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ANNUAL HISTORICAL REPORT, CY 1973
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA


CHAPTER I
THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

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SECTION I - UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA (USFK)
Authorized and Assigned Strength

(C) Authorized and assigned strengths for all elements of the Command, as of 31 December 1973, are as follows:

	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL	
	AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG
Hq UNC/USFK	108	87	69	58	8	8	83	65	268	218
Hq JUSMAG-K	82	80	26	23		3	43	43	156	149
Army Section	134	103							134	103
Navy Section			27	24					27	24
Marine Component					22	20			22	20
Air Force Section							58	54	58	54
COMNAVFORK			80	94	3	3			83	97
COMAFK/314AD							7002	7193	7002	7193
Eighth USA	30367	27971							30367	27291
*STRATCOM	1485	1240							1485	1240
*Army Sec Agency	412	443							412	443
*Def Comm Agency	4	4	4	4			4	4	12	12
*Def Att Off	5	5							5	5
*FE Dist Eng	66	36							66	36
*Kor-Reg Exch							1	1	1	1
*SSG-Yongsan	33	31					6	6	39	37
*Army Matl Comd	3	2							3	2
*Army Aud Agency	0	1							0	1
*Army Res Unit	1	1							1	1
*Comp Sys Comd	5	7							5	7

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ARMY AUTH ASG NAVY AUTH ASG USMC AUTH ASG USAF AUTH ASG TOTAL AUTH ASG

*Fld Cour Sta	7	6						7	6
*Jud Circuit	2	2						2	2
*MSCO Pusan			12	11				12	11
*SUSLAK			16	20				16	20
*Adv Res Pr Agcy							2	2	2

TOTAL US FORCES	32720	30021	234	234	38	34	7199	7368	41191	37657
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*Units not vouchered against USFK strength.

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SECTION II - HEADQUARTERS UNITED NATIONS COMMAND (UNC)/USEFK
Authorized and Assigned Strength

(C) A recapitulation of the HQ UNC/USEFK strength as of 31 December 1973 was as follows:

SERVICE	AUTHORIZED			ASSIGNED			DEPENDENTS IN COUNTRY
	OFF	ENL	TOT	OFF	ENL	TOT	
MILITARY							
US Army	56	52	108	53	34	87	114
US Navy	30	39	69	30	28	58	51
US Marines	7	1	8	7	1	8	5
US Air Force	41	42	83	38	27	65	56
SUB TOTAL	134	134	268	128	90	218	226
CIVILIAN							
US (All DNC)			54			39	32
LWR			15			14	
SUB TOTAL			69			53	32
HQ TOTALS	134	134	337	128	90	271	258

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Assignment/Departure of Flag/General Officers

(U) There were four flag/general officer changes during 1973. On 1 August 1973 General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, received the command of United Nations Command/United States Forces Korea (UNC/USFK) from General Donald V. Bennett, USA.

(U) Lieutenant General John R. Murphy, USAF, replaced Lieutenant General Robert N. Smith, USAF, as Chief of Staff, HQ UNC/USFK, on 30 September 1973.

(U) There were two changes in the TDY position Senior Member, United Nations Military Armistice Commission. Major General Fred E. Haynes, USMC, replaced Major General Rollen H. Anthis, USAF, and served from 6 February 1973 to 12 August 1973. General Haynes was replaced by Brigadier General (P) Thomas U. Greer, USA, who served from 13 August 1973 through the end of the year.

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CHAPTER III: PERSONNEL (U)

1. (C) Eighth Army Strength Posture. During the six-month reporting period, the overall Eighth Army strength posture improved. On 1 Jan 74 a total of 2,561 officers and 24,282 enlisted men were assigned to the command against a combined authorization of 31,155; on 30 Jun 74 officer assignments increased to 2,633 and enlisted men totaled 25,612 versus a combined authorization of 30,147. Overall, the command strength increased from 86 to 94 percent of authorization.¹ (The 30 Jun 74 authorized/assigned strength figures for US services in the ROK follow: Army--32,357/29,599; Air Force--6,964/7,190; Navy--263/254; Marine Corps--48/41.)

2. (U) Termination of the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (AFEM). On 1 Oct 66 DOD authorized awarding of the AFEM to all US military personnel who, after that date, served 30 consecutive days in the ROK. This was in line with an increase of incidents in Korea wherein some US personnel were exposed to hostile fire. Thereafter, in Apr 68 DOD designated as a Hostile Fire Area a 15-mile-long sector below the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and approved additional pay allowances for service in that area. As clashes along the DMZ subsided to only two in 1972-73, DOD lifted the Hostile Fire Area designation/pay in Sep 73.² As a follow-on to these actions, DOD terminated awarding of the AFEM for Korea service. The 14 Feb 74 directive, however, was retroactive to 1 Sep 73, by which time many awards had been made based on service after Sep. In order to preclude excessive administration required to withdraw the medals from ineligible individuals and annotate personnel records, USFK requested an adjustment of the termination date. On 7 Jun 74 this command was informed that DOD had authorized awarding of the AFEM until 30 Jun 74. Thus, personnel who arrived in the ROK after 1 Jun 74 will not be eligible for the medal.

3. (U) Station Housing Allowance (SHA). Military personnel whose duty assignment is in Seoul are eligible to draw allowance for each day government quarters are not assigned as prescribed by the Joint Travel Regulation (JTR). SHA payments are made to offset the high cost of obtaining adequate economy housing. In Dec 73 Eighth Army requested an exception to the JTR which would authorize payment of SHA at the Seoul rates to members whose dependents reside in Seoul, irrespective of the sponsor's duty station. This action was intended to remove inequities caused by the fact that adequate family housing is generally obtainable only in Seoul. Consequently, personnel stationed within commuting range of the capital city usually quarter their families in Seoul, yet the location of their

1. See p 90 for civilian strengths; p 89 for KATUSA strengths; and p 61 for Korean Service Corps strengths.

2. P 6, EUSA Semi-Annual Report of Major Activities, 1 Jul-31 Dec 73.

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duty station determines their eligibility for SHA. DOD approved the request and an amended JTR went into effect on 22 Mar 74.

b. Prior to the Oct 73 opening of Rental Guarantee Housing (RGH) projects³, the US Army Korea Procurement Agency (KPA) made an agreement with the contractor that the tenants would be billed for heating oil at a fixed rate until an actual consumption figure was established. After the latter was determined, tenants would be billed or reimbursed accordingly. KPA and the contractor also agreed that the contractor would operate utilities at zero loss or profit. The winter energy crisis resulted in a 25-30 percent increase in heating costs on the ROK economy. Thus, tenants received delayed billing for heating fuel consumed from Oct 73 through Jan 74 which exceeded the original KPA estimate. Additionally, effective 1 Feb 74, electricity rates increased approximately 25-30 percent. At the request of USFK, DOD's Per Diem Committee approved adjusted increases in SHA rates for RGHs in Seoul and Taegu. These revised rates, effective 1 May 74, represent an increase of approximately \$51 monthly for both officers and enlisted men. This change, however, does not apply to SHA rates for other quarters on the economy.

4. (U) Key Military Positions. "Key military positions" in a short tour area are those deemed to be of such import that assigned personnel are required to serve the "with dependents" tour (24 months in the ROK), whether accompanied or unaccompanied, provided government quarters are available and concurrent travel of dependents is authorized. Accordingly, on 2 May 74 Eighth Army requested DA designate key billets in certain areas as follows:

	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>
Seoul	201	58
Pusan	19	18
Uijongbu	12	--
Osan	5	3
Taegu	101	59

At the same time an exception to policy was requested that would allow some spaces in other areas to be designated "key positions." Although government quarters are not available in these locations, all are within commuting distance of Seoul and personnel assigned to these billets would be authorized SHA for quarters on the economy. Key positions in those areas are:

	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>
2d Inf Div	28	27
I Corps (ROK/US) Gp	--	6
USAG-Camp Humphreys	7	19

Above requests are pending DA confirmation. (Most DAC positions in Korea are 24-month tours. See para 4, page 91.)

3. Housing developments consisting of 300 units in Seoul and 70 in Taegu for which the US Government has guaranteed the private contractor 97 percent occupancy for ten years. See also p 74.

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CHAPTER XII: PERSONNEL (U)

1. (C) Strength Posture. There follows the authorized/assigned strength figures for US forces in Korea as of 31 Dec 74:

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Army	32,521	33,799
Air Force	6,500	6,768
Navy	248	226
Marine Corps	36	38

End of year totals for Eighth Army reflected 2,791 officers and 29,980 enlisted men assigned against a combined authorization of 31,820. Additionally, Eighth Army had an average 7,445 Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA)¹ personnel assigned during the year.

The command's US and Korean national (KN) civilian strengths at the close of 1974 were:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>KN</u>
Appropriated Fund	1,225	15,187
Nonappropriated Fund	221	5,684
Contract Hire	83	8,119
Personal Hire	--	6,167

2. (C) Increased Utilization of WAC Personnel in Eighth Army. Termination of the draft in 1973 and subsequent reliance on an all-volunteer Army resulted in increased WAC assessments. At the same time, all non-combat and non-strenuous MOSS were opened to fully utilize this influx of women. DA then directed all commands world-wide to identify positions which could be manned by both male or

1. The KATUSA program was initiated in 1950 upon verbal agreement among the ROK President, the US Ambassador to Korea, and the CINCUNC. Augmentation was originally based on a ratio of 100 per each US Army infantry company and 75 for each artillery battery. At its peak in 1952, KATUSA strength amounted to 20,000. KATUSA not only bolstered wartime US units but improved combat operations in the areas of local language ability, identification of friend or foe, enemy intelligence, knowledge of local terrain, continuity, etc. Integration of KATUSA with US Army personnel in Korea has continued since the Armistice but on a gradually decreasing scale. In Jul 71, following the reduction of US forces in the ROK, authorized strength was stabilized at 7,240 men. Replacements for the program are selected by ROKA at its recruit training schools from those who completed six weeks basic training. KATUSA then receive on-the-job training in a variety of much needed skills of benefit to the US and the ROK. They serve primarily in combat units but support virtually all Eighth Army organizations.

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female replacements. Impact on Eighth Army's personnel posture was considerable. Prior to 1974 WAC personnel assignments to Korea were very restricted. Limited headquarters positions were available to WAC officers and only EW desiring to accompany their husbands were approved for assignment to the command. This policy was evidenced by the 31 Dec 73 WAC strength of eight officers and 19 EW. Now, however, WAC replacements are being assigned to Eighth Army without regard to marital or volunteer status and are being used not only in administrative capacities, but also in maintenance and support functions. As a result, more than 500 WAC personnel were in Korea at the end of the year and total strength by Jul 75 is expected to be in excess of 800.

As greater numbers of WAC personnel continue to arrive, contingency plans to develop and expand female BOQs/BEQs are being implemented. Moreover, Eighth Army is experiencing an increasing number of married military couples. Their assignments, estimated at 70 couples by 4th Qtr FY 75, are cost effective in that services of two military members are obtained at the price of moving one family overseas. Geographical location of WAC personnel in Korea at the end of 1974 follows: Seoul--337; Pyongtaek--50; Taegu--43; Uijongbu--37; Pusan--11; Waegwan--9; Osan--8; Chunchon--3; and Tongduchon--3.

3. (U) Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) Implementation. The Army's new personnel information reporting system, SIDPERS, became fully operational in Eighth Army during 1974. Simply stated, SIDPERS is a standard computer-oriented personnel system designed to replace the PERMACAP system which had been used in Korea. There are five SIDPERS Interface Branches throughout the ROK, one each at Taegu, Yongsan, Uijongbu, Tongduchon, and Pyongtaek. Their mission is to serve as a control point between the units and the data processing element. In conjunction with the conversion, Yongsan Data Processing Center underwent a complete overhaul and the main computer system, an IBM 360/50, became fully operational 24 Jun 74. In preparation for the conversion, training teams from USARPAC gave instruction to unit morning report clerks and personnel specialists throughout Korea on use of the mark sense forms which update computer files. Processing began 1 Jul 74 and the first computer cycle was produced 17 Jul concurrent with completion of Jun's PERMACAP processing.

SIDPERS furnishes better support to local commanders through availability of records briefs which serve as information and personnel resource management tools. These records briefs are also provided to the individual soldier as a means to verify information on the automated data base. This affords him an opportunity to correct any erroneous data that may be present. Additionally, with the automation of many routine personnel actions, administrative workload was greatly reduced, thereby enabling personnel record specialists to devote more time to actually servicing the troops.

On 1 Sep 74 the morning report was eliminated in Korea. It was replaced by two SIDPERS forms, DA Form 2475-2 (the historical document for each man in a unit) and DA Form 4187 (the document used to report personnel status changes).

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(C) Transfer of Prisoner of War (POW) Responsibility

Previous command post exercises (CPX) indicated that US forces in Korea lack the necessary Military Police and Engineer resources to adequately discharge POW responsibility. Accordingly, EUSA requested that ROKA accept this mission. ROK MND/JCS concurred and instructed ROKA to coordinate with this command on procedural details. A problem thereafter developed regarding US support in the form of hospital equipment and camp construction materials. The US position on support for ROKA is that, although materials are currently not available, sympathetic consideration would be given to ROKA requests in an emergency situation.

Per CINCUNC direction, during CPX FOCUS LENS FY 76, ROKA exercised POW responsibility under a coordinated ROK/US plan and convincingly demonstrated an ability to execute the varied tasks. Afterwards, a meeting was held with the ROKA DCSPER in order to obtain the ROK's overall concept for POW taskings. It is anticipated that an agreement will be effected in 2d half FY 76 with an effective date of 1 Jul 76.

(U) Expeditious Discharge Program (EDP)

The EDP was initiated in USAREUR during Oct 73 and expanded to EUSA on 7 Nov 74. This program provides for discharge of individuals who have demonstrated that they cannot or will not meet acceptable retention standards required of enlisted personnel because of one or more of the following conditions: poor attitude, lack of motivation, no self-discipline, inability to adapt socially or emotionally, and failure to demonstrate promotion potential. EDP applies to all active Army personnel who have completed at least six months but not more than three years of continuous active duty at the time an immediate commander formally recommends discharge.

EDP has proved highly successful and effective in Korea in meeting its objectives of identifying and rapidly separating substandard, nonproductive soldiers who are considered to be unqualified for further service. Since program inception in Nov 74, 800 soldiers have received honorable or general discharges under this policy.

(U) ROKG Korea Service Medal (KSM)

Genesis of the KSM was a Feb 74 report to Seoul from the ROK diplomatic community in Washington, D.C., which alleged that several high-ranking US officers, who had previously served tours in Korea, expressed dissatisfaction about the ROKG's lack of recognition for efforts expended by these officers to enhance ROK security and promote fraternal relations with local communities.⁸ That same month the ROKA general officer serving as Director of the ROK/US Operational Planning Staff (OPS) contacted this headquarters' ACoFS, J1 regarding the number of US awards given to USFK personnel. At

8. ROK Diplomatic Report of 8 Feb 74, Subj: Consideration for Award of Citations to USFK.

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the same time, MND's Personnel Bureau Director (PBD) obtained statistics on ROK awards to USFK personnel. During Mar 74 discussions between the ACofS, J1 and PBD, establishment of a KSM was proposed by the ROK.⁹ The MND PBD was informed that the ROKG would have to formally propose such an award and that it would have to be submitted to DOD for approval prior to authorization for acceptance and wear of the KSM by USFK personnel.

On 19 Jul 74 the ACofS, J1 received notification from MND PBD that a ROK Presidential Act had approved the KSM. The OPS Director then informed the ACofS, J1 that the medals were available for immediate distribution (description appears at Appendix 7). The ACofS, J1 deferred acceptance, again explaining that the medal must be recommended to DOD for approval since the decision to accept foreign service awards requires consent of Congress.

Briefly, ROKG desired to award the KSM to Korea-based UNC/USFK military and civilian personnel serving in a defense-related capacity. The KSM proposal was staffed through this headquarters and coordinated with the Am/Embassy, Seoul. The US Ambassador concurred with the military portion of the offer; however, he did not agree with presentation of a service award to US Government civilian employees.¹⁰ Rationale was that ribbons and medals were more appropriately a military tradition whereas civilian awards were better directed along the category of plaques or monetary recognition. CINCPAC concurrence was obtained and the recommendation was sent to the JCS.

In Jan 75 this command was informed that SECDEF disapproved acceptance of the KSM on grounds that requirements for combat or outstanding meritorious service are not met in Korea under present conditions.¹¹ MND PBD was so advised on 1 Mar by UNC/USFK/EUSA CofS letter.

At a 14 Apr 75 meeting between the ACofS, J1 and MND PBD, it was pointed out that the KSM would have to be conferred upon and worn by members of the ROK armed forces before US personnel would be eligible to wear the medal. Additionally, it was noted that the criteria for the award should be adjusted so as to define it as a decoration presented for achievement rather than a service award. Finally, it was emphasized that the ROK could not be provided with requested personnel rosters since US law precludes military members or employees of the US Government from soliciting or encouraging the tender of an award from a foreign government.

From May through end of the reporting period, various ROK representatives contacted this headquarters in an effort to solve the impasse. Essentially, all meetings covered same issues as the 14 Apr conference.

Notwithstanding US disapproval, MND officials began to award the KSM to selected USFK personnel, to include one presentation to a colonel from

9. MND ltr of 18 Mar 74, Subj: Status of Honors to Foreign Forces Personnel in Korea.

10. J1 Summary Sheet, 31 Jul 74, Subj: KSM.

11. JCS/Memo/SM-40-75 of 17 Jan 75, BG Cooke to ADM Gayler, Subj: KSM.

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CHAPTER XII: PERSONNEL (U)

(C) Strength Posture

There follows the 1974¹ and 1975² year-end authorized/assigned strength figures of US forces in Korea:

<u>SERVICE</u>	1974		1975	
	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Army	32,521	33,799	33,413	33,019
Air Force	6,500	6,768	6,232	7,125
Navy	248	226	246	208
Marine Corps	36	38	41	38
TOTAL	39,305	40,831	39,932	40,390

A similar comparison of US and Korean national (KN) civilian strengths is:³

<u>CATEGORY</u>	1974		1975	
	<u>US</u>	<u>KN</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>KN</u>
Appropriated Fund	1,125	15,187	1,583	16,938
Nonappropriated Fund	221	5,684	205	5,757
Contract Hire	83	8,119	10	5,076
Personal Hire	--	6,167	--	6,065
TOTAL	1,529	35,157	1,798	33,836

The 31 Dec 75 statistics for ROK armed forces were:⁴

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Army*	527,844	520,556
Navy (to include Marine component)	43,846	46,288
Air Force	28,310	30,353
TOTAL	600,000	597,197

*Includes a Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) authorization of 7,037 versus 6,456 assigned.

1. UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1975, p. 175.
2. J1 Docu, undated, Subj: UNC Strength as of 31 Dec 75.
3. CPO HistSum 1975.
4. J1 Docu, undated, Subj: UNC Strength as of 31 Dec 75.

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alternatives: (1) maintain the status quo; (2) assign operational control of postal units to EUSA AG; and (3) establish a separate postal command. Latter was approved with the postal command structured as an AG Detachment (Postal) under the staff supervision of this headquarters' AG (see page 235). It is believed this arrangement will provide optimal staff supervision and control of postal matters.

Purpose of the US Army Port Operations, Pusan study was to develop an organizational structure to more efficiently accomplish the Port's mission and to improve operating methods and procedures. It was found that the DA Standard Port System, installed in Nov 73, was operating well below optimum effectiveness. Principal causes were deficiencies in organizational structure, poorly defined functional responsibilities, and the absence of import/export operating procedures. A Comptroller Management team, drawing from an earlier study by and in cooperation with the Ad Hoc Port Committee created for related purposes, developed new import and export procedures, an improved organizational structure, and well defined functional responsibilities. Recommendations were agreed to by the Port Commander and the Commander, 2d Trans Gp.

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(S) CHAPTER XIII: PERSONNEL (U)

(C) Strength Posture (U)

(C) The 1976¹ and 1977² year-end authorized/assigned strength figures of US forces in Korea were:

<u>SERVICE</u>	1976		1977	
	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Army	33,630	31,791	30,867	31,772
Air Force	7,012	7,666	7,451	8,093
Navy	288	274	280	279
Marine Corps	44	45	52	52
TOTAL	40,974	39,776	38,650	40,196

(C) The 1976 and 1977 year-end statistics for ROK armed forces were:³

<u>SERVICE</u>	1976		1977	
	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Army*	529,828	521,747	526,585	525,534
Air Force	31,256	30,761	32,839	33,807
Navy (includes Marine Component)	46,056	46,327	47,816	48,156
TOTAL	607,240	598,835	607,240	607,497

*Includes a Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) authorization of 7,240 versus 6,289 assigned at end CY 77.

(U) A similar comparison of US and Korean national (KN) civilian strengths follows:⁴

<u>CATEGORY</u>	1976		1977	
	<u>US</u>	<u>KN</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>KN</u>
Appropriated Fund	1,657	16,610	1,505	15,806
Nonappropriated Fund	171	5,648	169	5,787
Contract Hire	76	5,575	123	682
Personal Hire	-	5,845	-	5,413
TOTAL	1,904	33,678	1,797	27,688

1. SECRET UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1976 (U), p. 241.
2. CONF J1 Docu, undated, Subj: UNC Strengths as of 31 Dec 77.
3. Ibid.
4. CPO Hist Sum 1977.

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(U) USFK Dependents in the ROK

(U) The number of USFK dependents in the ROK was at a manageable level (approximately 4,000) prior to 30 Jul 73. On that date, DA implemented this command's proposal to lift the restricted area designation (locations in which dependents are forbidden due to dangerous and/or primitive conditions) for Seoul, Taegu, Pusan and Chinhae. Rationale was that removal of the restriction would permit establishment of two-year command sponsored tours, thereby enhancing combat readiness by increasing continuity, improving morale, reducing personnel turbulence, and providing a more stable and desirable tour for personnel in Korea. Thereafter, many individually sponsored dependents converted to command sponsorship. By 1975, their numbers had increased to about 8,000; simultaneously, the individually sponsored rolls unexpectedly rose to more than 9,000.

(U) In May 75 the ROK-US SOFA Committee, after reviewing problems involving black marketing, agreed to an accord denying access to commissary, exchange and Class VI facilities for dependent spouses acquired in the ROK with following exceptions: (1) Those who in their own right are authorized direct access but acquire dependent status (e.g., a service member who marries another service member), (2) locally acquired dependents of civilians who have been continuously employed by USFK since 8 Feb 67 (date of SOFA) or earlier, and (3) locally acquired dependents who were in joint domicile outside the ROK with their sponsor for one year prior to sponsor's latest return to Korea. This policy change resulted in the confiscation of approximately 4,200 ration control plates issued to dependents. (See page 250.)

(U) In addition to aggravating the black market problem in Korea, the increasing number of individually sponsored dependents resulted in overburdened educational and medical support facilities and would cause serious difficulties for the command in the event of evacuation. The dependent issue was a matter of concern to the Congress, DA and this headquarters. Hence, a major local study was undertaken and submitted to DA in Nov 75. The study concluded that individually sponsored dependents should be reduced to the lowest possible level. This would be accomplished by providing the major overseas commander (CG, EUSA in the case of Korea) with authority to prohibit use of commissaries, exchanges, Class VI stores and DOD schools by individually sponsored dependents and to prohibit their residence in unrestricted areas. Further, government-paid transportation to the US for dependents acquired in-country should be denied unless determined by the major overseas commander to be in the best interests of the US.

(U) Meanwhile, US congressional conferees had agreed in late 1975 that in no case should non-command sponsored dependents be authorized support services in the ROK when the sponsor's tour remains the short

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used to determine an acceptable dependent population was the optimum student level of DOD dependent schools. Strength objectives for command sponsored dependents were set at 6,840 minimum and 7,600 maximum. To counter a downward trend which had begun in Jul 76 and establish additional control over dependent strength, this headquarters in May 77 authorized 3,150 USFK command sponsored positions. They were subsequently distributed on assigned strength bases to staff agencies and troop units in Seoul, Taegu, and Pusan/Chinhae areas. DA was advised that this command needed support in filling the designated positions with personnel who were willing to serve in Korea in an accompanied status. Aggravating the situation was a severe shortage of suitable economy housing in the Seoul area (see page 237). At end CY 77 the command sponsored dependent population had risen to 6,343, from a low point of 5,639 in Jul 77.

(U) 36-Month Command/Staff Tour for Command Designees

(U) The 36-month Command/Staff Tour Program is an EUSA test project initially developed in early 1975 and approved by DCSPER, DA. It provided for selected officers on the DA Command Designee List to serve a 36-month command sponsored tour in the ROK which combined unit or activity command with an assignment to a key staff position within HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA. Although the desired goal envisioned 18-months service in a designated command position followed by the same period in a staff billet, the program offered flexibility in that the command/staff sequence could be reversed and command tour length adjusted for any period from 12 to 18 months. Officers selected were authorized government family housing for the entire 36-month tour. Responsibility for program implementation and further development in EUSA was transferred in Mar 76 from ACofS, J1 to Cdr, MILPERCEN-K following provisional organization of the latter agency.

(U) The 1976 test program provided for a maximum of ten participants to be selected from O-6 and O-5 level Command Designee Lists. Four officers whose projected O-6 command assignments, military specialties, and staff assignment availability dates identified them as potential program candidates were offered participation by DA following a MILPERCEN-K request. All four selectees, however, declined the offer. A new slate of candidates from the O-5 level Command Designee List for assignment to Korea brought forth five volunteers. The test project was evaluated in 1977 and determination was made that it would not be adopted as a formal DA program but would be retained as an O6-O5 level assignment option to be negotiated on an individual basis.

(S) Transfer of Prisoner of War (PW) Responsibility (U)

(S) Command post exercises (CPX) in mid-1970s indicated that US forces in Korea lacked the necessary Military Police and Engineer

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"all others" tour. Subsequent DA guidance indicated a 1 Jul 76 effective date. Specific implementation was effected through a change in the command's ration control regulation. Rationale was that all US armed forces members, civilian employees and contractors must abide by direction to that regulation. Additionally, implementation must be consistent, particularly among all component commands of USFK, or morale would be adversely affected.

(U) General considerations regarding dependent access/support were as follows: (1) the 19 May 75 ROK-US SOFA prohibition regarding access to support facilities remained unchanged, (2) medical support would continue to be provided to individually sponsored dependents as specified by law, and (3) the term "support facilities (services)" encompassed only post/base exchanges, commissaries and Class VI facilities privileges. Dependents who were denied support were not permitted access to those facilities and were not entitled to dollar/item authorizations. Support services such as theatres, postal, recreational facilities, snack bars, etc., were not denied to any category of dependents.

(U) Non-command sponsored dependents of sponsors who had foreign service tour extensions approved prior to 1 Jul 76 would continue to receive privileges until the sponsor's adjusted DEROS; those with sponsors whose extensions were approved subsequent to that date would receive privileges only through sponsor's original DEROS, and would be denied support thereafter. Dependents acquired as a result of a marriage in the ROK prior to 1 Apr 76 would receive support through sponsor's normal DEROS; if sponsor's marriage application was submitted prior to 1 Apr, same policy would apply provided marriage occurred before 1 Jul 76. Dependents of US military retirees residing in Korea were deemed to be in non-command sponsored status; those arriving after 1 Jul 76 would not be entitled to shopping privileges, those already in the ROK would retain access until 1 Jul 77. On this date, ROK-SOFA Committee rescinded their accord of 19 May 75 since subsequent US congressional sanction implemented on 1 Jul 76 effectively accomplished the same purpose.

(U) Principally because of the above restrictions, the number of non-command sponsored dependents had decreased from a Jan 76 high of 10,342 to 6,663 by end CY 76. During 1977 the number stabilized slightly below that level; figure at year's end was 6,068. The command objective is to reduce the number of individually sponsored dependents in the ROK to the lowest possible level; acceptable ceiling was established at 5,000.

(U) With regard to command sponsored dependents, the Nov 75 study had stressed the desire to retain the maximum number that could be adequately supported. Recommendations to DA pointed out that combat readiness would be improved by the added continuity, increased morale and reduced personnel turbulence derived from two-year "with dependents" tours. For command sponsorships (military and civilian) the standard

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resources to adequately discharge PW responsibility. Accordingly, USFK requested that ROKA accept this mission. ROK MND/JCS concurred and instructed ROKA to coordinate with this command on procedural details. Thereafter a problem developed regarding US support in the form of hospital equipment and camp construction materials. The US position on support for ROKA was that, although materials were then not available, sympathetic consideration would be given to ROKA requests in an emergency situation.

(S) Per CINCUNC direction, during CPX FOCUS LENS FY 76, ROKA exercised PW responsibility under a coordinated ROK/US plan and convincingly demonstrated an ability to execute the varied tasks. Afterwards, a meeting was held with the ROKA DCSPER in order to obtain the ROK's overall concept for PW taskings. In accordance with a Memorandum of Agreement dated 13 Jan 76, ROKA was to assume responsibility for PW custodial tasks effective 1 Jul 76. The US SECSTATE subsequently stated, however, that decision to transfer PW responsibility to the ROK would be deferred until a DOD analysis of PW operations during the Vietnam War was completed. On 1 Jun COMUSKOREA informed the ROKA CofS that planned transfer of responsibility must be held in abeyance until further guidance is received from the US Departments of State/Defense.

(S) In Aug 77 COMUSKOREA informed JCS that no word had been received on this issue and requested current status of DOD determinations.⁵ JCS replied that the matter was still under study and that guidance would be forthcoming.⁶ At end of reporting period nothing further was received on this subject. Meanwhile, ROKA responsibility for PW taskings was written into the scenario for CPX FOCUS LENS FY 77 and was effectively carried out.

(U) Ration Control Program and
Command-Unique Personnel Information Data System (CUPIDS)

(U) EUSA has operated a ration control program for US forces in Korea for nearly 25 years during which time it experimented with many versions of card and book systems. All worked well for a short period but were soon compromised or otherwise circumvented, and finally discarded. The first mechanized system was introduced in Jan 71. A USFK ration control plate (RCP), similar to a plastic credit card, was developed to improve administration of the command's ration policy. System became fully operational in May 71 with completion of RCP issue. Embossed in raised lettering on the RCP is the individual's name, rank, social security number, family status, and information relating to commissary, post

5. SECRET COMUSKOREA Msg 290740Z Aug 77. (U)

6. SECRET JCS Msg 141638Z Sep 77. (U)

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exchange and Class VI privileges. Procedurally, the customer completes a purchase and presents his RCP to the clerk who places it in a data recorder (anvil) which records the sale, customer, sales outlet, cashier and date on a standard IBM card. The card is then delivered to a data processing facility, and the purchase information is transferred to a computer which maintains a numbered account on each individual/family based on the sponsor's social security number.

(U) Though this initial mechanized system was a great improvement over previous card/book procedures, a comprehensive study conducted in late 1974 by ACofS, J1 disclosed numerous discrepancies. A review of individual files confirmed the suspicion that data base was inaccurate and incomplete. Approximately 35,000 active RCP holders were not on file; 11,000 former RCP holders who were on file had departed the command; 3,000 dependents were not on file; and quality control program and input/audit trail procedures did not exist.⁷ As a result, consensus was that a new system should be developed that would be self-editing and provide a larger, more accurate data base.

(U) The CUPIDS program developed thereafter resulted in much improved reliability/adaptability while reducing RCP production time and multi-program redundancy. A CUPIDS application form was designed which furnishes ration control, noncombatant, medical, religious and other command-unique personnel management data. Forms are serially numbered to enhance overall control of the system. If forms are submitted which have been reported as lost or stolen by the issuing agency, they will be rejected by a computer table file comparison and identified as such. The RCP was modified to allow utilization by medical facilities through inclusion of embossed medical-required record data. After updating and correcting former ration control and noncombatant computer programs, CUPIDS was placed into effect on 15 Dec 75 with reissue of new RCPs to all authorized individuals. During 1976 CUPIDS replaced the existing temporary RCP (a paper form) with a newly designed plastic plate. The temporary RCPs, for immediate issue to incoming personnel, are serially numbered, centrally controlled and have a fixed expiration date.

(U) In Jan 77 the command's ACofS, Compt began a comprehensive CUPIDS management survey and study aimed at achieving greater efficiency, improving cost effectiveness, and revising controls and application which would produce a more responsive, customer-oriented ration system. To determine individual service members' views on the ration control program the Comptroller developed and distributed a questionnaire to more than 1,200 USFK enlisted officer and DOD civilian personnel stationed throughout the ROK. The questionnaire was designed to elicit responses concerning individual knowledge and personal opinions of the system, as well as

7. J1 Memo to CofS, 9 Mar 76, Subj: CUPIDS.

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-- Receive reports of dishonored checks from USFK installations and notify all other check cashing agencies by teletype message.

-- Publish and periodically update a Korea-wide Dishonored Check List for distribution to all USFK check cashing locations.⁹

-- Maintain individual files on personnel whose checks are dishonored and provide notification to unit commanders.

(U) The CCCO started operations on 1 Aug 77 and by year's end 2,635 dishonored check actions had been processed. Total value amounted to about \$48,000 per month; actual monetary losses came to approximately \$3,500 monthly, of which 63 percent reflected PX and BX transactions.

(U) Command sanctions to be imposed on individuals who write dishonored checks are prescribed in UNC/USFK/EUSA Reg 608-1, 31 Aug 77. Essentially, for a first offense, the person's check cashing privileges will be suspended for six months and individual's ID card will be over-stamped accordingly if dishonored check is not redeemed within seven days of notification. For a second offense, check cashing at USFK activities will be suspended for 12 months and the ID card over-stamped. If the check writer does not redeem the dishonored check for any offense, privileges are suspended indefinitely.

(C) Noncombatant Emergency Evacuation (NEMVAC) and Relocation Plans (U)

(C) ACoFS, JI's noncombatant emergency evacuation plans are outlined in COMUSKOREA CONPLAN 5060, designated NEMVAC. In Feb 77 a revised version of NEMVAC was published and distributed, drawing on experience gained during Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS in Jul 76.¹⁰ In event of hostilities the American Embassy, Seoul is responsible for relocating noncombatants from forward areas to relatively safe areas in southern Korea. If conditions dictate, noncombatants would be further evacuated out of country to safe havens elsewhere in the Pacific area or to CONUS. Although Embassy has basic obligation, COMUSKOREA acts as agent to carry out relocation/evacuation measures. A complementary COMUSKOREA Relocation Plan was developed in May 77 to rapidly move noncombatants from northern areas, where danger from enemy attack is greatest.

9. KRE, which cashes 70 percent of checks issued by USFK members locally, formerly maintained and published lists of personnel responsible for delinquent checks.

10. The earlier NEMVAC scheme was patterned on the successful evacuation of Saigon in 1975.

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(C) Both plans were tested for validity during ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 77 in Jul. Post-exercise evaluation revealed incompatibility in the USFK and Embassy implementation instructions. Based on changes in DEFCON and other indicators, the Embassy plan outlined phased events for orderly evacuation of noncombatants; the COMUSKOREA Relocation Plan did not address emergency evacuation by stages. This major discrepancy will be resolved by revising and coordinating USFK plans to correspond to Embassy evacuation/relocation procedures.

(U) EUSA Reenlistment Program

(U) In 1977 EUSA exceeded reenlistment objectives for both first termers and careerists. The command reenlisted 815 first termers during the year, surpassing the initial goal of 678 for a 120 percent performance rate. There were 1,331 career soldiers reenlisted versus an objective of 1,271; performance rate was 105 percent. Of the 2,146 total reenlistments, only 85 (3.9 percent) required a waiver for continued service. An additional indicator of the quality of EUSA soldiers was reflected by the low number of substandard personnel barred from reenlistment; only 193 were denied during CY 77.¹¹ (1976 figure was 529.)

(U) Expeditious Discharge Program (EDP)

(U) The EDP was initiated in USAREUR during Oct 73 and expanded to EUSA on 7 Nov 74. This program provides for discharge of individuals who have demonstrated that they cannot or will not meet acceptable retention standards required of enlisted personnel because of one or more of the following conditions: poor attitude, lack of motivation, no self-discipline, inability to adapt socially or emotionally, and failure to demonstrate promotion potential. EDP applies to all active Army personnel who have completed at least six months but not more than three years of continuous active duty at the time an immediate commander formally recommends discharge.

(U) EDP has proved highly successful and effective in Korea in meeting its objectives of identifying and rapidly separating substandard, non-productive soldiers who are considered to be unqualified for further service. In 1977 EUSA soldiers received 394 honorable or general discharges under this policy; a total of 2,061 have been released since program's inception.

(U) Marriage to Korean Nationals

(U) USFK personnel stationed in the ROK who desire to marry a Korean

11. MILPERCEN-K Hist Sum 1977.

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(S) CHAPTER XIII: PERSONNEL (U)

(C) Strength Posture (U)

(C) The 1977¹ and 1978² year-end authorized/assigned strength figures of US forces in Korea were:

<u>SERVICE</u>	1977		1978	
	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Army	30,867	31,772	30,080	31,993
Air Force	7,451	8,093	7,910	7,862
Navy	280	279	280	276
Marine Corps	52	52	44	42
TOTAL	38,650	40,196	38,314	40,173

(C) The 1977 and 1978 year-end statistics for ROK armed forces were:³

<u>SERVICE</u>	1977		1978	
	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Army*	526,585	525,534	519,345	519,199
Air Force	32,839	33,807	32,839	32,237
Navy (includes Marine Component)	47,816	48,156	47,816	47,310
TOTAL	607,240	607,497	600,000	598,746

*Includes a Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) authorization of 7,240 versus 6,176 assigned at end CY 78.

(U) A similar comparison of US and Korean National (KN) civilian strengths follows:⁴

1. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 248.
2. (C) J1 Docu, 11 Jan 79, Subj: USFK Strength as of 31 Dec 78 (U).
3. (S) J1 Hist Sum 1978 (U).
4. (U) CPO Hist Sum 1978.

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--(U) To discourage black market activities, electric woks and electric blankets were added to the list of controlled items in Mar and May respectively; purchases of yardage fabric and sewing accessories were included in monthly dollar limits effective 1 Jul.

--(U) Cigarette sales were exempted from the monthly dollar limitation in Mar; monthly quantity limit (60 packs) remained unchanged.

--(U) During period 15-31 Dec non-command sponsored dependents (accompanied by sponsors) were permitted access to exchanges for holiday shopping; all established controls on purchasing limits, etc., remained in effect.

(U) Temporary RCPs issued to new arrivals and visitors were redesigned in 1978 to include more specific personal data; primary purposes were to provide more accurate purchaser identification and preclude counterfeiting of temporary plates. To furnish more timely notification of ration control violations to unit commanders, a computer generated law enforcement report form was developed which lists all individuals who exceeded their monthly purchasing limits; violator listings are sequenced by SSN and unit identification code.

(U) In Dec 78 JI's Data Mgt Branch received an optical character recognition scanner which, when fully operational in CY 79, will significantly reduce manual keypunch workload at Yongsan Data Processing Center and thereby expedite processing of sales transactions cards.

(C) Noncombatant Emergency Evacuation and Relocation Plans (U)

(C) COMUSKOREA CONPLAN 5060, designated NEMVAC, outlines measures for evacuating noncombatants from the ROK to safe havens elsewhere in the Pacific or to CONUS when hostilities are imminent. A complementary Relocation Plan addresses rapid movement of noncombatants from northern part of the ROK, where danger from enemy attack is greatest, to relatively safer areas in the south. Basic responsibility for noncombatant evacuation/relocation rests with the American Embassy; however, COMUSKOREA must be prepared to carry out emergency measures upon request of the US Ambassador. Both plans were tested for validity during ULCHI-FOCUS LENS in Jun 78. Post-exercise evaluation revealed that a redesignation of responsibility was necessary for emergency evacuation measures undertaken in the Seoul area, a warden notification system needed to be established, and that COMUSKOREA's Noncombatant Relocation Emergency Control Center and American Embassy representative should be collocated with USFK's Combined Transportation Movement Center. At year's end, COMUSKOREA plans were under revision in close coordination with US Embassy to insure compatibility of USFK/Embassy implementing instructions.¹¹

11. (S) JI Hist Sum 1978 (U).

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(U) EUSA Reenlistment Program

(U) In 1978 EUSA exceeded reenlistment objectives for both first term and career soldiers. The command reenlisted 1,020 first termers during the year, surpassing the initial goal of 699 for a 146 percent performance rate. There were 1,458 career soldiers reenlisted versus an objective of 970, a performance rate of 150 percent. Of the 2,478 total reenlistments, only 75 (three percent) required a waiver for continued service. A total of 301 substandard personnel were barred from reenlistment during CY 78; 1977 figure was 103.

(S) Transfer of Prisoner of War (PW) Responsibility (U)

(S) Command post exercises in mid-1970s indicated that USFK contingency plans did not include sufficient military police and engineer resources to adequately discharge PW responsibilities in wartime. Accordingly, this command requested that ROKA accept the PW support mission. ROK MND/JCS concurred and instructed ROKA to coordinate with USFK on procedural details. Per CINCUNC direction, during CPX FOCUS LENS FY 76, ROKA exercised PW responsibility under a coordinated ROK/US plan and convincingly demonstrated an ability to execute the varied tasks. In accordance with a Jan 76 MOA, ROKA prepared to assume wartime PW custodial tasks effective 1 Jul 76. The US SECSTATE subsequently stated, however, that decision to transfer PW responsibility to the ROK would be deferred until a DOD analysis of PW operations during the Vietnam War was completed. Since that time this headquarters has queried JCS on several occasions regarding status of the PW issue, most recently on 14 Sep 78. JCS responded that the analysis of Vietnam operations had not yet been completed and that this command would be kept informed of future developments.¹²

(U) Quality of Life Program

(U) In Aug 78 ACofS, J1 was tasked by COMUSKOREA to assess "the quality of life experienced by our service members, civilian employees and their dependents in the ROK" and to present quarterly briefings on findings, conclusions and recommendations. Shortly thereafter, J1 obtained from DCSPER, DA the following conceptual definition of quality of life: "A collective body of policies, programs and actions, both resource and nonresource dependent, by which the Army provides for the needs of soldiers and their families in order to foster their commitment to service and personal readiness to fulfill military requirements." Areas in which quality of life needs should be assessed were categorized by DA as: housing, health care, education, finance, services, community life, and assignment policy; Korean-American relations was added by direction of CG, EUSA.

12. (S) Msg, JCS 101401Z Oct 78 (U). Filed in J1 Plans 61

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(S) CHAPTER XII: PERSONNEL (U)

(C) Strength Posture (U)

(C) The 1978 and 1979 year-end authorized/assigned strength figures of US forces in Korea were:

<u>SERVICE</u>	1978		1979	
	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Army	30,080	31,993	29,892	30,311
Air Force	7,910	7,862	8,399	8,098
Navy	280	276	273	283
Marine Corps	44	42	52	50
TOTAL	38,314	40,173	38,616	38,742

(C) The 1978 and 1979 year-end statistics for ROK armed forces were:

<u>SERVICE</u>	1978		1979	
	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Army*	519,345	519,199	519,345	515,686
Air Force	32,839	32,237	32,839	31,900
Navy (includes Marine Component)	47,816	47,310	47,816	47,431
TOTAL	600,000	598,746	600,000	595,017

*Includes a Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) authorization of 7,240 versus 6,504 assigned at end CY 79.

(U) A similar comparison of US and Korean National (KN) civilian employee strengths follows:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	1978		1979	
	<u>US</u>	<u>KN</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>KN</u>
Appropriated Fund (incl 3,162 Korean Service Corps members)	1,369	15,573	1,333	15,576
Nonappropriated Fund	150	5,757	168	5,746
TOTAL	1,519	21,330	1,501	21,322

1. SECRET J1 Hist Sum 1979 (U).

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military assignments designated as command sponsored, nearly 1,000 were filled by personnel serving in an unaccompanied status. Primary reason was a critical shortage of suitable, reasonably priced economy housing, particularly in vicinity of Seoul (discussed on page 229).

(U) The number of non-command sponsored dependents, which had risen to 9,197 by end CY 78, declined to 8,281 by 31 Dec 79. Individually sponsored dependents were not entitled to exchange/commissary privileges, in accordance with the 1 Jul 76 restriction; many were experiencing considerable difficulty in maintaining an adequate standard of living due to escalating rental costs for family quarters on the local economy. Through messages to CONUS installations, the command continued to discourage military personnel from bringing non-command sponsored dependents to the ROK.

(U) USFK personnel stationed in the ROK who desire to marry a Korean National must first submit an application to their service component headquarters in Korea for processing and approval. A total of 3,256 marriages were approved in CY 79, compared with 3,619 in 1978.

(C) Noncombatant Emergency Evacuation and Relocation Plans (U)

(C) COMUSKOREA CONPLAN 5060, designated NEMVAC, outlines measures for evacuating noncombatants from the ROK to safe havens elsewhere in the Pacific or to CONUS when hostilities are imminent. A complementary Relocation Plan addresses rapid movement of noncombatants from northern part of the ROK, where danger from enemy attack is greatest, to relatively safer areas in the south. Relocation Plan also provides for noncombatant movement in the event of natural disaster or serious civil disturbance. Basic responsibility for noncombatant evacuation/relocation rests with the American Embassy; however, COMUSKOREA must be prepared to carry out emergency measures upon request of the US Ambassador. An updated Relocation Plan was published in Feb 79 and tested for validity the following month during Exercise TEAM SPIRIT; CONPLAN 5060, republished in Mar 79, was similarly tested during CPX ULCHI-FOCUS LENS in late Aug. Post-exercise evaluations of each plan revealed no major problem areas. Based on exercise results, area commanders updated their supporting plans to insure compatibility with COMUSKOREA documents. A revised edition of USFK/EA Pam 600-300 (Emergency Evacuation Instructions) was published on 22 Oct 79; pamphlet is issued to all newly arrived noncombatants and their sponsors.

(U) Quality of Life Program

(U) In Aug 78 ACoFS, J1 was tasked by COMUSKOREA to assess "the quality of life experienced by our service members, DOD civilian employees and their dependents in the ROK" and to present quarterly

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(S) Transfer of Prisoner of War (PW) Responsibility (U)

(S) Command post exercises in mid-1970s indicated that USFK contingency plans did not include sufficient military police and engineer resources to adequately discharge PW responsibilities in wartime. Accordingly, this command requested that ROKA accept the PW support mission. ROK MND/JCS concurred and instructed ROKA to coordinate with USFK on procedural details. During CPX FOCUS LENS FY 76, ROKA exercised PW responsibility under a coordinated ROK/US plan and convincingly demonstrated an ability to execute the varied tasks. In accordance with a Jan 76 MOA, ROKA prepared to assume wartime PW custodial tasks effective 1 Jul 76. The US SECSTATE subsequently stated, however, that decision to transfer PW responsibility to the ROK would be deferred until a DOD analysis of PW operations during the Vietnam War was concluded. DOD completed its study in 1979. DA, as DOD executive agent, then authorized USFK to draft a proposed US-ROK agreement whereby enemy prisoners captured by US forces would be transferred to ROKA control. Document was under development at close of reporting period.

(U) Human Relations Programs

(U) At end CY 79 the racial/gender profile of USFK's military population by percentage was recorded as follows:

	<u>CAUCASIAN</u>	<u>BLACK</u>	<u>OTHER*</u>	<u>FEMALE</u>
EUSA	55.1	33.8	11.1	6.6
USAFK	76.0	21.6	2.4	5.8
USNFK	81.0	10.0	9.0	3.0

*Includes Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans.

(U) On 7 Jun 79 ACoFS, J1 Human Affairs staff conducted a seminar, hosted by COMUSKOREA, for all major subordinate commanders and EUSA staff principals to determine appropriate actions for reducing high ratio of adverse actions directed against the command's black soldiers. Actions recommended by conference participants for implementation at all levels of command included the following: full compliance with requirements for mandatory attendance of all grades at equal opportunity (EO) seminars; institution of cross-cultural communication classes; emphasis on leadership training at lower unit levels; and reinforcement of military justice principles which inherently prohibit discrimination by race in disciplinary actions. The conference served as a highly effective communications catalyst for increasing commanders' and staff awareness of current racial

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(C) CHAPTER XIII: PERSONNEL (U)

(C) Strength Posture (U)

(C) The 1979 and 1980 year-end authorized and assigned strength figures of US forces in Korea were:¹

<u>SERVICE</u>	1979		1980	
	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Army	29,892	30,311	28,008	27,424
Air Force	8,399	8,098	8,661	9,108
Navy	273	283	324	299
Marine Corps	52	50	38	37
TOTAL:	38,616	38,742	37,031	36,868

(C) The 1979 and 1980 year-end statistics for ROK armed forces were:

<u>SERVICE</u>	1979		1980	
	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Army*	519,345	515,686	519,345	518,610
Air Force	32,839	31,900	32,839	32,049
Navy**	47,816	47,431	47,816	47,787
TOTAL:	600,000	595,017	600,000	598,446

*Includes a Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) authorization of 7,057 versus 7,240 assigned at end CY 80.

**Includes 23,000 in Marine component.

(U) A similar comparison of US and Korean National (KN) civilian employee strengths follows:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	1979		1980	
	<u>US</u>	<u>KN</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>KN</u>
Appropriated Fund	1,333	15,576	1,419	16,330
Nonappropriated Fund*	168	5,746	202	5,601
TOTAL:	1,501	21,322	1,621	21,931

*Includes 3,087 Korean Service Corps members.

1. (C) J1 Hist Sum 1980 (U).

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military personnel from bringing their dependents to the ROK. The lower number experienced in both categories of dependents can be in some part caused by the escalating rental costs on the local economy.

(U) On 1 October the USAF centralized its dependent control procedures at Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center (AFMPC) which has since authorized dependent travel for Air Force dependents. This means that USFK J1 no longer controls the number of USAF dependents entering the ROK. Command statistics now only show EUSA dependents. On 1 October a ceiling of 4,000 was established by DA for EUSA command-sponsored dependents. On 31 December EUSA dependents totaled 3,215.

(U) Local marriages directly affect dependent statistics. USFK military personnel stationed in the ROK who desire to marry a Korean National must first submit an application to their service component headquarters in Korea for processing and approval. A total of 2,741 marriages were approved in 1980 compared with 3,256 in 1979.

(C) Noncombatant Emergency Evacuation (NEMVAC)
and Relocation Plans (U)

(C) COMUSKOREA CONPLAN 5060, designated NEMVAC, outlines measures for evacuating noncombatants³ from the ROK to safe havens elsewhere in the Pacific or to CONUS when hostilities are imminent. A complementary Relocation Plan addresses rapid movement of noncombatants from northern part of the ROK, where danger from enemy attack is greatest, to relatively safer areas in the south. The Relocation Plan also provides for noncombatant movement in the event of natural disaster or serious civil disturbances. Basic responsibility for noncombatant evacuation or relocation rests with the American Embassy; however, COMUSKOREA must be prepared to carry out emergency measures upon request of the US Ambassador.

(C) Because of the civil unrest in the country during May (see page 55), a reevaluation of the complete evacuation/relocation matter was undertaken. Composed of members from J1, USAG-Y, US Embassy, J3, 17th Avn Gp, 314th AD, J4, 25th Trans Ctr, Provost Marshal and MILPERCEN-K, the study group analyzed NEMVAC procedures and recommended several changes. The first step was to combine the Relocation Plan and CONPLAN 5060. Other recommended improvements included: providing for three evacuation/relocation options (peaceful conditions, civil disorder, and hostilities), expanding the NEMVAC geographical locations from five to seven, requiring a NEMVAC point of contact in all units, better control of briefings given to noncombatants, streamlined processing procedures, and establishing a

3. (C) Noncombatants as of 31 December 1980: command-sponsored dependents - 7,059; non-command-sponsored dependents - 7,233; DOD-affiliated civilians - 3,185; Embassy-registered civilians - 4,827; estimate of civilians not registered - 2,000; and tourists, businessmen and visitors - 2,098; totaling 26,402.

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NEMVAC Committee (J1, J4, PMJ, US Embassy). Prior to writing the new plan, a coordination visit was made to Tokyo in June to confirm support arrangements in the event NEMVAC was set into motion. Semi-annual trips of this nature were recommended. Additionally, the NEMVAC was tested during Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 80 and lessons learned contributed to the development of a revised plan. Recommended changes were incorporated in the draft plan which was presented to the USFK/EUSA CofS on a 12 November briefing. The draft was approved for publication and distributed on 1 December. The first meeting of the NEMVAC Committee took place on 15 and 16 December at which the new plan was explained to representatives of subordinate commands and staffs. Detailed planning for writing supporting plans was also accomplished at this meeting.

(U) Free Bus Transportation to Friendship Village

(U) Friendship Village is a housing area leased by the US from the Korean National Housing Corporation for USFK command-sponsored families. Because of its location south of the Han River and distance from the Yongsan Military Reservation, it causes some inconvenience to residents to use their cars to travel to work. Rising gasoline costs, traffic hazards and parking congestion compound the difficulties. Citing these factors, a request was sent to DA asking permission for USFK to provide free bus transportation between Friendship Village and Yongsan each morning and evening. The action was disapproved based on existing laws which prohibit free transportation to and from a member's place of duty and residence.

(U) Quality of Life (QOL) Program

(U) In August 1978 the ACofS, J1, was tasked by COMUSKOREA to assess "the quality of life experienced by our service members, DOD civilian employees and dependents in the ROK" and to present quarterly briefings on findings, conclusions and recommendations. This is part of a worldwide assessment administered by DCSPER, DA. The concept of QOL was defined by DA as: "A collective body of policies, programs and actions, both resource and non-resource dependent, by which the Army provides for the needs of soldiers and their families in order to foster their commitment to service and personal readiness to fulfill military requirements." DA listed areas in which QOL needed to be assessed. They are housing, health care, education, finance, services, community, and assignment policy. "Korean-American relations" was a subject added by the direction of CDREUSA. The program in EUSA can be looked at in two aspects: the surveys to determine the EUSA soldier's degree of satisfaction with QOL, and the improvements made.

(U) Surveys. In late 1979 questionnaires, designed by DA, were administered to grades E-1 through O-3 randomly selected from the SIDPERS data base. Sufficient numbers were selected to obtain a 95 percent validity of results. All EUSA subordinate commands participated. A total of

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(C) CHAPTER XIII: PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION (U)

(C) Plans, Policy and Services (U)

(C) Strength Posture (U)

(C) The 1980 and 1981 year-end authorized and assigned strength figures of US forces in Korea are given in Table 35. ROK armed forces strength is shown in Table 36 and civilian figures are at Table 37.¹

(C) Table 35--US Forces Strength Posture

Service	1980		1981	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
Army	28,008	27,424	27,566	28,642
Air Force	8,661	9,108	9,634	9,699
Navy	324	299	365	324
Marine Corps	38	37	41	41
Total	37,031	36,868	37,626	38,706

(C) Table 36--ROK Forces Strength Posture

Service	1980		1981	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
Army*	519,345	518,610	519,345	518,503
Air Force	32,839	32,049	32,839	32,110
Navy**	47,816	47,787	47,816	47,175
Total	600,000	598,446	600,000	597,788


Notes: *Includes an assigned Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) of 6,866 at end of 1981.

**Includes 23,000 in Marine component.

1. J1 Hist Sum 1981 (U). CONF. Revw on 3 Dec 88.

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ment housing and personnel support facilities to be provided by the service member and his or her dependents.

a similar study was initiated to sponsor all eligible of Seoul by 1990. Again, more government housing facilities will be needed. The 1981 congressional ceiling, mentioned above, enabled EUSA to proceed with planning to accomplish these objectives.

(C) Noncombatant Emergency Evacuation (NEMVAC) (U)

(C) COMUSKOREA CONPLAN 5060-81, designated NEMVAC, outlines measures for evacuating noncombatants² from Korea to safe havens elsewhere in the Pacific or to the US when conditions require. These conditions would include imminent hostilities, natural disasters or civil unrest.³

(C) CINCPAC approved the new COMUSKOREA CONPLAN 5060-81 and it was published with an effective date of 1 May.⁴ During a liaison visit to US Forces, Japan, and the US Embassy in Tokyo, interested US officials there were briefed on the new plan. The port of Fukyoko was designated as the primary port of debarkation for noncombatants from Korea. It has excellent seaport facilities, an international airport capable of handling all sizes of aircraft, a large number of first class tourist hotels, a good rail network, and an American consulate. At the meetings, the benefits of continued liaison visits were stressed.

(C) In the early summer a limited NEMVAC exercise was conducted to test notification procedures and familiarize new personnel with procedures. This was followed on 18 September by a full-scale NEMVAC exercise which was held in conjunction with ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 81. A 100 percent notification of all DOD noncombatants was made. Processing centers were set up in all areas and noncombatants were asked to voluntarily report for processing. The response was overwhelming with thousands of people reporting

2. (C) Noncombatants as of 31 Dec 81: command-sponsored dependents - 8,004; noncommand-sponsored dependents - 6,709; DOD-affiliated civilians - 3,284; Embassy-registered US civilians - 7,781; estimated non-registered US residents and tourists - 4,258; third country nationals - 8,395; totaling 38,431.

3. (C) A complementary relocation plan addresses rapid movement of noncombatants from northern part of the ROK, where danger from enemy attack is greatest, to relatively safer areas in the south. The relocation plan also provides for noncombatant movement in the event of natural disasters or serious civil disturbances.

4. (U) Changes and improvements in the plan are discussed in USFK/EUSA Annual Hist Rev 1980 (U), p. 327. SECRET. (Info cited CONF) Revw 31 Dec 87. Filed in SJS Hist Br.

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Figure 1

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to the centers. The remaining evacuation procedures were tested as a command post exercise. An evaluation of the ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 81 test was made in November by the NEMVAC committee. Noted improvements were better reporting formats and procedures, improved transportation coordination, clarification of medical evacuation procedures, changes to emergency payment procedures and an alteration of the NEMVAC Kit contents. The unclassified USFK Pamphlet 600-300, Emergency Evacuation Procedures, was updated and sent to the printer.

(U) Quality of Life (QOL) Program

(U) In late 1979 questionnaires designed by DCSPER, HQDA, were administered to randomly selected personnel in Korea. These surveys identified areas of dissatisfaction for EUSA personnel. During 1980 programs were established to improve barracks privacy, living quarters conditions and furnishings, physical security, transportation services, leadership, PX services, medical facilities and MOS training. During 1981 command support has continued to emphasize improved living conditions. (See topics on PARR and MCA construction on pages 299 and 295.) Renovation of troop barracks continued to move toward the goal of all quarters meeting expeditionary standards by 1986. In addition, new family housing units were constructed in Taegu and Seoul by the Korea National Housing Corporation, creating additional government-leased family housing units (see page 321). Also, master planning was completed for expanding support services in the Seoul area to adequately support all eligible personnel desiring to bring their families to Korea, with similar planning being initiated for other areas south of Seoul. A new survey is being developed to assess 1982 QOL perceptions.

(U) Family Life Communications Line (FLCL)

(U) Family members voiced a need for more information concerning DA policies affecting their lives during the first Army Family Symposium conducted in Washington in October 1980. DCSPER established a FLCL in September 1981 in response to that concern. The FLCL allows individuals to call DA toll free and acquire direct information; however, the DA line could not accommodate direct overseas inquiries due to limited communication links and time zone differences. A FLCL was established in Korea in September to provide a service parallel to the DA FLCL. Five terminal points (19th Spt Comd, 2d Inf Div, CFA (ROK/US), Yongsan Garrison and HQ EUSA) were established with EUSA responding as soon as possible or providing any necessary links with DA. The FLCL in Korea is designed to allow family members of EUSA personnel to directly acquire information concerning local, MACOM or DA policies which affect their lives. It is not intended, however, to function as a crisis "hot line."

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(C) Enlisted Strength Shortages

(C) At the beginning of 1981, severe shortages existed in enlisted strength, particularly in combat arms, intelligence and medical specialties. Despite forecasts of 98 to 101 percent fill, EUSA enlisted strength declined from 99.9 percent of authorized in November 1980 to a low of 94.5 percent by March 1981. Extensive coordination with MILPERCEN-DA about the continuing strength decline culminated in a visit to Korea by MILPERCEN-DA representatives from 27 April to 2 May. Sources of the problem were identified as failure of personnel to exit the training base as projected, erroneous data in the personnel data base and problems inherent to a manual projection system. Exceptional management efforts were initiated by MILPERCEN, to include: Identification of additional infantrymen for "bulk-fill" assignment above those numbers allocated by requisitions; revision of HQDA Enlisted Distribution Guidance to reflect a minimum acceptable level of fill (MALOF) of 98 percent for both total enlisted strength and top five NCO assigned strength; and initiation of a quarterly critical MOS listing whereby EUSA could project shortages directly to MILPERCEN assignment managers on a regular basis. Intensive management visits to Headquarters, MILPERCEN, by Commander, MILPERCEN-K, and continuing dialogue concerning specific shortages by MOS and grade improved enlisted strength by the end of 1981. By December overall EUSA enlisted strength was 103.9 percent of authorized. Despite this fact, NCO fill remained below the worldwide fill rate with shortfalls concentrated at grades E8 and E6.

(C) Enlisted shortages in Career Management Fields (CMF) for Field Artillery Sergeant (CMF 13), Light Vehicle Repairer (CMF 63) and Electronic Warfare/Signal Interpreter (CMF 98) were the cause of degradation of Unit Status Report (USR) readiness reporting units. These shortages impacted primarily upon subordinate units of the 2d Infantry Division. The worldwide fill rate for each of these CMF was below 70 percent with the EUSA fill below the worldwide fill rate. Ninety-day projections indicated slight improvement in EUSA fill rate but were insufficient to alleviate the detrimental impact on unit readiness.

(U) Continuity and Stability Study Update

(U) In 1980 the Commander, US Army Military Personnel Center-Korea, conducted a study to analyze options available to EUSA to improve personnel assignments, stability, and continuity. Nine personnel assignment options and one internal operating procedure were examined.¹³ In February 1981 the continuity and stability study was delivered to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, DA. By year's end the DCSPER had reported; in response to a request for status from the Commander, EUSA, that the following initiatives were still pending action or were under further review for the reasons stated:¹⁴

13. USFK/EUSA Annual Hist Rvw, 1980, op. cit., p. 348.

14. HQDA DAPE-ZA 2114592 Dec 81, subj: Personnel Stability and Continuity in Eighth Army. Unclass. Filed in J1.

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(C) CHAPTER XIII: PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION (U)

(C) Plans, Policy and Services (U)

(C) Strength Posture (U)

(C) The 1981 and 1982 year-end authorized and assigned strength figures of US forces in Korea are given in Table 48. ROK armed forces strength is shown in Table 49 and civilian figures are at Table 50.¹

(C) Table 48--US Forces Strength Posture (U)

Service	1981		1982	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
Army.....	27,566	28,642	27,236	27,882
Air Force.....	9,654	9,699	10,527	10,377
Navy.....	365	324	384	333
Marine Corps.....	41	41	41	41
Total.....	37,626	38,706	38,188	38,633

(C) Table 49--ROK Forces Strength Posture (U)

Service	1981		1982	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
Army*.....	519,345	518,503	519,345	517,429
Air Force.....	32,839	32,110	32,839	31,871
Navy**.....	47,816	47,175	47,816	47,946
Total.....	600,000	597,788	600,000	597,246

Notes: *Includes an assigned Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) of 6,466 at the end of 1982.

**Includes Marine component.

1. Unless otherwise noted, source for this chapter is the ACofS, J1, Hist Sum, 1982 (U). CONFIDENTIAL.

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(U) Table 50--USFK Civilian Force Strength Posture

Category	1981		1982	
	US	KN	US	KN
Appropriated Fund.....	1,535	15,618	1,870	15,441
Nonappropriated Fund*.....	193	5,628	238	5,804
Total.....	1,728	21,246	2,108	21,245

Note: *Includes 3,195 assigned Korean Service Corps members.

(C) Noncombatant Emergency Evacuation (NEMVAC) (U)

(C) COMUSKOREA CONPLAN 5060-81, entitled Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan (NEMVAC), outlines US military support provided to the American Embassy, Seoul, in the protection and evacuation of US noncombatants and designated aliens in the Republic of Korea. Noncombatants² may be relocated from areas of potential danger to locations of relative safety in the ROK, or they may be evacuated to safe havens elsewhere in the Pacific and to locations in the United States.

(U) In February 1982 an updated edition of USFK Pamphlet 600-300, Emergency Evacuation Procedures, was published and distributed. This unclassified document is provided to newly arrived noncombatants to prepare them for possible evacuation.

(C) A major NEMVAC exercise was conducted in May which tested notification procedures, individual processing, and the actual relocation of 100 noncombatants from Seoul to Osan by rail movement. This exercise proved successful and many noncombatants voluntarily reported to processing centers to check the contents of their NEMVAC kits. A more comprehensive exercise was held during the command post exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 82. It evaluated staff actions and procedures required for notification, assembly, and the simulated relocation and evacuation of all noncombatants from the ROK to safe havens. Lessons learned from this exercise will be incorporated in a revised edition of the NEMVAC plan which is scheduled to be published in 1983.

Quality of Life (QOL)/Command Sponsorship

(U) During late 1981 the COMUSKOREA directed the development of a plan to command-sponsor all eligible personnel in Seoul and areas south of Seoul by 1990. US Air Forces, Korea (USAFK), shared these convictions and planned to increase its command sponsorship program. Since the Navy already offered command sponsorship to all eligible personnel, the plan had little impact on

2. (U) Noncombatants as of 31 Dec 82: Command-sponsored dependents-10,250; noncommand-sponsored dependents-8,938; US government and contract civilians-3,765; Embassy-registered and estimated non-registered US civilians-5,451; American tourists-3,400; third-country nationals-8,900; for a total of 40,704.

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CHAPTER XIV: PERSONNEL (U)

Personnel Strength Posture (U)

(U) The 1982 and 1983 year-end military personnel strength levels for USFK and ROK Forces are shown on Table 27. USFK civilian employee strengths appear on Table 28.

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Table 27--(U) Year-End Military Personnel Strength Levels

Service	1982		1983	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
US Army	27,236	27,882	27,844	27,226
US Air Force	10,527	10,377	11,129	11,153
US Navy	384	333	394	379
US Marines	41	41	41	41
US Total	38,188	38,633	39,408	38,799
ROK Army	519,345	517,429	519,345	524,834 ^a
ROK Air Force	32,839	31,871	32,839	32,618
ROK Navy/Marine Force	47,816	47,946	47,816	47,182
ROK Total	600,000	597,246	600,000	604,634

^aIncluded 6,949 Korean Augmentation to US Army (KATUSA) personnel (see note 1).

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1. (U) The KATUSA program was initiated in August 1950 under a verbal agreement between the CINCUNC (General MacArthur) and ROK President Rhee. The first KATUSA recruits, legally part of the ROK Army and administered by the ROK Government, were assigned as reinforcements for the understrength 7th Infantry Division in Japan, which was preparing for deployment to Korea. On 20 August 1950, US divisions in combat on the peninsula received their initial KATUSA reinforcements. At its 1952 peak, KATUSA strength had reached 27,000, of which 20,000 were in combat divisions and the remainder in EUSA combat support units. KATUSA strength declined after the Armistice and in July 1971, following a reduction of US ground forces in the ROK, a ROK-US agreement formalized the program and established the authorized KATUSA strength level at 7,240. Replacements, who were selected by ROKA, received on-the-job and school training in a variety of military skills and were assigned to virtually all EUSA combat, support, and headquarters organizations, thus substantially

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Table 28--(U) Year-End USFK Civilian Employee Assigned Strength Levels

Category	1982		1983	
	US Citizen	KOREAN National	US Citizen	Korean National
Appropriated Fund	1,870	15,441	2,377	17,274
Nonappropriated Fund	238	5,804	302	7,535 ^a
Civilian Total	2,108	21,245	2,679	24,809

^aIncluded 3,246 Korean Service Corps personnel (see page 235).

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(C) USFK's overall military personnel end strength was programmed to increase to 41,810 by the close of 1985. The expansion would be primarily a result of force modernization actions initiated to improve combat capabilities, including: conversion of the 2d Infantry Division to Division 86 configuration commencing in 1984; Total Army Analysis 88 actions reorganizing and raising strength levels for units providing critical combat support for EUSA; and actions designed to upgrade EUSA combat support and combat service support units currently manned at low authorized levels of organization (see Table 2, page 74). Personnel shortages which impacted adversely on Eighth Army's readiness status are discussed on pages 73-74.²

Mobilization of Ex-KATUSA Soldiers (U)

(C) Wartime personnel planning in early 1982 prompted concerns over the ROK Army's continued support of the KATUSA program in the event of hostilities on the peninsula. Following discussions between EUSA and ROKA personnel planners, the latter agreed in April 1982 to maintain KATUSA strength in wartime through "replacement of losses." EUSA subsequently recommended that ROKA include a provision in its mobilization plans which would direct the return of ex-KATUSA soldiers to US Army units as immediate wartime filler

(Continued)

reducing US troop requirements. Annual cost savings for EUSA were estimated to be at least \$90 million, attributed primarily to significant disparities in pay and allowance entitlements between KATUSA and EUSA personnel. (Eighth Army policies governing the KATUSA program were contained in EUSA Reg 600-2.)

2. (1) ACoFS, J1 Plans, Plcy & Svc Div Hist Sum 1983. CONFIDENTIAL.
- (2) Point Paper, ACoFS, G3 Force Dev Div, 20 Jan 84, subj: FY 82-85 Personnel End Strengths (U). CONFIDENTIAL.

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personnel and replacements for casualties. In August 1983, ROKA agreed to the proposal and requested a time-phased estimate of wartime KATUSA casualties, which EUSA's 8th Personnel Command (Prov) provided in September.

(C) According to the estimate, the greatest number of KATUSA casualties during the first 90 days of hostilities would be sustained by those assigned to the US 2d Infantry Division's infantry, armor, field artillery, and transportation units. The ROKA-developed wartime replacement concept would significantly reduce processing and training time required to replace KATUSA losses, thereby improving the personnel strength posture of EUSA's combat and support units.³ (The effects of KATUSA assignments on EUSA readiness reporting, an issue addressed by the General Accounting Office in 1982, is discussed on pages 82-83.)

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (U)

(C) Following extensive coordination with the US Embassy, Seoul, and higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands, ACoFS, JI planners completed work in December 1983 on a new COMUSKOREA/CDREUSA OPLAN 5060-84 (NEO), which replaced COMUSKOREA/CDREUSA CONPLAN 5060-81. The plan outlined US military support provided to the US Embassy in the protection and evacuation of US noncombatants and designated aliens in the ROK. Noncombatants could be relocated from potential danger areas to relatively safe locations in the ROK, or they could be evacuated to safe havens elsewhere in the Pacific area or to the US.

(U) Lessons learned in USFK-wide NEO exercises in May and August 1983 contributed materially in developing changes to emergency evacuation procedures embodied in the new OPLAN. ACoFS, JI conducted workshops throughout the year to address and resolve problems experienced by exercise participants. An updated edition of USFK Pamphlet 600-300, Emergency Evacuation Procedures, was published in August.

(C) The status of noncombatants located in the ROK at year's end was recorded as follows:

USFK command sponsored dependents	9,890
USFK non-command sponsored dependents	10,016
USG civilian employees and contractor personnel	5,491
(including their dependents)	
Non-USFK affiliated American residents	8,239
(including their dependents)	
US resident aliens (green card holders) (estimated) ...	6,000
American tourists (estimated)	4,500
Third country nationals (potential evacuees)	12,835
Total	56,971

(U) The USFK non-command sponsored dependent population increased from 8,512 at the beginning of 1983 to 10,016 at the year's end. The growth was

3. 8th PERSCOM (Prov) Hist Sum 1983. SECRET (info used CONF).

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CHAPTER XIV: PERSONNEL (U)

Personnel Strength Posture (U)

(U) Military personnel strength levels for USFK at the end of calendar year (CY) 1984 are depicted in Table 26. Civilian USFK employee strengths are shown on Table 27.

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Table 26--(U) Year-End Military Personnel Strength Levels

Service	1983		1984	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
Eighth Army	23,377	22,715	23,543	23,589
Other US Army ^a	4,467	4,511	4,744	4,411
US Air Force	11,129	11,153	10,807	10,974
US Navy	394	379	402	394
US Marines	41	41	43	43
USFK Total	39,408	38,799	39,539	39,411
KATUSA ^b	7,142	6,949	7,142	6,476

^aPersonnel from other MACOMs/agencies which provided in-country support to EUSA. Most were assigned to 1st Sig Bde (USAISC) and 501st MI Gp (INSCOM).

^bKATUSA--Korean Augmentation to US Army personnel (see note 1).

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1. (U) The KATUSA program was initiated 15 August 1950 under a verbal agreement between the CINCUNC (General MacArthur) and ROK President Rhee. The first KATUSA recruits, legally part of the ROK Army and administered by the ROK Government, were assigned as reinforcements for the understrength 7th Infantry Division in Japan, which was preparing for deployment to Korea. On 20 August 1950, US divisions in combat on the peninsula received their initial KATUSA reinforcements. At its 1952 peak, KATUSA strength had reached 27,000, of which 20,000 were in combat divisions and the remainder in EUSA combat support units. KATUSA strength declined after the Armistice and in July 1971, following a reduction of US ground forces in the ROK, a ROK-US agreement formalized the program and established the authorized KATUSA strength level at 7,240. Replacements, who were selected by ROKA, received on-the-job and school training in a variety of military skills and were assigned to virtually all EUSA combat, support, and headquarters organizations, thus substantially reducing US troop requirements. Annual cost savings for EUSA were estimated to be at least \$90 million, attributed primarily to significant disparities in pay and allowance entitlements between KATUSA and EUSA personnel. (Eighth Army policies governing the KATUSA program were contained in EUSA Reg 600-2.)

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Table 27--(U) Year-End USFK Civilian Employee Assigned Strength Levels

Category	1983		1984	
	US Citizen	Korean National	US Citizen	Korean National
Appropriated Fund	2,056	15,718 ^a	2,407	16,564
Nonappropriated Fund	291	6,570	528	6,632
Civilian Total	2,347	22,288	2,935	23,196

^aIncluded 3,200 Korean Service Corps personnel (see pages 237-38).

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(C) Compared to CY 1983, USFK's overall authorized military personnel end strength increased by 131 spaces; however, the total end strength of Army units rose by 443 spaces. The latter increase was primarily the result of the introduction of new M60A3 tanks and deployment of a multiple-launch rocket system battery in the 2d Infantry Division (345 spaces) (see pages 102-03). Activation of a tactical satellite communications company in the 1st Signal Brigade accounted for the remaining increase of 98 spaces (see page 139). Specific military occupational speciality shortages which impacted adversely on Eighth Army's readiness status are discussed on page 62.²

USFK Dependent Status (U)

(U) Command Sponsored Dependents. A major aim of USFK's policy on command sponsorship of dependents continually had been to accommodate the greatest number that could be adequately supported. Family sponsorship was provided to personnel who elected to serve a two-year tour of duty in the ROK. The primary standard used to determine an acceptable dependent population was based upon the maximum student enrollment which could be sustained by the DOD Dependent School System in Korea. Other governing factors included the support capabilities of medical, commissary, and exchange facilities, as well as the availability of US Government-controlled family quarters and adequate, affordable housing on the local economy.

(U) The sponsorship policy yielded significant benefits to the command by enhancing combat readiness through longer assignment continuity, decreased personnel turbulence, and increased morale by maintaining family integrity. The number of command-sponsored dependents in the ROK rose from approximately 4,000 in the late 1960s to over 10,000 at year-end 1982.

2. (1) ACofS, JI Plans, Plcy & Svc Div Hist Sum 1984. CONFIDENTIAL.
 (2) Point Paper, ACofS, G3 Force Dev Div, 2 Oct 84, subj: EUSA Force Structure Actions (U). SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

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--Family member employment assistance through priority placement and job referral; establishment of a one-stop employment information center in the Army Community Service Center.

--Initiation of installation-level community seminars to provide input into the EUSA FAP.

--Construction of 675 leased housing units for EUSA US civilian employees by mid-1986.⁸

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (U)

(C) Measures for the evacuation of noncombatants from the Korean Peninsula were outlined in COMUSKOREA/CDREUSA OPLAN 5060 (NEO). This plan outlined US military support provided to the US Embassy (which had overall responsibility) for the protection and evacuation of US noncombatants and designated aliens in the ROK. Noncombatants could be moved from potential danger areas to relatively safe locations in the ROK, or they could be evacuated to safe havens elsewhere in the Pacific area or to the US. If events dictated, COMUSKOREA could relocate noncombatants from danger areas prior to the US Ambassador's decision to evacuate. The evacuation mission would be assumed by the USFK at the Ambassador's request, contingent on approval by USCINCPAC and JCS to commit military forces for NEO.

(U) COURAGEOUS CHANNEL 1-84. A semiannual NEO exercise, COURAGEOUS CHANNEL 1-84, was conducted during 3-5 April 1984. Purposes of the exercise were to practice, evaluate, and improve notification and processing procedures for US noncombatants located throughout the ROK in accordance with OPLAN 5060 and its supporting plans and standard operating procedures. An overall goal was to improve the confidence of sponsors and family members in USFK's interest and ability to evacuate noncombatants to safe havens in an emergency. Specific objectives were:

--Notification of 100 percent of DOD noncombatants in Korea, using unit and area wardens and sponsors; exercise USFK crisis action procedures to initiate unit notification; and practice the use of American Forces Korea Network (AFKN) radio and television means for public information announcements.

--Evaluate staffing and procedures of area Noncombatant Relocation/Evacuation Control Centers to include adequacy of emergency plans, reporting procedures, and available communications support for command and control of evacuation operations.

--Determine capabilities of NEO Processing Centers to conduct operations which provide for maximum participation of noncombatants and to process them within 30 minutes of their arrival at the center; evaluate readiness status of participants' NEO kits; and observe the level of assistance

8. (1) ACoFS, J1 Hist Sum 1984. (2) Point Paper, ACoFS, J1 Plans, Plcy & Svc Div, 11 Jan 85, subj: Family Action Plan. (3) Point Paper, ACoFS, J1 Plans, Plcy & Svc Div, 11 Jan 85, subj: The Army Partnership with Families. All UNCLASSIFIED.

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provided by the center in the preparation of required NEO documents and dissemination of NEO information.

(U) COURAGEOUS CHANNEL 1-84 was the largest-scale NEO exercise ever conducted by USFK in terms of extent of notification and noncombatant participation. A total of 17,939 persons were notified (14,095 in May 1983) and 9,190 individuals were processed during COURAGEOUS CHANNEL 1-84 (4,738 in 1983). In addition to US DOD civilian employees and dependents of both military personnel and civilian employees, a sizeable number of family members from the American Embassy and the US business community in Korea participated in the NEO processing phase. Factors contributing to the success of the exercise were: Use of detailed NEO plans which provided clear objectives and standards of operation; highly effective media coverage by USFK Public Affairs Office and AFKN; and a growing awareness by DOD military and civilian families of their responsibilities for individual preparedness measures necessary to insure a successful evacuation.

(U) A significant deficiency brought to light by COURAGEOUS CHANNEL 1-84 was the lack of a Family Care Plan by some joint domicile (military members married to other military members) and sole parents. This plan, a mandatory requirement to be prepared by military parents in those two categories, would specify how their children would be cared for in the event an actual evacuation was ordered. Upon evacuation of noncombatants, military parents would be required to remain to perform their military duties; therefore, someone would have to be designated by the parents to take custody of their children and evacuate them. Unit commanders were reminded of their responsibility to insure all joint domicile/sole parents had a Family Care Plan. Other deficiencies noted during the exercise included: Reporting format discrepancies; inadequate NEO warden training; and apathy on the part of sponsors and noncombatants towards NEO.⁹

(U) COURAGEOUS CHANNEL 2-84. The second NEO exercise, COURAGEOUS CHANNEL 2-84, took place during 20-22 August 1984 in conjunction with Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS. The purposes and goals were essentially the same as those of the previous NEO exercise. A major objective was to contact and process new family members who had arrived in Korea during the summer rotation period. Exercise goals were substantially met. Deficiencies noted during the course of the exercise included:¹⁰

--(S) Status reports received by US Forces Japan (USFJ) ACoS, JI NEO support personnel from USFK lacked detailed, real-time information. Reports failed to identify the nationality, estimated arrival time, or ports of debarkation of noncombatants being evacuated to Japan. Development of a NEO status report that included the number of people (by nationality) being evacuated and their specific destination in Japan was essential.

9. (1) Point Paper, ACoS, JI Plans Div, 11 Jan 85, subj: Overview of USFK/EUSA OPLAN 5060 (U). CONFIDENTIAL. (2) ACoS, JI Hist Sum 1984. (3) USFK/EUSA Exercise Plan, COURAGEOUS CHANNEL 1-84, 12 Mar 84. (4) Exercise COURAGEOUS CHANNEL 1-84 After Action Report, undtd. All UNCLASSIFIED.

10. (1) ACoS, JI, Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USFK/EUSA ULCHI FOCUS LENS 84 After Action Report (U), 30 Jan 85. SECRET.

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--(S) Specific policy and guidance on NEO casualty reporting and processing required development.

--(C) Intelligence and facility damage reports indicated 100 percent of the highways and roads were unusable for moving war supplies and troops from south to north. However, noncombatants were moved from north to south over those same roads without degradation to travel time for bypasses, detours, or walking around damaged areas. Personnel manning relocation control centers needed to pay closer attention to intelligence and facility damage reports, moving noncombatants as feasible and adjusting enroute times accordingly.

--(C) Relocation control center personnel were moving noncombatants south without notifying 19th Support Command. This resulted in noncombatants arriving at locations where they could not receive proper care. The lack of notification also created the additional problem of noncombatants being evacuated out of country without the 19th Support Command knowing of the departure, destination, and number of evacuees, resulting in a loss of accountability. Better communications and closer coordination were needed between the relocation centers and 19th Support Command on the movement of noncombatants.

--(U) DOD Dependent School personnel were not properly prepared for NEO. School officials had not briefed their personnel on NEO requirements and procedures. In some cases teachers were unsure of necessary action for evacuation of students if NEO plans were implemented during school hours. Responsibility for insuring school officials were properly briefed on NEO requirements and procedures rested with ACoFS, J1.

(C) Noncombatant Status. The status of noncombatants located in the ROK at year's end was recorded as follows:¹¹

USFK command sponsored dependents	9,371
USFK non-command sponsored dependents	10,694
USG civilian employees and contractor personnel	3,709
(including retirees and widows)	
Non-USFK affiliated American residents	7,076
(including their dependents)	
US resident aliens (green card holders) (estimated) ...	6,000
American tourists (estimated)	5,000
Canadian and United Kingdom citizens	1,668
(by formal agreement)	
Other third country nationals (potential evacuees)	7,312
Total	50,830

Data Management (U)

(U) Command Unique Personnel Information Data System (CUPIDS). During 1984, the CUPIDS underwent further development to handle ration control requirements. Four new subsystems were established: Monthly administrative report, monthly sales report, daily application update, and daily sales update.

11. (1) EUSA R&A, 1st Qtr, FY 85. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Point Paper, ACoFS, J1 Plans Div, 11 Jan 85, subj: Noncombatant Estimate (U). CONFIDENTIAL.

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3. (U) Exchange Branch; Eighth Army Exchange Advisory Committee.

On 10 December 1965, a recommendation to establish an 8th Army Exchange Advisory Committee was submitted by CG, EASCOM to this headquarters. The recommendation was approved by the DC/S on 6 January 1966. Each major subordinate command with PX responsibilities has membership on this committee. This committee will assist this headquarters and the Exchange management in identifying problems and developing solutions, and it will provide a forum for the exchange of ideas on improving the service in all subordinate commands. Additionally, the 8th Army representatives to the JAKOR Exchange Council will be provided all facts relevant to current operations and problem areas prior to attending JAKOR Exchange Council meetings.

D. MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL DIVISION

1. (S) General. During the 1st and 2d Quarters FY 66, the Manpower and Personnel Division was involved in handling replacements, planning for a reduction-in-force, surveying requirements, and assisting G3 and G4 in reorganizing subordinate elements under COSTAR.

2. (U) Reduction of Pipeline-Air Travel. Since 1 July 1965, the bulk of Eighth Army replacements have come by airplane. The replacement by air system has increased the time personnel are available in the command and has reduced the size of the "pipe."

3. (U) Bulk-fill. From 1/3 to 1/4 of all enlisted replacements received are "bulk-fill" requiring extensive retraining and consequent assignment difficulties. Subordinate elements were advised of the problem and given specific instructions on how to solve it.

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(S) CHAPTER XI: COMPTROLLER

(U) FY 79 Command Budget Performance

(U) EUSA's Operation and Maintenance, Army budget execution for FY 79 (1 Oct-30 Sep 79) reflected maximum utilization of resources through intensified financial management actions taken at all levels of command. Against the \$296.1 million OMA program, obligations totaling \$295.96 million were recorded, resulting in a 99.95 percent fund utilization ratio; this figure represented most effective year end close-out ever achieved by this command.¹ (FY 78 OMA budget obligations amounted to \$280.5 million, with 99.73 percent fund utilization ratio recorded.)

(U) Eighth Army's Civilian Employees' Salaries/Wages/Allowances accounted for 50 percent of EUSA's FY 79 OMA budget: 32 percent was allocated for Korean National General Schedule (GS) employees, nine percent for Korean Service Corps, and eight percent for US GS employees, with one percent obligated for travel allowances. Remaining elements of expense were allotted for Supplies - 32 percent, and Contract Services - 18 percent.

(U) FY 80 Command Operating Budget (COB)

(U) The EUSA FY 80 COB, submitted in early Jul 79, was prepared using DA program budget guidance issued in May 79 based on this command's force structure at that time. Since budget processing was finalized prior to President Carter's 20 Jul 79 decision to postpone further withdrawals of 2d Inf Div elements from Korea, the FY 80 COB did not include OMA resources necessary for retaining in-country those units scheduled for redeployment in late CY 79 and 2d half CY 80 (constituting Increments IB and II, described on page 88, this report). This headquarters had notified DA in Apr 79 of EUSA requirement for additional funds to maintain a satisfactory readiness posture if planned troop withdrawals were delayed.² FY 80 funding shortfalls amounting to

1. SECRET Comptr Hist Sum 1979 (U).

2. CONF EUSA CJ-FD-MF msg 190845Z Apr 79, subj: Funding Impact of Withdrawal Delays (U). Filed in J3 Force Dev Div.

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(S) The first DAS summary report, dated 20 Jun 78, dealt with Phase I (CY 78-79 increments) of the troop withdrawal plan. Two principal issues addressed to OSD level were: (1) the need for program flexibility to insure that projected US force withdrawals are accomplished in a manner consistent with ROKF capabilities to assimilate transferred EUSA equipment without serious degradation of overall defense posture, and (2) the necessity for guidance on justification for transfer of specific equipment line items, and quantities thereof that should be included in the compensatory program. A second DAS summary report concerning similar issues and problems expected during Phase II (CY 80 increment) was published on 6 Nov 78. It pointed out three issues requiring resolution at DOD level: (1) recent OSD management initiatives, in possible conflict with SECDEF commitments to the ROK, would effect transfer to ROKA of nonoperational and logistically unsupportable weapons/equipment from CONUS sources while fully maintained and supported items would be withdrawn from Korea when EUSA units were inactivated, (2) existing prohibitions would exclude all US COMSEC devices from the compensatory equipment transfer program (see page 218), and (3) OSD guidance was needed to clarify types and scope of essential training for ROKA personnel that may be furnished as "Defense Services" within provisions of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (PL 95-384) which authorized cost-free equipment transfers.⁵

(U) On 12 Oct 79, a third DAS summary report was issued giving results of reviews from 1 Nov 78 through 30 Jun 79. According to DAS, significant deficiencies addressed in previous reports had been or were being adequately resolved; relatively minor problems remaining indicated that OSD had brought overall program plans, guidance, implementing procedures, controls, and interorganizational communications to a status wherein congressionally mandated equipment transfers would be successfully executed. Although a 20 Jul 79 Presidential decision had suspended further withdrawals of 2d Inf Div elements from Korea, long-planned EUSA nondivisional force reductions will continue through CY 80 with concurrent transfer of weapons/equipment to ROKA in accordance with PL 95-384 (discussed on page 131).

(U) Fiscal Operations In Absence of FY 80 Appropriations

(U) On 30 Sep 79 DA advised this command via immediate messages that obligation of funds against FY 80 appropriations, except in specified circumstances, were prohibited until further notice. As of 1 Oct 79 Congress had not enacted a continuing resolution authority (CRA) or an appropriations bill for FY 80. Disbursements were authorized only for the following: (1) payment of travel claims for military and civilian personnel,

5. Ibid., p. 164.

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(C) CHAPTER XI: RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (U)

(U) FY 80 Command Budget Performance

(U) EUSA's Operation and Maintenance Army (OMA) budget execution for fiscal year 1980 reflected maximum utilization of resources through intensified financial management actions taken at all levels of command. Against the \$337.34 million OMA program, obligations totaling \$337.192 million were recorded, resulting in a 99.96 percent fund utilization ratio. This figure represents the most effective year-end closeout ever achieved by this command.

(U) EUSA's civilian employees' salaries/wages/allowances accounted for 35.4 percent of the fiscal year 1980 OMA budget (23.1 percent was allocated for Korean National employees; 5.3 percent for the Korean Service Corps; and 7.0 percent for US General Schedule (GS) employees). Three percent was obligated for all travel, 37 percent spent on supplies, and 24.6 percent committed for contractual services.

(U) FY 81 Command Operating Budget (COB)

(U) Excellent DA support for FY 80 funding requirements has enabled EUSA to make modest improvements in readiness and in the Quality of Life (see page 328). Previous uncertainty over EUSA's future strength posed by the withdrawal plan interrupted coherent planning and caused sporadic programming, ad hoc funding and a drawdown of supplies and equipment. As a consequence, the FY 81/82 budget relies on long-term planning and meets the most urgent accumulated needs of the command, as well as maintaining the momentum of essential programs.

(U) Of particular significance to the EUSA FY 81 budget has been the impact of the Korean won devaluation. On 12 January the ROK devalued the won by approximately 20 percent (from ₩ 484 to ₩ 580 to the dollar). Resultant won savings (EUSA OMA funding) were estimated at \$25 million annually. These savings were reported to Congress and \$25 million was withdrawn from EUSA's FY 81 funding levels.



(U) However, increases in the price of goods and services purchased locally have more than offset the won savings. US Embassy Economic Trend Reports for Korea at the end of 1980 indicated a 38.9 percent wholesale price change in 1980 and estimates a 25 percent wholesale price change for 1981. Korean National pay raises have averaged 22.6 percent over the past

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(C) Integrated with DA programs and Modernization Resource Information Submission (MRIS) programs the packages, in order of priority, look like this:

(U) TABLE 22. EUSA, DA AND MRIS PDIPs (FY 82-86)

SOURCE	ITEM
Eighth US Army	Force Readiness Telecommunications Plan for Improving Communications In Korea (TPICK)
Modernization Resource Information Submission	Dragon Mount M175 TOW Improvement Package VIPER Light Antitank Weapon FIREFINDER Radar Ground Laser Locator Designator (GLLD) Electronic Warfare System, Multi-Target (MULTEWS) Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
Department of the Army	PACE Step 2 Trade Standoff Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) Support Army Management Headquarters
Eighth US Army	Quality of Life
Department of the Army	Living Standards Tactical Satellite Communications Quality of Life MCA Readiness MCA Quality of Life
Eighth US Army	Logistics Readiness Facilities Modernization
Modernization Resource Information Submission	Standoff Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) Division Air Defense (DIVAD) Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering System (GEMSS)

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
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TABLE 22 (continued)

SOURCE	ITEM
Modernization Resource Information Submission	Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) and Passive Optical Seeker Technique (POST) Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS) Countermeasures Set VHF/UHF Countermeasures Set HF/VHF Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) Data Link for Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR)
Eighth US Army	ADP Modernization 2d Div Restoration Non-Div Restoration
Modernization Resource Information Submission	Surface-Launched Unit Fuel-Air Explosive (SLUFAE) UET M9 (Universal Engineer Tractor) Light Weight Company Mortar System (LWCMS) (60mm mortar replaces 81mm mortar) Automatic Atmosphere Sounding Set OE-254/GRC Telephone Signal Unit Semitrailer M871 Semitrailer M872 Truck, Forklift Personnel Armor System, Ground Troops (PASGT) CVC Uniform System (new uniform of armor vehicle crewman) Position Location Reporting System (PLRS) AN/MS-64, AN/GSC-40 UHF Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Sys- tem (MILES) Mobile Field Kitchen Division Level Data Entry Device (DLDED)
Department of the Army	Korea Ammo Korea Withdrawal
Eighth US Army	Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR)
Department of the Army	Backlog of Maintenance and Repair 78 Level

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TABLE 22 (continued)

SOURCE	ITEM
Eighth US Army	War Reserve Shortages Training Management Control System (TMCS)
Department of the Army	Civilian Executives and Management National Foreign Intelligence Program- Minimum (NFIP) Force Structure Health Resources-Minimum Level Civilian Strength National Foreign Intelligence Program - Realignment NBC Defense Personnel Institutionalization of Personnel Manage- ment Unaccompanied Personnel

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(U) The Eighth Army Commander, GEN John A. Wickham, Jr., summed up EUSA's goals and priorities in a preface to the PARR document. It is quoted here in its entirety:

The focus of Eighth Army's FY 82-86 PARR is on programs to improve and sustain readiness. High priority is accorded near-term improvements in combat capability, command and control, and quality of life for soldiers. The PARR is based on the 2d Infantry Division remaining in the ROK throughout the FY 82-86 period, causing a major re-orientation of programming priorities.

DA guidance to program, in any PARR year, an amount approximating ten percent of total obligational authority, is a severe constraint for Eighth Army. Taking FY 82 as a sample year, ten percent amounts to \$42 million. Considering the nature and growth of the North Korean threat, and because expenditures on units programmed for withdrawal have been deferred for the past two years, \$42 million in FY 82 falls far short of what is needed. Eighth Army's FY 82 MCA requirements alone amount to \$67 million. Therefore, this PARR contains two PDIPs which reflect resources that should be added in view of the suspension of withdrawal. The funds are not included in Eighth Army's ten percent of TOA. The purpose of these PDIPs is to convey to DA the magnitude of minimum essential needs. I ask that the DA staff consider funding these packages, as they represent essential elements of the total command program.

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(U) Scheduled for completion in early 1981, repairs and construction at Stanton Army Airfield will help alleviate helicopter safety problems.

(U) Construction of aircraft revetments at Camp Humphreys was begun and is scheduled for completion by 1 October 1981.

(U) Relocatable buildings from ROK tactical sites were dismantled for future use at Camp Kittyhawk to house additional Taesong Village security personnel. Dismantling was completed on 24 November and re-assembly of the buildings is scheduled to begin in the Spring of 1981.

(U) Protection of US Army Aircraft

(U) At the direction of the USFK/EUSA Chief of Staff in October 1979, the ACoFS, J3, embarked on a series of vulnerability assessments and cost/benefit analyses aimed at the protection of non-divisional US Army aircraft in the ROK during wartime. This initiative evolved into an engineering feasibility study of airfield revetments throughout the ROK by the Far East District Engineer. Using this study and the results of a separate operational evaluation, the EUSA Aviation Officer concluded that revetments need not be constructed at all airfield locations. Protection would be required, however, at Camp Humphreys for 501st MI Group's surveillance aircraft and associated equipment, and also for aircraft at 19th Support Command's Camp Walker. Following COMUSKOREA's concept approval on 31 July, engineering plans were completed by November and revetment materials, obtained on a gratis basis from USAFK, were stockpiled at the work sites. Interim protective measures, to be funded with OMA resources, call for the construction of 10 revetments for 501st MI Group aircraft to commence in March 1981. One revetment for sensitive equipment was completed at Camp Humphreys in December as a training project for EUSA's 802d Engr Bn. The permanent plan for Camp Humphreys, estimated to cost \$5.6 million, was submitted as both a CDIP proposal and as an FY 83 MCA project (see page 297). Fourteen revetments will be constructed at Camp Walker in the 2nd and 3rd quarters of CY 81.

(S) Planning for Wartime Damage Repair (U)

(S) In-country engineer troop resources are not adequate to meet the requirements for constructing facilities for augmentation forces and repairing bomb damage in wartime. Engineer augmentation units are not scheduled to start arriving in country until about D+20. Therefore, ROK civilian contractors have been designated by the Ministry of Construction to assist US forces in bomb damage repair and in temporary construction of essential facilities. During 1980 an agreement was reached with the ROK Ministry of National Defense to significantly increase Korean contractor coverage for repair of wartime damage. This amounted to an increase of coverage from three geographical areas to six areas or installations. They are: Yongsan, Kunsan, Taegu, Pyongtaek, Waegwan, and Osan.

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(S) CHAPTER XI: RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (U)

(U) Fiscal Year 1981 Command Budget Performance

(U) EUSA successfully executed its FY 81 operation and maintenance, Army (OMA) budget through intensive financial management actions taken at all levels of command and systematic application of resources to prioritized requirements. Obligations totalling \$391.732 million were recorded against the \$391.996 million OMA program,¹ resulting in a 99.94 percent utilization rate. Factors contributing to the effective year-end close-out included: Early commencement of FY 81 budget planning in October 1980; identification, prioritization and support of Facility Engineer Activity-Korea projects with advance funding in February 1981; presentation of the year-end closing plan to the OMA Director, DA, for early approval in July 1981; and close cooperation throughout the year between the command's major activity directors, subordinate organizations, and the EUSA Comptroller.

(U) FY 81 budget allotments are shown in Table 24.²

(U) Fiscal Year 1982 Command Operating Budget

(U) Funding support from DA has enabled EUSA to base its budgeting on long-term planning for meeting accumulated needs of the command and maintaining essential force readiness and quality of life programs. Based upon program and budgeting guidance issued by DA, EUSA submitted an FY 82 budget totalling \$451.215 million (Table 25).

1. (U) The initial submission of EUSA's FY 81 budget called for expenditures totalling \$329 million. Subsequent funding requirements, primarily in pay and allowance increases, backlog maintenance and repair, and Command Work Review Board projects (see page 317), had raised the total budget figure to \$371 million by 1 October 1980. Additional supplemental allocations from DA, including \$10.67 million in July 1981 for fuel price increases and force readiness improvements, enlarged the FY 81 OMA budget commitment to \$391.996 million by year-end close-out.

2. Compt Hist Sum 1981. UNCLASSIFIED.

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new equipment systems, a prioritized list integrating new and existing PDIPs, and the Commander's Statement. The extent of DA support for each PDIP is known upon publication of the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which is submitted to DOD as the Army's proposals for resource allocation during the applicable program years.

(U) 1981 Developments. The EUSA PARR covering the FY 83-87 period was forwarded to DA in January. Army guidance had specified that not more than five EUSA-initiated PDIPs could be submitted. Additional constraints disallowed PDIPs containing proposed force structure changes and manpower increases and imposed a \$12 million cost limit for each program year. However, resource requirements were indicated in the PARR for 15 DA-directed PDIPs not subject to the ceiling. The Modernization Resource Information Submission portion gave operating and support cost estimates for 40 new equipment items and systems to be fielded during the FY 83-87 time frame. PARR guidance notwithstanding, four EUSA-initiated supplemental PDIPs were included which highlighted the command's critical needs for force structure improvements, personnel strength increases, and nuclear, biological and chemical defense equipment.⁹ A listing of PDIPs and associated resource requirements appears on Table 32.

(U) The Eighth Army Commander, GEN John A. Wickham, Jr., summed up EUSA's goals and priorities in a comprehensive preface to the PARR document. It is quoted here in its entirety:

(S) Given the significance of US security interests in Northeast Asia and continuing increase in the threat, the Eighth United States Army (EUSA) FY 83-87 PARR assumes that current or increased force levels will continue to exist in the Republic of Korea throughout the POM years. The highest priority effort in EUSA naturally remains combat readiness. The single most significant need is for improved command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) capability/survivability without which existing and planned augmentation forces cannot function effectively during hostilities. Adequate funding of the Telecommunications Plan for Improving Communications in Korea (TPICK) by all services is essential. Other important improvements are needed in force/logistics readiness and automation systems. Finally, the human element must be attended to by enhancement in living and working conditions for personnel.

(S) Force readiness is given paramount emphasis in the PARR. The PDIPs improve fighting capabilities of EUSA units and provide combat and combat support units with the best possible training and equipment. The war-fighting capability of EUSA must be optimized, since it--together with deployed air assets--is the major contributor to

9. (U) Intvw with LTC R. R. Coates, Actg Chief, Force Dev Div, ACofS, J3, 5 Mar 82.

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(S) Table 32--Program Development Increment Packages Included in
EUSA FY 83-87 PARR
(Dollars in Thousands - FY 82 Dollar Base Used)

Priority	Short Title	Funding	Total Resources Required
1	TPICK ^a	MCA OMA	\$24,865 3,101
2	Improve C ³ I ^b	MCA OMA	5,351 5,508
3	Improve NBC Prot/Decon Cap ^b	MCA OMA	1,160 9,388
4	Pers Readiness & Retention	MCA OMA FHMA	44,713 68,288 38,700
5	Logistics Readiness ^b	MCA OPA	19,244 15,997
6	Tng Areas & Firing Ranges ^b	MCA OPA	360 509
7	Improve/Modernize ADP Spt ^b	OMA	2,908
8	Modernize Field Med Equip	OMA	9,500
9	Tng Mgt Control System	OMA	459
10	Secondary Item War Reserves (Min)	OMA	4,943
11	Standard Army Ammo System	OMA	53
12	Secondary Item War Reserves (Enhanced)	OMA	10,426
13	Non-Tac ADP Op & Spt Costs	OMA	759
14	Admin Use Vehicles	No Funds Programed	
15	Real Prop Maint Actv Anl Recur Rqmts	OMA	22,500

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Table 32-Continued

Priority	Short Title	Funding	Total Resources Required
16	Modernize Sets, Kits & Outfits	OMA	\$ 1,739
17	Backlog Maint/Repair Reduction	OMA	36,000
18	Standard Finance System	OMA	636
19	Civ EO Recruiting	OMA	160
20	Clothing Sales Store Transfer	OMA	2,465

Notes: ^aTPICK is acronym for Telecommunications Plan for Improvement of Communications in Korea (see page 269).
^bEUSA-initiated PDIP. All others were DA-directed.

EUSA-Initiated Supplemental PDIPs

Improve 2d Inf Div Combat Capabilities	OMA	\$45,791
Improve NBC Capabilities	OMA	7,595
Convert two 2d Inf Div Engr companies to Mech Config	OMA	550
Military Manpower Increases (135 Off, 17 WO & 1,528 Enl)	OMA	11,140
Civilian Manpower Increases	OMA	925

deterrence on the peninsula. A modern and effective EUSA also serves as a template for ROK modernization efforts. Most importantly, if deterrence fails, EUSA must be prepared to fight and win. The fact that hostilities may erupt with little or no warning requires first class fighting capabilities and readiness now--not later.

(S) Existing C³I systems and facilities are inadequate for minimum wartime requirements. Systems and facilities are overage, vulnerable to ranger-commando and indirect fire attack, and lack responsiveness.

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War plans mandate successful defense north of Seoul (the forward defense concept). The integrity of the force and unity of command especially must be maintained during the critical first two weeks of any conflict. The TPICK (DA-directed) and C³I (EUSA-initiated) PDIPs include resource requirements for hardening these facilities. These EUSA PDIPs also support USACC and INSCOM PARRs which contain resource requirements to improve C³I systems. Favorable consideration of mutually supporting EUSA and USACC PDIPs and INSCOM General Defense Intelligence Programs (GDIPs) is essential for improved EUSA force readiness. Moreover, other procurement Army (OPA) support of TPICK is critical, since it is the driving force for OMA and MCA requirements stated in the EUSA and USACC PARRs.

(S) The need to improve EUSA tactical intelligence capability is associated with theater level C³I systems. These EUSA requirements partially are met by activation of the 102d MI Bn (CEWI) within the 2d Inf Div. Additionally, support is essential for accompanying Modernization Resource Information Submissions (MRIS) detailing resource requirements for operations and support of CEWI-related items. Specifically, these include Quickfix II, SOTAS, KG-45 Key Generators, Quickfix IB, TACJAM, and REMBASS. The echelons-above-division support provided by the 501st MI Group is complementary to EUSA initiatives. EUSA previously has stated command support for the INSCOM proposal to increase capabilities of the 501st MI Group. That support is strongly reaffirmed.

(S) Logistics readiness is key to the combat readiness effort. Continued and increased support to improve theater war reserve stockage of ammunition and secondary items for support of US and allied forces is required. Improved POL transfer facilities, underground storage tanks, and hardened pipeline facilities to upgrade capability to supply bulk POL during peacetime and provide necessary protection for wartime support are needed. Modern maintenance shops to improve organic support capability at unit, DS and GS levels and upgrade soldier work environment are required. Warehouses to alleviate a critical shortage of covered storage space are needed. Supplies and equipment (including PWRS) in some cases are placed in open storage due to lack of closed warehouses. This allows deterioration of critical supplies and results in increased costs for care of supplies in storage (COSIS).

(S) Automation systems and facilities must be upgraded to take advantage of new technology. ADP modernization has a high priority as it supports readiness and "go-to-war" capability. Lack of adequate support for the continuity of operations (COOP) plan has been cited as a serious vulnerability. Funds are included to overcome this deficiency.

(S) In-place US forces and reserve stocks are inadequate to conduct a sustained defense of the ROK. Early arrival of theater and tactical signal units to augment limited and vulnerable in-place C³

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systems is essential. The uninterrupted flow of time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) forces and logistics support essential for successful defense of the ROK is critical. These factors cause EUSA to be dependent upon strategic lift capabilities of other service agencies (MAC, MSC). This need is not an Army problem to solve; however, strategic air/sea lift is so crucial to EUSA operations/contingencies that the Army must support initiatives to upgrade strategic air/sea lift capabilities by other services.

(C) The constraint prohibiting statement of additional manpower requirements for FY 83-87 is unrealistic. Overlaying all other readiness and support problems is the need for additional US military and civilian manpower spaces. EUSA has experienced major shifts in orientation based upon the decision to withdraw ground forces from Korea. This has occurred over several years. The decision to suspend further withdrawal of forces has magnified the lack of support infrastructure to provide needed services. If further withdrawal continues in abeyance, redress must be provided. EUSA is in a seriously undersupported position in terms of manpower and the tragedy of this situation would be revealed should hostilities break out. Prohibiting identification and analysis of manpower needs denies use of the appropriate forum for highlighting these requirements. There also is good reason to state the total manpower shortfall in order to emphasize the importance of that issue and the impact it has on combat capability and deterrence.

(U) Host nation support in Korea is significant, perhaps the most significant of any US ally. Combined Defense Improvement Projects (CDIPs) are being developed in a unique cooperative arrangement. The CDIP and PARR development processes parallel each other. Projects such as Army facilities construction/improvement programs included in the PARR also are passed through CDIP review procedures. Projects accepted for ROK financing help to reduce EUSA PARR resource requirements. Similarly, US funded projects generate ROK confidence in the long term nature of the US security commitment and therefore help generate additional ROK financing of CDIP projects.

(S) The EUSA FY 83-87 PARR focuses on improvements required to offset in part the impacts of the withdrawal concept. This involves rebuilding the infrastructure to a level consistent with our national commitment to assure peace through strength and to fulfill the trust of providing our soldiers with quality fighting and living capabilities. Nowhere else in the world does the US gain more leverage for the modest expenditure of resources contained in this PARR.¹⁰

10. EUSA PARR, FY 83-87, dated Jan 81. SECRET. Declass on 1 Oct 93. Filed in J3 Force Dev Div.

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(S) In August this headquarters was tasked by DA to accomplish an assessment of the FY 83-87 POM as it applied to this command. A detailed review was completed which indicated the scope of funding support provided by DA for all PDIPs in EUSA's FY 83-87 PARR document. Analysis revealed that the highest priority PDIPs (TPICK and C³I) gained strong backing. Four critical areas were pointed out, however, in which either increased or earlier funding support is needed--military and civilian manpower, training systems, quality of life, and equipment modernization.¹¹ The review showed that none of the four supplemental PDIPs submitted by this headquarters (Table 32) received DA sanction. EUSA's assessment was used by the Army Staff to document requirements discussed at the October Commanders' Conference and, where appropriate, formed the basis for preparation of DA-directed PDIPs to be included in the next PARR cycle.

(C) In November work began on the FY 84-88 PARR to be forwarded in January 1982. Army guidance for this submission was less restrictive in that no limit was placed on the number of EUSA-initiated PDIPs which may be included. Furthermore, civilian manpower requirements may be identified in EUSA PDIPs. Most encouraging was the inclusion of DA-directed PDIPs for urgently needed force structure modifications and military manpower gains.¹²

(C) Combined Budget for HQ ROK/US Combined Forces Command (U)

(U) Background. A principal issue requiring resolution in conjunction with the establishment (on 7 November 1978) of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command was the division of responsibility for providing funds to operate the new binational headquarters. Preactivation agreements between ROK and USFK planners specified that budgeting and cost-sharing proportions for administrative support would be determined through mutual assent. The overriding concerns of USFK were that US financial support of CFC should be commensurate with the defense benefits derived, that funding actions be accurately recorded and accountability maintained, and that all US resources be provided in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

(U) Subsequent work in 1978-79 by a ROK/US task force, headed by the USFK Comptroller, was suspended after the October 1979 assassination of the ROK President and the ensuing political unrest. In 1980, under an agreement between CINCCFC and the ROK MND, a combined budget study group was formed comprising CFC staff officers and augmented with USFK financial

11. CDREUSA msg 290430 Sep 81, subj: MACOM Assessment of FY 83-87 POM (U). SECRET. Declass on 1 Sep 86. Filed in J3 Force Dev Div.

12. ACoFS, J3 Hist Sum 1981. SECRET.

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management and legal specialists. Following a visit by the study group co-chairmen to HQ US Army Europe, where they investigated that command's programming for US contributions to NATO, a combined budget model was approved by the US and the ROK permanent representatives to the ROK/US Military Committee in October and December 1980, respectively.¹³ At year's end a Combined Budget Activation Committee (CBAC) had been formed, with the USFK/EUSA CofS and the ROK Asst MND (Compt) appointed as co-chairmen.¹⁴

(U) 1981 Developments. During the first meeting of the CBAC on 26 February, the co-chairmen reaffirmed the ROK MND and USFK commitments to activation of a combined budget for CY 82. They agreed that several substantive issues would require prompt resolution, including (1) specific identification of items to be included in the first budget, (2) formulation of an accord on cost sharing, (3) preparation of a charter for a finance subcommittee of the ROK/US Military Committee, and (4) development of resource control procedures at HQ ROK/US CFC required for combined budget administration. Two CBAC subcommittees were formed, co-chaired by US representatives, to develop recommendations on the foregoing issues.

(U) At a second meeting of the CBAC on 21 April, the co-chairmen approved a subcommittee report recommending items for inclusion in the initial combined budget. These encompassed recurring costs for facility operation (utilities, maintenance, repair) at HQ ROK/US CFC,¹⁵ office equipment and supplies, and ADP services. Excluded were the substantial amounts of essential communications and transportation support provided by USFK. On 30 April a second subcommittee report presented conflicting views on cost sharing. The US position envisioned an equal apportionment of expenditures while the ROK representatives advocated that 70 percent of the contributions should be borne by the US and 30 percent by the ROK. Since no compromises could be reached by the CBAC co-chairmen, the USFK co-chairman recommended on 2 June that COMUSKOREA discuss the issue with the ROK Minister of National Defense.

(C) In response to continued questioning by service components on the legal basis for US material support of ROK/US CFC, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (East Asian and Pacific Affairs) (DASD-EAPA) had

13. (U) For a brief description of the ROK/US Military Committee, see note 1, page 1.

14. UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Hist Rept 1978 (U), pp. 285-87. SECRET (info used UNCLAS); USFK/EUSA Annual Hist Rept 1979 (U), p. 238. SECRET (info used UNCLAS); USFK/EUSA Annual Hist Rev 1980 (U), p. 304. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). Filed in SJS Hist Br.

15. (U) Located at EUSA's Yongsan Garrison in Seoul.

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requested the DOD General Counsel in October 1980 to provide advice on how the issues could best be resolved. Exchanges between USFK and DASD-EAPA followed, centering on the need for joint State Dept/DOD guidance regarding ROK/US cost-sharing negotiations. On 13 August DASD-EAPA hosted discussions in Washington with COMUSKOREA, along with PACOM, service component, and JCS representatives. Following this meeting, OSD, PACOM and USFK agreed on a two-pronged approach: (1) pursue with the ROKG development of a limited scope combined budget, to be implemented in CY 82, that provides for HQ CFC facility and administrative operations (noted earlier) in a 55 US:45 ROK cost-sharing ratio;¹⁶ and (2) concurrently seek ROKG agreement to develop during CY 82 a more comprehensive five-year program (CY 83-87) at the same cost-sharing ratio, to include expenditures for operations and maintenance hardware and associated command/control facilities at both HQ CFC and HQ Combined Field Army (ROK/US).^{17,18}

(U) Continuous refinement of cost data by the USFK Compt yielded an agreement by the CBAC co-chairmen on 6 October that the 1981 cost-sharing ratio had been 66 US:34 ROK for combined budget items. By year's end, COMUSKOREA had obtained agreement with the ROK Minister of National Defense on a 62 US:38 ROK cost-sharing ratio. That accord will be submitted in January 1982 as a formal budget activation recommendation to the ROK/US Military Committee, together with agreements on financial procedures and a charter for a finance subcommittee of the Military Committee.¹⁹

(U) EUSA Efficient Use of Resources Campaign

(U) Background. The Eighth Army Economy Measures Program (EMSPRO) was initiated in October 1980 to assist the command in identifying ways to better utilize resources. Improvements were derived from the DA Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment (PECI) program and other related activities such as management studies, methods and standards development/implementation, productivity measurement/evaluation, idea interchange,

16. (C) Draft OSD guidance had authorized that ratio, with 60 US:40 ROK as a fallback position.

17. USFK ACoFS, J5 Point Paper, 25 Aug 81, subj: CFC Comb Budget (U). CONFIDENTIAL. Declass on 25 Aug 87. Filed in J5 Strat & Policy Div.

18. (U) HQ CFA (ROK/US) is located on EUSA's Camp Red Cloud at Uijongbu, 15 miles north of Seoul. (See page 75 for operational missions.)

19. Compt Hist Sum 1981. CONFIDENTIAL.

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