


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
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
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August 15, 1969

**THE CONTROL OF LOCAL CONFLICT:
CASE STUDIES**

FAR EASTERN CASE STUDIES

ACDA/IR-154

VOLUME IV

Prepared for

The U. S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

by

**Browne and Shaw International Studies Division
BOLT BERANEK AND NEWMAN INC.
12 Woerd Avenue
Waltham, Massachusetts 02154**

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FOREWORD

→ This volume presents a portion of the results of a thirteen-month study project performed under contract with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in order to advance the Agency's research program directed toward the development of arms control and disarmament measures applicable to conflict and pre-conflict situations in the less developed areas of the world. It was designed to provide new insights, wherever possible, regarding measures relevant to the reduction of intensity of such conflicts, as a continuation of previous work done for ACDA by the Arms Control Project of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.¹ The M. I. T. work, by developing an analytical model of local conflict, provided a means of identifying and comparing factors influencing the course of such conflicts.²

The present study provides an analysis of ~~thirteen~~ cases of local conflict in the Far East and expands the previous data base in comparable form by using the general M. I. T. format. This report is divided into four volumes, as follows:

Volume I : Summary Report

Volume II : Latin American Case Studies

Bolivia (1967)
Cuban Insurgency (1952-1959)
Dominican Republic (1965)
Guatemala (1954)
Venezuela (1960-1963)

Volume III: Middle East and North African Case Studies

Algeria (1954-1962)
Iraq-Kurds (1959-1963)
Kuwait-Iraq (1961)
Lebanon (1958)
Yemen (1962-1968)

¹ See Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, The Control of Local Conflict: A Design Study on Arms Control and Limited War in the Developing Areas, ACDA/WEC-98, 4 Vols. (M. I. T., June 1967). Members of Browne and Shaw International Studies Division participated in this work as subcontractors and consultants.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Chapter III. (For a quick overview of the structure of the local conflict model, see chart reproduced herein as Figure 1, viii.)

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Volume IV: Far Eastern Case Studies

Philippines (1946-1954)
Quemoy-Matsu (1954-1958)
West Irian (1962-1963)

This group of cases was selected by ACDA to provide coverage of more of the 52 post-World War II cases originally recommended for study in the M. I. T. design study.¹ The selection includes two conventional interstate conflicts, four primarily internal, five internal with significant external involvement, and two colonial. The cases cover a wide range in duration of hostilities, including two relatively short cases of hostility and one (Kuwait) in which there was no outbreak of hostilities at all.

The incidence of local conflict in the developing world continues at the rate of about one or two new outbreaks of significant hostilities each year, and a conservative estimate suggests that there are over 70 current disputes which are potential candidates for the outbreak of hostilities in the next ten years.² This possibility alone makes the study and understanding of the control of local conflict - i. e., the analysis of what has influenced it in the past and the consideration of ways to reduce its intensity in the future - a matter of high interest to many nations. The Case Study results summarized here, therefore, are intended to assist in familiarizing interested U. S. personnel with structured historical data on some of the major factors at work in past conflicts, and to stimulate their thinking about methods of controlling or moderating such conflicts in the future.

The purpose is not to make policy recommendations to the U. S. government or for action by any other government. Second, our purpose is not to diagnose "the cause" of a conflict, not to assign blame, nor is it to attempt to prescribe a cure for any one conflict as a whole. Rather it is to isolate individual factors and consider their amelioration as though each existed alone. This rigorous methodology is fraught with difficulty in disciplining one's thought processes in order to avoid being influenced in largely subjective ways by the total environment.

¹ Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., (ACDA/WEC-98, II), See "Typology A," p. 77.

² Browne and Shaw International Studies Division, The United States and UN Peacekeeping: A View Toward the 1970s, for the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, (BBN, Waltham, Mass., November 1968), Appendix B, pp. 124-128.

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We are not building scenarios for resolving these conflict cases, but rather trying to develop individual building blocks for later use in pattern analysis. The implications of selected important factors and measures for the general controllability of local conflict are aggregated in the findings presented in Volume I.

Definitions

Local conflict: A dispute that is being or is likely to be dealt with by predominantly military means, outside the developed world, and with direct great power involvement (if any) on only one side.

Phase: An identifiable stage in the course of a local conflict.

The M. I. T. model of local conflict divides all local conflicts into phases as follows:

- Phase I - Dispute (pre-hostilities, pre-military)
- Phase II - Conflict (pre-hostilities, but seen in military terms)
- Phase III - Hostilities (purposeful, continuing military action)
- Phase IV - Conflict after termination of hostilities (but military option remains)
- Phase V - Post-conflict (but dispute not yet settled)
- S - Settlement

Dispute: A quarrel or disagreement over something substantive or the existence of a divisive issue.

Conflict: A dispute viewed in military terms by at least one of the directly involved parties.

Hostilities: Military activity engaged in to settle a dispute.

Transition: Movement across an inter-phase threshold as the result of the factor-generated pressures during a phase.


Threshold: A convenient point of demarcation at which to separate the phases.

Control: The prevention, moderation, or termination of organized violence, or of the threat of it, at the intranational or international level.

Factors: Conditions, perceptions, actions, or events which generate pressures that either tend toward or away from movement of the conflict across a threshold to the next phase.

STRUCTURE OF LOCAL CONFLICT CONTROL¹

Figure 1
VIII



¹Reproduced from ACDA/WEC-98, Vol. II, p. 60.

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Measures: Policies or actions which, if taken, might alter the course of local conflict by reinforcing a violence-minimizing factor or offsetting a violence-promoting factor.

The relationship of phases of conflict, types of factors to be considered in each, and the conflict-control policy objectives for measures to be suggested are best illustrated briefly in the attached chart (Figure 1).

Historic-Analytic Approach

The historic-analytic approach to the control of local conflict for the purposes of this study consisted of four major steps.

1. After having first collected, compared, and selected historical data from the most reliable sources for each conflict case, the conflict's phase structure was determined by examination.
2. Second, the identifiable factors which had any discernible influence in shaping the course of conflict phase, were listed under the heading of the conflict-controlling objective which they affected at that point in time.
3. Third, the actual measures which were taken, or could conceivably have been taken to control pressures for intensification of the conflict in each phase, or to reinforce pressures against intensification, were listed opposite each factor to which they are a partial or potential answer.
4. Fourth, the implications of these potential conflict controlling policy measures were assessed for a decision maker who may be faced with a similar conflict situation.

Factors-Measures Relationship

In the development of measures applicable to factors identified in each case, it should be emphasized that each measure applies to the one corresponding factor without consideration for any other factors or measures, and therefore without regard for policy consistency overall, or for the fact that one might counteract another at the same or different times. The sole basis for suggesting a measure is the belief that, if accomplished, it would fulfill the criterion of

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causing a reduction in the intensity of conflict resulting from that factor or cause a movement away from more intense phases. Because the only desired value or objective is the prevention of conflict outbreak and the control of conflict intensity, other possible policy objectives are ignored for purposes of this study. The reasons for this prescribed treatment have been best stated in the Design Study as:

"...by forcing ourselves to concentrate separately on single factors, and by identifying as large as possible a range and number of factors, we sought to neutralize the temptation to see the entire conflict as the product of a limited number of "causes," and all control as achievable through a small range of instruments. We also sought to avoid, at the other extreme, concentrating on events so unique to the individual situation as to have little relevance to conflict as a general phenomenon."¹

"...our over-all purpose was to develop as imaginative insight as possible into the potentials as well as the problems and dilemmas of controlling local conflicts. While some specific measures suggested may thus appear inapplicable or even bizarre in isolation, developing them in this manner was not wholly unrealistic. In reality goals often do conflict, steps taken to achieve one objective often do have undesired side consequences, and things that might have been right a generation ago often turn out to be generators of today's troubles."²

It should be further noted that it is difficult in many cases to maintain a rigid separation between factors and measures. Often an action cited as a measure in one phase, may become a factor tending to either promote or control hostilities in a later phase. For example, the bombing of rebel strongholds might be considered a control measure at one point and at a later point be a factor that tended to intensify the conflict by committing a large segment of the population against the government. This interchangeability between factors and measures must be kept in mind when reading the General Findings presented in Volume I.

¹Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., (ACDA/WEC-98, II), p. 94.

²ibid., p. 100.

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Arms Appendices

With regard to the arms appendices prepared for each of the cases, it was found difficult in those cases dealing with internal conflict and guerrilla warfare to obtain detailed reliable information on the weapons involved, particularly the numbers of weapons in the hands of insurgents. However, it was possible to gather sufficient data to draw what appear to be useful conclusions on the implications of weapons procurement and use in local conflict.

Procedure

The procedures used in preparation of this research report included both individual research and team analysis efforts. The first three sections of each case study were primarily prepared by a single author who conducted the basic research and supplied some of the notes for the arms appendices. The following individuals accomplished this work on the cases shown after their names:

Colonel Thomas L. Fisher, II - Philippines
Mr. Russell J. Bowen - Bolivia, Venezuela
Mr. Glenn M. Cooper - Iraq-Kurds, Kuwait-Iraq
Miss Priscilla A. Clapp - Cuba, Yemen
Miss Leidra A. Didell - Quemoy-Matsu, West Irian
Mr. Gene R. Harris - Algeria
Mr. Geoffrey Kemp - Lebanon
Dr. Richard J. Krickus - Dominican Republic
Mr. Lewis A. Frank - Guatemala

Additional research and writing assistance was provided by Mrs. Jacqueline White on Cuba and Venezuela, Mr. R. Lucas Fischer on Yemen and the Philippines, and Mr. Barton S. Whaley on Quemoy-Matsu. Drafts were then reviewed by area consultants, including Colonel Hartley F. Dame (Latin American cases), Mr. Nadav Safran (Middle East) and Dr. Lucian Pye (Far East). Cases were reviewed and critiqued by Miss Amelia C. Leiss, Deputy Director of the M. I. T. Arms Control Project and reviews of the economic factors in each case were prepared by Mr. Frank. Miss Clapp prepared additional material on the availability and uses of arms in these cases and wrote all of the arms appendices. She also served as Assistant Project Director and technical editor. All of this work was reviewed, edited, and amended by the Project Director at each stage. Finally

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the cases were read and suggestions made by our Senior Advisory Panel, consisting of Dean Edmund A. Gullion, former U.S. Ambassador to the Congo, Dr. Raymond Vernon, Professor of International Trade and Investment at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, and Mr. John H. Hoagland, Vice-President, Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.

In addition, we greatly appreciate the helpful advice of Mr. Curtin Winsor, as ACDA/International Relations Bureau Project Monitor, throughout the study period, and his review of the drafts, plus those of Mr. Edmund S. Finegold of the Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau and Miss Ruth Sivard of the Economics Bureau. Finally we could not have managed at all without the superlative work of Mrs. Carol A. Frue as secretary and the extensive typing assistance of Mrs. Shirley B. Nichols and Mrs. Evelyn Collura.

I am personally grateful for the generous support of all my colleagues who were involved in this effort.

Thomas L. Fisher, II
Manager, Strategic Policy Studies
Project Director

August 15, 1969

THE CONTROL OF LOCAL CONFLICT:
CASE STUDIES
ACDA/IR-154

THE PHILIPPINES-HUK CONFLICT (1946-1954)

Prepared for
THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Prepared by
Thomas L. Fisher, II

for
Browne and Shaw International Studies Division
BOLT BERANEK AND NEWMAN INC.
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THE PHILIPPINES-HUK CONFLICT (1946-1954)

I. IDENTIFICATION OF PHASESA. Background of the Conflict (Phase I)

1. The Historical Setting. Earliest records indicate that the Philippine Islands were settled and ruled primarily by the Malayan peoples, moving up the littoral and island chains of the South China Sea in the past 5000 years. Shortly before the arrival of Spanish explorers, Chinese and Japanese explorers ruled portions of the islands in the names of their homelands.¹ Ferdinand Magellan discovered the islands on March 16, 1521, and claimed them for Spain. He was killed in a battle with the natives on April 27, 1521 - the first recorded Caucasian casualty of Philippine conflict against "western imperialism".² Spanish adventurers following him colonized the islands, starting in Cebu in 1565 and spreading north to Manila (1576) and south to Mindanao (1596).³ This colonization was not without prolonged conflict and active hostilities, particularly on the part of the Mohammedan Moors of the southern islands and their brethren who conducted raids, which continued into the 19th century from the Sulu Archipelago and Borneo, not unlike the Viking raids of Anglo-Saxon times.⁴ The Spaniards rapidly conquered all the larger islands and established their administration and the conversion of the majority of natives to Christianity. A Chinese uprising and attempted capture of Manila, supported by pirates, was defeated in 1662. The English took it for a year (1762-3), but the Treaty of Paris restored it to Spain, and their rule continued without serious challenge until 1896, although there were some 14 minor uprisings of the natives against the Spanish.⁵

¹W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, Vol. I. (Cambridge, Riverside Press, 1928), p. 31.

²Ibid., p. 30.

³The Encyclopedia Americana, (1957) Vol. XXI, p. 759f.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 759g.

Newspapers in the local tongues began to spread liberal ideas in the second half of the 19th Century, and Jose Rizal emerged as leader of a reform movement.¹ Organized revolt under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo broke out in 1896, but was suppressed, and Rizal was executed on December 30, 1896. This caused a fresh outbreak in 1897, ended by a payment of 600,000 pesos to Aguinaldo and some of his followers to leave the islands.²

The Spanish-American war of 1898 followed, and the Spanish fleet was destroyed in Manila Bay by Admiral Dewey on May 1st. U.S. Forces were landed and Manila surrendered in August. The treaty of peace signed at Paris ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States for \$20,000,000.³ During the war, Aguinaldo had returned and renewed the insurrection. Disappointed in the expectation that the Americans would withdraw after the Spanish defeat, he kept up a desultory guerrilla warfare against American forces until his capture in 1901. On the understanding that the United States was establishing a government to prepare the inhabitants for self-rule, he swore allegiance to it and held his peace until the Japanese conquest in 1942.⁴

U.S. civil government under the Taft Commission took over from the military on July 4, 1901, and the five Commission members supervised Filipino officials and a General Assembly elected in 1907. Partial self-government was allowed to the Provinces, and municipalities were fully self-governing.⁵ Democratic institutions grew rapidly; legislative power was vested in a bi-cameral congress in 1916, and the Commission reduced to a single Governor General. A draft constitution for a Commonwealth of the Philippines was authorized by the McDuffie-Tydings Act of 1934 and

¹The Encyclopedia Americana, op. cit., p. 759g.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Forbes, op. cit., pp. 83-104.

⁵Ibid., p. 96, and The Encyclopedia Americana, op. cit., p. 759h.

approved in 1935. Manuel Quezon was elected first president under this constitution in 1935.¹ It provided for full Philippine independence after a ten year probationary period, during which the United States retained some responsibilities for external affairs and defense of the islands.² Realization of independence had to be postponed because of World War II, but became a reality on July 4, 1946.

2. Geographic and Demographic Factors.³ A total of some 7,100 islands comprise the Philippine Islands. (See map, Figure 1). Of these, 2,773 have received a name and the remaining 4,327 are unnamed.⁴ They range from 4 degrees to 21 degrees north latitude, and from 116 degrees to 126 degrees east longitude. This constitutes a distance of some 1,150 miles from north to south, and 682 miles from east to west. The southeast coast of Asia is 500 miles away.⁵ The total area of the Philippines is 115,758 square miles and the bulk of this is contained on eleven islands. More than 6,600 of the islands are less than one square mile in area.⁶ The topography consists of seasonally flooded swamps, irrigated rice lands, rolling grassy uplands, and mountain ranges.⁷ Ranges averaging 4,000 feet in height form a backbone through most of the islands. Mount Apo on Mindanao, at 9,610 feet, is the highest in

¹Forbes, op. cit., p. 544.

²The Encyclopedia Americana, op. cit., p. 759j.

³Two thirds of the first paragraph and nearly all of the second are taken with permission from Wyman J. Priester, Jr., The Huk Movement in the Philippines: Its Origin, Its Decline, and Its Revival, Maxwell AF Base, Ala., AWC Report No. 3481, April 1967).

⁴Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National Development. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1942, p. 28.

⁵Luman H. Long, ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1967, New York, Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1966, p. 647.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannon, Counter Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, p. 31.

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the islands, and is an active volcano.¹ The climate is generally hot and humid. Three-fifths of the surface of the islands is covered by subtropical evergreen forests.² The single most important feature of Philippine geography affecting the conflict was the fact that the Philippines form an archipelago, and are separated from the Chinese mainland by several hundred miles. Thus the nearest likely source of men, material, and bases was relatively inaccessible to the Huks, and the sea limited their mobility and in some cases, escape. The swamps and forested mountains that ring the rice-growing areas of Central Luzon, however, provided relatively safe hiding-places and base sites for Huk units.

Ninety per cent of the islands are uninhabited; two-thirds of the population lives on two islands -- Luzon and Mindanao. The population was estimated in 1966 at 32,600,000.³ Forty-three distinct ethnic groups, speaking eighty-seven languages and dialects, have been identified within the islands. A great majority of the people belong to the Malay racial group. Blends with Indonesian, Mongoloid, Chinese, Spanish, and American are evident.⁴ Although only 20 per cent of the people can speak it, the official national language is Pilipino (Tagalog). English and Spanish are also used in government and commerce. Some eighty-odd native dialects are spoken in various areas of the islands.⁵ The Philippine Republic is unique in that it has the only Christian majority in the Far East. An estimated eighty-three per cent of the population is Roman Catholic, with an additional ten per cent, Aglipayan -- a Filipino Catholic splinter group. Protestants, Moslems, and Buddhists are minority groups.⁶

¹ Josephine Budd Vaughan, The Land and People of the Philippines, New York, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1956, p. 3.

² Ibid., p. 4.

³ Robert De Roos, "The Philippines, Freedom's Pacific Frontier," National Geographic, Vol. 130, September 1966, p. 312.

⁴ Hayden, op. cit., p. 11.

⁵ De Roos, op. cit., p. 312.

⁶ Long, op. cit., p. 647.




Figure 1

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Both population and urbanization were rapidly growing problems, much as they are in many of the developing countries with warm climates. In spite of a drop caused by World War II, population increased as much as four per cent in some years of the next decade. Total numbers were, however, not the problem, but rather their distribution and use of resources.¹ In Manila, which is the one great urban center in the Philippines, the population passed 2,000,000 in 1950. This growth and the lack of adequate housing, partially the result of the war, brought with it all the social evils of the big city. This trend occurred in spite of a tendency on the part of older people to cling tenaciously to their land or homes, and of the strong family-centered traditions abetted by the Catholic Church. The social structure of the Philippines and its problems were still predominantly rural in the post-war decade.²

3. The Economy. The Philippine Islands have been exceptionally blessed with both abundant natural resources and a climate producing luxuriant plant growth. On the other hand the enervating heat and humidity, over a great portion, and perhaps the ease of obtaining food from both land and sea, had combined with historical and demographic factors to restrain the efficiency of its economy.

The Philippine economy had always been and still was basically agricultural. In 1948, about 90% of the population derived its livelihood directly or indirectly from agriculture, and 70% did so directly. Despite this only about half the arable land was actually cultivated.³ Rice, corn, and camotes were the chief subsistence crops; copra, sugar, hemp, fruits, minerals, and forest products were the leading extractive export products. The huge depletion of live stock and poultry during the war was a continuing handicap for many years.⁴

¹ Marshal C. Balfour and associates, Public Health and Demography in the Far East (New York, The Rockefeller Foundation, 1950), p. 106.

² President's Action Committee on Social Amelioration, Philippine Social Trends (Manila, 1950).

³ Gerald D. Berreman, "The Philippines, A Survey of Social, Economic, and Political Conditions," (ICA) Data Paper No. 19, Southeast Asia Program, (Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University, 1956), p. 26.

⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

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The principal feature of this agricultural economy, and the one generally blamed for most of its troubles, is the share tenant system, resulting from the accretion of most of the best land into estates in the hands of a few rich (sometimes absentee) landlords, or caciques. This system is the legacy of the feudalistic system of the Spanish occupation, common to many areas of their former empire. It is gradually breaking down, but not nearly fast enough to suit anyone but the landlords. It remains particularly strong in the central provinces of Luzon to the north of Manila.¹ The tenant farmer (tao) is forced into ever increasing debt servitude to his landlord, or escaping this, to the merchant (generally Chinese) who buys his crop and sells him his necessities. Inefficient agricultural, marketing, storage, and transport methods all add to his difficulties. Techniques are primitive and yields are low.

By 1956, some farmers' cooperatives and credit unions were started, but they were woefully insufficient even for those who owned their own farms (about 50 per cent), as were also the government funds supporting agricultural extension work and assistance and Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration efforts. This fact reflects the disproportionate influence of large landowners in the government.² Cooperative effort is something the Filipino understands, as it is a central feature of most village, or barrio, life; but he had yet to apply it widely to his financial affairs, even though it was urged as the one way, short of violence, to escape the usurious hold upon him.³

Even those Filipinos employed in industry, government, and services lived under a system of strong paternalistic controls, based generally on either family relationship or the ever-present oriental custom of "squeeze" or bribery, even though it was ever-so-genteelly disguised as "gifts". The insufficiency of their wages and standard of living was emphasized and exaggerated by the exceptionally high level

¹ Berreman, op. cit., p. 27.

² Ibid., p. 28.

³ Ibid., p. 29.

of popular awareness of the American way of life.¹

Philippine resources and industries have great potential but relatively little development; the extraction of products of the sea being one good example.² Imports greatly exceeded exports, by a factor over 2 to 1 in 1949. As a result of the favored position of their trade with the United States, partially exempt from normal tariff rates on a diminishing scale until 1974, and of the historic development of their ties with the United States, the U.S. share of their foreign trade was 71.5% in 1953.³

This unfavorable balance was partially offset by U.S. assistance and the high level of U.S. investment in the Philippines. \$620,000,000 was provided outright, over a period of five years, under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946.⁴ Total U.S. capital investment in the Philippines had grown from about \$218 million in 1940 to \$350 million in 1954.⁵ A great part of the asset value of tangible property had been lost during the war, so that investors in effect started afresh in 1945. Most of this flow of capital went for the rehabilitation of war damage, so that by 1950 the aggregate physical production had only climbed back to approximately the level it was at in 1937.⁶ By 1953, however, it had risen above this level an additional 80%, providing a very significant increase in the national product.⁷ Inflation, rising to crisis proportions in 1949, had declined after the imposition of exchange and import controls in 1950, and the cost of living price index, which in 1949 was 334 per cent of its level

¹ Berreman, op. cit., p. 31.

² Ibid., p. 33.

³ Ibid., p. 36.

⁴ The Encyclopedia Americana, op. cit., p. 759c.

⁵ U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Investment in the Philippines—Conditions and Outlook for United States Investors, (Washington, D. C., G. P. O., Feb. 1955), p. 7.

⁶ Frank H. Golay, The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development, (Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 102-3.

⁷ U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, op. cit., p. 16.

at the beginning of the war, remained at the same level through 1953.¹

In sum, the Philippine economy was a major factor - probably the leading factor - in the developments in internal conflict in the post-war decade. It lay in ruins at the beginning of the period, and the artificial stimuli of unusual infusions of outside income from the United States, in the form of reparations, did little to improve the lot of the poor tao or laborer in the first five years. Instead they provided the incentive to banditry, black marketing, bribery, and, at the least, over-inflated claims. The money, in the form of property damage or back-pay claims and surplus deals went to those who already had wealth or position, and could afford a lawyer. Land tenure and fair crop sharing issues were forgotten or laid aside by the politicians in the scramble, and it was only after the government establishment came to the brink of disaster in 1949 that the needs of the common man began to receive some of the attention they required to regain stability. Recovery then was rapid, and confidence in the established social system grew along with interest in and real income to the poor during the second five year period.

4. The Legacy of World War II. The war left more than an economy in ruins. It left the worst physical devastation found in any other country except perhaps Poland. And it left a generation accustomed to Japanese cruelty, oppression, trickery, and seeking redress with a gun whenever possible, without concern for the "innocent bystander" who had to fend for himself. And finally it left intact organizations accustomed to the comradeship and discipline of the camp and the defile, and knowing how to use the peasant mass for support and intelligence. To make things easier for those who put these skills to illegal use, it left massive depots full of military equipment, readily available from black marketeers; and, ultimately, it placed arms in the hands of practically all who wanted them. To make problems more difficult for the government, it left deep rifts between those who had allegedly collaborated with the Japanese and those who had fought on the side of the Americans. Phase II of the Philippine-Huk conflict - the preparation of the military option - can be considered as starting with the organization of the Huk forces in 1942.

¹ Ibid., p. 17, and Golay, op. cit., p. 104, Table 17.

A RAND Memorandum¹ summarizes the growth of the ideological content of the postwar conflict as follows:

"Communist influence came into the Philippines in the 1930's, but generated no significant support until the outbreak of World War II. Another movement paralleled Communist infiltration -- the formation of the Socialist Party as an outgrowth of tenant farmer grievance against the landlords. With the outbreak of World War II, these two parties consolidated their guerrilla efforts. When inaugurated on July 4, 1946, the young Philippine Republic inherited tremendous rehabilitation and reconstruction problems. The motivation for post-war guerrilla activities in Central Luzon was pre-war social and economic restlessness and discontent. The peasants in Central Luzon had been subjected to injustices and inequities and to feudal conditions, and they were attracted to an ideology that promised them a better way of life."

Philippine history is rich in insurgency, but until Magsaysay in 1950, Filipinos had no experience in fighting effectively as counterinsurgents, despite considerable minor conflict between guerrilla bands during the war, which probably taught Magsaysay, who had been a guerrilla officer, some of the lessons he put to good use later.

"Early revolts had no direct connection with the Huks, but they accustomed the people to the practice of revolt and fanned the flame of agrarian unrest."²

The nom-de-guerre "Huk" is a contraction of "Hukbalahap," the acronym of one of the largest guerrilla organizations, which was organized during the war to fight the Japanese and to attempt to seize enough power to assure its members of better conditions and a place in the political sun after the Japanese surrender. The full name in Tagalog was Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, meaning in English, "Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army". It was organized on March 29, 1942, shortly

¹ RAND Corp., "A Brief of the Philippine HUK Campaign" (RM-3652-PR, Santa Monica, Calif., July 1963), p. 1.

² Priester, op. cit., p. 10.

before Corregidor fell, by a group of leaders of the "United Front," which was the political product of the marriage of convenience of the prewar Communist and Socialist Parties. It had a certain patriotic aura at first and some degree of approval from U.S. military representatives who contacted it at various times during the war. This veil of legitimacy, however, soon fell away when it proved itself to be interested only in forwarding Communist aims and, with the exception of one squadron, failed to cooperate with U.S.-approved guerrillas and later with returning U.S. forces.

It was founded by a group representing the interests of the Socialist National Union of Peasants, from the "rice bowl" of Pampanga Province, and another group who were the intellectuals and labor leaders of the Communist party (CPPI) in Manila. This dichotomy was to endure right up to the present time, and become a source of both strength and weakness. The Huk army was commanded by Luis Taruc as military commissar with Casto Alejandrino as vice-chief. Other leading figures in the early period were Mariano Balgos, a labor leader; Juan Feleo, CPPI organizer; Vicente Lava, a communist intellectual, and Pedro Abad Santos, a socialist.² The federation of the two parties resulted in its complete domination by Soviet-oriented Communists.³ The Huks gathered arms from many sources, mainly those abandoned or hidden by the U.S. Army in Bataan and others captured from the Japanese, confiscated from civilians, or made by Filipino blacksmiths.⁴ At war-time maximum in early 1945 their strength was estimated at over 20,000 armed "regulars" and up to 50,000 "reserves" or un-armed supporters.⁵ Of the estimated 25,000 persons they killed in

¹ Priester, op. cit., p. 10.

² Ibid., p. 11.

³ George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership, (New York, Praeger, 1964) p. 95.

⁴ Priester, op. cit., p. 11.

⁵ Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 293.

the four years of the war, only 5,000 are known to have been Japanese: the rest were Filipinos who opposed them.¹

Upon the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, the Huks demanded official recognition as patriotic nationalists, and backpay as guerrillas. They were denied both, except for a few cases, as they had not cooperated with U.S. or Philippine authorities: and their appeal to nationalism fell flat in the light of the already promised Philippine independence.² Huk political action had no significant electoral following except in central Luzon, since it had been unable, or neglected, to organize on other islands. It further alienated itself from authorities in 1945 by taking local government into its own hands in its stronghold in the central "rice bowl", appointing its own officials who ruled by terroristic methods. These activities led to the arrest and jailing of Taruc and Alejandrino by U.S. military authorities.³

CPPI authorities therefore determined upon a policy of moderation for the time being, and made common cause with the Osmena wing of the Nacionalista Party, which was strongly anti-collaborationist. The Huks organized a popular front party, the Democratic Alliance, to run an independent slate of candidates in some provinces for the upcoming national elections in April 1946.⁴ Taruc had been released from jail in September and ran for Congress from Pampanga, winning handily. The Democratic Alliance won only a total of six seats, however.⁵ Many of the Huk units, although ordered disbanded, had hidden their arms rather than turn them in, and maintained their contact with each other. Despite offers and counter-offers of negotiation with the government, relations deteriorated steadily to a state of de facto civil war by the time of formal Philippine independence on July 4, 1946.⁶

¹Taylor, op. cit., p. 122.

²McLane, op. cit., p. 293.

³Ibid., p. 296.

⁴Ibid., p. 297.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 298.

There were other legacies of the war, some already partially noted, that set the stage for the developing conflict and drew various actors into involvement.

The Philippine economy functioned at very low levels during 1945-46. During 1946 physical production was estimated to be less than 40 per cent of production in 1937. The index of manufacturing production was estimated at 21 per cent and of mining at 2 per cent. In agriculture, which experienced more substantial recovery, 1946 output was estimated at 58 per cent of that of 1937.¹

Hence unemployment was rife, and many former agricultural areas had not yet been returned to production either for lack of farmers or of farm animals; the carabao or water buffalo being essential to plowing. Many discharged Filipino soldiers or guerrillas were waiting for their back-pay and had little to do to keep them out of trouble. Thievery and armed robbery grew by leaps and bounds; U.S. Army "jeeps", munitions, and other surplus or personal property being favorite objectives.²

Public education did not receive any serious attention for years. The questions of war damage claims and the handling of veterans benefits and surplus property provided limitless opportunities for misrepresentation and graft on a vast scale.³ Taylor says, "Part of the purpose of the payment of war damage claims was to restore former American businesses in the Philippines to their pre-war status".⁴ At the same time, Americans and their favored Filipino trading partners benefitted by the U.S.-Philippine Trade Act of 1946, urged on the new republic by the U.S. Congress, which gave U.S. citizens parity with Filipinos in development of resources and operation of utilities and provided free convertibility and transfer of funds to the United States. It established preferential tariff scales for their trade until 1974.⁵ Another factor was the failure to provide for the

¹ Golay, op. cit., p. 67.

² Based on personal experience and observations of the author.

³ Taylor, op. cit., p. 120.

⁴ Ibid., p. 115.

⁵ Milton W. Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic, (Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 1965), p. 12.

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


Fig. 2 — "Huklandia" — 1946

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collection of adequate taxes in the Philippines to provide for even basic expenditures such as pay of the Army and police, let alone badly needed expanded social welfare and agricultural programs. For example, in fiscal year 1945-46, tax revenues were only \$53 million, of which almost one third came from taxes on cigarettes! (As compared with \$100 million in 1940.)¹ This fiscal irresponsibility regarding both tax collection and foreign exchange position persisted until late 1949, and was a considerable factor in failing to meet the legitimate aspirations of the tenant farmers, who therefore turned to support of the Huks. All this led to growing discontent among the poor and dissatisfaction with government handling of the problems. As a result a considerable portion of the populace of central Luzon was ready to resort to armed force for redress of their grievances, and an even greater proportion secretly sympathized and assisted or at least took no counter-action.

B. Phase III - Hostilities

Significant hostilities began roughly in May 1946, after the Philippine national election and the victory of Manuel Roxas and his Liberal Party. Its first sub-phase, A, during which the Huks were in the ascendancy, lasted until March 1950 when the Army was charged with responsibility for internal security by President Quirino, followed by appointment of Magsaysay as new Secretary of National Defense with wide authority to lead the war against the Huks. This started sub-phase B, which continued until the effective end of hostilities and the suppression of the Huks. May 1954 will be considered for the purposes of this study as the end of sub-phase B and of Phase III, since the surrender of the Huk military commander, Luis Taruc, at that time, symbolized effectively the government's victory. The few Huk remnants that still existed after that did not represent an effective military force or one capable of a significant political impact.

¹Golay, op. cit., p. 69.

1. Phase IIIA: May 1946 - March 1950. The victory of Roxas in the April 1946 elections and the defeat of Sergio Osmena and his Nationalists, allied with the Communist front Democratic Alliance, blocked the moderate strategy the Huks had followed since the end of the war.¹ The new Liberal Party won the Presidency, with nearly three-quarters of the seats in the House of Representatives, and a majority of the Senate. While the Democratic Alliance won six seats in the House, all from Central Luzon; Taruc and Jesus Lava, two of the winners, were barred from taking their seats by legal barriers put up by the new Roxas government. They were accused of using terrorism to win the election. The electoral defeat and the denial of their seats to Taruc and Lava "marked the end of serious Communist efforts toward collaboration with the parliamentary regime."² Roxas had made a campaign promise to restore order in Central Luzon in 60 days after the election.³ Leaders of the Huk military organization -- the Hukbalahap proper -- and rural political cadres began to move back to Central Luzon, where Huk strength remained centered.⁴ The Huk GHQ and the Huk squadrons were reactivated in May 1946.⁵ At the same time President Roxas embarked upon an attempt to settle the Huk question by force, using the Military Police Command (under the Department of the Interior) with the assistance of civilian armed units called 'civil guards' in the pay of wealthy landowners and politicians.

¹ McLane, op. cit., pp. 296-7.

² Ibid., p. 298.

³ Hernando J. Abaya, The Untold Philippine Story, (Quezon City, P.I. Malaya Books, Inc. 1967).

⁴ McLane, op. cit., p. 298.

⁵ Robert R. Smith, The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economic, Political, and Factors, (CC Mil. Hist., DA, Washington, D.C. 1963).

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There was sporadic but relatively heavy fighting throughout June and July, reported in the New York Times to have involved hundreds on each side.¹ When little progress had been made by late July, Roxas turned to a program of conciliation. He announced an ambitious program of social reform, including land reform, increased credit to small farmers, resettlement projects, limits of landlord's crop share, agricultural research, and veterans' benefits. The program, if passed, would have been far in excess of the government's financial resources, and it is doubtful that Roxas would have been able to carry it out, or that he even intended to make the program more than a propaganda device to weaken Huk support.² He proposed a truce during which Huks would be able to surrender their weapons without penalty, and engaged in desultory correspondence and negotiation with Taruc on this proposal.

The so-called "minority" portion of the Philippine Communist Politburo, those involved with the Hukbalahap and the organizational effort in the rural areas, was inclined to a militant course. The "majority" portion, (largely centered around urban-based Communists whose entry into the party stemmed from the labor or student branches),³ favored trying to pacify Roxas by a partial surrender of arms. While the Hukbalahap in the field tended to ignore the official leadership of the party, up to May 1948 the majority portion of the Politburo continued to be very reluctant to commit the party to violence and to the abolition of private property.⁴ Roxas in turn was impeded in his efforts at conciliation by the attitudes of the military and provincial governors, who remained committed to a solution by the immediate use of force.⁵

¹New York Times, July 14, 1946, p. 14.

²Smith, op. cit., p. 68.

³McLane, op. cit., p. 422.

⁴Ibid., pp. 298-9.

⁵Smith, op. cit., pp. 68-9; Abaya, op. cit., pp. 32-3.

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The Huk problem was not occupying the bulk of the government's attention. Besides the continuing problems of restoring wartime physical and economic damage, the Roxas administration was faced with a number of serious issues in U.S.-Philippine relations and with the Philippine problems that grew out of them. These included U.S.-Philippine negotiations on surplus property, military bases, military assistance, and trade agreements. The U.S.-Philippine Trade Act of 1946, involving parity rights of Americans and American enterprises with Filipinos in the Philippines, which necessitated a constitutional amendment, caused particularly difficult negotiation both with the U.S. and with the Philippine Congress.¹ Thus the Huk problem was only one of many facing the Roxas administration.

In the military realm, the Philippine government had only a limited anti-Huk capability. The Philippine Army, after postwar demobilization, was mostly composed of administrative, training, and supply formations with only two combat battalions.² The Philippine Air Force in 1946 was equipped only with C-47's and L-4 and L-5 observation planes.³ The Philippine Military Police Command, (MPC), was formed from remnants of the old Philippine Constabulary and some 12,000 Army personnel, led by regular army officers assigned to the police. Four MPC field commands, each corresponding to one of the four provinces in Central Luzon where the Huks had important strength (see map, Figure 2), had a total strength of 3,000 officers and men. The MPC maximum total strength in the whole country was 20,000 men.⁴ The Huk armed force in this area was about 9,000.⁵ Therefore the fighting in late April and May of 1946 against the re-assembled Huk forces was rather less than successful.

¹ Meyer, op. cit., p. 48.

² Boyd T. Bashore, "Dual Strategy for Limited War" in Franklin M. Osanka, Ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare, (New York, The Free Press, 1962), p. 196.

³ RAND Corp., Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Philippine - Huk Campaign, RM-3652-PR, July 1963, p. 34.

⁴ Carlos P. Romulo, Crusade in Asia: Philippine Victory, (New York, The John Day Co., 1955), p. 100; Meyer, op. cit., p. 181.

⁵ RAND Corp., Symposium..., op. cit., p. 10.

Yet since the Philippine counter-guerrilla forces were far from being able to change that result, the half-hearted attempts of the summer of 1946 to reach a negotiated solution appeared to be wise, if not palatable. On the other hand, Roxas did not have the political backing nor did the Philippines have the economic ability to make the kind of thorough-going concessions and reforms the Huks were demanding. The state of the Philippine economy was severely strained, and Roxas was at that point involved in negotiations with the United States. Thus the half-heartedness of the summer's proposals and the resumption of heavy fighting after the expiration of the truce period at the end of August (though it had never entirely stopped) seem more plausible, especially since President Truman had signed a military assistance act on June 26, 1946 that offered military training and equipment to the Philippines.¹

While the actual assistance agreement was not signed until March 1947, it was retroactive to the date of independence, July 4, 1946. In the interim, \$137 million dollars of surplus military equipment had been transferred from United States hands to the Philippines.² It is unclear whether training activities went on in the interim between independence and the signing of the military assistance agreement, but its retroactivity suggests they may have been. The U.S. Congress voted \$19,750,000 for fiscal year 1947 military assistance.³ Also, on March 14, 1947, a U.S. Military Bases Agreement was signed, effective for ninety-nine years, granting the United States the right to use twenty-three separate sites in the Philippines, mostly located well away from urban areas.⁴

After August 1946 a new round of government offensives began. The Military Police Command and the civil guards often used torture and indiscriminate force to root Huks out of the barrios, while at the same time large numbers of forces were kept static in defensive positions. The troops were ill-led and ill-fed, depending on locally-gathered food, often commandeered, instead of on a regular supply system. The influence of

¹ Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 36-7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

local and provincial politicians inhibited the mounting of any concerted operations or the use of consistent procedures,¹ and a majority had been part of the wartime constabulary under the collaborationist government.²

The Huk response was to use small hit and run raids and ambushes in which the Military Police Command suffered badly. The most important result of these was that MPC morale, already low, slipped even further, while Huk morale, and Huk prestige among the peasants, went up. Government officials became unwilling to work, or at least to spend nights, at rural posts.³ At the same time, rural political agitators were at work, using economic grievances, government corruption, MPC brutality, and Huk victories as arguments, and organizing peasants into the National Peasants Union (PKM). Both military and political expansion of the Huk movement went on, and Huk influence spread from the original four provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija (collectively called "Huklandia") into Bataan and Zambales.⁴ (See map, Figure 2).

In December 1946 the pace of hostilities slowed because both sides were in need of rest and resupply.⁵ The government forces were getting U.S. equipment by then, and some retraining was required. In addition some of the programs envisaged under Roxas' agrarian reform plan were now in small-scale operation, and time was needed for them to have any effect. Government rest, resupply, and retraining were apparently the main motives, however, because in March 1947 a major government offensive to capture the Huk headquarters on the slopes of Mount Arayat in Pampanga Province took place. It reportedly caught the Huks by surprise, and many of the Huk lower echelon cadres and troops were killed or captured, but the leadership escaped.⁶ After this attempt at a quick resolution by force, government operations again deescalated. There were some government-Huk political contacts, but no substantial results.

¹RAND Corp., Symposium..., op. cit., pp. 14-15.

²Abaya, op. cit., p. 32.

³RAND Corp., Symposium..., op. cit., p. 16.

⁴Smith, op. cit., p. 71.

⁵Ibid., p. 73.

⁶Ibid., pp. 73-4.

By the end of March 1947 the Philippines had signed agreements with the U. S. for military assistance and for U. S. military bases, putting both these aspects of the U. S. presence on a regular legal basis. By then, too, the process of economic recovery from the war was beginning to show some results, as production rose and the cost of living went down. In 1947 national income had risen one-quarter over that of 1946, per capita income about 20%, while the cost of living had sunk 25%. On the other hand, the Philippines still suffered from some crippling economic and social-economic problems. The amount of tenant-farmed land had actually increased as a percentage of the whole, compared to 1939 figures, while the size of tenant farms had decreased.¹ Therefore, it seems highly likely that the lot of tenant farmers had not improved.

During the rest of 1947 and into 1948 anti-Huk operations continued at a fairly low and certainly ineffective level, while the Huks apparently continued to use a strategy of military defense -- ambushing small MPC units, raiding police stations, and murdering government officials and landowners, but not attempting large-scale operations -- and continuing to spread their political organization, even into the Visayan Islands. The government had no effective counter for this. Although some programs for rural education and agricultural credit had been set up, they were under-financed to the point of nullity; and although the tenant's share of his crop was supposed to be up to 70%, enforcement was ineffective.²

In March of 1948 the Huks and the PKM were finally declared to be illegal organizations by President Roxas. At the same time he announced that an intensified fight against the Huks would be undertaken.³ Roxas' death in April, however, delayed another round of major fighting. Roxas' successor, Vice-President Elpidio Quirino, acted quickly to attempt further negotiations. Taruc was contacted on May 5 by Quirino's brother, proposing an amnesty in return for which the Huks should surrender their arms; in addition, the MPC forces in Central Luzon would be removed.⁴

¹ Golay, op. cit., Table 47, p. 271.

² Smith, op. cit., p. 68.

³ New York Times, March 7, 1948, p. 25.

⁴ New York Times, May 14, 1948, p. 5.

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Further negotiations were in progress when the May 1948 Philippine Communist Party conference was convened. The city-based "majority" faction changed its earlier policy and new leadership accepted the basic formulation that "the main form of struggle is the armed struggle." There was no agreement, however, on whether the movement should now move to an actual attempt to overthrow the government, as opposed to the existing attempt to accomplish reforms by the use of force.¹

The Philippine Communist Central Committee reached no decision in the May conference on the negotiations with Quirino, and the military leadership, led by the Lava brothers and by Taruc, was free to follow its own course. Taruc went to Manila in June to conclude the terms of an amnesty to include the surrender of arms by the Huks. An amnesty was declared on June 21. He regained with back pay the seat in Congress that the Roxas government had denied him in 1946. The surrender of arms was scheduled originally to take place by July 15, though the deadline was twice extended. But reportedly less than 190 Huks gave up their weapons.² On August 29, Taruc returned to the jungle, after collecting his back pay, and charging bad faith because the government failed to disarm civil guards.

The motives behind this Huk behavior are unclear. One possibility is that the whole episode was a tactical maneuver designed to probe the intentions of the new Quirino government. Another, not necessarily contradictory possibility was that in spite of the change of policy in May, continuing factional disputes made the movement too disunited to embark on so extreme a course as armed overthrow of the government. Jose Lava reported that two members of the "majority" faction, after losing a vote at the May conference, attempted to set up their own Politburo, and succeeded in getting considerable rank-and-file support among party members in Manila and in the Congress of Labor Organizations. This intra-party dispute may well have made the new leadership unwilling to abruptly refuse the Quirino overtures.³

¹ McLane, *op. cit.*, pp. 418-20.

² *New York Times*, August 8, 1948, p. 24.

³ McLane, *op. cit.*, pp. 421-2.

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Not only were Huk motives in negotiating and accepting the amnesty mixed, but Quirino was apparently unable to supply the genuine and believable change in rural conditions and government that might possibly have satisfied the Huk leadership, but more likely have influenced numbers of Huk followers and sympathizers. Though Quirino may not have expected full compliance with the provision for the surrender of weapons, and though he promised agrarian reforms, the opposition of the landed and political elite did not allow him sufficient political power to promise plausibly, or to begin to perform them.¹ Quirino's own intentions are unclear, but moot: whether or not he wished reforms, he was not the personality, and had not the power, to produce them.

The collapse of the truce led the government to return to military measures. Immediately the government began a series of new attacks and a new wave of mostly ineffective screening operations by the MPC in Huklandia.² By then, the government forces were operating with air support, having received F-51's and trainers with some combat support capability in 1947.³ In addition, light observation aircraft were used for reconnaissance, alone and in conjunction with ground operations.

The Communist leadership was now nearing the point of an open call for overthrow of the government,⁴ though one more attempt at influencing electoral politics was to come. In any case, however, the Huk forces were not yet ready for large military operations, and the political and military support base needed to be expanded.

Some encouragement was given to the hard-core Huks by Communist success in China.⁵ But probably more important was the increasing corruption and inefficiency of the Quirino government. Appointments and assignments of constabulary officers continued to be dominated by favoritism. Forces continued to be tied down in static defense roles,

¹Abaya, op. cit., pp. 36-7.

²Smith, op. cit., pp. 77-8.

³RAND Corp., Symposium..., op. cit., p. 34.

⁴Smith, op. cit., p. 79.

⁵Ibid., p. 80.

both because of low force morale and efficiency and because of the demands of politically important landowners for protection. Political resistance prevented any of Quirino's proposed reforms from being put effectively into practice.¹ And the economic lot of the peasants continued to fail to improve; agricultural production in 1948-9 was only 93% of the prewar level, though the agricultural working force was at prewar levels or even higher.² By this time Huk organizers were moving out of the Central Luzon core into Southern Luzon and the Visayas.³

One incident that badly damaged the Huks, however, was the killing in an ambush of the widow and daughter of the late President Quezon. While quite possibly accidental -- it was a roadside ambush of a car carrying the Quezons -- it certainly damaged the Huks' reputation.⁴

The approaching presidential elections of November 1949 delayed an all-out commitment to a revolutionary overthrow of the government. President Quirino was running against the Nationalist candidate Jose Laurel, who had been the occupation President under the Japanese. The Philippine Communists decided early in 1949 to support Laurel, swallowing his collaborationist ties for the sake of his anti-Americanism. Jose Lava has claimed that Laurel had given early pledges to Huk representatives that he would campaign on a platform of anti-imperialism and agrarian reform. As the campaign went on, however, Laurel rejected Communist and Huk support, made Liberal corruption the main issue, and mostly ignored the question of relations with the U.S. However, the Communists continued to give him support.⁵

¹Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 82ff.

²Golay, *op. cit.*, Tables 4 & 5, pp. 39, 10.

³William J. Pomeroy, The Forest: A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines, (New York, International Publishers, 1963), p. 42.

⁴RAND Corp., Symposium..., *op. cit.*, p. 21. The incident recalls the ambush and killing of the British Commissioner in Malaya under similar circumstances and with similar results in 1949.

⁵McLane, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

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The campaign was marked by serious irregularities, including the use of organized violence, on both sides. The Liberals though, perhaps because they were in control of the government and its financial resources, outdid their rivals and waged a campaign that was exceptionally rough even by Philippine standards. The game, or rather profession, of politics was always a major determinant of the course of events in the Philippines, as it is usually a synthesis of all other factors. Two views of that conflict environment are presented by George Taylor, first:

Politics is a major industry for the Filipinos; it is a way of life. Politics is the main route to power, which, in turn, is the main route to wealth. Power is as important to the making of money as it is to the keeping. Those who have political power can evade payment of taxes and customs dues, block investigations, break competitors, and ruin political opponents. More money can be made in a shorter time with the aid of political influence than by any other means--this is one reason for the landlord's neglect of agricultural improvement and avoidance of the risks of the entrepreneur.

The Filipino thinks of political parties as large impersonal machines to which he has little or no loyalty; he tends to relate himself to a person, rather than to a principle or an institution. The viable political groups therefore tend to be small personal machines based on kinship, favors, and the relationships between leader and followers. The power of the local boss is based partly on economic influence and the immobility of labor, partly on the control of information and of access to the outside world.¹

The second view (below) is an often quoted Philippine reaction to much of the expressed or implied American criticism of Philippine politics, written for the Manila Chronicle in October 1950 by the President's private secretary, (although responsibility was later disowned by Quirino).

What is not widely understood is that Philippine "bankruptcy" and "corruption" have an intimate relation to American example in racketeering and to the insidious inspiration provided by conspicuous consumption otherwise known as the so-called American standard of living. It still remains to be generally appreciated that, in the matter of graft and corruption, Filipinos are mere pikers compared to their more accomplished and eminently successful mentors who had had, and still have, a vast continent in which to base their operations. The Filipinos,

¹Taylor, op. cit., p. 157.

there is no question, are inefficient all right - even in their grafting - due, no doubt, to simple lack of sufficient experience. With more time and greater chances, they will yet show they can equal, or even surpass, the stink familiar and now taken for granted in Washington and such very proper, exemplary centers of power, prosperity and culture.¹

The narrow Liberal victory, amid evidence of gross electoral fraud, at once further discredited the Quirino regime and pushed the Communist leadership to the point of an open call for forceful overthrow of the government.² The crucial decisions, according to Taruc's account, were taken at a meeting of the Politburo and some other leaders of the party at Huk headquarters in the Sierra Madre mountains, December 26, 1949-January 18, 1950.³ The strong Marxist leaders agreed that a revolutionary situation existed in the Philippines that would culminate in a revolutionary crisis by 1951, and decreed that the party and the Huks spend the next two years preparing an armed struggle to achieve such a seizure. The political objectives and program of the movement were no longer claimed publicly to be merely reformist, but were admitted openly to be similar to Mao's Chinese "New People's Democracy." The Communist leadership of the movement was now to be publicized and projected at every opportunity, and the political allies the Huks had made through the Democratic Alliance of 1946 and with the Nationalists were to be cast off as "traitors to the people." The Huk army was renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) -- "People's Army of Liberation." Finally, a strict military discipline was imposed not only over the party and the HMB but over all the front organizations and peasant groups controlled by the party.⁴

In addition, the party increased its administrative control over the Huk army. The party secretariat now was given complete power over the army, and the general secretary, Jose Lava, in effect was the real commander, while Taruc was apparently demoted, being assigned as

¹Taylor, op. cit., p. 140.

²Smith, op. cit., pp. 81-85.

³Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader, (Washington: Praeger, 1967), p. 68ff.

⁴Ibid., p. 73ff.

Politburo Supervisor in one of the regional committees.¹ The party leadership, perhaps belatedly being drawn to the two-camp doctrine of Zhdanov in 1947 and the Calcutta Conferences of 1948, was cutting itself off from struggle within the framework of Philippine politics, freeing itself of alliances with less militant groups, and committing itself to an open struggle for ultimate ends.

After the election, both government corruption and Huk successes increased sharply.² The Huks were gathering in battalion-sized camps and raiding in groups numbering over 500 men, to the extent that they began to present a lucrative target to the Philippine Air Force which was occasionally called in in time to catch them in the open.³ U.S. civil and military missions in the Philippines were urging reforms and intelligent action, but the government was not responding. In particular, JUSMAG, (the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group), tried to get a reorganization and reform of the armed forces brought about, but no response was made. Finally, the Secretary of Defense, Ruperto Kangleon, resigned in protest against Quirino's inaction.⁴

The Communist party and the Huk army, committed to revolution, became increasingly aggressive in their attacks, raiding larger targets and closer to Manila. While the HMB at the end of 1949 numbered about 15,000 armed men, the Philippine Army had only 17,000 and the Constabulary 12,000.⁵ During the new year the Huk raids rose in strength to achieve the temporary capture of two provincial capitals in Central Luzon.

2. Phase IIB: March 1950 - May 1954. Finally, however, the Huk successes elicited some response on the part of both the Quirino administration and other political figures. At the end of February 1950 Quirino proposed moving the task of dealing with the Huks from the MPC, under the Ministry of the Interior, to the Army, under the Ministry of Defense. This amounted

¹Taruc, op. cit., p. 75ff.

²Smith, op. cit., p. 84.

³New York Times, April 13, 1950, p. 14 and April 15, 1950, p. 7.

⁴Smith, op. cit., p. 86.

⁵RAND Corp., Symposium..., op. cit., p. 17; Smith, op. cit., cites Huk armed strength at 12,000 at this time, p. 98.

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to a government admission that the Huks now posed a serious threat to Philippine security.¹ By executive order, 7 battalions (3,000 men) were sent back to the Army as part of a gradual withdrawal of Army strength from the MPC. The Army was then to be reorganized into mobile units. In March, the MPC was formally merged into the Army by executive order.² This produced a unified force of about 27,000, of whom 7,000 former MPC men were relegated to police duties.³

The Army wasted little time in moving to the attack and pressed the Huks hard during the next six months. Although little credit is given them in most sources until after Magsaysay became Secretary of Defense, a perusal of accounts in the New York Times and Philippine Armed Forces Intelligence Estimates quoted by Barton⁴ show that the Huks lost heavily during this period and were driven out of a number of their long time strongholds by Philippine Army operations. The Philippine Air Force also came into full use and began to account for numbers of Huk dead.⁵ Air Force Liaison officers were attached directly to each Arm Battalion Combat Team (BCT) and L-5 spotter aircraft were equipped to call in armed fighters and trainers.⁶ Fragmentation bombs, up to 100 pounders, were found to be most effective. The Air Force also did a great deal of photo reconnaissance and combat cargo, resupply and medical evacuation work.⁷ For the first time sustained coordinated operations of adequate

¹ New York Times, March 5, 1950, p. 24.

² Golay, op. cit., p. 82; New York Times, March 31, 1950, p. 4.

³ Smith, op. cit., p. 101.

⁴ Fred H. Barton, Salient Operational Aspects of Paramilitary Warfare in Three Asian Areas, ORO (Chevy Chase, Md., The Johns Hopkins University, April 9, 1953), pp. 54-55.

⁵ New York Times, June 3, 1950, p. 4.

⁶ RAND Corp., Symposium..., op. cit., pp. 39-49.

⁷ Tomas C. Tirona (Lt Col, PAF), "The Philippine Anti-Communist Campaign" in Air University Quarterly Review, Maxwell AF Base, Ala., Summer 1954, pp. 48-55.




Fig. 3 — "Huklandia" — 1950

forces including artillery made it hot for the Huks and kept the pressure on them. Operations also were coordinated in other surrounding provinces into which the Huks had expanded or fled for shelter. (See map, Figure 3.) The larger Huk formations began to disperse. On June 2nd it was reported that the Huks were losing 200 men a week in casualties and 25 percent more through surrender or capture.¹ Altogether, they appear to have lost at least 2,000 effectives during this six-month period.

This shift was clearly along the general lines urged by JUSMAG, though it is unclear what role, if any, the U.S. mission had in this decision. At the same time, momentum was gathering for a much more explicit U.S. role in the reorientation of the Philippine response to the Huk challenge. In Secretary of State Acheson's speech to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950 — more widely known because of its exclusion of South Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter — greater Philippine self-help and aid accountability were called for. Acheson noted that the U.S. had given the Philippines \$2 billion in aid, veteran's benefits, war damage payments, military equipment, and the like, but that this had not been used effectively.² Philippine reaction was sharp. It was, for instance, pointed out that most of the money had eventually returned to the U.S. for imported goods — which was correct, though the goods imported often did not represent a prudent use of the funds and contributed little to Philippine capital investment and economic development.

A more constructive move was made when Presidents Truman and Quirino conferred in February 1950 and agreed on the concept of an economic survey mission to explore Philippine economic and financial problems and to make recommendations. Though Quirino apparently conceived of the group as a joint Philippine-American commission, the Truman administration made plans for a unilateral American mission, and the initial public announcements of each side's plans, in March of 1950, revealed this misunderstanding. By the end of May, Quirino had been induced to accept

¹ New York Times, June 3, 1950, p. 4.

² Meyer, op. cit., p. 89.

the idea of a unilateral American mission, combined with assurances that the mission, headed by Daniel Bell, would seek Philippine cooperation. The Bell Mission arrived in Manila on July 10 and submitted its report to Truman on October 9, 1950.¹

The Bell Mission report was a candid and comprehensive critique of Philippines economics, finance, and administration. The picture it presented included the following. Agricultural productivity was extremely low, and the standard of living and real wages of agricultural workers were still below prewar levels. There was insufficient agricultural credit available to small tenant farmers at reasonable interest rates, so that peasant indebtedness was a major problem. The rural educational system was starved for funds. The tax structure did not collect enough money for even the low level of expenditures the Philippine government had underway, with resulting and recurring budgetary crises. What taxes were collected had an adverse effect, since the income tax laws, in theory mildly progressive, were violated massively and endemically, with the result that government revenue tended to be drawn from various excise taxes that bore heavily on the poor.

While foreign investment and foreign exchange receipts had been high during the postwar period, production had been relatively little expanded because too much of the investment had gone into commerce and real estate instead of agricultural and economic development. Too, a considerable part of foreign exchange receipts had been dissipated in luxury imports, the remittance of profits, and the transfer of Philippine capital abroad. The combination of the stagnant agricultural wage levels with the continuing high levels of demand for Philippine exports had meant that the inequalities in income distribution had grown. And inefficiency and corruption in government service were widespread. Measures were proposed to improve these conditions.²

¹Meyer, op. cit., p. 90ff.

²Report, Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, passim; quoted in Golay, op. cit., ch. IV.

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In fact, while the Bell Mission was in the Philippines, some measures were beginning to be taken to alleviate some of these conditions. Import controls were imposed. New tax measures were passed increasing income taxes, estate and inheritance taxes, sales taxes, especially on luxury items, and various other special taxes, and instituting the withholding of income tax. In addition, the Philippine balance of payments got additional benefit from an increase in world demand for its exports due to the outbreak of the Korean war, with Philippine exports in 1950 30% above 1949 levels.¹ Besides the internal improvement in Philippine finances, the Bell Mission proposed a U. S. program of loans and grants on the order of \$250 million over five years. In November 1950 the U. S. and the Philippines signed an Agreement for Economic and Technical Cooperation by which the Philippines agreed to implement the Bell Mission recommendations while the U. S. agreed to furnish technical assistance and to initiate an economic aid program at the Bell-recommended levels.²

While the measures taken by the Philippine government in this period certainly greatly strengthened its financial stability and to some extent increased its tax-gathering power, and while those measures of administrative improvement probably increased to some extent the efficacy of governmental action, it is important to realize that drastic changes in rural conditions did not occur because of them. While the Bell Mission devoted some attention to problems of land tenure and agricultural credit, as well as to more technical questions of agricultural productivity, substantial moves towards real land reform did not occur. A contributory cause was Philippine reaction to the Hardie report on land tenure and land reform released by the U. S. aid mission at the end of 1952, which was factual but worded far too strongly and even arrogantly for the Philippine political elite to accept.³

¹Golay, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

²Meyer, op. cit., p. 94.

³Golay, op. cit., p. 274.

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Evidence was still clear that the Philippine government and elite were taking seriously the Huk threat and the need for a more creative response in spite of the limits on the new interest in reforms. In April 1950, while preparations for the Bell Missions were still being made, Quirino sent Congressman Ramon Magsaysay, chairman of the House Committee on National Defense and a member of Quirino's Liberal Party, to the United States to ask for more military aid. This was successful; in the two years ending June 30, 1954, the Philippines received \$47 million in military aid from the U.S. instead of the \$20 million that had been received over the preceding five fiscal years.¹ The Philippine military budget was expanded drastically in the next two years, using aid funds and the new revenues produced by the economic reforms being taken.² On July 1, 1950, Quirino created a National Security Council. Finally, on September 1, 1950, Quirino, apparently with U.S. encouragement, appointed Ramon Magsaysay Secretary of National Defense, with extraordinary authority to manage the fight against the Huks.³ The changes introduced by Magsaysay, and the accumulating effects of the reforms already made, gave a new impetus and image to the government campaign against the Huks.

Ramon Magsaysay was a truly unusual leader.⁴ He came of peasant stock in Zambales Province, had worked his way through college, and got into politics after the war by dint of his wartime service, first as supply officer and then District Commander of a USAFFE recognized guerrilla unit. He was big, bluff, and hearty, and no hint of dishonesty ever attached to his personal dealings. When he became Secretary of National Defense, he tackled the Huk problem with characteristic energy and wisdom, following two simultaneous policies: one of the ruthless mailed fist and the other a policy of attraction.

¹ Golay, op. cit., p. 82.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., and Smith, op. cit., p. 99.

⁴ Carlos Quirino, Magsaysay of the Philippines, (Manila, Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc., 1958), Chapters I-IV, passim.

With my left hand I am offering to all dissidents the road to peace, happy homes and economic security, but with my right I shall crush all those who resist and seek to destroy our democratic government. ¹

His understanding of the problem and basic compassion is also shown by the following statement:

"A physician does not kill his patient - he seeks the cause and then applies the cure." ²

He demanded and received adequate funding to do the military job. He put funds to unusual and effective use in establishing a scale of rewards for information or capture of Huks and for payments for turning in of loose firearms and ammunition. 89,000 firearms were surrendered or captured and millions of rounds of ammunition turned in during the period 1950-1955. ³ He even went so far as to appeal to business elements interested in ending the conflict for voluntary contributions to a "Peace Fund," and obtained a generous response, thereby making funds available for some of the more questionably legal rewards and undercover or psychological activities. ⁴ He insisted on spot promotion for deserving leaders, whether legally authorized or not, and was equally prompt in removing the undeserving. This image of dynamic action, even if occasionally hasty, together with his habit of unannounced inspections and face-to-face confrontation, set, by personal example, a whole new tone for the campaign. Perhaps most important, he gained the immediate approval and support of the press, which had been strongly anti-administration but welcomed an authentic hero figure. ⁵

Magsaysay's programs can be placed into five main categories, with some overlapping: 1.) reform and reorganization of the military forces; 2.) changes in military strategy, tactics, and methods; 3.) changes in military behavior and military action towards the population; 4.) programs of rural reform; and 5.) programs specifically designed to induce Huk surrender by non-coercive means.

¹ Quirino, op. cit., p. 62.

² Ibid., p. 63.

³ Ibid., p. 65.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 71.

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Magsaysay's military reforms and reorganizations in part continued those begun by Quirino in the spring of 1950. The reorganization of Army troops and some former Military Police was completed. The redesignated Constabulary was given a lesser police role, while larger combat operations were handled by the Army and Air Force. The Army was reorganized into 26 highly flexible and mobile battalion combat teams (BCT's) of approximately a thousand men each, designed to be as self-contained as possible, able to follow the Huks back into the jungles and mountains on a sustained basis rather than be tied down in a static defense role.¹ In addition some special units, such as deep-penetration Ranger units and special forces designed to simulate Huk units and thus to penetrate Huk base areas, were formed. The collection and use of military intelligence was sharply improved. Ambushes and night patrolling began to be used by the government as well as by the Huks. Too much emphasis can hardly be given to the impact of using guerrilla methods against the Huk guerrillas: to them it was a most unsettling loss of security.²

In addition to these structural and procedural changes, Magsaysay carried out a housecleaning in the personnel of the Army and Constabulary. Ineffective and incompetent officers were discharged or retired and efficient officers promoted. Salaries were increased, and regular provision of food and supplies made unnecessary the sort of corrupt dealing of supplier that had so antagonized the populace. In fact extra rations and candy were issued to give to the poor and children just to improve the Army's image. Corruption and malfeasance in the army were strongly and publicly punished. He ordered that every soldier act as an ambassador of good will from the government to the people - the so-called "Attraction Campaign." Magsaysay personally devoted much time and effort to visiting units in the field, rewarding or punishing as appropriate, and always projecting the image of a vigorous, effective, but just leadership to the army and the people.³

¹ Bashore, op. cit., pp. 186-7.

² Valeriano and Bohannon, op. cit., Chapter 11, passim.

³ Ibid., pp. 206-210.

In addition to lessening the burden that the undersupplied, demoralized, and uncontrolled troops had placed on the peasantry, Magsaysay introduced some measures that had considerable effect on rural grievances. He set up a Civil Affairs Office, directly responsible to him, which provided a highly publicized channel for peasants to present their grievances against bureaucrats or landlords and to receive a quick response, as well as investigating incidents independently. The armed forces were also used for civic action programs. The services of the Judge Advocate General's Office were made available free to peasants who had substantive grievances and could not afford regular legal representation. Army medical men served wherever needed and started anti-malaria measures. The Army Engineers built prefabricated schoolhouses, opened new or better roads to isolated areas, constructed bridges, and the like.¹ Again this was accompanied by a glare of publicity, so that its effect on the government's image was multiplied out of proportion to the genuine local improvements which did occur.

The above reforms effected some real change in conditions and were intelligently used to induce the peasants and the Huks to change their minds about the government's military effectiveness and political justice. Another program accomplished only minimal real change but proved extremely effective in inducing peasant support and Huk surrenders. This was EDCOR, the Economic Development Corps, which surveyed and cleared land in undeveloped areas -- first in Mindanao, later in northern Luzon --, built roads, and then settled there a mixed group of ex-Huks, Huk-suspects, civilians, and ex-soldiers. They were assigned house-lots and farm plots of 15 to 25 acres,² and, after having established their farms, were to receive title to their land. However, it must be noted that the number of ex-Huks that participated in the program was only a few hundred. The effect of EDCOR, which was profound, cannot

¹Valeriano and Bohannon, op. cit., pp. 211-221.

²Priester, op. cit., p. 30.

have been due to the satisfaction of Huk land-hunger, but rather due to the evidence it presented that the Philippine government did indeed care for peasant aspirations and that satisfaction of these aspirations was possible in cooperation with the government.¹ The new military tactics and organization, and the increased effectiveness this produced, conveyed the other half of the message: that satisfaction of peasant aspirations was not possible through rebellion.

At the same time, psychological warfare programs were explicitly designed to encourage support from the peasants and defections from the Huks. In particular, surrendering Huks were given good treatment and opportunities to return to a normal life, and these opportunities were widely publicized, to complement the EDCOR operation, the new military effectiveness of government forces, and the image of dynamic and concerned leadership projected by Secretary Magsaysay. One study of these programs derives these lessons:

Alert to every opportunity, Magsaysay operated a laboratory at Camp Murphy, near Manila, in order to determine the causes that made the people join or support the Huks. Huks, who had surrendered or were captured, were interrogated at Camp Murphy concerning the reasons for their actions. Three primary reasons were given by these people: Lack of food, bad government, and exploitation by landlords. Interviews with the ex-Huks who had been settled at the EDCOR farms revealed that, for fifty-four per cent of them, promises of land for the landless was the major reason for joining the Huks, or was a factor in strengthening their loyalty to that group. Another twenty-eight per cent gave their support to the Huks because the latter had promised to be the righteous protectors of the down-trodden masses. The basic causes were therefore economic, social, and political but not ideological.²

¹ Alvin H. Scaaf, The Philippine Answer to Communism, (Stanford, Calif., The Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 113.

² Priester, op. cit., p. 33.

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In an interview in Manila, Magsaysay said:

You do not kill Communism with the sword and the gun alone. Communism is an idea. When a man in a rice paddy with a hungry belly, working on land which is not his--in debt, always in debt and his children hungry, too--when a man in that position hears somebody say: "The land belongs to the man who works it--come with us and we will give it to you!" then, my friend, something happens. To that man it is a cool wind blowing through a hell on earth.

So much you can do against Communism with a gun. The rest you must do by offering this man more hope than Communism can offer him.

That's how Communism must be fought--by action not only in killing Communists but by offering the people something better, more real, more immediate than the Communists offer them.¹

The role of the United States in these changes was clearly important, but not much detail is known. The then-Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, who acted as a military adviser to Secretary Magsaysay, has been reported to have been very influential in suggesting many of Magsaysay's reforms.²

Parallel to the reformed military effort, economic changes were taking place under the impetus supplied by the Bell Mission recommendations and the economic aid supplied by the United States. Foreign exchange reserves continued to improve as imports were lowered and export demand stayed high, though variations in import controls caused some fluctuation in the reserve level.³ In addition, a system of rural banks was created in order to provide credit to the peasants at reasonable interest. However, other areas of agrarian reform did not get similar attention. Except for the EDCOR program there was no organized colonization of the unpopulated areas of the Philippines. Though land reform was discussed, no substantive moves were made, and the existing crop distribution and tenure security

¹"We Smashed the Communists," U. S. News and World Report, Vol. 34, No. 7, February 13, 1953, p. 36.

²Smith, op. cit., p. 104; Priester, op. cit., p. 17; Abaya, op. cit., p. 340.

³Golay, op. cit., p. 84.

laws were laxly enforced. However, with U. S. aid, land survey and title registration procedures were improved, and an agricultural extension service was established which increased voluntary colonization.¹ In addition, a minimum wage law was enacted in the spring of 1951, improving the lot of plantation workers, though not those on small farms. Finally, Quirino established the Philippine Central Bank as a stable and effective instrument of monetary and fiscal control.²

Added to this program of reforms, the government had a major windfall victory in October 1950. Magsaysay personally brought about the defection of a Huk who gave him information on the Manila Communist Party Headquarters and organization, allowing a nearly total roundup of the urban part of the party organization and leadership as well as an invaluable store of documentary information.³ The numbers of Huks killed began to rise⁴ and while the estimated strength of Huk forces went up as well,⁵ this may have been due only to improving intelligence, or to calling up "reserves." In any case, after mid-1951, the estimates began to sink dramatically, to 5-7,000 armed men in February 1952.⁶ In 1951, Magsaysay, supported by Quirino, used the army to ensure a relatively honest election. Quirino had also strengthened the powers and independence of the Commission on Elections.

The Communist Party, beginning in December 1951, took formal account of these adverse developments. It was admitted that the "revolutionary current has abated" and a long, protracted struggle was predicted. More attention was to be paid to labor unions and student infiltration.⁷ By mid-1952, Taruc was growing more estranged from the party leadership.

¹Golay, op. cit., p. 86.

²Ibid., p. 85.

³Smith, op. cit., p. 105.

⁴McLane, op. cit., p. 429.

⁵Barton, op. cit., pp. 54-5.

⁶Ibid., p. 55. In two critical years of fighting (April 1, 1950-1952) official Philippine Government figures list 4,358 HMB killed, 2,497 captured, 5,515 surrendered, 8,572 weapons captured. In addition 11,076 civilians were arrested for collaboration with the HMB, of whom 9,591 were released.

⁷McLane, op. cit., p. 429.

And by the end of 1952, the party's emphasis had shifted from the Huk insurgency to penetration of open organizations, with a concurrent reduction in Huk raids and casualties.¹

From the end of 1952 on, the military insurgency was steadily reduced. In 1953, Magsaysay switched parties and ran for President on the Nationalist ticket, running against Quirino. Magsaysay's campaign was vigorous, well organized, and well financed, and drew support from professional and ex-guerrilla groups who were outside the regular party organization. In a comparatively free election, Magsaysay received about two-thirds of the votes.

By now the insurgent threat was much reduced, though low-strength BCT's were still stationed in the critical areas to provide security for the population.²

By early 1954, surrender negotiations were going on with various Huk leaders, both privately and through the press.³ Finally, on May 16, 1954, through the intermediary of a Manila Times correspondent, Taruc surrendered.

3. Postlude: May 1954 - Present. After Luis Taruc's surrender, and the spate of surrenders the news evoked, the Huk bands dwindled down to a few hundred men deep in the jungle and mountains. Never quite eliminated, and still headed by Jesus Lava and Pedro Taruc, their strength appears to have been growing apace lately. In spite of Magsaysay's efforts before his death in 1957, substantial land reform has never been carried out, and so the grievances of the peasants of central Luzon remain, though perhaps mitigated by the ameliorative programs of agricultural credit, extension services, more education, public works, and the development of a new strain called "Miracle Rice" which quadruples their crop.

At least some Huk units have apparently become near-gangsters, supporting themselves by gambling, vice, and extorting money and supplies from townspeople; one of the areas most affected is that

¹ McLane, op. cit., pp. 429-30.

² Osanka, op. cit., pp. 200-1.

³ New York Times, February 16, 1954, p. 3.

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surrounding the U.S. air base at Clark Field. In 1956, the remaining Huk leaders had agreed to shift to an effort only to preserve the underground organization.¹ Perhaps under the stimulus of the growing influence of Indonesian Communists, perhaps only by the laxness of administration and Constabulary, the Huks by 1964 were carrying out occasional attacks on remote villages. In 1965 evidence of Chinese Communist support for the Huks began to appear, with propaganda printed in China appearing, regular Radio Peking broadcasts in Tagalog, and reports of Chinese Communists agents slipping in through lax immigration laws.² By then, the Huks were again strong in eastern Pampanga province, collecting an estimated \$10,000 a week in profits from gambling, vice, and transport facilities in Angeles, near Clark Air Force Base. From this income Huk soldiers were supported and interest-free loans given to cooperative peasants, while regularly taxes were imposed on peasants and landlords in Huk areas.³ Philippine official concern appeared to be increasing, but it still remains to be seen how effective it will be.

¹ Priester, op. cit., p. 35.

² Ibid., pp. 35-6.

³ Ibid., p. 36.

II. FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. PHASE I TO PHASE II: THE INTRODUCTION OF A MILITARY OPTION

1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option

- a. A tradition of revolt and as a result of the war a hardening toward violence by those accustomed to privation.
- b. The share tenant system of agriculture, together with high interest rates, kept the tenant and poor farmers in bondage to the landlords or middle-men, and from receiving a fair return on their labor and achieving a decent standard of living.
- c. A high level of popular awareness of the American way of life, with its material wealth, gangsters, and western movies, and a predilection toward violence as a legacy of the war.
- d. War damage and back-pay claims payments and veterans' benefits went largely to those with political pull or established position, and did not help the poor too.
- e. Semi-clandestine para-military organizations experienced in guerrilla combat were intact after the war.

RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES*

A. MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Stronger emphasis on law and order and peaceful democratic change in the course of preparations for Philippine independence.
- b. Action by U.S. authorities to achieve crop sharing and loan rate reforms prior to independence. A moratorium on debts after the Japanese surrender and a strong program to assist farmers and industries to get back into production would have helped.
- c. Plain-spoken clarification by national leaders of the economic facts of life and in favor of the establishment of the rule of law for the new republic.
- d. A much more stringent application of equitable rules for claims payments together with organization for this purpose, seen to be reaching out to all areas and helping all alike.
- e. Insistence on unbiased investigation and on disbanding and surrender of personnel rosters and equipment as a prerequisite to recognition.

*These measures are not meant to be recommendations for U.S. foreign policy. They are strictly intended to be hypothetical and are based upon the assumption that the sole objective is the reduction of the intensity of local conflict. They have no relationship, one to another.

FACTORS

- f. Arms and military equipment were available in the hands of disaffected persons and could be readily augmented by purchase, theft and capture.
- g. The economy was at a low ebb in the first half of 1946, with low production and low wages, but high prices through inflation. The unemployed took to robbery like ducks to water. Tax collection failed to provide income for government social programs.
- h. Huks failed in a try for recognition as the established political authorities in central Luzon, by strong-arm methods in the towns and at the polls.

2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military

- a. A government dedicated to democratic methods, law and order, and peaceful change, through education.
- b. Huk problems in supply and communication due to the difficulty of travel and transportation over land and especially over intervening seas.
- c. A predominantly Christian people under control of the Roman Catholic church.

MEASURES

- f. Strong inducement to turn in or round up arms in the hands of civilians and measures to destroy them and protect the stocks in government control.
- g. Provision of unemployment relief and job assistance, initially with U.S. aid to establish better on the job training in rehabilitation projects. Providing an adequate tax structure and enforcing it would have helped to hold down inflation.
- h. Recognition that the Huks represented a threat to stable government and immediate strong measures to keep them out of control of towns.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. A strong government publicity and educational campaign to reinforce appreciation of the value of return to peaceful ways.
- b. Make Huk communication, coordination, and supply even more difficult by continually shifting check points and intercept measures on communication routes.
- c. Ask the Church to play a more active role in alleviating suffering and urging peaceful solutions.

FACTORS

- d. Huks won representation in the Congress in elections in 1946, but were later denied their seats.
- B. PHASE II TO PHASE IIIA: THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES
1. Factors Promoting Hostilities
- a. U.S. Military Assistance and Base rights agreements assured the Philippine government of its external security and of the training and equipment it needed for external security for years to come. It probably led to complacency regarding the Huk threat.
- b. Local political influence over MPC operations tended to restrict it to activities in direct local defense of those interests, with little area-wide coordination.
- c. The ascendancy of Roxas and continuation in office of much of the wartime Congress disappointed and embittered the anti-collaborationists and left wing politicians who had hoped to inherit political power.

MEASURES

- d. A way might have been found to permit seating of Huk elected representatives, thus giving them open communication with government and a responsible voice in solution of peasant problems. If illegally elected, they should have been tried and the reasons publicized.
- B. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES
1. To Offset These Factors
- a. The JUSMAG might have foreseen the type of threat inherent in the Huks, and possible U.S. involvement in defeating it, and taken much more specific steps to optimize Philippine COIN capabilities.
- b. Centralized military command of both military and police operations could have been instituted immediately.
- c. A better explanation by the U.S. authorities of their lenient stand on the collaboration issue and acceptance that those not guilty of criminal acts had done their best for their country.

FACTORS

- d. The attitude of military and provincial authorities who were committed to a solution of the Huk problem by force.
2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities
- a. The control of the country by the U. S. government up to July 4, 1946.
- b. The system and example of peaceful democratic change for nearly fifty years and the desire to return to peaceful pursuits and for clemency, resulting from war-weariness.
- C. PHASE IIIA TO PHASE IIIB: THE GROWTH OF HOSTILITIES
1. Factors Tending to Intensify Hostilities
- a. The corruption and inefficiency of the Quiriao government encouraged growing opposition.
- b. The election campaign of 1949 reached a nadir in Philippine politics, and the actual polling was declared the most fraudulent in Philippine history.
- c. Government failure to carry out promised land tenure, crop-sharing, and agricultural credit plans.

MEASURES

- d. A strong central government policy of more velvet glove and less iron hand at first might have influenced some Huks to disband.
2. To Reinforce These Factors
- a. Further efforts to disband wartime units and provide for law and order prior to independence.
- b. Insistence on disarming of demobilized civilians and guerrilla units, combined with strong efforts to provide equitable treatment and land and fair crop prices for the peasants.
- C. MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE HOSTILITIES
1. To Offset These Factors
- a. Drastic steps to provide an honest and efficient government would help greatly to win over the people, as Magsaysay proved later.
- b. The dissidents could be given some way of making their grievances known and gaining redress through responsive representation. Clean elections are a sine qua non.
- c. Carrying out of programs by demanding adequate budgetary and tax support from party members, and seeking U. S. support.

FACTORS

- d. Disunity of the Communist Politburo and Huk leaders permitted revolutionary activists to win control of the movement.
- e. The success of the Communists in China encouraged the Huks to emulate them openly.

2. Factors Inhibiting Hostilities

- a. The Military Police Command had a strength of only 3,000 poorly trained men in the four provinces in which the bulk of the 9,000 armed Huks was located. It undertook operations, on President Roxas' orders, somewhat cautiously.

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- b. President Roxas made a real attempt at negotiating for peace with the Huks, offering a program granting many of their goals, but it was not consummated due to political opposition in Congress and by provincial authorities and landlords, and to the intransigence of a large faction of the Huks. His reform programs were under-financed to the point of accomplishing nothing.
- c. President Quirino in 1948 offered an amnesty in return for surrender of all Huk arms, which brought a few leaders and followers into the open.

MEASURES

- d. Discreet support of less radical socialists, and strong condemnation and arrest of Communist revolutionaries.
- e. Pointing out the dissimilarities in the situation and the lack of contiguous land support.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Formulating a concept of a coordinated counter-guerrilla warfare force (the trouble was still considered a matter for local police action and political negotiation.)
- b. Strong support for Roxas' initiative could have been given by the United States, and a campaign to whip up his party and public support mounted. Alternatively, if it became clear the Huks would not compromise, the need for a strong military capability might be urged.
- c. Evidence of a real will and ability of the government to carry out amnesty provisions fairly and whole-heartedly.

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FACTORS

D. PHASE IIIB TO PHASE IV: THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. Factors Tending to Continue Hostilities

- a. The armed strength and popular support of the Huks was still increasing up to mid-1950 or later.
- b. There was little concrete progress toward land tenure and crop-sharing reform.
- c. Failure of the Philippine Government authorities to follow up and exploit Taruc's surrender and denouncement of his Communist ex-comrades, to cause a complete surrender or extermination of the military threat.

2. Factors Tending to Terminate Hostilities

- a. Recognizing the gravity of the Huk threat to internal security and assigning responsibility to the Army to conduct an all-out coordinated campaign of suppression.
- b. Assignment of responsibilities to end the Huk menace to a dynamic and charismatic leader, and giving him a free hand and full government and financial support.

MEASURES

D. MEASURES DESIGNED TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

1. To Offset These Factors

- a. Rapid implementation of Quirino's economic reforms and Magsaysay's military measures, including the "Attraction Campaign," were needed to turn the tide visibly and undermine Huk popular support.
- b. Drastic changes were needed in the "rice bowl," not merely resettlement of a few families in distant areas.
- c. The ideological and tactical split of Taruc with the Politburo provided the government with ammunition it could have immediately and fully exploited, and still might to greater advantage.

2. To Reinforce These Factors

- a. Publicity to clarify the nature of the threat and the outlawed status of the Huks: seeking stronger U.S. advice and assistance.
- b. Full public support and backing for Magsaysay at whatever political cost to the President.

FACTORS

- c. Centralization and strengthening of government intelligence and psychological efforts.
- d. Aggressive offensive tactics against the Huks by constantly moving small unit probes and use of guerrilla groups and tactics against guerrillas.
- e. U.S. demands that the Philippine government clean up its economic house, through the Bell Mission, as a prerequisite to more aid, resulted in a sound Philippine financial basis for the first time since the war.
- f. A highly visible effort to provide "land for the landless" through the Economic Development Corps settlements provided an alternative to the Huks and stole their propaganda thunder.
- g. Cleaning out corruption and inefficiency in the Army, rewarding efficiency and punishing wrongdoing, improved its efficiency and acceptability.
- h. Relatively quite clean elections were held in 1951 and 1953, impartially supervised by the Army, thus improving the government's image.

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MEASURES

- c. Seeking U.S. support and assistance and Malayan advice.
- d. More use of air power to give the Huks no rest in safe areas.
- e. Further and faster relinquishment of economic privileges of the U.S. citizens in the Philippines.
- f. A greater real effort, perhaps enlisting U.S. assistance, might have had more lasting effect.
- g. Full publicity for these actions would provide maximum credibility for the program.
- h. Democracy in action might be emphasized in order to give the oppressed some hope of real representation.

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FACTORS

1. The Huks became increasingly hopeless, and induced surrenders more frequent, until finally their one most charismatic leader, Luis Taruc, split with the Marxist leadership completely and surrendered, leaving only scattered, poorly coordinated, and ineffective remnants of the Huk military movement.

MEASURES

1. Maximum propaganda exploitation of the surrenders and increasingly intensive pressure on the remnants, rather than slacking off, might have put a more permanent and complete end to the threat.

III. LESSONS FOR CONFLICT CONTROL

A. "Controlling" the Conflict

The conflict in the Philippines, in which the Huks proclaimed themselves the active champions of the peasant opposition to the government, was not the result of international, racial, or economic conflict but rather localized political and ideological motivations, with class overtones. The general poverty among the rice farmers, particularly of central Luzon, established a background of grievances that could be appealed to, to fan revolutionary flames. The post-war inflation, disruption of the way of life, and injustices and injuries produced a sense among the poor of central Luzon of special problems to which the government was not seen to be responding effectively. Thus a feeling of relative deprivation, of hopelessness, combined with an awareness of a better way of life and the example of Communist success in China led to a susceptibility to communist revolutionary propaganda and a willingness to support the local guerrillas who made some claim to be patriotic nationalistic champions of the common man.

"Controlling" the rising tide of armed conflict in the Philippines, then, meant alleviating these grievances, demonstrating effective care for the welfare of all the people, and finally effectively "giving the lie" and carrying the fight to the hard core of active revolutionaries and their intellectual apologists until they were eliminated as an effective force. The United States could help this process of control mainly by calling attention to the need, assisting the government to get on a firm financial footing, and supplying material assistance and advice. But the conflict was not recognized as a serious threat to the United States' interests for nearly four years; and when it was, the United States was busy with the Korean War and took no active part in the conflict in the Philippines.

Therefore, the Philippine government controlled the course of the conflict largely on its own, through a basically two-pronged strategy which Magsaysay entitled "All Out Friendship or All Out Force". Force alone had been tried intermittently for years, with little real concern for the victims; but it had been primarily defensive and negative in its aims and

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appeared to be serving only the behest of the rich minority. This tactic was changed in 1950 to an unrelenting offensive military pressure on the Huks, through better intelligence, covert special force and regular military small unit actions moving out into the guerrillas own operational environment. But the real secret of success was the combination of force and friendship: making the government forces show themselves to be the friend and protector of the downtrodden in myriad ways, winning through effective public relations and financial and welfare measures the support of the civilians on whom the Huks had previously depended. As a first step, the Army was made into effective counter-guerrilla fighters and effective ambassadors of the government to the disaffected portion of the people by the forceful and inspired leadership of its Secretary of National Defense. Second, at almost the same time, President Quirino provided him effective financial support and alleviation of some of the peoples' economic ills by taking sound steps recommended by the Bell Mission to put the Philippine economy in order. There was undoubted U.S. pressure put upon President Quirino to take both these major steps, but he has hardly received the credit due him for doing so at the ultimate cost of his loss of the Presidency to Magsaysay. Probably the real possibility of losing it to the Huks seemed a worse evil.

B. Keeping the Dispute Non-Military

1. In an environment with a tradition of revolt, a long history of local grievances, and the past four years of bitter guerilla warfare against the violence of a ruthless enemy, the problem of re-establishing respect for law and order was paramount. Strong emphasis on restoring and training the forces of law and internal security was needed prior to handing over political independence, but it was not adequately done. Hand in hand with this problem was that of instilling firm allegiance to democratic methods of peaceful change and alleviation of wrongs through responsible representative government. U.S. training and example was effective, but for some years the issue was in doubt. Fortunately, the Huks never really offered a well thought out or appealing alternative mode of government.

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Furthermore, the great majority of the Filipinos never even considered an alternative to their new free republican government: they simply did not get involved, and their inertia would have been difficult to overcome.

2. More specifically, the existence of trained, experienced clandestine guerrilla bands who had just been through a war and now found themselves without any of the fruits of victory in their hands, except their weapons, was almost sure to lead to turning to a military option. They were hardened to violence and had seen very considerable American samples. Steps to give just rewards, if due, to disband the units, and to collect their weapons were urgent but only half-heartedly tried.

3. The accumulated debts of the peasant rice farmers, their loss of livestock, seed, and manpower, and the apparent inaction of the government to change the old tenant crop-sharing pattern led to desperation on the part of some and at least a willingness to listen to and support the Huks who promised them land and fair treatment. A post-war moratorium on old debts would have hurt few, and government action to specifically assist farmers and the unemployed to get back into productive pursuits could have gone far to avoid deterioration into military conflict.

4. When the Huks tried to emerge as a legal political movement or front in some few towns and Congressional elections of 1946, they met with government rejection on rather weakly stated legal grounds and charges which were never proven by due process of law in the courts. While they undoubtedly did not have clean hands, neither did many on the government side, and they were due a fair hearing. Perhaps some compromise with the less criminal or deeply indoctrinated elements might have provided for a safety-valve through some representation of the farmers by those leaning to less violent socialism, thus weaning them from communism.

C. Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

5. Given the preceding background and lack of the measures suggested or other adequate ones, it was nearly impossible to prevent serious hostilities, since minor outbreaks and at least banditry were endemic. That being the case, much stronger measures prior to and following Philippine independence to train and equip adequate internal security forces and to appreciate the situation facing them might have at least delayed hostilities if not eliminated the roots of them. The United States was partly to blame in this matter, by opting out of the bitter post-war controversy over the issue of alleged war-time collaboration of Filipino politicians with the Japanese.

D. Moderating/Terminating Hostilities

6. The Philippine government slid fairly rapidly downhill in the esteem and trust of its people as many of its officials proved to be venal, corrupt and yet protected from any effective political remedy by the people. Fair and honest elections appeared impossible prior to 1951, as force was tried by both sides, and the party in power was clearly able to control the outcome. Steps to provide for honest elections were essential to reduce the public defection from the government, and this required the positive control of the balloting process by the security forces under honest leadership.

7. The government failed to carry out frequently reiterated promises to improve the land tenure and crop-sharing laws, provide agricultural credit and extension services, and to show itself interested in relieving the plight of the tao until the politicians and provincial authorities, among whom the landowners were heavily represented, got sufficiently frightened. Even then it took considerable high level pressure from the United States, plus promises of economic and military assistance, to get a program of economic reform off the ground and rolling. Ways of doing this should have been studied and pressed sooner.

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8. Revolutionary Marxists won complete control of the Huk rebellion from those of a more nationalist, socialist bent. They openly avowed their allegiance to international communism and intent to overthrow the government by force. The Philippine Communist Party had been outlawed in 1948, but little action was taken against it until 1950. It should have been identified sooner and what it was doing made clear to the people, as it tended to lose support when the foreign nature of its doctrine and control became clear.

9. The Military Police Command was almost wholly ineffective and incapable of coping with the Huks in the "rice bowl" of Luzon. It was kept largely in defensive static positions or made a few well-signalled sweeps with Army reinforcements. Central control and responsibility for conduct of this civil war should have been assigned much earlier to properly trained, equipped, and controlled military forces.

10. The recognition of the psychological context of the struggle came late, but once it did this factor was handled better under Magsaysay than any other known case of psychological warfare. He was careful to disguise the possibly unfavorable political connotations of this activity under the headings of the "Attraction Campaign", the Civil Affairs Office, and public relations. He ensured that appropriate action was taken to punish malfeasance and wrong-doing by government personnel and to publicize both this action and rewards for efficiency and assistance to the people. Instructions to the soldiers on proper troop behavior were widely published, and civil assistance such as health care had a real use rather than being just an act for propaganda purposes. Civic Action was carried out by combat soldiers rather than public relations staffs, and the open policies of friendship and food for the people of "Huklandia" won many over, and won nearly unanimous approbation of the press which had been openly critical. He welcomed publicity as the best means of assuring credibility of his efforts.

11. The promise of "land for the landless" through the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) program and the rewards for capture of Huks or surrender of arms, together with unremitting pressure of combat patrols and Air Force surveillance and attack, led to increasing surrenders and defections. The ideological split of Huk Supremo, Luis Taruc, with the Politburo, followed by his surrender, gave the government all the ammunition it needed to cripple the active Huk movement for many years thereafter, but should have been exploited and followed up much more energetically than it was, rather than slacking efforts in the belief that permanent victory for the government was at hand.

E. Summary List

In sum, the key conflict-control measures were:

KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

- Training and restoring the forces of law and order
- Disbanding the Huk units and collecting their weapons
- Relieving debts and assisting farm production
- Compromise to permit socialist representation of the farmers

PREVENTING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

- Training and equipping adequate internal security forces

MODERATING/TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

- Providing honest government and clean elections
- Pressure for economic reforms and prompt assistance
- The international Communist alignment of Huk leaders should have been publicized
- Early central control and responsibility for conduct of the government campaign
- Masterful psychological warfare and public relations activities
- Energetic exploitation of Luis Taruc's split with the Politburo and surrender

APPENDIX

WEAPONS ANALYSIS - THE PHILIPPINES-HUK CONFLICT (1948-1954)

A. Weapons of the Huk Forces.

Most estimates place the strength of the militant (i. e. armed and organized) Huk forces varying somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000. It rises to a maximum by mid-1951, when their power curve descends and is overtaken by the rising curve of government success. Nine months earlier, the new Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay, had begun his concerted and systematic effort to eliminate the Huk threat to the Philippine government. By October 1951, Philippine intelligence figures that the number of Huk militants had been reduced to somewhat over 8,000, of whom only about 6,700 were armed. After this their numbers quickly declined as the Philippine armed forces became more and more adept at counter-guerrilla warfare.

The following is a list of the types of weapons that were common to the Huk forces. No attempt to estimate their numbers individually by types would be valid, for lack of information, but total weapons in use at the peak of Huk activity in 1951 was probably well over 20,000.

<u>Weapons</u>		<u>Amount</u>
.303 Lee Enfield rifles	U. K.	
.30 cal. Springfield rifles (1903)	U. S.	} probably between 15-30,000
.30 cal. M1 rifles and carbines	"	
.45 cal. M3 submachine guns	"	
.30 cal. machine guns	"	limited number
mortars (probably 60 mm.)	"	a few
8mm. Type 100 submachine guns	Japanese	} a few
6.5 mm. Type 38 or 99 rifles or carbines	"	
6.5 mm. Type 3 machine guns	"	
7.7 mm. Type 92 machine guns	"	

1. Their Acquisition. Most of the Huk weapons were acquired during World War II, from U. S. stocks hidden prior to May 1942, recovery from the battlefields, or capture from the Japanese. After the war, control over the possession of unlicensed weapons in the Philippines was lax, and military weapons became plentiful because of sale as surplus of U. S. stockpiles in the Philippines. There is no indication that the Huks were lacking

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in small arms, until after 1951 when Magsaysay began to eliminate large numbers of Huk weapons. As part of his strategy, Magsaysay paid for the turn-in of weapons from the civilian population in an effort to cut down the Huk sources of supply. However:

Many thousands of arms were recovered, but there is no conclusive evidence that the Huk were seriously handicapped by this campaign. Even when arms were plentiful, some of the Huk preferred to carry home-made weapons; others already possessed weapons in abundance. Always, it seemed, there were those who could steal ammunition which would get into Huk supply channels.¹

It has been estimated that Magsaysay's efforts to confiscate Huk weapons between 1950 and 1955 brought in over 89,000 small arms.² If this is so, then the Huks must have been able to arm their forces several times over. Nevertheless, Philippine government estimates of Huk strength after 1951 indicate that not all of the guerrillas were armed.³

From all accounts, Huk weapons were acquired exclusively in the Philippines. The lack of land borders made it difficult for an outside party to become involved as a major supplier of the Philippine insurgents. Furthermore, the cost of doing so would be high when compared to the ready availability of weapons in the Philippines through robbery, purchase, capture or confiscation. U.S. military depots were particular victims of Huk raids.

¹ Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannon, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience, (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 135.

² Carlos Quirino, Magsaysay of the Philippines, (Manila: Carmello & Bauermann, Inc., 1958), p. 65.

³ Fred H. Barton, Salient Operational Aspects of Paramilitary Warfare in Three Asian Areas, ORO (Chevy Chase, Md., The Johns Hopkins University, April 9, 1953), p. 55.

The Huk campaign was a communist insurgency and as such enjoyed some moral support of the world communist movement. No arms or ammunition, however, appear to have entered the Philippines from Communist countries in support of the Huk effort.¹ Even financial aid seems to have come mainly through the United States, although its origins could have been elsewhere.²

2. Their Use. No evidence has been found to indicate particularly effective or inventive use of weapons by the Huks. They were used mainly in ambushes against government forces or in coercion of the rural population. The Huks did not undertake any sort of urban insurgency, and explosives do not seem to have figured heavily in their strategy. Assassination was, however, a common tactic at local levels.

One point of interest is the fact that the Huks did not attempt to retaliate against government air action. Once in a while they fired a .50 cal. machine gun at government aircraft, but apparently with little effect. Near the air base at Basa the Huks occasionally fired on ground security forces, but made no attacks on the aircraft.

B. The Weapons of the Philippine Armed Forces.

The campaign against the Huks was fought in two distinct stages by two different Philippine forces. The responsibility for anti-Huk operations lay with the Military Police Command until March 1950, when it was transferred to the armed forces (with some units of the Constabulary subordinated). The Philippine army during the subsequent campaign numbered about 30,000, while the Constabulary had been about 12,000.

¹ RAND Corp., Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Philippine - Huk Campaign, RM-3652-PR, July 1963, p. 14. Russia was at one point indicated as a source of outside assistance by submarine, but no tangible proof of this was ever presented.

² Ibid., p. 22.

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The following is an approximate list of the army's weapons:

<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Supplier</u>	<u>Date of Acquisition</u>	<u>Amount</u>	
.30 cal. M-1 Garand rifle	U. S.		about 18,000	60%
.30 cal. M91 Carbine	U. S.		about 7,500	25%
BAR	U. S.) about 4,000	12%
.45 cal. submachine gun	U. S.			
.30 cal. machin. guns	U. S.			
.50 cal. machine guns	U. S.			
60 mm. mortars	U. S.			
81 mm. mortars	U. S.			
75 mm. howitzers	U. S.			
105 mm. howitzers	U. S.			
C-47			one squadron	
L-5) one squadron	
L-4				
F-51 Mustang	U. S.	late 1947		
T-6 Harvard	U. S.	late 1947		
T-13	U. S.	late 1947		

1. Their Acquisition. As is obvious from the preceding list, the Philippine armed forces received their weapons from the United States. These were on hand and turned over upon gaining independence in 1946, or were later provided under the terms of a military assistance agreement concluded in 1947, and renewed in 1951. A U. S. training and advisory group (JUSMAG) accompanied the weapons. Philippine pilots were trained in the United States.

When the Constabulary first took up the fight against the Huks, their only firearms were carbines. Later they acquired rifles, some machine guns, and mortars, presumably from the United States.¹

With generous U. S. assistance, the Philippine forces re-equipped and retrained for the counterinsurgency effort in 1950, concentrating especially on effective small unit action and long range patrolling, and using aircraft for reconnaissance as well as for bombing and strafing. At the same time, however, substantial amounts of artillery were supplied by the United States for defense against external aggression or use in Korea, although this did not get much use against the guerrilla threat.

¹Valeriano and Bohannon, *op. cit.*, p. 114. These weapons were acquired before the armed forces took over the fighting.

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2. Their Use. As the Philippine armed forces under the direction of Ramon Magsaysay developed its counterguerrilla strategy, they began putting their weapons to more and more effective use. This is reflected especially in the fact that government patrols became proportionally smaller as the campaign progressed. Up to October 1951 an average of four Philippine armed forces personnel (AFP) were employed against one Huk guerrilla.¹ Within six months this ratio had been reduced to three to one, and continued to decrease as the AFP adopted guerrilla methods themselves.

When, under the direction of U.S. advisors, the Philippine armed forces reorganized into Battalion Combat Teams (BCT's) to fight the Huks, their weapons were assigned as follows:

A BCT was normally composed of a Headquarters and Service Company; three rifle companies, each of 110 men; a weapons company armed with mortars and heavy machine guns; and a reconnaissance company at least partially equipped with armored cars. A field-artillery battery was often attached to the BCT. . . . Personnel of the weapons company and of the field-artillery battery were often employed as riflemen.²

Mortars were generally used to cover AFP patrols when they came in sight of their objectives, but heavier artillery was not often useful against the guerrillas. From 1946 to 1950 artillery was tried against suspected Huk concentrations, with little effect. "Patrols proved to be by far the most effective weapons for applying force to the Huk."³ In patrolling, light armored cars were used extensively on the roads, but heavy armor was not used at all.

¹Barton, op. cit., p. 55.

²Valeriano and Bohannon, op. cit., p. 124.

³Ibid., p. 130.

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In the campaign against the Huks, the use of air power was found to be most effective in the reconnaissance role, and in transportation and communications. As the Philippine Air Force came into play against the Huks, reaching full operational capabilities in 1952, they also developed their reconnaissance capabilities. The C-47s, L-4s and L-5s were kept very busy during the latter stages of the campaign.

In 1946, the principal mission of the Philippine Air Force was support of the ground forces. By 1948 two squadrons of fighter-bombers had come into operation and bombing and strafing had become a capability of the air force. When Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense, he demonstrated reluctance to employ the air force expensively for bombing and strafing unless intelligence on the targets reliably indicated that they were heavy concentration of Huk forces. He did not find indiscriminate bombing compatible with his policy of winning popular support for the government. Napalm was of little use and incendiary bombs were used against crops only two or three times. The main aerial weapons used against the Huks were the .50 caliber machine gun and standard anti-personnel bombs up to 100 lbs.¹

Late in the campaign an airborne battalion was organized and trained, but it was never used because of the scarcity of parachutes. American involvement in Korea had resulted in a general scarcity of new military equipment for the Philippine armed forces.

¹RAND Corp., Symposium..., op. cit., passim.