


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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



VOLUME III

1969

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Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII

1970

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ADMIRAL JOHN S. MCCAIN JR.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

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FOREWORD

(U) My area of responsibility, the Pacific Command, is the largest of seven unified U.S. military commands. It is an area beyond the West Coast of the Americas that encompasses 85 million square miles. It reaches from the Bering Sea in the north to the region of the South Pole. It stretches past the island state of Hawaii, across the Pacific to Guam and the Philippines. It continues over the South China Sea beyond Vietnam and Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. From the northern regions along the coast of Asia it extends southward past the Soviet Union and Japan, past Okinawa and Taiwan, to Australia and New Zealand. Those 85 million square miles cover about 40 percent of the earth's surface.

(U) The mission of the Pacific Command is to defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean area and to support U.S. national policy and interests throughout the Pacific, Far East, and Southeast Asian areas. The overall mission includes the providing of military assistance to the countries of Asia, to help them protect themselves from external aggression and internal subversion.

(U) The major potential source of danger in the Western Pacific is Communist China. While the motivations and intentions of Communist China's leaders are matters of conjecture, their capabilities can be fairly accurately measured. Another major problem confronting United States interests is the formidable political and economic influence and growing military power of the Soviet Union in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. North Vietnam and North Korea are current examples of violently nationalistic communist leadership. Both are aggressors and both seek through overt and covert insurgency the overthrow of legitimate, legally constituted governments.

(U) The importance of security in the Pacific cannot be overemphasized. We must be aware of the continuing global threat which our country faces

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from the ambitions, goals, and activities of the communist world. Only a firm, positive posture on our part, backed by adequate military capabilities, can assure the security of this country, and with it, that of the Free World.

(U) To defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean and to support U.S. national policy and interests throughout the Pacific, the Far East and Southeast Asian areas is a mission carrying great responsibility. It is not an easy mission. No one expects it to be. The mission is being accomplished, however, by many men and women, in many different places. They are serving courageously and with valor on the field of battle. And they are doing a humanitarian thing to help the people of South Vietnam retain the right to decide their own future without outside coercion. I am proud of these men and women who guard 24 hours each day the ramparts and heritage of a free land and a free people given us by our Nation's founders.



JOHN S. MCCAIN, JR.

Admiral, United States Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific

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PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the standpoint of CINCPAC. Additionally, the required annual report preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS to the extent that major decisions and directives of the JCS concerning the PACOM may be determined by historians of the JCS without research in the records of the PACOM. This 1969 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As in the case of previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those connected with international crises and those peculiar to a joint command. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and achievements and omits "detailed" activities of subordinate unified commands or of Allied nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history is organized in the same manner as previous histories, primarily in line with the objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and the planning for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) This year's history is published in four volumes: Volume I - Chapter I; Volume II - Chapters II and III; Volume III - Sections I - V,

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Chapter IV; and Volume IV - Sections VI - X, Chapter IV. A glossary and an index for the complete history is included in Volume IV only. Pagination is complete within each volume rather than running consecutively throughout the four volumes. As in previous years, the annual histories prepared by COM-USMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are included as Annexes A and B, respectively.

(U) The CINCPAC Command Historian, Colonel J. R. Johnson, USA, under the supervision of Colonel William C. Harrison, Jr., USAF, Secretary of the Joint Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, planned and published the 1969 CINCPAC Command History as required by CINCPAC Staff Instruction 5750. 1D of 20 August 1968. Colonel Johnson personally researched and wrote Chapter IV with exception of Sections V - IX.

(U) Members of the CINCPAC Historical Branch assisted the Command Historian in the preparation of the history. Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, as Senior Historian, researched and wrote Chapters II and III and Sections V and IX of Chapter IV. In addition, he provided technical guidance and shared his professional expertise when and where required throughout the preparation of this history. Mrs. Polly Tallman, Assistant Historian, prepared Chapter I and Sections VI - VIII of Chapter IV and prepared the pictorial layout for the history.

(U) Miss Maggie M. Kaonohi, Clerk-Stenographer of CINCPAC Historical Branch, typed the manuscript in final format. Mrs. Mary Jane Garrett, CINCPAC Librarian, compiled the index. Senior Chief Yeoman C. J. Curry, USN, who also compiled the glossary, Chief Yeoman William A. Hendrixson, USN, and Yeoman Second Class Judy G. Ege, USN, proofread the final manuscript and performed the many other tasks connected with readying the volumes for the printers. Master Sergeant John F. Stevenson, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Graphics Section, JO412, and his successor, Draftsman First Class Mateo V. Garrovillas, USN, supervised the preparation of all graphics for this history. Lithographer First Class Edward A. Donlin, USN, Reproduction Unit Supervisor, JO412, and Staff Sergeant Leonard L. Powell, USAF, Reproduction Device Expert, JO412, handled the expeditious printing of the draft manuscript which facilitated staff coordination. Finally, the immeasurable support rendered by the CINCPAC staff is greatly appreciated.

J. R. Johnson

J. R. JOHNSON

Colonel USA

CINCPAC Command Historian

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CHAPTER IV

**ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

(U) The threat of aggressive communism in Asia affects the peace of the area, American national power in the Pacific, and the problem of collective security throughout this vast region. Its significance is underscored by the fact that in my area of responsibility, the Pacific Command, live more than one-third of the people on earth under 25 different flags.

.....


It has been my privilege to command U.S. Forces in the Pacific.... I have seen our brave men--many young, some older--act with unsurpassed valor and devotion in Vietnam and Korea. Others assigned elsewhere through the Pacific serve magnificently with the Air Force, Army, Navy and the Marine Corps. They are doing the difficult and little understood job of protecting the nation's security.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

(U) CINCPAC's plans, policies, programs, operations, decisions and actions associated with his mission of countering Communist aggression in Southeast Asia and Korea is discussed in this chapter.

1. Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Monterey, California, 2 Dec 69.

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
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SECTION I - SOUTHEAST ASIA PLANS, POLICY AND PROGRAMS

Contingency Planning Southeast Asia

(U) Contingency plans for Southeast Asia fall primarily in two categories--plans for the defense of the Southeast Asia mainland and the re-deployment of forces from the Republic of Vietnam.


Plans for Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia



1. Point Paper, J5513, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Jul 69, Subj: Numbered Contingency Plans for Southeast Asia (U). See CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol II, pp. 512-514 and CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 27-30 for additional information.
2. Point Paper, J5513, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Jul 69, Subj: Numbered Contingency Plans for Southeast Asia (U); Point Paper J5511, Hq CINCPAC, 22 Oct 68, Subj: CINCPAC OPlan 41-69.

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
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1. CINCPAC 260433Z Feb 69.
 2. Ibid.

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1. Point Paper, J5513, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Jul 69, Subj: Numbered Contingency Plans for Southeast Asia (U). See also CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 28-29 for additional background information.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 21-27; Point Paper, J5513, Hq CINCPAC, 3 May 69, Subj: T-Day Planning (U).
 3. Ibid.
 4. Point Paper, J5513, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Jun 69, Subj: T-Day Planning.


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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Point Paper, J5513, Hq CINCPAC, 3 May 69, Subj: T-Day Planning (U).
5. J5 Brief No. 00123-69, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Apr 69, Subj: SM-245-69 of 15 Apr 1969; Review of CINCPAC OPlan 69-69 (A T-Day Plan for Redeployment of Forces) (U).

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1. J5513 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of June 69 citing JCSM-245-69, 15 Apr 69 and CINCPAC ltr 5513, Serial 001599, 20 Jun 69 (CINCPAC OPlan 5069); Point Paper, J5513, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Jul 69, Subj: T-Day Planning (U).
2. Point Paper, J5513, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Jun 69, Subj: T-Day Planning (U).

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T-Day Residual Force Planning

(S) On 15 November 1968, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS his recommended residual force strengths for Alternatives A through D. 4 In turn, the JCS on 13 December 1968 forwarded the CINCPAC/JCS-recommended residual force structure to the SECDEF for approval. On 20 January 1969, the DEPSECDEF forwarded his approved residual force structure to the JCS. A

-
1. J5 Brief 00272-69, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Oct 69, Subj: SM-669-69 of 7 Oct 69, Subj: Review of CINCPAC OPlan 5069 (A T-Day Plan for Redeployment of Forces) (U).
 2. J5523 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
 3. JCS 06186/112208Z Dec 69.
 4. See CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 26-27 for a detailed account of the CINCPAC recommended force structure for the various alternatives.

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comparison of the CINCPAC/JCS-recommended force structure and the DEPSECDEF force structure follows:¹

<u>Force Package</u>	<u>CINCPAC/JCS Proposed Strength</u>	<u>DEPSECDEF Proposed Strength</u>	<u>Change</u>
Alternative "C" Corps	131,341	123,060	-8,281
RVNAF Shortfall	32,303	39,332	+7,029
MAAGV	39,010	18,544	-20,466
NSA/SCA Element	4,507	4,507	--

(8) Detailed strength changes for the above force package were as follows:²

a. Alternative C Corps-Sized Force - Reduced 8,281 Spaces.

(1) One conventional infantry division was substituted for one of the two airmobile divisions--saving 2,220 spaces.

(2) The Air Force squadrons were reorganized into three wings instead of four and were to operate from three jet bases rather than five--saving 4,609 spaces.

(3) Reduction of personnel in civil engineering squadrons (200) combined with additional heliport support personnel (269)--additional 69 spaces.

(4) The equivalent of two battalions of Army engineers was deleted--saving 1,521 spaces.

b. RVNAF Shortfall Package - Increased 7,029 Spaces. The increase represents functions which were assigned to the proposed MAAGV but which should pass to the GVN or the RVNAF as part of the Modernization Program. Additions were as follows:

(1) Air Force heliport crews and air control electronics detachments--269 spaces.

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1. J5 Brief No. 0044-69, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Feb 69, Subj: T-Day Planning (U); JCS 2472/170-30, 22 Jan 69.
 2. Ibid.

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(2) Medical units--1,377 spaces.

(3) Two type B construction battalions and an engineer group headquarters--1,448 spaces.

(4) RVNAF communications support--3,935 spaces. The 7,102 man signal brigade was separated into two components--3,267 spaces remained with MAAGV to provide communications support to MAAGV operations. One hundred spaces of the 182-man DCA element were transferred to the RVNAF Shortfall Force.

c. MAAGV - Reduced 20,466 Spaces. 7,029 of these spaces were transferred to the RVNAF Shortfall Force as described above. The reductions were:

(1) Headquarters MAAGV - Reduced 640 spaces (from 1,231 to 591) due to the reduction in forces commanded.

(2) Air Force Advisory Element - Reduced 342 spaces (from 843 to 501). 269 of these spaces were added to RVNAF Shortfall Force to operate equipment in support of VNAF operations.

(3) Army Advisory Element - Reduced 2,230 spaces (from 4,170 to 1,940) based on a reduced level of hostilities permitting a reduced advisory staff.

(4) CORDS - Reduced 3,052 spaces (from 6,998 to 3,946) to foster civilian self-sufficiency.

(5) Medical - Reduced 1,433 spaces (from 2,481 to 1,048) by transferring to the Shortfall Force the medical units which support civilian war casualties and required support for U.S. Shortfall Forces.

(6) Engineering - Reduced 3,716 spaces (from 4,140 to 424) to remove units identified with the "Nation Building - LOC" program which was to be assumed by the RVNAF.

(7) Provost Marshal - Reduced 464 spaces (from 743 to 279). RVNAF and VN auxiliaries would provide security outside MAAGV headquarters.

(8) Signal - Reduced 3,835 spaces (from 7,102 to 3,267) which were moved to the Shortfall Force.

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(9) DCA Element - Reduced 100 spaces (from 182 to 82) which were moved to the Shortfall Force.

(10) Joint Support Group (JSG) Headquarters - Reduced 99 spaces (from 192 to 93) to reflect 52% reduction in size of supported elements.

(11) JSG Aviation Support Group - Reduced 1,063 spaces (from 2,046 to 983) to reflect 52% reduction in size of supported elements.

(12) JSG Supply and Maintenance - Reduced 3,492 spaces (from 6,717 to 3,225) to reflect 52% reduction in size of supported elements.

(S) The JCS, on 30 January, requested CINCPAC's comments and recommendations not later than 14 February on the military impact of the DEPSECDEF's decision on key elements of the Corps Force, Shortfall Package and the Command/MAAGV as well as the civilianization concept of selected MAAGV spaces.¹

(S) On 17 February, Admiral McCain replied to the JCS request. He gave a detailed point by point rebuttal of the DEPSECDEF U. S. residual force structure and closed with the following summary and conclusions:²

a. Major changes in the support structure and stationing plans will occur as a result of the division mix and will negate assumed personnel space saving.

b. Transfer of units to the Shortfall Force combined with a standard 52 percent reduction in the MAAG leaves a shortage of support and supervisory personnel.

c. A revised Shortfall package must be prepared because of changes introduced by DEPSECDEF decisions and because of acceleration of the RVNAF Phase II Modernization Program. OSD apparently considers transfer of functions within a certain time frame as the basic criterion for assignment to the Shortfall; whereas, the original package was tied to the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program.

d. It is emphasized that the Shortfall force does not

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1. JCS 1481/302135Z Jan 69.
 2. CINCPAC 172340Z Feb 69.

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stand alone but is integral to the total force to be implemented with Alternatives A or B. The Shortfall force will be supported and controlled by the MAAG; thus, a reduction in advisors and transfer of other elements of the MAAG does not necessarily justify a reduction in Hq or support elements. Furthermore, if the DOD proposed MAAG were left in RVN without the Shortfall force, the MAAG alone would be unable to accomplish assigned missions unless the personnel deleted by DOD were placed back in the Command/MAAG.

e. The proposed MAAGV is not large enough for the immediate post-hostilities situation as presently visualized, either with regard to security conditions or to training proficiency of the RVNAF. A transition to levels of advisory effort and support units proposed by OSD should be gradual as circumstances allow. When reduced MAAG levels are directed, restructuring should be according to the needs of RVNAF pertaining at the time.

f. A definitive study of civilianization potential is required.

g. Continuation of a strong pacification and development effort in the immediate post-hostilities period is essential to achievement of U. S. objectives in RVN.

(S) Finally Admiral McCain pointed out to the JCS that:¹

If the DOD decisions are integrated into T-Day planning, further study to include detailed stationing plans will be required. Additionally, the force levels, personnel totals, and organizational structure pertain to a given environment and time frame. Continuous review of all factors is required, and no precise figures or totals can be forecast for lengthy periods in the future.

(S) On 12 March, the JCS rebutted the DEPSECDEF decision to modify personnel strengths of the Corps-sized force, the Shortfall force and the Command/MAAGV force. The JCS recommended that:²

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1. Ibid.
 2. J5513 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69; J5 Brief No. 0088-69, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Mar 69, Subj: JCSM 138-69 of 12 Mar 69; T-Day Planning (U).

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a. The initial force level of 71,313 U. S. military personnel in T-Day Alternatives A and B be approved for planning purposes for the combined Command/MAAGV and RVNAF Shortfall package during the immediate post-hostilities period.

b. The initial force levels of 39,010 U. S. military personnel for the Command/MAAGV and 131,341 U. S. /Free World military personnel for the Corps-sized force be approved for planning purposes for T-Day Alternative C.

c. The above recommended force levels be established as general guidelines for the T-Day alternatives and that specific structuring of forces within these levels be developed subsequently by CINCPAC and approved by the JCS.

d. The reduction of the initial Command/MAAGV to an ultimate MAAGV structure occur on a time-phased basis with completion of U. S. /Free World redeployments, progress of the RVNAF modernization program, and improvement of internal security in RVN.

(S) The JCS on 12 March, sent a reclama to the DEPSECDEF 20 January decision and recommended that the original recommended forces be retained for T-Day planning:¹

a. A MAAGV of 39,010 for all T-Day alternatives.

b. A U. S. RVNAF shortfall force of 32,303 for Alternatives A and B.

c. A balanced corps-sized residual force of 131,341 for Alternative C.

d. An NSA/SCA element of 4,507 for all alternatives.

(S) The SECDEF on 17 September replied to the JCS reclama. He authorized:²

a. Two airmobile divisions in the corps forces which added 2,220 spaces.

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1. J5 Brief No. 00260-69, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Sep 69, Subj: JCS 2472/170-40 of 18 Sep 69, Subj: T-Day Planning.
 2. Ibid.

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b. A total of 4,535 new advisory spaces in the Transition Force (Shortfall Force) and the Corps Force so that the full-hostilities advisory force level will be maintained in RVN during the immediate post-hostilities period.

c. An additional 2,442 spaces for the Transition Force and 3,935 for the Corps Force to provide adequate provisions for command and control, communications, aviation, supply and maintenance for these temporary forces.

d. An additional 922 spaces in the Corps Force to staff the air bases at Phan Rang and Tuy Hoa in a Dispersed Operating Base (DOB) status.

(S) The following is a recapitulation of the forces recommended by the JCS, the forces authorized by DEPSECDEF on 20 January and the revised authorized strength of 17 September approved by the SECDEF:¹

	JCSM-138-69 Recommended Strength	DEPSECDEF 20 Jan 1969 Auth Strength	SECDEF Authorized Strength
<u>Transition Force Alternative (Alt A & B)</u>			
MAAGV	39,010	18,544	18,544
Transition Force (Shortfall)	32,303	39,332	46,309
NSA	<u>4,507</u>	<u>4,507</u>	<u>5,584</u>
Total	75,820	62,383	70,437
<u>Corps Force Alternative (Alt C)</u>			
MAAGV	39,010	18,544	18,544
Corps Force	131,341	123,060	134,672
NSA	<u>4,507</u>	<u>4,507</u>	<u>5,584</u>
Total	174,858	146,111	158,800

(S) On 23 September, the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments and recommendations to revise JCSM 733-68 of 13 December 1968. CINCPAC was also requested to comment on the impact of the planned force levels resulting from the SECDEF decision of 17 September. CINCPAC forwarded his

1. JCS 09667/232204Z Sep 69; J5 Brief 00315-69, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Nov 69, Subj: JCSM-711-69 of 13 Nov 69, Subj: T-Day Planning (U).

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comments and recommendations on 17 October.¹ The JCS forwarded their JCSM-711-69 which updated the force strengths and composition contained in JCSM-733-68. Although CINCPAC's comments and recommendations of 17 October were considered by the JCS in preparation of JCSM-711-69, the Transition Force (Shortfall) in Alternatives A and B recommended by the JCS was 42,865 U.S. military personnel as opposed to the 46,309 previously authorized by the SECDEF. As of 31 December the SECDEF had not acted upon JCSM-711-69.²

PACOM Force Requirements and Capabilities

(U) As a consequence of the recommendation of the President (Thieu) and our own Commander in the field (General Creighton W. Abrams) I have decided to order the immediate redeployment from Vietnam of... approximately 25,000 men.

This troop replacement will begin within the next 30 days and it will be completed by the end of August.

President Richard M. Nixon³

(U) In 1969, changes to the U.S. force structure in RVN were constantly under study. Due to the accelerated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program and political considerations, the first U.S. troop redeployments from RVN took place. The RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program continued at an accelerated pace and plans were made to replace U.S. units with RVNAF units as fast as equipping and training of RVNAF could be completed.

~~(S)~~ Rigid manpower ceilings imposed on deployments to RVN and Thailand remained restrictive to the introduction of new concepts and newly developed or improved weapons systems which were not included in the original ceiling. The deployment of required additional forces to RVN or

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1. J5 Brief 294-69, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Oct 69, Subj: JCS 2472/170-42 of 21 October 1969; Subj: T-Day Planning (U); Ltr, Ser: 002964 of 17 Oct 69, Hq CINCPAC.
 2. J5 Brief 315-69, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Nov 69, Subj: JCSM-711-69 of 13 Nov 69, Subj: T-Day Planning (U).
 3. In a statement made on 8 June 1969 at the Midway Island conference with President Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam.

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Thailand was possible only by providing trade-offs which reduced the strength of operating units or by the elimination of a function and the deletion of the entire unit involved.¹

Southeast Asia Deployment Program 6

(S) Southeast Asia Deployment Program 6 which was approved by the SECDEF on 4 April 1968, was in effect on 1 January 1969. It included a ceiling of 549,000 U. S. military spaces for RVN and 12,545 spaces identified for civilianization.² The approved Program 6 end strengths for the end of FY 70 by service are shown below (strengths in thousands):³

	<u>USA</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Total</u>
Vietnam	368.6	37.2	61.5	82.2	549.5
Thailand	12.2	0.5	34.9	--	47.6
Okinawa	15.0	1.9	15.8	7.4	40.1
Japan	7.5	6.5	19.9	2.3	36.2
Philippines	0.3	5.4	19.0	0.7	25.4
Guam	0.1	4.6	4.0	0.3	9.0
Taiwan	1.0	0.7	7.3	--	9.0
U. S. Navy Offshore	--	42.0	--	--	42.0
Total	404.7	98.8	162.4	92.9	758.8

Changes to Program 6

(S) During 1968, a total of 33 changes was made to Southeast Asia Deployment Program 6. These changes altered Program 6 FY end strengths. The approved Program 6 end strengths on 1 January 1969 for end of FY 70 are shown below (strengths in thousands):⁴

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1. Point Paper, J5541, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Mar 69, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6.
 2. Point Paper, J5542, Hq CINCPAC, 6 May 68, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6; CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, p. 40.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Point Paper, J5541, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Dec 68, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6 (U).

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	<u>USA</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Total</u>
Vietnam	368.6	37.2	61.5	82.2	549.5
Thailand	12.4	0.5	35.0	--	47.9
Okinawa	15.1	1.9	15.9	7.4	40.3
Japan	7.7	6.5	21.5	2.3	38.0
Philippines	0.3	5.4	19.1	0.7	25.5
Guam	0.1	5.0	4.0	0.3	9.4
Taiwan	1.0	0.7	7.1	--	8.8
U. S. Navy Offshore	--	<u>42.0</u>	--	--	<u>42.0</u>
Total	405.2	99.2	164.1	92.9	761.4

(S) On 13 January 1969, the SECDEF approved changes 34 through 39. Significant changes were:¹

Change 34. Aircraft attrition rates and projected losses for tactical aircraft and helicopters were revised to reflect the FY 70 budget plan attrition estimates.

Change 35. An Air Force RED HORSE civil engineering squadron was approved for redeployment from Thailand by 30 June 1969.

Change 36. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo, subject: RVNAF Phase II Force Structure, dated December 18, 1968 approved the accelerated RVNAF Phase II Expansion and Modernization Plan. This authorized an increase in the RVNAF from 850,000 to 866,400 by July 1971 and added five additional maneuver battalions.

Change 37. On 9 December 1968, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the permanent deployment of the 13th C-130 squadron (532 personnel) to be based on Taiwan. This squadron had been deployed on a temporary basis to Japan.

Change 38. The B-52 sortie rate was revised to reflect the variable 1,400 - 1,800 sorties approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 9 December 1968. The Program 6 tables assumed that 1,800 sorties would be flown during good weather months in Laos (October - March) and 1,400 the other six months (April - September). Air ordnance consumption rates were changed to reflect this decision as well as the revised tactical air sortie rates.

1. J5541 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69 citing JCS 2472/263-6 of 15 Jan 69.

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Change 39. Air Force strength in Guam was increased from 4,000 to 5,517 to reflect personnel increases associated with additional B-52s stationed there. This increase resulted from a decision early in 1968 to increase the B-52 sortie rate to 1,800 per month. The manpower tables were not adjusted at that time through an oversight.

(S) On 14 March, the SECDEF approved changes 40 through 44. Significant changes to Program 6 were:¹

Change 40. Authorized in RVN an additional 200 Navy spaces to accommodate MARKET TIME personnel, an additional 100 Marine Corps spaces, and a decrease in Army spaces by 300. Reduced Air Force strength in Thailand by 400 spaces in June upon redeployment of the RED HORSE heavy construction squadron.

Change 41. Reflected DEPSECDEF approval for deployment of the 71st Special Operations Squadron (AC-119 gunships) to RVN in January 1969.

Change 42. Added an additional aerial rocket battalion for the second air-mobile division (101st Airborne Division).

Change 43. Revised the A-1 program due to non-availability of aircraft from modification program. Four squadrons, a total of 193 aircraft, authorized to operate in Southeast Asia vice 111 aircraft.

Change 44. Reduced Navy assault craft by 25 as a result of turnover of a like number of craft to the RVN Navy as part of RVNAF modernization program.

(S) As of 1 June, the Southeast Asia Deployment Program 6 end strength for FY 70 was increased by changes 33 through 44 as indicated below. The authorized strength for Vietnam remained unchanged.²

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1. J5541 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69 citing JCS 2472/263-7 of 17 Mar 69.
 2. Point Papers, J5541, Hq CINCPAC, 9 May 69 and 12 Jun 69, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6 (U).

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	<u>USA</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Total</u>
Vietnam	368.3	37.4	61.5	82.3	549.5
Thailand	12.7	0.4	35.0	--	48.1
Okinawa	15.1	1.9	16.0	7.4	40.4
Japan	7.7	6.6	21.5	2.3	38.1
Philippines	0.3	5.5	19.1	0.7	25.6
Guam	0.1	5.1	5.5	0.3	11.0
Taiwan	1.0	0.7	8.0	--	9.7
U. S. Navy Offshore	--	42.0	--	--	42.0
Total	405.2	99.6	166.6	93.0	764.4

(S) Changes 45 through 51 to Program 6 were approved on 7 June. Significant changes to the program were:¹

Change 45. Revised aircraft attrition rates and projected losses for tactical aircraft and helicopters based on recent experience in Southeast Asia.

Change 46. Noted that an Air Force RED HORSE civil engineering squadron (400 personnel) would redeploy from Thailand by 30 September 1969 and that an Army construction battalion (1,300 personnel) would depart by 30 June 1970.

Change 47. Revised B-52 sortie rate to 1,600 sorties per month.

Change 48. Reduced the number of CVAs from three to two on-the-line at any one time.

Change 49. Eliminated an Army engineer combat battalion and two artillery battalions (105mm and 155mm) in accordance with the RVNAF modernization program. Equipment was to be turned over to the ARVN and personnel spaces were reallocated to higher priority MACV requirements.

Change 50. Reflected revised Air Force and Army aircraft phasing schedules within previously approved force levels. In addition, the Air Force tables depicted the turnover of aircraft to VNAF as authorized in the RVNAF modernization plan.

Change 51. Authorized 77 additional personnel to Taiwan to support the COLLEGE EYE program in the Western Pacific.

1. J554A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69 citing JCS 2472/263-8 of 13 Jun 69.

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Actions Leading to Southeast Asia Deployment Program 7

(U) On 8 June 1969, President Nixon, while at a conference on Midway Island with President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam, announced the redeployment of 25,000 U.S. troops from RVN.

(C) Two initial actions were taken to implement this decision. The first was the convening of the Redeployment Planning Conference at Camp Smith during the period 12-14 June. The purpose of the conference was to determine the movement requirements and to consider the ancillary problems incident to the President's decision. The major thrust of the conference was to refine the planning which had been accomplished on a closely held basis. The Steering Committee noted that the redeployment plan was part of a broad objective to Vietnamize the war. As stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense, the objective of Vietnamizing the war is to transfer progressively to the Republic of Vietnam greatly increased responsibility for all aspects of the war in Vietnam. The committee also noted that planning should remain as flexible as possible so that rapid and appropriate additional responses could be made in response to continued RVNAF improvement, progress in the Paris negotiations, or changes in the military situation in Southeast Asia.¹

(C) The second action taken was the holding of the CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board (JTB) Movement Planning Conference at Camp Smith during the period 19-21 June 1969 to prepare the Movement Program for the redeployment from RVN to PACOM and CONUS destinations. Participating in the conference were representatives from the OSD; JCS; CINCPAC; MAC; MSTs; the PACOM Components; COMUSMACV and Components; and other interested agencies. The guidelines followed were those established at the Redeployment Planning Conference. The conferees refined requirements and applied transportation resources for the movement of passengers and unit equipment redeploying by air and sea. The program was briefed to the SECDEF and the JCS during the week of 23 June. Instructions to implement the CINCPAC Movement Program were issued by CINCPAC to all Services, Component Commanders, transportation single managers, and COMUSMACV. The first movement was scheduled to begin on 8 July and the last units scheduled to depart RVN on 27 August.²

(S) The planned redeployment included approximately 20 Reserve and National Guard units to be returned to the U.S. for inactivation, the 9th

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1. Point Paper, J481A, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Jul 69, Subj: KEYSTONE EAGLE.
 2. Ibid.

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Division less one brigade, Marine units consisting primarily of the 9th Regimental Landing Team, and approximately 1,200 Navy personnel.¹

(S) The 25,000 military space reduction caused the following significant changes to Program 6 through Change 51:²

a. Approximately 15,400 Army personnel, including the 9th Division (minus one brigade), redeployed to Hawaii and CONUS. This included six infantry battalions, two 105mm and one 155/8" artillery battalions, a HAWK battalion, and two engineer combat battalions.

b. Approximately 8,400 Marines (primarily the 9th Regimental Landing Team) redeployed from RVN. Three infantry battalions, a 105mm artillery battalion, a HAWK battalion, and a helicopter squadron (21 CH-46s) redeployed to Okinawa. A Marine VMFA squadron (15 F-4s) and about 400 personnel redeployed to Japan.

c. Approximately 1,200 Navy personnel, an LST, and three barrack ships departed RVN; 252 redeployed to Okinawa with the 9th Marine Regiment, 147 personnel and the LST remained in WESTPAC, and the balance returned to CONUS.

d. The VNAF fighter and attack capable aircraft tables were increased 36 A-1s and 18 A-37s (total of three squadrons) effective December 1971 as authorized by the RVNAF modernization program.

e. Approval of DAR AF-69-415 authorized 135 personnel and four EC-121s to be stationed in Japan to support the COLLEGE EYE program. Fifty-nine of the 135 personnel transferred from Taiwan to Japan.

Southeast Asia Redeployment Program 7

(S) The 25,000 military space reduction by President Nixon, which reduced the U.S. maneuver battalions in RVN from 112 to 103 (83 Army, 20 USMC), served as the basis for the establishment of Southeast Asia Redeployment Program 7. Program 7 reduced the RVN ceiling from 549,500 spaces to 524,500 effective 31 August 1969. The tables outlining Program 7 strengths were forwarded by the SECDEF to the CJCS on 15 July and to CINCPAC by the JCS on 16 July.³

1. News of Interest, CINCPAC Public Affairs, 17 Jun 69, p. 9; JCSM 2472/504, 16 Jul 69.
2. JCSM 2472/504, 16 Jul 69.
3. Ibid.

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(S) Program 7 established the following end FY 70 strengths:

	<u>USA</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Total</u>
Vietnam	352.9	36.2	61.5	73.9	524.5
Thailand	11.4	0.4	34.6	--	46.4
Okinawa	15.1	2.2	16.0	15.0	48.3
Japan	7.7	6.7	21.6	2.7	38.7
Philippines	0.3	5.5	19.1	0.7	25.6
Guam	0.1	5.1	5.5	0.3	11.0
Taiwan	1.0	0.7	8.0	--	9.7
U. S. Navy Offshore	--	36.5	--	--	36.5
Total	388.5	93.3	166.3	92.6	740.7

(U) On 16 September, President Nixon announced the redeployment of an additional 40,500 U. S. troops from Vietnam. This action reduced the authorized strength in RVN to 484,000. The redeployment, completed by 15 December, was based principally upon progress made in the Vietnamization program.¹

(S) To implement the President's decision, a Phase II redeployment conference was held at CINCPAC's headquarters 25-26 September. As a result of this meeting, the SECDEF approved the new Southeast Asia Deployment Program 8. The new program authorized 484,000 U. S. military spaces in RVN. This was a reduction of 40,500 spaces from the 524,500 space ceiling authorized by Program 7. The reductions included:²

a. 14,082 Army personnel including the 3d Brigade, 82 Airborne Division.

b. 18,465 Marines of the 3rd Marine Division (-) and the 1st Marine Air Wing.

c. 541 Air Force personnel. This reduction included the authorization for two tactical fighter squadrons not deployed (36 F-4s), a tactical bomber squadron (12 B-57s), and two Special Operations Squadrons (18 A-1s and 6 C-47s/20 U-10s).

1. Point Paper, J12, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Dec 69, Subj: USMACV Military Strength (U).

2. J5 Brief 281-69, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Oct 69, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #8; JCS 2472/535 of 7 Oct 69.

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d. 412 Navy personnel in five mobile construction battalions and those serving with Marines.

(S) The Program 8 space ceiling for RVN became effective 15 December. The space ceiling in Thailand was scheduled to be reduced gradually to 42,065 from 47,665 by 30 June 1970. A tabulation of the approved Program 8 end strengths follows (strengths in thousands):¹

	<u>USA</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Total</u>
Vietnam	338.3	30.8	59.4	55.5	484.0
Thailand	12.7	0.4	34.5	--	47.7
	(9.8)	(0.4)	(31.8)	--	(42.0)
Okinawa	15.1	2.2	16.0	15.0	48.3
Japan	7.7	6.7	21.6	2.7	38.7
Philippines	0.3	5.5	19.1	0.7	25.6
Guam	0.1	5.1	5.5	0.3	11.0
Taiwan	1.0	0.7	8.0	--	9.7

(S) The new ceilings by Service for RVN are:

Army	338,270
Navy	30,820
Air Force	59,401
USMC	<u>55,509</u>
Total	484,000

SEABEE Teams to Support the Revolutionary Development Program

(S) In the fall of 1967, USAID requested seven additional SEABEE teams for RVN and in early 1968 requested eight more teams. This total of 15 teams was in addition to the 15 teams already in RVN. CINCPAC concurred in the requirement for the seven teams but recommended the spaces for the teams not be included in the RVN ceiling since there was no military requirement for the State-sponsored teams. The OSD and the JCS held that the additional teams must be charged against the in-country ceiling regardless of sponsor.²

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1. Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 69, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #8 (U).
 2. J5 Brief No. 001-69, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jan 69 of JCS 2472/325-3, 10 Dec 68, Subj: SEABEE Teams to Support the Revolutionary Development Program (U).

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(S) CINCPAC non-concurred that USAID's request for eight additional teams was a military requirement and stated that trade-off spaces were not available. The SECDEF notified the Secretary of the Navy on 6 December 1968 that no expansion of the SEABEE program was possible until the necessary military spaces could be provided within established ceilings. The Secretary of the Navy notified USAID that the 15 additional teams could not be supported and that the 136 spaces of the teams already in-country could probably be absorbed within the ceiling. The latter was accomplished on 20 December 1968. The requirement for 15 additional teams was recognized; however, sufficient spaces to absorb the 220 spaces for the additional teams did not materialize during 1969.¹

U. S. Air Force Security Police for Bases in Thailand

(S) In late 1968, CINCPACAF requested an increase of 1,019 USAF Security Police at bases in Thailand. An overall evaluation of the security capability and requirements of bases in Thailand was conducted by the Air Force after the 26 July 1968 attack on Udorn RTAFB. The survey and evaluation revealed a critical shortage in USAF Security Police capability at all bases in Thailand. The shortage was determined to have been caused by the substantial increase in the number of U. S. personnel, aircraft, and other equipment, together with the rise in serious insurgent incidents in Thailand since 1967. Trade-off spaces were not provided for the requested increase in Air Force Security Police.²

(S) CINCPAC in a message to the JCS on 15 December 1968 supported the CINCPACAF request. However, the SECDEF, on 24 February 1969, in a memorandum to the CJCS disapproved, at that time, the requested spaces. The SECDEF stated that he was not convinced that a further increase in U. S. personnel would provide sufficient protection to justify their presence in Thailand. The SECDEF stated that if the security personnel were of sufficient priority, trade-off spaces from lower priority activities should be provided.³

Piaster Expenditure Program

(U) The United States in 1966 recognized the need to implement measures designed to strengthen the Government of South Vietnam and preserve economic stability. To support this objective, the SECDEF, on 13 July 1966,

1. Ibid.

2. J5 Brief 0074-69, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Mar 69, of JCS 2353/162, 26 Feb 69, Subj: Deployment Adjustment Request AF-69-402 (U).

3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 150220Z Dec 68.

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established the "Piaster Limitation Program" which was later redesignated "Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program." Supervision of the program was vested in the JCS with management of the program vested in CINCPAC. In-country operational control of the program to reduce both official and personal expenditures was the responsibility of COMUSMACV and the PACOM Component Commanders. The memorandum establishing the program provided for assessing expenditure ceilings, establishing controls, and the reporting of monthly expenditure data. The three major categories to be reported were "Operations and Maintenance and Other (O&M)," "Construction" and "Personal Spending." Six-month ceilings were established by the SECDEF on the basis of expenditure projections developed in-country and submitted by COMUSMACV through CINCPAC to the JCS.¹

Ceiling for CY 69

(U) Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, on 25 January, approved a ceiling of 41.356 billion piasters for the CY 69 Piaster Reduction Program. The first-half ceiling for CY 69 was set at 20.844 billion piasters and at 21.012 billion for the second half of CY 69. The second-half ceiling would be reviewed and possibly revised in June in light of economic and military conditions existing at that time.²

(X) The overall ceiling provided for two wage increases to be given U.S. sector employees during CY 69. The SECDEF warned:³

Since the inflation forecasts for Vietnam during CY 69 indicate price increases comparable to the... increase in CY 68, continued efforts must be exerted to limit piaster spending by DOD. MACV has made an admirable contribution to this end and its continued support in this important endeavor will be a valuable aid in promoting price stability in Vietnam.

(U) The mid-year piaster expenditure review which took place in Washington during the period 23-27 June, was attended by a CINCPAC representative from J72 (Comptroller). During the review, the second half of CY 69 piaster expenditure ceiling was reassessed and the projected piaster expenditures for the first half of CY 70 were discussed. After a detailed review of the revised expenditure projects for the last half of CY 69, it was agreed that no revision would be made to the approved SECDEF expenditure

1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 87-88; Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program, 31 Mar 69, report prepared by CINCPAC Comptroller, p. 10.
2. JCS 1532/302330Z Jan 69.
3. Ibid.

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ceiling for that period. ¹

(C) On 31 July, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF announced on 25 July that the piaster ceiling for CY 69 would remain at 41.856 billion piasters. The SECDEF also stated:

It is especially gratifying to see the continued support that MACV has rendered in the important objective of stabilizing the Vietnamese economy. The decline in the rate of price inflation thus far in CY 69 is in large measure due to their efforts in staying within the piaster ceilings.

In a personal letter to General Abrams on 15 August 1969, Admiral McCain conveyed Mr. Laird's congratulatory remarks and expressed his personal pleasure and appreciation for the continued successful efforts of COMUSMACV in limiting piaster spending in the Republic of Vietnam. ²

Expenditures vs. Ceilings

(U) As indicated above the approved CY 69 piaster expenditure ceiling was 41.356 billion piasters. The first-half CY 69 ceiling was 20.844 billion and the second-half ceiling was 21.012 billion. As indicated on the following chart "DOD Piaster Expenditures vs. Ceilings," the expenditure for first-half CY 69 was 20.059 billion piasters and 20.233 billion for second-half CY 69--a total expenditure of 40.282 billion piasters for CY 69. ³


(U) The gradual increase in expenditures during CY 1969 was attributed mainly to two salary adjustments in January and May for local national labor. This increase was most evident in the Operations and Maintenance and Other expenditure category, in which local national labor cost in September 1969 was 1.240 billion piasters compared to .932 billion in September 1968. The other higher Operations and Maintenance and Other expenditures were due to increased prices, which have risen approximately 17% since 31 December 1968. ⁴

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1. J722 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
 2. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 3. Ltr, Ser 5059, Hq CINCPAC (J722), 5 Nov 69, Subj: Quarterly Analysis-Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program; Intv, LCOL W. C. Hutchison, USAF, J7221, Hq CINCPAC, with COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 29 Jan 70.
 4. Ibid.

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DOD PIASTER EXPENDITURES VS CEILINGS



SOURCE: J722, CINCPAC

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(U) The reduction in the per capita rate for civilian expenditures which dropped from \$149.13 in November to \$53.36 in December was significant. During the month it was determined that previous reports had reflected a duplication of bulk sales of piasters to civilian contractors which had been reported both as bulk sales to contractors as well as accommodation sales. This duplication was corrected and procedures clarified to preclude future erroneous reporting.¹

(U) As of 31 December, the approved piaster ceiling for CY 70 had not been received by CINCPAC.

RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program

(TS) President Lyndon B. Johnson in early 1968 expressed "intense interest in and placed emphasis on the expansion of the RVNAF to attain a posture of self-sufficiency at the earliest possible time."² On 13 November 1969, Admiral McCain addressed the same subject to the PACOM Service Component Commanders, subordinate unified commanders, and designated CINCPACREPs. He pointed out that President Nixon had publicly announced a U.S. policy toward Vietnam which provided a positive, clear-cut statement of U.S. intentions in RVN. Therefore, CINCPAC believed that it was appropriate to reaffirm and disseminate the U.S. objective in Vietnam and to outline the undertakings associated with the attainment of that objective. In so doing he quoted from Volume I of the JSCP 70, "CINCPAC Tasks:"

(2) In pursuance of the objective of allowing the people of the Republic of Vietnam to determine their future without outside interference, and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assist the RVNAF in taking over an increasing share of combat operations. The tactical goal of the combat operations is to defeat the subversion and aggression which is intended to deny self-determination to the people of the Republic of Vietnam. This overall mission encompasses the following undertakings:

(a) Provide maximum assistance in developing, training, and equipping the RVNAF as rapidly as possible.

(b) Continue military support for accelerated pacification, civic action, and security programs.

1. Ibid.

2. JCSM-233-68, 15 Apr 68, Subj: Accelerated Expansion of RVNAF (U).

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(c) Conduct military operations designed to accelerate improvement in the RVNAF and to continue to provide security for U. S. forces.

(d) Conduct military operations to reduce the flow of materiel and manpower support for enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam.

(e) Maintain plans for a comprehensive air and naval campaign in Vietnam.

Admiral McCain emphasized that, even though the mission statement directed increased emphasis on Vietnamization, a change in current operations or emphasis was not directed since actions required by the policy had already been implemented.¹

Review of 1968 Actions

(S) In consonance with the President's desire, the SECDEF, in April 1968, expressed concern that because of the possibility of imminent negotiations, accelerated planning and action would be required to hasten the expansion and modernization of RVNAF, with a view to create a self-sufficient RVNAF as soon as possible. In response to this requirement the JCS tasked CINCPAC to submit an RVNAF improvement and modernization plan.² CINCPAC, in turn, tasked COMUSMACV to prepare the plan.

(S) On 3 May 1968, COMUSMACV submitted a plan for the RVNAF optimum force structure in three parts: (1) a force structure plan with an 801,215 space ceiling; (2) a schedule of activations; and, (3) equipment lists and dollar costs. COMUSMACV's plan to turn over from U. S. units mission essential equipment was compatible with his time-phased plan for the provision of U. S. combat and logistical support to sustain the RVNAF should the U. S. redeploy. The most important consideration in these plans was that the Vietnamese would be provided equipment only after they were trained and prepared to accept it. Should conditions exist whereby the U. S. was to redeploy in a specified time period, major shortfalls would occur. Both plans provided for an orderly transfer of equipment and the provision of necessary combat and logistic support during a U. S. redeployment.³ CINCPAC endorsed both these

1. Intv, LCOL H. O. Hoppe, USAF, J5532, Hq CINCPAC with COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 30 Jan 70.
2. JCS 6703/172116Z Apr 68. See CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 58-81 for a detailed account of the program for 1968.
3. COMUSMACV 12540/030610 Apr 68; COMUSMACV 12529/030345Z Apr 68.

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plans.¹ The philosophy of a residual U. S. force to remain in RVN to provide combat and logistical support to sustain the RVNAF should the U. S. redeploy was carried over to T-Day Planning.²

(S) The JCS plan for RVNAF expansion and modernization, based on the CINCPAC/COMUSMACV plans, was submitted to the SECDEF on 23 May 1968. The JCS recommended that the FY 68 modernization and the FY 69 force structure and equipment requirements be approved for execution, and that additional funding and procurement authority for the FY 68 and FY 69 portions of the plan be provided.³

(S) The SECDEF approved the requested 801,215 RVNAF force level on 24 May 1968⁴ and on 25 June 1968 approved the FY 68 RVNAF Modernization Program; the FY 69 force structure for ARVN combat units; the ARVN and VNMC 105mm and 155mm artillery battalions; additional RF and PF units; and two VNAF UH-1 helicopter squadrons. The SECDEF requested that the entire program be reviewed in two phases as follows:⁵

Phase I: Provide for the indefinite future a force structure which would give the maximum possible GVN ground combat capability, assuming continued U. S. participation in the war at presently approved levels. Thus, during Phase I, an increase of tactical air, naval, and certain other combat support and logistic forces might not be required.

Phase II: Would provide for an RVNAF which would be self-sufficient and capable of meeting insurgency requirements that would remain if NVA and U. S. forces withdrew. It would not provide the equipment required to deal with renewed large scale aggression from North Vietnam.

(S) The preliminary Phase I plan with a proposed unit authorization list and a unit activation schedule was submitted to the JCS on 2 August. This plan allocated over 64,000 spaces to ground combat units. The plan provided an increase in ARVN of seven infantry battalions, six armored cavalry squadrons and 19 artillery battalions as well as logistical units to support this increase; four helicopter squadrons in VNAF; and one PCE and one LST for the VNN.

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1. CINCPAC 082027Z May 68.
 2. Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Dec 68, Subj: RVNAF Expansion and Modernization.
 3. JCSM 324-68, 23 May 68.
 4. JCS 1107/282020Z May 68.
 5. JCS 3391/261857Z Jun 68.

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Total unprogrammed cost was \$6.88 billion. Of this total, 62 percent was for ammunition.¹

(C) COMUSMACV's final Phase I plan was substantially the same as his preliminary plan. The final plan was recommended for approval by CINCPAC on 17 September 1968, and approved by the SECDEF on 23 October 1968 with a proviso that M-16 rifles would not be issued to logistic troops and artillery ammunition consumption would not be increased over present levels.² Because of the excellent progress of the Vietnamese mobilization program, the force ceiling of 801,215 was exceeded and COMUSMACV requested authority to raise the ceiling to 850,000.³ CINCPAC concurred and recommended approval to the JCS on 11 October 1968.⁴ The SECDEF approved the increase on 5 November 1968.⁵

(S) COMUSMACV submitted his Phase II plan on 8 October 1968 and on 27 October 1968, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS approval of the plan with exceptions which were addressed separately at a later date.⁶ On 9 November 1968, the JCS recommended that the SECDEF approve the plan.⁷ On the same date, COMUSMACV urged early approval of the Phase II plan due to the rapidly moving events in Vietnam and requested a force level ceiling of 877,000, an increase of 27,000. The new increase was to be utilized as a training pool to accelerate the expansion of RVNAF. CINCPAC concurred and recommended approval to the JCS on 18 November 1968.⁸ On 12 December 1968, the JCS recommended approval of the FY 70 and 71 portions of the Phase II plan and COMUSMACV's proposal for acceleration.⁹ The SECDEF approved the Phase II plan on 18 December 1968 and directed that COMUSMACV proceed with the accelerated plan.¹⁰ COMUSMACV submitted his

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1. Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Dec 68, Subj: RVNAF Expansion and Modernization.
 2. JCS 4196/252158Z Oct 68.
 3. COMUSMACV 29424/041215Z Oct 68.
 4. CINCPAC 111105Z Oct 68.
 5. JCS 04972/052202Z Nov 68.
 6. COMUSMACV 29815/080425Z Oct 68; CINCPAC 272240Z Oct 68.
 7. Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Dec 68, Subj: RVNAF Expansion and Modernization.
 8. COMUSMACV 34325/090515Z Nov 68; CINCPAC 182120Z Nov 68.
 9. Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Dec 68, Subj: RVNAF Expansion and Modernization.
 10. Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Mar 69, Subj: RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (U).

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accelerated Phase II plan on 26 December 1968¹ and CINCPAC recommended approval on 29 December 1968.²

(S) On 12 December the JCS tasked CINCPAC to develop two conceptual plans dealing with (1) a situation which envisions the North Vietnamese acceding to U.S. goals for a negotiated settlement, and (2) an intermediate situation in which the North Vietnamese partially accept these goals. These plans were to include an estimate of the threat and assured intensity of combat and outline the RVNAF force structure and the level of U.S. support forces required.³

Actions on RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program During 1969

(S) As 1968 ended, COMUSMACV was in the process of preparing plans for the optimum and intermediate situations postulated by the JCS. The proposed Accelerated Phase II RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan was receiving attention of the JCS.

Plans for Optimum and Intermediate Situations

(S) On 3 January, COMUSMACV submitted plans for the optimum and intermediate situations to CINCPAC. A force structure was developed for both situations and were called Phase III and Phase IIIa. COMUSMACV warned that the "paper is submitted only as a response to the directive given and under the assumed situations provided by the JCS.... It does not reflect the views of this command as to the situation and related needs which can reasonably be forecast for the future." The RVNAF force structure ceiling for the intermediate plan (Phase IIIa) was 858,400 and 804,300 for the optimum plan (Phase III) as opposed to 877,000 for the Phase II plan.⁴

(S) CINCPAC approved the COMUSMACV concept and on 9 January Admiral McCain told the JCS the plans submitted by COMUSMACV provided for workable force structures for the long term, provided the postulated situations under which they were developed materialized. He emphasized that the reduced RVNAF force structures set forth would be acceptable only if all the conditions in the postulated situations were met and that failure to achieve any of the conditions stated for each situation would partially negate the validity of the associated force structure. Actually, the plans provided a

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1. COMUSMACV 44494/261320Z Dec 68.
 2. CINCPAC 290625Z Dec 68.
 3. JCSM 732-68, 12 Dec 68.
 4. COMUSMACV 508/031238Z Jan 69.

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basis for further examination and discussion, should the postulated situations develop.¹

(S) Admiral McCain then told the JCS, "there is room for concern over assumptions which characterize (the two situations).... It is not apparent why the U. S. should accept a negotiated settlement of the war which does not achieve our objectives." He felt that as a minimum a settlement should require Hanoi to:²

- a. Stop infiltrating personnel and material into RVN and Laos.
- b. Demonstrate conclusively that all NVA units are being withdrawn from RVN, Laos, Cambodia and the DMZ.
- c. Stop its support and direction of the VC and Pathet Lao insurgencies.

(S) Admiral McCain concluded his message to the JCS by concurring with COMUSMACV that the conceptual plans submitted, which met the assumed situations, did not realistically address the current situation. He recommended early achievement of the Accelerated Phase II Plan.³ The JCS forwarded the concept to the SECDEF recommending that it be a basis for further discussion of the post-hostilities RVNAF force structure.⁴

Accelerated Phase II Plan

(S) On 4 January 1969, the JCS forwarded the Accelerated Phase II RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan to the SECDEF recommending approval.⁵ The plan, however, was not approved by the DEPSECDEF until 28 April 1969. The accelerated plan, combined with actions taken under the original Phase II plan, was intended to create a self-sufficient RVNAF by the end of FY 72 capable of meeting internal insurgency requirements assuming the U. S. and NVN withdraw. The plan involved the turnover of assets of U. S. units in RVN to the RVNAF. The approved RVNAF ceiling was 875,790 spaces.⁶

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1. CINCPAC 090425Z Jan 69.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid., citing JCSM 40-69, 21 Jun 69.
 5. J5521 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Jan 69 citing JCSM-6-69, 4 Jan 69.
 6. Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Jul 69, Subj: RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (U).

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(S) Prior to the approval of the Accelerated Phase II Plan, the Department of the Army proposed that H-34 aircraft be substituted for UH-1 aircraft in the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program. On 8 January, the JCS requested CINCPAC to comment on the proposal.¹ CINCPAC requested comments from COMUSMACV and the Component Commanders. COMUSMACV and CINCPACAF non-concurred in the plan while CINCPACUSARPAC and CGFMFPAC (commenting for CINCPACFLT) concurred in the Army proposal.² On 15 January, CINCPAC told the JCS that he concurred with COMUSMACV and on 17 January the JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendation to divert 60 UH-1s from USARV to VNAF.³

(S) COMUSMACV requested authority on 26 January to take the actions necessary to activate the 3d Quarter, FY 69 ARVN units in the Accelerated Phase II Plan.⁴ On 5 February, CINCPAC requested the JCS to approve COMUSMACV's request which the JCS did on 20 February.⁵

(S) On 26 February, the JCS requested they be furnished an evaluation of the VNN performance with their new river assault craft prior to 15 June 1969.⁶ COMUSMACV submitted the requested evaluation on 1 June. The VNN River Assault and Interdiction Division's (RAID), which was formed as a result of the turnover of U.S. equipment in February, performance was assessed as outstanding.⁷

GVN Request for RVNAF Ceiling Increase

(S) At Midway Island on 8 June, President Nixon was briefed on GVN plans to support an increased force level and an improved standard of living for RVNAF soldiers and their dependents. On 21 June, the SECDEF sent a message to the JCS with information copies to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV on the subject. He requested a report by 27 June on the status of additional funds, equipment and personnel to support the GVN plans. The report was to be used as background information for the National Security Council in considering the situation in Vietnam.⁸

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1. JCS 9070/082300Z Jan 69.
 2. COMUSMACV 2500/131024Z Jan 69; CINCPACAF 120149Z Jan 69; CINCPACUSARPAC 1340/112304Z Jan 69; ADMINFMFPAC 120149Z Jan 69.
 3. CINCPAC 152250Z Jan 69; JCS 9754/172323Z Jan 69.
 4. COMUSMACV 5412/261422Z Jan 69.
 5. CINCPAC 052037Z Feb 69; JCS 2931/201345Z Feb 69.
 6. JCS 3299/261347Z Feb 69.
 7. COMUSMACV 32548/010848Z Jun 69.
 8. SECDEF 2943 ASD/ISA/211912Z Jun 69.

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(S) COMUSMACV submitted an initial analysis of the GVN proposals along with recommendations for a force structure increase. He recommended a 77,883 increase in RVNAF by FY 70 and an increase of 15,000 National Police as opposed to the GVN proposal to increase the RVNAF by 138,972 spaces. In addition, COMUSMACV recommended and CINCPAC supported as planning requirements an increase in the RVNAF of 39,164 spaces for FY 71 and an increase of 15,000 National Police. The bulk of the sophisticated equipment requested by the GVN was not considered valid by COMUSMACV. CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's proposals and recommended they be approved for planning purposes.¹ Admiral McCain warned that "achievement of the currently approved 875,790 ceiling should be reached prior to further expansion; in addition, qualitative improvement of existing regular forces (ARVN, VNN, VNAF and VNMC) should show visible improvement before new regular units are authorized."²

(S) On 5 July, COMUSMACV, by letter, presented a detailed analysis of the GVN Midway proposal and included his recommendation for increases in the RVNAF force structure. The weapons densities, list of major equipment items, and cost data for the force structure increase was dated two days earlier. CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's analysis of the GVN proposal with one exception. The GVN proposal contained a requirement for eight radar sites. CINCPAC believed only five were a valid requirement for in-country tactical air operations. The three additional sites would be required only for an extended air defense mission.³

(S) In the same message, Admiral McCain pointed out to the JCS that the critical manpower situation in Vietnam dictated that any major force structure increase would probably place an unacceptable strain on manpower resources. Accordingly, he recommended that COMUSMACV be granted authority to implement the force structure increase incrementally as the Vietnamese demonstrate their capability to attain these new goals. This

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1. COMUSMACV 37696/270420Z Jun 69; CINCPAC 282156Z Jun 69; Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Jul 69, Subj: RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (U); J5 Brief No. 00201-69, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Aug 69, of JCSM 462-69, 29 Jul 69, Subj: Government of Vietnam Proposals Presented at the Midway Conference, 8 June 1969.
 2. CINCPAC 282156Z Jun 69.
 3. CINCPAC 122134Z Jul 69 citing Ltr, MACMA, Subj: Republic of Vietnam Proposals Midway Summit Meeting 8 June 1969 (U), 5 Jul 69; Ltr, MACJ-464, Subj: Equipment and Cost Estimates for Validated Midway Proposal, 3 Jul 69.

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authority would insure that the qualitative improvement of the already approved force structure maintained its momentum and would provide COMUSMACV with the necessary controls to maintain the recommended expansion of the RVNAF at a rate commensurate with their capability. CINCPAC also noted that COMUSMACV's recommendation for a force structure increase of 92,883 for RVNAF included a 15,000 increase in the National Police force which should be addressed separately.¹

(S) On 29 July, the JCS informed CINCPAC that they had recommended SECDEF approval of their analysis and recommendations which were essentially the same as COMUSMACV's and CINCPAC's. In addition, the JCS told CINCPAC that they expected prompt SECDEF approval and that they had also recommended approval for ship-loan legislation for two destroyers to be turned over to the RVN Navy. Prior to the JCS message, the SECDEF had notified CINCPAC, COMUSMACV and the AMEMBASSY Saigon that while the appropriate agencies in Washington were reviewing the GVN proposal, the AMEMBASSY and COMUSMACV were authorized to explore the full range of proposals with appropriate GVN and RVNAF officials.²

(TS) On 18 August, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF had approved their recommendation on the GVN proposal. The SECDEF stated:³

I approve the recommended FY70 RVNAF force structure increase (77,883) and the FY71 increase (39,164) for planning purposes. The 15,000 increase in National Police strength for FY70 is also approved. An additional 15,000 increase for FY71 is approved for planning purposes. COMUSMACV is authorized to release to the Joint General Staff the FY70 force structure on an incremental basis as recommended. The added personnel spaces should be released as the GVN successfully demonstrates its ability to expand and improve RVNAF, and recruit and train the next increment.

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I desire that the Secretary of the Navy take necessary action to obtain appropriate ship loan legislation, and an

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1. CINCPAC 122134Z Jul 69.
 2. JCS 5531/291543Z Jul 69; SECDEF 5243 Joint State-Defense Message/ 241953Z Jul 69.
 3. JCS 6981/182145Z Aug 69.

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agreement from the Department of Transportation for the turnover of U. S. Coast Guard assets....

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Accordingly, I desire that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service Secretaries review the current RVNAF Modernization and Improvement Program, and other on-going and planned actions to enhance RVNAF capabilities, with the goal of developing an RVNAF with the capability to cope successfully with the combined Viet Cong-North Vietnamese Army threat. This review should consider: actions to improve RVNAF leadership and esprit, and reduce desertion rates; possible increased use of combined operations and planning; what the RVNAF optimum force structure should be; ways to improve RVNAF logistic and intelligence capabilities; and, most important, development of strategy and tactics best matched with RVNAF capabilities.

I desire a report by 30 September 1969 of the results of this review, including any additional requirements which may have been identified to achieve the Vietnamization objective.

(TS) The JCS in the same message clarified Secretary Laird's remarks regarding the goal of developing an RVNAF with the capability to cope successfully with the combined VC-NVN threat. It was not the intention of the SECDEF to preclude retention of a U. S. residual support force for assistance to the RVNAF to cope with the combined threat. However, the SECDEF did envision "that progressively greater improvements in RVNAF capabilities should permit examination of options of U. S. residual support force at alternative levels lower than the range..." envisioned in the U. S. Embassy-COMUSMACV plan--Vietnamizing the War.¹

(TS) The JCS requested CINCPAC to furnish them by 22 August, a statement of risk associated with an associated austere residual force proposed by the OSD staff. (The OSD staff proposal was included in the JCS message.) By 2 September the JCS required an input on which to base a reply to the SECDEF discussed above.² COMUSMACV responded on 22 August with his comments on the austere residual support. He indicated, and

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.

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CINCPAC concurred, that U. S. residual support force must be retained at the level recommended in the Vietnamizing the War Plan. ¹

(TS) CINCPAC received COMUSMACV's review of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program on 2 September. COMUSMACV indicated that the RVNAF force structure should not be increased at this time, but that emphasis must be placed on qualitative improvement within the existing programs. ² After receiving comments from the CINCPAC Component Commanders and reviewing COMUSMACV's comments, CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV and so indicated in a message to the JCS on 6 September. CINCPAC further emphasized that the present programs needed to stress qualitative improvement, not expansion. ³

(TS) On 6 September, the JCS requested additional information, concerning actions to improve RVNAF intelligence capabilities, proposals to improve RVNAF utilization of existing resources, action to improve territorial forces, and the feasibility of extending the draft to age 42 and authorizing additional women in the RVNAF. ⁴ COMUSMACV, on 10 September, provided a response to the JCS's request for additional information. He indicated that increasing the draft age to 43 would provide an additional 22,000 personnel in FY 70; however, he recommended against expansion of the draft since qualitative improvement was the important factor and this age group would not provide the proper type personnel. COMUSMACV also recommended against expanded use of women due to the inherent nonacceptance of females in the military role by both male and female segments of the RVN populace. CINCPAC concurred on 12 September in a message to the JCS. ⁵

(S) On 21 October, COMUSMACV forwarded the unit authorization list (UAL) and activation schedule which was a detailed distribution of the approved spaces from the GVN Midway proposal. On 27 October he requested approval of the UAL in order to assure timely receipt of equipment to support FY 70 activations and so that programming action could be completed in support of the approved Midway force structure increase. ⁶

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1. COMUSMACV 48436/221208Z Aug 69.
 2. COMUSMACV 50351/020938Z Sep 69.
 3. CINCPAC 062356Z Sep 69; CINCUSARPAC 060111Z Sep 69; CINCPACAF 050523Z Sep 69; CINCPACFLT 050251Z Sep 69.
 4. JCS 8376/061741Z Sep 69.
 5. COMUSMACV 51678/101036Z Sep 69; CINCPAC 120441Z Sep 69.
 6. COMUSMACV 60399/272345Z Oct 69; J5A1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.

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RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Phase III and Related U.S. Planning

(TS) On 21 November, the JCS provided CINCPAC guidance for the development of input to a Phase III RVNAF Improvement and Modernization and Related U.S. Planning Study. CINCPAC's input was to consider the problem:¹

To provide a Phase III Plan for development of RVNAF which will raise RVNAF effectiveness to the point where the GVN can maintain at least current levels of security while US forces are phased down to a support force by 1 Jul 71 and then, by continuing steps, to the level of an advisory force (MAAG) by 1 Jul 73.

(TS) Significantly, the term "support forces" used in the problem to be solved replaced the term "residual support forces" which had been used in the past. The term residual was to be avoided. Also, the term "support forces" in the study included combat forces unless specified otherwise.²

(TS) The JCS provided CINCPAC with four basic assumptions:³

a. The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army threat will continue at its current level through 1 July 1973.

b. The U.S. objective and missions in the RVN will continue as currently stated through 1 July 1973.

c. U.S. support force strength will decline, alternatively:

(1) To 260,000 by 1 July 1971 and an advisory level by 1 July 1973; or

(2) To 190,000 by 1 July 1971 and an advisory level by 1 July 1973.

d. Third-Country Forces will decline to two Division Force Equivalents (DFES) by 1 July 1971 and remain at that level through 1 July 1973.

1. JCS 5041/211950Z Nov 69.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

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(TS) The JCS requested CINCPAC's comments and recommendations on the assumptions by 30 November and the final report by 8 January 1970. Admiral McCain notified the JCS on 30 November that he concurred in the assumptions with the exception of his recommendation that Assumption A be changed to include the Pathet Lao as part of the threat. In addition, Admiral McCain recommended three additional assumptions:¹

a. Resources and funds required to support the plan will be made available to the DOD for all in-country and out-of-country requirements, and resources and funds required by other than DOD agencies to support their programs will be available.

b. No major change in U.S. effort in Laos; therefore any support of RVN from Thailand may include requirement to deploy additional units to Thailand.

c. There is no significant decrease in the level of support of an elected government by the population of RVN; there have been no major political upheavals.

(TS) To insure the planning effort was proceeding along proper lines recommended approval of the assumptions as listed in paragraph 2 above was requested NLT 6 December 1969.

(TS) The JCS concurred in CINCPAC's recommendations on 5 December with the exception that support of RVN from Thailand would be accomplished with "current authorized strength in Thailand," whereas Admiral McCain's assumption included a "requirement to deploy additional units to Thailand."²

(TS) Based on the above, COMUSMACV continued planning on the basic RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (Phase III) and Related U.S. Planning while CINCPAC developed the annex for out-of-country forces which would be required to support Phase III. COMUSMACV's input was due to CINCPAC on 1 January 1970.³

Equipage and Funding

(S) The Accelerated Phase II Plan, in general, did not involve additional equipment above that contained in the Phase I and Phase II plans (as modified),

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. J5A2 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Dec 69.

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but did involve an advancement in required delivery dates. To assure ARVN's ability to receive, store and distribute the U.S. equipment, an increase of 9,427 spaces for various ARVN logistic support units was requested and approved.¹

(S) The total estimated cost of providing materiel, including ammunition, for the RVNAF program as contained in the Phase I and Phase II plans for the five-year period was \$11.16 billion. \$1.147 billion was approved as part of the FY 69 budget. This left \$10.02 billion unfunded. Approximately \$698 million additional funding was placed in the FY 69 supplemental DOD budget request. \$1.53 billion of the FY 70 funding requirement of \$1.99 billion was included in the President's FY 70 budget. This left \$455 million unbudgeted. In determining funding requirements for RVNAF improvement and modernization for inclusion in budget requests to Congress, equipment assets excess to requirements for the U.S. baseline force were considered as available for the RVNAF program without the need for replacement in the U.S. inventory. Thus, new obligational authority requested of Congress was less than the \$11.16 billion planned cost because there was no payback for some of the equipment transferred.²

(S) The following is a breakdown of the estimated funding for the programs contained in Phase I and Phase II which constituted the Accelerated Phase II Plan:³

	(Thousands of Dollars)		Total (five-year period)
	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	
Phase I	\$1,845,732	\$1,534,213	\$ 8,025,912
Phase II	<u>63,139</u>	<u>454,946</u>	<u>3,138,934</u>
Total	\$1,908,871	\$1,989,159	\$11,164,846

(C) Actual budget submissions and fiscal year funding requirements were expected to vary from planned figures due to refinement of equipment requirements, reduced ammunition requirements, accelerations or slowdowns in the program, and the probability that the Services might not be reimbursed for assets turned over to RVNAF.⁴

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1. Point Paper, J4321, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jul 69, Subj: Equipage and Funding - RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (U).
 2. Ibid.
 3. Point Paper, J434, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Mar 69, Subj: Funding, RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (U).
 4. Ibid.

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(S) As of 12 December the status of equipment deliveries was as indicated:¹

ARVN. Maneuver units were fully equipped with M-16 rifles and the RF/PF had received over 95% of their TOE authorization. It was anticipated that nearly all of the equipment requirements would be met on schedule. Some exceptions included certain engineer equipment (scoop loaders, cranes and tractors), 1-ton trucks, water trailers and tool sets.

VNAF. The initial emphasis was on conversion of certain existing squadrons to more modern aircraft. New unit activations were practically all in the FY 71 and FY 72 time frame and equipment for these new units will be provided by turnover of assets by U.S. units. Status of delivery of aircraft was as shown below:

UH-1H helicopters. The total requirement comprised aircraft for 12 squadrons plus attrition. The first four squadrons had their UE of 20 aircraft plus attrition. Activation of additional squadrons will begin in Fiscal Year 1971.

O-1A. O-1 deliveries to VNAF were primarily dependent on O-2 and OV-10 production. The program through February 1970 will fully equip the initial four squadrons and cover attrition losses.

A-37. Delivery of A-37 fighters commenced in 1969. The 54 on hand provided UE aircraft for three squadrons. Attrition aircraft were programmed commencing in FY 70 and UE aircraft for the remaining squadron by turnover from U.S. units in FY 72.

C-123B. These transports were not due into inventory until FY 72 when 48 were scheduled for turnover.

AC-47. Fifteen AC-47s were currently on hand for the initial VNAF AC-47 squadron. Additional aircraft will be provided by turnover or from other U.S. assets.

VNN. Most of the equipment requirements for the VNN were to be satisfied by turnover of the assets of U.S. Navy units presently in SVN. Turnover was to be made as the VNN acquired the capability to operate and support the equipment. Delivery dates of FY 71 and FY 72 for the DEs were

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1. Point Paper, J432, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Dec 69, Subj: RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Equipment Program (U).

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dependent on VNN performance progress. PCEs were to be provided from CONUS assets. Twenty-six WPBs were being obtained by turnover from USCG assets in SVN. Turnover of two U.S. RASs was completed in FY 69. A total of 89 craft was involved. Assets of two additional U.S. RASs were planned to be turned over during FY 70 subject to the VNN capability to man and operate them effectively. Training of VNN operational and support personnel was the pacing factor.

Accelerated Expansion and Improvement of National Police

(S) As indicated earlier in this section COMUSMACV and CINCPAC furnished their comments and recommendations on President Thieu's proposed increase in the RVNAF. CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV's recommendation to increase the GVN National Police by 15,000 in FY 70 and an additional 15,000 in FY 71. On 29 June, COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC that the GVN proposed to expand the National Police force to 92,200 by the end of CY 69 and to 122,000 by the end of CY 70. The purpose of this increase was to satisfy President Thieu's policy of policing every village by the end of CY 70.¹

(S) In order to provide sufficient police to accelerate attacks against the VC infrastructure, to maintain law and order, and to exercise other civil police responsibilities in rural as well as in urban areas, men, facilities, money and advisors would be required. To accomplish the CY 69 goal, 13,000 men per month, beginning August 1969 through December 1969, would be required. To reach the goal of 122,000 for CY 70, 3,000 men per month during 1970 would be required. The GVN stated it had the necessary manpower.²

(S) COMUSMACV outlined the major expansion and improvement of the GVN National Police proposal on 29 June and requested that commodity support for the National Police be included in the AID/DOD program realignment in the overall amount of \$12,500,000, which included \$125,000 for public safety telecommunication support. On 2 July, COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC with the U.S. FY 70 support requirements to assist the GVN in reaching CY 69 and CY 70 National Police force goals. The Embassy, U.S. AID and CINCPAC concurred in both of COMUSMACV's submissions.³

(S) On 23 August, COMUSMACV recommended additional funding for the GVN National Police force proposal and CINCPAC concurred in the

1. COMUSMACV 38139/291051Z Jun 69.

2. Ibid.

3. COMUSMACV 38797/021534Z Jul 69; CINCPAC 120251Z Jul 69.

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recommendation and in the supporting rationale on 3 September. ¹ On the same day, 3 September, COMUSMACV notified CINCPAC that the Department of the Army stated that it did not have the authority to support the GVN National Police. However, COMUSMACV stated that after a review of this subject he believed that his request was appropriate for additional DOD fund support and recommended that his requests be reconsidered for inclusion in the AID/DOD realignment program for FY 70. ² CINCPAC concurred. ³

Training for Expansion of RVNAF

(S) During 1969, training was conducted for expansion of each Vietnamese military service. The Army of Vietnam training was primarily in combat arms, improvement of the logistical base, and for communications and electronics skills. The Vietnamese Navy training supported the turnover of U.S. Navy assets to Vietnamese Navy crews through on-the-job training afloat by the Vietnamese Navy and the U.S. Navy. The Vietnamese Air Force program provided for buildup in UH-1 squadrons and Vietnamese Air Force technical training self-sufficiency. The greatest problem was the shortage of qualified graduates from the in-country English language training school. ⁴

(S) The Army of Vietnam training program was designed to increase the combat capability, provide for a substantial logistical base, and allow turnover to ARVN of stations in the Integrated Communication System (ICS) - Southeast Asia. Combat arms training was concentrated in bringing the 15 major combat units up to strength and in expanding Popular Force (PF) units. Training was on schedule. Logistical base training ran slightly behind schedule because qualified manpower was diverted to higher priorities. It was estimated that more than 2,000 ARVN personnel must receive English language training plus communication-electronics training over the next four to five years. ⁵

(S) The VNN training provided naval skills for continued accelerated turnover of Vietnamese Navy assets of river patrol boats and coastal patrol craft to the VNN. This training consisted largely of recruit training or on-the-job training afloat. Some individual skills required to man a destroyer escort were taught in the CONUS. The VNN had approximately 700 officers

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1. COMUSMACV 48683/240140Z Aug 69.
 2. COMUSMACV 50485/030701Z Sep 69.
 3. CINCPAC 120108Z Sep 69.
 4. Point Paper, J3A22, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Oct 69, Subj: Training for the Expansion of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).
 5. Ibid.

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and 7,000 enlisted in training. U.S. mobile training teams were provided to assist the VNN in developing better individual skill identification systems, training plans, and management controls.¹

(S) The VNAF Improvement and Modernization Program will expand the VNAF from 20 to 40 squadrons in approximately two and a half years. Pilot, technical, and English language training were areas of concern since they taxed training facilities. The U.S. Army will train all rotary wing pilots and mechanics, and the USAF will train fixed wing pilots and technical personnel in CONUS.²

(S) In-country technical training facilities were being expanded to provide follow-on and replacement training in the following sequence:³

a. Language training after basic military training. Some English language training to provide the ability to understand manuals written in English, although the actual classes were to be in Vietnamese.

b. Basic Three-Level Course. After English language training, trainees will attend one of 17 basic courses of technical instruction.

c. Weapons Systems Training. Immediately following the basic course, trainees will attend a short course to familiarize them with their specific weapons system equipment.

d. Follow-on-training. In each unit all new personnel will enter formal on-the-job training conducted by USAF augmentees. After departure of the augmentees training will be continued by VNAF technicians.

(S) The numerous requirements for English language training overtaxed the RVN Armed Forces language school which is responsible for in-country English language training. The school expanded its training facilities and increased the number of instructors in order to provide English language training for 5,000 students in lieu of the programmed through-put of 500. This situation gave rise to many problems involving adequacy of training facilities, material, instructors, advisory personnel, and trainees.⁴

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

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(S) A representative of the Defense Language Institute made a staff visit to RVN in September. During the visit he noted the following deficiencies.¹

a. Too much emphasis was placed on English comprehensive level test scores, not enough on quality of instruction.

b. Problem of possible English comprehensive level test compromise invalidating the indication of a student's ability.

c. Need for a permanent Defense Language Institute English language training advisor to COMUSMACV.

d. Lack of experienced instructors.

e. Poor living and school facilities for students.

(S) Since the success of the RVNAF expansion program was contingent to a large degree on the in-country English language program providing large numbers of qualified students for CONUS training, CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's requirements for instructors, advisors, training facilities, materials, and equipment.²

Republic of Vietnam Internal Security Capabilities

(S) The JCS, on 28 January, requested COMUSMACV to provide comments on questions originating at the highest level regarding the organization of GVN National Police. COMUSMACV responded on 4 February with a comprehensive analysis of the GVN police program. Cognizant CINCPAC staff elements concurred in COMUSMACV's reply. On 15 February, the JCS provided CINCPAC excerpts from National Security Study Memorandum 19 of 11 February for information and requested additional information in order to balance the report. CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV on 16 February with providing his proposals by 24 February for expanding and improving the Vietnamese police force. The 24 February suspense date was very close since CINCPAC had to review COMUSMACV's reply and meet the JCS 26 February suspense date.³

(S) On 17 February, the SECDEF provided additional guidance concerning the forces to be examined, time frame of the study, topics to be covered,

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. J555 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Feb 69.

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and methodology. He requested comments regarding scope and methodology be furnished by 20 February. The study was to be accomplished in two phases: Phase I - an analysis of the current situation and Phase II - examination of the future situation.¹

(S) Responding to a phone call from Ambassador Colby, DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS on 17 February to Lieutenant General Hutchin, Chief of Staff, CINCPAC, Admiral McCain informed the JCS that additional time would be required to fully prepare the detailed and comprehensive analysis desired and requested an additional ten days.²

(S) On 18 February, the JCS requested CINCPAC and COMUSMACV comments on scope and methodology of the OSD study not later than 20 February.³ COMUSMACV provided his comments on 19 February and stated that the scope and methodology is more complex than necessary, and recommended that the scope of the study be sharpened to focus upon those forces whose primary role and mission is to counter enemy guerrillas, bandits and infrastructure up to squad size, with particular attention to the indigenous police forces.⁴ On 19 February, the JCS outlined the information required from CINCPAC and COMUSMACV to fit into the JCS input to the OSD study. The RVNAF Phase II Accelerated Program would represent the current situation, and the RVNAF Phase III study would represent the future situation. The JCS suspense dates for the first and second increment reports were established as 26 February and 1 March, respectively, pending decision by OSD on CINCPAC's request for a ten day extension.⁵

(S) On 20 February, CINCPAC concurred generally in the scope and methodology outlined by ASD/ISA and the structuring of the JCS input and focus of the study.⁶ On 1 March, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV conform to the JCS structuring and submit the first increment for CINCPAC's review not later than 3 March and the second increment not later than 8 March since the ten-day extension had been granted.⁷

(S) COMUSMACV provided the first increment report on 3 March for CINCPAC review. CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV's input and provided comments in amplification and in support of the SECDEF guidelines

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1. SECDEF 2741/172350 Feb 69.
 2. J555 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Feb 69.
 3. JCS 002749/181456Z Feb 69.
 4. COMUSMACV 10644/200753Z Feb 69.
 5. J555 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
 6. CINCPAC 210452Z Feb 69.
 7. CINCPAC 011903Z Mar 69.

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provided on 17 February. On 9 March, COMUSMACV forwarded his second increment report to CINCPAC. In the report COMUSMACV concluded (1) that the National Police and Regional Forces should be maintained at the Phase II level as a minimum; (2) the Popular Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group should be phased out as the situation permitted with significant numbers of their personnel recruited by the National Police as replacements and by the People's Self-Defense Forces; (3) ARVN should be phased down as rapidly as the situation permits to supply trained personnel for territorial or police forces and to reduce the full mobilization burden on the populace and the economy; (4) a constabulary type force in the Phase III situation could not be justified by a foreseeable requirement; and (5) Reserve Forces will be required in the era after RVNAF phase down to provide for rapid mobilization in the event of a resumption of hostilities. ¹

(S) CINCPAC, on 12 March, concurred with COMUSMACV and offered comments in extension of COMUSMACV's comments. CINCPAC concluded his report to the JCS with three thoughts: ²

a. The subject study should of course take proper account of the findings and recommendations of the AID Manpower Survey and the Joint Development Group.

b. We should not underestimate VC resiliency. Even if the assumption in paragraph 5. a. of Ref A is correct, i. e., no external resources will be available to the VC-- we should assume that, regardless of the form of a final peace agreement, Hanoi will continue to give at least non-military aid and comfort to the Viet Cong in any post-hostilities atmosphere. We should be realistic about this and plan for it.

c. If there is a genuine peace in South Vietnam, we can anticipate that large numbers of refugees will exert pressure on the authorities for resettlement to original villages. Activities related to this will add responsibilities to the internal security forces.

(S) On 12 March, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's comments on the possibility of an early transfer of RVNAF, including RF/PF, personnel or units into the GVN National Police structure. Nine days later, COMUSMACV

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1. COMUSMACV 14266/090350Z Mar 69.
 2. CINCPAC 130300Z Mar 69.

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replied that (1) early transfer was not contemplated; (2) GVN mobilization policies favor RVNAF, and RVNAF cannot spare competent personnel from their already short supply of leaders; (3) solution to the training problem was essential to developing an effective National Police organization; (4) U. S. funds for FY 69 and 70 are adequate but GVN funding is inadequate due to the low priority given to National Police requirements; and (5) support of the GVN would be absolutely essential to implementation of the accelerated expansion of the National Police. CINCPAC notified the JCS on 22 March that he concurred with the COMUSMACV response that the security situation required the RVNAF in their present role.¹

(S) A SACSA memorandum addressed to LTG Hutchin, dated 28 March, furnished CINCPAC the second draft of a response by OSD/ISA to NSSM #19. Copies of the draft were delivered to COMUSMACV on 30 March for his comments.²

(S) On 31 March, COMUSMACV provided his initial comments on the study and indicated that a complete review would be completed on 6 April. COMUSMACV agreed with the overall goals of the study but considered the proposed reorganization of forces into a Territorial Security Force (TSF) under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and an Internal Security Force (ISF) under the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) to be unsound, disruptive and ill-timed. His concern over the ISA draft was shared by the Joint Staff and the Services. A request was submitted to the National Security Council (NSC) Staff for an additional seven day delay in the submission of the study to the NSC Review Group. This was necessary in order to provide time for preparation and consideration of a formal nonconcurrence with the draft by the JCS. CINCPAC concurred on 4 April that a nonconcurrence was in order.³

(S) COMUSMACV provided a detailed rebuttal of the concept outlined in the ISA study on 6 April. It addressed individually what he considered to be the six major issues of the study, and provided a resume of steps to improve internal security suggested by previous MACV submissions. CINCPAC's response to the JCS concurred in COMUSMACV's comments, stating that reorganization of GVN force structure now locked in combat with an aggressive enemy was not practicable. CINCPAC reiterated his previous position that this was the time to put emphasis on the protection of population and special enhancement of civilian security, and that the GVN National Police should be the spearhead of this effort.⁴

1. J555 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

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(S) From CINCPAC's point of view the OSD draft proposal was contrary to the views of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV and not in conformance with concepts developed in the RVNAF modernization and improvement programs and in post-hostilities planning. Further, the OSD draft was far too detailed and was based on interpretations of the situation in Vietnam which did not reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs and the field commanders. The implications of the adoption of the proposed OSD draft were many:¹

a. Three armies would be created--ARVN, TSF and ISF--which would compete for resources but would not have clearly delineated functional differences.

b. The GVN National Police would be split three ways--the National Police Field Force to the TSF, the uniformed branch police to the ISF, and the special branch police maintained under the MOI. As a result, functional expertise would be seriously fractionalized.

c. The Popular Forces (PF) under the MOI, would still be supported logistically by the MOD.

d. Responsibility for advising the ISF would fall on the U. S. Agency for International Development (AID). It was doubtful that AID could provide the quantity of advisors required for the PF elements of the ISF without DOD assistance.

e. The assignment of full-time Popular Self-Defense Force (PSDF) elements to the TSF would destroy the political purpose of the PSDF program without adding appreciably to internal security.

f. A major realignment of responsibilities from Saigon down to each village and hamlet would take place. Existing command, administrative and logistical channels would be disrupted, and forces which have been trained to function in tandem would be divided. Time would be needlessly wasted and GVN leadership would be diverted to reorganization problems at the very time when they should be giving their full attention to on-going problems.

(S) SACSAs concluded that the JCS should nonconcur with the OSD draft and that the study should be rewritten to reflect the COMUSMACV's and CINCPAC's concepts for internal security. The JCS approved the SACSAs

1. J5 Brief No. 00117-69, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Apr 69, Subj: South Vietnam Internal Security Capabilities (U); JCS 2472/426-5 of 9 Apr 69.

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recommendation and on 12 April in a memorandum for the SECDEF on NSSM #19, generally concurred with the evolutionary programs devised by COMUSMACV and approved by CINCPAC for the development of internal security forces and for their transition to meet a peace-time situation. They considered that the proposals presented by OSD represented an unnecessary reorganization which would seriously disrupt current progress in internal security. They felt that the study was far too detailed for an NSC paper. The JCS recommended that the draft OSD study be withdrawn and redrafted, taking the stated views into account. They further recommended that the new paper be developed in more concise form in order to improve its utility to the NSC.¹ At the end of the year the OSD study was reported to be a "dead issue."²

Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF)

(U) Since 1964 a large majority of the free world countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere have provided the Republic of Vietnam with either technical, economic or military assistance. Predictably, those nations closest to the Communist threat in Asia have contributed the most military assistance with the exception of the United States.³

(U) A recapitulation of the military forces furnished by Free World Forces during 1969 is shown on the following chart.

Australia-New Zealand Forces

(S) During 1969, Australia and New Zealand provided essentially the same type assistance they provided in 1968. Military assistance consisted primarily of a brigade task force with supporting personnel, approximately 100 combat advisors, a Canberra squadron, a Caribou squadron, a helicopter (UH-1H) squadron, and a guided missile destroyer. New Zealand forces were composed of two infantry companies and a 105mm artillery battery which operated with the Australian brigade task force.⁴

(S) The Australian and New Zealand ground elements conducted operations in their assigned tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) which included

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1. Ibid.
 2. Point Paper, J555, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Oct 69, Subj: Republic of Vietnam Internal Security Capabilities.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, p. 81. For a detailed accounting of the contributions made by each country involved, see CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol II, pp. 561-569.
 4. Point Paper, J3B34, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Jul 69, Subj: Australian/New Zealand Operations in RVN (U).

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FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES 1969

	AUSTRALIA	CHINA	KOREA	NEW ZEALAND	PHILIP- PINES	SPAIN	THAILAND	TOTAL
JAN	7,655	29	50,154	549	1,583	12	7,783	67,765
FEB	7,681	29	50,317	546	1,574	12	11,577	71,736
MAR	7,493	30	50,742	549	1,586	12	11,553	71,965
APR	7,646	30	50,748	568	1,562	12	11,231	71,787
MAY	7,893	28	50,279	560	1,556	12	11,545	71,673
JUN	7,646	27	50,884	556	1,506	12	11,562	72,193
JUL	7,637	30	49,708	557	1,485	12	11,560	70,989
AUG	7,608	30	49,304	555	1,456	11	11,478	70,442
SEP	7,544	30	48,482	551	1,446	10	11,250	69,313
OCT	7,592	31	50,189	553	1,544	12	11,763	71,684
NOV	7,592	31	50,189	540	1,544	12	11,763	71,671
DEC	7,592	31	50,189	540	1,553*	12	11,763	71,680

* THE CINCPAC FWMAF RECAPITULATION SUMMARY OF 11 DECEMBER
REPORTED AN AGGREGATE STRENGTH OF 183. THE REDUCTION IN
STRENGTH WAS DUE TO THE GPO'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW THE
PHILCAG FROM RVN.

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all of Phuoc Tuy province and that portion of Binh Tuy province south of National Highway #1. The 1st Australian Task Force operated under the control of the U.S. II Field Force Commander. The Task Force's operations were characterized by numerous reconnaissance in force (RIF) and small unit actions in its tactical area of operation with the primary mission of supporting the RVN accelerated pacification program. ¹

(S) The Canberra squadron, located at Phan Rang AB was attached to the 35th U.S. Tactical Fighter Wing. The squadron operated eight aircraft with a normal sortie rate of eight sorties per day. Targets were usually not assigned closer than 10 KM to the Cambodian or NVN border. The helicopter and Caribou squadrons operated from Vung Tau and provided tactical air support to the Australian Task Force and other Allied operations. A U.S. helicopter company normally provided additional support to the task force. ²

(S) One Australian guided missile destroyer was employed in conjunction with elements of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the primary role of providing naval gun fire support. A Royal Australian Navy clearance team was located at Vung Tau and performed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) missions. ³

Republic of Korea Forces in RVN

(S) ROK Army personnel initially entered the RVN in mid-1964. The first ROK contribution was a Tae Quan Do (Karate) training team which provided sub-teams to RVNAF training centers. Soon after the arrival of the training team, the ROK provided a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH). Subsequent contributions expanded ROKA forces in RVN with an overall command element (ROKFV) and combat and combat support forces. In 1969, ROKA/ROKMC strength in the RVN averaged approximately 50,000. Major ROK elements in the RVN were the ROKFV Headquarters, two infantry divisions (18 battalions), a Marine brigade (four battalions), eight artillery battalions, an engineer battalion and the MASH. Operational control of ROK forces in RVN was retained by CG, ROKFV with headquarters at Nha Trang adjacent to U.S. I FFV headquarters. Operations with U.S. or ARVN forces were conducted on the basis of coordination and cooperation. ⁴

(S) The ROK Army divisions operated in an area approximately twice the size of the assigned TAORs since 9 July 1967. Moreover, the assigned TAORs

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Point Paper, J3B33, Hq CINCPAC, 23 May 69, Subj: ROK Forces in SVN (U).

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included more than 350 KM of Highways 1 and 9 which connect principal cities and ports along the RVN east coast extending from Phan Rang on the south to Phu Cat on the north and extending to the vicinity of An Khe on the west. The ROK Marine brigade was deployed to the vicinity of Danang and assumed responsibility for a portion of the Danang TAOR. ¹

(S) During 1969, the pattern of ROK operations did not materially change from those conducted in 1967-68. Primarily the operations consisted of extensive small unit actions, battalion and multiple battalion search and clear operations within or relatively close to their TAOR. ROK units effectively carried out both their combat operations and revolutionary development missions. ²

(TS) Both CINCPAC and COMUS Korea have prepared contingency plans for the emergency return of the ROKFV from RVN to the Republic of Korea. On 18 April, COMUS Korea recommended to CINCPAC that (1) a review of CINCPAC plans to determine whether the schedule for the return of the ROKFV could be accelerated and (2) approval of changes to the COMUS Korea supporting plan so that a sanitized version of the plan could be provided to the ROK to facilitate U. S. -ROK planning. ³ CINCPAC concurred in COMUS Korea's recommendation and recommended that the JCS approve. ⁴ On 25 June, the JCS approved the release of the sanitized COMUS Korea plan and added two minor changes. ⁵ On 19 July, CINCPAC authorized COMUS Korea to release his supporting plans to the ROK JCS subject to certain changes. ⁶ The sanitized version of the COMUS Korea Contingency Plan-ROKFV was released to the ROK JCS on 2 October. ⁷

Proposed Manpower Increase for ROKFV

(S) Beginning March 1969, COMUSMACV attempted to get the ROKFV to reduce its in-country strength to the 48,339 the U. S. had agreed to support. The ROKFV had maintained a constant overstrength varying from 2,750 to 1,531 since early 1968. COMUSMACV has supported this overstrength from available resources. The ROKFV has maintained that the overstrength is necessary due to personnel turbulence. At COMUSMACV's suggestion the

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. COMUS Korea 58519/182348Z Apr 69.
 4. CINCPAC 070547Z Jun 69.
 5. JCS 003624/252117Z Jun 69.
 6. CINCPAC 192113Z Jul 69.
 7. COMUS Korea UK 61684/031915Z Oct 69.

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ROK requested an increase in TOE authorized strength of 439. With allowables for patients, replacements and turbulence this TOE increase would equate to 449 additional spaces which the U. S. would agree to support. In turn, the ROKFV agreed that if the new TOE strength was approved, the over-strength would be eliminated and a firm future U. S. -supported strength of 48,788 would be adhered to.¹

(S) On 10 September, COMUSMACV forwarded to CINCPAC a recommendation for the increase of 449 ROKFV spaces. The recommendation was based on COMUSMACV's continuing requirement to support the ROKFV over-strength from available COMUSMACV resources. CINCPAC on 14 September, supported COMUSMACV and so recommended to the JCS.²

(S) On 3 October, the JCS in a back channel message discouraged the request citing the necessity for complicated inter-intra governmental coordination that would be required.³ COMUSMACV in turn requested that the negative reply be made through normal channels.⁴ The JCS, on 17 October, replied as requested and told CINCPAC that if a reclama were made it should include the comments of the U. S. "Country Team" in Korea, additional budgetary requirements for COMUSMACV, and justification for each of the increased spaces requested.⁵ By the end of 1969 a reclama had not been received.

Philippine Civic Action Group

(S) The Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) was organized during 1969 into a 1,500 man contingent consisting of an engineer battalion as its nucleus. The contingent included a headquarters company, a station hospital, a logistics support company, a field artillery battery and a security battalion. In contrast to all other Free World Forces, the PHILCAG did not have an actual combat role. It has had a very difficult and anomalous task. The Filipinos have had to represent themselves successfully to the provincial people as supporters of the Vietnamese Government and as contributors to the Free World effort, while simultaneously conveying the impression of scrupulously limiting themselves to the humanitarian interests of all the people. The basic mission of PHILCAG was to provide assistance to RVN in the form of

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1. Point Paper, J5522, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Sep 69, Subj: Increase in ROKFV Authorized Strength.
 2. COMUSMACV 51688/101134Z Sep 69; CINCPAC 140200Z Sep 69.
 3. J5522 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Oct 69.
 4. COMUSMACV 071105Z Oct 69.
 5. JCS 2708/171533Z Oct 69.

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engineering civic action projects such as building bridges, roads and resettlement hamlets. The PHILCAG also engaged in limited medical civic action programs.¹

(S) In 1968, the original strength of the first PHILCAG (PHILCAG I) was reduced from an average strength of 2,000 to approximately 1,500 due to political maneuvering. This occurred when PHILCAG I was due to rotate home and be replaced in RVN by PHILCAG II. In order to force the Philippine Congress to act on the budget, which included funds for the continuation of the PHILCAG, President Marcos decided to gradually reduce the number of personnel in the PHILCAG, thus forcing Congress to act. The maneuver failed and the rotation of PHILCAG personnel and the maintenance of the unit in RVN in 1969 had to be supported from defense funds.²

(X) On 13 March 1969, the Nacionalista House Caucus voted to withdraw PHILCAG and send a medical contingent to Vietnam in its place. The PHILCAG vote was accompanied by a threat to put Marcos' budget bill "on ice." On 20 March, Washington papers carried a UPI report that President Marcos and congressional leaders had decided to withdraw the PHILCAG and replace it with a medical team. The Philippine Government had not informed U. S. Government of any such intention.³

(C) On 26 March, the American Embassy Manila reported that the politically explosive PHILCAG issue had been out of the public eye for many months and that this was attributed in part to a Presidential decision that the PHILCAG served the Philippine national interest; maintained the GOP right to a seat at the Vietnam settlement table; and established a Philippine claim to a share in surplus war materiel when a settlement is reached. President Marcos was willing therefore, despite the absence of congressional authorization, to use regular defense funds to bear the relatively modest Philippine costs of maintaining the PHILCAG in Vietnam. Significantly, the Filipino units were rotated during this period and while there was some press coverage of returning troops, 1,500 men went to Vietnam without a word about their movement appearing in the newspapers.⁴

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1. Point Paper, J555, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jul 69, Subj: Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) (U).
 2. See CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 85-86 for a detailed account of PHILCAG II.
 3. Point Paper, J555, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Aug 69, Subj: Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) (U).
 4. Ibid.

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(C) After a Vietnam visit in mid-March, the Philippine Defense Under Secretary Melchor approached AID Director Haroldson with the suggestion that AID finance the PHILCAG with a new PL-480, Title 1 Program to make up for the funds refused by the Philippine Congress. Similar inquiries were later made by Melchor to CHJUSMAGPHIL also. This action posed two questions for the U.S.: Should the U.S. pick up the entire cost of the PHILCAG? And, if the U.S. decision on the question is negative, is the U.S. prepared to see the PHILCAG pull out?

(C) The American Embassy Manila deferred to Saigon and Washington on the value of the PHILCAG to the GVN and U.S. in the war effort.¹

(C) On 14 April, American Embassy Saigon stated that the U.S. should not underwrite the entire cost of PHILCAG. Their review of the situation indicated that the withdrawal of PHILCAG would not, aside from the dent in Allied solidarity, affect the total war effort. The Embassy stated that the PHILCAG withdrawal would probably precipitate an already rumored GVN move to invoke sanctions against Philippine labor (between 5,000 - 8,000 Filipino TCN's in RVN). They felt that the U.S. should not take any initiative to maintain PHILCAG in Vietnam. On 18 April, SECSTATE stated he preferred to defer a decision until he knew what choice actually faced the U.S. and the circumstances surrounding such a choice. The American Embassy Manila was directed not to respond to Melchor until such time as his request was concluded in formal terms.²

(C) The Philippine Senate, on 5 June, passed its version of the national budget and on 6 June the Philippine press stated that six million pesos were included in the measure for the specific purpose of supporting a phased withdrawal of the PHILCAG from Vietnam. The American Embassy Manila felt that the Senate proviso expressed the sentiment of some senators, but that the intent of the proviso was probably a bargaining gambit with President Marcos in the closing days of the session rather than a serious effort to withdraw the PHILCAG. Final action on the budget was not expected until 15 June. On 5 August COMUSMACV received a letter from General Manuel T. Yan, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines which read that the PHILCAG had been authorized to stay in RVN beyond its normal 12-month tour, probably up to six additional months.³

(C) On 27 September, the JCS requested CINCPAC to furnish detailed financial and material support given to PHILCAG each year both in the

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

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Philippines and in Vietnam as well as a detailed account of operations in Vietnam. This information was due to the Symington Sub-committee by noon 29 September, Washington time. CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV and CHJUSMAGPHIL with providing the information directly to the JCS action officer with an information copy to CINCPAC.¹ CINCPAC provided an overview of PHILCAG operations to the JCS.² On 29 September, the JCS requested additional information from CHJUSMAGPHIL which was provided on 30 September.³ COMUSMACV, on 3 October, provided additional information on PHILCAG personnel located in Saigon.⁴

(C) On 5 October, the U. S. Embassy in Manila stated that President Marcos told members at a 4 October press conference that he was going to withdraw the 1,500-man PHILCAG from RVN probably after the elections. The Embassy summarized its views on Marcos' purposes regarding the PHILCAG and concluded that Marcos would not withdraw the PHILCAG but might possibly reduce it.⁵ On 14 November, the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo notified the U. S. Ambassador Byroade that the Philippine Government had decided to withdraw the PHILCAG. No date for the withdrawal was given.⁶ On 19 November, Brigadier General Carreon informed COMUSMACV that the Philippine Government planned to replace the PHILCAG with a reduced strength military unit of approximately 230 men. The replacement unit supposedly would be in RVN by 25 December. The unit was to consist of a small headquarters detachment, security platoon, mobile medical/dental platoon and a village improvement platoon.⁷ By the end of 1969 the replacement unit was not in RVN nor had the GOP approved such action.

(C) The GVN was upset by the hasty and peremptory nature of the Philippine notification terminating the PHILCAG and urgently sought U. S. advice on what might be done to "stay the blow."⁸ U. S. Ambassador to the Philippines Byroade advised the SECSTATE that the U. S. should not make any effort to persuade President Marcos to change his decision. He believed the break should be made clean, that is, neither encourage nor accept any purely token military force as being sufficient to justify a continued role for

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1. CINCPAC 280045Z Sep 69.
 2. CINCPAC 282255Z Sep 69.
 3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 300940 Sep 69.
 4. COMUSMACV 559776/031536Z Oct 69.
 5. AMEMBASSY Manila 10540/070926Z Oct 69.
 6. AMEMBASSY Manila 11810/141013Z Nov 69.
 7. AMEMBASSY Manila 23163/191045Z Nov 69.
 8. AMEMBASSY Saigon 22917/151005Z Nov 69.

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the GOP as a military ally in RVN. The Ambassador believed that the U. S. should encourage the GVN to announce immediately that an ARVN unit had been designated to take over the PHILCAG camp, mission, and equipment. ¹

(S) On 24 November, the SECSTATE expressed the view that the matter of encouraging the GOP to retain uniform forces in RVN was a matter between the two governments and that the U. S. should avoid urging retention of Philippine forces or endorsing the concept that token forces ensure status as a troop contributing country which would entitle the GOP to a role in the post-war policy councils on Vietnam. ²

(S) AMEMBASSY Manila concurred with the SECSTATE position and added that the U. S. should no longer act as if the GOP were still a troop contributing country since Romulo's official notification was unqualified. ³ AMEMBASSY Saigon also concurred and added that however small the GOP's contribution in RVN, it had contributed, it was still a SEATO ally and would continue to have reasons for remaining involved in Southeast Asia "no matter how Marcos manifests his political priorities." All concerned agreed that it was unlikely that any justification existed for financial support of a small residual unit. ⁴

(U) On 20 December, the PHILCAG arrived in Manila after a seven and one-half day sea voyage. ⁵ A force of 50 officers and 139 enlisted men remained in RVN. Of this force a small equipment retrograde team of 11 officers and 47 enlisted men were scheduled to return to the Philippines by the end of January 1970. The remaining personnel under the former PHILCAG Chief of Staff were to remain in RVN as PHILCONV (Philippine Contingent Vietnam). The PHILCONV was directed to wear the Republic of Philippines patch in lieu of the PHILCAG patch. It was also directed to continue maintaining an office at the FWMA office in Saigon. ⁶ The official status of the PHILCONV was not clear as the year ended.

Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces (RTAVF)

(S) Major elements of the first Thai forces arrived in RVN in September 1967. This unit was designated the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment. A

1. AMEMBASSY Manila 11823/170300Z Nov 69.
2. SECSTATE 196975/242115Z Nov 69, see also AMEMBASSY Saigon 23004/171040Z Nov 69.
3. AMEMBASSY Manila 12073/250949Z Nov 69.
4. AMEMBASSY Saigon 23988/021225Z Dec 69.
5. UPI wire release published in CINCPAC News of Interest, CINCPAC Public Affairs Office, 20 Dec 69.
6. AMEMBASSY Manila 465/160705Z Jan 70.

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year later, September 1968, it rotated back to Thailand and was replaced by the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces. The first increment of the RTAVF, regimental-sized, arrived RVN during the period 22 July - 5 August 1968 and the second increment closed in RVN on 15 February 1969. The first increment of the RTAVF was scheduled to redeploy to Thailand in 1969 being relieved by the third increment of the RTAVF. Both the first and third increments were scheduled to be moved by PACOM airlift. The movements began on 26 June and were to be completed by 5 August. Cargo, in 200 conex containers, was moved by two LSTs to Thailand and closed there on 12 July 1969.¹

(S) The RTAVF is under the operational control of II Field Forces with headquarters at Bear Cat, SVN. The division is supported logistically by the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Laudatory comments were received with respect to combat operations conducted by the Thai forces. In addition to combat operations, the RTAVF have conducted civic action programs.²

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1. Point Paper, J4821, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jul 69, Subj: Airlift of Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces (RTAVF) between Thailand and Vietnam (U); Point Paper, J3B31 Hq CINCPAC, 11 Apr 69, Subj: Status of Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces (RTAVF) in Vietnam.
 2. Point Paper, J3B31, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Mar 69, Subj: Status of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) in Vietnam.

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SECTION II - OPERATIONS SOUTHEAST ASIA

(U) Throughout the Republic, the Vietnamese soldier is taking over the combat readiness and combat action in this war, and U.S. casualties continue to remain low compared to previous months this year.

(U) On past occasions we have noted that after a low level of enemy activity, the enemy has had time to rest, refit and prepare his troops for combat. He then repeats his aggressive efforts in attempting to take over the country.

(U) But now this same period of time is proving to the world that the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces are not letting him rest. They continue to train themselves, accept new combat responsibilities, and set out in their combat actions with a renewed determination to defeat the enemy.

.....

(U) All indications, at the present time, point to renewed fighting on the enemy's part in the future, as the North Vietnamese continue to attempt to maintain an impression of military strength despite the heavy cost in lives of their men. The enemy's actions demonstrate that his ultimate objective of trying to put North Vietnamese leadership in Vietnam remains unchanged.

(U) It would be unrealistic to hope that a Vietnam settlement, when achieved, will end the threat of aggressive communism. Backed by U.S. ground, sea, and air power, our allies must develop and maintain conventional forces to help deter the aggressive ambitions of their communist neighbors.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

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1. Address by Admiral McCain, USN, CINCPAC, to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Monterey, California, 2 Dec 69.

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(U) This section of Chapter IV presents Admiral McCain's review of military operations in Southeast Asia during 1968 and covers operations in Southeast Asia during 1969. The coverage is more limited this year than in the past several years because of the cessation of ROLLING THUNDER and SEA DRAGON operations on 1 November 1968. As in the past, however, ground, air and naval operations in-country have received extensive coverage in Annex A.

Review of Military Operations in Vietnam, 1968

(U) The United States forces and the forces of the Free World are now in such a military posture that any activity on the part of the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong - be it guerrilla warfare, covert, overt, or conventional warfare - can be handled.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

(U) Admiral McCain, on 1 January 1969, submitted his "Year End Review of Vietnam - 1968" to the JCS. His report reviewed the Allied objectives, examined the enemy situation and the military progress made by the Allies and discussed the outlook for the future.²

(S) Admiral McCain told the JCS that the Allied military programs were designed to support two major objectives. The first objective was to defeat the VC/VNA forces in RVN by vigorously executed offensive and psychological actions, destruction of enemy base areas, interdiction of LOCs, denial of vital resources, and the conduct of intensified intelligence and surveillance programs. The second objective was to extend GVN control in RVN by providing urban and territorial security, identifying and eliminating VC infrastructure, opening and securing major lines of communication, and conducting civic actions. The purpose of the two objectives was to "drain enemy resources and curtail enemy efforts, thus achieving a reduction of insurgency in RVN and establishment of a secure environment for economic and political development."

1. Remark by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC, to the Press at Hickam AFB on 30 Aug 68 reported in the "Honolulu Star-Bulletin" of 30 Aug 68.
2. The "Review of Military Operations in Vietnam, 1968" has been taken in its entirety from CINCPAC 012252 Z Jan 69 and CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 288-304.

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(S) CINCPAC recapped the enemy's offensive effort in 1968 and reported the results of this effort. While the enemy's "TET Offensive" achieved a measure of surprise, he failed to achieve his goals. The GVN and RVNAF "did not collapse, but gained further confidence and a new measure of respect." In the final analysis the enemy was unable to hold any cities attacked, in many areas lost much of his political infrastructures, and troop morale was impaired. He lost approximately 40,000 men, seriously degrading his combat capability. His major gain from the TET offensive was psychological. His second offensive in May, designed to influence the Paris peace talks which were just beginning, failed and he lost almost 30,000 men in the effort. He withdrew to his border sanctuaries and prepared for his third offensive of the year. He launched his attack on 17-18 August against Saigon and Da Nang and lost some 20,000 men before his effort faded in mid-September. At the close of 1968, many major enemy units were in border sanctuaries or in remote base areas, however, there was increasing evidence that some major units were moving into I CTZ and northern III CTZ. He was making small-scale attacks against minor objectives throughout RVN and attacking population centers by fire, except Saigon. He was still committing acts of terrorism as he pursued his efforts to consolidate and expand his control of the population. The enemy remained flexible and by virtue of his deployment, retained multiple options. His forces could start a full-scale return to NVN or could return in force for major attacks in RVN. He may "believe that, as currently disposed, his forces pose a counterweight to a possible resumption of bombing, and are in a position to respond to any military or political opportunity which might appear."

(S) In addressing friendly air operations over NVN and Laos, Admiral McCain reported that the "air war over NVN and Laos was conducted in three separate and distinct phases due to operating authorities and limitations imposed." During the first phase, 1 January to 31 March, air operations were authorized throughout NVN and Laos. "Weather was the dominant factor influencing ROLLING THUNDER operations during this period and with the New Year and TET standdowns, combined to reduce the air effort." Nearly all strikes required the use of the all-weather bombing techniques. In most cases weather precluded BDA and eliminated the capability to evaluate many of the strikes. Air operations in Laos, BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER, were devoted to interdiction operations. In the second phase, 1 April to 31 October, offensive air operations were limited to Laos and that area of NVN south of 19 degrees N. Emphasis was placed on harassment, disruption and interdiction of the movement of men and materiel into RVN. The area was void of lucrative industrial or military fixed targets. The detection and destruction of fleeting targets were emphasized and interdiction operations continued in Laos against trucks, vital supplies and support personnel. The third phase took place from 1 November to 31 December with air strikes

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being limited to Laos. The air effort was "diverted to an intensified interdiction campaign in Laos (COMMANDO HUNT) and additional air support to in-country operations."

(S) Admiral McCain told the JCS that the in-country air effort was dedicated to the support of ground forces in RVN and the interdiction of the extended battle area. Air attacks were a key factor in the high enemy casualties during February and were vital to the disruption of enemy plans and the destruction of his units. In the most concentrated bombardment program since World War II, tactical air and B-52s flew over 22,500 strike sorties into the area around Khe Sanh, disorganizing heavy enemy attacks on the base. The forces at Khe Sanh were supported by more than 1,000 airlift sorties which delivered more than 12,000 tons of cargo despite heavy enemy ground fire. During the May offensive, 500 fixed wing sorties struck within a radius of eight KM of Saigon, with VNAF aircraft accounting for 185 of these. During the period 5 May to 30 June there were 997 ARC LIGHT sorties flown within 40 KM of Saigon. These strikes, in coordination with multi-division ground operations, did much to disorganize and destroy enemy forces in and around Saigon. The ARC LIGHT program, limited to 800 sorties per month until 1 February was increased to 1,200 sorties and increased again on 15 February to 1,800 sorties. The increases were approved for the purpose of countering the increasing enemy threat in RVN. Failure of the enemy to attain his objectives at Khe Sanh, Dak To and in the Saigon/Gia Dinh area can be credited in large measure to the B-52 support of ground elements.

(S) In his report, Admiral McCain pointed out that "Allied operations in Vietnam during 1968 were greatly enhanced by the mobility of the Free World Forces. COMUSMACV was able, by virtue of tactical mobility, to operate without committing major portions of his forces to a reserve role." He cited the redeployment of the 1st Cavalry Division to the I CTZ in February and to the III CTZ in October as a "classic example of the use of mobility to achieve maximum utilization of combat assets." As a result of these rapid deployments the enemy's operational plans were frustrated and friendly forces won major victories. Admiral McCain then stated that, "COMUSMACV has been able to apply maximum effective combat power at decisive times and places as a...result of superior tactical mobility."

(S) In addressing the Nation Building effort, CINCPAC reported that progress in the pacification program during the "first half of 1968 was characterized by a slow recovery from the TET offensive. The threat of follow-on attacks acted as a deterrent to prompt and decisive pacification efforts." However, the program was "gradually reoriented" toward an "offensive posture" as the Allies' operations blunted and turned back the enemy effort. The end of October saw a gain in the momentum of the

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pacification program. During the last three months of 1968, the GVN initiated the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) which was designed to take advantage of the enemy's weakened posture and to extend GVN influence in previously "contested" and VC areas. By the end of the year, the shifts of population to GVN control was significant.

(S) In setting forth his outlook for 1969, Admiral McCain told the JCS that the enemy could no longer mount large-scale attacks against urban areas without fear of heavy losses. His capability to provide food and other essentials had been reduced. At the same time he has been compelled to withdraw into base areas and sanctuaries:

This does not mean, however, that he has been defeated, since the war remains fundamentally political in nature. While being frustrated...militarily..., the enemy is placing greater emphasis on political efforts to gain his goals.

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Notwithstanding his current military weakness, there are no indications that the enemy has deviated from his goal of both a military and political victory in SVN. The enemy has utilized the respite from our air and naval attacks to improve his military position in the Laos/Cambodian base areas and throughout NVN. He has rapidly rebuilt key war supporting installations and repaired his industrial base. Additionally, recent large increases in the movement of men and supplies toward SVN indicate that the enemy intends to greatly increase his forces in SVN either in preparation for an anticipated FWF withdrawal or to re-engage in serious ground conflict as occurred in the first nine months of 1968. If this trend continues, and there appears to be little reason to anticipate otherwise, a direct and continuing threat of substantial proportions will be created for Free World Forces early in 1969.

(S) In outlining his strategy for 1969, Admiral McCain stated that the ground strategy would be a continuation of that of 1968 but the emphasis would change. Allied forces would attack the full spectrum of communist organizations, activities, and facilities in a coordinated effort. In the densely populated areas, including the coastal plains and the Delta, the basic objective would be to eliminate all VC/NVA political infrastructure and military forces and to establish firm GVN control of those areas. Another objective would be

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to deny those areas adjacent to the coastal plain to the enemy thereby preventing their use for rest, refitting, training, resupply and as staging areas for mounting attacks against populated areas. In remote essentially uninhabited areas the basic objective would be to interdict and disrupt the enemy's resupply and infiltration routes and major bases.

(S) The GVN Pacification and Development Plan would continue and extend the Accelerated Pacification Campaign through 1969.

(S) CINCPAC told the JCS that he expected the mission, objectives and goals of air operations in Southeast Asia would remain essentially unchanged from 1968. Under "current" bombing restrictions "tactical strike forces would continue large-scale interdiction operations in Laos and close direct air support operations in SVN." He emphasized that "CINCPAC forces must maintain the full capability to strike NVN in the event negotiations fail and a resumption of ROLLING THUNDER air campaign is directed."

(S) After discussing the major developments that took place in 1968, Admiral McCain stated:

As the situation now exists in South Vietnam the enemy has no chance for military victory. Our firepower and mobility deny him the capability to mass his forces except at great expense of manpower. The momentum developed in the last half of 1968 will be maintained in 1969. Continuous pressures will be exerted on enemy forces by operations aimed at denying the use of base areas, locating and destroying supply caches, interception of infiltrators, interdiction of Laotian supply routes, elimination of VC infrastructure, and complete pacification of the country. To accomplish these objectives, the current tempo and intensity of operations and commitment of forces must be maintained. A too early relaxation of these pressures on the enemy would be a most serious strategic error.

Holiday Stand-Downs in Vietnam

(U) Prior to 1969 nine stand-downs (cease fires) were observed in RVN: Christmas 1965 - 30 hours; TET 1966 - over four days; Christmas 1966 - 48 hours; New Year's 1967 - 48 hours; TET 1967 - over five days; Buddha's Birthday 1967 - 24 hours; Christmas 1967 - 24 hours; New Year's 1968 - 36 hours; TET 1968 scheduled for a 36-hour period from 1800 hours, 29 January

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through 0600 hours, 31 January;¹ and Christmas 1968 - 24 hours.²

(U) The first stand-down in 1969 was for Buddha's birthday. The GVN, on 8 May, announced that a 24-hour cease-fire in observance of the 2,513th birthday of Buddha would take place on 30 May. The cease-fire was scheduled for 0600, 30 May to 0600, 31 May. During the stand-down the enemy violated the truce 147 times.³ As in all previous stand-downs the enemy took full advantage of the cease-fire.

(U) The second stand-down took place in September when the United States and the Republic of Vietnam announced on 8 September that allied military operations would be scaled down to match the enemy's during the Viet Cong's three-day cease-fire in mourning for Ho Chi Minh. The joint communique stated:⁴

The scale of our military operations in the past has been influenced by the scale of enemy military operations. During this period, the scope of our military operations will likewise be influenced by the nature of enemy military operations.

The Communist announcement of a cease-fire must be viewed in the light of the savage rocket attacks against civilians in Da Nang, and other aggressive actions which have followed the announcement. It must also be viewed in the light of the known history of past Communist violations of cease-fires which they themselves had proposed. Consequently, it is not our intention to talk about cease-fires at this time.

(U) Allied forces resumed offensive operations on 11 September after the Viet Cong ended the three-day cease-fire with at least 31 mortar and rocket attacks.⁵

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1. As a result of an NVN build-up in the DMZ area, the GVN, on 29 Jan 68, announced that the Allies would not observe a stand-down in the five northern provinces of RVN. On the afternoon of 30 Jan 68, the TET stand-down was cancelled due to the NVN TET offensive.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 110, 112, and 114.
 3. News of Interest, CINCPAC Public Affairs Office, 8 May 69, p. 1 and 31 May, p. 1; JCS 09399/161711Z May 69; CINCPAC 170840Z May 69.
 4. AP Wire Service report from Saigon, 8 Sep 69 published in CINCPAC News of Interest, CINCPAC Public Affairs Office, 8 Sep 69.
 5. Ibid., 11 Sep 69.

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(U) The next stand-downs were for Christmas and New Year's. On 5 December the JCS told CINCPAC that he was authorized to observe a Christmas truce period from 1800 hours, 24 December to 1800 hours, 25 December and New Year's truce from 1800 hours, 31 December to 1800 hours, 1 January 1970, all times Saigon time.¹ CINCPAC in turn notified COMUSMACV of the authorization.² The stand-downs were conducted with the usual VC/NLF incidents.

Anti-Infiltration Interdiction Systems

The original plan did not work out as expected and, as a result, important reductions have occurred in the requirements for this system.³

Secretary of Defense Laird

(S) The Jason Division of the Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA), in August 1966, completed a study of an air supported anti-infiltration barrier designed to help isolate the South Vietnam battlefield from North Vietnam. In early September, this study was presented to the Secretary of Defense with a suggestion that a period of months be devoted to examining the concept in detail. However, the Secretary of Defense decided on immediate implementation, noting that, if the fulfillment of the concept was not going well, it could be stopped in three months with only minor expenditures of funds. On 15 September 1966, the Secretary issued a memorandum naming LT GEN Alfred D. Starbird, USA, as Director of Joint Task Force 728 and charged him with implementation of the infiltration interdiction system. The project office established as headquarters for the Director became known as the Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG), and the Director, endowed with rather sweeping powers, reported directly to the Secretary while keeping other senior defense officials informed. The system was to be installed in-theater and operating by 15 September 1967.⁴

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1. JCS 05845/052117Z Dec 69.
 2. CINCPAC 062230Z Dec 69.
 3. Statement by SECDEF Melvin R. Laird before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
 4. Memorandum for the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the CJCS from Defense Communication Planning Group, IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE/DUCK BLIND Committee, 15 Oct 68; hereafter cited as Russell Report.

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(S) As then conceived, the anti-infiltration system was to have two parts¹--one against foot traffic, and the other against vehicles. The part against foot traffic was to extend along, but south of, the southern border of the Demilitarized Zone on into Laos ending northwest of Tchepone; that against vehicles was to cover the road networks in Laos from Mu Gia Pass to south of Route 9, an area approximately 100 by 40 KM. The eastern end of the anti-foot traffic system in the coastal plains was designed as a wide ground barrier of minefields, concertina, fences, sensing devices, patrols, and airmobile troops, the remainder of the anti-foot and all of the anti-vehicle system was "to be effectuated entirely by air action." Antipersonnel mines of the type known as Gravel were to be employed in large quantities, as were noise making making button bomblets to actuate acoustic sensors. The initial system was estimated to cost \$800 million per year. Key requirements consisted of 20 million Gravel mines, 25 million button bomblets, 10 thousand SADEYE bomb clusters, and 1,600 acoustic sensors per month, 70 OV-2 aircraft, 20 mine dispensing C-123 aircraft, and 500 strike sorties and photo reconnaissance to cover 2,500 square miles per week. That the Secretary recognized many changes would be necessary in effecting an anti-infiltration barrier was indicated by his reference to the "first generation" of the system.²

(S) As originally conceived, the barrier was comprised of three systems: on the east, a physical barrier; in the center, an air-supported antipersonnel system; and on the west, an air-supported anti-vehicular system.³

(S) Various technological, political, and financial difficulties were encountered which delayed or forced modification or partial implementation of the separate segments. On 22 December 1966 a modified plan, incorporating the results of a continuing exchange of views between the SECDEF, the JCS, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and the Director of DCPG, was issued by the Director establishing among others the below key milestones:⁴

"1. For the Linear Barrier. Procure the materials for the linear section so as to be ready in-theater by July 1967, but without commitment now as to when they might later be used.

"2. For the Air Supported Capability. Develop and prepare the aircraft elements and other resources unique

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1. See following chart.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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to the air supported capability on a schedule to permit operational availability in-theater by 1 November 1967. Ready for this date would not constitute a decision as to deployment. "

(U) Actions outlined in subsequent portions of the 22 December memorandum commenced with the requirement to obtain from CINCPAC and COMUSMACV their specific plan for the interdiction of infiltration. ¹

(S) The highest national priority was accorded this project in a SECDEF memorandum dated 19 January 1967 to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Despite the emphasis on the total system, effort and resources were concentrated on that portion considered the most promising or important. Accordingly, on 22 April 1967, the antipersonnel portion, was downgraded to the status of "operational test and limited operational capability. " ²


(S) On 22 September 1967, the SECDEF, because of the practical difficulties involved in meeting previously determined deployment dates, authorized further slippage of the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the anti-vehicular subsystem (MUD RIVER) from 1 November to 1 December 1967, and, for the air-supported antipersonnel subsystem (DUMP TRUCK), to 1 January 1968. The former date was substantially met, but the enemy's TET offensive and the subsequent Khe Sanh battle effectively suspended implementation of the antipersonnel subsystem. On the eastern end, logistical problems, enemy action, and concern for mobility, combined with an early and intense monsoon to force suspension of the installation of the linear barrier (DYE MARKER). ³

(S) Thus, in early 1968, only one of the three planned segments of the proposed barrier--the anti-vehicular subsystem (MUD RIVER)--was in operation. As the year progressed, a program of continuing refinement aimed at the improvement of this subsystem was carried out. The center sector (DUMP TRUCK) of the proposed barrier remained essentially unimplemented. On the eastern end (DYE MARKER), efforts were devoted to the construction of a series of mutually supporting strong points, three of which were connected by a 600 meter wide path cleared of vegetation. Simultaneously, as an outgrowth of sensor employment during the defense of Khe Sanh, an examination of the value of sensor systems in tactical applications in ground battle (DUFFEL BAG), was directed by COMUSMACV. ⁴

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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1. PRACTICE NINE consisted of two parts: one against foot traffic and one against vehicle traffic. Combined the two parts consisted of three subsystems: (1) a physical barrier on the east, (2) an air-supported anti-personnel system in the center, and (3) an air-supported anti-vehicle system on the west. PRACTICE NINE was redesignated ILLINOIS CITY.
2. ILLINOIS CITY was redesignated DYE MARKER.
3. The two air-supported subsystems of DYE MARKER were jointly designated as MUSCLE SHOALS. The air-supported antipersonnel subsystem in the center was nicknamed DUMP TRUCK and the air-supported anti-vehicle subsystem in the west was nicknamed MUD RIVER. After this action the only part of DYE MARKER that remained was the physical barrier subsystem on the east.
4. DYE MARKER was redesignated DUEL BLADE.
5. MUSCLE SHOALS was redesignated IGLOO WHITE.

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DUEL BLADE (DYE MARKER)

(S) As mentioned above, during the construction of DUEL BLADE (DYE MARKER), the strong point obstacle system (SPOS) south of the DMZ, enemy activity in the area of interest forced suspension of the construction effort. On 21 October 1968, General Abrams informed CINCPAC and the CJCS that new sensor developments, present requirements, and current and planned operational tactics prompted a re-evaluation of the SPOS. As a result of the re-evaluation, COMUSMACV approved for planning purposes a concept for an anti-infiltration program which proposed establishment of a sensor screen to be emplaced immediately south of the Ben Hai River, extending from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Laotian Border. The plan further proposed that the system would interface with COMMANDO HUNT; all available intelligence gathering means, to include sensors would be used; DUEL BLADE would not be resumed as originally planned and appropriate portions already constructed would be used, as tactically feasible, in support of the new concept; and the remaining unused assets of DUEL BLADE would be used in support of the new concept.¹

(S) CINCPAC concurred in planning for the establishment of a sensor screen as described by COMUSMACV, and interposed no objection to the contemplated use of DUEL BLADE resources in support of the new concept. On 29 October 1968, COMUSMACV published MACV Planning Directive 10-67 which tasked III MAF for operational and administrative planning and implementation of the revised DUEL BLADE concept. The plan was submitted to COMUSMACV on 27 November 1968 and briefed to CINCPAC on 10 January 1969.²

(S) The DUEL BLADE II program of 1969 continued with the same objective as originally planned--to establish a system for denying or impeding enemy infiltration across the DMZ or through Laos into northern Quang Tri province. The major difference between the program in 1969 and that which was originally planned was in the use of maneuver forces in a mobile rather than static posture.³

DUFFEL BAG (DUCK BLIND)

(S) During 1968, a plan for the in-country application of sensors to a wide variety of tactical situations was developed. The DEPSECDEF, on 5

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, p. 16.
 2. Point Paper, J3B13A, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Apr 69, Subj: DUEL BLADE (U)
 3. Point Paper, J3B14, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Dec 69, Subj: DUEL BLADE II, COMMANDO HUNT, DUFFEL BAG and COMMANDO SHACKLE Sensor Operations.

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April 1968, requested the Director of the DCPG to assist CINCPAC, COMUSMACV and the CG, Seventh Air Force in the introduction and use of available MUSCLE SHOALS and DYE MARKER assets in a program that would enhance the U.S. detection and surveillance capability and to prepare in conjunction with them a plan for the application of these assets to a wide range of operations against the enemy. The program was nicknamed DUCK BLIND and later was redesignated DUFFEL BAG. DUCK BLIND was not considered a part of the Anti-Infiltration Interdiction System since the resources were used for operations other than to impede overland infiltration from NVN to RVN.¹

(8) On 10 April 1968 the JCS requested CINCPAC to submit a plan to implement the DUFFEL BAG concept. In turn, on 14 April 1968, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV in coordination with DCPG to prepare the plan. The plan was submitted by COMUSMACV to CINCPAC on 1 May 1968. CINCPAC forwarded the plan with comments and recommendations to the JCS on 8 May 1968. He recommended that (1) the plan be approved for planning purposes on a limited trial basis only; (2) implementation of the plan be on an incremental basis, by phase, as recommended by COMUSMACV and approved by CINCPAC; (3) continuing review be made of DUFFEL BAG operations in order that non-productive applications be identified and discontinued; and (4) sensor procurements be maintained at a level to support MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER operations as conceived and the introductory DUCK BLIND Phase I Operations. Procurement for Phase II should be anticipated but subject to a later more definitive statement of requirements based on result of operational evaluations conducted during Phase I.²

(5) The JCS agreed with CINCPAC's recommendations with exception to necessary procurement actions related to Phase II and so advised the SECDEF. They recommended that (1) the Phase I DUCK BLIND plan be approved for execution and be supported with currently programmed funds and manpower resources; (2) the Phase II DUCK BLIND plan be approved for planning purposes; (3) appropriate FY 68 procurement decisions to support Phase I and Phase II of the DUCK BLIND plan be made by the Director DCPG; and (4) the FY 69 apportionment of MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER funds incorporate allocations which would support possible CY 69 usage requirements.³

(8) The DUFFEL BAG plan consisted of two phases. Phase I completed in 1968, consisted of operational tests of sensor employment in eight different

1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 17-18; Point Paper J3B13, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Apr 69, Subj: DUFFEL BAG (U).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

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tactical applications. Favorable results of these introductory operations were to be exploited as rapidly as possible during follow-on operations conducted during Phase II. The tactical applications were:¹

- a. Combat sweep - to provide current intelligence on enemy positions and/or movements into the tactical area of responsibility.
- b. Targeting - to provide accurate and timely information on enemy location and movement.
- c. Base area surveillance - to provide intelligence regarding the occupation of the enemy base areas and living sites.
- d. Route surveillance - to monitor operations along known or suspected enemy lines of communications, both on land and over water.
- e. Ambush - to provide the intelligence necessary to follow friendly attack of enemy movements.
- f. Convoy protection - to detect enemy ambush forces and target them for attack.
- g. Base defense - to provide a capability to detect and locate enemy efforts to approach a base in sufficient time to allow for appropriate counter action.
- h. Landing zone monitoring - to provide timely warning of enemy intentions, thus allowing the option of contingency action.

(S) Operational tests of these tactical applications were completed in 1968, and evaluations of the effectiveness of these tests were forwarded to JCS by COMUSMACV. The concept and objectives of DUFFEL BAG were confirmed by JCS and approval was received to enter into Phase II Operations.²

(S) The number of sensors in use in DUFFEL BAG continued to increase in 1969. As of 15 December there were 2,852 active sensors in use and these were spread throughout the IV Corps with the largest number operational in the III Corps. One hundred eighty-nine of these sensors were being used by the ARVN under the TIGHT JAW plan.³

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1. Ibid.
 2. Point Paper, J3B13, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Apr 69, Subj: DUFFEL BAG (U).
 3. Point Paper, J3B14, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Dec 69, Subj: DUEL BLADE II, COMMANDO HUNT, DUFFEL BAG and COMMANDO SHACKLE Sensor Operations.

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COMMANDO HUNT

(TS) COMMANDO HUNT was one of two significant plans developed in 1968 for in-country application of sensors to a tactical operation. The plan was developed by the Seventh Air Force for the purpose of conducting an intensified interdiction campaign in Laos during the 1968-69 "Northeast Monsoon" season in Southeast Asia. The objective of COMMANDO HUNT was to reduce the flow of enemy resources into RVN by destroying trucks and caches of military supplies along routes leading south, tie down substantial forces and resources supporting the infiltration route structure, and to exploit the effectiveness of the IGLOO WHITE sensor system as a participant in the truck-killing effort. The main effort of COMMANDO HUNT was to be directed primarily against key traffic control points (TCP) on major LOCs, perishable area targets, and fleeting targets of opportunity.¹

(TS) On 30 August 1968, COMUSMACV voiced certain reservations regarding the COMMANDO HUNT plan. He didn't want to earmark a dedicated force to the interdiction plan, he was concerned that the required sensor frequencies were not available in the number proposed, and had reservations about the operational control aspects of the plan in view of Ambassador Sullivan's tight control over the "Rules of Engagement" in Laos. Based on these reservations, COMUSMACV did not approve the plan at that time. On 9 September 1968, however, the JCS, after receiving a briefing on the plan, considered it to have merit within the context of the views expressed by COMUSMACV and shared by CINCPAC. The JCS asked if COMUSMACV could revise the plan to achieve a substantial portion of the objective while at the same time eliminating those features COMUSMACV found unacceptable. CINCPAC on 22 September 1968, forwarded to the JCS a "Northeast Monsoon Plan" which included a COMUSMACV-revised COMMANDO HUNT input. On 10 October 1968, the JCS notified CINCPAC that they considered the concept sound, realistic and within current capabilities. Phase I of the plan was implemented on 1 November 1968.²

(TS) COMUSMACV announced on 2 April 1969 that Phase I was terminated on 31 March 1969 and that Phase II was implemented on 1 April. Phase II differed from I in that the interdiction campaign in Laos was treated as an entity as opposed to the somewhat compartmentalized approach used in Phase I to facilitate evaluation of IGLOO WHITE. Additionally, in Phase II, command and control was exercised by Commander, Seventh Air Force through normal communications channels and the ABCCCs. The functional

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 19-20.
 2. Ibid.

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responsibility of Commander, Task Force ALPHA, was the management of the IGLOO WHITE sensor field to include planning for and placement of sensors and sensor protective munitions, together with the collection and continuous evaluation of sensor derived intelligence with two primary objectives. The first objective was the immediate tactical exploitation and the second, the evaluation and assessment of sensor derived information. The result of the latter was passed in the form of recommendations to the Seventh Air Force as an input to the daily planning for the air interdiction campaign. COMMANDO HUNT reporting continued during Phase II to provide the data base for analyzing operations under the Phase II concept. ¹

(S) A final report on COMMANDO HUNT dated 20 May 1969 was prepared by the Seventh Air Force staff in conjunction with representatives of Headquarters USAF, Task Force ALPHA, and the Rand Corporation. On 31 May, the CINCPAC staff was briefed on the report. The purpose of the COMMANDO HUNT report was twofold: (1) to document comprehensively the impact of airpower in the overall interdiction campaign in Laos, and (2) to appraise the specific contribution of the IGLOO WHITE sensor system to that effort. The time frame of the report was from 15 November 1968 through 31 March 1969. ²

(S) The briefer stated that the COMMANDO HUNT interdiction campaign, in conjunction with combat operations in South Vietnam, successfully prevented the enemy from building stockpiles that would permit him to expand his operations in South Vietnam. The interdiction attacks by Air Force, Navy and Marine aircraft in Laos destroyed about 47 percent of the enemy's resupply input. Another 29 percent was consumed in maintaining and defending the LOC, and about six percent was stockpiled. The remaining 18 percent was delivered to South Vietnam. This amount was just sufficient to replace supplies expended by the enemy in his in-country combat efforts, or destroyed or captured by friendly forces. It was concluded that the combined effects of the interdiction campaign and in-country combat operations (1) forced the enemy to draw down stocks supplied through Laos because of inadequate resupply during the period of the report; (2) prevented the enemy from accumulating enough supplies from Laos to increase stockpiles sufficient to raise the level of combat activity in RVN; and (3) prevented the enemy from accumulating enough supplies from Laos to maintain the level of activity during the southeast monsoon season of January-April 1969. ³

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1. Point Paper, J3B213, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Apr 69, Subj: COMMANDO HUNT
 2. Point Paper, J3B213, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Jun 69, Subj: COMMANDO HUNT (U).
 3. Ibid.

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(S) In 1969, the COMMANDO HUNT II system was an expanded anti-vehicular infiltration system supporting an increased air interdiction campaign in Laos. Sensors were emplaced from the BARREL ROLL area to the southern edge of the STEEL TIGER area. Sensor readout and evaluation was accomplished at Nakhon Phanom in the Task Force ALPHA facility. As of 15 December there were 510 active sensors in the expanded COMMANDO HUNT area.¹

COMMANDO SHACKLE

(S) COMMANDO SHACKLE is the nickname for a Seventh Air Force developed operation using the Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal (DART) for surveillance along the infiltration routes between the Cambodian borders and Saigon in the II Field Force area. Ground forces are used to support the plan by hand emplacing the sensors. The sensors emplaced are monitored by an EC-121 aircraft flying a special orbit in the target area.²

(S) DART became operational on 1 March 1969 and successfully conducted an eight-hour mission each night during initial operations. Prior to 1 May an EC-121 aircraft orbiting between the sensors and the DART located at the Bien Hoa Air Base, relayed the intelligence data picked up by the sensor to the DART. On 1 May, an automatic data relay (ADR) replaced the EC-121 aircraft.³

(S) The ADR was located on the Nui Ba Den mountain. On 15 June enemy sappers destroyed the installation, however, repairs were completed and the installation became operational again on 11 July. A second DART was located at Pleiku on 1 October and an EC-121 conducted orbiting operations 24 hours each day to relay intelligence data to the DART. This operation was called COMMANDO NECKTAR.⁴

(S) The COMMANDO SHACKLE sensor operation was conducted in the following manner. Signals emitted by the sensor were monitored by an individual on the ground who in turn relayed the information into divisional tactical

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1. Point Paper, J3B14, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Dec 69, Subj: DUEL BLADE II, COMMANDO HUNT, DUFFEL BAG, and COMMANDO SHACKLE Sensor Operations.
 2. Point Paper, J3B14, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Apr 69, Subj: COMMANDO SHACKLE.
 3. Intv, LCOL H. J. Blumhardt, USA, J3B13, Hq CINCPAC, with COL J. R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian, 3 Feb 70.
 4. Ibid.

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operations centers (TOCs). The average time required to relay the sensor detected targets to a TOC was one minute. At the same time, signals emitted by the sensor were relayed by the ADR to the DART where the information was recorded on a print-out. The average time of one minute was also required to relay targets from DARTs to TOCs.¹ Operation of COMMANDO NECKTAR was the same as COMMANDO SHACKLE except an EC-121 relayed the data rather than the ADR.

TIGHT JAW

(S) DCPG was tasked by Dr. Foster, DDR&E, to develop a general concept of where and how DCPG ground surveillance equipment might be employed by the RVNAF and a plan to equip, train and assist the RVNAF in the initial deployment. A "straw-man" was prepared, submitted to, and approved by Dr. Foster. The JCS directed that a detailed plan for the introduction in RVNAF of the DCPG-type ground surveillance equipment be prepared in the field and forwarded to them. The plan, OPlan 103-69, TIGHT JAW, was prepared by COMUSMACV and submitted to CINCPAC for review.²

(S) TIGHT JAW, extended the DUEL BLADE II concept to appropriate border areas in all CTZs. Initial implementation commenced with U.S. forces in I, III and IV CTZs. As selected RVN forces develop an operational capability and are trained in the employment of DUFFEL BAG type surveillance equipment, they will conduct combined sensor supported operations. The plan was consistent with the anti-infiltration and border surveillance requirement of the RVNAF/FWMAF Combined Campaign Plan, it responded to the requirement of the JCS tasking in that it provides an RVNAF ground surveillance systems plan while minimizing the impact on other RVN modernization programs. It complemented the present DUFFEL BAG program and DUEL BLADE II border surveillance effort.³

(S) The plan was designed to augment existing surveillance and anti-infiltration programs in accordance with threat priorities, and as the operational effectiveness of RVNAF permitted. In addition, the plan provided for a gradual expansion of RVNAF training and operational capability in the use of specialized sensors, ancillary devices, and related equipment both in being and under development commensurate with the tactical need and the ability of RVNAF to employ and also exploit.⁴

1. Ibid.; Point Paper, J3B13, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Jul 69, Subj: COMMANDO SHACKLE.
2. J3 Brief 190-69, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Aug 69, Subj: Ground Surveillance Plan for ARVNF (U) (JCS 2472/471-1 of 5 June 1969).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

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(S) On 20 April, the plan was forwarded to the JCS with CINCPAC's recommendation that it be approved for immediate implementation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the COMUSMACV concept as an initial step in training and equipping RVNAF for employment of DCPG-type surveillance equipment. They noted that the anti-infiltration provisions of the plan could not be expected to stop infiltration completely since sensor systems are capable of only assisting in impeding infiltration. However, the implementation of this concept would provide RVN forces an increased capability for battlefield surveillance, target acquisition and intelligence gathering. The JCS approved the plan on 21 June. ¹

(S) Preliminary FY 69 and FY 70 DCPG-type equipment requirements for COMUSMACV, to include the RVNAF, were evaluated by DCPG, in coordination with the Services. Based upon a review of these requirements, it was estimated that they could be met within the FY 69/70 DUEL BLADE/IGLOO WHITE/DUFFEL BAG program. Sensor requirements for FY 70/71 were forwarded to JCS on 1 June 1969. On 20 June 1969, CINCPAC told the JCS that the COMUSMACV estimate appeared to be a balanced statement of requirements and was considered the best estimate that could be made at that time. CINCPAC further recommended that COMUSMACV's sensor requirements be approved. In view of the probable changing theater requirements, the JCS directed CINCPAC and COMUSMACV to redefine the FY 71 sensor and equipment requirements prior to September. The JCS also requested a progress report on TIGHT JAW and any scheduled revision prior to 1 October. ²

(S) On 30 September, COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC with an evaluation of the progress on TIGHT JAW. On 3 October, CINCPAC submitted a TIGHT JAW progress report to the JCS. He told the JCS that the progress to date was satisfactory and that no change in the TIGHT JAW concept was indicated at the present time, that the equipment requirements as stated in the basic plan remained valid, that the training of RVNAF sensor personnel was progressing satisfactorily, that ARVN commanders were supporting the program and were enthusiastic about the sensor potential, and finally, that based upon current progress, training of RVNAF personnel should be completed by the end of March 1970 rather than October 1970, as initially provided for in the basic plan. ³

Plan for Disestablishment of Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG)

(S) The JCS, in November 1968, recommended that the Director, DCPG

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. CINCPAC 031914Z Oct 69.

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be tasked to develop, in coordination with the Services, an orderly transition plan to phase out the DCPG. Initiation of this phase out was suggested to commence in July 1969, with completion as soon thereafter as practicable. The IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE/DUFFEL BAG sensor system developed by the DCPG was divided into phases which were generally indicative of significant changes in sensors and related equipment. PHASE I was the original employment of the sensor systems in Southeast Asia. PHASE II sensors, employed during 1969 incorporated a command and control capability which permitted control of sensor operations. PHASE III sensors, now in research and development, were to incorporate additional channels and a digital system for sensor identification. 1

(S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff after reviewing the management functions performed by DCPG concluded that these functions for support of the IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE/DUFFEL BAG systems should be transferred to the Services when an adequate PHASE III field operational capability in support of U. S. forces in Southeast Asia had been attained. An adequate PHASE III capability was anticipated no later than June 1971. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the DCPG be disestablished upon attainment of an adequate PHASE III field operational capability and that DCPG be tasked with defining, in coordination with the Services, the initial specifications for any post-PHASE III system. 2

Air Operations Southeast Asia 1969

(S) During 1969, air operations in Southeast Asia consisted primarily of large-scale interdiction operations in Laos and close direct air-support operations in SVN. ROLLING THUNDER operations, which ceased on 1 November 1968, were not resumed in 1969. However, contingency plans for ROLLING THUNDER strike options were prepared but never executed.

(S) Air operations in-country continued to pursue the broad objectives of support to the Free World Forces and defeat of the VC/NVA forces. Air operations in Laos were directed against the flow of enemy personnel and material from NVN to RVN. Interdiction operations in Laos received primary emphasis. The flexible capability and the heavy firepower support provided by B-52 operations was exploited to the maximum.

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1. J3 Brief 237-69, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Oct 69, Subj: Disestablishment of JTF 728, Defense Communication Planning Group (DCPG) (C) (JCSM-647-69 of 16 Oct 69).
 2. Ibid.

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ROLLING THUNDER Contingency Plans

(TS) During 1969, CINCPAC's actions to influence the war in Vietnam through ROLLING THUNDER were limited to the task of maintaining a full capability to strike NVN in the event that negotiations should fail and a resumption of ROLLING THUNDER operations was directed. In addition, four contingency plans for strike retaliatory options were prepared.¹

(TS) The first plan is the two-option retaliatory plan for air strikes against targets south of 19 degrees N. The first option, retaliation for major attacks against Saigon, provides for 450-500 Seventh Air Force strikes per day for a period of 48 hours against the most lucrative targets south of 19 degrees N. Targets consist of transshipment points and targets of opportunity on road and water LOCs as discovered by FAC aircraft. Backup targets consist of hard targets such as selected petroleum sites, railroad complexes, and major transshipment points. Option two, retaliation for minor attacks against major population centers, is a one-time strike against the railroad complex and petroleum storage facilities at Vinh, Quang Khe, and Dong Hoi. Carrier-based aircraft would be used against Vinh and land-based aircraft against Quang Khe and Dong Hoi with naval gunfire to be delivered subsequent to the final aircraft TOT for a period of two hours. The desired warning time for the two options is 48 hours but with prior coordination this time could be reduced to 12 hours.²

(TS) The second plan provides for a carrier air strike against Bai Thuong airfield just south of 20 degrees N. This plan envisions the use of 14 strike aircraft plus necessary support to inflict maximum damage to the airfield and support facilities. Only six hours prior notification is required for execution provided the CVA is at YANKEE Station.³

(TS) The third plan provides for a coordinated two-day maximum effort air campaign to neutralize Bai Thuong airfield and to inflict maximum damage to 14 high-value targets in the Thanh Hoa area followed by armed recce as determined by the results of the initial effort. Thanh Hoa area targets consist primarily of railroad yards and facilities, petroleum storage facilities and transshipment points. Forces employed in the initial two day effort will include three carrier strike groups attacking morning, noon and afternoon each day and two Seventh Air Force strike groups attacking morning and

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1. Point Paper, J3B21, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Jul 69, Subj: ROLLING THUNDER Strike Options Below 20 Degrees (S).
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

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afternoon each day with coordinated TOTs and mutual support. A 48-hour advance notification is required to insure that three aircraft carriers are at YANKEE Station.¹

(TS) The fourth plan calls for B-52 ARC LIGHT strikes against 31 targets in the RP-I area over a minimum time period. Targets consist of truck parks and storage areas with a high level of activity along major LOCs above 17 degrees 10 minutes N. Six aircraft would be used against each target. A maximum force of B-52s would be compressed into a minimum period of time. Maximum ECM, IRON HAND, MIG CAP and SAM suppression support aircraft are required. A 48-hour advance notification is necessary.²

Air Operations in NVN

(TS) U.S. air operations in North Vietnam were limited primarily to air reconnaissance and as indicated above these operations were not part of the ROLLING THUNDER campaign.

Air Force Tactical Forces in Southeast Asia

(TS) On 12 April, the JCS requested CINCPAC to consider the alternative of reducing two Thailand-based tactical fighter squadrons rather than two from RVN if directed by higher authority. CINCPAC recommended that if directed to reduce the reduction should be from RVN rather than Thailand; however, CINCPAC remained of the opinion that the point had not been reached where tactical air could be reduced in Southeast Asia.³

(TS) Prior to the JCS request of 12 April, the JCS had already discussed the possibility of reducing air assets as a result of the November 1968 bombing halt. They told the DEPSECDEF, on 23 November 1968, that after their review of the effectiveness of diverting air assets released by the bombing halt, they had concluded that air assets should not be reduced.⁴

(TS) On 18 April, the JCS concurred with CINCPAC and COMUSMACV in their evaluation of the feasibility of withdrawing two tactical fighter squadrons from Southeast Asia. They stated that there was no evidence that the threat

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. J3B11 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.

4. J3 Brief 96-69, Hq CINCPAC, 1 May 69, Subj: Air Force Tactical Forces in Southeast Asia (U) (JCSM-236-69 of 18 Apr 69) and (JCS 2147/494-1 as revised 16 Apr 69.)

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in Southeast Asia had been reduced and that the reduction of the two squadrons would inhibit COMUSMACV's ability to deal with the constantly shifting threat. Further, the JCS reaffirmed that a reduction in air assets in Southeast Asia was not militarily sound until there was positive evidence that the enemy was negotiating in good faith and that a significant reduction in the threat had taken place. If for other than military reasons a decision were made to reduce Southeast Asia air assets, the JCS recommended the reduction be made from South Vietnam rather than Thailand for the following reasons:¹

a. Thailand based squadrons are well located and fully committed to out-country operations and could shift to in-country operations with little delay.

b. Thailand based forces are employed in the Laos interdiction program and should not be reduced at this time.

c. If tactical fighter forces are withdrawn from Thailand now it may be difficult to reintroduce them after T-Day.

d. Thailand bases are less susceptible to attack than bases in SVN.

e. Program 6 spaces are more critical in SVN than Thailand.

Increased Aerial Photographic Reconnaissance Over NVN

(TS) On 7 March, the JCS directed an increased aerial reconnaissance effort over North Vietnam for ten to 15 days. The purpose of the increased aerial photographic recce was to indicate to the North Vietnamese a possible U. S. preparation for the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam in an effort to obtain a lessening of NVN combat activity in South Vietnam. This increased effort applied to SR-71, drone, and tactical reconnaissance programs, with the stipulation that the previously authorized tactical reconnaissance sortie allocations of 25 per-day, 90 per-week, remain in effect. On 15 March, the JCS extended this period of increased reconnaissance an additional seven days.²

1. Ibid.

2. J3B51 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69, citing, JCS 04162/072243Z Mar 69, JCS 5981/202046Z Nov 68, and JCS 04784/152200Z Mar 69.

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(TS) Due to scheduling problems resulting from sortie limitations, CINCPACAF requested that the 90 sortie per-week limitation be waived during the period of increased reconnaissance. In response to this request, and to obtain improved flexibility in responding to future contingency requirements, CINCPAC requested the JCS delete the 90 sortie per-week limitation on tactical reconnaissance over North Vietnam. On 27 March, the JCS canceled the increased reconnaissance effort, directed reconnaissance operations be returned to normal, and stated that manned tactical reconnaissance south of 19 degrees N would be maintained at the previously authorized 25 per-day, 90 per-week sortie limitation.¹

Air Operations in Laos

(S) Admiral McCain in his "Year End Review of Vietnam - 1968," stated:²

Air operations out-of-country will continue to be directed against the flow of enemy personnel and materiel from NVN to SVN. Interdiction operations in Laos will continue to receive primary emphasis and the IGLOO WHITE sensor system will continue to be used in an intelligence gathering role in support of those operations.

(S) This outlook for 1969 proved to be true. With the diversion of ROLLING THUNDER aircraft from NVN to Laos after the cessation of ROLLING THUNDER, the interdiction campaign and air support to in-country operations in Laos were intensified. Air power was employed in Laos to reduce the infiltration from North Vietnam through Laos into South Vietnam and to support friendly forces in the struggle against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese. However, restrictions were imposed on the employment of forces and on the selection of targets in order to protect non-combatants and friendly forces and to prevent inadvertent border violations.³

Air Operating Authorities and Rules of Engagement in Laos

(TS) Air operations in Laos have always been conducted under constraints which did not permit maximum flexibility in the use of friendly air power.

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1. Ibid.; citing, CINCPAC DO/250359Z Mar 69, CINCPAC 270947Z Mar 69, and JCS 5703/272243Z Mar 69.
 2. CINCPAC 012252Z Jan 69.
 3. Point Paper, J3B233, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Aug 69, Subj: Laos Air Operations Areas (U).

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USAF SORTIES NVN 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	* ATTACK	CAP/ESC	** RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
A-1		6			6
AC/RC-47			371		371
F-4	128	404		2	534
F-102		2			2
F-105	85	591			676
RB-57			1		1
EB/RB-66			737	1065	1802
RF-4			816	252	1068
RF-101			351	2	353
EC-121				800	800
C/HC-130			628	526	1154
EC/KC-135				833	833
HELOS				407	407
TOTAL	213	1003	2904	3887	8007

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE AND FLAK SUPP.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, RDF

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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USN/USMC SORTIES NVN 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	* ATTACK	CAP/ESC	** RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
A/EA/RA-3			885	3622	4507
A-4	51	334	86	2684	3155
A/EA-6	4	70	7	357	438
F-4		5895	318	8	6221
F-8		6238	758	64	7060
EA-5			264	17	281
RF-8		.1	295	18	314
E-1				1103	1103
E-2				1322	1322
G-1/EC121			1	405	406
A-7	17	289	39	704	1049
P-3				126	126
HELOS				205	205
TOTAL USN	72	12827	2653	10635	26187
A-EA-6			4	822	826
F-4		1736		1	1737
RF-4			416	11	427
EF-10			2	929	931
TOTAL USMC		1736	422	1763	3921

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE AND FLAK SUPP.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, RDF

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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US AIRCRAFT LOSSES NVN 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
A/EA/RA-3		1											1
A-4					1		1						2
A/EA-6												1	1
F-4		1	1				1						3
F-8		1	1	2	3		2	2	2	1	1		15
RF-8					1								1
A-7											1		1
HELOS		1											1
TOTAL USN		4	2	2	5		4	2	2	1	2	1	25
F-4								1					1
TOTAL USMC								1					1
RF-4						1							1
TOTAL USAF						1							1
TOTAL LOSSES	0	4	2	2	5	1	4	3	2	1	2	1	27

LEGEND: OPERATIONAL LOSS
 COMBAT LOSS

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES THAILAND 1969

BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
A-1			2			1				1		2	6
A-26			1										1
AC/RC/C-47						1							1
F-4	2								1				3
F-102	1												1
F-105					1		1			1	2		5
EB/RB-66				1									1
EC-121				1					1				2
HELOS	1						2			1			4
B-52							1						1
TOTAL USAF	4	0	3	2	1	2	4	0	2	3	2	2	25
TOTAL USN													
TOTAL USMC													
TOTAL	4	0	3	2	1	2	4	0	2	3	2	2	25

LEGEND: OPERATIONAL LOSS

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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USAF SORTIES SVN 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	* ATTACK	CAP/ESC	** RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
A-1	2058	2		365	2425
A-37	10691	40		5	10736
A/E/R/C-47	2609	650	11028	6727	21014
AC-119	2564	1		256	2821
F-4	20445	242		1148	21835
F-100	58177	86		1487	59750
F-102		974		105	1079
B-57	391			32	423
RB-57			1255	26	1281
RF-4			7862	249	8111
RF-101			3091	52	3143
C-7				156630	156630
C-123				78528	78528
C/HC/AC-130			10	72577	72587
O-1/2			87953	45980	133933
U-10			1	6684	6685
OV-10	36		17796	12873	30705
KC-135			3	2113	2116
TOTAL	96971	1995	128999	385837	613802

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, CAS, DAS AND INTERDICTION

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, SLAR, RDF

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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USN/USMC SORTIES SVN 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	* ATTACK	CAP/ESC	** RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
A/E/RA-3				2	2
A-4	5314		10		5324
E/A-6	340				340
A-7	2282				2282
F-4	809				809
TOTAL USN	8745		10	2	8757
A-4	15426		266	4	15696
E/A-6	7696	4	237	145	8082
F-4	21681	41	256		21978
RF-4			1849		1849
EF-10			675	127	802
C-117				1199	1199
KC-130				7045	7045
O-1			978	821	1799
OV-10		101	6128	3939	10168
TOTAL USMC	44803	146	10389	13280	68618

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, CAS, DAS, AND INTERDICTION

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, SLAR, RDF

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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VNAF SORTIES SVN 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	* ATTACK	CAP/ESC	** RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
A-1	14919	153	9	97	15178
A-37	10444	53	7	67	10571
F-5	5483	59		23	5565
A/R/C-47	1785	2	836	1118	3741
O-1	28	24	15294	9770	25116
U-17			2989	4095	7084
U-6			800	2403	3203
C-119				257	257
OV-10			9	16	25
TOTAL VNAF	32659	291	19944	17846	70740

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, CAS, DAS AND INTERDICTION

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, SLAR, RDF

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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USAF AIRCRAFT LOSSES SVN 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
A-1							1						1
	1												1
							1					1	2
A-37												1	1
												1	1
AC/RC/C-47									1				1
									1	1			2
F-4	3	1	2	1		2		4		1	2	1	17
				1									1
	1										2	1	4
F-100	5		6	2	2	2	4	3	1	1		1	27
			1		1								2
	2			1			1	1	2	2			9
RF-4	2	1										1	4
	1												1
				1				1					2
C-7									1			1	2
	1		1				1						3
					1								1
C-123										1		1	2
													1
C/HC/AC-130				1	1	1							3
										1		1	2
	1												1
O-1/2	1/		1/	1/1		/4	2/1	1/	/2	/1	1/1		17
			1/		/2	/1		1/1		/1	1/1	/1	10
		1/				2/1						1/	5
U-10					1			1					1
													1
		1											1
AC-119										1			1
OV-10							1			1	2	1	5
	1			1		1						1	4
TOTAL	19	4	12	10	8	14	12	13	8	11	10	14	135

LEGEND:

GROUND FIRE
UNKNOWN
OPERATIONAL
DESTROYED ON GROUND

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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USN/USMC AIRCRAFT LOSSES SVN 1969

BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
A-4							1						1
A-7						1							1
F-4							1						1
TOTAL USN						1	2						3
A-4	1		1	1	1			2					6
										1		1	2
			7										7
A/EA-6	1								1				2
											1		1
F-4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1						7
								2	1				3
	1			1	2				1				5
KC-130					1								1
C-117												1	1
OV-10				1	1								2
								2					2
TOTAL	4	1	9	4	6	1	1	6	3	1	1	2	39

LEGEND:

GROUND FIRE
UNKNOWN
OPERATIONAL
DESTROYED ON GROUND

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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VNAF AIRCRAFT LOSSES SVN 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
A-1	1	2							1				4
									1		1		2
A-37							1						1
F-5							1						1
O-1	1												1
	2												2
RC/C-47			1					1	1				3
U-17											1		1
	1					1					1		3
TOTAL	5	2	1			1	2	1	3		3		18

LEGEND:

GROUND FIRE

UNKNOWN

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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HELICOPTER SORTIES BY MODEL AIRCRAFT AND SERVICE SVN 1969

AIRCRAFT	SORTIES						
	ARMED HELO	COMBAT SUPPORT			COMBAT TOTAL	# NON-CBT SUPPORT	TOTAL
		CARGO	TROOP CARRIER	@ OTHER			
USA UH-1	418917	344377	1633824	1193095	3590213	1052317	4642530
OH-13				227	227	9	236
OH-23	39	362	1400	15666	17467	12261	29728
CH-47	1764	348222	110925	34218	495129	90370	585499
CH-54		27968	1561	510	30039	1506	31545
AH-1	387289	1	2412	58032	447734	491	448225
OH-6	23236	5994	9112	635899	674241	66035	740276
OH-58		55	155	500	710	252	962
TOTAL USA	831245	726979	1759389	1938147	5255760	1223241	6479001
USMC UH-1	57634	540	395	20186	78755	4982	83737
UH-1 \$							
UH-34	15	3568	1027	13181	17791	1467	19258
UH-34 \$		1300	3196	1533	6029	2738	8767
CH-46	228	22529	43947	60278	126982	64019	191001
CH-46 \$	1	4011	4042	3159	11213	4509	15722
CH-53		33113	13569	1173	47855	6274	54129
AH-1	20740			36	20776		20776
TOTAL USMC	78618	65061	66176	99546	309401	83989	393390
USAF UH-1	6564	1009	1124	3762	12449	3973	16422
HH/CH-3				2010	2010		2010
HH-43				7792	7792		7792
TOTAL USAF	6564	1009	1124	13554	22251	3973	26224
TOTAL USN							
U.S. TOTAL	916427	793049	1826689	2051247	5587412	1311203	6898615
VNAF UH-1	4386	1158	43096	1128	49768	10897	60665
CH-34	798	5962	13282	700	20742	3539	24281
VNAF TOTAL	5184	7120	56378	1828	70510	14436	84946
US/VNAF TOTAL	921431	800169	1883067	2053075	5557922	1325639	6983561

NOTES @ INCLUDES RECCE, SAR, FAC, C&C, AIR EVAC AND OTHER COMBAT SUPPORT SORTIES.
 # INCLUDES LOG CARGO/TROOP CARRIER AND OTHER NON-COMBAT SUPPORT SORTIES.
 \$ USMC SLF AIRCRAFT

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HELICOPTER LOSSES SVN 1969 BY TYPE HELICOPTER

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
HH-3		1											1
HH-43	1					1							2
								1					1
UH-1	1	1	1	1								1	5
					1			1		1			3
TOTAL USAF	2	2	1	1	1	1		2		1		1	12
UH-1		1					1			1			3
			1		2								3
UH-34	1	2											3
AH-1									1		1		2
CH-46	2	2	3	7	2	6	3	2			2	1	30
	1		2		2	3	1			1		1	11
CH-53									1				1
				1	1						1		3
TOTAL USMC	4	5	6	8	7	9	5	2	2	2	4	2	56
TOTAL USN													0
CH-34	1	1	1				1		8		1		13
			1		1								2
UH-1										2	1		3
TOTAL VNAF	1	1	2		1		1		8	2	2		18

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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US ARMY HELICOPTER LOSSES SVN 1969

BY TYPE HELICOPTER

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
UH-1	10	20	26	29	32	21	8	13	16	7	30	13	223
	23	13	30	29	21	26	20	22	25	19	18	10	256
		(3)	(2)		(12)	(3)			(1)		(14)	(1)	(36)
OH-13		1											1
OH-23	2	1									1		4
CH-47	3	11		1	1						1		17
		3	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	15
	(2)	(9)											(11)
CH-54			1										1
OH-6	13	11	18	15	22	13	18	19	16	15	21	11	192
	8	5	11	6	10	8	13	7	13	9	6	14	110
		(1)			(1)	(2)		(1)			(6)	(1)	(12)
AH-1	3		4	2	3	4	4	6	7	2	9	4	48
	1	2		3	4	2	8	5	6	5	2	9	47
								(2)	(3)		(3)		(8)
TOTAL	63	67	91	86	94	75	70	75	84	58	89	62	914

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

DESTROYED ON GROUND (INCLUDED IN COMBAT LOSS)

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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US ARMY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT LOSSES SVN 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
O-1	2	6	5	4	6	2	1						26
	4	5	4	2	1		1	2		5			24
		(3)	(3)	(1)	(2)								(9)
U-1	1	1											2
				1				1					2
U-6		1			1	1			1				4
OV-1			2							1	2		5
			1			1	2	1	2	2			9
U-8	1												1
U-21			1										1
TOTAL	8	13	13	7	8	4	4	4	3	8	2		74

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

DESTROYED ON GROUND (INCLUDED IN COMBAT LOSS)

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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The constraints imposed resulted from political-military considerations.¹ As air operations were intensified changes to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) became necessary. This ultimately led to misunderstandings in the interpretation of the ROE.

(TS) On 12 June 1969, the U.S. Air Attache in Vientiane in a message to CINCPAC suggested a meeting be held in Udorn, Thailand or Vientiane, Laos to discuss the ROE for air operations in Laos. The attache told CINCPAC that "a recent request to strike targets in Laos revealed that the operators in Vientiane and Udorn were not in agreement with Saigon, Hawaii, and Washington on interpretation of the rules." He cited other incidents and pointed out that the AMEMBASSY Vientiane was particularly concerned with terminology and "making as few areas and exceptions as possible and publishing one document with all agencies concurrence." It was suggested that the conference be held after the arrival of the newly selected Ambassador to Laos, Mr. Godley who replaced Ambassador Sullivan.²

(TS) The conference was held in Vientiane from 11 to 15 August with representatives from CINCPAC, the 7th AF, CTF 77, COMUSMACV, 7/13th AF, PACAF, AIRA Vientiane and AMEMB Vientiane in attendance.³ The final report of the conference recommended several changes to the existing operating areas, operating rules, and rules of engagement which would ease the conduct of operations. Those changes requiring approval of the JCS were forwarded by CINCPAC to the JCS on 27 August.⁴


(TS) The JCS approved CINCPAC's recommended changes on 23 September⁵ and on 27 September CINCPAC promulgated the BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER/YANKEE TEAM Basic Operation Order which set forth authorities pertaining to operating rules and areas in Laos.⁶ The Operation Order defined the geographic limitations of both the BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER area of operations. The BARREL ROLL Area was divided into three operating zones--BARREL ROLL North, East, and West as indicated on following sketch of "BARREL ROLL Operating Area." Within BARREL ROLL East, a 10 NM buffer zone was established contiguous with the NVN border. The STEEL TIGER Area was divided into two operating zones--STEEL TIGER East

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1. See CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol II, pp. 660-665; also, CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 183-191.
 2. AIRA Vientiane 120800Z Jun 69.
 3. J3B214 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 4. CINCPAC 270337Z Aug 69.
 5. JCS 9611/231714Z Sep 69.
 6. CINCPAC 272318Z Sep 69.

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
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NORTHERN LAOS BARREL ROLL (BR) OPERATING AREA



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and West as indicated on following sketch of "STEEL TIGER Operating Area." Within the STEEL TIGER East zone a positive control area was established.¹

General Rules for Air Operations in Laos

(TS) General rules for air operations in Laos set forth in the CINCPAC Operation Order include:²

- a. The position of the FAC or strike aircraft will be determined by the most precise navigational aids available before controlling or conducting strikes in Laos.
- b. Visual strikes will not be conducted within 500 meters of a known POW camp. All weather strikes will not be conducted within 3,000 meters of a known POW camp or friendly position.
- c. Weather reconnaissance; pathfinder; FAC; flak suppression; IRON HAND; pre-strike, concurrent, and post-strike reconnaissance; CAP; flare; SAR; and ESM flights are authorized in support of strike missions. However, active ECM will be employed only as specifically authorized.
- d. All targets and areas of operation will be validated by AMEMBASSY Vientiane, or designated representative. Air Attache, Vientiane is authorized to validate within all approved operating areas and his representative in Savannakhet is authorized to validate only in STEEL TIGER.
- e. Targets of opportunity may be validated by:
 - (1) A Forward Air Guide (FAG) only in his area of responsibility.

-
1. CINCPAC 272318Z Sep 69; The Buffer Zone is that area of Laos within 10 NM of the NVN border between 19 degrees North and 21 degrees, 15 minutes North, in which no strikes are authorized except as approved by the JCS. When approved, strikes must be conducted under positive FAC/FAG control and COLLEGE EYE monitor. The Positive Control Area (PCA) is that area of Laos within 10 NM of the NVN/RVN border between 19 degrees North and 16 degrees, 40 minutes North. Aircraft may operate in the PCA when fraggged or diverted by 7th AF provided they remain under positive radar control and comply with PCA operating instructions of the 7th AF.
 2. CINCPAC 272318Z Sep 69.

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(2) RAVEN and NAIL FACs provided a Lao observer is aboard to approve each validation and if the strikes are controlled by the validating FAC.

(3) The ABCCC within all approved operating areas provided a Lao observer is aboard to approve each validation.

(4) All other aircraft with an authorized Lao observer aboard.

f. Aircraft will be armed with optimum ordnance validated by AMEMBASSY Vientiane for the specific target or operating area. Unexpended ordnance may be jettisoned in areas authorized by the AMEMBASSY Vientiane.

g. Authority is granted to attack and destroy AAA and SAM sites south of 19 degrees in NVN which fire upon U.S. aircraft operating in Laos. This authority includes AAA and SAM support facilities in the immediate vicinity of the firing sites.

h. IRON HAND aircraft operating in support of air operations in Laos are authorized to fire SHRIKE Missiles at AAA and SAM radar signals emanating from NVN below 19 degrees N when these signals clearly indicate an immediate threat to friendly forces. SHRIKEs may also be used against AAA and SAM radars located in BARREL ROLL East and STEEL TIGER East.

BARREL ROLL Area Operating Rules

(TS) The CINCPAC Operation Order set forth specific rules for each of the three zones within BARREL ROLL.¹

a. BARREL ROLL North. No U.S. air strikes or YANKEE TEAM operations are permitted unless specifically requested by the AMEMBASSY Vientiane and approved by CINCPAC and the JCS.

b. BARREL ROLL East.

(1) No U.S. air strikes are permitted within the buffer zone unless targets are specifically validated by AMEMBASSY Vientiane and approved by CINCPAC and the JCS. When authorized, strikes will be conducted under COLLEGE EYE monitor and FAC control. Current authorities granted within the buffer zone are strikes along Route 7 to VG 0254 and A-1 aircraft with JOLLY GREEN support, if required for SAR, are authorized to

1. Ibid.

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conduct air strikes along Route 65 to 104 degrees 30 minutes E. In addition, when requested by AMEMBASSY Vientiane, air strikes in support of friendly LIMA sites may be authorized by DEPCOMUSMACV for Air or his designated representative.

(2) Armed reconnaissance is authorized within 200 meters of all LOCs up to the buffer zone.

(3) Targets more than 200 meters from an LOC must be validated. Strikes must be conducted under the control of an authorized FAC/FAG, or utilize all-weather bombing systems.

(4) COLLEGE EYE monitor is required for all U.S. military air operations.

(5) Napalm may be employed against motorized vehicles and occupied AA/AW positions, and targets validated for napalm by AMEMBASSY Vientiane.

(6) Strikes may be conducted within 500 meters of an active village or non-combatant(s) only when ground fire is being received from the location or when in close air support of friendly troops. However, ordnance will not be expended on the town of Sam Neua unless requested by the AMEMBASSY Vientiane and approved by CINCPAC and the JCS.

c. BARREL ROLL West.

(1) All targets in BARREL ROLL West must be validated, and strikes must be conducted under COLLEGE EYE monitor under the control of an authorized FAC/FAG, or utilize all-weather bombing systems. Aircraft may operate in the PCA when fraggged or diverted by the Seventh Air Force, provided they remain under positive radar control and comply with the PCA operating instructions published by the Seventh Air Force.

(2) Napalm can be authorized only against targets validated by AMEMBASSY Vientiane.

(3) Air operations within 25 NM of Vientiane or 10 NM of Luang Prabang are prohibited unless requested or authorized by AMEMBASSY Vientiane. AC-47 gunships may transit the Vientiane prohibited area when responding to requests for support in the BARREL ROLL Area.

(4) No U.S. air strikes will be conducted on the town of Khang Khai unless specifically requested by AMEMBASSY Vientiane and approved by CINCPAC and the JCS.

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(5) No U.S. air strikes will be conducted on the town of Phoung Savan unless validated by AMEMBASSY Vientiane.

STEEL TIGER Area Operating Rules

(TS) The CINCPAC Operation Order also specified operating rules for both the East and West Zones of STEEL TIGER.¹

a. STEEL TIGER East.

(1) Armed reconnaissance is authorized within 200 meters of all LOCs. Aircraft may operate in the PCA when fraggged or diverted by the Seventh Air Force provided they remain under positive radar control and comply with the PCA operating instructions published by the Seventh Air Force.

(2) Targets more than 200 meters from an LOC must be validated and strikes must be conducted under the control of an authorized FAC/FAG, or utilize all-weather bombing systems.

(3) Napalm may be employed against motorized vehicles, occupied AA/AW positions, and targets validated for napalm by AMEMBASSY Vientiane.

(4) Strikes may be conducted within 500 meters of an active village or non-combatants only when ground fire is being received from the location or when in close air support of friendly troops.

(5) No air strikes or armed reconnaissance will be conducted closer than three nautical miles to the Laos-Cambodia border, unless approved by AMEMBASSY Vientiane.

b. STEEL TIGER West.

(1) All targets in STEEL TIGER West must be validated and strikes must be conducted under the control of an authorized FAC/FAG, or utilize all-weather bombing systems.

(2) Napalm may be employed only against targets validated for napalm by AMEMBASSY Vientiane.

(3) Air operations are restricted below 5,000 feet AGL within five nautical miles of Saravane and Attopeu.

1. Ibid.

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(4) Air operations are restricted below 10,000 feet AGL (5,000 feet AGL for fringed photo reconnaissance) within 10 NM of the cities of Thakhek, Savannakhet, and Pakse.

YANKEE TEAM Operations

(TS) The specific objective of the YANKEE TEAM (YT) tactical reconnaissance is to acquire intelligence data in support of BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER operations and other intelligence collection objectives in Laos. Like the other air operations in Laos, YT operations have constraints:¹

a. No operations are permitted in BARREL ROLL North unless specifically validated by the AMEMBASSY Vientiane and approved by the JCS.

b. No operations are permitted within 25 NM of Vientiane or 10 NM of Luang Prabang unless authorized by the AMEMBASSY.

c. Operations are restricted below 5,000 feet AGL within five NM of Saravane and Attapeu, and 5,000 feet AGL within 10 NM of Thakhek, Savannakhet, and Pakse. Additionally, YT aircraft can operate in the PCA only under positive radar control and must comply with PCA operating instructions.

Operations in the BARREL ROLL (BR) Area, 1969

(S) January - The total sorties for the month decreased from 1,586 in December to 1,158. BDA revealed a significant increase in secondary explosions, but in the remaining categories of BDA remained substantially the same or decreased.²

(S) February - The downward trend in sorties continued during the month. Only 913 were flown in February as opposed to 1,158 in January and 1,586 in December 1968. There was a significant increase in structures destroyed, but in the remaining categories the BDA remained relatively the same or decreased.³

(S) March - The total strike sorties increased from 913 in February to 1,265 in March. There was a very significant increase in structures destroyed--1,264 in March as compared to 618 in February. In the other

1. Ibid.

2. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.

3. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.

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USAF SORTIES LAOS 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	* ATTACK	CAP/ESC	** RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
A-1	15052	1908	9	70	17039
A-26	3099			2	3101
A/R/C-47	450	2	1754	228	2434
AC-119	32	1	25	14	72
F-4	47949	1449	1112	5904	56414
F-100	10970	39	189	1757	12955
F-102	8	1058		27	1093
F-105	20493	1476		26	21995
B-57	2242		56		2298
RF-4			10699	382	11081
RF-101			803		803
EB-66			188	3011	3199
EC-121			3	3262	3265
N/C-123	181		76	2038	2295
A/H/C-130	1105		227	4474	5806
O-1/2				13356	13356
OV-10				4675	4675
U-10			2	852	854
KC-135				16020	16020
HELOS				5025	5025
TOTAL	101581	5933	15143	61123	183780

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE AND FLAK SUPP.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, RDF

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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USN/USMC SORTIES LAOS 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	* ATTACK	CAP/ESC	** RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
E/R/A-3			579	189	768
A-4	14895	4	2	735	15636
E/A-6	4142	1	44	43	4230
A-7	11088	19	4	174	11285
F-4	3068	527	1	23	3619
F-8	18	815	8	139	980
RA-5		1	558	66	625
RF-8		37	405	28	470
E-1				7	7
HELOS				2366	2366
C-1				2	2
TOTAL USN	33211	1404	1601	3772	39988
A-4	2835	18	1338	417	4608
E/A-6	2763		2	391	3156
F-4	4181	545	12	12	4750
RF-4			71		71
TOTAL USMC	9779	563	1423	820	12585

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE AND FLAK SUPP.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, RDF

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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USAF AIRCRAFT LOSSES LAOS 1969

BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
A-1	3	1	4	2		2	2			1	2	1	18
												1	1
A-26			1				1						2
AC/RC/C-47		1											1
F-100	3	1		3	1					1	1	1	11
								1					1
F-4	3	1	2	3	1	1		2	2	4	6	6	31
	2	2	1	1			2						8
F-105	1	2	3	1	1	2		1			2	1	14
		1					1						2
B/RB-57	1		2										3
		1											1
RF-4				2							3	1	6
C/HC/AC-130					1						1		2
O-2	1	1	2										4
		1			1								2
										1			1
HELOS	2					1				3			6
	1	1											2
OV-10												1	1
										1			1
TOTAL	17	13	15	12	5	6	6	4	2	11	15	12	118

LEGEND:

GROUND FIRE

UNKNOWN

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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USN/USMC AIRCRAFT LOSSES LAOS 1969 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
A-4	1						1						2
		2				1							3
	1	1					3	2					7
A/EA-6				1									1
									1		2		3
A-7		1			1								2
				1						1	1		3
			1	1	1		1	1				2	7
F-4											1		1
		1	1										2
RA-5			1										1
RF-8												1	1
HELOS								1					1
TOTAL USN	2	5	3	3	2	1	5	4	1	1	4	3	34
A-4				1									1
												1	1
A/EA-6			1										1
F-4												1	1
HELOS	1						1	1				1	4
	1												1
TOTAL USMC	2		1	1			1	1				3	9

LEGEND:

GROUND FIRE

UNKNOWN

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: MAJOR I.G. MIETH, USAF, J3A314, CINCPAC

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ENEMY LOSSES - LAOS
1 JAN - 31 DEC 1969
DESTROYED/DAMAGED

	<u>VEHICLES</u>		<u>WBLC</u>	<u>STRUCTURES</u>	<u>BRIDGES</u>	<u>AAA/AW</u>	<u>SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS</u>	<u>ROAD CUTS</u>
	<u>ATTACKED</u>	<u>DEST/DAM</u>						
JANUARY	5,538	915/417	5/3	390/83	29/19	116/287	2,949	1,179
FEBRUARY	4,287	677/304	13/4	754/106	22/31	88/262	6,177	945
MARCH	4,854	864/293	8/6	1,379/224	27/27	133/331	8,929	1,066
APRIL	5,110	1,030/295	18/11	1,343/388	14/14	119/424	9,878	677
MAY	4,579	1,007/397	17/6	1,901/559	17/19	54/325	4,891	135
JUNE	1,477	340/200	56/26	1,584/650	28/29	6/78	2,731	75
JULY	482	125/68	49/32	1,701/797	36/31	15/49	2,370	128
AUGUST	278	68/46	58/19	2,062/804	29/21	19/15	1,675	102
SEPTEMBER	386	95/72	77/21	2,520/866	17/14	36/40	1,642	455
OCTOBER	920	155/121	23/8	2,237/615	22/20	18/47	1,751	687
NOVEMBER	3,180	675/276	26/9	1,599/237	6/7	48/117	3,508	428
DECEMBER	4891	815/650	16/12	699/154	8/5	220/185	3,748	106
TOTALS	35,982	6,766/3,139	366/157	18,169/5485	255/237	882/2160	50,249	5,987

SOURCE: MAJOR J.R. LEE, JR., USAF, J24333 HQ, CINCPAC.

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categories there was an increase in BDA except for AAA/AW destroyed which remained relatively the same.

(S) April - The total strike sorties increased from 1,265 in March to 1,656 in April. There were decreases in all BDA categories except vehicles and AAA/AW destroyed. ¹

(S) May - The total sorties increased from 1,656 in April to 1,885 in May. This made the third consecutive month that sorties increased. There were increases in all BDA categories except AAA/AW destroyed and road cuts. The structures destroyed is the highest recorded for any one month since air operations began in Laos. ²

(S) June - Sorties increased for the fourth consecutive month. A total of 1,961 strike sorties were flown during the month. BDA revealed increases in vehicles, WBLC, and bridges destroyed and decreases in the remaining categories. The 88 enemy vehicles destroyed is unusually high for the BARREL ROLL Area and indicates the enemy's increased supply effort during the 1969 monsoon. ³

(S) July - During the month, an all-time high of 3,620 sorties were flown. Vehicles destroyed remained the same as June which was the highest on record; however, all other categories of BDA increased. This increased BDA and the two months (June and July) all-time high vehicle attrition indicated an effort by the enemy to consolidate its position since overrunning Muong Soui in early June. ⁴

(S) August - The 4,664 sorties flown in BARREL ROLL Area during the month reflects an all-time high. Vehicles destroyed decreased significantly from 87 in July to 21 in August. In the other BDA categories there were increases in WBLC and structures destroyed and decreases in the remaining categories. ⁵

(S) September - During the month 4,332 sorties were flown. It was the second highest total ever flown in the area. Vehicles destroyed increased to 68 as compared with 21 destroyed in August. There were increases in all BDA categories with the exception of structures and bridges destroyed, which decreased. ⁶

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1. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
 2. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
 3. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
 4. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
 5. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 6. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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(S) October - The 5,133 sorties flown in BARREL ROLL was the highest total ever flown in the area since the beginning of the conflict. Weather permitted the diversion of strike aircraft from the BR area to the STEEL TIGER Area. Even with the diverted sorties, BDA increased in all categories with the exception of structures destroyed. During October strike sortie emphasis shifted from fixed logistical targets to the interdiction of primary and secondary roads and the destruction of vehicles. ¹

(S) November - Operations decreased during the month. Of the total number of sorties flown, only 3,075 were fragged in this area. This was a decrease of 2,058 sorties from the month of October. Two factors accounted for this decrease. With the improved weather conditions associated with the Northeast Monsoon, the enemy's concentration of effort has shifted to the infiltration of supplies and materials into Southern Laos. Consequently, the majority of the air effort has been directed to this area. Weather within the BARREL ROLL Areas also deteriorated, resulting in many sorties being diverted to the south where more favorable flying conditions prevailed. Most of the sorties flown in this area were in support of friendly ground operations, interdiction of the main route structure and armed reconnaissance. ²

(S) December - Operations in Northern Laos increased slightly during the month. Of the total number of the sorties flown, 3,322 were executed in the area. This represented an increase of 247 sorties from the month of November. BDA within the area improved in vehicles, bridges and AAA/AW sites destroyed and damaged categories; however, all other categories showed a decrease. The main effort within the area was conducted in support of Operation ABOUT FACE, armed reconnaissance and route interdiction. ³

Operations in STEEL TIGER (SL) Area, 1969

(S) January - During the month 13,272 attack sorties were flown in the area. Approximately 825 vehicles were destroyed as compared to 662 for December. In the other BDA categories, there was an increase in AAA/AW destroyed; a decrease in secondary explosions, road cuts, and structures destroyed; and in the remaining categories the BDA remained relatively the same. ⁴

(S) February - A total of 11,733 attack sorties were flown in the STEEL TIGER Area. This total represented the major portion of the air strikes

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1. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
 2. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
 3. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 4. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.

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flown in Laos during the month. There were 766 trucks destroyed as compared to 825 for January. In the other BDA categories there were increases in WBLC destroyed and secondary explosions and in the remaining categories there was a decrease.¹

(S) March - The STEEL TIGER Area received the major portion of the strikes with 12,387 sorties flown. There were 794 trucks destroyed as compared to 766 for February. In the other categories, there were increases in BDA in all categories except WBLC and structures destroyed.²

(S) April - The number of attack sorties for the month decreased to 11,157 as compared to the 12,387 flown in March. However, the number of trucks destroyed rose to 1,009 as compared to the 766 destroyed in March. In the other BDA categories increases were registered with the exception of bridges and AAA/AW destroyed and road cuts.³

(S) May - Of the 11,723 ordnance delivering sorties flown in Laos during May, the STEEL TIGER Area received the major portion of the strikes with 9,838 sorties flown. There were 959 trucks destroyed as compared to 1,009 for April. In the other BDA categories, there were increases in structures and bridges destroyed and decreases in the remaining categories.⁴

(S) June - During the month, 9,880 attack sorties were flown in the area resulting in the destruction of 252 trucks, a decrease of 707 trucks destroyed as compared to May. There were increases in the WBLC and bridges destroyed and decreases in the other BDA categories.⁵

(S) July - The STEEL TIGER Area received the major portion of the strikes with 7,929 sorties being flown. Only 38 vehicles were destroyed compared to 252 in June. This is the lowest number of vehicles destroyed in the area since September 1967. In other BDA categories road cuts and destruction of structures and AAA/AW sites increased while the remaining categories decreased.⁶

(S) August - During the month the STEEL TIGER Area received the major portion of the strikes when 6,102 sorties were flown. There were 47

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1. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
 2. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
 3. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
 4. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
 5. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
 6. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.

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vehicles destroyed which was a slight increase over the 38 destroyed in July. There were increases in all the remaining BDA categories. ¹

(S) September - During the month STEEL TIGER received approximately 58 percent of the total 10,000 plus sorties flown in the BR/SL area. There were increases in structures destroyed and road cuts; however, there was a decrease in all other BDA categories. ²

(S) October - There was a substantial increase in all reportable BDA categories due to the Northeast Monsoon which creates a dry season in South-east Asia. The STEEL TIGER Area received the majority of the sorties flown in Laos--52 percent. ³

(S) November - Southern Laos received approximately 73 percent of the air effort in Laos. Night operations increased due to the enemy's effort to transport material and equipment down the main lines of communications under cover of darkness. The night time sortie rate almost doubled with 3,549 sorties flown during November as compared to 2,021 in October. Truck kills also increased reflecting the change of emphasis in tactics from fixed logistical targets to the more perishable moving targets. Because of this shift in the force application, BDA decreased in some categories, however, marked increases were noted in vehicles destroyed, secondary explosions and anti-aircraft sites silenced. The first evidence since May of the enemy's efforts to transport large quantities of materials through Laos for utilization in the Republic of Vietnam was detected in November. ⁴

(S) December - Southern Laos received approximately 75 percent of the air effort. There were marked increases in both day and night operations. Daytime missions increased by 754 sorties. The majority of the 5,654 daytime sorties were directed against fixed logistical targets, road interdiction and seeding of delayed munitions along the main lines of communications. Night operations showed an increase of 1,077 sorties over the month of November. This increase in effort was commensurate with the enemy's attempt to infiltrate more supplies into the Laotian Panhandle. All source intelligence data showed a marked increase in vehicular activity throughout the main route structure in Laos. This increase in sortie rate produced greater BDA results in vehicles and AAA/AW sites damaged and destroyed and in secondary explosions attained. ⁵


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1. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 2. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
 3. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
 4. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
 5. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.

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AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS 1969

(ORDNANCE EXPENDING SORTIES)



NOTE: STATISTICAL INFORMATION BASED ON DATA AVAILABLE DURING CY 1969 AND IS SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT.

 BARREL ROLL


 STEEL TIGER

SOURCE: J243, HQ CINCPAC

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AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS - DAY ARMED RECCE (ORDNANCE EXPENDING SORTIES)



NOTE: STATISTICAL INFORMATION BASED ON DATA AVAILABLE DURING CY 1969
AND IS SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT.

BARREL ROLL


STEEL TIGER

SOURCE: J243, HQ CINCPAC

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AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS - NIGHT ARMED RECCE (ORDNANCE EXPENDING SORTIES)



NOTE: STATISTICAL INFORMATION BASED ON DATA AVAILABLE DURING CY 1969
AND IS SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT.

 BARREL ROLL

 STEEL TIGER

SOURCE: J243, HQ CINCPAC

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SAC B-52 Strikes in Southeast Asia (ARC LIGHT)

(S) SAC B-52 operations in Southeast Asia are conducted under the nickname ARC LIGHT. The first mission was flown by Guam-based B-52 aircraft on 18 June 1965. ARC LIGHT has expanded from an initial 30 aircraft, 150 sortie per month operation to a peak 104 aircraft, 1,800 sortie per month operation in 1968 with aircraft based at Andersen AFB, Guam; Kadena AFB, Okinawa; and U-Tapao AB, Thailand.¹

(S) The history of ARC LIGHT operations has been covered annually in the CINCPAC Command histories since 1965. The 1967 CINCPAC Command History included a resume of the operations from 1965 through 1967. The resume included the ARC LIGHT mission, approval authority, the sortie rate, basing, restriction of operations and ARC LIGHT effectiveness. The coverage of 1969 operations, however, will be limited to those topics that continued into 1969 from 1968 and topics not previously covered.

ARC LIGHT Sortie Rate

(S) The DEPSECDEF on 19 December 1968, directed a variable sortie rate of 1,400 to 1,800 sorties per month effective 1 January 1969. Comments on the DEPSECDEF directive were requested of CINCPAC by the JCS. The comments were to be furnished the JCS not later than 15 January 1969.²

(S) CINCPAC in turn requested COMUSMACV's comments on 24 December 1968.³ COMUSMACV complied with CINCPAC's request on 28 December⁴ and on 3 January, Admiral McCain told the JCS that he concurred with COMUSMACV's proposal to continue the 1,800 per month sortie rate throughout the first quarter.⁵ Admiral McCain supported his concurrence with COMUSMACV's proposal by providing the JCS with the following rationale:⁶

To strike the number of valid ARC LIGHT targets nominated daily by field commanders would require approximately three times the currently authorized ARC LIGHT sortie rate of 1,800 sorties per month. The requirement to strike infiltration routes, truck parks and base camp areas

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, p. 204.
 2. JCS 8024/192054Z Dec 68.
 3. Admin CINCPAC 240116Z Dec 68.
 4. COMUSMACV JPCCO 44900/281255Z Dec 68.
 5. CINCPAC 030454Z Jan 69.
 6. Ibid.

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has increased since the cessation of bombing in NVN. The enemy has continued to move large quantities of supplies southward. The ARC LIGHT effort necessarily has been divided between attempting to interdict the movement of supplies through Laos and, in-country, to destroying and disrupting the enemy's ability to mount another offensive. Any reduction in the ARC LIGHT sortie rate at this time would be militarily inadvisable. CINCPAC strongly supports continuation of the 1,800 ARC LIGHT sortie rate until there is some major change in the strategic and tactical situation which warrants its reduction. Any programmed reduction in ARC LIGHT must be based upon a concurrent reduction in the field commanders' military requirement, and when military experience and judgement indicate that it can be reduced.

CINCPAC concluded his message by stating that a SAC proposal to reduce the sortie rate for the second and third quarters of CY 69 was premature.¹

(S) On 26 January, the JCS told CINCPAC that they were going to seek reprogramming authority for the 1,800 sortie rate. The JCS felt that they had sufficient information available to support the reclama, however, to insure they had CINCPAC's latest views they requested him to furnish them with any additional rationale or comments that he cared to make. The comments were needed not later than 27 January.² Admiral McCain replied on 26 January that the COMMANDO HUNT Operation in Laos received the major portion of the ARC LIGHT effort since 1 January. During the period strikes against interdiction points and enemy crossing points had forced the enemy to seek other routes to move his vehicles. Aerial photography substantiated this claim when enemy vehicles were detected on Route 8 which had not been utilized by the enemy for over a year. In by-passing interdicted points a detour of 90 miles within Laos resulted, thereby extending the vehicle vulnerability period to tactical air strikes.³

(S) Admiral McCain then told the JCS that intelligence sources indicated that ARC LIGHT strikes disrupted communications, destroyed numerous caches of supplies and materials and caused desertions by enemy troops en-route to RVN. Also, that ARC LIGHT strikes within RVN disrupted enemy attack plans.⁴

1. Ibid.

2. JCS 09803/211911Z Jan 69.

3. CINCPAC 262252Z Jan 69.

4. Ibid.

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(S) CINCPAC concluded his message to the JCS by stating:¹

The increasing number of targets along the Laos LOCs, and the continuing threat in SVN point to the need for a minimum of 1,800 sorties per month. Any reduction in this overall ARC LIGHT effort would allow greater and more rapid infiltration of men and supplies, thereby allowing the enemy to increase his capability to mount attacks upon our bases at the time and place of his choosing.

Strongly recommend reprogramming an 1,800 ARC LIGHT monthly sortie rate for CY69.

(S) The JCS, on 18 February, submitted a reclama to the SECDEF recommending a 1,800 monthly ARC LIGHT sortie rate. They felt the 1,800 per month sortie rate was justified and that it would be militarily inadvisable to reduce the sortie rate below that level until some major change in the strategic or tactical situation warranted a reduction.²

(S) Secretary of Defense Laird, on 1 April, made a press release and an appearance before Congress in which he indicated that the ARC LIGHT sortie rate for FY 70 would be 1,600 sorties per month. The JCS responded to this announcement on 26 April in a memorandum to the SECDEF. The memorandum was a JCS reexamination of the military impact on reducing the sortie rate. They told the SECDEF that the employment of B-52s had been very effective in blunting enemy thrusts toward key installations and population centers and that from 1 December 1968 through 31 March 1969, field commanders submitted five times more target nominations than there were ARC LIGHT strikes available.³

(S) On 18 June, the SECDEF requested the views of the JCS on the alternatives of maintaining an ARC LIGHT sortie rate of 1,800 sorties per month through FY 70 with a \$100 million reduction in tactical air or establishing a 1,600 per month ARC LIGHT sortie rate and retaining the tactical

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1. Ibid.
 2. J3 Brief No. 37-69, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Mar 69, Subj: JCS Decision on ARC LIGHT Sortie Rate (U); JCSM-97-69 of 18 Feb 69; JCS 2472/389-5 of 7 Feb 69.
 3. J3 Brief 98-69, Hq CINCPAC, 7 May 69, Subj: Memorandum for SECDEF on ARC LIGHT Sortie Rate (U); JCSM 253-69 of 26 Apr 69; JCS 2472/389-7 of 22 Apr 69.

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air at current levels.¹ The next day the JCS requested CINCPAC's views on the alternatives.² Admiral McCain replied on 22 June that a reduction in the ARC LIGHT sortie rate or tactical air capability in Southeast Asia was operationally undesirable. Neither alternative "support the needs of our field commanders or addresses the attrition caused by these forces to the enemy's resources and to the enemy's capability to heighten, prolong, and intensify his combat efforts." CINCPAC stated that if a reduction should become necessary, the least objectionable alternative would be the reduction in ARC LIGHT sorties from 1,800 to 1,600 per month.³

(S) Admiral McCain also provided the JCS his rationale for the alternative he selected:⁴

a. A \$100 million saving in tactical air effort equated to the loss of four F-100 squadrons or three F-4 squadrons and closure of the associated base.

b. The re-introduction of tactical air units required in response to new enemy initiatives would be politically sensitive, expensive, and time consuming. On the other hand, B-52 units would not require a permanent beddown. The TDY status of B-52 units would permit adjustments in sortie rates with fewer adverse political overtones, thereby providing a greater deployment/redeployment flexibility. Thus, it would be less difficult to reconstitute the 1,800 per month ARC LIGHT sortie rate than it would be to re-establish the tactical air capabilities.

c. It is essential that ARVN units assume a greater share of the ground war responsibility. To ensure the success of this effort, it is necessary to provide substantial direct air support.

(S) In summary, Admiral McCain stated that he and COMUSMACV were convinced that ARC LIGHT and tactical air in South Vietnam and Laos had reduced the intensity of the enemy effort and had substantially reduced casualties among U. S. and other Free World Forces. He still recommended that

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1. Point Paper, J3B221, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jul 69, Subj: ARC LIGHT Sortie Rate (U).
 2. CINCPAC 221818Z Jun 69.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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tactical air remain at current strength and that the B-52 sortie rate continue at 1,800 sorties per month.¹ On 27 June, the JCS in a memorandum to the SECDEF supported the CINCPAC position.²

(S) On 18 July, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF approved an ARC LIGHT sortie rate of 1,600 sorties per month on 15 July. In the same message CINCPAC was notified to take necessary action to implement the decision.³ The next day CINCPAC dispatched a message to COMUSMACV and CINCSAC directing that the 1,600 sortie rate be implemented "effective immediately." CINCPAC also requested CINCSAC to provide revised air munition requirements by bomb loads, and sortie rate for each operating base.⁴

(S) CINCSAC in planning for the implementation of the new sortie rate recommended the following concept of operations: (1) continue to provide ten TOTs per day on cyclic timing, (2) maintain the current TOT assignment and mission/cell structure for U-Tapao and Kadena, and (3) maintain the current TOT from Andersen AFB, Guam and change the force structure per mission to one five-aircraft and two three-aircraft missions for the respective TOTs. CINCSAC stated that the concept would provide an average sortie rate of 1,612 sorties per month, optimize resource use, minimize disruption of present cyclic operations, provide COMUSMACV with 53 daily sorties, and provide an optimum position for the production of compressed missions.⁵ COMUSMACV concurred in the SAC proposal on 21 July.⁶ The new 53 daily sortie combination was actually begun on 20 July.⁷


(S) The JCS on 1 October notified CINCPAC that higher authority had directed that ARC LIGHT sorties would be flown at approximately the same rate flown during August-September 1969. This rate was to be maintained until further directed by the JCS.⁸ CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV and CINCSAC of this decision on 3 October.⁹ To attain this new sortie rate of approximately 1,400 sorties per month, CINCSAC notified all concerned that

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1. Ibid.
 2. J3 Brief No. 151-69, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jul 69, Subj: ARC LIGHT Sortie Rate (U); (JCSM 401-69 of 27 Jun 69).
 3. JCS 4891/181729Z Jul 69.
 4. CINCPAC 190300Z Jul 69.
 5. CINCSAC 182347Z Jul 69.
 6. COMUSMACV 42351/210949Z Jul 69.
 7. J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of July 69.
 8. JCS 1290/012159Z Oct 69.
 9. CINCPAC 030650Z Oct 69.

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he would phase into a 47 sorties per-day rate on 5 October. He planned 30 sorties daily from U-Tapao using five TOTs, 12 sorties daily from Kadena using two TOTs, and five sorties daily from Andersen using one TOT.¹ On 17 October, Mr. Kissinger reported that the President had directed that the support facilities for B-52 operations were to be held at a level which would allow the rapid restoration of higher sortie rates, if required. By retaining support facilities at the 1,600 sorties per-month level, the authorized sortie rate could be increased by 200 sorties per month almost immediately.² The sortie rate remained at 1,400 for the remainder of 1969.



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
ARC LIGHT SORTIES 1969

MONTH	SORTIES AUTH	SORTIES FLOWN SVN	SORTIES FLOWN LAOS	TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN	MISSIONS FLOWN SVN	MISSIONS FLOWN LAOS	TOTAL MISSIONS FLOWN
JAN	1800	724	1130	1854	123	243	366
FEB	1784	1013	646	1659	178	161	339
MAR	1800	1579	243	1822	272	43	315
APR	1800	1009	771	1780	173	132	305
MAY	1800	1543	290	1833	267	47	314
JUN	1800	1433	278	1711	259	49	308
JUL	1730	1294	437	1731	231	80	311
AUG	1600	1291	153	1444	272	36	308
SEP	1600	1065	282	1347	232	66	298
OCT	1400	1108	353	1461	223	65	288
NOV	1400	834	571	1405	184	115	299
DEC	1400	809	643	1452	179	126	305
TOTAL	19,914	13,702	5,797	19,499	2,593	1,163	3,756

SOURCE: LCOL V.D. LOKEN, USAF, J3B221, HQ, CINCPAC.

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Use of ARC LIGHT in Northern Laos (S)

(TS) In 1969, the military situation in Northern Laos deteriorated to the point that active consideration was given to the employment of ARC LIGHT. The enemy was able to capture Muong Soui. Recognizing the worsening situation, Ambassador Godley, on 17 July, told the State Department that consideration should be given to the possible requirement for utilizing B-52s on selected high-yield targets along Route 7 and in the PDJ (Plaines des Jarres)-Muong Soui area. To support this action he proposed to forward B-52 target boxes. Ironically, on the same date the State Department sent a message to the

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1. AMEMBASSY Tokyo 791/311040Z Jan 69.
 2. CINCPAC 022127Z Feb 69.
 3. CINCPACREP RYIS 0436/060810Z Feb 69.

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American Embassy Paris stating that, "We do not wish to consider the use of ARC LIGHT in North Laos at this time since it would interfere with if not nullify diplomatic effort. . . ."¹

(TS) On 24 July, a CAS field report noted that the military situation continued to be serious, that the initiative remained with the enemy and that indications were that the enemy intended to regain all of the territory they had before the 1962 Geneva Agreement, and, the destruction of Vang Pao's troops.²

(TS) On 27 July, CINCPAC changed a previous position against the use of ARC LIGHT in Northern Laos by stating to the JCS that the possibility that Souvanna might acquiesce to Communist demands for a cessation of bombing in Laos as a pre-condition for reaching a settlement was of prime concern. CINCPAC further stated that should a bombing cessation be forced upon the U. S., NVA capabilities in RVN would be greatly enhanced by secure LOCs and base areas. COMUSMACV supported CINCPAC's recommendation to use ARC LIGHT in Northern Laos because of the possible widespread impact on present U. S. authorities for bombing in Laos.³

(TS) COMUSMACV, on 4 August, provided CINCPAC and the JCS targeting information pertaining to two target options. Option I targets were psychological and political. Option II targets were military in nature. CINCPAC concurred in the target selection for both options and on 8 August requested COMUSMACV to review continually and update the targets. On the same date, Operation GOOD LOOK, an ARC LIGHT reconnaissance mission, was successfully conducted by three B-52s to obtain radar scope photography of the suggested targets. CINCSAC and COMUSMACV in coordination with AMEMB Vientiane were prepared to execute ARC LIGHT strikes in Northern Laos upon authorization from the JCS.⁴

ARC LIGHT Compressed TOTs

(TS) An ARC LIGHT compressed TOT (time on target) is a surge operation where the maximum number of sorties are conducted in a minimum of time. All necessary aircraft assets are utilized without regard to a normal cyclic TOT. In most instances, TOT compressions cause a loss in total sorties.

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1. Point Paper, J3B221, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Aug 69, ARC LIGHT in Northern Laos (S).
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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(TS) On 27 February 1969, in an operation in III CTZ, 60 B-52 sorties were compressed and flown in a four-hour time period. The operation was highly successful and resulted in the loss of only 16 sorties over a two-day period. COMUSMACV commended SAC on the success of the operation. ¹

(TS) On 8 and 17 March 1969, in two operations, 60 B-52 sorties were compressed and flown in a four-hour time period. Infrared returns and repeated contacts with major enemy forces in northern Tay Ninh province and in western Binh Long province in the vicinity of the Fish Hook indicated that the enemy forces were a major potential threat to Tay Ninh city and to Saigon. Both operations were highly successful and were conducted as BUGLE NOTE missions using MSQ procedures. ²

(TS) On 27 and 28 May, 114 compressed sorties were flown in two separate operations. The operation on 27 May involved 60 sorties in northeastern Tay Ninh and northwestern Binh Long provinces. The target areas contained bivouac, training and rest areas, food and munitions caches, truck parks, maintenance facilities, and several rear service complexes including a food processing plant. The 28 May operation involved 54 sorties in western Kontum province and was against artillery and mortar positions, two large bivouac areas, numerous bunkers, storage facilities for munitions and supplies and a complex including tracked vehicles believed to be a threat against Ben Het and Dak To. Initial reports indicated that both strikes were very successful. ³

(TS) During June 1969, 252 ARC LIGHT compressed sorties were flown in five separate operations. The first compressed operation was on 9 June and involved 60 sorties in northeastern Tay Ninh province within a three hour and 20 minute time frame. The second operation, on 10 June, was in western Kontum province where 54 sorties were compressed within a three hour and 20 minute time period. The third operation was flown on 13 June and compressed 30 sorties into a one hour and 50 minute time period. This operation was located in northeastern Tay Ninh and northwestern Binh Long provinces. The fourth operation, on 27 June, was located in western Kontum province and involved 60 sorties compressed into a three hour and 45 minute time frame.

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1. J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
 2. J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69. The BUGLE NOTE concept provided for three B-52s every 1-1/2 hours to bomb a COMUSMACV target under MSQ Control. When BUGLE NOTE missions were flown the quick reaction force at Andersen was eliminated. MSQ (COMBAT SKYSPOT) procedures involves the release of ordnance under control of ground radar sites.
 3. J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.

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The fifth operation, on 29 June, involved 48 compressed sorties in two hours and 55 minutes against targets in Binh Long province. Intelligence sources had identified these areas as major enemy base camps occupied by significant enemy forces. Although TOT compressions caused a loss of total sorties, it was believed that the significant results which had been received from previous compressed strikes warranted the loss.¹ During the remainder of 1969 the scheduling of compressed sorties became routine.

ARC LIGHT - BUMPY ACTION Conflict

(TS) On 16 January, CINCPAC requested CINCSAC and COMUSMACV to comment on timing and route separation of BUMPY ACTION² drones and ARC LIGHT aircraft. It had been noted that BUMPY ACTION drone operations and ARC LIGHT operations were occurring simultaneously in adjacent areas. If this scheduling continued without timing and route separation between the two operations, it would probably trigger an NVN MIG reaction to BUMPY ACTION drones in the proximity of an ARC LIGHT force which might cause an ARC LIGHT MIG alert and mission diversion or cause MIG interceptions of BUMPY ACTION drones to be used as a feint in the interception of B-52s. As a result of CINCPAC's action and comments by CINCSAC and COMUSMACV, a new procedure was established. Should a conflict occur, the Seventh Air Force and OL-20 would resolve the conflict by changing the BUMPY ACTION mission timing or by flying with an increased state of alert by GCI (ground control intercept).³

ARC LIGHT Operating Rules

(S) On 16 January CINCPAC recommended to JCS a change in the notification requirement to not later than three hours prior to TOT for inflight diversions within a validated SALOA (Special ARC LIGHT Operating Area) in Laos. The JCS approved and changed the JCS ARC LIGHT Planning Document which was followed on 18 January by CINCPAC Change Eight to the ARC LIGHT Operation Order which gave approval for ARC LIGHT diverts in Laos with notification as soon as possible but no later than three hours before TOT within validated SALOA's.⁴

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1. J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
 2. BUMPY ACTION is a drone reconnaissance program conducted by SAC in NVN for intelligence purposes.
 3. J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69; CINCPAC 160201Z Jan 69.
 4. CINCPAC 160045Z Jan 69; JCS 9662/170900Z Jan 69; CINCPAC 180318Z Jan 69.

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ARC LIGHT Secondary Targeting in Laos (S)

(S) On 19 November, COMUSMACV requested a change to the CINCPAC ARC LIGHT Basic Operation Order to permit secondary targeting in Laos. CINCPAC concurred in the request and so recommended to the JCS. The recommendation was approved and the JCS notified CINCPAC of their action on 29 November. Necessary changes were made in the ARC LIGHT Basic Operation Orders at all levels concerned to reflect authority for COMUSMACV to program secondary targets in Laos for missions with primary target in Laos. The preplanned secondary (alternate) targets selected in Laos required: (1) concurrence of the American Embassy Vientiane, (2) the primary target to be fragged in Laos, (3) targets to be in a SALOA, (4) targets to be in the IIIA category, and (5) targets to be below 16 degrees, 30 minutes N. ¹

SAM Firing at ARC LIGHT Aircraft

(S) On 23 June, COMUSMACV requested authority to permit IRON HAND crossings of NVN borders when necessary to provide maximum protection for ARC LIGHT forces. On 26 June, CINCPAC notified COMUSMACV that his request was approved provided the B-52 force was entering a SAM or AAA threat area and that the IRON HAND penetrations of NVN were limited to that area and time frame necessary to provide optimum support for the B-52 force. ² The CJCS on 13 August notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF did not desire to extend the contingency authority for ARC LIGHT IRON HAND support to overfly NVN, however, should a SAM threat develop the SECDEF would reconsider at that time. On the same date, CINCPAC rescinded the authority he had granted to COMUSMACV on 26 June. ³

(TS) On 19 December, an NVN missile battalion fired at least two missiles at the second cell of an ARC LIGHT mission without success in the Ban Laboy area of Laos. The missiles were fired from the NVN side of the border. The Seventh Air Force reported that probably five SAMs were fired at the three B-52s. The B-52s reported FAN SONG SAM-associated radar signals, visual observation of missiles passing as close as 50 feet from the aircraft and seeing missiles detonate above the B-52s at approximately 40,000 feet. MIGCAP, ECM and TINY TIM support aircraft reported RHAW (radar homing and warning) indications and sightings. It was believed that the NVN SAM attempt

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1. CINCPAC 220333Z Nov 69; JCS 5498/291332Z Nov 69.
 2. CINCPAC 261915Z Jun 69.
 3. CINCPAC 132356Z Aug 69; J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.

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failed due to the electronic countermeasures taken by the B-52s and supporting ECM aircraft.¹

(TS) On 22 December, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that:²

a. Visual reconnaissance of NVN be conducted to locate the SAM site and that strikes be conducted against it.

b. Support aircraft be authorized to engage other sites or MIGs which might oppose the strike force attacking the site.

c. Overflight of NVN by IRON HAND aircraft supporting ARC LIGHT in the same threat areas be authorized.

d. Preemptive strikes be authorized on a case-by-case basis against NVN SAM sites which pose a threat to ARC LIGHT or gunship operations over Laos.

(U) A reply to CINCPAC's request had not been received by 31 December.

B-52 Bombing Halt Over RVN

(U) On 7 September, the JCS in a RED ROCKET message suspended all ARC LIGHT operations in RVN for the period 071601Z to 101601Z September.³ ARC LIGHT operations in RVN were suspended again on 11 September. In another RED ROCKET message the JCS directed suspension of all B-52 missions in RVN for a period of 36 hours. The message contained the caveat that no one outside of military circles was to be informed of this action.⁴ The suspension was in effect until 1415Z hours, 12 September.

(U) The AP Wire Service, on 12 September, reported that President Nixon had personally ordered a 36-hour halt in B-52 bombing missions over RVN" but has now directed that the bombings be resumed...⁵

Press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said the temporary cessation in sorties was ordered to give policymakers time

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1. J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jan 70, for the month of Dec 69; 7th AF DIODO/200458Z Dec 69.
 2. Ibid.
 3. CINCPAC 071842Z Sep 69 citing JCS RED ROCKET ONE 071245Z Sep 69.
 4. JCS RED ROCKET THREE 110215Z Sep 69.
 5. AP Wire Service item printed in CINCPAC News of Interest compiled by CINCPAC Public Affairs Office, 12 Sep 69.

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to determine what the Communists intended to do about the level of fight following the 72-hour ceasefire they had announced to mark the death of Ho Chi Minh.

Ziegler said the level of enemy activity now has reverted to pre-truce levels and that, for that reason, Nixon had sent the big bombers back into the skies.

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The press aide, in seeking to explain the motivation for the brief halt in B-52 operations, said Washington wanted to determine whether the Communist-initiated truce "had political significance beyond the death of Ho. "1

Naval Surface Operations

(U) As in the past, the coverage of U. S. Navy operations in this section is limited primarily to CINCPAC's policies and decisions, and actions by higher authority affecting CINCPAC's mission. In addition, the mission and the exercise of operational control of the various operations conducted in RVN or off-shore are briefly reviewed. Detailed coverage of naval surface operations can be found in Annex A, in the monthly editions of the "Pacific Area Naval Operations Review" published by CINCPAC Fleet, and in the monthly editions of "United States Naval Operations, Vietnam" published by Chief of Naval Operations.

MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN Operations

(C) The mission of MARKET TIME operations is to detect and prevent waterborne logistics craft from infiltrating into RVN. The Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV), exercises operational control of the forces assigned to MARKET TIME (Coastal Surveillance Force - TF-115). The mission of GAME WARDEN is to interdict VC waterborne traffic on the inland waterways of RVN, particularly in the Mekong Delta and to open waterways to legitimate traffic. Like MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN forces (The River Patrol Force - TF-116), are under the operational control of COMNAVFORV.²

Mobile Riverine Force


(C) The Mekong Delta Mobile Riverine Force (MDMRF) was initially

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1. Ibid.
 2. USMACV Command History 1967, Vol I, pp. 463 and 469.

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
MARKET TIME PATROL AREAS



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GAME WARDEN BASES

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Note: In addition to the fixed bases at Nha Bc, Binh Thuy, My Tho, Sa Dec and Ben Luc, GAME WARDEN mobile bases are utilized. These bases are shifted as necessary in the furtherance of operations.

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called the Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Forces (MDMAF). The force is a joint U. S. Army and U. S. Navy force designed to operate from a fixed base and a mobile base consisting of barrack and support ships. This force projects a U. S. military presence into the Delta thereby assisting in bringing the population and resources of the Delta more effectively under RVN control. ¹

Operation SEA LORDS

(S) A combination of MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN, and Mobile Riverine Forces was integrated to interdict VC infiltration along the Cambodian border and to conduct arterial interdiction of the rivers in the deep Delta that had heretofore been under VC control. The overall operation was called SEA LORDS (South East Asia Land-Ocean-River-Delta Strategy). ²

Attack Aircraft Carrier (CVA) Posture in Southeast Asia

(S) As a result of the 14 January fire aboard the USS ENTERPRISE, CINCPACFLT requested authority to assume a four-CVA WESTPAC posture during the period repairs to the ENTERPRISE were being accomplished. In support of this request, made on 18 January, CINCPACFLT pointed out that the early deployment of an EASTPAC CVA or the extension of a WESTPAC CVA to fill the gap during the non-availability of the ENTERPRISE would have an adverse impact on both short and long term readiness. ³

(S) CINCPAC concurred in the request and, on 19 January, authorized CINCPACFLT to assume a four-CVA WESTPAC posture during the non-availability of the ENTERPRISE. The JCS was informed that such action had been taken. ⁴ In assuming the four-CVA posture, CINCPACFLT was directed to maintain two CVAs at YANKEE Station during normal operations and three CVAs at YANKEE Station as frequently as could be accommodated within the upkeep schedule with off-line CVA(s) ready to provide a rapid increase in the tempo of combat operations, if required. ⁵

(S) On 15 February, the JCS reported that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) had advised that the commitment to maintain seven CVAs deployed to WESTPAC and the Mediterranean had been reduced to six by 1 July 1969. It

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1. Ibid., p. 479.
 2. J3B4 CINCPAC Staff review of draft manuscript, Section II, Chapter IV, CINCPAC Command History 1969, 14 Feb 70.
 3. CINCPACFLT 180313Z Jan 69.
 4. CINCPAC 192202Z Jan 69.
 5. CINCPAC 192203Z Jan 69.

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was pointed out that all reasonable means to maintain current deployment levels had been exhausted--carrier months gained by lengthening overhaul intervals had been expended and as a result at least four CVAs had to be overhauled in FY 70. In view of NATO commitments, which militated against any reduction of the two CVAs in the Sixth Fleet, the JCS indicated that a reduction of one CVA in Seventh Fleet appeared to be the most feasible solution. CINCPAC was requested to provide the JCS with comments on the impact that such a reduction would have on operations.¹

(S) On 13 February, taking into account comments provided by CINCPACFLT,² CINCPAC advised the JCS that, with four CVAs deployed in the WESTPAC, two CVAs could be maintained at YANKEE Station continuously, with a surge capability of providing three CVAs for short periods, and that current SIOP commitments could be met. It was pointed out that the loss of the fifth CVA would result in reduced operational flexibility in WESTPAC--the ability to schedule necessary CVA upkeep periods and desired port visits while, at the same time, maintaining the capability to simultaneously meet requirements in Vietnam and contingencies elsewhere in the WESTPAC.³ Comments from COMUSMACV on this subject were received subsequent to CINCPAC's response to the JCS. However, no objections to the proposed reduction of one CVA were offered provided the current level of support for Southeast Asia air operations could be maintained.⁴

(S) On 20 February, the JCS reported that the CNO had indicated that with four CVAs in the WESTPAC, all could normally be deployed to meet a surge capability of four CVAs for short periods. CINCPAC was requested to comment on the capability of providing four vice three CVAs to meet surge requirements.⁵ In response to this query, CINCPACFLT provided comments which were incorporated in CINCPAC's reply to the JCS on 23 February.⁶ The JCS was informed that, while the fourth CVA would normally be in a stand-down posture for upkeep periods and port visits, all CVAs could be committed to meet a contingency requirement. It was pointed out that having all CVAs on the line for any extended period of time would degrade long-term availability and readiness due to disruption of planned maintenance and upkeep schedules.⁷

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1. JCS 2621/150005Z Feb 69.
 2. CINCPACFLT 160533Z Feb 69.
 3. CINCPAC 180337Z Feb 69.
 4. COMUSMACV 10121/180251Z Feb 69.
 5. JCS 2924/200014Z Feb 69.
 6. CINCPACFLT 211833Z Feb 69.
 7. CINCPAC 230152Z Feb 69.

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(S) On 26 February, the JCS advised the SECDEF of plans to reduce the number of CVAs deployed to Seventh Fleet from five to four, effective 1 July 1969.¹ On 27 March, the JCS announced that tables of SEASIA deployments in Program 6 would be adjusted to reflect two vice three CVAs effective 1 July 1969 and granted authority to the CNO and CINCPAC to modify CVA deployment schedules accordingly. With four CVAs deployed in the WESTPAC, two CVAs could be maintained at YANKEE Station continuously, with a surge capability of providing four CVAs for short periods. SIOP commitments could be met with four CVAs deployed to the WESTPAC. The loss of the fifth CVA would result in reduced operational flexibility in WESTPAC, however.² On 3 April, CINCPAC authorized CINCPACFLT to modify the CVA deployment schedules as appropriate to provide for the deployment of four vice five CVAs to Seventh Fleet effective 1 July.³

Trawler Surveillance

(C) On 1 September, CTF-115 reported that a MARKET TIME patrol aircraft had detected an unidentified SL-6 type trawler approximately 40 miles southwest of Phu Quoc Island. Covert air surveillance was commenced and U.S. and VNN units were alerted to the possibility of an infiltration attempt in the U-Minh Forest area.⁴

(S) COMSEVENTHFLT alerted appropriate forces and provided guidance on surveillance actions and a plan to be executed when directed. The plan had two phases: Phase I - covert surveillance and Phase II - overt surveillance. Phase II included five steps: Step 1 directed trawler to proceed to an RVN port; Step 2 directed trawler to stop for visit and search; Step 3 harassed trawler; Step 4 fired shot in vicinity of trawler; and Step 5 destroyed the trawler.⁵

(S) Phase I of the plan was executed by COMSEVENTHFLT,⁶ and USS WALKE (DD 723) and USCGC SPENCER (WHEC 36) were designated TU 70.8.6 and directed to take covert surveillance station within 20 miles of the trawler.⁷ The WALKE and the SPENCER arrived on station on 2 September.⁸

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1. J3 Brief 39-69, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Mar 69, Subj: CVA Force Levels (U) (JCSM-110-69).
 2. Ibid.; JCS 5660/272025Z Mar 69.
 3. CINCPAC 030403Z Apr 69.
 4. Admin COMSEVENTHFLT 010810Z Sep 69
 5. Admin COMSEVENTHFLT 010956Z Sep 69.
 6. Admin COMSEVENTHFLT 011410Z Sep 69.
 7. CTG 70.8 011947Z Sep 69.
 8. USS WALKE 021240Z Sep 69; CTU 70.8.6 021458Z Sep 69.

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Movements of the trawler after the initial aircraft detection followed a track around the south end of RVN, approximately 120 miles off the coast.

(S) On 2 September, CINCPAC provided the JCS with a summary of actions taken to date against the trawler; pointed out that the trawler had passed within RVN territorial waters with Seventh Fleet units in continuous contact, thereby fulfilling the requirements for immediate pursuit, and recommended that Phase II, Steps 1 and 2 of COMSEVENTHFLT's plan be executed.¹

(S) On 3 September, after passing to the south of RVN, the trawler changed course to the northeast in the general direction of the Paracel Islands. The USS GEORGE K. MACKENZIE (DD 836) joined the WALKE and the SPENCER in covert surveillance of the trawler.² COMSEVENTHFLT directed that the USS JOUETT (DLG 29) proceed to Cam Ranh Bay to embark an EOD Team and Chinese/VNN interpreters, and proceed to the area of TU 70.8.6 in event authority was granted to board the trawler.³ In view of the number of surface units on the scene, COMSEVENTHFLT also directed that air surveillance of the trawler be discontinued until further advised.⁴

(S) In response to the CINCPAC recommendation for execution of Phase II, Steps 1 and 2 of COMSEVENTHFLT's plan, the JCS disapproved the request in view of: (1) the lack of adequate evidence of the commitment of a hostile act; (2) the trawler's position in international waters; (3) the fact that the trawler did not then constitute a threat; and (4) the time and distance elapsed since passage of the trawler through RVN territorial waters.⁵ In passing this disapproval to CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC directed that surveillance be maintained until the trawler's destination is determined or the trawler enters Communist-claimed territorial waters.⁶

(S) The JOUETT completed embarking an EOD and a combat camera team, and interpreters on 3 September, and relieved the SPENCER as on-scene trawler surveillance commander (CTU 70.8.6) on 4 September.⁷ As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT and CTG 70.8, the WALKE was detached from trawler surveillance duties on 4 September, leaving the JOUETT and the

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1. CINCPAC 021831Z Sep 69.
 2. CTU 70.8.6 030010Z Sep 69.
 3. COMSEVENTHFLT 030346Z Sep 69.
 4. COMSEVENTHFLT 031330Z Sep 69.
 5. JCS 8062/031535Z Sep 69.
 6. CINCPAC 031815Z Sep 69.
 7. CTU 70.8.6 040658Z Sep 69.

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MACKENZIE to continue covert surveillance.

(S) At 1930Z hours on 5 September, in the vicinity of Lincoln Island, all radar contact with the trawler was lost during heavy rain squalls.¹ Further air and surface surveillance failed to relocate the trawler.

(S) COMSEVENTHFLT's evaluation of the situation was that the trawler had probably proceeded to Hainan.² In accordance with COMSEVENTHFLT and CTG 70.8 directions, TU 70.8.6 was deactivated on 8 September and air search for the trawler was terminated on the same date.³

Battleship USS NEW JERSEY

(S) On 12 April 1967, Admiral Sharp recommended the activation of two IOWA-class battleships. He informed the JCS that he considered it prudent to relate his previous recommendations for additional naval gunfire ships--DDs and CAs--to the long term need for heavy naval gunfire of the type available only in the IOWA-class battleship. After CINCPAC furnished overwhelming rationale, the SECDEF approved the activation of the battleship and on 1 August 1967 the Chief of Naval Operations directed the activation of the USS NEW JERSEY. After refitting, the NEW JERSEY, on the morning of 30 September 1968 entered her third war when her 16-inch main battery opened fire at an enemy fortified storage area in the DMZ.⁴

(U) During its seven months of providing naval gunfire support, the NEW JERSEY fired approximately 10 times more 16-inch rounds than the 700 rounds fired during World War II. In one 85-day period, she fired nearly 4,000 rounds of 16-inch and nearly 11,000 rounds of five-inch ammunition.⁵

(U) On 26 April after being directed back to WESTPAC in connection with North Korea shooting down a U.S. EC-121 plane, the USS NEW JERSEY departed for the United States not knowing it would soon be moth-balled. The NEW JERSEY arrived at Long Beach, California, on 5 May.

(U) In an interview with the press, Captain J. Edward Snyder, Jr., skipper of the NEW JERSEY told reporters:

"This (23 pound piece of shrapnel from one of the NEW JERSEY's two-ton shells) goes through the air at Mach 4--

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1. CTU 70.8.6 062230Z Sep 69.
 2. COMSEVENTHFLT 071718Z Sep 69.
 3. CTG 70.8 072200Z Sep 69; COMSEVENTHFLT 080554Z Sep 69.
 4. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, p. 238.
 5. CG III MAF 271534Z Mar 69.

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four times the speed of sound--and there is nothing in Vietnam that can stop it. The name battleship is a misnomer. It is, in fact, a floating artillery platform with the nine largest artillery tubes in the world.

"These 16-inch shells can penetrate 30 inches of solid rock," Snyder went on. "It can destroy Communist caves that otherwise can only be taken by infantry walking with flame throwers and explosives."

Snyder said the 56,000-ton battleship fired only 700 rounds during its entire service in World War II. "It was used mainly as a taxi to haul Admiral William F. Halsey around," said Snyder, whose utterances recall those of "Bull" Halsey.

In its seven months off the coast of North and South Vietnam, the New Jersey lobbed more than 5,000 rounds of 16-inch ammunition at targets ashore.¹

(U) As a result of the President's economy move, the Secretary of the Navy announced on 22 August that the NEW JERSEY would be moth-balled.²

Electronic Warfare

Electronic Warfare Operations

(S) During 1969 electronic warfare activities in the PACOM continued to be primarily devoted to the support of combat operations in Southeast Asia. Electronic support missions and electronic countermeasures missions flown in support of air operations over Laos and reconnaissance operations over North Vietnam were as shown in the accompanying graph. IRON HAND missions were flown to suppress fire control radars and surface-to-air missile activity against PACOM air forces.


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1. AP Wire Service report, Long Beach, California, 5 May 69, printed in CINCPAC News of Interest, CINCPAC Public Affairs Office, 6 May 69.
 2. CNO 221928Z Aug 69.

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ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MISSIONS



Electronic Warfare Policy Guidance

(S) In May 1967 the JCS asked CINCPAC for his comments and recommendations on revision of two JCS publications, one on electronic warfare, the other on communications deception and communications jamming, to assure responsive policy guidance for planning and employing electronic warfare capabilities. CINCPAC recommended, among other things, combining both subjects in a single document to facilitate electronic warfare management. CINCPAC restated this recommendation to the JCS in November 1968.¹

1. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.

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(S) The revised publication, JCS MOP 95 of 7 March 1969, was in consonance with CINCPAC's recommendation, integrating electronic warfare and communications deception/jamming police guidance in one document. It provided the commanders of unified and specified commands with authority for the use of electronic warfare, listed electronic warfare responsibilities, provided guidance for civil broadcast electronic countermeasures, and emphasized electronic warfare training and intelligence support.¹

(S) This guidance from the JCS and a review of CINCPAC's Instructions revealed a need for updating CINCPAC's guidance and reorganizing it in one concise instruction. This new Instruction (003430.3) was promulgated on 5 September 1969 to facilitate electronic warfare management within the PACOM. Significant changes concerned increased emphasis on electronic warfare training, additional guidance on intelligence support, basic electronic warfare definitions, additional guidance on electronic warfare frequency band designations, and consolidation of electronic warfare reporting procedures.²

Electronic Warfare Requirements

(S) On 26 April CINCPAC submitted to the JCS an updated statement of PACOM electronic warfare requirements for the period FY 70 through FY 75.³ The document contained two sections: a basic section that listed general electronic warfare requirements and an annex section that contained electronic warfare requirements tailored to appropriate PACOM contingency plans. Several significant changes were incorporated in the update. One was the addition of an active electronic countermeasures (ECM) section that included requirements for active/passive ECM equipped drones, an anti-radiation missile capability, and a "look through" capability for electronic warfare support aircraft. Another change was increased emphasis on the overall neutralization of enemy radars by the use of anti-radiation missiles, electronic and mechanical jamming, avoidance tactics, and destruction by bombing. Other significant changes were the revision of ECM tolerance requirements for electronic radar site location based on current and expected strike planning requirements, increased emphasis on signal intelligence (SIGINT) support controlled and tasked at the tactical level, addition of CINCUSARPAC ground and airborne electronic warfare requirements, and the addition of airborne radio direction finding requirements.⁴

1. Ibid.

2. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

3. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 26 Apr 69, Subj: PACOM Electronic Warfare Requirements FY 1970-1975 (U).

4. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.

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(S) After first seeking CINCPAC's concurrence¹ in the matter of giving the document wider dissemination, the JCS published a memorandum in which was stated that they found CINCPAC's statements of requirements useful; that they anticipated abbreviated versions of the statements would be included in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan; and suggested that the commanders of other unified and specified commands prepare similar documents for the JCS based on the CINCPAC format and content.²

Electronic Warfare Training Activities

(S) CINCPACAF, on 27 January 1969, recommended tasking PACAF tactical Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)-Passive Electronic Countermeasures assets to conduct peacetime electronic reconnaissance along peripheral reconnaissance routes in direct support of CINCPAC, provided this did not interfere with their primary tactical mission.³ On 15 February CINCPACAF further pointed out the need to conduct electronic warfare training in a realistic environment.⁴

(S) CINCPAC replied that he recognized a vital requirement that PACAF active and passive electronic warfare assets be retained in the theater after the cessation of hostilities as an integral component of PACAF forces. He also acknowledged the requirement for realistic training.⁵ He advised CINCPACAF that coordination would be effected to include the EB-66C as a CINCPAC direct support asset for tasking under the Peripheral Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) and that specific instructions providing for full and effective ELINT/Passive Electronic Countermeasures training areas were being developed.⁶

PACOM Electronic Warfare Force Cutbacks

(S) Partial dismantling of the Southeast Asia tactical electronic warfare force took place under budget cuts of the Air Force's Project 703, which deactivated the 41st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS) on 31 October.⁷

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1. JCS 01424/292053Z May 69; Admin CINCPAC 032358Z Jun 69.
 2. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69; J3 Brief No. 162-69, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Jul 69, of MJCS 319-69 of 1 Jul 69, Subj: Statement of Electronic Warfare (EW) Requirements.
 3. Ltr, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 27 Jan 69, Subj: ELINT Activities Conducted by the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands (U).
 4. CINCPACAF 150016Z Feb 69.
 5. CINCPAC 252105Z Feb 69.
 6. Ibid.
 7. JCS 1382/022116Z Oct 69.

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CINCPAC notified the JCS that deactivation of the 41st without an attendant increase in the equipment authorized the remaining EB-66 squadrons would reduce electronic warfare responsiveness to contingency operations.¹ Some aircraft from the 41st TEWS were redistributed to the 42d TEWS (at Takhli, Thailand) and the 19th TEWS (at Kadena, Okinawa), leaving a total of 29 aircraft, which was sufficient to meet the initial requirements of any single contingency plan.² No EB-66C models were withdrawn from the PACOM.

(C) The EF-10B electronic warfare support airframe phased out of Southeast Asia in November 1969, having been replaced by the EA-6A aircraft. Although the EF-10B was limited in electronic warfare capability, it had provided sorely needed electronic warfare support in Southeast Asia since April 1965.

Electronic Warfare in Joint Exercises

(S) CINCPAC encouraged a dynamic electronic warfare training program in the PACOM. On 12 February, in a message to COMUS Korea, he discussed Exercise FOCUS RETINA. He said that he desired that electronic warfare be included in as many exercises as was feasible and that planning should include all available assets.³ In response to CINCPAC's query about electronic warfare plans to be used in that particular exercise, COMUS Korea advised that imitative communication deception would be used, but on U. S. radio nets only--that neither foreign forces nor nets would be involved.⁴

(S) In April COMUS TDC advised that electronic warfare training would be a part of Exercise FORWARD THRUST to be held in late April. Both chaff and electronic jamming were used in the training exercise for Republic of China air defense artillery and missile units.⁵

Meaconing, Interference, Intrusion, and Jamming

(S) Additional emphasis was placed on steps to effectively identify and

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1. CINCPAC 162051Z Sep 69.
 2. J3B8/Memo/0017-69, from LCOL B. B. Skinner, USMC, J3B8, Hq CINCPAC, to J3, Hq CINCPAC, via J3B and J30, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Oct 69, Subj: PACOM Air EW Assets (U).
 3. CINCPAC 120338Z Feb 69.
 4. COMUSKOREA 141001Z and 241100Z Feb 69.
 5. COMUSTDC 180343Z Apr 69; CINCPAC 190301Z Apr 69.

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counter enemy meaoning, interference, intrusion, and jamming (MIJI)¹ efforts in the PACOM in 1969, with specific emphasis on Southeast Asia. CINCPAC had furnished the JCS with recommendations regarding possible actions to reduce the effectiveness of enemy MIJI activities. Some of these were proposed following an October 1968 electronic warfare conference and reiterated in January 1969. CINCPAC recommended that the Air Force Special Communications Center in San Antonio be tasked to analyze all incidents reported by CINCPAC's component and subordinate command commanders.² CINCPAC continued:

... To adequately cope with a major enemy MIJI effort there is a need for improved secure voice systems, high speed data links and displays in aircraft and control facilities, and adequate countermeasures to include a reliable system to locate and neutralize enemy installations. Recommend Services initiate appropriate actions to further define the MIJI problem and obtain a satisfactory technical solution.³

(S) In February the Military Airlift Command (MAC) expressed concern about intrusion attempts against MAC aircraft in Southeast Asia.⁴ CINCPAC replied that he shared MAC concern regarding the seriousness of the MIJI problem.⁵ He advised COMUSMACV and CINCPACAF that there was an urgent need to find a satisfactory interim solution to the enemy voice intrusion and

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1. The following definitions pertain:

Meaoning: The clandestine generation or retransmission of a radio navigation signal to confuse navigation.

Interference: Any electromagnetic energy that seriously degrades, obstructs, or interrupts radio communications or that endangers the functioning of radio navigation or other safety services. Interference in this sense effectively precludes the use of a frequency as opposed to interference that is purely a source of annoyance.

Jamming: The deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy with the object of impairing the use of electronic devices, equipment, or systems.

Intrusion: The intentional insertion of electromagnetic energy into transmission paths with the objective of deceiving the operators or of causing confusion. (CINCPACINST 03823.1, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jul 69, Subj: Suspected Meaoning, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion Incident Reporting and Evaluation.)

2. CINCPAC 160159Z Jan 69.
3. Ibid.
4. MAC 222100Z Feb 69.
5. CINCPAC 010242Z Mar 69.

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interference problem before the existing low level of activity increased significantly in scope and sophistication.¹ COMUSMACV advised that continuing emphasis had been placed on the threat and noted that MIJI occurrences were both sporadic and widely scattered.² CINCPACAF advised that the dispatch of a MIJI briefing team to Southeast Asia from the Air Force's Special Communications Center would be an initial step in a program for devising procedures to counter hostile activity.³ Such a team visited Hawaii on 5 March as part of the Southeast Asia visit. The team's purpose was to educate Southeast Asia personnel on the MIJI problem, attain better reporting to provide for more accurate evaluation (in order to get appropriate information into the hands of the operating forces in a meaningful and timely manner), and to assist in countering enemy MIJI efforts.⁴

(S) In May the JCS published guidance that incorporated CINCPAC's previous recommendations. They issued a joint MIJI reporting regulation to replace the various Service regulations and assigned to the Air Force's Special Communications Center the task of evaluating all MIJI incidents on a worldwide, all-Service basis for a one-year trial period. It also provided for standard reporting procedures for all Services.⁵ CINCPAC then prepared guidance for PACOM based on the JCS memorandum.⁶ CINCPAC also recommended to the JCS that since the Air Force's Special Communications Center was the agency responsible for detailed analysis and evaluation that it be authorized to modify incident reporting instructions as it deemed appropriate.⁷

Interface of Tactical Air Control Systems in Southeast Asia

(S) A requirement for compatible tactical air control systems in Southeast Asia was recognized in 1967. As a result, steps were taken to upgrade the Navy, Air Force, Marine, and National Security Agency systems to provide semi-automatic and interfaced tactical data systems in Southeast Asia to facilitate coordination of friendly air operations, prevention of border violations

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1. CINCPAC 010235Z Mar 69.
 2. COMUSMACV 121445Z Mar 69.
 3. CINCPACAF 072052Z Mar 69.
 4. J3B8/Memo/007-69, from LCOL B. B. Skinner, USMC, Hq CINCPAC to J3B, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Mar 69, Subj: MIJI Briefing Team.
 5. J3 Brief No. 108-69, Hq CINCPAC, 20 May 69, of SM-315-69 of 12 May 69, Subj: Requirement for the Reporting and Evaluation of Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion Incidents.
 6. CINCPACINST 03823.1, 2 Jul 69, Subj: Suspected Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion Incident Reporting and Evaluation (U).
 7. CINCPAC 262249Z Jul 69.

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of Communist China, and the passing of MIG and surface-to-air missile alerts to U. S. aircraft.¹ Tests of the interface conducted in 1968 in CONUS had demonstrated a need to correct certain deficiencies prior to implementation of the program in Southeast Asia.

(S) On 12 May 1969 a CINCPAC Interface Evaluation Team went to the CONUS again to evaluate the revised program to insure that it was technically and operationally ready and that use would not degrade existing systems in Southeast Asia. They concluded that the interface had an excellent potential to enhance the coordination of air operations and that there were no problem areas that had to be corrected prior to deployment. The team recommended that the interface be deployed and implemented.² CINCPAC therefore recommended to the JCS that the interface be deployed in accordance with the Southeast Asia Interface Implementation Plan of 24 January 1969.³

(S) Programs were deployed and interface implementation began. As of 31 July all systems had been interfaced and data was being exchanged on a real time basis.⁴ After evaluation by the CINCPAC Interface Evaluation Team, CINCPAC accepted the interface for operational use.⁵ As a result, configuration management reverted to the JCS from the Air Force Chief of Staff.⁶

(U) CINCPAC also established a PACOM Tactical Data System Interface Advisory Group, which convened for its initial meeting on 15 September.⁷ The purpose of the group was to provide continuity in interface planning and operations, to facilitate and advise in overall management of the installed interface and any other interfaces that might be employed in the PACOM. The group recommended that CINCPAC promulgate an instruction on the Advisory Group,⁸ provide amplification on JCS configuration management guidance, and formulate recommendations pertaining to future interface requirements.⁹

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol IV, pp. 19-21; J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 2. CONUS TEST FORCE SANTA MONICA CALIF 291605Z May 69.
 3. CINCPAC 050543Z Jun 69.
 4. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
 5. Ibid.; CINCPAC 150234Z Aug 69.
 6. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 7. CINCPAC 091928Z Sep 69.
 8. CINCPACINST 05420.1, 22 Sep 69, Subj: Pacific Command Tactical Data Systems (TDS) Interface Advisory Group (U).
 9. CINCPAC 240458Z Sep 69; J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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(S) CINCPAC also sent a representative to be a member of a Southeast Asia Tactical Data System Interface briefing team organized by the JCS. The briefers provided information on the requirement, development, implementation, and results of the Southeast Asia interface to representatives of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, the National Security Agency, the Defense Department, and CINCEUR, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE.¹

(S) After operational acceptance of the interface, the JCS noted the opportunity to determine benefits accrued from this interface and requested CINCPAC's views on its value and mission impact.² CINCPAC noted the value of the interface, advised that original requirements were fulfilled, summarized the impact of the interface on the various Services and on joint operations, and provided items for future consideration.³ He explained that a more comprehensive report on lessons learned was being prepared for submission at a later date.

(S) In another message to the JCS he stressed the need for proper management once such a system was operational. He noted that requirements to change an operational interface could result from changes in the basic operational concept, changes in hardware or software of a participating system, or changes to JCS message standards. He recommended to the JCS that to avoid degradation to operations, changes should be tested for impact prior to being implemented in an operational environment. In addition, he recommended that appropriate CONUS facilities be made available to evaluate, test, and verify these proposed changes.⁴

BUMPY ACTION Support

(S) CINCPAC took steps to provide more effective electronic warfare support for BUMPY ACTION drones in the high threat areas of Hanoi and Haiphong. This was accomplished by increasing EB-66C and EA-6A electronic warfare support, thereby providing more powerful jamming support through the use of steerable antennae equipment aircraft.⁵ In October 1969 the Air Force Special Communications Center published a report on electronic warfare operations in support of BUMPY ACTION drones. This report showed

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1. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
 2. MJCS 507-69 of 3 Nov 69, cited in J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 3. CINCPAC 020515Z Dec 69.
 4. Admin CINCPAC 250007Z Oct 69.
 5. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.

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that the survivability rate for drones increased with electronic warfare support.¹

Standardization of Electronic Warfare Frequency Band Designation

(U) The existence and use of two separate letterband systems of electronic warfare frequency designation had been a source of confusion throughout the electronic warfare community. A joint Air Force-Army-Navy regulation provided one system of designating frequency bands to be used by the Services.² The confusion stemmed from the continued use of a second system that had originated during World War II.³ CINCPAC recognized that the existence of the two separate letterband systems was a source of confusion and ambiguity and recommended that the JCS promulgate joint policy adopting a single system for worldwide electronic warfare use.⁴

(U) The JCS implemented CINCPAC's recommendation in a memorandum on 20 May.⁵ They directed the U. S. military establishment to use specific frequencies or use the existing letterband systems specified in the joint regulation. The effective date of implementation was 31 December 1969.⁶

JCS Guidance on IFF Systems

(S) In March 1969 the JCS promulgated electronic warfare policy and guidance in MOP-95 (see item on Electronic Warfare Policy Guidance in this section). On 22 April the JCS provided new guidance on the use of electromagnetic systems to exploit Soviet type IFF (identification, friend or foe) systems operationally.⁷ CINCPAC therefore promulgated new procedures with certain restrictions for the use of these systems in the PACOM.⁸ There were no restrictions placed on operating these systems in the passive mode, but use of active modes was to be only in combat operations or conditions indicating

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1. Air Force Special Communications Center Electronic Warfare Evaluation (Comfy Boy 7-69) of 16 Oct 69.
 2. Air Force Regulation No. 55-44, Army Regulation No. 105-86, OPNAV Instruction 3430.9B, MCO 3430.1, 27 Oct 64, Subj: Performing Electronic Countermeasures in the United States and Canada.
 3. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
 4. J6 Brief No. 499-69, Hq CINCPAC, 28 May 69, of MJCS 266-69 of 20 May 69, Subj: Electronic Warfare Frequency Band Designations.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.
 7. JCS 7450/221353Z Apr 69.
 8. CINCPAC 250208Z Apr 69.

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imminent threat to United States ground, sea, or air units. In those cases, CINCPAC directed, the electronic warfare system was to be used in the least compromising active mode commensurate with tactical needs.

(S) CINCPAC stated that the advantages of this capability were self-evident, but that the anticipated gain had to be weighed against the attendant loss through possible compromise. He admonished all commanders to "exercise prudence in the use of this equipment."¹

(S) In June CINCPACFLT asked for a waiver of the provisions of the additional restrictions to allow operational evaluation of SEE SAW III equipment. In July CINCPAC forwarded the request to the JCS. As a result the JCS reassessed their guidance and rescinded the additional restriction.²

(S) CINCPAC, therefore, removed PACOM restrictions that had been based on the special guidance, simplifying the future operational employment of such systems.³

Modified FAN SONG

(S) Since the first photograph in March 1968 of a modified FAN SONG radar in North Vietnam, considerable effort was devoted to determine the function of the box-like structure on top of the radar. A continuous special collection program, FRESH NEWS, involving PACOM and SAC electronic warfare support measures and ELINT collectors in addition to drones did not reveal any new emissions attributed to FAN SONG. A breakthrough in this mystery occurred when a Cuban defector provided information that the modification was a Soviet version of a Czechoslovak optical device.⁴ If the modification should be an optical tracking device, it would provide an electronic counter-countermeasure capability against jamming and an improved low altitude tracking capability. More detailed information on the capability of the possible new tracking device was solicited through Service channels by CINCPAC's Air Force and Navy component command commanders.⁵

Revolutionary Development Program

(U) A detailed discussion of the Revolutionary Development Program will

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1. Ibid.
 2. JCS 7742/281614Z Aug 69.
 3. J3 Brief No. 215-69, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Sep 69 of JCS 2010/349 of 20 Aug 69, Subj: Operational Exploitation of Soviet-Type IFF Systems (S).
 4. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69; DIA 040153Z Nov 69.
 5. CINCPACAF 101815Z Nov 69, CINCPACFLT 140033Z Nov 69.

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be found in Annex A. Coverage of the program in this chapter will be limited to CINCPAC's involvement in the RD Cadre Program.

Revolutionary Development Cadre Program (RDCP)

(S) In April 1968, the responsibility for the overall direction of the RDCP was assumed by DOD. Prior to this time, the CIA was responsible for RDCP funding. The Department of the Army was designated as the executive agent for the program to include planning, policy, programming and accounting; however, the CIA continued to support the program with personnel and logistics. It was expected that CINCPAC would be brought into the picture on matters having budgeting and funding implications.¹

(S) On 26 February 1969, COMUSMACV forwarded a general plan to the JCS for relieving CIA of its remaining management responsibilities for the RDCP in Vietnam by 30 June 1969. The message stated that a detailed plan for this transfer of responsibility would be forwarded by subsequent messages when developed and that Ambassador Bunker and CAS (CIA) Saigon concurred. COMUSMACV's plan gave a general outline of systematic steps which would be taken to assure that the program transfer will be handled in a manner which would not affect the pace of pacification. CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's plan on 9 March and so notified the JCS.²

(S) On 20 March, the JCS concurred in principle with COMUSMACV's plan. Additional information of interest to the JCS and the SECDEF was required, however. On 29 March, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to provide the information. The information and recommendations were provided and concurred in by CINCPAC on 4 May.³

(S) The JCS, in a memorandum for the SECDEF, on 19 May, supported CINCPAC and COMUSMACV recommendations. COMUSMACV had requested appropriate special authority be granted and received by COMUSMACV not later than 15 May 1969 to permit effective support of the RDCP, specifically including the use of:⁴

1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, p. 253.
2. J5 Brief 106-69, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Apr 69, Subj: Revolutionary Development Cadre Program (U); JCS 2472/452 of 20 Mar 69; Point Paper, J555, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Nov 69, Subj: Revolutionary Development Cadre/Son Thon Revolutionary Development Cadre (RD/STRD Cadre) (U).
3. J5 Brief 143-69, Hq CINCPAC, 27 May 69, Subj: Revolutionary Development Cadre Program (U); JCSM-303-69 of 19 May 69.
4. Ibid.

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a. Procedures contained in AR 580-5 (S), and waiving the requirement to establish formal accountability as required by AR 580-5.

b. Contractor support for repair and utilities assets in connection with construction and maintenance of GVN owned and operated facilities, to include the full range of engineer support of such GVN facilities in the areas of repair and maintenance services and real estate.

c. Payment and support of RD Cadre personnel using the same procedures employed by CAS.

(S) In addition to supporting the CINCPAC and COMUSMACV recommendations, the JCS recommended to the SECDEF that: (a) appropriate special authority requested by COMUSMACV be granted; (b) the memorandum of understanding between DOD and CIA for the RDCP should be reviewed in consultation with DA and amended to reflect revised interagency responsibilities for the program; and (c) more definitive guidance relative to DA's responsibilities for the program should be issued by OSD.¹

(S) On 30 June, the SECDEF approved the transfer of the RDCP from CAS to COMUSMACV under specified criteria which included:²

a. Responsibility for program management to be transferred from CAS to COMUSMACV effective 1 July 1969.

b. Authority granted to COMUSMACV to utilize O&MA and PEMA funds in direct support of the programs.

c. COMUSMACV was charged with the responsibility for development and implementation of the RD Cadre payroll procedures to assure that clear audit trails are maintained down to RD Cadre team level.

d. U.S. accountability for supplies and equipment acquired through service channels would be dropped at point of issue to GVN in RVN.

e. Transfer of the RDCP financial and logistical support would be on phased basis over the first quarter of FY 70.

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1. Point Paper, J555, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Nov 69, Subj: Revolutionary Development Cadre/Son Thon Revolutionary Development Cadre (RD/STRD Cadre) (U).
 2. Ibid.

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f. COMUSMACV would be responsible for budget preparation and submission to USARPAC for the program.

g. DA would be responsible for establishment of program funding channels and procedures consistent with program management requirements of COMUSMACV.

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SECTION III - SPECIAL WARFARE

(U) This section of Chapter IV covers CINCPAC's actions and decisions pertaining to certain special operations in Southeast Asia. These operations are sensitive in nature and should be treated accordingly.

PRAIRIE FIRE (PF)

(TS) PRAIRIE FIRE, initially called SHINING BRASS, is the unclassified nickname of a ground reconnaissance, interdiction and exploitation program conducted against the VC/NVA in Laos since October 1965. PF forces, tailored to the mission, are infiltrated into Laos by foot or helicopter. The primary operational element is the Reconnaissance Team (RT) of 12 men (three U.S., nine indigenous). Exploitation forces are restricted to three platoons for any one operation. Fire support is provided by artillery, gunships, and tactical air. The PRAIRIE FIRE Area of Operation (PFAO) extends in Laos from a point approximately 30 km above the DMZ south to the Cambodian border with a depth varying from 20 km in the north to 30 km in the south. During periods of adverse weather in RVN, PF teams are inserted from launch sites at Nakhon Phanom and Ubon, Thailand. A forward refueling site, located on the Plateau de Bolovens in Laos, supports PF operations launched from Ubon.¹

Proposed Expansion of PRAIRIE FIRE Area

(TS) In 1968, CINCPAC at the request of COMUSMACV proposed to the AMEMBASSY, Vientiane an expansion of the PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations to include the Nape, Mu Gia, and Ban Karai passes. Ambassador Sullivan nonconcurred in the proposal.² On 20 November 1968, Admiral McCain made the same proposal but this time Nape pass was dropped. Again, Ambassador Sullivan nonconcurred.³ CINCPAC then informed COMUSMACV that unless COMUSMACV had strong objections no further action was intended by CINCPAC. In reply COMUSMACV provided additional rationale and urged support for his proposal. On 11 December 1968, in full support of COMUSMACV's request, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS obtain authority as expeditiously

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1. For a detailed discussion of PRAIRIE FIRE for years prior to 1969 see CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. II, pp. 741-745 and CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. III, pp. 257-262.
 2. CINCPAC 020910Z Nov 68; AMEMBASSY Vientiane 10045/030642Z Nov 68.
 3. CINCPAC 202321Z Nov 68; J3A3 Memo 0003-69, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Jan 69.

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as possible to permit expansion of the PF area of operations to include the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes.¹ On 31 December 1968, a joint State-Defense message advised Ambassador Sullivan that after thorough discussions, there was an inclination to approve CINCPAC's recommendation but would appreciate the Ambassador's current views in light of his informal discussions with ADM McCain on 26 December. On the same date, the JCS requested CINCPAC's views on the proposal since his conversation with Mr. Sullivan.²

(TS) On 2 January 1969, Ambassador Sullivan addressed the proposal again in a message he sent to the SECDEF. Information copies were sent to SECSTATE, AMEMBASSY Saigon, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. In the message he told the SECDEF that he shared the Joint Chiefs' concern about enemy logistical activity, especially during December. He acknowledged that the southward movement of supplies indicated prospects of trouble in the northern provinces of SVN in the period immediately ahead.³

(TS) Ambassador Sullivan told the SECDEF that in the more than four years that he had been Ambassador to Laos, his examination of the air interdiction program revealed about a 15 percent destruction of the enemy logistics throughput. Therefore, any effort to improve the rate of destruction should be measured against the "marginality of results." Measurement of the proposed PF operations would have to be considered in light of political risks "which are well known to Washington." Ambassador Sullivan commented on the normal conduct of PF operations in areas of Laos which were contiguous to SVN and the fact that the PF program "is being conducted on clandestine basis contrary to Souvanna's expressed wishes."⁴

(TS) Ambassador Sullivan believed that in the proposed operation the probability of capture and exposure was very high and that "measures of deniability was practically nil." This belief was based on the proposal to insert teams into areas contiguous to North Vietnam, heavily guarded by NVN troops, and where intense anti-aircraft fire could be expected. Nevertheless, he would be willing to take this risk if he thought arguments for a truly effective destruction effort against NVN logistics were convincing. However, he found the arguments "far from compelling" and believed the increased rate of destruction expected from the proposed operation would be limited to "at most a few percentage points above the current destruction rate!" The Ambassador stated that "I find myself unhappily in the posture of contradicting an almost

1. J3A3 Memo 0003-68, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Jan 69.

2. SECDEF 8630/312303Z Dec 68; JCS (SACSA) 312318Z Dec 68.

3. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 020/021115Z Jan 69.

4. Ibid.

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unanimous military expression of opinion which seems to feel that some truly significant improvements would be made." At the risk "of venturing into military provinces" he layed out his reasoning to inspection:¹

It is claimed that PRAIRIE FIRE teams possess real time target acquisition, reporting, and exploitation capability to bring in tactical air strikes. Our experience in providing real time reporting through the Mark I system indicated that our teams obtained truck destruction by strike aircraft of less than one percent against their reports of truck sighting. Average time between target sighting and provision of information to Air Force was between two and three minutes. Problems had to do with availability of aircraft, perishability of targets, weather, and other similar factors. [It will be argued (and I concede) that PRAIRIE FIRE teams have language advantage over CAS teams.] But it has also been our experience, with English speaking ground controllers, that direct voice communications with high performance aircraft equipped with UHF radios is not repeat not dependable often times not repeat not technically feasible. This has limited response to propellor-driven craft (equipped with UHF, VHF and FM radios), which are in short supply, and which find anti-aircraft environment in the passes far from permissive.

These limitations, coupled with the doubtful prospects for team survival in the environment under consideration, are primary causes for my skepticism. I must admit, in all candor, that this skepticism is enhanced by my genuine concern that we will be sending a great many brave young men to almost certain death in this effort. I realize this is more properly General Abram's responsibility than my own, but it is a prejudicial element in my outlook.

Having said all these things, I am faced with the cold fact that their truth can only be established or denied if the case is put to the test. I would therefore propose that a limited trial effort be made to establish the facts. [It would be done in such way that we cause no repeat no disruption for the time being to the CAS road watch effort. (CAS Headquarters, incidentally, is wrong in its description of current team

1. Ibid.

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locations. We have two on the Lao side at Ban Karai and one in NVN at Mu Gia.) If the test indicates the program could have significant success, we would then rearrange the CAS teams. If not, we could preserve their integrity.

OK Since neither of the areas proposed can be serviced out of South Vietnam launch sites, operations would have to be mounted from Thailand. Nakhon Phanom is only point currently equipped to handle PRAIRIE FIRE teams. Mu Gia is closest LZ from this point. It also has least current problem for CAS teams and has most permissive anti-aircraft environment. There are several usable LZ positions in region which would not repeat not compromise LZ used by CAS. I would therefore propose conduct test in Mu Gia.

Consequently, I would propose that, as soon as MACSOG can make preparations and Embassy Thailand concurs, we attempt a trial period of one month to test the risk versus the results. MACSOG representatives should open direct contact with [REDACTED]

Debut etc. While I have very little confidence this will succeed, I wish to have my people provide maximum assistance to give these teams the best possible chance to survive.

(TS) On 3 January, ADM McCain in a message to GEN Abrams referred to Ambassador Sullivan's views and comments and stated that "...while there are details in (the) reference (Ambassador Sullivan's message) on which CINCPAC has reservations, the end result is a proposal that PF operations be conducted in the Mu Gia area on a trial basis." CINCPAC was inclined to concur in conducting a 30-day test to determine the tactical feasibility of the proposal. To be successful the test would require "close coordination and cooperation between MACV and AMEMB, Vientiane." CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to comment on the proposed test as soon as possible.

(TS) On 9 January, COMUSMACV told CINCPAC that he concurred in the proposed test in the Mu Gia area and that the test should take place as soon as possible. He cautioned that adverse weather and other factors might require extension of the test beyond 30 days to obtain a valid evaluation. In closing COMUSMACV told CINCPAC that his headquarters was developing

1. CINCPAC 030453Z Jan 69.

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criteria and methods by which to assess the effectiveness of the operations, not just by count of truck kills, but by the effect of the operations on the entire enemy logistic effort in Laos and in SVN. The assessment vehicle was to be forwarded at the appropriate time. ¹

(TS) CINCPAC, on 11 January, notified the JCS that he recognized the validity of the concern expressed by Ambassador Sullivan regarding the proposal; however, "the situation demands that every feasible effort be made to exploit full extent of our interdiction capability." Accordingly, CINCPAC concurred in conducting a 30-day test to assess the proposed operations with the proviso that he would submit appropriate recommendations in the event bad weather or other factors should require the test to be extended. ADM McCain recommended approval of the 30-day test in the Mu Gia pass area and that Washington level decision on his recommendation of 11 December 1968 to establish new PF areas be held in abeyance pending recommendations resulting from the proposed test. ²

(TS) On the same date, the SECSTATE replying to Ambassador Sullivan's message of 2 January 1969 stated he could not approve the proposed test at that time. He requested that representatives of the AMEMBASSY Vientiane and CINCPAC to study and coordinate the proposed operation and forward the plan to the JCS for State/Defense review. ³

(TS) CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV on 12 January to prepare, coordinate with AMEMBASSY Vientiane, and submit to CINCPAC detailed plans for the tests to include criteria and methods by which it was planned to assess the effectiveness of the operations. ⁴ On 1 February, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to provide information of the status of the plans. The next day COMUSMACV forwarded the proposed plan to Ambassador Sullivan for coordination and furnished CINCPAC a copy of the plan. COMUSMACV, on 4 February, told CINCPAC that the plan would be expedited but submission of the final plan to CINCPAC was subject to AMEMBASSY Vientiane response. ⁵

(TS) On 5 February, AMEMBASSY Vientiane, notified COMUSMACV that further coordination of the plan was necessary and suggested that a discussion be held at Udorn, Thailand on 10 February. ⁶ The meeting was held at Udorn

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1. COMUSMACV 1723/091110Z Jan 69.
 2. CINCPAC 110120Z Jan 69.
 3. State 004984/110034Z Jan 69.
 4. CINCPAC 122242Z Jan 69.
 5. COMUSMACV 6827/021157Z Feb 69; COMUSMACV 7109/040131Z Feb 69.
 6. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 778/051044Z Feb 69.

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on 10 February as recommended. The plan was discussed and no major areas of disagreement were encountered. However, Minister Hurwitch requested further details of the plans to include tentatively selected LZs and observation posts. COMUSMACV furnished the information on 12 February.¹ On 25 February, CINCPAC in a message to the AMEMBASSY Vientiane and COMUSMACV pointed out that because of high level Washington interest and the forthcoming seasonal adverse weather in the Mu Gia area, assistance in expediting finalization and coordination of the proposed test plan was required and would be appreciated.²

(TS) On 26 February, AMEMBASSY Vientiane replied to CINCPAC's 25 February message. Ambassador Sullivan told ADM McCain that he had received COMUSMACV's "sketchy" plan of 2 February and the printed plan delivered by special courier from MACV on 12 February. Ambassador Sullivan stated that there were marked discrepancies between the two plans. The printed plan, entitled SHILOH III, did not contain "a reference to the plan being a test plan or that the objective of the exercise is to test the feasibility and effectiveness of placing PRAIRIE FIRE teams in the Mu Gia Pass area." The Ambassador continued with the comment that SHILOH III did not mention "a meaningful test period," no mention was made of the criteria and methods by which it was planned to assess the effectiveness of the operations, and that SHILOH III "does not authorize PF teams to ground (sic) FAC USAF strikes against perishable and hard targets, which we had been led to believe was the main point of proposing that the lives of U.S. personnel be risked in this inhospitable area." Ambassador Sullivan enumerated the various documents that he had received from COMUSMACV and commented that "the necessity to piece and patch these documents together into a coherent whole...regretably caused some delay. Ambassador Sullivan made several other comments on SHILOH III but in conclusion he failed to state when his approval of the plan could be expected."³

(TS) On 28 February, CINCPAC in a message to COMUSMACV, with an information copy to AMEMBASSY Vientiane, stated his purposes and objectives of the test operations remained:⁴

a. Operations are to be based on a 30 operational day test period to assess the effectiveness vs. the risks.

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1. COMUSMACV 9243/140222Z Feb 69.
 2. CINCPAC 252042Z Feb 69.
 3. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 1204/260750Z Feb 69.
 4. CINCPAC 280254Z Feb 69.

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h. The cost - in material damaged or destroyed, personnel casualties, and diversions from other missions.

(TS) On 15 May, State/Defense agreed in principle to the conduct of SHILOH III but withheld approval to commence operations. When CINCPAC determined that test operations should begin, State/Defense would review the plan in light of the political situation at that time. The JCS approved deferring implementation of SHILOH III and requested timely notification when implementation was desired. CINCPAC advised the JCS that adverse weather conditions in the Mu Gia area would likely preclude SHILOH III operations prior to 1 October 1969. As the weather improved, the tactical operational environment would be reevaluated and the JCS notified if and when it was desired to implement SHILOH III.¹ On 21 September, COMUSMACV reevaluated the Mu Gia area and determined that operations should be deferred indefinitely because of the enemy's increased defensive posture. CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's reevaluation and recommended to the JCS that OPlan SHILOH III be deferred indefinitely.² The JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendation on 21 October and CINCPAC notified all concerned on 24 October.³

Use of CS Gas to Support Extraction

(TS) On 25 October, the value of using CS gas to suppress enemy fire was demonstrated vividly in an action west of Base Area 614. A PRAIRIE FIRE platoon of 32 men engaged a NVA company in a five-hour firefight resulting in 26 friendly casualties. Immediate attempts to extract the platoon were unsuccessful due to heavy enemy small arms, 50 cal. and 12.7mm machine gun fire. Two helicopters and a number of supporting gunships were damaged. Thirty-six tactical air sorties with conventional ordnance and multiple gunship sorties were unable to suppress the enemy fire. The Amembassy Vientiane promptly approved a request to employ CS gas which was distributed from CBU 19s by eight AIE sorties around the platoons perimeter. Enemy fire was reduced immediately to only sporadic small arms fire allowing the complete, successful extraction of the unit.⁴

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1. SECSTATE 077720/152347Z May 69; CINCPAC 050537Z Jun 69; JCS 1512/311537Z May 69.
 2. COMUSMACV 53979/230215Z Sep 69; CINCPAC 252105Z Sep 69.
 3. JCS 2924/211250Z Oct 69; CINCPAC 241857Z Oct 69.
 4. J3 Memo 0002230-69, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Nov 69, from MGEN Elwood to ADM McCain, Subj: PRAIRIE FIRE Monthly Summary (U).

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PRAIRIE FIRE STATISTICAL SUMMARY 1969

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
MISSIONS	36	18	36	39	44	40	28	47	54	35	37	38	452
ENEMY KILLED *	12	16	48	36	25	42	46	56	67	32	24	74	478
ENEMY CAPTURED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FRIENDLY KIA (U.S./RVN)	3/2	0/1	5/6	0/7	0/3	0/4	1/6	3/7	2/13	6/11	0/4	1/2	21/66
FRIENDLY WIA (U.S./RVN)	1/5	6/9	20/69	14/44	3/9	3/6	8/19	12/10	18/35	15/43	4/10	7/12	119/278
FRIENDLY MIA (U.S./RVN)	3/0	0/0	1/5	0/1	1/2	0/2	2/2	0/2	0/1	0/5	5/15	0/3	12/38
HELICOPTER SORTIES (GUNSHIPS)	43	19	59	88	44	46	24	59	91	94	50	71	688
TACTICAL AIR SORTIES	70	32	118	141	43	44	68	97	124	125	56	149	1067
SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS	20	2	86	25	9	13	6	25	31	18	11	9	255
ENEMY WEAPONS CAPTURED	2	8	4	3	2	9	5	3	14	6	4	2	54
MINES EMPLACED	2	2	6	174	5	24	0	34	18	32	6	2	305
CACHES DESTROYED	0	0	2	2	0	3	6	2	4	4	2	3	28
VEHICLES DESTROYED	3	0	10	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	5	29
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS	56	50	31	74	40	52	72	47	87	52	76	81	716
HELICOPTER LOSSES **	3	1	1	6	3	0	3	5	5	1	1	1	30

* FIGURES REFLECT ONLY BODY COUNT

** ALL CAUSES

*** VNAF

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An Operational Lesson Learned - Team Survivability

(TS) Experience indicates that the first two or three planned series of missions, capitalizing on the element of surprise, achieve the greatest degree of success. After the first couple of missions into any one limited target area the enemy intensifies his observation efforts, employs additional security forces, and improves his defensive posture. Continued reinsertion of PF teams into the same limited area after the enemy has taken defensive countermeasures are usually paid for in terms of severe penalties to the PF forces. Thus, to insure mission success and reduce casualties, missions must be shifted continuously from one general target area or base area to another throughout the PF area of operation.¹

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1. J3 Memo 0002373-69, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Dec 69, from MGEN Elwood to ADM McCain, Subj: PRAIRIE FIRE November Monthly Summary (U).

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SECTION IV - CINCPAC'S MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(S) A system for measuring progress of the war effort in Vietnam evolved from the goals established at the Honolulu Conference in February 1966. At the conference, attended by President Johnson, high ranking government officials of SVN, and others, six goals were established as objectives for operations in SVN during 1966. These goals became the basis for measuring progress.¹

(S) In October 1966, CINCPAC's strategy for Vietnam was promulgated and it included three interdependent undertakings which together constituted the concept for the conduct of military operations against North Vietnam and in Laos and South Vietnam.² Initially, in 1967 nine goals were established for the three undertakings;³ however, another goal was added in March 1967-- secure the water lines of communication in the National Priority Areas of III and IV Corps Tactical Zones.⁴ In July 1967, a second change occurred. The goal to open 65 percent of the railroads and secure those in National Priority Areas was changed to opening 55 percent of the railroads and securing those in the National Priority Areas of II and III Corps.⁵

(S) The 10 goals for 1967 were modified to reflect changing programs and to establish progressively higher goal objectives to be achieved during 1968. In addition, because of increasing emphasis directed toward reducing the VC infrastructure--political cadre--and improving RVNAF effectiveness, two new goals related to these areas were added for 1968.

(S) In 1968, because of increasing emphasis directed toward reducing the VC infrastructure and improving RVNAF effectiveness, two new in-country goals addressing these subjects were added for 1968, making a total of 12 goals for 1968. The eight in-country goals for 1968 were reevaluated in formulating the goals for 1969 and one new goal addressing enemy ground attacks by fire against population centers, economic areas, and bases were added. The 1968 goal of reducing imports into NVN was deleted from the four

1. CINCPAC Command History 1966, Vol. II, pp. 605-606.

2. CINCPAC ltr, Ser 000438, 20 Oct 66.

3. Interview between LCOLs J. F. Jewell and F. E. Leavens, J3A5, and LCOL Johnson, Command Historian; CINCPAC 090556Z Jan 67.

4. CINCPAC 162232Z Apr 67.

5. COMUSMACV 24773/260536Z Jul 67.

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out-of-country goals. The strategy, goals, and progress made toward achieving the 1969 goals are discussed in this section.¹

(S) The CINCPAC strategy for 1969 changed significantly from the 1968 strategy. The changes reflected the Vietnamization of the war and the halt in the bombing of North Vietnam. CINCPAC's 1968 strategy in RVN was to (1) seek out and destroy communist forces and infrastructure by expanded, offensive military operations, and (2) extend the secure areas of RVN by military operations and assist the GVN in building and independent, viable, noncommunist society by civic actions coordinated with military operations. CINCPAC's strategy outside the RVN was to take the war to the enemy by unremitting but selective application of United States air and naval power thus reducing Hanoi's ability to support and direct military operations in RVN.²

CINCPAC's Strategy

(S) CINCPAC's strategy for 1969 included (1) provide maximum assistance in developing, training, and equipping the RVNAF as rapidly as possible, (2) continue military support for accelerated pacification, civic action, and security programs, (3) conduct military operations designed to accelerate improvement in the RVNAF and to continue to provide security for U. S. forces, (4) conduct military operations to reduce the flow of materiel and manpower support for enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam, and (5) maintain plans for a comprehensive air and naval campaign in Vietnam.³

CINCPAC's Goals

(S) CINCPAC's nine goals within the Republic of Vietnam:⁴

- I. Enhance RVNAF effectiveness.
- II. Eliminate 21,600 Viet Cong infrastructure throughout the Republic of Vietnam during CY 69.
- III. Increase the population living within relatively secure areas to 90 percent; correspondingly increase the number of relatively secure hamlets.

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1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia, 31 March 1969, Hq CINCPAC, 29 May 69.
 2. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress, 31 Dec 68, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Mar 69.
 3. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia, 31 Dec 69, Hq CINCPAC.
 4. Ibid.

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- IV. Inflict VC/NVA personnel losses to extent which exceeds input.
- V. Reduce the ability of the enemy to conduct ground attacks and attacks by fire against population centers, economic areas and bases.
- VI. Deny VC/NVA forces utilization of known base areas.
- VII. Open 100 percent and secure 70 percent of designated waterways.
- VIII. Open 100 percent and secure 80 percent of designated roads.
- IX. Open 100 percent and secure 80 percent of designated railroads.
- (S) CINCPAC's three goals outside the Republic of Vietnam:¹
 - X. As authorized, achieve and maintain a level of damage to war supporting targets which will render those targets unusable for their intended purpose.
 - XI. As authorized, reduce enemy capability to move men and materiel into Laos and the Republic of Vietnam.
 - XII. Reduce enemy capability to interfere with our air operations.

Progress Toward Goals in 1969

(S) Goal I: Enhance RVNAF effectiveness. Results of regular ground forces of RVNAF measured in terms of a KIA ratio improved in the last quarter of CY 69. The ratio was 4.3 enemy KIA to 1 RVNAF for the first three quarters of CY 69 and 6.4 to 1 for the last quarter. The average enemy to RF/PF KIA ratio for CY 69 was 3.8 to 1. The U.S. advisors assessment of the combat effectiveness for RVNAF regular ground forces improved during the last half of CY 69. The average percent of effectiveness for the first half of CY 69 was 74 and 78.4 for the last half. The desertion rate within the RVNAF continued to be a significant problem even though the CY 69 rate of 10.1 desertions per 1,000 troops was an improvement over the 12.5 percent average for CY 68. Both the RF and PF continued to show improvement in firepower while the percent of units receiving the required six hours of training remained a problem. In the RVN Navy the total number of river security craft was increased by 10 PBR and logistic ships increased by 76 RAID craft. It was considered significant that the level of operational and employed craft

1. Ibid.

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remained constant even though the number of assigned ships and craft increased. The total number of VNAF combat ready aircrews increased from 65 percent of the 530 aircrews authorized in January 1969 to 86 percent of the 547 authorized in December 1969. ¹

(S) Goal II: Eliminate 21,600 Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) throughout RVN during CY 69. During CY 69 Phung Hoang (PHOENIX Program) operations were directed toward neutralization of the upper echelon VCI. The results were gratifying and as indicated in the chart, "Eliminate VC Infrastructure," the monthly average of VCI neutralized at district or higher level during CY 69 was 329 compared to 191 during CY 68. Of the 5,373 VCI neutralized during the fourth quarter CY 69, 24 percent, or 1,203, were from district or higher level. During all of CY 69 an average of 21 percent of VCI neutralizations were from district or higher level as compared to 13 percent for CY 68. These comparative figures reflected a significant improvement in the neutralization of upper level VCI during CY 69. A total of 15,776 VCI were neutralized during CY 68 and 19,534 during CY 69, an increase of 3,758 during CY 69. This is a significant 23.8 percent increase; however, this gain takes on added significance since only upper echelon VCI were included in the CY 69 total. The annual goal was 90.4 percent accomplished. ²

(S) Goal III: Increase population living within relatively secure areas to 90 percent and correspondingly increase the number of relatively secure hamlets. The 90 percent goal was reached by the end of the third quarter CY 69 and by the end of CY 69 92.7 percent of the population lived in relatively secure areas as indicated on the chart, "Population Control." In November and December the main thrust of pacification was to consolidate gains made in the Phase I and Phase II campaigns. Overall progress in security and pacification in CY 69 was achieved by more effective use of GVN military resources to initially clear target areas and then to follow up with the establishment of local government and local defense. As directed by COSVN Resolution No. 9, enemy activity increased during November and December and pacification became a target for attacks. Even so, consolidation and improvement in security status continued through the end of the year. Hamlet security also improved throughout the year. The number of hamlets classified as "Relatively Secure" increased from approximately 50 to 80 percent. Hamlets classified as "VC Controlled" decreased from approximately 24 percent to six percent as indicated by the chart, "Hamlet Status." As of 31 December 1969, 96.4 percent of inhabited villages and 92.5 percent of all hamlets had elected governments. During CY 69, 99 percent of the 17,000 village/hamlet


1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

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GOAL II
ELIMINATE VC INFRASTRUCTURE
(LOSSES BY ECHELON)




SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 31 DEC 69. PREPARED
BY LCDL W.W. BARTON, JR. USMC, J3A32

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GOAL III POPULATION CONTROL




SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 31 DEC 69. PREPARED BY LCOL W.W. BARTON, JR. USMC, J3A32

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GOAL III HAMLET STATUS



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SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 31 DEC 69. PREPARED BY LCOL W.W. BARTON, JR. USMC. J3A32

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officials scheduled for training at Vung Tau completed the village/hamlet course. Training was also provided 34,607 province officials, which represented 88 percent of goal accomplishment. Significant strides were made during CY 69 in electing and training GVN personnel for government service, thereby strengthening GVN control and security in the RVN. ¹

(S) Goal IV: Inflict VC/NVA losses to extent which exceeds input. This goal was achieved during every quarter in 1969. The total reported VC/NVA input for CY 69 was 161,100 and the total reported losses 292,920. It should be noted that the enemy losses and gains reflected in the chart, "VC/NVA Losses Vs Input" are estimates. ²

(S) Goal V: Reduce the ability of the enemy to conduct ground attacks and attacks by fire against population centers, economic areas, and bases. This goal was not achieved. Attacks by fire increased steadily during CY 69. The measurement of progress toward reducing the enemy's ability to conduct ground attacks or attacks by fire was based on four indicators: (1) VC/NVA personnel losses, (2) VC/NVA weapon losses, (3) VC/VNA materiel losses and (4) enemy initiated attacks. ³

(S) Goal VI: Deny VC/NVA forces utilization of known base areas. On 1 January 1969, 37 VC/NVA base areas were identified by COMUSMACV as being active in RVN. Under the concept promulgated in the CY 69 Combined Campaign Plan, AB144, all identified VC/NVA base areas were to be neutralized by the end of the year. All base areas were to be subjected to repeated air strikes and random ground operations to create insecurity, disrupt command channels and limit enemy use of all base areas. The CINCPAC goal to deny VC/NVA utilization of known base areas was based upon this concept. As indicated on the chart, "VC/NVA Base Area Goal," progress toward this goal lagged behind the goal projection throughout CY 69, as the year ended with only 22 percent of goal accomplishment. ⁴


(S) Goal VII: Open 100 percent and secure 70 percent of designated waterways. During CY 69 designated waterways were classified according to their average security status during each month as (1) Secure, (2) Open, ⁵ or (3) Closed. On 31 January, the number of kilometers being evaluated under the CY 69 goal was 1,659. This was a 10 percent increase over the CY 68

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

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GOAL IV
VC/NVA LOSSES VS INPUT



SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
31 DEC 69. PREPARED BY LCOL W.W. BASTON, JR. USMC, J3A32


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GOAL VI

VC/NVA BASE AREA GOAL

PERCENT OF TOTAL ENEMY BASE AREAS IN RVN DENIED ENEMY USE




LEGEND: PERCENT DENIED —
PERCENT OF GOAL - - -

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 31 DEC 69. PREPARED
BY LCOL W.W. BARTON, JR. USMC, J3A32

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**GOAL VII
WATERWAYS
TOTAL KILOMETERS CONSIDERED 1694 ***



* FROM 1 JAN TO MAR THE GOAL WAS 1659 Kms.

LEGEND: PERCENT OPEN ———
PERCENT SECURE - - - - -
PERCENT OF GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 31 DEC 69. PREPARED
BY LCOL W.W. BARTON, JR. USMC, J3A32

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waterway goal. During March, 35 km of waterways in I CTZ were added to the goal, resulting in a new total of 1,694 km being considered. At the end of the fourth quarter, 1,122 of the 1,694 km were considered Secure and all designated waterways were considered Open. The chart, "Waterways," shows progress made during CY 69. It reflects the average waterway security status achieved during each month. As indicated the Open goal of 100 percent was achieved by the end of the first quarter in CY 69.¹ The Secure goal of 70 percent missed being achieved by 0.9 percent. It should be noted that for goal measurement purposes, total waterways considered in an Open security status included not only waterways classified Open, but also waterways classified Secure.

(S) Goal VIII: Open 100 percent and secure 80 percent of designated roads. As indicated on chart, "Roads" the goal to Open 100 percent of designated roads was 99.3 percent accomplished by 31 December 1969, 0.7 percent below the CY 69 goal. The goal to Secure 80 percent of designated roads stood at 68.1 percent by 31 December 1969, 11.9 percent below the CY 69 goal. Roads were classified according to their average security status during each month as (1) Secure, (2) Open, or (3) Closed. For goal measurement purposes, total roads considered in an Open security status included roads not only classified Open, but also classified Secure.²

(S) Goal IX: Open 100 percent and secure 80 percent of designated railroads. During CY 69 designated railroads were classified according to their average security status during the month as (1) Secure, (2) Open, or (3) Closed. For goal measurement purposes, total railroads considered in an Open security status included railroads not only classified Open, but also railroads classified Secure. At the beginning of CY 69, 81 percent of the designated railroads were in Open category. At the end of the year, 97.9 percent were Open, 2.1 percent below the year-end goal of 100 percent. As indicated on the chart, "Railroads" CY 69 commenced with 26 percent of the designated railroads in the Secure category. At the end of the year, 64.4 percent were Secure, 15.6 percent below the year-end goal of 80 percent.³


(S) Goal X: As authorized, achieve and maintain a level of damage to war supporting targets which will render those targets unusable for their intended purpose. Air strikes against ROLLING THUNDER targets were not authorized during CY 69, therefore, no progress could be measured toward

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1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia, 31 March 1969, Hq CINCPAC.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

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GOAL VIII
ROADS
TOTAL KILOMETERS CONSIDERED 3811




LEGEND: PERCENT OPEN ———
PERCENT SECURE
PERCENT OF GOAL ———

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 31 DEC 69. PREPARED
BY LCOL W.W. BARTON, JR. USMC, J3A32

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**GOAL IX
RAILROADS
TOTAL KILOMETERS CONSIDERED**



SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 31 DEC 69. PREPARED
BY LCOL W.W. BARTON, JR. USMC, J3A32

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this goal. The enemy continued restoration efforts as 13 targets were added to the "worthy of strike" category of the ROLLING THUNDER Target List during the quarter.¹

(S) Goal XI: As authorized, reduce enemy capability to move men and materiel into Laos and the Republic of Vietnam. The total infiltration for CY 69 was 104,000 which represents a 58 percent decrease from the 246,300 estimate for CY 68. The estimated infiltration of NVN personnel into the RVN during the fourth quarter CY 69 amounted to 5,100, a significant reduction from the 30,200, 52,900 and 15,800 estimated for the first, second, and third quarters, respectively. It represented the lowest number of infiltrators for a quarter since CY 65.²

(S) Goal XII: Reduce enemy capability to interfere with our air operations. During CY 69 the NVN jet fighter inventory increased 70 percent. The U.S. combat aircraft loss rate for CY 69 was .058 compared with a loss rate of .06 percent for CY 68. Little or no progress was made toward Goal XII.³

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

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SECTION V - CAPABILITIES OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA

(U) ...going to the mainland of the Southeast peninsula. In Burma, to the north, they are having increased insurgent activities. If Burma does not remain strong I can assure you that there will come a day when Red China will move south. Don't forget the chart I showed you on the limits of the Chinese at the time of the Manchu Dynasty.

Moving to Thailand, which really in effect is the key-stone of all of Southeast Asia in the long run--in the immediate future it is going to be Laos--but the insurgent operations in Thailand are increasing to the north; there also is a substantial pocket of communists down on the border between Malaysia and Thailand itself.

Speaking to Laos, this right now is one of our more important problems outside of Vietnam. The communists, as you can see, have taken over half of Laos. Of course, one of the primary purposes of the North Vietnamese and the Red Chinese would be to establish points of egress into Thailand as indicated here. Suppose at some future date the communists are successful in taking over Burma and Laos, as you can see, they would then outflank Thailand which would lead to great difficulties.

.....

Now, then, we get to the basic problem, Vietnam, and I want to run over some facts here in contrast to what you have been reading in the newspapers....

.....

Well, I say to you that we do have a military initiative and although it's going to take a long time, the success is certainly on our side. And if you want to call that being

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optimistic or pessimistic, you have to draw your own conclusions on that statement.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

Military Assistance Program (MAP), Southeast Asia

Introduction

(S) This section of Chapter IV is designed to cover only those items concerning MAP or MASF (Military Assistance Service Funded) in Southeast Asia that are not elsewhere treated in this annual history, specifically the service-funded MAPs of South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. As explained earlier at the beginning of Chapter II of this history, this division of CINCPAC's multi-faceted MAP activities into two separate chapters, besides providing continuity with earlier CINCPAC histories, is also logically based in the assigned missions and objectives of CINCPAC.

(S) Because of the unique character, complexity, and magnitude of the conflict in South Vietnam, many military assistance topics are mentioned in other portions of Chapter IV of this annual history, especially in the logistics section. Moreover, the annual histories submitted by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI for Calendar Year 1969, both of which are attached as Annexes A and B, respectively, to CINCPAC Command History 1969, should prove to be a treasuretrove of detail on this subject for anyone who is interested. In addition, other topics, such as personnel matters, concerning MAP activities in Southeast Asia are discussed in Chapters I and II of this annual history. This latter chapter also contains the Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) annual evaluations of all PACOM countries, as well as the item, "Strategic Mobility Work Projects for MAP and/or AID Funding," which deals primarily with MAP railroad stocks both in Thailand and South Vietnam. Moreover, Chapter II covers, in detail, the MAPs in Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore, as well as Indonesia and the Philippines, which some geographers insist properly belong in the area encompassed by the term, Southeast Asia.

(S) Throughout Calendar Year 1969, as in previous years, U. S. MAP achieved its primary objectives of providing MAP-supported nations in Southeast Asia "with requisite capabilities to maintain their own internal security

1. An Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC, before the Propeller Club of Honolulu in Hawaii on 2 July 1969.

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and to counter communist-directed subversion or insurgency"; in fact, this MAP support, coupled with the U. S. "resolve in Vietnam... have bolstered both the will and capability of Southeast Asian nations to resist Communist expansionism." ¹ Although the effectiveness of the military forces vary greatly from nation to nation in Southeast Asia, U. S. military assistance has achieved important improvements "in terms of organization and command, contingency planning, logistics efficiency, and uniformity of weapons and equipment." ²

Reprogramming Requirement for Weapons Systems Logistics Officers (WSLOs)

(C) In December 1969, CINCPAC received information that the reprogramming requirement for WSLOs was applicable to MASF, as well as to grant aid programs. Accordingly, CINCPAC dispatched a message requesting the necessary reprogramming data to both COMUSMACTHAI and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI. This reprogramming would apply to FY 70 and all subsequent years. ³

English Language Training (ELT) in Countries of Southeast Asia

(U) From 28 August through 8 September 1969, Mr. J. Sisk, the Defense Language Institute (DLI) representative in the MAP Training Branch (J3A2), Hq CINCPAC, made a trip to Southeast Asia. The purpose of this trip was for Mr. Sisk to accompany the "new English Language Program Manager (ELPM) to Saigon, to assist him during his initial indoctrination and to provide technical assistance to DLI and U. S. military personnel assigned to ELT programs in SEA." ⁴

(S) The highlights of this trip follow below and give somewhat of a survey of the status of ELT programs in Southeast Asia:

a. Vietnam

(1) Need for a permanent ELPM in Vietnam
(Incumbent is on a TDY basis for 60 days). Size, complexity and importance of the ELT program to the success of the VNAF I & M program demands that an early assignment of a permanent ELPM be accomplished.

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1. CINCPAC MA Plan for PACOM Region FY 70-75, dtd 7 Aug 69, p. 5.
 2. Ibid.
 3. CSAF AFSMSDB 232238Z Dec 69; CINCPAC 030223Z Jan 70; J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
 4. J3A2/DLI-REP History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69, included in J3A23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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(2) Too much emphasis on ECL test scores - not enough on quality of instruction, which is what ultimately determines if an English language trainee will complete CONUS training.

(3) Lack of experienced ELT instructors.

(4) Problem of possible ECL test compromises invalidating ECL indication of a student's ability and the slippage this creates in providing qualified personnel for filling CONUS training spaces.

(5) Relocation of a major portion of the RVNAFLS and of an Annex in Vung Tau should relieve some of the crowded conditions that presently plague the ECTP in Vietnam.

(6) Recommendations:

(a) A study be made to determine if locally-administered ECL tests have been compromised, and if so, that immediate replacement action be accomplished.

(b) Adequately equip new classroom facilities and concentrate use of DLI personnel within the ELT to improve the quality of language instruction.

b. Thailand - RTG is originating a proposal to establish a headquarters and school to consolidate ELT resources in Thailand.

c. Laos - ELT program in Laos remains efficient and effective.¹

(d) On 28 August 1969, it was formally announced that the:

...Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Thailand (the Prime Minister) had approved in principle the establishment of an Armed Forces Language Institute. This institute will, under the approved three phased plan, gradually assume direction and control of, and then centralize, all English language training personnel, facilities, and materiel

1. Ibid.

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used by the Royal Thai Armed Forces. In addition, it will present instruction in other Occidental languages and in Oriental languages.¹

(S) Later, the Royal Thailand Government (RTG) submitted a proposal to establish a Thailand Armed Forces Institute of Language and International Studies, which would centralize and coordinate the requirements for conducting English language training for all Thai armed services.² On 9 September 1969, COMUSMACTHAI requested information as to the feasibility of an in-country survey of the Thai plan requirements by a DLI team. "In order to complete review and develop CINCPAC position regarding" this plan, CINCPAC requested of the Thailand Country Team on 1 October 1969 more detailed information.³

Laos

(U) In Laos, wide areas in the north and in the panhandle previously classified as "contested" are now dominated by North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao Forces. Stretching west and south like two fingers in the heart of Southeast Asia, Laos is critically important to the free Asian countries' efforts to withstand the communist aggressive campaign. For the first time in recent years the rainy season has not produced the expected reduction in the enemy's offensive activity and he continues to conduct the most determined aggressive campaign in Laos since the 1962 accords. The present deteriorating situation in Laos is of serious concern to us.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.⁴

Objectives of DEPCJUSMAGTHAI MASF

(S) U.S. MASF to Laos is designed to support the following objectives:

(1) To support the Armed Forces of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) to defeat insurgency in areas that are


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1. COMUSMACTHAI 090308Z Sep 69.
 2. J3A23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69, citing COMUSMACTHAI ltr MACTJ43 of 19 Sep 69.
 3. Admin CINCPAC 012247Z Oct 69; J3A23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69; COMUSMACTHAI 090308Z Sep 69.
 4. An Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC, before the National Alcoholic Beverage Control Association at Honolulu, Hawaii, on 11 November 1969.

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LAOS

AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1969

BASIC INFORMATION				OVERALL OBJECTIVE	U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	
AREA	91,000 SQ. MI.	ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	4 ACRES			
POPULATION	2,700,000	LITERACY RATE	12%			
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.4%	LIFE EXPECTANCY	35 YEARS		TO PREVENT COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER IN LAOS.	U.S. AMBASSADOR HON G. McMURTRIE GODLEY U.S. AID DIRECTOR MR. CHARLES A. MANN DEPUTY CHIEF JUSKING THAILAND COL PETER T. RUSSELL, USA
GROSS NAT PROD	\$186 MIL	PER CAPITA	67.35			
KING - Sri Savang Vathana PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MINISTER OF SOCIAL ACTION, MINISTER OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND LEADER OF THE NEUTRALIST FACTION - Prince Souvanna Phouma VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF EDUCATION, AND LEADER OF RIGHTIST FACTION - Louang Nistongmay VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND LEADER OF THE COMMUNIST FACTION - Prince Souphanouvong						
MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES				COMBAT CAPABILITY		
ARMY	27 INF BNS, 4 ARN BNS, 5 FLD ARTY, 39 VOLUNTEER BNS, 1 PSY WAR BN, 5 RECON TRPS, 6 ENG BNS, 17 PARAMIL COS, 1 RIVER GP BN.			Maintain minimum security in non-communist area main population centers. Provide very limited ground defense against local communist insurgency.		
NAVY	NONE			Maintain minimum security of river routes in conservative area and provide limited logistic support for conservative forces.		
AIR FORCE	4 TAC FTR WINGS, 4 AIRLIFT WINGS.			Provide limited fighter bomber, logistic and reconnaissance support to ground forces.		

²⁰AS OF 15 JULY 1969

²¹DOES NOT INCLUDE PATHET LAO OR DISSIDENT NEUTRALIST MILITARY FORCES.

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 145.

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Note: Previously exempted by USCINCPAC

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or may come under RLG control.

(2) To support the Government of Prince Souvanna Phouma and to assist it to maintain its policy of non-alignment.

[REDACTED] a

Brief Background on DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI MAP

(S) In order to better understand the unique nature of U.S. military assistance in Laos, the following brief background has been furnished:

5. (S) In 1962, in order to comply with the Geneva Accords, the MAAG left Laos. However, the need for military assistance did not diminish. The problem was solved by the establishment [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of Deputy Chief, JUSMAG, Thailand, to 1.3(a) administer the assistance program in coordination with an office within the USAID, Laos, called the Requirements Office, and the military attaches. In spite of the difficulties inherent in this arrangement, it functions. Deputy Chief was able to program for an increase in the overall strength of the Forces Armees Royal (FAR) to 56,500, and to provide timely logistical support. In 1963, the Military Assistance Program took over the support of the Neutralist Army which broke from its former PL allies. This support called for an almost complete re-equipment of the Neutralists who heretofore received Soviet aid. It also added 10,000 men to the program.

6. (S) In 1964, training for Lao officers and men was resumed. [REDACTED] 4e 4F

7. (S) During the past five years military operations in Laos have gradually increased in scope. Both government forces and the Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese frequently use regimental size forces. This intensification of the conflict

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1. CINCPAC MA Plan for DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI FY 70-75, Vol. I, dtd 29 May 69, p. 1.

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after the Geneva Accords demanded an increase in ammunition outlays and in the replacement of war damaged and lost equipment. Added to this were the demands of a more sophisticated logistical system, increases in the inventory used by the Royal Lao Air Force, continuing requirements for maintenance assistance, and the reorganization of the Neutralists. An additional burden was imposed in 1966 when the Lao Armed Forces increased to the military assistance supported force of 75,000 men.¹

Request for Total Funding of Selected FY 70 DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI MASF Items

D. (S) On 24 October 1969, [REDACTED] requested total funding of nine selected FY 70 MASF program lines, which totaled to \$861,750. "Total funding is required," he explained, "due to expanded tempo."² Moreover, for most of these items, there had been a depletion of continuing resolution authority (CRA) funding. Five days later, CINCPAC forwarded the necessary data on these nine program lines and requested SECDEF to take appropriate action to secure total funding.³

Reorganization of Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) and Increased MASF Laos Aircraft Authorizations (S)

(S) On 11 February 1969, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI furnished CINCPAC with detailed information on how the RLAF was "being re-organized into four (4) composite sqdns with one sqdn each to be located at Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Savannakhet and Pakse, plus a headquarters with the training element organically attached at Vientiane."⁴ To achieve this reorganization, he requested the expeditious changing of the current MASF Laos aircraft Unit Equipment Allowance (UE) to reflect the new force structure and increased aircraft authorizations. This proposal, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI pointed out, was in full agreement with the one made by the American Embassy in Vientiane, Laos.

(S) At CINCPAC's request, CINCPACAF reviewed this proposal and offered comments. He concurred "with the increased UE except in the area

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1. Ibid., p. 24.
 2. DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand 69-2462/241003Z Oct 69; J4315 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
 3. Admin CINCPAC 290612Z Oct 69.
 4. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 9043/111030Z Feb 69.

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of T-28 aircraft for pilot training, " but warned that Thailand had experienced problems with the composite squadron concept and had discarded it.¹ As a result, on 26 February 1969, CINCPAC asked DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI to "discuss your proposal with COMUSMACTHAI, to determine if Thailand problems relate to your proposed concept, and forward comments," as well as supplying additional input for the CINCPAC position.² DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI answered that the composite squadron concept was valid for the RLAF and requested CINCPAC to forward his request.³

(S) By 15 March 1969, having received DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI's response, CINCPAC was ready to forward his position in this matter to SECDEF:

1. Military activities in Laos during the past six months have not followed the established seasonal patterns. Since the cessation of the bombing in North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao (PL) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) have increased the use of logistic avenues within Laos. They have also developed and secured new ones. Paris peace talks have apparently prompted the Communists to consolidate as much area within Laos as possible in order to better their bargaining position. In general, the Communists have been fighting two wars in Laos, one in the north and one in the south.

2. To meet this increased activity by the NVA and the PL, the RLAF has steadily increased its sortie rate. The American Ambassador has requested an increase in the use of aircraft supported by the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) Program Laos and approval to reorganize into four composite squadrons. The increase in UE involves 29 additional aircraft, 24 each T-28s and five each UH-34s....

3. There is no increase in investment costs. The increase in T-28 and UH-34 UEs can be filled without additional investment costs by applying on-hand and/or undelivered attrition aircraft from the current or prior year program.... The major cost item will be for air munitions, \$21.1 million. At the fall review it was indicated that the shortfall in

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1. CINCPACAF DOMA 202028Z Feb 69; CINCPAC 122247Z Feb 69; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
 2. CINCPAC 260440Z Feb 69.
 3. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 9069/100330Z Mar 69; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.

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
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ammunition would have to be funded. The increase in short-fall created by the increase in sorties will also require funding and cannot be absorbed within the established program dollar ceiling.

4. In order to provide maximum assistance to the RLAF and in the best interest of the U. S. Government in Southeast Asia, recommend the increase in aircraft UE and reorganization of the RLAF into four composite squadrons as indicated in Para 2 be approved. This recommendation, based on the present objectives of the U. S. in Laos, seeks to further the Government of Laos' ability to maintain control over the geographical areas contemplated by the 1962 Geneva Accords, to maintain internal security and counter Communist inspired subversion, espionage, insurgency or aggression.¹


(S) On 16 May 1969, the JCS recommended to SECDEF that this requested reorganization and UE increases be approved, except for the increase in T-28s because of nonavailability of T-28 assets. CINCPAC advised DEPCHJUSMAG-THAI of this proposed action on 25 May 1969:

... The turndown on the T-28 aircraft UE increase was due to insufficient available T-28 assets to support an increased UE total of 77. It was anticipated that the presently planned advanced attrition aircraft would support the current UE (48 tactical and five trainers). These advanced attrition aircraft have been procured and rehabilitated, and, while being held in CONUS, are on loan to the U. S. Air Force to conduct pilot training in support of the improvement and modernization of the Vietnamese Air Force. Therefore, to support a UE for T-28s greater than 53 aircraft would require diverting from currently approved requirements.²


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1. CINCPAC 152055Z Mar 69; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
 2. CINCPAC 250052Z May 69; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.

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(9) In conclusion, the American Ambassador to Laos stated that his position was as follows:

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1. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 3544/020833Z Jun 69; JCS 1618/031850Z Jun 69.
 2. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 3544/020833Z Jun 69.

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reconsidered favorably in the light of the foregoing.¹

(S) On 20 June 1969, CINCPAC requested [REDACTED] to confirm the requirement for the T-28s, to comment on the American Ambassador's reclama, and to prepare one of his own for the T-28s if it appeared appropriate. In response, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI provided this information, indicating that the requirement was valid and requesting a reclama. CINCPAC on 6 July 1969, submitted a reclama to the JCS, recommending "reconsideration of the requested increase T-28 UE for Laos."² Part of his justification for such a course of action follows below:

3. The recent pressures by the PL/NVA on Moung Soui diverted a large number of U.S. Air Force sorties to support the defense. Had the additional twenty-four T-28 aircraft been available at Udorn, many of these diverted U.S. sorties would have been flown by the RLAF.

4. Under less demanding conditions, options and alternatives such as a follow-on aircraft that are more readily available might be an acceptable solution to the shortage of T-28 aircraft. However, the situation in Laos does not permit the flexibility of transitioning to a new weapons system without serious degradation of existing mission effectiveness. Further, the introduction of an alternative aircraft, such as an unsophisticated jet trainer aircraft, might be viewed as an escalation of the U.S. effort. While such aircraft might be available, the requirement for airfield expansion and improvement would weigh against such a course of action because of construction cost and time requirements.

5. It would appear that the required T-28s for the VNAF training could be drawn from available Navy/Air Force assets and returned upon completion of training. If twenty-four T-28 aircraft cannot be made available for use [REDACTED] then a feasible substitute aircraft should be made available. If RLAF cannot satisfy sortie requirements [generated by American Embassy, Vientiane,] such additional requirements must be requested

1. Ibid.

2. CINCPAC 062303Z Jul 69; CINCPAC 200134Z Jun 69; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.

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from 7th/13th Air Force at Udorn. The RLAF should be encouraged to carry their fair share of the close air support of their ground forces.

6. In order to provide the required T-28 aircraft for Laos to increase the present UE 53 to 77 and to provide adequate attrition aircraft readily available at Udorn, request T-28s presently held in CONUS and being used for VNAF training be made available. These aircraft have been rehabed and were programmed and funded in FY 68. They are the only configured T-28s available. To lessen the initial impact, request that nine aircraft be shipped immediately, six to bring the current total of 71 to 77 and three to provide readily available attrition aircraft. The T-28s drawn from Air Force/Navy assets should provide adequate replacements for VNAF training without degrading the existing program.¹

(S) CINCPAC informed [REDACTED] on 1 August 1969 of the latest JCS proposal to SECDEF "to ensure a continuing capability to maintain the RLAF at the approved force level and to provide necessary T-28 aircraft for Service training and operational requirements."² Although CINCPAC cautioned that this "information does not constitute a reply to the CINCPAC reclama regarding the JCS turndown for increasing the T-28 aircraft UE, it does indicate the direction of the JCS thinking and if prophetic of the probable JCS reply."³ Just 10 days later, the [REDACTED] wired the following comments and recommendation to SECSTATE:

Numerous messages on this subject have been exchanged between AMEMB/VTE; DEPCHJUSMAG; CINCPAC; CSAF; JCS and OSD during the several past months. All have expressed or implied that a valid requirement exists for a UE of 77 aircraft to support the U.S. interest in Southeast Asia but approval for an increase in the UE was not approved because of a lack of T-28 assets in the world-wide inventory. Further the several agencies have explored the Services inventories for a follow-on aircraft compatible to RLAF capabilities, support facilities, airport runways and mission requirements. None have been identified that can do the job of the T-28.

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1. CINCPAC 062303Z Jul 69.
 2. CINCPAC 010440Z Aug 69.
 3. Ibid.

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Although the JCS recommendations outlined in Ref A will provide the necessary assets 18 to 24 months in the future, it leaves a serious void in our ability to meet the immediate tactical threats within the country today. Since the detailed study on UE requirements was completed last spring, the tactical and political situation required aircraft to be deployed to a fifth operating location (20 alternate). New training requirements exist, T-28Bs and Ds are used in the FAC role, and the increased enemy activity in north Laos makes it virtually impossible to meet the daily requirements for tactical air. Aircraft availability is further degraded in that 7 T-28 aircraft are presently undergoing major repair for crash and battle damage at Udorn and are not available for mission requirements....

Recommend you intercede with OSD to have JCS release 19 Navy T-28 trainer aircraft to the USAF thereby releasing 19 combat configured T-28 aircraft to be airlifted to Laos to meet the current and immediate tactical requirements.¹

(S) On 13 August 1969, CINCPAC concurred in Ambassador Godley's proposal and recommended to the JCS that it be approved.²

(S) One of the several items being studied to better support the Royal Laotian Government Armed Forces (RLGAF), advised SECDEF on 23 September 1969, was the request for T-28 support. Being addressed was the determination of "ways to provide T-28 aircraft for RLG shifting them from the Thai and replacing those given up by Thai or by diversion from CONUS assets."³ The next day, CINCPAC recommended:

...the use of Thailand assets to support the immediate request for additional T-28s with the MAP pay-back to Thailand in A-37/OV10/OVIA/CONUS T-28 assets. Alternatively, T-28s could be provided by exploring through diplomatic channels the use of a Thai T-28 squadron to support the Laotian war. Estimated cost per year of Thai Squadron is

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1. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 5442/110940Z Aug 69.
 2. CINCPAC AIRBORNE 132005Z Aug 69; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 3. SECDEF 232238Z Sep 69, cited in J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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one million dollars, excluding ordnance. Additionally, recommend the JCS support CINCPAC request for release of CONUS assets to provide follow-on support.¹

(TS) In mid-October 1969, the JCS reviewed the background of the entire T-28 issue and provided alternative courses of action that would meet the requirement for T-28 aircraft. Four main options were provided, and the JCS discussed the "various pros and cons of each of the Options along with the various Suboptions under Option III."² The four main options were as follows:

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|-------------------|---|
| <u>Option I</u> | Provision of a Thai T-28 squadron in direct support. |
| <u>Option II</u> | Provision of T-28 aircraft to RLAF by transfer from Thai assets and replacing with A-37 aircraft through MAP. |
| <u>Option III</u> | Provision of 22 T-28D aircraft to RLAF from CONUS assets retaining UE of 53. |
| <u>Option IV</u> | Provision of 22 T-28D aircraft to RLAF and increase UE to 77. ³ |

(TS) As set forth in their memorandum of 16 October 1969, the JCS:

...considers Option I or II, or a combination of the two, would ensure the best long term utilization of the Services remaining T-28s assets. However, in view of urgency for additional T-28s to support the Lao war effort, it recommends Suboption III-A, which provides RLAF with 22 T-28D, currently utilized in RVNAF I&M training. Replacements for these aircraft would come from U.S. Navy assets. This action would have an immediate adverse impact on Navy pilot training.⁴

(S) As Calendar Year 1969 terminated and 1970 began, the position of CINCPAC in the matter of T-28s for Laos remained unchanged; CINCPAC

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1. CINCPAC 240401Z Sep 69.
 2. J5 Brief No. 290-69, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Oct 69, Subj: JCSM 643-69 of 16 Oct 1969, Subj: Contingency Planning-Laos (S).
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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continued "to support the requested increase in UE for T-28 aircraft in the RLAF", continued "to explore OSD as a source of T-28 assets to provide attrition aircraft for RLAF", and supported "the use of Thai squadron of T-28s for combat operations if additional T-28s cannot be made available from U.S. assets." ¹

Expedited Shipment of 105mm Howitzers to Laos (S)

(S) In a message to CINCPAC on 9 January 1969, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI requested the immediate shipment by air of four 105mm howitzers to replace recent combat losses and the expedited surface shipment of two more to be utilized as replacements for howitzers undergoing repair. ² The following day, CINCPAC forwarded this request, urging that "all possible effort be made to accommodate" the expedited shipment of six howitzers, which were already programmed and funded items of Laos MASF. ³ Based upon information received from USAMC (United States Materiel Command), DA advised CINCPAC on 24 January that there were no known assets within CONUS to meet this request, but suggested the following alternatives:

1. Diversion from scheduled February-March 1969 shipments to USARV, Project OGT, or Project OUX.
2. Screen current PACOM assets for possibility of shipments to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI with payback after FY 70.
3. Until howitzers become available, substitute 4.2 inch mortar M-30 series, which could be made available immediately. ⁴

(S) Within five days, however, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI rejected the idea of 4.2 inch mortars, stating that they were "not repeat not acceptable substitutes." ⁵ Although a review of USARPAC depot stocks revealed no serviceable assets available, a review of the PACOM War Reserves uncovered two howitzers--105mm M101A1--available for shipment if authorized by DA. As a result, CINCPAC requested DA on 1 February 1969 to authorize CINCUS-ARPAC to release these two howitzers. This authority was granted by DA

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1. Point Paper, J5322, Hq CINCPAC, 22 Jan 70, Subj: T-28 Aircraft to Support Laotian War (S).
 2. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 9012/091030Z Jan 69.
 3. CINCPAC 100344Z Jan 69.
 4. J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69; CGUSAMC 45439/142135Z Jan 69; DA 894846/242241Z Jan 69.
 5. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 69-0251/291011Z Jan 69.

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five days later, and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI was so notified.¹

(S) At CINCUSARPAC's suggestion, CINCPAC queried COMUSMACV on 30 January 1969, requesting that the requirement for four howitzers "be screened for possibility of loan from USARV Closed Loop Program with pay back after FY 70."² "Loan is not considered advisable," COMUSMACV replied on 17 February 1969, stating that the USARV Closed Loop Program was currently 30 howitzers behind schedule.³

(S) CINCPAC, meanwhile, had been querying COMUSMACTHAI about the impact, if four howitzers "could be made available in Feb 69 by diversion from project Code OGT with payback after FY 70."⁴ COMUSMACTHAI's opinion was that they could "not be diverted from Project OGT without impeding training and incurring serious RTA ill will."⁵ However, if all concerned parties concurred in the borrowing as suggested by DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, COMUSMACTHAI wanted to be advised "as to the Julian date subject howitzers would be repaid to the RTA."⁶

(S) On 12 February 1969, CINCPAC asked USAMC for the Julian date that the four howitzers could be paid back, if they were borrowed from RTA (Royal Thailand Army).⁷ In response, DA informed CINCPAC 12 days later that the "estimate for earliest availability of assets to be 4Q FY 71. Continuing effort will be made to improve this availability. Shortage of this item for international logistics recipients, world wide, is a major supply problem undergoing intensive review."⁸ As an alternative, however, DA suggested the substituting of four 75mm pack howitzers, which would be "available for shipment within 90 days from receipt of requirement."⁹ DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI nonconcurred in this proposal on 5 March 1969, stating that the "75mm pack howitzers are not repeat not acceptable substitutes."¹⁰

(S) In a message to the JCS on 10 March 1969, CINCPAC summed up the developments since DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI initial request and recommended

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1. CINCUSARPAC 3518/290036Z Jan 69; CINCUSARPAC 3820/300454Z Jan 69; CINCPAC 012216Z Feb 69; DA 896398/061945Z Feb 69.
 2. CINCPAC 302244Z Jan 69; CINCUSARPAC 3518/290036Z Jan 69.
 3. COMUSMACV 170533Z Feb 69.
 4. CINCPAC 280346Z Jan 69.
 5. COMUSMACTHAI TAAGL 080700Z Feb 69.
 6. Ibid.
 7. CINCPAC 120405Z Feb 69.
 8. DA 898512/242243Z Feb 69.
 9. Ibid.; J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
 10. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 9068/051033Z Mar 69.

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that "four each 105mm howitzers be made available to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI from other than PACOM assets. "1 Just nine days later, the JCS notified CINCPAC that "four howitzers, 105mm, M101A1, can be available by airlift by 15 Apr 69 or sooner to fill the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI requirement. This can be accomplished without impact upon other SEA deliveries. "2 CINCPAC, in turn, quickly informed DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI of this successful turn of events and advised the appropriate Army command in CONUS of the necessary funding and requisitioning information. 3

Request for 105/155mm Howitzers for Laos (S)

(S) In mid-1969, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI requested expedited delivery of five 105mm howitzers programmed in FY 68 to replace combat losses at Moung Soui. CINCPAC concurred, but DA stated that the only source of 105mm or 155mm howitzers for July delivery would have to be from Closed Loop Support (CLS) and CINCUSARPAC recommended that no issues be made from either PACOM CLS or war reserve stock to satisfy DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI's requirement. On 9 July, therefore, in view of recent combat operations, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI presented to CINCPAC a summation of his total howitzer requirement and provided programming data with justification for replacing operational losses. CINCPAC answered as follows on 30 July 1969:

4. Expedited delivery of five 105mm howitzers programmed in FY 68, Ref F, can be made in September without adverse effect on other claimants. These, plus in-country assets, should provide adequate 105mm howitzers for FAR/FAN forces.

5. Request resubmission of programming data, for both 155 and 105 howitzers, with justification and compensating decreases to preclude further increase of program dollar ceiling. 4

(S) "To summarize, " read a message from the American Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, on 5 August 1969, "our requirements for nine (9) each 105mm hows and four (4) each 155mm hows is as programmed and explained in above

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1. CINCPAC 102005Z Mar 69.
 2. JCS 5063/192205Z Mar 69.
 3. J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69; CINCPAC 212129Z Mar 69.
 4. CINCPAC 300443Z Jul 69; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.

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rationale. It is also our recommendation that these items be furnished from U. S. sources if adequate support to the FAR/FAN forces is to be continued."¹ When DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI replied to CINCPAC's request three days later, he gave the desired reprogramming, stating that two additional 105mm howitzers were necessary because of combat losses since the initial programming action. "No compensating decrease," he further indicated, "is being made since current program reflects valid requirements needed to adequately support host country in combat operations. The current unstable situation and fluidity will if anything increase requirements until stabilization in some form is realized."²

(S) On 16 August 1969, CINCPAC submitted the additions and increases to the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI FY 70-71 programs to SECDEF and indicated that no compensating decrease could be submitted. "A continuous review of the program is in progress in an attempt to absorb some of the increasing costs; however," he added, "a program ceiling increase of \$312,160 will be required now to meet the additional cost of FY 70 requirements."³ SECDEF's approval was forthcoming on 26 September 1969. He further stated that the proposed increase in the program ceiling "will be addressed in separate action. Meantime, above howitzers will be carried in overprogrammed status."⁴

Request for Increased Munitions for Laos FY 69 MASF (S)


(S) By letter on 8 January 1969, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI informed CINCPAC that the air munitions requirement in Laos would exceed the program dollar line by \$9.7 million because of increased sortie rates; accordingly, he requested a ceiling increase to accommodate the additional air munitions requirement.⁵ In reviewing the Laos FY 69 MASF program, CINCPAC noted that the ground munition requirements also appeared to be over the program dollar line. As a result, on 15 February 1969, CINCPAC requested DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI to review both air and ground munition requirements in order to "establish a recommended revised country dollar ceiling."⁶

(S) DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI supplied the total munition requirement in a

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1. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 5294/050912Z Aug 69.
 2. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 9273/081030Z Aug 69.
 3. CINCPAC 160138Z Aug 69; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 4. SECDEF 9878/261555Z Sep 69; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
 5. J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69, citing DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI Ltr of 8 Jan 69, Subj: PCN-D-11/69-M.
 6. CINCPAC 152336Z Feb 69.

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PEG CINCPAC Photo
Newly constructed air munitions storage area at Savannakhet
in Military Region III.

letter on 5 March 1969.¹ It indicated that additional funds were required for ground munitions, as well as for air munitions. "In order to fund the increased ammunition requirements of \$13.7 million, \$9.7 million increase in...air munitions and \$4 million increase in...ground ammunition, for FY 69," CINCPAC advised SECDEF on 1 April 1969, "a program dollar ceiling increase will be required."² He, therefore, recommended an increase in the country program dollar ceiling from \$96 to \$102.5 million to accommodate these air and ground munition requirements, stating that failure "to fund and provide this required ammunition will result in an unacceptable degradation of FAR capabilities at a critical period of an expanded NVA/PL offensive."³

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1. J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69, citing DEPCHJUS-MAG THAI Ltr of 5 Mar 69, Subj: PCN-B-23/69M.
 2. CINCPAC 010205Z Apr 69.
 3. Ibid.; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.

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(S) On 9 May 1969, SECDEF questioned the amount of this increase. "Understand here," he stated, "that the recomputation of FY 69 air ammunition (LAMP) requirements forwarded to AFLC indicate an increase of only \$3 million as compared to \$8.9 million requested...." ¹ As a result, SECDEF requested "that further evaluation be made of the \$13.7 million stated increase. Every effort should be made to reprogram for any increased FY 69 requirements within the current FY 69 MASF approved level of \$96 million." ² Twenty days later, because FY 69 was drawing to a close, he requested CINCPAC's "results of further evaluation be provided as early as possible." ³

(S) After receiving the necessary information from DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, CINCPAC replied to SECDEF by cancelling his earlier request for an increase in country program dollar ceiling of \$6.5 million to fund increased air and ground munitions for Laos FY 69 MASF. "Reevaluation of the FY 69 program," he explained on 13 June 1969, "indicates that due to substitution in air ammunition resulting in savings, further reduction in program line items and MAP excesses supplied at no cost, the requirement for air and ground ammunitions for FY 69 can be met within the present country ceiling of \$96 million." ⁴

Blueprint for Improvement of Royal Laotian Government Armed Forces (RLGAF)

(TS) During the 28 August 1969 Coordinating Committee for U.S. Missions Southeast Asia (SEACORD) conference, the American Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, "provided CINCPAC with a list of equipment required by Laotian forces. This included: M-60 machine guns, 106mm recoilless rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, M-41 tanks, T-28 aircraft, M-706 armored cars, 155mm howitzers, HT-2 and PRC-25 radios." ⁵

(S) Following a talk with Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos, on 13 September 1969, Ambassador Godley forwarded his assessment of General Vang Pao's urgent requirements for military hardware and money, which were needed to establish a defensive line and to consolidate in the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ) area after the recent RLG military successes there. The Prime Minister, according to Ambassador Godley:

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1. SECDEF 8888/092016Z May 69.
 2. Ibid.
 3. SECDEF 1407/291940Z May 69; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
 4. CINCPAC 132220Z Jun 69; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
 5. J5534 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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... emphasized that these were minimum requirements if RLG forces were to have any hope of slowing down NVN/PL battalions as and when they began dry season offensive. He believed that equipment requested should be in hands of Vang Pao's men within a month if they were to have maximum effect. Once again I explained that we would do our best, especially on M16s but that I could not give him any encouragement about early delivery dates. 1

(6) Then, in a seven-page message addressed to CINCPAC on 15 September 1969, [REDACTED] set forth his "blueprint" for improving the RLG military forces. He started his message off as follows:

1.3(a)(4)(5) 1. Since the fall of Nam Bac in early 1968, an increasing disproportionate share of the combat load in Laos has been carried by irregular [REDACTED] forces. Nearly all RLG offensive efforts have been launched by these forces. Cumulative unreplaced losses in both irregular and regular forces are making themselves felt with increasing pressure. NVA strength within North Laos is at an all time high. Though we are having temporary success in the PDJ area we believe this to be caused not by enemy intent, but by his logistic difficulties. This condition is not expected to continue once the roads begin to dry out. Despite our current efforts, when the next dry season arrives, the enemy will find himself much further forward than ever before, at this time of year. Unless we can increase our strength, we shall be only capable of employing once again the spoiling attack as our principal delaying tactic and hope that with adequate air support we can hang on.

2. The Meo forces are nearing the bottom of their manpower barrel. We believe for the longer term to have an even chance to be able to stay in the ball game, the RLG must get more mileage from its regular forces. To accomplish this, several facets of the problem must be attacked more readily in some fields than others; thus each item is not necessarily totally dependent on the other. Listed hereafter are our immediate requirements. Most of these were discussed in very general terms with CINCPAC and members of his staff on 29 Aug 69.... 2

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1. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 6276/131137Z Sep 69.
 2. AMEMBASSY Vientiane 6291/150833Z Sep 69.

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(S) Besides containing the items discussed at the August 1969 SEACOORD conference, this "blueprint" mentioned numerous other things, such as M-16s, command changes and reorganization of the Forces Armees du Royaume (FAR)/Forces Armees Neutralist (FAN), improved pay and allowances, training, rations, etc. for the FAR/FAN, an increase in Army Attache (ARMA) Project 404 personnel and funding, an expansion of U.S. military communications network, a renovation of existing U.S. support procedures, etc. The materiel portion of [REDACTED] "blueprint" called for the programming and expedited delivery of 10 major items. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI concurred generally in these requirements, but questioned the timing for the introduction of new weapons. Prior to the receipt of this "blueprint," CINCPAC, at the request of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, had taken action to program and expedite delivery of four of the mentioned items with the following results:

(1) M-16 Rifles: [REDACTED] being airlifted for delivery NLT 10 Oct 69; preparatory actions taken to ship additional 12,000 from Nov production. b.

(2) M-79 Grenade Launchers: Funding [REDACTED] in FY 70 program provided by MOA OA/LA/08. [REDACTED] being airlifted early Oct. Two hundred forty-eight will be shipped for Dec delivery. b.

(3) M-706 Armored Cars: Expedited funding and delivery [REDACTED] requested by CINCPAC. Program data to reflect M-706E1/E2 configuration requested of supply agencies by CINCPAC. b.

(4) 155mm Howitzers: Programming of [REDACTED] additional (FY 70) approved by SECDEF to be carried in overprogrammed status. (PACOM assets of [REDACTED] unknown quantity from CLS.) CINCPAC effecting coordination on availability with DA in anticipation of DEPCH program change for four more.¹ b.

(S) On 16 September 1969, the JCS requested CINCPAC to provide his "comments and recommendations for preparation of early response to DOD regarding both availability and desirability of providing equipment" contained

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1. J4315 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69; DA 182227Z Sep 69; SECDEF 1251/011942Z Oct 69; DA 032139Z Oct 69; CINCPAC 300513Z Sep 69; SECDEF 9878/261555Z Sep 69; ADMIN 302252Z Sep 69.

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