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H. S. PERSONS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Assistance,
Logistics and Administration

SECRET

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
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CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF READINESS OF U.S. FORCES

Along the far fringes of the Pacific, in those areas where communist forces were attempting to erode the Free World frontier, there was an obvious relationship between communist operations and the decisiveness with which the Free World reacted in opposition. Recognizing the communist technique of probing the Free World for areas of uncertainty or indecision, CINCPAC made it his primary responsibility to maintain and deploy the Pacific Command Armed Forces -- more than a third of a million men -- so that these forces could react with prompt resolution to stand against communism. Twice during 1962 CINCPAC carried out sudden deployments of his forces to areas threatened by communist encroachment.

Chapter I describes the size and composition of those communist forces adjacent to the Pacific Command, and of the U.S. Forces in the PACOM area. It then tells of CINCPAC's actions to maintain a cohesive and unified force, to plan for its deployment and employment, and to improve and modernize the methods for controlling it.

Because of the relative importance of CINCPAC's efforts to support and strengthen the governments of the Republic of Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, the significant CINCPAC activities in each of those countries are combined in respective sections of Chapter IV. Accordingly, much of the information that normally would be included in this chapter is described in Chapter IV.

COMMUNIST FORCE STRENGTH CHANGES

As in previous years, the USSR was responsible during 1962 for the most important developments in the Communist bloc military posture. Although further reductions in Soviet personnel strength were reflected, there was significant improvement in the operational capability of missile systems as well as improvement in the quality of other weapons and equipment.

and continued expansion of MRBM deployment was noted. A total of five ICBM sites with 10 launchers, and 10 MRBM sites with 40 launchers, provided this area with formidable strategic missile capability. Surface to air missile sites, which numbered only 13 in 1961, had mushroomed to a total of 81 by the close of 1962 to augment significantly jet fighters providing air defense for this area.

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Nearly all changes in the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet were reflected in the qualitative upgrading of the submarine force. The 1962 submarine balance, after taking into account Far East shippard construction, North Sea Route transfers, and the transfer to Indonesia of ten "Whiskey" class submarines, registered an increase of one over last year for a total of 99. This total included six guided missile nuclear-powered, ten conventional-powered ballistic, and three conventional-powered guided missile submarines, a significant qualitative increase.

The Soviets continued their military research and development program with comprehensive nuclear testing at sites within the USSR as well as at the Novaya Zemlya area. Tests ranged from low yield to multi-megaton detonations. ICBM test firings into the mid-Pacific impact area were again carried out.

Chinese Communist ground forces reflected a loss of one line division with a small percentage decrease in personnel strength. The Red Chinese Navy had a slight increase in personnel. However, no changes in the number of major combatant ships appeared. A significant reduction in the number of jet aircraft became apparent in the Red Chinese air forces, most probably due to lack of essential spare parts, a dwindling production rate, and a virtual absence of deliveries of aircraft or spare parts from Soviet Bloc nations. However, surface-to-air missile sites increased from four to eight by the year's end. Also a surface-to-surface cruise missile site was reported at Lien Shan.

In North Korea the ground forces increased the number of line division by one with an increase in the total number of troops. Minor

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increases were reflected in the number of patrol and minecraft but the number of naval personnel remained constant. Two "Whiskey" class submarines were photographed near the end of the year at Mayang-do but whether these were transferred to the North Korean Navy or were just making a port call was not determined. The most significant change occurred in the North Korean Air Force. The jet bomber force had a 100 percent increase and MIG-21 jet fighters appeared for the first time in any Asian communist air force.

Small personnel gains were registered in all three branches of the North Vietnamese armed forces in 1962. While there was no significant change in equipment, the Peoples' Army of Vietnam probably improved its combat capabilities as a result of its support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, particularly anti-helicopter operations. Air support experience was undoubtedly enhanced through participation, in conjunction with the Soviets, in airlift operations into Laos from North Vietnam.

With the appearance of a Tall King early warning radar on North Korea's east coast, plus the addition of a series of early warning radars on Communist China's coast, Bloc air defenses in the Far East improved considerably.


A summary of principle strength figures in Communist bloc order of battle and the 1962 changes thereto is shown in Figure 2.

U.S. FORCES DURING 1962

During 1962 all services except the Navy showed increases in military personnel. At year's end the total personnel in PACOM exceeded the 1961 figure by approximately 14,000. The largest part of this number was attributable to an Army increase of about 10,000, most of which was needed to assist Southeast Asia countries counter communist aggression. By comparison, the strength of U.S. Army Forces rose from 91,541 to 101,273, the Air Force from 62,028 to 65,896, whereas U.S. Navy strength (including U.S. Marine personnel) declined from 278,410 to 278,263 as of 31 December 1962.

THE PACIFIC COMMAND

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962



8

CINCPAC made two major shifts of personnel during the year, but they did not Affect the overall PACOM strength. These two moves were the deployment of U.S. personnel to Thailand (see Chapter IV), and the movement of the U.S. Fleet (Navy and Marine) personnel to the Caribbean during the Cuban crisis. The Cuban move involved 12,000 U.S. Marine personnel and 30 ships. Although these personnel were moved to the Atlantic they continued to be carried as part of PACOM forces.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The only significant changes made during 1962 to the command relationships within PACOM were those that were necessary because of the addition of new organizations in Southeast Asia.

At the beginning of the movement of U.S. troops into Thailand in mid-May, (See the Laos section of Chapter IV), CINCPAC designated the Deputy CINCUSARPAC as Commander JTF-116, and directed him to assemble an advance echelon of his staff and deploy it to Thailand. As soon as he was operational in Thailand, he was to assume operational control of all U.S. combat units there and, until he received further instructions, he was placed under the operational command of CINCPAC and instructed to coordinate his activities with CHJUSMAG Thailand. 1

On the same day, 15 May, CINCPAC established the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI) and designated General Paul D. Harkins as COMUSMACTHAI in addition to his duty as COMUSMACV. In both capacities, Harkins was to report directly to CINCPAC. USMACTHAI consisted of the forces of JTF-116 in Thailand, JUSMAG Thailand, and of other U.S. military elements then in Thailand or to be ordered there, over all of which COMUSMACTHAI was given operational command. Having established the new command, CINCPAC directed CJTF-116 and CHJUSMAG to report for duty to COMUSMACTHAI. 3, 4

^{1.} CINCPAC 1513052 May 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 151834Z May 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 162355Z May 62 (S)

^{4.} CINCPAC 151920Z May 62 (S)

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	SS AIR	99	+1					• •				
	PERSONNEL MAJOR AIRCRAFT:	65,000	+650	PERSONNEL Major Aircraft:	75,000	+4,000	PERSONNEL Major Áircraft:	16,000	2,000	PERSONNEL Major Aircraft:	1,008	+550
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[#] LINE DIVISIONS INCLUDES INFANTRY (MOTORIZED RIFLE MECHANIZED). TANK (ARMORED) AND AIRBORNE (PARACHUTE) DIVISIONS ## INCLUDES CAVALRY (SECURITY) AND PUBLIC SECURITY DIVISIONS IN ADDITION TO THOSE LISTED ABOVE.

FIG 2

PACOM MIL	ITAR	Y STRENGTH C	HANG	ES DURING 1962	2
PACFLT		USARPAC		PACAF	
NUMBERED FLEETS 2 ATTACK CARRIERS [CVA] 9 SUPPORT CARRIERS [CVS] 4 CRUISERS [CA, CG, CLG) 7 DESTROYERS [DD, DDE, DL, DLG, DDG] 113 PATROL SHIPS 21 CARRIER AIR GROUPS [CVG] 9 CARRIER ASW GROUPS [CVG] 4 PATROL RON (VP) 16 AEW RON (VW) 2 AEW RON (VQ) 1 SUBMARINES [SS, SSN, SSG, SSNG, SSR] 46 AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE VESSELS 73 MINE WARFARE SHIPS 42 FLEET MARINE FORCE 1 MARINE DIV/AIR WING 2	CHANGES PURING YR 0 0 0 +1 1 -7 -1 0 +1 0 0 -8 +1 0 0	ARMY HO 1 CORPS HO 2 INFANTRY DIVISION 3 AIRBORNE BATTLE GROUP (Reinf) 1 MISSILE COMMAND (AT) 1 MISSILE BN (Hawk) 5 MISSILE BN [Little John] 1 SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (Abn) 1 LOGISTICAL COMMAND 3 8" HOWITZER BN 2 TARGET ACQUISITION BN 1 MISSILE BN (Herc) 5 ENGINEER BN [Const) 4 ENGINEER BN [Combt] 1	CMANGES DURING YR 0 0 0 0 +1 0 0 +1 0 0 0 +1 0 0 0	NUMBERED AIR FORCES 2 TACTICAL BOMBER SQ 3 TACTICAL BOMBER SQ 10 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQ 10 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQ [TAC]{Rotation}; 2 TACTICAL MISSILE GP 1 FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQ [1 HANG Sq] 6 TROOP CARR SQ [Assault][Rotation] 2 AIR REFUELING SQ 1 AIR COMMANDO [TAC] [Rotation] 1 COMPOSITE RECON SQ 1 TACTICAL RECON SQ 2 TROOP CARRIER SQ [Hvy] 2 TROOP CARRIER SQ [Med] 4 AIR RESCUE SQ [MATS] 4	CHANGES DURING YE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPE

PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL

SERVICE-CATEGORY-COUNTRY AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962

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RYUKUYUS	87,015	16,357	90611	2,510	19,511	12,430	1,409	1,022	29	-	358	13.865	9 393	35		1 K7R	25.284	Ene	300	3 2	3
THAILAND	5,754	4,353	2,755	372	=	1,212	æ	6	3	-		220		2	1	=	9	365	206	5 5	220
VIETNAM	10,426	9,422	6,874	439	534	1,575	30		80		21	302	=	2	1	210	29	487	6	3 6	8 8
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Following the establishment of USMACTHAI, CINCPAC studied the command arrangements in Southeast Asia, and discussed the matter with General Harkins. At the end of May, CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that he formalize General Harkins' dual role by establishing a headquarters to be called USMACTHAI/V, which would consist of General Harkins and a small staff. Each side of this dual organization would be headed by a deputy commander. For USMACV Admiral Felt recommended that an Air Force lieutenant general be named as deputy, this being the only change necessary to that command. In the case of Thailand, CINCPAC proposed that JTF-116 be inactivated and that its JTD be modified to make it suitable as the staff of the Deputy COMUSMACTHAI, thus eliminating the necessity for two staffs in Thailand.

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Under this proposed arrangement the following commanders would be in charge of CINCPAC or SEATO operational plans:

- 1. CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, Phase II Laos -- Deputy COMUSMACTHAI would be the force commander of all U.S. forces committed to this plan. He would be responsible to CINCPAC through COMUSMACTHAI/V.
- 2. CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, Phase II Vietnam -- Deputy COMUSMACV would be the force commander of all U.S. forces committed to this plan, and would be responsible to CINCPAC through COMUSMACTHAI/V.
- 3. CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, Phases III and IV -- COMUSMACTHAI/V would become COMUSSEAsia and would consolidate his Thailand and RVN staffs as appropriate to set up one over-all command for Southeast Asia.
- 4. SEATO Plan 5 As COMUSMACTHAI/V, General Harkins would be the SEATO Force Commander, and the Deputy COMUSMACTHAI would serve as the SEATO Field Force Commander.
- 5. SEATO Plan 7 -- COMUSMACTHAI/V would be the SEATO Force Commander, and the Deputy COMUSMACV would be the SEATO Field Force Commander.
- 1. CINCPAC 302332Z May 62 (TS)

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6. SEATO Plans 4 & 6 -- In view of the size and composition of the forces committed to these plans, and the rank of the corps and other commanders, CINCPAC recommended a four star general as the SEATO Field Force Commander. This would be General Harkins for Plan 6, For Plan 4 he would be the Field Force Commander for the Central Region. 1

The JCS did not reply to the message by which CINCPAC made this proposal, but advised him by telephone that they did not favor parts of the recommendation. Thereafter, the problem lay dormant until mid-September when CINCPAC advised COMUSMACTHAI that he expected to withdraw the combat forces in Thailand and, since it was improbable that a staff in Thailand would be authorized, CINCPAC suggested that General Harkins commence using CHJUSMAG as a working representative in Thailand. Several days thereafter, CINCPAC again raised the subject with the JCS, this time to recommend that he dis-establish USMACTHAI and withdraw CJTF-116 and return him to "designate" status in Hawaii, with a nucleus joint planning staff available to him. This would then leave CHJUSMAG as the senior U.S. representative in Thailand, and his staff could be augmented if necessary to handle some of the new projects then underway in Thailand. CINCPAC would exercise operational command of units in Thailand through his PACOM Component Commanders, with JUSMAG in a coordination role. However, if political reasons dictated keeping USMACTHAI, CINCPAC recommended that JUSMAG be given the additional duty as Chief of Staff for COMUSMACTHAL. In this capacity and with a few additional staff members, he could handle USMACTHAI functions. JTF-116 would be withdrawn. COMUSMACTHAI/V would exercise operational command of assigned forces through his appropriate component commanders. Of the two proposals, CINCPAC recommended the first if it was politically feasible and, if not, approval of the second. 3

^{1.} Ibid.


^{2.} CINCPAC 150452 Z Sep 62 (C)

^{3.} CINCPAC 192043Z Sep 62 (S)

PACIFIC COMMAND ORGANIZATION 1962

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

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For his part, General Harkins said he favored retention of the COMUSMACTHAI designation because of the prestige value with the Thais and with other SEATO nations.

At the 8 October Secretary of Defense meeting at CINCPAC Headquarters, Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Admiral Felt and General Harkins discussed the command relations in Southeast Asia for the period following the withdrawal of JTF-116. They agreed that General Harkins should continue as both COMUSMACTHAI and COMUSMACV, assisted by a small joint staff in Thailand to carry out SEAsia planning as directed by CINCPAC. CHJUSMAG Thailand (Major General T.J. Conway) would serve concurrently as deputy to COMUSMACTHAL Two other changes in command arrangements were considered at the same meeting, but action was deferred. One was a proposal to concentrate all air responsibilities in Southeast Asia (except for Air MAAG functions) in the CG, 2d Air Division who would report to General Harkins in his dual capacity. The second proposal was to place under CHJUSMAG Thailand the Army Logistical Support Group and any Army troop units rotated in and out of Thailand.

Admiral Felt, General Harkins and Major General Conway met in Bangkok on 18 October to consider an appropriate command organization and agreed that COMUSMACTHAI had two major functional responsibilities - MAP functions and control, coordination, planning and support functions. Accordingly, CINCPAC advised the JCS that he planned to form two major divisions under the Deputy COMUSMACTHAI:

- 1. JUSMAG Division.
- 2. Control, Coordination, Planning and Support Division:
 - a. Engineer Activities
 809th Engineer Battalion
 Engineer Construction Battalion
 Naval SeaBees
 - b. Communication Activities 167th Signal Company 999th Signal Company STARCOM Troposcatter
- 1. COMUSMACV MAC J5 2930 DTG 251032Z Sep 62 (S)
- 2. CINCPAC 090032Z Oct 62 (S)



- Planning Activities (performed by a small group of planners)
- d. Support Activities 9th Log Command 31th Hospital Company 1st Aviation Company Supply Point Company

COMUSMACTHAI (and his deputy) would have operational control of all subordinate elements listed above, and Deputy COMUSMACTHAI would be the U.S. military voice in Thailand. The administration and support of these elements would remain the responsibility of the appropriate CINCPAC Component Commander, with CINCUSARPAC administration and support being funneled through the Support Activities Group in Thailand. 1 General Harkins put this plan into effect on 30 October when he designated General Conway as Deputy COMUSMACTHAI, and assigned to him the two major functional responsibilities described above.²

In November CINCPAC suggested that, since the planning function did not fit neatly into either of the major divisions, COMUSMACTHAI set up three major divisions, the third being an Exercise and Plans Division, since the JCS had indicated they wanted to add the operational control of troop exercises to the functional responsibilities that CINCPAC had suggested.

Formal JCS and Secretary of Defense approval of the recommendations that CINCPAC had made to the JCS on 19 October was received on 10 November. In directing the implementation of the command arrangements for Southeast Asia, the JCS defined the conditions and responsibilities that would be in force. General Harkins would continue as both COMUSMACTHAI and COMUSMACV, with CHJUSMAG Thailand serving as Deputy COMUSMACTHAI. There would be no deputy for COMUSMACV in RVN where General Harkins would remain in direct charge of the U.S. military support of counterinsurgency operations. Operational control of all Air Force activities

CINCPAC 190200Z Oct 62 (S)
 COMUSMACTHAI MAC J1 4500 DTG 300130Z Oct 62 (S)
 CINCPAC 070020Z Nov 62 (S)

(except those MAAG air functions that remained under the chief of the respective MAAGs) would be exercised through a command channel running from CINCPAC to COMUSMACTHAI/V to the Commander, 2d Air Division. CINCPACAF remained responsible for the administration and logistic support of the 2d Air Division. In Thailand COMUSMACTHAI would exercise operational control, through his deputy, of the subordinate elements and units that CINCPAC had listed in his message on 19 October (DTG 190200Z). The administrative and support of these units would remain the responsibility of the appropriate CINCPAC Component Commander. When these command arrangements were put into effect, CJTF-116 would be returned to "designate" status. 1

Since COMUSMACV's Army component commander performed only administrative and logistic functions, COMUSMACV recommended that if a CINCPAC unilateral plan or a SEATO plan was implemented, a combat-capable Army component commander and staff be provided to conduct the tactical war. 2 CINCPAC explained that he did not intend for COMUSMACV to have an Army component commander and staff separate from his joint headquarters. As the joint commander, General Harkins would exercise direct control over the ground battle and, as the senior Army commander, he would perform the Army component function. 3 CINCPAC also clarified the status of the 9th Logistical Command, which he wanted stationed in Thailand. The CO of that unit and designated members of his staff were to have additional duty as a COMUSMACTHAI staff division to handle coordination of engineering, communication, and support activities. The command line for service administrative and logistic support matters to the 9th Log Command would run from CINCUSARPAC through the CG USARYIS. The Deputy COMUSMACTHAI would exercise operational control over units of the 9th Log Command, deployed in Thailand. Army units in Thailand not assigned to the 9th Log Command would remain assigned

SPORET

^{1.} JCS 7332 DTG 100104Z Nov 62 (S)

^{2.} COMUSMACV MAC J5 4414 DTG 240847Z Oct 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 200201Z Nov 62 (S)

to their parent organization, but would be under the operational control of COMUSMACTHAI, and would receive logistic and administrative support from the 9th Log Command. 1

ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION

The most significant 1962 changes to CINCPAC's Staff were connected with programs to use electronic data processing equipment to support portions of CINCPAC's operation. One of these, the PACOM MAP Data Center, was established on 6 August 1962 as a support facility of the CINCPAC Staff. A second significant change was the expansion of the Command and Control System Group (J02C) and its support activity, the Pacific Command Detachment Naval Command Systems Support Activity. The former, an all military unit, increased from 12 to 30 members during the year. The second unit was predominantly a civilian unit made available by the CNO to support CINCPAC. First organized late in 1961, at the end of 1962 it consisted of two officers and more than 40 civilians.

In addition, several smaller changes were made within Staff Divisions during 1962. The Intelligence Division created two new branches - the Requirements/Collection Branch and the Target Intelligence Branch. The Plans Division (J-5) added a Research and Development Branch to its organization.


Revision of the Joint TD

The proposed CINCPAC JTD for 1 July 1962 was submitted to the JCS in early June. It requested an increase of 102 staff members of which 39 were officers and 63 enlisted. The basis for the requested increase was the newly assigned missions in intelligence collection and targeting, the need for a 24-hour operation at an increase in the automatic data processing operations at Camp Smith , and an increase in operations throughout PACOM with a resulting increase in staff work.

. CINCPAC 1801342 Nov 62 (S)

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC and STAFF


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


Of the 102 new billets requested, the JCS on 24 September approved only 32, of which 14 billets were for officers and 18 were enlisted. Of this total, 19 were approved for ADP operations, 12 for new intelligence missions, and one billet for the new Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff/Personnel. 1 The JCS had approved previously the manning of the PACOM MAP Data Center at the level of 14 military and 15 civilian spaces. During October CINCPAC asked the JCS for 15 additional spaces to man the 24-hour operation at JCS approved this increase in November. 4 JCS also approved a two man increase for the J5 R&D Branch, thereby raising CINCPAC's personnel authorization to 619. 5 At the end of the year the JCS had not replied to an 11 December request for an additional increase of 24 spaces for the Intelligence Division. Six of these requested spaces were for established J2 branches; 18 spaces were to man a new PACOM Warning/Indications Center. 6

Establishment of Office of Research and Development Advisor

A research and development advisor was added to CINCPAC's Staff as a result of a JCS message at the end of 1961. It was not until mid-August of 1962 that the office became operative. The purpose of the office was to help CINCPAC keep abreast of R&D activities and trends in Washington, and to guide the R&D projects in PACOM. Of particular interest were those projects in the Republic of Vietnam and in Thailand. (See Chapter IV) At the end of the year the JCS had authorized an Army colonel, an Air Force lieutenant colonel, and an Air Force technical sergeant, for this branch of the Plans Division.






CINCPAC ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE HIS COMMAND FACILITIES PACOM MAP Data Center

Early in 1962 CINCPAC commenced planning for a facility that could process the records and transactions for the PACOM Military Assistance Program. CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS his proposal for a MAP data center that would keep MAP records and reduce the administrative work loads of the MAAGs. The Secretary of Defense and the JCS approved the proposal in March.

1. CINCPAC 292326Z Jan 62 (C) 2. JCS 3705 DTG 201639Z Mar 62 (C)



The PACOM MAP Data Center was officially established on 6 August as a support activity to CINCPAC, and was assigned the following missions: 1 To adapt automatic data processing systems (ADPS) to CINCPAC's MA Programs; to formulate procedures for using automated MAP data systems within PACOM; to help the PACOM staff design MAP procedural and record functions to be performed on ADPS; to determine if other CINCPAC administrative procedures and programs should be mechanized; and to provide ADP services to meet CINCPAC's requirements at Camp Smith.

Specifically, the Military Assistance Program encompassed a basic five year program that involved four billion dollars in programs listed on a file of more than a million punched cards, with an estimated annual change rate of 800,000 cards. ²

The processing system chosen as a result of program specifications and contractor bids was the IBM 1401 Digital Computer with the 1405 Random Access Disc Storage. Electronic accounting auxiliary equipment included an IBM alphabetic accounting machine, card sorter, collator, interpreter, card punch and verifier stations, and other minor equipment. The capacity of the basic (RAMAC 1405) was initially allocated to cover 15,000 item control records, 5,000 sub-project records and 28,000 items requirement records.

The initial cost of facility arrangements at Camp H. M. Smith was \$29,000. An operating budget for FY63 was established at \$276,000, which included equipment rental, civilian employee salaries, and minor equipment and supply costs.

On 20 August 1962, the first program for the digital computer system was completed and assembled for RAMAC loading. The first machine products were submitted to the MAAGs in the form of subproject summaries on 28 August. During the first part of August the PACOM MAP Data Center supported the supplemental submission of

^{1.} CINCPAC Staff Notice 5400 of 10 Sep 62 (C)

^{2.} J4 Memo 388/62 of 2 Jan 62, Subj: CINCPAC EAM Operations at Camp Smith. (C)



program requirements to OSD covering the FY64-68 period, and in September participated in operation "SHAKEOUT", a revalidation review of MAP undelivered balances for FY62 and all years prior, in coordination with representatives of OSD, the Military Departments, and CINCPAC Staff.

The CINCPAC MDC had barely commenced operation when the OASD/ISA changed the requirements and procedures for keeping and reporting MAP data, the effect of which was an estimated five-fold increase in the work load. Two changes occurred in the spring of 1962 when CINCPAC was asked to maintain undelivered balances by fiscal year back to 1959, and to project deliveries to FY71. 1,2 As a result. CINCPAC was required to maintain a data base covering a period of 13 years, plus shortfall, in order to produce a 5 year MA Program. In October CINCPAC recommended that this period be reduced to a more manageable base of 7 years, but OASD/ISA said it was necessary to extend the programs to FY69, and deliveries to FY72 in order to meet the requirements of the Secretary of Defense. 3,4 During November CINCPAC representatives attended a MAP conference in Washington at which revisions in the Military Assistance Manual (MAM) were explained, and at which it was pointed out that Secretary of Defense data requirements had greatly increased, and that procedures had to be realigned to the new DOD Program Element System and to the Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP). After CINCPAC had considered the effect of these requirements upon his operation, he advised the OASD/ISA that, in his opinion, as a result of the new concepts, new techniques and new procedures, the data system requirements imposed upon PACOM would increase five times. The MAP Data Center, which had taken two years to build, would be overwhelmed, and the sheer volume and complexity of detail required would reduce the ability of PACOM and its MAAGs to perform operational and advisory functions. CINCPAC explained that the job of educating the

CINCPAC 062316Z Oct 62 (U) OASD/ISA 12977 DTG 162139Z Oct 62 (U)



OASD/ISA 598426 DTG 192315Z Apr 62 (U) OASD/ISA 307075 DTG 222232 Z Jun 62 (U)

MAAG personnel and handling the paper work involved in converting to the new system was great, and he strongly recommended that OASD/ ISA extend the submission date from 15 May 63 to 15 June, limit programming against MAP elements to the second element level (as described by the new MAM) rather than the four elements as proposed, and that the MA Plan be updated twice a year instead of quarterly. 1

At the end of the year CINCPAC was making estimates of the additional electronic equipment he would need in order to handle the increased requirements for data. The OASD/ISA had not indicated what action would be taken upon CINCPAC's recommendations.

CINCPAC Automatic Data Processing Branch

Organization and Equipment: On 2 February 1962 the Electronic Data Processing Section of CINCPAC's Operations Division was transferred to the Command and Control System Group. This was done to have one organization unit that was responsible for all Automatic Data Processing for the Staff, except for the PACOM MAP Data Center.

The mission of the CINCPAC ADP Branch was to provide technical assistance to the Staff on ADP matters, consolidate CINCPAC ADP requirements for command and control purposes, coordinate computer programs developed under commercial contract, and direct programming activities of assigned military personnel, conduct acceptance, testing, and be responsible for computer programs, base data files, and ADP products used by the Staff. 3

The Command and Control System Group received support from the Naval Command Systems Support Activity (NAVCOSSACT), a Chief of Naval Operations organization that was established in Washington in December 1961. During the first quarter of 1962, a group of NAVCOSSACT personnel (military, civil service, and civilian contract analysts and programmers) were at Camp Smith on a temporary duty status. In May 1962, NAVCOSSACT opened a Pacific Liaison Office at

- I. CINCPAC 280502 Z Nov 62 (C)
- 2. CINCPAC Staff Notice 10462 of 2 Feb 62 (U)
- 3. CINCPAC Inst P05400.6 of 16 Jun 61 (C)



Camp Smith with the officer in charge designated as a member of CINCPAC's Staff: NAVCOSSACT personnel were responsible for the technical problems connected with each ADP system, and helped develop an operational capability on the interim IBM 704/1401 computer system. At some yet undetermined date all programming was to be directed towards the Control Data Corporation 1604A/160A Computer System, which was scheduled for installation during the 1963-64 period.

A second organization supporting CINCPAC's ADP operations was the Fleet Operation Control Center Pacific (FOCCPAC), the CINCPACFLT unit that was responsible for a find the CINCPAC ADP equipment located there. During 1962 FOCCPAC appointed project officers in the areas of intelligence, communications, operations and logistics to support the CINCPAC Staff computer data systems.

To develop CINCPAC's ADP program, each staff division having an ADP requirement appointed an officer to work with the Command and Control System Group to determine computer program objectives. To do the coordination, subject matter research, analysis and programming work, a project team concept was used with teams consisting of CINCPAC and NAVCOSSACT analyst programmers, and a systems coordination officer to determine the data requirements. Teams were established for most existing projects.


Computer Programs: Some 60 computer programs containing in excess of 150,000 program instructions were produced during the year. Computer programs were used extensively to support

These programs were used under emergency conditions for evaluating operational procedures. The tests produced excellent results, and indicated some modifications were needed to satisfy the requirements of the Intelligence and Operations Staffs.

Throughout the year, a great deal of work was devoted to revising the , which was

necessary because of the high rate of change in detail data, and in concepts, particularly in the Operations and Intelligence areas.

During 1962 numerous computer programs were operated daily to provide the various staff offices with planning and operating documents.



A Cross Reference Listing was also maintained as a ready reference for locating any item of intelligence data stored either on punched cards or magnetic tape.

An Assigned Frequency File was maintained for the CINCPAC Communications Division. The data contained was an accumulation of pertinent information about every PACOM radio circuit. The file,



updated with changes as they occurred, provided data on radio circuits that could be retrieved.

The Logistics Division had three systems of operational computer programs which were:

- 1. Transportation System. This consisted of a transportation requirements file that contained data pertinent to the transportation and needs for implementing the CINCPAC Operations Plans. It also contained a transportation facilities file which consisted of information on ports, beaches, airbases, LOCs, routes, and logistic aircraft and ships.
- 2. Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants System. This was a series of files that contained data on facilities, stock, status and cargo capabilities.

3.

At the end of 1962, CINCPAC had other projects under development, and a larger number planned for the future.

PACOM FORCE OBJECTIVES

U.S. Forces

Soon after the beginning of the year the JCS asked CINCPAC to comment on a tentatively programmed allocation of major force units for the PACOM for the period FY63 through FY67. The allocation, prepared by the individual Services, was based on JSOP-67 and upon decisions by the Secretary of Defense on the FY63-67 force levels and major items of equipment. Admiral Felt made strong recommendations for an increase in each of his component commands. He pointed out that intelligence indicated that the threat from communist forces would increase substantially, but that his mission under JSOP-67 was the same and the forces proposed for PACOM were substantially the same as for FY63. Because of this, and because national policy called for more flexibility and every effort to keep war at a non-nuclear



^{1.} JCS SM-85-62 of 18 Jan 62 (S)

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level, CINCPAC considered the projected forces inadequate. In addition to specific comments upon the forces of each of his component commands, CINCPAC listed three areas of weakness. These were a requirement for Military Sea Transport Service shipping to move his ground forces, the need for improved seaplanes.

For his Army forces, CINCPAC recommended an additional infantry division to be deployed to the Philippines, a recommendation dependent upon a suitable base and an agreement with that country. He also wanted the division force to include two engineer combat battalions because of the difficult terrain and lack of roads in Southeast Asia. As in 1961, CINCPAC again recommended that the number of U.S. battalions in PACOM be increased from 3 1/2 to 8 -- two each for Okinawa and Korea, and one for the Philippines, Guam, and the two National Guard battalions in Hawaii. The only other significant recommendation for Army forces was for units to support the recommended increases.

To meet the Soviet and Red Chinese air threat, CINCPAC wanted to maintain the five F-102 squadrons in his theater. The Air Force program indicated only four squadrons for PACOM. CINCPAC was willing to accept the reduction to four squadrons in FY65

and to three squadrons in FY67 provided it could be replaced by a squadron equipped with the planned long range interceptor-tactical fighter plane. CINCPAC also wanted to increase PACOM's offensive force of tactical bombers to 18 squadrons in FY65 through the retention of the 3rd Bomb Wing, which he recommended should be converted to F-105s or F-110s during FY66. Another recommendation was for two additional airlift squadrons, one with C-130s and one with C-123s.

^{2.} Ibid. Encl 1

^{3.} Ibid. Encl 3

The widest gap between the Service programmed allocation of major forces for PACOM and what Admiral Felt considered adequate was in Naval forces. For the period ending with FY64 CINCPAC recommended the following additional forces: two CVS carriers, a missile cruiser, 29 destroyers, 15 submarines, five patrol ships, eight mine warfare ships, and 18 additional ships to transport amphibious assault forces. This was a total of 78 additional vessels required for the near term; for the period ending with FY67 Admiral Felt recommended a total of 136 additional vessels. CINCPAC also recommended that Navy air forces be increased by two air groups for the two additional CVS carriers, and that VP reconnaissance squadrons be increased by two for the near term and by four by the end of FY67.

The following tabulations show the comparison between the Service units programmed for the period FY63-67 and the forces recommended by CINCPAC.

Major Combatant Forces

Program Elements	Service P Units. En	rogrammed	CINCPAC Recommended Units. End of:		
	FY64	FY67	FY64	FY67	
Army:					
Inf. Division	3	3	4	4	
Brigades	1	1	1	ī	
Msl Comd (AT)	1	1	1	ī	
Bn	3 1/2	5 1/2	8	8	
Hawk Bn	6	6	8	8	
Field Arty Bn	4	4	4	4	
Engr Combat Bn	1	1	3	3	
Little John Bn	1	1	1	ì	
LaCrosse Bn	1	•	1	•	
Sergeant	1	1	1	1	
Pershing	-	1	-	1	
Sp Forces Gp	1	1	1	ī	
Avn Co's	5	7	5	7	

^{1.} Ibid. Encl 2

Program Elements	Units.		rammed		nits. End	commende of
Navy		FY64	FY67		FY64	FY67
	~***					•
Attack Acft Carrier (9.	9		9	9
ASW Support Carrier (CVS)	4	4		6	6
Cruisers: C/M		7	7	,	7	10
GUN		1	1		2	Ŏ.
Destroyers:						
(G/M)(DLG/DDC	G)	19	37		24	48
(GUN)(DD/DDE/	DDR)	81	58		105	102
	\cap	13	21		15	27
	l j	31			44	34
	ĺ		15	•		
Detrol Chi-	L .	0	9		0	9
Patrol Ships:		18	24		23	30
(DE/DEG/DER)	•	10	24		23	30
Mine Warfare Ships:		20	30		47	" "
(MSO/MSC/MHC/I	MCS)	39	39		47	50
Amphibious Ships:						
(AGC/AKA/APA/A		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,				- 45
LSD/LST/LPH/A		72	64		90	105
Command & Control S	hip	, 0	0		1	2
CVA Air Group	•	9	9		9	9
CVS Air Group		4	4		6	6
VP Ron		15	15		19	21
VW (Barrier)		1	. 1	* *	' 1	1
Special Missions:						•
Photo Sqdns (VF	'P)	1	1		1	1
Photo Sqdns (VA		1	1		1	1
Flt Weather Sqd		1	1		1	1
Flt Air Recco Sqdn (V		ī	1	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	1	1
Air Early Warning (V.		2	2		2	2
Interceptor Sqdn (VF)		0	0		0	0
Helo Combat (HU)	·· /	ĭ	ì		ì	i
Marine Corps:		•	-		-	_
Flt Marine Forc	es	1	1		1	1
Div/Wing Teams		2	2		Ž	2
Air Force						
F-102		4	. 3		5	3
	Not in	dicated	in SM 8	5-62)	-	1
B-57	•	2	_	•	3	•
F-100		3	3		3	-
F-105		6	6		6	6
F-110A		2	6		Ö	12
F-84F		4	-		3	- -
r O 44		2	2		2	2


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Program Elements	Service Pr Units. End			C Recommen	ded
Air Force (cont'd)	FY64	FY67	FY64	FY67	
	-	1 2	-	1 2	
RF-101 RF-110A	2 -	2	2 -	2	
C-130A C-130B	4 · · ·	4 2	5 -	5 2	
C-124(H) C-123	2 (Not indicated	in SM 85-62	2	1	

Free World Forces



The countries were divided into two priorities. CINCPAC recommended that Laos be moved from the first priority group to second priority. In general, Admiral Felt favored increasing ground forces for those countries to which insurgency was a threat, and increasing the number of patrol craft and coastal defense vessels for Cambodia, Thailand and Republic of Vietnam.


^{1.} JCS SM 27-62 of 9 Jan 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC lts Ser: 00634 of 13 Sep 62 (S)

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Extensive changes were required during 1962 to CINCPAC's and to his unilateral plan for the defense of Southeast Asia, which was rewritten to eliminate many of the specific details in force deployments that made the plan subject to continuous modifications. Extensive revisions were also made to logistic plans to support the operational plans; this action is described in the Joint Logistic Activities


This was also true of a series of seven plans that were prepared in 1961 as part of the JCS Berlin plans. The following paragraphs describe the 1962 changes to CINCPAC plans. For additional information see the 1961 CINCPAC Command History, page 14.



The task organization was similar to the superseded plan except that COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI was designated to become COMUSSEAsia upon execution of the plan and would then assume operational command of certain PACOM forces, including all MAAG units in Southeast Asia. The new organization eliminated the need for Joint Task Force 116 of the old plan. Also, in the PACOM were placed under CINCPAC's operational command at the time was activated. Previously, these elements were only made available to CINCPAC.

The Concept of Operations Annex was more specific in defining the threat as the campaign of both the USSR and Communist China to dominate the world. The PACOM threat was described as the combined military potential of the USSR, Red China, North Korea and North Vietnam.

or to honor a security treaty commitment. Other changes in the concept of operations reflected the JSCP provisions for limited wars and the use of conventional weapons in operations short of general war.



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SOURCE: J51

CINCPAC OPLAN 27-63

Contingency plans for the defense of Korea were revised and the new plan, superseding OPLAN 27-60, was promulgated on 27 May. Although numerous, the changes were minor in nature and concerned with changes in intelligence information and target lists. No significant changes were made affecting the concept of operations, forces committed, or command relationships.

In the event of a renewal of communist aggression against South Korea, this limited war plan provided for U.S. participation in military operations in Korea with forces from the Republic of Korea and other United Nations forces that might be made available. In the event of an outbreak of hostilities as a result of communist aggression, the mission of U.S. forces would be to help defeat the aggressors


CINCPAC OPLAN 32-63

During the year CINCPAC revised his unilateral capabilities plan that provided for defense of mainland Southeast Asia under conditions of conflict short of general war. Besides bringing the plan in line with the and making the necessary changes to provide for COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI (eliminating JTF-116 from the plan), the force deployments section was modified to eliminate some of the details contained in the superseded OPLAN 32-59. These changes did not affect the basic strategic concept, but made it necessary to rewrite the basic plan and the annexes on forces, concept of operations, logistics and personnel, command relationships, and civil affairs. The revised OPLAN 32-63 was promulgated on 7 September 1962.

As a result of the reactivation within the 25th Infantry Division of an additional non-airborne battle group, CINCPAC decided to hold the 503d Airborne BG in PACOM reserve in Phase II (Vietnam) instead of deploying it with the initial forces. The revised concept of operations provided the general scheme of maneuver, designated the objectives to be secured, and, in Annex A, provided a list of forces available, thus leaving to the commander the choice of specific deployments and tactics.

Regarding Laos, a change in the assumptions was made as a result of political negotiations then underway to establish a coalition government. The plan anticipated that the U.S. would provide military forces to help pro-western Laotian forces resist a communist inspired attempt to over-throw and take over the Royal Lao Government.

An assumption was added to OPLAN 32-63 as a result of the 8 October




Substantial increases were made to the combat forces earmarked for initial deployment in Phases II, III, and IV of the plan. Army forces for Phase II - Laos, for instance, were increased from one brigade task force consisting of two battle groups to one infantry division and one mechanized infantry brigade (reinf) within Southeast Asia, and an airborne division in PACOM reserve.

Naval forces were increased from two BLT's to a Marine expeditionary brigade made up of one RLT and a composite Marine air group.

Under OPLAN 32-59 the air forces were a tactical fighter squadron and one tactical reconnaissance task force. The new plan earmarked

two tactical fighter squadrons, a TRTF, a tactical bomber squadron, and a detachment of an air commando group.



Forces earmarked for Phase II - Republic of Vietnam, provided for employing two MEF comprised of 2/3 of a Marine division and wing, a two battle group Army brigade, a logistics command, U.S. Air Force squadrons, and supporting arms and service units. The total U.S. strength would be approximately 52,000.

Phase III operations for defense of the Republic of Vietnam against overt invasion by North Vietnam provided for using a MEF comprised of a Marine division/wing team, three U.S. Army divisions, USAF squadrons, and supporting arms and service units for a total of approximately 168, 350 U.S. personnel. Phase IV operations provided for the expansion of the conflict brought on by Communist Chinese intervention. In this phase U.S. strength was increased to approximately 221,000 with the addition of 2 additional Army divisions, one additional MEF from EastPac, and additional CASF fighter squadrons.

Other significant changes included:

2.

- 1. Assignment of responsibility for Air Defense of Mainland SEAsia, (see Annex C).
 - 3. Coordination and control of logistic activities.



5. Responsibility for operations of ports and beaches was transferred from CINCPACFLT to CINCUSARPAC as a result of the establishment of the 9th Log Command to handle operations in SEAsia. The job of channel clearance was assigned to CINCPACFLT.

Mainland Southeast Asia was defined by the plan as Laos, the Republic of Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma,

The plan expected maximum use of the local national forces and resources from the above countries, as well as the effective employment of U.S. and Allied forces.

CINCPAC OPLAN 33-62

The need for a CINCPAC operation plan providing for limited harassment of North Vietnam by U.S. naval and air power became evident in late 1961. CINCPAC directed that a plan be written in preparation for a CINCPAC position to be provided to the JCS. (SECRET)

CINCPAC OPLAN 33-62 was promulgated on 6 June to provide the JCS and CINCPAC a flexible means of directing military actions against selected targets in North Vietnam. Operations anticipated by the plan were retaliatory military actions against selected targets in North Vietnam. The objective was to create a direct cause-and-affect relationship by carrying out in North Vietnam counter-actions similar to some of the Viet Cong actions perpetrated in the south. Types of actions planned were mining of harbors, armed reconnaissance by air, raiding parties to destroy installations or facilities or to ambush and harass, amphibious raids, or underwater demolition team raids.

2. W.W. Rostow memo to General Taylor, 16 Oct 61, Subj: A Plan for CINCPAC to prepare in the Next Two Weeks. (S)

Retaliatory military actions would be carried out by U.S. forces, indigenous special forces, and personnel who fled to the south in 1954.

CINCPAC OPLAN 60-62

At the beginning of the year a new agreement between the Departments of State and Defense became effective, an agreement entitled "State-Defense Policies and Procedures for the Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens Abroad in Time of Emergency". The main change between this and previous agreements was a reorganization of the liaison organization. The Tokyo Liaison Group was eliminated and the Manila Liaison Group was redesignated as the Far East Liaison Group, to which was appointed a permanent State Department chairman. CINCPAC designated CINCPACREP Philippines as his representative on the Far East Liaison Group. (CONFIDENTIAL)


CINCPAC's OPLAN 60-62, which superseded OPLAN 60-59, was rewritten to conform with the new State-DOD agreement, and to incorporate other minor changes. Under the plan, CINCPAC would furnish emergency evacuation planning help, and be prepared to furnish forces, transportation and facilities in order to help the Department of State in the emergency care, protection and evacuation of U.S. non-combatants and certain designated aliens from countries in the PACOM area.

(GONFIDENTIAL)

CINCPAC OPLAN 82-62


Promulgated on 7 February, OPLAN 82-62 was a new plan that became the PACOM instrument for providing an augmentation force and operational support to help CINCARIB meet contingency situations in the Caribbean Command. The plan was prepared in accordance with JCS instructions that CINCPAC prepare and coordinate plans to support national policy and meet national commitments under the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. OPLAN 82-62 supported the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and CINCARIB's Contingency Plan 2-61.

I. See Chapter IV, p 177



Under the provisions of the plan, upon execution of CINCARIB's Plan 2-61, and when directed by the JCS, CINCPAC would deploy and support appropriate PACOM Navy and Marine Corps augmentation forces to designate d staging bases or directly to the area of operations, as dictated by the existing situation. Additionally, PACOM Naval elements might be required to operate in support of CINCARIB.

Operational control of the PACOM Navy/Marine Corps augmentation forces would pass to CINCARIB when they entered his area of responsibility, or when directed by the JCS. However, CINCPAC would continue to exercise through CINCPACFLT, operational command of PACOM Naval elements operating in support of and executing missions with CINCARIB.



Other CINCPAC Planning

Proposal to Substitute Infantry for Airborne Division: In mid-October CINCSTRIKE proposed to CINCPAC the substitution of an infantry division for one of the two airborne divisions that were scheduled to augment PACOM forces in support of contingency operations.

CINCPAC explained his concept for the deployment of CONUS augmentation divisions, but delayed giving an answer until he had additional time to consider the proposal.

However, during December CINCPAC determined he could not accept an infantry division for an airborne division, and set forth his position to CINCSTRIKE.

3,4

U.S. Forces & Equipment for PACOM FY63-67: During January the JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments on the adequacy of Service-programmed forces and equipment for PACOM during the period FY63 to FY67. In his answer, CINCPAC noted that the threat from the communist forces in the Far East was expected to increase during the next several years. On the other hand, CINCPAC's mission in

and because national policy called for an increased ability to respond in a more flexible manner to keep war at a non-nuclear level, CINCPAC informed the JCS that forces programmed for PACOM were inadequate, and he recommended that major combat forces in each Service be increased during the period FY63-67.

For these reasons

^{1.} CINCSTRIKE STRCC 971 DTG 152257 Z Oct 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 030330Z Nov 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 010306Z Dec 62 (TS)

^{4.} CINCPAC 282135Z Dec 62 (TS)

^{5.} JCS SM 85-62 of 18 Jan 62 (TS)

^{6.} CINCPAC ltr Ser. 000103 of 3 Apr 62 (TS)

Ten come

Phase-out of MSTS Troops Ships: In January the JCS asked CINCPAC what effect the phasing-out of MSTS troop ships would have on current, as well as general, and limited war operations. After discussing the problem with his Component Commanders, CINCPAC decided that the emergency requirements justified the continued peace time operation of the MSTS troop ships. It was determined that the phase-out would be detrimental to limited war planning and that more airfields, POL tankers, staging areas, and in-country transportation would be required. The impact on general war plans would be the loss of flexibility and early reaction time while waiting for the conversion of commercial ships or the reactivation of reserve fleet ships. It was recommended that the surface transportation be retained for dependents, civilian employees who refused to fly, certain medical cases, and for morale reasons. 1

The Impact on PACOM of

The JCS asked CINCPAC what the affect would be on his own plans if he
was required to support

and, at
the same time, respond to communist aggression in the PACOM area.

In answer, CINCPAC said that the requirement to support CINCLANT's plan would have a great affect upon his ability to carry out his own plans, but stated that nevertheless he would be able to respond effectively.

LORAN-C Stations: In answer to a JCS request for the unified commanders' position on the continued operation of LORAN-C in wartime or in periods of increased tension, CINCPAC said that this operation would be a major requirement for CINCPAC forces. He further emphasized the importance of completing the LORAN-C complex as soon as practicable. 3, 4 (SECRET)

^{1.} CINCPAC 250350Z Jan 62 (TS)

^{3.} JCS 6148 DTG 180200Z Sep 62 (S) 4. ADMINO CINCPAC 152337Z Oct 62 (S)

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
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1 37

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Early Warning Requirements

In February the JCS asked CINCPAC to express his views on two questions raised by the Secretary of Defense --- the relative priority of different threats, such as low re-entry angle ICBMs, ERBMs, and SLBMs; and the military usefulness of augmenting systems for warning because of the short warning times afforded. (SECRET)

3. JCS 3422 DTG 262154Z Feb 62 (S)

CINCPAC's position on the first of these was that the SLBM posed a significant threat to PACOM forces because available intelligence supported the estimates of both quantitative and qualitative improvements in the system during the next few years. The ERBM and low reentry angle ICBM threats were not considered as serious since these threats were based on estimated Soviet capabilities and not on hard

With respect to the military usefulness of augmenting systems for warning, CINCPAC explained he was unable to say if the BMEWS gap fillers against low re-entry angle ICBMs could provide warning time to PACOM forces. However, over-the-horizon radars, incorporating features to detect all ballistic missiles could give some warning time through basing these radars on the periphery of the USSR, although it was doubtful if the warning would be early enough to justify the cost. (SECRET)

intelligence indicating intentions or actual development.

Weapons Allocation and Planned Use

The JCS advised CINCPAC in March that production of the MK-43 MOD 1 nose (which could be set for either anair or surface burst) would be delayed nine months or longer, but that production of the MK-43 weapons with the MOD O nose (for surface burst only) could be continued. 2 Although CINCPAC recommended continued production of the MOD O nose which could be replaced by the improved type, the JCS later decided to accept the delay rather than to manufacture more MOD O type noses. 3

In answer to the JCS request for CINCPAC's views on missile warhead characteristics, and the numbers of the various missiles to be used, CINCPAC recommended the 'dial-a-yield' type warheads, improvements in CEP/yield ratios until clean weapons became available, and that the number of missiles should coincide with the FY67 force level requirement for three MRBM squadrons and nine POLARIS submarines. 4 (SECRET)

(SECRET)

CINCPAC 080155Z Mar 62 (S)

JCS 232307Z Mar 62 (TS) CINCPAC 242232Z Mar 62 (TS) CINCPAC 120642Z May 62 (S)

A mid-year decision by the President resulted in a large reduction in the number of Davy Crockett warheads allocated to CINCPAC. CINCUSARPAC remained as the only user of that system; his allocation was reduced from 180 to 33, and the JCS reserve of 20 Davy Crockett weapons was eliminated. 1

In August the JCS made available to CINCPAC the nuclear weapon allocation for FY63. ² CINCPAC in turn suballocated the nuclear weapons to his Component Commanders and asked for their dispersal requirements based on the new suballocation. ³ The FY63 allocation increased organic delivery weapons, anti-air weapons and anti-submarine weapons over the FY62 allocation, but reduced the number of air strike weapons.

CINCPAC reiterated to the JCShis requirement for fractional yield, fusion type nuclear weapons, and asked the status of their development. The JCS replied that the development of such weapons was underway, but that it was impossible to forecast the date they would be available in PACOM.

Nuclear Weapon Requirement Study FY65

The annual nuclear weapon requirement study was completed on 3 April and forwarded to the JCS as required by SM 1306-61. Normally this study would have covered fiscal years 64 and 65, however, because of an early review of FY64 requirements, the JCS deleted the need to re-study the FY64 period. The main difference between the 1965 study and earlier studies was a greater recognition of the Allied nuclear capable delivery vehicles to give fire support in the Taiwan and Korean area. ⁵

^{1.} JCS SM 703-62 of 25 Jun 62 (TS)

^{2.} JCS SM 842-62 of 1 Aug 62 (TS)

^{3.} CINCPAC 310415Z Aug 62 (TS)

^{4.} JCS 5880 DTG 291509Z Aug 62 (TS)


^{5.} CINCPAC ltr Ser: 000104 of 3 Apr 62 (TS)

Development of Post-Strike Reconnaissance Plan

At the end of 1962 CINCPAC was in the process of revising Annex H (Reconnaissance) to his OPLAN 1-63, the purpose of which was to establish procedures for conducting post-strike reconnaissance and reporting and exchanging information between commanders. CINCPAC expected to publish the annex early in 1963 so that it would be effective with the first revision to SIOP-63. The revised annex would contain the CINCPAC Coordinated Reconnaissance Plan for initial reconnaissance of SIOP targets. 1


SIOP Alert Force Commitment

CINCPACAF asked for a change in the alert force definition that would eliminate the reference to reaction time and let him include flyable alert aircraft (those that could be in the air within one hour after receipt of the execution order) in the PACAF alert force committed to SIOP. CINCPAC did not approve deleting a time reference in the alert force definition, but did authorize CINCPACAF to include flyable alert sorties in the alert force for PACAF, in view of the capability of the force to meet the 15 minute reaction time in most instances. SECRET



War Gaming SIOP-63

Phase I: During the first part of 1962 the War Games Branch prepared inputs, and developed planning and attrition factors in preparation for the gaming of SIOP-63. Assistance in the preparation for 1. ADM. Felt's Problem Book, Item: Post-Strike Reconnaissance, dated 2 Jan 63, (TS). Filed in J04
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00815 of 13 Dec 62 (S)



gaming was received from the CINCPACREP JSTPS in the form of attrition tables and instructions for their use. Additional assistance was requested from JCS to furnish SAC profile and tanker data. However this information was not forthcoming by the end of the year.

Using the previously developed manual gaming model and procedures with computer assistance, an analysis was conducted according to JCS instructions of the SIOP-63 (1 August position) as it pertained to the Pacific Command. Under the various conditions specified by the JCS, the analysis developed an estimate of:

Damage to allied population and industry and to U.S. military installations associated with SIOP forces in the PACOM area.

The probable numbers and types of surviving PACOM SIOP delivery vehicles, taking into account the weapons, launch bases, and controls necessary to permit use of these vehicles.

The completed analysis was forwarded to the JCS on 13 September 1962 and was briefed to representatives of the Joint Staff at JSTPS and to the Joint Staff, JCS. ²

Phase II: After completing the above analysis, preparations were made for a two sided computerized war gaming of the 1 December position of SIOP-63. Preparations included development and testing of a program that would permit war gaming dynamically both Blue and Red forces simultaneously. In this Phase II gaming, the Red plan was based on the JCS developed Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan (RISOP). The purpose of this game was to evaluate the effectiveness of SIOP-63 in the Pacific and develop estimates of the consequences of its execution as they affected CINCPAC's area of interest.

SRG Model: Future war gaming of SIOP was planned to use a computer program of the CINCPAC developed air battle model which was developed by the Systems Research Group under contract to the Naval Command Systems Support Activity. This program would permit the simulation to follow each sortie (missile or aircraft) in detail, considering the system reliability, base loss, attrition from enemy

1. JCS 5481 DTG 282223Z Jul 62 (TS) 2. CINCPAC ltr Ser: 000282-62 of 13 Sep 62 (TS) defenses, impact of damage and fallout, and the impact of visibility conditions from weather and darkness.

Limited War Gaming: Initial steps were taken during 1962 to assess existing models, studies, and games on limited war. It was anticipated that in 1963 the War Games Branch would be augmented in order to accomplish limited war gaming, hence early familiarization with current contingency plans and the gathering of background data was a matter of continuing activity.


OPERATION OF U.S. FORCES

Twice during 1962 PACOM forces of significant size were deployed hurriedly to check communist thrusts or threats. During May and June Army, Air Force, Marine and Naval units were deployed to Thailand following the fall of Nam Tha in Laos to the communists. Late in October, PACOM Marine and Navy units were sent to the Caribbean during the Cuban crisis.

Movement of U.S. Forces to Thailand

The following is a tabulation of the major movement of U.S. troops and equipment into Thailand: (SECRET)

U. S. Army: During the first part of May, 1 BG/27 Infantry (-) was in Thailand participating in a training exercise and was directed to remain there until further notice. At the conclusion of exercise AIR COBRA, the BG moved to the vicinity of Korat. Movement of the augmentation force for this BG commenced on 17 May when the first group departed Hawaii. The augmentation force consisted of the 1st How Bn, 8th Arty (Reinf); 4th BG Area Spt Plt, Co. B, 125th Sig Bn; 4th DS SV (-), Fwd Spt Co., 725th Ord Bn; Det, 25th Avn Co.; Co. C (Reinf), 65th Engt Bn; 1st Amb Plt (-), Amb Co., 25th Med Bn; 1st Clr Plt (-), Clr Co., 25th Med Bn; 3d Trk Plt (Reinf), Co. A, 33d Trans Bn; Elm of 25th MI Det; Troop B (Reinf), 3d Rcn Sq, 4th Cavl; and the 2d Armd Car Plt (Reinf), Co. C, 33d Trans Bn. The forward element of CJTF 116 departed Hawaii on 15 May and arrived at Bangkok on the 17th. It



assumed operational control of U.S. forces in Thailand on the 19th, and moved to Korat on 22 May. CJTF 116 (Rear) left Okinawa for Thailand on 20 May. The 999th Signal Co. (-) moved from Okinawa to Thailand between 20 and 26 May. The 9th Log Command moved from Okinawa to Thailand between 25 and 27 May, a platoon of the UTT Co. left Okinawa for Thailand on the 29th. The 1st Aviation Company (Caribou aircraft) left Ft. Benning on 31 May enroute to Thailand. The advance elements of the 167th Signal Company arrived in Bangkok on the 24th. The 31st Field Hospital left Ft. Lewis, Washington on 25 May enroute to Korat.

USAF: The 510th TFS (with 20 F-100s) flew from Clark AFB and arrived at Takhli Air Base on 16 May. At CINCPAC's request, the JCS approved the movement from CONUS to Clark AFB of a F-100 squadron, a C-130 squadron, a communication and control element, and a manned mobile radar unit. Two of these units were later deployed to Thailand.

U.S. Navy: As the build-up of U.S. forces in Thailand got underway, CINCPAC directed the HANCOCK Carrier Group to operate in the southern extremity of her normal readiness operating area. The BENNINGTON ASW Carrier Group was directed to cover the HANCOCK Group. The VALLEY FORGE, NAVARRO, POINT DEFIANCE, VAMMEN and BRANNON proceeded to arrive in Bangkok area on 16 May to off-load the ready Marine BLT (BLT 3/9).

<u>USMC</u>: BLT 3/9 (less tanks and the LVT detachments) and HMM Sqdn 261 (UH-34 helicopters) were off loaded at Bangkok on 16 May, and proceeded to vicinity of Udorn. VMA Sqdn 332 (with 20 A4D air-craft and supporting elements) flew from Cubi Point to Udorn, arriving on 16 May.

Additional information on the movement of U.S. forces into
Thailand is contained in the Laos section of Chapter IV. Information
on the withdrawal of these forces is included in the Thailand section of
Chapter IV. (UNCLASSIFIED)

1. CINCPAC 130909Z May 62 (S)

Cuban Crisis

USMC Operations: On 18 October the JCS directed that a Marine BLT of the 1st Marine Division (Reinf), and a task element of the 5th MEB be assigned immediately to the operational control of CINCLANT, who asked that the BLT be moved as soon as possible to Guantanamo Bay. 1,2 On 20 October BLT 2/1 and the 3d Light Anti-aircraft Missile (LAAM) Bn changed operational control to LANTCOM, and on the following day the 5th MEB was alerted to move. JCS established worldwide DEFCON 3 for U.S. forces on 22 October and also directed that the 5th MEB embark, passing to control of CINCLANT upon transitting the Panama Canal. BLT 2/1 moved by air and closed on Guantanamo Bay on 22 October: the 3d LAAM Battalion closed there on the 25th. Marine Attack Squadrons 121 and 223 were directed to shift operational control to CINCLANT in place. VMA 121 moved to Cherry Point, N.C., on 12 November, but the latter remained at its home base, MCAS El Toro, California. At the end of October the following Marine units, with a total strength of approximately 12,000 personnel, had been assigned to the Atlantic Command: five BLTs, two attack squadrons, a transport aircraft squadron, a medium helicopter squadron, and a LAAM battalion.

Naval Operations: On 19 October the JCS asked CINCPAC to assemble the amphibious shipping to lift the 5th MEB (-). The sailing directive was received from the JCS on 25 October. Task Group 53.2, consisting of COMPHIBGRU THREE in the ELDORADO plus one LPH, six APAs, one APD, four AKAs, eight LSDs, one AO, and one AF sortied from San Diego on 26 and 27 October, escorted by eight destroyers.

These units commenced movement through the Panama Canal on 6 November and passed to the operational control of COMPHIBLANT.

- 1. JCS 182345Z Oct 62 (TS)
- 2. CINCLANT 190618Z Oct 62 (TS)
- 3. JCS 221805Z Oct 62 (TS)
- 4. JCS 192231Z Oct 62 (TS)
- 5. JCS 251859Z Oct 62 (S)
- 6. COMPHIBPAC 271821Z Oct 62 (S)

The JCS cancelled the world-wide DEFCON 3 on 27 November and directed all 5th MEB elements and other PACOM forces that had been assigned to LANTCOM, with the exception of the 3d LAAM Battalion, to return to home stations embarked aboard PHIBGRU 3 shipping. ¹ The JCS also directed that BLT 2/1, which had been airlifted into Guantanamo Naval Base, would be embarked on the returning ships. ² VMA 223, which had shifted to operational control of CINCLANT but had remained in place in El Toro, was returned to the operational control of CINCPAC. ³ At the end of November, only the 3d LAAM Battalion remained positioned in the LANTCOM area.

During the return trip, plans were made to permit the orderly unloading of troops and equipment at San Diego and concurrently to retain the capability to participate in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 if directed. Off-loading of ships commenced on 10 December, when the USS NOBLE arrived in port. At the request of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the NOBLE had proceeded to San Diego ahead of the main convoy in order that elements of BLT 1/7, scheduled as the next WESTPAC rotation unit, could prepare for the move that had been delayed by the Cuban situation. Except for the 3d LAAM Battalion, which had been alerted to receive a permanent change of station to the East Coast, all units of the 5th MEB and PHIBGRU 3 had returned to homeports and bases by 17 December.

Naval Patrols Along the Red China Coast

During the middle of April the USS DEHAVEN conducted a JCS approved patrol along the coast of Communist China, and received several warnings from Red Chinese naval units off Tsingtao. 5,6 Despite some State Department opposition, the next patrol was approved for the USS GREGORY for the period 20-25 May. After this was

^{1.} JCS 272124Z Nov 62 (TS)

^{2.} JCS 282249Z Nov 62 (TS)

^{3.} CINCLANT 291208Z Nov 62 (TS)

^{4.} CINCPACFLT 181837 Z Dec 62 (S)

^{5.} CINCPAC 172231 Z Mar 62 (S)

^{6.} CTG 72.9 DTG 141153Z Apr 62 (C)

conducted without major incident, similar patrols were conducted during the following four months. To introduce a change, the October patrol ship, the USS HOLLISTER, went from Taiwan along the route of previous patrols as far as 32°N, at which point it followed a new track through the Korea Straits along the North Korean coast to 42°N, and then returned by the same route, meeting neither ship nor aircraft reaction during the patrol. The USS SHELTON followed the same track for the November patrol. For December the USS AGERHOLM shifted the patrol to the Gulf of Tonkin and sailed around Hainan Island and into the Gulf as far as 21°N, the deepest penetration by a U.S. warship in that area. The patrol, between 16 and 24 December, was followed by three Red Chinese naval units without incident.

JOINT TRAINING

PACOM forces participated in two JCS sponsored, world-wide command post exercises (CPX) and in several smaller scale joint training exercises. Exercise WHIP LASH was scheduled by the JCS with a vulnerability period between 8 and 18 May. The CPX objective was to train participants in emergency conditions in both limited and general war, and to test contingency operations plans. Participating commands were provided situation summaries and certain pre-positioned messages compatible with the exercise scenario. The exercise commenced on 8 May, but the JCS cancelled it two days later, and CINCPAC terminated PACOM's participation because the exercise messages were being confused with a genuine emergency situation then building up in Laos as a result of the seizure by communist forces of Nam Tha. 3 PACOM Forces participated less than 72 hours in the exercise and failed to accomplish any of the specific objectives. The primary lesson learned was that an exercise of that type involving contingency plans provided a highly effective means for reviewing and familiarizing personnel at all levels with contingency plans.

^{1.} ADMINO COMSEVENTHFLT 300954Z Sep 62 (S)

^{2.} COMSEVENTHFLT 080250Z Dec 62 (S)

^{3.} JCS 4477 DTG 102113Z May 62 (S)

Exercise HIGH HEELS II commenced on 6 September with the intelligence build-up (Phase I). Before this, on 4 September, a 12-hour Jolly Roger Exercise was held to acquaint new personnel with the operational procedures of the Joint Target Intelligence Group (JTIG) to support the Joint Nuclear Plot. Other preparations for HIGH HEELS II took place earlier following the 1 August effective date of SIOP-63. The CINCPAC Representative of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff toured the PACOM area to brief appropriate commands on the new SIOP, and a series of progressive Jolly Roger Exercises was conducted implementing SIOP-63 procedures in preparation for the CPX. Also, Pacific Alternate Command Element representatives deployed to the alternate headquarters in Guam for training and familiarization purposes.

The alert Phase -- Phase II - of HIGH HEELS II began on 20 September with JTIG becoming operational on a continuous basis. Phase III, the hostilities phase, was declared the next morning and lasted until 0900 local time on 23 September.

A detailed account of the communications aspects of HIGH HEELS II is included in the communications section of this chapter.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Throughout the year, CINCPAC intelligence produced studies and analysis of military and political activities and developments in the Communist Bloc and in other countries within CINCPAC's area of responsibility. Evaluations of communist intentions and capabilities, and analysis of the changing forces and trends within the governments, nations, and military forces became the basis for U.S. policies and decisions. Many of the detailed products of the CINCPAC Intelligence Division were published in the Weekly Intelligence Digest. This section does not attempt to describe the routine intelligence activities which comprised the largest portion of CINCPAC's intelligence product, but lists only the more significant of the other-than-routine matters.

The Communist Threat to South Korea

A significant CINCPAC intelligence activity during 1962 was the development of a realistic appraisal of the Red Chinese/North Korean threat to South Korea in the period from 1962 to 1968. This evaluation was an outgrowth of a Secretary of Defense request for an examination of several alternatives with regard to U.S. support and force levels for Korea that were then under consideration. The Secretary assigned this project to a small group headed by Major General John B. Cary (USAF Ret.), which visited Korea during February and March to arrive at the forces needed to counter each threat. One of the alternatives was to consider the threat as being only from North Korea, which would justify a reduction in ROK forces.

At the request of General Cary, CINCPAC prepared a detailed intelligence examination of the separate military threats from North Korea and Red China, including amphibious and airborne threats, the size of the enemy air and nuclear threats, and the enemy's ability to build up, move and support its forces in combat. 1,2


Before returning to Washington, the Cary Group indicated that its conclusions would support CINCPAC's position that there should be no reduction in the military force levels in Korea.

The Red China Threat to Japan

Another appraisal of an enemy threat was made at the end of 1962 when the Intelligence Division prepared assessments of the military threat to Japan from the Soviet Union and Red China, and a summary of communist missile capabilities in the Far East. In the exchange of messages with the U.S. Ambassador to Japan made during preparations for two high-level talks scheduled in Japan early in 1963, the Ambassador made numerous references to the Chinese Communist threat to Japan. CINCPAC believed that this threat had been over rated considering that the prime threat was the USSR. The intelligence studies

CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00094 of 23 Mar 62 (TS)
 CINC Seoul Korea UK 60156 DTG 190300Z Mar 62 (S)

^{3.} Memo, ADM. Stroh to ADM. Felt, Subj: Cary Group Report, 16 April 1962, (TS). In J513 files.




that he planned to use in support of his position indicated that the overt threat to Japan would occur only in a general war situation, and that it would be primarily a Soviet threat. 1,2

Vulnerability of the DRV


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Intelligence analysis of the communist government of North Vietnam indicated certain vulnerable areas that would make attractive targets for retaliatory attacks that could be carried out by special forces or tribesmen from the Republic of Vietnam. These targets included power plants, railroads, bridges and similar assets that had been constructed by the French and upon which the DRV economy had become dependent. Using this study as a basis, CINCPAC presented to the JCS his concept of clandestine attacks to harass the DRV and bring to an end some of the advantages the DRV enjoyed because of its protected borders. At the request of the JCS, CINCPAC prepared his OPLAN 33-62, which is described in the Operational Planning section of this chapter.



1. J2 memo 00065-62 of 28 Dec 62 (TS) in J2 files.

2. J2 memo 00240-62 of 31 Dec 62 (S) in J2 files.



Analysis of the GVN and Viet Cong Power Balance

During the early part of 1962 CINCPAC submitted to the JCS two carefully prepared appraisals of the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the GVN forces versus the Viet Cong. The first of these, forwarded on 23 February, pointed out the advantages the Viet Cong enjoyed because it could choose the terms of the war. By imposing a non-conventional form of warfare the Viet Cong hoped to prolong the fighting and sap the GVN military and political strength. And by its extremely elusive methods the Viet Cong had successfully placed conventional military elements at a disadvantage and eroded some of the advantages of the GVN's more modern armaments.

CINCPAC summarized the conditions in February by saying that the VC was feeling the results of the GVN's increased strength, but it had not suffered any major setbacks or loss of territory. Still unwilling to stand and fight in the open, the VC planned a prolonged form of attritional warfare which could not be counteracted by purely military



means. He also said that although military superiority was a prerequisite to a solution, final success would come only when all of the people could be alienated from the Viet Cong and given adequate protection and security. 1

Two months later was willing to express cautious optimism, especially for the long term. He noted improvements in the GVN's fighting concepts and capabilities, and in intelligence procedures and results. But he warned that his appraisal made in February was still valid, and that it would require time and patience as well as hard work and imagination to win the people's war in the RVN.

Throughout the year the Weekly Intelligence Digest carried a running analysis of the war in the Republic of Vietnam, highlighting all facts and factors of the conflict.

India/Red China Conflict

After making a study of the Sino-Indian border conflict, in an 8 November message, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS several recommendations for a U.S. course of action. Noting that Tibetan guerrilla remnants were left behind Red Chinese lines after Red China suppressed an uprising in Tibet in 1959, CINCPAC suggested there was a good chance the Tibetans could interdict roads and bridges, and otherwise seriously harass the Red Chinese military effort if these potential resistance fighters could be reinforced in Tibet and furnished with arms and demolition materials. Renewed insurrection in Tibet could help reduce the effectiveness of the Chinese frontal effort. CINCPAC also suggested that, on the political front, the Dalai Lama be given encouragement. 3

^{1.} CINCPAC 230815Z Feb 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 260006Z Apr 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 080415Z Nov 62 (S)

Exemples .

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CINCPAC COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

As in previous years, CINCPAC devoted an extensive effort during 1962 to improve communications in the PACOM area by establishing new systems and by improving or expanding existing systems. Some of the communications areas involved were joint overseas voice switching, cyphony requirements, communications security assistance, Trans-Pacific cable, automatic teletype relays, command and control, frequency management, the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), standardized procedures, troposcatter systems, aircraft control and warning (AC&W) systems, SEATO communications, electronic warfare (EW), and Southeast Asia telecommunications.

CINCPAC was particularly concerned with the communications systems of Southeast Asia where the role played by the United States required a reliable and responsive intra and inter theater communications system.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

This section describes communications activities that were of PACOM-wide significance, or those that involved several countries in a common communications area. Communications in the Republic of Vietnam, Thailand and Laos are described in Chapter IV. The planning and improvement of Communications in other countries and areas within PACOM are described in Chapter II. (GONFIDENTIAL)

Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) Communications

Exercise High Heels II was conducted from 6 to 28 September 1962 and proved to be the most successful test of PACOM's communications system to date. Improvements in message traffic were noted on virtually all command and control communications actions. The addition

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resulted in an overall outgoing handling time average of 6 minutes for operational immediate precedence messages, compared to 22 minutes for High Heels I. Some of the problems encountered and CINCPAC's recommendations to JCS to eliminate them were:

- did not degrade the system to the extent anticipated. To achieve the desired results it would be necessary to establish an umpire/trusted agent system for each major geographical complex. CINCPAC recommended that:
- a. One of the bi-annual exercises have as its objective communications casualties extensive enough to test the ingenuity of commanders, and to make the Joint Operational Reports incomplete.
- b. An umpire/trusted agent system be established at major force levels in each major geographical area in order that all communications restoral actions could be judged as feasible.
- c. The filter desk system simulating message delays be eliminated in favor of labeling communication channels an "Exercise Casualty".
- d. Real traffic at relay station be handled in a normal manner, except for operational immediate precedence and higher messages.
- 2. The requirement to keep alternate headquarters and relocation sites current on the progress of the simulated emergency caused communications problems. An excessive amount of duplicates were introduced into the system and abnormal burdens were assumed by the readdressing communication center. CINCPAC recommended that:

The JCS establish a dual address indicator group (AIG) system. AIG lists would consist of peacetime and emergency lists expanded to conform with the number of AIG lists in emergency use. The emergency AIG lists would be employed automatically by all exercise

participants at worldwide JCS DEFCON 1 and would include the alternate location requirements of all commands at the Unified/Specified Command level. Readdressal systems would be employed by command relocating at different DEFCONs to avoid unnecessary complications.

- 3. The handling of emergency messages, though improved over previous exercises, continued to require excessive handling time. If significant improvement was to be achieved in message handling, drastic reconfiguration of the system to its commandand control function would be necessary. CINCPAC recommended that:
- a. Six hundred to 1000 word per minute automatic tape segregator/multipliers be provided on an expedited basis to all torn tape relays, with priority given to the command and control minor relays.
- b. Command and control minor relay concept as outlined below be included in the Defense Communication Agency (DCA) Mid-Range Plan:

Geographical Location	Command & Control Minor relay site (Subj to further coordination)	Operational Responsibility
Hawaii	CINCPAC/	Navy
Philippines Japan Okinawa Taiwan Korea Vietnam Thailand Laos	Clark Air Force Base Camp Drake Fort Buckner ** Grass Mountain ** Not Selected Tan Son Nhut Don Muang Udorn **	Air Force Army Army Army Air Force Air Force Air Force Army

- * Already modernized with AN/FGC-59 and AN/FGC-71 Multiple Address Processing Unit (MAPU) equipment.
- **- Co-located with primary relay but with physical separation.
- c. Each command and control minor relay be connected to Naval Communication Station for on-line entry into Naval broadcast stations to the extent feasible.
- 4. Minimize was imposed by JCS and unified commands, causing a flood of messages frequently duplicative throughout the DCS.

This item was reported to JCS with CINCPAC recommendations for the establishment of a coordinated area imposition system. 1

- 5. Circuit restorations for post casualty restoral actions were not closely coordinated. Each terminal would attempt restoral via different means. Establishment of the Defense Regional Control Centers should reduce or eliminate this problem.
- 6. Receipts between communication stations/relays for emergency messages should be prompt. handled 270 emergency and 251 flash messages which generated 770 receipts. When the receipts were delayed, messages were routed alternatively causing unnecessary duplicates in the DCS. The JP network restoration priority 1D circuits would be equipped with flash/emergency traffic alarms that would provide visual and audible signals (distinctive from teletype bell) and would activate after 4 bells signal requiring operator presence to disengage.

CINCPAC Command and Control Facilities

CINCPAC maintained the capability for fast, reliable, secure and non-secure teletype and voice circuits to senior and lateral contacts on CONUS and to subordinate PACOM commanders. Local secure voice circuits used the KY-1, KY-9 and KO-6 voice encryption equipment. The KY-9 (land line) and KO-6 (radio and land line) equipment were used on long range circuits. CINCPAC's secure voice and secure teletype capability is illustrated by Figure 10.

In addition to the capabilities mentioned above, the Joint Chief of Staff Alerting Network (JCSAN) and Joint Chiefs of Staff Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System (JCS EMATS) were available for immediate contact with the JCS. To provide maximum use and flexibility, a 100 line 4-wire cordless telephone switchboard was being procured to replace the existing small cordless board and call director at CINCPAC's Camp Smith War Room. Two pre-emptive EMATS

^{1.} CINCPAC 180212Z Aug 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00807 of 11 Dec 62, pp 1- A-4, (S)

^{3.} HDNAVCOMMSYS 281848Z Jun 62 (C)

SECRET

circuits were installed, the primary on JP circuit 5 and the secondary on JP-19. EMATS was installed on JP-5 in 1961 and on JP-19 in February 1962. CINCPAC also had direct non-secure voice alert circuits via military channels to the following PACOM commanders:

CINCUSARPAC

CGEUSA

CINCPACFLT

COMFIRSTFLT

CINCPACAF

COM7THFLT

CTG 79.3

5TH AF COMMAND CENTER

18th Tactical Fighter Wing Command Center

DET 1 8th Tactical Fighter Wing Command Center

498th Tactical Missle Group Command Center

13th AF Command Operation Center

DET 1 405th Staff Operation

Center

DET 1 3rd Bomber Wing Staff Operations Center

PACE

COMUSKOREA


COMUSJAPAN

Trans-Pacific Cable

A Trans-Pacific submarine cable from California to Oahu-Midway-Wake-Guam-Japan was programmed for completion by AT&T in June 1964. Dual terminations were planned on Oahu at Hanauma and Makaha with total patch through capability via submarine cable. In addition to the AT&T cable, other commercial cable projects were planned for PACOM at the same time.

DACCCPAC P350/0188 DTG 200204Z Jan 62 (C) COMUSJAPAN USCOM 02065 DTG 130426Z Feb 62 (U)

DACCCPAC P300/1431 DTG 220223Z Feb 62 (C)




SECRET

FIG 10

Y-SECURE VOICE

At the end of the year, estimated dates for completion of these planned cables were: 1,2



May 1964 Jul 1964 Jul 1964 Jul 1964 Apr 1965 Sep 1963 Sep 1963 1967

Cyphony Requirements

Much progress was made in covering teletype circuits, with the eventual objective that of covering all circuits within PACOM. The single channel cryptographic device KW-26 was used primarily, but the supply was insufficient for the demand. The cost, the need for a specialized operator and maintenance training, and general user non-acceptance of the KO-6 limited the covering of voice circuits. The KY-9 voice encryption equipment proved satisfactory provided high quality landlines were available. The KY-9 was limited to landline operation and its supply was also limited. A KY-9 was installed at CINCPAC Headquarters, Camp Smith in April and a second KY-9 was

nets (Command Net and Security Net) were covered by half-duplex voice encryption equipment KY-1s. These were planned to be replaced with voice encryption equipment KY-3s which would be full-duplex. The KY-3s would be compatible with the key generator equipment KG-13s which were to cover all overseas trunks. In Hawaii the KG-13s were scheduled to be installed

DCA Mid-Range Task 7 Hawaii


Defense Communications Agency Mid-Range 7 Hawaii concerned reterminations of priority users in Hawaii to the Air Force Plan 55 Automatic teletype relay at Hickam AFB. As a result of a traffic

- 1. DACCCPAC P300/1431 DTG 060223Z Apr 62 EFTO
- 2. HQ USAF AFOAC-OP 60318 DTG 222027 Z Jun 62 (C)

engineering survey of trunk loading, it was determined CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSARPAC would be reterminated in the Air Force Plan 55 Auto Relay. ¹

CINCPAC was to terminate two full-duplex circuits and one on-call receive-only from Camp Smith to Hickam AFB Plan 55. 2

Task 7 Hawaii was dependent upon completion of Task 7 Japan and the availability of cryptographic equipments (KW-26). Cut-over date



Operation Dominic

Joint Task Force 8 Operation Dominic, which ended in November 1962, required many actions by CINCPAC. Change 5 to CINCPAC Communications-Electronics Instruction was published

A great amount of preparatory effort to reroute critical communications circuits via the least vulnerable paths was taken prior to each scheduled detonation. CINCPAC imposed minimize on several occasions 24 hours prior to high altitude bursts.

Okinawa Facilities

CINCPAC established a requirement for a troposcatter link from Okinawa to the Philippines. This would give more reliable communications

- 1. DACCCPAC P330/04931 DTG 081832 Z Nov 62 (C)
- 2. USNAVSTA Honolulu ltr Ser: 0445 of 4 Dec 62, p B-I-1 (C)
- 3. CINCPAC 282245Z Nov 62 (C)
- 4. AFCS TCRE 2506M DTG 131355Z Dec 62 (C)
- 5. DCA 422.1/01212 DTG 080010Z Dec 62 (C)
- 6. CINCPAC 102054Z Feb 62 (S)

between the Philippines and Okinawa than the existing high frequency systems that were plagued with propagation problems. 1

Also, a troposcatter system to Japan was under construction with an estimated operational date of October 1963.

For the first time in PACOM, the Hawaii-Okinawa Army and Air Force frequency assignments were combined into a single DCS frequency complement to enhance operational performance. Defense Area Communications Control Center Pacific (DACCCPAC) was charged with the day-to-day management of these resources.

Joint Overseas Switchboards

Defense Communication Agency Mid-Range Plan Task 9 Pacific Area specified that four-wire switchboards would be installed in the Pacific Area. CINCPAC confirmed these requirements and specified the locations to be Hawaii, Philippines, Okinawa, Saigon, Bangkok, Japan, Guam, Formosa, and Korea. Department of Army had operational responsibility for switchboards in Bangkok, Saigon, Okinawa, Taiwan, and Korea; the Air Force had operational responsibility for switchboards in Japan and the Philippines; and the Navy was responsible for switchboards in Hawaii and Guam. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Frequency Control and Management

CINCPAC converted the PACOM Frequency Allocations and Uses document used for control and management of frequencies from an electrical accounting machine process to ADP facilities in March 1962. Computer facilities at Kunia, consisting of IBM 704 equipment, were used with the G.C. Dewey Corporation doing the programming.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

In conjunction with the conversion of frequency records to computer processes, CINCPAC Instruction 2410.1 of 23 March 1962 was published (UNCLASSIFIED)

- 1. CINCPAC 110302Z Dec 62 (C)
- 2. CINCPAC 052250Z Sep 62 (S)
- 3. CINCPAC 100317Z Jul 62 (U)
- 4. CINCPAC 232233Z May 62 (S)
- 5. CINCPAC 150156Z Dec 62 (C)

for guidance of CINCPAC Area Frequency Coordinators. Additionally, new reporting forms were prepared and distributed for the maintenance of frequency information. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Subsequent to conversion to ADP methods, a representative of the Joint Frequency Panel, U.S. Military Communications-Electronics Board, JCS, visited CINCPAC to observe the CINCPAC frequency computer program to gather information concerning computer techniques for use in the frequency management function at JCS level.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

To aid the Defense Area Communications Control Center Pacific (DACCCPAC) in its frequency management tasks for the Pacific Defense Communications System (DCS), the information in the computer was configured to permit DACCCPAC to retrieve frequency data pertinent to the DCS. (UNCLASSIFIED)

In the interest of standardization, CINCPAC requested the JCS to consider adopting a uniform format for use by all military agencies in reporting harmful frequency interference. As a result, a format consistent with that of the International Telecommunications Union 1959 Radio Regulations was adopted by JCS and was disseminated to major elements of the PACOM. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Hundreds of frequency coordination and clearance actions were involved in support of Operation Dominic during its one year planning, operational and phase-out period. The operation ended in November 1962 and relied primarily on radio for communications. Frequency requirements for communications, telemetry and control ranged from VLF through the radar bands. Military, scientific and civil agencies as well as foreign governments became involved in the resolution of the various aspects of frequency clearance and coordination. Frequencies were diverted from both tactical and DCS in order to meet the requirements.

PACOM frequency coordination for Project Mercury's latest mission, which began in July, was successfully concluded with the recovery of (UNCLASSIFIED)

^{1.} CINCPAC 270306 Z Sep 61 (U)

^{2.} CINCPAC ltr Ser: 44 of 9 Jan 62 (U)

the MA-8 vehicle and its astronaut. Prior to, during, and for several hours after the six orbit flight, protection was afforded Project Mercury frequency assignments. Also, during the flight, military and civilian amateur radio stations in the PACOM area participated in a high frequency communications experiment. The purpose of the experiment was to establish a representative high frequency (HF) propagation profile for the mission, on a global scale. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare received an increasing amount of attention in PACOM by U.S. SEATO, and MAP supported military forces during 1962. Electronics warfare requirements were originated by SEATO, and MAP supported countries submitted requests for electronic warfare equipment, training and publications with increasing frequency.

Problems faced in trying to provide an electronic warfare capability for MAP supported countries involved availability and cost of Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) and Electronic Counter Counter Measures (ECCM) equipment, together with security and release factors. Modern and sophisticated air defense electronics systems were being introduced into PACOM MAP countries. These countries wanted related ECCM equipment, not yet programmed, which would enable them to use effectively their electronic equipment.

CINCPAC sponsored a PACOM Electronic Warfare conference at Fuchu Air Station, Japan from 15 to 18 May 1962, to review and improve the PACOM electronic warfare capability.

Representatives from most major commands in PACOM attended, as well as representatives from JCS and the Service Headquarters in Washington. After a series of presentations, those attending formed working groups to give detailed attention to particular electronic warfare problems associated with surface-to-air missile systems, AC&W systems, and overall electronic warfare training requirements. 2

AFMTC Patrick AFB 271930Z Sep 62 (U)
 Chairman, PACOM EW Conference ltr Subj: Report of PACOM EW Conference, 18 May 62 (S)

Third Annual Joint Communications-Electronics Conference

The Third Annual Joint Communications-Electronics Conference was held in Washington, D.C. from 2 to 4 October 1962. The PACOM delegation included CINCPAC Deputy J6 and the Chief, CINCPAC J6 Plans and Policy Branch. Principal items covered by the CINCPAC conferee's in a review of PACOM communications-electronics were:

- 1. Progress in implementing the DCS, including joint overseas switching, cyphony requirements plan, Plan 55 for Japan and Hawaii, Trans-Pacific cable, Project WET WASH, command and control system communications, and frequency management and procedures.
- 2. Communications-electronics projects in MAP, including modernization and automation of air defense ground environment, provisions of modern telecommunications systems to PACOM countries, communications security assistance to Allies, electronic warfare, and navigational aids.
- 3. Communications-electronics in sub-limited warfare, with emphasis on PACOM efforts in developing adequate communications-electronics bases in Thailand and Republic of Vietnam, and the lessons learned from experience, procedures, techniques and problems associated with the military situation in Southeast Asia.

Automation of Air Defense Ground Environment in the PACOM

Aircraft Control and Warning radar systems, in operation in the land masses of PACOM, were manual systems which had long reaction time and low intercept handling capacity. Extensive studies were made by the Staffs of CINCPAC, the component commanders and certain MAAGs to determine requirements for automation of the air defense ground environment. CINCPAC advised, and the JCS concurred, that requirements for U.S. forces in PACOM included AN/GPA-73 systems for Hawaii, the Philippines and Okinawa, and two AN/MSQ-28s for Korea. (For additional information see Chapter II).

Village/Hamlet Radios for Republic of Vietnam and Thailand

Increasing insurgency in the Republic of Vietnam, and the rise of infiltration and subversion problems in Thailand focused attention on the urgent need for rapid communications to support counterinsurgency and counter-subversion operations at the village and hamlet level. Actions during 1962 to extend electrical communications means to the "rice roots" in the RVN and Thailand had, as a common base, a U.S. AID project for village radios in the RVN. This project began several years ago and was designed to provide a greater span of government control in underdeveloped areas. Two different approaches were used to implement the communications programs. In the RVN, U.S. AID had the stewardship, receiving assistance from COMUSMACV in the form of manpower and money for material. COMUSMACTHAI had the lead in Thailand, receiving advice and assistance from U.S. AID.

While in Southeast Asia during the period 8-11 May 1962, the Secretary of Defense pressed for the expansion of the U.S. AID village radio program in the RVN to include provision of a hamlet warning communications system. At the same time he approved a similar village radio program for Thailand. 1, 2, 3

At a 23 July SecDef meeting in Hawaii, the Secretary of Defense approved procurement of village type radios (TR-20) to be financed by MAP, and offered DOD funds and personnel to accelerate the program in the RVN. The Country Team schedule for village radios in Thailand was accepted by the Secretary at this same meeting. 4,5

As a result of the 23 July meeting, CINCPAC recommended that a special signal unit of 1 officer and 75 enlisted men be moved to the RVN with the mission of supporting U.S. AID in accelerating hamlet radios installations. CINCPAC also recommended that 6000 hamlet (SECRET)

1. JCS 4869 DTG 012329Z Jun 62 (TS)

2. COMUSMACV MAC J5 960 DTG 281100Z Jun 62 (TS)

3. CHJUSMAG Thailand MAL 20784 DTG 100430Z May 62 (S)

4. JCS 5455 DTG 262318Z Jul 62 (TS)

5. CINCPAC 272355Z Jul 62 (S)

radios be procured and shipped to Vietnam. 1,2 During the months of August to November many problems were encountered concerning the preferred type of radio set to be provided, and in the procurement and delivery schedule for the sets. Finally, CINCPAC concurred with a Country Team proposal to suspend further procurement of 2300 hamlet radio sets, as it was obvious that the Country Team needed time to re-assess the type and quantity of radio sets for the program. CINCPAC further recommended that funds earmarked for these radios be applied to other important projects. 3,4 CINCPAC concurred with a Country Team recommendation that the 76-man special signal unit be relieved by U.S. AID civilian personnel after it completed its 180-day temporary assignment in the RVN in March 1963. This would permit the completion of 3700 hamlet radio installations by the special unit with equipment arriving incountry, and give U.S. AID time to recruit civilians to take up the maintenance task and make future installations. ⁵

The ultimate requirement for full coverage in the village radio program for Thailand included 2300 village radios. The program was phased, with the installation of 243 radios (TR-20) as a pilot project in the northeast provinces of Thailand. The pilot program radios were in the process of delivery, and were being distributed through MAP channels. At the end of 1962, there were indications that this program might be delayed by the lack of local nationals who could be trained to operate and maintain the radios. The remaining 2057 radio sets were scheduled for delivery in quarterly increments of 257 each during FY64 and FY65. 6,7,8

Southeast Asia Telecommunications Project (SEATELCOM)

SEATELCOM, the U.S. AID sponsored telecommunications project for mainland Southeast Asia (described in CINCPAC's 1960 and 1961

CINCPAC 080730Z Aug 62 (S) CINCPAC 150131Z Aug 62 (C) SAIGON 551 to STATE 5PM 27 Nov 62 (C)

CINCPAC 010400Z Dec 62 (U) CINCPAC 180241Z Dec 62 (C)

CHJUSMAG Thailand MAO 21304 DTG 210830Z Jun 62 (S)

CINCPAC 240005Z Aug 62 (S) CHJUSMAG Thailand MASO 22306 DTG 080545Z Dec 62 (S)

Command Histories) would, if implemented, provide adequate in-country communications for the nations concerned. Some progress was accomplished in the project during 1962.

In Laos, the only portion of the project to be implemented was improvement of the Vientiane telephone system.

and U.S. AID assumed responsibility for completion of the project.

That part of the project in RVN north of Saigon was deferred indefinitely. Engineering a telecommunications system for the southern part of the country was completed. A contract was awarded to ITT on 6 November 1962 for installation of a microwave toll system in the Delta area.

A \$13.3 million contract was signed in Bangkok on 19 October 1962 which provided for the Collins Corporation to install by 4 October 1963 long distance, through trunks from Bangkok to Udorn and from Bangkok to Ubon, and to install by March 1964 drop outs to all principal population centers in the Bangkok plains and along the Bangkok-Udorn and Bangkok-Ubon axis. The Thai system was to have a minimum of 31 channels in low usage areas and a maximum of 240 channels on the primary arteries. 1, 2, 3

The Officer in Charge of Construction, Southeast Asia would manage the toll system contracts for the RVN and Thailand. 4

A contract was awarded to Philco Company for the regional single side band trunking system to link Bangkok and Saigon. ⁵

The military value of this telecommunications project had decreased as a result of military systems which were installed, or planned for the short-range future, reducing the military dependence upon SEATELCOM.

^{1.} BKK 554 to AID 188 to CINCPAC 5PM 16 Oct 62 (C)

^{2.} CHJUSMAG Thailand MASO 22035 DTG 190620Z Oct 62 (C)

^{3.} CINCPAC 212030Z Oct 62 (C)

^{4.} DIRPACDOCKS spdltr Ser: 0161 of 31 Nov 62 (C)

^{5.} USOM/SAIGON A377 to AID/W 7 Aug 62 (U)

Communications Activities within PACOM Countries

The Philippines: Progress continued on Plan FORESIGHT SIERRA, the Philippine name for a MAP supported, long line communications system for the Armed Forces Philippines. Eventually this joint service system was expected to link military installations located throughout the archipelago, including U.S. installations.

AN/TRC-24 equipment with associated relay and terminal facilities would make up the backbone of the system, providing a 12 channel network from northern Luzon to Mindanao. Telephone and teletype switching facilities at key locations would provide local and long distance trunking, and permit flexibility in communications for military units operating throughout the islands through strategically located communication terminals.

Throughout 1962 Stromberg-Carlson technicians trained and supervised Philippine military dial telephone installation and outside plant construction teams in the phased installation of the 15 dial telephone exchanges programmed for the Philippines, and in the construction of associated telephone distribution systems. CINCPAC concurred with a request from CHJUSMAG Philippines for engineer and equipment (AN/TRC-24) assistance in making a survey of the proposed long lines route between Manila and Cagayan De Oro, Mindanao. 1,2

CINCPAC established a requirement for a Philippine-Okinawa troposcatter system and a Philippine-Southeast Asia troposcatter system to improve communications in those areas since the existing high frequency systems were unreliable due to propagation conditions and HF spectrum saturation in the Philippines. (GONFIDENTIAL)

A troposcatter system between the Philippines and Taiwan was under test at the end of the year.

CINCPAC requested JCS to direct deployment of three mobile NAVAID units from CONUS to Clark AFB to provide for PACOM contingencies. This had not been resolved at the end of the year. 4

CHJUSMAG PHIL 5551As DTG 010808Z Aug 62 (S)

CINCPAC 032251Z Aug 62 (S) CINCPAC 110302Z Dec 62 (C) CINCPAC 052250Z Sep 62 (S)

Communication Activities in Thailand: All CINCPAC and SEATO contingency plans for operations in mainland Southeast Asia embraced a common requirement for a communication-electronics base in Thailand. Prior to 1962, the concept for communications-electronics support for these plans called for maximum use of existing MAP provided facilities and systems, supplemented as necessary with U.S. mobile contingency resources, which for the most part were to be introduced into the area concurrent with the deployment of U.S. Forces. Experiences during the MILLPOND operation in 1961 and during the deployment of U.S. forces into Thailand in May and June 1962 indicated that only limited communications-electronics support could be expected from local national resources, and that dependence upon mobile contingency organizations and equipment, which were not available in PACOM in the quantity and type required, was an inadequate solution, and wouldn't satisfy the reaction time called for in operations plans. For Thailand, CINCPAC initiated a program that would provide essential communications-electronics support for Thailand's defense operations, and provide a base trunking system configured to provide long lines communications to key areas within Thailand, to include sufficient capability to permit immediate expansion if U.S. forces were committed to military operations in the area.

The MAP-provided Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) radio relay network, designed to support the Thai air defense system, was the only long lines system in Thailand. Crash action was taken to improve this network, both in quality and quantity. The delivery of MAP provided helicopters was expedited to facilitate logistic support, particularly at mountain relay sites in the system. At the end of the year links extended from Don Muang to Sattahip, Korat, Ubon, Udorn, Koke Katheim, Takhli, Phitsanulok and Chiang Mai.

Associated with U.S. efforts to improve the RTAF radio relay network was a provision that the U.S. would receive allocated channels in the system. U.S. radio relay equipment was installed from Bangkok to

^{1.} CINCPAC 150222Z Jun 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 140030Z Jul 62 (S)

Don Muang and from Udorn to Vientiane, Laos. These U.S. facilities interconnected with the RTAF system at Don Muang and at Udorn, providing communications among U.S. Forces positioned at various RTAF installations, and voice and teletype channels between Bangkok and Vientiane.

A U.S. Army radio relay company (167th Signal Company) was deployed to Thailand to install a radio relay system along the Mekong River, 10-50 miles inside Thailand, from Udorn to Ubon. could be provided immediately for Thai security forces involved in counter-subversion operations in the Northeast area. This radio relay system would include provisions for installing separate branch links across the Mekong to the key Laotian cities of Paksane, Thakhek, Savannakhet, and Pakse to support any future contingency operations in Laos. The radio relay company also provided on-the-job training to Royal Thai Army personnel who ultimately would assume operation of the system. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Positioning of U.S. forces in Thailand during mid-1962, coupled with the lack of an adequate in - country communications - electronics base to satisfy their minimum requirements, brought about a three phase program to provide a base trunking system which would satisfy the minimum needs common to all CINCPAC and SEATO contingency plans. 6, 7, 8, 9

Step 1, completed or nearing completion involved further improvements to the existing communications-electronics configuration.

Step 2, was the establishment of a 24-voice channel troposcatter backbone system in Thailand, consisting of:

^{1.} CINCPAC 030056Z Feb 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 242010Z Mar 62 (S)

^{3.} JCS 3900 DTG 032022Z Apr 62 (S)

^{4.} JCS 4793 DTG 261736Z May 62 (S)

^{5.} CINCPAC 282345Z Nov 62 (C)

CINCPAC 140327Z Jul 62 (C)

^{7.}

CINCPAC 090043Z Aug 62 (S) JCS 5812 DTG 231754Z Aug 62 (S) CINCPAC 310259Z Oct 62 (S)

- 1. A troposcatter link between Bangkok and Korat, with additional mobile 24-voice channel troposcatter systems providing three links, Korat to Roiet, Roiet to Udorn and Roiet to Ubon. Roiet would have a voice frequency trunk patching capability.
- 2. A 12-voice channel microwave link from Roiet to Nakhon Phanom for entry into the Udorn-Ubon radio relay system being installed by the 167th Signal Company.
- 3. A mobile 24-voice channel troposcatter leg along the route Korat-Takhli-Phitsanulok-Chiang Mai, with voice frequency breakout at each place named.

The U.S. Army moved four troposcatter terminals into Thailand as part of Step 2 (TST-101 at Bangkok and Korat, and AN/TRC-90 at Korat and Ubon). This equipment was being tested at the end of the year. A troposcatter system to Saigon was under test with an estimated operational date of March 1963. The U.S. Army had up to four additional troposcatter terminals (AN/TRC-90) in the Republic of Vietnam available for deployment to Thailand. The U.S. Air Force had six troposcatter terminals (AN/MRC-80) which could be deployed from Clark AFB. However, the Thais erected a roadblock in implementing the U.S. communications base with the claim that introduction of the terminal equipment into Thailand was dependent upon a commitment that the equipment would be turned over eventually to Thailand.

The U.S. position in this matter was that the equipment was organic to U.S. units that would operate the communications system and was not a part of the Military Aid Program. CINCPAC recommended to JCS, and JCS concurred, that deployment of Air Force troposcatter terminals be deferred indefinitely. CINCPAC also directed that the additional Army troposcatter terminals be held in the Republic of Vietnam until agreement was reached with the Thais on the ultimate disposition of the equipment. 2, 3, 4

^{1.} CP 052250Z Sep 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 180012 Z Nov 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 200203Z Nov 62(C)

^{4.} JCS 7510 DTG 212328Z Nov 62.(S)

Step 3, of the program called for completion of arrangements for military use of channels in the U.S. AID sponsored microwave system (SEATELCOM) for Thailand, a substantial portion of which had been contracted for completion in October 1963. Initially, it was envisioned that the U.S. Forces would make token use of this microwave system, with an option for greatly expanded use during an emergency.

The Republic of Vietnam: Communications activities within the RVN are described in Chapter IV.

Communications Activities in Laos: Due to limited and generally unreliable radio communications with Vientiane, CINCUSARPAC, with CINCPAC's approval, programmed a new radio relay facility at Udorn, Thailand, to serve Vientiane. Initially planned to terminate at Clark AFB, CINCPAC later directed that Okinawa be designated as the gateway terminus because of difficulties in obtaining suitable frequencies at the Philippine terminal. 1, 2 The relocation of Starcom Vientiane's transmitter and receiver facilities to Udorn was completed and activated on 28 March. 3

On 1 April CHMAAG Laos assumed responsibility for maintenance and operation of the Vientiane facility, and CINCPAC approved a CHMAAG Laos request for \$22,000 to cover the costs.


Following the establishment of a coalition government in Laos, CINCPAC suggested to CHMAAG Laos that it would be prudent to maintain austere communications with Vientiane, and proposed that one voice and one teletype system be left operational. The Vientiane—Clark trunk was deactivated on 15 September after the decision was made for MAAG Laos to withdraw on 6 October 1962. A U.S. signal team from Okinawa was sent to Vientiane to maintain minimum essential communications for USARMA Vientiane after the MAAG withdrew

^{1.} CINCPAC 121948Z Jan 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 130347Z Jan 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCUSARPAC 030331Z Apr 62 (C)

^{4.} CINCPAC 240343Z Aug 62 (S)



Japan: DCA Mid-Range Task 7 Japan concerned reterminations of Army and Navy common user service to the Air Force Automatic Teletype Relay (Plan 55) at Fuchu Air Station. CINCPAC concurred in this and it was scheduled for completion in 1963.

In addition to the consolidation of common-user subscribers, CINCPAC recommended a command and control relay in Japan to provide operational service to all commands with unlimited message classification. 1

CINCPAC supported intra-Japan troposcatter system and asked JCS to support this requirement and to assist in early funding approval.

A new semi-automatic torn tape teletype relay was completed at Camp Drake, Japan in July 1962.

Republic of China: The Chinese Army operated and maintained a common user communications system that provided trunking circuits among major communications centers located on Taiwan and the Penghu. This system, known as the Military Command and Administrative Network, did not satisfy the overall requirements for communications channels, particularly on Taiwan. Consequently, various other long lines systems have been installed on the island, resulting in a complex of terminal and relay installations consisting chiefly of AN/TRC-1 and AN/TRC-24 equipment. These parallel systems, comprised primarily of low channel-capacity equipment, did not provide satisfactory communications from a quantity or quality viewpoint.

CHMAAG China proposed that a project called the Military Integrated Communications System (MICS) be implemented to meet all the communications requirements of the GRC armed forces, including air defense.

CINCPAC approved the proposal to proceed with the Military Integrated Communications System, noting that 6 million dollars identified in sub-project A75 FY63 MAP should at least give MICS a

^{1.} CINCPAC 232242 Z Jun 62 (C)

^{2.} CP 052250Z Sep 62 (S)

^{3.} CHMAAG China ltr MGCH of 21 Sep 62, Subj: Integrated Communications Systems. (S)

substantial start, and hopefully, could buy the backbone wideband trunk with provision for modest expansion. 1 At the request of CINCPAC, Department of the Army provided communications engineering assistance in designing a fixed wideband trunking system for the Chinese armed forces along with an associated cost estimated. 2,3,4

CHMAAG China planned to install the backbone MICS system, to include wideband radio equipment and as many of the major buildout links as possible, within the FY63 funding availability (\$6.151 Million).

Indonesia: Implementation of an Indonesian Fixed Communication Project for Armed Forces began in Jun 1961 with the award of a contract to the Philco Corporation to engineer the system; furnish, install and test equipment; and train personnel for the operation and maintenance of an extensive tropospheric scatter system which consisted of four planned increments. Increments I and II would link Djakarta with theater and army area headquarters for Sumatra, Java and Bali. Increments III and IV would link Borneo, the Celebes and Ambon.

An "impact link providing 12 channels between Djakarta and Bandung was completed on 12 August 1962. Surveys for the backbone system for Increments I and II have been completed by Philco.

Construction of buildings to house equipment, and building of access roads to sites were responsibilities of the Indonesian Army. However, the Indonesian Army failed repeatedly in meeting site preparation The political and economic situation, coupled with the West New Guinea episode and the Asian Games, had adverse affects on the Army's progress in site preparation. The Chief Signal Officer of the Indonesian Army reassured USMILTAG that the Indonesian Army would continue to place high priority on the project, and hoped to provide renewed progress on site construction. 6 Nevertheless, as a result

CINCPAC 290250Z Sep 62 (S)
 CINCPAC 032255Z Oct 62 (C)

^{3.} CINCPAC 181810Z Dec 62 (S)

^{4.} CO USASCC Arlington USASCC-5318 DTG 311849Z Oct 62 (C)

^{5.} CHMAAG China MGCE 133 DTG 080245Z Jan 63 (S)

^{6.} CHMILTAG MTAG 03/2220/1 DTG 080400Z Aug 62 (C)

of Indonesian Army failure to meet site preparation commitments, CINCPAC recommended that FY63 funding for this project be reduced from 6.2 to 3.8 million dollars. 1

Korea: In addition to the Joint Overseas Switchboard and the automatic air defense equipment AN/MSQ-28s mentioned earlier, Korea was scheduled to complete a new torn tape teletype relay in 1964.2

Guam: At approximately 111150Z November 1962, typhoon Karen swept across Guam leaving a mass of debris and totally disrupting the external communications system. Winds gusted to 147 knots prior to the breakdown of the measuring device. 3 The Pacific scatter system was inoperative due to antenna damage. By using emergency generator, DCS Station Fingayan was able to restore single-side-band trunks to Hawaii, Japan, and the Philippines by 112125Z. (UNCLASSIFIED)

DACCCPAC rerouted all high-priority circuits on Guam through Okinawa and Japan. Base damage at Andersen Air Force Base, including communication facilities, ran from 300 to 400 million dollars. single channel order wire between Hickam and Anderson was restored at 120040Z by routing through Japan. The Guam telephone system was completely inoperative with all trunks out. 7

Within only a few days minimum essential internal and external communications were restored with rapid progress being made to complete restoration.

JOINT LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES

Joint Logistic Planning

Transportation Support of OPLANS: Transportation requirements to support the four special situations anticipated by CINCPAC

- CINCPAC 312347 Z Oct 62 (S) CINCPAC 052250 Z Sep 62 (S) CTF 35 DTG 111734 Z Nov 62 (U) DACCCPAC P410/04964 DTG 112125 Z Nov 62 (C) 1958 COMMSQ D-011 DTG 120519 Z Nov 62 (C) DACCCPAC P417/04965 DTG 120040 Z Nov 62 (C) PWCEN Guam 121114 Z Nov 62 (U)

OPLAN 32-59 and OPLANS 25-60 were developed during 1961 and were approved by the JCS at the end of that year. It was not until early 1962, however, that transportation tables to support these plans were published in final form. During 1962 all three of these OPLANS were revised. The changes that were incorporated in 25-63 and 27-63 were comparatively minor and CINCPAC advised the JCS that the original transportation tables for OPLANS 25-60 and 27-60 were adequate for planning. For OPLAN 32-63, however, the changes in the basic plan were extensive and would require a complete revision of the transportation requirements and tables. In the meantime, the JCS asked CINCPAC to prepare an estimate of the transportation requirements for OPLAN 32-63, and to include this estimate when the basic plan was submitted for JCS approval. Accordingly, these requirements were prepared in sufficient detail to permit review and approval action by the JCS.

At the end of 1962 the transportation tables for the three revised plans remained to be published. The Component Commanders were revising their OPLANS 25-63 and 27-63 and the final transportation tables were expected to be published early in 1963. The detailed tables for OPLAN 32-63 would be completed later in the year.

CINCPAC submitted no transportation tables for his OPLAN 1-61 since the JCS assumed responsibility for establishing these requirements. However, in approving 1-63, the JCS asked CINCPAC to prepare transportation plans for the movement and support of his own units within his theatre.

Logistic Feasibility of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-63: In October the JCS asked CINCPAC to review his OPLAN 32-63 to determine if it was logistically feasible and to compare CINCPAC tonnage estimates with those in a recent JCS study entitled, "Logistic Support Capabilities in Thailand and Laos." The JCS study concluded that 49,800 troops could be supported in Laos during a build-up period and 74,700 thereafter. CINCPAC's plans were based on initial requirements for Phase II Laos of 42,300 U.S. troops with a maximum of 67,800 if all reserves 1. JCS 6662 DTG 112203Z Oct 62 (S)

were committed after D plus 45. Forces totalling 35,200 would remain in Thailand. Forces in Laos would not increase for Phase II, and for Phase IV the ultimate increase would not exceed 20,000. In reply, CINCPAC said he considered the logistic provisions of OPLAN 32-63 feasible, and that the JCS study was a realistic appraisal of support capabilities in Thailand and Laos. He qualified this, however, by saying that if he had to implement 32-63 and any other contingency plan at the same time, the support of either plan might be jeopardized. CINCPAC also pointed out that the Special Logistics Actions in Thailand (the SLAT program) would benefit logistics in that area because of the heavy equipment and engineer resources that would be available immediately. 1

Transportation Support of Berlin Contingency Plans: CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT to provide transportation requirements for the PACOM deployments required by SM 1280-62 for support of Berlin contingency plans. These requirements indicated that approximately one third of the required augmentation force could be moved in PACOM amphibious ships which had been designated to augment LANTCOM. The remainder of the force to be deployed would follow via an administrative lift from other than PACOM resources.

Proposed Airlift Support of CINCLANT Contingency Plans: During the early part of September CINCLANT proposed the use of PACOM and EUCOM C-130 aircraft to support his Cuban contingency plans. This proposal, which the JCS approved for planning purposes, called for withdrawal of all PACOM C-130s for approximately five days. Besides all MATS C-124 transport aircraft were fully committed to CINCLANT's contingency plans, leaving only some MATS C-118s and C-121s to replace the C-130s.

^{1.} CINCPAC 100002 Z Nov 62 (TS)

^{2.} CINCPAC ltr Ser: 41/000323 of 19 Dec 62 (TS)

^{3.} CINCLANT 061446Z Sep 62 (TS)

^{4.} MATS MAXWP 2496K DTG 111519Z Oct 62 (S)



Assuming that all PACOM C-130 aircraft might be withdrawn to support CINCLANT operations, CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF to assess the impact on High Gear, Quick Strike, and other existing operations throughout PACOM. He also was asked to recommend possible courses of action to minimize the impact of the loss of the theater C-130 aircraft. CINCPACAF made the following recommendations:

- 1. High Gear C-130 aircraft could be replaced by eight C-124s and one C-121 from the 315th Air Division; however, this would delay weapon deliveries to the strike bases by 35 to 95 minutes.
- 2. Quick Strike could be supported by increased use of the remaining theater airlift assets.
- 3. Other existing operations could be handled, although much less efficiently, by increased use of other airlift assets and adjustments to the Southeast Asia schedules.

CINCPAC thought the effect of losing the 64 C-130s could be reduced by a substantial increase in the use of all remaining 315th Air Division aircraft, including Air America, and that PACOM could return to normal operational levels within 35 days after the C-130s were returned.

CINCPAC then directed his Component Commanders to be prepared to furnish adequate support for their own deployed forces in the event all theater C-130s were withdrawn, with the least reliance upon airlift, and to review existing air requests and reduce requirements where possible. He also directed CINCPACAF to prepare alternate plans for satisfying PACAF airlift requirements of CINCPAC OPLAN 1-63 without using C-130s, and to get standby authority to increase use rates for the 315th Air Division aircraft remaining after withdrawal of the C-130s. CINCPAC asked MATS to assess its existing capability to provide a substitute airlift if the C-130s were withdrawn, to which MATS replied that it was committed to provide maximum support to

^{1.} ADMINO CINCPAC 202233Z Oct 62 (TS)

^{2.} PACAF PFOCO-S-62-1175 DTG 2203102 Oct 62 (TS)

^{3.} ADMINO CINCPAC 231955Z Oct 62 (TS)

the CINCLANT contingency requirements, so that any diversion of MATS aircraft would require JCS approval. After CINCPAC informed the JCS of the affect of the temporary withdrawal of PACOM's C-130s, the JCS advised him that the recall to active duty of AF Reserve C-119 units had eliminated the requirement for either PACOM or EUCOM C-130 aircraft. 2, 3

Theater Airlift

Scheduled Flights to SEAsia: The lack of sufficient theater airlift to satisfy all customers became evident early in 1962, and on 27 January CINCPAC asked that the assignment of additional C-124 and C-130 aircraft be completed in FY62 rather than FY63. In the meantime, a five day backlog of MATS cargo at Okinawa developed for SEAsia and CINCPAC called a conference attended by MATS representatives and components. The result was an agreement to take action on part of PACOM users of MATS to submit more accurate forecasts of airlift requirements. (SECRET).

On 16 February the Chief, Western Pacific Transportation Office (WTO) recommended that MATS be asked to make the scheduled flights between Clark and Southeast Asia because the 315th Air Division could not handle the requests. CINCPAC delayed action on this matter until later in February when the JCS advised that another squadron of C-130 aircraft would be assigned to PACAF by 1 June 1962. Accordingly CINCPAC directed the Chief, WTO to continue using 315th airlift for scheduled flights to Southeast Asia on a priority seven basis, giving shippers as much advance notice as possible on availability of airlift space.

^{1.} MATS MCP/TCC 2677K DTG 241350Z Oct 62 (TS)

^{2.} CINCPAC 280003Z Oct 62 (TS)

^{3.} JCS 7105 DTG 300353Z Oct 62 (C)

^{4.} CINCPAC 272301 Z Jan 62 (S)

^{5.} CGUSARYIS RITS-M1310 DTG 310745Z Jan 62 (S)

CINCPAC 022151Z Feb 62 (U)

^{7.} JCS 3583 DTG 092303Z Feb 62 (S)

^{8.} CINCPAC 232124Z Mar 62 (S)

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To encourage the use of MATS and MSTS for routine support of Southeast Asia forces, CINCPAC proposed reducing the theater airlift priority for that purpose from five to seven, and asked his Component Commanders for their reaction. 1 CINCPACFLT and CINCUSARPAC favored the proposal, but CINCPACAF recommended that instead of reducing the priority, MATS should take over the complete operation of airlift service to Southeast Asia. 2 CINCPAC then notified the principal users of the 315th Air Division aircraft, and MATS and MSTS, that he was considering cancelling all 315th flights to Southeast Asia effective 1 August, and asked for comments on that proposal. 5 CINCPACAF. however, reversed his position and opposed cancellation of the 315th scheduled flights into Southeast Asia on the grounds that support of forces there was an intra-theater airlift requirement that should be performed by the 315th. 4 Since the 315th was consistently overflying its programmed hours, which could jeopardize the reliability and capability of the theater airlift, CINCPAC took the position that continued operation of Southeast Asia scheduled flights contributed to the critical shortage of theater airlift to meet "on-call" mission requirements. He directed the Chief, WTO to limit theater airlift service to Southeast Asia to a non-scheduled basis, in accordance with the existing CINCPAC airlift priority system, as soon as the MATS service to that area was expanded. 5 CINCPAC then directed the Chief WTO to cancel certain projected flights, and to reduce its Southeast Asia airlift schedules by approximately 30 percent. As a result of these actions, during the last two months of 1962 the 315th Air Division stayed within the number of hours for which it was manned and equipped.

Augmentation of Theater Airlift: In addition to the C-130 squadron transferred PCS from CONUS to Okinawa in June to augment 315th Air Division airlift capability, in May a C-130 squadron was sent to Clark

^{1.} CINCPAC 182212Z Apr 62 (S)

^{2.} PACAF PFMDC 206 DTG 080136 Z May 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 162142Z Jun 62 (S)

^{4.} PACAF PFDAL 075 DTG 120335Z Jul 62 (S)

^{5.} CINCPAC 080447 Z Sep 62 (S)

on a temporary basis. In addition, a C-123 squadron went to Vietnam and an Army Caribou company was ordered to Thailand. 72,3 The C-130 squadron at Clark returned to CONUS with its departure geared to take place shortly after the Marine BLT returned to Okinawa from Thailand.

Airlift Management in SEAsia: During July CINCPACAF proposed setting up an airlift management system for Southeast Asia to help COMUSMACV centralize control and direction of all available USAF airlift resources. COMUSMACV favored the proposal provided it would be under his operational command and responsive to his Air Allocations Board, and would exercise operational control over his C-123 aircraft and coordinate operations of the Army, Navy and Marine airlift resources in RVN and Thailand. 5 After receiving authority from CINCPAC. COMUSMACV activated the 6492d Combat Cargo Group (P) on 21 September. b

Other Transportation Planning

Mariners Contract for LST Crews: Prior to 1 April 1962, MSTS had contracted with a Japanese company to operate 17 LSTs, some of which engaged in moving MAP supplies to Southeast Asia. On the recommendation of the General Accounting Office, this contract was replaced on 1 April by a three month contract between an agency of the Japanese Government and the U.S. The contract came up for renewal on 30 June 1962, but the Government of Japan was reluctant to become involved as the legal employer of crews participating directly in Southeast Asia activities. Although the problem was within the jurisdiction of MSTS, CINCPAC emphasized his continuing requirements for MSTS LSTs in operations and for support of his OPLANs, and asked MSTS to take necessary actions to preserve this capability. 7 He also

AFSTRIKE OPS Order 112-62 DTG 191220Z May 62 (S) JCS 4792 DTG 261337Z May 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCSTRIKE STRJ 3-0/42 DTG 192120Z May 62 (S)

CINCPAC 112154Z Jul 62 (C)

^{5.} COMUSMACV MAC J4 2115 DTG 230905Z Aug 62 (S)

^{6.} COMUSMACV MAC J3 5175 DTG 290720Z Nov 62 (S)

^{7.} CINCPAC 091850Z Apr 62 (S)

recommended to the JCS that the use of foreign seamen be re-examined in the light of risks involved. If they were to be employed, CINCPAC considered the indirect method of hire preferable to direct hire under Status of Forces Agreement. Although the Japanese Seamen Union threatened to strike the LSTs effective 1 June, the strike was cancelled on 31 May and the contract was extended through 30 June 1963.

Proposed Transportation Coordination Agency: Late in 1961, COMUS Korea recommended that a single agency be established to coordinate the transportation of all U.S. military personnel and cargo moving between Japan and Korea during wartime. Representatives of the Component Commanders opposed such an arrangement and, after further investigation, CINCPAC concluded that there was little requirement for inter service coordination of transportation between Japan and Korea, and rejected the plan.^{2,3}

Airlift Service to Phnom Penh: After CHMAAG Cambodia asked the Chief, WESTPAC Transportation Office to establish a weekly 315th Air Division flight between Saigon and Phnom Penh, Cambodia, CINCPAC suggested that this service might be provided more satisfactorily by MATS, by commercial airlines, or a contractor. Although Hq USAF directed MATS to provide the service commencing in July, CINCPAC met the requirement by using COMUSMACV resources, and advised Hq USAF that MATS service would not be required. (UNCLASSIFIED)

A <u>Airlift Service to Djakarta</u>: During May CHMILTAG Indonesia asked CINCPAC to set up two MATS flights a month between Clark AFB and Djakarta to handle passengers and cargo. Since theater airlift was not available, CINCPAC asked MATS if it could establish the flights. 6

1. CINCPAC 290446Z May 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC ltr Ser: 00084 of 16 Mar 62 (TS)

^{3.} CINCPAC 240119Z Mar 62 (S)

^{4.} CINCPAC 180015Z Apr 62 (U)

^{5.} CINCPAC 100118Z Jul 62 (U)

^{6.} ADMINO CINCPAC 202239Z Jun 62 (C)

SECRET

However, by the time MATS referred the matter to Hq USAF, Pan American Airways had commenced weekly jet service from Manila to Djakarta, and CINCPAC notified Hq USAF that no further action was necessary. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants

POL for UK, NZ and Australia for SEATO Plan 5: In order to insure the coordination of procurement from local commercial sources in Thailand for POL needed to support SEATO Plan 5, CINCPAC proposed that the U.S. supply POL on a reimbursable basis to the UK, New Zealand, and Australian forces. Representatives of countries involved drafted bilateral agreements that were forwarded to their governments for approval. During November the first of these SEATO agreements--providing that the U.S. supply POL products to the Australian Air Force for SEATO Plan 5 -- was signed by the U.S. and Australia.

Proposal for a Standard Aviation Lubricant: Because each of the three services used a different aircraft lubricating oil, PACOM stocking activities have carried three types of 1100 aviation lubricant. In January 1962, CINCPAC proposed to the Defense Petroleum Supply Center that the Services adopt a single product. 2 The Chief of Transportation, U.S. Army agreed to convert Army aircraft to the Navy's product on a worldwide basis. The Air Force decided to continue to use 1100 avlube with (UNCLASSIFIED) 2% cyclohexanone.

Contamination of Jet Fuel: The problem of fuel contamination in PACOM, a serious problem in previous years, was confined to only one tank located in Thailand during 1962. Representatives from the Air Force Aerospace Fuels Office at Tachikawa conducted a survey of POL facilities Southeast Asia early in the year. Although contaminated, the fuel in the Thailand tank was suitable for use. The inspecting team found other locations free of contamination, but found operating procedures that were below standard or hazardous. CHJUSMAG Thailand and the Office in charge of construction in Southeast Asia instituted appropriate corrective actions.

CINCPAC 090044Z Aug 62 (C) CINCPAC 100254Z Jan 62 (U) QMPC 1tr SSMPC-T of 21 Aug 62 (U)

Anti-Icing Additive for JP-4 Fuels: During February CINCPAC advised his Component Commanders and all Sub-Area Petroleum Offices in PACOM that, effective 1 April 1962, an anti-icing agent (specification MIL-I-27686) would be added to JP-4 fuels consigned to overseas areas.

Requisitioning Packaged Petroleum Products: The Defense Petroleum Supply Center (DPSC) revised its supply management of packaged petroleum products to be effective on 1 July 1962. the old procedure PACOM forces obtained slated packaged petroleum products by submitting a monthly request through channels to the DPSC and service Inventory Control Points (NICP). Under the interservice supply support agreement, each NICP was responsible for filling specific requirements by geographic areas. CONUS and overseas inventories were financed by the respective service stock funds, except for Korea and Okinawa where inventories were financed by O&M funds. Under the revised plan, as implemented by CINCPAC, designated Army and Navy depots in PACOM, responsible for the support of all service consumers in their respective areas. would submit MILSTRIP requisitions to NSC Oakland, the then designated DPSC wholesale stock point responsible for the support of the Pacific area.

However, on 8 June the DPSC revised overseas requisitioning channels and directed that AF requisitions be submitted to DPSC direct and that Army requisitions be submitted to DPSC via Oversea Supply Agency, San Francisco. Navy requisitions would continue to be submitted to NSC Oakland, but issues would be made from Navy retail stock as separate from DPSC owned wholesale stock. On 27 June DPSC delayed the effective date of the new supply procedure until October 1962, at which time it was implemented.

^{1.} CINCPAC ltr 4020 Ser 271 of 9 Feb 62 (U)

^{2.} CINCPAC Inst. 4020.5C (U)

^{3.} DPSC ltr DPSC-PD/4470 of 8 Jun 62 (U)

^{4.} DPSC 271845Z Jun 62 (U)

POL Support for CJTF 116 OPLAN 32-60: The Defense Petroleum Supply Center completed contracts that provided for pre-positioning in RVN facilities POL supplies to meet the first 20 days requirements for CJTF 116 OPLAN 32-60 (Phase II Vietnam). These items were in place by mid-1962.

Limitations on General War

In November CINCUSARPAC informed CINCPAC that a delay in the scheduled arrival of logistic forces from CONUS in the period beyond 60 days after the commencement of hostilities would place a critical limitation on PACOM general war operations. These logistic forces were post M-day mobilization augmentations (in particular, medical units), which were listed in the DA Mobilization Program for FY63. In explaining his thinking on the problem, CINCPAC recognized that USARPAC logistic forces were the minimum required by either general war or contingency plans. However, CINCPAC did not agree that delays in logistic augmentation from CONUS would place critical limitations on the conduct of war operations since the delays would not affect the planned initial nuclear strike operations, and planning for post initial nuclear strike operations would have to be based on the expectation that such delays are more likely than not to occur. CINCPAC said there was a serious question as to whether critically needed forces, particularly hospitals, would be available from CONUS after D-day of general war. 2

Joint Logistics Officer Management Training

During the latter part of November the JCS informed CINCPAC that, as part of a larger SecDef program, the Director for Logistics of the Joint Staff was studying the need for a joint logistic management school. The JCS asked for CINCPAC's views. 3 CINCPAC replied that an officer, qualified in his own Service logistics, could fill (UNCLASSIFIED)

^{1.} CINCUSARPAC RF 96984 DTG 240300Z Oct 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 081847Z Nov 62 (TS)

^{3.} JCS 7588 DTG 281703Z Nov 62 (U)

CINCPAC logistics assignments satisfactorily, and that joint logistic management training was not a prerequisite. CINCPAC suggested that the Service logistic courses could be expanded to include joint logistics, but that if a joint logistic management school were established, the head of the school should have the benefit of first hand study of joint staff and unified command problems and procedures. I

U.S. CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Plans

The PACOM civic action program received impetus from a 12 February State-Defense message that expressed the President's interest in taking full advantage of the contribution the U.S. could make in several world crisis areas, and stated that a \$10 million fund had been established for civic action programs to be carried out in six countries, including Burma and Korea. The message also contained an offer to furnish a State-Defense team to help set up or expand country Both Burma and Korea responded to the offer by asking for assistance, and a State-DOD team accompanied by a CINCPAC representative, visited the two countries during February and March.

As a result of its Korean visit the team recommended, and the Country Team endorsed and forwarded, a proposal for a \$2.5 million expansion of Korea's civic action program. On 30 March the State Department approved its share of the proposed funding breakdown -approximately \$1.5 million. The approval of the MAP portion was subject to CINCPAC's concurrence but when he presented his proposal to DOD he was told that the special fund described by the 12 February message had not been established and that it would be necessary to fund this program from other sources. MAP funds for civic actions in Korea totalled \$735,000 and CINCPAC wanted to use approximately \$600,000 of this to support the established and successful Armed Forces Assistance to Korea program. Washingt on agencies favored a

(UNCLASSIFIED)

^{1.} CINCPAC 070020Z Dec 62 (U)

^{2.} AIDTO CIRC X-189 of 4PM 12 Feb 62 (S)

more even division of the funds, and at the end of the year this question remained unresolved.

The Country Team in Burma proposed to support the Burmese Government frontier resettlement project in the Namsang Area, a project that was approved and underway at the end of 1962.

In a separate action, a State-Defense Civic Action Survey Team visited Indonesia as the result of the Indonesian Government's request for help in setting up a civic action program. After tours throughout Indonesia, the survey team developed a civic action program that was later approved by Washington agencies. It was a three phase program to be financed by both AID and MAP. The first phase, to be financed by AID, provided for furnishing hand tools and some spare machine parts for military and civilian use. The tools were intended for training purposes and for use in road construction. Phase II, to be funded by both AID and MAP, was to include heavy engineering equipment to be used by Indonesian Army engineer battalions for road construction, flood control, agricultural development, and civilian housing projects. The third phase was to be funded and implemented by AID and DOD based on requirements that would be developed later by the Indonesian Army and the U.S. Country Team. CINCPAC agreed to the MAP funded portion of Phase II, but objected to the proposal for Phase III on the basis that Indonesia had no specific idea of the scope of the civic action plans and programs. He contended that MAP funding should be for specific items only, and should not be used to create a slush fund for projects to be selected later. 1

Training Activities

During 1962 Civic Action and Civil Affairs Mobile Training Teams were on the job in Laos, Thailand, the Republic of Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan and Korea. Teams operating in these countries were furnished either from the 97th Civil Affairs Group on Okinawa, or from CONUS reserve units on active duty. The neutralist countries, (Genfidential)

1. CINCPAC 312347 Z Oct 62 (S)

Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia, reported they had no requirements for training teams. The Republic of China had an effective program of its own, operated by well trained personnel.

In the Republic of Vietnam, where only a limited program had been undertaken previously, a civil affairs advisor was added to each corps and division, and a civil affairs office was included in the COMUSMACV headquarters. By the end of July there were also CA officers assigned with each Field Command Headquarters, and Civil Guard/SDC Headquarters. Civil affairs personnel personnel took an active part in the strategic hamlet program. One CA mobile training team arrived in August to prepare instructional courses for CA training. In September all three corps asked for a CAMTT to help train CA cadres and to serve as advisors. Three of these teams were in place by mid-December; the fourth was scheduled to arrive early in 1963. The approximately 48 personnel in the four teams were from the 97th CA Group on Okinawa.

Other Civil Affairs Activities

Korea: The Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) program (described in CINCPAC's 1961 Command History) was one of the most successful in the PACOM area. Originally funded by the International Cooperation Administration, the AFAK program was left without operating funds when the ICA refused to continue its support. On 17 February 1962 the funding problem was settled when Washington increased the FY62 MAP for CINCPAC by \$600,000 for the support of AFAK. The method of funding future programs was not determined but, pending a decision, CINCPAC was directed to plan for the program in FY64-68 at the same level. The AFAK program, however, became entangled with the funding controversy for the Korean civic action described above, and at the end of 1962 the FY63 AFAK program had not been funded.

Okinawa: There were persistent civil affairs problems connected with the administration of the Ryukyu Islands that stemmed from a

feeling among both Ryukyuans and Japanese that the islands should be under Japanese administration. Related to this was a desire of the Ryukyuans to gain a larger voice in their government. CINCPAC watched these trends carefully, but his official interest was restricted to maintaining the military bases, and in preventing any repeal of U.S. authority that would place the base rights in jeopardy.

Japan: On 23 May 1962 CINCPAC received a request from CHMAAG Japan for a 7 man CAMTT to help the Army section of the MAAG develop the civil affairs aspects of contingency plans and to conduct a three week civil affairs school for the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force. CINCPAC approved this request and civil affairs officers were provided on a TDY basis from CONUS sources. During the period 6-31 August they worked with the Army section of CHMAAG Japan and conducted the civil affairs school after which they returned to CONUS.

Trust Territory: A recurring problem in the Trust Territory was the handling of requests from former residents who wanted to return to visit their former homes and to perform religious ceremonies honoring the dead. On 13 September 1962 the High Commissioner of the Ryukyus forwarded another such request, and asked for CINCPAC's comments on a request for entry clearance for 30 members of the Okinawa Repatriates Association to visit various islands in the Trust Territory to perform religious ceremonies and to collect and cremate remains of Okinawan and Japanese war dead. Admiral Felt advised that the request be turned down, explaining that a group of Buddhist Priests had been permitted to visit islands in the Trust Territory in 1953 after the governments of the U.S. and Japan agreed that this would be a one time visit only. Since then several requests for the same purpose had been turned down. CINCPAC further advised that approval of the latest request would probably trigger additional requests to visit the Bonin and Volcano islands and strengthen the arguments of those

^{1.} CHMAAG Japan 230714Z May 62 (C)

persons who advocated a complete open door into the Trust Territory. He recommended that the request be sidetracked before it had official status, and if that failed, that the request be disapproved. On 25 October the High Commissioner advised that he would no longer support the request. A similar request, submitted through the Japanese Foreign Office, sought permission for former residents of the Bonin Islands to return to tend graves and pay respects to their ancestors. The request was rejected by the State Department. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Security Controls for Guam and the Trust Territory: On 17 May the JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments on the need for continuing the security controls over entry into the Territory of Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. CINCPAC promptly explained that he considered those islands important to the United States. He recommended that the controls be continued and, further, that positive action be taken to orient the island people toward the United States. He suggested that the Trust Territory citizens be given U.S. national or citizen status, that Guam be made a Commonwealth of the U.S., and that the Trust Territory be organized into one or more commonwealths. In addition, on 22 May, CINCPAC asked his Component Commanders to see that all members of their staffs were aware of the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands to the U.S., and of the great danger if control of the islands fell into unfriendly or neutral interests.

In August 1962 the President discontinued U.S. Naval control over the entry of persons, ships, and aircraft into the Island of Guam. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Relief Measures for Guam: Following the devastation caused by typhoon KAREN on Guam on 11 November, CINCPAC designated CINCPACFLT as the coordinating commander for typhoon relief operations. 3 The USNS SULTAN was diverted to Guam to furnish power and troops on board helped in security and emergency operations. Four hundred and thirty-five USMC personnel were airlifted from

CINCPAC 190419Z Sep 62 (C) HICOMRY HC-LO 9165 DTG 250720Z Oct 62 (C) CINCPAC 112255Z Nov 62 (U)

Kaneohe, Hawaii to Guam for security duties. CINCUSARPAC contributed tentage and field kitchens, and PACAF and CINCPACFLT contributed transportation for technicians, equipment, and Seabees.

Civilian and military activities had returned to a degree of normalcy by the end of November.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

SPECIAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES

On the JCS list of geographic areas that were threatened by communist encouraged insurgency situations, two Southeast Asia countries -- Laos and the Republic of Vietnam -- were categorized as critical. Thailand and Cambodia were classified as "critical standby", meaning that with little or no warning they could develop into active problem areas. Four other PACOM countries were considered potentially critical. Therefore, one of CINCPAC's main areas of concern was the employment of special warfare units to assist indigenous military and paramilitary units counter communist insurgent and guerrilla forces.

Detailed descriptions of the special warfare units and their employment in Laos, Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam are included in Chapter IV. This section is intended to describe only the various special warfare activities in the PACOM and the general scope of these operations.

Training Activities in PACOM

PACOM requirements for Special Forces and other special warfare personnel continued to increase during 1962. Much of the special forces training was done by mobile training teams furnished by the 1st Special Forces Group (Reinf) on Okinawa. In addition to its mission of supporting PACOM general and limited war and contingency plans, in midyear this group had existing and projected requirements for 100 MTTs that would require 1279 personnel -- requirements that exceeded the group's ability to furnish teams. Most of the MTTs were used in the RVN, Thailand, and in Laos. All of the White Star MTTs were withdrawn from Laos by 6 October in conformance with the articles of the Geneva Convention.

Several Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) MTTs were employed in the RVN during 1962, and CINCPAC had long range requirements for SEAL teams in six other countries. Other MTTs were furnished by Mobile Construction Battalions and known as SeaBee Technical Assistance Teams (STATS).

Training in psychological operations was provided by the U.S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activities Pacific. Other MTTs were used in PACOM to train specialists in first aid, civil affairs, riot control, intelligence, counterintelligence, psychological operations, and information responsibilities.

In addition to training Allied personnel, all Services in PACOM emphasized the training of U.S. personnel in the various forms of special warfare. The Pacific Air Force carried out survival training for crew members, and individual and unit training in counterinsurgency operations. The Navy trained underwater demolition teams, conducted special courses in combat, and evasion and escape training for aviators and all Navy personnel going to the RVN. USARPAC conducted a tenweek course in counterinsurgency operations on Okinawa, the 25th Infantry Division operated a Jungle and Guerrilla Warfare Training Center for its personnel. Members of MTTs also gained experience while training members of Allied nations. During 1962 approximately 850 Army personnel served with MTTs in the RVN, and 60 SF personnel gained counterinsurgency experience while training the Royal Thai Army and Border Patrol Police. To broaden the experience in special warfare activities, the three Services had a program of sending selected senior officers in key staff and command positions to get first hand experience by serving six weeks TDY with the MAAGs in Southeast Asia, and with USMACV Headquarters.

Special Warfare Operations in PACOM

China, Korea and the RVN had well established special forces and/ or PsyWar organizations to carry out special warfare programs, and Thailand was in the process of developing a special warfare capability.

China had a total of four special warfare groups made up of approximately 12,700 men, of which approximately 3,000 received MAP support. China also had a PsyWar group and two PsyWar companies, all of which were supported by MAP. Korea had an active SF group and PsyWar units modeled along U.S. lines that made regular propaganda broadcasts and operated loudspeakers along the DMZ. Thailand's interest in special warfare units increased as the insurgency threat became more apparent. At the end of the year, that country had a Ranger battalion, and two additional SF companies were programmed. All units received MAP support. In addition to its Civil Guard units, Self Defense Corps, and several other paramilitary forces that carried out special warfare missions, the Republic of Vietnam had a SFgroup with an authorized strength of 805 men and a PsyWar battalion, both of which received MAP support. Two additional ARVN PsyWar battalions were authorized MAP support but had not been organized, and a Civil Guard PsyWar battalion was being formed under MAP support.

Burma and Japan had no trained special warfare units, and Indonesia had no units that were designated as such, even though some units were trained in special warfare techniques. Cambodia's Engineer Frontier Battalion had a mission of countersubversion and counter guerrilla activity. The Philippines had an active PsyWar/Information organization as an integral part of each military unit down to battalion level, and a SF unit was programmed under MAP sometime during the FY62-65 period. In Laos the anti-communist FAR included a Psychological Service Battalion, which was operating at approximately half strength at the end of the year. Paramilitary units composed of members of minority tribes were developed and trained by SF MTTs.

Several U.S. Air Force units were engaged in supporting special warfare activities in the RVN. These included Project Farm Gate, a 1st Air Commando Group detachment with a strength of approximately 150 personnel and eight T-28E, eight RB-26, and four C-47 aircraft;

two light assault transport squadrons designated as Mule Train and Sawbuck II and equipped with 16 C-123 aircraft each; and a detachment known as Hilo Hattie that operated a specially equipped C-54 aircraft on intelligence missions. The craft was equipped with a covert 100 inch LOROP camera, limited ELINT capability, K-47 night cameras, and reconofax infrared sensor.

Research and Development Activities

Research and development for counterinsurgency in the RVN and Thailand was carried out under Project AGILE, a program to conduct research, development, test and evaluation for remote area conflict. Testing was done by the Combat Development Test Centers in the RVN and Thailand.

Another R&D unit was a Utility Tactical Transport (UTT) company that was deployed to the RVN to evaluate the effectiveness of the armed helicopter in the role of escorting troop transport helicopters. The UTT had 15 HU-1A "Iroquois" helicopters, each of which was armed with two 30 caliber machine guns and 16 2.75" rockets. Similar tests were conducted by the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment that was deployed to the RVN in September. This unit had six AO-1A "Mohawk" aircraft armed with two 50 caliber machine guns and up to 76 2.75" aero 70 rockets. Each aircraft was equipped also with a KA-30A aerial camera with a horizon-to-horizon capability. The unit was being evaluated in the RVN in the role of aerial surveillance with the capability of defending itself against attack from the ground.

CHAPTER II

OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

The preceding chapter discussed one of the principal objectives in the accomplishment of CINCPAC's mission, that of maintaining and improving the state of readiness of assigned U.S. forces in PACOM. This chapter discusses another CINCPAC objective, that of improving the state of readiness of all forces of Allied countries in the PACOM area. In 1962, one of the principal ways CINCPAC influenced the individual countries was through the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Therefore, this chapter is devoted largely to a discussion of CINCPAC's MAP activities. (UNCLASSIFIED)

AREA WIDE ACTIVITIES

Military Assistance Program

In January, CINCPAC received the new World Wide Military Assistance Basic Planning Document (BPD) from the Director of Military Assistance. The Basic Planning Document set forth the policy and planning guidance for the development of the military assistance plans for the period FY64-68, and established the over-all JCS objectives of the program. The main objective of the plan was to assist PACOM countries establish and maintain internal security. Countries that enjoyed a degree of internal security received assistance in order to help them deter communist inspired subversion or insurgency. Countries that were threatened by communist inspired subversion or insurgency received aid to defeat the communists and establish internal security.

Further, the BPD provided guidance for the selection of equipment for MAP supported forces. Included were the characteristic of weapons and equipment under development that were expected to be in production during the planning period.

For the preparation of FY64-68 Plan and the FY63 Program, PACOM yearly dollar guide lines were furnished as follows: FY64-68 Plan - \$735 million per year. FY63 Program - \$775 million.

CINCPAC's Supplement to the Military Assistance Basic Planning

Document: In accordance with the DOD Military Assistance Basic

Planning Document, CINCPAC published a supplement thereto in March
setting forth definitive long-range military assistance planning and
program guidance for PACOM. This document outlined detailed
instructions by country for development of force objectives for combat
support and training applicable to the armed forces of each PACOM
MAP supported country. Each country was provided with dollar guidelines through FY68, In addition, all PACOM countries, except Japan,
Burma, and Indonesia were directed to develop a Logistic Plan to
improve the logistic support of the respective countries. 2

CINCPAC's Supplement to the Military Assistance Manual: In support of the DOD Military Assistance Manual, CINCPAC published a new supplement in February. The supplement provided instructions for submitting minimum supporting data required by CINCPAC for program changes, deviations, and revisions. The new procedures were to eliminate the annual review by processing transactions as they occurred, but due to the inherent problems the annual review was required at least through the FY63-68 submission. (UNCLASSIFIED)


FY62 Military Assistance Program: At the end of 1961 the approved FY62 MA Program stood at \$865 million less the SecDef contingency reserve, leaving \$777 million as the program ceiling, of which \$647 million was funded. After several items were deferred the approved program was reduced to the initial level of \$687.6 million. In the final DOD MA Program order approvals for FY62, \$671, 997, 200 was approved, funded and distributed for PACOM as follows:

^{1.} DOD ltr Ser. I-14446/62 of 24 Jan 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC Supplement to the DOD Military Assistance BPD. (S)

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

PROGRAM AND DELIVERIES BY COUNTRY FY 1950 THROUGH FY 1961



MAAG AND SERVICE ADVISORY GROUPS PERSONNEL

PACIFIC COMMAND AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED-BY SERVICE AND CATEGORY

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962

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Laos	\$ 40,906,400.	Indonesia	\$ 3,882,900.
China	\$107,356,200.	Burma	\$ 9,000,000.
Korea	\$173,714,900.	Cambodia	\$ 7,623,400.
Philippines	\$ 22,211,400.	Vietnam	\$144,906,800.
Japan	\$ 47,408,300.	PacFar East	\$ 19,500,000.
Thailand	\$ 75,440,900.	USALCJ	\$ 20,046,000.

In addition, \$61,015,900 was approved for training. Therefore the total MAP order approval for FY62 was \$733,013,100.

FY63 Program and FY64-68 Plan: In preparation for the FY63 Military Assistance Program submission, CINCPAC sent a team of officers to all PACOM MAAGS to review the detailed procedures for submitting the refined FY63 Program and the FY64-68 Plan. This team completed the tour of WESTPAC in April in preparation for the required May and June submission. The benefits received from the team's tour were excellent, as 90% of the field personnel were new to the MA Program and several revised procedures were in effect.

During May and June each MAAG presented its program at CINCPAC Headquarters for review and approval. After review and editing of the FY63 MA Program, and FY64-68 MA Plan a CINCPAC representative accompanied the submission to the OSD. This submission consisted of a 450 pound package which contained plan summaries, EAM cards, and MAP formats. The amount of the submitted FY63 Program was \$865 million and the FY64 Program was \$874 million. The net program after deduction of MAP owned assets and credit assistance equaled \$805 million for FY63 and \$774 million for FY64.

FY63 Military Assistance Program: In August the OSD/ISA made a substantial downward revision of the FY63 Program that CINCPAC had submitted in order to bring the total DOD program within the anticipated funds available. In implementing this, OSD/ISA requested comments on the revised program. Disturbed by the revised program, Admiral Felt stated that it was pertinent to recall that the forward

^{1.} CINCPAC ltr Ser. 00481 of 14 Jul 62 (S)

^{2.} OSD/ISA memo I-19672/62 of 31 Aug 62 (S)

military strategy for the defense of the U.S. from an attack through the Pacific Ocean area required a comprehensive and balanced program. The revised program strengthened the Republic of Vietnam and Thailand but seriously impaired the program for Korea, and especially crippled the programs for China, the Philippines and Japan. At the same time the revised program gave preferred status to three neutral countries. Some specific CINCPAC comments were as follows:

Korea - The revised program contained practically no force improvement and had grave implications for the U.S. and UN defense posture in PACOM. No provision was made for the GPA-37 radar, which was needed desperately for air defense.

China - It was pointed out that the Seventh Fleet was not the only means of deterring Red China from attempting to seize Taiwan and the other off-shore islands. The Chinese Army, Navy, and Air Force were also real factors in the power equation. Reducing their strength to the point where they were second best was risky, not only to the GRC but to the rest of Free Asia and eventually the United States. Deletions from the proposed FY63 program for China were not as drastic as those made to the Korea program, but they were made in areas that were the keys to continued GRC superiority over Red China.

Philippines - The Philippine Government had shown considerable awareness of past deficiencies and was taking action to correct them. Admiral Felt stated that it was incongruous to him that the Philippines should receive less support than a neutral nation that was receiving material furnished by the Soviet Bloc.

Japan - The revised program for Japan would have adverse affect on almost all cost-share projects. Efforts on the part of the Japanese Self Defense Agency to obtain increasing support in the Japanese budget might be nullified. Although CINCPAC was working toward an objective whereby the Japanese would finance completely their military defense, he did not think this was the time to take the final step.

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^{1.} CINCPAC 160049Z Sep 62 (S)

Admiral Felt recognized that he had made many recommendations for beefing-up support to the Republic of Vietnam and Thailand, all of which he still favored. "However, with the plug inserted into Southeast Asia end of the boat," it appeared to him "that the bow and center sections were leaking." CINCPAC found himself in an unusual position of having to support a shooting war in Southeast Asia with less funds than normally funded for a PACOM-wide Military Assistance Program.

CINCPAC made the following recommendations to improve the proposed reduced program:

Cut Indonesia aid to \$10 million.

Cut Burma aid to \$ 5 million.

Apply recoupments and the above cuts as follows:

Korea \$ 12 million
China \$ 7 million
Philippines \$ 3 million
Japan \$ 2 million

In addition, as funds became available the over-all PACOM program could be raised to the level submitted originally. Also, Admiral Felt requested the rationalization for the cuts made by OSD/ISA.

In an attempt to salvage some of the original FY63 MA Program, CINCPAC recommended to the OSD the following specific actions to reduce the Indonesian MA Program from \$16,385 to \$13,745 million:²

- 1. Eliminate the third phase of the recommended, but not yet approved Indonesian Army Civic Action program. This was a \$3.0 million contingency or slush fund for a program that might be developed in FY63.
- 2. Delete the \$440.0 thousand PGM (motor gunboat) and spares, as requested by the CNO of the Indonesian Navy.
- 3. Delete the \$3.4 million small arms standardization project from the FY63 program, since the Indonesians planned to convert 35 infantry battalions to light engineering battalions.

^{1.} CINCPAC 160049Z Sep 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 312347 Z Oct 62 (S)

4. Delete \$2.4 million from the \$6.0 million for the Indonesian Army Fixed Communication System. This amount was not required for FY63 due to slippage in the site preparation.

CINCPAC also recommended that the \$440.0 thousand for the motor gunboat for the Cambodian Navy be deleted. With the funds generated by the above actions, CINCPAC recommended the following items be restored to the FY63 MAP: 1

- 1. Provide two PC ASW overhauls for the Philippine Navy, \$550.0 thousand.
 - 2. Provide one PCE to the Korean Navy, \$1.6 million.
- 3. Provide one DD and one PC ASW overhaul for the Chinese Navy, \$1.45 million.

In response to the CINCPAC recommendations, the OSD agreed the items should be deleted from the FY63 MAP, but claimed that the savings, for political reasons, could not be used outside of Indonesia or Cambodia.²

In December CINCPAC countered that, in his opinion, it would be unbecoming and unproductive for the U.S. to make an unsolicited effort to buy the Indonesian Navy. Pointing out that the FY63 Indonesian program was adequate to retain our entree, he strongly recommended that no substitutes be offered to the Indonesian Navy for the deleted PGM and that the generated funds be applied to the Chinese MAP for ASW overhauls. 3

PACOM MAP Data Processing Center: The PACOM MAP Data Center was officially established on 6 August 1962, as a support activity to CINCPAC. The objectives of the data center were to reduce the work load of the MAAGs and to provide a capability for individual MAP transactions, to provide for a controlled evolution of automation in MAAGs and countries, to develop techniques for computing MAP requirements, and to conduct research into better MAP data systems including electronic inventory control in the country level.

^{1.} CINCPAC 100321Z Nov 62 (S) 2. OSD DEF 922089 DTG 262341Z Nov 62 (S) 3. CINCPAC 180316Z Dec 62 (S)

^{4.} JCS 3705 DTG 201639Z Mar 62 (C)

The process system installed was a result of program specifications and contractor bids. The equipment included the IBM 1401 Digital Computer with the 1405 Random Access Disc storage, EAM auxiliary equipment with IBM Alphabetic accounting machine, card sorter, interpreter, card punch, and verifier stations. Additional information on the PACOM MAP Data Center is presented in Chapter I.

Resupply of MAP Supported Forces in Wartime: With the approval of the DA plan for resupply of common Army items to Korea only, the DA stated the problem of inadequate resupply still remained. The DA pointed out that accelerated MAP deliveries would depend on the availability of Army owned assets that might not be adequate because certain items were no longer required to support the U.S. Army (e.g., the 60mm mortar, 57 and 75mm rifle and repair parts). Without MAP stockpiles or precut requisitions, the Army would have no way of knowing the requirements to support MAP forces. To overcome this problem, the DA proposed the major end item density data be obtained for each MAP country, and that U.S. Army inventory control points be required to compute automatic resupply for MAP country forces (using the end item density data) for any given situation. CINCPAC informed CINSUSARPAC that he concurred in the DA proposal, with the assumption that automatic resupply would exclude bulk POL but would include repair parts, ammunition and other consumables, as well as combat losses of major end items at U.S. rates. CINCPAC stated that end item density information was available in the MAP EAM S-2 summary which provided a consolidated listing by MA Program item, by country and service, showing allocated assets at the beginning of the fiscal year and projected delivery requirements during the ensuing years. summary was produced twice a year and was distributed to all Component Commanders, MAAGs and Service departments.

DA was cautioned about using end item density without due consideration to quantities involved in probable acceleration during limited war of available undelivered balances from prior funded programs,

combat losses and MAP shortfall. CINCPAC also stated that airlift probably would be called for in a limited war for undelivered MAP quantities of artillery, weapons, and electronic and communication equipment, as well as for combat losses.

Accessorial Charges and Transportation Costs

Early in 1962 the DOD published an instruction that required a review of policies that concerned the shipment of MAP material. purpose of the review was to have the countries receiving aid pay for the accessorial charges and transportation costs of MAP material. 2 After CINCPAC consulted the several country teams he determined that the economies of MAP supported countries in PACOM, except Japan, were exceptionally weak. Despite U.S. military and economic assistance, progress in the development of self-sufficiency was slow. In the case of the Republic of Vietnam and Laos, subversive elements had harassed the government by direct military action, sabotage, and subversive propaganda. These actions resulted in continued instability of the political and economic situation. To insist that these additional costs be assumed would require increased U.S. economic aid to finance other projects then funded from country resources, or it would result in unacceptable cuts in the military assistance program of these countries. In the case of Japan, due to the budget procedure of the Diet it was impossible to reallocate funds within the budget, and no provisions for this purpose were made in the FY62 budget by the Japanese Defense Agency. 3 CINCPAC did not consider it feasible to have PACOM MAP supported countries pay the accessorial charges and transportation costs.

Outflow of Gold

In July the Secretary of Defense requested information on the outflow of gold as the result of construction projects in PACOM. 4

CINCPAC 030111Z Nov 62 (S) DOD Inst. 2110.12 of 13 Feb 62 CINCPAC ltr Ser. 00282 of 1 May 62 (S) OSD DEF 916542 DTG 062251Z Jul 62 (S)

addition, the OSD proposed several recommendations to reduce the gold outflow. CINCPAC reported that a definite reduction was possible if the recommendations were adopted, but that this would reduce the amount of construction that could be accomplished with the funds available. It was pointed out that most of the projects were Southeast Asia construction that was required for operational contingencies. CINCPAC recommended that with the implementation of the reduction of gold criteria, an increase in funds be authorized. 1

Concerned over a balance of payments deficit with Japan, the Department of the Army in July suggested to CINCPAC several possible areas of agreement with the Government of Japan (GOJ) for greater GOJ expenditure of dollars in U.S. missile systems and other equipment. In answer, CINCPAC explained that he thought there were only limited opportunities for such agreements. In the meantime, OSD suggested a plan to eliminate vehicle procurement in Japan or to offset dollar expenditures by increased Japanese military procurement in the U.S.. CINCPAC doubted that the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) would have large requirements for U.S. military goods, but expressed his position in favor of continuing the program of vehicle spare parts procurement and rebuild activities in Japan.

During October DA asked CINCUSARPAC to make a feasibility study on the operations of the U.S. Army Logistical Center Japan to determine if it could be relocated, or if the parts and services being procured in Japan could be procured in the CONUS. At the same time, the OSD asked CINCUSARPAC to review the overseas procurement of repair parts. These studies were incomplete at the end of the year. CINCPAC's concern in this matter was related to the cost of items and services he was obligated to procure from allocated MAP funds.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

^{1.} CINCPAC ltr Ser. 00525 of Jul 62 (S)

^{2.} DA 202124Z Jul 62 (C)

^{3.} CINCPAC ltr Ser. 0500 of 22 Jul 62 (C)

^{4.} OSD DEF 918190 DTG 172350Z Aug 62 (C)

^{5.} DA 920310 DTG 171536Z Oct 62 (C)

^{6.} OSD DEF 920069 DTG 1010222 Oct 62 (C)

Continuing Resolution Authority

On 7 July 1962, in response to an OSD request, CINCPAC submitted the continuing resolution authority required for the FY63 MAP program as \$42.8 million. These were the funds considered necessary to carry on in essential areas without disrupting actions that were carried over from the previous FY. Areas where funds were required to carry on operations while awaiting the new FY63 funds were ship building, construction, repair and rehabilitation, contract technical assistance, missile calibration, follow on repair parts, consumables and training. (UNCLASSIFIED)

War Reserve Ammunition

On 30 August the JCS advised CINCPAC that the MAP war reserve ammunition items were deferred, with the exception of those for the Republic of Vietnam, and that the JCS was reviewing the war reserve ammunition levels that were maintained by MAP grant aid recipient countries. The JCS further outlined basic elements and guidance proposed for inclusion in the DOD Basic Planning Document for use by unified commanders in developing war reserve ammunition. guidance included the nature and seriousness of the threat, the treaty obligations of the country concerned, the resupply time required for full operational capability, country storage and maintenance capability, the existing level, the ability and willingness of the recipients to provide ammunition from their own resources, the priority relative to other material, and dollar guidelines. Computation of war reserve levels was based on the active weapons plus reserve forces mobilized by D+30, and supplemented as necessary for paramilitary forces. The total was expressed by day of resupply using U.S. rates of fire. The JCS requested CINCPAC's views as to guidance proposed and the rationale supporting the ammunition war reserve levels in each PACOM country. 4

^{1.} OSD 301088 DTG 101938Z May 62 (U)

^{2.} CINCPAC 301736Z Sep 62 (S)

CINCPAC concurred in the proposed guidance and recommended that it be incorporated in the Military Assistance BPD. In addition. CINCPAC made the following recommendations for countries in PACOM:

Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia: that no war reserve ammunition be authorized in view of the neutral status of these countries.

Japan - that no MAP ammunition be provided since Japan could provide ammunition from its own resources.

Korea, China, Republic of Vietnam, and Thailand -

Army small arms 90 days Other Army ammunition 60 days Navy and Air Force ammunition 60 days

For Korea the predominant factors were the size of the North Korean threat, the common border between North and South Korea, and the time required to resupply the ammunition. The levels for China were considered the minimum required to repel an invasion by Red China, and for the Republic of Vietnam the minimum required because of the long supply lines. Levels for Thailand were based on resupply factors and the fact that the primary threat to Southeast Asia was along the routes leading to Bangkok.

> The Philippines - Army small arms 45 days Other Army Ammunition 30 days Navy and Air Force Ammunition 60 days

These levels were based on the reduced threat from insurgency and the minor commitment to SEATO, plus the country's ability to maintain ammunition.

Laos - War reserve levels were authorized for 25 days, with a balance of 30 days (Saltshaker) retained in Thailand under CINCPAC control as Southeast Asia war reserve.

AC&W Radar Systems in PACOM

The AC&W systems that were in operation at the beginning of 1962 in the land masses of PACOM were manual systems with long reaction times and low intercept capability. Automatic data processing and display equipment was needed to meet the expected manned bomber threat

1. CINCPAC 301736Z Sep 62 (S)

of the 1960-70 period. To determine the need for automatic data processing equipment, CINCPAC established the PACOM Air Defense Ground Environment Requirements Committee (PADGERC) in 1960. As a result of this committee's study the following requirements for U.S. Forces and MAP supported countries were determined.

Japan: The AN/GPA-73 system was approved in the FY61-66 MA Plan for the automation of the air defense of Japan, with Japan expected to pay half of the estimated \$100 million cost. The first increment was scheduled for installation in FY63-64. Subsequently, the Japanese requested competitive bids from three U.S. companies. These bids varied from \$55 million to \$70 million for the basic systems, and the ECCM capability would add from \$10 to \$15 million more. In the FY63-68 plan review CINCPAC recommended that \$27 million be funded in FY63 and \$59 million in FY64 for the Japanese AC&W systems. With the existing costs-share ratio of 25/75 it would require the Japanese to pay \$64 million by credit assistance.

During October 1962, the Japanese Air Self Defense Force AC&W System Selection Team visited CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, and NORAD to discuss the funding, cost-sharing and the compatibility of systems programmed for air defense areas adjacent to Japan. In addition, the team was to obtain recommendations from U.S. air defense authorities on the best system for Japan. Due to the rather large reduction anticipated in funds for Japan in FY63, the discussion was limited to items of technical and operational matters. 2

MAP supported projects in Japan were under review by Washington officials who threatened to eliminate all cost-share projects from FY63 support. 3 CINCPAC pointed out to the DOD the need for the AC&W system for Japan and urged a commitment of funds in the FY63 MA program to support this project. 4 In response, the DOD requested a

^{1.} Information on AC&W systems in PACOM was taken from items in Admiral Felt's Problem Book. Copies retained by J04. (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC ltr Ser. 00675 of Oct 62 (S)

^{3.} OSD 211928Z Sep 62 (S)

^{4.} CINCPAC 260455Z Sep 62 (S)

US OPRL SECRET AC& W SOUTHEAST ASIA MAP PROPOSED ---COMMUNIST CHINA NORTH VIETNAM BURMA FPS 20/8 LAOS MP8 11/14 U.S. CHIANG MAI IPS L/10 UDORN PAG AF FP PHITS/NULOK DANANG KORAT QUBON) OPRL /TPS I/K APRIL 63 TPS 1/10' -BANGKOK / DON ANDANG FPS 20/6 **ØAMBO** MPS 11/14 SOUTH TAC CONUS MPS 11/3 AMTANSON NHUT US OPRL MPS 11/14 MAP 5 LT-WEIGHT RADAR OPR'L + I PROGRAMMED MAP 5 HEAVY (2 MOBILE & 3 FIXED) PROGRAMMED US. 4 HEAVY OPR'L 00 60 100 200

FIGURE 15

firm outline of the requirement, and an indication of the Japanese commitment to support this project in the Japan FY63 appropriations. 1

In November CINCPAC informed OSD/ISA that the proposed PACOM MAP cut that eliminated the semi-automated air defense systems for Japan and Korea resulted in an indefinite prolongation of inadequate defense. Although CINCPAC had recommended that the AN/GPA-73 be scheduled for both countries, this did not mean that CINCPAC had settled on a definite system. It was understood by CINCPAC that the Washington deletion was made partly because the Japanese had not made up their minds on the system they wanted. CINCPAC explained that the Japanese would make their choice when the U.S. indicated a willingness to cost-share the project and when the U. S. determined what it intended to do about Korean and Okinawan air defense. It appeared to CINCPAC that somebody had to initiate action since the U.S. was also unwilling to commit funds until the Japanese had shown their firm intent by including funds for automation in their budget. The Japanese military, on the other hand, could not persuade civilian officials to go ahead until there was positive U.S. support. CINCPAC recommended that every effort be made to restore the funds for the semi-automated air defense systems for both Japan and Korea.

China: The AN/GPA-73 was also considered for China, but it was not approved by CINCPAC due to the belief that the reduction in reaction time was not sufficient to warrant the large expenditure. After considering other systems, it was determined in June of 1962 that until an integrated concept and plan was developed by CHMAAG and CINCPACAF no further action would be taken.

Korea: COMUS Korea had presented a strong case on the need for increased air defense capability in Korea, the possibility of an "iron bomb" war, and the possibility of using the AC&W equipment in offensive roles. In the 1962 MA review CINCPAC approved funding for the

^{1.} OSD DEF 917765 DTG 012047Z Oct 62 (C)

^{2.} CINCPAC 100321Z Nov 62 (S)

system in FY63 and FY64 to include two new radar sites for a total of 8 sites scheduled for automation by the GPA-73.

Thailand: The approved MAP called for two fixed heavy radar sites (AN/FPS-20/6), one on the Korat Plateau and the other at Ubon, and two mobile heavy radar equipped sites at Ubon and in the vicinity of Chieng Mai. Both fixed radar sites were scheduled to be installed and equipped in FY63. Seven sets of light transportable radars were provided from MAP funds, of which four were installed at Korat Air Base, Udorn, Don Muang, and Phitsanulok. The remaining three were used for low altitude gap filling, back-up at mobile heavy radar sites and for training. All of the radar sites were linked together by the RTAF AN/TRC-24 radio relay system.

In addition to MAP equipment, the U.S. had an AC&W capability in Thailand. A PACAF Control Reporting Center (CRC)(MPA11/14) was deployed to Don Muang, initially for MILLPOND support, and subsequently to upgrade the RTAF AC&W training. In connection with existing concern about subversion in Northeast Thailand, and to supplement RVN radar coverage, the unit was moved to Ubon in May 1962. As part of U.S. forces deployed to Thailand in May and June 1962, a USMC mobile heavy radar (MPS 11/16) was positioned at Udorn. An additional MPS 11/16 radar was obtained later from CONUS and deployed to Don Muang.

Vietnam: The FY63-67 Plan called for heavy radar sites (AN/FPS-20/6) located at Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang. Due to the Presidential program requirement to develop the air surveillance capability in 1961, the heavy radar at Da Nang was expedited with equipment delivery in late 1962 and installation was expected to be completed in April 1963. In the interm, at CINCPAC's request, the JCS deployed a manned mobile CRC from CONUS resources. In addition a Control and Reporting Post (CRP) was airlifted to Tan Son Nhut to perform an essential function as well as to provide radar coverage. The RVN program was later changed to only one fixed heavy site (Da Nang) and the Tan Son Nhut requirement was satisfied by in place transfer of the

AN/MPS-11/14. With the introduction of Jungle Jim a Tactical Air Control System (TACS) was deployed from PACAF resources. In early 1962 the VNAF light radar (TPS-1/10) was operational at Pleiku. As a result of the numerous aircraft reported, CINCPAC approved a general site improvement as well as additional scopes to cope with this problem.

SAM For Japan

CINCPAC continued during 1962 to work with the problems connected with establishing SAM battalions in Japan.

Japan was scheduled to receive the first NIKE battalion in FY63. This initial battalion was under the grant aid program and was furnished without cost to the Japanese government, except for the AN/TSQ-38 which was cost-shared. The cost of the second NIKE and the two HAWK battalions was shared by the U.S. and the GOJ, which was to pay 65% of the U.S. dollar costs based on prices furnished by the DOD. Total cost for the second NIKE and the two HAWK battalions was estimated at \$55.4 million. The following was the schedule for having operational SAM battalions in Japan:

1st NIKE FY63 1st HAWK FY65 2nd NIKE FY66 2nd HAWK FY67

In the FY64-68 Plan the third HAWK battalion was included at the request of the JDA and the third NIKE for FY68 was included at the request of the CHMAAG Japan for planning purposes only.

Two problems which arose during the year concerned the Annual Service Practice (ASP) firing, and the replacement training for the NIKE. It was determined that the Japanese had the capability to conduct in-country ASP but, because of the delicate political and social situation, the JDA had stated in the Diet that the ASP would not be conducted in Japan. For reasons of economy, the Japanese preferred to conduct the ASP on Okinawa. This plan was not feasible due to the political, propaganda and security problems in Okinawa. The JCS

approved a plan for the Japanese to conduct their annual practice at Fort Bliss.

In November the agreement was completed for the Japanese to fire their ASP at Fort Bliss in late October or November 1963. This was approved on a one time basis for 1963 only. (CONFIDENTIAL)

For some time it was understood that the Japanese were responsible for the training of replacements in the NIKE battalions. The Japanese had assumed that the SAM replacement training could be accomplished on-the-job. Due to the technical aspects and the inability to train NIKE replacements in this manner, it was finally realized that formal training was required, but the Japanese had not budgeted for the additional expense in the Japanese FY62 budget. On 14 September CINCPAC directed the CHMAAG Japan to include this cost in his training revision CINCPAC agreed to defray only the cost of training replacements for a six month period, and that thereafter the cost would have to be funded by the GOJ. ²

Negotiations for a government to government agreement on the cost-sharing of the AN/TSQ-38 for the first NIKE (grant aid battalion), and hardware for the second NIKE and two HAWK battalions began in September. Negotiations were aimed at an exchange of notes between the Ambassador and the Foreign Office, concurrent with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between JDA and CHMAAG. As noted above, GOJ would pay 65% of hardware costs. Problems which arose shortly after the beginning of negotiations included the following:

- 1. The JDA wished to separate training of the first HAWK battalion from the agreement in order to start training before the conclusion of the agreement. CINCPAC wished to delay training until the agreement was signed. OSD concurred.
- 2. The JDA was inquisitive as to the basis for the prices given them by CHMAAG Japan, and was concerned about the condition of equipment to be furnished. CINCPAC recommended that the CHMAAG use the term "MAP acquisition prices."

 (CONFIDENTIAL).

CINCPAC 070405Z Nov 62 (C)

^{2.} See 1962 items in Admiral Felt's Problem Book. (S), In J04 files.

3. The JDA requested that the equipment be described as "new" or "new on the whole." CINCPAC recommended that the wording should be "meets MAP standards." (GONFIDENTIAL)

At the end of 1962 negotiations on both the exchange of notes and the memorandum of understanding were continuing.

The first Japanese NIKE Battalion (provided by MAP) was assigned by GOJ on 26 December 1962 to the Ground Self Defense Force. The battalion was to be transferred to the Air Self Defense Force as of 1 April 1964. The second NIKE Battalion, when activated, was to be assigned to the Air Self Defense Force. Two HAWK Battalions, when activated, were to be assigned to the Ground Self Defense Force.

(GONFIDENTIAL)

SAM For Korea

The FY62-67 MA Plan for Korea provided for one HAWK Battalion in FY63, one in FY64, and one in FY67. It also provided for one NIKE Battalion in FY63, and one in FY66.

This program was delayed until the Department of Defense authorized the release of classified information to the ROKA. On 25 November 1961, the OSD authorized CINCPAC to release confidential information on the HAWK system to the Koreans, and on 1 May 1962 the U.S. and ROKG signed an agreement on the security of information As a result, beginning in June 1962, CINCPAC was authorized to release to the ROKA secret instruction material on the NIKE and HAWK.

However, the delay made it necessary to revise the FY63-68 MA plan to reflect the required lead time as follows:

lst HAWK	FY65
2nd HAWK	FY66
lst NIKE	FY66
2nd NIKE	FY67
3rd HAWK	FY68

In July 1962 CINCPAC queried the JCS on the feasibility of using U.S. troops (in lieu of ROK troops) to man either the two planned NIKE Battalions, or the two NIKE and the three HAWK Battalions. CINCPAC

CINCPAC 272140Z Oct 62 (C)
 CHMAAG Japan CMB 5503 DTG 270302Z Dec 62 (C)
 OSD 914756 DTG 282002Z May 62 (S)

BECKET

U. S. Army troops rather than ROKA it should be the two NIKE Battalions. The JCS recommended to the SecDef that the U.S. not assume responsibility for the SAM in Korea planned under MAP.

COMUSK was directed to begin negotiating an agreement with the ROK on the provision of the first HAWK Battalion. OSD requested that the agreement be forwarded to Washington for review prior to signing or approval. ²

SAM For China

One MAP-provided NIKE Hercules Battalion was already operational in the Chinese Army in 1962. In addition, one HAWK Battalion was planned to become operational during FY64, and a second NIKE Hercules Battalion was to be operational in FY66.

Other MAP Activities

Cessna 185 Aircraft for MAP: Because the U.S. Army was terminating its requirements for the O-1A aircraft, the OSD proposed that the Cessna 185 aircraft be substituted for the O-1A as well as the U-6A and the U-10A in the Military Assistance Program and Plans. An evaluation of the Cessna 185 by the Component Commanders and CINCPAC led to the conclusion that the Cessna 185 aircraft was generally acceptable as a substitute for all three aircraft. However, CINCPAC pointed out that in order to make the substitution in an orderly manner it should be included in the FY64 and subsequent programs with the exception of Cambodia where 7 O-1A aircraft were programmed for FY63. This quantity was considered large enough to warrant substitution in FY63.

^{1.} CINCPAC 090203Z Aug 62 (S)

^{2.} COMUS KOREA UK-60613 DTG 020840Z Oct 62 (S)

^{3.} OSD DEF 922619 DTG 110039Z Dec 62 (C)

^{4.} CINCPAC 270407 Z Dec 62 (U)

BURMA AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962

BJECTIVE US DIPLOMATIC MISSION	HELP BURMA SURVIVE AS AM INDEP- ICALLY FRIENDLY TOWARD THE U.S. HOM. JOHN SCOTT EVERTOM U.S. ARBASSADOR HOM. JOHN SCOTT EVERTOM U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, AID. CHIEF, MEDT COL. MORRIS J. MAUDTS, USA	MAP OBJECTIVE	PROMOTE U.S. INFLUENCE THROUCH EUCOURACEMENT AND SUPPORT OF PRO-WESTERN ATTITUDES WITHIN THE BURNESE ARMED FORCES AND IMPROVE AND STRENCTHEN THER CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COPE WITH DISSIDENT ELEMENTS. PROVIDE BURNA AN ALTERNATIVE TO SOVIET BLOC MILITARY ASSISTANCE.	COMBAT CAPABILITY	NOT TET CAPABLE OF FULLY SECURING INTERNAL PEACE AND GROER, BHABLE TO OFFER SUSTAINED EFFECTIVE RESIST- ANCE TO DIRECT ATTACK BY CHICOMS, NO SKANFICANT GAPAB- ILITY BEYOND BURNA BORDERS.	CAPABLE OF CIVING LIGHT SUPPORT TO THE ARMY, DISCOURACING PIRACY, AND CONDUCTING INSHORE PATROL DUTIES.	IT IS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS PRIMARY MISSION OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY BY SUPPORTING THE ARMY AND MAY, REGLIGIBLE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AGAINST AIR ATTACK BY MAJOR POWER.
OVERALL OBJECTIVE	HELP BURMA SURVIYE AS AN INDEP-ENDEM, UNITED, NON-COMMUNIST STATE, BASICALLY FRIENDLY TOWARD THE U.S. AND THE FREE WORLD.		PROMOTE US. INFLUENCE THROUGH WESTERN ATTITUDES WITHIN THE BIAND STRENCTHEN THEIR CAPABILITY AND STRENCTHEN THEIR CAPABILITY COPE WITH DISSIDENT ELENENTS. SOVIET BLOC MILITARY ASSISTANCE.	TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	73 INF BNS, SLIGHT INF BNS, 4ARTY BNS, 1ANTI-TANK BN AM IARMORED BN, 1ARMD GAR BN	1 PF.1 INSF. 6 PCH. 33 PR. 6 PT. 106, 4 U.S. 1, 4 TAC J	2 FTR/PARR SOBM, 2 TRANSP SOBM 3 COMMUNICATIONS SOBM 1 OPERATIONAL CONVERSION UNIT ARK
	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 1962(E) - \$ 1,312,000,000 PER CAPITA\$ 131,000,000 AS % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPERID. 34.9% AS % OF TOTAL RESOURCES AMALLABLE 8.6%		Aung Gyi Thaung Tin	AUTHORIZED MAP FORCES	5 IMF BDE. 25 IMF BNS(POLICE), GARTY BNS, 4 SIG RGTS	6 PGM	1 TAC FTR SQD, 2 TRANS SQDS, 2 HELO SQDS
BASIC INFORMATION	AREA	BURMA	Chairman of Council of Ministers Union of Burma Revolutionary Government/Defense Minister-General Ne Win Vice Chief of Staff Army-Brigadier Aung Gyi Vice Chief of Staff Air-Brigadier Thomas Clift Vice Chief of Staff Navy-Commander Thaung Tin		ARMY	MANY	AIR FORCE

MAP Delivery of Ships: During 1962 the U.S. overhauled, reconditioned and delivered to MAP supported countries the following ships: Burma, four LCMs; China, one LSM and one ATA; Cambodia, two LCUs; Korea, two ATAs and one PCE; Philippines, one LSM and one 64' L Boat; Thailand, one LSM and one LST; and Vietnam, two MSFs, one LSM, and one LST.

COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

Burma

The Military Assistance Program for Burma was carried out to promote U.S. influence in the Burmese Armed Forces, to promote the capability of these forces to maintain internal security, and to preclude the acceptance of Sino-Soviet Bloc military aid and advice. Burma continued her independent course in world affairs despite the close proximity of Communist China. Burma spent a substantial portion of the national budget on self defense rather than to rely on outside help.

Cambodia

The objective of the Military Assistance Program for Cambodia was to assist in strengthening the capability of the Cambodia forces to maintain internal security against subversion and insurgency inspired by communist or other elements inimical to the U.S. interest, and to encourage pro-Western orientation. Cambodia contributed approximately two-thirds of the support of her 31,000 active military force. This was about one-third of all domestic revenues. In addition to Cambodia's contribution of pay and allowances for the military forces, the defense budget provided for substantial amounts for the construction of roads, bridges, military housing, and the purchase of end items and consumables not provided for by military assistance.

One of the significant actions that was taken in regard to Cambodia was the MAP support of additional ground forces, including two new Frontier Battalions. These battalions were designed to carry out civic action activities in the northeast area, an area populated by tribesmen

with limited loyalty to the RKG. CINCPAC had not approved the new Frontier Battalion proposed in 1961 because of Prince Sihanouk's vacillating position. By the end of 1961, CHMAAG Cambodia had submitted a list of equipment for the new battalion. CINCPAC considered this amount to be excessive and requested that it be reduced. After several resubmissions and recommendations by CINCUSARPAC, it. was determined that the cost for the Frontier Battalion was \$671,000. In February CINCPAC approved the first battalion for the FY63 program under the approved FARK force ceiling of 31,000. In June the RKG formally requested that the U.S. support a FARK force increase of 3,184 over and above the approved 31,000. This increase was to include a second Frontier Battalion and three additional infantry battalions, and to expand the existing units by 924 personnel. CHMAAG Cambodia's FY63 MA program and FY64-68 plan included these units, and on 30 June, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS approve the increase. 2 On 4 July, in joint action, State-Defense-AID approved the requested increase. 3 Disappointed because the U.S. offer for this increased support did not include pay, allowance and subsistance support, the RKG suspended action on its plans to organize the new units. On 9 August the OSD indicated that approval of the force increase and support for the first Frontier Battalion was deferred pending information on the RKG intent to activate and support the new units. CINCPAC advised OSD that he had approved the first Frontier Battalion for the FY63 program in February, under the approved 31,000 FARK force ceiling. On 22 August, CINCPAC asked the OSD to reconsider its deferral of the funding of the first battalion since this unit was under the approved ceiling force level, was not involved in the pay and allowance controversy, and was organized and ready to receive equipment. 5 In December OSD lifted the deferral on this battalion. 6

^{1.} CINCPAC 242116Z Feb 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 302353Z Jun 62 (S)

^{3.} State 766 to Phnom Penh 4 Jul 62 (S)

TELECON TT DA 4219 of 9 Aug 62 (S)
 CHMAAG Cambodia 1981 DTG 170720Z Aug 62 (S)
 Program Status Report FY63 MA Program, 17 Dec 62 (S)

SECRET NOFORN

CAMBODIA AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962

INDONESIA AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962

OVERALL OBJECTIVE US. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	PREVENTION OF COMMUNIST DOMINATION OF INDONESIA WITH THE EVENTUAL ACHIEVEMENT OF A MORE STABLE, GROW- ING. AND FREE INDONESIA. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, AID. CHIEF, MILTAG. COL ROBT. N. VAN. VOLKENBURGH, U.S.A.	MAP 08JECTIVE	PROVIDE TRAINING AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF EQUIPMENT FOR INDONESIA ARMED FORCES ON A LIMITED BUT CONTINUING BASIS WITH THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF FAVORABLY INFLUENCING AND STRENGTHENING U.S. TIES WITH YOUTHLY INFORTANT ELEMENTS IN INDONESIA, ENABLING THEM TO AVOID BECONING DEPLYING OF THE SOVIET BLOG FOR THEIR MILITARY NEEDS AND TO BOLSTER THEIR RESOLVE TO RESIST COMMUNISM. SEEK TO IMPROVE THE ABLITY OF THE ARMED FORCES TO MAIRTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY ACAINST COMMUNIST INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY, AND TO COMBAT COMMUNIST ACTIVITY.	COMBAT CAPABILITY	MAINTAIN WITERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL MINOR INCURSIONS BUT NOT A MAJOR ATTACK.	SUPPRESS SAUGGLING AND SUPPORT A THREE-BATTALION SIZE LANDING FORCE, CONDUCT ONLY TOKEN SUBMARINE INTERDICTION AND ASS OFERATIONS, INDONESIAN MARINES ARE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING BATTALION SIZE LANDING FONGES FOR ANT-RIBIDIS ASSAULTS	FORCES IN BEING ARE OPERATIONS AND YER AIR DEFENSE OFFENSIVE BOMBING OPFRATIONS AND YER AIR DEFENSE OPFRATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND TO SUPPORT MINOR GROUND OPERATIONS.
OVERALL OVERALL	PREVENTION OF COMMUNIST BONNS OF INDONESIA WITH THE EVENTUAL ACHIEVEMENT OF A MORE STABLE, GI ING AND FREE INDONESIA. ING AND FREE INDONESIA.	22		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	IAO INF BN, 4 MP BN, 8 CAV BN, 7 FA BN, 1 MTM ARTY BM, 4 AAA BN, 1 MORT BN, 2 COMB ARTY BN	ICL., 500, 60E, 12.55, 30PC, 21 PCM 21 PT, 9MSI, 4 MSF, 8LST, 6 LCU/LCI, 2 APA 1 MSC, 5 M0, 2 MK, 2 MS, 2 ARS, 2 ARI, 15 MISC	2 MED BMR SOLLET), 11T BMR SQ (PISTON 1 D/F SQDN, 2 A/W FTR SQDN, 11T BMR SQLET), 1 TACTICAL FTR SQDN, 2 TRANSPORT SQDN, 2 RECCE SQDN
2	891.5 WILLON 891.5 WILLON 1.13		ASUTION COLUMN C	AUTHORIZED MAP FORCES	IZO INF BINS, 5 TK BINS, 5 ARMD CAV BINS, 15 ARTY BINS	7PC/PGM,10LSIL/LST, 16 A A/C 1/3 RLT	I TAC FTR SQ., I TAC RCM SQ. 2 TRANS SQS., I ASR SQ
BASIC INFORMATION	AREA	INDONESIA	President/Prime Minister-Achmed SUKARNO Defense Minister/G/S Armed Forces-Gen A. H. NASUTION C/S Army- MGEN Achmad JANI C/S Arwy-RADM Edi MARTADINATA C/S Air Force-Air Vice Marshal Umar DANI Commandant MarCorps-BGEN HARTONO MIN FOREIGN AFFAIRS-SUBANDRIO, Dr. FIRST MINISTER-DJUANDA, KARTA W.		ARMY 120 INF BKS,	NAVY 7PC/PCM,IC	AIR FORCE ITAC FTR SQ.

Indonesia

The underlying purpose of the Military Assistance Program, as in prior years, was political, in that it was designed to influence Indonesia to retain a non-communist position.

At the request of the Indonesian Government, a Civic Action Survey
Team that was sponsored by the Departments of State and Defense
visited Indonesia and developed a civic action program that was approved
by Washington. The program was to be financed by AID and MAP funds.
The details of this project are included in the Civil Affairs Section of
Chapter I. (UNCLASSIFIED)

<u>Japan</u>

The Military Assistance Program was to maintain Japan internally secure, closely allied to the U.S., and to strengthen its defense against external aggression. Unlike several other countries, Japan paid all costs of supporting its existing armed forces, including pay, food and clothing, housing, real facilities and consumables, as well as most of the operation and maintenance costs. The Japanese manufactured significant amounts of their own defense equipment, for example, F-104 and the P2V-7 aircraft.

F-104 Aircraft for Japan: Under U.S. license, Japan was scheduled to manufacture 200 F-104D/J aircraft for introduction into the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF). Two problems arose during 1962 - training and the production schedule. Due to shortage of ground support equipment, spares, etc., the USAF was unable to provide the type of training the JASDF desired. As a result, a large gap developed between the production schedule and planned squadron activation. To avoid an overproduction of aircraft that would create a costly storage problem, CINCPAC recommended that the production schedule be stretched to match the activation of squadrons. 2,3

^{1.} HQ USAF AFSMS-OT 99783 DTG 082252Z Feb 62 (C)

^{2.} AMEMB Tokyo A-555 to State 29 Oct 62 (C)

^{3.} CINCPAC 170412Z Nov 62 (C)

Reorganization of the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force: During 1962 the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) completed its reorganization started in 1960. Previously the force consisted of five Army headquarters that commanded the major GSDF tactical units of six 12,700 man infantry divisions, four combined brigades, and an airborne brigade. As reorganized, the major units consisted of 12 smaller infantry divisions, a mechanized division, and the airborne brigade.

The key objective of the reorganization was to establish a modern mobile force capable of operating effectively in Japan's difficult terrain. CINCPAC considered the new divisions a step in the right direction, but certain deficiencies remained. The units themselves were basically scaled down versions of the older, larger divisions. The reduction in artillery strength ran counter to experience gained by other nations and severely limited the divisions' capability to defend on a broad front. The organic aerial reconnaissance capability was insufficient, resulting in limited fire power for the reconnaissance elements. The divisions used some light tanks, since the Japanese budget would not permit the GSDF to provide all the medium tanks called for in the TO&E.

The most serious problem facing the GSDF was a manpower shortage that rose to 28,000 men in 1962, and that was compounded by maldistribution that shorted tactical units at the expense of overstrength headquarters and service units. On occasions, rifle companies were unable to muster more than 40 men for training due to initial shortages and requirements levied by station service units for non-essential duties.

Assigned strength of the divisions averaged 63 per cent of that authorized, a strength level that no longer qualified them to be considered combat ready. 1

Request for Loan of Light Tanks to Japan: During November a representative of the Japan Defense Agency visited Washington and requested that the U.S. consider storing in Japan a number of surplus

^{1.} WID No. 37-62 of 14 Sep 62 (S)

JAPAN AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962

OVERALL OBJECTIVE U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	OF JAPAN TO U.S. AMBASSADOR. NOWER. INSURE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, AID NOLY CO-OPER NRCHARLES D. JOWES RMLY ALIGNED BYG. J. N. WORTHMGTON, USA	NAP OBJECTIVE	A JAPANESE DEFENSE EFFORT CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST-INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY AND CAPABLE OF ASSUMING INCREASING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE JAPAN AREA AND, THEREBY, TOGETHER WITH UNITED STATES FORCES, OF COPING WITH THE DETERRING COMMUNIST AGGRESSON IN THE PACIFIC. ULTIMATELY, A JAPAN WILLING AND ABLE TO SUPPORT ITS DEFENSE FORCES BRITIRELY FROM ITS OWN RESOURCES.	COMBAT CAPABILITY	NAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT LIMITED Detensive operations	LIMITED ABILITY TO ESCORT COASTAL CONVOYS, I AST SOON OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE, 6000 MINESWEEPING CAPBILITY	600D UNDER VER CONDITIONS, AWX CAPABILITY GROWING, SMALL SIZE LIMITS ABILITY
OVERALL O	DENY CONTROL OF JAPAN TO ANY HOSTILE POWER. INSURE A STRONG, FRIENDLY CO-OPER ATIVE NATION FIRMLY ALIGNED WITH U.S.		A JAPANESE DEFEI SECURITY AGAINST AND CAPABLE OF A OF THE JAPAN AR FORCES, OF COPING PACIFIC. ULTIMATELY A JAPA ENTIRELY FROM ITS	TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	12 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, I NECIANIZED DIVISION, I AIR-BORNE BRIGADE, 10 ARTILLERY BATTALIONS, 8 ANTI - ARCKAFT BATTALIONS, 2 4.2 NORTAR BATTALIONS, 5 ARMIES.	BD0, 455,8 DE, 42 (PC, PT, PF), 420KS), MSC, MSC), MSB, MNC) 481LSM, LSSL, LCU, LCM, LCVP, LST), 15 PB 81 - YC, 8 - M1SC.	3 A/W FTR SQDN, 2 TRANSPORT SQDN, 10 D/F SQDN, I Recon SQDN
	LIFE EXPECTANCY 6005S NAT PROD. 1962(E). \$51.9 BILLION PER CAPITA. \$537 DEFENSE BUDGET 1961(E). \$622 MILLION AS NOF TOTAL CENTRAL CONT. EXP. 8.5% AS NO FOTAL CENTRAL CONT. EXP. 8.5%		SHI ASHI, KEIZO, GEN ADAYOSHI, ADM GEN GEN J-WADA, ISAMU	AUTHORIZED MAP FORCES	IZ INFANTRY DIVISIONS, I AIRBORNE BRIGADE, I MECHANIZED DIVISION.	SELECTED ITEMS OF ORDNANCE AND ELECTRONICS. FURNISHED UNDER IMP WHILE SHIPS BEING BUILT, ON COMPLETION, IMP SUPPORT IS TERNINATED.	II A/W FTA SOOMS, 2 TRANSPORT SOONS, 2 RECON SOOM, 8 TAC FTR SONS II SAR DETACHMENTS
BASIC INFORMATION	AREA 143,000 SQ MI LIFE EXPECTANCY POPULATION 96 MILLION GROSS NAT PROD. ISSE(E) \$; AMABLE LAND PER CAPITA 5 LITERACY RATE 97 % AS % OF TOTAL CAPITA AS % OF TOTAL CAPITAL COVI	JAPAN	EMPEROR-HIROHITO PRIME MINISTER-IKEDA, HAYATO MIN FOREIGN AFFAIRS-CHIRA, MASAYOSHI DIR-GEN DEF AGENCY-SHIGA, KENJIRO CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF COUNCIL-HAYASHI, KEIZO, GEN CHIEF, GROUND STAFF-OMORI, KAN, GEN CHIEF, MARITIME STAFF-NAKAYAMA, SADAYOSHI, ADM CHIEF, MA STAFF-MATSUDA, TAKESHI, GEN DIRECTOR GENERAL, MSB(COAST GUARD)-WADA, ISAMU		ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE

SECRET

light tanks. According to his proposal, these tanks would be on a loan status to Japan, but the JGSDF would use and maintain them at Japanese expense. They would be returned to the U.S. if desired. In response to a JCS request for CINCPAC's views, Admiral Felt opposed the loan because he considered that there was no strategic requirement for light tanks in Japan, because the action would not encourage Japan to speed up production of its own tanks, and because the only surplus lighttanks available were obsolete M-24s.

Korea

The Military Assistance Program objective for Korea was to maintain ROK forces capable of assuring internal security and, together with U.S. Forces in Korea and such outside U.S. combat and logistic support as was readily available, capable of: (1) deterring or successfully resisting aggression from the North Korea forces alone; (2) deterring aggression by North Korea forces together with Chinese Communists, or conducting a holding operation against those Chinese and North Korean forces.

ROK Force Reduction and Funding Level: As in previous years, Korea received a major portion of the PACOM MA Program. Also, as in previous years, the OSD asked CINCPAC to review the Korea program and attempt to reduce the amount of aid provided. In July OSD/ISA requested that plans based on four separate levels of U.S. support be forwarded covering the following: (1) \$250 million per year (basic plan); (2) \$250 million, scaled down to \$140 million (the alternate plan); (3) \$225 million per year; and (4) \$180 million. CINCPAC forwarded the required information but reaffirmed his position indicated in the FY64-68 MA Plan and did not concur with any Korean MA Plan developed under the cutbacks indicated in the OSD request. He emphasized that:

^{1.} OSD DEF 921966 DTG 220133Z Nov 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 141835Z Dec 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 090203Z Aug 62 (S)

- 1. If one U.S. division was moved from Korea to Okinawa it would result in a substantial reduction of U.S. strength and would jeopardize the capabilities of conducting a successful defense of Korea. The reduction of one division would undoubtly be assessed by the ROK and the Sino-Soviet Bloc as decreasing U.S. support for the ROK and a reduction of its ability to stand against the communists in NE Asia. It would eliminate half of the U.S. front-line combat strength, reduce the nuclear capability by 25% for the Honest John and 50% for the Davy Crocket weapons available, and increase the requirement for augmentation of one additional U.S. division in Korea upon the outbreak of hostilities. In consideration of these factors, CINCPAC urged that the two U.S. divisions be retained in Korea.
 - 2. In regard to NIKE and HAWK units, CINCPAC recommended that two ROKA MAP NIKE Hercules battalions be transferred to the U.S. and that three HAWK battalions be left in ROKA MAP, provided sufficient manpower and funds were made available.
- 3. In regard to ROK force level reduction, CINCPAC recommended no change from the present ROK force level of 600,000.
- 4. With regard to air defense, CINCPAC rejected the request that the funding of the F-104G aircraft be accelerated to fit the specific production schedules and at the same time reduce the annual funding levels. CINCPAC recommended that AC&W and F-104G funding be provided in accordance with the PACOM FY63 Program and the FY64-68 MA Plan.
- 5. Concerning the improved and automated AC&W systems for Korea, CINCPAC recommended that the U.S. share of AC&W manning be limited to contract technical service personnel reflected in the FY64-68 MA Plan, and additional U.S. military personnel, in order to provide continuing system management and operational assistance in control of U.S. aircraft.

ROK Leaflet Ballon Operation: In support of the JCS-directed United Nations Command PsyWar offensive against the North Koreans,

KOREA AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962

OVERALL OBJECTIVE	PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AGAINST RENEWED COMMUNIST AGERESSION PRESERVE AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, LOCKING TOWARD EVENTUAL PRACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA UNDER A FREE, DEMOCRATIC, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT FRIENDLY TO THE U.S.	TO MAINTAIN FORCES CAPABILE OF (A) MAINTAINING INFERMAL SECTION (B)	DETERRING OVERT COMMUNIST ATTACK, (C) DEFEATING SUCH ATTACK IF SHORT OF AN ALL OUT COMMUNIST EFFORT, AMD (D) ASSIST U.S. FORCES EXTENSIVELY IN THE EVENT OF A GENERAL WAR IN THE PACIFIC	U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	U.S. AMBASSADOR U.S. DIRECTOR, AID CHIEF, PROVMACK MCHAMBER S. KILLEN CHIEF, PROVMACK	COMBAT CAPABILITY	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL AGRESSION FROM NORTH Korea, assuming adequate logistic & AIR Support from Outside Sources	WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MINE COUNTERNEASURES THE ABILITY OF THE ROK MANY TO PREFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY. THE ROK MARINES ARE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING RECHENTAL SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMPHIBOUS ASSAULT OPNSOR LANGER SIZED FORCES, IF LIFTAND OTHER SUPPORT IS MADE AVAILABLE	TACTICAL FTR SQDNS, 2 A/WFTR SQDN, I TRANSPORT SQDN FORCES IN BEING OPERATIONALLY READY TO SUPPORT GROUND OPERATIONS, AND TACTICAL RECON SQDN
		inuas sure				TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	18 INF DIVS, 10 RES DIVS, I SPECIAL FORCES GP, 10 TK BINS, MAINTAIN 12 155 HOW BINS, 1 155 GBN, 2 B"HOW BINS, 5 4.2 MORTAR BINS KOREA, A I AAA BRIGADE, (2 ARMIES, 5 CORPS)	2 DE/4 PF/ 16 PC/3 PT/8 LST/2 LSSL, 10 MINECRAFT FORM 1T 12 LSM/ 5AKL/4 AO/1 ARL / 1 APD / 1 LSMR SAKL/4 AO/1 ARR BRIC 11 MARINE DIVÉ"), 1 MAR BRIC, 1 MAR BRIC OR LARGE	5 TACTICAL FTR SODNS, 2 A/WFTR SODN, I TRANSPORT SODN FORCES I TACTICAL RECON SODN
BASIC INFORMATION	37,000 SQ.MI. 25.5 MILLION WTH 2.5 % 0.2 ACRE 1F 80 %		ET SELF-FINANCED (E) 1961 Govt exp	ACTG PRESIDENT - PAK CHONG HUI, GEN	CHALKMAN - SCNR - FAR CHONG HUI, GEN PRIME MINISTER - KIM HYON CHOL CLEF MINISTER - PAK PHONG KWON, LTGEN(RET) CLS ARMY - KIM CHONG OH, GEN CNO - YI MAENG KI, VADM C/S AIR FORCE - CHANG SONG HWAN, LTGEN COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - KIM TU CHAN, LTGEN	AUTHORIZED MAP FORCES	IS INFANTRY DIVS, 10 RES DIVS I SPECIAL FORCES GROUP	2 DE/4 PF/16 PC/3 PT/ 10 MINECRAFT/1LSMR 8 LST/12 LSM, 1 APD, 1 MAR DIY.	6 TACTICAL FTR SQDNS, 2 TRANSPORT SQDNS 1 TACTICAL RECON SQDN, 2 A/W FTR SQDNS 1 TAC AIR CONTROL SQDN,
	AREA POPULATION (1961) ANNUAL GROWTH ARABLE LAND PER CAP	LIFE EXPECTANCY GROSS NAT. PROD. 1963	PER CAPITA DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FI AS % OF GNP AS % OF CENT GOVT EXP	ACTG PRE	CHALKMAN CHALKMAN DEF MINIS: C/S ARNY CNO - YI M C/S AIR FO COMMAND		ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE

the CINCUNC recommended that funds be made available for additional leaflet drops on North Korea. These drops were initiated on a small scale in July of 1962. Although the ROK Minister considered them successful, because of limited operational funds the ROK were unable to continue the project. CINCPAC passed the problem to CINCUSARPAC, who in turn passed it to the U.S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity Pacific. Twenty thousand dollars was programmed for the project in the spring of 1963 when the winds would be more favorable.

Korean Air Defense: In September the OSD advised CINCPAC that the F-5A aircraft was scheduled for introduction into Korea in place of the previously programmed F-104G. ² After receiving strong protests from CHMAAG Korea and CINCPACAF, CINCPAC recommended that the F-104Gs be restored to the Korea MA Program because the air defense capability of Korea would be seriously degraded by substituting F-5As for F-104Gs. After an additional exchange of correspondence in which the OSD explained that the F-104G did not have all-weather capability and CINCPAC pointed out that this was being corrected, OSD stated that the decision was firm and that the F-5As were programmed for Korea in place of the F-104Gs. ³, ⁴

Operation Quick Trip: In August, the Department of the Army proposed a plan for the automatic shipment of common Army supplies to meet the requirements of Army forces of MAP supported Allies involved in a limited war covered in CINCPAC contingency OPlans. In reviewing the plan CINCPAC concurred but pointed out that it was inadvisable to pre-position supplies and precut requisitions for the resupply of PACOM Allied forces except for ROK forces. As a result the plan was used to resupply the ROK forces in common Army items required in limited war. The plan was called Quick Trip.

^{1.} CINCUSARPAC RJ 96925 DTG 192230Z Oct 62 (S)

^{2.} OSD DEF 919132 DTG 142355Z Sep 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 280808Z Nov 62 (S)

^{4.} OSD DEF 922451 DTG 052338Z Nov 62 (S)

^{5.} CINCPAC 041845Z Sep 62 (S)



Support of UN/ROK in a Limited War: The JSCP provided that in a limited war in which sizeable numbers of U.S. forces were involved and in which there was a combined operation under a U.S. commander, U.S. military assistance for committed allied forces normally would be supplied through the U.S. pipeline and would not retain any separate MAP identity, depending upon the logistic procedures of the services involved. This plan further provided that, in any case whatever, the decision to abandon normal MAP channels and supply allied forces through the supply pipeline of the U.S. forces would be made by the Secretary of Defense on the recommendation of the JCS. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the decision be made in advance, to give COMUSKOREA standby authority to abandon normal MAP channels of U.S. forces in Korea immediately in the event CINCPAC OPLAN 27-63 was implemented, (i.e., renewal of Communist aggression against ROK). This authority was appropriate since sizeable U.S. forces were already deployed in Korea, and COMUS Korea as CINCUNC exercised operational control over U.S. /UN/ROK forces. CINCPAC considered this necessary to give COMUS Korea logistic authority, commensurate with his combat operational responsibilities, from the onset of limited war hostilities in which sizeable U.S. forces were involved. 1

Philippines

The Military Assistance Program for the Philippines was to assist in organizing, training, and equipping the military establishment capable of maintaining internal security; and contribute to the defense of the Philippines, and to the collective defense of the Western Pacific Area. In addition the MAP was intended to help secure a political climate favorable to continued U.S. use of bases in the Philippines.

1. CINCPAC 260002Z Oct 62 (TS)

PHILIPPINES

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962

BASIC INFORMATION				OVERALL OBJECTIVE	UECTIVE	U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION
CROSS INT PROD. 196 CROSS INT PROD. 196 PER CAPITA DEFENSE BUDGET (C FY 1962 (F) 44.3 ML AS % OF CAPITAL Q AS % OF CAPITAL Q	LIFE EXPECTANCY	O OUEZON O OUEZON		TO DEVELOP THE PHILIPPINE REPU- BLIC INTO A STRONG, INDEPENDENT COUN- TRY CAPABLE OF NAINTANING INTERNAL SECURITY, DEFENDING ITSELF AGAINST EX- TERNAL ATTACK, AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE COMMON DEFENSE UNDER SEATO.	TO DEVELOP THE PHILIPPINE REPU- LINTO A STRONG, INTEPENDENT COUN- CAPABLE OF MAINTAINE, INTERNAL URITY, DEFENDING ITSEL AGAINST EX- NAL ATTACK, AND CONTRIBUTING TO E COMMON DEFENSE UNDER SEATO.	U.S. AMBASSADOR HON WR. E. STEVENSON U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, AID MR. PAUL D. SUNMERS CHIEF, JUSMAG
PHILIPPINES					MAP 08	MAD OR JECTIVE
PRESIDENT-MACAPAGAI, DIOSDADO P. VICE PRES & SECTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS-PELAEZ, SECTY NATL DEFENSE-PERALTA, MACARIO L. J. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP-SANTOS, ALFRED M., LT VICE C/S, AFP-MOLINO, PEDRO Q., MGEN DEP C/S, AFP-AGARIA, NICANOR D., BGEN CG, ARMY-PAPA, RICARDO G. FOIC, NAVY-MAGLUYAN, JUAN B., COMMODORE CG, AIR FORCE-VICTORIA, JONAS, BGEN CHIEF CONSTABULARY-GARCIA, DIMINIDOR F., I	PRESIDENT-MACAPAGAI, DIOSDADO P. VICE PRES & SECTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS-PELAEZ, E. SECTY NATL DEFENSE-PERALTA, MACARIO L. JR. CHEF OF STAFF, AFP-SANTOS, ALFRED M., LTGEN VICE C/S, AFP-MOLINO, PEDRO Q., MGEN CG, ARMY-PAPA, NICANOR D., BGEN CG, ARMY-MAGLUYAN, JUAN B., COMMODORE CG, AR FORCE-VICTORIA, JONAS, BGEN CG, AIR FORCE-VICTORIA, JONAS, BGEN CHIEF CONSTABULARY-GARCIA, DIMINIDOR F., BGEN			DEVELOPMENT MILITARY AND PARAN TRAINED AND MOTIVE ENCIES WITHOUT DI FORCES AND (B) TO SECURITY WITHIN WI BE STRENCTHENED.	AND MAINTENANCE WILTARY FORCES PO WIEG (A) TO PREVENTE O PROVIDE CONDITION HICH DEMOCRATIC IS	DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF BALANCED COMBAT AND LOGISTIC MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FONCES PROCRESSIVELY BETTER EQUIPPED, TRAINED AND MOTIVATED (A) TO PREVENT OR DEFEAT COMBUNIST INSURCENCIES WITHOUT DIRECT INTERVENTION BY U.S. OR OTHER FREE WOLLD SECURITY WITHIN WHICH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES CAN BE STRENCTHENED.
	AUTHORIZED	ZED MAP FORCES	TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	ES	5	COMBAT CAPABILITY
	I INF DIV 4 RES DIV PHIL CONSTABLILARY (15,000)		1 INFANTRY DIV 4 RES DIV CONSTABULARY(149 COMPANIES) 1 DOES CHASD DA	ag Govern	MAINTAIN INTERNA ANCE TO EXTERNA	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, OFFER LIMITED RESIST- ANCE TO EXTERNAL ATTACK AND CONTRIBUTE BCT TO
	22 PC/PF/SC 4 LST, 31.SM, 11.SH, 1APD 1/3 MARINE BLT 8 MSC/MS	SA	6PF, 3 PC/PCS, 10 PCM, 2 SC, 2 MSC, 4 LST, 2LSIL, 2 AKL, 3AUX,4 MISC, 1 MAR BN	MSC, 4 LST,	OFF SHORE PATROL AND AMPHIBIC CAPABILITIES SATISFACTORY AS IN	OFF SHORE PATROL AND AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES SATISFACTORY AS W
	2 TACTICAL FIGHTER S QDNS, 2TRANSI I AIR RESCUE SQDN, I A/W FTR SQDN I COMPOSITE RCN SQDN	PORT SQUNS,	2 DAY FTR SQDNS, 1 A/W FTR SQDN, I TRP CARRIER SQDN, 1 AIR RESCUE SQDN,	TRP CARRIER	LIMITED CAPABILITY TO FUI TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SEC	LINITED CAPABILITY TO FULFILL MISSION OF ASSIST ARMY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY & CONTRIBUTE TO
					LETERAL ABAINS	JEFERSE MGAINSI EXTERNAL ATTACK

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962

OVERALL OBJECTIVE U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	THE COMMUNISTS, INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF GRC ARMED FORCES, PROMOTE THE CONTINU- ED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL STATURE OF A FRIENDLY, RESPON- SIBLE GOVERNMENT ON TAIWAN. GRIEF, MAAG. MALEN TAIWAN.	MAP OBJECTIVE	TO MAINTAIN FORCES CAPABLE OF (A) MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY. (B) DETERRING OVERT COMMUNIST ATTACK, (C) DEFEATING SUCH ATTACK IF SHORT OF AN ALL OUT COMMUNIST EFFORT, AND (D) ASSIST- ING U.S. FORCES EXTENSIVELY IN THE EVENT OF A GENERAL WAR IN THE PACIFIC.	COMBAT CAPABILITY	NANTALM DITERNAL SECURITY AND COMOUCI EFFECTIVE GROUND DEFENSE OF TANNAM, PENCHUS AND OFFSHORE ISLANDS IF PRO-VIDED OUTSIDE AIR, NAVAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT COULD CONTRIBUTE APPROXIMATELY 3 DIVS TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE EFFORT.	<u> </u>	FORCE COMBAT READY
TAPE!	DENY THE FFEE FORCE ED PO STAN		TO (8) DE ATTACI	TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	21 INF DIVS, 2 ARM DIVS, I ABN REGT, I NINE HERCULES BN. 4 SPECIAL FORCES GRP, 4 TAKK BNS, 4 RECOM BNS, I ARMD CAR REGT, 26 FIELD ARIT BNS, 6 COMBAT ENG. BNS, 2 ARMIES, 6 CORPS.	4 DD. S DE, 25 PATROL CRAFT, 6 PT, 10 MINE CRAFT, 65 AMPHIB CRAFT, 1APD, 2 ACC, 1 AKL, 1 AO, 2 AKA, 10 MSE, 9 MISC, 1 MAR DIV, 1 MAR BRIG, 2 LYT BNS, 1 COMBT SERV REGT.	14 TAC FTR SODNS, 1A/W FTR SODN,2 TAC RCN SODN,1AIR RESCUE SODN, 6 TRANSPORT SODNS, 1 TOWTARGET SO
BASIC INFORMATION	GROSS NAT. PROD.1963 (E) \$1.9 BILLION PER CAPITA. \$1.51 DEFENSE BUDGET 1963 (E) \$205 MILLION AS % OF GNP 10.3 AS % OF CENTRAL GOVT EXP 53.4	REPUBLIC OF CHINA	PRESIDENT - CHIANG, KAI-SHEK, GENERALISSIMO DEF MINISTER - YU, TA-WEI, DR CHIEF, GEN STAFF - PENG, MENG-CHI,GEN C/S ARMY - LIU, AN-CHI, GEN C/S ARMY - NI YU HSI, ADM C/S ARYY - NI YU HSI, ADM C/S AIR FORCE - CHEN, CHIA-SHANG, GEN COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - CHEN, WEI-YUAN, LTGEN	AUTHORIZED MAP FORCES	IS INFANTRY DIY, 2 ARN DIY, 7 RES DIY (INF), I ABN REGT, I NIKE BN, 2 SPECIAL FORCES GRPS	4 DD/5DE/22 PATROL CRAFT/6 MINECRAFT/1 APD/22 LST/1LSD/14 LSM 6 PT/3 LSSL/1 LSIL/1 MAR DIV/1 MAR BRIG/2 LYT BN/1 COMBAT SERVICE RGWT/1 LST - C	12 TAC FTR SODN, I TAC RECON SOON, I COMPOSITE RECON SODN, - 7 Transport Sodn, I air rescue Sodn, 2 a/w ftr soon
BA	AREA	REP	PRESIDENT - CHIANG, KAI-SHEK DEF MINISTER - YU, TA-WEI, CHIEF, GEN STAFF - PENG, ME C/S ARMY - LIU, AN-CHI, GEN C/S NAVY - NI YU HSI, ADM C/S AIR FORCE - CHEN, CHIA-S COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - CH		ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE

Republic of China

The Algorithms of the Mineral Continues Program for the Newster Contra were to assit vernment to maintain security of Taiwan es i una Pangesta de locale, est auditribula ta de collective non-scene · 1985年 - 1987年 - 19874 - 1987年 - 19874 - 19874 - 19874 - 19874 - 19874 - 19874 - 19874 - 19874 - 198

Coganization of the Chinese Army: During 1901 the side of the Chinese Army was of major concern since the Republic of China considered that de-activation of eight reserve divisions would chare positive repercessions. The TY60-56 Truguett and a company to be the Arm With Light Delicions, leaving fifteen "Forward Look" infantry divisions, six light reserve divisions. two armored divitions, and one reserve infinity division with "Forwand Look! commont of The Chinese agree to all the problems of the e de la compresenta de personal de la compresenció de la compresenció de la compresenció de la compresenció de 2d 36 requested that CHMAAC China obsain assurance from the Republic of

United that MAP recognized themy using their ain Many plantages.

Albany Reservoise Continues (Lancette Sections Section 1987) Mi Hongram contained a sub-proise outilier Metagras describe alimintale show dystem. I have this was a magic of property of pro-The was the of the will be harmoned and be the first of the same o armed forces, including air defense, CHMAAG recommended that the there a he changed to Military Integrated Communications Gretom II II.

. The first λ is a substitute of the λ - λ and the vir defense concept ultimately approved was manual or and constant of TIMAAQ to image of that the company has considered by carriest possible date, in order that corrain communication systems could be eliminated. In approving the program CINCRAC directed C BiakG China to reflac scriber the convironments and to initiate the accessary programming action.

i. CINCPAC 2010 (52 Jen 62 (5)

 ^{2.} CINCPAC 090344Z Jul 62 (5)
 3. CHMAAG China Itr Subj: Integrated Communications Systems, 21 505 62 (3) NOTE: 4 760500 265 (7)

Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand

The significant CINCPAC actions in connection with the Military Assistance Program for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand are incorporated in the respective sections of Chapter IV.

MA TRAINING PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

In the preceding sections of this chapter the actions of CINCPAC were discussed in regards to the equipment supplied by the MA program to each supported country. In this section a portion of the Military Assistance Training Program is discussed. See Chapter IV for training pertaining to Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. The MA Training Program provided the operational and technical training required by each country's armed forces to use the supplied equipment to obtain the objectives set forth in the DOD MA Basic Planning Document and CINCPAC's supplement thereto.

MA Training Program Objectives

Some of the main objectives of the Military Assistance Training Program were as follows: to obtain the capability to operate, maintain, and use the equipment and supplies provided; to standardize the procedures in tactics and techniques; to develop country self-sufficiency in training; to influence key personnel in favor of the U.S., its policies and methods; and to create the ability to operate effectively with U.S. units.

MA Training Program Refinement of FY63

Early in 1962 the annual MA refinement conferences were held for the FY63 MA Training Program. Representatives from the OSD, CINCPAC, DA, CNO, USAF, USCONARC, CINCPACFLT, PACAF and each PACOM MAAG attended the refinement conference for the FY63 Program. Some of the more important items stressed to each MAAG were as follows:

THAILAND AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962

OVEDAL! OBJECTIVE	VALUALL UDJEVIJAL	NETANI THAILAND AS AN ALLY AND STRENGTHEN THE NATION'S WILL AND ABILIT TO RESIST COMMUNISM FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT.	MAP OBJECTIVE	DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF BALANCED CONBAT AND LOGISTICS. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FIRES PROPERTY DE TYTED CAUMOUS TO THE COMMENT OF THE CAUMOUS TO THE	AND WOTIVATED (A)TO PREVENT OR DEFEAT COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES WITHOUT DIR- est intervention by U.S. or other free world forges and (8) to provide con-	ULIONS OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY WITHIN WHICH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES CAN BE STRENGTHENED.	U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	U.S. ANBASSADOR	HON KENNETH T, YOUNG	US. REPRESENTATIVE, AID.	CHIEF JUSHAG	COMBAT CAPABILITY	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, CAN CONTRIBUTE UP TO 1 RCT TO COLLECTIVE DEFINSE	ļ	LIMITED AIR-BORNE OPERATIONS AND CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE	ARMY, DAY AIR DEFENSE.
ークジーでで												TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS 1 RAINER BN (S.F.) 1 CAV DIVISION 1 ARTY BN 1 AAA BDE 1 AAA BN 1 RCT	IDESTROYER ESCORT, II MOTOR CURBOAT, II PATROL ESCORT, SCHECHASERS, 2 RIVER GUNBOATS, 6 MINESWEEPERS, 7 LANDING SHIPS, 37 LANDING CARFT, 8 AUXILARY, 16 MISCELLANENOS. S MARNE BAS	6 FTR/BMR SQDNS, I FTR/INCPTR SQDM	2 TRANSPORT SGOM, ICOMP. RECOM SGOM
BASIC INFORMATION			10WTH 2.8 %	ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	LITERACY RATE 60 % LIFE FXPCTANCY RAYEADS	33 (E)	DEFENSE BUDGET SELF FINANCED 1963 S 74 MILLION	AS % CENTRAL GOVT - EXP. 13.8	KING-PHUMIPHON ADUNDET	PRIME MINISTER, SUPREME COMMANDER THAI ARMED FORGES AND CINC ARMY - SARIT THANARAT FLD MAR	CINC NAVY-SWASI, BHUTANANTA, ADM CINC AF-BOONCHOO, CHANDARUBEKSA, AIR MARSHALL	AUTHORIZED MAP FORCES	3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 1 CAV DIV, 1 PSY WAR BN 1 RCT 2 SEP CMBT BNS, 1 RANGER BN (SF) 1 ABN GP	IDE, 17 PC/SC/PCE/PGM, 2 MMC, I MARINE BRICADE, 4 MSC, ILST 3 LSM, 2 LSIL, 2 HH-16 B A/C	2 TACTICAL FTR SODM, 2 TRANSPT SODM, ICOMPOSITE RECON SODM,	6 TAC COMPOSITE SQDM, 4 HELICOPTER SQDMS, I AW FTR SQDM
	4004	POPUL ATION	ANNUAL GROWTH	ARABLE LAN	LITERACY RATE	GROSS NAT. F PER CAPIT.	DEFENSE BL	AS % CEN	KING-PHU	PRIME MI FORGES A	CINC NAV		ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	

VIETNAM AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1962

OVERALL OBJECTIVE	TO PREVENT FREE VIETNAM FROM FALLING UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL AND TO CONSOLIDATE VIETNAM'S POSITION AS A MENLY—INDEPENDENT, ANTI-COMMUNIST STATE.	MAP OBJECTIVE U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF BALANCED COMBAT AND LOGISTIC MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES U.S. AMBASSADOR. PROGRESSIVELY BETTER EQUIPPED. TRAINED AND MOTIVATED (A) TO	PREVENT OR DEFEAT COMMUNIST IN- U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, AID SURED INTER- WENTHOUT DIRECT INTER- WENTHOUN BY US OR OTHER FREE	CONDITIONS OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY WITHIN WHICH DENO	ONRES CAN BE STRENGTHENED. CHIEF, MAAG	CONRAT CADADIS ITY	IN INTERNAL NG LINES OF FOR LIMITE	CAPABILITY FOR PATROLLING RIVERS AND COASTAL WATERWAYS. MARINE CORPS CAPABLE OF BLT LANDING SUPPOPER ESHIPTESISTANCE PROVIDED AIR, CUNFIRE	CAPABLE OF PROVIDING LIMITED CLOSE SUPPORT FOR ARMY, LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF ABN OPMS
	TO PREVENT CONTROL AND INDEPENDENT,	HAP	DEVELOPMENT AND OF BALANCED CONBAT MILITARY AND PARAMIL PROGRESSIVELY BETTER TRAINED AND MOTIVATE	PREVENT OR DEL	COMDITIONS OF II	CRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND P. DURES CAN BE STRENGTHENED	TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES	ABN BNS — 3 SEP INF REGTS ABN BNS — 1 TERR REGT A CIVIL GURD (75,999) SEP BNS — SELF DFFNSF CARPS (65,328) F	PATROL CRAFT (PC) 4 IMMECRAFT (3 MSC, MSCO) LANDING SHIPS 139 LANDING CRAFT LICHT CARCO SHIP 8 MSCO SHIPS 130 LANDING BMS BMS BMS BMS BMS BMS 130 LANDING BMS	2 TRANS SQDAS 2 HEL SQDN
BASIC INFORMATION	66,000 SQ. ML 14.8 MILLION 2,4%	PITA.	20-40% YEARS 1963 (E) \$1.1 BILLION 573	0 1963 (E)	PRESIDENT-NGO DINH DIEM SEC OF STATE, FOR NATL DEFENSE. NGO DINH DIEM	CHIEF, GEN. TIEM. CHIEF, GEN. ARMY-NGUYEN KHANH, BGEN DEP C/S ARMY-HO TAN QUYEN, CAPT DEP C/S AIR FORCE-HUYNH HOU HIEN, COL COMMANDANT MARCORPS-LE NGUYEN KHANG, LTCOL	AUTHORIZED MAP FORCES	9 INF DIVS, I ABM BDE, 4 ARMS CAV SQDS, 3 INF REGTS (SEP), 91 1 INF REGT (TERR), I RAMGER CMS, 18F5F, 6 3 PSY WAR BM, 25 COMBT BMS (SEP), CIVIL GUARD (81,000), 86 SELF DEFENSE CORPS (80,000)	8 PC/YNS, 2 LST, 10 PGM 3 MSC, 2 LSSL, 6 LSM 1 MARINE BRIGADE, 15 JUNK FORCE DIVISIONS 14 LSIL, 1 LSSL, 1 LCV, 1 AKL	- 3 TRANSPT SODNS
	POPULATION ANNUAL GROWTH	ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	LIFE EXPECTANCY GROSS NAT PROD 1963 (E) PER CAPITA	DEFENSE BUDGET AS % OF GNP AS % OF CENTRAL	PRESIDENT-NGO SEC OF STATE, NGO DINH DIFM	CHIEF, GEN S DEP C/S ARN DEP C/S NAV DEP C/S AIR COMMANDAN		ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE

- 1. The proper use of contract technicians and the requirement for reduction in the number programmed.
 - 2. The proper planning and use of guerrilla training.
- 3. The proper selection of MAP students and English language students.
 - 4. The need for MAAG advisors to visit field units.

Based on the refined programs, MAP funding was estimated for FY63 MA Training Program at \$17.8 million for the Air Force; \$16.6 million for the Navy; and \$25.1 million for the Army.

Target Submarines for PACOM MAP Training

In January 1961 CINCPAC proposed that MAP support two U.S. Pacific Fleet submarines to provide ASW target service to PACOM MAP assisted navies. ¹ The Director of Military Assistance agreed to support the two auxiliary submarines from MAP budget projects training funds. Two submarines were scheduled to deploy alternately to WESTPAC to provide this training. MAP support was limited to logistic support, including fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and overhaul and repair, but did not include the crews' pay and allowances or similar personnel expenses, which were absorbed by the U.S. Navy. Services were restricted to navies of friendly nations which qualified for grant aid assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

To initiate the plan, a deviation to the FY62 MAP training program was approved and the first submarine deployed to WESTPAC in August 1962. Provisions were made to provide additional funds in the FY63 MAP and in FY64-68 MA Plan. It was estimated that \$1.694 million was required for this project, annually. (GONFIDENTIAL)

^{1.} CINCPAC ltr Ser. 038 of 13 Jan 61 (C)

^{2.} CNO 222038Z Jun 62 (C)



CHAPTER III

CINCPAC ACTIONS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES

The success with which CINCPAC carried out his mission of containing or defeating communist expansion thrusts in the PACOM area was dependent upon the mutual cooperation between the U.S. and the Free Nations in the West Pacific. Each of these countries was a target for communist subversion or insurgency, and the larger part of CINCPAC's total effort was devoted to creating within each of these Allied Nations the armed forces that could be aligned into the most effective single force to resist communism. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CINCPAC ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF SEATO

Admiral Felt regarded the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as the forum in his theater that held the greatest promise for the Free World, and he recognized that its success depended upon the relationships between the U.S. and other SEATO members, and among the other members themselves. CINCPAC's participation in SEATO, and his efforts through other channels to unite the remaining Free Nations in PACOM are described in this chapter. (UNCLASSIFIED)

During 1962 there were two SEATO Military Advisors (MILADs) conferences, and several major committee conferences. Admiral Felt, in his capacity as the U.S. MILAD, attended both MILAD conferences. Members of his staff and representatives from other PACOM commands attended the committee conferences as U.S. representatives.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Military Advisors Conference Number 16 (MA16C)

The 16th Meeting of the SEATO MILADs convened at Bangkok on 2 May 1962. The MILADs approved the Military Planners Office (MPO) Plan 7, the SEATO plan for countering communist insurgency in Republic of Vietnam (RVN). At the same time, the MILADs approved initial

UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND




FIG 25

force requirements consisting of three Regimental Combat Teams (RCT), plus three more in general reserve; three tactical fighter squadrons, a light bomber squadron, a tactical reconnaissance squadron, and other air forces as required under national command; and naval forces as required under national command. With the total force requirements for Plan 7 settled, Admiral Felt announced the U.S. force commitments that the JCS previously had authorized for the plan. Other SEATO members, with the exception of three, also announced their force commitments at this time. The Filipino MILAD elected to postpone a commitment, and neither France nor Pakistan made a declaration.

Of the three RCTs required for the ground forces under SEATO command, the U.S. agreed to furnish two; Australia, New Zealand and Britain each agreed to furnish elements of the Commonwealth Brigade, meeting the requirements for initial ground forces but failing to provide for the three RCTs needed for a general reserve, although this latter requirement was partially filled by Thailand's proposal to deploy its troops along its border with Laos and Cambodia to prevent communist infiltration and subversion. Although initially under national command, presumedly these troops would be counted as reserve units available to SEATO. 1

The MILADs agreed that the U.S. should be the Appointed Nation for Plan 7 and, as such, provide the Force and Field Force Commanders. After accepting on behalf of the U.S., the USMILAD informed the other MILADs that he anticipated that General James F. Collins would be the Force Commander, and General Paul D. Harkins the Field Force Commander, although no announcement would be made until Plan 7 was implemented.

Another item of importance was consideration of a Thailand proposal for consolidation of all MPO plans. The MILADs agreed to refer the problem to the MPO for study to determine the feasibility of consolidating MPO Plans 4, 5, 6, and 7, and the desirability of having a single Appointed Nation.


1. CINCPAC 042315Z May 62 (TS)

There was also disagreement between the Pakistan MILAD and the others over a proposed agenda item entitled "MPO Study on the Threat of West Pakistan of Communist Inspired Overt Aggression from Afghanistan against Pakistan." At the time the agenda was approved, the MILADs had deleted the first three words of the title, thereby agreeing not to consider the paper as representing the MPO position, but rather as that of the Pakistan MILAD. To forestall an impasse in plenary session, the U.S. MILAD having read and disagreed with the Pakistan view in March, discussed the matter privately with the Pakistan MILAD, and explained that the other MILADs would be unable to agree with the Pakistan assessment. He also pointed out that a rumor that SEATO was preparing plans to defend Pakistan against Afghanistan would have the effect of aligning that country more solidly with the Soviet Bloc. The Pakistan MILAD explained that his concern was not with the Afghans themselves, but rather with a Soviet backed attack against Pakistan, and that his country would prefer an arrangement that would ensure timely U.S. assistance, together with studies to determine the extent of U.S. assistance needed. He further said he would be willing to withdraw the Afghan threat issue from the SEATO forum if such studies could be undertaken. Admiral Felt agreed to present the Pakistan views to the JCS. Accordingly, the Pakistan MILAD agreed to defer consideration of the item, and the U.S. MILAD explained to the JCS that Pakistan considered that its government had a problem parallel to that of Thailand, but felt that it was getting only token sympathy from SEATO. Afraid that the Soviets would use Afghanistan as a base for aggression against Pakistan, that country wanted concrete evidence of U.S. readiness to provide military assistance. Admiral Felt suggested that Pakistan might like a statement comparable to the then recent Rusk/Thanat communique that reassured Thailand of U.S. military assistance, and that it wanted a group of planners to study the problem of what and how U.S. combat support might be provided. 1, 2

^{1.} CINCPAC 040600Z May 62 (TS)

^{2.} CINCPAC 272301Z Mar 62 (TS)

SEATO ORGANIZATION




By the same message to the JCS, the U.S. MILAD asked for a statement of U.S. policy in respect to providing combat support to Pakistan in case of Soviet instigated military aggression against Pakistan, as well as a decision on whether or not a coordinated study could be commenced as Pakistan requested.

In July the JCS informed CINCPAC that the U.S. policy with respect to providing combat support to Pakistan in case of Soviet instigated military agression against Pakistan was agreed upon by the two governments at Ankara, Turkey on 5 March 1959. The JCS considered the threat to West Pakistan resulting from Sino-Soviet coercion of Afghanistan would be subject to CENTO rather than SEATO defense planning action. It was pointed out that in CENTO forums the U.S. had refrained from entering bilateral coordination. It was further pointed out that bilateral contingency planning was under discussion at the governmental level. 1

Two other major items considered at MA16C were concerned with estimates of the communist courses of action. The first of these estimates was contained in Annex A to the report of the Seventh Intelligence Meeting. The course of action accepted as most likely by the majority was an invasion of the Protocol States and Thailand with a transit of Northeast Burma by Chinese communist units enroute to Thailand. The Pakistan MILAD, however, refused to go along with this estimate, favoring instead a previously considered estimate that included attacks on East Pakistan. When the MILADs failed to agree, the U.K. attempted a compromise by introducing a position paper that set forth two communist courses of action, but also stated that the communist would give a higher priority to attacks against the Protocol States and Thailand than to attacks on East Pakistan. Pakistan objected with equal force to this wording. To resolve the impasse, the U.S. MILAD suggested amending the U.K. paper to indicate that communist military operations would be directed against the Protocol States, Thailand and Burma, with subsequent attacks against East Pakistan, omitting any reference to a specific likelihood of





the events. With this amendment, Annex A was approved as suitable for planning purposes. 1

Military Advisors Conference Meeting Number 17 (MA17C)

The seventeenth meeting of the SEATO Military Advisors was held in Bangkok 16-17 October 1962. Some of the important items agreed upon are discussed below:

At the sixteenth meeting of the MILADs, Thailand had proposed that SEATO Plans 4,5,6, and 7 be consolidated under one Appointed Nation. The Chief MPO reported that the MPO had found that it was militarily feasible and desirable to consolidate MPO Plans 4,5,6, and 7, but that it was impracticable with more than one Appointed Nation. The MILADs agreed that the military situation had changed in SEAsia and that the consolidation of the MPO Plans was no longer desirable.

Pakistan had proposed that the boundary of the western region be relocated to shift Burma into the central region. Thailand proposed that the boundaries of both the central and western region be relocated to exclude Burma from both regions. After considerable difficulty the MILADs agreed to exclude Burma from both the western and central regions, and recognized that the field force commander of each region was responsible for the defense of his area against communist aggression through Burma. In addition, the SEATO Force Commander could adjust the boundaries of the central and western region with particular reference to Burma in light of the situation when the plan was executed.

For some time Pakistan had requested that information between SEATO and CENTO be exchanged freely. (Pakistan was a member of both organizations). It was agreed that due to different objectives of the two organizations, information would be exchanged on a "need to know", case by case basis only, and that the exchange of information classified above confidential would be made only after obtaining specific approval

1. CINCPAC 132244Z Jul 62 (TS)

from the MILADs in each individual case. As a general rule CENTO and SEATO would exchange written military information on specific points rather than complete Secret and Top Secret plans or documents.

The French MILAD was instructed by his government to ensure that the neutrality of Laos was taken into account in regards to MPO Plan 6. The MILADs agreed not to cut up the plan but directed the MPO to examine the desirability of preparing a variant to MPO Plan 6B/6l covering the case of DRV attack against the Republic of Vietnam without invading Laotian territory.

The U.S. MILAD informed the conference that the U.S. was increasing its force declaration for MPO Plans 4C/61 and 6B/61. In increasing its commitments the U.S. pointed out that it demonstrated the vital importance the U.S. attached to the defense of SEAsia. To the U.S. the issue was clearly whether or not the freedom enjoyed in that part of the world would continue. Unfortunately, even with the increases made by the U.S., the requirements of the plans were not fulfilled. Admiral Felt urged the other MILADs to review their forces so that an acceptable balance could be achieved between the forces required and those declared.

It was agreed that the SEATO MPO undertake the development of a plan for assisting Thailand in an insurgency situation.

SEATO Sixth Communication-Electronics Meeting (CE6M)

The Sixth Communication-Electronics Committee Meeting was held at SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok from 26 June to 4 July 1962. 2, 3 The PACOM delegation included representatives from CINCPAC's Staff, and from PACAF, COMUSMACV and CITF 116, Action taken on the more significant of the llagenda items included the following:

(CONFIDENTIAL)

- 1. CINCPAC 181010Z Oct 62 (TS)
- 2. CINCPAC 040734Z May 62 (C)
- 3. CINCPAC 292051Z Sep 62 (U)

The Committee concluded that ACP 178, Maritime Electronic Warfare Instructions, should meet the present requirement of Member Nations for a document giving basic doctrine on electronic warfare for all services, and that there was no requirement for Draft SEAP-19 "SEATO Electronic Warfare Instructions". The delegates recommended acceptance of the offer of the United States to prepare draft EW Appendices for MPO Plans 4,5,6, and 7. The Committee concluded that there was no basis for development at that time of SEATO EW equipment lists, and recommended that member nations requiring assistance in their own country by an Electronic Warfare (EW) Instructional Team should arrange this bilaterally through the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in their Country.

conclusion, the Committee agreed that many of the communications - electronics problems encountered during SEATO Exercises were the result of inadequate planning by exercise planning staffs. It was further agreed that to overcome these shortcomings, any member nation sponsoring a SEATO exercise should invite the CHMPO to make available at appropriate exercise planning conferences the services of a planner from the SEATO MPO C-E Division. In addition to the general conclusion, the delegates arrived at a significant number of agreements relative to specific actions that should be undertaken by member nations, CHMPO, future Exercise Planning Staffs and Future Exercise Directing Staffs to communications-electronics for future exercises. 1


The Committee noted that satisfactory progress was made toward fulfilling SEATO requirements for communications - electronics publications. It recommended acceptance of a U.S. offer to initiate action to provide to the MPO a quarterly extract of the NATO status

^{1.} CINCPAC ltr Ser: 0785 of 31 Dec 62 (C)


list. 1 The delegates further agreed that CHMPO should be requested to issue regular monthly status reports of SEATO cryptomaterial.

The Communications-Electronics Annex (Annex F) to MPO Plan 5/62 was reviewed. Additionally, the Committee reviewed and further developed the Communications-Electronics Annexes (Annex F) to MPO Plans 4C/61, 6B/61, and 7/62. The Committee also revised Annex F to each MPO Plan following a standard format, and recommended that CHMPO issue them as changes to the plans. (CONFIDENTIAL)

The Committee reviewed the SEATO communications-electronics state of readiness and agreed that it was generally adequate to support SEATO operational plans. However, it was agreed that there were three main problem areas in which considerable work and coordination were still required. These included frequency allocation for SEATO plans; communications circuits, equipment and personnel; and call signs, address groups, address indicating groups, and routing indicators.



1. CINCPAC 1tr Ser: 0450 of 3 Aug 62 (C)



Targeting data on South China and North Vietnam were revised. The order of battle for Red China, North Vietnam, Afghanistan, Burma and the Protocol States were determined. 1

SEATO Operation Plans

There were four SEATO Force Commander's plans in effect in 1962. Three of them were from prior years and were revised and further developed by the MPO. One new plan was developed. All of the plans anticipated a defense of Southeast Asia, or a part of it, against communist insurgency or attack. SEATO MPO Plan 4 provided for the defense against overt attack by North Vietnam and Communist China, and the defense of Southeast Asia, to include the Philippines and Pakistan. This plan was revised by the member nations and the MPO and was republished to the MILADs in February out of session. 2 MPO Plan 5 provided for the defense of Laos against communist insurgency. At the end of the year, this plan was revised and was in draft form awaiting the approval of the member nation MILADs. MPO Plan 6 provided for the defense of the Protocol States (Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia) against overt attack by North Vietnam. This plan was revised and further developed by the Member Nations, and published to the MILADs in February. MPO Plan 7 provided for assistance to the Republic of Vietnam to counter communist insurgency. This plan was approved in draft form at the MA16C with minor changes. It was published in June as MPO Plan 7/62.5

SEATO Training Exercises

Five SEATO exercises were scheduled in 1962 to improve the readiness of the SEATO forces. Of these, only four were conducted They consisted of an amphibious exercise conducted in the Philippines, (CONFIDENTIAL)

Rpt of the SEATO Intelligence Committee Eighth meeting, Nov 62 (SEATO (S))
SEATO CHMPO MS/619/1/62 of 15 Feb 62 SEATO TS
SEATO CHMPO MS/624/1/62 of 15 Feb 62 SEATO TS
SEATO CHMPO MS/632/1/62 of 15 Feb 62 SEATO TS
SEATO MPO MS/627/4/62 of 21 Jun 62 SEATO TS

two naval control of shipping exercises that were conducted in the South China Sea, and a tactical air exercise conducted in Thailand. Each exercise is discussed below:

Tulungan: ; This was a SEATO amphibious exercise conducted in the Philippines and co-sponsored by the U.S. and the Philippines. presented numerous problems in the planning stage due to a change in Philippine administration, lack of over - the - beach training by the Philippines, withdrawal of the United Kingdom and New Zealand from the exercise, and reduced Australian participation. In addition, as the date of the exercise approached, the situation in SEAsia continued to deteriorate and the U.S. was required to reduce its participation. The scenario was changed and the exercise was conducted 20 March to 3 April. The President of the Philippines and official party observed the exercise from the USS OKLAHOMA CITY and the U.S. Chairman of the JCS observed from an aircraft. This exercise was considered a success and was the largest amphibious lift conducted in the Western Pacific since World War II. It involved approximately 37,000 U.S., Australian and Philippines personnel, 70 ships and 400 aircraft. (CONFIDENTIAL)

A bonus was obtained in this exercise by sending the fast and the slow groups plus the ASW supporting groups through the Straits of Taiwan to harass the Chinese Communists. This was to further the JCS cold war policy. 2

Air Cobra: This SEATO stactical air exercise was conducted in Thailand with the U.S. and Thailand as co-sponsors. Countries that participated were Australia, France, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with the bulk of the forces coming from the U.S. and Thailand. CINCPAC designated PACAF as the commander responsible for conducting the exercise. From the beginning considerable trouble was encountered in planning the exercise due to Prime Minister Sarit's (SECRET)

^{1.} CTF 260 310251Z Mar 62 (C)

^{2.} CINCPACFLT 062241Z Mar 62 (TS)

from 23 April to 2 May.

attitude toward SEATO. He was agreeable to a combined U.S. /Thailand exercise but he opposed SEATO auspicies on the grounds that it cost too much. Sarit's dissatisfaction caused an exchange of diplomatic letters culminating in an invitation to Foreign Minister Thanat to visit Washington for a series of meetings in early March. As a result of these meetings, clearance was finally obtained on 23 March. The exercise was conducted

In the final critique of the exercise it was determined that some errors made in Exercise AIR BULL in 1961 were repeated. The following recommendations were submitted:

Standard operating procedure for SEATO should be developed. A single scale map should be used.

Planning should be followed through by the same individuals.

Staff responsibilities should be defined prior to the exercise.

However, it was determined that SEATO was capable of conducting behind-the-lines guerrilla warfare.

Upon the completion of the exercise the U.S. Battle Group remained in Thailand to conduct in-country training requested by CHMAAG Thailand.

Sea Devil & Seascape: These were two command post exercises for SEATO naval control of shipping. This was a problem that the U.S. and Australia had worked on for some time in an attempt to build an organization that could exercise control of shipping in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. SEA DEVIL was conducted in April and May while SEASCAPE was conducted in October. Active participants were the U.S., Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and France, with other member nations sending observers. The objective of the exercises was to exercise the established Naval Control of Shipping Organization using imaginary and actual ship routings and keeping tracks of the movements of actual shipping. During SEASCAPE, the coordinated plot showed at

^{1.} CHMAAG Thailand 060355Z Dec 61 (S)

one time 290 ships on normal routes plus three constructive convoys. Both exercises were considered successful by the director, the Commander, Anti-Submarine Forces, Pacific. 1

Air Sea Defense: Although planned for late 1962, this exercise was not held due to difficulties in planning. As in numerous other exercises, the Philippines wanted to designate the exercise director but rather than set a precedent, whereby U.S. forces would be subjected to other than national command and control, CINCPAC recommended cancelling the exercise. At the close of the year it was tentatively scheduled for April or May of 1963. ²

SEATO Training Exercise Schedule

In January CINCPAC recommended several minor changes to the SEATO training schedules. He wanted to establish firm dates, and recommended minor changes to bring exercises in line with existing SEATO Plans. The new schedule recommended by CINCPAC was as follows:

1962-63 Annual Exercise Schedule


Naval Control of Shipping Exercise	Sponsor Aus/U.S.	Oct/Nov 62
Air Seaward Defense	Sponsor Phil/U.S.	Jan/Feb 63
Ground Defense Exercise	Sponsor Thai/U.S.	Feb/Mar 63
Maritime Exercise	Sponsor UK	Apr/May 63

1963-65 Long Term Exercise

Grand Scale Exercise based on SEATO MPO 6/61 in 63-64 as a follow-on of the Ground Defense Exercise in 62-63 was scheduled in three phases:

Phase I	Command Post Exercise	Sponsor UK/U.S.
Phase II	Tactical Air Exercise	Sponsor Thai/UK/U.S.
Phase III	Airborne Amphibious Assault Exercise	Sponsor U.S.

- 1. J3 Historical report Oct 62 (S)
- 2. CINCPAC 172333Z Nov 62 (S)
- 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 0057 of 23 Jan 62 (S)



1964-65 Scheduled Exercises

A combined CPX-field maneuver Ground Defense Exercise.

An Air Defense Exercise.

A Maritime Exercise.

(SECRET)

Other SEATO Matters

SEATO Logistics: One of the principles of SEATO logistics was that each member nation was to provide its own logistic support for SEATO Operations. The United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand attempted to arrange for POL products to meet SEATO Plan 5 requirements through commercial suppliers in Thailand. However, the U.S. had previously contracted for the commitment of practically all the available commercial POL facilities in Thailand in the event of a SEATO contingency. The Commonwealth Nations then proposed that their SEATO Plan 5 requirements also be met through U.S. contractual arrangements. This proved feasible, and bilateral agreements were signed with the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand. In September Australia proposed that a similar agreement with the U.S. be made covering Australia's SEATO force POL requirements, as well as spares and other U.S. made replacement equipment for SEATO Plans 4, 6 and 7. CINCPAC prepared drafts of an agreement covering these proposals, but the drafts had not been approved at the end of the year. 1

Exchange of Observers and Information Between SEATO and CENTO:
The Chief, Military Planning Office, SEATO (CHMPO) reported to the
Military Advisors that the Chief of Staff, Combined Military Planning
Staff (C/S CMPS), had proposed a CENTO exchange of observers for
military exercises and the exchange of intelligence information necessary
for co-ordination of planning. The C/S CMPS indicated that the existing
exchange of information that was restricted to the confidential level was
of little benefit. ²

^{1.} CINCPAC ltr ser 00740 of 8 Nov 62 (S)

^{2.} MS/903/62/62 of 18 Apr 62 SEATO (TS)

The CMPO pointed out that CENTO planning was only for situations arising from global war, while SEATO planning covered more limited contingencies. Therefor, the question of co-ordination of planning was not necessary at this stage, nor could a requirement be established for the need to exchange intelligence and information in this respect.

CMPO recommended that no change be made to existing policy. He further pointed out that the existing SEATO procedure which allowed the sponsoring nation to invite observers from non-member nations after consulting with member nations was also satisfactory.

CINCPAC agreed with the CMPO that the existing policies were satisfactory and changes were not necessary at this time. 1

COMBINED EXERCISES (NON SEATO)

In addition to SEATO exercise, several combined exercises were scheduled with the armed forces of the other nations as part of the Component Commanders annual training cycle. More than twenty combined exercises were conducted in 1962. They ranged in scope from important tactical training between minor allied military units to large scale land-sea-air exercises preceded by extensive coordinated planning preparation. Normally CINCPAC's concern in combined exercises was limited to early planning and scheduling and granting or securing approval.

U.S./Japan Exercises: IU.S. Forces in PACOM conducted four combined exercises with the Japan Self Defense Forces during 1962. Three of the exercises were air defense and one was a mining exercise. The objective of air defense exercises was to coordinate the air defense capability of Japan. Participants were units from the 5th AF, the 7th Fleet and the Japan Air Self Defense Force. The third air defense exercise objective was to test the coordinated air attack and air defense capbility, and nuclear broadcast procedures. Units of the following commands participated; PACAF, 7th Fleet, SAC, and the JASDF.

1. CINCPAC 290445Z May 62 (S)

The mine exercise was conducted in Japanese waters with units of the 7th Fleet and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force participating.

- U.S./Canada Combined Exercises: PACOM forces conducted three exercises with Canadian forces during 1962, a composite exercise, an anti-submarine exercise, and one that involved submarine launched missiles. Units involved were from the 1st or 7th Fleet and the Royal Canadian Navy.
- U.S./ROK Combined Exercises: During 1962, U.S./ROK forces conducted seven combined exercises, three were command post exercises (CPX), three were field training exercises (FTX), and one was an amphibious type.

The first CPX, conducted in May, was a theater-wide exercise that involved units of the United Nations Command, U.S. Forces in Korea and the ROKA. It was nick-named COUNTER THRUST. The second CPX was conducted in August. The objective of the 14-day exercise was to familiarize units with war plans. The last CPX was conducted during November, named Strong Shield, the exercise was designed to test operation plans and standard operating procedures.

The amphibious exercise, conducted from 31 May to 19 June, involved three APAs, three LSTs, an AKA, an LPH, two mining divisions and supporting units, in addition to ROK forces.

Korea I was the name give to the FTX conducted in October and November, a Special Forces exercise that involved units from the 1st US SF Group (Abn), USAB&VAPAC, PACAF, and ROKA.

Another FTX was conducted in October and November to test the 4th Missile Command in standard operating procedures for support of the 1st ROK Army.

The third FTX conducted in Korea was to test operation plans and standard operating procedures down to and including the division level for units of the United Nations Command, US forces in Korea and the ROK Army.

U.S./GRC Combined Exercises: During 1962 six combined exercises were conducted with the Chinese Armed Forces. Three were field training and three were anti-air-warfare exercises. All three of the anti-warfare exercises were conducted with units of the 7th Fleet.

Two of the FTXs were for special forces. With units of the 1st SF Group, USAB&VAPAC, and a USA Tactical Transport Company participation with GRC SF units. The third field training exercise was a mobile field training exercise involving units from USARPAC, USTDC, USARYIS and the Republic of China.

U.S. /Philippines Combined Exercises: Only one combined exercise was conducted with the Philippines during 1962. It was named GREAT SHELF. Planning for this exercise covered a two year period (see CINCPAC Command History for 1961) and had gone through several changes in the scenario. Some of the problems involved in the planning of this airborne mobility exercise were a change in the Philippines administration, lack of over-the-beach training by the Filipinos, their insistance that the exercise director be a Filipino, and the inability of the U.S. to participate on the scale originally planned. With the above problems finally solved in late 1961, the exercise was rescheduled for 5 February 1962. U.S. Forces were placed on alert on 28 January. Although U.S. forces from CONUS arrived in the objective areal6 hours late because of weather conditions, this was overcome by a slight change in the scenario, as delays were expected in moving forces of this size over the distance involved. The last CINCSTRIKE aircraft departed California on the 6th of February and the last group returned on The exercise was considered successful and valuable 15 February. 1 training.

1. CINCSTRIKE 150510Z Feb 62 (U)

POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Korean Status of Forces Agreement

When the Republic of Korea in 1960 raised the question of a Status of Forces Agreement, the U.S. at first avoided the issue but later relented, agreeing to negotiate certain matters, but specifically excluding payments for property claims and the delicate subject of criminal jurisdiction. Negotiations were interrupted by the 16 May 1961 military coup and thereafter the U.S., although recognizing an obligation to negotiate, refused to participate in discussions until the ROK government returned to normal. 1

The ROK government announced early in 1962 its desire to resume negotiations. CINCPAC again advised the JCS that he opposed any agreement that would permit the ROKG to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. In March the ROKG indicated it was ready to discuss customs, taxation and other matters upon which agreement could be reached more easily than upon the criminal jurisdication and property questions. The American Ambassador to Seoul suggested working level talks on these minor matters, commencing toward the end of May. On 12 May, however, COMUSK recommended that a U.S. position, fully coordinated between the State and Defense Departments, be determined prior to any discussions with the ROK. In agreement with CINCPAC recommendations, COMUS Korea opposed any negotiations on the issues of criminal jurisdication or payment of property claims.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Ambassador advised the ROKG that the U.S. was prepared to negotiate all matters except those of criminal jurisdication and property claims — restrictions to which the ROK Foreign Minister objected. In a counter proposal, the ROKG offered to agree informally

^{1.} CINCPAC's objections to negotiations covering criminal jurisdiction, as set forth to the JCS, are described in CINCPAC's 1961 Command History, See p. 158.

^{2.} CINCPAC 212300Z Feb 62 (S)

^{3.} SEOUL to STATE 1021, 1028 and 1076, all March 62 (C)

^{4.} COMUSK 120117Z May 62 (C)

. 1

that negotiations begin with less complex problems, delaying the more delicate discussions until 1963. Having a choice between refusing to reopen negotiations or accepting the ROK offer, the U.S. Ambassador to Seoul on 12 June recommended to the State Department that the U.S. agree to a resumption of SOFA negotiations, including the subject of criminal jurisdiction, with the understanding that an agreement would not be concluded until the ROK returned to a constitutional government and judicial procedures, and until it guaranteed that U.S. personnel would be protected by justice and confinement systems comparable to U.S. standards. State Department authorization was given two days later and, on 15 June, the U.S. Ambassador informed the ROK Foreign Minister of the conditions under which the U.S. was willing to begin negotiations at the working level. 2, 3

U.S. and Korean teams negotiating the Korean SOFA held nine working level meetings between 20 September and the end of 1962. During the last four of these meetings the two sides reached agreement on several of the less controversial articles of the draft agreements.

Japan

Fuji-McNair Training Area: The Government of Japan (GOJ) began in August 1960 to press for the release of the Fuji-McNair maneuver area to GOJ control. Negotiations toward this end, conducted by the U.S. - Japan Joint Committee, made progress during 1961 but failed on two points. The U.S. wanted GOJ assurances that, in exchange for the return of the facility, equivalent training usefulness of the area would be retained by the GOJ for use by both Japanese and U.S. Forces, that U.S. Forces could continue to use the area on a "mutually acceptable" basis, and that, in compensation for any loss of training time at Fuji-McNair, U.S. Forces could use any Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) facility without further application to the Joint Committee on a case-by-(UNCLASSIFIED)

^{1.} SEOUL to STATE 1277, 12 Jun 62 (S)

^{2.} STATE to SEOUL 1126, 14 Jun 62 (S)

^{3.} SEOUL to STATE 1297, 15 Jun 62 (S)

case basis. The Japanese wished to designate only one alternate JDA facility for U.S. use. The second unresolved point concerned U.S. insistence that the Japanese guarantee to remove intruders during periods of U.S. use, an obligation the Japanese already recognized and considered unnecessary to include. (UNCLASSIFIED)

After further negotiation, COMUS Japan forwarded for CINCPAC approval a draft agreement that settled the two unresolved issues generally in accordance with the Japanese position. The draft provided for U.S. use of JDA areas at Hijudai-Jumonji in compensation for any loss of training time at Fuji-McNair, and for use of other areas on a case-by-case basis. Although the proposed agreement did not guarantee specifically that the Japanese would remove intruders when the Fuji-McNair area was being used by the U.S. it committed the GOJ to apply to areas made available under the agreement all provisions of Japanese law that would be applicable if the areas were held by the U.S. as "facilities and areas" under the Status of Forces Agreement

CINCPAC concurred in the Draft Agreement on Release of Fuji Maneuver Area of April 1962 and, on 10 April, forwarded it to the JCS, where it was approved on 21 April^{2,3} The draft agreement was expected to form the basis for the final agreement, but the GOJ had not accepted the agreement at the end of the year.

Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee: Admiral Felt and Mr. Edwin O. Reischauer, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, represented the U.S. at the second meeting of the Japan - United States Security Consultative Committee, held in Japan on l'August. Members of this committee exchanged views on the international situation as if affected the security of Japan and the Far East. They agreed to continue close liaison and consultation on security matters between the two countries. (UNCLASSIFIED)

^{1.} COMUSJ ltr to CINCPAC, 5 Mar 62 (U)

^{2.} CINCPAC ltr ser 727, 10 Apr 62 (C)

^{3.} JCS 4167 DTG 211858Z Apr 62 (C)

Philippine-U.S. Defense Planning

A long standing problem in connection with combined U.S.—Philippine planning or exercises was the choice of a commander. In planning conducted by the Mutual Defense Board (MDB), it was obvious that the Filipinos wanted all forces on their soil to be under the command of a Filipino; the U.S. was equally determined that U.S. forces would serve only under a U.S. commander. Late in 1961, CINCPAC decided to defer further action, hoping that the newly elected Philippine administration would be easier to deal with. (SECRET)

At the beginning of 1962, Lt. Gen. P.A. Cruz replaced Lt. Gen. M. F. Cabal as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as Filipino co-chairman of the MDB. In order to assist CINCPACREP PHIL in discussions with General Cruz on the subject of command arrangements, CINCPAC clarified his position with regard to the future role of the MDB by pointing out that agreement already existed that a Philippine and U.S. national commander would head up unilateral military operations of forces assigned or placed under their respective operational control in support of the Phil - U.S. Defense Plan. The MDB would be the facility through which they would coordinate unilateral military efforts to ensure mutually supporting operations and a common defense As CINCPAC envisioned the role of MDB, it would function as a facility for coordination by the commanders of the national forces to ensure that planned uninational operations were mutually supporting and would provide a common defense. 1 (SECRET).

The command arrangement question came up at the first MDB meeting in 1962 after General Cruz replaced General Cabal, and the U.S. concept was approved. However, General Cruz made it plain that he seriously doubted the wisdom of establishing a parallel command concept, but he agreed, after noting that after more than three years the MDB had failed to produce a plan, and he considered an imperfect plan better than

1. CINCPAC 040530Z Feb 62 (S)

SECRET

none. Agreement on the command arrangement removed the major cause for delaying completion of the Philippine-U.S. MDB OPLAN No. 1.

Criminal Jurisdiction in Hawaii

On 25 July 1962 Service representatives met with the Attorney General of Hawaii and other civilian officials to discuss a 1954 agreement that left jurisdication of off-base offenses by Service personnel, except traffic misdemeanors, in the hands of military authorities. As the result of this meeting, and another one on 8 August, the State of Hawaii assumed jurisdication over all off-base felony offenses committed by military personnel. It was also agreed that further arrangement would be made with respect to off-base misdemeanor offenses.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

VISITING IN THE PACOM AREA

Strengthening of relationships between the U.S. and other countries in the PACOM was materially assisted by visits to CINCPAC and the Component Commanders by numerous foreign dignitaries and by personal contacts of CINCPAC representatives who visited foreign countries in the area. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Visits by U.S. Civil and Military Officials

In 1962 CINCPAC actions to improve the state of readiness of U.S. Forces in the PACOM were facilitated by briefings and discussions held with the large number of representatives of U.S. governmental agencies who visited CINCPAC in Hawaii during the year. (UNCLASSIFIED)

During 1962 there were 206 groups of high ranking officials from the Executive Branch of the government, Department of Defense, the Military Departments, the Congress and other branches of the government

 Verbatim Transcript of the 62-2 Meeting of the Phil-U.S. MDB, MDB1-159-14, pp 5-11, 20 Mar 62 (S)(See also CINCPACREP PHIL 050701Z Feb 62, Secret No Forn)

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that visited CINCPAC in Hawaii. There were 848 visitors in these various groups of which 366 were Flag/General rank and above. The majority of the visitors transited Hawaii on inspection trips to and from the various countries in the PACOM area. Usually the visitors received background briefings from CINCPAC on their outward journey or presented debriefings to CINCPAC on their return In addition the Component Commanders received more than 300 groups of high ranking visitors. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The principle offices or committees represented by visitors to CINCPAC during the year were as shown in Appendix A. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Visiting by Representatives of Foreign Countries

During the year 51 groups of high ranking foreign civilian and military dignitaries visited CINCPAC. There were 94 persons of Flag/General rank and 142 other persons in the groups. In addition, more than 100 similar groups visited the Component Commanders. Most of the visits were specifically made for briefings and/or discussions on matters of mutual interest. A list showing some of the more important foreign visitors to CINCPAC, grouped according to countries, appears in Appendix B. (UNCLASSIFIED)

1962 WEAPONS DEMONSTRATION

A CINCPAC Weapons Demonstration was conducted during the period 1-8 December 1962. It brought together military leaders of the free nations in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, gave them an opportunity to become better acquainted with each other in an atmosphere devoid of political considerations and protocol, and enabled them to observe military techniques and capabilities of U.S. Armed Forces in the Western Pacific

Invitations were extended to fourteen countries. Australia, Cambodia, Republic of China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaya, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the

Republic of Vietnam accepted. All designated three officers to attend except France, which sent one officer. A total of thirty-six foreign officers attended the Demonstration. Sixteen were Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chiefs of Service or Deputy Chiefs of Service.

The group gathered at John Hay Air Base in Baguio, Philippines on 1 December where visitors were welcomed by their host, Adm. H. D. Felt, USN, at the American Embassy residence. Lieutenant General Alfredo M. Santos, Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines, Rear Admiral D. J. Welsh, USN, CINCPACREP Philippines, Major General T. R. Milton, USAF, Commander, 13th Air Force, and Major General A. P. Tacon, CHJUSMAG Philippines served as co-hosts while the group was at Baguio.

The group embarked in the USS KITTY HAWK on the morning of 3 December. Enroute to Okinawa guests witnessed daily air operations, night air operations, an ASW demonstration, an air defense operation and a naval firepower demonstration. Admiral J. H. Sides, USN, CINCPACFLT, Vice Admiral T. H. Moorer, USN, COMSEVENTH FLEET and Rear Admiral R. C. Shifley, USN, COMCARDIV SEVEN were co-hosts during the cruise at sea.

The group disembarked in Buckner Bay Okinawa on 6 December. During the period 6-8 December, firepower demonstrations were conducted by USARPAC, PACAF and FMFPAC units; weapons, equipment and weapons systems were displayed statically; NIKE-HERCULES, HAWK and HONEST JOHN missiles were fired as part of annual service practices. General E. O'Donnell, Jr., USAF, CINCPACAF, Admiral Sides, General J. F. Collins, USA, CINCUSARPAC, Lieutenant General P. W. Caraway, USA, CINCPACREP Ryukyus, and Lieutenant General C. A. Roberts, USMC, CG FMFPAC served as co-hosts on Okinawa.

A budget of \$30,000.00 was made available for direct support items. These funds were made available from appropriations with 33.3% provided from Navy MAP Administrative funds, 43.3% Navy MAP Training, 13.4% Navy Operations and Maintenance, and 10% State Department

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Representation funds. The amount made available was sufficient to cover all costs incurred by CINCPAC in connection with the Demonstration

The degree to which objectives of the Demonstration were achieved can be measured by direct quotes from letters received subsequent to the Demonstration.

"The Demonstration instilled a revival of the faith and confidence that our great friend and ally will give a good account of itself if the time comes for a showdown."

Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines

"We have thoroughly enjoyed the trip and were deeply impressed with the Demonstration. Moreover, I can assure you that this event greatly contributed to promoting friendship among the top ranking military officers of the free nations, to their cogitation of the strength of the US armed forces and consequently, to strengthening of defense power of a free world."

Chief of the Maritime Staff Japan Defense Agency

"There is no doubt that the Demonstration brilliantly achieved its objectives and can be counted an important milestone in the field of Allied co-operation for peace and stability in the Western Pacific."

Commander in Chief Far East Fleet United Kingdom

"I was deeply impressed with every aspect of your demonstration, which amply displayed the solidarity and strength of our free nations. What I observed at the occasion will long remain in my memory and provide me with renewed assurance that the shield of freedom is forever unpenetrable."

Vice Chief of Staff Republic of Korea Air Force

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"I wish to express my deep appreciation for what you have done for me and my party of two other general officers during the time of your Weapons Demonstration. We have not only enjoyed ourselves tremendously, but we also have gained immeasurable amounts of knowledge concerning the capability and limitation of the mighty U.S. forces in the Western Pacific."

Chief of Staff,
Supreme Command
Royal Thailand Armed Forces

"Thank you very much indeed for that excellent Weapons Demonstration and all the outstanding hospitality everywhere that went with it --- One of the most useful and interesting benefits of your get together was to be able to meet so many people in our own field - to be able to talk about our mutual interests."

Chief of Air Staff Royal New Zealand Air Force

"Fascinating though the weapons demonstrations were, I believe that the contacts made with those participants from other nations, particularly those situated in South East Asia, are even more valuable than the knowledge gained from the demonstrations."

Chief of Naval Staff Royal Australian Navy

CHAPTER IV

ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND INTERNAL UPRISINGS

CINCPAC ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSIONS IN VIETNAM

At the outset of the 1961 U.S. program to accelerate its aid to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) and stiffen that country's resistance to communist insurgency, U.S. military leaders had predicted a protracted and difficult war, an assessment that remained valid during 1962. Even backed by massive U.S. aid, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) failed to inflict serious defeat upon the Communist inspired and supported Viet Cong (VC). During 1962 this abrasive war was largely a stand-off of attrition. However, some measures of military progress were achieved by the RVN, and these achievements provided the basis for optimism about the future. In 1962 the Viet Cong irregulars underwent their severest military pressures to that time. In consequence, where the in-motion-military trends favored the Viet Cong at the beginning of 1962, at the end of the year they favored the RVN.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

In terms of armed attacks, there was a steady decline in Viet Cong initiative. Viet Cong armed attacks for the first six months of 1962 averaged 188 per week. During the last six months the average dropped to 92. 1

The most valuable Viet Cong asset was the popular support its guerrillas received from at least some of the people of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), and the failure of the GVN to carry out its civic action programs to merit and win the confidence of all its people. Instead of explaining the protection and other advantages that the government could offer the people, many of the civic action programs dwelled upon the sacrifices the people should make for the government. The Viet Cong was able during 1962 to depend upon a portion of the populace for recruits, food, intelligence and protection because some of the people found little difference in the advantages offered by their government and

^{1.} PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest No. 4-63 (S)

those promised by the guerrillas. The Viet Cong prospered as a result of other defects in the GVN — the lack of clear-cut and well defined chains of command, weaknesses in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) intelligence system, a shortage of competent officers and non coms, and a mediocre status of training among members of the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps.

To the credit of the GVN were several achievements and other advantages that were expected to weigh more heavily in the future. With its better trained and equipped RVNAF, the GVN succeeded in blocking the further spread of insurgency. More concrete evidence of progress was available in the decreasing rate of Viet Cong initiated incidents and the increasing rate of VC casualties; the improved ratio of RVNAF versus VC weapons losses; sturdier initiative and shortened reaction time. The GVN assets that were wholly or partially in existence in 1962, but the full weight of which had not yet begun to be felt by the communists, included better intelligence nets, expanded and improved communications, vastly improved mobility, and the strategic hamlet construction program that was just beginning to be effective in denying to the VC the food, medicine, and intelligence it needed. 2 encouraging to the GVN were trends, discernible at the end of the year, toward a willingness of the people to defend themselves against the VC and, on the part of Montagnard tribes, to swing over to the GVN side.1

CINCPAC's intensive program of training and equipping the RVNAF that was near completion at the end of 1962 had greatly improved operational, planning, communications, intelligence and supply procedures. At the same time, the Viet Cong was harassed by the constant pressure of combat operations, which placed the GVN in a favorable position for launching a nation-wide campaign to eliminate the insurgency. At the end of 1962, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV were thinking in terms of a coordinated national effort to bring into full play simultaneously all military, para-military and irregular forces to destroy the Viet Cong

^{1.} COMUSMACV 080714Z Sep 62 (S)

^{2.} SAIGON 376 to STATE 030516Z Oct 62 (S)

SECRET

in all areas and by all means available. At the end of November President Diem, who agreed with the broad concept of a nation-wide operations plan, directed the reorganization of the GVN command structure required to make such a plan practicable. 2

These achievements had forced the communists to revise their time table for insurgency. In 1959 Ho Chi Minh had hoped to defeat the GVN within a year; during 1962 he indicated that 15 or 20 years might be necessary for the job. Instead of plans for overrunning the Republic of Vietnam, VC efforts toward the end of the year appeared to be directed toward disrupting the strategic hamlet program, intensifying propaganda against the military forces, and supporting a neutralist movement. One of the most convincing indications of the success of U.S. military assistance came from reports that Ho Chi Minh was speaking kindly of President Diem, and hinting of a willingness to negotiate some differences.

The U.S. actions to help the Republic of Vietnam to meet and defeat the communist insurgency, and CINCPAC's part in carrying out the program, are described in the following pages.

Operational Planning

CINCPAC prepared or refined during 1962 several plans for military operations in Vietnam. The problem, however, was not in preparing the plans, or in adapting them to the conditions existing in that country, but in persuading the GVN to adopt and carry out plans that for political reasons were not always palatable to the government.

Counter-Insurgency Plan for Vietnam: This plan was completed early in 1961 and was intended as an overall plan to cover political, economic and military actions that CINCPAC considered necessary to

^{1.} CINCPAC 190115Z Dec 62 (S)

^{2.} COMUSMACV J5 5048 DTG 280422Z Nov 62 (S)

^{3.} STATE 355 to SAIGON 222037 Z of 11AM 22 Sep 62 (S)

^{4.} SAIGON 337 to STATE 220526Z of 1PM 22 Sep 62 (S)

^{5.} SAIGON 261 to STATE 071153Z of 8PM 7 Sep 62 (S)

SECRET

defeat communist insurgency. When it was presented to the GVN, President Diem agreed to a few of its provisions but rejected the overall concept.

During the first three months of 1962 the Country Team revised the plan, hoping to present a plan that would be acceptable to President Diem. Like the older plan, it combined use of political, economic, psychological, military and paramilitary efforts to gain control of Vietnam. However, the revised version was intended to be more applicable to existing developments by providing for use of geographically phased operations, and by making more specific recommendations for control and coordination procedures. And, to make the plan more attractive to President Diem, it was set forth in simple and concise language.

Many of the provisions to which President Diem objected, however, were carried over into the revised plan, which he was equally reluctant to adopt. Instead President Diem announced a plan for clearing the communists from the Delta region - a plan that was in accord with and supported the Country Team's Counter-Insurgency Plan. To avoid clouding the issue, COMUSMACV, with the Ambassador's approval, recommended to CINCPAC in May that no attempt be made at that time to push the presentation of the Counter-Insurgency Plan. 2

The Delta Pacification Plan: There was no written plan by this name. The term was used by the GVN to describe several general concepts for driving the guerrillas from ten provinces in the delta area of Vietnam. As implemented, the Delta Plan combined some of the essential features of the U.S. prepared Counter-Insurgency Plan and a British prepared Thompson Plan. The latter plan was similar to the Campaign Plan for Vietnam - a U.S. concept for a systematic operation to clean up the Delta region - except that the Thompson Plan provided command arrangements more flexible than those in the U.S. plan. Implementation of the plan was entrusted to President Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who

^{1.} CINCPAC 280332Z Apr 62 (S)

^{2.} ADMINO CINCPAC 050256Z May 62 (S)



also was in charge of the GVN favored plan for relocating the population in strategic hamlets protected from Viet Cong attack. As a result, the two plans became interwoven and the concept of the Delta Plan became subordinated to that of the strategic hamlet program, which received primary emphasis to the detriment of the coordinated civil and military actions envisaged by the Delta Plan. In this manner, the effort was spread over too large an area, reducing the effectiveness of the Delta Plan, and weakening the strategic hamlet program. As a result of this dilution of effort, the Delta Plan, with the civic action follow-up, was not pressed as vigorously as originally expected and hoped. \(\text{SECRET} \)

Campaign Plan for Systematic Armed Action Against the Viet Cong: Early in December 1961 CINCPAC set out to develop a plan for systematic armed action against the Viet Cong and to have it adopted and implemented by the GVN. CINCPAC sent to CHMAAG Vietnam a draft outline of a plan he hoped would get the RVNAF started on a specific campaign to defeat the Viet Cong, with instructions that CHMAAG try to persuade the GVN to develop the detailed plan and a series of tactical courses of action. CINCPAC wanted the RVNAF to undertake a phased campaign, with priority given to the delta area, specific targets in the I and II Corps areas, and known crossing points along the Laos - Republic of Vietnam border. CINCPAC wanted an overall national plan that would give measurable results and indicate specifically the progress made. 2,3

Proposed tactics emphasized the use of an RVNAF joint task force that could deploy from one area to another to conduct operations with locally garrisoned forces, and assume command of reinforcing or relieving forces deployed away from their home bases, thereby placing the maximum combat strength at the proper time and place to defeat the Viet Cong. CINCPAC wanted to concentrate forces in the III Corps tactical zone, starting with Zone "D".

When the plan was first presented to President Diem, he was reluctent to accumulate such a large force under one man's authority, and he

^{1.} Commander's Estimate of the Situation in Vietnam, Hq CINCPAC 26 Sep 62 (S). In J2 files.

^{2.} CINCPAC 060247 Z Dec 61 (TS)

^{3.} CINCPAC 190057 Z Sep 62 (S)

opposed having such a task force operate directly under field command. Although Diem early in January approved the Campaign Plan in principle, he made no move to implement it. This plan was set aside in favor of a more readily accomplished operation for taking a single province that would contribute to the task of clearing Zone "D", a plan for securing one province by defeating the Viet Cong on a lasting basis. This plan became known as the Binh Duong Province Plan, or Operation Sunrise. With a province population of about 300,000, the friendly forces numbered 3,500 regulars plus Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps personnel. The enemy force was estimated at 1,600.

The preparatory phase that got underway in March consisted of three or four months used to gain intelligence, conduct civic actions, and prepare for an offensive role. Phase II was a period of military operations to gain control of population centers and lines of communication. In the final phase, the emphasis was to shift from military to provincial authority for a two or three month period of mopping up operations. The plan called for the resettlement of most of the residents of Binh Duong Province. The operation was in progress at the end of the year.

At the second Secretary of Defense Conference, 15 January 1962, the Secretary decided to drop plans for clearing Zone "D" and concentrate on clearing Binh Duong Province, favored by President Diem, and then moving to other areas where operations would produce positive results. Accordingly, on 19 January, CINCPAC directed CHMAAG Vietnam to cancel the Zone D plan for the foreseeable future. 2, 3, 4

Despite the existence of several plans for eliminating the communist guerrillas from the delta area, the problem still plagued the GVN at the end of the year. CINCPAC believed that Zone D should be re-elevated to the top of the target priority list and, in a September message to COMUSMACV, he warned that intelligence reports indicated that Zone D was a major safe haven for VC troops threatening Saigon,

^{1.} CHMAAG Vietnam 210957 Z Dec 61 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 190245Z Jan 62 (TS)

^{3.} Commander's Estimate of the Situation in Vietnam, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Sep 62 (S). In J2 files.

²⁶ Sep 62 (S). In J2 files. 4. CINCPAC 121910Z Sep 62 (S)

Bien Hoa and adjacent areas. He suggested that COMUSMACV consider a course of action that would "destroy or drive sick, starved, blistered, and blasted Viet Cong from Zone D so that we can scoop them up outside of their nest or prevent them from setting foot in the area again." He suggested that the Combat Development Test Center and other agencies could help devise or perfect methods such as scatter bombing with butterfly bombs, anti-personnel mines, use of chemical irritants, or use of chemicals to defoliate areas and expose targets for air strikes. (SECRET).

CINCPAC OPLAN 32-63: CINCPAC's unilateral plan for the defense of Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, underwent major revisions during 1962. It is described in Chapter I under the Section on Operational Planning. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Establishment of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

With the approval of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, CINCPAC established the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (USMACV) thus putting into effect a plan that had been under consideration for several months. CINCPAC activated the new command as of 081600Z February 1962. Lieutenant General Paul D. Harkins was designated as COMUSMACV and appointed as a full general upon assuming his new duties. In the same message by which he established the new command, CINCPAC set forth the COMUSMACV Terms of Reference which he had previously submitted for the approval of the JCS. 4

Under these Terms of Reference, COMUSMACV, as the senior U.S. military commander in the Republic of Vietnam would have direct responsibility for all U.S. military policy, operations and assistance to that country, and the authority to discuss both the U.S. and Vietnamese military operations directly with the President of the RVN and other

(SECRET)

CINCPAC 121910Z Sep 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 081600Z Feb 62 (S)

^{3.} JCS 062339Z Feb 62 (S)

^{4.} JCS 222300Z Jan 62 (TS)

GVN leaders. COMUSMACV was also responsible for advising the GVN on all matters relative to security, organization, the use of the RVNAF, and of counter-insurgency or other paramilitary forces. He would have direct access to CINCPAC and through him to the JCS and Secretary of Defense. Since the U.S. Ambassador was responsible for U.S. political and basic policy matters, COMUSMACV consulted with him on those matters but if a difference of view existed, both representatives were free to communicate their positions to Washington for a decision. The Ambassador and COMUSMACV were responsible for keeping each other fully informed, especially on all high-level contacts with the GVN, major military plans and pending operations. 1

The Joint Table of Distribution for COMUSMACV, submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS on 6 February, was approved on 16 February, resulting in a manpower authorization of: Army 113, Navy 35, Marine Corps 18, and Air Force 50. 2,3 Service responsibilities for key staff billets in COMUSMACV were determined as follows: C/S, major general, USMC; ACofS J1, Navy captain; ACofS J2, Air Force colonel; ACofS J3, Army brigadier general; ACofS J4, Army brigadier general; ACofS J5, Air Force brigadier general; ACofS J6, Army colonel; Comptroller J72, Navy captain.

After establishing the new command, CINCPAC revised the command arrangements and terms of references of his commanders in the Pacific Command, and for CHMAAG Vietnam. 5,6

Expanded Advisory Role for CHMAAG Vietnam

CINCPAC succeeded during 1961 in lifting the restriction against placing MAAG advisors with all battalions, although he cautioned CHMAAG Vietnam against exposing MAAG personnel to the risk of capture. In January, CINCPAC further authorized, with GVN concurrence and within the borders of RVN, U.S. advisors to accompany the unit they

^{1.} CINCPAC 081600Z Feb 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC ltr Ser. 0079 of 6 Feb 62 (S)

^{3.} JCS 3331 DTG 162326Z Feb 62 (S)

^{4.} CINCPAC 210331Z Feb 62 (S)

^{5.} CINCPAC ltr Ser.00180 of 7 Apr 62 (S)6. CINCPAC Inst. 003020.2C of 13 Apr 62 (S)

were advising. This authority was intended to permit the advisors to help the RVN commanders in operational, signal and logistical matters, in establishment and operation of aerial resupply, and in providing additional communication advice and support. Although the U.S. advisors were armed when in the field, CINCPAC directed that they would not participate in combat except for their self protection.

MAAG Vietnam Joint Emergency Personnel Augmentation Plan

CINCPAC's actions to build up MAAG strength to meet its expanded responsibilities were known as the Joint Emergency Personnel Augmentation Plan (JEPAP). Three changes to the JEPAP MAAG Vietnam were made at the end of 1961. The changes approved by the JCS during 1962 are listed below, together with the DTG of the message by which CINCPAC requested the change.

Total manpower authorizations at the beginning of 1962 were 2066 Army, 135 Navy, 6 Marine Corps, 187 Air Force, for a total of 2394 personnel.

Change	DTG	
4	032342Z Jan	Added 2 POL officers (1 Army, 1 AF) and 1 Navy intelligence officer.
. 5	090100Z Jan	Added 115 Army, 12 Navy and 14 Marine Corps personnel
6	090407Z Jan	Added 74 Army advisors for GVN units
7	090408Z Jan	Added 436 Army advisors at battalion level
8	122125Z Jan	Added 205 Army, 13 Navy, 2 Marine Corps and 14 Air Force advisory personnel
9	132120Z Jan	Added a Navy and an Air Force PIO officer
10	132105Z Jan	Added 13 Army communication personnel
11	172240Z Jan	Added 68 Army, 4 Navy, 9 Marine Corps, and 54 Air Force Special Forces and technical advisors
12	242005Z Jan	Added 23 Army MP personnel
13	130102Z Feb	Transferred 84 Army, 14 Navy and 37 Air Force personnel to COMUSMACV
14	132245Z Feb	Added 72 Army and 8 Navy advisory and support personnel

^{1.} CINCPAC 201925Z Jan 62 (S)

SECRET

Change	DTG	
15	060130Z Feb	Transferred 134 Army communication spaces to DA for STARCOM Saigon
16	170001Z Feb	Added 218 Army lieutenants as observers at battalion level
17	040055Z Mar	Added 16 Army, 3 Navy and 31 Air Force advisors and technicians
18	172150Z Mar	Added 6 Navy officers
19	110656Z Mar	Eliminated, at COMUSMACV's request, 101 Army officer advisors
20	142225Z Apr	Reduced Special Forces by 32 Army personnel
21	240458Z Aug	Added 27 Navy personnel to MAAG Navy Section

At the end of September, the authorized manpower for MAAG Vietnam consisted of 2737 Army, 148 Navy, 21 Marine Corps, and 230 Air Force personnel. The total was 3136.

The 19 June request for a reduction of 101 observers was the result of a COMUSMACV determination that advisory teams at battalion level were too large. At that time a five-manteam was authorized for each ARVN infantry battalion. Each team included a major and two captains, a field radio repairman, and a small arms repairman. Subsequent to the authorization, COMUSMACV recommended that the major and one captain be eliminated. CINCPAC supported the action and the SecDef later approved. The total reduction in requirements amounted to 252 personnel, of whom COMUSMACV recommended that 151 be sent as advisors to corps, division and school level, and to the CG and SDC. 1

The JCS approved during November the transfer of 231 Army spaces from MAAG Vietnam to the U.S. Army Security Group, Vietnam in connection with the transfer of responsibility for maintenance of the Operations and Intelligence Communications Net in Vietnam from MAAG Vietnam to the 39th Signal Battalion. ²

Military Aid Program for RVN

The huge build-up of military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam that got underway in 1961 did not reach its peak of activity until 1962.

CINCPAC 110656 Z Mar 62 (S)
 JCS 231409 Z Nov 62 (S)

In dollar amounts, the FY 62 MA Program was approximately a third larger than the FY 61 figure - \$151 million compared with the previous figure of \$101 million. To meet the emergencies and the changing demands required frequent revisions in the MA plans and programs.

With the firm support of the OSD, requests for additions or deviation to MAP funds received prompt attention at both CINCPAC and the Washington level. Some of the more important requests, of which most were processed during the first part of the year, are listed below:

Date Approved	Amount Funded	Type of supplies or equipment furnished
13,16 Jan	\$5,077,700	Generators, commo equipment, armored personnel carriers, construction equipment
19 Jan	1,329,000	Tires, tubes, batteries, and weapons
20 Jan	750,000	589 trucks for use of MAAG personnel including 136 LCVPs
5 Feb	1,813,500	Equipment for 17 Civil Guard Boat platoons
7 Feb	785,000	AKL for RVN Navy
16 Feb	53,459	Ordnance items
20 Feb	985,000	Individual clothing and equipment items
29 Feb	827,600	84 command junks, 440 ordinary junks
12 Mar	323,500	650 war dogs and equipment
29 Mar	248,620	Rocket launchers and ammunition
	6,500	Radar equipment
30 Mar	119,300	77 10KW generators
31 Mar	151,876	Fragmentary bombs and fuzes
30 Apr	3, 138, 400	A wide variety of materiel and supply items
5 Jun	236,000	Communication, construction and photo equipment
24 Jul	10,000	Modifications to give three C-47s a photo capability

Soon after the beginning of FY63, CHMAAG Vietnam asked for early funding of \$31.5 million of the FY63 MAP for Vietnam. CINCPAC relayed the request to OASD/ISA, asking that the entire FY63 MAP for Vietnam be funded early or, if this was not feasible, at least the \$31.5

^{1.} CHMAAG Vietnam 210451Z Jun 62 (S)

million portion. Although the OSD was unable to fund the entire FY63 MAP Vietnam without prior Congressional appropriation action, it took prompt action to fund the lesser amount. These funds were needed to provide for material for newly activated and trained ARVN units.

Emergency Add-on for FY63 MAP: During August COMUSMACV asked for a FY63 add-on of \$4.6 million to provide 20,530 AR-15 rifles to selected ARVN units and Marine battalions. CINCPAC disapproved the request because of the lack of MAP funds after OSD's revision of the FY63 MAP. A month later, however, the Department of the Army advised COMUSMACV that it was prepared to support his request for a substantial quantity of AR-15s under MAP. DA also proposed suspending supply of all M1 rifles and carbines in the Vietnam FY63 MAP pending decision on the AR-15 rifle, but CINCPAC non-concurred in the proposal, explaining that the AR-15 rifle had been considered and turned down. Several other COMUSMACV requests for FY63 add-ons were returned without action because of the lack of funds.

OSD also advised CINCPAC that any changes to the FY63 MAP which increased the dollar value would have to be accompanied by compensating reductions. In view of the large dollar value additions requested by CHMAAG Vietnam, CINCPAC asked him to submit a consolidated list of FY63 add-ons and deletions in order of priority.

USAF Changes to Changes to FY63 MAP: At the end of November, Hq USAF approved an increase in the RVN FY63 MA Program of \$6,800 to provide body armor for VNAF pilots, and an \$83,041 deviation for the modification of three VNAF C-47 aircraft into a photo configuration. 9,10

(CONFIDENTIAL)

^{1.} CINCPAC 271950Z Jul 62 (C)

^{2.} OSD DEF 918024 DTG 142327 Z Aug 62 (S)

^{3.} COMUSMACV ltr Ser. 00123 of 22 Aug 62 (S)

^{4.} CINCPAC 152058Z Sep 62 (S)

^{5.} DA 152214Z Oct 62 (S)

^{6.} CINCPAC 230155 Z Oct 62 (S)

^{7.} CINCPAC 260445Z Oct 62 (S)

^{8.} CINCPAC 160215Z Nov 62 (S)

^{9.} CSAF AFSMS-CD-PC 98206 DTG 281937 Z Nov 62 (C)

^{10.} CSAF AFSMS-CD-PC 98785 DTG 2923242 Nov 62 (C)

U. S. Logistic Operations in Vietnam

Support of U. S. Military Forces in RVN: As a result of the substantial U. S. Force increase, CINCPAC enunciated the following principles to be applied to the provision of logistic support to U. S. Military Forces in Vietnam: 1,2

- 1. Development of support patterns and responsibilities would be, insofar as practicable, compatible with those envisioned under CINCPAC and SEATO contingency plans.
- 2. Logistic and administrative support remained an individual service responsibility subject to modification by inter-service agreements.
- 3. Effective use had to be made of existing or readily available capabilities in order to avoid delay.
- 4. PACOM assets would be screened first to fulfill equipment requirements before requisitions were levied on CONUS sources.

Housing and Support Facilities: During April COMUSMACV, in a letter to CINCPAC, asked his consideration of a proposal to construct an integrated compound for housing and support facilities. The support facilities considered necessary were permanent type medical facilities, commissary, exchange, theater, chapel, BOQs, BEQs, and family quarters. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Before making a decision, CINCPAC sent a team of three engineers to Saigon to make a complete study of the housing requirements, estimate construction costs, and determine site availability. In case the team found that the concept of a single compound was impracticable, CINCPAC asked that it investigate alternate possibilities.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

In its report to CINCPAC, submitted at the end of July, the team of engineers recommended that plans for a single compound be abandoned, partly because of the difficulty and cost in obtaining a parcel of (GONFIDENTIAL)

^{1.} ADMINO CINCPAC 120838Z May 62 (TS)

^{2.} CINCPAC 262351 Z Feb 62 (S)

COMUSMACV ltr, Subj: Proposed Construction of U.S. Facilities at Tan Son Nhut, 19 Apr 62 (U)
 CINCPAC 022027Z Jul 62 (C)


land large enough to accomodate the facilities needed, and partly because of excessive construction costs. Instead, the team recommended that family type quarters, BOQs and BEQs be obtained through leases, and that the lease on one theater be renewed and another theater leased. It was recommended that facilities for an exchange, post office and commissary be constructed, using some existing buildings on property for which COMUSMACV was negotiating, and that a chapel and high school building be constructed near the Tan Son Nhut elementary school. If done, the grade school classrooms could also serve as Sunday School classrooms, and construction of a high school would free classrooms then used by the high school to provide space to accomodate the elementary grades. 1 (CONFIDENTIAL)


Medical Support of U.S. Military Forces in RVN: To meet the needs for medical and hospital support for the increased numbers of U.S. military personnel in RVN, CINCPAC concurred in CHMAAG Vietnam's request for a 100-bed hospital augmented by orthopedic, neurosurgical and thoracic teams. 2 As a result, the 8th Army Field Hospital was deployed during mid-spring to the vicinity of Saigon, and PACAF established three dispensaries in RVN. These units, together with the Medical and Surgical Branch of the MAAG, also provided medical care and hospitalization for Navy and Marine Corps personnel. (SECREF) -


After a team of engineers recommended to CINCPAC against construction of a single integrated compound, CHMAAG Vietnam asked for a fixed hospital in Saigon to replace the tents in which the field hospital was housed and also to replace the Air Force manned dispensary. CINCPAC approved the concept and passed the request on to the CNO. (SECRET)

2. CINCPAC 072307 Z Feb 62 (S)

^{1.} Rpt on Housing & Support Facilities Study for Authorized U.S. Personnel in Saigon, Vietnam, 30 Jul 62 (C). In CINCPAC J4 files.







U.S. Communications in RVN

During 1962, CINCPAC continued to enlarge upon and push modernization of communications-electronics base in the Republic of Vietnam with the dual objective of creating a communications-electronics environment to meet the defense needs of the RVN in their counterinsurgency operations, and one having a configuration so that it could be expanded to satisfy minimum U.S. needs in support of CINCPAC and SEATO contingency plans. 4,5

Multiple channel single sideband radio facilities, known as the Army of the Republic of Vietnam SSB system, were provided through MAP to supplement RVN military high frequency, voice and CW long lines circuits. These facilities provided two voice and two teletype channels of high quality from Saigon to Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot and Can Tho, with radio relay equipment used to extend branch links to other key areas in the RVN. MAP projects were underway to improve local distribution systems in various areas of the country, to include expansion of telephone switchboards and installation of multi-pair plastic cable. (CONFIDENTIAL)

^{4.} JCS 2935 DTG 172121Z Jan 62 (S)

^{5.} JCS 3142 DTG 022247Z Feb 62 (S)

^{6.} CHMAAG Vietnam MAGAR-LS 4091 DTG 150255Z Oct 62 (C)

SECRET

The RVN Navy communications system was improved by equipment modernization and system reconfiguration. Radio transmitters were collocated with ARVN facilities at the new transmitter site near Tan Son Nhut.

Radio receiver and communications center facilities at the Republic of Vietnam Navy headquarters, Saigon were rehabilitated. The new communications system provided conventional fleet broadcast and shipshore circuits, a landline teletype distribution system among installations in the Saigon area and long lines communications to and from outlying Navy installations by means of the ARVN multiple channel, single side band radio relay network. Radio transceivers at Phu Quoc, My Tho, Can Tho, Vinh Long, Long Xuyen, Vung Tau, Nha Trang and Danang provided local voice and CW tactical communications as well as emergency long lines backup communications with Navy headquarters, Saigon. Navy ships, river boats and junks were being equipped with modern radio equipment for inter-ship and ship-shore communications. 1

A limited tactical air control system (TACS) was deployed to the Republic of Vietnam from PACAF resources. The TACS, which employed integrated U.S. and RVN communications-electronics assets (including U.S. mobile heavy radars at Tan Son Nhut and Danang), became operational on 15 January 1962. This satisfied a pressing need for effective and responsive tactical air operations support from the Vietnamese Air Force, and also established facilities for teaching the Vietnamese Air Force, how to operate a tactical air control system.

U.S. personnel and equipment were provided for a Joint Operation Center, Combat Reporting Center, and Forward Air Controller (JOC, CRC, FAC) pool at Tan Son Nhut; an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) and Combat Reporting Post (CRP) at Danang; and an ASOC and CRP at Pleiku. High frequency voice and teletype radio circuits were used to interconnect the various elements of the TACS, as an interim measure, pending completion of a troposcatter communications project.

Mobile PACAF contingency units were deployed to augment the austere NavAids facilities in the Republic of Vietnam. Installation of a British DECCA Tactical Air Positioning System (TAPS) was underway 1. CHMAAG Vietnam MAVNV-NA 3142 DTG 201303Z Aug 62 (C)

to test its value in connection with precision control of helicopter and tactical air operations against insurgents. The ground environment of of TAPS was turned on 14 December 1962. High frequency radio facilities were installed at locations such as Saigon, Can Tho, Ban Me Thout, Pleiku, Qui Nhon and Danang to support U.S. helicopter operations in the Republic of Vietnam. These facilities included airground voice circuits for communications with helicopters operating over extended distances, and point-to-point CW and voice circuits between ground installations for operational and administrative communications. 1, 2, 3

The Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps received MAP aid to provide for rapid communications in support of counter-insurgency operations at the hamlet and village level. Radio equipment was provided for communications from the hamlet or village to District Headquarters, and from District Headquarters to Civil Guard posts and patrols within the district. Districts also maintained radio communications to the province level. District and Province Headquarters were linked into the military communications network. U.S. AID (assisted by MAP and MAAG Vietnam) also supported counter-insurgency operations by providing small, compact commercial radio transceivers for village and hamlet public safety communications installations.

These radio sets served to connect the hamlets to the villages, and the villages to either the national police or military communications networks at District Headquarters level.

The step-up in counter-insurgency operations in the Republic of Vietnam, and more important, the pronounced build-up of U.S. assistance to the Vietnamese, created an urgent requirement for a modern, reliable communications base within the country. A tailored U.S. Army Signal Battalion (39th Signal Battalion) was deployed to the republic with the primary mission of providing communications facilities for U.S. forces supporting the Vietnamese, and also to provide communications training and support to Vietnamese forces. Communications

^{1.} PACAF PFODC OCC 62-1042Z DTG 150100Z Jan 62 (S)

^{2.} JCS 5607 DTG 081550Z Aug 62 (S)

^{3:} HQ 2ND Air Div 20DC-62-267 IL DTG 150921Z Dec 62 (S)

facilities provided by this signal battalion included a radio network to support an operations and intelligence system, and a backbone troposcatter telecommunications system, with terminal spurs, which tied together the various units, advisory detachments and installations throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

The operations and intelligence communications system included the use of microwave and landline facilities in the Saigon area which linked a joint intelligence center with the headquarters of RVNAF (Joint General Staff (JGS)), COMUSMACV and CHMAAG Vietnam. Voice and teletype radio circuits were used to connect COMUSMACV and CHMAAG Vietnam with U.S. field advisors at each corps and division headquarters. U.S. field advisors at the division level had voice and CW radio communications to U.S. intelligence teams and field advisors at engineer group and regimental level. A voice radio net linked U.S. regimental advisors with battalion advisors. U.S. field advisors assigned to the provinces were inter-connected by a CW radio net which also was guarded by U.S. advisors at the appropriate division or corps level.

The backbone troposcatter system, equipped with AN/MRC-85 transportable tropo sets, provided 68 voice channels and 48 teletype channels. The coastal leg of the backbone system connected Saigon with Nha Trang, Qui Nhon and Danang. A second axis extended from Nha Trang to Pleiku, and thence to Ubon, Thailand. Twelve 24 voice channel tropo (AN/TRC-90) and microwave (AN/TRC-24) spurs provided terminal facilities to U.S. supporting forces and to RVN forces located at key areas such as Quang Tri, Hue, Quang Ngai, Kontum, Ban Me Thout, Bien Hoa, Vung Tau, My Tho, Vinh Long, Can Tho and Soc Trang. 1, 2

Electro-mechanical Communications Security systems were issued to the Republic of Vietnam. Python (SSM-33) and off-line (KL-7) were in use at the Presidential and Ministerial level.

The KL-7 was also (GONFIDENTIAL)

^{1.} COMUSMACV MAC J3 4714 DTG 082345Z Nov 62 (S)

^{2.} COMUSMACV MAJ J3 4838 DTG 152345Z Nov 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 300345 Z Jan 62 (S)

FIG 27

CONFIDENTIAL

used at the corps and division level. Below division level, use of the M-209 cryptographic device was authorized with special operating procedures and key lists. Coincident with the military effort, the U.S. Overseas Mission (USOM) received authority to use Python and M-209 for police purposes. The military was charged with coordination and training of this State Department sponsored program. (GONFIDENTIAL)

COMUSMACTHAI was authorized to enter into a formal agreement for the handling of Australia and New Zealand message traffic from SEAsia using U.S. military systems. 2, 3 (GONFIDENTIAL)

U.S. Research & Development Activities in Vietnam

At the January Secretary of Defense Conference, Secretary McNamara raised the subject of research and development projects in RVN by explaining that he hoped to make that country a laboratory for tactics, techniques and weapons. This subject had been under consideration at the DOD level for some time, and originated in the President's interest in increasing the counter-guerrilla capabilities in all Services. During 1961 the Director of Defense Research and Engineering established in RVN an Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Field Unit that had the task of advising personnel of the GVN staffed and operated Combat Development and Test Center, Vietnam. The ARPA Field Unit was a DOD unit over which CINCPAC had no directive authority.

Joint Operational Evaluation Group, Vietnam (JOEG-V): Using authority derived from the JCS, CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV on 25 July to activate, under his immediate operational control, a Joint Operational Evaluation Group, Vietnam. This was carried out with an effective date of 1 August.

^{1.} JCS 3124 DTG 012246Z Feb 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 020118Z Jun 62 (C)

^{3.} CINCPAC 280100Z Jun 62 (C)

^{4.} Rpt of 2nd Sec Def Conf. 15 Jan 62 (TS), Item 15.

^{5.} CINCPAC 252357 Z Jul 62 (C)

^{6.} COMUSMACV 011004Z Aug 62 (S)

The purpose of the new agency was to take advantage of the combat environment in Vietnam for testing and experimenting with new concepts, tactics, techniques and materiel that could not be tested satisfactorily in an area where there was no combat. As described by the JCS, the JOEG-V was not intended to replace existing procedures whereby the Services were authorized to conduct in the Republic of Vietnam their own tests to support their own programs. Rather, the agency was to provide a means by which operational evaluations could be coordinated and conducted to give the greatest return to all Services or commands having interest. Test projects could be initiated by the JCS, the Services, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, or other commands, but the JOEG-V was to be allowed to determine the extent to which the tests could be conducted appropriately in Vietnam.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

In his original instructions, CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to determine the additional resources he would need for the new agency, and to commence planning for tests on the use of armed helicopters, and Caribou, Mohawk and L-28 aircraft. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Late in July the JCS directed the Department of the Army to deploy to Vietnam an Army unit with six specially configured OV-1 Mohawk aircraft to be used in evaluating the concept of province sector surveillance developed by the Howze Board Study. The JCS also asked CINCPAC to deploy from Okinawa and Thailand to Vietnam a U.S. Army transportation company with 15 armed HU-1A helicopters. These were to be used to test a concept of using armed helicopters, and the tactics and techniques in air mobile operations.

Proposal for Single Director for OSD/ARPA Field Unit and the JOEG-V: At the same time that the JCS authorized CINCPAC to establish JOEG-V, they recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the OSD/ARPA R&D Field Unit supporting the CDTC-Vietnam be placed under the operational control of COMUSMACV, thus bringing this field (COMPIDENTIAL)

^{1.} JCS 5404 DTG 211904Z Jul 62 (C)

^{2.} CINCPAC 252357Z Jul 62 (C)

^{3.} JCS 262104Z Jul 62 (S)

^{4.} JCS 272044Z Jul 62 (S)

unit and JOEG-V under the same command. Secretary McNamara rejected the proposal because he preferred to keep responsibility for CDTC counter-insurgency research and development with DDR&E, but he did appoint a single director over the field unit and JOEG-V. Under the terms of reference, which CINCPAC had an opportunity to review and approve, the Director of the ARPA Field Unit and JOEG-V would report to DDR&E/ARPA on activities related to research, development, test and engineering, development of RDT&E requirements, and the engineering tests of equipment and systems, and through COMUSMACV to CINCPAC and JCS for the evaluation of military operations and user tests. (GONFIDENTIAL)

Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV): The JCS on 19 November asked for CINCPAC's comments on a proposal to set up a permanent Army Test Unit, which would initially conduct the recently approved Army tests of the Caribou, the armed helicopters, and Mohawk aircraft. Its long term purpose would be to conduct those tests of Army concepts, tactics, techniques and material that JOEG-V would be directed to evaluate, and conduct tests that were of interest only to the Army. (GONFIDENTIAL)

CINCPAC agreed with the concept of establishing in RVN an Army test unit, but recommended that the JCS adopt the interpretation that service augmentation to JOEG-V would be on a temporary basis for the duration of the specific project in the field of which the individuals were experts. The JCS notified CINCPAC on 4 October that the Secretary of Defense had approved establishment of the Army test unit. (GONFIDENTIAL)

CINCPAC prepared terms of reference for COMUSMACV. At the same time, DA prepared a TD that provided for 97 personnel to be assigned to the test unit, which was designated as ACTIV.^{6,7} Establishing a large permanent test organization conflicted with CINCPAC's

^{1.} JCS SM-529-62 of 19 Jul 62 (C)

^{2.} CINCPAC ltr Ser. 00812 of 12 Dec 62 (S)

^{3.} JCS 6196 DTG 191439Z Sep 62 (C)

^{4.} CINCPAC 260240Z Sep 62 (C)

^{5.} JCS 6560 DTG 042241Z Oct 62 (C)

^{6.} CINCPAC 120355Z Dec 62 (S)

^{7.} DA 921716 DTG 161914Z Nov 62 (C)

recommendation, but before he could object DA had deployed 48 personnel to RVN. At this point, CINCPAC interceded by denying theater clearance to additional ACTIV personnel. As the result of a DA request that the matter be reconsidered, on 22 December CINCPAC explained his specific reasons for opposing a large permanent staff for ACTIV. 2

Other R&D Proposals: During November CINCPACAF advised CINCPAC that he would like to increase the 2d Air Division staff by 12 persons who would conduct tests of AF weapons systems and operate similarly to the ACTIV. 3 CINCPAC had not answered the request at the end of the year.

COMUSMACV asked for authority to arm U.S. Army OV-ls (MOHAWK) with 2.75 inch rockets for defensive purposes, pointing out that the machine guns in that aircraft held only 100 rounds. He also requested authority to man the OV-ls with an all-U.S. crew under instrument weather conditions. CINCPAC disapproved both requests because use of U.S. crews did not conform to national policy, and because the aircraft were being evaluated in the surveillance role and would not conduct armed reconnaissance or air strikes.

GVN Military Force Levels

Strength levels of the GVN military forces that were authorized MAP support at the end of 1961 were for 205,000 members of the RVNAF, 68,000 Civil Guardsmen, and 49,000 members of the Self Defense Corps. On 30 December 1961, CHMAAG Vietnam requested authority to use an RVNAF strength figure of 206,622 for FY62 and a figure of 223,059 for FY63 in the preparation of the FY63-68 MA Program and Plan. CINCPAC told him to stay within the approved figures, but to consider

^{1.} CINCPAC 120335Z Dec 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 220401 Z Dec 62 (C)

^{3.} CINCPACAF 260520Z Nov 62 (S)

^{4.} COMUSMACV MAC J3 4866 DTG 170443Z Nov 62 (S)

CINCPAC 192121Z Nov 62 (S)

^{6.} CHMAAG Vietnam 301305Z Dec 61 (S)



the desirability of a further increase for the Civil Guard. CHMAAG Vietnam promptly recommended that the Civil Guard strength be increased by 4,000 and the SDC by 10,800 to support the Province Pacification Plan, and asked that CINCPAC reconsider his previous request for an increase in the RVNAF - spaces that were needed on the basis of a new requirement to support 3,000 members of Highland Scout units.

Late in January, CINCPAC asked CHMAAG Vietnam to review the GVN force level requirements for the immediate future and under the then foreseeable conditions. In answer, CHMAAG Vietnam claimed that his best estimate indicated that the GVN needed at least 395,000 well trained and equipped troops including the CG and SDC. Although the need existed, and although the manpower was available, a serious training problem existed. Despite vastly expanded programs to train officers and NCOs, the lack of leadership continued to be the factor that limited the GVN's ability to expand its forces. For that reason, CHMAAG Vietnam proposed time phased MAP support levels for the over-all military and para-military GVN force levels as follows:

	Authorized FY62	Recommended FY62	FY63	FY64
RVNAF	205,000	206,622	215,000	225,000
CG	68,000	72,000	81,000	90,000
SDC	49,200	60,000	72,000	80,000
TOTALS	322,200	338,622	368,000	395,000

In response to a JCS request for recommendations on the force structure and strengths of GVN forces and the use of MAP funds to support other local defense groups such as Father Hoa's forces, CINCPAC sent to the JCS his assessment of the subject, incorporating the conclusions reached at the 19 February Secretary of Defense Conference. His assessment was based on the forces required by the Country Team's draft Outline Plan for Country-Insurgency Operations

^{1.} CINCPAC 060300Z Jan 62 (S)

^{2.} CHMAAG Vietnam 100911Z and 120239Z both Jan 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 262313Z Jan 62 (S)

^{4.} CHMAAG Vietnam 051405Z Feb 62 (S)

SECRET

as limited by the GVN's ability to train, organize and use properly its military resources. CINCPAC agreed with CHMAAG Vietnam that force increases should be considered on a long term basis, and recommended the following force levels:

	Actual	Recommended FY62	FY63	FY64
RVNAF CG SDC	186,000 67,300 61,700	206,600 72,000 65,000	215,000 81,000 80,000	225,000 90,000 80,000
				(SECRET)

Concerning the use of MAP funds for local defense groups such as Father Hoa's, CINCPAC said that most of those groups received effective support from Controlled American Source (CAS), and some materiel and training assistance from COMUSMACV. Since CAS enjoyed freedom of action and flexibility for the support of such groups, CINCPAC favored the existing arrangement until some later time when the groups could be integrated into the CG or SDC.

On 9 April the JCS advised CINCPAC that the DOD and State Department had agreed to his recommendations, had authorized MAP support for FY62 and FY63 Force levels, and had approved the FY64 figures for MAP planning purposes. ²

GVN Para-Military Forces

Approximately a third of the Republic of Vietnam's military forces at the beginning of 1962 belonged to either the Self Defense Corps or the Civil Guard. The former was a nationally recognized organization that operated under the Minister of the Interior, and was supplemented by other militia-type organizations. Members were organized as 11-man squads and 38-man platoons under village and district control. Civil Guard units, on the other hand, were the private forces of the province chief to whom they were assigned. He could assign them further to district chiefs.

^{1.} CINCPAC 260405Z Feb 62 (S)

^{2.} JCS 3979 DTG 092059Z Apr 62 (TS)

Self Defense Corps: Although the authorized MAP supported strength of the SDC at the beginning of the year stood at 49,200, its actual strength was in the neighborhood of 57,000. Since the larger number was needed, CHMAAG Vietnam favored increasing the authorized strength to 60,000. In this, he received CINCPAC's support, although Admiral Felt's first concern with the SDC was to improve its state of training. The plan for SDC training was based upon using 30 provincial training sites, of which only 12 were completed and in operation at the beginning of the year. On 10 January CINCPAC asked CHMAAG Vietnam to consider a revised program that would reduce the six week training time, and pointed out that the SDC personnel were not intended to be more than a home guard organization capable of defending the villages in the spirit of American settlers on the Indian frontier. CINCPAC wanted the RVNAF and the Civil Guard to conduct military operations to secure the countryside, leaving the SDC free to report on VC movements and activities, and prepared to put up stubborn, village level resistance to marauding bands of Viet Cong. 1

CHMAAG Vietnam was reluctant to reduce the training for the SDC on the grounds that it was in daily contact with the VC and, although much smaller than the RVNAF, was suffering more casualties than the regular army. 2

One serious problem was connected with furnishing weapons to the SDC, which was using obsolete French weapons, a matter that CINCPAC described to OSD/ISA on 13 January. This problem, and the need for accelerated training were also discussed at the Second Secretary of Defense conference on 15 January at which time the decision was made to train the SDC members first to use weapons, to be followed later by more advanced security and civic action training. As soon as a unit had completed the short course on use of weapons, the Secretary of Defense wanted the old weapons replaced by carbines, pistols, shotguns and sub-machine guns. He also said he was prepared to make

^{1.} CINCPAC 102223Z Jan 62 (S)

^{2.} CHMAAG Vietnam 130415Z Jan 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 130144Z Jan 62 (S)

^{4.} CINCPAC 300151Z Jan 62 (S)

available immediately an additional 40,000 carbines from U.S. sources, and, if they were needed, more would be available. Even though U.S. weapons were available for immediate issue to the SDC, the GVN was hesitant about putting them in the hands of the troops because President Diem questioned the loyalty of some SDC members and feared that U.S. weapons might end up in VC hands.

The training objective for CY62 was to train 60,000 SDC members, or a total of 1579 platoons. At the end of the year, 1500 platoons had completed training and the remainder was then in training. (SECRET)

Civil Guard: The 64,000 members of the Civil Guard at the beginning of 1962 were organized into 372 companies, of which only 33 had completed U.S. training. Another 32 were undergoing the course that had been reduced from 24 to 12 weeks to make it possible to complete all training by the end of 1962, using the 12 mobile training teams to supplement the six training centers. (SECRET)

The training objective for calendar year 1962 was to train 372 rifle companies. By the end of 1962, 353 of these companies had completed training, and the balance was undergoing training.

(SECRET)

Training of GVN Forces

During January the JCS confirmed CINCPAC's full authority, through his Component Commanders, to use personnel and material within PACOM to support training and operations in RVN military forces. The JCS agreed to accept a degradation of CINCPAC's posture in order to conduct contingency operations that might result from such deployment. They pointed out, however, that combat units would not be assigned to forces of the GVN. (SECRET)

CINCPAC reported to the JCS during mid-April that a Jungle,
Swamp and Mountain Training Center had been established at the
Ranger Training Center. The first of five training cycles, each having
(UNCLASSIFIED)

^{1.} Record of 2nd SecDef Conf, 15 Jan 62 (TS), See Item 5

^{2.} Record of 4th SecDef Conf, 21 Mar 62 (TS), See Item 3

^{3.} CINCPAC 190115Z Dec 62 (S)

^{4.} JCS 172121Z Jan 62 (S)

a capacity of 200 students, commenced in April. The comprehensive seven week course would be available to all Vietnamese officers and NCOs. (UNCLASSIFIED)

At the Sixth Sec Def Conference, 23 July, one of the questions that arose was that of determining the length of the period for which the U.S. should plan to furnish training and advisory assistance to the GVN. General Harkins estimated that it would take a year after the RVNAF, CG and SDC were fully operational before the Viet Cong could be eliminated as a disturbing force. Using this as a basis, the Secretary directed that the U.S. plan for a three year period of operations and that COMUSMACV prepare to scale down his activities on a general basis until, at the end of that period, the GVN would have a trained officer corps, and would need no more U.S. assistance.

Use of Mobile Training Teams in RVN

Technical and Special Training: One of the most effective programs in the Republic of Vietnam was the use of mobile training teams to conduct technical or special type training. Most of the teams were on a temporary duty status and spent only six months in RVN before being rotated, or completing their task. At the beginning of November the Army had in RVN 11 MTTs with a total strength of 15 officers and 58 EM, the Navy had five MTTs with six officers and 42 EM, and the Air Force had one 16-man MTT training Vietnamese Air Force mechanics in the maintenance of T-28 aircraft. One of the most successful of the Army MTTs was a 3-man special forces medical MTT that had proven to be very effective in winning the local populations away from the Viet Cong, and recruits for the Citizens Irregular Defense Group. CHMAAG Vietnam asked for a follow-on medical MTT to report in April, CINCPAC agreed but suggested to the JCS that since there was a continuing requirement for these technicians they should be included in the MAAG JTD. 3 Other Army MTTs were used to train dog handlers,

CINCPAC 130317Z Apr 62 (U)

^{2.} Record of 6th SecDef Conf, 23 Jul 62 (TS), p 2-1.

^{3.} CINCPAC 030101Z Apr 62 (S)

teach radar maintenance and operations, train and advise the ARVN special forces, prepare lesson plans for use in the PsyWar training center, help the ARVN in propaganda analysis and training, and instruct mechanics in maintenance and operations of the Mll4 armored personnel carrier.

Six MTTs were programmed for the balance of FY63 and included teams to conduct training in CBR, intelligence, Civic Actions, and PsyWar.

Navy MTTs in RVN at the beginning of November included a team of instructors at the RVN Naval Training Center, two teams to conduct training in the operation and maintenance of small boats, an instructor at the RVN intelligence school, and an MTT to provide SEAL training for a RVN Navy SEAL unit. At CINCPAC's direction, earlier in the year a Marine MTT equipped with six (DUKW) amphibious vehicles conducted tests in the Delta area of RVN. (CONFIDENTIAL)

MTTs to Support CAS Combined Studies Group: As a result of a CAS desire for advisors in the Combined Studies Group, COMUSMACV requested two Marine captains, two Army captains, and three additional Special Forces MTTs -- a total of approximately 50 persons. After determining that the personnel were available, CINCPAC directed CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT to expedite action to move them to Saigon. The Army personnel, who moved from Okinawa, arrived in Saigon at the end of May.

In addition to the above described MTTs that were funded by MAP, CINCPAC agreed in May to furnish two Marine and two Army officers and three additional SF MTTs (a total of approximately 50 persons) to serve as advisors on the CAS supported Combined Studies Group. 3,4 At the end of the year there were approximately 40 SF MTTs in RVN, not counting 11 teams that CINCPAC in October directed CINCUSARPAC to provide to develop a force of about 20,000 Catholic Youth in the Delta area. These SF MTTs were to be replaced on a continuous basis, with a reasonable time for overlap. 5

^{1.} CINCPAC rpt "On Board MTT Monthly Rpt." 1 Nov 62 (C), In J3 Files 2. CINCPAC 300609 Z Mar 62 (C) 3. CINCPAC 050456 Z May 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 050456Z May 62 (S) 4. CINCPAC 082244Z May 62 (S) 5. CINCPAC 070111Z Nov 62 (S)

Program to Counter DRV. Actions in Vietnam


Following a Hanoi announcement early in 1962 concerning the recent establishment in the Republic of Vietnam of a Marxist-Leninist party known as the Peoples Revolutionary Party, CINCPAC speculated that this move could be the goundwork for the introduction of a rival communist backed government in Vietnam. He suggested to the JCS that CAS could sponsor similar type action in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by sending a small group with a radio to cross from the Sam Neua area into the DRV from where the group could broadcast information of a "Rival Government" established in the DRV to oppose Ho Chi Minh's regime. CINCPAC suggested that similar broadcasts, asking for the support of all free nations, could be repeated periodically, and supported by other psychological warfare actions. 1

Expanding on the possibility of harassing the DRV Government, in April CINCPAC recommended to the JCS other means of retaliating against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which thas been enjoying the best of two worlds - conventionality in the north and uninhibited terrorism in the south. " Pointing out that many physical assets of the DRV, such as power plants, bridges, and railroads, were very vulnerable to attack, CINCPAC said he thought the RVN, with U.S. assistance, should establish a direct cause-and-effect relationship, retaliating in kind for acts of violence and terror. For a VC ambush or large scale raid, where retaliation in kind was impossible, CINCPAC suggested that a commando raid on some DRV coastal facility would serve the purpose, and that the destruction of their material assets in the north could induce the communists to lower the heat in the south. He also urged that the U.S. should be undeterred by any adverse reaction, but should stick to the single purpose of convincing the DRV leaders that a Viet Cong action in the south would inevitably be followed by a roughly similar counter-action in the north.

To present CINCPAC's concept and secure approval from higher authority, the JCS wanted CINCPAC to furnish them with his specific

. CINCPAC 050548Z Feb 62 (S)







proposals for clandestine activities. In his answer, CINCPAC explained that his objective was to harass the DRV regime and, through the use of psychological warfare, reconnaissance and sabotage teams, to force it to divert its effort. Some psywar programs were already underway. Planes flying at night along the Laos-North Vietnam border had made several leaflet drops, using the wind to carry the leaflets into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam;

and sabotage teams were trained and ready to drop and join the reconnaissance teams.

Toward the end of May, although there had already been a high level Washington decision against overt action against the communist held portion of Vietnam the JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments and recommendations on the desirability of developing operational plans for conducting overt U.S. military operations, large and small, that would be retaliatory in nature to DRV actions against the RVN or Laos. The JCS inquiry was concerned with overt actions apart from the clandestine activities that CINCPAC had discussed the month before. In response, CINCPAC explained that he favored such a plan and, at his own level, already had plans for overt actions which he could submit for JCS approval, to be followed by more detailed planning by Component Commanders. The JCS asked CINCPAC to submit his plan since his concept for the use of U.S. forces against selected targets in the DRV was under consideration. The result of this request was CINCPAC OPLAN 33-62 which was submitted to the JCS early in June.

JCS 281850Z Apr 62 (C)

JCS 251307 Z May 62 (TS) CINCPAC 310830 Z May 62 (TS) JCS 020011 Z Jun 62 (TS)



Strategic Hamlet Program

Plans for relocating the civilian population in strategic hamlets that could be defended against Viet Cong attacks originated with the GVN during 1961. Strategic hamlets were a development of the earlier Agroville Program. As soon as it became apparent that the GVN planned to go ahead with the program, the Country Team in Vietnam tried to have the program carried out on a systematic basis, urging that priorities be established in the following order: Delta region, Coastal region, and then Central Vietnam. Although the GVN made progress with the construction program, the methods, quality of the completed hamlet, and the popular support and acceptance of the program varied widely, depending upon interpretations of the program by local officials. Particularly in the Delta area, relocating hamlets to areas where they could be defended usually involved economic hardship, leading to popular antagonism to a program that became identified with restrictive control rather than protection of the people by the government. Although more than 5,000 strategic hamlets were completed during the year, the entire program suffered from lack of direction and coordination, and from cross purposes among officials at local levels.

Since the GVN was committed to pushing the program on a nation wide basis, U.S. officials in Saigon hoped to take advantage of the momentum behind the strategic hamlet program, and to exercise planning guidance by concentrating resources under U.S. control in those areas considered most important. (GONFIDENTIAL)


In addition to planning assistance, which was not always accepted by GVN officials, the U.S. contributions to the program consisted of certain construction materials, ordnance items, and communication equipment.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

For all completed strategic hamlets the U.S. attempted to provide a 'hamlet kit' that consisted of ordnance items valued at approximately \$2,700, including carbines, shotguns, grenades, trip flares, and

^{2.} AMEMB SAIGON to SECSTATE 201039Z Jul 62 (C)





^{1.} Commander's Estimate of the Situation in Vietnam, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Sep 62 (S). In J2 files.



ammunition. The construction items consisted of barbed wire, steel posts and other material needed to safeguard the hamlet. They were valued at approximately \$8,600 for each hamlet. Orginally, ordnance items were MAP funded, and the construction equipment and communications equipment were furnished by AID. During August, however, the Secretary of Defense decided that MAP funds would be used for the entire 'hamlet kit", including the radio equipment.

OSD approved 330 hamlet kits in July and the Secretary of Defense approved 1500 the following month. For planning purposes, CINCPAC estimated that by the beginning of 1963 the monthly requirements would be 350 kits, and recommended that 2100 hamlet kits be funded in FY63 in addition to the 1830 kits then approved and funded. (GONFIDENTIAL)

On 28 September OSD advised that delivery of the 1500 kits would not be completed until April 1963, and asked CINCPAC to re-evaluate the delivery requirement for the 2100 kits. CINCPAC advised OSD that in view of slippage in delivery of certain major items in the hamlet kits, the requirement for 2100 additional hamlet kits should be reduced to 1050. He further recommended that the split AID-MAP funding of the kits be resumed because of the heavy strain on MAP funds as a result of the reduction in the PACOM FY63 MAP. (SECRET)

During November, Washington Agencies asked CINCPAC and the Country Team to estimate the number and cost of hamlet kits required in FY64. The U.S. Ambassador and CHMAAG Vietnam reported a need for 2053 hamlet kits at a cost of \$18.1 million for FY64, with certain long-lead time items totaling \$6.3 million to be funded in FY63. CINCPAC supported this requirement and recommended to DOD the use of DOD contingency funds in FY63 and both AID and MAP funds in FY64. (SECRET)

^{1.} Record of 6th SecDef Conference, 23 Jul 62 (TS), p 3-1

^{2.} JCS 282040Z Aug 62 (C)

^{3.} CINCPAC 082356Z Sep 62 (C)

^{4.} OSD 282354Z Sep 62 (S)

^{5.} CINCPAC 131130Z Oct 62 (S)

^{6.} Saigon 550 to State 27 Nov 62 (C)

^{7.} CHMAAG Vietnam 270103Z Nov 62 (S)

^{8.} ADMINO CINCPAC 300026Z Nov 62 (S)

Although some of the more than 3,000 hamlets that were completed by October were not particularly good, the over-all program was considered successful. COMUSMACV estimated that the GVN had increased its control in one area from 40% to 70% of the population during an eight month period. The hamlet program was considered expecially successful among Montagnard tribesmen. By October President Diem was exercising better control of the program and COMUSMACV has a plan to insure that U.S. equipment was phased into each hamlet project in an orderly manner.

CINCPAC was concerned with two additional aspects of the strategic hamlet program. One of these was ensuring that each re-established hamlet had some type of trained and armed defense unit capable of protecting the inhabitants from guerrilla attacks. The second was a program to install a system of radio communication in each hamlet. Three radios were considered for this system - a TR20, a smaller "handie talkie," and an intermediate sized transistorized and flashlight battery powered unit. At the Sixth Secretary of Defense Conference held on 23 July, the Secretary directed that the remaining estimated requirement be met by ordering 2,000 of the TR20s and 3,000 of the intermediate size radios, and that installation commence in October rather than in January as He also wanted USMACV to help USOM with the program. The requirement for the intermediate size radio was later increased to 4,000 rather than 3,000, making a total of 6,000 MAP funded radios. number was in addition to the initial order for 2,000 TR20s procured earlier in the year by USOM. 2 (SECRET)

In order to keep the program rolling, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that a detachment consisting of one officer and 75 EM be formed to support the installation and maintenance of hamlet radios. The JCS approved the recommendation and in September the Department of the Army deployed the 72d Signal Detachment to Vietnam. (SECRET).

Records of 6th SecDef Conf, 23 Jul 62, p 2-2, and 7th SecDef Conf, 8 Oct 62, p V-A-1, both (TS)

^{2.} COMUSMACV 071232Z Sep 62 (S)



Operation Ranch Hand

The project to defoliate jungle areas to improve visibility and prevent ambushes by the Viet Cong continued sporatically during 1962. Preparations for this Secretary of Defense approved project were well underway at the beginning of the year. 1

On 6 January the JCS authorized CINCPAC to carry out operations to defoliate selected strips along Route 15 from Bien Hoa to Vung Tau. Total distance to be defoliated was approximately 16 miles. The area to be covered by spray was estimated at about 6,800 acres.²,3

The Pacific Air Force, using C-123s adapted to carry spray equipment, commenced spraying on the morning of 13 January. VNAF AD-6 aircraft provided air cover. ⁴ The job was completed on 16 January after a total of 10 spray missions. ³

Spraying operations were coordinated carefully with the GVN which released announcements on 10 January to explain the experiments. The operation was followed by a drop of leaflets and by mobile loudspeaker coverage to inform the target area residents of the experiment and the reasons for it. (SECRET)

After CINCPAC had approved limited areas along Route 15, CHMAAG Vietnam asked for permission to carry out scattered experimental spraying, a request that CINCPAC disapproved, partly because some of the areas were too near the Cambodian border, and because he wished first to assess results of the Route 15 project. 6,7 After CHMAAG Vietnam revised the list of targets for spraying and resubmitted his request, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that six additional targets for experimentation be approved. JCS approval was received on 5 February. 8

^{1.} CINCPAC's 1961 Command History, p 190 (TS)

^{2.} JCS 061853Z Jan 62 (TS)

^{3.} Vietnam Diary, Hq CINCPAC 17 Jan 62 (TS)

^{4.} Vietnam Diary, Hq CINCPAC 14-15 Jan 62 (TS)

^{5.} CHMAAG Vietnam 120724Z Jan 62 (S)

^{6.} CHMAAG Vietnam 171329Z Jan 62 (C)

^{7.} CINCPAC 190322Z Jan 62 (C)

^{8.} JCS 052258Z Feb 62 (C)

Operations to defoliate the new target areas commenced on 14 February. In the meantime, however, ground reconnaissance by U.S. advisors made on 10 February along Route 15 indicated that, although some leaves had fallen, most remained on the trees and little or no military advantage had been gained. Attempts to burn the leaves from the sprayed area were unsuccessful. On 12 February the JCS advised CINCPAC that the project was under close scrutiny at JCS, and asked for a detailed report on the effectiveness of operations, a request that CINCPAC passed on to CHMAAG Vietnam. 2,3 Although CHMAAG Vietnam claimed it was too soon to make a realistic appraisal of the program against the Viet Cong, he indicated only limited success with the program. 4 Two days later, during the Third of the Secretary of Defense conferences held on 19 February, Secretary McNamara, who was dis satisfied with the results of the defoliation operation, asked for a complete technical report to be prepared by a qualified individual. wanted the report forwarded to him through military channels, after which he would consult the Army chemical experts. The OSD later undertook a program to furnish the qualified scientists to the Republic (SECRET) of Vietnam.

Spraying of the six additional target areas was completed on 20 February. Meanwhile examination of the original area sprayed indicated only marginal benefits. Not more than 25% of the dense foliage appeared to be damaged and the plants showed no evidence of being killed. Attempts to start sustaining fires to burn the areas had failed. Accordingly, CHMAAG Vietnam assessed the tactical benefits as negligible and suggested that further tests might be conducted more easily in another area, such as Thailand. During the Fifth Secretary of Defense conference held in Saigon on 11 May, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps Research and Development

^{1.} CINCPAC 160257 Z Feb 62 (S)

^{2.} JCS 122255Z Feb 62 (S)

CINCPAC 130345Z Feb 62 (S)

^{4.} CHMAAG Vietnam 170115Z Feb 62 (S)

^{5.} OSD DEF 910354 DTG 240008Z Feb 62 (S)

^{6.} COMUSMACV 121123Z Mar 62 (S)



Command reported that the spray equipment had been adjusted to dispense one gallon of chemicals per acre, whereas three gallons per acre would have been more effective. However, on 3 May the entire project was suspended by the OSD, which advised CINCPAC that no further use of the defoliation chemicals, to include experimentation and operational trials and use, would be made without the approval of the Secretary of Defense. 1

The technical report for which the Secretary of Defense had asked was completed by mid-June. Blaming previous lack of success on use of the wrong nozzles and chemical mixtures too lean to be effective, the technical experts recommended that the operational phase of the program be resumed immediately, and that a program of research and development in vegetation control be initiated in both the U.S. and Thailand to improve chemical agents and dispensing equipment.

In the meantime, CHMAAG Vietnam had pressed for authority to proceed with six other defoliation projects. Admiral Felt supported one of these, the spraying of heavy scrub growth near the Bien Hoa airfield, but withheld approval of the other projects until he was satisfied with the military objective of each target area. 3 After CHMAAG Vietnam furnished the justification, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that they approve the remaining projects. 4 This approval was granted on 15 August and, in the same message, the JCS said that the Secretary of Defense was making available in the Republic of Vietnam a team of experts to give technical advice. The team was to be headed by Brigadier General F. J. Delmore who also had been a member of the group that recommended resumption of defoliation operations. 5 Results of the first of these projects, in which a larger spray nozzle and three gallons of the chemical agent per acre were used instead of the one gallon per acre used in the first experiments, indicated that approximately 90% of the (SECRET)

^{1.} OSD 031703Z May 62 (TS)

COMUSMACV ltr Ser. 0022, Subj. Comments on ARPA/OSD Defoliation Report, 15 Jun 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 160155Z Jun 62 (S)

^{4.} CINCPAC 270020Z Jun 62 (S)

^{5.} JCS 152022 Z Aug 62 (S)

plants were affected. When spraying operations on the other approved target areas were nearly completed, CINCPAC on 6 October recommended to the JCS that spraying operations continue against other target areas along main communication routes in Vietnam. 2

At the end of November a joint State/Defense message authorized COMUSMACV and the U.S. Ambassador to conduct defoliant operations, provided operations did not involve crop destruction, and provided they were limited to clearing roadsides, power lines, railroad and other lines of communications or areas adjacent to military installations. CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to resume operations. 3 spraying operations were conducted on 18 December, with re-spraying on 24 December. Other targets were withdrawn temporarily because defoliation was not needed or because trees were in the dormant stage.

Use of Chemicals to Destroy Crops

The possibility of using chemicals to destroy crops in order to deny them to the Viet Cong had been raised in the Republic of Vietnam, but lacked support in Washington. After it appeared that the use of chemicals to destroy the jungle foliage was impracticable, President Diem made a request of COMUSMACV for the chemicals and helicopters for the destruction of crops, claiming that he could identify positively the growing crops that were owned by members of the Viet Cong. The matter was raised at the Fourth Secretary of Defense conference. 21 March, where it received support from Ambassador Nolting and the Secretary of Defense. 5

Thereafter, however, the entire program was delayed by opposition within the State Department, particularly from the Under Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs who urged CINCPAC to deny requests for approval of crop destruction missions on the grounds that the underfed people of South East Asia would never understand this act by a country

^{1.} CHMAAG Vietnam 061030Z Sep 62 (S)

CINCPAC 060439Z Oct 62 (S) ADMINO CINCPAC 042051Z Dec 62 (S) COMUSMACV 020806Z Jan 63 (S) Record of 4th SecDef Conf, 21Mar 62, CINCPAC Ser 00090, p1-3 (TS)



with surplus food. Nevertheless, because of its military advantages and because of the enthusiastic support the plan had from the GVN, CINCPAC still felt that the proposal had merit and, on 13 July, recommended to the JCS that they proceed with a trial operation. ²

In mid-August GVN officials renewed their request for chemicals to destroy the crops and, on the basis of this, COMUSMACV and the U.S. Ambassador to RVN forwarded similar requests for prompt action through military and diplomatic channels. Both requests made it clear that the Country Team strongly favored the proposal. On the same day that he received the request, CINCPAC sent another message to the JCS urging them to get the pilot project underway. He explained that the shortage of food in the Montagnard highland area had already caused the VC to resort to robbery, terrorism and armed attack because the tribesmen had been reluctant to part with food under any condition or barter. As a result of the food shortage, large numbers of Montagnards had moved to GVN secured areas, abandoning growing crops, Under these circumstances, CINCPAC considered crop destruction a promising and singular weapon.

Late in September the entire problem was submitted to the President for a decision, but he withheld it until he could learn if there still was time to achieve the objective, if there were provisions to furnish food to any friendly people whose crops might be destroyed, and other details of the plan. The Ambassador furnished the requested information on 27 September, explaining that there were GVN provisions for replacing the Montagnard's food that might be destroyed, and that there was sufficient time to seriously hurt the VC if the project got underway soon.

Shortly before the 8 October Secretary of Defense Conference the decision was made in Washington to use certain areas in the Phu Yen Province as a test case for crop destruction operations.

^{1.} GENEVA 15 to CINCPAC 3PM 9 Jul 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 130343Z Jul 62 (S)

^{3.} COMUSMACV 211013Z Aug 62 (S)

^{4.} CINCPAC 212321 Z Aug 62 (S)

^{5.} State 369 to Saigon 4PM 26 Sep 62 (S)

^{6.} Saigon 356 to CINCPAC 9PM 27 Sep 62 (S)



On 27 November the State Department approved the destruction of crops in Zone D, and of crops in the Thua Thien Province a few days later. Only limited scale crop destruction was carried out before the end of 1962.

CINCPAC's Efforts Toward Building Airpower in RVN

The task of creating within RVN effective and coordinated airpower was among the most costly in the use of U.S. MAP funds and training efforts, and also offered the greatest potential for widening the gap in military strength and advantage between the GVN and Viet Cong. Although most of the U.S. backed projects were commenced in 1961, the impressive gains were made during 1962.

Tactical Air Control System - BARN DOOR: In accordance with a decision made at the end of the previous year, CINCPAC, on 1 January 1962, directed CINCPACAF to deploy to RVN equipment and personnel for a tactical air control system. Known as BARN DOOR, the project called for a U.S. /RVN Joint Operations Center (JOC) at Tan Son Nhut that, along with various other agencies, would provide effective coordination and control for both Vietnamese and U.S. aircraft. Fully operational on 14 January, the system provided an immediate reaction capability to tactical air operations. The first air support mission flown was based on a direct request to JOC from III Corps, eliminating the need to obtain GVN, JGS or field command approval for close air support strikes.

Eight months later CINCPAC reported to the JCS that the improvement in the effectiveness of VNAF/U.S. air to ground operations had made possible an increase in FARM GATE and VNAF combat fighter sorties from 206 in January to 602 in June.

Operation Mule Train: Use of C-123 transport aircraft - Operation Mule Train - got underway on 3 January with 16 aircraft available for combat airlift support. Directed and planned with the help of the JOC (CONFIDENTIAL)

^{1.} PACAF 150100Z Jan 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 110858Z Aug 62 (S)

and the Joint Airlift Allocation Board, the mission of Mule Train included combat support, short haul airlift operations, and aircraft procedure training. At the Secretary of Defense Conference on 19 February, CINCPAC raised the question of employing another C-123 squadron, which CINCPACAF thought was within USAF capability to furnish. On 25 May CINCPAC explained to the JCS that the demand for troop carrier type missions in RVN was increasing but the airlift available to COMUSMACV was being used to full capacity to provide logistical support. CINCPAC asked for the deployment of an additional C-123 squadron as soon as possible. The JCS approved the move and the 777th TCS was deployed from CONUS, making a total of 37 C-123s in RVN.

Farm Gate: At the beginning of the year the Farm Gate operation (designated as Jungle Jim at the Air Force level) was carried out with 145 U.S. personnel and 16 aircraft - four SC-47s, four RB-26s, and eight T-28s. Four additional RB-26s were added to the program later. The criteria for operations were that Vietnamese crew members were to be carried on all strike missions, missions were to be accepted only when the GVN Air Force could not handle them, and all missions had to be coordinated thoroughly between the U.S. and the GVN. In addition to operational type missions, Farm Gate personnel were conducting training in night attacks, flare dropping, outpost air support, free fall resupply, and night area reconnaissance.

Operation Water Glass: Following radar sightings of unknown air-craft and unsuccessful intercept by B-26 aircraft in the vicinity of Pleiku on the nights of 19-21 March, CINCPAC deployed 4 F-102 air-craft to Tan Son Nhut. 3,4 The F-102 detachments operated from Tan Son Nhut for intermittent 10-day periods during March, April, June, and July. In response to a requirement for a propeller-driven interceptor with a night fighter capability, the Navy developed a team using (SECRET).

^{1.} CINCPAC 25006 Z May 62 (C)

^{2.} Second SecDef Conf, 15 Jan 62, CINCPAC Ser 00021, Item 3 (TS)

^{3. 2}nd ADVON 211250Z Mar 62 (S)

the EA-1F (AD-5Q), employing the APS-31 and APS-19 radar. The first EA-1F detachment of 3 aircraft deployed to Tan Son Nhut during August and September. The TF-102 detachment returned there on 6 November for a six weeks deployment to be followed by a similar deployment of the EA-1F detachment in January 1963.

Although no known active enemy targets were detected, the night intruder activity ceased immediately after arrival of the first F-102 detachment. In addition to serving as a deterrent to night intruder activity, the operation provided invaluable operational training for the air and ground units involved and served to improve air traffic control in Vietnam.

Authority to Destroy Hostile Aircraft: On 27 March CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACV to destroy any hostile aircraft that might appear over RVN by using U.S. aircraft in accordance with rules of engagement set forth by the JCS. CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to work out means to ensure maximum discretion and a minimum amount of publicity using low key treatment in the event an enemy plane was destroyed. He explained to COMUSMACV and to the JCS his plan for carrying out such a policy. CINCPAC proposed that the U.S. remain silent if its air action destroyed an enemy plane, thereby creating uncertainty in the minds of the enemy. If necessary, the VNAF could claim credit through GVN information channels. To establish plausiability, CINCPAC suggested that RVNAF T-28 aircraft should be airborne each time F-102s were scrambled on a mission. Then, if the event could not be attributed to a T-28, U.S. and GVN officials could explain the incident as an instance of mechanical failure or pilot error.

T-28 Planes for the VNAF: At the end of 1961 CINCPAC arranged for the use on a temporary basis of 15 T-28C aircraft. They were on hand at the beginning of 1962 and in use in a pilot reconversion program to train RVN pilots for the 2d VN Fighter Squadron, which was scheduled to be combat ready by the end of April. They were to be returned to the

^{1.} CINCPAC 272041 Z Mar 62 (TS)

^{2.} CINCPAC 290138Z Mar 62 (S)



U.S. Navy after the U.S. delivered to the GVN 30 T-28Bs that were programmed under MAP. The 30 aircraft arrived in Saigon on 3 March.

In the meantime, at the Second SecDef conference, 15 January, it was decided to investigate the possibility of keeping the 15 T-28C aircraft even after the 30 T-28Bs arrived, if they could by used, supported and manned. On 18 April OSD approved retention of these aircraft as an addition to the FY MAP at a total cost of \$390,000. 2

T-28 Training for the Republic of Vietnam: The arrival of the 30 T-28Bs created a pilot shortage and, in addition, placed a severe strain on the maintenance capability of the VNAF despite action taken in 1961 to increase training spaces for T-28 pilots from 30 to 65. As a partial solution, a 52-man USAF maintenance MTT was approved and sent to RVN to augment training VNAF personnel and help in maintaining the 44 T-28 aircraft then on hand. Earlier, during the 15 January SecDef conference Admiral Felt had pointed out the pilot shortage, and secured SecDef support for an increase in the number of VNAF pilots. CHMAAG Vietnam outlined his proposal, which included greatly increased CONUS training and assignment of 30 company grade USAF C-47 pilots to augment the VNAF transport group until the training program could catch up. 4 These were approved and included in Change 17 to Joint Emergency Personnel Augmentation Plan (JEPAP) MAAG Vietnam. 5 Action was also taken to add to the FY62 AF MA training program 50 pilot training spaces, that were to be filled by ARVN officers. 6,7 This action raised the total FY62 T-28 pilot spaces to 115, and CINCPAC approved an equal number for the FY63 MATP. 8

Plans to Expand the VNAF: During November COMUSMACV proposed revisions to the FY63-68 MA Plan for improvement and expansion of the VNAF. This action stemmed from the planned intensification of

CHMAAG Vietnam 090637 Z Mar 62 (S)
OSD DEF 912929 DTG 182028 Z Apr 62 (S)
HQ USAF MAGAF-CH 980 DTG 212307 Z Mar 62 (S)
CHMAAG Vietnam 130737 Z Feb 62 (S)
CINCPAC 100427 Z Mar 62 (S)

^{6.} HQ USAF 222313Z Mar 62 (S) 7. CHMAAG Vietnam 100508Z Feb 62 (U)

CINCPAC 310455Z Mar 62 (S) COMUSMACV J5 4747 DTG 100417Z Nov 62 (S)

the counter-insurgency campaign scheduled to commence early in 1963. As approved by CINCPAC, the revision envisaged introduction in mid-1%3 of a squadron of 25 A-1H, FY65 addition of two helicopter squadrons, FY64 establishment of one reconnaissance squadron, a delay from FY64 to FY65 in the modernization of one C-47 squadron to a C-123 squadron, an augmentation of three liaison squadrons with additional aircraft during the critical period of the campaign. I

B-26 Aircraft for VNAF: During the 8 October 1962 Secretary of Defense conference a decision was made to establish a B-26 unit in the HQ USAF advised that the aircraft could be made available: however, OSD insisted that any increase in MAP funding be offset by reductions. 2 CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to determine a course of action and to submit a deviation to the FY63 MA Program. However, COMUSMACV said that the B-26 was not the best means to improve the As a result, CINCPAC recommended to the OSD that B-26 aircraft not be introduced into the VNAF and that pilot, mechanic and logistic resources be directed toward the build-up of a second A-1H squadron. 5

Airlift Management in SEAsia: The enlarged airlift mission within RVN and Thailand and the limited resources available necessitated a means of better management, direction, and control, CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to establish within his headquarters a Joint Air Allocation Board, and directed PACAF to take necessary action to activate a Combat Cargo Group (Troop Carrier). b

Helicopters: Three helicopter companies were in RVN at the beginning of the year and, at the 15 January SecDef conference, the Secretary said additional helicopter companies could be made available if they were needed. He asked CINCPAC and CHMAAG Vietnam to determine if the need existed. As a result of his investigation, CINCPAC

CINCPAC 062125Z Dec 62 (S) OSD DEF 921033 DTG 010234Z Nov 62 (S) CINCPAC 072053Z Oct 62 (S)

COMUSMACV J5 DTG 100417 Z Nov 62 (S) CINCPAC 280057 Z Nov 62 (S) CINCPAC 172108 Z S ep 62 (S)

concluded, and advised the JCS that there was a valid requirement for a fourth Army light helicopter company to support RVNAF operations in the Delta Area. Since the unit would be located in the isolated area, CINCPAC asked for a maintenance - avionics - medical package to support the operations. He also recommended that ten four-place HU-1A helicopters be furnished to COMUSMACV to be used by U.S. advisors in the field. The SecDef approved this recommendation on 6 March. 2

Although the Army was responsible for furnishing this fourth unit, it was hard pressed to make it available immediately. Instead, the Fleet Marine Force Pacific volunteered to furnish a medium helicopter squadron that was available on Okinawa; a solution that was agreeable with CINCPAC and the JCS. Accordingly, on 21 March CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to deploy HMM-163 from Okinawa. The unit was in place by mid-April.

On 1 June COMUSMACV appealed to CINCPAC for additional helicopter units, basing his request on the successful use of helicopters during past operations, their popularity with GVN officials, and the need for additional lift capability. In addition to what he then had, he wanted two Army helicopter companies with H-34s and another USMC HUS squadron. COMUSMACV considered the H-21 suitable in the Delta Area, but the H-34 better for the mountain region. With the units requested, he planned to position two USMC UH-34 squadron in I Corps, two Army H-34 helicopter companies in II Corps, and three Army H-21 companies in III Corps. 4 CINCPAC withheld a decision on this recommendation until he had additional information, but favored the deployment of Army units having H-21s since there were no Army H-34 units in PACOM and deployment of a CONUS unit would complicate supply and maintenance problems. On the other hand, an H-21 company was then in Hawaii; the second company would have to come from CONUS. In the

^{1.} CINCPAC 280217Z Feb 62 (S)

^{2.} JCS 061838Z Mar 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 210412Z Mar 62 (S)

^{4.} COMUSMACV 010034Z Jun 62 (S)

^{5.} CINCPAC 050449Z Jun 62 (S)

A

end, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that one H-21 company from PACOM and one from CONUS be deployed to Republic of Vietnam, and this action was directed by the JCS at the end of July. ¹ The request for a second Marine UH-34 squadron was disapproved because this unit was not available. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV that the 81st Transportation Company from Hawaii and the 33rd Transportation Company from CONUS and supporting units, would be deployed to Republic of Vietnam, and urged that press treatment of the arrival of the units in Saigon be as quiet as possible. ² The units arrived near the beginning of October.

With these two units, COMUSMACV had a Marine squadron equipped with 24 UH-34 helicopters, and five Army companies, each of which had 20 H-21 helicopters. On 1 November he pointed out to CINCPAC that on 1 June he had asked for three helicopter units, of which he had received only two. For the other unit that he needed, COMUSMACV asked for a U.S. Army company of HU-1Bs. Each of the 25 aircraft in the company would be armed with detachable machine guns and rockets.

In addition to the U.S. tactical units in RVN, the Army's 57th Helicopter Ambulance Unit, with five HU-1A aircraft, was located there.

The VNAF also had two helicopter squadrons, each of which had 10 H-34 aircraft.

Following the decision to conduct tests in RVN on the use of armed helicopters in air mobile operations, the JCS authorized CINCPAC to deploy to RVN a U.S. Army Utility Tactical Transportation Company (Provisional) with 15 HU-1A helicopters, which were specially configured to carry arms. They were to be used to accompany troop carrying helicopters to provide suppressive fire during landing operations. In making the tests, the planes were to retain the U.S. markings, and be manned by U.S. crews.

^{1.} JCS 312309Z Jul 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 130033Z Aug 62 (S)

^{3.} CHMAAG Vietnam 011034Z Nov 62 (S)

^{4.} JCS 5464 DTG 272044Z Jul 62 (S)

Jet Aircraft for RVN: Although the use of jet aircraft in RVN was prohibited by the 1954 Geneva Accords, Admiral Felt pointed out at the Sixth SecDef conference that the military requirement for jet reconnaissance planes still existed. It was then being met by U.S. action, but Admiral Felt thought the GVN should have its own jet reconnaissance capability. The SecDef recognized the need to avoid disturbing the existing sensitive political situation, and suggested the use of RB-26 aircraft, of which two recently had been moved from Thailand to RVN as a temporary measure.

Other Related Actions to Strengthen the Republic of Vietnam

<u>Civic Actions in RVN</u>: As the result of a report that RVN soldiers were mistreating RVN civilians, Admiral Felt urged COMUSMACV to place greater emphasis on his civil affairs program. He listed the following four fields as fundamental to a civil affairs program.

- 1. Develop in the troops a respect for civil rights by punishing promptly those who violate these rights.
- 2. Develop CA companies to participate in combat operations and provide stability in the area until civil control is restored.
- 3. Organize and train civic action teams for use in remote areas where civilians can not go safely.
- 4. Urge regular troop units to participate in civic action projects.

 (CONFIDENTIAL)

CINCPAC also pointed out that additional CA advisory personnel were available if required. (CONFIDENTIAL)

At the request of the State Department, the American Embassy in Saigon and COMUSMACV developed a Medical Civic Action program for the RVNAF that would require extensive advisory participation and supply support by the U.S. It was agreed that USOM Saigon would provide the medical supplies for the program, and that the U.S. military services would provide the personnel. The Departments of State and Defense,

^{1.} Record of 6th SecDef Conf, 23 Jul 62 (TS) pp 1-4

^{2.} CINCPAC 240012Z Apr 62 (C)

and AID approved the program and CINCPAC took steps to set it in motion. On 30 November CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a revised MAAG Vietnam JTD which included 127 additional billets for the medical personnel necessary to carry out the program.

During November the 97th Civil Affairs Group on Okinawa furnished three Civic Action Mobile Training Teams to conduct training in the "clear and hold" operations in the II Corps area. A fourth Civic Action MTT was scheduled to deploy to Vietnam in January 1963 for the same purpose.

Amnesty/Surrender Program: In April, COMUSMACV reported that a bounty system for Viet Cong personnel and weapons had been established as a part of Operation Sunrise. In reply to a CINCPAC proposal that this program be expanded into a larger scale bounty and amnesty program, COMUSMACV replied that a national amnesty and bounty program had been prepared and approved in principle by Secretary Thuan. In September, in reply to a CINCPAC query, on the status of the program, COMUSMACV reported that the amnesty program still had not received final GVN approval and that Ambassador Nolting would encourage GVNaction. Subsequent reports indicated considerable GVN dissatisfaction with the proposed program, and in November it was reported that President Diem had dropped the amnesty and bounty program from consideration.

On December 21, the GVN announced that the Interministeral Committee had approved a new program, with the Vietnamese title: "A Program to Recruit and Reassemble Members of the Resistance now on the Wrong Path". The program rejected the concept of absolute amnesty, but offered other than hard core VC the opportunity to surrender with conditions that war crimes would be forgiven, but penal crimes would be punished. The new "surrender" program was expected to be implemented in early 1963.




COMUSMACV 426 DTG 211345Z Apr 62 (S)
 COMUSMACV 762 DTG 200650Z Jun 62 (S)

^{3.} ADMINO COMUSMACV J3 3006 DTG 281035Z Sep 62 (S)

^{4.} CINCUSARPAC DISUM 22 DTG 210324Z Nov 62 (S)

^{5.} USIS Saigon TOUSI 138 of 28 Dec 62 (S)





Father Hoa's Guerrilla Fighters: One of the most effective anticommunist organizations in Vietnam during 1961 was a group led by Father Hoa, a priest. Toward the end of that year, CINCPAC had obtained OASD/ISA authority to transfer excess MAP items to CAS. which could give them to Father Hoa. In January 1962, OSD authorized the transfer of several thousand Thompson sub-machine guns, 450 pistols, 84 75mm recoilless rifles, and various foreign made weapons, together with ammunition.

Because of Father Hoa's singular success, early in the year CINCPAC suggested that CINCPACFLT send a small mobile training team composed of selected U.S. Marine Corps personnel to study Father Hoa's training methods and operational tactics. Both CHMAAG Vietnam and CINCPACFLT agreed to the proposal, and the team of four officers and three EM arrived in RVN on 20 February, and remained there until the end of March. 2 (SECRET)

Furnishing Chemical Agents to RVNAF: To a CHMAAG Vietnam request that he be authorized to provide CS chemical agent to the RVNAF, CINCPAC replied that he would give favorable consideration after the users were able to defend themselves if the communists should retaliate with toxic chemical agents. 5 CHMAAG Vietnam had proposed that the CS agent be used in connection with smoke to flush guerrillas from holes. 4

Photo Facilities for CHMAAG Vietnam: CINCPAC trimmed a CHMAAG Vietnam request for photograph facilities and, after considering USARPAC recommendations, recommended that CHMAAG Vietnam have a Class B Signal Corps Photo Facility and a Class C Film Exchange. The original request had been for a Class A Photo Facility and a Class A Film and Equipment Exchange. Instead of providing these facilities through an augmentation of the MAAG, CINCPAC concurred in a JCS suggestion that the facilities be provided by a TO&E signal battalion.

1. OSD 192305Z Jan 62 (TS)

6. CINCPAC 310351 Z Mar 62 (S)





CHMAAG Vietnam MAGVN-MT 5721 DTG 191036Z Mar 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 170019Z Feb 62 (TS)
4. CHMAAG Vietnam 090841Z Feb 62 (S)
5. CINCPAC 071847Z Feb 62 (U)

MAP Ships to RVN: Two minesweepers and an LST were transferred under the MA Program to the Republic of Vietnam during 1962. LST 975 was transferred on 12 April, MSF 239 on 17 April, and MSF 299 on 1 September. (GONFIDENTIAL)

Unconventional Warfare - Use of SEAL Teams: After the U.S. Navy organized two Special Operations Teams to develop tactics and techniques for supporting counter-insurgency and UW operations in rivers and restricted waters, CINCPAC approved a liaison visit to RVN by two officers from the new units. Organized at the beginning of 1962 into two units consisting of 10 officers and 50 EM each, the teams were called SEAL units. 1

Before arrangements could be worked out for several members of SEAL teams to conduct similar training for the GVN Navy, CIA in Washington asked for two SEAL UDT trainers to handle CAS Saigon training requirements. CINCPAC concurred in this request, and the two trainers arrived in Saigon on 10 March.^{2, 3}

A few days after the arrival of the first SEAL MTT, CHMAAG Vietnam asked for a second one to arrive during April to train 72 Vietnamese Navy personnel in small landing operations, special operations and clandestine activities. At CINCPAC's request. CINCPACELT took prompt action to meet this requirement. 4

Junk Force: Construction of junks proceeded slowly during 1962. Early in the year CHMAAG Vietnam had expected to deliver the total number of 644 junks by June, but at the end of 1962 only 335 had been accepted and delivered to the Vietnamese Navy. This number included 215 junks equipped with only a sail, 89 with only a motor, 16 with an auxiliary engine, and 15 command type junks.

The junk force was organized with 28 junk divisions operating under four Coastal Districts. At the end of the year, 11 divisions were fully operational and four other divisions were partially operational.

CINCPAC 090409Z Jan 62 (S)

CINCPAC 242341Z Feb 62 (S) CHMAAG Vietnam 180809Z Mar 62 (S) CINCPACFLT 210012Z Mar 62 (S) CHMAAG Vietnam 050607Z Feb 62 (S)

CHMAAG Vietnam ltr MAGNV/NA-9000-N3, Ser 1409-63 of 4 Jan 63 (C)

In September Chief MAAG Vietnam advised CINCPAC that existing plans provided for each of the 28 planned junk divisions to have three motor junks in addition to three command junks. The two southernmost divisions of the 3rd Coastal District would have only sail junks equipped with auxiliary motors; the seven divisions in the 4th Coastal District would be equipped with only motors. All other divisions would consist of three command, three motor-sailers (except one division that would have six), and 17 junks with only sails.

Construction Program for RVN: During the 15 January 1962 SecDef Conference, Secretary McNamara favored broadening the construction program then underway in Vietnam. He approved an additional \$1.2 million for a new airfield at Pleiku, but asked for CINCPAC's recommendations on the overall construction program, with justification. At the end of the month CINCPAC submitted to OASD a \$17.2 million program, a substantial increase over the FY62 previous figure of \$11.6 million. On 13 February the OSD approved the revised program for immediate implementation.

Besides expanding the scope of airfield construction throughout RVN, the program enlarged ammunition depot storage, increased the hospital beds, and expanded the extremely limited naval facilities.

Since the construction program was larger than any contractor then in Vietnam could handle, BUDOCKS negotiated with several construction agencies and arranged for two firms - Raymond International and Morrison-Knudson - to do the work on a cost plus fixed fee basis. At the end of 1962 construction was underway on a 10,000 foot concrete, all weather, jet airfield at Bien Hoa; a 6000 foot pierced steel planking strip at Pleiku; and the heavy AC&W site at Da Nang. The FY63 MAP, approved and funded by OSD, provided for completion of these airfields, plus work on an all weather jet airfield at Da Nang, new parking aprons at Tan Son Nhut, and repair work on airfields in the Delta area.

CHNAVSEC MAAG VN spdltr MAAG: N3: JKC 9000 Ser. 00435 of 20 Sep 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 270428Z Jan 62 (S)

^{3.} OSD DEF 909811 DTG 131754Z Feb 62 (S)

Architectural and engineering work was nearly complete on four ammunition depots and eight hospitals, all of which were expected to be under construction during CY63. In the Navy program, A&E work was nearly finished on a program to expand naval facilities at Saigon and construct new facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. These projects were scheduled for construction in CY63.

DOD Takeover of Paramilitary Training (Operation SWITCHBACK): At the 24 July SecDef conference, the Secretary directed that DOD assume responsibility from CAS for training the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, the details of which were to be worked out among DOD, CAS, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. The CIDGs, which were made up largely from primitive tribes and minority groups that had not fully recognized the sovereignty of the RVN, were being trained as augmentation units for the ARVN, SDC, CG, and the National Police. First organized in 1961, the CIDGs were favorite targets for the VC.

Twelve Special Forces MTTs from the 1st SF Group were in Vietnam assigned to training CIDGs at the time the SecDef directed the DOD to conduct the training, eight additional teams arrived during August, and the rest of the 29 MTTs that had been authorized for CIDG training arrived the following month. A small SF planning staff from Ft. Bragg arrived in RVN at the beginning of September and determined a requirement for 76 personnel to staff the Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Forces (Prov) Vietnam, to be a control and support element for SF activities. CINCPAC concurred in the need, and directed the deployment of these personnel by 1 November 1962. Full responsibility for CIDG training was to shift from CAS to COMUSMACV by 1 July 1963. (SECRET).

CINCPAC's mission with regard to the CIDGs was to help the RVN recruit, train and operate the CIDG by providing the training teams, logistical and other support, and advice on operational matters, and to help CAS train the RVN special action forces which were to help carry (SECRET)

^{1.} JCS SM 901-62 (TS)

^{2.} COMUSMACV 121046 Z Sep 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 170008Z and 170009Z both Sep 62 (S)

out all aspects of paramilitary, medical, economic and civic development in those regions that previously had little government control. For this purpose, 80,000 CIDG hamlet militia and 20,000 CIDG strike forces were to be trained by the end of CY65.

In October CINCPAC directed CINCUSARPAC to furnish 12 additional MTTs, 11 of which were to be used to develop a force of about 20,000 Catholic youth in the Delta area. CINCPAC also arranged for the continuous replacement, with reasonable overlap, of the 41 MTTs then authorized for CIDG training. 1 The following month CINCPAC approved the deployment of two SeaBee Technical Assistance Teams to GVN. These teams were to be used to offer technical engineering help to the CIDG village self-improvement program. 2

At the end of the year, the U.S. Army Special Forces Vietnam had assumed operational control of all CIDG/Switchback activities. 3 CINCPAC recommended that no change be made in the existing agreement that CAS fund the entire Switchback program in FY63, and that thereafter DOD establish a special fund outside of MAP. 4 JCS however advised that it expected approximately seven million dollars of MAP money would be earmarked to meet the DA portion of FY63 Switchback costs. 5

CINCPAC ACTIVITIES IN LAOS

The U.S. objectives in Laos at the beginning of 1962 was to establish a neutral government. The means by which the U.S. hoped to achieve its objective were approximately opposite from those employed a year earlier when CINCPAC was urging General Phoumi Nosavan to launch decisive attacks to recover the Plaines de Jarres and preserve a Western-oriented government in Laos. Within a year after the U.S. had toppled Souvanna Phouma's government and replaced it with one headed by General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum, U.S. Policy had shifted to the

^{1.} CINCPAC 070111Z Oct 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 150346Z Nov 62 (C)

^{3.} SSO MACV Saigon MAC 026 DTG 040900Z Jan 63 (S)

^{4.} ADMINO CINCPAC 040225Z Dec 62 (TS) 5. JCS 1928 DTG 221756Z Dec 62 (S)

support of a neutral government headed by Souvanna. Souvanna's government could not come into being, however, until the three quarreling princes -- Boun Oum representing the anti-communist faction, Souvanna advocating neutralism, and the communist minded Souphanouvong --- agreed on the formation of a coalition cabinet. Boun Oum and Phoumi adamantly opposed any proposal that did not provide for the important cabinet posts of Defense and Interior to be controlled by anti-communists. Phoumi's intransigence stemmed from an understandable reluctance to give up his position of power, from his conviction that Souvanna's type of neutralism was difficult to distinguish from Souphanouvong's communism, and partly from what appeared to be Phoumi's belief that U.S. policy would shift, as it had before, and return to his support.

CINCPAC Support of U.S. Policy in Laos

During 1962 CINCPAC's mission of training and supporting the Laotian armed forces did not always parallel that of urging or forcing Phoumi to negotiate with Souvanna and Souphanouvong. CINCPAC shared Phoumi's desire to maintain strong anti-communist forces in Laos and, when the State Department authorized the U.S. Ambassador in Laos to threaten to withdraw MAAG advisors, air support and supplies from Phoumi, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the U.S. attempt to strengthen the negotiating position of the RLG while simultaneously weakening that of the Souvanna-Souphanouvong group. 1 CINCPAC objected to the fact that the U.S., its Allies, and the neutral nations were all applying pressure to the anti-communist elements, whereas no one was applying pressure to the communists. 2 Since Phoumi had a logistic complex and alternate headquarters in Savannakhet, and six of the nine Army Mobile Groups in the southern part of the country, which he could partition off from the communist dominated north, CINCPAC doubted that U.S. sanctions against Phoumi would achieve the result the U.S.

^{1.} SECSTATE to Vientiane 050100Z Jan 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 050218Z Jan 62 (S)

wanted. "I still think," he told the JCS, "that we do not have to take the irrevocable step of publicly disowning the anti-communist elements in Laos and cutting of our aid to them."

CHMAAG Laos agreed that the imposition of sanctions for the purpose of bringing Phoumi into line would result in a lack of confidence and a decline of Forces Armees du Royaume (FAR) morale that would negate the U.S. advisory effort long before the lack of material would effect CHMAAG's ability to advise and train the FAR. ²

Suspecting Phoumi of insincerity concerning his avowed willingness to negotiate, the U.S. government threatened to withhold the February aid funds from the RLG, and then took stronger measures on 28 February when the President directed CINCPAC to fully clarify the U.S. position on a coalition government. There were indications that Phoumi and Boun Our hoped to stall on negotiations until the Pathet Lao would be provoked into a military attack that would then force the U.S. into direct military intervention. Phoumi's uncle, Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat of Thailand, was suspected of encouraging and supporting this position and the President directed CINCPAC to inform Sarit that the U.S. would not allow itself to be driven into a war in Laos by Phoumi's lack of cooperation, and that further intransigence by Phoumi would make intervention impossible and would bring only military disaster on Phoumi's ; forces. The President wanted Sarit to understand that time was running out, and wanted him to advise Phoumi to cooperate with the U.S. and Souvanna. 3

The President's message reached Admiral Felt in the Far East where he was attending a conference of Far East Chiefs of Mission. On 5 March he called on Sarit and laid the facts before him. The following day he met General Phoumi at the Lao Embassy in Bangkok. Seizing the initiative, Phoumi reviewed recent military accomplishments, his dependence upon U.S. military support, and his progress in presenting

^{1.} CINCPAC 060154Z Jan 62 (S)

^{2.} CHMAAG Laos 011321Z Feb 62 (S)

^{3.} President of the U.S. 280023Z Feb 62 (S)

nis plan for having the King assume leadership of the government. Speaking from notes, CINCPAC then carefully presented to Phoumi the points contained in the President's message, which Phoumi accepted without giving the impression that anything said had changed his convictions. Admiral Felt stressed the need for Phoumi to cooperate with Souvanna in forming a solid front to balance off the communists, to which Phoumi claimed to agree, but he protested that Souvanna had never demonstrated true neutrality.

Bringing the intractable Phoumi to heel, however, proved to be no simple task. It required three additional months and heavy U.S. economic and political pressure, the first dose of which was administered at the beginning of March when the U.S. withheld its usual monthly payment to the RLG, a move that annoyed King Savang who complained that the U.S. was trying to force the Lao people to accept a government that was not to their best interests. Instead of yielding to the pressure, the RLG adapted economic and financial measures to adjust to the suspension of U.S. aid.

After cutting off financial support, State Department strategy for dealing with Laos revolved around efforts by the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Averell E, Harriman, to force Phoumi in line by persuasion if possible, or by additional sanctions if necessary. Ambassador Harriman set up a conference with Sarit and Phoumi in Bangkok - a meeting that Phoumi failed to attend. Instead, Phoumi invited Ambassador Harriman to visit him in Vientiane. The U.S. State Department sent its ambassadors to Laos and Thailand to increase the pressure on the King and Sarit. Souvanna threatened to go to Paris for a rest. Ambassador Brown in Bangkok recommended that the U.S. suspend delivery of all military supplies into Laos as a means of applying pressure on Phoumi; and Souphanouvong, exploiting a sorry scheme of events that placed the U.S. position parallel to his own, had

^{1.} Bangkok to State 071145Z Mar 62 (S)

^{2.} CHMAAG Laos 191200Z Mar 62 (S)

^{3.} Vientiane 1315 to State DTG 210368Z Mar 62 (S)

the contumely to make similar suggestions and claim that it was up to the U.S. to force Phoumi to accept a coalition government. 1, 2, 3

Ambassador Harriman eventually met with both Sarit and Phoumi on 25 March, but Phoumi stubbornly resisted arguments from both sides, claiming that Souvanna had failed in his mission to form a government. In this position, Phoumi enjoyed the support of King Savang who had resisted Ambassador Harriman's pressure two days earlier by stating that he could not agree to a government in which the Pathet Lao would participate. 5

During April, after the U.S. had refused to deliver a second payment of aid to the RLG, King Savang wrote to President Kennedy to express his conviction that a coalition government would fail and that the suspension of aid would seriously affect the anti-communist struggle. In the existing impasse, Phoumi revived his plan for a government headed by the king, with the three princes as deputy prime ministers, and a 16-member cabinet following the formula of eight neutralists and four members from each of the right and left. The King left the impression with Ambassador Brown that he might consider such a plan.

Negotiations dragged during April because Souvanna left for Paris early in the month and, toward the end, Phoumi and Boun Oum set out on a tour of neighboring countries to solicit support for their position in opposition to the coalition government.

In the end, Phoumi was forced to yield, not by U.S. persuasion and pressure as much as by a military disaster he suffered at Nam Tha early in May. Souphanouvong's Pathet Lao first attacked Nam Tha at the end of January when there was disagreement between Phoumi and U.S. personnel over the advisability of reinforcing RLG defenders of the area. U.S. personnel opposed reinforcement on the grounds that it would amount to sending troops into a trap. The same disagreement arose at

State 822 to Vientiane 8 PM 19 Mar 62 (S)
 Vientiane 1318 to State DTG 211207 Z Mar 62 (S)
 Bangkok 1449 to State DTG 211250 Z Mar 62 (S)
 Vientiane 1325 to State DTG 250637 Z Mar 62 (S)

Vientiane 1336 to State DTG 261135Z Mar 62 (S) State 877 to Vientiane DTG 101800Z Apr 62 (S)

^{7.} Vientiane 1425 to State DTG 171229Z Apr 62 (S)


the beginning of May when the communists renewed their attack on Nam Tha. U. S. personnel again strongly opposed Phoumi's proposals to augment his units but, as he did before, Phoumi carried out the reinforcement, insisting that because of political reasons he could not afford to lose Nam Tha. Although U. S. observers reported that the FAR gave a better account of itself than during previous engagements, it abandoned Nam Tha on 6 May, destroyed much equipment and withdrew to the southwest. Large numbers of his troops fled across the Mekong river to a sanctuary in Thailand.

In a message to Vientiane, the Secretary of State explained that U.S. policy in Laos had been based on the assumption that the FAR was incompetent to prevent the communists from overrunning Laos as long as Viet Minh units remained active. Therefore, the U.S. tried to bring about the withdrawal of the Viet Minh and set up a coalition government so constructed that friendly FAR units would control the Mekong valley areas of greatest interest to the U.S. and its Allies. This policy was based on the belief that the FAR could secure this area from the Pathet Lao without help. By breaching the Mekong Valley line, the Nam Tha debacle jeopardized eventual U.S. intentions, for which the State Department blamed Phoumi's disregard of MAAG advice. Suspicious that he might have deliberately invited a major engagement to force the issue of military support for RLG forces, the State Department wanted to solve the impasse in Laos by eliminating Phoumi from his position of power. The best solution would have been Phoumi's complete disappearance, but it recommended a more feasible two-stage plan for moving Phoumi from a political to a military position, and then reducing his military stature later. 3

As a result of this message, CHMAAG Laos called on Phoumi on 13 May and put the blame for the military defeat upon Phoumi and his faulty disposition of troops at Nam Tha, and upon his refusal to follow MAAG's advice to reduce rather than build up his forces there. CHMAAG

Vientiane to State 011030Z May 62 (S)
 CHMAAG Laos 070304Z May 62 (S)

^{3.} State 987 to Vientiane 10 PM 12 May 62 (S)




Laos explained that the U.S. Government had directed him to advise Phoumi that unless he could give concrete evidence that corrective action would be taken by him, MAAG would not help return his troops from Thailand to Laos. CHMAAG Laos listed several fundamental corrections, and Phoumi agreed to cooperate. Although the State Department's wish to get rid of Phoumi proved impracticable, his errors at Nam Tha, exhausted U.S. patience and wrecked his right to stubborn independence.

U.S. Policy in Case of a Cease-Fire Breakdown

Throughout the long period of maneuvers and tedious negotiations that preceded the establishment of a neutral government in Laos, one of CINCPAC's chief concerns was the nature of U.S. actions to be taken if communist forces tried to seize the main population centers of Laos by military force, thus achieving their political objectives. Essentially the same problem -- what to do if fighting broke out between the communist and non-communist military forces in Laos -- existed after the neutral government was placed in power. Admiral Felt's consistent position on this matter was that the communists would respect the use of force, that they would exploit any situation to which the U.S. reacted indecisively, and that the threat of overt intervention by Red China was unlikely.

This question was discussed at CINCPAC Headquarters on 21 March at the time of the Fourth Secretary of Defense Conference. Three alternatives were recognized if fighting broke out again -- the U.S. could continue its support of the FAR through MAAG Laos, it could withdraw all of its personnel and end its assistance to Phoumi and the FAR, or it could introduce U.S. combat units with or without SEATO. CINCPAC favored continued support of RLG forces while waiting for the three princes to agree upon a government. However, if fighting commenced again for any reason, CINCPAC favored implementing either SEATO or U.S. unilateral plans, using ground forces to secure urban



^{1.} CHMAAG Laos 131200Z May 62 (S)

areas and release the FAR to engage the communists, but using U.S. air power against the enemy in Laos. Admiral Felt thought the U.S. should support the FAR in retaking the PDJ and regaining Southern Laos. However, should the Viet Minh intervene overtly, CINCPAC favored retaliating by air attacks against North Vietnam. He emphasized the need for U.S. air power if fighting broke out in Laos, and pointed out that a Seventh Fleet carrier task group off the east coast of Vietnam, and U.S. air units located in Thailand, would be able to stop any Red Chinese air effort before it could be employed effectively against major airfields used by the U.S. 1

During the uneasy period that followed the loss of Nam Tha and the introduction of U.S. troops into Thailand, to which the communist countries reacted with a blast of propaganda, the JCS asked CINCPAC's comments on two questions that were under study at the highest Washington level: In the event of a general breakdown of the cease-fire, would it be necessary or desirable for the Thais to move into Sayaboury Province to occupy that area of Laos that was west of the Mekong; and, what military response, if any, should be made in Laos? 2 After considering COMUSMACTHAI's comments on the same questions, CINCPAC submitted on 31 May a detailed response to the JCS. Unless the communist forces crossed the Mekong into Sayaboury Province, CINCPAC considered its occupation by Thai forces would be impracticable and politically unwise. He also doubted that the Thais would risk direct confrontation with the Viet Minh unless U.S. forces participated. On the second question, CINCPAC advocated that U.S. military response to a cease-fire breach should be fast and in sufficient strength to convince the communists of U.S. determination. Doubting that the FAR would resist communist pressure, especially if Viet Minh were present, CINCPAC said that effective resistence would vary according to the amounts of Thai/U.S. encadrement and troop units furnished. emphasized that an attempt to back up FAR ground troops with Thai or

Record of 4th SecDef Conf. 21 Mar 62 - CINCPAC Ser. 00090 of 22 Mar 62 (TS)

^{2.} CJCS 4790 DTG 252258Z May 62 (TS)





U.S. air support would not be sufficient. The most effective means available would be implementation of plans to place U.S. and possibly other SEATO forces into Laos.

For any military operations in Laos, Admiral Felt believed that the key ingredient to insure success was the proper use of U.S. air power. He advocated that, from the outset, the U.S. should initiate a large scale air interdiction program against enemy airfields, aircraft, supply dumps, troop concentrations and lines of communication in both Laos and Republic of Vietnam. The offensive effort, that should be carried into North Vietnam if necessary, should use USAF tactical fighters based in Thailand and carrier-based Naval Aircraft, using the full range of non-nuclear ordnance while retaining nuclear capability to cover the unlikely possibility that Red China might intervene overtly. Although Admiral Felt recognized that strikes against the enemy logistic system in North Vietnam would be politically unpalatable, he took a firm position against any restrictions on the use of airpower that would prolong hostilities and increase the loss of life. 'My view is, 'he explained, "that if we go in letting the Commie Bloc know we mean business and are prepared to go as far as necessary to attain our objectives they won't lay the security of their nations on the line by pouring forces into Laos. If we go into Laos in a manner which assures the Commies that they can operate with impunity from national sancturies, even General Harkins' estimate of the number of forces required is inadequate."1

Plans for Holding Southern Laos

The feasibility of holding the southern "Panhandle" of Laos was under consideration several times prior to the establishment of a neutral government. This matter was also discussed at the Fourth SecDef Conference where it was suggested that southern Laos might be the best settlement the U.S. could expect. The Secretary of Defense

^{1.} CINCPAC 310001 Z May 62 (TS)

asked if Phoumi could hold that area without help from the Thais and without U.S. air support, but with a U.S. guarantee to deploy U.S. forces to Thailand if the security of that country was directly threatened. To this, CINCPAC said he did not believe Sarit would commit his troops in Laos except on a shoulder to shoulder basis with U.S. troops.

In mid-May the JCS asked for CINCPAC's assessment of the feasibility of holding the Laos Panhandle against a Pathet Lao/Viet Minh attempt to dominate that area. On the assumption that the U.S. would support the RLG by providing equipment and necessary airlift, and financial support, the JCS wanted CINCPAC to consider four possibilities -- that no outside ground forces would participate; that the Thai forces would help the FAR; that both Thailand and South Vietnamese forces would participate; and that, in addition to Thai and RVN forces, the U.S. would put U.S. combat forces into Savannakhet, Pakse and Thakhek and provide U.S. tactical air support.

In reply, CINCPAC said that if the defending forces consisted only of FAR with U.S. logistical and financial support, the Panhandle would be lost. If Thai military forces participated on a substantial scale, the FAR probably could hold the area. However, he did not believe that Thai forces would go into Laos unless U.S. forces did. Nor did he believe that the RVN could afford to engage in extensive operations in Laos. The winning combination of forces in CINCPAC's opinion was the last one, provided that U.S. forces deployed in Laos were not restricted from using air power as necessary to destroy the enemy logistical system.

A more complete analysis of the problem of holding the Panhandle was contained in CINCPAC's evaluation of actions in Laos submitted to the JCS at the end of May. In this message, CINCPAC said it would take a larger effort to hold the Panhandle than it would have taken had the U.S. acted boldly before the enemy was permitted to build up his



^{1.} Record of 4th SecDef Conf., CINCPAC Ser. 00090 of 22 Mar 62 (TS)

^{2.} JCS 4561 DTG 151304Z May 62 (TS)

^{3.} CINCPAC 190410Z May 62 (TS)

strength in Laos. He suggested that enemy reactions to U.S. operations in Laos would be affected greatly by the degree of boldness and rapidity with which they were carried out. "We should move in a manner that, by word and deed, will let the enemy know we are going to take whatever steps are necessary to gain firm control of southern Laos."

For military operations, CINCPAC considered his OPLAN 32-59 suitable for initial U.S. deployment, after which he would want to bring in the entire 25th Infantry Division, add a tactical bomb squadron to USAF elements, and move a CONUS-based airborne division to Clark AFB as PACOM reserve.

As alternatives to implementing OPLAN 32-59, CINCPAC said certain steps could be taken to convince the communists that they have pushed the U.S. too far and that they would have to pay for it. After ruling out a show of force, by which he believed the communists were no longer impressed, CINCPAC argued for delivering a concerted air attack on located enemy targets in Laos, and for covert and overt retaliatory operations against North Vietnam -- Operations that could cause them to back off, thus making it unnecessary for the U.S. to get involved in large scale military operations to save Laos or RVN.

The JCS furnished additional planning guidance on 2 June and asked that COMUSMACTHAI immediately initiate planning for military operations, and that CINCPAC commence planning for the movement of forces and their logistic support according to his recommendation for the forces needed to hold the Panhandle of Laos. JCS guidance stated that the U.S. political objectives were first to establish a neutral, unified and independent Laos. If that objective could not be attained, the objective was to insure control of a sufficient portion of Laos to prevent further communist incursion into the Southeast Asian Peninsula. The military objective was to use U.S. and Allied military forces to further the political objectives. CINCPAC promulgated a change to his OPLAN 32-59 (Phase II Laos) in order to bring the plan in line with

^{1.} CINCPAC 310001 Z May 62 (TS)

^{2.} JCS 4875 DTG 022250Z Jun 62 (TS)

JCS guidance and to form a basis for COMUSMACTHAI's development of a supporting plan for seizing the Panhandle.

Continuation of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Support

Early in August CINCPAC asked CHMAAG Laos to submit his views on the desirability of augmenting the U.S. Information Service staff in Laos to provide for PsyOps support after withdrawal of MAAG. In response, CHMAAG Laos said that USIS and MAAG agreed that a continuation of these activities to support the Integrated Laotian Army would be desirable. CHMAAG Laos outlined a coordinated USIS-MAAG assessment of personnel requirements for this augmentation. In mid-August CINCPAC informed the JCS that he favored providing for continuing PsyOps and Civil Affairs support, and outlined specific personnel requirements for a USIS augmentation necessary for these advisory and support functions. (SECRET)

In reply, the JCS said that with Country Team concurrence, the Embassy in Laos had agreed to a joint State-USIA-USAID position that technical operations would be a responsibility of U.S. AID, while policy guidance and program content would remain a responsibility of USIS. (SECRET)

Aircraft and Pilots for the RLG

During 1961 the program to strengthen the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) was delayed and limited for political considerations. In March 1962 CHMAAG Laos asked CINCPAC for three T-6 aircraft to replace three that had been damaged beyond repair. With only five T-6 planes left, General Phoumi needed the replacement aircraft to maintain combat effectiveness against the increasing enemy armored capability. CINCPAC advised CHMAAG Laos that the T-6 aircraft should be available in the "SALT SHAKER" storage area in Thailand, but delivery was (SECRET).

^{1.} CINCPAC 090330Z Jun 62 (TS)

^{2.} CINCPAC 040113Z Aug 62 (S)

^{3.} CHMAAG Laos OPT 4103 DTG 100937Z Aug 62 (S)

^{4.} CINCPAC 152326Z Aug 62 (S)

^{5.} JCS 6239 DTG 201539Z Sep 62 (S)

^{6.} CHMAAG Laos 120550Z Mar 62 (S)

stopped by a State Department message asking that no action be taken to replace the damaged planes in order to avoid encouraging Phoumi's belief that if he held out long enough, the U.S. would come to his aid.

A few days after the above action, CHMAAG Laos expressed to CINCPAC his concern that 14 T-28D aircraft, then scheduled to arrive in May might become involved in political considerations that could result in some action that would withhold from CHMAAG Laos the planes he needed to deal with enemy armor being build up in the PDJ. 2 was programmed to get 14 T-28 Nomads in June 1962, and the FY62 AF MATP for Laos included a T-28 pilot transition and maintenance MTT for an in-country transition program. To speed up the training program, CINCPAC proposed to CHMAAG Laos and CHJUSMAG Thailand a plan to divert three T-28 planes from RVN to use in training Lao pilots, with the training to take place in Thailand because of the uneasy political situation in Laos. 3 After both officers approved the plan, on 4 May CINCPAC asked CHMAAG Vietnam to move three planes and the necessary support to Thailand.


The transition program commenced on 25 May. When it was completed on 22 August, 12 pilots, 16 FAR mechanics, 16 ECCOIL mechanics. and 16 RTAF mechanics received training. The FAR pilots attained a daylight only combat capability in gunnery, dive and skip bombing, omitting the napalm and rocket training because of an equipment shortage.

The T-28 Nomads were never delivered to Laos, however. 27 April OSD directed that they be held in Thailand until the political situation permitted delivery. O CINCPAC later approved a HQUSAF recommendation that they be held in CONUS. In October they were approved for conversion to reconnaissance type planes and CINCPAC directed that they be sent to the RVN when modified. 7

OSD 270014Z Apr 62 (S) CINCPAC 191320Z Oct 62 (S)

Bangkok 1451 to State DTG 220610Z Mar 62 (S)

CHMAAG Laos 010800Z Apr 62 (S) CINCPAC 112307Z Apr 62 (S) ADMINO CINCPAC 040012Z May 62 (S) CHMAAG Laos ML AF 4486 DTG 050728Z Sep 62 (S)





Introduction of U.S. Forces into Thailand

At the time of the Fall of Nam Tha, the 1st Battle Group, 27th Infantry (-) was in Thailand where it was engaged in Thailand-U.S. training exercises following the completion of Exercise Air Cobra. Immediately after the loss of Nam Tha, the JCS advised CINCPAC that this unit would remain in Thailand pending further developments. On the following day, 8 May, the U.S. sought RTG approval of its proposal to leave the battle group in Thailand on a temporary basis, to which Prime Minister Sarit and the military authorities were quick to agree. 2 On 10 May, CINCPAC followed through by directing that several precautionary steps be taken to shorten the 96-hour starting time for implementing OPLAN 32-59. He directed the CG of the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa to activate the JTF-116 Headquarters, assemble the staff, and refine plans for moving out. He directed CINCPACAF to make arrangements through JUSMAG Thailand to move four F-100 aircraft to Thailand for an operational visit, CINCPACFLT to give the BLT afloat a good workout ashore and anticipate sailing on the USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8) from Subic Bay to the Gulf of Siam, and he directed CINCUSARPAC to determine what units should be moved to support the 1st BG 27th Infantry_in Thailand. 3 On the following day CINCPAC directed the VALLEY FORGE to sail toward the Gulf of Siam, and recommended to the JCS that they approve his plan to offload the BLT at Bangkok and airlift it to Udorn. 4

On 11 May the JCS asked for CINCPAC's opinions as to the adequacy of SEATO Plan 5 or CINCPAC Plan 32-59 for meeting the existing situation in Laos, information needed in order to discuss the subject at the White House. ⁵ CINCPAC assured them that either plan was adequate to carry out objectives set forth in the plans. ⁶

^{1.} JCS 072159Z May 62 (S)

^{2.} Bangkok to State 1747 DTG 111205Z May 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 100530Z May 62 (TS)

^{4.} CINCPAC 110625Z and 110715Z both May 62 (S)

^{5.} JCS 4497 DTG 111603Z May 62 (TS)

^{6.} ADMINO CINCPAC 120919Z May 62 (TS)

JCS approval of the moves recommended by CINCPAC was received first on 13 May but was subject to diplomatic arrangements for clearance. After the Thailand Government concurred in the proposed deployment, the JCS directed CINCPAC to offload the BLT on the VALLEY FORGE and move it to Udorn, to move a Marine attack squadron to Udorn, to move the 1st BG 27th Infantry (-) to Ubon and to bring it to its selfcontained unit strength, to reinforce the 9th Log Command, then at Korat, as necessary to support the BG, to move a USAF tactical air squadron plus necessary supporting units to Thailand, and to move CJTF-116 and necessary elements of his staff and his component commanders and their staffs to Thailand and to assign all U.S. combat units in Thailand to the operational control of CJTF-116. CINCPAC immediately complied with this directive. 3 The Marine attack squadron consisting of 20 A4D aircraft moved from Cubi Point, and the PACAF 510th TFS, consisting of 20 F-100 aircraft, moved from Clark AFB and Don Muang, to arrive at Takhli on 16 and 17 May.

On 15 May CINCPAC established the U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand, naming General Harkins as COMUSMACTHAI. 4
On the same day he designated the Deputy CINCUSARPAC (Lt. Gen. Richardson) as CJTF-116 for CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, Phase II Laos, and directed him to deploy his component commanders and minimum staffs to Thailand. 5 General Richardson left Honolulu on the same day and the advance element of the headquarters, consisting of 42 officers and 65 enlisted men, left soon thereafter. On the following day, 16 May, CINCPAC directed CJTF-116 to assume operational control of all U.S. combat units in Thailand and to report to COMUSMACTHAI for operational command. 6 (See the Command Relationships section of Chapter I for detailed explanation of Command relations in SEAsia). SECRET)

^{6.} CINCPAC 162355Z May 62 (S)



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
^{1.} JCS 4527 DTG 130231Z May 62 (TS)

^{2.} JCS 150223Z May 62 (TS)

^{3.} CINCPAC 151307Z May 62 (TS)

^{4.} CINCPAC 151834Z May 62 (S)

^{5.} CINCPAC 151305Z May 62 (S)





Movement of the balance of the 1st BG, 27th Infantry, got underway with the first elements leaving Hickam AFB on 17 May. This movement included artillery, engineer, aviation, medical, signal, ordnance and transportation support units. 1


These were the principal movements directed by CINCPAC to strengthen the Free World position in the face of communist aggression in Laos. Some additional support was assigned to PACOM by the JCS which, on 16 May, directed the Army to deploy a 100-bed evacuation hospital to PACOM, and on 18 May directed CINCSTRIKE to augment PACOM by deploying a F-100 squadron of 18 aircraft and a C-130 squadron of 16 aircraft to Clark AFB, and if required, directed the Army to furnish a Caribou company and the Air Force to furnish a C-123 squadron. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACTHAI to make arrangements to receive the hospital. After investigating the need for the additional C-123 squadron, CINCPAC asked that it be held in CONUS for possible future deployment.

Withdrawal of MAAG Laos

Plans to end all activities of MAAG Laos in that country, and to recover excess materiel and equipment and remove it from Laos began to take shape during the last quarter of 1961 when events at Geneva and in Laos indicated the establishment of a neutral national government was possible. In January CINCPAC directed CHMAAG Laos to continue to plan for collecting excess material where the U.S. could exercise control over its custody and movement - plans that should be made in collaboration with CHJUSMAG Thailand to be sure of his ability to absorb both personnel and material. CINCPAC's concern was to prevent the weapons and ammunition falling into hands of the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh. ⁵

^{5.} CINCPAC 240420Z May 62 (S)





^{1.} CINCUSARPAC 160344Z May 62 (S)

^{2.} JCS 162227Z May 62 (S)

^{3.} JCS 182323Z May 62 (TS)

^{4.} CINCPAC 172307 Z May 62 (TS)





In mid-February the JCS furnished guidelines for the physical withdrawal of U.S. military personnel, supplies and equipment, and asked CINCPAC to make plans and recommendations on the assumption that all military personnel would have to be withdrawn within 32 to 75 days after an agreement was reached. The JCS wanted an administrative withdrawal with minimum publicity, all U.S. owned military equipment and supplies withdrawn for use or relocation in PACOM unless otherwise recommended, provisions for U.S. surveillance and control of military equipment in excess of neutral force requirements, the U.S. to maintain control of SALT SHAKER stocks in Thailand until no longer required by the FAR, the required personnel attached to JUSMAG Thailand for the MAAG Laos Phase-out, and U.S. military personnel to remain in Laos as long as practical. The JCS also advised that MAP equipment in Laos should remain with the FAR after withdrawal, and that the JCS hoped to recover any excess equipment. 1 (SECRET)

When events during the first three months of 1962 revealed the extent of the disagreement among the three political groups in Laos, CINCPAC suggested to CHMAAG Laos that he should expand his withdrawal plan, OPLAN 62-62, to provide for two contingencies. The first would be a situation whereby all foreign military forces, including MAAG Laos, would have to be withdrawn either on an expedited or phased basis. The second situation was to provide for continued MAAG assistance in forming the new Laos Army. Although not a JCS requirement, CINCPAC thought it was necessary to prepare for possible political approval of a Laos request for U.S. MAAG help with forming the new national Army and demobilizing excess forces. ²

In planning for disposal of U.S. equipment, CHMAAG Laos proposed that equipment having a value of approximately a million dollars be transferred to USOM on a non-reimbursable basis, claiming that a lack of transportation could make the cost of moving the equipment excessive. CINCPAC objected to this suggestion since much of the property would

JCS 142214Z Feb 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 020745Z Mar 62 (TS)

^{3.} CHMAAG Laos 050700Z Apr 62 (S)

be excess to USOM needs. Since 75 days would be available for moving the equipment, CINCPAC suggested the transportation could be managed, and recommended that CHMAAG Laos carefully determine what items could be used by other U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia.

CINCPAC's suggestion that MAAG Laos plan to help, either in integrating the new Laos national Army or demobilizing the excess forces, received little support from the U.S. Ambassador in Laos who considered such a plan unrealistic. The JCS also advised CINCPAC that the retention of the U.S. MAAG in Laos beyond the agreed date would be directly contrary to the expected agreement. They asked CINCPAC to be certain Phoumi understood this condition. As an alternative, the JCS asked for plans to augment the military attache as soon as possible in order to increase intelligence coverage, help USOM take over MAAG functions, observe the use of military equipment, and maintain close liaison with other allied personnel concerned with giving military assistance to the coalition government. The JCS suggested that not more than 10 additional persons, selected from those then in Laos, would be sufficient.

The Geneva Agreement on Laos was signed on 23 July. CINCPAC immediately directed CHMAAG Laos to implement Phase I (warning phase) of his OPLAN 63-62, the revised plan that replaced 62-62. He also recommended to the JCS that he hold off on the withdrawal of all White Star MTTs as long as practicable so that they could remain situated throughout Laos where they could check the actions of the communist forces, including the Viet Minh. Although the existing plan called for moving about 45 WSMTT personnel out of Laos early in the 75-day period, which the Embassy thought would reflect U.S. good intentions, CINCPAC wanted to hold these teams in place until during the last 15 days of the period. At the same time he sent a message to

^{1.} CINCPAC 130318Z Apr 62 (S)

^{2.} CHMAAG Laos 270908Z Jun 62 (S)

^{3.} JCS 032254Z Jul 62 (S)

^{4.} JCS 092336Z Jul 62 (S)

CINCPAC 280315Z Jul 62 (S)

CHMAAG Laos asking him to modify his withdrawal plan to hold the WSMTTs to the latest practicable time. ¹ CINCPAC also said he preferred to have MAAG personnel take full advantage of the anticipated 75-day withdrawal period, rather than move the bulk of the personnel out during the first six weeks, according to OPLAN 63-62. ² Accordingly, CHMAAG amended his plan to provide for holding the WSMTT personnel until the last ten days of the 75-day period, and other MAAG elements to the latest practicable time. ³ Again in mid-September, CINCPAC reminded CHMAAG Laos that he did not have to follow his withdrawal plan rigidly and that it was preferable to defer the movement as long as possible. "I want the final departure of personnel," Admiral Felt directed, "to be of significant size, with flags flying and tails over the dashboard."

On 6 October, the 75th day following the signing of the Geneva Accords, the last group of MAAG personnel, including the Chief of MAAG, passed through the ICC checkpoint and all activities of U.S. MAAG Laos in that country came to an end. The total of U.S. personnel withdrawn from Laos was 666, including 193 officers, 470 EM, and 3 civilians.

Plans to Support FAR After MAAG Withdrawal

Under U.S. policy, the U.S. was committed to support non communist elements of the coalition government, including the FAR, pending the integration of the opposing forces. Expecting that the demobilization and integration of Lao armed forces would take a long time, on 18 August, CINCPAC proposed a program of support that he intended to carry out unless he was instructed otherwise.

Working through the non-resident MAAG Laos in Thailand and the special agency of U.S. AID Laos, CINCPAC planned to support the FAR after the MAAG withdrawal as long as the FAR existed as an autonomous anti-communist fighting force. The non-resident MAAG Laos in

CINCPAC 280422 Z Jul 62 (S)
 CINCPAC 282313 Z Jul 62 (S)

^{3.} CHMAAG Laos 300915Z Jul 62 (S)

Bangkok would perform MAP functions of planning, programming, requisitioning, receipt and storage in Thailand, and shipment to Laos. The special agency of U.S. AID Laos would receive the materiel in Laos, insure proper storage, and influence the maintenance as much as it could. CINCPAC thought that the following support should be rendered to the FAR after MAAG personnel left; 1, 2

- 1. Only austere training requirements for vehicles, weapons, aircraft and other TO&E would be considered. CINCPAC did not intend to replace combat losses of equipment.
 - 2. POL in-country stocks would be maintained.
- 3. Follow-on spares, commercial consumables, clothing and textiles required to support training of FAR units that were then equipped and capable of training would continue to be requisitioned.
- 4. Ammunition deliveries would remain suspended except for small lots needed for training.
- 5. POL and follow-on spares for Air America operations would continue.
- 6. Construction material for Civic Action projects would be provided to the extent of MAP funds made available for that purpose and as requested by the Ambassador.

Plans for a Non-Resident MAAG Laos

Assuming that some type of military assistance would be necessary to sustain the RLG armed forces following the formation of a coalition government, on 21 March CINCPAC recommended to OSD/ISA that a "PEO" type operation using military personnel under cover be set up and charged with the responsibilities of supervising military assistance. It was especially important, he felt, to be certain that this task was not given to either the French or to a non-military U.S. agency. He raised the issue again toward the end of April with a recommendation to the JCS that such an organization could be set up within the Ambassador's Country Team in Laos

CINCPAC 180255Z Aug 62 (S) CINCPAC 050417Z Sep 62 (S) CINCPAC 210047Z Mar 62 (S) CINCPAC 270224Z Apr 62 (S)

He also asked CHMAAG Laos to plan for the contingency that a rapid deterioration of the political or military situation in Laos might develop after the withdrawal of MAAG Laos, and it became necessary for higher authority to direct the immediate re-establishment of the MAAG. To prevent a repetition of the chaos and disorganization that followed the 1958 attempt to form the RLG coalition armed forces, CINCPAC suggested that a cadre organization to assist CHJUSMAG Thailand could be set up on a standby basis in Thailand, prepared to return and set up operations in Laos with a minimum delay. 1

When the State Department, AID, and DOD, in a joint message suggested that the functions of supervising the MAP in Laos could be performed by 14 to 16 personnel of a special agency in U.S. AID Laos, CINCPAC advised the JCS that he agreed with the concept but doubted that the group was large enough. CHMAAG Laos had recommended 42 as the minimum number of U.S. personnel needed to carry out MAP programming, requisitioning, receipt storage, maintenance and end use supervision of the materiel. CINCPAC also urged that the personnel selected should be either regular military personnel in civilian clothes or carefully selected reservists or younger retired officers. EECRET

A third solution, suggested by CINCPAC on 15 July was to augment the USARMA office by a few personnel to handle intelligence collection, turn auditing and budgeting matters over to the U.S. AID office in Laos, and then set up in Thailand a group selected from MAAG Laos. Members of this group would process and coordinate equipment requirements and deliveries and carry out other military functions of MAP. CINCPAC asked CHMAAG Laos to submit his recommendations for augmenting U.S. AID Laos, and for a JTD for a non-resident MAAG Laos to be covered by JUSMAG Thailand. CHMAAG Laos recommended 29 additional AID spaces, and a 66-man JTD for the Deputy Chief of JUSMAG Thailand. To the JCS, CINCPAC recommended that only 25 personnel be added to U.S. AID Laos, but that 64 Army and 6 Air Force



^{1.} CINCPAC 280002 Z Apr 62 (TS)

^{2.} CINCPAC 120411Z Jui 62 (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 150015Z Jul 62 (S) 4. CHMAAG Laos 191005Z Jul 62 (S)



general Reuben Tucker as CHMAAG Laos to be set up in Thailand with Major General Reuben Tucker as CHMAAG Laos under cover as Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand. CINCPAC considered 70 personnel enough to provide a base that could be expanded readily if necessary. The JCS on 14 August informed CINCPAC that the Secretary of Defense had approved his concept of augmenting U.S. AID Laos, of setting up a separate 70-man element of JUSMAG Thailand as the non-resident MAAG Laos, and of augmenting the Laos military attaches by eight personnel. CINCPAC made it clear to CHMAAG Laos, however, that the non-resident MAAG Laos would not have a separate unit designation in Thailand.

CHMAAG Laos became Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand on 7 October, the day after the withdrawal of MAAG Laos was completed. After serving two months under the new title, the former CHMAAG Laos recommended to CINCPAC that the position of Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand be turned over to a senior colonel in January 1963, and that his unit be integrated into JUSMAG Thailand in March with a gradual phase-out of duties that would be complete by 1 May 1963. The reason behind this was that the greatest asset of the former MAAG Laos group was its advisory personnel who had close contacts with key FAR officials. These personnel were being rotated and only a few would remain by mid-February 1963. With the passing the time, the probability that MAAG Laos would return to Laos decreased, and the proposed reduction in the strength of FAR forces would further lessen the value of the MAAG Laos group in Thailand.

Admiral Felt preferred to wait until at least February 1963 before considering the recommendation to put a senior colonel in the position of Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand. By that time Admiral Felt expected a clearer picture of the events to come. He also pointed out that the primary job of Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand was to administer the MAP program, and the secondary job was to stand by in readiness to return to Laos. 5

^{4.} CHIUSMAG Thailand MADC 245 DTG 040600Z Dec 62 (S) 5. CINCPAC 140157Z Dec 62 (S)



^{1.} CINCPAC 282232Z Jul 62 (S)



Logistic Support Requirements Forward of Mekong

During November CINCPAC sent to the JCS his concept of resupply of combat forces forward of the Mekong Valley for CINCPAC OPLAN 32-63 Phase II - Laos. CINCPAC intended to provide support by light fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and airdrop until combat forces could secure surface lines of communication and the engineers could make the necessary LOC improvements. To support this concept, Phase II - Laos called for early deployment of light logistic aviation units and engineers. Depending upon the tactical situation, CINCPAC thought specific engineer tasks in Laos were likely to include the following: Improvement of ferry slips at Mekong crossings; augmentation of local craft with 27-foot engineer boats, pontoon and Navy cube barges on the Mekong and other rivers; repair of Pakse airfield to accomodate C-124/130 aircraft; and the improvement of several existing airstrips and roads in Laos.

CINCPAC considered his OPLAN 32-63 logistically feasible. He expected SLAT and other prepositioning and construction projects in Thailand, Vietnam and WESTPAC to improve reaction times and flexibility. SLAT and other prepositioning actions in Thailand that would facilitate engineer operations in Laos included pierced steel planking to improve airfields in Thailand and Laos, engineer boats, tactical bridging equipment, and LOC construction materials. With the U.S. Army 809th Engineer Construction Battalion and detachments of other engineer forces then in Thailand and able to redeploy into Laos in a emergency, additional prepositioning actions in Thailand were not considered warranted at that time.

1. CINCPAC 150322Z Nov 62 (TS)

CINCPAC ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN THAILAND'S RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISM

The compromises and armistice that settled over Laos during 1962 caused a feeling of uneasiness in Thailand which had hoped that the thrusts of communism could be either turned back or contained in Laos. However, early in 1962 when it appeared that a coalition government in Laos would make it easy for the communists to dominate that country and to control the Mekong River towns, Thailand and U.S. officials alike expected Thailand to experience increasing communist pressure. This section describes the more important actions by which CINCPAC attempted to strengthen and help Thailand while the opportunity still existed.

Special Logistic Actions Thailand (SLAT)

After communist forces broke the cease fire agreement in Laos and seized Nam Tha in May, CINCPAC published a concept for military operations in Southeast Asia. The JCS then asked CINCPAC to plan for the movement and employment of logistic support for forces in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC's logistic concept, developed in response to JCS guidance, included selective pre-positioning and various anticipatory actions to reduce reaction time and improve the logistic base in Thailand. During the latter half of June CINCPAC, with the help of COMUSMACTHAI, CHJUSMAG Thailand, the U.S. Ambassador, and the RTG, developed and submitted for JCS and SecDef approval, a program having an estimated cost of approximately \$30 million. 4,5,6

The principal projects in this program, and their status at the end of the year were the following:

- 1. CINCPAC 310001Z May 62 (S)
- 2. JCS 4875 DTG 022250Z Jun 62 (S)
- 3. CINCPAC 060950Z Jun 62 (S)
- 4. CINCPAC 120712Z Jun 62 (S)
- 5. JCS 5090 DTG 221417Z Jun 62 (S)
- 6. JCS 5174 DTG 292146Z Jun 62 (S)
- 7. The year-end status was listed in Admiral Felt's Problem Book, entry on SLAT dated 11 Dec 62 (S)

- 1. Pre-position rolling stock in Thailand. CINCPAC proposed to procure 10 locomotives, 20 reefer cars and 100 tank cars, all of which would have to be manufactured because of the meter guage tracks in Thailand. At the end of the year the locomotives and tank cars were under procurement, after the U.S. had agreed to increase the locomotive horse power from 650 to 778. The reefers were cancelled at the end of the year.
- 2. Construction of a permanent POL pipeline from Bangkok to Don Muang Airfield and a tactical pipeline from Don Muang to Tahkli and Korat. Construction of the pipeling from Bangkok to Don Muang a permanent line having one 4" and one 6" line was to be completed by civilian contractors to be selected in early 1963. It was expected that design work would be completed by the middle of March 1963, and the entire project completed by mid-1964, provided that the project was not held up by negotiations with the RTG. Pipe and ancillary equipment for the tactical pipeline were scheduled to be stored at Korat upon the completion of the depot. This line was scheduled to be constructed upon CINCPAC's orders when and if the need for it to meet contingency requirements arose.
- 3. Extend and improve the airfield at Nakhon Phanom so it could accomodate C-124 and C-130 aircraft. Located on the Mekong opposite Thakhek, Laos, this airfield was intended to be a means of injecting troops into the Thakhek area to gain immediate control of the Mekong side of the narrow neck of Laos. Early in August CINCPAC advised COMUSMACTHAI that he wanted a runway length of 6000 feet and unloading aprons of 100,000 square yards, and that he hoped the minimum landing, taxiway, parking and marshalling facilities could be completed by the middle of 1963. A better site was selected 12 kilometers west of the existing airfield. At the end of the year a SeaBee battalion was on site, the first shipment of pierced steel planking had arrived in Bangkok, and the first lot of asphalt was enroute to Thailand.

^{1.} CINCPAC 070346Z Aug 62 (S)

- 4. Construct storage depots at Korat and Udorn to be used for the storage of Army engineer equipment, field fortification meterials, tactical bridging, and other materials to be pre-positioned in Thailand. An engineer construction company arrived in Thailand in December, and the materials for the construction of the Korat and Udorn depots were being shipped. An engineer supply point company had been alerted for PCS movement to Thailand to operate the depots that were expected to be completed by June of 1963.
- 5. Pre-position 1.2 million square feet of pierced steel planking to be used for general airfield improvement and maintenance. This planking was being held in CONUS until all requirements for the Nakhon Phanom had been delivered, after which JUSMAG Thailand would ask for the shipment of the additional planking as soon as the port and the depot could handle it.
- 6. Deliver a floating crane to the port of Bangkok. The rehabilitation of a U.S. Navy 50-ton crane was completed in December of 1962. The RTG, however, indicated it did not wish to be burdened with the expense of maintaining the crane. CINCPAC planned to keep the crane at Subic Bay if the Thais did not accept it.
- 7. Modernize the Thai tactical communications system. Equipment for this project was being delivered and was scheduled for delivery during the remainder of FY63.
- 8. Deliver seven HUS-1 helicopters to the RTAF. These air-craft were scheduled for delivery in August 1963.

Although the eventual cost of SLAT was expected to approach \$30 million, the Secretary of Defense stipulated that the projects had to be completed within a ceiling of \$2 million outflow of gold. 1

Establishment of USMACTHAI and Movement of U.S. Combat Troops into Thailand

The course of events that led to establishing the U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Thailand, and to the introduction of U.S. combat
forces into Thailand commenced in Laos during the May battle for

JCS 5225 DTG 051831Z Jul 62 (S)



Nam Tha. These actions are described in the Laos section of this chapter. See pages 214 and 215. (SECRET)

Plans and Force Structures for Thailand

When the problems connected with insurgency in Laos were either solved or postponed by the formation of a coalition government, U.S. officials turned their attention to Thailand, which was the next logical target for communist insurgency. Until mid-spring, U.S. assistance to Thailand had consisted of furnishing military assistance and a Military Advisory Group. In addition to a Thailand internal security plan that was very general in concept, CINCPAC assisted in the preparation of two plans, both of which were dependent upon and involved a determination of the extent of Thailand's force structure. Earlier in the year, as a result of the March Secretary of Defense Conference. CINCPAC proposed to CHJUSMAG Thailand that he approach the RTG with a package deal consisting of RTA units that were essential to meet the threat in Thailand. CINCPAC suggested improving logistical units, organizing two additional Ranger companies, and organizing an airborne battalion by conversion and addition of C-47 aircraft. The RTG concurred in the need for the additional units and also favored including a PsyWar battalion and an engineer light equipment company, provided' the U.S. supplied the necessary equipment and troop support.

During the Secretary of Defense's visit to Thailand on 9 May 1962 it was agreed that the U.S. would provide equipment for an airborne battalion if the RTG would finance the jump pay. During this visit he also approved the provision of the initial increment of equipment for a PsyWar battalion. (SECRET)

Country Team Plan for Thailand: Preparation of a plan to counter communist encroachments in Thailand commenced early in 1962 and was carried out by CHJUSMAG Thailand and by the U.S. Ambassador (SECRET)

^{1.} CINCPAC 260753Z Mar 62 (TS)

^{2.} CHJUSMAG Thailand MAA 20546 DTG 051010Z Apr 62 (S)

^{3.} Memo of Conversation, AMEMB Bangkok, 11 May 62 (S)




to Thailand, who had overall responsibility. The purpose of the plan was not to create a long range plan, but rather to draw up a series of coordinated measures for dealing with insurgency actions. CINCPAC commented on the military aspects of the plan, but approval of the plan was to come from Washington. At the end of the year the Country Team Plan was still incomplete.

Internal Security Plan for Thailand: During the period 6 June to 15 July, the U.S. Embassy in Thailand prepared and submitted to the State Department an internal security plan for Thailand. The plan was intended to contain five sections: the purpose, estimate of the situation, basic strategic plan, programs addressed to operational goals, and actions required. Only the first four sections, however were completed.

Master Force Plan for Thailand: One of the items under discussion at the 23 July Secretary of Defense Conference was the status of paramilitary security forces, to include the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC), Border Patrol Police (BPP), and the National Police. During this discussion, the Secretary said he wanted to determine the overall force levels - regular armed forces as well as the paramilitary organizations - and he asked for a plan that would include the skeleton of forces required in each category, the initial steps that the U.S. should take to meet the requirements, and the U.S. agency that would be responsible for each category of forces. He asked for a plan from the village force level to the armed forces level to be worked out by the Country Team and CINCPAC, and said he would delay action on the Thailand FY63 MAP until the plan was complete.

In addition to force levels, two other programs were included in the plan - village radios and a system of feeder roads. The village radio program was included because it was MAP funded and essential to the plan; the feeder road program was included, although AID funded, because it was necessary to the mobility concept inherent in the plan. The major provisions of this plan that was prepared by JUSMAG, with



CINCPAC assistance in determining the military and paramilitary forces to be included, were to:

- 1. Build up the Border Patrol Police in strength and equipment.
- 2. Revitalize the Provincial Police by adding equipment and intensifying training.
 - 3. Create a village level component in the existing VDC.
- 4. Provide for equipping the RTA with M-113 armored personnel carriers and equipping the RTAF with HUS-1 helicopters to give greater mobility for counterinsurgency operations.
- 5. Provide for increasing the strength of the existing units and activating new units by using the Vice President's commitment of \$12.6 million. (see below)

After the Ambassador approved the plan and after it was refined by the CINCPAC staff, it was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 20 August. (SECRET).

During the 8 October Secretary of Defense Conference, the conferees considered the merits of the Internal Security Plan and the Master Force Plan, including the source of funds available to support the forces or projects. As a result, the Secretary decided that the first priority would be given to the build-up of the BPP from its existing strength to a strength of 7,512; second priority to the revitalization of the 28,000 Provincial Police; and third priority to the development of the VDC as rapidly as politically feasible, and preferably organized at the village level. This decision to accord first priorities to the paramilitary forces reflected the Secretary's conclusion that these forces were more suitable to meet insurgency, which was the only existing threat. At CINCPAC's suggestion, Secretary McNamara approved an RTAF increase for FY63 needed to man the early warning radar network being developed, but said that further increases would be examined in detail before submission of the FY64 MAP. Increase in the Thailand Army would be discouraged by assigning to them alow priority.

^{1.} CINCPAC ltr 3010 Ser. 00582 of 20 Aug 62 (S)

With regard to the development of an airborne battalion, and engineer light equipment company, and a PsyWar battalion, that had been favored at the time of the March SecDef Conference, the Secretary agreed to provide equipment provided that the RTG would bear the cost of manning the units. 1

On 24 October the DOD advised CINCPAC that the Master Force
Plan for Thailand had been approved in principle, as modified by DOD,
to reflect the following guidance:

(SECRET)

- 1. The U.S. would not provide funds to the RTG for pay and allowances of regular or paramilitary forces except as provided in subparagraph 4 below.
 - 2. The U.S. would not provide funds to the RTG for field rations.
- 3. Although desirable, the U.S. would not exert pressure on the RTG to increase the manning level of the RTA to 80% of authorized strength.
- 4. First priority would be given to the build-up of the BPP to a FY63 strength of 7,000. If the RTG was unwilling to provide pay and allowances for the additional personnel, then the U.S. would consider providing equipment for the military forces if local currency of equal value was applied to the RTG to support additional BPP personnel.
- 5. Second priority would be given to the revitalization of the Provincial Police by providing equipment and training.
- 6. Third priority was the build-up of a Volunteer Defense Corps as rapidly as politically feasible, starting at the village level and advancing to the province level.
 - 7. A 500 man increase in the RTAF was approved for FY63.
- 8. The FY63 MAP would include 56 APCs, 32 M-41 tanks, 8 C-123 aircraft, and 8 HUS-1 helicopters.
 - 9. Approval of support for a reserve division was withheld.

(SECRET)

2. OSD 240351Z Oct 62 (S)

^{1.} Record of Seventh SecDef Conf., 8 Oct 62 (TS)



10. A Master Force Plan summary sheet would be updated and submitted in light of coordination with the RTG, and based upon RTG and U.S. funding feasibilities.

\$12.6 Million Troop Support "Commitment"

Closely connected with the question of force levels for Thailand was that of furnishing the funds to support the forces. This problem was further complicated because the U.S. Vice President, during a May 1961 tour of Southeast Asia, made to Thai officials statements from which they inferred that the U.S. would provide \$12.6 million annually to maintain RTG forces at full strength. The Thailand Minister of Defense questioned Admiral Felt about this matter in March, and explained that the Thai budget allowed for a manning level of only 68 percent. Admiral Felt questioned the JCS about the existance of such a commitment, explaining that U.S. Embassy officials in Thailand doubted that the commitment was intended to be for a definite amount annually. 1

An investigation of the matter by the JCS revealed that the figure of \$12.6 million was raised by Thai officials during a discussion with the Vice President. That figure represented the amount the RTG estimated it would need to maintain its forces at full strength, but no U.S. commitment was intended until the RTG indicated what its own contribution would be. Later in March, in response to a State Department request, Ambassador Young, in coordination with CHJUSMAG, proposed that the \$12.6 million troop support 'commitment' be satisfied by limiting the payment to one year, encouraging the RTG to increase its budget for troop support, and by allocating the funds as follows: \$4.1 million for new units, \$6.2 million for a reserve division including MAP equipment, \$1.1 million for the Volunteer Defense Corps, and \$1.2 million for training exercises. In a message to the JCS and DOD, CINCPAC objected to the proposed solution, claiming that it would not

^{1.} CINCPAC 051100Z Mar 62 (S)

^{2.} JCS 092231Z Mar 62 (S)

^{3.} Bangkok 1989 and 2033 to State DTD June 62 (S)

provide a sound basis for raising the manning levels of the existing MAP units to a minimum 80% of authorized strength. He pointed out that equipment for a reserve division could not be justified until the manning level of regular units was improved, that a one-time payment would not provide a basis for an agreed long range solution to the troop support problem, and that it would be overly optimistic to assume that in FY63 the RTG would have enough funds for a strength buildup of existing MAP units, for continued support of the VDC, as well as for training exercises in future years. (SECRET)

The matter was discussed further during the Sixth SecDef Conference held on 23 July at which time Ambassador Young said he was present when the Vice President made the commitment, and the Secretary of Defense said that the U.S. agreed that the commitment for \$12.6 million was made, but for one year only. However, because of the existing misunderstanding about whether the commitment was for one year or an indefinite number of years, Secretary McNamara said the U.S. was willing to consider a move to furnish the full amount the first year, a lesser amount the second, and nothing the third year. He suggested that plans should be based on a total figure between \$18 and \$19 million. This decision was reversed at the next SecDef Conference, however, when the Secretary said that no commitment had been made by the Vice President, and that Ambassador Young would have the task of correcting the misunderstanding with the RTG. 3

Training the Border Patrol Police

The task of initiating a training program for the Thai Border Patrol Police (BPP) got underway as the result of a USOM request for four Special Forces MTTs to commence the first of a two-phase training program for the BPP. OSD passed the request to CINCPAC who suggested to CHJUSMAG Thailand that the required training could be done (GONFIDENTIAL)

^{1.} CINCPAC 012300Z Jul 62 (S)

^{2.} Record of 6th SecDef Conf., 23 Jul 62. See Item #4. (TS)

^{3.} Record of 7th SecDef Conf., 8 Oct 62. See Item T-A (TS)

^{4.} OSD 911077 DTG 102017Z Mar 62 (C)



by the RTA using its Rangers or Paratroop forces, a preferable solution since he was afraid that reliance upon U.S. training assistance would detract from the need for the RTA to develop its own training capabilities. CINCPAC requested that OSD review the requirements for U.S. training teams. If they were needed, he proposed that combat arms MTTs be furnished in place of the special forces personnel. response, CHJUSMAG explained that RTA capabilities were limited and were used to improve the RTA. The 24-week training program for the BPP consisted of 635 hours of instruction of which only 245 were associated with subjects for which Special Forces personnel were considered better qualified; for the remaining instruction CHJUSMAG agreed that combat arms personnel augmented by some PsyWar specialists would be as satisfactory. He recommended that a mixture of U.S. Army SF, combat arms, and PsyWar personnel be combined in MTTs that would make the best use of the skills. 2 (CONFIDENTIAL)

CINCPAC promptly agreed to provide the training support and directed CINCUSARPAC to provide the teams. However, because the BPP was under the control of the Ministry of Interior, he asked that CHJUSMAG first establish Country Team agreement that the training would be done under the operational control of CHJUSMAG in coordination with USOM Bangkok and the RTA. CINCPAC also wanted to be sure that Thai officials understood the U.S. willingness to help in BPP training should not be construed as willingness to assume MAP support for the BPP. Thai officials readily acknowledged and agreed to these conditions.

To speed up the program, CHJUSMAG Thailand presented a concept for combined RTA and BPP counter-insurgency training, but CINCPAC pointed out to COMUSMACTHAI that the BPP would continue to be a USOM/CAS responsibility. 6 CINCPAC explained that he was

^{1.} CINCPAC 162115Z Mar 62 (C)

^{2.} CHJUSMAG Thailand 260930Z Mar 62 (C)

^{3.} CINCPAC 300320Z Mar 62 (C)

^{4.} CINCPAC 282255Z Mar 62 (S)

^{5.} CHJUSMAG Thailand 180530Z Apr 62 (S)

^{6.} CHJUSMAG Thailand 280605Z Apr 62 (S)

making available 40 MTT personnel who were scheduled to arrive in Thailand early in June. However, training of the BPP had the first priority, and the RTA training was not to be combined with BPP training except in the case of the Phase I instructor-cadre courses. In addition to the MTTs, CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACTHAI to make available training personnel from both the Army battle group and the Marine BLT then in Thailand, to help in training of BPP. Training commenced on schedule on 18 June and the first eight week course was completed on 11 August. Two other 10-man MTTs arrived in Thailand early in October to conduct the Phase II counter-insurgency training.

Aviation Activities in Thailand

During the spring of 1962, CHJUSMAG Thailand determined that the L-19 aircraft in Thailand needed renovation, and that the number of pilots and maintenance personnel on hand was inadequate to operate the authorized total of 65 aircraft. CHJUSMAG prepared a plan, for CINCPAC approval, that would provide for the issuance of 33 new L-19s that the SecDef had directed be placed in operation in Thailand, for the renovation of the older aircraft, for additional pilot and maintenance cources, and for an increased JUSMAG advisory effort to improve aviation activities. ^{5,6}

CINCPAC instructed CINCUSARPAC to help with the receipt and issue of the additional aircraft, and asked DA to organize in CONUS a composite unit of 60 personnel, with necessary maintenance and instructional equipment, to be employed in Thailand for one year period. CINCPAC also recommended that four officers and one warrant officer be added to JUSMAG as aviation advisors, which was approved by JCS and forwarded to DA for assignment action. 8

- 1. CINCPAC 182028Z May 62 (S)
- 2. CINCPAC 022353Z Jun 62 (S)
- 3. CHJUSMAG Thailand 291000Z Aug 62 (S)
- 4. USARYIS 050415Z Oct 62 (S)
- 5. CHJUSMAG Thailand 171110Z Apr 62 (S)
- 6. CHJUSMAG Thailand 120700Z May 62 (S)
- 7. CINCPAC 171820Z May 62 (S)
- 8. JCS 5213 DTG 032129Z Jul 62 (\$)

In the meantime, the four-man MTT furnished by USARPAC had assembled and issued to using units some of the new L-19s, and had completed technical inspections of 15 old planes. Since discrepancies found could be corrected by the RTA and because of the progress already made, on 9 August CHJUSMAG Thailand advised CINCPAC that the composite unit from CONUS would not be needed. By the end of the year pilots and those in training totalled 96, a number that the RTA considered sufficient for its 69 aircraft. The RTA had 144 trained mechanics, and 21 of the 33 new L-19s were operational. 2,3

The 1st Aviation Company, equipped with 18 Caribou (AC-1) air-craft, was deployed to Korat, Thailand, and commenced movement from Ft. Benning, Georgia at the end of May.

During 1962 Thailand received its initial delivery of T-28 aircraft - a total of 40 planes. Since experienced T-28 pilots and maintenance personnel were not available in the RTAF, a two-man pilot transition MTT and a five-man maintenance MTT were provided to help phase the T-28D into the inventory. The MTTs arrived in Thailand on 22 May for a 26-week tour. After conducting a training program for Lao pilots until 14 August, Thai personnel were trained until 25 November, when the program was completed without accident or incident. A total of 39 pilots and 50 maintenance personnel underwent training. (CONFIDENTIAL)

By an 11 April message, the JCS recommended to CINCPAC that aircraft funded for Thailand in its FY62 program be expedited and delivered as soon as possible. CINCPAC asked for the opinion of CHJUSMAG Thailand and then recommended against the proposal, except on a small scale. CINCPAC's position was based on Thailand's inability to use and maintain the aircraft if they were delivered early, the inadequate supply and logistic system of the Thai Air Force, and previous experiences from delivering major items of equipment without

^{1.} CHJUSMAG Thailand 090345Z Aug 62 (S)


^{2.} CHJUSMAG Thailand 010615Z Sep 62 (S)

^{3.} CHJUSMAG Thailand 150250Z Sep 62 (S)

^{4.} Team Captain MTT 63-109-1 ltrs of 25 Aug and 27 Nov 62, Subj: Mobile Training Team Performance Report. (C)

^{5.} JCS 4004 DTG 111709Z Apr 62 (S)


adequate preparation or follow-on support. Because of the lead time needed to train pilots and critical specialists and to support training and support facilities, CINCPAC recommended that delivery could be speeded up to provide seven T-33A aircraft during October 62, and 10 F-86F during December. In addition 30 T-28D aircraft were to be delivered in August, and 10 in October. CINCPAC thought that the Thai Air Force would be fully occupied putting these aircraft into operation. I



^{1.} CINCPAC 210415 Z Apr 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 280128Z Mar 62 (S)

SECRET



The Bangkok By-Pass Road

A solution to a two year old problem was determined at the end of 1961 when OSD approved construction of an all-weather road from the Gulf of Siam at Chachoengsao to Prachinburi to by-pass the congestion in the capital city. CINCUSARPAC was prepared to furnish an engineer construction battalion to do the work. During January 1962 the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand notified CINCPAC that the RTG had agreed to provide an engineer unit to help the U.S. engineers, and that Thailand would be responsible for a part of the construction costs. 5 The project

^{1.} Supreme Command Headquarters, Ministry of Defense, Thailand, Ltr to Maj. Gen. Conway, CHJUSMAG dtd 13 Sep 62 (C) - Copy in CINCPAC J212 files.

2. CINCPAC 290411 Z May 62 (S)

3. JCS 072115Z Jun 62 (S)

4. CINCPAC 150003Z Jun 62 (S)

5. Bangkok msg DTG 211002Z Jan 62 (U)

was approved and funded in the amount of \$5.9 million and the 809th Engineer Battalion commenced movement to Thailandby mid-February.

The by-pass project as originally planned consisted of widening the existing road and raising the grade by as much as two meters, and the construction of 21 reinforced concrete bridges. As determined by the Secretary of Defence, the Navy had overall responsibility for construction in Southeast Asia. The Navy exercised this responsibility through the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the Pacific Division BUDOCKS, and the Officer in Charge of Construction, Southeast Asia who was charged with the design and technical supervision of construction.

CHJUSMAG had responsibility for administrative support, for overall military supervision of the battalion, and for procurement of supplies and equipment in Thailand. The time to complete the road was estimated to be at least two years.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

During July COMUSMACTHAI recommended to CINCPAC that he consider a new routing for the northern half of the by-pass road. The proposed change, which was favored by the Thais, would shift the northern terminus of the road to the east and would facilitate the eventual construction of a second all-weather road to Korat. COMUSMACTHAI estimated that the proposed change would permit a reduction in construction time because it would cross higher ground, and require less embankment, drainage, and bridge work. He said that the Thais had indicated they would provide the necessary right of way. ³

After studying the recommendation, CINCPAC advised OASD/ISA that he intended to approve it provided that:

- 1. The RTG agreed to furnish the necessary real estate at no cost to the U.S.
 - 2. The total cost did not exceed \$5.6 million.
 - 3. The construction time would not exceed 30 months.

^{1.} CGUSARYIS 130600Z Feb 62 (U)

CINCPAC ltr to DIRPACDOCKS, Subj: Status Report - Bangkok By-Pass Road. Ser. 598 of 24 Mar 62 (U)

^{3.} COMUSMACTHAI 170835Z Jul 62 (S)



- 4. The relocation would require only surfacing the minor improvements to about 4.6 miles of the Kabinburi-Prachinburi road, the cost of which would be included in the total cost. (SECRET)
- 5. And that no commitment would be made or implied for the improvement by the U.S. of the road from Kabinburi to Korat. On 18 August CINCPAC advised COMUSMACTHAI that the proposed relocation was approved, subject to these five provisions. He also urged COMUSMACTHAI to try to get an RTG commitment to improve the road from Kabinburi to Korat. (SECRET)

At the end of the year work was proceeding well on both the southern part of the by-pass road which was then under construction, and upon the A&E studies for the northern portion.

(SECRET)


Communist Activity in NE Thailand

On 12 January 1962 CINCPAC intelligence published and disseminated its report on Communist subversive efforts in Thailand, citing the existing subversive organizations, certain known personalities, and the Thai government's countermeasures. In subsequent intelligence studies during the year CINCPAC intelligence disseminated additional data on this topic. (SECRET)

As a result of intelligence reports on communist activity in Northeast Thailand, CINCPAC warned CHJUSMAG Thailand that communist encroachment in that area was the ground work to further the enemy's ultimate objective of dominating Southeast Asia. A secure base of operations in the isolated, semi-jungle region would give the communists a significant bridgehead west of the Mekong, CINCPAC pointed out, and a communist dominated area in Northeast Thailand could have considerable impact on FAR defense efforts in Southern Laos. CINCPAC urged CHJUSMAG to advise Prime Minister Sarit of the extent of the communist threat, and to encourage Sarit to respond

^{4.} PACOM WID Nos. 14-62, 20-62, 26-62, 30-62, 40-62, 45-62, 51-62 (S)





^{1.} CINCPAC 102341Z Aug 62 (S)

^{2.} CINCPAC 180225Z Aug 62 (S)

^{3.} PACOM WID No. 2-62 (S)





to this threat by use of prompt military force. ¹ Early the following month, CHJUSMAG Thailand advised CINCPAC that the Thais were becoming aware of the communist problem, and that they had deployed four companies to the border areas in the north and northeast to counter infiltration and to improve the morale of the civilian population. ²

SEATELCOM

The problem of improving regional and national communications in Southeast Asia, for both military and civilian use, had much less military significance in 1962 than in previous years before military systems reduced the military dependence upon SEATELCOM. The project was first proposed in 1955. Some progress was made but there were long delays, partly because of difficulties between ICA (AID) and civilian contractors. At the end of 1962 only Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam expected to benefit from the program; Cambodia elected not to participate and the Laos portion of the project was abandoned because of political and military events in that country. (UNCLASSIFIED)

In the Republic of Vietnam, that part of the project planned to serve the area north of Saigon was deferred indefinitely. Engineering of a telecommunications system for the Southern part of the country was complete, but no contract had been awarded at the end of 1962.

(GONFIDENTIAL)

In Thailand, a \$13.3 million contract was signed on 19 October 1962 that provided for the Collins Corporation to do the following:³

- l. Install by 4 October 1963 long-distance, through trunks between Bangkok and Udorn, and Bangkok and Ubon.
- 2. Install by 3 March 1964 drop outs to all principal population centers in the Bangkok plain, and along the axes named above.
- 3. Establish this system with a minimum of 31 channels in low-usage areas, and a maximum of 240 channels on primary arteries.

 (GONFIDENTIAL)

2. CHJUSMAG Thailand 061125Z Mar 62 (TS)

^{1.} CINCPAC 070042Z Feb 62 (TS)

^{3.} Admiral Felt's Problem Book, SEATELCOM item submitted 9 Nov 62. In J04 files. (C)

Village/Hamlet Radios for Thailand

While in Southeast Asia in May 1962, the Secretary of Defense said he wanted to begin a village radio program in Thailand similar to the one then being established in South Vietnam. Accordingly, the Country Team in Thailand developed a plan that the Secretary accepted when it was presented to him at the 23 July SecDef Conference. CINCPAC recommended that 2,400 radio sets be procured for Thailand. The plan for Thailand provided for 240 radios to be installed in northeastern provinces, as a pilot program, beginning in November 1962. Starting in June 1963, 250 radios would be installed each quarter until a total of 2,300 radios were operating. COMUSMACTHAI was responsible for the program that was expected to cost \$1.2 million.

RTA MAP Equipment Levels

On 28 August CINCPAC notified CHJUSMAG Thailand of a new policy on providing MAP equipment for the RTA. In the past, MAP equipment had been furnished according to the TO&E strengths of units, although actual strengths were substantially lower and the U.S. had been unsuccessful in attempts to persuade the RTG to improve the situation. Accordingly, CINCPAC directed that equipment would be furnished commensurate with the manning level of supported units, except that units manned at 80% or more of TO&E strength would receive equipment for a full strength unit. 3

Approximately 30% of the 81,000 members of the RTA received no MAP support and CHJUSMAG Thailand recommended that this support be extended to the other 25,000. Although CINCPAC recognized the advantages, he explained that funds were not available.

^{1.} See page 165

^{2.} Admiral Felt's Problem Book, item 9 Nov 62, In J04 files (S)

^{3.} CINCPAC 282349 Z Aug 62 (S)

^{4.} CHJUSMAG Briefing Folder for CINCPAC Conference at Bangkok on 18 Oct 62 (S)

^{5.} CINCPAC 290019Z Nov 62 (S)

Withdrawal of U.S. Combat Troops from Thailand

Whereas the mid-May agreement to deploy U.S. combat troops to Thailand, as a result of communist actions at Nam Tha, Laos, was reached within a few days, negotiations to withdraw the forces extended over a four month period. The decisions and actions connected with deploying U.S. troops to Thailand in May are described in the Laos section of this chapter. Plans for this action were developed by the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand and by CINCPAC and, out of deference to Thai interests, were coordinated carefully with Thai officials throughout the planning period.

The first troops to go were mobile assault Marine units, which the President on 28 June authorized to be redeployed gradually to their ships. The JCS directed that approximately 1000 Marines be withdrawn and returned to their regularly assigned ships and stations. Movement was to commence on 2 July and be completed within one week. 1 State Department directed that the movement be carried out so that it could be reversed quickly, if events required such action. 2 designated the following elements of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to be moved to the USS VALLY FORGE, NAS Cubi Point or to Okinawa; One company of BLT 3/9 to Okinawa; support unit consisting of sub-unit MABS-12 to Cubi Point; Helicopter squadron (HMM-261) to ship; A4D squadron (VMA-332) to Cubi Point; Marine Air Control squadron 4 to ship; Marine Air Tactical Control Unit 66 to ship; and Hq MAG to Cubi Point. In addition to the Valley Forge, the withdrawal required 43 C-130 sorties and 14 C-124 sorties furnished by the 315th Air Division, 52 sorties by GV-1 aircraft organic to the Marines, and two LSDs, the BELLE GROVE and CARTER HALL. Redeployment of 1015 Marines from Thailand was completed on 8 July. 4

On 27 July the JCS directed that the remainder of the Marines be withdrawn, and that the movement commence within 48 hours.

JCS 5165 DTG 290227 Z Jun 62 (S)
 State 2095 to Bangkok, 9PM 28 Jun 62 (S)

CINCPAC 290433Z Jun 62 (S) COMSEVENTHFLT 082326Z Jun 62 (S)

JCS 5461 DTG 271556Z Jul 62 (S)



movement commenced 12 hours after receipt of the directive and the last plane departed Udorn 69 hours after initiation of the move. The last shipload of equipment and supplies departed Bangkok on 11 August. In summary, the withdrawal of the Marines during the two phases involved moving 2967 personnel, 576 vehicles, and 4737 short tons of cargo. The total lift required 207 transport aircraft sorties, 221 railroad cars, and eight ships.

The departure of the Marines aroused Thai uneasiness that other withdrawals might follow, a feeling that the RTG officials made plain to the Ambassador. As a result, the Ambassador recommended to CINCPAC that the U.S. retain some allied combat elements in Thailand in the immediate future, and that the battle group that was still there be replaced by another for training purposes. 1 CINCUSARPAC had recommended to CINCPAC during June that another unit from the 25th Infantry Division replace the 1st Battle Group, 27th Infantry, if the requirement for U.S. troops in Thailand extended over a prolonged period. 2

In response to a JCS request for CINCPAC's recommendations with respect to the military desirability of keeping the battle group in Thailand after mid-August, CINCPAC replied that the situation had changed since May and that there was no longer a military need for keeping the troops there. Since the battle group had been in Thailand three and a half months, CINCPAC believed it had derived the maximum training and familiarization benefits from such a tour. Since the rainy season would reduce mobility until October, he recommended that the battle group be withdrawn without relief, and that another BG be sent to Thailand late in October for a month's training. Additional units could gain training experience during a SEATO exercise scheduled for March 1963. Such a training program, CINCPAC explained, would not suggest that the U.S. favored a standing U.S. or SEATO force in Southeast Asia, nor would it suggest to the Thais that U.S. combat troops would always be available.



Bangkok 167 to State, 9PM 28 Jul 62 (S) CINCUSARPAC 190317 Z Jun 62 (S) CINCPAC 280215 Z Jul 62 (S)



The U.S. Ambassador to Thailand was concerned about the strain on the civilian economy caused by a large number of Americans in the country. The withdrawal of the Marine units had made possible the introduction of a corresponding number of engineer troops to commence a logistical improvement program intended to strengthen the joint overall military capability.

For political reasons the 1st BG, 27th Infantry was replaced by another BG of the 25th Infantry Division, with the rotation beginning on 20 August as directed by the JCS on 11 August. The same MATS jet aircraft that carried members of the 1st BG, 25th Infantry from Hawaii to Thailand returned with personnel of the 27th Infantry. Equipment was transferred laterally in place. The transfer involved moving 1,374 personnel from Hawaii to Thailand and 1190 in the opposite direction. The move was completed on 4 September. ³ The question of withdrawing U.S. combat troops from Thailand was not discussed seriously with the Thais until a 15 October meeting attended by Prime Minister Sarit, U.S. Ambassador Young, and Admiral Felt. the departure of the Marines, Sarit had changed his thinking and in October he was concerned about criticism that Thailand was becoming an "occupied country". Although a little sensitive about the criticism, Sarit explained that he was prepared to "endure the stigma" for a while longer. At this point, Admiral Felt proposed that the U.S. withdraw 200 cavalry personnel and introduce an additional 200 SeaBees, a proposal that immediately met the approval of the Prime Minister, who explained that the RTG was concerned only with the presence of U.S. combat troops as distinct from military construction units. (SECRET)

CINCPAC immediately directed CINCPACFLT to get the SeaBees on Okinawa underway as soon as possible, and told CINCUSARPAC to prepare to return the armored cavalry troops and the APC platoon to

2. JCS 111941Z Aug 62 (S)

3. CINCUSARPAC 050327 Z Sep 62 (U)

^{1.} Bangkok to CINCPAC DTG 300345Z Jun 62 (S)

^{4.} Bangkok 693 to State DTG 151200Z, 9PM 15 Oct 62 (S)

their home stations. 1 Two days later, after CINCPAC noticed that a Bangkok newspaper had quoted Sarit to the effect that American troops would be withdrawn at an unspecified date, CINCPAC sent a message directing his staff to commence making preparations to move the troops. 2

Final agreement was reached on 5 November when the Ambassador and Thai officials agreed to a withdrawal of the battle group by 1 December. By 9 November CINCPAC had received JCS and State Department approval of his movement plan, and he issued detailed instructions to CINCUSARPAC and COMUSMACTHAI on 10 November. 4,5,6 First elements of the 1st Battle Group, 35th Infantry departed Korat on 26 November; the move to Hawaii was completed on 5 December. 7,8 Joint Task Force 116 closed its operations in Thailand on 8 December. (SECRET)

On the question of the tactical fighter squadron in Thailand, CINCPAC expressed to the JCS his strong position in favor of keeping the squadron in place. 10

^{1.} CINCPAC 150715Z Oct 62 (C)

^{2.} CINCPAC 170415Z Oct 62 (TS)

^{3.} Bangkok to State, DTG 051125Z Nov 62 (S)

^{4.} State 796 to Bangkok, 9PM 9 Nov 62 (S)

^{5.} JCS 7322 DTG 092208Z Nov 62 (S)

^{6.} CINCPAC 100202Z Nov 62 (S)

^{7.} CINCPAC 280102Z Nov 62 (C)

^{8.} CINCPAC 051025Z Dec 62 (U)

^{9.} CJTF 116 281030Z Nov 62 (U)

^{10.} CINCPAC 082320Z Dec 62 (S)

APPENDIX A

Visits to CINCPAC by U.S. Civil and Military Officials

U.S. DISTINGUISHED VISISTORS

Secretary of State (The Hon Dean Rusk and Mrs Rusk)
Asst Secretary of Defense, ISA (The Hon Paul H. Nitze and
Mrs. Nitze)
plus party of 20. 11 May 1962.

Secretary of Defense (The Hon Robert S. McNamara)
Chairman of the JCS (Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer)
Director, Bureau of Intelligence & Research (The Hon Roger
Hilsman)
U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam (The Hon Frederick E. Nolting, Jr.)
Dep Asst Secretary of Defense (William P. Bundy)
plus party of 18. 14-15 January 1962.

Secretary of Defense (The Hon Robert S. McNamara)
Chairman of the JCS (Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer)
Asst Secretary of Defense, ISA (The Hon Paul H. Nitze)
Asst Secretary of State (The Hon Averell Harriman)
Asst Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (The Hon Arthur Sylvester)
Vice Dir, Joint Staff, JCS (RAdm Joseph H. Wellings, USN)
plus party of 24. 18-19 February 1962.

Secretary of Defense (The Hon Robert S. McNamara)
Chairman of the JCS (Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer)
Chief of Staff U.S. Army (Gen George H. Decker)
Asst Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (The Hon Arthur Sylvester)
U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam (The Hon Frederick E. Nolting, Jr.)
Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command (Vietnam) (Gen Paul D. Harkins)
Dep Asst Secretary of Defense (William P. Bundy)
plus party of 9. 21 March 1962

Secretary of Defense (The Hon Robert S. McNamara)
Asst Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (The Hon Arthur Sylvester)
Dir Joint Staff JCS (VAdm Herbert D. Riley, USN)
Dep Asst Secretary of Defense (William P. Bundy)
Spec Asst to Dir for Counter Insurgency & Special Activities in JCS (MGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC)
Dep Asst Secretary of State (Sterling J. Cottrell)
plus party of 26. 22-23 July 1962.

UNCLASSIFIED

- Secretary of Defense (The Hon Robert S. McNamara)
 Chairman of JCS (Gen Maxwell D. Taylor)
 Asst Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (The Hon Arthur Sylvester)
 Asst Secretary of State (The Hon Averell Harriman)
 Dir Joint Staff JCS (VAdm Herbert D. Riley, USN)
 Dep Asst Secretary of Defense (William P. Bundy)
 Dep Asst Secretary of State (Sterling J. Cottrell)
 Spec Asst to Dir for.Counter Insurgency & Special Activities in JCS (MGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC)
 plus party of 34. 7-8 October 1962.
- Attorney General of the United States (The Hon Robert F. Kennedy and Mrs. Kennedy)
 plus party of 3. 2-3 February 1962.
- Secretary of the Army (The Hon Elvis J. Stahr, Jr.)

 Dep Dir, Defense Intelligence Agency, OSD (LGen W. W. Quinn and Mrs. Quinn)

 plus party of 4. 6-7 April 1962.
- Secretary of the Air Force (The Hon Eugene M. Zuckert)
 Dep C/S Operations, Hq USAF (LGen G. P. Disosway, USAF)
 Dir of Operational Rqmts, Hq USAF (MGen W. W. Momyer, USAF)
 plus party of 6. 19-21 December 1962.
- Director Defense Research & Engineering (Dr. Harold Brown and Mrs. Brown)

 Under Secretary of the Air Force (The Hon Dr. Joseph V. Charyk)

 Dep Dir Def R&E Admin & Mgt (VAdm C. B. Martell, USN)

 Dep Dir Def R&E Research & Info Systems (Dr. Eugene G. Fubini and Mrs. Fubini)

 Dir of Advanced Research Projects Agency (Dr. Jack P. Ruina)

 plus party of 3. 17-19 June and 20-23 June 1962.
- Director Defense Research & Engineering (Dr. Harold Brown and Mrs. Brown)
 Asst Dir of Defense R&E (BGen Paul T. Cooper)
 plus party of 4. 3 October 1962.
- Chairman JCS (Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer and Mrs. Lemnitzer) plus party of 8. 19-22 March 1962.
- Chairman JCS (Desig)(Gen Maxwell D. Taylor)
 plus party of 7. 31 August-2 September and 19-20 September 1962.
- Chief of Staff U.S. Army (Gen George H. Decker)
 Dir Joint Staff JCS (VAdm Herbert D. Riley, USN)
 plus 1. 10-11 June and 16-17 June 1962.

- Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force (Gen Curtis E. LeMay)
 Inspector General USAF (LGen William H. Blanchard, USAF)
 Air Force Aide to President (BGen Godfrey T. McHugh, USAF)
 Chairman Inter-Agency Task Force in VN (Mr. Sterling J. Cottrell)
 Director of Telecommunications (MGen John B. Bestic, USAF)
 plus party of 7. 16-17 April and 20-21 April 1962.
- Chief of Naval Operations (Adm George W. Anderson and Mrs. Anderson) plus party of 2. 22-24 July 1962.
- Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (Gen David M. Shoup)
 Dir of U.S. Marine Corps Education Center (MGen Robert K.
 Rottet, USMC)
 Asst Div Comdr Third Mar Div (Desig) (BGen John H. Masters, USMC)
 plus party of 11. 18-19 September and 1-2 October 1962.
- Director of Central Intelligence Agency (Mr. John A. McCone)
 Dep Dir for Plans (Mr. Richard Helms)
 plus party of 4. 15 June 1962.
- AID Administrator (Mr. David E. Bell) plus party of 2. 26-27 December 1962.
- Asst Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (The Hon W. Averell Harriman and Mrs. Harriman) plus 1. 5-7 March 1962.
- Asst Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (The Hon Arthur Sylvester) 22-23 July 1962.
- President's Special Representative for African, Asian, & Latin American Affairs (The Hon Chester Bowles and Mrs. Bowles) plus party of 3. 17 March 1962.
- American Ambassadors to -

Australia (The Hon William C. Battle) 4-9 July 1962. Burma (The Hon John Scott Everton) 28 February-1 March 1962. Cambodia (The Hon Philip Dodson) 22-24 July 1962.

(The Hon William C. Trimble) 8 June 1962. (Departing)

China (The Hon Alan G. Kirk) 28-30 June 1962.

(The Hon Everett F. Drumright) 10-20 March 1962. (Departing) India (The Hon Kenneth J. Galbraith) 28 Jan - 16 February 1962. Indonesia (The Hon Howard P. Jones) 31 October - 3 November 1962. Korea (The Hon Samuel D. Berger) 17-18 August 1962. Laos (The Hon Winthrop G. Brown) 30 June-8 July 1962. (Departing) Philippines (The Hon William W. Stevenson) 30-31 January 1962 and 11 September 1962.

Republic of Vietnam (The Hon Frederick E. Nolting, Jr.)

4 January 1962, 14-17 January 1962, 18-20 February 1962,
20-22 March 1962, 22-24 July 1962, and 6-7 October 1962.
Thailand (The Hon Kenneth T. Young) 22-24 July 1962.

- Former Secretary of State (The Hon Dean Acheson and Mrs. Acheson)
 8 January and 6 February 1962.
- Former Under Secretary of State (The Hon Robert Murphy) 9-10 October 1962.
- Member President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (The Hon Gordon Gray)
 plus party of 4. 29-31 July 1962.
- Under Secretary of the Navy (The Hon Paul B. Fay, Jr., and Mrs. Fay) plus 1. 6-8 June and 6-7 July 1962.
- Director, Bureau of Intelligence & Research Dept of State (Mr. Roger Hilsman)
 plus 1. 28-30 December 1962.
- Asst Secretary of the Air Force (The Hon Dr. Brockway McMillan) 14-15 June 1962.
- Asst to the Secretary of Defense on Atomic Energy, Chairman Military Liaison Committee (Dr. W. Johnson) 16-19 May and 23 May 1962.
- Director, National Security Agency (VAdm L. H. Frost, USN) plus party of 4. 12-15 April and 2-4 May 1962.
- Dep Asst Secretary of Defense, ISA (Mr. William P. Bundy) plus party of 4. 16-17 February and 2 March 1962.
- Dep Asst Secretary of Defense, ISA (Mr. Hayden Williams) plus party of 1. 4-7 March 1962.
- Dep Asst Secretary of Defense for Education and Manpower (Mr. Edward L. Katzenbach) plus 1. 14 August and 28-31 August 1962.
- Director of Advanced Research Projects Agency (Dr. Jack P. Ruina)
 Dep Asst Secretary of Air Force (R&D) (Mr. F. J. Ross)
 plus 1. 10-11 April 1962.
- Deputy Director Research & Engineering (Engineering & Chemistry) (Dr. James H. Gardner) 9-10 December 1962.
- Deputy Dir for NMCS, DCA (MGen J. B. Bestic, USAF)

 Dep Dir Def R&E Research & Info Systems (Dr. Eugene G. Fubini)

 Spec Asst of DDR&E for Comd & Control (Dr. R. C. Prim III)

 plus party of 10. 15-16 December 1962
- Chief Judge, COMA (The Hon Robert E. Quinn and Mrs. Quinn)
 Commissioner, COMA (Mr. Daniel E. Carney)
 plus party of 4. 15-20 August 1962.
- Member White House Staff (Mr. Michael V. Forrestal) 26-28 December 1962.
- National Commander of the American Legion (Mr. James E. Powers)
 22-29 December 1962.

CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS

- Mbr Senate Appropriations Cmte. 19-21 November and 19-20 December 1962.

 Sen Gale W. McGee (D-Wyo)
- Mbr Senate Interior/Insular Affairs Cmte. 19-21 November and 19-20 December 1962.

 Sen Frank E. Moss (D-Utah)
- Mbr Senate Foreign Relations, Interior/Insular Affairs Cmtes and Special Cmte on Aging. 19-21 November 1962 and 19-20 December 1962.

 Sen Frank Church (D-Idaho)
- Mbr House Armed Services Cmte. 20 November 6 December 1962. Sen (Elect) Daniel B. Brewster (D-Md) and Mrs. Brewster
- Mbr Senate Armed Services Cmte. 25-27 November 1962 Sen E. L. Bartlett (D-Alaska)
- Mbr Senate Cmte on Appropriations. 26 November 1962 and 8-10 December 1962.

 Sen Roman L. Hruska (R-Nev)
- Mbr Armed Services Cmte, Govt Operations Cmte, Interior/Insular Affairs Cmte, and Joint Cmte on Atomic Energy. 30 November 5 December and 13-16 December 1962. Sen Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash)
- Foreign Policy Mission. 13-17 December 1962.

Sen Mike Mansfield (D-Mont)

Sen Claiborne Pell (D-RI)

Sen Benjamin A. Smith, II (D-Mass)

Sen J. Caleb Boggs (R-Del)

Sen (Elect) Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii)

Mr. H. H. Ford, Dep Asst Sec State for Ops (State Dept Escort)

Mr. F. R. Valeo, Admin Asst to Sen Mansfield

Mr. F. E. Meloy, Jr., Dir, Off of Western European Affairs State Dept

BGen C. R. Roderick, USA, Dep Asst to Asst SecDef for Legislative Affairs

- Mbr Joint Cmte on Atomic Energy. 24-26 April and 28 April 1962. Rep Craig Hosmer (R-Calif)
- Mbr House Appropriations Cmte. 21-25 August 1962. Rep Daniel J. Flood (D-Pa)

Rep Phil Weaver (R-Nebr)

Rep T. Dale Alford (D-Ark)

UNCLASSIFIED

Mbr Armed Services Cmte. 21-25 August 1962. Rep Alexander Pirnie (R-NY) Mr. James R. Ray, Professional Staff Mbr Lt Col W. D. Lynch, DA Rep & Escort Officer 2nd Lt B. R. Pirnie, USA, Son of Rep Pirnie

Mbr House Cmte on Armed Services. 9-16 November and 14 December 1962.

Rep Jeffery Cohelan (D-Calif)
Lt Col Winchester Kelso, Jr., DA Rep

Navy Marine Company (Reserve Composite). 10-11 November and 24-25 November 1962.

Rep Williard S. Mailliard (R-Calif)

Rep Henry C. Schadeberg (R-Wisc)

Rep Charles E. Chamberlain (R-Mich)

Rep John P. Saylor (R-Penn)

plus 36 others

Army Congressional Command & Operations Group. 26-28 November and 9 December 1962.

Rep William G. Bray (R-Ind)

Rep Hastings Keith (R-Mass)

Rep Alexander Pirnie (R-NY)

Rep G. B. Purcell (D-Tex)

Rep Benjamin Reifel (R-SD)

Rep Clark MacGregor (R-Minn)

Rep J. Edward Roush (D-Ind)

Mbr House Appropriations Sub-Cmte. 30 November 1962.

Rep Frank T. Bow (R-Ohio)

William R. Little, Escort Officer

Mbr House Cmte on Labor and Education. 30 November - 3 December and 22 December 1962.

Rep John H. Dent (D-Pa)

Mbr House Cmte on Labor and Education. 2-3 December 1962. Rep Robert N. Giaimo (D-Conn) Mr. Howard Gamser, State Dept Rep

Mbr House Interstate & Foreign Commerce Cmte. 5-8 December 1962. Rep Dan Rostenkowski (D-III)

Mbr House Interstate & Foreign Commerce Cmte. 8 December 1962. Rep Torbert H. MacDonald (D-Mass)

Mbr Judiciary & Veterans Cmte. 5-12 December 1962. Rep Roland V. Libonati (D-III)

Mbr House Appropriations Cmte. 5-10 December 1962. Rep John M. Slack, Jr (D-WV) Mr. George E. Urian, Professional Staff Mbr Lt Col Lynch, DA Rep

APPENDIX B

Visits by Representatives of Foreign Countries

The following indicative listing shows the countries and some of their distinguished representatives who visited CINCPAC in 1962.

AUSTR	ALIA
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- His Excellency Robert G. Menzies, Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs plus party of five. 22 June 1962.
- Hon Howard Beale, Australian Ambassador to the United States. 11 May and 17-19 October 1962.
- Hon Garfield Barwick, Minister of External Affairs and Mrs. Barwick. 8-9 September 1962.
- Vice Admiral Sir Roy Dowling, Secretary to Queen for H. M. visit to Australia and Lady Dowling. 18 July and 15-17 August 1962.
- MGen J. G. N. Wilton, Chief of Australian Army (Desig). 7-9 September 1962.

CHINA

- Gen 1st Class Yu Ta-wei, CNA, Minister of National Defense and Mrs. Yu Ta-wei 9 March 1962.
- Gen 1st Class Wang Shu-Ming, CNAF, GRC Delegate to UN Military Staff Committee, plus 1. December 1962.

INDONESIA

- His Excellency Dr. Subandrio, Minister of Foreign Affairs. LtGen Hidajat Minister/Deputy Minister of Defense plus party of 5. 18 July 1962.
- The Hon Malik, Indonesian Ambassador to Russia plus party of 2. 11 July 1962.

GERMANY

The Hon Herbert Dittman, German Ambassador to Japan. 12-14 February 1962.

JAPAN

His Excellency Masayoshi Ohira, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
His Excellency Kakuei Tanaka, Minister of Finance.

UNCLASSIFIED

JAPAN
(CONTINUED)

His Excellency Seishi Shigemasa, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry.
His Excellency Hajime Fukuda, Minister of International Trade and Industry
Mr. Kiichi Miyazawa, President of Economic Planning Agency.
His Excellency Takeo Ohashi, Minister of International Trade and Industry.
29 November 1962.

The Hon Muneo Toga, Administrative Vice Minister of Defense, JDA plus party of 2. 29 July and 11-13 August 1962.

The Hon Kenjiro Shiga, Director General, Japanese Defense Agency.
Mr. Osamu Kaihara, Director Defense Bureau plus party of 3. 8 November and 23-25 November 1962.

His Excellency Eisaku Sato, Minister of Trade and Industry. 29-31 October 1962.

Gen Keizo Hayashi, GSDF, Chairman, Joint Staff Council, JDA plus party of 6. 19 January and 4-7 February 1962.

VAdm Sadayoshi Nakayama, MSDF, Chief of Maritime Staff, MSO plus 1. 23 April and 7-10 May 1962.

KOREA

Gen Chong Oh Kim, Chief of Staff ROKA plus party of 4. 17-20 September and 20-23 November 1962.

Mr. Jong Pil Kim, ROK CIA Director. 7-9 November 1962.

LIBYA

The Hon Yunes Belkhair, Minister of Defense, plus party of 2. 12-14 June 1962.

MEXICO

His Excellency Aldolpho Lopez Mateos, President of Mexico plus party of 50. 3-4 October and 23-24 October 1962.

NEW ZEALAND

His Excellency Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister The Hon J. R. Marshall, Deputy Prime Minister The Hon A. D. McIntosh, Secretary of External Affairs. Plus party of 2. 2 September 1962.

NEW ZEALAND (CONTINUED)

- The Hon Thomas Shand, New Zealand Cabinet Member and Minister of Labor. 22 May 1962.
- The Hon Duncan McIntyre, Member of Parliament and Former Army Brigadier Associate Member Army Board. 17-20 June 1962.
- The Hon Walter Nash, Member of Parliament and Leader of Opposition. 1 September 1962.
- His Excellency George Robert Laking, Ambassador to the U.S. 11 May 1962.

PHILIPPINES

- The Hon Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Philippines. 20 June and 28 June 1962.
- The Hon Amelito R. Mutuc, Philippine Ambassador to the U.S. (Desig) 7-8 September 1962.

THAILAND

- His Excellency Khoman Thanat, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mrs. Thanat.
 Lt Gen Wallop Rochanavisutr, J2 Thailand Army.
 plus 1. 7 March 1962.
- His Excellency Khoman Thanat, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mrs. Thanat. plus 1. 20 September 1962.
- Lt Gen B. Busrindre, Director Royal Thailand Survey Department. 3-8 May and 22-24 May 1962.
- Lt Gen Rajanawisut Wallop, J2 Royal Thailand Armed Forces. 4-8 May 1962.
- MGen Menasuta Singchai, Deputy Director Joint Planning and Policy, Director CDTC plus party of 4. 16 September and 16 November 1962.

UNITED KINGDOM

- His Royal Highness Duke of Edinburgh, British Embassy, Wash D. C. 18-19 November 1962.
- Admiral Sir Casper John, G. C. B. First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, RN and Lady John. plus party of 3. 20-22 February 1962.
- Mr. R. G. K. Thompson, Head of British Advisory Mission, VN. 30 March - 1 April 1962.

UNCLASSIFIED

VIETNAM

His Excellency Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Secretary of State for Presidency and Asst Secretary of State for National Defense. plus party of 4. 15 Sepetember 1962.

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
1 January 1954 - 31 December 1962

Introduction 1945-1954

The eighteen months following the surrender of Japan was the period of French reconquest of Indo-China. With English military help and U.S. tacit approval, the French first retook Southern Vietnam by force. In the north, a new government led by Ho Chi Minh got control of administration in North Vietnam, taking it without a fight from the defeated Japanese. The military weakness of Ho Chi Minh's government and the political weakness of his communist party led him to postpone a showdown with the French. Serious fighting didn't commence until 19 December 1946 when the tightening grip of the French threatened the communists.

The eight year war came to be regarded as war between world communism and democracy. It placed the U.S. in the awkward position of supporting colonialism and opposing a people's fight for freedom.

During 1947 and 1950, while France was losing battles in the North, the U.S. and France carried on negotiations with Vietnamese leaders—Bao Dai, Ngo Dinh Diem and others—for a non-communist government in South Vietnam. Early in 1950 communist countries recognized the DRV. Great Britain and the U.S. recognized the government headed by Bao Dai, and the U.S., on 8 May, announced its policy of giving aid to France for Indo-China war. However the U.S. failed to change French policy in Vietnam. France suffered severe military losses in 1950. On 6 December General De Lattre de Tassigny was appointed High Commissioner and commander of the 391,000 French troops. He succeeded in halting the communist advance until his death on 11 January 1952. Thereafter the French position deteriorated.

UNCLASSIFIED

1954

18 Feb The Big Four at Berlin agreed upon Geneva Conference on Korea & Indo-China to commence 26 April.

Mar-Apr Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

5 Mar Premier Laniel approved a truce if Viet Minh would evacuate Cambodia, Laos, the Tonkin Delta, & South Vietnam.

8 May Dien Bien Phu fell.

Diem appointed premier by pro-French and former Emperor Bao Dai. Diem had been in U.S. the four preceding years.

29 Jun French began evacuation of Red River ports.

21 Jul Geneva Agreements signed.

16 Sep France turned over to Diem control of police, justice and security departments, public utilities and civil aviation.

25 Sep Diem reorganized cabinet, included Cao Dai & Hoa Hao leaders.

24 Oct President Eisenhower's letter to Premier Diem published in Saigon. Letter promised American aid would be given directly to Government of South Vietnam, but U.S. "expects this aid will be met by . . . undertaking needed reforms."

Nov General Collins, President Eisenhower's special Ambassador to SVN, arrived in South Vietnam to strengthen Diem's position. U.S. aid enabled Diem's government to commence large scale program for resettlement of 900,000 refugees from the north.

1955

11 Feb Diem succeeded in taking control of the Vietnamese armed forces from the French.

12 Feb U.S. General John W. O'Daniel (chief of U.S. mission to South Vietnam) took over responsibility for training South Vietnamese Army.

Feb Several clashes occurred between the SVN Army and members of the Hoa Hao Sect.

l Mar U.S. Secretary of State Dulles arrived in Saigon.

In the name of a "National Front" of the sects and other dissident groups, the Binh Xuyen attacked the national government by firing at presidential palace. The National GVN Army reacted vigorously. The French interfered, and with Ambassador Collins' support, imposed an armistice on the GVN.

UNCLASSIFIED

1955 contd

- 17 Apr GVN appealed to UN because of DRV's refusal to let northerners migrate to South Vietnam, as provided by Geneva Agreements.
- A showdown occurred between Bao Dai and Ngo Dinh Diem.
 Bao Dai ordered Diem to go to France. Diem refused, and supported by a Revolutionary Committee that mobilized support of his government, resumed struggle to oust the Binh Xuyen. He demanded removal of Bao Dai as Chief of State and the withdrawal of all French troops.
- 9-11 May Discussions between Premier Faure and Secretary Dulles resulted in withdrawal of French troops from Saigon-Cholon area toward the coast.
- May Diem's government decisively defeated the Binh Xuyen. This placed the Saigon police, which had been controlled by the Binh Xuyen for many years, firmly in the hands of Diem and the Army. The U.S. Government and press were becoming impressed by Diem's staying power.
- 6 Jun Vietminh government demanded talks, in accordance with Geneva Agreements, to prepare the elections in July 1956 to unify Vietnam.
- Diem declared that South Vietnam, which did not sign the Geneva Agreements, would not participate in general elections unless assured that the elections would be genuinely free in the North as well as in the South.
- 20 Jul & South Vietnam again rejected North Vietnam's invitation to discuss elections.
- 23 Oct Referendum deposed Bao Dai (former emperor and head of state of Vietnam since 7 Mar 49).
- 26 Oct Diem, as President, proclaimed South Vietnam a republic.

1956

- North Vietnam asked for a new meeting of the participants in the Geneva Conference, complained that South Vietnam refused to participate in all-Vietnam elections.
- 4 Mar General elections for RVN's first National Assembly resulted in victory for supporters of Diem.
- 26 Oct RVN received a constitution.
- Nov Land reform program in RVN received a new impetus through an October decree that was aimed at breaking up large land-holdings created during the colonial period.

SECRET

1957	
Jan	U.S. aid to SVN was approximately a half billion dollars during 1955 and 1956, of which two thirds was to build up and maintain the armed forces. No French troops remained in Vietnam. (U)
3 Jan	International Control Commission reported neither North nor South Vietnam was fulfilling 1954 agreements. (U)
9 May	Legal deadline expired for Chinese persons born in Vietnam to exchange Chinese citizenship papers for Vietnamese citizenship cards. (U)
25 Oct	USSR vetoed resolution to admit South Vietnam to UN. (U)
1958	
7 Mar	North Vietnam proposed conference on reduction of respective armed forces. (U)
16 Mar	South Vietnam rejected the proposal. (U)
9 May	Diem distributed land to landless farmers. Approximately 35 percent of tenants became land owners. (U)
10 Sep	France and GVN signed agreement providing for France to provide 1.5 billion francs to help the GVN purchase Frenchowned rice lands in RVN. (U)
26 Dec	North Vietnam official proposed in letter to President Diem that the two governments discuss limitation of military commitments and establishment of commercial and other exchanges. (U)
1959	
30 Aug	General elections. About 120 of 123 members elected were supporters of Diem. (U)
Oct	Guerrilla activity was on the rise. (U)
1960	
27 Apr	CINCPAC submitted study on combatting insurgency in RVN and recommended a RVN national emergency organization and a coordinated national plan.
2 May	CHMAAG authorized to detail advisors to armored, artillery and separate marine battalions level.
5 May	U.S. announced military assistance would be increased at request of GVN. (U)
30 May	U.S. Special Forces teams arrived in RVN to conduct training. (U)

1960 contd

- 30 Jun CINCPAC submitted Draft Plan for Counterinsurgency Operations by Government of South Vietnam. (U)
- Diem warned National Assembly that GVN faced long struggle.against communist imperialism. (U)
- Oct CHMAAG and CINCPAC attempted to obtain American Embassy concurrence for 20,000 increase in RVNAF.
- 25 Oct President Eisenhower assurred Diem that "for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead." (U)
- 11 Nov Attempted coup by rebel paratroopers who laid siege to Diem's palace failed after arrival in Saigon of troops loyal to Diem. Communists were unable to exploit the situation.(U)
- 16 Nov Diem's Brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, announced plans to appoint a new government and introduce a far-reaching reform program based on reports of the Ford Foundation and a French Study group. (U)
- 22 Nov Diem decree transferred Civil Guard from Interior to Defense and attached Self Defense Corps to Director General of Civil Guard. (U)

1961

- 31 Jan CHMAAG Vietnam authorized to detail advisors down to all battalion headquarters and to command posts at lower level when required.
- 6 Feb Diem announced an administrative reform program. (U)
- l Mar Final U.S. approval of C-I Plan and directive sent to Ambassador.
- 10 Mar Communists announced newly formed National Front for the Liberation of SVN. New guerrilla offensive announced. Purpose was to prevent 1961 elections. (U)
- 24 Mar GVN ordered all enlisted reserves into active service by 16 April. (U)
- 4 Apr Diem appealed to the ICC to make an "immediate and energetic investigation" of growing communist terrorism and subversion in RVN. (U)
- 7 Apr U.S. State Dept declared U.S. "is determined to continue strong support of the GVN." (U)

1961 contd

- 9 Apr Diem reelected for five year term. (U)
- President Kennedy at press conference declared that consideration was being given to the use of U.S. forces, if necessary, to help RVN. (U)
- 10 May Ambassador Nolting presented credentials. (U)
- 12 May VP Johnson met with Diem who did not want U.S. combat troops but desired increase in MAAG.
- 13 May Additional U.S. military and economic aid announced by joint communique. (U)
- 20 May U.S. Presidential Program sent to CINCPAC. Contained 30 separate projects. Up to this time, MAAG had been held to strength of 685.
- May Border patrol became major study problem.

 Sqd of 25 AD-6 acft delivered to RVN.

 MAAG commenced training SDC as well as CG.
- 19 Jun Crash program to bolster the internal security of RVN agreed upon between GVN and U.S. group of financial, economic, and military experts. (U)
- Jul Civic Action Mobile Training Team went to work in RVN.
- 2 Aug GVN ordered all men between 25 and 35 to report for military duty. (U)

 Montagnard relief program approved.
- 8 Aug GVN extened tour of compulsory military service by six months. (U)
- Aug-Sep Increase in guerrilla activity. GVN ordered all men between 25 and 35 to military duty and extended compulsory military service. (U)
- 11 Aug Increase of RVNAF up to 200,000 authorized.
- 25 Sep President Kennedy before UN General Assembly said that "the smoldering coals of war in SEAsia" are a threat to peace. (U)
- Adm Felt, at SEATO meeting in Bangkok, said there was no immediate prospect of using U.S. troops to stop communist advance in SEAsia, but indicated that among the plans evolved for "every eventuality" some called for the use of U.S. troops. (U)
- 18 Oct General Taylor arrived Saigon. CINCPAC sent his views on additional actions required to JCS.

1961	conto	i
19 Oc	t	\mathbf{Di}

19 Oct Diem proclaimed state of emergency. (U)

- 24 Oct GVN made formal charges of aggression against North Vietnam and demanded ICC carry out investigation of leading role of North Vietnamese authorities in direct aggression aimed at conquering the South. (U)
- 26 Oct Sixth Anniversary of RVN. Diem asked for new impulse to a rapid transformation of economic and social structure of Vietnam through respect for human beings, community development and collective progress. (U)
- Oct By end of this month, mobile search and height finder radars and supporting communications were operating at Tan Son Nhut.
- 4 Nov British note to USSR proposed joint British-Soviet appeal to DRV to end its subversive activities in RVN. (U)
- 8 Nov CHMAAG submitted plan for using Rangers on border patrol.
- 16 Nov President of U.S. announced decision to bolster RVN strength but not to commit U.S. combat forces. (U)
- 17 Nov Sec. of State Rusk called on ICC to look into the "determined and ruthless" communist campaign to overthrow the GVN. (U)
- 20 Nov Discussions commenced between U.S. and Diem on actions by both govts to implement General Taylor's recommendations for reforms in Diem's administration. (U)
- 7 Dec Intelligence Plan approved.
- 11 Dec First contingent of U.S. military personnel 400 Army personnel with two helicopter companies arrived in SVN. (U)
- 12 Dec ICC, in emergency session since arrival in Saigon of 33 helos, considered dissolving Committee in view of U.S. help to SVN. (U)
- 16 Dec At SECDEF Conference, CHMAAG estimated that one fourth of RVN population supported communists and that another one fourth was on the fence. The Secretary of Defense stated that Jungle Jim (already in place) was cleared to operate. (S)
- Dec Diem was not enthusiastic about outline plan for systematic action against VC because he was still reluctant to delegate much authority and control of forces to his commanders.

 MAAG authorized strength at end of year was over 4,000.

 Army fixed wing company and headquarters, signal and maintenance units were in place.

1962	
3 Jan	Sixteen C-123 aircraft were made available for combat airlift support in RVN. (Operation Mule Train)
4 Jan	Joint U.SRVN communique announced "broad economic and social program (to raise living standards), an intensification and expansion of efforts already made for the same purpose during the last two years Measures to strengthen South Vietnam's defense in the Military field are being taken simultaneously." (U)
8 Jan	Inauguration of National Economic Council to advise GVN. (U)
9 Jan	Announcement of increase in RVN Army from 170,000 to 200,000. (U)
10 Jan	USSR accused U.S. of gross interference. (U)
15 Jan	Two more U.S. Helo companies arrived in RVN. (U)
Jan	Press reported military activities against VC picking up. (U)
3 Feb	Diem officially launched Strategic Hamlet Program. (U)
8 Feb	COMUSMACV activated. (U)
13 Feb	General Paul D. Harkins arrived in Saigon as COMUSMACV
19 Feb	SECDEF McNamara pointed out in press statement that struggle was not full-scale warfare but was guerrilla warfare. (U)
24 Feb	Peiping Radio broadcasted demands for withdrawal of U.S. personnel and equipment saying that danger of war in SVN was serious. This was followed up two days later by Zorin saying at a press conference that Americans were getting bogged down. (U)
27 Feb	Two planes piloted by officers of the VNAF bombed and strafed Presidential Palace. (U)
l7 Mar	Tass published Soviet Ministry Note to signatories of 1954 Geneva Agreements complaining about intravention of the Agreements and demanded "normalization of the situation".
22 Mar	(U) First clear and hold operation got underway in Binh Duong Province. (U)
27 Mar	Rules of Engagement issued for engaging and destroying hostile acft which might appear over RVN.
2 Apr	GVN signed agreement with ESSO for building oil refinery. Communique stated new refinery would permit GVN to save \$2.5 million in foreign currencies. (U)

1	9	62	contd

- 15 Apr U.S. Marine unit of 400 men landed with 16 helicopters below Mekong Delta in RVN. (U)
- Britain rejected the Soviet proposal that Britain and the USSR jointly, as co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference, call on U.S. to stop intervening in RVN. Britain asked the USSR to join in appeal to North Vietnamese to desist from subversive activities in RVN. (U)
- 20 Apr National Assembly pledged support to Diem's strategic hamlet plan. (U)
- Apr' A month of GVN military successes. (U)
- May Canadian and Indian members of the ICC for Vietnam found North Vietnam guilty of subversion and covert aggression against RVN. Polish delegation rejected the charge. (U)
- 25 May CINCPAC requested additional C-123, this was approved and CINCPACAF deployed the 777th TCS, making a total of 36 C-123s in RVN.
- In North Vietnam the Committee of the National Liberation Front for RVN ordered intensified attacks against strategic hamlets of RVN.
- 17 Jul National Liberation Front for RVN took a political tack by calling for neutralization of SVN. (U)
- 25 Jul COMUSMACV directed to take over CIDG training.
- U.S. announced that it would provide \$10 million for emergency projects to help refugees in the guerrilla war. (U) Press reported GVN improved promotion system for military officers. (U)
- Sep GVN successes forced Ho Chi Minh to change his timetable. In 1959, he had predicted defeat of GVN in 1 year; recently revised estimate of 15 to 20 years. (U)

 Main target of VC was the strategic hamlets.
- 28 Oct CINCPAC asked JCS for State Dept approval to discuss use of Chinese pilots in RVN.
- Nov Diem agreed to concept of nationwide operations plan. He reorganized the Armed Forces and command structure and finally delegated operational authority to General Ty and the other commanders.
- 19 Dec CINCPAC submitted to JCS his concept of National Campaign Plan for GVN.
- 31 Dec Secretary Rusk approved request to discuss use of Chinese Pilots in GVN.

Contract to the

1962 contd

End '62 Intensive program of training and equipping the RVNAF was well over the hump.

Tactical Air Control System and airlift system was improving.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ACTIV. Army Concept Team in Vietnam AC&W Aircraft Control and Warning ADMINO Administrative Officer ADP Automatic Data Processing A&E Architectural & Engineering AFAK Armed Forces Assistance to Korea AFB Air Force Base AID Agency for International Development AIG Address Indicator Group

AKL Light Cargo Ships AMEMB American Embassy

APC Armored Personnel Carrier ARPA

Advanced Research Projects Agency ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

ASD/ISA Assistant Secretary of Defense/International

Security Affairs

ASOC Air Support Operations Center ASP Annual Service Practice ASW

Anti-Submarine Warfare

В

BEQ Bachelor Enlisted Quarters BG Battle Group

BLT Battalion Landing Team

BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

BOQ Bachelor Officer Quarters BPD Basic Planning Document, MAP BPP Border Patrol Police (Thailand) BUDOCKS

Bureau of Docks

CA Civil Affairs

CAMTT Civil Affairs Mobile Training Team

CAS Controlled Américan Source

CBR Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare

CDTC Combat Development and Test Center

C-E Communications - Electronics CENTO Central Treaty Organization CG Civil Guard/Commanding General

CHICOM Chinese Communist

CHMAAG Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group

CHMPO Chief Military Planning Office CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CLAPAC Central Intelligence Agency Pacific CIDG Citizens Irregular Defense Group

	CINCARIB CINCLANT CINCPAC CINCPACAF CINCPACFLT CINCPACREP CINCSTRIKE CINCUNC CINCUSARPAC CJTF CMPS CNO COMCARDIV SEVEN COMSEVENTHFLT COMUSK COMUSMACTHAI COMUSMACV COMUSSEASIA CONUS CPX CRC CRP CVA CVS	Commander in Chief Caribbean Commander in Chief Atlantic Commander in Chief Pacific Commander in Chief Pacific Air Force Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander in Chief Pacific Representative Commander in Chief of the Strike Command Commander in Chief United Nations Command Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific Commander Joint Task Force Combined Military Planning Staff Chief of Naval Operations Commander Carrier Division Seven Commander Seventh Fleet Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Commander United States Southeast Asia Continental United States Command Post Exercise Control and Reporting Center Control and Reporting Center Control and Reporting Post/Combat Reporting Post Aircraft Carrier Attack Aircraft Carrier Support
	CY	Cold War/Chemical Warfare Calendar Year
		<u>D</u>
	DA	Department of the Army
	DACCCPAC	Defense Area Communications Control Center Pacific
-	DCA DCS DDR&E DEFCON DGZ DMZ DOD DPSC DRV DTG	Defense Communications Agency Pacific Defense Communications System Director, Defense Research & Engineering Defense Condition Desired Ground Zero Demilitarized Zone Department of Defense Defense Petroleum Supply Center Democratic Republic of North Vietnam Date Time Group

E

EAM Electronic Accounting Machine ECCOIL Eastern Construction Company in Laos ECCM Electronic Counter Counter Measures ECM Electronic Counter Measures **EMATS** Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System ERBM Extended Range Ballistic Missile **EUCOM** European Command EW Electronic Warfare

F

FAR Forces Armee du Royaume (Royal Armed Forces of Laos)

FARK Cambodian Army

FAC Forward Air Controller

FOCCPAC Fleet Operations Control Center Pacific FTX Field Training Exercise

G

GOJ Government of Japan
GRC Government of the Republic of China
GSDF Ground Self Defense Force (Japan)
GVN Government of the Republic of Vietnam

Ή

HAWK Homing-all-the-way-killer (Surface-to-air missile)

I

ICA International Cooperation Administration ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ITT International Telephone & Telegraph

.T

JASDF Japanese Air Self-Defense Force **JCSAN** Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network **JCSM** Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum JDA Japanese Defense Agency **JEPAP** Joint Emergency Personnel Augmentation Plan **JGSDF** Japanese Ground Self Defense Force JGS Joint General Staff (Vietnam) JOC Joint Operations Center JOEG-V Joint Operational Evaluation Group Vietnam JP Joint Pacific JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan **JSTPS** Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff JTD Joint Table of Distribution

J

JTF Joint Task Force
JTIG Joint Target Intelligence Group
JUSMAG Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group

L

LANTCOM
LPH
Loc
Loc
Loc
Log
LORAN-C
LST
Atlantic Command
Landing Platform Helicopter
Lines of Communication
Logistics
Navigational Systems Station
Tank Landing Ship

M

MA Military Assistance
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAG Marine Air Group
MAM Military Assistance Manual
MAP Military Assistance Program/Plan
MAPU Kellogg Multiple Address Processing Unit
MATP Military Assistance Training Program

MATP
Military Assistance Training Program
MATS
Military Air Transport Service
MEF
Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU
Marine Expeditionary Unit

MDC MAP Data Center

MICS Military Integrated Communications System
MILAD Military Advisor (To SEATO or ANZUS Council)

MILSTRIP Military Standard Requisitioning & Issue

Procedures

MPO Military Planning Office (SEATO)
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MSF Fleet Mine Sweeper

MSF Fleet Mine Sweeper
MTT Mobile Training Team

N

NAS Naval Air Station
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVCOSSACT Naval Command Systems Support Activity
NCO Noncommissioned Officer

NCO Noncommissioned Officer
NICP Naval Inventory Control Points

NIKE Naval Inventory Control Point NIKE Surface-to-air Missile

NORAD North American Air Defense Command

NSC Naval Supply Center
NUDETS Nuclear Detonations

NZ New Zealand

O

Selection for the facility

OASD/ISA Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense/ International Security Affairs OB Order of Battle **OPLANS** Operational Plans OSD Office of Secretary of Defense

PACAF Pacific Air Force PACOM Pacific Command PADGERC PACOM Air Defense, Ground Environment Requirements Committee

PC Patrol Craft PCE Patrol Craft Escort

PCS Permanent Change of Station

PEC PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center

PEO Programs Evaluation Office POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants **PSYOPS** Psychological Operations PSYWAR. Psychological Warfare

R

R&D Research and Development RB Reconnaissance Bomber RCT Regimental Combat Team RDT&E Research, Development, Test & Engineering RISOP Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan RKG Royal Cambodian Government RLAF Royal Laotian Air Force

RLG Royal Laotian Government RLT Regimental Landing Team ROK Republic of Korea ROKA

Republic of Korea Army ROKG Republic of Korea Government RTA

Royal Thailand Army RTAG Royal Thailand Air Force RTG Royal Thailand Government RVN

Republic of Vietnam

RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S

SAC Strategic Air Command SAM Surface to Air Missile SDC Self Defense Corps - RVN

SEAsia Southeast Asia SEAL Sea-Air-Land

SEATELCOM Southeast Asia Telecommunications SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

S

SECDEF Secretary of Defense SECSTATE Secretary of State SF Special Forces SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan. SLAT Special Logistic Actions Thailand SLBM Sea Launched Ballistic Missile SOFA Status of Forces Agreement SRG Systems Research Group STARCOM Strategic Army Communications System STATS SeaBee Technical Assistance Teams

T

TACS
Tactical Air Control System
TAPS
Tactical Air Positioning System
TCS
Troop Carrier Squadron
TD
Table of Distribution
TFS
Tactical Fighter Squadron
TO&E
Table of Organization and Equipment
TRTF
Tactical Reconnaissance Task Force

U

UDT Underwater Demolition Team
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
USAB&VAPAC U.S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity
Pacific

USAF United States Air Force
USAR YIS United States Army Ryukyus
USARMA United States Army Attache
USARPAC United States Army Pacific

USCONARC United States Continental Army Command

USIA United States Information Agency
USIS United States Information Service

USMACTHAI United States Military Assistance Command,

Thailand

USMACV United States Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam

USMC United States Marine Corps

USMILAD United States Military Advisor (SEATO)
USMILTAG United States Military Technical Advisory

Group - Indonesia

USOM United States Operations Mission

USTDC United States Taiwan Defense Command

UTT Utility Tactical Transport
UW Unconventional Warfare

V

VC VDC VLF VN VNAF

Viet Cong Volunteer Defense Corps - Thailand Very Low Frequency Vietnam Vietnamese Air Force

WESTPAC WSMTT WTO

Western Pacific
White Star Mobile Training Teams
Western Transportation Office

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