in 1951-53 came, almost literally, within a sentence of getting precise agreement on timing and mutual responsibilities. In the Western New Guinea dispute Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker happily was able to work out a timetable for the flag ceremonies.

It is the fanciful impression of the vast majority of all people, I am sure, that "the language of diplomacy" is a mystical mixture of prolixity, subtlety, and obfuscation. Prolixity and obfuscation have no place in a sound agreement, and subtlety only if you and your Opposite agree on what you mean by its use.

The experts argue for "plain language" as that most likely to produce a worthwhile understanding. Always bear in mind that, between peoples, language is enough of a barrier to get over without "piling up the verbiage." If interpretation or translation is necessary, the plainer or simpler the language the quicker and better will your non-English-speaking Opposite understand you.

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Nuances are generally undesirable except where you are dealing with a very sophisticated Opposite and critical observations must be made.

Whether the negotiation is informal or formal, written communication is often essential in support of your oral presentation (particularly if you got "B" or below in Public Speaking!). Where the subject under discussion is somewhat complicated and your Opposite is expected to "think over" what you said, leaving a memorandum (or as our English friends, who like to brush on their French, say, "bout de papier") cannot only expedite his understanding of your position but also persuade him more readily of your friendliness and good faith. This is not to suggest, however, that maximum paper-pushing produces maximum results. Overuse of written communications can actually be counter-productive. Your Opposite may become suspicious that your repeated written precision is to lure him into something you could not get by friendly personal persuasion. Furthermore, in negotiation where there is likely to be much "give" and "take" and "reconsideration" of previous positions taken, it is no service to yourself or your Opposite to expose yourself to recitations of your previous writings. This can seriously slow down negotiations, particularly where the written word becomes more important and official than the spoken word. Slowing down negotiations because of written words tends to speed up irritations and suspicions. Therefore, written communications should be used judiciously to improve and expedite understanding, not to elaborate

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and possibly confuse each step in the negotiation.

One final bit of advice: There are distinctions--some subtle, but important--in the various types of written communications you may have with your Opposite. The relative differences and the importance attached to them should go far to persuade you that a good, clear-thinking brain, and articulate tongue in your head, will usually make for easier and better understanding with your Opposite.

E. Adaptability. Along with sociability this is perhaps the most easily acquired talent. Anyone who is genuinely interested in people can develop the asset of adaptability. And, an asset it is, for it is a sure key to establishing close rapport with your Opposite. It is a dull but necessary observation that there are not only differences among personalities but also differences within a personality. Your Opposite may be a man of many moods and interests and, if so, you will do well to learn to accommodate, or develop them.

This will not be a matter of just being pleasantly obliging. That's part of it, but real adaptability is being able to approach your Opposite, under instruction, and adjust your representation to his mood or preoccupation in the manner best likely to obtain his agreement. Usually our Opposite should have a degree of imperturbability which will make quick perception of what he is thinking, or what's bothering him, difficult. But once his facade weakens you should be quickly thinking: whether and how much to press; how much or how little detail to use; whether to face a rough session, or change the subject.

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Adaptability, however, is much more than instant adjustment to your Opposite. It is the ability to meet and cope with the New and Different, and do it gracefully and with manifest friendliness. When your assignments involve more than one Opposite such as in international organizations or multilateral negotiations you may come to know in trying to adopt yourself how the proverbial chameleon feels on a scotch plaid. One Opposite may be the keen intellectual; another the affable affluent type whose father is President of the country; another the ascetic mystical type; and another whose after-hours accomplishments are his greatest concern. If you are assigned the responsibility of working on agreement with them you will have to be adaptable. It does not mean adapting your country's position or objective to these diverse Opposites. It does mean being able to approach and work with them in developing a common area of agreement suitable to your country's requirements. It does not mean saying one thing to one Opposite and the reverse to another (After all, despite their diversity, they may get together and compare notes on you!).. It does mean interesting yourself in what interests them, and attuning your timing and tactics to what is most likely to elicit their agreement. It could mean that your adaptability would consist of: matching wits with the intellectual; being affable with the President's son; being a vegetarian with the mystic; being an expert on wine, women and hang-overs, while not indulging, with the nocturnal operator.


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But adaptability is even more. It is being able, seemingly in less than one day, to: do all the thinking and reporting that your Ambassador or the Department wants you to do; talk over a pending PL 480 agreement with your Opposite; be escort officer for some inevitable VIP; address the luncheon of the Local Grey Ladies (in the stead of the Ambassador); play tennis with the Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of Public Welfare (who is the man who will have the final say-so on the PL 480 agreement); attend the opening of the new art exhibit by the artist who is the nation's pride and joy, and at dinner sit next to the local patriarch who wishes to explain why his jurisdictional difficulties are of importance to the United States as the Leader of the Christian World.

Of course, I've exaggerated, with something to spare, what will confront you either in personalities or problems. But, let me assure you the exaggeration becomes less and the reality more as you get closer to the top. If you haven't adaptability you haven't a chance of effecting the upward transition.

F. Dignity. None of the dictionary definitions really satisfy one in trying to describe this important talent. It is not nobility of manner or of mind, nor is it rank or rank-consciousness. What we are here considering bears these definitions in mind but in operation is the friendly correctness and respect with which you and your Opposite deal with each other not only as individuals but as representatives of sovereign and equal nations. What could and perhaps should be a warm lasting personal friendship cannot be so

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intimate when it is your government dealing with his government. Dignity is your best inhibition against your representing yourself only instead of your government.

Satisfactory negotiation requires friendly correctness and mutual respect for a number of reasons. First and foremost, at the outset of any negotiation there is an inevitable reserve on both sides, since it is the period of getting acquainted, and of ascertaining each others objectives. No wise negotiator is going to sit down at the table and in an ebullient mood state precisely what his position and fall-back position are. This would be like trying to win at poker with your hand up and everyone else's down. Dignity, properly understood, is the legitimate restraint you exercise in not over-exposing your position while respecting your Opposite for doing the same. Particularly, where the negotiation is likely to be long, this restraint and respect is the sound initial basis for your timing and tactics.

Secondly, the exercise of dignity can serve to avoid personal over-effusiveness, which, particularly if your Opposite is of limited acquaintance, can readily produce in him either suspicion as to what and how much you want, or contempt for you. Neither of these reactions are conducive to agreement. Too much folksiness or lack of restraint can lead your Opposite to wonder how serious you are in negotiating with him. He may have plenty of time for party patter or endless tale-spinning, but not at the negotiating table where he has a job to do for his government and he legitimately assumes you have, too.

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Thirdly, too casual negotiation can lead to carelessness which sooner or later ensures disagreement. It is only by giving continuous attentive and respectful consideration to what your Opposite is proposing that you are likely to reach precise mutual understanding.

Finally, dignity requires and ensures that, since both governments are sovereign, you are treating your Opposite as an equal-- whether or not he is personally. To treat him any other way may readily imply an indignity to his government. Conquered governments have, perforce, signed agreements, but an insulted sovereign nation will not.

G. Modesty. The requirement for this talent is best described by Harold Nicholson in his book Diplomacy:

"The dangers of vanity in a negotiator can scarcely be exaggerated. It tempts him to disregard the advice or opinions of those who may have had longer experience of a country, or of a problem, than he possesses himself. It renders him vulnerable to the flattery or the attacks of those with whom he is negotiating. It encourages him to take too personal a view of the nature and purposes of his functions and in extreme cases to prefer a brilliant but undesirable triumph to some unostentatious but more prudent compromise. It leads him to boast of his victories and thereby to incur the hatred of those whom he has vanquished. It may prevent him at some crucial moment, from confessing to his government that his predictions or his information were incorrect." (p.

Sir Harold's list of the consequences of vanity goes on for considerable length.

My personal observations thoroughly support the necessity for modesty. The "will to win" and show off the trophy is very natural, perhaps especially among us Americans. This is a genuine barrier to modesty and to a satisfactory agreement with your Opposite. He

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periods of detailed multilateral discussions. His difficulty was he had a limited capacity for concentrating either on what he was supposed to listen to or what he was advised to say. Within the time limit of his capacity he could do either well but not both.

Ambassador Johnston, in contrast, had a remarkable memory. He not only could report at length on the dialogues he would have with Heads of State etc. (I have seen a 25 page memorandum of a session he had with Khrushchev) but he always had the endless capacity for intense concentration on briefings and details which made his representations to such people effective and persuasive.

The higher up the ladder you go the more important it will be to have a good memory, because the negotiations in which you will be participating later may be at such a level that you will be both US spokesman and "note-taker". The trouble is that, as you begin to grasp that top rung, then is when you are getting old enough for your memory to fail you, unless you have kept it under rigid development and training.

The obvious necessity, it should go without saying, for a good memory is to ensure accurate reporting to your superior. If your negotiating instructions are ever based on your inaccurate or inadequate reporting you will almost certainly have a justly deserved unhappy, if not impossible, time in getting an agreement, and you may have done your country a lasting disservice.

Which reminds me of the card which had "REMEMBER....." in big letters on one side, and on the other side it said ".....to remember!" It's sound advice.

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I. Sense of Humor. However silly the suggestion may seem when comparing this talent with those already discussed, a well developed sense of humor, well controlled (i.e. used appropriately, but sparingly) can be an absolute God-send in long or tense negotiations. It can effectively and favorably change the temper or the tempo of the session where grimness or dismay has resulted from strong positions or wearisome repetitions.

While many of your diplomatic colleagues unfortunately will be devoid of a sense of humor, nearly all will be human enough to want to escape, if only momentarily, from deadlock or despair into a laugh at the negotiating table. A quick germane witticism can do it--but never from the youngest (and perhaps brightest) member of any delegation.

Someone once said, "Laughter relaxes quicker than liquor". This is true. Furthermore, it will produce a better agreement!

Negotiation can be a deadly serious thing to any honest and earnest representative of his country, but, whether he appreciates it or not, his own necessary sense of objectivity and timing may require that he be able to look at himself, at his Opposite, and at the mutual problem in a suddenly less intense ("more detached", if you will) situation. His own sense of humor can do it for himself without his saying anything. Someone else's sense of humor can do it, if it is timely and immediately understood.

I say "timely and immediately understood" for several reasons. Whatever is said should be said about some situation, emotion, or

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thought common to all. However much this seems like having a methodical (and hence unhumorous) sense of humor, other displays of humor may not achieve the objectives desired--momentary release from tension, change of pace, and an opportunity--for mutual self-reflection.

I do not want to pose as the "Twentieth Century Diplomat's 'Joe Miller'", but I would suggest that three types of humorous remarks are better buried in your throat than in your Opposite's weary or resentful brain: (1) The Narrative Joke: This, unless told by a truly expert raconteur and absolutely to the point of the moment, can build up to irritation at your interrupting or delaying the discussion for possibly suspected motives; (2) The Colloquial Joke: Here language difficulties or interpretive problems may cause the same as (1) above, or bewilderment as to the subtlety your Opposite may have missed; and (3) The Local Joke: This is when you tell an Arab a Joke about a "rug merchant." He may understand, but suddenly and deeply resent your judgment--and not just of what is funny.

Humor, whenever resorted to, must of necessity be quick, light of touch, and never at the expense of your Opposite. It should also never too often be at the expense of yourself and your countrymen, for the unfortunate impression that can be created thereby is a demeaning of your countrymen, or possible disloyalty, which your Opposite may try to take advantage of but not respect you for.

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Humor, if resorted to too persistently, is very likely to raise in your Opposite's mind the question of how serious you are in trying to reach an understanding with him.

If, from what I have said on this subject, you, as a coming negotiator, are deterred from thinking of, using, or developing your sense of humor--stay deterred. If, on the other hand, you are challenged, then keep your wits, and your wit sharp, for a good sense of humor has aptly been described as "The Negotiator's Survival Kit."


J. Sociability. What you read about yourself and your colleagues in the local social or diplomatic gossip columns is only the top of the iceberg in mentioning this talent. True, it is the obvious part of it.

I will leave the partying advice to those durable dames who make a living at it.

Since you, like most people, already have pretty well established ideas or aspirations about Society (with a capital "S"), I would merely urge that your participation in it be viewed as a well-reasoned duty of yours to be a pleasure to others.

What I am interested in discussing here is your conscientious development of contacts with your Opposite's fellow-countrymen in such things as religious, business, welfare, health, and educational activities. Your involvement in these extra-diplomatic interests can show your Opposite that you have a friendly and genuine--not passing--interest in his people and nation. This can do much to

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


help enhance his confidence in you and increase your credibility.

Pragmatically, your involvement can also increase your empathy and your knowledge of the problems that may come before you. You will thereby be a better, more experienced negotiator as you face your Opposite.

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As I observed at the beginning of this section on "Self-Possession", the list of the essential attributes which one's self should possess is long. You may agree with it or think of other talents that are important to possess. The point is, don't get discouraged by the list or by the advice which you have thus far labored through. The possession of some of the listed talents is a good start on developing the rest, particularly since there is an inevitable interrelation among some of them.



IV.

"PLACE"


(Having discussed at length the essential make-up--heredity, if I may so abuse the word--of the Negotiator, what about the effect of environment on negotiation? In answer, this part of the treatise is divided into two sections: (1) the necessary discussion of "Open" versus "Quiet Diplomacy"; and (2) what are the different requirements, if any, imposed upon a negotiator engaged in bilateral, multilateral, or international organizational negotiation. Since I have already discussed and illustrated many of these different requirements in the different fora of negotiation this section will be largely summary in nature.)

1. Open versus Quiet Diplomacy

While there have been instances of wide-open negotiation down through the ages, as well as all the secret diplomacy which has made our history books so fat and boring, Woodrow Wilson is popularly blamed for starting the controversy as to which method is more desirable. In his famous "14 Points" enunciated to Congress in January 1918, Wilson listed number one as "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at." His efforts in that line of action are known to history, and today we can relax in the knowledge that there is a justification and use for both "Open" and "Quiet" negotiation.

The United Nations, its various bodies, and associated organizations are of course media for "Open" negotiation. Speeches, resolutions, special committees on special problems, membership problems, voting blocs, and vetoes are the accepted and established means of "Open"

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Commenting on Soviet maneuvering at the United Nations, Kertesz and Fitzsimons in their book Diplomacy in a Changing World observe: "The 'open diplomacy' of the United Nations is a particularly useful sounding board for such an opportunistic and irresponsible diplomacy. Reckless promises and unfounded statements cannot be matched by negotiators whose actions are scrutinized by a democratic public opinion and press and who are responsible to the organ of a democratic state. Because of such abuses by Soviet representatives many important present-day social and political problems have not found a solution through multilateral negotiations and the action of international agencies. Soviet sabotage, in the United Nations is only a manifestation of the basic contradiction between declared Communist revolutionary methods and the solution of 'international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character'--one of the main purposes of the United Nations.

"We should note, however, that the bullying attitude of Soviet representatives in the United Nations occasionally revealed their inability to understand free societies and in consequence boomeranged against their aims. It exposed with some clarity the realities behind their professed principles and informed the democratic countries of real Soviet intents, methods, and manner. Some of Vyshinsky's speeches had a sobering effect particularly upon the American public. He substantially contributed to the development of a political climate in the United States which made possible the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Point Four Program." (pp. 148-149)

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My years of experience at various UN Security Council and General Assembly sessions have persuaded me that "Open" negotiations serve the valuable purposes of: (a) educating the new, neutral, and nervous nations of the world on the "facts of life" of the Cold War (e.g. Disarmament)--something that bilaterally, even with some willing allies, we could not hoped to have done; and (b) inhibiting disputant nations from outright hostilities (e.g. Palestine, Kashmir, Western New Guinea, Cyprus, Yemen). In both types of operation the motions of negotiation have been more important than the results.

If any of these problems is ever finally resolved by agreement, it will be by "Quiet" negotiation--by negotiators off in some unnoticed place. And this is the type of negotiation the experts advocate as the only way to get effective agreement. If you will accept as axiomatic that no nation wishes to be watched as it is making concessions, then, quiet, unnoticed negotiation is logical and called for. Unless he is instructed to do so, no negotiator really wants to give a running public accounting of what he is doing. (Having said this I should defend the UN Representative who is expected, if not instructed, to give a "running account." My previous comment on the likelihood of his effecting a lasting negotiated agreement stands). If he is instructed to "keep the public informed" the chances are that no agreement is intended, or, if intended, agreement is so far from likely that the benefits from publicity or propaganda must be maximized against the failure of negotiations. To illustrate: it has been my unhappy analysis of the Kashmir negotiations, culminating

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in what could and should have been successful bilateral talks in 1963, that both the Indians and Pakistanis involved in the discussions had been far more instructed on public posture than private agreement. The Kashmir dispute will be settled, but settled when the negotiators have clear instructions to avoid or not contribute to public attention. Until that time of mutual decision, no genuine agreement is likely to be sought or intended--except on terms totally objectionable to the other party. The UN, as the "Open" medium of negotiation is certain to keep the question, not the solution, open.

Having mentioned this classic--and hopefully not ageless--dispute, my comments apply equally to all the other inhibited disputes previously mentioned!

There are, of course, and always will be the legions--particularly of the press--who will contend that the public "has a right to know" what may be transpiring in a negotiation. This is a plea which is often hard to resist, especially if you have been approached after having had a hard day with your Opposite. The temptations can be great to get your side of the story favorably aired before your Opposite may "do you in" the same way.

Resist that temptation. Only a miracle-man or someone close to the level of head-of-state can hope to negotiate successfully with his Opposite both at the table and through the press. Let your Opposite talk to the press or the public first about what you and he are negotiating. This gives you the "might of righteousness": you can ask for an explanation or suggest the preparation of a clarifying

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joint communique; "feel compelled" to change your position because of the unfortunate story (or misinformation) in the press; or suspend the talks--if you're authorized to do so.

Where the negotiations are formally "behind closed doors" and involve high ranking individuals, press attention and coverage--accurate or not--are inevitable. Admiral Joy in his book How Communists Negotiate had this to say: "Press coverage of negotiations should be as unfettered as physical facilities permit. If your objectives are honest and sincere, if your methods are above reproach, if your skill in negotiating is adequate, you need not fear the press. The American people deserve to know what is going on, since they must foot the bill in lives and in dollars". (p. 170)

This attitude is fine and dandy as far as it applies to long drawn out "tug-of-wills" negotiations such as one must expect in dealing with Communists. But where negotiating situations are developing or changing fast they can become gorgeously fouled up at the wrong moments by what has been conveyed or alleged to the press by one or both sides, or by some total ignoramus not associated with the negotiations at all.

Where negotiations are proceeding in good faith, usually the best way to keep them that way is for you and your Opposite to agree together that neither will talk to the press, or that you will inform the press by an agreed joint communique. I have previously expatiated on the subject of your credibility. I would here merely observe that there is no quicker way to undermine it than by being found guilty

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of talking to the press or the public about negotiating matters.

Having said all this on press relations I should here put in a few words in strong defense of American diplomatic correspondents. While there are a few whom I would not trust any farther than I could throw the Washington Monument, most of them are men of great integrity who can be trusted with legitimate confidences and who will report faithfully and accurately. After all, they have not gotten as high as they have in their profession only to have their reputations thrown away by false or irresponsible reporting. And, they are the sort who would rather have no information than have you give them false or misleading information.

The risks inherent in negotiations exposed to public gaze--the hardening of positions, and the vanities of the negotiators which must be coped with--tend to underscore the wisdom of usually resorting to quiet or unobtrusive negotiation. Where the subject-matter is highly classified, where national sensibilities are involved, or where the day-to-day "house-keeping" problems between governments must be handled, quiet, hopefully unnoticed, negotiation provides the best chance of understanding and agreement. In effecting such negotiations, the relative level or rank of the negotiators is often essential. The relative importance a government attaches to a problem can be determined by the level of its representative-negotiator. Or, while the government may attach great importance to a matter it may use a low-level representation to explore possible reactions or rebuff before indicating the real significance of its interest.

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To illustrate: one Ambassador-expert whom I consulted pointed to the problem of a proposed courtesy call of one of our destroyers. Such a call had not been attempted in a number of years because relations had been somewhat strained. The Ambassador knew that if he made the suggestion that the destroyer make the visit, the proposal would have undue importance attached to it and with any public attention given to it, the government would probably feel compelled to refuse the ship's call. If one of the junior officers of the Embassy made the inquiry, no importance might be attached to the request and it might be promptly refused, or if accepted at such a low-level and the visit subsequently attracted any degree of public attention considerable embarrassment and unpleasantness might result. The Ambassador decided to have the Deputy Chief of Mission call on the Undersecretary at the Foreign Ministry and after discussing something else, raise our interest in the destroyer's visit, and find out what problems, if any, there might be. This approach at this level showed that we did attach importance to the visit but wanted the arrangements to be worked out as unobtrusively as possible, and if the visit occurred all chance of embarrassment or unpleasantness would have been anticipated and avoided.

Another contributing expert, a firm advocate of quiet negotiation, operates on the general rule: Move negotiations up only to the level necessary--no higher. Under this guidance you can begin to see that even at your relatively junior level you will get an early chance at quiet negotiation of increasingly important matters.

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

Unnoticed low-level negotiation is extremely helpful to the "high-ups" where, for example, you and your Opposite have a well-established and trusted rapport. Recall, if you will, my story of my working out with my Indian Opposite the meeting between our irritated yet anxious heads of delegation, Secretary Herter and Prime Minister Nehru.

The same expert, cited previously, likes to "get the spade-work done in advance" through using lower-level officers. This concept of quiet team-work, he finds, works on both sides of the negotiating table.

Mention should be made of resort to "technical" or "expert" negotiation. High-level or low-level, this can be a surprisingly satisfactory way to conduct quiet, generally unnoticed or ignored talks. The mere identification tends to discourage public interest, and hence lessen press interest.

For nearly two years of the Jordan River negotiations, with the help of Arab leaders themselves, by identifying our Arab Opposites as "The Arab Technical Committee" we worked out and overcame a number of critical political problems which, raised in a forum by any other name, would have surely terminated our efforts far short of the over-all technical agreement that we did get.

The only official contacts which Israel and its surrounding Arab neighbors have had since 1949 have been the bilateral Mixed Armistice Commissions set up by the several General Armistice Agreements to enforce such things as cease-fires, non-crossing of armistice





lines etc. These Commissions, while of only varying success over the years, have on occasion been used to iron out, unnoticed, some other matters not specifically covered by the Armistice Agreements.

While any agreement--however arrived at generally requires some formalization, the experts strongly contend that informality provides the best environment for quiet negotiation. The fewer people involved the likelier and more natural the informality will be and the quicker the agreement. This obviously does not mean that a certain amount of planned activity cannot be helpful, such as luncheons, dinners, cocktail parties etc. A lot of gaps can be closed between gulps, and however deadly most of us view a so-called "working" party, it is sound negotiating advice to "relax and employ it." The important thing at such events is not to mistaken the euphoria for agreement!

## 2. Requirements in Different Negotiating Environments

In the preparation of this treatise, I made the arbitrary assumption that the experience and tests of negotiating ability for the vast majority of Foreign Service Officers would be bilateral for most, if not all of their careers. Hence in analyzing and setting down what were the essential attributes of and qualifications for a good negotiator, I have attempted to envisage You as in a field post dealing with nationals of that one country. With the proliferation of nations, however, and the multiplication of international problems, the prospects are that as you proceed up through your career there will be more and more demands for your engaging in multilateral or international organizational negotiation.

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In the face of such a prospect, questions can arise as to whether there are different demands on your negotiating talents; whether some have to be developed or concentrated on more than others. For example: Given a multilateral or international organizational negotiating forum, are empathy or credibility as important as they must necessarily be in bilateral relations? If you are involved--or enmeshed--in either of these fora, it is hard not to come to the conclusion that the timing and tactics problems become so demanding and the diversity of contacts which you must maintain are such that genuine empathy is almost impossible and credibility can reduce itself to whether you say you have the votes and can deliver them.

Or what of the faculties involved in Self-Possession? Are Objectiveness, Dignity, Modesty as important or necessary as Adaptability, Patience, and Good Memory? One can conclude that in multilateral or international organizational negotiations the latter three are essential to survival, plus Articulateness.

In making judgments such as these at least some sense of difference of negotiating environment is necessary. The best delineation, I suggest, is: (1) In bilateral negotiation you dealing with a people; (2) in multilateral negotiation you are dealing with a problem; and (3) in international organizational negotiation you are dealing with an institution. These are perhaps facile generalities, but the truths contained are such as to justify the distinctions made in the different fora.

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

Bilateral negotiation puts you in the most exposed position vis-a-vis your Opposite. It is, or should be, a close continuing relationship of somewhat indeterminate duration. Such exposure makes your successes or failures, your strengths and weaknesses in negotiation usually readily detectable to your Opposite. Hence the requirement for your developing and maintaining all the attributes and faculties of a negotiator which we have discussed. Since you and especially your superior are dealing with a number and possible variety of problems, your sense of timing and tactics must be in terms of priorities and in depth. If the Ambassador, for example, is to remain viable and he is instructed to engage in what amounts to several negotiations simultaneously he must not only decide on a priority among the several items but so time his representations that they will not prove counterproductive. In dealing with his Opposite who may well be the Head of State or the Foreign Minister, he must assess what, why, and when said Opposite will oblige, endure, or refuse him. To a much less extent this may be your timing and tactical problem too. Furthermore, your developing Credibility, Empathy, and Self-possession are your insurance for enduring viability.

Multilateral negotiation is quite different. Your self-exposure is likely to be much less--especially at your junior level, but the demands on some of your special, developing capabilities, may be sudden and enormous. I am referring in this regard to something such as an international conference, or ad hoc gathering assembled to consider some particular problem or problems where you are "tapped" to be a member of one of our delegations.

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Because such an international congregation is a specific purpose, the purpose or problem tends to insure that there will be some leaders, knowledgeable experts, and usually a lot of "followers." Because of the subject of the conference, a degree of empathy--or identifiable antipathy--already exists among the participants. The likely diversity of necessary contacts tends to lessen the need for your developing empathy except perhaps with key personalities or delegations who will be focal or control points in the development of positions and in lining up votes. Credibility is based largely on your memory (i.e. not telling different delegations conflicting things) and on your ability to say where the votes are and "deliver them" if and when needed. Since a conference may be of unspecified duration, timing can usually be subordinated to tactics. Tactics based on your essential knowledge of your subject--if not of your fellow negotiators (whom you may not really be able to know)--make the heaviest demands on your Patience, Confidence, and Adaptability.

International organizational negotiation despite its having similar demands on and requirements from you is really almost an art of its own. Negotiation in an international organization demands knowledge of the subjects of debate, of the rules of procedure, of the key individuals and delegations, and the likely alignment of votes. Timing and tactics are essential particularly when it comes to swapping support and votes on various items. While your personal word and judgment can, if supported by developments, command increasing attention, your Credibility is basically established by



what delegation you're on (and since you are on the US Delegation your Credibility is assured unless you make a horrible misjudgment or misleading statement of your government's position). Voting being to a large extent a matter of leaders and blocs, developing Empathy for delegates and their problems is not particularly important-- in fact, may be an outright waste of time (It has been somewhat sarcastically said "Empathy at the UN is sympathy for the little, bewildered delegate". There is much wisdom as well as wit in this). On the other hand, you are working against deadlines and diversity. The demands on your Self-Possession can be terrific, especially on your Patience, Adaptability, and Articulateness. (This last becomes quite essential since explaining a US position or amendment or arguing against some other delegations can become an impossible problem if you can't state your case succinctly and persuasively to a large number of delegates in a short period of time).

In all three fora of negotiation, let me stress that one thing stands out--the knowledge of your subject in bilateral action; knowledge of the problem in multilateral deliberations; knowledge of the institution and the myriad problems before it in an international organizational meeting. The first requirement of a good negotiator cannot be understressed--knowledge of his subject.

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This part of this treatise should not be closed without at least some passing suggestion as to the best geographical locations for negotiating. I am not trying to drum up trade for Switzerland or

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other beautiful spots around the world. What I am suggesting is that, where significant or intense negotiations must take place between two countries, they would seem to have a better chance of success if they take place in some third country sufficiently removed or disassociated from the two countries to reduce press and public attention and tensions. The experts all agree that where an atmosphere of friendly calm and detachment exists the prospects for agreement are definitely enhanced.

Obviously, this will not be your pleasant prospect--at least that you can arrange for--for some years to come. But even when intense negotiation must occur between you and your Opposite in his country, the creation of the atmosphere suggested above, wherever the specific locality and whenever the occasion, will be most helpful for worthwhile negotiation.



V.

"THING"

The third part of the triple-moun is "Thing"--the subject matter of any negotiation: not Who, or Where, but What. You have only to look at the Treaty Series to discover how many different things must be the subject of international agreement. From treaties of alliance and peace to seed testing conventions, myriad matters require negotiation. And to a sufficient number of people or nations these matters are of such significance that international agreements must-be reached. And, the United States almost inevitably has to be involved.

It is, perhaps, very fortunate for you, if not your government, that there are a variety of fora for negotiation on matters from the most essential to the most esoteric. I suspect, however, that in the course of your bilateral relations with your Opposites you will be surprised at how much of the spectrum of subject-matters you will cover.

Thanks to the variety of fora, many of the new and smaller nations have expanded opportunities for negotiating on a lot of mattters that normal diplomatic relations would never permit. Thus, in UN Commissions on such subjects as Human Rights, Status of Women, Protection of Minorities etc., and the various regional economic commissions, and in special conferences such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development, small nations intend to and do make themselves felt on specialized subjects which are or become for presitge

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or bargaining purposes immensely important to them. Whatever may be the topic; whatever may be the United States interest, unconcern, or total lack of enthusiasm in the particular subject under discussion, if you are assigned to it it will be your clear responsibility to understand the problem and make the best deal possible for the United States.

What does this mean? Bear in mind the significance and vital importance of the subject matter to the others "present and negotiating." It may have no (repeat no) significance to you but, if you don't know the subject--however "far out", intricate, or esoteric it may be-- you may blow it for your government.

Never for a moment assume that there are little problems in multilateral or international organizational negotiations. If there were they never would be raised: if raised they are somehow inevitably problems on which you as US Representative must have a position. I say "must have a position" because, as I have said before, we are looked to for manifested US interest, for guidance for some, for a basis for opposition from others. Escaping stating what our views are, on whatever the item may be before the international body, is a virtual impossibility. Therefore, you must know the subject, and because it is important to someone or some delegation present, failure to do your homework on it will be readily detected.

And, Gentlemen Readers, while yet pursuing this line let me impress upon you the unwisdom of tangling with lady delegates on such matters as those I have discussed. It is not just a matter of chivalry or diplomacy. It is plain common sense. With but few





exceptions lady delegates who show up at international meetings, particularly on what may seem to be the more esoteric subjects, know their subject backward and forward, up and down, this way and that. They are inevitably articulate, if not succinct, and they are determined and deeply interested. In this regard I have never forgotten the description of one delegate given by a revered but bloodied boss of mine who once said: "She remained a female long after she left off being a diplomat!"

Because diplomats foregather on specific issues, whether the negotiation be bilateral, multilateral, or in an international body, of certain degree of Empathy is already established. However, it is essential that you "catch on" to or at least try to understand the interest, nay enthusiasm, that some of your Opposites may have for the subject. If it happens to be a highly complicated or "way out" matter, let your Opposite explain his fascination for it, maybe more than once, if desirable. Just don't say "Yes" unless you're instructed to do so,

In matters such as those we are here considering you will be able to do valuable service for your superior, who quite likely will be busy with many other matters. Get to know the subject for him, and establish the rapport with your Opposite or Opposites so that if he has to move into the final stages of negotiations he can do so, and with confidence. And, I would add, the more successfully he can move in at the last moments the better will your Credibility become.

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As for your Self-Possession, those faculties under your control should be considered as keys in a keyboard, to be played as required. As a general guide it can be safely asserted here that how or why you play them is better determined by the forum than by the subject of negotiation.


In what I have said above, I have not meant to suggest that the major part of anyone's negotiating career is absorbed in getting satisfactory agreements on esoteric or other matters peripheral to the welfare and security of the United States. I have merely chosen to lay heavy stress on these items because they constitute a great challenge which must be faced at least in the imagination of the trainee-negotiator.

Since the Department and the Foreign Service have more than enough problems to cope with all of the time, and far too many of them crucial to national security, it is not our policy to think up "make work" negotiations. Therefore, you can safely assume that most negotiating activities, with which you will be associated, are germane to the protection or advancement of interests of the United States. This in itself should be incentive enough for you to apply all of your available negotiating capabilities in carrying out your assignments. And someday, you, and we, may hope that you will be involved in high-level negotiations where your abilities will be essential in assuring that the United States security and international status is enhanced by the best possible agreement you can obtain.

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What I have sought to impress upon you throughout this part of the treatise is that you treat whatever the subject of negotiation as important and that your first obligation is the first named requirement of a good negotiator: Know your subject, and the other attributes of a good negotiator will develop surprisingly well.

Good luck in the Service of your Country!



BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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(It was my privilege to serve under and learn much from him.)

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