REVIEW
OF
UNITED STATES
OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES

April 1960

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obligations for their defense and to possess the capability to fulfill its commitments.

The following review of the elements of the national military...
Dear Mr. President:

At this morning's meeting you referred to the report submitted to you in December, 1957 by Frank Nash, which was concerned with U. S. Overseas Military Bases. In preparing this report, Mr. Nash consulted the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and the Unified Commanders. I thought you might be interested in refreshing your memory by the following pertinent excerpts from this report:

"We will have need for such a base system, supplemented by forces and facilities maintained by our allies, in order: 1) to maintain a deterrent to general war by assuring our capability to deliver a strategic counteroffensive, and by providing the dispersal necessary so that the enemy cannot calculate on erasing our retaliatory power through surprise attack by one blow; 2) to assure that we can maintain tactical forces in being at or close to potential trouble spots (supplemented by mobile forces maintained in central areas) so that a potential aggressor knows we are determined to assist indigenous forces in defending themselves and have varying military capacities for assisting them which can be used with discrimination as circumstances dictate; and 3) to promote US political objectives, giving tangible evidence of political solidarity with our friends and of our intention to honor our various defense alliances, and thereby encouraging the fullest contribution to the common defense on the part of our friends and allies. (pages 8-9)

"Our base system is key to our survival as a nation. If this system is so organized as to demonstrate our strength and our readiness to meet all types of military action, there is solid reason to believe that our policy of containment will succeed, that total war will be avoided, and that limited aggression can be smothered." The foregoing analysis of the
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TOP SECRET
FOREWORD

This report has been prepared in compliance with a request by the President to the Secretary of Defense for a re-examination of the United States overseas military base system and a review of the findings and recommendations contained in the Report to the President in December 1957 by the late Mr. Frank C. Nash.

The report is addressed to the conclusions of the Nash Report concerning the continuing need of the overseas base system for the foreseeable future, that is, the next five to ten years. It does not consider those portions of the Nash Report that deal primarily with the political aspects of retaining the overseas base system.

Part I of the report is a general review and summary. Part II contains a detailed review and evaluation of the overseas bases by area and function for the 1960-1963 time period and a general forecast of overseas base requirements from 1963 through 1969.
Overseas bases will continue to play an essential role in national security for the next decade. The advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has changed the nature of air power. The ICBM is a strategic weapon designed to deliver a nuclear warhead to the heart of an enemy's population center. Its development and deployment have increased the effectiveness of U.S. military forces and have made possible the maintenance of a more limited defense posture.

The United States military strategy is based on the premise that the Soviet Union is the principal threat to American security. The United States military forces are designed to deter and, if deterrence fails, to fight and win a nuclear war. The strategy is implemented through a combination of offensive and defensive operations.

The primary role of the United States military is to provide a basis of support for our national security strategy. It is the responsibility of the United States military to deter nuclear attack and to carry out the mission of the United States government to defend the nation from attack by any means.

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In the Strategic Air Command, the present overseas base system permits the dispersed deployment of medium bomber strike forces with a quick reaction time as well as effective deployment of tanker units in support of the medium and heavy bomber fleets. There will be a continuing need for these bases, at least until 1963. By the end of that year, because of political considerations, the bases in Morocco are scheduled for release. After 1963, the future tenure of other strategic bases for the peacetime disposition of medium bombers is not certain. With further phase-out of the medium bomber force, it may be expected that the remaining force would not be able to support the overseas deployment in its present scale. Therefore, peacetime stationing of medium bombers overseas may be reduced markedly in the years following 1963. In any event, these overseas bases will remain a requirement for the indefinite future to support wartime strategic operations involving emergency recovery and re-strike missions. These bases may also be required for tactical and transport aircraft and for staging purposes during emergency as well as peacetime operations. Intercontinental ballistic missiles will require no overseas base support except for training and test purposes.

Overseas bases associated with the mission of defending the North American continent from air and sea attack are regarded as a continuing requirement as long as the potential enemy possesses the capability to attack the United States by these means. These bases will not only provide for early warning and effective employment of the strategic retaliatory forces, but will also serve the military and civil defense efforts in reducing the damage to our industrial base and population centers. Additionally, they will continue to assist in maintaining control of vital sea areas and air communications.

In Europe, the United States will require for the next three to four years substantially the same number of bases it now utilizes in supporting the current NATO military plans. Force contributions expected of the NATO nations beyond 1963 are not firm. The introduction of medium-range ballistic missiles into NATO after 1963 could reduce the need for some of the tactical air forces supplied by the United States, with a possible minor reduction in air base needs. With the continuation of NATO during the 1963-1969 period, it is expected that the United States would require major forces deployed in Europe, with adequate base support, to continue to maintain its leadership in the alliance and to contribute to an effective NATO military strategy. The forces deployed to Europe will also be advantageously positioned for contingency operations in the Middle East.

In the Far East, the United States has reduced its Army and Air Force base holdings significantly in the last few years. This trend will continue to a minor degree for the Air Force through 1963, under present plans. The remaining bases in the Far East will continue
to support the forward deployment of U.S. ground, sea and air forces in the area, as part of the basic strategy to deny further communist encroachment and, in case of general war, to hold territory as far forward as possible, securing Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The forward positioning of these forces in the cold war is a continuing part of the deterrent to possible communist aggression in this part of the world. The U.S. bases, by their proximity to likely areas of conflict, will expedite commitment of the appropriate force in time to defeat possible aggressive action and help prevent broadening of the war.

In the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeastern Asia areas, the U.S. overseas base system is almost non-existent. Present facilities which would be required as bases for the support of modern U.S. military forces are generally inadequate, without extensive construction, for other than small-scale military action. There are only limited possibilities for increasing the base capability in peacetime, although some improvements have been made by peacetime construction of critical facilities through the Mutual Security Program. The growing communist threat to this area of the world points up the urgent need for adequate support facilities.

Overseas facilities will continue to be required for support of a world-wide communications network, which is mandatory in order to insure adequate control of modern military forces with atomic weapons, to facilitate the transmission of intelligence to the United States, and to administer the deployed forces. Present plans call for the modernization of this system through the progressive installation of advanced equipment by 1965. While this modernization will require additional sites, it will permit re-routing or reduction to standby status of some of the existing high frequency stations. The varied activities associated with space research will probably create an ever-changing requirement for many small facilities of a temporary nature, scattered throughout the world.

From an overall view, one of the prime strategic advantages enjoyed by the United States over the USSR is the possibility of surrounding the communist bloc with combat forces—land, sea and air—or of strategically positioning or shifting these forces wherever needed. An adequate U.S. overseas base system is a primary means of exploiting this benefit of geography and of promoting the continued collective defense effort among free world nations.

Recent difficulties involving retention of essential overseas bases, such as in Morocco, Libya, and the West Indies Federation, have been encountered for the most part in those countries which have little or no identification with U.S. security interests. Our other base rights appear to be as strong as the alliances or bilateral collective security arrangements they support.
The ability of U.S. forces to respond to emergency situations in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East could be improved. From a base support standpoint, continued active effort is recommended in:

a. Obtaining the necessary rights for the operations of U.S. military forces in these areas when required.

b. Pre-stocking items of military equipment and supplies to permit rapid deployment and to sustain operations until re-supply is possible.

c. Pursuing all possible peacetime measures to improve essential facilities in these areas so that they would be readily usable for U.S. military emergency operations.

If reductions in military forces should occur during the next decade, through arms control agreements or other political or economic considerations, the overseas base holdings supporting U.S. forces should be carefully evaluated before being relinquished. It should be recognized that these bases would represent the best possible means for reacting to emergencies in areas uncovered by a withdrawal of U.S. forces. A lack of adequate in-transit bases, staging areas, and terminal facilities for contingency operations could reduce reaction capability to such a degree that U.S. military intervention might be too late to safeguard our security interests. If actual relinquishment of an essential base becomes necessary, possible future use should be safeguarded by a right of re-entry.
In December 1957, a report to the President by Mr. Frank C. Nash on U.S. Overseas Military Bases expressed the following central theme regarding the need for an overseas base system in the ensuing decade:

"We will have need for such a defense system, supplemented by forces and facilities maintained by our allies, in order (a) to maintain a deterrent to general war by assuring our capability to deliver a strategic counteroffensive, and by providing the dispersal necessary so that the enemy cannot count on erasing our retaliatory power through surprise attack by one blow; (b) to assure that we can maintain tactical forces in being at or close to potential trouble spots (supplemented by mobile forces maintained in central areas) so that a potential aggressor knows we are determined to assist indigenous forces in defending themselves and have varying military capacities for assisting them which can be used with discrimination as circumstances dictate; and (c) to promote U.S. political objectives, giving tangible evidence of political solidarity with our friends and of our intention to honor our various defense alliances, and thereby encouraging the fullest contribution to the common defense on the part of our friends and allies. (Pages 8-9)

"Our base system is key to our survival as a nation. If this system is so organized as to demonstrate our strength and our readiness to meet all types of military action, there is solid reason to believe that our policy of containment will succeed, that total war will be avoided, and that limited aggression can be smoothed. The foregoing analysis of the political and military aspects of probable U.S. requirements over the next ten years leads to the conclusion that their general scope and pattern are not likely to diminish in size and complexity during this period. It is certain, however, that adjustments and shifts in emphasis will occur as we adjust our strategic doctrine to the range of new weapons, improvements in the mobility and firepower of our tactical forces, and the political or military vulnerability of particular overseas areas." (Pages 12-13)

During the two-year period since the completion of the Nash Report, continuing and recurrent problems have been experienced in maintaining certain important elements in the U.S. overseas base system. In October 1959, the President requested of the Secretary
of Defense a re-examination of the United States overseas military base system and a review of the findings and recommendations of the Nash report. On 16 December 1959, the National Security Council, in referring to the study then in progress in the Department of Defense, requested that this study provide a basis for Council discussion of U.S. overseas bases, with special emphasis on the implications of developments in the missiles field.

In the review of the probable U.S. requirements over the next decade, the following study has been addressed mainly to the conclusion of Mr. Nash that adjustments and shifts in emphasis will occur as we adjust our strategic doctrine to the range of new weapons, improvements in the mobility and firepower of tactical forces, and the political and military vulnerability of particular overseas areas. It is noted that certain adjustments to the overseas base system have indeed occurred since publication of the Nash Report, but not necessarily for the reasons cited by Mr. Nash. These chiefly have been the reduction of Army forces in Japan, the withdrawal of Army forces in Iceland, and the redeployment to Britain and Germany of Tactical Air Force squadrons from France. Also, inactive base holdings of over 300,000 acres, involving facilities developed during World War II in the Philippines and in the Caribbean area, are expected to be relinquished shortly. New bases acquired include those in Canada for use of the Strategic Air Command and for further extension of the air and missile early warning systems. In addition, arrangements have been reached for the deployment of ICBM's to be assumed by host state personnel, in the U.K., Italy and eventually in Turkey. Substantial progress has also been made in the implementation of the NATO atomic stockpile concept under which nuclear weapons, maintained in U.S. custody, will be readily available to the forces of the alliance in time of need.

In order to assess the future need for an overseas base system, a portrayal of our present system in relation to its capability to fulfill the requirements of national policy and military strategic concepts is a prerequisite. The following report briefly summarizes the applicable elements of national military policy, portrays the present overseas base system, and assesses probable trends in this base system, both for the short- and long-term future.

The Nash Report considered future requirements for the base system projected over a period of from five to ten years from 1957. This period was selected as being in general accord with the expected time for long-range military planning. The present report also accepts a ten-year period, projected from 1960, as a limit for trend predictions, but recognizes that events can be forecast with a much greater degree of certainty in the immediate and near-term future, say for three years hence, than can later trends and events. Pertinent U.S. and allied
military planning documents, such as the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, FY 1963-64, and MACO MC-70, furnish guidance as to military base needs and objectives in the 1963 period. More immediate base requirements can be forecast from considerations of current capabilities plans employing weapons systems now in production or in use. Beyond 1963, the phase-in of newer weapons systems by the services, force levels, and the effects of such factors as allied plans and commitments, enemy capabilities, and the general international political atmosphere become more indefinite. For these reasons, the present report divides the next ten years into two basic time periods: from the present to 1963, and from 1963 through 1969.

The report identifies those areas where significant requirements for the development of facilities exist for certain emergency conditions, but where base holdings are maintained in peacetime, for political or other reasons. It also suggests certain possible measures which could be taken in peacetime to better assure the prompt availability of adequate facilities in these areas when needed for military operations.
A system of U.S. military bases overseas serves to support the national strategy which guides the employment of U.S. military forces in peace and war. Therefore, a study of our present and future overseas base system should include, initially, an examination of the present and foreseeable national military strategy as it relates to any general requirement for overseas bases. (Confidential)

The United States national military strategy is derived from policy guidance formulated by the National Security Council and is implemented through military strategic plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These joint plans are designed to furnish strategic guidance for employment of military forces in being, and for the desired composition and strategic employment of forces in the near-term future (four to seven years hence). In addition, a strategic estimate is prepared for general long-range military developmental requirements (eight to twelve years in the future). From the overall military strategic plans, the Unified and Specified Commanders and the Military Services determine the overseas military bases required for the many operational plans or supporting activities. These requirements are reviewed annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consolidated, and set forth in a comprehensive report called "U.S. Base Requirements Overseas" (UBRO). This document is a detailed inventory of present base holdings as well as future base requirements to support any of the many emergency situations which might arise in both limited and general war. (Confidential)

The U.S. national and military strategy for the last ten years has recognized as the basic threat to U.S. security the determination and ability of the hostile Soviet and Communist regimes to direct their political and ideological influence and their rapidly growing military and economic strength toward achieving world domination. A chief element of this threat lies in the Soviet possession of rapidly growing nuclear capabilities (which have made the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas) as well as large conventional forces. Accordingly, a central aim of U.S. policy has been to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight a general war should one be forced on the United States. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disarming character of general nuclear war, the danger of local conflicts developing into general war, and the serious effect of further communist aggression. National strategy is designed to achieve
the basic U.S. objective by deterring or being prepared successfully to wage general or limited war, and by effectively conducting the cold war with the Eino-Soviet bloc (whenever period of time the basic threat to U.S. security may continue).

Under the current national military policy, the United States and its allies in the aggregate will have, for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with communist overt aggression in its various forms and to prevail in general war should one develop. Moreover, the policy emphasizes that the deterrent is much more likely to be effective if the United States and its major allies show that they are united in their determination to use military force against such aggression. The strategic military concept stresses the principle of mutual security and envisages that the United States will require the support and cooperation of the appropriate major allies and certain other free world nations in providing and using their share of military forces in common defense and in furnishing bases for U.S. military power. In this connection, the strategy requires forward deployed forces and a world-wide system of bases in order to remain sufficiently flexible in meeting the requirements for cold, limited and general war.

In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the national policy states that the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military force its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military programs for continental defense.

Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression is based on a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use in cases authorized by the President. Within the total U.S. military forces, national policy requires inclusion of ready forces which, in conjunction with indigenous forces and with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate to (a) present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression and (b) defeat such aggression or hold it pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to defeat it quickly. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of misdeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be expected.

According to national policy, the United States should, as practicable, strengthen the collective defense system and induce Western Europe and other allies with well-developed economies to increase their share in collective defense. The United States should take the necessary steps to continue its NATO and other allies the U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that, while their full contribution in participation must be forthcoming, the United States is committed to carry out its
obligations for their defense and to possess the capability to fulfill its commitments.

The foregoing review of the elements of the national military strategy indicates in a general way the relation of overseas military bases to the prosecution of essential war tasks, the necessity for prompt response to commit overt aggression in any form, and the necessity for maintenance of free world strength in peacetime. In the subsequent sections of this report, the present and projected overseas base complex will be reviewed on a functional and area basis as it relates to the national military strategy. (Confidential)
The Strategic Air Command supports the national policy of deterring general war with its strike force of bombers and missiles. It is essential that these forces be so deployed that an enemy cannot count on their neutralization by a single attack, even by surprise. The overseas base complex plays an important role in supporting these strategic deterrent forces. While the bulk of the strike force of the Strategic Air Command are deployed in the United States, portions of these forces utilize overseas bases to provide dispersal and quick reaction capability, thus complicating the problem of enemy planners. The strike forces also rely on overseas bases to support important refueling capabilities, post-strike, and emergency recovery bases.

In 1950 the Strategic Air Command is programmed for 210 squadrons which are being reduced to 156 squadrons by 1953. The numbers of squadrons and changes in composition are reflected as follows:

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<td>210</td>
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Although the overall reduction is small, there is a substantial change in the composition of the forces during this time period. The most significant changes occur in the medium bomber inventory, which is reduced by 40 squadrons, and the missile force, which shows an increase of 22 squadrons. With these changes in force structure, it is possible to assess fairly accurately the effects on overseas base requirements through 1953.

The heavy bombers are capable of striking Russian targets from the United States. However, jet-takers provide necessary support of these bombers in giving added range and flexibility in striking more distant targets. In addition, jet-takers are needed in support of the medium bombers which require at least one and sometimes two refuellings before striking deep into enemy territory. Deployment of part of the medium bomber force to overseas bases serves to reduce this requirement, since the bombers thus deployed have a capability of striking assigned targets without refueling.
There have also been reductions in the overseas bases used in peacetime by the Strategic Air Command. In the United Kingdom, four bases were released for use by tactical air units withdrawn from France upon the latter's refusal to permit the storage of atomic weapons in its territory. Seven other bases were relinquished to the British Government since they were no longer adequate for use by planes in the present inventory of the Strategic Air Command; were no longer required for such missions as fighter escort; or were so close to other bases used by the Strategic Air Command that they did not provide effective dispersal. Adverse operating conditions at Male, Grenada, also limited its peacetime utilization. By the end of 1963, U.S. forces are committed to withdraw from the three Strategic Air Command bases in Morocco.

The relatively limited number of overseas bases available to the Strategic Air Command highlights their continuing importance. As noted earlier, the Strategic Air Command will continue to rely heavily during the period 1960-1963 on its heavy and medium bomber fleet, both of which are supported by overseas bases. This period will see the advent of missiles in significant quantities, both in the United States and the USSR. Aside from the need for the protection of our strategic strike forces based in the United States, the increased enemy capability in long-range missiles dictates the maximum degree of dispersal and quick reaction possible on the part of our strategic striking forces. This can be accomplished in large measure by the "reflex" bases and tanker refueling facilities available to the Strategic Air Command abroad.
A network of communications and radar installations reaches across the middle of Canada. Established and manned by Canadian forces, this network is designed to provide early warning of enemy aircraft and provide communication with the U.S. and the rest of the world.

The IRO system is essentially complete and is in full operation in all areas. The early warning system, located in the middle of the country, is designed to detect enemy aircraft probing the area and to provide early warning to the decision-makers in the U.S. and Canada.

The IRO system is also designed to provide communication with the U.S. and the rest of the world. This network is essential for the defense of Canada and the U.S., and is a key component of the overall defense strategy.

In carrying out the national policy of defending the U.S. and Canada, the IRO system is an essential part of the overall defense strategy. It is designed to provide early warning of enemy attacks and to provide communication with the rest of the world.

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To the east and west coasts of the U.S. employing 16 Navy radar picket ships and 36 Air Force Sentinel aircraft off each coast plus 4 lighter-than-air ships in the Atlantic. The Air Force currently maintains four Fighter Interceptor squadrons in this North Atlantic region. The foreign bases which support these squadrons are located in Labrador, Newfoundland, Iceland and Greenland.

In addition to these facilities, which are designed for use against the long-range bomber and air-breathing missile threat, three other installations will be used for the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMES): at Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and at Fylingdale Moor, United Kingdom. At each of these stations, a high-powered, long-range radar is expected to be able to detect enemy long-range missiles shortly after launch. This radar watch could afford up to fifteen minutes tactical warning to U.S. strategic retaliatory forces. The positioning of these radar stations is designed to provide coverage of the polar region, where the enemy missile trajectories against the United States are likely to be concentrated. The BMES sites in Alaska and Greenland are now under construction; negotiations have been completed for the establishment of the third site in the United Kingdom.

Six foreign bases in the North Atlantic support a number of vital or important wartime and peacetime missions of the U.S. Naval Forces under the Commander in Chief, Atlantic. These bases are Argentia, Labrador; Keflavik, Iceland; Bermuda; Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; the Azores; and Chaguaramas, Trinidad. The naval and air facilities at Argentia support air early warning operations in continental air defense, anti-submarine operations, sea-air rescue and fleet operations protecting the North Atlantic lines of communications. The NAS fuel storage facility at Fylingdale, England, when constructed, will provide further logistic support to fleet wartime operations, while naval facilities under construction at the Keflavik Air Base will be an essential link in the planned peacetime early warning barrier chain from Greenland to the United Kingdom. Facilities in Bermuda are utilized by naval air forces to support anti-submarine operations, fleet reconnaissance, and aircraft staging. In addition to the air facilities, there are fuel and ammunition storage areas.

The naval installation in the Guantánamo Bay area has provided excellent year around training facilities to U.S. naval forces based in the United States. This installation also provides an important support base for wartime naval operations in the Caribbean area. An additional important naval base for wartime training, escort operations, and support of fleet units is maintained at Chaguaramas, Trinidad, on a stand-by status.

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U.S. base installations in the Azores play a major role in the defense of North America. In addition to the support of strategic air operations, the air installations are utilized for air early warning operations and as a link in the air transport route in support of the European Command and the U.S. installations in North Africa. The existing and planned naval facilities will be capable of supporting anti-submarine warfare operations, escort vessels and radar barrier units.

In Alaska, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal Zone, U.S. forces maintain a number of military bases which support the defense of these United States-controlled territories as well as more far-ranging operations. A reinforced Army battle group utilizes six bases in the Canal Zone for protection of the Panama Canal; two reinforced Army battle groups and Army air defense elements, operating from bases complexes North and South of the Alaska Range, assist in the ground and air defense of Alaska. On the island of Guam, the 25th Infantry Division (minus one battle group), stationed at Schirren Barracks, serves as the Pacific Command reserve, together with the First Marine Brigade and Marine Air Group. The Navy maintains a sizeable establishment in the Hawaiian Islands including Barbers Point Air Station, a Marine Airfield at Kaneohe, and a Naval Shipyard. The Navy also maintains facilities in the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico and Alaska. Naval and air bases in these territories support both strategic and continental defense missions. The Air Force operates two Fighter Interceptor squadrons from bases in Alaska and two transport squadrons from Hickam Air Base in Hawaii.

Some 17 inactive areas (totalling 31,383 acres) in the Caribbean, obtained from England in 1941 under the ninety-nine year Leased Bases Agreement, have recently been determined excess to military requirements and the Departments of State and Defense are prepared to release them when politically appropriate. Additional inactive areas in the Caribbean are currently being considered for possible release.

The remaining foreign bases in this hemisphere are being utilized for high priority research and development missions; apert research and test at Port Churchill, Canada, and Thule, Greenland, and missile tests at the Atlantic Missile Range. Ten of the 13 U.S. missile test sites in the Caribbean and South Atlantic Area are located on foreign soil. These stations, which operate under the cognizance of the Air Force Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, monitor the launching trajectory and impact of the intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles over the 5,000 mile South Atlantic course (across the Bahamas and Windward Islands to Ascension Island). With the possible inactivation of some of the closer-spaced tracking stations and a likely extension of the range, it is anticipated that the Atlantic Missile Range will be required for the foreseeable future. The Pacific Missile Range is being similarly utilized on the West Coast. This range, under the cognizance of the Navy, provides range support.
for the Department of Defense and other designated government agencies for launching, tracking and collecting data on guided missile, satellite and space vehicle research and provides support for training of operational guided missile units. Overseas bases supporting this activity are mainly planned for locations on United States-controlled territory, although certain sites, such as Australia, may also be included in future progress for the Pacific Missile Range.

The 1960-1963 period will pose challenging problems in the task of defending the U.S. based nuclear strike forces and U.S. population centers. Both are relatively soft targets, and the growing enemy ICBM force makes these targets dangerously vulnerable. A Soviet ICBM attack, accompanied by a medium-range missile attack from submarines, and followed by a manned-bomber attack probably represents the optimum means which the enemy could employ against the continental United States. It is not the purpose of this report to detail all the possible measures which the United States could adopt to counter this enemy threat. It is intended, however, to portray the vital role of the overseas base system as a part of the defense of the continental United States.

In exhausting every possible to obtain early strategic warning of the enemy's plans, increased effort must be placed on timely intelligence. This will require intensified intelligence activities from posts situated around the capitalist bloc; more efficient visual, photographic or electronic observation of the enemy's bases; and an extensive, rapid, and reliable network of communications world wide.

The operational availability of the three ICBM stations will contribute to our ability to secure tactical warning of an ICBM attack. This warning will afford some protection for the U.S. based strategic deterrent force. The dispersal inherent in the overseas reigh bases has also been mentioned as a means of protection against a total knockout blow. It is recognized that these bases are vulnerable to intermediate range weapons, but an attack against these bases must be perfectly synchronized with an attack against the United States in order to prevent some degree of warning to elements of the strategic strike force located on bases in this country.

Defensive measures against the air-breathing threat are also strengthened by use of foreign bases. Further integration of the United States-Canadian air defense effort under NORAD appears desirable; this would include the establishment of the necessary air defense control centers in Canada and the consummation of agreements to employ nuclear weapons for air defense purposes. It should also be feasible to turn over to the Canadians a major portion of the air warning installations in Canada.
The extension of the DEW line from Canada across Greenland will also increase the effectiveness of the air early warning system. Keflavik Air Base and other installations in Iceland will play an important role in the projected seaward extension of this line from Greenland to the United Kingdom. In addition, the Iceland bases will offer possibilities for additional air and sea surveillance of enemy submarines and increase the effectiveness of submarine detection systems now in use or expected to be employed in this period. The establishment of the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. barrier should replace and permit the disestablishment of the air-sea barrier between Argentina and the Azores. Also, the proposed utilization of port facilities in northern United Kingdom from which to operate hunter-killer submarines in times of emergencies should provide timely intelligence on the movement of enemy submarines.

Other overseas bases in the North Atlantic—in Bermuda, Cuba, the Azores, and Puerto Rico—will provide important support for naval forces carrying out anti-submarine missions. Similarly, effective air warning and anti-submarine operations in the near Pacific are dependent on naval bases in Hawaii, Midway, and Alaska, as well as on the West Coast of the United States.
BASES IN EUROPE IN SUPPORT OF NATO
As a vital part of its military participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States has committed substantial ground, sea, and air forces to the defense of Western Europe. This deployment arose as a result of awareness that the loss of populations and land areas of Western Europe to Soviet control would seriously endanger U.S. security. Soviet ground and air forces deployed in East Germany, numbering some 20 divisions and 20 air regiments, plus forces available in the USSR, pose a serious threat to free European territory. The military capability of these Soviet forces has been steadily and materially improved in the past several years. Continuing modernization and improvement of the Soviet forces will increase significantly their capabilities.

The NATO military plan to deter aggression against NATO European territory or to defeat such aggression if it should occur has been termed the “sword and shield” strategy. That is, sufficient allied ground, sea, and air forces would be deployed as a “shield” to fend off any incursions or limited attacks against NATO, thereby forcing the enemy to pause and consider whether to break off the action or deliberately expend it. The shield forces would also blunt or hold a mass attack offensive into Western Europe and supporting maritime areas. In the event of a massive Soviet attack, a combined air, missile, and naval air counteroffensive would be launched against the USSR. The principal edge of the “sword” is the U.S. Strategic Air Command, supplemented by U.S. naval air forces and other strike forces, as well as tactical air units and medium-range missiles under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Agreed NATO military plans for “shield” forces are predicated on a force of 29-1/3 divisions in Central Europe together with 151 tactical air squadrons positioned in that general area.

U.S. forces today constitute a primary part of the “shield” force in Central Europe. These U.S. “shield” forces are also advantageously deployed for rapid reaction to contingency situations in the Middle East. In addition, U.S. forces situated in Europe play an important role in supporting U.S. responsibilities and policies toward Berlin (where 4,000 Army troops, not committed to NATO, are garrisoned). They utilize an extensive system of bases as shown on the attached map. In addition to the bases shown, U.S. forces use commercial facilities and other allied military bases in the area, in conjunction with other NATO nations, for training, occasional, operational maneuvers, or convenience in logistic support arrangements. Use of these additional facilities is recognized in NATO military planning.
The bulk of U.S. ground combat forces committed to NATO are deployed in West Germany. These forces, which consist of five divisions (two being armor), one armor group, three armored cavalry regiments and combat support units, are dispersed throughout 15 base areas containing troop billets, training areas and forward supply depots at 121 locations. For the logistic support of these forces and partial support of other U.S. and NATO forces in peace and in war, logistic complex of command and communication facilities, including depots, hospitals, port facilities, troop billets, and a pipeline extending from the coast of France into Germany. U.S. Army forces in Europe also include the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), a missile command which is also NATO-committed, stationed in northern Italy. Its combat elements occupy two main areas, and its logistic support area is located in northeastern Italy. Including the two separate, non-NATO battle groups in Berlin, the U.S. Army, Europe, totals approximately 527,000 military personnel and employs 6,000 U.S. civilians and 50,000 foreign nationals.

Air Force units committed to NATO include 21 fighter-bomber squadrons, 10 other tactical squadrons, 7 transport squadrons and 3 squadrons of surface-to-air missiles. These units use air bases in Germany, nine in the United Kingdom, one in the Netherlands, one in Italy, two in Turkey, and four in France. Bases in Iceland and the Azores provide air transit facilities between the United States and its forces in Europe. Outside the NATO area, Wheelus Air Base in Libya affords our Forces in Europe with the only maintenance and training facilities available on a year-around basis. In addition, Wheelus Air Base is of importance as a possible staging area in the event of limited war in the Middle East. In all, U.S. Air Forces in Europe operate some 450 airfields in a network of varying size and varying form large air bases to individual aircraft control and warning sites. Air Force personnel supporting NATO include approximately 108,000 military personnel, 4,000 U.S. civilian employees, and 26,000 foreign nationals.

The U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet which operates in the Mediterranean Sea is composed of 56 ships, 2 carrier air groups, 2 anti-submarine warfare aircraft squadrons, and a Marine battalion landing team with air support. This fleet is supported at sea by an underway replenishment group which in turn receives its support from the United States, except for fuel, lubricants, and some spare parts, which are supplied through either Naples, Italy, or Rota, Spain. Primary communication support is presently provided by facilities located near the base at Port Lympne, England. The air anti-submarine warfare squadrons are normally based at Rota, Spain and Naples, Sicily. These two squadrons are rotated at unscheduled intervals through 8 NATO maritime air bases in the Mediterranean. In addition to the 6th Fleet and the 4 locations noted above, the Navy maintains ammunition storage at Cartagena, Spain, and is planning to expand its
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operations from Iceland. These six installations are manned by approximately 6,500 personnel including about 5,400 military, 400 U.S. civilian employees, and 2,500 foreign nationals. For emergencies and wartime operations, the Navy has pre-stocked, or plans to pre-stock, 28 other locations with such supplies as fuel, lubricants, spare parts and ammunition. These sites are located at commercial or allied military installations on Mediterranean islands in countries bordering the Mediterranean and the Northeast Atlantic Ocean area.

Included in the European area are 21 Loran stations which are manned by the Coast Guard.

Except for the release of four air bases in England, due primarily to force reductions, and the transfer of use of eight air bases in Germany to the German Air Force, the major base complex in support of our forces committed to NATO in Europe have remained substantially unchanged over the past several years.

Difficulties in securing agreement on the storage of atomic weapons in France necessitated the repositioning within the last year of tactical air squadrons from five bases in France into Germany and the United Kingdom. Three of these bases in France are now retained in a Dispersed Operating Base status. By way of new facilities, Loran C stations, essential to the POLARIS mission, are being established in Italy, Turkey and Libya and in Iceland, Norway and the Faeroes. During this period, other new facilities have been established for positioning of NIXE and NACE units in Germany. While technically not requiring the establishment of U.S. bases, the implementation of the ICBM program and the NATO atomic stockpile concept will require additional USAF personnel. Under arrangements reached for the stationing of ICBM's in the United Kingdom, Italy and Turkey, the host state will be responsible for manning the missile systems. However, U.S. personnel will be required to train the host state forces and at least in one case, Turkey, to man the sites for a period of years until host state personnel are fully trained. Under the NATO atomic stockpile plan, a large number of sites are being constructed or will be established, mainly through infrastructure (NATO's common financing arrangement for base construction), for the stockpiling of nuclear weapons to be readily available to the forces of the alliance in time of need. Under present U.S. legislation, these weapons must remain in U.S. custody, and accordingly, a U.S. custodial detachment must be stationed at each stockpile site.

The current deployment of U.S. ground, naval, and air forces in Europe is in fulfillment of U.S. commitments to meet approved NATO force requirements as contained in the basic NATO military planning document, NC-70. This NATO force schedule, prepared in early 1969.
as a result of the decision to incorporate atomic weapons into the NATO arsenal, calls for U.S. contributions essentially as they are today through 1963 except for a reduction of tactical air squadrons from 49 to 43. Base needs to support these contributions have largely been satisfied except for facilities for newer air defense weapons, tactical missiles, communications, and certain naval support facilities. These projects which qualify as NATO infrastructure are planned for construction through this procedure. The programmed reduction of U.S. tactical air squadrons, as contained in EC-70, would probably be accompanied by some adjustments to the air base structure in England and France.

It is recognized that the United States has under continual review its force contributions to NATO and in the NATO Annual Reviews has made allowance for adjustments to its force requirements as contained in EC-70. Any revision to EC-70, calling for major changes in U.S. force contributions from those presently programmed, would affect in turn U.S. base holdings. Minor reduction in Army and Air Force forces would probably result largely in reduced saturation and charged missions of facilities rather than substantial reduction in numbers of facilities. No evidence is presently available of NATO military plans or anticipated increased contributions from other NATO allies which would justify major reductions of U.S. forces in Europe through 1963.

To be in keeping with the U.S. effort to promote greater participation by the other members of the alliance, it appears appropriate for the United States to seek to satisfy whatever future base needs may develop through infrastructure wherever possible. Further, during the current deliberations on future infrastructure programs through 1963, it appears desirable to press for a greater financial contribution from the other prosperous NATO countries than has been their share up to now.
U.S. military forces deployed to the Far East are situated in an area of uneasy truce and standoff between Western military power, together with Far Eastern Allies, and the ever-present military power of Communist China, supported by the USSR. The inconclusive conflict in Korea has left that country divided. Japan, now removed communist aggression. This has required the continued stationing of two Army divisions in Korea and positioning of tactical air forces, naval, and marine forces nearby—in Japan and Okinawa. Japan and the Philippines are not fully able to defend themselves; the Republic of China requires assistance of U.S. military forces to maintain its territorial integrity; and the nation states of Southeast Asia, with their limited military forces, are highly vulnerable to communist aggression.

U.S. forces under the Commander in Chief, Pacific, operate from a number of bases in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, in addition to bases in U.S. administered territory such as in Okinawa, Da Nang, Guam, and Wake. In addition to CINCPAC headquarters, there are extensive military facilities and substantial forces in Brazil. These forces are positioned to provide defensive and offensive capabilities in support of national objectives and defense commitments in this area.

The U.S. Army Pacific currently contributes to the defense of Korea with two divisions and a missile command supported by command, tactical, and logistical bases in five general areas in that country. These four areas in turn contain 39 different installations. The Army also utilizes storage, maintenance, communication, and logistical facilities at 15 additional installations (5 in Okinawa and 10 in Japan). These installations maintain a reserve of combat essential items for U.S., NK, and other U.S. forces in Korea, and provide support for possible contingency operations in other areas of the Far East, and Southeast Asia. The U.S. Army base complex in the Far East is manned by approximately 116,000 personnel including 54,000 military, 4,000 U.S. civilians employees and 58,000 foreign nationals. Since January 1958, the withdrawal of Army combat and related support forces from Japan has resulted in the release to the Japanese Government of some 22 separate facilities and the transfer to the Navy and Air Force of 20 other facilities. This withdrawal has now been completed. The Army is at present deploying an airborne battle group, with mobile logistical support, to Okinawa, as the fifth battle group of the 25th Infantry Division stationed in Brazil. This force would utilize existing facilities on Okinawa, expanded as necessary.

Naval and Marine forces in the Far East consist of approximately 143 ships (ranging from attack carriers to mine sweepers), four carrier
Air Group 15 Aircraft personnel, including the Air Force Group 15 installations, are in Japan (171), 2 in the Philippines, 9 in Borneo and 2 in Okinawa. The total force is 20,000 personnel, including 171 aircraft personnel. The Air Force Group 15 installations are located in the east, northeast and southwest areas of Japan. These areas are considered to be the most important for Air Force operations. The Air Force Group 15 installations are located in the east, northeast and southwest areas of Japan. These areas are considered to be the most important for Air Force operations.

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cold war is visualized as a continuing part of the deterrent to possible communist aggression. In case of limited war, the U.S. bases, by their proximity to likely areas of conflict, will permit the early commitment of appropriate forces to help defeat this aggression and prevent broadening of the conflict. Also, because of the remoteness of this area, the base structure in the Far East will continue to represent a major capability to absorb the initial logistic drain which invariably accompanies contingency or emergency operations.

The expected growth of Communist Chinese military strength during the coming years, coupled with their expansionist aims, renders unlikely any settlement consistent with U.S. security interests of such questions as the divided Korea and Vietnam. Continued military presence in the Far East is, therefore, deemed essential for the 1950-1963 period. The deployment of these forces is not only necessary for the Far East region but is also required for rapid reaction to contingencies which are likely to arise in Southeast Asia and possibly South Asia. Base limitations in this region will be discussed in the following section of this report.
BASES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(The contents of this section are classified SECRET)

In the wide area of the southern periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc, some 50 degrees of longitude between Turkey and the Philippines, the United States maintains little or no base holdings. Aside from relatively few but strategically located special intelligence and communications facilities, the only sizable U.S. installation in this area is the air base at Mina Al Amal, Saudi Arabia. Other U.S. installations are of minor size and are designed principally to serve military and economic aid missions.

The scarcity of facilities in the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean-South Asia area, and in Southeast Asia in support of U.S. forces is chiefly due to political difficulties in making the necessary arrangements and to the lack of available U.S. forces and resources to develop or utilize such facilities in peacetime. Yet the United States is committed by the Southeast Asia collective defense treaty and by announced policy in the Middle East, to assist regional countries in combating communist aggression against their territory. Moreover, in all of these areas South of the Soviet and Communist Chinese borders, there are political and economic tensions which could create emergency situations requiring U.S. military intervention in some form.

The Unified Commanders and the Military Services have recognized the need for adequate base support in the Middle East and Southeast Asia; specific requirements for pre-stockage purposes and for rights to use existing host state facilities in wartime have been reflected in appropriate military planning documents covering some of the contingencies which might arise in these areas. However, the ability of U.S. forces to respond quickly and decisively in emergencies is hampered among other things by the remoteness of this region of the world and by the relatively limited number of suitable facilities in the area which could support U.S. operations. Aside from the problem of obtaining the necessary emergency rights, U.S. forces with their initial equipment must be brought in either from contiguous areas of deployment (such as the Far East or Europe) or from the United States and thereafter supported from logistic base complexes developed after the outbreak of hostilities. U.S. military operations will also be hindered by the primitive and difficult nature of the terrain, which is largely unsuited to present models of high performance aircraft and land vehicles of low cross-country mobility. A successful U.S. military venture in this area is therefore largely dependent on attaining a sustained logistic capability and on the cooperation and capability of indigenous forces.
It would be most advantageous, in making a timely response to a limited type of action, to have adequate ground troops stationed where they can be deployed rapidly and supplies pre-stocked as near the scene of action as possible. This requirement for Southeast and South Asia is satisfied in some degree by the two-thirds-Marine division force on Okinawa and the airborne battle group being deployed there. The Marine battalion landing team, with the South Pacific Fleet in the Mediterranean and battle groups from the Army forces in Germany can initially be dispatched to areas of the Middle East. Additional forces would be deployed from Hawaii or the continental United States. Logistic support for Middle East operations can also be affected from resources based in Europe. A move from the United States to South Asia, Southeast Asia or the farther reaches of the Middle East would place severe demands on available air and surface transportation. Such a transportation load could be alleviated considerably by further strategic positioning of U.S. ground forces overseas and by pre-stocking of supplies and equipment at forward locations. The Army is at present positioning an airborne battle group with logistic support, on Okinawa. The Army is also developing interim forward depot facilities in Italy for support of Middle East contingencies. Planning has been initiated for more permanent Army forward depot and staging facilities in Turkey. U.S. military forces have little capability for conducting sustained operations in the Indian Ocean area. To alleviate this situation, bases are being pursued to support current use of Makassar, Egypt, Karachi, Pakistan and Diego Garcia Island for pre-stocking of fuel and for staging. The Air Force would have to utilize existing U.S. or NATO bases in Turkey and U.S. bases in the Far East plus the few facilities available in the objective area.

In Southeast Asia, several projects are being accomplished under the Mutual Security program which have significant military advantages. For example, the present airfield at Vientiane, Laos, is being repaired; also, a new runway will be built and will be capable of supporting heavy cargo aircraft. However, more airfield and road improvement is urgently needed in Laos, not only to assure better communications, trade development and government control of the interior, but to facilitate military operations in this difficult terrain. An all-weather road from Pakse, Laos, to Konum, South Vietnam, has been cited by CINCPAC as an urgent military necessity. Additionally, in Vietnam, port improvements, adequate airfields, and lines of communication are required at and between the following key areas: Thu Bon, Haiphong and Sigon. Airport improvement is also desirable at Pochamparom, Cambodia, and Dakar, Dakohela.

In Thailand, port and railway improvements leading from Bangkok are required. Three new, relatively modern airfields are being constructed, at Korat, Udon, and Nan. The completion of these airfields will add substantially to the base posture in Southeast Asia.
However, aircraft parking areas and access roads will be sorely needed at these airfields to make them fully effective in limited war operations.

The base situation in the Middle East is not considered as critical as in Southeast Asia, although improvements to our logistic support capabilities are desirable. It has been mentioned that forward pre-stockage of Army supplies in Turkey is contemplated. This pre-stockage and troop staging would be carried out at existing bases already earmarked for U.S. use, with the temporary use of one or two N.A.T.O. infrastructure bases. Naval and Marine forces would also utilize temporarily N.A.T.O. bases in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There are a few facilities in Southern Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Ceylon and India) capable of supporting limited war or contingency operations. However, in event of hostilities in this area, it is considered that the number of existing facilities now available in these South Asian countries would be inadequate. National policy states that the United States should, where feasible, obtain the use of or the right to use military and strategic facilities in South Asia, including the right to operate forces in the area upon the threat of or during hostilities in which the United States is involved. It appears that the same policy should obtain for U.S. requirements in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
The world-wide deployment of U.S. military forces has necessitated the development of a world-wide communications network. Such a network is mandatory in order to insure adequate control of modern military forces with atomic weapons, to facilitate the transmission of intelligence to the United States, and to administer the deployed forces.

The number and types of installations are dependent on distances involved, progress in communications technology, and strategic requirements overseas. The present network of long-haul communications stations support principally high frequency or cable transmission. To insure adequacy and diversity of communications support, more reliable and secure methods of electromagnetic communications with high capacity, such as tropospheric scatter, are being installed progressively and will be employed in conjunction with existing or planned high frequency and cable relays. Initial planning for the future communications network indicates the use of some 120 fixed installations for communications purposes overseas. This count does not include all those installations connected with such operations as NEW Line, Mid-Canada; and other systems interlacing Canada and Alaska. Space and detail permitting, the majority of the 120 sites have been identified on the attached chart. It will be noted that several areas in the chart, i.e., Spain, Germany, Turkey and Japan, have a seemingly disproportionate share of terminal and relay stations. These are necessary to provide diversity in routing; diversity in method of communication; and to accommodate increased service requirements generated by the more advanced weapons systems.

These locations are designed to meet existing and planned requirements and are susceptible to integration into a world-wide joint communications network now being developed which will be capable of meeting military long-haul, point-to-point requirements. This network will not include: (a) tactical communications systems, self-contained within tactical organizations; (b) self-contained information gathering, transmitting and processing systems normally local in operation and use; and (c) land, ship or airborne terminal facilities of broadcast systems, ship-to-shore, ship-to-ship, air-ground-air systems.

In order to insure the degree of reliability necessary to meet requirements for the transmission of vital commands, critical intelligence, weapons control information, and essential support data, these sites are so utilized and dispersed as to preclude major damage to a world-wide joint communications network, should appreciable damage be sustained in any one large geographical area. To accomplish
this reliability, major communications axes emanating from the continental United States are designed to provide two or more distinct paths to overseas locations. (These major axes are indicated on the attached chart.) In the case of Europe, for example, two major routes are utilized, one to a northern gateway complex in England and one to a southern gateway in Spain. These routes, in turn, connect with a trans-Mediterranean axis. In the Pacific, interconnecting paths follow routes through the central Pacific to Southeast Asia and to Japan and through Alaska to the Far East.

It is anticipated that current plans for the long-haul communication network will be essentially fulfilled by 1955. Installation of the tropospheric scatter systems is proceeding in all geographical areas. These new systems will permit re-routing or reduction to standby status of some of the existing high frequency stations. Additionally, they will provide increased capacity with greater reliability and security.
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OVERSEAS BASES FROM 1963 THROUGH 1969

(The contents of this section are classified SECRET)

As previously mentioned, a forecast of the need for a U.S. overseas base system for the years following 1963 must be founded on more indefinite factors and trends than are available for the immediate future. The effect on base needs of actual production and deployment programs is largely speculative. Nevertheless, with the assumption that world tensions and the struggle with world communism will continue basically as they are today, and with the assumption that the present national policy to counter the communist threat to U.S. and free world security will remain valid for the future, it is possible to set forth certain factors which will influence the need for maintenance of an overseas base system. The impact of developments in weapons technology, particularly those of breakthrough character—such as space vehicles—is even more difficult to assess.

For the period after 1963, it is assumed that the U.S. policy will remain that of deterring the Communists from resorting to overt aggression and that the United States and its allies should be prepared to meet such aggression in any form if it should occur. It is also likely that unless there is a real solution to the disarmament problem, the Sino-Soviet bloc will continue to maintain impressive military power. Whether or not a settlement is reached over Germany and Central Europe, it is reasonable to suppose that the collective security concept embodied in NATO will continue. The United States would be committed militarily to such alliances and to alliances with other free world nations, with possible adjustments in force contributions from that now prevailing or programmed.

In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war during 1963-1969, it is also assumed that national policy will continue to require as part of its military force an effective nuclear retaliatory power, a power which will be kept secure from neutralization, even from a surprise attack. The role of overseas bases in promoting the effectiveness of the present retaliatory force and in enhancing the security of that force has already been cited. The role of overseas bases in supporting a U.S. nuclear retaliatory force after 1963 will depend primarily on weapons yet to be fully developed and on decisions yet to be made regarding the composition of such a force. From certain evidence of likely trends in weapons characteristics and force composition, it appears that, after 1963, overseas bases may play a diminishing part in support of the nuclear retaliatory force.

The present trend in composition of the overseas bomber force will result in a continued reduction in the B-47 and KC-97 tanker inventory.

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Concurrently, the B-52 force will reach a total of 12 squadrons by 1963; from there, it will probably remain at the same level for a number of years, depending on the useful life of the aircraft. The jet tanker force of KC-135's will total 50 squadrons by 1963; also, a modest number of B-58 bombers will be in the inventory by 1963. Thus the trend in the manned bomber force in the Strategic Air Command after 1963 would be to reduce reliance, as far as initial strike operations are concerned, on foreign overseas bases during the 1963 to 1969 period. Strategic operations conducted from foreign bases would then be primarily to provide greater efficiency and flexibility (such as tanker refueling for increased range) and to facilitate post-strike recovery and staging operations in wartime. In addition, these bases could provide greater efficiency and flexibility of operations for the tactical and strike support forces. Dispersion of the heavy bomber force would be carried out on bases located on United States-controlled territory.

The increased development, production, and deployment of long-range and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles can be expected to contribute significantly to an effective nuclear retaliatory power. The missiles to be deployed after 1963 will likely have more reliability and accuracy than present models in production. Present plans for safeguarding the ICBM force contemplate dispersal and hardening of sites in the continental United States; plans for future models of ICBM's also visualize security through mobility, such as use of railway launching platforms. Additional possibilities which warrant investigation are barges or ships on inland lakes or waterways and in relatively secure, contiguous maritime waters. Such launching platforms should be located away from populous centers in the United States. Development of a medium to long-range air-to-surface missile would also add to the desired variety of nuclear attack weapons.

The use of medium-range submarine launched missiles, such as the Polaris weapon-system, will contribute greatly to the desired dispersion and mobility of the nuclear retaliatory force. The deployment of this force will require major overseas base support initially.

With the aid of dispersal mobility, and other protective measures, it should be possible for the United States to prevent destruction of its strategic retaliatory force from enemy attack, including a surprise attack. The same protective capability will probably apply to long-range strike forces of the USSR. Therefore, it appears that during the latter half of the 1963 to 1969 period, both the United States and the USSR would be capable of devastating each other's homeland with nuclear weapons, but not without being susceptible to a destructive attack in reprisal.
The communist bloc can be expected to continue to test free world resolve and resistance wherever feasible to further their expansionist aims. Any resort to overt aggression on their part would probably be in the form of probing actions in areas where the United States would be confronted with the greatest military, geographic, and political difficulties. Such actions, if unopposed, could result in an erosion of free world strength; if successful, the communists would be encouraged to undertake bolder ventures, thus increasing the chances that military conflicts would spread into general war. It would be incumbent upon the United States, therefore, to have the capability to counter swiftly and successfully these aggressions in a manner best designed to avoid general war. Sufficient military strength in being, on the part of the United States and its allies, suitably deployed, and adaptable to the need for flexible application of military power, would be an essential means to realize this capability. Our overseas base system will continue to be the necessary element in making possible the forward deployment of these forces to strategic areas of the world.

Overseas bases will remain essential as an element in cold war actions designed to improve and retain U.S. leadership among non-communist nations and to promote free world solidarity. Many of our present bases are associated with force deployments to fulfill national commitments to alliances, such as NATO. For the NATO or any other collective security strategy to be effective, continued U.S. support with significant forces appears necessary.

In NATO, continued improvement in defensive capability of allied forces, notably Germany, should be possible. This will increase the ability of the alliance to retard or arrest a major aggression against the strategic area of Western Europe. Also, it can be expected that some of the NATO nations will develop an offensive capability which may allow some adjustments to U.S. strike forces assigned to NATO. For example, it is planned that from 1962 to 1965, some 300 medium-range ballistic missiles would be deployed in Europe and would replace tactical aircraft on about a one for one basis. To the extent that these missiles are manned by other NATO nations, no U.S. base requirements would be generated other than facilities to accommodate U.S. special ammunition custodial detachments. Even these would probably be provided through NATO economic infrastructure procedures. The reduction in manned aircraft requirements could be expected to result in some minor reduction in the number of air bases now assigned for U.S. use.

In contrast to the expected improvement in allied military capability in NATO, military forces of allies and associated free world nations in the Far East and in Southern and Southeastern Asia and the Middle East can be expected to attain at best a limited
capability for defense. Therefore, U.S. forces would be required to supplement and complement these indigenous military forces in opposing large-scale communist aggressions. As has been previously indicated, an improvement in the potential base structure in the Far East, Southeast Asia, Southern Asia, and the Middle East is an immediate requirement if the rapid and efficient deployment of U.S. forces to these areas is to be realized in time of need. In view of the expected continued increase in military power and aggressive attitude on the part of Communist China, this need would become even more critical in Southern Asia and Southeast Asia after 1965.

Overseas bases associated with the mission of defending the North American continent from air and sea attack are regarded as a continuing requirement as long as the potential enemy possessed the capability to attack the United States by these means. These bases will not only provide for early warning and effective employment of the strategic retaliatory forces, but will also serve for military defense efforts in reducing the damage to our industrial base and population centers. Additionally, they will continue to assist in maintaining control of vital land and sea areas and air communications.

Other changes to the overseas base system are expected to be minor. The varied activities associated with space research will probably create an ever-changing requirement for many small facilities of a temporary nature, scattered throughout the world. Also, as previously noted, plans for long-haul communications envision the establishment by 1965 of additional installations to accommodate newer communications systems, with a reduction in some of the existing facilities now employed.

During the 1963-1969 period there is a possibility of attaining some form of international arms control agreement with the Soviet Bloc. Because of the many and varied types of agreements which might be reached, many possible consequences affecting overseas base holdings may result. It is important to note, however, that adjustments in U.S. force levels brought about by such disarmament agreements, if coupled with a relinquishment of overseas bases, will doubtfully curtail the ability of the United States to deploy its remaining military power to critical areas of the free world.

From an overall view, one of the prime strategic advantages enjoyed by the United States over the USSR is the possibility of surrounding the Communist bloc with combat forces—land, sea, and air—or of strategically positioning or shifting these forces wherever needed. An adequate U.S. overseas base system is an essential need of exploiting this benefit of geography and of promoting the continued collective defense effort among free world nations.
Lang et al. 1960 Review

Bases - 3-fold purpose

(a) to maintain strategic deterrent - SAC
(b) to maintain tactical forces
(c) to promote US political objectives

NB how easy US got SAC bases. URS never - this no doubt why URS concentrated on ICBMs.

f.8. (d) to defend US mainland against attack
    - by early war - int faces; com facs.

NB how overseas bases are essential for all three,
    incl a coms syst to control nuclear forces,
    to transmit intelligence + to administer deployed forces
    - this the US just doesn't have.

f.10. one of the prime short advs of US - bomb of surrounding the Com. bloc.

NB function (d) defend US mainland now v. restricted - Als, Can.

f.42. comms are mandatory,

every word of this report suggests URS has no capab for global war or war intervention.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for FMP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>①</td>
<td>strategic offensive</td>
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<tr>
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<td>③</td>
<td>promotion of political objectives</td>
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<td>intelligence</td>
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<td>⑤</td>
<td>defence of the homeland</td>
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