

This document consists of 131 pages.  
Number 16 of 47 copies. *Series B*

23

FOURTH SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL  
Foreign Policy Study

505

B

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION PROGRAMS IN DETERRENCE

Can Our Efforts to Communicate with the Soviet People Affect the  
Foreign Policy Decisions of the Soviet Regime?

by

Abraham M. Sirkin

United States Information Agency

June 4, 1962

THIS STUDY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

Foreign Service Institute

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date:

JAN 22 1992

RELEASE  
 EXCISE  
 DENY  
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info  
FOIA Exemptions \_\_\_\_\_  
PA Exemptions \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFY  
 DECLASSIFY  
IN PART

MR Cases Only:  
EO Citations \_\_\_\_\_  
TS authority to:  
 CLASSIFY as  S or  C OADR  
 DOWNGRADE TS to  S or  C OADR

DECLASSIFIED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS	5
A. Points of Agreement	5
B. Major Problem Areas	9
III. THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION	54
A. Radio	54
B. Exchanges of Persons and Exhibits	68
C. Use of Soviet Government's Own Media	73
D. Other Means	74
IV. CONTENT AND TONE OF COMMUNICATIONS	76
A. Long-Range Values	76
B. Credibility	79
C. Major Crises and Issues	83
D. Matters of Tone, Language and Technique	90
V. ORGANIZATION AND RESEARCH	97
A. Organization	97
B. Research	102
VI. SUMMARY	109
FOOTNOTES	118
SPECIALISTS CONSULTED	121
BIBLIOGRAPHY	125
BIOGRAPHY	130

DECLASSIFIED

## I. INTRODUCTION

A vast amount of thought and effort has been devoted in recent years to the problems of preventing thermo-nuclear war and of deterring Soviet behavior which might lead to war or further communist expansion. Not only have enormous military expenditures been dedicated to these purposes but much of the nation's best brainpower has been engaged in analyzing the strategy of deterrence. Our political and military thinkers have been studying the various factors which might influence the decisions of the Soviet leaders in matters of war and peace, pressure and accommodation. And our strategists and policy makers have been trying to determine how our power and diplomacy can be brought to bear most effectively on such decisions.

In the course of these studies, considerable thought has been given to the question of communicating effectively with the Soviet leadership what we would like them to know and understand about our capabilities and intentions. Leading authorities on the subject have agreed that this is a crucial aspect of deterrence and that the psychological impact of our military posture may be significant, and as worthy of study, as the hardware in which it is encased.

One aspect of the subject, however, has received no recent attention. It is this: The possible impact on the decision-making process in the USSR of our efforts to communicate with the Soviet public. Our thinking so far has focussed primarily on what can be done to communicate directly with the Soviet leadership, on what we can do politically and militarily

CONFIDENTIAL

and what we can say through normal diplomatic channels and other means of public and private direct communication which can affect the views and policies of the Kremlin. The assumption has been apparently accepted in many quarters that in the Soviet dictatorship, public opinion can play no role in the formulation of foreign policy and that outside efforts to reach that public can have little or no direct, or even ultimate, effect on Kremlin decisions on the political-military sphere.

The purpose of this paper is to reexamine this assumption.

The time is now ripe for such a reexamination. The mounting thermonuclear capabilities have generated a search for a wider range of non-military techniques and devices to effectuate, reinforce and supplement the fundamental military means of deterrence. The fissures which have recently appeared in the Sino-Soviet bloc give signs of developing some permanence and may have repercussions within the USSR. Despite the apparent continuity of ultimate goals, the Khrushchev regime has differed significantly from its predecessor in the relative weight it has given to domestic persuasion as against terror and in its willingness to permit some greater degree of exposure of its population to outside influences. As compared to a decade ago, there now exists in the West a considerably greater body of first-hand knowledge of the real views held by numerous individuals in various segments of Soviet society on major domestic and foreign issues. The inexorable calendar insists that a new generation will soon be taking the center of the Soviet stage, while another generation, whose world outlook may not yet be fully molded, waits impatiently in the wings. Finally a new Administration in the United States provides

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

a logical opportunity for a reevaluation of previous assumptions.

In this paper, therefore, I shall try to open up several related questions for discussion and perhaps further study. These questions are:

To what extent can the views of significant elements of Soviet society have an influence on the foreign policy decisions of their leaders?

What means can we devise and develop to communicate more effectively with such audiences?

What would have to be the content and tone our communications to contribute to our deterrents and other foreign policy objectives?

It is obviously not possible to give categorical answers to such questions at this time, and certainly not as a consequence of the brief inquiry made in preparation for this paper. What I have sought to do has been to determine the present state of thinking on these questions among a sampling of experts, within the Government and outside, in the fields of Soviet society and politics, of deterrent strategy and of international communications. The views of these experts were obtained in the course of interviews with them over a six-week period in April and May 1962 and from a reading of books, articles and papers by a number of them. This paper covers the range of views expressed, a number of conclusions based on these views, proposals for Government action and recommendations of subjects requiring more detailed study as a basis for future action.

The general areas with which this paper deals have vast ramifications and would require volumes to cover adequately. The scope here has been narrowed arbitrarily to make the subject manageable for this brief inquiry. It might, therefore, be useful to identify some of the major

related subjects which I have not attempted to cover in this study.

"Government Information Programs" in the title refers primarily to the conventional public media of international information at the disposal of the Government, such as radio, publications and exchange of persons, and not to the whole panoply of residential and departmental channels, devices and means for communicating with foreign officials publicly and privately. There will, however, be some reference to ways in which such channels might be more effectively used and exploited for reaching the Soviet people and leaders. Nor is attention given here to the matter of reaching world opinion outside the bloc and the controversial issue of the putative restraints this opinion might impose on Soviet behavior in the world arena. This is worthy of more intensive and sophisticated study than it has received so far but it is beyond the scope of this paper. Only tangential reference is made in the following pages to the information efforts directed to the satellite peoples of Eastern Europe and to the Chinese people and the possible effect of such efforts on their own leaders and on the Kremlin. These subjects too deserve more detailed study; however, some of the points developed here in regard to the USSR may be applicable, with appropriate modifications, to other communist nations.

CONFIDENTIAL

031507030

II. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. POINTS OF AGREEMENT

A variety of assumptions, concepts and views about the structure and functioning of Soviet government and society are involved in seeking answers to the questions posed in this paper. On some of these assumptions and ideas there is general agreement among students of the Soviet scene. In regard to others, there is considerable difference of opinion.

Apparently there is a general consensus among the specialists on the following propositions:

1. The people of the USSR have an overwhelming desire for peace and a genuine fear of war.

The mature generations have lived through losses, destruction and hardship which have brought home to them, more than to most other people of the world, what war means. There may be some question about the degree to which the present student generation shares these feelings, since an increasing number of its members did not fully share the war experience. Many of them, however, did live through the post-war difficulties of shortages and reconstruction and most of them have been exposed to the vivid recollections of their parents. It is because of this underlying fear and its past associations that Soviet, as well as satellite, citizens fall so quickly and automatically into "eve of war" patterns of behavior, such as the scare-buying of necessities and the gathering before street microphones to hear news bulletins, whenever

CONFIDENTIAL

they become aware that international tension has greatly increased and that a crisis may be brewing.

2. The people of the USSR generally "accept" their system and regime.

There are widely different estimates about the proportion of the population that might be called enthusiastic, apathetic, resigned, or disaffected to some degree. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that even the latter harbor little hope of overturning the regime or drastically altering the economic system. Most domestic critics of the Soviet government, and there is a considerable number of them in the USSR, look for changes within the present framework to make life more comfortable and agreeable for themselves and their families or to have it conform more completely to stated Soviet goals and ideals.

3. Patriotism is an increasingly important emotion in the USSR.

There is a widespread and growing sense of pride among the Soviet people in Soviet achievements in science, in military power, in athletic skill and prowess, and in some phases of industry. This is true even among those who are critical of shortcomings in other phases of Soviet life. It is not universal, of course, and its depth is uncertain. It is not clear how much this feeling involves identification with regime as well as with country. Nor do we know for certain how this relates to the individual nationalisms of the non-Russian people of the USSR and whether these nationalisms have lost much of their force. There is little doubt, however, that this new patriotism exists and that it contains elements and sensitivities beyond the powerful "defense of the

CONFIDENTIAL



homeland" nationalism which reached a peak in World War II and which still retains much of its emotional strength.

4. Soviet leaders desire popular approval of their policies and are generally able to direct public attitudes on foreign affairs along desired lines.

The Government of the USSR devotes considerable manpower and effort to the psycho-political task of "agit-prop" to get its line across domestically. It has developed elaborate machinery to prevent the exposure of its people to unauthorized information and alternative views. Because of this virtual monopoly of politically significant information and ideas, the leadership is generally able to impose its concepts on the majority of interested citizens. For obvious reasons, this is more true in foreign affairs than in domestic matters. In questions of external policy, few Soviet citizens have any personal experience against which to check the Government's statements. There is an unknown, and consequently debatable, degree of political apathy, of scepticism about official pronouncements and of suspicion of anything that smacks of "propaganda" among various elements of the Soviet population. But apparently this is still no match for the all-pervasive official line which dominates the conscious view of most Soviet citizens and permeates the unconscious view of all who are subjected to its interminable outpourings.

5. Soviet citizens generally assume that virtually everything their government does in foreign affairs furthers the cause of world peace.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Soviet people value peace so highly and they have heard their leaders proclaim their devotion to peace so tirelessly that they cannot conceive of their Government doing anything which increases the danger of war.

There have been some exceptions to this. Khrushchev's threats at the time of the Lebanon landings in 1958 created enough tension to set off a wave of scare buying in Soviet cities. A similar situation developed following Khrushchev's speech of August 11, 1961, <sup>(1)</sup> presenting an apparent renewed ultimatum on Berlin, accompanied soon thereafter by the erection of the Berlin wall and the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests. But usually Soviet behavior which serves to raise tension abroad does not appear in that light at home. Actions which seem bellicose to the West have been rationalized as peace-oriented within the framework of the Soviet world view to the satisfaction of most of the Soviet public. This feeling is undoubtedly bolstered by Soviet patriotism and the psychological reluctance to admit the wrongness of the regime, which might imply the futility of past sacrifices.

This automatic assumption by the people of the USSR that the intentions and actions of the Soviet leaders are always directed to peace on the questions of war and peace. It may also be seen as the primary ideological target and, perhaps, most favorable opportunity for such communication.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

B. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS

The above five propositions are points on which most Soviet experts in the United States seem to be agreed. There are several related questions, however, to which they are inclined to give a wide range of divergent answers. These are matters on which little hard fact and virtually no quantitative material is now available. The differing opinions are based on combinations of personal experience, specialized training and interest, deductive reasoning and speculation.

The exposition and discussion of these differing points of view will be grouped under three major questions:

1. What degree of attention and concern does the Soviet regime give to its people's opinions on the matters of foreign policy?

As indicated in paragraph 4 above, it is generally agreed that the Soviet regime likes to have popular support for its foreign policies and that it expends considerable energy to achieve it. What is in question, however, is how seriously the Soviet regime considers the matter. The range of opinions among the experts might be grouped conveniently under three expressions of view:

(a) The Soviet regime has little real concern about domestic public attitudes on foreign policy.

This is the commonly held view among the lay public in the West and in the non-Communist press. It is strongly supported also by some of the leading students of Soviet government and society. The reasoning is clear.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

The Soviet regime, even with Khrushchevian modifications, is still a dictatorship. It does not respond to the popular will per se. Whether its actions are motivated by ideological goals, national statecraft, party control requirements or the power interests of individual leaders, the degree of popular support for any measure is a minor consideration. This is true to a large extent even on domestic issues where the need for public cooperation is greater and the limits of public acquiescence are narrower than in foreign affairs. Ever since its inception, the Soviet regime has taken unpopular steps, sometimes in the face of strong popular resistance. It has made some concessions to the popular will and perhaps an increasing number in recent years, but seldom, if ever, in matters of foreign policy. On such matters, the Soviet people do not expect to be consulted. Even well-educated and politically aware Soviet citizens, if not simply stating the official line on foreign policy questions, are inclined to give a helpless shrug and to note that these are matters of "high policy" which only the Kremlin leaders and professional diplomats can understand and deal with.

By and large the evidence of history may be said to fall on this side of the argument. Domestic public opinion did not seem to cause much of a problem to the Kremlin in the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution or the resumption of nuclear tests. Students critics of the Hungarian action were a small minority easily and quickly brought to heel.

How then does one explain the massive propaganda effort designed to obtain conformity of public attitude even on foreign questions? There are several answers. One is that a large part of it is simply a matter of habit and style. The manufacture of public opinion to support

leadership policies has become a ritual which must be performed as an obeissance to the mystique of Democratic Centralism and to those passages of Marxist-Leninist Holy Writ which assert the role of the Party as the vanguard of the proletariat and as expressive of the true will of the masses of workers and peasants. In this sense the whole agit-prop operation is an exercise in lip-service which is a useful prop to the true believers but is not taken too seriously either by its manipulators or its more sophisticated victims.

Another answer is: The regime seeks to mold the population into a carbon copy of its own aspirations -- the "new Communist man", who will automatically follow the lead of the Party. Still another answer is that although the regime does not consider the popularity of all its policies essential, it does find public support valuable enough to be worth a considerable expenditure. An atmosphere of public approval is a favorable factor in the development of cooperation and enthusiasm in carrying out the objectives of the Party in all spheres. A fourth answer may be this: Although the Government does not really require public approval for every one of its known policies, it is leary of permitting even the appearance of any break in the ostensible monolithicity of the Soviet leadership and public. At any one time there must be only one political tune and all must seem to be singing it. Otherwise dangerous precedents might take root.

(b) A second approach might be put this way:

The Soviet regime may or may not be seriously concerned about what the people think on foreign issues but it feels sure of its ability to manage public opinion as it wishes.

This view held by some Soviet specialists differs in one important particular from the previous one above. It concentrates on the Soviet Government's confidence in its ability to solve the problem rather than on the reality or unreality of the problem itself. From this point of view, the Soviet leadership can undertake steps which are not immediately understandable to, or automatically popular with, the Soviet people but it need have no worry on that score since the proven means of generating popular "understanding" and support are available to it. It is not important therefore to know how seriously in the abstract the Soviet regime regards the questions of public opinion on foreign affairs issues. What is important is that practically the leadership can ignore this factor in the decision-making process since by its various methods of coercion and persuasion and its huge apparatus of dissemination and restriction of information it can control the situation, even after the decision has been carried out.

The ease with which the Soviet regime managed its public opinion problems after Hungary and after the resumption of testing last year may be cited as evidence for the validity of this approach. This does not mean that the Government in these and other cases succeeded in stilling all doubts, satisfying all elements and convincing all individuals. It does mean that the regime obtained the desired degree of publicly expressed approval and apparent acceptance of the official line.

(c) A third category of experts might express its position this way:

CONFIDENTIAL

031507000

The Soviet regime is most seriously concerned about its people's views, even in the foreign policy field, and gives some weight to these views in its decision making.

Those who hold this view do not agree with one another on certain aspects of this proposition, nor do they all reach the same conclusions. For the sake of convenience, however, the following discussion will deal with the various aspects as if they were integral parts of a single concept.

The main proof that the Soviet leadership worries seriously about its public opinion is the nature and extent of its positive and negative efforts to deal with the problem. The positive side includes the vast agitational and propaganda machinery which has been employed by the Soviet regime to obtain public support for, and cooperation in, the achievement of Party objectives. This has been fully described by Alex Inkeles in his "Public Opinion in Soviet Russia" (1950). There have been changes in style and detail since that time but not in the general nature of the operation. The press, the radio, the cinema carry the official line exclusively. Public lecturers bring the line to the classrooms, the factories, the collective farms and even the public parks. And television and air travel have now been brought into play by Khrushchev who has added TV fireside chats to his barnstorming tours across the length and breadth of the Soviet Union.

More needs to be said about the negative effort. Stalin's iron curtain to prevent foreign information and ideas from reaching the

CONFIDENTIAL

Soviet public is still there and it is still effective. Foreign books, magazines and newspapers continue to be largely excluded. Foreign travel remains severely limited as compared with the volume of travel available to citizens of Western countries. Foreign radio broadcasts which touch on political questions are jammed.

Since the death of Stalin, the Soviet leaders have carefully pulled aside some folds in the curtain to permit a wider but controlled exchange with the outside world. There has been increased tourist travel, greater official exchange of students, specialist delegations and cultural presentations, elimination of jamming of broadcasts on non-sensitive subjects, exchange of "non-political" official magazines, and exchange of exhibits and cultural films.

What prompted these official openings in Stalin's wall? Some of the reasons given have been openly acknowledged, some only surmised. The obvious gains are the acquisition of technical knowledge and useful new ideas from the West, the opportunity to spread Soviet ideas, the chance to acquire prestige and acclaim for Soviet skill in the arts and in sports, and an improved image and greater respectability in the non-Communist world.

Two other considerations are of particular relevance to our subject: One is the fact that the iron curtain has always been a source of resentment among the Soviet intelligentsia. Permitting of greater contacts with the outside world can therefore be seen as a Khrushchevian

CONFIDENTIAL

03150700



concession to a major element of Soviet public opinion.

At the same time this relaxation of control fitted into the total picture of Khrushchev's style of leadership. Laying greater emphasis on persuasion than on terror or coercion, but with the latter never absent from the background, Khrushchev obviously calculated that he could allow some increase in foreign contact without danger to the regime. Most of the exchange arrangements have built-in controls to limit their deleterious effects. There is prudent selection of the trusted few who are permitted to leave the country as tourists, as delegation members or as students. The contents of exhibits or of official magazines must not touch on ideological or controversial political matters. The foreign films selected for showing to the Soviet people are chosen for their political innocence. And contacts with foreign visitors are not encouraged and from time to time sharply discouraged.

The recent history of jamming of the Voice of America is most illuminating on this score. After years of total jamming of all VOA programs in USSR languages, jamming ceased completely on the day Khrushchev arrived in the United States on his first visit. This continued throughout the period which the Soviet leader identified with the Spirit of Camp David. When this deteriorated in Soviet estimation the following spring jamming was resumed but this time on a selective basis. Items of news and comment concerning strictly domestic U. S. matters or items of no political interest to the USSR remained unjammed. The moment an announcer began reading an item on Berlin, or Laos, or nuclear

CONFIDENTIAL

tests, of Communist China, or some Russian defector, the entire Soviet jamming apparatus of thousands of stations throughout the USSR started emitting disagreeable sounds on all the frequencies carrying the "offending" material. The same pattern has continued to this day.

So the curtain still exists. And the controlled openings exist as well. Obviously the regime today is still careful about what it will permit its people to read, hear and know. But it has altered the formula of control. It allows the occasional foreigner to speak his piece on television or in Izvestia but counts on its impact to be blunted by immediate counter-argument and its total effect to be drowned in the flood of official material that flows incessantly from the ever-filled sluices of agit-prop.

Recently Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev himself, have complained publicly about the persistent Western ideological attempts to influence Soviet youth and the harmful effects of such influence. (2) Statements of this sort are a reminder of how carefully the Soviet leaders watch this situation, with perhaps an implied warning that if the openings in the curtain become too troublesome, the regime would not hesitate to narrow them or if necessary eliminate them completely. How easy this would be is another question, and a controversial one.

There is no doubt, however, that in its handling of exchanges and contacts, the Soviet leadership has consistently shown its concern over the information reaching the Soviet people on foreign affairs. It shows

CONFIDENTIAL

this in other ways too. Here are some examples:

Throughout the whole period of the heavy refugee flow from East Germany via Berlin leading up to the erection of the Wall, Soviet official and media resorted to the most far-fetched "explanations" about kidnapings and mass exodus of spies and provocateurs to keep the real cause of the crisis from their own people.

The Soviet Government has still not published as of this date a fair summary of the latest Western proposal for general and complete disarmament presented at Geneva two months ago. Soviet readers are aware of only those elements which the Soviet media have chosen to single out for attack.

In addition to outright suppression of facts, the regime engages in distortion and in selective emphasis on the negative aspects of the outside world.

When U-2 pilot Major Powers was to be exchanged for Soviet spy Colonel Abel, the Soviet negotiators insisted that the American representative promise that the exchange would not be used for propaganda. (3) When the mutual transfer took place, in February 1962, the Soviet people were told of the release of Powers but not a word about Abel. The Soviet Government could obviously not prevent the rest of the world from knowing, but was apparently determined that its own people should not know, that it too engaged in spying. It was not until two weeks later, after outside media had carried the full story, that Izvestia mentioned Abel and gave its "cleaned-up" version of the exchange. It is hard to

CONFIDENTIAL

understand such an incident except in terms of an extraordinary sensitivity to what the Soviet public thinks about its Government's behavior on the world scene and the urgent need to maintain at home a reputation for perfect virtue in international affairs.

So much for the nature and scope of the positive and negative efforts of the Soviet regime to manage its public opinion on foreign affairs. The argument is therefore made that the Soviet leaders would not put all these resources, manpower, energy and top-level thought and attention into this enterprise if it did not consider public attitudes of the utmost importance, and perhaps a factor to be taken into account in making decisions.

As noted above, however, not all experts looking at this body of facts reach the same conclusion. Some are not convinced that the vast effort, per se, proves that a possible unfavorable reaction at home would in any way affect a Soviet foreign policy decision.

What other arguments are there for such a view? There are several.  
Crisis Situations.

Underneath the surface of every dictatorial regime, there is a tension felt by the leadership because of a fundamental uncertainty about what the people generally, or elements whose views or interests have been suppressed, might do at a critical juncture. This tension is likely to show itself at a time of crisis. The most recent clear example in the USSR was the situation in Moscow in the first few days after the death of Stalin. The full story may never be known, but enough has emerged

CONFIDENTIAL

even from the official Soviet statements to make clear that the nervous Politburo did not know what to expect and made provision to cope with possible "disarray and panic". (4) The Party leaders probably had more reason to fear the bursting of pent-up feelings following the declining years of Stalin than they would perhaps following a major change in the present leadership. But relaxation and de-Stalinization may bring their own problems and uncertainties for the regime as another succession crisis approaches.

In such a situation, the real prospect of upheaval may not be as important as the degree to which the leaders are prone to fear, and worry about, such a prospect. This would be true not only in regard to a succession problem and its conceivable aftermath of open factional struggle but also in connection with a possible danger of war. In contemplating what might occur in a war crisis, the regime would want to assure itself in advance of the loyalty of its people and armed forces. With this underlying aim, the Soviet leaders feel a compulsion to make their foreign policies appear reasonable and peaceful to their own people. This may often be accomplished by agit-prop methods alone. But, as will be indicated later, occasions may arise or be created requiring the Soviet regime to consider the views of its own people in determining not only the shadow but even the substance of its international behavior.

Military doctrine.

Another clue to the solution of this question may be derived from a

CONFIDENTIAL

study of Soviet military doctrine. Twenty years ago Stalin compiled or took credit for what he called the "permanently operating factors" in war and listed as the first two the stability of the rear and the morale of the army, the others being the quantity and quality of division, armanent, and the organizing ability of commanders. (5) Despite de-Stalinization and the radical changes in military technology, these basic concepts have persisted through various reformulations. The prevailing view among Soviet military writers is that a thermo-nuclear exchange, if it should occur, could be only the beginning of a protracted war in which victory would go to the side best able to reorganize its forces, reconstruct its base and take over the contested ground. This would be a long process determined by superior endurance, organization and morale. Thus the Soviet military historian N. Talensky wrote recently:

"The outcome of a struggle would depend on the effectiveness of those blows, the power and the quality of nuclear rocket weapons and their means of delivery, the geographical conditions, etc.

"In the final analysis, however, the outcome of a nuclear war, if the imperialists ever succeed in unleashing it, would depend on such decisive factors as the superiority of the social and economic system, the political soundness of the state, the morale and political understanding of the masses, their organization and unity, the prestige of national leadership." (6)

We are often inclined to dismiss such statements as meaningless

CONFIDENTIAL

Marxist rhetoric, but there is something more to be seen here. The assumptions of superiority of the Soviet system and the soundness of the Soviet state can of course be ignored, but the indicated concern for the morale and political understanding of the masses has real meaning. These are not matters the Communists take for granted as coming automatically with their superior social system. Morale and political "understanding" are things they work hard to achieve.

The Soviet leaders have shown how vital this matter is for them in their planning for possible wartime conditions. In the literature of DOSAAF, the paramilitary civil defense body, repeated references are made to the fact that in thermonuclear war the front and the rear merge and so do the problems of military and civilian morale. In line with the above-stated military doctrine, special attention is given in DOSAAF to the agit-prop preparation for the period following a thermonuclear exchange; to the indoctrination of forces for protracted war or for the time of survival measures, recovery and reestablishment of control; and to the problem of motivating civilians to stay at their jobs and posts in the wake of a cataclysm as the nation is recuperating from its blows. The morale factor is obviously of tremendous importance in such planning.

The Soviet view of this prospect must be complicated also by the presumed urgent aim of the Party to retain or resume central control of the military, political and economic structure. One result of thermonuclear attack might well be the fragmentation and decentralization of

CONFIDENTIAL

control into the hands of regional military or other authorities not under Party discipline. This would provide an opportunity for realization of any independent regional or national strivings, especially if they were reinforced by bitterness over the regime's failure to prevent the calamity.

That such anxiety over popular attitudes is no mere theoretical matter was demonstrated clearly in the last war. A detailed report on The Siege of Leningrad by Leon Goure, (7) shows the extraordinary lengths to which the local Party leaders went to maintain the morale of the inhabitants, from the early confiscation of all privately owned radios to the intensive use of standard agit-prop devices and the most careful attention to policies of rationing and public participation in defense operations.

It is only logical to assume that this wartime pattern of thought is a continuation, perhaps in intensified form, of the normal peacetime Soviet approach. The conclusion may be warranted that the problem of public attitudes, loyalty and morale looms large in Soviet thinking at all times. In the crucial matter of war and peace, in which loyalties could be put to the severest test, Soviet leaders may be particularly sensitive to what the people of the USSR might think or feel about the government's judgments, policies and behavior.

Political Popularity.

Leninist theory is contemptuous of Party leadership which follows rather than leads the people. Concessions were made nevertheless in Lenin's own time and even in Stalin's to popular resistance and needs. Today, with terror used ever more sparingly and greater reliance on

CONFIDENTIAL



persuasion and "understanding", there is a greater tendency on the part of the regime to watch, and deal with or respond to, public feeling.

There are indications from time to time that in controversies within the present regime the popularity of a policy may be cited as a valid argument in its favor. (8)

For the purposes of our subject this raises two interesting questions:

(1) Is the popularity of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet public one of the main reasons for its adoption by the Soviet government as a policy as well as a slogan?

To be sure, there are enough other grounds for the Soviet Union wanting to pursue peaceful coexistence today. The danger of mutual devastation, the long-range requirements of the Soviet regime and its world aims, the propaganda value of a "peaceful" slogan in the Western and uncommitted areas, are all excellent reasons for proclaiming and, within limits, carrying out such a policy. But in the domestic Soviet pronouncements on the subject, especially in Khrushchew's own whistle-stop speeches throughout the USSR, there is a conscious playing on the popularity of the theme. Foreign critics of the regime both within and outside the Sino-Soviet bloc and the domestic Anti-Party group are castigated for their opposition to "peaceful coexistence" as if this were clearly self-incriminating. If domestic popularity was not one of the original reasons for adopting peaceful coexistence, it is certainly one of this policy's most significant and constantly exploited by-products. In either case, the result is that the Soviet regime has now made a heavy agit-prop

CONFIDENTIAL

investment in a slogan and policy against which the Soviet people may judge the regime's future international behavior, to the extent that they are informed of it. Perhaps the Soviet regime can invariably caulk the seams between its risky probing actions and its peaceful pronouncements with gobs of jamming and agit-prop. It is equally possible, however, that the original domestic popularity and the subsequent further popularization of the line of peaceful coexistence may have somewhat narrowed the Kremlin's room for maneuver in the international sphere.

The other interesting question is:

Might the issue of domestic popularity of the peaceful coexistence policy play a role in some future succession crisis?

To be specific, if Nikita Khrushchev died tomorrow, the struggle for succession would undoubtedly involve the individual ambitions, leadership abilities, and entrenched bureaucratic positions of the foremost Party personalities. One cannot rule out, however, the possibility that once again a wider sphere of Party leadership might provide the arena of choice. One can easily visualize that at least the form if not the substance of the argument between opposing forces would revolve around the hard-vs.-soft policy quarrel between the anti-Party, pro-Chinese "conservative" and the Khrushchevian "liberalizers" and "coexistentialists". And in this broadened arena, the popularity of one policy as against the other might well come into play. To carry the point one step further, popular feeling on such matters might well be determined by what the people generally or significant elements among them know about the relevant facts, situations and events, including what they might learn from

CONFIDENTIAL

foreign sources of information.

To sum up, American experts on the USSR hold sharply divergent views on the first major problem area discussed. No individual expert may recognize his own position in any of the three positions described, since they have been summarized, oversimplified and artificially amalgamated to give a rough approximation of the range of view on this matter. Considerably more discussion has been devoted to the third position because, among other reasons, it is the least common and familiar in the current literature. It might be pertinent to quote a recent comment by Professor Raymond A. Bauer, of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, who with Professor Alex Inkeles of Harvard made a careful study of the Soviet Citizen on the basis of information from Soviet refugees in the early 1950s. He noted the tendency of scholars, himself included, to concentrate at that time on the "sources of stability of the Soviet regime" in reaction to the "fairly widely held belief that the Soviet people were ripe for revolt".

"Emphasis," he said, "was placed on the controls exercised by the Soviet elite. To the best of my knowledge what was said was warranted and in proper perspective, except that, like everything that is said, it was selective. But this selective attention on sources of stability probably delayed our attention to sources of change and our realization of the limitations of the powers of the Soviet leaders." (9)

One of the purposes of this paper is to explore whether one of the "limitations of the powers of the Soviet leaders" lies in the area of Soviet public opinion related to matters of foreign policy.

CONFIDENTIAL

Which brings us to a consideration of the next major question:

(2) Can information from foreign sources affect the confidence of the Soviet people in the peaceful purposes of their Government's policies and actions?

Most of the specialists on the Soviet Union who were consulted agreed that any information designed to have an impact through the Soviet people on their leaders would have to address itself to the strongly held public assumption, identified in the previous section, that virtually everything the Soviet Government does in foreign affairs furthers the cause of world peace.

Although most specialists agreed that this was the basic task for an information program in this field, there was some difference over how easily or effectively the task could be done.

Before tackling this question directly, it may be worth examining a situation which affects all political communications with Soviet citizens and which relates both to the prospects of effectively "reaching" Soviet audiences with any message and the problem of determining how effective such communication may be. This is the phenomenon of the inner face and the outer "mask".

The Two Faces.

One recent academic writer about opinion in the Soviet Union has reported conversations with Soviet citizens on political subjects with a surprising degree of naivete. (10) He gave the impression that what the Soviet interlocutor said to his foreign questioner was identical with what

CONFIDENTIAL

the former really felt or believed. Other academic writers and journalists have been reporting in this way for some time. This is not a tenable approach. There is now an overwhelming amount of evidence to prove that what a citizen of the USSR says to a foreigner, or to any other stranger for that matter, can be at most an unreliable guide to his inner thoughts. This phenomenon is not unique to the Soviet Union. It exists to some degree everywhere. Americans or Englishmen or Frenchmen also will be critical at home but defensive abroad or in conversation with foreigners. What is different about the Soviet Union or any other closed society is that the distinction between what many people say on political matters and what they think or feel is of such a vastly greater order of magnitude than are such contrasts in more open societies as to constitute a difference in kind.

The evidence for this is now available from many sources. Khrushchev's various speeches about the evils of Stalin's day demonstrated how this operated at the highest levels of Soviet society. He now tells how he and his colleagues "really" felt during the peak period of the cult of personality.

More to the point, however, are the recent experiences of the numerous American graduate students who spent one or two years in Moscow or Leningrad universities. From the confidential report of one of them, who said it took him "a year of living in unrestricted and intimate contact with Russians" to understand the true situation, come these comments:

CONFIDENTIAL

One soon learns in the Soviet Union that a few elementary rules have to be observed in order to know Russians honestly. The first is never to expect a Russian to speak candidly with you in the presence of other Russians, unless they are his trusted friends. The second rule is never to expect a Russian who is talking to you in an official capacity to risk his job or his freedom (or, sometimes, to betray his trust) by revealing his private self. This must be kept firmly in mind if you have anything to do with Soviet cultural delegations, where both rules are bound to be intensified by the presence of people who are responsible for surveillance over their fellow delegation members and for directing the discussion along 'proper lines'....

"I suppose that after having talked for several weeks with human beings there is a psychological compulsion to believe that you have been in touch with realities and not in some schizophrenic never-never land where everyone says one thing but thinks another, so that in the end you are left unable to make any judgments at all based on what people have said to you. However, it is a wicked fact, but nevertheless, a fact, that whatever genuine intellectual life there is in the Soviet Union exists under the surface, and that Russians, when they feel they have to, can lie (not only to foreigners, unfortunately, but also to one another) with the flawless skill that a people gains from having lived under conditions of political oppression for as many years as they have....

"If there is anything nightmarish and diabolical about the Soviet Union, it is not that the Government has succeeded in some Orwellian way in twisting people's minds; it is that the government has succeeded in compelling people to pretend that their minds have been twisted into official molds, and moreover, to pretend with a mastery that creates a perfect illusion of reality....

"For a foreigner in the Soviet Union the road to a fruitful exchange of ideas lies in the several months of education by which he learns to separate the people who from fear, venality, or stupidity cannot be counted on to depart one whit from official ideology, from those who can be talked to in an honest human way." ( 11

This is corroborated by other perceptive students, by diplomats with long-term Russian acquaintanceships, by some of the guides at recent U. S. exhibitions who developed close relationships over a period with some Soviet citizens and by the occasional foreign visitor who had special

CONFIDENTIAL

entree to the world behind the official Soviet mask. The above report is made, of course, by one whose contacts were largely with the most sophisticated elements of the Russian intelligentsia. In other spheres he might have encountered a larger number of those who would not deviate from the official line out of "fear" or "venality" or who were so "stupid" as to believe everything that was put into their heads and mouths. The problem is therefore quantitative. We do not know what proportion of the Soviet people and of its more significant elements fall into the various categories of true believers, cynics, fearful rationalizers and resentful, reluctant, enforced liars. We know only that the entire spectrum exists in various echelons and sectors of Soviet society. And the educated guesses as to where the average lies range from one near extreme to the other.

What is the significance of the two-faces situation? One view is that since behavior rather than attitude is what really counts in the political and social sphere, an ineffective and largely inarticulated private attitude, even though widely held, has little bearing on events and can therefore be largely discounted. The opposing view is that the two-faces situation has a role to play in the process of change in a closed society. At certain times, particularly at moments of crisis, widespread and intensified private feelings can come to the surface in ways which may cause a change of course or wring a concession from the regime.

CONFIDENTIAL

To what extent this might be applicable in foreign affairs is hard to say. However, the two-faces phenomenon does make clear that a sizeable audience does exist in the USSR with few psychological bars to the reception of unofficial information and ideas.

One further quotation might illustrate this. It comes from a German who was trained from early youth in Russia for a career as a Comintern Agent. In his book Child of the Revolution Wolfgang Leonhard described what his translator called "political collywobbles", the term used among officials in the Eastern bloc for "doubts and uncertainties and opinions that do not coincide with the official line".

"These political collywobbles," he wrote, "are never expressed or even hinted at in the presence of non-members of the Party. It can happen, and I have often seen it myself, that in conversation with people from the West an official who is wrestling with the severest internal doubts will stubbornly, and apparently with complete conviction, defend the official Party line. His Western interlocutor then leaves him with the firm conviction of having been talking to a 150% Stalinist. He sees the whole conversation as a pointless waste of time, whereas in reality that same official, who is already at heart in opposition, will subsequently describe his conversation in detail to a small circle of fellow members of the opposition, and spend hours discussing it." (12)

We can draw two conclusions from this: First, that in communicating with Soviet citizens (and presumably doing so with some skill), we can count on hitting some targets; secondly, that we may never know it even

CONFIDENTIAL



if we have made some direct hits.

Conflict Between Actions and Peaceful Goals.

Let us now return to our major question about the prospect of creating doubts in the mind of the Soviet public about its government's everlastingly peaceful purposes.

The most frequent suggestion made by American Sovietologists was that information efforts directed to this end be concentrated on those occasions when Soviet international behavior contrasted sharply and clearly with Soviet self-proclaimed goals. A recent occasion cited by many was the Soviet behavior this spring in the Berlin air corridors.

The Soviet command dropped metal chaff in front of Western planes to interfere with their radar. The Russians also scheduled military flights in the corridor at the same times as previously scheduled Western flights. These harassments caused no casualties but raised tension sharply in the West over the Berlin access issue. Western protests over these matters were made through diplomatic channels. The Soviet people were told nothing of these developments by their own government. Although Western radios reported the news to those Soviet listeners who could hear it through jamming, most Soviet citizens remained totally unaware of the incidents. The result was that although the Soviet government played a risky, tension-raising, probing game in the West, it paid no price whatever in terms of increased tension at home.

This then might have been a situation made to order to bring to the Soviet people's attention the considerable gap between these apparently senseless provocations and the usual Soviet self-righteous proclamations

CONFIDENTIAL

of peaceful coexistence. If the Western powers had decided to take these matters seriously, if only for the educational effect within the USSR, the heads of State or the foreign ministers of the three Western powers might have delivered a stinging protest which would have required some Soviet official response, and the radio facilities of the major Western broadcasters might have been massed to reach a considerably enlarged Soviet audience despite jamming. Such an official reaction and information effort might well have created a stir among the Soviet public. The chaff incident alone might have been hard to make credible if the Soviet government chose to deny it, but the repeated scheduling of dangerous, simultaneous flights at a flash-point of direct confrontation of the two thermo-nuclear super-powers would have been hard for the Soviet propagandists to justify to their own people. A Western information effort along these lines might have accomplished two purposes: raised some doubts about the realities of peaceful coexistence, and created some degree of public tension in the USSR about the war danger - a Soviet domestic price which the Soviet leadership might have felt had to take into account in any decisions to embark on similar escapades in the future.

This of course is conjecture. There is no laboratory in which psycho-political experiments can be carried out and the effectiveness of such operations determined and then safely predicted. The experiments have to be made in real life. But they are the kind of probing initiatives it might be useful for the West to undertake so as to test the weak spots in the Soviet regime rear - and far less risky than the probes in which

CONFIDENTIAL

the Soviet regime pokes a military finger into the presumed soft places of the West.

There may have been sound political reasons for not exploiting the above situation in the manner suggested above.

Considerations may have included the state of morale within Berlin itself or the desired atmosphere for the opening of the Disarmament meeting in Geneva. More pertinent, however, may have been our wish to avoid getting Soviet pride involved to the point of forcing the public commitment of the Soviet leaders to a practice we wanted them to stop. The best means to employ to attain our objectives is always a matter of judgment. In this case, the quiet methods worked for the moment but they are not likely to have built up any restraints on another Soviet try.

Other opportunities suggested for a concentrated information approach to a Soviet audience involved other instances of Soviet failure to inform their own people about major facts of international life -- the refugee drain on East Germany which led to the erection of the wall, the time and size of the individual blasts of the Soviet test series last fall (for which a one-day massing of Western radio transmitters was arranged with good technical results), the exchange of Powers for Abel, and the details of the Western disarmament proposal at Geneva this Spring. In all these cases, the intensified information effort would have been designed to bring to the Soviet people relevant facts which their government had denied to them and which might, over a period, weaken their confidence in its peaceful intent.

CONFIDENTIAL

Credibility Problem      **DISCUSSION**

Two problems are raised by Operations of the type suggested. The first is that of credibility. After years of inurement to official propaganda, many Soviet citizens have developed a strong scepticism about government information of any type and from any source. Many are not likely to believe even factual information if it does not square with strong preconceptions. One device to reduce this scepticism suggested by students of Soviet society and employed frequently by Western broadcasters is to take advantage, where possible, of opportunities offered by the statements of Soviet leaders themselves. When Western sources quote Khrushchev or Izvestia to support a fact or idea, it makes it more difficult for the Soviet listener to question the reliability of the information. The damaging admissions of the de-Stalinization indictments are cases in point. One expert felt that even the Berlin crisis could be effectively labeled as a relic of the foreign policy initiated by Stalin in 1948, the Stalin who already stands indicted for his crimes against the Soviet people and who, it can be explained, caused trouble for other nations too.

Another important means of establishing credibility is to tie words to actions. In the case above, for instance, news of a high-level Western protest of warning about provocative Soviet flights is more credible than a mere news report about such flights. Regardless of how he takes the facts about the provocation, the Soviet listener and the Soviet reader (if the government of the USSR publishes the official note as it has done

**DISCUSSION**

with increasing frequency. In recent years, will understand at least that the West is taking a serious view of some situation. This latter point would get across even to the true believer who conceives of the matter in crude ideological terms as a case of the capitalist powers becoming enraged because their class interests have been affected. It might be to our interest on some occasions to get even this much across.

Hostility Problem.

The second problem raised is that of possible hostility of the listener to any communication which serves to increase tension or which implies criticism of his government. In part this is the ancient problem of blaming the messenger who brings bad news. In part it involves a possible reinforcement of the communist stereotype of the west and of the United States as aggressive, bloody-minded and war-mongering. It might also mean a refusal to listen and a possible reduction therefore of the size of our Soviet audience.

In a later chapter on context and tone of communications, specific suggestions will be noted for language and context that might reduce or counter-act the aggressive stereotype effect. And great care needs to be taken in choosing the subject for a major information effort to make sure it is not more likely to strengthen the stereotype without enough compensating advantages to offset this disadvantage.

One approach to the hostility problem among the experts consulted was that under present circumstances it would be better not to deal with foreign policy questions at all in our Soviet language broadcasts since

CONFIDENTIAL

we may do more harm than good. At the other extreme was the view that for some of the messages we want and should get across to the Soviet people, initial hostility is a small price to pay. What is more important is the lingering impact of the message itself which will probably outlast the immediate hostile reaction. A commoner view was that the potential hostility could be checked by manner and context of presentation but even if this were not always successful, one must assume that Soviet citizens, like people everywhere, could get used to, and learn to live with, and even ultimately accept, facts and ideas which are disagreeable or upsetting at first hearing, if the total of what they hear is satisfying in some way or meets a felt need.

The third major question to be considered is:

(3) How might the Soviet Government react to an increased foreign information effort directed to the Soviet people on world affairs?

On this question too there is a diversity of opinion among American experts.

The range of possible reactions will be considered with some indications of the varying points of view.

One theoretical possibility, of course, is that the Soviet government would ignore this effort altogether. If the increased effort is not large enough to be noticeable to any significant element of the Soviet public, the Soviet government would perhaps be wise to ignore it. But the radio effort alone as outlined in the next chapter would be noticed by the official Soviet monitors and jamming supervisors and by Soviet listeners

CONFIDENTIAL

to short-wave radio broadcasts from the United States and the West generally. These listeners, according to our best estimates, run into the millions. We can be fairly certain that the possibility of the Soviet Government ignoring this challenge is one we do not have to worry about.

The other possible reactions break down into two broad types: those concerned with the information field itself and those involving the substance of foreign policy decisions. Reactions wholly within the information field would be: a stepped-up program of agitation and propaganda at home and escalation of jamming.

(a) Increased Agit-prop Activity.

On the basis of past experience, an increase in the Soviet Government's own positive effort is almost an inevitable reaction to be expected to any greater foreign information operation. The expanded Soviet activity is bound to achieve some of its intended results but it also has its favorable aspects from the Western point of view. Some of the Soviet propaganda reaction will be in defensive terms since it will seek to respond to disagreeable facts which had been kept from the Soviet public. And for the many Soviet readers who are expert at reading between the lines, some of the originally denied material would inevitably peep out through the Soviet defenses.

Another possible consequence of an increased American and Western information effort might be to force the Soviet regime to begin giving its own people some of the facts it has hitherto denied them (couched, to be sure, in Soviet terms) in order to forestall their getting this information first from unfriendly sources. If this were to happen, it would

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

mark a partial victory for the Western effort. It would be an acknowledgement that the Soviet regime was less able than before to decide at will what it chose to tell its people and what it chose to withhold. This in turn might be a factor in reducing the Soviet room for maneuver in the foreign scene.

(b) Escalation of Jamming.

The technical aspects of jamming and the effort to break through it will be covered in the next chapter. Here it will suffice to touch on a few salient points. It is technically feasible for the Soviet Union, if they want to spend the money and the technological resources, to counteract effectively, with more jamming transmitters and increased power, many of the measures we take to get our signals through jamming. However, according to past experience, it takes the Soviet regime some time to build up its jamming capability. Increased efforts on the part of the West might not meet effective opposition for months and perhaps years after they were initiated.

The jamming operation is not without political cost to the regime. The reasons for shifting from the total jamming of some years ago to the selective jamming today might be partly financial retrenchment but is more likely an attempt to improve the Soviet image abroad by pretending to jam out only "objectionable" material and perhaps a concession to the Soviet intelligentsia, many of whose members have long resented jamming.

Increased jamming by the Soviet government will therefore have some domestic political price attached to it. This alone, of course, would not

CONFIDENTIAL



prevent the Soviet regime from embarking on it if the incoming information proved too troublesome.

We might then ask ourselves: If the Soviet government escalated its jamming activity to match our greater broadcasting effort, would we let it rest there? In a sense that is exactly what we did for the past decade or so until fairly recently. If it is worth so much for the Soviet Union to keep jamming us out, might it not be worth just as much or perhaps more to us to try to get our message back in? On thermo-nuclear matters and in regard to intercontinental delivery systems, we consider carefully how far we must go in countering Soviet capabilities. Should we perhaps not calculate just as carefully in the radio field where the risks are far less and where the ultimate gains and possible breakthroughs may reduce the danger of a mutual disaster?

If the Soviet regime got desperately worried about our broadcasting, it would have two more defensive measures open to it. One would be the establishment of penalties for listening. The other would be the confiscation of short-wave radios as was done in Soviet cities in wartime. Both of these would be unwelcome reversions to the days of greater coercion. Although they cannot be ruled out under certain circumstances, they seem unlikely for the foreseeable future. In any case, if it became clear that our broadcasts were growing intolerable to the regime and we felt it was important to preserve this channel to the Soviet people, we could probably alter the pattern of our broadcasts enough to reduce the likelihood of such drastic measures. One or two of those consulted felt that this was the wisest course to follow right now. The radio effort, in this view, should be adjusted at a level of political effectiveness which is not so low that it is not worth doing and not so high that it gets

CONFIDENTIAL

completely blotted out.

(c) Reduction or Elimination of Contacts with the West.

A possible Soviet reaction that is primarily within the information field but is also a substantive foreign policy matter would be a Soviet decision to reduce or eliminate contacts with the West to stop the "rot" of Western influence in Soviet society.

The trend to greater contacts is technically not irreversible. The Soviet regime has the power to plug the holes in the curtain at any time. It is quite conceivable that if, for any reason, the "hard-liners" took over in the Kremlin, there would be a reduction in the exchange programs and in other forms of contact quite apart from any increased effort on our part. One might speculate further, however, that at the next turn of the political wheel, bringing still another generation to positions of control, the trend toward greater contact would be resumed because of a combination of internal and external pressures and needs. In this sense, there may be good reason to believe, as some specialists in the field are inclined to do, that in the long run the trend toward broader relations with the outside world is irreversible.

The question here is: What about the possibility of a Soviet cutback of contacts out of anger over, or fear of, the impact in the USSR of an expanded Western information effort on foreign policy matters?

Western diplomats and exchange negotiators know that there are elements in the Party and in the Kremlin itself that are fearful of even the present level and "danger" of exchanges and are constantly looking

CONFIDENTIAL

for arguments, in the intra-Party disagreement over the question, to bolster the case against contacts and prove the need for reducing them. Any marked degree of effectiveness of a Western activity would be grist to their mill. This does not insure, however, that they would gain their point. The dominant group today, although still cautious about how much fresh air it will permit, does not like to be pushed in a direction it considers backward and "Stalinist", a direction which has dangers of its own. It is also possible, on the other hand, that the impact of an intensified Western effort might be so great that even this group would feel a need to retaliate or retreat. (A reduction or elimination of contacts has elements of both.)

The answer to this problem involves a choice on our part. As noted above in regard to jamming, part of the control of the situation lies in our hands. If the Western information effort should have such great effect as to cause the Soviet regime to react sharply in ways we feel are harmful to our own interests, we could modify and moderate our program temporarily to avoid the undesirable repercussions. There are many Western observers who feel that the long-range interests of the free world will be best served by a continuance of the present trend of gradually increasing contacts between significant elements of Soviet society and the West. They feel that the progressive weakening of the hold of the ideology and the erosion of the determination to dominate the world will most likely be achieved by a combination of military deterrence, political containment, Western political and economic progress,

CONFIDENTIAL

- 42 -  
CONFIDENTIAL

increasing Soviet affluence and self-satisfaction, and an infusion of non-communist ideas, values and realities into the minds of the present and future governing elements of Soviet society. Accordingly these observers are likely to be alarmed at any development which might interfere with the present and gradually expanding program of contacts which require careful political nursing and attention.

Such considerations, however, need not prevent the development of an additional tool designed to achieve the same ends. If the effective use of this tool seems to be endangering the success of other weapons in our psychological arsenal, its use could be suspended or altered as the occasion demands. The choice will be ours to make. If the Soviet regime indicates it may react by striking at contacts, we should have to decide in each case between the short and long term effects of any particular information effort on a current crisis as against its likely impact on the channels we wish to preserve for our longer-range objectives.

This whole situation may also be looked at in terms of economic bargaining tactics. If for instance our broadcasting capability should be developed to the point of being able to cause an impact on the Soviet people which is extremely distasteful to the regime, and if the regime shows signs of reacting in the direction of reducing contacts, the very possession of the means to hurt the Soviet regime in this way could become a bargaining counter to be used, among other things, to insure the continuation of the exchange program itself. Our spoken or tacit negotiating position would then be: "If you cut contacts, we shall, of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

43  
CONFIDENTIAL

course, continue to step up our major broadcasting effort. If you leave the contacts alone, we shall return our radio operation to its more routine level." In this way, if such is our deliberate choice, the expanded broadcasting capability could stand in the background, not only as a protection for existing exchange arrangements but as a possible bargaining threat with which to extract more. "If you don't allow a larger circulation for America or a larger number of such-and-such exchange visitors or a larger distribution list for our Embassy press releases, we shall have to consider bringing more radio transmitters into play". Lacking now even the capability, we have one less piece to play in this game and the choices made are usually not ours.

This type of bargaining is not unknown to either side in exchange negotiations. In fact, a kind of half-spoken, half-tacit bargaining involving certain types of broadcasting took place between American officials and Mr. Georgii Zhukov at the time of Khrushchev's first visit to the United States.

The two other types of possible Soviet reaction lie in the sphere of substantive foreign policy. One would be a negative type that we would normally want to avoid, and one would be the positive type at which the entire operation would presumably be aimed.

(d) "Provocation" and Tension.

We cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviet regime might regard the nature or the timing of a particular expanded information effort, presumably in the broadcasting field, as a "provocation" to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

which it would respond with some diplomatic or political act -- an official protest, a break-off of some negotiation, some kind of retaliatory threat. In such a case, we would have to decide our course on the basis of many considerations -- the degree of bluff we believed was involved, the extent to which the Soviet cry of provocation was more convincing or effective within the USSR than our original or continuing communication effort, our concern for the kind of cold war atmosphere we needed or wanted at the moment, the wisdom of backing down on an issue of this sort in response to Soviet pressure, and perhaps other considerations. This too would have to be played by ear. And the wide range of choices open to us in terms of the volume, intensity and persistence of our information effort makes possible a highly flexible response to any kind of Soviet reaction.

Although the "provocation" reaction cannot be excluded in any total listing of possibilities, there is reason to think it not likely. For large-scale information activity is a standard operation for both sides in the cold war, increases of effort take place constantly at both ends, and the mounting of a more comprehensive or more dramatic, program via one medium or another does not break through the boundaries of mutually accepted behavior patterns. The masters of Soviet agit-prop with their world-wide operations, dependent largely on the tolerance of democratic governments, are not likely to scream "provocation" too loudly.

The other possible reaction of a negative type worth considering is that the Soviet regime might genuinely feel that some particular

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

broadcasting effort in a crisis situation was in itself an indication of American or other Western intention to initiate hostilities. Any kind of signal from the West that gave this impression to the Kremlin could give rise to thoughts of pre-emption and to the see-saw calculations of both sides so thoroughly discussed by Schelling, Brodie, Kahn, et al. Obviously no such thoughts would develop on the basis of information activity alone. It would have to be accompanied by many other manifestations of crisis in the military and political sphere. In such a situation, the introduction of a major dramatic broadcasting effort addressed to the Soviet public, or perhaps even to the Soviet leadership elements themselves, would have to be decided upon on our side with all the attendant pros and cons clearly in mind. There might be occasions when we would deliberately employ this means to give the Soviet leaders one more indication of the seriousness of our determination on some matter. In that case, the information instrument would be specifically employed as a deterrent. It would be subject to the same ambiguity affecting other deterrents -- the question of when does a deterrent deter and when does it provoke. It would, however, have the additional flexibility and maneuverability involved in verbal communications, which can always be altered to suit the circumstances.

The more likely use of this instrument in a crisis situation would be in the attempt to inform the Soviet people of the risks being taken by their own government as one means of possibly inhibiting that govern-

CONFIDENTIAL

- 46 -  
CONFIDENTIAL

ment's dangerous actions. The purpose of the information operation would not be to increase the tension between the governments concerned but to let the Soviet public know of the tensions already being caused by its own government's behavior. It should be possible to phrase the content of the communications and to establish the tone in such a way as to make clear both to the Soviet public and its leadership, in some particular situation, for example, that the Western position remains firm, that the tension created by some Soviet action is dangerous to both sides, that honorable alternatives are available to eliminate the danger and reduce the tension.

(e) Considerations in the Decision-Making Process.

The most desirable Soviet reaction to our efforts would be any indications (which might of course be hard to come by) that the Soviet regime was taking the impact of our information efforts into account in its decisions on foreign policy. This type of reaction might be discussed under two broad headings -- short term and long term.

(1) Short term.

Most specialists on the Soviet Union and on deterrence consulted in this inquiry, doubted that information media could exert their influence quickly enough to affect Soviet behavior in short-term crisis situations. Some, however, disagreed and felt there was a reasonable prospect for such an effect. The three major situations considered were the eve of a thermonuclear crisis, lesser critical situations and succession crisis.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

(a) Thermonuclear crisis. The general view of the experts is that

by the time things have approached the button-pushing stage, Soviet leaders are not likely to be affected by the immediate state of Soviet public opinion and by some last-minute attempt to influence it from abroad. Whatever aspects of this opinion they might previously have felt to be worrisome they would have included in their calculations at some earlier stage.

Those who believe a Western information effort at such a late stage might nevertheless have a deterring effect on the leadership present these considerations:

Any decision regarding a thermonuclear attack would be made in the Kremlin only after a most intensive, soul-searching, perhaps bitter argument among the Soviet leaders. This is a situation in which there are bound to be opposing views and therefore factions. As past experience shows, such factions run fairly deep down in the Party, in the bureaucracy and, in matters involving strategic considerations, perhaps in the military. In the course of such an argument, with the survival of the country and the system at stake, the contents of a major broadcasting effort from the other side may have enough significance to be taken into account in the decision-making process. In earlier wars, the Hitlers and the Stalins could fancy themselves on a par with their generals, if not superior to them in strategic know-how, since they could, in some degree, speak the same technical language and be included in the same frame of references. This is less possible to Khrushchev and most members

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

48  
CONFIDENTIAL

of the Politburo. They have to rely increasingly on the advice of military specialists, intelligence experts, and scientific analysts who speak and think in terms the non-technical can only dimly understand. Information broadcasts addressed directly to such lower echelons of the decision-making process may make a significant impression.

Another consideration brought forward to support this point of view is as follows: A powerful broadcasting effort to the Soviet people on the eve of a thermonuclear crisis decision might give pause to the Soviet leaders because of its implications for the situation that might exist following the thermonuclear exchange. The Soviet leaders could become concerned about the state of morale that would prevail among the Soviet people or armed forces after a nuclear exchange if the men in the Kremlin suspected that the broadcasts might have planted the seed of doubt in the public mind as to the responsibility of the Soviet leaders for the holocaust. They could also become concerned about the capability of the same broadcasting set-up to churn up fearful trouble among its people or its forces following the cataclysm, when central control of the country by the Party would be in doubt, at least temporarily. There might also be some worry as to what Western broadcasts could do to the morale of the Russian soldier who does not have a good record of fighting outside his own homeland, if that should be involved in the Soviet strategic plan.

One counter to this line of argument is to suggest that all the Soviet command needs to do if it has worries about the impact of Western broadcasts after a thermonuclear exchange is to assign a dozen ICBM's to "take out" the transmitters. But we know now that this is not so

- 49 -  
CONFIDENTIAL

easy for Soviet strategists, who do not dispose, at this stage, of a plenitude of missiles. New targets add to the problem of target choice, involve great cost and are not a sure thing. Targeting and hitting are not identical.

(b) Lesser Crises

This type of lesser crisis discussed is the kind that might develop, for example, around individual moves in the Berlin access situation or some possible Soviet interference in a Middle Eastern or African state. Most of the specialists consulted doubted the ability of information operations to achieve immediate deterrence of Soviet adventurist decisions. The short-run success of such operations was unlikely, they felt, if they were tried today. However, there was considerable feeling that if a technical capability were developed that demonstrated its ability to get through jamming significantly, and if a reputation with the Soviet audience for reliability and credibility were established over a period of years, a major broadcasting effort from the West that created serious concern to the Soviet people might cause the leadership to take this factor into account in its short-run decisions.

Several students of both deterrence and of Soviet politics laid stress on the possibility of using a crisis-connected short-wave radio campaign as a supplementary means of demonstrating to the Soviet leadership our determination to stand firm on the issue involved. The view was that this extra effort, regardless of what impact it actually had on the Soviet public, might be an added indication to the Soviet leaders

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

50  
CONFIDENTIAL

that we meant business. It was admitted that if such a broadcasting operation was not accompanied by other more convincing actions and its message was unwisely phrased, it could give a contrary indication of weakness and the appearance of a substitution of bluffing or wheedling words for action. But this danger could be avoided, these students felt if the operation were skilfully handled.

(c) Succession Crisis.

The range of views on a possible role for foreign information activity in a Soviet succession crisis ranges from the opinion of several experts that this is perhaps the most fruitful occasion for such operations to the position of another highly qualified specialist that this is a dangerous sphere for foreign "intervention".

The arguments for considering a major information effort in this eventuality are these:

Even if the Soviet leaders are less likely to fear "disarray and panic" in a future succession crisis than they were after Stalin's death, they are still going to be extremely cautious about what they tell their people. We can confidently assume an information blackout regarding the inner Party struggle while the Soviet public will be hungry for information. This is the ideal time for Western media to fill the gap with whatever facts are known, with informed, reasonable speculation, and with the reactions of Western observers. This would be worth doing if only to gain a wider audience that might acquire a habit of turning to Western radio when it really wants to find out what is going on. This would be

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

using the succession situation as another chance to prepare the ground for communicating effectively in a later crisis.

There is also a more activist approach. As the struggle for power proceeds, factions develop with roots further down in the ranks of the Party. This might be a time to get across ideas, or even to launch informal proposals which might be attractive to one or another of the factions. Care would have to be taken not to give the appearance of favoring one faction over another because this might doom the favored side as the tool of the American imperialists.

There is also the possibility that as time goes on, the factor of popularity of one side or the other among the Soviet people may come to carry more weight than it has within the Party. This is a reasonable prospect as a new generation of managerial types, with little background of revolutionary heroism, comes into the forefront. Looking for an easier and more secure life, they may find it more comfortable and convenient to choose the popular side of an argument rather than the one involving the dragooning or coercing of a reluctant populace. Under such circumstances, the popularity factor may become more important in the choice of the top leadership. Since the succession problem may not be solved for a period of years, a skillful foreign information effort to the Soviet public could conceivably have some effect on the ultimate decision.

Finally, if the West desired to take advantage of the weakness and uncertainty of the regime in the difficult days of a leadership crisis

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
in order to obtain agreement to some Western proposal, a massive information effort to the Soviet public might help in forcing the hand of the interim managers in the Kremlin.

The opposing view to the activist approach warns against trying to manipulate another nation's political life from the outside. There is first the risk of increasing the cohesiveness among the rival factions and antagonizing virtually all elements of the population by presuming to poke one's nose into their business. Secondly and more important, we are likely to know so little about the Soviet political situation that we might well achieve the opposite result from what we intend. The best policy, according to this view, is to steer clear of any involvement and any temptation to manipulate the choice.

(2) Long Term Deterrent Effect.

The majority of the experts consulted felt that a Western information effort designed to inform the Soviet people of the dangers of its Government's foreign policy, if technically effective and capably handled, could make a long-run contribution to deterrence of Soviet aggressive behavior.

Many of these specialists doubted that such a program could affect Soviet decisions in an immediate situation. They believed, however, that if it became clear to the Soviet leaders that they could no longer count on the Soviet people remaining calmly in the dark while they made adventurous sorties that raised war fears in the West, this would begin to figure in their calculations for the future. This factor might of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

course not be decisive. But no single factor is decisive in such situations. So the effort that might not fulfill its maximum immediate purpose in a specific case could yet lay the groundwork for accomplishing a similar task in the future.

If a repeated infusion of facts and realities about the world situation from the outside prompted the Soviet government to inform its own people more fully about foreign affairs, this too might serve to contribute to the same deterrent effect.

Apart from crises, a greater understanding by the people of the USSR of the other side of the disarmament story, of the German situation, of Western European progress, of some aspects of Chinese truculence, of Soviet behavior in the UN, of the way Soviet policies in general are operating against the personal goals and broader aspirations of the Soviet people might serve as a restraining factor on the Soviet government's international behavior.

But to assist this objective from the outside, there are requirements for adequate technical means, skillful and sophisticated communication and an expansion and coordination of total effort.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
III. THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

The means of reaching the Soviet people with information and ideas from abroad include: short-wave radio, exchange of persons and exhibits, the Soviet Government's own mass media, distribution of foreign Embassy press releases in the USSR, mass mailings of Western materials to Soviet citizens, foreign publications made available to Soviet citizens unofficially, and exchange of films and official magazines.

Not all of these means lend themselves equally well to the handling of material about international affairs. Short-wave radio and personal contacts are perhaps best suited for this purpose, whereas films and official magazines, at least under present and foreseeable exchange arrangements, must steer clear of such subjects altogether.

In this paper most attention will be given to radio and personal contacts, although comments will also be made on some of the other means mentioned.

A. RADIO

(1) Current Operations

There are two major broadcasting organizations in the United States producing and transmitting programs to the USSR. One is the official Voice of America, operated by the Broadcasting Service of the United States Information Agency, in Washington. The other is Radio Liberty, operated by the American Committee for Liberation, with headquarters in New York and broadcasting station abroad.



DECLASSIFIED

The Voice broadcasts in English, Russian and six other USSR languages. Radio Liberty uses sixteen USSR languages in addition to Russian. The Voice programs in Russian include about two hours a day of fresh news and feature material, parts of which are repeated at other times of the day. The programs in the other languages are briefer. The VOA English service to Eastern Europe (including the USSR) includes several hours of news and features a day plus the one-and-one-half hour "Music USA" Program which has a remarkably enthusiastic audience among Soviet youth. Radio liberty is on the air around the clock in Russian or other Soviet languages.

VOA programs cover world news, official and unofficial American opinion on major international and US developments and features about various aspects of American life. Radio Liberty covers the same ground but adds a considerable amount of news and comment on events and situations within the USSR. The Radio Liberty staff includes more than 200 Soviet emigres.

Other major broadcasters beaming programs to the USSR include the British Broadcasting Corporation, the French Government radio, the Vatican radio and some other broadcasters, mainly governmental. Recently Peking has begun to broadcast to the Soviet Union.

(2) The Audience

Because of the difficulty of obtaining quantitative data, only the broadest estimates can be made of the size of Soviet audiences for the major foreign broadcasters. These estimates are based on projections

DECLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

from bits and pieces of information from refugees, visitors, listener mail and other sources. The estimates vary on the number of Soviet citizens who tune in to VOA, or the BBC, or Radio Liberty at one time or another in the course of a week but even the minimum figures run into the millions. The number of fairly regular listeners is of course smaller and even more difficult to estimate closely.

A fair amount is known of the nature of the Soviet audience to foreign broadcasts. A high proportion is among the intelligentsia and the youth. Radio Liberty reports getting letters recently from workers and farmers but the majority of its mail from those in the 25-to-40 age group, for example, is from students, writers, scientists, managers and engineers. (13)

In this respect, VOA executives feel that their Soviet audience, like international short-wave radio audiences in many other countries, is a self-selected elite group. The apathetic, the uninformed, and those content to be led by others do not have the intellectual curiosity or incentive to seek out sources of information other than those normally and conveniently made available to them by their own societies. Therefore most USSR listeners to foreign radio programs come from those levels of society the broadcasters are most eager to reach. The audience includes in the first instance the official monitors whose task is not only to determine what is to be instantaneously jammed out but also to make available a daily report of significant broadcasts to higher echelons, presumably in the Soviet foreign ministry. (The Japanese Government

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

has reputedly increased the power of its transmission to the USSR recently so as to make them clearly audible in Moscow and consequently included in the regular Soviet monitoring reports. The Japanese Foreign Ministry is apparently interested in these broadcasts as an alternative means of getting "messages" to the Soviet top leadership outside normal diplomatic channels.) The rest of the Soviet audience to foreign broadcasts includes elements of lower echelons in the bureaucracy itself, members of the intelligentsia (some of whom may move in leadership circles) and a substantial segment of the generation which will provide the leadership of Soviet society in later decades.

There is also a secondary word-of-mouth audience of uncertain size. Since the jamming of VOA and the BBC is now only partial rather than total and since the coercive atmosphere generally is now somewhat relaxed, the inhibition against passing on what has been heard on foreign radio may perhaps be less strong than it once was.

(3) Jamming (14)

Jamming of Soviet languages of the VOA and BBC began in 1948 and of Radio Liberty the day it first went on the air in 1953. English-language broadcasts, even those beamed in the direction of the Soviet Union, were never deliberately jammed, according to VOA monitors, and have not been to this day. The jamming of the Soviet languages ultimately became total covering entire broadcasts in these languages regardless of subject or content. Jamming of the BBC stopped for a period during the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to London in 1955. Jamming of VOA stopped on

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

September 15, 1959, the day Khrushchev began his visit to the United States. It was resumed to a limited extent in April 1960 and substantially stepped up in May following the U-2 incident. Since that time jamming has been total for the Baltic languages, for Armenian and for Georgian but remains on a selective basis for Russian and Ukrainian. At some times the selective jamming has attacked about 80 percent of the broadcasting time. More recently it has been applied to about 30 percent of the Russian and Ukrainian programming. The BBC is also subject now to selective jamming. Radio Liberty has been jammed totally without let-up.

For several years, Soviet officials kept telling American and British exchange negotiators to take the French radio for a model for foreign broadcasting to the USSR since it confined its Soviet language programs to purely cultural matters and was therefore not being jammed. Recently, the French radio decided to put more substantive material into its broadcasts, including news of world affairs. Now that it too has joined the sinners against Soviet official radio purity, it too has been subject to selective jamming. In the past few months, the Soviet Union has also begun jamming Russian language broadcasts of the Vatican and of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

Technically, jamming is of two types. Sky-wave jamming is accomplished by a fairly powerful transmitter broadcasting a noise signal on the same channel that an incoming broadcast is using. Sky-wave jamming covers a wide area, but its effectiveness is erratic, depending to large extent on the time of day and the geographic position of the receiver in relation

CONFIDENTIAL

59  
DECLASSIFIED

to both the broadcaster and the jammer. This is the only kind of jamming used for rural areas and explains why broadcasts from abroad which are theoretically jammed can be heard fairly intelligibly on one frequency or another in many rural areas of the Soviet Union.

For urban areas, there is a more elaborate and effective jamming operation. Many small transmitters are placed throughout populated sectors so as to jam out incoming broadcasts primarily with their ground-wave signals. These local jammers are loud and effective in their immediate vicinity but cannot normally reach beyond a 10-15 mile limit. Since Russian-language broadcasts of VOA alone often go out on eight to twelve different frequencies and are often on the air at the same time as Russian programs of the BBC or Radio Liberty, one or two dozen local jamming transmitters are required to blot out incoming programs in one urban area. A city as large and spread out as is Moscow apparently requires three systems of such jammers to cover the metropolitan region.

VOA engineers estimate that the total Soviet jamming effort against all foreign broadcasters involves more than 2000 transmitters, large and small. Radio Liberty says its engineers have established that more than 200 jamming transmitters have been concentrated on its network alone.

Estimates of the total cost of jamming to the Russians vary widely. One view is that budgetary considerations may account in part for the shift from total jamming to selective jamming. An opposing view holds that the electric power costs involved in running transmitters are relatively insignificant and also that, if the operation includes some

60  
D E L I S E R I E D

automatic control devices from a central or a few regional headquarters, there may not be much strain on technical manpower. Building up a jamming network, however, does take up considerable electronic resources and is not accomplished overnight. This is a relevant fact to be considered in any American or Western decision to embark on an expansion of transmitting capability.

Because of the vagaries of propagation via the ionosphere, the means by which short-wave signals are bounced forward, the effectiveness of jamming varies. During certain periods of day at different times of the year, jamming is less successful than at other times. Errors are sometime committed by the jammers in tuning in on the broadcasting frequency. There are other reasons too for some broadcasts' being able to get through the jamming screen. Although jamming discourages many would-be listeners, it is not completely frustrating to those with enough incentive to seek out an intelligible channel.

Various devices are employed by radio engineers to minimize the effect of jamming, but there are two standard measures for improving the listener's chances. These are: more power and more frequencies. When VOA increased the number of frequencies on which it placed each broadcast in jammed languages in 1958, its monitors reported an increased penetration of the VOA signal. Similarly, Radio Liberty reports marked success with its new transmitters whose power is many times greater than that of the transmitters it used until 1961. It attributes its increased volume of mail in the past year from Soviet citizens, including many in urban areas,

CONFIDENTIAL

61  
CONFIDENTIAL

to the sole fact of its increased transmitter power. In 1964, the VOA should have available on lease from the BBC six transmitters in England with power five times as great as the ones presently in use and equivalent in strength to those now employed by Radio Liberty. They will be available for broadcasts in the jammed Soviet and satellite languages. On the other hand, the total number of transmitters available to VOA for such broadcasts in the next few years may be reduced because of the surrender of VOA radio bases in Morocco and the diplomatic problems entailed in locating substitute bases in the Mediterranean.

Increased power makes the broadcasting transmitters more intelligible against most long distance sky-wave jamming and reduces the area that local jammers can effectively control. Because of their political significance, urban areas and their spreading suburbs are the prime targets for foreign broadcasters. Anything that limits the effects of local jamming is therefore of key importance.

(4) Proposed Use of Radio for Short-Term or Long-Term Deterrence Objectives.

If enough of a breach can be made in jamming, radio can play a major role in any American or Western information effort designed to have a deterrent effect on the Soviet leadership in critical political or military situations. Some of the political considerations involved are discussed in the previous chapter. A few comments are needed on the technical possibilities and problems.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

There are two ways of handling radio for this purpose. One is to build up gradually a strong capability for getting through jamming by constructing more transmitters of great power and by employing them for the regular broadcasting service addressed to the Soviet people. This approach is favored by those who believe the long-term effects of bringing the realities of the world situation and Western ideas generally to the Soviet public is more significant than anything that can be done on a shorter-term basis. This is also the attitude of those who are concerned about possible undesirable Soviet retaliations if we were to launch more sporadic radio efforts, particularly during warmer periods of the cold war. The feeling was that such efforts might appear as more dramatic and more dangerous challenges to the regime than the more gradual, continuous improvement of radio capability. The disadvantage of this approach is that it would make more certain an ultimate Soviet response in terms of increased jamming operations against the permanently increased broadcasting efforts.

The other proposal is to use radio on occasion as a flexible political instrument. This would involve selecting appropriate moments or situations for a massing of many frequencies, of the greatest possible power, to broadcast simultaneously in Russian, and any other Soviet languages deemed desirable, the relevant facts and ideas which have been denied to the Soviet people by their government.

One experiment along these lines has already been made. On November 5, 1961, VOA, BBC and Radio Liberty joined in broadcasting simultaneous

CONFIDENTIAL



- 63 -  
DECLASSIFIED

programs to the USSR on the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. VOA's one-hour program on this subject was carried on as many as 52 of its transmitters, many of them "borrowed" from VOA services normally broadcasting at that time to other countries but cancelled for this occasion.

Technically the experiment was a success. For the first time in recent years several clear VOA frequencies were heard in central Moscow. VOA engineers estimate that half the frequencies were audible in other Soviet cities where jamming is heaviest. Not only did the jamming authorities have trouble locating the additional frequencies, but the number of different channels used by the Western broadcasters obviously outran the present Soviet capability in terms of number of transmitters available for jamming.

Unfortunately, the only way the VOA was able to carry out this experiment was by robbing many of its other services. The heavy round-the-world programming schedule of the VOA keeps all its available transmitters employed, at least at the peak listening hours for various parts of the world. The VOA is therefore fighting its battle of words and ideas with all its reserves committed. It has no room for maneuver on any single front, no matter how important, without withdrawing or weakening its forces on other sectors.

Furthermore, many of the transmitters employed in this exercise by the VOA had only a theoretical marginal possibility of reaching the USSR since their antennae were beamed to neighboring areas and not to the Soviet target. If more of the antennae were capable of being shifted to the

DECLASSIFIED

direction of the USSR or had been built originally for that specific purpose, the VOA monitors might have been able to report even more spectacular results on November 5.

Now the proposal made is that, with the facilities available or hopefully to become available, a massing of frequencies be arranged to break through jamming whenever a crisis situation calls for it or a suitable major opportunity presents itself. Such a massing might last for a whole broadcasting day or even for several days, depending on the situation. In this way, Soviet listeners would have time to become aware of the different broadcasting conditions existing and to pass the word on to friends who might tune in. If the message delivered by high-powered transmitters and properly beamed antennae is carefully prepared and couched by specialists in language that is persuasive to the various key elements of Soviet society, the least we can expect is that the Soviet audience for Western broadcasts would be enlarged both for the regular programming and for the next such intensified information effort. A number of such operations might also begin to produce some impact on the Soviet regime in the direct or indirect ways discussed in the previous chapter.

Obviously such efforts cannot be indulged in too frequently. If the massing of American or Western broadcasters became weekly or monthly occurrences, they would lose much of their effect. Two or three times a year would seem to be a reasonable maximum. If they were kept down to that number, the likelihood of inducing a major Soviet investment in additional jamming capacity would be lessened. More frequent massing

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

operations might make it harder for the Soviet budget planners to refuse the requests of the jamming officials for more equipment and men.

If we developed some experience with the massing of transmitters and learned something of the degree of impact this might have on Soviet listeners, it might be possible to vary the intensity of the operations and develop a repertoire of half-size, quarter-size and other intermediate efforts. In certain operations, only one broadcaster, such as the VOA, might intensify its activity. In other instances, two broadcasts might be employed. Different types of crises and opportunities might elicit different degrees of flexible response.

There apparently was no non-technical follow-up on the November 5 operation, and no facts are available regarding listener reaction to the broadcasts. Perhaps no material on this was obtainable. In any future exercise of this type, it is hoped that means might be found to get some indication of audience size and response.

(5) Future Needs

In 1950, top-level government attention was given to the problem of determining what is needed in the way of facilities and technical research to communicate by radio with the Soviet people, and a study of the subject was made at MIT. Telecommunications specialists since then have served on scientific committees of the Voice and offered valuable suggestions. New building programs recently have provided Radio Liberty with higher power, and more powerful transmitters will be available to VOA in two years. But there has been no comprehensive new look on a government-wide basis,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

at what the situation requires today.

Such a survey is very much in order. Among the experts consulted, both those who were interested primarily in a permanently improved capability to get through jamming and those who favored a powerful reserve capacity of transmitting power to be used as a flexible political instrument felt that greater resources should be devoted to the task. We need to know what can be done and what is the best way to do it. More research funds and technical manpower need to be devoted to the whole problem of improving our capabilities in international broadcasting.

The failure to deal adequately with the technical problems, however, traces back fundamentally to the question of political priorities. How important is it to us as a government and as a people to have an effective means of communicating about crucial events with the Soviet people and to have a supplementary means of directly or indirectly reaching the men in the Kremlin? And the same question is becoming increasingly relevant and significant in regard to Communist China.

If higher priority were given to this objective in political and budgetary terms, certain technical results should follow. For example: VOA has a small research and development fund available that it desires to use for a contract research project on the possibility of constructing transmitters with power of a higher order of magnitude than the present "state of the art" allows. But because the amount involved is so small as compared to what is disposed of by Defense and Space agencies, and because there is little prospect of the research resulting in "hardware"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

67-5110  
DECLASSIFIED

appropriations, no first-class telecommunications concern will accept the contract. Every one of them is much too busy with projects which are better financed to be bothered with something so picayune. Is the political potential that might develop from communicating with the Russians so insignificant as to stand last in line after every need for communicating with Saturn and Mars has been met?

Again, a vast amount of work has been done in telecommunications in the Defense and Space complexes of the United States Government. But there has been no tie-in with the Government's requirements for international broadcasting. The advances made and the research being done should be examined for their applicability to the broadcasting field.

One more example: When VOA seeks added facilities, it is a highly public matter which must be discussed by two Congressional Committees and voted on in both Houses. If the purpose of new facilities is stated in terms of the audience to be reached, and possibly even in terms of the need for beating jamming, the Soviet Union would have a good opportunity to set up its additional jamming transmitters before we completed our own facilities. Its record in the past on this score is obscure. In the case of Radio Liberty, the Soviet jamming system had enough capacity to jam the first transmitters that came on the air in 1953. Nine years later, this system was not ready with the answer to Radio Liberty's higher-powered transmitters when they started to operate and has not effectively caught up with them yet, at least not with the needed power. Nevertheless, giving the Soviet leaders a head start through public

DECLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

68  
CONFIDENTIAL

budget requests and hearings on VOA facilities would be taking unnecessary chances. If the task of reaching the Russians had higher priority, the job of obtaining VOA facilities for bloc audiences would not be left to the normal budgeting procedures but would be handled quietly under some other budgetary arrangement, which, as is the case in other instances would not be beyond the wit of the Administration and Congress to devise.

There are other needs, particularly in the research field. More should be learned about the technical effectiveness of our facilities (transmitters, antennas and frequencies) in delivering programs to the target areas, the effectiveness of individual jammers, the pattern of selective jamming. Even the monitoring information that is now collected in VOA is not fully analyzed and used to improve performance, because of the lack of research personnel. More ways should be found to take advantage of the phenomenon of "twilight immunity" which favors transmitters as against jammers during certain hours.

Much more can be done to make jamming a greater political liability to the Soviet government than it already is, both within the USSR and in other countries. If enough ridicule is poured on jamming as uncivilized behavior for a power claiming to represent the wave of the future, the resulting embarrassment might, over a period, inhibit the regime from intensifying its jamming operations.

B. EXCHANGES OF PERSONS AND EXHIBITS

Only radio among the means of communication considered can possibly have any immediate impact on the handling of international political

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

69  
CONFIDENTIAL

issues in the Soviet Union. And even radio, most observers feel, is likely to achieve its effects in the USSR more in the long run than in the short.

Of the other means mentioned, personal contact is probably the most significant. These include exchange of students, of delegations, of cultural presentations, and of technical and professional observers. They include visits also of officials and of tourists in both directions. Exhibits are mentioned here because their significance for the purpose of this paper lies in the opportunities created by the personal contacts of the exhibit guides. The exhibits themselves are confined to relatively bland, non-political, non-controversial matters, as are the films and official magazines.

Although the word used is "exchanges", we are concerned here with the one-way communications impact of American hosts on Soviet visitors to this country and of American visitors to the Soviet Union on the citizens of that country.

The Soviet visitors to this country or to Western nations generally are as well-chosen from our point of view as presumably they are from that of the Soviet Union. In order to qualify for such a coveted prize as a trip to the United States, they have to be trusted citizens with influence, status or specialized skill. Nonentities are not likely to be chosen. We may not be getting all the top party officials nor all the leading Komsomol politicians who are likely to be the leaders of the future, but we are getting a sprinkling of them plus numerous individuals

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

who probably move in their circles.

Man for man, the most effective means of communication we can have with the Soviet people is through personal contacts. How can these be used to further the purposes discussed in this paper?

Two suggestions are made. One concerns primarily Soviet visitors to this country. Some of the Soviet groups that come here leave the country without ever having once been exposed to a serious conversation with people who are well-informed both about our own policies and situation and about the way the Soviet mind works. Such groups conclude their visit with perhaps some useful correction of their previous views about the United States on the basis of their own observations. But they do not have the opportunity of hearing during their visit a fair and reasonable presentation of the Western view of major issues. The suggestion is therefore made that the Department make provision for such a political discussion with appropriately qualified Americans at least once during each group visit.

For politically oriented visitors such sessions might be arranged quite openly, for mutual political expression. For some groups, like folk dancers, it may not be worth doing at all. With other groups, it would be wise to be casual about it and arrange for social gatherings with persons who happen to speak Russian and are interested in Soviet visitors. Discussion of major foreign policy subjects would come up naturally. A prime objective would be to get across facts which might raise doubts as to the peaceful record and intentions of the Soviet regime

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

and, on the other hand, to underline the peaceful direction of our own policies.

Sometimes this function can be performed by the American guide who is furnished to each visiting group. It would be ideal if all such guides were able to contribute to the political education of their charges. Where the guide is not of this calibre, there is all the more reason to "organize" a session with appropriate State Department officials or specialists from the Russian Institutes at Columbia or Harvard or from other schools, suitable members of the various university centers for international affairs, or of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Perhaps this is the kind of arrangement that should be undertaken by a citizen committee on American-Soviet exchanges, now in the discussion stage. Arrangements of this type are needed not only to take the greatest advantage politically out of the exchanges but to avoid the political defeats inflicted on our side when delegations leave the United States thinking that Americans cannot hold their own in political discussion with Russians.

The second proposal is intended to contribute to the same objective but might be of use to Americans discussing foreign policy questions with Soviet citizens both here and in the USSR.

Many Americans have the following experience in talking to well-informed Russians. The American asks a question, or makes a critical comment, or expresses a point of view and the Russian immediately counters with a well prepared standard Soviet reply. The American is

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

then stumped for an answer and either fails to reply or flounders in his reaction. Only later, after the conversation is over, does the American discover the fallacies in the Soviet response and figures out what he might have said to undermine the official Soviet position and to leave his Soviet interlocutor something to think about.

To cope with this situation, the suggestion is that a handbook be prepared which describes the standard Soviet comeback position on major issues, including the main questions of foreign policy, and which indicates the weaknesses of each Soviet position in ways that would be difficult for the Soviet citizen to refute. The material for the handbook should be collected on the basis of the experience of those who have had most success in handling such conversations. It should be brought up to date to keep abreast of changing issues and later stages of old arguments.

Handbooks of this type would be of value to some of the more serious American hosts for Soviet visitors and to some of the more politically aware Americans visiting the USSR either as individuals or in organized groups. The handbooks could be in a convenient format like that of the British Points of Issue and could be made to look as capsuled reports of recent conversations without any indications that they are intended as guides to future conversations. Even if some copies fell into the hands of the Soviets, there would be no great harm. It might be good to have the total confrontation between the Soviet and Free Worlds move to a higher level of debate.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Such manuals would solve another problem of personal contacts. Because of the behavior patterns of our society, Americans are often scared of serious discussion with Russians on the grounds that in this country we should be polite to our guests and when traveling in the USSR we should be polite to our hosts. With no such inhibitions, Soviet citizens get the advantage both ways. When they do discuss political questions, they have little hesitation in speaking up either as hosts or as guests. A manual of this sort might make it clearer that Americans can always remain polite in language and courteous in manner and yet be firm, vigorous and persuasive in debate.

It would be helpful to advise all Americans who are involved in personal contact with Soviet citizens that they should not seek, or expect, cheap and easy victories, to be registered by Soviet admissions of defeat or expressions of doubt about their own positions. The "two-faces" phenomenon discussed in the previous chapter should be kept in mind. We can rest assured that many of the Soviet listeners will be paying careful attention to any intelligently presented point of view, even though they are unlikely to give any indication of their real thoughts.

#### C. USE OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S OWN MEDIA

For a variety of reasons the Soviet regime has, on occasion, made its mass media available to Western officials or spokesmen to express their points of view. In recent years the Soviet press has carried the texts of official communications from Western nations to an increasing extent, perhaps out of a desire to demonstrate official correctness. The Soviet

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

regime has also invited foreign statesmen, ambassadors and other personalities to speak on the domestic radio or TV. Several months ago, Izvestia carried the full text of an interview its editor had with President Kennedy, which was something of a departure, even though Mr. Adzuhubei made sure to include lengthy comments of his own in the text in an attempt to counteract the President's impact on Soviet readers.

Obviously we should press the Soviet regime as hard as possible to grant the greatest number of such opportunities, since we can reach more Soviet citizens in this way than in any other. A good deal of the negotiations and the pressure for such exchanges should be made public because there is evidence that the Soviet regime has sometimes yielded on such matters to avoid embarrassment.

More use might also be made of official notes, not just for their diplomatic effect but as devices for getting certain facts and concepts before the Soviet public, as long as the Soviet regime continues the practice of publishing them.

#### D. OTHER MEANS

The American Embassy in Moscow has begun to distribute press releases in the USSR as the Soviet Embassy has been doing for sometime in the United States. This will of course provide a useful means of bringing major foreign policy matters to the attention of leading Soviet officials and citizens in ways differing considerably from the Soviet government's version of events. A summary of the Western disarmament proposal, now

DECLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

being translated into Russian, will be an excellent item for such distribution.

One more means of communication is worth considering. That is the publication of Russian translations of key books and articles which provide important insights into the world situation and make clear the Soviet role in international affairs. Such volumes and articles are beginning to be produced and made available to appropriate visitors from behind the Iron Curtain. Some will undoubtedly read them and the occasional daring one may take an item back with him.

Another channel of communication to the Soviet people is through the satellites. Because of the substantial travel within the bloc, ideas that are current in Poland apparently get circulated in a matter of weeks in the main cities of the USSR, at least among the youth and the intelligentsia. It is worth using all the possible means of getting information to the satellites not only for its internal value in each country but as another means of ultimately reaching the people of the Soviet Union.

CONFIDENTIAL

76  
DECLASSIFIED

IV. CONTENT AND TONE OF COMMUNICATIONS

The success of any information effort we may undertake depends not only on our ability to reach the audience but on what we say and how we say it. In the case of communicating with the Soviet people, a number of special factors have to be taken into account.

A. LONG-RANGE VALUES

All the specialists on the USSR who were consulted are convinced of the value of bringing certain types of general information from the outside world to the Soviet people. One type of material considered most important is that which presented a true picture of life in the United States and other non-communist countries. Another type favored is the presentation of developments in the physical and social sciences, the arts and humanities viewed objectively and not through Marxist lenses. The hope was expressed that this steady infusion of facts and ideas from the outside world would ultimately cause an adjustment in the thinking of some of the generation of future Soviet leaders in ways helpful to the interests of the free societies.

There was general agreement also on the need to make known to the Soviet public the realities of the world situation, the facts about international political events as they occurred, and Western and other non-communist attitudes toward major world issues. Although some favored doing this only on a regular basis with a gradual expansion of effort, and others preferred the occasional highlighting and dramatic concentration of this activity, virtually all stressed the need for expanding and im-

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

proving the effort in this field. Sooner or later Soviet international behavior should be affected by the fact that a widespread realization existed among the Soviet public of the gap between the Soviet official view of world problems and the real factors and issues involved in these questions.

A number of the Sovietologists were interested in still another area of communication with the Soviet public. That is the reporting and discussion of events and trends within the USSR itself. This is the special sphere of interest of Radio Liberty. Such information obviously appeals to those who are disaffected. The same material, just as obviously causes resentment among the large part of the population that is generally patriotic. We can only guess about the degree of interest in, and reaction to, such material among the Soviet citizens who fall in neither category above, there is difficulty in determining with any degree of accuracy, what proportion of the Soviet public falls into which category. There is strong evidence that Soviet citizens are starved for information about how people live abroad. Even though the indications are less clear, we may assume that among the politically alert citizens of the USSR there is substantial interest both in non-Soviet views of international questions and in outside reactions to internal Soviet matters.

Several of those consulted felt that a world-wide debate is now in progress with the Communist side still doing most of the talking. The United States and the West have not really begun to participate systematically in this dialogue, although several recent speeches by President

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

78  
D E L A S I F I E D

Kennedy and Secretary Rusk have moved in this direction. The audience the Soviet leaders keep in mind for this debate is not in the emerging countries only but at home as well. The men in the Kremlin feel the need for assuring their own people that, despite slow progress in many fields, they are on the winning side, that they are bound to "overtake and surpass" and that their system is the wave of the future.

Some of the experts felt that the time has come for the United States, with its vigorous and articulate leadership, to join seriously in the debate -- both on the urgent, life-and-death issues of war and peace and on the longer-range questions of ideology. In proposing "peaceful engagement" on the latter subject recently, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University, wrote:

"The West, and particularly the United States, must increasingly address itself to the ideological and social problems which the Communist societies are facing. In discussing the future, the Communist never hesitate to offer prescriptions and guides to action. Today, the Communist world is facing a mounting ideological debate with many Communists engaging in sincere self-doubt and criticism. The dilemma which many of them face, however, is that there appears to be no alternative to their existing socio-economic and political system. The West should join in this dialogue, Western statesmen in their speeches, which increasingly penetrate the Iron Curtain, should not hesitate to discuss the problems with which the Communist societies contend--be they with agriculture or with their youth or with their political institutions--and should offer not only criticisms but constructive suggestions for improvement. These suggestions could stress the compatibility of socialism and pluralism, of national ownership and personal freedom, and should try to stimulate dialogue concerning the future development of Communist societies.

"The West has tended to abdicate discussion of the future to the Communists, and merely to restrict itself to negative criticisms

D E L A S I F I E D

CONFIDENTIAL



of current Communist reality. Authoritative statements by Western leaders, including the President of the United States, on the future development of Communist societies, would obviously be rejected by Communist leaders as interference in their domestic affairs, but this rejection in itself would be reflection of their sense of insecurity and of their fear of an open dialogue with the West. It would stimulate great interest among the youth, and might have the effect of destroying the greatest domestic asset which the Communist leaders now enjoy--namely, that since they have a complete monopoly on policy making and on all sources of policy information, opposition to them, in effect, means opposition to social development and economic growth. An opponent of the Communist regime is normally without an alternative. To be against Communism is to be against everything and to stand for nothing. By opening up such a dialogue, the West could change this." (15)

One possible objection to such a proposal is that suggesting ideas for internal Soviet changes from the United States might result in their rejection, even by many Soviet citizens, as American or capitalist inspired. However, this too may depend on how our part of the debate is phrased and handled. In any case, whatever pressure we can stimulate to alter the political structure of the regime in more popular directions should undoubtedly, in the long run, affect the international behavior of the Soviet Union in our favor.

B. CREDIBILITY

The problem of credibility exists in all communications. It has unique aspects, however, when it comes to communicating with the Soviet people. For the last 45 years, the public of the USSR has been engulfed in such a vast stream of indoctrinating verbiage that it has developed a whole range of special defenses against anything which it suspects might fall in the category of propaganda.

Many Soviet readers have learned to read between the lines to find what was left out and therefore what presumably really happened. They

"know" from their own experience that anything said by a government may not mean what it says but may instead convey a hidden meaning or conceal a motive which one must try to fathom. They apply the same rules of interpretation to foreign propaganda, by and large, that they do to their own government's. They are often shrewd in their suspicions of motivations and often wildly off in their guesses as to what statements really "mean."

To achieve credibility with such an audience is an extremely difficult task. It cannot be accomplished overnight. A reputation for veracity can be built up only after years of patient work and meticulous reliability. One single but obvious slip can set the process back by months or years.

The high reputation of the BBC is maintained because of its care to avoid such slips even at the most trying times, such as during the Suez crisis. The faithful official reporting by the VOA Russian Service of the various contradictory explanations of the U-2 flight was termed a "defeat" for VOA by one Soviet specialist. Because of this and other incidents, he felt the Voice could achieve lasting credibility with Soviet listeners only if it has some appearance of independence from the American Government and does not have to treat every single statement of a government official as gospel. A Soviet student, a regular listener to the Voice was quoted as saying, with bitterness, after the U-2 contradictions, that VOA is just as much a liar as the Soviet radio.

How is credibility achieved? First, of course, by telling the truth and nothing but the truth. This is essential, whether it be for the effectiveness of normal every-day communications or for the ability to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

make an impact in a crisis situation. Its importance in the latter type of situation was stated in an MIT study of 1952 in these words:

"The persuasiveness of political warfare at a time of internal crisis or war will depend heavily on the extent to which the U. S. has succeeded in building up, in the period prior to that time, a foundation of fundamental ideas and connections with the people concerned, in addition to that kind of credibility which only a sustained flow of reliable communications can achieve." (16)

But simply telling the truth is frequently not enough for a Soviet audience. With its frame of reference so different from ours after so many years of being cut off from objective or even alternative sources of information, the Soviet audience finds it difficult to believe facts which do not fit its pre-conceptions.

Several suggestions are offered. One, already mentioned earlier, is to make use wherever possible of statements and material from Soviet sources. When normally hostile governments agree on some point, this may well be taken by Soviet citizens as an indication of some degree of reliability. The de-Stalinization process has uncovered a gold-mine which has not been fully exploited.

Another suggestion: Great care must be taken with the context in which statements, events, facts or ideas are placed. To begin with, the material must carry a convincing explanation of why the point is being discussed at all at any particular moment. Otherwise many Soviet listeners would not be paying attention so much to what is being said as trying to figure out what the motive is for saying it. Indirect approaches,

CONFIDENTIAL

82  
D E L A S I F I E D

incidental references often carry more weight with Soviet listeners or interlocutors than direct statements.

For instance, if VOA made the direct statement that the United States does not jam Radio Moscow's broadcasts to North America, many in the Soviet audience who are sure we jam Soviet radio just as the Soviet Union jams ours might not believe our denial. However, if VOA carried a program ostensibly designed to show the wide choice available to the American short-wave listener and played clear recordings of what Paris, Rome, Tokyo and Moscow radio sounded like in Chicago, the Soviet listener would not only get the point but would more than likely believe it.

Probably the most important suggestion, however, is this: For the Soviet audience more than for any other, words to be effective must be related to action, information should reflect events, the verbal shadow must be cast by real substance. This is not a job for information services alone. To be persuasive not only to the Soviet people but to people everywhere, our policies should be expressed in deeds imaginatively conceived not only to advance our interests and those of the vast majority of the world's people but to strike a responsive chord in their hearts. Then the task of words would be to extend the influence of the actions and their credibility would be assured.

Even within the realm of information and propaganda itself, the source of the words makes a real difference. A statement of alleged fact or opinion emanating from a government information agency or an Embassy press office carries less weight and is more easily discounted as

D E L A S I F I E D

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
propaganda that an official note or a major pronouncement by a chief of state. Diplomatic demarches and top-level expressions are half-way steps toward action, and provide the essential basis for news, comment and discussion having some measure of persuasiveness and credibility.

For many Soviet listeners, the credibility of information on foreign affairs that conflicts with what their own government tells them or what they want to believe may depend also on how much rapport, friendly feeling and good will the U. S. and other Western communicators have built up in the period before a crisis. Since the regime justifies much of its military and foreign policy on the basis of the permanent hostility of the West, normal communications to the USSR should seek to undermine this concept. Opportunities should be sought or created to express friendliness to the Soviet people, appreciation for their culture and their achievements, hope for greater understanding and contacts between them and ourselves, and approval of positive tendencies and actions in their society. Against such a background, U. S. and other Western communications of concern over a bad turn of events which endangers the peace and our mutual interests will be more credible to the Soviet listener than if such information emerged from a background of unrelieved carping and apparently ceaseless undifferentiated hostility toward everything that happens in the Soviet world.

C. MAJOR CRISES AND ISSUES

(1) Tensions and Its Alternatives

As already indicated, many of the specialists consulted, though not

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

all, favor communicating to the Soviet people the degree of tension being caused in the West and elsewhere by specific Soviet moves on the international scene. Most of them cautioned, however, that this should be done with the utmost care not to play into the hands of the Soviet propagandists who have built up the stereotype of the "aggressive," "war-minded" Western powers.

The generally agreed advice is, therefore, that in periods of rising tension, Western communicators should emphasize the needlessness of the crisis, the strong desire of the West for peaceful conditions and solutions, the peaceful and tension-relaxing alternatives that exist: of further negotiation in good faith, or return to the status quo situation, or the sensible, reasonable reconsideration of the Soviet action or impending move. Analysis of the dangers of Soviet behavior should be coupled with expressions of concern for the real interests of the Soviet people themselves, hopes for their progress to a better life in peaceful conditions and anxiety lest Soviet behavior endanger the realization of the personal goals and national aspirations of the Soviet people as well as of other peoples of the world. There should be emphasis too on the way the self-interest of the people of the West is served not only by firm determination in the current crisis but also by the continuance of peace.

In any special information effort concerning an international crisis, analysis of the tension-raising factors should be accompanied by

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

logical exposition of what the Soviet people stand to lose by continuation of the Soviet government's present course and presentation of an honorable way out for both sides.

In the case of further critical developments in the Berlin situation, a repeated suggestion was that an attempt should be made to make the Soviet public uneasy over the prospect of turning over the possible decision as to their own fate and the fate of the world to the East Germans. Another suggestion was that the Soviet devotion to peaceful coexistence should be applied to Berlin and that the question should be asked repeatedly: "Why not permit peaceful coexistence to continue in Berlin? Why not let well enough alone?"

The purpose would always be to attach the responsibility for greater tension to the acts or course of the Soviet regime and to do it in ways which would be convincing to the peculiarly conditioned Soviet mind.

2. Issues of the Arms Race and Disarmament.

Some of the specialists on the USSR felt that the Soviet people should know more about the specific capabilities of modern weapons and the broad outlines of current strategic thinking. They thought this would provide the Soviet public a better background for judging the risks involved in Soviet actions and policies. There was general agreement, however, that it would be a great mistake to do this in the abstract, in the terms, for instance, of Kahn, Schelling or Brodie. In this form, the material could only reinforce the stereotypes of Western war-mindedness and militarism. Here too context is the key. The essential points

CONFIDENTIAL

made, and dangers emphasized, by the Western strategic writers could be brought to the Soviet public's attention with little or no emotional kickback if they were explained in the context of disarmament as the kind of dangers our arms control proposals are seeking to reduce or eliminate. For instance, we should try to explain why the West insists on inspection of arms remaining on each side after there would have been mutual destruction of agreed amounts of armament. In analyzing the dangers that would result from lack of inspection, the various considerations of surprise attack, first and second strike capabilities, fears and temptations of preemption could all be described with the repeated assurance that it is the dangers connected with such considerations that we are urgently and earnestly seeking to control and eliminate. We should also constantly be emphasizing the reciprocal nature of the fears and perils and our standing offers to do our part in reciprocal arrangements to reduce the danger and the tension.

If the Government sees fit to undertake some of the unilateral measures in the arms field, such as those recently suggested by Professor Thomas Schelling, to lessen the dangers of the present confrontation, one or another of these measures might lend themselves to an information campaign to apprise the Soviet people of our move and perhaps thereby bring some pressure on the Soviet regime to move in a similar direction. This would be possible, however, only if the groundwork had been laid with a previous effort to give the Soviet people a better understanding of the real issues in disarmament and arms control.

The seriousness and reasonableness of Western proposals for disarmament should be brought home to the Soviet people on a permanent basis

CONFIDENTIAL



as well as in dramatic concentrations of information effort at appropriate occasions in connection with disarmament negotiations. We have often been inhibited in the past by fear of the charge that our interest in disarmament is only for its propaganda value. We might do better to take the opposite tack -- to insist that only by letting the Soviet people know what the Western proposals are can the Soviet regime demonstrate that it too is serious about disarmament. We should be using the information arm more frequently and imaginatively than we do as a support for the negotiating process itself. We should repeatedly challenge the Soviet regime for open debate before all peoples, including its own, on the relative merits of the conflicting proposals. Repeated rejection of this challenge would expose the lack of faith of the Soviet leaders in the validity of their own proposals. And if this continued rejection is forcefully brought to the attention of the Soviet people, another cause for doubt of the regime's purposes will have been seeded in the Soviet public mind.

Two specific aspects of arms control are worth special consideration. One is the simple but significant question of costs. The citizens of the USSR are constantly aware of the problem of limited resources and are fairly sensitive to the way their regime disposes of these resources. Even the Soviet successes in space, which have nourished the patriotic pride of most Russians, have not entirely smothered misgivings about priorities in allocation of resources for use of earth-bound citizens of the USSR. A major Western information effort focussing on the costs

CONFIDENTIAL

of the armaments race to the Soviet public in terms of the sacrifices that have had to be made in Soviet living standards might bring added pressure on the regime, which has historically been more responsive to public feeling on domestic economic matters than to public attitudes on foreign affairs.

The other aspect is more complex. It is the question of openness. Since the issue of inspection has become the key factor in disarmament negotiations, there might be a theoretical case for building an information effort to the Soviet public around a direct attack on the Soviet regime's policy of closely guarded military secrecy as the greatest single menace to the peace of the world. However, there was unanimous agreement among the experts that this would be a mistake. They felt that on the matter of military secrecy the Soviet people generally shared the views expressed by the regime and would not understand or sympathize with any outside criticism of this stand. Indirect approaches were suggested instead. One was to make clear, by actions and proposals, our own willingness to permit inspection of military sites, either reciprocally or, where appropriate, unilaterally. The other indirect approach proposed was to give evidence in convincing ways of the degree of openness that exists already in regard to military matters -- locations, budgets, strengths, production details, etc. -- in the United States and the West. Without making any direct contrast with the Soviet practices, our programs and spokesmen could note that we regard our openness policies not only as the inevitable accompaniments of our democratic process but as contributions to peace.

3. Openness

Even though Soviet secrecy on military matters was not recommended as a subject for direct attack from the outside, the experts generally approved much more direct assaults on other aspects of the closed society. Among the better informed elements of the Soviet Union, there is widespread resentment against the obstacles put in the way of Soviet contact with the outside world and the failure of the regime to let its people know what is really going on, whether in foreign affairs or in other fields. Since significant elements of the audience are likely to be receptive to this line of attack, suggestions were made for a more intensive verbal assault on jamming, both in radio broadcasts and through other channels. Prolonged and incessant ridicule of the extent to which the Soviet government goes and what costs it incurs to keep its own people from knowing what others have to say might well begin to have an effect even on the leadership.

Much more could be made of the resented Soviet bans on foreign publications and books while Soviet newspapers and magazines are sold freely on the newsstands of London, Paris and New York. The limitations on foreign travel are also onerous to many Soviet citizens in the upper levels of present and future influence. Soviet students are most envious of the massive foreign travel of American and Western students. In this case the contrast should perhaps not be rubbed in the faces of the unfortunate Russians. It might better be discussed in the context of sympathy with the plight of Soviet students and the expressed hope

CONFIDENTIAL

that they will ultimately prevail on their leaders to permit them the privileges enjoyed by their colleagues in other lands. Large-scale public offers to Soviet students of cheap or even free summer tours of Western Europe or the United States on either a unilateral or exchange basis, might be hard for the Soviet regime to turn down altogether at some stage in the future.

D. MATTERS OF TONE, LANGUAGE AND TECHNIQUE

As already noted there now exists in this country and in other non-communist lands a large body of experience on communications with the Soviet people. But it is scattered amid a welter of published and unpublished reports, and much of it is still stored as bits and pieces of unrelated recollections in the minds of those persons all over the world who have managed to develop meaningful contacts with Soviet citizens.

Some brief steps toward systematic collection and analysis of this information have been taken. Quantitative information has been collected from escapees and repatriates from the USSR. Some aspects of the experience of the American guides to the American Exhibition in Moscow of 1959 have been reported. This is being followed up by similar reports on the smaller American exhibits which have toured several Soviet cities in the past two years. The comment books in which thousands of Soviet citizens wrote comments on many subjects at the Moscow Exhibition have been partially reproduced. (17)

What is now needed is a comprehensive, systematic working over of the information which foreign visitors to the USSR (as well as advisers to

CONFIDENTIAL

Soviet students here and American guides for Soviet touring groups) have acquired over the past few years in order to develop two main bodies of information:

(1) A public opinion breakdown of the Soviet population. Some leading communications authorities feel that there is now enough information available, if properly collated and analyzed, on which to base at least rough estimates of the proportions of certain strata of Soviet society that fall into the broad categories along the spectrum from true believers through careerists, cynics, doubters, apathetics, to outright oppositionists. Also there may be enough information on which to base estimates of various attitudes on different specific issues, domestic and foreign.

(2) An analysis of what works and what does not work in communicating with the Soviet people. A useful beginning has been made here in a USIA report, based largely on the experience at the Moscow Fair of 1959. (18) This should now be done on the basis of the total available experience, including what the University students who probed most deeply under the surface were able to learn.

A continuing study is in order to keep this information up to date on the basis of new contacts and to broaden the range of coverage and the numerical base for the estimates. Social scientists should be able to develop some practical methods for obtaining specific new information right on the scene.

Both these bodies of information would be of invaluable assistance

CONFIDENTIAL

to those engaged in broadcasting to the Soviet Union, in organizing exchange visits, and in planning other information operations addressed to Soviet audiences.

Several generalized suggestions are possible even without the aid of the comprehensive research proposed.

First and foremost, material intended for a Soviet audience required the most careful special tailoring if it is to be understood as intended by this audience with its unique preconceptions, isolation and 45-year-long conditioning. The present practice of VOA, for example, of giving its Soviet audience translations in Russian, Ukrainian, etc., of news and political commentary prepared for world wide use cannot be justified in terms of the program's objectives, regardless of the administrative reasons which might make such a practice convenient or desirable, or the supervisory problems it is intended to solve.

Because of the special considerations mentioned throughout this paper, it is clearly essential to report and to "background" news and to develop political points in commentaries for Soviet listeners in ways which are totally different from what it is possible to do in news and comments addressed to people with free access to varied sources of information.

Secondly, since it is known that there are considerable differences of opinion beneath the surface in the USSR and certainly a wide variety of interests, not all communications to the Soviet people should be prepared with the image of a single composite Russian in mind. Different

CONFIDENTIAL

subjects, different approaches; even different points of view might be communicated to appeal to different groups among the major elements in Soviet society. Not everything need be said to please every Soviet listener. But, with the aid of surveys such as those suggested earlier, we should have clearly in mind what elements we are trying to impress with any particular message.

On the other hand we should be careful to avoid language, phrasing, tone and manner which experience has shown merely irritate all Soviet citizens. Certain political locutions fall naturally from Western lips which most Soviet citizens, even many critics of the regime, take as affronts to themselves. There is no reason to repeat such phrases on the air in Russian and Ukrainian even though there may have been some reason to carry the original quotation in English and other languages.

To take a possibly mythical example: It might be wise to develop a long-range campaign to point out to Soviet listeners that their leaders are behaving toward the satellites and other nations in ways which are similar to those of the colonizers of earlier centuries and are thus acting in an "imperialist" manner. But until a considerable number of Russians is convinced that there may be some truth to this charge, casually using the phrase "Soviet imperialism" may merely create needless hostility in the Russian listener against the broadcaster.

On the whole, consultants recommended avoidance of both language and tone that have a "propaganda" flavor. Soviet audiences of the type we should be most interested in reaching are more likely to respond

CONFIDENTIAL

favorably to language which sounds objective, and a tone which sounds reasonable and dispassionate. Many Soviet citizens are impressed if they hear a fair presentation of both sides of a case. This factor may be used to get across the implication that those who have faith in the validity of their own position are willing to permit the other side to be heard.

Advice was also given to appeal where possible to Russian national pride. One suggestion was that this was wise to do even in discussion of crisis situations caused by Soviet actions. For instance, we could point out to Soviet listeners how powerful and strong their country now is, and how important it is therefore that the Soviet government use this power carefully and not in ways which will cause us once again to increase our power.

Several matters in this whole area need reexamination. They should be dealt with in the light of new information obtained about Soviet attitudes or at least on the basis of careful analysis of existing information.

Three such questions follow:

(a) Do voices of emigrés offend Russians as emanating from traitors? There have been some strongly expressed views to that effect. Obviously official Russians will say so, as will all those wearing an official mask. It also sounds plausible to Americans who are a nation of immigrants, with no history of emigration. Does it also hold true for a nation with a long tradition of political emigrés, some of whom returned in this very century to run the Revolution? This needs much more careful study than it has had so far. And there is probably no



single answer. We might ultimately find that for certain types of broadcasts or for certain categories of listeners, native Americans or Westerners are required and that for other types of broadcasts or listeners emigrés are more appropriate or persuasive.

(b) Should Western broadcasts, or press releases, or speeches given on Soviet radio or TV, state facts, make sharp comparisons and draw clearcut conclusions or should they be more subtle, providing carefully ordered factual material, explaining the alternatives, and letting the Soviet listeners draw their own conclusions? There is no doubt that many sophisticated Russian begin to smell propaganda when obvious conclusions are articulated. On the other hand a considerable amount of theoretical communications research in the United States indicates that many people require conclusions to be drawn for them. Here too the answer, after more study, may be that for certain subjects and audiences, subtlety is essential; for others, the need may be for clarity and precision.

(c) How much repetition of facts and concepts is desirable or necessary? Advice is given by Americans returning from the USSR that Soviet listeners are "tired of hearing" about our standard of living or some other subject. Others will return with the certainty that Russians are hungry for information about jobs, homes, clothes and cars and that they "can't get enough" of such information. One or the other view might be wrong or, strange to say, they may both be right. General parading of our affluence in statistics may be resented, whereas specific information

0315507000

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

about individuals may fascinate. Or else discussing such matters on the air may be objectionable, whereas a live human being answering questions in a Moscow Park may be convincing and exciting. In any case, we now operate in these matters by guess work whereas some crude but useful quantification of hard fact may be just around the corner.

One of the problems regarding repetition is this: We know from theoretical psychological studies and from some actual propaganda experience that repetition is essential in the information of public opinion. On the other hand Americans, especially of the sophisticated type who engage in political information activity, have low boring points. Since they themselves get bored easily, they tend to turn to more interesting subjects and to drop old ones too soon. This may also be the case at higher levels responsible for major Western political pronouncements. There is a tendency to say: "We've covered that one already." Khrushchev does not make this mistake. He has buried us and our system a hundred times, with a different imaginative metaphor for each funeral.

The problem of what requires and bears repetition and what does not and how the needed repetition can be made palatable is only one of the many matters which can be dealt with more intelligently if the Government organized the pulling together and analysis of the information within our grasp.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

V. ORGANIZATION AND RESEARCH

Various conclusions and recommendations regarding some phases of the subject of this paper have already been set forth, particularly in Chapters III and IV. In this final Chapter, proposals are offered by a Government-wide organization of effort, and recommendations are made for research projects that are essential or desirable if this effort is to be successful.

A. ORGANIZATION

The task of communication with the Soviet people, whether one views it in terms of its long-run effect on the Soviet system or in terms of its potentialities for significant, perhaps startling, short-run political impacts, clearly deserves the most careful attention of our Government:

There are two major elements of this task: One is to establish our total effort in this field on a new and higher plane of effectiveness, commensurate with the job to be done and the possibilities it holds for contributing to our survival as a nation and to the security and progress of all free societies. The other is to carry forward this new effort, at its higher level, with the greatest possible technical efficiency and political skill.

To carry out both sides of this task, these proposals are made:

- (1) A special planning group should be established under the direction of the Department of State to reexamine our present operations

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REF ID: A63110

in this field, to survey the resources which are available or could be made available to expand and improve these operations, to initiate studies required to determine the facts needed for conducting an intensified program and to prepare the plans for establishing the whole effort on a new level. Such a planning group should be drawn from the Government departments and agencies which have major activities or interest in this field. It should also have the participation or advice of leading non-government specialists on Soviet society, telecommunications, and communications psychology.

(2) A permanent interdepartmental staff should be set up to guide the conduct of the communications effort, to develop strategic and tactical plans for its effective and coordinated employment in relation to immediate and longer-range Government objectives, to assure the continued attention to the research needs which should be filled, to conduct technical and political experiments as feasible to learn more precisely the possibilities and limitations of the information arm in this sphere, to bring the results of the research and experiments and the best technical and psychological advice to the attention of the communicators, to watch for opportunities to get important facts or ideas across to the Soviet public and to organize a coordinated effort to take advantage of such opportunities, to devise means of dealing with various types of Soviet responses to our communications activity, to suggest occasions and plans for cooperation of all free world communications programs addressed to the Soviet people, to offer suggestions to

CONFIDENTIAL

the Secretary for specific actions and high level statements that would have particular impact on the Soviet public, and to be on constant alert for ways to improve the total effort.

Such a staff, too, should be drawn from the agencies operating in this field to assure that the plans and guidance are conceived in practical terms. It also should take advantage of the expertise in related areas that is to be found outside the Government.

On the other hand, care should be taken that such a central planning staff should not seek to get involved in the detailed and routine operations of the agencies performing the communications tasks. There is value in some decentralization of control in this area. American and free world activity in such communications should not give any appearance of monolithicity and rigidity. The political guidance of this body normally need not be any more rigid or restrictive than the present Departmental information guidances. For purposes of sustained emphasis on certain subjects at certain times, some tighter control may be warranted for specific topics and periods but this should not affect the spontaneity and diversity of our general communications programs for the Soviet public.

In two other phases of this work, over enthusiasm might conceivably cause trouble. In exchanges of persons, our attempts to expose Soviet visitors to political ideas should not be so forced and heavy-handed that the visitors may feel, and charge, that they were required to do things that they did not want to do; nor should our advance briefing

CONFIDENTIAL

-100-  
CONFIDENTIAL

of American visitors to the USSR or of American hosts to Soviet visitors be overzealous and too obvious. In expanding research, we have to be careful not to subject so many American tourists to questioning about their Soviet contacts that Soviet spy-mania might begin to appear to have some justification. Most of the research activity should concentrate on politically sophisticated Russian speakers, who comprise a fairly small minority of the travelers and hosts. In any case, there is no present need to worry about over-activity in exchange handling and in research. The problem is still very much the other way.

If a planning group such as that proposed above is named, one of its first agenda items might well be to commission a technical study of the expansion possibilities of the number and power of VOA's transmitters and the improvement of their capability to reach Soviet listeners through jamming. This would be desirable regardless of which approach the group ultimately favored -- the gradual improvement of the effectiveness of normal broadcasting operations, the need for reserve power to deal with crisis situations or exploit political opportunities, or the desirability to have extra broadcasting capacity either for direct communications with the Soviet people and leaders in a world crisis or for the purpose mentioned in a study made at the Center for International Studies of MIT in 1952, which urged the following among other steps in a possible program in preparation for a Soviet internal crisis:

"The preparation of special reserved means of mass communications over and above those now regularly used, for the purpose of transmitting,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

against the background of previous propaganda, concrete American terms or offers at a time of internal crisis or war." (19)

The three approaches mentioned in regard to the need for, and use of, expanded facilities are not mutually exclusive. The planning group might wish to ask its technical surveyors to propose ways of accomodating all three.

Essential as it is to develop the needed facilities, however, it may not be worth embarking on a major construction program if there is no prior decision to provide greater attention and resources to the contents of the programs to be carried by the strengthened facilities. For instance, if no change is contemplated in the practice of filling a considerable part of the Russian Service of VOA with translations of news and comment prepared for a world-wide audience rather than with skillfully prepared material tailored to the special mentality and conditions of the Soviet listeners, it might be hard to justify any considerable increase in technical expenditures. Quality of content and skill of presentation are as signigicant in this respect as the strength of the signal.

Much of what has been suggested in this paper is based on limited experience, speculation and deductive reasoning. Answers to some of the questions raised can only be provided or approached in the light of information developed by the type of research suggested in the remainder of this chapter. Answers to other questions and the wisdom of the

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

various proposals made can be developed only on the basis of experiment and trial and error. Some of the ideas can be tried out in relatively harmless ways and it may be possible to get some indications of their degree of success or failure and the reasons therefore. In the case of broadcasting, arrangements could be made from time to time to spot observers in various USSR centers to obtain information discreetly on the impact of experimental efforts. This is now clearly within the realm of possibility.

B. RESEARCH

Considering the importance of the subject, the volume of research conducted by the Government to support its program of communications with the Soviet people is infinitesimal. The little that is done within Government agencies or under contract with the Government is valuable and of high quality but it barely scratches the surface of the problem.

Many of those consulted in this inquiry suggested specific matters that should be investigated and the study of which should prove useful to those engaged in shaping and handling our varied communications efforts addressed to the Soviet people. These suggested topics are listed here along with other topics that emerged as likely and fruitful subjects for detailed study to advance our national objectives in this sphere. Several of the suggested topics may have been covered to some extent in recent research, such as that by the Special Operations research office at American University. In some instances, the scholar who made the suggestion or seemed particularly interested in pursuing the study, given the time and opportunity, is noted in parenthesis.



1. Political Orientation

- (a) The constraints on Soviet leadership. (Gouré.) (To what extent, for instance, does the image of peacefulness of the USSR, even within the USSR, inhibit the actions of the regime?)
- (b) The developing Russian nationalism, and its possible effects at home and abroad (Brzezinski.) (20)
- (c) Biographical study of Soviet leaders -- background, education and the changes in the sources from which leadership tends to come. (Fainsod.)
- (d) Areas of tension and dissatisfaction in Soviet society. (Fainsod.)
- (e) Problem of the generations as portrayed in Soviet literature, differences in aspirations, attitudes, etc. (Fainsod.) (21)
- (f) The processes of political rationalization in the USSR. The motivations and reasoning processes of individuals in different elements of Soviet society in accepting and justifying Soviet domestic and foreign policies.
- (g) The changes in methods of control in the USSR from 1952 to 1962. An analysis of the nature and degree of change from coercion to persuasion in various aspects of Soviet life.
- (h) Effect of international tensions within the USSR. Reaction of the Soviet public to war scares and reaction of the Soviet leadership to any rise in domestic concern over increased world tension.
- (i) Differences between domestic and foreign versions of Soviet

CONFIDENTIAL

statements on war dangers and crisis situations. A study along these lines, suggested by Dr. Philip Mosely, would throw light on whether Soviet leaders are concerned about war fears of the USSR public.

(j) Public opinion breakdown of the Soviet population. Analysis of degrees of loyalty and dissent, views of key elements on major issues, image of America, held by different groups in the USSR. Some scholars warned of the temptation to quantify and to generalize on the basis of inadequate samples and information. However, if done with care and honesty, and used with full awareness of the tentative nature of the findings and their inherent limitations, such analysis would seem a step forward from the present situation of sheer guesses based on narrower individual impressions and still smaller samples.

(k) Profile of Soviet student in Moscow and Leningrad Universities. Analysis of types, backgrounds, attitudes, based on information from our exchange students at those universities. (Fainsod.)

(l) Soviet admissions of past mistakes. (Ulam.) This would provide a useful body of material for broadcasters and conversationalists to draw from and enlarge upon in their communication with Soviet listeners, when use of Soviet sources would increase credibility.

(m) Degree of concern of Soviet leaders over reliability of satellite populations and of various nationality elements in the USSR.

## 2. Technical

(a) More detailed analysis of monitoring reports on a continuing basis to determine effectiveness of our facilities (transmitters,

CONFIDENTIAL

- 105 -

CONFIDENTIAL

antennas and frequencies) in reaching the target areas.

(b) Detailed analysis of jamming to determine identification and location of jammers, pattern of selection for jamming, uniformity of jamming pattern in various regions, time it takes for jammer to zero in on disapproved item.

(c) Research and development for high powered flexible antennas for broadcasts to key centers of Soviet Union.

(d) Possibilities of developing super-powered transmitters to reach key centers in European Russia.

(e) Ways of utilizing twilight immunity effect to push maximum volume of programming into Moscow-Leningrad-Kiev regions during period of relative immunity from sky-wave jamming.

(f) Possibilities of placing powerful broadcasting facilities in Pacific area to attain flexibility in reaching USSR targets.

(g) Ways of massing, coordinating and flexibly using transmitters to increase chances of getting clear signals through local jamming.

(h) Technical and security problems of high powered short-wave broadcasting on brink of thermo-nuclear war.

### 3. Communicating With Soviet Citizens

(a) Soviet understanding of our communications. How they view what we have to say. (Gouré.)

(b) Analysis of communications and influence patterns in the USSR.

(c) Possibilities of developing a "Communications Model" for the Soviet Union over a long period on the basis of the increasing volume of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

available research material. This would take into account domestic media output, foreign information, word-of-mouth, etc. (de Sola Pool.)

(d) Ways of taking advantage of Soviet media to get Western ideas across to Soviet public.

(e) Analysis of what works and what does not work in communicating with the Soviet people. Described in previous chapter.

(f) Study of whether satellite radio picks up material from Western press and radio and whether satellite radio reaches into the USSR.

(Mosley.)

(g) Soviet official and unofficial reaction to American and Western radio broadcasts. (Barghoorn.)

(h) Analysis of occasions, type and frequency of reference in Soviet publications to American broadcasts. (Inkeles.) This might be related to the study of jamming patterns.

(i) Soviet audience reactions to various styles and techniques of foreign broadcasts. (Barghoorn.)

(j) What American media and sources are given attention by Soviet media and sources. MIT is now doing a study on an unclassified basis. Study within Government could analyze same point in Soviet documents obtained on a confidential basis. (de Sola Pool.)

(k) Follow up on careers of Soviet participants in U. S. exchange visits to determine later importance of these participants and whether visits affected careers. (Barghoorn.)

CONFIDENTIAL

(l) Impact on Soviet students of American exchange students in the USSR. (Barghoorn.) As reported, of course, by the American students.

(m) Impact of American experience on Soviet students in American universities. What they accepted and what they rejected. What was persuasive to them and what was not. On what things they changed their minds. (Fainsod.)

(Care should be taken that the latter two studies do not duplicate a general study on face-to-face impact of American citizens on Soviet citizens being done at MIT.)

(n) Analysis of Soviet propaganda lines that require refutation. (Barghoorn.)

(o) Devices to strengthen credibility of American statements and devices to demonstrate our openness. (Barghoorn.) Also devices to increase rapport with audience.

(p) The possibilities of reaching significant elements of the Soviet people through unofficial and clandestine means, whether by books, pamphlets radio, word of mouth, or other means.

(q) Profile of the short-wave listening audience in the USSR and its listening pattern.

(r) The possibilities of requiring the short-wave radio instrument for communicating directly to the Soviet leadership.

(s) Speculative analysis of the types of broadcast messages to the Soviet public that would convey to Soviet leaders American determination in crisis.

CONFIDENTIAL

(t) Possible uses of short-wave radio in succession crisis and analysis of possible Soviet public and official reactions to such uses.

(u) Soviet audience reactions to various categories of broadcast material -- international affairs, life in the United States and the West, internal Soviet affairs, developments in the sciences and humanities, entertainment.

(v) "War gaming" of use of massed broadcasting facilities in historical or hypothetical crisis situation.

This paper has focussed exclusively on the USSR. It is not too early, however, to begin thinking of some of these questions in relation to Communist China. With the developing Sino-Soviet conflict, the imminent prospect of Chinese nuclear capability, the domestic economic failures and the extra-ordinary isolation of the Chinese leadership, it seems fairly evident that our meager broadcasting effort to mainland China is totally out of gear with the political realities, prospects and opportunities. A study of this type about Communist China may well be in order.

CONFIDENTIAL

0310581030

DECLASSIFIED  
VI. SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper is to reexamine a widely held assumption -- the assumption that in the Soviet dictatorship, the views of the Soviet public can play no role in the formulation of foreign policy and that therefore outside efforts to reach that public can have little or no direct, or even ultimate, effect on Kremlin decisions in the political military sphere.

Political Considerations

Specialists on Soviet politics and society, on deterrence, and on international communications were consulted on various aspects of this matter. They generally agreed on these points: The people of the USSR have an overwhelming desire for peace and a genuine fear of war. On the whole they "accept" their system and regime and are increasingly "patriotic". Soviet leaders are normally able to direct public attitudes on foreign affairs along desired lines. Soviet citizens generally assume that virtually everything their government does in foreign affairs furthers the cause of world peace.

The specialists consulted were not agreed in their views on three major problems which may be stated in the form of questions:

(1) What degree of attention and concern does the Soviet regime give to its people's opinions on matters of foreign policy?

One view was that the Soviet regime has little real concern about domestic public attitudes on foreign policy and that its propaganda

DECLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

120  
CONFIDENTIAL

activities at home in this field are not essential but have a variety of other explanations and purposes. Another view was that regardless of how the regime feels about its people's opinions, it is certain of its ability to manage public opinion as it wishes, with the aid of its massive agitational machinery and its monopoly of information.

A third category of experts believed that the Soviet regime is most seriously concerned about its people's attitudes on foreign policy matters and took these attitudes into account in its decision making. The reasons for this view are based on the massive scale of the Soviet agit-prop effort on foreign affairs; the history of the iron curtain and of jamming, both during and since the days of Stalin; the behavior of the Soviet leaders in crisis situations, including the days immediately after the death of Stalin; the stress on morale of both front and rear in Soviet military doctrine; and the apparent increase in the significance to Soviet leadership of the domestic popularity of certain ideas, such as peaceful coexistence.

(2) Can information from foreign sources affect the confidence of the Soviet people in the peaceful purposes of their government's policies and actions?

Most of the specialists consulted agreed that this is the most important point of attack but there was difference of opinion over how easily or effectively the Soviet people's confidence in their government's peaceful behavior could be shaken by information from the outside.

Those who felt there is a good chance of success for such an

CONFIDENTIAL



endeavor pointed to the undercurrent of doubt that exists among key elements in Soviet society as demonstrated by the "two-faces" phenomenon, the permanent "official-line" mask which many Soviet citizens wear to conceal their real views or their uncertainties on many questions about which the Communist Party has a position.

The most frequent suggestion made by American specialists was that information programs to the Soviet people, particularly through the medium of broadcasting, be concentrated on these occasions when Soviet international behavior contrasts sharply and clearly with Soviet self-proclaimed goals. A recent such occasion cited by many was the provocative Soviet activity in the Berlin air corridors this Spring. Most Soviet citizens were totally unaware of these incidents. A concentration of information effort on this occasion might not only have raised doubts in the Soviet public mind about its Government's peaceful policies but also have caused some degree of tension on the Soviet home front, a price the Soviet regime generally prefers not to have to pay for its probing operations abroad.

Although information operations along these lines raise questions of credibility and possible audience hostility, these matters are apparently manageable.

(3) How might the Soviet Government react to an increased information effort directed to the Soviet people on world affairs?

Undoubtedly the Soviet regime would increase its own counter-effort in the form of more agit-prop and perhaps greater jamming. The latter

CONFIDENTIAL

involves some domestic financial and political cost and raises questions of mutual escalation. A possibility exists of retaliation in the form of reduction or elimination of contacts with the West but this too has problematic aspects for the regime. Soviet charges of "provocation" or Soviet concern over the appearance of greater tension have to be considered, but these depend largely on the tone and content of our own communications.

The Soviet reaction we would hope to achieve with our effort, however would be this: that the regime take the impact of our information program into account in its decisions on foreign policy.

Although most of the consultants felt there is little chance of having direct influence through this means on Soviet decisions in short-term crisis situations, some students of Soviet affairs and of international communications see distinct possibilities even in such circumstances. In visualizing conditions existing on the eve of a thermo-nuclear crisis, for instance, several foresee a possible contribution to deterrence in massive broadcasting efforts which might affect the course of the pre-decision argument within the Kremlin itself or give the Soviet leaders pause by reminding them of the morale problems that could be caused in their rear by a powerful Western broadcasting capability still operating after a devastating nuclear exchange.

In the case of lesser crises caused by Soviet pressures, the was expressed that if a Western technical capability were developed to

CONFIDENTIAL

031507031

.113  
CONFIDENTIAL

get an effective signal through jamming, and if a reputation with the Soviet audience for reliability and credibility were established over a period of years, a major broadcasting effort from the West that created serious concern to the Soviet people might cause the leadership to take this factor into account in its short-run decisions. An additional point made by some is that the mere mounting of such an information operation, in certain crisis situations and when accompanied by other moves, might be a supplementary means of demonstrating to the Kremlin our determination on the issues involved and might therefore serve, in itself, as a contributory deterrent factor.

A number of specialists felt that Western broadcasting media could have a particularly large and interested Soviet audience during a succession crisis in the USSR. Some suggested furthermore that the West use this period and our information capability to try obliquely to affect the choice of leader or to gain approval for Western proposals or ideas but other warned strongly against the temptations of "meddling", with possible dangerous results for our own interests.

A majority of the experts consulted, however, felt that a Western information effort designed to inform the Soviet people of the dangers of its government's foreign policy, if technically effective and capably handled, could make a long-run contribution to deterrence of Soviet aggressive behavior.

#### THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

Of the various means of reaching the Soviet people with information

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

and ideas from abroad, short-wave radio and personal contacts are the ones best suited for the handling of material about international affairs.

The listeners to the two American broadcasters to the Soviet Union -- the Voice of America and Radio Liberty -- and to the BBC are believed to be numbered in the millions in the course of a week. A significant proportion of them are among the key elements of the Soviet public we are most interested in reaching: bureaucrats, managers, the intelligentsia and youth. The selective jamming which the Soviet Union now employs against outside information on world affairs is most effective in the urban areas, but our broadcasters have been increasingly successful in getting understandable signals through jamming, particularly to rural areas and suburbs, with the aid of more power and more transmitters.

In general, the specialists consulted favor development of a greatly increased capability of reaching the Soviet people by radio. Some prefer to have the additional facilities used to bolster our normal day-to-day effort because of the significance of its long-run effect. A larger number want some portion of the increased capability used as a flexible political instrument to bring important information to the Russian people on critical or opportune occasions as a means of directly or ultimately influencing Soviet foreign policy. This could be done by massing high powered transmitters of one or more of the U. S. and other Western broadcasters to get through the jamming to a wider audience. At present this can be done in only limited fashion. In the case of VOA, it can be done

CONFIDENTIAL

now at all only by robbing the facilities normally used for broadcasts to other countries, since VOA's reserves are presently all committed.

A survey is needed to provide a comprehensive new look at what is required technically in terms of research and construction to get a clearer radio signal through jamming to audiences in the key centers of the USSR. In view of the political potentials involved, a higher priority should be given to this task within the Government.

Man for man, the most effective means of communication with the Soviet people is through personal contacts. The exchange program can be strengthened to help it contribute more effectively to our foreign policy objectives by two devices: (1) steps to insure that Soviet groups visiting the U. S. be exposed to at least one session of serious discussion of foreign policy issues and (2) preparation of briefing material that will help carry sophisticated Americans more effectively through the early stages of conversations with Soviet citizens on foreign policy matters.

We should also make the fullest possible use of the Soviet Government's own media to get our point across to the Soviet people -- by means of Soviet press, radio, television, and the mails.

#### Content and Tone of Communications

In addition to strengthening the means of communication, much more attention has to be given to the content and tone of our communications with the Soviet people. Care has to be taken to achieve as much credibility as is possible with an audience that is highly suspicious of propaganda, to deal with crisis situations in ways which do not reinforce stereotypes of Western aggressiveness, and to place such issues as

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

disarmament, openness and the costs of the arms race into reasonable and convincing contexts.

There now exists in this country and in other non-communist countries a large body of experience on communications with the Soviet people. What is now needed is a comprehensive, systematic collection of this experience and an analysis of it to develop two main bodies of information; (1) rough estimates of the proportion of the population that holds various attitudes about the regime as a whole and about specific issues, domestic and foreign and (2) an indication of what works and what does not work in communicating with the Soviet people.

Organization and Research

Our total effort to reach the Soviet people should be placed on a new and higher plane of effectiveness, commensurate with the possibilities it holds for contributing to our survival as a nation and to the security and progress of all free societies. A special planning group should be established under the direction of the Department of State to prepare plans for establishing the whole effort on a new level.

This new program should then be carried forward with the greatest possible technical efficiency and political skill. A permanent staff should be established, also under Department of State direction, to guide the conduct of the communications effort by the various agencies involved and to coordinate their activities on appropriate occasions.

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- 117 -  
DECLASSIFIED

Much more still needs to be known about the possibilities, problems and issues involved in this matter. Research should be undertaken on specific political, technical and psychological aspects of the question to increase the likelihood of success in this endeavor.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

118  
CONFIDENTIAL

1. Speech by N. Khrushchev at Soviet-Rumanian Friendship meeting in Moscow, August 11, 1961.
2. Speeches by S. P. Pavlov, first secretary of the Komsomol (Communist Youth Organization), and by N. Khrushchev at Komsomol Congress in Moscow, April 19, and 21, 1962. Article by Mikhail A. Suslov, secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee, in Kommunist, No. 3, 1962, in which the author denounced harmful trends among Soviet students and commented: "We evidently insufficiently take into account the fact that in contemporary conditions the influence of bourgeois propaganda is spread among us along many paths: through the press, radio, all kinds of delegations and tourists."
3. "Inside Story of a Lawyer's Adventure" by David Snell, Life, Feb. 23, 1962.
4. Decision of Joint Session of Plenum of Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Council of Ministers of the USSR and Praesidium of Supreme Soviet of USSR, published in Pravda, Mar. 7, 1953.
5. Raymond L. Garthoff, The Soviet Image of Future War, Washington, D. C.: public Affairs Press, 1959. pp. 24-5.
6. "The Absolute Weapon' and the Problem of Secrecy" by N. Talensky, International Affairs, Moscow, April 1962.
7. Soon to be published. Proofs of the book were seen by the writer of this paper during a visit to the Rand Corporation.
8. This is not to deny that unpopular decisions continue to be made. The announcement of June 1, 1962, of a rise in meat and butter prices is a

CONFIDENTIAL



good example. But even here there is some evidence that public opinion was a factor in the decision-making process. The decision was apparently preceded by a lengthy debate and the regime went to great lengths to justify the price rise in terms of the need to counter America's growing armaments.

9. "Strategy Setting and Accuracy of Perception in International Relations" by Professor Raymond A. Bauer, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, a paper read to the Eastern Psychological Association, April 27, 1962
10. "Secrecy: A Basic Tenet of the Soviets" by Professor Urie Bronfenbrenner, Department of Child Development, Cornell University, in The New York Times Magazine, April 22, 1962.
11. Confidential memorandum prepared for the New York Bureau of Radio Liberty by Burton Rubin, U. S. exchange student at Leningrad University during academic year, 1959-60; instructor in Russian language and literature at Amherst College.
12. Wolfgang Leonhard, Child of the Revolution, translated by C. M. Woodhouse, London: Collins, 1957, pp. 373-4.
13. Radio Liberty pamphlet, The Most Important Job in the World, 1962, p. 14
14. "The Language and Facilities Structure of the Voice of America", Report of a Special USIA-State Committee, 1961, See Appendix F, "Jamming".  
(Confidential)
15. "A Policy of Peaceful Engagement" by Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, New Republic, Mar. 26, 1962, p. 16.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 120 -  
CONFIDENTIAL

16. "The Vulnerability of the Soviet Union and Its European Satellites to Political Warfare", study done at Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1952. (Secret)
17. Reports of Research and Reference Service of U. S. Information Agency: Visitors' Reactions to the American Exhibit in Moscow, p-47-1959; Soviet Curiosity About America, R-15-1960; "Plastics USA" in Kiev, R-32-1961; "Plastics USA" in Moscow, R-48-1961; "Plastics USA" in Tbilisi, R-59-1961; The Soviet People View America, R-1-1962; "Medicine USA" in Moscow, The First Week, R-25-62; "Medicine USA" in Moscow, The Second Week, R-29-62; "Medicine USA" in Kiev, The First Week, R-45-62; "Medicine USA" in Kiev, The Second Report, R-51-62. (All these reports are classified Official Use Only.)
18. What Works and What Does Not Work in Communicating With the Soviet People, by Ralph K. White, Reports and Reference Service, USIA, R-20-1960.
19. See Note 16.
20. Frederick C. Barghoorn's Soviet Russian Nationalism, published by Oxford University Press, New York, in 1956, covers developments up to that time. The impact of Soviet space achievements and the increased volume of source material resulting from the exchanges program may make a new study worth while.
21. There is useful, suggestive material on this subject in The Taproot of Soviet Society, by Nicholas P. Vakar, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962.

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIALISTS CONSULTED

Department of State.

Edward Freers, Political Adviser to Strategic Air Command, former U. S.  
Minister in Moscow

Mose L. Harvey, Policy Planning Council

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Chief, Bloc International Political Activities Division,  
INR

Robert Baraz, Bloc International Political Activities Division, INR

Roger Kirk, Office of Soviet Union Affairs

Harry G. Barnes, Office of Soviet Union Affairs

John Armitage, formerly with Office of Soviet Union Affairs

Charles C. Flowerree, Office of Research and Analysis for Sino-Soviet  
Bloc, INR

William J. Jorden, Policy Planning Council

Raymond L. Garthoff, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political  
Military Affairs

U.S. Information Agency.

Henry Loomis, Director, Broadcasting Service

Alexander K. Klieforth, Program Manager, VOA

Edgar T. Martin, Engineering Manager, VOA

George Jacobs, Chief, Frequency Division, Office of Engineering Manager, VOA

W. E. Dulin, Deputy Chief, Frequency Division, Office of Engineering Manager,  
VOA

Hans N. Tuch, Deputy Assistant Director (Soviet Bloc)

CONFIDENTIAL

12  
DECLASSIFIED

Alexander Park, Chief, Soviet and Satellite Division, Research and Reference Service

Ralph K. White, Chief, Special Projects, Research and Reference Service

Leo Laufer, Communist Affairs Specialist, Office of Policy and Plans

Andrew T. Falkiewicz, Soviet Desk Officer, Office of Asst. Director for Europe

Francis Macy, Soviet Exhibits Officer

Lazar Pistrak, author of "The Grand Practician; Khrushchev's Rise to Power", Assistant Librarian, Soviet and Communist Affairs, Research and Reference Service

James Mocerri, Planning Officer, Office of Policy and Plans

School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Robert C. Tucker, Professor of Government (visiting)

Rand Corporation.

Myron Rush, Social Science Department

Arnold Horelick, Social Science Department

Leon Gouré, Social Science Department

Herbert Dinerstein, Social Science Department

Charles Thompson, Social Science Department

Paul Kesckemeti, Social Science Department

Allen Ferguson, Economics Department

Cullen Crain, Telecommunications Specialist

Ciro Zoppo, Social Science Department

Fred Iklé, Social Science Department

DECLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

Council on Foreign Relations

Philip E. Mosely, Director of Studies

W. Phillips Davison, Staff Assistant, Specialist on Communications

John C. Campbell, Staff Assistant

Columbia University.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Research Institute on Communist Affairs

American Committee for Liberation.

Howland H. Sargeant, President

Eugene Sosin, Program Manager, Radio Liberty

Mrs. Catherine Dupuy, Policy Officer, Radio Liberty

Col. Stephen McGiffert, Chief of Radio Liberty network

N. Y. Times.

E. C. Daniel, Asst. Managing Editor, former Moscow Correspondent

Harrison Salisbury, former Moscow Correspondent

Yale University.

Frederick C. Barghoorn, Professor of Political Science

Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

Merle Fainsod, Director; Professor of Government

Adam B. Ulam, Professor of Government

Alex Dolberg, Fellow

Edward Keenan, Fellow, Student at Leningrad University 1959-61

Priscilla Johnson, former NANA Correspondent, Moscow

Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

Thomas C. Schelling, Professor of Economics

Alex Inkeles, Professor of Social Relations

CONFIDENTIAL

-124-  
DECLASSIFIED

Robert Levine, Research Associate

Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University

Raymond A. Bauer, Professor of Business Administration, formerly with  
Russian Research Center

Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Ithiel de Sola Pool, Professor of Political Science

Herbert Ritvo, Research Associate in Soviet Studies

Brandeis University.

Robert A. Feldmesser, Assistant Professor of Sociology

Wheaton College.

Nicholas P. Vakar, Professor of Russian Civilization

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

125  
CONFIDENTIAL  
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aczel, Tamas and Meray, Tibor. The Revolt of the Mind. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. A personal account of the events within Communist literary circles in Budapest leading up to the Hungarian revolt of 1956. The book vividly illustrates the sharp dichotomy between the public and private views of Communist intellectuals in the satellites and casts some light on the similar phenomenon known to exist, although perhaps in attenuated form, in the USSR.

Barghoorn, Frederick C. Soviet Russian Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. A tracing of the roots of Russian nationalism in pre-Soviet Russian history and a compilation of expressions of Russian nationalism in Soviet documents, literature, journals and actions. Much of the book is devoted to a discussion of Russification policies and specific great Russian nationalism. The volume concludes with some interesting speculation on the relation between various aspects of Soviet nationalism and Soviet foreign policy.

Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. An analysis of the changes in strategy caused by the advent of missiles, of various approaches to deterrence, and of the prospects and role of limited war in the new situation. A useful introduction to the world political-military situation today.

CONFIDENTIAL

126  
DECLASSIFIED

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. A collection of five articles on various aspects of Soviet politics. The first two are historical. The latter three describe the nature of changes taking place in the Soviet control system, in the ideology and in bloc relationships. The essay on the "Nature of the Soviet System" notes the importance of the agit-prop organization in sustaining the ideology.

Fainsod, Merle. How Russia Is Ruled. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. A detailed description of the Communist Party's rise to power, its methods of control and the instruments it uses to rule the Soviet people. A closing chapter on the cohesiveness of the system and its tensions is a concise statement of the situation at the time of Stalin's death.

Fainsod, Merle. Smolensk Under Soviet Rule. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. An excellent case study of how Soviet rule operated in one community before the war, reconstructed on the basis of documents taken by the Germans in Smolensk and later acquired by the United States. It shows in detail how local Party and government control was carried out and contains a particularly interesting chapter on censorship of the press and of libraries.

Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. A well organized description of the officially stated Soviet doctrine on nuclear and limited war, the role of the various services, the position of the armed forces in the Soviet system, and Soviet

CONFIDENTIAL



127  
D E L A S E R I E D

evaluation of U. S. and Western military strategies, strengths and weaknesses.

Garthoff, Raymond L. The Soviet Image of Future War. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959. Traces of the development of "the permanently operating factors which decide the outcome of wars" attributed to Stalin. Stress is laid throughout on the importance of the morale of the forces and the rear in Soviet political and military thinking.

Inkeles, Alex. Public Opinion in Soviet Russia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950. The only complete description of the philosophy and operation of the Soviet agitation and propaganda apparatus. Since the the book was written, the machinery has been operated with some increased flexibility, relaxation, and sophistication but the description in the book of the Soviet government's concepts, system and organization for making its people accept, or at least express, its political line remains largely valid.

Inkeles, Alex and Bauer, Raymond A. The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. Description of occupational, familial, political and social life of Soviet citizens based on interviews with refugees done in 1950-51. In addition to matters of daily living, the study describes different types and degrees of loyalty and hostility to the regime. Political material, being from Stalinist period, is now dated but provides useful background for present situation.

D E L A S E R I E D

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Kissinger, Henry A. The Necessity for Choice. New York: Harper & Brothers  
1960. A cogent analysis of the political-military situation facing the  
United States today and a discussion of the political and diplomatic  
problems involved in deterrence, arms control, alliances, limited war  
possibilities, and negotiations with the USSR.

Moseley, Philip E. The Kremlin in World Politics. New York: Vintage Books,  
1960. A collection of articles covering various aspect of Soviet policy,  
mainly in foreign affair, over the past two decades. The article entitled,  
"Russia Revisited: Moscow Dialogues, 1956" is a particularly vivid descrip-  
tion of the problem of communicating with Soviet citizens.

Rostow, W. W. The Dynamics of Soviet Society. New York: W. W. Norton  
& Co. Inc., 1953. A summary of the way Soviet rule was imposed on all  
aspects of society in the USSR and expanded to the satellites, and a  
discussion of the various forces in Soviet society contributing to cohesion,  
instability and tension, as of the period just before and immediately  
following Stalin's death. The volume touches on some of the questions dealt  
with in this paper, including the role of propaganda, the concern of the  
regime over outside influences, the significance of ideology, the problems  
of succession, and the attitude of the Russian people on such matters as  
peace, patriotism and personal aspirations. Most of the generalizations  
made are apparently still valid. A similar study today, however, might  
involve significant changes in emphasis.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5-129  
DECLASSIFIED

Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Application of bargaining concepts and game theory to political-military strategy and negotiating problems of the major powers. Contains discussion of various types of explicit bargaining and tacit negotiation in relation to military situations.

Vakar, Nicholas P. The Taproot of Soviet Society. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962. Notes the impact of peasant ways of thinking on the organization of the Soviet state and the style of its leadership under Stalin and Khrushchev. Provides some intimation of the changes that may be in store for Soviet society when the march of the generations brings forward leaders further removed from the influences of the Russian village.

CONFIDENTIAL  
DECLASSIFIED

BIOGRAPHY

Was born in Barre, Vermont, in 1914. Attended public schools there. When family moved to New York, attended Townsend Harris Hall High School and was graduated in 1931. Received A. B. from Columbia College in 1935 and M. A. from Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism in 1936.

Did some string reporting for New York newspapers, free lance public relations work, and editorial and publicity work for a national welfare organization in New York from 1936 to 1941.

Selected for service with U. S. Army in Spring of 1941, became officer in Quartermaster Corps in 1942, did Quartermaster and Transportation Corps service in New Caledonia in 1943 and 1944 and, service command public relations in the Philippines and Japan in 1945. Served in Public information Office of Sixth Army in Kyoto until Spring of 1946 and was chief of news Division of Public Information Office for Far East Command and of Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Tokyo from 1946 to 1948, first as major, then as civilian.

Joined U. S. Economic Mission (Marshall Aid) in London in 1948 as Assistant Information Officer. In 1953 became Economic Information Officer of USIS, London, and Information Officer in 1954. Was Deputy Public Affairs Officer, London, from 1955 to 1957.

Served as chairman of a USIA promotion panel in Washington in 1957 and as member of USIA committee to survey the language structure of the Voice of America in 1958. Was Long-Range Planning Officer in the Office of Plans, USIA from 1958 to 1961. In 1960 was member of the staff of

DECLASSIFIED

the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) and in 1961 was a member of a Special USIA-State Committee on the Language and Facilities Structure of the Voice of America.

\*

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED