


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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



VOLUME IV

1969

Prepared by the Historical Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII

1970

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ADMIRAL JOHN S. MCCAIN JR.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

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FOREWORD

(U) My area of responsibility, the Pacific Command, is the largest of seven unified U.S. military commands. It is an area beyond the West Coast of the Americas that encompasses 85 million square miles. It reaches from the Bering Sea in the north to the region of the South Pole. It stretches past the island state of Hawaii, across the Pacific to Guam and the Philippines. It continues over the South China Sea beyond Vietnam and Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. From the northern regions along the coast of Asia it extends southward past the Soviet Union and Japan, past Okinawa and Taiwan, to Australia and New Zealand. Those 85 million square miles cover about 40 percent of the earth's surface.

(U) The mission of the Pacific Command is to defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean area and to support U.S. national policy and interests throughout the Pacific, Far East, and Southeast Asian areas. The overall mission includes the providing of military assistance to the countries of Asia, to help them protect themselves from external aggression and internal subversion.

(U) The major potential source of danger in the Western Pacific is Communist China. While the motivations and intentions of Communist China's leaders are matters of conjecture, their capabilities can be fairly accurately measured. Another major problem confronting United States interests is the formidable political and economic influence and growing military power of the Soviet Union in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. North Vietnam and North Korea are current examples of violently nationalistic communist leadership. Both are aggressors and both seek through overt and covert insurgency the overthrow of legitimate, legally constituted governments.


(U) The importance of security in the Pacific cannot be overemphasized. We must be aware of the continuing global threat which our country faces

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from the ambitions, goals, and activities of the communist world. Only a firm, positive posture on our part, backed by adequate military capabilities, can assure the security of this country, and with it, that of the Free World.

(U) To defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean and to support U. S. national policy and interests throughout the Pacific, the Far East and Southeast Asian areas is a mission carrying great responsibility. It is not an easy mission. No one expects it to be. The mission is being accomplished, however, by many men and women, in many different places. They are serving courageously and with valor on the field of battle. And they are doing a humanitarian thing to help the people of South Vietnam retain the right to decide their own future without outside coercion. I am proud of these men and women who guard 24 hours each day the ramparts and heritage of a free land and a free people given us by our Nation's founders.


JOHN S. MCCAIN, JR.
Admiral, United States Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific

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PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the standpoint of CINCPAC. Additionally, the required annual report preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS to the extent that major decisions and directives of the JCS concerning the PACOM may be determined by historians of the JCS without research in the records of the PACOM. This 1969 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As in the case of previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those connected with international crises and those peculiar to a joint command. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and achievements and omits "detailed" activities of subordinate unified commands or of Allied nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history is organized in the same manner as previous histories, primarily in line with the objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and the planning for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) This year's history is published in four volumes: Volume I - Chapter I; Volume II - Chapters II and III; Volume III - Sections I - V,

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Chapter IV; and Volume IV - Sections VI - X, Chapter IV. A glossary and an index for the complete history is included in Volume IV only. Pagination is complete within each volume rather than running consecutively throughout the four volumes. As in previous years, the annual histories prepared by COM-USMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are included as Annexes A and B, respectively.

(U) The CINCPAC Command Historian, Colonel J. R. Johnson, USA, under the supervision of Colonel William C. Harrison, Jr., USAF, Secretary of the Joint Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, planned and published the 1969 CINCPAC Command History as required by CINCPAC Staff Instruction 5750. 1D of 20 August 1968. Colonel Johnson personally researched and wrote Chapter IV with exception of Sections V - IX.

(U) Members of the CINCPAC Historical Branch assisted the Command Historian in the preparation of the history. Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, as Senior Historian, researched and wrote Chapters II and III and Sections V and IX of Chapter IV. In addition, he provided technical guidance and shared his professional expertise when and where required throughout the preparation of this history. Mrs. Polly Tallman, Assistant Historian, prepared Chapter I and Sections VI - VIII of Chapter IV and prepared the pictorial layout for the history.

(U) Miss Maggie M. Kaonohi, Clerk-Stenographer of CINCPAC Historical Branch, typed the manuscript in final format. Mrs. Mary Jane Garrett, CINCPAC Librarian, compiled the index. Senior Chief Yeoman C. J. Curry, USN, who also compiled the glossary, Chief Yeoman William A. Hendrixson, USN, and Yeoman Second Class Judy G. Ege, USN, proofread the final manuscript and performed the many other tasks connected with readying the volumes for the printers. Master Sergeant John F. Stevenson, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Graphics Section, JO412, and his successor, Draftsman First Class Mateo V. Garrovillas, USN, supervised the preparation of all graphics for this history. Lithographer First Class Edward A. Donlin, USN, Reproduction Unit Supervisor, JO412, and Staff Sergeant Leonard L. Powell, USAF, Reproduction Device Expert, JO412, handled the expeditious printing of the draft manuscript which facilitated staff coordination. Finally, the immeasurable support rendered by the CINCPAC staff is greatly appreciated.

J. R. Johnson

J. R. JOHNSON

Colonel USA

CINCPAC Command Historian

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CHAPTER IV (Continued)

SECTION VI - COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

Post-Hostilities Communications-Electronics Planning

(S) One of the most complex communications-electronics problems facing CINCPAC in 1969 was the matter of turning over many of the sophisticated fixed communications equipments and systems that had been installed in Southeast Asia to members of the Vietnamese or Thai Armed Forces who were not yet trained to operate or maintain them. Pressures were exerted from Washington to accelerate this process (or planning for this process), but corresponding pressures were not exerted to assure enough trained personnel.

[REDACTED]

(S) On 24 August 1968 CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a proposed concept for the post-hostilities use of communications-electronics systems in the RVN.¹ On 19 November 1968 the JCS forwarded the concept, somewhat revised, to the Secretary of Defense. The revisions made by the JCS limited the application of the concept to the fixed wideband communications system instead of to the general application to all fixed communications-electronics systems that had been envisioned by CINCPAC.²

(S) Early in 1969 the JCS forwarded to CINCPAC the concept approved by the Secretary of Defense, which was identical to the JCS concept except for the Secretary's emphasis that the civilian contract operations and maintenance assistance for the Integrated Communications System-Southeast Asia be limited to that necessary to handle critical facility outages. The JCS deferred for approximately 45 days the furnishing of other guidance CINCPAC had requested.³

(S) CINCPAC had enough guidance, nevertheless, to proceed with post-hostilities planning. CINCPAC Oplan [REDACTED] tasked COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI to determine the specific post-hostilities requirements for the communications systems, but such determination had to await JCS approval of coordination with host governments in order to determine their requirements.⁴

-
1. CINCPAC 240546Z Aug 69.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 14-15.
 3. J6 Brief No. 00108-69, Hq CINCPAC, 31 Jan 69, of JCS SM-46-69 of 23 Jan 69, Subj: Communications T-Day Planning (U).
 4. Ibid.

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7W (S) These completed plans were forwarded to the JCS by CINCPAC later in the year. The plan from COMUSMACV (his OPlan [redacted] identified total post-hostilities requirements; provided for the phased introduction of RVN management, operation, and maintenance of communications-electronics facilities; and identified those facilities that would be in excess of post-hostilities requirements.¹ COMUSMACV's plan was forwarded by CINCPAC on 9 September. On 29 September CINCPAC forwarded COMUSMACTHAI's post-hostilities communications-electronics concept to the JCS. It was compatible with COMUSMACV Oplan [redacted] and envisaged a period of joint Thai-U.S. manning of fixed systems with a gradual phase-out of U.S. personnel as the Thai personnel became qualified to operate and maintain the systems.²

(S) In October the JCS asked CINCPAC for comments and recommendations on additional post-hostilities considerations, contained in a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, which was quoted by the JCS in part, as follows:

I have reviewed the proposals set forth in JCSM 550-69 and agree that it is essential that new programs should be developed and current programs expanded to enable Vietnamese and Thai personnel to operate and maintain a residual integrated communications system - Southeast Asia (ICS-SEA). The residual system should be designed specifically for Vietnamese and Thai requirements which I expect would be considerably less than the ICS-SEA provided for U.S. Forces. I desire the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a detailed time phased plan for turnover of selected equipment and facilities to provide the Vietnamese and Thai governments an ICS-SEA capability after redeployment of U.S. Forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff should identify other CE equipment and systems which are required to provide the Vietnamese and Thai forces an integrated system tailored to their needs. Such equipment which is required by residual U.S. Forces should be included and disposition recommendations made for the remainder.

In addition to other time-phased alternatives, please consider as one contingency a U.S. residual force of 230,000 men by 31 December 1970 and complete operation of CE

1. J612 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

2. Ibid.

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systems by local nationals as soon as possible thereafter. You may wish to discuss these alternatives directly with the ASD (SA). I suggest you also include recommendations for provision of a secure communications capability for the Vietnamese and Thai forces. 1

(S) CINC PAC replied on 28 October. He stated that he could not reconcile these comments from the Deputy Secretary with previous approval by the Secretary of Defense of CINC PAC's concept for post-hostilities planning, of which CINC PAC had been notified by the JCS on 23 January 1969 in SM 46-69. The following statements are extracted from CINC PAC's comments:

... The turnover of ICS-SEA facilities is a long range program dependent upon the training of sufficient Vietnamese and Thai personnel to man them. In the interim, US personnel must man the residual sites. ... COMUSMACV Oplan [REDACTED] divides the ICS stations into three categories in accordance with their relative importance to the US residual command and control requirements, support of RVNAF/GVN, and those stations important to both of these factors. Stations in the first category would be retained under US control as long as a significant US residual combat force remains in RVN. Stations in the second category would be turned over to the RVNAF as soon as they attain the capability to operate and maintain them effectively. Stations in the third category will be turned over as US requirements decrease and as the RVNAF attain the capability to operate them. ...

... No time estimate can be attached to these phases until the success in training Vietnamese and Thais in the operation, maintenance and management of the system can be evaluated. No meaningful training program can be started until SECDEF tasks and funds service support of this training, so no real progress is being made in this program yet.

... Recommend that SECDEF be advised that the initial estimate of C-E equipment requirements for GVN support is that contained in the integrated US/GVN C-E equipment requirements contained in COMUSMACV Oplan [REDACTED] COMUSMACV, AMEMB Saigon and USAIDV are now working on the semi-annual update of this plan... to provide more detail

1. JCS 02788/172158Z Oct 69.

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and to include initial estimates of circuit requirements in the ICS-SEA. COMUSMACTHAI is working on a similar preliminary estimate....

... Significant reductions can be made in the residual communications-electronics systems in the immediate T-Day time frame only at the following cost:

- a. The serious degradation of our capability to maintain an adequate posture in SEAsia to permit rapid re-entry of US/FWMA forces.
- b. Inadequate C-E facilities to support increased responsibilities of the GVN for both combat and nation building.
- c. Decrease in command control effectiveness and combat support of US residual forces by the requirement to satisfy urgent GVN and RVNAF requirements from an inadequate US residual C-E base.

... The C-E requirements for a residual force of 230,000 men by 31 Dec 70 would be critically dependent on the proportion of US combat and combat support troops in the force. Under the assumption that this force will be preponderantly combat support and combat service support troops supporting an RVNAF having expanded combat missions, there will be little or no decrease in fixed C-E requirements. Fixed long haul circuitry and C-E facilities now supporting US combat forces will be required to support the expanded combat mission of the RVNAF. Present RVNAF C-E capability is entirely inadequate to support their increased mission of replacing the US combat forces. Release of US signal units now operating the US Army Corps Area communications system will depend on our success in training and equipping RVNAF units under the RVNAF I&M program to replace them.

... The NOFORN restriction on T-Day planning continues to impede the determination of posthostilities C-E requirements for support of RVNAF and Thai forces. To discuss posthostilities RVNAF and RTARF stationing plans, and thus to determine C-E equipment and communications channel requirements to support these plans, CINCPAC requires a favorable response to the recommendation in in his letter

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Ser 00247-69 of 9 Sep 69 to remove the determination of posthostilities C-E requirements from their present connection with NOFORN T-Day planning.

...reference... the proposal to send an ad hoc... planning group to the RVN and Thailand, we realistically could not expect such a group in two weeks to determine, with any degree of validity, equipment and circuit requirements, the military portion of which COMUSMACV has been working on for many months and the civil portion of which USAIDV is still attempting to get underway. An ad hoc group could visit RVN and Thailand... to become aware of the practical difficulties in making such a determination. An appreciation of the magnitude of the problem will possibly facilitate subsequent staff actions on the subject.

...Recommend that RVNAF and RTARF [REDACTED] requirements be satisfied by continued authorization of the same type of equipment... presently authorized the RVNAF....

...[Indications are] that the OSD system analysis officials are either not aware of or are interpreting differently. the OSD approved concept [of JCS SM 46-69].... It is recommended that, if the concept of a single integrated communications system in SEAsia to satisfy all US and GVN requirements as outlined [in SM 46-69] remains valid, ASD (systems analysis) be advised that no specific time phasing can be attached to this program at this time.... portions of the system will be made available to the Vietnamese as US requirements decrease and as the GVN managerial, operational and maintenance capabilities permit. Until an effective training program is undertaken and an evaluation can be made of the capability of the RVNAF to provide students capable of assimilating the technical instruction necessary, any time phased plan made at this time for the turnover of facilities to the GVN to operate, maintain and manage would lack validity. 1

(S) The JCS, in reply to CINCPAC's message, acknowledged that there was no question that the turnover was a long-range program that would be interdependent with the training of local personnel. Nevertheless, they said,

1. CINCPAC 280416Z Oct 69.

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the urgency of the requirement forwarded by the Deputy Secretary (on 17 October) "demands that all possible planning in this area be accomplished as a matter of priority."¹ They noted some of the problems involved, but asked that CINCPAC prepare and submit by 5 December a proposed time-phased schedule for the turnover of selected equipment and facilities. The schedule for the RVN was to complement the time-phased alternatives used in CINCPAC's input on Vietnamizing the War that CINCPAC had submitted in a letter on 25 July.

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~~(S)~~ Before CINCPAC submitted his turnover schedule, the JCS advised the Secretary of Defense that there were several factors commented on by CINCPAC and endorsed by the JCS that would affect the validity of any schedule prepared under existing circumstances. Such factors were the questionable availability of manpower, the time involved in training communications-electronics personnel, and the unknown rate of retention of trained personnel.² In regard to the training of local nationals, the JCS indicated that the U.S. Army Chief of Staff would be requested to submit a training plan based on the one developed by COMUSMACV, USARV, and the 1st Signal Brigade for training Vietnamese for the ICS-SEA.³

~~(S)~~ In July CINCPAC had informed the JCS of problems caused by inadequate tasking of the Department of the Army by the Defense Department in the matter of training local personnel. The JCS were asked to reaffirm their tasking of the Army because the original tasking directive was ambiguously worded and failed to define the extent of Army responsibility. As a result the Department of the Army, CINCUSARPAC, and the Commanding General of USARV had indicated inability to provide funding and personnel support for this program.⁴

~~(S)~~ The JCS then prepared a recommendation that the Defense Department task military departments and the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to accomplish planning and funding activities in support of this training. Subsequent to tasking by the Secretary of Defense, however, the Services and the DCA would have 60 days in which to submit training plans for approval and funding. Thus, there was expected to be a delay of at least 90 days from

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1. JCS 04084/061414Z Nov 69.
 2. J6 Brief No. 001170-69, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Nov 69, of JCSM-701-69 of 6 Nov 69, Subj: Training of Local National Communications-Electronics Personnel in Southeast Asia (U).
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCPAC 042341Z Jul 69.

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15 October, the date CINCPAC had hoped such training would start.¹

(S) On 18 November the JCS acknowledged CINCPAC's concern for early tasking for communications-electronics training and established a number of specific responsibilities. The three Services were assigned formal training responsibilities. Each was to plan, budget, fund and conduct formal training. The Army was assigned training responsibility for all Service components in operation and maintenance of the ICS-SEA, including cable systems, tandem switches, dial telephone exchanges, electric power generators, and air conditioning equipment. The Navy was to be concerned with training for all Service components to operate and maintain Navy communications-electronics systems. The Air Force was assigned formal training for all Service components to operate and maintain air traffic control systems, navigational aids, and surveillance and warning systems. The Director of the DCA was tasked to plan, budget, and fund for training for communications systems management. The Services and the DCA were tasked to conduct on-the-job training on their sites or equipment regardless of the Service affiliation of the local national personnel.²

(S) On 21 November CINCPAC was tasked by the JCS to prepare a Phase III RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan. The assumptions and guidance under which this plan was to be developed were significantly different from the guidance under which the communications-electronics turnover schedule had been developed by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI. As a result of the new tasking, CINCPAC cancelled the original tasking of COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI and recommended to the JCS that the copy of the turnover schedules prepared by those two staffs and hand-carried to Washington by a JCS staff member be used for the data necessary to support the training plan requirement. Data submitted under the Phase III Improvement and Modernization guidance would be developed to the level of detail required for future planning actions. Thus the Phase III program for the RVN and the Military Assistance Program for Thailand would become the control documents available to the Secretary of Defense for funding decisions.³ Preparation of the Phase III document was in progress at the end of the year.

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1. J6 Brief No. 00850-69, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Sep 69 of JCSM-550-69 of 5 Sep 69, Subj: Training of Local National Communications-Electronics Personnel in Southeast Asia (U).
 2. J6 Brief No. 001206-69, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Nov 69, of JCS SM-790-69 of 18 Nov 69, Subj: Training of Local National Communications-Electronics Personnel in Southeast Asia (U).
 3. J612 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.

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PACOM AUTODIN Restoral Planning

(U) A meeting to develop a PACOM AUTODIN restoral plan was conducted by the DCA at Colorado Springs, Colorado the week of 4 August.¹ Such a restoral plan would be required after the phaseout or phasedown of Southeast Asia DCA manual relays, upon which the existing Interim Pacific AUTODIN Restoral Plan relied heavily. It was considered necessary to designate certain other existing record communications facilities to function in an AUTODIN traffic continuity restoral role.²

(U) CINCPAC expanded the Colorado Springs meeting to include all existing and programmed AUTODIN subscribers. The following subscribers were identified at the meeting:

- a. Those subscribers that require uninterrupted service.
- b. Those subscribers that can be served by alternate delivery means or by rehomming.
- c. Validated requirements that cannot be supported by existing AUTODIN plant.³

(U) Following the Colorado Springs meeting CINCPAC convened a PACOM agencies meeting at Camp Smith on 14 and 15 August to develop an interim AUTODIN restoral plan pending implementation of the DCA plan. DCA Pacific was tasked to develop and promulgate the interim plan by 15 September 1969, based on inputs from CINCPAC's component command commanders, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAI.

(U) As a result, the following facilities were designated as interim primary AUTODIN automatic switching center traffic continuity restoral facilities for Southeast Asia:

- a. JP/PAFCO Relay (USAF), Korat, Thailand
- b. JP/PAFCO Relay (USAF), Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam.

(U) The designated interim secondary facilities, all in the Republic of

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- 1. DCA 520/4304/182147Z Jun 69.
 - 2. CINCPAC 190315Z Aug 69.
 - 3. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.

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Vietnam, were the Naval Communications Station at Cam Ranh Bay, the Army Major Relay Station at Long Binh, the III Marine Amphibious Force Communications Facility, the I Marine Air Wing Communications Facility, and the U.S. Army minor relays at Da Nang, Can Tho, Bien Hoa, and Cu Chi.¹

AUTOSEVOCOM Reconfiguration in Vietnam

20 (C) A planned relocation of a number of Air Force units within Vietnam required a corresponding change in the configuration of a portion of the AUTOSEVOCOM network to provide for continued service to these units in their new locations. COMUSMACV forwarded the plan for network reconfiguration on 10 July 1969.² On 15 July CINCPAC approved the plan and requested JCS approval.³

(C) The JCS advised on 1 August that they were not clear on all details of the reconfiguration and requested amplifying information. Although CINCPAC believed that the requirement had been clearly stated, he provided amplifying and clarifying information on 22 August and again requested JCS approval.⁴ He also asked COMUSMACV to provide the JCS with before-and-after diagrams of the configuration to insure their understanding.

(C) The JCS approved the reconfiguration in September and it was implemented in November.

AUTOSEVOCOM Maintenance

(C) The rapid implementation of a greatly expanded worldwide Automatic Secure Voice Communications System (AUTOSEVOCOM) in 1968 and 1969 had not been paralleled by sufficient increase in manning in the field to provide sufficient numbers of trained cryptographic repairmen. The shortage of Army cryptographic maintenance personnel in Vietnam to support the extensive AUTOSEVOCOM installations in that country had prevented some subscribers and switches, which were the responsibility of the Army for maintenance, from going operational.⁵

(C) The Department of the Army had been asked to take action to alleviate the shortage of trained crypto repairmen in Vietnam. In response, the Army was in the process of increasing the number of such personnel

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1. CINCPAC 190315Z Aug 69.
 2. COMUSMACV 40236/100625Z Jul 69.
 3. CINCPAC 150328Z Jul 69.
 4. Admin CINCPAC 222312Z Aug 69.
 5. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.

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
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assigned to Vietnam and providing interim limited contractor maintenance assistance while military personnel were in the process of being transferred. In June 1969, however, the Department of the Army, in reviewing the critical shortage of crypto personnel, suggested that one possible means of alleviating this shortage would be to reduce the number of subscribers provided secure voice service by reviewing existing requirements for possible deletions.¹

(S) CINCPAC replied that reduction of the number of subscribers was not a valid solution to the problem of a shortage of crypto repair personnel. He noted that total requirements in the PACOM would not diminish but would likely increase in the future, even though changing requirements might shift the location of AUTOSEVOCOM assets.²

Control of Crypto Keying Material in the AUTOSEVOCOM Network

(S) Within the worldwide AUTOSEVOCOM network three areas had been designated, each having had separate narrowband



(S) On



This action isolated Vietnam and Thailand from the remainder of the Pacific AUTOSEVOCOM system as well as the remainder of the worldwide system.⁵

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1. DA 914502/272002Z Jul 69.
 2. CINCPAC 122214Z Jul 69.
 3. J624 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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5. J624 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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20 (S) This incident revealed that existing procedures for control of [REDACTED] and further, that the procedures required refining.

(S) CINCPAC, therefore, asked the Defense Communications Agency, Pacific and the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu to take immediate coordinated action to notify all concerned [REDACTED] 21

As a second step CINCPAC requested both agencies to coordinate in order to develop and then promulgate refined procedures as an addendum to the existing PACOM AUTOSEVOCOM Operating Procedures and Directory Publication (DCA PAC Circular 400-S70-7).²

Tactical Secure Voice

(S) It was proposed that tactical secure voice programs for the PACOM would include both wideband and narrowband systems. The wideband system became more and more implemented in Southeast Asia in 1969. In January the overall effectiveness of the security provided the system and the operational utility of the wideband ciphony systems used in combat operations were studied. CINCPAC forwarded the results of his study to the JCS on 28 March, as well as a report on the status of implementation of the program. CINCPAC made the following recommendations:

... That the tactical secure voice program be continued, with expedited delivery of required modification and installation kits.

... That the UHF/VHF [ultra high frequency/very high frequency] tactical secure voice program be expanded to include certain logistic and administrative nets in RVN.

... That the procurement and delivery of high frequency ciphony equipment be accelerated.

... That the development of follow-on series of ciphony equipment now in design stage be continued.³

1. CINCPAC 271906Z Sep 69.

2. Ibid.

3. J6422 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.

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715 (S) The JCS reported to the Secretary of Defense on the status of the program in May. Their report was in consonance with CINCPAC's findings and recommendations. They stated that the tactical secure voice program, to include development and follow-on equipment, should be continued. They recommended that the Services be authorized to procure additional equipment as operational requirements were identified. ¹

(S) In July CINCPAC informed the JCS that he had been informed by COMUSMACV and the Defense Department Special Representative Vietnam that there were two major problems delaying increased secure voice availability and use by combat forces in Vietnam. ²

[REDACTED] As these problems were beyond the scope of CINCPAC's control, he asked the JCS to insure resolution of these problem areas by the Services. He asked that the Services change their regulations to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to support programmed equipment. ³

(S) Then on 12 November CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a status report on implementation of the program in the PACOM. It identified progress since June and also the problems that were delaying the program. Installations had increased by 20 percent between 30 June and 30 September. The overall PACOM program was 63 percent complete. Problems delaying completion were primarily engineering and procurement actions requiring action by the Services. The majority of these were addressed by the JCS in July and were being acted on. Command emphasis was in the process of being shifted from installation to utilization of available equipment. ⁴

(S) The matter of narrowband tactical secure voice systems for the PACOM also received attention in 1969. Procurement contracts had been delayed in December 1968 and again March 1969. ⁵ CINCPAC had repeatedly expressed the urgent requirement for this equipment in Southeast Asia operations. When CINCPAC learned that some procurement delays could be based on gathering information from other commanders of unified and specified

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1. J6 Brief No. 0523-69, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Jun 69, of JCSM-344-69 of 29 May 69, Subj: Evaluation and Utilization of Tactical Secure Voice Communications (U).
 2. CINCPAC 290309Z Jul 69.
 3. Ibid.
 4. J6423 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
 5. J6421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.

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commands for worldwide application for further justification of the program, he asked the JCS about the status of the program.¹

(C) On 3 December the JCS notified CINCPAC that the Deputy Secretary of Defense had cancelled procurement action for the narrowband secure voice equipment.² This action removed any possibility of providing a narrowband system for the PACOM in the immediate future. It left a gap in the secure voice capability between the wideband system and the AUTOSEVOCOM system.

(S) On 31 December CINCPAC forwarded a request to the JCS regarding a temporary short term security system to cover HF/SSB³ radio transmissions until a long term narrowband system became available. He recommended a system recommended by CINCPACFLT that involved the use of [REDACTED] to fill "the urgent and continuing requirement for the capability in PACOM."⁴

Management of the Automatic Telephone Service in Southeast Asia

(U) The Defense Communications Agency, Pacific (DCA PAC) system plan for automatic telephone service in Southeast Asia stated that the Department of the Army, through the Army's Strategic Communications Command, would be the operating command for the telephone service. In January 1969 CINCPAC recommended that the JCS approve a change to the system plan proposed by the DCA PAC that would eliminate the "operating command" concept and place the management control and operational direction of the telephone service under a single manager.⁵

(U) The JCS replied that adherence to a Defense Department directive⁶ would have eliminated the need for an operating command, as the directive clearly defined the tasks and responsibilities included under the concept of management control, operational direction, and operations and maintenance management.⁷ The JCS further requested the DCA to revise the proposed change to include provisions for monitoring contractor operations and maintenance as well as manpower requirements.

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1. CINCPAC 192200Z Jul 69.
 2. J6 Brief No. 01260-69, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Dec 69, of J6M 1289-69 of 3 Dec 69, Subj: CINCPAC Narrowband Secure Voice Requirement.
 3. High frequency/single side band.
 4. [REDACTED]
 5. CINCPAC 252205Z Jan 69.
 6. DOD Directive 5105.19.
 7. JCS 4856/172147Z Mar 69.

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(U) On 31 August the DCA PAC forwarded to the DCA a proposed revision based on the guidance received from the JCS. The proposed revision was under study by the JCS at the end of the year.

(U) To provide interim management and operational direction pending final resolution of these responsibilities, CINCPAC issued an instruction in April 1969 that tasked the DCA-Southeast Asia Mainland Region with the management of operational direction of the system.¹ In December that agency forwarded a draft instruction on automatic telephone service management, which was being coordinated with the component command commanders at the end of the year.

Communications Security

(S) CINCPAC found it necessary to continuously stress the importance of operational security and communications security. Various operations security surveys were made in 1969, some under the name PURPLE DRAGON. These surveys usually found a number of operations, physical, and communications insecurities. CINCPAC took follow up corrective action.²

(C) One continuing problem was the use of homemade codes and authenticators. CINCPAC believed that one cause was that authority to fabricate such codes was contained in a couple of National Security Agency publications. CINCPAC recommended that those publications be rescinded.³

(C) Another problem was with call sign and radio frequency changing procedures. CINCPAC was concerned over the enemy's capability to exploit the use of call signs and frequencies. In October he initiated a study of the procedures for changing signs and frequencies among his component command commanders, CINCSAC, COMUSMACV, COMUS Korea, and COMUSTDC.⁴

CINCPAC said that all communications should be encrypted and if

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1. Ltr, CINCPAC to Chief DCA PAC, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAI, 21 Apr 69, Subj: Management of Automatic Telephone System, Southeast Asia.
 2. CINCPAC 232216Z Aug 69; CINCPAC 192317Z Aug 69.
 3. Admin CINCPAC 030313Z Oct 69.
 4. CINCPAC 100310Z Oct 69.

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existing operations codes were not available they should be requested. ¹

(S) In December the Commander of the Military Airlift Command proposed deletion of operational codes and authenticators in routine airlift requirements. CINCPAC concurred in deleting the operational codes due to the specialization of codes in Vietnam and elsewhere in the world. To cover most contingencies an aircraft would have to carry [REDACTED]. Authenticators were still required however. An aircraft flying in the PACOM needed to carry [REDACTED] which were simple to use and in general use. ²

(S) Communications security advice and training for RVNAF came under study in 1969 in connection with Vietnamization. On 12 December CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a request from the U.S. Navy Advisory Group in Vietnam for permission to provide communications security training to the Vietnamese Navy on such subjects as proper circuit discipline, proper code and authenticator usage, communications security publications and manuals, and enemy communications intelligence capabilities. ³ Also in December a study of existing RVNAF communications security posture and the expected situation as U.S. forces were withdrawn was completed. The draft report of the study was to be taken to Vietnam early in 1970 by the National Security Agency Pacific representative to the CINCPAC Operations Security Group. Major areas of communications security improvement considered in the draft study that required close examination prior to being included in final recommendations were proposals involving providing (through U.S. advisors) AUTOSEVO-COM and Nestor support to the RVNAF, and providing the RVNAF with remote teletype feeding through U.S. secure circuits. ⁴

(S) In mid-1969 COMUSMACV had requested the release of 35 additional KL-7 crypto convertors for use by the RVNAF, and CINCPAC had forwarded the request to the JCS, recommending approval. In August the JCS asked for additional information about the employment and use of this equipment. COMUSMACV supplied the information in September, but the stated usage did not meet National Policy criteria [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV of this and at the same time proposed to the JCS that an exception be granted due to the interrelationship of missions with U.S. forces. ⁵ CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV for his comments.

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1. J6421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
 2. Admin CINCPAC 240318Z Dec 69.
 3. Admin CINCPAC 122110Z Dec 69.
 4. CINCPAC 302128Z Dec 69.
 5. Admin CINCPAC 300133Z Sep 69.

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220 (S) COMUSMACV replied that he did not consider that an exception should be made. CINCPAC therefore asked the JCS to cancel further consideration of the request. ¹

Communications Support for Korean Forces in Vietnam

70 (S) In mid-1969 the system provided by the United States to the [redacted] for dedicated and direct communications between [redacted] became operational. Its operating efficiency, however, was directly proportional to the degree of proficiency of personnel operating the system. On-the-job training [redacted] continued. ³

70 (S) As a result of some operational service problems, the [redacted] informally expressed a desire to have the system upgraded to a full duplex operation rather than the half duplex system that had been provided. CINCUSARPAC studied the system and on 1 August advised CINCPAC that the conversion was technically feasible but that it would require the procurement of additional equipment costing approximately \$32,000, which would require funding from some source not yet identified. ⁴

(C) On 9 August CINCPAC asked [redacted] to study the matter further. ⁵

COMPASS LINK

70 (S) Early in 1969 a system of transmitting imagery from the Republic of Vietnam and vicinity became operational. ⁶ The program was called [redacted]. In September the JCS asked the Air Force Chief of Staff to plan for and provide a two-day [redacted] interconnect at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam. The two-way interconnect was to provide the capability for timely receipt of [redacted] by the 7th Air Force. ⁷

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1. CINCPAC 170320Z Oct 69.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. II, p. 795.
 3. History of Headquarters United States Forces Korea, 1 July - 30 September 1969, p. 21.
 4. CINCUSARPAC 010111Z Aug 69.
 5. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 6. J621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 7. JCS 08284/051815Z Sep 69.

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(S) On 4 September CINCPAC informed the JCS that in view of the deactivation of the USS ARLINGTON and the impracticability of transferring [REDACTED] equipment to another ship at that time, there was no longer a requirement for the [REDACTED] interconnect at Tan Son Nhut. 1

(S) The JCS therefore cancelled their requirement and asked the Air Force Chief of Staff to cancel plans for provision of the two-way interconnect. 2

Communications Support for Operations
GIANT SLINGSHOT and SEA LORDS

(S) Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT was an interdiction operation on the waterways west and northwest of Saigon to the Cambodian border controlled from Navy Advanced Tactical Support Bases (ATSB) and carried out by combined air, waterborne, and amphibious operations. Through the first half on 1969 the operation was expanded and made permanent. Navy communication resources, however, were insufficient to provide the necessarily complex information channels among ASTBs and from ASTBs to forces under their control. COMNAVFORV sent a requirement for additional resources through Navy channels in April³ and interim arrangements were made for a major loan of Army equipment and the use of especially configured boats in fixed locations.

(U) The Chief of Naval Operations declined to support the requirement and recommended that it be submitted through joint channels. 4 Although this requirement fell well within the scope of "tactical" needs normally handled by the Services and requiring neither JCS or Defense Department approval, it was forwarded by CINCPAC to the JCS with a recommendation that the Navy be tasked to provide the necessary resources. 5

(S) Operations expanded under the name SEA LORDS and in September COMNAVFORV stated several communications requirements for command and control, intelligence reporting, and logistics and administrative coordination for intensified SEA LORDS operations in western and southwestern IV Corps Tactical Zone to counter significant shifts of enemy forces to those areas. 6

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1. Admin CINCPAC 042137Z Sep 69.
 2. JCS 08284/051815Z Sep 69.
 3. COMNAVFORV 190746Z Apr 69.
 4. CNO 151616Z May 69.
 5. CINCPAC 221806Z Aug 69.
 6. COMNAVFORV 130436Z Sep 69.

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(C) On 16 September the JCS asked both the Army and the Navy to support the requirement using existing Service resources where possible and initiating funding actions if necessary. They converted what had been considered a Navy requirement and responsibility into a joint Army-Navy action, but without providing guidance as to how the responsibility should be split.¹ This guidance was based on the assumption that there were communications assets available in Southeast Asia.²

(C) Then in November the JCS asked CINCPAC to reevaluate all communications support requirements for the SEA LORDS interdiction operations in terms of theater capabilities. The operation was to be aligned to the greatest extent to the capabilities within MACV to provide minimum essential communications support using any available assets. Consideration was to also be given to future plans involving support and the disposition of the equipment employed. Any needs for additional equipment identified during this review were to be addressed through appropriate Service channels.³

(U) The implication was that CINCPAC validated requirements for additional communications equipment were unlikely to be approved or funded.⁴

(C) On 5 December CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to conduct a survey of all SEA LORDS communications requirements with a view toward aligning the operation to that which could be supported with available assets.⁵ The matter was still under study at the end of the year.

Communications Equipment Requirements for the Army Attache, Laos

(S) On 12 July CINCPAC validated the requirements stated by the Office of the U.S. Army Attache, Laos for communications equipment to establish a secure VHF/FM⁶ voice radio network and a HF/SSB⁷ radio network.⁸ These circuits were needed to provide communications to Vientiane for the Assistant

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1. J6 Brief No. 0905-69, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Sep 69 of MJCS-432-69 of 16 Sep 69, Subj: Navy GIANT SLINGSHOT/SEA LORDS and Related Joint Interdiction Communications Requirements (U).
 2. J6 Brief No. 01218-69, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Nov 69 of MJCS-528-69 of 19 Nov 69, Subj: SEA LORDS Communications Support (U).
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. CINCPAC 050316Z Dec 69.
 6. Very high frequency/frequency modulation.
 7. High frequency/single side band.
 8. CINCPAC 122208Z Jul 69.

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Attaches in [REDACTED]

Originally submitted on 19 April,¹ these requirements were the subject of an exchange of messages between CINCPAC and the Attache culminating in a letter from the Attache that outlined the general concept of employment of the radio nets.²

(S) In September CINCPAC informed the JCS that the funds for this type of support came from the Chief of Naval Operations, who would require information regarding JCS approval of the requirement before funds would be provided.³ The matter of providing the equipment was waiting approval of the Department of the Army. The Chief of Naval Operations notified CINCPAC on 15 October that his approval was being withheld until the JCS validated the requirement for the crypto material.⁴

(S) On 21 November the JCS asked the Army to provide the equipment on a loan basis.⁵ On 9 December CINCPAC asked the Chief of Naval Operations, as a result of JCS approval, to approve funds for FY 70, which had been withheld.⁶ The Chief of Naval Operations had not done so by the end of the year.⁷

Operations and Maintenance Responsibility for the IWCS in Thailand

(S) Late in 1968 a team from the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted a survey of contract services in the PACOM. Among the recommendations made by the team was one that the Secretary directed the JCS to investigate and report on the feasibility and desirability of assigning single Service responsibility for the operation and maintenance of all DCS facilities in Thailand to the Department of the Air Force.⁸ The Integrated Wideband Communication System (IWCS) in Thailand was operated and maintained by the Department of the Army, with the exception of seven of the 34 sites that were the responsibility of the Air Force. The Army had developed a "complex logistical and maintenance support system, an effective administrative and supervisory system and the necessary training facilities to support the IWCS in Thailand, including that portion operated by the Dept of the Air Force."⁹

1. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI BANGKOK 9127/190330Z Apr 69.
2. J612 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
3. CINCPAC 270318Z Sep 69.
4. CNO 152005Z Sep 69.
5. JCS 05052/212026Z Nov 69.
6. Admin CINCPAC 090035Z Dec 69.
7. J612 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
8. J612 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
9. CINCPAC 060139Z Mar 69.

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(S) CINCPAC did not consider the change desirable. He said:

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... CINCPAC is vitally concerned that no precipitant change be made in the O&M support of the communications system in Thailand which might adversely affect essential command and control of operating forces in SEAsia or which might increase the difficulties in achieving an effective transition to the planned post-hostilities posture in SEAsia.

... There appears to be no compelling reason for making such a change at this time. There is no indication that the change would result in a markedly improved capability which would be required to justify the detailed, complex and time consuming actions necessary to achieve it. Further the change would inhibit rather than facilitate the orderly transition to the post-hostilities posture envisioned by the JCS.¹

Nothing further was heard on the matter in 1969.

Tropospheric Scatter Link Between Ubon and Udorn Thailand

(S) In mid-1968 the Air Force Communications System installed an AN/TRC-103 system between Warin (Ubon) and Udorn, Thailand with a relay at Roi Et in order to relieve the foreseen overload on the DCS in northeast Thailand. Until mid-1969 the system was beset by many technical and logistic difficulties, never achieving operational status as part of the DCS.

(S) By August substantially all difficulties had apparently been overcome to the extent they ever would be, and a formal test of the system for acceptability as part of the DCS was scheduled, to end 30 September.²

(S) Shortly before the end of the test, CINCPACAF proposed replacement of the equipment with some higher powered equipment.³ Although the more powerful equipment was located in the PACOM (at Clark Air Base in the Philippines), it was under JCS control and JCS approval would be required before it could be moved or used.

(S) In response to CINCPACAF's proposal, CINCPAC asked COMUSMAC-THAI to thoroughly review the situation in anticipation of the need for very

1. Ibid.

2. J623 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

3. CINCPACAF 240342Z Sep 69. The equipment proposed was the AN/MRC-98.

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firm justification that would be required to obtain JCS approval of the replacement.¹ COMUSMACTHAI considered costs involved and the uncertainties of the situation in Southeast Asia before he recommended that the AN/TRC-103 be retained and that the DCA be urged to accept the link as a substandard system, use it to the maximum extent practicable, and deactivate it when requirements declined enough.²

(S) On 10 October the DCA Southeast Asia Mainland Region/Saigon stated that they would not accept the link as part of the DCS because it failed to meet DCS standards.³ They did state, however, that they had no objection if the link were to be activated as a non-DCS facility. CINCPAC asked the DCA PAC to comment on this position, stating that it did not seem consistent with the real situation in which there was existing reliance on tactical and marginal systems in the PACOM. CINCPAC said "rigid enforcement of compliance with DCS standards as condition for accepting an asset for DCA operational direction and management control would seem to have far reaching repercussions."⁴

(S) Subsequent coordination between CINCPAC and the DCA PAC revealed that the DCA Southeast Asia Mainland Region/Saigon message would be withdrawn and that the Udorn-Warin link would be accepted as an element of the DCS system.⁵

Doi Inthanon Radar/IWCS Site

(S) The disagreement over the importance and funding of the Doi Inthanon Radar/IWCS site continued in 1969.⁶ Because of the lack of radar coverage and navigation aids in the northwest section of Thailand, COMUSMACTHAI had validated construction of a site at Doi Poi, near Chiang Mai. Construction was under way in 1967 and 1968 on this site when permission was suddenly withdrawn by the Thai Government because of the location of the King's Summer Palace on the same mountain. About \$1 million was used up, therefore, at Doi Poi. New site surveys were conducted and Doi Inthanon was chosen as the best alternate location, although a 45 kilometer road would have to be constructed up the mountain through dense jungle and prime virgin forest. Cost estimates for the road vary from two to over six million dollars depending upon the use of troop labor (U.S. / Thai) or civilian contractor, and on the type

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1. CINCPAC 242212Z Sep 69.
 2. COMUSMACTHAI 260402Z Sep 69.
 3. DCA SAM V100/2012/100005Z Oct 69.
 4. CINCPAC 112204Z Oct 69.
 5. J627 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
 6. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 21-22.

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of road surface to be constructed. ¹ Although vigorously denied by COMUS-
MACTHAI, [REDACTED]

(S) CINCPACAF, who believed that the site had no foreseeable operational value to USAF operations and who had placed it number 73 on a list of 77 projects programmed for Thailand based upon urgency of requirement, ³ was nevertheless tasked to submit the necessary documents for funding the project. ⁴

(S) In January 1969 the Air Force Chief of Staff made an attempt to fund the site by collocating a high priority [REDACTED]. Another Air Force Chief of Staff effort was to have COMUSMACTHAI earmark residue funds for Doi Inthanon from other Military Assistance Program construction projects in Thailand. On 30 September COMUSMACTHAI reported to the Chief of Staff that \$639,000 had been identified from these sources. This amount, plus the \$596,400 still available from the original project at Chiang Mai, brought the total to \$1,235,400, which was not enough. ⁶

(S) The Doi Inthanon project became known as [REDACTED] the new [REDACTED]. The Air Force Chief of Staff's attempt to fund both in a single package, contingent on Congressional appropriation action, was his solution to a quid pro quo agreement [REDACTED] whereby country clearance would not be given for [REDACTED]

(S) CINCPAC, therefore, had a number of questions for COMUSMACTHAI in December regarding the whole program. He noted that the Air Force funding package reportedly contained \$7 million for [REDACTED] and \$20 million for [REDACTED] which preliminary plans placed on the abandoned Ko Kha

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1. Point Paper, J614, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Oct 69, Subj: Doi Inthanon Site (U); J614 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
 2. Point Paper, J614, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Oct 69, Subj: Doi Inthanon Site (U).
 3. Point Paper, J617, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Dec 68, Subj: Doi Inthanon Radar/IWCS Site (U).
 4. CINCPAC 251901Z Jan 69.
 5. Point Paper, J614, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Oct 69, Subj: Doi Inthanon Site (U).
 6. Ibid.
 7. J614 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.

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airfield). He also noted the great variation in cost estimates for both the access road and the cantonment area for Doi Inthanon.

(S) CINCPAC asked COMUSMACTHAI who authorized the quid pro quo requirement that [REDACTED] could not be constructed unless [REDACTED] was completed first. He asked if we were establishing a precedent for further [REDACTED]. He asked for the latest realistic cost estimates for road and cantonment construction, and he asked about funds available in addition to those that might be made available by the Defense Department. He asked what formal commitment the Thais had made to man and operate the site and what continuing support the Thais would need if they did man and operate it. He asked the relationship of this project to others for Thailand. He concluded, "In summary, it now appears that a complete new look at Doi Inthanon is required."¹ CINCPAC was waiting for a reply at the end of the year.

Communications Requirements - Korea

(S) On 11 October 1968 CINCPAC validated and forwarded to the JCS a consolidated statement of communications circuit requirements in support of COMUS Korea.² He advised that there were critical deficiencies in the existing capabilities to support U. S. forces in Korea. Specifically, the capabilities of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The quality and capacity of the communications systems, both in-country and out of country, were not adequate to support modern combat operations. There were a number of tactical, quasi-tactical, and administrative communications networks that permitted little or no interoperability. The single most important need in this regard was for an integrated communications capability that would provide for rapid, secure, and reliable exchange of information among U. S. and Allied forces.

(S) Late in October 1968 the JCS validated the circuit requirements for COMUS Korea and forwarded this validation to the DCA for use in the development of a subsystem/project plan (SS/PP). They also requested that the DCA include the interface requirements for the military Services tactical (non-DCS) systems in the SS/PP.³

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1. CINCPAC 180227Z Dec 69.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 22-28.
 3. J6 Brief No. 00148-69, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Feb 59 of MJCS-492-68 of 30 Oct 68, Subj: Communications-Electronics Requirements in Support of COMUSKOREA (U).

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(S) The SS/PP forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and funding was to upgrade communications in Korea over a 28 month period at a total investment cost of \$49.6 million. Annual operational and maintenance costs were projected to be \$7.3 million.¹ The plan was known as the Korea Wideband Network (KWN); it had formerly been the Korean Wideband Communications System (KWCS).

(S) Subsequent actions resulted in another alternative plan being chosen, at lower cost. This plan (SS/PP 6-69; Alternate 3, Option C) recommended alternatives to provide for an integrated in-country long haul and tactical communications capability for U.S. forces at an estimated cost of \$18.4 million.²

(S) The Secretary of Defense finally funded the project in the amount of \$7.9 million, withholding an additional \$7.1 million. In early November 1969 the U.S. Army began planning and engineering for implementation of that part of the project that was funded.³

(S) On 20 November CINCPAC notified the Director of the DCA, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and commanders of his component command commands that he concurred in the proposals for planning meetings for these programs and offered the following comments:

... It is CINCPAC position that the previously validated COMUSK/CINCPAC/JCS circuit requirements should be the basis for development of a follow-on plan for use of the withheld \$7.1M. When completed the plan should be forwarded to CINCPAC for coordination and subsequent submission to DCA for inclusion in... [DCA SS/PP 6-69 of 29 Nov 69].

... A well engineered high quality communications base which will facilitate future upgrade actions is required. Because of the withheld funding limitation of \$7.1M, it is requested that priority of circuit requirements previously validated and which cannot be satisfied through use of the release \$7.9M be given prime consideration in the proposed plan. In this context, the plan should to the maximum extent include the following specific areas:

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1. Ibid.
 2. History of Headquarters United States Forces Korea, 1 July - 30 September 1969, p. 21.
 3. J621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.

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a. An increased ability to interface between existing major in-country transmission systems thus providing a flexible overall system with alternative routing capabilities and increased survivability.

b. A quality improvement program for the in-country communications system to meet DCA engineering standards so as to insure compatibility with the world-wide Defense Communications System.

c. Provisions for increased capacity for required communications facilities in a quantity adequate to meet the needs of COMUSKOREA.

... To meet the improvement criteria of the Korean Wideband Upgrade Plan outlined... above, the following specific actions should be considered for incorporation therein:

a. Replace or rehabilitate on an austere case-by-case basis the equipment providing the present RF path between Seoul and Pusan. New equipment must be transportable and meet DCS engineering standards unless standards are in conflict with characteristics of existing multiplexing equipment. The RF provided must be initially capable of carrying [REDACTED] and be expandable to [REDACTED] DCS standards. The RF equipment should include antennas, feed systems, and essential common equipments to interface present multiplex with new transistorized multiplex equipments. New equipments should be programmed only in those instances where the present equipments are beyond economical repair or rehabilitation and/or cannot be made to meet the RF requirements outlined therein.

b. Provide an interface capability between the DCS backbone, ROKA microwave, and ROKAF Blue Fortune Systems. The interface points for the Backbone and ROKA systems should be at Seoul, Taegu, and Changsan while the Backbone and ROKAF Blue Fortune Systems should be interfaced at Osan [REDACTED] and Taegu.

c. Upgrade certain tech control facilities in the U. S. Backbone System to DCS standards. These will include controls at [REDACTED]

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This upgrade will provide facilities for positive system control and include test gear to support this requirement.

d. Replacement of major substandard components of NEC equipment throughout the Backbone System consistent with guidance contained...above.

e. Provide common equipment to include super group, group and mux bays for portions of the backbone selected for expansion. This expansion is to be in support of high priority validated circuit requirements.

f. Installation of batteries at all backbone stations to augment the installed power back-up systems utilizing costly generators.

g. Establish a high capacity spur and lateral system from the backbone to meet priority requirements south of the forward area.

...CINCPAC considers it essential that the final plan be reviewed by COMUSKOREA, CINCPAC and CINCPAC PACOM Service Component Commands before it is forwarded to DCA and SECDEF....¹

(S) In one other action designed to help insure more effective interoperability of in-country communications, the collocation of U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force technical control facilities in Korea was studied. On 5 August CINCPAC advised COMUS Korea of this objective and as an initial step requested consideration of an Air Forces Korea proposal for joint manning of the Taegu Technical Control.² This proposal was concurred in by COMUS Korea on 18 August.³ CINCPAC responded on 5 September to a request from COMUS Korea for additional guidance by noting that a policy of collocation of technical control facilities be followed, to include joint manning wherever feasible. He said that coordinated collocations surveys of DCS technical controls in Korea should proceed without delay.⁴

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1. CINCPAC 202318Z Nov 69.
 2. Admin CINCPAC 052345Z Aug 69.
 3. COMUSKOREA UK 60890/181020Z Aug 69.
 4. Admin CINCPAC 052145Z Sep 69.

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SECTION VII - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy

(U) Mapping, charting, and geodesy efforts in the PACOM were again concentrated in Southeast Asia in 1969, but a gradual shift to other high priority areas in the PACOM was noted. New products were introduced, existing products were revised and updated, and a vast amount of data was collected to satisfy aerial cartographic and hydrographic survey requirements. Certain of these projects are described below.

Orthophoto Pictomaps - CAVALCADE PONY

(C) A need developed in Vietnam to provide accurate 1:25,000 scale maps that would provide easier correlation of ground features to map detail. The U.S. Army Topographic Command recommended a solution by production of orthophoto pictomaps. These pictomaps eliminated relief displacement and added marginal data to assist in ground identification of selected control points determined by photogrammetric methods during the orthophoto compilation. Late in December 1968 COMUSMACV forwarded recommended priorities for country-wide coverage of these products.¹ In February 1969 CINCPAC forwarded² the COMUSMACV priorities to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) with the recommendation that initial production be limited to the top four priority areas with subsequent production to be determined after field use. The DIA validated the requirement³ for the orthophoto pictomaps and directed⁴ the Department of the Army to produce the new product at the rate of 250 map sheets per year. In November the U.S. Army Topographic Command initiated production of 86 sheets in the CINCPAC-designated priority 3 area.

TACAN-Overprinted Special Southeast Asia Tactical VFR Chart

(U) The Special Southeast Asia Tactical VFR⁵ Chart was developed to provide operational aircrews with a single, multi-use visual and instrument

1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 33.
2. Ltr, CINCPAC to Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 3 Feb 69, Subj: Priority for Production and Revision of SVN Map Sheets.
3. Ltr, Defense Intelligence Agency to CINCPAC, 24 Mar 69, Subj: 1:25,000 Scale Orthopictomap.
4. Ltr, Defense Intelligence Agency to Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA, 8 Apr 69, Subj: Large Scale Mapping Program for South Vietnam.
5. Visual Flight Rules.

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configured flight information publication. In October 1968 COMUSMACV and the Seventh Air Force had recommended a modification to the chart whereby Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) lattices would be overprinted. TACAN was used extensively in Southeast Asia in support of offensive and defensive operations by various types of aircraft of all Services. In April 1969 CINCPAC authorized¹ a prototype TACAN overprinting of the Special Tactical VFR Chart by the 7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron. This prototype followed two field evaluations of experimental charts. In May CINCPAC formally validated the requirement to the DIA.² In June that agency approved the TACAN lattice, as it appeared on the April prototype edition, for continued use on subsequent editions of the chart.³

Fluorescent Charts and Tactical Maps

(U) In November 1968 CINCPACFLT had validated a requirement from the III Marine Amphibious Force for prototype fluorescent maps for use in the I CTZ. CINCPAC validated the requirement to the DIA in December, contingent on development of an adequate power/light source.⁴ The prototypes were printed on both plastic and paper and along with a power/light source were sent to the field for evaluation in March 1969. In September the III Marine Amphibious Force completed its evaluation and recommended that the map and light source not be adopted for use.⁵

Ground Survey Operations - Project HONER

(C) In January 1968 the U.S. Army Vietnam had submitted a request to upgrade the geodetic net in Vietnam.⁶ CINCPAC validated the project to the DIA, but, based on stated military requirements, the DIA stated that there was insufficient justification. Subsequently, CINCPAC recommended to COMUSMACV that Project HONER be satisfied using in-country survey assets. In October 1969 the U.S. Army Vietnam recommended that Project HONER be suspended until conditions were more favorable.⁷ The request was based on

1. CINCPAC 120047Z Apr 69.
2. Ltr, CINCPAC to Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 16 May 69, Subj: TACAN Overprinted Special SEA Tactical VFR Chart.
3. Ltr, DIA to CINCPAC, 9 Jun 69, Subj: TACAN Overprinted Special SEA Tactical VFR Chart.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 34.
5. Ltr, CG, III Marine Amphibious Force to U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office, 4 Sep 69, Subj: Evaluation Report - Prototype Fluorescent Topographic Maps.
6. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 36.
7. J26 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.

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three factors: the dependence of day-to-day operations on the tactical situation, the relatively low priority given the survey by tactical commanders, and the unpredictable nature of the weather even during the "dry" season. Geodetic requirements were being met by HIRAN¹ and CAVALCADE PONY programs. As this project had never been validated by the DIA, approval for suspension was not required. Accordingly, the U.S. Army Vietnam suspended further work on Project HONER and deactivated the geodetic detachment assigned to the project. This action was concurred in by CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC whose original views were that this project was more suitable to a post-hostilities environment.

Aerial Survey Operations

(S) During 1969 Aerial Survey Team Three (AST-3), on temporary duty in South Vietnam, continued to work on Project AF 68-15 (COMBAT STEEL), which was the collection of aerial cartographic photography of the RVN.² By the end of the year the project was 92 percent complete. The team also worked on various other special projects assigned by COMUSMACV. In August CINCPAC recommended to the DIA that the team be withdrawn on completion of the COMBAT STEEL project. At that time COMUSMACTHAI requested that the team be redeployed to Thailand in November and December.³ CINCPAC was unable to support this proposed redeployment, based on known military requirements.

(S) The matter of whether AST-3 would be permanently assigned to Southeast Asia had not been resolved in Washington. Meanwhile team members continued to be on temporary duty there. In November CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV for his comments and concurrence on the extension of the team through 31 March 1970, pending resolution of the decision regarding permanent assignment.⁴ On 1 January 1970 COMUSMACV concurred with the extension.⁵

COMMANDO HUNT/STEEL TIGER SOUTH Support

(S) In May 1969 COMUSMACV requested 1:25,000 orthophoto maps overprinted with LORAN⁶ of the COMMANDO HUNT and STEEL TIGER SOUTH

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1. High Range Navigation.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 36.
 3. Admin CINCPAC 212251Z Aug 69.
 4. CINCPAC 281648Z Nov 69.
 5. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 6. Long Range Navigation.

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areas to support Seventh Air Force operations.¹ This product was to be given the highest priority over all other COMUSMACV requests. CINCPAC concurred in the COMUSMACV request and forwarded it to the DIA for production. On 29 May the DIA directed the Department of the Army to accord the COMUSMACV request the highest priority for production, but actual production was dependent on the acquisition of suitable data by Aerial Survey Team 3.

(S) Production would face a number of problems, however. The uncertainty of the status of the survey team and a reevaluation of the needs of the Seventh Air Force were expected to influence actual production. It appeared that the Seventh Air Force would non-concur in permanent assignment of the survey team and it would be possible the graphics would not be produced because of a lack of data.²

Cambodia Mapping Agreement

(S) The United States continued to furnish maps of Cambodia to Cambodia in accordance with a 1957 agreement despite CINCPAC's objections.³ By May 1969 all non-sensitive maps had been shipped. Therefore, additional shipments were initiated at the rate of five per month of the 66 sheets designated least sensitive, of the 161 sheets remaining. In June the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the 161 sheets not be released to Cambodia and that a memorandum stating this position be forwarded to the Secretary of State.⁴ This action supported CINCPAC's position, which remained unchanged. CINCPAC believed that the release of tactically valuable maps covering areas adjacent to the Republic of Vietnam could impose unwarranted hardships on U.S. and Allied forces and should not be released to Cambodia.⁵

Naval Survey Operations

(S) From May to October the USS MAURY (AGS-16) conducted coastal hydrographic surveys off the east coast of the Republic of Korea, primarily between Hupo Hang and Muhko Hang. This survey was conducted as a joint effort by both U.S. and Korean mapping, charting, and geodesy resources. The Korean survey ship SURO-3 participated and, after a brief period of training in modern survey techniques, contributed significant data.⁶

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1. Ltr, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1 May 69, Subj: Revised Mapping Priorities (U).
 2. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 40.
 4. J2 Brief No. 17-69, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Jun 69, of JCSM 380-69, Subj: Large Scale US Topographic Maps of Cambodia (U).
 5. Ibid.
 6. J26 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.

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Lease of Hydrographic Boats to the Republic of Korea

(S) In July the Navy's Oceanographic Office was queried on plans for eventual disposition of eight 52-foot hydrographic boats from the USS MAURY and the USS TANNER, both of which were scheduled for deactivation. On CINCPAC's recommendation, the Oceanographic Office indicated that two of these soundboats would be leased to the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy in order to increase the survey capability of the ROK Hydrographic Office.

(S) The initial concept for transfer of the boats was to lease them for a five-year period to the ROK Navy at no cost. The ROK Navy would then permit their use by the ROK Hydrographic Office, a civilian agency under the Ministry of Transportation.

(S) In October COMUS Korea recommended that State Department channels be used for the transfer of the soundboats in order to insure their use by the ROK Hydrographic Office.¹ This proposal was concurred in by CINCPAC and forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations for consideration. At year's end it appeared that other considerations would preclude the use of State Department channels and, should the transfer occur, military channels would be used.²

Escape and Evasion Charts

(S) In June 1968 CINCPAC had proposed to the DIA that new evasion charts of Korea be given top priority.³ The DIA concurred and requested CINCPAC's comments on the possibility of printing these charts on both Organasol and paper. CINCPAC recommended that the charts be printed on paper for delivery in August 1969. The charts were produced as scheduled.⁴

New Joint Operations Graphics for Korea

(S) Based on a CINCPAC recommendation, the Army's Topographic Command initiated production of new 1:250,000 Joint Operations Graphics for all of Korea.⁵ In order to provide adequate revision material, the Strategic Air Command was requested to obtain new high altitude photography. This was accomplished in February 1969. Production was nearly complete by the end

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1. COMUS Korea EK 62086/280819Z Oct 69.
 2. J26 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 41.
 4. J26 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 5. Ibid.

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of the year and all sheets were expected by March 1970.¹

The Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Program

(S) Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Activities continued in both Vietnam and Korea in 1969. In June a member of CINCPAC's staff visited COMUSMACV to align HUMINT collection operations with appropriate HUMINT Project Numbers and to review the use of other HUMINT program numbers, designators, and identifiers. Appropriate numbers were assigned during the visit and their use instituted effective 1 July 1969. A requirement for a periodic report on each collection operation was levied by CINCPAC effective for the period 1 April through 31 June and quarterly thereafter with the initial reports due not later than 31 August.²

(S) In Korea the 502d Military Intelligence Battalion was brought into the HUMINT Program. Selected activities were assigned HUMINT Project Numbers. Only partial implementation of this program was planned for Korea. This began in October. The program was to be expanded when the unit had gained experience and when appropriate procedures and formats had been developed.³

New Computer for COMUSMACTHAI

(C) In September two CINCPAC staff members participated in a pre-installation readiness and performance survey at COMUSMACTHAI's headquarters in connection with the installation of a new IBM 360/20 computer for command and control and Intelligence Data Handling Systems use.⁴

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1. Ibid.
 2. J23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
 3. J23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
 4. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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SECTION VIII - PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

U. S. Personnel Missing and Taken Prisoner

(S) Problems associated with a serious lack of information on personnel missing in action or taken prisoner in Southeast Asia continued in 1969.¹ The passing of another year exacerbated the hardship for both the U. S. personnel in that condition and their families, some of whom had had no word for as long as five years on their status. At the end of 1969, 426 U. S. military personnel were listed as prisoners of war and 930 were missing in action and possibly captured.

(S) In June 1968 the Deputy Secretary of Defense had first issued guidance on the policy for processing returned U. S. prisoners of war and other detained personnel, which had prompted a CINCPAC Instruction on such processing.² In January 1969 the Deputy Secretary issued supplemental policy.³ In this memorandum the Deputy Secretary reinforced his earlier memorandum regarding uniformity of treatment among the Services. The new memorandum was premised on the assumptions "that it will apply to the repatriation or return of a relatively large group of US PW/Detainees who are returned on the SEA land mass and that COMUSMACV would be the subordinate unified command."⁴

(S) He directed that regardless of Service affiliation all returnees would be evacuated as expeditiously as possible--consistent with medical considerations--to a "single central processing location in Vietnam or elsewhere in WESTPAC if circumstances require."⁵

(S) Immediate needs of the returnees and requirements of the Services were to be fulfilled at these centers, but retention there should be not less than 36 hours and not more than 72 hours "unless exceptional circumstances require variance from these norms."⁶

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 62-63.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Memorandum, Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18 Jan 69, Subj: Policy for Processing of Returned U. S. Prisoner of War and Other Detained Military Personnel.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.

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(C) All returnees were to be returned by aeromedical evacuation to CONUS where, under the control of their parent Service, they were to proceed to the designated Service hospital closest to their families, in the absence of other clearly overriding considerations.

(C) The Deputy Secretary reiterated the need to afford full protection of the rights of the returnees. The plan was to maximize the intelligence obtained, but at the same time to warn the returnees of provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that applied in such circumstances (regarding self-incrimination).

(C) CINCPAC prepared a revised Instruction, based on the Deputy Secretary's guidance.¹ CINCPAC directed that a single central location for processing, under rules equally applicable to all Services, be established whenever larger numbers of returnees were received at one time or when there were indications of a continuing flow of released U. S. prisoners of war. In cases of smaller numbers of returnees (as had been the case in the past) the CINCPAC subordinate unified command commander or single Service military representative could continue to request the appropriate PACOM Service commanders to assume early direct control of their respective returnees. CINCPAC specified, "The treatment afforded each returnee in PACOM will be as uniform and standardized as possible consistent with the needs of the individual returnee."²

(C) Returnees were not to be exposed to direct contact with the news media, their families, or the public until military doctors stated that they were medically and emotionally (psychologically) able to adapt to the rigors of such exposure. Also, military authorities concerned should have decided that the returnee's processing, to include debriefing, had reached a stage where the interruption for such exposure would not prejudice U. S. national interests or the ultimate completion of processing and evacuation.³

(C) Specific policies and procedures were established for medical processing, intelligence debriefing, public affairs matters, communication with their families, safeguarding of returnees' legal rights, evacuation coordination, and personnel records and reporting.⁴

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1. CINCPAC Instruction 03461.1A, 13 Jun 69, Subj: Policy for Processing of Returned U.S. Prisoners of War, Other Detained Personnel, and Evaders (U).
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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(C) The new guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense caused a number of changes in plans by both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. A single central processing location replaced the previous PACOM concept of four--one for each Service. Minimum processing time of 36 hours and maximum of 72 hours allowed altered previous PACOM plans that had envisioned from one to 10 days. Aeromedical evacuation was prescribed, whereas CINCUSARPAC plans had allowed for air evacuation by other than medevac flights and CINC-PACFLT had planned for evacuation to be carried out in part by hospital ship. Debriefing tasks were to be determined by the significance and perishability of the information to be gained; CINCPACFLT had contemplated more extensive debriefing. Warning of rights under the self-incrimination provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was to be given only when a returnee had been charged with an offense or when his responses, or other information, led to reasonable suspicion of an offense; CINCUSARPAC had provided for an automatic warning before interrogation began, but the other Services had already reflected the Deputy Secretary's approach.¹

(C) All PACOM component command plans, therefore, had to be changed to some degree, as did the Prisoner of War annex to COMUSMACV's OPlan 69-69.²

(C) In August 1969 representatives of CINCPAC and his component command commanders visited the Republic of Vietnam to observe and discuss plans and preparations for the processing of recovered U. S. prisoners.³ In November another team, composed of representatives of CINCPAC, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Department of the Army, and CINCUSARPAC visited Vietnam to make further plans for repatriation.

(C) The Services had all been calling their repatriation programs by different names. The Air Force used SENTINAL ECHO, the Navy used OZONE PRIZE, and the Army used RECAPAC. On 5 November CINCPACFLT recommended that the JCS assign a joint nickname for use by all Services in the interest of uniformity.⁴ On 17 December the JCS informed CINCPAC that the nickname EGRESS RECAP had been assigned and was to be used with all

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1. J1 Brief No. 7-69, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Feb 69 of JCS 2478/168-2 of 22 Jan 69, Subj: Policy for Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel (U).
 2. Ibid.
 3. Admin CINCPAC 192355Z Jul 69.
 4. CINCPACFLT 050411Z Nov 69.

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material associated with the processing of returned U. S. military personnel.¹ The name of the Service using the nickname could be appended to the nickname if appropriate. CINCPAC relayed this information to his subordinate unified and component command commanders.²

Changes to Designated Hostile Fire Area - Vietnam

(U) In February CINCPAC had recommended certain changes to the designated hostile fire area in Vietnam.³ The recommendation was supported by the JCS and forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In April the Secretary replied that the Department of Defense had no objection to modification along the lines recommended by CINCPAC. He noted, however, that CINCPAC proposed to extend the boundary for the southwestern coastal area. He felt that in the absence of any overriding reasons the hostile fire area should "reasonably adhere to the 12-mile coastal limitation which was initially used in designating the Vietnam hostile fire area."⁴ The JCS then asked for CINCPAC's comments or resubmission of a proposed boundary change.

(U) In reply, CINCPAC concurred that the hostile fire area should reasonably adhere to the 12-mile coastal limitation. He submitted the following definition of the hostile fire area:

The total land area of North and South Vietnam including inland waters and the adjacent sea area west of a line from a point on the east coast of Vietnam at the juncture of North Vietnam and China, southeastward to 21-00N, 108-15E, thence south to a point where it intersects a line 12 miles seaward from the base line from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured as shown on large scale charts of the coast of South Vietnam; thence continuing on that line to 10-16N, 103-38E, thence northeast to 10-21N, 103-44E, thence on straight lines to 10-23N, 103-49E; 10-26N, 103-54E; 10-30N, 103-55E; 10-30N, 104-01E; 10-28N, 104-06E; 10-16N, 104-14E, thence northeast to the junction of the Cambodia and Vietnam border; and the airspace thereover.... This boundary is proposed only to facilitate the administration of hostile fire pay. Change in the presently prescribed MARKET TIME operating area is not recommended.⁵

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1. JCS 6463/171604Z Dec 69.
 2. Admin CINCPAC 191947Z Dec 69.
 3. CINCPAC 040115Z Feb 69.
 4. JCS 6072/031507Z Apr 69.
 5. CINCPAC 162135Z Apr 69.

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(U) In May the JCS forwarded Defense Department approval of the change recommended by CINCPAC,¹ which redesignated the Vietnam hostile fire area by assignment of geographic coordinates.

Uniform Service Provisions for Hostile Fire Pay

(U) In the matter of special pay for duty subject to hostile fire there were certain inconsistencies among the Services in pay for certain aircraft passengers. Crew members or others who were actual participants in a tactical combat operation or part of Military Airlift Command flights over or landing in Vietnam were entitled to special pay for duty subject to hostile fire even if they were not actually exposed to such fire.

(U) The primary question concerned the eligibility for hostile fire pay of passengers--such as those on leave, in permanent change of station, travel, etc.--who were not actual participants and who had no duty in connection with tactical combat operations.²

(U) COMUSMACTHAI raised the question to CINCPAC in a letter dated 17 April 1969.³ CINCPAC referred the matter to CINCUSARPAC for action.⁴

(U) The matter was referred through Army channels to the Defense Department's Military Pay and Allowance Committee. Until this time the Army had not been awarding hostile fire pay to "passengers." The Air Force had been, according to CINCUSARPAC. The Navy and Marine Corps also paid such passengers, or at least it was indicated that they did.⁵ The Army asked that a uniform interpretation be approved by the Military Pay and Allowance Committee for application by all Services.⁶

(U) CINCPAC informed COMUSMACTHAI of the committee's decision on 4 August.⁷ Crew members were entitled to hostile fire pay when participating

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1. J1 Brief No. 27-69, Hq CINCPAC, n.d., of JCS 2478/289-2 of 20 May 69, Subj: Redesignation of Vietnam Hostile Fire Area.
 2. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
 3. Ltr, COMUSMACTHAI to CINCPAC, 17 Apr 69, Subj: Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire Pay.
 4. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
 5. Memorandum, Jesse W. Wickham, Alternate Army Member, Department of Defense Military Pay and Allowance Committee to Chairman, Department of Defense Military Pay and Allowance Committee, 23 May 69, Subj: Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire (SPHF).
 6. Ibid.
 7. Ltr, CINCPAC to COMUSMACTHAI, 4 Aug 69, Subj: Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire.

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in tactical or strategic combat operations within a designated hostile fire area. Crew members on a USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI flight landing in Vietnam were entitled to hostile fire pay if they engaged in combat or combat support operations or if they were subject to hostile fire. Passengers were determined to be not eligible for hostile fire pay unless their aircraft was actually subject to hostile fire while performing its mission in a designated hostile fire area.¹

(U) CINCPAC informed both CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT of the ruling to insure uniform application by the Services in the PACOM.²

Temporary Duty Assistance for DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI

(S) On 13 March 1969 the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI requested temporary duty assistance of two civilian personnel for 179 days to conduct a study of Lao Army budget and pay systems. He wanted an in-depth study of how the budget was prepared, what rationale was used, how cost figures were arrived at, how funds flowed from Vientiane to regions and from regions to field units, and what reporting was done from field units to regions to Vientiane.³ In mid-November two officers had finally been assigned to that task after a great number of messages had been exchanged at many levels in various departments.

(S) When CINCPAC inquired of his component commanders they replied that no personnel were available. His request to the Secretary of Defense also resulted in a negative reply.⁴ The Secretary of State suggested to the American Ambassador in Vientiane that an ad hoc committee be formed with members provided, perhaps, by AID, Attache, and CAS personnel.⁵ The Ambassador replied that for this special in-depth study the ad hoc committee was not the answer and he wanted two Army officers.⁶

(S) On 17 May CINCPAC asked the Department of the Army to take action.⁷ After several exchanges the Army replied that personnel were available within the PACOM and recommended that the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ltr, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT, 4 Aug 69, Subj: Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire.
 3. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 131030Z Mar 69.
 4. SECDEF 07878 B/260001Z Apr 69.
 5. SECSTATE 069523/032149Z May 69.
 6. AMEMB VIENTIANE 2953/100151Z May 69.
 7. Admin CINCPAC 171832Z May 69.

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requisition against his ceiling. ¹ The DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI replied that he needed temporary duty personnel as his permanent-change-of-station positions were required for operational matters. ² At one point CINCUSARPAC proposed sending a personnel team on temporary duty to determine the actual requirement, ³ but the Ambassador did not concur in this need.

(S) In November CINCUSARPAC agreed to provide one officer from the Eighth Army and CINCPAC asked COMUSMACTHAI to provide one officer, each for 90 days temporary duty. ⁴ The study was underway at the end of the year.

Joint Service Commendation Medal

(U) In November 1968 the JCS replied to a CINCPAC request that authority to award the Joint Service Commendation Medal be delegated to subordinate unified commands and joint activities headed by an officer of grade O-8 or higher. The JCS replied that they did not favor the broad delegation of authority, but did state that they would consider specific recommendations on a case-by-case basis. ⁵

(U) On 17 January 1969 CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a recommendation that authority to award the Joint Service Commendation Medal be delegated to COMUS Korea. ⁶ CINCPAC noted that COMUS Korea, under existing procedures, could only recommend the award. The recommendation was then forwarded to CINCPAC where personnel "who are quite distant from the service or achievement must approve or disapprove the award." ⁷ Existing procedures were time consuming in that board action was required by both COMUS Korea and CINCPAC. In the case of awards for meritorious achievement the procedures could result in "the award being presented long after the act of achievement." ⁸ CINCPAC recommended that authority be delegated to COMUS Korea to "improve responsiveness in formally recognizing achievement or service performed in support of a major element of the Pacific Command." ⁹

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1. CINCUSARPAC 120615Z Jul 69.
 2. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 9361/241031Z Sep 69.
 3. CINCUSARPAC 012240Z Nov 69.
 4. CINCUSARPAC 070403Z Nov 69.
 5. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. I, p. 203.
 6. CINCPAC 170230Z Jan 69.
 7. Ibid.
 8. Ibid.
 9. Ibid.

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(U) On 4 March the JCS advised CINCPAC that the Secretary of Defense had granted authority to COMUS Korea for award of the Joint Service Commendation Medal to "members assigned to his headquarters and those joint activities reporting to or through his command. "1

Rest and Recuperation (R&R)

(S) The R&R program continued throughout 1969, although this program naturally reflected total troop strength and would diminish with troop withdrawals. There were also some changes in sites available for R&R. Flights to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia were cancelled on 16 May because of rioting and the unstable political situation there. The site had already been scheduled for closure in June and it was never reopened.² In August the Secretary of State approved termination of the Penang R&R site and advised that public explanations regarding closing of the site should be based on the rationale of the U. S. -ARVN replacement program and the commensurate reduction in the R&R program.³ While these sites were being phased out, CINCUSARPAC recommended that the R&R program for Hawaii be expanded.⁴ Flights had been at the rate of two a day when CINCUSARPAC recommended that they be increased to three and then four a day. COMUSMACV recommended that any increase be more gradual than that proposed by CINCUSARPAC, but he agreed in principle. He also recommended that flights to Tokyo and Singapore be decreased concurrently with the Hawaii increase.⁵

(S) The matter of closing Japan as an R&R site was studied in 1969, because of its declining popularity and savings that could be effected if the site were closed.⁶ COMUSMACV stated that the use of the site should be continued at least temporarily to provide a variety of sites and because of possible increased interest in the site because of EXPO '70 (a world's fair type exhibition). The matter of terminating the program there would be studied again in 1970, CINCPAC advised.⁷

(S) Singapore was scheduled for termination of the R&R program effective 1 February 1970. No publicity was to be given for the phaseout and redeployment of U.S. personnel from Vietnam was to be used as an explanation.⁸ In addition, reasons furnished by CINCPAC to the JCS for the closure

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1. JCS 03845/042208Z Mar 69.
 2. AMEMB KUALA LUMPUR 1942/260930Z May 69.
 3. CINCPAC 200126Z Aug 69.
 4. CINCUSARPAC 272226Z Jun 69.
 5. COMUSMACV 42874/240809Z Jul 69.
 6. CINCUSARPAC 012221Z Nov 69.
 7. Admin CINCPAC 250342Z Nov 69.
 8. Admin CINCPAC 132205Z Nov 69.

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included below average seat utilization rate, reduced flights making the stationing of the R&R detachment there a matter of questionable economy, and the fact that R&R requirements could be satisfied by the remaining sites.¹

(C) In September CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to provide a listing of R&R sites in order of preferred priority for reduced participation or closure as requirements diminished.² His listing and the rationale for each started with Hawaii, which affected the largest number of Americans and which he recommended for an increase to shorten waiting time, reduce gold flow, and permit more personnel to visit the site of their choice. Next was Sydney because utilization was nearly 100 percent and it was the most popular site. Third was Bangkok, followed by Hong Kong, the most popular stopping site where the expenditure average was double that of other free port sites. Taipei had a high utilization rate and was increasing in popularity. The lowest utilization percentages were tallied for Tokyo, Manila, and Singapore. For these sites, most individuals were standbys who could not obtain space to the site of their choice for the time requested. COMUSMACV recommended that reductions should begin with Singapore, Manila, and Tokyo, but to permit variety he recommended that all sites be retained as long as economically possible.³

(C) The matter of apparel on R&R flights arose again in 1969. On 27 January CINCPAC concurred in a COMUSMACV proposal to authorize the wearing of civilian clothing while traveling on R&R aircraft to and from all sites except Hong Kong and Taipei.⁴ In March, however, the Thailand Supreme Command asked, through the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, that all military personnel arriving and departing Bangkok wear their uniforms.⁵ CINCPAC, in response to this request, asked COMUSMACTHAI, in coordination with the Ambassador, to resolve any problem areas that may have prompted the request and attempt to gain reconsideration or the reasons for such a request to revert to previous policy.⁶ Taipei was added to the sites for which civilian clothing was authorized effective 7 December 1969.⁷

(C) One last change regarding R&R programs for U.S. personnel occurred on 14 September, when CINCPAC approved a program to implement six nights

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1. J113 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
 2. Admin CINCPAC 060130Z Sep 69.
 3. COMUSMACV 53750/210934Z Sep 69.
 4. CINCPAC 272211Z Jan 69.
 5. COMUSMACTHAI 171047Z Mar 69.
 6. CINCPAC 280311Z Mar 69.
 7. COMUSMACV 67328/070446Z Dec 69.

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on the ground at all R&R sites beginning on or about 1 November. This was to make the program more uniform, as personnel going to sites farther from Vietnam had been being permitted six nights, while those not going so far had been allowed only five. Daily on-ground strengths were not to exceed existing authorizations and at least 127 hours was to be provided between scheduled flight arrivals and scheduled flight departures. Additionally, ordinary leave on R&R aircraft was to be restricted to the regular R&R cycle with personnel departing with one R&R group being required to return with that same group.¹

(C) The matter of R&R for Korean troops in Vietnam arose on 27 January when COMUSMACV recommended approval of a request received from the Deputy Commander of Korean forces in Vietnam to provide round trip transportation for approximately 1,897 ROK troops a month to Seoul for six days of R&R. The Korean general indicated that his officers and men could not afford to take R&R to countries other than Korea on their pay and allowances; he hoped that the program could be initiated at the earliest possible date.² CINCPAC in turn asked COMUS Korea to coordinate with the American Ambassador to Korea and provide comments and recommendations on the request.³

(C) After studying the matter, CINCPAC, on 23 May, recommended to the JCS that the program be initiated. Limited pay received by the Koreans, equity with other Free World Military Assistance Forces, and adverse morale impact on the Korean servicemen in Vietnam were listed as the basis for the recommendation. CINCPAC enumerated certain specifications including announcing the program through State Department channels for political impact, one R&R per duty tour per serviceman, use of Military Airlift Command airlift, U.S. personnel in Vietnam having close relatives or dependents in Korea be allowed to participate, the ROK Government was to provide the processing facility in Seoul, and discontinuance of the special leave program to Korea for Korean personnel when the R&R program was implemented.⁴ Study of the financing aspects of the program continued and in August CINCPAC passed information to the JCS that he had received from COMUSMACV and the Commanding Officer of the Military Airlift Command. CINCPAC stated a pilot program with less than full participation was not as desirable as the full program but would be preferable to prolonged delay solely for the purpose of financing the full program. He also suggested that the cost to be borne by each government be specifically designated to preclude the ROK Government from seeking reimbursement from the United States for the cost of operating

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1. CINCPAC 140002Z Sep 69.
 2. COMUSMACV 5563/271308Z Jan 69.
 3. CINCPAC 230224Z May 69.
 4. Ibid.

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the R&R center at Seoul or other costs such as round trip surface transportation from the center to the homes of participants.¹ The program still had not been approved in Washington by the end of the year.

1. CINCPAC 161738Z Aug 69.

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SECTION IX - LOGISTICS

(U) Approximately four years ago we began what is commonly referred to as the "Vietnam Buildup." A little over a year ago our troop strength in Vietnam approximated 540,000. The complementary logistics support story there is probably without parallel in modern times.

In Vietnam a billion dollar construction program to facilitate logistics requirements has been completed. It will remain a tribute to American ingenuity long after communist aggression has been checked. Midway in the buildup, the total short tons of military cargo moved into South Vietnam each month reached nearly 700,000 tons. More than 95 percent of this tonnage moved by sea and almost 1,000 tons of high priority cargo was lifted into Vietnam by air each day.

Today, in South Vietnam there are six major deep water ports and eight additional ports of lesser capacity. Eight new jet bases have been built. Moreover, in-country, airplanes and helicopters are vital parts of our airlift system.

That we could move combat troops into battle while simultaneously developing the logistics support bases required to sustain them was due to the outstanding support we had from the U. S. Transportation industry, the military transportation organizations, and the manufacturers of transportation equipment. This civilian/military team effort was clearly visible from the start of the buildup and has continued with great effectiveness and efficiency.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN¹

Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA)

(U) The establishment, organization, and operation of PURA were all described in some detail in last year's history.² It continued to perform its

1. Remarks of Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific, to the Fourth International Transportation Seminar of the Pacific at Honolulu, Hawaii, February 9, 1970.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 72-81.

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original function during 1969. From May 1968 through September 1969, PURA redistributed \$110.9 million of the \$391.3 million advertised.¹ Its performance for the remainder of Calendar Year 1969 was as follows: October, received nominations for \$25.6 million of excesses and caused redistribution action for \$5.7 million; November, received nominations for \$20.5 million of excesses and caused redistribution action for \$6.1 million; December, received nominations for \$27.1 million of excesses and caused redistribution action for \$3.7 million.²

(U) For PURA, the most significant occurrence during 1969 was the proposed changes to its mission. During its continual review and evaluation, the PURA Executive Committee, established by CINCPAC on 30 November 1967, had recognized some general limitations in the PURA design. "Significant amounts of materiel", for instance, "are passing through the various screening processes to ultimately be disposed of by sale which could be used to fill valid unfunded requirements for U.S. military, MAP, AID and Federal civil agencies."³ The situation in PURA, as a Hq CINCPAC document described it, was as follows:

The present system of securing final disposition instructions for excess materiel is slow and bulky. In addition MAP cannot secure materiel on a non-reimbursable basis until it has been reported to property disposal.⁴

(U) As early as January 1969, a PURA ad hoc Executive Committee was discussing a plan for MAP utilization of PACOM excesses.⁵ Although SECDEF had not concurred in CINCPAC's proposal in November 1968 to add MAP

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1. Point Paper, J4132, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Oct 69, Subj: PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA).
 2. J4132 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct-Dec 69; CINCPAC 132311Z Nov 69; Admin CINCPAC 102331Z Dec 69; CINCPAC 102318Z Jan 70.
 3. CINCPAC JOINT PURA REDESIGN STUDY Prepared for Secretary of Defense 1 November 1969, p. 1 and p. 1 of Annex J.
 4. Point Paper, J4132, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Jun 69, Subj: Proposed Changes to Mission of the PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA).
 5. Memorandum for Record, LCOL John M. Zemitis, USAF, Acting CINCPAC PURA Project Officer, 31 Jan 69, Subj: Proceedings of 30 Jan 69 CINCPAC PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Executive Committee Meeting held at J4 LRC CINCPAC; J4132 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.

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to PURA, he had "tasked CINCPAC to proceed with an in-depth study to determine the most economic and expeditious means of establishing a PACOM/ MAP screening system for MAP utilization of PACOM excesses prior to transfer of assets to" Property Disposal Offices (PDOs).¹

(U) In a message to SECDEF on 16 May 1969, CINCPAC outlined the problems of the existing PURA system and "requested that SECDEF approve a revised PURA concept which if implemented will optimize utilization of excess."² In the interim, a modified free issue program was developed and implemented. Just a month later, the status of a proposed PURA redesign was as follows:

3. SECDEF has directed that CINCPAC develop a system for providing MAP with PACOM excess at no cost. SECDEF guidance included the stipulation that Defense Logistics Service Center (DLSC) screening must be accomplished prior to providing MAP with materiel at no cost.

4. In response to a CINCPAC request for a non-reimbursement funding policy for PURA, SECDEF stated that the present free issue in the field with deferred billing at Department level would not be changed. However, SECDEF also stated that a controlled program of non-reimbursement for selected items could be established for materiel not returnable to CONUS wholesale managers.

5. Based on SECDEF guidance contained in above paragraphs, CINCUSARPAC has provided CINCPAC with a concept which would provide free issue to U.S. elements and MAP in that order. Significant elements of the concept are:

a. PACOM holding activities would submit all excess nominations to PURA as well as replenishment requisitions on a fill or pass to CONUS.

b. PURA would simultaneously screen intra (Army/ Navy), inter and CONUS IMs.... Where CONUS IMs had no

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1. Point Paper, J4333, Hq CINCPAC, 31 Jan 69, Subj: Plan for MAP Utilization of PACOM Excesses.
 2. Point Paper, J4132, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Jun 69, Subj: PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA), citing CINCPAC 160241 Z May 69.

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requirement they would advise PURA thru DLSC. Upon receipt of status that materiel was not required by CONUS, then items could be issued without reimbursement to U. S. military, MAP, and non-DOD U. S. Agencies in that order. Residue would be immediately available for sale without further reporting.¹

(U) In July 1969, the following month, SECDEF approved CINCPAC's:

... redesign concept and requested development of a detailed plan of implementation for submission to and approval by OASD (I&L). Plan should provide a comparison of present system versus proposed system, so that advantages and disadvantages of both systems may be clearly identified. Plan should also identify impact points; specify directives, regulations, and programs which will require revision; set forth additional resources required; and protect time-phasing for implementation of plan.²

(U) Operating under direction provided by a PURA ad hoc planning group, a study was conducted from 8 September through 31 October 1969 at Bruyeres Quadrangle, Fort DeRussy, Hawaii. The end result was the CINCPAC Joint PURA Redesign Study Prepared for Secretary of Defense, dated 1 November 1969. This study, or implementation plan gave the details of the concept, the resources required to support redesigned system, and recommended the management of PURA by CINCPAC with a location in Oahu, Hawaii. By letter on 12 November 1969, CINCPAC forwarded this study to SECDEF, recommending that "the PURA Redesign Study be expeditiously coordinated with interested agencies, and that all resources specified be made available by OSD in order to provide for implementation by 1 July 1970."³

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1. Point Paper, J4132, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Jun 69, Subj: Proposed Changes to Mission of the PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA).
 2. CINCPAC JOINT PURA REDESIGN STUDY Prepared for Secretary of Defense 1 November 1969, p. 1 of Annex J, citing SECDEF 4138/091432Z Jul 69.
 3. Ltr, CINCPAC to SECDEF, 12 Nov 69, Subj: CINCPAC Joint PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA) Redesign Study; J4132 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69; CINCPAC JOINT PURA REDESIGN STUDY Prepared for Secretary of Defense 1 November 1969, p. 2.

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Herbicide Program for Southeast Asia

(S) As Calendar Year 1966 ended, CINCPAC logistics planners were cognizant that the "inadequate supply of herbicide for use in SVN during the second half of FY 67, FY 68 and FY 69 will degrade significantly the MACV/GVN defoliation and crop destruction capability. "1 The availability of herbicide, according to DA, would provide less than 50% of COMUSMACV's stated requirement for FY 68, an amount even less than would be available in FY 67. DA advised that the Southeast Asia defoliant program had been reviewed by both DOD and the Department of Commerce and that immediate actions were necessary to preclude a serious shortage of herbicide. Actually, the magnitude of these projected shortages would "curtail or cancel plans for the defoliation of large target areas such as the southern half of the DMZ and War Zone C as well as many similar projects related to district and province programs. "2 Although DA had made three proposals to partially alleviate the shortage, CINCPAC would not "concur in any alternate proposal to alleviate the shortage that will result in increased sortie rates and increased risk for crews and aircraft to achieve the same results. "3 Instead, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS several courses of action that would be necessary in order to maintain the highly effective defoliant program at the required operational level. Since close coordination would be required to effectively manage herbicide assets, action was instituted "to establish a reporting system similar to that used for the control of air munitions which will furnish all elements of data required from producer to consumer. "4 By February 1967, the first such report, covering the month of January 1967, had been submitted to the JCS. 5

(S) By August 1967, Orange--the standard agent--was in short supply, with the only acceptable substitute being White, a slower acting herbicide. Another type, termed Blue, was used for crop destruction. The use of herbicides "for defoliation and crop destruction in SVN has expanded from 50,000 gallons in 1962 to supportable requirements of 8.86 million gallons in FY 68 and 11.88 million gallons for FY 69 and FY 70. "6 At this time, mid-1967, COMUSMACV generated the herbicide requirements, which were subject to CINCPAC's concurrence and approval by the JCS. The U.S. Air Force had single service supply responsibility, and the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) had procurement responsibility, while technical support and guidance for the

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1. Point Paper, J4224, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Dec 66, Subj: Shortage of Herbicide.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Point Paper, J4224, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67, Subj: Shortage of Herbicide.
 6. Point Paper, J4224, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Aug 67, Subj: Shortage of Herbicide.

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herbicide program was provided by DA. Also, the JCS-instituted monthly reporting system was accurately reflecting the status of the herbicide program from the point of production to the time of consumption.

(S) Earlier, on 20 March 1967, the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning had reserved all production of Orange through 31 March 1968 to be used solely to fill military requirements.¹ That such action was necessary was evident from the fact that COMUSMACV had a stand-down of his aircraft at Bien Hoa on 17 and 18 April 1967, because of the lack of herbicide. Complicating the situation was the fact that a vessel carrying herbicide had arrived in Saigon on 13 April 1967 "and could possibly have been discharged in time to preclude the stand-down. In addition, stocks of herbicide were on hand at Danang, which, if redistributed to Bien Hoa, could have eliminated the shortage."² In another effort to solve this herbicide shortage problem, on "31 July 1967, Deputy SECDEF approved an expansion program for the conversion of a government facility to produce Orange."³

(S) Within a year, however, the shortage of herbicide in South Vietnam had disappeared. "As of 31 May 1968, over 30 days supply was on hand at Saigon unsegregated and over 145 days supply on hand (segregated) at bases from which missions are flown for a total of 175 days against the 60 day stockage objective."⁴ Such sizable quantities on hand in-country had already prompted COMUSMACV to request a suspension of all shipments. CINCPAC concurred and, in turn, requested the JCS to take action to suspend future shipments.

(S) Meanwhile, on 26 April 1968, the JCS, recognizing the need for action to reduce in-country levels, announced a plan for attrition of herbicide stocks in South Vietnam, which would reduce in-country levels to a 60-day supply by March 1969. CINCPAC concurred in this JCS plan on 21 May 1968, and the following occurred before the end of the next month:

... To enhance the management of herbicides, CINCPAC recommended that the COMUSMACV herbicide management agent (7th AF) and the CONUS herbicide support manager be authorized direct exchange of asset, expenditure, receipt and shipping data. This exchange should be at a frequency to allow for responsive supply action to stay within the established

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1. Ibid.
 2. Point Paper, J4224, Hq CINCPAC, 5 May 67, Subj: Shortage of Herbicide.
 3. Point Paper, J4224, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Aug 67, Subj: Shortage of Herbicide.
 4. Point Paper, J4134, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jun 68, Subj: Status of Herbicide.

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stock levels and still recognize the dynamics of the herbicide operation in SEAsia. JCS, CINCPAC and PACAF should continue to monitor the program through the monthly herbicide report and provide assistance as required. CSAF and JCS concurred in the CINCPAC recommendation and it has been implemented. 1

(C) The primary contributing factor to this buildup of excess stocks had been the fluctuating monthly usage by COMUSMACV. Weather, aircraft maintenance, and unanticipated stand-downs had all contributed to meet planned usage, with the resulting stock buildup. Although COMUSMACV had reduced planned usage several times, forecast usage had been attained by December 1968 in only four months since the inception of the program. "As of 31 October 1968, over 6.95 months of supply was on hand at bases from which missions are flown. Additionally, more than 4.78 months of supply is being stored at CONUS Gulf Coast ports and over 3.78 months of supply is due in from current contracts." 2

(C) On 27 February 1969, the JCS discontinued the submission by CINCPAC of the monthly PACOM Herbicide Report. Herbicides were no longer in critical supply, explained the JCS, for the following reasons: (1) present stocks were adequate; (2) Southeast Asia requirements had been reduced; and (3) an expanded industry was capable of satisfying all of both civilian and military requirements. Henceforth, the U.S. Air Force would "manage herbicides as normal supply items." 3

(C) By mid-April 1969, CINCPAC had obtained a rescission of the policy "restrictions placed by the Embassy at Saigon on the use of orange and the requirement to use white when spraying as close as 5 kilometers to rubber plantations." 4 Because of these restrictions, the expenditure of White herbicide had increased, resulting in the need to procure more White, while a 18-month supply of Orange herbicide still existed either in RVN or CONUS. Once the Embassy had lifted its restrictions on the use of Orange, the necessity of procuring additional White decreased, if not completely obviated, and COMUSMACV could make a review of his already stated herbicide requirements and resubmit his new ones.

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1. Ibid.
 2. Point Paper, J4134, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, Subj: Status of Herbicide.
 3. JCS 3442/271522Z Feb 69; J4135 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
 4. Point Paper, J4135, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Apr 69, Subj: Status of Herbicide.

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(C) On 21 April 1969, CINCPAC received the following communication from COMUSMACV:

Reference A indicates additional quantities of White not ordered by this command are enroute to RVN. Attempts have been made since April 1968...to frustrate shipments of all types of herbicides except when requested by this headquarters.... yet in Nov 68, approximately 460,000 gals were received, and now another shipment is enroute. Considering the recent trial suspension of previous Embassy policy, the efforts made during previous month to reduce consumption of white is indicated in Ref E (which shows a three month supply on hand as of 1 April with another 30 day supply known to be enroute). This headquarters is unable to understand the rationale for additional shipment without clearance....¹

(C) The same day, CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF to provide the rationale requested by COMUSMACV. Two days later, CINCPACAF furnished both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV with the following rationale:

Rest assured that if it had been at all feasible, herbicide shipments identified in Ref Alfa would have been suspended. It should be recognized that the Embassy policy change came too late to suspend these shipments which were already programmed for timely resupply of RVN type White herbicide requirements.

... SAAMA assured this Hq that no further shipments of herbicides, regardless of type, would be scheduled until rqn's are received thru AF channels....²

(C) As of July 1969, the long supply of Orange still existed, and the procurement of White herbicide was being held in abeyance. COMUSMACV had reviewed and resubmitted requirements of "5.23 million gallons for FY 69 and 5.69 million gallons for FY 70 and FY 71."³ The CINCPAC position on herbicides at this time, as previous, was that "CINCPAC and PACAF should continue to monitor the program through the 7th AF monthly herbicide report and provide assistance as required."⁴

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1. COMUSMACV 23902/210440Z Apr 69.
 2. CINCPACAF DM 230158Z Apr 69; CINCPAC 212030Z Apr 69; J4135 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
 3. Point Paper, J4135, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jul 69, Subj: Status of Herbicide.
 4. Ibid.

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Responsibility for Terminal and Land Transportation Functions in RVN

(U) Operation of ocean and inland marine terminals in II, III, and IV CTZ, RVN, has been a normal mission of the U. S. Army. In early 1966, however, because of COMUSMACV's urgent requirement for additional lighterage and stevedoring services, MSTTS was appointed by DOD to contract for these services. Consequently, since that date, the Alaska Barge and Transport Company (AB&T), under contract to MSTTS, has provided stevedoring, lighterage, and beach clearance services at the ports of Vung Tau, Phan Rang, Cam Ranh Bay (shallow draft), and Nha Trang, as well as RVN intracoastal movement of cargo by tugs and barges.¹

(U) The AB&T contract was scheduled to expire on 7 December 1969, with an option for one year renewal. In April 1969, SECDEF directed DA to assume on 8 December 1969 the responsibility for the land transportation and terminal functions performed in RVN by AB&T under MSTTS contract. However, in June 1969, COMSTTS recommended that the AB&T contract in RVN be renewed for an additional year. "Rationale for this recommendation was that fragmentation of the present integrated system would result in a confused and more costly operation, and would lose to DOD the benefits of a highly developed contractor organization."² Upon receipt of COMSTTS's message, CINCPAC:

... requested comments and recommendations from COMUSMACV and CINCUSARPAC. COMUSMACV advised that it did not object to exercising the option for renewal of the AB&T contract, if MSTTS would provide (1) management cost data to CGUSARV, and (2) permit flexibility in the movement of AB&T resources from one site to another. CINCUSARPAC replied that the U. S. Army position on the exercise of the option to renew the contract would be determined at the DA level.³

(U) On 31 October 1969, CINCUSARPAC informed CGUSARV that SECDEF "requests Army to plan to assume port/terminal and land transportation functions effective 1 Jul 70 in Army RVN area of responsibility now performed under MSTTS/AB&T contract. DA requests plan be submitted by 9 Jan 70."⁴

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1. Point Paper, J4813, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Jan 70, Subj: Alaska Barge and Transport (AB&T) Terminal and Marine Operations in RVN.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCUSARPAC GPLO-SV/312107Z Oct 69.

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CINCPAC, a few weeks later, requested that "copies of the USARV plan be made available to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV in order that it may be reviewed to determine its impact on MACV logistic capabilities." ¹ Meanwhile, DA had requested that the U. S. Army not be required to assume this responsibility, and SECDEF subsequently ruled that AB&T, under MSTs contract, would continue to provide RVN terminal services through 7 December 1970. CINCPAC's position in this matter, as of 17 January 1970, was:

In view of the downward trend in the scale of RVN port operations, the Army's recommendation for renewal of the AB&T contract, and COMUSMACV's latest position on AB&T contract renewal, CINCPAC has no objection to MSTs extending and administering the AB&T RVN contract through 8 Dec 70. ²

Southeast Asia Real Property Assets Disposition Plan

(S) The JCS memorandum of 29 October 1969 tasked CINCPAC to prepare a coordinated plan for the disposition of real property assets in Southeast Asia to accommodate the phased incremental redeployment of U. S. forces. On 8 November, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's and COMUSMACTHAI's comments on the assumptions and consideration that should be included in the planning guidance being prepared. These inputs were to be forwarded to Hq CINCPAC by 14 November, since the JCS had given CINCPAC a deadline date of 15 December 1969 for developing the plan. In his message to these subordinate component commanders, CINCPAC furnished the following background:

2. It is noted that the U. S. military investment in facilities and other real property in SEAsia has high visibility, although it is relatively modest in relation to the total cost of the war. Construction and equipment programs have received close scrutiny. Present and future programs for acquisition, redistribution, and disposal will be monitored closely. While considerable effort has been made in the area, as shown by OPlans, logistic improvement plans and directive, it is necessary to consolidate interrelated actions into a single plan.

3. The JCS requirement is for a single coordinated plan for disposition of real property to accommodate phased

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1. CINCPAC 190537Z Nov 69; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
 2. Point Paper, J4813, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Jan 70, Subj: Alaska Barge and Transport (AB&T) Terminal and Marine Operations in RVN.

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incremental redeployment of U.S. Forces. The plan must be responsive to redeployments of varying size at varying intervals. It must be flexible, as variation in phasing of redeployments affects requirements for remaining U.S. Forces, other U.S. Agencies, allied forces and allied governments.... 1

(S) On 14 November 1969, CINCPAC announced to COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI a schedule designed to meet the JCS suspense. He also provided the detailed planning assumptions and considerations that would be used in the development of this disposition plan. He began his message with the following statement:

2. Many current documents and effective actions underway fit this requirement. However, it is necessary to bring all efforts together under one comprehensive plan to ensure that there will be no appearance of inefficiency or waste of resources, as well as no actual waste, and to ensure that an adequate audit trail is left for all real property actions.²

(S) By letter on 15 December 1969, CINCPAC forwarded, as requested by the JCS, a plan for the disposition of real property assets in Southeast Asia. He, furthermore, mentioned the following to the JCS:

2. (S) Significant questions are raised in the consideration of future requirements of U.S. Forces for facilities in Southeast Asia. Retention of selected facilities in operable or caretaker status to support CINCPAC plans is mentioned in paragraph 4.a. of the enclosure. Requirements for such facilities are being investigated and recommendations will be submitted.³

(S) The same day, CINCPAC provided copies of this plan to his component commanders, as well as to COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI; the latter two were also tasked to develop an implementing plan by 1 February 1970 in full coordination with the PACOM Service commanders. The importance with which CINCPAC viewed this plan showed in his letter forwarding the copies:

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1. CINCPAC 081942Z Nov 69; J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
 2. Admin CINCPAC 140356Z Nov 69; J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
 3. Ltr, CINCPAC to Chairman, JCS, 15 Dec 69, Subj: Disposition of Property in Southeast Asia.

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2. ~~(S)~~ The purpose of the enclosed plan seems clear, but I would like to rephrase it and ask that you pass this to all subordinate units, to make sure that there is no misunderstanding at any level: Use our remaining facilities assets to help and encourage the Government of Vietnam and Royal Thai Government Forces as much as possible. For our own more temporary needs, make do and do without so that we will get the greatest and longest overall benefit from the residual assets that are still available.

3. (U) The Free World countries of Southeast Asia face a long and difficult struggle in defending their freedom against Communist aggressors. They will need all the help we can give them. With very austere funding in view for the future, it is most important that we make maximum use of all resources to help them in their future defense efforts.¹

MACV Critical Items Distribution/Allocation Committee (MACVDAC)

(U) On 8 September 1968, CINCPAC approved revised Terms of Reference (TOR) for MACVDAC and provided them to COMUSMACV for implementation. Subsequently, before the end of the year, "interested personnel from Service Components and the Departments went to Vietnam to develop internal working procedures. In addition the team developed interface procedures between the MACVDAC and the DADAC which were forwarded by CINCUSARPAC to DA for concurrence and implementation."²

~~(S)~~ In a message to CINCPAC on 10 February 1969, COMUSMACV requested a modification of the TOR for MACVDAC to include authority for the distribution and allocation of equipment items in short supply to U.S. military advisory elements in RVN. The existing TOR restricted MACVDAC's authority only to actions related to RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (I&M) Programs.³ "Evaluation of the request in the light of comments by the Service Components and emergency exception criteria contained in JCS PUB 2 led to the conclusion that further expansion of MACVDAC Terms of Reference

1. Ltr, CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAI, 15 Dec 69, Subj: CINCPAC Logistics Plan, Facilities No. F-70; J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. Point Paper, J4132, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Dec 68, Subj: MACV Distribution/Allocation Committee (MACVDAC); CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 93.
3. COMUSMACV 100344Z Feb 69; J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.

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was not warranted at this time. ¹ CINCPAC communicated his position in this matter on 22 March 1969.

(S) From 15 through 18 September 1969, a joint working level conference met in the PACOM Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) to discuss the role of MACVDAC in:

... the in-country redistribution of available assets as U. S. units in RVN are redeployed or inactivated. Informal agreement was reached among PACOM, PACOM Service Components, and MACV representatives as to the scope of MACVDAC authority and areas wherein this authority might be exercised under the existing CINCPAC approved Terms of Reference to facilitate RVNAF improvement and modernization. ²

FREIGHTER CARGO Reporting

(S) On 20 April 1969, CINCPAC announced that a conference would be held at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, in the latter part of 1969. Its purpose would be to refine proposed transportation reports and to examine materiel actions that would assist in the management of FREIGHTER CARGO, a nickname for the logistic plan for complete RVN withdrawal, actions³ This conference was held as scheduled on 26 and 27 May 1969:

... The conferees prepared preliminary formats for reporting overall passenger and cargo movement, unit deployments and special items of interest such as ammunition and light aircraft. Details of the reporting procedures would later be briefed to the CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board in July. ⁴

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1. J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69; CG FMFPAC 172214Z Feb 69; CINCPACAF 180530Z Feb 69; CINCUSARPAC 260432Z Feb 69; CINCPACFLT 262152Z Feb 69.
 2. J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
 3. CINCPAC 200131Z Apr 69; J482 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69; Intv, Mr. George N. Bech, Jr., J4823, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 26 Mar 70.
 4. J4823 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; CINCPAC 100324Z May 69.

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~~TS~~ The FREIGHTER CARGO Materiel and Transportation Reporting System was presented to the PACOM JTB Meeting on 10 July 1969. Because of the wide latitude of logistic involvement, however, CINCPAC again requested his component commanders, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAI on 15 August 1969 "to provide comments/recommendations prior to publication of Appendix VII, Annex F, CINCPAC OPlan 50-69." ¹ Subsequently, on 13 September 1969, CINCPAC was able to forward a finalized consolidation of all FREIGHTER CARGO Materiel and Transportation Reports to the JCS, Service Departments, component commanders, and sub-unified commands. This action was the terminal one, for nothing further of significance occurred during the remainder of Calendar Year 1969. ²

Revision of CINCPAC Instruction (CINCPACINST) 4551.1

(U) Early in 1969, CINCPACINST 4551.1A, a revision of "CINCPACINST 4551.1, was approved by J4 and released for distribution. It updates policies and procedures for the disposition of U.S. Government property held by construction contractors in Vietnam and Thailand." ³

Transportation - Control Measures

PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB)

(U) The PACOM JTB was established in August 1966 to provide effective and economical utilization of PACOM transportation resources. During Calendar Year 1969, the PACOM JTB held two special meetings and four regular meetings at the following places and on the following dates:

- (1) 20 March 1969 - At Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii
- (2) 21 June 1969 - Special Movement Planning Conference

At Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii

- (3) 9 July 1969 - Section I - At Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii

10 July 1969 - Section II - At Western Area Military
Traffic Management and Terminal Services,
Oakland, California

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- 1. Admin CINCPAC 130045Z Sep 69, citing CINCPAC 150540Z Aug 69.
 - 2. J4823 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69; Admin CINCPAC 130045Z Sep 69; Intv, Mr. George N. Bech, Jr., J4823, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 26 Mar 70.
 - 3. J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.

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- (4) 19 September 1969 - At Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii
- (5) 4 October 1969 - Special Movement Planning Conference

At Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii

- (6) 4 December 1969 - At Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii¹

~~(C)~~ The two special PACOM JTB meetings were called to "develop a CINCPAC Movement Program for the redeployment of troops from RVN in consonance with the President's announcements. The movements were designated KEYSTONE EAGLE and KEYSTONE CARDINAL."²

(U) Summarized below are the more significant accomplishments of the regular PACOM JTB meetings during 1969:

- a. Established definite procedures with CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CG FMFPAC, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAI for the implementation of "FREIGHTER CARGO" and "FRESH LOOK."
- b. Established a CINCPAC Joint Logistics Council (JLC), CINCPACINST 4600.1, 18 October 1969, consisting of the same members of the JTB. The purpose of the JLC is to function as an advisory body to the CINCPAC on logistics matters of Unified Command interest.
- c. Established U. S. Customs, Agriculture and Public Health inspection procedures in RVN to reduce the delay in the redeployment of troops and the movement of retrograde cargo from RVN through CONUS aerial and water ports of entry.
- d. Improved and expanded container/containership service to PACOM area.
- e. Resolved the movement of outsize air cargo when

- 1. Memo, Mr. Louis A. Moccia, JTB Recorder/Secretary, J4832, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. T. R. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 19 Feb 70, Subj: CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board (JTB).
- 2. Ibid.

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the Military Airlift Command phased out the C-124 aircraft in December 1969.¹

Diversion of Shipping Standard Operating Procedure

(U) By means of a detailed message on 12 March 1969, CINCPAC standardized the "methods of requesting, reviewing, approving and ordering diversion of MSTS cargo ships, other than tankers, in PACOM."² The diversion procedure that he set forth:

... provides a definition of terms, details responsibilities and enumerates situations for which actions are required of CINCPAC, Subordinate Unified Commanders and/or Service Component Commanders in the diversion of shipping due to logistics requirements. The diversion by MSTS commands of ships for operational necessity, weather, repair or emergency is not covered in this procedure.³

(U) Apparently, some confusion occurred in April and July 1969 over that portion of the diversion procedure that stated "when authority is granted for a ship to be diverted from its original destination(s), the requestor of the diversion is responsible for insuring that advance manifests and cargo stow plans are forwarded to the new discharge port(s)."⁴ Finally, on 11 July 1969, CINCPAC requested his component commanders and COMUSMACV to ensure that all requestors of diversion actions are acquainted with, and comply with, the provisions of the CINCPAC ship diversion procedures in order to "preclude confusion and ensure proper distribution of manifests."⁵

Thailand Port Capability Report (CINCPAC RCS 4600-14)

(U) On 2 June 1967, CINCPAC initiated the submission of the Thailand Port Capability Report (CINCPAC RCS 4600-14), a 12-month daily throughput report, which was updated quarterly, for the ports of Sattahip and Bangkok in Thailand. By 1 October 1969, however, it became evident that this report was

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1. Ibid.; see also J4832 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Feb, Mar, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, and Dec 69.
 2. CINCPAC 122133Z Mar 69.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCPAC 262359Z Apr 69; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69; CMDR WAMTMTS 911419/251750Z Apr 69; J481A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69; CMDR WAMTMTS 918812/072030Z Jul 69.
 5. Admin CINCPAC 110545Z Jul 69.

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no longer needed, because of the "current stabilized condition of Thailand port facilities and the availability of Thailand port capability information in" the PACOM Port Capability Projections Report (CINCPAC RCS 4600-5).¹ Therefore, CINCPAC discontinued effective immediately the submission of the Thailand Port Capability Report. However, he requested that future submissions of the PACOM Port Capability Projections Report would include a separate port capability projection for the port of Vayama in Thailand.

Request for the Rerouting of an Ammunition Ship

(S) DEPCJUSMAGTHAI, on 13 October 1969, requested CINCPAC to arrange to have the ammunition ship, GREEN MOUNTAIN STATE, diverted from its original routing in order to "insure continuous flow of ammunition which is used in direct support of combat missions and to prevent special airlift requirement."² The following day, COMSTSFE provided CINCPAC with the present routing of the ship and requested a new routing.³ On 15 October 1969, CINCPAC provided the new routing, placing Vayama as the second port of call even though the cargo for other ports was overstowed; because of the "need for expeditious delivery versus alternate routing," CINCPAC considered that "internal cargo handling time is less than transit and discharge time associated with alternate route."⁴

Control of Air Cargo 463L Pallets

(S) From 19 March 1967 through 22 January 1968, the importance of controlling 463L air cargo pallets had been repeatedly emphasized at all levels of command throughout PACOM. After the JCS indicated in early 1968 the impact caused by the shortage of pallets, however, CINCPAC again stressed the importance of pallet control on 23 March 1968. Later in the year, on 26 December, he further requested his component and subordinate commanders to place the maximum possible command emphasis on this problem. Within two days, COMUSMACV assured CINCPAC that an aggressive program had been established in Vietnam to recover pallets and that it would be supported to the fullest.⁵

1. Admin CINCPAC 012330Z Oct 69; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
2. DEPCJUSMAG Bangkok Thailand 69-2354/131006Z Oct 69; J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
3. COMSTSFE 140450Z Oct 69.
4. CINCPAC 150508Z Oct 69; J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
5. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 105 and 106.

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(C) In response, on 1 January 1969, CINCUSARPAC directed his subordinate activities to search for "463L pallets, nets, tiedown straps and chains" and to return those found to the nearest local airfield.¹ A month later, CINCUSARPAC reported the establishment of "an aggressive Army program, throughout the Pacific area, to ensure rapid return of pallets and associated air tie-down gear."² COMUS Korea, meanwhile, on 10 January 1969, informed CINCPAC that stringent controls over pallet use in Korea had already been established and that no change to the existing procedures was contemplated.³

(U) Nevertheless, as the JCS advised all commanders of unified and specified commands on 19 March 1969, the total air cargo pallet level in CONUS was at a critically low level, similar to the situation during the 1968 Tet offensive. In an attempt to alleviate this situation, all activities under CINCPAC's command were to "be requested to return all 463L air cargo pallets on hand to the nearest Air Force air terminal for immediate use in the airlift system."⁴ Three days later, CINCPAC requested his component and subordinate commanders to provide continuing emphasis in this area and to notify their subordinate activities of this concern expressed by the JCS.⁵

(U) By mid-May 1969, however, MAC (Military Airlift Command) was able to report that its pallet inventory level of 6,578 in CONUS was the highest level achieved in many months. The steady improvement of the situation in April from the dangerously low level in March had made it possible to avoid floorloading. On 21 May 1969, CINCPAC assured MAC that his command emphasis on the recovery of air cargo pallets would continue.⁶

Review of a Proposal for Control of Retrograde Materiel from RVN to CONUS

(C) DA forwarded the following letter to CINCUSARPAC on 14 February 1969:

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1. CINCUSARPAC 52735/010550Z Jan 69; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
 2. J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69; CINCUSARPAC 4268/012100Z Feb 69.
 3. COMUSKOREA UK 56771/100805Z Jan 69.
 4. JCS 5092/192311Z Mar 69; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
 5. CINCPAC 220344Z Mar 69.
 6. MAC 162305Z May 69; Admin CINCPAC 210530Z May 69; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.

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1. The Army Materiel Command's Logistic Control Office, Pacific (LCO-P) in anticipation of the increased retrograde movement from South Vietnam to CONUS has proposed a concept of documentation flow to provide assistance in the control of materiel from the time it departs USARV until arrival at CONUS destination.

2. This proposal is based on the premise that there will be a need to maintain item identity during the lift and shipment phase of retrograde and a need for a focal point in CONUS to receive materiel retrograde intelligence and initiate timely actions pertaining to the retrograde....

3. Request inclosed LCO-P proposal be reviewed, coordinated with interested staff agencies of CINCPAC and MACV, and your comments/recommendations, as to the feasibility of utilizing this system for the control and monitoring of retrograde movements from SVN to CONUS destinations, be provided this office....¹

(S) On 1 March 1969, CINCUSARPAC requested CINCPAC to review this LCO-P proposal, to coordinate it with COMUSMACV, and to provide his comments and/or recommendations. CINCPAC, in turn, sent the proposal to COMUSMACV for his review and comments. A reply was forthcoming from COMUSMACV on 11 April 1969, stating that information received from Hq USARV indicated:

...that the procedures posed by the LCO-P Proposal were rejected, by interested agencies, during a recent Freighter Cargo Conference. This conference was held at the Logistics Control Office Pacific, 17-21 March 1969.

2. This headquarters concurs in the agreed course of action to adopt existing Milstrip/Milstamp procedures for the control of retrograde cargo rather than introduce a new system.²

(S) After reviewing the LCO-P proposal and securing COMUSMACV's comments and recommendation, CINCPAC returned the LCO-P proposal to

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1. Ltr, DA to CINCUSARPAC, 14 Feb 69, Subj: LCO-P Proposal Review.
 2. 5th Ind to ibid.

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CINCUSARPAC on 24 April 1969 with the following comment:

1. This headquarters concurs in course of action to adapt existing Milstrip/Milstamp procedures for the control of retrograde cargo rather than initiate a new system.¹

KEYSTONE EAGLE

(C) On 8 June 1969, President Nixon announced at the Midway Conference that the U. S. would redeploy approximately 25,000 troops from RVN between 1 July and 31 August 1969. To implement this decision, Hq CINCPAC took two initial actions:

- a. A Redeployment Planning Conference was convened at Camp Smith on 12 - 14 June 1969. Its purpose was to determine the movement requirements and to consider the ancillary problems incident to the President's decision. The major thrust of the conference was to refine the planning which had been accomplished on a close-hold basis. The Steering Committee noted that this redeployment plan is part of a broad objective to Vietnamize the war. As stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense, the objective of Vietnamizing the war is to transfer progressively to the Republic of Vietnam greatly increased responsibility for all aspects of the war in Vietnam. The Committee also noted that planning should stay as flexible as possible in the Paris negotiations, and changes in the military situation in Southeast Asia.

- b. The CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board (JTB) Movement Planning Conference was held at Camp Smith, Hawaii, on 19 - 21 June 1969 to prepare the Movement Program for the redeployment from RVN to PACOM and CONUS destinations. Participating in the conference were representatives from the OSD, JCS, CINCSTRIKE, MAC, MSTs, the PACOM Components, COMUSMACV and Components, and other interested agencies. (The guidelines followed were those established at the previously mentioned Redeployment Planning Conference. The Movement Program, as published, is in consonance with those guidelines; however, it is subject to modification where necessary to meet operational conditions

1. 6th Ind to ibid.; J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.

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and requirements related to RVNAF effectiveness goals of COMUSMACV.) The conferees refined requirements and applied transportation resources for the movement of passengers and unit equipment redeploying by air and sea. The Program was briefed to and approved by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS during the week of 23 June. ¹

(S) This redeployment was given the codename of KEYSTONE EAGLE, Phase I of Incremental Redeployment from RVN. Instructions to implement the CINCPAC Movement Program of 20 June 1969, which established the departure of troops from RVN, were issued by CINCPAC, the Military Services, component commanders, Transportation Single Managers, and COMUSMACV. In all, 11 changes to this Movement Program were proposed, concurred in, and incorporated into this program before KEYSTONE EAGLE was completed. The redeployment was accomplished with the first movement beginning on 8 July and the last on 28 August 1969. The majority of the USA personnel were airlifted with only a minimum number moving by sea to accompany unit supplies and equipment. The majority of the USN and USMC personnel and equipment redeploying within PACOM moved via fleet shipping. ²

(S) During KEYSTONE EAGLE, COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC with a daily 24-hour progress or situation report, projected movement reports, and a 10-day total report covering the withdrawal of personnel and cargo. CINCPAC, who assumed operational command of CONUS-destined units at 140 degrees West Longitude, and receiving PACOM commands provided arrival and closing reports to CINCPAC. In all, CINCPAC provided 52 CINCPAC KEYSTONE EAGLE Daily Movement Situation Reports to the JCS, with the final one on 29 August 1969. Sufficient data had been available to CINCPAC, as well as all others concerned, to adequately monitor implementation of the redeployment. The grand totals involved in KEYSTONE EAGLE were 25,097 personnel and 15,284 short tons of cargo. On 11 and 12 August 1969, a critique of KEYSTONE EAGLE was conducted by a PACOM JTB working group. In a message on 17 August 1969, CINCPAC promulgated the lessons learned, stating that they were "furnished for the info and guidance of all concerned in order that future redeployments may achieve the optimum degree of

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1. Point Paper, J481A, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jul 69, Subj: KEYSTONE EAGLE.
 2. Ibid.; Intv, Mr. George N. Bech, Jr., J4823, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobbridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 26 Mar 70; J481A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69; CINCPAC 150010Z Jun 69; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69; Admin CINCPAC 290543Z Aug 69.

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effectiveness, efficiency and economy. "1

KEYSTONE CARDINAL

(S) On 16 September 1969, President Nixon announced another troop reduction in RVN, which ultimately was given the codename of KEYSTONE CARDINAL, Phase II of Incremental Redeployment from RVN. CINCPAC immediately took steps to implement the transportation aspects of this troop redeployment, which were described in his message to the JCS on 4 October 1969:

1. (U) A special CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board Movement Planning Conference was held 2-4 Oct to prepare a movement program addressing the transportation aspects for redeployment of units from RVN thru 15 Dec 69. The Movement Program was prepared in coordination with all interested CINCPAC and CONUS Commands and agencies....

... The movements of personnel and cargo is scheduled during the period 21 Sep 69 thru 14 Dec 69. The Movement Program addresses the redeployment from RVN of approximately 15,396 troops and 35,700 S/T of cargo. In addition the rotation of casualties and reduction in the personnel replacement flow to RVN and other MACV personnel actions will achieve the new MACV authorized strength of 484,000.

3. (U) The Movement Program is subject to modification where necessary in order to meet operational situations and requirements related to the RVNAF effectiveness goals of COMUSMACV. Release of forces from MACV OPCON to component commands will be effected accordingly.

4. (U) No logistical problems are foreseen that would materially affect the redeployment.

5. (U) Appropriate implementing instructions are being issued. CINCPAC will render a daily SITREP covering movements accomplished in accordance with the CINCPAC

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1. CINCPAC 170142Z Aug 69; Point Paper, J4811, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Aug 69, Subj: KEYSTONE EAGLE; J4823 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jul and Aug 69; CINCPAC 040541Z Jul 69; Admin CINCPAC 290543Z Aug 69; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.

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Movement Program.¹

(S). The same procedures utilized during KEYSTONE EAGLE were also utilized during KEYSTONE CARDINAL. For various reasons, the CINCPAC Movement Program of 4 October 1969 was modified through 10 changes. All personnel were moved as of 14 December 1969. In all, CINCPAC provided 62 CINCPAC KEYSTONE CARDINAL Daily Movement Situation Reports to the JCS, with the final one on 15 December 1969, reflecting a total movement of 14,353 personnel and 28,375 short tons of cargo.²

Transportation - Surface

Containership Service to RVN

(S) Containership service commenced to RVN at Da Nang on 1 August 1967, under a MSTS-contract with Sea-Land Service, Inc. As Calendar 1968 ended, the following service was being provided:

Service to Okinawa and the Philippines is by self-sustaining T-3 containerships which make both parts of call on each sailing. Service to Danang is provided by self-sustaining C-2 ships. Non-self-sustaining C-4J ships arrive Cam Ranh Bay every fifteen days and discharge their 654 containers by pier installed 40 ton Gantry Cranes. Trans-shipment from Cam Ranh to Saigon and Qui Nhon is via a C-2 self-sustaining shuttle ship carrying 226 containers.

In RVN Sea-Land discharges the containerships and delivers within a radius of thirty miles of the pier. Deliveries beyond the thirty mile radius are by military tractors and drivers. Retrograde cargo can be moved at rates approximately 70% to 80% of the outbound charges.³

1. CINCPAC 042337Z Oct 69; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69; Admin CINCPAC 200431Z Sep 69; Intv, Mr. George N. Bech, Jr., J4823, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 26 Mar 70.
2. CINCPAC 152149Z Dec 69; COMUSMACV 190830Z Dec 69; Admin CINCPAC 200437Z Dec 69; J4823 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct-Dec 69; CINCPAC 310422Z Dec 69; CINCPAC 131905Z Dec 69; J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; CINCPAC 262159Z Sep 69; J4811 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69.
3. Point Paper, J4815, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Dec 68, Subj: Containership Service to PACOM.

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(C) Following a comprehensive study, CINCPAC provided COMSTS in late 1968 with detailed requirements and capabilities for expanded container service to RVN. Subsequently, in a response to a CINCPAC request, COMUSMACV outlined a concept for this expanded service and set forth its basic requirements, which were forwarded to COMSTS. Meanwhile, containerizable cargo for Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay had been overgenerating in CONUS west coast ports, and the excess was being diverted to break-bulk shipping. As an interim measure, until he could issue a Request for Procurement (RFP) under competitive bid for this added service, COMSTS had added an additional C-4J ship to the Cam Ranh Bay schedule beginning on 16 December 1968 and revised the Okinawa and Da Nang schedules in order to send an occasional larger ship to Da Nang to help reduce the excesses in CONUS.¹

(U) On 7 January 1969, CINCPAC requested COMSTS to incorporate COMUSMACV's requirements, as amended by CINCPAC, "in forthcoming RFP, as appropriate without delay to establishment of services requested" by CINCPAC on 13 October 1968 "and without potential detriment to overall lowest landed cost rates which may otherwise be realized."² Three days later, COMUSMACV identified some areas that would require improvement in capabilities in order to accommodate the proposed expanded scope. CINCPAC, in a message to COMSTS on 12 January 1969, requested that these improvements also be incorporated and that those that could not be added at this time should be considered in future program and/or contract expansion.³

(C) By 10 April 1969, COMSTS issued a RFP for added service to RVN and, by 13 December 1969, Container Agreement (CA) 1380 had been executed; it provided for expanded Sea-Land service through July 1971, and contained many distinct advantages. CINCPAC's position throughout Calendar Year 1969 had remained the same: "To maintain the optimum container service to RVN, to provide rapid turnaround of shipping with resultant decrease in port/depot congestion, demurrage, and pilferage."⁴

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1. Ibid.; CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 112; CINCPAC 130028Z Oct 68; COMUSMACV 41978/140439Z Dec 68; COMUSMACV 43184/191715Z Dec 68; COMUSMACV 311655Z Dec 68.
 2. CINCPAC 070534Z Jan 69; J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
 3. COMUSMACV 1912/101046Z Jan 69; CINCPAC 120040Z Jan 69; J4812 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
 4. Point Paper, J4811, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Dec 69, Subj: Containership Service to RVN; Point Paper, J4815, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Apr 69, Subj: Containership Service to PACOM; Point Paper, J4815, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Dec 68, Subj: Containership Service to PACOM.

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(U) On 3 December 1969, COMSTS queried CINCPAC about the acceptability of a Sea-Land proposed change in service to Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, and Qui Nhon. CINCPAC, in turn, requested his component commanders and COMUSMACV to review the proposed change and to provide their views as to acceptability by 13 December. The replies indicated acceptability of the change, with COMUSMACV requesting that shuttle reefer service be provided to Da Nang. On 16 December 1969, CINCPAC forwarded his concurrence to COMSTS on the proposed change and requested, if feasible, shuttle reefer service to Da Nang.¹

PACOM Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) System

(U) No significant problems were anticipated--and none were experienced--in the operation of the PACOM RO/RO system in Calendar Year 1969. In fact, this system worked excellently. During this period, the PACOM RO/RO shipping system operated between Okinawa and Saigon, Cam Ranh, Qui Nhon, Da Nang, and Sattahip. Of the two USNS ships and two chartered ships in the MSTs RO/RO shipping assets, the USNS COMET and SS TRANSGLOBE were assigned to PACOM RO/RO service, while USNS SEALIFT was approved for use in PACOM as requirements dictated. The vehicle assets consisted "of 2,400 twelve ton trailers, 50 land tractors, and ten Walter Tractors."²

(U) The following quotation has been reproduced to provide a summarized description of how the PACOM RO/RO system operated throughout 1969, as well as its status and CINCPAC's position in mid-December 1969:

The port of Da Nang cannot utilize the RO/RO capability of either COMET or SEALIFT due to pier non-compatibility; these (COMET and SEALIFT) ships are worked as conventional cargo ships. TRANSGLOBE can efficiently utilize stern ramps. There are no current plans to upgrade the port of Da Nang RO/RO facilities.


The ports of Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay work RO/RO ships using the stern ramps. In addition, the side ports of

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1. COMSTS 031513Z Dec 69; CINCPAC 032305Z Dec 69; CINCPAC 160225Z Dec 69; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 2. Point Papers, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Dec 68, 7 Mar 69, 19 Mar 69, and 13 Dec 69, Subj: PACOM RO/RO System; Intv, CDR Fred L. Brady, USN, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 26 Mar 70.

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PACIFIC SEALIFT ROUTES MSTS



SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 110.

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the SEALIFT can be used at Cam Ranh Bay efficiently. There is no planned construction or upgrading for either port.

The RO/RO facility at Qui Nhon has no stern discharge capability; one of the RO/RO ships, SEALIFT, can work the side ports at the Delong pier. COMET and TRANSGLOBE cannot work the side ports due to the height above the pier and the steep slope of the ramp incline. Stern ramp facilities are planned.

2nd Log Command RO/RO cargo projections for the fourth quarter of CY 69, equal 60,000 net M/T per month. Total ship capability is approximately 38,200 M/T. Normally each RO/RO ship completes two voyages during a month, however, SEALIFT has had maintenance problems which resulted in sporadic use of her services since Jul 69. In addition COMET has been in overhaul in Japan and is just now returning to service. Therefore there have been shortfalls in capability versus requirements.

MSTS has met shortfall in capability by placing RO/RO cargo on LSTs and SEATRAINS as requirements dictate.

Users of the system, mainly in RVN, have continually recommended the RO/RO system be placed on a set schedule similar to reefer ships. MSTS position is that scheduled service would result in low ship utilization and not be responsive to the total system requirements.

CINCPAC POSITION: The PACOM RO/RO system as constituted is reliable and fulfills the concept of rapid delivery of ready to use vehicles and high priority cargo. To place the RO/RO ships, or any other type complementing the system, on a schedule is not the best utilization of ships or within the MSTS requirement for meeting RDDs of offered cargo. Support will be given to improving port capability and improved cargo offering procedures by customers to enhance the RO/RO system responsiveness.¹

Increased RO/RO Assets for Western Pacific (WESTPAC)

(S) As reported in last year's history, CINCPAC had requested in late

1. Point Paper, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Dec 69, Subj: PACOM RO/RO System.

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December 1968 a review of RO/RO requirements in WESTPAC to justify the assignment of USNS SEALIFT to WESTPAC service vice CONUS to Okinawa service.¹ This request was based on the fact that the two assigned RO/RO ships fulfilled only 50% of the historical and projected WESTPAC RO/RO requirements. In the end, however, MSTs did not concur in this proposal, stating that USNS SEALIFT could better be used between CONUS and Vietnam.²

(C) CINCPAC, in turn, responded to COMSTS on 15 January 1969 as follows:

3. The transpacific route does not capitalize on the RO/RO feature which provides rapid ship turnaround through discharge of "ready-to-use" vehicles and of trailers assigned to the RO/RO fleet. Transpacific run would likely carry primarily "dead vehicles" and, therefore, preclude achievement of one of the benefits of the RO/RO concept. Further, within the 90 day period for one transpacific round trip, six WESTPAC trips could have been performed. The cargo carried on these six trips could enable release of two LSTs and two SEATRAN ships for service elsewhere, in addition to providing required satisfactory service to the port of Qui Nhon.

4. Request reconsideration be given to assigning SEALIFT to WESTPAC service. If an evaluation period is required, a period of 90 days is considered sufficient to validate that the best utilization of these ships is in the short, fast haul, with frequent port-calls, from Okinawa to RVN.³


(C) A week later, COMSTS, having reconsidered his earlier decision, directed that USNS SEALIFT be assigned to WESTPAC RO/RO service. CINCPAC, in turn, dispatched a message on 25 January 1969, emphasizing that maximum utilization of all RO/RO assets should be stressed by concerned commands, such as CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT. The remainder of Calendar Year 1969 passed without any further significant developments concerning this matter.⁴

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 121; CINCPAC 210342Z Dec 68; J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
 2. COMSTSFE 261004Z Dec 68; COMSTSPAC 280021Z Dec 68; COMSTS 021335Z Jan 69; J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
 3. CINCPAC 152251Z Jan 69.
 4. COMSTS 221614Z Jan 69; CINCPAC 250538Z Jan 69; Intv, CDR Fred L. Brady, USN, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 26 Mar 70.

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MSTSPAC/FE NUCLEUS (USNS) SEALIFT CAPABILITY

AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1969



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SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 109.

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RVN Port Throughput Capabilities

(S) On 20 December 1968, CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV for "data on present day and/or programmed RVN ocean port export capability".¹ COMUSMACV provided this data on 13 January 1969.² "Annex F CINCPAC OPLAN 67-69 and CINCPAC OPLAN 69-69 tasked COMUSMACV to identify transportation constraints with respect to movement requirements."³ According, on 1 February 1969, CINCPAC instructed COMUSMACV to submit the necessary data for these two plans, indicating which plan the constraints were applicable, and to advise CINCPAC "of any problems in developing data that would delay submission."⁴

(S) MACV Port Throughput Survey Report, dated 1 February 1969, furnished terminal and/or barge site capabilities in RVN. During a review of this report at Hq CINCPAC, however, it was discovered that the report disclosed that "a lack of washdown facilities or fresh water for washdown was common at all ports listed."⁵ In a message to COMUSMACV on 1 March 1969, therefore, CINCPAC requested to be advised of "plans/actions in process to alleviate this problem" and that future updates of this survey report would contain this required information.⁶

RVN Port Operations


(S) Throughout Calendar Year 1969, CINCPAC's position on the operations of ports in RVN remained constant: "Overall throughout capability will remain adequate to support all areas; and although temporary problems can be expected due to weather and enemy action, no unmanageable situations are foreseen."⁷ Total RVN port throughput capability remained adequate to support all operations. A steady downward trend in cargo destined for RVN was evident, for example, from 1,238,000 short tons in January 1969 to 625,000 short tons in October 1969. This decrease was directly traced to the programs designed to purify RVN stock levels, improved management of supplies within the system, and reduced total requirements.

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1. CINCPAC 200535Z Dec 68; for last year's developments on this subject, see p. 114 of CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV.
 2. COMUSMACV 2542/131815Z Jan 69.
 3. J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
 4. CINCPAC 012317Z Feb 69.
 5. J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
 6. Ibid.; CINCPAC 012243Z Mar 69.
 7. Point Papers, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Dec 68, 19 Mar 69, 2 Jul 69, and 13 Dec 69, Subj: RVN Port Operations, which are the sources for the information contained in this subsection.

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AUTHORIZED STOCK LEVELS (SUPPLY CLASS/DAYS OF SUPPLY)

FOR U. S. FORCES IN VIETNAM
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1969



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CINCPACFLT		CINCPACAF		CINCSARPAC	
CLASS	DAYS (by location)	CLASS	DAYS	CLASS	DAYS
I	DA NANG	I	5.10 ^a	I	56
II	30 ^a	II	60 ^b	II	60
III	90 ^b	III	30	III BULK	30
IV	30	IV	30	III PEGD	45
V	30	V	45	IV	60
VI	45	VI	85 ^c	V	60
VII	45	VII	45 ^b	VII	60
VIII	60 ^{a/g}	VIII	60 ^b	VIII	60
IX	45	IX	60 ^b	IX	60
		X	N/A TO USAF		

CLASS	DAYS (by location)	CLASS	DAYS
I	DA NANG	I	5.10 ^a
II	30 ^a	II	60 ^b
III	90 ^b	III	30
IV	30	IV	30
V	30	V	45
VI	45	VI	85 ^c
VII	45	VII	45 ^b
VIII	60 ^{a/g}	VIII	60 ^b
IX	45	IX	60 ^b
		X	N/A TO USAF

CLASS	DAYS (by location)	CLASS	DAYS
I	DA NANG	I	5.10 ^a
II	30 ^a	II	60 ^b
III	90 ^b	III	30
IV	30	IV	30
V	30	V	45
VI	45	VI	85 ^c
VII	45	VII	45 ^b
VIII	60 ^{a/g}	VIII	60 ^b
IX	45	IX	60 ^b
		X	N/A TO USAF

Notes:
a. Class IR(FREEZE), 30 days; IR(CHILL), 22 days; IS, 90 days; IC, 30 days; IN and S based on actual consumption. IC based on full force. Days of supply not additive.
b. Thirty additional days of safety level authorized under specified conditions.
c. Safety level of 30 days for items provided by USARV. Safety level of 60 or 90 days for items provided by Navy.
d. Varies by location.
e. 90 days for aviation units.
f. Packaged. (For III MAF only).
g. Based on initial allowances (30 days) and mount-out allowances (30 days).

a VARIES BY LOCATION. USARV AND NAVY (DANANG ONLY) DEPOTS SUPPORT USAF REQUIREMENTS.
b STOCK LEVELS INDICATE AVERAGE FIGURES ONLY. ACTUAL REQUISITIONING OBJECTIVES ARE BASED ON ECONOMIC ORDER QUANTITIES (EOQ) FORMULA THAT DOES NOT EQUATE TO A STANDARD FOR DAYS OF SUPPLY. LEVELS ARE NOT NORMALLY ESTABLISHED FOR EQUIPMENT OR MAJOR END ITEMS.
c BASED ON PACEX INVENTORY TO SALES RATIO COMPUTATION.

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, P. 100.

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(S) As of mid-December 1969, the projected workloads indicated that all ports in RVN would be operating at, or slightly below optimum levels:

While there have been no significant problems associated with port operations in RVN, delays in shipping are to be expected due to weather and results of enemy actions. In the recent past minimal ship turnaround time for general cargo ships has been accomplished. This is basically accounted for by the lower level of ship activity during 1969 as compared with like periods in 1968. During 1968 an average of 55 ships were in RVN waters per month. The 1969 average has been 30 ships per month.¹

Throughput Capability and Requirements in Northern I CTZ (NICTZ)

(S) By December 1969, sufficient throughput capability had been developed to meet all current and projected operational requirements in NICTZ, and CINCPAC position was that actions would have to be sustained to assure the maintaining of an adequate throughout capability to support the changing force levels in NICTZ. The status at this time, as well as some developments that occurred during the year, follows:

The rotation of military units under KEYSTONE EAGLE and KEYSTONE CARDINAL reduced the current support requirements in NICTZ to 1,263 S/T per day, including 325 S/T for the RVNAF, effective 5 Dec 69, supporting approximately 42,969 U.S. plus RVNAF troops.

The beach capability still continues to be maintained at 3,600 S/T per day. With highway, rail, and air movement capability, the total capability for support remains at 6,400 S/T per day. The total capability has been more than adequate to support the NICTZ requirements.

The capability of moving 1,000 S/T per day into NICTZ via Highway 1 is dependent upon conditions of the roadway, enemy interdiction, and availability of trucks. Eight hundred S/T per day can be airlifted to Phu Bai, Quang Tri, and Dong Ha airfields. The railroad, which became operational in Jan 69, has a capability of hauling 1,000 S/T daily. At the present time it is used mainly for the movement of passengers.

1. Point Paper, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Dec 69, Subj: RVN Port Operations.

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The maximum capability of 6,400 S/T per day at the present time is dependent upon less than severe weather, absence of serious dredging problems, reasonable security from enemy action, and extensive use of fleet LSTs.

MACV is capable of providing four dredges to preclude disruption of cargo operations by maintaining continuous positive control over monsoon silting at both Tan My and Cua Viet. Adverse weather conditions and enemy harassment curtailed operations at Hue/Cua Viet in Nov and early Dec. Highway operations were similarly affected....

To augment the throughput capability on an emergency basis, COMNAVFORV has a contingency plan wherein specially-loaded Seatrain ships or LSTs would be discharged by helicopter in NICTZ. This system is on call of MACV and would have to be tested to determine capability during adverse weather conditions.¹

Ammunition Discharge in RVN

(C) CINCPAC's position concerning ammunition discharge in RVN remained constant throughout Calendar Year 1969:

Efforts by MACV to increase ammo throughout capability at Cat Lai should be continued. Reasonable delay of ammo ships in RVN is cost effective and is to be expected if ammunition is to be readily available to meet operational needs.²

(C) Ammunition accounted for the following approximate percentages of all military cargo discharges in RVN during these months: December 1968 - 26%; March 1969 - 16%; May 1969 - 16%; July 1969 - 26%; December 1969 - 22%. During 1969, the major ammunition handling ports in RVN were Da Nang, Cat Lai, Vung Tau, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon; they received about 75% of all the ammunition shipments. In general, these ports were able to discharge the ammunition expeditiously except Cat Lai where, at times,

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1. Point Paper, J4815, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Dec 69, Subj: Throughput Capability and Requirements in Northern I CTZ (NICTZ); also Point Papers, J4815, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Dec 68, 19 Mar 69, 6 May 69, and 28 Jul 69, Subj: Throughput Capability and Requirement in Northern I CTZ.
 2. Point Paper, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Dec 69, Subj: Ammo Discharge in RVN; Point Paper, J4811, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Dec 68, Subj: Ammo Discharge in RVN.

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requirements exceeded the capability of the port.¹

(S) Throughout most of 1968, it was necessary to route ships to Subic Bay, Philippines, for hold prior to being discharged at Cat Lai. From 1 through 11 January 1969, an average of 2.6 ships per day were held at Subic Bay, waiting for berths to open up at Cat Lai. This figure, however, was reduced to .2 ships during February 1969. Analysis of the alternatives at the PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB) meeting in September 1968 determined that ship holding was the best cost effective course of action and the most responsive to requirements, when weighed against off-shore or transit storage. Therefore, at the end of 1969, the practice of routing ships to Subic Bay for hold prior to being discharged at Cat Lai was still in effect, whenever necessary. However, through intensive management, COMUSMACV often has been able to divert ammunition ships destined for Cat Lai to other ports, when required to ease port congestion. In addition, ammunition ships destined for Da Nang were subject to being diverted or held for short periods, while ASP (Ammunition Supply Point) 1, which was destroyed on 26 April 1969, was being rebuilt.

(S) The ammunition capabilities and throughput problems of RVN ports were major topics at the PACOM JTB meeting in September 1969. In the end, agreements were reached by all concerned on the measures required to improve handling and throughput capabilities. "Success of these measures was reviewed at the December 1968 PACOM JTB, and again at the July 1969 PACOM JTB."² Since these measures were adopted, CINCPAC has continually monitored them. By December 1969, the status of certain other aspects of ammunition discharge in RVN was as follows:

Additional barge discharge site improvements have been made, providing increased capability at Cat Lai. Further improvements by the placement of an additional buoy in the near future will provide greater flexibility to port operations.

Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency (AAPSA) has advised that, due to increased ARVN ammo

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1. Unless otherwise cited, the following Point Papers were the source of the information contained in this subsection on ammunition discharge in RVN: Point Papers, J4814, 19 Mar 69, 6 May 69, 6 Jun 69, 2 Jul 69, 28 Jul 69, and 13 Dec 69, Subj: Ammo Discharge in RVN.
 2. Point Paper, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Jul 69, Subj: Ammo Discharge in RVN; J481A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69; Admin CINCPAC 102309Z Jul 69.

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requirements, it may be necessary to ship some entire shiploads of ARVN ammo with multiple ports of call in order to prevent ARVN ammo saturation at Cat Lai.

Air Force munitions are loaded on ships exclusively designated for Air Force consignees. This method facilitates diversion when required by changing conditions.

The destruction of ASP 1 at Da Nang on 26 Apr created shortages in that area which have been alleviated by cross leveling. However, since there now exists a shortage of storage space, ships destined for Da Nang can expect diversion, or short waits, until the facility at ASP1 is completed....1

Thailand Port Operations

(S) By the beginning of Calendar Year 1969, the utilization of the commercial port at Bangkok for discharging military cargo had been virtually eliminated by the construction of the Sattahip port complex. Throughout 1969, general cargo was handled at the four berths and a barge discharge site at Sattahip, while ammunition was discharged at Vayama, Delong, and MAP piers. Estimated overall throughput capability of Thailand ports was 92,000 short tons per month, of which 58,000 short tons were available for ammunition discharge (1,440 short tons per day at the Delong pier and 500 short tons per day at the MAP pier). If required, this ammunition discharge capability could be increased to 70,000 short tons per month. The successful commencement of Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) service from Okinawa to Sattahip began in January 1968. Since this date, the service has been satisfactory and expeditious, with the RO/RO ships making twice-monthly calls at Sattahip for discharge.²

(S) One major problem throughout 1969 was adequate tug service, since continued operation of the port at Sattahip was dependent upon this tug service. The Royal Thailand Government (RTG), for the last time, had extended the permits and visas of the Panamanian Tug Company, which had been contracted to work the Sattahip port, until 30 June 1969. As the year began, efforts were in progress to obtain replacement tugs. After stating on 6 August 1969 "that

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1. Point Paper, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Dec 69, Subj: Ammo Discharge in RVN.
 2. Unless otherwise cited, the following sources provided the information contained in this subsection: Point Papers, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 68, 6 May 69, and 6 Oct 69, Subj: Thailand Port Operations.

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FY 70 tug contract was awarded to Ear Peng Chiang Co. (EPC) effective 1 Jul 69 and that EPC had been informed by Thai customs officials that they could not operate until properly cleared", COMUSMACTHAI detailed to CINCPAC all the problems concerning tug support at Sattahip and Vayama, indicated that no tugs were available through U. S. Army sources within the Western Pacific, and requested "immediate action be taken to determine availability of any U. S. military tugs and crews in PACOM area for TDY use at Sattahip/Vayama. If available, action be taken to direct movement to tugs to Thailand ASAP".¹

(C) The following day, CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT to determine whether any tugs might be "available through Navy sources that may be used as interim solution while new contractual services are being secured."² In response on 8 August 1969, COMSEVENTHFLT advised that "one ATF can be available and could arrive at Sattahip in approximately five days.... With optimum transit conditions one ATA could reach Sattahip in approximately twelve days."³ CINCPAC passed this information to COMUSMACTHAI, who, in turn, on 13 August 1969, requested that the "SEVENTHFLT assets (ATA tug) be held in reserve until possibility of further contractual actions can be researched."⁴

(C) "On 6 Sep", COMUSMACTHAI later notified CINCPAC on 19 September 1969, "RTG granted contractor and USG permission to operate the Japanese tugboats at Sattahip on an interim basis."⁵ Therefore, continued COMUSMACTHAI, the requirement "for SEVENTHFLT assets does not exist at this time."⁶ CINCPAC, in turn, after reiterating previously expressed appreciation, requested CINCPACFLT on 21 September 1969 to release the tugs from a hold status.⁷

(S) The problem of tug services, however, remained of a recurring nature, since the Ear Ping Chiang Company was operating the Japanese-chartered tugs under a temporary waiver of RTG customs fees. At any time,

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 061001Z Aug 69; J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 2. Admin CINCPAC 070215Z Aug 69.
 3. COMSEVENTHFLT 081530Z Aug 69.
 4. COMUSMACTHAI 130135Z Aug 69; J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69; Admin CINCPAC 100017Z Aug 69.
 5. COMUSMACTHAI 191009Z Sep 69.
 6. Ibid.
 7. Admin CINCPAC 210045Z Sep 69; J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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this waiver could be revoked, which would result in the loss of one ammunition berth. Both COMUSMACTHAI and the American Embassy at Bangkok were continuing efforts to bring about a permanent settlement of the custom fees to guarantee uninterrupted service, but no progress had been made by October 1969.

(S) Besides the loss of one berth at the Delong during those periods when tug services were not available, the seasonal shortage of trucks, provided by the Express Transportation Organization (ETO), a Thai company, for onward transport of ammunition during the rice harvest posed another difficulty. By October 1969, however, closer "liaison with the ETO operators and providing daily requirements for truck assets during the harvest season has relieved this problem area to some extent."1

(S) Another problem area concerned the Delong ammunition pier. It is improperly oriented for tide and water conditions. As a result, ship damage and delays in docking have been recurring problems. Surge lines at the Delong pier, installation of which had started in 1968 as a stopgap measure, did partially alleviate the delay and damage problem. The dependence on tugs for berthing ships at the south face of the Delong pier, however, would only be resolved by the construction of a properly oriented pier. Towards the end of 1969, CINCPAC's "position, reconfirmed to JCS on 5 Oct 68 is that the Sattahip port complex will meet projected requirements but that construction of a permanent ammo pier in 1971 time frame is needed to replace the present Delong pier."2

Delayed Release of a RVN Floating Storage Reefer

(S) Discussions in the working group sessions at the PACOM JTB December 1968 meeting indicated that the release date for the floating storage reefer at Qui Nhon would be 1 April 1969.3 On 13 January 1969, however, CGUSARV advised COMUSMACV that the beneficial occupancy date (BOD) for the refrigerated storage warehouse at Qui Nhon scheduled for 20 February 1969 would not be met and that the reefer ship could not be released as planned. Two days later, COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC "that reefer ship HIBUERAS be retained till construction of refrigerated storage warehouse at

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1. Point Paper, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Oct 69, Subj: Thailand Port Operations; FONECON, CDR Fred L. Brady, USN, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, with COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 19 Mar 70.
 2. Point Paper, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Oct 69, Subj: Thailand Port Operations.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 117.

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Qui Nhon is completed. "1 CINCPAC, in turn, on 20 January 1969, concurred "in retention of HIBUERAS until reefer warehouse operational. "2

Late or Non-Receipt of Documentation for RVN-Bound Ships

(U) As explained in last year's history, COMUSMACV had proposed the use of MAC mission flights to expedite the receipt of manifests for ships loaded in Western Pacific ports for RVN discharge, since the non-receipt of this necessary documentation had been "a continuing problem. "3 Accordingly, on 26 January 1969, CINCPAC initiated an Air Transportation Coordination Office (ATCO) to ATCO system of manifest distribution as an interim solution to the problem of late or non-receipt of manifests in RVN. 4

(U) At the PACOM JTB July 1969 meeting, it was determined that the ATCO to ATCO system was no longer necessary, because of the recent activation of an automated manifest facility at Saigon and the scheduled activation of similar facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. "Effective immediately, " CINCPAC announced on 28 July 1969, "the requirement for WESTPAC loading ports to forward manifests via the 'ATCO-to-ATCO' system is cancelled. "5

Ship Demurrage

(U) In connection with a CINCUSARPAC message on 3 January 1969 "regarding the initiation of actions designed to reduce demurrage charges billed to DA", COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC on 16 January to "provide data regarding basis for computation of demurrage/detention charges" in order to permit a thorough evaluation by a sealift committee within his Hq. 6 "For clarification", replied CINCPAC three days later, "two terms are used to classify billing areas. Demurrage is the charge levied on MSTs by commercial operators. Delay time pertains to MSTs controlled ships and is the charge MSTs levies on the shipper service (Army, Navy, or Air Force). "7 Samples of these two terms, as well as their charges, were provided for use in the

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1. COMUSMACV 3018/151143Z Jan 69; CG USARV LBN RVN 41650/130802Z Jan 69; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
 2. CINCPAC 202353Z Jan 69.
 3. COMUSMACV 43617/211534Z Dec 68; CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 113 and 114.
 4. CINCPAC 260002Z Jan 69; Admin CINCPAC 280011Z Dec 69; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
 5. CINCPAC 280120Z Jul 69.
 6. COMUSMACV 3095/160120Z Jan 69.
 7. CINCPAC 190002Z Jan 69.

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deliberations of the committee in Hq MACV. In addition, as CINCPAC stated in his message of 19 January 1969: "Additional background information is being reproduced for mailing to MACV J45 prior to 23 Jan"1

Report on Intra-RVN Movement Data (SASM RCN-12B)

(U) "In view of the stabilized transportation situation presently existing in Vietnam," COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC on 17 April 1969 for a reevaluation of the requirement for the submission of the Report on Intra-RVN Movement Data (SASM RCN-12B).² The JCS had established this requirement on 31 January 1968.³ Both CINCPAC and the JCS, however, indicated "a continuing need for the information contained in the Intra-RVN Movement Data Report."⁴ Therefore, on 21 May 1969, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to continue submitting this report on a monthly basis. At the same time, complying with a JCS request, CINCPAC "requested CINCPACAF to add JCS (SASM) to their distribution for the '834th Air Div Tactical Airlift Performance Analysis-Southeast Asia."⁵ The remainder of Calendar Year 1969 passed without any further development concerning the Report on Intra-RVN Movement Data (SASM RCN-12B).⁶

MSTS Ship Delay Time Billings of Shipper Services (Ship Demurrage)

(U) After referring to "data pertaining to demurrage and a listing of charges billed by MSTS to Army", CINCUSARPAC, on 3 January 1969, "requested that CINCPAC take such actions as are required to reduce the demurrage charges billed to DA for which little or no benefit is derived."⁷ On 6 February 1969, in response to a CINCPAC query, COMUSMACV provided the following recommendations "to permit reduction demurrage/detention charges":

a. Detention criteria and charges should be redesigned

1. Ibid.; J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
2. Ltr, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 17 Apr 69, Subj: Report of Intra-RVN Movement Data (SASM RCN-12B); J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 144.
4. Admin CINCPAC 210528Z May 69; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; CINCPAC 020346Z May 69; JCS 8863/091905Z May 69.
5. J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; Admin CINCPAC 210528Z May 69.
6. Handwritten Memo, CDR Robert W. Freeman, USN, J4813, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. T. R. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 23 Mar 70.
7. CINCUSARPAC 146/030512Z Jan 69.

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- to reflect only unproductive ship utilization and thereby provide a useful management indicator.

b. PAMPA should schedule cargo into RVN ports evenly in time and within CONUS-RVN discharge allocation. When bunching of ships occur the cargo flow should be adjusted to permit clearing of the delayed shipping.

c. Whenever possible ships should be loaded for single port discharge.¹

(U) Approximately a month later, on 12 March 1969, CINCPAC dispatched the following message to COMSTS:

2. Penalties for the detention of ships have historically been based on unproductive utilization of ships after they have arrived in port and are ready in all respects to commence cargo operations. Under existing criteria for MSTTS ship delay time billings, it appears that penalties are at times assessed shipper services for ships that were effectively utilized throughout the time they were in RVN waters.

3. As the volume of cargo being shipped out of RVN grows, it will become necessary for an increasing number of ships to both discharge and load while in RVN. This will result in a situation where most ships will normally be required to be in RVN more than ten days, and will thus be subject to MSTTS ship delay time billing, even though they are expeditiously discharged and loaded.

4. Req review of the parameters presently being used to determine which ships are subject to MSTTS ship delay time billing, and revisions if applicable to take into consideration ships making multi RVN port calls, and the expected increase in the number of ships that will be both discharging and back-loading while in RVN.²

(U) On 16 April 1969, COMSTS requested CINCPAC's "concurrence and/or comments and recommendations" on a proposed revision of the MSTTS

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1. COMUSMACV 7518/060412Z Feb 69; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
 2. CINCPAC 121909Z Mar 69.

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parameters used to determine which ships would be subject to MSTs delay time billings.¹ Three days later, CINCPAC, in turn, requested his component commanders and COMUSMACV to "forward to CINCPAC NLT 28 Apr comments/recommendations on revised MSTs ship delay time parameters proposed by" COMSTS.² Furthermore, in order to make appropriate recommendations, an extensive search of the PACSHIPS data base was conducted, before CINCPAC replied to COMSTS. The more significant comments that CINCPAC submitted to COMSTS on 4 June 1969 were as follows:

a. Concurrence in proposed 1500 M/T daily discharge standard for general cargo. Separate parameters would be appropriate for reefer and ammo ships which require special handling. A daily discharge rate of 1000 M/T for ammo and 250 M/T for reefer ships.

b. Concurrence in the proposed 1200 M/T daily loading standard for general cargo, and a recommendation for a standard of 800 M/T for ammo ships and 400 M/T for reefer ships.

c. Concurrence in lay time commencing when ship arrives in port and is available for discharge/load if an accurate ETA has been given 48 hours in advance.³

(U) CINCPAC also presented a number of other considerations in his message to COMSTS, besides requesting "if the MSTs Ship Delay Time Billing system could be revised accordingly."⁴ Subsequently, this ship demurrage matter was referred to the DOD Comptroller for a resolution. As of 31 December 1969, no decision had been received by Hq CINCPAC from DOD on this matter.⁵

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1. COMSTS 161914Z Apr 69; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
 2. CINCPAC 190350Z Apr 69.
 3. J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69; Admin CINCPAC 040444Z Jun 69.
 4. J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
 5. Handwritten Memo, CDR Robert W. Freeman, USN, J4813, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. T. R. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 23 Mar 70.

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Beach Discharge Lighters (BDLs)

(C) As early as June 1968, CINCPAC had "outlined the need for an ocean going open deck self propelled barge type vessel for logistical resupply, the accomplishment of rapid efficient inter port movement of RO/RO cargo from and to centralized transshipment ports of call for deep draft RO/RO ships and recommend that a prototype be acquired either by lease or contract arrangement for operational testing and evaluation in SEA. "¹ The following month, the JCS requested CNO to take action, "since the matter is an MSTs function prescribed by the MSTs charter. "² By the last day of Calendar Year 1968, COMUSMACV was advising that the intra-coastal movement of containers would increase, thereby necessitating a mix of marine assets. ³

(C) Just three days later, on 3 January 1969, CINCUSARPAC confirmed the "requirement for four (4) BDLs to support operations in RVN and for upgrading the Army's obsolete floating equipment fleet which requires an exorbitant maintenance effort", because of the age and condition of the assigned LCMs and LCUs. ⁴ On 29 January 1969, COMSTS, after commenting on the "increasing requirement for RVN intra coastal capability", requested CINCPAC to "confirm whether requirements for additional intra coastal capability exist and identify craft most suited for that purpose, i. e., additional RO/RO barges, shallow draft prototype, etc. "⁵

(C) CINCPAC's response was forthcoming in a message to COMSTS on 1 March 1969. Pertinent portions of CINCPAC's reply follow:

3. Increased movement of cargo by container within RVN will require a different mix of intra-coastal and intra-port complex marine assets than is presently available. MSTs development of the RO/RO barge concept will permit intra-coastal movement of containers between protected harbors, but a need remains for a self-propelled, ocean-going, shallow draft craft such as the SPV (Small Port Vessel) to load and deliver containers to shallow draft ports with exposed beaches. In addition, each RVN port complex should have the capability

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1. COMSTS 291333Z Jan 69, citing CINCPAC 290007Z Jun 68.
 2. COMSTS 291333Z Jan 69, citing JCS 4775/152013Z Jul 68.
 3. COMUSMACV 4552/311655Z Dec 68; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
 4. CINCUSARPAC 147/030514Z Jan 69; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
 5. COMSTS 291333Z Jan 69.

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of delivering containers and other RO/RO cargo within the port complex, and to points served by inland waterways. The BDL (Beach Discharge Lighter) has proven in the Cam Ranh Bay port complex that it can efficiently perform this latter type of mission.

.....

5. Recommend that a minimum of one commercially available, ocean-going, shallow-draft, RO/RO craft, such as the SPV, be procured ASAP for service and evaluation in RVN to develop cost-effectiveness data and operational support concepts. Should the potential cost effectiveness and operational desirability of the SPV-type craft be proven, it is visualized that a substantial portion of the aging LST fleet operated by MSTs can be replaced by such a craft designed for cost-effective logistic operations.¹

Sealift of Army Aircraft

(U) In mid-October 1968, CGUSARV reiterated the position of his Hq concerning the sealift of USA aircraft:

2. Request action be taken immediately to reschedule any Army aircraft tentatively booked for surface shipment (via SEA-TRAIN type vessels) to other aircraft carrier type vessels such as USNS CARD, CROATAN CORE, etc.

3. The difficulties encountered during off-loading and the increased hazards of flying the aircraft off the vessel (SEA-TRAIN type) demand that this type vessel not be used.

4. Army aircraft are not to be surface shipped on SEA-TRAIN type vessels.²

(U) On 6 January 1969, CINCPAC was notified that "Army aircraft will be booked for sealift on the SEATRAN PUERTO RICO to commence loading approximately 16 Jan 69" from CONUS to RVN.³ The following day, in

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1. CINCPAC 012223Z Mar 69.
 2. CG USARV 74163/130057Z Oct 68.
 3. CG USAAVSCOM STL 061851Z Jan 69; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.

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accordance with USARV's request, CINCPAC requested booking on another ship. One week later, however, CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's approval of the sealift of 75 USA aircraft by the Seatrain PUERTO RICO on a one-time basis. On the same day, 14 January 1969, COMSTS outlined a program to monitor this sealift for evaluation purposes, since the MSTs cargo ship and aircraft ferry (T-AKV), although a more efficient aircraft ferry, is more costly and possesses limited flexibility and utility when compared with other Seatrain ships, such as the PUERTO RICO. CINCPAC concurred in this evaluation.¹

(U) CINCPAC's concurrence was requested on 13 February 1969 in the shipment of aircraft aboard Seatrain ships, since the four T-AKVs available to MSTs were not sufficient to carry the large amounts scheduled for sealift from CONUS to RVN. The following day, CINCPAC queried COMUSMACV on this matter, indicating that maximum authorization should be given. COMUSMACV concurred a week later in the shipment of aircraft aboard the Seatrain FLORIDA, requesting that the 82 aircraft scheduled for sealift by this ship "be proportionately distributed among the using services--Army, Navy and Air Force. This will provide the opportunity for a tri-service evaluation of the performance of Seatrain type vessels for surface shipment of aircraft."²

(U) "No major problems were encountered in offloading aircraft from SS Seatrain PUERTO RICO", commented COMUSMACV in his after-action report to CINCPAC on 17 March 1969.³ "It is the opinion of MACV and component commands", concluded COMUSMACV, "that the Seatrain is an acceptable vehicle for transport of aircraft when... operational commitments required their use."⁴ He made the following recommendations for the use of Seatrain ships in sealifting aircraft:

a. That aircraft scheduled for Seatrain sealift be carefully preserved to minimize corrosion problem.

b. That consideration be given to modifying the Seatrain by enclosing the main deck to eliminate salt spray.

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1. CINCPAC 070533Z Jan 69; CINCPAC 140544Z Jan 69; ADMIN COMSTS 141421Z Jan 69; CINCPAC 152348Z Jan 69.
 2. COMUSMACV 10907/211421Z Feb 69; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69; COMDR WAMTMTS 904301/131615Z Feb 69; Admin CINCPAC 140344Z Feb 69.
 3. COMUSMACV 16145/170228Z Mar 69.
 4. Ibid.

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c. That hatch tarpaulins be utilized to prevent salt water seepage onto hold stowed cargo.

d. That standard aircraft tie down equipment be used.

e. That Seatrain ships used for sealift of aircraft be no smaller than SS Seatrain PUERTO RICO class.¹

(U) The next day, CSAF concurred in the shipment of aircraft on the Seatrain OHIO, provided that these aircraft "can be adequately stowed inboard of the ship's rail" and not directly exposed to the heavy sea spray.² On 25 March 1969, CINCPAC concurred in the continued shipment of aircraft on Seatrain ships, if COMUSMACV's and CSAF's recommendations were complied with. In addition, he asked MSTs to consider providing suitable billets aboard Seatrain ships for aircraft escort personnel. From this date on, unless COMUSMACV's or CSAF's recommendations were not being followed, CINCPAC's concurrence would no longer be required for the shipment of aircraft on Seatrain ships.³ By the end of Calendar Year 1969, the situation had changed somewhat. "With only 1 T-AKV in active service, Seatrain ships are now being utilized to transport light aircraft from CONUS to RVN and other PACOM ports."⁴

Airlift of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables (FFV) to RVN

(C) Discussions held 15 July 1969 at CHWTO indicated that airlift of FFV to RVN was feasible utilizing "PACOM C-130 rotator and other available airlift."⁵ In order to institute this airlift, CINCPAC dispatched a message on 13 August 1969, indicating the actions that would be required:

FOR: CINCUSARPAC. Request reaffirm availability of reefer transfer capability from aerial ports to storage areas in RVN.

FOR: CINCPACAF. Request determine cost efficiency of

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1. Ibid.
 2. CSAF AFSTPMB 182221Z Mar 69.
 3. Admin CINCPAC 252215Z Mar 69; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
 4. Handwritten Memo, Mr. William J. Besser, J4815, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. T. R. Strobridge, JO451, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Mar 70.
 5. CINCPAC 130545Z Aug 69; J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69; CINCPAC 230305Z Aug 69.

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your proposed 20X8X8 containers and commence procurement action to obtain sufficient leased containers.

FOR: MSTSF. Request impact on release of the two shuttle ships if airlift is commenced within sixty days.

FOR: ALL. Target date for commencement of airlift vice sealift of FFV is tentatively set at 1 October 1969....Request comments on ability to meet target date.¹

(U) Subsequently, Hq CINCPACAF staff held a series of meetings to coordinate implementation of procedures for airlifting FFV to RVN. On 20 August 1969, CINCPACAF requested approval of the program evolving from these meetings and that "PACAF be designated as coordinating office of primary responsibility (POR)."² Three days later, CINCPAC approved the program and designated CINCPACAF as the coordinating OPR for air transportation aspects, with CHWTO still remaining responsible for the control, management, and utilization of PACOM airlift assets. At the same time, CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC to initiate action "with COMSTSFE to coordinate release of reefer ships from FE/RVN shuttle on or about" 1 October 1969.³

(U) Despite delays because of tax problems and national holidays on Taiwan, CINCPAC was able on 27 September 1969 to reinstitute the test program for 3 and 6 October. By 1 October 1969, the tax problem had been resolved, and COMSTSFE had reported that two reefer ships would be released from the RVN run on or about 3 and 9 October. In view of the tax solution, CINCPAC requested on 3 October 1969 that the airlift of FFV to RVN be implemented on a full schedule. At the same time, he requested CINCUSARPAC to maintain a "close coordination with COMSTSFE to accomplish release of both reefer ships at the earliest time and yet assure sufficient back up capability to handle reported Oct tonnage over run."⁴ This new airlift

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1. CINCPAC 130545Z Aug 69.
 2. CINCPACAF 200505Z Aug 69.
 3. CINCPAC 230305Z Aug 69; J481 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 4. Admin CINCPAC 030536Z Oct 69; Admin CINCPAC 070551Z Sep 69; CHWTO Hickam AFB 242358Z Sep 69; CINCPAC 272308Z Sep 69; J4814 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Sep and Oct 69; COMSTSFE 010230Z Oct 69; COMSTSFE 020240Z Oct 69; Invtr, CDR Fred L. Brady, USN, J4814, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 26 Mar 70.

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schedule apparently worked smoothly, for the remainder of Calendar Year 1969 passed without any further developments necessitating action by CINCPAC.

Retrograde Movement of Light Aircraft

(8) In a message to COMUSMACV on 27 February 1969, CINCPAC stated that the "special handling and type ships required to transport light aircraft dictates that shipping requirements be determined early to allow identification of shipping shortfall, if any, in respect to FREIGHTER CARGO." ¹ The last mentioned term is a code name for a logistic plan for complete RVN withdrawal. ² COMUSMACV was requested to provide verification of requirements received informally from the JCS that indicated "in-country authorization of 6,231 light aircraft requiring 4,025,252 square feet of shipping space, with 5,875 destined CONUS, 212 destined Okinawa, and 144 for Hawaii." ³

(S) Knowing of the marginal sealift capability of MSTs to remove light aircraft from RVN within six months, the discussions at the PACOM JTB March 1969 meeting "considered the possibility of moving certain light aircraft via available Sea-Land container ship capability. Preliminary evaluations in RVN were reported as having indicated possibility that OH6, O1 and H23 aircraft could be so moved." ⁴ Accordingly, on 21 March 1969, CINCPAC requested MSTs to conduct a transportability evaluation "to establish which light aircraft can be safely moved in commercial containers, and develop loading specifications and/or transportability kits required to effect such movement." ⁵ On 29 March 1969, COMUSMACV provided his sealift requirements for light aircraft by type and phase for T-Day planning. In addition, he provided the redeployment of units by phase, indicating that some units had been changed from one phase to another thereby changing the movement phase of some aircraft. CINCPAC, meanwhile, had converted COMUSMACV's requirements, as stated in COMUSMACV's message of 10 March 1969, for aircraft retrograde movement into square feet, measurement tons (M/T), and short tons (S/T) and forwarded this data, appropriately allotted to each phase of Phase I through Phase VI of T-Day planning, to MSTs for use in reevaluating

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1. CINCPAC 270033Z Feb 69.
 2. Intv, Mr. George N. Bech, Jr., J4823, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 26 Mar 70.
 3. CINCPAC 270033Z Feb 69; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
 4. CINCPAC 210604Z Mar 69; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
 5. CINCPAC 210604Z Mar 69.

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capability against requirements. Therefore, in order to submit these latest COMUSMACV changes to MSTs, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV on 19 April 1969 to furnish his amended requirements, containing phase changes of aircraft for retrograde movement.¹

(S) On 27 April 1969, COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC with an update of his retrograde light aircraft phase-out requirements, based on a revised phase-out schedule of major units. CINCPAC, in turn, in a message to MSTs on 9 May 1969, furnished the amended requirements and requested that the "sealift capability be re-evaluated based" on these new figures.²

(S) COMUSMACV, on 7 June 1969, provided CINCPAC with further amended sealift requirements. These changes were based on the removal of USMC aircraft from the requirement by utilization of fleet ships and the deletion of those helicopters that were capable of being shipped in Sea-Land containers. Once again, on the following day, CINCPAC revised the data previously submitted to MSTs and requested another reevaluation of MSTs's sealift capability based on the new requirements.³

(S) The following month, the Commanding General, Third Marine Amphibious Force, after a review of available fleet assets, indicated "that movement of light A/C to MIDPAC/EASTPAC locations will be accomplished primarily by MSTs not fleet assets. Fleet assets will be utilized to transport A/C to MIDPAC/EASTPAC on an opportune basis only."⁴ When these revised requirements were submitted to COMUSMACV, they were forwarded to CINCPAC. CINCPAC, in turn, converted these revised requirements to square footage, M/T, and S/T and forwarded these changes in requirements to MSTs with a request that another sealift capability reevaluation be made, because of revised requirements. "COMSTS indicated minor changes in phases I and III and still leaving an excess of capability in all phase VI, which still continues to show a shortfall for the whole period."⁵

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1. COMUSMACV 19173/291535Z Mar 69; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69; CINCPAC 092355Z Apr 69; CINCPAC 190351Z Apr 69; COMUSMACV 14562/101419Z Mar 69.
 2. CINCPAC 090334Z May 69; COMUSMACV 25325/271027Z Apr 69; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
 3. J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69; COMUSMACV 33687/070225Z Jun 69; CINCPAC 100528Z Jun 69.
 4. COMUSMACV 170634Z Jul 69; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
 5. Ibid.; CINCPAC 262242Z Jul 69.

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(S) Meanwhile, on 16 July 1969, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to provide information as to whether or not troops and equipment being returned from RVN under project KEYSTONE EAGLE would have "possible reduction, if any, of requirements for retrograde movement of light aircraft via sealift, for T-Day planning." ¹ In reply, COMUSMACV stated that there would be no effect on the previously submitted requirements. At the end of Calendar Year 1969, the situation had not changed, because:

Retrograde requirements are being reviewed and revised after every KEYSTONE series movement program. This is all part of the FREIGHTER CARGO T-Day planning program. This program will be under constant revision until T-Day eventually occurs. ²

Transportation - Air

Airline Ticket Sales in RVN

(U) "For many years, airline ticket sales to servicemen in PACOM were handled by concessionnaires of the Army and Air Force Pacific Exchange Service (PACEX). " ³ Early in 1968, however, SECDEF decided to establish Pan American Airways (PAM AM) as the sole airline ticket sales agent on the military installations in Vietnam vice PACEX. CINCPAC had "concurred in the change with the understanding that servicemen would get discounts on purchases in RVN. " ⁴ On 31 March 1969, COMUSMACV asked CINCPAC about the "status of recommendation that fare reductions be given on airline tickets purchased by U. S. servicemen in RVN. " ⁵

(U) Earlier, on 18 December 1968, SECDEF had advised CINCPAC "that an Ad-Hoc Group established within the Air Transport Association (ATA) to advise the DOD on airline ticket sales in the overseas areas has developed specific recommendations in the PACOM area. These recommendations require approval by the Civil Aeronautics Board prior to being officially

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1. CINCPAC 160023Z Jul 69; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
 2. Handwritten Memo, Mr. William J. Besser, J4815, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. T. R. Strobridge, JO451, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Mar 70.
 3. J4 Brief No. 24-70, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Mar 70, Subj: JCS J1DM-94-70, Memorandum for the Commander in Chief Pacific on Airline Ticket Sales - PACOM Area of 26 Feb 1970.
 4. Ibid. ; CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 136-139.
 5. COMUSMACV 19448/310659Z Mar 69, cited in CINCPAC 080414Z Apr 69.

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presented to the DOD. ¹ On 8 April 1969, CINCPAC referring back to a request of approximately a year's standing, queried the JCS on the "status of Ad-Hoc Group recommendations for PACOM area, particularly as they affect fare reductions for servicemen in RVN. ² The JCS replied on 23 April 1969, "assuring CINCPAC that the request for an airline ticket fare reduction is still under active consideration". ³ By the end of Calendar Year 1969, nothing further of significance had occurred, for this matter was "still under study at OSD. ⁴

(C) In mid-September 1969, the JCS forwarded to CINCPAC a complaint from Northwest Airlines regarding the operation of its ticketing facility at the Tan Son Nhut airport in RVN. CINCPAC, in turn, requested COMUSMACV to provide comments upon which a reply to the JCS could be based. COMUSMACV answered as follows on 28 September 1969:

...JCS directed that COMUSMACV take action to establish PANAM as the authorized agent charged with providing a ticketing and travel service for servicemen in Vietnam. It was further directed that no action pertaining to the award of ticketing or travel service contracts (other than to PANAM) be taken without the prior approval of ASD (I&L).

4. (U) Mr. J. Darrell Jordan, Vietnam manager for Northwest Airlines approached this Hq with a proposal to deal with the tri-service ATCO at Tan Son Nhut in providing tickets in exchange for government transportation requests. In view of Ref B and C he was advised to inform his head office that inquiries concerning ticket services in Vietnam should be addressed to the Office of ASD (I&L). ⁵

(C) Besides supplying the JCS with COMUSMACV's message on this matter, CINCPAC dispatched a message on 1 October, replying to the JCS.

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1. CINCPAC 080414Z Apr 69, citing SECDEF 7931 A/181954Z Dec 68.
 2. CINCPAC 080414Z Apr 69.
 3. JCS 7572/231843Z Apr 69; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
 4. Point Paper, J4824, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Jan 70, Subj: Airline Ticket Sales in PACOM.
 5. COMUSMACV 54912/280629Z Sep 69; CINCPAC 240509Z Sep 69; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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In the end, this matter of a complaint by the Northwest Airlines was resolved, when CINCPAC notified COMUSMACV on 16 December 1969 that the JCS had:

...advised that previous guidance from OASD (T&WP) relating to ticketing or travel services in Vietnam was intended to be applied only on our military installations in Vietnam. The Northwest Airlines facility in question is currently located in the commercial portion of the Tan Son Nhut Airport, and so its continuance there is not a matter to be determined by the Department of Defense (DoD). Thus, there is no objection to the use of the Northwest Airlines for ticketing of official DoD travel covered by Government Transportation Requests or for the ticketing of unofficial travel in the same manner as other commercial ticketing facilities are used throughout the world.¹

(S) Then, on 19 December 1969, COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC of the following:

1. (U) On or about 5 November 1969 PAN AM Airline added a five percent transportation tax on tickets sold to servicemen in Vietnam.

2. (S) The tax is being assessed on tickets purchased in Vietnam for CONUS travel when it is an extension of overseas movement; e.g. from points in CONUS to Hawaii and return.

...this tax resulted from recent U. S. Internal Revenue Service audit of PAN AM and an interpretation of Rev. Rul. 57-24. Other carriers (NWA) are not assessing this tax on purchases in RVN.

4. (S) Request determination of the validity of applying this tax to tickets purchased in Vietnam (outside CONUS) and also the application of the tax to CONUS travel when it is in connection with dependent overseas travel, i. e. from points in CONUS to Hawaii and return. The tax is an additional burden on servicemen bringing their families to Hawaii for R&R and is in fact a fare increase.²

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1. CINCPAC 160446Z Dec 69; Admin CINCPAC 010502Z Oct 69.
 2. COMUSMACV 9424/190052Z Dec 69.

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761 - CINCPAC quickly determined that the adjudication of this matter was not within his purview. Therefore, the following day, he recommended to the JCS that "action be taken with OSD to resolve this matter. "¹ No resolution to this problem was forthcoming before the end of Calendar Year 1969.²

Air Transportation Agreement - DD Form 1381

(U) In a message to CINCPAC on 19 September 1969, COMUSMACV requested authority to waive the execution of an air transportation agreement--DD Form 1381--in "the case of Vietnamese and Free World Military Forces traveling on official business on U. S. military aircraft within the Republic of Vietnam."³ This agreement released the U. S. from any and all claims for property damage, personal injury or death resulting from or during a flight. However, as COMUSMACV pointed out, "the signing of the release agreement is questionable as a legal matter, and it could be sensitive from a political/diplomatic viewpoint."⁴

(U) CINCPAC recommended concurrence to the JCS on 27 September 1969, since the "waiver of this requirement will enhance passenger processing in RVN, reduce costs and improve relationships with the Vietnamese and free world forces in RVN."⁵ On 3 November 1969, CSAF, with the concurrence of DA, authorized the waiving of the requirement to execute DD Form 1381 "in the case of Vietnamese and Free World Military Forces traveling on official business on United States military aircraft within the Republic of Vietnam."⁶

Christmas Mail Program for RVN

(U) "Reported backlog of SAM/PAL mail at CONUS gateways and Yokota, Japan", COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC on 13 December 1969, "...presents a clear danger of collapsing the in-country airlift capability to move mail by 25 Dec if that mail arrives late in the RVN."⁷ After staff consultation with

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1. Admin CINCPAC 202322Z Dec 69; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 2. Point Paper, J4824, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Jan 70, Subj: Airline Ticket Sales in PACOM.
 3. COMUSMACV 53382/191104Z Sep 69; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
 4. COMUSMACV 53382/191104Z Sep 69.
 5. CINCPAC 270552Z Sep 69.
 6. CSAF AFSTPLA 031740Z Nov 69; J4824 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
 7. COMUSMACV 68483/130713Z Dec 69.

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officials from the Pacific Region, Postal and Courier Service, CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV the next day that "intense management is being applied to RVN Christmas mail delivery program all levels to assure timely completion." ¹ CINCPAC also requested COMUSMACV to:

... provide rationale to support statement of danger of collapse of in-country airlift capability to move mail by 25 Dec. C-130 level in-country has increased by only one aircraft since 1 Dec. Consider ample supplemental capability of offshore main operating bases to meet any expanded delivery needs. ²

(U) On 16 December 1969, COMUSMACV responded that his statement on the danger of collapse of in-country airlift capability was based on total airlift capability and not on C-130s alone. "The combined actions," he concluded, "being taken by postal and transportation agencies in reducing the backlog and the schedules of arrival of aircraft now being submitted by San Francisco military mail terminal have alleviated the problem". ³

Proposed Relocation of C-130 Aircraft in Thailand


(S) CHWTO was informed on 11 January 1969 that the 13th Air Force was initiating a "study to determine feasibility of relocating to U Tapao the six (6) C-130 aircraft presently based at Don Muang RTAB. Objective: alleviation of crowded conditions at Don Muang RTAB." ⁴ CHWTO's views were requested as to what the impact this proposed action would have on PACOM airlift. Four days later, CHWTO indicated that the plan would not be feasible and cited various reasons. "High in the order of importance was the need for close interface with MAC arrivals and departures at Bangkok." ⁵ Two days later, CHWTO approved "request for two additional C-130s, 27 Jan - 1 Feb 69... to support additive PAX and cargo airlift requirements" in Thailand. ⁶

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1. CINCPAC 140110Z Dec 69; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 2. CINCPAC 140110Z Dec 69.
 3. COMUSMACV 68917/160547Z Dec 69; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 4. 13AF Clark AB PI 110406Z Jan 69.
 5. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69; CHWTO 150730Z Jan 69.
 6. CHWTO 170516Z Jan 69.

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C-130 Support in Vietnam

(S) "C-130 aircraft provided to COMUSMACV for intra-RVN airlift support averaged 61 per month during 1969. The peak of 66 was reached in March with a low of 58 for the months of June, July, and August." 1

FREIGHTER CARGO Airlift

(S) In connection with FREIGHTER CARGO T-Day planning, CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF on 10 January 1969 to provide the receiving and transit capabilities for all PACAF-operated air terminals in PACOM. On the same date, similar requests were made of CINCPACFLT and COMAC. This information, which was received in Hq CINCPAC by 25 January 1969, was "to be used in conducting a FREIGHTER CARGO feasibility study. Current OPLANS state a requirement will exist for stockpiling of cargo tiedown equipment, pallets, etc." 2 Earlier, on 12 January 1969, CINCPAC had requested CINCPACAF to provide PACAF plans to satisfy this requirement. 3

(S) On 22 January 1969, CINCPAC dispatched the following message to his component commanders:

1. To conduct a complete feasibility study on withdrawal from RVN and to insure all transportation assets are considered, it is necessary to identify all transportation capabilities including organic. For purposes of this report "Organic" is defined as that transportation which is assigned to and controlled by an activity for the purpose of serving its own needs.

2. Request addressees provide estimates of organic lift capabilities, water and air, above that required for performance of primary mission on implementation of T-Day.... 4

(S) In response, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF provided their estimates of organic transportation capabilities, both air and


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1. Handwritten Memo, Mr. George N. Bech, Jr., J4823, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. T. R. Strobridge, JO45, 26 Mar 70, n. s. ; see also J4821 and J4823 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Jun and Aug-Oct 69.
 2. J4823 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69; CINCPAC 100336Z Jan 69; CINCPAC 100337Z Jan 69; CINCPACAF 210452Z Jan 69; CINCPACFLT 182354Z Jan 69; MAC 251920Z Jan 69.
 3. CINCPAC 120042Z Jan 69.
 4. CINCPAC 220534Z Jan 69.

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PACIFIC AIRLIFT ROUTES PACAF (DOAL)

EFFECTIVE 9 OCTOBER 1969



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SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 62, p. 112.

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water, that would be available for FREIGHTER CARGO. On 8 February 1969, CINCPAC directed that "quarterly updates be provided effective 30 June 1969. Negative reports required."¹ On the same day, COMUSMACV provided an update of the RVN aerial port capabilities. When requested by CINCPAC to comment on these new capabilities, CINCPACAF replied on 25 February 1969 that the USMACV data should be used, since it "appears to be an update and refinement of data furnished" by CINCPACAF to CINCPAC on 14 February 1969.² For all practical purposes, nothing further of significance occurred in this matter, as far as Hq CINCPAC was concerned.³

Military Airlift Support for Senator Tower

(U) On 17 March 1969, the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (OSAF) notified CINCPAC that Senator John G. Tower (Republican - Texas), a newly appointed member of the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, was planning a visit to Southeast Asia in April 1969 to receive updated briefings since his last visit. Since OSAF has been designated the action agency for this visit, it requested CINCPAC to provide PACOM airlift support on portions of Senator Tower's itinerary. COMUSMACTHAI confirmed on 28 March the requirement for a military T-39 aircraft to airlift Senator Tower and his party from Takhli Air Base, Thailand, to Hong Kong on 12 April. The following day, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF to provide this airlift.⁴

Airlift Support for Members of Philippine-U. S. Mutual Defense Board

(C) On 10 September 1969, CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF to provide special airlift support from Sangley Point, Philippines, to Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and return for members of the Philippine-U. S. Mutual Defense Board that was meeting on 23 September 1969. Four days later, CINCPACAF advised that the only available aircraft was inadequately configured. Nevertheless, on 16 September 1969, CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF to provide the best available--a C-118--as no other suitable aircraft were in PACOM.⁵

1. CINCPAC 080350Z Feb 69; CINCPACFLT 050444Z Feb 69; CINCPACAF 032337Z Feb 69; CINCUSARPAC 4233/010618Z Feb 69.
2. CINCPACAF 250507Z Feb 69; Admin CINCPAC 140131Z Feb 69; COMUSMACV 8115/081411Z Feb 69; J4823 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
3. Intv, Mr. George N. Bech, Jr., J4823, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobebridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 26 Mar 70.
4. OSAF 171837Z Mar 69; COMUSMACTHAI 280304Z Mar 69; CINCPAC 290018Z Mar 69; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
5. CINCPAC 100500Z Sep 69; CINCPAC 160440Z Sep 69; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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PHILCAGV Special Leave Program

(U) On 11 September 1969, COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that the temporary curtailment of the PHILCAGV Special Leave Program support flight because of problems in landing clearances, customs, and landing fees had been lifted. Accordingly, he requested the resumption of these PACOM support flights. The following day, CINCPAC requested CHWTO to take the necessary action to resume this service.¹

Don Muang Utilization

~~(S)~~ As CSAF directed on 31 October 1969, CINCPACAF commenced a study to determine the facilities and resources that would be required to move the air cargo terminal function from Don Muang to U-Tapao in Thailand. Approximately a month later, CINCPACAF reported the initial findings of this study to USAF, SAC, and MAC, stating that, upon their concurrence of the outlined concepts, he would initiate action to complete transfer of command and operational elements by 1 July 1970. On 7 December 1969, CINCPAC, because it appeared "that the PACAF proposal may result in changes to existing MAC route patterns in PACOM", requested that "PACAF brief their study findings and proposed concept to appropriate CINCPAC and component Service command staffs at CINCPAC, J-4 LRC, 1030 hours 9 Dec 69."²

~~(S)~~ Following this briefing, CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC's, CINCPACFLT's, CGFMFPAC's, and CHWTO's comments and/or concurrence regarding the MAC route modifications in Thailand as proposed by CINCPAC-AF. As of 31 December 1969, CINCPACFLT and CGFMFPAC had concurred in CINCPACAF's proposal.³

Logistics Support Activities

Logistical Support of Hq USMACV and Field Advisers

~~(S)~~ As in the previous year, the logistical support of Hq USMACV and field advisers continued to occupy a good portion of CINCPAC's attention in

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1. COMUSMACV 51870/111255Z Sep 69; Admin CINCPAC 120541Z Sep 69; J4823 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
 2. CINCPAC 070045Z Dec 69; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 3. Admin CINCPAC 130135Z Dec 69; J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; CINCPACFLT 4630/190027Z Dec 69; CG FMFPAC 4631/170205Z Dec 69.

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Calendar Year 1969.¹ On the last day of 1968, DA informed COMUSMACV that funding for Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA) principal items authorized by Joint Table of Allowance (JTA) 82-7 would be transferred from the Department of the Navy to the Department of the Army beginning with FY 70. At his request, CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV on 3 May 1969 of the new equipment reporting requirements that would stem from this transfer of funding responsibility.²

~~(S)~~ By June 1969, a PACOM-level conference was proposed tentatively for early August to coordinate matters relating to the logistic support of Hq USMACV and field advisers. This proposal resulted:

...primarily from FY 70 changes in funding policy under which Department of the Army will fund for all major item equipment requirements and for the operations and maintenance support of MACV field operating units, and Department of the Navy, for the operation and maintenance support of MACV Headquarters.³

(U) After the plans were finalized for a working level conference to discuss and resolve matters relating to the logistic support of Hq USMACV and field advisory teams, CINCPAC tasked CINCUSARPAC on 11 July 1969 to host the conference in early August. The following quotation gives the status of the logistic support of Hq MACV and field advisers immediately prior to this conference:

2. Recent changes in departmental level funding policies, rapid increases in the numbers of MACV field advisers, and difficulties in the timely documentation and submission of equipment requirements could have an adverse impact on the logistic support of MACV Headquarters and MACV field advisers.

3. On 1 Jul 69, funding responsibility for major items of equipment for the support of MACV Headquarters and MACV field advisers was transferred from Department of

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1. For background information, see pp. 152-4 of CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV.
 2. DA 892111/312104Z Dec 68; J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; CINCPAC 030122Z May 69.
 3. J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69; DA 892111/312104Z Dec 68; CNO 211355Z Apr 69.

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the Navy to Department of the Army. On the same date, responsibility for operations and maintenance support was realigned, with Department of the Navy being tasked to support MACV Headquarters and Department of the Army, MACV field operating units. These changes have resulted in new reporting requirements, new requisitioning and issue procedures, and new standards for equipment authorization.

4. Another complicating factor in logistic support has been the proliferation of unprogrammed requirements, such as increases in the numbers and types of field advisor teams. At the present time, MACV has more than 1400 advisor teams of 131 different types. Teams are being continually shifted and difficulty is experienced in determining what equipment is on hand and what is needed.

.....

CINCPAC POSITION

7. Continue to support COMUSMACV requirements for assistance in obtaining necessary logistic support for MACV Headquarters and MACV Field Advisors.¹

(C) "A joint working-level conference on the Logistic Support of MACV was held in the Main Conference Room, Building 230, Fort Shafter, from 4 through 7 August 1969", and its purpose "was to discuss and resolve problems relating to the Logistics Support of MACV Headquarters and Field Advisory Teams."² Representatives of DA, PACOM, USMACV, and USARPAC attended the conference. By letter on 13 August 1969, CINCPAC provided the JCS with a summary of the conclusions reached at this conference, as well as the unresolved problem areas, stating that "JCS assistance may eventually be required in the areas of O&M funding, approval of charge proposals to the MACV Joint Table of Allowance and transfer of commercial passenger carrying vehicles".³

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1. Point Paper, J4134, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Jul 69, Subj: Logistic Support of MACV Headquarters and Field Advisors.
 2. Memorandum For Record, COL Lawrence E. Mullen, USA, J413, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Aug 69, Subj: Logistic Support of MACV Headquarters and Field Advisory Teams.
 3. Ltr, CINCPAC to the JCS, 13 Aug 69, Subj: Logistic Support of MACV Headquarters and Field Advisory Teams; J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.

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Revision of USMACV Joint Table of Allowances (JTA) 82-7

(U) At the request of Hq USMACV, a meeting was held at Hq CINCPAC on 12 May 1969 "to discuss problems associated with Joint Tables of Allowances 82-7, the document which provides equipment support to HQ MACV and MACV field advisors."¹ Representatives of DA, Hq CINCPAC, and USMACV attended. The essence of the meeting is found in the following quotation:

3. HQ MACV has a serious effort under way to update JTA 82-7. To form a solid base for determining equipment requirements, HQ MACV has elected to make Tables of Allowances for each type of advisor team. These tables will then be combined and the total equipment requirements reflected in the JTA. Because of the magnitude of this undertaking it was estimated by MACV representatives that the JTA could not be updated before the end of September 1969. It was pointed out by LTCs White and Ireland that this delay would impact adversely on DA's ability to properly program PEMA items support. MACV representatives agreed to update PEMA item requirements on an expedited basis and estimated that a change request for PEMA items above could be prepared by 30 June. This request would not be completely accurate but would be much closer to the true picture than the current JTA. A list of procedural problems were then explored....MACV representatives expressed the view that the meeting was very helpful to them.²

(U) As promised, COMUSMACV forwarded to CINCPAC on 18 June 1969 a request for a change to USMACV 82-7 of 17 March 1969. This was the first of three proposed changes designed to realign the basic USMACV equipment authorization document with current requirements of Hq USMACV and field advisory teams. After a careful review, CINCPAC forwarded this proposed change to the U.S. Army Equipment Authorization Review Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, stating that he concurred in it and requested "prompt action to preclude an adverse impact on the logistic support of MACV Headquarters and field advisor teams."³

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1. Memo, LCOL James R. White, USA, DA, to Director, Organization, Unit Training & Readiness, OACSFOR, n.d., Subj: Trip Report, HQ USPACOM and HQ USARPAC, 11 - 15 May 1969.
 2. Ibid.; J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
 3. Ltr, CINCPAC to CO, U.S. Army Equipment Authorization Review Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 10 Jul 69, Subj: Change to Joint Table of

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(U) On 28 July 1969, COMUSMACV submitted Change 2 to USMACV JTA 82-7 for review to CINCPAC. Concurring in this proposed change, CINCPAC forwarded it to Hq DA on 8 August 1969. According to COMUSMACV, this change:

...is a composite of the valid approved authorizations of JTA 82-7, the requirements outlined in Change 1, 21 July 69, and the complete computed support requirements for 96% of the field advisory effort. As a total document it supercedes JTA 82-7 dated 17 March 69. All future changes based on changing operational requirements will be submitted as amendments to the inclosed document....¹

Transfer of USMACV Passenger Vehicles From USN to USA Ownership

(S) On 18 September 1969, a conference was held at Hq USARPAC to "address the transfer of passenger vehicles from Navy to Army ownership in accordance with OSD Program/Budget Decision 182 of 3 Dec 68."² Previously, on 1 July 1969, CNO had authorized the transfer from Department of Navy to Department of Army cognizance of all other administrative use vehicles and investment type support equipment for Hq USMACV and field advisers.³ "The joint working group agreed that CINCPAC should recommend to CNO that all support equipment, to include passenger vehicles, be transferred to Army in order to facilitate the integrated programming, funding, management, and support envisioned in the OSD Program/Budget Decision."⁴

Technical Assistance Required From Other U. S. Government Agencies Than DOD

(S) In connection with planning for the withdrawal of U. S. forces from Vietnam, USARV recognized and made known "a requirement for technical

Allowances 82-7; J4134 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jun and Jul 69; Ltr, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 18 Jun 69, Subj: Change to Joint Table of Allowance JTA 82-7.

1. Ltr, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 28 Jul 69, Subj: Change to Joint Table of Allowance JTA 82-7; Ltr, CINCPAC to Hq DA, 8 Aug 69, Subj: Change to Joint Table of Allowances 82-7; J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
2. J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69, with attached xerox copies of pertinent pages of OSD Program/Budget Decision of 3 Dec 68.
3. CNO 011310Z Jul 69.
4. J4134 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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assistance of United States governmental agencies, other than Department of Defense. "1 On 17 December 1968, CINCPAC queried CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF--CINCUSARPAC had already given his concurrence--for their comments and recommendations concerning the adequacy of the USARV requirement, stating that once their replies had been received, "total PACOM requirements will be forwarded to the JCS for action. "2

(S) On 24 January 1969, after providing the total requirements, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS "that appropriate action be initiated to obtain required assistance from and coordination with agencies indicated. "3 A response from the JCS was forthcoming on 5 February 1969. It indicated that a joint directive for this required support was being staffed "and when approved by JCS and the Services, will provide guidance to CINCPAC and all DOD agencies concerned with the problem. "4

(S) Because of data and assumptions on cargoes to be moved out of RVN that CINCPAC had furnished on 16 February 1969, the JCS requested CINCPAC on 18 March 1969 for a re-examination of the requirements for U. S. "Coast Guard (USCG) personnel to assist in connection with the planning for the movement and inspection of dangerous cargo and explosives. "5 CINCPAC, in turn, a few days later, requested COMUSMACV to make a "re-evaluation of technical assistance requirements. "6

(S) Replying in early April 1969, COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC with a re-evaluation for USCG personnel to support roll-up operations in RVN and made the following recommendation:

Currently the U. S. Coast Guard is authorized 6 officers and 36 enlisted personnel to handle incoming ammunition. Recommend this authorization be increased by one officer and 20 enlisted personnel to provide a minimum capability for

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1. J4111 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69, citing USARV 251101Z Nov 68.
 2. CINCPAC 170413Z Dec 68; CINCUSARPAC 251101Z Nov 68.
 3. CINCPAC 240416Z Jan 69; CINCPACFLT 040054Z Jan 69; CINCPACAF 030214Z Jan 69.
 4. JCS 1831/051728Z Feb 69; J4111 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
 5. JCS 4885/181430Z Mar 69; CINCPAC 230004Z Mar 69; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
 6. CINCPAC 230004Z Mar 69.

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movement and inspection of dangerous cargo and ammunition during retrograde operations.¹

(S) Meanwhile, on 10 April 1969, CINCPAC advised that COMUSMACV's figures were "incorrect. Present authorization is five officers and twenty-nine enlisted" USCG port security and explosive loading personnel in RVN.² Eight days later, CINCPAC requested clarification from COMUSMACV "so that number of personnel to be trained can be determined."³ By 23 April 1969, CINCPAC was able to provide a rationale for the USCG personnel requirement to the JCS:

2. Requirement for USCG personnel has been re-examined. Present authorization is verified as five officers and 29 EM. Projected workload will require one officer and 20 EM additional for a total of six officers and 49 EM. This is the minimum required to effectively accomplish the required tasks and will require some shifting of personnel to meet peak requirements at various ports.

3. It is emphasized that the technical assistance from USCG is not limited to the proper movement and inspection of ammunition cargoes....⁴

Korean Combat Meal (KCM)

(S) In 1967, the U. S. and the ROKG (Republic of Korea Government) reached an agreement to provide one KCM per day to each man in the ROKFV (ROK Forces Vietnam). This action became necessary because of an abnormally high wastage of U. S. "C" rations by ROKFV troops, as well as the fact that the continuing lack of a combat ration satisfactory to individual Korean tastes was adversely affecting troop morale and well being. "It was agreed that the ROK Ministry of Defense would purchase the ration and the U. S. would reimburse the ROKG through a Special Letter of Credit handled by AID. Procurement would be entirely in ROK hands, with the U. S. delivering the rations to Vietnam in U. S. ships. In Vietnam the ROKFV would take delivery,

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1. COMUSMACV 20285/040943Z Apr 69; COMUSMACV 21837/111017Z Apr 69.
 2. COMDT COGARD 101939Z Apr 69; J4811 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
 3. CINCPAC 180018Z Apr 69.
 4. CINCPAC 230450Z Apr 69.

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store and distribute the rations. "1 A Memorandum of Understanding covering this matter was signed on 24 March 1968. 2

(C) On 1 April 1969, after COMUSMACV asked for a supplementary procurement of 1,256,583 additional KCMs in FY 69 because of the increased strength of ROKFV, as well as the supplying of KCMs to non-ROKFV, such as POWs, detainees, and refugees, COMUS Korea in turn, requested CINCPAC to arrange that "\$771,516.83 be transferred to the Agency for International Development and the subsequent allocation of these funds to USAID/K. Upon approval of the foregoing and receipt of funds, COMUS will amend the Memorandum of Understanding dated 24 Mar 1968 to cover subject meals. "3 Upon being queried by CINCPAC on this matter, COMUSMACV replied on 10 April that the "cost of the KCM is approximately 11 cents less than the MCI and it has been considered economically advantageous to the U.S. to support the non-ROKFV requirements with KCM for one daily meal. The alternative is to provide the more expensive MCI. "4 Accordingly, on 19 April 1969, CINCPAC forwarded COMUS Korea's request to SECDEF. 5

(C) On 31 May 1969, CINCPAC initiated a follow-up action by message to confirm information received by telephone that the funding for FY 69 and FY 70 KCMs had been approved by SECDEF. In a message on 9 June 1969, SECDEF advised CINCPAC that the requested "funds in the amount of \$771,516.83 are being transferred by DA to USAID to cover FY 69 supplemental ration requirements and to maintain existing 45 day stock level. Amend implementation memo accordingly, and initiate memo for FY 70. "6 In addition, SECDEF tasked DA to provide \$3,075,146 of the FY 70 funds. This amount would be sufficient only for the first quarter of FY 70, since the total FY 70 funding requirement was over \$11 million. "The funding had been delayed due to USAID's reluctance to continue to administer the procurement of these rations. "7 The same month, COMUS Korea reported to CINCPAC that the "FY 70 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to provide Korean Combat Meals (KCM) to the Korean forces in Vietnam was signed on 26 Jun 69. "8

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1967, p. 848; see also pages 846 and 847.
 2. CINCPAC 192325Z Apr 69; COMUSKOREA UK 58133/011025Z Apr 69; J4133 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
 3. COMUSKOREA UK 58133/011025Z Apr 69.
 4. COMUSMACV 21585/100915Z Apr 69.
 5. CINCPAC 192325Z Apr 69.
 6. SECDEF 2087/092151Z Jun 69; CINCPAC 311814Z May 69; J4133 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
 7. J4133 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
 8. COMUSKOREA UK 59945/280602Z Jun 69.

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(S) In the past, AID, as an agency of the State Department, had administered the KCM program, using Special Letters of Credit (SLC) to effect payment. Although agreeing to continue administering this program through the 1st quarter of FY 70, AID now requested DOD to take over the administration of these letters of credit relating to the KCM program, as well as the Net Additional Cost (NAC). As a result, OSD began exploring the feasibility of this request. If OSD agreed to this proposal of AID, both USARPAC and COMUS Korea anticipated that the task of administering the KCM program would become an U.S. Army responsibility. USARPAC was against taking the program over, and COMUS Korea, on 26 July 1969, stated that it was impossible to operate under SLC procedures, since U.S. Army Disbursing Offices were not staffed to perform the extensive auditing required. Both COMUS Korea and CG USAEIGHT recommended to CINCPAC that, if the program became their responsibility, that direct payment be made by the U.S. Army Disbursing Offices using won check or U.S. Treasury check.¹

(S) CINCPAC, in turn, in a message to SECDEF on 30 July 1969, requested OSD to consider the problems of administration and payment that U.S. Army personnel in Korea would encounter if AID did not handle the FY 70 KCM program.² "Recent discussions between OSD and STATE," SECDEF finally informed CINCPAC on 21 August 1969, "have terminated in agreement that AID will continue to administer subject program."³

Issue of 15% Additional U.S. Rations to ROKFV

(U) In April 1969, COMUSMACV agreed to issue 15% additional MCI rations to ROKFV personnel engaged in night combat operations. Subsequently, "III MAF refused to issue the additional rations to ROKMC units supported by the III MAF due to lack of CMC authority and funding."⁴ At CINCPAC's request, COMUSMACV reconsidered his earlier authorization and released the following order on 1 November 1969:

... Effective immediately the authorization... for issue of 15 percent additional MCI rations to ROKFV is rescinded. Issue of MCIs to ROKFV units subsisting on operational rations will not exceed two meals per man per day.⁵

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1. COMUSKOREA UK 60479/260147Z Jul 69; J4133 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69; J4133 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 2. CINCPAC 302332Z Jul 69.
 3. SECDEF 7276/212116Z Aug 69.
 4. J4133 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
 5. COMUSMACV 61200/010030Z Nov 69; J4133 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.

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Military Construction in Support of Southeast Asia

(S) By the end of March 1969, military construction (MILCON) funding in support of Southeast Asia had reached a grand cumulative total of \$2,421,000,000. Of this figure, the totals for Vietnam and Thailand were \$1,714,000,000 and \$377,000,000, respectively.¹

(S) Based on the assumption of continued hostilities in Southeast Asia, as well as continued contingency deployments to Korea, CINCPAC had recommended in mid-1968 a FY 70 Military Construction Program (MCP) of \$566 million, plus the establishment of a \$100 million contingency fund. He had recommended \$325 million specifically for Vietnam and Thailand. As of March 1969, however, the SECDEF had recommended a FY 70 MCP, which included no funds for either Vietnam or Thailand and only a worldwide contingency fund of \$25 million. In addition, SECDEF had withheld apportionment of \$99 million of the \$167 million appropriated in FY 69, while only \$8 million remained uncommitted of the SECDEF FY 70 contingency fund.²

(S) The following U. S. construction troop units were in RVN as of March 1969: 14 USA Engineer Battalions (Construction), 13 USA Engineer Battalions (Combat), 10 USN Seabee Battalions, and five USAF Red Horse Squadrons. Moreover, there were two USA Engineer Battalions and one USAF Red Horse Squadron deployed in Thailand. By this time, the Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) construction contractors had been phased down both in RVN and Thailand. From 50,800 employees in July 1966, the joint venture of Raymond International, Morrison-Knudsen, Brown and Root, J. A. Jones (RMK-BRJ) had decreased its number of employees in RVN to 24,411. Meanwhile, the joint venture of Dillingham, Zachery, and Kaiser (DZK), formed for construction work in Thailand, was in the process of being phased out by May 1969. At the end of March 1969:

...the projects assigned to the construction contractor were 83 percent complete and those assigned to troop construction units were 58 percent complete. The Officer in Charge of Construction, RVN has recommended to COMUSMACV that the construction contractor be reduced from

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1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia 31 March 1969, Hq CINCPAC, 29 May 69, pp. 119, 120, and 129.
 2. Point Paper, J422, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Mar 69, Subj: Military Construction Program Funding Status; Point Paper, J4222, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Mar 69, Subj: Military Construction in Support of SEAsia; CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 158-60.

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PROGRAMS THRU FY69 FUNDS PROVIDED TO DATE

BASED ON MILCON STATUS REPORTS

TOTALS		MISC.	
AM FORCE	408.2	AM FORCE	88.2
NAVY	418.7	NAVY	36.4
ARMY	986.1	ARMY	122.4
TOTAL	1,813.0	TOTAL	238.8



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25,000 to a work force level of 18,000 in July-August time frame. The Army Military Construction program was 72 percent complete, the Navy program 77 percent complete, and the Air Force program 92 percent complete.

In the RVN 133 aircraft shelters were completed by the end of March. The highway program stood at 935 kilometers completed, 1,308 kilometers were under construction, and an additional 478 kilometers funded. Tan My Port is nearing completion. The Newport bridge interchange was also completed. Construction progress in all areas was satisfactory....¹

(S) By 10 March 1969, the construction capability in both RVN and Thailand had been analyzed together with the work remaining, and CINCPAC had forwarded his recommended capability schedule to the JCS. For Thailand, CINCPAC recommended:

(a) Retaining the two Army Engineer Battalions and the one Air Force Red Horse Squadron until Dec 31, 1969.

(b) On 31 Dec reducing the authorized strength of the two Army battalions from 2,700 to 1,400 and phasing the personnel of the deactivated Air Force Red Horse Squadron into the Base Civil Engineer organizations.²

(S) SECDEF, however, directed the deactivation of the USAF Red Horse Squadron by June 1969. By 7 May 1969, the JCS, concurring in CINCPAC's recommendations, forwarded a reclama to SECDEF. By 12 July 1969, SECDEF had authorized delay in:

...the deactivation of the Air Force Red Horse Squadron by 30 September 1969. A reduction in Army Engineer troop strength was also directed from the current 2,700 to 1,400 between 1 Jan and 1 July 1970. The deactivated units are to be redeployed from Thailand. COMUSMACTHAI,

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1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia 31 March 1969, Hq CINCPAC, 29 May 69, p. 120; Point Paper, J4222, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Mar 69, Subj: Military Construction in Support of SEAsia.
 2. Point Paper, J422, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Apr 69, Subj: Military Construction (MILCON) in Support of SEAsia; Point Paper, J4222, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Mar 69, Subj: Military Construction in Support of SEAsia.

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CINCUSARPAC, and CINCPACAF Staffs are currently reviewing the remaining construction projects, unobligated funds and scheduled construction capability to insure accomplishment of the most urgent projects.¹

(S) On 22 June 1969, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS an integrated PACOM-wide priority list of urgent construction requirements totaling \$99.4 million. Of this amount, \$67.3 million was earmarked for Southeast Asia, with the highest priorities assigned to projects in support of RVNAF modernization. The list included 80 projects (17 Army, 28 Navy, and 35 Air Force). He recommended that it be funded by using the balance of the unapportioned FY 69 MILCON and any available SECDEF contingency funds. By December 1969, however, reprogramming actions had reduced this list to 21 projects, totaling \$12.1 million.²

(S) On 6 August 1969, CINCPAC forwarded his recommended PACOM FY 71 MCP to the JCS. He recommended funding for projects totaling \$209 million and provided validated requirements for an additional \$261 million in projects if the force levels were not substantially reduced by the end of 1970. Out of the total \$209 million, \$108 million were for the support of Southeast Asia operations and \$30 million were for contingency use. This PACOM FY 71 MCP did not include the 80 projects on the list of urgent construction requirements that CINCPAC had forwarded earlier on 22 June 1969.³ The JCS, on 29 September 1969, recommended to SECDEF a \$105 million funding level for the PACOM FY 71 MCP, which included \$65.4 million for support of Southeast Asia and \$25 million for contingencies. "SECDEF and congressional action on this program will not be known until the end of CY 1970."⁴

(S) As a follow-on to his recommendations in June 1969 for the funding of urgent construction requirements, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS on 30

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1. Point Paper, J422, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jul 69, Subj: Military Construction (MILCON) Program in Support of SEAsia and Korea; Point Paper, J422, Hq CINCPAC, 7 May 69, Subj: Military Construction (MILCON) Program in Support of SEAsia and Korea.
 2. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Dec 69, Subj: Military Construction in Support of RVN, Thailand and Korea; Point Paper, J422, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jul 69, Subj: Military Construction (MILCON) Program in Support of SEAsia and Korea.
 3. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Aug 69, Subj: Military Construction Program Funding Status.
 4. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Dec 69, Subj: Military Construction in Support of RVN, Thailand and Korea.

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
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MILITARY CONSTRUCTION THAILAND **PROGRAMS THRU FY69 FUNDS PROVIDED TO DATE** **LOCATION AND COST** **BASED ON MHCON STATUS REPORT**

(\$ MILLIONS)

FUNDS AVAILABLE	
ARMY	121.5
NAVY	28.3
AIR FORCE	243.9
GRAND TOTAL	394.7

MISC.	
ARMY	41.5
NAVY	22.2
AIR FORCE	12.5
TOTAL	81.2



AS OF 31 JULY 1969

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 102.

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30 November 1969 an interim priority list of projects totaling \$52.53 million. "This total included \$47.0 million in support of the RVNAF I&M Program."¹ This revised list included those construction projects considered to be urgently required under all foreseeable conditions in Southeast Asia and Korea. "A supplemental list of additional requirements will be forwarded by 15 Jan 70, in keeping with planning requested by the JCS for Phase III of the RVNAF I&M Program."²

(C) As of the beginning of December 1969, SECDEF still had not apportioned \$91.7 million of the authorized \$167 million FY 69 MCP. In addition, only minor amounts remained still uncommitted from SECDEF's \$70 million FY 69 contingency fund. There was no FY 70 MCP for Southeast Asia. "Until FY 71 funds become available, funding for new/urgent construction requirements in SEAsia and Korea is limited to the uncommitted portion of the \$136.4 million unobligated RVN/Thailand/Korea funds, and to possible release of some of the \$91.7 million unapportioned FY 69 funds."³

(S) During the last quarter of Calendar Year 1969, the major feature of the RVN construction program:

...was an emphasis on construction of facilities for RVNAF. Funds programmed for RVNAF facilities as of 31 December totaled \$221 million of which \$116 million was for ARVN, \$51 million for VNN and \$54 million for VNAF. Facilities previously used by U.S. forces are being transferred to RVNAF at an increased rate. In the fourth quarter facilities at Blackhorse, Dong Ha, My Tho and the construction contractor facilities at Tan My were transferred to RVNAF.

Facilities requirements to support Phase III of the RVNAF I&M Program were estimated and submitted to JCS. Total unfunded requirements are estimated at \$177 million. This does not include unfunded highway construction requirements of \$121 million.

Construction capability in RVN continued to decline slowly. At the end of December there were 10 Army Combat

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1. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Dec 69, Subj: Military Construction in Support of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (I&M) Program.
 2. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Dec 69, Subj: Military Construction in Support of RVN, Thailand and Korea.
 3. Ibid.

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Bns, 13 Army Construction Bns, 5 Navy Seabee Bns, and 4 Air Force Redhorse Squadrons in-country. The civilian construction contractor was reduced to an employment level slightly under 18,000 personnel. This reduction was planned to continue until a level of 15,000 employees is reached by the end of April 1970.¹

Munitions

PACOM Air Munitions Allocations

(S) The CINCPAC Non-Nuclear Air Munitions Conference (NAMC) is convened approximately semiannually with the objective of reviewing and validating users' stated requirements, and allocating available assets. NAMC III was held at Hq CINCPAC from 3 through 6 February 1969.²

(S) Based on CINCPAC's component commanders' changes in air munition requirements, a revised PACOM air munitions allocation document was published and distributed on 27 June 1969. These revised allocations were based upon the CINCPAC component commanders' "stated requirements as compared to assets on hand and anticipated receipts from production."³ A month later, another PACOM air munitions allocation document was published and distributed:

This revision was necessitated by changes in CINCPAC air munition requirements as stated by Component Commanders. The revised allocations were based upon these stated requirements (including across the board reductions for PACAF and the reduction in SAC sorties from 1800 to 1600 per month) as compared to assets on hand and anticipated receipts from production.⁴


(S) From 7 through 10 October 1969, NAMC IV was held at Camp H. M. Smith. "The conference was jointly sponsored by the CINCPAC J3 and J4 staffs and included representatives from OSD, JCS, CNO, CSAF, CMC, DA, PACOM Component Commands, and other interested agencies."⁵ Its

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1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia 31 December 1969, Hq CINCPAC, p. 29.
 2. Intv, MAJ Norman T. Kobayashi, USA, J4713, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 6 Apr 70.
 3. J4712 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
 4. J4712 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
 5. J4712 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.

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SEASIA AIR MUNITIONS
REQUIREMENTS/ALLOCATIONS/EXPENDITURES
[THOUS OF SHORT TONS]
CY1969



SOURCE: J 4

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objective was to review and update the PACOM air munitions requirements and allocations through Calendar Year 1970, taking into account recent expenditure experiences, anticipated force structures within and outside of Southeast Asia, and production forecast. As a final result of NAMC IV, a joint J3/J4 document, containing the requirements and allocations for controlled air munitions within PACOM, was published on 12 November 1969. "Requirements, submitted by Component Commanders, were based on latest anticipated force structure. Allocations considered current inventory, anticipated receipts from production and available JCS reserve and ensure operational support at the stated levels thru CY 70. "1

CINCPAC Semiannual Review of RVNAF Ammunition Rates

(S) On 16 and 17 January 1969, the CINCPAC semiannual review of RVNAF ground ammunition, based on the expenditures during the period July - December 1968, was conducted at Camp H. M. Smith. Its purpose was to validate the RVNAF ground ammunition rates for the next six-month period. "Representatives from OSD, JCS, DA, MACV, and USARPAC participated as well as the CINCPAC Staff. The review resulted in recommendations to the JCS to reduce the rates for 140 items, increase the rates for 24 times, and no change in the rates for 34 items. "2 JCS approval was obtained on 12 February 1969.


(S) The second CINCPAC semiannual review of RVNAF ground ammunition for 1969 was conducted on 31 July and 1 August 1969. This review was based on the expenditures experienced during the period January - June 1969. "Representatives from OSD, JCS, DA, MACV, AMC, MUCOM, APSA, and USARPAC participated as well as the CINCPAC Staff. Additionally, two Vietnamese officers from the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, ARVN attended. This was the first rate review which included ARVN representation. "3 The minutes of this review was distributed on 20 August 1969, while the recommended rates and stockage objective were submitted to the JCS on 4 September 1969. Approval by the JCS was obtained on 30 September 1969. "4

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1. J4712 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
 2. J4714 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69; Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 21 Jan 69, Subj: Vietnamese Ground Ammunition Level; Intv, MAJ Norman T. Kobayashi, USA, J4713, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 6 Apr 70.
 3. J4713 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
 4. J4713 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69, citing CINCPAC Ltr Ser 002263 of 20 Aug 69; J4713 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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SEASIA
AIR MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES (SHORT TONS)
JAN 1967 THRU DEC 1969



1967 = 1968 = 1969

SOURCE: J4

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T-Day Planning for Ammunition

(S) Throughout Calendar Year 1969, much T-Day planning for ammunition took place in J47, Munitions Branch, Hq CINCPAC. Changes and modifications, of course, occurred as new guidance was received. Among the more significant accomplishments--on some, planning was initiated during the latter part of 1968--of the J47, Munitions Branch, Hq CINCPAC, in connection with FREIGHTER CARGO T-Day planning during Calendar Year 1969 were:

- a. Development of Air Munitions Management Plan, which permits rapid response to pre and post T-Day actions required.
- b. Developed the Ammunition Storage Requirements and Capabilities at PACOM storage location.
- c. Developed procedures and defined responsibilities for disposition of ammunition in the Southeast Asia pipeline.
- d. Determined Munitions Stockage Objectives for post T-Day forces, both U. S. and RVNAF.
- e. Developed Potential Ammunition Storage Sites in PACOM for possible use in retrograde of munitions from Southeast Asia.
- f. Prepared Munition Appendices to Logistical Annexes of all CINCPAC T-Day OPlans.
- g. Obtained PACOM Munitions War Reserve Requirement to be used in planning redistribution of Southeast Asia munitions assets.
- h. Obtained JCS approval to remove limitations to the quantity of ammunition authorized for storage in PACOM other than in the Southeast Asia area.
- i. Obtained authority for CINCPAC to divert air ammunition from Southeast Asia to other PACOM areas.
- j. Identified CINCPAC post T-Day Ammunition Responsibility. ¹

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1. Intv, LCOL Thomas E. Buchanan, USA, J472, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 10 Apr 70; J472 and J473 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Sep and Nov 69.

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T-Day Planning - Diversion of Air Munitions

(S) As reported in last year's history, CINCPAC had requested air munition diversion authority on 16 November 1968, because the existing constraints hampered T-Day planning. On 4 April 1969, the JCS advised that SECDEF had approved CINCPAC's request for diversion authority. The JCS further requested that this SECDEF guidance be incorporated into the CINCPAC Air Munitions Management Plan. Since the JCS desired a copy of this plan at the earliest date, a draft copy was handcarried to Washington, D. C., on 8 April 1969, and the final plan was forwarded to the JCS on 20 June 1969.¹

CINCPAC Air Munitions Management Plan

(S) On 6 December 1968, the JCS stated that "T-Day planning currently underway to formulate policies and guidelines for actions which would be necessitated by declaration of T-Day."² The JCS message requested CINCPAC to develop an air munitions management plan for use in developing T-Day and post T-Day plans at the JCS level, as well as to support CINCPAC's earlier recommendations concerning diversion authority in PACOM.³

(S) Once he had the plan developed in draft format, CINCPAC forwarded it on 27 February 1969 to his component commanders and CINCSAC for their review and concurrence.⁴ Concurrently, this plan was being coordinated within Hq CINCPAC with the J2, J3, and J5 staff divisions. After review and concurrence by his component commanders and CINCSAC, CINCPAC finalized this air munitions management plan and forwarded it to the JCS on 20 June 1969.⁵

Munitions Assistance Visit to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI

(S) From 18 through 29 November 1969, a Laos ammunitions procedures (LAMP) assistance visit was made to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI. The team was

1. JCS 6203/041825Z Apr 69; J4712 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69; Intv, MAJ Norman T. Kobayashi, USA, J4713, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 6 Apr 70; CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 191-3.
2. JCS 7168/062247Z Dec 68.
3. Ibid.; J471 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
4. Ltr, CINCPAC to component commanders and CINCSAC, 27 Feb 69, Subj: Air Munitions Management Plan.
5. J471 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69; Intv, MAJ Norman T. Kobayashi, USA, J4713, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 6 Apr 70.

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composed of one Hq CINCPAC and two Ogden Air Materiel Area (OOAMA) representatives; the purpose of the trip to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI was:

a. To make first hand observations of the ammunitions storage capabilities, distribution operations and the operational environment in an effort to determine the problem areas which have made necessary emergency logistic support actions during the past four months.

b. To jointly determine the corrective measures necessary to preclude the future necessity of such emergency actions and to insure adequate logistics support to the RLAF.¹

(S) As a result of this trip, actions "were initiated to establish 60-day levels of supply for all air munitions items. On hand and due-in balances were reconciled, and procedures for reordering coordinated to preclude emergency resupply actions such as have been necessary in the past."²

Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) in Southeast Asia

(U) This portion of the history, which deals with Calendar Year 1969 POL matters in Southeast Asia, is designed to cover only those significant topics not treated elsewhere. Chapter I of this history, for instance, discusses POL from a PACOM-wide viewpoint, and its narrative and accompanying charts, of necessity, treats POL in Southeast Asia as a part of the overall PACOM POL picture during 1969. In addition, scattered throughout this history are passing mentions of POL activities as they affect MAP, logistics, operations, etc.

PACOM POL Conference

(C) From 17 through 19 February 1969, a PACOM POL Conference was held at Hq CINCPAC. Among the attendees were representatives of CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC), MSTs, and all PACOM Sub-Area Petroleum Offices (SAPOs). The agenda of the meeting covered a wide range of topics, including formal presentations and group discussions on the following:

a. T-Day Planning (JPO, SAPOV, SAPOTHAI)

1. J47/Memo/00434-69 to J4, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Dec 69, Subj: Trip Report, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, 18-29 Nov 69; Intv, MAJ Norman T. Kobayashi, USA, J4713, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, CINCPAC HistBr, 6 Apr 70.
2. J4711 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.

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- b. Current PACOM POL Construction Projects (JPO)
- c. POL Construction Planning (JCS)
- d. Stockage Objectives (JCS)
- e. Cargo Operations (DFSC)
- f. Contract Administration (DFSC)
- g. Navy Distillate Program (CNO)¹

(C) Besides providing a valuable update on the POL logistic posture of PACOM, this conference served as a useful forum for the consolidation of ideas and the clarification of thinking concerning:

- a. T-Day and post T-Day POL and facilities requirements.
- b. PWRS determination and resolution of current PWRS inconsistencies among the services.²

Southeast Asia Semi-Annual POL Allocations Meeting

(U) From 20 through 23 August 1969, a meeting was held at Hq CINCPAC for the purpose of conducting the semi-annual review of the Southeast Asia POL requirements and the proposed distribution pattern for the period of January through June 1970:

The most significant outcome of the conference was a firm agreement for increased MSTS POL delivery to RVN. Due to legal requirements and the increased availability of U.S. Flag Tankers, MSTS tankers will replace commercial vessels for deliveries to Bien Hoa, Na Trang, Thuy Hoa, Qui Nhon, Chu Lai, and Da Nang. This change will take effect in January 1970.³

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- 1. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69; Ltr, CINCPAC to Distribution List, 16 Jan 69, Subj: CINCPAC Petroleum Logistics Conference; J44/Memo/08-69 to J4, 23 Jan 69, Subj: PACOM POL Conference; CINCPAC 250021Z Jan 69.
 - 2. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
 - 3. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.

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Change of Floating Storage in RVN

(U) During the discussions of the CINCPAC Southeast Asia POL Allocations Meeting in February 1969, it was "determined that as a result of eliminating the Japan/RVN tanker shuttles, it is desirable to increase floating storage Da Nang from a T2 to a T5 tanker. The other T2 floating storage requirement in RVN should remain unchanged."¹ As a result, COMSTS proposed on 11 March 1969 that the T-2 floating storage tanker at Da Nang be replaced with a larger T-5 tanker. The backup availability of an increased floating storage capability at Da Nang was expected to offset the loss of flexibility resulting from the elimination of the Japan/RVN tanker shuttles. "The component service Inventory Control Points concurred in the proposed change and agreed to absorb the slight additional costs in accordance with an existing tri-service agreement."² On 11 April 1969, the T-5 class tanker HAMPTON ROADS took station as the floating storage tanker at Da Nang; it had a four product capability with a total storage capacity of 209 thousand barrels.³

POL Pipeline Between Sattahip and U-Tapao in Thailand

(S) As explained in last year's history, the increasing POL consumption at U-Tapao Air Base necessitated remedial action. By December 1968, a construction project to improve the pipeline transfer capability from the terminal at Sattahip to U-Tapao was undertaken. This \$900,000 USAF project called for the construction of a permanent, 12-inch JP-4 pipeline. The necessary funding for this project was accomplished through the use of surplus FY 67S MCP funds held by the Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC), Thailand. By 19 May 1969, the pipeline was completed, accepted, and in operation.⁴

Tan My Buoy Installation in I CTZ

(U) In August 1969, the installation of a POL monobuoy at Tan My in I CTZ was completed. This new 42-foot diameter buoy is connected to shore tankage by means of two 8-inch discharge lines. It was completely operational

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1. COMSTS 111952Z Mar 69; J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
 2. Ibid.; NAVFUELSUPO Alex Va 141500Z Mar 69; CO USAPC Alex Va 142138Z Mar 69; SAAMA Kelly AFB Tex 182130Z Mar 69.
 3. COMUSMACV 22325/131009Z Apr 69; J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
 4. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 210 and 211; J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; COMUSMACTHAI 190916Z May 69.

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by September 1969. This buoy "is expected to provide increased discharge reliability during typhoon season and improve resupply capability in the I CTZ area."¹

U.S. Government POL Losses in Thailand

(S) Ever since the U.S. commenced military operations in Thailand, POL losses have been experienced to some degree. "Small losses are inevitable, owing to the type of operations, the multiplicity of delivery locations and the necessary dependence on primarily commercial delivery systems."²

(S) Early in 1968, Mr. John M. McGee, a disgruntled assistant petroleum inspector in Thailand, had written letters to Senator Proxmire (Democrat - Wisconsin), complaining about POL inspection in Thailand. Acting on this complaint, Senator Proxmire in late 1968 requested a GAO evaluation of the extent of the losses. Reports of these alleged losses received wide news media coverage. Meanwhile, in November 1968, COMUSMACTHAI transferred Mr. McGee from Thailand, when his conduct was determined to be prejudicial to the best interests of the United States. As the press reports continued in intensity, CINCPAC forwarded comments on 10 January 1969 to the JCS to provide factual background information to counteract certain statements emanating from Mr. McGee and the Office of Senator Proxmire.³ Before the end of the month, Mr. Ritchey Williams, a Civil Service Commission investigator, who was investigating the personnel actions aspect of Mr. McGee's stated grievances, visited Hq CINCPAC on his way to Thailand and talked to various CINCPAC staff officers, as well as taking the deposition of CAPT Franklin B. Goodspeed, USNR, Chief, Joint Petroleum Office (JPO), J44, Hq CINCPAC.⁴

(S) At Senator Proxmire's request, GAO made a study of the alleged POL losses in Thailand. Upon the conclusion of its investigations, GAO's

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1. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
 2. Point Paper, J441, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Oct 69, Subj: Government POL Losses in Thailand.
 3. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69; Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Mar 69, Subj: Thailand POL Losses; COMUSMACTHAI 210211Z Nov 68; COMUSMACTHAI 210801Z Nov 68; CINCPAC 102134Z Jan 69.
 4. J44/Memo/62-69 to J4, 27 Jan 69, Subj: Visit to J-44 by Mr. Ritchey Williams, GS-15, Civil Service Commission Investigator, with Encl: Copy of deposition given by Capt. F. B. Goodspeed on 27 January 1969.

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final report, bearing the date of 9 January 1969, was released.¹ The conclusions and ramifications of this GAO report are described by the following excerpts from a Hq CINCPAC document dated 10 October 1969:

... The results of the investigation, which concentrated on calendar year 1967 deliveries, estimated total losses at less than 3 million gallons, or less than 1% of a total of more than 380 million gallons delivered during the year. The report acknowledged many procedural improvements already instituted by COMUSMACTHAI in an attempt to cut down the losses. In addition, the GAO recommended several additional actions which have since been implemented.

The losses, though large in the absolute terms reported in the press, are not an indication of a total lack of control by the government. The GAO report specifies that much of the loss can be attributed directly to fraud, forgery, and collusion. The probability exists, therefore, that a more sophisticated system of accountability, properly administered, may not have detected such irregularities.

.....

The investigation naturally spurred a close review of handling procedures. In Thailand, control, receipt, and quantity inspection methods have been under detailed review. POL personnel have been given detailed instruction in combating theft and fuel diversion. There is no evidence of organized, large thefts of POL products.

Action to decrease POL losses in Thailand was underway long before Senator Proxmire's interest became public. These actions have been continued, intensified, and expanded. Without a doubt, some theft of POL products has occurred. But the extent of the problem has been magnified out of proportion, largely due to publicity surrounding the McGee case. POL support of operations in Thailand has been, and continues to be, outstanding.²

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1. Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Mar 69, Subj: Thailand POL Losses.
 2. Point Paper, J441, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Oct 69, Subj: Government POL Losses in Thailand.

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Alleged POL Drum Thefts in Thailand

(C) On 11 February 1969, SECDEF requested CINCPAC to provide certain information on which to base a reply to a congressional inquiry concerning the possible theft of empty POL drums in Thailand. After securing the necessary statistical information on drum shipments from COMUSMAC-THAI, CINCPAC passed it on to SECDEF on 18 February 1969.¹

(C) Because of the continued congressional interest, SECDEF requested additional information regarding the possible diversion of empty drums to the local black market or to other miscellaneous uses, such as the construction of bunkers and revetments. Again, COMUSMAC-THAI furnished the required information, which CINCPAC passed to SECDEF on 28 February 1969.²

(C) At the time, the situation regarding empty POL drums in Thailand was as follows:

a. Only 13,959 drums out of a total of 88,091 drums delivered up country during CY 1968 are unaccounted for. In addition, of the drums delivered, approximately 66,000 had been used previously. This afforded substantial savings to the U.S. Government.

b. There is no evidence of any black market activity in empty drums. This is confirmed by the lack of interest on the part of local scrap metal dealers in disposal sales of used drums.

c. The number of drums diverted to other uses, such as bunker and revetment construction, is insignificant.³

GAO POL Review, Southeast Asia

(C) At Hq CINCPAC on 16 October 1969, a GAO debrief was held regarding the findings of the GAO in their investigation of POL operations

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1. SECDEF 2249/111551Z Feb 69; CINCPAC 120552Z Feb 69; COMUSMAC-THAI 171101Z Feb 69; CINCPAC 180332Z Feb 69; J44/Memo/106-69 to J4, 17 Feb 69, Subj: Drum Shipments Thailand.
 2. CINCPAC 202357Z Feb 69; J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69; COMUSMAC-THAI 270423Z Feb 69; CINCPAC 282209Z Feb 69.
 3. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69; Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 6 May 69, Subj: Loss of Empty POL Drums in Thailand.

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throughout all of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. This investigation, which had commenced on 15 July 1969, had been made at the request of Senators Proxmire and Montoya. It was planned to have an initial draft report ready by 1 November and a final report by 31 December 1969.

(C) A preliminary analysis of the findings presented at this GAO debrief showed:

... that the most sensational finding from a publicity attracting standpoint is that 34.6 million gallons of fuels were reported lost through pipeline operations in the Qui Nhon area during the period 2 Jan through 25 Jul 69. Specifics furnished to DA indicate loss to be 29.4 million gallons and that actions other than pilferage have been the principal cause of POL losses in the pipeline operation. 1

The U. S. Government as Self-Insurer

(U) During April 1969, it was determined that the U. S. Government would become self-insured as to cargoes and cargo war risk premiums for petroleum products delivered to Southeast Asia by the in-country contractors. This determination was made on the basis that:

a. It is the general policy of the Government to self-insure government-owned property.

b. Losses of product in Vietnamese waters were not of a magnitude which would warrant continued payments of insurance premiums.

c. The Government would achieve a significant annual budgetary savings. 2

(U) As a result, effective 1 July 1969, Marine Cargo Insurance coverage, Cargo War Risk premiums, and General Average coverage were eliminated from the Southeast Asia in-country contracts. Shortly thereafter, it was discovered that additional inspectors would be required in order to assure adequate POL procurement inspection under the changed provision of the Southeast Asia contracts. As a result, on 18 July 1969, this problem was

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1. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
 2. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.

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taken under advisement by the Navy Fuel Supply Office (NFSO) in an effort to effect a solution.¹

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1. Ibid. ; Defense Fuel Supply Center 3219-69/302037Z Jun 69; COMUSMAC-THAI 071014Z Jul 69; CO NAVFUELSUPO 182114Z Jul 69.

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SECTION X - ACTION TAKEN TO COUNTER
COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

(U) Stepped-up infiltration to the South, the brazen capture of the Pueblo, and the more recent shooting down of one of our planes many miles from North Korean air space, reflect a truculence that could escalate sharply into a major war.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.,¹

The North Korean Threat

(U) In Korea, Kim Il-Sung makes no secret of his goal to unify Korea under his control by force during the next few years...he launched a carefully planned campaign to this end, highlighted by the 1968 Blue House raid in Seoul designed to assassinate President Park of the Republic of Korea; subsequent events continue to reaffirm his aggressive intentions. Clearly, he will not scruple at even the most flagrant measures to achieve his objective.²

(S) The North Korean threat remained unchanged in 1969. A surprise attack could be launched against the Republic of Korea by North Korean land forces, 12 divisions and one brigade, deployed near the Demilitarized Zone. With little warning, North Korea could launch a large-scale attack, drawing on 20-22 of its 25 division equivalents supported by about 500 combat jet aircraft. In a large-scale Chinese-North Korean assault on the Republic of Korea, it is estimated that a force of 50-60 divisions would be the most feasible attacking force. This force would be well within communist logistic capabilities, which in Korea would not be the limiting factor. Some 1,000-1,500 jet fighter aircraft and up to about 200 light and medium bombers, plus a sizable force of submarines and patrol craft, would be expected to support any communist Chinese campaign against Korea.³

1. Admiral McCain's basic speech, "The Pacific and National Power: Collective Security in Asia," as of mid-September 1969 on file in J74 (Public Affairs Office), CINCPAC.
2. Ibid.
3. Point Paper, J2215, Hq CINCPAC, 24 May 69, Subj: Military Threat to the Republic of Korea. An account of North Korean conventional and unconventional capabilities can be found in Vol. IV, pp. 213-217, CINCPAC Command History 1968.

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North Korean Conventional Armed Forces

(S) The North Korean Army consisted of 356,000 personnel organized into 20 infantry divisions, four infantry and four artillery brigades, one tank division, five tank regiments, and other supporting units. The Air Force consisted of about 570 jet aircraft. About 75 percent of this force was MIG-15/17 aircraft. There were about 95 MIG-21s. These fighters were primarily used for air defense. Offensive capability lay in about 75 obsolescent IL-28 light jet bombers. The Navy, a coastal defense force, possessed four submarines and about 15 missile-armed patrol boats. These forces could not conduct successful offensive operations without extensive support and reinforcement from Communist China or the USSR. It was believed that North Korea would not risk initiating hostilities without firm assurance of such support. There were no indications that such assurance would be received. The Republic of Korea on the other hand was assured of U.S. support and reinforcement for defense against armed aggression.¹

North Korean Unconventional Capability

(S) The principal threat to the Republic of Korea was the subversive infiltration conducted by North Korea's unconventional warfare organizations. Each of the three North Korean Army groups along the Demilitarized Zone had a 3,000-man Foot Reconnaissance Station capable of harassment, ambush, sabotage, and terrorism against the ROK. In addition, the 17th Reconnaissance Brigade consisting of 9,300 personnel had been trained for airborne infiltration and guerrilla warfare in the event of war. The brigade possessed a modest airlift capability provided by some 30-50 light transports, each of which could drop about 10 men. The principal arm of the North Korean guerrilla effort is the 124th Army Unit. Its overall strength was estimated to be 5,000 men. The 124th was organized to conduct long-range agent penetrations and guerrilla warfare. An additional 16,000 personnel were in training or serving in support functions. Fifty or more fast agent boats provided an excellent capability to infiltrate agents on ROK coasts.²

(S) During 1969, there was a marked decrease in enemy aggression along the DMZ. Only 99 recorded incidents took place in 1969 as compared with 462 in 1967 and 542 in 1968. As a result of the decrease in incidents, casualties were drastically reduced. Five U.S. and five ROK personnel were killed in 1969 compared with 16 U.S. and 75 ROK in 1967 and 14 U.S. and 81

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1. Point Paper, J2215, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Aug 69, Subj: Threat to the Republic of Korea.
 2. Ibid.

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ROK killed in 1968. As in recent years, the pattern of NK concentrating incidents in the U. S. zone of the DMZ was continued.¹

North Korean Shootdown of U. S. Navy EC-121 Reconnaissance Plane

(S) During recent military armistice commission meetings, the North Koreans have been particularly vehement and vicious in warning UN forces about provocative actions.²

(S) On 11 April, COMUS Korea in a message to CINCPAC advised that COMUS Korea was trying to keep the above situation "cool" and suggested that COMMANDO CLINCH flights stay at least 15 NM from the DMZ and preferably farther while routed over the ROK. He also suggested that aircrews be especially alert and prepared to abort at the first indication of any North Korean reaction.³ On 13 April, ADM McCain in a message to CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT and COMUS Korea stated that caution would continue to be exercised on all PARPRO (Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program) operations in the vicinity of North Korea even though all PARPRO tracks were designed to provide minimum provocation consistent with mission accomplishment. CINCPAC pointed out that "...review of approved C. C. tracks discloses no case where the aircraft will operate on a northerly heading within 15 NM of the DMZ."⁴

(S) At 150605Z April⁵ the JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) notified JRC CINCPAC that it had received a message which reported a possible shootdown of the United States reconnaissance mission [REDACTED] over the Sea of Japan at [REDACTED] at approximately 150447Z April by a minimum of two North Korean aircraft. A follow-up report to the report made to the JCS JRC stated that there had been a possible KORCOM (Korean Communist) reaction to non-KORCOM flight activity over the Sea of Japan. Information available during the period 150222Z to 150454Z April disclosed that a non-KORCOM aircraft encountered an unknown number of KORCOM aircraft at a point approximately 95 NM east of Hoemun, North Korea at 150442Z April. The non-KORCOM aircraft disappeared from the

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1. Highlights of U. S. Army, Pacific, Activities (U), December 1969, Hq USARPAC, 20 Feb 70, p. 35.
 2. COMUSKOREA 110927Z Apr 69.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCPAC 130409Z Apr 69.
 5. 142005W, Honolulu time.

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radar at 150454Z April.¹

(S) The CINCPAC Command Center received a telephone call from PACAF at 142145W (150745Z) April informing CINCPAC of a message received by that headquarters. The message stated that the 314th Air Division at Osan, Korea had received a call [REDACTED] at 0612Z hours advising that an EC-121 aircraft was down at [REDACTED] at 0411Z hours. At 0641Z hours word was received at Osan that an HC-130 aircraft from Tachikawa, Japan was enroute to the scene of the downed EC-121 at 0622Z hours. In addition, two F-106s were reported on CAP (combat air patrol) at 38°-30'N--131°-30'E and by 0630Z hours all F-106s aircraft at Osan were placed on five-minute alert.²

North Korean Announcement of Shootdown

(U) At 150659Z April, FBIS, Okinawa informed the CG, Eighth United States Army that the Pyongyang Domestic Service had broadcast at 0655Z hours that the "Korean People's Army" had shotdown a U.S. reconnaissance plane at 1350 hours Korean time when it intruded into the airspace of the "DPRK."³ In a subsequent broadcast the North Koreans reported that the plane was shotdown with "one stroke."⁴

United States Announcement of Shootdown

(U) At 150920Z April, COMUS Korea/CINCUNC advised the JCS and CINCPAC that he had received a query from the ROK CIA requesting comments or confirmation of a Pyongyang radio broadcast that the North Koreans had shotdown "a spy plane" at 151400 hours Korean time. The ROK CIA was referred to the ROK DSA without comment. GEN Bonesteel stated that in the message that he would take a position of no comment and requested official guidance at the "earliest" particularly on press queries. He asked if there were any special instructions for official discussion with ROK Armed Forces

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1. CDR R. D. Murphy, USN, J3B51 provided COL J. R. Johnson, CINCPAC Command Historian, with the above information and with much of the other data used in the EC-121 shootdown narrative in this section.
 2. Incoming telephone report log, CINCPAC Command Center 142145W Apr 70; COMAFKorea 150825Z Apr 69. This message was addressed to both CINCPACAF and CINCPAC. CINCPAC's time of receipt (TOR) was 150844Z (142244W). In effect, PACAF received the COMAFKorea message and relayed the contents to CINCPAC prior to CINCPAC's receipt of the message at 2245Z Hours.
 3. FBIS Okinawa 150659Z Apr 69.
 4. FBIS Okinawa 150726Z Apr 69.

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and concluded the message with the comment that he was increasing the "status of air defense and missiles."¹

(U) At 151000Z April, OSD/PA notified all concerned that the following message had been released by the Defense and State Departments:²

The North Koreans have claimed that they have intercepted and shot down a U.S. military aircraft. We can report the following:

Aerial search operations are underway in the Sea of Japan approximately 95 miles southeast of Chongjin, North Korea, for a four-engine, propeller-driven Navy EC-121 aircraft with a reported 31 persons aboard.

The reconnaissance aircraft, based at Atsugi, Japan, has been missing since about midnight Monday, EST. The flight began at approximately 5 P. M. EST, April 14.

The aircraft commander was under orders to approach no closer than 50 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea.

Names of the men aboard the aircraft will be released following notification of next of kin. We have no additional details at this time.

United States Reaction

(U) Immediately upon verification of the shootdown of the EC-121 several actions were initiated. SAR (Search and Rescue) forces were dispatched to the scene of the incident, PARPRO missions were suspended, and U.S. forces were alerted for redeployment.

SAR Operations

(S) As indicated above, an HC-130 aircraft from Tachikawa was enroute to the scene of the incident by 0622Z hours and two F-106s were in the area on CAP operations. In addition, the USS DALE (DD) and H. A. TUCKER (DD)

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1. COMUSKOREA/CINCUNC 150920Z Apr 69.
 2. OSD/PA 151000Z Apr 69.

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were assigned SAR missions and were underway from Sasebo at 151130Z hours.¹ DDs STERETT and MAHAN also participated in the SAR effort.²

(U) At 151026Z April Secretary of State Rogers sent a message to the U. S. Embassy in Moscow and advised that the North Koreans had announced that they shot down a U. S. aircraft "...quote which intruded into DPKR airspace unquote. An EC-121 is missing over Sea of Japan.... It was under orders not...to approach closer than 50 NM to Korea and was apparently attacked at least that far from the coast though details still lacking. Search underway for crew of 31...." Secretary Rogers closed his message with a request that the Soviets be asked to alert any of their ships that were in the area to pick up possible survivors.³

(C) U. S. Ambassador to Moscow Beam notified Secretary Rogers at 151135Z April that he had informed Mr. Kornienko, Chief, USA Section, Foreign Ministry of the SECSTATE request. Kornienko stated that he was uninformed regarding both the missing aircraft and the NK broadcast but would inform the Soviet authorities immediately regarding the request for help in rescuing any survivors.

~~(S)~~ At 1951Z hours on the same date, the SECSTATE informed the AMEMBASSY Moscow that:⁴

Secretary called in Dobrynin 12:15 P. M. today to discuss North Korean shoot-down of EC-121. Secretary told Dobrynin that EC-121 during its flight was at no time less than 40 miles from North Korea and that shoot-down was well over 50 nautical miles from North Korean coast. We do not know whether there were any survivors, but we are anxious to enlist Soviet help in rescue effort. We had instructed our charge in Moscow this morning to inform the Soviet Foreign Ministry of the missing aircraft and to ask that any Soviet ships in the area assist in rescue of any possible survivors. It was our understanding that there are ships in the area of unidentified nationality and the Secretary wished Dobrynin to know that we had issued instructions to our aircraft in the area not to fire on any vessels involved in rescue operations. Secretary reiterated hope expressed

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1. USS DALE 151012Z Apr 69.
 2. Admin CINCPAC 160315Z Apr 69.
 3. SECSTATE 057284/151026Z Apr 69.
 4. SECSTATE 057429/151951Z Apr 69.

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in Moscow early today that Soviet Government would do what it could to bring about the safe return of any possible survivors.

Dobrynin said he had received no information concerning the incident from Moscow beyond a brief Tass statement based on the North Korean release. He would report immediately to Moscow the Secretary's remarks and specifically his request that Soviet vessels in the area offer all possible assistance.

(C) At 160157Z a SAR HC-130 reported sighting debris in an area three miles long and one mile wide at 41°-19'N--131°-48'E. Two Russian ships with long boats were also reported in the area. One long boat had picked up a 20-man life raft. CINCPACFLT advised CINCPAC that voice intercept identified the Soviet ships as DD 429 (KOTLIN class) and DLG 580 (KASHIN class). DD 429 was reported as being along side a life raft. 1

(S) CINCPAC received copies of two situation reports on 15 April. One was from CTG 72.4 to the Fifth Air Force JRCC/CC and the other from 314th Air Division at Osan. CTG 72.4 stated that a SAR C-130 had sighted two Soviet vessels in the general search area--DD 429 and DLG 580. The SAR aircraft sighted the debris at approximately the same time. The debris consisted of a Mae West, dye markers, a partially inflated 20-man orange life raft, aircraft insulation, and a silver colored object suspected to be aircraft wreckage. The debris was streaked in a straight line from an oil slick at a bearing of 190 degrees to approximately three-four miles long and one mile wide. The SAR aircraft dropped smoke lights and lead the two Soviet ships to the center of the debris area. On arrival at the area at 2345Z, the ships launched four small boats and proceeded to retrieve a raft and debris. The HC-130 crew believed that the DD and DLG had not sighted the debris area prior to the SAR aircraft sighting the debris. The situation report also stated there was no visual evidence of water disturbance by other vessels prior to arrival of the Russian ships. There was no indication that the ships picked up any survivors. 2

(S) The 314th Air Division reported that Air Force SAR plane 963 had established contact with the Soviet DLG 580 at 41°-46'N--131°-40'E heading

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1. Telephone Report Log, CINCPAC Command Center, 151600W (160200Z) Apr 69. Prior to receipt of this message by CINCPAC the SAR HC-130 had requested and permission was granted to vector the DD and the DLG to the area.
 2. CINCPACFLT 161424Z Apr 69.

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south approximately 28 miles north of the crash site. When 963 asked if DLG 580 had survivors the reply was "no." When asked about aircraft parts DLG 580 responded in the affirmative. AF 963 requested permission to fly low over the ship and permission was granted. As 963 passed over the ship the crew photographed parts of the EC-121 lying on the aft part of the ship. The crew saw a wheel, a ladder, and a shirt of some type. The dialogue between the Soviet DLG 580 and AF SAR 963 continued:

Russian ship DD 580 asked where 963 was from. 963 reported from Korea. 963 asked about Russian ship DD 429 if picked up any body from A/C. Reply - ship 429 departing from area. Ship 580 asked if 963 saw any survivors - reply no. Ship 580 asked how many were on board downed A/C. Reply 31. Ship 580 asked if any alive--told not sure. Ship 580 changed heading to north. Ship 580 asked 963 to fly over ship to site of A/C parts in water. 963 was at limit of search area (30 miles from point of crash). 963 asked if anybody was located or on board - reply no, just listed parts. Ship 429 heading south from crash site at good speed. 963 requested permission to drop radio to Russian ship 429. 5th Air Force Rescue gave permission and to forward report on what found out.¹

(S) At 161115Z April, 314th Air Division reported to CINCPAC:

The following information from Air Force Rescue 963 thru RAG BAG:

AF Rescue 50963 at 17451 dropped a radio to ship 429. Position 40 - 41 N/131 - 26E heading 030. At this time it appeared that 429 had reversed course. Previous heading 210 degrees prior to A/C arrival. At 1810I radio was picked up by ship 429. Communication was established. A/C asked ship 429 what parts had been picked up. Ship 429 asked A/C if 33 persons were aboard. A/C advised ship 429 that 31 persons aboard. Ship 429 asked A/C if they saw survivors. A/C replied negative. A/C asked ship if they saw survivors. Ship said negative. Ship 429 advised A/C if survivors were sighted notify ship 429 and they would pick them up. Ship 429 advised AF 963 that following items picked up: 1 rubber raft no size available; 2 cigarette packs;

1. 314th DCC Osan AB Korea 160945Z Apr 69.

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2 pencils (assumed imperial, unable to interpret Russian clearly); 1 A/C seat; other pieces of A/C; 1 man's jacket. AF 963 asked if jacket had a name or serial number. Several pieces of wood. A/C asked ship if they were in area last night. Negative reply. 1804I communications stopped. 1855I A/C attempted to contact ship. 1900I ship 429 flashed lights off and on (not in code pattern). 1905I A/C departed area. Ship 429 position 41 - 05 N 131 - 28 E heading north at 22 KTS.¹

(U) As of 161215Z April, USS DALE and TUCKER and the HC-130 were the prime SAR vehicles. The fighter CAP consisted of four aircraft.² By 161550Z the USS DALE reported picking up a section of fuselage, with apparent bullet or shrapnel holes.³ The USS TUCKER recovered internal compartment metal, a 5'x1' piece of fuselage structure with three bullet holes, a 3'x4" piece of styrofoam structural insulation with metallic foil backing, a 2'x3' piece of cabin interior, and a small section of a status board.⁴

~~(S)~~ Two bodies of the EC-121 crew were picked up by the USS TUCKER. The bodies were identified as LTJG Joseph R. Ribar and Aviation Electronics Technician 1/C Richard E. Sweeney.⁵ No other bodies were ever recovered.

~~(S)~~ The USS TUCKER and the Soviet DD 429 effected transfer of debris of the EC-121 picked up by the DD 429 to the TUCKER. The TUCKER's captain reported that the Russians were extremely cordial but business-like. Speeches and messages of condolence were offered by the Russians. The crew of the TUCKER presented a USS TUCKER cigarette lighter and eight copies of Playboy to the crew of the DD 429.⁶

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1. 314th DCC Osan AB Korea 161115Z Apr 69.
 2. 314th DCC Osan AB Korea 161225Z Apr 69.
 3. Ibid., 161600Z Apr 69.
 4. CINCPACFLT 170327Z Apr 69. For a detailed listing of debris picked up see CINCPACFLT 180021Z Apr 69.
 5. The exact time the bodies were located is not available. Apparently the recovery took place prior to 0454Z hours on 17 April in the vicinity of 41°30'N--131°45'E. 5th AF message 181541Z Apr 69 fixes the time as of 170230Z.
 6. Records available at this headquarters do not pinpoint the time and date that debris exchange took place. The date appears to have been 18 April; CINCPACFLT 182311Z Apr 69; AMEMB Moscow 1628/171510Z Apr 69; SECSTATE 059796/180357Z Apr 69.

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~~(S)~~ The SAR effort was terminated by the JCS on 19 April when they told CINCPAC that:¹

1. (U) Since there is no longer any probability of recovering survivors from the EC-121 which was shot down by the North Koreans on 15 April 1969, it is desired that you discontinue existing search and rescue operations.

2. (U) Withdraw search ship and aircraft from search area.

~~(S)~~ Preparation for reaction to North Korea's hostile action in shooting down the EC-121 was almost immediate. The Fifth Air Force commander directed that all of his conventional forces be brought to maximum readiness for deployment to Forward Operating Bases (FOB) with "execution to be expected not earlier than... 152400L." ² CINCUNC requested COMAFK to increase significantly air defense by HAWK and HERCULES missiles until further notice. ³ The Seventh Fleet commander directed his units to prepare for the possible deployment of an attack carrier task force into the Korean area. He further directed that three CVAs "remain topped off on fuel, ammunition and other assets insofar as possible without substantially degrading the Southeast Asia effort." The ENTERPRISE and RANGER were assigned first priority for contingency purposes. ⁴

~~(S)~~ At 160210Z April, the JCS sent CINCPAC an execute message to commence movement of three carrier task forces with suitable ASW, AAW, and cruiser bombardment capability toward the Sea of Japan at the best sustained "SOA" (speed of advance). The task forces were to hold south of Korea. ⁵ CINCPAC in turn directed CINCPACFLT to commence immediate movement of the task forces. ⁶

~~(TS)~~ On the same date, ADM McCain, in response to the JCS-directed movement of the three carrier task forces toward the Sea of Japan, told the CJCS that similar Navy forces had been deployed to the Sea of Japan for a lengthy period in response to the PUEBLO seizure. And that while coordinated plans to strike targets in North Korea were developed, not one of the plans

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1. JCS 737/192036Z Apr 69.
 2. 5th AF Blue Dat 41A/150824Z Apr 69.
 3. CINCUNC 58445CJ/150851Z Apr 69.
 4. COMSEVENFLT 151116Z Apr 69.
 5. JCS 06996/160210Z Apr 69.
 6. Admin CINCPAC 160324Z Apr 69.

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was executed, in fact tactical air was restricted from flying close to North Korea. ADM McCain then told the CJCS no guidance had been provided as to the mission of the CVAs steaming north to join forces with USAF tactical air in South Korea. CINCPAC suggested that by the time the task forces reached their destination in the Sea of Japan a mission that provided immediate positive action should be assigned. ADM McCain believed that:¹

...this could inject an element of surprise, particularly in view of the fact that past performance might lull the North Koreans into a false sense of security. If we operate again in the Sea of Japan only as a show of force and without positive action, I believe that we continue to provide justification to their judgment of us as QUOTE paper tigers UNQUOTE. The end result might well be the opposite of our intended purpose and encourage rather than discourage further belligerencies.

(TS) Task Force 71 was activated by COMSEVENFLT. The three CVAs assigned to TF 71 were the USS RANGER (CVA 61), USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN 65), and USS TICONDEROGA (CVA 14). All three carriers with escorts sailed from YANKEE STATION. To replace them on YANKEE STATION, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31) with escorts moved from Hong Kong and the USS KITTY HAWK with escorts moved from Subic. This action caused an 18-hour gap between ships at YANKEE STATION.²

(TS) All TF 71 units joined up north of Bashi Channel (between Taiwan and the Philippines) on the night of 18-19 April. On 19 April, the JCS directed that TF 71 proceed from the holding point of 32°N--127°-20'E through the Tsushima Strait to reach a preferred launch point in the Sea of Japan by 211500Z April. Upon reaching the preferred launch point, the TF would then depart the Sea of Japan and return to the Yellow Sea to operate south of 35° 35'N and east of 122°-30'E until 25 April at which time ships of the TF would return to normal Seventh Fleet operations. The JCS changed the departure time from the Sea of Japan twice--241800Z April and 251800Z April. TF 71 actually departed the Sea of Japan for the Yellow Sea on the morning of 26 April. On that same day the JCS directed that one CVA with appropriate escort ships remain in the vicinity of Korea for an additional 10-day period. The remaining ships were released to normal Seventh Fleet operations. The USS ENTERPRISE, the USS STERETT and six additional escorts remained to operate in the vicinity of Korea.³

1. CINCPAC 160840Z Apr 69.


2. J3B41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.

3. Ibid.

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(TS) In addition to the movement of TF 71, the 16th U.S. Air Force Tactical Fighter Squadron was diverted to Korea while enroute to Southeast Asia. Also, tactical fighters from Misawa and Yokota were deployed to Korea.¹



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1. J3B222 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
 2. CINCPAC 151032Z Apr 69.
 3. JCS 7237/181808Z Apr 69.
 4. CINCPAC 181825Z Apr 69.
 5. JCS 7269/182051Z Apr 69.
 6. CINCPAC 182338Z Apr 69.
 7. CINCPAC 190250Z Apr 69.

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Retaliatory Plan Against North Korea

(TS) On 17 April, the JCS requested ADM McCain to submit as quickly as possible two separate operation plans--one for attack of Sondok (Song Dong Ni Airfield) and one for the attack of the Wonsan airfield. Under each plan, 12 to 24 A-6 aircraft, carrier launched, would strike the airfield complex in the target area.³ On the same date the JCS requested CINCPAC and CINCSAC to prepare separate operation plans for the attack of the two same airfields by up to 24 Guam-based aircraft.⁴ CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF to provide planning assistance to CINCSAC for these plans.⁵ The JCS modified their request for the B-52 strike plans when they requested that the plans describe "how the operation would be conducted with 12 aircraft" as well as with 24 B-52s.⁶

(TS) On 18 April, CINCPAC forwarded his plan, FRACTURE MAPLE, which was developed around the two targets--Wonsan and Sondok (Song Dong Ni) airfields. Target elements to be struck at Wonsan were aircraft and revetments, support facilities, POL storage areas, runways, and taxiways. A-6 aircraft were to conduct "night full-systems" attacks against the airfield complex. The plan for strike against Sondok Airfield also called for A-6 aircraft with "night full-systems" attacks against revetted aircraft and hardstands, storage areas, support facilities, and runways and taxiways.⁷

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1. JCS 7334/191814Z Apr 69.
 2. CINCPAC 200031Z Apr 69.
 3. JCS KS7098/170311Z Apr 69.
 4. JCS 7104/170941Z Apr 69.
 5. CINCPAC 171345Z Apr 69.
 6. JCS 007108/171408Z Apr 69.
 7. CINCPAC 180339Z Apr 69.

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(TS) Retaliatory options proposed by CINCPAC included the seizure of the fish factory ship built for NK by the Netherlands,¹ positioning a TALOS ship 50 miles off Wonsan with authorization to destroy identified NK aircraft,² authorize the Sea of Japan Task Force (TF 71) to impound or harass fishing boats and NK coastal craft that ventured beyond the claimed 12-mile limit,³ [REDACTED] and use of the NEW JERSEY to fire against selected targets in Wonsan.⁵

(TS) To minimize confusion over each of the several CINCPAC operational plans for retaliation against North Korea, CINCPAC assigned the following nicknames to the plans:⁶

FRACTURE MAPLE - carrier operations

FRACTURE PINE - cruiser operations

FRACTURE APPLE - shipping restriction operations

FREQUENT SCORE - reconnaissance protection operations.

(U) Neither retaliatory nor offensive operations were undertaken. An operation plan for the protection of reconnaissance aircraft operating in the vicinity of North Korea was implemented, however.

Alert Status of WESTPAC Forces

(TS) On 18 April, CINCPAC, in response to a query from "higher authority," requested CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT to provide him with information regarding the alert status of the forces in WESTPAC which were in a position to respond at the time of the shutdown to include the location and time and distance of such forces to the area of the incident. In addition, ADM McCain wanted to know (1) the time responsible officials learned of the shutdown and the elapsed time from command decisions to initial responses to include down to aircraft controllers, or others who controlled scrambles or other actions, and (2) supplemental rules of engagement provided to CAP

1. CINCPAC 170223Z Apr 69; CINCPAC 190114Z Apr 69.

2. CINCPAC 170745Z Apr 69.

3. CINCPAC 170746Z Apr 69.

5. CINCPAC 200032Z Apr 69.

6. J3B15 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69 citing CINCPAC 230514Z Apr 69.

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aircraft dispatched to SAR area, as well as those provided to surface SAR forces.¹

(TS) In reply to CINCPAC's request COMSEVENTHFLT reported no Navy forces were in a position to respond with air cover at the time of the EC-121M shootdown. The ENTERPRISE, RANGER, and TICONDEROGA were conducting special operations at YANKEE STATION while the BON HOMME RICHARD was in Subic and KITTY HAWK was enroute from Subic to Hong Kong. The KITTY HAWK was the closest carrier to the scene--some 1,400 miles and 47 hours away at a 30 knot SOA. The only available units in the Japan-Korea area were the DALE and TUCKER in Sasebo; the STERETT, MARAN, and RUPERTUS were in Yokosuka. Only the TUCKER was in an increased readiness state because of her assignment as reaction ship for Banner operations.²

(TS) COMSEVENTHFLT stated that his flagship received notification of the possible shootdown of the EC-121 at 150634Z April.

Immediate attempts to confirm the shootdown were unsuccessful. However, at 150758Z... USS TUCKER and USS DALE were ordered to sail from Sasebo in the event that SAR assistance was required. The decision to sail TUCKER and DALE was reached as soon as VQ-1 could be contacted and a determination made that the aircraft was an hour overdue at its termination base. Forces initially directed proceed at best speed vicinity lat 41-12N long 131-48E. Later directed to remain at least 20 NM from Soviet or North Korean land mass. After wind and current drifted floating debris near Soviet/North Korean land mass, surface SAR units were temporarily ordered to close the Korean and Soviet land masses no closer than 50 NM. The twenty nautical mile limit was later reinstated by CINCPAC.³

(TS) CINCPACAF reported to ADM McCain that eight USAF and two ROKAF aircraft were on five-minute air defense alert and six USAF aircraft were on 30-minute air defense alert in a position to respond at the time of the EC-121 shootdown. In addition, two air rescue aircraft were on 30-minute alert.

As a matter of interest the following actions were taken (all times ZULU):

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1. CINCPAC 182302Z Apr 69.
 2. COMSEVENTHFLT 190830Z Apr 69.
 3. Ibid.

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A. 5AF ADVON alerted by its warning center at 0445 placed two F-102s on CAP to overwater point east of Kan-Nung coordinates NJ 5050. F-102s were airborne at 150504. At 150519 the F-102s CAP was moved to NJ 3030. At 150553 two F-106 were scrambled to replace the F-102s. At 150655 two F-102s replaced the F-106 CAP.¹

(TS) CINCPACAF reported:²

3. Aircraft on alert by type, location, distance and time from shootdown were: 4 F-106, Osan Korea, 350 NM, 30 min; 4 F-102s, Suwon, 345 NM, 41 min; 2 F-5s, Kangnung, 260 NM, 34 min; 1 HC-130, Tachikawa AB, Japan, 470 NM, 1 hr and 50 min; 1 HC-97, Naha AB, Okinawa, 900 NM, 4 hr and 20 min.

4. Supplemental rules of engagement provided to CAP aircraft crews were: operations would be conducted no closer than 50 NM from the North Korean/Chinese/Russian coast. The provisions of PACAF Regulation 55-1 which implements CINCPAC Instruction 03710.2A (Rules of Engagement) were applicable.

Contingency Plans for Response to North Korean Provocations

(TS) On 8 May 1968, the JCS requested CINCPAC to analyze the various incidents and provocative acts which North Korea might initiate and to suggest appropriate U.S./ROK military responses for each. In addition, CINCPAC was requested to analyze the various military responses suggested and to recommend those for which planning should be undertaken.³ CINCPAC responded on 7 June 1968 in a letter to the JCS.⁴

(TS) On 21 August 1968, the JCS after considering CINCPAC's response requested CINCPAC to prepare outline plans for those courses of action

1. CINCPACAF 200005Z Apr 69.

2. Ibid.

3. The JCS requests for contingency plans in 1968 and 1969 and CINCPAC's response to these requests were discussed in an interview with CDR L. M. Ramsey, USN, J5519, CINCPAC and COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 14 Oct 69. All documents cited were reviewed by COL Johnson either in his office or in CDR Ramsey's office; JCS 8482/081548Z May 68.

4. Ltr, Hq CINCPAC, ser. 001306, 7 Jun 68.

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considered appropriate for further examination.¹ During April 1969, CINCPAC in response to the JCS request of 21 August 1968 forwarded a series of message outline plans. These outline plans were consolidated into an outline plan, FRINGE BALL, and forwarded to the JCS on 2 May.²

(TS) On 7 July, the JCS tasked CINCPAC with the mission of developing a series of concept plans for selected military actions in response to North Korean provocations. The JCS requested that the plans be more detailed than the FRINGE BALL plan. The number of selected actions for which concept plans were to be prepared increased from seven to 23. The actions enumerated by the JCS covered a broad range of options.³

(TS) In response to this tasking by the JCS, CINCPAC prepared OPLAN 5020 A-Z. The OPLAN had 26 annexes. Each annex was a concept plan and Annexes A-W responded to the 23 actions proposed by the JCS. Briefs of other CINCPAC plans were included in the last three annexes. OPLAN 5020 A-Z was forwarded to the JCS on 9 October.⁴ Although some of the concept plans requested were considered infeasible by CINCPAC (BLT sized-raids, forays), the plans were prepared and submitted in order to apprise the JCS of existing limitations.⁵

(TS) In August at a meeting in San Francisco, Dr. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, requested ADM McCain to furnish him a list of the available contingency options being developed for use in the event of future North Korean provocations. On 27 August, CINCPAC forwarded a message to the JCS in which he proposed for transmission to Dr. Kissinger through appropriate channels, a list of the options requested. The proposed transmission contained ADM McCain's caveat "...that these proposed options are in various states of development and that most have not yet been approved by the JCS. In this connection, there will be a certain amount of consolidation, adjustment, and possible expansion as planning progresses."⁶

(TS) On 15 December the JCS approved CINCPAC OPlan 5020 A-Z and requested that the next revision of the plans include a brief, separate

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1. JCS 7743/212142Z Aug 68.
 2. CINCPAC 020142Z May 69.
 3. JCS 4006/071852Z Jul 69.
 4. Intv. CDR L. M. Ramsey, USN, J5119, Hq CINCPAC with COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 14 Oct 69.
 5. Point Paper, J5119, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Sep 69, Subj: Korean Contingency Planning (CINCPAC OPLAN 5020) (C).
 6. CINCPAC 270430Z Aug 69.

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paragraph in each plan specifying operating authorities and restrictions applicable to initial operations and rules of engagement in the event of a North Korea, Peoples Republic of China or Soviet response. The JCS also directed that 10 specified options be added.¹

CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69

(TS) CINCPAC OPlan 27-69 is a unilateral capabilities plan for the defense of Korea. The plan provides for U.S. participation with or without UN aegis and is based on JSCP 69 mission and forces. Initial force augmentation requires drawdown of committed forces from Southeast Asia. Concept of the plan consists of two phases: Phase I - Initial Operations and Phase II - Counteroffensive. Under aegis of UN, CINCUNC will conduct operations as directed by the JCS, supported by CINCPAC. In event UNC is terminated or abrogated, COMUS Korea will exercise operational control over U.S., ROK and UN forces made available.²

CINCPAC Mission

(TS) CINCPAC's mission is to assist in defense of Korea by providing military forces to UNC and supporting UNC as directed; coordinating provision of logistic support for U.S., ROK and UN forces; and being prepared to counter aggression against the ROK in event UNC fails to function.³

Concept of Operations

(TS) The concept of operations envisions a two-phased operation:⁴

a. Phase I: From initiation of hostilities until U.S., ROK and UN forces are prepared to launch a counteroffensive. The objective is to defeat the enemy assault, protect bases and areas, and prepare for counteroffensive operations.

b. Phase II: Defeat communist aggression and destroy or neutralize enemy forces on the Korean peninsula.

Major U.S. Forces

(TS) Major U.S. forces, in addition to the 2d and 7th U.S. Infantry

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1. JCS 06325/151832Z Dec 69.
 2. Point Paper, J5115, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Sep 69, Subj: CINCPAC OPlan 27-69 (Defense of Korea) (C).
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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Divisions and 137 USAF aircraft in-country, include 9-1/3 U.S. Army divisions, 12 U.S. Navy CVA/CVWs, 2-7/9 U.S. Marine divisions, and 40 U.S. Air Force TFs. Initial augmentation calls for 3-1/2 U.S. Army divisions, five CVA/CVANs from the Western Pacific, one Marine Regimental Landing Team, and 12 tactical-fighter squadrons from Southeast Asia. CONUS augmentations, including selective mobilizations, provide for all major forces for Korea by the end of an approximate six-month period, in addition to rebuilding forces in Southeast Asia by the end of an approximate eight-month period.¹

Command Relations

(TS) The Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea; and Commander, U.S. Air Forces Korea are designated as component commanders for both COMUS Korea and CINCUNC.² CINCUNC exercises UN authority over UN operations and UN and ROK forces assigned. UN directs the UNC through the SECDEF and the JCS. In accordance with the agreement between the U.S. and ROK, CINCUNC exercises operational control over ROK forces. In the event UN authority is terminated and the U.S. fulfills the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, operational control of ROK and other UN forces in Korea will be assigned to COMUS Korea. Under the UN, military operations will be conducted by CINCUNC and supported by CINCPAC. COMUS Korea, as a subordinate unified commander under CINCPAC in Korea, will report to CINCUNC for the conduct of UN operations. If UN Command authority is terminated, military operations will be directed by CINCPAC who will assign operational control of U.S. forces in Korea to COMUS Korea. Responsibility for the air defense of Korea is assigned to CINCPACAF.

Project 703 Force Reductions

(TS) The planned Project 703 force reductions will have a serious impact on OPlan 27-69. If the reductions are carried out the impact will be that:³

a. While the major forces required for OPlan 27 will remain in the structure, the freedom of action to utilize them will probably not exist for the following reasons:

(1) Disengagement in Southeast Asia for redeployment could become extremely hazardous and difficult.

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1. Ibid.
 2. COMUSKOREA is also CINCUNC.
 3. Ibid.

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(2) Supporting ground force units deployed primarily in RVN will not be available in sufficient numbers to permit deployment of all major forces to Korea and adequately support operations in Southeast Asia.

(3) Reduction in NGF, amphibious, ASW and auxiliary ships will severely restrict the capabilities of major units. Underway replenishment capability may be the constraining factor on naval operations.

(4) Reduction in aircraft units and in the numbers of CVA/CVSs which will be supportable would hazard the air battle in Korea in a combined NK/CPR attack.

(5) Strategic mobility assets which were previously marginal will be insufficient to support the time-phased force and logistic build-up in Korea.

b. The defense of Korea against a combined NK/CPR attack will probably require early decisive reliance on nuclear weapons to preserve the forces in Korea and to prevent seizure of the ROK by communist forces.

Status of OPlan 27-69

(TS) The JCS conditionally approved OPlan 27-69 on 7 April 1969 pending receipt, review and approval of the Time Phased Force Deployment Lists (TPFDL), communications-electronics and transportation considerations and a logistic appraisal.¹ The TPFDL was transmitted to the JCS in June.²

CINCUNC Operation Plan 27-69

(S) In view of the relationship between CINCPAC OPlan 27-69 and the CINCUNC OPlan 27-69, the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the latter plan to include his comments on the feasibility of releasing the plan to ROK military agencies.³ CINCPAC reviewed the plan as requested and recommended it be released to the ROK military agencies subject to the following changes:⁴

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1. J5115 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of April 1969 citing JCSM-211-69 of 7 Apr 69.
 2. CINCPAC Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes.
 3. JCS 05856/052204Z Dec 69.
 4. CINCPAC 300421Z Dec 69.

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- a. Delete reference to U. S. forces, such as B-52s, other than those present in Korea.
- b. Delete the paragraph concerning the possible use of nuclear weapons.
- c. Make certain changes concerning Air Defense Command relationships to make the CINCUNC plan consistent with the CINCPAC OPlan 27-69.

U. S. Air Force Posture in Korea

(S) Following the PUEBLO incident in 1968, USAF tactical fighter and fighter interceptor units were deployed to the ROK. By the end of 1968 a total of 151 USAF aircraft were in South Korea. On 3 September 1968, the SECDEF announced that he proposed to withdraw approximately one-half of the augmentation aircraft from the ROK. The SECDEF's decision was rebutted by CINCPAC and the JCS. As a result of the rebuttal the SECDEF announced on 15 October 1969 that there would be no partial withdrawal of U. S. aircraft from Korea in 1968.¹

(S) On 22 January 1969, the JCS passed to CINCPAC a CINCONAD request that consideration be given to returning an F-106 fighter interceptor squadron (FIS), which was deployed from the CONUS to Korea after the USS PUEBLO incident.² On the same date, the JCS quoted a Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum which stated:³

Since the PUEBLO situation has largely been resolved, I believe it is time to begin phasing down the tactical Air Forces deployed to Korea early in 1968. At a minimum, we can reduce our deployed tactical aircraft by 50 in June 1969 when the Air National Guard personnel called to active duty following the PUEBLO crisis return to Reserve status. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should take the necessary actions to reduce the support personnel and base activities following the return of these aircraft to the U. S.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 247-250. SECDEF's rationale for the partial withdrawal of U. S. aircraft and CINCPAC's comments thereon are included in the above cite.
 2. JCS 220007Z Jan 69; CINCONAD 160001Z Jan 69.
 3. JCS 009890/221934Z Jan 69.

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The ASD/ISA should work with the Department of State to notify the government of the Republic of Korea of our intention to reduce our tactical air forces by 50 aircraft together with the supporting personnel in June 1969.

(S) The JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on both the CINCONAD and the DEPSECDEF memoranda to the JCS.¹ After requesting and receiving CINCPACAF's and COMUS Korea's comments, ADM McCain replied on 26 January. He told the JCS that the fundamental threat to the ROK, of which the Blue House and USS PUEBLO incidents were but manifestations, had not been diminished by the release of the USS PUEBLO crew. Conversely, the NKPR objective of unifying Korea under communist rule remained unchanged. NKPR capabilities to wage either conventional or unconventional war continued to grow steadily in all force categories but particularly in air offensive and defensive capabilities, and were expected to continue to do so.²

(S) He then pointed out that it was possible that U.S. actions to secure the release of the USS PUEBLO crew might have been interpreted by the NKPR as evidence of weakness of U.S. resolve. On the other hand, other U.S. actions might be viewed by the ROKG as evidence of a lessening of U.S. determination to fulfill mutual defense commitments in Asia. The recent reduction in the FY 69 MAP for the ROK, which resulted in the cancellation of 10 new F-5s could lend credence to such a ROKG assessment. Significant reduction in U.S. force deployments to or in support of the ROK would aggravate the out-numbered situation faced by U.S. and ROK air forces in the ROK and would tend to corroborate an assessment of weakening U.S. determination with the result that the NKPR could be stimulated to test the resolve of the new U.S. administration and accelerate its time-table for unification of Korea by intensifying its campaign against the ROK including both more frequent and more serious provocations and possibly overt aggression. In addition, the ROKG could be led to the conclusion that it should undertake unilateral responses, without consultation with the United States.³

(S) ADM McCain pointed out that a tactical reconnaissance squadron would return to the CONUS from Itazuke AB, Japan in April 1969 without replacement and affirmed a previous position in this regard.⁴

(S) He summarized his position by stating:⁵

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1. Ibid.
 2. CINCPAC 262250Z Jan 69.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

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...the threat in Korea not only is undiminished but is increasing. From a purely military viewpoint, forces of at least the general magnitude now deployed in Korea are required to meet the threat and to deter the enemy. Politically it is an inopportune time, considering the various commitments made during and immediately following the BLUE HOUSE and PUEBLO incidents, to withdraw tactical fighter squadrons without replacements.

...it is recommended that:

- a. The F-106 FIS be retained.
- b. The two ANG F-100 squadrons be replaced with two tactical fighter squadrons, preferably with F-4's.

(S) On 28 January, the U. S. Ambassador to Korea stated that, politically, he saw no insurmountable problem in withdrawing the two ANG squadrons but recommended advance discussion with the ROKG.¹ On 31 January, GEN Bonesteel, COMUS Korea, provided additional information to the Chairman of the JCS and recommended discussion with the ROKG before withdrawal of the two squadrons.² GEN Nazzaro, Acting CINCPAC, also told the CJCS that he supported GEN Bonesteel's views and concurred with both GEN Bonesteel and Ambassador Porter that there should be discussion with ROKG officials before a withdrawal of USAF augmentation forces was initiated.³

(S) The JCS, on 13 February, in a message to CINCPAC and CINCONAD told them that the force posture in support should be flexible enough to support contingencies. Accordingly, base developments should be continued as a matter of priority and, at the same time, any indications that the force in the ROK was permanent should be avoided. The JCS stated that no replacements for the F-100s being returned to the U. S. were being planned. However, for this reason and for reason of the acknowledged threat: (1) the F-106s would remain in Korea, (2) the five-base posture would be maintained, and (3) an option would be retained until 15 April 1969 to recommend replacing to F-100s. CINCONAD was told by the JCS that "the problems for CONUS air defense that continued deployment of the F-106 squadron entail are recognized, but considerations of all aspects of the matter led to the above conclusion."⁴

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1. AMEMBASSY Seoul 0400/280740Z Jan 69.
 2. J5152 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
 3. Ibid.
 4. JCS 2470/132158Z Feb 69.

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(S) On 4 March, CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF and COMUS Korea to furnish him by 20 March a comparison of the 1 January 1968 and current levels of threat and a review of the USAF Northeast Asia force posture and strategy as related to the situation in Korea, including possibilities of replacement with aircraft other than fighters and other means of satisfying the requirement.¹ This information was to be used as a basis for a renewed request to the JCS about 1 April for replacement of the two F-100 TFSs.²

(S) ADM McCain, on 4 April, in a message to the JCS, detailed the unchecked growth in NKPR threat to the ROK and examined the military and psychological impact of a reduction in aircraft. He told the JCS:³

Because of the relative capabilities and survivabilities of F-100s and more modern tactical fighters, it is not considered necessary that the fifty F-100s be replaced on a one-for-one basis if more modern aircraft are provided. For example, two 18 UE F-4 TFSs would be regarded as suitable replacement and should be provided from the CONUS until a settlement in Southeast Asia will allow realignment of the permanent PACOM force to include appropriate deployments in the ROK.

...In summary, the threat in Korea not only is undiminished but has increased and is expected to continue doing so. From a purely military viewpoint, forces of the general magnitude now deployed in Korea are the minimum required to meet the threat and deter overt attack. Considering the various commitments made at the time of and immediately following the BLUE HOUSE and USS PUEBLO incidents, it appears to be an inopportune time, politically and psychologically with respect to both Korea and Asia as a whole, to withdraw tactical fighters from Korea without replacement. Accordingly, the position last expressed in Ref A is reaffirmed and it is recommended that the two F-100 TFSs be replaced with two F-4 TFSs at UE 18.

(S) The CINCPAC request was to have been considered by the JCS on 15 April but as a result of the North Korean destruction of an EC-121 over the Sea of Japan, consideration was postponed until 1 May.⁴ Following the loss

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1. CINCPAC 040131Z Mar 69.
 2. J5152 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
 3. CINCPAC 040302Z Apr 69.
 4. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.

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of the EC-121, the U. S. Ambassador in Seoul assessed the impact of withdrawal of tactical fighters upon the ROKG and recommended replacement of the two F-100 TFSs. CINCPAC endorsed the Ambassador's assessment, again urged replacement of the two F-100 TFSs and asked for authority to notify the ROKG of U. S. intent to replace them. ¹

~~(S)~~ The JCS, in a memorandum to the SECDEF on 1 May, recommended that the two F-100 TFSs (50 planes) returning to the CONUS in June be replaced on a temporary basis, in the ROK with two CONUS-based USAF F-4 TFSs (36 planes), and the ROK Government be so advised. ² On 29 May, the JCS announced SECDEF's approval of the JCS recommendation. ³ On 14 June, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the two squadrons of F-100s would be replaced by two squadrons of F-4s. One squadron was scheduled to arrive 20 June and the other to arrive 27 June. Authority was granted to move the 421st TFS from the ROK to RVN after the arrival of the 68th TFS in the ROK on 20 June. In another message on the same day, the JCS suggested that the 421st remain in the ROK until arrival of the first element of the 560th TFS on 27 June. This action was designed to allay possible political problems with the ROK Government. ⁴ When the movement was completed the total number of U. S. aircraft remaining in the ROK was 137.

~~(S)~~ On 20 October, the JCS requested CINCPAC to advise them by 23 October of the estimated date when final F-4 aircraft would be delivered to the ROKAF, when the ROKAF F-4 squadron would be ready operationally, and the CINCPAC-recommended date for termination of the USAF F-106 deployment to the ROK. ⁵ Based on comments by CINCPACAF and COMUS Korea, CINCPAC advised the JCS on 24 October that the ROKAF would receive its last F-4 aircraft in December and that the squadron was expected to attain combat readiness by 30 June 1970. CINCPAC also recommended the F-106 FIS deployment be continued beyond 31 December. He stated that he would keep the requirement to redeploy the F-106 FIS under continual review between 24 October and the date the ROKAF F-4 squadron achieved operational readiness. ⁶

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1. AMEMBASSY Seoul 2059/240800Z Apr 69; CINCPAC 260156Z Apr 69.
 2. J5 Brief 00132-69, Hq CINCPAC, 8 May 69, Subj: Tactical Air Deployments to Korea (U) JCSM-236-69 of 1 May 69.
 3. J5 Brief 00157-69, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jun 69, Subj: Tactical Air Deployments to Korea (JCS 1776/801-3 of 29 May 69) (U).
 4. JCS 141501Z Jun 69; JCS 141811Z Jun 69.
 5. JCS 02874/202003Z Oct 69.
 6. CINCPAC 242019Z Oct 69.

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(TS) On 6 November, the JCS responded to CINCPAC's 24 October message. They told CINCPAC that they desired the deployment of FIS to the ROK be terminated "at the earliest possible date commensurate with the ROKAF squadron being operationally capable of assuming an appropriate portion of the air defense mission." For planning purposes, the JCS designated 31 March 1970 as the redeployment date "unless overriding factors dictate otherwise at that time." In closing, the JCS requested CINCPAC to furnish them by 10 March 1970 the operational status of the ROKAF F-4 squadron and an assessment of the situation in the ROK at that time.¹

(TS) On 11 November, CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF and COMUS Korea to furnish him on or about 31 December interim reports on the current and projected operational status of the ROKAF F-4 squadron, the situation in the ROK related to further requirement for the F-106 FIS and preliminary recommendations with respect to a phased termination of the F-106 deployment "correlated to incremental attainment of combat readiness by the ROKAF F-4 squadron, or any alternate solution," should the forecast show that the squadron would not be operationally ready by 31 March 1970. CINCPAC further requested that he be provided by 3 March 1970 with recommendations on the most advantageous timing and content of announcements to the ROKG and the public relative the termination of the FIS deployment. The recommendations were to be made under the assumption that, as a minimum, a phased termination would commence about 31 March 1970.²

(TS) On 15 November, CINCUNC in a message to CINCPAC, took exception to associating the withdrawal of the FIS with the attainment of combat readiness status by the ROKAF F-4 squadron. His objection was based primarily on the limitations of CINCUNC's operational control of ROK forces which would restrict their use to the defense of the ROK. Some of the tasks of the F-106 FIS were unilateral U.S. tasks.³ ADM McCain told GEN Michaelis that he recognized the limitation of CINCUNC's operational control of ROK forces. CINCPAC stated that it was not anticipated that ROKAF squadron would assume literally all the tasks of the USAF F-106 squadron, however, the ROKAF squadron should assume all of the F-106 FIS tasks directly concerned with the defense of the ROK. The remaining F-106 tasks would have to be assumed by in-country USAF air assets.⁴

(TS) On the same day, CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF to include in his 31 December reply to CINCPAC an analysis of the extent to which the ROKAF

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1. JCS 4149/062330Z Nov 69.
 2. CINCPAC 110504Z Nov 69.
 3. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
 4. CINCPAC 222222Z Nov 69.

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F-4 squadron, and other USAF fighter aircraft in the ROK, Japan, and in Okinawa (if necessary) would be able to replace the F-106 FIS.¹

~~(TS)~~ On 31 December, COMUS Korea provided CINCPAC with the interim report requested by CINCPAC on 11 November. He stated that the ROKAF squadron had completed about 50 percent of its operational training and that the squadron would be ready on 15 June 1970. He recommended that no decision regarding the redeployment of the F-106 FIS be made until after the ROKAF squadron had attained a combat ready status and a favorable analysis of the overall situation in Korea at that time.² The CINCPACAF reply was not expected until about 6 January 1970.³

Augmentation of U. S. Eighth Army

~~(TS)~~ In July 1968, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS an increase of 29,592 manpower spaces for U. S. Army Korea. Of these spaces, 8,500 were for priority space increases in combat and combat support units in-country, 2,393 were for other augmentation spaces, and 18,699 were spaces for additional units to be deployed to Korea.⁴

~~(TS)~~ On 17 October 1968, the JCS in a memorandum to the SECDEF recommended 8,500 spaces as a Priority I requirement and that personnel to fill the spaces be provided as soon as possible. In addition, the JCS recognized the requirement for 21,999 other spaces, 907 more than CINCPAC supported, but indicated that the requirement should be viewed in light of other priorities.⁵ On 30 November 1968, the DEPSECDEF informed the JCS that action on the recommendation would be deferred until completion of the Korean Planning Program Budget Study in mid-December.⁶

~~(TS)~~ COMUS Korea continued to review the U. S. Army forces requirements and as a result, CINCPAC, on 27 April 1969 forwarded a revised force listing to the JCS which adjusted priorities and the force structure. CINCPAC requested an additional 233 spaces and increased the Priority I requirements from 8,500 to 9,831. On 16 June, the JCS informed CINCPAC that "now" is

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1. CINCPAC 222221Z Nov 69.
 2. COMUSKOREA 311130Z Dec 69.
 3. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jan 70, Subj: Tactical Air Deployment to Korea (U).
 4. Point Paper, J5116, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Nov 68, Subj: Augmentation of U. S. Eighth Army (U).
 5. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 246.
 6. Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, 1 Apr 69.

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not the propitious time to forward requirements for increased manning levels and force structure to higher authority.¹

(S) On 8 August, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the DEPSECDEF in a memorandum on 30 July had cancelled the Korean Deployment Control System. It was the DEPSECDEF's belief "that there will not be any substantial number of changes to the approved U. S. forces in Korea in the near future and the deployment situation was relatively stable." The DEPSECDEF directed that future changes to the authorized manpower ceilings be submitted in accordance with the existing Program Change Request (PCR) system. Accordingly, the JCS rescinded all JCS documents and correspondence or portions thereof pertaining specifically to the Korean Deployment Program. All outstanding CINCPAC change requests to the program except number 13 were turned over to the appropriate Services for any necessary action. The JCS comments of 16 June, discussed above, were applied to PCR 13.²

Redisposition of U. S. Forces in Korea

(S) During 1969, CINCPAC examined the advisability of replacing the U. S. 2d Infantry Division along the Korean DMZ with ROK forces. The desirability of replacing U. S. forces on the DMZ by less expensive ROK forces had been recognized for some time and has been continuously studied in consonance with basic U. S. objectives. In the diplomatic atmosphere during 1969, the basic U. S. objective was to maintain confidence and credibility between the two nations.³

(S) The U. S. 2d Infantry Division, the only U. S. force occupying a DMZ position, sits astride the historic and shortest invasion route to Seoul, Korea, the capital of the ROK. The 2d Division area of responsibility encompasses the posture required to directly control the center of the Armistice Commission meetings at Panmunjom, the UNC Advance Camp and the Swiss-Swedish Camp.⁴

(S) The timing of a possible redisposition of U. S. forces is the most critical factor. Such a move during 1969 would probably have been

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1. Ibid. 3 Jul 69 citing CINCPAC 270630Z Apr 69 and JCS 162250Z Jun 69; Point Paper, J5111, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Sep 69, Subj: Augmentation of U. S. Eighth Army (U).
 2. JCS 6405/082211Z Aug 69.
 3. Point Paper, J3B31, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Sep 69, Subj: Redisposition of UNC Forces in Korea (S).
 4. Ibid.

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misinterpreted by North Korea as a lessening of U. S. resolve and encourage increased provocations and aggressiveness by the Communist.¹

(S) In addition to timing, many other factors were considered including U. S. /ROKA command relationship, comparative combat capabilities of the 2d U. S. Infantry Division and a ROK infantry division, construction and other costs in relocating the 2d Division and many other factors.²

(S) Since Korea is not a member of the United Nations nor a signatory of the Armistice, repositioning could compromise U. S. /ROKA command relationships. CINCUNC, rather than COMUSK, has operational control of ROK forces. Should U. S. presence be completely removed from the DMZ, the ROKG would likely come under heavier pressure to remove ROK forces from UNC operational control. Removal of all U. S. forces from the DMZ would complicate the UNC capability to exercise close, direct control of security, traffic and activities in the proximity of Panmunjom and the UNC Advance Camp. U. S. forces on the DMZ demonstrate U. S. willingness to fight along side of ROK forces, strengthens Allied relationships and helps to justify UNC operational control over ROK forces.³

(S) The replacement of the 2d Division by ROK forces cannot be evaluated on a one-for-one basis. On the basis of comparative combat capabilities it would require a heavily augmented South Korean division, plus additional combat support units to replace the 2d Division. Also, it is not solely the combat capability of the U. S. forces that deters overt communist aggression. In addition, there is the anticipation that U. S. forces, once involved, will be backed up by major U. S. forces.⁴

(S) Redisposition of the 2d Division in Korea would require substantial MCA funding and real estate for new rear area troop housing and base camp construction. Real estate is difficult to obtain in large tracts. If the 2d Division were replaced by ROK forces along the DMZ, it is highly probable that problems of troop housing and real estate acquisition would become extremely difficult from a budget and program point of view.⁵

(S) Replacement of U. S. forces along the DMZ might appease a sentiment to remove U. S. forces from a position of vulnerability to confrontation-type

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

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DMZ incidents and possible U.S. casualties. This would leave Koreans facing Koreans which could lead to increased tensions and serious escalatory incidents. UNC influence toward restraint is made more credible and effective when U.S. forces are subject to the same infiltration attacks as ROK forces and can demonstrate the feasibility of accepting these attacks without undertaking emotionally dictated or excessive counter-measures. Any U.S. domestic political gain which might accrue from removing the U.S. 2d Division from the DMZ could be completely overshadowed by the more inflammable overall political and military situation in Korea which could result. On the other hand, removing U.S. forces from the DMZ might help keep the U.S. from being dragged into major hostilities which could result from unrestrained ROK retaliatory actions with possible rapidly rising escalation. However, in cases where ROKs need rapidly to be cooled down, the threat of withdrawing a U.S. division from its position astride the most rapid invasion route to Seoul would be a powerful restraining lever.¹

(S) On 4 September, CINCPAC replied to the Secretary of State's query on the subject of the redistribution of U.S. forces in Korea. In a message to the JCS, ADM McCain explained that he had recently been queried by the SECSTATE on the concept of replacing the 2d U.S. Infantry Division with ROK forces along the DMZ and, subject to the JCS's concurrence, recommended that "the CINCPAC position be passed to the SECDEF for further relay to SECSTATE."²

(S) In the proposed reply to the SECSTATE, CINCPAC covered essentially the same factors discussed above. He pointed out that "at a propitious time U.S. Armed Forces in Korea should be reduced. However, (I) do not consider the current time frame to be appertune or a wise one for such actions." ADM McCain felt that the present U.S. force dispositions should be maintained until: (1) the Vietnam situation permits all or a majority of the ROK forces in Vietnam to return to Korea; (2) the current trend of North Korea's aggressiveness had decreased; (3) substantial progress had been made on modernization of ROK forces; and (4) the ROK political situation had stabilized after the ROK 1971 presidential election.³

(S) CINCPAC concluded his message with the recommendation to the JCS:⁴

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1. Ibid.
 2. CINCPAC 041420Z Sep 69.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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That when ROK active forces are augmented by ROK troops returned from Vietnam and if North Korean aggressiveness has been reduced, the U.S. sector on DMZ should then be reduced to a battalion-sized sector encompassing the advanced camp, the road to Panmunjom and the joint security area.

(TS) In December, the JCS requested CINCPAC to submit a plan for the withdrawal of one division from Korea and a discussion of issues associated with the withdrawal. As the year ended CINCPAC was preparing his reply.¹

Planning, Programming, Budgeting (PPB) Study-Korea (NSSM-27)

(TS) The Interagency Planning, Programming, Budgeting (PPB) Study-Korea, also known as NSSM-27, was passed to CINCPAC by the JCS on 1 July for comments to assist the JCS in developing a position as part of the internal DOD review process.²

(TS) On 23 July, CINCPAC commented at length on NSSM-27. ADM McCain told the JCS that the study appeared to present only a partial estimate of the strategic situation for the period FY 70-74 including the presentation of seven alternative courses of action for U.S./ROK force posture and modernization.³ The study did not present the basic U.S. national policy which could be expected to guide decisions during that time frame, therefore conclusions as to the adequacy of alternatives could not be determined. Because of the study format, comparisons of the alternatives could be made only on the basis of dollar costs.⁴

(TS) CINCPAC summarized his comments by stating:

U.S. goals, defense commitment to the ROK, and the threat of communist aggression in Northeast Asia must be the primary determinants of overall US policy toward Korea with US and ROK defense costs being considered as constraints on the alternative policies which might be considered. Selection of any one of the programs (or a variation thereof) proposed in the PPB Study must be consistent with clearly defined policies (which the study did not articulate) and with budgetary reality. The cost criterion approach is valid only to assist in

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1. Point Paper, J5151, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Jan 70, Subj: Troop Withdrawal Planning Korea (TS).
 2. JCS 3648/011729Z Jul 69.
 3. CINCPAC 231616Z Jul 69.
 4. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.

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the selection of program alternatives which are determined to fulfill those objectives of fundamental U.S. policy goals.¹

(S) On 7 August, the JCS transmitted a revised one--volume NSSM-27 to CINCPAC. The revised volume replaced the original two-volume study in interagency consideration. The new study addressed the issues and objectives fundamental to decisions pertaining to U.S. relationships with the ROK. The study assumed that the U.S. commitment to ROK security as embodied in the Mutual Defense Treaty would remain unchanged. The major program decisions contained in the revised study included: (1) counter-infiltration programs, (2) military roles and capabilities, and (3) economic programs. Programs (1) and (2) had implications for CINCPAC.²

(S) Three alternative counter-infiltration programs were delineated. A description of each program, including costs and pros and cons of each were set forth. The programs ranged in character from comprehensive to very modest. Four alternative armed forces postures with supporting rationale and threat assessment were presented. The alternatives dealt with various levels and mixes of U.S. and ROK force modernization and improvement. The study indicated that all of the force alternatives would:³

a. Be sufficient to repel all-out North Korean attack and to defend against NK/CPR forces for about 60 days unaided by U.S. reinforcements.

b. Require U.S. logistical support for sustained defense against North Korean or North Korean/CPR attack.

c. Require substantial U.S. air reinforcement in case of either NK or NK/CPR attack.

(S) The four force postures were similar to the seven programs in the original study and covered about the same range of capabilities and costs. Greater emphasis was placed on trade-off possibilities of replacing expensive U.S. ground forces with less expensive ROK ground forces.⁴

1. CINCPAC 231616Z Jul 69.

2. J5 Brief 00231-69, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Sep 69, Subj: U.S. Policy Toward Korea - Interagency Program Analysis (Reference NSSM 27) (U) (JCS 1776/807-2 of 7 Aug 69); Point Paper, J5115, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Sep 69, Subj: NSSM 27 (Planning, Programming, Budgeting (PPB) Study-Korea).

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

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(S) On 27 August, the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the revised NSSM-27. ADM McCain replied as requested on 11 September using the line-in-line-out technique. He recommended changes to various paragraphs in the study and furnished his rationale for the changes he recommended. In closing his reply he furnished additional comments:¹

The fact that the decisions confronting the US Government are posed as questions indicates that the parameters of US policy toward Korea are yet undefined and that a valid recommendation for selection of an alternative force posture is therefore not practicable at this time. The range of force alternatives set forth in postures one through four, though fairly narrow, does permit selection of fairly varied capabilities. From the ground force point of view it is unlikely that even posture one, 'increased readiness' would appear more advantageous to the ROK than posture two, present program. Postures three and four would appear less attractive. From ROK Navy and Air Force points of view only posture one presents any significant advantage: two, three, and four appear almost identical. Because of the domestic US political climate in terms of both foreign aid and US troop commitments in Asia, postures three and four appear the more expedient and realistic. However, in both of these postures, achievement of the force objectives in the current JSOP, which reflect the requirements based on military judgment, appears remote.

ROK Armed Forces Development Objectives Plan

(S) During 1968 a definitive study was made concerning U.S. policies toward Korea by the State Department's Policy Planning Council. The Senior Interdepartmental Group did not approve the proposals made in this study and directed that a NSSM-27 be made to examine alternative U.S. /ROK force structures for the defense of the ROK. NSSM-27 postulated two major programs: (1) policy continuity, and (2) accelerated self-reliance. Within these two major programs a total of seven alternative force development packages were set forth.²

(S) To place CINCPAC and COMUS Korea in a sound position to comment rapidly and factually on NSSM-27 and develop data to support a necessary

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1. CINCPAC 111530Z Sep 69.
 2. J5115 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.

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request for an increase in the present ROK MAP dollar ceiling, CINCPAC, in May 1969, directed preparation of a ROK force improvement study by COMUS Korea. At the same time, the ROKG was in the process of developing the ROK Armed Forces Development Objectives Plan for presentation at the Second Annual U.S. /ROK Defense Ministers' Conference. There were only minor differences between the COMUS Korea and ROK Plans.¹

(S) The ROK plan was mentioned to President Nixon by ROKG officials visiting Washington, was briefed in broad terms to the DEPSECDEF Packard at the conference, and was forwarded in condensed form to the DEPSECDEF. The DEPSECDEF stated during the conference that the U.S. would consider the ROKG plan at the same time action was taken on NSSM-27. In addition, the ROK plan was discussed during the Presidential Meeting in San Francisco, 21-22 August.

(TS) COMUS Korea transmitted the ROK plan and his comments on it to CINCPAC for review.² The JCS requested that the plan be examined and cost data prepared so that it could be reviewed relative to other alternative force programs contained in NSSM-27.³ CINCPAC comments were forwarded to the JCS with a detailed evaluation. The following is a summary of CINCPAC's comments:⁴

The ROK Armed Forces Development Objectives Plan assessed the communist threat to the ROK and outlined the available ROK forces. This information, essentially accurate, was modified by COMUSKOREA comments. In general, the stated force development objective was to create ROK forces capable of defending Korea together with U.S. forces in-country and U.S. reinforcements planned for deployment in the event of hostilities. Key assumptions on which these proposals were based are: (1) the threat will continue, (2) USFK will remain in the ROK, and (3) MAP equipment and supplies and the CIG-FIR package, programmed prior to the preparation of the plan, would be delivered to the ROK in full.

(TS) The development objectives in the ROK plan when considered with U.S. forces assumed to be in-country were in excess of the minimum needs

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid. Citing USFK CJ ltr of 23 Jul 69; Subj: ROK Armed Forces Development Objectives Plan (S).
 3. JCS 5066/222023Z Jul 69.
 4. CINCPAC 060921Z Aug 69.

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of ROK forces." Nevertheless, without considering any specific modernization program, an examination of the current ROK force posture disclosed that more funds were needed than were being provided. Most urgent of the needs were increased funds to prevent further deterioration of the force, and to modernize certain types of equipment which were clearly obsolete and did not justify the effort or funds to maintain. Vehicles, F-86 type aircraft, and certain aging engineer equipment were examples in this category. Secondly, certain additions to the force structure were needed to bolster lagging and insufficient capabilities. An example in this category was the need for additional non-divisional field artillery battalions.¹

(TS) A fundamental defect in the ROK plan was the failure to assign priorities to the extensive listing of force development objectives. Initial and intermediate force development objectives were not identified. The ROK plan suffered also in the same way as the various NSSM-27 alternatives in that meaningful evaluation was impractical without clearly defined policy to indicate the level of ROK capabilities which the U.S. should support.²

(S) On 21 October, the JCS in a memorandum to the SECDEF compared the ROK Armed Forces Development Objective Plan with the NSSM-27 force posture alternatives and drew essentially the same conclusions as CINCPAC's. The JCS recommended that the ROK plan not be considered further as a statement of desirable objectives for the ROK Armed Forces.³

U.S. Tactical Air Warfare Study - Korea

(TS) The DEPSECDEF in a memorandum on 6 March 1968 requested the JCS to conduct a joint study to determine U.S. tactical air warfare requirements and force effectiveness in Korea for the purpose of determining deficiencies and recommending improvements. On 20 March 1968, the JCS approved a two-phase study effort and included all Services as participants.⁴

(S) The due date for the interim report covering the first phase of the study was 6 May 1968. The completion date for the second and final phase of the study was 15 July 1968. The interim report was completed, as directed,

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. J5 Brief 291-69, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Oct 69, Subj: ROK Armed Forces Development Objectives Plan (U) (JCSM-664-69 of 21 Oct 69).
 4. See CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 252-254 for terms of reference for the study, synopsis of the findings, and a discussion of CINCPAC's analysis of the two-phase study.

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on 6 May 1968, and distributed to the Directorates and Agencies of the JCS, the Services, and CINCPAC for comment. The final report was forwarded to CINCPAC for analysis. CINCPAC forwarded his analysis¹ of the study to the Director, Joint Staff, for review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense/ Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Review Group.

(TS) The JCS in a memorandum to the SECDEF on 25 February 1969 commented that:²

- a. The study was responsive to the DEPSECDEF terms of reference.
- b. The study was a comprehensive planning document for information and subsequent actions to be taken on U. S. /ROK and North Korean tactical air warfare capabilities and U. S. /ROK requirements.
- c. The JCS concur with the CINCPAC comment that the nuclear-loaded alert aircraft in Korea provide a needed function and should be retained instead of changing the 15-minute alert status.
- d. Improvements recommended by the study for deployed and initial augmentation forces were primarily in the areas of tactical air communications, control, and air defense systems. Longer term improvements for total force requirements include additional jet and supporting aircraft bases, aircraft shelters, and provision of additional Navy fighters to permit deployment of otherwise available attack carriers.
- e. Procurement of a follow-on fighter that would favorably meet the current and anticipated threat in Korea should be expedited.
- f. The JCS concur in the recommendations made in the study and consider that the suggested improvements were required irrespective of the size of the peacetime deployments in the Korean theater.

(TS) The conclusions and recommendations developed in the final report had important implications affecting military strategy for Korea, particularly those comments concerning capabilities of the force to survive and achieve air superiority. The North Korean threat made it mandatory that CINCPAC

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1. See preceding footnote.
 2. J5 Brief 00076-69, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Mar 69, Subj: JCSM 109-69 of 25 Feb 69, Study to Determine U. S. Tactical Air Warfare Requirements and Force Effectiveness in the Korean Theater (U).

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maintain an adequate capability in Northeast Asia for the defense of the ROK. As of March 1969, recommendations contained in the study that had been accomplished by CINCPAC or were in progress included: (1) interim rules of engagement for Korea; (2) planning and programming of two additional jet capable airbases; (3) construction of large scale passive defenses and support facilities for U. S. /ROK airbases; (4) improving U. S. /ROK communications facilities; and (5) redeployment of automatic weapons systems to defend high priority airbases and communication and radar sites. ¹

Replacement of Korean MDL Markers

(TS) On 12 March, the North Koreans were notified that a work party would replace MDL Marker 0022 plus three others on 15 March along with two others on later specified dates. This work was in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and subsequent agreements related thereto. As work was being conducted on 15 March, the North Koreans fired small arms and machine guns across the MDL into the United Nations Command Zone wounding one of the 2d Infantry Division work party members and killing one and wounding three in patrol covering the work party. ²

(TS) On 23 March 1969, CINCUNC informed CINCPAC and JCS of precautions planned to protect future work parties and suggested that State Department might wish to consider using other channels, i. e., informing Soviet Ambassador, to impress upon the North Koreans the dangers that could arise from the present situation. CINCPAC concurred generally in CINCUNC's intended course of action and advised keeping the DMZ as cool as possible without backing down from North Koreans. The JCS concurred in CINCUNC's contingency measures; advised CINCUNC to delay notification of the North Koreans of the time that work was planned, thus allowing State Department time to react if desired; and requested CINCUNC provide an evaluation of 26 March MAC meeting. ³

(TS) A joint State/Defense message discussed the ramifications of CINCUNC's proposed actions, procedural matters pertaining to maintenance of MDL markers and indicated that after the next MAC meeting the entire subject would be raised with the Soviets. CINCUNC responded to the JCS and State messages with an evaluation of the 26 March MAC meeting and proposed the following additional courses of action:

1. Ibid. See CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 255-260.
2. CINCUNC-COMUSK UK57960/231300Z Mar 69.
3. J3B3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69 citing CINCUNC 0957/231309Z Mar 69 (BOM), CINCPAC 240710Z Mar 69 (BOM), JCS 5387/242342Z Mar 69; and CJCS 03631/251404Z Mar 69 (BOM).

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a. To proceed with another meeting of the Military Armistice Commission. NK's will be informed, contrary to usual procedure in advance, of the UNC intent to discuss the replacement of MDL markers. This is to insure that the NK senior member has had an opportunity to receive policy guidance from above. This will insure that there will be no misunderstanding of our proposed actions and will permit NK to respond to our position after the subject has been reviewed at appropriate policy level. We also propose again to insist on the presence of a joint observer team when the MDL markers are emplaced.

b. That no further action be taken to replace the MDL markers in the 2d U. S. Division Sector until the results of the next meeting of the MAC can also be analyzed.¹

(TS) CINCPAC on 30 March, concurred in CINCUNC's 29 March proposals and expressed concern to the JCS that any long delays beyond the next MAC meeting would serve to erode the U. S. /UNC position. The JCS concurred in CINCUNC's proposals and instructed CINCUNC not to notify the North Koreans of date work expected to be performed without prior Washington approval.²

(TS) The JCS on 3 April, advised CINCPAC that due to high level interest in the 15 March incident concurrence must be obtained from the Department of Defense and State Department for each step planned.³ On 8 April, CINCUNC summarized the results of the 288th MAC meeting for CINCPAC and the JCS, provided a marker replacement plan, and recommended that the JCS obtain Washington approval to go ahead with the plan on or about 14 April.⁴

(TS) U. S. Ambassador to Korea Porter concurred in CINCUNC's plan to commence marker work with marker numbers 77 and 72. However, he pointed out that he would like the opportunity to discuss the matter with Marshall Green, who was due in Korea on 11 April, before commenting further on the question and the timing on the marker work.⁵ On 9 April, CINCPAC concurred with CINCUNC's proposal and so indicated to the JCS.⁶ On 9 April,

1. SECSTATE 045372/250055Z Mar 69; CINCUNC 58093/290739Z Mar 69.
2. J3B3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69 citing CINCPAC 300425Z Mar 69 (SPECAT); JCS 5782/312128Z Mar 69.
3. J3B31 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69 citing CJCS 170/031345Z Apr 69 (SPECAT).
4. CINCUNC 58272/080252Z Apr 69.
5. AMEMBASSY Seoul 1720/080755Z Apr 69.
6. CINCPAC 090446Z Apr 69.

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the JCS advised that they had recommended approval of CINCUNC's plan and stated that authorization would be forwarded upon receipt of final approval.¹ On 12 April, CINCUNC provided all concerned with a summary of the 289th MAC meeting held on 10 April 1969.² As a result of the EC-121 shootdown no further action took place until COMUS Korea requested the matter be settled during the presence of TF 71 in Korean waters.³ CINCPAC informed COMUS Korea that the action was still pending and COMUS Korea would be promptly informed when authority to continue MDL marker replacement was received.⁴

(TS) On 3 May, the JCS advised that the EC-121 shootdown incident had temporarily set aside consideration of the CINCUNC plan for replacement of MDL markers and requested CINCUNC's comments as to whether the plan was still appropriate in light of recent events and the then current situation. Also, the JCS requested CINCUNC's views with respect to when implementation should begin.⁵ CINCUNC informed the JCS and CINCPAC that recent heavy rains in Korea had resulted in flooded conditions in the area of MDL markers making replacement very difficult at that time. The floods resulted in additional damage and that it was difficult to forecast when the ground would be dry enough to permit marker replacement. Subsequent to receding of flood water, an examination of the markers in 2d U. S. Division Zone would be made and a repair schedule developed. CINCUNC requested that he be granted authority to resume marker replacement and repair based on his assessment of the situation pertaining at the time. CINCPAC concurred in CINCUNC's request.⁶ On 28 May JCS granted approval to resume marker replacement and repair as required in accordance with the previously submitted CINCUNC plan and requested information in advance of dates proposed for resumption.⁷

USS PUEBLO

(S) The USS PUEBLO departed Sasebo, Japan, 10 January 1968 on a naval surveillance and intelligence collection operation off the east coast of North Korea. On 23 January 1968, the PUEBLO and its entire crew was

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1. J3B31 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69 citing CJCS 170/091435Z Apr 69 (SPECAT).
 2. CINCUNC 58401/120533Z Apr 69.
 3. J3B31 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69 citing COMUS-KOREA/CINCUNC 58566/210832Z Apr 69.
 4. Ibid, citing CINCPAC 230131Z Apr 69.
 5. JCS 8415/031747Z May 69.
 6. CINCUNC 59091/150801Z May 69; CINCPAC 170801Z May 69 (TANGO 12).
 7. JCS 1253/281811Z May 69.

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captured by the North Koreans in international waters. After 11 months of imprisonment the crew was released on 23 December 1968. However, the USS PUEBLO was retained by NK.¹

(TS) The JCS addressed the continued retention of USS PUEBLO by NK in a memorandum to the SECDEF on 28 February 1969. The JCS pointed out that the continued retention of a commissioned ship of the U. S. Navy under enforced custody of a foreign power damages severely the prestige of the U. S. As long as the PUEBLO remains as a symbol of defiance, the credibility of the U. S. as a defender of the principle of freedom of the seas is in jeopardy. Therefore, the U. S. Government should consider courses of action to cause North Korea to release the PUEBLO.²

(TS) The JCS memorandum then set forth a list of actions, in sequence, which appeared to the JCS to provide the most practical initial approach for securing the release of the PUEBLO:³

(1) At Panmunjom, demand return of PUEBLO in private session between U. S. and N. K. representatives, utilizing evidence of falsification of navigational records and maltreatment of the crew during captivity as backup material.

(2) If the private demand fails, release the same position publicly at Panmunjom, together with a demand for appropriate redress.

(3) If unilateral approaches at Panmunjom prove unsuccessful, present the U. S. position before a United Nations forum, requesting diplomatic support.

(4) Initiate action in an appropriate international adjudicatory body to establish a legal basis for return of PUEBLO and gain broader international support; if N. K. refuses to consent, capitalize on the propaganda value.

(5) If the foregoing actions fail, inform N. K. that if shared use of the high seas depends upon effective power


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1. See CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 225-236 for a detailed discussion of the PUEBLO incident.
 2. J3 Brief 46-69, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Mar 69, Subj: Courses of Action Concerning USS PUEBLO (S)/JCSM-115-69.
 3. Ibid.

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rather than law, N. K. can expect her share to be far more limited than that prior to PUEBLO seizure.

(TS) The JCS commented that after peaceful means to effect the return of the PUEBLO had been exhausted, positive military action should be taken. Courses of action suggested were:



-
1. Ibid.

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GLOSSARY

(U) Some abbreviations appear in the text in both capitals and in upper and lower case letters. To prevent redundancy, only capitals in the abbreviations have been used in this glossary.

A

AA	Antiaircraft
AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
AAPSA	Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency
AAW	Antiaircraft Warfare
AB	Air Base
ABCCC	Airborne Command and Control Center
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ABMIS	Airborne Ballistic Missile Intercept System
ABN	Airborne
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
ABRI	Armed Forces of Indonesia
AB&T	Alaska Barge and Transport
AIC	Airman First Class
A/C	Aircraft
ACA	Airlift Clearance Authorities
ACNS CORPS	Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps
ACP	Allied Communications Publication
AC/S	Assistant Chief of Staff
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADDL	Additional
ATG L	Degaussing Ship
ADM	Admiral
ADMIN	Administration
ADMIN CINCPAC	Administrative Headquarters CINCPAC
ADMINO	Administrative Office
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
ADR	Automatic Data Relay
ADVON	Advance Squadron
ADVS	Advisors
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AF	Air Force
AFADVSYP	Air Force Advisory Group

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AFAG	Air Force Advisory Group
AFAK	Armed Forces Assistance to Korea
AFB	Air Force Base
AFF	Affairs
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFPSC	Armed Forces Philippines Supply Center
AFS	Combat Store Ship
AFSC	Air Force Systems Command
AG	Miscellaneous Ship
AGC	Amphibious Force Flagship
AGE	Associated Ground Equipment
AGL	Average Ground Level
AGS	Surveying Ship
AID	Agency for International Development
AIRA	Air Attache
AK	Cargo Ship
AKL	Light Cargo Ship
ALCON	All Concerned
ALLOC	Allocation
AMC	Army Materiel Command
AMEMB	American Embassy
AMEMBASSY	American Embassy
AMPHIB	Amphibious
AMT	Amount
AN/ARC	Joint Nomenclature/Aircraft Radio Transceiver
AN/PRC	Joint Nomenclature/Transistorized, man-packed portable FM radio set
ANG	Air National Guard
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
AO	Oiler
AOG	Gasoline Tanker
AP	Armor Piercing; Associated Press; Transport Ship
APC	Accelerated Pacification Campaign
APD	High Speed Transport
APL	Barracks Craft (non-self-propelled)
APO	Army Post Office
APPROX	Approximately
AR	Army Regulation; Repair Ship
ARA	Australian Royal Army
ARC	Aircraft radio transceiver
ARL	Landing Craft Repair Ship
ARMA	Army Attache

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ARMD	Armed
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ART	Article
ARTY	Artillery
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASAP	As soon as possible
ASCOM	Army Support Command
ASDF	Air Staff Defense Force; Air Self Defense Force (Japan)
ASD (ISA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASPAC	Asian and Pacific Council
ASST	Assistant
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
ATA	Air Transport Association; Auxiliary Ocean Tug
ATCO	Air Transportation Coordination Office
ATR	Rescue Ocean Tug
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications System
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AVG	Average
AVR	Aircraft Rescue Boat
AW	All weather
AWOL	Absent Without Official Leave
AWX	All weather interceptor

B

BAC	Base Area Command
BAF	Burmese Air Force
BALPA	Balance of Payments
BARPT HAW	Barber's Point, Hawaii
BB	Battleship
BCT	Battalion Combat Team
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment
BDE	Brigade
BDF	Burma Defense Forces
BDL	Beach Discharge Lighter
BDP	Base Development Plan
BG	Brigadier General
BGEN	Brigadier General

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BIL	Billion
BILI	Basic Issue List Items
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
BMR	Bomber
BN	Battalion
BOD	Beneficial Occupancy Date
BOM	By other means
BR	BARREL ROLL; Branch
BSA	Boy Scouts of America

C

C	Confidential
CA	Chinese Army; Container Agreement; Heavy Cruiser
CAB	Civil Affairs Branch
CAF	Chinese Air Force
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
CAPT	Captain
CAR	Carrier
CART	Cartographic
CAS	Close Air Support; Controlled American Source
CAV	Cavalry
C&B	Chemical and Biological
CBT	Combat
CC	Command Center
CCK	Chiang Ching-Kuo
CCN	Chinese Communist Navy
CCP	Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CCRSFF	Commander Central Region SEATO Field Forces
CCRSFF(D)	Commander Central Region SEATO Field Forces (Designate)
CDR	Commander
C&E	Communications and Electronics
C-E	Communications-Electronics
CENT	Central
CEOI	Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction
CG	Commanding General
CGFMFPAC	Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
CGUSAEIGHT	Commanding General, United States Eighth Army
CGUSAMAC	Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command
CGUSAQMCENFL	Commanding General, U. S. Army Quartermaster Center, Fort Lee

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CGUSARHAW	Commanding General, United States Army, Hawaii
CGUSARV	Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam
CHAP	Chapter
CHDLG	Chief, Defense Liaison Group
CHICOM	Chinese Communists
CHJUSMAGPHIL	Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines
CHMAAG	Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group - Country
CHMEDT	Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team
CHMEDT BURMA	Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma
CHPROVMAAG-K	Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (Provisional)
CHUSDLG	Chief, United States Defense Liaison Group
CHUSMAG LAOS	Chief, U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Laos
CHUSNAVADGRU	Chief, U.S. Naval Advisory Group
CHWTO	Chief, Western Pacific Transportation Office
CI	Counter-Infiltration; Counter Insurgency
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIGCOREP	Counter Infiltration - Counter Guerrilla Concept and Requirement Plan
CIGFIR	Counter-Infiltration/Guerrilla and Force Improvement Requirements
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCONAD	Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCEUR	Commander in Chief Europe
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet
CINCPACINST	Commander in Chief Pacific Instruction
CINCPACREP	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative
CINCPACREPPHIL	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command
CINCSTRIKE	Commander in Chief Strike Command
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CLIP	Country Logistics Improvements Plan
CLS	Closed Loop Support
CMBT	Combat

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CMBTSPTGP	Combat Support Group
CMC	Chinese Marine Corps; Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
CMDO	Commando
CMDR	Commander
CMPO	Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office
CN	A riot control agent; Chinese Navy
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Commanding Officer; company
CofS	Chief of Staff
COGARD	Coast Guard
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COL	Colonel
COM13AF	Commander Thirteenth Air Force
COMAFKOREA	Commander United States Air Forces, Korea
COMASWGRU	Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Group
COMD	Command
COMDT	Commandant
COMFLEACTS	Commander, U.S. Naval Fleet Activities
COMM	Community
COMMDO	Commando
COMNAVBASE SUBIC	Commander Naval Base, Subic
COMNAVFORV	Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam
COMNAVPHIL	Commander Naval Forces, Philippines
COMP	Composite
COMSAT	Communication Satellite
COMSEVENTHFLT	Commander, Seventh Fleet
COMSTS	Commander Military Sea Transportation Service
COMSTSFE	Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Far East
COMSTSPAC	Commander Military Sea Transportation Service, Pacific
COMUS	Commander, United States Forces
COMUSJAPAN	Commander, United States Forces, Japan
COMUSK	Commander, United States Forces, Korea
COMUSKOREA	Commander, United States Forces, Korea
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSNAVPHIL	Commander United States Naval Forces, Philippines
COMUSSEASIA	Commander, United States Forces, Southeast Asia
COMUSTDC	Commander, United States Forces, Taiwan Defense Command

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CONST	Construction
CONUS	Continental United States
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CPAF	Cost Plus Award Fee
CPR	Chinese Peoples Republic (Communist China)
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRA	Continuing Resolution Authority
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRSFF	Central Region SEATO Field Forces
CS	Chemical Agent; a riot control agent
C/S	Chief of Staff
CSAF	Chief of Staff, Air Force
CSF	Casualty Staging Flight
CSO	Counter Subversion Office
CSP	Committed to Scheduled Programs
CT	Country Team
CTF	Commander Task Force
CTG	Commander Task Group
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
CVA	Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVA(N)	Attack Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear Propulsion)
CVAN	CINCPAC Voice Alert Network
CVS	Anti-submarine Support Aircraft Carrier
CVSG	ASW Carrier Air Wing
CVW	Carrier Air Wing
CY	Calendar Year

D

DA	Department of the Army
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DAR	Deployment Adjustment Request
DASE	Direct Air Support Element
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCMPO	Deputy Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office
DCO	District Central Office
DCP	Development Concept Paper
DCPG	Defense Communications Planning Group
DCS	Defense Communications System; Deputy Chief of Staff
DD	Destroyer
DDR&E	Director, Defense Research and Engineering
DE	Escort Ship

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DEFCON	Defense Condition
DEPCHIEF	Deputy Chief
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI	Deputy Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand
DEPREP	Deployment Reporting System
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DEPT	Department
DER	Radar Picket Escort Ship
DET	Detachment
DFE	Division Force Equivalent
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIR	Directive
DIR-GEN	Director-General
DIRLAUTH	Direct Liaison Authorized
DIV	Division
DLG	Defense Liaison Group; Guided Missile Frigate
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DLSC	Defense Logistics Service Center
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOB	Dispersed Operating Base
DOD	Department of Defense
DOD MAM	Department of Defense Military Assistance Manual
DOI	Department of Interior
DOL	Dollar
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DSA	Defense Security Agency; Defense Supply Agency
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
DSTE	Digital Subscriber Terminals
DTG	Date Time Group
DZK	Dillingham, Zachery, and Kaiser (civilian construction firm)

E

EASTPAC	Eastern Pacific
E&CA	Economic & Cultural Affairs
ECB	Engineer Combat Battalion; Engineer Construction Battalion
ECL	English classroom language
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
ECTP	English classroom training program

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ECDMX	Small Scale Automatic Switching Facilities
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
ELPM	English language program manager
ELT	English language training
EM	Enlisted man
ENCL	Enclosure
ENG	Engineer
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Demolition
EPC	Ear Peng Chiang Co.
ERSFF	Eastern Region SEATO Field Forces
ESD	Electronic Systems Division
ESM	Electronic warfare support measures
EST	Eastern Standard Time
ETA	Estimated Time of Arrival
ETO	Express Transportation Organization
EUCOM	European Command
EUSA	Eighth United States Army
EW	Electronic Warfare
EXP	Expense

F

FA	Field Artillery
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAC	Forward Air Control
FAG	Forward Air Guide
FAN	Forces Armees Neutralist
FAR	Forces Armees Royale (Forces Armees du Royaume)
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FDL	Fast deployment logistic
FFV	Fresh fruits and vegetables; Field Force Vietnam
FIS	Fighter Interceptor Squadron
FLETACSUPPRON	Fleet Air Tactical Support Squadron
FM	Frequency Modulation; radio receiver
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FOB	Forward Operating Bases
FOIC PN	Flag Officer in Command, Philippine Navy
FONECON	Telephone Conversation
FOS	Follow on spares
FPB	Fast Patrol Boat
FROKA	First Republic of Korea Army

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FSC	Federal Stock Catalog
FT	Fort
FTR	Fighter
FWF	Free World Forces
FWMA	Free World Military Assistance
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
FWMF	Free World Military Forces
FY	Fiscal Year

G

GAO	General Accounting Office
GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept
GEN	General
GM	Gunner's Mate
GMG2	Gunner's Mate (G) Second Class (Navy rate)
GNP	Gross National Product
GOA	Government of Australia
GOB	Government of Belgium
GOI	Government of Indonesia
GOJ	Government of Japan
GOM	Government of Malaysia
GOP	Government of the Philippines
GOS	Government of Singapore
GOVT	Government
GP	General purpose; group
GPS	Groups
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
GRI	Government of the Ryukyu Islands
GSA	Girl Scouts of America
GSDF	Ground Self Defense Force (Japan)
GUB	Government of the Union of Burma
GVN	Government of the Republic of Vietnam

H

HANKAM	Indonesia Department of Defense; Ministry of Defense and Security (Indonesia)
HASP	Hawaiian Armed Services Police
HAW	Hawaii
HAWK	Mobile, Surface-to-Air Guided Missile

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HDRF	Homeland Defense Reserve Force
HELO	Helicopter
HICOMTERPACIS	High Commissioner, Territory of the Pacific Islands
HMB	Hukbong Malagpalaya Ng Bayan (formerly HUK)
HON	Honorable
HOW	Howitzer
HQ	Headquarters
HQTRS	Headquarters

I

IAC	Intelligence Assessment Committee
IAF	Indonesia Air Force
IBM	International Business Machine Company
IBOP	International Balance of Payments
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IDA	Institute of Defense Analyses
IFF	Identification, friend or foe
IJCS PAC	Integrated Joint Communication System - Pacific
ILC	Institute of Land Combat
I&M.	Improvement and Modernization
INCL	Inclosure
IND	Indorsement
INF	Infantry
INT	Intelligence
INTCP	Interceptor
INTV	Interview
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IPD	Issue Priority Designator
IRAN	Inspect and Repair as Necessary
IRAN/OVHL	Inspect and repair as necessary/overhaul
IRG	Interdepartmental Regional Group
ISA	International Security Affairs; International Security Agency; Internal Security Agency
ISF	Internal Security Force

J

JAEP	Joint AUTOSEVOCOM Evaluation Project
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JAWG	Joint AUTOSEVOCOM Working Group
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff

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JCSAN	Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network
JCSM	Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JDA	Japanese Defense Agency
JLC	Joint Logistics Council; Joint Logistics Command
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JMSDF	Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force
JOINTMAAG-K	Joint Military Assistance Advisory Group-Korea
JOPREP	Joint Operational Reporting System
JPCCO	Joint Pacific Command and Control Operations
JPO	Joint Petroleum Office
JRC	Joint Reconnaissance Center
JRS	Joint Reporting Structure
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSG	Joint Support Group
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JTA	Joint Table of Allowances
JTB	Joint Transportation Board
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JTF	Joint Task Force
JUSMAG	Joint United States Military Advisory Group
JUSMAGPHIL	Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines
JUSMAGTHAI	Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand
JUWTF	Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force

K

KCM	Korean Combat Meal
KIA	Killed in action
KM	Kilometer
KMAG	Military Advisory Group, Korea
KNP	Korean National Police
KORCOM	Korean Communist

L

LAMP	Laos Ammunition Procedures
LAW	Light anti-tank weapon
LBC	Liberation Broadcasting Company
LBN	Long Binh (Vietnam)
LCC	Logistics Control Center
LCDR	Lieutenant Commander

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LCM	Mechanized Landing Craft
LCOL	Lieutenant Colonel
LCPL	Landing Craft Personnel, Large
LCU	Land Craft Utility
LCVP	Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel
LFR	Inshore Fire Support Ship
LGS	Local General Schedule
LNW	Project code assigned supply shipments
LOC	Lines of communication
LOG COMD	Logistics Command
LOGSUM	Logistics Summary
LORAN	Long Range Navigation
LPH	Landing Platform Helicopter (amphibious assault ship)
LRC	Logistics Readiness Center
LSD	Dock Landing Ship
LSM	Medium Landing Ship
LSSL	Support Landing Ship, Large
LST	Tank Landing Ship
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTD	Language training detachments
LT GEN	Lieutenant General
LTJG	Lieutenant junior grade
LTR	Letter
LVT	Landing Vehicle Track
LVTA	Landing Vehicle Track Armored
LZ	Landing Zone

M

MA	Military Advisor; military assistance
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAAGV	Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACSOG	Military Assistance Command Studies and Observations Group
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MACTHAI	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACVDAC	MACV Critical Items Distribution/Allocation Committee
MAF	Military Assistance Funds
MAI	Military Assistance Institute
MAJ	Major
MAJ GEN	Major General

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MAM	Military Assistance Manual
MAP	Military Assistance Program (or Plan)
MAP/AID	Military Assistance Program/Agency for International Development
MAPEL	Military Assistance Program Equipment List
MAPEX	Code name for project established to provide for maximum feasible redistribution of all DOD excess/long supply assets to PACOM MAP countries.
MAP/MASF	Military Assistance Program/Military Assistance Service Funded
MAPOM	Military Assistance Program Owned Material
MAR	U. S. Marine Corps
MARC	MILAD'S Representative Committee
MARCORPS	Marine Corps
MA&S	Military Assistance and Sales
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MASH	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MASL	Military Assistance Program Articles and Services List
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MAX	Maximum
MBA	Military Base Agreement
MC	Medical Corps
MCA	Military Construction Army
MCAS	U. S. Marine Corps Air Station
MCI	Army Meal Combat Individual
MCP	Military Construction Program
MCS	Mine Countermeasures Support Ship
MDAO	Mutual Defense Assistance Office
MDB	Mutual Defense Board (U. S. - Philippines)
MDL	Military Demarcation Line
MDMAF	Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Forces
MDMRF	Mekong Delta Mobile Riverine Force
MEAFSA	Mediterranean, Africa South of the Sahara and Southern Asia
MECH	Mechanized
MED	Medical; medium
MEDT	Military Equipment Delivery Team (Burma)
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MGEN	Major General
MI	Mile
MIDPAC	Mid-Pacific
MIJI	Meaconing, interference, intrusion, and jamming
MIL	Million; military

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MILAD	Military Advisor (SEATO or ANZUS Council)
MILCON	Military Construction
MILGP	Military Group
MILGROUPS	Military Groups
MILS	Missile Impact Location System
MIMEX	Name assigned to a program for obtaining major items for MAP from U.S. long supply.
MINDEF	Minister of Defense
MIT	Military Integrated Telephone System
MM	Millimeter
MMO	Military Materiel Office
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MOA	Military Assistance Program Order Amendment
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MODN	Modernization
MOI	Ministry of the Interior
MORT	Mortar
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOVECAP	Movement Capabilities
MPES	Mission Progress Evaluation System
MPO	Military Planning Office (SEATO)
MSC	Minesweeper, Coastal (non-magnetic)
MSDF	Maritime Staff Defense Force
MSF	Minesweeper, Fleet (steel hull)
MSGT	Master Sergeant
MSI	Minesweeper, Inshore
MSML	Motor Launch Minesweeper (also MLMS)
MSO	Ocean Minesweeper
MSQ	Tracking Radar
MSTS	Military Sea Transportation Service
MSTSFE	Military Sea Transportation Service, Far East
MT	MARKET TIME; Measurement tons
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MWA	Military Working Arrangement

N

NAFA	Non-Appropriated Fund Activity
NAG	Naval Advisory Group
NAMC	Non-Nuclear Munitions Conference
NAS	Naval Air Station
NAT	National
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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NAVAIDS	Navigation Aids
NAVFUELSUPO	Navy Fuel Supply Office
NAVILCO	Navy International Logistics Control Office, Bayonne, N. J.
NAVSHIPPREPFAC	U. S. Naval Ship Preparation Facility
NAVSUPSYSCOMHQ	Navy Supply Systems Command, Headquarters
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NGF or NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NFSO	Navy Fuel Supply Office
NH BN	NIKE HERCULES Battalion
NICTZ	Northern I Corps Tactical Zone
NIKE	Surface-to-air missile
NJ	New Jersey
NK	North Korea
NKPR	North Korean People's Republic
NLF	National Liberation Front (Communist in SVN)
NLT	Not Later Than
NM	Nautical Mile
NO	Number
NOD	Night Observation Device
NOFORN	Not releasable to foreign nationals
NPW	Nuclear powered warship
NS	No subject
NSA	National Security Agency; Naval Support Activity
NSA/SCA	National Security Agency/Service Cryptologic Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
NWA	Northwest Airlines

O

O/A	On or about
OASD/ISA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs
OASD/PA	Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs
OBE	Overtaken by Events
OCA	Operational Control Authority
ODMA	Office of the Director of Military Assistance

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OFMA	Office of Foreign Military Assistance
OICC	Officer in Charge of Construction
OLA	Offshore Labor Agreement
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OMA	Operations and Maintenance Appropriation
OOAMA	Ogden Air Material Area
OP	Operational
OPCON	Operational Control
OPlans	Operational Plans
OPNAV	Naval Operations
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OPREP	Operational Reporting
OPS	Operations
ORTC	Overseas Replacement Training Center
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI	Office of Special Investigation; Offshore Islands
OSP	Off-shore procurement
OSPJ	Off-shore Procurement - Japan

P

PA	Philippine Army
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACEX	Army and Air Force Pacific Exchange Services
PACOM	Pacific Command
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACSHIPS	Pacific Command Ship Inventory and Port Status Reporting System
PADAF	Pacific Command Air Defense Analysis Facility
PAF	Philippine Air Force
PAL	Parcel Air Lift
PALOS	Pacific Logistic Operations - Streamline
PAMEX	PACOM excesses in custody of component service supply activities which are available to MAP. Controlled by CINCPAC; implemented by supply holding activities.
PAN AM	Pan American World Airways
PARA	Paragraph; paratroop
PARPRO	Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program
PAT	Patrol

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PATMRG	PACOM Target Materials Review Group
PAX	Passenger
PBD	Program Budget Decision
PBX	Private Exchange Switchboard
PC	Philippine Constabulary; patrol craft
PCA	Positive Control Area
PCE	Patrol Craft Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft, Fast
PCH&T	Packing, Crating, Handling and Transportation
PCN	Procurement Control Number
PCR	Program Change Request
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PCT	Percent
PCZ	Philippine Constabulary Zone
PD	Passive Detection
PDJ	Plaine des Jarres
PDO	Property Disposal Office
PEC	PACOM ELINT Center
PEG	Performance Evaluation Group
PEMA	Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army
PERCAP	Per capita
PF	Patrol Escort Ship; Popular Forces; PRAIRIE FIRE
PFAO	PRAIRIE FIRE Area of Operation
PG	Patrol Gunboat (USN)
PGM	Motor Gunboat
PHIL	Philippines
PHILCAG	Philippine Civic Action Group
PHILCAGV	Philippine Civic Action Group Vietnam
PHILCONV	Philippine Contingent Vietnam
PHILMILAD	Philippine Military Advisor
PI	Philippine Islands
PIN	Plan Identification Number
PIO	Procurement Information Office; Public Information Office
PL	Pathet Lao; Public Law
PME	Precision Measurement Equipment
PMEL	Precision Measuring Equipment Laboratory
PN	Philippine Navy
POE	Port of Embarkation
POL	Petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POV	Privately Owned Vehicle
POW	Prisoner of War
PPB	Planning, programing, budgeting

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PPBS	Policy Planning Board Study
PROD	Production
PROG	Progress
PROP	Propeller
PROV	Provisional
PROVMAAG-K	Military Assistance Advisory Group Korea (Provisional)
PSDF	Popular Self-Defense Force
PSY	Psychological
PSYOP	Psychological Operation
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PT	Point; Motor Torpedo Boat (now designed PTF (Fast Patrol Craft))
PTF	Fast Patrol Craft
PUB	Publication
PURA	Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency
PWG	Permanent Working Group (SEATO)
PWRS	Prepositioned War Reserved Stocks
PX	Proposed exercise

R

RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RADC	Rome Air Development Center
RADM	Rear Admiral
RCN	Record Control Number; Republic of China Navy
RCS	Reports Control Symbol
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
R&D	Research and Development
RD	Revolutionary Development
RD1	Radioman First Class (Navy rate)
RDC(P)	Revolutionary Development Cadre (Program)
RECCE or RECON	Reconnaissance
REGT	Regiment
REP	Representative; republic
REQ	Request
RES	Reserve
RET	Retired
RFP	Request for Procurement
RF/PF	Regional Forces/Popular Forces
RGT	Regiment
RIF	Reconnaissance in Force

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RLA	Royal Laotian Army
RLAF	Royal Laotian Air Force
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RLGAF	Royal Laotian Government Armed Forces
RMK-BRJ	Raymond International, Morrison-Knudsen/Brown and Root, J. A. Jones (Civilian Construction Firm)
RNGR	Ranger
RNZA	Royal New Zealand Army
RO	Requirements Office
ROC	Republic of China
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
ROKAF	Republic of Korea Air Force
ROKF	Republic of Korea Forces
ROKF-V	Republic of Korea Forces in Vietnam
ROKG	Government of the Republic of Korea
ROKMC	Republic of Korea Marine Corps
ROKN	Republic of Korea Navy
ROP	Republic of the Philippines
RO/RO	Roll On/Roll Off
RO/USAID	Requirements Office/United States Agency for Interna- tional Development
RPAF	Republic of the Philippines Air Force
RPT	Repeat
RQN	Requisition
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
RT	Reconnaissance Team
RTA	Royal Thailand Army
RTAB	Royal Thailand Air Base
RTAF	Royal Thailand Air Force
RTAFB	Royal Thailand Air Force Base
RTAFSC	Royal Thailand Armed Forces Staff College
RTARF	Royal Thailand Armed Forces
RTAVF	Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Forces
RTG	Royal Thailand Government
RTMC	Royal Thailand Marine Corps
RTN	Royal Thailand Navy
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force; RVN Armed Forces
RVNAFLS	Republic of Vietnam Air Force Language School
RVP	Replacement Patrol Squadron

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S

SABMIS	Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Intercept Squadron
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACSA	Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities
SALOA	Special ARC LIGHT Operating Area
SAM	Space Available Air Mail; Surface-to-Air Missile
SAPO	Sub-Area Petroleum Office
SAPOTHAI	Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Thailand
SAPOV	Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Vietnam
SAR	Search and rescue
SASM	Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility
SC	Submarine chaser
SCC	Security Consultative Committee
SCC SC	Security Consultative Committee Subcommittee
SCDA	SEATO Central Distribution Authority
SCH	School
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEACoord	Coordinating Committee for U. S. Missions Southeast Asia
SEAL	Sea, Air and Land (Team)
SEAP	SEATO Military Publication
SEASIA	Southeast Asia
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SEC	Section; security
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SECY	Secretary
SECY GEN	Secretary General
SER	Serial
SF	Special forces
SFC	Sergeant First Class
SFF	SEATO Field Forces
SGT	Sergeant
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIMEX	Name assigned to a program for obtaining secondary items for MAP from U. S. long supply.
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SL	STEEL TIGER

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S&L	Systems and Logistics
SLC	Special Letters of Credit
SMAMA	Sacramento Air Material Area
SMPO	SEATO Military Planning Office
S-NOFORN	Secret- not releasable to foreign nationals
SOC PAC	Special Operations Center Pacific Command
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOS	Special Operations Squadron
SP	Self-propelled; special; specialist
SPB	Support Patrol Boat
SPEC	Special
SPECAT	Special Category
SPOS	Strong Point Obstacle System
SPS	Surveillance radar
SPT	Support
SPTGP	Support Group
SPV	Small port vessel
SQ or SQN	Squadron
SQS	Squadrons
SROKA	Second Republic of Korea Army
SS	Steamship; U. S. Navy submarine
SSB	Single Side Band
SSBN	Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine (nuclear powered)
SSGT	Staff Sergeant
SSM	Test Evaluation and Monitor System
SSN	Submarine (nuclear)
SSSSA	Department of State Shared State Support Agreement
S/T	Short tons
STA	Science and Technology Agency
STRD	Son Thon Revolutionary Development Cadre
SUBJ	Subject
SUP CT	Superior Court
SVN	South Vietnam

T

TAC	Tactical Air Command
TACAMO	Nickname for Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TACSATCOM	Tactical Satellite Communications
T-AKV	Cargo ship and aircraft ferry
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility

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TCN	Third Country National
TCP	Traffic Control Points
TDC	Taiwan Defense Command
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/E	Table of Equipment
TET	Lunar New Year Holiday
TEWS	Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
TF	Task Force
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
THAI	Thailand
TK	Tank
TMS	Teams
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOR	Terms of Reference; time of receipt
TOT	Time on target
TPFDL	Time phased force deployment list
TRANS	Transport
TRNG	Training
TRW	Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
TSF	Territorial Security Force
TSN	Tan Son Nhut (Air Base)
TTPI	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
TV	Television

U

UAL	Unit Authorization List
UE	Unit Equipment Allowance
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
UNK	Unknown
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAEIGHT	Eighth United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAMC	United States Army Materiel Command
USARJ	United States Army, Japan
USARPAC	United States Army Pacific
USARSUPTHAI	U. S. Army Support Command, Thailand

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USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
USARYIS	United States Army, Ryukyu Islands
USCA	United States Code Annotated
USCAR	United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCGC	United States Coast Guard Cutter
USCINCEUR	United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USDA	United States Defense Attache
USDAO	United States Defense Attache Office
USDOD	United States Department of Defense
USF	United States Forces
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USFK	United States Forces Korea
USG	United States Government
USIA	United States Information Agency
USMA	United States Military Assistance
USMACTHAI	United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
USMACV	United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMILAD	U. S. Military Advisor
USMILADREP	United States Military Advisor's Representative
USMILRONT	United States Senior Military Representative on the Okinawa Negotiating Team
USN	United States Navy
USNS	U. S. naval ship
USS	United States ship
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTDC	United States Taiwan Defense Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

V

VADM	Vice Admiral
VC	Viet Cong
VCi	Viet Cong Infrastructure
VFR	Visual Flight Rules
VHF	Very High Frequency
VLF/LF	Very low frequency/low frequency
VMFA	Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Republic of Vietnam Navy
VOL	Volume

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VP
VQ
VUNC

Patrol Squadron
Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron
Voice of the United Nations Command

W

WBLC
WESTPAC
WG
WO
W-PAFB
WPB
WSLO
WTCA
WTO
WWMCCS
WX


Waterborne Logistic Craft
Western Pacific
Wing
Warrant officer
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Coast Guard Patrol Boat
Weapons Systems Logistics Officer
Water Terminal Clearance Authorities
Western Pacific Transportation Office
World Wide Military Command and Control System
Weather

Y

YNC
YT

Chief Yeoman (Navy rate)
YANKEE TEAM

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(U) The indexer in preparing this index integrated Volumes I, II, III and IV of the 1969 CINCPAC Command History. Annexes A and B of the CINCPAC 1969 history are not included in this index since each annex contains its own individual index.

(U) Priorities for entries are:

Country -- Japan, Korea, etc.

Military function -- personnel, logistics, operations, etc.

Major program -- Military Assistance, etc.

Regional defense organization -- SEATO, etc.

Ships -- by name under "ships"

Aircraft -- by designation under "aircraft"

Weapons -- by designation

Program, plan, project or system -- by name, PEACE KISS, HAWK, etc.

Concepts of special interest to CINCPAC -- command and control, etc.

(U) Generally, a country approach has been followed, with cross-references in support of this approach.

(U) Each volume is paged separately, and volumes are indicated in each entry by Roman numerals.

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
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