Dilemmas in Deterrence

A Case Study by Captain Daniel T. Twomey

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

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SUMMARY

In a world where nuclear weapons exist and nuclear technology continues to expand, and where the two Superpowers have divergent philosophies and interests, the United States national security strategy has as its centerpiece the concept of deterrence. Deterrence has been alternately praised and criticized, accepted on faith and dismissed out of hand as an anachronism.

Any strategy for the prevention of war, especially a war whose extent, duration, and possibly everlasting effects on mankind are hypothetical, and will hopefully remain so, allows dissection from any number of directions based on varied interpretations of history and visions of the future.

This essay examines the theory of deterrence and some of the operational or practical dilemmas encountered in the conduct of deterrence as a national strategy or policy. It then touches upon the moral dilemmas inherent in a strategy threatening the use of nuclear weapons. Finally, there are some observations tying together the theory, the ethical, and the operational difficulties which are not going to be solved easily, if at all. The examination is not meant to be definitive. It is a personal clarification of ideas often pointing out problem areas that need consideration rather than resolving them. Though admittedly superficial, the essay is an attempt on part of a Catholic military officer to come to grips with a difficult reconciliation of what seems to be a "practical necessity" and what may become a "moral imperative."

The author concludes that today's strategy of deterrence is not illogical and is not immoral. Neither, however, is its success likely to be eternal. As a strategy of managing uncertainty in a dangerous age, deterrence remains uncomfortable but necessary. The proper question is not whether deterrence should be abandoned, but rather what will keep the teeth in deterrence until an alternative can be found.

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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the nuclear capability and the refinement of associated weaponry have created the preeminent dilemma of divising an approach to international relations that will effectively prohibit the use of these weapons. Unfortunately, given the existence of nuclear weapons and given a world where nations do not perceive general interests and philosophies to be in consonance, the prevention of nuclear war cannot be clearly separated from war or conflict in general.

Conflict is a continuum running from the use of words, through "cold war", insurgency-counterinsurgency, conventional (non-nuclear) limited warfare, global conventional, limited nuclear and strategic nuclear war. There is no necessity that these somewhat artificial categories must follow in a set or pre-ordained sequence. It is, however, generally accepted that they are listed in order of descending likelihood but increasing destructability and therefore increasing necessity of prevention. U.S. national security policy has thus become one emphasizing deterrence of armed conflict as the prime goal.

The content of deterrent policy and many of the assumptions behind the policy are increasingly being taken to task by members of all portions of the political spectrum within the United States as well as by allies and antagonists overseas. The overall concept of deterrence, both the deterrence of nuclear war and the deterrence of conflict at all levels is at the heart of the ethical and fiscal debates facing all branches of government today. It is doubtful that a coherent defense budget or arms control position can be achieved without coming to grips with the proper make up of deterrence.

Coming to grips with deterrence is neither a pleasant nor an easy task. On the surface the concept of prevention of another's action through threats seems straightforward and easy to identify. After all, history is filled with examples of how well deterrence works. Modern history of the relations between the Superpowers (World War II till the present) is the most studied example of the effectiveness of deterrence. However, even the most "simple" mechanisms must undergo preventive and periodic maintenance. As the world

conditions change, so must the strategies which nations employ to govern their relationships. Deterrence is a dynamic not a static concept and as it is investigated to ensure that it is evolving with the international environment, a number of dilemmas or contradictions come to light which can easily unravel the existing peace.

During the past several years both academicians and practicioners alike have dissected deterrence from every conceivable perspective. They have attempted to explain every assumption, problem, contradiction and unknown resulting in mountains of written "evidence" and opinions. Since the concept of deterrence is so closely tied to the psychological world of perceptions, and since success and failure of deterrence must remain to a great extent in the realm of the theoretical rather than the empirically proveable, the focus and tone of the analyses have been as varied as the world views, interpretations of history, political, and military biases and visions of the future held by those participating in the debate. Whatever specific explanations and proposals the proponents and critics of deterrence provide, their debate further exacerbates the difficulty in articulating a policy that has been accrued from past policies and practices and may not have evolved as rapidly as the real world.

This paper will first review the theory of deterrence and the history of the practice of modern deterrence and will then highlight some of the major dilemmas that need to be addressed by practicioners. After discussing both moral and operational challenges, some personal observations are offered which attempt to take into account these moral issues as well as the real world circumstances and perceptions in which these ethical considerations take place. Though a personal evaluation of deterrence, the paper provides a framework for the continued assessment of deterrence as an approach to national security and international stability.

CHAPTER I

DETERRENCE THEORY

Any theory of deterrence must address the factors likely to affect deterrence outcomes. Scholars and policy formulators have approached this addressal from every conceivable direction: the eyes of the deterrer, the perceptions of the prospective deterree, the historian, and the futurist. Deterrence has been modeled using practical historical nations and events and has been discussed *ad nauseam* in abstract philosophical and psychological terms using mythical participants with generalized ideological outlooks and inventive scenarios. Deterrence has been divided into general and "pure" or immediate; it has been treated as a theoretical concept as well as a phenomenological event. Deterrence has been called a policy, a strategy, a goal, an objective, a facade, a process, an orientation, a relationship. It may emphasize denial or punishment; it may be real or pretend, based on declarative policy or practical planning. Its success or failure has been said to depend primarily on either force and capabilities or perceptions of will and intent. National style, risk calculations, assumptions of human rationality, political and fiscal costs, technological advancements and potentialities must all be used to link interests, commitment, capability, credibility and the operational parameters of deterrence. Deterrence is perhaps best described as a game of strategic interaction in which a rational opponent assesses costs and benefits of action based on the expectations regarding the likely behavior of its adversary.[1] Since our government has not been able to find a more sure practical method of prevention of war than deterrence, it has become the centerpiece of our security policy.

Today's debates on deterrence have centered on the practical case of deterrence as practiced by the Superpowers in an era of rapidly expanding technology drastically affecting the likelihood, conduct, and potential results of modern warfare. Before discussing some of the specific practical and moral dilemmas posed by depending on deterrence as the centerpiece of security it is necessary to quickly review some of the basic theory of deterrence.

Patrick Morgan defines deterrence as "the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else."[2] Deterrence exists then in a world of theory, inference and hypothesis. In this world of hypothesis, theorists have identified several factors that impact the outcome of deterrence.[3]

First, there must be a threat to influence the opponent's expectations about how the deterring power will act in a conflict situation. The type and extent of the threat will vary depending on the situation and the interests involved. In general however, the threat will be seen to be different from purely defense which is seen to end an aggression. The threat (to prevent the aggression) will likely add punishment and retribution to defense.

Next, the threat must be signaled to the opponent. The nature of the signal and its manner of presentation are extremely important. Since the deterrer has, in effect, relinquished the initiative to the opponent, it is vital that the deterree believe the threat will be carried out and that the deterring power has sufficient motivation to follow through on the threat. In the modern world, transmitting the message of deterrence is very complex especially since there is very little data and experience with nuclear war. Nations must deal primarily with theory, inference and hypothesis; and transmission by trial and error will likely not survive more than a very few errors.

The third factor is the linking of credibility, commitment and intrinsic interest. This is a matter of proper coordination of signals, consistency with national style and history, and practical capabilities at the time of the signals.

Credibility of the deterrer is a prime factor. Credibility is a function of capabilities, the damage these capabilities can inflict and the perception of the intentions of the deterrer. This is predominantly a psychological component since it involves a calculation of costs and/or gains, i.e. the costs of making war are greater or less than the gains or losses from retreat or no resistance. Credibility is affected by relative levels of strength and if the umbrella of deterrence stretches over a country "protected" by the deterrer, the credibility of this "extended deterrence" is greatly affected by the relationship between the deterring power and the weaker country that is

targeted for aggression.

There must be the capability to back up the threat. It is the adequacy and appropriateness of the capability as perceived by the opponent that is important since he must be convinced that it can't be easily circumvented or "piecemealed".

Sixth, the vulnerability of the deterrer to preemption plays a role in the opponent's calculations and evaluation.

Finally, the concept of deterrence depends heavily on the assumption of rationality on the part of the actors involved. Rationality is generally defined in terms of calculating and value maximizing decision makers. It involves instrumental rationality which assumes purposive and goal directed action or reasonable rationality where the actor does not act if costs outweigh the gains. It may even involve rationality in the true psychological sense-especially in times of extreme pressure or crisis. (There are some theorists like Morgan who believe that it is the measure of irrationality in human behavior that makes deterrence successful and not the emphasis on rational calculations.)

These seven factors appear to be most appropriate and influential in situations of "pure" or immediate deterrence and of somewhat lesser relevance in their totality to general deterrence.[4] Specificity and appropriateness of the threat, clarity of the signal, certain credibility with relation to the specific instance involved, and the "ready" capability of force to back up the threat provide the observable rationality important in cases of immediate deterrence. In general deterrence, ambiguous national policies are more frequently the rule and thus deterrence works more as a result of the uncertainty facing the aggressor and the rationality/irrationality present in both the deterrer and the aggressor. Overemphasis on deterrent strategy in cases characterized as part of general deterrence without coming to grips with the limits of the scope and relevance of deterrence often produces crises and crisis escalation rather than control and management of the relationships between the states. Deterrence is part of a general influence process and not a separable self-contained phenomenon.

In applying the seven factors, it becomes clear that deterrence doesn't depend on intentions of the deterrer alone but more on the beliefs of the one to be deterred. The perceptions of both sides are perhaps the most important keys to successful deterrence. In discussing the relationship between deterrence and perception, Robert Jervis reminds us that actors' perceptions diverge from objective reality and from the perceptions of other actors. A statesman needs to see how his opposite number sees the world, i.e. how things look through his eyes.[5] Deterrence will possibly misfire if the two sides have different beliefs in the perceived cost of punishment that can be inflicted and the perceived probabilities that they will be inflicted. Jervis assesses four primary areas of concern for the practicioners of deterrence: misperceptions of value, misperceptions of credibility, judging the adversaries' alternatives, and self-deterrence.[6]

Each side must have an accurate understanding of what the other side considers of value since one deters the other by convincing him that the value he can expect from a certain action is outweighed by the punishment he can expect. The aggressor, for example, must know what kind of war the deterrer is threatening to wage. The deterrer must know what the aggressor values most in order to tailor the threat properly.

Probably the most important cause of deterrence failure is misperception of credibility. How do states determine another's general resolve? How does the statesman calculate how much his counterpart is willing to pay? Deterrence Theory rests on the assumption that general judgments about others' credibility are important; but how context bound are these judgments and how important is the overall reputation of a nation in relation to its specific interests in the crisis in question?

Deterrence may fail if the defender fails to grasp the aggressor's evaluation of the alternatives to fighting. Is the aggressor acting based on the attraction of positive gains or is he acting because he feels inaction will force him to suffer grave losses? Jervis makes the interesting observation: "Status quo powers often underestimate the pressure that is pushing the other to act and therefore underestimate the magnitude of threat and/or the degree of credibility that will be required to make the other refrain from moving."[7]

Sometimes states can successfully deter others unintentionally or unknowingly. Statesmen can also be deterred by "perceiving" things that are not there. Alarmists may deter themselves by paying too much attention to hypothetical calculations about enemy capabilities and becoming more hesitant and less confident thus encouraging the other party to believe it is safe to take actions otherwise considered too dangerous. This type of self deterrence taken to its extreme could result in a self-fulfilling prophecy of defeat.

The likelihood of misperception in any or all of these areas puts extensive limits on the degree to which deterrence strategies can be fine tuned. Strategies must also be tailored to the other's pre-existing beliefs and images which further limits the range of strategies. The perceptual difficulties noted here strengthen the view that definitive deterrence theory and definition are based on verifying a psychological phenomenon.

The various aspects of deterrence theory, especially when considered in conjunction with today's nuclear world, thus raise a number of paradoxes or dilemmas that are not easily or definitively solveable for the future. The dilemmas revolve around what is perhaps the key dilemma of deterrence. "The more likely it is that you will use your capability if you need to, the less likely it is that you will ever be faced with the need. And the converse is equally true."[8] This dilemma is surrounded by an ever increasing family of dilemmas that are entwined with each of the key factors affecting the success of deterrence discussed previously. The litany of uncertainties or dilemmas associated with the practice of deterrence have been brought to the forefront by both ends of the political spectrum. There are those who believe deterrence as a reactive strategy does not go far enough and allows the Soviets a free hand in all but the military sphere of action. On the other side, some hold that deterrence is too confrontational and dangerous and can only result in nuclear holocaust. Between the two extremes are numerous divergent paths toward improving the current concept by increasing its credibility through improved understanding of antagonists, clearer signals, stronger links between interests and commitment, and an improved and better understood capability to back up the threat to retaliate.

The attempts to address and solve the operational dilemmas are not alone.

The assault on the morality of deterrence has intensified, even if it is still in its infancy. The most cogent treatise has been by the Catholic Bishops, but even they have not yet taken the full step from theory and doctrine to practice and alternatives.

Before addressing these moral aspects, Chapter II will address some of the specific operational dilemmas in the context of the U.S. and Soviet Union as the prime players in the deterrence process.

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONAL DILEMMAS

Today's debates in the West about deterrence and the attendant nuclear strategy appear to be brought about by the 1970's change in the military balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially in the nuclear area. This change in the balance resulting in a decrease in the relative strength of the West has brought with it a fear of intensified Soviet aggression and pressure on the West and an increased fear of nuclear war. No one knows the risks of nuclear war; statistics are of little help; and estimating the risk is fraught with danger. Amos Tversky caught the mood of the debates in a 6 December 1983 New York Times article. "People have no sensible mental model for dealing with very improbable events, so they either ignore them entirely and assume they will not happen, or, if forced to consider them, grossly overestimate their likelihood."[9]

It is very hard to evaluate general deterrence as has existed between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to aggression against Western Europe. Have the Soviets been deterred for these last four decades or have they not had the intent to take Europe? If they have been deterred, what has deterred them? U.S. nuclear threat, U.S.-NATO nuclear capability, U.S.-NATO conventional military capability, or something else? In the case of Europe, "successful deterrence is very much more than just a matter of having a favorable military balance and very much a matter of the nature and extent of ties between the defender state and the state it wishes to protect."[10] Since deterrence is a function of both political and military considerations, decision-makers must weigh the perceived political consequences of military action as well as the military risks and costs. If the combination of costs and risks is very high, deterrence will likely succeed. (Keep in mind however that sometimes, as we have seen, even the risks may be perceived to be preferable to the status quo.) If a strategy is to deter, it must be credible. Both sides must believe that if deterrence were to fail, the U.S. would actually operate its forces in accordance with the strategy and both sides must believe that such operations would be likely to achieve U.S. wartime

goals.[11] A number of the confusions and criticisms surrounding the U.S. policy of deterrence center on U.S. strategy, its forces, and its capability to achieve wartime goals. There is confusion on what the U.S. strategy is and how it has evolved. There is criticism on how much and what type of capability is required to carry out the strategy. And there is debate about the overall morality of the strategy.

In 1968 in Gulliver's Troubles, Stanley Hoffman suggested that "American national style is characterized, on the one hand, by commitments to very broad principles of ambiguous character and, on the other, by an 'engineering approach' to problems that emphasizes technique and technology."[12] But strategic decision can't follow the laws of mechanics because risk, misperception and miscalculation are subjective phenomena.

If there is confusion on what the U.S. strategy is, Secretary of Defense Weinberger tries to dispel it in his 1986 Annual Report. U.S. defense strategy is to deter aggression and coercion against U.S. allies, friends, and vital interests. He continues stating that if deterrence should fail, the U.S. strategy would be to seek the earliest termination of conflict on terms favorable to the U.S., our allies and our national security objectives; while at the same time seeking to limit the scope and intensity of the conflict.[13] Deterrence according to the Secretary is the core of U.S. strategy.

"Such interrelated factors as U.S.-Soviet relations, relative strengths of major nations, global military balance, and current regional military situations must be considered in the formulation of strategy and the development of forces to support it. U.S. military strategy and force levels must be adequate to confront a wide range of challenges from low intensity conflict to threats involving modern conventional and nuclear forces."[14]

The military sources of deterrence include effective defenses, the threat of escalation, and the threat of retaliation. The credibility of deterrence then is a function of having and being perceived to have the military capability to execute these effectively. That is another way of saying that the ability must exist to remove all incentives for direct attack against the United States and its allies by ensuring any attacker an unacceptable outcome.

These quotes from the Secretary and from the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly highlight the key elements of deterrence as seen by the U.S. government. It is an extended deterrence which means American protection is extended over friends and allies and is not limited to preventing attacks against the United States. Response will be flexible, and the potential outcome of a conflict will be unacceptable to the attacker. Deterrence involves conventional as well as nuclear capability, and global military balance is important. Although these concepts appear relatively straightforward, they leave a lot to the imagination and are open to interpretation in almost every respect, especially with regard to nuclear strategy.

Declaratory policy (public statements made by authorized government officials about how nuclear weapons would be used) is often misleading due to oversimplification or a reluctance to discuss politically sensitive aspects of employment policy. These aspects may be sensitive domestically or internationally. Employment policy, on the other hard, is the actual policy governing the use of nuclear weapons, the type of targets that are to be attacked, under what circumstances, and with what confidence of success.[1]

In discussing the historic elements of U.S. strategic nuclear policy, Desmond Ball subdivides it into several facets which are not all consistent with each other.

    a. <u>Declaratory Policy</u> includes annual reports, public debate rationale and budget decisions which may or may not resemble closely how the U.S. would act in crisis and war.

    b. <u>Force Development Policy</u> instructs decisions on the size and capability of ICBMs and basing modes, requirements for strategic bombers, and the size and characterisitics of the SLBM force.

    c. <u>Operational Policy</u> determines such things as alert rates of missiles and patrol practices of submarines.

    d. <u>Force Employment Policy</u> (action policy) defines how we would actually use our forces in the event of an exchange.

e. <u>Arms Control Policy</u> defines the objectives as to the character of the balance being sought, the capabilities of U.S. forces required and provides guidance for the development of bargaining chips.[16]

This somewhat artificial cataloguing of policies helps us understand why we are operating under what appears, in many cases, to be contradictory policies and leads Ball to conclude, "If strategic discourse were to pay appropriate attention to the nuclear weapons employment aspect of U.S. strategic policy as opposed to the misleading and increasingly sterile debates about declaratory policy then there would be a number of interesting and important issues which could well be addressed."[17]   However, even this suggestion doesn't bring us to a singular thread in U.S. nuclear policy. Aaron Friedberg succinctly summarizes the development of U.S. doctrine:

> "U.S. strategic doctrine, such as it is, has always contained two different strands.   One is 'assured destructionist' in coloration and exphasizes the importance of the countervalue deterrent, the dangers of regarding nuclear forces as ordinary weapons of war, the risks of threatening the enemy's nuclear capabilities, the value of stability and the necessity for 'indices' of sufficiency.   The other strand is more traditional, arising as it does from some universal and time-honored principles of military action.   It focuses on war outcome, on the importance of preparing to achieve sensible objectives should deterrence fail and therefore on the necessity for defeating the enemy by denying him his objectives and destroying his willingness and ability to wage war."[18]

Sometimes these strains have come into open conflict.   In certain areas and times, one or the other has clearly been dominant; but they have often just coexisted with one another.   From McNamara in 1962, through Schlesinger in 1974 and President Carter's PD-59 in July 1980, the emphasis and description of U.S. strategic policy has been counterforce.   The Reagan Strategic Modernization Program seems to indicate an even heavier reliance on a counterforce strategy.   Ball maintains that war plans have always included a wide range of targets including military forces, stockpiles, bases, installations, economic and industrial centers, political and administrative centers, and (after 1950) Soviet nuclear forces. He also notes that even with

great changes in avowed U.S. stragetic policy and targeting doctrines, these general categories have been remarkably resilient.[19]

Aaron Friedberg further summarizes U.S. targeting strategy:

"...between the end of World War II and the first years of the fifties, the United States did not explicitly target Soviet military installations with its nuclear forces. (Although the targeting of urban industrial areas during this period was intended to have an immediate effect on the war on the ground.) From the early sixties to the present (1980) Soviet military forces, and especially their nuclear threat forces have apparently made up a majority of the designated targets against which American strategic weapons would be used in the event of war."[20]

U.S. strategic policy as defined by PD-59 (and as is continued by President Reagan) is not revolutionary but, is rather, as Harold Brown noted in his remarks at the Naval War College on 20August 1980, "a natural evolution of the conceptual foundations built over the course of a generation."

Even this cursory review of U.S. nuclear strategy helps dispel the myths that U.S. policy is strictly one massive retaliation or assured destruction or that there is no coherent strategy. The U.S. has always had a nuclear strategy, i.e. a set of objectives, however crudely defined, and an accompanying plan containing detailed target and employment requirements. The question of what to do if deterrence fails has received a great deal of attention for a very long time, even if it has not been discussed in "declaratory policy."

Even though our nuclear strategy does exist, the elimination of the confusion about it, which in turn might reduce the confusion about the role it plays in our overall deterrent strategy, is not a simple task. The problem is reflected in one of the dilemmas facing the political and military leadership. The closer the declaratory policy approximates and exposes the employment policy (and the other subcategories, such as force development and operational policy) the less successful the strategy will be. To maximize its own leverage and protection, the Soviets would develop counter measures to minimize the effectiveness and therefore the credibility of the policy. On the

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other hand, a major disparity between declaratory and employment policy also risks a loss of credibility. Types and capabilities of individual weapons systems and the selected combination of weapons by their very existence limit and, to some extent, announce the policy being followed. A declaratory policy of second strike counterforce is not credible if the deterring arsenal is made up of vulnerable, very large weapons with a questionable capability for command and control. From the military perspective a disparity of weapons capabilities and policy could force plans and tactics that are incorrect, inappropriate, and likely ineffective. There has always been some disjunction between employment policy and force structure, but the amount acceptable has probably decreased with the loss of U.S. strategic superiority. Today, consistency and efficiency require increased correspondence between declaratory, employment, operational, force development, and arms control policies. As Ball says, "Failure to effect a sensitive and mutually responsive relationship between target planning and strategic policymaking risks incredible declaratory statements and inefficient war plans."[21] The history of the development of U.S. strategic policy and targeting strategy indicates that there is a growing appreciation of this relationship. The same history also reminds us of the internal bureaucratic and fiscal aspects of strategy development which further complicate the sending of coherent signals to the Soviets.[22] (Logically, strategy is driven by objectives and in turn strategy drives the requirement for capabilities. But logic does not always prevail. Limited resources force the development of limited capabilities; and, some objectives are considered so important that they directly drive the development of a capability without ever going through the strategy stage.)

However coherent the strategy, the credibility of deterrence is extremely dependent on the ability to carry out the strategy; and as opponents become more equal in military power, deterrence is based more and more upon resolve and will. The political leaders' resolve and will can be demonstrated in part by the resources tied up in backing up the strategic policy. In March 1985 Secretary Weinberger reaffirmed the three major elements that the 1983 Scowcroft Commission determined effective deterrence today to require:

1) Holding at risk those military, political and economic assets which the Soviet leadership have given every indication by their actions they value most and which consistute their tools of power and control.

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2) Creating a stable strategic balance by eliminating unilateral Soviet advantages and evolving to increasingly survivable deterrent forces; and

3) Maintaining a modern effective Strategic Triad by strengthening each of its legs and emphasizing secure and survivable command, control and communications.[23]

In addition to the essential targeting requirements which come from these "principles of deterrence,"[24] the Secretary believes the U.S. (or deterrer) must be able to control escalation. This means that the forces and targeting must combine to provide a capability to respond to an adversary's initiated conflict in a way that denies him the motive and advantage of escalation. In a further policy statement Mr. Weinberger adds, "We must have sufficient forces to make certain that the Soviets understand clearly that we can and will deny them their objectives at any level of conflict they might contemplate."[25]

At this point we can recognize three additional dilemmas:

1) In order to ensure deterrence we need to think about and plan against possible failures of deterrence;

2) The stronger we make the capability of the military forces backing our deterrent strategy, the stronger the fear on the part of the Soviets that our strategy is one of first strike rather than deterrence; and

3) A paradox caused by the relationship of extended deterrence and escalation control is articulated by Richard Smoke, "At one level, the enormous growth of U.S. and Western military capabilities might seem to be cause for placing considerable confidence in the West's ability to employ strategies of extended deterrence...However, many of the developments...also tend to undercut such confidence in important respects. The intertwining of extended deterrence and escalation dynamics leaves the credibility of the deterrent threat at least partially dependent upon the threatener's ability-or to be exact, his perceived ability-to manage the escalation process."[26]

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Planning for the possible failure of deterrence is not only prudent militarily, it is necessary to make deterrence credible. Deterrence and the capability for war fighting (not war winning) are but two sides of the same coin. Confusion in this area is, perhaps, the most prevalent misconception about our deterrent strategy. The belief that thinking about and introducing more accurate, limited weapons with better plans for contingencies is a shift away from deterrence is incorrect. As Quinlan said, the "deterrent effect of weapons and plans is not something separate from and independent of their capability for actual use; deterrence operates precisely through capability for actual use."[27] Weapons that are unusable are not credible, weapons that are difficult to use are less credible, the lack of meaningful plans creates the perception of a lack of serious will. Perhaps Mark Twain described this aspect of deterrence quite well years ago:

> "The other day two bulldogs met. They circled snarling and growling. Both were bluffing, so nothing happened. And they were about to walk off when one of them opened his mouth. He had no teeth. So the other dog tore him to pieces."[28]

The decision about the size, shape, and sharpness of the teeth required is the heart of the first two dilemmas. Military considerations have always played a role in influencing the political military leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. Sam Huntington sees military forces contributing to deterrence in three ways. They deter by being in place, thereby increasing the uncertainties and potential costs to the aggressor. They deter by being in place and possibly effecting a successful defense, thereby causing a possible defeat of the enemy. Finally, they deter by threatening retaliation against assets highly valued by the aggressor.[29] All elements must be present. A purely defensive strategy is an inherently weaker deterrent than one which threatens (or promises) retaliation. Unfortunately strategies and forces designed for deterrence are not necessarily as well suited to defense. When we think about deterrence pursued through the capability to deny the enemy, we are typically thinking about conventional land, sea, and air forces. When we think about deterrence pursued through the capability to punish the enemy, we are typically thinking strategic nuclear forces whether massive or limited. In addressing extended deterrence, Huntington concludes that a purely conventional defense is the same as deterrence without retaliation.

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This "denial only" strategy means that the aggressor can be tempted to estimate the cost needed to defeat the enemy forces and to achieve his objective. If the nuclear retaliation threat is also present, the attacker's uncertainty and risk are greatly increased.[30] Unfortunately, the distinction between denial and punishment is muddied somewhat when speaking solely of the nuclear deterrent. Countercity or countervalue weapons are easily categorized as punishment, though they may, of course be effective counterforce weapons as well. Counterforce weapons may be used for either denial or punishment. The distinction must be made based on targeting practices, employment plans, and operational policies. This, then, returns us to the earlier discussed dilemma of declaratory policy and its relationship with force development, employment, and operational policies and its use as a signal to the Soviets.

Secretary Weinberger has used declaratory policy to define the nuclear weapon arsenal that he feels meets the needs for both denial and punishment, while providing the survivability and redundancy to demonstrate a retaliatory rather than a first strike posture.

"...the concept of a strategic triad provides an indispensable element of deterrence. The combined effect of having three complementary legs complicates Soviet attack planning and any efforts to prevent U.S. retaliation. The existence of the three legs provides, in addition, an important hedge against the possibility that a single Soviet technological breakthrough could threaten our overall deterrent capability. By maintaining a triad of forces, we compel the Soviet Union to disperse its resources against three components, preventing it from concentrating its considerable resources on defeating only one or two U.S. strategic systems. The strengths of each triad leg not only complement the strengths of the other two but also compensate for their weaknesses. To deter successfully all types of nuclear attack, our forces as a whole must possess a number of characteristics and capabilities -- including survivability, prompt response, endurance, mission flexibility, and sufficient accuracy and warhead yield -- to retaliate against hardened Soviet military targets. No single weapon system can incorporate all of these capabilities. Submarines are less vulnerable but they are difficult to communicate with at times, and

currently their missiles are less accurate. Bombers are accurate and retrievable, but they are much slower. ICBMs are easier to command and provide a quicker response, but they are more vulverable than submarines. The three systems together can incorporate all of the elements necessary to deter any type of nuclear attack. Thus, the key advantage of the triad is that is provides an important measure of strategic stability."[31]

Deterrence is a game of strategic interaction in which each opponent assesses costs and benefits based on expectations regarding the likely behavior of the other. The day of the U.S. monopoly or overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons came to an end in the 1970s. Soviet gains in both strategic and conventional capabilities have increased so much more rapidly than those of the West that the credibility of the West's deterrent capability could soon come into question. The balance of military capabilities is important. It is important to the attacker in assessing his ability to attack and fight and in estimating the defender's probability to fight. The perception of a relative military advantage could also have political advantages in peacetime and in crisis situations. Brent Scowcroft maintains, "If comparative military trends were to point to their (Soviets) becoming superior to the West in each of a number of military areas, they might consider themselves able to raise the risks in a crisis in a manner that could not be matched."[32]

President Reagan's Strategic Modernization Program when combined with the policy statements offered by the President himself, the Secretary of Defense and government spokesmen such as the Scowcroft Commission, draw closer together force development and declaratory policies. The Modernization Program emphasizes the capabilities required of the strategic forces for a U.S. policy to deny Soviet objectives, to provide flexible response, and to demonstrate the endurance necessary for retaliation rather than dependence on a first strike.[33] A policy that doesn't possess the military forces with the capability to enforce it is hollow and not credible to us, to our allies, or to our adversaries. Yet a posture that is perceived by the U.S. as a retaliatory deterrent but is viewed by the Soviet Union as a provocative threat is especially dangerous. Whether the capabilities supporting the deterrent policy deter, tempt, or provoke attack is very

dependent on political factors and on the nature of the Soviet motives and beliefs. As we have seen, uncertainty may not prohibit the attacker if he perceives an intolerable cost of not attacking; but, "a nuclear threat is the best hedge against uncertainty about Soviet motives because it raises the risks that counter Moscow's perceived costs of not going to war."[34]

Deterrence is, in the end, a matter of national will and resolve, a matter of political relationships, and a matter of perceptions. The military capabilities of both sides are important but are only one aspect. Betts sees the essential problems for the U.S. strategy lying in unchangeable geography and only marginally alterable politics. Geography makes the U.S. homeland more secure than the U.S.S.R. but reverses the advantage where defense of allies and conflict in crucial third areas are concerned.[35] Extended deterrence, is more likely to be effective when the defender's visible and symbolic stake in his protege is great. Economic linkage, arms transfer and local military capabilities are major players in increasing the likelihood of successful deterrence. The credibility of extended deterrence is not based on details of forces or doctrine but on the basic recognition that America extends its nuclear commitment to Europe because the independence of Western Europe from Soviet dominance is essential to the independence of the U.S.[36] Soviet behavior is most likely to continue to be determined by particular stakes and potential costs which will be colored by their perception of the balance of nuclear weaponry, their views of armed conflict in general, and especially their acceptability (or lack of) of nuclear war as an instrument of policy.

Some of the theoretical and practical dilemmas involved in deterrence have been addressed, and it appears the U.S. deterrent policy has accepted the challenge to remain dynamic. Both policy and the capabilities associated with those policies have changed with the political times and with the increased Soviet capabilities. The U.S. continues to attempt to come to grips with the interrelated paradoxes of the nuclear age: 1) Because of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, a nuclear war seems implausible; but many believe it is likely or fairly likely. 2) The nuclear powers command unprecedented destructive power, but they can't use that power. 3) It is not meaningful (in the traditional sense) to speak of winning a nuclear war.[37]

Nuclear weapons have fundamentally changed the nature of war. Deterrence is an uncomfortable strategy. Management of the escalation process appears to remain a very weak link in deterrence as practiced today. Tight controls over weapons, improved command and control systems and procedures, alliance and U.S. contingency plans are all attempts to strengthen the control of escalation. The question of what happens if deterrence fails remains important for the intellectual cohesion and credibility of our nuclear strategy. It is also a question that, in the West, is increasingly treated in terms of religious morality. Though posing theoretical and not operational problems for the decision makers -- yet, the moral dilemmas associated with nuclear warfare and also applicable to nuclear deterrence, may pose an even greater threat to continued faith in deterrence as a strategy.

CHAPTER III

MORAL DILEMMAS

"The nuclear age is an era of moral as well as physical danger. We are the first generation since Genesis with the power to virtually destroy God's creation. We cannot remain silent in the face of such danger. We are simply trying to live up to the call of Jesus to be peacemakers in our time and situation."[38] With these words the Catholic bishops entered seriously, for the first time, into the nuclear debate. The bishops believe that the dangers and dynamics of the nuclear arms race present qualitatively new problems which must be addressed by fresh applications of traditional moral principles.

Fear about the bomb is a sometimes thing. Most people know that nuclear weapons are a problem just like they know that oil is running out and that the burning of fossil fuels may be heating up the earth; just like they know that midwest farmland is losing tons of topsoil per acre per year and that acid rain is poisoning our lakes. All of these promise doom, and nuclear weapons are often placed in the pile of things we can't do anything about.[39] Admiral James Watkins reiterates this same thought, "We, as Americans, have been reluctant to look at difficult questions about nuclear weapons and national defense. It was easier to 'not think' the 'unthinkable' than to intellectually deal with our questions about national defense in the nuclear age."[40]

Perhaps the timing of the contemporary debate is tied to the awareness of the end of American strategic superiority combined with, what some have called, the "cavalier" attitude of some high U.S. government officials regarding nuclear issues. The nuclear debate crosses over all lines: political, organizational, professional, and ideological. Since the debate deals with the rights of people and the relationship of people to government, the entire spectrum of defense and strategic deterrence is being placed under public scrutiny with a fervor rarely experienced. Public concern is best described as a disagreement about the best way to prevent a nuclear war. In any case, the moral questions raised by nuclear weapons need to be thought through from

their foundations all the way to their practical implications. In this analysis, the resort to faith, religious witness, or rhetoric are not appropriate.

The dilemma to be addressed is that the moral result of avoiding nuclear war was achieved through the auspices of certain (maybe morally questionable) type of weapons. The central political dilemma we discussed earlier, that is, to ensure deterrence we need to think about and plan against possible failures of deterrence, has also strained our moral conceptions. May we resort to nuclear warfare under any circumstances? May we threaten to do what we may not do? May we possess what we may not use? The French Catholic bishops, the Lutheran Church in America, the Episcopal Church and the U.S. Catholic bishops have all addressed the dilemma. The Pastoral Letter of the Catholic bishops provides by far the most in-depth analysis of the problem, and they admit they have not solved the problem but have only shed light on it. The Catholic bishops generally appear to echo what the Protestants have said.[41] They, in the letter, feel the strong tug between the schools of pacifism and those holding to the just war theory. The movement through several drafts show the difficulties the bishops encountered: philosophical, moral, bureaucratic, and realistic-political. The final draft published in the Spring of 1983 leaned much farther toward the just war side than they did in the earlier drafts. Like any primarily theoretical, philosophical analysis, there are a number of criticisms of the Bishops' methods and conclusions as well as a great deal of praise for providing an analytic look that is filled with realistic reflections as well as utopian yearnings.

The Catholic bishops begin their letter with a discussion of "peace" which has a long and complex tradition in Catholic thought. Through history peace has had a number of different meanings: the individual's sense of well-being or security, the cessation of armed-hostility, the right relationship with God, and eschatological peace which is the final realization of God's salvation. In the Old Testament peace was seen as a gift from God; in the New Testament war and peace are seen in the context of the reign of God which Christ proclaimed and inaugurated. Peace is possible, but never assured; its possibility must be continually protected and preserved. Peace is seen not as an end in itself, but as an indispensable condition for the task of creating a more human world for all men everywhere. Peace is the setting in which

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moral choices can be most effectively made. "Justice is always the foundation for peace,"[42] and thus the struggle for justice may at times threaten certain forms of peace. In the words of the Pastoral Constitution of Vatican II:

> "Certainly war has not been rooted out of human affairs. As long as the danger of war remains and there is not competent and sufficiently powerful authority at the international level, governments cannot be denied the right to legitimate defense once every means of peaceful sentiment has been exhausted. Therefore, government authorities and others who share public responsibility have the duty to protect the welfare of the people entrusted to their cause and to conduct such grave matters soberly."[43]

But, the Pastoral continues,..."Nor does the possession of war potential make every military or political use of it lawful."[44] In consonance with this, the bishops maintain that the Christian must defend peace, properly understood, against aggression; it is the how of defending peace that offers the moral options.

Within Catholic tradition certain moral principles provide guidance for public policy as well as for individual choice. Particularly appropriate here is the Church's teaching on just war criteria. Francis Winters notes that just war theory attempts to reconcile two apparently conflicting human rights: the right to a just political order and the right to life. It is "a philosophical sheath for the sword to protect the sacredness of life."[45] The application of just war criteria entails consideration of sociological, economic, political, and military as well as moral questions. Just war criteria are divided into two categories: *Jus ad bellum* -justifiability of resorting to war, and *Jus in bello*- the morally permissible conduct in fighting a war.

Jus ad bellum: There are seven basic rules in initiating a just war:

1. Just cause: The confrontation must be real and there must be certain danger. It is doubtful that a war of retribution today would fit into this criterion.

2. Competent authority: Those ordering the war must be those responsible for the public order. (Revolutionary groups pose an interesting question here.)

3. Comparative justice: The rights and values at stake must be critical enough to override the presumption against war; and limited means must be used to pursue the objective.

4. Right intention: Intentions must be in accordance with the just war criteria and not for enslavement, genocide, etc..

5. Last resort: All peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted.

6. Probability of success: This is very hard to apply and is an attempt to prevent an irrational resort to force and disproportionate or futile outcomes.

7. Proportionality: The damage inflicted and the costs incurred must be proportionate to the good expected.

Jus in bello: The criteria here are closely tied with the ideas of proportionality and discrimination. There is unequivocal condemnation of indiscriminate destruction of entire cities. Consideration of possible harm, the dangers of error and miscalculation, accidents, etc. are important as well.

Using a basic presumption that war is to be avoided, the application of the just war criteria, and the belief that the possibilities of political or moral limits on nuclear war are extremely minimal, the bishops basically conclude that the moral task is prevention of nuclear war.

With regard to the use of nuclear weapons, the major problems arise in conjunction with discrimination and proportionality. Counter-population warfare is unacceptable under any circumstances, even in retaliation. The initiation of nuclear war and the conduct of limited nuclear war are also condemned because of the overwhelming likelihood of escalation, uncertainty about discrimination in targeting, and uncertain long term effects.

The bishops recognize that deterrence has become the centerpiece of U.S. strategy and that there has been substantial continuity in U.S. action policy in spite of the changes in declaratory policy. Pope John Paul II said, "In current

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conditions 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. Nonetheless, in order to ensure peace, it is indispensible not to be satisfied with this minimum, which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion."[46] The bishops show a great deal of concern about the specifics of targeting doctrine and plans which will impact on civilian casualties and about the relationships of deterrent strategy and warfighting capability to the likelihood that war will, in fact, be prevented. Not all forms of deterrence are morally acceptable. For example, direct targeting of innocent civilian populations is not acceptable. Using the criteria of proportionality, even the written assurances from Secretary Weinberger and then National Security Advisor William Clark that the U.S. will not use the weapons for the purpose of destroying populations, don't satisfy the problem caused by indirect, unintended but massive civilian causalties. The bishops don't believe that nuclear war could be subject to precise rational and moral limits. Thus, the stressing of warfighting capabilities and perhaps even extended deterrence are not preferred because, the bishops believe, they are destabilizing concepts which increase the likelihood of war. The bishops believe that nuclear deterrence should be a step toward progressive disarmament and has in itself a limited role. Deterrence is grudgingly accepted as an unpleasant interim measure. They are profoundly skeptical about the moral acceptability of any use of nuclear weapons. The bishops move back to generalities in proposing steps in the building of peace. There must be accelerated work for arms control, reduction and disarmament. There must be continued insistence on efforts to minimize the risk of any war along with efforts to develop non-violent means of conflict resolution. A peaceful world must be shaped based on the conception of the human family. The international focus needs to be on problems requiring common efforts across the ideological divide.

When treating in the details of deterrence, the bishops may have succumbed to the temptation to be certain where we can't be certain. Perhaps they also overestimated the weight of abstract principles in concrete actions. We must be very wary of the reliability of any estimates of the risks of future military actions which have no historical precedents such as the bishops' assumption that the danger of nuclear escalation is an "unacceptable moral risk."

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The bishops' letter raises the consciousness of the moral issue very clearly and powerfully, but does not give definitive answers to most of the questions. They are searching for an authentic peace that exists without fear; not just a cessation of war, not just a counterbalance and stalemate of military power.

John Langan sees a fundamental problem in the document in that there are "at least three different realms of discourse which offer overlapping answers to a single practical question of what we should do with nuclear weapons. The realms [moral-religious, technical-strategic, and political] start with different assumptions, utilize different concepts, are employed by different experts, and are addressed to different audiences. All too often they also reach different and conflicting conclusions, though this is more often the result of divisions within disciplines than of divisions among disciplines."[47]

Without getting deeply into the philosophical and theological questions involved in ends versus means, intentional and unintentional consequences of action, intent and potentiality versus action, Susan Okin provides a perceptive, provocative and, I believe, fairly accurate analysis of the bishops' letter through the answering of four questions:

1. Does the bishops' conditional moral acceptance of deterrence follow from the premises and arguments? NO. The just war premises and the evidence and logic drive strongly toward nuclear pacifist conclusions. (There is a problem of accepting the moral equivalence of intention and action thus downgrading consequentialism. If an act is immoral-- due proportionality or discrimination -- there can be no pertinent argument about the consequences of the act or the threat of the act. The only way to arrive at a conditional approval of deterrence is to approve certain uses in certain circumstances. Then only the deterrent threats tied to those uses would be acceptable.)

2. Do their arguments justify the specific deterrent policies practiced by the U.S.? NO. U.S. policy far exceeds the limits of what is conditionally morally acceptable to the bishops due to likely massive civilian damage which fails both the proportionality and discrimination criteria.

3. Can the conditions they place on deterrence be met in the real world?

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NO. The bishops demand a deterrent strategy that maximizes stability and is compatible with meaningful arms control. The conditions that they demand are not consistent with the type of deterrent policy that would meet their standards of moral acceptability. (A countervalue strategy would likely be most stable and most "arms controllable" but would also be most morally objectionable.)

4. Are serious efforts being made to meet the bishops' conditions? NO. There is no evidence that there is a serious movement pushing toward nuclear disarmament which is the logical conclusion of the bishops arguments.[48]

By far the most consistent and powerful criticisms of the Pastoral entail the bishops' lack of recognition of the actual potential aggressors and the consequences of their succeeding. There is no calculus of proportion between the costs of deterrence and defense and the costs of surrendering to a totalitarian regime. "An analysis that fails to make the necessary moral distinctions between democracies, with all their faults and limitations, and the Soviet bloc cannot accurately set forth the circumstances within which we must make decisions about a governed international community; nor can it offer the full moral basis for the NATO deterrent system."[49] The bishops don't rest their case at all on the reality of the Soviet threat. "Moral justification and criticisms of national security policy should be based both on general assessments of the dangers present in the international system and on a realistic assessment of the resources, policies, and intentions of the principal adversary, the Soviet Union...what often gets neglected in moral denunciations of nuclear weapons is the question of the moral weight to be given to our preservation as a free political community and secondarily to our government's freedom to act in our interest on specific issues."[50] There cannot be moral neutrality or indifference to the difference between liberty and totalitarianism. There is a dual threat of mass destruction and aggressive totalitarianism. There is also a dual task of diminishing the risk of nuclear war and avoiding mass destruction and preserving our liberties and those of like minded nations and containing aggressive totalitarianism. We must keep both of these in mind and not deal with either in isolation. The morality of conduct between states must take account of the various moral conducts of the different states. The reality of the Soviet Union may be the linchpin of the dilemma.

The document also lacks a developed statement about what a properly ordered international community would be -- one that would most nearly guarantee peace and inhibit war. There is little discussion of the major obstacles lying between the present and that community.

Will the abandoning of deterrence prevent nuclear devastation; will it preserve liberty; if not, how is that morally superior? Perhaps no choice is wholly satisfactory. What moral choice brings about the fewest evil consequences? Michael Novak is correct when he says, "To abandon deterrence occasions the greatest evil, for it entails endangering that liberty which is more precious then life itself. Free societies are an indispensible social condition of free moral life and the preservation of human rights."[51]

Reverend David Hollenback, S.J. sums it up in his book <u>Nuclear Ethics</u>, "It is impossible to reach a moral judgment about the morality of nuclear deterrence as a general concept." Moral thinking, he maintains, ought to make specific judgments on "whether a concrete policy option will change the current situation in a way that decreases the probability of war and increases the possibility of arms reduction."[52]

Deterrence will be needed as long as the Soviet Union is both armed with nuclear weapons and continues to be a truly serious political and military threat to the West.

CHAPTER IV

OBSERVATIONS

"It may well be that what you conclude depends on where you start. Those who begin with an overriding sense of the danger of a Soviet threat and who feel a responsibility to ensure American victory in any U.S.--USSR conflict will see the world differently from those who begin with a commitment to the worth and dignity of every human being and a love of the earth."[53] Neither naivete nor excessive cynicism should be allowed to undercut the moral correctness of judgments which are built upon an assessment of the purposes and character of the leadership of the Soviet Union. Are they status quo or revisionist; are they messianic or conventional nationalist. It may not be moral to trust a liar, but it is also not moral to have an erroneous hardness of heart which results in withholding trust.

It is necessary to know how the Soviets see themselves and what their strategies for war are. We must keep in mind that Soviet leadership is made up of a small number of leaders who get power without public control. They are heirs to the Marxist-Leninist ideology which legitimizes their role in history, their authority, and defines the bounds of "morality" thereby providing a check on their behavior. They are also part of a Russian history and culture filled with xenophobia, a sense of inferiority and loyalty. Even when the significance of their words and deeds are evaluated in this context, the priorities of ideology, nationalism, and maintenance of power must be set in the proper order, which changes with times, personalities, and situations.

After a thorough study of Soviet military doctrine, Joseph Douglas goes so far as to suggest that deterrence needs to be redefined as a derivative product stemming from the capability to survive and defeat the enemy's strategy. Even though this, taken literally, would relegate the West to a purely reactive, mirror image strategy, Douglass' provocative analysis of Soviet strategy, its implications for U.S. defense planning, and the associated problems existing in for the U.S. provide excellent food for thought. (Table 4)[54]

The appraisal of deterrence as a strategy to maintain peace is complicated by the different concepts of peace held by the West and the Soviets. The Western idea of peace is a mixture of the Christian definitions in that it involves a freedom from war and, usually, an assumption of harmony, relaxation of tension, and concord. For the Soviets, peace is a period of long-term competition in all areas other than military confrontation, a period which allows the movement to a condition when worldwide socialism will make war obsolete.

Debate about deterrence is really a debate about politics and the interpretation of existing--and future--conditions. Paul Wolfowitz cuts to the meat of the question of whether deterrence is necessary:

> "The wish for a less competitive relationship with the Soviet Union is more than understandable. But wishing will not make it so. To the contrary, unrealistic hopes can make the competition more dangerous. To think that Soviet aims may change in the near future leads us to neglect those actions necessary to maintain favorable balances and compete effectively over the long haul. To think that we can harmonize Soviet objectives with our own, whether by agreements and negotiations or by a sudden weakening of Soviet power and resolve, leads us to neglect both the fundamental differences that underlie the competition and the balances that underlie agreements."[55]

If we are to counter the political leverage the Soviets are gaining through their strategic ascendancy, we must maintain a credible deterrent force. While we would like to look beyond this undesirable but essential requirement, we must face the reality of the world in which we live. Perhaps part of the cause of the debate today was predicted by Lucian the Skeptic in his conversation to Hermotimus, "I cannot show what truth is so well as wise people like you and your professor, but one thing I know about it, and that is that it is not pleasant to the ear; falsehood is more esteemed."

Deterrence is not immoral or illogical, but it is also not likely to be eternal. Thus while we are searching for an alternative, we must strengthen and stabilize present relationships. We must ensure a stable balance exists. There must be a balance in the visible indicators of power in order to give

both sides the perception of freedom of movement. Recognizing dangers of nuclear war is not enough to prevent it. Nuclear weapons can't be disinvented, and we can't shirk from burdens we can't unilaterally end. National policies are needed that recognize the dangers of war and attempt to prevent war. Our way of life and our growth as a nation can't succeed if we can't halt the use of force to destroy what we seek. Thus, there is no contradiction between deterrence and the focus on how to fight and the likely results of the battle.

A strategy requires sound calculation and coordination of the ends and means, including intermediate means proportionate to intermediate ends. It involves choices within a framework of finite resources and requires the ability to distinguish between the desirable and the possible, the essential and the expendable. The strategy must not have goals that far exceed resources available to achieve the goals and must also adapt to fundamental changes in the national, international, political, military, and economic environment.[56]

Many things, however, affect the outcomes of both deterrence and war. "Predicting outcomes and designing strategies to make those which appear desirable more likely is an extremely uncertain business. Everything from weapons effects, to operational military problems, to likely patterns of political desicion-making in wartime is shrouded in doubt."[57] Yet prediction is an essential and unavoidable part of the strategic planning process at every level.

It is perhaps this uncertainty which has made deterrence as effective as it has been. In the 1950s, if either side struck first, he could likely destroy the opponent with little damage to himself. This is not true today where the development of the intellectual understanding of deterrence has shaped the development of weapons systems and procedures. In addition to the role uncertainty plays in increasing the risk factor for a potential aggressor;, the understanding of uncertainty also provides a psychological protection from fear. The more oversimplified the analysis of U.S.-Soviet relations and especially the nuclear balance and the respective nuclear capabilities, the more threatening and likely nuclear confrontation appears. Oversimplification hides the numerous uncertainties military planners and, in the final analysis, political leaders on both sides must consider during their

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decision making and before their acting. In the military area, it is these uncertainties that are, to a great extent, hidden in the distinctions between declaratory, force development, operational, execution, and arms control policies. Uncertainty in areas of weapon performance, force employment parameters, target parameters, scenario conditions, and short and long term results certainly restrain any decision to go to war.[58] This may be why Betts calls nuclear uncertainty "both the sin and the salvation of doctrine."[59]

Perhaps the discussion of the theoretical basis of deterrence, coupled with some of the practical and moral dilemmas associated with this centerpiece of our national strategy has led us to the conclusion that deterrence is simply the management of uncertainty. A well developed and dynamic strategy of deterrence has dimensions of crisis prevention dealing with the contributory causes that give cause to crises. It directs crisis management which, once a crisis has begun, attempts to prevent precipitating factors that could lead to war. It tries to predict and to provide escalatory control opportunities once warfare has begun. What deterrence has not done is deal with the basic causes of conflict inherent in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. It has however, thus far, assisted fairly effectively in preventing and managing crises to allow a time frame for developing communications and approaches to achieve long-range stability. Concepts and methods of deterrence have changed and must continue to change. The maturing of theory has combined with technological advancements in surveillance, weapons, and communications to give rise to a new deterrence. Richard Smoke notes that "We have arrived at a point where a significant portion of the deterrence that inhibits major challenges to the status quo derives, not from the threats governments choose to make, but from a mutual appreciation of a mutual danger. A unilateral "deterrence by policy" is being supplanted by a shared "deterrence from escalation anxiety."[60]

There is probably no choice today but to live with a certain level of anxiety with respect to both the Soviets and nuclear weapons. There is probably nothing that can be done to make the world reassuringly safe. The dilemmas have not been resolved and in fact may not be able to be resolved as long as the two opposing world views exist. Living with the dilemmas may be uncomfortable, but no alternative is readily apparent. Deterrence works through a combination of mutual suspicion, incomplete understanding,

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uncertainty, and a perception that there may be some degree of irrationality present in the opposing side. The question is not whether deterrence should be abandoned, but rather what will keep the teeth in deterrence. The nuclear dilemma can not be resolved, only managed.

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FOOTNOTES

[1]Huth, Paul and Russet, Bruce, "What Makes Deterrence Work?" <u>World Politics</u>, July 1984, pp. 497-500.

[2]Morgan, Patrick, <u>Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis</u>, 2nd Edition, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1983, p. 11.

[3]The organization and material here has been taken predominately from the unpublished draft dissertation entitled <u>Theoretical and Operational Biases in Deterrence: An Experimental Assessment in a Simulated Political Decision-Making Context</u> by Alan G. Whitaker, Washington, D.C., 1984.

[4]Morgan, <u>Op.Cit</u>. In approaching deterrence as a phenomenological event rather that as a theoretical conflict, Morgan has concentrated on types of threats, the specific behaviors targeted for deterrence and the resulting actions and reactions.   He has subdivided deterrence into two basic categories.   Pure or immediate deterrence occurs between two states when one is seriously considering an attack on the other (or an area deemed important to him). The target threatens use of force in retaliation to prevent him and the attacker desists primarily because of this threat to retaliate. General deterrence occurs in non-specific, non-immediate situations and may be viewed as a preemptive policy of discouraging aggression.   Conditions exist where one side <u>could</u> consider the use of force. The other side believes the aggressor <u>may</u> do so and therefore maintains forces and warns the decision-makers of the aggressor. The aggressor does not go beyond this preliminary consideration of force since he believes it would result in corresponding force.

[5]Jervis, Robert, "Deterrence and Perception," <u>International Security</u>, Winter 1982/83, pp. 3-30.

[6]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 5-20.

[7]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 13.

[8]Quinlan, Michael, "Thinking Deterrence Through," *Nuclear Arms*, ed. J.R. Woolsey, ICS Press, 1984, p. 57.

[9]Quoted in Nye, Joseph S., Jr., "Arms Control and the Prevention of War," *Washington Quarterly*, Fall 1984, p. 59.

[10]Huth and Russet, Op.Cit., p. 497.

[11]Epstein, Joshua, "Horizontal Escalation," *International Security*, Winter 1983/1984, pp. 19-31.

[12]Quoted in Johnson, Robert H., "Periods of Peril," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1983, p. 950.

[13]Weinberger, Caspar W., *Annual Report to Congress, FY 1986*, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 4February 1985, pp. 25-26.

[14]Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture, FY 1986*, USGPO, Washington D.C., 1985, p. 8.

[15]The distinction between declaratory and employment policy is described in Richelson, Jeffrey, "PD-59, NSDD-13, and "The Reagan Strategic Modernization Program," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 6, Number 2, June 1983, pp. 125-146.

[16]Ball, Desmond, "U.S. Strategic Forces, How Would They Be Used," *International Security*, Winter 1982/83, pp. 31-33.

[17]*Ibid.*, p. 38.

[18]Friedberg, Aaron L., "A History of U.S. Strategic Doctrine 1945-1980," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 3, Number 3, December 1980, p. 39.

[19]Ball, *Op.Cit.*, p. 33.

[20]Friedberg, Op.Cit., p. 44. NOTE: the majority of the description of the history of U.S. strategic doctrine is from Aaron Friedberg who cites heavily Henry S. Rowen's "Formulating Strategic Doctrine" in Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Volume 4, Appendix K: Adequacy of Current Organization: Defense and Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, June 1975), and Alfred Goldberg's "A Brief Survey of the Evolution of Ideas About Counterforce," (Rand Corporation RM-5431-PR October 1967), and Desmond Ball, "Deja Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration," (Santa Monica: The California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1974).

[21] Ball, Op.Cit., p. 59.

[22]Rowen, for example, explains the divergence between declaratory policy and employment plans at one juncture of our history:

> "The primary purpose of the Assured Destruction capabilities doctrine was to provide a metric for deciding how much force was enough; it provided a basis for denying service and congressional claims for more money for strategic forces...However it was never proposed by McNamara or his staff that nuclear weapons actually be used in this way."

Quoted in Friedberg, Op.Cit., p. 53.

[23]Weinberger, Caspar W., The Potential Effects of Nuclear War on the Climate, Report to Congress, March 1985.

[24]Ibid., p. 10.

[25] Weinberger, Op.Cit., Weinberger, Annual Report, FY 1986, p. 46.

[26]Smoke, Richard, "Extended Deterrence; Some Observations," Naval War College Review, September/October 1983, pp. 46-47.

[27] Quinlan, Op.Cit., p. 57.

[28]Quoted by Watkins, J.D., "To Seize the Moment," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1985, p. 14.

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[29]Huntington, Samuel R., "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Affairs, Winter 1983/84, pp. 32-56.

[30]Ibid., pp. 32-56.

[31]Weinberger, Op.Cit., Annual Report, FY 1986, p. 51.

[32]Scowcroft, Brent, Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, USGPO, April 1983, p. 5.

[33]The tables below are modifications of those developed by Jeffrey Richelson, Op.Cit., pp. 134 and 141. Table 1 provides a simplified portrayal of the major requirements of strategic weapons employed in support of our deterrent strategy. Table 2 is a delineation of some of the specific parts of the President's modernization program and the particular areas of improvement.

TABLE 1

STRATEGIC WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS

TARGET COVERAGE AND DESTRUCTION CAPABILITIES
Hard Target Kill Capability
Soft Target Kill Capability
Time Urgency
Collateral Damage Limitation
Coverage of Entire Target Spectrum

ENDURANCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
Endurance
Retargeting
Location and Destruction of Mobile Targets

STRATEGIC C^3I REQUIREMENTS

ENDURANCE
Early Warning
Continued Warning
Initial Leadership Survival
Continued Leadership Survival
Retaliation Decision Transmission
Continuing Communications with Strategic Forces

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
Two Way Communications with Strategic
Forces/Forces status Reporting
Damage Assessment
Real Time Imagery and Other Intelligence
Communications with Adversary

TABLE 2

REAGAN PROGRAM COMPONENT	TIME-URGENT HARD-TARGET KILL CAPACITY	INCREASED WARHEADS	ENDURANCE	FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
THE REAGAN STRATEGIC PROGRAM STRATEGIC WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS				
C^3I				
DSP Improv.			X	
NEACP Improv.			X	X
PACCS Improv.			X	X
Mobile Comm. Ctr.			X	X
MILSTAR			X	X
TACAMO Upgrade			X	X
ELF			X	X
ERCS Expansion			X	X
IONDS			X	X
CSOC			X	X
BOMBER MODERNIZATION				
B-1B		X		X
ATB				X
ALCMs		X		
VLF Equipment				X
SLBM				
Trident/D-5	X	X	X	X
ICBM MODERNIZATION				
MX	X	X		X
MM III Mk12A	X	X		X

[34]Betts, Richard K., "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence," World Politics, Volume 37, Number 2, January 1985, p. 178.

[35]Betts' views as discussed in Rosenberg, D.A., "The Origins of Overkill," International Security, Spring 1983, pp. 3-71.

[36]Slocombe, Walter B., "Extended Deterrence," Washington Quarterly, Fall 1984, p. 103.

[37] Johnson, Op.Cit., pp. 967-968.

[38]Catholic Bishops, "Pastoral Letter on War and Peace: The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," Origins, 19May 1983, Volume 13, Number 1, p. 1.

[39]Powers, Thomas, "Living With the Fear, The Benefits of Familiarity," Commonweal, Volume CIX, Number 5, 12March 1982, pp. 132-134.

[40]Quoted in Steinker, Lisa, "Peace Is Our Common Goal," St. Anthony's Messenger, Volume 91, Number 5, October 1983, p. 30.

[41]Table 3 provides a quick reference of the main religious groups that have addressed the nuclear issue in print. The table was created by Randall K. Bowen in an unpublished thesis "The Church Militant: Church Teachings on the Morality of Nuclear War," Georgetown University, 1983.

TABLE 3

ISSUE	GROUP			
	U.S. Catholic Bishops	Episcopalians	Lutherans	French Bishops
Nuclear Freeze	yes	silent	yes	silent
Counter-value (city)Targeting	no	no	no	no
Counter-force (weapon) Targeting/limited Nuclear Warfighting	no	silent	silent	no
Nuclear First Use	no	silent	silent	silent
Any Nuclear Use	implied no	silent	silent	ambiguous
Strengthen Conventional Forces	yes	silent	yes	silent
Freeze Defense Spending	implied yes	yes	no	silent
Negotiate Eventual Nuclear Disaramament	yes	yes	yes	yes
Intensify Nuclear Negotiations with Soviets	yes	yes	yes	yes
Strengthen International Security Organizations (i.e. UN)	yes	yes	yes	yes
Negotiate Comprehensive Test Ban	yes	yes	silent	silent

[42]Catholic Bishops, Op.Cit., p. 7.

[43] Ibid., p. 8.

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[44] Ibid.

[45] Winters, Francis X., S.J., "The American Bishops on Deterrence -- Wise As Serpents: Innocent as Doves," Science, Technology and Human Values, Summer 1983, Volume 8, Number 3, pp. 23-29.

[46] John Paul II, Message to the Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, June 1982, p. 3.

[47] Langan, John, S.J., "A Useful Benchmark of Catholic Thinking," Commonweal, 13August 1982, p. 425.

[48] Okin, Susan M., "Taking the Bishops Seriously," World Policy, Volume 36, Number 4, July 1984, pp. 527-554.

[49] Finn, James, "Discrimination is Called For; Dialogue is Needed," Commonweal, 13August 1982, p. 434.

[50] Langan, Op.Cit., p. 426.

[51] Novak, Michael, "Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age," National Review, 1April 1983, p. 383.

[52] Quoted in Spaeth, Robert L., "Debating Disarmament with the Catholic Bishops," delivered at the World Affairs Center at the University of Minnesota, 6December 1982.

[53] Paradise, Scott I., "Catholic Doctrine and Nuclear Dogmatics," Science, Technology and Human Values, Volume 8, Number 3, Summer 1983, p. 34.

[54] Douglass, Joseph D., Jr., "Strategic Planning and Nuclear Insecurity," Orbis, Volume 27, Number 3, Fall 1983, pp. 667-694. (Table 4--See page 45).

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[55]Wolfowitz, Paul D., "Preserving Nuclear Peace," <u>Naval War College Review</u>, March/April 1983, p. 75.

[56]Record, Jeffrey, "Jousting with Unreality," <u>International Security</u>, Winter 1983/1984, pp. 3-18.

[57]Friedberg, <u>Op.Cit.</u>, p. 63.

[58]Bennett, Bruce, <u>Assessing the Capabilities of Strategic Nuclear Forces: The Limits of Current Methods</u>, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, June 1980. Bennett's table below provides a more detailed listing of some of the major uncertainties faced by military and political planners and decision makers.

MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES IN ASSESSING STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

UNCERTAIN WEAPON PERFORMANCE

Deployment/Availability	Height of Burst
Warhead Loadings	Reliability
Yield	Range
Accuracy	Footprint
--Dispersion (CEP)	Launch Rate
--Systematic Bias	Reprogramming

UNCERTAIN FORCE EMPLOYMENT PARAMETERS

Prelaunch Survivability	Time-on-Target Control
Command and Control Connectivity	Fusing/Burst Height
Penetration Probability	Warhead Allocation

UNCERTAIN TARGET PARAMETERS

Location and Altitude	Hardness and Shielding
Mobility	Value
Size and Shape	Climatic Conditions

UNCERTAIN SCENARIO CONDITIONS

Warning	Attack Timing
Attack Objectives	Scale of Attack

MODELING UNCERTAINTIES

Prompt Effects	Fallout Radiation Level
Fratricide	Fallout Distribution

PROTRACTED WAR UNCERTAINTIES

Interactions with Tactical	Enduring Survival
Nuclear/Conventional Forces	Enduring Availability

[59]Betts, Op.Cit., p. 179.

[60]Smoke, Op.Cit., p. 48.

	Elaboration	Implications for U.S. Defense Planning	Problems	Hypothetical "What to Do"
I. Nuclear Offense Emphasis	The Soviet military threat is not exclusively nuclear or conventional. It is combined arms at all levels. Nuclear weapons are the decisive component and conventional forces would occupy enemy territory and secure victory. At the same time, the most important aspect of Soviet strategy at both the global and theater levels is their nuclear offensive.	U.S. distinctions such as conventional-nuclear, strategic-tactical, and warfighting-deterrence are artificial and misleading. Plans and strategies for war in Europe, for the use of Rapid Deployment Forces, and for global war do not match the apparent threat. Priorities in the current U.S. military build-up do not conform to the real needs.	The U.S. military services have not addressed nuclear warfighting or combined arms warfare. The navy has been minimum deterrence oriented. The air force still is focused on strategic bombing. The army has been unable to integrate nuclear weapons into its doctrine. All three services are uninterested in continental defense.	Examine the validity of U.S. strategy for strategic and theater warfare and of the U.S. conventional-nuclear distinction in the framework of Soviet strategy and capabilities, e.g., the nuclear role of "conventional" forces in Soviet strategy, what they mean by "exploitation" and "using the results of nuclear strikes," and their doctrine for using nuclear weapons to prevent U.S. involvement in "local revolutionary movements."
II. Seize the Initiative (Surprise First Strike)	This is the Soviet preferred attack option. Launch-on-warning is considered a poor, second-best option. Soviet efforts to achieve surprise will include deception, false diplomacy, disinformation, distractions to confuse U.S. leadership, and covert disablement of critical C³I.	Soviet tactics coupled with the Western propensity to see nuclear war as impossible means that Soviet surprise tactics stand a good chance of being successful. The U.S. cannot plan on tactical warning or on mobilization. An appreciation of what to expect and the essential forces, plans, and training need to be developed in peacetime. Strategy and posture need to have their major components designed for a "no warning" scenario.	The current emphasis on C³I mobility should provide a good foundation for building a survivable "no warning" posture. Major problems are a relative absence of associated meaningful strategy development and strategic planning capability. Civil defense and emergency planning are major problems. It is difficult to identify any national-level planning capability or evident real expertise or interest.	Establish a group of quality senior military analysts within the Soviet Bloc Division of the CIA Operations Directorate to conduct true, all-source analyses of Soviet strategy, intentions, and preparations for war. Develop a Red Team to devise comprehensive attacks on the United States and its allies. This team should have access to all U.S. security information that has been passed to the Soviet Union or otherwise compromised.
III. Decisive First Strike	The first strike is designed to achieve strategic goals. Most immediate strategic goals are to destroy U.S. nuclear capability, political and military control, and, most likely, power, transportation, and other time-critical military and military-industrial targets. The Soviet objective is maximum efficient concentration of nuclear power. Gradualism is not a Soviet concept. There is no evidence of limited Soviet counterforce interest.	The U.S. at present cannot expect to survive. Moreover, U.S. vulnerabilities encourage Soviet decisive first-strike strategy. Need to dissipate force of Soviet strikes with combination of active and passive defenses and to make military forces and political leadership as nontargetable as possible.	The main problem is overcoming a strong emotional belief that there is no way to significantly "ease" the consequences of a massive nuclear strike. The army's apparent lack of interest and low technical competence will hinder development of any effective active defense.	Examine effectiveness and tradeoffs within a system of active and passive defenses. Address the organizational problem of active defense development and command. Establish a defenses program. Stress concealment, mobility, and deception in combination as major survival tactics. Develop program of strategic intelligence countermeasures. Use national reconnaissance assets to assess effectiveness.
IV. Maintain the Initiative (Achieve Total Defeat)	The attack does not end with the first strike. The first strike is just the start. The attack will continue to (1) deny U.S. the chance to recover, (2) destroy residual forces, (3) seize strategic regions, and (4) achieve our total defeat. There is no possibility of political agreement in evident Soviet doctrine.	The U.S. cannot simply ride out the attack because the attack is not to end until all forces are destroyed. There will be no time to catch our breath and reconstitute forces. Strategy and forces must be oriented toward nuclear battle management. Strategic target acquisition in the traditional sense (currently nonexistent) is critical.	Neither concepts nor capability for fighting a nuclear war exist. Capability and mind set have been and are single-strike oriented. A steady, long-term approach to preparations is required. This, in turn, requires national-level concern, attention, and long-term planning capability, which do not appear to exist.	Establish a network of mobile strategic nuclear warfighting command centers. Program survivable intrawar strategic and tactical forces for nuclear warfighting operations. Define interface requirements and identify operational problems. Establish a continuing national-level capability to (1) develop nuclear strategy and (2) direct and coordinate long-range planning.
V. Defense Importance	Defense is as important as offense. Soviet "defense" includes a wide variety of active and passive measures. Concealment, mobility, deception, and duplication are especially important. Independence and self-sufficiency of major commands and regions are important both to survival and recovery. The most important activity after initial exchange is to neutralize the effect of U.S. strikes.	The importance the Soviets place on defense and the utility of their efforts are not appreciated. Soviet preparations for war and their ability to recover from U.S. strikes have not been examined. This should be a critical input to U.S. strategy formulation, targeting, and a key to understanding how consequences can be "eased."	Major changes in intelligence mind set and collection and analysis priorities are required to understand Soviet preparations and capabilities. But the current system is unlikely to change either its bias or its practice.	Analyze Soviet defense and other war preparations measures. Identify various techniques (specifically, hardening, mobility, concealment, dispersal, redundancy, reserves, and deception) and assess their effectiveness. Identify target-acquisition and targeting problems. Prebriefed targets suddenly may cease to exist when the war starts. Identify and test alternative approaches for strategic target acquisition.
VI. Planning Scenario	The Soviets assume the "worst" case: extensive use of nuclear strikes by the enemy, including against cities. This scenario is the basis for all planning.	U.S. plans and policy must begin to take the worst-case scenario into account—not because it is the "worst" case, but rather because it is the likely case. Given the Soviet objectives, doctrine, and worst-case planning, why expect them to limit their attack and then negotiate?	There is a strong bias against looking at the worst case because it appears too hard to handle. There is also a strong lobby that does not want it made "workable." There does not exist a reasonably comprehensive description of a determined Soviet attack and the resultant environment that various U.S. planning entities should be aware of if their planning is to be effective.	Have Red Team develop a range of scenarios for use by policy, and emergency planning and research, development, and acquisitions organizations. Identify and characterize the environment associated with a range of comprehensive Soviet attack scenarios. Include nonnuclear and forces of special designation as well as nuclear forces.
VII. Preparation for Nuclear War is the First Priority of the Entire State	All improvements and programs (e.g., construction) are evaluated from a nuclear-war perspective. Survival of people, institutions, facilities, supplies, and forces are planned according to their importance to fighting and winning the war and preparations continue apace.	U.S. deterrence concepts (assured destruction of a significant percentage of industry and population) have become invalid. The U.S. can create rubble, but with present plans and capabilities sooner or later will not be able to destroy the Soviet capability to survive and recover with unanticipated rapidity. New approaches to strategic force employment and targeting are required.	The value of preparation is downplayed by U.S. intelligence, military, and influential intellectuals. The dominant assumption is that nuclear war is impossible. A major change in mind set is needed, but will be difficult to bring about.	A major intelligence effort to understand Soviet preparations and vulnerabilities appears essential. It is important to locate all reserves and understand their management. Evaluate all Soviet preparations for survival and rapid recovery and estimate recovery times.
VIII. Strategic Deception	It is best to win without war. Misleading the U.S. about the nature of Soviet capabilities and intentions is needed for the Soviets to achieve superiority, enable first strike, and achieve a war-winning balance. This is an especially serious problem because of its pervasive influence on all aspects of national security planning. A turnaround in national security thinking and capabilities may be difficult, if not impossible, unless these Soviet efforts are effectively countered.	Soviet deception efforts may be heavily responsible for gross errors in U.S. intelligence estimates. Soviet actions also exacerbate problems associated with the antinuclear and antidefense movements.	Soviet deception is still not regarded as a major problem. Identifying Soviet efforts and their effectiveness will be difficult because the data are controlled by the very agencies whose position is that a problem does not exist. Between 1974 and 1976 the U.S. dismantled nearly all its internal security apparatus most capable of dealing with this problem.	Establish a combined counterintelligence (focused on Soviet deception and active measures) and political warfare planning staff within the NSC. Revise debilitating internal directives and reinstate appropriate internal security mechanisms.

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