COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME II

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CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII
1970

TOP SECRET
ADMIRAL JOHN S. McCAIN JR.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
FOREWORD

(U) My area of responsibility, the Pacific Command, is the largest of seven unified U.S. military commands. It is an area beyond the West Coast of the Americas that encompasses 85 million square miles. It reaches from the Bering Sea in the north to the region of the South Pole. It stretches past the island state of Hawaii, across the Pacific to Guam and the Philippines. It continues over the South China Sea beyond Vietnam and Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. From the northern regions along the coast of Asia it extends southward past the Soviet Union and Japan, past Okinawa and Taiwan, to Australia and New Zealand. Those 85 million square miles cover about 40 percent of the earth's surface.

(U) The mission of the Pacific Command is to defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean area and to support U.S. national policy and interests throughout the Pacific, Far East, and Southeast Asian areas. The overall mission includes the providing of military assistance to the countries of Asia, to help them protect themselves from external aggression and internal subversion.

(U) The major potential source of danger in the Western Pacific is Communist China. While the motivations and intentions of Communist China's leaders are matters of conjecture, their capabilities can be fairly accurately measured. Another major problem confronting United States interests is the formidable political and economic influence and growing military power of the Soviet Union in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. North Vietnam and North Korea are current examples of violently nationalist communist leadership. Both are aggressors and both seek through overt and covert insurgency the overthrow of legitimate, legally constituted governments.

(U) The importance of security in the Pacific cannot be overemphasized. We must be aware of the continuing global threat which our country faces.
from the ambitions, goals, and activities of the communist world. Only a firm, positive posture on our part, backed by adequate military capabilities, can assure the security of this country, and with it, that of the Free World.

(U) To defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean and to support U.S. national policy and interests throughout the Pacific, the Far East and Southeast Asian areas is a mission carrying great responsibility. It is not an easy mission. No one expects it to be. The mission is being accomplished, however, by many men and women, in many different places. They are serving courageously and with valor on the field of battle. And they are doing a humanitarian thing to help the people of South Vietnam retain the right to decide their own future without outside coercion. I am proud of these men and women who guard 24 hours each day the ramparts and heritage of a free land and a free people given us by our Nation's founders.

JOHN S. MCCAIN, JR.
Admiral, United States Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific
PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the standpoint of CINCPAC. Additionally, the required annual report preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS to the extent that major decisions and directives of the JCS concerning the PACOM may be determined by historians of the JCS without research in the records of the PACOM. This 1969 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As in the case of previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those connected with international crises and those peculiar to a joint command. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and achievements and omits "detailed" activities of subordinate unified commands or of Allied nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history is organized in the same manner as previous histories, primarily in line with the objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and the planning for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) This year's history is published in four volumes: Volume I - Chapter I; Volume II - Chapters II and III; Volume III - Sections I - V,
Chapter IV; and Volume IV - Sections VI - X, Chapter IV. A glossary and an index for the complete history is included in Volume IV only. Pagination is complete within each volume rather than running consecutively throughout the four volumes. As in previous years, the annual histories prepared by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are included as Annexes A and B, respectively.

(U) The CINCPAC Command Historian, Colonel J. R. Johnson, USA, under the supervision of Colonel William C. Harrison, Jr., USAF, Secretary of the Joint Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, planned and published the 1969 CINCPAC Command History as required by CINCPAC Staff Instruction 5750.1D of 20 August 1968. Colonel Johnson personally researched and wrote Chapter IV with exception of Sections V - IX.

(U) Members of the CINCPAC Historical Branch assisted the Command Historian in the preparation of the history. Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, as Senior Historian, researched and wrote Chapters II and III and Sections V and IX of Chapter IV. In addition, he provided technical guidance and shared his professional expertise when and where required throughout the preparation of this history. Mrs. Polly Tallman, Assistant Historian, prepared Chapter I and Sections VI - VIII of Chapter IV and prepared the pictorial layout for the history.

(U) Miss Maggie M. Kaonohi, Clerk-Stenographer of CINCPAC Historical Branch, typed the manuscript in final format. Mrs. Mary Jane Garrett, CINCPAC Librarian, compiled the index. Senior Chief Yeoman C. J. Curry, USN, who also compiled the glossary, Chief Yeoman William A. Hendrixson, USN, and Yeoman Second Class Judy G. Ege, USN, proofread the final manuscript and performed the many other tasks connected with readying the volumes for the printers. Master Sergeant John F. Stevenson, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Graphics Section, JO412, and his successor, Draftsman First Class Mateo V. Garrovillas, USN, supervised the preparation of all graphics for this history. Lithographer First Class Edward A. Donlin, USN, Reproduction Unit Supervisor, JO412, and Staff Sergeant Leonard L. Powell, USAF, Reproduction Device Expert, JO412, handled the expeditious printing of the draft manuscript which facilitated staff coordination. Finally, the immeasurable support rendered by the CINCPAC staff is greatly appreciated.

J. R. JOHNSON
Colonel USA
CINCPAC Command Historian

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CHAPTER II

CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

...Military assistance to countries whose security is important to United States security, but which lack sufficient resources of their own for adequate defense, remains in my view an essential instrument of our national security policy. Military assistance continues to prove its worth many fold in enhanced U.S. security and in savings of American lives and dollars.

In developing the PACOM Military Assistance Program, three principal factors were considered. These were the communist threat in the Pacific area, the attitude and defense capabilities of MAP recipient Pacific countries, and the competing demands on U.S. resources which limit the funds available for military assistance in the Pacific as elsewhere.

The threat in the Pacific area is much more active and encompassing than in other parts of the world....

It is heartening to observe that, in spite of the subversion, infiltration and threats to their security, the Military Assistance-supported countries in PACOM maintain a strong desire to remain free. Unfortunately, they have not advanced to the point where they can maintain their freedom without outside help....

There has been a continuing reduction in military assistance over the past few years. This trend is neither unexpected nor, in principle, objectionable. However, in arriving at the degree of assistance a friendly country requires, the threat to that country must be carefully considered. The alternatives to military assistance are, of course, greater direct U.S. involvement, or a withdrawal to a "Fortress America" concept of defense. It is not in our national interest to accept either of these alternatives.
All PACOM MAP-supported countries underwrite a share of their own defense requirements consistent with their ability to do so. The remainder must come from military assistance. We fully recognize that the amounts required to provide this remaining support to the defense efforts of our friends and allies is a distasteful and burdensome drain on U.S. resources. The amount sought for the Pacific area is the minimum amount required to maintain the status quo of the supported forces. It reflects our efforts to effect the maximum economies possible without seriously jeopardizing our security, the security of our friends and allies or, of course, our own economy.

Of the $214 million in the Pacific region programs, 12% is needed for administration, handling, and transportation costs necessary to move supplies from the U.S. to the recipient countries. Sixty-eight percent is needed for the day-to-day operating costs of the forces now in being. Only 20% of the amount sought is intended for modernization of force structure.

Clearly, the United States cannot and should not attempt on its own to contain the communist threat against every free nation in Asia. While we can provide major air and naval forces as part of the deterrent, the manpower and other resources that the PACOM countries make available are essential to deterring aggression. Nonetheless, the military capability of our Asian allies still depends heavily on our assistance. Their security is our security. It is for this reason that a continued Military Assistance Program is a vital element in defense of U.S. interests in the Pacific area.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. ¹

¹ Statement by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, on 26 June 1969, hereafter cited as CINCPAC 26 Jun 69 MAP Statement.
Brief Introduction to PACOM Military Assistance Program (MAP)

(U) Today, as in past decades, the United States bears a mantle of leadership for, unfortunately, a great nation can neither avoid the responsibilities or escape the hazards of greatness. It, like former great powers, is obligated to assume the burdens inherent in such leadership, since to do less would not be in keeping with its own heritage.

(U) When challenged by the growing worldwide menace of international communism following World War II, the Free World naturally looked to the United States to bear the major responsibility of thwarting this aggression. In addition, the United States recognized that its defense depended on stopping this threat well before it reached American shores. MAP, therefore, can be said to have evolved out of the fundamental postwar policy of assisting the Free World to defend itself against invasion or internal subversion by communist countries. Since its inception, MAP "has been predominantly in the self-interest of our country--enlightened self-interest, we would hope, but self-interest nonetheless." 1

(S) In speaking of the past accomplishments of military assistance in the PACOM area, the current CINCPAC military assistance plan for the PACOM region stated the following of the ten countries that had received aid through MAP:

...At the beginning of MAP the forces of these countries consisted of ineffective mixtures of disassociated units characterized by poor leadership, hampered by lack of education and technology and equipped with obsolete and non-standard items of weapons and equipment from many countries. Today, through MAP, these forces have progressed to varying degrees of modernization, standardization and reorganization.

In summary, MAP in the Pacific area has made possible the development of a major positive source of Free World strength. MAP supported forces are in various states of readiness and total over two million men. The Army forces comprise over 50 active divisions and 600 separate

battalions. Approximately 500 ships of these nations are available to perform surveillance and mine warfare, in furtherance of their responsibility for local defense in coastal waters. The Marine amphibious forces are composed of more than 3 divisions and the Air Force totals more than 200 squadrons of fighter, interceptor, attack, reconnaissance and transport aircraft. 1

(S) The treatment of CINCPAC MAP activities for Calendar Year 1969 has been divided between two separate chapters of this annual history, since this arrangement provides continuity with earlier CINCPAC histories and is logically based in the assigned missions and objectives of CINCPAC. This chapter is designed to reflect the more significant and pertinent activities of CINCPAC in the realm of MAP that occurred during the year, except for those actions pertaining to Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Since these three countries are heavily involved in the fighting in Southeast Asia, their military assistance programs are wholly service-funded. Their MAP activities, therefore, are described in Chapter IV: Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia. In this year, as in previous ones since the creation of PACOM, an inordinate amount of CINCPAC’s thoughts and time, as well as those of his staff and his subordinate commands, was consumed in meeting the problems posed by MAP.

(I) For further background material on this subject, the reader is encouraged to peruse the pertinent pages in the histories of this command for the last two years, which are cited in the footnote below. 2 There, a person can find a discussion of the extremely complex operations by which military assistance is planned, programmed, administered, and financed, the importance of MAP and its objectives to the worldwide interests of the United States, and a brief history of PACOM MAP.

1. CINCPAC MA Plan for PACOM Region FY 70-75, dtd 7 Aug 69, pp. 31 and 32.
SECRET

SECTION I - PLANNING AND FUNDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE

MAP Legislation

(5) Over the years, congressional appropriations in support of MAP have been gradually reduced. The annual appropriations have always been less than the Executive Branch's request for funds in the 20-some years of its history. The Foreign Assistance Act appropriation for FY 69, for example, as related in last year's history, was the lowest, since the program was established in 1948. This decreasing MA fundings, coupled with increasing costs, have adversely affected force improvements and readiness in certain PACOM MAP countries, principally Korea. In contrast, the MAPs for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand are wholly Service-funded and are not affected by Foreign Assistance Act appropriations.¹

(5) As Calendar Year 1968 drew to an end, the FY 70 Foreign Assistance budget was in the process of being prepared. Prepared by the outgoing administration, it contained a request for $2.72 billion for foreign assistance, an amount that was $200 million less than that requested for FY 69. Of the $2.9 billion requested by the Executive Branch for FY 69, however, only $1.97 billion was authorized by Congress, and the appropriations legislation had cut this amount further to $1.76 billion. For FY 70, the Executive Branch was seeking $375 million for MA under the act. Of this amount, $220.6 million was designated for PACOM MAP. The FY 69 PACOM MAP appropriations share, for comparison purposes, was $199.9 million.²

(5) Because of the decreasing congressional authorization for MA funding, major revision to PACOM MA plans have been required, and the subsequent funding approval and implementation by SECDEF have been delayed. The major impact, as of 23 May 1969, was as follows:

a. Deletion of significant quantities of improvement items, primarily in Korea and the Philippines.

2. SECDEF 6569/272343Z Nov 68; SECDEF 4745/020002Z Nov 68; Point Paper, J5311, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Dec 68, Subj: MAP Appropriations; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
b. Delay in procurement of essential hardware resulting in delayed deliveries.

c. Reduction in attrition replacement of old/damaged equipment.

d. Reduction in planned construction.¹

(U) As he does every year, CINCPAC appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives in 1969. On 26 June, he gave a presentation on the PACOM FY 70 MAP and answered questions from the members of the committee.²

(U) As of 31 December 1969, however, legislative actions on the Foreign Assistance Act were still not completed. Funding for the FY 70 MAP, therefore, proceeded under a continuing resolution authority (CRA). The status of the authorizations and appropriations at the end of the year were as follows:

a. The authorization bill was approved by Congress for a two year period and authorized $350 million for FY 70 and FY 71.

b. The appropriations bill presented to the Congress included $404.5 million for MAP with the following additional provisions: $50 million for Korea; $54.5 million for China; and $300 million for worldwide including Spain. The bill was passed by the House but defeated in the Senate by a vote of 44 to 22 with instructions to reduce appropriation levels (MAP to $350 million) and to remove additional provisions proposed for Korea and China. Further action on the appropriations bill was deferred until the next session of Congress which starts on 19 January 1970 at which time the defeated bill will be returned to the Joint Conference Committee for resolution.³

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1. Point Paper, J431, Hq CINCPAC, 23 May 69, Subj: PACOM Military Assistance.
2. J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
3. J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; SECDEF 6741/221823Z Dec 69; Point Paper, J5313, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Jan 70, Subj: FY 70 MAP Legislation.
MAP Dollar Line Management

(U) "There are a number of important actions taking place at the Washington level," CINCPAC informed his Chiefs of MAAGs and Military Groups (MILGRPs) on 27 January 1969, "which will have a bearing on the future of our Military Assistance Programs. First, the State Department is currently reviewing the Military Assistance Manual (MAM) guidance.\textsuperscript{1} Out of this revision of the Department of Defense (DOD) MAM, as SECDEF advised CINCPAC on 10 February 1969, were revised procedures in Part II for the management of MAP dollar lines. The most significant change to existing procedures was that Fiscal Year (FY) MAP "dollar lines of the current Fiscal Year shall be available for requisitioning until 31 December of the subsequent Fiscal Year," except as specifically exempted from automatic cutoff policy.\textsuperscript{2} Previously, as of 1 July each year, the Military Departments discontinued processing requisitions against prior year dollar line MAP orders issued during the first six months of the preceding Fiscal Year.

(U) The revised dollar line management procedures were subsequently incorporated into Part II of DOD MAM by a printed change and promulgated to all concerned activities on 1 April 1969.\textsuperscript{3}

FY 71-75 MAP Planning Guidance

(3) On 29 March 1969, SECDEF provided CINCPAC with tentative dollar guidelines for PACOM MAP for the period of FY 71-75. These guidelines were to be used by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and CINCPAC, but would not necessarily be used in the planning of other departments of the Executive Branch. The new dollar guidelines, with the dollars given in millions, are shown below and compared with the previous OSD guidance.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{enumerate}
\item CINCPAC Military Assistance Newsletter No. 2, 27 Jan 69, p. 1.
\item SECDEF 2184/102034Z Feb 69; J434 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
\item J434 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; Memo, LT GEN Robert H. Warren, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Military Assistance and Sales, DOD, to recipients of Military Assistance Manual - Part II, 1 Apr 69, Subj: Transmittal II-33.
\item J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69; SECDEF 5860/291807Z Mar 69.
\end{enumerate}
# MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

## DOLLAR GUIDELINES

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1/ Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)
2/ Includes CONUS training program for Malaysia ($200,000)
3/ Vietnam not included; not subject to $ restrictions.

**SOURCE:** PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 140.
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**MAP In-Country Ship Overhaul Funding**

*(S) A problem arose during Calendar Year 1968 concerning the MAP funding of in-country ship overhauls for the Philippine and China Navies. In

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*Amount includes $.2 million for Malaysia program shown above under previous guidance.*
both these instances, CINCPAC had to request exceptions to the standard policy of an automatic cut-off date of 31 December 1968 for the funding of these overhauls scheduled in the 3d and 4th Quarters of Fiscal Year 1969 MAP. To prevent similar difficulties occurring in the future, CINCPAC addressed this problem to SECDEF towards the end of the year. "In order to provide orderly overhaul management and to preclude the necessity for requesting extension of automatic cut-off date," CINCPAC suggested that either of his two recommended alternative procedures be adopted.¹ In response on 30 January 1969, SECDEF stated the following:

For all MASM data for in-country ship overhauls under Generic Code C6A will not be changed. These line items will continue to be programmed with unit of issue "XX", but will be excluded from automatic cut-off of requisitioning. The next revision to MAM, Part II, Chapter 5, will contain provisions for this exclusion.

For CNO, pending publication of revision to MAM, Part II, request you initiate action to exclude ship overhauls, Generic Code C6A, from requisition cut-off.²

Cancellation of MAP Reporting Requirements

(U) For the first time in October 1962, and again in October 1965, SECDEF requested that all "Unified Commands notify ISA by cable of any services, construction or shipment construed by country MAAG or Unified Commander to be noteworthy from the nature of the item, its initial introduction into the country, or the coincidence of its arrival with other events or that may evoke significant adverse or favorable public or governmental reaction locally or in neighboring countries."³ On 4 February 1969, however, SECDEF notified CINCPAC that this requirement for a report in those cases when the delivery of U.S. military assistance might be expected to cause significant local or third country political and public reaction was cancelled immediately. SECDEF's rationale for such a turnabout was his belief "that adequate safeguards exist to assure continuing surveillance of the Military Assistance Program

2. SECDEF 1485/302140Z Jan 69.
3. SECDEF 4024/132121Z Oct 65; J434 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
CONFIDENTIAL

(grant and sales) and that there is no need for special procedure or instructions such as was initiated in 1962. 1

(U) As a result, on 19 February 1969, CINCPAC disseminated a message that cancelled this MAP reporting requirement throughout PACOM. Moreover, as suggested by SECDEF, CINCPAC also encouraged each addressee of his message to continue to work closely with other elements of the Country Teams "to assure continued relationship of MAP to total country foreign assistance program." 2

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Projections FY 70-71

(U) On 1 July 1969, a SECDEF message to CINCPAC and other commanders of unified commands read as follows:

... Objective of this message is to obtain MAAG, Mission or other DOD Representative, as appropriate, FY 70 and 71 data and recommendations as a basis for updating FY 70 projections and preparing projections for FY 71. Country submissions will be submitted through unified commands in normal fashion.

Such additional data as is deemed appropriate to better understanding here of FY 70-71 projections and their probable validity. 3

(U) Nine days later, CINCPAC requested that all concerned within PACOM forward to him the desired information. A portion of his message read as follows:

2. (U) As a result of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 MAAGs/Missions/DOD representatives through the unified commands will be integrated more closely into military sales planning and the generation of military sales

2. CINCPAC 190103Z Feb 69; J434 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
3. OSD 3651/011852Z Jul 69; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
Implementing procedures are being prepared by OSD/ISA. In carrying out FMS functions MAAGs/Missions/other responsible DOD representatives are permitted direct communications with OSD and the military departments while keeping CINCPAC informed.

4. MAAGs/Missions/and DOD representatives in discussions with host country officials should emphasize that available U.S. Funds for credit purchase are quite limited and that such discussions are in the nature of developing projection of future requirements only. All projected sales must be developed in collaboration with the Chief of U.S. Mission.

By 29 July 1969, all but one of the replies from the various countries had been received by CINCPAC. Since SECDEF had wanted this information by 30 July, CINCPAC dispatched a message on 1 August 1969 forwarding it, with the later reply data being forwarded as soon as it arrived, with a recommendation "that procedures be established that clarify FMS responsibilities and authority."

MA and FMS of Chemical and Biological (C&B) Warfare Agents to Foreign Governments

On 20 August 1969, "because of political sensitivity," DA, as the cognizant military service for DOD, advised CINCPAC that "it is essential that any action which might lead to the... sale by the Army of C&B warfare agents to any foreign government be approved in advance, and that procedures

1. Admin CINCPAC 102306Z Jul 69.
2. USDAO/Canberra 0979/230606Z Jul 69; COMUSKOREA UK 60423/240614Z Jul 69; USDAO/Wellington New Zealand 0367/140245Z Jul 69; USDAO/Wellington New Zealand 0377/220140Z Jul 69; CHJUSMAGPHIL 251400Z Jul 69; CMDAP Japan 6093/250722Z Jul 69; COMUSMACTHAI MACTMAP 240540Z Jul 69; CHMEDT/AMEMBASSY Rangoon MCX 103/260500Z Jul 69; CHDLG Jakarta 280856Z Jul 69; CMAAG Taipei Taiwan MGPR 7265/290501Z Jul 69; USDAO/Singapore 1980/120309Z Aug 69.
3. CINCPAC 010341Z Aug 69; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
be established to assure compliance. In subsequent messages on 6 September and 1 October 1969, CINCPAC requested DA to provide clarification as to whether or not riot control agents and herbicides, as well as which items in FSC 1365 (chemical agents and accessories), were included as restricted agents. DA, in reply, notified CINCPAC on 3 October 1969 that the restriction was all inclusive.

Seeking clarification as to the apparent contradiction of policy between the FMS of C&B warfare agents and grant aid of same agents for which no prior approval was required, CINCPAC, on 16 October 1969, recommended that "SECDEF promulgate general guidance with respect to MA&S of C&B agents within the intent of the restriction, apparently issued to inhibit possible USG involvement in foreign government use of weapons/munitions which could cause adverse public reaction." SECDEF's response came on 31 October 1969. "General overall policy re chemical and biological (C&B) agents under high level review at present and general guidance will be promulgated after completion of review. In meantime, sales will continue to be determined on a case by case basis." Moreover, all identified chemical agents and accessories in current and prior year grant aid programs were approved, but those unidentified items in rolled-up dollar lines remaining undelivered would require identification and prior OSD approval for delivery. This requirement for OSD approval of C&B agents in grant aid programs necessitated a procedural alignment for both grant aid and FMS. Fortunately, an examination of CINCPAC MAP Data Center records indicated that there were no undelivered balances in current or prior year grant programs.

PACOM MAAG Administration and Overhead Support Review

A DOD-proposed visit to the PACOM MAAGs in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, which commenced in April of 1969, terminated on 9 May 1969. The Comptroller, J72, Hq CINCPAC, furnished the CINCPAC representative, who accompanied the two visitors from OASD/ISA and from Naval Supply Systems Command. The purpose of this trip, which was to familiarize the two visitors with the organizational and environmental situations that affected budgeting at these MAAGs, as well as to exchange general MAP budgeting information:

1. DA 201512Z Aug 69; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
2. Admin CINCPAC 060337Z Sep 69; Admin CINCPAC 010327Z Oct 69; DA 032201Z Oct 69.
3. CINCPAC 160242Z Oct 69.
4. SECDEF 3718/311734Z Oct 69.
5. Ibid.; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
UNCLASSIFIED

...was accomplished. An irregular manner of handling Assistance-in-Kind funds in the Philippines was brought to light; subsequent guidance from CINCPAC was furnished to resolve the problem. The only other significant problem uncovered was that PROVMAAGK proved a need for $84,000 in MAP funds to reimburse Eighth Army for MAAG housing costs. The DOD visitor committed himself to obtaining those funds. ¹

**Military Budget Support Funds**

(U) In mid-1969, JO3, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics, and Administration, Hq CINCPAC, "assigned responsibility for the task of reviewing and evaluating the MAAG administration of local currency financing of host country military budgets to J72, " CINCPAC Comptroller, after "J71 could find no evidence of CINCPAC reports to SECDEF of reviews of MAAG financial management of" military budget support funds as required by DOD Military Assistance Manual (MAM), Part II, Chapter Q.² ² It was planned that the required review would be performed by the J72 Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) representative during the annual in-country evaluation of the MAP and that a report of these findings would be forwarded to the Office of the Director of Military Assistance as prescribed by the DOD MAM, which also set forth the responsibilities for both MAAGs and unified commands in connection with local currency utilization for support of host country military programs.

**Military Budget Support Agreements**

(U) DOD MAM, Part II, Chapter Q, sets forth explicit instructions regarding "MAAG responsibilities for review and observation of host countries' implementation of local currency supported military programs" and prescribes that "Unified Commands will be responsible for thorough and timely reviews and evaluation of MAAG administration of the local currency financing of military programs" and report annually the results of these reviews to the Office of the Director of Military Assistance. ³ ³ "In order to familiarize

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1. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
personnel with procedures followed by the MAAG in discharging its responsibilities" set forth in the DOD MAM, CINCPAC requested on 9 July 1969 that his Comptroller, J72, be provided with the following:

...(1) a copy of the military budget support agreement drawn up with the recipient country, (2) the amount of local currency contributed by the United States in support of the host country military budget and its percentage of the total defense budget, and (3) methods and procedures employed by the MAAG in reviewing and observing host country implementation of local currency supported military and civil programs including copies of local directives or instructions. 1

Weapons Systems Logistics Officers (WSLOs)

QS "To insure an equitable distribution of supply operations costs," announced SECDEF on 25 November 1969, arrangements had been made to transfer the funding for WSLOs from the Air Force Logistics Command's Management Expense funds to the Country Program materiel funds. 2 The necessary re-programming to implement this new SECDEF policy would be initiated by the CINCPAC J4 staff upon the receipt of the requirements data from affected MAAGs--Korea, China, and the Philippines--and of cost data from SECDEF and CSAF.

Strategic Mobility Work Projects for MAP and/or AID Funding

QS In the past as now, the purpose of the Strategic Mobility Projects since their inception has been to support and to improve the mobility posture of the U.S. in those areas covered by the "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, by the most economical and effective means of funding by either AID or MAP or a combination of both. Projects selected were those that contributed: (1) expediting deployments specified in contingency plans; (2) furthering the developments of airfields, ports, roads, and rail lines; and (3) improving cargo and POL handling facilities for both air and sealift. "3

1. Ltr, CINCPAC to Chiefs of MAAGs, 9 Jul 69, Subj: Local Currency Utilization in Support of Host Country Military Budgets; J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
2. SECDEF 5198/251630Z Nov 69; J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
On 30 January 1969, CINCPAC notified all concerned that a conference was being planned "at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, for purpose of discussion of the FY 70 PACOM Military Assistance Program (MAP) and areas of mutual interest among the Chiefs of MAAGs and MILGRPs (including COMUSMACV AC/S for Military Assistance). PACOM DAOs with FMS programs have also been invited to attend." This scheduled event would be only the second time...
ADM McCain addresses a meeting of the PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference in April 1969.

Since 1960 that a PACOM Chiefs' Conference had been held, the last one being in October 1968. I, "I consider it of vital importance," ADM McCain was quoted by a newspaper during the conference, "to periodically review the military assistance program with my senior representatives from the Pacific and Asian countries where this program is in effect."

(U) This conference for the MAAG and MILGRP (Military Group) Chiefs was conducted at Camp H. M. Smith from 2 through 4 April 1969. Because of the significance of this meeting, which covered the entire scope of both current and projected PACOM MAP activities, the following summation of the

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substance, as well as the highlights, of the conference has been quoted verbatim from the final report. 1

(U) "At 0815 on 2 April 1969, Admiral McCain convened the conference. He welcomed the Chiefs, stressing the importance of their positions, and explained why he had convened the conference. (The purpose of this conference was to provide CINCPAC with information on the FY 70 PACOM Military

PACOM MAAG Chiefs take a lunch break at the CINCPAC Flag Mess at Camp Smith.

1. This brief, summarized report of the conference was prepared by COL Gerald S. Brown, USAF, J5313, Hq CINCPAC, to serve as the introduction to the Final Report of PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference - April 1969, and its 18 enclosures contain the actual texts of the presentations by the MAAG and MILGRP Chiefs; Intv, COL Gerald S. Brown, USAF, J5313, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC, HistBr. 29 Apr 69.

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"PRESENTATIONS"

"1. After Admiral McCain's remarks, MAJ GEN Taylor, CHPROVMAAG-K, gave the initial presentation. He described the threat including the current insurgency problems in Korea. He described the MAP transfer program for Korea and the implications of a continued suspension of the program. He then explained the FY 70-75 MA Program and the importance of MAPEX to this program and, finally, the Counter Infiltration Guerrilla Force Improvement Requirements (CIGFIR). MAJ GEN Taylor concluded by recommending that:

a. CINCPAC assist in getting CIGFIR, or a portion thereof, approved.

b. Every effort be made to lift the MAP transfer program suspension.

c. Continuing emphasis be placed by command and supply echelons at all levels, on reducing lead times for delivery of MAP materiel.

d. CINCPAC consider deploying a small MAPEX coordinating team to Vietnam, with at least limited approval authority, in order to better implement MAPEX procedures.

2. Following MAJ GEN Taylor's briefing, BGEN Daughtrey made a presentation on the organization replacing the MAAG in Japan (the Military Materiel Office (MMO)), its functions and programs, and the transfer of residual MAAG functions to other commands. He concluded his presentation by emphasizing the goals of the U.S. organization in Japan. These are:

a. Drawing the Japanese into assuming a larger responsibility for the security of Asia.

b. To elicit an increase in Japanese defense expenditures.

c. To assist in the qualitative improvement of Japanese forces by promoting the use of the latest U.S. defense hardware.

d. To maintain U.S. military presence and rapport with the military and civilian leaders of Japan Defense Agency.

e. To further U.S. military plans, policies and interests.
3. MAJ GEN Ciccolella then gave a report on the Government of the Republic of China financial status, the FY 70-75 program plan for China, details of the FY 70 program, and the proposed $20 million Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit package for China. He summarized the major efforts being made by the MAAG and the Chinese armed forces in offsetting the effects of reduced direct aid. He concluded his presentation with an examination of the trends in GRC expenditures through FY 75, and cautioned against over-taxing the GRC economy or weakening the military establishment by a complete withdrawal of U.S. grant aid.

4. Following MAJ GEN Ciccolella, Minister Fearey briefed on the political considerations involved in military assistance.

5. The remainder of the morning of 2 April 1969 was devoted to a seminar on Regional Cooperation between MAAGs, with RADM Shaffer as moderator. Discussion centered around using the industrial capability of one country to manufacture or rebuild a common item to be used by all, rather than developing duplicate capabilities; e.g., have China rebuild trucks, Korea manufacture M-16s, etc.

6. The afternoon of 2 April was a discussion period for consideration of specific topics previously submitted by the MAAG and MILGRP Chiefs of Korea, Thailand, and Laos. In addition, CINCPAC staff personnel gave brief reports on Volume III, JSOP, and the CINCPAC plan for training replacement MAP personnel.

7. The conference resumed at 0830 on the morning of 3 April 1969, with MAJ GEN Gomes giving the history of MAP in the Philippines, the current organization of the armed forces in the Philippines, the U.S. objectives, and the FY 70-75 program plan. He described the progress made by the Phils in their repair and rebuild programs, their shipbuilding capability and, finally, the resulting problems of reduced grant aid expenditures in the Philippines. He urged CINCPAC to support his position of returning the Philippine Military Assistance Program to its former level of $22 million.

8. After MAJ GEN Gomes, BGEN Galloway, the MACV Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, briefed on the organization of RVNAF, the RVNAF force structure, status of new units, modernization of equipment, the MACV management systems, and the prospects for the Republic of Vietnam armed forces. He ended his presentation by advising that the RVNAF modernization program is on schedule but completion is directly dependent on timely availability of equipment. The RVNAF is improving in leadership, logistical support and combat effectiveness.
"9. CAPT Bolan's briefing concerned current intelligence in Thailand and the Thailand FY 70 MASF program....

"10. LCDR Smith of J2 CINCPAC staff then briefed on the latest intelligence estimates in Vietnam....

"11. LCOL Sanna of the J4 CINCPAC staff gave a presentation on utilization of transferable assets in the aid Military Assistance Program.... He discussed the MAPEX, SIMEX and PAMEX programs and procedures.

"12. The morning session of 3 April 1969 was concluded by staff reports by representatives of the J5 and J4 CINCPAC staffs on T-Day planning.... These briefings covered the various options for withdrawal of forces on 'R' Day and the plans for movement of personnel and cargo under each of these options.

"13. On the afternoon of 3 April, discussions were held between the Chiefs and individual CINCPAC staff sections on MAAG administrative matters. Discussions involved personnel, money, supply, and transportation matters. There were no discussions considered appropriate for inclusion in this report.

"14. The conference reconvened at 0830 on 4 April 1969 with a report on the situation in Laos, given by COL Russell, DEPCHJUSMAAGTHAI.... He described the FY 70 program for Laos and what he considered to be necessary for improvement of the situation in that country. The prime recommendation was for a military channel which would be responsive to the military requirements and have some control over the utilization and employment of the hardware provided under the Military Assistance Service Funded programs. At the conclusion of the presentation, Admiral McCain advised COL Russell that he desired to discuss the matter of Laos in the afternoon of 4 April. At this meeting Admiral McCain directed the CINCPAC staff to study the problem and provide him with a proposal. (Subsequent data on the proposed organizational arrangement for Laos will be provided by J55.)

"15. COL Hamblin, Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), Burma, gave the next presentation, on the status of Burma MAP and the activities of MEDT.... He advised that, although the Military Assistance Program for Burma has terminated, except for a $200,000 per year training program, the Burmese may make an overture for continuation of the equipment program some time in the future. In view of this, MEDT has developed a five-year material program totaling $17.1 million....

"16. COL Roye, CHDLG, completed the Chiefs' presentations by describing the FY 70 civic action program and conditions in Indonesia.... He reported
that the country is making progress but it still has a long way to go. The equipment provided under MAP is being utilized properly in construction of roads, bridges, and schools. There is, however, difficulty in supply organization and management within the Indonesian armed forces; the government is in poor economic condition; and there is a chronic shortage of food in the country. In spite of these drawbacks, the Indonesians are making progress.

"17. LCOL Astarita of the J3 CINCPAC staff then gave a staff report on Readiness Criteria for use in evaluations of the operational readiness status of foreign forces which are supported by the MAP and MASF programs. At the conclusion of his presentation, there was discussion among the Chiefs as to what criteria should be established.

"18. The final session of the conference was a seminar moderated by RADM Shaffer. The first subject discussed was the relationship of CINCPAC MAP effort (in its pure military sense) to the function of national police and home defense forces.

"19. COL McKinnon, the CSAF representative, reported on the status of aircraft which may become available to MAP. He first talked about the F-5-21 status and reported that the first aircraft had flown during the last week of March. The production cost as it now stands will be $1.5 million per copy. The Air Force has allocated $2 million to the R&D efforts and the Honorable E. Mendel Rivers has added $14 million to the proposed FY 70 Air Force budget for continued R&D efforts.

"Fall-out aircraft for MAP were reported as follows:

| FY 71-72 | 200 | F100-D |
| FY 73    | 150 | F100-F |
| FY 69    | 100 | F101-B |
| FY 71-72 | 300 | F102   |

"He then discussed the availability of transport aircraft and gave a resume of the Cessna Sky Van fall-out:

| FY 69    | 169 | C119 |
| FY 70    | 49  | C124 |

"Sky Van Data: Cost - $395,000
- Engines - 2 turbo props
- Capacity - 24 passengers, or 3500-6000 lbs. cargo depending on range, or 16 fully-equipped paratroopers
"COL Robson of PACAF then gave a short briefing on the characteristics of the F-5-21 and compared it with the F-5....

(U) "CONCLUSION"

(U) "The conference was closed at 1130 on 4 April 1969. The Chiefs proceeded to Admiral McCain's office for his parting remarks and for pictures."

Availability of Excess Minesweepers to MAP

(U) Early in 1969, CNO advised that the Belgian Navy had declared 16 minesweepers--eight MSCs (Minesweeper, Coastal (non-magnetic)) and eight MSIs (Minesweeper)--excess to its requirements, while the French Navy had declared one MSC excess to its requirements; all of these minesweepers were available for redistribution. Accordingly, on 8 April 1969, CINCPAC requested applicable PACOM MAAGs to submit requirements and justifications. "In view of location," he warned, "consideration must be given to transportation/tow requirements and costs, country ability to pay such costs, and impact upon MAP grant aid if country cannot fund."1

(U) CHJUSMAGPHIL indicated an interest in two of the MSCs on 15 April 1969, but needed additional information to judge "whether or not acceptance is feasible."2 Two days later, CHMAAG China requested seven Belgian Navy MSCs, justifying on the basis of shortfall requirements, current minesweeping capabilities, the "well established CHICOM mining threat," and the fact that the "seven minesweepers is major part of MAAG/China proposed GRC naval force reorganization."3

(U) After CINCPAC added his approval to this recommendation, CNO concurred in CHMAAG China's proposal on 8 May 1969 and requested that action be initiated "to effect transfer these vessels from GOB to GRC on as is/where is basis at no cost to MAP except for preparation for tow and related costs. Delivery of vessels will be in accordance with arrangements between MAAG China and MAAG Belgium."4 CINCPAC requested CHMAAG China to comply with CNO's instructions five days later.5

1. CINCPAC 082109Z Apr 69; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 150620Z Apr 69.
3. CMAAAG Taiwan MGNA 436/171001Z Apr 69.
4. CNO 082235Z May 69; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; CINCPAC 020003Z May 69.
5. CINCPAC 130133Z May 69.
Meanwhile, one additional Belgian Navy excess MSC and one French Navy excess MSC were under consideration by CHJUSMAGPHIL for the Philippine Navy. Because of the inability of the Republic of the Philippines to fund this transfer, CHJUSMAGPHIL inquired as to the possibility of securing American assistance for the funding of tow costs from Europe to U.S., repair and rehabilitation there, training and associated costs from about 80 Philippine Navy personnel, and onward routing logistic support cost. The rest of the year passed, however, without any further progress being made in this respect, primarily because the Philippines were not authorized to get any minesweepers in its current program, its requirement of this nature being two years hence.  

On 9 June 1969, Chief, Naval Section, MAAG China reported from Belgium that the seven mothballed MSCs were "in excellent condition. Nine zero percent on board spares and six complete units shore based spares to be made available at no cost." He recommended that the tow be made in three increments. Then, on 6 November 1969, CHMAAG Brussels notified all concerned that the final increment of four coastal minesweepers had been turned over to the Chinese Navy. As of the end of Calendar Year 1969, therefore, eight minesweepers (seven serviceable and one to be cannibalized in-country) had been authorized and turned over to the Chinese Navy.

**Disposition of H-34 Aircraft to Meet PACOM MAP/MASF Requirements**

The decision early in 1969 to accelerate delivery of UH-1Hs to the VNAF (Vietnamese Air Force) required "that equal acceleration be given to phase out and disposition of approximately sixty H-34 acft," and an AFLC (Air Force Logistics Command) team was scheduled to journey "to Vietnam as soon as possible to observe USAF/VNAF facilities and determine workload involved in disposing of the above assets." As a result, on 29 January 1969,

1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 070642Z May 69; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; Intv, LCOL Francis P. Sanna, USAF, J4322, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 30 Jan 70; CHJUSMAGPHIL 160720Z May 69.
2. CHMAAG Bellux 050/091039Z Jun 69; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
3. CHMAAG/Bellux Brussels 674/071127Z Nov 69; J4319A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
4. Intv, LCOL Francis P. Sanna, USAF, J4322, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 30 Jan 70.
5. AFADVSYP TSN AB RVN 210945Z Jan 69; CSAF AFSMSDA 292010Z Jan 69; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
CSAF requested CINCPAC to advise of the potential PACOM MAP/MA SF requirements for the H-34 aircraft.

On 1 February 1969, CINCPAC queried COMUS Korea, CHMAAG China, CHJUSMACPHIL, COMUSMACTHAI, and DEPCHJUSMACGTHAI as to their potential requirements for the H-34 during FY 69-71. The first three replied negatively. COMUSMACTHAI submitted a potential requirement for 25 H-34Ds to replace 25 H-34Cs, with an additional five H-34Ds for attrition. DEPCHJUSMACGTHAI submitted a requirement for an increase of five H-34s in his authorized UE (Unit Equipment Allowance), stating that this increase would be accomplished by utilizing programmed attrition helicopters in the FY 69 and previous programs; in addition, he said that seven attrition H-34s per year would be required. 1

These requirements set forth by COMUSMACTHAI and DEPCHJUSMACGTHAI, CINCPAC replied to CSAF on 21 February 1969, were "the only current PACOM MAP/MA SF potential requirement for the H-34; however, future requirements are dependent upon approval of proposals currently under review by Washington agencies." 2 CINCPAC further stated that a 60 to 90 day period would be needed for a more definitive assessment to be given, since he anticipated an adverse decision on the China helicopter co-production program, which was to be financed by a FMS loan. Despite the delayed production decision, however, CHMAAG China reiterated on 5 March that there was no China requirement for the excess H-34s. "By telephone, the J53 China desk officer ascertained that CHMAAG China had determined the cost of rehabilitation of the VNAF H-34 would be prohibitive." 3 As a result, on 8 March 1969, CINCPAC informed CSAF that there were no additional H-34 helicopter requirements.

Just six days later, CSAF notified CINCPAC that only eight UH-34Ds were available for redistribution and, of these eight, only one met the criteria previously established by COMUSMACTHAI. CINCPAC, in turn, requested COMUSMACTHAI's comments on this new development. COMUSMACTHAI

1. CINCPAC 010413Z Feb 69; CINCPAC 012114Z Feb 69; COMUSKOREA UK 57202/070630Z Feb 69; CHJUSMACPHIL 120206Z Feb 69; CHMAAG Taiwan 2252/190803Z Feb 69; COMUSMACTHAI 180531Z Feb 69; DEPCHJUSMACGTHAI 9044/120330Z Feb 69; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
2. CINCPAC 210405Z Feb 69.
3. J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69; CHMAAG Taiwan 3210/050305Z Mar 69; CINCPAC 210405Z Feb 69; CINCPAC 080004Z Mar 69.
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replied as follows on 20 March 1969, with the "Ref C" referring to his earlier message that requested "the RVN aircraft selected have a maximum of 18 months accrued since last IRAN/OVHL, and a minimum of 500 operating hours remaining on all major operating components:"

...This headquarters cannot comment on variance of availability of H-34Ds for redistribution. Our requirements are for as many H-34Ds as possible that meet requirements of Ref C. We will accept one or eight according to the number available. Any amount will reduce the manpower and materiel being expended and to be expended in the future by the RTAF and MASF programs. This exchange will make additional helicopters available for use by the RTG agencies during the next eighteen months. 1

Accordingly, on 22 March 1969, CINCPAC informed CSAF that the PACOM requirements for H-34s previously set forth remained valid and requested that the one UH-34D meeting the established criteria be redistributed to Thailand as an attrition aircraft. Four days later, CSAF concurred in this redistribution in an "as is" condition. 2

Long Range Master Facilities Plans

CINCPAC MAM, Part I, Section C, Chapter III, dated 3 October 1968, required MAAGs in China, Korea, Philippines, and Thailand to prepare and submit long range facilities plans to CINCPAC and his component commanders. Designed to assist these countries in the orderly development of their facilities, these plans contained detailed information on all military facilities, including all utilities, within the MAP-supported countries. Unfortunately the detail with which these plans had been prepared made them too voluminous to be of value to either the CINCPAC staff or the component commanders' headquarters. 3

By letter on 6 January 1969, COMUS Korea requested a waiver of this requirement. As a result, the Military Assistance Branch, J43, Hq CINCPAC, held a meeting "with representatives of the component commands and it was determined that no use was being made of plans as now submitted.

1. COMUSMACTHAI 200444Z Mar 69; COMUSMACTHAI 180531Z Feb 69; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69; Admin CINCPAC 152309Z Mar 69; CSAF SMSDA 142314Z Mar 69.
2. CINCPAC 222345Z Mar 69; CSAF SMSDA 262239Z Mar 69.
3. J4324 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
It was agreed by all that submittal of abbreviated plans would be beneficial to MAAGs, Component Commands and CINCPAC. Accordingly, on 8 February 1969, an attempt was made by CINCPAC to obtain only abbreviated plans solely for the use of the military headquarters in Hawaii.

(U) By mid-year, two out of the four MAAGs had not been able to get the countries to prepare them; for China, for instance, abbreviated plans would have had to be prepared for 729 Chinese military installations. The abbreviated plan concept was an attempt to see if a useful set of plans could be obtained; difficulties in preparation as encountered by the MAAGs in China and Korea had not been anticipated. On 2 and 3 July, J43 contacted the interested officials of the components by telephone. USARPAC and PACFLT preferred to drop completely the requirement to forward copies of the plans. PACAF preferred to drop only the requirement for abbreviated plans and desired submittal of the full set of each country's Air Force plans. In the end, CINCPAC notified all concerned on 14 July 1969 that the CINCPAC MAM:

...will be modified to delete the requirement for preparation and submittal of Long Range Master Facilities Plans. The requirement is being eliminated due to reductions in MAP program funds and BALPA reductions in MAAGs and is not due to a lessening of the value of Long Range Master Facilities Plans in guiding the orderly development of facilities. Preparation of the plans should be encouraged and may be MAP funded. In countries where plans are not now prepared, a Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP) project to prepare them would be warranted.

Redistribution of Excess Vehicles from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN)

(C) On 26 February 1969, CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC, in his assigned role as PACOM MAP Vehicle Standardization Coordinator, to make recommendations for the distribution of excess OSP-J (Off-shore Procurement-Japan), M600 Series, and obsolete/salvage M-standard vehicles from RVN.

1. Memo, J43 to J4, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Feb 69, Subj: Long Range Master Facilities Plans.
2. CINCPAC 080349Z Feb 69.
3. Memo, J43 to J4, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Jul 69, Subj: Long Range Master Facilities Plans; CHMAAG Taiwan 61456/301017Z Jun 69.
4. CINCPAC 140018Z Jul 69.
5. CINCPAC 260619Z Feb 69; J434 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
CINCUSARPAC's recommendations were forthcoming on 17 March 1969. He believed that redistribution priorities should be based on the "composition and density of country vehicle fleets, country facilities and capabilities for rehabilitating components, assemblies and end items, continued supportability of such vehicles and the military threat to the affected countries."¹

(footnote)

Based on previously established priorities of two years ago,² as well as CINCUSARPAC's recommendations, CINCPAC directed the following priorities on 2 May 1969:

...that Korea will be ultimate repository for OSP-J vehicles in PACOM and was given first priority for all excess/salvage OSP-J vehicles and components. Korea was also given first priority for excess/salvage M600 Series vehicles and components. Thailand was given second priority and the Philippines third priority for OSP-J and M600 Series vehicles and components. China was given first priority and Korea second priority for excess/salvage M-standard/obsolete M-standard vehicles and components.³

Excess OG-108 Material for China and Korea

(footnote)

Upon learning that a requisition of the Republic of China (ROC) Army for excess OG-108 uniform material had been cancelled, CHMAAG China requested CINCPAC on 9 June 1969 to give further consideration "to fulfilling the requirement for providing this material to the ROC Army. Budget savings realized as result of receiving this material will enable funds to be diverted to other equally critical areas."⁴ Three days later, based on assurances and responses provided by CHMAAG China and COMUS Korea, SECDEF approved CINCPAC's request to allocate over two million yards of this material to China and Korea. "This transaction," SECDEF stated, "is being processed into the FY 69 China & Korean programs under SIMEX procedures."⁵

1. J434 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; CINCUSARPAC 9914/172334Z Mar 69.
2. CINCPAC 122155Z Aug 67.
3. J434 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; CINCPAC 020540Z May 69.
4. CMAAG Taipei Taiwan 6225/090527Z Jun 69.
5. SECDEF 2360/122040Z Jun 69; J4312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69; Headquarters, United States Forces, Korea, Historical Report 2d Quarter CY 1969, dtd 20 Aug 69, p. 33.
F-5 Modernization Program

The PACOM MAP Aircraft Modernization Program—the replacing of obsolescent F-86F tactical fighters with the more sophisticated and effective F-5A/B—remained an active one throughout Calendar Year 1968, as it had since the initial provision of the new aircraft to China, Korea, and the Philippines in 1965. On 7 May 1969, however, SECDEF announced that, "unless unforeseen circumstances should later require a reversal, the FY 1970 programs will constitute the buy-out of U.S.-produced F-5 aircraft for Military Assistance Programs."1

"Despite rumors to the contrary," SECDEF further stated, "there is no U.S. production contract in being for any new replacement fighter for either grant aid programs or for potential international sales."2 Several proposals, however, were under study, primarily directed to the sales program; as SECDEF explained:

...Two proposals are under study: the Northrop F-5-21 (modified F-5A); and a "stripped" version of the McDonnell Douglas F-4E. A Lockheed proposal based on derivatives of the F-104 has been received recently. We intend to have these proposals, and any alternatives deemed appropriate, evaluated by the Department of the Air Force.3

Subsequently, the FY 70 Korea MAP requirements for F-5s "were reduced from 13 to three because of country ceiling restrictions, leaving a total of 22 each programmed for PACOM MAP/MAF."4 Then, on 31 December 1969, SECDEF advised that present "plans here contemplate procurement of twenty F-5 aircraft in FY 71" for worldwide requirements and "that FY 71 is definitely the 'buy-out' year."5

PACOM MAP/MAF Follow-on Fighter Requirements

On 17 December 1968, following a PACOM-wide review, CINCPAC

2. OSD 8627/071605Z May 69.
3. Ibid.; LCOL Riepma Memo of 30 Jan 70.
4. LCOL Riepma Memo of 30 Jan 70.
5. SECDEF 7245/312313Z Dec 69; LCOL Riepma Memo of 30 Jan 70.
informed the JCS of a current and urgent "need to plan now to update and modernize the PACOM MAP/MASF country air forces within the next three to five years." As he pointed out, the "threat to PACOM from enemy air forces includes over twenty-five hundred fighter aircraft of the Russian MIG series, the MIG 15, 17, 19, and 21, " with the last one being the most dangerous because of its superior performance over the other MIGs. The bulk of the fighter aircraft possessed by PACOM MAP/MA SF countries, " on the other hand, "is of Korean vintage. The start on a modernization program was reflected in the modest acquisition of F-104 and F-5 aircraft by these countries." In conclusion, CINCPAC recommended that the results of his investigations "be the basis for a decision to select the appropriate fighter aircraft that will meet the threat and establish a program for phased replacement of obsolete fighter aircraft in the PACOM allied country air forces."

(S) Nine days later, the JCS's interim reply informed CINCPAC that this subject would be addressed on a world-wide basis. When queried by the JCS, CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE supported CINCPAC's position in January 1969 and furnished additional rationale pertaining to their own areas of responsibilities. CINCPAC dispatched a follow-up message to the JCS on 22 April 1969, stating that:

> During the four months that have elapsed since Ref A was dispatched, events in the PACOM and other critical areas of the world emphasize the need for modernization of allied country air forces. The priority modernization of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) clearly emphasizes that the allies of the U.S. must be strong and prepared to withstand the initial threat from adjacent communist countries.

(S) Responding to concerned unified and specified commands in mid-September 1969, the JCS indicated that no solution was in sight, although they "will continue to take every opportunity to bring the problem of allied force modernization to the attention of SECDEF." Having just returned from visits

1. CINCPAC 170350Z Dec 68; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
2. CINCPAC 170350Z Dec 68.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 220350Z Apr 69; USCINCEUR 902/300849Z Jan 69; CINCSTRIKE 782/272303Z Jan 69.
6. JCS 8845/121854Z Sep 69.
to Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines," read a CINCPAC message to the JCS the next month, "I have come away with an even greater sense of urgency that acquisition and delivery of a modernized international fighter aircraft to PACOM allied country air forces is of prime importance." 1 Finally, on 29 November 1969, the JCS notified CINCPAC of the following:

2. A joint Senate/House Committee action on the Military Procurement Authorization Bill provided for $28 million to initiate the procurement of a fighter aircraft to meet the needs of the Free World Forces in Southeast Asia. The conference report requires that the Air Force conduct a competition for the aircraft which shall be selected on the basis of the threat as evaluated and determined by SECDEF.

3. The Air Force is now preparing a requirements action directive for an advanced military assistance fighter aircraft aiming at an industrial request for proposal date in January in order to obligate the anticipated funds this fiscal year. 2

MAAG Aircraft and Flying Hours Authorizations

(U) On 31 January 1969, CHMAAG China requested that the "FY 69 rotary wing flying hour authorization be increased" from 320 flying hours to 445 for the OH-23. 3 Concurring in the necessity of this request to "ensure that the MAAG advisory effort and the essential missions" were supported, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 12 February that "the FY 69 OH-23 flying hours for MAAG China be increased to 445. Understanding is that 50 percent of the additional requirements will be funded by MAP and 50 percent by the Services." 4 On 29 April 1969, the JCS advised that "135 additional flying hours for OH-23 for MAAG China FY 1969 has been approved by OASD/ISA. This increases the approved FY 1969 OH-23 flying hours to 455." 5

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA))) requires the JCS to submit requirements for MAAG aircraft and

1. CINCPAC 200225Z Nov 69.
2. JCS 5794/290032Z Nov 69; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
3. CMAAG Taipei Taiwan 11394/310815Z Jan 69; J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
4. CINCPAC 120222Z Feb 69.
5. JCS 8057/292030Z Apr 69; J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
flying hours on an annual basis. These aircraft requirements and flying hour authorization requests are prepared and submitted by the MAAGs to the unified commands, where they are staffed and forwarded to the JCS.

(U) During 1969, CINCPAC's submission reflected an increase in flying hours for MAAG China, which was considered justified because personnel reductions had resulted in increased requirements to remaining personnel. Aircraft requirements for MAAG Korea were subject to further adjustment pending receipt of a reevaluation of the value of fixed wing versus rotary wing aircraft. MAAG Philippines requested a U-8 aircraft to replace the present U-6 aircraft based upon the requirement for long overwater flights in instrument conditions. 1

(U) On 31 October 1969, the JCS recommended to ASD(ISA) that the following aircraft and flying hours be approved, since CINCPAC's request was considered the minimum essential. 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Flying Hour Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep of China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 U-8F (A)</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 OH-23G (A)</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 C-47 (N)</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 C-54 (AF)</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep of Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 O-1A (A)</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 U-6A (A)</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 OH-23 (A)</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 U-8D (A)</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 C-47 (AF)</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) By message on 3 December 1969, CINCPAC announced to his subordinate commands the necessity to manage closely the flying hour program for MAP/MASF countries and requested an update of all flying hour programs. His rationale is given below:

... Increasing budget constraints and the resultant requirement for tighter management dictate increased

2. Ibid.
attention to the MASF/MAP flying hour programs. Deviations
(program vs. experience) in the MAP flying hour program of
even a small magnitude impact heavily on programming of
POL, spare parts, etc., and have further direct impact on
operating budgets. To improve the management of MAP
flying hour programs the following procedures will apply
pending change to the CINCPAC MAM....

(U) After he had received responses to this message, CINCPAC passed
them to CINCPACAF for comment. CINCPACAF still had not provided his
comments on these responses by the end of Calendar Year 1969. "Upon
receipt of comments, approval of programs will be given and changes incor-
porated in the MAM." 

Senator Symington's Subcommittee Hearings

(C) On 12 September 1969, SECDEF asked CINCPAC for the answers to
ten questions, all of which pertained to MAP, posed by the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and
Commitments Abroad, "in preparation for their hearings on the Philippines." Because of the short suspense date, CINCPAC requested CHJUSMAGPHIL to
forward his reply to this query "direct SECDEF, info CINCPAC, JCS, and
PACOM components." CHJUSMAGPHIL furnished the information as re-
quested on 17 September 1969. A day earlier, the JCS had made the follow-
ing request of CINCPAC:

... LTGEN Robert H. Warren, Deputy Assistant
Secretary (Military Assistance and Sales), will appear as the
Defense Department witness on this topic during the week
beginning 30 September. In order to assist GEN Warren
during his testimony relating to the Philippines MAP program,
the Asst. SECDEF (ISA) has requested that MGEN George B.
Pickett, Jr., Chief JUSMAG, Philippines, accompany LT-
GEN Warren when he appears before the Subcommittee.

1. Admin CINCPAC 030035Z Dec 69; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the
   month of Dec 69.
2. Admin CINCPAC 190435Z Dec 69.
3. J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
4. SECDEF 8882/122103Z Sep 69.
5. CINCPAC 132304Z Sep 69; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of
   Sep 69.
6. CHJUSMAG PHIL 170900Z Sep 69.
7. JCS 9095/161941Z Sep 69.
In a message on 17 September 1969, CHJUSMAGPHIL acknowledged that he would proceed to Washington, D. C., from Hawaii, following the meeting of the Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Board. Subsequently, before the end of Calendar Year 1969, Senator Symington’s Subcommittee hearings on the U.S. security agreements and commitments pertaining to the Philippines were held and, following the hearings, a debrief was given to the CINCPAC staff by CINCPACREP Philippines. 1

The JCS again asked CINCPAC on 3 October 1969 to make witnesses available for these hearings; the JCS message read that COL Peter T. Russell, USA, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, and:

...Major Thomas are requested by SECDEF to be available in Washington for consultation and review of their prepared statements by 6 October 1969.

3. (S) Colonel Russell and Major Thomas will be required to prepare written statements only on questions relating to military assistance - portions of which were listed in Reference B. Suggest CINCPAC replies to military assistance questions be made available to these witnesses. 2

Two days earlier, SECDEF had requested CINCPAC to supply, as soon as possible (ASAP), "information for use in reply to Symington Committee inquiry on what force levels were supported by MAP and MASF in Laos since 1962 on a year-by-year basis by major unit." 3 CINCPAC provided this information by message on 5 October 1969. 4 Enroute to Washington, D.C., COL Russell and MAJ Thomas stopped at Hq CINCPAC, where CINCPAC provided the additional information requested by the JCS on military assistance. "Upon completion of the Subcommittee hearings, COL Russell returned to CINCPAC for debriefing and provided a copy of the hearing transcript." 5

Reduction in Reporting by MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups

CINCPAC was notified by SECDEF on 3 December 1969 that the Chairman, National Security Council (NSC):

1. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70; FONECON, LCOL Edward J. Leonard, USAF, J5333, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. T. R. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 16 Mar 70.
2. JCS 1448/031829Z Oct 69.
3. SECDEF 1271/012044Z Oct 69.
4. CINCPAC 052115Z Oct 69.
5. J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
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...Under Secretaries' Committee, by memorandum dated 12 Nov 69, has urged DOD (as well as other departments) to reduce reporting from abroad. The following is quoted from cited memo: "The President has ordered a significant reduction in the volume of reporting from abroad. He considers the problem critical, requiring immediate action."

2. In view of the recent personnel reductions in MAAGs, Missions and MilGroups (MAAGs), it is highly essential that a review and reduction in the reporting workload placed on MAAGs be accomplished....

(U) Three days later, CINCPAC requested the PACOM MAAGs to submit a listing—-as of 1 December 1969—of "reports submitted to outside agencies." To accomplish the review and reduction in MAAG reporting workload in accordance with the suspense dates" set by SECDEF, the CINCPAC Comptroller, J72, distributed a memorandum on 8 December 1969 to the divisions and special offices of Hq CINCPAC, requesting them to review these PACOM MAAGs' listings upon receipt at Hq CINCPAC and submit "to J72 prior to 20 January 1970 recommendations for elimination or reduction in frequency of those reports determined to be non-essential or required less frequently."3

Training of U.S. Personnel for MAP Duties

(U) "Upon the discontinuance of the Military Assistance Institute (MAI) on 30 June 1968, SECDEF conducted a study to determine the training requirements for U.S. personnel to be assigned to MAP duties." The end result, as SECDEF announced on 19 December 1968, was that future training for MAP duties would be provided in three phases, all of which were described in detail in last year's history. CINCPAC was tasked to provide a plan for implementation and timing of the new program, along with estimates of requirements for personnel and funding.

(U) On 15 February 1969, CINCPAC forwarded to SECDEF a proposed plan for the implementation of the three-phase training program. In general,

1. SECDEF 5664/031850Z Dec 69.
2. CINCPAC 060303Z Dec 69.
3. J72/Memo/671-69 to J-Staff, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Dec 69, Subj: Reduction in Reporting by MAAGS, Missions and MILGROUPS (MAAGS).

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this plan provided for on-the-job training and orientation in-country for advisor personnel, all of which would be accomplished by the PACOM MAAGs. "Phase II training", explained CINCPAC, "can best be conducted by means of CINCPAC Staff Mobile Training Team (MTT) presenting instruction twice annually at four sites in the PACOM area." During FY 70, approximately 140 MAP personnel in planner and programmer positions would require this training. Training programmers would receive the necessary training at Camp H. M. Smith enroute to their new duty stations or shortly afterwards, while materiel programmers and planners would receive their training in-country. CINCPAC also estimated that the "cost to conduct Phase II training is $39,200 for FY 70." SECDEF's approval was forthcoming on this plan of CINCPAC on 7 March 1969.

(U) Several months later, CINCPAC promulgated CINCPAC Instruction (CINCPACINST) 1540.1, dated 14 July 1969, Subject: Training of U.S. Personnel for Military Assistance Program (MAP) Duties, which "establishes the methods by which U.S. personnel will be trained for the performance of Military Assistance Program duties, and assigns responsibilities for the conduct of the training." As set forth in this instruction, a CINCPAC MTT was organized and developed to present Phase II instruction to U.S. personnel assigned MAP/MAF duties in PACOM. The initial CINCPAC MTT, consisting of eight Hq CINCPAC staff personnel, presented:

...Phase II training at Taipei, Saigon, Bangkok during the period 29 Oct - 15 Nov 1969. Eligible personnel assigned to outlying MAAGs/MILGRPs were invited to participate at either Taipei or Bangkok. A total of 117 students received training during the initial MTT visit.

Administration of PACOM MAP/MAF Training Programs

(U) Early in 1969, reduction in the personnel of the J3A2 MAP Training Branch, Hq CINCPAC, JTD (Joint Table of Distribution), scheduled to become effective on 1 July 1969, prompted an analysis of the assigned MA functions

1. CINCPAC 152358Z Feb 69; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
2. CINCPAC 152358Z Feb 69.
3. SECDEF 4132/072155Z Mar 69.
4. CINCPACINST 1540.1, 14 Jul 69, Subj: Training of U.S. Personnel for Military Assistance Program (MAP) Duties.
5. J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
and responsibilities of the subordinate component commanders in light of the procedures then used by Hq CINCPAC for the administration of training programs. As a result of this evaluation, the decision was made to realign certain MAP/MASF training program administrative procedures. A coordination meeting was held at Hq CINCPAC on 15 May 1969, both to facilitate this realignment and to afford service component command representatives an opportunity to discuss the changes. Here, the changes were explained, as well as discussed, in great detail:

Effective 1 JUL 69, with start of FY 70 training MAP/MASF programs, the following change of procedures will be in effect for administration of subject training programs:

a. Subordinate component commanders will administer and implement current fiscal year respective Service training programs to include associated training matters.

b. Training requests for additions and increases to current fiscal year program will be submitted to subordinate component commanders and CINCPAC. Subordinate component commanders are hereby authorized to approve and/or disapprove such requests for CINCPAC, unless informed otherwise by CINCPAC.

c. Planning and conduct of the annual Service training workshops prescribed in para 8, Chap. T, Part II, Ref A, will be accomplished by subordinate component commanders in accordance with guidance and instructions to be published by CINCPAC.

d. CINCPAC MAP Training Branch as reorganized will provide a joint and country orientation as opposed to the current Service oriented activity. A MAP training coordinator will be designated and charged with overall coordination of detail program data to be incorporated in CINCPAC Data Base files and the data base of ODMA/ISA and Military Departments.¹

(U) By message on 25 July 1969, CINCPAC advised all PACOM MAAGs, military departments, and component commanders that, as of 1 August 1969,

¹ Admin CINCPAC 140106Z May 69; J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
### MAP TRAINING PROGRAM
**FY 1970 & FY 1971**  
**AS OF 1 OCT 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army FY 70</th>
<th>Army FY 71</th>
<th>Navy-Marine Corps FY 70</th>
<th>Navy-Marine Corps FY 71</th>
<th>Air Force FY 70</th>
<th>Air Force FY 71</th>
<th>Total FY 70</th>
<th>Total FY 71</th>
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<td>$45,140,163</td>
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<td>$44,921,104</td>
<td>$43,790,249</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Service Priority  ** Includes MASF Supplement for Korea

**Source:** PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 139.
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Service component commanders would administer and implement the current Fiscal Year MAP/MASF Service training programs, to include associated training matters:

...Additionally, the component commanders would plan and conduct the annual service training workshops. CINCPAC MAP Training Branch will be reorganized to provide a joint and country, vice service, orientation, and will be responsible for overall coordination of detailed program data to be incorporated in the data base files of CINCPAC, ODMA/ISA and military departments. MAP actions which involve English Language Training (ELT), Field Training Services, Language Training Detachments (LTD), contract language training personnel and ELT Mobile Training Teams will be acted on by CINCPAC, based on component commander recommendations. 1

(U) Next month, on 4 August, CINCPAC notified his component commanders of the tentative schedules of the FY 71 training workshops and gave "the sequence of planned action related to the preparation for and conduct of subject workshops." 2 Then, by letter on 18 August 1969, CINCPAC forwarded instructions "to PACOM MAAGs, component commanders, and military departments concerning the revision of future year PACOM Navy/Marine MAP training programs." 3

Personnel Activities

Service Responsibility for Assigning Chiefs/Commanders of MAAGs, MAP Missions and Military Groups (MILGPs)

(U) The JCS 'SM 202-68 of 27 March 1968 provided the selection procedures and factors to be used in recommending Service responsibility for manning Chief/Commander positions in MAAGs, Missions and MILGPs. SM 257-69 of 16 April 1969 rescinds SM 202-68. 4 The 1968 instructions

1. J3A2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69, citing CINCPAC 250045Z Jul 69.
2. J3A2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69, citing CINCPAC ltr ser 3611 of 4 Aug 69.

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required that beginning with Calendar Year 1970, recommendations on positions due to rotate each calendar year were to be forwarded prior to 1 March of the preceding calendar year. "SM 257-69 now requires that beginning with CY 70, commanders of appropriate unified commands review the Service responsibility for each country within the geographical area of command and that the CY 70 review be forwarded to the JCS for approval not later than 1 March 1970." Following the Calendar Year 1970 review, subsequent reviews would be accomplished every three years rather than on an annual basis. As far as Hq CINCPAC was concerned, no action would be "required by SM 257-69 until the CY 70 review and submission of CINCPAC recommendations prior to 1 March 1970."²

Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), Burma, Joint Manpower Program (JMP)

(U) By means of a letter on the last day of 1968, CINCPAC submitted his recommendations on the 1 July 1969 MEDT Burma JMP to the JCS. Subsequently, on 27 February 1969, the JCS approved a FY 70 manpower authorization of 40 spaces for the MEDT Burma JTD to become effective on 1 July 1969.³

MAAG China JMP

(SC) CINCPAC's recommendations on the 1 July 1969 MAAG China JMP were forwarded to the JCS on 10 December 1968. Approval by the JCS of these recommendations on 10 March 1969 resulted in a total manpower authorization of 487 spaces, with 10 of these being non-MAP supported, to become effective on 1 July 1969.⁴

Defense Liaison Group (DLG), Indonesia, JMP

(SC) By letter on 16 December 1968, CINCPAC forwarded his recommendations on the 1 July 1969 DLG Indonesia JMP to the JCS. On 4 February 1969, the JCS approval of this JMP provided for a total of 24 spaces.⁵ Later,

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. JCS 3506/272146Z Feb 69; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
4. JCS 4274/102234Z Mar 69; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
5. JCS 1799/042257Z Feb 69; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
on 22 November 1969, CINCPAC requested a one space increase to the DLG Indonesia JTD. On 15 December 1969, the JCS approved a new authorization of 25 spaces, "subject to the identification of compensatory MAP space from within PACOM resources." 1

**MAAG Korea (Provisional) (PROVMAAG-K) JMP**

(U) CINCPAC submitted his recommendations on the 1 July 1969 PROVMAAG-K JMP to the JCS on 21 December 1968. Approval by the JCS on 11 February 1969 provided for a total authorization of 57 spaces to become effective on 1 July 1969. 2

**JUSMAG Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL) JMP**

(Confidential) By letter on 8 January 1969, CINCPAC forwarded his recommendations on the 1 July 1969 JUSMAGPHIL JMP to the JCS. The JCS response was forthcoming on 28 February 1969. As recommended by CINCPAC, read the message, "FY 1970 manpower authorization is approved for JUSMAG, Philippines JTD effective 1 Jul 69." 3 The JCS approval of the JMP provided for a total authorization of 84 spaces with four spaces non-MAP supported.

**Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Annual Evaluations**

(U) A major, if not the primary, duty of the CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group is to plan, develop, and execute "a program designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the Military Assistance Program and the various Military Assistance Organizations in the PACOM." 4 In fulfilling this mission, CINCPAC PEG officers traveled to seven PACOM countries to make evaluations of their MAP activities during Calendar Year 1969. 5 The following country by country discussion highlights the summaries of evaluations, as well as some of the general observations, made by the PEG during its 1969

1. JCS 6308/151435Z Dec 69; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. JCS 2277/112042Z Feb 69.
3. JCS 3579/282025Z Feb 69; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
5. Intvs, CAPT Brooks W. Setzer, USN, J711, Hq CINCPAC, and COL Curtis Keoka, USAF, J712, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 23 Jan 70.
visits. Of particular unique significance this year, were the PEG visits to Indonesia and Deputy CHJUSMAG, Thailand.

Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), Rangoon, Burma

(6) From 8 through 12 February 1969, a CINCPAC PEG team visited the U.S. MEDT in Rangoon, Burma, contacting each member of the MEDT in the process. During the team’s official call on U.S. Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., the Ambassador expressed the opinion that the MEDT "was well constituted, performing effectively, and was a valuable asset of the Country Team."¹ Being familiar with the status of MAP for Burma, the Ambassador was hopeful that:

...the MEDT could continue its functioning in Burma, and was attuned to the possibility that the MEDT would be withdrawn if a continuation of a MAP for Burma is not consummated. Concerning the latter point, the Ambassador reiterated his views previously provided CINCPAC, summarizing them as follows: both State and the Embassy share the CINCPAC view as to the desirability of a continuing program for Burma, with the crux of the problem still being the means of accomplishing it. The Ambassador is not sanguine about the possibility that the Government of the Union of Burma (GUB) would officially request a follow-on MAP, without at least a prior indication that the United States would favor such an undertaking.²

(6) The CINCPAC PEG team found that a very favorable rapport existed between MEDT personnel and their working level counterparts in the Burma Defense Forces (BDF). In addition, senior Burmese military leaders were attending virtually all of the MEDT social functions to which they were invited. Although strict travel controls continued to be applied by the BDF to MEDT personnel, travel outside of Rangoon for the CINCPAC PEG team had been arranged without the expected "objection or delay by the Ministry of Defense

1. J71/Memo/0012-69, from COL Edgar R. Poole, USA, Chief, PEG, Hq CINCPAC, to JO3, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics, & Administration, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Feb 69, Subj: Staff Visit to the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), Burma. This trip report is the sole source of the following account of the PEG evaluation of Burma MAP. Hereafter cited as Burma MAP PEG.

2. Ibid.
(MOD), including, for the first time, arrangements for travel by Burma Air Force aircraft during a portion of the itinerary. 

The following activities of the BDF were visited by the members of the CINCPAC PEG team: 1st Base Ammunition Depot, Mandalay; Base Ordnance Depot (General Stores), Mandalay; Tenasserim Naval Region, Moulmein; Naval Base, Moulmein; Naval Base Engineering Unit, Moulmein; 503rd Wing, Chante Air Base; Meiktila Air Base. "As was the case during the 1968 visit," commented the staff visit report, "appearance and military bearing of BDF personnel was exceptional. It was noted that personnel outside of Rangoon area appeared more relaxed and talked somewhat more freely than those stationed in Rangoon." At the 1st Base Ammunition Depot, the PEG visitors observed "an active ammunition renovation program underway, which had been instigated by the MEDT and was being guided by a technically well qualified member of the MEDT." As in the previous year, the CINCPAC PEG team made an official call on COL Kyi Maung, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Burmese Army. The meeting was a cordial one, with COL Kyi Maung stating how he welcomed the annual visits of the CINCPAC teams.

Besides the topics already mentioned concerning the CINCPAC PEG team's evaluation of MEDT Burma, as well as the team's detailed comments on the BDF, the following points were considered noteworthy enough for inclusion in the team's report of the visit:

c. (S) Phase II of the Burma MAP was progressing satisfactorily. All requisitions for the Fifth Increment will be completed soon. Definitization of the Sixth, and final, Increment will be completed by 1 March 1969. There had been no CONUS training of BDF personnel since 1964. However, the Burma Navy had recently requested approval of such training by MOD; the probability of MOD approval was considered minimal.

d. (S) A Phase III, or continued military assistance program, for Burma had not been resolved. ... This subject had been raised often by the MEDT with the MOD, with the latest instance on 6 February. Except for indications that continued military assistance was needed and desired by the BDF, an official expression that continued assistance was desired had not been made. In the absence of a firm United States position concerning continued assistance to the GUB, further probes by the MEDT could conceivably become counter-productive.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

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e. (S) The CHMEDT was concerned about the possibility of further decreases in MEDT personnel authorizations before the matter of continued military assistance to Burma was resolved. BALPA I and II had eliminated three personnel spaces from the MEDT. As the bulk of the equipment remaining in Phase II of the program is delivered, retention of the MEDT would not be justified on the basis of equipment deliveries, per se. This could be used by some to support further decreases in MEDT strength to the point where the few personnel remaining would be involved totally with internal administration—an undesirable situation.

f. (U) The MEDT was authorized 22 vehicles, and none were deadlined at the time of the visit. Standardization of sedans (to Chevrolet models) had not been accomplished as desired by the MEDT and as reported by the FY 68 CINCPAC team. In recognition of the difficult spare parts and maintenance conditions existing in Burma, this standardization should be accomplished at an early date.

g. (C) Personnel replacements continued to be troublesome to the MEDT. Delays in replacement arrivals due to visa problems had continued; of the 32 replacements received during the past two years, only four met their predecessors. Since it required about five months to obtain a Burma visa from the CONUS, replacements should be identified at least six months in advance of reporting dates. During the next seven months, four individuals...will be rotating for whom replacements had not been identified. Additionally, as proposed a year ago, in view of the environment in which the MEDT must function, the CHMEDT should have the opportunity to accept or reject senior replacement personnel. Also in recognition of the existing family living conditions, the CHMEDT had instituted a policy of not approving concurrent travel of dependents with incoming replacements when the size of the family exceeded two children.

h. (C) Establishment of the APO (96306) for the MEDT had proved to be a fine morale booster. The APO was functioning smoothly, except for incoming packages for non-diplomatic personnel. Concerning the exception, the U.S. Embassy in close concert with the MEDT was working actively to resolve the issue.

i. (C) The ten M16 rifles to be loaned to GUB by USARPAC had not yet arrived in Burma, and the current location of the rifles was unknown. The associated ammunition had arrived at Bangkok, Thailand and was expected soon in Burma.

j. (U) The MEDT emphasized to the CINCPAC team that support of the MEDT by CINCPAC, its component commands, and all CONUS logistical
supporting agencies had been uniformly splendid to date.

k. (U) The MEDT was aware of the provisions of CINCPACINST 5720.4B concerning coordinating authority for military public affairs. The MEDT reported that all public affairs matters were handled by the U.S. Embassy, and that none were handled directly by the MEDT.

l. (U) Particularly in view of the sensitive environment in which the MEDT must function, the esprit de corps and willingness to get the job done demonstrated by the MEDT were commendable. Arrangements for, and the cooperation and graciousness extended to, the CINCPAC team were outstanding.1

China

(S) During the period from 14 April through 2 May 1969, a CINCPAC PEG evaluation was conducted of MAAG China, whose primary mission "is to influence the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) to maintain and utilize its armed forces in support of U.S. objectives."2 The MAP-supported objectives for the Republic of China (ROC) at this time were as follows:

a. (S) Maintain GRC Armed Forces sufficient, in combination with available U.S. forces, to defend Taiwan, and the Penghu.

b. (S) Maintain a climate in which the United States will continue to enjoy existing and, if required, additional overflight, staging and base rights.

c. (S) To encourage and assist the GRC, within the limits of economic, financial, technological, and scientific feasibility, in the attainment of military "self-sufficiency" in the support and development of those Armed Forces of the ROC considered essential for the attainment of U.S. objectives.3

(S) At Hq CINCPAC, following their evaluation, the CINCPAC PEG staff

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
officers prepared a 189-page final report on the effectiveness of CHMAAG China in carrying out these objectives. Their most significant findings are contained in a section of the report, entitled "Summary of Major Findings," which reads as follows:

"a. (U) MAAG China was functioning effectively in discharging its MAP responsibilities. Of particular note was the continuing effective management of the MAAG and the MAP despite manpower reductions in the MAAG and declining dollar ceilings in the MAP.

"b. (U) The MAP was demonstrably effective in maintaining the combat capability of the GRC Armed Forces.

c. (U) CHMAAG had implemented an excellent personnel/manpower management program in relation to the directed manpower reduction of the BALPA and PBD 412 Programs. As a direct result of this management program, the reduced military and civilian manpower ceilings would have only a minimal affect upon the MAAG's capability to effectively perform its mission.

d. (C) The GRC Armed Forces school system was operating at less than full capacity, was meeting the training requirement of GRC, and was conducting training in an effective and professional manner. All school authorities contacted agreed that training of third country personnel, specifically those from the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) could be accomplished if the GRC approved such a policy and if instruction was conducted in Chinese or English. There existed a considerable potential to shift a portion of the future training requirement for RVNAF students from CONUS to Taiwan to the benefits of the GRC, RVN, and the U.S.

e. (C) The U.S. Special Forces Advisory Detachment was underutilized when considering the advanced state of training of the Chinese Army Special Forces and in relationship to the magnitude of advisory effort afforded other CA units.

f. (U) The 2-1/2 year NCO school program established by CA was most noteworthy. Commanders at all levels were enthusiastic about the program. It was an excellent system to provide the CA with a young, educated NCO to replace the older NCOs.

g. (C) CA combat unit personnel were well trained and qualified with on-hand equipment. However, most of it was of WWII vintage and in the event of mobilization, replacement with newer equipment would initially cause training and supply problems that could result in lower combat effectiveness.
h. (S) The lack of delay, withdrawal, and defensive phases in the infantry battalion annual training test was considered a serious deficiency.

i. (S) The CN concept of conducting all amphibious landings at dawn failed to take into account other optimum conditions such as tide and weather.

j. (C) The CAF tactical fighter forces did not have an effective night attack capability nor was training in fighter weapons delivery at night being conducted.
"k. (U) The CAF navigator assets were limited. No navigator training program was in effect. The introduction of two additional squadrons of C-119s would compound the problem.

"l. (U) The CMC needed continuing command emphasis and standardization of instruction for improvement of its logistical system.

"m. (U) A problem existed in the CAF concerning F-100 main wheel tires. All F-100s world-wide had been modified to take tubeless tires but the CAF had decided against the change. As a result, the CAF needed inner tubes and inner tubes were no longer in production.

"n. (U) The J-57-21 jet engine support for the CAF from CONUS continued to be unsatisfactory.

"o. (U) Through CAF project 'Pick Up,' significant monetary savings had been realized. Idle equipment and supplies had been correctly identified through research and made active as prime items or suitable substitutes. Excesses were redistributed to other CAF bases or evacuated to depot storage.

"p. (U) During the past year, the CAF Logistics Control Center (LCC), utilizing the IBM 360-20 computer, had been established. Manual records were being transferred to machine accounting. The conversion completion target date was 15 May 1969. The LCC represented a significant advance in CAF logistics management.

"q. (U) Damage Control and other low levels of shipboard safety practices in the CN needed continued command attention.

"r. (U) The improvement in shipyard performance was noteworthy as evidenced by improved management techniques and improvement in compliance with overhaul scheduled completion dates.

"s. (U) Material excess to needs of the CN continued to be stocked.

"t. (U) The CA had made considerable progress in maintaining their overaged equipment. Maintenance received command emphasis at all levels.

"u. (U) A critical shortage existed in track assembly and linkage parts for CA engineer dozers.

"v. (U) CA 1st Engineer Command battalions were short tractor-trucks to haul equipment to job sites. This precluded independent operation of the battalions.
"w. (S) Improvements made in CSF arsenals, factories and plants were outstanding.

"x. (S) The current MAP dollar guidelines, in conjunction with the GRC defense budget were marginally adequate to maintain and operate the forces and equipment on hand but inadequate for modernization.

"y. (U) Improvement had been made in the operations, maintenance and support of CAF NAVAIDS facilities.

"z. (U) The 3rd and 4th echelon shops and Base Depot Maintenance Shops in the CA First and Second Field Armies had developed noteworthy capabilities in overhaul and fabrication.

"aa. (S) Adequate auxiliary power generator units at AC&W sites remained a problem.

"bb. (S) Shortage of vehicular radio mounts and mounting kits in some CA units adversely effected their mobility and command and control.

"cc. (U) The expansion of the Mission Progress Evaluation System (MPES) which had been implemented by the MAAG as an internal management tool and information system was a significant improvement."1

Indonesia

(S) The abortive Communist coup of late 1965 began the final elimination of President Sukarno and his pro-Communist era, which came on 13 March 1967, when Sukarno was removed from office and General Suharto was made the Acting President until elections could be held. "Within less than a month, on 4 April 1967, Indonesia officially agreed to a resumption of MAP materiel grant aid after a suspension of several years."2 As a result, the first PEG evaluation of Indonesia MAP, following reinstatement of the program, took place during Calendar Year 1969; the last previous PEG evaluation of Indonesia

1. Ibid., pp. 2-4.
MAP had been conducted from 5 through 11 November 1963, with its final report being published on 24 February 1964. 1

(S) During 1969, the U.S. military assistance for Indonesia was designed to assist in the achievement of the following objectives:

a. To encourage the Indonesian Government to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia's neighbors and with the United States.

b. To encourage the Indonesian Government to pursue responsible economic and fiscal policies.

c. To give tangible support to the Government's use of Indonesian Armed Forces in its civic rehabilitation program.

d. To develop and strengthen contacts between Indonesian military personnel and their U.S. counterparts. 2

(S) A CINCPAC PEG evaluation of the Defense Liaison Group (DLG), Indonesia, and the Indonesia MAP was conducted from 1 through 5 December 1969. 3 Before departure, an exit briefing was conducted with the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Francis J. Galbraith, by COL Christopher R. Keegan, USA, Chief, CINCPAC PEG Team. The Ambassador concurred in the team's summary of significant findings and expressed specific interest "in improving the civic action capabilities of the Indonesian police force and the Armed Forces sea and air transportation means." 4

1. Intvs, CAPT Brooks W. Setzer, USN, J711, Hq CINCPAC, and COL Curtis Kekoa, USAF, J712, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 23 Jan 70; CINCPAC Command History 1964. Appendix D, p. 453; FONECON, LCOL Mervin E. Meister, USA, J5321, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 23 Jan 70; Intvs, YNC J. P. Benjamin, USN, and SSGT Richard B. Harrison, USA, both in the Office of COL Christopher R. Keegan, USA, J71, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 23 Jan 70.


3. J71/Memo/003-70 to JO45, 22 Jan 70, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, with two Enclosures.

The following, which will be a significant portion of the final PEG report that was in the process of being readied for the printers at the end of 1969, "summarizes the major findings of this evaluation that affect the performance of the Defense Liaison Group and the Military Assistance Program in Indonesia."¹

"a. (S) The Defense Liaison Group (DLG) was effective, although limited in its capability to provide advice and assistance to MAP-supported field units engaged in Civic Action missions. Excellent rapport and relationships had been developed by the DLG and existed between the DLG, the U.S. Ambassador, the Embassy Staff, and the Civic Action Directorates of the Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters. Considerable improvement was noted in DLG administrative procedures, policy and guidance since the assignment of the present Chief; however, there was a backlog in filing of classified documents. A modest increase in qualified officer personnel was required to ensure accomplishment of the DLG mission. This increase should concentrate on providing training and logistical officer expertise to assist the Civic Action units of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

"b. (S) Indonesian Armed Forces units engaged in Civic Action MAP-supported projects were ineffective, with minor exceptions, due to MAP-funding limitations, overaged equipment, lack of spare parts, inadequate training in supply and maintenance skills, indiscriminate dispersion of equipment (Army) to other than MAP-supported units, lack of commercial consumables to the Armed Forces by the Government of Indonesia, and an antiquated personnel management system. To alleviate the situation and maintain a low-profile of U.S. presence and equipment:

"(1) (S) The country team should submit recommendations for a modest increase in the current MAP ceiling to support training, both CONUS and in-country, and to provide adequate logistical support for existing MAP-supported equipment within the Indonesian Armed Forces.

"(2) (S) Mobile Training Teams should be included in the MAP Training Program in the skill areas of Aviation Maintenance, Supply Management, Personnel Management, and allied areas. These teams should focus on the service unit level, i.e., officer and NCO level, where the need appears most critical to improve and enhance the capability of the Indonesian Armed Forces to accomplish the MAP-supported units engaged in Civic Action missions.

1. J71/Memo/003-70 to JO45, 22 Jan 70, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, with two Enclosures.
"(3) (S) 04, 05 level CONUS officer training was required in the maintenance and logistics management areas.

"(4) (S) Orientation tours and Senior Foreign Officer courses should be emphasized at the senior officer level to favorably influence these officers with modern U.S. management system concepts.

"(5) (S) Planning for future years, FY 71-76 should be oriented to emphasize training (CONUS, off-shore U.S., and in-country), and to provide a modest increase in major end-items of equipment to progressively improve the Indonesian Armed Forces capability for Civic Action in transportation (ground, sea, and air), logistics support, engineering, and communications.

Korea

(S) The military assistance mission of COMUS Korea "is to assist the Republic of Korea (ROK) in developing Armed Forces capable of maintaining internal security against Communist directed or inspired subversion and insurgency or other forces hostile to U.S. interests and, with U.S. combat and logistic support, deterring and resisting external aggression." From 1 through 19 September 1969, a CINCPAC evaluation of Korea MAP was conducted "to examine the progress of the MAP, determine the effectiveness of the MAP, assess the effectiveness of the military assistance organization in Korea, and to point out deficiencies that warranted command attention." The MAP-supported objectives for ROK at this time were as follows:

a. To maintain Republic of Korea (ROK) forces sufficiently strong to resist, (1) with U.S. air and Naval support, if necessary, any aggression by North Korea, and (2) in conjunction with U.S. forces, as required, aggression from Communist China.

1. Ibid.; in the printed final report, this information can be found in Ltr, CINCPAC to CHUSDLG Indonesia, 10 Feb 70, Subj: Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program in Indonesia, with Encl: Final Report of the CINCPAC FY 70 Evaluation of the MAP in Indonesia, pp. 3 and 4.
2. Ltr, CINCPAC to COMUSKOREA, 18 Nov 69, Subj: Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program in Korea, with Encl: Final Report of the CINCPAC FY 70 Evaluation of the MAP in Korea, p. 1. Hereafter cited as Korea MAP PEG.
3. Ibid.
b. To support the development of ROK forces in South Vietnam.

c. To help create a viable Korean economic and social structure.

d. To maintain a climate in which the United States will continue to enjoy existing and, if required, additional overflight, staging and base rights. 1

(U) The senior U.S. military commander in Korea has the unique distinction that he wears three hats as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUS Korea), and Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army. He is responsible to CINCPAC for MAP affairs within Korea in his role as COMUS Korea. To fulfill this mission, COMUS Korea has organized elements of his command in a unique fashion. 'There is no centralized Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), per se, in Korea as is usually found in many MAP countries and typically expected by most of those involved in MAP affairs at all echelons. COMUS Korea agencies for the administration of the MAP in Korea...are the Provisional Military Assistance Group, Korea (PROVMAAG-K), an Army Advisory Group (KMAg), a Naval Advisory Group (NAG), and an Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG). 2 In brief, PROVMAAG-K is charged with the overall surveillance of Korea MAP, the integration of service component programs into a single MAP for Korea, the providing of advisory service to higher echelon ROK organizations, and the assisting in the formulation of the ROK defense budget, while each of the service advisory organizations is responsible for MAP affairs directly to its respective service component command which, in turn, is responsible to COMUS Korea in MAP matters.

(5) As is customary, the PEG team published a final report following its evaluation of Korea MAP. At the front of this 252-page document was located a new section, entitled "Summary of Major Findings." This new section provided not only a summary, but a complete recap of all findings and recommendations listed in Part II of the report, including COMUS Korea's and CINCPAC's responses thereto. The section summarized the more significant observations of this evaluation, which affected the performance of the military advisory organization and the Korea MAP. 3 This summary read as follows:

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
a. (U) PROVMAAG-K and the service advisory groups were functioning effectively. Since the FY 69 MAP evaluation of Korea, PROVMAAG-K had developed command management review procedures for portraying the status of important programs affecting the over-all MAP in Korea. In view of PROVMAAG-K's responsibility for over-all surveillance of the MAP and the integration of service component programs into a single MAP for Korea, the command semiannual review has provided a valuable management tool for the accomplishment of the PROVMAAG-K mission. The service advisory groups had not developed similar formal procedures for monitoring the status of their respective portions of the MAP; however, it was considered that periodic, over-all reviews by service advisory groups of their respective programs that provide input to command review would contribute to over-all mission effectiveness. The mission dedication and professionalism displayed by all advisory personnel and the fine rapport which had been developed with their respective ROK Armed Forces counterparts were outstanding.

b. (U) The MAP for Korea, within current funding limitations, has contributed effectively to the maintenance of an adequate defensive posture for the ROK Armed Forces. There was a strong feeling of confidence and determination that enemy intrusion and infiltration could be detected and defeated. This feeling of confidence was prevalent throughout the ROK Armed Forces. However, there are areas where further improvement in ROK Armed Forces operations were required. These are addressed generally below....

c. (S-NOFORN) Current MAP dollar guidelines and ROK Defense Budget were not adequate to sustain properly the present ROK Armed Forces as well as support related and supplemental programs designed to provide for counterinfiltration operations, for minimum force structure increases to ROK forces, and for operating costs of the ROK forces. In light of the additional operational requirements generated by the infiltration threat to the Republic of Korea, judicious management of available resources was required to meet the varying requirements of the Korean environment.

d. (U) The problem of delays at the POE of KMAG replacements, resulting from late receipt of valid passports and visas, addressed in the 1967 and 1968 Evaluation Reports, had not been solved.

e. (S) Reduction of 414 positions in 1968-1969 due to the BALPA program, followed by the President's ten percent impending reduction of another 248 U.S. military positions will impact adversely on the advisory effort, the COMUSK MAP, and the operational mission. Skillful personnel management and organizational tailoring will be required to minimize adverse effects.

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f. (S) Support functions assigned to KMAG, particularly at Detachment 'L' and its three sub-detachments, detracted from the advisory mission. The 166 positions (16.4 percent of total authorized) involved in support functions (messes, clubs, motor pools, caretakers) were considered to be an excessive number involved in non-advisory functions so as to warrant close scrutiny and evaluation by COMUS Korea.

g. (S) Certain reductions in spaces in the MAAG Korea can be accommodated without undue degradation of the military assistance advisory organization capability to perform its advisory, operational control, and surveillance missions. In light of the impending reduction mentioned in subparagraph 2e, above, and in view of the tense situation resulting from North Korean provocations, COMUS Korea should be permitted sufficient time to review the present military assistance advisory organization in the ROK with the view toward proposing a revised organization to accommodate these reductions, to assure continuity in the advisory effort, and to maintain mission effectiveness.

h. (S) The Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) was an important program in assisting US-ROK relations, in helping the ROK from a grass-roots, socio-economic point of view, and in countering North Korean subversive attempts. It was an extremely valuable asset to the U.S. unit commander.

i. (S) The ROKG could absorb an increased portion of the won costs of defending the ROK without a significant detriment to its economic growth. The proper timing of an approach to the ROKG to gain their approval to modify the provisions of the Brown Memorandum and to assume a larger share of their defense burden depended primarily on political considerations.

j. (U) The quarterly DCSLOG ROKA Review and Analysis briefings were considered an effective means for conducting joint US/ROK reviews of the MAP and for initiating actions to effect improvements in the ROKA logistics system.

k. (S-NOFORN) The tactical mobility of ROK ground forces, the firepower capability of small infantry units, and the combat engineering capability were being steadily degraded by a combination of factors. These included: vehicle and equipment shortages; age of the vehicle fleet and individual and crew-served weapons; inadequacy of funding for and availability of repair/spare parts; and funding limitations for vehicles, equipment, and weapon modernization.
"l. (G) Camouflage training and command emphasis on tactical cover and deception techniques was required throughout the ROK Armed Forces.

"m. (G) Funding limitations for modernization of the ROKA Air Defense Artillery equipment, called for in modification work orders, will cause incompatibility between ROK Air Defense and U.S. equipment.

"n. (G) The ROKA Explosive Ordnance Demolition (EOD) capability was inadequate. Only 25 percent of the required CONUS-trained personnel and specialized tool sets were on hand.

"o. (G) Throughout ROK Army units, the misuse of field wire for fixed distribution systems had contributed to a severe shortage of field wire. Manual switchboards supporting major headquarters (FROKA, SROKA, and LBC) prevented expansion of those facilities and would lead eventually to congestion and degradation of telephone service. Communications support for C-1 forces created deficiencies in supporting units which reduced the supporting units' capability to react in emergency combat operations.

"p. (G) The training effectiveness of Navy crews in gunnery and anti-submarine warfare was being degraded by the lack of fire control training equipment and the lack of command emphasis on the use of the ASW Dual Ship Attack Teacher.

"q. (G) The current ROKN ships overhaul policy was deficient in not keeping pace with increased operations.

"r. (G) The Navy Fleet Communications was still in need of a properly located antenna installation. This was a continuing deficiency noted in the FY 69 Evaluation Report.

"s. (S-NOFOR) Establishment of the Direct Air Support Element (DASE) of the ROKAF Tactical Air Control System (TACS) to effectively employ close air support in a combat environment had not progressed beyond the planning stage.

"t. (U) The number of priority 03 through 06 requisitions being submitted to the ROKAF AMC Supply and Transportation Depot was excessive. This practice caused unwarranted delay in processing of requisitions that legitimately required expedited action.

"u. (U) Appropriate funding support had not been taken for the operations and maintenance functions to support planned expansion of the Air
Force long lines system. Non-support of operational and maintenance requirements would result in degradation of the system.\textsuperscript{1}

Philippines

\textsuperscript{1} The previous CINCPAC PEG evaluation of JUSMAG Philippines was conducted from 18 November through 5 December 1968. Its purpose, like the one in 1969, "was to examine the progress of the MAP, determine the effectiveness of the MAP, assess the effectiveness of the JUSMAG, and to point out deficiencies that warranted increased command attention."\textsuperscript{2} During 1969, the U.S. MAP-supported objectives for the Philippines were: (a) "To support the retention of U.S. base rights in the Philippines"; (b) "To develop and maintain military/paramilitary forces with a primary mission of maintaining the internal security of the Philippines"; (c) "To support a capability to deploy limited Philippine forces within the SEATO area for mutual defense tasks"; and (d) "To improve the capability of the Philippine armed forces to provide their own logistic support".\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{2} A CINCPAC PEG team conducted an evaluation of JUSMAG Philippines and the Philippine MAP during the period 7-19 December 1969.\textsuperscript{4} For the first time in any evaluation, COL Christopher R. Keegan, USA, Chief, CINCPAC PEG team, provided both an entrance and an exit briefing for the Chief of Staff, AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines), and the Philippine Service commanders. The entrance briefing concerned the mission, purpose, and objectives of the evaluation, while the exit briefing summarized the team's significant findings as pertaining to the host-country units. Both briefings were received with interest and enthusiasm and set the stage for the evaluation and subsequent corrective action to be implemented by the AFP to improve the MAP-supported forces in FY 70-71.\textsuperscript{5}

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. Korea MAP PEG, pp. 3-6.
\item 4. J71/Memo/003-70 to JO45, 22 Jan 70, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, with two Enclosures.
\end{itemize}
The following, which will be a significant portion of the final PEG report that was in the process of being readied for the printers at the end of 1969, "summarizes the major findings of the evaluation which affect the performance of the military advisory organization and the Military Assistance Program in the Philippines":

"a. (S) The JUSMAG was effective in discharging its MAP responsibilities. Operating provisionally under a reorganization, organized along joint functional lines, the JUSMAG had improved efficiency and effectiveness. The rapport of JUSMAG advisors with their counterparts in the AFP was evident at all echelons of command and had contributed significantly toward the continued improvement of the AFP.

"b. (S-NOFORN) The MAP had been effective in furthering the continued development of the AFP at a moderate rate. As in past years, MAP dollars and the GOP defense budget were insufficient to fully support MAP objectives; however, improvement in forces and equipment were noted in all services. Shortfall throughout the AFP had continued to increase. With the imposed ten percent reduction in the AFP budget ordered by the GOP, few if any improvements in the acquisition of investment items can be foreseen except those that were MAP funded. The programmed reduction in the purchase of consumables for the AFP with MAP dollars will further limit the ability of the AFP to modernize and expand. A continued slow rate of growth can be expected.

"c. (C-NOFORN) From the standpoint of organization, current strength and qualifications of personnel, the JUSMAGPHIL was effective. Fiscal year 1971 personnel authorization had been established at 72 personnel and implementation of the overseas reduction program of the President of the U.S. would further reduce the authorization to 64. Reduction of the JUSMAG JTD below a personnel authorization of 75 would have an adverse effect on the advisory effort, impair the capability of the Chief, JUSMAG to administer the MAP and carry out proper administration of the JUSMAG staff and headquarters activities. Administration in JUSMAGPHIL was being accomplished in an effective, efficient and economical manner.

"d. (C-NOFORN) Redesignation of the JUSMAG Philippines Constabulary (PC) advisory function to that of Field Advisory Detachments had expanded the role of the advisor in the field, and had proved effective. One Field Advisory Detachment was located in each PC Zone/Military Area (MA) and the Detachments functions had been increased to include responsibility for coordinating activities with all service elements of the AFP located within the respective Zones/Areas. The detachments monitored PA and PC training activities, coordinated and expedited logistics matters, furnished
technical advice and assistance in law enforcement matters to the Commanding Generals of the respective PCZs, and served as JUSMAGPHIL representatives to PAF and PN elements within their geographical areas of responsibility. This revision had resulted in an efficient utilization of the limited number of available JUSMAG advisory personnel.

"e. (U) The establishment by the JUSMAG of the Joint Plans and Programs Division was a positive functional and effective step in improving the JUSMAG capability in this area.

"f. (U) The Comptroller JUSMAG was performing his duties in an effective manner. Personnel assigned to the Comptroller's office were highly motivated and knowledgeable. Particularly noteworthy was the proposed Review and Analysis System developed by the Comptroller which would augment the present management system. However, follow-up action was not being accomplished to insure that changes were made to Army MAP training appropriations for Philippine Student Training and prompt action was not being taken to deobligate unexpended funds.

"g. (S-NOFORN) The size of the Armed Force of the Philippines (AFP) was not in consonance with MAP-supported strength objectives due to failure of the Republic of the Philippines Government to provide sufficient funding. Decisions on personnel actions were centralized at the highest level of government which resulted in undue political influence and slow processing of personnel matters that had an adverse effect on sound personnel management. Due to retirements of World War II veterans during the next few years, the combat experience level of commanders in the AFP will be appreciably lowered and will result in a loss of the strongly U.S. oriented attitude which now exists at the top levels of the AFP.

"h. (U) The AFP proposed plan for reorganization of the GHQ staff and the services, to include consolidation and integration of logistical activities at a joint level, was significant in that it demonstrated an awareness by the AFP that economy and more efficient and responsive operations could be achieved through the application of sound management techniques.

"i. (U) Establishment by the AFP of the Office of Foreign Military Assistance (OFMA) as a focal point of all AFP military assistance programming and requirements was a major accomplishment.

"j. (U) AFP vehicles deadlined for administrative purposes and the on shelf maintenance of equipment and repair parts in warehouses and supply points were not being preserved or maintained. There was no evidence of an in-storage/on shelf/administrative maintenance program in any AFP
maintenance area or storage facility visited except in the III Military Area Supply Point.

"k. (U) The long lines communications requirements for the Armed Forces of the Philippines exceeded the capability of existing long lines system. However, a plan had been developed by the Communications Electronics Group, General Headquarters, AFP, to expand the system in order to meet its current and projected requirements. Approval of the plan by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and full support of CHJUSMAG will be required to insure its implementation.

"l. (U) The AFPSC Depot Mobile Maintenance Teams for on-site repair of vehicles had effectively contributed to reducing the downtime of equipment and had produced significant savings in transportation costs.

"m. (U) Improvements in procedures, storage and inventory control by AFPSC, PAF and PN supply centers were evidence of outstanding command attention, effective management, and advisory assistance.

"n. (U) The activation of the 52nd Engineer Brigade Headquarters in Cagayan de Oro, to provide command and control of the six Engineer Combat Battalions (ECBs) located throughout the 3rd and 4th Military Areas was a significant improvement over the previous organization of one brigade headquarters of 10 ECBs. Effective span of command and control were enhanced by this action.

"o. (U) The Naval Training Command was effectively training PN personnel for the Naval Operating Force within the limitations of facilities and equipment available. Training aids and electronics training equipment required modernization. There was a requirement to establish Coast Guard peculiar training courses for officers and enlisted men.

"p. (C) The USAF and PAF controllers at the Air Defense Control Center at Clark AB were not current on Rules of Engagement nor familiar or knowledgeable in the armament configuration of alert aircraft.

"q. (U) The PAF, utilizing exceptionally effective managerial techniques, revised flying and technical training courses and schedules had shown significant progress towards solving its training problems. The PAF was meeting its programmed flight training requirements.

"r. (C) MAP engineer construction equipment assigned to the 51st Engineer Construction Brigade was not being effectively utilized due to a lack of funding of approved projects.
s. (U) The Cavite Naval Shipyards was performing its mission effectively. Command emphasis was apparent and effective at all supervisory levels and the working mechanics were highly motivated. Work production was at a new high level - several special projects had been undertaken during the past year in addition to the heavy scheduled workload. Additionally, the shipyard had achieved the capability of overhauling all PN ships.

t. (C) The Naval Ordnance Depot, Caballo Island, was marginally effective in performing its mission. The unsatisfactory conditions existing at the time of the FY69 evaluation had not been corrected.

u. (C) The Harbor Defense Unit was ineffective in carrying out its mission. The electronic detection systems were inoperative and the unit was in caretaker status.

v. (C) The acquisition of three additional LSTs by the PN in November 1969 had significantly increased the lift capability available to the AFP for the logistical support of the outlying island military installations and civil action projects. This equipment should provide the Marine Battalion with an amphibious operational training capability.

w. (U) The PAF had a positive and professional attitude at all levels of command and a strong Zero Defects Program in being. PAF maintenance and supply support was effective and had made significant progress since the FY69 evaluation.

x. (C) The 5th FW, 205th CW and 100th TW did not have adequate corrosion control treatment of painting facilities. The field maintenance facilities of the 205th CW and 100th TW were in a provisional location and were in poor condition. Lack of adequate field maintenance facilities and equipment was hampering the maintenance effort.

y. (C) All phases of support to the 505th Rescue Squadron require command attention. Maintenance and supply support of the HU-16, HH-34, and UH-19 was below acceptable standards.

z. (U) Communication-electronics test equipment calibration assistance was required by the Philippine Navy shipyard electronics calibration shop. None of the Philippine Navy's test equipment had been calibrated.

1. J71/Memo/003-70 to JC45, 22 Jan 70, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, with two Enclosures; in the printed final report, this information can be found in Ltr, CINCPAC to CHJUSMACPHIL, 10 Feb 70, Subj: Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program, Philippines, with Encl: Final Report of CINCPAC FY 70 Evaluation of the MAP, Philippines, pp. 3-6.
Thailand

A CINCPAC evaluation of Thailand MAP was conducted from 3 through 21 February 1969. Its purpose was to evaluate the progress of the MAP for Thailand, determine the effectiveness of the JUSMAGTHAI and status of host country activities, ascertain conditions reflected in previous audit and evaluation reports, and to highlight deficiencies that merit command attention. Recognizing the dual function of the military commander, who was both COMUSMAGTHAI and CHJUSMAGTHAI, the CINCPAC PEG team addressed itself to that portion of its mission dealing primarily with the MAP for Thailand.

During this evaluation, the CINCPAC PEG team members visited various military organizations and installations in Thailand, as well as consulting with numerous significant U.S. and Thai individuals. Approximately a month after the team's departure from Thailand, its 208-page final report was published by Hq CINCPAC. The more pertinent findings of this CINCPAC PEG team were contained in the section of this report, entitled "Summary of Major Findings," which is quoted verbatim as follows:

a. (U) In the period since the FY 68 evaluation, the JUSMAG had continued to function effectively. Mission dedication, motivation, professionalism, and rapport achieved with Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) personnel by JUSMAG advisor personnel were particularly noteworthy. Although some facets of JUSMAG operations merited attention, such as establishment of a ground safety program and an increased comptroller advisory effort, within the context of the prime mission of the JUSMAG, it was performing effectively, and reflected strong command leadership in a sensitive, dynamic and important environment.

b. (U) The Military Assistance Program (MAP) for Thailand had been effective in assisting in the proper development of the RTARF as an effective and responsive military establishment. Although improvements in the RTARF were still necessary, and salient areas are highlighted in subsequent findings and in Part II of this report, the RTARF had made significant

1. Ltr, CINCPAC to CHJUSMAGTHAI, 25 Apr 69, Subj: CINCPAC FY 69 Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program for Thailand, with Encl: Final Report of the CINCPAC FY 69 Evaluation of the MAP, Thailand. This letter and accompanying final report served as the sources for the information in the following account of the CINCPAC PEG evaluation of Thailand MAP. Hereafter cited as Thailand MAP PEG.
progress since the FY 68 evaluation in the face of serious personnel and budgetary limitations.

c. (U) Construction and operation at Kanchanaburi of the camp for the Royal Thai Army (RTA) Overseas Replacement Training Center, and the assembly, training and timely deployment to Vietnam of increments of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) had been a notable achievement of the JUSMAG and of the entire RTA.

d. (S-NOFORN) Immediate and long range benefits accruing from annual MAP bilateral planning with the RTARF merited continued annual discussions regarding composition of the annual tri-service priority list.

e. (C) DOD MAP guidance to the JUSMAG had been adequate, although significantly influenced by U.S. Embassy interpretations thereof. Delay in receipt by the JUSMAG of MAP planning guidance for FY 70-75 would create a difficult situation should major changes be made to the guidance now expected to be promulgated.

f. (U) Procedures being followed in the transfer of title of incoming MAP materiel at Sattahip were not in accordance with DOD instructions.

g. (U) Supply support provided the JUSMAG by the 501st Field Depot of USARSUPTHAI had continued to be inadequate; this inadequate support was addressed also in the FY 68 Evaluation Report.

h. (U) The study directed by CINCPAC on 26 August 1967 on the subject of host country support of the JUSMAG, which stemmed from an Army Audit Agency report (PA 67-13), still had not been developed by the JUSMAG. Work was commenced on the study as a result of the FY 69 evaluation.

i. (C) Current MAP dollar guidelines, in conjunction with the host country defense budget, were only minimally adequate to maintain the forces and equipment on hand within the RTARF and for only modest modernization of relatively low priced replacement materiel.

j. (C) Initiation of Project 33 by the RTARF at the instigation of the JUSMAG was a good step forward in improving RTARF management of its force structure. Supporting plans (data concerning personnel, logistical and financial support of the force reflected in the basic project) were needed to enhance further RTARF management efforts.

k. (U) Functioning of the Military Assistance Program Evaluation Team, Thailand had continued to influence an increasing command interest
throughout the RTARF in matters concerning operational readiness of military units.

"l. (G) A combination of U.S. Integrated Communications System (ICS), MAP-provided tactical equipment, and Thai-owned commercially purchased equipment provided for adequate command and control of the RTARF. Without the U.S. facilities, the remaining command and control facilities would not be adequate.

"m. (G) Throughout the RTARF, units were short of authorized manning levels, due in part to the establishment of the RTAVF and Royal Thai Government budgetary limitations. Retention of skilled personnel within the RTARF had continued to be troublesome.

"n. (U) Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) controlled Joint Helicopter Maintenance and Supply Activity had begun. However, facilities needed by the activity would not be completed until mid-1970.

"o. (U) Considerable progress had been achieved by the RTARF in the classification and disposal of excesses since the FY 68 evaluation; however, large quantities remained, particularly in the depots.

"p. (U) The RTARF was not emphasizing properly the utilization of CONUS-trained personnel as instructors upon their return from the CONUS. Technical training being received by RTARF personnel was of a high standard, but the numbers being produced did not meet requirements.

"q. (G) Vehicle deadline rates, although considerably improved since the FY 68 evaluation, remained too high for effective unit combat operational capability.

"r. (U) The RTARF lacked a C-E ground safety program.

"s. (U) Efforts of the Army Advisory Group concerning standardization of engineer equipment within the RTA were commendable. Attention should be devoted by the JUSMAG to a comparable effort involving other categories of equipment.

"t. (U) When fully established, the Second Army Support Command (II ASCOM) should facilitate and improve significantly logistic support of RTA units in northeast Thailand. Construction of the physical plant for the II ASCOM was progressing, and facilities to be provided appeared to have been planned well.
"u. (U) There had been measurable improvements in training conducted by RTA units since the FY 68 evaluation, particularly in unit training and in the conduct of annual training tests for units up to battalion size.

"v. (☑) Repair and maintenance of facilities within the RTA had not improved significantly. The RTA budget for this repair and maintenance in FY 68 met only 19 percent of the requirement.

"w. (☑) Replacement with RTA troops of the USA personnel operating the Overseas Replacement Training Center (ORTC) at Camp Kanchanaburi merited close monitoring by the JUSMAG. The phase down of USA personnel had been scheduled to be completed by June 1969. At the time of the evaluation, only about one-half of the RTA complement for the ORTC was on board.

"x. (☑) The care, handling, preservation and storage of RTA ammunition was poor at most units visited during the evaluation.

"y. (☑) Royal Thai Navy (RTN) shipboard maintenance was generally unsatisfactory in hull, machinery and electronics. This was due in part to the extreme age of most of the ships, inadequate command attention, and the RTN policy of shore-based maintenance responsibility.

"z. (☑) The RTN Dockyard needed an aggressive internal management program to improve its functioning. The Dockyard also required implementation of an effective industrial safety program.

"aa. (U) Although the facilities for the RTN ammunition depot at Sattahip had been completed a year ago, the RTN had not accepted the structures for use. Full use of this facility at Sattahip should be instituted by the RTN in the near future.

"ab. (U) The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) had made significant strides in several areas since the FY 68 evaluation, i.e.: operationally ready and utilization rates for aircraft had improved; functioning of the Logistic Control Center was improving logistics management; operations of the scheduled logistics flights within country were facilitating supply and maintenance.

"ac. (☑) Progress was being made by the RTAF in improving security at RTAF air bases, but progress had been slow and much remained to be done.

"ad. (☑) The RTAF needed an effective equipment management system to improve its supply, maintenance and accounting operations.
ae. (Q) RTAF weapons controllers at the AC&W sites were not receiving sufficient live intercept training to become and/or remain proficient.

af. (Q) The last of three air conditioning units at the Don Muang RTAFB Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory (PMEL) failed 13 January 1969. At the time of the evaluation, repair work had not begun. Without the air conditioning, the PMEL could not function properly. Continued work stoppage at the facility could have significantly adverse affects on the RTAF flight mission accomplishment.

ag. (Q) A needed reorganization of the Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) had been approved, but not implemented at the time of the evaluation. Early implementation of the reorganization should result in marked improvements within the RTMC."

Deputy CHJUSMAG, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI)

(Q) During the same time frame that the evaluation of Thailand MAP was being conducted, a CINCPAC PEG team also did the same for the MAP activities of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI. All of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI's operations being conducted in Thailand were covered, but pertinent activities within Laos were restricted to a limited evaluation.

(Q) As in previous years, the enforced geographical separation of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI "from the country for which he bore MAP responsibility had continued to present unusual problems in military assistance planning and programming. The military assistance advisory effort and determination of MAP requirements had continued to be the purview of the Military Attaches and the Requirements Office (RO)/USAID in Laos under the direct supervision of the U.S. Ambassador."

At the recommendation of the CINCPAC PEG team in 1967, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI had initiated, developed and submitted to

1. Ibid.
2. Ltr, CINCPAC to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, 24 Apr 69, Subj: Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program, DEPCHJUSMAG, Thailand, with Encl: Final Report of the CINCPAC FY 69 Evaluation of the MAP, DEPCHJUSMAG, Thailand, p. 2. This final report, hereafter cited as DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI MAP PEG, is the source for the following account, unless otherwise cited.
3. Ibid., p. 8.
CINCPAC a study for an improved Laos MAP management system, but this study had not yet been approved.\footnote{1}

\[8\] The mission of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI \textit{"is to assist, through authorized channels, the Royal Laotian Government Armed Forces, Neutralists and paramilitary forces to attain and maintain the capability to maintain internal security against Communist inspired subversion and insurgency and to provide maximum feasible resistance to Communist inspired external aggression."}\footnote{2} The purpose of the CINCPAC PEG team's evaluation was to determine the effectiveness of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, \textit{"evaluate to the extent possible the progress of the MAP, ascertain conditions reflected in previous audit and evaluation reports, and to highlight deficiencies that merit command attention."}\footnote{3}

\[8\] The recommendations made by the CINCPAC PEG team in its final report covered the more significant findings of the team and are reproduced below:

\textit{"(U) That DEPCHIEF establish an active ground safety program in consonance with applicable military and industrial safety standards."

\textit{"(U) That CINCPAC recommend to the JCS that the USA and USAF Attaches in Laos be directed to consult with the DEPCHIEF on matters involving their military assistance advisory functions."

\textit{"(U) That CINCPAC recommend to the JCS that the function in Laos of military assistance advice on ground force matters to the Royal Laotian Army and to the U.S. Ambassador be centralized as the responsibility of the USA Attaché."

\textit{"(U) That DEPCHIEF review current Laotian H-34 pilot training to assure that requirements for such pilots are being satisfied."

\textit{"(U) That DEPCHIEF take immediate necessary action to have the height of PEPPERGRINDER ammunition bunker barricades raised to conform to established safety criteria."

\textit{"(U) That DEPCHIEF recommend to RO/USAID that the RLA be urged to program sufficient labor funds for uninterrupted uniform production at the Quartermaster Central Depot."

3. Ibid.

\[\text{SECRET}\]

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"(U) That DEPCHIEF review internal budgeting and funding procedures, with the objective of assuring that all programmed requirements are included in future budget estimates.

"(U) That DEPCHIEF request the USARSUPTHAI 47th Finance Office to furnish a copy of all disbursement vouchers citing DEPCHIEF funds to assist in improved DEPCHIEF fund accounting and control.

"(U) That DEPCHIEF arrange for the storage of the Top Secret safe combination in a secure location that would permit access to the Top Secret safe in an emergency.

"(U) That DEPCHIEF (a) develop a JTA applicable to its current mission, (b) request CINCPAC assistance, as required, in developing the JTA and in securing authorization for vehicles on hand in the unit, and (c) establish coordination with USARSUPTHAI to resolve the reported inadequate supply support provided by the Self-Service Supply Center in Bangkok and the 501st Field Depot.

"(U) That DEPCHIEF ensure that unit fund property records are maintained in accordance with applicable regulations. "

1. Ibid., pp. 6-30 passim.
SECTION III - COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

Burma

The last increment of the material assistance to Burma was completed in FY 68. Present assistance is limited to a $200,000 program for training only. Although this is a small program, it is considered very important. While Burma adheres to a strict neutrality, the Military Assistance Program to that country has resulted in authorization for the U.S. Military Equipment Delivery Team to be stationed in Burma. This small group is the only outside military presence allowed in country and is important in terms of maintaining U.S. influence. While Burma's strategic location between India, Thailand and Red China makes it a tempting prize, the Burmese Government has demonstrated its desire for independence by taking an aggressive stand against CHICOM-inspired insurgency and provocation. To strengthen this resolve, there is a continuing need for assistance to Burma, the magnitude of which should be continually evaluated.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. 1

Burma MAP (Ø)

During 1969, as in previous years, Burma MAP was conducted under the guise of a sales program, 'which allowed Burma to 'purchase', with token payments in non-convertible local currency, U.S. materiel and services provided through grant aid military assistance.' 2 Such an arrangement 'obviated most of the normal grant aid regulatory requirements, which are distasteful to Burma,' and allows the maintenance of her posture of neutrality and non-alignment. 3 Throughout its existence, Burma MAP has provided:

...approximately $50 million in investment items and $30 million in supporting FOS, auxiliary items, training and related services. This investment, and the accompanying

1. CINCPAC 26 Jun 69 MAP Statement.
3. Ibid.
### Map Countries and Program Summaries

**Burma**

**As of 1 October 1969**

#### Basic Information

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*Constant Prices KITAT Exchange Rate of 4.7K to $1.00*

#### Overall Objective

**U.S. Diplomatic Mission**

- Assist all efforts to promote free world influences and resist communism.
- General objectives are:
  - (A) To help assure Burma's continued independence and non-alignment.
  - (B) To maintain U.S. influence in the Burmese armed forces.
  - (C) To assist Burma in containing the various factions of atheistic and Communist insurgency.

#### Minor Force Guidelines

**Army**

- 99 INF BNS
- 3 ARTY BNS
- 1 ARMED BN
- 1 ARMY CAR BN
- 1 MORTAR BN

**Navy**

- 3 PATROL SHIPS
- 33 PATROL BOATS
- 18 NAVAL LANDING FORCE
- 1 NASMALL OR CARGO YACHT
- 1 MINE-SWEEPER
- 1 MINE-BATTLESHIP
- 5 TUGS

**Air Force**

- 1 TAC FTR SQ
- 2 TAC SQUAD QMS
- 2 HELICOPTER SQ
- 1 TAC COMP WGS

**Combat Capability**

- Not yet capable of fully securing internal peace and order, unable to offer sustained effective resistance to direct attack by Chicom. No significant capability beyond Burma borders.
- Capable of giving light support to the Army, encouraging piracy, and conducting modest inshore patrol duties.
- Limited capability to maintain internal security by supporting the Army and Navy, negligible air defense capability against air attack by major power.

#### Major Country Forces

- 3 INF DIVS
- 30 INF BNS
- 3 LT INF BNS
- 4 ARTY BNS
- 1 ARMED BN
- 1 ARMY CAR BN

**Map Objective**

- CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY - BROADIE SHAN TA
- VICE CHIEF OF STAFF AIR - BRIGADIER THAMO DUN
- VICE CHIEF OF STAFF NAVY - COMMODORE THANG TIN

### Source

PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 141.

*Inf Bns and supporting arms are not assigned permanently to divisions, but forces are attached for specific operations. Conduct of internal security mission involves primarily rifle company, platoon and squad level fighting, although BN-size operations have occurred in Northeast Burma. **Army T-33's.*
military presence to manage and administer it, has been
the single most important factor in maintaining U.S. influence
in Burma and providing the present Burmese capability to
contain insurgency. ¹

All Burma Defense Forces (BDF) units receive support through MAP.
On 23 June 1969, the published two volumes of the Burma MA Plan for FY
70-75 were promulgated by Hq CINCPAC. This plan provided for only a mini-
mal amount of funds ($200,000) annually for training purposes only. The sixth
and final increment of Burma MAP has already been implemented, and the
delivery of equipment programmed under it will complete the U.S. materiel
program for Burma. Although Burma cannot afford to purchase major invest-
ment military equipment and its annual purchases are not expected to exceed
$125,000, the plan forecasted that "the FY 71 total might reach $1,000,000,
primarily for purchases of naval weapons."²

The MAP-supported objectives of the United States for Burma in 1969
were: (1) "To help assure Burma's continued independence and non-
alignment"; (2) "to maintain U.S. influence in the Burmese Armed Forces";
and (3) "to assist Burma in containing the various factions of ethnic and com-
munist insurgency."³ The instrument through which "MAP requirements have
been developed, programs submitted, deliveries accomplished, and U.S.
Military 'presence' maintained in Burma" has been the Military Equipment
Delivery Team (MEDT) Burma.⁴ Since it is the only foreign military mission
permitted in Burma, other than attaches, MEDT Burma "is really the only
source of U.S. contact with a number of Burmese military. This, of course,
contributes greatly to exerting U.S. influence and is of great value to the
Ambassador."⁵

"There is no question that Burma needs continued U.S. assistance,"
remarked Chief, MEDT Burma at the PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference in

¹. Point Paper, J5322, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Aug 69, Subj: Burma Military
   Assistance.
². CINCPAC MA Plan for Burma FY 70-75 (C), Vol. I, p. 13; Point Paper,
   J5322, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Aug 69, Subj: Burma Military Assistance.
³. CINCPAC MA Plan for Burma FY 70-75 (C), Vol. I, p. iii.
⁴. Point Paper, J5322, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Aug 69, Subj: Military Equipment
   Delivery Team (MEDT).
⁵. Ibid.
April 1969. Burma just does not have the necessary foreign exchange holdings to allow both the purchase of military equipment and the importation of adequate quantities of industrial and commercial consumer goods. In brief, therefore:

...from any point of view, whether economical, political, or moral, Burma cannot afford to purchase military equipment required to maintain or improve present military capabilities. Consequently, her only alternative to deterioration of her military capabilities or a dangerous depletion of her dwindling assets is the continuation of a military assistance program in some form with another country. Failure of the U.S. or other western countries to provide additional military assistance to Burma during the plan period will lead to either extensive deterioration of existing force structure; the expenditure by Burma of her limited foreign exchange holdings, to the detriment of an already deteriorating economy, in an attempt to maintain and improve existing force structure without assistance; or out of necessity, the acceptance by Burma of military assistance from communist countries.

As the year 1969 began, so it drew to a close, for the overall outlook for Burma still appeared bleak:

In general, however, the Burmese insurgency situation has not improved and may even be worsening. Though mauled and scattered at Pegu, the White Flag Communists have been gathering strength elsewhere, especially in areas closer to Burma's border with Communist China. Karen ethnic insurgency also remains strong. In essence, Burmese Government authority cannot be considered effective in many areas of Upper Burma, and there is little prospect for speedy improvement.

1. Final Report of PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference - April 1969, with its 18 enclosures containing the actual texts of the presentations by the MAAG and MILGRP Chiefs, prepared by COL Gerald S. Brown, USAF, J5313, Hq CINCPAC.
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As explained in last year's history, "Phase II of Burma MAP has expired and, if no new program was forthcoming, then the Burmese would have difficulty in maintaining their struggle against the insurgents within their country." The sixth and final increment of Burma MAP had been implemented in November 1968 and, as of mid-1969, "all that remains is a $200,000 program for training only. The continued lack of military assistance for other than training, will create serious problems for the Burma Defense Force and reduce its effectiveness in resisting internal and external aggression from Communist China." Burma MAP Phase II, as Chief, MEDT Burma explained in April 1969:

...is a modest five year program to give support to BDF and the equipment already delivered. The program was designed as pure grant aid unilaterally by MEDT and reviewed and concurred in by the Ambassador and Country Team. It consists primarily of follow-on-spares support and a repair and rehabilitation capability; a few investment items at a total cost of six million dollars for a small improvement in BDF force structure and capability....

Throughout 1969, CINCPAC had continued to support Burma MAP Phase III. As of January 1970, however, SECDEF, in response to a CINCPAC query, advised that "a military assistance material program for Burma will not be considered in FY 71 and the outlook is not too hopeful for any future program."

Urgent Request for Air Munitions for Burma MAP

"At a meeting requested by Burma Ministry of Defense on Wed 091300 Apr 69," CHMEDT Burma reported to CINCPAC the following day, "an official request was made for 2.75' rockets and fragmentation bombs for use by Burma.

3. Final Report of PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference - April 1969, with its 18 enclosures containing the actual texts of the presentations by the MAAG and MILGRP Chiefs, prepared by COL Gerald S. Brown, USAF, J5313, Hq CINCPAC.
Air Force on T-33 aircraft. The initial requirement was stated as 2,000 rockets and 5,000 bombs, preferably to be made available from surplus stocks, and an immediate need existed.

The justification for this request, as CHMEDT Burma explained it, rested in the Chinese Communist-supported insurgent activity which, for more than a year, had continued to increase in both scope and intensity and to spread until it encompassed a large portion of the northern Shan State, stretching from the state border near the Irrawaddy River to the Salween River valley and the western border with Yunnan, China. Concern was being felt by the Burmese that this entire area—and perhaps more—might be lost to the Chinese-supported insurgents, with a psychological snowballing effect upon and reaction to the ethnic insurgents. To forestall this possible loss, the Burmese Defense Forces (BDF) were forced to commit major forces, which directly involved the Burmese Air Force (BAF) for the first time in the counterinsurgency fight. T-33 fighters, firing 2.75" heat rockets and .50 caliber machine-guns, flew combat missions against the insurgents in the Shan State near the Yunnan border, the first such operational use of these planes. Being loaded and launched from the airfield at Myitkyina, far from the combat zone, these aircraft encountered the obvious difficulties of time, distance, and carrying capacity, compounded by the lack of good navigation and communications equipment, which explained their marginal success. Indications were that the BAF planned to move its base of operations to a more forward position, thereby considerably reducing flying time, as well as the communications and navigation difficulties. It was against this background, commented CHMEDT Burma on 12 April 1969, that:

...additional aircraft munitions were officially requested on 9 April. The prime objective is the capability to interdict insurgent forces and ambushes in open areas with antipersonnel fragmentation weapons while retaining the option of selective firing and bombing to conserve ammunition yet obtain optimum effectiveness.

This action represents a reasonable approach to containment of the insurgency. Although the T-33 aircraft may not represent the most effective weapon system for this application, its use with the munitions requested, represents the most reasonable approach given the urgency of the situation, limitations of force equipage and funding. The most likely alternative to providing the requested support is the

1. CHMEDT/AMEMBASSY Rangoon MCX-066/100830Z Apr 69.
loss to the insurgents of a sizable area of the Shan State. 1

(3) On the same day, in corroborating CHMEDT Burma's justification and rationale for granting the Burmese request, the U.S. Ambassador to Burma, Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., stated that the American MAP for Burma has been aimed at assisting the Government of the Union of Burma (GUB):

...to handle its insurgency problems. If we now refuse to accommodate our MAP program to new situation that requires additional hardware, there will be no way to avoid giving GUB the impression that we are no longer interested in helping them; moreover, some leftist elements in GUB will suspect that we may have made decision to allow increased pressures on Ne Win government so that it will fall and be replaced by more rightist regime.

For the future, it likely that the time is moving closer when we will be approached by GUB with direct questions on continuation of MAP program. It is even possible that the present discussions will lead directly into a request for a new program....2

(3) Although neither the requested nor substitute items were available from either excess or surplus stocks, feasible items were determined to be available from existing stocks or from production. Chief of Staff, Air Force (CSAF) authorized the immediate airlift of the requested quantities on 24 April 1969, and expedited action was initiated the next day to certify these munitions for use with the BAF T-33s. On 2 May 1969, CINCPAC submitted the programming data via AUTODIN for 834 M1A4 bomb clusters, 5,004 fuzes, 2,000 rocket motors, and 2,000 rocket warheads, for a total cost of $234,683.00. As a result of a recent Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) flight-test program, it was possible to provide the BAF with conditional operational specifications to permit the use of the M1A4 munitions prior to the receipt of an updated supplement to the T-33 Flight Manual. Against a desired delivery date of 10 May 1969, shipment of the total quantities was effected by airlift, with the rockets and the remainder of the requirement being received in-country on 15 and 27 May 1969, respectively.3

1. CHMEDT Burma MCX-067/120530Z Apr 69.
2. AMEMBASSY Rangoon 1209/120530Z Apr 69.
3. OOA/MA Hill AFB, UTAH 161829Z Apr 69; CSAF 181702Z Apr 69; CSAF 242127Z Apr 69; CINCPAC 260121Z Apr 69; CSAF 062107Z May 69; CHMEDT/AMEMBASSY Rangoon MCX-077/020230Z May 69; CHMEDT Burma MCX-086/160930Z May 69; CHMEDT/AMEMBASSY Rangoon M-U-AF-512/300519Z May 69; J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
Turning to the Republic of China we find a country with a military establishment that has grown from a defeated, demoralized and basically unequipped army which escaped from the Mainland in 1949. Through our military assistance in prior years the ROC has developed the capability to deter the Chinese Communists from attempting to carry out their avowed threat to "liberate" Taiwan. Under this security mantle, the economic growth of Free China has been one of the brightest features of the post-World War II years in Asia.

It is partially as a result of this economic growth, as well as the declining dollars made available, that military assistance to the Republic of China has been sharply reduced over the past few years. In attempting to compensate for this large reduction, the GRC has increased its defense budget and expanded its military purchases program. While it is true that its economy is presently sound, the effort to transpose costs from the Military Assistance Program to the GRC budget may divert too many resources from economic development to defense requirements. Too rapid a transfer of costs could have an adverse effect on the future viability of the country.

Modernization of equipment previously provided through military assistance is one of the major problems confronting the Republic of China in order to maintain a credible deterrent posture to the CHICOM's. The infantryman is armed with M-1 rifles and is transported in World War II trucks. Commanders are obligated to use obsolete communications equipment. The majority of the Air Force inventory consists of Korean War vintage F-86 aircraft, which are comparable with the MIG-17, but which are completely outclassed by the MIG-19 and MIG-21 in the CHICOM Air Force. Much of the Navy is obsolete, hard to maintain, and rapidly deteriorating.

Aside from its increased fiscal support for its armed forces, the Republic of China is doing a great deal to enhance its capabilities in other respects; it has established a vehicle co-production program to eliminate the basic ground transportation problem; M-14 rifles and M-60 machine guns are being co-produced, albeit on a scale which will not provide
sufficient weapons for all MAP-supported units for some years; and the capability has been developed to repair and rehabilitate ships, aircraft, aircraft engines, trucks, generators, small arms and precision instruments of all types.

Despite these encouraging aspects of the situation, there is no doubt that continued U.S. assistance is required. The modest FY 70 Military Assistance Program for the Republic of China will not allow for modernization of the armed forces. It will only be sufficient to help maintain the existing forces and provide limited self-sufficiency items for an improved manufacturing capability to produce military hardware.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.

Co-Production of Helicopters

CHMAAG China first broached the subject of developing an in-country capability for co-producing helicopters with U.S. assistance to CINCPAC on 6 October 1967. He pointed out that the concept was a sound one, since it was in consonance with the MAAG objectives of gradually phasing out grant aid by increasing the self-sufficiency program of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) armed forces and encouraging "the GRC to purchase within fund limitations through FMS, equipment that cannot be provided because of MAP fund ceilings." Although CINCPAC had concurred in CHMAAG China's proposal from the beginning and the GRC greatly desired this capability as soon as possible, no real progress had yet been made on this concept as Calendar Year 1968 ended, "despite the voluminous message traffic and countless man-hours spent at all levels of command." A detailed account of the tortuous progress of this proposal since its conception in late 1967 can be found in the last two annual histories of this command. The last significant action taken

1. CINCPAC 26 Jun 69 MAP Statement.
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1969

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA
14,000 SQ. MI.
POPULATION
14,2 ML
ADULT POPULATION
14 ML
LIFE EXPECTANCY
67 YEARS
AGRICULTURE
8,2 ACRE
GROSS NAFT. PROD. ($10)
$4,16 BILL.
PER CAPITAL
$570
DEFENSE BUDGET (SELF-FINANCED) 1969 ($1)
$400 MIL.
AS % OF GNP
1.25
AS % OF SELF FINANCED PROVINCIAL/CENTRAL GOVT EXP: 9.75
PRESIDENT - Generalissimo Chang K'ai-shek
VICE PRESIDENT - Yen Chi-kan
DEFENSE MINISTER - Huang Chieh
CHIEF, GEN STAFF - Gen 3rd grade Kao Kwei Yen, CA
CINC ARMY - Gen 2nd grade Tsang Han-Chang
CINC NAVY - ADM Peng Chi Chiang, CH
CINC AIR FORCE - Gen 2nd grade Lan Ming-Tang, CAF
CINC COMBINED SERVICE FORCE - Admiral 2nd grade Liu Kuang K'ai, CH
CHIEF OF MILITARY INFORMATION - LT GEN Han Kuo-Cheng
CHIEF, MARCOM - LT GEN Han Kuo-Cheng
CHIEF, FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Wei Tai-Ming

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES

ARMY
1 BATTALION, 2, 25 Maj Gen Bns, 2 Arm Divs, 14 Inf Divs, 2 Arm CAV Regts, 1 Arm Inf Bde, 2 SF CPs, 1 PAV WGR, 6 TAPC, 1 BDCPG, 1 lst CMBT Bns, 12 FIELD ARTY Bns, 1 RES Inf Div, 13 AAA AW Btrys, 14 90 MM ADA Bns.

NAVY
12 DD/DE, 28 PATROL BNS, 8 MSC, 1 AAC, 2 APD, 32 LST/LSM, 1 LSO, 1 SEAL UNIT, 1 MFR BNS, 2 LVT Bns, 1 LTCA BN, 2 Kr/Am, 1 abt/Am, 1 RIC, 11 LRC.

AIR FORCE
3 FTR BMT/CAM/111, 1 TAC FTR SQ, 1 TAC RECON SQ, 1 COMP RECON SQ, 1 A S F PATROL SQ, 1 SR SQ, 7 TRANSPORT SQ, 5 ACW, 13 AAA AW Bns.

OVERALL OBJECTIVE
TO DEFEND TAIWAN AND THE PECOS FROM COMMUNIST ATTACK AND TO RETAIN APPROPRIATE U.S. BASE RIGHTS ON ROC TERRITORY.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION
U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. WALTER P. McCORMAUGH
U.S. AIR DIRECTOR
MR. GERALD HUFFMAN ACTING
CHIEF, MAJ GEN
RICHARD G. CICCOLELLA, USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

(A) To maintain ROC armed forces sufficient, in combination with available U.S. forces, to defend Taiwan and the Penghu.

(B) To maintain a climate in which the United States will continue to enjoy visiting and, if required, additional overflight, staging and base rights.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES

ARMY
16 INF Divs, 1 Lt INF Divs, 2 Arm Divs, 2 Arm Bdes, 2 Arm CAV Regts, 1 Arm Inf Bde, 1 SF Cp, 1 Air Cp, 1 Acw Corps, 22 FA Bns, 4 SPK Bns, 2 Mil Bns, 5 4.2 Mort CoS.
TOTAL STRENGTH: 756,900

NAVY
12 DD Types, 2 Marine Divs, 2 LVT Bns, 1 LTCA BN, TOTAL STRENGTH: 76,400

AIR FORCE
138 FTR JET, 9 PROP, RECON: 11 JET, 9 PROP, 5 FTR, 5 4.2 Mort, 2 LVT, 7 PROP, TOTAL STRENGTH: 83,900

COMBAT CAPABILITY

Maintain internal security & conduct effective ground defense of Taiwan, Penghu & offshore islands against small scale attack if provided outside air, naval & logistic support. Could contribute approx. 3 divs to collective defense effort. Well-organized & combat ready.

The overall ability of the Chinese Navy to perform its assigned mission is considered fair. The Chinese Marines are considered capable of conducting dir sized amphibious operations, provided the required air & naval support, including amphibious shipping, are available.

Force combat ready. The Air Force has demonstrated its ability to perform its primary function, air defense of Taiwan, under day WVR conditions. The limited all-WX defense capability has improved since the F-104G sq became operational. Air defense against a low altitude threat remains a problem. Capable of providing fighter cover for naval operations in the area and tactical support for an arm corp.

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 147.
in 1968 on this subject was "CINCPAC's forwarding to SECDEF clarification of the force structure for optimum and minimum helicopter requirements, and recommendation that Volume III of JSOP 71-78 be used as basis for support of the GRC helicopter co-production proposal." 1

(S) The first development in Calendar Year 1969 came on 4 January, when the American Ambassador at Taipei, Walter P. McConaughy, reported to the Secretary of State on a conversation with President Chiang Kai-shek. At a private tea for the American Ambassador and his wife on 28 December 1968, President Chiang Kai-shek stated that "he wished to go on record officially to the effect that the helicopter co-production facility request as of now was being moved by him to the head of the GRC defense priority list." 2 Since it now had number one priority, he wanted Ambassador McConaughy to convey this fact to his government. When asked by the American Ambassador "if he literally meant that he would put the helicopter co-production facility ahead of the long-standing items of highest priority, such as additional fighter aircraft, air defense missiles and shortfall equipment acutely needed by the Chinese Army," President Chiang Kai-shek replied that he did mean this, and he "earnestly reiterated the request for prompt action." 3

(S) The next development came in a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 6 February 1969, which provided directive guidance to CINCPAC for consultations with the Chinese on GRC Force Reorganization and Reduction. The following comments were made in regard to the acquisition of helicopters for the GRC:

A prime substantive area of concern will be objective of modernizing GRC forces. One major modernization program the GRC has put before USG is the acquisition of helicopters. We believe final decision on acquisition of helicopters by co-production or purchase should be made in light of findings developed in overall force reorganization and costing studies. In order that helicopter decision will not be prejudiced by lack of FY69 FMS funds, USG has reserved decision on dol$ 5 million of FY69 FMS credit of dol$ 20 million allocated for GRC. This dol$ 5 million will not be allocated until GRC and USG have had opportunity to review resulting overall force reorganization and costing studies and determine desirability of GRC purchase or

1. J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
2. AMEMBASSY Taipei 0013/040700Z Jan 69.
3. Ibid.

SECRET
co-production of helicopters within broad framework of priority defense requirements and joint resources available.¹

Nine days later, CHMAAG China, in a joint COMUSTDC/MAAG China response to the joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message, made the following statements to CINCPAC:

The State-DOD approach... We believe this is a negative approach and will be counterproductive. No matter how skillfully or diplomatically presented, it will not be interpreted as anything other than failure of U.S. to recognize a legitimate and essential GRC modernization requirement and as a lever to force a reduction of forces. Moreover, GRC will not fail to recognize this as a definite loss of $5 million in their FY69 FMS program come 30 June 1969, all explanations re U.S. reservations of decision on $5 million, etc., notwithstanding.

In lieu of the foregoing, we recommend following approach: the U.S. Ambassador initiate the joint discussion with the Minister of Defense by informing him that the U.S. government, recognizing the need to modernize the GRC armed forces and thereby permitting a much needed reorganization and reduction of forces, has agreed to provide $5 million in the FY69 FMS credit arrangement to initiate a helicopter co-production program. This positive approach would immediately eliminate the main stumbling block to any reorganization/reduction effort, and in our considered opinion would evoke a wholehearted cooperative attitude on part of Minister of Defense to subsequent proposals re joint consultative committee and eventual meaningful reorganization and reduction plan....²

In a message to the Chairman of the JCS on 20 February 1969, CINCPAC expressed serious concern over that part of the SECSTATE/SECDEF guidance for influencing the GRC reorganization and reduction plan which concerned the helicopter co-production program. Of particular concern was the reference to withholding the decision on the $5 million credit sales until a review of the overall force reorganization and costing studies had been made.

1. SECSTATE 19013/1/060144Z Feb 69.
2. CHMAAG Taipei MGCH 233/150501Z Feb 69.
especially since it was estimated that probably a year would be necessary to develop an initial force reorganization plan. CINCPAC made it clear that he "believed this approach could gravely jeopardize the basic USG objectives outlined in" the joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message and made his own recommendation after calling attention to certain aspects of the problem:

3. ... The following considerations are pertinent:

a. The proposed helicopter co-production program has been endorsed by the Country Team and CINCPAC.

b. President Chiang Kai-shek has now listed the acquisition of the helicopters as the number one priority on the GRC defense priority list.

c. Should U.S. not approve the helicopter co-production proposal, it is expected that GRC will seek support for this project from a third country source.

d. To put a matter of this importance to the GRC in limbo for a year would prejudice the GRC against conducting realistic discussions leading to the desired force reductions.

e. Delay could only serve to exacerbate the adverse reactions generated by the major cuts in military assistance.

f. MAP is no longer of sufficient magnitude to allow the U.S. unilateral authority to determine what the GRC does and does not acquire for its armed forces.

g. CINCPAC placed helicopters for the GRC Armed Forces as major force priority #9 immediately after air defense requirements and combatant navy ships.

h. During this 14-month period work on the reorganization and reduction plan could proceed in an atmosphere of mutual confidence with a higher degree of success in achieving desired objectives.

4. In view of the above, CINCPAC strongly reaffirms the recommendation that $5M in credit be made available now to finance the first increment of the helicopter co-production program. It is considered that failure to do so
will both adversely affect our efforts to encourage the GRC toward a force reorganization/reduction plan and significantly impair the future advisory efforts of MAAG, COMUSTDC, and the Embassy.  

This position taken by CINCPAC was supported by Ambassador McConaughy five days later in a message to SECSTATE, because of the significance that the helicopter co-production proposal had become to the GRC, as well as the possible future ramifications in terms of political and military considerations. "The approval of the $5 million loan as a starter now," wired the Ambassador, "will provide the needed combination of sweetener and stimulant for the GRC as we enter the negotiation."2 Despite the emphatic concurrence of CINCPAC, CHMAAG China, COMUSTDC, and the American Embassy in Taipei on this helicopter co-production proposal, SECDEF, in a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message response on 26 February 1969 to CINCPAC's stated position, stated that, while appreciating the difficulties pointed out by CINCPAC, it was still believed "that guidance in reference instruction should remain unchanged on helicopter proposal."3

At the same time, however, SECDEF advised CINCPAC that if "GRC so desire this $5 million can be used for other jointly agreed priority items in FY 69 and $5 million FMS credit appropriations for FY 70 will then be set aside for similar purposes."4 On 9 March 1969, CINCPAC requested that CHMAAG China "develop substitute listing for the $5 million FY 69 FMS Credit Sales currently recommended for phase I helicopter co-production."5 Twenty days later, CHMAAG China responded with a revised list, which substituted items totaling $4.5 million for the funds originally scheduled for the helicopter co-production program.6

On 4 April 1969, SECDEF advised that the U.S. Government was now prepared to negotiate the final FMS agreement with the GRC, excluding the $5 million for helicopter co-production, and that, if a "decision on helicopter issue is not forthcoming by 1 June 69, the funds may be applied in this fiscal year to other items."7 The next day, CINCPAC passed this information on to

1. CINCPAC 200431Z Feb 69.
2. AMEMBASSY Taipei 0543/251124Z Feb 69; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
3. SECDEF 3417/262336Z Feb 69.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 090014Z Mar 69.
6. CHMAAG Taipei MGPR 3287/290303Z Mar 69; J5332A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
7. SECDEF 6185/041652Z Apr 69.
CHMAAG China and requested that a final FMS list be prepared, as well as a $5 million FMS add-on list being developed in the event that the helicopter co-production proposal was not favorably considered. On 11 April 1969, CHMAAG China furnished CINCPAC with a final list of items totaling $15 million and informed him that a list of add-on items totaling $5 million was being held in abeyance pending a decision on the helicopter co-production program. The following day, CINCPAC forwarded to SECDEF his concurrence "in list of items proposed for $15 million FMS credit sales in FY 69."1

(6) Then, on 5 May 1969, a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message passed on the following information to CINCPAC, CHMAAG China, and the American Embassy at Taipei, which changed the picture somewhat:

Decision reached approving helicopter co-production program and dols 5 million credit under FMS for Phase I, FY 69 credit program for GRC therefore being increased from dols 15 million to dols 20 million to include helicopter program. This approval with understanding that this does not commit USG to support further increments of co-production program. Extension of further U.S. participation, if any, would depend upon subsequent analyses.2

(6) The SECSTATE had indicated that it was preferable for the GRC to learn of this decision through the American Ambassador informing the GRC Minister of National Defense (MND) Chiang Ching-kuo.3 Accordingly, Ambassador McConaughy reported on 6 May 1969, further amplified by another message the next day, that he had informed MND Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) of the approval of the necessary funds for Phase I of the helicopter co-production program. The Chinese Minister, reported the American Ambassador:

...was obviously pleased by the approval of the $5 million FMS credit, and apparently decided to respond with some news on force reduction and reorganization which he thought would gratify the USG.... There is no doubt in my mind that CCK clearly understands that the approval of the $5 FMS credit constitutes no commitment for future USG support, and that he realizes that our decision on future

1. CINCPAC 122313Z Apr 69; J5332A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
2. SECSTATE 70245/052356Z May 69; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. Ibid.
support depends upon the results of further studies.  

After the approval in May 1969 of the requested funds, no further action of any significance occurred regarding the helicopter co-production program during the remainder of Calendar Year 1969.

**Excess M-14 Rifles for China MAP**

"To the extent that any such items are to become excess," CHMAAG China recommended to CINCPAC on 7 January 1969, "that provision be made to provide up to 380,000 M14's to the Republic of China on an 'as is where is' MAP 'no cost' or FMS 'low cost' basis." His justification for this request was that ROC, with the concurrence of the U.S., had established the M-14 as the single weapon with which its armed forces would be armed, but its maximum production capacity of M-14s, with initial production commencing in FY 70, would be only 15,000 weapons per year, a rate "insufficient to modernize the Chinese Army in the foreseeable future." A week later, CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC's comments and/or recommendations on this proposal, queried DA as to the possibility of providing these weapons to ROC, and asked CHMAAG China to advise on the source of Chinese funds to support this request in the event that weapons could be provided at "no cost" or low FMS cost, for the repair parts, BILI (Basic Issue List Items), and ammunition would have to be funded.

In reply on 24 January 1969, CINCUSARPAC recommended to CINCPAC that CHMAAG China be apprised of the following information and that he would be informed later as to the future M-14 rifle availability to ROC as free issue or low cost sale:

Availability of M14 rifles for issue/sale to ROC is dependent on:

a. DOD approval of DA study on one rifle Army

(M16).

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1. AMEMBASSY Taipei 1513/071003Z May 69; AMEMBASSY Taipei 1494/061100Z May 69.
2. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Jan 70, Subj: Helicopter Coproduction for GRC; FONECON, LCOL Charles R. Casey, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 13 Feb 70.
3. CHMAAG Taiwan MGARG4-0 1214/071003Z Jan 69.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 140542Z Jan 69.
b. M16 rifle production allocations to permit replacement of M14 rifles in U.S. units.

c. Determination as to type rifle, M14 or M16, which will be used to modernize ROKF. ¹

CHMAAG China's reply on 30 January 1969 to CINCPAC's query was as follows:

The Combined Service Force Facilities are capable of producing 100 percent of BILI and ammunition and 70 percent of the repair parts for the weapon. Funds for the in-country production of repair parts, BILI and ammunition will be provided by GRC. The remaining 30 percent of the repair parts will be purchased through FMS. ²

"Informal information available in DA," CINCPAC was advised on 18 June 1969, "indicates that a quantity of 14,000 M14 rifles may be available in PACOM area as excess. In the event this can be confirmed, DA is prepared to recommend to OASD/ISA that the rifles be programmed in China MAP as excess, and available at no cost to MAP, 'as-is, where-is',"³ PCH&T (Packing, Crating, Handling and Transportation) charges, however, would be at the expense of ROC. At the same time, DA requested CINCPAC to confirm the availability and location of these M-14s within PACOM and to provide comments and recommendations in regard to ROC requirements and proposed action.

CINCPAC, in turn, two days later, requested CINCUSARPAC for "confirmation of availability and location of 14,000 excess M-14 rifles," and requested CHMAAG China for "programming data with full justification."⁴ After consulting CGUSARV and CGUSAEIGHT, CINCUSARPAC replied on 1 July 1969 that, although USARV had no excess M-14s, USAEIGHT had an excess of 7,968 M-14 rifles.⁵ As for CHMAAG China, he provided the desired programming data, as well as the following justification, to CINCPAC on 26 June 1969:

1. CINCUSARPAC 3095/240648Z Jan 69; J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
2. CHMAAG Taiwan MGARG4-0 1284/300501Z Jan 69.
3. DA 913110/181830Z Jun 69; J4312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
4. CINCPAC 200429Z Jun 69.
5. CINCUSARPAC 23462/210500Z Jun 69; CINCUSARPAC 96301/010435Z Jul 69.
CONFIDENTIAL

Under the U.S. approved M-14 co-production program, the maximum production capacity will be 15,000 rifles per year. At this rate, it will take approximately 23 years to accomplish the desired shoulder weapon modernization program for the ROC. Also due to normal start-up production difficulties, only 200 weapons were produced in FY 69. These difficulties have already caused a slippage in the desired modernization schedule. Program approval of the 14,000 M-14 rifles...will assist in accomplishing the objective of modernizing the ROC Armed Services at the earliest possible date.1

On 10 July 1969, CINCPAC supplied DA with the information that the USAEIGHT had an excess of 7,968 M-14s at its Camp Carroll Depot in Korea. He also concurred in the issuing of these rifles to ROC, as proposed by DA, since it "will assist in meeting ROC modernization schedules and strengthen ROC Armed Services."2 The next day, DA directed United States Army Materiel Command (USAMC) to offer these rifles at no cost to China MAP in an "as-is, where-is" condition and requested CINCPAC to place a hold on the M-14s at the Camp Carroll Depot pending completion of processing.3 Subsequently, on 14 July, DA canceled these instructions, stating that it had "been determined that subject rifles are not available as excess for China MAP at no cost."4

Four days later, DA informed CINCPAC that "8,000 unserviceable M-14 rifles will be provided from CONUS stocks to ROC at no cost to MAP," except PCH&T charges, and that the "Army has been authorized to initiate supply action prior to receipt of confirming MAP order."5 USAMC, in turn, dispatched the necessary instructions to the appropriate CONUS command to "expedite supply action upon receipt of RQN and advise ALCON when shipment from depot is complete."6 DA advised CINCPAC of the rationale for its actions in this matter on 24 July 1969:

1. CHMAAG Taiwan 62853/261017Z Jun 69.
2. Admin CINCPAC 100141Z Jul 69; J4312A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
4. DA DCSLOG-GA-FSLB 142030Z Jul 69.
5. DA DCSLOG(P&B)-M16 182208Z Jul 69.
6. CGUSAMC AMCIL-GF 251657Z Jul 69; J4312A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
...This action was taken solely for the purpose of supporting the original commitment to provide 7,968 M-14 rifles to be serviceable and needed to support other DA requirements. Therefore, they could not be provided to ROC under the proposed arrangements. Paramount consideration of the decision to reinstate only 8,000 of the 14,000 requirement is the DA FY 70 M-14 Rifle Rebuild Program. It is not feasible to provide serviceable M-14 rifles to satisfy other U.S. requirements.

...Assets from the Army Depot Overhaul Program and from redistribution will be required for the next eighteen to twenty-four months to equip the reserve components with the preferred M-14/M-16 rifle.

Current reports state that there are no excess M-14 rifles in USARV....

Based on the above rationale, it is doubtful that DA can provide 6,000 additional M-14 rifles (over and above the 8,000) to ROC within the next eighteen to twenty-four months.\(^1\)

\(^{(c)}\) CHMAAG China, on 5 August 1969, requested the air shipment of the 8,000 M-14 rifles that had been processed for supply to China MAP.\(^2\) Three days later, CG U.S. Army Materiel Command (CGUSAMC) advised that this request had not been "approved by higher authority" and requested that the "shipment be accomplished by fastest surface means."\(^3\) Meanwhile, in a telephone conversation on 6 August, CHMAAG China had learned of the cost, if these weapons were shipped by air. "In view of the high PCH&T cost that would be incurred if shipped by air, "approximately $70,000 versus approximately $20,000 for surface transportation, CHMAAG China stated on 9 August 1969, "request expedited surface shipment."\(^4\) Before the end of Calendar Year 1969, these M-14s had been delivered in-country.\(^5\)

1. DA DCSLOG(P&B)-M16 2422342 Jul 69.
2. CMAAG Taiwan MGARG4-R 829/050501Z Aug 69; J4312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
3. CGUSAMC 082029Z Aug 69.
4. CMAAG Taiwan MGARG4-R 8223/090503Z Aug 69.
5. FONECON, LCOL Charles H. Dunn, USA, J4312, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 13 Feb 70.
Proposed Accelerated Funding of GRC Vehicle Co-Production Program

The GRC Vehicle Co-Production Program was designed "to produce 18,352 M-series vehicles over period FY 67 - 75. Total cost to be $80 million of which $50 million to be provided by FMS credit in four phases." On 11 July 1969, CHMAAG China requested the accelerated funding of $5 million for the Phase IV of the vehicle co-production program, with funds to be provided in FY 70, vice FY 75 as originally planned. This action was deemed necessary to maintain the production level and to offset the effects of rising prices. CINCPAC gave his concurrence to CHMAAG China's request on 19 July 1969.

Chinese Army personnel repairing an air compressor at Taichung.

1. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jan 70, Subj: GRC Vehicle Cophroduction.
2. CMAAG Taiwan MGPR 7226/110805Z Jul 69; J5332A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
3. CINCPAC 192304Z Jul 69.
CONFIDENTIAL

In a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 21 August 1969, which was a response to a query on the status of action on the request, it was stated that the question was "under intensive study here. We expect to reach decision at early date and will notify you at that time." Having received no further information by 14 October 1969, CHMAAG China repeated his request to CINCPAC and asked that "expeditious action be taken to complete arrangements for obtaining total Phase IV ($5 million) credit to permit orderly procurement of additional engines and other vehicle components." Concurring with CHMAAG China, CINCPAC reiterated his request in a message to SECDEF two days later.

On 6 November 1969, SECDEF advised both CINCPAC and CHMAAG China that the justification for funding under Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) was too weak. He also stated that the $5 million for Phase IV of the GRC Vehicle Co-Production Program would be reviewed after the FY 70 MAP and FMS funds had been appropriated by Congress and the FMS credit levels had been determined. The rest of the Calendar Year 1969 passed without any further occurrence of significance in this matter.

FY 69 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Credit Arrangement for China

The last significant action taken by Hq CINCPAC on the FY 69 FMS credit arrangement for China in Calendar Year 1968 occurred on 16 November. At this time, CINCPAC forwarded, with his concurrence, to SECDEF a CHMAAG China-recommended list of equipment proposed for purchase by the GRC (Government of the Republic of China). This list was, actually, a joint CHMAAG China and GRC Ministry of National Defense (MND) effort, representing an update of an earlier one submitted to CINCPAC in January 1968. Despite CINCPAC's pointing out to SECDEF that a delay "in concluding the FY 69 FMS credit sales program restricts MAP and FMS update planning by the country team and could adversely affect U.S. influence with GRC on future sales programs," no decision was forthcoming from Washington, D. C., before the end of the year.

1. SECSTATE 141585/212223Z Aug 69.
2. CMAAG Taiwan MGPR 141019Z Oct 69; J5332A, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
3. CINCPAC 162109Z Oct 69.
4. SECDEF 4087/061422Z Nov 69; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jan 70, Subj: GRC Vehicle Coproduction.
5. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. II, p. 122, citing CINCPAC 162018Z Nov 68; ibid., citing Intv, LCOL Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 17 Feb 69; ibid., pp. 121 and 122.
The first hint in Calendar Year 1969 of the Washington policymakers' intentions came on 6 February. In a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on GRC force reorganization/reduction, SECSTATE indicated that FY 69 FMS credit funds, with the exception of the $5.0 million designated for the helicopter co-production proposal, had been allocated for the GRC. In an attempt to clarify the situation and to prompt some definite action, CINCPAC forwarded the following message to SECDEF on 13 February 1969:

In order to update MA Plan/Program for FY 70-75, it is required that final action on FY 69 FMS credit sales be forwarded to CHMAAG China for implementation. Further delay in completing action on this integral portion of the FY 69 MAP will create problems of coordination and result in misunderstanding with GRC officials.

Recommend that FY 69 FMS credit sales for the Republic of China which have been approved be forwarded to CHMAAG China for implementation. ¹

Two days later, in an additional attempt to achieve some action, CHMAAG China dispatched the following message, in which "Ref A" stands for the jointly-developed MAAG China/MND FMS credit list previously submitted in November 1968:

Request that a formal credit sales arrangement between the GRC and the USG relating to the purchase of U.S. defense articles and services be prepared for U.S. $20 million based on the equipment listed in Ref A and forwarded to MAAG China for formal coordination and signature with the GRC.

Request expeditious action in order to permit GRC to finalize their program for the purchase of needed defense articles through both cash purchases and credit arrangements. ²

1. CINCPAC 130005Z Feb 69; SECSTATE 19013/1/060144Z Feb 69; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69. For a detailed account of the helicopter co-production proposal, see the pertinent subaction on this subject in this history, as well as the previous two years' developments in CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I, pp. 371 and 372 and CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. II, pp. 126-138.

2. CHMAAG Taiwan 2247/150505Z Feb 69.
SECRET

SECDEF, in a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 26 February 1969, informed CINCPAC that the final decision on the helicopter co-production was to be held in abeyance, pending the outcome of force reorganization and costing studies, but should the GRC so desire, the $5.0 million earmarked for the helicopter co-production could be used for other high priority items in FY 69 FMS. As a result, CINCPAC requested CHMAAG China to develop a substitute listing for this sum. A revised FY 69 FMS list totaling $20.13 million, which included substitute items for the helicopter co-production, was submitted to CINCPAC by CHMAAG China on 29 March 1969. 1

On 4 April 1969, SECDEF announced that:

We are prepared to negotiate a credit sales arrangement with GRC providing for $15 million credit, terms 6-1/2 percent interest 8 year repayment, 10 percent cash down payment...excluding...helicopter co-production $5 million.

Helicopter project will be subject subsequent message. If decision on helicopter issue is not forthcoming by 1 June 69, the funds may be applied in this Fiscal Year to other items. 2

When requested the next day by CINCPAC to develop a final list for $15 million FY 69 FMS credit, CHMAAG China responded six days later with a revised list totaling $15 million. He further advised that an add-on list of $5 million was being held in abeyance, pending a decision on the helicopter co-production. On 12 April 1969, CINCPAC concurred in the revised list, requesting that the "add-on list for $5 million be forwarded to CINCPAC for consideration." 3 CHMAAG China forwarded this list "at an estimated cost of $5.0 million" on 30 April 1969. 4

In a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 5 May 1969, however, SECSTATE approved the credit arrangement for the $5 million for Phase I of the helicopter co-production program, thereby voiding the requirement for

1. SECDEF 3417/262336Z Feb 69; CINCPAC 090014Z Mar 69; CHMAAG Taiwan MGPR 3287/290303Z Mar 69.
2. SECDEF 6185/041652Z Apr 69.
3. CINCPAC 122313Z Apr 69; CINCPAC 052327Z Apr 69; CHMAAG Taiwan MGPR 4240/111035Z Apr 69.
4. CHMAAG Taiwan MGPR 4299/301035Z Apr 69.

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further consideration of the add-on list.  

FY 70 FMS for China

The GRC FMS cash sales and commercial arrangements for FY 70 has been projected at $24 million, with credit being arranged in approximately $20 million increments. "The FMS program is closely integrated with the Grant Aid Program, and, due to reduction in MAP funds, it is becoming more significant to the Republic of China," CHMAAG China informed CINCPAC on 29 July 1969. "The second increment represents GRC desire for add-on items for a $40 million program." This additional credit sales arrangement was wanted by the GRC to purchase high priority investment items to equip, as well as to continue the modernization of, its armed forces.

The following items were those proposed for the FY 70 credit sales procurement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Increment ($20.12 million)</th>
<th>Millions of Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel Carrier (50)</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer, SP, 105mm (36)</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket, M-72 LAW (2500)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Communications, CA</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Observation Devices</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nike/Herc Support Equip</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16 rifles (5000)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer, towed, 155mm (24)</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and ASW Modernization</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-44-1 Torpedo</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-104 Flight Simulator</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio (SSB/6185)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Equip, ECM</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Items, CAF</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Communications, CMC</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. SECSTATE 70245/052356Z May 69.
2. J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Jan 70, Subj: FY 70 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for China.
4. CMAAG Taiwan MGPR 7265/290501Z Jul 69.
Special Tools and PME, CMC............. 10
Foundry.................................. 2.00
Production and Test Equip, CAF........ 0.76
Misc Equip................................. 0.08

Second Increment ($20.35 million)

Phase II Helo co-production................ 11.00
Phase IV Vehicle co-production............. 5.00
Tropo Scatter............................... 1.00
Acquisition/Modn of Addl Ships............. 1.00
Armored Personnel Carriers................ 2.35

For the remaining five months of Calendar Year 1969, nothing further of significance occurred, so the status of FY 70 FMS for China was still the same.

Disposition of Excess China MAP WWII Vehicles

After pointing out the difficulties involved in demilitarization of excess WWII vehicles, CHMAAG China requested on 1 December 1969 approval, as an exception to CINCPAC policy, to sell salvage WWII vehicles intact, when adequate stocks of spare component parts were on hand to support the remainder of the vehicle fleet. Part of his rationale follows:

...The increased monetary return will be placed in an account (MAP Scrap Fund) which is jointly managed by the Chief MAAG and the Minister of National Defense of the Government of the Republic of China. The availability of additional funds in the MAP Scrap Fund together with the concentration of effort on the disassembly and rebuild of M-Series vehicles will, in turn, contribute to acceleration of modernization within the Chinese Armed Forces, and will tend to expedite the phase out of aged WWII vehicles.

1. J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69; CMAAG Taiwan MGPR 7265/290501Z Jul 69.
2. J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; Point Paper, J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Jan 70, Subj: FY 70 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for China.
3. CMAAG Taiwan 010801Z Dec 69; J4323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
Upon being requested for his comments and recommendations on this proposal, CINCUSARPAC responded to CINCPAC that China "should have sufficient M-standard vehicles on hand in near future to satisfy rqmts without need for continued use of WW II vehicles"; he recommended that Property Disposal Officers (PDOs) in China be authorized "to sell these vehicles intact to highest bidders whenever component stock levels are deemed adequate to" support the remaining vehicles in the WWII fleet. 1 On 20 December 1969, therefore, CINCPAC granted CHMAAG China’s request for an exception to the policy stated in Section C, Chapter IV, CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual, Part I. Approval was given to sell the excess WWII vehicles intact to the highest bidders by the PDOs and by the GRC where title was not accepted by the U.S., provided component stock levels were considered adequate to support the remainder of the China WWII vehicle fleet. 2

F-100A Aircraft for China MAP

On 21 November 1969, CSAF indicated that it was planned to make three F-100As available to GRC by December 1969 and another one during the first quarter of FY 71. These aircraft would "be transferred to CAF ownership at SMAMA, " and all costs—estimated at $85,000—"incident to preparation for onward movement and delivery to final destination" would be the responsibility of the CAF. 3 "Pending receipt of MAP order amendment," CSAF advised on 3 December 1969, the program increase of four F-100As was "approved for implementation." 4

F-104A/B Aircraft for Chinese Air Force (CAF)

In August 1968, the GRC requested an F4C squadron from the U.S. to counter the Chinese Communist air threat in the Taiwan Straits area, hoping to obtain this squadron as an addition to the regular China MAP. "Request was denied due to high cost, already heavy burden of GRC defense budget, and non-availability of assets." 5 Over a year later, on 19 November 1969, SECDEF advised that one squadron of F-104A/Bs might become excess to USAF needs shortly and requested comments on the proposal "that these aircraft (20 As

1. CINCUSARPAC GPLO-IL 100005Z Dec 69; Admin CINCPAC 030312Z Dec 69.
2. Admin CINCPAC 202045Z Dec 69.
3. CSAF 212223Z Nov 69; J4319A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
4. CSAF 032328Z Dec 69.
5. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jan 70, Subj: F4C Squadron for GRC.
and 2 Bs) be made available to the CAF in an 'as is' operational condition at no cost to MAP except for PCH&T charges. 1 Within a matter of days, the Country Team, CINCPAC, and CINCPACAF concurred in the proposal. 2

On 29 November 1969, a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message confirmed this offer, authorized the charging of the PCH&T charges against FY 70 MAP, and authorized the American Embassy at Taipei to discuss the matter with GRC after President Nixon had replied to President Chiang Kai-shek's letter of 19 November 1969 on "Taiwan Strait Patrol modification." 3 On 11 December 1969, GRC Minister of National Defense Huang accepted "with pleasure" this offer of F-104A/ Bs at no cost to MAP, stating that the F-104s would "replace one squadron F-86 aircraft in the CAF." 4 He also

1. SECDEF 4894/192056Z Nov 69.
2. CINCPACAF DPL 212321Z Nov 69; CINCPAC 232205Z Nov 69; AMEMBASSY Taipei 4762/241019Z Nov 69; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
3. SECDEF 5501/291643Z Nov 69.
4. AMEMBASSY Taipei 5076/170829Z Dec 69.
stated that there was "still imminent need for F-4Cs and asked MAAG China's aid in getting these aircraft included in the China MAP; in this connection, he said that "acceptance F-104A/B aircraft by GRC and requirement for F-4 aircraft for CAF are quite separate."¹

C-119G Aircraft for China MAP

(σ) By message on 3 October 1969, CSAF advised all concerned that:

...a MA program for 37 C-119G has been approved. It now appears fallout of aircraft will commence during second quarter FY 70. Project has been implemented for delivery of aircraft to begin during this quarter. Firm delivery dates cannot be given as firm fallout from active inventory is not available. Plan is to deliver approximately six C-119G aircraft each month through March 70.²

Emergency Funding for China MAP

(σ) On 12 February 1969, CHMAAG China requested CINCPAC for the "continuation of action to obtain prompt and total funding of the FY 69 China MAP. Delayed funding will further decrease or completely deplete stockage items, accelerate deadline rates of equipment and degrade the combat readiness posture of the GRC armed forces to an unacceptable level."³ Only $14.8 million had been funded out of the total of $23.5 million programmed O&M requirements. CINCPAC passed CHMAAG China's message, with his concurrence, to SECDEF three days later, recommending "earliest funding remainder FY 69 China MAP to maximum level within available funds."⁴ SECDEF's reply was forthcoming on 18 March 1969:

...Sufficient funds are not available to fund remainder of China and other PACOM country programs at this time. As funds become available, they are being applied toward unfunded balances for the PACOM area as well as total worldwide requirements.⁵

¹ Ibid.; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; J4319 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
² CSAF AF9MSDA 032203Z Oct 69; J4319 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
³ CMAAG Taipei Taiwan MGPR 2231/120105Z Feb 69; J434 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
⁴ CINCPAC 150011Z Feb 69.
⁵ SECDEF 4941/182053Z Mar 69; J434 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
Purchase of Warships by China Through FMS

1. On 1 May 1969, CNO advised CINCPAC that, because of the cancellation of previous commitments, two destroyers "USS SPROSTON (DD 577) and USS PHILIP (DD 498) located Hawaii could be made available to MAP recipient nations for purchase 'as is where is' for approx. $150,000 each." In light of the expressed interest of GRC in acquiring excess destroyers and other type ships in connection with the planning for the MAAG-proposed force reorganization, CINCPAC had CHMAAG China contact the Chinese Navy concerning these two ships. On 16 May, CHMAAG China replied that the Chinese Navy wished to purchase the two destroyers and had the funds to pay for them; however, he recommended that a letter of offer be withheld, pending the receipt of price and availability information on unmodified Fletcher class destroyers and other types of ships, since GRC intended "to purchase total four DD, four DER, and one SS as replacements for a variety of ships which would be retired from service in a compensating force reduction." Two days later, CINCPAC concurred with CHMAAG China and requested that CNO furnish "earliest price and availability of Fletcher class DD with original weapon configuration." About a month later, CHMAAG China informed CINCPAC that the Chinese Navy had received and reviewed this requested information and could be "expected to make formal request within thirty days for specific types of naval ships."

2. In a message to CINCPAC on 7 July 1969, SECSTATE advised that the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D. C., had requested in a note on 29 May:

...that USG sell to GRC, through FMS program, nine US warships which it understands are to be placed on stricken list; four Fletcher or Smith class destroyers (DD), four radar picket escort ships (DER), and one diesel submarine (SS). Note states GRC intends to employ DD's and DER's in Taiwan Strait patrol duties, quote replacing some obsolete and older ships which constitute great drain on resources and afford little combat capability unquote, while submarine is intended for ASW training.

1. CNO 012034Z May 69.
2. CHMAAG Taiwan 5261/161033Z May 69; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; CINCPAC 070450Z May 69.
3. Admin CINCPAC 180017Z May 69.
4. CHMAAG Taiwan 6286/270101Z Jun 69; J4322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
... With the exception of the USS SPROSTON DD 577 and USS PHILLIP DD 498, all destroyers suitable for transfer were committed to other Free World countries to meet valid requirements. However, there is limited number of destroyer radar escorts and diesel submarines available. Additional ships will be stricken during the next few years and could be made available to GRC if valid requirement exists.

... regarding availability of stricken submarines for GRC, DOD has responded with view that GRC neither requires nor is prepared to support such and that adequate ASW practice provided by PACOM units.

Request Country Team and CINCPAC opinion on GRC request....

When queried by CINCPAC for his comments, CHMAAG China replied on 18 July 1969 that the "Chinese note of 29 May considered to be based on GRC estimate of ships available and is not a well reasoned request leading to a balanced naval force. Note does not refer to GRC deactivation of ineffective ships. DER has no more combat capability than PCE which we have been attempting to reduce in CN inventory." He then recommended that the U.S. should hold to the JSOP 72-79 submission for GRC, except that (1) "all surface additions to be steam driven destroyer types with five-inch guns"; (2) "provide one DE as attrition replacement for RCN DE-21 (ex-US DE-6) which is approaching point of total obsolescence"; and (3) "provide one to four submarines to create sub-surface capability." Recognizing that a final evaluation of GRC's requirement for and capability to support and operate submarines would have to await replies to questions of cost data and the intentions of PACOM in regards to providing target submarine services to GRC for the next five years, CHMAAG China concluded as follows:

... Regardless of final evaluation, MAAG China recognizes validity of GRC need to develop sub-surface capability as a defensive measure against potential CHICOM naval blockade, as an ASW weapon, and as a means of furthering CN ASW training. It is recommended that:

1. SECSTATE 111806/072218Z Jul 69.
2. CHMAAG Taiwan 737/180916Z Jul 69.
3. Ibid.
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A. MAAG China assist CN to develop a training program for CN to obtain at GRC expense the skills necessary to operate and maintain a submarine.

B. USG adopt official position that decision on sale of submarine be deferred pending development of CN subsurface capability. 1

(§) Meanwhile, as SECSTATE advised on 22 July 1969, the "Chinese Embassy here in note of July 8 has requested that USG transfer to GRC as ship loan four submarines at San Francisco which GRC understands are soon to be placed on stricken list. Note contains no justification for request, and it not clear whether or how this related to May 29 request." 2 Four diesel-driven thin-skinned submarines had been stricken from the U.S. Navy register as of 30 June 1969, but they had been extensively stripped, thus necessitating considerable and extensive overhaul work. After stating that DOD's view on submarines for GRC had not changed, SECSTATE asked that an appraisal of this latest GRC ship request be included in the comments on the Chinese note of 29 May.

(§) In general, CINCPACFLT, COMUSTDC, and the American Embassy in Taipei, Taiwan, supported CHMAAG China's recommendations concerning surface additions to the Chinese Navy, but did not concur in supporting the development of a submarine capability. "We recommend," read the message from the American Embassy in Taipei to SECSTATE on 30 July 1969, "that USG agree provide Chinese Navy (CN) with five destroyer-type ships on condition that GRC deactivate specific ships on phased basis. With regard to GRC request for submarines, we recommend that USG inform GRC that USG believes that further study of costs and benefits of GRC acquisition of submarine capability is required before decision is made." 3 As the Ambassador to China, Walter P. McConaughy, put it, this message had "the concurrence of the Country Team with the exception of those passages related to submarines on which Chief MAAG wishes to take a more affirmative position in support of submarines for GRC." 4

(§) As for CINCPAC, he supported CHMAAG China's recommendations for surface craft, but took exception with the proposal of providing GRC

1. Ibid.
2. SECSTATE 120842/222012Z Jul 69.
3. AMEMBASSY Taipei 2854/300850Z Jul 69; COMUSTDC 190901Z Jul 69; Admin CINCPACFLT 192301Z Jul 69; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
4. AMEMBASSY Taipei 2854/300850Z Jul 69.

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with submarines. "Acquisition, operation, and maintenance of submarines by GRC," read his message to SECSTATE on 1 August 1969, "can be made only at expense of high priority items already in critical shortfall and would contribute little to attainment of U.S. objectives with regards to Taiwan and Penghus." As a result, he recommended "that no submarines be made available to GRC at this time."

After learning that the five-inch steam-driven DEs were not available, CHMAAG China notified CINCPAC on 9 September 1969 that he had "originated a change to the JSOP for 5 DD's instead of 2 DD and 3 DE types." Since this revised recommendation was consistent with his input to JSOP FY 72-79, CINCPAC concurred in a message to the JCS five days later. At the same time, CINCPAC also concurred with CHMAAG China's inquiry as to the possibility of obtaining more suitable DDs than USS SPROSTON and USS PHILIP.

The U.S., stated a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 1 October 1969, intended to respond to the GRC request with the offer to sell five DDs; "refusal of submarines is based on desire to avoid giving GRC major new offensive weapons system, lack of defensive requirement for submarines, lack of CN personnel capable of operating and maintaining submarines, and costs of acquiring, operating, and maintaining this weapon system." This offer would be contingent upon a Chinese agreement to deactivate 42 obsolescent ships, including four LSTs, with the sale being divided into two stages of three DDs and two DDs, respectively. "Consummation of second stage of sale would depend on GRC deactivation of...28 ships within one year of arrival in Taiwan of...three DDs."

Views on this proposal as requested were submitted by CHMAAG China on 9 October 1969, with the Country Team and CINCPAC concurring:

The 42 ships compensating reduction proposed...is generally in accordance with CMAAG proposals for CN reorganization and modernization. However it exceeds by eight the 34 ships the CN has been willing to discuss in the past for deactivation as compensating reductions. CN objections relative to deactivation of 4 LSTs are expected to be

1. CINCPAC 010541Z Aug 69.
2. Ibid.
3. CHMAAG Taiwan 9215/090821Z Sep 69.
4. Ibid.; CINCPAC 140201Z Sep 69; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
5. SECSTATE 166772/012118Z Oct 69.
6. Ibid.
firm due to need for resupply off shore islands. It is considered unwise to insist upon the reduction of the 4 LSTs at the expense of serious delays in trade-off agreement. The GRC would possibly agree to trade-off 4 LSTs for 2 AKLs or other suitable replacement for LST resupply mission.\(^1\)

\(^{1}\) A week later, SECSTATE advised that GRC not be informed of the LST and other offsets contained in the second stage until negotiations had

A Chinese Navy LST beached for off loading during a landing exercise at Pingpu.

PEG CINCPAC Photo

1. CHMAAG Taiwan 090517Z Oct 69; CINCPAC 112250Z Oct 69.
actually been opened on the sale of the remaining two DDs, since GRC's reactions to the first stage proposal would provide an indication of GRC's general reaction. Accordingly, the American Embassy at Taipei was authorized to make the sale offer.  

(9) In a morning meeting with Minister of National Defense (MND) Huang and other Chinese officials on 21 October 1969, COMUSTDC and CHMAAG China explained the proposed sale of five DDs, as well as the U.S. decision not to give any submarines to GRC. No surprise was shown concerning the general outline of the offer, and the "Chinese seemed to accept as matter of course principle that specific CN vessels would have to be decommissioned for each DD received," furthermore, CHMAAG China later indicated that he perceived "no major difficulty in obtaining MND acceptance total deactivations required for five DDs, except for four LSTs." As for the submarines, MND Huang said he understood rationale behind decision but expressed mild disappointment, noting in low key that President Chiang still interested in SS for training purposes.

(9) Shortly after this meeting, in Washington, D. C., "Captain Wang Hsi-ling, Chinese Naval Attache requested the names and location of the three destroyers being considered for sale to GRC and date destroyers would be available for inspection and transfer." On 22 October 1969, CNO advised that the following DDs would be available for inspection and transfer on the dates indicated: USS SAMUEL MOORE (DD-747) - 24 October 1969, USS BRUSH (DD-745) - 27 October 1969, USS BRISTOL (DD-857) - 1 December 1969.

(9) In a message on 19 November 1969, the American Embassy in Taipei stated that the MAAG China had received a letter "from GEN Kao, Chief General Staff, listing 25 CN vessels to be decommissioned for the three DDs." Six days later, SECSTATE authorized the American Embassy in Taipei to exchange with the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs the diplomatic

1. SECSTATE 175922/162302Z Oct 69, cited in J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69; Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Oct 69, Subj: Sale of Warships to GRC.
2. AMEMBASSY Taipei 4236/230942Z Oct 69.
3. Ibid.
4. CNO 222125Z Oct 69.
5. Ibid.; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
6. J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70, citing AMEMB Taipei 4694/190957Z Nov 69.
note that he had enclosed in his message on the sale of the first three destroyers. This note also included an agreement to decommission the 25 CN vessels listed in the American Embassy message of 19 November 1969. Subsequently, on 9 December 1969, the American Embassy in Taipei reported the receipt of a reply the previous day from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which had accepted these conditions on transferring the first three destroyers.¹

(3) On 22 November 1969, following a visit to Taiwan, during which calls were made upon President Chiang and other GRC officials by Deputy SECDEF Packard and himself, CINC PAC informed SECDEF that there "appeared to be an undercurrent of genuine concern with regard to the depth of the USG commitment to the GRC."² In view of this concern, since the Chinese were "particularly adamant concerning the requirement for a limited number of submarines," CINC PAC recommended that the U.S. position concerning the acquisition of submarines by GRC should be re-examined.³ He believed that submarines could be made available under the following guidelines:

a. Not more than two submarines to be provided GRC, thus permitting one submarine to conduct ASW training while the other is undergoing overhaul/upgrade.

b. GRC to clearly understand that submarines are for ASW training only.

c. GRC to bear acquisition, O&M, and training costs outside of MAP.⁴

(3) In response to this proposal of CINC PAC, the American Embassy in Taipei stated "that if there is a reevaluation, it should focus (as did previous evaluation) on validity of military requirement, cost considerations, and GRC capability to support submarines."⁵ In short, the American Embassy did "not believe that political considerations in themselves justify reevaluation or warrant reversal earlier decision."⁶

(3) By 5 January 1970, SECDEF had reviewed the matter, found no new overriding considerations to justify the sale of submarines to GRC, and

1. J533 History, Hq CINC PAC, for the month of Feb 70, citing SECSTATE 196812/252302Z Nov 69; AMEMB Taipei 4694/190957Z Nov 69; AMEMB Taipei 4941/090450Z Dec 69.
2. CINC PAC 222223Z Nov 69.
3. Ibid.; J5332 History, Hq CINC PAC, for the month of Nov 69.
4. CINC PAC 222223Z Nov 69.
5. AMEMBASSY Taipei 4839/290430Z Nov 69.
6. Ibid.; J5332 History, Hq CINC PAC, for the month of Nov 69.
adhered to his original position of refusal for the following additional reasons:

GRC request is primarily motivated by desires of President Chiang without adequate staff evaluation.

No operational submarine will be available for sale in the foreseeable future.¹

Proposed Use of ROC NIKE HERCULES

1. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jan 70, Subj: Submarines for GRC; SECDEF 7392/052117Z Jan 70; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. CINCPAC 020417Z Apr 69; J516 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. CINCUSARPAC 15198/230736Z Apr 69.
4. COMUSTDC 240748Z Apr 69.
MAPOM (MAP Owned Material) NIKE HERCULES

(S) By means of a memorandum on 6 January 1969, SECDEF notified CINCPAC that "some MAPOM NIKE HERCULES equipment was available for programming in the Grant Aid program to satisfy existing requirements of eligible Grant Aid recipient countries, without regard to country dollar ceilings." This equipment would be programmed in the FY 68 MAP, with rehabilitation costs being chargeable to and programmed in FY 69 MAP. CHMAAG China, who was advised by CINCPAC of this new development on 15 February 1969, responded on 3 March with a list of items desired from the available listing provided by SECDEF.

(S) CHMAAG China reacted so quickly because he desired an additional NIKE HERCULES battalion to improve the air defense capabilities in southern Taiwan, a goal he had been urging the previous year. "The Republic of China (ROC) air defense system in 1968 included both interceptor and fighter aircraft, conventional air defense artillery, and a missile group. The latter was composed of one HAWK battalion and one NIKE HERCULES battalion, units of which were deployed to protect strategic areas located in the northern portion of Taiwan, being concentrated primarily in the Taipei area."

(S) On 24 March 1969, SECDEF questioned the feasibility of forming a second NIKE HERCULES battalion, rather than supporting or augmenting the existing battalion, and posed other questions as to cost, basic load, and training. CHMAAG China replied, as follows, on 27 March 1969:

The feasibility of supporting or augmenting the existing battalion was not considered since the offered equipment is of 1963 configuration, not generally compatible with the existing battalion equipment which is of the improved type.

1. CINCPAC 052256Z May 69; J516 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. CHMAAG Taiwan 321/030101Z Mar 69; J5332A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69, citing CINCPAC Ltr J431, Ser: 0305, 15 Feb 69.
5. SECDEF 5364/242114Z Mar 69.
Using the offered equipment in a float or replacement part capacity is wasteful of equipment. While some of the offered equipment is compatible to a degree, the fact that it represents four almost complete fire batteries is the overriding factor and demands that it be used to provide SAM defense for vital areas in southern Taiwan. The basic consideration then is not one of supporting an existing capability but rather one of satisfying a recognized and needed capability which does not now exist.

O&M costs for the 2nd NH Bn will be borne by MAP. Costs are estimated at $200,000 for FY 70 and $600,000 for succeeding years.... The remaining equipment required to field the battalion is available in CONUS depots and would have to be obtained from existing U.S. stocks through FMS with costs to be borne by GRC.

Total basic load is not considered at this time. One missile per launcher capability, total of 36 missiles, is recommended.... Further the establishment of a second NIKE Battalion would permit relatively simple augmentation by additional missiles in the future, which can be provided by FMS or from excess.

The training program is planned as suggested, with the exception of the requested training for 37 personnel who constitute hard-skill specialists and cannot be trained in the GRC....

In a message to SECDEF on 1 April 1969, CINCPAC concurred in CHMAAG China's views and recommended "that the MAPOM NIKE HERCULES equipment be used to form a second missile battalion for employment in the air defense system of the Republic of China." SECDEF's reply came on 15 April 1969:

Formation of second battalion from MAPOM assets approved but dwindling MAP resources make it necessary that no additional support be provided under MAP. Therefore, cost of O&M and missiles and other equipment not available from MAPOM cannot be supported by MAP and should be borne by GRC through FMS.

1. CHMAAG Taiwan 334/271011Z Mar 69.
2. CINCPAC 010246Z Apr 69.
SECRET

Necessary training approved subject Army's capability to provide and no increased costs to China MAP Program. Advise courses and spaces. 1

(5) "In view of limitation placed on use of MAP funds for O&M costs, read CINCPAC's message to CHMAAG China on 19 April 1969, "request advise if GRC willing to bear additional costs through FMS. Further request advise if list of courses and spaces...still valid for reply to SECDEF." 2 In reply on 28 April 1969, CHMAAG China stated that the GRC was willing to bear the additional costs brought on by the second NIKE HERCULES battalion and that CHMAAG China's previously-submitted list of courses and spaces was still valid. 3

(U) Shortly thereafter, CINCPAC forwarded this information to SECDEF, and the GRC began attempting to attain this equipment through the screening of U.S. excesses. From this point on, since the major policy decision in this matter had been made, Hq CINCPAC could expect to be involved only in routine requests from the GRC for U.S. excesses. 4

Transfer of MAP-Provided Ex-U.S. Navy Vessels from Japan to China

(5) On 4 March 1969, CHMAAG Japan reported that three ex-U.S. Navy (USN) 63-foot aircraft rescue boats (AVRs) had been declared excess to the needs of the Japanese Navy and were available for return to U.S. custody. Three days later, as requested by CNO, CINCPAC queried PACOM MAP/MAF recipients as to their needs and justifications for these vessels. All replies, except one, were negative. Based upon a Chinese requirement for high speed patrol boats, CINCPAC recommended to CNO on 27 March that "the three ex-U.S. AVRs be transferred to the Chinese Navy in 'as-is' condition at no cost except for PCH&T or preparation." 5 On 4 April 1969, CNO concurred and requested CINCPAC to "initiate action to effect transfer these vessels from GOJ to GRC at no cost to MAP. PCH&T or tow preparation costs...

1. SECDEF 6973/1522172 Apr 69.
2. CINCPAC 190045Z Apr 69.
3. CHMAAG Taiwan 4310/280505Z Apr 69; J5332A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
4. Intv, LCOL Charles R. Casey, USMC, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 15 Sep 69.
5. Admin CINCPAC 270002Z Mar 69; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.

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is responsibility of GRC. "1 CINCPAC, in turn, the next day, directed CH-MAAG Japan and CHMAAG China to coordinate this transfer between them. 2

Validation of Electronic Countermeasures Equipment

(9) In October 1966, a U.S. Mobile Training Team (MTT) made a survey of the Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities of the GRC. It also made recommendations on the U.S. assistance that would be necessary to achieve an adequate EW posture. In response to the MMT final report, the "JCS approved of providing assistance to the GRC and stated that requests for EW equipment should be justified by the GRC concept of defensive employment and validated on a case-by-case basis by CINCPAC. "3

(9) On 14 September 1968, CHMAAG China dispatched a message to CINCPAC, requesting that a limited number of EW transmitters, receivers and jamming pods be released to the GRC for training purposes. 4 After determining the exact equipment requirements, CINCPAC validated CHMAAG China's request on 3 May 1969. 5

Electronic Warfare (EW) Mobile Training Team (MTT)

(9) "To increase their EW capability, the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) requested an EW MTT. In response, the JCS sent an all Service team to aid the GRC EW training program and assist in developing a program of EW concept, doctrine and tactics. "6 The primary purpose of this MTT was to provide EW orientation for senior and staff GRC officers and to update EW training courses. J3B8, Hq CINCPAC reviewed the team's "course material and found that it satisfied the JCS requirement that only the defensive EW concept be presented. "7 The EW MTT on its deployment to Taiwan briefed J3 and J6 staff representatives of Hq CINCPAC on 8 August 1969, at which time the "team appeared to be well organized and prepared. "8

1. CNO 042129Z Apr 69.
2. CINCPAC 052356Z Apr 69.
4. CHMAAG Taiwan MGMND-D 9310/140307Z Sep 69.
5. CINCPAC 032011Z May 69; J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
6. Point Paper, J3B8, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Nov 69, Subj: Electronic Warfare (EW) Mobile Training Team (MTT) Taiwan.
7. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
8. Ibid.
The EW MMT deployed to Taiwan from 10 September to 9 October 1969. There, it "created interest in high levels of the GRC and made recommendations that the MAAG request release of appropriate EW literature and equipment to the GRC."\(^1\) CINCPAC, of course, would have the responsibility of validating these requests prior to forwarding them to the appropriate military service for action. CINCPAC concurred in the recommendations of the EW MTT, which had prompted MAAG China to request release of literature to the GRC. As of 8 November 1969, CINCPAC had validated two of MAAG China's requests and was in the process of validating another. His position was to continue "to examine the GRC requests for EW assistance in view of their defensive EW program and validate if appropriate."\(^2\)

**Indonesia**

Another very important country in the overall Pacific Command Military Assistance Programs is Indonesia. General Suharto has made some progress in overcoming internal economic and social problems but improvement is slow.

A modest amount of U.S. military assistance has been channeled into a civic action program for that country in an effort to stabilize the government and assist General Suharto in gaining the confidence of the people. The Indonesian Armed Forces have effectively used the equipment provided. Indications are, that given time and some assistance, the Suharto Government will contribute to the stability and progress of Southeast Asia.

The Military Assistance Program for the Indonesian Armed Forces is designed to maintain U.S. influence in Indonesia for a minimum amount of money. The FY 70 program will continue to emphasize training and equipment support of the Indonesian civic action efforts.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. \(^3\)

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1. Point Paper, J3B8, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Nov 69, Subj: Electronic Warfare (EW) Mobile Training Team (MTT) Taiwan.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 26 Jun 69 MAP Statement.
INDONESIA
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1969

GENERAL OBJECTIVE
CONTINUED AVAILABILITY TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES OF SEA AND AIR BASES BETWEEN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN AREAS.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
NON. FRANCIS J. GALBRAITH

USAID REPRESENTATIVE
MR. STOKES M. TOLBERT

CHULU
COL TAYLOR R. FULTON, USA

BASIC INFORMATION

POPULATION: 731,000 SQ ME
BIRTH RATES: 490, 1 MIL
DEATH RATES: 7.7%
AGRICULTURE LAND PER CAPITA: 1.5 ACRE
AGRICULTURE LAND UNPRODUCTIVE: 0.5 ACRE
GROSS INT. PROD. 1969: $1 BILLION
GROSS INT. EXP. 1969: $1 BILLION

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

Continued availability to the U.S. and its allies of sea and air bases between Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES

ARMS
34 INFS, 1 PARA COMMANDO BN, 1 CAV TANK BN, 45 INF BN, 45 INF BN, 45 INF BN
1 PARA COMMANDO REGT, 1 PARA COMMANDO BN, 1 RAID BN, 1 EHF BN, 1 CAV BN, 4 SMART COMMANDOS
MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL MINOR INＣURSIONS BUT NOT A MAJOR ATTACK. LAUNCH AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN BRIGADE STRENGTH.

NAVY
6 DD, 2 PCE, 18 PGM, 6 PT, 4 MFS, 3 APL
PARTIALLY SUPPRESS SMUGGLING AND PROVIDE LIMITED SUPPORT FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. CONDUCT ONLY TOKEN SUBMARINE INTERCEPTION AND ASW OPERATIONS. INDONESIAN NAVY IS NOT MARGINALLY READY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE BOMBING OPERATIONS AND VFR AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD.

AIR FORCE
2 TAC FTR SQS, 2 SAR SQ, 1 SAR SQ, 1 TAC COMP
TOTAL STRENGTH 10,000
FORCES IN BEING ARE MARGINALLY READY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE BOMBING OPERATIONS AND VFR AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD.

* AS OF 1 JULY 69

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 142.
Additional U.S. Assistance to Indonesian Armed Forces

(5) At Bali, on 6 August 1969, senior Indonesian military officials met with Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. State Department, to "enter strong plea for modest additional U.S. assistance to Armed Services within framework of present program for training and providing additional transport and engineering equipment. . . . Main request was for more Army training and provision at nominal cost of obsolete surplus U.S. Air Force planes for transport, air and sea rescue, disaster relief."¹ Ten days later, Francis J. Galbraith, American Ambassador to Indonesia, forwarded his evaluation and recommendations concerning this request to SECSTATE and CINCPAC. "Heightened expectations and insistent Indonesian requests for increased military assistance were among results of the recent, precedent-making, highly successful Presidential visit," he reported, adding that "President Nixon's visit was a milestone in U.S.-Indonesian relations."² In brief, because of overriding political reasons, he believed that limited additional assistance was warranted and that an early positive response was imperative.

(5) In a message to SECDEF on 22 August 1969, CINCPAC stated he was in agreement with Ambassador Galbraith's evaluation and would assist in this matter as appropriate. Because of the small dollar value MAP to Indonesia, exploration of various areas was undertaken in an effort to stretch the existing program funds. Some measure of success occurred almost immediately, when CSAF advised that nine aircraft engines, plus technical assistance personnel, were available to help bolster the sagging air transport deadline problem that had consistently prevailed in the Indonesian Air Force.³ Then, on 5 September, CSAF furnished CINCPAC with his overall position:

...that introduction of new type transport acft to Indonesian Air Force inventory would only complicate already overburdened maintenance/logistic base. On hand C-47 and HU-16s should first be repaired with USAF assistance if required and an effective maintenance capability developed prior to the addition of more aircraft to the country inventory. Further if a valid need exists for additional transport aircraft, recommend that additional quantities of C-47/HU16 be considered.⁴

1. AMEMBASSY Canberra 4193/071108Z Aug 69.
2. AMEMBASSY Djakarta 5596/1/160842Z Aug 69.
3. CINCPAC 221130Z Aug 69; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69; CSAF AFSMSDA 221904Z Aug 69.
4. CSAF AFSMSAB 051329Z Sep 69.
MAP-supported dump trucks of the 13th Engineer Construction Battalion.

13th Engineer Construction Battalion Motor Pool
The same day, CHDLG Indonesia asked CINCPAC for a delay in the submission of his recommendations on the additional assistance pending the outcome of a joint meeting of the Indonesian military services. The purpose of this meeting, scheduled to meet 8 September, was to prepare a consolidated request for this additional assistance by the Indonesian military services, including justifications. The next day, a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message informed CINCPAC that Ambassador Galbraith's proposals "are receiving close attention by STATE and DOD. There is agreement that early, significant gesture in responding to GOI requests for assistance is required to accomplish our political objectives." After outlining a four point action program, being considered at the national level, to provide a visible and timely impact to earlier Indonesian requests, the message requested CINCPAC's comments. Its funding guidance further stipulated that the accomplishment of this program was to be attained, if possible, within the framework of the FY 70 MAP.

The requested CINCPAC comments were forthcoming in a message to SECDEF, CSAF, and CHDLG Indonesia on 10 September 1969. Besides granting CHDLG Indonesia's request for a delay, CINCPAC commented as follows:

2. FOR SECDEF: Concur in considerations and action program encompassing the four elements.... Also note is taken of no wish to change present MAP TOR or basic agreement with GOI, neither of which permit providing combat equipment.

3. FOR CSAF:

   a. Concur.... Immediate repair of on-hand IAF transport aircraft plus development of an effective in-country maintenance capability within the IAF is realistic and should provide early significant impact desired.

"CINCPAC's recent visit and pro-Western attitudes displayed by high ranking Indonesian officials, who had previously attended U.S. Service schools," commented CINCPAC on 17 November 1969, "suggest extension to broaden host country attitudes where possible and appropriate. It appears that increased emphasis should be given to the priority areas of training, rehabilitation of U.S. equipment, including transport items and communication

1. SECSTATE 151109/1/060339Z Sep 69; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69; CHDLG Djakarta 051032Z Sep 69.
2. CINCPAC 100420Z Sep 69.
support. In reply on 26 November, CHDLG Indonesia forwarded a Country Team recommendation that included an increase in the program ceiling of one million dollars. CINCPAC's recommendation to SECDEF on 16 December 1969, therefore, endorsed an Indonesia MAP FY 71-75 that would include additional training, communications support to selected paramilitary forces, moderate increases to air transport equipment, and rehabilitation of on-hand U.S.-origin equipment. He concluded by stating that these recommendations:

1. CINCPAC 170925Z Nov 69; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. Ibid.; CHDLG Djakarta 261013Z Nov 69.
SECRET

...represent an increase of $1.5 million to current Indonesia annual MAP ceiling; however, the resultant accomplishment of realistic and significant U.S. objectives in Indonesia over future plan years far outweigh the small dollar increase recommended above. A comparatively small current investment will pay great dividends in the future.  

Accelerated Delivery of Prior Year MAP Equipment

(☐) Since the meeting between senior Indonesian military officials and Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. State Department, on 6 August 1969, reported CHDLG Indonesia on 21 October 1969, "the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI) have been pressing for increased military assistance in a general way, although to the knowledge of CHDLG, no promises of specific additional assistance have been made."² Although forced to work within the "constraints of guidance" provided by the joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message of 6 September 1969, CHDLG Indonesia had been attempting "to find means whereby the heightened expectations of ABRI can be partially satisfied without additional costs to Indonesia MAP."³ After reviewing the problem, he concluded "that accelerated delivery of selected items for selected MAPELS would be economical method likely to succeed in creating early favorable impact."⁴ As a result, he nominated 71 FY 68 and FY 69 program lines to be considered for accelerated delivery.

(☐) CINCPAC, believing that this proposal had merit, requested CSAF, CNO, and DA to take the necessary action to expedite the delivery of the nominated equipment on 24 October 1969. At the same time, he authorized direct coordination in this matter between them and CHDLG Indonesia.⁵ By 31 December 1969, accelerated delivery of the 71 selected items of prior year MAP equipment for Indonesia had been accomplished.⁶

1. CINCPAC 160455Z Dec 69; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. CHDLG Jakarta 210500Z Oct 69; AMEMBASSY Canberra 4193/071108Z Aug 69.
3. CHDLG Jakarta 210500Z Oct 69; SECSTATE 151109/1/060339Z Sep 69.
4. CHDLG Jakarta 210500Z Oct 69; J4316 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
5. Admin CINCPAC 242218Z Oct 69.
6. J4316 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
MAP equipment ready for issue at Engineer Deprocessing Detachment at Tandjung Priok.

MAP equipment awaiting parts prior to issue at Engineer Deprocessing Detachment at Tandjung Priok.
Logistic Assistance to Indonesian Air Force

"Fundamental in the development of a successful maintenance base is the need for an operational" PMEL (Precision Measuring Equipment Laboratory), stated CSAF on 5 September 1969, while discussing the proposed improvement of the air transport of the Indonesian Air Force; he then requested CINCPAC for a program realignment to support a PMEL in Indonesia.¹ Five days later, CINCPAC provided SECDEF with the necessary programming data for support of a PMEL at an estimated cost of $30,000.² CHDLG Indonesia, however, did not concur with this program change, stating that his records indicated an uncommitted balance of only $10,000, which was insufficient to cover the cost of the PMEL.³

Indonesian Air Force C-130 free dropping cargo in a roadless area of West Irian.

Learning from CSAF that there was an uncommitted balance of $71,566 as of 31 August 1969, because several Indonesian requisitions had been satisfied by no-cost, excess items, CINCPAC asked CHDLG Indonesia to reconsider his nonconcurrency on 16 September 1969.⁴ In reply on 23 September, CHDLG Indonesia requested the withholding of emergency action on the PMEL equipment for the following reasons:

1. CSAF 051329Z Sep 69; J4319 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
2. CINCPAC 100130Z Sep 69.
3. CHDLG Djakarta 110858Z Sep 69.
4. CINCPAC 160022Z Sep 69.
SECRET

(1) Lack of trained host country personnel to effectively utilize equipment concerned.

(2) Lack of host country funds to install PMEL equipment.

(3) Lack of host country ability to provide a climate controlled space in which to house PMEL equipment.

(4) Incomplete host country plans for utilization of PMEL equipment even if problems outlined sub paras (1), (2), and (3) above solved. 1

While appreciating this rapid response to the valid PMEL equipment requirement, continued CHDLG Indonesia, the Indonesian Air Force "at this point in time has not indicated that it desires this equipment. "2 As soon as its desires and capabilities become known, CHDLG Indonesia stated that "action will be taken by this activity to either implement furnishing of PMEL equipment or to cancel project entirely. "3 Accordingly, on 26 September 1969, CSAF suspended implementation action on the additive requirement for a PMEL for the Indonesian Air Force, pending further study of this project by CHDLG Indonesia. 

(5) Finally, on 14 November 1969, CSAF asked for "a GO-NO-GO decision for Indonesia PMEL equipment. "5 Then, eleven days later, CHDLG Indonesia stated that "PMEL could be effectively utilized if specified conditions were met. "6 "If $30,000.00 estimate is still valid, " CINCPAC wired to CSAF on 29 November 1969, "request you proceed with developing a schedule for delivery of equipment as a package. "7

Request That Information Be Provided to Indonesia Department of Defense

On 2 September 1969, CHDLG (Chief, Defense Liaison Group) Indonesia forwarded to CINCPAC a request he had received from the Indonesia

1. CHDLG Djakarta 230945Z Sep 69.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. CSAF AFSMSDB 262143Z Sep 69; J4319 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
5. CSAF AFSMSDB 142246Z Nov 69, cited in CINCPAC 292332Z Nov 69.
6. CHDLG Djakarta 251037Z Nov 69, cited in CINCPAC 292332Z Nov 69.
7. CINCPAC 292332Z Nov 69; J43161A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
CONFIDENTIAL

Department of Defense (HANKAM) for information concerning U.S. military policies, organization, and procedures relative to the education and training systems and programs of the U.S. armed services. Having been tasked with the job of developing controls and standards for the training and education of all the services of the Indonesian Armed Forces, the military personnel of the HANKAM, who had no previous experience in this field, desired to compare the U.S. system, programs, and policies with the reference data that they had before developing their own program. Because this request went far beyond the scope of normal MAP training support, CHDLG Indonesia asked for a policy determination on this matter, stating that:

Recent developments indicate that HANKAM is becoming more viable organization and appears to be gaining in its efforts to acquire more control and authority over military services. This is welcome development from standpoint of administration of MAP if nothing else and certainly will make DLG task easier as time goes on. For these reasons, would like to support HANKAM request to some degree if possible.  

Concurring in CHDLG Indonesia's interpretation that this request indicated "an increased responsiveness to MAP efforts in Indonesia and would be a welcome development in U.S.-Indonesian relations," CINCPAC recommended the following to SECDEF on 30 September 1969:

In light of the recent Presidential visit to Indonesia, and to give a prompt and favorable reaction to subj req, recommend the following course of action:

a. Provide the requested references as soon as suitable data on DOD organization, policy, etc., can be assembled.

b. Prepare to offer Indonesia special orientation tour for a few key military personnel of HANKAM to visit various CONUS military tng and education agencies. Offer to be made after a suitable interval following delivery of requested information to HANKAM.

c. Prepare to offer an MTT composed of specially selected U.S. military personnel to advise and assist

1. CHDLG Djakarta 020851Z Sep 69; J3A22 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

HANKAM in the development of an adequate in-country education and TNG system. MTT size and composition to be determined by minimum requirements and the low profile policy of the U.S. mission. MTT to be offered during visit of key HANKAM personnel.

SECDEF's concurrence in all three of CINCPAC's proposed courses of action was forthcoming on 23 October 1969. "Each military service and the Dept. of Transportation for the Coast Guard will be requested to expeditiously forward the desired training information to CHDLG, " advised SECDEF, and he outlined orientation tour and MTT procedures to be followed by CINCPAC. Two days later, in a follow-up action, CINCPAC also requested the pertinent agencies to take action in accordance with SECDEF's instructions "when deemed appropriate in relation to Indonesian requests for TNG assistance."

Personnel Housing for Defense Liaison Group (DLG) Indonesia

In October 1967, SECDEF authorized the funding of $100,000 through the Department of State Shared State Support Agreement (SSSSA) for the immediate lease, renovation, furniture, and furnishings of four housing units for DLG Indonesia. This action was a reluctant, but necessary, one, because of the inability of the Government of Indonesia (GOI) to fulfill its agreement to provide the housing prior to the approval of the GOI Calendar Year 1968 budget. Accordingly, CINCPAC was instructed to enjoin DLG Indonesia to request the American Embassy in Djakarta to press the GOI for reimbursement to the U.S. of these rental costs of $100,000. As of 6 March 1969, however, CHDLG (Chief, DLG) stated that the GOI was still unable to provide the required housing.

Accordingly, on 12 April 1969, because two additional houses were urgently needed to accommodate two married personnel assigned to DLG Indonesia, CINCPAC, with the concurrence of the American Embassy in Djakarta, since "AMEMB and CHDLG continuing to press for long term housing support from GOI but negotiations very slow and no solution will resolve present problem," recommended to SECDEF that "funds be authorized in the amount of $50,000 for immediate 5 year lease, renovation, furniture

1. CINCPAC 302040Z Sep 69.
2. SECDEF 31BO/231415Z Oct 69; J3A22 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
3. Admin CINCPAC 250311Z Oct 69.
4. SECDEF 9560/211509Z Oct 67 and CHDLG Indonesia 060210Z Mar 69, both cited in CINCPAC 122209Z Apr 69.

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and furnishing for two additional housing units, as an exception to DOD policy. SECDEF answered as follows on 28 May 1969:

We are mindful of hardship caused by housing shortage; therefore, this office is willing to fund the requested $50,000 by corresponding reduction in the FY 69 MAP materiel program. Our concern should be expressed to GOI, including fact that cost of housing will be at expense of MAP materiel. If they can provide housing, MAP will be increased commensurately.

CINCPAC had proposed a $50,000 decrease in FY 69 Indonesia MAP to provide funding for the needed DLG Indonesia housing, and SECDEF requested that these proposed decreases be submitted to the implementing Military Department since MAP orders have already been issued for those items. Six days later, after informing CHDLG Indonesia of SECDEF's actions, including the providing of the necessary funds through the SSSSA, and instructions, CINCPAC requested CHDLG Indonesia to implement SECDEF's requested action. On the same day, CINCPAC processed the necessary FY 69 Indonesia MAP decrease actions. Later, the same month, one of the submitted program change decreases was rejected, because of an insufficient uncommitted balance. This problem, however, was generated by an apparent error in requisitioning each instead of seven each--and this matter was referred to DLC Indonesia for resolution.

Military Assistance for Basic Pilot Training T-41 Aircraft

A SECSTATE message on 1 April 1969 forwarded a "draft text of proposed agreement between Indonesia and United States for U.S. military assistance for basic pilot training aircraft" to the Charge D'Affaires in Djakarta, Indonesia, and authorized him "to open negotiations in manner believed most propitious for conclusion of executive agreement based on this text." While stating that he considered this "present inclusion of basic trainer aircraft to be compatible with overall concept of our Indonesian MAP,"

1. CINCPAC 122209Z Apr 69.
2. SECDEF 1305/282102Z May 69.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 122209Z Apr 69.
4. Admin CINCPAC 040117Z Jun 69; Admin CINCPAC 040116Z Jun 69; J4322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
5. NAVILCO Bayonne NJ 231930Z Jun 69; J4322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
6. SECSTATE 49133/011900Z Apr 69.
being important in sustaining Indonesian Air Force participation in civic action programs, SECSTATE instructed the Charge D'Affaires to "make clear in context of negotiation of new agreement that nothing therein implies U.S. obligation or intention to extend MAP to basic rearmament or internal security support." SECSTATE further explained why the agreement "refers to 'up to a squadron' of aircraft rather than naming any specific figure, since this clearly delimits order of magnitude involved but still allows programming flexibility to take into consideration availability of funds and possibly changing Indonesian priorities related to civic action portion of our MAP support." In the end, Charge D'Affaires advised SECSTATE on 17 April 1969 that the exchange "of notes completed with receipt Acting Foreign Minister's note of concurrence dated April 17."

Japan

It should be of interest to you that we are disestablishing our Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Japan this coming summer, since our grant aid to that country has been terminated. It will be succeeded by a small Military Materiel Office, located in the Embassy, which will be the focal point for our military sales program in Japan. Other residual MAAG functions will be assumed by the Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.

Phase-out of MAAG Japan and Establishment of Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO)

During 1968, plans and preparations for the phase-out of MAAG Japan and the establishment of its successor, a Military Materiel Office (MMO) in the American Embassy in Tokyo, progressed satisfactorily; in anticipation, certain MAAG functions were gradually transferred to COMUS Japan or other agencies in Japan. Early in the following year, on 27 March 1969, CINCPAC asked the JCS for an "early favorable decision" on the proposed

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; J532 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
3. AMEMBASSY Djakarta 2308/170830Z Apr 69.
4. CINCPAC 26 Jun 69 MAP Statement.
JAPAN
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1969

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA................................................................................. 364,900 SQ. KM.
Pika) RATHER......................... 88,000 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH............. 0.5 MILLION
ANCILLARY LAND PERCAP........ 0.3 ACRE
LITERACY RATE............... 97%
LIFE EXPECTANCY............. 67 YEARS
GROSS INT. PROF. (1967)........ $19.5 BILLION
PER CAPITA......................... $953
DEFENSE BUDGET (1967)........ $54.1 MILLION
AS % OF GNP....................... 8.6%
AS % OF TOTAL BUDGET........ 1.2%

EMPEROR - Hirohito
PRIME MINISTER - Eisaku Sato
MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Kichis Akashi
MINISTER DEFENSE - Kaki Achi
MINISTER JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY (JDA) - Kichi Akashi
CHIEF, GROUND STAFF (GDSF) - LT GEN Masao Yamada
CHIEF, MARITIME STAFF (MSDF) - ADM Sato, Admiral, Navy
CHIEF, AIR STAFF (ASDF) - GEN Kagoshiki, Okinawa, AF
CHIEF, MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY - Ichiro Kawanishi

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

ARMY
12 INF DIVS, 1 MEC DIV, 1 ABN BDE, 1 SCH BDE, 16 ARTY BNS, 4 TANK BNS, 26 SPT BNS, 5 NAVE BNS, 1 AAA BNS.
TOTAL STRENGTH 157,000

NAVY
1 CV, 25 DD/DS TYPES, 15 SS, 10 PC/PF/P2, 48 MINE WARFARE SHIPS, 10 ASW PAT BNS, 7 SP TYPE HELOS, 1 SAR SQ, 7 LST/LSM.
TOTAL STRENGTH 35,000

AIR FORCE
12 FW FLY SQS, 1 AW SQ, 9 MRE BNS, 1 TAC FTR SQS, 1 TAC RECON SQ, 1 WE SQ, 11 SAR DET, 2 TRACKING SQS.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES

FTR: 464 JET, 16 PROP, RECON: 14 JET, 16 PROP, TRACK: 3 TURBO PROP, 30 PROP.
TOTAL STRENGTH 39,100

OVERALL OBJECTIVE
U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

TO RETAIN U.S. BASES AND FACILITIES WITH ACCESS AND ACCESSIBILITY; AND ASSESS ALL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AMERICAN INFLUENCE.

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. ARMIN H. METER

CHIEF, MISSION
COL. WILLIAM M. REYNOLDS, JR., USAF

COMBAT CAPABILITY

MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT LIMITED DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

LIMITED ABILITY TO ESCORT COASTAL CONVOYS; 1 ASW SQ OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE; GOOD MINESWEEPING CAPABILITY; HIGH DEGREE OF READINESS.

GOOD UNDER WFR CONDITIONS; AREA CAPABILITY GROWING, SMALL SIZE AND AIRCRAFT FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITS CAPABILITY. CAPABLE OF PROVIDING TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR BOTH GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES.

AS OF 1 JULY 69

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov. 69, p. 143.
plans for the termination of MAAG Japan by 30 June 1969, furnishing the following rationale:

2. Concept for accomplishment of residual MAAG functions by a MMO and COMUSJAPAN contained in Ref A is a valid requirement and essential to CINCPAC ability to influence military matters on a regional basis. Command and control lines for the MMO through CINCPAC to DOD are considered appropriate for the accomplishment of essential military planning as it applies to regional military strategy and policy, to development of U.S. and Allied objective force levels and associated equipage and to U.S. contingency and bilateral operational planning.

3. The MMO has been established within the present MAAG structure on a trial basis. It is contemplated that this activity will move to the Embassy Annex in the summer of 1969. Present trial operation of the MMO is expected to provide for a smooth transition of functions of the newly established office and to facilitate transfer of certain MAAG residual functions to COMUSJAPAN.\(^1\)

\(\text{On 22 May 1969, the JCS notified CINCPAC that DOD had approved the plans for the phase-out of MAAG Japan.}\(^2\) The next day, however, the JCS asked for CINCPAC's recommendations on the following statement in the DOD approval memorandum, which imposed a JTD (Joint Table of Distribution) consideration:

Initial staffing of up to 10 U.S. positions and 6 indirect hire foreign nationals is approved. A JTD should be submitted for approval in accordance with normal MAAG procedures. Due to the somewhat unique nature of this office, it is appropriate to consider filling the positions of Chief and Deputy Chief with a military officer and a civilian official, with either eligible to hold the senior position.\(^3\)

CINCPAC's reply to the JCS was forthcoming on 30 May 1969:

1. Admin CINCPAC 270037Z Mar 69; J5122 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
2. JCS 9841/221556Z May 69, cited in JCS 9950/231905Z May 69.
3. JCS 9950/231905Z May 69; J5122 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. The nature and scope of responsibilities of the Chief in carrying out the TOR and administering the organization are considered more appropriate for a military incumbent of the position. Functions for which a civilian official might be best qualified can be adequately carried out by a civilian Deputy Chief. While it would be appropriate for the civilian official (Deputy Chief) to be in the senior position temporarily during the absence of the Chief, a rotational arrangement whereby the senior position is open to a civilian official could lead to extended occupancy by a particular individual since tenure in the military position is subject to Service overseas tour policies not applicable to the civilian member.

4. Anticipate that transition to an office headed by a civilian would result in a radical change in the Japanese view of the functions being performed. Japanese Defense officials would find the relationship difficult to relate to a transition from the MAAG. Continued Japanese support of operating costs for the office, which now appears susceptible to favorable resolution, could be placed in jeopardy.

5. Recommend the position of Chief remain designated to be filled by a Military Officer. Retitling of the senior civilian position as Deputy Chief should provide adequately for a higher level of civilian participation, apparently envisioned in the DOD approval memo, without disrupting the preferred structure and essential purpose of the organization. 1

(1) Subsequently, the JCS forwarded a memorandum to SECDEF that contained "a recommendation that the Chief of the successor office to MAAG Japan be approved as a military position and that the senior civilian position be designated as deputy chief." 2 CINCPAC's position, therefore, had been accepted, for this recommendation supported it.

(2) Meanwhile, in a message to CINCPAC on 27 May 1969, COMUS Japan enumerated the seven residual MAAG functions scheduled for transfer to him and recommended that all but the requirement for the JSOP (Joint Strategic

1. CINCPAC 300529Z May 69.
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Objectives Plan), which was specifically assigned to him, be assigned instead to CINCPAC's component commanders for accomplishment through their Service commanders in Japan. In reply on 15 June 1969, CINCPAC advised that:

2. Each of the seven functions listed in Ref A and designated for transfer to COMUSJAPAN have joint as well as Service implications. Service aspects of those functions, including liaison with appropriate JSDF Service elements as well as certain uni-Service matters formerly handled by the Service elements of the MAAG will necessarily become the responsibility of the U.S. Service Commanders in Japan. It is expected that these matters will be handled in accordance with guidance provided by the respective PACOM Service Component Commander and necessary supporting arrangements developed through Service channels.

3. COMUSJAPAN is responsible for the overall monitorship of residual MAAG functions to be continued in Japan not included in the new TOR of the MAAG successor organization and will coordinate those matters of joint concern...

Six days later, CINCPAC outlined to his component commanders "those residual functions of a joint nature for which COMUSJAPAN would be responsible and stated that certain uni-Service matters formerly handled by the Service elements of the MAAG would necessarily become the responsibility of the U.S. Service Commanders in Japan. These matters should be handled in accordance with guidance provided by respective PACOM Service Component Commanders and necessary supporting arrangements developed through Service channels." Accordingly, he requested his component commanders to provide the necessary "guidance to Service Commanders in Japan and supporting arrangements be developed in accordance with" CINCPAC's guidelines.

As scheduled, on 4 April 1969, the American Embassy in Tokyo and the Government of Japan exchanged notes, which changed the designation of the MAAG to the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO). The American

1. COMUSJAPAN 270701Z May 69; J5122 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
2. CINCPAC 150135Z Jun 69.
3. CINCPAC 210444Z Jun 69.
4. Ibid.
Ambassador to Japan, Armin H. Meyer, signed for the U.S., while Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi signed for the Government of Japan. At this time, COMUS Japan assumed a number of the residual functions of the former MAAG. 1

Recoupment of U.S. Share in Excess Missile Equipment, 2d SAM Package Agreement

("The problem herein stated," wrote CHMAAG Japan on 1 December 1967, "is the recoupment of U.S. share of funds generated from the sale of excess missile equipment and parts furnished Japan under the cost-share agreement for the 2d Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Package." 2 Factors that complicated the problem were: (1) lack of any known precedent or policy that could give CHMAAG Japan guidance for the disposal of cost-share equipment; (2) while conceding that the agreement for sharing the returns applied to all major items, the Japanese felt that the spare parts were exempt from the agreement; and (3) Japan had made purchases of some parts through FMS, which were then mixed with those received under cost-share, thus making accountability difficult. In view of the foregoing, CHMAAG Japan recommended to CINCPAC and SECDEF that the U.S.:

a. Waive our residual rights in the U.S. portion of the concurrent spares.

b. Continue full, 35%, residual rights for all major missile system items. 3

("In his endorsement to CHMAAG Japan's letter on 4 January 1968, CINCPAC nonconcurred in the proposed waiving of American residual rights to the spare parts and recommended to SECDEF that "the U.S. continue full, 35% residual rights for all major missile system items and spare parts." 4 When some six months passed without any reply to his letter, CHMAAG Japan

1. History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 July - 30 September 1969, dtd 14 Nov 69, p. 15; FONECON, LCOL G. Hoidra, USAF, J5126, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 14 Jan 70; J5126 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
2. Ltr, CHMAAG Japan to SECDEF, 1 Dec 67, Subj: Recoupment of U.S. Share in Excess Missile Equipment, 2d SAM Package Agreement.
3. Ibid.
4. 1st Ind. to Ibid., CINCPAC to SECDEF, 4 Jan 68.
again wrote to SECDEF, recommending "that procedures be agreed upon, in writing, between Japan and the U.S. for disposition of all cost-share equipment. This headquarters will negotiate an agreement upon receipt of the requested guidance." On 19 August 1968, CINCPAC concurred in this request and recommended to SECDEF "that an interim working procedure be established to allow Japan to directly dispose of obsolete, unserviceable and/or condemned concurrent spares provided under the cost-share agreement with Japan depositing to U.S. credit a fair share percentage of any returns obtained from sale of such materiel."2

"Decision on request for spare parts waiver," SECDEF finally notified CINCPAC and CHMAAG Japan on 28 May 1969, "will be furnished following development of data on cumulative FMS purchases of missile spare parts to date by Japan. Reply expected to be provided about 16 June 1969."3 SECDEF's decision came, as promised, on 17 June 1969: "Unqualified waiver of U.S. residual interest in 35 percent of cost-shared concurrent spare parts is not repeat not approved."4 However, SECDEF did provide his policy and procedures pertaining to the disposition of concurrent spare parts, which, CHMAAG Japan commented eight days later, were "highly feasible. Anticipate we will be able to reach early agreement with JDA on this matter."5

Redistribution of Excess MAAG Japan Property

(U) On 11 June 1969, CHMAAG Japan distributed an itemized list of property becoming excess upon the deactivation of MAAG Japan, stating that requests for the listed equipment "should be submitted to CINCPAC for approval."6 PACOM MAAGs responded quickly to CINCPAC, requesting items for this list for their respective headquarters.7 Upon receipt of authority from the appropriate naval command, CINCPAC issued instruction on 2

2. 1st Ind. to ibid., CINCPAC to SECDEF, 19 Aug 68.
3. SECDEF 1234/281541 Z May 69.
4. SECDEF 2653/171605 Z Jun 69.
5. CMAAG Japan 250722 Z Jun 69.
6. CHMAAG Japan 3568/110704 Z Jun 69; J4324 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
7. COMUSJAPAN 230222 Z Jun 69; CHMAAG China 170501 Z Jun 69; CHMEDT/ AMEMBASSY Rangoon M-U-P-575/170633 Z Jun 69; COMUSKOREA UK 60066/031601 Z Jul 69; COMUSMACTHAI HCS 160615 Z Jun 69.
August 1969 to MAAG Japan for redistributing the excess property. 1

Disposition of MAP Grant Aid Ships Declared Excess by Japan

(U) In a message on 13 May 1969, CHMAAG Japan reported the ex-U.S. LSSL-76 and the ex-U.S. LSSL-94, ships earlier transferred to Japan under MAP Grant Aid, as excess to Japanese requirements. He also told of the two ships being "rusty, in very bad condition and equipment remaining on board inoperative." 2 Three days later, CINCPAC concurred in CHMAAG Japan's recommendation "that both hulls be sold as scrap 'as-is/where-is' since all usable equipment had been previously cannibalized or removed and in view of condition." 3 As a result, on 23 May 1969, CNO requested CINCPAC to proceed with disposition of both hulls locally through sale as scrap with proceeds of sale to the U.S. Government. 4 CINCPAC, in turn, on 4 June 1969, directed CHMAAG Japan to proceed with the disposition action in accordance with CNO's instructions, to remove and forward designated items of historical interest--if any--to the Curator of the Navy, and to advise all concerned when and how the disposition of these ships was consummated. 5

Korea

Of the countries provided military aid under the Foreign Assistance Act, the Republic of Korea faces the most serious situation, where a constant and alert defense is necessary to counter the North Korean program of infiltration and subversion. While the Pueblo incident and the Blue House raid are the most publicized examples of North Korean aggressiveness, there are numerous other incursions by armed infiltrators from the north, seeking, through subversion, sabotage and other acts of violence, to lay the groundwork for the eventual overthrow of the legitimate government and the unification of South Korea with the North under a communist regime.

Through our efforts in past years, the Republic of Korea has been provided a force, trained and equipped for the basic

1. Admin CINCPAC 022241Z Aug 69; NAVSUPSYSCOMHQ 190057Z Jul 69.
4. Naval Speed Letter, from CNO to CINCPAC, 23 May 69, Subj: MAP Grant Aid Ships Declared Excess; screening requirements for.
5. CINCPAC 042353Z Jun 69; J4322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.

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purpose of preserving the security of the country. In this
environment the Korean economy has flourished to the extent
that, if this security is preserved, we can look forward to
the day when the Republic of Korea Government can bear a
far greater share of its defense effort.

A substantial return from our past assistance, of
course, is the deployment to Vietnam of approximately
50,000 men from the ROK Armed Forces. This is by far the
greatest Third Country contribution to our effort in Southeast
Asia, and I can assure that this ROK force is performing in
an outstanding manner.

The most significant problem facing the South Korean
Armed Forces is lack of modernization. Their forces are
equipped with weapons and vehicles of World War II vintage,
which require a large dollar value of spare parts and exten-
sive maintenance to keep them operational. In fact, even
though the greatest share of the PACOM Military Assistance
Program over the past two years has gone to Korea, the
greatest percentage of these funds was required for operating
and maintaining on-hand equipment.

The FY 69 program was designed to provide for a
modest modernization of ROK forces. However, when the
overall authorization and appropriations were reduced from
the amount requested, it became necessary to reduce the
planned level for South Korea from $160 million to $139
million. The reduction required deletion from the program
of about $14 million in force improvement items and $7 million
in operating costs. This left only $10 million for items to
improve the ROK force capabilities, with the remainder of
the program merely to sustain the force in its current posture.

The FY 70 program is again designed to make a modest
improvement in the ROK force capability; however, the bulk
remains primarily for operating costs. Without a continuing
modernization program for South Korean forces, the gap
between the well-equipped forces in the north and the forces
in the south will be widened to a point where the North Koreans
# Korea

**As of 1 October 1969**

## Basic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>39,000 sq. mi.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arable Land Per Capita</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
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<td>As % of GNP (USA)</td>
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</table>

**President**: Gen. Pak Chung-Hei, ROKA (Ret.)

**Prime Minister**: Gen. Kim Jong-sik, ROKA (Ret.)

**Defense Minister**: Gen. Y. Chung-sik, ROKA (Ret.)

**Minister of Foreign Affairs**: Choe Kyu-ha

**Chairman JCS**: Gen. Min Hong Tae, ROKA

**C/S Army**: Gen. Soo-Chong, Choe, ROKA

**C/S Air Force**: Gen. Kim Sung-Tong, ROKAF

**Commandant, MARCOMPS**: Gen. Chung, Kwang-Ho, ROKMC

## Major Force Objectives

### Army
- 19 INF Divs., 1 RES Divs., 1 RES Rear Area Sec Div, 1 Tank Bn, 1 SP Forces, 1 REE Bn, 1 SC Bn, 1 8" How Bn, 10 FIELD ARTY Bns., 13 ENGR CBT Bns., 9 HELICOPTER Bn., 1 RNR QM Bn., 1 PTD WAR BN.
- 6 DIVs, 19 Pz, 1 SEA UNIT, 16 LCM, 32 LCP, 10 MRC, 2 APR, 7 LCT, 11 LKA, 1 MAM, 1 ISLAND SEC UNIT, 3 PB, 6 FLY, 6 SPB.

### Navy
- 6 DD TYPES, 1 MARINE DIV (-1), 2 MARINE BDE (PROV), TOTAL STRENGTH 50,400

### Air Force
- 2 AWX SQS, 8 ACAW UNITS, 3 SF SQS, 1 RECON SQ, 1 TAC CONTROL SQ, 1 HELICOPTER SQ, 2 TRANS SQS, 1 AIR CMD SQ.
- 110 JET, 10 PROP, 110 JET, 3 PROP, 30 JET, 10 PROP, HELICOPTER, 6 TURBOPROP, 3 PROP, TOTAL STRENGTH 21,100

**Overall Objective**: Protect South Korea against renewed Communist aggression and maintain console operational control of ROK forces.

**U.S. Diplomatic Mission**

**Ambassador**: Hon. William J. Porter

**US Marine Corps**

**Commander**: Maj. Gen. John E. Michaelis, USA

**US Air Forces**

**Chief of Staff**: Maj. Gen. LIVINGSTON M. TAYLOR, JR., USA

## Map Objective

(A) To maintain ROK forces sufficiently strong to resist, (1) with U.S. air and naval support if necessary, any aggression by North Korea, and (2) in conjunction with U.S. forces as required, aggression from Communist China as well.

(B) To support the deployment of ROK forces in South Vietnam.

(C) To help create a viable Korean economic and social structure.

(D) To maintain a climate in which the United States will continue to enjoy existing and if required, additional overflight, staging and base rights.

## Combat Capability

- Maintain internal security and effectively repel aggression from North Korea, assuming adequate logistic and air support from outside sources.

- With the exception of mine countermeasures the ability of the ROK navy to perform its assigned mission is considered satisfactory. The ROK Marines are considered capable of providing residual counter amphibious assault type or larger scale forces, if lift a support in made available.

- Forces in being operationally ready to support ground operations, and conduct VFR air and limited A/W defense missions.

**Source**: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 144.

*As of 1 July 1969*
may no longer be deterred from an overt attack.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

Equipping ROK Forces (ROKF) with a New Rifle System

(8) In 1969, as in the previous year, CINCPAC found himself involved in the problem of modernizing the ROKF inventory of small arms. The primary shoulder weapons with which the ROKF were armed were the caliber .30, semiautomatic, M-1 rifle, and the caliber .30 carbine; although possessing the same caliber, their ammunition was not interchangeable. Both these weapons were of World War II vintage and, therefore, inferior in many respects to the fully automatic AK-47, with which the North Korean Army was equipped. The North Koreans, moreover, had the capability to manufacture their basic shoulder weapon. To provide the South Koreans with an improved rifle with an automatic capability, approximately 610,000 rifles would be required. Previously, a number of alternative methods of achieving this goal had been considered, utilizing M-14 rifles, M-16 rifles, and various mixes, as well as building an M-16 plant in South Korea. As the new year began, CINCPAC felt the following two alternative methods were worthy of continued, serious consideration:

a. Construction of an M-16 rifle plant in Korea and production there of 600,000 M-16 rifles needed to equip ROKF.

b. Provision from U.S. sources of about 250,000 M-14 rifles for infantry maneuver units and other units likely to engage in close combat (except for those whose primary role involves internal defense operations, such as the counter-infiltration (CI) battalions) and provision from U.S. sources of M-16 rifles for CI battalions and similar type units.²

(8) Then, on 3 January 1969, the JCS provided CINCPAC with an additional alternative for future consideration, as well as requesting DA to

1. CINCPAC 26 Jun 69 MAP Statement.
2. CINCPAC 182043Z Jan 69; J531 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69, citing CINCPAC 180202Z Jan 69; Point Paper, J531, Hq CINCPAC, 24 May 69, Subj: Equipping Republic of Korea Forces (ROKF) with a New Rifle System. For previous developments of modernizing ROKF with a new rifle system, see pages 198-208 of CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. II.
provide information concerning the availability and cost of providing M-14 rifles to ROKF. The JCS alternative was as follows:

Provide 255,000 M-16 rifles from U.S. production for ROKF maneuver units (of which 10,000 were funded in the $100 million FY 68 Korea MAP Supplemental Package). Provide 360,000 M-14 rifles from U.S. sources for ROKF support personnel.¹

These three alternatives all included provisions for the conversion of the ROK arsenal to give it the capability to manufacture the appropriate types of ammunition. Therefore, when DA provided him with tentative data on availability of the M-14, but no estimate of cost, except to warn that it "cannot be assumed at this time that the M-14 would be made available at no cost to the ROKF," CINCPAC, in turn, pointed out that:

...both the M-14 and M-16 rifles provide significant military advantages for use by ROKF, none of which are overriding in CINCPAC's view. Therefore, the relative cost of equipping ROKF with various rifle systems is a key factor in reaching a decision on which alternative to implement and must be determined before the alternatives...can be properly evaluated and the facts concerning these alternative methods can be placed before the ROKG...

Recommend earliest determination be made of firm availability and cost of providing ROKF on a surplus basis M-14 rifles, basic issue and ancillary items, and 7.62 ammunition, and provision of these data to all addressees.²

In reply on 6 February 1969, DA informed CINCPAC that firm cost and availability data on M-14s for ROKF could not be determined until SECDEF approved the cost effectiveness study (one-rifle Army), which was in the Secretary of the Army's office for approval. "Unable to assess processing time within DOD," DA further stated for, if any objection were raised, "resolution may be time consuming."³

1. J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69; JCS 8726/031753Z Jan 69.
2. CINCPAC 182043Z Jan 69; DA 892772/081844Z Jan 69; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
3. DA 896378/061914Z Feb 69.
Later in the month, on 19 February, CINCPAC dispatched a message to the JCS. Initially, he addressed himself to the JCS alternative proposal of 3 January 1969, pointing out in detail why he did not consider this alternative "to be a practicable solution." 1 Secondly, CINCPAC reaffirmed his recommendations made to the JCS on 24 December 1968. 2 Thirdly, since it appeared that some time would elapse before the "one-rifle Army study" (Ref F in the following message) would be approved and "in view of the non-availability at the present time of availability/price data on M-14s," CINCPAC made these supplemental recommendations:

a. Further consideration of the M-16 plant in Korea be deferred pending determination of firm availability and cost data on the M-14 rifle.

b. Processing of the study in Ref F be expedited.

c. If the Korean Country Team feels it appropriate, the ROKG be informed that the decision on the M-16 plant will not be made until all reasonable alternative methods of achieving subject goal be evaluated. 3

The JCS replied on the same day by outlining another alternative, "designed to meet immediate counterinfiltration requirements and long range modernization at least potential cost to U.S.," and which took into consideration the "high level ROKG interest in obtaining small arms plant and their willingness to finance the major cost of project." 4 CINCPAC's comments were requested on this alternative, which follows:

a. Provide ROK 100,000 M16s from U.S. production. The 10,000 rifles in $100 Million Package and those that may be provided under CIGFIR apply to total figure.

b. Support ROK effort to obtain M16 plant to produce remaining 510,000 under Plan 1 of Survey Team Report. Terms and financial arrangements subject to USG/ROK/Colt Negotiations. 5

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1. CINCPAC 190455Z Feb 69.
2. See paragraph 10 of CINCPAC 240615Z Dec 68 or pages 207 and 208 of CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. II.
3. CINCPAC 190455Z Feb 69.
4. JCS 2908/192238Z Feb 69.
5. Ibid.
CINCPAC, in turn, proposed to COMUS Korea on 21 February a possible "way of funding/programming for the 100,000 M-16 rifles...to come from U.S. production" both within and outside of Korea MAP, and asked for COMUS Korea's comments on this proposal, as well as the JCS alternative. A reply was forthcoming within five days. Since he felt that the cost of even a portion of these rifles could not "be absorbed by Korea MAP without seriously affecting current and future year MA programming," COMUS Korea nonconcurred with both the JCS alternative and CINCPAC's proposal. Instead, with the concurrence of the American Embassy in Seoul, he reiterated his support for the following measures:

Recommend support of ROKG effort to obtain M-16 plant to produce 600,000 weapon equivalents under Plan I of Survey Team Report; approve requirement for 30,000 M-16 rifles in the CIGFIR special requirements package and expedite delivery of those and the remainder undelivered in the FY 68 Korea MAP Supplemental to satisfy the immediate CI requirements.

As of 1 March 1969, CINCPAC was considering the two following alternatives, as well as the JCS one; minor differences with CINCPAC's previously stated alternatives were a result of changing requirements of ROKF as indicated in CIGFIR (Counter-Infiltration/Guerilla and Force Improvement Requirement):

a. Provide about 40,000 M-16 rifles from U.S. production to meet urgent counterinfiltration requirements (10,000 in the FY 68 Supplemental and 30,000 in CIGFIR). Construct an M-16 plant in Korea and produce about 570,000 rifles needed to equip the remainder of ROKF.

b. Provide 20,000 M-16 rifles from U.S. production to meet urgent counterinfiltration requirements (10,000 in the FY 68 Supplemental and about 10,000 in CIGFIR for quick reaction and similar forces). Provide from U.S. sources about 230,000 M-14 rifles for other infantry maneuver units and other units likely to engage in close combat. Support personnel retain their present weapons.

1. CINCPAC 210251Z Feb 69.
2. COMUSKOREA UK 57525/262335Z Feb 69.
3. Ibid.; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
In actuality, the JCS proposed alternative of 19 February 1969 was "probably motivated by the desire to find a proposal, acceptable to all concerned, for reequipping ROKF with a new rifle system. Two factors weighed against continued consideration of the alternatives outlined above. First, Washington level agencies were posed with the military/political implications of exporting a competitive M-16 production facility after using the ROKF requirement for M-16 rifles in computing total world-wide requirements. Secondly, the cost and availability of M-14 rifles for ROKF remained unavailable.... Continued consideration of providing M-14s to ROKF would require waiting for results of the 'one rifle study'...."  

Therefore, although the JCS proposal would be more expensive to implement than CINCPAC's two alternatives, CINCPAC indicated to the JCS on 1 March that, if further consideration of his alternatives was inappropriate, he was ready to concur in the JCS alternative, subject to the following:

a. The 30,000 M-16s contained in CIGFIR should be funded as part of CIGFIR.

b. Source of funding for the remaining 60,000 rifles to be procured from U.S. sources (100,000 total minus 30,000 in CIGFIR and 10,000 in the FY 68 Supplemental) was not evident to CINCPAC and would have to be further addressed. Cost of these rifles, basic issue and ancillary items, concurrent and follow-on spares, and training ammunition would be approximately $14 million. This amount could not be absorbed in Korea MAP without disrupting higher priority programs.**

A week later, CINCPAC submitted additional comments on the same subject to the JCS. First, since firm cost/availability on the M-14 was not immediately available, he felt that the M-14 alternative should not be further considered. Second, he emphasized that the Korea MAP could not fund any of the 90,000--100,000 minus 10,000 in the Korea MAP FY 68 Supplemental--M-16s to come from U.S. sources. Third, the M-16s contained in CIGFIR, contingent upon approval of the package, should be provided under expedited delivery to satisfy the immediate counterinsurgency requirement. Fourth, CINCPAC supported the acquisition of an M-16 production facility by the ROKG

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1. J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69, citing a message from VADM Johnson to GEN Nazarro, CINCPAC, DTG 162330Z Jan 69.
2. J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69; CINCPAC 010200Z Mar 69.
(ROK Government) and recommended that the funding for it be in accordance
with the following provisions, provided by COMUS Korea:

This is the only alternative... that does not represent
a continuing cost to the USG (MAP) beyond the six year pro-
duction period. In addition, expenditures under the proposed
loan will all be U.S. source, thus precluding gold flow from
the U.S. The ROKG desires to obtain a loan of approximately
$25 to $35 million from the USG, basically for capital invest-
ment. It will be repaid in accordance with negotiated arrange-
ments made between the two governments. This is a ROKG
expense, not a USG expense. The ROKG intends to finance
labor and utilities costs through its own won budget. It is
planned that the cost of raw material will be initially pro-
grammed in the Korea MAP over the six year production
period, during which time the cost to MAP will be progressively
reduced on a cost-sharing formula with the ROKG ultimately
relieving Korea MAP of any expense for raw materials. In
the end, it will be completely ROK owned, ROK operated
and ROK supported facility. 1

Evidently, the arguments of CINCPAC and COMUS Korea were con-
vincing for, in a memorandum to SECDEF on 8 April 1969, the JCS recom-
ended three things: (1) "Modernization of the ROK rifle system with M-16
rifles be accepted as a desirable and pressing military requirement"; (2) "A
proposal under which up to 100,000 rifles could be provided from U.S. pro-
duction and the remainder manufactured in the ROK should be favorably con-
sidered for modernization of the ROK forces"; (3) "Thirty-thousand M-16
rifles (refers to those in CIGFIR) for the ROK be approved as an urgent
military requirement, with justification being forwarded at a later date." 2

In a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 30 May 1969, CINCPAC
learned that "USG agencies concerned have approved in principle arrangements
with ROKG for purchase and co-production of M-16 rifles, subject to further
study of politico-economic implications." 3 Representatives from Colt Indus-
tries, Inc., traveled to Seoul, Korea, in the middle of June to discuss

1. COMUSKOREA UK 57594/040347Z Mar 69; CINCPAC 080419Z Mar 69;
   J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
2. J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69; citing JCSM 206 of
   10 April 1969.
3. SECSTATE 87767/300110Z May 69; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the
   month of May 69.
preliminary contract negotiations with ROKG representatives. During the course of several meetings, various points of differences arose. The basic matter of dispute, however, was that the Colt representatives appeared unable to "offer more than twenty parts produced in-country with purchase of rest from Colt" and maintained that it "would be impractical for ROKs to produce more than twenty parts." The ROKG representatives, on the other hand, claimed that the U.S. Army Technical Study conducted last year had led them to believe that they could produce all of the M-16 components in Korea. The Colt proposal would have been substantially more expensive to implement than production of all components of the rifle in Korea. In addition, it was desirable from a political standpoint to have a facility capable of producing the entire rifle. For these reasons, they stated that the Colt proposal was unacceptable and that what the ROKG wanted was an arrangement whereby the complete rifle could be manufactured in Korea. "As addressees will be aware from reports submitted on M-16 negotiations;" a Korea Country Team message stated on 30 June 1969, "positions of Colt, ROKG and Army Study far apart. Additional negotiations will undoubtedly be necessary." 2

"Discussions conducted at Defense Ministers level during Presidential meeting in San Francisco, 21-22 August, revealed no additional action at the Washington level had been taken." However, for the remainder of Calendar Year 1969, this matter was under intensive study at the DOD level and had the personal interest of the Deputy SECDEF. CINCPAC's position in this matter did not change from June 1969 until the end of the year. Actually, there was little difference between the proposals of the JCS and COMUS Korea. "Although somewhat more costly, CINCPAC concurred with the JCS proposal, primarily because of the domestic political considerations involved, provided a satisfactory source for funding the additional 60,000 rifles to come from U.S. production could be found," since no additional M-16s could be funded by Korea MAP.

2. AMEMBASSY Seoul 3504/300930Z Jun 69; comments of LCOL Wilber B. Warren, II, USA, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, on draft manuscript in Mar 70; FONECON, LCOL Wilber B. Warren, II, USA, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. T. R. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 16 Mar 70.
4. Ibid.; Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jan 70, Subj: Equipping Republic of Korea Forces (ROKF) with a New Rifle System.
5. Ibid.; Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Jun 69, Subj: Equipping Republic of Korea Forces (ROKF) with a New Rifle System.
Because SECDEF's estimated cost of manufacturing 600,000 M-16 rifles and related items in Korea would be beyond the capability of the ROKG to support over a six-year period, two alternatives for accomplishing the modernization of ROKF small arms were under consideration by DOD in mid-November 1969:

a. Production in Korea of only 300,000 M-16 rifles over a six year period (sufficient to reequip ROK maneuver units). Consideration would be given at a later time to expanding the rifle modernization program to meet the full requirement.

b. Production in Korea of 600,000 AR-18 rifles for all of ROKF.  

Now, for the first time, the possibility of producing AR-18s in Korea surfaced. The AR-18 "is a light weight, caliber 5.56mm rifle made primarily of stamped parts and would be substantially cheaper and simpler to make than the M-16." The U.S. Army expected to complete its expedited testing of this weapon to insure its suitability by February 1970. As of 31 December 1969, the status of this action for the modernization of ROKF small arms had not changed significantly from that of November 1969.  

Counter-Infiltration/Guerrilla and Force Improvement Requirements (CIGFIR)

(U) North Korea's ultimate aim to reunify, by force if necessary, all Korea under Communist domination has remained the same for years. Kim Il Song appears willing to try to provoke retaliation, as evidenced by the attempted raid in January 1968 of the Presidential Mansion and the seizure of the USS PUEBLO two days later, and the Ulchin-Samchok landings in November 1968.

Kim Il Song's willingness to test our defenses is evidenced by the number of incidents of North Korea infiltration, which increased significantly during 1968. There were 761 incidents in 1968 involving more than a thousand armed

1. J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69, citing JCSM 1776/841-1, Improvement Programs for Korea of 17 Nov 69.
2. Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jan 70, Subj: Equipping Republic of Korea Forces (ROKF) with a New Rifle System.
3. J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
agents. There were 60% more firefights in the DMZ during 1968 than in 1967.

A 224 million dollar requirement for additional defense support was developed and submitted in January 1969. We called this plan "CIGFIR"... This package was considered and submitted in reaction to the alarming increase in Communist infiltration activity; to off-set those draw downs brought about by recent CI operations; and to rectify the serious impact of 21 million dollar reduction to the FY 69 program....

MAJ GEN L. N. Taylor, Jr., USA, 1
CHPROVMAAG-K

(5) Probably the first indication that COMUS Korea was reviewing the posture of U.S. and ROK forces in Korea in the light of the latest intelligence estimates on both the unconventional and conventional threats to Korea's security and was preparing several proposals to improve the readiness of these forces came in the form of two messages on 21 December 1968. In reply on the 30th, CINCPAC suggested that probably the most productive approach would be to submit one overall proposal for the improvement of forces rather than submitting a series of uncoordinated proposals. Subsequently, early in January 1969, an exchange of messages took place between COMUS Korea and CINCPAC concerning the need for counter-infiltration equipment. 2

(5) The document containing COMUS Korea's proposals--CIGFIR, U.S. Forces Korea, 15 January 1969--was delivered to Hq CINCPAC on 16 January 1969 by a briefing team, headed by MAJ GEN L. N. Taylor, Jr., USA, CHPROVMAAG-K. This team briefed CINCPAC on these proposals the next day and conducted briefings at each of his Service component commands during the

1. Enclosure 1 of Final Report of PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference - April 1969, which was prepared by COL Gerald S. Brown, USAF, J5313, Hq CINCPAC.
2. COMUSKOREA UK 56513/210915Z Dec 68; CINCPAC 300530Z Dec 68; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69, citing COMUS-KOREA 56506/210400Z Dec 68, COMUSKOREA 024054Z Jan 69, and CINCPAC 050217Z Jan 69.
period 17-20 January. Basically, CIGFIR consisted of three parts:

...First, it contains a concept to counter North Korea's unconventional aggression. This concept provides for a layered defense of the DMZ and seaward approaches to the ROK and for rear area security type measures in the interior. Seven additional counter-infiltration battalions, ten ranger battalions, and two truck companies are to be activated in order to provide forces to cope with the unconventional threat without degrading the conventional posture of ROKF. A list of materiel needed to implement this concept and to improve the counter-infiltration posture of ROK and U.S. forces accompanies the concept. U.S. cost is estimated to be $171.3 million, of which $164.6 million is for ROK and $6.7 million for U.S. forces. Secondly, it contains a $20.1 million package of items deleted from the MAP as a result of the $21 million reduction in the FY 69 program. Thirdly, it provides for an additional $39.9 million increment of force improvement items needed by ROKF to meet the threat of the improved North Korean conventional forces. Total U.S. cost of implementing the entire package is estimated at $231.3 million, assuming the ROKG provides $23 million in won. Basically, CIGFIR is designed to provide resources needed to blunt the unconventional aggression against the South, to deter more serious acts of aggression by the North, and to prevent miscalculation on the part of North Korea of U.S. resolve to assist in the defense of the ROK. 1

(S) After receiving and evaluating his component commanders' comments, CINCPAC forwarded CIGFIR to the JCS by letter on 31 January 1969. He recommended "that approximately $140 million of the counter-infiltration requirements be approved and funded, withholding concurrence in about $30 million of requirements pending reevaluation by COMUS Korea and further review by CINCPAC. 2 The day previous, CINCPAC had requested COMUS Korea to reevaluate those areas in question and had queried him concerning other matters related to CIGFIR, the most important being a request to establish an order of priority for CIGFIR requirements. 3

1. J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69, citing CIGFIR, U.S. Forces Korea, 15 Jan 69.
2. J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69, citing CINCPAC Ltr Ser 00271 of 31 Jan 69; CINCUSARPAC 2534/220006 Z Jan 69; CINCPACAF 220038 Z Jan 69; CINCPACAF 222205Z Jan 69.
3. CINCPAC 292155Z Jan 69.
COMUS Korea's reply came as a message on 11 February 1969, and it also included reclamas on some of the requirements that either CINCPAC or one of his component commanders had challenged. Meanwhile, on 20 February, as another look was being taken in Hawaii at COMUS Korea's re-evaluated requirements, the JCS requested additional information, including the placing of the CIGFIR requirements within the general context of PACOM-wide requirements:

a. Relationship of CIGFIR requirements to JSOP/MAP, especially the relationship of these items to those in the MAP shortfall. Comment specifically on reductions in MAP shortfall which would occur if the plan were approved.

b. Potential ancillary and follow-on costs (in men and money) inherent in plan approval. Include specifically comments on:

1. Whether additional personnel would have to be deployed;

2. Whether cost estimates for construction projects in CIGFIR include the entire costs of construction; and

3. Cost estimates of expected increase to MAP O&M and PCH&T costs. 1

On 3 March 1969, COMUS Korea provided input, supplementing his messages of the previous month, on which CINCPAC could base an answer to the questions raised by the JCS. In his reply on 8 March 1969, CINCPAC furnished the JCS with additional comments and recommendations concerning CIGFIR, making full use of the views of his component commanders. He agreed with COMUS Korea that MK-24 flares and M-16 rifles were necessary for the airfield security forces and that the provision of APDs (High Speed Transport) and LCPLs (Landing Craft Personnel, Large) to the ROK Navy (ROKN) be deferred and given the lowest priority in CIGFIR. As for the deployment of U.S. P-2s to Korea and the later possible provision of these aircraft to the ROK Air Force (ROKAF), he felt that such a course of action was not warranted at this time and should await the implementation of the remainder of the sea barrier concept before being further considered. He concluded by giving his evaluation of the place of CIGFIR requirements in the overall PACOM-wide requirement picture:

1. JCS 3050/202354Z Feb 69; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69; COMUSKOREA UK 57248/111307Z Feb 69.

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In broad terms, SEAsia has first priority for PACOM resources. However, where provision of items listed in CIGFIR is urgently needed, and these conflict with SEAsia requirements, priority for delivery of such items will have to be determined individually on the basis of the situation in PACOM when CIGFIR is implemented. 

(8) In a memorandum to SECDEF on 19 April 1969, the JCS recommended three things concerning CIGFIR: (1) "Supplemental MAP funding in the amount of $108.1 million be provided for the items which could be made available within 12 months"; (2) "Consideration be given to increases in future ROK MAP to accommodate, starting in FY 71, the balance of the requirements"; (3) "Service budgets not be considered as a source of funding for these requirements." On the last day of the month, SECDEF approved action to request a FY 69 $108.1 million supplemental MAP budget to fund that portion of CIGFIR slated for the ROK armed forces that could be made available within the first 12 months. The remaining portion of the package was to be considered in future Korea MAP country levels. 

(9) On 10 May 1969, however, the JCS stated that the feeling "in ASD(ISA) is that inclusion of any quote soft unquote items will offer undesirable and unnecessary loopholes for State and Bureau of Budget objections, thus jeopardizing Congressional approval." Included in their message, therefore, was a proposal to submit a number of hard-to-get items, consisting of helicopters, communication equipment, vehicles, Cape Class Cutters, and AGE (Associated Ground Equipment) for aircraft. CINCPAC was also requested to establish priorities within PACOM on this equipment for the ROK armed forces. 

(10) CINCPAC responded the next day, stating that "the most immediate and dangerous threat to U.S. interests in PACOM is in SEAsia" followed secondly by the threat to the United Nations Command (UNC) forces in Korea. In the event, however, that UNC forces in Korea were short of certain items which could threaten the accomplishment of their mission and if the provision of these would conflict with the requirements of Southeast Asia, then the

1. CINCPAC 080226Z Mar 69; COMUSKOREA UK 57586/031120Z Mar 69.
3. Ibid., citing Msg, LT GEN Warren, OASD/MA, to LT GEN Hutchin, Chief of Staff, Hq CINCPAC, DTG 021959Z May 69.
4. JCS 8958/101805Z May 69.
5. Ibid.; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
6. CINCPAC 112325Z May 69.
priority for delivery of such items should be determined individually. As for the proposed substitutions in the $108.1 million supplemental package, CINCPAC had three comments to make. First, if it was impossible to obtain the UH-1H helicopters from any other resources besides those allocated to PACOM, he recommended that 13 UH-1Hs be shifted from USMACV's allocation to ROK armed forces, while, in turn, 13 UH-1Ds from the U.S. Eighth Army allocation be provided to USMACV. Second, in view of the limited production and other large requirements, CINCPAC could not support the provision of 3,099 AN/PRC-25 radios to ROK armed forces; instead, he recommended that the United States Forces, Korea (USFK) personnel in Washington, D.C., determine minimum number needed for frontline battalions deployed directly on DMZ and for battalions actively engaged on a routine basis in counter-infiltration operations, and that this smaller number be considered for inclusion.  

Third, out of the $3.9 million in CIGFIR for AGE, CINCPAC recommended that the $900,000 in items to be included in the JCS proposal should be selected from among those not in critical short supply.

In a memorandum to SECDEF four days later, the JCS recommended that "those items which would make the MAP supplemental more defensible be included in the FY 69 supplemental MAP budget request." Then, in a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 30 May 1969, CINCPAC was notified that a decision "has been made at highest levels not RPT not to ask for the Dol 108 Million CIGFIR Package as 1969 MAP Supplemental." The message further stated that CIGFIR would not be submitted to Congress until after the review of a Policy Planning Board Study (PPBS) on Korea.

Later in the year, Mr. Broomfield, Republican Congressman from Michigan, proposed a $100 million add-on for Korea, which consisted of those items required primarily for counter-infiltration/guerrilla operations. Then, in October 1969, the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee proposed an amendment to the FY 70 Foreign Aid Authorization Bill that would provide an additional $50 million for Korea MAP. This committee also indicated that it would like the Korea MAP to have an additional $50 million in FY 71.

1. Ibid.
3. SECSTATE 87767/300110Z May 69.
5. Point Paper, J533, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jan 70, Subj: Korea's Counter Infiltration/Guerrilla and Force Improvement Requirements (CIGFIR); J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69; SECDEF 3679/302304Z Oct 69.
By 12 January 1970, the "House Appropriation Bill approved an add-on for $50 million in FY 70 and $50 million in FY 71 for Korea; however, the Authorization Bill containing add-ons was defeated in the Senate," and the "Joint Conference Committee action more than likely will result in deletion of Korea add-ons."¹

Project PEACE KISS

In July 1969, a study group of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) presented a briefing to Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) proposing an inexpensive concept for detection, identification, and intercept of infiltration while still at sea. The proposed system consisted of three phases. "Phase I equipment consisted of passive detection devices, modified SPS-10 radars, night observation devices (NOD) palletized for installation in C-46/54 aircraft and other communications equipment."² The estimated cost of Phase I was $735,000.

Following this presentation, CINCUNC committed COMUS Korea to purchase Phase I, stating that consideration of procurement of Phases II and III would be dependent upon the success of Phase I. Accordingly, COMUS Korea directed on 11 July 1969 the reprogramming of FY 70 MAP to provide the necessary funds to provide $735,000 to purchase and implement Phase I. In submitting a program change request in the amount of $735,000 to SECDEF on 16 August 1969, CINCPAC asked for early processing and funding of this request, which was designed to provide "for rapid improvement in ROK capability to detect earlier and react faster to suspected agent boats."³ On 26 August 1969, SECDEF approved the program deviation and authorized CSAF implementation under Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) funding, with a MAP Order Amendment (MOA) to be issued upon submission of definitized programming data.⁴

On 5 September 1969, CSAF indicated that the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) would not be able to implement the program without

1. Point Paper, J533, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Jan 70, Subj: Korea's Counter Infiltration/Guerilla and Force Improvement Requirements (CIGFIR).
4. SECDEF 7585/262027Z Aug 69; J4318 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
additional definitization. The next day, COMUS Korea advised "that definitized program data was not available since equipment is non-standard and not MASL listed." As a result, CINCPAC authorized COMUS Korea to effect direct liaison with AFSC to develop the required definitization. On 15 September 1969, CSAF assigned the nickname or project code name of PEACE KISS to this project.

Developments concerning Project PEACE KISS for the remainder of Calendar Year 1969 follow:

...CINCPAC directed COMUS Korea to effect direct liaison with AFSC to obtain necessary definitization of Phase I equipments. AFSC provided the available definitized listing and MAP Order Authority (MAO) was issued and procurement actions commenced. An implementation meeting on the Korean Counterinfiltration Study was held on 15-17 October at the Aeronautical Systems Division at W-PAFB, Ohio. The meeting was attended by U.S. agencies responsible for the procurement of Phase I equipment and the implementation of Phase I of PEACE KISS. The target date for the initial delivery of equipment was established as 31 March. A target date of 30 June was established as the completion date of Phase I. AFLC was charged with the overall single point of management. Commander 5AF designated AFAG as the primary point of contact and Project Manager for PEACE KISS. On 1 December, the ROK JCS identified Cholla Pukto Province on the west coast as the first sector for implementation of PEACE KISS. A joint ROK/US working level conference was held 19 December to discuss PEACE KISS problem areas and implementation. The DCO 1646 AFAG visited Cholla Pukto Province to survey the area for the passive detection (PD) device sites, become familiar with communications arrangements, visit coastwatcher sites, and meet with proper authorities to prepare for future PEACE KISS tests. Because the ROK Army did not desire to utilize the FM-1 and FM-5 radios, procurement of all radios was suspended pending a review of the communications arrangement in January 1970 by Mr. A. J. Beauchamp, Electronic Systems Division, ESD (ESLF)

1. COMUSKOREA UK 61211/060447Z Sep 69; CSAF 051456Z Sep 69; J4318 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
2. Admin CINCPAC 062338Z Sep 69.
3. CSAF 151925Z Sep 69.
and Mr. L. B. Seus, Rome Air Development Center, RADC (EMCAA). 1

Increase in ROKAF Aircraft Inventory

On 19 June 1969, following a visit and a request by the Chief of Staff (CofS) ROKAF, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (CSAF) advised that the desired "ten C-54 aircraft and thirteen T-33 aircraft are available in the USAF excess inventory and can be made available to ROKAF against present shortfall requirements" and asked if "this offer is accepted by COMUS Korea and CINCPAC." 2 COMUS Korea replied a month later that these additional aircraft "offered by USAF CofS are required for increased airlift for ROK forces in Vietnam, for sea surveillance in the Republic of Korea, and for ROKAF pilot training proficiency." 3

The Korea Country Team's concurrence in COMUS Korea's position was forthcoming the next day. CINCPAC immediately tasked CINCPACAF with making a determination "as to availability of FWMF funds to support utilization of six C-54 aircraft" as increased airlift for ROK forces in Vietnam. 4 CINCPACAF's reply came on the last day of July 1969:

Currently available PACAF O&M resources do not provide for increased level of support. Additional MASF funds will have to be made available to PACAF by Hq USAF. PACAF will advise Hq USAF of additional fund requirements at the earliest opportunity. 5

Since both COMUS Korea and CINCPACAF concurred in CSAF's proposal to provide 10 C-54s and 13 T-33s to ROKAF, CINCPAC also concurred in a message to CSAF on 9 August 1969; at the same time, he recommended "approval of additional funds necessary to permit employment of six C-54s in Vietnam.... This increase in ROKAF aircraft operating in RVN would reduce ROK forces Vietnam dependence on USAF aircraft." 6

2. CSAF AFMSDB 191833Z Jun 69.
3. COMUSKOREA UK 60352/181200Z Jul 69.
5. CINCPACAF DOMA 3105442 Jul 69.
6. CINCPAC 092347Z Aug 69; J5331A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
Above, T-33 IRAN line at the Air Material Command Depot, Taegu Air Base.
Below, F-86F IRAN line at the Air Material Command Depot, Taegu Air Base.
month, CSAF asked for CINCPAC's concurrence in the use of two MIMEX RCNs (Record Control Numbers) for the transfer of the C-54s and T-33s at no cost to Korea MAP. 1 CINCPAC nonconcurred in the use of these RCNs, because they pertained to T-28 and O-1 aircraft in the FY 69 shortfall and SECDEF’s instructions precluded the use of prior year MIMEX RCNs. 2

5 On 9 September 1969, however, CSAF explained to CINCPAC that SECDEF had agreed to the use of FY 69 MIMEX RCNs in this case as "an exception to policy and to preclude adjustment to FY 70 MAP Korea program ceiling."3 In view of SECDEF’s approval, CINCPAC concurred in the use of these two FY 69 MIMEX RCNs three days later. 4

6 Early the next month, SECDEF reviewed the usage and support of these 10 additional C-54s and proposed MASF support of all 14 C-54s that would be in the ROKAF inventory, including the four that would be used in Korea. "This support under MASF," continued SECDEF, "to continue until ROKF are no longer supported in Vietnam by ROKAF C-54s, at which time all ROKAF C-54 support will revert to MAP. Therefore, CINCPAC’s comments and/or concurrence as to the practicality of this proposal were requested. After two exchanges of messages with COMUS Korea, COMUSMACV, and CINCPACAF, CINCPAC answered this query in a message to SECDEF, CSAF, and CINCPACAF on 26 November 1969, stating that his earlier recommendation:

... concerning usage and funding for support of the ten additional C-54 aircraft to be provided to ROKAF is reaffirmed. In addition, the four C-54 aircraft presently in the ROKAF inventory should continue to be Service funded. While the administrative difficulty posed by Service funding the support for the C-54 aircraft to be used in support of ROKF-V and MAP funding the support for the four C-54 aircraft to be used in the ROK is recognized, this difficulty is the only apparent basis for Service funding the support of these four aircraft. Since many of the undesirable aspects of utilizing two types of funding can be overcome by specifically identifying the aircraft to be supported by each type of funds, support for the four aircraft to be utilized in the ROK should be MAP funded.

1. CSAF AFMSMDSB 021619Z Sep 69; J4318 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
2. Admin CINCPAC 060545Z Sep 69.
3. CSAF AFMSMDSB 091611Z Sep 69.
4. Admin CINCPAC 112236Z Sep 69.
5. SECDEF 1604/062125Z Oct 69; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
3. After the ten aircraft presently proposed for use in RVN are no longer required there for the support of ROKF-V, ROKAF should retain all 14 of the C-54s to modernize its transport inventory. At this time, support for all these aircraft should be provided by MAP.

4. FOR CINCPACAF. If the six additional C-54 aircraft are provided for utilization in support of ROKF-V, request monitor their use and recommend appropriate reduction in USAF airlift support provided ROKF-V.  

Weapons for ROK Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF)

"The HDRF is a paramilitary force organized after the Blue House raid in the fall of 1968. The purpose of this force is to provide additional manpower to assist in combating North Korean intrusion and infiltration activities, and to give as much of the population in ROK as possible an opportunity to participate in the struggle." In the fall of 1968, COMUS Korea requested that this force, some 2-million strong, be provided with additional weapons, preferably at "no cost" to Korea MAP, since the HDRF "is a key element in ROK thinking of total defense problem facing ROK and is playing a major role in search operations against infiltrator activity."

After checking with DA, CINCPAC had to advise COMUS Korea on 14 Jan 1969 that, "with the exception of M1 carbines and limited quantities of .30 caliber AP ammunition, items requested...are not available to MAP at no cost. " He also had several pertinent comments to make about the wisdom of equipping the HDRF with small arms at that time. Although agreeing that an effective HDRF could contribute significantly to the internal defense operations of Korea, CINCPAC felt that providing it with excess weapons might be a premature move until all related matters had been given full consideration. Low cost, or even no-cost weapons, for instance, would only be the beginning of the HDRF weapon system costs. Without a clear source of funding for repair parts to make the weapons serviceable, as well as follow-on support, such a move might prove unproductive. Then, support of this paramilitary organization had to be weighed against both other ROK forces' requirements.

1. CINCPAC 262202Z Nov 69; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
2. J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
4. CINCPAC 140346Z Jan 69.

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and the available resources. In fact, if additional MAP support was given to the HDRF, such an action might set an undesirable precedent, implying that the United States was prepared to fully support it thereafter. As a result, CINCPAC believed that "now may be the best time to establish ROKG responsibility" for this force. Furthermore, he was of the opinion that any action towards providing additional weapons for the HDRF should be deferred, pending a more detailed COMUS Korea evaluation of the proposal, especially as to funding for both initial procurement of repair parts, BILLI (Basic Issue List Items), and ammunition, including follow-on support, as well as a concept for providing other equipment, such as individual equipment, vehicles, radios, etc., should these requirements develop.

By 22 March 1969, COMUS Korea was ready to raise the question again with CINCPAC by stating that austere ROK funding for such weapons might be feasible. At the same time, he summarized the status of, and additional need for, weapons to arm the HDRF, as well as requesting that a renewed effort to locate quantities of useful excess weapons and ammunition that could be made available at no cost to Korea MAP. About a month later, on 1 May, COMUS Korea reemphasized the urgency of this requirement, recommending that all agencies investigate the availability of small arms and ammunition with the view of providing approximately one million weapons, or any portion thereof, for use by the HDRF. If it proved impossible to provide these requested items at no cost and if no other source of funds was available, he continued, then the use of MAP funds was recommended on a one-time basis. COMUS Korea accompanied these recommendations with the following rationale:

I agree wholeheartedly with President Park's belief that the Homeland Militia is one of the most effective organizations and concepts in dealing with NK counterinfiltration threat. The HDRF is composed of trained ex-servicemen. They have been provided uniforms and basic equipment by their government and they participate regularly in training drills—they are extremely nationalistic and enjoy a high morale. Most important to the overall defense posture here is the ROK belief, and mine, that the HDRF, if properly armed and backed by the thirty plus ROKA light infantry counterinfiltration battalions and the KNP combat police companies will become increasingly capable of handling NK

1. Ibid.; J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
2. COMUSKOREA UK 57947/221043Z Mar 69; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of May 69.
large scale commando-infiltrator incursions in rear areas, precluding the necessity of deploying large numbers of ROK active Army forces from their DMZ and conventional defense missions. I believe we should do everything possible to assist in the arming of this militia of over 2 million men. The HDRF does, we believe, qualify for military assistance by contributing to internal security of the ROK by assisting in combating and defeating communist supported aggression and thereby providing an environment of security and stability to enhance rapid social, economic and political progress. The revised Appendix B to the agreed minute of 17 Nov 1954 restricts MAP grant aid support to the 600,000 military force level and an agreed-to force structure. The U.S. government can approve utilization of military assistance grant aid funds for a paramilitary organization, such as to HDRF, even though this force is above the 600,000 force level and not within the approved force structure supported by the Korea MAP. The $100 million package did provide approximately 635,000 small arms for the militia force.  

In a message on 20 May 1969, CINCPAC outlined several alternatives to accomplish COMUS Korea's objective, stating that he would support any of them provided ROK Government (ROKG) would agree to fund follow-on cost of all HDRF weapons. COMUS Korea's comments and recommendations were requested. Four days later, COMUS Korea advised CINCPAC that action had already been "taken to include 390,000 M1 carbines, 10,000 M2 carbines, and necessary spare parts and Basic Issue List Items at a cost of $3,068,000 in the $108.1 million Korean MAP Supplemental which will provide part of CIGFIR. "Decision has been made at highest levels," a joint SECSTATE/SEC-DEF message informed CINCPAC on 30 May 1969, however, "not RPT not to ask for the Dol 108 million CIGFIR package as 1969 MAP Supplemental. We presently foresee that any further action on supplemental would be after completion" of a planning-programming-budgeting study on Korea. 

On 4 June 1969, as a result of discussions at the Second Annual U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers Conference held in Korea during the period 2-4 June, Mr. Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and ADM McCain became involved

1. COMUSKOREA UK 58779/010841Z May 69.
2. CINCPAC 200740Z May 69.
3. COMUSKOREA UK 59274/240127Z May 69.
4. SECSTATE 87767/300110Z May 69; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
in a discussion that entailed an in-depth review of the requirement for small arms assistance to the HDRF.\textsuperscript{1} Out of this encounter came Mr. Packard's approval for the immediate delivery by air of 4,000 carbines for the HDRF. On the same day, CINCPAC notified the JCS that this conference had "highlighted the urgency which the ROKG attaches to furnishing small arms to the HDRF. Currently, the ROKG has about one third of the individual small arms required to equip a total force of approximately two million personnel."\textsuperscript{2} As a result, CINCPAC recommended, among other things, that the 790,000 surplus weapons and surplus ammunition, which DA had advised him on 8 May 1969 were available, be furnished to Korea MAP at no cost in an "as is" condition.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{\S} A response to CINCPAC's recommendations came in the form of a joint SECSTATE/SECDEF message on 13 June 1969. It authorized COMUS Korea and the American Embassy in Seoul to inform ROKG of the following decisions which had been approved that day:

\begin{itemize}
  \item A. Inclusion of 790,000 weapons and surplus ammunition in the Korea MAP for the HDRF.\ldots
  \item B. Surface movement of weapons and ammunition to commence at early date and to be completed as soon as possible.
  \item C. Absorption of PCH&T costs in the FY 70 Korea program in the normal manner unless you determine an alternate source of funding from your own FY 70 MAP resources.
  \item D. ROK assumption of costs of rebuild, BILI and repair parts.
  \item E. Notifying the ROKs regarding A, B, and D above.
  \item F. No further air shipments of weapons.\textsuperscript{4}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{\S} Four days later, CINCPAC gave the action on discussing this matter with the ROKs to COMUS Korea who reported on 21 June 1969 that the

\begin{enumerate}
  \item CINCPAC 042322 Z Jun 69; J5331A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
  \item CINCPAC 042322 Z Jun 69.
  \item \textit{Ibid.}; DA 908226/082126 Z May 69, cited in \textit{ibid.}
  \item SECDEF 2486/132102 Z Jun 69.
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{SECRET}

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authorization "to provide 790,000 weapons has been discussed with ROK MND officials. Response is that ROKG is willing to rebuild weapons and to assume follow-on support; agreement is now being prepared."1

Earlier, on 4 June 1969, CINCPAC had dispatched a message to DA, requesting "that 4,000 each carbines, in best condition, be airlifted by MAC C-141 to Korea for delivery to ROKG."2 He emphasized that this was "an urgent requirement and has the verbal approval of the Dep Secy of Defense, Mr. Packard. Speed of delivery is essential."3 DA, in turn, directed United States Army Materiel Command (USAMC) the same day to ship these weapons "by special mission MAC C-141 to arrive Korea within 48 hours computed from 040300Z Jun 69."4 The next day, USAMC advised that the plane carrying these carbines had departed Birmingham, Alabama, and was scheduled to arrive Kimpo AB, Korea, at 2352 hours (Zulu Time) on 5 June 1969.5

On the same day, DA directed USAMC to freeze current stocks of weapons, ammunition, BILI, and repair parts listed as available at no cost to MAP, pending a SECDEF/JCS decision on possible release to Korea MAP. Six days later, DA changed this directive, by directing USAMC to take immediate action to prepare for ocean shipment to Korea these frozen stocks, to assign project codes to enable continuous surveillance of this shipment, and to advise all concerned of the movement schedule. By the next day, 12 June, the project code of LNW had been assigned this shipment.6

A SECDEF message of 13 June authorized the informing of the ROKG that approval for the inclusion of Project Code LNW items in Korea MAP FY 70 had been granted and requested programming data. After notifying COMUS Korea and receiving his reply, CINCPAC provided SECDEF with the requested programming action on 26 June. At the same time, he asked DA to advise SECDEF, CINCPAC, and COMUS Korea of the dollar value of the repair parts and BILI being shipped at no cost, as well as the shipment status. As of 9 July 1969, the following was the shipping status for the 790,000 weapons, as well as the related ammunition and BILI/repair parts:

1. COMUSKOREA UK 59811/2107422Z Jun 69.
2. CINCPAC 040200Z Jun 69.
3. Ibid.
4. DA 911266/0415333 Z Jun 69.
5. CG USAMC 58983/051416Z Jun 69.
a. Weapons on ships under way -
   111,000 (SS Illinois - ETA 17 July 1969)
   31,000 (SS Buchanan - ETA 27 July 1969)
   136,000 (SS Letitia Lykes - ETA 2 August 1969)
   278,000

b. Weapons in ports waiting or being loaded -
   508,000

c. Weapons airlifted earlier -
   4,000

d. Ammunition - still in depots - transport being
   arranged.

e. BIL/Repair parts - some enroute to ports - some
   in depots waiting shipment - no-cost quantities dollar values
   as follows:

   (1) Rifle Cal 30 M1    $3,928,273.57
   (2) Carbine M2         1,462,917.40
   (3) Submachineguns     242,057.62

   $5,633,248.59

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Proposed Use of PTF (Fast Patrol Boat) for CI Efforts in Korea

(5) On 12 May 1969, COMUS Korea advised CINCPAC that he had
informally received information that indicated "that about ten PTF craft
(Nasty and Osprey class) can be made available from current USN resources
for use by ROKN in C-I efforts, provided JCS authorization is granted."2
After imposing certain limitations and conditions under which the PTF could
be accepted by ROK Navy (ROKN), COMUS Korea requested that these craft
be provided for counter-infiltration operations in Korea. Two days later,
CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT to confirm the availability of the PTF and
to comment on the requirements outlined by COMUS Korea.3

(5) In return messages on 17 and 18 May, CINCPACFLT provided
detailed comments, such as the operating costs for 10 PTFs would be

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1. J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69; Admin CINCPAC
   170541Z Jun 69; Admin CINCPAC 260005Z Jun 69.
2. COMUSKOREA UK 58996/120935Z May 69.
3. Admin CINCPAC 140005Z May 69.
approximately $3.2 million per year, and indicated that:

... confirmation of availability six Trumpey PTF is dependent on CINCPAC/JCS decision. Plans were being formulated for use four Osprey as reaction unit to augment MARKET TIME forces due to reduction DER force levels and PG class problems. COMNAVFORV recently authorized by COMUSMACV to implement reaction force concept utilizing NGFS ships on an available basis to augment M/T surveillance and interdiction on the assumption this concept will prove effective and PG class problems will be resolved in near future, CINCPACFLT endorses use these craft in SKorea.

... The most critical problem in provision of ten PTFs to SKorea will be availability of personnel to form boat training and maintenance teams.... Boat Support Unit One, CORONADO, has only available pool of PTF expertise and is fully committed to PTF program in Danang and provision of MSTS to support SEAL ops in SVN. 1

Patrol Boat taken out of the water for painting and work on the hull at the Chinhae Naval Shipyard.

(FED CINCPAC Photo)

1. CINCPACFLT 180101Z May 69; CINCPACFLT 170411Z May 69.
In addition, CINCPAC was cognizant that COMUSMACV desired to release six Nasty class PTFs from his control. He, therefore, advised COMUS Korea on 24 May that some PTFs might become available for loan to ROKN and asked him to provide a concept for the use of these craft, the adjustment to be made in the JSOP, and supporting justification to include compensatory deletions from MAP to cover expected operating costs. The same day, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT with the following:

a. Recommendation on whether the four Osprey Class craft...should be utilized in augmentation of Market Time at this time or provided to ROKN.

b. Recommendation on whether the six Nasty Class PTFs...should be provided to ROKN.

c. Information as to whether provision of these craft to ROKN can be supported with boat training and maintenance teams.¹

On 20 June 1969, because of the complexity of the problem areas involved in providing PTFs to ROK, CINCPACFLT recommended "no further action on subject deployment pending results CINCPACFLT PTF briefing team visit."² Four days later, CINCPAC gave his approval. After the team made its visit to Korea, for the purpose of evaluating the proposal and determining the feasibility of employing the PTFs in the CI role in Korean waters, it conducted a debrief at Hq CINCPAC on 23 July. The team determined that, "while it was feasible to introduce these craft into the ROKN, it would not be desirable as the operational results achieved by these craft in a counteragent boat role would be outweighed by the operating costs and maintenance problems associated with these craft."³ Furthermore, COMUS Korea had concurred in this view after being debriefed by the team.

CINCPACFLT confirmed the team's findings in a message to CINCPAC on 1 August 1969 and recommended against the deployment of PTFs to Korea. In the end, on 17 August, CINCPAC dispatched the following message--in which, Ref C refers to CINCPACFLT's message of 1 August--to COMUS Korea:

1. CINCPAC 240200Z May 69; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
2. CINCPACFLT 202102Z Jun 69.
3. J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69; Admin CINCPAC 240123Z Jun 69.
...In Ref C, CINCPACFLT recommended against deployment and stated that PTFs are not suitable for ROKN C-I operations for following reasons:

a. PTFs would not solve major problems of detection and classification of agent infiltration craft.

b. Operational characteristics of PTF craft preclude economical operation in extended patrol or detection role.

c. PTFs not suitable for operation in waters vicinity Han River Estuary and Inchon Port due to shallow water.

d. Weather, tides and rough seas along Korean coast would restrict PTF operations during winter months.

e. Extensive facilities for berthing and maintaining PTFs would have to be constructed.

f. Boat support personnel not available within CINCPACFLT resources.

2. Concur in Ref C. Operational restrictions and high operating costs preclude effective employment of PTFs in C-I role. 1

ROK Army (ROKA) Critical Shortage of Repair Parts

A COMUS Korea message to CINCPAC on 17 May 1969 read as follows:

Combat readiness of the ROK Army (ROKA) is seriously impaired at this critical time as a result of a rapid and still continuing increase in the deadline rate of combat and general purpose vehicles (more than 25 PCT in May ROKA units). Considering the current military threat to the ROK, this high deadline rate is of serious concern.

ROK Army's combat readiness is further degraded by the CINCPAC imposed vehicular ceiling which reduces its general purpose vehicular ceiling by 7,224 vehicles. To

1. CINCPAC 170516Z Aug 69; CINCPACFLT 010051Z Aug 69.
compound this problem ROK Army needs 3,217 general purpose vehicles to reach the authorized CINCPAC ceiling. Thus in reality ROK Army is short 10,441 vehicles of a T/E authorization of 41,878. The CINCPAC ceiling already limits the mobility of the ROK Army to an austere level and this problem is compounded by a high deadline rate. Thus, it is imperative that all vehicles on hand be maintained in an operational condition at all times.

MAP funding has been neither timely nor adequate for providing repair parts in necessary amounts. The situation was further aggravated by the directed reduction of 21 million in the FY 69 Korea MAP which resulted in a $7 million cut in ROKA operating cost program plus a $2 million cut in ROKA investment cost program. After the reduction, the ROKA operating cost shortfall overall totaled $28 million.

Accordingly, request your assistance to accomplish the following critical objectives:

a. Assure earliest possible receipt of critical repair parts listed in Para 5 above which are already funded for Korea MAP but not delivered.

b. Expedite delivery of remaining repair parts which have been funded for Korea MAP.

c. Expedite funding and subsequent delivery of other remaining repair parts included in FY 69 Korea MAP for which MAP funds have not yet been provided.¹

(C) On 23 May 1969, CINCPAC requested SECDEF to provide maximum funding of FY 69 Korea MAP as soon as possible. At the same time, he requested DA to make every possible effort to expedite supply action for the requisitions of critically needed repair parts listed in COMUS Korea's message.² "To date," SECDEF informed CINCPAC on 29 May, "we have

¹ COMUSKOREA UK 59150/171005Z May 69.
² CINCPAC 230535Z May 69.
Vehicle Mobilization Reserve Stock at the 33rd Ready Reserve Division, Sosa.

Close-up of trucks in Vehicle Mobilization Reserve Stock at the 33rd Ready Reserve Division, Sosa.

funded $12.9 of a $15.3 million FY 69 automotive spares program. We are... releasing MAP orders for remaining unfunded $2.4 million of automotive spares on 2 June 69 update. 1 "OSD feedback of 4 June 1969 indicated $2,484,428 for Korea repair parts lines has been funded." 2 By the end of Calendar Year 1969, most of these repair parts had been delivered in-country. 3

1. SECDEF 1406/291939Z May 69.
2. J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. Intv, LCOL James N. Vinton, USA, J4314, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 30 Jan 70.

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Transfer of Ex-USN Ship Hulls to ROK Navy (ROKN)

In December 1969, CINCPAC concurred in a recommendation by CINCPACFLT for the transfer of ex-USS PASCO and ex-USS GLOUCESTER to ROKN at no cost to MAF for use as non-self-propelled fuel oil barge and combat oiler, respectively. Originally, this transfer was to take place on an "as-is, where-is" basis, the preparation for tow costs to be borne by the ROKG, and delivery to Chinhae to be by tow of opportunity. On 11 February 1969, however, limited MAP support was requested in order to use the ships for coastal patrol boat repair facilities and for Engineering School Training, and Korea MAP vice ROKG funds were requested to pay for the preparations necessary before towing. Subsequently, CNO authorized Korea MAP funding, and CINCPAC approved CINCPACFLT's recommendation to provide limited MAP support for these two ship hulls. After being towed to Korea during February and March 1969, both the hulls were officially turned over to the ROKN Chief of Naval Operations by the Chief, U.S. Naval Advisory Group, Korea, at 0900 hours on 1 April 1969. 1

Salvage Tires for Korea MAP

On 12 April 1969, CINCPAC requested SECDEF, as an exception to policy, to authorize a no-cost addition of 40,000 salvage tires located in the Property Disposal Office (PDO), 1st Logistical Command, in South Vietnam, to the FY 69 Korea MAP. His rationale for this request follows:

b. Subject size tires were transferred from MAP support to ROK WON defense budget in 1965. There is a need for additional tires in ROKA Vehicle Rebuild Program as well as for tactical use. The tires in PDO are repairable carcasses which can be recapped and repaired for ROK forces vehicles. ROK MND has requested assistance in obtaining these repairable tires and has agreed that PCH&T and all follow-on support will be ROKG responsibility at "no cost" to MAP. A memo of understanding between ROKG and USG

1. CHUSNAVADGRU ROKN 110935Z Feb 69; CNO 141419Z Feb 69; CINCPAC-FLT 150528Z Feb 69; CINCPAC 180330Z Feb 69; J432 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69; CINCPAC 182237Z Dec 68; CNO 232310Z Dec 68; NAVSHIPREPFAC Yokosuka 270801Z Jan 69; COMFLEACTS Sasebo 122111Z Mar 69; COMUSKOREA UK 57384/181524Z Feb 69; CINCPAC 180330Z Feb 69; CTF SEVEN THREE 131705Z Mar 69; COMUSKOREA UK 58190/031152Z Apr 69; J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
is currently being consummated, with this "no cost to MAP" stipulation. This understanding sets a precedent for future transactions and is considered in the best interest of the USG. 1

(Ø) Three days later, CINCUSARPAC requested that "action on transfer of cited tires be held in abeyance pending DA decision" regarding the establishment of a tire recap/rebuilt facility in the PACOM area, probably in Taiwan. 2 CINCPAC, however, felt that the proposed action "will not only ease 1st Log Comd storage requirement, but will also reduce further deterioration by shipping the tires to an operating ROKG facility, rather than wait for tentative opening of a new facility o/a 1 Jan 1979." 3 As a result, on 20 April 1969, CINCPAC informed CINCUSARPAC that no action was being taken to cancel the program change to release the tires to Korea MAP, but he also requested CINCUSARPAC to advise if any other factors warranted a reconsideration. In reply, CINCUSARPAC gave his concurrence on the proposed release on 3 May 1969. 4 SECDEF, as an exception to policy, approved CINCPAC's request for the release of these 40,000 tires to Korea MAP on 6 May 1969, requesting CINCPAC to "establish this as a MAPEX transaction." 5

Early Delivery to Korea of UH-1Hs Bought Through FMS

(Ø) "A nation-wide program is underway at ROK initiative," COMUS Korea informed CINCPAC on 24 November 1968, "to solicit contributions from all levels of the populace in order to purchase arms and equipment for the ROKG to use in guarding against infiltrators." 6 Because of President Park's expressed interest in helicopters, COMUS Korea believed that the end result would be an attempt by the ROK Government (ROKG) to seek the purchase of the helicopters through FMS. For his part, COMUS Korea considered this campaign as "a positive demonstration of a sincere desire on the part of ROKs in general to provide defense items for the ROK," as well as a "positive step forward by the ROKG in self-help." 7

1. CINCPAC 120134Z Apr 69; J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
2. CINCUSARPAC GPLO-SM 13995/150706Z Apr 69.
3. CINCPAC 200129Z Apr 69.
4. CINCUSARPAC GPLO-SM 16662/030434Z May 69; J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
5. SECDEF 8517/061359Z May 69.
6. COMUSKOREA UK 56546/240410Z Dec 68.
7. Ibid.

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Through messages from SECSTATE, DA, and COMUS Korea over the next two months, CINCPAC learned that: (1) the ROKG wanted to purchase five UH-1Hs through FMS and to secure an early delivery of these aircraft; (2) these helicopters would be $100,000 cheaper per unit if bought through FMS than if bought commercially; (3) availability through FMS was approximately 22 months from the date of final acceptance of the Letter of Offer; (4) a reduction in leadtime was impossible at that time without a diversion from U.S. requirements, an action that would require SECDEF's approval; otherwise, any diversion at that time would have to be at the expense of other PACOM allocations. The recent assessments of the threat to South Korea, on which the operational requirements for these aircraft was based, had been forwarded by COMUS Korea in messages in late 1968, as well as the CIGFIR in early 1969. 1

On 19 February 1969, COMUS Korea requested, through CINCPAC, that "SECDEF approval be obtained for diversion of five UH-1H helicopters for delivery in 90 to 120 days from the consummation of the sale." 2 Basically, his rationale was twofold: (1) the FMS price was substantially more favorable than the commercial price; (2) the 22-month leadtime under FMS did not meet operational requirements, would be detrimental in promoting FMS to the ROKG, and would not show timely results in individual contributors. The same day, the American Ambassador to Korea, William J. Porter, endorsed this recommendation of COMUS Korea stating that "such forthcoming response on our part would not only have beneficial effect on U.S.-ROK relations but would facilitate significant improvement in ROKG's counter-infiltration capabilities." 3

In response to these recommendations, the JCS asked CINCPAC on 21 March 1969 for "recommended military priorities for delivery of five UH-1H helicopters to ROK versus PACOM, excluding Vietnam." 4 CINCPAC replied as follows:

Within PACOM, UH-1 helicopters are scheduled for delivery only to Vietnam, Korea, and Thailand during the

1. COMUSKOREA UK 56992/250601Z Jan 69; COMUSKOREA UK 56513/ 210915Z Dec 69; COMUSKOREA UK 190730Z Feb 69; SECSTATE 19675/ 070012Z Feb 69; DA 897207/122203Z Feb 69; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Feb 69, citing COMUSKOREA UK 56506/210400Z Dec 68 and U.S. Forces Korea Counter Infiltration/Guerrilla Force Improvement Requirements of 15 Jan 69.
2. COMUSKOREA UK 57395/190730Z Feb 69.
3. AMEMBASSY Seoul 847/190925Z Feb 69.
4. JCS 5262/212127Z Mar 69.
remainder of FY 69 and during the first half of FY 70. UH-1Hs programmed for delivery to Thailand were promised in return for deployment of the Thai division to Vietnam; therefore, they cannot be diverted. Consequently the only source of diversion from within PACOM, excluding Vietnam, is U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK); however, USFK are scheduled to receive only UH-1Ds.

Recommend the five UH-1Hs for early delivery to the ROK be diverted from other world-wide UH-1H assets.¹

(5) In a memorandum to SECDEF on 7 April 1969, the JCS subsequently recommended that:

a. Two helicopters be provided to the ROK within 120 days and three within 180 days of consummation of sale from planned Army new production assets without diversion from those scheduled for delivery to Southeast Asia or Korea.

b. The ROK be advised that future FMS requests for helicopters must be satisfied under normal lead time.²

(SECDEF's approval for the FMS of five UH-1Hs to South Korea was forthcoming four days later. On 13 May 1969, DA furnished an amended Letter of Offer, including airlift costs of the helicopters, while the Korean Military Attaché deposited the necessary funds on 20 June 1969. As of mid-year, the five helicopters from early August U.S. production were scheduled to arrive in Korea by 10 September 1969.³

(5) This date of delivery was necessary so that they could be assembled in time for display on 1 October 1969, the ROK Armed Forces Day. Since the ROKG "has made a concerted effort to secure contributions from all sources in Korea in order to buy these helicopters," commented COMUS Korea to CINCPAC on 6 June 1969, it "would be most advantageous to the ROKG to give extensive publicity to the physical presence of the helicopters during the Korean Armed Forces Day. It would also materially assist the U.S. efforts to increase the Foreign Military Sales program if the helicopters were on hand

1. CINCPAC 290514Z Mar 69.
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for this occasion."1 Subsequently, the JCS indicated that DA would make
every possible effort to deliver the five UH-1Hs to Korea by the desired date
as requested by COMUS Korea and supported by CINCPAC. "In view of high
level interest in the case, DA requested that USAMC provide ALCON, by 3
July 1969, a schedule of events indicating dates and necessary actions which
will be accomplished in order to meet the 10 September 1969 in-country
delivery target date."2 On 24 June 1969, CGUSAMC informed COMUS Korea
and CINCPAC that the five helicopters would be delivered in-country by the
desired date--10 September 1969.3 "Helicopters and ancillary equipment
were subsequently received in good condition in Korea on 10 Sep 69."4

Request for Airlift of Blankets

(U) In a message to CINCPAC on 26 September 1969, COMUS Korea
requested that the issue priority designator (IPD) on the requisitions for
60,000 blankets scheduled for delivery to Korea in October 1969 be upgraded
in order to qualify for air shipment. In addition, he requested that premium
surface transportation be provided "for the 39,000 available on 3 November
69 as well as the 41,000 excess light weight blankets available through
SIMEX."5 The air shipment of the 60,000 blankets, according to COMUS
Korea, was "necessary and justified to avert human suffering of ROKA per-
sonnel during the coming winter season."6

(U) COMUS Korea furnished additional justification for the airlift of these
blankets on 4 October 1969, stating that 60,000 blankets was "the absolute
minimum which must be airlifted in order to commence deliveries to forward
area for this winter season."7 He also added that the "average minimum
temperature expected in the month of Nov 69 in the Central DMZ is 30 degrees
Fahrenheit."8 On the same day, CINCPAC gave his approval for the air ship-
ment of these needed blankets.9

1. COMUSKOREA UK 59501/060034Z Jun 69.
2. J4323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69; CINCPAC 100409Z
   Jun 69.
3. CGUSAMC 61017/241246Z Jun 69; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the
   month of Aug 69.
4. J4323 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; CGUSAMC 151527Z
   Jul 69; CGUSAMC 081434Z Sep 69.
5. COMUSKOREA UK 61561/261232Z Sep 69; J4313A History, Hq CINCPAC,
   for the month of Sep 69.
6. COMUSKOREA UK 61561/261232Z Sep 69.
7. COMUSKOREA UK 61701/041008Z Oct 69.
8. Ibid.; J4313A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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Establishment of a Single Joint MAAG in Korea

Over the years, there has been a long history of studies and proposals from various sources concerning the organization for military assistance in Korea, since no clear-cut organization that would satisfy all the requirements of the unique situation that exists there has yet been devised. The present organization has been in effect for a number of years and has been supported by all of the recent COMUS Koreas and CINCPACs.¹

The current overall organization, to the extent that it impacts on MAP, and the current military assistance advisory organization in Korea are described below:

...USFK Service Component Commands are under the command... of the CINCPAC Service Component Commands, through 5th AF in the case of COMAFKOREA. These USFK commands are placed under the operational control of COMUSKOREA upon implementation of CINCPAC OP Plan 27-69. Service Advisory Groups are under the command of their respective Component Commanders. Primary reason for this command arrangement is that these commanders exercise operational control of their respective ROK forces; therefore, it is desirable that they exercise command of the advisors that serve as their "eyes and ears" with these forces and that serve to restrain impetuous ROK commanders. However, this factor is decreasing in importance. With the increasing sophistication of ROKF and the reduction in the number of personnel available for advisory duty in the ROK, few advisors, especially in ROKA, are left at levels where they can observe effectively and report ROKF activities and serve as a restraint on ROK commanders. For example, when the latest personnel reduction in military assistance advisory activities of 149 spaces is completed, corps level will be the lowest ROKA level of command that will have advisors. An advisor at this level probably will learn little more than the ROK commander wants him to know.

COMUSKOREA has responsibility for Korea MAP. In essence, PROVMAAG-K is a staff division of Headquarters

¹ J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69; Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Jan 70, Subj: Establishment of a Single Joint MAAG in Korea.
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USFK that handles MAP matters. While Chief PROVMAAG-K currently exercises MAP surveillance over routine MAP matters, items which are directive in nature and the determination of ROKF requirements are handled through the USFK Service Component Commanders to the Service Advisory Groups. COMNAVFORKOREA and COMAKOREA (Rear Admiral/BG billets) also serve as chiefs of their respective Service Advisory Groups.¹

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(ㄷ) COMUS Korea, in a message to CINCPAC on 6 November 1969, outlined proposed changes in the organization of military assistance advisory activities in Korea, especially the establishment of a single joint MAAG, stated that a complete study on this matter prepared by him would be available shortly, and requested CINCPAC's approval in principle of the proposed changes. Of the alternatives for the reorganization of the military assistance effort in Korea, he said, the most promising:

... is a single joint MAAG which would operate directly under the command of COMUSK. Concept of organization would combine current Service Advisory Groups and PROVMAAG-K into a single joint MAAG under the command of Chief PROVMAAG-K. Current PROVMAAG-K staff would initially serve as nucleus headquarters for JUSMAAG.²

(ㄷ) In reply on 25 November 1969, CINCPAC agreed that in "view of the growing professionalism, sophistication and independence of ROKF and the personnel reductions being made in military assistance advisory activities, it is appropriate to review alternative means of organizing these activities."³ However, he stated that the proposed reorganization would be considered only after the receipt of the completed study. The reasons for CINCPAC's position in this matter at this time were as follows:

a. There is no great urgency in this matter; because there are numerous interests involved, and because the present organization has received repeated support, caution in making changes is advisable.

b. Without specific knowledge of the military assistance advisory functions of the chief of the proposed joint

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1. J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
2. COMUSKOREA UK 62192/061810Z Nov 69; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
3. Admin CINCPAC 250350Z Nov 69.

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MAAG, the USFK Service Component Commanders, and the Service Advisory Group Commanders, and their relationship to COMUSKOREA, there is little basis for approving even in principle the proposed reorganization.

c. The COMUSKOREA message did not provide this information. 1

On 26 November 1969, COMUS Korea airmailed the completed study to CINCPAC, recommending that the proposed concept for the organization and operation of a joint MAAG be approved for implementation. 2 CINCPAC, on 4 December 1969, requested comments and recommendations on this proposed concept from his component commanders. 3 In response, CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF nonconcurred in the proposed concept, while CINCPACFLT concurred. 4 Meanwhile, on 9 December 1969, COMUS Korea, in a message to CINCPAC, requested that any decision on his proposal be held in abeyance pending the final action on another project. 5

Possible Sale of Destroyers to Korea 6

In the latter part of Calendar Year 1969, the ROK Navy (ROKN) requested COMUS Korea's assistance in securing the price, condition, and availability data on four destroyers for basing a decision on whether or not to purchase these ships through FMS. However, the ROK Government (ROKG) had not submitted a formal request to buy these destroyers, which were to be used to improve seaborne counter-infiltration operations. At this time, the ROKN had three destroyers. It was COMUS Korea's opinion that, from a military point of view, additional destroyers were not the best answer to the counter-infiltration problem in Korea, but that the political consequences of refusing to sell them to the ROKG, while selling them to numerous other countries around the world, would be undesirable. Therefore, with the concurrence of the American Embassy at Seoul, COMUS Korea recommended the sale of not more than two destroyers to Korea, primarily for political reasons,

1. J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
3. CINCPAC 040038Z Dec 69.
4. CINCUSARPAC 310058Z Dec 69; CINCPACAF 232309Z Dec 69; CINCPACFLT 272142Z Dec 69.
5. COMUSK PROVMAAG-K 090307Z Dec 69.
under the following well-defined, but in part, negotiable conditions:

... (a) receipt of a formal ROKG request for destroyers; (b) the initiation of an in-country program to construct fast boats; (c) ROKG agreement to provide all future support costs of the additional destroyers; (d) collection of transit costs connected with previous transfers of ships to the ROKN.

On 18 December 1969, CINCPAC concurred in COMUS Korea's recommendation. Three days later, in view of the possibility of a misunderstanding as to whether or not the ROKG had filed an official and legitimate request for the destroyers, CINCPAC requested clarification. In reply on 24 December 1969, COMUS Korea stated that "the ROKG does not consider the ROK CNO letter an official request for the purchase of destroyers but a request for price, condition and availability data."

CINCPAC, on the last day of the year, requested COMUS Korea to "submit to CINCPAC NLT 10 Jan 70, for comment and forwarding to SECDEF and CNO, recommended detailed provisions concerning the following: (a) the initiation of an in-country program to construct fast boats; (b) ROKG agreement to provide all future support costs of the additional destroyers; (c) the collection of transit costs connected with previous transfers of ships to the ROKN."

At the same time, he further recommended to SECDEF that "CNO be authorized to prepare and forward to the ROKG price, condition, and availability for sale of two destroyers to the ROKG subject" to the conditions outlined earlier by COMUS Korea and "after receipt of additional details requested" by CINCPAC from COMUS Korea on 31 December 1969.

1. CINCPAC 311810Z Dec 69; Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Jan 70, Subj: Possible Sale of Destroyers to the ROK (S); J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69, citing Ltr from US Naval Advisory Group, dtd 25 Oct 69, w/1st Ind by Hq USFK dated 18 Nov 69, Subj: Purchase of Destroyers, Request Cooperation for (S).
3. J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69, citing CINCPAC 210612Z Dec 69.
4. J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69, citing GEN MICHAELIS KRA 4585/240624Z Dec 69.
5. CINCPAC 311810Z Dec 69.
6. Ibid.; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
Requested Authorization of Leave in Hawaii and Japan for ROK Orientation Tour Participants

(U) COMUS Korea, on 29 July 1969, inquired as to CINCPAC's position concerning leave in Hawaii and/or Japan for ROK Army participants of Korean orientation tours. In reply on 16 August 1969, CINCPAC stated that he:

...interposes no objection to leave in Hawaii and/or Japan at no REPEAT NO expense to MAP. Service regulations authorize such leave upon completion of official trng, visits and tours. In the case of general officers, CINCPAC will be advised of name, rank, number of personnel and period of leave in Hawaii and/or Japan.  

Korea MAP Dollar Ceiling

(8) Early in 1969, because of an increase in operating costs resulting from the implementation of recommendations previously submitted, Counter Infiltration - Counter Guerrilla Concept and Requirement Plan (CIGCOREP), the $100 Million Package, and from the requirement for additional force modernization, it was determined that an increase in the Korea MAP dollar ceiling was needed. Justification, however, was necessary in order to support a request for an increase in the Korea MAP dollar ceiling, as well as to respond to the results of the Interagency Planning-Programming-Budgeting Study for Korea. On 9 May 1969, therefore, CINCPAC requested COMUS Korea to submit recommendations for improvements in the Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces. In addition, he asked that a "recommended increase in the Korea MAP dollar ceiling be determined for each of the years in the period FY 71-75 along with items to be added, cost, and supporting justification, to include priorities."  

(8) In response, COMUS Korea submitted his plan by letter to CINCPAC on 6 June 1969. It "included recommendations for the Korea MAP dollar ceiling to accomplish ROK force structure/modernization objectives." On 20 August 1969, CINCPAC dispatched a message to COMUS Korea, informing

1. CINCPAC 161736Z Aug 69; J3A21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
2. CINCPAC 092015Z May 69; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
him that action on this plan would be deferred "pending action at the national level on NSSM 27."\(^1\) For the remainder of Calendar Year 1969, CINCPAC took no further action on this matter.\(^2\)

M-47 tanks of the 1st Armored Brigade participating in a Quick Reaction Test.

Tank Obstacle constructed in the vicinity of Sun-dong Reservoir, 6th Infantry Division, V ROK Corps.

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1. CINCPAC 200435Z Aug 69.
2. J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; FONECON, COL Louis S. Stickney, Jr., USA, J533, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 9 Jan 70.
Confidential

Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK)

(U) The AFAK program, originated in 1953, is a military civic action conducted by U.S. Forces, Korea, and designed to enhance the image of the U.S. military in the eyes of the Korean people. It was described on 30 December 1969 as follows:

...It is an excellent program and has paid large dividends. CG, Eighth U.S. Army is executive agent and exercises overall supervision of the program and ensures proper implementation. It consists of construction projects, medical assistance and voluntary assistance.  

(3) In order to react to CINCPAC's request of 25 February 1969 for off-shore procurement (OSP) for AFAK, as well as attempting to eliminate or reduce the gold outflow involved, SECDEF requested CINCPAC to "screen the stocks of cement and reinforcing bars in the PACOM area to determine if any of this materiel is excess and could be supplied to the AFAK program at no cost to MAP except PCH&T." A screening elicited only the availability of approximately 11,000 feet of reinforcing bar. CINCPAC transmitted this information to SECDEF and, simultaneously, requested COMUS Korea to "arrange for transfer of the property and submit re-programming action reflecting its acquisition."

("Certification approved 19 May 1969," SECDEF advised CINCPAC, "for OSP of cement and rebars for AFAK.") On 24 May, CINCPAC requested DA to provide the necessary funding citation to the Comptroller of the U.S. Eighth Army in ample time to meet the target date for allocation of "1 June 1969 to permit fund obligation by 30 June 1969." DA replied as follows five days later:

...DA cannot meet the requested date of 1 June 1969 for alloc of funds. The alloc will be issued ASAP after 2 June 69 which should permit sufficient amt of time to obligate these funds in support of the AFAK prog prior to 30 June 69. . . .

1. Point Paper, J533, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Dec 69, Subj: Armed Forces Assistance Korea (AFAK).
2. SECDEF 031914Z Apr 69.
3. J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
4. SECDEF 9667/202043Z May 69.
5. CINCPAC 240120Z May 69; J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
6. DA 910755/291822Z May 69.
In mid-1969, the annual problem of funding the AFAK program arose once again. Despite previous Country Team (CT) and CINCPAC recommendations, SECSTATE advised on 3 July 1969:

...Services still do not have legal authority to fund AFAK program. DOD therefore recommends that PL 480 Sec. 104(C) local currency be used for this purpose. DOD points out that virtually all items required to support AFAK can be purchased with WON, that AID and MAP appropriations cuts make these inappropriate sources, and that ROK should not object to use of dols 300,000 in WON for AFAK in light of dols 35-40 million grant input of 104(C) WON for defense budget support. DOD would therefore like to have Embassy approach ROKG to seek approval for funding AFAK with 104(C) WON.

2. STATE and AID take position that available PL 480 WON already earmarked for other purposes, that ROKG already protested use of PL 480 currencies and that PL 480 commodities being supplied on increasingly hard terms.

3. Consequently request CT's evaluation of program's continuing value and recommendation on course of action:

   a) terminate AFAK if of marginal value, or

   b) if worthwhile, financing program with either PL 480 Sec. 104(C) WON or MAP, bearing in mind continued high materiel requirements for ROK forces.¹

A reply to SECSTATE was forthcoming in a Korea Country Team message on 23 July 1969:

2. AFAK is a decided asset to U.S. commanders at all echelons in Korea, promotes good community relations, is effective in neutralizing irritants between U.S. personnel and civil community. AFAK is significant people-to-people effort in securing and maintaining Korean good will. There is increasing value in continuing AFAK as refutation of Communist propaganda aimed at discrediting U.S. presence.

¹ SECSTATE 109968/031150Z Jul 69; J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.

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Conclude that AFAK cost is far outweighed by inherent benefits to military posture.

3. PL-480 sources available are budgeted by the ROKG, form part of their total budget and passed by the National Assembly. It is not appropriate that these funds be used to finance a U.S. armed forces civic action program.

4. AFAK does not qualify for MAP funding under Section 505, Foreign Assistance Act, 1961.

5. Recommend: a) AFAK be continued at approximate $250,000 annual level, and b) source of funds be sought other than PL 480 or MAP by SDO.¹

United Nations (UN) Forces Support in Korea MAP

[S] On 27 March 1969, COMUS Korea recommended to CINCPAC that action be initiated to fund the requirements for the UN forces in Korea and Japan from other than Korea MAP in FY 69 and in future year Korea MAPs. A pertinent part of his rationale follows:

E. The fact that UN forces support is provided from within Korea MAP ceiling, programmed and funded at a higher priority than ROK defense requirements, has not been released to the ROK because of the probable unfavorable diplomatic/political repercussions. Nevertheless, officials are increasingly aware of the general content of MA program and are closely monitoring the FY 68 and FY 69 MAP funding in order to evaluate the U.S. performance in modernizing ROK forces in compliance with Ambassador Brown's letter of 4 March 1966 and the $100 million augmentation program resulting from Mr. Vance's visit in February.

F. The legal and political importance of the UN as a basis for the presence of U.S. and other armed forces in Korea and Japan, and the critical importance of maintaining a visible multi-national UN presence in the ROK are recognized. By the provision of the Yoshida-Acheson exchange of notes of September 1951, which are reflected in the preamble to the status of UN forces in Japan agreement of February 1954.

¹. AMEMBASSY Seoul 3927/230357Z Jul 69.

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Japan agreed to support the United Nations action in the case of Korea. This UN agreement also provides that it shall terminate when all UN forces withdraw from Japan (Articles XXIV and XV). To a certain extent, the continuation in force of the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan depends also upon the presence of the UN Command in both Japan and Korea as evidence that international peace and security in the Japan area still has not been restored (Article X). For these reasons, it is essential to maintain visible proof that the Unified Command is in Japan and is composed of the forces of more than one state. Thus the UN Thai detachment is the "more than one" state representative besides the U.S.

G. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is essential that funding of UN forces support in Japan and Korea derive from a consistent and reliable source rather than be left to the vagaries of annual grant aid MAP appropriations. 1

TS CINCPAC requested his component commanders' comments on COMUS Korea's recommendation on 28 March 1969. Their replies generally supported the recommended course of action. 2 Accordingly, on 12 April 1969, CINCPAC informed SECDEF that he concurred in COMUS Korea's rationale "supporting the funding of UN forces in support of Korea from a source other than Korea MAP." 3 After stating that he was "unaware of a suitable substitute source of funds which can be utilized without adverse effect" for FY 69 and 70, CINCPAC recommended "that SECDEF budget and fund the subject support outside of the MAP commencing in FY 1971." 4

Additional Funds for FY 70 Korea MAP

In response to CINCPAC's request of 1 November 1969 for additional funds totaling $492,355 to provide for critical ROK Army supply requirements, SECDEF advised six days later that the FY 70 Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) had expired on 31 October 1969. "Until such time as CRA is extended," he continued, "additional funding of MAP requirements is not authorized." 5

1. COMUSKOREA UK 58043/270430Z Mar 69.
2. CINCPAC 282308Z Mar 69; CINCUSARPAC 12749/050724Z Apr 69; Admin CINCPACFLT 052053Z Apr 69; CINCPACAF 050622Z Apr 69.
3. CINCPAC 122211Z Apr 69; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
4. CINCPAC 122211Z Apr 69.
5. SECDEF 4221/072138Z Nov 69; J4318 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
However, SECDEF added that it was planned "to fund these critical requirements in amounts requested on a priority basis as soon as CRA is extended."  

**FY 69 MAP OSP Authority for Rubber Curing Presses**

On 30 February 1969, SECDEF notified CINCPAC that approval of OSP certification authority for six rubber curing presses for the ROK Army Tank Track Rebuild Facility had been given on 14 January 1969. CINCPAC, in turn, informed COMUS Korea of this decision and requested the submission of a program change. This program change was submitted by COMUS Korea on 14 Feb 69. CINCPAC processed the program change to SECDEF on 19 February 1969, requesting "expedited approval and funding."

DA provided CINCPAC on 13 March 1969 with the funding data related to a program change for the OSP of the six rubber curing presses. Two days later, CINCPAC advised COMUS Korea that the necessary funds had been approved and allocated for the program change.

**FY 70 MAP OSP Requirements for Cement and Asbestos Board**

On 2 January 1969, COMUS Korea requested authority from CINCPAC "to offshore procure cement in Korea to meet the FY 70 Korea MAP requirements of 829,736 bags of Portland cement." Six days later, CINCPAC requested that SECDEF grant OSP certification for this item at an estimated cost in Korea of $771,655 versus CONUS price of $3,642,541. "Although cost comparison data submitted...meets criteria of DOD Dir 2125.1," replied SECDEF on 17 January 1969, "prerequisite for OSP certification is program justification and end use of requirements recommended for procurement off-shore." Therefore, continued SECDEF, upon receipt of the "complete justification and program change data, your request for OSP certification will be considered."

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1. SECDEF 4221/072138Z Nov 69.
2. SECDEF 1484/302139Z Feb 69; J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
3. CINCPAC 040139Z Feb 69.
4. COMUSKOREA UK 57297/140252Z Feb 69.
5. CINCPAC 190334Z Feb 69.
6. DA 900927/132039Z Mar 69; Admin CINCPAC 150630Z Mar 69; J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
7. COMUSKOREA UK 56651/020200Z Jan 69.
8. CINCPAC 082355Z Jan 69; J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
9. SECDEF 9664/171650Z Jan 69.
10. Ibid.
SECRET

In another message on the same day he had requested OSP authority for cement, COMUS Korea had "requested OSP authority be granted for cement asbestos board for ROK Forces in the FY 70 MAP." Subsequently, after receiving additional information from COMUS Korea, CINCPAC processed a program change on 13 February 1969 requesting SECDEF to authorize OSP certification for 40,500 sheets of cement asbestos board and 701,876 bags of cement to support the FY 70 Korea MAP.

Several months later, on 15 August 1969, CINCPAC provided SECDEF with additional programming data on recomputed requirements for 1,001,395 bags of cement and 40,540 sheets of cement asbestos board at a total cost of $967,255. CINCPAC added an additional COMUS Korea requirement of $9,000 for cement to the FY 70 requirement on 29 August, bringing the total cost to $976,255 for the same number of bags and sheets. The status of this action as of 31 December 1969 was as follows:

Procurement and distribution for cement and asbestos board requirements for Korea is underway. Remaining funding is dependent upon FY 70 Congressional MAP appropriation.

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Funding of Raw Rubber for Korea MAP

"Based on previous information indicating a CONUS price of 70 cents per pound for raw rubber, action was initiated to obtain OSP authority to fill FY 70 requirements for Korea...." In July 1969, however, all concerned were advised "that further investigation revealed that item could be procured

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1. COMUSKOREA UK 56652/020205Z Jan 69, cited in CINCPAC 210324Z Jan 69.
2. Admin CINCPAC 132005Z Feb 69; J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69; COMUSKOREA UK 57045/291015Z Jan 69; COMUSKOREA UK 57044/291010Z Jan 69; Ltr, Hq USA Advisory Group, Korea, to Chief, Joint U.S. MAAG Korea (Prov), 29 Jan 69, Subj: FY 70 Program Change for OSP Cement and Cement Board, PCN: KS B 48-69; Ltr, Chief, Joint U.S. MAAG Korea (Prov), to CINCPAC, 29 Jan 69, Subj: FY 70 Program Change for OSP Cement and Cement Asbestos Board, PCN: KS B 48-69; CINCPAC 070342Z Feb 69; J431 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
5. J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
6. J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
from CONUS commercial sources at approximately 27 cents per pound or could be procured by CONUS commercial suppliers in Indonesia at 11 cents per pound, excluding certain fees, accessorials and transportation costs, for direct delivery to Korea", since this "confirmed revised price would negate requirement for OSP authority." ¹

On 11 October 1969, CINCPAC requested that SECDEF provide early additional funding in the amount of $96,850, which was required to purchase raw rubber for the ROK Army (ROKA) Tank Track Rebuild Facility. The following CINCPAC rationale for such action evidently persuaded SECDEF, for his approval was forthcoming five days later:

...additional funds are required to purchase raw rubber for the ROKA Tank Track Rebuild Facility that is under construction and nearing completion. This facility will provide in-country rebuild of all ROKA tank track shoes now being accomplished in Japan at high cost to MAP. Productive operations are anticipated to commence no later than Feb 70; therefore, to provide a timely supply of raw rubber through established Red River Arsenal procurement channels, the early additional funding is required. Numerous future MAP economies are dependent upon the timely activation of this approved CLIP project, and a very substantial reduction in the IBOP anticipated upon attainment of full production capabilities of this facility. ²

Malaysia

Switchboards for Malaysia

On 20 May 1969, the American Ambassador to Malaysia, James D. Bell, informed SECSTATE that the Malaysian permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense has asked if the U.S. could "provide immediately: four units SB-22/PT switchboard total estimated cost approximately $2000. "³ He strongly urged that this requested equipment be shipped immediately by air, because:

This equipment, provided under agreement in existence and for which funds have been committed, is genuinely and

1. CGUSAMC Wash DC AMCIL-GF 181934Z Jul 69.
2. CINCPAC 112303Z Oct 69; SECDEF 2580/161455Z Oct 69; J4313 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
3. AMEMBASSY Kuala Lumpur 1822/201240Z May 69.
urgently needed. A request for such a small item in such a small quantity leads me to believe that this may be an attempt at a quick test of U.S. attitude toward present Govt. If we were to refuse request, or to delay prompt reply, we would run risk of getting off to a very bad start with new order of things. Govt. leaders are quite conscious that many members of diplomatic corps are deeply concerned over racial situation. . . .

(6) One day later, with SECSTATE concurrence, SECDEF requested CINCPAC to provide the Government of Malaysia (GOM) "with four units from theater stocks on urgent basis, utilizing commercial air transportation. Because of uncertain situation in Malaysia, we do not repeat not desire to use military transport aircraft unless in your judgment inordinate delay in delivery would result."2 CINCPAC, in turn, on 22 May 1969, requested CINC-USARPAC to furnish these switchboards per SECDEF's instructions. The same day, the necessary orders were given to the 9th Logistical Command in Thailand for providing the requested items and utilizing air shipment to effect delivery. "Four SB-22/PT Switchboards were delivered to the GOM at 271847H May 69 via Air Malaysia."3

Philippines

Turning to the Philippines we find a staunch friend which through the years has shared a commonality of interest with us. But the country faces problems of degeneration, ignorance, poverty and unrest which, if not overcome, pose a serious threat to stability and progress.

The two main objectives of our Military Assistance Program in the Philippines are: first, to support the retention of U.S. base rights in that country; and second, to develop forces with the primary mission of maintaining internal security. Integral to the second objective is the military assistance channeled to the civic action programs of the Philippine Armed Forces which promote economic viability and assist the government in holding the loyalty of the people.

1. Ibid.
2. SECDEF 9799/212211Z May 69.
3. J4322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; CINCPAC 220530Z May 69; CG 2d Log Comd, Machinato, Okinawa 116/221435Z May 69.
PHILIPPINES
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1969

BASIC INFORMATION

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<td>AS % OF GROSS BUDGET</td>
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PACIFIC COMMAND

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES; TO ENHANCE PHILIPPINE MILITARY SUPPORT IN SEATO; AND TO MAINTAIN U.S. OPERATED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR

HOWARD A. JURODZE

U.S. AID DIRECTOR

MR. WESLEY C. HARLAND

CHIEF JUSMAC

MAJ GEN GEORGE B. Pickett

USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

General objectives are:

(A) To support the retention of U.S. base rights in the Philippines.

(B) To develop and maintain military/paramilitary forces with a primary mission of maintaining the internal security of the Philippines.

(C) To support a capability to deploy limited Philippines forces within the SEATO area for mutual defense tasks.

(D) To improve the capability of the Philippine armed forces to provide their own logistic support.

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES (FY73-76)

<table>
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<tr>
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MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES

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COMBAT CAPABILITY

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONDUCT LIMITED OASH PATROL AND MINOR AMBUSHES AND AFN OPERATIONS</td>
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SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 146.
Despite the fact that many influential Filipinos consider military assistance as a quid pro quo payment for U.S. bases, and have urged that we provide more sophisticated equipment geared to external defense, we have so far successfully sidetracked these requests as not being the best use for the limited resources available. Rather, we have assisted the Government of the Philippines to attain a measure of self-sufficiency for internal security.

The Philippine Air Force now has the capability to overhaul completely aircraft engines, including jets.

The Navy in the past year has greatly expanded its ability in the ship repair and boat construction fields. Ships no longer have to be sent to Guam for overhaul—it is now done in the Philippine Navy’s own shipyard at Cavite.

Within the Army, the engineering construction battalions have been fully equipped. These battalions greatly enhance capability in road and infrastructure construction. The present employment of the ten battalions throughout the Philippines, on projects of both immediate and long-range impact, is making a vital contribution toward nation building. PHIL-CAG II, a 1,500-man replacement unit for Vietnam, had one and one-half years of training in preparation for its move. During this period of civic action on-the-job training, it constructed 150 schoolhouses and 18 bridges in the Philippines.

The Military Assistance Program for the Philippines has remained at approximately the same level for several years. The program for FY 70 is basically designed to support and maintain present force capabilities.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. 1

Philippine Engineer Construction Battalions (ECBs)

1. CINCPAC 26 Jun 69 MAP Statement.
To the left is a road under construction, below a constructed bridge. Both these MAP-supported projects, assigned to the 522nd Engineer Battalion, were undertaken in support of the Philippine President's Civic Action Program.
Philippine students learn about MAP-provided equipment at the Engineer Training Center, Camp Tinio, Luzon.
NEWLY-ARRIVED MAP equipment at the 51st Engineer Brigade, waiting to be issued.

The construction of a road at Carmona, Luzon, by the MAP-supported 522nd Engineer Construction Battalion.

A MAP-supported activity, the Automotive and Construction Equipment Maintenance Area, 51st Engineer Brigade, at Quezon City.
Philippine Air Force (PAF) and another to the Philippine Navy (PN) for operational control, since they "would still continue to perform those construction and civic action projects as was intended within the spirit of the Presidential agreement." The ECBS were to remain administratively assigned to the 51st Engineer Brigade. Then, on 1 July 1969, the Philippine Army (PA) activated the 52nd Engineer Brigade. By the end of Calendar Year 1969, four of the ten MAP-supported ECBS were assigned to the 51st Engineer Brigade, while the other six were assigned to the 52nd Engineer Brigade, with no PA ECB being attached to the PAF or PN any longer.

**MAP Support of Philippine Army Engineer Brigades**

(U) By letter on 21 November 1969, CHJUSMAGPHIL informed CINCPAC that the AFP had activated the 52nd Engineer Brigade on 1 July 1969. This reorganization was accomplished completely within the assets of the original 51st Engineer Brigade, with six of the 10 MAP-supported ECBS formerly assigned to the original brigade being assigned to the new brigade. Accordingly, CHJUSMAGPHIL requested CINCPAC's recognition of the 52nd Engineer Brigade as a MAP-supportable element of the Philippine Army. On 4 December 1969, CINCPAC authorized CHJUSMAGPHIL "to recognize the 52nd Engineer Construction Brigade as a MAP-supportable element of the PA and to continue to provide such support as may be required."

**Disposition of F-102s**

(U) In a message to CINCPAC on 4 December 1969, CHJUSMAGPHIL reported the possibility that a squadron of USAF F-102s at Clark AFB could be salvaged in the Philippines or else be made available to MAPs of other countries. If the aircraft were to be salvaged, he considered it appropriate "to salvage the aircraft outside the Philippines to lessen the adverse effect on attitudes of the ROP." CHJUSMAGPHIL further recommended that, if the aircraft were made available to MAPs, they not be provided to the Philippine Air Force (PAF), because of lack of military necessity. He wished approval to inform the Philippine officials, if queried as to why the F-102s were not

2. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
3. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69, citing CHJUSMAGPHIL Ltr JPAR, 21 Nov 69.
4. CINCPAC 041958Z Dec 69.
5. JUSMAG Phil JPCH 040700Z Dec 69; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
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provided the PAF, that: (a) the aircraft were near the end of their service life and would require expensive modifications; (b) excessive costs would be incurred in supporting a weapons system with small military necessity; and (c) other AFP requirements had a higher priority.

Both SECDEF and CINCPAC, on 8 and 9 December 1969, respectively, approved CHJUSMACPHIL's position and recommended that the F-102s not be provided to the PAF and, if they were to be salvaged, such action should take place outside the Philippines. On 29 December, CSAF reported that these 20 aircraft are unsuitable for any, repeat any, MAP requirement due to condition and short service life remaining. Although stating that the most economical disposition of these F-102s would be to salvage them in place, he requested CINCPACAF's recommendation as to a suitable location for salvage of the aircraft. In reply on 31 December 1969, CINCPACAF stated that "it is politically more feasible to transfer the F-102's from PI for salvage and that Navy carriers should be used as mode of transportation to CONUS," He also began action to have the aircraft prepared for salvage and removal from the Philippines.

Request for Release of Riot Control Munitions

On 9 September 1969, CHJUSMACPHIL requested after-the-fact approval for the programming of riot control munitions, because "there is no repeat no positive knowledge of the requisite authority having been obtained from CINCPAC to program riot control munitions under MAP for the Armed Forces of the Philippines." Such approval, however, was required under the provisions of Section Chapter V of the CINCPAC Supplement Military Assistance Manual (MAM), Part II. Stating that these munitions would be used by legally constituted law enforcement bodies in line of duty and under competent military command, CHJUSMACPHIL also asked for authority to release 200 each CS and CN tear gas projectiles to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

"Consider that subject riot control munitions," replied CINCPAC on 21 September 1969, "probably should not be released to AFP at this time in

1. Ibid.; Admin CINCPAC 0902512 Dec 69; SECDEF 5942/0820072 Dec 69.
2. CSAF AFODC 2921132 Dec 69.
3. CINCPACAF 3103582 Dec 69.
4. Ibid.; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
5. CHJUSMACPHIL 0901122 Sep 69.
6. J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
7. CHJUSMACPHIL 0901122 Sep 69.
view of sensitive pre-election political climate and general adverse reaction to use of chemical agents. Should either the pre-election or post-election political climate so dictate, a request to CINCPAC for release of riot control munitions, citing the Ambassador's concurrence may be reinitiated.¹ Four days later, CHJUSMAGPHIL informed CINCPAC that the Country Team concurred in his position and that a request would not be reinitiated until future political conditions so dictated.²

Proposed Amendment to PHILCAGV-USMACV Military Working Arrangement (MWA)

(C) In a letter to COMUSMACV on 10 March 1969, General Manuel T. Yan, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, made the following statement:

During my visit to PHILCAGV in Vietnam, I noted that most of the arms and equipment presently provided for their use by MACV would greatly enhance the accomplishment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) missions here in our country, if such arms and equipment could eventually be availed of and utilized in the Philippines, specifically in our anti-dissident campaign and our military civic action efforts. These AFP activities have been given great emphasis by President Marcos because the improvement of the socio-economic condition of our people, and success in the anti-dissident campaign will contribute largely to the solution of other pressing problems of our government.³

(C) General Yan then went on to propose the amendment of paragraph 7 of the Logistics Support and Construction Annex to Military Working Arrangement between Chief of Staff, AFP, and COMUSMACV, dated 20 July 1966, "so that the title to selected items of equipment as may be recommended by COMPHILCAGV, which are within the Philippine Military Assistance Program and are furnished for use of PHILCAGV in Vietnam, shall eventually be transferred to the Philippine Government."⁴ In forwarding this proposal to CINCPAC on 8 April 1969, COMUSMACV "recommended the proposed change to the MWA not be approved. Equipment for which there is no requirement in Vietnam, if any,

1. CINCPAC 212359Z Sep 69.
2. JUSMAG PHIL 250600Z Sep 69.
3. Ltr, General Manuel T. Yan, CofS, AFP, to COMUSMACV, 10 Mar 69, Subj: Amendment to AFP-MACV Military Working Arrangement.
4. Ibid.
should be considered on a case-by-case basis and transferred only after approval of CINCPAC. COMUSMACV opposed this proposal for the following reasons:

a. No U.S. owned equipment should be withdrawn Vietnam if it is required to fill shortages in allied forces. The proposal would waive USMACV right of retention and redistribution.

b. The transfer of equipment to the Philippine Military Assistance Program is outside the purview of USMACV. The proposal does not provide for decision approval by MAP management agencies.

(C) CINCPAC, in turn, forwarded the proposal and COMUSMACV's comments to CHJUSMAGPHIL for review. CHJUSMAGPHIL concurred with COMUSMACV's opinion in this matter and recommended "that reply to Chief of Staff AFP state that the proposed action is beyond the purview of COMUSMACV and the MWA." Because of both COMUSMACV's and CHJUSMAGPHIL's objections, CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV on 10 May 1969 that:

...title to supplies and equipment which are furnished FWMAF in RVN at U.S. expense will be retained by the U.S. Exceptions are:

a. Supplies and equipment furnished as replacements of donor-owned items.

b. Items for which there is no requirement in RVN as determined by COMUSMACV and approved by CINCPAC at time of redeployment of the FWMAF.

(C) At the same time, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to make the reply to Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, include information

1. Ltr, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 8 Apr 69, Subj: Proposed Amendment of PHILCAGV-USMACV Military Working Arrangement.
2. Ibid.
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL JPAR 051300Z May 69; Ltr, CINCPAC to CHJUSMAGPHIL, 22 Apr 69, Subj: Proposed Amendment of PHILCAGV-USMACV Military Working Arrangement.
4. CINCPAC 100402Z May 69; J531 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
that was substantially the same as the preceding instructions. For all practical purposes, as far as Hq CINCPAC was concerned, this action was the terminal one.  

**Expedited Delivery of UH-1Hs for Philippine Air Force (PAF)**

During his July 1969 visit to CINCPAC, the Philippine Secretary of National Defense Mata "made a special plea for additional helicopters to be delivered on an expedited basis," stating several times "what a great difference just a few additional helicopters to the four (4) currently on hand would make at this time in the Phil internal security situation" and adding how much this additional mobility was "needed for enhancing stability within his nation this fall." Subsequently, on 22 July 1969, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that three helicopters be diverted to PAF from the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program, with payback at a later date.

"In order to prepare JCS recommendation to OSD and in view of the high priority accorded RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program," replied the JCS three days later, "request additional rationale for diverting helicopters to Philippine AF...." CINCPAC's answer was forthcoming on 29 July 1969. The impact of this diversion on the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program, he said, would be negligible. However, "an estimated 150 armed Hukbong Malagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) (formerly HUKs), aided by an estimated 900 active supporters and a mass base of about 25,000," he warned, "will probably use the chaos, which inevitably accompanies Philippine elections, to consolidate their position and gain new footholds." Furthermore, the PAF "has the capability to receive and utilize three UH-1H helicopters," and they "can be effectively utilized and will greatly increase PAF capability."

Towards the end of the following month, CINCPAC learned that the JCS had supported his position and had recommended approval to SECEDEF. In the same month, on 29 August, the American Ambassador to the Philippines, Henry A. Byroade, informed CINCPAC that "he deemed it advisable

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1. *Ibid.*; FONECON, COL John H. Fye, III, USA, J53, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 12 Sep 69.
2. CINCPAC 220255Z Jul 69; Point Paper, J4319, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Nov 69, Subj: UH-1 Helicopters for PAF.
3. JCS 5360/252017Z Jul 69.
4. CINCPAC 290324Z Jul 69; J4319 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
5. CINCPAC 290324Z Jul 69.
that the helicopters arrive on or about 15 Nov 1969, because of possible political problems.\(^1\) When CINCPAC advised the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) of this development, he responded that the delivery, if approved by SECDEF, would be accomplished on or about this date. On 19 September 1969, CINCPAC learned that this diversion had been approved by SECDEF, with the helicopters being diverted from aircraft scheduled from U.S. Army, Vietnam, rather than the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program, with payback in the third and fourth quarters of Fiscal Year 1970. Finally, on 4 November 1969, "USAAVSCOM advised that 3 UH-1H aircraft were scheduled to arrive Nichols AFB, Rizal, P. L., on 15 Nov 69."\(^2\)

**Philippine Purchase of Ammunition from China**

\(\text{(S)}\) In mid-October 1968, as CHJUSMAGPHIL advised CINCPAC, the "Philippine Government desires to purchase, at its own expense, rifle ammunition from Government of Republic of China."\(^3\) Although President Marcos' motivation for such a move was primarily for personal political reasons, both CHJUSMAGPHIL and the American Ambassador to the Philippines, G. Mennen Williams, approved. Then, on 19 October, the GRC Vice Foreign Minister stated that the "GRC probably would accept GOP order but it might take some time to manufacture ammunition since stocks on hand insufficient."\(^4\) Subsequently, the Philippines "requested DOD assistance in procuring raw materials required for the manufacture of 30-calibre carbine ammunition", and, on 21 January 1969, both the State and Defense Departments "decided to make a one-time exception to permit this purchase."\(^5\) Before the end of Calendar Year 1969, the Philippines had purchased small arms manufacturing components in the amount of $242,044.\(^6\)

**Proposed Improved Capability of Philippine Air Force (PAF)**

\(\text{(S)}\) On 11 June 1969, CHJUSMAGPHIL reported to CINCPAC that General Yan, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), had requested AFP participation in C-130 missions to Southeast Asia and F-102 air defense missions, as well as training with HAWK missiles. In reply to General Yan,

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1. Point Paper, J4319, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Nov 69, Subj: UH-1 Helicopters for PAF.
2. Ibid.
4. AMEMBASSY Taipei 4899/210420Z Oct 68.
5. SECSTATE 9754/212250Z Jan 69.
6. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
CHJUSMAGPHIL had advised "that systems listed in the request are not now, or in the foreseeable future, available for this area." As a means of easing AFP pressure for more modern aircraft and equipment, however, especially in an election year, he suggested that selected PAF aircrew members be given orientation flights in F-102 and C-130 aircraft and that selected PAF maintenance men be given informal training in these aircraft.

Three days later, CINCPAC, while agreeing that every means should be explored to reduce AFP pressures for new equipment, warned that it "would appear that orientation flights could have the reverse effect of increasing, rather than reducing pressures for new, sophisticated equipment." On 24 July 1969, CHJUSMAGPHIL proposed that he resolve the matter by informing the AFP that training in F-102s, C-130s, and HAWK missile systems could not be made available at this time, and CINCPAC concurred five days later.

Then, towards the end of the year, CHJUSMAGPHIL reported that the Chief of Staff, AFP, had again raised the subject of HAWK training for the AFP on 20 December 1969, with President Marcos purportedly originating this request. CINCPAC's concurrence was requested in CHJUSMAGPHIL's proposed reply to the Chief of Staff, AFP, whereby this request for such training would be denied. On 1 January 1970, CINCPAC gave his concurrence, stating "that the thrust of military assistance provided the Philippines must continue to be directed toward equipping the AFP for its internal security role."

Commercial Consumables for FY 70 MAP

On 14 May 1969, CHJUSMAGPHIL proposed to CINCPAC that a number of locally produced and/or commercial consumables be approved for inclusion in the FY 70 Philippine MAP. Out of the total cost of these items, which was $1.22 million and 10 percent lower than the previous year, $1.15 million was earmarked for partially supplying various types of POL for the Philippine Navy (PN) and the Philippine Air Force (PAF); MAP support of the

1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 111200Z Jun 69; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
2. CINCPAC 140540Z Jun 69.
3. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69, citing CHJUSMAGPHIL 241750Z Jul 69 and CINCPAC 290400Z Jul 69.
4. CHJUSMAGPHIL 290912Z Dec 69, cited in J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
5. CINCPAC 010141Z Jan 70, cited in J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
POL requirements of the Philippine Army (PA) and the Philippine Constabulary (PC) had "been gradually withdrawn over the past several years with total elimination of that support beginning in FY 70." 1 Previously, some four years earlier, an attempt had been made to completely withdraw MAP support of Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) fuel requirements and to force total costs absorption by the Government of the Philippines (GOP):

...Failure on the part of the U.S. to allow for gradual country absorption, to include proper local defense planning and budgeting, led to almost total failure of that absorption plan. The lack of funds with which to purchase POL had a severe impact on AFP operations - airplanes did not fly, ships did not steam, and motorized ground equipment was placed upon blocks. This situation subsequently forced CHJUSMAG Phil to request re-instatement of partial MAP-support of AFP POL requirements. 2

"Realizing that a realistic approach has to be developed toward eventual elimination of POL/commercial consumable support to the AFP," CHJUSMAGPHIL submitted also in May 1969 "a time-phased reduction plan designed to eliminate all POL support to the AFP by FY 1975, with the exception of special lubricating oil for the Philippine Navy." 3 After giving a detailed description of his plan, CHJUSMAGPHIL urged CINCPAC to approve this time-phased reduction, as well as the proposed dollar amounts for the commercial consumable programming during the FY 70-75 plan period. Even if support of non-POL items, argued CHJUSMAGPHIL:

...must be continued through FY 1975 at the levels projected for FY 1970 and even if Lube oil support to the Navy is continued at $30,000 in FY 1975 as now planned, the total commercial consumable support to the AFP in FY 1975 will be slightly less than $100,000. A reduction of that magnitude during this plan period will be an important achievement when compared to the $1.35 million programmed for commercial consumables in FY 1969 and when compared to past failures in attempting country absorption of commercial consumables. 4

1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 142301Z May 69.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
The recently MAP-provided Floating Drydock YD205 (ex-APD-44), with a capacity of 2,800 tons. The acquisition of this drydock gave the Cavite Naval Shipyard the capability to overhaul all Philippine Navy ships.

Four recently MAP-acquired Swift Boats (PCFs), under the operational control of the Philippine Coast Guard and used primarily to combat smuggling and piracy in the Sulu Sea.
Since both the DOD Military Assistance Manual (MAM) and its CINCPAC Supplement require that requests for MAP support of commercial consumables have the recommendation for approval of the Country Team, with the final approval authority being vested in OSD, CHJUSMAGPHIL confirmed this concurrence and recommendation for approval of the Country Team on 22 May 1969.\(^1\) Five days later, CINCPAC, concurring in this request, recommended that SECDEF give the required approval.\(^2\) SECDEF's reply on 16 June gave approval for the FY 70 inclusion of commercial consumables, but requested CINCPAC to submit "a plan which would completely phase-out MAP support of commercial consumables by end of FY 72."\(^3\) Accordingly, CINCPAC tasked CHJUSMAGPHIL two days later to comply with this new SECDEF requirement.\(^4\)

On 22 July 1969, CHJUSMAGPHIL submitted a plan, concurred in by the American Ambassador to the Philippines, to reduce support to $815,450 in FY 71 and $363,300 in FY 72, at which time, all support of commercial consumables to AFP would terminate. He warned, however, that:

This plan presupposes adequate action by Armed Forces of Philippines and ROP Government to take parallel action to enhance their capability as U.S. support lessens. Current indications are contrary to their taking such action; however, properly timed and appropriate measures will be taken to persuade them of the necessity for so doing.\(^5\)

In a message to SECDEF four days later, CINCPAC concurred in CHJUSMAGPHIL's plan and recommended approval of it. A month later, on 27 August 1969, SECDEF notified CINCPAC that the plan "is approved. However, proposed plan should be reviewed annually at time of plan submission to determine if necessary parallel action taken by Philippine Armed Forces and ROP will permit implementation."\(^6\) Two days later, CINCPAC forwarded SECDEF's approval and caution to CHJUSMAGPHIL, requesting that the plan "be reviewed prior to submission of annual Military Assistance Plan to

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1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 220230Z May 69; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
2. CINCPAC 270434Z May 69.
3. SECDEF 2580/161936Z Jun 69.
4. Admin CINCPAC 180341Z Jun 69; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
5. CHJUSMAGPHIL 220624Z Jul 69; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
6. SECDEF 7629/271458Z Aug 69; CINCPAC 260039Z Jul 69; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
determine if implementation is feasible.\(^1\) For all practical purposes, as far as Hq CINCPAC was concerned, this action was the terminal one for the calendar year.\(^2\)

Establishment of a Colt Arms Factory in the Philippines

\(\$\) During December 1968, SECSTATE approved a request from the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GOP) to negotiate a license agreement with the Colt Company of the United States for the establishment of a small arms factory, but CINCPAC informed the JCS that the venture was neither economically sound nor militarily supportable, suggesting instead alternatives whereby AFP units could be equipped with the M-16.\(^3\) In a message on 24 January 1969, the JCS concurred in CINCPAC's position, agreed "that alternatives to M-16 production facility for Philippines should be examined," but conceded that the GOP determination to establish a weapons manufacturing facility was probably an overriding political objective, which could make it "unlikely that GOP will accept an alternative to M-16 production facility."\(^4\) For the remainder of the calendar year, there "was no further message traffic on the subject."\(^5\) The FY 70 Philippine MAP, moreover, contained 1,454 M-16 rifles for the AFP.\(^6\)

President Marcos' Aide Memoires

\(\$\) "On Jul 26, 1969 in Manila," SECSTATE informed CINCPAC in a message on 12 December 1969, "President Marcos, without comment, handed six Aide Memoires to President Nixon."\(^7\) Both CINCPAC and the Country Team were requested to comment on these six Aide Memoires, whose subjects were: (a) AFP requirements in case of complete withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Vietnam; (b) U.S. assistance to establish bases in the Southern Philippines; (c) proposed Manila north expressway extension; (d) logistical assistance for the anti-dissident campaign in Central Luzon; (e) ammunition

\begin{itemize}
\item Admin CINCPAC 290404Z Aug 69.
\item FONECON, LCOL Edward J. Leonard, USAF, J5333, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 27 Jan 70.
\item JCS 51087/2419532Z Jan 69.
\item J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
\item Ibid., CINCPAC MA Plan for Philippines FY 70-75, 23 Jun 69, Vol. I, p. 106; FONECON, LCOL Edward J. Leonard, USAF, J5333, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 28 Jan 70.
\item SECSTATE 206418/121755Z Dec 69.
\end{itemize}
reloading machine; and (f) ammunition requirements for the armed forces of
the Philippines. 1

(S) In general, as his message of 30 December 1969 read, CINCPAC did
not support the requests contained in President Marcos' Aide Memoires—a
position that was in consonance with the comments of the American Ambassa-
dor to the Philippines, Henry A. Byroade, on the same Aide Memoires—
primarily for the following reasons:

a. Currently programmed military assistance supports
JSOP objectives for the Philippines, and is geared to equip
the AFP to combat their primary threat, the threat to internal
security.

b. Cost of most of the requests exceed current and
projected MAP funding.

c. Ammunition levels are considered to be adequate.
Shortages will be eliminated as a result of FY 70 and FY 71
MAP programming. An ammunition reloading machine pro-
vided through MAP is capable of providing 120,000 rounds
per day. 2

Singapore

Proposed Purchase of LSTs by Singapore

(S) The Government of Singapore (GOS), reported the American Embassy
in Singapore on 7 October 1969, had expressed a desire to purchase from the
U.S. up to four LSTs, which would be used in hauling scrap and other materi-
als from Vietnam to Singapore and perhaps in other regional cargo transport
operations. Requests similar to this one had been made earlier, but they
were always turned down because of the nonavailability of surplus LSTs. This
time, however, GOS understood that some LSTs were being withdrawn from
active service, thus making them available. Previously, the American Em-
bassy would have supported such a GOS request without any reservation, but
now:

... RPT now, however, we are reluctant recommend
sale this particular craft due solely to nomenclature: 'landing

1. Ibid.; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; CINCPAC 300314Z
Dec 69; AMEMBASSY Manila 12801/221006Z Dec 69.

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ship-tanks. While any other type of cargo ship would be unobjectionable, we fear that Malaysian Government might associate acquisition of LSTs with Singapore's recent purchase of 36 French tanks from Israel and conjure up bogeyman of Singapore amphibious invasion of Malaysian coastline.

...GOM reacted fairly strongly to GOS purchase of tanks. We have in fact heard rumor locally that GOM decision drop consideration second causeway plan...based at least partially on fear of invasion over causeway by tanks from Singapore.

...believes MINDEF interest not in LSTs specifically, and proposes suggest that request be made not RPT not for LSTs but for more general category of cargo ships, in which case we can see no objections. 1

[S] When queried by CINCPAC the following day, CINCPACFLT concurred with the position of the American Embassy in Singapore and suggested the sale of Liberty-type ships, of which three were then available, in lieu of LSTs. CINCPACFLT's rationale was that allocation of USN LSTs, if and when available, should be distributed to support existing FY 72-79 JSOP shortfall requirements of PACOM MAP navies, i.e., Philippines and Thailand. While recognizing the positions of these others, CINCPAC nevertheless recommended to SECDEF in late October that, "as additional LSTs become available and shortfall requirements are filled, the U.S. should consider the GOS as a candidate for the purchase of this type vessel." 2 His rationale was as follows:

Current and future logistical support problems, geographical location and vessel configuration favor GOS purchase of LST type vessel over other available general cargo type vessels. 3

Proposed Purchase of Tracked Vehicles by Singapore

[S] On 14 October 1969, GOS requested a firm Letter of Offer from the U.S. Government (USG) for the purchase of the following tracked vehicles:

1. AMEMBASSY Singapore 2173/070030Z Oct 69.
56 M-109 SP (Self-Propelled) 155mm howitzers, eight bridging tanks (50-ton capacity), eight dozer tanks, and eight mine clearing tanks. It indicated a willingness to accept a delay of 18 to 24 months in delivery. This proposed acquisition, however, generated immediate verbal alarm from the Government of Malaysia (GOM), "who considered this acquisition a serious offensive threat that could eventually be used against them."\(^1\)

\(\text{(3)}\) Diplomatic views were solicited by the U.S. from Australia and New Zealand. Both seemed sympathetic with the problem, but were reluctant to participate in any negotiations between the GOS and GOM concerning this arms purchase. As a result, on 24 October 1969, SECSTATE outlined items of interest that both Malaysia and Singapore should consider, suggesting "that both countries consider the validity of their mutual defense and unilateral efforts be made to intensify the security bonds between the nations in order to erase misunderstandings and habitual apprehensiveness."\(^2\)

\(\text{(3)}\) American Embassy officials in both Singapore and Malaysia conducted numerous meetings on this subject with gratifying results. In most instances, the host country officials openly admitted that they understood and appreciated the U.S. position in this matter. On 29 November 1969, SECSTATE reassured both countries that defense arms purchases from either of them would receive the same consideration. "It appears," read a CINCPAC document as of mid-January 1970, "that unless some unforeseen situation arises between the two countries, consumation of this FMS transaction is imminent."\(^3\)

FMS of Armored Cars to Singapore

\(\text{(C)}\) On 8 January 1969, United States Defense Attache Officer (USDAO) Singapore, advised CINCPAC, among others, that the Government of Singapore 'had increased the previous FMS order from 176 to 247 Cadillac Gage V200 'Singapura' armored cars.'\(^4\) These vehicles were to be configured for armament as follows: 20mm cannon - 88, 90mm cannon - 40, 120mm mortar - 18, 81mm mortar - 22, command vehicles - 59, and maintenance/recovery - 20. The renegotiated contract involved a sum of $16.5 million.

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69; USDAO/Singapore 50/080356 Z Jan 69.
(U) ...to discuss with you, fully and openly, a subject which should be of the most direct concern to every American. That topic is the threat of aggressive communism in Asia today as it affects the peace of the area, American national power in the Pacific, and the problem of collective security throughout this vast region. Its significance is underscored by the fact that in my area of responsibility, the Pacific Command, live more than one-third of the people on earth under 25 different flags.

In the Pacific we are facing the whole gamut of threats, both active and potential, that the communists have at their disposal. A glance at a map shows that, of the communist nations in the world, the four which present threats to Free World security--Communist China, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and North Korea--border the Western Pacific.

Finally we come to the two security pacts of direct concern to the Pacific Command.

The Manila Pact--the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization--is made up of the nations whose major concern is the containment of communist activities in Southeast Asia. The eight SEATO nations include the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines.

The other pact, ANZUS, is made up of the three English-speaking nations which have major commitments and responsibilities in the Pacific area--Australia, New Zealand and the United States. This involves many matters of mutual concern, both military and political.
One further security bulwark has been erected toward achieving greater stability along the eastern coast of Asia. This area is stabilized by U.S. mutual assistance pacts with Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of China, and the Republic of the Philippines.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. 1

1. An Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific, before the National Alcoholic Beverage Control Association at Honolulu, Hawaii, on 11 November 1969.
UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS
IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND

SECTION I - CINCPAC ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF SEATO

(6) Against this program of creeping aggression by Peking and Hanoi, and the ever present possibility of open invasion--threats which will not end with any foreseeable Vietnam settlement--SEATO stands as an indispensable shield. Unquestionably SEATO has weaknesses. But it also has essential strengths of flexibility and accommodation to political and military realities at this stage of history. Under it Member Nations prepared and able to do so have come to the Republic of Vietnam's assistance, joined by the Republic of Korea and, in non-military ways, by other Free Nations. Perhaps at a future date it will be feasible and desirable to replace SEATO with a tighter security organization. This is not possible now. We would be well advised to preserve and strengthen as feasible the organization we now have.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.  

(U) Free World defenses against the continuing communist threat throughout East Asia continue to rest on a combination of U.S. -allied bilateral treaties and SEATO. U.S. faithfulness to its treaty commitments has been demonstrated in Vietnam. In May of this year at Bangkok the SEATO nations solidly reaffirmed their adherence to SEATO as an indispensable instrument of allied mutual security in Southeast Asia.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.  

1. ADMIN CINCPAC 180300Z Sep 69, forwarding a presentation, entitled "Collective Security in East Asia," by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC.

2. An Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific, before the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics at Monterey, California, on 2 December 1969.
SEATO ORGANIZATION

SEATO COUNCIL

MILITARY ADVISERS

SPECIALIST COMMITTEES

CHIEF, SNPO

DEP. CHIEF, SNPO

* MIL. ADVISERS REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE

COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT WORKING GROUP

SECRETARY GENERAL

DEP. SEC. GEN

OFFICE OF SEC. GEN.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT

AL-OH COMMISSION

** NOTE: DIVISION NOT NAMED SINCE MCMXLI.T.C.M.C.M."T WHOEVER PERMANENTLY ORIENTED AS FOLLOWS: (1) OOH: TRAINING TO OPERATIONAL PLANNING DIV. (2) STANDARDIZATION TO LOGISTICS PLANNING DIV.

S.M.S. - SEATO MILITARY PLANNING DIVISION

HDU - PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE

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CONSULTATION & REVIEW

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 3, revised by J514 to show status as of 31 Dec 69.
Military Advisers 30th Conference (MA 30C)

(C) As the U.S. Military Adviser (USMILAD), ADM McCain attended the Thirtieth Conference of the SEATO Military Advisers (MILADs) in Bangkok, Thailand, on 16 and 17 May 1969. Earlier, the previous month, ADM McCain, along with the other MILADs, had concurred in the "signing of Military Advisers' Report, MA 30C, at 1200 hours on 17 May 69 and subsequent USMILAD attendance at the Thailand Chiefs of Services' luncheon, 1230 hours, same day." This change from a latter signing, scheduled at

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., the U.S. Military Adviser, talks with senior Thai Service officers on his arrival in Bangkok to attend the 30th meeting of the SEATO Military Advisers in May 1969.

1. CINCPAC 190345Z May 69; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
2. CINCPAC 170446Z Apr 69.
1400 hours, had been effected because of the different MILADs' "desires to close out the MA 30C Conference NLT 1200 hours on 17 May so that they would be free in the afternoon to conduct national business." 1

(U) For the first time at MA 30C, the U.S. representatives working on the various subcommittees prior to the formal opening of the SEATO MILADs' conferences had ample time to both finish up their usual overflow of work and to adequately brief the USMILAD on the current ramifications of their work before the meeting began. Previously, the overwhelming need to complete their customary overflow of subcommittee work would keep them working late into the night, thereby allowing them only a 10 to 15 minute period immediately preceding the commencement of the conference the next day--for briefing the USMILAD. This innovation had come about from a recommendation of the Australian MILAD in January 1969 that "one clear day should be left between scheduled completion of subcommittee work and the formal opening session of MA 30C." 2 Recognizing the wisdom of this suggestion, the MILADs gave their concurrence and, beginning with MA 30C, this new procedure was to become a standard practice. 3

(U) Another innovation at MA 30C was the changed procedure for presenting the progress report covering the period since the last conference by the Chief of the SEATO Military Planning Office (CMPO). Rather than completing his report 45 days prior to the commencement of the conference and then giving an oral report at MA 30C for these remaining 45 days, CMPO recommended on 22 January 1969 that the report be completed in its entirety in outline form 30 days before the conference. Then, two days prior to the beginning of MA 30C, the Progress Report Subcommittee would review it and recommend the final approval and publishing. As for USMILAD, he requested that the "CMPO be notified that USMILAD notes revised procedure and requests the proposed outline contain a summary of each topic." 4

(US) The first item on the agenda of MA 30C, therefore, was a progress report for the period of 18 October 1968 through 16 May 1969 by the CMPO.

1. J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
2. CINCPAC 122050Z Feb 69; FONECON, COL R. F. Fraser, USA, J514, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 15 Jul 69.
3. J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
4. CINCPAC 040357Z Feb 69; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
He was immediately followed by the Secretary General of SEATO, LT GEN Jesus Vargas, who addressed the conference and emphasized "that communist insurgency and subversion in the free countries of Southeast Asia must be expected to continue no matter what the results of the Paris peace talks."\(^1\) In commenting on his recent visit to South Vietnam, he said that he had found the political and military situation far more encouraging than one or two years ago. President Thieu’s initiative in calling for a broadly based aggregation of Nationalist Parties supporting the government was a most encouraging development.\(^2\)

\(^{(TS)}\) The next agenda item concerned an issue raised during MA 28C in the spring of 1968, when the CMPO was requested "to ascertain whether or not a formal review of MPO Plan 5/61, which was then in abeyance mainly because of a French objection, should be undertaken."\(^3\) At MA 30C, all Member Nations readily concurred in the "approval of the MPO Plan 5/69 Basic Plan, Concept of Operations, Force Requirements and Directive to Commander.... and agreed as future action to review force declarations to the plan."\(^4\) In this instance, the changes and recommendations made by the U.S. to the original plan were accepted. The MILADs directed CMPO "to complete remaining annexes to Plan 5/69 and insure that other MPO plans contain transitional arrangements appropriate to MPO Plan 5/69."\(^5\)

\(^{(TS)}\) The next order of business, Agenda Item C, also concerned a SEATO plan--the approval of Change 1, MPO Plan 9/67--and "the change was agreed to without difficulty."\(^6\) This plan, an emergency plan for the defense of Thailand against attack from forces of North Vietnam, was first approved by the MILADs at MA 27C in September 1967.\(^7\) At MA 30C, all of the comments

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1. CINCPAC 190345Z May 69.
2. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 190345Z May 69.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
and recommendations of the U.S. concerning Change 1 to MPO Plan 9/67 were accepted. In addition, the Thailand MILAD updated and increased his country's air forces declarations to the plan, while the Philippines MILAD, whose country had not previously declared forces to the plan, made declarations to Plan 9/67 in the amount of a task force of one battalion combat team (approximately 1,330 men in all ranks).  

(S) Agenda Item D dealt with SEATO Force Planning Factors. All the MILADs agreed that a requirement existed for a SEATO Military Publication (SEAP) on this subject. As a result, they directed CMPO:

...to proceed with further development and refinement of these factors in accordance with MILADs' guidance. Generally this guidance drew CMPO's attention to a realistic assessment of the effectiveness and capability of enemy combat forces, his logistic support system, effect of terrain limitations, initial SEATO interdiction operations on enemy forces and his lines of communications. In addition, planning factors are to reflect the capabilities of Member Nations, rather than accepting one Member Nation's planning factors and then applying this one set of factors to all SEATO forces. On the matter of re-examining the present procedure for the development of SEATO field forces plans, the different Member Nations decided to continue to follow procedures set up in MA 21C. CMPO was directed to re-examine these procedures for MILADs' consideration at MA 31C.  

(C) As for the appointments of CMPO, Deputy CMPO (DCMPO), and Head of Planning, MPO, the next agenda item, the New Zealand MILAD accepted the invitation to provide an officer for appointment as CMPO by 30 June 1970, the Philippines MILAD declared his country would fill the appointment of DCMPO in February 1970, and the USMILAD accepted the appointment of Head of Planning, a position which was to be filled in April 1970.  

(C) Agenda Item G involved the program of future work. It was approved with one addition—that SEAP 43, which addressed the subject of

1. CINCPAC 190345Z May 69; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
2. CINCPAC 190345Z May 69.
3. Ibid.
counterinsurgency in the SEATO Treaty Area, was to be reviewed and updated. Next, the MILADs agreed that MA 31C would be held at SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand, on 30 and 31 October 1969, with USMILAD chairing the conference. 1

(Q) Before the close of MA 30C, both the U.S. and Thailand MILADs made presentations to the conference members. In his talk, ADM McCain emphasized the vital importance of SEATO in meeting the communist threat in the Southeast Asia region and then reviewed the situation in South Vietnam, noting that Free World forces had successfully countered the enemy’s latest offensive, which had began on 23 February 1969. He "stressed the point that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army had been defeated in every significant engagement and had sustained heavy casualties" and described "the continuing improvement of South Vietnamese forces, their assumption of a steadily expanding share of combat operations and the progress achieved in pacification." 2 This progress being made by the Free World forces in South Vietnam did not go unnoticed by the MILADs listening to ADM McCain.

(Q) The Thailand MILAD briefed the conference on the communist insurgency in his country, as well as the combined military and civic action measures undertaken by the Royal Thai Government to counter this threat. He said that "there was increased evidence of external assistance to the communist terrorists who operate in Thailand" and warned "that the present situation in Laos warranted close scrutiny because that was the area of greatest potential threat to Thailand at this time." 3 Of particular interest to the MILADs at MA 30C was Thailand MILAD’s "statement that the steps being taken in Thailand by the Royal Thai Government were meeting with success, and that this was evident from the recent successful elections and the inability of the communist terrorists to launch any sizable attacks." 4

(U) Immediately following the termination of MA 30C, ADM McCain dispatched a message to the JCS of the significant events of the meeting. He concluded his message with the following summation:

The 30th MILADs Conference went off extremely well. A fine working relationship was evident between the Military Planning Office and the various subcommittees.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. CINCPAC 190345Z May 69.
4. Ibid.
Admiral McCain being interviewed by the press at the SEATO Military Advisers 31st Conference, 30-31 October 1969 in Bangkok.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., U.S. Military Adviser, joins other Member Nations officials at the flag raising ceremony at SEATO Headquarters just prior to the SEATO Military Advisers 30th Conference in May 1969.
Air Chief Marshal Dawee of Thailand was a most effective chairman. There exists a high degree of professionalism among representatives of the different Member Nations' delegations attending these meetings. SEATO plans can be considered as reasonably sound and applicable to the contingencies for which they are designed. Where weaknesses exist, efforts are constantly being made to improve and amend the plans in consonance with guidance given by the MILADs. It was evident from this successful meeting that SEATO is the best regional security organization possible in this area at this time, that it has great value, and that the U.S. should continue to support it strongly. 1

While in Bangkok, ADM McCain also attended two other separate meetings. On 20 and 21 May 1969, he and Minister Robert A. Fearer, his Political Adviser, as well as other U.S. delegates, attended the Fourteenth SEATO Council Meeting. Then, outside the SEATO context, ADM McCain and Minister Fearer served as U.S. delegates to the Troop Contributors' Conference on 22 and 23 May 1969. This meeting was attended by those seven countries that were providing military forces to the Vietnam War, and authority for holding such conferences is contained in Article 30 of the Manila Communique of 24 October 1966. Earlier, on 2 April 1969, the SECRET has asked ADM McCain if he would provide a military briefing on the war in Vietnam to the delegates attending the Troop Contributors' Conference. As a result, ADM McCain gave a report at the conference on the Allied military progress in South Vietnam. While in Thailand, ADM McCain's activities "received extensive coverage in the Bangkok World and the Bangkok Post, as well as broad American coverage nationally and in the local Honolulu newspapers." 2

Military Advisers 31st Conference (MA 31 C)

(U) On 30 and 31 October 1969, the Thirty-first Conference of the SEATO Military Advisers (MILADs) was held in Bangkok, Thailand. ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, the U.S. MILAD, chaired the meeting. All Member

1. Ibid.; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
2. J74 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69; CINCPAC 080420Z Apr 69; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69; CINCPAC 200100Z Apr 69; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; CINCPAC 100202Z May 69.
Military leaders from the Member Nations attending the SEATO Military Advisers 31st Conference in Bangkok on 30-31 October 1969 meet with Thailand Prime Minister, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn.

Nations of SEATO, except France and Pakistan, sent MILADs to MA 31C, and an observer from Pakistan sat in on the meeting. The following narrative covers those items on the agenda that ADM McCain considered significant enough to include in his report to the JCS.

($) As was customary, the Secretary General of SEATO, LT GEN Jesus Vargas, addressed the MILADs at the first session, immediately following a progress report by CMPO on the period since MA 30C:

...noting the lack of enthusiasm by Asian nations for the Soviet proposed collective security of Asia. He predicted a continued intransigent attitude on the part of the Communists at the Paris negotiating table. He reviewed recent political developments in Southeast Asia and commented on action being taken by the Secretariat General concerning...
counterinsurgency. Noting the high degree of harmony existing between the MPO and the Secretariat, he praised the progress being made in furthering SEATO plans and expressed hope that the military exercise program would be meaningful and worthwhile. ¹

Several significant decisions were made at MA 31C. An excellent example, for instance, occurred when the first voting on an agenda item took place. Agenda Item B dealt with the procedures for the development of SEATO plans that were designed to decrease the amount of planning time by approximately 40 percent. In the end, the "Member Nations agreed to adopt procedures and accepted U.S. recommendation that they be used as guides rather than firm requirements." ²

The next three agenda items dealt with proposed changes to MPO plans and, in every case, all of the U.S. positions and recommendations were accepted by the MILADs. Earlier, in the summer of 1969, MPO had distributed drafts of Change 2 to MPO Plan 4/68, Change 2 to MPO Plan 5/69, and Change 3 to MPO Plan 8/66 for comments and proposed approval at MA 31C. After requesting and receiving comments from his component commands and concerned subordinate unified commands, ADM McCain requested that the JCS approve his intended positions as USMILAD on these changes. This approval—with but a few minor changes—was soon forthcoming. Subsequently, at MA 31C, all of USMILAD's comments and recommendations on these changes were approved. Briefly, Change 2 to MPO Plan 4/68 "provided additional guidance for naval command arrangements, made amendments to UK forces declarations, and reflected administrative updates stemming from specialist committee meetings since May 69," Change 2 to MPO Plan 5/69 involved "adoption of eight annexes which reflected standard format, terms and procedures previously adopted for other SEATO plans in the areas of operations, logistics, communications, and intelligence," and Change 3 to MPO Plan 8/66 involved a routine updating, as well as an update of air requirements based on application of SEATO Force Requirements Planning Factors, and also put the plan in a format

1. CINCPAC 310700Z Oct 69; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69; FONECON, LCOL R. L. Ethridge, USAF, J5142, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 25 Nov 69.

2. CINCPAC 310700Z Oct 69.
approved for other MPO plans. 1

The SEATO Exercise Schedule, as well as the Exercise Forecast, was addressed next in Agenda Item F. In the voting, all of the U.S. positions were accepted, while all of the U.S. objectives were met. For instance, PX-42 was postponed for one year, an action that eliminated the unwanted PX-45. Accordingly, to fill the gap in the SEATO Exercise Schedule, a new small-scale air development/symposium exercise, PX-46, which was based on MPO Plan 4 was adopted for the fall of 1970. At MA 31C, both exercise dates and previously submitted force commitments underwent minor adjustments. The following exercise dates, locations, and co-sponsorships were those agreed upon:

a. PX 46, Nov 70, Thailand, co-sponsorship by U.S. and Australia tentative pending development of exercise by MPO.

b. PX 43, Mar 71, Philippines, U.S./Philippines co-sponsorship established previously at MA 29C.

c. PX 44, Sp 71, maritime, U.S./Australia co-sponsors.

d. PX 42, Apr/May 72, Thailand, co-sponsors U.S./Thailand. 2

When the program of future work came before the MILADs, they approved a MPO proposal to program future work on a 12-month basis rather than the customary six-month period. This decision was commensurate with the U.S. position. As for the chairmanship, date, and location of the next meeting, MA 32C, the MILADs "agreed that the conference be held in the Philippines, 2-3 April 1970, and that GEN Yan, PHILMILAD, would be chairman." 3

1. Ibid.; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69; ADMIN CINCPAC 040007Z Sep 69; ADMIN CINCPAC 040008Z Sep 69; CINCPAC 190519Z Sep 69; JCS 2985/212117Z Oct 69; CINCPAC 150210Z Aug 69; CINCPAC 300448Z Aug 69; JCS 2519/152208Z Oct 69. Background on the MPO plans mentioned in this paragraph can be located on pages 264, 266, 269, and 270 of CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. II.
2. CINCPAC 310700Z Oct 69.
3. Ibid.
Under the remaining agenda item of "Other Business," both U.S. and Thailand MILADs made presentations, while the Philippine MILAD announced that BG Felix Pestana, RPAF, had been selected to become Deputy CMPO sometime around 1 Feb 1970 to succeed Spec Naval Captain Chob Sirodom, RTN. After reviewing the communist terrorist activities in Thailand over the past six months, the Thai MILAD concluded "that in the north and northeast, activity has been reduced, the central region remains calm, and that the critical area has now shifted to the south. He emphasized that the situation could drastically change if conditions in Laos deteriorate." For his part, USMILAD provided an overview of the military situation in Asia and discussed the progress being made in Vietnam to strengthen Vietnamese forces and to achieve the goals of the pacification program. In closing, he "cautioned that the termination of hostilities in Vietnam would not automatically end the threat of communist aggression in East Asia, and emphasized the continued importance of SEATO as an instrument of Allied mutual security in Southeast Asia."  

As ADM McCain reported to the JCS immediately following MA 31C, the conference:

...was characterized by a high degree of professional competence among the delegates from all Member Nations. Tasks were carried out with an efficiency and dispatch reflecting the excellent military working relationships that exist between Member Nations and the SEATO Military Planning Office. SEATO plans are reasonably well developed and the Exercise Schedule is balanced and realistic. In summary, the conference results were most encouraging and beneficial to U.S. interests. SEATO continues to display its valuable contribution to the deterrence of communist aggression in Southeast Asia. It deserves continued strong U.S. support.

SEATO Military Plans - A Summary

The multinational-staffed SEATO Military Planning Office (SMPO) consisted of 31 officers at Hq SEATO, Bangkok, Thailand, in September

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

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1969. Its planning guidance emanates from the Council of Ministers and MILADs, who meet annually and semi-annually, respectfully. Approval of the resultant plans is made by the MILADs at their semi-annual meeting, where a single adverse vote can delay or prevent the consideration or publication of a plan. Other handicaps under which SMPO operates is the existence of "a certain lack of expertise among the Asiatic representatives, which is often compounded by a language barrier." In addition, some Member Nations are unable to make any meaningful contributions as far as source material for planning purposes, while others prevent the release of important data that would provide significant inputs because of security limitations or restrictions. "The quality of SEATO Plans," therefore, "will never compare favorably with U.S. unilateral Plans as long as they are produced by a multinational Staff, with imposed limitations of a small staff, restricted expertise, incomplete planning data, and a minuscule budget."

Despite such criticism, however, American planners consider the SEATO plans to be reasonably sound and applicable to the contingencies for which they were designed. Moreover, they serve a useful purpose in support of U.S. national policies and objectives.

Through the years, the military plans prepared by SMPO have been constantly updated, changed, revised, or modified whenever appropriate. As of late September 1969, SMPO had developed six SEATO plans, three being concerned with overt aggression by the Chinese Communists or North Vietnam—or both—and three being addressed to insurgency in the SEATO or Protocol countries. A summary of these plans is given below, while any later developments concerning any of these plans that occurred at MA 31C can be found in the earlier subsection on this MILADs' conference:

**MPO Plan 4/68.** Defense of Southeast Asia, including Pakistan and the Philippines, against attack by Communist Chinese forces and those of North Vietnam. Appointed Nation for plan is the United States; Force Commander is CINCUSARPAC. Field Forces Commanders: COMUSMACV for Central Region; Republic of Philippines for Eastern Region; and Pakistan for Western Region.

**MPO Plan 5/69.** Assist the Royal Laotian Government to counter communist insurgency in order to establish

2. Ibid.
conditions which will maintain the security and independence of Laos. Appointed Nation for plan is Thailand; Force Commander, Field Marshal Thanom; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMATHAL.

MPO Plan 6/66. Defense of the Protocol States against an attack by forces of NVN. Appointed Nation for Plan is United States; Force Commander, CINCUSARPAC; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACV.

MPO Plan 7/64. Assist the Government of South Vietnam to counter communist insurgency and regain control of its territory so as to establish conditions in which it can resolve its problems and maintain its security and independence. This plan is not being kept current due to the fact that the events in Vietnam today have made the plan OBE. Appointed Nation, United States; Force Commander, CINCUSARPAC; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACV.

MPO Plan 8/66. Assist the Royal Thai Government to counter communist insurgency in Thailand. Appointed Nation for plan is Thailand; Force Commander, Field Marshal Thanom; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMATHAL.

MPO Plan 9/67. Defense of Thailand against an attack by NVN forces. Appointed Nation is Thailand; Force Commander, Field Marshal Thanom; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMATHAL.

SEATO MPO 5/69

[Note] Late in 1968, USMILADREP forwarded proposed copies of draft Annexes B and C to MPO Plan 5/69 to USMILAD for comments and recommendations which, in turn, were to be presented to the MILADREPs' Committee for consideration prior to the publishing of these annexes in final draft form. On the first day of 1969, USMILAD concurred in these annexes, except for the extraneous material devoted to contingencies, transitional, and command arrangements in Annex B (Concept of Operations). Accordingly, USMILAD recommended that this information be either deleted or

1. Ibid.
relocated under Annex E (Command and Organization). 1

(TS) A few days later, on 15 January 1969, SMPO proposed that draft MPO Plan 5/69 be Agenda Item B at MA 30C. Two months later, on 3 March 1969, the American Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, forwarded his comments on draft MPO Plan 5/69: Replying by message on 13 March 1969—in which "Ref A" refers to the 3 March message of the American Embassy in Vientiane—USMILAD gave his concurrence:

2. (TS) USMILAD concurred in para 3 of Ref A and has recommended to JCS that the Plaine Des Jarres be removed from the list of critical terrain.

3. (C) Para 2 of Ref A has been taken under advisement... Your recommendation will be placed in the intelligence channels with a view to introducing the subject at the SEATO Intelligence Working Party Meeting in May 69. 2

(TS) On the same day, USMILAD recommended that the JCS approve this plan subject to certain changes and recommendations, none of which were considered controversial or substantive. This approval was forthcoming on 26 April 1969. Subsequently, at MA 30C in May 1969, the Member Nations' MILADs approved MPO Plan 5/69, with all of the changes and recommendations made by the U.S. to the draft plan being accepted. 3

Change 1 to SEATO MPO Plan 9/67

(TS) On 26 February 1969, SMPO distributed Change 1 to SEATO MPO Plan 9/67, which was scheduled at Agenda Item C for MA 30C. Besides updating the Basic Plan, Concept of Operations, and Communications Annex, this change proposed some increase in ground forces requirements and a sizable increase in air force requirements, as well as a revised Logistics Annex. It also incorporated "other appropriate amendments in accordance with changes already made to MPO Plans 4 and 6 and proposes other

1. CINCPAC 010007Z Jan 69; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
2. CINCPAC 130242Z Mar 69; J514Z History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69, citing MS/624/1/69 of 15 Jan 69 and AMEMBASSY Vientiane 031143Z Mar 69.
3. CINCPAC 190345Z May 69; CINCPAC 130240Z Mar 69; J514Z History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69, citing JCS 262144Z Apr 69.
necessary guidance for the transition of operations from other plans to Plan 9 and from Plan 9 to Plan 4. "1

(6) After consulting with concerned PACOM component commanders and subordinate unified commanders, USMILAD recommended approval, subject to certain changes and recommendations, to the JCS on 29 March 1969. The JCS approved USMILAD's position on 9 May 1969. Later in the month at MA 30C, this change was presented and approved by the Member Nations' MILADs, with all of the U.S. comments and recommendations being accepted. 2

Central Region SEATO Field Forces (CRSFF) OPlan 4/69

(6) SMPO forwarded a final copy of CRSFF OPlan 4/69 for review and comment to USMILAD on 27 February 1969. Since this plan had been recently amended, USMILAD requested concerned PACOM component commanders and subordinate unified commanders that "substantive comment and recommendations only be submitted on the OPlan by 1 May 1969." 3 In fact, the recommended changes in this final copy "consisted mostly of an update reflecting recent SEATO Specialist Conferences held in Bangkok - intelligence, logistics, C&E, etc." 4 In the end, on 22 June 1969, USMILAD approved this final revision of CRSFF OPlan 4/69, less Tab A to Appendix 2, Annex A, and Annex F, which had not been forwarded, subject to certain comments and recommendations. 5

Review of Draft Eastern Region SEATO Field Forces (ERSFF) OPlan 4/69

(6) USMILAD's comments and recommendations on draft ERSFF OPlan 4/69, which reflected the changes included in SMPO Plan 4/68 and was designed to supersede ERSFF OPlan 4/63 when finalized, were requested by SMPO on 17 June 1969. After soliciting the views of Hq CINCPAC, CINCPAC-USARPAC, and COMUSMACV, USMILAD forwarded his comments and recommendations--mainly consisting of corrections to the Base Area Command

1. J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69; CINCPAC 070001Z Mar 69.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 292244Z Mar 69; JCS 091401Z May 69, cited in J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. CINCPAC 032008Z Apr 69; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 220335Z Jun 69.
for the Eastern Region—to SMPO on 17 October 1969.1

SEATO Field Forces (SFF) OPlan 6/68 with Change 1

(ço) USMILADREP was informed on 29 October 1968 that the Military Planning Office would assist the SEATO Field Forces Commander in the preparation of changes to Draft SFF 6/68 and that the changes would be issued to Member Nations before 31 December 1968.2 The intent of such action apparently "was to have Member Nations withhold comments on Draft SFF OPlan 6/68, distributed on 11 Sep 68, until changes based on Change 3, MPO Plan 6/66, could be issued, " since their comments were to be submitted by 28 February 1969.3 Since he had not received any changes by 18 January 1969, USMILAD inquired as to when they could be expected. Because of the other priorities existing within Hq COMUSMACV, coupled with the emphasis placed by USMILAD upon the early publication of CRSFF OPlan 4/69, answered USMILADREP on 3 February, the changes to SFF 6/68 would be delayed until approximately late February or early March 1969.4

(ço) A draft copy of SFF OPlan 6/68 with a proposed Change 1 was finally forwarded to USMILAD for review and comment on 8 May 1969. After consulting with the PACOM component commanders and COMUSMACV, USMILAD replied to CMPO on 21 July 1969, stating that he concurred in SFF OPlan 6/68 with Change 1, subject only to those comments and recommendations that he set forth in his message.5

(ço) Before the SEATO Force Commander (CINCUSARPAC) could finalize this plan, however, he required the comments and approval of the Member Nations on the draft SFF OPlan 6/68. All the Member Nations, except the Philippines had submitted their comments to CMPO, who had not released these comments, apparently waiting for the Philippine submission. Since the officers "at Field Forces level (COMUSMACV) who are working with the plan will be rotating during the summer of 1970," USMILAD queried CMPO to learn when the SEATO Force Commander could expect to be

1. CINCPAC 170401Z Oct 69; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
2. CINCPAC 182036Z Jan 69, citing MS/632/7/68 dt 29 Oct 68; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
3. CINCPAC 182036Z Jan 69.
4. USMILADREP SEATO MPO Bangkok Thailand 030602Z Feb 69.
5. CINCPAC 060133Z Jun 69; CINCPAC 210515Z Jul 69; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
provided these Member Nations comments.1 This message was sent by USMILAD on 29 November 1969, and the "action now rests with the CMPO. He can either provide the Force Commander with the comments he currently has, or again request comments from the Philippines."2

Review of Draft SEATO Field Forces (SFF) OPlan 9/69

(5) On 21 March 1969, CMPO forwarded a draft copy of SFF OPlan 9/69 to USMILAD for review, comment, and concurrence, with special emphasis on the proposed Member Nation planning responsibility for subordinate commands. USMILAD, in turn, requested his PACOM component commanders and COMUSMACTHAI to review the plan, with CINCPACFLT being specifically requested to recommend a U.S. subordinate command for assignment of planning responsibility for Commander Naval Component for the plan. Finally, on 21 July 1969, USMILAD advised CMPO that he "approved Draft SFF 9/69 subject to certain comments and recommendations. Comments were made on the assignment of planning responsibility to specific commands, i.e., BAC and Naval Component Commander."3

Changing SEATO Force Commanders on Transition from one MPO Plan to Another

(5) On 9 December 1968, the SEATO MPO proposed a principle for reducing the difficulty involved in changing Force Commanders of MPO plans during critical times. The intent behind this proposal was, for example:

...for the Force Commander in a Plan 5 situation to serve in the same capacity if a transition to a Plan 6 situation became necessary. Specifically, this involved retaining the Force Commander for Plan 5 (Insurgency in Laos) who is Thai as the Force Commander for Plan 6 (NVN aggression against the protocol states), rather than switching to the U.S. designated Force Commander.4

1. CINCPAC 292306Z Nov 69; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
2. Ibid.
3. J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69; CINCPAC 050009Z Apr 69; CINCPAC 210516Z Jul 69.
4. J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
USMILAD requested CINCUSARPAC's comments and recommendations on this proposal on 15 January 1969. These, as well as those of CINCPAC's staff, did not favor the proposed transition concept. In addition, other SEATO Member Nations were also opposed to the implementation of the proposed concept. As a result, before the end of the month, CMPO withdrew this proposal and asked the Member Nations to take no further action at this time.\footnote{1}

**SEATO Military Exercises**

In recent years, because certain SEATO Member Nations have made sizable combat forces commitments to the Vietnam conflict, coupled with the withdrawal of the United Kingdom military forces from Southeast Asia, considerable difficulty has been encountered in developing SEATO military exercises. As a result, the MILADs decided to stabilize the planning frequency of these exercises at two a year—one ground and one maritime endeavor. During Calendar Year 1969, however, only one exercise, SEASPIRIT (SMPO PX-39), was held. This exercise is described in the subsection immediately following this discussion of SEATO military exercises. Actually, since SEATO has no standing military forces like NATO, it can display its military prowess and expertise in an effective and tangible manner only through its annual military exercises. Towards this end, a total of 36 combined SEATO military exercises have been conducted over the years.\footnote{2}

\footnote{1} All of these exercises have been normally co-sponsored by two nations, with the directorship of the exercise being determined bilaterally by the nations involved. Of the 36 exercises conducted already, the U.S. has been a co-sponsor for nearly all of them and has provided the director for most of them. "There is a reluctance on the part of other SEATO nations to accept co-sponsorship unless U.S. has done so; therefore the U.S. response has been designed as a pump-priming technique rather than reflecting a desire by U.S. to dominate SEATO Exercises."\footnote{3} Although the co-sponsor with

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1} Ibid.; ADMIN CINCPAC 212124Z Dec 69; USMILADREP SEATO MPO Bangkok Thailand 290300Z Jan 69.
\item \footnote{2} CINCPAC 140138Z Sep 67, cited in CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. II, p. 276; Point Paper, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Aug 69, Subj: SEATO Military Exercises; Intv, COL R. F. Fraser, USA, J514, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 11 Dec 69; Point Paper, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, 2 May 69, Subj: SEATO Military Exercises.
\item \footnote{3} Point Paper, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Aug 69, Subj: SEATO Military Exercises.
\end{itemize}
the United States has always been invited to accept the directorship, this nation almost invariably declines, since such a task involves considerable work, organization, and frustration.

[S] Despite this and numerous other difficulties surrounding these exercises, the U.S. has strongly supported the SEATO exercise program, as well as consistently urging other Member Nations to participate more fully in it. It has been the opinion of the United States that, besides testing SEATO plans, these exercises have other worthwhile values:

a. Develop working relationships and understanding among military personnel from the several countries who one day may become engaged in a common endeavor quite apart from SEATO operations.

b. Provide a test vehicle for bilateral plans which roughly parallel SEATO plans, but which, because of their nature, cannot be exercised conveniently in their own right.

c. Serve as one of the few public manifestations of SEATO and provide, for the benefit of friend and potential foe alike, a display of solidarity and resolve among Free World Nations in Southeast Asia. ¹

[S] Each year, the SMPO prepares a five-year SEATO Exercise Schedule that is presented as an agenda item at the MILADs' annual fall conference, where it is reviewed, modified, and approved. The exercises for the upcoming two years are fairly well defined as to date, scope, and objectives, with the delegates expected to declare forces and determine sponsorship for them in addition to approving them, while those for the last three years of the schedule are identified only as to type and the MILADs merely note them. As described earlier in this chapter, the MILADs' meeting in October 1969--MA 31C---approved the Exercise Schedule for the next two years and noted the proposed Exercise Forecast for the following three years.²

SEATO Exercise SEA SPIRIT (SMPO PX-39)

[S] "The South China Sea lying between Manila and Bangkok served as a

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 310700Z Oct 69.
maneuver area for the SEATO Maritime Exercise SEA DOG in mid-1967. These waters again were the site of another SEATO maritime exercise, PX-39, nicknamed SEA SPIRIT, during 1969. The final planning conference for PX-39 was held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 25 through 28 February 1969. Here, the final details were smoothed out for the exercising of SEATO maritime forces in combined maritime operations, with emphasis on convoy and ASW (Antisubmarine Warfare) operations, as well as play of the Base Area Command, during the time frame of 22 May - 7 June 1969.

(U) Exercise SEA SPIRIT began with opening ceremonies in Manila, Philippines, on 26 May 1969. Following a work-up phase, a simulated convoy protected by naval elements from U.S., United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines "departed Philippine waters on May for Sattahip, Thailand, in support of SEATO OPlan 4. A naval CPX involving Region Naval Component Commands and Naval Control of Shipping, as well as a limited Base Area Command CPX, was conducted in conjunction with the passage of convoy exercise."

(UC) An unfortunate tragedy, however, abruptly ended the maritime portion of Exercise SEA SPIRIT. "At 2016Z on 2 June 1969, HMAS MELBOURNE collided with USS FRANK EVANS at 08-58N/110-30E. Both ships were participating in ASW exercises enroute from the Philippines to Bangkok as part of the naval forces in the multinational SEATO Exercise SEA SPIRIT." Accordingly, a joint U.S./Australian Navy Board convened at Subic Bay, Philippines, to inquire into the facts surrounding the collision. Meanwhile, the Exercise Director relocated his headquarters from Sangley Point, Philippines to Sattahip, Thailand, on 5 June 1969, and two days later, Exercise SEA SPIRIT was terminated.

2. CINCPAC 082356Z Feb 69; J3B16 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
3. Ibid.; PACOM Digest May 69, p. 35.
4. J3B16 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
5. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69, citing COMASWGRU ONE 022044Z Jun 69; FONECON, LCOL Judson J. Conner, USA, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 18 Jul 69.
6. COMASWGRU ONE 022322Z Jun 69 and SECNAV 031704Z Jun 69, both cited in J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
7. DIREPRS PX-39 Sangley Pt 050129Z Jun 69; FONECON, LCOL Judson J. Conner, USA, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 19 Jul 69.
During Exercise SEA SPIRIT, members of USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI had participated in the land-based portion of the exercise. Actually, one purpose of PX-39 had been designed to examine the concept, organization, and mission of the USMACTHAI-developed "Base Area Command." Following the termination of exercise, Hq USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI commented that:

...While the scope of SEA SPIRIT was primarily limited to port operations and movements, it was sufficient to provide conclusive evidence that the "Base Area Command" is necessary, the concept is valid and the organization is adequate with minor revisions. 1

SEATO Intelligence Assessment Committee
Twelfth Meeting (IAC 12M)

Immediately following two days of military subcommittee meetings, the Twelfth semi-annual SEATO Intelligence Assessment Committee Meeting (IAC 12M) met in the SEATO Headquarters building at Bangkok, Thailand, on 19 and 20 February 1969, followed by the semi-annual U.S.-Australian Conference on Cambodia Intelligence Collection. COL Lloyd C. Edwards, Jr., USAF, CDR Andrew C. Stratton, USN, and MAJ Joel J. Snyder, USAF, all of the Operational Intelligence Branch (J22), Hq CINCPAC, served as USMILAD's delegates at the meeting, which was chaired by the New Zealand delegate. Of the SEATO Member Nations, only France was not represented, although Pakistan was represented merely by two observers. 2

Earlier, on 10 and 11 February 1969, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) representative, Mr. George Fowler, had conferred with USMILAD's delegates at Hq CINCPAC about the military portion of the U.S. submissions for IAC 12M. Once these individuals resolved the minor difference that existed among them, they quickly agreed upon what the U.S. military position would be. Then, on the 14th, at the American Embassy in

2. J221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69 and Intv, CDR Andrew C. Stratton, USN, J2214, SEATO Officer, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 11 Aug 69, which are the sources for the information contained in this subsection on IAC 12M. For accounts of IAC 10M and IAC 11M, see pages 283 and 284 of CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. II.
second SEATO Intelligence Working Party met in the same place from 27 through 30 May 1969. 1

(COL George E. Redheffer, USA, J22, Chief, Operational Intelligence Branch, J2 Division, Hq CINCPAC, chaired the meeting. Other USMILAD representatives were CDR Andrew C. Straton, USN, J2214, SEATO Intelligence Officer, and LCOL James R. Smith, USA, J2215, Head, Communist Far East Subsection, both of the J2 Division, Hq CINCPAC. The meeting was conducted in a friendly and cordial atmosphere, despite the position of the United Kingdom on the threat to Thailand, and all Member Nations, except France and Pakistan, had representatives at it. "The recommendation by Ambassador Sullivan to change the final sentence of the SITUATION of Plan Five from 'the Chinese communist aim in Southeast Asia is the removal of western influence and the substitution of Chinese communist influence' to 'a CHICOM aim as seeking to destroy the established and independent governments of neighboring states and impose a Communist government' was not approached at the meeting by the U.S. delegation due to non-concurrence by DIA. "2

The "Enemy Situation in Laos" and an "Assessment of Chinese Communist Nuclear and Missile Capabilities" were among the agenda items agreed to by the Member Nations prior to the beginning of the meeting. As the author nation for intelligence on Laos and Communist China, the U.S. provided the basic working papers for the consideration of the members of the SEATO Intelligence Working Party in May 1969. Representatives of other SEATO Member Nations attending the meeting also contributed to both of these subject areas, as well as providing brief assessments of the situation in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand.

Since the SEATO Intelligence Committee Fourteenth Meeting (INT 14M) had issued its report in November 1968, the enemy had made some territorial gains in Laos toward Thai borders. The working party, therefore, concluded that the concept of operations for North Vietnamese aggression against Thailand, overt or covert, would be changed to the extent that the North Vietnamese currently possessed an enhanced capability because of

1. J22 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69 and FONECON, CDR Andrew C. Straton, USN, J2214, SEATO Intelligence Officer, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 19 Jul 69, which are the sources for the information contained in this subsection on the SEATO Intelligence Working Party.
2. J22 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
Bangkok, the total U.S. submissions to the meeting were discussed by representatives of USMILAD, DIA, the American Embassy, and the State Department. Here, several rather lengthy political amendments were submitted by the State Department but, after they had been discussed, an agreed U.S. position was determined.

Some of the State Department-proposed amendments, however, changed the subversive threat portion of papers on Thailand and Indonesia, submitted by Thailand and Australia, respectively. It was decided, therefore, that the American delegates would pass the proposed changes to these two papers to the author nations privately prior to the convening of IAC 12M. If the author nations agreed with the proposed changes, then they could sponsor the respective changes instead of the U.S. This course of action would avoid any possible embarrassment to the author nations, particularly Thailand, if the U.S. were to propose the extensive amendments in the open session. As it turned out, most of the U.S.-proposed amendments were accepted amicably and later sponsored by the author nations.

One of USMILAD's delegates made the following comment about IAC 12M shortly following the meeting:

Subcommittee and committee meetings were friendly and productive as usual. Generally the same delegates attend each of the committee and working party meetings. This results in the meetings being held in a friendly atmosphere and, when necessary, permits person to person out of session contact with other delegates on a frank and helpful basis to resolve problem areas.¹

SEATO Intelligence Working Party Meeting

In November 1967, the members of the Thirteenth Meeting of the SEATO Intelligence Committee (INT 13M) concluded that, although "the establishment of a permanent Intelligence Working Party appeared impracticable, it was felt that the requirement for more frequent reviews of the threat estimate could be adequately met by temporary Intelligence Working Parties convening between SEATO Intelligence Committee Meetings."² The first such working party met in Bangkok, Thailand, on 22 May 1968.³ The

¹ J221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
the forward disposition of their forces. Of noteworthy interest was the fact that the senior United Kingdom delegate reserved his position on this point. This was "the first known instance of such a case of UK formal disagreement with any SEATO Intelligence committee report. The Australian delegation confided to the U.S. delegation that the UK delegation was directed by its 'political peers' not to accept a threat increase attributable to the Laos situation, although as military officers the UK delegation seemed to agree with the assessment."  

SEATO Intelligence Assessment Committee  
Thirteenth Meeting (IAC 13M)  

(5) Upon their arrival at Bangkok, Thailand, on 22 August 1969, the U.S. delegation to IAC 13M met at the American Embassy for preliminary discussions. Those representing USMILAD were COL Lloyd C. Edwards, Jr., USAF, CDR Andrew C. Straton, USN, and MAJ Joel J. Snyder, USAF, all being of the Operational Intelligence Branch (J22), Hq CINCPAC. Two days later, a productive meeting was held with the Australian delegation, with mutually acceptable positions being developed for the countries of major concern—Republic of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Since the Australians had no major substantive issues with the U.S. positions, most of the changes recommended consisted of updating information, accuracy, and implications of verbage.  

(5) The military subcommittee, which addressed the insurgent threat in each country, opened on 25 August. It proceeded quite smoothly through the U.S. papers on Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and Laos. The United Kingdom (UK) delegate raised a few questions on the threat in Laos, but accepted the U.S. rationale as final. The military Subcommittee concluded its meeting with several questions on the Thai and Malaysia papers, which were held over for final decision by the main committee.  

(5) On 25 August 1969, the main committee of IAC 13M met. The Chairman of the Council of Representatives, Philippine Ambassador Calingo, opened the meeting. His opening statement was a realistic appraisal of the changing situation in the SEATO Treaty Area; in the light of UK and U.S. withdrawal plans, he said, the free Asian nations would be required to "face up to the reality that the defense of our freedom is primarily our ..."

1. Ibid.  
2. J22 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69, which is the sole source for the information contained in this subsection on IAC 13M.
responsibility. "1 His address was followed by one of equal importance given by SEATO Secretary General, Jesus Vargas, who stated that "free Asians, fired by an intense nationalism and a sincere desire to take on a steadily increasing responsibility for their own internal defense, have themselves embarked on a reexamination of their national and foreign policies in the light of those changes in policy, enunciated or impending, of their more powerful neighbors and allies."2 He, furthermore, predicted continued aggressive propaganda from Peking with continued subversion and insurgency, mentioning that the Soviet Union had "indicated, although only tenuously, an intention to create a collective security system in Asia."3 He also emphasized that he foresaw that "a redefinition of SEATO's role and still closer redirection of SEATO's activities in CSI affairs would ensue."4

Not having conducted any preliminary coordination, the UK delegation circulated proposed changes to all papers, most of which had to be fully discussed in open session. After the session, the Australian, UK, and U.S. delegations met informally and were able to resolve most differences on the remaining papers. The UK, however, maintained a firm position, in the face of Australian and U.S. opposition, to minimize:

...the extent of NVA/PLA military control in Laos and the increased potential for external support of Communist Terrorists insurgency in Thailand resulting from improved LOC's, base areas, and disposition of enemy forces nearer Thai borders in Laos. The UK position in minimizing the threat posed by NVA/VC/Pathet Lao actions is in keeping with the UK position established in May at the SEATO Intelligence Working Party Meeting when the UK reserved its position on increase of threat to Thailand occasioned by the forward disposition on NVA forces and improved logistics capability, should the NVA redirect their effort toward Thailand. 5

SEATO Intelligence Committee Fifteenth Meeting (INT 15M)

Chairied by New Zealand, INT 15M was held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 10 through 25 November 1969. All SEATO Member Nations participated

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
fully with the exceptions of France and Pakistan, neither of whom was represented. All participating delegations also agreed on the INT 15M Report without exception. Described as a "productive meeting," INT 15M "was conducted in an atmosphere of cooperation by all member nations." In addition, CMPO commented favorably on "the value of the threat review for updating SEATO military contingency plans."

(5) As evolved at INT 15M, the overall threat to the Treaty Area, "derived from updated SEATO intelligence documents, is generally in accord with current CINCPAC intelligence holdings and is considered suitable for SEATO planning." The assessment of the CHICOM threat, for instance, indicated that the "number of enemy divisions which could be supported by present route capacities in an initial deployment against Bangkok is 2 to 3+ divisions less than agreed at INT14M last year. The difference is due to revision of methodology application procedures." With respect to the threat from North Vietnam, INT 15M determined that North Vietnam was capable of deploying a maximum of eleven (11) infantry divisions for out-of-country operations in either a combined CHICOM/NVA attack or acting unilaterally. This reflects an increase of one (1) division over INT14M due to an increase in available forces.

(5) At INT 15M, the intelligence committee approved 12 agenda items; those whose subjects follow, they reserved for review and approval by the MILADs: (1) "Assess the Communist Military Threat to the Treaty Area for the next two years"; (2) "Review SEAP 40 (The Manner in which lightly Equipped Communist Forces could infiltrate the Treaty Area)"; (3) "Consider major revision of SEAP 34 (Targeting Data - Potential Targets for Retarding the Communist Advance)"; (4) "Consider the programme of Future Work and date of the next Meeting"; (5) "Consider possible improvements in the working procedures of the SEATO Intelligence Working Party". The meeting's final report updated all the SEATO intelligence documentation as required. During the meeting, the U.S. fulfilled all its programmed requirements as an author nation. One new development at INT 15M was the:

... attendance by a UK political representative at all key subcommittee and steering committee sessions when

1. J2/Memo/00519-69, MAJ GEN Keegan to ADM McCain, 8 Dec 69, Subj: SEATO Intelligence Committee Fifteenth Meeting (INT15M).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
the Threat to the Treaty area was developed. Such participation by a civilian political officer at a SEATO military intelligence meeting was unprecedented and related to the high political significance placed by the UK on the NVA/PL situation in Laos. The UK had reserved its position on the Laos assessment in the Intelligence Working Party Report of May 1969. The UK also attempted to maintain this despite overriding opposition by other member nations at the August 1969 SEATO Intelligence Assessment Committee Meeting. 1

SEATO Cartographic Committee Ninth Meeting (CART 9M)

(U) The ninth meeting of the SEATO Cartographic Committee was held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 10 through 14 February 1969. The meeting, which was attended by delegates from all Member Nations except Pakistan, was chaired by a representative of the United Kingdom, CDR Scott E. Drummond, Jr., USN, Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Branch, J2 Division, Hq CINCPAC, as the sole USMILAD representative, participated in the meeting. The purpose of CART 9M was "to coordinate mapping and charting activities of Member Nations to insure the best possible map and chart support to meet SEATO requirements. The objectives of CART 9M were successfully achieved." 2

SEATO Military Medical Committee Third Meeting (MED 3M)

(U) The first SEATO Military Medical Committee had been held in 1966, the second one in 1968. 3 The third meeting of the military medical representatives of the SEATO Member Nations, less France and Pakistan, was held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 3 through 6 June 1969. The Philippines provided the chairman for MED 3M. RADM John S. Cowan, USN, MC, CINCPAC Surgeon, headed the United States delegation of nine members. 4

1. Ibid.
2. Intv, CDR Scott E. Drummond, Jr., USN, J263, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 18 Jul 69; J26 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
4. J76/Memo/170-69 to JO45, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Aug 69, Subj: CINCPAC Command History; FONECON, LCOL E. R. Heine, USAF, MC, J762, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 4 Sep 69.
The following were the significant occurrences at MED 3M:

Twenty-two agenda items covering communicable disease control, medical civic action, non-infectious environmental health hazard control, aviation medicine, and medical organization and administration were examined and recommendations for improvements advanced.

The most significant action of the meeting was the recommendation for formation of a military/civilian study group to prepare alternate proposals for a SEATO sponsored medical civic action program. The concept of this program was originated by Rear Admiral Cowan. ¹

Commander Central Region SEATO Field Forces
(Designate) (CCRSFF (D)) Logistics Conference

In his role as CCRSFF (D), COMUSMACV conducted a multinational logistics conference at SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand, from 21 through 25 July 1969. It was attended by 53 representatives from Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States. On the whole, this "conference was highly successful and productive. Unfortunately, all conference goals were not met due to the difficulty and complexity of some of the agenda items, and the shortage of working time."²

Prior to the commencement of this logistics conference, COMUSMACV held a unilateral U.S. meeting with Hq MACTHAL, beginning on 17 July 1969, with the purpose of ensuring that the U.S. delegation entered the conference with a clear understanding of what the U.S. position was on all agenda items. Representatives of CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACV, and COM13AF were present at this unilateral meeting.

Because the incumbent SEATO logistic planners on COMUSMACV's staff had never prepared for or participated in a SEATO conference, the J4 staff of Hq CINCPAC provided assistance to them in both planning and organizing the conference. In addition, the SEATO Logistics Coordinator of J4,

¹ J76/Memo/170-69 to JO45, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Aug 69, Subj: CINCPAC Command History.
² J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69, citing SEATO Report of CCRSFF (D) Logistics Conference of July 1969. Unless otherwise cited, this document is the sole source for the following information on the CCRSFF (D) Logistics Conference.
Hq CINC Pacific, assisted the COMUSMACV staff in conducting both the U.S. unilateral meeting and the multinational logistics conference.

Three matters of some importance were brought out at the multinational logistics conference. First, all the nations contributing forces to the Central Region agreed on the necessity of reviewing Change 1 to Central Region Plan 4, the BAC (Base Area Command) in Thailand OPlan, and the final report of PX-39 before the SEATO Logistics Program for FY 70 could be finalized; therefore, no time frame was set for the next logistics conference, and the planned date of December 1969 for the SEATO Real Estate Conference was slipped to mid-1970. Second, the planners from the staffs of COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI felt that their SEATO jobs would be easier if CINC Pacific would come out with a message reemphasizing the importance of SEATO to U.S. national interests, since they felt that there was an abnormal emphasis on current operations to the detriment of planning in their respective headquarters. Third was the subject of SEATO supply planning factors, which was discussed in considerable detail. "Although SEATO is currently processing U.S. proposed planning factors for multinational adoption, many senior planners felt that the U.S. planning factors are too high for SEATO. Although time did not permit the development of specific recommendations, the consensus of opinion was that supply planning factors (expeditionary force type) lighter than the ones proposed by the U.S. should be developed." 1

During this conference, COL Emil L. Konopnicki, USA, J4117, Hq CINC Pacific, was approached by:

...COL Hartridge, ARA of the Australian Department of Defence... on the probable CINC Pacific answer if Australia invited CINC Pacific and COMUSMACTHAI representatives to informal logistic discussions in Canberra during November or December 1969. The purpose of the discussions would be to determine what specific U.S. support Australia could expect if she became involved in a Thailand contingency. COL Hartridge was advised that the recently concluded Memorandum of Understanding was as specific and as far as the U.S. could go without an exchange of funds. However, if Australia still felt she needed additional information to completely understand memorandum provisions, CINC Pacific would probably be receptive to an invitation for Canberra discussions. COL Hartridge stated he would

1. Ibid.
counsel Sir John Wilton to recommend during CINC PAC's
ANZUS visit that the U.S. and Australia engage in informal
logistic discussions sometime in the immediate future.¹

SEATO Communications-Electronics (C-E)
Committee Twelfth Meeting (C-E 12M)

On 17 June 1969, the SEATO Military Planning Office (MPO) pro-
posed the convening of C-E 12M on the dates 6-17 October 1969, and for-
warded the provisional agenda for Member Nations' comments. CINC PAC
submitted his approval and comments on 30 July 1969.²

In preparing for C-E 12M, the USMILAD, ADM McCain, requested
the PACOM commands based on Oahu, Hawaii, to have their delegates
selected for the conference to meet at Hq CINC PAC in the 'J6 Conference
Room at 0900, Tuesday, 2 Sep 69 and 0800, Wednesday 3 Sep 69 to discuss
agenda items. Product of this preconference meeting will provide initial
U.S. position/working papers for agenda items."³ In addition, the U.S.
delegates were "to attend U.S. pre-conference meeting at COMUSMAC THAI
Hqtrs, 0800 - St, 4 Oct 69 and Sunday, 5 Oct 69, Room A-212. All delegates
be prepared to discuss views on all agenda items. CINC PAC Chief Delegate
will provide delegates with copies of provisional U.S. position papers at that
time."⁴

All Member Nations, with the exception of France and Pakistan,
participated in C-E 12M, which was conducted at SEATO Headquarters in
Bangkok, Thailand, from 6 through 17 October 1969. New Zealand provided
the chairman, and the U.S. provided one of the two subcommittee chairmen.
Members of Hq CINC PAC staff, along with representatives of the major U.S.
commands within PACOM, attended the conference.

A total of 13 agenda items were processed and acted upon during
C-E 12M. According to LCOL Donald G. Robison, USMC, J611, Hq CINC-
PAC, who was a delegate to this conference;

Significant tasks accomplished included a review of
SEATO cryptographic materials, instructions and

1. Point Paper Brief, J4117, Hq CINC PAC, 29 Jul 69, Subj: Logistical
Support of Australian Forces.
2. CINC PAC 300308Z Jul 69.
3. ADMIN CINC PAC 062247Z Aug 69.
4. CINC PAC 291920Z Aug 69.
distribution, and a review of progress during the past year in the area of non-cryptographic C-E publications. Discussion of problem areas along with proposed solution regarding distribution of non-cryptographic publications in both peace and war were considered by the committee.¹

(Confidential) Considerable attention was given to naval C-E plans and doctrine during C-E 12M, because of the relatively detailed planning progress in ground communications planning in SEATO and the lack of such in naval C-E planning. In this regard, a review of the "After Action" report of Exercise SEA SPIRIT, with recommended follow-up actions, was accomplished, as well as a review and update of the draft SEATO supplement to ACP (Allied Communications Publication) 176 (Naval Communications).

(Confidential) A review was also conducted of Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to MPO Plan 4. As a result, applicable common changes were proposed for inclusion in the C-E annexes of all MPO plans.

(U) At C-E 12M, it was determined that "follow-up action procedures will emphasize greater latitude and direction by the Chief, C-E Division, MPO, in determining the vehicle for accomplishment of work. In this regard specific working parties to complete work required as a result of C-E 12M were not directed, but may be called by the MPO, if required, in order to accomplish tasks beyond the scope and capability of the MPO Staff."²

SEATO Communications-Electronics (C-E) Working Party

(Confidential) On 20 May 1969, the SEATO MPO established the convening of a SEATO C-E working party in July 1969. CINCPAC gave his concurrence on 10 June. The following day, he requested those major PACOM commands with SEATO planning responsibilities to provide delegates. When this working party met at SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand, from 7 through 17 July 1969, the U.S. delegation consisted of ten representatives, with LCOL Donald G. Robison, USMC, J611, Hq CINCPAC, serving as the chief U.S. delegate. Representatives from all SEATO Member Nations, except France and Pakistan, attended this meeting.³

1. J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69, citing the Final Report of C-E 12M.
2. Ibid.
3. J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69; CINCPAC 240318Z Jun 69.
This SEATO C-E working party had a twofold purpose. The first was the preparation of a SEATO Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction (CEOI), which was a long-time SEATO C-E requirement and was necessary in order to provide broad C-E planning guidance to the SEATO Field Force Commander and his subordinate forces. The second was to develop a system for the distribution of SEATO cryptographic materials in time of war, which "included a need to develop the additional manning requirements for the Force Commanders Distribution Agency (SEATO Cryptographic Distribution Agency) and for additional personnel required for national distribution agencies as a result of the increased workload required to distribute SEATO cryptographic documents." "

While the committee that tackled the preparation of a SEATO CEOI encountered no great difficulty, the committee addressing itself to the subject of cryptographic materials discovered that:

...the requirement to develop a distribution system for SEATO Crypto material could not be completed without first resolving the concept for use of this material by SEATO forces and determining a basis for issue in accordance with that concept. The working party proposed a concept for the use of SEATO cryptomaterial, a basis of issue and a distribution system."

With the termination of the SEATO C-E working party, the results were forwarded to the Member Nations for review and concurrence. In the opinion of the U.S. delegates, the CEOI would pose no problem to the U.S.; however, since the "communicators evolved the standards for distribution of cryptographic materials under the second agenda item, a thorough evaluation of the concept and basis of issue should be conducted by operational staffs to insure that code requirements and distribution procedures will meet their needs."

SEATO Naval Command and Control

On 26 March 1969, CMPO distributed a draft SEATO Publication (SEAP) 47, "Naval Control and Protection of Shipping Within SEATO." Approval by Member Nations MILADs was requested "by 22 May 1969 in order

1. J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
3. Ibid.
for it to be available for comparison purposes by the exercise director of SEATO Maritime Exercise PX-39 (22 May - 7 June 1969) in preparing the post-exercise report. To facilitate his position being developed "prior to commencement of SEATO Exercise PX-39," USMILAD asked CINCPACFLT to review SEAP 47 on 18 April 1969. Actually, draft SEAP 47:

...is based upon a proposed revision of the Radford-Collins Agreement. The agreement was revised in August 1968 to reflect the signatory nations' desires to adjust ocean area boundaries, especially COMNAVPHIL's areas of responsibility, to facilitate the control of convoys and the effect of the United Kingdom's reduced presence in Southeast Asia after 1971. As proposed by the revision, COMNAVPHIL would be the Ocean Control Authority for the control and protection of allied merchant shipping throughout the Gulf of Thailand. In an emergency or war situation involving the possibility of active maritime conflict, the SEATO member nations will participate in naval control of shipping and associated in-port functions. During peacetime it is envisioned that the necessary administrative arrangements and provisions for shore based facilities be accomplished in order to support general war requirements for Naval control and protection of shipping.3

On 11 May 1969, USMILAD advised CMPO that he "approves the use of the Draft SEAP for SEATO Exercise PX-39 only. Approval of the Draft SEAP for future SEATO use is dependent upon action by higher U.S. authority."4 Subsequently, these provisions were considered and used in PX-39.5

On the same day, 11 May, USMILAD recommended to the JCS that his "position that Draft SEAP be approved without change for future use within SEATO."6 The JCS, in reply on 9 June, requested clarification on one point. Three days later, USMILAD "clarified the fact that proposed changes to boundaries of areas of responsibility, mutually proposed by Australia and

1. J5 Brief No. 185-69, 17 Jul 69, of JCS 2339/300, Naval Command and Control.
2. CINCPAC 180146Z Apr 69.
3. J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
4. CINCPAC 110342Z May 69.
5. J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
6. CINCPAC 110341Z May 69.

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New Zealand and CINCPACFLT, would be reflected in the draft SEAP by a change to be issued by CMPO following the exercise director's final report on Exercise PX-39. Concluding that the draft SEAP, subject to certain adjustments to Operational Control Authority (OCA) boundaries, provided appropriate information and guidance concerning naval control and protection of shipping, the JCS approved it for future use within SEATO on 7 July 1969. USMILAD, in turn, on 25 July 1969, advised CMPO that he approved draft SEAP 47 if the 14 changes in area boundaries that he listed were made. Actually, these changes were those that will be published following the exercise director's final report of SEATO PX-39.

Subsequently, on 19 September 1969, USMILADREP forwarded CMPO's request to the MILADs of Australia and the United States for information concerning the subdivision of their major ocean areas of responsibility as a result of the major ocean area boundary changes contained in USMILAD's message of 25 July 1969. USMILAD, in turn, requested CINCPACFLT to furnish the required information concerning current sub-area boundaries within U.S. ocean area of responsibility direct to USMILADREP for CMPO, with an information copy to CINCPAC, by 1 October 1969 to enable CMPO to proceed with the production of a second draft of SEAP 47 within SEATO for SEATO use. This desired information was mailed by CINCPACFLT to USMILADREP for CMPO on 30 September 1969.

U.S. Policy Guidance

A Communications-Electronics (C-E) team, representing USMILAD and consisting of LCOL R. L. Youngblood, USA, J642, Hq CINCPAC, and LCOL D. G. Robison, USMC, J611, Hq CINCPAC, attended a working group session on agenda items for CE 12M at SEATO Headquarters from 3 July through 22 July 1969. While so engaged, they discovered the need for additional guidance on the U.S. policy concerning the stockpiling and distribution of SEATO operational codes which the U.S. had agreed to produce for contingency purposes. USMILAD referred this cryptomaterial problem to the JCS.

1. J5 Brief No. 185-69, 17 Jul 69, of JCS 2339/300, Naval Command and Control; JCS 2088/092152 Z Jun 69; CINCPAC 120038Z Jun 69.
2. J5 Brief No. 185-69, 17 Jul 69, of JCS 2339/300, Naval Command and Control; JCS 4007/071817 Z Jul 69.
3. CINCPAC 250509Z Jul 69.
4. J5 Brief No. 185-69, 17 Jul 69, of JCS 2339/300, Naval Command and Control.
5. CINCPAC 250509Z Jul 69; USMILADREP SEATO MPO Bangkok Thailand 190300Z Sep 69; CINCPAC 270333Z Sep 69; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
on 9 July, recommending more flexible distribution and storage procedures than previously established. Following JCS's approval, USMILAD forwarded the approved recommendations to the C-E team on 11 July 1969. 1

(6) "During past SEATO Communications Electronics Conferences," USMILAD informed the JCS on 2 August 1969, "the question of a Category A Crypto System for SEATO has been a subject of recurring discussion. "2 Such a system, however, would involve machine encryption and raise a series of problems involving logistics and maintenance support. In the past, the position of the U.S. has been that SEATO did not need crypto machines, since paper operations codes which would provide long term security of TOP SECRET information could be prepared for SEATO if requirements were stated. Moreover, the U.S. did not want to provide crypto machines, because the initial costs and the anticipated expense and problems involved in providing logistics support for this type system to some SEATO Member Nations. In addition, the U.S. felt that the Asian Member Nations did not have the necessary facilities to adequately protect and operate crypto machines. "The requirement for a firm well structured U.S. policy on this matter," urged USMILAD, "is considered essential"; stating his concurrence with the position proposed by the National Security Agency's Pacific Office, he recommended that "it be supported and adopted as guidance for the U.S. position in this matter." 3 Subsequently, a modified version of this recommendation was approved by the national authorities, and it was authorized as the U.S. position at CE 12M.

U.S. Memorandum of Understanding with Australia and New Zealand

(6) Since early 1967, USMILAD and his staff have been carrying on negotiations with both Australia and New Zealand over U.S. logistics support of their forces in Thailand upon the implementation of a SEATO plan. 4 These negotiations ceased during the first half of 1969, when Memorandums of Understanding, satisfactory to both sides, were signed between the U.S. and Australia and New Zealand, respectively.

1. ADMIN CINCPAC 092005Z Jul 69; ADMIN CINCPAC 110231Z Jul 69; J6421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 022218Z Aug 69.
3. Ibid.; FONECON, Mr. Hunter Dunn, J6421, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 17 Jan 70; J6421 History. Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
On 11 December 1969, USMILAD forwarded Memorandums of Understanding to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Department of Defence, Canberra, Australia, and Chief of Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, New Zealand, and requested their "recommendation on time and place for signature should you find the Memorandum of Understanding satisfactory as written."\(^1\) By agreement, the U.S. -Australian Memorandum of Understanding was signed by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. for the U.S. and General Sir John Wilton at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, on 7 March 1969. The U.S. -New Zealand Memorandum of Understanding, on the other hand, was signed by Admiral McCain for the U.S. and General Sir Leonard Thornton for New Zealand at SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand, on 17 May 1969.\(^2\)

Request for Airlift of SEATO Representatives

On 12 November 1969, the USMILADREP forwarded a request from CMPO to USMILAD for aircraft to transport the senior MILADREPs of Hq SEATO and their wives to and from the Philippines for MA 32C. After checking informally with the Chairman of the JCS, USMILAD advised USMILADREP that "U.S. military aircraft will be provided on a non-reimbursable basis in support of this mission... Request submit detailed airlift requirement to CINCPACAF, info CINCPAC, approx thirty days prior to desired travel date."\(^3\)

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1. Ltr, CINCPAC to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Department of Defence, Canberra, Australia, 11 Dec 68, Subj: Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and the Commonwealth of Australia; Ltr, CINCPAC to Chief of Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, New Zealand, 11 Dec 68, Subj: Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and New Zealand.

2. J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for Jan 69; Ltr, CINCPAC to Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, Department of Defence, Canberra, Australia, 24 Jan 69, Subj: Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and the Commonwealth of Australia; J4117 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69; Point Paper, J4117, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Jul 69, Subj: Logistical Support of Australian Forces; J41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.

3. CINCPAC 060001Z Dec 69; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
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Appointment of a New SEATO CMPO

(*) On 18 December 1969, USMILADREP SEATO advised USMILAD that New Zealand had nominated MAJ GEN R. McK. Patterson, Royal New Zealand Army (RNZA), to fill the position of CMPO, when MAJ GEN Autrey J. Maroun, USA, rotated on 1 July 1970. Ten days later, USMILAD concurred in this appointment, which would become effective with the approval of the other MILADs. By the normal rotation procedures, this appointment should have been undertaken by the Philippines. However, as the MILADs noted at MA 30C, it was customary for the appointments of Secretary General, currently filled by Mr. Jesus Vargas of the Philippines, and CMPO not to be filled by one nation. As a result, New Zealand agreed to accept the invitation to fill the CMPO position, when it fell vacant. ¹

Proposed CMPO Assistance in Setting Up a Counter-Subversion/Insurgency Center

(*) On 24 July 1969, CMPO recommended to the MILADs that he proceed with certain counter-insurgency tasks designed to assist the SEATO Secretary-General in setting up a Counter-Subversion/Insurgency Center, which had been recommended in the SEATO Expert Study Group Report on Counter-Subversion for the SEATO Council Representative in July 1969. In reply on 27 August, USMILAD advised that the CMPO paper, containing his proposals, could be used as a planning level brief by the MILADs' Representative Committee (MARC) and the MPO. He also concurred that this paper and Volume I, Part III of the SEATO Expert Study Group Report should be examined jointly by the SEATO Permanent Working Group (PWG) and the MARC. However, USMILAD did not fully concur in certain tasks for the MPO to perform "until an agreed determination is made of the organization, resources, and role of the proposed new Counter-Subversion/Insurgency Center. Thereafter, the role of the MPO should be examined with a view to assisting wherever possible, but doing so in a manner that will not adversely affect present MPO resources and mission."²

(*) Because of certain comments made by the SEATO Secretary-General on the Expert Study Group Report, CMPO asked USMILAD on 3

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1. USMILADREP SEATO MPO Bangkok Thailand 180301Z Dec 69; FONECON, LCOL R. L. Ethridge, USAF, J5142, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 17 Jan 70; CINCPAC 282212Z Dec 69; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. CINCPAC 270340Z Aug 69; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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September to confirm his comments and recommendations on this report. On 16 September 1969, USMILAD confirmed to CMPO that his previous comments and recommendations concerning the report remained the same.  

SEATO Orientation Courses

(U) As in previous years, three SEATO Orientation Courses were conducted during Calendar Year 1969. 2 On 3 December 1968, after stating that the last 1968 course was "very successful in the accomplishment of its objective, due largely to the support rendered by Member Nations including briefings and visits to Thai and United States units and installations in Thailand", the SEATO MPO requested the MILADs to note "the proposal to conduct SEATO Orientation Course 1/69 during the week 17-24 February 1969" and asked for "national student quotas for field grade officers to attend course 1/69 and an estimate of the desired quotas for Courses 2/69 and 3/69." 3

(U) After noting the dates for SEATO Orientation Course 1/69, USMILAD requested on 23 December a quota of 15 students for each of the three courses to be held during 1969. SEATO MPO approved this request on 7 January 1969. 4

(U) On 8 April 1969, USMILADREP informed USMILAD that SEATO Orientation Course 2/69 was to be held from 9 through 16 June 1969. By message on 20 April, USMILAD advised the JCS, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAI of the assigned quotas for the course and requested them to submit names of attendees for the course direct to USMILADREP, with only an information copy to him. The quotas were allotted as follows: JCS - 2; CINCPAC - 3; CINCPACFLT - 2; CINCPACAF - 2; CINCUSARPAC - 2; COMUSMACV - 2; COMUSMACTHAI - 2. 5 Subsequently, on 24 May and 3 June 1969, USMILAD advised

1. CINCPAC 160119Z Sep 69; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
2. FONECON, CDR H. E. Huling, USN, J5141, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 21 Jan 70.
3. SEATO MPO MS/80/67/68 to MILADs, 3 Dec 68, Subj: SEATO Orientation Courses.
4. ADMIN CINCPAC 231920Z Dec 68; SEATO MPO MS/80-1/2/69 to MILADREPs, 7 Jan 69, Subj: SEATO Orientation Course 1/69; J514 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
5. USMILADREP SEATO MPO Bangkok Thailand 080300Z Apr 69; CINCPAC 200114Z Apr 69; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
UNCLASSIFIED

USMILADREP of changes in the CINCPAC staff officers to attend the course. SEATO Orientation Course 2/69 was held as scheduled, and the full U.S. quota was utilized. 1

(U) On 18 August 1969, CMPO informed USMILAD that SEATO Orientation Course 3/69 was scheduled from 3 through 10 November 1969, with the U.S. quota being 15 spaces. The following day, USMILADREP requested a presentation of the Vietnam situation by the CINCPAC Briefing Team to the members of the SEATO Orientation Course 3/69 at Hq SEATO, Bangkok, Thailand, on 4 November. CINCPAC concurred on 23 August. On 9 September 1969, USMILAD advised the JCS, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACThai that the assigned quotas were identical to those for Course 2/69 and requested them to submit names of attendees for SEATO Orientation Course 3/69 direct to USMILADERP, with only an information copy to him. By the end of September, USMILADREP had received the names of course attendees and had relayed them to CMPO. Subsequently, Course 3/69 was conducted as scheduled.2

(U) In preparation for the round of orientation courses next year, USMILADREP asked CINCPAC on 12 December 1969 for a presentation of the Vietnam situation by the CINCPAC Briefing Team to SEATO Orientation Course 1/70 on 3 March 1970, as well as to the Thai National Defense College on 2 March 1970. Concurrency in this briefing schedule was forthcoming on 16 December. On 24 December, however, USMILADREP passed on the request of the Commandant, Thai National Defense College, for a change, if possible, in the date of the presentation. "Concur in date change from 2 March to 4 March", read CINCPAC's message on 6 January 1970, "for CINCPAC Briefing Team presentation to Thai National Defense College requested in Ref A."3

1. CINCPAC 242246Z May 69; ADMIN 031918Z Jun 69; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
2. J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69, citing MS/80-3/1/69, 18 Aug 69; USMILADREP SEATO MPO Bangkok Thailand 190300Z Aug 69; CINCPAC 230511Z Aug 69; J555 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69; CINCPAC 090008Z Sep 69; FONECON, CDR Huling, USN, J5141, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC Hist Br, 21 Jan 70.
3. CINCPAC 060410Z Jan 70; USMILADREP SEATO MPO Bangkok Thailand 240300Z Dec 69; CINCPAC 160459Z Dec 69; USMILADREP SEATO MPO Bangkok Thailand 120300Z Dec 69; J555 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
On 8 January 1969, the JCS approved the new SEATO MPO JTD, with the authorizations totaling 17. This manpower level was the same as the one approved by the JCS on 16 July 1968. On 4 June 1969, however, JCS-approved manpower increase to the SEATO MPO JTD resulted in a total authorization of 18 spaces to be effective on 1 July 1969.

1. JCS 9044/082201Z Jan 69; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
3. JCS 1725/042046Z Jun 69; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
SECTION II - CINCPAC POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(U) Today there are no less than 12 possible problem or trouble areas in the Far East. As you are well aware, they extend from Korea right on down to Singapore and Indonesia. Now this means that the United States as an aid to the Free World must maintain a military presence or the capability of doing so among these many different places I have mentioned to you. This military presence has got to be a combination of a well balanced force, again, of all four services.

Now I want to speak of the proliferation of nations which has occurred since World War II. At the conclusion of World War II ninety per cent of the Afro-Asian area was under the control of seven colonial powers. Since World War II these colonial powers have given up and many of their possessions throughout the world have now become independent. There are 50 new independent nations with all of the complicating factors associated with that many more new individual countries involved in the settlement of problems that face mankind.

Now we fought one war here - we're fighting one now. We had the war in North Korea and as you are well aware we are now fighting a war in Vietnam against communists of North Vietnam. In the Pacific area, the Soviets are the primary provider to North Vietnam for supplies, ammunition, and other essentials to maintain a war. They have a strong force in the Pacific and I want to point out this force numbers scores of submarines. They have a strong Air Force and also a large army that is capable of being deployed...

The Red Chinese, however, are the real threat, from my own viewpoint, as far as world peace is concerned. They maintain a standing army of something in the neighborhood of 2-1/2 million. These people have an air force which is sufficient to perform a job that they may
want to do as far as Southeast Asia is concerned.

...by the way of quick summation, we are dealing here with 25 nations with over one billion people, or one-third of the world's population. It is the responsibility of my command to appraise the threat, to assess the resources needed and to assure capabilities in order to meet the various tactics that these people can take in the Western Pacific.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. 1

Clarification of International Constraints on Instructions to U.S. Field Commanders Overseas

Because of a SECDEF inquiry on 3 April 1969, the JCS requested CINCPAC eight days later to provide information concerning the degree, "if any, to which the authority of specific U.S. senior field commanders to protect U.S. forces overseas is affected by the provisions of international agreements or standing instructions," as well as if there was "any basis for uncertainty about the extent of their authority to act to protect their forces, particularly in emergency situations where the survival of U.S. forces requires action without referral to higher authority." Accordingly, on 15 April, CINCPAC requested his component commanders and subordinate unified commanders to furnish the necessary information relative to their areas of command, "operational, geographic or functional responsibility and any recommended changes in operative international agreements or standing instructions." 3

In reply, COMUSMACV, COMUSTDC, COMUS Japan, COMUS Korea, and CINCPACFLT reported the non-existence of any adversely affecting international agreements or standing instructions or any uncertainties about the extent of their authority. CINCUSARPAC, COMUSMACTHAI.

2. JCS 6783/112241Z Apr 69; J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. ADMIN CINCPAC 152058Z Apr 69.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER U.S. FORCES IN THE PACOM

THAILAND

SOUTH AFRICA AGREEMENTS COMBINED 24 NOVEMBER
1969. PENDING COMPLETION OF SOFA, INTERIM
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AGREEMENT REACHED ON
2 JULY 1969 WHICH CONTAINED SAFEGUARDS TO
BE GRANTED U.S. ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL IN
THE EVENT OF TRIAL BY THAI COURTS.

JAPAN

CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

KOREA

CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

PHILIPPINES

CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

AUSTRALIA

CONCURRENT U.S. HOST
COUNTRY JURISDICTION

INDONESIA

VIETNAM

N.S. EXERCISES EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
N.S. PERSONNEL ENJOY DIPLOMATIC
STATES UNDER MILITARY ASSISTANCE
AGREEMENTS

MALAYSIA

SINGAPORE

COUNTRY TO COUNTRY
AGREEMENTS PROVIDE TOURIST
STATUS ONLY FOR U.S. PERSONNEL

BURMA

CURRENT, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY,
NO FORMAL AGREEMENT FOR
TEAM MEMBERS

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 86.
and CINCPACAF, however, explained that, although no basis for uncertainty existed concerning the extent of the authority of field commanders to protect their forces, a limitation was imposed on the self-defense of U.S. forces, bases, and installations in Thailand. This limitation is best summed up in COMUSMACHTAI's reply, which recommended no change in the self-restrictions at the present time:

2. (S) While no formal agreement exists, a statement of the Thai Supreme Commander's policy constitutes a standing instruction from which COMUSMACHTAI, with AMEMB approval, has developed regulations governing the arming of all U.S. personnel in Thailand. These regulations in general:

   a. Restrict the use of weapons to self-defense roles within the confines of bases/installations occupied by U.S. personnel.

   b. Leave no areas of uncertainty as to U.S. commander's authority within base/installation perimeters.

   c. Allow sufficient latitude for appropriate reaction to current and anticipated threats within the base/installation without referral to higher authority.

3. (S) Our prime area of concern is the potential, but as yet undemonstrated, insurgent capability to employ high angle fire or long range weapons. Under current RTG (and consequent AMEMB) constraints, U.S. fire power cannot be employed beyond base/installation perimeters without express Ambassadorial approval. In a hit-and-run type of attack involving such weapons, the entire onus for defense is on RTG forces since it is unlikely that the required approval could be obtained in time for effective U.S. response thereto. 1

1. COMUSMACHTAI 180940Z Apr 69; COMUSMACV 24007/211135Z Apr 69; COMUSTDC 210240Z Apr 69; COMUSJAPAN 180730Z Apr 69; COMUS-KOREA UK 58605/221636Z Apr 69; CINCPACFLT 232223Z Apr 69; CINCUSARPAC 14972/220602Z Apr 69; CINCPACAF 250317Z Apr 69; J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
In his message to the JCS on 3 May 1969, CINCPAC summed up this information as follows:

2. Standing instructions concerning the authority for protection of U.S. forces are promulgated in Rules of Engagement (ROE) and are understood clearly by PACOM field commanders. Current Rules of Engagement contain the statement that the rules do not modify, in any manner, the traditional responsibility of a military commander to defend his unit with all means at his disposal. This provides that in the event of attack, commanders will take immediate action to protect their forces. This provision is applicable in emergency situations where the survival of U.S. forces require action without referral to higher authority.

3. With the exception of Thailand, there are no restrictions on U.S. unilateral emergency self-defense actions imposed by international agreements or standing instructions with host countries in the PACOM.

6. COMUSMACTHAI considers no change in present self-defense restrictions appropriate at this time. He states, however, that the U.S. Mission continues to reevaluate its policy to insure its suitability with regard to the existing threat to U.S. forces and property.

7. Concur in the position of COMUSMACTHAI that, while some restrictions on self-defense measures have been accepted in Thailand, present policy should be continued subject to periodic evaluation in the light of the existing or developing threat to U.S. forces.

Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. (ANZUS)
Treaty Security Consultations

On 15 October 1969, CINCPAC informed the JCS that RADM Lloyd R. Vasey, USN, J5, Hq CINCPAC, would be his representative to the ANZUS Security Consultations scheduled to meet on 23 and 24 October 1969

1. CINCPAC 030213Z May 69.
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at the State Department, Washington, D. C. Following this meeting, the State Department was to prepare a full report of the consultations. The agenda items at these ANZUS Security Consultations were as follows:

A. ChiCom foreign policy in East Asia Region to include a review of internal developments. ChiCom nuclear ability and U. S. ability to neutralize it.

B. Soviet policy and intentions in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.


E. U. S. base requirements and prospects in East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific.

F. Developments in regional cooperation. Progress in developing five-power defense arrangement for Malaysia/Singapore area, progress in ASPAC, the ADB, ASEAN, etc. Future of SEATO; discussion of SEATO counter-subversion study; Thai suggestion for political discussions.

G. Indonesia. Assess internal stability and progress, role in regional affairs, policies of ANZUS partners with regard to military assistance.

H. Malaysia/Singapore. Assess outlook for stability in Malaysia and for cooperation between Malaysia and Singapore.

I. Philippines. Discuss internal situation and Philippines water question.

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J. Thailand. Discuss insurgency and RTG handling of situation.

K. Korea. Discuss internal situation in South Korea; evaluate North Korean intentions. 1

Australia

Criminal Jurisdiction of U.S. Servicemen Charged with Homicide

(U) On 6 February 1969, Warrant Officer (WO-1) Lawrence J. Hull, USA, appeared before an Australian court for a preliminary hearing in connection with the death of Josephine Dunphy on 16 December 1968. There, a "prima facie case of murder was established and Hull was bound over for trial" on 24 March 1969 in Central Criminal Court, Sydney. 2 Bail was denied and Hull remains in Australian custody. The U.S. request for a waiver of Australian primary jurisdiction, which had been submitted on 23 December 1968, was subsequently refused by the Attorney-General, Government of Australia (GOA). 3

(U) When brought to trial on 25-26 August 1969, WO-1 Hull was "found not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 10 years penal servitude with 3 year non-parole period." 4 Although appealed by the Crown, the appeal was dismissed on 17 October 1969, and the court reduced the original sentence to nine years and four months, with no non-parole period. 5

China

SOFAR - Increase of Punishment on Appeal/Application of Chinese Martial Law/Notice of Offense

Having been convicted of intimidation and sentenced by a Government of the Republic of China (GRC) criminal court, three airmen--

2. COMNAVPHIL DET/Sydney 090640Z Feb 69.
3. USSSO Australia 120618Z Feb 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
4. USSSO/Canberra 270357Z Aug 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
5. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69; USSSO Canberra 170715Z Oct 69.

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Sergeant (SGT) Leslie L. Kennedy, SGT Gerald F. Bohnenberger, and Airman First Class (A1C) Kerby A. LeBouef--appealed to a higher Chinese court. At this appellate hearing, the intermediate appellate court, using Chinese martial law as a basis, found them guilty of the more serious offense of robbery and increased their sentences from two years to 12 years, respectively. Both the American Embassy in Taipei and SECSTATE became concerned about the following aspects of the case: (1) the fact that the GRC waiver in the case was purportedly recalled under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and its implementing arrangements for intimidation, a crime not specified as recallable; (2) the application of Chinese martial law to U.S. military personnel; and (3) the failure to warn the defendants of the robbery charge, thus violating their SOFA right to be informed of the charges against them before trial. As SECSTATE indicated, while the SOFA "on its face does not exempt SOFA personnel from the application of martial law, special laws, and the emergency decrees, it is clear that GRC and USG purpose...was to exempt SOFA personnel from martial law...."¹

Another serious question warranting diplomatic attention, according to Commander, U.S. Forces, Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC), was "the impact of increased sentence in light of U.S. law, both military and civilian, on increased sentences and attendant loss of confidence in Chinese courts by military personnel plus political impact in Congress on SOFAs in Western Pacific and Asian areas."² This question was not a new one, and earlier cases have involved the same point. However, despite the jurisdic-tional implications, "no objection was ever lodged with the Chinese because (presumably) the results were in the best interests of the accused."³

On 13 November 1969, SECSTATE agreed that the issues of this case should be taken up with Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)/Acting Director of North American Affairs and GRC representative Joint Committee Frederick Chien, seeking his "intercession to see that High Court's decision is overruled."⁴ The basis for overruling might be the change for charge in the decision on appeal or the application of martial law which led to a six-fold increase in sentence. During the subsequent discussion, Mr. Frederick Chien readily admitted that the "defendants had a 'strong point' in claiming that they were not informed of charges against them as required under SOFA

1. SECSTATE 175388/1/161635Z Oct 69; ADMINO COMUSTDC 040343Z Oct 69; COMUSTDC 060616Z Oct 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69.
2. COMUSTDC 280825Z Oct 69.
3. Ibid.
4. SECSTATE 191745/132316Z Nov 69.
Article 14, Paragraph 9B, "and 'promised to use 'all good offices available' with Supreme Court to get High Court ruling reversed."¹ On the martial law aspect, Mr. Chien, who was one of the Chinese negotiators of the SOFA, was less favorable on this point. His recollections of the SOFA negotiations were that "GRC had never promised not to apply martial law, only expressed its desire to avoid applying such provisions."²

(U) "Appeal to Supreme Court filed," read a message on 26 November 1969; "Newly retained local counsel pursuing all legal remedies."³ As of the end of Calendar Year 1969, this appeal was still pending.⁴

(Q) In mid-December 1969, the GRC began an attempt to recall their waiver of jurisdiction in the case of Airman First Class Bernard J. Baio, USAF, and Airman Richard G. Tipton, USAF, for the offense of "forceful taking." The controversy in this case again concerned the possible application of Chinese martial law to the crime and (thereby making Chinese military law applicable to) U.S. servicemen, whether or not the offense of "forceful taking" is recallable under the SOFA and, if so, the procedures surrounding such recall. This matter was still pending at the end of Calendar Year 1969.⁵

SOFA - Recall of Waiver of Jurisdiction in an "Exceptional Case"

(Q) At the 7 January 1969 meeting of the Joint Committee for Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) representative raised the question of recalling its waiver of jurisdiction in the case of two U.S. Navy enlisted men who allegedly had assisted another U.S. serviceman—who had been convicted by a GRC court—in attempting to flee the country. By the terms of U.S.-GRC SOFA, the GRC waives, in advance, their primary jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen in all cases, except a few, enumerated, serious offenses, of which aiding or abetting a convicted person is not one. The SOFA provides that even in the cases where the general waiver applies, if GRC believes the major interests of Chinese justice make it necessary for GRC to exercise jurisdiction, it can, with the concurrence of the U.S., recall its waiver in an "exceptional case." Since the U.S. "representative in Joint Committee stated that he considered

1. AMEMBASSY Taipei 4654/171021Z Nov 69.
2. Ibid.
3. ADMINO COMUSTDC 260319Z Nov 69.
4. COMUSTDC 300750Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
5. COMUSTDC 170849Z Dec 69; COMUSTDC 180904Z Dec 69; ADMIN CINCPAC 191940Z Dec 69; CSAF AFJALM 222252Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.

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beyond his powers to determine this an quote exceptional case unquote, "the matter was referred to the respective governments."

On 7 March 1969, the U.S. approved GRC's request to exercise jurisdiction in this instance under the "exceptional case" clause, "subject to GRC limiting jurisdiction to specific offense, GRC acknowledging no precedent and no new general category of waiver recallable offense being thereby established." In the end, GRC agreed to these conditions, stating that "any prosecution of accused would be limited to a charge of violating Art 164 of GRC Criminal Code. Art 164 provides max of 2 years imprisonment, detention, or fine max 500 yuan (at present rate of exchange US $37.50) for the offense of concealing an offender or person who escapes legal arrest or detention."

(U) Upon trial, both sailors were found guilty, and the Chinese court announced their sentences on 18 July 1969. RD1 J. F. Durand, USN, received seven months of confinement that was not commutable, while GMG2 D. W. Clemonns, USN, was sentenced to five months of confinement that was commutable to a fine.

Japan

U.S. -Japanese Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Meeting

As in 1967, only one meeting of the U.S.-Japanese SSC took place during 1969. This 10th SCC meeting was held in Tokyo, Japan, on 9 July 1969. The spokesmen for the numerous U.S. representatives were Armin H. Meyer, American Ambassador to Japan, and ADM John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC, while the spokesmen for the equally numerous Japanese side were Kiichi Aichi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Kiichi Arita.

1. COMUSTDC 080252Z Jan 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
2. COMUSTDC 110633Z Mar 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
3. COMUSTDC 230220Z Apr 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
4. COMUSTDC 140048Z Aug 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA). 1

During the first portion of this session, Foreign Minister Aichi commented on Korea and the intentions of China and Russia in the Far East, his remarks being based on a consensus of views obtained at a recent meeting of Japanese Ambassadors in Tokyo. Following a situation report on Asia by ADM McCain, "Ambassador Meyer spoke briefly on the Paris talks and Vietnam, President Nixon's trip (Guam Doctrine), the Soviet Collective Security proposal for Asia, progress in South Korea and the CHICOM nuclear program." 2

After this exchange of views by members of the committee on the current international situation as it affected the common security of Japan and the U.S. in the Far East, JDA Director General Arita initiated discussion of the facilities and areas in Japan used by U.S. armed forces, speaking almost exclusively about the Mito Air-to-Ground Range problem. Accordingly, the committee reviewed the concrete steps--agreements being consummated on 21 of the total 54 facilities and areas--taken by the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee toward implementing the so-called bases package plan concerning the adjustment of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan since the 9th SCC meeting on 23 December 1968. While taking note of this progress, the SCC in its 10th meeting "expressed the hope that the remaining portions of the plan for return, joint use or relocation of those facilities and areas would be implemented on an expeditious basis by the Joint Committee." 3 It was suggested that the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee make another report after six months.

Security Consultative Committee Subcommittee (SCC SC)

The first SCC SC meeting was held in May 1967, although the idea of a small subcommittee of the SCC was broached to the American Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, by CINCPAC as early as September

1. CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I, pp. 465-7; FONECON, Office of J5125, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 8 Dec 69; History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 July - 30 September 1969, dtd 14 Nov 69, p. 7; J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
1965. In the end, agreement was reached 'to establish a subcommittee within the SCC for regular follow-up 'working level' talks at Vice-Minister-Ambassadorial level.... These talks are aimed at being highly informal, with full opportunity for give and take without formal comment on either side."¹²

(U) The sixth SCC SC meeting took place in Tokyo, Japan, on 15 October 1969. The American Ambassador to Japan, Armin H. Meyer, headed up the U.S. delegation, which included PACOM representation by RADM L. R. Vasey, USN, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Hq CINCPAC.²

(S) The principal topic at SCC SC VI was future defense planning, which was based primarily on a JDA presentation, and the U.S. side stated that the Japanese planning was compatible with U.S. policy. "The balance of conversation ranged over role of sea power, ABM's, Sino-Soviet dispute, GOJ-US-ROK Air Defense exercises, Japanese participation in UN or Post-Vietnam peacekeeping, possibility of Japanese military material assistance to Korea and other Asian countries, Soviet intentions in the area and future action of Communist China."³ Despite the fact that nothing new or profound resulted from SCC SC VI, the meeting was categorized as "a useful step forward in defense dialogue."⁴ For the time and location of the next SCC SC meeting, the U.S. suggested a March or April 1970 session in Washington, D. C., but no decision on this matter was reached.

Korea

SOFA - Challenges to the Validity of the Korean SOFA

(S) A Korean trial court convicted Specialist 4 (SP4) H. K. Smallwood, USA, of the murder of a Korean female and arson on 2 June 1968. His sentence, imposed 13 January 1969, was 15 years imprisonment. Following his indictment, Specialist Smallwood had filed a habeas corpus action in a U.S. District Court, contesting the validity of the SOFA under which he was being made available to the Korean authorities for prosecution. Since his case attracted considerable press attention, the Korean authorities became concerned that the U.S. courts were interfering in the Korean judicial process.

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2. J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69, which is the sole source for the following account of SCC SC VI.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
On 25 June 1968, however, the U.S. District Court ruled in favor of the U.S. and dismissed Smallwood's habeas corpus petition. An appeal of this decision was planned but, in the meantime, Smallwood's appeal to the Seoul High Court had been successful:

...On 13 Jan 69, the Seoul High (Appellate) Court found SP4 H. K. Smallwood not guilty of all charges pending against him. Since the Prosecutor did not file an appeal by midnight 20 Jan 69, the decision of the High Court became final at the time and ROK jurisdiction terminated.

Specialist Smallwood departed Korea at 1900 hours, 21 Jan 69, on orders assigning him to the US Army Personnel Center, Ft Lewis, Washington, for reassignment. 1

(Ç) Another challenge to the validity of the Korean SOFA occurred during SFC Orville L. Ogden's trial held in a Korean court, for attempted murder. Trial began on 23 October 1969, and it was "charged that he deliberately fired at a group of children on a hunting expedition in February because the children were harassing the hunting party." 2 Four days later, his attorneys, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, filed a:

...complaint seeking restraining order, preliminary, and permanent injunction to prohibit transfer of Ogden to Koreans for trial. Attorneys also filed on same day writ of habeas corpus, alleging that detention in Korea beyond his normal assignment for purposes of making him available for Korean trial was illegal. Basis of complaint and writ is that Korean SOFA unconstitutional. 3

(Ç) Subsequently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order "to the extent of precluding the transfer of appellant to the custody of the authorities of the Republic of Korea pending ultimate disposition" of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 4 Fortunately, this order did not preclude the presenting of SFC Ogden for trial by a

1. CG USAEIGHT Seoul, Korea 76105/220207Z Jan 69; AMEMBASSY Seoul 141/130750Z Jan 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
2. AMEMBASSY Seoul 6071/040820Z Nov 69.
3. SECSTATE 187189/052013Z Nov 69.
4. DA TJAG 072032Z Nov 69.
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Korean court as long as he officially remained in U.S. custody, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) authorities did not press the issue. ¹

(U) The Taegu District Court found SFC Odgen innocent of the initial charge of attempted murder and instead found him "guilty of an additional charge under Korean law of inflicting bodily harm and was assessed a fine of 200,000 Won (approximately $665.00). SFC Odgen declined his right to appeal, paid the fine and returned to CONUS on 22 Nov 69."²

(G) Similar also was the case of SP4 Frederick H. Bassett. On 19 July 1969, the Taegu District Court found SP4 Bassett guilty of attempted rape resulting in death and sentenced him to five years of imprisonment. He appealed his conviction to a higher Korean court and remained in U.S. custody. Subsequently, in November 1969, he filed a:

...habeas corpus petition in U.S. District Court, District of Columbia alleging (1) that the US-ROK SOFA is invalid as it is an executive agreement and not a treaty, and (2) conviction by a ROK court would deprive him of constitutional rights without the due process of law.³

(G) When the American Ambassador to Korea, William J. Porter, informally discussed the Bassett case with ROK Minister of Justice, he found Minister Yi Ho "was sympathetic and understood implication of problem for Korea. Said he would take steps to see that no request for custody was made."⁴ Although the U.S. District Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in an ex parte hearing issued on 24 November 1969 "a temporary order restraining the Secretary of Defense from turning custody of Bassett over to the ROK authorities."⁵ Six days earlier, the Taegu High Court had modified the original findings of the Taegu District Court and, as a result, SP4 Bassett was found guilty of violence resulting in death and was sentenced to a period of confinement of one to two years.

1. Ibid.; AMEMBASSY Seoul 6119/060900Z Nov 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69.
2. CGUSAEOIGHT Seoul, Korea 121135Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
3. COMUKOREA UK 62616/031045Z Dec 69; AMEMBASSY Seoul 6119/060900Z Nov 69.
4. AMEMBASSY Seoul 6446/290700Z Nov 69.
5. COMUKOREA UK 62616/031045Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69.
Subsequently, apparently believing credit for pretrial confinement, plus parole opportunity, would allow SP4 Bassett to go free in about four months, his attorneys made a motion to withdraw his appeal from the U.S. court. When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia granted this motion, the American military officials in Korea were freed from maintaining custody of Bassett and released him to the proper Korean authorities. This action closed the case. However, the legal questions raised by the Ogden and Bassett cases were left unresolved.  

Philippines

Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Board (MDB)

For the first time in its 11-year old history, the MDB met outside of the Philippines for a meeting. It was held at Hq CINCPAC, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, on 23 September 1969:

...Admiral McCain, Co-Chairman of the Board presided. Members in attendance included: On the Philippine side; GEN Manuel T. Yan, C/S Philippine Armed Forces, Co-Chairman, BGEN Rafael Ileto, CG PA, BGEN Vincente Raval, CG PC, BGEN Jesus Singson, CG PAF and Commo Ismael Lomibao, FOIC PN; on the U.S. side; LT GEN Francis Gideon, COM 13 AF, RADM Draper L. Kaufman, COMNAVPHIL, RADM Valdemar Lambert, COMNAVBASUBIC, and MGEN George B. Pickett, CHJUSMAAGPHIL.

The MDB was formed in 1958, with the purpose of providing inter-governmental machinery for liaison between Filipino and U.S. military authorities in matters concerning common defense. By 1962, it had come up with plan for the mutual defense of the Philippines against aggression. The MDB meets once a month and, in the future, it "is contemplated that one MDB meeting will be held outside the Philippines each year." Probably because of the uniqueness of this meeting, it received extensive coverage by the Hawaiian press and TV.

1. COMUSKOREA UK 62616/0310452 Z Dec 69; SECSTATE 205741/111953 Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. J5126 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
Fatal Shooting at Subic Bay - SOFA

In mid-1969, Gunners Mate Third Class (GM3) Michael D. Mooney, USN, was in charge of the pistol range at the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Philippines. As he admitted later, he was aware that hunting was illegal on the military base. Nevertheless, on the afternoon of 10 June, he and another sailor, who had been painting a storage building on the pistol range, took a walk into the nearby woods, where wild boar tracks had been noticed earlier, to look for game. Sighting what he thought was a wild pig drinking from a stream, a belief that was held by his USN companion, he fired his .45 caliber pistol. Unfortunately, the wild pig turned out to be a Filipino by the name of Amor, who was allowed to hunt for scrap metal on the firing range from time to time. "Amor was shot in back and either died instantly or shortly thereafter," although there did not seem to be any delay in rushing him to the hospital. 1

Action was taken immediately by U.S. authorities to furnish airlift for the deceased's father and uncle to travel to Subic Bay and to return with the body. Moreover, on 14 June 1969, upon receiving a cash settlement of 15,000 pesos (about $4,000), the father executed a release and an "affidavit of desistance (expression of disinterest in criminal prosecution since shooting was accidental not intentional)," forgave GM3 Mooney, and assured him "of family prayers for the repose of his soul." 2

Since SECSTATE pointed out that the facts would not make this shooting an "official duty" case under the 1965 amendments to the Military Base Agreement (MBA), thus giving the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GOP) primary jurisdiction, it was decided to request a waiver of GOP jurisdiction so as to permit the appropriate U.S. naval authorities to proceed in accordance with military law. 3 When the U.S. request for waiver was presented to the local Fiscal on the morning of 20 June, the Fiscal said he would report it to the GOP Secretary of Justice Ponce Enrile the following day. He also stated that Secretary Enrile considered the 1965 amendments as not being in effect and that, under the earlier 1947 MBA, the U.S. had primary jurisdiction, since the offense had occurred on base. 4 In a letter of

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1. CINCPACREPPHIL/COMUSNAVPHIL 111241Z Jun 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69; COMNAASE [COMNAVBASE] Subic 1012002Z Jun 69.
2. COMNAVBASE Subic Bay 141342Z Jun 69; COMNAVBASE Subic 131141Z Jun 69.
3. SECSTATE 100642/192041Z Jun 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
4. AMEMBASSY Manila 6445/201027Z Jun 69.
1 July, Secretary Enrile replied "that the Republic of the Philippines would require more time in order to inquire into the facts and the applicable law on the subject, after which your request will accordingly be acted upon."¹

(2) In mid-July 1969, the American Embassy in Manila reported to SECSTATE that:

Manila Times and other papers July 15 report that Secy Justice Ponce Enrile has sent Memo to President Marcos reaffirming earlier Teehankee opinion to effect that 1965 criminal jurisdiction amendments not valid because not ratified by Philippine Senate. Instead, 1947 MBA provisions on criminal jurisdiction are in effect. As result, Memo reportedly states that U.S. has primary jurisdiction in Moomey case at Subic. According to Times, Memo says that if it approved by President Foreign Office should be asked to make representations for court martial of Moomey in Philippines so that GOP observer can be present....²

(2) On 28 August 1969, GOP Secretary for Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo informed the American Embassy in Manila that the GOP had no objection to the U.S. asserting its jurisdiction in the Moomey case. Embassy officials decided to "treat Romulo's action as waiver GOP primary jurisdiction under 1965 agreement, while recognizing that GOP may wish treat it as U.S. exercise of jurisdiction under 1947 provisions."³ Secretary Romulo made no comments on the basic problem of the 1965 versus the 1947 MBAs, since this question was still pending before President Marcos. Because the GOP had inquired several times about having its observer present at GM3 Moomey's court-martial, the Embassy asked to be informed as soon as a trial date was set, so that it could afford the GOP adequate opportunity to send an observer, if it wished to do so. Once a waiver by the GOP of its jurisdiction had been received, a trial by general court-martial for GM3 Moomey on the charges of negligent homicide was scheduled for late September 1969.⁴

1. AMEMBASSY Manila 6973/031010Z Jul 69.
2. AMEMBASSY Manila 7377/150955Z Jul 69.
3. AMEMBASSY Manila 9180/280824Z Aug 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
4. COMNAVBASE Subic Bay 020755Z Sep 69; ADMINO COMUSNAVPHIL 040905Z Sep 69; COMNAVBASE Subic Bay 120803Z Sep 69; COMNAVBASE Subic 152354Z Sep 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
GM3 Moomey's trial by general court-martial resulted in his acquittal; subsequently, he was transferred and discharged. Shortly thereafter, on 10 October 1969, the Philippine Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Jose D. Ingles, submitted the following note to the American Ambassador:

The Philippine Government considers the acquittal of Moomey as a gross miscarriage of justice and, therefore, strongly protests the decision of the court-martial. To redress the wrong and in the interest of the friendly relations between our two countries, the Department hereby requests that immediate steps be taken to have Michael Moomey face trial before a Philippine court.

This case has highlighted the urgency of renegotiating the Military Bases Agreement as stated in the letter of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, dated 15 January 1969. In fact a renegotiation of the entire agreement has become imperative not only to avoid the recurrence of similar incidents but also to remove other causes of friction brought about by the presence of American military bases in the Philippines. 1

In reply the same day, the American Ambassador stated:

...apart from problem of double jeopardy, there is no legal way USG could bring Moomey back to Philippines for another trial. I told Ingles that wording of final paragraph of note disturbed me because it sounded as though USG had been dragging its feet on GOP requests to renegotiate when in fact I had, since my arrival, told President Marcos, Secy Romulo, and other high officials of GOP that USG stood ready and willing to renegotiate or discuss any aspect of our defense relationship, including the bases agreement. 2

For all practical purposes, this exchange of comments ended the GM3 Moomey incident. "Further notes and hearing by a Philippine Congressional committee add nothing to the case and bear only on Philippine political

1. CINCPACREP PHIL 100942Z Oct 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69.
2. CINCPACREP PHIL 10679/101030Z Oct 69.
maneuvers regarding renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement. "1

Airlift Support of Philippine Undersecretary of Defense Melchor's Visit to Vietnam

Because of the possibility of the PHILCAGV (Philippine Civic Action Group Vietnam) being raised as an issue in the forthcoming Philippine congressional sessions, advised the American Embassy in Manila on 10 March 1969, "President Marcos has directed Undersecretary of Defense Melchor to make a quick trip to Vietnam... to gain first-hand knowledge of current situation there and be able to testify before Philippine Congress with some authority."2 Since Mr. Melchor indicated a need for U.S. military T-39 airlift support for his trip, the American Embassy in Manila recommended that this request "be given favorable consideration by U.S. military authorities in Vietnam."3 On the same day, CHJUSMAGPHIL concurred in the proposed trip, stating that it was in the "interest of retaining present PHILCAG capability and is beneficial to U.S. interests in Philippines."4

In a message to the JCS on 12 March 1969, CINCPAC recommended approval of Mr. Melchor's request, since the use of military airlift in this case appeared justified.5 The following day, the American Embassy in Saigon concurred in this proposed visit. Because of the necessity of speed in order to fulfill the request, the CINCPAC action officer obtained verbal approval from the JCS for this airlift, and CINCPAC directed CINCPACAF to provide the needed airlift on 17 March 1969. The same day, the JCS confirmed its verbal approval by means of a message.6

2. AMEMBASSY Manila 2384/100900Z Mar 69.
3. Ibid.; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
4. CHJUSMAGPHIL JPCH 101300Z Mar 69.
5. CINCPAC 120537Z Mar 69.
6. ADMIN CINCPAC 170620Z Mar 69; JCS 4861/172221Z Mar 69; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
Registration Fees for U.S. Special Services Vehicles

During 1969, besides the additional Science Tax, GOP Land Transportation Commissioner Edu also "demanded that Special Services vehicles pay normal registration fees. His attention has been focused on those vehicles which are available for rental to servicemen for their personal use."\(^1\) In the opinion of the American Embassy in Manila, however, "such vehicles should not be required to pay full registration fees and should be treated like other official U.S. military vehicles in the Philippines, which pay only four pesos for the license tag",\(^2\) since they belong to "official agencies of the U.S. Government and entitled to the protection of the MBA against imposition of the GOP registration fee."\(^3\)

CINCPAC concurred in this position and suggested the following to CINCPACREP Philippines in a message on 13 June 1969:

...in negotiations with GOP that stress be placed on fact that Special Services Organizations are integral part and function of United States Government, and accordingly, tax exempt. This is true of non-appropriated fund activities generally. They are recognized as instrumentality of the USG and have been held to be so by the Supreme Court of the United States. (Standard Oil Company of California vs Johnson 316, U.S. 481 (1942) 62 Sup Ct Decisions 1168). Standard Oil Case relates to Post Exchange activities. However, case and decision can be equated to Special Services activities and functions and has been so related in other Federal Court decisions.\(^4\)

In the end, on the night of 28 June 1969, the American Embassy in Manila received a letter, also addressed to Commissioner Edu, which contained Secretary of Public Works Raquiza's decision "on registration fees for Special Services vehicles. Letter back-dated to June 13, i.e., before Raquiza's resignation as Secy Public Works.\(^5\) This decision concurred in the U.S. position, for Secretary Raquiza concluded "that morale and welfare activities are 'official' and that therefore all NAFA activities are 'official' and their vehicles are thus entitled to exemption from normal registration fees."\(^6\)

1. AMEMBASSY Manila 6020/110930Z Jun 69.
2. Ibid.
3. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
4. CINCPAC 131920Z Jun 69.
5. AMEMBASSY Manila 6808/300945Z Jun 69.
6. Ibid.
Confidential

Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) Registration and the Science Tax

By means of a circular on 2 January 1969, Commissioner Edu of the Philippine Land Transportation Commission advised "that pending receipt of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice as to the applicability of special Science Fund Tax to motor vehicles owned by U.S. force personnel, all agencies handling registration of motor vehicles should exert efforts to collect the special Science Fund Tax."¹ Just the previous year, this Commissioner Edu had been influential in the unsuccessful attempt to require U.S. military and civilian personnel in the Philippines with POVs to pay the Philippine vehicle registration fees, although these vehicles had always been "exempt from any fees under Article XII, Paragraph 3, Military Base Arrangement (MBA)."² In this new attempt to collect an additional fee from the Americans, CINCPACREP Philippines' position was "that U.S. force personnel are not subject to the special Science Fund Tax and that servicemen and others entitled to exemption under the MBA should refuse to pay the said tax."³

By mid-March, CINCPACREP Philippines was expressing the concern of the military commanders in the Philippines over the delay of the GOP in resolving the issue of the applicability of the Science Tax to the personnel of U.S. forces stationed in the country. "Although deadline for re-registration in the Philippines is over two months away (31 May)," he commented to CINCPAC, "allowing GOP to drag this issue out much longer will put us in the position of attempting to negotiate an issue of importance to us against a tight deadline."⁴ CINCPAC concurred with this concern and recommended to SECDEF on 29 March that "SECSTATE be alerted to the continued GOP delay which is causing adverse morale and administrative problems for U.S. military personnel serving in the Philippines."⁵ Finally, on 24 April 1969, the American Embassy in Manila advised all concerned that the GOP had decided that the recently enacted Science Tax on registration of POVs in the Philippines would not be applied to U.S. personnel on U.S. military bases.⁶

1. CINCPACREP PHIL 180925Z Jan 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69; AMEMBASSY Manila 6020/110930Z Jun 69.
3. CINCPACREP PHIL 180925Z Jan 69.
4. CINCPACREP PHIL 170547Z Mar 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
5. CINCPAC 292205Z Mar 69.
6. AMEMBASSY Manila 4177/240841Z Apr 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
SECRET

A Fatal Shooting by U.S. Sentry at Sangley Point - SOFA

(5) On 26 July 1968, Lance Corporal Kenneth A. Smith, USMC, a sentry at the Naval Station, Sangley Point, Philippines, shot and killed a Philippine national named "Gonzales, a known and dangerous hoodlum. . . . At the time he was killed, Gonzales was attempting to escape custody of, and arrest by the sentry."¹ Subsequently, on 4 January 1969, Lance Corporal Smith was acquitted by a Navy General Court-Martial of all charges arising out of this shooting; he departed the Philippines on PCS (Permanent Change of Station) orders the same day.²

(6) Four days later, the American Ambassador to the Philippines, G. Mennen Williams, called upon Carlos P. Romulo, the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to notify him of the results of the court-martial. As Ambassador Williams put it:

2. Romulo knew something of case, although not of course familiar with details. Following my presentation, he reacted immediately and emotionally, almost seeming to lose control. Focussing on result of court-martial, he said that acquittal created 'very serious' situation. He said that Filipino people would not understand complexities of factual situation that had led court to acquit Smith, that they would see it as case in which 'white man had killed brown man' and that American military had let white man go unpunished. Filipino people, he reiterated several times, would not be able to understand and accept this result. In addition people not understanding complexity of factual situation, Romulo said that they will not easily understand why GOP did not get jurisdiction over Smith. Furthermore, he said they will be conscious of fact that 32 other Filipinos have been killed on American military bases with similar results. Fact that Smith married to Filipina would not, in Romulo's opinion, help situation since Filipinos tend to look down upon Filipina women married to foreigners.

2. CINCPACREP PHIL/COMNAVPHIL 040723Z Jan 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
7. At end of conversation, Romulo said that if public reaction very strong it might be necessary to open immediately discussions on jurisdictional provisions of MBA and 'settle question once and for all.' He said that political reaction could of course be strong enough, if jurisdictional problem cannot be settled, to make it necessary to get rid of bases entirely. I commented that this seemed drastic solution for present problem. Apparently referring again to possible public reaction to result in Smith case, he then said that we would have to face up to it and see what happens....

Criminal Complaint Against a USAF Security Policeman - SOFA

(U) On 21 September 1969, Sergeant (SGT) Gavino Lira, USAF, a Security Policeman stationed at Clark AFB, apprehended a Philippine national, Rudolfo Paruli, who was attempting to exit the main gate with a camera. Since Paruli's story could not be verified at the time of apprehension, SGT Lira confiscated the camera. Later information proved the Philippine national was the legitimate owner of the camera, so it was returned to him.

(U) On 30 September, however, Paruli "filed criminal complaint with city Fiscal, Angeles City, alleging physical injuries, grave threats and slander by Lira and two John Does." SGT Lira's commander, accordingly, filed an appropriate official military duty certificate with the local Fiscal on 23 October 1969. At first, the Fiscal dismissed the complaint, then reconsidered, and reopened the case.

(C) Immediately, controversy developed as to whether or not the case should be handled under the 1947 or 1965 amendments to the MBA. When a warrant of arrest was issued by the Fiscal against SGT Lira, he was advised "to stay on the base and not to accept service of any kind. If service is forced upon him or inadvertently accepted he has been advised to contact Base Legal authorities immediately." When an American Embassy official brought this case to the attention of Chief State Prosecutor Gancayco on 4 December 1969, Gancayco told him that "controversy over effectiveness of 1965 notes had created confusion in minds of Fiscals," and suggested that the Embassy write a letter setting forth the facts of the case so that the

1. AMEMBASSY Manila 246/081620Z Jan 69.
2. HQ 13AF Clark AB Phil 130951Z Nov 69; 173 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
3. HQ 13AF Clark AB Phil 050926Z Dec 69.
Prosecutor could discuss the matter with the Angeles City Fiscal.  

An Embassy official delivered a note to Gancayco on the afternoon of 10 December, explaining that further Philippine court action had compelled reference of this matter to the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, as well as emphasizing the "seriousness of arrest order issued against person over whom U.S. has primary jurisdiction." At the end of Calendar Year 1969, the matter was still pending.

Shooting of a Philippine National at Clark AFB - SOFA

On 11 December 1969, Carlito Sevilla, a Philippine national, jumped Airman First Class (A1C) Charles E. Hough, USAF, one of several Security Policemen at Clark AFB, who were in hot pursuit of three men (including Sevilla) for the theft of a TV set from Clark AFB quarters. A1C Hough's weapon discharged during the ensuing scuffle when both fell to the ground. The bullet struck and wounded Sevilla in his lung, which partially collapsed, but successful surgery was performed at the Clark AFB hospital, after which his condition was described as "stable."

Although the shooting occurred on the Clark AFB military reservation, approximately one-half mile from the base proper (the fenced area), the local Fiscal notified the base commander almost immediately that he was in the process of investigating the shooting and requested that A1C Hough be placed under administrative hold. In reply, the base commander advised that A1C Hough had been routinely placed on administrative hold on 11 December:

... coincident with initiation of OSI investigation, that Hough will remain in such status until OSI investigation reviewed and appropriate action determined, and that Fiscal is encouraged to personally monitor OSI investigation to include posing any supplemental questions to Sevilla after OSI interrogator finishing after permission given by medical

1. AMEMBASSY Manila 12350/060454Z Dec 69.
2. AMEMBASSY Manila. 12481/110910Z Dec 69; SECSTATE 203971/082213Z Dec 69.
3. 13AF Clark AB Phil 170226Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
4. HQ 13AF CAB PI 110040Z Dec 69; 13AF CC Clark AB Phil 110041Z Dec 69; AMEMBASSY Manila 12483/110945Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
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authorities. Fiscal will also, if he desires, be given opportunity to ask supplemental questions of witnesses.  

The U.S. position at this time was that the USAF "has exclusive investigative jurisdiction. Line of duty certificate has been prepared by Security Police Commander." On 13 December, the American Embassy in Manila received a note from the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, requesting "that Airman Hough be confined to base for duration of investigation (by whom unspecified)." The Embassy replied "that Hough routinely placed on administrative hold pending outcome Air Force investigation." By 19 December, the USAF "investigation is now considered closed. No disciplinary or administrative action against Hough is contemplated. No criminal charges against Sevilla are contemplated. Sevilla is now ambulatory...and is expected to be fit for discharge from the hospital in about two days." 

On 30 December 1969, the Fiscal gave the Base Judge Advocate a subpoena to be served on Hough to appear 2 Jan 1970, at Fiscal's office for preliminary investigation of charge of frustrated homicide against Hough. A USAF legal officer, however, instructed AIC Hough "not to attend investigation and not to leave Clark Air Base." The controversy in this case focuses on whether or not the shooting incident occurred on the "base" and what--at least for the Philippine officials--is meant by the "words 'base and or bases' as used in Art. 13 of 1947 MBA." 

Thai SOFA Negotiations

"We cannot yet predict," commented the American Ambassador to Thailand, Leonard Unger, on 23 November 1968, "when more formal

1. HQ 13AF Clark AB Phil 120517Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. HQ 13AF Clark AB Phil 120517Z Dec 69.
3. AMEMBASSY Manila 12572/150945Z Dec 69.
4. Ibid.
5. 6200ABWG Clark AB PI 191030Z Dec 69.
6. 6200ABWG CAB 310735Z Dec 69.
7. Ibid.
8. AMEMBASSY Manila 12927/240921Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.

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negotiations will commence as the local political climate remains somewhat
dynamic."\(^1\) Despite the progress that had been made during 1967 and 1968,
the lack of significant developments during Calendar Year 1969 proved
Ambassador Unger's prediction as a correct one.\(^2\) In fact, as of October
1969, the negotiations between the U.S. and Royal Thai Government on a
SOFA still remained "at a standstill, and agreement in the foreseeable
future is not expected."\(^3\) As at beginning of 1969, CINCPAC's position at
the end was the same, favoring an "ultimate complete SOFA as in the best
interests of both countries."\(^4\)

A Thailand Civil Suit Against Commander, U.S. Army Support Command,
Thailand (USARSUPTHAI)

\(\bigcirc\) While driving a U.S. Army 5-ton truck on 7 November 1968, a U.S.
soldier by the name of Private Stewart collided with a Thai bus about 75
miles north of Korat, Thailand. Twenty days later, Private Stewart returned
to the United States. After filing a claim with the U.S. Foreign Claims Com-
mission, which was denied, the Thai bus driver then brought a civil suit in
the Thai courts for $13,000.00 against Private Stewart and BGEN David Ott,
Commander, USARSUPTHAI, as the soldier's employer.\(^5\)

\(\bigcirc\) "Under United States Law," read the U.S. position in this case,
"which governs the master-servant relationship, Stewart's employer was the
United States Government and not BG Ott. Therefore, BG Ott is not a proper
defendant. Under well recognized principles of international law, the United
States is immune from a suit in Thailand."\(^6\) Nevertheless, the U.S. Depar-
tment of Justice authorized the employment of a local Thai attorney to appear
on the behalf of the U.S. to prevent an unfavorable decision by default in the
Thai courts.\(^7\)

1. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 23341/2305052 Nov 68.
   History 1968, Vol. II, pp. 337-42; FONECON, LCOL J. M. Marden, USA,
   J732, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC
   HistBr, 22 Jan 70.
3. Point Paper, J73, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Oct 69, Subj: Thai Criminal Jurisdic-
   tion of U.S. Personnel.
4. Ibid.
5. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
7. Ibid.; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
(U) On 8 July 1969, representatives from the legal office of Hq USARSUPTHAI attended a hearing in this suit case as observers at Khon Kaen, Thailand. The Thai civil court dismissed the plaintiff's case for lack of proper service of process and did not even reach the immunity issue. Although this decision precluded another suit against Private Stewart in Thailand, "further action against BG Ott remains a possibility," but a remote one, since the plaintiff privately "voiced considerable discouragement." 1

Airlift Request for Royal Thai Armed Forces Staff College (RTAFSC) Orientation Tour

(U) Early in January 1969, COMUSMACTHAI requested military airlift support from CINCPAC of 62 students and escorts from RTAFSC for the annual orientation tour in April to Australia and New Zealand. After approving the trip, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT to provide organic airlift support, who eventually assigned two C-118s to this mission. When the U.S. Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Canberra, Australia, advised CINCPAC that the Thai Attache had asked if he and two Australian staff officers could accompany the RTAFSC group throughout Australia and to New Zealand, approval was forthcoming. In mid-March, the 13th Air Force warned that, because of congestion at the Don Muang airfield, the C-118s would not be able to remain overnight and recommended the use of the U-Tapao airfield with pickup and delivery of passengers at Don Muang. COMUSMACTHAI, however, arranged with the Royal Thai Air Force for aircraft parking space at Don Muang. No other problems developed. 2

A Traffic Accident by a U.S. Serviceman While on Official Duty - SOFA

(U) On 7 February 1969, while operating a USAF truck on official dispatch, Staff Sergeant Cleveland C. Rock, USAF, was involved in a traffic accident on Friendship Highway approximately two hours driving distance from Korat Airfield, Thailand. After being taken to the police station at Kaeng Khoi, he was released after an officer from his detachment signed a

1. CG USARSUPTHAI 100815Z Jul 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
2. CINCPAC 092106Z Jan 69; CINCPACFLT 110053Z Jan 69; COMUSMACTHAI 140631Z Feb 69; CINCPACFLT 150043Z Feb 69; COMUSMACTHAI 171201Z Feb 69; CINCPACFLT 120714Z Mar 69; 13AF Clark AB 130201Z Mar 69; COMUSMACTHAI 200629Z Mar 69; CINCPACFLT 210114Z Mar 69; CINCPAC 222001Z Mar 69; FLETACSUPPRON TWO ONE BARPT HAW 252154Z Mar 69; J4821 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Mar 69.
custody receipt, promising to return him to the police station for questioning or trial whenever requested by the Thai police.

On 19 February, having determined the extent of the Thai victim's injuries, the U.S. compensated the victim with a payment of 5,000 baht (approximately $240.10) and received in return a release of all further claims. When this release was presented to the Thai police inquiry officer, he requested that Sergeant Rock be brought to the police station "on 21 Feb 69 to pay an administrative fine of 50 baht imposed by him for the offense of negligently causing bodily injury." Although desirous of closing the case and terminating the custody receipt, the U.S., because this was an official duty case, had to inform the Thai authorities that it could not let Sergeant Rock pay the fine.

Although Sergeant Rock was never ordered to not pay this fine, the "U.S. policy of insistence upon retention of primary jurisdiction over duty offenses was explained to him as was the deleterious effect of establishing precedents antagonistic to that policy. He was asked to cooperate and has done so consistently, to his credit." In February 1969, the American Embassy in Bangkok submitted the case of Sergeant Rock to the Allied Coordinating Committee, an all Thai committee that had been established to resolve problems concerning U.S. forces. Since then, the American Embassy had consistently and frequently asked for action on this case, but no decision had been obtained by Sergeant Rock's scheduled departure date of 22 September 1969. Accordingly, he was held in Thailand in accordance with appropriate USAF regulations. On 12 November 1969, following a congressional inquiry, the American Embassy authorized Sergeant Rock's departure from Thailand, despite the fact that the Thai police case was not closed, and he departed two days later.

Custody Receipt System Endangered by Erroneous Return of Serviceman to U.S.

Following the death of a Thai civilian resulting from injuries received in an accident with his private automobile in January 1969, Staff

1. 7/13AF SJA Bangkok Thai 060958Z Nov 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69.
2. 7/13AF SJA Bangkok Thai 060958Z Nov 69.
3. CSAF AFJALN 032252Z Nov 69; 7/13AF SJA Bangkok Thailand 121005Z Nov 69; COMUSMACTHAI 120709Z Nov 69; CINCPACAF 130002Z Nov 69; 388CSG Korat RTAFB Thai 150340Z Nov 69; 388CMBT SPT GP Korat RTAFB Thai 180603Z Nov 69.
Sergeant William R. McClain, USA, was charged with negligent homicide by the Thai civil authorities. As was customary, he was released to U.S. authorities by the Thai police upon the signing of a custody receipt, whereby a U.S. officer guaranteed his availability for further Thai judicial proceedings. In this instance, however, Sergeant McClain was inadvertently returned to the United States, even though still pending Thai charges. Moreover, efforts to return him involuntarily for trial were to no avail, since there exist specific legal prohibitions against such an action. Both the American Ambassador to Thailand and COMUSMACTHAI were highly concerned that the consequence of U.S. inability to comply with the terms of the custody receipt might wreck the entire informal custody receipt system, resulting in a Thai decision to retain custody of all accused U.S. personnel in the future. In addition, they had fears that this one error might have important political repercussions in the entire area of criminal jurisdiction matters.1

However, Sergeant McClain agreed to return voluntarily to Thailand and stood trial on 26 November 1969. Upon advice of his counsel, he pleaded guilty and was found guilty of the charge of negligent homicide and was sentenced to two years of confinement, which was suspended for one year, a fine of 2,000 baht (approximately $100), and revocation of his driving license. As was previously planned, Sergeant McClain paid his fine and departed Thailand for the United States as soon as possible after his trial. Maximum cooperation and aid, it was reported, were "received from Thai authorities in this case."2

Thai Exercise of Jurisdiction over Master Sergeant (MSGT) Eugene M. Walker, USAF

Although no formal Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) had yet been signed between Thailand and the United States as of the end of 1968, arrangements were functioning that recognized primary Thai jurisdiction in "odious"

1. Point Paper, J73, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Oct 69, Subj: Special Problems in the Exercise of Thai Criminal Jurisdiction (Cases of Sergeants Walker & McClain); J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69.
2. CG USAR SUP THAI Korat Thailand 280100Z Nov 69; DA TJAG 110346Z Oct 69; CG USAR SUP THAI Korat Thailand 160920Z Oct 69; CG USAQM-CENFL Ft Lee Va 131925Z Nov 69; CG USAR SUP THAI Korat Thailand 180935Z Nov 69; CG USAR SUP THAI Korat Thailand 250945Z Nov 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69.
cases. On 1 January, the Thai police arrested MSGT Eugene M. Walker, USAF, assigned to the Royal Thai Air Force Base at Udorn, on suspicion of murdering his 16-month old adopted daughter of Thai nationality the previous night. From all indications, the alleged crime appeared to be the most serious one committed so far by a member of the U.S. military forces in Thailand.¹

As of 1 February 1969, no evidence had been uncovered implicating any third party.² Two days later, MSGT Walker was released by the Thai officials to the custody of the U.S. Air Force; subsequently, he was transferred to Camp Friendship at Korat, Thailand, for confinement pending the completion of the investigation, since "no suitable confinement facility exists at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base."³

When the U.S. requested permission to remove MSGT Walker from Thailand for further psychiatric evaluation on 7 July 1969, Thai Air Chief Marshal "Dawee indicated that arrangements should be made for a US-trained Thai psychiatrist to examine existing medical records and reports and report to the RTG on the case."⁴ Later in the month:

... Doctor Prasop, Head of Prasot Neurological Institute who with his assistants conducted an evaluation of SGT Walker has advised orally that the neurological evaluation confirmed a deterioration of Walker's left arm and that they agreed with Dr. Burns that the death of the child was due to an accident. Their psychological evaluation concurred with that of Dr. Gray. They agreed with Dr. Burns that Walker was not mentally responsible at the time of mutilation of the child's body but not because of pathological intoxication as found by Dr. Burns. Their conclusions were that because of acute depression at the death of the child Walker was in a fugue at the time. Dr. Prasop found Walker to be mentally competent at this time....⁵

2. 432CMBT SPTGP Udorn Thailand 010938Z Feb 69.
3. 432CMBTSPTGP Udorn Thailand 060240Z Feb 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
4. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 9007/071122Z Jul 69.
5. 7/13AF SGA Bangkok 290540Z Jul 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
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By letter on 4 August 1969, the Thai police inquiry officer in this case requested MSGT Walker’s presence for further proceedings. Since the American Embassy at Bangkok had sought permission to remove this U.S. serviceman from Thailand from the Thai officials on 11 June, the Thai police inquiry officer, CAPT Santi, was advised that he would receive instructions from his superiors for a postponement and that MSGT Walker would not be turned over at this time. Nevertheless, on 18 August, CAPT Santi again requested the deliverance of the American serviceman to him. In the opinion of the American authorities, it was "deemed probable that if Walker is released to the inquiry officer that he will immediately forward the charges to the prosecutor with a recommendation for prosecution." Apparently, this discussion over a postponement of the proceedings was misinterpreted by the Thais as a U.S. refusal to turn the accused over to the Thai authorities, a matter which received considerable adverse press coverage. "Local newspapers of 18 and 19 August carried prominent articles concerning the case all pointing out that U.S. authorities had refused to deliver Walker and that a second request had been made."2

The following aspects of the case were expounded by the Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn in a press interview on 20 August 1969:

...He came here and was stationed in Thailand. He had a friend who had a child here in Thailand. This Master Sergeant promised to look after the child and he later adopted it....He loved the child dearly....He loved to play with the child....He liked to toss it in the air, then catch it. He tossed it in the air two or three times. Then he missed the child and it fell on the floor. Since it was a very small child, it was killed by the fall. He was very unhappy and he cried. Then he drank a whole bottle of liquor, plain and without soda. Reporter: But...we have a picture of the baby's body and it looked very horrible. Thanom: Oh, that happened after he had been drinking and was drunk after the baby died....He had been drinking so heavily that he was out of his senses. It was then that he did what is reported to the baby's body....Reporter: What action will be taken in this matter? Thanom: Under international law, this case would have to be heard in a Thai court. The American authorities

1. 7/13AF SJA Bangkok Thailand 200358Z Aug 69.
2. Ibid.; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69, citing a translation of an article from the Thai Rath newspaper dated 18 Aug 69.
have informed the Chief of Staff that he will be turned over any time he is needed. They raise no objections whatsoever.  

On 23 August 1969, MSGT Walker was delivered to the Udorn Police Station, where it was "determined that the police had received no directions to delay the proceedings from the National Police Department. With the Provincial Chief of Police, they proceeded to the Provincial Chief Prosecutor's office where the police file was turned over to the Chief Prosecutor." Trial was set for 4 September 1969, and MSGT Walker was released on a bail of 300,000 baht. When MSGT Walker was admitted for a psychiatric evaluation on 25 August, the Director of the Somdet Choa Praya Hospital at Thon Buri, Thailand, stated that a period of two to three weeks would be needed. Accordingly, the Thai legal advisor to COMUSMACHTAI, Judge Wongse, visited the Chief Public Prosecutor at Udorn in attempt to get a postponement. Agreeing to a postponement, the Chief Public Prosecutor advised that "he had not completed his review of the file but had found defects therein and would request the police to reinvestigate."  

During September, pretrial maneuvering continued. Although there was substantial evidence to indicate that MSGT Walker mutilated the body in a state of temporary psychosis after the child had been accidentally killed, various "efforts of U.S. officials to obtain jurisdiction of the matter have been unsuccessful. Recent Thai press coverage has, after a long quiet period, stirred the matter up considerably and has, in effect, ruined any chance of obtaining jurisdiction over SGT Walker." Subsequently, on 22 September 1969, MSGT Walker was arraigned on a charge of premeditated murder, a plea of not guilty was entered, trial was set for 9 October 1969, and a new bail bond was posted.  

1. 7/13AF SJA Bangkok Thailand 220436Z Aug 69.  
2. 7/13AF SJA Bangkok Thailand 230545Z Aug 69.  
3. 7/13AF SJA Bangkok Thailand 280819Z Aug 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.  
4. Point Paper, J73, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Oct 69, Subj: Special Problems in the Exercise of Thai Criminal Jurisdiction (Cases of Sergeants Walker and McClain).  
5. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69; 7/13AF/SJA/Bangkok Thailand 130500Z Sep 69; 7/13AF SJA Bangkok Thailand 221010Z Sep 69; 7/13AF SJA Bangkok Thailand 290928Z Sep 69.
Hearings in the case of MSGT Walker were conducted at the Provincial Court House in Udorn, Thailand, on 9 and 31 October and 12 and 24 November 1969 with more still to come.1 One new development occurred when the public prosecutor subpoenaed two airmen who were then stationed in the United States. Although the American Embassy in Bangkok recognized:

...that U.S. is under no legal obligation to return the airmen to Thailand, it is our judgment that U.S. interests would be best served if airmen were to appear at Walker's trial. Inevitable publicity on Walker case would probably play up the absence of Huston, whose role as key witness has been previously alluded to in press. This would have an adverse affect on Thai/U.S. relations in criminal jurisdiction field. We also believe it would ruffle feeling of local police and judicial officials elsewhere in Thailand to detriment of working relations between local Thai and U.S. officials, already subject to strain.2

Furthermore, under Thai criminal procedure, the ex parte statements of these two witnesses could be used against Walker, if they did not appear at the trial. "Failure to produce the witnesses would place U.S. Government in poor position in future cases to insist on a U.S. defendant right to confront the witnesses against him (this right being incorporated in the 16 June 1966 Exchange of Notes on Trial Safeguards)."3 As a result, these witnesses were made available by the USAF.4

The fourth and fifth trial sessions in the case of MSGT Walker were held during December 1969. Since the prosecution had not finished presenting its case by the end of the year, the sixth trial session was scheduled for 20 January 1970.5

2. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 14585/301147Z Oct 69.
3. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69.
5. 7/13AF SJA Bangkok, Thailand 120815Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; 7/13AF SJA Bangkok, Thailand 220345Z Dec 69.
Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction Over U.S. Civilians

(U) After 10-1/2 months of pre-trial confinement, Mr. Rueben D. Wynn was brought to trial in a Republic of Vietnam court on the charge of murder. An employee of a U.S. Army contractor corporation, Mr. Wynn was tried by the Vietnamese on 20 May 1969. He was found not guilty of willful murder but guilty of negligent homicide, and was sentenced to 18 months' confinement. Pretrial confinement of 10 1/2 months applies toward sentence. ¹

Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over U.S. Civilians in Vietnam

(Ç) At the end of 1968, no decision had been reached as to whether a court-martial, trial by the Vietnamese, or trial by a District Court in the United States would dispose of the charges against "C. A. Branum, a U.S. civilian employee of Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc., a U.S. -invited contractor performing solely in support of U.S. mission in Vietnam, for his part in the larceny and illegal disposition of some $150,000.00 worth of U.S. Government property."² In January 1969, however, SECSTATE advised the American Embassy in Saigon that the U.S. Department of Justice, apparently in a reversal of its prior decision not to accept the Branum case, had inquired whether "certain possible witnesses in Branum case are actually available for trial in Federal Court outside of Vietnam."³ In the end, on 27 February 1969, Mr. Branum departed Vietnam in the custody of U.S. military police for Travis AFB, where he was to be taken into custody by U.S. Marshals for trial in a U.S. District Court in California.⁴

(Ç) On 13 March 1969, SECSTATE informed the American Embassy in Saigon that the State Department "has reviewed its policy concerning requests for GVN waivers of jurisdiction and has determined that modifications are required to permit use of courts-martial to deal with serious currency cases."⁵ The conclusions reached during this review follow:

1. 7AF TSN AB RVN 230850Z May 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. SECSTATE 5621/132259Z Jan 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
4. SECSTATE 27734/202331Z Feb 69; AMEMBASSY Saigon 3405/220930Z Feb 69; CG USARV Long Binh RVN 47968/240240Z Feb 69; DA 898583/ 251806Z Feb 69; CG USARV LBN RVN 271028Z Feb 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
5. SECSTATE 38849/131720Z Mar 69.
...first, policy statement of March 13, 1967 will remain in force; second, in all cases waiver requests should continue to be made only where important interests of justice require trial by court-martial; third, with regard to currency cases, waiver requests should be made in the serious cases involving large currency offenses if GVN declines to prosecute; fourth, further efforts should be made to improve administrative measures presently in effect to frustrate and deter illegal currency transactions, including effective steps to increase use of deportation and exclusion procedures; and fifth, greater efforts should be made to persuade GVN to prosecute those subject to its jurisdiction who commit crimes in Viet Nam....¹

The next significant case concerning jurisdiction was that of a Mr. Glenn Thomas Fitze, a U.S. citizen and a former employee of a U.S. contractor in Vietnam (RMK-BRJ). In July 1969, military authorities in Vietnam proposed to exercise court-martial jurisdiction over Mr. Fitze for the alleged murder of another U.S. civilian, Mr. Wayne M. Whitacker, aboard a USG (U.S. Government) barge used by the contractor in dredging operations, on 28 March 1969. Before MACV could proceed with such a court-martial, however, the State Department had to grant permission to seek a waiver from the GVN and the waiver had to be actually received; therefore, the American Embassy in Saigon asked the State Department on 20 July for "appropriate guidance as soon as possible for responding to MACV," which was requesting permission to seek a waiver in this case.²

"Commission of crime on USG owned barge," observed CINCPAC on 23 July 1969, "provides possibility of indictment in U.S. District Court under special maritime and territorial criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. (Title 18, USCA, Secs. 7 and 1111 pertain)."³ Accordingly, he suggested that COMUSMACV give consideration to this "possibility if GVN waives jurisdiction."⁴ The next day, SECSTATE advised that his department was "exploring with Department of Justice possibility assertion U.S. special maritime jurisdiction."⁵

1. Ibid.  
2. AMEMBASSY Saigon 14602/200450Z Jul 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.  
3. CINCPAC 230135Z Jul 69.  
4. Ibid.  
5. SECSTATE 122632/241959Z Jul 69.
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The alleged murder took place on a barge moored in a branch of the Mekong River along the Vinh Long airfield. At this point, the Co Chien River is navigable and subject to the ebb and flow of the South China Sea. On the basis of this information, supplied by the American Embassy in Saigon, and the U.S. nationality of the two men, the Justice Department tentatively determined in August that the U.S. special Maritime Jurisdiction applied. 1 During the following month, DOD and the Department of Justice engaged in discussion of the Fitze case without reaching any final decision. 2

Although "extremely reluctant to do so" because of jurisdictional problems—for instance, the Justice Department decided "that prosecution of Fitze in continental U.S. would not be desirable"—SECSTATE, on 15 November 1969, gave authorization to the "Embassy to request waiver GVN jurisdiction for purpose initiation court-martial proceedings if repeat if MACV still wishes bring charges in court-martial." 3 In the end, as the American Embassy informed SECSTATE on 5 December 1969, "COMNAVFORV has made determination not to proceed with court-martial of Fitze. COMNAVFORV believes cases such as this should be handled with greater dispatch in the future." 4 SECSTATE concurred in this belief, the appropriate Vietnamese officials were notified of this decision, and the case was considered closed. 5

In contrast to the Fitze case, the one involving Mr. Anthony N. Simonaro was swiftly and satisfactorily handled in September 1969. A civilian of American nationality and employed by the Dynatelectron Corporation at Ban Me Thuot, Mr. Simonaro was charged with the wrongful possession of marijuana and opium, as well as the sale of marijuana to military personnel. Upon request, the State Department granted permission to seek a waiver, which was granted by the GVN, thus permitting the U.S. military authorities in Vietnam to proceed with a trial by general court-martial. 6

1. AMEMBASSY Saigon 15808/060825Z Aug 69; SECSTATE 135694/131506Z Aug 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
2. AMEMBASSY Saigon 18994/190744Z Sep 69; SECSTATE 159888/192131Z Sep 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
3. SECSTATE 192867/151944Z Nov 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69.
4. AMEMBASSY Saigon 24189/050815Z Dec 69.
5. SECSTATE 204319/091546Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
6. AMEMBASSY Saigon 17870/031015Z Sep 69; SECSTATE 149607/042144Z Sep 69; AMEMBASSY Saigon 18047/051025Z Sep 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.

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MACV requested permission, the American Embassy advised SECSTATE on 8 November 1969, to seek a waiver from the GVN in the case of Mr. James F. Wills, an American citizen employed as an automobile salesman for a firm under contract with the Vietnam Regional Exchange, for flagrant currency manipulation violations. Twelve days later, SECSTATE informed the American Embassy that the "Justice Dept interested in possibility prosecution of Wills in U.S. for bribery of Post Office official."1 As Calendar Year 1969 ended, the Wills case was still under consideration by the Department of Justice, and MACV had indicated "that venue in CONUS is desirable if Justice decides to prosecute."2

1. SECSTATE 195198/201928Z Nov 69; AMEMBASSY Saigon 22441/080840Z Nov 69; CINCPAC 110310Z Nov 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct and Nov 69.
2. AMEMBASSY Saigon 24117/041000Z Dec 69; AMEMBASSY Saigon 25208/270630Z Dec 69; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.