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FEBRUARY 1984

☆U.S. Government Printing Office: 1986—491-133/43651




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

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(6) ARMY ROLES, MISSIONS, AND DOCTRINE IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ARMLIC).

Preconflict Case Study 6.

MALAYA,

(9) Technical rept.

(11) 15 Feb 1971

(12) 242 p.

(14) CRI TR-64C

(15) Prepared by Carlisle Research Office
[redacted] DAAG 25-67-C-0702 for
US Army Combat Developments Command
Institute of Advanced Studies
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

270900

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PREFATORY NOTE

1. This case study of the preconflict period in Malaya is one of a series undertaken by the Carlisle Research Office of Operations Research, Incorporated for the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies (USACDCIAS), now designated Institute of Land Combat (USACDCILC). The purpose of the case study is to develop a better understanding of the political, economic, social, psychological, public health, scientific-technological, and military factors conducive to low intensity conflict and change of indigenous governmental control. A total of seven such studies has been completed and placed on file at the Defense Documentation Center (DDC) for authorized users.

2. The seven case studies were used as basic research for the USACDCIAS study of Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC). No assumptions are made as to whether Army actions are either desirable or necessary in connection with any given conflict. It is recognized that Army capabilities to give military or civilian assistance are among those that the US Government may use or not, in furtherance of US policy and national interests, and that they should be designed and maintained to best serve the purposes of national authorities with the greatest effectiveness at the least cost.

3. The data in this report were drawn from open sources, published and unpublished, available through public institutions and Government agencies. No field work is involved, and no policy recommendations are made. The data have been checked against selected classified sources and with knowledgeable individuals. Modified systems analysis methods, aimed at determining points of tension or dysfunction conducive to low intensity conflict, were used. Basic assumptions and study method for the ARMLIC study are on file at USACDCILC.

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

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1786	British establish base at Penang to facilitate China trade.
1826	Straits Settlements established, comprising Singapore, Malacca, Penang.
1848	Large tin deposits discovered in Perak; exploited by Chinese.
1896	Federation of Malaya formed by British, separate from Straits Settlements. First commercial rubber planting.
1907	Government facilitates Indian labor immigration.
1909	Siam relinquishes control of three northern Malay States to British; they become "unfederated States."
1912	First tin dredge begins; European displacement of small Chinese mines.
1929	Depression begins; tin and rubber prices collapse. Compulsory registration of opium addicts.
1930	Malayan Communist Party formed under Comintern auspices. London conference on Malaya. Malayan branches of Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) outlawed.
1931	Malay Volunteer Regiment established, combining previously existing, largely European units.
1932	Sir Samual Wilson begins inquiry into Malaya/Straits Settlements administration; Governor General Clementi's decentralization and reform proposals, though unpopular with colonial establishment, are endorsed. Role of Chinese specialists in British administration reduced.
1933-39	Wilson recommendations for administrative decentralization and reform implemented.
1933	Quota imposed on Chinese male immigration. Malay Regiment, first regular military unit, formed (with British officers).
1934	Straits Settlements Civil Service established, open to non-Europeans. Chinese Government begins financial assistance to overseas Chinese schools.

TABLE B (continued)

1940	Anti-British agitation led by Communists.
1941	Japanese attack; British get cooperation of Malayan Communists in defense.
1942	British defeat.
1942-45	Japanese occupation; severe hardships for Chinese.
1943	Subhas Chandra Bose brought from Germany to head Indian Independence League. British Government develops plans for postwar Malayan Union.
1945	Japanese surrender in Malaya. Communists control parts of Malaya before reestablishment of British control. Sir Harold MacMichael obtains Sultans' support for Malayan Union.
1945-46	British military administration.
1946	United Malay National Organization established, with Onn bin Jaafar as President, to oppose Malayan Union.
1946-47	Communist-fomented labor unrest and strikes.
1948	Federation of Malaya replaces Malayan Union. Malayan Communist Party leads revolt. Emergency declared.

SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS: FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO CONFLICT

1. Overview. Malaya originally interested the British in the 17th century because of its strategic location on the trade route between India and China. British concern remained primarily economic until the eve of World War II. The emergency of 1948 was the climax of unforeseen political and social effects of economic policies and actions pursued for the previous hundred and fifty years.

a. By 1930, the original Malay population was outnumbered by the Chinese and Indian immigrants who had been brought to Malaya to provide labor for British and Chinese enterprise or had been attracted by the greater economic opportunities there. The 1930's saw these two new ethnic communities turn from their original transient character toward increasingly permanent population groups; but there was little integration, or even interaction, among the Malay, Chinese, and Indian communities. Neither Chinese nor Indians had any real sense of belonging to a larger Malayanpolity, especially in the case of the Chinese. Such political allegiance as they had was given to their homeland; they sought little from the British colonial Government and received little.

b. The Chinese provided much of the entrepreneurship and labor for the growing modern economic sector of Malaya, and their community had all the problems of industrialization--the extreme range of individual income levels and living standards and the oppressive working conditions--alleviated only slightly by a laissez-faire Government and aggravated by the impact of changes in world markets and currencies. Exposed as the Chinese were to the revolutionary currents of thought from China, it is little wonder that revolutionary ideas took root among them, despite the outward prosperity of Malaya in comparison to almost all other Asian countries. The Indians had their own home Government to fight for their interests; the Malays were protected in the continuation of their traditional agrarian life as a matter of British policy and inclination; the Chinese were left to fend pretty much for themselves, and the leaders of their community, part of the economic establishment, were little interested in reform.

c. The hardships of World War II fell disproportionately hard on the Chinese population, because of Japanese policies. World War II and its aftermath also stimulated the rise of nationalism, pushed the three communities into closer contact, and eroded the prestige and power of the British colonial administration. The Chinese Communists in Malaya were, moreover, aided by the British just before and during the war as a desperate measure to reinforce the insufficient defenses of the area, particularly of Singapore. The abortive Malayan Union highlighted the problem of ethnic rivalries and crystalized Malay hostility toward and

fear of the Chinese. When the Communist call for revolt went out from Calcutta in 1948, therefore, the Chinese in Malaya were fertile soil to nourish a response.

2. Underlying issues. Far more than in Kenya, British policies in Malaya were dominated by economic interests. In the early 19th century, Penang, Malacca, and then Singapore developed primarily as trading centers or entrepots on the great trade routes between England and China and between China and British India. As the mineral wealth and agricultural potential of Malaya was discovered, the British extended their interest to the hinterland, providing law and order, economic infrastructure, and some public health measures. They imported or encouraged the import of Chinese and Indian labor to produce tin and rubber, since the Malay population was not interested in such work. They developed Malaya economically, but hardly at all politically, because this was not their concern; and until World War II they paid little heed to the political and social consequences of their economic policies.

a. Lack of common national feeling. The Malays gave their allegiance to the Sultans of the nine separate Malay States. The Indians thought of themselves as sojourners who would return to India. The Chinese, apart from a relatively small group of acculturated "King's Chinese," were separated from the other communities by language and culture. Long accustomed to suspect all government, they kept to themselves. To a considerable extent, the three communities were separated both geographically and by economic specialization and had in common only their subordination to the British Crown. This subordination had been accepted as the natural order of things until the growth of nationalist feeling in the interwar years, the defeat of Britain in 1941-42, and Japanese and Communist propaganda all called it into question. But the diminution of British power left a vacuum, because there was no indigenous political leader or institution to take its place which could command the general support of the population.

b. Chinese orientation to homeland. Up until the end of the 19th century, many of the Chinese in Malaya had been moving toward acculturation to the Malay milieu, adopting Malay language and dress. However, two factors reversed this trend: the swelling numbers of the Chinese community, and the appeal of leaders and parties in China for support from the overseas Chinese. The latter factor commenced with the appeals of Kang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen for support of their reform and revolution at the turn of the century. It was facilitated by the greatness of the Chinese cultural tradition and by the establishment of Chinese schools and party organization. By 1930, the anti-British position of the Kuomintang (Chiang Kai-shek's party), reflected by the party organization and schools in Malaya, had grown so strong that the British first proscribed the Kuomintang entirely, then ruled that no Malayan chapters of it could be organized. At this time the Chinese schools were put under closer British scrutiny, but a generation had already been exposed to

Chinese nationalism. The language of instruction continued to be Chinese, for the majority of the community's schools. The attitude of all but a small minority of Chinese toward the Malayan Governments was one of avoidance, rather than participation or opposition, except for a small militant group with Communist leadership which favored revolution, again derived from the ideas of the Communists in China. It would have been easy enough to find, in the inequities, housing and working conditions, and exploitation of the Chinese by their own kind, the same deprivations and frustrations which supported revolt in China itself.

c. British paternalism. Along with their emphasis on economic exploitation and development, the British also had a sense of concern for the Malay population as the original inhabitants of the land, and undertook to protect them in their traditional social milieu. The Indian and Chinese communities, for whom the British did not have the same sense of responsibility, were not similarly protected and in general had to look out for themselves. In consequence, the Sultans and their courts continued in all their pomp; the Malays enjoyed preference over Indians and Chinese in access to responsible governmental positions outside the Straits Settlements; and Malays were given exclusive rights to the majority of the ricelands on the Peninsula; but they remained for the most part within the political and economic framework of their traditional petty agrarian states and had little incentive to modernize. In the absence of modernization, however, the Malays did not have the power base to protect their position against the other communities. The British administration, which held the real political power, was therefore the only source of equilibrium, given the superior energy and economic achievement of the other ethnic groups and the lack of political, economic, or social integration among them. So long as British power was absolute, this version of divide and rule, which had developed more by circumstance than by design, worked very well. The diminution of this power after World War II, however, pitted the various population groups against one another. In this situation the Chinese, who unlike the Malays were ambitious, achievement-oriented, and thoroughly involved in the modern economic sector of Malaya at all levels, had a built-in advantage, reinforced by the age-old Chinese feeling of cultural superiority. Such an inherently unstable situation, in which the weakest group was closest to the center of power, encouraged frustrated members of the stronger group to assert themselves.

3. Impact of World War II. The War affected the Malayan situation in five ways: it destroyed the previously unquestioned preeminence of the British; it institutionalized organized violence as a means to accomplish political ends; it created severe deprivations and frustrations, especially among the Chinese; it greatly reinforced the nationalist stirring which had already appeared in China, India, and the then Netherlands East Indies, all of which had ties with Malayan population groups; and it added the emotional issue of collaboration with the enemy to existing social tensions.

a. The population was emotionally unprepared for the speedy and decisive Japanese conquest of Malaya. The defensive arrangements were wholly a British show, although some native troops participated in the action; consequently the defeat was wholly attributed to the British, and their prestige as an imperial power suffered an irremediable loss.

b. Although the Communist Party had had a prewar following among the Chinese, the difficulties of the partisan struggle during World War II welded the resistance together into an organiced and experienced force, which could readily be turned against the British. This force became both skilled in the use of violence and accustomed to it. It is likely that among the Chinese community, remnants of the secret society tradition, which had included the use of violence and terror, reinforced the lessons of the Japanese occupation.

c. Malaya was dependent upon foreign trade for a large part of its food supply. The war interrupted the trade, and the Japanese gave priority to war supplies, with the consequence that severe food shortages and malnutrition developed. The public health measures of the British--particularly malaria control--were abandoned during the war, so that sickness rose. Living standards in general fell sharply. Japanese ferocity toward the Chinese forced many of them to flee to the edge of the jungle, there to eke out a subsistence by farming. Other Chinese, particularly from Singapore, were moved by the Japanese to centers on the mainland and left largely to their own devices. Though the majority of these refugees or squatters did not themselves turn guerrilla, their deprivation and frustration were expressed vicariously through their support for the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army. This support after 1948 was very important for the guerrilla struggle against the British.

d. Although the Japanese did not set up an independent Malayan State, they did preach Asian self-determination against the colonial powers. For the Chinese, furthermore, the presence of the Japanese and their hostility toward the Chinese population gave substance to the ideas of revolution and struggle which were coming from China itself. Despite the insulation of the three main ethnic communities, the Chinese would not have been insensitive to the growth of nationalism among the Malays--who were aware of the establishment of an independent state in the Netherlands East Indies under Japanese auspices--and the Indians, among whom the Japanese actively encouraged the establishement of an armed force to fight for Indian independence against the British.

e. Many Malays acquiesced in serving the Japanese authorities, including the largely Malay police force. They thus incurred Chinese hostility as collaborators. Additionally, Japanese policies forced the cooperation of the wealthier members of the Chinese community (for example, in the collection of funds for the Japanese war effort in 1942) and hence undermined the influence of the more conservatively inclined Chinese on their own people.

4. Economic problems. Unemployment or depressed living standards for thousands resulted from fluctuations in world demand and prices for rubber and tin, especially after World War I and in the depression of the 1930's. These consequences of Malaya's economic dependence on foreign trade fell most heavily on the Chinese and Indian communities, since the bulk of the Malays still lived within a traditional economy (except for those in the cities who depended upon imported food). The impact in Malaya was somewhat cushioned by the return of many Chinese and Indian unemployed to their homelands; but from the mid-1930's on, the Japanese invasion of China made the return of the Chinese difficult or impossible. In addition, the exploitation of cheap labor and the laissez-faire philosophy of the British administration led to extreme inequalities in incomes and living standards--not only as between the British and the Asiatics, but also within the three Asiatic communities, and particularly among the Chinese. The Chinese community was a principal local source of both entrepreneurs and laborers in the modern economic sectors, and therefore contained in microcosm the tensions and contradictions of a modernizing society--more so, probably than the other ethnic groups.

5. Chinese attitudes. The Chinese, more than the other ethnic groups, manifested distrust of Government, capacity for social organization, and strong achievement orientation. They also had a sense of cultural and ethnic superiority, although there were several subgroups among them. (One of these, the Hakka, was itself somewhat disparaged by the others and thus was perhaps more prone to frustration. Hakka were prominent among the guerrilla fighters.) These attributes tended to reinforce frustrations and to motivate aggressive action.

6. Failure to solve postwar problems. The British did not return to full authority and control in Malaya until a month following the Japanese defeat. The interregnum was a period of anarchy filled with acts of vengeance and terror by the Chinese partisans and general looting and disorder, which the collaboration-tainted police were unable to control. The British Military Administration eventually restored order, but economic reconstruction was a much slower proposition. Full recovery was not achieved until after the outbreak of conflict in 1948. Political and social reconstruction were even slower and were hindered rather than assisted by the abortive Malayan Union.

7. Failure of Malayan Union. The British established a federation of all parts of Malaya except the Island of Singapore in April 1946. The Sultans were to lose their sovereignty to the British Crown in the larger entity, and large numbers of Chinese and Indians were to be admitted to citizenship. Although this proposal was intended to deal with the basic and growing political problems of Malaya, it was drawn up in camera by the Colonial Office, virtually forced upon the Sultans, and involved very little if any consultation with the people of the area. The consequence was opposition to the proposal by most major elements

of the population, particularly the Malays, and support by virtually no one. The eventual substitution of another federation scheme, although a wise move in the circumstances, further evidenced the decline in British power. This, plus the resentments and hostilities induced by the abortive Union, encouraged revolt. Paradoxically, the improvement of the Federation of the Union may also have encouraged revolt, in that the new arrangements in the dissidents' eyes may have threatened eventual improvement of the situation and thus decreased prospects for the dissidents' accession to power.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1. Nature of the study. Malaya is one of seven nations selected to provide a data base for analysis of the factors which lead to low intensity conflict and loss of Government control. Study of the pre-conflict period, defined for research purposes as 1930-48, was conducted on an interdisciplinary basis, examining political, economic, sociological, psychological, public health, scientific-technological, and military aspects of the period. Definitions, assumptions, and study methods which are common to all the countries examined are on file at the Institute of Advanced Studies.

a. The data were drawn from an exhaustive perusal of published works on Malaya and some unpublished sources, especially for statistical purposes. The Center for Research on Social Systems of the American University provided information for compiling the bibliography and furnished certain statistical information. The findings, where possible and appropriate, were checked against classified Government information for their validity. The results are summarized in the following sections of this chapter and are presented at more length, by discipline, in the succeeding chapters on political, economic, sociological (including cultural and public health), and military factors.

b. Descriptive information is included in this report only to the extent necessary for coherent analysis. More complete data are available in the US Army Area Handbook for Malaysia and Singapore and in other works cited in the bibliography.

2. Descriptive background.

a. Nomenclature. For purposes of this study, the unqualified term Malaya (originally coined by the British) is used for convenience to include the 11 Malay states on the Malay (or Kra) Peninsula of Southeast Asia, which comprised the Federation of Malaya at the end of the pre-conflict period, plus the British Crown Colony of Singapore (an island joined to the mainland by a causeway). This combined area was never a political unit, but it all contributed to the situation under study. When the mainland only is discussed, it is referred to as such, or as the Malay States. Various other terms which have applied to this area over the years are as follows:

(1) Malay States. Principalities on the Malay Peninsula which have had a more or less autonomous existence for some centuries, under the traditional rule of Malay aristocrats. A few such states became provinces of Thailand and are not considered in this study. Five others were individually under British suzerainty until 1946. Four were combined under British Governors as the Federated Malay States. Two (Penang and Malacca) were British colonies for over a century, combined with Singapore and other smaller territories as the Straits Settlements until 1946. There were other similar Malay States in Sumatra and Java under Dutch rule, which became part of present Indonesia.

(2) Federated Malay States. Federation of the states of Perak, Pahang, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan, under a British High Commissioner, formed in 1895.

(3) Unfederated Malay States. States under British control but not part of the Federated States: Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu in the north, and Johore in the south.

(4) Straits Settlements. British Crown Colony, separate from the Federated and Unfederated States but with the same Governor, comprising the island of Penang (plus a coastal strip opposite it), the former Malay state of Malacca in the south, the island of Singapore, and smaller islands. The Straits Settlements was established as a unit in 1826; Penang and Malacca were separated in 1946.

(5) Malayan Union. An abortive British colony established in 1946, comprising the 11 political units on the mainland (including Penang). Objections to numerous aspects of the Union led to its elimination in 1948.

(6) Federation of Malaya. A self-governing federal entity within the British Empire, established in 1948 to include the same 11 Malay states of the Malayan Union. It achieved independence in 1957.

(7) Malaysia. A term used for many years to refer to the Pacific area peopled by ethnic Malays--particularly the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago, and sometimes including the Philippines and other islands as well. In 1963, the Federation of Malaya expanded to include Singapore and the British colonies of Sarawak and Sabah on the Island of Borneo. The term Malaysia was then applied to the newly expanded state.

(8) Singapore. Island acquired by the British in 1819, as a trading center, and largely peopled thereafter by Chinese immigrants under British rule. It was merged in Malaysia in 1963, but seceded in 1965 to become an independent state.

b. Geography. Mainland Malaya has an area of 50,915 square miles. It consists of a spinal mountain range running roughly north and south in the center of the Peninsula flanked by coastal plains with a low-level region to the south. About 80 percent of this area, in 1967, was covered by dense tropical jungle, mountains, or swamps; 12 percent was given to the cultivation of rubber; 2.9 percent to rice; and 2 percent to coconut and oil palms. The coastline totals 1,200 miles. On the west, it is practically an unbroken succession of mangrove and mud flats, with only infrequent bays and other indentations. On the east coast, there are continuous stretches of sand and surf bordered by littoral vegatation. The area of Singapore is 2,096 square miles. Average daily temperature varies from about 70° to 90°F, although in the higher areas temperatures are lower and vary more widely. Malaya experiences a southwest and a northeast monsoon yearly. Annual rainfall averages about 100 inches, although it varies considerably in different locations and from year to year.

c. The people. About three-quarters of the mainland population (totaling 7,232,000 in 1961) occupies the western portion of Malaya. The greatest concentration is along the western coast where all districts had (in 1965) at least 100 persons per square mile. These areas, except for the vicinity of Kuala Lumpur (the capital city) and one river valley, are no more than 30 miles in width. They are the sites of the most intensive mining and the most extensive rubber estates. A second population concentration (although with only 7 percent of total mainland population) is the rice-growing area of the northeast. In the interior, densities averaged less than 25 people per square mile, although density reached 100 in certain small areas of economic development. The Malay Peninsula formed one of the routes south traveled by the prehistoric peoples who settled in Indonesia, Melanesia, and Australia. Migrants around 2000 BC, possibly Caucasoid, intermingled with Mongoloid peoples to produce the proto-Malays. These were primitive rice farmers. Later, Chinese and Indian traders and other Malay stock from Indonesia came to the Peninsula. Both Hindu and Islamic culture heavily influenced politics and society. From the 16th century, Portuguese, Dutch, and finally British forces established bases in or near the Peninsula; the Europeans had little direct effect on the ethnic compositions, but the British in particular were responsible for an influx of large numbers of Chinese and a smaller number of Indians. Chinese accounted for more than a third of the mainland population in 1961. The Island of Singapore had a population of 1.7 million in 1961, of which three-quarters were Chinese.

d. History. The early Buddhist Malay kingdom of Srivijaya, based in east Sumatra, dominated much of the Malay Peninsula from the 9th to the 13th centures. The powerful Hindu kingdom of Majapahit, based in Java, gained control of the Malay Peninsula in the 14th century. The conversion of the Malays to Islam, beginning in the early part of the 14th century, was accelerated with the rise of the State of Malacca, under the rule of a Moslem prince.

(1) The arrival of the Portuguese in Malacca in 1509 marked the beginning of European expansion in this area as the power of the sultanates progressively declined. The Dutch ousted the Portuguese from Malacca in 1641, and in 1795 were replaced in turn by the British, who had occupied Penang in 1786. Sir Stamford Raffles founded a British settlement at Singapore in 1819. In 1826 the settlements of Malacca and Penang were combined with Singapore to form the colony of the Straits Settlements. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the British concluded treaties establishing protectorates over the nine Malay States on the peninsula. Four of these States were consolidated in 1895 as the Federated Malay States.

(2) Malaya enjoyed a long period of prosperity with the gradual establishment of a well-ordered system of public administration, the extension of public services, and the development of large-scale rubber and tin production. This period was interrupted by the Japanese invasion and occupation from 1941 to 1945. After the war, the local Communists, mainly Chinese, expanded their influence and made plans for an armed struggle. A state of emergency was declared in June 1948, and a long and bitter guerrilla war ensued. The emergency was ended in 1960 as Malaya, in partnership with the United Kingdom, gained the distinction of being one of the very few countries in the world to suppress a large-scale Communist uprising.

3. Political factors. More than a century of British hegemony in Malaya had developed an economy and administrative apparatus that were comparable to many advanced states. In contrast, there was very little political development to go with it. British objectives were to maintain a climate of order and an infrastructure which would facilitate free private enterprise. The Malay States were encouraged to preserve their traditional ways under British tutelage. The large Chinese population was left to its own devices except when internal security was threatened, as by the secret societies in the 1880's and by the Kuomintang (KMT) and Chinese Communists in the 1930's. The Indian community was largely transient. Government was divided into several different jurisdictions. There were few if any political institutions, up to World War II, that created loyalty to any sort of national entity or permitted public participation in political affairs. Mass movements and political parties were virtually nonexistent (except for the Communists) until World War II. The various deliberative and executive bodies were exclusive elite groups, dominated by the British. Only those in Singapore were even partially elective. This policy was not necessarily destabilizing, so long as British power was unquestioned and economic well-being was increasing, but it did not build a strong or shock-resistant political community.

a. The force that held the Malayan economy and polity together was the British presence and the widely respected British power, reinforced by effective and generally fair administration. The rapid defeat of British forces by the Japanese in World War II shattered British prestige.

British reestablishment of control after the Japanese surrender was slow, and postwar economic recovery was difficult. The failure of the scheme for Malayan union, which the British precipitately pushed through in 1946 and then withdrew because of widespread Malay resistance, served to underline the lessened British power.

b. All three ethnic communities had been exposed to the upsurge of nationalism and anticolonialism in the interwar years: the Malays through their contacts with the Muslim countries of the Near and Middle East and with the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia); the Chinese through their continuing orientation toward their homeland with its revolutionary turmoil and anti-Western feeling; the Indians through the growth of nationalism in India. Although the Japanese did not promote the idea of an independent Malay state, they did support Asian nationalism and opposition to the Europeans.

c. The British until World War II favored the Malays, as the original inhabitants of Malaya, even though the Chinese had become almost equally numerous on the mainland. Only Malays were admitted to the top administrative levels in the Federation (although this was not true in the Straits Settlements), and the best farmlands were reserved for them. This policy did not prevent many Chinese from prospering in business and becoming influential, but it was obvious, as the Chinese community grew more settled and less transient, that the British-supported Malay social and political position, as compared with the Chinese, was the reverse of what the Chinese, with their superior energy and competitiveness and their feeling of cultural superiority, might have expected. The British altered their live-and-let-live approach to the Chinese community in 1930, under the pressure of growing influence from China through the Kuomintang and Chinese Communists. The KMT was first outlawed, then limited in its activity; the Communists were also hunted down. In 1932, many of the special powers of the British officers handling Chinese affairs were given to the regular administrative officers, most of whom did not speak Chinese or interest themselves in Chinese problems. In contrast to the generally even-handed British administration, the Japanese actively discriminated against the Chinese community in many ways, forcing many from Singapore and elsewhere, mostly townsmen and laborers, into a marginal agrarian existence on the mainland. The Japanese also, by forcing Chinese community leaders to raise funds for their war effort, added to tensions within the Chinese community itself.

d. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and to some extent the Kuomintang, fostered anti-imperialist, anti-British sentiment in Malaya. Only the Communists, however, developed an active dissident organization. Guided by the Chinese Communists and the Comintern, the Malayan Communists (almost wholly Chinese) took advantage of disaffection fostered by economic privations of the depression and built up the most effective political organization in Malaya, apart from the British

administration, by 1940. Despite its outlaw status, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was strong enough to help the British in the defense of Singapore in 1941-42. The British trained a number of Communists as guerrilla fighters and supported their units against the Japanese during World War II. This organization and this training reinforced the Communist ability to rise against the British. Although the records do not make the point explicitly, it appears that the Communists were also rebelling against the established leaders within their own Chinese community, which exhibited in microcosm the disparities of China itself. Communist assassinations of "unreliable" Chinese during World War II point in this direction.

e. The Malayan security forces were drastically weakened after World War II, because they had been used by the Japanese authorities to enforce their draconian occupation rule. This weakness was highlighted during the month-long hiatus between Japanese surrender and the British reentry, when the Anti-Japanese Peoples Liberation Army (almost wholly Chinese) was the only significant force in-being.

f. As the British administration grew more sophisticated and complex, its officers lost the close touch they had originally with local rulers and population. The consequence was a loss of communication and understanding and a tendency toward Parkinsonian proliferation which had to be vigorously attacked in both the 1920's and 1930's.

g. Throughout the preconflict period, the political orientation of the two main non-Malay groups--the Chinese and the Indians--was toward their respective homelands, rather than toward the area in which they lived. Both communities were composed chiefly of immigrants, many of whom returned to their native areas after saving some money. From the early 1930's, as Chinese male immigration was sharply curtailed and war at home made return less attractive, the Chinese became a more permanent part of Malaya--more so than the Indians, whose immigration and return were more formalized and facilitated by intergovernmental arrangement. Even so, the Chinese were oriented by upbringing and formal education toward China. The Indians owed some of their protection in treatment and employment in Malaya to Indian Government intervention. All these factors promoted continuing ties with the respective homelands and blocked the growth of a Malayan consciousness. (It also blocked the spread of communism outside the Chinese community.) The Malays, for their part, did not recognize a larger entity than the nine separate Malay States and gave their allegiance to the several Sultans.

h. Both the Japanese occupation authorities and the Communist-dominated resistance fighters made extensive use of violence from 1942 to 1944. The Communists were more successful in terror and assassination among the local populace than in operations against the Japanese.

4. Economic factors. The economy of Malaya, including the Straits Settlements, was basically a mechanism (or better, a congeries of mech-

anisms) to serve the needs of European business interests. The European-owned tin mines, rubber estates, trading firms, and banks were the primary beneficiaries of colonial Government policies and expenditures, largely in transport, communications, buildings, basic public health, and internal security. Some enterprising Chinese prospered also in the laissez-faire climate--including opium concessionnaires whose payments to the State consituted for many years a major source of Government revenue. However, the Malayan subsistence economy changed relatively slowly, and the lot of the average man contrasted vividly with that of the wealthy few, especially of the Europeans, whose income per male resident averaged more than 10 times that of the Chinese. The British drive for economic development had little or no general welfare dimension, except indirect benefits from the prosperity and employment brought by private enterprise. Nevertheless, the growth of a modern economic sector, especially in transport and commerce, highlighted the contrast and tension between the traditional and modern styles of social organization. The growth of the trade union movement, and the Communist penetration of the movement after World War II, reflected this tension and the slow adaptation of traditional institutions to the new requirements.

a. Malaya was heavily dependent on world markets and strongly affected by international economic conditions. Repeated boom-and-bust cycles in rubber and tin brought unemployment and wage reductions. Colonial monetary and fiscal policies generally aggravated rather than dampened the effects of economic swings, because of conservative retrenchment of expenditure in bad times and because Malayan currency was tied to the pound. For example, gross output in 1932 was 70 percent less than in 1929. The impact of cyclical swings fell most heavily on the Chinese, especially during the world depression after 1929. The Malays were less involved in the modern economic sector, and the Indians were more easily able to return to their homeland.

b. All components of the Malayan populace were affected by the economic adversities of World War II, but the effects fell most heavily on the Chinese. The British scorched-earth policy put 80 percent of all tin dredgers out of action and delayed postwar recovery until 1950. Large numbers of Chinese laborers were thus without jobs during and for several years after the War. The rubber estates, which employed a large portion of the Indian laborers, were less adversely affected. Since Malaya was dependent on imports for 60 percent of its food, the wartime interruption of trade, aggravated by bad Japanese economic management, created immense hardship for the non-Malay population. Thousands of Chinese were forced into marginal subsistence agriculture, often on lands that were reserved for Malays under the British administration. Sixty percent of Malaya's power capacity was lost during the war, and per capita electric power consumption in 1950 was still 16-18 percent less than in 1940. The Malays suffered less than the other ethnic groups, both because the traditional agrarian economy was less affected and because Japanese policies favored the Malays.

c. Although the separation of Malaya's three economies--the rubber estates, the tin mines, and the traditional agrarian economy--was not as complete as sometimes described, it demonstrated the lack of any effective national economic integration--a counterpart of the political and ethnic fractionation of Malaya. It tended to tie Chinese economic well-being to one commodity, tin, except for the Chinese who were involved in commerce and other services and those few in the other major areas. Similarly, Indian fortunes were largely tied to rubber, except for the "chettiers" or small traders. The Malays for the most part had not involved themselves in the modernizing aspects of the economy; they were, as a result, insulated to some extent from the effects of intentional economic fluctuations, but at the same time were without an economic power base to support their social primacy. This fact may have encouraged the Communists, almost wholly Chinese, in their attempt to seize power.

d. The Malayan economy exemplifies colonial "muddling through," with economic and financial policies outdated at the time of their application and sluggish response to economic swings and shifts. Such an approach was peculiarly vulnerable in the immediate postwar period, when rapid rehabilitation and social welfare action was most needed, but when the needs of the metropole, as always, took precedence. The consequences of wartime privations and postwar insufficiencies fell hardest on the Chinese, as had the problems of the depression. Shortages of trained administrators and the low level of educational expenditure, two major shortages in postwar Malaya, illustrate deficiencies in both political and economic policies of the colonial Government, if these policies are judged from the viewpoint of developing a Malayan national entity rather than a prosperous and secure adjunct of empire; but it is clear that the policymakers did not have this viewpoint until the growth of nationalism forced it on them. Nevertheless, in comparison with other nations of Asia, Malaya until the outbreak of World War II was far more prosperous, orderly, and secure, as demonstrated by the large numbers of immigrants from China, India, and the Netherlands East Indies.

5. Sociocultural factors. Throughout the preconflict period, Malaya's three major ethnic groups--Malays, Chinese, and Indians--were sharply differentiated by language, culture, religion, occupation, and residence patterns, as well as by their relationship with the British administration. Their separation was not total, but there was little political or social interaction among them. In employment, for example, enterprises run by Chinese or Indians preferred to hire people of the same ethnic group. Such separation bred feelings of strangeness which reinforced the growth of intercommunal suspicion and hostility during and after World War II.

a. The Malays' society and culture readily accommodated to the British control of the country, which was maintained in a manner calculated to cause least interference with their tradition. Malay society had long had a two-class structure and had inculcated obedience to the authority of the ruler. The aristocracy continued to enjoy preferred status under

the British, although it lost most of its real power; but Malay culture emphasized enjoyment of living rather than achievement. The bulk of the Malays were essentially unaffected by the British administration, which took pains to protect their traditional agrarian living patterns. They continued to live in their villages and practice subsistence agriculture and fishing. Only a small part of the population was affected by modern education and mass media exposure, and Malay movement into the cities was exceedingly slow. There seems to have been very little awareness of the changed situation produced by the growth of large Chinese and Indian communities until late in the preconflict period--possibly not before World War II--because of the high degree of intercommunal separation in a relatively sparsely populated and wealthy country. Only those few Malays who were competing for positions in the modern political and economic sectors felt, up until the wartime period, their disadvantage in comparison to the Chinese and Indians.

b. Unlike the Malays, the Chinese were in general strongly achievement-oriented and caught up in economic and social change.

(1) Chinese family upbringing and culture emphasized achievement of status and wealth through individual initiative and hard work for the benefit of the family group. The Chinese community had an open class structure, so that upward mobility was accepted. Until the 1930's, most Chinese in Malaya were China-born and expected to return to China, and the Chinese community was viewed by the British and Malaya--as well as by itself--as largely transient and temporary. Depression in Malaya and Japanese invasion of China changed this pattern; the Chinese community became increasingly settled and permanent, so that status in Malaya became the important consideration rather than the prospect of return to China.

(2) The British administration, although it had encouraged Chinese immigration to provide labor for the tin mines, had always left the Chinese largely to themselves, both politically and economically. In consequence, even by the 1930's, labor conditions for the many in the mines were very bad; public health measures were rudimentary at best; and living conditions were poor in the extreme. At the same time, the Chinese community was thoroughly organized into a number of economic, social, and quasi-political groups, at least some of which cut across class, linguistic, and kinship lines. The Chinese--unlike the Malays--participated at all economic and social levels of Malayan affairs and had begun to participate in political affairs as well through representation in legislative councils, particularly in the Straits Settlements. The British, however, continued to occupy nearly all major political and administrative posts.

(3) The traditional Chinese desire for education had resulted in development of a largely self-contained system of schools, whose cur-

riculum was more influenced by the Chinese homeland than by the British administration and which taught largely in the Chinese language. There was some British supervision from 1930 on, and some Government aid, but many of the Chinese schools were wholly self-supported. The effect was to reinforce the exposure of the Chinese to currents of change, not only from the modern sector within Malaya, but also from China; to orient the Chinese inward to their own community, or outward toward China, rather than toward a multiracial Malayan nation; and to promote the sense of Chinese ingroupness by enlarging knowledge of the standard Chinese language (Kuo-yu) among the various dialect groups.

(4) The capacity and willingness of the Chinese to organize and get things done was manifested in the Communist Party as well as in other activities. Because of this fact, the Communists could offer assistance to the British in their extreme need to defend Malaya and Singapore in 1941 and could have this offer accepted despite previous British opposition. The British then trained the guerrilla fighters who became the core of the resistance movement, first against the Japanese, then against the British themselves. Interviews in the midfifties of surrendered guerrillas indicated that their Communist affiliation and participation in combat was motivated primarily by the desire to increase their status by association with prominent men they knew in the movement, and eventually to reach positions of leadership. Since the openness of Chinese society readily permitted upward mobility, the majority of Chinese were opposed to the Communists--especially in the light of the real prosperity that many of them had achieved prior to the Japanese occupation. Accordingly, the motives of the Communist members and supporters must have included nationalist and anticolonialist aspirations aroused by education, by contacts with China, and by the experiences of the Japanese occupation.

(5) In contrast with the Malay community, the Chinese community showed strong signs of cultural and social change in clan and family structure and in religious observances. Their acceptance of change was also demonstrated in their ready acceptance of Western medicine, in contrast to the resistance of the Malays. The Chinese-language press had a higher circulation per Chinese than the Malay press per Malay. Accompanying this trend toward change--and perhaps a contributing cause of it--was a rapidly growing Chinese birth rate, which overtook and outdistanced the Malay birth rate as the proportion of women in the Chinese population rose. The 18-year-olds of 1948 grew up in a community which was just changing from sojourners to settled residents, with a growing proportion of young people, and altering its world view accordingly--while at the same time enduring the hardships and uncertainties engendered by world depression, the Japanese invasion of China, and the rise of nationalism.

c. The Indian community in Malaya was numerically large, and, like the Chinese, its members were found at all levels of economic and social affairs. Unlike the Chinese, the Indians had their own Government

of India to insist upon their rights and a program of immigration and emigration regulated by intergovernmental agreement. In consequence, Indian welfare was more carefully attended to by the British administration, and the Indians were better able to adjust to economic fluctuations by changes in the rate of arrival and return home. The Indians also stayed shorter periods in Malaya on the average than the Chinese. Their community had very little internal organization. They also had their own schools, which taught in Indian languages (Tamil and Malaylam) and thus tended to orient them toward their homeland. The Japanese occupation fell less hard on them than upon the Chinese (except for the unfortunate victims of forced labor on the Siam-Assam railway) and encouraged them further to think in terms of Indian self-determination through the Independence Army. None of these circumstances was particularly conducive toward revolt before World Wai TT; after the War, the rapid progress of India toward independence may well have absorbed whatever revolutionary feelings may have arisen from the wartime experience.

6. Military factors. Malaya borders a major east-west maritime trade route (the Straits of Malacca), and for many years had been a major source of tin and rubber. Additionally, the Islands of Singapore and Penang have been major entrepots in European trade with the Far East. However, Malaya in the 1930's faced no major external threat from its neighbors, since the territorial rivalries of the colonial powers had subsided into economic competition, and Thailand had no aggressive designs. The British believed that war in Europe would have little impact on Malaya, and that, in any event, the naval base at Singapore would assure the area's safety. Although the Japanese threat to Southeast Asia grew, there was little anticipation of the eventual overland attack through Siam, nor of the Japanese ability to sink two British battleships at Singapore in the early days of war in the Pacific. The strategic situation thus did not appear to call for large armed forces, except for British naval power.

a. The land surface of Malaya is 80 percent jungle, and the east and west coasts are also separated by the mountain backbone of the Peninsula. The country thus lends itself to guerrilla operations and offers refuge to rebel forces, although it also makes living and movement difficult. The terrain is also largely responsible for the traditional fractionation of the Peninsula into many political entities, which constantly struggled among themselves for power, but did not maintain large standing armies. Although the Malays took advantage of their long coastline for communication, fishing, and piracy; they did not develop modern naval power. The British developed a modern road and rail network linking the major centers, and during the 1930's had securely consolidated their political control throughout Malaya, but the jungle was both refuge for the resistance forces and obstacle for the Japanese during their occupation of Malaya. It continued so after the British reentry.

b. Regular Army forces in Malaya before World War II were limited to a British garrison at Singapore, an Indian battalion, and two regular Malay battalions, largely British-officered. In addition, there were

several types of volunteer forces, including organizations in the various Malay States (federated and unfederated) and the Straits Settlements. There was also a volunteer all-European regiment of battalion size for the Federated Malay States and another in the State of Johore. Total strength of the volunteer forces was about 5,000 in 1935. Officers were both European and Malay; other ranks were chiefly Malay, except in the two all-European units. Despite their heterogeneous nature and lack of coordinated training above company level, these forces fought well in defense of Malaya against the Japanese. They were too few before the war to constitute a large factor in Malayan politics or even internal security, except for the European volunteer regiment, which assisted the police in times of internal unrest.

c. Early police forces in Malaya were largely paramilitary in nature, to cope with the constant small rebellions and disturbances within and among the Malay States. After 1900, largely in response to the growing involvement of Chinese secret societies in crime, the police developed criminal investigation and detection capabilities, working in close cooperation with the administrative departments.

(1) The police force was the first Government department open to Malays, who made up most of the personnel at increasingly senior levels, except for the detectives; these were largely Chinese. Europeans had filled all senior positions but were gradually being replaced by Malays. In 1947, there were 154 permanent police officers (mostly European), 192 inspectors (mostly Malay), and more than 9,000 men at other levels in the Federation police. Singapore had a separate police force, similar to the Federation force and with the same ethnic differentiation. In 1955, it had about 4,000 men. There were training schools on the mainland and in Singapore. Some personnel were trained in England and China.

(2) Morale and efficiency were high, and police power was exercised with restraint prior to World War II; but the force deteriorated badly during the occupation. Some men left; others turned to extortion. The Japanese used the police, still mostly Malays, against the Chinese, thus embittering the relations between the two ethnic groups.

(3) During the time between Japanese surrender and British return, the guerrillas were almost the only organized force and were free to make reprisals. Only a remnant of the police force was operating when the British returned; morale was low, prestige was low, equipment was short, and corruption was high. The police soon were reorganized and reequipped; radio-equipped patrols proved of much value during the emergency. However, the police forces still were rebuilding at the outbreak of the emergency and could not meet both the Communist challenge and the requirements of normal law and order enforcement. The memory of the British defeat and burgeoning nationalist feelings also adversely affected the capacity of the British administration to maintain internal security.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL FACTORS

Section I. Government, Political Parties, and Interest Groups

by Eugene H. Miller, PhD

7. Government organization and performance. The legislature in Malaya in 1930-47 must be described in the context of the three political structures that had developed in the 19th century: the Straits Settlements, the unfederated Malay States, and the Federated Malay States.

a. The Straits Settlements. Legislative power was vested in a legislative council, subject to the dissent of the Secretary of State for Colonies. The primary problem of the council was its composition. All unofficial members before 1924 were appointed by the Governor. Only two of the unofficial members were elected, and they were not chosen by a wide franchise but by the chambers of commerce of Singapore and Penang. The others were chosen from the three settlements (Malacca, Penang, and Singapore) and from the different ethnic communities. Thus, the 13 unofficial members included seven Europeans, three Chinese, one Malay, one British Indian, and one Eurasian. Of the 13 official members, eight were members of the executive council, and three headed the departments of education, medical and health, and Chinese affairs. The official members' vote was at the command of the Governor. Bills he supported usually were passed. "Essentially, the council functioned in order that the unofficial representatives might make known the desires of their constituencies, without being allowed any voice in the final decisions."[1]

b. The unfederated Malay States. There were no legislative councils as the term is usually understood in the West. State councils, made up of the rulers, the principal chiefs, several leading Chinese, and the Resident Adviser, did have legislative powers. However, their primary function was to serve as sounding boards for new ideas.

> Each resident was able to assess the feelings of the other groups involved in relation to a particular issue, while membership in the council gave back to the sultan and the chiefs some of the prestige they had lost by the institution of the resident system.[2]

c. The Federated Malay States. The States of Perak, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, and Pahang were united as the Federated Malay States in 1896. Each State retained its legislative powers through its own council, which consisted of the ruler and representatives of the various groups within the State. However, in 1909, a Federal Council was created. It was chaired by the High Commissioner and included the four British residents

and the native ruler of each of the four States, as well as the Resident General and four unofficial members appointed by the High Commissioner. This attempt at centralization was

> short-lived because, as the Council grew in size and attempted to accommodate the wishes of the Chinese, Indian and European inhabitants, it was weakened. Effective power returned to the states and their powerful British officials.[3]

8. Political parties and interest groups. R. S. Milne maintains that in Malaya's plural society there were no mass political movements before the Japanese occupation. The nature of the population, with two main ethnic groups, the Malays and the Chinese, as well as the presence of a significant Indian minority, made it difficult to inaugurate representative political institutions. The British opted instead for indirect rule through local Sultans. In the absence of elections, there was little incentive for development of Western-type political parties.[4]

a. Ginsburg and Roberts, while agreeing that "active political partisanship and representative government are relatively new, primarily postwar phenomena in Malaya,"[5] trace the seeds of contemporary parties to the formation of a number of small weak "intellectual" political groups before 1941; the creation of large pro- and anti-Japanese organizations, supported by substantial numbers of the Malay, Indian, and Chinese communities, during the period from 1941 to 1945; and the organization after 1945 of representative parties espousing special platforms and appealing to various segments of the population.

b. In the first period, two distinct political groups developed among the Malays, the conservative Kaum Tua, which rejected the West and reverted to pre-Western values, and the modernist Kaum Muda, which advocated adopting Western techniques in order to compete with the alien culture. Both camps were motivated by events in the Islamic world outside Malaya. The conservatives were influenced by pan-Islamic movements in Egypt and Turkey. Before 1922 the movement in Malaya was under the control of orthodox groups centered inthe religious seminaries of Perak and Kelantan. Moslem clubs sprang up, Egyptian and Arab synonyms were introduced as substitutes for English words, and the traditional role of the Sultans was weakened by enthusiasm for an anticipated universal Islamic Federation. In 1922, events in Turkey caused a marked swing of the pendulum inthe Islamic world. The revolution and modernization of the former caliphate was imitated by Muslims in Southeast Asia, particularly the younger English-educated men in the towns. Thus, Kaum Muda, a party of approximately one hundred young Malays from the growing middle class, advocated "progress along Western lines through democracy and the seizure of new economic and cultural opportunities."[6] Other manifestations of liberalism among the Malays were the Anjaman-i-Islam and the Ahmadiya movements under the leadership of Sir Syed Amier Ali and Mira Ghulam Ahmed.

c. As in other parts of Southeast Asia, nationalism does not seem to have developed in Malaya before World War I. However, a number of Malay associations were formed in the 1920's. Two of the most active were the Malay Association for the Advancement of Learning, which had a nationalistic bias, and the Malay Union, centered in Singapore, which was committed to organize "all Malays for the preservation of their rights and their political economic advancement." Ginsburg and Roberts conclude that "by 1941 the influence of the modernist movements in Malay political thought was marked, although the conservative elements remained active and enjoyed the support of the Malay masses and their tradition-bound leaders who felt threatened by the modernist movements."[7]

d. The second major ethnic group in Malaya, the Chinese, also displayed both traditionalist and modernist tendencies in political organization in the period preceding World War II. Traditionalist organizations were of two types: the secret societies and community associations, such as guilds and chambers of commerce. Because of their close and historic links to the Chinese motherland, the secret societies were to play a particularly significant role in Malayan political life. The secret society which was to have the most influence and from which all others stemmed was the Triad Society or Hung League. Founded in the 17th century, it was dedicated to the overthrow of the foreign Manchu dynasty. It not only operated inside the Manchu Empire but established overseas branches to follow the waves of 19th century emigration.[8]

e. Not all the new settlers and immigrants in Malaya joined the Triad; they came from different parts of China, spoke different languages, and had different customs. Thus rival groups developed. The Ghee Hin, mainly Cantonese, and the Hai San, largely Hakka, became the main societies. Theoretically they were committed to bringing down the Manchus, but they were more concerned in practice with looking after the welfare of new arrivals, helping them find jobs, securing loans, and rendering whatever assistance was needed. This Tammany Hall type of operation brought most of the immigrants into one or another of the societies, and the leaders developed considerable power. In the early years, they helped to preserve peace in the Straits Settlements and the Government reciprocated by appointing them Capitans China. Thus, until 1880, the Chinese community was largely governed through the societies, and the members gave more allegiance to the society than they did to the laws of the country. Unfortunately, as the various groups competed for power, the mutual aid aspect began to be replaced by aims that became more and more criminal. Disturbances and riots growing out of rivalries over which society should control vice and gambling in particular areas led to required registration in 1869. This attempt at control through supervision did not succeed, and the societies were declared illegal in 1889. They went underground. Some members later turned from crime to politics and became

active supporters of the local branch of the Kuomintang or the local cell of the Communist Party. Like the secret societies, political parties had followed the immigrants from their homeland to their overseas residence.[9]

f. The growth of these two revolutionary movements represented the modernist trend in Malayan Chinese politics. The area was an early center of overseas support for the Nationalist revolution in China. Urged by Sun Yat-sen the Kuomintang established a strong branch among the Cantonese on Penang. The goals of the local party were "to maintain among the Chinese an intense interest in the revolutionary movement in China, focus their primary interest on the southern Chinese movement, and support Chinese independence and nationalism with funds and personnel." The Kuomintang was to a considerable extent associated with some of the secret societies. Its success in stimulating an alien nationalism was anathema to both Malay and British authorities. Consequently, the party was declared illegal. After its triumph in China in 1929, the authorities in Malaya took a second look at the problem and from 1930 on the local Kuomintang was allowed to operate under strict governmental control.[10]

g. The chief rival of the Kuomintang was the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The first organizational work in Malaya was attempted in 1924. The next year, a special representative was dispatched from China to make contacts with local Chinese and Indonesian revolutionaries. His mission was facilitated by the nationalist-Communist arrangements that had been made between Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Communists under the sponsorship of Moscow. The 1923 accord provided for Soviet political and military advisers for the Kuomintang's projected march from Canton to Peking. In return for this aid, the Chinese Communists were admitted to the Kuomintang. Under the circumstances, a number of Communist agents were able to infiltrate the Kuomintang organization in Malaya, and Communist power within the party developed significantly until 1927. At that time, Chiang Kai-shek broke with the Chinese Communists, expelled them from the Kuomintang and sent Galen, Borodin, and other Soviet advisers packing. The close tie between overseas Chinese and the motherland was again demonstrated --the break in China was reflected in a similar rupture in Malaya. The Communist-infiltrated Malayan revolutionary committee severed all ties with the local Kuomintang. The break-away organization concentrated its efforts on two groups with low status in the Chinese community, the Hailams from Hainan and the Hakkas. Its overall position, however, was substantially weakened, and in 1928 the Comintern sent several agents to Singapore to organize a region-wide Communist Party, the Nan-yang Communist Party, uniting Chinese Communist groups in Malaya, Burma, Indochina, and Thailand. A Youth League and a Nan-yang Federation of Labor were set up as affiliated groups.[11]

h. The ties with Moscow were demonstrated in 1930 when the Comintern, distrusting the overemphasis on organization among the Chinese and wanting to broaden the base of the movement among other ethnic groups, dissolved the Nan-yang Communist Party and replaced it with the Malayan Communist Party. At the same time the Nan-yang Federation of Labor was renamed the Malayan Federation of Labor, with increased emphasis on the organization of Malay workers. The British were not slow to react. Shortly after these changes in Communist organization and tactics were inaugurated, the British struck hard with a series of wholesale arrests and deportations of Communists from Malaya. However, the party was not completely liquidated and during the 1930's various factors encouraged its revival. These were the effects of the worldwide economic depression, the change in the party line from militant revolution to popular front tactics, the Japanese invasion of China and the revival of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China, and the growing preoccupation of the British with the German danger in Europe. The rebirth of Communist activity in Malaya during the prewar decade was evident in a series of violent strikes, vigorous anti-Japanese movements, and, between 1939 and 1941, an anti-British campaign which was suddenly reversed after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. In the 10 years between their "liquidation" in 1930 and the outbreak of World War II, the Malayan Communists had succeeded in infiltrating the Kuomintang and weakening it from within. Thus when Singapore fell in February 1942, "the Communist party was virtually the only well-organized resistance group in the country."[12]

i. A third ethnic group, the Malayan Indians, had no strong political organizations similar to those of the Chinese before 1936. In that year N. Raghavan and C. S. Goho founded the Central Indian Association of Malaya, which became the champion of better labor conditions and education and political privileges for Indians in Malaya. The new organization had some initial success but "its involvement with Congress politics in India and with the Malayan Communist party in labor strikes served to divide the local born from the immigrant Indians and to antagonize the employers of Indians." In addition the association aroused the opposition of the Government. In face of all these difficulties, the Indians' political interest group was unable to survive the Japanese occupation.[13]

j. The second stage in the development of active political organizations among the peoples of Malaya came with the country's involvement in World War II. The years 1941-45 saw an acceleration of political consciousness characterized by the creation of pro- and anti-Japanese organizations, supported by substantial numbers of the Malay, Chinese, and Indian communities. The three ethnic groups reacted differently to occupation by an alien Asian power. The Japanese encouraged pan-Malay nationalism but in a low profile manner. The Malays, with the exception of a few anti-Japanese guerrilla groups such as the Wataniah in Penang, tended, for the most part, to

cooperate with or at least obey the invaders. The Japanese, in turn, apparently made no open attempt to create a pro-Japanese organization, although they did try to promote an "Asia for the Asian" psychology in the schools and in their general propaganda. One positive attempt at creating a pan-Malay attitude, the unification of the administration of Malaya and Sumatra, was not successful and was abandoned in short order.[14] Similarly, Japanese encouragement for the Union of Malay Youths (KMM), a left-wing group that had been founded in 1937 by Inche Ibrahim Bin Yaacob to advocate independence for Malaya and union with Indonesia, brought no positive results. Later KMM was reconstituted as the People's Association of Peninsular Indonesia (KRIS).[15]

k. Tokyo's policy toward the Malayan Indians was influenced by the Japanese desire to overthrow the British in south as well as Southeast Asia. Shortly after their victory at Singapore, the Japanese organized Indian Independence Leagues (IIL). The first leaders of these groups, Ragahavan and Goho, who had established the prewar Central Indian Association, failed to get the movement off the ground. However, with the arrival of S. Chandra Bose in 1943, this overseas Indian nationalist movement gained momentum, and there were nine IIL branches in Malaya by 1945. Recruits for the Indian National Army, a liberation force formed in Malaya, came primarily from unemployed estate workers, but general support for the IIL was given by all classes of Indians; partly from national loyalty, partly from fear of retaliation if they did not cooperate.[16] (Harry Miller disagrees with this opinion. His impression is that the vast majority of Indians were suspicious and disinclined to join or support the nationalist movement. He also maintains that the Indian estate laborers were transferred by the thousands to work, along with Allied prisoners of war, as forced labor on the Japanese strategic railway link between Burma and Thailand. These men would not have been available as recruits for the Indian National Army.[17])

l. A special group like the Sikhs, many of whom had been employed as policemen by the British, found it in their personal interests to switch their allegiance. However, loyalty to the Japanese was by no means unanimous in the Indian community, nor were the overt adherents necessarily enthusiastic. A few Indians did join anti-Japanese guerrilla forces, and some others were imprisoned in camps for recalcitrants. Goho and K.P.K. Menon had reservations about the genuineness of Japanese interest in a truly independent India, and relations between the Indians and the Japanese became more and more strained during the final stages of the war. (Bose remained loyal to the end. As the Japanese were driven out of Burma and freedom forces were preparing to recapture Malaya, he was put on a plane for Japan that never arrived. However, the legend persists in West Bengal that he is still alive and will reappear to lead Indians to true freedom.) When the British completed their reconquest of Malaya, they adopted a policy of reconciliation toward the followers of the Indian Nationalist

Movement. A few leaders were tried but later released. However, the movement had its consequences in a new political consciousness among the Indians, even though it "tended to be oriented toward India rather than Malaya."[18]

m. The third ethnic group, the Chinese, played the most important role in Japanese-occupied Malaya. Before the fall of Singapore, the British had just had time to decide that stay behind parties should be formed. In these groups were regular British officers, Chinese (both Communist and Kuomintang), and some Malays, especially in Pahang.[19]

n. The Communists proved to be the most effective and eventually the most powerful of these forces. Like their comrades elsewhere, the Malayan Party had followed faithfully the tortuous line of the Comintern. During the 1930's, it promoted "anti-Japanese" movements under the guise of patriotism, but when the Soviet Union signed its non-Aggression Pact with Germany in August 1939, the party launched a violent anti-British campaign and instigated a wave of strikes that seriously cut production of rubber and tin. Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union brought a full swing of the pendulum. Instead of being an imperialist war, the British fight against Hitler now became a war for freedom. The party ceased fomenting labor trouble, and the Secretary-General of the party offered the Government unconditional cooperation against the enemy a few days after the Japanese attack on Malaya. Whitehall, with its back to the wall, accepted.[20]

o. Four classes had been graduated from the guerrilla training school in Singapore before the city's fall. Although ill-equipped--some authorities would say nonequipped--these forces were immediately sent behind the Japanese lines. In March 1942, they were officially named the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), while the civilian supporters were organized as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU). Both groups were almost entirely Chinese and were controlled by the Malayan Communist Party, which made the most of the chance to organize public support and to recruit an armed force, not only to fight the Japanese, but eventually the British.[21] Not only did "hundreds of young Chinese rubber tappers, miners, vegetable gardeners, woodcutters, barbers, shop assistants and house servants join the guerrillas but hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the towns and villages willingly supplied the guerrillas with food, medicines" . . . and intelligence.[22]

p. Japanese policy toward the Chinese was ambiguous. Ruthless attempts were made to suppress civilian support of the MPAJA. When intimidation failed, appeals to Chinese dislike of the Malays, the Indians, and the British were tried, again without success. In the end, MPAJA became the most powerful political-military force in Malaya and was in a favorable position to make a bid for power when Japan surrendered 14 August 1945.[23]

q. The Communists did not launch an immediate revolt. Outwardly they conformed to the British order to disband the MPAJA. Members of this organization were encouraged to join an "alumni" association, the MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades Association, which operated under close Communist supervision. Similarly, the political counterpart of MPAJA, the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Union, was transformed into the People's Democratic Movement (PDM). Among the Chinese, the Malayan Communist Party and the New Democratic Youth Corps now became more powerful than the Kuomintang and its San Min Chu I Youth Corps. A small Indian Communist Party, that had been founded in Singapore in 1945, affiliated with the MCP.[24]

r. In line with the Comintern's immediate postwar policy, the MCP infiltrated other organizations. Labor unions were of particular interest to the Communist leaders. In late 1945 the General Labor Union (GLU), was organized. It soon came to dominate the labor movement in Malaya. However, the authorities' resistance to the general strike of February 1946 and the reinstitution of the requirement that all union officers have a previous record of actual work in the trade represented by their union brought the reorganization of the GLU into the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU). The latter organization claimed a total membership of 463,000 and affiliated with the Communist-led World Federation of Trade Unions. By the time the emergency was declared, it controlled 214 out of the 277 registered unions in Malaya, including the key tin, rubber, and longshoreman's unions.[25]

s. In addition to taking a commanding position in the labor movement, the MCP developed contacts with postwar parties. One of the first new political organizations was the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), founded by Dr. Barhanuddin at Ipoh in late 1945. The MNP was really dominated by resident Indonesians who were trying to gain support for a pan-Malayan independence movement. It remained active for some time, although the conservative Malays rejected it in the end. However, its program was of political significance because of its similarity to the eight-point program of the Communists at the time: establishment of a Government administration representative of all nationalities; improvement of living conditions; and development of industry, agriculture, and commerce; right to free speech and association; increased wages and abolition of high taxes and interest rates; establishment of a national defense army; free education in the several major languages; restoration of property confiscated by the Japanese; tariff autonomy; and aid in freeing the oppressed peoples of the East. This program was tailored to the Communist goal of identifying with nationalist movements in the colonial world.[26]

t. A second organization with some Communist connections was the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU), established by two Eurasian lawyers, Philip Hoalim and John Eber, in December 1945. Its platform, which called for uniting non-Malay communities in a program for racial

equality and self-government for Malaya within the Commonwealth, had the support of Chinese professional men. Although primarily a middle class party, the MDU did have several MCP members at its inauguration. The latter were attracted not by the MDU's program of Commonwealth membership but by its anti-Government bias.[27]

u. The tendency to form essentially communal parties in the post-war period was demonstrated in the Indian community with the foundation of the Malayan Indian Association, the Ceylon Tamil Association, and the Pan-Malayan Muslim Indian League. The latter was primarily a self-protection organization set up in reaction to India-Pakistan disturbances. The most important group was the Malayan Indian Congress organized in August 1946. Its sponsor, John Thivy, patterned it after the Indian Congress Party. It drew heavily upon the prewar Indian Independence Leagues for its membership.[28] The Malays in turn, were inspired to political protest by the British Government's announcement that it intended to end indirect rule by setting up a Malayan Union under the Governor with full executive powers. Equal citizenship rights were to be granted to those who could claim Malaya as their homeland. In the proposed Union, each ruler, as traditional and spiritual leaders of the Malay people, would chair a Malay Advisory Council in his State that would be primarily concerned with religious matters. They would also compose a Central Advisory Council empowered to review legislation affecting the Muslim religion and to discuss other subjects at the Governor's discretion. The Sultans were to be asked to sign new treaties that would give the British Crown jurisdiction in their states.[29]

v. London's argument that federation was the wave of the future did not impress the Malays. Rather, they were repelled by the proposals. They looked upon them as a device to convert protectorates into colonies by changing autonomous rulers into exalted religious advisers. Of even more importance, they regarded the citizenship proposals as a serious threat to their special position, which had been safeguarded for years under the existing treaties. Under the new regulations, citizenship would be easily available to all non-Malays who had been born in the country or who had been domiciled there for 10 years out of the previous 15. It also could be acquired after 5 years' continuous residence. To the Malays, these simple requirements harbored the threat of an unwarranted accretion of Chinese political power. The decision to impose the Malayan Union without local consultations--followed later by the pressure tactics to gain the "agreement" of the rulers--tore it. The Malays came very close to revolting.[30]

w. Fortunately, the nationwide protest did not break down into violence. It was channeled into a rash of political parties and associations designed to prevent the Malayan Union from coming into force on 1 April 1946. Onn bin Ja'afar, whose father and grandfather had been Prime Ministers of Johore, organized the National Movement of Peninsular Malays. It mushroomed and attained 110,000 members in

Johore alone. Encouraged by such support, Onn merged 41 Malay associations into the United Malays' National Organization (UMNO) on the day the Union was to go into operation. As first president, Onn became the acknowledged leader of more than 2 million Malays. Support came primarily from the Malay aristocracy and bureaucratic and intellectual circles.[31]

x. Although leadership came from the Malay "establishment," the vigorous support of the masses for the nationalist movement was impressive. When two representatives came out from London to ascertain the views of the rulers and the people, they were met in every town and village by protest rallies. The climactic demonstration came in Kuala Kangsar, the capital of Perak and scene of the meeting between the two British MP, the Sultans, and Onn and the Executive Committee of the UMNO. A mile-long procession carried banners calling for the death of the Malayan Union and shouted, "Hidup Melayu" (Long live the Malays). The most significant feature of the rally was "the dominant, challenging, vehement part played by Malay women who had left their rice fields, kitchens, and children to participate in this demonstration. At their head walked the wife of the Sultan of Perak--an unprecedented role for a ruler's wife."[32]

y. The UMNO campaign was successful. By November 1946, the British withdrew certain of the Union proposals, in particular those regarding citizenship and the rights of Malay rulers. This satisfied the Malays but alarmed non-Malays, who feared that the UMNO wanted to disenfranchise them and take all power into Malay hands. Consequently, the Malayan Democratic Union, headed by Hoalim and Eber, organized the all-Malayan Council of Joint Action (CJA) to oppose UMNO. The CJA was a broad coalition that included the MDU, the Malay Nationalist Party, the Malayan Indian Congress, the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, the MPAJA Ex-service Comrades Association, the Malayan New Democratic Youth Corps, Angkatan Wanita Sedara (Women's Party), Angkatan Permuda Insaf (Youth Party), the Ceylon Tamil Association, and the Malay Students' Union. Such a coalition was bound to be unwieldy. It produced a compromise platform designed to rally the support of the non-Malays while appeasing the Malays. It called for unification of Singapore and the Federation; a fully elected and representative Legislature; equal political rights for all who regarded Malaya as their home; assumption by the Malay Sultans of positions of fully sovereign and constitutional rulers; Malay control of matters concerning Malay custom and Moslem affairs; and encouragement of the advancement of the Malay community. The last three points were meant to get Malay concurrence on the first three.[33]

z. Despite its catholic platform, the CJA soon fragmented. The Malay Nationalist Party, Angkatan Permuda, Insaf, objecting to AMCJA's predominant Chinese membership, bolted the broad organization to form the Malay Council of Joint Action. Other Malay groups also defected

from CJA to join the Malay Council of Joint Action which was renamed People's United Front or PUTERA. To CJA's six point platform, PUTERA added demands that Malay become the official language and that London give up part of its control over foreign affairs. In the end, the split was not bitter. CJA and PUTERA cooperated in their nationalist endeavors. The former represented the Chinese view, while the latter spoke for the anti-UMNO Malay view. Most of CJA's support came from the Indian and Chinese trade unions, which were largely Communist-affiliated, while PUTERA, so far as is known, did not have Communist ties. The Malayan Indian Congress' participation in CJA lost it many members, because of CJA's Communist affiliations, and because many Indians believed that their interests were being subverted by Chinese domination of CJA.[34]

aa. The protests and organized opposition to the proposed Malayan Union succeeded. However, the non-Malays were unhappy over the citizenship and immigration provisions of the new federal constitution scheduled to go into force 1 February 1948. CJA, but not PUTERA, returned to the political wars in the fall of 1947. It headed a joint Chinese-Indian attempt to sabotage the new constitution through a boycott of the Singapore elections and nonparticipation in the federal legislative council. A largely Chinese group, led by Tan Cheng-Lock, supported CJA's plan of action in Singapore. Only some 20,000 of the 100,000-200,000 eligible voters went to the polls, and only one Chinese was elected. The Indians, on the other hand, voted in substantial numbers, and three Indians were elected.

ab. Having failed in their efforts to prevent the inauguration of the new constitution and responding to disaffection among the Chinese and labor union supporters of the party, the Communists changed their policy in early 1948. Again, as in past switches in the party line, the Malayan politbureau was following an overall change in worldwide Comintern strategy. An increase in terrorism signaled the implementation of the new tactics. The Government adopted counter-measures. By June 1948, full-scale guerrilla warfare had developed--the emergency had begun.[35]

ac. Political parties and interest groups, to the degree that they provided a vehicle for mobilization of public opinion and, as in the case of the Malayan Union proposal, the power to influence Government action, served as a prophylactic to conflict. However, their tendency to polarize along ethnic lines and the subordination of the Communists to external discipline were vital factors in creating the divisive environment that preceded overt conflict.

9. Political communication. Malaya represents in rather extreme degree the problems of communication found in a plural society. Not only are four major communities, Chinese, Malay, Indian, and English, spread throughout the area, but the Chinese are subdivided into a number of

special linguistic communities, centered around seven different dialects. Similarly there are a number of Indian special dialect communities: Tamil, Telegu, and Malayan from south India and Punjabi, Maharatti, Bengali, Marwari, Pushtu, and Sindhi from northern India. On the other hand, linguistic differences between different tribes and groups of Malays "do not prevent mutual intelligibility, and divisions into special communities may be overlooked." As in other plural societies in the Commonwealth, English is not only the language of the majority of the European population of Malaya but a sort of lingua franca of some members of the Chinese, Indian, and Malay communities, among which it provides a means of mutual communication.[36]

a. The difficulties of universal communication inherent in the existence of different linguistic communities are heightened by geographic differentiation of the various language groups. The nationwide "tendency for the various communities to segregate themselves from one another--to cluster into fairly exclusive specific communities--is duplicated in the major urban centers and the smaller geographic units." Each city or town tends to have Malay, Chinese, Indian, and European sections. Further fragmentation is evident in the existence of distinct dialect-neighborhoods within the Chinese section and of separate northern and southern Indian communities within the Indian section. In the countryside, a village will tend to be either Chinese, Malay, or Indian and seldom will have much mixture of ethnic groups.[37]

b. The obstacles to cross-cultural oral communication, then, are formidable. However, several "superlanguages" tend to promote communication. "Kuo-yu" serves this function among the various Chinese groups, and Malay, as the lingua franca of the region, qualifies as a superlanguage. English performs a dual role as a means of intercommunity communication among certain members of the Indian communities and as a general language connecting elements of all the major groups.[38]

c. Just as linguistic differences impede oral communication among the various communities, so different degrees of literacy and forms of writing are a hindrance to communication. The Indians have the highest literacy rate of the three main ethnic groups, followed by the Chinese, with the Malays in last place. Europeans and Eurasians above the age of 15 are almost all literate. The low rate for the Malays is a reflection of their rural residential pattern, while the high rate for the Indians is associated with the low number of women and children in their community. The very high literacy among the Europeans and Eurasians is associated with their traditional employment in public service, which requires at least a minimum mastery of the English language.[39]

d. The fact that English is intelligible in both its spoken and written forms promotes communication among those who have acquired facility in its use. The existence of a standard written language that is mutually intelligible to members of any dialect group fosters

literary communication among the Chinese. However, the difficulty of learning to write and read the ideographs tends to inhibit literacy among the Chinese masses. Malay has two forms of writing: rumi, the Romanized alphabet, and jawi, a form of Arabic script. The dual alphabet apparently is not an obstacle to communication among literate Malays, since they usually are familiar with both systems. The Indians in Malaya use a variety of different symbol and semantic systems. As in India itself, the languages of those who have their roots in northern India and those who hail from the south are mutually unintelligible. Thus the Punjabis, who are the only important northern Indian literacy community in Malaya, can communicate with each other but not with the more numerous Tamils and Malayalms. The latter, both south Indian in origin, use different systems of writing but can understand each other's dialects.[40]

e. English not only is the primary language for Europeans and Eurasians but also is a secondary language for some members of the Malay, Chinese, and Indian communities. It is of prime importance in official and commercial documents and in education, journalism, and radio broadcasts. As a lingua franca, English enables the representatives of the Raj to communicate with the various ethnic groups and the latter to communicate with each other. The second point is especially significant in view of the low literacy in languages other than their own among the major communities. Considering the importance of English in communication, it is unfortunate that only about 4.4 percent of the total population of Malaya was literate in English in 1947. The Indians show the highest literacy in English, the Chinese next, and the Malays the lowest.[41]

f. In a plural society, persons who are bilingual perform an important function as communication links with the other communities. Malay is next in importance to English as the principal secondary language. The 1947 census lists some 18,000 Chinese and 11,000 Indians as literate in Malay. "It is doubtful that more than an insignificant number of non-Chinese are literate in Chinese or non-Indians literate in an Indian dialect."[42]

g. The press, dependent on literacy for its effectiveness, plays an important communication role in Malaya. The Human Area Relations Files survey of the daily press stresses the intercommunity predominance of the English language press, the increasing importance of Singapore as the newspaper publishing center, and the relative lack of competition among the various papers.[43]

h. In view of the fact that members of any particular community are not likely to read another community's papers, it appears that the bilingual and biliterate elite of the individual ethnic groups read the English-language press. Thus, whereas the various Chinese, Malay, and Indian papers are inclined to perpetuate communal differences, the English language press "leads toward a growing commonality of interest."[44]

i. Except in the case of the English-language papers, which divide along regional and political lines, each newspaper caters to a distinct group and becomes an organ of that group. In only a few cases is there any suggestion of competition for the attention of the same readers.

> It must be concluded . . . that the daily press in Malaya appears adequate in relation to demand, even if not in relation to what is most desirable from some points of view. There is apparently little general demand for either prompt or general news coverage. The papers, in catering to particular groups, seem to express and satisfy the desires of the group, and little more is asked of them.[45]

j. In addition to daily editions, a number of the papers publish special Sunday editions. There are also several weekly papers. In the absence of a demand for up-to-the minute news and in light of their economic advantage in a low-advertising area, the latter are able to maintain circulations that enable them to play a significant role in communications.[46]

k. Periodicals other than daily and weekly newspapers range from triweeklies to quarterlies. They are published in English, Chinese, Jawi, and Tamil, although the latter press is virtually nonexistent. The English periodicals are concentrated on the mainland and the Chinese in Singapore, while the Malay magazines are strong in both areas. The periodical and weekly newspaper press "appear in some ways to make up for the insufficiencies apparent in the daily newspaper field as far as the Malays are concerned."[47] Reuters enjoyed a virtual monopoly of supplying wire service news to Malayan papers before 1941. The UPI and AP did not begin operations in the area until after World War II.[48]

l. Radio broadcasting goes back to 1922, when two amateur stations were placed in operation in Singapore. The Federated States Government set up the British Malayan Broadcasting Corporation, which began a regular broadcasting schedule in 1936. Four years later, the crown colony organized the Malaya Broadcasting Corporation. Shortly after World War II, the two organizations were united under the Pan-Malayan Department of Broadcasting and operated under the name Radio Malaya. Unfortunately, statistics are not available on the number of listeners in the timeframe of this study.

m. In addition to the press and radio, rumor and word-of-mouth information serve as media of communication. Hard information on the degree of their effectiveness is difficult to come by. One study of Communist guerrillas who had surrendered during the emergency indicates that some Chinese, at least, put considerable faith in personal sources.

> Lacking any general standards for evaluating the reliability of information, they tend to be unsure of impersonal sources, but they are fully confident of their ability to appraise individuals in face-to-face situations, regard rumor and word-of-mouth information as reliable, and are much more ready to act on the basis of what "people said" than on information received through impersonal mass media.[49]

Trade unions, fraternal societies, mutual protection groups, schools, and youth associations are active transmission belts on the informal level. The views of Chinese who have studied abroad are given considerable weight by the indigenous Chinese.

n. In remote communities, travelers and peddlers play their traditional role as news sources. In Malay kampongs, newspapers are read aloud to illiterate members of the community. Local stores and coffee and toddy shops are rumor and information centers. The opinions of "important" persons are listened to with respect. Thus, the religious leaders is an important opinion setter among the Malays, and any attempt to influence this ethnic group must consider the position of the families of nobility who have traditionally been the forerunners in changes of custom law and opinion.[50]

o. As in the rest of Asia, bazaars are prime centers of communication. Tradesmen and Government personnel meet here. Information from their conversations, genuine news as well as rumor, is carried by itinerant traders, boatmen, and porters from bazaar to bazaar. From each bazaar, the information is carried into various dialect communities through bilingual individuals. In the long process of oral transmission, "rumor is magnified, and translation into the various dialects frequently makes remarkable changes in meaning and emphasis."[51]

p. Although there are significant divisions along language and dialect lines within the Malay, Chinese, and Indian ethnic groups, the press, in each instance, seems to be adequate for political communication among the literate members of the society and between them and the Government. Word-of-mouth communication plays an important role for the nonliterate. However, in this instance, inaccuracies in information or misrepresentation of the facts may, at times, confuse the public and cause a breakdown of understanding between the people and the Government. In the timeframe of this study, radio broadcasting had not developed to the point where it could compensate for the inadequacies of bazaar and kampong information media.

q. Although the vernacular press serves the needs of individual ethnic groups, it does not function as a means of cross-cultural communication. Under these circumstances, English plays the lingua franca role. Unfortunately, the number of people literate in English is comparatively small, so, in the final analysis, plural languages promote

the continuation of a plural society and retard the development of political communication on a truly national level.

Section II. Constitution, Government and Political Culture

by Donald S. Macdonald

10. Government organization and performance. From before 1930 until the outbreak of World War II in Asia, the British administered Malaya effectively and without major unrest. The regime was criticized both for fractionation and for overcentralization, but attempts to remedy these problems met influential opposition and hence were quite limited. The principal factors contributing to conflict during this period were negative: the failure of the British to stimulate any real sense of communality or consensus among diverse racial elements, and lack of attention to special Chinese problems. The Japanese administration of Malaya during its wartime occupation was badly managed, corrupt, and brutal, particularly for the Chinese population. After the war, the British were slow in reoccupying Malaya; they then tried to remedy too rapidly the defects of their prewar administration. Their prestige was lowered by their defeat of 1941, and they faced an enhanced sense of nationalism in each of the major population groups.

11. Major political units. As a result of historical factors, Malaya was divided until 1941 into three loosely related parts. A High Commissioner named by the British Crown headed the Federated Malay States (FMS), comprising four of the five southern Malay kingdoms of the Peninsula with the bulk of the economic activity. The High Commissioner was concurrently Governor of the Straits Settlements (SS), comprising the ports and hinterlands of Singapore, Penang, Labuan,* and Malacca. There were five unfederated Malay States (UMS), the four in the north each had a British Adviser to oversee the Sultan's administration, and Johore in the south, the fifth unfederated State, had a General Adviser with essentially the same functions. The advisers were subordinate to the High Commissioner.

a. During the Japanese occupation, the four northern States reverted to Thai control, the remainder of Malaya was ruled as a Japanese colony, and Singapore had a separate military administration. Japanese officials maintained control somewhat as the British had done, using locals in subordinate capacities, but with far less success. The Japanese personnel apparently were selected principally for having some Malayan background and frequently were ill-fitted for the authority they exercised.

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*The Island of Labuan was transferred to the Crown Colony of Sabah in 1946.

b. Following the surrender of Japan, there was an interregnum of about a month before the British reestablished their administration throughout the area they previously had controlled. During the war, plans had been made to work toward a unified and self-governing Malaya. To this end, a Malayan Union was established in late 1946 by hastily-negotiated treaties with the Sultans of the four federated and five unfederated states. The Union was abortive, however, largely because the Malays feared that a centralized State with the Sultan's power gone and with citizenship for the Chinese and Indians would result in loss of Malay political control. A Federation was therefore established in 1948 to take its place, with the understanding that the degree of popular participation in government was gradually to increase. The Federation included the former Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca, but Singapore continued as a British crown colony with augmented self-government.

12. Government of the Straits Settlements. Singapore, the headquarters of the Straits Settlements Government and its most important territory, was almost wholly a British creation. When Sir Stamford Raffles planted the British flag in 1819, there was little on the island beyond a fishing village. Throughout its subsequent history, Singapore had been concerned almost exclusively with commerce and trade; its population came there for that purpose, and the main job of government was to facilitate the activities of British, Chinese, and other businessmen in the trade among China, India, and Europe and in the exploitation of Malayan resources. Penang, an 18th century British acquisition, and Malacca, the center of a once-large Malay empire, were also primarily of interest as bases for trade; although their importance was increasingly eclipsed by that of Singapore, and their original Malay population was increasingly diluted by Chinese and Indian immigrants.

a. The great commercial houses, both European and Chinese, wanted no more government, at no more expense, than necessary to provide a secure environment. Law and order, not nationbuilding, was the objective of the British administration. Until the 1930's, the costs of governing were met in large part by the taxes paid by Chinese who had franchises for the sale of opium (and, earlier, for the operation of gambling houses).[52] The Chinese, Indian, and Malay communities were left chiefly to their own devices. Most of the people were in any event sojourners, attracted to the colony by its prosperity, with the aim of making money and returning to their homelands. Despite the growth of nationalist feelings in each of the three groups and the increase in permanent residents, British domination and British policies were not seriously challenged until the Japanese took over in 1941.

b. During the period studied, the Straits Settlements had the status of a crown colony, with governmental institutions essentially

the same as those of other such British colonies. The Governor was named by the British Crown, and had extensive powers over all aspects of the colony's affairs except justice, subject to the Orders in Council (not parliamentary enactments) which established basic policies and governmental framework. The Government administration comprised a number of functional departments; the senior officials were European British, but a Straits Civil Service allowed for some participation by other races (who were eligible for British nationality). The Governor was advised by an Executive Council, consisting chiefly of Government department heads but including also some nominated unofficials to speak for major community interest groups. The advice of the Council could be disregarded, but the Colonial Office had to be informed. Within the scope allowed by Orders in Council, a Legislative Council deliberated on the Colony's affairs and enacted regulations to govern it. Most of the Colony's governmental structure and its relations to the home government closely paralleled those discussed in the Kenya case study and will not be repeated here. The principal difference was the greater sophistication of the local population groups and their share, however, small, in the political process.

c. Just as the Government of Kenya had had a Chief Native Affairs Commissioner, the Straits Government had a Secretary for Chinese Affairs. In the Straits Settlements, somewhat as in Kenya, the administration left most native affairs in the hands of this officer and a handful of assistants to settle in the light of their expert knowledge, language comprehension, and experience. Both the British administration and the Chinese community were generally content with this arrangement, for the Chinese--with the exception of the Straits-born English-educated minority--preferred to avoid contact with government and handle their own affairs in their own way. The Chinese Affairs Officers, whose role originated in the creation of a Protector of Chinese in 1877 to deal with the problem of secret societies and their depredations, had extensive responsibilities for both administration and adjudication among the Chinese, as well as for communication between the Chinese and the governing authorities, since the Chinese Affairs Officers were the only British officials who spoke the language and were familiar with Chinese customs and community problems. In general, they had the respect of the Chinese, who often took their civil disputes to them for judgment. The effect of the arrangement, however, was to perpetuate the separation of the Chinese from the Colony's government and political process. The most damaging manifestation of this separation was in education, for the Chinese operated their own schools in their own language, according to their own curriculum, and the British educational authorities were ignorant of, and even indifferent to, what went on in them.

13. The Federated States. Under an 1896 treaty pushed through by Sir Frank Swettenham, the Sultans of Perak, Pahang, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan took their kingdoms (which comprised most areas of principal British economic interest) into a federation, with a central

governmental authority at Kuala Lumpur. The treaty continued previous arrangements under which the Sultans accepted the advice of British Residents, who had functioned as de facto Prime Ministers; but now the Residents and their subordinate staffs became, in most respects, executive agents for policies and programs decided at Kuala Lumpur by a Chief Secretary and his Federal departments. However, the British Government could not legislate directly by Orders in Council, but required the signatures of the Sultans, who were immune from prosecution in the British courts.[53]

a. In 1931, there was some modification of the high degree of centralization which had characterized virtually every aspect of political life in the Federation except Malay religion and custom (which, by treaty, continued to be the exclusive province of the Sultans). Responsibility for certain aspects of administration--notably agriculture, medicine, forests, surveys, and police--was decentralized to the State administrations, which were given a share of the Federal revenues to carry on these activities. The role of the Chief Secretary was reduced. (The Federal Council had been reorganized in 1927.) Real control, however, remained in Government House in Kuala Lumpur, which continued to collect virtually all revenues, make the major decisions, and control communication with London. This relatively modest measure and other attempts at further decentralization were opposed by powerful commercial interests, because they were unwilling to trade off the inevitable loss in Government efficiency for the long-term political benefits of greater State autonomy. Efforts at bringing in the unfederated States failed because these States were unwilling to surrender the somewhat greater measure of autonomy they possessed.

b. The Sultans of the four Federated States were protected in their positions and prestige by the British; they enjoyed the full allegiance of their Malay subjects (who, unlike residents of the Straits Settlements, were not British subjects). The Sultans were the titular heads of the Muslim religion. They participated in periodic conferences on Federation affairs, and their signatures were required to legalize Government documents and acts; but if they possessed some political influence, they had virtually no political power. (However, the Sultans had one political weapon in their ability to go directly to the King of England, as demonstrated by the Sultan of Selangor in a contretemps with his Resident over the succession.[54]) Executive functions of the Federated States were exercised by European British personnel of the Malayan Civil Service, which did not admit personnel of other races until the mid 1930's.

14. The unfederated States.

a. The northern Malay States of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu were under varying degrees of Siamese political influence until 1909, when Britain became more concerned at the threat of German

expansion than at the diminishing problem of French designs on Siam. Under terms of British treaties with Siam and with the Malay rulers, each of the four Sultans accepted a British Adviser and agreed to follow his advice; however, these States did not enter the Federation. They were far less developed economically and offered less potential for development, and the degree of control exercised by the Advisers was somewhat less than in the Federated States. Some of the chief Government officers continued to be the traditional Malay office-holders.

b. Johore, in the extreme south of the peninsula opposite Singapore, was also an unfederated State, but for a different reason. Two strong and able Sultans had adapted their governmental structures to the new challenge of Chinese spice growers and the proximity of a modernizing city. They had been exposed to the West; additionally, they hired foreign advisers of their own. They resisted assignment of British advisers; Abu Bakar (1862-95) enjoyed a personal relationship with Queen Victoria. Eventually, a General Adviser was accepted, who exercised functions similar to those of Advisers in other unfederated States. In certain forms, however, Johore maintained a greater semblance of autonomy than the other states.

15. Malay governmental institutions. In all the Malay States, prior to the establishment of British control, political life had been dominated by an elite group of royal and aristocratic families whose members traditionally filled 32 major State offices below the Sultan, in a hierarchy patterned on ancient Hindu cosmogony.* At the top of this structure were the two "props" of the Sultan, the crown prince and the Bendahara (Prime Minister). Other positions included a chief officer, a chief of justice and police, heads of major territorial subdivisions, a naval chief, a port officer, and the like. The scattered individual villages, chiefly along the rivers which were the main communication routes, were under local headmen and district chiefs. The Sultan personified the State, and the people were conditioned by upbringing and religion to give him complete loyalty.

a. Rivalries for power within this structure, particularly for succession to the throne, and contests among the States, had brought near anarchy in the 19th century in the absence of any overall authority over the peninsula and in the face of the strains introduced by Chinese exploitation of tin. It was to end this anarchy and disorder that the British asserted control through their Residents. The four northern

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*Negri Sembilan was unique in that its society was matrilineal and that it was a federation of nine smaller states, one of whose chiefs was the paramount ruler. This arrangement was the model for the designation of paramount ruler of Malaya under the 1957 constitution.

States, however, were more remote, less favored economically, and in the shadow of Siam. Rivalries and the strains of modernization impinged upon them less, and more of the traditional framework survived.

b. During the period under review, a few of the Sultans developed a more modern outlook and took active interest in the affairs of their States. Generally, however, traditional attitudes prevailed on the part of rulers and people, while the British operated a modern administrative structure in the Federated States that superseded the traditional one. The Malays were not unaware of this fact; they seem to have had conflicting feelings about it, since on the one hand the people welcomed the new order, justice, and rising standard of living, while on the other there was resentment that the foreign administration had sidetracked the indigenous authority. One effect of British policy, by leaving religion and custom to the Sultans, was to isolate the Government and politics from the religious and social life of the people. Another effect, by the increase in governmental size and complexity, was increasingly to isolate the British officials from the people.

16. Local government. The British continued the traditional system of village headmen, and added British District officers to supervise local affairs in accordance with policies and directives of the colonial (or Federation) government.

a. The village headman (penghulu) was transformed from his original role of locally chosen spokesman into a minor salaried Government official, sometimes a stranger to the community he administered.[55]

b. The District Officers, in Malaya as elsewhere, were key figures of the British administration, since it was they who primarily dealt with the people in matters that touched their daily lives, and had certain judicial as well as administrative powers.

c. In the Straits Settlements, the municipalities of Singapore and Penang had appointive municipal councils composed of both officials and nonofficials; and the rural areas had appointive rural boards. In the Federated Malay States, the 25 districts had sanitary boards (with general municipal responsibility), licensing boards, and a few drainage boards. Some at least of the unfederated States also had such local groups.

d. In general, the superposition of District Officers and a British governmental structure upon the traditional Malay Government caused relatively few overt problems among the Malays, who were inclined to accept hierarchy and direction from above. Local government had relatively little impact on the Chinese, who tended to control their own community affairs, and looked primarily to the Chinese Affairs Officers for their contacts with the British administration. This situation was gradually changing, however; the legislation giving special powers

to the Secretary for Chinese Affairs in matters concerning the Chinese in the Federated Malay States was repealed in 1932, and the District Officers had increasing responsibility for Chinese in their areas.

17. Judiciary and legal system. Establishment of even-handed justice and elimination of disorder and capricious governmental acts was one of the great accomplishments of British administration throughout Malaya. In the Straits Settlements, the law was based on English common and statute law, modified as necessary in interpretation by local usage among the people involved, and incorporating features of the legal code of India. The same was generally true in the Federation. There seems to have been more uniformity in the judicial system than in administration as between the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States. British judges staffed the High Courts of both, as well as many of the lower courts.

18. Security. Military and security forces are discussed in detail in chapter 5. Although Singapore was improved as Britain's major naval base in the Far East, it was not assigned any major warships until the eve of the Japanese attack; and the land forces were too weak in numbers to withstand a major assault successfully. Relatively few men from Malaya were organized into military units. Internal security forces, however, were staffed largely by Malays as policemen and Chinese as detectives, under British direction. They were highly effective in carrying out the missions assigned to them until the Japanese occupation, which misused them, ruined their morale, and made them the object of intense public hostility. After the war, they had to be completely rebuilt, in a time when nationalist spirit was beginning to challenge British authority. There was an interregnum of a month between the Japanese surrender and the reestablishment of British authority. Although the police in 1948 reported Communist mobilization preparations, the colonial Government did not believe them.

19. Postwar reorganization. During World War II, the British Colonial Office made plans for promoting unity and self-government in Malaya and for bringing the various ethnic groups and political units together. Within 2 months after the British reoccupied Malaya and established an interim military administration, Sir Harold MacMichael was sent to negotiate agreements with the Sultans of both the Federated and unfederated States under which they surrendered sovereignty to a Malayan Union, with the status of a British crown colonly.

a. Penang and Malacca joined the other nine States under a Federal Government at Kuala Lumpur. Singapore remained outside the Federation as a separate crown colony. Each of the States in the Union had its own governmental hierarchy and its own Legislative Council, with the Sultans exercising almost purely ceremonial functions. There was no mention of elections. All persons born in the territory of the

Union or who had resided there 10 of the previous 15 years were to become citizens; others could be naturalized after 5 years.

b. When the Union Constitution went into effect in April 1946, the citizenship issue and the Sultans' surrender of sovereignty stirred very strong dissent among the Malay population. The Malays disliked the continuation of British colonial control and feared that they would lose to the Chinese and Indians the power to govern in their own homeland. Former British officers objected to the scheme and to the high-pressure tactics used to put it through. The non-Malay communities also objected, largely because they had not been consulted. The Sultans themselves were not in favor of the arrangement; they had signed lest they lose their thrones. For these reasons, the Union was never completely consummated. Instead, negotiations began which led to the establishment of a Federation of Malaya in 1948. The Federation, which also included Panang and Malacca but not Singapore, preserved autonomy for the State Governments and had much more restrictive citizenship provisions in order to assure continued Malay control. The net effect of the whole controversy was to exacerbate nationalist feelings and promote interracial antipathy.

20. Government policies and decisions. For over a century, the British viewed Malaya, including Singapore, as a convenient entrepot for trade with China, as a means of keeping control of the trade route through the Straits of Malacca, and as an area for economic exploitation and development. Interest centered primarily on Singapore but extended to the mainland, as first Chinese and then British interests exploited the tin deposits and developed spice and rubber. The responsibility of the British administration was seen as preserving a climate of law and order that would foster economic activity and as providing essential infrastructure, such as public health, transport, and education. Little if any thought was given to political and social development per se, beyond promoting respect for British authority and preserving the form of the Malay state. (British promotion of Malay agriculture and the fostering of cooperatives is a partial exception to this statement.[56]) For a long time, British colonial officers in Malaya, as elsewhere, were inspired by a somewhat Hobbesian authoritarian philosophy: "The Leviathan on one hand, and the New Testament on the other, influenced the British administration." They believed in free private enterprise, and a minimum of interference with it. The tension between authority and liberty in the British-controlled areas, deriving both from contrasting philosophical strains and the feelings of the ruled, was most clearly manifested in India but was felt in Malaya to some extent as well.

a. Development. The idea of development was a central one for the British administrators, and they built up

> A structure comparable in scale and efficiency with that existing in the advanced countries . . . out of the

returns of rubber and tin. When these returns begin to sink /in the early 1920's and again in the early 1930's/ the structure was found to be grossly topheavy since it was in no way justified by an equivalent rise in the standard of life of the mass of the people.[57]

Nor was economic development accompanied by commensurate political and social development. The general public, although not unmindful of the benefits brought by the British push for development--benefits which had attracted many from China, India, and Java--were not yet themselves development-minded. ". . . Malaya had outgrown the Malays."[58]

b. Policy toward non-Malays. The success of the British in promoting economic development was in part due to the influx of Chinese and Indians to provide labor and skills, for the Malay population was content with its traditional standards and customs of life and was disinclined to go into wage labor for foreigners. The British need for labor, and the attraction of the rising standard of living in Singapore and the Federation in contrast to other parts of Southeast Asia, led to the growth of large communities of Indians and Chinese; but since most of these were sojourners, come to make their fortunes and go home, the British did little to integrate them into Malayan political life. It was not until the 1930's that Chinese immigration was curtailed. The Malays received the most attention, because they were the permanent residents and the natives of the area, and because the British found dealing with them congenial. The Indian Government compelled adoption of certain measures to benefit the Indians. The Chinese, however, were left pretty much to themselves--not only because the British lacked personnel who understood Chinese language and problems, but also because the Chinese, with a tradition of hostility toward government, preferred to manage their own affairs.

c. Pro-Malay policy. The British civil servants who devoted their lives to Malaya professed to feel a keen responsibility for the welfare of the local population--particularly the Malays, as the original inhabitants. As in Kenya, they preferred the unspoiled ones to those with modern ideas.

(1) In later years, the British had twinges of conscience at the impact of foreign populations on Malaya, although they believed that the immigrants were an essential ingredient of the economic development that had been achieved, since the Malays were not disposed to do the necessary manual labor or learn the necessary skills. Sir Frank Swettenham proudly records the benefits he believed that the British brought to the Malays and quotes an American observer as telling him that so much had been done that there was no more to do unless the surplus income were distributed among the inhabitants.[59] Additionally, the British looked more to the Malays for support as Chinese antipathy grew. Whereas earlier the Chinese businessmen had been the chief

beneficiaries, other than the British themselves, of British policy and administration, by the 1930's the government was following a pro-Malay policy to the extent of embittering some of the Chinese. For example, Chinese were barred from the Malayan Administrative Service (though not that of the Straits Settlements). After the war, however, an effort was made to build toward essential equality of the races.

(2) Among policies benefiting the Malays were the practice of reserving 60 percent of the arable land in the Federated States for Malay agriculture and assisting the Malay farmers to grow rice; the decentralization policies of the late 1920's and 1930's, which tended to restore some authority to the Malay States; the continued protection and support of the native potentates in their not very potent grandeur; the higher per-capita expenditure on Malay schools, as compared with Indian and Chinese schools; the establishment of the Malayan-staffed Malay Administrative Service, and the admission of senior members of this service, beginning in the midthirties, to the lower ranks of the previously European Malay Civil Service (there were 20 such officers by the end of 1938, in the posts such as Assistant District Officer and lower-level magistrate). The fact that most Malays--by their own preference and with British encouragement, as well as through their exclusion from jobs in enterprises run by other races--continued a traditional agricultural existence meant that the depression of the 1930's did not affect them much, whereas it created serious unemployment for the Chinese and Indians. Though unintended, this was another benefit for the Malayans of British policies.

21. Policies toward the Chinese. As noted above, the British established a special department of Government, with specially trained officers, to deal with the Chinese community. This was done primarily to deal with the threats to security and order posed by the secret societies, although the Chinese Affairs Officers came to exercise somewhat wider functions. In general, however, the British let the Chinese manage their own affairs. Once the problem of the secret societies was reduced to manageable proportions, the new problem of Chinese political activity emerged. Many revolutionary activities in China, notably those of Sun Yat-sen's group, were largely financed with Singapore Chinese money, and the Kuomintang cultivated and maintained strong influence among the Chinese in Malaya throughout the preconflict period. This influence was chiefly due to the continuing orientation of most Chinese toward their homeland, which was encouraged by the curriculum of the Chinese schools and was not contested effectively under prevailing British policies. The Governments of the Straits and Malaya attempted to proscribe or control political activities, but the British Foreign Office was concerned at maintaining good relations with the Chinese Government and resisted strict controls. A compromise was reached, after the proscription of the KMT in 1931, under which Malayan or Straits Chinese might belong to the Chinese KMT but could not organize local branches of it. The problem was further complicated

by Chiang Kai-shek's purge of Communists from the KMT in 1927 and by the Chinese coup d'etat of 1936 against Chiang to force cooperation with the Communists. Dissident activity is discussed in section III.

22. Self-government. The British noted the first stirring of nationalism among the Malayans in the late thirties; other ethnic groups had shown such tendencies earlier. Various decentralization schemes had been proposed or implemented, in response to an undercurrent of feeling on the part of both Malayans and some British officers that centralization in the Federal Government had gone too far in sidetracking the traditional authority. The plan for Malayan Union imposed in 1946 was supposed to work toward the only nationalism thought feasible--one which would include all three major racial elements in a unified, largely self-governing policy. It failed, however, for reasons already noted: the Malays saw further centralization of British power; they feared (not without justification) that they would be overwhelmed by the Chinese and Indians if the latter had access to political power; and there was virtually no time for consultation with the various ethnic communities and interest groups regarding the principles of a plan which had very far-reaching implications for the future of Malaya, but which sprang full-blown from the heads of Whitehall. Had World War II not intervened, blocking communication and action, it is possible that the initial Union proposal would have been better conceived and better received by the people. In the event, the abortive Union reinforced nationalist feelings and ethnic differences.

23. Japanese occupation. Japanese policies during the World War II occupation, 1942-45, created severe deprivations among virtually all races and classes but had their greatest impact on the Chinese. The consequence was heightened nationalism and heightened ethnic tensions. Occupation policies were primarily influenced by the prosecution of the war, which required the maximum exploitation of the area's resources and the suppression of unrest. The Japanese utilized the existing British administrative structure, with some necessary modifications, and increased somewhat the role of the Malays in it. They generally endeavored to maintain good relations with the Malay leaders and people but failed in the end despite some initial receptivity. Unlike their policy in other Asian countries, the Japanese did not promise Malayan independence; such encouragement as they gave it toward the end of the war was in the context of a broader entity including Indonesia, and Malaya was not the responsibility of the Greater East Asia Ministry. Because of the war with China, the Japanese singled out the Chinese community for harsh treatment from the outset, although some of the wealthy and middle-class Chinese, by making "contributions" and by going through at least the motions of cooperation with the Japanese authorities, were able to avoid complete destitution. Some Chinese in Singapore (as well as Indians and even Malays) were resettled in Johore and elsewhere by the Japanese and told to support themselves by farming; others fled to the hinterland to escape the Japanese. Japanese

propaganda concerning Japanese war aims and the evils of the West apparently had some effect, despite the shortcomings of their role.

24. Political culture. Because of the diverse nature of the population of Malaya and its control by an essentially foreign power, it was impossible to speak of any one political culture. Moreover, since political interest and participation were very low for most elements of the population until at least the time of World War II, the political dimension of culture for most of the society was minimal.

a. For the British administrators, the political culture was of course that of their homeland, but the liberal ideas put into practice in England during the 19th century were regarded as inapplicable to the colonial situation. Authority, justice, law and order, perpetual progress, a favorable climate for development of private enterprise, and responsibility for native welfare were the principal ideas of the men who bore the white man's burden. As Governor-General Clarke put it in 1874, "The Malays, like every other rude Eastern nation, require to be treated much more like children, and to be taught." A few of the Malays, Indians, and Chinese, exposed to British schooling both in the colony and in England, acquired some at least of the British ideas.

b. For the great bulk of th Malays, the political culture was a traditional one which accorded supreme position to the Sultan and his 32 officers and dictated obedience to their commands.

(1) "During the interwar period a few of the Sultans who had received an English education and understood twentieth-century problems began to take an active part in the government of their states. The majority, however, were as feudal-minded as their people, so that the blind led the blind and authority was exercised by a handful of British officials." Despite the heavy influx of immigrants, "the Malays never sensed a 'loss of independence' before /World War II/. They were loyal and devoted subjects of their Sultans who were 'sovereign' heads of their own states. A stigma of national subjugation never stung the Malays into 'driving out the intruders.'" (Mahajani (60) 118) Mahajani goes so far as to suggest that "but for the cataclysmic change wrought by the Japanese occupation, Malay nationalism might still have lain dormant for decades "[60] Moreover, like other people in marginal economic circumstances, the Malays were inclined to fatalism (encouraged by their religion) and viewed the world as a "fixed pie" of values from which they could gain more only by taking it from someone else.[61] This view gave them very little initiative for improvement and change, so long as they were convinced of the overwhelming power of the British.

(2) Despite the generally traditional orientation of the Malays, there were two streams of progressive thought entering Malaya during the period studied: the current of nationalism in the Dutch territories, communicated by the steady migration of Indonesians into

Malaya; and the new progressive revival of Islam centered in Cario (which was also a large ingredient in Indonesian nationalism). The latter produced a division of views among the Malay elite between the conservative religious faction (Kaum Tua) and the progressive faction (Kaum Muda).[62] Each had its publications to spread its views, and, in at least one case, the traditionalist feeling ran so high as to precipitate armed revolt in Kelantan, a traditionalist stronghold. The Sultans, in order to preserve the religious sanction for loyalty to themselves, kept the Kaum Muda under control through heresy trials or by shipping adherents to the Straits Settlements.[63] Nevertheless, the new ideas laid the foundation for a Malay national consciousness that was clearly manifested in 1946, when great crowds gathered in Kuala Lumpur to protest against the Malayan Union.[64]

c. The Indian community was fractionated by regional, caste, and occupational differences. Until 1936, it had no overall organization, and such political leadership as it possessed was provided chiefly by agents of the Government of India.[65] Even though the percentage of permanent residents was gradually increasing, most Indians thought of themselves as sojourners in Malaya. However, developing political consciousness in India itself, together with the privations and confusion brought by the depression in Malaya, produced a consolidated Indian seminationalism. Led by the Indian middle class, the Central Indian Association of Malaya sought to raise the status of the Indian community, fly by supporting the claims of the laborers. However, it does t.. seem that the Indians of Malaya had any coherent political culture of their own, beyond what their ancestral land had given them or what they had learned from the British, with a slowly growing addition of nationalist and anticolonialist feeling. This feeling was brought to a head by the Japanese encouragement of the Indian Independence League and the Indian Liberation Army in Malaya during World War II, but it primarily concerned India itself, rather than Malaya.

d. The Chinese community was in many ways an extension of China, with all its diversity, rather than a political or social part of Malaya. As with the Indians, the bulk of the Chinese were migrants whose roots were in their homeland; the only exception was the English-educated group who lived in the Straits Settlements, many of whom had British nationality by birth and regarded themselves as British. The other Chinese regarded the Malayan administration with the same indifference or hostility that was traditional toward Government in China and arranged their own community affairs through the traditional regional, clan, occupational, and family groupings they had brought with them from China. Nevertheless, Tregonning states that . . . "until 1900, the Chinese in Malaya were becoming more Malayan, even to the point of forgetting their own language and using Malay dress. But Chinese revolutionary activity thereafter, and the interest of leaders like Kang Yu-Wei and Sun Yag-sen in the Malayan Chinese, reawakened Chinese orientation."[66]

(1) The anarchy of Malaya and early British indifference permitted secret societies to gain a stronghold among the Chinese in the 19th century, serving no social ends except their own profit and perhaps the filling of an institutional vacuum among people far from home. The secret societies were brought under control before the beginning of the conflict period but never entirely disappeared. Some of their techniques, moreover, were applied in the organization of political groups, first by Sun Yat-sen and his followers, later by the Kuomintang and the Communists. The Chinese Government and the Kuomintang vigorously campaigned among the Chinese of Malaya, to whom they looked for considerable financial support and thus maintained the spirit of identity with the Chinese homeland, while the British administration took a lissez-faire approach. Local Chinese notables occupied such political leadership roles as could be said to exist.

(2) The spirit of Chinese nationalism was stimulated in Malaya by developments in the homeland; the activities of Chinese revolutionary leaders; the pro-Malay policy of the British; the effects of the world depression; and the activities of the Communists, who from the early thirties propagandized the overthrow of the British administration and establishment of a Malayan People's Republic. The greatest influence, however, was the Japanese attack on China and the Japanese occupation of Malaya. The Japanese not only galvanized the Chinese into the organization of violent resistance (aided during the war by the British), they also split the Chinese community by allowing somewhat more privilege to the propertied classes in return for contributions and grudging acquiescence in their regime. One may speculate, moreover, that some class-consciousness had existed among the Chinese themselves for some time, given the extreme contrast in living conditions between rich and poor, and that to some extent the rising of the Chinese in Malaya was a miniature of the situation in China itself.

e. The tranquil continuance of the British colonial administration in Malaya, at a time when nationalist stirrings were manifest all around it, was made possible by the recognition in all communities of British power; by the economic prosperity of the peninsula, which even despite the depression was generally recognized to put Malaya ahead of its neighbors; by the generally evenhanded and moderate British policies, which outweighed the British condescension; and by a general reluctance to rock the boat, since no one of the various ethnic groups would accept another's leadership if British direction were removed. It seems likely that all communities shared something of the Malayan fatalism and "constant-pie" mentality, so long as British power was unquestioned. The unexpected, rapid overwhelming of the British defenses by the Japanese in 1941 dramatically introduced this question, at a time when nationalist ideas were penetrating all the ethnic groups.

25. Political socialization and participation. The previous paragraph stressed the general lack of political participation by all elements

of the Malayan population, at least until the eve of World War II. The formation of political interest groups reflected growing political awareness, but these groups were very far from mass movements.

a. The British administration gradually provided opportunities for the various ethnic groups to be represented in deliberative bodies at all levels of Government. The representatives, however, were without exception appointed (in certain instances, in response to an informal "election" within the interest groups concerned, such as chambers of commerce), and the British up until World War II maintained that Malaya was not ready for a broader form of participation.

b. During the early days of British rule, once the lessons from some egregious mistakes had been learned, the rapport between British colonial officers and the Malay ruling class seems to have been good; the British understood and responded to Malay problems and won their respect. The Sultans "proved admirable advisers of the British authorities."[67] The British Governors and High Commissioners are said to have been careful to sound out local opinion before exercising their extensive powers, and thus avoiding errors of commission. However, the same trends toward complexity and bureaucratization which led to the topheavy structure noted above also led to a depersonalization of British administration and increasing reliance on Indian and Chinese staff, and hence to a diminution of effective political communication, whatever the gains in technical efficiency. This was one of the considerations behind the decentralization proposals of the 1920's and 1930's.[68] It seems probable, however, that such decentralization as was achieved did not restore the earlier rapport. The supreme example of lack of communication and participation was, of course, the Malayan Union proposal, which was devised in Whitehall, sprung on Malaya by the Colonial Office with no consultation and virtually no warning, and railroaded through the Sultans with scant and even tendentious explanations of its significance.[69] Whether the same depersonalization and lack of communication was also a problem with the Chinese community is not clear, but it seems likely in view of the diminishing role of the Chinese Affairs Officers after 1932 and the scarcity of Chinese-speaking officers. The British failure to credit police reports of Chinese mobilization in 1948 supports this view.

c. Political socialization in Malaya (including Singapore) was all but nonexistent prior to World War II. A small minority of each population group received secondary level education, and an even smaller minority went to English universities. Education was largely in vernacular schools of the various groups; the Government concentrated on Malay education, leaving the other communities to run their own schools with some state subsidy and inspection. Tregonning asks whether the British, in promoting vernacular education, wanted "to establish two communities, not one," leaving "the balance . . . with the administration."[70] A few Chinese and Indians entered the Straits

Settlements administrative hierarchy, chiefly at lower levels. Some Malays entered the Malay Administrative Service, and a very few, the lower levels of the Malay Civil Service. This policy lessened the onus of exclusion, but it could hardly have produced much political socialization; indeed, it was probably implicitly intended to avoid socialization and the increased demands for participation which would have followed. It did, however, lay the groundwork for the recruitment of Malay leaders in the governments of later years.

d. The Chinese schools, indeed, were agents of Chinese, rather than Malayan, political socialization.

> On retrospect it seems almost a disaster that the full resources of the /colonial/ government were not thrown more effectively behind a policy which would have effectively combated the Kuomintang control /of the schools/ and which in addition might have grouped into one the divided educational streams of Singapore and the peninsula. . . .[71] In the 1930's the /Chinese/ schools were the centers of incident after incident in which the authority of the state was questioned,

and only the rivalry between the Kuomintang and the Communists kept it from greater violence. The British, indeed, feared for a time that the Chinese Government had intentions of recapturing Malaya as a lost territory, although this particular fear seems to have been largely groundless.

e. During World War II, the Japanese depended somewhat more on the Malays for Government operation than the British had. They also continued the use of deliberative councils with representatives of the various ethnic groups, although they seem to have been less skillful than the British in utilizing them. Japanese propaganda, intended to alienate the people from the Allies and win them to the Japanese cause, undoubtedly made them more politically aware: the heightening of nationalist feeling was a good indicator, although other factors were also at work, as already recorded.

26. Conclusions.

a. With the luxury of hindsight, it can be said that the British laid the foundation for the 1948 emergency in their failure to promote an interracial national society. Had they foreseen the ultimate consequences of the large-scale Chinese immigration, controlling its volume and arranging for appropriate socialization of the immigrants, and had they been more effective in counteracting Chinese revolutionary activity in Singapore; and if they had done these things at the turn of the century, when the resident Chinese were already on the road to Malayanization, and when the power of the British Raj was

absolute, then the Communist call for revolution might have had far less backing, and the insulation of the revolutionaries in a foreign culture would have been far less complete.

b. Preoccupation with economic development and efficiency appears to have partially blinded the British administration to the human side of what it was doing, and hence to have made it insensitive to the growth of nationalist feeling. It is difficult to explain the Malayan Union debacle in any other way. Moreover, few of the people in Malaya--few, even, among the Chinese--were really integrated into the machinery of the modern Malayan Government and economy, although many performed subordinate roles in it.

c. The suppressive policies imposed by the British on the Chinese in the 1930's--immigration restrictions, censorship, banishment--however necessary to public order, aroused the antipathy of the Chinese. Had appropriate measures been applied earlier, such stringent measures and much of the bad feeling might have been avoided.

d. Loss of British prestige as a result of the War lessened their control and emboldened their enemies. British defeat in Malaya and Singapore may or may not have been inevitable, in the light of the circumstances at the time; but little or no advance preparation of the population for it seems to have been made, psychological or physical. The loss of British prestige was thereby intensified, although considerably offset by the bravery of the fight.

e. Although the Japanese were hated by all communities in Malaya, their occupation had the heaviest impact on the Chinese in terms of physical and mental suffering and loss of life and property. Moreover, the occupation may have split the Chinese community between the traditional leadership--either impoverished or branded as collaborators--and the new revolutionaries, thus encouraging the same kind of class thinking promoted by the Chinese Communists in China itself. Moreover, Japanese anti-Western propaganda undoubtedly had an effect on all communities.

f. The month-long hiatus between the Japanese surrender and the establishment of the British Military Administration gave opportunity for the wartime guerrillas to move in and assert control at a time when the Malayan police, because of their association with the Japanese during the war, were impotent. The effect was to reinforce the power and organization of the guerrillas and further attenuate British power. On the other hand, it may have served to crystalize Malay feeling against the Chinese.

g. The Malayan Union proposal and its eventual cancellation, except insofar as it indicated British opposition to self-determination, did not greatly affect the Chinese community, which was almost the sole source of the 1948 revolt. However, the unprecedented mobilization of Malay

anti-British feeling may have served to underline the erosion of British power and thus to encourage the dissidents.

h. Despite the foregoing listing of factors conducive to conflict, it should be recognized that the British brought great blessings to Malaya and substituted the rule of law, public tranquillity, and a just and development-minded administration for the anarchy and marginal existence which had previously prevailed. The people of Malaya were generally better off in material terms than any other Asian people except the Japanese. That the British failed to foresee the adverse as well as the beneficial long-run consequences of their colonial rule, or to function as political and social as well as economic developers, is due partly to the universal lack of understanding in the 19th century of the nature of the problems involved and partly to the unpredictable nature of some of the key events--notably the depression and World War II.

Section III. Subversion: Communist History, Organization, and Doctrine

by James E. Trimnaman

27. Summary. The Malay Communist Party did not come into existence until 1930. The early anti-imperialist and nationalist appeals of communism had little force in Malaya, principally because of Malaya's multiracial composition. The Malays were generally satisfied and complacent under British administration and resentful of the presence of large Chinese and Indian populations. The Chinese were by far the most politically and commercially aggressive element of the population and constituted the bulk of the membership of the MCP. Although there were efforts by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern to reduce the operational control and influence of the Chinese Communist Party over the MCP, these efforts were largely unsuccessful.

a. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war gave the MCP its first real opportunity to appeal to Chinese nationalist sentiment and attract them into the party and its front groups. By the time the Japanese began to invade Malaya, the MCP, although still small, was the best organized and most potent political force outside the British Malayan administration.

b. The harshness of the Japanese occupation and their repressive measures against the Chinese population further forced the Chinese into sympathy with the MCP. Although the party and its anti-Japanese army never threatened Japanese control, its organization and control over the Chinese population increased substantially during the Japanese occupation.

c. When the British returned to Malaya, the MCP had in many areas already emerged from the interior and had established firm control.

There are no clear indications in the literature as to why the MCP decided not to challenge the return of the British at this time and accepted the disarming and disbandment of their forces.

d. In 1945-47, the MCP concentrated once again on the development and control of labor organization, using strikes and boycotts to advance their anti-British imperialism policies. Having failed to achieve substantial progress, and apparently receiving encouragement from the Chinese Communist Party, the MCP in 1947-48 determined to return to the interior, recreate its army and support elements, and pursue the revolutionary cause by resort to violence.

28. Early organization and development of the MCP. The success of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia had a great impact in most of the eastern nations, especially China, Indonesia, Indo-China, and to a lesser extent India. Small but intense groups of leftists and anti-imperialists emerged and eagerly anticipated the socialist revolution. The early enthusiasm led to numerous disasters at premature efforts to seize power but the eastern movements continued to draw adherents.

a. The exception to this general pattern was Malaya. By the 1920's, Malaya was very much a pluralist society, roughly 45 percent Malays, 43 percent Chinese, and 10 percent Indians. The Malays regarded the Chinese and Indians as intruders, but at the same time were favored over them by British colonial policy, and evidenced no discontent with their lot under British rule. The Chinese were economically and politically aggressive but the principal focus of their interest was events in their Chinese homeland rather than in Malaya. The Indians were generally confined to the lowest social classes in Malaya and evidenced considerable resentment with their position, but their political and nationalist sentiments were also oriented toward their homeland, and they continued to regard themselves as transients in Malaya. Therefore, Communist revolutionary thought had little appeal for the Malays, and those Chinese and Indians who adopted the new religion were oriented more toward its application in their respective homelands than in Malaya. These circumstances acted to seriously retard the growth of communism in Malaya. No Malayans of any ethnic derivation participated in the early Comintern meetings and none were available for revolutionary training as party cadre in the early Communist efforts in the East.[72]

b. In the period 1924-30, there were various efforts to introduce communism into Malaya, but because of the pluralist nature of the society these efforts were directed necessarily at each race more or less independently. Nationalism, the driving force behind communism elsewhere in the East, was itself a divisive element in Malaya and its expression by any one ethnic group further alienated rather than attracted the other races of the country.

c. Early Comintern directives charged the Communist party in the metropole country with the responsibility for nurturing communism in that country's colonies. There is no evidence, however that the British Communist Party made any serious efforts in Malaya; its principal focus at the time was on India.

d. Circumstances in Indonesia were conducive to the rapid spread of communism there. In 1925, after the failure of the Communist insurrection on the Island of Java, many Indonesian Communists took refuge in Singapore. Among them were Tan Malaka, Subakat, Tamin, Alimin, and Musso. Alimin had visited Singapore in 1924 and had encouraged the Comintern to begin infiltration of leftist groups. Tan Malaka, the principal Comintern agent for Southeast Asia, directed some agitation among the Malays, although his main concern was with Indonesia. He finally had to report failure, which he blamed upon the "laziness and contentedness" of the Malays. He concluded that the only revolutionary potential rested with the Malayan Chinese.

e. The Chinese of Southeast Asia had always been intimately connected with the political events of China. From 1905 to 1909 Singapore was the principal rendezvous point for Chinese political refugees, such as Sun Yat-Sen, Wang Ching-wei, and Hu Han-min. It was these overseas Chinese who fostered the Chinese Revolution of 1911. When the Kuomintang came into existence in China in 1912 as a result of a fusion of five societies, a branch of the Kuomintang was registered in Malaya in the same year.

f. When the Chinese came to Malaya they brought their secret organizations and societies with them. Much of the Chinese community was accustomed to living within the context of covert societies, whose existences and operations were as often illegal as not. The intensive organization of the Kuomintang in Malaya fit well into the traditional arrangement in the Chinese community, and the temporary cooperation of the Chinese Communists in mainland China permitted the Chinese leftist wing to operate freely in Malaya under the banner of the Kuomintang. The Communist-Nationalist break in China in the winter of 1927-28 caused a similar schism among the Malayan Chinese, but the leftist wing now felt strong enough to proceed alone.[73]

g. Not all Chinese by any means were attracted to the Communist revolutionary movement. From the outset, the principal targets for Communist agitation were the Hailams (Chinese from Hainan Island) and to a somewhat lesser extent the Hakkas. Both groups were particularly clannish and secretive. The Hailams especially remained separate from other Chinese and clung proudly to a long revolutionary tradition. For the most part, these people were the coolies and servants in Malaya and were looked down upon by the more prosperous mainland Chinese. They proved to be fertile soil for Communist agitation.

h. Shortly after the 1927 split in China, the Chinese Communist Party sent several agents to Malaya to begin the reorganization of the movement among Malayan Chinese. They organized the "Nan-yang kung' ch'an-tang" or South Seas Communist Party, which in addition to Malaya was also responsible for directing activities in Siam, Indochina, Indonesia, and Burma until the movements in these countries were capable of sustaining themselves.

i. There is some evidence that the Comintern was reluctant to see the Chinese party exercise complete control over the movement in Southeast Asia. The Chinese leaders of the Malayan party were criticized in reviews by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern with failing to institute a "broad workers' and peasants' movement" and to encourage other races to join the party. Throughout the preconflict period, there remained an undercurrent of competition between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern as to which was to exercise operational control over the movement in Malaya.

j. The early organizational efforts were directed principally at youth and labor. The Communist Youth League was organized in 1926 and infiltration of the Chinese schools and encouragement of leftist-oriented schoolteachers were the early objectives. The South Seas Federation of Labor was organized under the overall direction of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat in Shanghai, and ordered to unite and organize Communist-dominated unions throughout Southeast Asia. Serious strikes began to erupt in 1928, especially in Singapore, and the British authorities began to take effective action by detaining or deporting known labor agitators.[74]

k. As a result of British suppression, a Nan-Yang Communist Party Congress was called in May 1930. The decision was made to dissolve the party and create separate parties for each of the States in Southeast Asia. This decision was apparently directed by the Comintern to reduce Chinese influence on the parties brought into being thereby; however, the actual work in and operational control over them continued to be exercised by cadres from the Chinese Communist Party.

l. The new Malayan Communist Party was placed under the direction of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. Shortly thereafter the South Seas Federation of Labor held its annual congress in Singapore and was reorganized into the Malayan Federation of Labor. It was directed to deemphasize Chinese preeminence and actively seek membership from other races.

m. In April 1930, a French Comintern agent named Joseph Ducroux was sent to Singapore to oversee the carrying out of the new directions. In June he was arrested by British authorities, and he revealed to them the membership and organization of the MCP, the Far Eastern Bureau, and the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat. The British conveyed this

information to China, and, in a series of swift raids, the Communist headquarters in Singapore, Shanghai, and Hong Kong were closed.

n. Although the MCP organization was in utter disorder and cut off from Comintern directives and financial assistance, it began again slowly to rebuild its cadres and union influence. According to Ducroux's account to the British, the party membership stood at 1,500 at the time of his arrest; there were about 10,000 members of the Communist-controlled labor unions, and 200 members in the Anti-Imperialist League, a party front organization.

o. By 1933, the Far Eastern Bureau was reestablished in Shanghai and began to provide direction and assistance. At the same time, the worldwide economic depression had left many in Malaya unemployed and in terrible poverty. The Malayan economy was highly dependent on the world prices of rubber and tin; when the prices of these fell, many laborers, among them many Chinese, were left destitute and susceptible to Communist agitation. A third factor helping in the recovery of the MCP was the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, which gave rise to intense anti-Japanese feelings among the Malayan Chinese and was easily exploitable by Communist propaganda. New party-controlled anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist associations sprang up throughout the Chinese community.[75]

p. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 caused a sudden transformation in the MCP. The Nationalist-Communist decision to cooperate in China against the Japanese invasion caused a similar reaction in the Malayan Chinese community, and many Chinese who had formerly been reluctant to join Communist front groups flocked to the anti-Japanese association. By the time the Japanese attacked Malaya in December 1941, the MCP numbered about 5,000 and enjoyed the smypathetic support of thousands more through its front groups. The party leadership was young and spirited and controlled hundreds of trained revolutionary cadres prepared to follow the will of the party. Aside from the British Colonial Government, the MCP was probably the most effective organization in Malaya, even though its membership still appeared small in a population of millions.[76]

29. World War II: The Japanese Occupation. In the summer of 1941, six months before the Japanese invasion of Malaya, the MCP saw the threat of Japanese expansionist designs in Southeast Asia and approached the British to offer cooperation in the event of war. The British at first turned down the offer, refusing to deal with an outlawed segment of the Chinese community and believing that acceptance of assistance from the Asian community would constitute an open admission that the British couldn't protect their own colonies.

a. However, on December 8 the Japanese began their invasion of Malaya, and when the MCP and other Chinese groups again offered

assistance, the British accepted. Somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 Chinese volunteers were organized into a group called DALFORCE and, although poorly trained and armed, subsequently fought with great valor and high casualties in the defense of Singapore. At the same time, the British began training at 101 Special Training School a smaller group of Chinese selected by the MCP for guerrilla and sabotage operation. Each successive class was given 2 weeks training, armed, and sent into the interior as a stay behind force.

b. By the time Singapore fell, 165 Communists had been trained and sent into the field. The first class was sent to Selangor, where it formed liaison with the State party committee and began to draw recruits. They became known as the First Independent Force of the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). The second class was sent to Negri Sembilan and named the Second Independent Force of the MPAJA; it drew recruits from the tin mine workers through previous association with the Communist-controlled unions. The third class moved to the jungle regions of northern Johore and became the Third Independent Force. The last classes were combined into the Fourth Force and sent into southern Johore.

c. At first these forces attempted aggressive actions against the Japanese but soon discovered that poor leadership and training caused these actions against the Japanese to lead to disastrous results. In addition, the jungle proved a formidable enemy as well as concealing friend; many MPAJA members were unable to adjust to jungle living and died or deserted. Constant Japanese sweeps through the jungle added further to the disorganization and morale problems. The central military command of the party soon directed all units to focus their efforts at establishing themselves safely in the jungle, developing supply lines, and recruiting and training as many members as supplies and arms permitted.[77]

d. Japanese treatment of the Chinese population of Malaya was cruel in the extreme. Some 5,000 Chinese were killed in the first few days of the occupation at Singapore alone. Many Chinese fled Singapore and eventually settled on the mainland in areas neighboring the jungle. Many thousands more joined them, as hunger and disease began to plague the urban areas. The MCP carried on intensive organizational and propaganda work among the Chinese, organizing a large support structure for its resistance forces. This mass base was called the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU), which was responsible for supplying the "army" with food and intelligence. By 1944 the MCP controlled hundreds of thousands of Chinese through the mechanism of the MPAJU.[78]

e. In 1943-44, the MPAJA added the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Independent Forces. The Fifth force, however, was given the specific objective of traitor-killing, assassinating Chinese, Indians, and Malays who cooperated with the Japanese and Chinese who were

"politically unreliable;" i.e., often those who might offer some resistance to MCP control of the Chinese population after the liberation. By the party's own calculation, the assassination squads of the Fifth Force killed more than 2,500 "traitors" during the war. The Sixth Force was organized in order to undertake and coordinate all propaganda and political work among the members of the army and the union and to provide much-needed cadre training for the guerrilla units. Poor leadership among the lower and middle leadership cadres of the army were generally blamed for the relatively poor showing the army made at resisting or harassing the occupying army. By the end of the occupation, the army numbered almost 5,000, yet it was able to inflict only 2,300 casualties (killed and wounded) on the Japanese occupying forces.[79]

f. A major setback to the resistance occurred in September 1942, when a general conference of high-ranking party and military officers was convened at Batu Caues in Selangor to discuss future military policy. A large Japanese force took the Communists by surprise and killed or captured more than a hundred party officials, including about one-half of the party's political commissars. The education and training of replacements for these losses were major party preoccupations throughout the remainder of the war.

g. In October 1944, the MPAJA began to receive substantial assistance from the Allied Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) and started to undertake reorganization for the liberation effort. The British had lost contact with the guerrillas after the Japanese had completed their occupation of Malaya. In July 1942, the SEAC organized Force 136 and made it responsible for contacting, supplying, and directing resistance forces in Burma, Thailand, and Indochina. Teams of British officers with previous experience in Malaya and interpreters supplied by the Kuomintang began training in early 1943. Contact with the guerrilla high command was finally established in December 1943, and an agreement was signed in January 1944. The guerrillas agreed to cooperate against the Japanese and to help maintain law and order during and after the war; the British were to supply weapons, training, money, and medical facilities. It was mutually agreed that postwar policy questions were not to be discussed or negotiated at that time.

h. SEAC established a plan for the amphibious assault on the west coast of Malaya, called Operation ZIPPER, and scheduled the operation for August 1945. The Communists agreed to accept the leadership of British liaison teams and to undertake the clearing of landing sights and interdiction of Japanese reinforcements. In October 1944, the first British teams and supplies began to arrive, and the MPAJA began to reorganize and arm its forces for the liberation.

i. In actual practice, the British had little control over the Communist forces and were kept generally ignorant of their plans. The British use of Kuomintang members as interpreters caused varying

degrees of friction to appear, a pattern similar to that taking place on mainland China at the time. However, unlike the Greek, Crete, and Yugoslav Communist forces which generally sought to conserve their strength of men and ammunition for the future revolutionary takeover rather than pressing the attack on Axis forces, the Malay Communists appeared fully prepared to concentrate their forces to defeat the Japanese. Hanrahan suggests that this may have indicated the absence of communication and direction from the Soviet Union or China, which would have undoubtedly pressed a policy of conservation of forces for the postwar revolution rather than spending them in easing the Allied liberation.

j. The Japanese surrender and the ending of hostilities took place before Operation ZIPPER got underway, so the sizable British buildup of the MPAJA proved to be unnecessary only by the accident of timing.[80]

30. Postwar confusion; preparation for revolution. The suddenness of the end of the war caught both the British and the MCP by surprise, and neither had a clear plan for the immediate future. The British were slow in moving forces into Malaya; in many areas it was weeks before the British forces arrived. The MCP found itself in complete control of the peninsula, the only power in Malaya through these weeks, further armed from Japanese stores and commanding a force of between 6,000 and 7,000 men. The MPAJA engaged high popularity; in the absence of the British, many people believed the MPAJA had defeated the Japanese alone! However, indecisive leadership and a growing rift as to whether to press the revolution by force now or return to the longer road of revolution by labor organization and agitation. Before the party could clarify its position, the British forces began to arrive and the first option lapsed.

a. By December 1945, the demobilization and disarming of the MPAJA began and operated smoothly with party cooperation, despite considerable bitterness on the part of many guerrillas. The arms and supplies dropped by the British were returned or accounted for, and the British were satisfied that the disarming had been successful. However, the MCP had determined that it was not going to give up all its military capability. Arms picked up in the early part of the war, Japanese caches, and British drops reported as lost (which amounted to 20 percent of all arms supplied) were carefully stored away in the jungle for future use. At the same time, the party established a veterans organization in order to keep control of its disbanded soldiers.[81]

b. At a meeting of the enlarged plenum of the central committee in January 1946, the party officially adopted the moderate line, stressing united front tactics to end British colonial control and establish a constitution, freedom of political organization, and self-government. Heavy propaganda emphasis on demands for easier Malayan

citizenship for Chinese and Indians and for a democratic system of one-man, one-vote in the future independent nation was carefully calculated to enlist the support of Chinese and Indians for the party, but also alienated Malays who enjoyed a new sense of nationalist spirit and were intent on perpetuating their favored position in the country. Many Malays who might have otherwise been attracted to the anti-British stand of the MCP were rapidly disaffected by this patiently Chinese nationalist expression. The new British administration studiously ignored the proposals of the MCP and by the early part of 1946 had begun to restrict the activities of the party.[82]

c. Simultaneous with its political agitation, the party began to rebuild its labor movement. A dock strike was called in October 1945, in which 7,000 workers participated. The MCP also established the General Labor Unions in the same month, a federation aimed at bringing together all unions in Malaya. By 1947, when the name was changed to the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, the MCP could boast that it controlled 75 percent of the union members in Malaya and 214 of the 277 registered unions of the country. By the end of the year, the party's unions represented some 463,000 workers.

d. A series of union strikes began in January 1946 and lasted through 1947, but their popularity began to wane. The general public became disaffected with continued labor agitation and heavy-handed union tactics began to cause resentment among many workers. Again the MCP appeared to have no plan for the next step in revolutionary progress, and British counteractions began to take effect. Legislation in early 1948 began to restrict control of the party over the unions, and arrests and deportations of labor leaders had seriously jeopardized Communist control over the labor movement by May.

e. By June, the labor troubles had discredited the "moderate" leadership of the party, and the "hard-line" revolutionaries had taken over and determined to return to the policy of revolution by violence. As the party shifted its headquarters into the jungle and began to establish a new army, its control over the labor movement slipped away to nothing. As a result of the party's concentration on the urban labor front, it had largely ignored its propaganda and organizational activities in the rural areas. Through the occupation years, the control of the rural areas had been the real strength of the MCP. In the intervening several years, this area of support had been allowed to lapse, making the reestablishment of a rural base an immediate and urgent task. The slowness of the development of the MCP's new revolutionary line is attributable in large part to having to undertake simultaneously the movement of the party into the interior, the reestablishment of the army, and the re-creation of a rural support base.[83]

31. Communist leadership. Not a great deal appears to be known of the secondary and lower leadership of the Malayan Communist Party. Constant

pressure from first the British, using the mechanism of deportation, then the Japanese and their program of Communist extermination, and the British again kept party leadership in a constant state of rapid turnover and general turmoil. Presented below are sketches of the highest leadership of the party which managed to survive the Japanese occupation. The last three leaders formed the party's Central Committee on the eve of the conflict period.

a. Loi Tak was Secretary-General of the MCP from 1939 to 1947. A great deal of mystery appears to surround him; nothing is known of his birthplace or early years, and, even when he headed the party, only a handful of people knew his true identity. He was characterized as intelligent and possessing great charm. He also had a great capacity for ruthlessness and intrigue. He had tremendous organizational capability, which enabled him to collect and order a party out of the chaos of the early 1930's and to lead this party through the Japanese occupation largely on the illusion of his own charisma.

(1) Loi Tak first came to the attention of the MCP in 1932, when he arrived at Singapore, and soon he had local party officials astounded at his zeal for and knowledge of communism and impressed with his apparent party credentials and extensive travels. He held that he was a member of the party's Shanghai Town Committee and had visited both the USSR and France to observe the application of Communist theory in these countries. The Malayan party accepted his credentials as such, and he began to rise rapidly in the party heirarchy. In 1939, he was elected Secretary-General of the party, the first formal head of the party since its inception.

(2) Loi Tak began the preparation of the party for the coming Japanese invasion, mobilizing support elements and raising a guerrilla force. He approached the British to secure arms and training for this force shortly before the Japanese succeeded in occupying Singapore.

(3) When the Japanese occupied Malaya they were particularly intent on eliminating any potential Chinese resistance in the form of the Communist party. Within a year almost all senior party officials had been captured and killed. Party activity in Singapore ceased completely, and the Japanese continued to press their hunt for communists in the Malayan interior. The Batu Caves massacre in September 1942 was the greatest blow to the party, for in it the Japanese succeeded in capturing or killing almost the entire membership of the Central Executive Committee on the mainland. Loi Tak appeared to lead a charmed life; he continued to travel extensively throughout the country and to survive every Japanese raid and trap. He was rapidly becoming a party legend.

(4) After the war Loi Tak's position appeared unassailable. He had survived his early contemporaries in the party and enjoyed a

charisma much like that of Ho Chi Minh in Indochina. In 1946 he was reelected party head and adopted a moderate policy of seeking to oust the British and bringing about the revolution by paralyzing Malaya with labor strikes rather than by resorting to armed rebellion. In early 1947 a group of hard line revolutionary party members had emerged and, encouraged by the progress of the Chinese revolution, began to press for armed revolt and to accuse Loi Tak of "right-wing deviation." In March, Loi Tak disappeared, taking the central party funds with him.

(5) The shock of Loi Tak's disappearance so appalled the rest of the party hierarchy that it was kept secret for several months. Finally the party issued a detailed paper claiming to have discovered that Loi Tak had never been a member of the Shanghai Town Committee and had never traveled to the USSR or France; his earlier party credentials were nonexistent; there was even evidence that he was cooperating with the Japanese and betraying other party leaders, and that he may have been doing the same with the British both before and after the war. The extent of truth in these accusations cannot be determined from the literature; some authors believe them while others are inclined to dismiss them as a necessary party reaction to Loi Tak's treachery and escape.[84]

b. Chen Ping became Secretary-General of the party after the disappearance of Loi Tak. He was then 26 years old, well educated, and spoke four dialects of Chinese, Malay, and English. A considerable amount is known of him, for he was the party's liaison with the British from the outbreak of World War II until 1947.

(1) Chen Ping was born in the small coastal town of Sitiawan in South Perak. His father had developed a small successful business in selling and repairing bicycles. He attended first a Chinese then an English school and was regarded as an intelligent boy and good scholar. While in school, Chen Ping was introduced to Marxism by party members who were seeking to establish cells in Perak; in 1940 he became a party member.

(2) When the war with Japan broke out, Chen Ping was appointed a member of the Perak State Committee which was to become one of the most powerful in the party during the occupation. Chen Ping was not a fighter, but he had considerable organizational ability which was applied to the extention of the party and the creation of the anti-Japanese army. He was soon made Perak State Secretary, in charge of the best guerrilla organization in Malaya. When the British liaison with the guerrillas was organized, Chen Ping became the principal contact. The British liaison officers were impressed by his ability and honesty. Although he was amiable toward them, he also made it plain that he believed the current cooperation with the British was only temporary; ultimately the Communists would rebel against British imperialism and "liberate" the country.

(3) By the end of the war, Chen Ping was one of Loi Tak's chief lieutenants. At the same time, the British appeared to have tried to woo him away from the party. Chen Ping worked closely with the British on the demobilization of the anti-Japanese army and was highly praised and decorated by them; they encouraged him to rejoin his wife and return to his father's business. However, when Loi Tak disappeared, the party appointed Chen Ping as chief investigator into his past and his presumed betrayals. Shortly thereafter he was elected party Secretary-General and he began to reorganize the party and recreate the army for insurrection.[85]

c. Yeung Kwo was the number two man in the party Central Executive Committee under Chen Ping. He was born in 1917 somewhere in the northern part of Malaya and joined the MCP at age 15. During the Japanese occupation, Yeung Kwo was secretary of the Selangor State Committee, controlling the party organization in Kuala Lumpur. He also was the Central Committee's representative and communication link to the Negri Sembilan and Pahang committees. Yeung Kwo developed a considerable reputation as a fighter and leader during the occupation; the Japanese considered him one of the most dangerous communists in Malaya. In 1946, Yeung Kwo was appointed to the Central Executive committee. He was one of the few leading Communists who apparently suspected Loi Tak of treachery during the occupation. It was Yeung Kwo's allegations which finally caused Loi Tak to disappear. In 1948, when Chen Ping became the Secretary-General of the MCP, Yeung Kwo became his chief lieutenant and one of the principal architects of the coming revolt.[86]

d. Lan Lee was the third person appointed to the Central Executive Committee in January 1946. He was born in China in 1916 and brought to Malaya by his parents at an early age. He became a teacher in a Chinese school in Johore. In 1935, he joined the MCP. During the Japanese occupation, Lan Lee became a member of the Perak State Committee with Chen Ping. Because of his teaching experience, he was put in charge of propaganda and became a highly accomplished propagandist. In acknowledgement of his achievements, he was appointed to the Central Executive Committee in 1946 and given the special assignment of running the party's Education Committee and supervising all party propaganda in Malaya. Lan Lee developed a network of effective agitation-propaganda teams for each State, composed mostly of former teachers, students, and newspapermen. The British soon came to acknowledge effectiveness of this propaganda network under the guiding hand of Lan Lee.[87]

32. Organization. The Malaya Communist Party was formally organized in the same manner as other Communist parties. The lowest component was the party cell, composed of as few as three party members. Above the local cells was a branch party organization ruled by the Branch Committee. Above several branches was a district organization composed of the leaders of the branches and governed by the District Committee. The districts were similarly organized into State organizations

corresponding to the Malayan States and governed by State Committees. Singapore had a Town Committee, which ranked equal to the State Committees. Above the states were three regional bureaus consisting of the heads of the State Committees for each of the North, Central, and South Federation. The chiefs of the State Committees also formed the party congress and plenum council. The supreme body of the party was the Central Executive Committee. Prior to 1947 the Central Executive Committee was composed of three men: the Secretary-General and two lieutenants. After the insurgency had begun, the membership of the Central Committee was raised to 10.

a. In reality, geographic and security hindrances necessitated a high degree of autonomy between and among the State Committees and the Singapore committee. During and after the Japanese occupation, the full party council was able to meet only irregularly and at long intervals, so that at the State level resided the principal responsibility to carry out the general directions of the Central Committee. For this reason also, there was a wide spectrum of efficiency and military capability reflected in the operation in the various states.

b. Prior to the Japanese occupation, most party energy was devoted to the infiltration and organization of the trade unions under the Malayan General Labor Union. Heavy emphasis was also placed on the control of the Chinese schools. As consistent with Marxist doctrine, an abudance of other front groups also appeared, such as the youth movement, women's groups, professional societies, etc.

c. With the onset of the Japanese attack, the party's organizational efforts were devoted to withdrawal from the cities and into the interior. The total loss of the labor movement and the schools was anticipated. Two new organizations were gradually developed, the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army and the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Union. The high command of the MPAJA was directly responsible to the party Central Executive Committee for the conduct of guerrilla operations against the Japanese. In theory, every State was to generate a regiment of the army; however, some States were able to organize several guerrilla units which they called "regiments," while others produced none. Each regiment was divided into companies, platoons, and sections. Party control was maintained at each level to the sections by the presence of trusted party members as political officers. At lower levels, the military commander was not necessarily a party member, but, at every level, the political representative was the senior officer. The State Committees were also responsible for setting up independent killer-squads specialized in assassinations and terrorism against collaborators. Below the State Committees, the party was divided into two halves to provide control over the army and the Union.

d. The MPAJU was the army's auxilliary, responsible to feeding and clothing its local army unit and providing it with money, guns,

scouts, and a warning and intelligence network. Numerous suborganizations with specialized duties came under the MPAJU, such as the Anti-Japanese Resistance League, the Anti-Japanese Self-Protection Society, the Friends of Guerrilla Warfare, youth associations, and the Farmers' Union.

e. By the end of the war, the party's membership was estimated at about 35,000 members. The army had about 5,000 men, its numbers being restricted severely, more by the arms and supply capabilities of the party's organizations than by the numbers willing to join. The MPAJU was believed to number several hundred thousand at the close of the Japanese occupation.

f. Between 1945 and 1947, the party devoted itself to the recreation of a labor movement, first through the organization of the General Trade Unions and then through the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions. The organization of the MPAJA was kept somewhat intact, partially by the maintenance of skeleton units in the interior and by the creation of ex-servicemen's associations.

g. When the party began to prepare for the insurgency, it undertook a program similar to that of 1940-41. First the party organization was moved out of the cities and into the interior, often to prepared positions planned for and developed during the Japanese occupation. The new army, called finally the Malayan Races Liberation Army, was patterned after its predecessor, the MPAJA, and the hierarchy of political control remained the same. To perform the equivalent function of the MPAJA, the party organized the Min Yuen, meaning Masses Movement. The numbers of people in each of these organizations slowly grew to equal those of their predecessor organizations.[88]

CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC FACTORS

by Harley M. Roberts

Section I. Introduction

33. History. Malaya has had a series of economic swings that have been dramatic in their effects and significant far beyond her borders. As a major raw materials producer for more than a century, Malaya has experienced the conventional boom-and-bust cycles associated with surplus production. Her strategic position and orientation to the seas have been additional factors tying her economic conditions closely to economic and political events of the distant world. The results have been recorded in dramatic reversals of a highly unstable economy, as well as by a set of contrasts between distinctive socioeconomic sectors ranging from utter village simplicity to highly developed commercial and financial centers. The entreport seaport of Singapore still is next door to the small traditional Malay fishing village.

a. To stress the essential instability of the Malayan economy and its boom-or-bust export nature is also to underemphasize the striking consistency in her major economic production sectors and in modes of production over much of the 50 years preceding the 1948 declaration of emergency conditions. This consistency of economic patterns, which underlay the startling swings in annual physical volumes produced, in financial flows, employment opportunities, and export earnings, was related directly to the persistance and rigidity of hierarchial social and political relationships. The system of European colonial administration, where social and economic ties reinforced an elite political system, adapted only reluctantly and slowly to both short-run crises and to longer term pressures for change.

b. The basic social patterns in Malaya arose from the close relationship of the underpopulated Peninsula to the Malaysian islands of Sumatra and Java, from the industrious Chinese who flooded in to fill the need for labor, and from the Indian laborers preferred by British estate managers. Basic political considerations were the unplanned way in which British political control was extended through the Peninsula, the policies introduced by theories of indirect rule, and the laissez-faire British political tradition that stressed nonintervention in commercial business and benevolent paternalism toward the Malays.

34. Early developments. It is difficult to select a few years as economic turning points, from the many major economic reversals experienced in Malaya. During the 19th century, many modern trends were well established, thanks to discoveries of the tin of Larut in 1848 and of Kuala Lumpur in 1858. In 1885, the first short railroad link

was built, and Malay's first tin smelter followed soon after. By 1900, tin exports supplied over half the world's needs, and the first rubber plantations were just being planted. In 1912-13, the first mechanized tin dredges were introduced; the Johore rail line had linked Penang (Georgetown), the tin districts, and Malacca with Singapore for 3 years; and Malayan rubber exports were shortly to exceed Brazil's wild-rubber output.

35. Rubber production control. The period before World War I saw rapid growth in Malay's production, as well as rapid growth of a semipermanent pool of immigrant laborers, both Chinese and Indian. But the 1921-22 period must be considered a major turning point, since the pattern for rubber, the major modern export, was established in these years. Rubber plantings, which provided 53 percent of world consumption in 1920, were sharply slowed and controlled under the Stevenson restriction plan of 1922 to 1928. Major consequences were felt in the US market, which took 61 percent of all Malaya rubber in 1921, and in Sumatra and Java, where rubber acreage expanded rapidly. Also, the 1921 census defined Malaya as a truly plural society, where Chinese and Indians outnumbered the Malay-descent population in a number of individual States.

36. Depression years. The next major economic turning point was a function of the worldwide depression of 1929-32, during which rubber prices tumbled and tin employment fell off sharply. 1931 provides a precise definition of this turning point, for the census in that year showed that Chinese (36 percent) and Indians (14 percent) actually outnumbered the total Malayan population, with its 49-percent share. In this year, a new Governor Ceneral, Sir Cecil Clementi, attempted to introduce measures to centralize British political administration; a law restricting Chinese immigration was introduced, and in both rubber and tin, schemes to restrict Malay production, curtail small holder rubber plantings, and attempt to raise world prices were debated and subsequently introduced. These steps all determined the course of the Malayan economy up to the Japanese invasion. The introduction of imperial preference duties on imports helped to undermine Singapore's regional role as a trade center.

37. Japanese occupation. The Malayan economy was no more prepared for the Japanese occupation period than were the untrained British troops, the British Navy, or the seaward-aimed guns of Singapore. From 1942 through December 1944, Malay's export industries suffered a near-total collapse, first from the scorched-earth withdrawal policies of the British, and then from Japanese occupation policies which drained off Indian estate labor to Siam and discriminated harshly against Chinese businessmen and farmers. Half-hearted collaboration of most Malays with the Japanese provided an added political problem for the postwar period and served to heighten nationalist feeling and demonstrate the advantages of village self-sufficiency.

38. Postwar changes. When the British Military Administration returned to Malaya in 1945, the physical plant of the country was in poor condition, and a new set of demographic and political forces was at work, particularly evident in the new importance of semipermanent Chinese and Indian rural inhabitants, many existing as rural squatters on lands previously labeled Malay Reservations and forbidden for their purchase. The British Colonial Office, insensitive to the ambiguous problem of wartime "collaboration" and nationalism, attempted unilaterally in October-December 1945 to impose political unification on this new mixture and to reestablish the old commercial and financial domination of a European elite and bureaucracy. Centralization in the Malayan Union failed, but centralizing tendencies continued.

a. While the 1947 census showed that community proportions remained roughly unchanged from 1931, it also showed a dramatic increase in the urban population, and a near-normal sex ratio within the two immigrant communities, suggesting that they were now fully resident in Malaya. The 1947 rubber production was the highest ever, some 20 percent above 1940 levels, whereas tin and coal output was only one-third the prewar levels. But the slow recovery of rice production and other foodstuffs required official rationing that continued through 1951. The 1947 rice production was about 75 percent of the 1940 and the 1948 normal levels. The Federation's overall cost of living index for non-Europeans averaged 340 percent of 1939 levels, when a Declaration of Emergency Conditions was made in June 1948 in response to the general strikes and the estate assassinations earlier that year.[1]

b. The emergency marks 1948 as a critical year and a political turning-point. Economic consequences of the emergency period are difficult to isolate, however, since the Malayan economy had not fully recovered from the losses caused by wartime neglect and destruction in 1948, and since major counterguerrilla operations did not occur promptly. The creation of New Villages occurred during the later 1950-51 period of the Korean War, amid a rubber boom and a rapidly growing Malayan national income. While the emergency period subsequent to 1950 is not studied in this paper, the dramatic upturn in national income and in export earnings of 1950 require that this boom year be included as the completion of Malaya's postwar economic recovery. Also, statistics for the 1945-48 period are incomplete and not comparable to prewar conditions directly. As of 1951 a British reporter could state:

> Although bandit activity has extended throughout the whole of the Federation of Malaya, it is a remarkable fact that production has not suffered much. Nevertheless a serious brake has been imposed on prospecting for new tin deposits and on various other kinds of developments . . . .[2]

39. Economic trends. In summary, the important trends of Malaya's economy can be analyzed very well by close examination of the 1920-22

period, the 1929-31 period, by a comparison of 1940 and 1947 conditions, and by reference to the 1950 boom period. These economic turning points conveniently coincide with the years of Malayan censuses. Common economic trends in these various periods included important immigration shifts, a series of output restriction schemes for rubber and tin, and sharp swings in Malaya's foreign earnings, employment, and internal incomes which continually emphasized that her economy was highly unstable.

Section II. The National Economy

40. Data availability. The earliest official statistics for Malaya's overall national income and product are those prepared by F. C. Benham for 1947-50, and these estimates are not strictly comparable with later efforts or the United Nations data on national accounts. Some scattered efforts have been made to estimate Malayan production totals for earlier years, in particular the 1929-32 period. Any major effort to develop further data for the interwar period, however, is extremely unlikely; too many complications are introduced by the unreliable coverage for earlier years, and the arbitrary complications caused by the three-part administrative division of "Pan-Malaya" into the Straits Settlements, the four Federated Malay States, and the five unfederated Malay States. The Malaya Department of Statistics was only established in 1929, and its records continued to reflect the official interest in trade and financial data.

41. Gross national product. The FMS administration was perhaps the best run of these three Governments and was responsible for the major tin-mining and rubber-growing areas. Weight must be given to the 1931 "national income" estimate of gross production at M$154 million, made by the FMS Retrenchment Committee of 1932. Fully two-thirds of this total "income from production" came from rubber and tin production, even during this depression year when Federal exports were less than 40 percent of the 1921 level, at M$125 million.[3] Considerably later, Bauer made a private estimate of the 1932 gross value of agricultural and mining output for all Malaya, putting it at M$176-190 million. His comparison of this with the predepression year of 1929 showed that gross output declined by 70 percent, from its peak of about M$568 million. Bauer's figures showed that rubber output was almost three times the value of tin output in 1929, but only 150 percent by value in 1932. The money value of rubber fell almost 80 percent, while tin output value fell 65 percent over these 3 years.[4]

TABLE I. CRUDE ESTIMATES OF PAN-MALAYAN GROSS OUTPUT OR PRODUCT, 1929-50
(in millions of M$)

Year	Amount	Estimator
1929	568	Bauer[1]
1932	176	do
1940	850	Silcock[2]
1947	3,511	do and Benham[3]
1948	3,580	do
1949	3,426	do
1950	5,419	Benham[3]

Sources: [1]P. T. Bauer in Readings in Malayan Economics by T. H. Silcock, p 187. [2]T. H. Silcock and E. K. Fish, ed, The Political Economy of Independent Malaya: A Case Study in Development, p 243. [3]F. C. Benham, ibid.

a. The table above suggests the historical orders of magnitude for gross value of major outputs and gross national product at market prices. The major impression created by comparing the prewar and postwar data is one of tremendous expansion; this is clearly a mistake, which is due to the considerable depreciation in real value of the Malayan Straits dollar (M$) during the war period. Unfortunately, no adequate adjustment for purchasing power can be made, since price data comparing 1939 with the postwar period is scanty and geared to meet bureaucratic needs. The Malay Straits dollar has remained a constant proportion of the British pound ever since 1906 (@ 8.57 to 1), and its international value therefore has followed the fluctuations of the pound in its 1932, 1940, and 1949 devaluations. At the same time, Malaya's major export market has long been the United States, and thus her export values have closely mirrored the swings of US demand and international price levels. In brief, while postwar output was fully four times the dollar volume of prewar output, and the European prices were 250-230 percent of prewar 1939 levels, Malaya and other communities experienced price levels of 370-315 percent of prewar levels that eliminated most of this gain.[5]

b. Benham's estimates have been frequently criticized, but they remain the only consistent data for the early postwar period, and also include the extraordinary spurt in Malayan earnings caused by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, that brought prosperity and 3 years of rapid growth to the country. His findings showed that gross product stayed almost exactly constant during 1947, 1948, and 1949, while 1950's GNP represented a sudden expansion of 55 percent above 1947's level. In 1950, the contribution of the agricultural-forests-mining sectors was fully double that of 1947, thanks to record international price levels for raw materials. Subsequent calculation by IBRD experts for the 1949-53 GNP levels confirmed the size of this 1-year change in most particulars.[6]

41. Population growth and distribution. Malaya's population growth is covered in detail elsewhere; up to 1930-31 the major element was provided by immigration of Chinese, by Indians, and also by a number of "Malaysians" or "jawa" immigrants from the Netherlands East Indies. During the 1930's, Chinese immigration shifted to restore a more normal sex ratio, and under the Japanese occupation, non-Malay males suffered from considerable hardship. Thus the census of 1947 showed the total population was 34.5 percent larger than that of 1931, and had grown at almost 1.9 percent on annual average. However, the male labor force had actually fallen over these 16 years by a total of nearly 3.6 percent.[7] Another important trend during this period was the rapid growth of urbanized population, which expanded to 35.1 percent of the total population by 1947; urban growth absorbed fully 51.4 percent of the entire population increase between these years.[8] Chinese made up nearly 69 percent of the urban population, although they represented only 30 percent of the rural population of 1947.[9] Indians, on the other hand, made up about 10-11 percent in both the rural and the urban populations of 1947, this representing a fall from their 15 percent share in 1931's overall population.

42. Income distribution. Such population data suggests the question of the distribution of national income between the major communal groups of Malaya. This conplicated effort has been attempted for 1947 by Prof. Silcock, whose calculations showed that total Chinese incomes were roughly 2.5 times the aggregate Malay incomes, with 22 percent of the total money value of individual incomes going to Malays, while Chinese took 57 percent of the total. This sharp income differentiation is especially notable, since the two communities were of nearly identical size in Pan-Malaya, although the Chinese active male population, 15-59 years old, numbered roughly 22 percent larger than the Malay males.

a. The table below reproduces Prof. Silcock's estimates of individual incomes by communal groups, with additional calculations implied by his data. Very real income differences are normally concealed by the simple overall averages for geographical or administrative groupings. While Malay incomes per active male average some M$979

TABLE II. MALAYAN INDIVIDUAL INCOMES BY COMMUNAL GROUPS, 1947[1]

	Incomes-Share (in thousand M$)	Income per capita	Income per male	Income ratio per male
Malay	656-22	M$258	979	0.58
Indian	337-11	560	1,296	0.76
Chinese	1,714-57	656	2,090	1.23
Others	316-10	4,510	10,500[2]	6.18
Total	3,023-100	Average 519	1,700	1.00

Sources: [1]T. H. Silcock and E. K. Fisk, ed, The Political Economy of Independent Malaya: A Case Study in Development, pp 2-3, 279t. [2]Calculated values implied by Silcock data. See Norton Ginsberg and Chester F. Roberts, ed, Area Handbook on Malaya, p 105.

yearly, this was only 58 percent of the overall Pan-Malaya average income of M$1,700 and was less than half of the comparable Chinese male's earnings of M$2,090. If the average Malay male worker in 1947 used his income as a base, he would have viewed these statistics as proving that an equivalent Indian received 132 percent as much in a year, a Chinese male 213 percent, and all other groups including Europeans received 10.6 times his annual income. Similar calculations by Silcock for 1957 showed that the proportions for all three major communities remained much the same as in 1947.

b. Little more can be said about levels of consumption in the prewar period, because there was no accepted living standard minimum for the prewar period, and only very inadequate statistics for the postwar period. The Federation Household Budget Survey of 1957-58 provided only a limited amount of useful data on low-income families--primarily that Indian and Malay households both numbered about 5.0-5.1 persons, while Chinese families reached their peak of 6.6 persons in rural districts.[11] Personal saving levels that could be projected back to 1947 are unknown.

43. Capital investment and formation. For the subject of prewar capital formation, only fragmentary information is available, which cannot be put into any meaningful context. For example, it has been estimated that Malaya as a whole contributed some £22.2 million (M$334 million) in direct contributions to the joint defense establishment between the two World Wars.[12] This amount cannot usefully be related to other interwar data.

a. The total amount of foreign capital investment in Malaya before the war has been estimated at M$362 million (US$455), with an additional estimate of Chinese capital at M$600 million.[13] Finally, Benham's national accounts for 1947 gross capital formation showed this amounted to M$265 million or 7.5 percent of gross product. Silcock has placed the 1947-50 total capital stocks at roughly M$9 million—M$10 million, and stressed that net investment was little more than 3-4 percent for later years.

b. The subject of Pan-Malaya's transactions with the outside world and the inflows and outflows of investment capital are discussed later. While it is not possible to estimate accurately how much was taken out of Malaya by British and other investors, it is clear that the amounts were very large early in the century and of much less significance during the 1930's. Since Malayan trade continued to provide a surplus and a large dollar earning capacity after 1945, the colony was particularly important for British finances after World War II. Accurate accounts are unlikely, in view of poor records, Singapore's physical situation, and the prevalence of postwar smuggling.[15]

44. Summary. In summary, it must be stressed that adequate statistics do not exist to permit careful analysis of output or income variations between the different States or political groupings of Malaya. The prewar political fragmentation into the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States, and the unfederated Malay States is reflected in the varying quality of statistics which are available, and it is no surprise that careful scholars have mislabeled the data which they have cited.[16] For the postwar period, correct coverage is easier. It appears that the Straits colonies or Singapore accounted for 16 percent of total Pan-Malayan population during 1947-52, for 26-27 percent of all Malayan incomes and gross product, and for 63-65 percent of all foreign trade. This predominant position was even more marked during the prewar period.

Section III. Traditional Sectors

45. Raw materials exploitation. Malaya's economic growth has been closely related to the successive waves of raw materials production and of exports markets far from the peninsula. In this sense, it is likely to seem strange that such important sectors as the rubber and tin industry should be treated as if these were traditional and slowchanging sectors; in fact, technological and capital changes have been extremely important to these sectors, and they have had to respond quickly to drastic shifts in their foreign markets. Nevertheless, these raw material exploitative sectors which are tied closely to the rural scenery of Malaya do qualify as traditional sectors by several important measures. Firstly, rubber and tin production by individuals or family units have been important occupations for a long time, since

at least 1900. Secondly, these industries have been closely associated with specific social communities, so they may well be labeled traditional occupations for the particular racial group. Thirdly, these industries have been given close Government attention for many years, even in the Malayan setting which was avowedly laissez-faire. And further, there has been a slow-changing aspect to all these subsectors, from the point of view of its importance in the overall economy. The simplest explanation for treating rice, rubber, and tin as traditional sectors lies in the fact that these are all "resource-farming" activities, which were undertaken by individuals, as well as by large plantation type organizations.

46. Land use. The conventional picture of the Malay Peninsula is of a central spine of mountains, paralleled on east and west by dense jungle forests and large swamps. But this picture needs further detail: fully 50 percent of the land area is too mountainous for cultivation, and the east coast is too low-lying for much cultivation. The relatively narrow strip of the western coast has been the center of Malayan activity which from earliest times was concentrated along the many river valleys and close to the sea.

a. Land has always been in surplus supply, while the manpower required to clear and use it has been short. The rapid growth of the jungle has meant that steady effort was necessary to maintain cleared land or to avoid the rapid growth of choking sawah grass; similarly, the rugged terrain, even close to the sea, meant that transportation represented a constant difficulty and effort, limiting the growth of larger economic units and of local markets.

b. Of the total Malayan area, about 14 percent of 3.4 million acres was planted to rubber in 1940, while only 785,000 acres were used for rice production.[17] But almost all this potential for agricultural growth remained unknown for much of Malayan history; up to about 1850 Malaya remained an unpopulated country with little prospect of agricultural development.

c. The earliest efforts to establish a sugar industry in Malaya which would match the booming industry of the Netherlands East Indies were made at this time, and for a number of decades this plantation industry expanded. However, in the 1890's a major sugar slump led to Malayan production being almost completely curtailed; similarly, a number of coffee plantations which had been established by Ceylonese planters also suffered a grave slump at this time.[18]

d. Both these early industries established the possibility of plantation-type farming in Malaya, but both suffered in competition with Java's low-cost plantation agriculture because of the lack of labor and the geographical subdivisions of the peninsula. From these early experiments, it became a firmly held conviction that the native Malays

provided an unreliable source for modern agricultural production. since they valued leisure so highly that they would not work too cheaply on plantations. The inflow of Chinese and Indian labor started by the 1880's and continued to be very large up to 1931.

47. Rice and Malay society. The original Malay settlements of the 19th century were small and oriented to the peninsula's many rivers and the sea. The Malay of the Malay Peninsula is distinctive in many ways. Rice culture reflects many aspects of this distinctive nature, as well as the common elements of language, religion, and culture which the Malays share with other communities of the Indonesian islands.

a. Rice production was a well-developed technique very early in Malay history, as may be noted from the animistic conviction that padi rice for seed must be cut from the stalk in a special manner, so that the "senamgat" (soul) of the rice will not lose its strength from fright.[19] Irrigated rice lands (sawah tanah) were developed by family effort as well as community effort and, thus, became family property of the clan, which descended through the female side and was administered by the oldest woman of the family according to custom (adat).[20] On the other hand, other land that was cleared by make labor and used for other crops than rice remained in their individual possession as long as it was used, and this land could be separately inherited. According to custom, land which was left unused for a number of years became a free good, available to anyone wishing to make the effort to reclaim it. Such customs and the rather ambiguous legal situations which must have resulted undoubtedly reflect the speed with which uncultivated land reverted to jungle-like conditions in the Malayan climate.

b. In many parts of Malaya, patterns of rice production exist which clearly reflect the early position of immigrant Chinese in the traditional society. Chinese traders early developed into local shopkeepers as well, and the "padi kuncha" system suggests that this relationship was an early exchange pattern as well. Under this system, goods and seed are advanced to the rice-grower at the beginning of planting and as they are needed prior to harvest. When the regular main season rice harvest was gathered, in the first quarter of each year, these debts fell due and were paid in kind. This pattern inevitable led to considerable peasant overcharging and indebtedness and to the eventual loss of even the best ricelands to local landlords. While few good studies exist of the historical evolution of Malayan rice, there is considerable data to suggest that tenancy became a progressively more serious problem, and that the three major rice-producing states of Kedah, Kelantan, and Perak had considerable increases in the proportion of sharecropping tenants after 1932. An official survey of 1960 found that 93 percent of all tenant farmers in Malaya were in the rice-producing sector. It appears that it was common for a large proportion of the leased riceland to change hands almost every year,

as tenants were replaced or moved elsewhere. New tenants of the post-war period were required to pay "kamoney," to be approved by the landloard,[21] and sharecroppers gave up fully 33-66 percent of their crop as rents.

c. The major rice-producing States of Malaya are in the northern tier and have many similarities to the Thai rice areas. Kedah State alone provided over one-third of all Malayan rice production in 1931, and with Kelantan and Perak supplied 62 percent of Malay production. However, internal production was never sufficient for domestic needs, and fully 60 percent of Malay's total rice consumption was imported during the 1930's and the postwar period. In 1937, the cost of these imports amounted to some M$24 million for some 573,000 tons; in 1949, imports of 507,000 tons cost some M$205 million.[22] A major reason for this heavy importation, of course, has been the physical transportation difficulties imposed by the distance between the northern rice-producers, and their major market areas in the larger southern cities. Since Singapore alone represented 16 percent of Malay's population, and ocean transport of rice surpluses from both Burma and Thailand was conveniently easy, there have been good economic reasons for Malay's dependence on foreign rice.

d. Governmental intervention in the rice industry has been important ever since 1932, when the Drainage and Irrigation Department was established as a consequence of recommendations by the 1931 Tempany Report of the Rice Cultivation Committee. This was the first major official attention to agriculture since the 1900-1905 Krian Irrigation Project in Perak which covered 60,000 acres. A minimum price level for rice was established, although this was set so low as to be largely ineffective. Despite official action, the increase in rice acreage remained relatively modest up to 1941. It appears clear that the official policy to reserve land ownership rights to the administration of the Malay States and preserve the "Malay Reservations" was in direct conflict with the proclaimed policy to attain domestic self-sufficiency in rice. Lim cites one example from 1930 of some Penang Chinese who were prevented from forming a mechanized padi estate in Kedah and, therefore, established an estate in Thailand.[23]

e. After 1945, there were again efforts to reestablish the rice padi sector, and rice rationing arrangements were set up throughout Malaya which continued until 1951. Rice output recovered slowly to the prewar level by 1948, and expanded further in 1950-51 because of increased planted acreage and better average yields.[24] There seems to have been little relationship between the relative prices for rice and for rubber during this period. They are grown in different districts, and it appears that official efforts to extend Malaya's official irrigation areas did not result in an equivalent addition to the total planted acreage. While rice was produced in all of the Malay States, the amounts remained insignificant in the south after 1945, and, according to most estimates, not more than one-third of all output was ever marketed.

f. By 1948, the Malay farmer's condition remained little altered from that of the 1930's; most villagers of the northern tier depended on rice and subsistence production, while Malays of the southern states depended on fishing or on smallholder rubber-tapping, cocoanuts and oil palm harvesting, or fruits raised on small plots of 3-6 acres. Malay diets in rural areas were better than their urban levels, however, and although Malays seem to have been internally mobile, they showed little interest in moving to Malayan cities during the period. A survey of peasant family incomes in Tenggaun in the mid-1950's showed that padi provided less than 10 percent of a monthly income of M$88.20.[25]

48. Rubber sectors and the Indian community. The rubber production sector has been analyzed in more detail for Malaya than any other part of the economy. It is divided very sharply into two distinctive subsectors: the large estate producers of high efficiency, led by European managed companies, and the rubber small-holder community of numerous "inefficient" part-time tappers on small plots of some 5-15 acres. It is well-known that the labor force on large estates is primarily Indian in origin, brought over as transient labor under 3-year contracts during much of the pre-1930 period; most analysts point out that the smallholder rubber producers are predominantly Malays who obtained a small but regular income from rather aimless tapping of overaged rubber trees which provided 25-50 percent lower yields per acre than the well-managed estates. While these generalizations are broadly correct, they need some important elaborations--in fact, there have always been a number of Chinese smallholders, Chinese contract labor was an essential part of the clearing and construction work of the estates, and Chinese middlemen provided the rubber collection points for most smallholder rubber output. It is not really accurate to describe Malay's rubber industry as one of the noncompeting economic sectors which paralleled the peninsula's plural social structure.

a. The rubber industry of Malay was founded from Brazilian trees, secretly transplanted in England, Ceylon, and Malaya in 1876-77. Despite Ridley's famous efforts to popularize rubber planting, the very first estates were not planted until 1897-1900, and by the later year only 5,000 acres were in rubber. The following decade, however, saw an extraordinary boom in rubber planting, as the world price climbed steadily, as consumption levels for the growing US auto market increased, and as the Brazilian Government attempted to force the price of wild rubber upward.[26] By 1905, some 150,000 acres were planted, and in 1910 over one million acres existed in Malaya, Ceylon, and the Netherlands East Indies (NEI). By 1914, Malayan rubber production exceeded the world's wild rubber supply, including Brazil who had provided 40 percent of the 1910 production. In 1920, Malaya produced 51 percent of the world's rubber, while the NEI output was 22 percent, from plantations established on Sumatra in close imitation of the Malayan industry.

b. This very rapid expansion represented the first swing in the rather volatile history of the rubber industry in Malaya and led directly to the first of Malaya's efforts to regulate and restrict rubber production. During 1922-28, the Stevenson Restriction Scheme plan for self-imposed quotas on Large British producers was in effect, but this effort foundered on the unexpected boom in US auto and tire demand and the Dutch refusal to restrict Sumatran smallholders from plantings and tapping. Within Malaya, however, the restrictions operated to hold back the growth of individual smallholder production, due to irregular bans on land alienation in the Malay Reservations and to the enforcement of quotas on existing smallholders. When the Stevenson plan ended, the Malay exports were almost identical to those of the NEI, at 38 percent of world demand. The US depression began almost immediately thereafter, and again the world's demand and rubber prices fell off sharply. By 1932, rubber employment in Malaya and Sumatra was only half of 1929 levels. Again the major rubber-producing nations negotiated an output restriction plan, the International Rubber Regulation Agreement, which went into effect in June 1934. This time NEI production was included, and Malaya received only a quota of only 45 percent of world output based on 1929-32 production and planting history. This agreement, extended to 1943, did not eliminate sharp swings in rubber production. In 1938, Malaya's quota went to 45 percent of approved basic output, but in 1939 the quota jumped to 90 percent. However, it did provide a means of sharply discriminating against nonestate rubber producers, both in Malaya and on Sumatra, since new plantings were completely banned and replantings with improved rubber stock was also controlled.[27]

c. In 1940, about 3.4 million acres of rubber was planted, and roughly 40 percent of this was tapped by smallholders; a ratio almost identical to that in 1922 when new plantings were first controlled.[28] The wartime occupation saw very little loss in trees and acreage, but a major disruption in the Indian labor force and in estates management. Of the 2,500 estates which exceeded 100 acres by definition, there were 900 European estates, mostly publicly held companies with an average 1,600 acres active in 1947, along with a slightly larger number of Chinese estates and some 393 Indian-owned estates of a size averaging 240,000 acres.[29] By 1952, the number of European estates had fallen to 735, largely through amalgamations, while both Chinese and Indian estate numbers increased. Estate productionrecovered more slowly than smallholder output in 1946 and slowed in 1951-57, but during 1947-52 both sectors produced rubber in quantities fully 20 percent higher than the 1940 peak historical output. While 1947 estate labor was only 60,000 persons lower than the 310,000 employed in 1940, the Indian labor share of this had fallen to 52.5 percent, while Malay employment doubled its share to 20 percent.

d. The smallholdings planted areas included all Malay States, but over 25 percent of these were in Johore, and a further 35 percent

in Selangor, Malacca, Negri Sembalan, and Pahang. Of a total of 393,000 smallholdings, only 6,800 exceeded 25 acres in size, but these medium holdings were almost one-sixth of the total area, and nearly 66 percent of the area of these was Chinese-owned in 1952.[30] For the smaller peasant-type rubber holdings with an average size of 3.8 acres, some 161,000 Malays owned 56 percent of the acreage, Chinese held 36 percent, and Indians owned 7 percent. The yields on these smallholdings, on overall, averaged about 300 pounds per acre, or only 63 percent of the 480 pounds per acre obtained by 1952 estate production. It has been generally agreed that smallholder plantings had been very minor since the 1922 restrictions, so that many of these trees were believed to have reached the maximum 30-35 years which represents their productive lifetime. As a result, a rubber replanting scheme to provide support to smallholders was introduced in 1953; these official arrangements, however, probably benefited more estate production than the smallholders.

e. It is especially noteworthy that the wartime creation of a US synthetic rubber industry during wartime has introduced a new cost element into the world market. Despite the postwar return to natural rubber, which has certain technical advantages, synthetic rubber supplied 25 percent of the total world consumption in 1950 and fully 43 percent of all US consumption.[31] This was true, although the United States bought large amounts of Malayan rubber for its strategic stockpile in 1950 and thus pushed the natural rubber price in New York up to US$0.41 and US$0.59, more than double the pre-Korean War levels. It appeared that synthetic rubber would provide dangerous competition to Malayan exports, however, in the absence of cold war conditions; and this led the Malayan Government to take more direct action to encourage high-yield rubber varieties to be planted by estates and smallholders.[32]

f. The importance of the Indian community in Malaya to the rubber industry is an important part of Malay's labor and union history as well. Indian labor was imported for work on the coffee estates of the 1880's and, in general, was transient and rural in its character. However, after 1908, a system of licensed Kangani (overseer) labor contractors was established, and the Indian Government made efforts to control the conditions of employment, still on the premise that Indians were transient laborers only. However, many Indians found the Malayan culture, with its strong Hindu influence, attractive enough to encourage them to settle permanently, in the countryside as well as in the major cities. During the 1930's, the original wave of Tamils was succeeded by a number of Indian immigrants from northern India, who tended to settle in the cities.

g. The ups and downs of employment on the rubber estates during the 1930's caused some extreme variations in Indian employment and much dissatisfaction within India itself. By 1931, there were 571,000 Indians resident in Malaya, and net immigration during the

following decade added about 45,000 more.[33] But during the Japanese occupation, Indians in the rubber industry were particularly hart hit; some 50,000 males were drafted as handlaborers on the proposed Burma-Siam railway, and few of these lived to return to Malaya. In the post-war years to 1952, some net migration of Indians returning to India occurred, but about 11 percent of both the rural and urban population continued to be Indians, and nearly 30 percent of this represented workers on rubber estates. A small group of Indians, generically known as chettiars established themselves quite early as rural crop financing brokers, and thus accumulated the ownership of farmland, in spite of the alienation restrictions imposed by official land policy. However, the Indian community was primarily noted for its place in rubber estates labor and for its urban role as part of a growing trade union and professional group.

49. Tin mining and the Chinese. Tin mining in Malaya is intimately associated with the Chinese community and with Chinese immigration, yet this industry was started many centuries ago by Malays, and its modern structure has been dramatically shaped by European companies. The industry remains a combination of very large-scale mechanized operations and a small-scale prospecting effort by individuals. In Malaya, rapid expansion of this industry occurred between 1880 and 1930, but later trends showed a much slower growth.

a. Up to 1848, the tin mining industry was almost entirely Malayan and centered on Taiping close to Penang. Tin was discovered in Larut district, Perak, and in Kinta in 1880. An inflow of Chinese laborers resulted, and disputes over tin claims in Larut resulted in violent fighting between rival Malay-Chinese factions in 1872-74, leading to British intervention and thus to the four Federated Malay States. By 1889, tin mine workers at each of Larut and Kinta districts numbered 45,000-47,000. By 1913, output was 27,000 tons; some 225,000 workers were employed in the industry for a peak level. The first laborsaving tin dredges were introduced from Australia in 1912, and by 1929 the industry had only 90,000 employed workers.[34]

b. Malayan tin provided more than half of world output up to 1900; from 1910 to 1920 this proportion fell slowly, as NEI and Bolivian output expanded. During all this time, export duties on tin provided a large part of official revenue for the FMS, and much governmental investment went into the road and rail system which facilitated tin and rubber exploitation. Hand methods of smelting tin at the mine were slowly replaced; the Straits Trading Company smelter of 1887 near Singapore and a Chinese smelter of 1897 at Penang were first. The latter was then purchased by British interests in 1911, and as the Eastern Smelting Company was brought under the Anglo-Oriental Mining Corporation, the holding company for the London Tin Corporation and the General Tin Investments.

c. By 1929, the two Malayan smelting companies were capable of handling not only Malayan output of some 70,000 tons but also the bulk of NEI tin ouptut, which absorbed 30 percent of total smelter capacity.[35] European minihg concerns by this time provided fully half of total production, compared to only 22 percent prior to the introduction of dredges. Extensive mechanization of the industry and centralization had reduced employment to just 100,000 by 1929. The International Tin Committee output restriction scheme, which started in 1931 in reaction to falling US depression demand and continued through 1941, meant even more trouble, since Malayan quotas were kept at 33 percent of world output. Only 50,000-65,000 workers were required by the industry during this decade.

d. The Japanese invasion, with a scorched earth policy followed by the retreating British, put over 80 percent of all dredges out of action and delayed the postwar recovery of the industry until 1950. Some M$70 million was provided to rebuild one smelter and to supply dredges, and by 1950 production had reached 70 percent of the high 1940 level. But the major problems came from US stockpile purchases and very high Korean War prices. In 1950-52, world prices were nearly double the 1948 average, and tin output was back to roughly 33 percent of a very slowly increasing world supply. Postwar tin restriction schemes have driven Malayan producers to eliminate hand-labor and cut costs wherever possible, as was done during the 1930's. The large numbers of Chinese laborers who were thus left without jobs or without outlets for their ore provided the large part of the discontended squatter population of 1948-50.

e. The Chinese tin miners who came to Malaya in large numbers from 1880 to 1920 were from farming districts in Kwangtung and Fukien provinces. They came as transient labor, primarily to find steady employment and to send regular remittances back to their families in China. The large numbers who flooded in were grossly exploited by the owners of the tin mines; this led often to attempts by the British officials to regulate mine labor conditions. Much mining work was of very low skill, and only the largest mines were prepared to set up barracks housing (often called kongsis) for workers. Reduced tin employment during the 1930's led to emigration; later the influx of Chinese women helped to correct the previous sex imbalance and establish more permanent Chinese populations in the tin districts.

f. In 1947, the Pan-Malayan census found only some 43,400 persons employed in the tin mining industry; there were 56 large dredges operating, or half of the prewar number, yet European firms were again producing their prewar share of 60 percent of total production. In the famous Kinta tin district of Perak State, for example, which had a population of 250,000 in 1931, the total population had grown very little, reaching 281,500 in 1947. Yet a comprehensive study by Ooi shows that 94,000 of the rural population represented squatters, while half the population lived in 14 towns. These Chinese families had

moved onto estate and mining lands during the wartime occupation to raise food because of mining cutbacks during the wartime occupation; in 1950 they were grouped and relocated into 30 New Villages, each approaching 400 houses in a tight cluster for self-defense. The two-fold result was to create a new compact form of village and create a uniquely high statistical level of urbanization.[36]

g. The Kinta district represented an unusually high concentration of Chinese and is far from typical of the nonmining districts of Malaya. Yet the readiness of Chinese tin miners to become small farmers in this overpopulated district suggests the extent to which Chinese energy and industriousness was applied to activities competitive with the Malayan community. It also suggests that the slow recovery of this tightly controlled extraction industry was felt especially sharply by this one community, which was still forbidden to purchase or farm land that remained unused, either as tin mining reserves, as forests, or as Malay Reservations.

Section IV. The Modernizing Sectors

50. Leading sectors. Under this heading, the leading sectors are considered which generated Malaya's rapid growth in the modern sense of an increasingly integrated, socially mobile economy. Of course, the entire tin-mining sector might be identified as a primary source of modernizing impulses, since its labor needs drew in the active Chinese population, and its earnings and its capital needs were the original impulses which started the peninsula upon its growth path. But tin has been treated already as a traditional sector, because its early expansion was not based on highly modernized methods, and because its primary force was spent prior to the First World War. Therefore, the sectors which continued to impel economic and social change during the 20th century are central here; these are the transport sectors, the commerce and manufacturing sectors, and the trade union movement. All of these owed much, of course, to the primary sectors of rubber and tin and were dependent on Government actions.

51. Rail and road transport. There can be little doubt that Malayan modernization owed a great deal to her well-developed railway system, largely completed by 1910, and to her road system which was considerable by the same date but saw its most important expansion by 1928. In fact, by 1904 the regular income of the Federated States Railway provided a significant annual profit which was automatically absorbed by the FMS Government budget until 1928. After 1914, the gross railway receipts exceeded FMS duties on tin; the healthy profits from railway operation provided the capital which modernized the expanded port facilities at Penang and Singapore.

a. The best concise history of the development of Malayan railroads, highways, and ports is provided by C. Y. Lim. The earliest railroads were built between the tin-mining districts and their river or seaport outlets between 1885 and 1899; however, the major burst of railway construction came between 1904 and 1909, when Singapore/Johore Bahru was linked with Malacca and Penang and when the new rubber estates spread their plantations southward into Johore State, following along the railway. The East Coast line, Gemas to Tumpat/Singghora, was built during 1924-31. Road construction expanded in step, with the important cross-peninsular road to Kuantan finished in 1911. By 1938, there were 1,068 miles of track and some 6,000 miles of roads in Malaya, with fully 75 percent of this in the four FMS states.[37]

b. Between 1903 and 1920, fully 30-35 percent of the FMS railways receipts represented surplus, or profits; losses came in 1931-33, as passenger and goods traffic fell, but profits reverted to 18 and 28 percent in 1939-40. The total prewar capital invested was estimated at M$228 million, and the railway ran one of Penang's three port authorities.

c. Wartime damages to the railway interrupted service on the East Coast line until 1951, but the main line was in operation in 1946 and near normal by 1948 with employment of 11,000. A major problem was renewal of rolling stock, for one-third the locomotives and half the cars were lost during wartime.[38] Roads were also badly neglected, and a number of bridges were still of temporary construction in 1950. The postwar period saw a rapid recovery of the highway vehicles fleet, which numbered 29,000 in 1940 and 33,000 in 1947, but gasoline was strictly rationed until April 1950, and the purchase of non-British vehicles was banned from 1941 to 1951. From 1948 to 1950, the number of operating buses remained unchanged from prewar; they carried some 120-125 million passengers yearly. Rail passengers recovered from 4.3 to 5.8 million, or about the 1933 level.[39]

d. The three major seaports of Malaya were developed extensively as early as 1900, although Singapore was then rapidly supplanting Penang in size of traffic and volume handled. Combined data for Malaya and Singapore is difficult to calculate, but Penang was supreme throughout the prewar period as an export port, while the major development of Dungan, the east coast port for iron ore export to Japan started only in the late 1930's. Wartime damage to the Singapore port was extensive, much of it due to the 1942 invasion and British denial operations, but by 1949 facilities and damage had been returned to nearly the prewar level of 3.7 million tons. Before 1941, some 20,000 laborers worked at the naval base alone; in 1947 the private harbors employment was about 11,000 or one-third of the Malayan total employment in shipping.[40] While tin and rubber provided the largest volume of exports, imports to Pan-Malaya were heavily biased toward petroleum and rice, in bulk terms. After 1950, port congestion was a problem, but postwar strikes were ended after early 1948.

52. Manufacturing and commerce. The earliest economic theories of growth held that rapid development was bound to occur wherever free exchange and commercial enterprise held sway. However, commercial risk-taking and enterprise in trading and retailing activities are not necessarily connected with the growth of productive capital or the investment flows into manufacturing which have sparked cumulative growth in most of the developed European countries. Malaya offers an example of this dichotomy between commerce and industry, just as the history of Singapore provides an example of the limited spread effects of a highly developed urban economy into the traditional economy of its hinterland. While the details of this very modern development problem cannot be worked out here, especially since theories are still poorly worked out, a broad sketch of Malaya's major modernizing features follows, with a short discussion of the politicoeconomic aspects of labor unions and their postwar role in the emergency.[41]

a. The commercial history of Malaya, and especially of Singapore, remains to be written. In particular, the role played by Chinese, both early immigrants who became "residents" and the later entrepreneurs, has not received sufficient attention; although this national group made up fully 66 percent of the population by 1947. Various studies have analyzed the Chinese role as middlemen for the tin and rubber trades, as urban and rural risk-takers, and as founders of the "native" or local banks which linked together the entrepot ports of Singapore and Penang with the Malayan countryside or hinterland. But the precise relationships between such Chinese and the European concerns which held the commanding heights of both the Singapore and Malayan economies have not been well explained.[42]

b. Manufacturing in Malaya may be dated from 1881, in the form of a single engineering firm which grew into United Engineers Ltd. But up to 1914, the only true industrial units were the three tin smelters at Singapore and Penang. Up to 1932, the United Engineers foundry and a Ford auto assembly plant were the largest factories, although a number of small Chinese food processing plants had been established. The 1938 Colonial Report cites about 20 factories in the FMS which employed some 5,100 persons, half of them Chinese; these were making matches, liquor, soda water, with one each; three pineapple canneries; a plywood plant and a cement plant.[43] But FMS Government offices employed 29,800 persons that year.

c. In 1947, some 75,000 persons in the Federation and 16,500 in Singapore were employed in secondary industry, but most of this number were in very small shops, with the family as the primary unit. By contrast, some 65,000 in the Federation and 52,000 in Singapore were workers in utilities and transport.[44] By 1950, a large cement plant was planned, since prewar firms had closed and shipbuilding and auto assembly plants had revived; but the footwear industry, employing 11,000, and two large breweries were Malaya's largest and centered in Singapore. Most widely dispersed among the States were factories

for pineapple canning, rice mills, beverage and icemaking plants, and shops for bicycle and auto repair.

d. The powerful attraction of Singapore for all forms of industry is understandable; physical security was highest there, and financial details and connections easy. But an important consideration was the availability of public services, such as water and power. The earliest power utilities were private firms for Penang and Singapore; with the spread of pumps and then dredges in tin-mining, many firms in Perak set up individual generating units, and by 1930 the Perak Power Company had built Chenderoh Dam to supply this industry.[45] By 1941, municipal power was being supplied to 114 towns in Malaya, and total generation was some 650 million kw-hr. Although the per capita consumption of electrical power was very hidh by Asian standards, this was primarily due to use in the two largest cities and the tin districts. Wartime damages cut out 60 percent of the power capacity, however, and so the 1950 level generated was still 16-18 percent below the 1940 level. A Central Electricity Board was finally created in 1949, and its findings showed that only 12 percent of the power went to lighting and 9 percent to commercial use; 75 percent of the 1950 power was used in tin mining and dredging, with other mines using 4 percent. The shortage of generating capacity was put at 120,000 kw, and Singapore was particularly undersupplied.[46]

53. Labor and trade unions. The broad lines of Malaya's economic growth since 1900 have been traced to the importance of imported labor and the inflows of foreign peoples, in response to conditions of labor scarcity and of high export earnings. In the plural and polyglot society that resulted, it was natural that clearly separated economic sectors developed which were also often communal and essentially noncompetitive with each other. These noncompetitive aspects have been stressed often; what therefore requires particular explanation is the relative cooperation in political matters between the heterogeneous parts of the Malaya labor movement. This analysis will also point up some reasons why a relatively small group of insurgent terrorists caused such major changes during the emergency period.

a. Up to 1929, the population of Malaya expanded primarily from the immigration of large numbers of able-bodied male workers. The result was an extremely unbalanced population, in terms of sex ratios and dependency rates. During the 1930's, this imbalance was moderated by a reduction in Indian labor inflows and by a sudden rise in Chinese women immigrants; natural growth became the primary factor. Wartime policies of the Japanese further helped to reduce the male labor force and provide opportunities for female laborers. Thus the 1947 census showed some 46 percent of the male population in the working age group, significantly lower than for 1931. The urbanized proportion of the population had risen to 35.1 percent, while the numbers of wage workers on rubber estates and in tin mining had continued to decline through the 1930's.[47] The 1947 labor force consisted of 1.46

million males and 440,000 females, with about 48 percent of each category representing actual employees.

b. Census data unfortunately does not provide unequivocal data on the occupational structure of the labor force; in fact, there is a distinct lack of useful information about the important industries of rubber and tin.[49] The 1931 census reported some 75,000 persons employed in tin mining and some 280,000 engaged in rubber cultivation, but Emerson pointed out that these figures required much reinterpretation.[50] Lim has collected statistics to show that, overall, rubber estates employed 350,000 in the 1937 peak year and only 290,000 in 1947.[51] Tin employment in 1947 was also down sharply and totalled only some 44,000; it rose only modestly in the following years of more normal output.[52]

c. Mahajani and Thompson provide a good survey of labor history and organization. There was prewar official supervision of labor conditions, but there was no machinery for labor arbitration, and strikes often occurred because of arbitrary wage cuts when the world price of rubber or tin fell. In both industries, wages were explicitly tied to prices, and no revision of this practice took place until 1955. Legislation passed in 1941 to cover strike arbitration or grievances was not put into effect until mid-1946. With the official proclamation of the emergency in 1948, all major union leaders were either jailed or escaped to the jungle; the entire labor union movement was altered by official action and came under the leadership of nonmilitants, primarily Indian, until after 1957.[53]

Section V. Government, Money and Foreign Payments

54. Spending categories and budgets. In the long term trends and nature of the public budgets of the various levels of government in Malaya, we can trace most directly the policies and influences which affected the Malayan economy, either in a contracyclical or in a disruptive way. It is in this point of study where the colonial role in economic life stands most ready for judgment, and where the external influences of world trade and comparative advantage are either recognized or ignored. Since official policy regarding the money supply and credit availabilities is often closely interwoven with fiscal policy, and both are affected by external pressures on the balance of trade and payments, these subjects are also examined here. The overall conclusion for the pre-1941 period is that all levels of the colonial Malaya Government followed an undirected pattern of government, which resulted in often contradictory policies, in the appearance of considerable governmental paternalism, but in predominantly laissez-faire policies, inconsistent with any active effort for development. During the postwar period, a similar inconsistent mixture of patterns emerged, with the police and military needs of the emergency rapidly assuming the highest priority by 1948.

a. The problem of making any realistic functional analysis of the prewar and preindependence Government budgets of Malaya is immense, and no systematic study of either the revenues system or expenditures patterns has been made.[54] The complications introduced by the three separate administrative groups of prewar, and by inter-budgetary transfers between the three major levels of the Federated States are very great and cannot be eliminated here. British Colonial Reports do not provide sufficient detail, so the statistics in Lim,[55] the United Kingdom Board of Trade,[56] and Li[57] are used here.

b. During the years prior to 1914, there was close relationship between the FMS revenues and total trade values, because export duties on tin shipments provided an overwhelming share of official receipts, ranging between 33 and 47 percent. A second major source was from the sale of opium tax-collection rights to opium farmers, but in 1909 this practice was replaced by making opium into a Government monopoly; for the unfederated states, opium provided a major revenue source, and tin was unimportant. In the Straits Settlements, an income tax was introduced in 1917 which provided 10 percent of all receipts, but this was ended in 1923, and no similar tax was imposed until 1941. The very large surpluses accumulated by the FMS provided ample funds to build the Malayan railway and link Johore Batu with Penang by 1910; the original Krian Irrigation Project in Perak was similarly funded from ordinary revenue and income.

c. The annual FMS budget revenue increased from M$54 million in 1920 to M$72 million in 1922. This revenue represented more than half the gross revenue for all Malaya political divisions and amounted to between 25 and 33 percent of the value of nearly exports. The significant year-to-year variations in revenues obscure an overall truth that this rich governmental structure steadily accumulated surpluses until 1931. While tin duties became steadily less important, they remained well above rubber export duties; revenues from lands, from the railroad, and from investments in London became steadily more important. In the boom year of 1937, when revenues totaled M$80 million and tin duties provided 25 percent of this, the FMS further owned a general surplus of M$85 million, an Opium Replacement Fund of M$30 million, and a Special Reserve Fund of M$15 million. Almost all of this represented sterling securities held in London. By comparison, the unfederated States had M$31.6 million in reserves in 1938; and the Straits received M$36.6 million regular income, with duties on tobacco, liquor, opium, textiles and petroleum making up much of their income. Emerson reported that Johore's budget surplus and opium reserve fund were similarly large in 1934.

d. How were these very large accounts spent? The FMS financed perhaps 75 percent of the M$228 million cost of the West and East Coast Railways from regular revenues, and financed most of the road network which was largely complete by 1928.[58] Beside these major capital investments, however, little investment with any long-term

multiplier effect took place during these years. Instead, the FMS administrative structure was built up to an amazing degree and in 1931 amounted to a total of 25,082 persons costing some M$25 million--or, over 88 percent. In 1932, official Retrenchment Commissions were appointed for the FMS, UMS, and Straits Governments; and the 1932 FMS report led to a rapid cut in personnel to 17,500, by 17 percent. Since these figures did not include the Malay state bureaucracy, the extent of overstaffing was clearly major.

e. The largest nonpersonnel spending category was that of public works, after the railroad budget was separated in 1928 from the FMS. Colonial reports show that much of the public works nonrecurrent costs went into the construction of public buildings or into minor irrigation projects during 1937-38. The recurrent public works expenses of 1937-38 included maintenance for some 15,200 buildings valued at M$88 million and some 48 town water supply systems worth M$18 million.[59] The Federation expenditures for health services during the 1930's consistently outpaced those for education, and both together represented only 10-11 percent of expenditures. A similar picture existed in the Straits Colonies in 1935, when education took M$2 million of the M$34 million budget costs, or 10 percent less than the expenses of public hospitals and dispensaries, while other health services added M$1 million. In contrast, Straits police services cost an average M$3 million during 1930-34 according to Emerson.[60]

f. One observer has found that the goals of government in Malaya prior to political independence can be best summed up as the simple goal of order.[61] For the years of 1950-53, this is demonstrated by the rising share in total State and Federation expenditures which was taken by military and police costs. In 1950, these costs took 22 percent of the total, and this share increased to a peak of 31.7 percent in 1953. In 1951, the Federation budget proposed M$158 million for expenditures on defense and the emergency, while Singapore's budget contained M$22.7 million for the police, prisons, and the volunteer defense forces.[62] The postwar financial grant aid provided by the UK through 1950 amounted to £22.3 million, of which almost all was spent on military or quasimilitary purposes, including an £8 million (M$68.8 million) grant for 1949-50 security measures. Unfortunately, there is no convenient parallel to the prewar expenditures for law and order. The Straits provided fully 20 percent of its annual budget prior to 1933 as a direct defense contribution to the United Kingdom, and some M$4 million yearly thereafter, out of a budget of about M$37 million.[63] At the same time, the Straits police force was costing more than M$3 million yearly.

g. For the postwar period of 1946 to 1950, official budget figures are also difficult to disentangle and to interpret. From Malaya's liberation until September 1945, there was no effective Government save that of the Malay authorities. The British Military Administration, which went out of existence in April 1946, is reported to have spent £7 million or M$60 million in governing, for these 7 months.[64]

Until 1950-51, budget expenditures show large miscellaneous accounts which prevent analysis.

h. The major postwar change was the cancellation of all income from opium traffic, which was made illegal. Fully 75 percent of the Federation's revenue in 1951 was from customs duties, primarily on duties on tobacco, liquors, and petroleum, in that order. In addition, about one-third of Singapore's revenues came from the personal and company income tax, while the FMS obtained only one-sixth from such taxes. The tax rates of 20 percent on company profits and a maximum range of 3-30 percent on personal incomes between M$5,000 and M$55,000 was instituted in 1947 for both governments under 1941 law and operated quite successfully, in view of the postwar stresses and problems.

i. On the side of development and social welfare expenditures, however, the postwar record is quite different: of the various funds in grants and loans promised by the United Kingdom for various purposes, only £410,000 had been received out of the £26 million offered by February 1951. The Malay Governments moved very slowly to take advantage of the 1948 Colonial Development and Welfare Act, under which £5 million was earmarked for the country. A Draft Development Plan was not prepared until August 1950, and this proposal included new electrical plant of M$200 million and economic development projects with a capital cost exceeding M$160 million.[65] At roughly the same time, a Singapore draft development plan was developed which called for some M$540 million in spending over 6 years. According to Ness, these plans were completely revised in 1951-52, and little more economic planning was done until the 1956-60 First Five Year Plan.[66] In its 1954-55 study of the economy, the World Bank determined that public capital formation amounted to M$92 million and M$91 million only in 1949-50, with Singapore accounting for M$21 million and M$32 million of this.[67]

55. Money, credit, and banking. The history of Malayan currency provides a unique view of the long-run process of financial colonialism and of international financial controls and the system upheld by the London money market and the pound sterling. Since Malaya exports have long been shipped primarily to the United States, she represented an important British dollar earner; since Singapore represented an important entrepot port for the entire Southeast Asia region, her meticulous observance of every principle of total free trade became a sacred duty and part of the British free enterprise myth. The Straits dollar thus became a symbol, linking London with the East and tying high finance closely to the everyday brokerage and shipping details of "trade."

a. From 1887 to 1900, the preferred currency throughout Malaya was the silver dollar ("Mex"), which suffered from the price swings of this metal and pleased only the moneychangers. In 1899, the Bank of England granted the right to a Singapore Board of Currency Commissioners to issue a Straits dollar, in amounts fully backed by sterling, and by 1906 it was determined that this dollar should be

permanently linked to the pound, at the rate of 2s. 4d or M$8.57 per pound. Until 1926, this system worked only moderately well; the Commissioners insisted on keeping a high level of currency backing, roughly 135 percent and being extremely liquid in silver holdings, which meant a steady exchange loss. But from that year onward, the sterling bills and securities held as backing provided a steady income, totalling M$49 million by 1932. The FMS and UMS had long since become fully accustomed to using the Straits dollar, and the Blackett Report of 1934 recommended that they share in the profits as well; by 1935, the new system formally established the Malayan dollar along the standard lines of a British colonial Currency Board, but splitting profits in a ratio of 3:3:2 between the three Governments and leaving the Commissioners in Singapore rather than London.

b. The quantity of the currency rose steadily with Malays's trade and internal growth: a total note issue of M$43 million in 1913 grew to M$85 million in 1921 and 1930, and to M$105 million in 1929 and 1938. While the total issue swung sharply from year to year with Malaya's export earnings, backing was firmly maintained at 100-110 percent through the 1930's and through all problems of the British pound. During the Japanese occupation, Malayan dollars were hoarded throughout the peninsula, and after liberation these notes promptly reappeared. Postwar data shows that the note issue for 1946-48 held steady at about M$400 million, and expanded by 50 percent during 1950's rubber boom, following the devaluation of sterling.

c. Prewar figures on deposits held by the banking system are not available, but postwar statistics for 1949-51 suggest that total private deposits amounted to between 90 and 100 percent of the public holdings of currency notes. Thus the overall money supply was then 16-18 percent of gross output. The primary commercial banks throughout this long period were three large British banks and one Dutch bank, all branches of an overseas headquarters. Between 1903 and 1940, however, a series of local banks were established, all of which were Chinese-owned and which essentially represented the interests each of one of the Chinese dialect groupings. After 1945, the commercial banking field rapidly returned to normal, and by 1950 there were 13 overseas banks and 21 Singapore banks represented. Data shows that these all followed a highly conservative policy during 1949-50, with cash representing 10-11 percent of assets and loans and advances only 27-28 percent.

d. The important feature of this sterling-linked currency pattern has been noted frequently; under pre-1940 practice, it removed all real power to control the quantity of currency from local political authorities and served to centralize the colonial community's financial savings in London. Prewar Malaya was a perfect example of both the benefits and the rigid limitations of this system, since the Malayan dollar was normally backed by sterling assets and metals that exceeded the note issue, these British assets earned her significant interest,

and this sterling exchange system linked the Malayan economy perfectly with the economic booms and falls of the international market for raw materials and thus accentuated her economic instability and vulnerability.

e. The prewar currency system worked to help drain off and sterilize Malayan export earnings during profitable export years, to the extent that governments and individuals built up their surpluses and savings. If these savings in London had been drawn on during export depression years, the swings in internal incomes would have been smoothed out; but, in fact, exactly the opposite occurred. During the booms, Malayan governments expanded far beyond any real needs, and during depression years, they sharply retrenched official spending at the very time when rubber estates and mining companies were cutting back in employment. Thus, the currency system and the overseas branch banking structure combined to increase the vulnerability and instability of the Malayan economy and to make most of her labor force keenly aware of international events and outside market forces.

56. Foreign payments and investments. It is nearly impossible to make a realistic and meaningful analysis of prewar trends in Malaya's balance of payments, because statistics of annual capital movements are lacking. A study of the trade statistics which are available in great detail shows that Malaya's merchandise balance was highly favorable for almost every year of the 20th century, in boom export years as well as depressions. Further, Malaya's exports to the United States have long linked her closely to this very large economy: in 1929 the United States bought 60 percent of Malaya's rubber and 50 percent of her tin, and by 1939 these shares were 58 and 66 percent.[68] From these exports, the Straits and the FMS Governments derived their major revenues and their budget surplus funds. Likewise, the rubber estates and mining companies earned the profits which they remitted to company headquarters and reinvested in Malayan operations.

a. According to one often-quoted source, the total of Western investments in Malaya amounted to US$194 million in 1914, with about US$150 million representing "direct" business investments in the country. This direct investment had risen to US$447 million by 1930 and amounted to US$372 million in 1937, with two-thirds of this representing rubber plantations and about 70 percent of total investment being by British investors.[69] It appears that total Chinese-owned investments in Malaya may have had a value of some US$200 million in 1937. Using a rather broad interpretation of foreign investments in Malaya, Mackenzie determined that foreign companies engaged in rubber and tin-mining had capital of M$749 million and M$165 million respectively in 1949, while the total of 527 companies incorporated in the Federation had capital of M$284 million.[70]

b. However, these figures give very little insight into the capital flows into and from Malaya; more illuminating are the 1947-49 estimates for the balance of payments, which show remittances falling from M$70 million to M$40 million, profits and dividends rising from 20 to 50 million, and total invisible income payments running between 25 and 12 percent of payments for imports.[71] In 1950, an official guess of interest and profits paid abroad amounted to M$120 million, which implies foreign ownership of assets worth somewhere between M$600 million and M$1 billion.

c. A primary outflow from Malaya has always been the remittances sent back to mainland China by transient Chinese workers and by residents; the progressive decline of these remittances during 1947-49 reflected the Communist victory in China and the uncertain financial situation that resulted. There is, therefore, no way to estimate the size of these prewar remittances or of the money flows into India due to Indian immigrant labor. These difficulties reflect the fact that free capital movements represented an economic article of faith during the prewar period, and that, while the actual capital investment by British and foreign interests in Malaya may not have been very large in a net total, they did provide two factors which Malaya has always needed--namely, an adequate amount of seed capital together with critical technical and managerial skills. In 1955, an expert analysis of Malaya's economy suggested that the second of these has always been the critical shortage of the economy.[72]

57. Conclusions. Roff's excellent history of Malaya suggests that the 1934-41 period saw the formation of a new Malay awareness and nationalistic organizing push, which created three different new Malay social elite groups. These were the Arabic-educated religious reformers, the Malay-educated radicals of the Sultan Idris Teachers College, and the English-trained civil servants of the traditional Malay sultanates.[73] It is notable that none of these groups emphasized economic change for the rural countryside, but were concerned primarily with Malay opportunities in the cities; in March 1946 the UMNO under Onn Jaafar helped to bridge over these groups. The social history of the Chinese resident in Malaya has not been covered in equal depth, but valuable hints are provided by Purcell.[74]

a. The main Chinese social divisions, running along "tribal" ethnic lines, were blurred in the communally financed Chinese school system, by instruction in the national Chinese language, but tended to keep Chinese from active participation in politics, except for those in the labor union movement. A single Chinese organization was not formed until late 1948, February 1949, when the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was formed under Sir Cheng-lock Tan, with the specific purpose of conducting a lottery with proceeds to be used to resettle and rehabilitate rural Chinese squatters. Mahajani states that the MCA goal was to block an official proposal that some 500,000 Chinese should be deported; the lottery income soon reached M$2 million every 6 weeks, and by 1952 the MCA acted against UMNO-Alliance sentiments

by financing the visit of Victor Purcell, a former "Chinese Protector," to Malaya.[75]

b. Many surveys of the postwar period skip lightly over the unpleasant subjects of "wartime collaboration" and of postwar antipathy between the Malay and Chinese communities; this is easily understood, since the minority Chinese group were traditionally nonpolitical by preference and anxious to get recognition as full citizens of Malaya. But, it must be stressed that wartime resistance groups included mostly anti-Japanese Chinese agitators, that most Malays adopted a passive collaborationist policy during the occupation, and that the 6,800 MPAJA members recognized after the war's end included Chinese agitators who resented controls by the Malay-dominated police. In Singapore, Chinese made up a large share of the trade union membership, which agitated almost continuously during 1946-47. In rural districts, Sino-Malay hostility was particularly evidenced by several riots, the most serious being at Bahut Batu Pahat, Johore in October 1945 which required Onn bin Jaafar himself to intervene.[76]

c. British efforts to control postwar labor unions struck at both Indian and Chinese urban labor; but Indian members had other communal organizations to rely on, such as the MIC and the MIA; by 1948, the extremist labor leaders were all Chinese and were in jungle hiding. It seems clear from Pye's interviews with 60 Chinese defectors from the MCP that most guerrilla recruits were younger persons, with poor economic or educational prospects for the future, and motivated by personal drives for power and advancement.

d. It has been stressed above that the Malayan economy up to 1942 consisted of three separate economies: the subsistence village sector, the extractive and export economy of tin-mining and rubber-tapping, and the commercial-trading economy. It is overly simple to divide Malaya's three major communities along these same lines, but it is worthwhile to note that both the Malay and the Indian societies participated only in two of the three economies to any notable extent, while the Chinese played a role important to all three. This description was even accentuated by the formation of wholly Chinese New Villages, under emergency conditions after 1950.

e. The instability and simultaneous continuity of the various Malayan economic sectors has also been stressed. By 1920 and 1922, Malaya's largest producers had begun attempts to restrict tin and rubber supplies, under the Bandung agreement and the Stevenson Plan; restriction schemes were renewed in the 1930's with similar bad effects both on individual miners and tappers and on Malaya's overall share of the world market. These attempts introduced much rigidity into the export economy, but they failed to eliminate sharp price swings and did not make mining or estate employment more stable. It was easy to conclude that output and internal prices were being manipulated by distant foreign interests for their own narrow profit.

f. The more active modernizing sectors were those connected with entrepot commerce and urban small scale manufacturing. Also important in changing social attitudes were the growing governmental bureaucracy and the very large transportation agencies, including the railroads, the port agencies, and the urban streetcar systems. All of these employed large numbers of workers, paid little attention to labor welfare, and incorporated the stratified society which colonial administrators believed to be rooted in the culture and personality of the different communities. It was these major utilities which provided the bulk of the militant postwar labor movement and offered the major target for strikes and irresponsible agitation.

g. The Government's role before the war had been a minor one, ineffectively paternal. The postwar period saw futile efforts to enforce basic rationing, direct intervention in purchasing of tin and rubber by the British Ministry of Supply and the American stockpile authorities, and the slow return of prewar European companies and managers to their previous position as an economic elite. No clear policies emerged, as local "unofficials" and the Malay rulers battled the new British bureaucracy and the Colonial Office in London; various Government agencies pulled in different directions; and funds for development were lacking. Until the 1949 devaluation, the British pound was overpriced relative to the major postwar producer, the United States; while the tight British control of sterling meant that budget surpluses were channeled quickly back to investments in London, and Malaya's dollar earnings were released very slowly for Malayan imports. Thus the 1950 export boom created large internal holdings of currency and significant Government surpluses; but these internal incomes were not offset by increased imported goods, and inflation was the result. The Malay laborer's living index rose from 100 in 1949 to 136 by March 1951.[77]

h. In summary, Malaya provides an excellent example of the peculiar way in which colonial Governments have muddled through, applying economic and financial policies which were outdated at the time they were conceived and responding sluggishly to economic swings and shifts. Such an approach was peculiarly vulnerable in the immediate postwar period, when rapid rehabilitation and social welfare action were most needed. In 1954-55, Prof. Silcock singled out two overwhelming shortages in post Malaya: the acute shortage of trained Malay administrators, and the shortage of educational expenditures by the Colonial Government. By these two criteria, he implied, the colonial tradition in Malaya must be found wanting.[78]

CHAPTER 4

SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Section I. Demography, Education, and Ethnic Groups

by Donald S. Bloch

58. Introduction. This chapter will identify some of the social factors that provided a background for the conflict that developed in Malaya in 1948. The major protagonists in this struggle were the Malays and the Chinese, thus the conditions under which these two groups lived and their interrelationships, or lack of them, will be emphasized. The Indian community will be treated briefly, and the English will be treated in passing. English influence in Malaya was not negligible but was primarily political and is treated more extensively in the political section.

59. General population characteristics. The population characteristics of the peninsula of Malaya and of Singapore were primarily the results of immigration and economic development. Prior to and during the period considered in this study, population growth was greatly influenced by immigration. A flood of Chinese and Indian immigrants produced a plural society wherein three ethnic groups, Chinese, Indians, and Malays, made up 98 percent of the population as of 1947. Development of commerce, tin mines, and rubber plantations on the western coastal area of the Peninsula engendered population concentrations in the area of active economic development and stimulated the growth of urban centers. Continued development of commercial activity on the Island of Singapore drew great numbers of immigrants who concentrated in the city of Singapore, producing a city of over 700,000 by 1947.

60. Population growth. The population of the Malayan peninsula increased by 169 percent between 1921 and 1947, and the population of Singapore increased by 224 percent. As table III indicates, from 1931 to 1947 the population of Singapore increased at a much greater rate than the Peninsula. The difference is probably due to the restrictive immigration policies of the peninsula that were implemented in response to the worldwide depression of the 1930's, but which evidently did not apply to Singapore. In 1933, male Chinese immigration was restricted to a yearly quota, and in 1938 immigration of Chinese females was restricted. Further, surplus Indian laborers were sent back to India in the 1930's, and the Indian Government imposed a ban on the emigration of unskilled laborers in 1938.[1] The Japanese occupation also had an effect on the Indian and Chinese population. In 1943, the Japanese compelled 73,502 laborers from the Malay peninsula to work on the "death railway" in Thailand and almost 21,000 of the 85 percent who were Indian were reported to have

TABLE III. POPULATION OF MALAYA AND PERCENTAGE INCREASE, CENSUS YEARS 1921-47

	Population			Percentage increase	
	1921	1931	1947	1921-31	1931-47
Malay Peninsula	2,906,691	3,787,758	4,908,086	30.3	29.6
Singapore	420,004	559,946	940,824	33.3	68.0
Total	3,326,695	4,347,704	5,848,910	30.6	34.5

Source: Norton S. Ginsburg and Chester F. Roberts (eds.), Area Handbook on Malaya, 1955, p 99.

died during its construction.[2] The Chinese were also victims of Japanese brutality, but there are no good estimates of the number killed during the occupation.

a. The statistics presented in table III perhaps require some clarification, because the time periods are not equal. During the 10-year period 1921-31, the average annual population increase on the Peninsula was about 88,000, and only about 70,000 per year during the 16-year period 1931-47. In Singapore, however, the average annual increase was about 14,000 from 1921 to 1931 and almost 24,000 from 1931 to 1947.

b. The rapid increase in population evidently did not put undue pressure on the arable land. T. E. Smith, discussing the 1947 population, stated, "Although Malaya is a small country, it does not as yet suffer the same population pressure as Java, China, India, and the Philippines."[3]

61. Population composition and distribution. Since 1921, Malays, Chinese, and Indians combined represented over 98 percent of the population of the Peninsula and more than 95 percent of the population of Singapore (table IV). The Chinese and Indian populations were transitory, for the most part, up to 1931, in that Chinese and Indian males migrated to Malaya to work and save and return to their homeland. The Indian immigrant usually went back to India after 7 or 8 years, whereas the Chinese immigrant generally stayed longer.[4]

a. During the years, and especially since 1933, Chinese males sent for their families and settled in Malaya. The census of 1947 showed that almost two-thirds of the Chinese population were Malaya-born. The intergovernmental relations which controlled immigration

TABLE IV. POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN MALAYA, CENSUS YEARS 1921-47

	1921		1931		1947	
Malayan Peninsula	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%
Malays	1,568,588	54.0	1,863,872	49.2	2,427,834	49.5
Chinese	855,863	29.4	1,284,888	33.9	1,884,534	38.4
Indians	439,172	15.1	570,987	15.1	530,638	10.8
Other*	43,068	1.5	68,011	1.8	65,080	1.3
Singapore						
Malays	54,426	13.0	66,172	11.8	115,735	12.3
Chinese	316,877	75.4	419,564	74.9	730,133	77.6
Indians	32,342	7.7	50,860	9.1	68,978	7.3
Other*	16,359	3.9	23,350	4.2	25,978	2.8

*Primarily Europeans and Eurasians.

Source: Norton Ginsburg and Chester F. Roberts, Area Handbook on Malaya, p 105.

and treatment of Indians acted to encourage transiency, thus a much smaller percentage of Indians settled in Malaya than did Chinese.[5]

b. Malaya's population was concentrated in a rather narrow band along the west coast of the Peninsula and on the Island of Singapore. In 1947, about 72 percent of the population inhabited that area, and an additional 7 percent occupied a fairly densely populated area in the northeast, stretching from the Thai border to the city of Kuala Trengganu.[6] The urban population was also concentrated in cities and towns along the west coast of the Peninsula and in Singapore. Some 90 percent of the urban population lived in this area (table V), and the area included 21 of the 23 cities with a population of more than 10,000 in 1947.[7]

c. The population of Malaya was more highly urban than its neighboring Southeast Asian countries. There has been a steady increase in the proportion of urban residents in both the peninsula and total population of Malaya. The decreased proportion of urban residents shown for Singapore reflects a suburban development which was not recorded as urban but would be considered urban under criteria used in the United States, where metropolitan areas which include the population of suburbs of large cities are recorded as urban. Suburbs also developed around the larger cities of the peninsula, thus the 1947 figure, if not the 1931 percentage, tends to underestimate the urban population.

TABLE V. PERCENTAGE URBAN OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF MALAYA, CENSUS YEARS 1921-47

	1921	1931	1947
Malay Peninsula	19.1	21.1	26.5
Singapore	83.4	79.6	80.0
Total Malaya	27.7	29.5	35.1

Source: Norton Ginsburg and Chester F. Roberts, Area Handbook on Malaya, p 106.

TABLE VI. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE URBAN POPULATION OF MALAYA BY ETHNIC GROUP FOR 1931 AND 1947

	1931	1947		
	Total Malaya	Total Malaya	Peninsula	Singapore
Malay	15.9	17.4	21.1	11.3
Chinese	65.4	68.3	62.4	78.5
Indian	14.8	11.4	13.8	7.2
Other	3.9	2.9	2.7	3.0

Sources: T. E. Smith, Population Growth in Malaya, p 6. Norton Ginsburg and Chester F. Roberts, Area Handbook on Malaya, p 106.

d. In general, the Chinese were the dominant urban ethnic group. They comprise over 50 percent of the urban inhabitants in nine of the 12 Malayan States, including Singapore. The States of Kelantan, Trengganu, and Perlis, where the Chinese are less than half of the urban population, have the highest proportion of Malay inhabitants and low ratios of urban residents. Roberts points out that over 50 percent of the Chinese urban population, about 30 percent of all Chinese in Malaya, resided in the three cities with more than 100,000 population in 1947 (table VII), and 72 percent of the Chinese urban residents lived in the 10 cities with populations greater than 30,000. In 1947, about 54 percent of all Chinese residents in Malaya were recorded as urban, and because of the growth of suburbs, this probably understates the proportion.[8]

TABLE VII. DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE MAJOR CITIES OF MALAYA FOR 1947, AND PERCENT INCREASE 1931-47

	Population 1947	% increase 1931-47	Malay	Chinese	Indian
Singapore	679,659	52.5	11.3	78.5	7.2
Pevang (Georgetown)	189,068	26.5	10.3	73.0	13.9
Kuala Lumpur	175,961	57.9	11.0	66.4	18.0
Ipoh	80,894	52.1	7.5	70.0	18.2
Malacca	54,507	43.3	12.6	74.5	7.7
Taiping	41,361	37.5	13.6	61.8	24.0
Johore Bahru	38,826	80.9	36.4	41.0	12.9
Seremban	35,274	64.4	8.6	65.0	17.6
Klang	33,506	60.2	15.2	60.5	18.0
Alor Star	32,424	74.6	36.6	47.8	13.9
Bandar Maharani	32,228	58.5	29.3	58.5	6.5
Kuala Trengganu	27,004	93.3	81.6	15.6	2.0
Bandar Penggaram	26,506	98.8	20.4	66.5	5.9
Telak Anson	23,055	57.1	19.6	60.5	16.8
Kota Bharu	22,765	53.4	63.6	30.3	4.3
Butterworth	21,255	57.0	30.3	46.0	21.2

Source: Norton Ginsburg and Chester F. Roberts, Area Handbook on Malaya, p 108.

e. On the other hand, only 14 percent of the Malaysians were urban dwellers in 1947. They were dominant in two cities of over 20,000 on the east coast, Kuala Trengganu and Kota Bharu, where the effects of colonialism and immigration were felt least. In general, Malays comprised a larger proportion of the population of towns having less than 10,000 inhabitants than they did in the larger towns and cities.[9]

f. Of the total Indian population in Malaya, 39 percent was urban in 1947. They tended to live in the larger cities and towns. Almost 80 percent of the urban Indians were found in urban places of more than 10,000 inhabitants. For the most part, the rural Indians lived and worked on the rubber estates in the western part of the Peninsula. Between the inhabitants of urban centers along the west coast of the Peninsula and the estate workers, 95 percent of the Indian population in the Peninsula in 1947 was concentrated along the west coast.[10]

g. The rural Chinese were also concentrated along the west coast of the Peninsula, most living near the tin mines and on the rubber estates where they worked. The rural Malays, however, were more evenly distributed throughout the rural areas of the Peninsula in both agricultural and fishing communities.[11]

62. Conclusion. In general, during the period under study, the population distribution of the three ethnic groups tended to keep them isolated from one another. Further, the transient character of the Indian and, to a lesser extent as time went on, of the Chinese communities justified a limited interest in the welfare of Malaya as a national entity.

Section II. Education

by Donald S. Bloch

63. School systems. There were, in effect, four separate school systems in Malaya in terms of language of instruction: English, Malay, Chinese, and Tamil (Indian). Each of the vernacular school systems catered to members of one ethnic group, whereas the English schools were open to all. The structure of this "multisystem" consisted of English and vernacular primary schools which were prerequisite for the English and Chinese secondary schools, from which qualified graduates could attend Raffles College or the King Edward VII College of Medicine. All schools in which 10 or more students obtained regular instruction, which were not primarily religious, and which passed certain sanitary and educational standards were registered with the Director of Education. The registered schools were either Government-operated and maintained, private but aided by capitation grants, or private and unaided by Government funds.[12] For the most part, the Malay Koranic schools were not registered and were unaided.

64. Malay education. Prior to 1867, when the Colonial Office became responsible for the administration of the Straits Settlements, education for Malays was obtained in Koran schools which provided a narrow religious education. After that time, the colonial Government built and staffed secular vernacular primary schools for Malays first in the Straits Settlements and then in the Federated and Unfederated States.[13]

a. Although free education was provided and several States had instituted compulsory education for boys by 1908, the Malays at first resisted secular education. In 1872 there were 818 pupils enrolled in Malay schools, by 1900 there were 13,898 enrolled, and by 1920 some 46,000 pupils (mostly boys), representing about 12 percent of the Malay population between the ages of 5 and 15, were attending 757 Malay schools.[14] Roff contends that the rising enrollment reflected a growing enthusiasm on the part of Malays for secular education.[15] This was probably strengthened by policy reforms after 1900; i.e., to provide "a sound primary education closely linked to the environment of the pupils and to provide a firm foundation for advanced education in English,"[16] rather than to produce better or more intelligent farmers and fishermen,[17] as well as conditions during the Japanese occupation which awakened the Malay to the fact that his inferior position vis-a-vis the Chinese and Indians was due in large part to his lack of education. Thus enrollment in the Malay schools continued to rise to 122,000 by 1941, and, although education was disrupted by WWII, school enrollments rose to 170,000 in 1947.[18] This latter figure represents 19 percent of the 900,000 Malays between the ages of 5 and 19 and probably about 25 percent of the population between 5 and 15.[19]

b. Under the colonial administration, the Department of Education encouraged the education of Malay girls. Opposition to this policy was quite active, since the parents' preference to keep the girls at home to help in household tasks was reinforced by the Muslim tradition of seclusion of women, and by 1900 only 250 girls were attending Malay girls schools. After the First World War, several events contributed to reducing traditional resistance to female education: the curriculum was revised to include training in domestic subjects, the establishment of a teacher training college for Malay women raised the status of the girls' schools, and the enthusiasm of the Chinese community for education of females following the Chinese revolution. By 1937, there were almost 13,000 Malay girls attending school, and after WWII the demand was so great that barriers to coeducation broke down[20] and in 1947 almost 48,000 of the 170,700 school attendees were girls.[21]

c. The rise in school attendance during this period tends to obscure the limited success of the Malay primary schools. For the most part, the schools were one-room structures with inadequate furniture and equipment, into which were crowded several classes that received instruction simultaneously, and many schools had texts for only 25 percent of the students.[22] At most, 4 years of education was provided for those who did not leave after 1 or 2 years. The pupils gained a rudimentary literacy in Malay and some knowledge of arithmetic.[23] Standards were low not only because of overcrowding and lack of texts, but also because there were insufficient teachers, few of whom were trained. Very few pupils continued their education

in the free English schools, primarily because they were not prepared, but also because many parents would not permit their children to move from their village to the town or city. For the large majority of pupils, Malay primary education was a dead end.

d. Teacher training for the Malay schools got off to a slow start. In 1898, a school was established in Perak, supported by the States of Perak and Selangor, which had the capacity for 10 students, drawn from those who had completed 4 years in the Malay schools, and provided a 2-year course. In 1900, the colonial Government established a college at Malacca to serve all of Malaya, and the school in Perak was closed. The college at Malacca accommodated 60 students for a 2-year course. It graduated 30 students each year to supply trained teachers for the 227 existing schools plus about 15 new schools which opened each year. In 1922, the Sultan Idris Training College (SITC) was established in Perak and the college of Malacca was closed. The SITC started with 200 students and later expanded to 400. The students, mostly sons of peasants and fishermen, who were drawn from the Malay primary schools by competitive examination, received the only secondary education available in Malaya. As a residential school based on the pattern of English public schools, the organization of study and living arrangements produced an esprit de corps and a unifying experience for students drawn from all quarters of Malaya.[24] This, along with access to higher education, the broadening of horizons which permitted "a subordination of state to ethnic loyalties" and a common view of the position of Malays in Malaya, and an environment of political change and political discussion extant in the 1920's produced a student body and faculty concerned about Malay social and political problems. The succession of graduates provided a nucleus of a small nationalist intellectual group according to Roff.[25]

e. In 1905 a Malay school was established in Kuala Kangsar, Perak, to train Malays of "good families" for civil service positions. In 1909, it was dignified by the name Kuala Kangsar Malay College, although it provided an English education through the VII Standard (seventh grade) or junior secondary level. When it first opened, 79 students enrolled, some of whom were commoners, but the school soon became the sole province of the sons of Malay royalty and nobility. By 1913, enrollments had increased to 138 and remained at that level until the 1930's, when enrollment again rose. Many pupils entered the College from the vernacular schools and had no knowledge of English. The average age of those who completed the Seventh Standard Certificate was 16 or 17. The 20-30 a year who left school at that time found positions in the lower ranks of Government service as clerks, surveyors assistants, or translators. Others stayed for additional education. A few took specialized courses, such as typing, surveying, and drafting, and were able to get better positions, but most took a 3-year course which emphasized Government activities and became part of an elite group who were appointed to the Malay Administrative Service.[26]

65. Chinese education. Chinese immigrants to Malaya traditionally established and supported their own schools. Until the early part of the 20th century, they provided a classical Chinese education in dialect of the supporting community. Any man who could read and write the dialect fluently was considered a qualified teacher, and he usually combined teaching with fortunetelling, geomancy, and letterwriting.[27]

a. The educational reforms instituted in China after the revolution of 1911 influenced Chinese education in Malaya. In most schools, the curriculum was refined to include some instruction in Western science, and the national language, kuo yu, became the medium of instruction. Teachers and textbooks were imported from China, and both expressed not only strong Chinese nationalist views, but also views that were anti-British. When the colonial Government became aware that the Chinese schools were being used as vehicles for subversive propaganda, legislation was promulgated for the registration and control of schools and teachers under a Chinese Department of Education and for a system of grants-in-aid to Chinese schools. By 1922, the Government was supervising most of the schools and teachers, and the system of grants-in-aid was operative. Later, the Government prohibited the importation of texts with subversive content, and the Chinese publishers produced new texts which were free of subversive material but which had no Malayan content.[28]

b. In 1938, there were 91,534 Chinese pupils attending 1,015 schools in which Chinese was the medium of instruction. Of these, 158 were unregistered, nonsupervised small private schools of the old style providing traditional classical Chinese education at a primary level.[29] Of the other 857 schools, 518 were registered and supervised, and 299 of that number were receiving Government grants-in-aid. There was a Chinese high school in Singapore, and 19 other schools extended their instruction into the secondary level. There were also six girls schools that provided postprimary normal school education.[30]

c. Although the Chinese in Malaya had a great respect for education and tried to provide a good education for their children, the quality of the Chinese educational system left much to be desired. Poor pay and 1-year contracts did not attract teachers of high quality, classes were overcrowded, and discipline was poor. Most of the registered schools taught some English, but poor instruction and insufficient hours did not give the pupil a knowledge of the language. Proportionately, very few pupils continued their education beyond the primary grades.[31]

66. Indian education. Indian vernacular education developed on the rubber estates, when Indian laborers were imported to work on the estates. The Labour Code, passed in 1912, provided that owners of rubber estates establish schools with trained teachers for the children of the Indian laborers, and provided for small grants-in-aid. Later

the Government established some Indian vernacular schools in urban areas for the children of Government employees, and some private schools were developed by local residents and by missions.[32]

a. These schools provided not more than a primary education, using Tamil as the language of instruction. The quality of education was poor. The estate owners and managers were not interested in educating their laborer's children but in complying with the law. Facilities were poor, classes were overcrowded, and teachers were poorly paid and few were trained. The educational quality was also affected by lack of support by the Indian community. Many parents preferred that their children work rather than go to school, and, because they stayed in Malaya for a relatively brief period, their transiency inhibited support.[33] From 1930 on, except for the WWII years, there was some improvement in Indian vernacular education, since an Inspector of Tamil Schools was added to the Department of Education and the Government increased its grants-in-aid.[34]

b. By 1931, there were only about 10,000 pupils attending Indian vernacular schools, and there were 415 teachers, of whom only 64 were trained. By 1938, there were 26,299 pupils attending 601 schools, and by 1941 there were 27,539 pupils attending 628 schools. There were also 235 trained teachers in the system by 1941.[35]

67. English education. The earliest schools providing instruction in the English language in Malaya were established primarily by missionary societies, but a few were founded by local residents. Later the colonial Government established primary and secondary English schools to educate the children of the European and Eurasian communities and to produce youth qualified to serve in clerical positions in Government and European firms, and English schools are open to children of all ethnic communities in Malaya. A system of grants-in-aid was promulgated for the private schools.

a. Detailed statistics on number and enrollment in English primary and secondary schools were not available. The Annual Reports for the Straits Settlements and the Federation of Malaya indicate that in 1938 there were 106 Government or aided primary and secondary schools and 74 private unaided schools with a total enrollment of 53,786. A bit less than 20 percent of that number were from English-speaking homes, the rest were children of Malay, Chinese, or Indian parents, and about 25 percent of the total were enrolled in secondary schools.[36] By 1946, total enrollment had reached some 78,000.[37]

b. Malay, Chinese, and Indian children could enter English schools at the first primary grade or after they had completed 3 or 4 years of vernacular education. Since English was not taught in the Malay and Indian vernacular school, and the quality of English language instruction in the Chinese schools was poor, there were

comparatively few who transferred. Malay children were under further handicaps, because the English schools were located in urban areas. Many of their parents either did not want qualified pupils to live in the towns and cities or could not afford the travel expense even when the child would be on scholarship. A further inhibition for Malays was that since many of the schools were run by missionaries, the parents suspected that they would be subject to proselytizing and did not want to run that risk.[38] In 1938, 3,511 Malay pupils were enrolled in English schools. By 1947, that number had increased to 9,609, and there were 30,107 Chinese and 14,080 Indian pupils enrolled.[39]

c. Rounding out the system of English education were the Malay college at Kuala Kangsar,* the King Edward VII College of Medicine, Raffles College, and vocational education. King Edward VII College of Medicine gave degrees in medicine and dentistry, and a diploma in pharmacy. Raffles College gave diplomas for completion of a 3-year course in art or science and also provided a fourth year postgraduate course in education.[40] Enrollment in these institutions was limited first by the number qualified to enter and later by the facilities. In 1929, only 66 pupils were qualified to enter the King Edward VII College of Medicine, and by 1941 there were 300 qualified applicants for 60 vacancies. Raffles College opened in 1929 with 82 students and by 1941 had an enrollment of over 300, with many qualified applicants turned away for lack of facilities.[41]

d. Vocational education in Malaya consisted of four trade schools providing 3-year courses in carpentry, bricklaying, plumbing, electrical installation, motor engineering, and the like; the Technical College, which developed from a training school for employees of the Public Works Department; and a College of Agriculture, which started as a school to train Department of Agriculture employees. The impact of these schools has been rather small. As of 1948, there were 280 pupils enrolled in the four trade schools, and it is estimated that many fewer were attending the technical colleges.[42]

68. Literacy. A comparison of literacy rates over time usually indicates interest in formal schooling and any change in the quality of the educational system. From 1931 through 1947, literacy increased among the Malays, Chinese, and Indians in their own languages, and, although statistics are lacking, since all ethnic groups became more interested in an English education after WWII, there was undoubtedly a general increase in literacy in the English language. Table VIII

*This school has been discussed above in the section on Malay education.

presents a picture of generally increased interest in education, and it also indicates the result of better educational facilities. During

TABLE VIII. LITERACY BY ETHNIC GROUP AND SEX, 1931 AND 1947
(in percent)

	1931		1947	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Malays	26.3	4.4	38.7	12.0
Chinese	42.1	9.9	49.2	18.8
Indians	35.9	8.6	52.9	20.0
Total	35.6	7.6	45.7	16.4

Source: Norton Ginsburg and Chester F. Roberts, Jr. (ed), Malaya, 1958, p 142.

this period, the colonial Government had increased the percent of the budget spent on vernacular education. The statistics on the increase in female literacy also show that modern educational trends were influencing these ethnic groups. Although English was taught in many Chinese schools, and English schools were open to all ethnic groups, by 1947 only 4.4 percent of the total population of Malaya (including Europeans and Eurasians) were literate in English.[43]

69. Conclusions. The four educational systems in Malaya were characterized by language diversity and marked differences in goals. The aim of Malay vernacular education at first was to provide more intelligent farmers and fishermen,[44] and later the goals were broadened to provide a base for transfer to the English school system. However, the Malay educational system was not adequate to fully meet the latter goal. The Chinese educational system tended to perpetuate Chinese culture and language including, after 1911, strong feelings of Chinese nationalism. The primary goal of Indian education was literacy in Tamil. And the English system was developed to provide educated recruits for the Government and European firms, as well as to provide the educational means for those who wished to continue their studies in institutions of higher learning.

a. Separate school systems and perpetuation of language and cultural differences tended to keep the major proportion of each ethnic group socially isolated from members of other ethnic groups. Although the following observation cannot be blamed entirely on the

school systems, their structure did little to mediate these conditions: the more educated Malay did not want to work for Chinese or Indians, and there were very few Malays in business;[45] on the other hand, Winstedt observes that Chinese and Indians not only would not admit Malays into their firms but also had preceded Malays into European firms and kept alive the fiction that the Malay is lazy.[46] The comparatively few members of the ethnic groups who had social and intellectual contact in the English school system evidently did not provide a significant force toward mediation of ethnic suspicions.

b. For the Malay community, the bright student who gained an English education and a broader, more modern outlook than the members of his village did not provide a bridge to modernization. Such students took positions in Government which gave them a life quite apart from the village and village life of their countrymen.

c. The educational policies in Malaya did not produce a large unemployed, uneducated elite who became alienated from the Government to form a nationalist cadre, as was the experience in other underdeveloped nations.[47] The great majority of those who received an English education found positions within the Government. On the other hand, as has been stated above, the conditions surrounding the education of Malay teachers at the Sultan Idris Teachers College did provide a nucleus of a nationalist intelligentsia.

Section III. Ethnic Groups

by Donald S. Bloch

70. The Malays. There were a small number of aboriginal tribesmen in Malaya, about 3,000 dwarf Negritos called Semang, and about 24,000 Sakai who were comparatively tall and fair. The civilized Malay migrated to the Malay peninsula from Yunan between 2500 and 1500 B.C., and there was a more or less steady stream of immigrants of Malay stock into the peninsula from Sumatra, the Celebes, Java, and other Indonesian Islands as far back as medieval times. The modern Malay is the result of intermarriage with Chinese, Hindu and Muslim Indians, and Arabs.[48]

a. The Malays of Malaya, whether they migrated directly to the Peninsula or indirectly from the Indonesian islands, all had a common anthropological background, a common religious experience, a common language, and a common history of foreign domination by the Dutch or the English. They were in effect homogeneous.[49]

b. The large majority of Malays lived in rural areas and made their living as farmers or fishermen. About 74 percent of the Malay population were farmers and almost 6 percent were fishermen in 1947. More than one-half of the Malay farmers cultivate rice as a main crop.

However, fishermen and those with small rubber holdings also cultivate rice for their own use. Only 2 percent were in Government jobs, including the military, and less than 2 percent were professionals.[50]

c. Since only a little more than 3 percent of the Malay population is involved in commercial activities[51] and mostly in the cities and towns, Malay farmers and fishermen rely primarily on Chinese merchants to market their surplus and extend any credit they may need to tide them over between seasons, for the purchase or repair of equipment, or for weddings and other ceremonies. The interest rates on these loans were high, sometimes amounting to one-third to one-half of the crop or catch, so that many were in constant debt.[52] An additional factor that mitigated against easy payment of a loan was that the crop or catch of the borrower had to be sold to the lender, most always at a price which disadvantaged the borrower.

d. The rural Malays lived in kampongs or villages. Typically the houses in a kampong were strung out along the sides of a road, path, canal, river, or beach. Each house was usually surrounded by a garden and trees which provided a variety of foodstuff. In some fishing villages where the land was limited, houses were close together and sometimes one behind another. The house was built on stilts with a wood floor and walls and a roof of thatch woven from palm leaves. Putting the house on stilts protected the home from floods and also provided for better ventilation and protection against some wild animals and snakes.[53]

e. Although the houses were set apart from one another, they were not surrounded by the land that produces the major crop for the farmer as are farmhouses in the United States. In some cases, a rice farmer had to travel 2 miles to his holdings. This occurred not only because of the layout of the kampong relative to the farm land, but also because the inheritance laws, based on the tenets of Islam, require precise proportional distribution of all property to the beneficiaries, resulted in extreme fragmentation of land holdings. Such continued subdivision contributed to increased indebtedness on uneconomical holdings and produced a group of landless renters and tenant farmers.[54]

f. The Malayan kampong had been relatively untouched by the advent of British rule or by Chinese and Indian immigration, thus, its traditional structure and functions have generally persisted through 1947. For the rural Malay, the kampong was an important and meaningful social unit. There were strong ties among its members by virtue of a common history, culture, religion, and customs. Usually the kampong was small enough so that all its members knew each other, and, in fact, many were related to one another. The residents were brought together time and again for communal work, such as building and improving roads, canals, dams, and schools, as well as to observe religious holidays in the village mosque and in

their homes and for ceremonies attendant upon births, deaths, marriage, and circumcision. The kampong supported the local religious teacher and was an administrative unit linked to the Government through the kampong headman. Personal and family relationships were reinforced through common and communal activities, and strong ingroup feelings developed based on mutual dependence and cooperation as well as common experiences. Under these conditions, it was understandable that only a few Malays willingly left this atmosphere of security and protection for the unknown, dangerous urban life.

g. Early Malay cities were centers of political and commercial control. They were the seat of the Raja and his court and comprised not only the royal retinue but also those who provided services to the court. The ruler also controlled trade, since it was his royal prerogative to collect import and export duties, monopolize shipbuilding and piracy, and the like, and these activities attracted foreign commercial and financial interests. Traditionally, the city was inhabited by a small fraction of the population of a State, and the urban Malay confined his activities to Government and religion. During the period of this study, urban Malays continued to be a small fraction of the Malay population and were primarily associated with Government and religion, although a few, perhaps 10 percent, were in commerce, industry, and the professions. However, their status had changed radically, since the English were the real administrators of Malaya and control of commerce and finance were primarily in British and Chinese hands.[55]

h. The center of a typical city in Malaya consists of a rectilinear pattern of streets lined with shops above which were dwellings. Just outside the central core were Government buildings, churches, and schools, and just beyond these structures were found the timber and thatch or timber and sheetmetal dwellings of the Chinese, Indian, and Malay. Europeans and wealthier members of the three ethnic groups lived toward the outer fringes of the city, and here too were some of the newer Government buildings. Industry was usually located adjacent to the railroad or near the harbor, which were part of or near the core of most cities.

i. Population densities of Malayan cities were very high. According to the 1947 census, Singapore had an average density of 21,800 people per square mile, in the center of the city; however, the densities ranged from 130,000 to 200,000 persons per square mile. The central core of Kuala Lumpur and Georgetown had densities of more than 100,000 persons per square mile. Other large cities were somewhat less congested but had core densities of more than 20,000.[56] Within the cities, in the center as well as in the outer fringes, the various ethnic groups tended to concentrate in rather homogeneous sections.

j. Virtually all of the Malays considered themselves to be Sunni Muslims of the Shafi'i school. However, within the framework of Islam were found remnants of Hinduism and the older animism. Animism contributed a belief in spirits associated with both the animate and inanimate world as well as a belief in "semangat," the vital force which was present in all parts of one's body and in inanimate objects. It was abundant in hard objects (such as nuts, stones, and teeth) ard also in hair, finger- and toenails, and saliva. The practices of sacrifice, magic, and sorcery, used to placate the spirits and control semangat, continued through the period of this study. Sacrifices and magical rituals were used by farmers and fishermen to insure good harvests. Sorcery was practiced in connection with the hair clippings, nail parings, and even sand from a footprint to control its owner's semangat thus gain the owner's love or endanger his life. It was customary for parents to invite one to spit on a baby to give it strength. These practices were invoked within the framework of Islam as the following passage indicates:

> One way for a lover to abduct the soul of a girl, which for him must be personal or else valueless, is to boil or steam any possession of hers or sand from her footprint, reciting at the same time an incantation taught him by his later faiths, Hindu and Muslim. And religious teachers are invited by parents to spit into a child's mouth or upon his head in order to transfer to him intelligence and ability to learn and recite the Koran.[57]

k. Hinduism, mixed with some Buddhism, was replaced by Islam by the end of the 16th century, but some practices and rituals survive in modified form. The Malay shaman and medicine man learned and incorporated Hindu magic and spiritualism into the older system, and much magic, spirit worship, and sacrifice continued as cults within the framework of Islam. The Hindu god Siva was invoked by Malay magicians, through 1947, to restrain evil spirits. The marriage ceremony, current during the time covered in this study, wherein the bride and groom are dressed and treated as royalty, and the enthronement ceremony of Malay Kings derive from the Hindu. At least 12 rituals starting with the ritual of marriage consummation, through naming the child, handing him over to his religious teacher, and at completion of his religious studies are Hindu survivals. "Much of such adaptations of the old faith to the new must have been due . . . to early Muslim missionaries from India, who brought with them a syncretism of Hindu and Muslim beliefs and practices."[58]

l. As a Sunnite Muslim, it was very important that the Malay prepare his body for the judgment day and protect his body and soul from evil spirits. He did this through Islamic prayers and practices as interpreted by al-Shafi'i. The Five Pillars stated in the Koran are most important. They are the profession of faith, the ritual prayers and purification, almsgiving, the fast of Ramadan,

and the pilgrimage to Mecca. However, Malay practices were not traditional as regards the Five Pillars, as well as other injunctions, as the following examples indicate. Profession of faith is an acceptance of monotheism and of Allah as the one god, but Malays continued to believe in other divinities and spirits. Ritual prayer should be conducted five times each day with special obligations for men on Friday noon and on holidays, however, Malays tended to ignore all but the sunset prayer and placed great emphasis on the Friday prayer in the mosque to the extent that fishermen would not stay at sea for more than a week in order to be present in the mosque for the Friday prayer. Almsgiving was institutionalized through the levy of a yearly religious tax. The fast during the month of Ramadan was observed, but it was combined with an evening ritual of feasting; and although, as interpreted by al-Shafi'i, a substitute was acceptable for the pilgrimage if one could not afford it, the Malay considered it binding.

m. Other injunctions were also ignored or modified. The Malay did accumulate and wear gold and jewels, took some interest from impersonal organizations, and gambled where this was forbidden by the Koran. The Islamic code of law tended to subordinate women in the family and for inheritance purposes. On the other hand, Malay customary law (adat) tended to place women on an equal footing with men. At the local level, a Moslem judge (kadi) administered Islamic law, which was liberally mixed with and many times superseded by Adat.

n. Thus the Malay Muslim of the period under study had a very mixed religious heritage. His Hindu background, reinforced by Sufi mysticism, supported his worship of ancestors and saints; he wore amulets to ward off evil spirits and practiced animal sacrifice, astrology, shamarism, and divination all under the general framework of Islam. Stimulated by religious reform in Egypt in the late 19th century and by the melange of practices that were identified as Islamic by the Malay, a religious reform movement developed in Malaya in the beginning of the 20th century. Known as Kuam Muda (young faction), the reformists claimed that Malay backwardness and domination by others was indicative of the general decline of Islamic people, and that the cause was that, in ignorance, Muslims had ceased "to follow the commands of God as expressed through the mouth and life of His Prophet Muhammad."[59] This was quite evident in Malaya, and what was required was not just a return to the pure religion but also "an attempt to re-think Islam in terms of the demands made by the contemporary situation, to participate, as it were, in induced social change, the dynamic of which would be provided by a reformed Islamic ideology."[60] Their ideas of purification of Islam as practiced by Malays and its use as an instrument of change, albeit for the greater glory of Malays in Malaya, was in sharp contrast to the ideas of religious conservatism and the traditional elite who formed an alliance of opposition known as the Kaum Tua or old faction. The new ideas penetrated the Islamic religious community of Malaya, but the Kaum Muda were seen as no more than a

prenationalist influence by Roff, since they were not able to develop a program nor organization which attracted mass support.[61]

71. The Chinese. The Chinese community in Malaya has come, for the most part, from the southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi and Hainan Island. They represented nine major language groupings. However, the five largest groups comprised almost 93 percent of the total in 1947 (table IX). About three quarters of the Chinese community lived in Singapore. Although there had been contact between China and the Malay Peninsula from the early 15th century, there were comparatively few Chinese in Malaya until Singapore was established in 1819. Chinese immigration then increased, especially to Singapore, to

TABLE IX. CHINESE LANGUAGE GROUPS IN MALAYA, 1931 AND 1947

	1931	1947
Hokkien	538,852	827,411
Cantonese	417,516	641,945
Hakka	317,506	437,407
Tiechiu	208,681	364,232
Hainanese	97,568	157,649
Kwongsai	46,095	71,850
Hokchiu	31,908	48,094
Hokchia	15,301	12,754
Henghwa	) 31,026	17,065
Others	)	36,260
Total	1,704,452	2,614,667

Source: Norton S. Ginsburg and Chester F. Roberts (eds.), Area Handbook on Malaya, 1955, p 509.

take advantage of the opportunities offered for entrepot trade, however, the largest influx of Chinese came during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, after the major tin lodes had been discovered.

a. Until the early 1930's, Chinese immigrants were primarily males who expected to accumulate wealth and return to China or send for their wives. By 1931, less than one-third of the Chinese community had been born in Malaya, indicating a transient population. With the onset of the worldwide depression, many returned to China and the colonial Government restricted immigration of males but not females. Families were reunited or new families formed, and, by 1947, more than 60 percent of the Chinese community had been born in Malaya.[62]

b. Although the majority of the Chinese were initially concentrated in tin mining and the cultivation of export crops, by 1947, they were represented in just about every economic endeavor in Malaya and were concentrated in the various service industries. A large majority of the non-British commercial enterprises were owned and operated by Chinese, they dominated the service industries both in the urban and rural areas, they owned and operated tin mines as well as provided most of the labor, and they owned many small and medium rubber estates by 1947. They dominated the pineapple industry and vegetable production. Very few were found in subsistence agriculture, until the Japanese invasion sent some 500,000 inland to avoid the invaders.

c. As might be expected because of their concentration in service and commercial activities, the Chinese tended to be urban dwellers. Almost 54 percent of the Chinese in Malaya lived in cities and towns in 1947. Only 12 percent were classified as agricultural, the other nonurban proportion of the Chinese population was associated with tin mines, rubber, and pineapple estates, or were the middlemen and merchants in rural areas.[63]

d. The Chinese community was organized into many benevolent mutual aid associations. Initially, these associations, brought from China, were based on membership in a particular clan, district or village of origin, or dialect. These "kongsi," as they were known, functioned "to assist needy members, carry out various religious rites, and help in settling disputes among their members or between their members and others."[64] They also provided for education of the young and for employment. Within the kongsi, no distinction was made on the basis of wealth or occupation. Later other associations arose, based on interest (social, cultural, or sports) and on occupation, which tended to cut across clan, sectional, and dialect groups. The more recent associations may have been stimulated in part by a weakening of kongsi ties brought about by increased urbanization, the use of a single language (kuo yu) as the medium of instruction in most Chinese schools, and by wartime dislocations. However, the Chinese community of Malaya in the 1940's was characterized by a complex organization of overlapping associations and multiple loyalties which tended, especially in the cities, to unify a rather diverse group.

e. As might be expected because of the associational ties, Chinese employers not only hired only Chinese but also tended to hire members of their own kongsi. This was true of urban employers and mine and estate owners and managers. Among European-owned firms, the Chinese portion of the labor force tended to be homogeneous by dialect group if not by kongsi. Thus the differences in dialect, clan and section of origin, which were strongly interrelated, tended initially to distribute the Chinese population of Malaya into homogeneous enclaves in both urban and rural areas. By 1947, this tendency was somewhat diminished.

f. Mining and estate settlements were entities isolated in large part from the surrounding agricultural area. Mining settlements were a collection of crude huts that could be abandoned when the mine played out and operations moved. These single-room huts were dispersed within the area, so that the laborers could cultivate small portions of land. Some of the settlements developed into villages and towns. The estate settlements were more permanent and nucleated. The manager's home, the smokehouse, the processing plant, and the laborers homes were closely clustered at the end of a road or railway spur that connected with the main road.[65]

g. The three major religions of China, Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, were tolerant of each other and of other religions; had no dietary restrictions nor a caste system; and permitted one to conform to two or all three simultaneously. "Such tolerance is reflected in the capacity of an individual Chinese to profess belief in all of the above religions and to practice those rituals which he thinks will best serve him for particular purposes."[66] The Chinese Malayan was characterized by this same tolerance. Purcell has pointed out that the number of temples in Malaya and the purchases of religious materials, such as joss-sticks and holy papers, gave the appearance of devoted adherence to the religions. But it was a more casual adherence with ancestor worship as the common thread.[67] And it is interesting to note that, in the census of 1947, it was estimated that 98 percent of the Chinese professed adherence to the Chinese "national religion" which the editor of the census described as Confucianism or ancestor worship.[68]

h. Confucianism emphasized a code of ethics, as the basis of relationships between members of a family, and concerned itself generally with the organization of the State, society, and social relationships. However, it included a number of divinities. It was the basis of ancestor worship and the ceremonies surrounding death, mourning, and burial. Buddhism was characterized by a pantheon of gods through which, by proper worship, evil could be avoided and the desirable things of this life obtained. It espoused reincarnation, thus motivating adherents to live a good life so as to raise their status in a future existence. Buddhist monks and nuns tended the temples, took vows of celibacy and vegetarianism, and were the primary

practitioners. The Malayan Buddhist adhered to Mahayana Buddhism, his main divinity for worship was Kuan-yin, the goddess of mercy, but he also worshipped many others in the temples, shrines, and in his home. Taoism emphasizes superstition, and the Taoist practitioner wrote charms, exorcised evil spirits, and communicated with the dead through automatic writing. Taoism was also characterized by a pantheon of gods through which immortality could be obtained. It borrowed the Buddhist concept of priesthood and reincarnation, and espoused ethical concepts that complemented Confucianism and Buddhism.

i. Adherence to more than one of the three religions by the Chinese was, perhaps, influenced by the similarity of their ethical codes and because each included a number of divinities. The extent of multiple adherence and mixing is pointed up by a brief description of the Chinese concept of the spirit world in the Area Handbook for Malaysia and Singapore.

> The spirit world is divided into three parts: the upper heaven, the western heaven and the lower spirit world. The upper or supreme heaven is headed by the Jade Emperor from whom all final authority emanates. Under him are various ministers (such as the god of war and his sworn brother); the heads of the three religions (Confucious, Buddha and Lao-Tzu); and numerous others, including the gods of 10 directions, of celestial bodies, of the stars, . . . and of all natural objects on earth.[69] (Emphasis added.)

j. The Malay Chinese generally followed the religious traditions discussed above. They have, however, included local heros in their pantheon of divinities and have discontinued a number of festivals. Ancestors were still important and were believed to inhabit ancestral plaques, but the Malay Chinese were casual about the plaque. Some families did not make a plaque, and many who made them preserved names of only one or two generations. Many kept the ancestral plaque in the temple rather than at home because they should be in a permanent place where they can be cared for and the Malay home is not considered permanent, or because the plaque does not look well in a modern house with modern furniture. These explanations certainly appear to be rationalizations which indicate some breakdown in strict observance. Further, the Malay Chinese used one temple for both Buddhist and Taoist worship and paid respect to Mohammedan holy places. There was also a growing religious scepticism among the more educated Chinese.[70]

k. In general, although the Chinese religious tradition was tolerant of other religions, there was little conversion. As of 1947, there were only 31,000 Christians and 3,500 Muslims of Chinese parentage.[71] The Muslim Malays were also tolerant of other religions but had almost no conversions to other religions. Both groups also

tended to be endogamous, so that religious differences added to the social isolation of these ethnic groups but did not, in themselves, play an important part in developing tensions between them.

72. The Indians. Indians comprise the third largest ethnic group in Malaya and are the most transient. Indians have had contact with Malaya since the beginning of the Christian era, when the Indians sought trade and colonies. Contact through increased trade opportunities accelerated in the 15th century, and from then to the 19th, although there were not more than 20,000 Indians in Malaya at any one time, they exported Islam to the Malays. During and since the 19th century, the development and expansion of coffee, sugar, and rubber plantations produced a steady stream of Indian laborers who worked in Malaya an average of 3 years and then returned home. Since 1941, however, more Indians have taken up permanent residence in Malaya.[72]

a. Most of the immigrants came from the Tamil-speaking south Indian states. They made up about 90 percent of the total Indian population in Malaya in 1947, and 90 percent of the south Indians spoke Tamil. Most of the other immigrants were northern Indians from the Punjab region.[73]

b. Immigration of Indian laborers to Malaya has been regulated by the Indian and colonial Governments since the 19th century. Conditions were agreed upon, and changed from time to time, regarding method of recruitment of Indians, working conditions (including education of the children), and the number to be recruited. In 1938, the Indian Government closed off all emigration to Malaya. After World War II, the Indian Government controlled emigration to Malaya through passport regulation and by requiring the emigrant to show he could make a living in Malaya.

c. Not all Indians came to Malaya as contract laborers. Some who migrated without assistance became laborers but went into their own business or took positions with the Government. The Punjabis, for example, were primarily engaged in commercial and financial activities in urban areas, although some became estate watchmen and policemen. One study indicated that in 1939 about 4 percent of the employed Indian population of Malaya was engaged in trade, business, and the professions; about 10 percent was in skilled and semiskilled occupations, and the rest worked in unskilled and menial jobs.[74] By 1947, there was an upgrading in Indian employment, and not as high a proportion were in unskilled jobs; however, about 70 percent of the employed were in agriculture (primarily on the estates) and in personal services.

d. About 39 percent of the Indian community lived in urban areas in 1947. Although the urban Indian may not have been physically isolated from other groups, his social contacts and business associates were drawn almost exclusively from the Indian community. Most of the

Indians living in the rural areas of Malaya were on estates. Here he was isolated from the Malay and Chinese rural community. He was usually employed in an estate where most of the workers were of his caste and locale in India.

e. Most of the Indians in Malaya were Hindu. Each estate had a temple, and the Hindus worshipped Vishnu, Siva, and Kali primarily, but also other gods as appropriate. About 9 percent of the Indians were Muslim, and less than 3 percent were Sikhs. There did not appear to be tension between these and other religious groups in Malaya. Sikhism is a tolerant religion, some of the Muslims intermarried with the Malays, and the Hindu religion, based on deification of the site of family residence and on family welfare, was weakened by migration to Malaya.[75]

Section IV. Communications

by Donald S. Bloch

73. Introduction. Communication throughout the population of Malaya was inhibited by language barriers and a general literacy rate among the non-Europeans of less than 50 percent. Not only were there four major ethnic groups, but in two of these, the Chinese and Indian, differences in dialect made communication difficult between communities in the same ethnic group. This situation was being alleviated slowly among the Chinese, by use of a single language as the medium of instruction in the Chinese schools, and for the population as a whole because of a greater emphasis on instruction in English for Malays and Chinese.

74. The mass media. In 1947 there were 36 daily newspapers published in Malaya and 18 weeklies. The daily newspapers have a total circulation of 274,100 in a population of almost six million. There were 13 English dailies with a circulation of 110,500, 10 Chinese with a circulation of 115,300, four in Malay circulating 17,300 copies daily, seven in Tamil with a circulation of 25,400, and one in Malayalam and one in Punjabi with respective circulations of 5,000 and 500. There were also 18 weekly newspapers published in 1947 for which there are no circulation statistics; eight were published in English, five in Chinese, one in Malay, and one in Tamil. The Chinese papers were published in Kuo-yu and some of the major dialects, but no breakdown is available. It is evident that, except for the English community, newspapers reached a small proportion of the people.[76]

a. Radio broadcasts began in Malaya in 1922, when two amateur stations started operations. In 1936, the British Malayan Broadcasting Corporation started a regular schedule of broadcasts, and in 1940 the Malaya Broadcasting Company, organized by the colonial Government, started operations. The two broadcasting companies were

amalgamated into Radio Malaya shortly after World War II. There is little information concerning the extent, type, or linguistic mix of broadcasts prior to 1947, but we do know that war news and Government propaganda were broadcast until the occupation of Singapore and that educational broadcasts for schools started in 1941. As of 1939, there were about 10,000 radio receivers in Malaya, one-half of them in Singapore. English and Chinese owned all but a few hundred, and Malays owned but a handful.[77] It is most probable that broadcasts prior to the occupation were mostly in English, with some in the national Chinese language.

b. By 1947 there were 22,861 radio receivers in Malaya, with 11,043 in Singapore. This number included 182 receivers in the schools: 100 in English schools, 55 in Chinese schools, and 27 in Malay schools. A total of 290 hours of broadcast time was devoted to education, with 76 hours for the Malay schools and the rest split almost evenly between English and Chinese schools. The linguistic mix of general broadcasting time was 33.3 percent in English, 28.3 percent in Chinese (including Kuo-yu, Cantonese, Hakkienese, and Hakka), 20.0 percent in Tamil, and 18.3 percent in Malay.[78]

c. Although word-of-mouth communication through reading newspapers aloud and by talking with itinerant traders and with travelers may have expanded the number within linguistic groups receiving general views of the country and the world, the mass media did little to stimulate a feeling of unity among the ethnic groups.

Section V. Cultural Values

by Donald S. Bloch

75. Malay. The Malay identified with and gave his first loyalty to his family, then to his class, his village, and then to the Muslim community. The kampong Malay had an emotional attachment to the land or the sea and considered farming or fishing to be more prestigious and satisfying than trade or wage labor. Independence was also a strong value, so that the villager would rather own his own land or fishing equipment than be a renter or tenant, even though the monetary rewards might not be as great. For the urban Malay, nonmanual work had more prestige than manual work and, within this restriction, the higher the pay, the more the prestige.

a. In general, the Malay was not motivated to accumulate wealth. He valued pleasure and the enjoyment of life and thought of work as a means to that end. He valued current consumption and short-run satisfaction rather than sacrifice for long-term gains. However, he attempted to maintain an income or harvest sufficient to take care of his family throughout the year and to provide a small surplus for feasts and to obtain a few luxuries.

b. There were other factors which also acted to inhibit accumulation of wealth and economic competitiveness among the Malays. The pattern of mutual support and obligation and the Islamic virtue of charity provided a cushion against misfortune and lessened the importance of accumulating a surplus against potential economic problems. Further, the Islamic concept of fatalism made it impossible for the Malay Muslim to improve his position against the will of Allah. On the other hand, poverty as a result of laziness brought on strong negative sanctions. Such a man or family was not treated as a full member of the community.

c. The Malay, in common with many other orientals, valued surface placidity. It was important for him to hide any outward expressions of passion or anger, otherwise he would be shamed and lose face.

76. Chinese. The Chinese of Malaya identified with and gave their primary loyalty to their families, as was traditional in China, and then to the kongsi rather than to clan and village. In general, the traditions of filial obligation, respect of parental authority, commemoration of ancestors, and respect for age were continued in Malaya. The older Chinese tended to be strictly conformist, but conformity had weakened among the younger and among the better educated Chinese. As has been indicated, traditional care of the ancestral plaque had been weakened to the point where some families did not keep a plaque either at home or in the temple, and the young have not deferred to traditional authority. Purcell points out that marriage was being treated as the concern of the bridal couple rather than of the extended family.[79]

a. For the Chinese, wealth was a means of attaining status for the individual and for the family. This was attenuated among the Chinese in Malaya, where wealth as a status symbol superseded the more traditional symbol of education. Education, however, had a strong positive value for the Malayan Chinese and ranked only below wealth as a symbol of prestige.

b. The Chinese in Malaya also valued outward expressions of calm and dignity. Overt displays of anger or passion were considered uncouth and led to the loss of face. A Chinese was likely to tell his audience what he felt the audience wanted to hear in order to avoid argument and embarrassment. On the other hand, he was honest and demonstrable with his family in the confines of their own home.

77. Indian. Specific information about the cultural pattern and values of the Indian community in Malaya were not available. The social structure and value system of the Indian community in Malaya was unstable and revealed no firm pattern because of the temporary nature of Indian residence, and because those who lived and worked on the various estates had patterns of living imposed on them by the patriarchial estate owner or manager.[80]

78. Conclusions. This section will briefly point up the actual and potential bases of tension between the Malay and Chinese communities in Malaya. This does not imply that these sources of tension were directly responsible for the conflict that developed in 1948.

a. All aspects of the social structure of Malaya tended to perpetuate heterogeneous, isolated ethnic communities. The population distribution of the ethnic groups in rural areas (the Malays primarily in farming and fishing kampongs and the Indians and Chinese on their respective estates and mines) and the ethnic clusters in the urban areas effected physical isolation. Differences in language, religion, and customs and the propensity for those of one ethnic group to hire and socialize with members of the same ethnic group tended to perpetuate social isolation. Social and physical isolation of components of a population promote feelings of strangeness and suspicion between the communities, thus developing or laying the basis for the development of tensions. In Malaya, this condition was being alleviated ever so slowly during the latter part of the period under study by the emphasis on education in general and knowledge of the English language in particular, as media of social and occupational mobility.

b. The small group of better educated Malays found that they had to compete, many times unsuccessfully, with Chinese for the jobs to which they aspired. Such competition in view of the high expectations which followed the completion of an English education was, undoubtedly, sufficient to garner hostility against the Chinese "immigrants."

c. The two small groups, the Kaum Muda and the graduates of the Sultan Idris Training School, which provided a small nucleus of nationalist sentiment in colonial Malaya also provided a source of tensions.

d. With the Japanese occupation of Malaya and the consequent loss of British protection, the Malays became much more aware of their subordinate and disadvantaged position in their own country vis-a-vis the Chinese. Evidently this stirred many erstwhile placid and contented Malays and broadened the base of nationalistic feelings to the point that there was strong collective opposition to the union of Malaya proposed by the British after World War II, because it appeared, to the Malays, to permit the Chinese to dominate their country politically and economically.

Section VI. The Family

by Jessie A. Miller, PhD

79. Introduction. The family in Malaya was notable for its wide range of cultural patterns. Not only were there marked differences

between the major ethnic groups (Chinese, Indian, Malay), but Malayan marriage and family customs in themselves formed an interesting study in syncretism--an intermingling of Ancient Hindu tradition, Muslim law, and Malay customs. There were no uniform marriage laws. Each State issued its own regulations providing for Islamic, Christian, and civil marriages. Customary rites of other groups, including Chinese, Indian, and aboriginal peoples, were also recognized. Of all these, three are considered important for this study: the bilateral Malay families that were essentially similar throughout Malaya, the matrilineal families of Negri Sembilan, and the Chinese patriarchial family.

80. The bilateral Malay family. The marriage and family patterns of the majority of the Malays were basically Muslim, although traces of earlier Hindu culture remained, particularly in the ceremonial aspects of the wedding.[81] Except in the province of Negri Sembilan, kinship was bilateral, that is, traced through both parents. However, there was little sense of lineage and little interest in either ancestors or descendents for more than two generations in the past (grandparents) or two in the future, (grandchildren). Bonds between brothers, sisters and cousins were close. The kaum, or circle of relatives beyond the household, frequently came together for joint economic aid and ritual occasions.

a. Although Muslim law permitted a man to have four wives, monogamy was the rule except for a few wealthy and aristocratic families.[82] Marriages were normally arranged by the families. In choosing a bride or groom, great emphasis was placed on wealth, family status in the village, education, and the economic future of the bridegroom. A near relative with the highest possible status was generally considered most suitable, although in some areas there were extensive marriages across linguistic and cultural barriers. Particularly in the upper class, political considerations were apt to be important. Since the bride and groom were usually young, it was customary for them to live with his parents temporarily. When it was felt that they were experienced enough to manage alone, an independent household was established. One son or daughter (usually the youngest daughter), together with his or her spouse and children, continued to live with the parents and inherited the house and household goods.

b. The basic functional unit of Malay society was the extended family, which included three living generations. It participated as a unit in the major Muslim festivals, the family ceremonies, and in economic and social activities. Within this unit, land and property were inherited and redistributed. Custom favored the retention of property by a surviving spouse and after his/her death an equal distribution to the children (para 83 below).

c. As in other Muslim countries the male was the dominant partner in marriage: customarily the wife walked behind her husband; the men

ate alone and were served by the women, who ate later in the kitchen; even among the well-to-do, daughters seldom received more than a secondary school education. However, women were not as strictly secluded as in many Muslim countries. A young girl mingled freely with boys in the village until she was about 10 years old, when she was placed in seclusion till her marriage at about age 15. After marriage, she enjoyed relatively great freedom and if divorced often remarried.

d. The income of a Muslim woman, whether from her own private property or dowry settlement, was independent of control by her husband. In his study of a Malay fishing village, Firth noted particularly the freedom of women in economic matters:

> Not only do they exercise an important influence on the control of the family finances, commonly acting as bankers for their husbands, but they also engage in independent enterprises which increase the family supply of cash. Petty trading in fish and vegetables, the preparation and sale of various forms of snacks and cooked fish, mat-making and spinning and net-making, harvesting rice, tile making. . . . Many are teachers in the vernacular schools. . . If there is alluvial mining near she may wash for tin or gold, or she may tap rubber on her own estate. . . .[83]

e. Divorce, regulated by Muslim law (para 84 below), was easy to secure and was an extremely common feature of Malay life. Children usually remained with the mother until they were of age, after which they chose the parent with whom they would live. To what extent this marked instability of the nuclear family created problems and tensions is not known. Children were wanted and loved. Apparently they were treated with affection, and their upbringing was generally permissive. Further studies of child-training practices and the interpersonal relations of family members are needed.

f. In his discussion of the Malay family, Michael Swift suggests that the ease of divorce played a part in the Malay emphasis on present consumption rather than accumulation for the future:

> Malays . . . place greater emphasis on present abstinence with the goal of accumulation. . . This tendency is increased by fear that any sacrifice made may be for the benefit of someone else. If a wife helps her husband get rich, how can she be sure that he will not use the money to attract another younger and prettier wife? If a husband spends a great deal of money in a fine house, how can he be sure that he will not divorce his wife later on and so enable some other man to enjoy the house he made?[84]

g. Throughout Malaya, ritual played an important part in family life. The birth of an infant, the passing from childhood to adulthood,

marriage, and death were occasions for bringing the family together and emphasizing the solidarity of the group.

81. The family in Negri Sembilan. Unlike the other areas of Malaya, the family in the state of Negri Sembilan was matrilineal, that is, descent was traced through the female line. Also, a significant distinction was made between the extended family and the household. The former was a kinship group consisting of a woman, her children, her daughter's children, and possibly a fourth generation, the children of her daughters' daughters. A man's children did not belong to his descent group but to that of their mother. A household, on the other hand was made up of a woman, her unmarried children and married daughters, their unmarried children and married daughters, and the husbands of all the women. In other words a married man belonged to his mother's extended family but to his wife's (or mother-in-law's) household. The eldest son in each generation was the head of his sisters' families, controlled their landholdings, supervised their economic affairs, and was generally responsible for the upbringing of their children. Although a man lived with his wife in her house, he had to defer to her eldest brother in any matter concerning the affairs of the household or his own children. His own economic activities were for the support of his family, not the household in which he lived.

a. In Negri Sembilan, as elsewhere in Malaya, women held no offices, possessed no executive authority, and had no right to enter into any contracts, even a marriage contract. But they did vote for tribal officers, and, as indicated, land was registered in their names.[85]

b. The extended families that traced their descent from a common ancestress some generations removed constituted a clan, and the clans within a given geographical area formed a negeri, that is a tribe or territory. Clans, politically, were of two types: the waris had specific privileges, because their ancestors were supposed to have married women of the aboriginal Senois and, thus, to have obtained land titles and political privileges. All tribal chieftains had to be elected from wari clans, "the heirs of the land." Other clans owned land but lacked this political privilege.[86]

c. Within the hierarchy of family, clan, and tribe, rights and responsibilities were clearly specified. Every extended family elected an elder (or in large family more than one) who had to keep informed about family relationships, quarrels, infractions of the rules by family members, marriage payments, divorces, and the general enforcement of the marriage code. An elder had to be approved of and could be dismissed by the clan chief.

d. The main function of the clan was the control of land. Traditionally, all fixed property belonged to it. However, individual plots were held by the women who could buy, sell, or transfer them.

Inheritance was in the female line, that is from mother to daughters, or, if there were no daughters, to the daughters of her sisters.

e. Land was two types: ancestral land, which could not be alienated from the clan, and acquired land, which became ancestral upon passing to the great-granddaughter of the original possessor. Every family and every clan had the responsibility of maintaining the ancestral land and preventing its alienation to outsiders. The British administrators ruled that newly cleared and planted lands and rubber land should be inherited according to Muslim law, that is through the patrilineal line, unless the owner specifically registered it as ancestral land. This weakened the hold of the clan over property traditionally considered theirs. As a result there was continuing tension between traditional matrilineal law and patrilineal Muslim law.

f. In child training and in the importance of family ritual, Negri Sembilan did not differ greatly from the rest of Malaya.

g. In conclusion, it should be noted that throughout Malaya the family, rather than the lineage, was emphasized as the basic regulatory institution. Within the family, child training tended to be permissive, and the general orientation was toward considerable freedom for the individual. Although kinship solidarity was expressed through festivities and ceremonial occasions, in the economic sphere, the self-reliance of the individual within the family unit was stressed.

82. The impact of social change. Throughout the colonial period, British policy actively sought to protect Malay peasant life from the disruptive effects of economic and social change. It did this partly in the interests of the protectorate relationship and partly to avoid the economic unrest and social discontent that could be expected to follow any disorganization of village life. The policy was, on the whole, strikingly successful in keeping the peasant within the matrix of the traditional agricultural society. Not only did he become little involved in the mushrooming export economy, but he was shielded from the rapid social changes taking place in the cities. By 1920, not more than 4 or 5 percent of the Malays had moved to urban areas. Although the numbers rose slowly during the remainder of this period, even in 1947 most Malays "continued to find the town strange if indeed they had any acquaintance with it at all."[87]

a. Village life was not, however, completely stagnant. Economic, educational, and communication changes did take place--changes that were greater in some geographical areas than in others. But the pace was slow, and adaptation to it gradual. The overall result was a remarkable persistence of the traditional patterns of social organization, including those of family life.[88] Even the impact of the Japanese occupation was surprisingly slight: prewar and postwar descriptions of the Malayan family are notably similar.

b. There is nothing to suggest that the Malayan family was a destabilizing factor. It was a dampener rather than an amplifier of conflict.

83. Muslim inheritance. Where Muslim law was followed, the wife received one-eighth of a man's property, and the rest was divided among the children, the sons receiving two shares to each share given a daughter. If there were no sons, the wife received one-eighth, the daughters shared one-half the remainder, and the other half was distributed among the man's patrilineal relatives.[89] The old Malay custom before the advent of the British was for daughters to share equally with sons, or for sons to waive altogether in favor of daughters. It was common in some areas for the land and houses to be given to the daughters, while sons divided the personal property. They were expected to acquire land for themselves by clearing and planting it or by marrying women who inherited it.[90]

84. Muslim divorce. A man divorced his wife simply by informing her of his intention to do so and registering the divorce with the proper official. If he made the announcement only once to his wife, it could be revoked by mutual consent within the next one hundred days. If the announcement was made three times, it could not be revoked. A woman could receive a divorce by going to a Muslim religious judge. A man was allowed to remarry immediately, a woman had to wait 100 days for the divorce to become final. Should the couple wish to remarry the wife must first have consummated marriage with another man. This led to a custom whereby a man married a woman for money and agreed to divorce her the next day.

85. The Chinese family. In China, life centered around the family, the clan, and the village. The ideal family pattern was the extended family (chia), consisting of the patriarch, his wife or wives, unmarried daughters, married sons and their wives and children, possibly married grandsons and their children.

a. Polygyny was an accepted practice. The first, or primary, wife was taken in an arranged marriage, traditional betrothal and wedding ceremonies were followed, and the union was in some formal way recognized by the community. Brides were chosen primarily with a view to providing a son, so that the lineage would be unbroken and economic security and care provided for the parents' old age. The primary wife retained her status unless divorced. Secondary wives were clearly designated as such. A man might also take as concubines women he did not choose to recognize as wives. In old China, all the wives and their offspring formed part of one household. In more recent times, separate quarters were often provided at least for a favored wife and her children. In practice, only the wealthy could afford such an establishment (or establishments), and the nuclear family was more common.

b. Legally and in its philosophical concepts, the family was strictly patriarchial, with all authority and ownership of property vested in the fathers. Nonetheless, the Chinese matriarch (the first wife of the eldest male) was frequently a vigorous and dominating person, and the role of women within the home somewhat more important than the statement of theory would indicate. Filial piety was the highest virtue, and the individual's interests were always subservient to those of the group.

c. The sense of kinship responsibility was strong and required that, when possible, one give assistance to relatives, even those as distant as fifth cousins.[91] Geographical separation did not lessen one's responsibilities to the family: a son, husband, or father who went to distant parts of the Empire or overseas sent part, usually a large part, of his earnings home. A man's loyalties and identification remained with his native village, even though he might be absent for decades. His descendants probably regarded themselves as natives of that place, even though they had never been there.

d. Frequently, all of the families in a village had the same surname and were regarded as descendants of a common ancestor. Thus, they constituted a clan. The family genealogy was recorded in the clan temple, and, when possible, births of new members were registered even though they were born elsewhere. Some clans were segmented, that is, divided among several villages. This occurred most commonly in the Yangtze Valley and the southeast Provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung, where most of the overseas Chinese originated. These segments were referred to as subclans (fang) and could usually trace a common descent. Where clans were segmented, the subclan performed the role at the village level which would be performed by the larger group in an unsegmented clan.[92] In those villages where there was more than one lineage group, the physical layout emphasized the clan relationship by allotting to each a separate residential section.[93]

e. The clan, like the family, was a closely knit unit. Its functions were extensive. By cutting across class lines (its members ranged from the most successful merchant or scholar to the most menial laborer), it provided a strong integrative social force. The clan elders, recognized rather than formally elected, were those older men whose wealth, learning, or achievement of Government position through the examination system gave them status. Increasingly with modernization, leadership was vested in the more wealthy families, and the poorer groups had, accordingly, less power.[94]

f. The elders had numerous responsibilities, including the arbitration of disputes and, when necessary, the meting out of punishment.[95] The principle of collective responsibility, pao chia, was generally recognized. The clan also protected its members against outsiders. It had some firearms for use in case of necessity, but, more usually, if trouble arose, the elders approached other clans

with the request that they control their own lawless members.[96] The clan acted as intermediary in dealing with officials. Interclan councils, for example, decided upon appropriate shares to be paid by each family on levies made by the Government.

g. The clan maintained the temples and schools and served as a cooperative group for many undertakings. Land might be terraced by members of a family, but an important irrigation project or reclaiming land from a river was beyond the ability of a single family. Here the clan acted. The reclaimed land was usually divided and rented to individual families for a specific time, after which it reverted to the full control of the clan. Some land in each village--sometimes as much as 70 percent--was collectively owned.[97] Thus, through a chain of family and clan authority, law, order, and public projects were carried out without a great deal of formal government at the local level.[98]

h. At the same time that the Chinese family taught mutual responsibility, status, and respect for hierarchy, it defined individual roles in such a way as to allow for, even to demand, individual initiative and independence in thinking. For example, it was understood that through hard work, thrift, skill, and initiative the individual could improve his economic and social position; in village matters, there was no individual vote guaranteed by a constitution, and yet, in village meetings every adult male was theoretically a voting member by natural right.[99] In the long tradition of civil service examinations, the basis for the selection of Government officials was always individual merit rather than lineage, class, or economic status. It is also interesting to note that the Chinese peasants, in their folk tales and drama, showed great admiration for the rugged individualism of the revolutionary soldier. Finally, the peasants, though often poor and exploited by their richer kin, did identify with the clan and its achievements. They thus had a sense of personal worth and dignity.

i. Such were the family patterns, and some of the attitudes and values implicit in them that the Chinese immigrant brought with him to Malaya. They formed a highly practical vehicle for the adjustment of the Chinese to life in the new environment. Two points in particular are significant: the transfer of the clan structure to Malaya and its impact on Chinese-Malay relationships, and the selective adaptation of marriage and family patterns and their role in the pre-conflict period.

86. Chinese clan structure in Malaya. In the period before 1930, most of the immigrants were men. Some arrived as independent traders. The majority were laborers who came not as isolated invididuals but as part of a group or, at least, with personal connections with Chinese already in the country.[100] Their contacts were primarily

with their own linguistic group (tribe*); frequently with men from the same or a neighboring village. Although they left their families behind, kinship connections, real or fictitious, continued according to the role models learned in the villages. Generally they lived together in kongsu houses.

a. Through personal connections, a man joined other associations, most of which had a linguistic or village basis. Their purposes ranged from advancement of education and religion to relief of poverty and provision of funeral mourners. Most important, through their network of personal relationships, they maintained an elaborate credit-debit structure that gave them a strong competitive position with other ethnic groups.

b. In contacts with the Malayan Government, traditional clan practices also prevailed. The more influential members of the group acted as intermediaries in dealing with officials, maintained order, arbitrated disputes, and protected clan (or association) members. As in China, the clan, in effect, governed itself with a minimum of outside interference. It was said that, because of the background of experience in their home country, "security could be found only in personal and highly particular relationships, and not in impersonal and formal relationships with government agencies."[101] The British accepted this situation virtually without comment, until open warfare between secret societies threatened the law and order of the community. At this point they tried to destroy the secret societies, but with only partial success.

87. Chinese marriage and family patterns in Malaya. As has been indicated above, most of the early Chinese immigrants to Malaya were men who left their families at home and expected to return to China. For this reason, the sex ratio was extremely uneven. In 1901 in the Federated Malay States, there were just under 100 Chinese females to every 1,000 males; in 1911, the figure was 247 for all of Malaya; in 1921, 384; in 1931, 436. Since the highest ratio was in the Straits Settlements, the discrepancy in Malaya was even greater than the figures indicate.[102]

a. Despite these figures and the obviously transitory nature of most Chinese residents, there was a steady growth of established Chinese homes and settled communities. By 1931, some 29 percent of the Chinese in Malaya had to all intents and purposes become permanent residents.[103] Conducive to this development were the traditional Chinese family patterns. There were no bars to a second marriage nor to keeping

*The terminology used in Malaya is somewhat different from that used in China. In Malaya, the term "tribe" is commonly applied to a dialect group. The tight organizations formed by the various provincial or dialect associations gave them appearance of a "tribal" organization in Malay society.

since polygyny was an accepted and respectable institution to the Chinese. If a first wife had been left at home to care for his parents (a first wife's primary duty was to her parents-in-law, not to her husband), a man frequently married again. As long as he remained in Malaya, the second wife assumed the role of the primary or first wife, and doubtless she and her children encouraged him to make Malaya his permanent home.

b. During this period prostitution flourished and the "white slave trade" was a serious problem for the Malayan Government. However, many girls who arrived as prostitutes became wives of Chinese laborers and established a stable family life.[104]

c. During the early 1930's, a marked change took place. Because of unemployment resulting from the depression, many Chinese men returned home. At the same time, the Malayan Government imposed stringent quota restrictions on the entrance of Chinese male laborers. Because the existing unequal sex ratio was considered unhealthy, similar limitations were not established for women. The absence of restrictions combined with the Japanese invasion of China sent hundreds of women--some laborers, some refugees--to Malaya. As a result, the character of the Chinese Malayan population was completely changed. Instead of kongsu houses which housed the men, "enormous numbers" of homes were established. Many of these were merely overcrowded cubicles or peasant huts, and the parents were a husband who had come as a temporary laborer and a wife who had come on similar terms or as a refugee.[105] They had not intended, in most cases, to plant roots in Malaya. But the long war in China and the Japanese occupation of Malaya gave time for families to grow up and for local and economic ties to form.[106]

d. As might have been expected, those who had married and brought up children increasingly identified their future with Malaya. As temporary residents they had been largely apolitical. Now they had reason to be interested in politics, citizenship, and power. Significantly, their new permanence did not increase their contacts with the Malay people. Quite the contrary. As the number of Chinese families increased, their need for outside contacts decreased. They now clustered in Chinese villages or in enclaves in the city where their greater numbers enforced their Chineseness. Earlier settlers that had been somewhat assimilated now renewed their interest in the homeland. As one small indicator, it was noted that fewer Chinese women wore Malay dress. It is believed that

> other cultural contacts with the Malays may also have declined. The specifically "Straits born characteristics of Malay-Chinese" may have become more widespread as the result of a better sex-ratio . . . but they may also have become diluted and weakened in the process.[107]

Particularly in the more conservative rural areas such as Sarawak, the "bonds of kinship and especially clan ties," "attachment to the district in China from which one's ancestors came," and "cultural chauvinism," reinforced by the Sino-Japanese war and China's emergence as a world power, combined to focus the thinking of Sarawak Chinese on their ancestral land.[108] Interest in home news was never failing, and small trifles from the home town were more eagerly discussed than were important local events.[109] This renewed identification with China is considered by some writers to be one of the most important developments in the preconflict period:

> The net effect was certainly not to make the Chinese community as a whole "Communist"--but rather to make it ambivalent (and hence an easy prey to rumor and fear) in its outlook on . . . Malaysia and its future /there/ and to cause it to exhibit a neutrality that could be readily manipulated under certain conditions toward a more overt expression of sympathy for Peking. . . .[110]

e. At the same time, other changes were taking place in the Chinese family. Particularly in the cities, traits characteristic of urbanization and modernization elsewhere in the world were seen: modification of the old patterns for choice of a marriage partner, a weakening of kinship bonds and responsibilities, less emphasis on the family as an economic unit, an improved status for women, and greater independence for adult sons. Nonetheless, in important ways, the old patterns continued: the obligation to honor and support parents in their old age remained compelling; in contacts with the outside world, the senior male still represented the entire family; elaborate rituals and festivities cemented kinship ties in most families.[111]

f. The disruption of Chinese life by the Japanese occupation was severe, yet such was the resiliency of the family that its postwar appearance, outwardly, was not essentially different from that of the earlier years. On balance, it does seem that, in the process of adjustment to the difficult years 1930-50, many of the Confucian precepts of morality and control were lost. The values transmitted by the family increasingly stressed the more materialistic aspects of economic success and social mobility. After interviewing young Chinese guerrillas who had surrendered to the British, Pye* noted their great emphasis on two characteristically Chinese values: status and personal relations. Most of the surrendered enemy personnel had been drawn into communism by friendly personal contacts. Their primary motivation was the hope of gaining prestige and a sense of security, by being

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*Prof. Pye points out that those interviewed do not constitute a scientific sample. Nonetheless his findings are interesting and significant.

recognized as a close associate of someone they believed to be influential and powerful.[112] Eventually, they hoped to achieve status through leadership positions.

g. Pye also found that, because of their isolation in the Chinese community, the Malayan Government seemed remote to them, whereas the Communist leaders were Chinese and not "foreign."[113] In general, they were unable "to divest themselves of traditional attitudes or to accept more fully a new orientation more appropriate to modern conditions."[114]

88. Summary. The evidence indicates that the Malay family was a stabilizing influence during this period. On the other hand, while the Chinese family remained a strong institution, the patterns of life it helped establish fostered conflict.

a. The tradition of the family-clan-village, with its self-sufficiency, self-government, and protective kinship walls, was transferred to Malaya and contributed to the establishment of a separate Chinese community.

b. The changed sex ratio of the 1930's greatly increased the number of permanently domiciled Chinese families and further accentuated the communal nature of Chinese life. At the same time, it aroused a new Chinese interest in Malayan citizenship rights and political power.

c. Paradoxically, the Chinese, particularly in rural areas, were increasingly oriented toward mainland China.

d. In the process of adjusting to the difficult years 1930-50, the force of many of the Confucian precepts of morality and control were diminished. Emphasis was placed on status and economic success.

e. The family-clan pattern, both by its structure and its value system, placed the Chinese in a strongly competitive position vis-a-vis the other ethnic groups and contributed materially to their economic success.

f. The combination of Chinese exclusiveness, economic dominance, and mainland orientation aroused the suspicions of the Malays and made communism in Malaya largely a Chinese phenomena.

g. The Chinese orientation and the family emphasis on success and status were important factors in leading young Chinese into the Communist movement.

Section VII. Social Class

by Jessie A. Miller, PhD

89. General. Class, as such, has been overshadowed in Malay politics by ethnic and communal tensions. Religious, language, and style of life differences, plus a high degree of residential segregation, prevented the development of common interests among Malayans, Chinese, and Indians of any economic and social level. Thus, before 1948, there was virtually no consciousness of class cutting across the major ethnic lines. Within each group, however, class differences were significant.

90. The Malay class structure. Traditionally, Malay society was sharply divided into two groups, an aristocracy and a peasantry; that is, a ruling and a subject class. The difference between them was based on birth and was clearly distinguished by attitude and custom.

a. At the top of the social hierarchy in each Malay State stood the Sultan and members of the royal family. The Sultan embodied in his person the supreme temporal authority and the religious leadership of the Muslim community. The ritual of his installation made clear the sacred importance of his office. Succession was limited to male members of a single royal line.[115]

(1) In addition to royalty (including those of royal blood too remote to aspire to the throne), the Malay aristocracy was made up of families who had by long-established custom the right to various offices. The exact status of each office, its symbols, and its privileges were carefully specified and were jealously guarded by the holder and his kin.[116] A consciousness of status and a concern for its outward expression were a constant preoccupation of the elite. For a man to move outside his inherited rank was almost unknown, and marriage outside one's class was rare.

(2) The Sultan, in theory, "owned the land," exercised virtually absolute power over the people, and granted extensive powers to other members of the ruling class. Particularly important were the territorial chiefs, each of whom was given direct personal control over an area of the State. Apart from the valued prestige of the title, the chief and his family gained valuable economic privileges: a share in the taxes, tolls, concessions, and monopolies of his district, as well as the right to exact labor from the villagers for the cultivation of fields, building of roads, and erection of buildings. Chiefs ordinarily kept a great deal more income than they turned over to the Sultan. Their wealth frequently nearly matched that of the ruler.

b. At the base of the social pyramid were the peasants. Most were fishermen and cultivators. Since all land theoretically belonged

to the ruler, they held their plots only in terms of right and use. Though, in practice, there was reasonable security, tenure was revocable at will by the Sultan or chief. Debt-slavery was common. At best, there was little incentive for the individual to exert himself to improve his economic position, especially since any evidence of prosperity was certain to attract the greedy attention of the overlord. Codes of hospitality, family obligations, and conspicuous consumption on ritual occasions--not saving--was emphasized. Leisure was highly valued.[117]

(1) Early English observers frequently commented on the exploitation of the people by an arbitrary and self-indulgent upper class. Swettenham, for example, refers to the "despotic rule of petty chiefs compounded by the predatory irresponsibilities of roving bands of young aristocrats."[118] There is no question that the dominant characteristic of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled was submission. The importance of this as an institutionalized value was expressed in custom and ritual. Every week the peasant went to the mosque to pray by name for his Sultan.[119] The law, too, took cognizance of differences in status. For an offense committed against an aristocrat, the fine was five buffalo. For the same offense committed against a commoner, the fine was one buffalo.

(2) One check on the arbitrary powers of the aristocracy was the large amount of uncultivated land available. Where conditions were too difficult, the peasant departed to another area. As Roff points out, the evidence makes it clear that in the unsettled conditions of the 19th century, migrations were frequent and of some magnitude.[120]

(3) Nonetheless a strong loyalty to the interests of his ruler seems to have been one of the basic attitudes of the Malay peasant:

> Traditional Malay political values, as reflected in fables and legends dating from long before the arrival of the British rate blind loyalty to one's Ruler above all else . . . these patterns had changed very little.[121]

They were reinforced by his deep commitment to Muslim spiritual values and to his acceptance of the Sultan as the spiritual head of the congregation. Like the aristocrat, the peasant accepted his position as part of the natural order. "It was for the Sultan to govern while the duty of the common man was to obey."[122]

c. Under the early British regime, a conscious effort was made to maintain the Malay social structure. The Sultans were given greatly increased dignity and symbols of status: they were provided with a privy purse and substantial personal allowance, and elaborate palaces were erected for them at state expense.[123] Appointments to rank and

title and the granting of allowances and pensions, as was traditional, remained largely in their hands. At the same time, the aristocracy was gradually assimilated into the upper echelons of the growing bureaucracy. Kuala Kangsar Malay College was founded to prepare young men for Government service and, except for the first experimental year, drew its students entirely from elite circles.

(1) The imprint of Malay social distinctions is seen in the early arrangements at the school. The first year, 26 of the boarders were direct descendants of one or other of the royal houses. These were designated "Class I" boarders, lived at the headmaster's own house, and received a maintenance allowance of $20 a month. Class II boarders, boys of royal blood but somewhat more remote from the throne and sons of major chiefs, received an allowance of $12 a month. Some lived with the assistant master and some in a separate house of their own. Class III boarders, consisting of sons of less important chiefs together with a few commoners, received an allowance of $7 a month and lived in unused railway bungalows. After the first year, no commoners were included in the student body.[124]

(2) The curriculum was modeled on that of the British public schools and sought to inculcate the British upper class values of diligence, fair play, and sportsmanship. Many of the students later traveled abroad. The young aristocrats thus acquired at least a veneer of westernization.

d. In contrast to their efforts to import British ideas and ideals to the ruling classes, the British administrators made conscious efforts "to protect" the Malay culture of the commoners. The exploitation of the peasant was lessened by the abolition both of debt slavery and of the rights of the nobility to impose tolls and other obligations, but for years no effort was made to move the ordinary man into the economic mainstream. The fear that "to teach English to Malays on any large scale would be unsettling in rural areas" was but one evidence of the British policy.

e. It is not surprising, in view of both tradition and policy, that the Malay two-class structure was slow to change. During the post-World War I rubber boom, a few peasants were in a financial position to provide a middle school or higher education for their sons, and about 1924 the British began to see the wisdom of encouraging some Malays to compete with the Chinese and Indians for lower echelon Civil Service appointments. Malay movement into these middle class positions, however, was slow. As late as 1938 (the last year for which statistics are available), Malays in seven key departments numbered only 1,742 as against 4,938 from other ethnic groups.[125] The vast majority remained fishermen and cultivators.[126]

f. Other reasons for the lack of upward social mobility are not hard to find. Among them are the essentially rural character of the Malay and the poverty of the rural dweller; the poor quality of the rural schools (including the fact mentioned above that English, the lingua-franca of the outside world was not taught); the reluctance of the Muslim peasant to take advantage of the mission schools (whose students consequently were largely Chinese and Indian); Government policy, which in the early days imported English-speaking Indians to fill the lower Civil Service positions; the early Malay habits of consumption and lack of interest in or understanding of capital accumulation; the resulting small number of Malay employers in the business world, coupled with the Chinese-Indian policy of employing only members of their own ethnic group.[127]

g. In 1948, by three of the commonly accepted criteria of class--occupation, education and income--Malayans as a group ranked well below the Indians and Chinese. Many young men, anxious to move ahead, believed their way blocked by Chinese business practices and by the large numbers of non-Malays in the professions and junior Civil Service positions.

h. As communism developed, it too was viewed primarily as a Chinese program and hence a further threat to Malay interests. In other words "alien races," not "upper classes" were the focus of frustration. Nationalism, not "class struggle" was the key issue.

91. The Chinese class structure. By 1930, the Chinese were represented in every walk of life in Malaya: the extremely wealthy and powerful business magnates; the middle class doctors, traders, lawyers, teachers, and other professionals; the skilled artisans; the unskilled laborers of the plantations and tin mines; the poor but independent cultivators. Whether judged by wealth, education, occupation, or recognized status, the objective criteria of class were present.[128] The subjective recognition of them was minimal. The vast differences in wealth and social position, the harsh exploitation of coolie labor, and the fact that few Chinese were employed by non-Chinese might have been expected to generate strong hostility between classes. That resentment existed is attested to by labor union activities and the growth of the Communist party within the Chinese community. However, some evidence suggests that the latter was the result not of class feeling or ideology but of individual desire to improve one's status position.[129]

a. Class strife was undoubtedly minimized by the migratory character of the community and its division along linguistic lines. Even more important was the Chinese social structure and the homogeneity of the Chinese value system. Most Chinese immigrants came not as individuals but as members of a group from one village (or nearby villages), speaking a common dialect and possessing real or fictive kinship ties. They soon joined other organizations, such as craft guilds or secret societies. This elaborate network of personal

relationships cut across class lines. Individuals, particularly in the lower class, identified with the clan, the linguistic group, the secret society in the guild rather than with other laborers whose language, in any case, he did not speak.

b. Equally important was the Chinese value system. Great stress was placed on hard work, thrift, and achievement of success. Coupled with this was a comparatively open class system. Most Chinese came to Malaya hoping to make a fortune. Not all succeeded, but the stability and order of Malaya gave many the oppurtunity to express their initiative and their entrepreneurial abilities. Thousands improved their economic position, and hundreds achieved considerable affluence. Mills reported ". . . many Chinese peasants who landed in Singapore with nothing but the clothes on their back ended their careers as millionaires." It's hard to say "how many" are "many," but upward mobility was common. The personal contacts and the credit system of the clan structure placed the Chinese in a strong competitive position, especially when compared with the Malays.[130] Living conditions for the laborers were hard and wages low, but a man who managed to acquire capital or an education was not denied status because of his birth. More accurately, perhaps, he always had status because of his clan membership.

c. The Chinese traditionally placed great value on education, and the Chinese community early began to establish schools for its children. Channels of upward mobility through the professions as well as through business were thus available to many. The Singapore Survey of 1947 reveals a larger number than might have been expected of Chinese born and brought up in Malaya who remained unskilled laborers. On the other hand, there were "thousands of small or large merchants, tens of thousands of contractors and small shopkeepers, possibly hundreds of thousands of independent peasants. . . ."[131] who believed themselves upwardly mobile. It seems fair to assume that the perceived openness of the Chinese class system contributed significantly to the unwillingness of the great majority of the Chinese to accept Communist control.[132]

92. The Indian class structure. By 1930, the Indians, like the Chinese, were represented at all levels of Malayan society. At the top were members of the Indian trading community: merchants from Gujerat (both Hindu and Muslim), who owned rich business concerns; Tamil-speaking Muslims from South India (Marakkayars); a few Sikh businessmen; and Chettiars from South India, who were moneylenders, bankers, and owners of rubber estates, paddyland, coconut plantations, and small tin mines. Chettiars were particularly well-known as purveyors of rural credit.[133] There was also a small middle strata. These were mostly Jaffina Tamils from Ceylon. They had originally been brought to Malaya by the British when English-speaking clerical help was needed. In the period 1930-48, they filled a majority of the lower echelon Government positions, particularly in the railways. The professional group (doctors and lawyers) were, for the most part,

Malaya-born descendants of the original Jaffina Tamils. In 1939, the two upper strata probably comprised no more than 4 percent of the 700,000 Indians in Malaya. Another 10 percent were in skilled and semi-skilled positions, and the remainder, that is the vast majority, were unskilled and menial laborers in the mines and on the plantations. These were nearly all low-caste workers from the Telegu- and Tamil-speaking areas of South India.

a. Despite considerable labor unrest in the Indian community between 1930 and 1948, it cannot be said that class conflict or class tensions were significant. The objective criteria (income, occupational and educational stratification) were present; the subjective perception of class was absent. Absence of class feeling can be traced primarily to two factors. First, the fragmentary nature of the Indian community and, second, the temporary character of Indian residence.

b. As in India, the population was split into communities identified by place of origin, language, and occupation. These were essentially the subcastes of the caste system. Although the restrictions and religious taboos of caste were not a prominent feature of Indian life in Malaya, individual identification remained with the group. There was no organization corresponding to the Chinese clans, guilds, and secret societies that cut across class lines. Nor was there a link between men of comparable income and educational levels who belonged to different "communities," such as Chettiars or Jaffina Tamils. In fact, the Indians were notable for their lack of effective organization of any kind.

c. The second factor restricting both group solidarity and class consciousness was the transitory nature of Indian residence. The larger firms regarded India as their home base. Few wealthy merchants or bankers brought their families to Malaya. Many of them paid visits to the country only once every 3 or 4 years. The employees of the firm were sent in on a 3-year contract basis. The unskilled workers also had an average stay of only about 3 years. Malayan land policies discouraged them from bringing their families and establishing residence. Some groups, such as the Jaffina Tamils, were exceptions to the general custom of temporary residence, but not until after 1948 did a more general trend toward permanent residence begin.

93. Conclusions. The major ethnic groups, Malay, Chinese, and Indian, illustrated three very different patterns of social organization. The Malays were divided by custom and attitudes into two groups: the ruler and the ruled. All accepted this arrangement as natural and were able to satisfy their desires for status within the two-class framework. The Malay peasant, at least until 1948, was protected by British policy from overly rapid social change which might have introduced serious maladjustments. The slowly emerging middle class focused its attention on ethnic problems and nationalism rather than class struggle.

a. For the most vast majority of Chinese a social structure that cut across divisions of wealth, education, and occupation and established individual identity with clan or kinship groups acted as a dampener of class feeling. The openness of the Chinese system and the apparent or perceived encouragement of upward mobility was a further mitigating factor. The individual desire for status which apparently induced many to turn to guerrilla activity was not basically a matter of class ideology.

b. The Indians, primarily because of their communal structure, did not develop a consciousness of class. Laborers were highly dissatisfied, but their transitory residence lessened any involvement in Malayan politics or in the Communist movement.

c. All three groups, Malay, Indian, and Chinese were diverted from "class struggle" by the strong ethnic tensions and the jockeying for economic and political position in the emerging Malayan State.

Section VIII. Public Health

by Thora W. Halstead, PhD

94. Background. In Malaya, there were two main ethnic groups, the Malays and the Chinese. The Chinese were drawn to communism, while the Malays were totally apathetic to it. When conflict finally erupted in 1948, the antagonists were Chinese. Yet, the Chinese were in an economically superior position and had had lower death rates than the Malays during the entire preconflict period. It was, therefore, the purpose of this section to examine and compare the health of each group and to determine if, indeed, the Chinese were favored in matters of health, and, if so, why. Health factors as they related to each group were investigated, as well as the responses they evoked in each group, in an endeavor to determine what factors, if any, were associated with the development of the conflict.

95. Traditional versus modern medicine. Both the Chinese and Malays believed in traditional folk medicine; they also followed traditional dietary rules and habits that influenced their health. Malay folk medicine was based on the fundamental principle of "preserving the balance of power" among the four elements. This was chiefly effected by constant attention to and moderation in diet. "To enforce these golden precepts, passages from the Koran are plentifully quoted against excess in eating or drinking."[134] A most important difference between the Chinese and the Malays regarding folk medicine, however, was the difference in their willingness to replace or augment traditional medicine with modern medicine. The beliefs and practices followed by the Chinese and Malays concerning medicine were reflected in the public health records and determined how each group was influenced by Government health measures.

a. Most Malays were rather skeptical about the benefits of Western medicine, but they were not opposed to it. They were convinced by experience of the value of vaccination, and the dramatic effect of arsenical preparations on yaws made them eager to have injections. They willingly patronized dispensaries for treatment of malaria, worms, and skin diseases; but they distrusted surgery and did not like hospitals. The peasant Malay who did enter a hospital did so because he was convinced that his particular disease would respond to hospital treatment rather than because he was acutely ill. If there appeared to be a risk of death, and time allowed, friends would take the patient home; therefore, the inhospital death rate for Malays did not give a true indication of the results of their hospital treatment (table X).

b. The Chinese gladly accepted Western medicine without giving up their belief in their own medicaments, which were often taken at the same time. They went to hospitals willingly, but usually they waited until their illness was far advanced. They worked until they were too ill to work any longer and were forced by economic necessity to enter the hospital. When they reached the end of their working life, many entered the decrepit wards, from which they were transferred to hospitals to die. They did not object to surgery and usually were ideal though fatalistic patients.[135]

c. The ratio of annual hospital admissions to ethnic group population was calculated (table XI) to ascertain the extent modern medicine was accepted by each group and any change that took place in this acceptance between the years 1930 and 1948. Admittedly, other factors, as availability of hospitals, also influenced these ratios; but superficially, at least, these figures suggest the Chinese were three times more receptive to modern medicine than the Malays. The high stationary Chinese ratios suggest a high degree of acceptance, while the Malays' increasing admissions/population ratios suggest a gradually growing awareness and utilization of modern medicine that never reached the Chinese level.

96. Vital statistics.

a. Birth rates and population. Immigration was unrestricted until 1930, and it determined the composition of the population as well as the population growth of Malaya. It produced the plural society composed of three ethnic groups that existed during the preconflict period and ultimately resulted in the conflict begun in 1948.[136] The composition of the population was of more importance during the preconflict period than either the total population count or population growth. Although 39 percent of the people in Malaya in 1931 were Chinese, less than one-third of these Chinese had been born in Malaya. The immigrant Chinese were mainly men who stayed or at least intended to stay only a short time, and the proportion of Chinese women to men was 513:1,000 (table XII).[137]

TABLE X. INHOSPITAL DEATHS FROM SELECTED DISEASES, 1930-48, IN MALAYA AND STRAITS SETTLEMENTS

Disease	Year	Chinese		Malays		Indians	
		Admissions	Deaths	Admissions	Deaths	Admissions	Deaths
Malaria	1930	11,502	973	1,424	25	23,259	899
	1934	5,157	312	1,372	15	9,001	178
	1937	8,750	508	1,579	9	14,170	286
	1947	11,625	661	4,572	102	9,518	266
	1948	6,375	383	4,734	73	7,466	124
Dysentery	1930	890	268	94	9	1,841	354
	1934	640	164	228	5	1,370	233
	1937	1,338	374	250	8	2,426	384
	1947	2,431	355	1,057	61	2,626	222
	1948	2,519	495	1,421	71	2,348	155
Pneumonia & broncho-pneumonia	1930	791	535	91	29	1,917	783
	1934	717	455	103	23	1,202	467
	1937	1,354	798	129	36	2,114	859
	1947	2,796	811	783	119	2,815	408
	1948	1,900	635	514	70	1,921	242
Pulmonary tuberculosis	1930	1,376	695	128	17	900	339
	1934	865	480	129	25	604	253
	1937	1,107	511	151	24	700	244
	1947	5,082	1,564	1,015	142	2,173	521
	1948	4,245	1,531	1,247	195	1,709	439
Cirrhosis of liver	1930	313	148	17	3	89	43
	1934	253	108	19	8	61	26
	1937	248	99	10	1	81	22
Beri-beri	1930	1,836	197	59	3	8	2
	1934	383	68	72	1	14	0
	1937	503	57	54	0	26	2
	1947	539	75	129	15	191	19
	1948	275	44	104	5	120	8

Sources: Federated Malay States, Medical Department Annual Report 1930 (1931) p 56; 1934 (1935) p 32; Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States Medical Department Annual Report 1937 (1938) p 88; Malayan Union Medical Department Annual Report 1947 (1948) p 31; Federation of Malaya Medical Department Annual Report 1948 (1949) p 23.

TABLE XI. RATIO OF MALAYAN HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS/ETHNIC GROUP POPULATION, 1930-48

Year	Chinese	Malays
1930	1/11	1/84
1932	1/26	1/90
1933	1/24	1/79
1934	1/26	1/72
1935	1/24	1/71
1936	1/23	1/67
1937	1/21	1/63
1947	1/20	1/62
1948	1/22	1/59

Sources: Federated Malay States Annual Medical Department Reports 1930, 1932-35; Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States Annual Medical Department Reports 1936-37; Malayan Union Annual Medical Department Reports 1947; Federation of Malaya Annual Medical Department Reports 1948

TABLE XII. FEMALES PER 1,000 MALES

	1921	1931	1947
Chinese			
Federation	371	486	815
Singapore	469	602	882
Malaya	384	513	833
Malays			
Federation		973	1,010
Singapore		863	830
Malaya		969	1,001

Source: Ginsberg and Roberts, Malaya (1958), p 75

(1) During the thirties and forties, a noticeable change occurred in the Chinese population. It began acquiring the characteristics of a permanently settled society. The British and Malays, however, continued to look upon the Chinese as transient foreigners.[138] Immigration laws played an important role in this trend toward permanence. Between 1934 and 1938, the number of Chinese women immigrants

rose sharply, when immigration laws limited the number of men who could enter the country; and by 1947 there were 833 women for every 1,000 Chinese men. Permanent homes were established, fewer men had wives in China, and the Chinese birth rate in Malaya rose (table XIII). Between 1931 and 1947, the increase in the population in the Federation was mainly due to the natural increase in the Malay and Chinese segments of the population. In this period, the Chinese proportion of the population grew from 39.2 to 44.7 percent, while the Malay proportion declined from 44.7 to 43.5 percent. In 1930 the Malay rate of natural increase was 1.9 percent annually in the Federated Malay States, while the Chinese increase was less tha 1.1 percent; in 1948 in the Federation of Malaya, the Malay rate was 1.8 percent, but the Chinese rate of natural increase had risen to 3.1 percent. In 1947, 62.5 percent of Malaya's Chinese population was Malaya-born.[139] Undoubtedly, this increasing natural growth of the Chinese portion of the population must have agonized knowledgeable Malays and strengthened their conviction that full citizenship should not be given the Chinese.

(2) Between 1931 and 1947, the population growth in Malaya was a result of a high birth rate and low death rate. While the Malay birth and death rates remained stabilized during this period, the Chinese birth rate rose as the Chinese sex ratio began to balance. During the thirties, the Chinese death rate went unchanged; between 1942 and 1945, the number of deaths climbed due to the occupation, but after the liberation, Chinese death rates dropped dramatically. There was a significant difference in the death rates of the Malays and the Chinese. The Malay death rate was consistently higher than the national average, while the Chinese rate was consistently lower; and it was this difference coupled with the increased Chinese birth rate that eventually led to the change in the population proportions of the two ethnic groups.

(3) Children were desired by both groups, and the difference in the growth of each group was primarily a product of different death rates rather than birth rates. Furthermore, the main reason for the higher death rate among the Malays apparently was their higher rate of infant mortality. It was therefore assumed that the different Chinese and Malay cultural factors that influenced death, especially infant death, were the significant population control factors. These included the acceptance or rejection of modern medicine, diet customs, and beliefs and practices followed regarding women and babies during the pre- and postnatal periods. Although both the Malays and Chinese continued to follow traditional medical practices, the Chinese were equally receptive to modern medicine and usually utilized a combination of the two. The Malays were in a period of transition between 1930 and 1948: modern medicine was increasingly accepted by them, but even in 1948 the proportion of Malays treated in hospitals was only one-third that of the Chinese.[140] The limited number of modern medical facilities in the rural areas where the majority of Malays lived discouraged conversion to modern practices.

TABLE XIII. BIRTH, DEATH, AND INFANT MORTALITY RATES

Year	Federated Malay States			Straits Settlements		
	Malays	Chinese	All races	Malays	Chinese	All races
			Births per 1,000 population			
1930	39.5	40.9[a]	36.5	42.5	39.5	38.3
1932	36.6	31.9	34.0	37.8	37.4	35.8
1934	37.8	35.1	35.4	37.2	44.3	40.7
1936	43.4	38.5	38.7	43.1	48.0	44.3
1938	43.7	42.3	39.7	38.8[d]	46.5[d]	42.1[d]
1940	43.1	42.4	39.7			
1947[b]	41.8	44.0	43.2			45.9
1948[c]	37.5	43.9	40.7			46.2
			Deaths per 1,000 population			
1930	20.4	30.4[a]	24.1	27.4	28.8	27.3
1932	19.1	18.3	18.5	24.0	21.3	21.4
1934	23.7	20.9	21.4	30.2	25.7	26.5
1936	21.5	18.5	19.2	29.5	24.4	24.9
1938	21.2	18.8	19.1	25.3[d]	22.5[d]	22.5[d]
1940	21.8	18.8	18.6			
1947[b]	24.6	14.3	19.5			13.3
1948[c]	19.8	12.9	16.4			12.4
			Infant mortality per 1,000 live births			
1930	160	173	163	224	184	194
1932	135	141	137	195	155	162
1934	181	151	163	236	154	172
1936	149	139	142	222	155	171
1938	153	141	147	193[d]	144[d]	156[d]
1940	146	131	134			
1947[b]	129	70	102			87
1948[c]	111	67	89			81

[a]Chinese birth and death rates rose approximately 15 and 7 per 1,000 people, respectively, in 1927-30 above the rates of the preceding 5 years.

[b]Rates are for the Malayan Union and Singapore.

[c]Rates are for the Federation of Malaya and Singapore.

[d]Rates are for 1937.

Sources: Federated Malay States Medical Department Annual Report 1930, p 204; Federated Malay States, Report of the Registrar-General of Births and Deaths, 1932, 1934, 1936, 1938, 1940; Federation of Malaya, Reports on the Registration of Births and Deaths for the Year 1948; Malayan Union, Annual Report of the Medical Department 1947; Straits Settlements, Annual Report of the Registration of Births and Deaths 1930, 1932, 1934, 1936, 1937; UN Non-self-governing Territories 1947, p 377 and 1951, p 269.

(4) The Chinese preference for highly milled rice led to many cases of beri-beri. A greater occurrence of malnutrition among the Chinese was prevented, however, by their choice of a varied diet including generous portions of vegetables. The Malay diet lacked this variety and especially the vegetables. Its relative deficiency to the Chinese diet became obvious when the infant mortality rates of the two groups living together in urban areas were compared (table XIII, see Straits Settlements). The infant mortality rates for urban Malays far exceeded the rates of both the urban and rural Chinese and rural Malays. Infantile beri-beri was a prime factor. In the cities where everyone ate polished rice, the more varied diet of the Chinese protected many from beri-beri. In the kampongs in the rice fields, where Malay infant death rates were lowest, the people followed the same food habits as the city dwellers, but the rice they ate was unpolished and consequently richer in the B vitamin that prevented beri-beri. The high Malay infant mortality rates were due, however, to a combination of other factors as well. These included the custom of restricting the diet of pregnant women, thereby debilitating both mother and child, and the weaning of babies as early as possible and feeding them a diet of rice.[141]

b. Morbidity information. Both the FMS and SS kept relatively complete records of the number of deaths due to specific diseases as well as the total number of deaths that occurred each year. Unfortunately, only about 25 percent of the deaths were annually certified by a medical practitioner in the FMS during the preconflict period. In the SS, 70 percent of the deaths were certified by a doctor, but about 25 percent of these medically certified deaths were registered merely by looking at the corpse.[142] Cause-specific death rates were calculated from the figures reported by the Health Departments of the FMS, SS, and Federation of Malaya. These rates were recognized as inaccurate and used only to reveal the more important causes of death and suggest changes in the incidence of specific diseases with regard to time (table XIV).

(1) Malaria was undoubtedly more prevalent in the FMS but was identified less frequently than in the SS. Much of the gain made in controlling this disease was wiped out during the Japanese occupation, but rapid progress was made in rehabilitating the antimalarial work immediately after the war.[143] Convulsions usually referred to a condition occurring in infants caused by malaria, respiratory and alimentary system diseases, helminthiasis, and malnutrition. A large portion of these deaths were undoubtedly due to infantile beri-beri. Tuberculosis and pneumonia were uncontrolled both before and during the preconflict period. The apparent drop in deaths due to tuberculosis after 1930 reflected only the departure from Malaya of many tubercular Chinese. During 1931 and 1932, repatriation of Indians and Chinese occurred to an abnormal extent, and the vast majority of the people departing Malaya were the weak and sick who could no longer perform the work expected of them on the estates and mines. The lowered

TABLE XIV. MORTALITY RATES OF IMPORTANT CAUSES OF DEATH

Disease	FMS 1930	FMS 1937	Fed 1948	SS 1930	SS 1937	Singapore 1947
Malaria	160	58	26	429	95	
Fevers of undefined origin	812	723	119	172	266	
Convulsions	230	241	[a]	460	340	162
Pneumonia and bronchopneumonia	180	157	50	250	238	132
Pulmonary tuberculosis	110	77	70	239	182	157
Dysentery, diarrhea, and enteritis	149	105	57	210	150	

[a]Not recorded.

Sources: Federated Malay States Annual Medical Department Report 1930 (1931); Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States Annual Medical Department Report 1937 (1938); Federation of Malaya Annual Medical Department Report 1948 (1949); Straits Settlements Annual Medical Department Report 1930 (1931); United Nations, Non-self Governing Territories 1948 (1949) p 377.

Chinese death rates in 1932 and the reduced number of Chinese hospital patients in 1934 were no doubt produced in part by this exodus of sick Chinese.[144]

(2) When the British returned in 1945, malaria and malnutrition were their primary concerns. Ironically, the shortage of rice had a beneficial effect in the cities, for when wheat and other foods were eaten as a substitute for rice, the incidence of beri-beri dropped. In 1948, tuberculosis had become the disease which attracted the greatest public interest. There was the general impression that a noticeable increase had occurred, particularly in the young adult population, as a result of malnutrition during the Japanese occupation. There was an increased demand for modern medical treatment among all classes of the community, but it could not be met because of the serious shortage of staff, especially doctors, for the Medical Department. Pneumonia did not receive special attention in 1948 or any prior year. Almost all antituberculosis work commenced after 1948.[145]

(3) While the preceding data indicated the more important causes of death, it did not show the ethnic incidence of these diseases. Only the FMS hospital inpatient records were reported in such detail, but many factors influenced these records. The Chinese willingness and Malay reluctance to be hospitalized was evident. Chinese hospital admissions were proportionately three times as great as Malay admissions. The high Chinese case mortality rate did not mean that the Chinese succumbed more easily than the other groups, but rather that the Chinese usually worked until they were too ill to carry on any longer.[146] Hospital records supported the repeated medical observation that the incidence of and fatality from tuberculosis, pneumonia, beriberi, and cirrhosis of the liver were particularly high among the Chinese. No program was established by any of the Government health agencies to thwart any of these diseases, except beri-beri, prior to 1948.

(4) In 1930, the State of Perak enjoyed the lowest death rate for Malays and Indians in the FMS, but the Chinese death rate was higher than in any of the other States. It was significant that over 50 percent of the mines and over 63 percent of the miners were found in Perak. The vast majority of miners were Chinese. In Negri Sembilan, where there were only 1,218 Chinese mining laborers, the Chinese death rate was the lowest in the Federation. With few exceptions, mining lands were sites of squallor containing communal kongsi huts built for laborers and dilapidated hovels occupied by squatters. Latrines were built over open ditches, ponds, or streams. The dirt floors of the kongsi huts were fouled with sputum. Refuse was dumped around the huts, and there was no effective drainage of the area. The water supply generally was adequate in quantity but not quality. Pneumonia and tuberculosis were the two most important killing diseases among the laborers. Durint 1930, efforts were made to have mines adopt some simple health standards regarding housing, water supply, and sewage and refuse disposal. These met with failure because "it was considered an unpropitious time to require the adoption of even these elementary health principles."[147] The dramatic decline in the Chinese death rate immediately following 1930 was believed due to the decreased demand for Chinese mine laborers caused by the drop in the price of tin and the application of the tin quota under the International Tin Restriction Agreement. The Chinese returned to China were in large the infirm who had been the first to lose their jobs.[148]

(5) In 1933, Government concern developed regarding the health and well-being of the Chinese. Protective labor legislation was passed and health inspections of estates and mines employing Chinese were begun. These inspections were very superficial, however, and did not approach the control wielded over the estates employing Tamils. Suggestions pertaining to health measures were submitted to the mine managers by health officers, but no legal means existed to compel compliance.[149] In 1937, mine managers were still under no legal obligation to submit health statistics, nor were they controlled as far as health measures were

concerned, but the larger mines usually cooperated with the Health Department and complied with recommendations for improving water supplies, sanitation, and housing for workers.[150] After the war, mines were not inspected by Health Department officers, but the Labor Code was applied to mines in Perak thus putting them on the same footing as estates. There were still no hospitals on mines as there were on estates, in either 1947 or 1948. Laborers were sent to Government hospitals.[151]

(6) Throughout the preconflict period, overcrowding of Chinese laborers in unsanitary dwellings existed in the town as well as on mines. In both places, exposure to massive droplet infection resulted in a high incidence of pneumonia and tuberculosis. Hakkas and Cantonese made up the bulk of the tin miners, and in the 1930's the Hakkas showed a tendency toward leftist politics. After the war, many of the leftist leaders were Hakkas or Hailams, and the settlements in mining districts became connected with terrorist activities.[152]

c. Mortality rates. During the thirties in both the FMS and SS, the Malay and Chinese infant and general death rates did not change. The Chinese death rates were, however, consistently lower than the Malays. The high Malay death rates reflected their high rate of infant mortality. The contributing causes to Malay infant deaths were identified as the customary deficient diet fed pregnant women and babies, syphilis, anemia of pregnancy, and ignorant and untrained midwives.[153]

(1) In 1948, the Registrar-General of Births and Deaths of the Federation of Malaya explained the ethnic group variation in vital rates as follows:

> The Chinese high birth-rate and low death-rate are due to some extent to the high proportion of young adults in the population. The figures for Malays are not affected by this factor, and they reflect a real improvement in the public health. . . . The reduction in infantile deaths and death-rates is evident in every race and in every State or Settlement. The greatest reduction is for Malays. The Chinese infantile death-rate is still well below the pre-war levels, and it is probable that rationing may still have its influence in causing the omission to report some of the infantile deaths.[154]

(2) Maternity mortality rates were not distinguished by ethnic group until 1936; it was then learned that the Malay rate was 13.2 per thousand births while the Chinese rate was 4.9 per thousand, a rate only slightly higher than that in England. The low Chinese rate was believed due to the good midwifery services, while conversely the Malays high rate was due to poor midwives. These rates remained almost unchanged throughout the remainder of the thirties. In 1948,

although the rates had dropped from both the Chinese and Malays, the disparity between the groups remained (the Chinese rate was 3.2 and the Malay rate 8.4 per 1,000 live births).[155]

97. Government attitude regarding drugs and their use. Not only was opium smoking legal in Malaya, but the revenue derived from opium was important to the Government. In return for a tax, the British granted opium farms to Chinese desiring them. About half of the Straits Settlements yearly income between 1898 and 1906 came from the taxation of opium. This tax was less important in the Federated Malay States, where more important sources of revenue were available.

a. Despite the Colony's dependence upon the opium tax, administrators misgivings regarding opium finally led to the appointment of a Commission in 1907 to investigate all aspects of opium smoking in Malaya. The Opium Commission published its findings and recommendations in 1908 and 1909. It concluded that opium smoking in moderation was relatively harmless, while excessive smoking produced minor digestive disorders and loss of energy. Petty theft was the only crime associated with opium, and in this respect opium addiction was preferable to the alternative habit of alcoholism, for "whereas opium tends to inaction, the tendency of alcohol is to activity."[156] The Commission felt that not only were the evils arising from the habit insufficient to prohibit opium, but that the Chinese population would not accept or respect such a prohibition. Registration of smokers was rejected because it was feared this would hamper Chinese immigration--and there was a demand for more laborers. The Commissioners further felt that the Straits Settlements could not afford to lose the opium tax money. The alternative methods of raising revenue through custom houses, poll tax, income tax, or a tax on savings taken to China were either unenforceable or economic suicide for the colony. Furthermore, local prohibition without concomitant international opium control would only induce smuggling. The Commission did however recommend the following Government controls: selling opium to women and children under 18 would be a legal offense, women would not enter licensed opium shops, and the drug would not be used in brothels. Most important, the Government would monopolize the importation and preparation of opium. Subsequently, the Government Monopolies Department took possession of the opium farms in Singapore, Penang, and Malacca in 1910; Johore, Selangor, Perak, and Perlis in 1911; Labuan and Kelantan in 1913; and Trengganu in 1917. The poppy was not cultivated in Malaya; instead the raw opium was imported and made into a smokable form (chandu) by the Government Opium Monopoly in a central factory in Singapore. In 1924 licensed shops were abolished, and the various Malayan Governments monopolized the retailing of opium.

b. The British Malaya Opium Committee was opposed to smoker registration, but the Geneva Opium Conferences of 1924-25 and subsequent international opinion led to the introduction of voluntary registration in 1928 and compulsory registration in 1929. Registration

was tightened progressively and rationing introduced. In 1931 many States would only sell opium to Chinese men. No new smokers were allowed to register after 1 January 1935 except on medical grounds. No new measures were taken to control opium until November 1943, when the British Government decided to abolish its opium operations and adopt a policy of total prohibition of opium smoking in British and British protected territories in the Far East.[157] Since the British did not return to Malaya until September 1945, this policy was not implemented until then. In February 1946, the British Military Government in Malaya issued the Opium and Chandu Proclamation. Both consumption of and traffic in opium were made punishable by specified fines and imprisonment. In 1948 the Proclamation was amended to allow for the treatment of addicts, and a new Deleterious Drugs Ordinance to cover all drugs was under preparation.[158]

c. The 1933 Joint Report to the League of Nations for the Straits Settlements and Federated and Unfederated Malay States stated that Indian hemp was neither indigenous nor cultivated in the country, furthermore it was prohibited to produce, possess, or use the drug. Total seizures of Indian hemp in all territories amounted to only 139.9 kg in 1933 and 102 kg in 1934.[159]

d. Between 1930 and 1938, the number of registered opium smokers dropped from 42,751 to 27,441, and the quantity of opium sold legally decreased from 73,515.9 to 42,212.7 pounds.[160] Since the use and sale of opium became illegal in 1943, there was no way of ascertaining the scope of the traffic in and use of opium in 1948. In 1965 opium smuggling continued to be a serious problem for the police.[161]

e. Opium smoking was almost exclusively a Chinese habit. This was demonstrated in 1936 when 28,069 Chinese but only 87 people of all other groups including Indians and Malays registered as opium smokers in the Straits Settlements. In the Chinese community, opium was considered a panacea. It not only cured sorrow and was fun but was often recommended by Chinese doctors to cure common ailments.

f. The majority of the smokers in both the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States acquired the habit while living in Malaya. The immigrant Chinese in the early 1900's belonged primarily to the farmer class, and in China both the price of opium and the influence of the family elder had acted as deterrents to the acquisition of the opium habit. Opium smoking was more prevalent among Straits-born Chinese than those born in China, possibly, as Purcell suggests, because the Straits-born Chinese were more affluent. The 1936 registration of smokers indicated, however, that a reverse had occurred, for 26,698 of the 28,069 registered Chinese opium smokers that year had been born in China.[162]

g. Since opium was smoked by such a large number of Chinese in Malaya, it must be assumed that at least a few of the smokers were

Communists. Opium was not, however, associated with the Communist movement in Malaya in any of the literature dealing with the preconflict period. According to the Report on the Suppression of Opium Smoking in the Federation of Malaya for the year 1948, there were comparatively few young healthy addicts, and the majority were Chinese who had become addicts while seeking relief from pain.[163]

98. Diet and food habits. The three main ethnic groups of Malaya, the Malays, Chinese, and Indians, each followed very different diets. The food habits of each group played important roles in the degree of good health each group enjoyed, but the individual family income was the prime factor in determining the adequacy of the diet.[164] Since only the attitudes of the Chinese and Malays are of interest in this study, only their dietary and nutritional differences were considered.

a. Rice was the main constituent of all the diets, but each group prepared it differently. Fish furnished most of the protein in the diet. While the Malays ate oxen, buffaloes, and goats, the Chinese monopolized the pig market. Poultry was raised by all groups, and both chicken and duck eggs were eaten.

b. The Chinese ate highly milled rice, while the rural Malays, who were the rice growers of the country, ate theirs unpolished and consequently vitamin richer. During the 1930's the vast majority of cases of beri-beri (caused by a deficiency of thiamine, Vitamin B1) in both the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States occurred in Chinese, due it was said to this preference for highly polished rice. Ironically the incidence of beri-beri increased during periods of prosperity, for the Chinese ate the polished rice whenever they could afford it. After the liberation, a shortage of rice necessitated the use of alternative foods, especially wheat, and this led to a reduction of nutritional diseases, especially beri-beri.

c. It was not until 1937 that the Health Department of the FMS realized beri-beri was also common among the Malay population in non-rice-growing areas where milled rice was sold. The infant mortality rate among Malays in Malacca in 1940 was 257 per 1,000 live births and was, due in large to beri-beri. The disease was abetted by the Malay beliefs that rice was the staff of life for infants, and fish was bad for children.[165]

99. Available food supplies. One of the first projects undertaken by the Division of Nutrition of the Institute for Medical Research, after its creation in 1946, was to determine the adequacy of the Malay diet and the root cause of poor diets. It found that rice-growing populations suffered from malnutrition seasonally immediately prior to harvest time. Coconut-growing communities had health standards similar to rice-growing areas, while fishing communities enjoyed the best health.[166] A 1940 survey of a Malay fishing village in Kalantan found that fruits

were enjoyed, but green vegetables even when readily available were eaten only as a relish with meals. Although the diet was not ideally balanced nutritionally, it satisfied the energy needs of the people. Most important, there was always the opportunity to obtain more food and to raise one's income level by expending more effort if one so desired.[167]

a. In 1947, a field investigation was conducted among the Malays of Malacca. Although the area was free of malaria, it had a poorer health record than any other part of Malaya, except parts of the east coast; yet the living conditions of this area were considered typical of a large section of the peasant population in Malaya. The calculated average food intake of the survey group (table XV) was found nutritionally inadequate, and local morbidity and mortality rates supported

TABLE XV. DAILY PER CAPITA NUTRIENT INTAKE

Diet constituents	Estimated requirement[1]	Malays (1947) Average consumption[2]	Chinese (1952) Average consumption[3]
Calories	2,100.0	1,630.0	1,600
Protein (gm)	60.0	47.0	37
Calcium (gm)	0.9	0.6	
Iron (mg)	10.0	12.0	
Vitamin A (units)	4,000.0	2,400.0	
Vitamin B (mg)	1.1	0.9	
Riboflavin (mg)	1.5	0.5	
Niacin (mg)	10.0	8.6	
Vitamin C (mg)	30.0	40.0	

[1]Estimated per capita requirements of the Malay survey group were based on a normal adult weight of 55 kg and a distribution within the group of infants, pregnant women, and different occupational groups. The National Research Council "Recommended Dietary Allowances, revised, 1945" was adjusted and used.

[2]Survey was made of Malays living in Malacca; these people were believed typical of "a large section of the peasant population of Malaya."

[3]Diet of a Chinese (Hakkien) market gardening community on Singapore Island.

Sources: Malayan Union Medical Department Annual Report 1947 (1948) pp 8-9; Federation of Malaya Institute for Medical Research Annual Report 1952 (1955) p 26.

the dietary findings. The caloric and protein intake in the different households varied directly with the money spent on food, and the latter was directly proportional to the income. The prevalent ribovlavin (Vitamin B2) and Vitamin A deficiencies were not related to cost but to dietary habit; cheaper diets often being more adequate than expensive ones.[168]

b. This field investigation was extended and a similar relationship between food, income, and work appeared also to exist in other Malay communities. Family incomes of fishermen, small property holders, and employed laborers were compared with regard to the diets each family followed, and it was concluded that income was the most important diet determiner. When families classified as well to do (approximately 30 percent of those surveyed) were excluded, as much as 80 to 95 percent of the income of the remaining families was spent on food. Those who worked the least hours had the lowest average income and the poorest diet. Means of earning supplemental income were available, so it appeared that the people in this study had the same freedom of choice to determine their own economic and nutritional level as the Kelantan villagers had had. Fishing families consistently were better nourished regardless of income. A special survey of Malay constables drawn from peasant communities was made to ascertain any changes in eating patterns when more money was available. These Malays each consumed 3,000 calories or more daily when the opportunity offered.[169]

c. Unfortunately, the nutritional studies conducted by the Division of Nutrition during the late 1940's dealt almost exclusively with Malay and Indian subjects. A brief survey carried out in a small Chinese timber cutting community in 1949 disclosed that the adult males performed 8-9 hours of heavy labor (more than any of the Malays in the preceding study) but consumed as much as 4,000 to 5,000 calories daily of a varied well-balanced diet rich in eggs, soy beans, pork, and other proteins.[170]

d. A description of the eating practices in Singapore in 1937 appears to be applicable to the majority of the urban Chinese during the preconflict period up to the Japanese occupation. While almost any article of food was available, cost determined the contents of the staple diet. Most of the Chinese population lived on rice, pork, a small amount of fresh or dried fish, and a variable quantity of vegetables. The diet was poor in protein, and the borderline of vitamin deficiency was often passed. Housing conditions made cooking at home difficult and created a demand for cooked foods which were supplied by hawkers in the streets. Almost invariably the food sold was prepared in dirty premises, exposed to gross contamination, and was a common source of typhoid and other intestional infections.[171] An endeavor was made to license and medically examine the hawkers, but in 1947 control of hawkers was still considered inadequate.[172]

e. In 1952, the diet of the poor Chinese (Hakkien) living in a market gardening community on Singapore Island provided approximately 1,600 calories per capita per day and about 37 grams of protein, of which about one-fifth was derived from animal sources. Approximately 80 percent of the calorie value of this diet was contributed by carbohydrates, 12 percent by fat, and only 8 percent by protein. It was thought that this diet was a cause of the uncommonly high incidence of cirrhosis of the liver among Chinese in the lower income groups.[173]

f. No accurate data exists on the level of nutrition and availability of food between 1942 and 1945, but medical examinations conducted immediately following the liberation of Malaya disclosed considerable malnutrition; in some groups up to 30 percent of the people examined showed serious symptoms.[174] The Japanese confiscated rice crops; consequently farmers refused to grow crops at full capacity and production fell by at least one-third.[175] Ships were not available to bring rice from Burma and Thailand, and the urban unemployed either subsisted on tapioca or moved to the countryside. The Japanese aided this trend by rounding up town dwellers and shipping them to remote farming colonies to clear land and plant food crops.[176] Thousands of urban Chinese became "squatters" in the jungle to escape both starvation and Japanese intimidation.[177] After the liberation, these farming colonies became the worst centers of malnutrition and disease and constituted a special problem for the British Military Administration.[178]

g. Food shortages were not relieved when the Japanese occupation ended. On the liberation of Malaya in September 1945, malnutrition was widespread, particularly among children. Supplementary foodstuffs were distributed immediately in the larger towns by the military administration, Red Cross, and other voluntary organizations. In 1946 only 40 percent of the normal rice requirements were available. Beginning in 1946, milk was distributed to school children, and in 1948 preschool children were included, and free snacks were added to the school feeding program.[179] In 1949 the general state of nutrition in the country finally reached, and possibly exceeded, the prewar standard. Rice shortages had produced an unexpected advantage; the incidence of nutritional diseases, particularly beri-beri, decreased when people were compelled to substitute other foods for rice.[180]

100. Malnutrition. Malaya by 1939 enjoyed the reputation of having the highest standard of living of any Asian country.[181] The literature about Malaya abounds with information concerning the economic achievements of the Chinese: their economic supremacy was obvious to all. It was therefore natural to assume the Chinese as individuals and as a group reaped more benefits, including food, than the other ethnic groups. Health records, however, did not support this assumption; instead they indicated that the Chinese suffered from malnutrition more than any other group during the 1930's. Even the 1952 diet of the poor Chinese compared unfavorably with the diet of the Malay poor in 1947, a time of more malnutrition. These statistics

suggest that while many Chinese were prosperous, the Chinese majority, who were poor, lived at a level bordering on malnutrition. Furthermore, their more urban life restricted their opportunity to supplement their diet--a problem which did not confront most Malays. In 1947, an estimated one-third of the child population of the poorer and middle classes in Singapore suffered from malnutrition.[182]

101. Sanitation.

a. Piped water supplies for towns in the FMS were derived from three main sources: upland streams, heavily polluted rivers and canals, and wells. In 1930 the water systems were examined, the defects noted, and plans formulated to improve storage and filtration and require chlorination. By 1937 most of these plans had been accomplished, and the water supplies to the larger towns were treated by sedimentation and filtration and chlorination when necessary. Water supplies were checked by bacterial and chemical analysis, and a high standard of purity was general.

(1) In the larger villages in 1930, the usual practice was to construct a public well. It was fitted with a pump, which was soon broken. As a result, if water was taken from the well, it was obtained by individuals, each with his own kerosene can or bucket and piece of rope. By 1937, many of the larger estates had a purified piped water supply, and village supplies were being improved either by providing a piped supply or by protecting existing wells. Purification plants for treating river water were constructed in Perak.

(2) Singapore had a piped pure water supply in 1931. In the outlying districts, however, water was derived from shallow subsoil wells. In those areas where ravines adjacent to kampongs had been drained through antimalaria work, the subsoil pipe systems were drained into semiprotected wells to serve the rural inhabitants. The Singapore municipal water pipes were gradually extended into the rural areas. By 1937 rural Singapore derived its water from the city piped supply, deep wells, antimalaria wells, shallow wells, and piped subsoil water. All water was regularly tested for purity.

(3) In 1947 all large towns in the Malayan Union had piped water supplies, but prewar standards had not been restored because materials were lacking. The water supply in rural areas was from wells usually of the shallow type, but many kampongs depended upon the rivers for their supply.[183]

b. There were no main sewage installations in the Federation of Malaya. Septic tanks existed in the more modern buildings in most of the large towns, but the main means of sewage disposal in towns was the bucket system. In rural areas, bore hole latrines, pit latrines, and overstream latrines were used throughout Malaya and Singapore Island. Latrines were also built over ponds to provide food for fish

or water suitable for the cultivation of vegetables. In 1937 the towns of Singapore and Penang supplemented the existing septic tanks and bucket systems with sewers; no other changes were effected anywhere else during the 1930-48 time period.[184]

c. Malays frequently bought "snacks" as treats, but a good portion of the food eaten by urban Chinese was purchased from hawkers who cooked and served it on the street. Some of the hawkers had fixed stalls in streets and market places; others were itinerant. Almost invariably the food was exposed to gross contamination and was a source of intestinal infections. The Health Departments in both Singapore and the FMS inspected restaurants, dairies, markets, bakeries, and cattle sheds and tried to limit and license food hawkers. They fought a never-ending battle and achieved few successes.[185]

d. Economic depression in 1930 reduced building costs, and housing development by landowners increased. New zoning plans were prepared, old unsanitary settlements were demolished, and new settlements constructed. In later years before the Japanese invasion, systematic demolition of unsanitary houses and slum clearance occurred continually in the large towns. Plans for all new buildings had to pass the scrutiny of both a town planning committee and the district Health Officer. The degree of success achieved in the towns was not discussed. A detailed sanitary survey of many villages was, however, conducted in 1936. Inspection revealed the existence of overcrowding, poor lighting and ventilation, unsanitary latrines, and improperly constructed drains. Where houses could be made sanitary at reasonable expense, nuisance notices were served on the owners. In 1947, much of the time of the Sanitary Inspectors was spent dealing with the greatly increased number of unsanitary unauthorized houses erected in urban areas during the occupation. Prewar slum areas had expanded and become more congested, and new slums had developed. Demolition was impractical and impossible because there were no alternative accommodations for the occupants.[186]

e. Preferential treatment for Malays extended beyond the political realm into the health field. The Indians too were favored in matters of health as a result of the 1922 Emigration Act passed by the Indian Government. This act set wage, living condition, and medical facility standards that Malayan planters were required to supply Indian workers.[187] It was the accepted belief that the Chinese were quite capable and able to protect their own interests. Estate health conditions were closely monitored by the Health Department, but conditions on mines (where the labor force was almost totally Chinese) were left to the discretion of the mine managers. The Health Department was legally powerless to correct unsanitary mining conditions (see para 96b(3) above).

102. Health facilities, personnel, and programs.

a. There were 59 treatment centers in the FMS in 1930. These included hospitals, social hygiene clinics, and dispensaries; and they contained a total of 6,656 beds. Estate patients represented a large portion of the patients, because little progress had as yet been made in providing estate hospitals as required under the Health Board Enactment.[188] By 1936, the FMS had 35 hospitals containing 6,733 beds, a mental hospital, a quarantine station, two leper settlements, 98 dispensaries, 43 infant welfare centers, and an Institute for Medical Research. In addition, there were 132 estate hospitals with 6,064 beds.[189] In 1948, the Federation of Malaya had 72 Government hospitals containing 13,177 beds. These were supplemented in rural areas by small permanent dispensaries and motor dispensaries operating on main roads. The estate hospital situation had become unsatisfactory, for there was a tendency to close rather than repair them. There were 162 such hospitals with 6,637 beds. The closing of some estate hospitals had thrown an additional strain on the already overworked and understaffed Government hospitals.[190]

(1) In Singapore in 1932, the SS Medical Department maintained six hospitals, containing a total of 3,460 beds, plus a prison hospital and leper settlement.[191] In 1936 the summary of SS medical facilities listed 17 hospitals with 3,333 beds, a mental hospital, two quarantine stations, two leper settlements, 21 dispensaries, 27 infant welfare centers, and a college of medicine. Actually, these figures underestimated the total facilities, for while only three Government hospitals in Singapore containing 1,753 beds were included in the summary, the six listed in 1932 were still in existence containing the greater number of beds. There were no estate hospitals in Singapore or any hospitals located in the rural area of Singapore, but roads and transportation facilities were such that the rural population could easily obtain medical aid.[192] There were seven Government hospitals in Singapore in 1948 containing 2,720 beds. The leper settlement and the social hygiene clinic and prison hospitals contained an additional 490 beds.[193]

(2) To supplement the Government facilities in both the FMS and SS, wealthy Chinese founded and endowed hospitals and wards in hospitals, such as the Tan Tock Sing Hospital in Singapore, the Tai Wa wards in Kuala Lumpur, and the maternity hospitals in Selangor and Perak. Some were administered by the Government, while others were controlled by unofficial committees. All of these facilities were in active use in 1936 and might well have been in 1930 as well. The Chinese also contributed generously to relief funds.[194]

(3) In the interim between 1931 and 1947 (both census years), the population of Singapore rose from 557,745 to 938,144, and the population of the area that became the Federation of Malaya from 3,787,758 to 4,987,427.[195] For a population of slightly over three million in

1936 in the combined areas of the FMS and the SS, there were 10,066 hospital beds, a proportion of 3.7 beds for every 1,000 of the population (many beds were not included in the count and the actual proportion was more favorable). There were also 171 dispensaries.[196] At the end of 1946 there were 0.06 doctors and 4.4 hospital beds per 1,000 population in the Malayan Union, while in Singapore there were 0.2 doctors and 2.5 hospital beds per 1,000 population.[197]

(4) The preceding records indicate that medical facilities in Singapore did not expand with the growing population between 1930 and 1948. As a consequence, far fewer facilities were available in 1948 per person than in 1930, due more to lack of expansion than the effects of war. In the FMS, both private and Government medical facilities improved throughout the thirties. The Chinese financed additional hospitals for themselves. Estate workers reaped the greatest medical benefits, however, as a result of laws requiring estates to maintain hospitals for their employees. During the years of Japanese occupation, medical facilities deteriorated, and after the war many private estate hospitals were not rehabilitated. The Chinese-endowed hospitals apparently survived.

b. Personnel. The changes that occurred in the percentage of deaths certified by doctors each year served as an indicator of change in the availability of doctors for the population. They indicated almost no change occurred.

(1) Eighty percent of the death certificates in Singapore in 1930 were certified by a doctor, but in 25 percent of those so certified, the medical practitioner had only viewed the body after death. In 1937, 84 percent of the deaths in Singapore were medically certified, but again 25 percent were not seen by a doctor until after death. Fewer deaths were recorded by medical practitioners in other parts of Malaya. In 1930, 27.8 percent of the deaths in the FMS were certified by doctors, and in the Federation of Malaya in 1948, 23 percent of the deaths were certified by a doctor who saw the deceased person alive.[198]

(2) The majority of midwives trained in Government hospitals were Malays, while the Chinese as a rule trained in the Chinese maternity hospitals. When the Malay women finished their training, they were sent to the villages to work and were paid a small salary. Few were able to establish themselves in private practice, however, because their Malay patients refused to pay them for their services, being well aware of the small salaries already paid the midwives. Chinese midwives were not confronted with this problem, and as early as 1935 the Health Department wrote that the Chinese community was well provided with midwives.[199]

c. Programs. The Health Departments of the FMS and the SS, as well as the FMS Institute for Medical Research, spent a major part of their time and energy combating malaria. With the exception of beriberi, other health problems were neglected as a consequence. A paper

submitted to the Advisory Council of the Eastern Bureau, League of Nations, Singapore, stated:

> The interest shown in pneumonia has not so far been proportionate to the gravity of the problem. . . . This may be related to the fact that pneumonia has not interfered with the settlement of the whites in the tropics as is the case with malaria. Only in big explorations when the disease has assumed the proportions of an economic menace has the problem been adequately approached.[200]

103. Summary and conclusions.

a. The Malay death rate was higher than the Chinese rate during the entire preconflict period. This was due mainly to the Malays' diet customs and their limited use of the medical facilities made available to them. Their demands for food and modern medicine never exceeded the supply that they at least believed they could attain.

b. The Chinese were cognizant of the advantages of modern medicine and even supplemented the Government facilities with their own hospitals. Their maternity hospitals and midwives were very influential in lowering the Chinese death rate. The poor Chinese laborer who lived on the tin mines or in the urban slums, however, could not afford to stop working. He took advantage of available medical facilities only when he was too sick to continue working. When he suffered from malnutrition (other than beri-beri), it was because he could not afford enough food or the right foods rather than that he had chosen the wrong foods through custom. His working conditions were among the poorest, because health laws did not protect him. He was aware of food inadequacies and his inability to adequately utilize available health facilities. Furthermore, he did not share the Malay's belief that he had it within his power to raise his living level by increasing his own efforts if he so desired for he was already working to the limit of his capacity. The areas that later were most involved in the conflict were the tin mine settlements, where health levels were lowest.

c. Opium was legal in Malaya until 1943. Opium smoking was almost exclusively a Chinese habit, and many were addicted. While it was harmful to the individual, it anesthetized him to his problems. Smokers tended toward inaction, not violence.

CHAPTER 5

MILITARY FACTORS

by C. Suzanne Rebourgiere

Section I. Background Information

104. Malaya's importance. Malaya's location in Southeast Asia is strategically important. It provides the overland route between the islands and the mainland of Asia. Control of Malaya means control of major lines of communication between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean and the ability to form a barrier to shipping between that Sea and the Bay of Bengal. The Strait of Malacca is so narrow that Malaya easily could control passage through it. Modern Malaysia's neighbors add to its importance and pose possible threats. The Philippines are northwest of Sabah; Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam are north of Malaya; Indonesia lies to the south; and Indonesia's Riau Islands are only 20 miles southeast of Singapore. These Islands could be important bases and staging areas for possible Indonesian action against Malaya. In the 1960's, the Riau Islands were supposed to have been used as bases for Indonesian paratroopers and guerrillas who penetrated Malaya to establish operational bases there. The Natuna Islands, also part of Indonesia, are on the route between Malaya and Borneo, and, even though they are more than 500 miles from Malaya's east coast, they are in position to interfere with communications between the Malay Peninsula and the segments of Malaysia in Borneo. Malaya's powerful, Peking-oriented Communist neighbor, Indonesia, poses a threat, and Malaysia's Government and people are intensely concerned with suppressing Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Today, because of its close affiliation with the Western powers and its strong anti-Communist policies, Malaysia plays a significant role in the balance of forces in Southeast Asia. As a member of the British Commonwealth, it is protected by a mutual defense agreement with the United Kingdom; and the United States also has a strong interest in its survival. In addition to its geographical significance, Malaya's stores of tin and rubber were (and continue to be) factors of military importance.

105. Military geography. The climate of Malaya means little to the footsoldier except that he is often hot and wet. His major problem is the difficulty of travel over rough terrain. The airman has more serious problems with the weather. On the windward sides of the mountains, rains are often continuous and the visibility is poor; and on the leeward sides, the air is turbulent. April and October bring heavy thunder storms; from October through March, the northwest monsoon causes low clouds to form east of the mountains, and the rains are heavy; the southwest monsoon, from late May to September, brings intermittent rains to the southwest. As a consequence, flying often is restricted

and visibility is poor. As for the geographical aspects, Malaya's physical characteristics make the country better suited to unconventional guerrilla-type operations than to conventional conflicts. The very nature of the terrain limits the size of the units that can be used. Only two places on the Peninsula have large anough open areas to allow battalion-size units to be used, and then not effectively.

a. The primary feature of Malaya is its jungle. It covers about 80 percent of the Peninsula, and no important social or economic settlement is more than a few hours' march away. Visibility is poor, and there are almost no good fields of fire. Command and control is difficult to maintain, and much depends on the ability, initiative, and training of both the unit leaders and the individual soldiers. One of the principal requirements for military success in Malaya is the ability of units and individuals to move and fight effectively in the jungle, for, to command Malaya, it is necessary to control the jungle. Jungle-trained leaders and soldiers are essential. The determinant of success against the Communist terrorists in Malaya was the excellent training for jungle fighting which the British troops had received. There were other factors, of course, especially the superior communications capabilities available to British troops and Malayan soldiers and police and the capability for airdropping supplies to units in the jungle. Without these, the Communist groups had to move slowly, lacked adequate communications and intelligence, and were forced to depend on friendly (or intimidated) individuals in jungle-edge settlements for information and supplies of food and arms.

b. Most mountainous areas are covered with forest and dense, virtually impassible undergrowth. The overall terrain is broken by rivers, which rise in the central ranges and flow in all directions to the sea. There is a network of roads and communication facilities on the western coast, but cross-country movement is either extremely difficult or even, in some areas, impossible.

c. Cleared, habitable areas are few, the largest being located in a narrow band from 10 to 50 miles wide along the western coast. Most of Malaya's people (approximately 8 million) live on this coast within 30 miles of the sea. Tin mines and rubber plantations are also situated in this narrow strip. Only two inland areas, both the sites of tin mines, have substantial concentrations of people. The two coasts are completely dissimilar, and even the attitudes of the people differ. The bustle of trade and the prosperity of the west coast contrast sharply with the quieter, less sophisticated life on the east coast.

d. Low plains surround the Malay Peninsula and lie inland between the mountain ranges. Coastal plains are usually flat, with swamps that cover wide areas and marshes that reach far inland. Although the freshwater swamp forests that extend along the entire west coast and the southern half of the eastern alluvial lowlands are not always under

water, they are subject to irregular flooding. Harbors have been developed along the west coast despite the swamps and mudflats and the heavy silting at the mouths of rivers and outside the harbors. On the east coast, sandbars block the river mouths, navigation is limited because of heavy winds and high seas, and there are no important harbors. Coastal plains and shallow banks, caused by sedimentation, extend long distances into the sea.

e. Under British administration, some of the income from tin and rubber was used to build a network of roads and railroads. In 1942, the Japanese were able to push south from Thailand on the fairly extensive main peninsular highways, but there were few feeder roads. The main north-south road ran along the western side of the mountains, and a railway paralleled the main road from Thailand to the southern part of the Peninsula. By 1935, there were over 5,000 miles of railroad in Malaya, all narrow-gage. Railways extended on both sides of the Peninsula, connecting Singapore with Penang on the west and with Bangkok on the east, and connecting Penang and Bangkok. Branch lines connected Port Swettenham, Port Dickson, Port Weld, and the port of Malacca with the western main line. Singapore was connected with Johore on the mainland by a causeway carrying both road and railroad. Locomotives for the railroads were manufactured in England and assembled in the central workshops at Kuala Lumpur. These shops had facilities also for repair and maintenance of locomotives and rolling stock. Cross-country travel, however, was extremely limited; the jungle was virtually impassible, and the rivers continue even today to be the only means of access to the interior.

f. A large number of rivers have their sources in the central mountain ranges and flow in all directions to the sea. Most western rivers are short, but the two longest are navigable for most of their courses (between 200 and 250 miles for navigation purposes). Rivers parallel the mountains and are crossed by east-west drainage streams. Water volumes change rapidly due to torrential rains. The heavy sudden rains, the dense vegetation, and the below-stream level of the lowlands impede runoff and result in the formation of swamps and marshes and in flooding.

g. Singapore's climate is similar to that of the mainland. The total area of the Island is only 224 square miles, and it is about 80 percent urban, with the rest under cultivation. The northern and southwestern coasts have large swamp areas. The western and southern parts have steep cliffs and small valleys. The city of Singapore is located on the southern part of the Island, with the naval base on the north. The harbor has excellent port facilities, and there is a modern airport.

h. Climatic differences between the Malayan mainland and the States of Sabah and Sarawak are minor. Both States are slightly hotter and wetter than the mainland. The northeast monsoon often stalls and

causes the rains to persist for days. The southwest monsoon's violent storms (sumatras) cause sudden severe flooding. Sarawak has no good harbors. The South China Sea off Sarawak is shallow; the shallow heavily silted rivers form great sandbars that create obstructions to upstream travel; and the beaches are muddy and fringed with thick palm and mangrove swamps. One of Sarawak's many rivers, the 350-mile Rajang, is navigable for small ocean vessels for about 60 miles and for smaller craft for about 150 miles. Rivers provide the only means of inland travel, and jungle paths connect their headwaters. Eastern Sabah, on the contrary, has many excellent deepwater ports, and the Island of Labuan in Brunei Bay has a good harbor that serves as the major port for Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei. Sabah's largest river, the Kinabatangan, flows generally from west to east into the Sandakan Bay and is navigable for launches for about 120 miles. Inland, the rugged country never has been explored, the unsurveyed borders are indeterminate, and an almost constant cloud cover prevents the use of aerial photography to determine the exact boundaries.

106. Military tradition. The early history of the Malay people is filled with wars of conquest and retribution and wars over succession to the thrones of the various States. Empires were formed by conquest, with the weaker States subjugated and forced to pay tribute, not just in wealth but in warriors and ships. Every Sultan had his palace guard and an army. In times of war, local levies supplemented the small regular forces, but this kind of forced military service naturally failed to produce a feeling for national military organization. From time to time, one State would join another against a third, but these joint ventures were temporary affairs made in the immediate interests of the allied States. There was no real attempt to form a union of the States, despite the fact that the Malays had the same ethnic background. The character of the terrain was one reason for the lack of such a union, for the permanent character of the individual and mutual jealousy of the States, and for the lack of identification with a larger unit, as a country or nation. The almost impassible tropical forests, heavy ground cover, and rough terrain made communication and travel by overland routes almost impossible. Warfare on land was primitive and on a small scale, consisting mostly of jungle ambushes and guerrilla-type engagements. Sea warfare was a natural outgrowth of the development of important world trade routes in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. The Malayan States and those in Borneo faced the sea, and their ports enabled them to exact tolls. More important, the ports and harbors became bases for pirates, who preyed on the shipping. Piracy was an accepted way of life for many. Under the Dutch monopoly of trade and enforcement of duties, many rulers of the States had either openly financed pirate fleets or encouraged them in return for a share of their plunder, and piracy continued to threaten shipping for some years after the arrival of the British. The type of warfare common in Malaya and surrounding areas was not designed for large military units. There was no need for large disciplined armies, and so none developed. There was

little chance under these conditions for a national consciousness to develop, and if any national military tradition was in the process of formation prior to the arrival of the Europeans, it did not survive.

107. The early years of British control. The acquisition in 1786 of Penang, a small island off the coast of Kedah, was the first step toward British control of Malaya. The second step was the assumption of protection over Singapore, which became an independent sultanate, separate from Dutch-controlled Johore in 1819 (an action engineered by the famous Englishman, Raffles). British sovereignty was recognized by a treaty with the Sultan of Kedah in 1824. Also, under the terms of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of the same year, approved by both Malays and Bugis, the Dutch recognized Singapore as a British possession and ceded Malacca to the British, retaining only the territories south of the Straits of Singapore and west of the Malaccan Strait. Eventual British control of all Malaya was assured.

a. Early British interests in this part of the world were concentrated on trading. In 1829, Penang, Malacca, and Singapore combined to form the Straits Settlements, but to the British their only real importance was that control over them gave control over the Straits and allowed the British to protect their shipping lanes from Gibraltar to Hong Kong. Promotion of economic interests in the area was definitely secondary to the denial of bases along the route to China to potentially dangerous frontier powers, protection of the route, and defense of India. Any political and administrative demands on the British related to Malaya and Singapore were avoided as much as possible.

b. Nothing happened prior to 1873 to change this attitude. The Dutch could not interfere under the terms of the 1824 treaty and had accepted settlement of differences with Sumatra (Gold Coast Treaties of 1871). France was content to administer its extraterritorial rights in Siam following recognition of the French protectorate over Cambodia (French-Siamese Settlement, 1867) and, in any event, was unable to interfere after its defeat by Prussia in 1871. The United States appeared to pose so little threat that a large concession it gained in North Borneo received little attention.

c. Then the situation changed, and the British decided to take action in Malaya, even to interfere in the affairs of some of the States. The Dutch had invaded northern Sumatra, and native princes offered to give island bases and trading monopolies to other foreign powers in an attempt to counterbalance Dutch power. Also, disorder and anarchy prevailed in Malaya, and the Sultans were seeking the aid of foreign powers to restore peace. The United Kingdom apparently was not among the foreign powers whose aid was solicited. During this period, Russia was the United Kingdom's most feared rival in Asia (conquests of the Khanates of central Asia in 1866-72 had brought Russia to the borders of Afghanistan); and the United States, Italy, and

Germany were also regarded now as possible threats to British supremacy in Asia.

d. There is no real evidence that any of the foreign countries concerned did attempt to gain influence or acquire land in Malaya, and it is probable that the British merely wanted to remove temptation in this instance. However, concern was aroused when the Malay princes sought help from European powers other than the United Kingdom, for the British certainly preferred to aid the Malay States rather than to admit other nations to the areas. Their decision to interfere was based not primarily on concern over conditions on the Peninsula or local economic interests but on a need to guard against foreign intervention in Southeast Asia. Reluctant as the British were to extend their commitments in Southeast Asia at this time, their fear of foreign encroachment led the United Kingdom to undertake the protection of the Malay States and to oversee their administration in the late 19th century.

108. Extension of British control. The Liberal government of the United Kingdom never considered annexation of Malaya, but, if order was to be restored, British influence would have to extend beyond the British settlements in Malaya. Eventually, control was extended over all Malaya, chiefly be means of protective treaties with the States' rulers. Such treaties were signed with Perak and Selangor in 1874 and with the Sultans of Negri Sembilan (1879) and Pahang (1888). In 1895, these four States formed the Federated Malay States (officially, the "Protected Malay States") under a centralized Government and accepted a British Resident-General. By the end of the 19th century, Southeast Asia's colonial map had been completed, and the United Kingdom was recognized as the most powerful influence in that part of the world. Siam ceded the four States of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis to the United Kingdom in 1909, but these States did not join the Federation, nor did Johore, which became a British protectorate in 1914. By this time, the United Kingdom was firmly cast in the role of protector of the peninsular States and Singapore, and the entire Malay Peninsula south of Siamese territory was under the British flag and British protection.

a. Along with the various treaties, the United Kingdom bound the rulers of several States to accept the advice of British Residents or Advisers. The only exceptions to the control exercised by these Residents were matters pertaining to the religion and customs of the people. Control and collection of revenues was administered under the advice of the Residents, which meant that the British controlled almost all administrative matters for the States. Some years later, the French accomplished the same thing in Cambodia, but there is little comparison of French and British methods, for, in many ways, the British intervened as little as possible in the domestic affairs of the States.

b. As the British established peaceful conditions, the ports grew rapidly. Singapore, whose growth was almost double that of Penang and Malacca combined, became the capital of the Straits Settlements. Until 1851, the Governor of the Settlements was responsible first to the Governmore of Bengal, then to the Governor-General of India. In 1858, the United Kingdom divested the East India Company of its governing powers, and control of the Settlements passed to the India Office in London. Throughout the period, members of the Indian Civil Service staffed the civil service in Malaya, and even the laws were adapted from Indian law. However, Singapore's trade had increased in value from less than £3 million in the 1820's to more than £13 million in 1864, and Settlements people resented the attempt of the Indian Government to tax the merchants, impose duties on ships entering Singapore harbor, and substitute the Indian rupee for the Straits dollar. The UK Government finally transferred administration of the Settlements to the Colonial Office in 1867, and the Straits Settlements became a crown colony, remaining so until after World War II.

109. Government in Malaya. Malaya was a political patchwork. There were 10 administrative units, consisting of the Straits Settlements and the nine Malay States.

a. The Straits Settlements consisted of Singapore Island, Penang Island, and Malacca. The British Governor was directly responsible to the British Parliament after 1867. In addition, there was an Executive Council, most of whose members were Government officials, and a Legislative Council. There was an official majority, because the Governor had both an initial and a casting (deciding) vote. All areas of government were brought under increasingly centralized control and under a fairly well-unified policy, primarily because the Governor of the Settlements also was the High Commissioner of the Malay States, to whom all Residents and Advisers were responsible.

b. Four of the Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang) had formed the Federated Malay States in 1895. These States had been governed by British Residents from the time they were placed under British protection by treaties with their rulers in the 1870's and 1880's. The Federated Malay States were administered separately. Each had a State Council, which had the administrative and legislative functions of the crown colony (Settlements) councils. All revenues were collected and all appointments made in the name of the ruler with the Resident's advice. Lack of communication between the States and Singapore (the Governor-General) resulted in differences and inequities in laws, taxation, and land administration.

c. The other five States (Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu) were known as the Unfederated States, and British Advisers served much the same function in them as did the Residents in the Federated States.

110. Forms of government. The first federation of Malaya, the Federated (Protected) Malay States, formed in 1896, consisted of the four central States of Perak, Pahang, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan united under a centralized Government. A British Resident-General was appointed, and Kuala Lumpur was chosen as the capital. Powers of Residents in the separate States were curtailed (those of the rulers were not), and the real authority was in the Resident-General, who made all major decisions and directed even the details of administration.

a. When Siam ceded the four northern States of Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Trengganu to the United Kingdom in 1909 (in accordance with the Bangkok treaty), these States chose not to join the Federation. In 1914, when Johore became a British protectorate, it, too, remained outside the Federation. These States guarded their independence closely. They refused to have Residents appointed, but all but Johore did accept Advisers in an advisory capacity only. Johore was unique in that its rulers had given it a written Constitution in 1859 which provided for the election of the sovereign to the throne, for councils of Ministers of State, and for administration of justice through laws and courts. It finally accepted a British General Adviser in 1914, but with closely restricted powers.

b. The Federated States resented the much larger degree of self-determination and political control possessed by the unfederated States and were dissatisfied with the ever-increasing centralization of control. One major problem was the lack of representation for the States afforded by the Residents, who eventually actually appeared to represent the Resident-General himself. Even the establishment in 1909 of a Federal Council to advise the Resident-General (now the Federal Secretary) had the effect of reducing the powers of the rulers, who were later replaced as council members by unofficial Malays.

c. When the British returned after World War II, the Malayan Union was formed (September 1945), comprising the greater part of British Malaya. However, the States were reorganized and established as the Federation of Malaya in February 1948 and became an independent country, a member of the British Commonwealth, in 1957.

d. In August 1962, Malaya and the United Kingdom agreed in principle on the formation of a new state, Malaysia, a political merger of the Federation of Malaya with the Island of Singapore and the British territories in Borneo (Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo). In December, a revolt in Brunei prevented that State from joining, but the others agreed, and the new Federation of Malaysia came into being on 16 September 1963.

111. Problems of government. The Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements was British territory, and people born there were British subjects with the right to British passports. Even though the Malay States

(both federated and unfederated) had surrendered their political independence through treaties, the rulers of those States remained independent sovereigns, and the people of those States continued to be their subjects. As such, they received no passport but were granted certificates of nationality, showing that they were British-protected but not British subjects. This would appear to be a minor difference, but it was sufficiently important to create an obstacle to a plan to return the Province of Wellesley to Kedah and Malacca to Johore (a plan evolved to persuade Kedah and Johore to enter the Federation).

a. At first, the British interfered as little as possible with internal State matters, but the vesting of more and more control in the Residents and Advisers was a logical development. From 1895 until the mid-1920's, the trend was toward more centralization, with authority concentrated in the federal officials, at the expense of the individual States. Many prominent Malays, the rulers, and even the highest British officials became increasingly dissatisfied with excessive central control, and some reforms did result. Councils were established, and the Governor had to consult them. However, most of the council members were appointed, and thus their votes could be influenced if not controlled, and the councils failed to represent the States or the people. Men from Malay, Chinese, and Indian communities served locally as members of advisory groups, such as for harbors and school boards. A Malayan Civil Service was established, and men were trained for it, but the higher posts continued to be filled by Englishmen. It provided, however, the one real form of participation in government by the people until after World War II. In 1932, the States were given financial grants and the right to make laws concerning education and other matters of local concern. However, when the States did enact laws, they were based on federal legislation modified just enough to serve for local conditions, and the result was virtually uniform legislation by 1940. There was complete freedom of religion and almost complete freedom of speech, press, and assembly. There was also a growing resentment of the preferential treatment granted the Malays.

b. Attempts at decentralization varied from one Governor (and High Commissioner) to the next. Despite the dissatisfactions expressed by the rulers over the administration of government (especially the rulers of the Federated Malay States, who resented their own subordinate positions and were jealous of the more powerful rulers in the unfederated States) not one of the races appeared to want a more progressive and less bureaucratic form of Government or to aspire to the kind of responsibility this would have entailed. Only the Sultans themselves, the Malay elite, and some Malaya-born Chinese intellectual leaders were conscious of the need for political change. The Colonial Office, however, was aware of it, and this was a major concern by the 1920's. Along with decentralization of powers, however, would come the threat of financial instability and the loss of protection afforded the Chinese, Indian, and European members of the communities; and the proposal

to abolish the position of Chief Secretary or to reduce his powers drastically met with resistance. The 1931 proposal of one High Commissioner that the Sultans consider a union of all Malay States raised bitter and strong hostility, pacified only by additional measures of decentralization, replacement of the Chief Secretary by a Federal Secretary with reduced status and fewer powers, and assurance that no State would be forced to join a union of States. This intense feeling against union (at least, the fears associated with such action) persisted after World War II and acted, along with the increased emotion of nationalism, to disrupt the well-intended British attempts to solve Malaya's problems.

112. Industry and immigration. The States thrived under the British, who advanced the tin mining industry and brought rubber trees to the area. Revenues from these two industries supplied the money to build roads, railroads, schools, and hospitals. With the development of the tin mines and rubber plantations, the need for workers increased. The Malays, content with minimum return for minimal work and lacking the motivation to acquire wealth, were inadequate and unsatisfactory as a source of labor. Workers had to be imported.

a. Most of the early arrivals came from China, and, as industry thrived, the Chinese population increased. Chinese settlement in Malaya had begun after Penang was founded in 1786, increased with the founding and growth of Singapore (starting in 1819), and became a steady and increasing influx with the need for laborers for the tin mines. So many Chinese immigrated between 1919 and 1939 that a quota system was introduced in the 1930's, and Chinese immigration was almost entirely prohibited after 1942. Almost all had one idea in common: they considered themselves temporary residents of a foreign land and intended to stay just long enough to accumulate a fortune and return to their homelands. Not all of even the early immigrants were laborers. Merchants, doctors, teachers, and other professionals came to serve their own people, and Chinese financiers appeared early on the scene to invest in the area's growth and make their contribution to it. The Chinese owned and operated most of the commercial ventures in Malaya (only the Europeans invested a larger volume of capital there). Today they own most of the small rubber plantations and over 40 percent of the tin industry, dominate the service industries and the pineapple industry, provide most of the shopkeepers and middlemen, and are the principal gardeners. The largest single concentration of Chinese people outside China itself is in Malaya, and Singapore City has been overwhelmingly Chinese for many years.

b. Immigrants also arrived from southern India to become laborers, agricultural workers, and servants. Many left India for political as well as financial reasons. The largest numbers came toward the end of the 19th century to work on the rubber plantations and on the roads and railroads. Early arrivals also included professional people. Many

descendants of the early laboring groups acquired education and became Government workers, teachers, lawyers, doctors, and policemen and soldiers. The Punjabis, particularly the Sikhs from norther India, were noted for being excellent soldiers and police. In addition, many Indian traders and businessmen came to Malaya.

c. There were fewer Ceylonese than Indians, but they formed a sizable community. Most of them arrived to work on the railroads, but in later years they were well represented both in the professions and in Government work. Of the three ethnic immigrant groups, these were most easily assimilated within the Malay culture.

d. Each of the two major immigrant groups kept to themselves, living in separate communities where their religious practices, their customs and languages, and their cultural attitudes were maintained almost intact. Both Indians and Chinese regarded themselves as temporary residents of Malaya; saw the situation as an opportunity to gain financial security; and, in the early years, shared in the overall lack of interest in becoming active participants in the development of Malaya as a country. The Malays regarded both groups as interlopers: unwelcome, not to be trusted, but necessary. Their reluctance to sell or lease land to either Chinese or Indians also discouraged ideas of permanent settlement. Each ethnic group was further divided within itself by the various dialects and differing local or tribal customs. No one language was common to all areas. Even today, although Malay, English, and Chinese are all commonly spoken, there are language barriers. Malay is the official language, yet it has not been able to penetrate those barriers completely or to permeate the several and diverse cultures. Islam was and is the official religion, and more than half the people (and all Malays) are Moslems. Most of the Chinese in Malaya are Confucian Buddhists, and the Indians are Hindus.

113. Major races, population, and distribution. Malay, Chinese, and Indian are the major non-European races in Malaya. In Borneo, there are negritos and other aboriginal groups. Generally speaking, these groups have distinct characteristics.

a. The Malays are largely a rural people. Most of them are fishermen, farmers, and rice growers, and most of them live near the sea along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. They also have held the higher level posts in Government service and in the military. The Chinese, in contrast, are predominantly urban, with the largest concentration in Singapore. They lead in commerce, industry, finance, and the professions and also are the chief gardeners of Malaya. Most Indians live in small towns or on rubber estates, where they supply most of the labor. However, many of them are professionals, and they are also known as excellent soldiers and have moved into civil service positions.

b. The first census, taken in 1911, listed about 1.5 million Malays, more than 900,000 Chinese, and 267,000 Indians. This probably was the last time the Malays outnumbered the Chinese, at least until 1965. According to the 1961 census, of a population of just over 10 million, 42.2 percent were Chinese, 9.4 percent were Indians, and the Malays and indigenous people combined amounted to 46.2 percent. (Indigenous people includes Malays, Indonesians,and other closely related groups.) The remaining 2.2 percent were negritos and other aborigines. Only about 10 percent of the total Malaysian population lives in Sarawak and Sabah.

c. The racial balance differs in each of Malaysia's four areas. Today, over half the population of the Peninsula is Malay, with about 37 percent Chinese and 10 percent Indian and Pakistani. Singapore is completely different: more than two-thids of its nearly 2 million people live at the southern tip of the Island, in the port city of Singapore. The city is commercial, industrial, and professional in tone, and overwhelmingly Chinese--at least 75 percent. In Sarawak, about 30 percent of the population is Chinese, and in Sabah about 23 percent. Only the Chinese have substantial numbers in all four components of Malaya. The Malays form the second largest ethnic group in Singapore and the third largest in Sarawak and Sabah. In Sarawak, the greatest concentration of people is in the three cities of Kuching, Sibu, and Miri and along the coast. In Sabah also, most people live in the coastal areas in small towns, with some in the interior farming areas. In both Sabah and Sarawak, the interior is almost uninhabited, with a few small clusters of tribes in the forests of Sabah.

d. When the Federation of Malaya was being planned, the balance between the numbers of Chinese and Malays was a major consideration. The Chinese would have constituted a considerable majority if Sarawak and Sabah had not joined, an untenable situation in view of the mutual distrust of the two groups. As it turned out, the balance favored the Malays by the addition of the indigenous, culturally related people of those territories in Borneo.

e. The British were not an unendurable burden; rather, they were regarded by both the Malays and the Chinese businessmen as providing protection without unduly interfering with anyone's rights. Chinese and Indians, while protected, had few--if any--political or civil rights, but, prior to World War II, this was not overly important to "temporary" residents. This attitude, especially among the Chinese, persisted for generations, and it was not until after the Japanese occupation that the Chinese assumed their birthright in Malaya and sought not only equal rights but citizenship and a role in the Government.

f. Even though the various groups remained separate and were never assimilated, this lack of communication resulted in an impression of general harmony along with the undercurrent of distrust, and they

lived in relative peace. (There were riots between the Chinese and the Malays in Singapore in 1923 and again immeidately after World War II.) The several cultures formed a sort of cohesive whole, to which the presence of the Europeans added merely another layer of attitudes, which had little effect on the separate groups. At no time was one group combined with or assimilated by another. Under these conditions, it seemed scarcely possible that any intense feeling of national identity might emerge.

114. The Malay people. Although urban centers are populated by Malays, Chinese, and Indians alike, most Malays live in rural villages known as kampongs. They seem to have little feeling of attachment to a specific or traditional locality, and they move frequently within the country. They are likely to engage in occupations with regular salaries rather than in trade, and many are Government employees. There are many small farmers and fishermen among them; and these people tend to live in permanent villages, in constrast to those who, living in the areas between the coastal villages and the interior, have a less settled, more nomadic type of farming and do not have permanent villages.

a. The Malays consider themselves to be the only "real" people, regarding the Chinese, the Indians, and indeed any foreigners, as both alien and inferior, no matter how long they may have been in the country. They saw "merdeka" (independence) as the return of the land rightfully their own. Nevertheless, after independence was achieved, they continued to believe that the British had an obligation to uphold, protect, and defend them.

b. Among the Malay people, there is a system of hereditary rank, with several levels ranging from an aristocracy (with titles) to commoners who are ex-slaves. The Malay preoccupation with rank has resulted in intermarriages (and thus connections) among the upper class families throughout the entire region. This class is more highly conscious of ethnic unity and regional political entity (thus nationalism), probably because of their wider experience, broader relationships, and service in Government posts under Sultans and Rajas.

c. Their fear of the economic power of the Chinese (and of the possibility that this power might be translated into political power) was genuine and not without reason. For the Malay, prestige and status were not measured in terms of wealth, but he could scarcely ignore the comparison of the affluence of the Chinese with the relative poverty of his own people. The Malays were favored under the British, and the chief reason the proposed union of the Malay States failed was that it provided for the enfranchisement of non-Malays. The Malays' strong reaction to this provision, again, was based on their fears of domination by superior number of the Chinese.

d. It is believed that no Malay ever exchanged Islam for Christianity. The Malays' religious sensibilities merely intensified their antipathy toward the Chinese and Indians. As a devout Muslim, the Malay centered his racial ambitions in his religion. However, by the 1920's, the ordinary Malay had become more genuinely interested in material progress and semipolitical power than in theology. There was no real conflict between religious and civil law. Muslim law covered marriage, divorce, and the legitimacy and welfare of the children (similar in a way to the Philippine cultural obligations and restrictions), but British criminal law was supreme, and British civil law was accepted, except where it contravened custom or Muslim law.

115. The Malayan Chinese. For many years, the Chinese in Malaya regarded themselves as temporary residents of a foreign land. Their aim was to amass a fortune and return to China, and many of them did so. Immigration and emigration were about equal, once enough time had elapsed to allow many of them to realize their goal. At no time before the late thirties did they show much interest in Malaya, other than in those areas that affected trade, investments, and business. They were not concerened with politics, and they looked on the British as protectors. They retained their close ties to their homeland, their clan and family associations, their language and dialects, their religious observances, and their guilds and secret societies--in short, their entire culture.

a. The Chinese secret societies went through several stages. At first, they were devoted to working for the betterment of their members. Bitter rivalries arose among them, and they soon became centers of organized crime. When the British enforced strong measures against them because of their violence, finally outlawing them in the late 19th century, membership declined and the societies became criminal groups. As revolution began to grow in China, the societies turned from small criminal undertakings and engaged in political activities related to the revolution in China and Sun Yat-sen's activities.

b. Most of the Chinese people in Malaya supported the Nationalist cause and the China of Chiang Kai-shek. In the earlier years, their interest in communism was never strong. They were reasonably prosperous and reasonably content under British control, fearing that, with Malayan independence and the withdrawal of the British, their protection would vanish along with the economic stability that had characterized the British administration.

c. At first loyal only to the homeland of their fathers, after World War II, they began to seek equal rights in Malaya and to establish their rights of citizenship. This created a serious problem, but apparently they were willing to wait to be accepted as a real part of the Malayan scene and as equal citizens of the new nation.

116. The Malay-Chinese problem. Of the non-Malay groups, the Chinese presented the most significant problems. The Chinese and the Malays differed almost completely in the most basic and important characteristics: values, temperament, religion, language, education, and means of livelihood. Probably the most important possession of the Malay was his lineage. For the Chinese in Malaya, the old values had diminished, and prestige was achieved through success in business and accumulation and display of wealth. Even though the Malays had no basic drive to accumulate wealth and did not regard it as a symbol of status, they were aware of the prestige and power gained by the Chinese and were disturbed by the threat of an increasingly larger Chinese population. As a result, mutual fear and distrust existed, with each group fearing the other would gain control in political matters and would dominate. This attitude later prevented formation of a close alliance between the Malayan States (where Malays outnumbered the Chinese) and Singapore (overwhelmingly Chinese) at a time when both areas sought independence and self-government and neither was strong enough to maintain itself as a separate country.

Section II. World War II and the Postwar Period

117. The prewar external situation. Tension in Europe mounted during the thirties, the USSR and Japan were beginning to be regarded as threats in the East, and the possibility of conflict blew hot and cold, making war seem to be both inevitable and remote.

a. British naval power had been supreme in Southeast Asia in the 19th century and continued to be so regarded until Britain's defeat in World War II in that area. Actually, the British had begun to withdraw from the South China Sea before World War I and had withdrawn almost completely (from a military viewpoint) in 1922, in compliance with the Washington treaty for limitation of armaments, placing its dependence for defense of the area on Singapore's strong naval base and British control of the Strait of Malacca.

b. France had a stranglehold on Yun-nan Province, on the northern borders of Burma and Indochina, and controlled both its rich resources and its railroads--thus, its trade. To survive, Yun-nan had to remain on friendly terms with both France and China. Indochina was eager to seize the first opportunity to free itself from French control, and rumbling from a militant Germany served to deter France from sending sufficiently large forces either to defend or to retain Indochina. In this dilemma, France threatened to form an alliance with Japan, hoping by this means to retain its power in Asia.

c. Japan's program of expansion started with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. War with China followed in 1937. The major drawback was a lack of raw materials. Southeast Asia, with its supply of

oil and rubber and its strategic location, was tempting,but Japan was not free to move into that area until the threat posed by the Soviet Far Eastern Army was nullified by the neutrality pact signed by both countries in April 1941. However, Japan was most successful in stirring up dissension in Southeast Asia and promoting dissatisfaction with the controlling Western Government among the colonies and protectorates.

d. The Dutch East Indies had made a step toward self-government by establishing a legislative assembly in 1918. Uprisings in the 1920's were followed by increasing discontent with Dutch control, fostered by the Japanese, and a growing sentiment for independence which threatened Dutch power there. The threat was aggravated by the Japanese policy of expansion, a lack of adequate Dutch military protective capabilities, and the unavoidable necessity for the Dutch to maintain a position of neutrality. Of all the States, the Dutch East Indies had the hardest battle for independence. Occupied by the Japanese during the war, it declared its independence in 1945 as the Republic of Indonesia without the sanction of the Dutch, who fought and lost a 3-year battle to reassert their control. (Indonesia proved a major threat to Malaya in the 1960's because of its violently hostile opposition to the federation of the Malayan States, expressed by economic boycott and aggressive military operations.)

e. Malaya had no background or history of foreign relations other than those entered into by the British. Under British administration and control, the foreign policy was designed to protect both British and Malayan interests. Under the Federation of Malaya, the statement was made (at the opening of Parliament in September 1957) that there was no intention to build either a large foreign service or large Armed Forces. This statement was in line with the traditional attitudes of polite nonaggressive relations with other countries and the avoidance fo unnecessary commitments. The policy continues to be pro-Asian without being anti-European, and pro-Western without being too closely identified with Western policies. It is clearly also anti-Communist, and the major concern continues to be one of internal threat of communism (in addition to the ever-present threat of Communist-controlled neighbors). In 1909, when Thailand ceded the four northern States of Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Trengganu to the British, it also agreed not to lease of cede the land adjoining these States or any harbors to a foreign Government if such action would be prejudicial to British/Malayan interests. However, in the 1930's, Thailand became closely allied with Japan and, as an ally of that nation in World War II, permitted Japan to attack Malaya from Thailand. The treaty between Great Britain and Thailand (1946) recognized the importance of Thailand to the defense of Malaya (a relationship clearly demonstrated in the war with Japan), and Thailand supported the UN-sponsored security arrangements for Malaya. Later, in 1949, Thailand permitted British forces to pursue Communist guerrillas up to 3 miles into Thailand, when the guerrillas

had retreated into the jungles just north of the Malayan border. In addition, Thai forces worked with Malayan forces in military operations against terrorists operating along the frontiers.

118. The prewar internal situation. Economically, Malaya was in excellent condition preceding the War. It had survived the worldwide depression, and its people were generally prosperous and contented. The period was marked by small rumblings of generally small ineffectual parties, and communism was not overly successful except among the Chinese.

a. Between 1920 and 1929, economic progress was so marked that the Malay States had achieved the highest standard of living in Southeast Asia. By 1931, Malaya was the largest single producer of tin in the world, and rubber, subject to great fluctuations, had become its largest moneymaking export. Despite a disastrous slump in the thirties, rubber regularly yielded over half of Malaya's export earnings during normal years and had just entered a boom period at the beginning of World War II. Singapore had become a great export center. Swamps, some jungle areas, and marshes were being converted into rice fields; production was up. the economy was stable; and the people were comfortably secure and contented. Malaya's strongest asset continues to be its economic foundation. Even the increased expenditures for defense necessitated by Indonesia's "confrontation" policy in the 1960's were offset by increased rubber production and higher prices and greater demand for tin. The only major threat discernible to the economic stability would be something like an all-out war with Indonesia.

b. Political development lagged, but there was little demand for change. Prior to the Japanese occupation, only the rulers, some members of Malay aristocracy, and a few Malayan Chinese intellectuals and leaders were concerend with politics. There was no overall awareness of a need for change in the bureaucratic form of government and no local desire for greater popular participation or responsibility. The British firmly believed that a democratic form of government, with its attendant majority rule, would submerge the indigenous Malay people (a definite minority in relation to the Malayan Chinese), and they continued to assure the prestige and authority of the States' rulers while controlling the actual administration of the States until 1953.

c. Hospitals had been built and public health measures introduced. However, whereas the Chinese would and did use the hospitals (when all else failed), the Malays were hard to convince that modern medical methods were efficacious, and their general health remained at a fairly low level, so that military recruits had to be given proper diet and medication to bring them to a satisfactory physical condition. Primary education was both free and compulsory for Malay children, although education for most children (particularly the Malays) was almost entirely restricted to that provided in the vernacular schools until the late 1930's, when the demand for English education increased

noticeably. Chinese and Indian schools were given financial assistance, and teachers for these schools were impoted from China and India. Many of the Chinese who came to teach seized the opportunity to spread the message of communism among the children. The first school for advanced education, the King Edward VII College of Medicine, had been established in Singapore in 1905, and Raffles College was established as a liberal arts school in 1929. The two colleges joined to form the nucleus of the University of Malaya after World War II. It was possible for the children of poor laborers to secure an education and move up the scale to Government posts or professional status. Nevertheless, there was much illiteracy and an almost complete lack of communication among the ethnic groups because of the separate schools. The attempt to achieve some uniformity in education, to encourage multiple-language systems, and to achieve an overall use of Malay and English was still uphill work in the 1960's, and illiteracy still stood at 51 percent in Malaya in 1957. This factor is of such great importance that a successful outcome in the struggle to provide education may help determine the success of the nation itself.

d. The general lack of interest in politics and the failure of the Malays to identify with any national entity, such as a country, have been pointed out. There was minimal prewar political activity among the people, and such small groups as did form were fragmented and ineffectual. The very nature of the populace made it difficult to develop institutions that were representative of the people. After 1945, political parties were organized which espoused platforms that appealed to different parts of the populace, but again these were not effective in themselves. They were, however, the forerunners of later political groups that, by joining in a common cause, generated enough support and power to challenge the British proposals for union and equal rights of citizenship for all. The Communist movement also lacked popular acceptance and was politically ineffective until the situation that developed during World War II provided the opportunity for the party to expand and become powerful.

119. Communism in Malay 1922-37. Early efforts (in the 1920's) to establish a popular and effective Communist organization in Malaya were largely unsuccessful. Up to 1937, communism posed little real threat there.

a. In 1922, the Chinese Communist Party established an office in Singapore as local headquarters for the South Seas area. This group, the Nanyang Communist Party, was active in Indonesia (then the Dutch East Indies) and in French Indochina (now Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). Attempts to recruit the Malays in the Malay Peninsula and Singapore were unprofitable. The Communists reported that the Malays were "hopelessly contented' with conditions under the British, and the Nanyang group restricted further contacts to the Chinese resident population. The Chinese Communist Party itself was working independently of the local

organization to recruit members of the Chinese community, but with little success.

b. Open collaboration in China between Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party and the Communists ended when Chian turned on the Communists, killing many and forcing the rest to go underground. The remnants of the Communist group settled in the northwest border region of China under Mao Tse-tung. The disaster suffered by the Communists in China affected the Chinese cause in Malaya adversely. Ties to their homeland were strong, and most Chinese in both Malaya and Singapore supported the Nationalist cause in China, identifying themselves with the ambitions and purposes of Chiang. Thus, when the split between the Nationalists and Communists in China occurred, the Chinese in Malaya also turned against the Communist groups there, forcing them underground. Communists who had escaped from Canton arrived in Malaya and Singapore, reinforcing the local groups and joining in terrorism and violence directed against the Nationalists in Malaya.

c. The general unpopularity of the Communists in Malaya, particularly in Singapore, plus the efficiency of the police, prevented them from achieving much success. About this time (1929-30), Communists in Southeast Asia came under the influence of Comintern agents in Singapore, who undertook to reorganize the movement there. The Nanyang Communist Party was replaced by the Malayan Communist Party, whose main objective was to establish a Soviet Republic of Malaya, a republic that would include Thailand and the Dutch East Indies. Local Chinese Communist leaders wanted to keep the party a Chinese Communist movement, apart from the larger organization which just happened to be located in Malaya and Singapore. Comintern agents, conversely, wanted the new party to have a membership that included Malays, Indians, and any other nationality that could be persuaded to join, in addition to the Chinese members. A few hundred Indians, mostly Singapore dockworkers, did join, but the Malays were not interested.

d. As a matter of fact, many of the Chinese members had been attracted to the MCP because it appeared to be another kind of secret society. It was operated much as were the Chinese secret societies, and the party was riddled with secrecy, strife, and conspiracy. In 1931, the MCP was almost destroyed when the police arrested a senior Comintern agent sent to Singapore to assure that the MCP was following Moscow doctrine. Information gained by the police from this arrest made it possible for them to arrest all the prominent MCP members. Information also was sent to Chiang, who was able to seize many of the underground Communists in China. Contact with and financial support from the Comintern was gone, and the local groups in Malaya, Singapore, Thailand, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines were on their own.

e. The Comintern Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai, destroyed as a result of the Comintern agent's arrest in Singapore, was reestablished in 1933. The bureau directed the MCP to replace its weaker and less desirable members with more dependable ones, newly recruited and trained. By 1935, efforts of the MCP to infiltrate trade unions; establish cells among dock, railway, and plantation workers; develop groups of local trained saboteurs; and promote industrial subversion were bearing fruit. After several minor strikes had been initiated, a larger strike was instigated at the Batu Arang coal mine in Selangor, and small soviets were organized among the employees. Only prompt police and troop action prevented the situation from becoming a success for the MCP. Many members of the illegal MCP were deported to China (where many probably were killed under Chiang's purge). One action of the Comintern did assist the MCP. In 1935, the Comintern required all Communist Party efforts to be concentrated against the Fascist regimes, even at the expense of letting up on other policies and subversive actions that had been directed against the democracies. The resulting lull in Malaya gave the MCP an opportunity to recoup and strengthen its organization.

f. When Japan attacked China in 1937, Chinese Communists joined with the Nationalists to defend their country. In reality, collaboration between the two parties was merely on the surface. The two groups in Malaya and Singapore also began to collaborate, a situation from which the Communists gained immensely. Under the banner of "defense" activities, and with relaxation of police pressure and a sort of unofficial recognition, the MCP was able to recruit members and gain supporting funds from the hitherto uninterested and even unfriendly Chinese population. Until the Japanese invasion, the MCP continued to be mildly unpopular, but it was tolerated, and it managed to interest some school teachers and, through them, to reach and appeal to many young Chinese.

120. The Japanese invasion of Indochina. In 1936, Japan signed an anti-Communist pact with Germany, and relations between Japan and the USSR became so tense that it seemed war was inevitable. However, the Non-Aggression Pact signed by Germany and the USSR in August 1939 caused Japan to have second thoughts about the advisability of becoming involved in a European war. Following the fall of Belgium, the Netherlands, and France to Germany in 1940, the Vichy Government, pressured by Berlin, permitted Japan to use Indochina for troop movements, and Japan's military forces were now at the border of Southeast Asia. In the fall of 1940, Japan formed a military alliance with Germany and Italy, both of whom recognized Japan's leadership in Asia. This pact removed the threat of Soviet interference in Southeast Asia, and when the Germans invaded the USSR, Japanese armies moved in force into Indo-China (disregarding Hitler's proposal that Japan move on the USSR in Siberia to support German plans) as a prelude to their planned attacks

on Malaya and the Philippines. By July 1941, Japan controlled Indochina, announcing that it was now a Japanese protectorate.

121. Immediate reactions to Japan's threat. Earlier Japanese conquests (Manchuria and China) had caused the United States to place an embargo in 1938 on the export to Japan of manufactured items, extended to include scrap iron and oil during the next 2 years. Following the conquest of Indochina, all Japanese assets were frozen by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Japan faced a severe shortage of raw materials, particularly of oil, because of the embargoes operated by the Allies. It either had to submit to demands for its withdrawal from the conquered trritories or to declare war on the Allies and move into Malaya as rapidly as possible. It chose to fight.

122. The struggle for Singapore. It was obvious that Japan's objectives were to secure Malaya, with its wealth of raw materiels, and to seize the naval base at Singapore. Japan now had an airbase 600 miles from Singapore and a naval base 700 miles away from which to operate.

a. British, Indian, Australian, and Malay brigades were already located in defensive positions from the southern border of Thailand to Singapore, and British reinforcements began to arrive in October 1941. In a last-minute attempt to deter the Japanese from going to war, the British sent a battle fleet consisting of a battleship, a cruiser, and four destroyers too Singapore on 2 December. This small fleet had no aircraft carrier. The small number of troops sent to join the British-Indian divisions was inadequate, and the small fleet sent without supporting units, essentially as a warning to the Japanese not to invade Southeast Asia, failed both as a bluff and as an effective defense.

b. A Japanese fleet of a battleship, seven cruisers, and 14 destroyers sailed through the Gulf of Siam and on 8 December shelled the beaches near Kota Bahru (capital of Kelantan) as a prelude to landing troops there. The British fleet, investigating reports of the landings, was discovered south of Kota Bahru by Japanese reconnaissance planes and was attacked by bombers. The battleship and cruiser were sunk, and about 800 men were lost--the worst British naval disaster since the start of the war. Coupled with the nearly complete destruction of the US fleet in the Pacific, it meant that neither the British nor the Americans had any capital ships in the Pacific or Indian Oceans (except for the survivors of Pearl Harbor), and the Japanese Navy was in control of the entire area. That same day, Japanese planes bombed Singapore city, its harbor, and its airfields. (Simultaneously, Pearl Harbor was attacked, and the United States entered the war.) The Royal Air Force had only 141 aircraft of various kinds in Malaya and Singapore, and the Japanese fighters and bombers were far superior to them.

c. Japanese superiority of the air and at sea was matched by the effectivenss of Japanese land forces. The Japanese 25th Army was

assigned the task of conquering Malaya and Singapore. The offensive was launched with three divisions, with a combat strength of 70,000 (total strength of 110,000). Available sea transports could carry only about one-fourth of the force, so about 26,000 troops were landed as an advance force to seize the northern airfields. The bulk of the army moved from Indochina through Thailand. Japanese tanks moved south on the roads in Malaya virtually unopposed (the defenders had no tanks), while land troops moved into Kedah and swept down the Peninsula. The British had not foreseen the need for fortifying the northern land borders and had concentrated on making the naval base at Singapore virtually impregnable.

d. The defending forces consisted of about six divisions, mostly of British, Australian, and Indian troops with a few Malay and Chinese units. The total strength was about 85,000--more than enough, numerically, to repel the invaders. However, the Japanese troops were experienced fighting units, seasoned by war with China and especially selected for this type of warfare and terrain. In contrast, the defending forces were not well trained, were totally inexperienced, and were under generally poor leadership, with the result that they were outmaneuvered, and the retreat down the west coat of Malaya was almost continuous. Furthermore, at the 1921-22 arms limitation conferences, the British had agreed not to fortify any bases east of 100 degrees east longitude, and, as a result, no reinforcements were available for the defending forces.

e. The defending troops withdrew to Singapore on the last day of January 1942 and attempted, unsuccessfully, to make the causeway between the mainland and the Island impassible. On 8 February, the two leading Japanese divisions began to cross the channel, and in 24 hours more than 20,000 Japanese troops had landed on the Island. The third division arrived shortly thereafter, raising the total of invaders to well over 30,000. Two additional Japanese divisions remained on the mainland. The battle for Singapore lasted a week, until 15 February. Refugees had poured into the city, swelling the population to more than a million. Food supplies were low, and the problem of an already inadequate water supply was aggravated by artillery shelling and bombings that burst water mains. The defending forces arrived at the naval base to find it deserted, undefended, and undestroyed. Even the great guns of Singapore had been pointed in the wrong direction, and lack of any defenses either at the northern border of the Island or the land around the naval base meant that Singapore and its base were far from defensible. After a 3-day period of almost continuous bombing and shelling, Singapore surrendered, and three and a half years of Japanese occupation of Malaya, Singapore, and British Borneo began. The immediate results of Singapore's fall were strategically disastrous. It enabled the Japanese to conquer Burma and the Dutch East Indies and brought them to the boundaries of India and Australia. Longer lasting effects were even more srious. The loss of Singapore and the

defeat of the British in this area meant the loss of the symbol of Western power in Southeast Asia and the Far East, a power built and maintained on British superiority on the seas.

123. Resistance to the Japanese. The entire British administration staff and all Europeans still in Malaya and Singapore were interned in Japanese camps. Although cessation of all rice imports caused hardship for all the people in Malaya, the Malay civilians fared much better than most people of occupied lands. Essentially, the Japanese showed consideration and even deference to them. The Malays themselves seemed to have no strong feelings about the British withdrawal or the arrival of the Japanese, and, for the most part, they neither aided nor opposed their new masters. However, the cruel and barbarous treatment given the Chinese following earlier Japanese victories in their villages and communities was well-known, and the knowledge of the inhuman tortures and executions of the Singapore Chinese led to greater resistance than might ordinarily have been the case. Many of the Indians in Malaya had welcomed the Japanese, and they were encouraged to form groups oriented toward Indian independence. The Indian Independence League was formed with the help of the Japanese. Many Sikhs who had been policemen in Malaya supported the invaders, but loyalty of the Indians to the Japanese was far from universal, and a few joined anti-Japanese guerrilla forces, while others were imprisoned for noncooperation. One fact was easily ascertained. Although many Malays had an almost completely passive attitude immediately following the invasion, and many of the Indians saw an opportunity in the invasion to serve either their own interests or those of their people, events and Japanese policies caused many changes. All three ethnic groups participated in the activities of various pro- and anti-Japanese organizations. This was one situation which resulted in the acceleration of the growth of political consciousness of all Malayans.

a. Before Singapore fell, the British had designated certain groups to remain in Malaya for the purpose of conducting anti-Japanese activities. These stay-behind groups included regular British Army officers, Chinese (both Communist and Kuomintang), and selected Malays.

(1) The position of the Communists in Malaya had changed with events. During the thirties, the MCP had been anti-Japanese (a result of the invasion of China by the Japanese). Then in 1939, after the USSR had signed a nonaggresion pact with Germany, the MCP became violently anti-British, instigating a series of strikes that caused rubber and tin production in Malaya to fall disastrously. Again, when Hitler attacked the USSR, the party ceased to cause trouble, apparently regarding the British conflict with Germany as a war for freedom. A few days after the Japanese attack on Malaya, the MCP (about 5,000 members) offered its full cooperation against the Japanese, and the British accepted.

(2) The Malayan Communist Party was the only group that was well-organized, had more than token strength, and was avowedly anti-Japanese. Before leaving Malaya, the British hurriedly organized classes in Singapore to train guerrillas to fight the Japanese and teach others in the art of sabotage. Before the Japanese took Singapore, four classes had been trained and sent behind the Japanese lines. A total of seven such groups (in all 165 men) formed the nucleus of the jungle-based Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army. The MPAJA managed to survive, to set up civilian support systems, and to train and indoctrinate increasing numbers of recruits. A civilian resistance group, the Anti-Japanese Union was organized, and it, as well as the MPAJA, was controlled by the MCP, which seized the opportunity to enlist popular support and build an armed force to harass the Japanese (and, later, to fight the British).

(3) In 1943, British intelligence managed to contact the MPAJA, which agreed to take orders from the Supreme Allied Commander in return for arms, ammunition, and explosives. Actually, this army carried out only a few operations against the Japanese and inflicted few casualties. (Many of its members occupied themselves in conducting terrorist activities against the Malayan people.) Its main objective was to be in a position to take control and make Malaya a Communist country. Following Japan's surrender, MPAJA emerged from the jungle with more than 6,000 trained fanatics. It had become the most powerful military-political force in Malaya.

b. The Chinese community had suffered the most of any group in Malaya from the Japanese occupation. During the first days, thousands of Chinese were slaughtered; the treatment was brutal in the extreme. Many escaped to the interior, and here they became squatters at the jungle's edge. The Malayan Chinese had been anti-Japanese since the Japanese had invaded China in 1937. These refugees occupied open land, built huts in squatter villages, and raised crops. Here they remained. After the war, these villages were pockets in the jungle, where the Malayan Communists were able to set up their own government, and, either willingly or through terror, the villagers became a major source of food and information for the Communists after the war and during the Emergency. To most Chinese, the policeman and the soldier represented the lowest rung on the human ladder. The Malayan Chinese was no different from his fellows in China in his attitude toward authority. He equated "government" with "European," and he felt no obligation to cooperate with representatives of either. In addition, an individual Chinese, with his traditionally strong family ties, might see his duty as requiring him to provide food and information to a local terrorist to whom he might have a far-fetched relationship rather than to risk Communist retribution by cooperating with the anti-Communist authorities. It was not that the Chinese were unwilling to fight; their actions during the occupation and the Emergency alike disproved that

theory; but, when they fought, they did so as Chinese people for Chinese reasons. Nevertheless, later, during the Emergency, the jungle Chinese constituted a serious problem to the British and Malayan leaders, and the guerrillas have continued for years to drift about the border areas, with armed forces still in pursuit.

124. The return of the British. While the Japanese occupied Malaya, the British had planned a military campaign for that region, but the Japanese surrender made these plans superfluous. Coming sooner than expected, the surrender found the British unprepared and in no position to reassume immediate control of Malaya. Before they returned, the MPAJA had emerged and set up some form of government in several areas, where they proceeded to try and punish those whom they regarded as having been collaborators with the Japanese. When the British returned in 1945, they found a strong Communist organization fairly well in control in many parts of Malaya. The British ordered the MPAJA to return its weapons and disband, orders which the Communists had no real intention of following. Arms were hidden for later use in the struggle for control, even though the Communists had agreed to return them. The Communist groups reorganized and, to all intents, appeared to be ready to help in therebuilding of Malaya.

a. The British Government announced that it was prepared to end indirect rule and proposed a Malayan Union under a Governor with full executive powers. The Constitution was developed in 1945, and the Union was to become effective on 1 April 1946. East State ruler, continuing to be the traditional spiritual leader of his people, would be a member of two councils: one primarily concerned with religious matters and headed by the Sultan himself, and the other a central advisory council established to review legislation that might affect the Muslim religion. The Sultans were requested to sign new treaties giving jurisdiction over the States to the British Crown. Actually, the Sultans were to become mere figureheads. The most troublesome provisions concerned the people themselves. Civil service posts were to be opened to Chinese as well as Malays on an equal competitive basis, ending the privileged position of the Malays. Even more disturbing to the Malays was the provision for full and equal citizenship for all people who claimed Malaya as their actual homeland. This plan to provide a centralized uniform government with more adequate representation of all ethnic groups aroused bitter opposition among the Malays. They saw this development as an almost certain guarantee that the Malayan Chinese would inevitably assume political control. The British decision to impose such a union without consulting the people brought the Malays extremely close to open revolt against the British.

b. That the revolt did not break down into violence, despite the strong emotions involved, was due to the fact that opposition was channeled into the activities of initiating and promoting several

political parties, associations, and groups, all with the single purpose of preventing the union from becoming an actuality. One organization, the national Movement of Peninsular Malays, had more than 100,000 members in Johore alone. To increase their power, 41 of these groups merged to form the United Malays' National Organization, and its president became leader of more than two million Malays. Primarily, support came from the aristocracy, the bureaucrats, and the intellectuals; but the mass of the Malay people also gave vigorous support. This concerted opposition was the first genuine display of Malay involvement in political problems, a major indication that the people no longer were unconcerned and that a feeling of nationalism did exist, even if it assumed a somewhat provincial and negative form.

c. Two British representatives were sent from London to assess the situation and to ascertain the views of the people and their rulers. They encountered protest rallies in every town. Even the women left their work to participate in the most dramatic demonstration of all--the one held in the capital of Perak--and at the head of the women's section marched the wife of the Sultan of Perak. The mile-long parade which greeted the British representatives, who had come to meet with the rulers and with the head of the UMNO and its Executive Committee, left no doubt about the depth of feeling on the issue. The UMNO campaign was a success, and the British withdrew several proposals, chief among them the one for equal citizenship.

d. Probably the only dissatisfied people were the non-Malays, who had hoped for equal rights and now feared complete disenfranchisement by the Malays, who would probably assume all power. These non-Malays also sought to force the issue by forming associations. One large group, the All-Malayan Council of Joint Action, was organized by the Malayan Democratic Union to oppose the UMNO. About 10 organizations joined to form the council, and, being understandably unwieldy, it broke to pieces. One of the problems was that its platform was a compromise, intended to claim the support of non-Malays and appease the Malays at the same time. One group reorganized as the People's United Front, but it ended by cooperating with the original council. The council represented the Chinese, and most of its support came from Indian and Chinese trade unions, largely Communist-infiltrated. PUTERA spoke for the general anti-UMNO point of view and was not Communist-affiliated.

e. The JCA again voiced protest in the fall of 1947, boycotting the Singapore elections and refusing to participate in the federal legislative council. This was a joint Chinese-Indian attempt to sabotage the new Constitution, due to go into effect in February 1948. The attempts failed, and the Communists were now prepared to use other tactics. Infiltration of unions and political groups had not brought the desired results, and attempts through strikes and other means to

sabotage industry and the economic structure (both part of the usual Communist pattern, which had worked very satisfactorily in other areas) had failed. The next step was to instigate and increase terrorist activities. When the Government responded with countermeasures, full-scale guerrilla warfare was begun in June 1948, ushering in the Emergency.

125. The effect of the people's protest groups on the possiblity of conflict. Actually, the political action groups formed by both Malays and non-Malays acted both as dampeners and as intensifiers of conflict.

a. At one point, what appeared to be the beginnning of inevitable conflict (even if on a small scale), stemming from Malay reaction to an unpopular Government decision, was dampened--channeled into the formation of political action groups. At this time, the Malays were very close to overt revolt against the British because of the attempt to impose a Malayan Union without securing the concurrence of the rulers and the Malay people. Malay antifederation groups, formed for protest and political action, had full Malay support, represented the opinions of the Malays, and were powerful enough to cause the Government to revise or remove the offending provisions in the proposed Constitution.

b. However, the existence of these Malay groups and their success in preventing the granting of equal rights and citizenship to non-Malays caused other groups to be formed in protest. Non-Malays feared that they might lose all rights if Malays were to assume full power, and they organized (under the sponsorship of the Communists) to demand those rights. At this point, the very existence of two opposing groups intensified the possibility of conflict. Polarized as all these organizations were on ethnic lines, they created the environment that preceded, nurtured, and led to conflict.

c. Basically, the internal problem that underlay most other difficulties was the inability (and lack of desire) of the ethnic groups to communicate, a situation that resulted in fear and distrust and in inequalities of opportunity. Within the political organizations formed (particularly in the non-Malay groups), there were attempts to bridge the gap, as was evidenced by the somewhat weak platform of the CJA, which attempted to appease the Malays and gain non-Malay support at the same time. This was an obvious possible dampener. The division was not simply ethnic but included the element of communism, itself associated in Malaya primarily with one ethnic group--the Chinese.

d. The Communist problem in Malaya was both an internal and an external factor. The Communists in Malaya, having become strong during World War II, were in position to challenge the formerly supreme British power. The dissension among the Malayan people, the divisive

factors, and the polarization of causes opened the way for the Communists to make their move in an effort to seize control.

e. The defeat of the British, the realization that they were neither extremely powerful nor essential, and the sitrrings of nationalism were all factors that added to the possiblity of conflict. The ethnic dissensions and the posture of the Communist elements added fuel. In a complex situation such as this, little could have been done to avoid open confrontation and violence.

f. The rise of protest against outside (particularly British) management and control of the States was one factor in the founding of political organizations. The MPAJA went underground when the British returned, and the new MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades Association operated under close Communist supervision. The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (the civilian counterpart of the MPAJA) became the People's Democratic Movement. The Malayan Communist Party and the New Democratic Youth Corps became more powerful among the Chinese Malays than the Kuomintang had been. There was even a small Indian Communist Party, affiliated with the MCP. The General Labor Union, organized in 1945, became the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions and controlled nearly all the registered unions (including the most important tin, rubber, and longshoremen's unions) by the time the Emergency was declared in 1948. A Malay Nationalist Party had less impact because the conservative element rejected it, but its program was similar to that of the Communists, calling for a government which would represent all nationalities. Chinese professional men supported the Malayan Democratic Union, established in 1945, which promoted the union of all non-Malay communities in Malaya.

126. Foondations and rise of Malay nationalism. The entire postwar period should be viewed in the light of the developing nationalism in Malaya, as well as from the perspective of internal and external threats. To describe the period that followed World War II and preceded the Emergency as one which began in war, developed in peace, and ended in war is to oversimplify what was happening.

a. The defeat of the British in Malaya in 1942 had been a severe psychological blow. Fierce as was the determination of the Malay States to preserve their sovereignty, block extension of British power, and eventually achieve independence, they still depended on British protection. Distrust of British motives, encouraged by the Communist elements, grew (aggravated by British lack of comprehension of the unreadiness of the Malayans to form one nation, as witness the short-lived attempt to provide for absolute equality of all the races in the 1945 Constitution). Nevertheless, this entire complex situation did prod feelings of national consciousness into life for the Malays.

b. European colonial rule, for all practical purposes, had ended in Malaya and throughout Southeast Asia with the beginning of World War II. In general, colonial governments had been repressive, and the reactions of the Dutch and French to evidences of nationalistic feelings had been especially severe. The problem of an upsurge of national consciousness was not one the British had been forced to face before the war. They had tried to protect the dignity and nominal authority of the Sultans and the rights of the people, particularly the Malays. The Sultans had sought a more active role in administration of their state affairs only in later years. The people were loyal to their rulers and largely unconcerned with politics. Even the Chinese had preferred British control in Malaya, recognizing the presence of the British as a guarantee of economic stability and protection for Chinese commercial activities. The geographic features themselves discouraged any concept of unity among the States. Thus, a general lack of dissatisfaction with British control, the nature of the people, and the natural geography of the land all combined to prevent or delay the rise of nationalistic pressures for many years--until World War II.

c. One of the major obstacles to the successful formation of a nation was the lack of communication between separate ethnic groups, and this was based as much on adherence to separate educational systems and to continued training in and use of different languages as on actual ethnic or racial differences. As late as 1950, attempts to force use of English and Malay failed, and parents were able to demand the use of their chosen language alone.

(1) State-operated primary schools were established for the Malays, and the Malay language was used in them. English was not taught in those schools until 1946. The attitude toward education did change from lack of interest in the 1920's to acceptance of the need for education even for girls; and upper class Malays were eager to introduce the English language, because they believed that restriction to the use of the Malay language also restricted opportunities to participate in the economic and political life of their communities.

(2) The Chinese placed a premium on classical education, and each group brought its schools and teachers along with it, supporting them voluntarily. Early in the 20th century, the curriculum changed. The language taught shifted from Chinese dialects to Mandarin, the national language of the new China, facilitating communication among the Chinese groups and emphasizing the renewed, intensely Chinese nationalism, while widening the gap between the Malayan Chinese and the Malays. The Chinese had become the most highly educated group in Malaya, but their inability to communicate in the Malay and English languages inhibited their participation in Malayan life and politics.

(3) The Malayan Indians also had their own schools, but these covered only the primary grades and were scarcely adequate for

raising the level of the Indian people in Malaya. The language commonly used in these schools was Tamil.

d. The earliest foundation for nationalist movements in Malaya (and Indonesia as well) was reaction against foreigners, but the favored treatment accorded the Malays by the British had a tranquilizing effect. Another reason for the delay in/evelopment of nationalist groups was the lack of proficient and daring leaders. Most Malay leaders were Government servants who were not highly motivated for independence, not particularly well qualified, and not deeply concerned with the welfare of the commonpeople. Government officials and members of the intelligentsia who headed nationalist movements were usually aristocrats with a background of English education (both local and foreign), and they tended to restrain rather than to advance the movement. Leaders not of the elite class were barely beginning to rise prior to World War II. The presence of the British, even though it provided security, was a goad, but hostility to the British was slow in developing. The first Malay association was not formed until 1926, and quasi-political parties did not emerge until 1937, a full 11 years later.

e. Disputes over decentralization and union resulted in the first real awareness of Malayan nationalism, but the idea of union intensified the fears of Malay and Chinese alike. The fears were genuine. In 1800, Malays had made up 90 percent of the population, but by 1911 they accounted for only 51 percent. An immigration restriction ordinance was passed in 1929, followed by the even more restrictive Aliens Ordinance of 1933, both of which affected the Chinese measurably. The Malays continued to fear the possibility of domination by the more numerous, wealthy Chinese. Non-Malays feared that withdrawal of the British and assumption of control by the Malays would result in even greater discrimination, and they became extremely critical of the preferential treatment accorded the Malays.

f. There was little political activity in Malaya prior to World War II, but an awareness of what might be termed national identity, and thus a political awareness, developed from the Japanese occupation. Postwar poltical parties were based on the drive for independence.

(1) The leading party was the United Malays' National Organization. Despite the Malays' fear of domination by the economically powerful Chinese, the UMNO joined with the Malay Chinese Association to form the Alliance Party in 1952. Later, the Malayan Indian Congress also joined the Alliance Party. In 1955, this strong party won 51 of the 52 seats in the Legislative Council, and the Malay prince Tunku Abdul Rahman was appointed as Chief Minister. In 1957, under the leadership of the Alliance Party, Malayan independence was achieved, and Rahman became Prime Minister. The UMNO was a conservative party with

Western-trained leaders, and the Alliance Party is pro-Western and friendly toward European economic interests.

(2) Following World War II, the Malayan Communist Party was well-organized and powerful and was able to dominate the trade unions. However, in 1948, the party resorted to armed force, with the result that martial law was declared and the party outlawed. The membership of the Communist Party was never over a few thousand, and these were mostly Chinese. Nevertheless, the struggle against that party did damage the Malayan economy and retarded social development. It posed a much less effective threat after 10 years of conflict.

(3) There are several smaller political parties: a Malay nationalist group (Party Negara), the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, the People's Progressive Party, the Malay Nationalist People's Party, and the Labor Party. In 1957, the last two joined to form a Nationalist Socialist Front Party. This Socialist front was opposed to the formation of Malaysia and managed to gain some legislative strength during 1960-62. However, it was unable to undercut the Alliance Party (which supported the Malaysia platform.

g. World War II might be regarded merely as an interruption in Malaya's slow move toward freedom, but the effects of the war and the Japanese occupation on the people's thinking had much influence on later developments. It was only after the Japanese occupation had ended that it became obvious that indifference to politics had ended.

(1) Some Malays and Malayan Indians had supported the Japanese and welcomed the invasion because they believed in the coprosperity sphere and hoped to serve their own interests. The Indian National Army had a headquarters in Malaya, and its leaders were engaged in helping the Japanese drive the British out of India and Southeast Asia. Many Indians became part of the Indian National Movement in Malaya, joined the army formed by Subhas Bose, and arrived at a strong belief that they had an important part to play in achieving freedom for Malaya as well as for India. However, the brutality which characterized the Japanese occupation resulted in a thoroughly anti-Japanese sentiment, which found outlet in resistance, largely through Communist activities.

(2) The Chinese, the most deeply affected of any Malayan groups, were strongly anti-Japanese following the invasion of China in the 1930's. Brutally treated during the invasion and occupation of Malaya, many escaped to the jungles where they worked with the MPAJA and the guerrilla forces. Some had been members of the Malayan Communist Party for a number of years. Following their retreat to the jungles during World War II, they had become thoroughly indoctrinated with communism. In addition, among their intellectuals and leaders, there had been developing over the years the idea that Malaya, not

China, was their country. A drive to obtain equal rights and a share in the government had been gaining momentum, and by the end of the war, they, too, were ready to seek freedom for Malaya.

(3) The Malay military units had fought well against the Japanese, but, at the beginning, most Malays reacted passively to the invasion, few thinking it worthwhile to resist the Japanese. During the occupation, the Japanese extended considerate treatment to most Malays, and, in the absence of the British, a consciousness of national as well as racial identity had spread. When the British returned, they were welcomed, and the people anticipated better conditions and liberation.

(4) The brutality of the Japanese had tended to unite dissimilar groups of people, however they might differ, and to promote a recognition of common interests and an emotion of national identification. Some years earlier, one Chinese member of the Legislative Council for the Straits Settlements had spoken out for a truly Malayan spirit devoid of racial differences and for a political goal of a self-governing British Malaya united under a central Government, with its capital at Kuala Lumpur, but he was well ahead of his time. It had taken the downfall of the British, the presence of occupying forces, and the necessity for cooperating with each other to weld the people and the movements and to give them force. By the time the Western powers were able to return, expecting to resume their former positions of power and influence, it was too late for the earlier relationships to continue. This was due, on the one had, to the position, the power, and the determination of the Communists in Malaya. But there was the added factor that the people themselves had changed in outlook and objectives.

127. The rise of Communist power in Malaya and the brink of conflict. Several factors assured the revival of the MCP in Malaya: the effects of a worldwide depression in the thirties; a change from militant revolution to popular front emphasis in the party line; the invasion of China by the Japanese, causing a revival of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China and an identification of the Chinese in Malaya with China's struggle; the growing preoccupation of the British with the German threat to Europe, resulting in the relaxation of many of the more stringent restrictions; the unavoidable dependence of the British on the Communists in Malaya during the Japanese occupation; and the defeat of the British and resulting loss of power to intervene.

a. After World War II, the MCP became more powerful than ever among the Chinese, and it was joined by a small Indian Communist Party, founded in Singapore in 1945. The MCP also infiltrated other organizations, especially the labor unions; and the General Labor Union was

organized late in 1945 under MCP guidance. The GLU dominated the entire labor movement in Malaya, but a general strike called in February 1946 was successfully put down by the authorities, and the GLU reorganized as the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions. By the time of the Emergency, the PMFTU controlled nearly all the 277 registered unions in Malaya and had a membership of more than 450,000.

b. The MCP also developed contacts with postwar political parties, such as the Malaya Nationalist Party and the Malayan Democratic Union, both formed in 1945. The MNP was largely Indonesian and sought Pan-Malayan independence. The MDU, a middle class party, supported by Chinese professinals, sought to unite non-Malays to gain racial equality and self-government for Malaya. The MCP interest in these groups was based on the anti-Government bias.

c. The Emergency was not formally declared until 1948. However, the Commonwealth Armed Forces (the Ghurkas, the King's OwnYorkshire Light Infantry, and the Malay Regiment) had been fighting the Communist guerrillas since 1947. Even though the Emergency lasted only until 1960, soldiers and police were reported as continuing to patrol the jungle along the Thai border until 1962, believing that Commununist terrorists had taken shelter just beyond the border.

d. The Government battled the Communist terrorists for public support and cooperation, and for awhile the people were passive in their response to both groups. Over a period ot time, however, the populace began to cooperate with the civil authorities. As for the military forces, both the military and police were engaged in countering the terrorists' attacks and pursuing them to their jungle bases. The military forces included not only the Malayan regiments but the Commonwealth troops and units stationed in Malaya. The situation would not have lasted quite as long as it did; but, even though it was willing to grant amnesty to individual terrorists, the Government steadfastly refused to permit any Communist political activity. This refusal caused negotiations with the jungle Communists to fail in 1955, 1956, and 1957. The MCP, working illegally and underground, continued to infiltrate labor, political and educational organizations.

128. Communist strategy in Malaya. There are various states of aggression, according to the Mao Tse-tung formula. First the Communists infiltrate a people and form a small core. Once leaders have been trained, an atmosphere is established of minor ambushes and skirmishes and a rash of destructive activities, all designed to inspire terror. It is at this time that guerrillas expect to establish themselves in inaccessible areas of a country, where they can hide and train a regular army. The support at this time comes from either a friendly or an intimidated people. It is also at this time that the Communists devote much of their efforts to damaging the resources,

industry, and economy of a country and to harassing the Government troops. All this is expected to gain popular support, so that the Communists may come out in the open. The Communist armed forces become more noticeable, but they evade the Government military forces until the latter appear to have become overextended and frustrated. At this time, the Communist groops are ready to enter a more conventional phase of warfare.

129. The British resistance. The British devised means of thwarting the Communist actions and prevented this series of steps from being successful. The British were able to take advantage of the fact that the Communists had failed to enlist the voluntary support of the people. British regulars joined Commonwealth, Gurkha, and Malayan soldiers and police and were able to keep the guerrillas on the defensive. Entire sections of the populace were moved to guarded villages to prevent supplies and information from reaching the guerrillas. Well-trained British "hunter platoons" lived in the jungles and were experts at tracking and ambushing the guerrillas. Almost the entire war consisted of such activities, and the Malayan Races Liberation Army, once 5,000-strong, had only a few hundred members left to take refuge in the jungles and borders of Thailand.

Section III. Military and Paramilitary Forces

130. British military administration. The British trading companies maintained their own armies and "civil service" until 1858. Over the years, any attempts by local Malay and Indian States to preserve their own independent characters and privileges resulted in further political conquest by the Europeans. In time, the British controlled the entire region and were responsible for its protection. However, the sultanates continued to maintain and use their private armies and to war with each other. It took nearly a century of British persuasion, pressure, and shows of force to end the almost constant conflict among the States. After British Residents and Advisers were installed, reforms directed against acts of violence were instituted, and wearing the kris was forbidden (although this traditinal weapon of the Malay warrior continued to be the symbol of their strength and military prowess); private armies no longer were a part of the scene by 1885. After 1867, the Governor of the Straits Settlements was directly responsible to the British Parliament. In name, he was Commander in Chief of the military forces in Malaya and the Settlements, but he could play no part in military affairs in peacetime except to coordinate civil matters (transport and supply) with military defense measures. Any recommendation he made about military forces for his "command" could be overruled by Parliament under pressure from the Cabinet and the military. In time of war, a regular military officer probably would become Commander in Chief. Military matters were the

concern of the Cabinet, the Committee for Imperial Defence, the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Air Ministry. No attempts were made throughout the years of British administration to form a native military unit in Malaya until 1933.

131. The defense establishment in 1935. Besides the strategic significance of Malaya's geographic location, the Malay States were valuable because of their supplies of tin (about 30 percent of the world's supply) and rubber, both essential to military operations. In the preconflict period, the British had no intention of relinquishing their control of Malaya. They believed that war in Europe would have little effect in the Southeast Asian countries that such actions as might be directed against Malaya would be of short duration and easily handled, and, above all, that Singapore with its naval base was quite secure. Thus, despite Malaya's obvious importance, regular British forces were not increased in the early 1930's, and there still was only one British garrison in Singapore in 1935. One Indian Army battalion of Burma Rifles was stationed in Taiping. The first regular Malay regiment was being formed at Port Dickson, but it still was in its early stages: it did not have enough troops for a battalion, and training necessarily was quite elementary. Obviously, if an emergency or open hostilities arose, these volunteers would have to be prepred to take the field with the regular forces.

132. Volunteer forces in the Federated Malay States. Some quite dissimilar volunteer units were gathered together in 1931 to form a rather loosely organized, yet fairly effective, volunteer force for the Federated Malay States.

a. The Malay States Volunteer Regiment (MSVR). There was only one voluneer force in the Federated Malay States before World War I: a regiment composed of Europeans and called the Malay States Volunteer Rifles (VR). This regiment served during World War I. After having existed for almost 19 years, it was disbanded on 31 December 1920 and replaced the next day by the Malay States Volunteer Regiment, also with a completely European membership. Most VR personnel joined the new MSVR, and the new regiment continued to observe the traditions of the old. The MSVR had a regular commandant and adjutant, with headquarters at Kuala Lumpur. It frequently assisted the police in times of internal unrest, and one contingent contributed greatly to the suppression of the mutiny of the 5th Light Infantry at Singapore.

b. The Malayan Volunteer Infantry (MVI). The first native volunteer forces were organized during World War I, when the Malay Sultans raised various contingents within their States. They were all termed the Malayan Volunteer Infantry and further identified by the name of each supporting State (e.g., Perak MVI). The members were Malays, and each State financed and controlled its own MVI unit. These forces

were not disbanded after World War I but were placed under the command of the MSVR Commandant for training only. The States continued to finance and administer the units. This organizational structure was neither effective noryconomical.

c. The Federated Malay States Volunteer Force (FMSVF). State battalions, known collectively as the Federated States Volunteer Force, were formed in 1931. The Commandant of the MSVR and MVI also became the Commandant of the FMSVF. The MSVR headquarters staff was increased slightly to permit it to assume complete administrative control of the MVI contingents of the separate States. Under this arrangement, State battalions and MVI units continued to retain their separate identities as State forces, but a battalion might consist of units from two different forces (table XVI shows the composition of the FMSVF). Uniforms were anything but uniform, and a battalion might be a melange of Malays in Gurkha headgear and British in Scottish kilts. In spite of this unorthodox situation, battalions did manage to emerge as individual cohesive entities which achieved an esprit de corps; and the advantages of uniform and centralized control, administration, and training were obvious.

(1) Most FMSVF officers received their commissions after having gone through the ranks. MVI officers were either Europeans who had gone through the ranks of the MSVR and transferred to the MVI or Malays who were commissioned from the ranks. Many of the privates in the MSVR were senior Government or business officials with excellent war records. These men often drove 30-40 miles one night each week after a full days' work to attend training classes. Rural districts provided a hgiher percentage of volunteers than did the towns and cities. There were relatively few young European men, and only a small number was attracted to service in the volunteer units, so the average age of MSVR personnel was high. The Malay volunteer soldier of the 1930's was intelligent and enthusiastic if well-led, but he lacked any real concept of battle. The difficulties of maintaining a good program of training was one weakness of the entire effort, and it was obvious that the native volunteers would need the help of the permanent staff and of European commanders if they were to meet any real emergency successfully.

(2) Equipment and arms were standard for the British Army of the times and included rifles, bayonets, and Lewis and Vickers guns. At the larger centers, all MSVR platoons were trained as machinegun operators, and these units were effective in operation. By the end of 1934, about half the MSVR was training with the Vickers gun. One MSVR platoon, X Platoon, consisted of members of the regiment who also were members of the Kuala Lumpur Flying Club. In addition to being trained as a ground unit, this platoon received additional training in Army cooperation flying from RAF personnel, who flew in

from Singapore. The FMSVF had no planes, and platoon members flew at their own expense in flying club aircraft. The attitude of this platoon was typical of most volunteers. They were given money to cover travel expenses to camps but, except for a small amount given to the rank and file while in camp, received no pay. In spite of this, in spite of the difficulties of getting together for training, and with little encouragement from their Government, the volunteers continued to train, to maintain their organizations, and to prepare for defense.

(3) The training itself presented many problems. Many of them and most of the NCO and officers put in far more time than the required minimum. MVI companies usually had full or nearly full strength, and they were reasonably well concentrated. This meant that it was not too difficult to get the men together for training. However, MSVR unit strength had fallen from more than 1,200 in 1928 to about 800 at the end of 1934, a direct result of the depression. There were fewer Europeans in Malaya, and these few were carrying a much heavier workload, so that many found little time to devote to volunteer military duties. Some platoons had only five or six members. With attendance at about 60 percent and platoons of companies often separated by as much as 40 miles (platoons of one company actually were 200 miles apart), there was little opportunity to get together for collective training, company commanders had little chance to command, and training suffered.

(4) Officers and NCO received training in February at the School of Instruction at Port Dickson on the coast of Negri Sembilan. Cadre were trained at drill centers. The training season for troops with officers was from March to September. From March to June, commanders conducted individual and weapons training at platoon drill centers of company headquarters. Training consisted mainly of drills and parades. Collective training seldom went above company level, primarily because there were only twolocations in Malaya that could accommodate a force the size of a battalion. In addition, it was extremely difficult to gather large groups at one place at one time for teaching, and the amount of time that the men could spare for training was limited. Camps were held at Port Dickson throughout the season, and the MVI companies were able to attend as complete units. The MSVR units were not able to participate as fully. Europeans seldom could devote an entire week to the training, and members of a unit often worked in the same office and could not be spared at the same time. This lack of collective training was the weakest part of the volunteer program, and it appeared that some form of compulsory military service would be the only real solution to the problem.

133. Other volunteer forces. Singapore, Malacca, Penang, Kedah, Kelantan, and Johore all had volunteer units. Johore's organization was the strongest. It had both European and Malay volunteer units, in addition to regular Johore Military Forces troops.

TABLE XVI. DISTRIBUTION OF FMSVF UNITS

Unit	Composition	Location
HQ, FMSVF		Kuala Lumpur
Perak Bn		
HQ		Ipoh
C Co, MSVR	3 rifle pl	Kampar, Batu Gajah, Sungei Siput
	1 MG pl	Ipoh
D Co, MSVR	3 rifle pl	Parit Buntar, Sitiawan
	1 MG pl	Taiping
G Co, MSVR	3 rifle pl	Bagan Datoh, Tapah, Cameron Highlands
	1 MG pl	Telok Anson
No. 1 Co, Perak MVI	4 rifle pl	Ipoh, Batu Gajah
No. 2 Co, Perak MVI	4 rifle pl	Telok Anson, Tapah, Taiping, Kuala Kangsar
Drums, MVI		Ipoh
Selangor Bn		
HQ		Kuala Lumpur
A Co, MSVR	2 rifle pl 2 MG pl	Kajang, Rewang Kuala Lumpur
B Co, MSVR	4 rifle pl	Klang, Kuala Selangor, Port Swettenham, Banting
F Co, MSVR	2 MG pl	Kuala Lumpur
No. 1 Co, Selangor MVI	4 rifle pl	Kuala Lumpur
No. 2 Co, Selangor MVI	4 rifle pl	Klang
Band and Drums, MVI		Kuala Lumpur
Negri Sembilan Bn		
HQ		Seremban
E Co, MSVR	1 MG pl 3 rifle pl	Seremban Sepang, Rantau, Kuala Pilah
No. 1 Co, NS MVI	4 rifle pl	Seremban
No. 2 Co, NS MVI	3 rifle pl	Kuala Pilah, Sri Menanti
Band, MVI		Seremban
Pahang Bn		
HQ		Kuala Lipis
H Co, MSVR	3 rifle pl	Bentong, Kuantan, Sungei Lembing
No. 1 Co, Pahang MVI	3 rifle pl	Kuantan, Pekan
No. 2 Co, Pahang MVI	4 rifle pl	Kuala Lipis, Raub, Bentong
Drums, MVI		Pekan
FMS Light Battery		
HQ		Kuala Lumpur
Right Sec, MSVR	Arms: 3.7 how, trained w/18 pdr	Kuala Lumpur
Left Sec, MSVR	Arms: 3.7 hos, trained w/18 pdr	Ipoh
Signal Co (O and some NCO, MSVR: men, MVI)	W/T sec, cable sec, inf bn sec, DR	Kuala Lumpur
X Platoon, MSVR 3 O, 20 OR	Air pl trained in Army co-op flt	Kuala Lumpur
Sultan Idris MVI Indep MVI co of students, not part of a State bn	1 rifle co	Sultan Idris College at Tanjong Malim

a. The Johore Volunteer Rifles, organized in 1916, became the Johore Volunteer Engineers (JVE) in 1928. All members had to be of pure European descent; most were British, but there were a number of Danes and a few French, Germans, Italians, and Norwegians. the adjutant and the instructor were regular Army officers; the rest were volunteers. The Sultan was an honorary colonel, and the Government of Johore paid the entire cost of maintaining the unit, including the salaries of the adjutant and instructor. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Malaya controlled the JVE. The unit's principal responsibility was to provide for the safety of European women and children in the event of internal unrest, and the JVE was organized to cooperate with the police in this effort and to help with local defense, should Johore State be invaded. Older men and those who lived in remote areas joined the musketry course. Members of the Colour Service attended a weapons course and had to fire the musketry course and pass an examination in field work. There were 10 drill centers and about 120 Colour Service men by 1935. The JVE training program had the same problems as did the programs of the Federated States.

b. The Johore Volunteer Force was an infantry unit composed of Malays. Most of its members were civil employees of the State, and the unit was commanded and maintained by the Sultan.

134. Strength and efficiency of the volunteer forces. The FMSVF had a strength in 1935 of less than 4,000, with about 100 officers. They were under the direction of the GOC in Malaya, and their training consisted of elementary recruit training plus annual training, which was mostly rifle practice. There also were volunteer units in the other States: Malacca and Penang each had a battalion stationed at Malacca, Singapore had two battalions and a number of smaller units, Kelantan had just raised a unit of both Europeans and Asiatics, and Johore had the JVE and the JVI. The JVI, with about 500 men, was one of the stronger units. Each unit was maintained, financed, and administered by the State to which it belonged. There was almost no attempt to coordinate training, and little could be accomplished without some form of centralized control. In an emergency, both the native commanders and their troops would need abundant help from the permanent military staff in Malaya. Nevertheless, the MVI (if commanded by Europeans) and the MSVR were expected to make a good showing when needed.

135. Regular military forces. The armed forces in the Federated Malay States before 1933 consisted of the Burma Rifles at Taiping and the volunteer forces described above. The British had made no attempt to organize any regular combat units of Malay troops. The eagerness of the Sultans to have their own State military units, similar to those of the colonies, plus the increasing importance of Malaya to UK defense plans led the British to organize an experimental company in 1933 as a nucleus for a Malay regiment.

a. All officers of the new units were British. An experienced adjutant was transferred from a volunteer battalion, providing an officer well-versed in knowledge of the people of the country. The commanding officer and a small staff were sent from England, a barracks was built, and the first squad of 30 selected Malays started training. Educational standards were high, and only young Malays who spoke English well were permitted to enlist. Squads of 25 men were added at 3-month intervals, and 150 were in training by the end of 1933.

b. Normally, British and Indian regiments were made up of men who understood organized fighting and had a background of years of military tradition. The Malay, although a descendant of warriors, had no experience with being a soldier. Generally pleasure-loving and easy-going, he had never been tested under conditions of military discipline and stress. The unusual problems facing the new company created doubts of its success, so the experiment was scheduled to continue for 3 years with only the original 150 men. The decision to continue the project and expand the force depended on the success of this group. The GOC in Malaya was so impressed by the rapid progress of the company and its efficiency that he recommended immediate expansion in 1934. The War Office agreed to accelerate expansion to a strength of 370, reached early in 1936. The regiment was organized into two rifle companies, one machinegun platoon, a small signal unit, a drum corps, and other supporting units. By the end of 1936, the regiment had 650 men and had added another rifle company, another machinegun platoon, a full signal section, mechanized transport, and a band. Expansion had necessitated the addition of four British officers and six staff sergeants in 1935, and another company commander and four British staff sergeants (one an armorer, another a music director) were added in 1936.

c. Both commissioned and noncommissioned British officers were given a course in Malay at the School of Oriental Studies in London before serving with the Malay Regiment. Officers served for 4 years (later this term was reduced to 3 years, with the option for a second 3-year term). The plan was designed to assure the continued presence of regimental officers who understood the people, their language, and their customs.

d. The term of service for regular Malay troops was 7 years; and for reserves, 5 years. The original 150 recruits were allowed to extend their 3-year terms. Recruits had to agree to erve anywhere. This requirement signified that the Malay Regiment was an imperial force, on the same level as the King's African Rifles, for example, and not just a domestic military organization. The idea of the Malay Regiment held such appeal that applicants outnumbered the openings. In 1935,

there were 1,500 applicants for 230 vacancies. As a result, the finest men were selected for service, and both the standards and the prestige of the regiment were high.

e. Each district had a recruiting quota in proportion to the population (and in excess of the requirements). The District Officer accepted applications only within his quota. To be permitted to register, applicants had to be at least 5 feet 4 inches tall, must have passed a designated level in school (Standard IV in a Malay school), and had to be physically fit. Applicants were interviewed, usually at the State capital, by a selection board (the commanding officer, the adjutant, a medical officer, a dental officer, and a high-level Malay official) which made the final decision.

f. The training given a Malay recruit compared favorably with that of a British infantry recruit, and the results were about the same. On the whole, the physical condition of the Malay recruits was low, and it was necessary to build them up; the more than adequate well-balanced diet provided caused remarkable physical development in the recruits. Also, the discipline and training created smart appearance, precise rifle movements, and obvious pride.

g. Organizational completion of the first battalion was not achieved until 1937, and a second battalion was added in 1941. both fought well in the brief defense against the Japanese until Singapore fell in 1942. The regiment was disbanded on its surrender, but it was reactivated at the end of World War II, and 600 of its veterans again enlisted.

136. The military as a separate class. Except for the Malay Regiment, with its pure Malay members, the British tried to make military forces cross-communal. One example is the Federation Regiment (formed in 1951), which encouraged the enlistment of Malays, Chinese, and Indians. In line with their overall policy, the British made no attempt to create a special military class of the indigenous forces they raised and trained. Possibly because the military never became a separate elite group, civilians did not resent them, and soldiers and veterans were respected by their communities. The absence of a military aristocracy in Malaya also could be attributed to the fact the few qualified Malays were attracted to the military as a full-time career, probably because of the lack of opportunity to attain positions of comand under the British system. As control was relinquished by the British, the picture might be expected to change, but there was no evidence of a development of a cult of military heroes, little evidence of the growth of a national military tradition, and none whatever of a tendency to seize additional territory or become aggressive as late as 1958.

137. The police system in Malaya. Two basic elements of a police system and legal administrative procedures had existed in the Malaccan empire prior to the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century: the night watchman, who guarded the sultanate against disturbances and crimes; and the balai (small precinct-like stations), where people could make known their complaints and seek justice. Even after the Portuguese took over the protection of settled areas, a local penghulu (headman) system was used to maintain local control. Under this system, a penghulu was placed over each separate language group in each area to settle disputes, oversee the watchman, and maintain peace. This system was continued under the Dutch and during the years of British control.

a. The influence of British ideas and practices of administering justice and maintaining order was understandably strong in later Malayan police organization. There was little original structure on which to build, and such systems as did exist were replaed by the British with their own types of organizations, modified to suit local conditions. At first, there was little large-scale criminal activity in Malaya. The major problems consisted primarily of the almost continual disorders, insurrections, rebellions, and small civil disturbances. To function within this situation, the police system developed as a paramilitary organization, and the first attempts to maintain order consisted of sending armed mounted patrols along the trails connecting settlements and towns.

b. The influx of the Chinese into Malaya and their failure to become assimilated within the Malay culture added another facet that influenced the shaping of the police forces. The individual Malay had been content to seek justice through appeal to the penghulu, and his attitude toward the police was not radically different. The Chinese, in contrast, sought recourse in their own fashion, through their secret societies.

(1) These societies took care of many of the functions ordinarily performed by Government agencies. They settled disputes (often by arbitration), meted out punishment (at times by violent reprisal), and, in a sense, actually governed their members. In general, the Chinese feared, despised, and distrusted both the military and the police, and this apparently characteristic attitude was reinforced by the language barrier. Most Chinese were unable to communicate in either Malay or English; a very limited number of police and some civil administrators spoke Chinese, so that they could communicate with the people in their areas, but the many dialects complicated the situation. Only a few soldiers spoke Chinese.

(2) The British, realizing the usefulness of the secret societies' control over their members, accepted the situation. However, when open warfare between the societies threatened order and

peace, an attempt, only moderately successful, was made to destroy the societies. In addition, it was these societies that became the chief perpetrators of crime in Malaya after 1900, and it was this development that brought about the changes in emphasis and procedures in the police departments. Still retaining their paramilitary capabilities, they developed facilities and effective capabilities for criminal investigation, detection, and apprehension. Also, an unusually close cooperation developed between the police and the administrative branches of the Government.

c. The police force in Malaya provided the first type of Government work open to the Malays, and, for a long time, it was the only one available to them. Recruitment was never difficult. The Malays made up the largest part of the lower ranks. Europeans filled the higher positions at first, but over the years the Malays (and some Indians and Chinese) gradually began to assume some of the posts. The Chinese seldom entered the regular police forces, for they disliked ordinary police work, but many of them did enter the detective branch, for which they appeared to have a special aptitude. Even in the police force, then, divisions were drawn along ethnic lines. The predominance of the Malays on the force tended to intensify the Chinese community's traditional hostility to the police. To overcome this difficulty, an effort was made in the 1960's to increase the number of Chinese police by admitting only one new member from any other race for every two Chinese recruited. Indians and Pakistanis traditionally have served on the force, and they continue to fill posts at all levels.

d. At first, British police cadets were sent to China for 2 years of training before being assigned to Malaya, but after 1949 they studied at the Government Language School in the Cameron Highlands, where a Chinese language course was available. It was expected that this type of training would continue after Malaya became independent. During the Emergency, rapid expansion of the force made it impossible for many recruits to be given any kind of formal police training. With reduction in the size of the force, training was resumed and the level of the force improved. Special schools were established to provide short courses for the constabulary, the field force, and the special branch; and the lower ranks also were given some training. In the 1950's, some of the Malay police were trained in England. Recruitment and training had been conducted at the Police Depot in Kuala Lumpur from the beginning of the police organization. Then the Police College established at Kuala Kubu Bahru in Selangor in 1952 became the major training center. This college was organized like its British counterpart. Malay language courses for non-Malays were offered, and advanced courses for inspectors included criminal investigation and police duty and administration. By 1955, the college could train 60 officers and inspectors and more than 30 junior officers annually. By that time, seven women had been trained

as inspectors at the Police Depot in Kuala Lumpur, and the first women constables were graduated in 1956.

e. By 1947, Malaya's police force had 154 permanent officers (most of whom were European), 192 inspectors (predominantly Malay), and more than 9,000 subordinate officers and constables. Changes in organization size and police functions were necessitated by the Emergency (1948-60). Depradations and terrorist activities of the Communists cuased the force to be quadrupled in size and given greater authority, to permit it to fight the terrorists as well as to carry on its regular duties. Additional categories of positions and forces were established, including lieutenants and special constabulary, created especially to conduct operations against the terrorists. By 1954, imore than 60,000 people were engaged in police work, but this number included members of the supporting staffs. By 1956, it was possible to reduce the size of the organization, particularly in those sections designed specifically for the Emergency, and many less well-qualified members were released. No further changes have been made since independence, and this force continues to be efficient and well-organized.

138. The Singapore police. Most major crimes occurred in urban areas. Singapore, where a large number of Chinese had settled, had a particularly high rate. In 1843, just 15 years after London's Metropolitan Police had been organized, the British created a police force for Singapore, the first such unit in this Southeast Asian area. As the city of Singapore grew in size and importance, its problems increased, and the police organization changed to meet the needs of both the city and the Island. The force, designed specifically to combat major crime, eventually became the modern, effective, and complex Singapore State Police. The organizational structure of the Singapore force was similar to that of the Malaya force (established later), but the two were completely separate. The Chief Commissioner of Police (Singapore) was responsible directly to the Governor. Malays filled most of the subordinate positions, Chinese were predominant in the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), and Europeans held the highest posts, just as in Malaya. The Island was divided into four police areas, each of which had two police divisions. In addition. later, there were specialized forces: Marine Police, Traffic Police, a Secret Societies Suppression Branch, and a Special Branch. The force numbered 3,958 by 1955. Recruits were required to pass a Government examination. All ranks were trained at a Police Training School, and some members of the force attended courses in England.

139. Police systems in Sarawak and Sabah. The States of Sarawak and Sabah had constabularies. Their origin was much the same as for the forces of Malaya, but their development was slower and their facilities for dealing with civil crime were less advanced. At first,

British colonial authorities controlled police activities from one headquarters in Brunei, with subordinate headquarters in Sarawak and Sabah. The early forces were primarily paramilitary patrols designed to control threats to internal security, with local headmen in charge of meeting the threats of criminal elements. No changes were made in the force in Sabah until 1963, but a separate force was established early in Sarawak to serve as the major police force in cities and to enforce the headmen's actions against civil crime. Both this later force and the original armed patrols existed until 1932, when they merged to form the Sarawak Constabulary. For awhile, Sarawak also had village constables, but the State Constabulary, slightly enlarged, had taken over their functions also by 1938. For years, the British made no attempt to establish a single police agency, although, following entry of the two States into the Federation of Malaysia, their police organizations became subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Security and Justice. The Emergency prevented effectuation of plans that had been made to organize a single National Malayan police establishment.

140. The roles and efficiency of the police. That the efficiency and morale of the police would vary under changing conditions was to be expected. However, the roles also changed and, with them, the attitude of the people toward the police forces. The 1930's provide the only period during which Malaya may be said to have functioned under normal conditions. The Japanese occupation and the Emergency both produced conditions that could scarcely have been considered normal, and between these two periods the Malays were becoming a people aware that existence under the agencies of law and order established by the British was not enough.

a. During the 1930's, the efficiency and morale of the police were high, and the restraint with which they wielded their power was admirable. Strikes, often instigated by the Communist element, created the most trying situations for the police during this period. The other major problems concerned the secret societies; and, even though police authority was strong, civil authorities held restraining power over the police, which often restricted police action against the secret societies.

b. The police force deteriorated during the Japanese occupation. At this time, the force was composed mostly of Malays, and many of them simply left the force and returned to their homes. Others, however, used their authority and weapons to intimidate and practice extortion against the people, and the Japanese were quick to use the remnants of the force against the Chinese inhabitants of Malaya. After the war ended, bitterness was deep, and there was open fighting between Malays and Chinese. Part of this bitterness was traceable directly to actions of members of the force who either took advantage

of their unbridled power or blindly, perhaps through intimidation, acted under Japanese orders.

c. When the British returned after the war, only a remnant of the police forces was operating. Morale was low, there was very little equipment, corruption ran high, and regard of the people for the police was extremely low. The British reorganized and reequipped the forces of Malaya and Singapore. They introduced the use of radio-equipped patrols at this time, which would prove to be extremely valuable later for rapid communication during the Emergency.

d. Throughout the war years, there was a growing realization among the people in Malaya that the British were neither invincible nor indispensable and that independence was possible. By 1945, with the return of the British, overt reaction greeted the possibility that the colonial types of systems might be reimposed. The Communist forces were in a powerful position, and, when the Malayan Communist Party became aware that it could not gain control by economic and industrial subversion alone, the war for power in Malaya began with guerrilla tactics and terrorism. By the time the Emergency was proclaimed in 1948, the Singapore police had regained its prewar level of efficiency, and it was able to prevent a planned Communist outbreak. Nevertheless, the building of both the organization and its morale was still in progress, and neither the Singapore nor the Malaya police was sufficiently strong to cope with both crime and the threats of the Communist terrorists. Radical changes were needed in the system of public order and protection.

e. To satisfy the dual police mission to maintain order and combat the terrorists, two groups were organized and maintained as separate forces. As a result, the force as a whole quadrupled in size. The Government was concerned with the normal police task of keeping order, but this requirement was subordinate to the need for maintaining internal peace and security in the face of the Communist activities. As a result, greater emphasis was placed on achieving full cooperation between the police and both military and civilian officials. To achieve this end, a State War Executive Council (SWEC) was established and assumed overall control. Under the SWEC, the problems of recruiting, training, and equipping the police forces received greater attention. Once independence was achieved and the British handed over full control of the forces of law and order, the transition was smooth. Almost the only change entailed was to replace the British officials with Malayan personnel, who assumed positions of leadership in both the police and judiciary systems. The Chief Commissioner of Police was placed in charge of the Federation Police Force and was, himself, directly responsible to the Ministry of Defense. Both the regular forces and those specifically

designed for use against the Communist terrorists and guerrillas were placed under this central control.

141. A comparison of Malayan military factors with those of neighboring countries. Generally speaking, the Malays were little interested in politics and lacked the strong sense of nationalism exhibited by their more independent and aggressive neighbors. Part of this indifference was reflected in the state of Malaya's military and police forces. Malaya did have a functioning system of laws and the machinery for administering them, and an adequate and sometimes most efficient police force was part of this system. However, it had no real Armed Forces, and any military or paramilitary organization that existed was in essence British, not Malayan. By way of comparison, Siam had a standing Army of about 25,000 men; a small Navy; and military, naval, and aviation schools during the thirties which attracted young men of the higher social classes. It also had a system of compulsory military service (18-40 years of age). The Siamese had a strong sense of nationalism and were able to achieve freedom. Following a revolution in the thirties (led chiefly by the quasi-middle-class--mostly lesser Government officials and tradesmen), the Commander of the Army became a virtual dictator. In Indochina, about half the 25,000 men in the Army (1930-35) were natives, and its police force was made up of natives.

142. Factors contributing to conflict in Malaya. The most corrosive factor, evident throughout the years, was the distrust generated by the divided character of the people. Differences among the major ethnic groups, the failure of immigrants to become part of the society or even to communicate with the other groups, and the lack of a feeling of national consciousness--all these fed and enlarged the separateness of the people and made them open to doubts and to the suggestions of others, whether internal groups or other countries. Out of this turmoil, however, has emerged a nation thoroughly anti-Communist and determined to maintain its separate existence as a nation that contains the separate ethnic groups. There is obviously no reason to believe that either the military or the people's organizations can be considered to be causes of unrest or contributors to political or armed conflict. There was no question of usurpation of power by a military group, nor was there a separate elite military or paramilitary caste or class. Although the stature of the police suffered and its popular acceptance waned because of excesses committed during World War II, the reorganized force can be regarded only as a contributor to stability. Both the military and the police were important factors in the defeat of the Communist terrorist forces; and they, along with a strongly anti-Communist populace, fought and worked to make and maintain Malaya as a free nation. The occupation by the

Japanese brought into focus a gradually growing consciousness of nationalism, but even this was turned from a possible outbreak of violence and channeled into political action.

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