

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

[75] ✓pt

Report To The Chairman, Subcommittee On  
Defense, Committee On Appropriations  
House Of Representatives  
OF THE UNITED STATES

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The Roles, Missions, And Relationships Of  
Pacific Command Headquarters

622

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-197676

The Honorable Joseph P. Addabbo  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense  
Committee on Appropriations  
House of Representatives


Dear Mr. Chairman:

As requested in your July 20, 1979, letter, we have reviewed the roles of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and his unified command structure. This report provides (1) detailed information on the unified command's missions, specific tasks, and functions, (2) the number and grade of personnel assigned throughout the command, (3) the cost to maintain the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and (4) an assessment of the Commander-in-Chief's, Pacific, role in training and other areas.

We were unable to estimate staff savings that might be realized in the Pacific Command under various restructuring plans, as requested, because of the time available to complete this assignment and, more importantly, because of the unclear role of the command in contingency or wartime conditions. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense fully define the desired role of the command under such conditions, and, once this is accomplished, undertake a functional analysis of the Pacific Command to determine its appropriate organizational structure and size.

As directed by your office, formal, written comments on this report were not obtained from the Department of Defense; however, we discussed the report with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, his staff, and with representatives of the service component headquarters in Hawaii. Their comments have been incorporated into the report where appropriate.

Sincerely yours,

  
Comptroller General  
of the United States

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## ABBREVIATIONS

CFC	Combined Forces Command
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCLANT	Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCPACREP	CINCPAC representative
CINCUNC	Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command
DOD	Department of Defense
ERP	expanded relations program
EUSA	8th U.S. Army
GAO	General Accounting Office
IPAC	Intelligence Center, Pacific
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff

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## CHAPTER 1

### HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REPORT

The Pacific Command (PACOM), headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii, is one of five unified commands in the U.S. national military command structure today. It is charged with defending and protecting U.S. national interests in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.

A unified command is one composed of significant forces from two or more services which normally have component commanders reporting to the unified command for operational matters and to their own service headquarters for personnel, administration, and logistics support matters. Thus, operational command of forces assigned to a unified command normally is exercised through service components. PACOM consists of a unified command headquarters, two subunified command headquarters located in Japan and Korea, and three service component headquarters in Hawaii.

During the 1960s the number of forces committed to the Pacific area increased dramatically as U.S. involvement in Vietnam changed from an advisory role to that of prosecuting a major war effort. With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam and the subsequent collapse of that government, the size and composition of military headquarters organizations in the Pacific have been a matter of considerable and continuing congressional interest.

This report discusses (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD's) actions to restructure and reorganize PACOM since 1974-75, (2) the PACOM headquarters mission-related activities, specific tasks, and their costs, (3) the unified command's role in wartime, (4) changes in the size and composition of PACOM organizations since 1976, and (5) our prior recommendations to restructure Navy and Air Force component command headquarters in the Pacific.

### ACTIONS TAKEN ON CONGRESSIONAL RECOMMENDATION TO RESTRUCTURE PACOM

In a 1974 report on the DOD 1975 appropriations bill, the House Committee on Appropriations made several recommendations for improving operational control over U.S. forces in the Pacific and for eliminating, consolidating, or reducing the authorized strength of various PACOM headquarters organizations. We found that DOD had taken some actions that were

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responsive to some of the Committee's recommendations or concerns. However, many recommendations had not been implemented. These recommendations dealt basically with the manner in which PACOM exercises operational command of subordinate forces. For example, the Committee felt command should be exercised through the subunified commands as opposed to through the service components. (See p. 13.)

### WHAT THE PACIFIC COMMAND DOES--MISSIONS AND COSTS

According to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), there are six primary activities that must be performed to support the Pacific unified command's overall mission to protect and defend U.S. interests in the Pacific region.

Overall, about \$75 million for 3,300 staff-years is expended by the headquarters organizations of CINCPAC, its subunified commands in Korea and Japan, and the service components in support of the unified and service missions in the Pacific. The unified effort accounts for about 1,380 staff-years at a cost of \$33.7 million (about 41 percent of the total headquarters effort), while the service mission requirements of the Army, Navy, and Air Force account for the balance--about 1,900 staff-years costing \$40.7 million or about 59 percent of the total.

CINCPAC basically monitors, coordinates, and facilitates activities and programs in support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). It performs a number of useful functions that, if not done in Hawaii would be done elsewhere. However, there appear to be opportunities to streamline the existing organization by examining the specific tasks and functions it now performs to assure that the level of effort expended is consistent with CINCPAC's current responsibilities. For example, the level of effort devoted by CINCPAC to administrative and headquarters support activities accounted for about 40 percent of the total staff effort. Additionally, the security assistance mission of unified commands has been significantly reduced in recent years, yet the staff level assigned this mission at CINCPAC has not changed.

Substantial personnel savings were realized when the intelligence activities of the services and CINCPAC were consolidated into a joint command, the Intelligence Center, Pacific (IPAC). Further personnel reductions may be possible when improved automatic data processing capabilities become operational. (See p. 19.)

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### WHAT WILL THE UNIFIED COMMAND HEADQUARTERS DO IN WARTIME?

In Vietnam, CINCPAC's role was that of a supporting command rather than the command actively prosecuting the war. For the most likely future regional conflict in the Pacific area--which CINCPAC believes is the defense of Korea--its role will again be support and coordination as documented in current plans. CINCPAC's role in a global conventional conflict with the Soviet Union is not altogether clear; however, according to CINCPAC it could be a supporting role. CINCPAC's supporting role and the tasks it can and should perform under wartime circumstances have not, however, been clearly defined, raising questions as to whether CINCPAC is optimally organized for this type of activity. (See p. 44.)

### CHANGES IN SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PACOM COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS

Since 1976 the number of personnel authorized for U.S. headquarters organizations in the Pacific area has increased. The significant increases occurred in Korea with a net increase of 295 positions, due largely to the establishment of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and in Japan with a net increase of 31 (with 10 additional positions requested for 1981) representing roughly a one-third increase during a 4-year period.

In addition, a new major Army command, the U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) has been established, and Army efforts to obtain authorization for a higher level command--the re-establishment of the U.S. Army, Pacific headquarters--continue. Further, WESTCOM has started an expanded relations program to improve army to army contacts in the Pacific. Certain aspects of this program raise questions as to whether the program should not more appropriately be performed in support of and under the supervision of CINCPAC's security assistance mission.

Finally, while the staffing level at U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) headquarters appears to have been reduced--from 1,185 to 985--it has actually remained stable. This apparent reduction was accomplished by transferring a number of positions to the Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff (PACOPS)--an organization that is not considered to be a management headquarters or activity. However, it appears

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to primarily perform management headquarters functions in support of CINCPAC and PACAF. (See p. 52.)

### CONCLUSIONS

Basically, the unified command in the Pacific is an extension of JCS. As such, it performs a number of useful functions that, if not done there, would be done elsewhere.

However, we believe that there are opportunities to streamline and restructure the organization to more efficiently carry out the command's daily activities. Previous proposals made both by us and the House Committee on Appropriations appear to still be viable.

For example, our two reports "Pacific Fleet Headquarters Efficiency Can Be Improved Through Consolidation" (FPCD-76-98, Feb. 4, 1977) and "Opportunities to Streamline the Air Force Headquarters Structure in the Pacific" (FPCD-79-27, Feb. 8, 1979) both conclude that increased efficiency and further economies could be achieved through consolidating and/or cutting back functions and/or eliminating some activities. Further, recommendations made by the House Committee on Appropriations, such as the consolidation of CINCPAC and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), appear to be viable, particularly considering that CINCPAC's role in wartime seems to be somewhat vague.

Further, changing world conditions and ongoing reevaluations of national strategy raise questions as to whether the current Pacific command structure is the most effective one to meet emerging problems (i.e., contingencies, war, etc.).

Since the establishment of the unified command structure in 1947, the role of the unified commands has changed considerably--in the Pacific from that of primary responsibility for prosecuting a war to one of providing "support and coordination," a vague term not formally defined by DOD. CINCPAC described it as "those actions which aid, complement, or sustain a command in accordance with current directives and agreements and provide for congruity of actions, goals, and objectives." Until the support and coordination roles of the Pacific unified command are clearly defined and the functions that PACOM can and should perform during a crisis/wartime situation are identified, it is difficult, if not impossible, to

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ensure that (1) the command is properly sized and (2) functions are being done at appropriate locations within the chain of command.

In addition, the need exists for DOD to examine and review both the Army and Air Force in the Pacific.

Careful consideration by DOD should be given to the present Army structure, particularly with regard to current efforts to re-establish a U.S. Army, Pacific headquarters. Such action will require establishing a separate 8th U.S. Army (EUSA) and a U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK) headquarters to

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

- Fully define and incorporate the wartime responsibilities of the unified command in the Pacific into the Unified Command Plan during DOD's current review.
- Perform a functional analysis of the existing unified command structure on a vertical basis to ensure that missions and functions are optimally staffed and located in the chain of command.
- Re-examine our previous recommendations on consolidating and streamlining service headquarters in the Pacific.
- Fully examine the pros and cons of the need for a Pacific-wide component headquarters for the Army in Hawaii.
- Establish safeguards to prevent the possible circumvention of personnel ceilings that can occur by transferring personnel into nonmanagement activities, such as PACOPS.

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
## CHAPTER 2

### INTRODUCTION

PACOM is one of five unified commands in the U.S. national military command structure today. A unified command is one composed of significant forces from two or more services--in the case of PACOM, all services are represented. The unified commander (Commander-in-Chief or CINC) normally has a component commander, for each military service assigned, who reports to the CINC for operational matters but directly to the service headquarters for personnel, administration, and logistics support matters. The other four unified commands are (1) the European Command, (2) the Atlantic Command, (3) the Readiness Command, and (4) the Southern Command. PACOM is the largest of the five commands geographically since its area covers the Pacific Ocean west of the South American coast, the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Bering Sea, part of the Arctic Ocean, and the Indian Ocean.

PACOM consists basically of a unified command headquarters--CINCPAC headquarters; two subordinate unified or sub-unified commands--U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ), and USFK; and three service component headquarters in Hawaii--U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), PACAF, and the Army's WESTCOM. Headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii, PACOM is charged with defending and protecting U.S. national interests in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. PACOM's area of responsibility and its major organizations are shown on the following map.

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


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COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN PACOM (U)




SOURCE: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF/JOINT LIAISON COMMAND

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U.S. PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC

As of September 30, 1979, about 321,600 U.S. military personnel were assigned to PACOM. Of this total about 304,700 were under the operational control of CINCPAC. Most of the balance of about 17,000 personnel were assigned to other commands (i.e., the Strategic Air Command and the Military Airlift Command). The following schedule shows personnel strengths by service.

<u>Service</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Under CINCPAC command</u>
Navy	156,800	155,600
Marines	72,500	69,800
Army	53,200	49,200
Air Force	39,100	30,100
Total	<u>321,600</u>	<u>304,700</u>

These forces are equipped with approximately 200 ships, over 1,500 aircraft, and in excess of 900 helicopters. Major concentrations of U.S. forces, beyond the U.S. west coast and Hawaii, are in Korea, the Okinawa Prefecture of Japan, and the Philippines. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~  
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U.S. COMMITMENTS AND  
INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC

The United States is presently a signatory to five major collective defense arrangements in the Pacific area. These arrangements are (1) the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, (2) the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Mutual Defense Treaty, (3) the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, (4) the Manila Pact, and (5) the ANZUS Treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

In addition to the military security arrangements, the United States has other important economic and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific area. For example, trade with countries of the area now accounts for almost 25 percent of all U.S. foreign trade and has exceeded the level of trade with the European Economic Community for the past 3 years. Trade for 1978 exceeded \$81 billion, with Japan being the largest single trading partner by a substantial margin.

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Another important U.S. interest in the Pacific centers on the flow of oil through the Indian Ocean area. According to CINCPAC estimates, about 95 percent of the Middle East's annual oil production traverses this area to reach oil importing countries. This amount includes about 16 percent of that imported by the United States, 75 percent used by Japan, and 90 percent used by Korea.

### HISTORY OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM AND PACOM

The unified command system has its origins in the U.S. command arrangements which evolved during World War II and its legal basis in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

Early in World War II, it was recognized that the complexity of modern warfare required that the air, ground, and naval forces in a theater of operations be under the control of one commander (i.e., that the war could not be fought on the basis of joint cooperation). The basic need to cooperate effectively with our allies in the prosecution of war eventually led to the formal adoption of the concept of combined and unified command of operational forces. The application of this concept worked best in the European theater; in fact, the Pacific theater was never unified under a single commander. Nevertheless, the concept of unified command emerged from World War II as a basic doctrine, replacing the prewar concept of "mutual cooperation."

The legal authority for the unified command of U.S. forces is contained in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. This act authorizes the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice of JCS, to establish unified commands to exercise operational control of the forces assigned to them. The service departments continue to have administrative and support responsibilities for their forces assigned to the unified command. This is the basic organizational pattern originally established, and it is essentially the organizational relationship that exists today--one that may properly be termed a federation rather than a unification.

### PACOM history

PACOM was established in July 1953. Its area of responsibility initially was for all the Pacific Ocean area except

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for Japan, Korea, and Okinawa. These locations were under the Far East Command, another unified command. PACOM and the Far East Command existed as separate but equal unified commands until 1957, at which time, the Far East Command was disestablished and its responsibilities were assumed by PACOM.

### PACOM trends

During the 1960s the number of forces committed to PACOM's area increased dramatically as U.S. involvement in Vietnam changed from an advisory role to that of prosecuting a major war effort. The size and composition of organizations in PACOM have changed substantially since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam and the subsequent collapse of that government.

The most significant changes were accomplished in the 1974-1976 time frame and included

- the establishment of IPAC as a joint subordinate command of CINCPAC;
- the disestablishment of U.S. Army, Pacific, and its replacement with a smaller U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group (a field operating agency);
- the establishment of WESTCOM, a major command, which absorbed the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group;
- the reduction in numbers of type commands under PACFLT through consolidation;
- the disestablishment of the Military Assistance Command, Thailand, a subunified command; and
- overall force reductions in the remaining organizations.

Thus, the number of military personnel in PACOM has decreased significantly since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia and the fall of the South Vietnam government. At the same time, the major remaining commands were relatively stable or even increased in size as reflected on the following page.

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	Total strength		
	1970	1974	1979
<u>Unified command</u>			
CINCPAC	1,326	1,078	736
IPAC	-	-	319
<u>Subunified commands</u>			
USFJ	77	77	120
USFK	299	337	404
U.S.-Taiwan Defense Command	203	106	(a)
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam	2,770	-	(b)
Military Assistance Command, Thailand	699	360	(c)
<u>Service components</u>			
PACAF	N/A	1,185	f/1,131
PACFLT	N/A	509	446
U.S. Army Pacific	1,048	891	(d)
U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group	-	-	(d)
WESTCOM (note e)	-	-	338

a/Disestablished in 1979.

b/Disestablished in 1972.

c/Disestablished in 1976.

d/The Army Support Group which replaced U.S. Army, Pacific, in January 1975, was a field operating agency and not a component; however, this organization performed a number of component functions. It was absorbed by WESTCOM in April 1978.

e/WESTCOM is the component for Army forces except those in Japan and Korea.

f/Includes Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff (see p. 60).

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## CHAPTER 3

### ACTIONS TAKEN ON CONGRESSIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESTRUCTURING THE PACIFIC COMMAND

In a 1974 report on the 1975 DOD appropriations bill, the House Committee on Appropriations made a number of recommendations for improving operational control over U.S. forces in the Pacific and for eliminating, consolidating, or reducing the authorized strength of various headquarters organizations in PACOM. DOD has implemented some, but not all of the Committee recommendations. This chapter discusses the Committee recommendations, DOD actions taken, and the DOD rationale for not implementing certain recommendations.

#### COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee stated in its August 1, 1974 report that

"\* \* \* the various headquarters in Hawaii are too numerous and too large for the forces deployed in the U.S. Pacific Command, now that the massive withdrawal from Vietnam has been completed and the recession from Thailand and Taiwan has begun."

The Committee further stated that

"\* \* \* the source of many of the problems with the command structure in Hawaii is the across-the-board delegation of operational command to service component commanders in the U.S. Pacific Command \* \* \* and it has led to substantial duplication of planning, operations, and intelligence staffs. More seriously, from the standpoint of forward deployed forces in Northeast Asia, it has engendered a complicated and circuitous line of operational command from the unified commander in Hawaii. The arrangement does not meet wartime operational requirements and would have to be adjusted simultaneously with the onset of a major emergency."

The Senate Committee on Appropriations concurred with the general views of the House Committee but stated that DOD should make the final decisions on command structure and ways to achieve the necessary savings. The conference report on DOD's fiscal year 1975 appropriation requested that a plan for reorganizing military headquarters in the Pacific be provided to the Congress by March 1, 1975. DOD submitted the plan to

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the Congress as requested. The House Appropriations Committee subsequently held hearings to discuss the actions DOD had taken or planned to take. In its report on the DOD appropriation bill, 1976, the Committee noted that DOD had reported that six major headquarters in the Pacific would either be eliminated or consolidated and that the fiscal year 1974 President's budget used as a base period would be reduced by about 4,076 positions in the fiscal year 1976 President's budget, an average reduction of more than 30 percent in military and civilian end strengths for the management headquarters in the Pacific.

The seven headquarters to be eliminated or consolidated were:

### Army

U.S. Army, Pacific	Eliminated
--------------------	------------

### Navy

Service Forces, Pacific	Consolidated
Amphibious Forces, Pacific	Consolidated
Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Pacific	Consolidated

### Air Force

U.S. Air Forces, Pacific	1/Eliminated
--------------------------	--------------

### Joint/Army

U.S. Forces, Korea	Consolidated
8th U.S. Army	

### DOD actions responsive to Committee recommendations

Most of the actions set forth above were consistent with some of the Committee's recommendations. For example, the disestablishment of U.S. Army, Pacific, and the consolidation

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1/This action was never taken.

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of USFK and EUSA were specific Committee recommendations. Planned disestablishment of the PACAF headquarters was a step beyond the Committee's recommendations which called for reducing its strength by one-third through a combination of transferring appropriate staff functions to the unified command, eliminating selected subordinate headquarters, and releasing selected combat units to subunified commanders in PACOM or to the Tactical Air Command in the United States. However, as discussed later in this chapter, except for a net reduction of about 300 authorized spaces in the PACAF headquarters, none of the other Committee recommendations concerning the Air Force were implemented.

In August 1974, IPAC, a joint subordinate command of PACOM, was established to provide intelligence data to organizations in the Pacific area. The creation of the center resulted in combined savings of 362 personnel spaces in PACOM headquarters and the component commands. Its creation was responsive to the Committee's concern that substantive duplication of intelligence staffs occurred in PACOM.

Although the Committee was pleased with the improvements made and contemplated, it pointed out that:

- DOD's plan was incomplete, particularly with respect to the Air Force.

- The 30-percent proposed reduction from the fiscal year 1974 President's budget did not reveal great improvements over the authorized strength levels of January 1974.

- In matter of command relationships, DOD disregarded the need to make emergency-ready and combat-ready arrangements in the Pacific; i.e., that the daily line of operational command or control should be the one most likely to be activated in a major emergency or war.

Because the DOD headquarters review, initiated in 1973, was still in progress and because the international situation in the Pacific had not stabilized, the Committee recommended no further changes in the organization or manning of the major headquarters of the Pacific Command. The Committee asked DOD to continue and to intensify its efforts to establish combat-ready command relationships, to eliminate superfluous echelons of command, and to trim headquarters staffs. The Committee



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responsibility of CINCPAC might be so expanded by absorbing PACFLT functions as to adversely cut into the commander's abilities to concentrate on the strategic direction and operational deployment of the forces. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

--Headquarters, 5th Air Force, be disestablished and operational control of the 313th Air Division on Okinawa be passed to the Commander, USFJ, and operational control of the 314th Air Division in Korea be passed to the Commander, USFK.

DOD's reaction to this recommendation is set forth in chapter 5 which includes a discussion of our February 1979 report on "Opportunities to Streamline the Air Force Headquarters Structure in the Pacific."

--The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan be designated as Commander, USFJ, and these two headquarters be consolidated.

Neither DOD's progress reports nor the Committee's hearings indicated how much consideration DOD gave this recommendation. DOD did note in its May 1976 progress report that the staff requirements for USFJ were at the minimum level required to perform USFJ's assigned mission. According to DOD, any reductions would affect significantly USFJ's capability to interface with the Government of Japan at a time when great emphasis was placed on U.S./Japan relations, and that significant structural change would require negotiations with the Government of Japan and consideration of other political impacts.

--U.S. Army, Japan headquarters and U.S. IX Army Corps headquarters be disestablished.

DOD contended that these two headquarters were needed because they provided support to forward deployed U.S. forces, to the U.S. Army, and to other services and DOD agencies in Japan and Okinawa. DOD also said that U.S. Army, Japan, had the significant missions of command and control, war reserve materiel and operational project storage and maintenance; the capability to plan and negotiate to expand the logistical base to meet contingencies; base operations and other support; and represented the Army with the U.S. and Japanese governmental agencies and self-defense forces.

--DOD be encouraged to delegate operational control of all U.S. Forces in South Korea to the Commander, USFK, who also should be given operational control over all

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Republic of Korea forces which have previously been made available to the United Nations Command (UNC).

This recommendation is similar to the one set forth on page 16 encouraging CINCPAC to exercise operational command primarily through the subunified commanders. DOD's opposition to this recommendation is the same as that set forth on page 16.

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
CHAPTER 4

WHAT PACOM DOES--

MISSIONS AND COSTS

According to CINCPAC, there are six basic mission-related activities that must be performed to support PACOM's overall mission to protect and defend U.S. interests in the Pacific. These mission activities are (1) operations, (2) intelligence, (3) command representation, (4) planning, (5) security assistance, and (6) logistics. CINCPAC's efforts in these areas range from managing programs to merely monitoring U.S. forces activities.

CINCPAC'S OVERALL MISSION,  
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND MISSION-  
RELATED ACTIVITIES




Headquarters staff effort

Overall, CINCPAC, the subunified commands, and service component headquarters expend about \$75 million annually for 3,300 staff-years in support of the unified and service

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activities. About 42 percent of the total headquarters staff expenditure was made by CINCPAC or its subordinates in support of the unified command mission. The basic distribution by unified and service-related missions is shown below.



The specific activities performed in support of the CINCPAC mission are discussed in the following sections.

### MISSION-RELATED ACTIVITIES

At our request, CINCPAC identified the mission-related activities which it and its subordinate and component organizations must perform in peacetime and wartime to support the CINCPAC's basic mission and responsibilities as the unified commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific. These activities are (1) operations, (2) intelligence, (3) command representation, (4) planning, (5) security assistance, and (6) logistics.

A brief definition of these mission-related activities follows. (See app. IV for a more detailed description of these activities, as well as specific tasks performed in their support.)

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- Operations. This activity is involved in the command, control, and coordination of JCS-assigned forces in the Pacific area.
- Intelligence. This activity ensures the availability of the needed intelligence information to support PACOM planning, exercises, and operational missions.
- Command Representation. This activity includes PACOM representation at national and international boards and councils and assistance to diplomatic missions in the Pacific in political/military matters.
- Planning. This activity involves the systematic analysis of the threat, strategy formulation, and determination of force and resource requirements.
- Security Assistance. This activity involves CINCPAC's assistance in conducting regional security assistance programs.
- Logistics. This activity deals with maintaining cognizance of the logistics readiness of assigned forces.


### Staff effort and costs

We requested CINCPAC to estimate the staff-years expended and the costs for each of the above six mission areas. CINCPAC also estimated the staff-years and costs expended by the subunified commands and major component headquarters in support of CINCPAC's missions. The following charts reflect (1) the percentage of effort CINCPAC devoted to the basic areas and (2) the costs associated with them.


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MISSION ACTIVITY/CINCPAC EFFORTS

STAFF-YEARS



COSTS



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The effort devoted to headquarters support, about 13 percent of the total, was not identified as a CINCPAC mission-related activity. It is for those functions and personnel in such areas as public affairs, legislative liaison, personnel office, etc.

It is interesting to note that, in addition to the staff-year expenditures for headquarters support, about 26 percent of the effort within the mission area is devoted to administrative support of the mission. In fact, administrative support of each mission activity is either the first or second largest task of all activities in terms of staff-year expenditure. The following table shows administrative support staff-years and costs for each mission related activity.

<u>Mission activity</u>	<u>Total staff-years</u>	<u>Admin support</u>		<u>Percentage of total mission</u>
		<u>Staff-years</u>	<u>Cost</u>	
Operations	217.7	48	\$ 932,600	22
Intelligence	118.6	29	492,500	24
Command representation	105.8	38	752,900	36
Planning	104.1	37	685,200	36
Security assistance	47.0	14	268,700	30
Logistics	43.5	23	456,600	52
Total	636.7	189	\$3,588,500	
Headquarters support	99.3	99.3	1,985,500	13
Grand total	736.0	288.3	\$5,574,000	26

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Thus, a total of about 288 staff-years of effort, about 39 percent of the total staff-years available, at a cost of approximately \$5.6 million, is expended for administrative support of specific mission activities and general support headquarters.

Mission activity	Subunified commands (note a)			Components		
	Staff- years	Percentage of total	Costs	Staff- years	Percentage of total	Costs
Operations	59.2	9	\$ 1,424,200	94.7	5	\$ 2,211,000
Intelligence	90.3	15	1,947,500	7.6	-	189,000
Command representation	62.9	10	1,704,500	22.2	1	589,500
Planning	67.7	11	1,795,300	66.5	3	1,773,900
Security assistance	1.5	-	36,300	13.1	-	360,200
Logistics	25.9	4	678,600	21.4	1	531,000
Total	307.5	51	\$ 7,586,100	225.7	11	\$ 5,654,600
Other Support:						
Headquarters administration	110.9	19	\$ 2,317,400	-	1	-
Other	175.9	29	3,396,200	21.7	-	268,600
Unilateral ser- vice require- ments	-	-	-	1,704.6	87	37,082,600
Total	286.3	48	5,713,600	1,726.3		\$37,351,200
Grand total	594.3		\$13,299,700	1,954.0		\$43,005,800

a/USFJ and USFK combined. USFK also includes costs of EUSA since this is an integrated command.

The remainder of this chapter discusses CINCPAC's and other commands' contributions in selected mission-related activities or tasks.

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE

The unified command role in the security assistance program has been reduced significantly with the basic shift in emphasis from a largely grant program to one now which



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consists mostly of foreign military sales. Since 1978 program planning and management responsibilities have rested with in-country teams and Washington level agencies. The staffing level at CINCPAC, however, has remained stable. We believe it should be examined to ensure that the current level is consistent with existing unified command responsibility.

### Types of security assistance

The United States provides defense equipment, military training, and other services to foreign nations through grants, credit, or cash under the security assistance program which consists of the following elements.

1. Military Assistance Program 1/--Defense articles provided to eligible foreign governments on a grant basis.
2. International Military Education and Training Program-- Training provided to selected foreign military and related civilian personnel on a grant basis.
3. Foreign Military Sales Credit Program--Credits and loan repayment guarantees provided to enable eligible governments to purchase defense articles, services, and training.
4. Security Supporting Assistance Program--Economic assistance provided, on a loan and grant basis, to selected countries of special political and security interest to the United States. 2/
5. Foreign Military Sales--Eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles and defense services, including training from the U.S. Government.

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1/It is planned that after fiscal year 1981, the United States will provide grant military assistance only in exceptional circumstances.

2/The International Security Assistance Act of 1978 amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to eliminate this and to substitute the Economic Support Fund and Peacekeeping Operations accounts.

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### Program and management changes

Over the years the security assistance program has evolved from one made up largely of grant aid to one which consists almost completely of military sales transactions. When the program was largely grant aid, detailed country-by-country plans were necessary to allocate the available resources to justify annual funding requests made to the Congress. During this period, the unified commands played a substantial role in planning and managing the program. They were responsible for support of in-country military assistance personnel and for developing and submitting security assistance programs to the Secretary of Defense. The in-country teams forwarded plans to the unified commands, which, in turn analyzed the plans to provide regional or "bigger picture" perspective. The unified commands then forwarded the plans to JCS for global analysis and incorporation into various planning effort needs and for supporting requests for funds.

With the shift to foreign military sales, this requirement no longer existed and, in fact, was no longer appropriate. For example, how can the United States plan a course of action for another country's military requirements when that country is paying for what it purchases, determining what it needs, and deciding when to buy?

Although the emphasis of the security assistance program has changed significantly, it is important, from a U.S. management perspective, to develop and maintain information on foreign government military requirements and expected yearly purchases from the United States.

Thus, in 1978, the basic planning process in the security assistance program was changed to (1) include the basic change that had occurred in the program (i.e., grant to sales) and (2) to ensure better interagency coordination of the program. The change requires each country to submit an annual integrated assessment that is the responsibility of the in-country team (headed by the Ambassador) and is a joint State/Defense effort.

The first annual integrated assessment, covering fiscal years 1980-82, was done in July 1978. Each Embassy, as required, submits its country report directly to the Department of State. The Embassy also sends copies to the International Security Affairs and the Defense Security Assistance Agency in DOD, JCS, and the appropriate unified command. These

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organizations review and analyze this assessment. Then several interagency panel groups develop the Congressional Presentation document.

The initiation of the annual integrated assessment procedures effectively eliminated the unified commands from the primary planning process in security assistance programs.

CINCPAC officials, however, contend that they still become involved in the planning and decisionmaking process and consider CINCPAC involvement essential to the timely and effective management/supervision of regional security assistance programs. CINCPAC cited DOD Directive 5132.3 "Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance" as authority for its role in this area. During our review, however, we found that DOD was revising this directive drastically to bring it up to date and to reflect the basic changes in program management that occurred in 1978. (See p. 26 of this report.) DOD expects to issue the new directive by mid-1980. It will substantially reduce the responsibilities of the unified commands in security assistance programs.

### CINCPAC's security assistance mission

CINCPAC defines its security assistance mission as providing JCS a military assessment and impact of security assistance programs within PACOM. According to CINCPAC, it commands the DOD security assistance organizations; develops and submits recommendations regarding organizations, staffing, and support of assistance groups; assists in the conduct of regional security assistance programs; ensures coordination of regional security assistance matters; and evaluates the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD security assistance organizations. In CINCPAC's view, it acts for the Secretary of Defense and JCS as the regional program manager for security assistance matters and provides support for assigned DOD security assistance personnel.

### CINCPAC level of effort in security assistance

A total of about 64.2 staff-years of effort was expended by CINCPAC and its subunified and component command headquarters in security assistance work. This level of effort represents about \$1.7 million in costs for the personnel working in the program. These figures obviously do not include the 406 personnel assigned to the security assistance organizations in the Pacific--military assistance groups, etc.--located in the countries receiving defense-related support in this program.

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Approximately 76 percent or 47 staff-years of the total was expended by CINCPAC. The gross distribution breakout follows:

<u>Command</u>	<u>Staff-years</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Percentage of total</u>
CINCPAC	47.0	\$1,346,000	76
USFJ	1.0	25,300	1
USFK/EUSA	.5	11,300	-
PACAF	7.4	186,800	11
PACFLT	1.7	36,800	2
WESTCOM	<u>6.6</u>	<u>136,600</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	<u>64.2</u>	<u>\$1,742,800</u>	<u>100</u>

The total effort by general tasks of the PACOM headquarters organizations involving security assistance is shown in the following schedule:

<u>Task</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>		<u>Other commands</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Staff-years</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Staff-years</u>	<u>Costs</u>	
Oversight of assistance organizations	9.0	\$ 276,900	1.1	\$ 31,400	\$ 308,300
Assist in conduct of programs	12.2	406,400	6.5	172,700	579,100
Comment on assistance plans	9.6	316,900	3.8	106,400	423,300
Evaluate program effectiveness	2.3	77,200	1.9	50,300	127,500
Admin. support	13.9	268,700	1.4	29,800	298,500
Other	-	-	.2	6,200	6,200
Total	<u>47.0</u>	<u>\$1,346,100</u>	<u>14.9</u>	<u>\$396,800</u>	<u>\$1,742,900</u>

CINCPAC characterized its role as one of supporting and coordinating efforts with the assistance groups; listing countries' requests by priority; providing a regional and a military prospective to country requests; and analyzing, assessing, and recommending military export sales and negotiations in PACOM.

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CINCPAC also:

- Conducts "Phase IV" orientation training to prepare individuals for their country assignment and the Tri-Service Training Workshop.
- Coordinates and hosts the annual Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar which is a meeting of senior assistance officials and representatives from host government countries.
- At the request of JCS, comments on various assistance program submissions, including the annual integrated assessment, the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum and its supporting analysis, the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis, and the Annual Consolidated Data Report.
- Comments to DOD on assistance group manning levels and budget planning.
- Evaluates the efficiency of security assistance organizations and participates in security assistance reviews in which various problems are discussed.
- Provides the Commander-in-Chief with updated information concerning the various security assistance programs.

### INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence ranked third in terms of the amount of staff-years expended by the major command organizations in support of the six mission activities identified by CINCPAC. Intelligence expended \$4.5 million for 216.5 staff-years; more than half of this total was expended by PACOM headquarters--118.6 years at a cost of \$2.4 million. This level of effort at CINCPAC represented 16 percent of CINCPAC's efforts or the second highest area of effort for the CINCPAC organization.

Only about 27 percent of CINCPAC's effort, however, was directed toward the management of the Pacific intelligence program. The remaining 86.5 staff-years, representing 73 percent of the intelligence mission, consist largely of administrative activities--support of the mission and dissemination of intelligence information (i.e., equipment operators).

With completion of the current program to upgrade PACOM's automatic data processing system, the workload for

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CINCPAC and IPAC in the areas of dissemination of intelligence data may decrease, thus, allowing for some reduction in staff levels.

The intelligence mission, organizations,  
and levels of effort

CINCPAC defines its intelligence mission as taking the actions needed to ensure the availability of intelligence necessary to support PACOM. According to CINCPAC, this responsibility is fulfilled through taskings; issuing directives; validating intelligence collection requirements; establishing collection priorities; managing intelligence resources through the service components, the subunified commands, and joint task force commands; and managing the dissemination of intelligence products.

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Headquarters intelligence effort

Based on the major PACOM headquarters analysis, a total of about \$4.5 million is routinely expended for 217 staff-years in support of this mission as reflected in the following table:

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Staff-years</u>	<u>Costs</u>
<u>Unified</u>		
CINCPAC	118.6	\$2,412,390
USFJ	5.8	152,300
USFK (note a)	<u>84.5</u>	<u>1,795,200</u>
Total	<u>208.9</u>	<u>\$4,359,890</u>
<u>Components</u>		
PACFLT	4.3	\$ 108,300
PACAF	2.3	51,200
WESTCOM	<u>1.0</u>	<u>29,500</u>
Total	<u>7.6</u>	<u>189,000</u>
Grand total	<u>216.5</u>	<u>\$4,548,890</u>

a/Includes EUSA.

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CINCPAC intelligence tasks

CINCPAC identified eight primary functions, including administrative support (see app. IV), which it must accomplish in support of the overall intelligence mission. The Director for Intelligence at PACOM headquarters is primarily responsible for this mission. The PACOM headquarters staff estimates it spends 118.6 staff-years performing tasks in support of CINCPAC's intelligence mission in the following general functional categories:

<u>Functional categories</u>	<u>Headquarters PACOM staff</u>			<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Off.</u>	<u>Enl.</u>	<u>Civ.</u>	<u>Staff-years</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Administrative support	3.0	21.3	4.1	29.0	\$ 492,500
Intelligence product dissemination and operation of special intelligence communications facility	4.3	52.0	1.2	57.5	855,500
Intelligence action officers (note a)	29.6	.3	2.2	32.1	1,064,400
Total	36.9	74.2	7.5	118.6	\$2,412,400

a/All other officers, enlisted, and civilians performing intelligence tasks.

It is interesting to note that the total staff-years and costs expended for intelligence product dissemination, operation of a special intelligence communications facility, and for intelligence administrative support represent 73 percent of the total staff-years and 56 percent of the total personnel costs expended by the PACOM headquarters staff. The balance of the staff-years and costs is devoted largely to the planning and conduct of the collection, processing, and production of intelligence products in PACOM, and overseeing the operation of IPAC.

Intelligence Center, Pacific

IPAC was established at the direction of JCS and became fully operational in August 1974. It is a joint organization composed of former elements of the CINCPAC and component service intelligence staffs.

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IPAC has primary responsibilities for its fiscal matters, planning, programing, administration, personnel matters, logistical support, and publications. Specifically, it is responsible for the

- annual program objective memorandum,
- general defense intelligence program,
- budget submissions,
- procurement and contractual actions, and
- overall program management.

The IPAC Comptroller Division provides day-to-day management of the IPAC budget. Development of the budget is somewhat complicated because IPAC must submit composite all-service and separate service-unique resource programs and budgets.

The General Defense Intelligence Program, which reflects IPAC's staff and funding requirements for the next 5 years is submitted through CINCPAC's J-2 for review by the individual services or defense intelligence production management staffs for final approval. The Department of the Navy serves as IPAC's executive agent with its operating funds and civilian costs being carried as part of the Navy budget. IPAC's operating budget is submitted through Navy financial management channels--through the CINCPAC Comptroller for review to the Navy Comptroller for final approval.


Possible impact of improved automatic data processing and capability

When IPAC was formed in 1974, an improved automatic data processing capability was felt to be an important requirement. The PACOM Data System Center program is currently underway to improve this capability. This program is a 3-year, \$17 million program to upgrade and replace existing intelligence data processing equipment. When this program is completed, it will provide CINCPAC, IPAC, and the components a common data processing network and intelligence data base to draw upon using 70 minicomputers. This system will enable off-island (Oahu) commands to have access to the data base and enable their analysts to

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- have access to both local and national data bases,
  - communicate directly with other analysts,
  - work with the files, and
  - review and generate messages.
- 

#### OPERATIONS

The major PACOM commands spend about \$9.4 million for a total of about 371 staff-years to support CINCPAC's operations mission. Most of this effort, 217.7 years at a cost of \$5.8 million, is used by CINCPAC.

Our review concentrated primarily on two tasks in the operations mission--the joint/combined training area and crisis management, which accounted for 59.3 staff-years and costs of \$1.7 million at CINCPAC. Our observations follow.

#### Joint combined training exercises

CINCPAC has authority to conduct joint training exercises and to establish the training policies for joint operations which are required for mission accomplishment. CINCPAC relies on its component and subordinate commanders to provide trained, equipped forces to conduct joint training exercises.

About 58 staff-years and \$1.6 million, or 17 percent, of the operations total are spent scheduling, planning, coordinating, and conducting selected joint/combined exercises. More than 59 percent and 63 percent of the staff-years and costs, respectively, are spent by PACOM headquarters.

The degree of CINCPAC's involvement in joint training exercises is an example of its intermediary role between the services and JCS. The tasks are necessary and would have to be performed by JCS itself if CINCPAC did not exist. However, there is some question whether the degree of CINCPAC involvement is fully consistent with the role envisioned in a July 1979 JCS memorandum to the services and the unified commands.

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This memorandum stressed the importance of joint military exercises in increasing the readiness of U.S. forces by (1) testing contingency plans and response capability, (2) enhancing relations with other nations, and (3) participating in mutual defense arrangements with our allies. The memorandum listed the procedural changes by priority to refine the JCS program and to enhance and preserve the authority of the unified commands to program, plan, and conduct such exercises. CINCPAC, however, believes that the planning and conducting of joint exercises is largely a service function.

#### The JCS Exercise Program

The JCS Exercise Program consists of JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercises. JCS-directed exercises are those which are directed by JCS or higher authorities. JCS-coordinated exercises are unified/specified command-sponsored exercises which require coordination by JCS because they involve forces of more than one unified or specified command or agency, or forces of other countries. The purposes of these exercises are to

- improve JCS and the unified and specified commanders' abilities to coordinate employment of two or more services' forces in combat;
- train combatant forces in joint and/or combined operations;
- test reaction capability;
- provide experience in delivering joint forces and firepower to the battlefield; and
- test plans, doctrine, and procedures.

These exercises may be "command post exercises," or "field training exercises," or a combination of the two. Command post exercises test the operations and communications within and between headquarters and involve little actual troop movement. Field training exercises are maneuvers conducted in the field under simulated war conditions in which troops and equipment of one side are actually present while those of an opposing force may be present or simulated. The size and complexity of these exercises vary greatly.

#### The Team Spirit Exercise

We concentrated on the Team Spirit Exercise because it is the largest JCS exercise conducted in PACOM. For Team Spirit 1980, 134,800 personnel, including 42,800 U.S. troops, will participate in this exercise. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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From our discussions with officials and review of documents, we observed that to date CINCPAC

--Contributes to, but primarily assists the component and subunified commands and other organizations to

- a. develop the joint/combined exercise directive,
- b. develop the exercise concept,
- c. determine the participating forces and extent of play/costs,
- d. develop the exercise control/evaluation plan,
- e. establish milestones, and
- f. establish public affairs policy.

--Prepares the "draft" Significant Military Exercise Brief, submits it to the component and subunified commands for review and input, and prepares the final brief that is submitted to JCS for approval by the Department of State, the National Security Council, DOD, and the White House.

--Prepares the exercise directive which provides the broad guidance for planning, conducting, and evaluating the exercise.

--Manages "lift" funds and evaluates the deployment of forces.

--Attends JCS's annual Worldwide Exercise Conference.

CINCPAC does not

--conduct the initial planning and logistics conferences;

--prepare and publish the exercise plan, including the control/evaluation plans;

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- conduct the intermediate planning conference;
- conduct the logistics coordination conference;
- conduct the airlift employment conference;
- conduct the final coordination conference;
- designate the exercise director;
- designate the chief evaluator;
- conduct the exercise; and
- conduct the verbal in-country critique after the exercise is completed.

### CINCPAC comments

CINCPAC stated that our observation as to whether CINCPAC involvement in training is fully consistent with the apparent role JCS envisioned, which was based largely on Team Spirit, implies a unified command headquarters role which is inappropriate. Specifically, CINCPAC stated that the appropriate level for detailed exercise planning and execution is at the lowest practical level within the component/subunified commands and that the proper CINCPAC role is direction, assistance, and policy guidance. With regard to the JCS memorandum on training cited in our report, CINCPAC stated that the phraseology used in the memo--"The commander of a unified or specified command will schedule, plan and conduct"--is standard terminology for JCS direction to unified commanders. From the JCS perspective, anything that is done by a subordinate of a unified command is, in a general sense, done by the unified command. Further, CINCPAC instructions specifically task component and subordinate commanders with responsibility for exercise initiatives.

### CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Crisis management is one of eight tasks CINCPAC identified as part of the operations mission activity. This task accounted for about a 25-staff-year expenditure as shown in appendix IV. This level of effort represents about 11 percent of the overall operations mission, \$717,000 in personnel costs, and 3.4 percent of CINCPAC's total effort.

CINCPAC defines this task as

"To develop, train, man, operate and exercise crisis management center/teams; establish/coordinate system and reporting requirements; establish/maintain

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data bases; coordinate with JCS and readiness and transportation agencies."

In other words, CINCPAC is to establish and maintain a capability to oversee operations during a period of crisis.

### Crisis action system

The crisis action system is part of the JCS Joint Operations Planning System, an automated system, which was established in the early 1970s to standardize the joint planning process. The crisis action system consists of the following six phases.

- Phase I/Situation Development. During this phase, the situation is monitored and an assessment is made by the CINC and other commanders as to whether a problem or crisis exists or has the potential for becoming one.
- Phase II/Crisis Assessment. This phase involves increased reporting on the situation and further assessment by JCS and the national command authorities.
- Phase III/Planning. JCS initiates this phase by issuing a JCS warning order to a CINC. This order constitutes a planning directive to the CINC and provides all available and pertinent information on a defined crisis situation and the anticipated missions to be assigned to the affected command. The order may include (1) tentative missions and possible courses of action, (2) areas of operations, (3) force designations, (4) assumptions and political factors to consider, and (5) administrative and logistics information. It is during this phase that the CINC determines whether an operations or concept plan exists for the situation. In response to the warning order, the CINC provides JCS with time-sensitive information and his estimates of the situation with a recommended course of action.
- Phase IV/Decision. JCS recommends a course of action to the national command authorities.
- Phase V/Execution Planning. JCS issues an alert order to the CINC to initiate executive planning. The order provides the CINC with the approved course of action and other pertinent information.

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
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--Phase VI/Execution. The planned response is executed.

For additional discussion on this area, see page 48.

#### Other operations programs

Due to time constraints, we could not examine a number of programs identified with other tasks under CINCPAC's operations mission. However, there could be some functional overlap between CINCPAC and operating agencies and, thus, DOD could possibly reduce the extent of CINCPAC effort in some of these programs by delegating some responsibilities for monitoring functions. These programs involve (1) assets and resources which are either owned and/or operated by other DOD agencies, services, or specified commands or (2) similar capabilities which exist in the services or other agencies. Examples of areas that may lend themselves to functional overlap include (1) the peacetime reconnaissance program and (2) communication programs and systems.



We have issued several reports dealing with problems in the management and development of DOD communications systems. Our most recent report (LCD-80-22) deals with the many problems in the Worldwide Military Command and Control System. A common problem normally identified in these reports is a lack of centralized control over these programs which results in excess capabilities, development of expensive non-standard systems, etc. Perhaps this area represents an opportunity whereby the unified command system can consolidate these programs--as was done in the intelligence program area.

#### PLANNING

Planning ranks as the second largest mission in the Pacific. CINCPAC defines its planning mission as the systematic process of translating broad national objectives into

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specific plans. It includes actions at all level of military command to analyze the threat, formulate strategy, and determine force and resource requirements. Planning at the unified command level provides for deployment, employment, and support of multiservice and multinational forces in all types of contingencies.

We reviewed the major PACOM headquarters analysis (see app. IV), and concluded that about \$6.3 million was spent routinely for a total of 238 staff-years in support of this mission as shown in the following table.

<u>Headquarters organization</u>	<u>Staff-years</u>	<u>Costs</u>
Unified:		
PACOM	104.1	\$2.8
USFJ	19.7	.5
USFK/EUSA	48.0	1.3
Total	171.8	\$4.6
Components:		
PACFLT	12.3	.3
PACAF	26.4	.6
WESTCOM	27.8	.8
Total	66.5	\$1.7
Grand total	238.3	\$6.3

CINCPAC identified eight primary tasks, including administrative support, which must be accomplished in support of the overall planning mission in the Pacific. As shown in the following table, developing contingency and supporting plans account for about 46 percent and 51 percent of the total staff-years and personnel costs expended by the major Pacific commands, respectively.

<u>Tasks</u>	<u>Pacific unified commands</u>		<u>Major component commands</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Staff-years</u>	<u>Costs</u>	<u>Staff-years</u>	<u>Costs</u>	<u>Staff-years</u>	<u>Costs</u>
Develop and prepare to implement contingency plans	53.4	\$1.7	35.1	\$ .9	88.5	\$2.6
Assist components in developing supporting contingency plans	13.6	.4	7.3	.2	20.9	.6
Total	67.0	\$2.1	42.4	\$1.1	109.4	\$3.2



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Most CINCPAC planning tasks are levied annually by JCS. The CINCPAC Planning Guidance Manual notes that an operation plan or other appropriate plan exists for most planning tasks levied by the JCS. Although the major commands report that more than 109 staff-years are spent developing plans, it appears that this effort deals primarily with reviewing and revising existing plans.

The JCS Joint Operation Planning System guides the preparation and management of plans for the conduct of military operations in PACOM. This system prescribes uniform policies and procedures for the development, coordination, dissemination, review, and approval of most joint military plans.

CINCPAC receives its planning mission annually from JCS taskings contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. JCS consults with and incorporates CINCPAC's suggestions in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan before it is issued each year. JCS taskings convey the what, where, when, and who of an operation.

CINCPAC's operation plans exist in complete or concept format. An operation plan in complete format can be translated into an operation order with minimum alteration. It exists for those situations which

--tax total forces available,

--tax the available logistics or mobility resources, and

--would be likely to occur within the period specified by JCS in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

An operation plan in concept format is an abbreviated plan which will require further expansion into a complete operation plan or an operation order prior to execution. As of March 1980, CINCPAC maintained 40 operation plans--10 in complete format and 30 in concept format.

These plans are normally reviewed annually, coinciding with the annual update of the planning tasks in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, to determine whether or not they require revision. The review normally lasts for approximately 6 months. The review is conducted to determine the adequacy, feasibility, and suitability of operations plans for accomplishing missions assigned.

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The review for adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned. The review for feasibility determines whether the assigned task can be accomplished by implementing the plan. It also includes whether the necessary forces, transportation, and logistics resources can be provided and whether the support required of departments and agencies can be provided. The review for suitability determines whether the plan

- is adaptable to the range of circumstances which can require the implementation of the plan and
- provides for the employment of combat support operations appropriate to the type and scale of threat envisioned.

#### CINCPAC comments

During our exit conference with the CINCPAC staff, we were informed that the additional workload generated by the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf area had required the augmentation of about 13 staffmembers to CINCPAC's Operations and Plans Directorates. Following the stabilization of the crisis workload, the CINCPAC Chief of Staff plans to conduct a manpower survey of the headquarters to identify organizational and staff modifications necessary to improve and streamline the staff. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) *Unclassified*

#### CONCLUSIONS

Basically, PACOM is an extension of JCS in the Pacific. As such, PACOM monitors, coordinates, and facilitates activities and programs in support of JCS. The command performs a number of useful functions that, if not done by it, would be done elsewhere. However, our review indicates that opportunities may exist to streamline the existing CINCPAC organization by examining (1) the level of effort expended in administrative support of the headquarters and in administrative support of CINCPAC mission-related activities, which together account for almost 289 staff-years, or about 40 percent of the total staff-years spent at a cost of approximately \$5.6 million, and (2) the specific tasks and functions performed by CINCPAC to ensure that the level of effort currently devoted to these activities is consistent with CINCPAC's current responsibilities.

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A functional analysis of the command structure on a vertical basis might offer potential for reduction in total positions and also ensure that tasks and functions are optimally located in the chain of command, as well as optimally staffed.

The basic premise of the functional approach is that it should not be necessary for each headquarters to have the capability to monitor every aspect of each subordinate headquarters. Each succeeding level in the command chain, if involved in the function at all, should be involved on a monitoring or exception basis only. This approach may reduce workload and staff at some levels and increase them at other levels with some overall economies-of-scale.

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## CHAPTER 5

### WHAT WILL PACOM DO IN WARTIME?

In the past, CINCPAC's role in a regional conflict, such as Vietnam, was that of a supporting command rather than the command actively prosecuting the war. For the most likely future regional conflict in the Pacific area--which CINCPAC believes is the defense of Korea--its role will again be support and coordination as documented in current plans. CINCPAC's role in a global conventional conflict with the Soviet Union is not altogether clear; however, according to CINCPAC it could be a supporting role. CINCPAC's supporting role and the tasks it could and should perform under wartime circumstances, however, have not been clearly defined, raising questions as to whether CINCPAC is optimally organized for this type of activity. The remainder of this chapter discusses the war-fighting command structure in Korea and CINCPAC's role in a Korean or other conflict.

### INTENT BEHIND ESTABLISHING UNIFIED COMMANDS

The original rationale for establishing unified commands was to centralize the execution of military operations and to establish a clear direct line of command to the unified combatant commands. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, states that it was the intent of the Congress to "provide for the establishment of unified and specified commands and a clear direct line of command to such commands." In the first Report of the Secretary of Defense, which was submitted in 1948, the following statement was made:

"\* \* \*it was the policy to set up unified commands in selected areas containing elements of two or more services where possible hostile action might require such a single commander to react tactically to a threat without awaiting guidance or decisions from Washington."

When the unified command system was established shortly after World War II, the strategic and technological environment was considerably different from the one which exists today. The Soviet Union was perceived as the basic political and military threat to United States interests. Further, the United States was the only nation with a nuclear weapons capability.

Today's environment is different. The technology of warfare and communications has changed immensely since World War II. In the ensuing 35 years, many sophisticated weapons

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and devices were developed, including (1) intercontinental ballistic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons, (2) nuclear-powered submarines and surface ships, (3) precision-guided munitions, including rockets and missiles, (4) advanced and long-range jet aircraft, and (5) communications and spy-in-the-sky satellites.

The current troubles in the Middle East/Persian Gulf area are representative of these problems and according to CINCPAC have caused JCS to review the Unified Command Plan to establish the responsibility for this area of operation.

During the Vietnam conflict and other past crises in the Pacific, the national command authority exercised direct command and control over the U.S. military forces involved through the on-scene commander and, in effect, circumvented the purpose for which the Pacific unified command was established. While not perfect, the communications capability existing today makes it possible for the national command authority to exercise command and control over U.S. military forces anywhere in the world.

Given these events and the likelihood that a separate unified command or a joint task force will be established to direct U.S. operations in any regional conflict, it appears that the role of the Pacific unified command will be that of a supporting command, as opposed to that of a tactical and supported command. Its role in a global conventional conflict is not altogether clear; however, according to CINCPAC, it could be a supporting one. The following section describes CINCPAC's role in Vietnam and crisis management and its expected role in a Korean conflict.

#### VIETNAM CONFLICT

The Vietnam War provided the most current combat test of the DOD doctrine on interservice cooperation and unified command. The military assistance group in Vietnam became the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, a subunified command, reporting to CINCPAC. This organization's subordinates--the U.S. Army, Vietnam; U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam; and the 7th Air Force--became subunified component commands.

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The chain of command established for the unified system was circumvented in a number of ways during this war, probably most notably in the area of command and control of air power. CINCPAC's role was generally limited to establishing lift priorities and allocating fuel and munitions to the services.

CINCPAC's role in air power in the Vietnam War was basically one of a conduit of information between the CINCPAC components and JCS. The 2nd Air Division/7th Air Force commander and all the ground force commanders nominated bombing targets to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, which consolidated and ranked the targets by priority. The Military Assistance Command sent the list to CINCPAC. CINCPAC reviewed the list but rarely made any significant changes before forwarding it to JCS. The process continued through the Secretary of Defense who coordinated with the Secretary of State before submitting it to the President. By early 1966, because of the obvious delay problems, the system was revised to permit JCS approval of targets within South Vietnam. However, this change did not increase CINCPAC's contribution.

CINCPAC would assign bombing targets released by JCS to PACAF and PACFLT. PACAF would then ensure that strike forces did not conflict with one another in approaching, attacking, and withdrawing from the target. CINCPAC expected PACAF to delegate coordinating authority to the 2nd Air Division, and this was done. The 2nd Air Division formed a working committee to formulate procedures for controlling the forces within the guidelines of CINCPAC's directive.

When CINCPAC was given authority for air strikes in North Vietnam and Laos, CINCPAC determined which missions would be assigned to PACAF and to PACFLT. Each component commander then detailed the missions to its subordinate commands.

Another example which shows CINCPAC's limited role was in the command and control of B-52s, which was a continuing problem throughout the Vietnam War. While operational control of the bombers was withheld from the subunified command in Vietnam, it was also withheld from CINCPAC. Thus, the operational control of B-52s remained under the control of the Strategic Air Command.

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## CRISES MANAGEMENT

The crisis action system represents a systematic approach for responding to and controlling a crisis situation in that it (1) establishes a clear chain of command beginning with the commander in the field to the unified command and to JCS and the national command authority and (2) delineates the general responsibilities and duties of the organizations concerned. Under the system therefore, JCS is responsible for providing guidance to a CINC and for directing the execution of the action approved by the national command authority. The unified command is responsible for (1) monitoring and providing situation assessments, (2) developing plans and possible courses of action, and (3) executing the response approved by national authorities and ordered by JCS.

Past experience suggests that this chain of command is often circumvented resulting in a shift of planning and execution responsibilities from the CINC to the commander in the field and to JCS and the national command authority. This situation can be attributed to two factors: (1) the technical capability of national authorities to communicate directly with commanders in the field and (2) the desire to prevent a crisis from escalating into a more serious situation. The following discussion of the Korean "Tree Cutting Incident" illustrates the circumvention of the crisis action system.

### Korea "Tree-Cutting Incident"

On August 18, 1976, (Korean time) North Koreans attacked a United Nations Command (UNC) work crew pruning a tree in the Joint Security Area of the Demilitarized Zone at Panmunjom, Korea. Two U.S. officers were killed. UNC notified JCS directly by message and sent information copies to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and CINCPAC at approximately 11:15 a.m. (Korean time).

The United States responded by deploying additional units to Korea in a show of force. Basically this included (1) deploying an F-4 and F-111 squadron to Korea, (2) moving the Midway carrier task force to the Korean straits, (3) having B-52s fly training missions near the area, and (4) increasing the defense posture of U.S. forces in Korea. (CONFIDENTIAL)


The crisis culminated when United Nations forces entered the Joint Security Area on the morning of August 21, 1976, to cut down the tree that the work crew had attempted to prune on August 18. The purpose of this action was to reassert the

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rights of UNC." The general manner in which this response was planned, implemented, and how the communications worked is discussed below.



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1/This organization had been formed in 1969 for crisis decisionmaking and was made up of representatives from DOD, Department of State, JCS, and other agencies.

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THE UNIFIED COMMAND'S EXPECTED  
ROLE IN A KOREAN CONFLICT

If war occurs in Korea, the joint Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) will fight the battle--land, naval, and air. It has primary responsibility for deterring North Korean aggression and conducting the combined defense of Korea if deterrence fails. The UNC military role is envisioned only in the event third country United Nations forces are provided in support of CFC. || x

CFC will be the primary operational commander in Korea which will direct and conduct the combined joint Korean defenses. CFC will receive mutually developed strategic direction and missions from both the Korean Government and the U.S. national command authority.

CFC exercises operational control of Korea/U.S. forces made available in peacetime and wartime through ground, naval, and air component commanders. During a war, CFC has the option of activating the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force to conduct certain intelligence, targeting, interdiction, and other special operations behind enemy lines. }

Upon implementation of war plans and when directed by the U.S. national command authority through JCS, the U.S. combat forces under CINCPAC's operational command in Korea and augmentation forces, as they arrive, will be placed under the operational control of CFC. As mentioned on page 6, CINCPAC exercises operational command of U.S. air forces in peacetime through PACAF, of U.S. naval forces through PACFLT, and of EUSA through USFK.

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USFK is the principal U.S. subordinate unified commander concerned with the defense of Korea. USFK will serve as the focal point through which CINCPAC provides U.S. support to CFC. USFK will be responsible for planning, coordinating, and providing U.S. support within Korea to the joint Korea/U.S. operations conducted under the operational control of CFC. CINCPAC will be responsible for planning, coordinating, and providing U.S. support and augmentation forces to USFK for passing to that Command.

CFC becomes the supported commander. USFK and CINCPAC become supporting commanders whose roles will be primarily to provide "support and coordination." However, DOD has not formally defined support and coordination. Senior officials at PACOM headquarters have described it as "those actions which aid, complement, or sustain a command in accordance with current directives and agreements and provide for congruity of actions, goals, and objectives."

Because the service departments are legally responsible for the administration, training, supply, and logistics support of their particular forces, it is not clear to us what the unified command structure will do in a support and coordination role in wartime over and above what the services are responsible for. The unified command structure does not have the capability or the resources to provide the support and coordination the services provide. We recognize that a unified command probably has much work to do in wartime, but until DOD clearly defines the unified command's support and coordination role, it will be difficult to determine staffing and organizational requirements, as well as the optimum place for performing these operations in peacetime or wartime.

### CONCLUSION

The original rationale for establishing a unified command system in 1947--that it would be the command that prosecutes the war--is still perceived to be true today. However, the role of the Pacific unified command appears to have taken on a new emphasis. With this change, the support and coordination role of the Pacific unified command has not been clearly defined. As a result, DOD cannot be assured that the appropriate organizational structure and size exists to carry out this new role and that the locations of the command organizations optimally serve this new role.

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We believe that JCS's ongoing review of the Unified Command Plan offers the opportunity for DOD to fully define and describe the desired role of the Pacific unified command. (See our recommendation on p. 5.)

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CHAPTER 6

CHANGES IN SIZE AND COMPOSITION  
OF PACIFIC HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATIONS

Since 1976 the number of personnel authorized for U.S. headquarters organizations in the Pacific area has increased significantly, primarily as a result of the establishment of CFC in Korea. In addition, a new major Army command, WESTCOM, has been established, and the Army is continuing its efforts to obtain authorization for a higher level major command, a U.S. Army, Pacific, to replace WESTCOM. Further, WESTCOM has initiated a U.S. Army to foreign army relations program that perhaps should more appropriately be performed under the CINCPAC's security assistance mission. Finally, Pacific Air Force headquarters while reducing its management headquarters staffing by 34 authorizations, has, in fact, merely transferred these people to the PACOPS staff, an organization that is not considered a management headquarters activity in support of CINCPAC and PACAF.

ARMY EFFORTS TO EXPAND  
ITS COMMAND STRUCTURE

Since 1977 the Army has been taking actions designed to re-establish its U.S. Army, Pacific command that was disestablished in 1974. Although Secretary of Defense approval for this action was denied, the Secretary did approve the establishment of a new major command, WESTCOM, in December 1978 to replace the Army CINCPAC Support Group, a field operating agency established in 1974 to provide the Army interrelationship with CINCPAC after U.S. Army, Pacific, was disestablished. The rationale for establishing WESTCOM was based in part, on consideration of the effect of withdrawing U.S. ground combat forces from Korea and the resultant disestablishment of EUSA headquarters and I Corps headquarters. Since this withdrawal is now being held in abeyance, it appears that one of the reasons for establishing WESTCOM is no longer valid.

The Army Support Group was not in the U.S. Army chain of command nor was it a component commander for U.S. Army forces in the PACOM area. It was tasked with the following missions.

--Provide liaison, advice, and assistance to PACOM headquarters and the Navy and Air Force component commands on Army matters in the Pacific. (CONFIDENTIAL) *Unclassified*

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- Assist the PACOM staff in preparing plans and prepare the Army supporting plans for areas not within the geographical area of a major Pacific Army command.
- Provide coordination with PACOM, PACAF, and PACFLT headquarters on Army matters concerning PACOM.

An Army study released on March 2, 1978, indicated that the following problems existed under this arrangement

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- the lack of titular, directive, and management authority required to fully represent the Army in PACOM;
- the lack of proper interface with CINCPAC, PACFLT, and PACAF caused by the disparity in rank structure;
- the confusion because of the U.S. Army Forces Command/CINCPAC overlap in Hawaii;
- the lack of significant assigned Army forces;
- the diminution of Army presence in PACOM; and
- the inability of any single Army commander in the Pacific to resolve Army differences within the Army family.

The U.S. Army Support Group concluded it was not adequately represented in Pacific-wide activities nor in its relations with the unified and service component commands in Hawaii.

According to the Army, these problems coalesced into the following major issues:


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- The downgrading of the U.S. Army, Pacific, resulted in the fragmentation of the Army command in the Pacific.
- The military utility of a corps headquarters in Japan was limited.
- Army command realignments would result from the withdrawal of Army ground combat forces from Korea.

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
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In addition, the study noted that certain actions were in progress and that the outcome "could have significant impact on future command relationships in the Pacific." Consequently, the study concluded that "the timing of Army organizational changes is extremely important."

The actions in progress at the time were

- the President-directed organizational review of DOD,
  - the withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces from Korea,
  - the formation of a combined command in Korea, and
  - the forthcoming dissemination of DOD consolidated guidance.
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
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


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With this decision, WESTCOM was established in March 1979 and began to function as the Pacific Army command for all areas outside Japan and Korea and as the Army component of PACOM.



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The Army's expanded relations  
program in the Pacific

The initiation and operation of an expanded relations program (ERP) with allied and friendly armies by the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group and its successor, WESTCOM, raise questions as to whether certain aspects of the program should not more appropriately be performed in support of and under the supervision of the CINCPAC security assistance mission.

ERP history and evolution

In 1977 the Army Support Group studied the U.S. Army role in the Pacific and concluded that declining Army strength and presence were resulting in the degradation of staff expertise about the area and a lessening of influence due to not enough Army-to-army contacts which, it was believed, detracted from stated U.S. intentions to remain a Pacific power. As a result, a program was developed "to support DOD and JCS military strategy through mutually beneficial activities with allied and friendly armies." This program became known as ERP, and is in addition to the unit exchange program that WESTCOM participates in. Since its inception in December 1977, ERP has grown with increases in staffing, funding, and activities and contacts throughout the Pacific. Initially, the Army established two additional personnel spaces and the Strategy Policy, International Relations, and Security Assistance Division to manage ERP.

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### ERP objectives, concept, and activities

The purposes of ERP are to

- enhance and support DOD, JCS, and U.S. Army goals, interests, objectives, and strategy;
- extend U.S. Army contacts and influence with friendly ground forces;
- fill the void created by U.S. withdrawals from Southeast Asia;
- provide a climate and program for rationalization, standardization, and interoperability with U.S. allies;
- advise and assist military assistance groups on U.S. Army matters; and
- work toward an ultimate coalition warfare capability with U.S. allies.

WESTCOM's international programs are multiphased and tailored to fit the PACOM countries and regional arrangements. The concept of ERP is to increase rationalization, standardization, and interoperability with foreign armies with the ultimate goal being readiness for coalition warfare. To achieve this, WESTCOM has instituted a four-phased program:

- Re-establish communications, develop influence and contacts, and encourage an expansion of activities through staff visits.
- Maximize friendly army participation in visits, observer training, on-the-job training, exchanges, and Army participation in various training exercises with emphasis on software standardization.
- Expand WESTCOM's participation in bilateral and multilateral defense planning.
- Strengthen allied and friendly Army support and resolve toward collective defense within U.S. interests.

To re-establish relationships with allied armies, WESTCOM has taken several initiatives that include

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- staff visits to PACOM countries which result in reciprocal visits and other activities;
- individual training activities (medical, aviation, intelligence, and logistics) and exchanges in which foreign army participation in on-the-job training and observer training in Hawaii are encouraged;
- exchange programs for officers, noncommissioned officers, and units of platoon and company size;
- information exchanges, such as the (1) initiation of the Pacific Army Management Seminar which provides a forum for the exchange of Army management techniques among armies of the Pacific, (2) operations, logistics, and intelligence exchanges with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, and (3) seminars in Australia; and
- exercise coordination with numerous PACOM countries.

We were told that WESTCOM presently spends approximately eight staff-years in pursuing the goals of the program. >

### ERP approving authorities

Various sources are cited as the basis for ERP aside from approvals from the Department of the Army and CINCPAC officials. Authorities cited for ERP activities include JCS policy memos, DOD directives, Army regulations, CINCPAC instructions, and the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis.

### ERP funding sources

Three basic types of funds are being used to support ERP--operations and maintenance, Army funding, and T-10 and N60 military assistance program dollars provided by the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

According to WESTCOM officials, ERP funding decisions are made very carefully. For example, WESTCOM used operations and maintenance funds so that a foreign army general could attend a Pacific Army Management Seminar in Hawaii as a guest speaker. However, the Staff Judge Advocate ruled that the general must not, as planned, engage in any activity while in Hawaii that could be construed as training or education.

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This ruling included attending the conference on days other than when the general was scheduled to speak and visiting Army training or operations activities.

Fiscal year 1979 funding for ERP was not a line item in the budget. However, with Department of the Army assistance, WESTCOM acquired and expended \$33,000--\$20,000 of operations and maintenance funds and \$13,000 of security assistance funds to support ERP. The fiscal year 1980-81 consolidated operating budget did not include sufficient funds for ERP because of the lack of experience factors and the growth of the program. According to WESTCOM, additional funds were needed to sustain the momentum of the program which was estimated to require \$154,000 (as opposed to \$124,000 actually allocated) in fiscal year 1980 and \$343,000 in fiscal year 1981. WESTCOM had allocated \$311,000 in operating funds for the unit exchange program for fiscal year 1980, in addition to the \$124,000 for ERP.

#### SIGNIFICANT PERSONNEL INCREASES

The present total authorized strength of U.S. personnel in the unified command organizations in the Pacific has increased over that authorized in 1976. The following schedule shows, by location, where the increases have occurred.

<u>Location</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>Net increase (decrease)</u>
Korea	1,052	1,347	295
Japan	89	120	31
Hawaii	<u>743</u>	<u>736</u>	<u>- 7</u>
Total	<u>1,884</u>	<u>2,203</u>	<u>319</u>

14.5 percent

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#### Korea

The November 1978 establishment of the bilateral Korea/U.S. CFC accounts for most of the increase in Korea. Following its establishment, the trilateral UNC/USFK/EUSA headquarters organization was changed. A joint headquarters for UNC and the bilateral Korea/U.S. CFC was formed. USFK/EUSA headquarters' organization remains a fully integrated joint headquarters.

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The proposed June 1, 1980, staffing authorization for the two joint headquarters is pending JCS approval and totals 1,347--255 positions for the joint UNC/CFC headquarters and 1,092 positions for the joint USFK/EUSA headquarters. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ *Unclassified*

Initiatives are now underway in Korea to study the viability of establishing separate headquarters for USFK and EUSA in response to perceived shortcomings identified in Korean defense plans with the establishment of CFC.

#### Japan

According to USFJ officials, the increase of 20 positions for fiscal year 1980 was attributable to a significant change in its mission. The United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee formally endorsed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation Guidelines on November 27, 1978. As a result, the United States and the Government of Japan are bilaterally planning for the defense of Japan and conducting combined exercises. USFJ stated that the new dimension of cooperation has increased the requirement for expanded relationships at all levels in the areas of operational planning and joint exercises. According to officials, this new mission has had a direct impact upon USFJ operational divisions and has indirectly affected all other divisions. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ *Unclassified*

Further, these officials stated that their role has greatly expanded over recent years. According to USFJ officials, this expansion has created a need for additional staff to fulfill responsibilities resulting from new missions and the significant increase in interaction between USFJ and the Japan security establishment. USFJ's expanded role has been brought about by a change in the political climate in Japan which is now more favorable to defense matters and the Government of Japan's increased intensified interest in bilateral cooperation under the mutual security treaty. In addition to the increase of 20 personnel positions in fiscal year 1980, an additional 10 positions were requested for fiscal year 1981.

#### CHANGE IN THE AIR FORCE ORGANIZATION

PACOPS, an Air Force headquarters controlled unit, was activated and assigned to PACAF headquarters in September 1979. Its mission is to perform combat related functions to maintain

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the combat readiness of PACAF and to deploy, employ, and execute combat air operations within PACOM.

PACOPS is directly subordinate to PACAF headquarters, and performs the functions of intelligence, operations, logistics, and plans. A total of 146 personnel are assigned to PACOPS. According to PACAF, staff authorization ceilings do not exist for PACOPS. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) *Unclassified*

Eight positions in PACOPS are dual-hatted by PACAF headquarters personnel. The CINCPACAF is dual-hatted as the Director of PACOPS. Deputy Chiefs of Staff in Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and Logistics also serve in PACOPS as Staff Directors for their respective functional areas. Assistant Deputy Chiefs of Staff in Operations and Intelligence serve as Associate Staff Directors in PACOPS. Finally, the Director of Command Control and the Director of Logistics Plans hold the same position in PACOPS.

To implement PACOPS, the Air Force transferred four directorates, representing 11 divisions and three divisions from two other directorates, from PACAF headquarters to PACOPS during fiscal year 1979. The functions and responsibilities of these directorates and divisions did not change. The net result of the moves reduced PACAF headquarters staff authorizations by 34 positions. These positions were realigned directly to PACOPS.

As a result of these moves, PACOPS performs a considerable amount of work for PACAF headquarters, particularly in its interface with CINCPAC in the areas of contingency and exercise planning. The Directorate of Contingency Plans, PACOPS, is designated by PACAF headquarters as the office of primary responsibility for developing all contingency and operation plans within PACAF. In this capacity, it interprets CINCPAC guidance and in turn tasks other PACAF functional components for input from their respective areas of expertise. As the single point of contact within PACAF for exercises, the Directorate of Operations Plans, PACOPS, is responsible for planning, coordinating, monitoring, and reporting on all exercises PACAF conducts or participates in. Although PACAF does not consider PACOPS to be part of the management headquarters, PACOPS does perform certain functions a management headquarters staff normally performs.

As shown in appendix IV, PACOPS spends at least 26 percent, or 40 staff-years, of its total staff-years in support of the CINCPAC mission-related activities. Apparently,

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asked DOD for a further progress report on these areas which DOD submitted in May 1976.

The DOD report did not identify any further changes in command relationships in the Pacific except for the planned disestablishment of various headquarters in Thailand. The disestablishment of these headquarters was the result of the Royal Thai Government decision to limit U.S. military personnel in-country to those associated with the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Defense Attache Office, and the U.S. Marine guards at the American Embassy.

Committee recommendations not implemented

A number of specific recommendations in the Committee's 1974 report have never been implemented. These recommendations and DOD's position on them follow.

--The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, be encouraged to exercise operational command primarily through the subunified commanders in Japan and Korea, through the commanders of the 3d and 7th Fleets, and through the Commander, PACAF (for air elements not assigned to subunified commands), rather than primarily through service component commanders.

--PACOM be designated as service component command for the Navy in addition to its other responsibilities and that PACFLT headquarters be disestablished.

DOD has stated that because of the large geographic area and the large number of naval forces involved, a Navy component commander is essential in PACOM. Also, the

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a portion of the remaining 74 percent, or about 116 staff-years, would be spent performing management headquarters functions in support of PACAF and Air Force requirements.

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## CHAPTER 7

### OUR PRIOR REPORTS ON THE PACIFIC

#### COMMAND STRUCTURE

In response to requests from the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, we issued two reports from February 1977 to February 1979 on the Navy and Air Force component commands in the Pacific. The following sections discuss the issues, conclusions, and recommendations in these reports.

#### "PACIFIC FLEET HEADQUARTERS EFFICIENCY CAN BE IMPROVED THROUGH CONSOLIDATION" (FPCD-76-98, FEB. 4, 1977)

We reported that, basically, the Navy's organization in the Pacific had not changed for years. Although consolidations had been made to increase efficiency, many offices in different PACFLT headquarters performed similar types of work. We concluded that increased efficiency and further savings could be achieved through consolidations and/or cutbacks in functions and/or eliminating some headquarters rather than across-the-board reductions.

One alternative organizational structure was to integrate the separate administrative headquarters, known as type commands, with the PACFLT staff. For example, the operations, maintenance, intelligence, and logistics divisions of each command could be absorbed by those divisions that already exist in the PACFLT.

The result would be an increase in the PACFLT headquarters staff but administrative efficiency would be improved by reducing the number of organizational levels which must consider a matter before it is acted on. Overall personnel savings should result--probably in the administrative area--although the higher grades that presently exist because the type commands function as separate organizations may also be reduced. Also, overhead costs may be reduced. Another potential benefit would be colocating the type command function in Hawaii.

We pointed out that the Navy is the only service that has dual chains of command--one for operations and one for administration, with the administration chain having multiple headquarters.



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PACFLT and senior Navy officials in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations did not believe it was feasible to integrate the type commands and Pacific Fleet. In their view it would create too much of a consolidated headquarters which would not be effective because of the large "span of control" in the Pacific and would be chaotic in wartime. Navy officials also felt that it would be unusual if several offices in both PACFLT and the type command headquarters were not concerned with the general aspects of the broad subject areas we used to identify the types of work they do.

We did not agree that further consolidation would create an unmanageable span of control. In contrast, consolidation of offices doing similar types of work should improve control, eliminate dispersion of effort, and increase efficiency. The commonality of functions, regardless of perspective, should at least provide opportunities for economies of scale.

### "OPPORTUNITIES TO STREAMLINE THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE IN THE PACIFIC" (FPCD-79-27, FEB. 8, 1979)

Our message in this report was that \$16 million could be saved annually if PACAF would reduce excessive layering (performing the same functions at different echelons) and duplication of its headquarters staff. This could have been achieved if PACAF reduced its staff to eliminate the 10-year increase in the ratio of management headquarters staff to combat aircraft--about 705 staff.

Our review disclosed that similar types of work in operations, plans, material, and intelligence functions were being performed by staffs at the three different Air Force headquarters in the Pacific. Basically, only the scope or geographical range of their responsibilities differed. With the reduction in combat forces that had occurred over the past several years, these differences tended to disappear and resulted in duplicative analyses of the same data.

We pointed out that the reductions noted above could be achieved under one possible restructuring plan. The plan involved (1) eliminating 5th Air Force headquarters in Japan and 13th Air Force headquarters in the Philippines, (2) reducing staff at PACAF headquarters in Hawaii, and (3) consolidating, cutting back, and/or transferring their functions and responsibilities to other Air Force commands.

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Under another approach to achieve the same savings, PACAF headquarters in Hawaii--with a staff of 1,019--could have been reduced by 705 staff without affecting other Pacific headquarters.

Many of these savings could have been achieved had the Air Force disestablished 5th Air Force headquarters and reduced PACAF headquarters staff as the House Committee on Appropriations recommended in 1974, or disestablished PACAF headquarters as planned.

PACAF officials disagreed with our conclusions and said that any layering or duplication of staff could be dealt with by local staffing surveys. They stated that as a result of changes in the Air Force mission in the Pacific and past decreases in the size and structure of their management headquarters, additional responsibilities had been concentrated at PACAF headquarters. They believed that the existing staffing was needed to provide the

- symbol of our defense commitment in the Pacific;
- political interface required with our Pacific allies under several unrelated treaty commitments;
- command direction, policy guidance, and staffing continuity necessary for PACAF's subordinate operational force located over an immense geographical area of responsibility;
- basic headquarters structure for expanding, should a contingency develop; and
- capability to plan for and conduct both theater-wide and regional operations as assigned by CINCPAC.

In commenting on the final report, the Air Force stated that it felt PACAF's staffing level was "about right" to handle the duties described above. As noted in our report, however, the Air Force had not justified the current PACAF manning level with any kind of workload analysis or work measurement, thus, apparently there was no objective basis for the Air Force contention.

Further, the Air Force contended that our comparison of PACAF's staffing level in 1969 and 1980 was not valid because the staffing level, in relation to combat resources in the

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## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### CONCLUSIONS

Basically, the unified command in the Pacific is an extension of JCS. As such, it performs a number of useful functions that, if not done in Hawaii, would be done elsewhere.

However, we believe that DOD has the opportunities to streamline and restructure the organization to more efficiently carry out the command's normal operations. Previous proposals made both by us and the House Committee on Appropriations appear to be viable still.

For example, our two reports "Pacific Fleet Headquarters Efficiency Can Be Improved Through Consolidation" (FPCD-76-98, Feb. 4, 1977) and "Opportunities to Streamline the Air Force Headquarters Structure in the Pacific" (FPCD-79-27, Feb. 8, 1979) both conclude that increased efficiency and further economies could be achieved through consolidation and/or cutbacks in functions and/or elimination of some activities. Further, the House Committee on Appropriations recommendations, such as the consolidation of CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT, appear to be viable, particularly considering that CINCPAC's role in wartime seems to be somewhat vague.

Further, changing world conditions and ongoing reevaluations of national strategy raise questions as to whether the current Pacific command structure is the most effective one to meet emerging problems (i.e., contingencies, war, etc.).

Since the establishment of the unified command structure, the role of the unified commands has changed considerably. In the Pacific, the unified commands' role has changed from that of primary responsibility for prosecuting a war to one of providing "support and coordination," a vague term DOD has not formally defined. CINCPAC described it as "those actions which aid, complement, or sustain a command in accordance with current directives and agreements and provide for congruity of actions, goals, and objectives." Until the support and coordination role of the Pacific unified command is clearly defined and the functions that PACOM can and should perform during a crisis/wartime situation are identified, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that the command is (1) properly sized and (2) functions are being done at appropriate locations within the chain of command.

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Pacific, was lower in 1980 than in 1964 (before the Vietnam buildup). This is true; however, the staffing level in relation to resources in 1980 is nearly twice what it was in 1969--a wartime year. This is the point highlighted by our report--why is the current peacetime staffing level almost twice that of a Vietnam wartime year? We consider the rationale behind the 1974 conclusions of the House Committee on Appropriations, the Secretary of Defense, and the Air Force regarding the size of PACAF still valid.

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In addition, DOD needs to examine and review other services in the Pacific, both the Army and the Air Force.

Careful consideration should be given to the present Army structure, particularly with regard to current efforts to, in effect, re-establish a U.S. Army, Pacific headquarters. Such action will require establishing a separate EUSA and USFK headquarters to replace the current single integrated

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

- Fully define and incorporate the wartime responsibilities of the unified command in the Pacific into the Unified Command Plan during DOD's current review.
- Perform a functional analysis of the existing unified command structure on a vertical basis to ensure that missions and functions are optimally staffed and located in the chain of command.
- Re-examine our previous recommendations on consolidating and streamlining service headquarters in the Pacific.
- Fully examine the pros and cons of the need for a Pacific-wide component headquarters for the Army in Hawaii.
- Establish safeguards to prevent the possible circumvention of personnel ceilings that can occur by transferring personnel into nonmanagement activities, such as PACOPS.

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## CHAPTER 9

### SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This review focused primarily on the responsibilities of CINCPAC and the unified commands during peacetime and wartime. We requested CINCPAC to define further its broad mission statement into auditable mission-related activities. These were (1) operations, (2) intelligence, (3) command representation, (4) planning, (5) security assistance, and (6) logistics. Once CINCPAC did this, we requested CINCPAC to specify the essential tasks for each mission-related activity performed in peacetime, along with taskings that its organization could be expected to perform in wartime.

We then requested CINCPAC to identify in a matrix format, the number of enlisted, civilian, and officer personnel and the related personnel costs involved in performing the essential tasks under each mission-related activity. We also requested that the two subunified commands in the Pacific, USFJ and USFK, provide the same information in the format stated above. Finally, we submitted the mission-related activities and tasks to the three component services in Hawaii (PACAF headquarters, PACFLT headquarters, and WESTCOM headquarters) to determine the staff-years they expend in support of the CINCPAC mission.

Using the matrix as a departure point to assess the need to perform these tasks and mission-related activities, we selected as "case studies" the

- contingency planning cycle (with emphasis on the plan for the defense of South Korea),
- joint/combined training planning cycle (with emphasis on the Team Spirit Exercise in South Korea),
- security assistance planning cycle,
- the intelligence mission, and
- crisis management.

These were used to ascertain what the relative contribution and involvement by the Pacific unified command organization and the services' headquarters (in Hawaii) are in support of the mission-related activities.

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We visited and talked with military and Embassy personnel at the following locations

- CINCPAC headquarters at Camp Smith, Hawaii;
- PACAF headquarters at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii;
- PACFLT headquarters in Makalapa, Hawaii;
- WESTCOM headquarters at Fort Shafter, Hawaii;
- USFJ headquarters at Yokota Air Base, Japan;
- U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan;
- USFK headquarters in Yongsan, Korea;
- U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Korea;
- CFC headquarters in Yongsan, Korea;
- EUSA headquarters in Yongsan, Korea;
- UNC headquarters in Yongsan, Korea;
- Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea, in Yongsan, Korea;
- JCS in Washington, D.C.;
- Department of State in Washington, D.C.;
- Defense Security Assistance Agency in Washington, D.C.;
- Services headquarters in Washington, D.C.; and
- Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C.

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APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I

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Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Committee on Appropriations  
Washington, D.C. 20515

July 20, 1979

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A 7. 52

The Honorable Elmer B. Staats  
Comptroller General  
of the United States  
General Accounting Office  
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Staats:

The Defense Subcommittee has in past years been concerned about the command relationships in the Pacific with a view toward reducing the number of military personnel engaged in overlapping headquarters activities. The Subcommittee has been informed that with new communications, Washington officials make many types of decisions, which previously would have been made in Hawaii or further out in the Pacific. Yet in an emergency or contingency operational control is transferred to a local commander in the Far East. It would thus appear that the role of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific is questionable and, possibly, a peacetime luxury.

In view of the above, the Subcommittee believes that a study by your office into the role of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific and his unified command layered over the operating structure in the Pacific would be very useful when considering future Department of Defense budget requests. The study should provide 1) detailed information on the missions, specific tasks and functions of the CINCPAC organization, 2) the number and grade of personnel assigned to this organization in Hawaii and throughout the Pacific, 3) the cost of maintaining this organization, 4) an assessment of the need for CINCPAC in training and its other tasks and 5) an estimate of the manpower savings that might be realized under various restructuring plans.

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APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I

The Honorable Elmer B. Staats  
Page Two  
July 20, 1979

The Subcommittee staff has had preliminary discussion on this project with the staff of your Federal Personnel and Compensation Division. We would like to receive a report on this study as soon as possible and no later than January 1980.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,



Joseph P. Addabbo, Chairman  
Subcommittee on Defense

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*Unclassified*PACIFIC UNIFIED COMMAND'S PERSONNELAUTHORIZATIONS BY GRADE DISTRIBUTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Hqs. PACOM</u>	<u>Hqs. USFK</u>	<u>Hqs. USFJ</u>	<u>Total</u>
Officers:				
O-10	1	1	-	2
O-9	1	1	-	2
O-8	5	1	1	7
O-7	3	1	-	4
O-6	64	21	8	93
O-5	191	31	20	242
O-4	59	52	17	128
O-3	16	19	6	41
O-2	1	1	-	2
CWO	2	2	-	4
Total	<u>343</u>	<u>130</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>525</u>
Enlisted:				
E-9	8	5	2	15
E-8	16	13	1	30
E-7	42	23	5	70
E-6	68	49	5	121
E-5	106	62	13	181
E-4	36	21	-	56
E-3	4	-	-	4
Total	<u>280</u>	<u>173</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>477</u>

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(Continued)

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Hqs. PACOM</u>	<u>Hqs. USFK</u>	<u>Hqs. USFJ</u>	<u>Total</u>
Civilians (GS):				
GS-16	1	-	-	1
GS-15	3	3	1	7
GS-14	9	3	2	14
GS-13	9	6	2	17
GS-12	4	9	3	16
GS-11	5	2	6	13
GS-9	9	2	2	13
GS-8	1	1	3	5
GS-7	16	2	-	18
GS-6	12	13	3	28
GS-5	32	15	2	49
GS-4	11	4	10	25
GS-3	-	5	-	5
GS-2	1	-	-	1
Local national employees	-	15	8	23
Total	113	80	42	235
Other	-	22	-	22
Grand total	736	404	120	1,260

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## FISCAL YEAR 1979 (ACTUAL) and FISCAL YEAR 1980 (BUDGETED)

## OPERATIONAL COSTS FOR PACIFIC UNIFIED COMMAND

## HEADQUARTERS

	HQ PACOM			HQ USFK (Note 2)			HQ USFJ			TOTALS		
	FY 79 Actual	FY 80 Budgeted	Difference	FY 79 Actual	FY 80 Budgeted	Difference	FY 79 Actual	FY 80 Budgeted	Difference	FY 79 Actual	FY 80 Budgeted	Difference
Military Pay	\$16,392,600	\$17,540,100	\$1,147,500	\$ 857,000	\$ 917,000	\$ 60,000	\$1,606,000	\$1,718,500	\$112,500	\$18,855,600	\$20,175,600	\$1,320,000
Civilian Pay	3,383,400	3,694,900	311,500	367,000	484,200	117,200	679,200	729,000	49,800	4,429,600	4,908,100	478,500
Major Procurement	733,800	1,059,400	325,600	80,000	573,400	493,400	38,600	71,800	33,200	852,400	1,704,600	852,200
Other (Note 1)	6,223,700	7,372,100	1,148,400	843,700	1,434,600	590,900	873,300	705,400	(170,900)	7,943,700	9,512,100	1,568,400
Total	\$26,733,500	\$29,666,500	\$2,933,000	\$2,147,700	\$3,407,200	\$1,261,500	\$3,200,100	\$3,224,700	\$ 24,600	\$32,081,300	\$36,300,400	\$4,219,100

/Other includes travel of personnel, transportation of things, utilities and rents, communications, purchased equipment maintenance, printing and reproduction, purchased services, supplies, equipment (less than \$1,000 per item), and other miscellaneous expenses.

/Does not include EUSA operational costs.

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APPENDIX IV

## ESTIMATED-STAFF YEARS AND COSTS EXPENDED BY THE MAJOR PACIFIC COMMAND

## ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE CINCPAC MISSION-RELATED ACTIVITIES AND INDIVIDUAL SERVICE REQUIREMENTS

CINCPAC mission-related activities/individual service requirements	Pacific unified commands				Major component commands in Hawaii								Total	
	HQS PACOM Staff- Years	HQS PACOM Costs	HQS USFJ Staff- Years	HQS USFJ Costs	HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2) Staff- Years	HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2) Costs	PACAF (Note 3) Staff- Years	PACAF (Note 3) Costs	HQS PACFLT Staff- Years	HQS PACFLT Costs	HQS, USA WESTCOM Staff- Years	HQS, USA WESTCOM Costs	Staff- Years	Costs
Intelligence	118.6	\$2,412,400	5.8	\$ 152,300	76.7	\$ 1,795,200	2.1	\$ 51,200	4.3	\$ 108,300	1.0	\$ 29,500	216.5	\$ 4,548,900
Operations	217.7	5,756,800	22.4	538,500	20.4	885,700	21.0	905,200	28.3	599,800	25.9	706,000	371.6	9,392,000
Logistics	43.5	1,093,300	9.4	272,600	7.9	406,000	12.7	301,700	1.7	37,000	6.6	192,300	90.8	2,302,900
Security Assistance	47.0	1,346,100	1.0	25,300	.4	11,300	7.1	186,800	1.3	36,800	4.6	136,600	61.8	4/1,742,900
Planning	104.1	2,779,700	19.7	544,000	21.4	1,251,300	6.5	644,500	12.3	304,400	27.8	825,000	238.3	6,348,900
Command Representation	105.8	2,810,500	46.8	1,334,900	10.0	369,600	5.9	142,000	6.6	167,800	9.6	279,700	190.9	5,104,500
Subtotal--Staff-years and costs expended in support of CINCPAC's mission-related activities	636.7	\$16,198,800	105.1	\$2,867,600	136.8	\$ 4,719,100	55.3	\$ 2,231,400	54.5	\$1,254,100	75.5	\$ 2,169,100	1169.9	\$29,440,100
Hqs Administrative Support (Note 5)	99.3	\$1,985,500	14.9	\$ 345,100	91.3	\$ 1,972,300	-	-	-	-	-	-	210.2	\$ 4,302,900
Other Support	-	-	-	-	71.9	\$ 1,510,400	-	-	21.7	\$ 7268,600	-	-	93.6	\$ 1,779,000
Joint Combined Information Systems (Note 8)	-	-	-	-	76.0	1,361,300	-	-	-	-	-	-	76.0	1,361,300
Armistice Affairs Division (Note 9)	-	-	-	-	28.0	524,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	28.0	524,500
Unilateral Service Requirements (Note 10)	-	-	-	-	-	-	929.7	\$21,158,700	369.8	\$7,963,700	289.5	\$ 7,960,200	1704.6	\$37,082,600
Total	736.0	\$18,184,300	120.0	\$3,212,700	404.0	\$10,087,600	985.0	\$23,390,100	446.0	\$9,486,400	365.0	\$10,129,300	3282.3	\$74,490,400

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APPENDIX IV

ESTIMATED STAFF-YEARS EXPENDED BY OFFICERS, ENLISTED AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

IN SUPPORT OF THE CINCPAC MISSION-RELATED ACTIVITIES AND INDIVIDUAL SERVICE REQUIREMENTS

	Pacific unified commands				Major component commands in Hawaii				Pacific unified commands and Major component commands in Hawaii			
	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian	LN	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian	LN	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian	LN
CINCPAC mission-related activities/individual service requirements												
Intelligence	67.8	1/121.4	18.7	1.0	208.9	5.4	1.8	.4	7.6	73.2	123.2	19.1
Operations	150.5	90.1	33.9	2.4	276.9	50.2	30.7	13.8	94.7	200.7	120.8	47.7
Logistics	32.5	18.9	17.3	.7	69.4	9.7	3.6	8.1	21.4	42.2	22.5	25.4
Security Assistance	31.3	9.4	7.8	-	48.5	8.6	.8	3.9	13.3	39.9	10.2	11.7
Planning	96.5	39.9	30.0	5.4	171.8	39.8	8.4	18.3	66.5	136.3	148.3	48.3
Command Representation	82.7	34.2	47.7	4.1	168.7	13.7	3.9	4.6	22.2	96.4	38.1	52.3
Subtotal--Staff-years expended in support of CINCPAC's mission-related activities	461.3	313.9	155.4	13.6	944.2	127.4	49.2	49.1	225.7	588.7	363.1	204.5
Hqg Administrative Support (Note 5)	50.5	95.1	53.0	11.6	210.2	-	-	-	-	50.5	95.1	53.0
Other Support	23.8	30.0	11.7	6.4	71.9	-	21.5	.2	21.7	23.8	51.5	11.9
Joint Combined Information Systems (Note 8)	12.0	48.0	16.0	-	76.0	-	-	-	-	12.0	48.0	16.0
Arms/Intelligence Affairs Division (Note 9)	7.0	8.0	2.0	11.0	28.0	-	-	-	-	7.0	8.0	2.0
Unilateral Service Requirements (Note 10)	-	-	-	-	-	637.6	619.3	447.7	1704.6	637.6	619.3	447.7
Total	554.6	495.0	238.1	42.6	1330.3	765.0	690.0	497.0	1952.0	1319.6	1185.0	735.1
												3282.3

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APPENDIX IV

ESTIMATED STAFF - YEARS EXPENDED BY OFFICERS, ENLISTED, AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF  
THE PACIFIC UNITED COMMANDS IN SUPPORT OF THE CINCPAC MISSION-RELATED ACTIVITIES

	Pacific unified commands																							
	HQS PACOM												HQS USFJ											
	USFK						EUSA						Total											
	Off	Enl	Civ	GS	LN	Total	Off	Enl	Civ	GS	LN	Total	Off	Enl	Civ	GS	LN	Total	Off	Enl	Civ	GS	LN	Total
CINCPAC mission-related activities																								
Intelligence	36.9 <sup>1/</sup>	74.2	7.5	118.6	2.7	2.0	1.1	-	5.8	24.6	44.0	8.1	-	76.7	3.6	1.2	2.0	1.0	7.8	67.8	121.4	18.7	1.0	208.9
Operations	125.2	68.4	24.1	217.7	8.2	10.4	3.1	.7	22.4	11.6	7.2	1.6	-	20.4	5.5	4.1	5.1	1.7	16.4	150.5	90.1	33.9	2.4	276.9
Logistics	20.2	15.0	8.3	43.5	4.7	1.2	3.5	-	9.4	3.5	1.2	3.2	-	7.9	4.1	1.5	2.3	.7	8.6	32.5	18.9	17.3	.7	69.4
Security Assistance	30.9	9.1	7.0	47.0	.2	.2	.6	-	1.0	.1	.1	.2	-	.4	.1	-	-	-	.1	31.3	9.4	7.8	-	48.5
Planning	57.7	29.1	17.3	104.1	10.3	4.3	4.6	.5	19.7	14.5	2.7	4.2	-	21.4	14.0	3.8	3.9	4.9	26.6	96.5	39.9	30.0	5.4	171.8
Command Representation	54.4	27.9	23.5	105.8	21.8	4.0	19.0	2.0	46.8	4.6	1.1	2.3	2.0	10.0	1.9	1.2	2.9	.1	6.1	82.7	34.2	47.7	4.1	168.7
Subtotal--Staff-years expended in support of CINCPAC's mission-related activities	325.3	223.7	87.7	636.7	47.9	22.1	31.9	3.2	105.1	58.9	56.3	19.6	2.0	136.8	29.2	11.8	16.2	8.4	65.6	461.3	313.9	155.4	13.6	944.2
Hqs Administrative Support (Note 5)	17.7	56.3	25.3	99.3	4.1	3.9	2.1	4.8	14.9	28.3	32.7	24.7	5.6	91.3	.4	2.2	.9	1.2	4.7	50.5	95.1	53.0	11.6	210.2
Other Support	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23.8	30.0	11.7	6.4 <sup>6/</sup>	71.9	-	-	-	-	-	23.8	30.0	11.7	6.4	71.9
Joint Combined Information Systems (Note 8)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.0	48.0	16.0	-	76.0	-	-	-	-	-	12.0	48.0	16.0	-	76.0
Armistice Affairs Division (Note 9)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.0	8.0	2.0	11.0	28.0	-	-	-	-	-	7.0	8.0	2.0	11.0	28.0
Total	343.0	280.0	113.0	736.0	52.0	26.0	34.0	8.0	120.0	130.0	175.0	74.0	25.0	404.0	29.6	14.0	17.1	9.6	70.3	554.6	495.0	238.1	42.6	1330.3

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ESTIMATED STAFF-YEARS EXPENDED BY OFFICERS, ENLISTED, AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF THE MAJOR COMPONENT COMMANDS  
IN HAWAII IN SUPPORT OF THE CINCPAC MISSION-RELATED ACTIVITIES AND INDIVIDUAL SERVICE REQUIREMENTS

Major component commands in Hawaii

CINCPAC mission-related activities/individual service requirements	PACAF (Note 3)						HQS PACFLT				HQS USA WESTCOM				Total					
	HQS PACAF			PACOPS			HQS PACFLT			HQS USA WESTCOM			Total							
	Off	Enl	Civ (GS)	Total	Off	Enl	Civ (GS)	Total	Off	Enl	Civ (GS)	Total	Off	Enl	Civ (GS)	Total				
Intelligence	1.5	.6	-	2.1	.2	-	-	.2	3.2	1.1	-	4.3	.5	.1	.4	1.0	5.4	1.8	.4	7.6
Operations	13.0	5.1	2.9	21.0	12.0	5.6	1.9	19.5	13.8	13.2	1.3	28.3	11.4	6.8	7.7	25.9	50.2	30.7	13.8	94.7
Logistics	7.5	2.7	2.5	12.7	.2	.1	.1	.4	.7	.6	.4	1.7	1.3	.2	15.1	6.6	9.7	3.6	8.1	21.4
Security Assistance	5.4	.5	1.2	7.1	.3	-	-	.3	1.2	.1	-	1.3	1.7	.2	2.7	4.6	8.6	.8	3.9	4/13.3
Planning	4.7	1.2	.6	6.5	14.1	2.0	3.8	19.9	8.5	3.2	.6	12.3	12.5	2.0	13.3	27.8	39.8	8.4	18.3	66.5
Command Representation	4.1	1.1	.7	5.9	-	-	.1	.1	5.0	1.6	-	6.6	4.6	1.2	13.8	9.6	13.7	3.9	4.6	22.2
Subtotal--Staff-years expended in support of CINCPAC's mission-related activities	36.2	11.2	7.9	55.3	26.8	7.7	5.9	40.4	32.4	19.8	2.3	54.5	32.0	10.5	33.0	75.5	127.4	49.2	49.1	225.7
Other Support	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.5	.2	7/21.7	-	-	-	-	-	21.5	.2	21.7
Unilateral Service Requirements (Note 10)	329.8	374.8	225.1	929.7	66.2	43.3	6.1	115.6	164.6	147.7	57.5	369.8	77.0	53.5	159.0	289.5	637.6	619.3	447.7	1704.6
Total	366.0	386.0	233.0	985.0	93.0	51.0	12.0	156.0	197.0	189.0	60.0	446.0	109.0	64.0	192.0	365.0	765.0	690.0	497.0	1952.0

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## ESTIMATED STAFF-YEARS AND COSTS EXPENDED BY THE MAJOR PACIFIC COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS

## CINCPAC INTELLIGENCE MISSION

## IN SUPPORT OF THE CINCPAC INTELLIGENCE MISSION

CINCPAC must assure the availability of intelligence necessary to support the PACOM planning, exercise, and operational missions; insure necessary counterintelligence measures are taken to protect the command; exercise command and control over the intelligence activities of subordinate commands and task forces, using the operational chain of command; and satisfy the intelligence needs of higher authority. In accordance with the authorities listed below, CINCPAC fulfills the intelligence mission through tasking, issuance of directives, establishment of requirements and priorities, and the management of resources through service component, subunified, and joint task force commands. CINCPAC further establishes standing procedures, plans, policies, and overall requirements for intelligence activities through the management cycle of planning, programming, collection, processing, and dissemination; and conducts relationships with foreign intelligence communities in the furtherance of the command and national goals.

## CITED AUTHORITY: Unified Command Plan

Defense Intelligence Plan

JCS PUB 2

SM-252-9, Annex A to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 1980, 24 April 1979  
JCSM-134-78, Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning

TASKS	Pacific unified commands						Major component commands in Hawaii						Total			
	HQS PACOM (Note 1)		HQS USFJ		HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2)		PACAF (Note 3)		HQS PACFLT		HQS USA WESTCOM		Total			
	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- years	Costs	Staff- years	Costs	Staff- years	Costs	Staff- years	Costs		
1. Plan the conduct of intelligence collection, processing, production, and dissemination in the PACOM	12.5	\$ 420,700	.1	\$ 3,400	13.0	6.0	\$ 516,800	.3	.2	\$14,000	2.7	\$ 64,400	.4	\$13,100	35.2	\$1,
2. Prepare CINCPAC input to program and budget managers	2.9	93,400	.1	3,400	.5	-	17,000	-	-	-	.1	3,000	-	-	3.6	116,800
3. Validate collection and counter-intelligence requirements, ensure the adequacy of resources to satisfy requirements, and coordinate the employment of assets supporting the command	7.7	252,500	.8	22,200	9.0	-	229,200	-	-	-	.6	17,800	-	-	18.1	521,700
4. Manage the production of substantive intelligence by validating requirements, and exercise staff cognizance over the operations of the Intelligence Center, Pacific, the Pacific Photographic Processing and Interpretation Center, the Defense Dissemination System and the DOD Delegated Production Program	5.7	186,700	-	-	29.0	-	506,900	.3	-	6,600	.6	17,800	-	-	35.6	718,000
5. Operate the PACOM Intelligence Board and Subordinate Management Action Groups	1.7	56,800	.1	3,400	-	-	-	.7	-	18,400	-	-	-	-	2.5	78,600

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TASKS	Pacific unified commands						Major component commands in Hawaii						Total	
	HQS PACOM (Note 1)		HQS USFJ		HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2)		PACAF (Note 3)		HQS PACFLT		HQS USA WESTCOM		Staff- Years	Costs
	Staff- years	Costs	Staff- years	Costs	Staff Years- USFK EUSA	Costs	Staff- years	Costs	Staff- years	Costs	Staff- years	Costs		
6. To facilitate the dissemination of intelligence products to the widest number of foreign and domestic consumers within security constraints and operate a special intelligence communications facility for the receipt and dissemination of compartmented information	57.5	\$ 855,500	.9	\$ 28,200	.1	\$ 3,400	.8	\$ 12,200	.1	\$ 2,900	.1	\$ 2,900	59.5	\$ 905,100
7. Establish and maintain close working relationships with select foreign intelligence communities for the furtherance of mutual interests	1.6	54,300	1.6	53,800	5.0	.1	134,500	-	-	-	.1	2,900	8.4	
8. Administrative support in support of the intelligence mission.	29.0	492,500	2.2	37,900	20.1	1.7	387,400	-	-	-	.2	2,400	53.6	
Total	118.6	\$2,412,400	5.8	\$152,300	76.7	7.8	\$1,795,200	2.1	.2	\$51,200	.2	\$108,300	216.5	\$4,568,900

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APPENDIX

## ESTIMATED STAFF-YEARS AND COSTS EXPENDED BY THE MAJOR PACIFIC COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS

## IN SUPPORT OF THE CINCPAC OPERATIONS MISSION

## CINCPAC OPERATIONS MISSION

To command all JCS assigned forces in PACOM and control and coordinate their activities to maintain the security of the PACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East, Southeast and South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

This is accomplished through operational command of Nuclear, Conventional and Special Operations Forces for combat and other operations as directed; reporting of significant situations and strategic or tactical events or operations to higher authority; exercises which train and maintain the readiness of joint/combined forces; supporting or coordinating with other U.S. commands and agencies in following U.S. policies; Nuclear Operations/Safety Management; Crisis Management; developing, acquiring, and maintaining a Command, Control and Communications system to accomplish assigned missions.

## CITED AUTHORITY: Unified Command Plan

JCS PUB 2  
JCS PUB 6  
DOD Directives  
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan - Annex C

## TASKS

1. Operational Command of Conventional, Nuclear or Special Operations Forces: Formulate directives and guidance; deploy, direct, control and coordinate the actions of forces; monitor their readiness; maintain policy and procedures of Emergency Action and Defense Readiness Conditions actions; monitor/revise Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and recommend changes; manage reconnaissance programs; establish and direct Joint Task Forces; resolve operational conflicts; standardize tactics, procedures and orders; direct/coordinate geophysical support. (Example programs: Operations Security, Electronic Warfare, Special Operations, Psychological Operations, and Joint Reconnaissance Center.)
2. Report significant situation and strategic/tactical events to higher authority; Develop and implement reporting requirements; consolidate and forward reports; maintain and assure accuracy of data base files; evaluate performance/compliance/accuracy. (Example: Situation Report, Operational Report, Nuclear Weapons Reporting, Residual Capabilities Assessment, etc.)

Pacific unified commands										Major component commands in Hawaii									
HQS PACOM (Note 1)		HO USFK		HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2)		PACAF (Note 3)		HQS PACFLT		HQS USA WESTCOM		Total							
Staff - years	Costs	Staff - years	Costs	Staff-years USFK EUSA	Costs	Staff years HQS PACAF PACOPS	Costs	Staff - years	Costs	Staff - years	Costs	Staff - years	Costs						
36.5	\$1,071,400	.6	\$ 20,500	2.2	1.1	8.0	3.4	11.4	\$262,900	6.2	\$175,900	69.4	\$1,869,900						
14.8	409,900	.3	8,400	3.1	.5	.7	2.3	4.5	77,800	1.7	45,000	28.1	699,300						

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Pacific unified commands										Major component commands in Hawaii																					
HQS PACOM (Note 1)					HQS USFJ					HQS USEF/EUSA (Note 2)					PACAF (Note 3)					HQS PACFLT					HQS USA WESTCOM					Total	
Staff-	Costs	Staff-	Costs	Staff-years	USFJ	EUSA	Costs	Staff-years	USFJ	EUSA	Costs	Staff-	Costs	Staff-	Costs	Staff-	Costs	Staff-	Costs	Staff-	Costs	Staff-	Costs	Staff-	Costs	Staff-	Costs				
years		years																													

3. Schedule, plan, coordinate and conduct selected joint/combined exercises to train and maintain readiness; schedule exercises; prepare exercise and control plans; conduct and control exercises; evaluate and monitor critique actions.

4. Support or coordination with other U.S. agencies and commands' environment protection programs; medical regulating activities; disaster or emergency relief; civil defense; search and rescue; air-ocean research and study programs; weather or tsunami warning/reconnaissance.

5. Nuclear Operations and Safety Management: Strategic Integrated Operation Plan and Theater Nuclear Force complement; manage Nuclear Operations Center; manage Permissive Action Link Program; liaison on target selection criteria and data; re-target surviving forces; responsibility for nuclear safety/security.

6. Crisis Management: Develop, train, man, operate and exercise crisis management center/teams; establish/coordinate system and reporting requirements; establish/maintain data bases; coordinate with JCS and readiness and transportation agencies.

7. Plan, acquire and maintain a survivable and enduring command, control, and communications system to accomplish the above items: Analyze present systems; coordinate/validate requirements; design architecture and implement; coordinate attack warning and alerting systems operations and architecture; operate, manage, test, and evaluate all phases of command, control and communications, Worldwide Military Command Control System in PACOM. (Examples: Military essential emergency communications network, airborne command post, primary and alternate command center operations, communications systems and automatic data processing systems.)

8. Administrative support in support of the operations mission.

9. Other

Total

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ESTIMATED STAFF-YEARS AND COSTS EXPENDED BY THE MAJOR PACIFIC COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS  
IN SUPPORT OF THE CINCPAC OPERATIONS MISSION

CINCPAC LOGISTICS MISSION

CINCPAC is responsible for maintaining cognizance of the logistics readiness of assigned forces; assuring their supportability and sustainability; planning for the logistics support of operations plans; and assuring that support operations are performed effectively and economically.

To carry out these responsibilities, the logistics staff prepares and analyzes logistics evaluations and recommends actions that will improve the PACOM logistics posture; reviews and assesses the PACOM Component Services' supply, maintenance and acquisition status; prepares logistics plans annexes in support of CINCPAC OPLAN; develops and promulgates transportation policy for the theater; exercises operational control over theater airlift plans for the acquisition, transfer and disposal of real estate; reviews PACOM construction requirements; and issues policy and guidance to prevent or eliminate unnecessary duplication of service functions.

CITED AUTHORITY: Unified Command Plan

JCS PUB 2  
 JCS PUB 3  
 DOD Instructions (4000 series)  
 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan  
 Inventory Management Plan

TASKS	Pacific unified commands				Major component commands in Hawaii				Total			
	HQS PACOM (Note 1) Staff- years	Costs	HQS USFK Staff- years	Costs	HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2) Staff-years EUSA	Costs	PACAF Staff years	Costs	HQS PACFLT Staff- years	Costs	HQS USA WESTCOM Staff- years	Costs

1. Reviews and analyzes the supply, maintenance, facility and acquisition support posture of PACOM service components, subordinate unified commands, military assistance advisory groups and other joint activities	3.2	\$ 104,800	1.0	\$ 32,300	.4	1.7	\$ 62,100	.5	-	\$ 9,500	.6	\$12,800	2.0	\$ 58,200	9.4	\$ 279,700
2. Issues administrative and policy guidance on interservice support matters to achieve economies and effectiveness through the prevention or elimination of unnecessary support duplications.	3.6	121,300	1.0	28,900	.3	1.1	43,300	.1	-	2,600	-	-	.5	14,300	6.6	210,400
3. Plans and manages peacetime support of U.S. forces and, as required, for allied forces; during wartime, authority expands to include direction over the allocation and utilization of petroleum storage facilities to meet total service storage requirements.	2.8	73,700	2.0	61,400	1.2	.4	62,100	1.0	-	18,800	-	-	.1	3,300	7.5	219,300
4. Assesses the logistics readiness of U.S. forces in PACOM to include unit readiness, stockage objectives, inventories, assets in transit, distribution, facility requirements, consumption, and reserves; recommends appropriate action to improve Army, Air Force, and Navy support, as appropriate.	4.8	136,100	.5	17,100	.2	.4	46,300	2.7	.4	57,100	.9	20,000	2.3	67,300	13.2	343,900

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APPENDIX IV

TASKS	Pacific unified commands				Major component commands in Hawaii				Total	
	HQS PACOM (Note 1) Staff- Years	Costs	HQS USFJ Staff- Years	Costs	HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2) Staff- Years	Costs	PACAF Staff- Years	PACOPS Staff- Years	Costs	Years

5. Maintains cognizance over PACOM munitions inventories and objectives and coordinates intra PACOM redistribution between subordinate organizations; directs redistribution of munitions to meet critical operational requirements.	1.2	\$ 34,400	-	-	.1	.3	\$ 11,500	.7	-	\$ 13,900	-	.2	\$ 4,900	2.5	\$ 64,700
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6. Develops and promulgates transportation policy for the PACOM theater including airlift, seallift, land transportation and personal property shipments; exercises operational control over theater airlift and, during wartime, control movements in theater.	3.7	121,400	.7	18,700	.2	.2	13,400	6.1	-	159,000	.2	4,200	.2	6,600	11.3	323,300
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7. Plans and issues policy guidance on matters related to real estate acquisition, transfer and disposal and on the construction and utilization of facilities including environmental protection and enhancement concerns.	1.4	45,000	.6	23,900	.2	.4	15,700	.1	-	2,500	-	-	.4	11,500	-	-
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8. Administrative support in support of the logistics mission.	22.8	- 456,600	3.6	90,300	5.3	3.1	151,600	1.5	-	38,300	-	-	.9	26,200	37.2	763,000
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Total	43.5	\$1,093,300	9.4	\$272,600	7.9	8.6	\$406,000	12.7	.4	\$301,700	1.7	\$37,000	6.6	\$192,300	90.8	\$2,302,900
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ESTIMATED STAFF-YEARS AND COSTS EXPENDED BY THE MAJOR PACIFIC COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE CINCPAC SECURITY ASSISTANCE MISSION

CINCPAC SECURITY ASSISTANCE MISSION

CINCPAC provides JCS a military assessment and impact of security assistance programs within PACOM. CINCPAC commands the DOD security assistance organizations; develops and submits recommendations regarding organization, staffing, and support of HAAGs; assists in the conduct of regional security assistance programs; ensures coordination of regional security assistance matters; and provides evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD security assistance organizations. In sum, CINCPAC acts for SECDEF and JCS as the regional program manager for security assistance matters and provides support for assigned DOD security assistance personnel.

AUTHORITY: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended  
DOD Directive 5132.3

TASKS:	Major component commands in Hawaii														
	Pacific unified commands				PACAF (Note 3)				Total						
	HQS PACOM (Note 1) Staff- years	Costs	HQS USFJ Staff- years	Costs	HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2) Staff-years USFK EUSA	Costs	HQS PACFLT Staff- years	Costs	HQS USA WESTCOM Staff- years	Costs	Staff- years	Costs			
1. Develop and submit recommendations regarding: a. Organization and staffing of Security Assistance Organizations. b. Budgetary considerations for Security Assistance Organizations. c. Terms of Reference for Security Assistance Organizations.	9.0	\$ 276,900	-	\$ -	.1	\$ 3,300	.2	-	\$ 5,300	.4	\$10,100	.4	\$ 12,700	10.1	\$ 301,000
2. Assist security assistance organizations in conduct of regional security assistance programs to include: a. Training Guidance relative to International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Sales, Mobile Training Teams, etc. b. Planning and development of country programs. c. Materiel actions relating to Military Assistance Programs and Foreign Military Sales. d. Providing in-country Security Assistance Training.	12.2	406,400	.2	5,100	.2	-	4.5	-	114,100	.2	5,900	1.4	42,700	18.7	579,100

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TASKS:	Pacific unified commands						Major component commands in Hawaii								
	HQS PACOM (Note 1)		HQS USFJ		HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2)		PACAF (Note 3)		HQS PACFLT		HQS USA WESTCOM		Total		
	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	
3. Review and submit recommendations on proposed Security Assistance Plans and Programs to include:															
a. Release of new technology/ weapons systems.	9.6	316,900	.7	18,600	-	-	1.1	.3	36,900	.4	11,900	1.3	39,000	13.4	423,300
b. Prioritization of PACOM-region nation requirements.															
c. Impact on regional stability/ country force structure.															
d. Compatibility with U.S. Arms Transfer Policy.															
4. Evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of PACOM security assistance program management.	2.3	77,200	-	-	-	-	.9	-	23,100	.2	5,900	.7	21,300	4.1	127,500
5. Administrative support in support of the security assistance mission	13.9	268,700	.1	1,600	.2	-	.4	-	7,400	.1	3,000	.6	14,700	15.3	298,500
6. Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.2	6,200	.2	6,200
Total	47.0	\$1,346,100	1.0	\$25,300	.4	\$11,300	7.1	.3	\$186,800	1.3	\$36,800	4.6	\$136,600	61.8	\$1,742,900

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ESTIMATED STAFF-YEARS AND COSTS EXPENDED BY THE MAJOR PACIFIC COMMAND

ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE CINCPAC PLANNING MISSION

CINCPAC PLANNING MISSION

Military Planning is the systematic process of translating broad national objectives into specific plans. It includes actions at all levels of military command to analyze the threat, formulate strategy and determine force and resource requirements. Planning at the unified command level provides for deployment, employment and support of multi-service and multi-national forces in all types of contingencies.

Some examples of planning done at CINCPAC include force planning, contingency planning, systems planning, theater nuclear and chemical planning, civil affairs planning (mobilization only), communications and automated data processing planning and development of command arrangements.

AUTHORITY: DOD Directive 5100.1

JCS PUB 2

Unified Command Plan

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

TASKS	Pacific unified commands				Major component commands in Hawaii								Total	
	HQS PACOM (Note 1)		HQS USFC		HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2)		PACAF (Note 3)		HQS PACFLT		HQS USA WESTCOM		Total	
	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs
1. Develop and prepare to implement contingency plans that provide for the employment of U.S. and allied forces, both conventional and nuclear, to defeat or otherwise deter forces inimical to U.S. interest. Plans include provisions for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil and public affairs, prisoners of war, environmental services, organization, operational security, and communications, and automated data processing functions.	30.8	\$ 999,900	6.7	\$207,500	8.3	7.6 \$ 497,000	1.1	16.0 \$417,700	6.4	\$159,100	11.6	\$364,700	88.5	\$2,645,900
2. Assist components in developing supporting contingency plans that bridge CINCPAC direction to the operating units. Function includes review and coordination of component plans to insure feasibility, suitability, adequacy and overall compatibility with national security policy and strategy in PACOM.	7.5	232,300	2.4	69,600	1.0	2.7 114,800	1.8	2.7 110,700	1.5	39,200	1.3	40,700	20.9	607,300
3. Assist State Department in development of evacuation plans for noncombatant employees and selected third-country nationals from countries in the PACOM where we have diplomatic missions.	.7	22,900	.3	10,300	.3	1.0 39,500	1.3	- 29,900	.5	11,400	.1	2,900	4.2	116,900

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	Pacific unified commands						Major component commands in Hawaii						Total			
	HQS PACOM (Note 1)		HQS USFJ		HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2)		PACAF (Note 3)		HQS PACFLT		HQS USAWESTCOM		Staff - Years	Costs		
	Staff - Years	Costs	Staff - Years	Costs	Staff-years USFK	EUSA	Costs	Staff-years PACAF	Staff - Years	Costs	Staff - Years	Costs				
SKS																
Develop, analyze, and recommend military strategy for PACOM and contribute to the formulation of national military strategy through the JCS.	6.1	194,000	.8	23,000	1.6	.3	64,200	.7	-	19,800	1.2	33,800	1.4	44,400	12.1	379,200
Develop, analyze, and recommend U.S.-allied/friendly force structures to provide security and support national military strategy in the PACOM	7.0	224,900	.8	27,300	1.0	.7	48,200	1.0	.8	45,800	.8	22,000	1.3	41,900	13.4	410,100
Develop command structures (command arrangements/agreements) that provide for operations among U.S. and allied military organizations that operate within or adjacent to the PACOM.	2.1	70,400	.3	10,300	1.7	.9	74,900	-	-	-	.4	10,100	.4	12,700	5.8	178,400
Technical support systems planning; example: Electronics, Communications and automated data processing planning.	13.1	350,100	2.7	81,700	1.9	4.2	183,500	-	-	-	.9	18,000	6.3	169,500	29.1	802,800
Administrative support in support of the planning mission.	36.8	685,200	5.7	114,300	5.6	9.2	229,200	.6	.4	20,600	.6	10,800	3.1	88,900	62.0	1,149,000
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	104.1	\$2,779,700	19.7	\$564,000	21.4	26.6	\$1,251,300	6.5	19.9	\$644,500	12.3	\$304,400	27.8	\$825,000	238.3	\$6,348,900

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## ESTIMATED STAFF YEARS AND COSTS EXPENDED BY THE MAJOR PACIFIC COMMAND

## ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE CINCPAC COMMAND REPRESENTATION MISSION

## CINCPAC COMMAND REPRESENTATION MISSION

The act of providing military expertise concerning the PACOM general area of responsibility at national and international boards, councils, military staffs, missions and meetings, to include preparation for the conduct of, and participation in international consultations and negotiations, and the preparation of discussion agenda. As the senior U.S. military representative in the Pacific, CINCPAC assists in the formulation of U.S. national security policy regarding the PACOM area. PACOM activities also encompass relationships and discussions with foreign and U.S. officials, both military and civilian, to include advising and assisting Chiefs of U.S. Diplomatic Missions in political/military affairs and negotiations. Representation is significantly influenced by the interaction of political, military, economic, technical (interoperability), sociological and psychological factors which impact on international peace and security in the Pacific Command.

AUTHORITY: Unified Command Plan

JCS PUB 2

TASKS	Pacific unified commands										Major component commands in Hawaii												
	HQS PACOM (Note 1)			HQS USFJ			HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2)				PACAF (Note 3)			HQS PACFLT			HQS USA WESTCOM		Total				
	Staff - Years	Costs		Staff - Years	Costs		Staff - Years	USFK	EUSA	Costs	Staff - Years	HQS PACAF	PACOPS	Costs	Staff - Years	Costs	Staff - Years	Costs	Staff - Years	Costs			
1. *Participate in international security forums. Examples: Mutual Defense Board Security Consultative Committee etc.	5.2	\$ 167,200		1.9	\$ 60,600		1.6		.2	\$ 51,500		.3	-	\$ 6,600		.2	\$ 4,200		.3	\$ 9,400		9.7	\$ 299,500
2. *Conduct visits by PACOM officials to area countries and discussions with national and foreign officials visiting PACOM.	10.9	339,800		1.2	40,100		.3		.3	14,900		.3	-	7,900		.4	10,100		3.5	105,500		16.9	518,300
3. Participate in negotiations with PACOM countries and implement agreements. Examples: Base right negotiations Status of Forces Issues, etc.	2.0	67,000		7.5	221,800		5.5		.7	140,100		.6	-	17,100		.4	10,100		-	-		16.7	456,100
4. Contribute to formulation of national security policy. Examples: Consolidated guidance Special studies (including DOD organizational studies Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Law of the Sea, etc.	6.0	198,600		.9	28,200		.1		.1	5,200		1.0	.1	28,900		1.4	38,000		.4	11,900		10.0	310,800

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## APPENDIX IV

10/28/19  
PAMS

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TASKS	Pacific unified commands						Major component commands in Hawaii					
	HQS PACOM (Note 1)		HQS USFJ		HQS USFK/EUSA (Note 2)		PACAF (Note 3)		HQS PACFLT		HQS USA WESTCOM	
	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs	Staff- Years	Costs
11. Administrative support in support of the representation mission	37.9	752,900	12.3	307,800	1.7	1.3	58,300	1.0	-	20,600	.8	11,500
12. Other	-	-	4.0	119,400	-	-	-	-	-	-	.7	17,600
Total	105.8	\$2,810,500	46.8	\$1,336,900	10.0	6.1	\$369,600	5.9	.1	\$142,000	6.6	\$167,800
											9.6	\$279,700
											4.7	136,100
											190.9	\$5,104,500

\*Includes preparation by the staff of material such as the following:

- (1) Background and point papers
- (2) Trip books
- (3) Agenda
- (4) Speech or Talking Papers
- (5) Trip reports

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8/This organization develops, manages, and operates the command and control automatic data processing system in support of the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, as part of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System.

7/Staff-years and/or costs expended by PACFLT headquarters to provide motor vehicle transportation in support of CINCPAC requirements.

6/Staff-years and/or costs expended by the joint staff to support requirements of EUSA, UNC, and CFC in Korea.

5/Represents all staff and direct support functions involving the executive direction of the management headquarters organization. Includes functions such as those performed by the head of the organization, deputy head, chief of staff, executive and special assistants, advisors, aids, stewards, secretaries, protocol personnel, and other personnel performing similar functions. The staff-years and/or costs expended by the major component commands in Hawaii are included in their unilateral service requirements (see GAO note 10).

4/The total does not include the staff-years and/or costs expended by the staff in the 406 positions authorized in the organizations performing security assistance tasks in the Pacific area.

3/The staff-years and/or costs expended by PACAF headquarters include expenditures by the Pacific Air Combat Operations staff. This organization is a Headquarters, U.S. Air Force controlled unit and assigned to PACAF headquarters. It performs a considerable amount of work in support of PACAF (See p. 60).

2/As discussed on page 107 USFK/EUSA headquarters is a joint headquarters. The staffs are fully integrated and each supports the CINCPAC mission-related activity as shown.

1/The total does not include the staff-years and/or costs expended by the staff in the 318 positions authorized for the Intelligence Center, Pacific. The Intelligence Center, Pacific, is a joint subordinate operational command under CINCPAC which consolidates the analysis and production of intelligence data (see p. 32).

## GAO NOTES

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9/This organization assists in administering and implementing the Armistice Agreement in Korea.

10/These requirements represent the staff-years and/or costs expended by the component commands in managing their forces.

11/Civilians are separately identified as General Series employees (GS) and Local National (LN).

APPENDIX IV

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CINCPAC exercises operational command through the Army, Navy, and Air Force component commanders in Hawaii. CINCPAC exercises operational command of Navy forces through the Commander-in-Chief, PACFLT. CINCPAC exercises operational command of Air Forces through the Commander-in-Chief, PACAF. CINCPAC exercises operational command of Army forces in the Pacific, less those stationed in Japan and Korea, through the Commander, WESTCOM. CINCPAC exercises operational command of U.S. Army, Japan, and USA through the subordinate unified commanders--the Commander, USFJ, and the Commander, USFK, respectively.

#### PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS

CINCPAC exercises operational command through the PACOM service component commanders, subordinate unified commanders, and through the commanders of joint task forces, when established. CINCPAC exercises military command over military agencies, offices, organizations, and commands which administer security assistance programs within PACOM. CINCPAC coordinates activities within the PACOM area through established coordinating authorities which are designated U.S. Defense Representatives or CINCPAC Representatives.

Operational command is synonymous with the term "operational control" except operational command is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commander of a unified or specified command.

CINCPAC exercises "operational command" of assigned forces. Operational command includes those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training. These responsibilities rest with each military service.

CINCPAC is the commander of all U.S. military forces assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to PACOM. CINCPAC is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense through the JCS, for accomplishing assigned operational missions.

#### COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PACIFIC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*Unclassified*The Army in the Pacific

Three major Army commands exist in the Pacific. These commands are

--WESTCOM at Fort Shafter, Hawaii;

--U.S. Army, Japan, at Camp Zama, Japan; and

--EUSA at Yongsan in Seoul, Korea.

The Commander, WESTCOM, serves as the Army component commander in the Pacific, except for those U.S. Army forces stationed in Japan and Korea. The Commander, U.S. Army, Japan, is the Army component commander for the Commander, USFJ. The Commanding General, EUSA, is the ground component commander for the Commander, USFK.

Approximately 53,000 Army troops are under the military command of these headquarters. The majority of these troops are assigned to the 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions in Korea, and Hawaii, respectively. (CONFIDENTIAL)

U.S. Army Western Command

WESTCOM is the Army component command in Hawaii. It is also a major Army command for all areas in the Pacific except Japan and Korea.

WESTCOM is authorized 338 positions. More than 55 percent of these authorizations are civilian positions. In addition, the command has been authorized 19 extra positions and has been assigned eight special duty personnel for fiscal year 1980.

In the operational chain of command, the Commander, WESTCOM, is a component commander under the operational command of CINCPAC. As a component commander, the Commander, WESTCOM, is responsible for accomplishing assigned operational missions outside Japan and Korea; such as

--preparing Army or PACOM plans (less Korea and Japan);

--coordinating U.S. Army matters of CINCPAC concern that involve more than one major command;

--arranging and coordinating U.S. Army security assistance support to meet CINCPAC requirements (less Korea and Japan);

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--participating with CINCPAC in strategy development for PACOM;

--participating with CINCPAC in planning, developing, and conducting political-military affairs; and

--managing and coordinating U.S. Army participation in joint/combined exercises except for Army forces stationed in Korea and Japan.

As the commander of a major Army command, the Commander, WESTCOM, reports to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. The Commander, WESTCOM, exercises command over assigned Army units and is responsible for their administration, personnel, training, logistics, and other matters.

Over 17,700 Army troops in Hawaii are under WESTCOM command. (CONFIDENTIAL) The IX Corps Reserve augmentation is

also assigned in Hawaii. This unit, which consists of approximately 240 officer and enlisted personnel, will augment the IX Corps in Japan to form a deployable corps headquarters in an emergency.

The WESTCOM staff reported they spent about \$2.1 million for 76 staff-years in support of CINCPAC's mission-related activities. (See app. IV.) They also estimated they spent about \$8 million for 290 staff-years performing unservice activities in such areas as personnel/community affairs, logistics/base support, operations/training, intelligence, communications/automatic data processing, resource management, and representation.

#### U.S. Army, Japan

U.S. Army, Japan, is the Army component to and under the operational control of the Commander, USFJ--CINCPAC's subordinate unified commander in Japan. As a component the Commander, USFJ, on matters

--pertaining to joint affairs,

--affecting Japanese authorities, and

--pertaining to the implementation of the status of forces agreement in Japan.

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--assists CINCPAC through USFK to develop operation plans by identifying forces, materiel, and planning factors based on guidance from the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and prepares the primary Army supporting plans for military operations within EUSA's geographic areas of responsibility.

As a major Army commander, the Commanding General, EUSA, is under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. In this capacity the Commanding General, EUSA, commands all U.S. Army units in Korea and is responsible for their organizations, administration, personnel, training, and logistics.

EUSA is the Army component to and is under the operational control of the Commander, USFK--CINCPAC's subordinate unified commander in Korea. The Commander, USFK, serves collaterally as the Commanding General, EUSA.

As the Army component commander, the Commander, EUSA, is responsible for the Army operating elements of the Defense Communication System in Korea. The Commander, EUSA, advises and makes recommendations on the proper employment of Army forces in accomplishing assigned operational missions. The Commander, EUSA, also

#### EUSA

As a major Army commander, the Commander, U.S. Army, Japan, is responsible to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army on all service matters. U.S. Army, Japan, employs 370 personnel--65 officers, 77 enlisted personnel, 152 U.S. civilians, and 76 Japanese nationals. As of September 30, 1979, about 2,500 Army troops were stationed in Japan of which 53 percent were located in the Okinawa prefecture.

U.S. Army IX Corps in Japan is a JCS-assigned unit under the operational control of the Commander, USFK. Its mission is contingency planning. The 64 staff positions of the U.S. Army IX Corps serve collaterally as the staff of U.S. Army, Japan.

U.S. Army IX Corps in Japan provides the nucleus for a deployable corps headquarters. When its reserve staff from Hawaii augments it, IX Corps becomes a fully staffed tactical headquarters which, if deployed, will require the normal combat support and service units normally found with a corps in the field such as artillery, aviation, engineer, and signal.

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Operational control of PACFLT assets is exercised by CINCPACFLT through the commanders of the 3d and 7th Fleets. The Commander of the 3d Fleet is based ashore at Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, and the Commander of the 7th Fleet is based afloat, aboard ship homported in Yokosuka, Japan. The ocean area is divided between the two commanders, with the 7th Fleet the forward deployed force in the western Pacific. In essence, the 3d and 7th Fleet commanders employ combined assets drawn from the inventories of each of the type commands and use them to fulfill mission requirements.

#### The PACFLT operational chain of command

CINCPACFLT exercises command of ships and units through numbered fleet commanders. CINCPACFLT controls administration, which is primarily concerned with management of resources (people, money, and material) through seven management headquarters called type commands. In addition, CINCPACFLT relies on coordinators in forward areas for an effective integrated and coordinated shore establishment.

The Navy's management organizations in the Pacific are authorized 1,060 positions. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), is the naval component commander in Hawaii. The staff of 446 at PACFLT headquarters reported they spend about 76 staff-years, or 17 percent, of their time performing missions for CINCPAC. The remainder of their time is spent in the administration, training, supply, and logistics support of their particular forces. (See app. IV.)

PACFLT assets include over 213,000 personnel, 1,800 aircraft, and an average of 210 active duty ships. Of the ships assigned, 47 are nuclear powered warships, including 43 submarines, 3 cruisers, and 1 aircraft carrier. Approximately one-third of the Navy personnel and aircraft assets are assigned to the Marine Corps in the Pacific.

The U.S. Pacific Fleet is the naval service component command in the Pacific. Its primary mission is to maintain a creditable readiness posture to meet any challenge in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

#### The Navy in the Pacific

About 26,735 U.S. Army troops are under EUSA command. The 2d Infantry Division is included in the assigned units.

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CINCPACFLT uses seven type commanders to discharge administrative responsibilities. The type commanders are responsible to CINCPACFLT for training of personnel, logistics support, equipment readiness, and technical and safety standards throughout the fleet. Basically, the type commanders train the personnel on individual ships and in squadrons. The seven type commanders and their locations are as follows:

PACFLT administrative chain of command

The 3d Fleet is basically involved in training so it can provide the 7th Fleet with fully combat ready, forward deployed forces. The Commander of the 3d Fleet is responsible for integrating ships, aircraft, and Marine Corps units into operational teams after indoctrination by their respective type commanders and the Training Command, Pacific. The 3d and 7th Fleets are responsible to CINCPACFLT for conducting naval operations in support of U.S. national objectives in the Pacific. The 7th Fleet, for example, must respond to the numerous operational requirements in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Approximately 25 percent of PACFLT ships are assigned to the 7th Fleet at any one time. Operational units in the Pacific are organized by task force. That is, the numbered fleets are broken out into various groups/units which comprise tailored forces (e.g., amphibious force, carrier force, etc.) to accomplish specific missions.

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Location

Type command

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii	Submarine Force, Pacific
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii	Fleet Marine Force (note a)
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii	Naval Logistics Command
San Diego, California	Naval Air Force
San Diego, California	Training Command
San Diego, California	Naval Surface Force
Charleston, South Carolina	Mine Forces (note b)

a/CINCPACFLT exercises operational control of units of Marine Corps operating forces assigned to CINCPAC through the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, comprises such air, ground, and service elements of the Marine Corps as are designated by the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, and assigned by higher authority to PACOM for service with fleet units for the conduct of such operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign or for such other offensive and defensive operations as may be directed.

b/The Commander, Mine Forces, serves as a type commander for both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets.

PACFLT area  
coordinators

CINCPACFLT has established four area coordinators to provide a workable interface between deployed units of the fleet and the permanently established U.S. naval shore activities. The area coordinators normally have no seagoing forces under their command. They generally initiate action to achieve coordinated and efficient service for fleet units, to represent all U.S. naval shore activities, and to provide coordination with other military services and local governments.

CINCPACFLT's four area coordinators are

- Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas;
- Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines;
- Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan; and
- Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Korea.

# The Air Force in the Pacific

PACAF is the Air Force service command activity in the Pacific. PACAF is composed of about 35,000 military, civilian, and local national personnel of which 1,313 positions are authorized for three management headquarters organizations. (CONFIDENTIAL)

## PACAF headquarters

The Commander-in-Chief, PACAF, is the Air Force component commander in Hawaii. CINCPACAF is responsible for planning, conducting, controlling, and coordinating offensive and defensive air operations in accordance with tasks assigned by CINCPAC.

As a component commander, CINCPACAF is responsible for accomplishing assigned operational missions. In this capacity, CINCPACAF acts as the senior advisor to CINCPAC on the proper employment of aerospace forces in the Pacific. CINCPACAF is also responsible to CINCPAC for the air defense of land areas in the Pacific through the Commanders of the Western Pacific North, Western Pacific South, and the Pacific Islands Air Defense Regions.

To perform this mission CINCPACAF controls about 311 aircraft which are organized into 19 squadrons, including 10 tactical fighter squadrons. These 10 tactical squadrons include about 192 aircraft which primarily have air superiority and air-to-ground combat missions. The remaining squadrons have various missions ranging from reconnaissance to special airlift. Squadrons are organized under four combat wings at Osan Air Base, Korea; Kunsan Air Base, Korea; Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan; and Clark Air Base, the Philippines. One squadron is assigned to Wheeler Air Force Base in Hawaii. (CONFIDENTIAL)

In the administrative and support chain of command, CINCPACAF is a commander of a major command and reports to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. As commander of a major command, CINCPACAF exercises command over all assigned Air Force operational and support units and is responsible for their administration, personnel, training, logistics, communications, combat development, and other matters.

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As shown in appendix IV, the 985 personnel in PACAF use about 55 staff-years, or 6 percent, of their total staff-years in support of the six CINCPAC mission-related activities. The remaining 94 percent, or about 930 staff-years, is spent in the administration, training, supply, and logistics support of their particular forces.

PACAF was reduced to its current authorized strength of 985 positions after PACOPS was activated. PACOPS--a U.S. Air Force assigned unit--was activated and assigned to PACAF in September 1979. The activation of PACOPS reduced the authorized strength of PACAF by 34 positions. These positions were realigned from PACAF to PACOPS, but the functions and responsibilities performed by the staff in these positions did not change.

With 146 personnel assigned, PACOPS is charged to perform integrated combat-related operational functions necessary to maintain the combat readiness of the Pacific Air Forces and for the deployment, employment, and execution of combat air operations within PACOM. It is composed of combat related activities in the functional areas of intelligence, operations, logistics, and plans. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CINCPACAF exercises both operational and administrative control over assigned forces primarily through the staff PACAF, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, and two major subordinate commanders, each assisted by a headquarters. These two headquarters are the 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, Japan, and the 13th Air Force at Clark Air Base, Philippines.

These two headquarters enable CINCPACAF to conduct theaterwide operations through the staff at PACAF. Additionally, CINCPACAF can conduct operations regionally in east Asia and the southwest Pacific through the commanders the 5th and 13th Air Forces, respectively. CINCPACAF can also conduct local operations in Okinawa, Korea, and Hawaii through the commanders of air divisions in these locations which are intermediate levels of command primarily consisting of operations and planning staff.

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The 5th Air Force

CINCPACAF exercises command over assigned forces in Northeast Asia through the Commander, 5th Air Force. The 5th Air Force mission is to conduct offensive and defensive air operations in accordance with tasks assigned by CINCPACAF, to maintain assigned forces at a level of readiness to ensure that directed operations are completed successfully, and to act as the CINCPACAF representative in Northeast Asia.

The Commander, 5th Air Force, is responsible for managing Air Force bases in Japan and Korea and equipping, organizing, and maintaining the operational readiness of subordinate units. The Commander, 5th Air Force accomplishes these responsibilities through a staff of 229 and through the commanders of two subordinate air divisions, the 313th Air Division in Okinawa and the 314th Air Division in Korea.

The Commander, 5th Air Force, is also designated as

--Commander, U.S. Air Forces, Japan;

--Commander, Western Pacific North Air Defense Region; and

--Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan.

The Commander, U.S. Air Forces, Japan, is the air component commander in the subordinate unified command channel and is responsible for accomplishing operational missions as assigned by the Commander, USFJ. Responsibilities as Commander, U.S. Air Forces, Japan, include developing contingency plans and programs to defend Japan in cooperation with the Japanese Self-Defense Force. The staff at the 5th Air Force supports the Commander in this role.

As Commander, Western Pacific North Air Defense Region, this person is responsible for planning and conducting air defense operations in Northeast Asia as assigned by CINCPACAF. Responsibilities include activating the air defense sectors in Japan and Korea and assuming responsibility for all air defense activities within the region during an emergency.

13th Air Force

CINCPACAF exercises command of PACAF units in the southwest Pacific through the Commander, 13th Air Force. The mission of the 13th Air Force is to conduct offensive and defensive air operations assigned by CINCPACAF. The Commander, 13th Air Force, is responsible for providing the air

defense of the Philippines and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, exclusive of the Marshall Islands. The Commander, 13th Air Force, represents CINCPACAF in relations with host governments and other military services in the southwest Pacific and trains all PACAF aircrews. The Commander, 13th Air Force, accomplishes these responsibilities primarily through an authorized staff of 99.

In addition, the Commander, 13th Air Force, is designated Commander, Western Pacific South Air Defense Region, and is responsible for contingency planning and conducting air operations in defense of the southwest Pacific as directed by CINCPACAF. Responsibilities include exercising operational control of U.S. Army air defense forces and coordinating the use of Navy air defense forces that may be made available for defense of the region.

#### CINCPAC'S SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS IN JAPAN AND KOREA

CINCPAC also exercises operational command through the commanders of the subordinate unified commands in Japan and Korea. These commands and their relationships with the host governments are discussed below.

#### Command relationships in Japan

USFJ is a subordinate unified command under the operational command of CINCPAC. The Commander, USFJ is responsible for planning and coordinating the defense of Japan under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. The Commander, USFJ

--administers the status of forces agreement and coordinates joint service matters ranging from operational events and disposition of facilities to local national labor matters,

--serves as the U.S. Defense Representative in Japan, and coordinates among noncombatant DOD elements in Japan, the U.S. Ambassador, and the Government of Japan's defense establishment.

USFJ is collocated with its Air Force component command--5th Air Force--at Yokota Air Base, Japan. The Commanding General, 5th Air Force, serves colaterally as the Commander, USFJ. The Commander, U.S. Army, Japan, and the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan are the other component commanders in Japan.

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The Commander, USFJ, exercises operational control of the U.S. Army, Japan. IX Corps is a JCS-assigned U.S. Army unit in Japan. The Commander, USFJ, exercises operational control of IX Corps through the Commander, U.S. Army, Japan.

Operational control over the Air Force units in Japan is exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, PACAF, through the Commanding General, 5th Air Force. The Commander, 7th Fleet, under the command of CINCPACFLT, exercises operational control of the U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans.

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, concluded in 1960 between the United States and Japan, is the basis for the presence of U.S. forces in Japan. After more than 2 years of consultations and negotiations, the United States and Japan approved the guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation in November 1978. Basically, these guidelines form the basis for definitive and comprehensive military-to-military planning between USFJ and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. The guidelines contain three key features applicable to military planning between the United States and Japan. The guidelines

--provide the broad guidance and parameters for bilateral planning for meeting contingencies in the Far East,

--provide guidance and direction for planning for the joint defense of Japan, and

--require that studies and analyses be performed in various activities including intelligence coordination, combined training exercises, and logistics/logistics support coordination.

As shown in appendix IV, USFJ's staff of 120 personnel serves primarily in support of CINCPAC's command representation mission. According to USFJ officials, the ongoing work to implement the guidelines for defense cooperation has resulted in actions to develop combined plans for meeting various regional contingencies and to broaden and deepen the range of military activities between U.S. forces stationed in Japan and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.

#### Command relationships in Korea

USFK, which was created in 1957, is a subordinate unified command under the operational command of CINCPAC. The Commander, USFK, serves as the focal point through which U.S.

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combat forces and combat support services are provided for defending the Republic of Korea. In this capacity, the Commander, USFK

--coordinates activities of U.S. forces and military agencies in the Republic of Korea on all matters of joint concern;

--effects local coordination with other U.S. Government agencies on such matters as the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; interservice support matters; and logistics support for the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group in Korea, Republic of Korea forces, and nonmilitary U.S. agencies and personnel;

--exercises operational control over USA, conducts joint training, and plans for the employment of joint forces in contingency and general war operations;

--coordinates all U.S. military intelligence activities in Korea; and

--acts as the representative of the Secretary of Defense and administers the U.S. military assistance program in the Republic of Korea.

As a subordinate unified command, the USFK staff is integrated with the USA staff--the Army component command in Korea. As discussed on page 98, USA is also a major Army command in the Pacific.

The current joint USFK/USA headquarters configuration resulted in part from the activation of a binational Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) in November 1978. CFC's activation was preceded by an agreement reached during the 1977 Security Consultative Meeting that the establishment of a combined command would show the joint commitment of the United States and the Republic of Korea to maintain the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and improve operational efficiency for the defense of South Korea. CFC's mission is to deter acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea and if deterrence fails, to defeat an armed attack.

Prior to this change, a tripartite headquarters existed which consisted of

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As shown in appendix IV, USFK's staff of 404 spends about 137 staff-years directly in support of the CINCPAC mission-related activities. Since the USFK and EUSA headquarters are integrated, the EUSA staff spends an additional 67 staff-years in support of CINCPAC. As a result, these two

The Commander, USFK, does not exercise operational control over any U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force combat forces in peacetime. The Commander, 7th Fleet, under the command of CINCPACFLT, exercises operational control of the U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Commander, 5th Air Force in Japan, who is under the command of CINCPACAF, exercises operational control over the 314th Air Division and U.S. Air Force combat forces assigned to Korea.

Three major component commanders are under the operational control of the Commander, USFK. They include the Commanding General, EUSA; the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Korea; and the Commander, U.S. Air Forces, Korea. The Commander, USFK, serves collaterally as the Commanding General, EUSA. In this capacity, the Commander exercises peacetime operational control of the EUSA combat and combat support units, including the U.S. 2d Infantry Division in Korea.

#### USFK/EUSA

Following the activation of CFC, the UNC/USFK/EUSA headquarters was formed. The USFK/EUSA headquarters remain integrated.

The United Nations Security Council created UNC in the 1950s in response to hostilities against the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea. Its missions are to maintain peace in Korea and to administer the armistice agreement which was signed in 1953 by the military commanders of North and South Korea.

The Commander-in-Chief, UNC, served collaterally as the Commander, USFK, and the Commanding General, EUSA.

--EUSA.

--USFK, and

--the United Nations Command (UNC),

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UNC ground, naval, and air component commands do not have any military forces. The forces previously assigned to these components--all Republic of Korea forces--were assigned to the CFC ground, naval, and air component commands in November 1978. As a result, CINUNC exercises operational control only over the small joint security area force at Panmunjom. Although the majority of the forces are under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, CFC, CINUNC does have the authority to direct the employment of CFC combat forces when necessary in support of armistice requirements.

The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINUNC), is solely responsible for maintaining peace in Korea and for maintaining the terms of the armistice agreement. CINUNC receives strategic guidance and direction only from JCS which acts as the executive agent in Korea for the United Nations. CINUNC communicates directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for UNC planning and for the conduct of combat operations. CINUNC's military role is envisioned only in the event third country, United Nations forces are provided and operating in support of the Commander-in-Chief, CFC.

#### UNC

About 91 staff-years are spent performing headquarters administrative support activities.

--28 staff-years at a personnel cost of \$525,000 is spent by the Armistice Affairs Division to administer and implement the armistice agreement in Korea. In February 1979, the staff of 28 was transferred to the joint UNC and CFC headquarters.

--76 staff-years at a personnel cost of \$1.4 million are spent by the Joint Combined Information System to develop, manage, and operate the command and control automatic data processing system in support of the Commander, USFK, as part of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System.

--About 72 staff-years at a personnel cost of \$1.5 million to support requirements of EUSA, UNC, and CFC.

The remaining USFK staff-years are spent performing the following tasks:

staffs spend about \$4.7 million for 204 staff-years in direct support of CINCPAC mission-related activities.

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1/This term was specifically created for CFC. It includes the national command authorities of each nation and the Nation's Joint Chiefs of Staff.

--provide operational guidance and strategic direction to CINCCFC;  
--develop and transmit strategic direction and missions from the national command and military authorities and from the annual Security Consultative Meeting;  
--provide a channel of communication between the Republic of Korea and U.S. national command and military authorities;  
titles;

The CINCCFC receives mutually developed strategic directions and missions from the Republic of Korea/U.S. Military Committee 1/ which is derived from the Republic of Korea and U.S. national command and military authorities. The functions of the Military Committee are to  
is a Korean Army four-star general.  
is a U.S. Army four-star general; the deputy to CINCCFC  
deputy commanders are not from the same country. CINCCFC  
A fundamental principle of CFC is that the chief and  
war in Korea and, if deterrence fails, directs combat operations. In wartime, the CINCCFC will direct and conduct the combined Republic of Korea/U.S. defense against North Korean aggression.

CFC

Day-to-day requirements of UNC are accomplished by the Armistice Affairs Division--an organization that responds directly to CINUNC. It assists CINUNC in administering and implementing the armistice agreement in Korea.

Since the CFC headquarters serves as the headquarters for UNC, most of the senior CFC officers are designated as the UNC staff and constitute a pool of expertise available to CINUNC to work UNC actions. Before CFC was activated, most USFK staff officers served collaterally as UNC staff-members.

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CFC's Air Component Commander exercises operational control over eight tactical wings of the Korean Air Force. Operational control is also exercised by the Air Component Commander over the Korean Army's Air Defense Artillery Command. U.S. Air Force air defense alert aircraft and the U.S.

The Commander, Naval Component Command, exercises operational control of three flotillas and two squadrons of the Korean fleet and the Korean Naval Marines. U.S. naval forces are not under the operational control of the CFC Naval Component Commander in peacetime or wartime.

The Ground Component Command consists of three major subordinate headquarters. These headquarters are Capital Corps, First Republic of Korea Army, and I Corps Group. In peacetime, these commands control 21 Korean Army divisions plus the 2d Republic of Korea Naval Marine Brigade. No U.S. ground forces are under the peacetime operational control of the CFC Ground Component Commander.

CINCCFC exercises peacetime operational control over assigned Republic of Korea combat forces and selected U.S. air defense forces through the ground, naval, and air component commanders.

Daily authority is assumed by the permanent session which is composed of only two members--the senior U.S. military officer assigned to Korea and the Chairman, the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff. The senior U.S. military officer represents the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Military Committee meets twice a year--the plenary session and the permanent session. The plenary session normally meets once a year in conjunction with the annual Security Consultative Meeting. Its members are the Chairman, Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff; another representative from the Republic of Korea; CINCCFC; the Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; and CINCPAC. CINCCFC represents the combined interests of both countries.

--elaborate, transmit, and coordinate support for the strategic plans of the Republic of Korea and U.S. national command and military authorities.

--make recommendations to the Republic of Korea and U.S. national command and military authorities concerning CFC operationally controlled units; and

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Army 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade in Korea, are also under the daily peacetime control of the Air Component Commander.

Although 12 different commands exist, there are only four commanders. The senior U.S. military officer assigned in Korea--a four-star Army general--serves simultaneously as CINCCFC, CINCUK, and the Commander, USFK. As CINCCFC, CINCUK, and the Commander, USFK, this officer exercises operational control concurrently through the respective component commanders. This officer serves simultaneously as the Ground Component Commander of USFK.

The senior U.S. Air Force officer in Korea--a three-star general--serves as the Deputy Commander, USFK, the Deputy CINCUK, and the Chief-of-Staff of CFC. He also serves concurrently as the commander of UNC and USFK air component commands.

It is only in the naval area that the same officer does not command all three components. The senior U.S. naval officer in Korea--a two-star admiral--serves simultaneously as the commander of the Naval Component Command of UNC and U.S. Naval Forces, Korea. A Republic of Korea three-star admiral is the Commander of the CFC Naval Component Command.

#### ORGANIZATIONS ADMINISTERING SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN THE PACIFIC

Security assistance programs are administered in PACOM under the military command of CINCPAC. The authorities administering the programs are

--Commander, USFK, who executes this responsibility and administers the program through the Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea;

--Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines;

--Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand;

--Chief, Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan;

--Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia;

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The mission of the Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan, is to accomplish foreign military sales program objectives and to establish and maintain a working relationship with the Japanese defense establishment. The staff in the Mutual Defense Assistance Office includes six U.S. military officers, six U.S. civilians, and five local national employees. The staff is located at the American Embassy in Tokyo and it performs all security assistance functions in Japan.

#### Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan

A staff of 218 assists the Korean armed forces in the functional areas of logistics management, transportation, fiscal management, and contract administration. The staff also provides advice and assistance in the areas of management and defense industry quality control. The cost to operate the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea was more than \$6.9 million in fiscal year 1979.

The Commander, USFK, is charged to assist the Republic of Korea in developing armed forces which can maintain the country's security. The Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea serves as the agent of USFK for accomplishing the U.S. military assistance mission in Korea. The Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Korea provides general policy direction and supervision in security assistance matters.

#### Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea

The activities of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea, and Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan, are briefly discussed below.

In addition to their routine duties, U.S. Defense Attaches are responsible to CINCPAC for administering security assistance programs in certain countries in the Pacific.

- Office of the U.S. Defense Representative, Pakistan.
- Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, India; and

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PACOM COORDINATING AUTHORITIES

CINCPAC's coordinating authorities fall into four general categories. They are

--U.S. Defense Representatives,

--CINCPAC Representatives,

--liaison/coordination authorities, and

--representation/coordination authorities to States and territories of the United States.

U.S. Defense Representatives

U.S. Defense Representatives are established in most countries in PACOM for governmental administration coordination only. In all cases, the U.S. Defense Representative's position is an additional duty.

CINCPAC Representatives

Six CINCPAC Representatives have been established in areas where there is not a subordinate unified commander and forces from more than one service are assigned. The responsibilities of CINCPAC Representatives are normally in addition to their regular duties. In general, they coordinate matters of concern to the military services and represent the service commanders in their responsibilities with host government officials. They do not exercise operational control over any combat forces in that role. The six Representatives are

--CINCPACREP Aleutians - Commander, Naval Station Adak;

--CINCPACREP Australia - U.S. Air Force Liaison Officer to Australia;

--CINCPACREP Guam/Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands - Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas;

--CINCPACREP Philippines - Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines;

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--CINCPACREP Thailand - Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand; and

--CINCPACREP Indian Ocean - Commander, Middle East Force.

As coordinating authorities, these representatives generally

--coordinate actions involving more than one service;  
--attempt to resolve disputed matters concerning more than one service;

--represent all services in relationships with the host government in foreign countries, the U.S. Ambassador, and other U.S. Government agencies;

--provide CINCPAC assistance in the acquisition and dissemination of releasable intelligence materials to friendly governments in their areas of responsibility; and

--make recommendations concerning logistics and administrative policies and programs.

Liaison/coordination authorities

CINCPAC has two full-time authorities for Liaison and coordination with other commands. They are

--CINCPAC Liaison Officer to the Alaskan Air Command, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and

--CINCPAC Representative to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

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Representation/coordination authorities  
CINCPAC has two authorities for representation with  
state or territorial governments. They are  
--CINCPAC Representative, Guam/Trust Territory of the  
Pacific Islands, and  
--CINCPAC Representative, Aleutians for Alaska.

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