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F. E. JANNEY
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Assistance
Logistics and Administration

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME I
1969

Prepared by the Historical Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII
1970

TOP SECRET
ADMIRAL JOHN S. McCAIN JR.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
FOREWORD

(U) My area of responsibility, the Pacific Command, is the largest of seven unified U.S. military commands. It is an area beyond the West Coast of the Americas that encompasses 85 million square miles. It reaches from the Bering Sea in the north to the region of the South Pole. It stretches past the island state of Hawaii, across the Pacific to Guam and the Philippines. It continues over the South China Sea beyond Vietnam and Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. From the northern regions along the coast of Asia it extends southward past the Soviet Union and Japan, past Okinawa and Taiwan, to Australia and New Zealand. Those 85 million square miles cover about 40 percent of the earth's surface.

(U) The mission of the Pacific Command is to defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean area and to support U.S. national policy and interests throughout the Pacific, Far East, and Southeast Asian areas. The overall mission includes the providing of military assistance to the countries of Asia, to help them protect themselves from external aggression and internal subversion.

(U) The major potential source of danger in the Western Pacific is Communist China. While the motivations and intentions of Communist China's leaders are matters of conjecture, their capabilities can be fairly accurately measured. Another major problem confronting United States interests is the formidable political and economic influence and growing military power of the Soviet Union in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. North Vietnam and North Korea are current examples of violently nationalistic communist leadership. Both are aggressors and both seek through overt and covert insurgency the overthrow of legitimate, legally constituted governments.

(U) The importance of security in the Pacific cannot be overemphasized. We must be aware of the continuing global threat which our country faces.
from the ambitions, goals, and activities of the communist world. Only a firm, positive posture on our part, backed by adequate military capabilities, can assure the security of this country, and with it, that of the Free World.

(U) To defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean and to support U.S. national policy and interests throughout the Pacific, the Far East and Southeast Asian areas is a mission carrying great responsibility. It is not an easy mission. No one expects it to be. The mission is being accomplished, however, by many men and women, in many different places. They are serving courageously and with valor on the field of battle. And they are doing a humanitarian thing to help the people of South Vietnam retain the right to decide their own future without outside coercion. I am proud of these men and women who guard 24 hours each day the ramparts and heritage of a free land and a free people given us by our Nation's founders.

JOHN S. MCCAIN, JR.
Admiral, United States Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific
(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the standpoint of CINCPAC. Additionally, the required annual report preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS to the extent that major decisions and directives of the JCS concerning the PACOM may be determined by historians of the JCS without research in the records of the PACOM. This 1969 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As in the case of previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those connected with international crises and those peculiar to a joint command. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and achievements and omits "detailed" activities of subordinate unified commands or of Allied nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history is organized in the same manner as previous histories, primarily in line with the objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and the planning for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) This year's history is published in four volumes: Volume I - Chapter I; Volume II - Chapters II and III; Volume III - Sections I - V.
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Chapter IV; and Volume IV - Sections VI - X, Chapter IV. A glossary and an index for the complete history is included in Volume IV only. Pagination is complete within each volume rather than running consecutively throughout the four volumes. As in previous years, the annual histories prepared by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are included as Annexes A and B, respectively.

(U) The CINCPAC Command Historian, Colonel J. R. Johnson, USA, under the supervision of Colonel William C. Harrison, Jr., USAF, Secretary of the Joint Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, planned and published the 1969 CINCPAC Command History as required by CINCPAC Staff Instruction 5750.1D of 20 August 1968. Colonel Johnson personally researched and wrote Chapter IV with exception of Sections V - IX.

(U) Members of the CINCPAC Historical Branch assisted the Command Historian in the preparation of the history. Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, as Senior Historian, researched and wrote Chapters II and III and Sections V and IX of Chapter IV. In addition, he provided technical guidance and shared his professional expertise when and where required throughout the preparation of this history. Mrs. Polly Tallman, Assistant Historian, prepared Chapter I and Sections VI - VIII of Chapter IV and prepared the pictorial layout for the history.

(U) Miss Maggi M. Kaonohi, Clerk-Stenographer of CINCPAC Historical Branch, typed the manuscript in final format. Mrs. Mary Jane Garrett, CINCPAC Librarian, compiled the index. Senior Chief Yeoman C. J. Curry, USN, who also compiled the glossary, Chief Yeoman William A. Hendrixson, USN, and Yeoman Second Class Judy G. Ege, USN, proofread the final manuscript and performed the many other tasks connected with readying the volumes for the printers. Master Sergeant John F. Stevenson, USAF, Shop Supervisor, Graphics Section, JO412, and his successor, Draftsman First Class Mateo V. Garrovillas, USN, supervised the preparation of all graphics for this history. Lithographer First Class Edward A. Donlin, USN, Reproduction Unit Supervisor, JO412, and Staff Sergeant Leonard L. Powell, USAF, Reproduction Device Expert, JO412, handled the expeditious printing of the draft manuscript which facilitated staff coordination. Finally, the immeasurable support rendered by the CINCPAC staff is greatly appreciated.

J. R. JOHNSON
Colonel  USA
CINCPAC Command Historian

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(U) ... In the Pacific we are facing the whole gamut of threats, both active and potential, that the communists have at their disposal. A glance at the map shows that, of the communist nations in the world, the four which present threats to Free World security—Communist China, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and North Korea—border the Western Pacific.

We must be aware of the continuing threat which our country faces from the ambitions, goals, and activities of the communist world. This is a real threat and the stark truth is that we must recognize it if we are to keep the peace. Only a firm, positive posture on our part, backed by adequate military capabilities, can assure the security of this country, and with it, that of the Free World.

We have had many "trouble spots" across the globe since VJ-Day in 1945, a day we thought would bring peace to the world. But what may be surprising to many is that there have actually been some one hundred "shooting wars" during that period, and countless additional "incidents" and "crises."

The Pacific has not especially been an area of tranquility and peace during this period. There have been a dozen major trouble spots along the eastern arc of Asia, from Korea in the northeast to the Indonesian archipelago.

The greatest safeguard to contain such flare-ups is to provide the strong and constant influence of our deterrent capability and our military commitments throughout this uncertain and restive area.

Deterrence requires the capability of projecting military power where it is needed, when it is needed, and to the degree of force that might be directed by our government. To put it very simply, we must maintain the ability to arrive on the spot, in strength, and promptly. And it is also vital that any potential troublemaker knows that we have this capability.
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In an area as vast as the Pacific Command, our deterrent posture demands a high degree of mobility and a carefully planned deployment. It calls for a flexibility and a versatility that allows for discriminating application of military force.

Finally, we must have adequate strength in forces and weapons, for in some areas in this world that is still the only language that is fully understood and respected.¹

¹. Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC, before the National Alcoholic Beverage Control Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, 11 Nov 69.

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SECTION I - UNITED STATES FORCES DURING 1969

PACOM-Wide Military Strength

As redeployment of forces from Vietnam began, military personnel strength in the PACOM diminished for the first time in recent years. Overall strength decreased by almost 75,000. Comparative strengths by Service were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>1 Jan 69</th>
<th>31 Dec 69</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>465,602</td>
<td>455,533</td>
<td>-10,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>285,721</td>
<td>256,665</td>
<td>-29,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>126,011</td>
<td>95,094</td>
<td>-30,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>173,729</td>
<td>169,636</td>
<td>-4,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,051,063</td>
<td>976,928</td>
<td>-74,135</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The major areas of concentration of military personnel and dependents and the changes during the year are indicated in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Dependents</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31 Dec 69</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>31 Dec 69</td>
<td>Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>11,153</td>
<td>+ 433</td>
<td>11,092</td>
<td>-1,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>63,110</td>
<td>- 5,682</td>
<td>50,335</td>
<td>-4,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>39,362</td>
<td>- 2,060</td>
<td>39,001</td>
<td>-5,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>63,824</td>
<td>+ 1,051</td>
<td>7,030</td>
<td>+1,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>24,386</td>
<td>- 1,744</td>
<td>20,899</td>
<td>-3,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryukyus</td>
<td>51,666</td>
<td>+13,399</td>
<td>32,401</td>
<td>+3,073</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>8,942</td>
<td>+ 42</td>
<td>5,593</td>
<td>- 650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>42,444</td>
<td>- 2,717</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>-4,120</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>477,352</td>
<td>-55,123</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>+ 16</td>
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</table>

The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM.

1. Figures furnished by J12.
Hereafter cited as PACOM Digest Nov. 69.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC (CINCPAC). CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned to the accomplishment of his missions. The mission of CINCPAC, in brief, terms, is as follows: To maintain the security of the PRC and defend the United States against aggression through the Pacific Ocean, to support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States and develop and deploy armed forces in accordance with directives of higher authority. The general areas of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations in the Pacific Ocean, including the islands therein, the Bering Sea, the eastern Indian Ocean area, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia.

2. CINCPAC exerts operational control of assigned forces through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established). CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. Military Advisor/Representative to the following organizations:
   a. SEATO Council, U.S. Military Advisor
   b. ASEAN Council, U.S. Military Advisor
   d. Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee, Member and Principal Adviser on military defense matters to the U.S. Ambassador.

3. PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:
   b. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) - commands forces of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific.

The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for accomplishing their respective missions and tasks as assigned by CINCPAC. They are subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Area Command (CINCPAC), whose mission is to command and control the forces of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force in the Pacific.

4. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNITED COMMANDS:
   a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUSFOR). The USFK is responsible for the defense of South Korea.
   b. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUSFOR Japan). The USFJ is responsible for the defense of Japan.
   c. United States Taiwan Forces (USTF), commanded by Commander United States Taiwan Forces (COMUSFOR Taiwan). The USTF is responsible for the defense of Taiwan.

The Secretary of Defense has directed CINCPAC to designate a Single Senior Military Representative in each country or area within the Pacific Command where U.S. military personnel are on duty. The Single Senior Military Representatives are:

- Korea: Commander U.S. Forces, Korea
- Japan: Commander U.S. Forces, Japan
- Taiwan: Commander U.S. Forces, Taiwan
- Philippines: Commander U.S. Forces, Philippines
- Thailand: Commander U.S. Armed Forces, Thailand
- Indonesia: Commander U.S. Armed Forces, Indonesia
- Australia: Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Australia

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 7.
SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES
FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

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<th>Rank</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
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<tr>
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<td>GEN</td>
<td>John H. Michaelis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR USFK</td>
<td>LT GEN</td>
<td>Robert N. Smith</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spec Ass't/BROK ML Aff</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Livingston N. Taylor</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHPROVMAAG Korea</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Arthur H. Adams</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spec Ass't/Army</td>
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<td>Abram V. Rinehart</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>Spec Ass't/Army</td>
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<td>William L. Glassgow</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>Spec Ass't/Army</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>James G. Hill</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>LGEN</td>
<td>George E. Rives</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>Spec Ass't/Army</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>William A. Pichler</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>Spec Ass't/Army</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>James D. Kemp</td>
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<td>David S. Ryan</td>
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<tr>
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<td>George P. Steele, Jr.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spec Ass't/Army</td>
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U.S. TAIWAN DEFENSE COMMAND

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<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>YADM</td>
<td>John L. Chew</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>EGEN</td>
<td>John A. Desportes</td>
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<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Lawrence F. Daniel</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Clifford M. Beaton</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>James P. Mahone</td>
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<td>COL</td>
<td>William F. Jung</td>
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<td>Carl S. Baker</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Gerald C. Gross</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
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<td>Lazar H. Rennub</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>William T. Rapp</td>
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<td>CDR Taiwan Patrol Force</td>
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U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

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<td>Creighton W. Abrams</td>
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<td>CDR USAMV</td>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>William B. Brooks</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>George B. Maxey</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
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<td>William E. Colby</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
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<td>Elias C. Townsend</td>
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<td>Thomas J. Harbison</td>
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<td>Richard P. Shaker</td>
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U.S. FORCES JAPAN

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<tr>
<td>SJS</td>
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<td>Wesley C. Franklin</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS JI</td>
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<td>Eugene C. Murphy</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>CDS JI</td>
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SOURCE: PACOM Digest No 969, p. 17.
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<td>Deputy CG, USAV</td>
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<tr>
<td>BGEN</td>
<td>LT GEN</td>
<td>Paul E. Pugh, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>commander 7th Air Force</td>
<td>CGS/Aide</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>Commander 3rd Air Div</td>
<td>LT GEN</td>
</tr>
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<td>CG XXIV Corps</td>
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<td>MAJ GEN</td>
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<td>See Personnel Staff Listing under Military Assistance Advisory Groups</td>
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<td>Area Joint Commanders</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION</td>
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<td>MAJ GEN</td>
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<td>Autrey J. Maroun, USA</td>
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<td>James C. Stanfield, USMC</td>
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SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 18.
# U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups

## Far East Region - Key Personnel

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<thead>
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<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Agency/Country</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>George B. Pickett, Jr., USA</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Group, Philippines</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>William F. Seith, USAF</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Group, Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACMS Plans and Programs</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Charles W. Hill, Jr., USA</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Group, Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACMS Admin/AG</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ch, Army Sec</td>
<td>COL</td>
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<td>William R. Easton, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ch, Air Force Sec</td>
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<td>Gordon W. Lake, USAF</td>
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<table>
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<th>Agency/Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>COL</td>
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<td>U.S. Central Defense Assistance Office, Japan</td>
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<td>ACMS JI</td>
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<td>ACMS 12</td>
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SOURCE: J12
# CINCPAC Component and Subordinate Unified Command Staff Personnel

**As of 31 December 1969**

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**Source:** J12
## MAAG Personnel - Pacific Command

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*As of 31 December 1969*

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**Source:** J12
# AVAILABLE FORCES

**As of 1 November 1969**

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**MAJOR AUGMENTATION FORCES WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE IN EMERGENCY**

### SOURCE:
PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 5.
Hereafter cited as PACOM Digest May 69.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

As of 1 November 1969

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 22.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR UNITS

AS OF 1 MAY 1969

SOURCE: PACOM Digest May 69, p. 23.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR UNITS
As of 1 November 1969

QUANG TRI MAG 39
HMM (2) S 4 CH46
VMO 18 OV-10A
6 B-1C 13 UH-1E
3 D-13

CAM RANH BAY
VP (L) DET (1) 11 P3

CHU LAI MAG 12
HMS (1) 2 T-2A
1 C1H7B
VMA (3) 60 A4
12 AGA
MAG 13
HMS (1) 1 C1H7B
3 T-2A
VFA (3) 45 F4B/1
VW DET (1) 1 WC12H

UTAPAO
VP (L) DET (1) 3 P3

VUNG TAU
NA (L) (1) 30 UH-1B

BINH THUY
VA (L) (1) 14 OV-10

HUE/PHU BAI MAG 39
HML (1) 24 UH-1E
HMM (1) 2 CH46A
26 UH-34 D
HMS (1) 1 C1H7B
HMM (2) 38 CH53A

DANANG MAG 11
HMS (1) 1 C1H7B
11 T4A
VAP DET 2 RA3D
VMA (AW) (2) 24 A6A
VMOA (1) 15 F4B
VMOA (1) 9 E3A
VFW (1) 9 R4D
VQ DET 6 E10H
1 EP3B, 3 EA3B

MARBLE MT MAG 18
HMS (1) 1 C1H7B
2 CH53A
HMM (2) 57 CH46
HMM (1) 23 CH53
23 CH46A/D
HML (1) 20 UH-1
VMO (1) 3 UH-1
10 OV-10
14 AH-1C

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 23.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS

AS OF 1 MAY 1969

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE
FLYING & MISSILE UNITS

As of 1 November 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION II - KEY PERSONNEL CHANGES IN 1969

CINCPAC

(U) On 13 January ADM McCain suffered a "slight stroke," which required him to be hospitalized in Hawaii and then in the Bethesda Naval Hospital in Maryland. During his absence GEN Joseph J. Nazzaro, USAF, CINCPACAF, served as CINCPAC. GEN Nazzaro was the senior officer of CINCPAC's component command commanders. ADM McCain returned to command on 13 February.

Chief of Staff

(U) LT GEN Claire E. Hutchin, Jr., USA, was replaced by LT GEN Michael S. Davison, USA, on 30 August. GEN Davison had formerly been Deputy CINC and Chief of Staff for CINCUSARPAC.

Political Adviser

(U) Ambassador H. L. T. Koren replaced Minister Robert A. Feary, who departed on 24 June. Ambassador Koren reported on 7 September.

Research and Engineering Consultant

(U) Dr. Theodore S. George reported for duty on 24 July.

Deputy Chiefs of Staff

(U) MAJ GEN Chesley G. Peterson, USAF, replaced MAJ GEN Royal B. Allison, USAF, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations on 28 June. MAJ GEN Peterson was formerly CINCPAC's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

(U) RADM Frederick E. Janney, USN, replaced RADM John N. Shaffer, USN, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics and Administration on 23 June.

Joint Secretary

(U) COL William C. Harrison, Jr., USAF, replaced COL A. W. Matthews, USAF, on 23 June. COL Matthews became Chief of the Plans and Policy Branch of the Plans Division, Hq CINCPAC.
UNCLASSIFIED

Assistant Chiefs of Staff

Personnel

(U) COL Douglas P. Frazier, USA, replaced COL John C. Barney, Jr., USA, on 12 May. On 26 August COL Frazier was replaced by COL Parkhurst C. Hough, USA.

Intelligence

(U) MAJ GEN George J. Keegan, Jr., USAF, replaced MAJ GEN Chesley G. Peterson, USAF, on 28 June.

Logistics

(U) BGEN Carl R. Duncan, USA, replaced BGEN John D. McLaughlin, USA, on 21 October.

Plans

(U) RADM Lloyd R. Vasey, USN, assumed the office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans on 9 September, replacing RADM Walter L. Curtis, USN.

Heads of Independent Offices

Performance Evaluation Group

(U) COL Christopher R. Keegan, USA, replaced COL Edgar R. Poole, USA, as Chief of the Performance Evaluation Group on 28 May.

Staff Judge Advocate

(U) CAPT D. W. Douglass, JAGC, USN, replaced CAPT Richard J. Hogan, Jr., USN, as Staff Judge Advocate on 29 October.

Public Affairs

(U) COL A. J. Lynn, USAF, replaced COL Thomas P. Coleman, USAF, as Public Affairs Officer on 26 June.

Protocol

(U) COL William C. Airheart, USMC, replaced COL Gilbert D. Bradley, USMC, as Protocol Officer on 5 July.
Surgeon's Office

(U) RADM John S. Cowan, MC, USN, was replaced as CINCPAC Surgeon on 31 July by RADM Frank B. Voris, MC, USN.
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KEY CINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL

MICHAEL S DAVISON
LT GEN USA
CHIEF OF STAFF

H L T KOREN
AMBASSADOR
POLITICAL ADVISER

J E MCGOWAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS ADVISER

THEODORE S GEORGE
RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING CONSULTANT

CHESLEY G PETERSON
MAJ GEN USAF
DEPUTY C/S
PLANS & OPERATIONS

FREDERICK E JANNEY
RADM USN
DEPUTY C/S
MIL ASST/LOG/ADMIN

WILLIAM C HARRISON, JR
COL USAF
JOINT SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED

28
## AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF CINCPAC STAFF DIVISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISION</th>
<th>1 January 1969</th>
<th>31 December 1969</th>
<th>PERCENT CHANGE</th>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Deputy CofS, Plans and Operations</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Deputy CofS, Military Assistance, Logistics, Administration</td>
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<td>Administrative Office</td>
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<tr>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>PACOM ELINT Center</td>
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<td>Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>201</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Joint Administrative Office serving the Chief of Staff and the two Deputy Chiefs of Staff.
** Included 1 CAS; no CAS on 31 December 1969.
SECTION III - ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION

Proposed Reduction of CINCPAC's Staff

(C) CINCPAC reviewed the declining force level in the PACOM and on 16 August he indicated to the JCS that he thought he could reduce his staff by about 10 percent without jeopardizing his assigned mission. He said that the FY 71 Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) submission would reflect this reduction.

(U) Further review of the workload related to the drawdown of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, however, and certain other matters that had increased related staff work, caused a reevaluation and a decision to cancel these requirements to reduce the staff by a specified arbitrary percentage. All were admonished to insure that their JTD submission reflected only the minimum manning required to perform essential functions. Long vacant positions, for example, were to be carefully screened to insure that they were essential.

Command and Control Functions Realigned in the Operations Division

(PS) In December 1968 an ad hoc study group of CINCPAC staff members was directed to devise a plan for developing an emergency capability for the CINCPAC to act personally for the JCS in executing the Single Integrated Operational Plan and also to conduct an overall review of the CINCPAC Command Center and its alternates to make recommendations for improving their capability. The first task is discussed in Section IX - Operations of U.S. Forces, later in this chapter.

(C) The second task was completed on 30 June when the study group published their final report. The group recommended means for improving the readiness of the CINCPAC Command Center and its alternates to discharge their assigned functions, both the nuclear and non-nuclear operations over which CINCPAC exercises, or may be required to exercise, operational command. The group noted that while it was important to give more emphasis to

1. CINCPAC 160215Z Aug 69.
2. JOL/Memo/503-69, LT GEN Davison, USA, JOI, Hq CINCPAC to RADM Janney, USN and MAJ GEN Peterson, USAF, Hq CINCPAC, and Distribution List, 30 Sep 69, Subj: Reduction of CINCPAC Staff.
3. Ltr, CINCPAC to Distribution List, 30 Jun 69, Subj: CINCPAC Command and Control Study (U).
4. Ibid.
attaining and maintaining an expanded, responsive, professionally trained and organized CINCPAC Command Center to serve the national strategic policy of deterrence, caution had to be exercised to insure that in so doing "we do not derogate support of combat operations in Southeast Asia."

(S) A number of organizational changes were effected as a result of the study. The realignment provided a capability at the CINCPAC Command Center at Camp Smith to perform all the functions required by a full spectrum of conflict. Thus CINCPAC had the capability of executing contingency and general war plans from Camp Smith plus the flexibility of relocating when he elected to do so rather than more or less automatically relocating at some specified Defense Condition (DEFCON) for general war operations to the Kunia Alternate Command Facility, as implied by existing continuity of operations plans. The Command Center at Camp Smith was to be continuously manned with five trained, professional operations teams, which would provide the capability to perform all command center functions required by the JCS and the Defense Department.

(S) Essentially, this realignment exchanged and regrouped more closely related functions and personnel under the Operations Division Deputies for Current Operations and Command and Control and transferred Command Center and Operations Division command and control functions from the Deputy for Operational Analysis to the Deputy for Command and Control. Remaining functions under the Deputy for Current Operations were to be "largely related to the day-to-day operations staff actions associated with the responsibility for control of operations in progress, and related policy matters, but without regard to level of conflict." 2

(S) Resulting functions under the Deputy for Command and Control were to be largely related to monitoring, checking, and verifying progress of operations in the execution phase, information processing for operations in progress without regard to level of conflict, and CINCPAC executive agent emergency responsibilities for notification, alerting, readiness implementation, warning and execution of contingency plans and the General War Plans.

(S) The goals of the realignment were to place the whole responsibility for the somewhat specialized management of the operation of the CINCPAC command centers under the Deputy for Command and Control as single manager to provide better command center command and control support for CINCPAC, his Service component command commanders, and the National

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., Encl I, Section II, pp. 1-2.
Command Authorities throughout the full spectrum of conflict; to provide more efficient training and standardization for battle staff teams; and to integrate operations security and nuclear operations and safety functions with other operations staff and related policy matters under a single manager at Camp Smith, providing a broader staff capability for the full spectrum of conflict and smoother transition to staff actions required in advanced readiness and emergencies.¹

**Special Operations Center, Pacific (SOCPAC) Disestablished**

The Special Operations Center, Pacific (SOCPAC), which had been activated on Okinawa on 1 November 1965,² was disestablished by CINCPAC effective 302400Z Jun 69.³ The SOCPAC had been the CINCPAC unconventional warfare planning agency under the Operations Division. It had been assigned three primary functions⁴—unconventional warfare plans, unconventional warfare exercises, and Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) support—which were not clearly related to the assigned functions of the Operations Division. All CINCPAC plans, including those for unconventional warfare, were the primary responsibility of the Plans Division rather than the Operations Division. As CINCUSARPAC had been made the CINCPAC executive agent for unconventional warfare training exercises, these exercises were his responsibility, not that of the Operations Division. As existing CINCPAC plans placed JUWTF requirements upon the subordinate unified and Service component command commanders, the JUWTF support responsibilities belonged to them rather than to the CINCPAC Operations Division.⁵

CINCPAC authorized the transfer of CINCPAC unconventional warfare planning from the Operations Division to the Plans Division effective 1 July.

1. Ibid., which also contains other details of the reorganization.
3. Ltr, CINCPAC to Distribution Lists I and II, 25 Mar 69, Subj: Disestablishment of Special Operations Center, Pacific Command (SOCPAC) (U).
4. Joint Memorandum, J5/Memo/047-69, 18 Feb 69 and J3/Memo/0314-69, 13 Feb 69, from MAJ GEN Elwood, USMC, J3, Hq CINCPAC and RADM Curtis, USN, J5, Hq CINCPAC, to LT GEN Hutchin, Chief of Staff, Hq CINCPAC, Subj: UW Planning Responsibilities.
5. J3A6/Memo/0090, from SOCPAC (J3A6), Hq CINCPAC, to the J3 Deputy for Special Operations and Analysis (J3A), Hq CINCPAC, 29 May 69, Subj: SOCPAC Historical Report (U).
1969. 1 CINCUSARPAC was to continue as the CINCPAC executive agent for unconventional warfare exercises, with CINCPAC's Operations Division 2 to retain cognizance over unconventional warfare exercise matters within the CINCPAC staff. The command responsibility for JUWTFs remained that of the subordinate unified command commanders with the Service components tasked to provide qualified personnel for the Headquarters JUWTF staff.

Military Assistance Training Functions Transferred to Plans Division

(U) A proposal to study the matter of consolidation of all CINCPAC Military Assistance functions into a single staff directorate was made by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations on 26 August. 3 He pointed out that staff organization associated with the Military Assistance Program was virtually unchanged since the establishment of the unified command in 1957 and involved eight major staff elements (J1, J3, J4, J5, J6, J71, J72, and the MAP Data Center). He noted that there were about 100 Military Assistance designated billets in the JTDs. Instead of a fragmented organization he recommended establishment of a single staff directorate with elements for plans and policy, programs, analysis and evaluation, and support. 4

(U) CINCPAC's Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans studied the matter and reported in September. 5 He observed, generally, that consolidation "offers no distinct advantage from either a management or resources point of view." 6 He noted that U.S. Military Assistance programs in the PACOM were unlike those of other unified and specified commands—the programs were more closely integrated with those for U.S. Forces. He thought that formation of a special directorate could tend to "gun barrel its vision as well as separate it

1. JO1/Memo/057-69, LT GEN Hutchin, USA, Chief of Staff, Hq CINCPAC, to Staff Distribution, 24 Mar 69, n.s.
2. Early in July the Operational Analysis and Reports Branch, which had been J3A5, was changed to J3A3, the Operational Studies and Analysis Branch, to fill the organizational gap left by the SOCPAC disestablishment. (J3A3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.)
3. J3/Memo/1694-69, MAJ GEN H. M. Elwood, USMC, J3, Hq CINCPAC to JO1, Hq CINCPAC, via JO2 and JO3, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Aug 69, Subj: Consolidation of Military Assistance Functions into a Single Staff Directorate.
4. Ibid.
5. J5/Memo/1074-69, COL John Dibble, Jr., USA, Acting J5, Hq CINCPAC to JO1, Hq CINCPAC, via JO2 and JO3, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Sep 69, Subj: Consolidation of Military Assistance Functions into a Single Staff Directorate.
6. Ibid.
from considerations of other staff agencies. "1 He found that while advantages in such a new organization might accrue to parts of the Operations Division, disadvantages would accrue to parts of both the Plans and Logistics Divisions. He recommended, however, that the MAP training functions and responsibilities be reassigned from the Operations Division to the Plans Division.2

(U) The change the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans recommended was the one adopted. The MAP Training Branch (J3A2) was redesignated as J534 effective 15 January 1970. There were no changes in the MAP/MASF training functional responsibilities or procedures or in the physical location of the branch.3

CINCPAC Joint Logistics Council Established

(U) On 18 October the CINCPAC Joint Logistics Council was established "to function as an advisory body to the CINCPAC on logistics matters of Unified Command interest."4 The council was to "review joint aspects of PACOM logistical matters and recommend to CINCPAC necessary action to insure the most effective, efficient, and economical utilization of available assets; and will conduct such studies and/or reviews of PACOM logistics as recommended by the council."5 The council was to be chaired by CINCPAC's Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics; other members were to be the principal logistics officers of CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, the Commanding General FMFPAC, and a permanent secretary-recorder. Normally meetings were to be held in conjunction with those of the CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board.6

Western Pacific Transportation Office Procedures Continued

(0) CINCPACAF proposed to CINCPAC in June that space allocation procedures for ocean shipping in the PACOM be revised, wherein CINCPAC's component command commanders would revert to pre-1965 procedures and submit requirements through Service channels instead of through the Chief, Western Pacific Transportation Office.7 CINCPAC asked all of his component

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 162133Z Jan 70.
4. CINCPAC Instruction 4600.1, 18 Oct 69, Subj: CINCPAC Joint Logistics Command (JLC).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
command commanders for their comments. After receiving and considering them, CINCPAC replied to CINCPACAF that existing procedures would be continued. He cited the sustained "high level of shipping activity in PACOM; continuation of hostilities in RVN; potential shortages of shipping capability in event of FREIGHTER CARGO implementation; and excellent total management of shipping experienced in WESTPAC since 1965" as his reasons for his decision. \(^1\) CINCPAC would review the matter periodically, however.

Transportation Office, Australia, Proposed

\(^{(S)}\) In mid-1968 the CINCPAC Representative Australia called attention to difficulties experienced in commercial transportation activities in Australia and recommended the transfer of commercial transportation functions to a military transportation office in Sydney. \(^2\) Among other things, some items of supply and personal property shipments on occasion went astray in warehouses in various Australian port areas. Some of these were not recovered for long periods (up to nine months). \(^3\)

\(^{(S)}\) CINCPAC proposed to task CINCUSARPAC to establish an office to provide common user transportation services \(^4\) in Sydney to be under the operational control of the CINCPAC Representative Australia and jointly manned by Army, Navy and Air Force personnel. CINCPAC asked for the comments of his component command commanders before calling a meeting to discuss the matter. \(^5\) All concurred in principle but both CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF raised objections to the concept of joint Service manning. \(^6\)

\(^{(S)}\) After a meeting at CINCPAC's headquarters on 19 May it was concluded that responsibility for manning and funding to provide transportation and management services be tasked to CINCUSARPAC, although the scope of such responsibilities and services was to be expanded in line with certain CINCUSARPAC recommendations, \(^7\) and that the CINCPAC Representative

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPACREP/Australia 030615Z Mar 69.
3. Ltr, CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC, 29 Aug 69, Subj: Trip Report - Australia.
4. For all Defense Department activities in Australia except the Naval Communications Station at North West Cape, which had been renamed for former Prime Minister Harold E. Holt.
5. CINCPAC 170444Z Apr 69.
6. CINCUSARPAC 300556Z Apr 69, CINCPACFLT 030313Z May 69, CINCPACAF 090356Z May 69.
7. CINCUSARPAC 300556Z Apr 69.
Australia should exercise coordinating authority rather than operational control. Navy responsibility for the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station remained unchanged. CINCPAC tasked CINCUSARPAC to conduct a survey in Australia before establishing the activity. This was accomplished in August.

(U) In September the CINCPAC Representative advised that clearance was required from the Government of Australia prior to establishment of the office. CINCPAC asked CINCUSARPAC to maintain liaison with CINCPAC's Political Adviser to facilitate actions to obtain the political clearance. He explained also that the Table of Distribution for the office had to have official approval before overtures would be made to the Australian Government. The new office had not been established by the end of the year.

Joint Secretariat Reorganized

(U) The Joint Secretariat was reorganized in 1969 in line with recommendations made by JCS manpower study groups. Various functions were realigned only; there continued to be five branches. The Headquarters Support Branch comprised the supply-services and the graphics-reproduction functions. The Headquarters Document Branch contained the mail and records and the classified records section. The Headquarters Personnel Branch contained Navy/Marine, Army, and Air Force sections and the travel section. The Headquarters Administration Branch consisted of the awards and decorations, area clearance, and security sections. The Historical Branch remained separate.

(U) The new JTD reflecting these changes became effective 1 July, but certain of the realignments had been effected in March. New numerical codes were assigned, as necessary.

1. CINCPAC 142352Z Jun 69.
2. CINCPACREP/Australia 110226Z Sep 69.
3. CINCPAC 070513Z Oct 69.
5. CINCPACNOTE 5400, 3 Mar 69, Subj: Realignment of Branches within the Joint Secretariat; dissemination of information relating to.
SECRET

J73 Redesignated Staff Judge Advocate

(U) On 1 July 1969, the effective date of annually revised Joint Tables of Distribution, the Legal Affairs Office was redesignated the office of the Staff Judge Advocate. This change in title was in line with changes in designation of certain legal affairs activities within the Navy Department. There was no change in the mission or responsibilities of the CINCPAC staff office.

Establishment of CINCPAC Representative, Singapore Proposed

(6) CINCPAC believed that redeployment from Singapore by the British, U.S. reductions in Southeast Asia, Soviet interest in the area, and the threat of increased Communist influence indicated a need for U.S. interest in Singapore. He therefore had recommended in July 1969 that the possibility of establishment of a CINCPAC Representative be studied. The U.S. military offices already assigned could either not handle the additional duties or were staffed by officers lacking the required seniority or experience.

(6) In response to CINCPAC's request the Chairman of the JCS, on 2 August, recommended a low key approach and suggested that creation of a CINCPACFLT Representative might be more appropriate. A study had been conducted by CINCPACFLT and officers of the Royal Australian and New Zealand Navies for joint operation of certain Singapore facilities. If such a joint operation were established, the senior U.S. Navy officer could be designated as the CINCPACFLT Representative. The matter was under study by the Navy at the end of the year. 1

Defense Communications Planning Group Liaison Office Disestablished

(U) The Defense Communications Planning Group Liaison Office at CINCPAC's Camp Smith headquarters was disestablished 30 June 1969. A requirement no longer existed for a full-time liaison officer. CINCPAC recognized a need, however, for close and effective liaison on all sensor activities and designated a member of his staff as central point of contact. The officer was in CINCPAC's Operations Division in the Operational Plans Branch. 2 The

1. Point Paper, J12, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Oct 69, Subj: Establishment of CINCPACREP, Singapore (S).
2. J3B13 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
Defense Communications Planning Group Liaison Office had been activated on 12 Dec 66.¹

JTD Proposed for CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus

A proposal to establish a Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) for the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus was forwarded from U.S. Army Ryukyus by letter on 13 December 1968.² CINCUSARPAC had considered the matter favorably and endorsed it on 21 January 1969.³

When the matter was studied by CINCPAC, however, he decided that a separate JTD was not required and so informed CINCUSARPAC on 6 March.

The Commanding General, U.S. Army Ryukyus had proposed a concept for establishment of a JTD for the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus to provide personnel assets to accomplish the representative's joint planning responsibilities with the High Commissioner of the Ryukyus. The proposed organization was to include a Joint Planning Staff, a Joint Service Labor Organization, and the office of the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus.⁴

CINCPAC explained his reasons for not favorably considering the proposal. He noted that his representative in the Ryukyus was charged with preparing plans in support of only three CINCPAC OPlans. Those plans had been completed, limiting further action to annual review and updating. CINCPAC said that he considered establishment of a JTD planning activity to coordinate uni-Service contingency plans to be unnecessary. He stated that plans and programs, base requirements planning, land retention matters, and activities related to the control of civil disturbances requiring coordination by the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus "should be developed through the Area Joint Committee."⁵ The Joint Service Labor Committee had been established to be responsible to the High Commissioner. Although the Joint Service Labor Committee, as provided for by the High Commissioner, operated

2. CINCPAC 060138Z Mar 69.
3. Ibid.
4. J5122 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
5. Ibid.
under the aegis of the CINCPAC Representative, "the function should continue to be performed through staffing arrangements currently in existence." 1

(C) CINCPAC concluded:

...Functions of the CINCPACREPs in various areas of the PACOM are collateral to other primary duties and staffing requirements are borne by the sponsoring Service rather than being provided on a JTD. Based on information available in this headquarters, functions of the planning staff outlined in the proposed concept can continue to be accomplished with Service assistance.... 2

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
SECTION IV - COMMAND FACILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS AND
COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

CINCPAC Representative Guam/Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(U) CINCPAC changed the title of his representative in the Mariana
Islands in May to Representative of the Commander in Chief Pacific in Guam
and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The short title was CINCPAC-
REP Guam/TTPI. The CINCPAC Representative continued his additional
duties as Commander Naval Forces, Marianas.

(U) The new title more accurately described the representative's area
of responsibility and was expected to facilitate liaison with the High Commiss-
sioner of the Trust Territory. In this regard, CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI was
asked in May to initiate arrangements to establish a liaison office on Saipan to
facilitate such liaison.

Consolidation of USTDC and MAAG China Proposed

[S] In 1969 CINCPAC studied the possibility of combining the Taiwan
Defense Command and the Military Assistance Advisory Group China. In this
regard, he sent a team to conduct a management study during September. (This study replaced previously programmed manpower management studies
of the two organizations.)

[S] Commenting on the completed feasibility study, COMUSTDC stated
that he agreed with the conclusions of the study "as pertains to the feasibility
of consolidation. From a management viewpoint such a consolidation is
desirable."4

[S] The Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, China stated
that "there are hard core dissimilarities in functions and missions which do
not support the feasibility of a merger."5

1. CINCPACSTAFFNOTE 5400, 5 Jun 69, Subj: CINCPAC Representative,
Mariana Islands; change in title of; CINCPAC 100338Z May 69.
2. CINCPAC 100338Z May 69.
3. Admin CINCPAC 220009Z Aug 69.
4. COMUSTDC 120420Z Dec 69.
5. Ltr, CHMAAG China to CINCPAC, 19 Sep 69, Subj: Management Study of
TDC and MAAG, China.
In reaching a decision, CINCPAC considered many facets of the situation. Previous modifications of the Taiwan Strait Patrol (discussed in the Operations of U.S. Forces section of this chapter), reduction of the Military Assistance Program for China (see Chapter II), and the downgrading of the role of the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group as a result of a consolidation, if approved, would imply a lessened U.S. interest in the Republic of China. In light of these considerations and subsequent indications of apprehension in the higher levels of the Chinese government with respect to the future course of U.S.-Chinese relations, CINCPAC considered it advisable not to pursue the idea of consolidating the two organizations. 1

Relocation of the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center

The relocation of the PACOM Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Center (PEC) from Fuchu, Japan to Hawaii had been under consideration since November 1967. In May 1968 CINCPAC determined that the PEC should relocate to Hawaii. A survey of potential relocation sites on Oahu revealed that facilities at Hospital Point, Pearl Harbor were available but that extensive renovations were required. 2 On 29 January 1969 the Secretary of the Navy requested an allocation of $410,000.00 from FY 68 Defense Department Contingency Funds to renovate the Hospital Point facilities. A funding decision was held in abeyance, however, pending actions related to other base reduction studies concerning bases in Japan.

In August the Defense Intelligence Agency determined that the PEC should be moved prior to 1 July 1970 as part of the 10 percent reduction in intelligence production resources overseas required for FY 70. 3

Faced with the fact that approximately 13 months would be required for Hospital Point site preparation after the funding citation was received, CINCPAC initiated a search for a temporary site for the PEC to meet the 1 July deadline for the move. He concluded that the CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility at Kuna represented the best alternative.

To expedite matters, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 17 November that they authorize the relocation of the PEC to Kuna, provide assistance in obtaining $115,000.00 for PEC moving expenses and modification of Kuna to permit PEC occupancy, and press for an early funding decision on

1. CINCPAC 100239Z Jan 70.
3. DIA message 141840Z Aug 69, cited in J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
Hospital Point to move the PEC into a permanent site as soon as practicable.\(^1\) On 18 November CINCPAC asked his Kunia Space Allocation Review Board to allocate approximately 16,000 square feet for temporary use by the PEC.

On 11 December 1969 the Secretary of Defense approved the transfer of $475,000.00 appropriated under Public Law 90-513 to "Military Construction-Navy" to provide for the immediate rehabilitation and alteration of facilities required by the PEC at Hospital Point.\(^2\) His rationale in providing contingency funds was based on the conclusion that the requirement to relocate the PEC prior to 30 June 1970 could not await normal funding procedures.

On 16 December the Officer in Charge of Construction on the project provided, among other things, an estimated completion date of 10 March 1971. CINCPAC therefore called a series of conferences at his Camp Smith headquaters to find ways to speed construction to permit partial PEC occupancy by the end of FY 70. Revised completion date and cost estimates were expected in January 1970.\(^3\)

**Airborne Command Post Activities**

A most serious and drastic change in the status of CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) occurred on 31 December 1969. The ABNCP (BLUE EAGLE) had completed at that time a total of 39,938 hours flying time since it began operation on 4 October 1965.\(^4\) But on 1 January 1970 the ABNCP was placed in a ground alert status. The action resulted from an Air Force Project 703 cost reduction proposal that was approved by the JCS on 5 September.\(^5\)

CINCPAC had responded by strongly recommending that the ABNCP be retained in an airborne alert status. He dispatched numerous messages on the subject in September, October, and November.\(^6\) But the final JCS decision was received in December.\(^7\) The JCS said that they had:

...taken a position with the Secretary of Defense that there is a valid requirement for maintaining a continuous

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1. CINCPAC 170923Z Nov 69.
2. Quoted in DIA 06367/160018Z Dec 69.
5. J3C1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
6. CINCPAC 081925Z Sep; 1220011Z, 170430Z, 192202Z and 291023Z Oct 69; and 030506Z, 282342Z, and 282343Z Nov 69.
7. JCS 06835/231959Z Dec 69.
airborne alert posture for the ABNCPs of USCINCEUR and CINCPAC; however, because of the severity of Project 703 budget constraints, it is necessary to accept the risks associated with placing these ABNCPs on ground alert. They will be reconsidered for return to a continuous airborne alert posture when fiscal constraints permit.

While in ground alert status, the ABNCPs were authorized to maintain the capability to assume a continuous airborne alert for up to 60 days during periods of increased tension. The JCS were to be notified immediately following a CINC's decision to initiate a continuous airborne status.

Personnel strength related to ABNCP operations was reduced also. At the beginning of 1969 the ABNCP was operating with eight battle staff teams (73 personnel). The 23 December message from the JCS authorized no more than 60 battle staff team members until approximately 1 April 1970, and then a further reduction to not more than 40. It was expected that the 60 personnel on board after 1 January would operate on a shift type schedule, which would be required until sleeping accommodations became available about 1 April 1970.

Both prior and subsequent to the grounding of the command post, however, there continued to be modifications made to the aircraft and their capabilities, most of which were good, in CINCPAC's opinion. One modification CINCPAC found objectionable was the installation of AN/ARC-96 VLF/LF equipment. The JCS had decided that it was necessary to equip CINCPAC's ABNCP with this capability as part of the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Net. CINCPAC objected principally because of the added weight the equipment would put in the aircraft and the resulting decrease

1. Following a study conducted at the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the JCS concluded, among other things, that the commanders of unified and specified commands controlling SIOP forces should have highly survivable command and control systems, even in the face of a no-warning attack and that an airborne alert status with a general/flag officer aboard would be "the best method of insuring this survivability." (J3 Brief No. 238-69, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Oct 69, of JCS Memo 648-69 of 17 Oct 69, Subj: The National Military Command System.)
2. JCS 06835/2319592 Dec 69.
3. Ibid.
4. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 68.
5. JCS 06835/2319592 Dec 69.
6. Very low frequency/low frequency.
in aircraft range. He also thought the ARC-96 had only marginal capabilities for PACOM operations.¹

(5) CINCPAC believed that the JCS failed to recognize CINCPAC's unique ABNCP operations. He did not have available alternate airfields or communications vans every 500 or 1,000 miles, as other commanders had in the CONUS or Europe. Of even more significance was the fact that the BLUE EAGLE range would be reduced² so that, of regular destinations, only Guam could be reached any time of year and Yokota, Japan when winds were favorable. Kadena on Okinawa, Clark in the Philippines, and Andrews in Washington would be out of range, without refueling—a prospect CINCPAC did not consider realistically practical as tankers were already considered a critical resource.

(6) Nevertheless, the JCS notified CINCPAC that ARC-96 installation should continue³ and equipment was in use in two aircraft by the end of 1969. Testing the effect of the installation was expected to continue, however.

(6) In a plan to periodically review all communications procedures and facilities for the ABNCP, CINCPAC established a joint communications working group in July composed of representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT.⁴ In their first meeting, held on 31 July, the group identified several specific radio and teletype procedures to improve the efficiency of operations.⁵ Long-range items the group identified for further study included the establishment of a dedicated high frequency network for the sole support of the ABNCP, the identification of exclusive high frequency radio frequencies, the status of the AUTOVON procedure capability for an ABNCP, and the minimum communications requirements to certify an ABNCP as available for its primary mission.⁶

(6) Among specific modifications completed in 1969 were installation of teletype for both classified and unclassified messages directly between the

1. J3 Brief No. 63-69, Hq CINCPAC, of 1 Apr 69, of JCS SM-170-69 of 24 Mar 69, Subj: AN/ARC-96 Modification for CINCPAC ABNCP.
2. There were already some undesirable range restrictions because of the use of EC-135P aircraft, which needed a heavy load of demineralized water on takeoff; CINCPAC wanted to trade off with some CINCSAC ABNCP aircraft that used different engines and would have provided him with more range. (Point Paper, J3Cl, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 69, Subj: EC-135C Aircraft for the CINCPAC ABNCP (U).)
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
airborne battle staff and the ABNCP ground facility, and a telephone connection between the ABNCP and the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command.

Among proposed improvements was a FONE patch circuit to permit the ABNCP to make a single call radio transmission to be received by PACAF high frequency single sideband stations, where it could be extended to PACFLT stations for relay to Navy forces.

Another proposed change was made after the decision to ground the ABNCP was firm. CINCPAC tasked the Commander, 14th Naval District to provide additional communications to support the ground alert posture, to include voice (wire and radio) and teletype communications, and to extend the Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network (JCSAN), for which CINCPAC had asked JCS permission.

Plans for the next generation airborne command post continued, meanwhile. CINCPAC representatives met with those of other commanders regarding the development of requirements and facilities for the advance airborne command post, which would probably be contained in some other aircraft, a C-5A or other follow-on aircraft for the EC-135 in use in 1969. Attention at this stage was concentrated on the automatic data processing system.

CINCPAC Command and Control Briefing Team

In December CINCPAC sent a special Command and Control Briefing Team to 10 commands in the PACOM. The briefing provided a clear

1. J3Gl History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
4. J626 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; CINCPAC 082315Z Jan 70.
6. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69. Commands visited were COMUS Japan/5th AF, COMUS Korea/EUSA, COMUSTDC, 7th Fleet, 13th Air Force, and the 313th, 314th, and 327th Air Divisions.
restatement of CINCPAC command relationship policy. Although there was some evident disagreement among COMUSTDC and COMUS Korea staff members with existing command arrangements, there was no doubt that the arrangements were understood. \(^1\) Staffs collocated with COMUSTDC and COMUS Korea, under the operational control of the Service components, were somewhat frustrated by being responsive to requirements of both the subordinate unified command commander and the Service component command commander. In the case of COMUS Korea there was the added complication of the CINCUNC role.

\(^{45}\) The issue that concerned COMUSTDC and COMUS Korea was their function with respect to control of U.S. forces, since under normal peacetime conditions there were no U.S. forces placed under their operational control. The briefing team explained that under the Peacetime Emergency Situation Command and Control Procedures Instruction, COMUSTDC and COMUS Korea would not ordinarily be intermediate commanders and that during peacetime emergency situations subordinate unified commanders should be concerned with monitoring the situation, making recommendations to CINCPAC as appropriate, and being prepared to assume operational control of forces should CINCPAC so direct. \(^2\)

\(^{56}\) During discussion periods following the briefing, it became apparent that the frequency of incident reporting concerned many staff officers. There was general feeling that the new PINNACLE reports could be a burden to communications and command centers. The team responded that it was essential to receive early fragmentary information as soon as possible, with follow-on reporting as additional facts became known. \(^3\)

PACOM Reporting Improvement Program

\(^{(U)}\) In late 1968 the JCS directed that CINCPAC conduct a command and control reporting study. The use of the term "command and control," however, seemed to have an inhibiting effect on the representatives of CINCPAC's component and subordinate unified command commanders, principally because of Service usage connotations. The study was concerned with manual as well as automatic reporting. Its objective was to reduce and avoid unnecessary duplication and redundancy of reporting, information flow, and processing. CINCPAC thought that the name of the study should be changed to reflect its ultimate objective more clearly. He recommended calling it the PACOM

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1. Ibid.
2. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
3. Ibid.
UNCLASSIFIED

Reporting Improvement Program (PRIP). The JCS concurred in the change.  

(U) An ad hoc study group, convened by the JCS in Washington, recommended that the Joint Operational Reporting System (JOPREP) be replaced by a broader, more responsive reporting structure, the Joint Reporting Structure (JRS). The JRS was intended to coordinate and consolidate information requirements of the National Command authorities, the JCS, the Services, and the Defense Agencies.  

(U) Later in the year the JCS sent CINCPAC general instructions for the JRS and tasked him to develop a supporting unified reporting structure by 1 October 1970. This was to supplement, not duplicate, the JRS. Existing procedures were to remain in effect until 1 August 1970. As JCS requirements were in line with the direction the PACOM Reporting Improvement Program was taking, no significant changes were required in CINCPAC's effort. A PACOM ad hoc committee was planned for January 1970 to draft a unified reporting procedure. This committee's formation was postponed on 28 October 1969, however, as almost all preliminary work could be accomplished at the CINCPAC staff level or by correspondence with PACOM Service component or subordinate unified command commanders.  

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Computer Rental Procedures

(U) A March 1969 report by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense on their audit of CINCPAC management of ADP equipment noted certain deficiencies in fiscal controls and recommended that procedures be established to assure that the Government paid only for computer services received. Significant changes from the former method provided for the certification of invoices by CINCPAC's Command and Control System Group and the taking of credits due to the United States at the time invoices were processed for payment.

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1. CINCPAC 190041Z Feb 69.
2. JO2C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
5. Ibid.
6. Ltr, CINCPAC to Distribution List, 28 Oct 69, Subj: PACOM Reporting Improvement Program.
7. The Deputy Comptroller (Internal Audit).
8. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jun and Jul 69.
SECRET

(U) In another matter, CINCPAC rented time on his CALCOMP Plotter to the University of Hawaii for scientific and technical plots. The University used 166 hours of plotter time in 1969.\(^1\)

**Computers for the World-Wide Military Command and Control System**

(U) Throughout most of 1969 a decision regarding uniform computer requisition was still not made by the Secretary of Defense.\(^2\) The hope remained that such a decision would permit acquisition of uniform equipment that would insure compatibility and standardization, worldwide.

\[\text{(C)}\] Among facilities that were awaiting a decision in this matter, two were in the PACOM: a request by CINCPACFLT for a responsive automatic data processing (ADP) system and a CINCPAC request for upgrading the Kunia ADP facility to make it compatible with the Camp Smith facility.\(^3\) Both had hoped to get an IBM 360/50, which had become the de facto standard in the PACOM. On 19 August, however, the Secretary of Defense denied interim sole source acquisition authority for the two computers.\(^4\) He based his denial for Kunia on the fact that there were 1,000 hours of unused time a month at that facility. He noted that CINCPACFLT was scheduled for early receipt of a World-Wide Military Command and Control System standard computer.\(^5\)

\[\text{(C)}\] On 5 November the Secretary finally approved the minimum acquisition of 54 computer systems during FY 71, 72, and 73. Optional additional procurement of 53 computers during the same period was also authorized.\(^6\) The Air Force was charged to select the computer and to be the single Service training manager and the single Service logistics manager.\(^7\)

\[\text{(C)}\] PACOM headquarters were excluded from the minimum acquisition

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1. JO2C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
4. JO2C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

SECRET

49
(34 systems), however. The IBM 360, therefore, would be retained for at least two more years as the standard computer within the PACOM. 

ADP for CINCPAC's Subordinate Unified Command Commanders

(U) COMUSMACTHAI requested an IBM 360/20 computer in February. This would upgrade his punched card capability for general staff support and would increase the capability for data processing applications by the MAC-THAI intelligence staff. CINCPAC wanted to establish a collocated command and control and intelligence data handling system processing facility in accord with JCS policy. The Chief of Naval Operations approved the request in July.

(U) The Chief of Naval Operations had previously approved COMUSMACV's request to upgrade his IBM 360/50H system.

(C) ADP requirements for COMUS Korea were also studied. In July COMUS Korea was tasked to prepare a statement of his data processing needs. At the end of the year the matter of choosing one of three alternatives for his use was under study by CINCPAC. One alternative was to establish a COMUS Korea computer system in Korea. A second was to establish a system in Korea to meet the needs of all U.S. activities in Korea. The third was to establish a system in Japan or Korea in which the needs of U.S. activities in Korea and Japan could be effectively combined.

Report on the War in Vietnam

(U) The Report on the War in Vietnam, through 30 June 1968, prepared by ADM Sharp (former CINCPAC) and GEN Westmoreland (former COMUSMACV) in 1968 was reviewed in Washington by the JCS before it was reprinted by the Government Printing Office. The JCS determined that certain parts

3. A 360/20 was delivered to Headquarters, COMUSMACV in February (JO2C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69).
4. JO2C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
5. JO2C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
6. JO2C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
7. JO2C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
of the still-undistributed report did, in fact, contain information that required security classification control. Accordingly, those copies printed by CINCPAC that were retained for record purposes were upgraded to SECRET. The rest were destroyed. The first week in April the Government Printing Office edition was released to the public. It received nationwide coverage and evaluation in the press.

(U) Admiral Sharp's portion of the report was printed substantially as it had been written. Several tables of data were deleted because of their classification; other changes were editorial and minor. There were substantial changes to GEN Westmoreland's report because, as he noted in his preface, the original report had been "couched in military terms which could be confusing to the general reader.... I have redrafted my original report in a form which I hope will be more understandable and useful to all who may be interested."

CINCPAC's Report on the War in Southeast Asia

(U) In November work began on a special operational report on lessons learned in the war in Southeast Asia, with special emphasis on Vietnam. It was to be a report on the war from CINCPAC's perspective. Work was assigned to an ad hoc special study group, under the cognizance of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations but composed of representatives of every division and separate staff office. Data for the period through 30 June 1970 was to be included, with the study ready for publication shortly after that date. Research by the many staff officers involved began in December to insure that all pertinent facets of operations were studied and analyzed prior to preparation of narrative topical overviews and the highlighting of lessons learned. Special emphasis was being given to command and control responsibilities and command relationships.

New Flag Mess Installed

(U) The joint tenancy of Camp Smith by CINCPAC and his headquarters staff and the staff of the Commanding General, FMFPAC continued. The CINCPAC staff was extended the use of clubs for both officers and non-commissioned officers.

(U) Until 1969, however, there was no dining facility suitable for entertaining the many distinguished guests that visited the headquarters. A new

flag/general officer mess was therefore installed in the headquarters building for that purpose. Seating about 40, the dining room was attractively appointed in colonial decor. For everyday activities, the mess served the ranking officers of the staff.

Admiral McCain entertains luncheon guests in the new CINCPAC Flag Mess.
SECTION V - CHANGES IN THE COMMUNIST THREAT DURING 1969

Changes in the Communist Threat During 1969

CINCPAC was principally concerned with four Communist countries in the Far East: the U.S.S.R., Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. The accompanying tables list summaries of ground, air, naval, and missile forces in those countries. Comparisons with CINCPAC Command Histories for previous years reveals an evolutionary growth and change in a number of areas.

In the northern part of CINCPAC's area of interest, it was noted that the U.S.S.R. had more than doubled its conventional forces in the Sino-Soviet border region in about three years, probably as a precautionary move against Chinese adventurism. This could also have been a contingency preparation for a preemptive strike on China's nuclear and missile production capability. There was no parallel buildup of Chinese ground forces, although some such forces had been deployed. It was not expected that basic differences would be resolved soon, nor was a diminution of hostility expected.

North Korea, being of strategic value to both powers in the event of a major confrontation, was expected to seek to remain neutral. Active involvement would have serious effects on North Korea. The pattern of infiltration activity by North Korea into South Korea reflected a great reduction in 1969, with only about a fifth as many such incidents as had been reported the year before. North Korea was not likely to receive the Soviet and Chinese aid and concurrence necessary for successful sustained aggression against the Republic of Korea.

North Vietnam's military establishment was in much better condition in 1969 than it had been the year before. After a year of freedom from U.S. air strikes, the North Vietnamese Army and Air Force had been expanded and the air defense system had been overhauled and refined.

1. Information for this section was taken from Point Papers, Hq CINCPAC, as follows: J2215, 17 Oct 69, Subj: Developments in Communist China; J2215a, c, undated, Subj: The Situation in Northeast Asia (U); J2212b, 4 Dec 69, Subj: NVN Air Defense/Laos Air Defense; and J2211c, 16 Dec 69, Subj: Military Situation in North Vietnam.
# Communist Far East Ground Strength

## USSR

**As of 1 July 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Field Units of Soviet Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Combined Army/Army Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Motorized Rifle Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Tank Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Airborne Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Artillery (Gun) Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Rifle Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Artillery Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 SS-1 (SCUD) Brigades</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Personnel:** 215,000

**Notes:**
- Does not include: (a) ground units assigned to territorial air defense (PVO); (b) coastal defense forces of Soviet Navy; (c) ground troops & support elements of the air forces; (d) internal security forces 7,900 to 15,600 and border guard troops 20,500 to 40,000.

## North Korea

**As of 1 July 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Army Group Divs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Infantry Divs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tank Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Antiaircraft Artillery Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Missile Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Infantry Divs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Artillery Divs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mortar Divs (HE - 160mm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Rocket Launcher Brigade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Personnel:** Army 356,000

**Security Forces:** 8,000

## China

**As of 1 July 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 ARMIES:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188 Infantry Divisions (FY: 11,710)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**21 Artillery Divisions:**
- 15 Field Artillery
- 3 Anti-aircraft Divisions
- 5 Armored Divisions
- 3 Cavalry Divisions (Security)
- 3 Airborne Divisions
- 21 Border Defense/His Divisions

**Railway Engineer Divisions:**

**124 Independent Regiments:**

**Personnel:**
- Army 2,179,000
- Security Forces 500,000

**Notes:**
- Includes 1 Infantry, 6 Tank, and 5 Cavalry, 26 border internal defense, 17 artillery, and 67 engineer, signal and service support.

## North Vietnam

**As of 15 Sept 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Vietnam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>99 Regular Forces (Note 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 Army Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 AAA Command (99 AAA regs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armored Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Artillery Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Independent Inf Regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Independent Eng Regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-40 Independent SAA units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-40 Independent Transportation Systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Personnel:**
- Regular Army 148,000
- Milizia 148,000

**Notes:**
1. Strength does not include approximately 174,500 more deployed outside of North Vietnam.
2. Estimated to consist of 1,000,000 Class I and 2,000,000 Class II.

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**Source:** PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 27.
## COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH

### FAR EAST & PACIFIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>USSR #</th>
<th>COMMUNIST CHINA</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
<th>NORTH VIETNAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBMARINES</strong></td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>DIESEL</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHORT RANGE ATTACK (OLD)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIGHT CRUISERS (MISSILE)</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIGHT CRUISERS (GUN)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS AND SUPPORT SHIPS</strong></td>
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<td>90,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>10,200</td>
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<td>337,800</td>
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---

### Notes:
- # AS OF 1 JULY 69
- * AS OF 30 JULY 69
- ** AS OF 30 SEPT 69
- \(^a\) Two in reserve
- \(^b\) Six in reserve
- \(^c\) Two in reserve
- \(^d\) Does not include personnel in Naval Aviation, Coastal defense, or training
- \(^e\) Does not include 26,000 personnel of Naval Air Force
- \(^f\) Possibly includes Naval Infantry and Coast Defense personnel

### Source:
- PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 30.
# SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR $^2$</th>
<th>CHINA $^2$</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA $^2$</th>
<th>NORTH VIETNAM $^3$</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMBAT AIRCRAFT</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Fighter (Day)</td>
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<td>1654</td>
<td>401</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Fighter (A/W)</td>
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<td>400</td>
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<td>210</td>
<td>1161</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Attack</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>155</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Light Bomber</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Medium Bomber</td>
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<td>Helicopter, Jet</td>
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<td>Helicopter, Prop</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>1311</td>
<td>1270</td>
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<td><strong>SUPPORT AIRCRAFT</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Transport, Light</td>
<td>164</td>
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<td>164</td>
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<td>Jet Transport, Medium</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Jet Transport, Light</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT</strong></td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL COMBAT SUPPORT</strong></td>
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<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>2952</td>
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**PERSONNEL STRENGTHS**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR $^2$</th>
<th>CHINA $^2$</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA $^2$</th>
<th>NORTH VIETNAM $^3$</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77,500</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>247,200</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>25,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not Estimated

**Includes 111 jet fighters, 4 light jet bombers, and 1 MiG 15 trainer in Communist China.

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 32.
# Summary of Communist Far East Missile Forces

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Type</th>
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<th>North Vietnam</th>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>244</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Coastal Defense</strong></td>
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<td>12-20</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>235</td>
<td>307</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Surface to Air</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-2</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>918</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-3</td>
<td>30 b</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-5*</td>
<td>21-35</td>
<td>126-210</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*as of 1 Jul 69*  
*as of 1 Jul 69*  
*as of 1 Jul 69*  
*as of 30 Sep 69*  

**Notes:**  
- a. Forty-two sites occupied intermittently or no history of occupancy. 4 training sites.  
- b. Fifteen sites occupied intermittently or no history of occupancy.  
- c. Chi Com SA-2 sites may consist of 3-5 launch sites of 6 launchers each.  
- d. Only a few are occupied; battalions frequently move between prepared sites. Estimated 35 to 40 battalions (three to six launchers per battalion).  

**Source:** PACOM Digest Nov 69, p. 34.
SECTION VI - U.S. BASE REQUIREMENTS OVERSEAS

Defense Department Study of U.S. Base Requirements in the PACOM

The Office of the Secretary of Defense continued in 1969 to try to reduce U.S. base structure, consolidate or eliminate facilities, and reduce and relocate units and manpower. A number of proposals from that office had been forwarded to CINCPAC by the JCS late in 1968. CINCPAC's comments in reply were outlined in the 1968 CINCPAC Command History. The position the JCS took was in complete support of the CINCPAC position, which had been considered in the preparation of their comments. Nevertheless, another study visit by members of the Secretary's staff was proposed for early in 1969. After several postponements, some partly based on the U.S. Ambassador to Japan's concern that such visits could lead to adverse political implications, the Secretary's Systems Analysis Deputy Assistant Secretary (Regional and Land Forces Analysis) for the Asian region led a group to Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii in May to discuss the issues in the previous proposals made by that office.

Their specific areas of interest centered on manpower data and manning documents; operating and support units including missions and functions performed, installation and facilities summaries, and descriptive data; and tenant activities of other Services and support requirements and cross-Service agreements. In Hawaii after their tour of the Pacific, members of the group "appeared to stress their views on the relative political sensitivity of bases..." While commenting that it would be premature to make any definite statements, the group leader said that in many cases the data tended to confirm the original proposals and that "other interesting possibilities" were discovered. He did not identify these new possibilities.

In September the JCS forwarded to CINCPAC the comments and recommendations made by the Secretary's study. CINCPAC was asked to

3. JS124 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
comment. CINCPAC stated in reply:

...CINCPAC recognizes the urgency for reducing US presence overseas and to limit budget and balance of payments expenditures and fully supports efforts toward accomplishment of reductions in these areas. However, such reductions must be the result of an orderly, coordinated analysis of requirements and must be weighed against the successful accomplishment of assigned missions. The OSD proposed reductions have not been prepared in conjunction with other ongoing force reductions such as redeployments, ten percent presidential overseas personnel reductions and project 703. Although major force posture is not seriously affected by the OSD proposals, implementation of Project 703 and NSSM 36 action as well as the OSD proposals would seriously degrade CINCPAC capability to accomplish assigned missions.

...The philosophy expressed throughout the proposals is that there is an overabundance of support personnel in the forward bases of the PACOM. This conclusion is based on application of an Air Force Model, the validity of which is contested by PACAF. Further, it has been arbitrarily modified and applied to all Services. Rationale for establishment of the proposed personnel reductions departs radically from established methods for establishing manpower requirements. A technically valid analysis is continuously performed by regular conduct of manpower surveys of personnel requirements in accordance with Service policies and guidelines. Actual on-site appraisal of facilities, missions, functions, and organization is required to arrive at valid manpower requirements of each installation. Another basic fallacy of the proposed model is that it excludes the requirements for support of foreign national mission personnel. For example support for these personnel is required in the areas of financial management, health examinations, security checks, administrative processing, industrial relations, job surveys and job supervision and training.

...Much of the study is based upon situations with respect to the Army that no longer pertain. Since January 1969, CINCUSARPAC has been pursuing an accelerated, in depth series of studies and actions directed towards realigning and refining the command structures of USARJ, USARYIS and the other USARPAC Subordinate Commands. In USARJ and
USARVIS, to the extent practicable, layering of headquarters has been eliminated, like missions consolidated, nice to have support dispensed with, and a dual staff/operational directorate structure implemented. As a result of these actions significant savings in personnel, money and materiel will be accomplished, but specifics will not be available until completion of all contemplated plans and actions.

...CINCPACFLT has initiated action in response to these other programs noted ...above and is now in the process of conducting detailed review of PACFLT organization structure and developing coordinated plans to (1) adjust base structure to provide adequate operational posture at a reduced cost, (2) balance operational, strategic and fiscal requirements with the objective of improving overall mission capability while concurrently achieving greater economies in utilization of available resources. Such action is in consonance with the objective of the proposals recommended by the OSD.  

CINCPAC then commented on specific OSD proposals. He basically non-concurred, except for actions that he had already taken or contemplated. He recommended that further action on the proposals be held in abeyance pending final implementation and evaluation of current reduction programs. CINCPAC then discussed the political and military impact the proposals could have:

...For all Services on Okinawa the DOD study envisions a reduction of 9610 military, 641 civilians and 9616 foreign nationals. The personnel savings represent a reduction of almost 14 pct of the total FY 69 DOD dollar impact to the Ryukyuan economy. It will mean a dismissal of over one-third of direct hire Ryukyuan employees. Additionally it could result in the loss of perhaps two or three thousand

1. CINCPAC 250401Z Sep 69.
indirect hire jobs as well, a matter not addressed in this study. Clearly, force and local hire reductions on the scale indicated would have major political and economic implications in this small, heavily base oriented island.

... (In the Philippines) The closing of Sangley Pt would have severe fiscal impact upon the province and city of Cavite which is heavily dependent on Sangley Pt with an estimated annual input into the local economy of 8M dollars. Unemployment exists throughout the Philippines and the local impact would be strongly felt at the GOP national level.

... The removal of the Navy from NAS Agana (Guam) would have an adverse impact on any future plans for the use of Guam for military purposes. Increased reliance on Guam military facilities could be required as forces are deployed from SEA and when Okinawa reversion conditions are resolved. Phaseout of Agana NAS would significantly limit the facilities available on Guam to accommodate these basing adjustments. 1

When the JCS commented on the OSD proposals, their remarks were in complete support of the CINCPAC position. 2 They non-concurred with all recommended actions that had not already been taken or contemplated because of the adverse effect they would have on mission requirements. They also commented that many of the proposals were based on invalid assumptions and incomplete consideration of the problem. 3 They recommended a comprehensive evaluation be made of the various force reduction and relocation proposals and their impact on U.S. commitments and the capability of U.S. Forces to fulfill them. They further recommended that if a decision were made in the future that further base or force reductions were necessary as a result of budgetary considerations, the Services, as managers of military resources, should be allowed to recommend where and how the force reductions were to be made. 4

Special State-Defense Department Study of Overseas Base Requirements in the 1970's

In 1968 a Special State-Defense Department Study Group was formed

1. Ibid.
2. J5 Brief No. 00285-69, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Oct 69, of JCSM-635-69 of 15 Oct 69, Subj: US Bases and Forces in Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines and Guam (U).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
to study U.S. overseas military base requirements and recommend an overseas basing system, with alternatives to support the U.S. global strategy through the next decade.¹

The completed study was forwarded by the JCS to CINCPAC for comment in March 1969. CINCPAC replied that the study was an excellent vehicle to launch more detailed studies, but that the study itself was not in sufficient detail to permit verification in all cases. He made a number of specific comments.² The JCS then commented on the study, basing their conclusions to some extent on CINCPAC's recommendations. They stated the study did not develop an optimum base system as sought by the terms of reference, but that it provided a point of departure for future studies of U.S. overseas basing systems and if it were used with current data it could be a useful reference document. They cautioned that it should not be used in isolation or as the sole basis for decisions because the basing systems developed in the study were designed to support a number of unrelated regional policy-strategy alternatives that were not derived from a world-wide strategy.³

United States Bases in Japan

CINCPAC continued his efforts to reduce U.S. bases in the PACOM in such a manner that U.S. military posture would not be too adversely affected. Of the 54 proposals affecting bases in Japan that had been presented to the Japanese Government on 23 December 1968,⁴ action was completed on 25.⁵ There were only 129 U.S. facilities in Japan at the end of the year. Almost all of the remaining items in the December 1968 proposal involved relocation of facilities at Japanese expense. Such actions posed problems with funding or real estate and rapid progress was not expected.

Both the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and CINCPAC believed that their program had worked out extremely well from the United States' point of view. Joint Committee actions and follow-up releases had occurred on the average of about three per month since the proposal was offered. Each action had

2. CINCPAC 0802452 Z Apr 69.
5. J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
been picked up favorably by the Japanese press, and while individual actions may not have had top headline importance, the cumulative effect of the press reaction had been to project the image of a reasonable U.S. side, willing to seriously address questions of base readjustment in a systematic and constructive way, rather than attempting to simply hang on to everything. 1

CINCPACFLT Base Restructuring Plan

(3) On 11 October CINCPACFLT forwarded to CINCPAC a proposal that had been submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations regarding base restructuring in response to a proposed budget cut in FY 71 base operations and maintenance funds. Various ship and support reductions or moves from Japan to the CONUS or Guam were proposed, but most subsequent attention centered on those proposals regarding transfer of MSC (coastal minesweepers) and MCS (mine countermeasures support ships). CINCPACFLT wanted to transfer the homeport of the MCS to the CONUS from Sasebo and retain the homeport of nine MSCs at Yokosuka. 2

(3) The Chief of Naval Operations approved the restructuring concept but disapproved the proposed retention of the MSCs in Yokosuka. He directed that one MCS be retained in Yokosuka and the MSCs be returned to the CONUS. On 7 November CINCPACFLT requested reconsideration of the MSC proposal. 3

(3) On 18 November CINCPACFLT submitted the base restructuring plan to CINCPAC for approval and included the retention of the MSCs in Yokosuka in the plan. 4 CINCPAC concurred 5 in the plan, noting that the reductions were budget forced and degraded PACOM force posture and military readiness in the Western Pacific. He advised CINCPACFLT that he would reclaim the JCS the decision by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(3) CINCPAC recommended to the JCS approval of the CINCPACFLT proposal, 6 pointing out that the loss of nine MSCs from the forward area would seriously degrade the PACOM mine countermeasures readiness posture. The PACOM reaction time to meet mine threat contingencies in the Western Pacific would be significantly degraded due to the excessive transit time of the MSCs from the CONUS, whereas the greater speed and endurance of the MCS

1. Ibid.
2. J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
3. CINCPACFLT 072354Z Nov 69.
4. CINCPACFLT 180313Z Nov 69.
5. CINCPAC 020443Z Dec 69.
6. CINCPAC 020444Z Dec 69.
would permit more rapid deployment from CONUS if needed to augment PACOM capabilities. As of the end of the year no decision had been received from either the Chief of Naval Operations or the JCS regarding the proposal or CINCPAC's reclamation.  

Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Japan

The matter of joint utilization of Iwakuni MCAS, Japan by the transfer of USAF functions and activities from Itazuke Air Base, Japan was under study by the CINCPAC staff at the beginning of the year. The CINCPACFLT feasibility study had concluded that the cost and time necessary to complete required facilities at Iwakuni made joint utilization of that base "operationally and economically infeasible." CINCPACAF and the CG, FMFPAC concurred in the CINCPACFLT conclusions.

The Government of Japan, however, continued pressure to terminate operations being conducted from Itazuke.

CINCPAC considered the study recommendations and other aspects of the basing problems in Japan. He considered significant the fact that base consolidation decreased dispersal capability in Japan and raised the level of vulnerability to enemy disruption of operations. CINCPAC agreed with the conclusions of the CINCPACFLT study--that joint utilization of Iwakuni was operationally and economically unfeasible.

Ryukyu Reversion to Japan - Weapons Storage and Manpower Restrictions

Despite all arguments from the military community, with CINCPAC having presented one of the most consistent and emphatic voices in opposition.

1. J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
3. Ibid.
5. J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
6. Ibid.

SECRET
it was agreed in 1969 by the United States that the Ryukyu Islands would be returned to Japan for administrative control.

(U) The Joint Communiqué published following the 19-21 November 1969 meetings of President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato outlined the conditions under which such administrative control would revert to the sovereignty of Japan. This communiqué was not the final agreement on Okinawa, but provided that the two governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for reversion.

(U) The U.S. Ambassador to Japan was designated the chief negotiator for the United States and for this task a special assistant to the Ambassador at ministerial level was assigned. This officer headed the Okinawa Negotiating Team. To ensure that the views of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS were known and adequately considered and to keep them informed on progress or potential problems in the negotiations, a senior military officer was assigned as the Senior Military Representative on the U.S. Okinawa Negotiating Team (USMILRONT). The Nixon-Sato communiqué provided that the primary forum for the negotiations would be the Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee.

(S) With administrative reversion, Japan would assume sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands and thereby acquire the fundamental responsibility for their defense as part of Japanese territory. It would be necessary to recognize valid Japanese national interests, and perhaps even make concessions where vital U.S. interests were not at stake. The major objective of U.S. Forces in Okinawa was the security of Northeast Asia and, in fact, the whole of the western Pacific and it was in this context that Okinawa made its major contribution. Japanese units introduced specifically for defense of Okinawa (unless they were also unconditionally committed to support of regional security), if used to displace U.S. units, would result in a net loss in overall security of the region.  

1. J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. Ibid.
COMUS Japan was responsible for joint planning with the Japan Self-Defense Force for implementation of agreed Terms of Reference for Okinawa. In this role, he was to coordinate with the USMILRONT and the High Commissioner of the Ryukyus those issues impacting on Okinawa reversion negotiations. COMUS Japan was to provide technical support to the USMILRONT and the High Commissioner. He was to keep both informed on all military contacts with the Self-Defense Forces that had an impact on the reversion. He was to request their representation in Joint Committee activities when it was appropriate. As CINCPAC's subordinate commander in Japan, he was tasked to keep CINCPAC informed of all activities relative to Okinawa reversion and when necessary forward unresolved issues between U.S. military representatives to CINCPAC for resolution.

1. Ibid.
The matter of possible ceilings being placed on manpower authorizations was also raised a couple of times during 1969. In June a joint State-Defense Department message requested that the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo inform the Japanese Government that redeployments to Okinawa and Japan would not involve any increase in either men or material over the levels existing pre-Vietnam.³ This appeared to imply the imposition of U.S. military manpower ceilings for the two areas.⁴

CINCPAC pointed out to the JCS that, in some cases, more sophisticated equipping demanded more manpower than was the case in pre-Vietnam.⁵ It was recommended that manpower ceilings for Okinawa and Japan, if required, be established on the basis of force requirements as stated by CINCPAC in his study of PACOM Near-Term Force Posture (FY 71) that had been furnished to the JCS in July 1969.⁶ Nothing further was heard of this matter and no further action taken by CINCPAC in 1969.⁷

The question of Okinawa strengths was raised again in August, however, this time by Messrs. Walter H. Pinkus and Ronald A. Paul, staff members of Senator Symington's Subcommittee on U.S. Security Commitments Abroad. CINCPAC was asked to furnish specific pre-Vietnam, current, and post-Vietnam strength figures for Okinawa.

CINCPAC provided the data to the JCS for delivery to the subcommittee members.⁸ Only pre-Vietnam figures (30 June 1964) and current (July

1. J5161 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
3. SECSTATE 097187/132316Z Jun 69.
4. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
5. CINCPAC 122334Z Jul 69.
6. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
7. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
8. CINCPAC 050230Z Aug 69.
1969) figures were provided. The 1964 figures were Army, 13,191; Navy, 3,512; Marine Corps, 16,798; and Air Force, 12,273; for a total of 45,774. The 1969 figures were Army, 15,187; Navy, 2,055; Marine Corps, 7,610; and Air Force, 18,127; for a total of 42,979. Post-Vietnam projections were not considered germane as they had not yet been approved by the JCS. In case a comparison were made to projected figures, however, CINCPAC cautioned that 1964 and 1969 figures represented units' varying percentages of authorized strengths while post-Vietnam figures would represent full authorized strengths of the units concerned. The figures for post-Vietnam would have been those in the July 1969 PACOM Near-Term Force Posture (FY 71) recommendations. ¹

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

The problems associated with the potential removal of U.S. bases from Japan and Okinawa (and perhaps from other countries) ² caused sustained military interest in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). Bases there instead of at more forward locations would seriously degrade existing U.S. capability, but would be better than no forward bases at all. The whole matter was most sensitive and was treated accordingly. Basic to the problem was the definition of the relationship to be established between the TTPI and the United States. These' political matters were beyond CINCPAC's purview, of course, but not beyond his interest. He believed that a permanent political association should be formed with military rights to certain lands retained.

The matter of land rights, therefore, received CINCPAC attention several times in 1969. As explained by the CINCPAC Representative Guam/TTPI:

...Discussion between Congress of Micronesia delegates and DOI /Department of Interior/ representatives have been recently terminated. It is understood that at the close of the negotiations that DOI made a unilateral offer to the Micronesian Congress to return all land in the TTPI to Micronesian control in return for an agreement that the TTPI would commit itself to a permanent political association with the U.S. The return of land to be time phased and with certain U.S. use options. It is also understood that DOI made clear that no one at the conference could guarantee U.S. offer.

1. Ibid.
Further, Micronesian reaction was to the effect that the offer would only be returning land that already belonged to the Micronesians. The definition of land to be returned was not defined by any of the negotiations.

The land mass of the TTPI is approximately 440,000 acres of which 16,760 acres or 3.81 percent is military retention land. About 14,000 acres of those retention lands are on Saipan and Tinian. When the above factors are considered in relationship to each other it seems apparent here that it would be completely unrealistic from a military standpoint to consider the return of retention land to the TTPI. It is recommended that CINCPAC make representation to higher authority that the factors cited make the offer of the DOI appear untenable from a U.S. military viewpoint. At least, these factors should be considered prior to any future negotiations with Congress of Micronesia delegates.

CINCPAC informed the JCS that he had informal information on the matter of the negotiations between the Micronesian delegates and Department of Interior personnel. He said that he was not aware of the details of the Under Secretary Committee's negotiating position or the precise demands of the Micronesians, but there appeared to be stipulations, concerning TTPI land, that it would be prudent for the U.S. Government to include in future negotiations on the political status of the TTPI. These were to:

- Preserve the right of eminent domain by the United States Government.

- Secure a reasonable period of time, possibly 5 years, prior to redesignation of any Military Retention Land in the TTPI.

In the matter of growing interest in the area, CINCPAC expressed concern regarding the increased number of visits and surveys by various agencies. He considered that if such were not adequately coordinated they could adversely impact on development planning relationships with the High

1. CINCPACREP GUAM/TTP 300619Z Oct 69.
2. CINCPAC 080433Z Nov 69.
Commissioner and the people of the TTPI generally. Accordingly, CINCPAC stated that the numbers of visiting personnel must be kept to a minimum and reiterated the requirement for CINCPAC approval for all visits. Additionally, he established a requirement for briefing and debriefing himself and his Representative in Guam/TTPI by military representatives making visits or surveys as well as reports of all visits and surveys.  

Upon receipt of this concern, CINCPAC informed the JCS that CINCPAC would continue to monitor closely all visits into the TTPI and "prior to granting any clearance will take into consideration the elements of concern" noted in Secretary Hickel's letter.  

In November CINCPAC reviewed the guidance he had issued with regard to the primacy of CINCPAC in all military activities in the TTPI. He determined that a requirement existed to publish general overall guidance that would clearly and unequivocally state CINCPAC policy. On 21 November CINCPAC sent a message to his component command commanders and the CINCPAC Representative Guam/TTPI. He said:  

...To insure that all military actions in the TTPI, pending the resolution of its political future, are consistent with...SECDEF guidance, all military activities in the TTPI are considered to be of joint concern. Accordingly, CINCPAC coordination is required prior to the initiation, or change in scope, of any activity involving matters of joint concern. CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI will, in each case, coordinate actions of joint concern and represent all PACOM Service Component Commanders in their relationships with HICOM- TERPACIS in accordance with CINCPACINST 003020.2E7...  

No opposition was registered by the Service component command commanders to this guidance designating the CINCPAC Representative to

1. CINCPAC 191050Z May 69.  
2. J5 Brief No. 000150-69, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jun 69, of JCS 2326/55 of 20 May 69, Subj: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.  
3. CINCPAC 290343Z May 69.  
4. CINCPAC 210313Z Nov 69.
Guam/TTPI to represent them to the High Commissioner. No further action was pending on this subject at the end of the year. 1

(U) Another CINCPAC action that took an enormous amount of time and work during 1969 was the study of TTPI base requirements, which was expected to be a matter of continuing study. In February CINCPAC tasked his component command commanders to assist in the development of a base requirements study. 2 The assumptions on which the study was based forced consideration of base requirements in the TTPI because the use of U.S. bases in Southeast Asia was denied, expansion on Taiwan was limited but expansion in Korea was permitted, and a series of base denials eliminated the opportunity to base forces, materiel, communications facilities, or intelligence facilities, in either Japan and Okinawa.

(C) CINCPAC received submissions from his component command commanders early in April; but their requirements for the TTPI in some cases exceeded the very limited land area available. 3

(U) At the request of the JCS, CINCPAC forwarded his tentative findings on base requirements, 4 realizing that the matter needed further coordination and study. Meetings between representatives of CINCPAC's Air Force and Navy commanders were not completely successful at resolving these matters. They therefore asked CINCPAC to establish priorities and furnish additional guidance so that they could better ascertain base requirements in the TTPI. 5

(C) CINCPAC advised his component command commanders of some modifications to their original basing submissions and requested new submissions. 6

(FS) The study was completed in June. 7 It revealed that if all bases and facilities were denied [REDACTED] the base structure within Guam and the TTPI would appear as follows:

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1. J5152 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. CINCPAC 180303Z Feb 69.
3. J5152 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
4. CINCPAC 141945Z Apr 69.
5. CINCPACAF 232200Z Apr 69.
6. CINCPAC 310145Z May 69.
7. Ltr, CINCPAC to the JCS and Distribution List, 14 Jul 69, Subj: TTPI Base Requirements Study (U).
The study was submitted to the JCS with the notation that it was based on a "worst case" situation and with the recommendation that its contents be closely held and that it be reexamined.

The JCS replied that the study was timely and useful and that it, along with other Service submissions, would be considered in the development of an overall plan for U.S. military structure in the TTPI. Further, they stated that a Joint Staff-Service planning group would be formed to develop such a plan. 3

study, "the costs are substantial and the results therefrom provide far less

1. J5154 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. Ibid.
3. JCS 7465/251636Z Aug 69.
Several specific base requirements questions were raised in 1969. In March, for example, the Secretary of Defense asked the JCS to provide an assessment of the need for to include an itemization of specific military requirements both existing and anticipated for the future, including contingency requirements. The JCS asked CINCPAC for information on which to base a reply.

Later that month CINCPAC furnished the following information:

... CINCPAC has no foreseeable essential requirements for retaining under strict military control. However, it would be desirable to maintain the Auxiliary Airfield in serviceable condition and to retain access rights for use of the field as an emergency servicing stop for both commercial and military aircraft. Use of the airfield could possibly become essential if withdrawal from SEA is compressed into a short time frame. Additionally, the Navy is investigating the possibility of automating the located on to permit cross fixing of aircraft SAR signals, possible submarine casualties, and explosive events in a wide area of the Pacific. Pending outcome of this investigation, the option to use the should be retained.

The increasing importance of TTPI in current and projected military planning requires viewing the problem in overall perspective. The TTPI have rapidly growing military and economic strategic value, and provide an alternative to possible future elimination or severe curtailment of foreign base rights for US forces in other areas, e.g., Philippines, Okinawa, or Japan. Current US control over TTPI and possibility of future

1. Ltr, CINCPAC to the JCS and Distribution List, 14 Jul 69, Subj: TTPI Base Requirements Study (U).
(S) CINCPAC also noted that settlement of the TTPI was essential to the best interests of the United States in the TTPI. 2

(TS) The JCS advised the Secretary that their views on the increasing strategic importance of the TTPI were reaffirmed and it was suggested that return of the TTPI could contribute to U.S. objectives in the TTPI, if precautions were taken for further testing. Further, they recommended retention of the Auxiliary Airfield indefinitely, and the

(S) In June CINCPAC/AF, in another matter, submitted a proposal for base development to be initiated in the first quarter of FY 70. 4 The initial phase was primarily concerned with development of two airfields on Tinian and one airfield on Saipan and a harbor on each island. It also included troop deployments.

(S) CINCPAC determined that the plan was premature, not based on validated requirements, and not consistent with recognized uncertainties related to TTPI political development, Okinawa reversion negotiations, and

1. CINCPAC 210455Z Mar 69.
2. SECDEF 4502/130051Z Mar 69 explained the problem this way. "In 1947, the

3. J5153 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69; J5 Brief No. 06108 69, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Apr 69, of JCSM-195-69 of 4 Apr 69, Subj: Military Requirement for

4. J5152 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
the future status of Southeast Asia operations. On this basis the proposal from CINCPACAF was not supported by CINCPAC and no further action was anticipated. 1

CINCPAC believed that in the matter of military civic action, the United States could create much good will and at the same time provide needed facilities and improvements in the TTPI. The first such effort began in 1969 in the form of Navy construction teams. 2 The first two 13-man teams arrived on 12 June for projects in the Truk and Ponape districts. In compliance with CINCPAC direction, the CINCPAC Representative in Guam/TTPI, in coordination with the High Commissioner, had provided a recommended program of projects. 3 CINCPAC concurred in the program and as he furnished it to the JCS for approval he advised that development of similar programs for the other four administrative districts was continuing.

The JCS granted authority in May for CINCPAC to coordinate and approve civic action programs and projects to be accomplished by the first six Seabee teams. 4 Accordingly, CINCPAC approved the recommended programs for Truk and Ponape and directed continued development of programs for the other districts. 5

In June the CINCPAC Representative provided a recommended program for the Marianas District. CINCPAC's review indicated that the projects were generated primarily by the District Administration Staff with some input from local leaders. Since such projects were to be responsive to the requests of Micronesian leaders, CINCPAC considered it propitious to defer approval of the Marianas District program until he received requests from a committee of local leaders then being formed. 6

On 8 August the CINCPAC Representative Guam/TTPI confirmed that the projects previously recommended for the Marianas had the approval of local Micronesian leaders. CINCPAC therefore approved the recommended program for those projects within the capability of the Seabee teams planned for deployment. 7

1. J5152 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. Deployed by the Navy in response to a request of the Secretary of Defense by the Secretary of the Interior. (SECDEF 8920/0921542 May 69.)
3. J5153 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
4. JCS 01315/282115Z May 69.
5. CINCPAC 032335Z Jun 69.
6. CINCPAC 030302Z Jul 69.
7. CINCPAC AIRBORNE 132003Z Aug 69.
(S) By the end of the year all six teams were deployed, one each in the Truk, Marshall, Yap, and Marianas districts and two in the Ponape district. The second team was sent to Ponape rather than the Palau district because local leaders in the Palau district had been reluctant to request civic action assistance. After waiting in Guam since its arrival on 1 September, the sixth team was sent to Kusaie Island in Ponape on 15 December.¹

(S) In October the Secretary of the Interior had advised the Secretary of Defense of his decision to discontinue the program on completion of the initial deployment due to budgetary constraints.² The Defense Secretary, in view of the widespread popular acceptance of the teams and strong growing support for their continuation, requested that the JCS recommend a program for replacement of the teams upon completion of their initial tours and he provided guidance for multi-Service participation.³ The JCS asked CINCPAC to update a plan he had previously recommended for such multi-Service participation.⁴

(S) As of 31 December, in compliance with this JCS request, CINCPAC was reviewing the previously submitted plan⁵ for joint participation to include revalidation of team locations as well as command and control considerations.⁶

(U) Within the CINCPAC staff there was one change in responsibility for certain TTP1 matters made in 1969. On 4 August it was agreed by representatives of the Plans and Logistics Divisions that the Logistics Division would assume from that time cognizance and action responsibility on all matters relating to the employment of construction teams. The Plans Division would retain action on matters still in the conceptual stage, such as the deployment of special teams for technical tasks, e.g., underwater demolition projects or topographic surveys.⁷

Diego Garcia

(S) In 1968 the United States and the United Kingdom had reached an agreement in principle regarding the construction of a joint U.S. military facility on Diego Garcia.⁸ Despite strong support from the JCS and the

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1. CINCPAC 112345Z Oct 69.
2. J5153 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
3. SECDEF 06618/191725Z Dec 69.
4. JCS 6966/242120Z Dec 69.
5. J5153 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
6. CINCPAC 300930Z Oct 69.
Secretary of Defense, however, funding was not authorized during 1969 because of stringent Congressional budgetary considerations.

As the matter was being studied quite a bit during the year, the Chief of Naval Operations early in 1969 strongly emphasized the necessity, due to the political sensitivity of the project, for all to take the most stringent security precautions to prevent unauthorized disclosure of any information whatsoever on the subject and that all concerned would be informed when international and internal considerations permitted relaxing this tight security precaution. 1

In October the Secretary of State advised that Congressional committee consideration of the project was nearing completion and that the appropriations bill should pass by late December 1969, with a target date for commencing construction of 1 April 1970. 2

On 20 December the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations apprised that the measure was not approved by the joint House-Senate appropriations conference for funding in the FY 70 Military Construction Bill. They advised that it would be resubmitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for inclusion in the FY 71 bill then under development. 3 Accordingly, it appeared that there would be further delay in the fruition of a joint U.S. military facility on Diego Garcia. 4

Mactan Air Base, Philippines

The Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines reported to CINCPAC on 1 November 1969 that the impending phaseout of USAF activities at dual-use Mactan Air Base generated a requirement for information on the extent to which the U.S. Government would support continued operation of the base by the Philippine Air Force, which items of equipment could be made available to them, and the technical means of effecting the transfer. 5 In a message to the Secretary of Defense, CINCPAC supported continued operation of Mactan by the Philippine Air Force and requested that the Secretary develop a legal basis and authority for the turnover of equipment in Military Assistance Program (MAP) shortfall. CINCPAC also

1. J5153 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69. The CNO also noted that he considered the Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet the major claimant for the facility.
2. J5153 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
3. CNO N11013/201445Z Dec 69; SECSTATE 222308Z Dec 69.
4. J5153 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
5. JUSMAGPHIL 010530Z Nov 69.
recommended that the 13th Air Force be designated the USAF executive agent for negotiations.  

CINCPACAF then recommended that the following be made available to the Philippine Air Force: permanent structures, items uneconomical to remove, items whose removal would disfigure or deface facilities or systems or leave them unusable, and equipment and supplies except for two 400 KW generators, all vehicles, the ground control approach unit, and certain weather measuring equipment.

On 2 December the Air Force Chief of Staff designated the 13th Air Force as executive agency for negotiations with the Philippine Air Force. He provided the following guidelines. Permanent buildings and structures and associated utility systems and installed property were to be transferred to the Philippine Air Force. Equipment excess to USAF needs, required by the Philippine Air Force, was to be transferred under MAP on a no-cost, as-is where-is basis. Equipment uneconomical to remove was to be made available under the MAP at no cost.

The Air Force Chief of Staff noted:

...Although there are no presently programmed requirements for the reutilization of Mactan by USAF, this Hq desires that all existing USG re-entry rights under the diplomatic level agreement of Dec 22, 1965 (T.I.A.S. 5924) be preserved, and availability of improvements, buildings or structures to the USAF as stated in current host tenant agreement be maintained.

1. Admin CINCPAC 050239Z Nov 69.
2. CINCPACAF 140001Z Nov 69.
3. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69; CSAF 022048Z Dec 69.
4. CSAF 022048Z Dec 69.
As Defense spending peaked and then began diminishing in 1969, the impact of budget constraints hit CINCPAC and the PACOM with great force. As has happened after every war or "conflict," the cuts in military expenditures were swift and broad and often quite extravagant, in the sense that hasty and improvidential cuts of manpower, services, or materiel ended up costing more in the long run than had been realized by temporary cuts and savings. CINCPAC sought to minimize this effect in the PACOM to the extent he could. Many cuts were imposed by the Services, and CINCPAC often became involved because the changes made by one Service could affect other Services in such a manner that no overall saving was realized by the Government, the money just came out of a different pocket.

The first actions to reduce expenditures began with the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, which required a reduction of Federal expenditures during FY 69 of not less than $6 billion below that requested by the President in his FY 69 budget submission. Of the $6 billion, the Defense Department was required to absorb half and reduce its expenditures by $3 billion. These numbers became the name assigned to the program; it became known as Project 693. At first it was difficult to measure the exact impact of Project 693 implications on the PACOM because original recommendations by the Services pertained to worldwide activities and were not readily identifiable by specific command or geographic area. Even the cuts in CINCPAC’s Operational and Maintenance, Navy funds were not directly attributable to Project 693, but were an economy measure in the same spirit.

For FY 69, CINCPAC received funds of only $23.7 million instead of $31.5 million, a reduction of $7.8 million, and CINCPAC saw that reductions would be necessary in temporary active duty expenditures, supplies, minor construction, and other support requirements. The reductions resulting from Project 693 for CINCPAC’s component command commanders were later computed to be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
<td>$12,671,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>61,600,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
<td>5,161,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGFMFPAC</td>
<td>569,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$80,001,000.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Point Paper, J72, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Nov 69, Subj: Reduction in Defense Expenditures (Project 693) (U).
2. Ibid.
The total for the PACOM, then, including cuts to CINCPAC's funds became $87,801,000.00. But this was only the beginning.

(75) For FY 70 another $3 billion cut hit the Defense Department. And two other reduction actions also impacted—one was a 10 percent reduction in U.S. personnel overseas ordered by the President and the other was as directed by National Security Study Memorandum 36 from the National Security Council. As more and more of the reductions proposed by the Services were studied, CINCPAC and his component and subordinate unified command commanders could assess their impact more accurately. It became immediately apparent that operations could no longer be sustained at the rates that they had been.

(75) In the matter of the reduction of U.S. personnel overseas by 10 percent, CINCPAC received his quota for reduction as proposed by the JCS in September. Of the 14,900 spaces to be reduced worldwide, CINCPAC was tasked to reduce by 10,279. The JCS proposal was by area or country and by Service with an additional category for those assigned to joint tables of distribution (JTD), which included the personnel in military assistance agencies. The JCS proposal was as in the table that follows (the "other" designation included Australia, Burma, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area/Country</th>
<th>JTD</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>182</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>2,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryukyuus</td>
<td></td>
<td>529</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>2,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1,859</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>5,546</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>10,279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
In his reply, CINCPAC stated that he generally concurred, but he asked for certain adjustments. He reemphasized "the need for continued flexibility in adjusting reduction quotas so as to minimize the net impact on the readiness and capabilities of US forces in the PACOM." The adjustments CINCPAC recommended were based on operational considerations and on incorrect identification of certain quotas. With the exception of a Navy shortfall of 133 spaces, the adjustments were primarily based on equal-quantity substitution within the Services by country. CINCPAC supported a 35 space shortfall of CINCPACFLT and forwarded the balance, 98 spaces, to the JCS for resolution.

In October the JCS sent their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on this matter. They approved CINCPAC's adjustments, including the 133 space shortfall which they transferred to the Atlantic Command. The PACOM total quota was thus reduced from 10,279 to 10,146 spaces.

In one minor matter, CINCPAC had recommended that reductions in Indonesia affect a medical officer and a corpsman. The State Department asked for an adjustment that eliminated two naval attaches instead. CINCPAC, asked to comment by the JCS, non-concurred based on the intelligence collection potential of the attaches as an essential element of PACOM's long term security interest in Indonesia. He noted that other medical options were open to the relatively few military personnel there. The JCS supported CINCPAC and the Defense Department tentatively agreed that the attaches would not be reduced.

Civilian personnel strength overseas was also to be decreased by 10 percent, or 1,084 spaces in the PACOM. These reductions did not appear to have any strategic implications. Principally affected were school teachers for dependents, whose loss would be offset by reducing certain services offered if there were no comparable reduction in the dependent school population as a result of the general 10 percent decrease in overseas personnel. Of more concern to CINCPAC were worldwide civilian ceilings established for 30 June 1970 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. While these could not be quantified for the PACOM yet it was expected that they would place severe limitations on CINCPAC's Service component command commanders.

1. CINCPAC 070416Z Oct 69.
2. Ibid.
5. Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Dec 69, Subj: Impact of Current Reduction Programs on PACOM Capabilities (U).
(TOP-SECRET)

The reduction of the number of local nationals employed by component commands as a result of restructuring, relocation, and redeployment actions could adversely affect U.S. relations in Okinawa and Japan, regardless of the Japanese Government's desire to reduce the U.S. presence at certain installations.¹ Problems associated with the cutbacks could also be experienced in the Philippines.

Intelligence programs were included in the reduction programs. Of 883 spaces designated for reduction in the Consolidated Intelligence Program and the Consolidated Cryptological Program in the PACOM, only 182 spaces in the Consolidated Intelligence Program were of direct concern to CINCPAC.² The move of the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center from Japan to Hawaii, which had already been programmed, took care of 139 of those spaces. Reduction was expected to be as follows, with only minimum impact on the other activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PACOM ELINT Center</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6499th Special Activities Group</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>526th Military Intelligence Detachment</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>704th Military Intelligence Detachment</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Funds for the operation of CINCPAC's headquarters and those of the other unified subordinate commands in the PACOM were cut again for FY 70. Navy Operational and Maintenance Funds requested by CINCPAC had been $33 million. CINCPAC received only $20 million and there were indications that the Navy might pull back another $1 million of that.⁴ Immediate economies were initiated in the CINCPAC headquarters, principally in matters of supplies and equipment, service calls and work requests, staff travel, and the tasking of component commands. In this last regard, CINCPAC paid travel and per diem costs for travel by members of component command staffs.⁵

1. Ibid.
2. Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Nov 69, Subj: Impact of Current Reduction Programs on PACOM Capabilities (U).
3. Ibid.
4. JO1/Memo/473-69, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Sep 69, Subj: Funding Levels for FY 70.
5. Ibid.
A number of publications were discontinued or printed in smaller quantity or published less frequently. The Command Digest, for example, was changed from a quarterly to a semi-annual publication, and a number of other Comptroller publications were discontinued—Comptroller Notes, CINCPAC Status of Operation and Maintenance Navy and Military Assistance Executive Funds, Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program, and Digest of Items from the Congressional Record.¹

By late October CINCPAC saw a need to consolidate his effort on the various reduction programs. Accordingly he established a working group of action officers from his components to be chaired by an officer from his staff.² The group, which began holding weekly meetings on 30 October, had as its objectives the surfacing of problem areas in accomplishing reduction directives and the surfacing of losses of capabilities and the impact of such losses on the PACOM ability to accomplish mission requirements.³

The impact of the various programs began to be more clearly assessed by CINCPAC as time went on. The following discussion is based on a point paper prepared in December by the Plans Division that summarized the effects of the budget constraints as they were seen at that time.⁴ Elsewhere throughout this history more elaborate or detailed records of certain of these effects have been pursued. CINCPAC believed that the various reduction programs would most seriously affect PACOM capabilities to:

- Rapidly respond to military contingencies.
- Provide antisubmarine warfare and amphibious lift forces.
- Maintain firepower initiatives necessary to influence combat operations and reduce Free World Forces casualties.
- Re-enter RVN to conduct combat operations at the level established prior to Phase I NSM 36 reductions.
- Maintain logistic support of contingency operations and/or support of RVNAF or US forces should they be re-committed.⁵

¹ J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct, Nov 69.
² Admin CINCPAC 290200Z Oct 69.
³ J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
⁴ Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Dec 69, Subj: Impact of Current Reductions Programs on PACOM Capabilities (U).
⁵ Ibid.
In more specific instances CINCPAC saw the effects of deactivations and redeployment of Army and Marine units following their withdrawal from Southeast Asia. The result would be delayed in reconstitution of the PACOM reserve, elimination of units that could be used to meet the timing and force requirements of contingency plans, increased delays associated with redeployment of forces from other areas and the CONUS, and thus an increased risk to forward deployed troops. Inactivations, CINCPAC believed, would degrade the PACOM force structure required to support contingency plans:

...below acceptable minimum levels, particularly in the areas of amphibious assault shipping and naval gunfire support. In view of the drawdowns in tactical electronic warfare, tactical reconnaissance and tactical fighter squadrons in SEAsia, the capability to withdraw tactical air forces from SEAsia to support contingencies in other areas is likewise degraded. 1

Operations in Southeast Asia were, of course, directly affected. Among the resources utilized there that would be reduced were the following:

Reduction of tactical fighter sorties from 18,000 to 14,000 sorties per month.

Reduction of ARC LIGHT sorties from 1,600 to 1,400 sorties per month.

Reduction of IGLOO WHITE/COLLEGE EYE support through loss or redeployment of 12 EC-121 aircraft.

Inactivation/redeployment of fifteen tactical fighter/bomber squadrons and one attack aircraft carrier.

Reduction of four Special Operations Squadrons with one additional SOS programmed for inactivation in FY 2/71.

Redeployment of 18 maneuver battalions.

Loss of one Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (EB-66).

1. Ibid.
Reduction of antisubmarine warfare capability through loss of 3 Navy Patrol Squadrons (VPRON), 19 destroyers and/or destroyer escort craft, and one support aircraft carrier.

Reduction of 2 heavy naval gunfire support ships.

Redeployment of five naval construction battalions to CONUS. 1

(TS) Budget-related reductions that would take place elsewhere in the PACOM included:

Loss of amphibious lift capability through release of twenty-five amphibious assault ships.

Inactivation of MACE-B squadron.

Inactivation of 2 tactical aircraft squadrons and 1 military airlift squadron.

Closure of Mactan and Tachikawa air bases.

Release of Phu Cat deferred to FY 71.

Change of Airborne Command Post alert status to ground alert on 31 Dec 69.

Inactivation of combat service support elements in the logistic structure which will degrade PACOM capability to support contingency operations and to apply U.S. logistic effort in-country in SEAsia to support RVNAF or recommitted US combat forces.

PACFLT base restructuring proposal which: reduces WESTPAC DD Force from 35 to 30; transfers homeport of an MCS, ADG, AFS and AR from Sasebo to CONUS thereby reducing mine countermeasures and underwater replenishment capabilities; transfers homeport of 8 LST's and 4 LFR's from Yokosuka to Guam; transfers homeport of nine MSC's from Sasebo to Yokosuka; and transfer of homeport of one AFS from Yokosuka to CONUS.

1. Ibid.
DA logistic base relocation proposal which: relocates Sagami maintenance depot to Taiwan, closes Ikego ammunition depot; transfers medical supply depot from Tokorizawa, Japan to Okinawa; and expands maintenance capability at Camp Carroll, Korea. 1

(TS) In terms of total manpower losses due to the reduction programs CINCPACAF had reported 15,583 spaces, CINCUSARPAC 34,120, and CINCPACFLT 29,254. PACOM force levels and capabilities were subject to still further reduction, as the Secretary of Defense had asked for a plan to withdraw a division or more from Korea. 2 The political implication of such a reduction, CINCPAC believed, would provide Asia's leaders, as well as anti-U.S. factions, with reinforcement of the idea that the United States was withdrawing from Asia. The potential for instability in Asia was nearly everywhere—a Soviet strike against Communist China, the threat to the Republic of Korea from the north, the reversion of Okinawa, Soviet pressure on Japanese fishing fleets, Communist China's nuclear development, internal instability in the Philippines, racial strife in Malaysia, withdrawal of the British from east of Suez, and the active Communist operations in the Republic of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. CINCPAC believed that a visible presence of U.S. military forces was required to maintain the delicate equilibrium that existed and that reductions could cause our allies to question their dependence on the United States for leadership and support. He considered a serious proportion the risk of Communist interpretation of reductions as a U.S. withdrawal from Asia, which could lead to Communist expansion of operations at a time when U.S. military capabilities were being reduced. 3

Defense Department Visitors Review PACOM for Reductions

(U) Mr. Charles O. Rossotti, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, and Mr. Philip A. Odeen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Regional Programs), visited the PACOM during the period 3 to 20 October 1969. They were briefed by the CINCPAC staff on 3 October before they set out on a tour of PACOM bases, and they were debriefed on 20 October enroute back to Washington. 4

The trip was for general orientation with the apparent primary purpose of identifying areas for further budgetary savings. At the request of the

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
visitors, the following subjects were some of the major points of discussion during their visit: impact of the President's 10 percent overseas reduction; Japan and Okinawa base reduction proposals; implications of the President's statement on Asia/Pacific policy made during his Guam press conference on 25 July; problems associated with Vietnamization planning; planning for possible U.S. troop redeployments from Thailand; post-war basing requirements and options in Thailand; and tactical air support of Laotian forces and planned interdiction campaigns.

The following events are as reported by Plans Division observers:

...During the latter stages of the tour and the 20 October debriefing at CINCPAC Headquarters, CINCPAC became quite apprehensive of the fact that the secretaries were placing CINCPAC mission accomplishment in a secondary role to budgetary reductions. During personal discussions, CINCPAC personally pointed out to Messrs. Rossotti and Odeen the dangers inherent to such a position and further emphasized his position in a message to Gen Wheeler. Stationing of the 173d Abn Bde on Okinawa was discussed at length and CINCPAC stated his position to Messrs. Rossotti and Odeen that the availability of the 173d Abn Bde for rapid deployment from its programmed base in Okinawa is essential to the timely and effective support of PACOM contingency plans. Additionally, CINCPAC emphasized the validity of a SIOP alert commitment for PACOM aircraft.¹

In another matter, both visitors expressed a new confidence in Vietnamization "which replaced their prior skepticism."² This feeling was a result of their visit to the Vietnamese Army's 7th Division and observations of numerous combined actions in Vietnam, they said.

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

(U) The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) was an annual publication in which the JCS provided the principal military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense for a specified eight-year period. It was prepared in three main parts: Volume I, Strategic Concept and Force Planning Guidance for Military Planning; Volume II, Analyses and Force Tabulations; and Volume III, Free World Forces.

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¹. Ibid.
². Ibid.
(3) The JSOP Volume I for FY 72-79 was published on 21 June 1969. 1 CINCPAC's subsequent review revealed the following. There were no significant changes in the global or regional appraisals from the previous year's JSOP (FY 71-78). The basic tenet of U.S. military strategy in Asia remained the same: containment involving three interrelated elements, (1) deterring or defeating direct or indirect aggression, (2) strengthening the areas threatened by aggression or subversion, and (3) influencing the leaders of Communist China, the U.S.S.R., and other Asian communist nations to abandon their expansionist policies. Comparison of this JSOP with the superseded one revealed that virtually all changes in the portions of concern to CINCPAC were for updating, for expanded treatment, or for improved grammatical expression. Approximately 60 percent of the recommendations CINCPAC had provided to the JCS in February were accepted either conceptually or verbatim. 2

(6) Normally this would conclude the action on Volume I for any JSOP year, but on 29 October the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that a revised strategy document be prepared and made available by 3 December 1969. 3

The sections on global and regional appraisals and the introduction were unchanged. The sections on the strategic concept and force planning guidance reflected the new strategy described above. One new section was added, the evaluation of military risks resulting from the revised strategy:

The JCS evaluated the military risks involved in disengaging forces from a war in Asia to partake in the initial defense of NATO as follows:

a. Disengagement of forces, particularly land forces, is hazardous and cannot be done quickly.

b. Reduction of U.S. forces engaged in combined operations would increase significantly the vulnerability of the residual U.S. and allied forces.

c. If significant casualty and equipment losses occur during disengagement, an extended period of time will be required to prepare withdrawn forces for subsequent operations elsewhere.

d. Redeployment of tactical aircraft would require extensive use of tanker aircraft, removing the tankers from the primary task of supporting strategic aircraft and thus degrading our strategic posture.

1. Ibid.
e. Withdrawal would reduce allied resolve.

f. The movement of forces from CONUS to Europe would reduce airlift/sealift forces available for the redeploy-
   ment of forces from Asia.

g. Disengagement and redeployment from Asia would be more difficult because the USSR would be an Asian enemy as well as a European enemy. ¹

(9) The new document concluded by stating:

   In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that adoption of the U.S. strategy in Part IV and the force planning
guidance in Part V, in the face of a growing Soviet threat and without a commensurate reduction in US commitments,
   involves substantial risk to the attainment of the national security objectives. ²

(5) CINCPAC had already submitted his U.S. and Allied force require-
   ments based on the first edition of the strategy volume. It appeared at the end of the year that CINCPAC would not have to make supplemental submissions in response to the revised volume, but "at the JCS would utilize the submis-
   sions already made and adjust the force requirements based on the new guidance. The new strategy was not expected to change CINCPAC's permanent force requirements. ³

(55) CINCPAC had submitted his recommendations for Volume II, JSOP FY 71-78 in September 1968. ⁴ Volume II was published in six books in March 1969. ⁵ In only a few instances was CINCPAC able to determine exact recommenda-
   tions affecting the PACOM, as most objective force levels were stated in world-wide terms and PACOM forces were indistinguishable in the total. ⁶ For example, there was no longer a SENTINEL anti-ballistic missile site recommended for Oahu. In another case, CINCPAC's General Purpose Land

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Force objective of 4 1/3 Army division force equivalents and two Marine Expeditionary Forces was recognized, but whereas CINCPAC had stated that all divisions should have their Sustaining Support Increments in place, the JCS had stated that those increments for the two divisions in Korea should be in Hawaii and the CONUS. Other strategic offensive and defensive objective force levels or specific force levels for General Purpose Air or Navy Forces or for airlift and sealift forces in the PACOM could not be determined.

(TS) In most instances the objective force levels stated by the JCS did not differ at all from those shown in JSOP FY 70-77. Under the listings of strategic offensive and defensive forces there was an increase of 135 FB-111 aircraft to a total of 210 and an increase from one to nine underwater long-range missile system, nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. The several changes in both offensive and defensive missiles and sites were all decreases.

(TS) General Purpose Land Forces remained at 18 1/3 division force equivalents and one independent brigade. Separate brigades increased from five to seven and artillery battalions from 150 to 161. Air defense battalions decreased by 20 to 195.

(TS) There were only negligible changes in the General Purpose Air Forces with Marine Corps fighter aircraft reduced by 30 to 195 and attack aircraft increased by 12 to 204.

(TS) General Purpose Navy Forces reflected minor changes in the number of attack carriers: an increase of one nuclear powered carrier (to five) and a decrease of one conventionally powered carrier (to 12). Nuclear powered submarines decreased from 85 to 78; conventionally powered submarines from 20 to 31. There was an increase of 11 ships in the frigate/destroyer escort group to 109.

(TS) Airlift force objectives remained constant. Sealift ships reflected reductions in two categories: multipurpose cargo ships from 15 to 12 and tankers from 19 to 10.

(U) Just as this comparison to the previous year's JSOP was being prepared, CINCPAC began work on his Volume II submission for JSOP FY 72-79. Preliminary guidance and a tentative program of events were provided to CINCPAC's Service component command commanders on 17 March 1969.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
This was a significant departure from past practice in two respects. In previous years it had been the practice to await JCS final guidance for submissions sometime in July before imposing any requirements on the Service components. Secondly, submissions were requested in two parts: a preliminary one addressed only to objective force levels and a final one addressed both to objective force levels and to contingency augmentation requirements. The changed procedure was to spread what in the past had been an unreasonable work load within a short period and to achieve a higher quality final product. The change in procedure was considered feasible because the annual JCS guidance for submissions changed relatively little from year to year, particularly with respect to the objective force levels.

(U) On 23 June CINCPAC received the JCS guidelines for JSOP FY 72-79 inputs. The differences from the previous year were relatively minor. As had been the case in 1968, the unified and specified commanders were allowed considerably less time for completion of their inputs than was provided in JCS policy.\(^1\) The suspense date established by the JCS was 15 August.

(U) Based on the submissions of his Service component command commanders, CINCPAC's recommendations on PACOM Objective Force Levels and Contingency Force Requirements for JSOP FY 72-79, Volume II were completed and forwarded to the JCS on 12 August.\(^2\) The following summary of force objectives was prepared by the CINCPAC staff office that prepared the submission:

1. (TS) Objective Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces.

   Offensive

   a. (S) Thirty mobile medium range ballistic missiles; this is a new and tentative recommendation.

   b. (B) 150 MINUTEMAN III missiles, an increase of 50 over last year; this is a tentative recommendation requiring further study.

\(^1\) J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.

\(^2\) J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69. The submission was forwarded in Ltr, CINCPAC to the JCS and Distribution List, 12 Aug 69, Subj: PACOM Objective Force Levels and Contingency Force Requirements (For JSOP FY 72-79, Volume II) (U).
c. (S) 15 SAC B-52s and 50 SAC tankers, the same as last year.

d. (S) Five POSEIDON MK-3 SSBNs, the same as last year.

e. (S) One PERSHING Battalion, one less than last year, upon the basis of attainability.

Defensive

f. (S) 25 C-5A Airborne Ballistic Missile Intercept System (ABMIS) aircraft with 16 missiles each; this is new and tentative.

g. (S) One F-4 Squadron (UE 25) for the Hawaii National Guard, similar to last year.

h. (S) Four Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Intercept Squadrons (SABMIS) ships with 50 missiles each; this is tentative and the same as last year.

i. (S) One SAFEGUARD site on Oahu, the same as last year.

2. (TS) Objective General Purpose Land Forces.

Four and 1/3 Army divisions and two Marine Expeditionary Forces, the same as last year.

3. (TS) Objective General Purpose Air Forces.

a. (S) Navy. Twelve CVWs, the same as last year except that attainment is slipped from FY 76 to FY 77.

b. (S) Air Force. Fundamentally the same as last year; 27 fighter and attack squadrons (648 aircraft), four tactical reconnaissance squadrons (72 aircraft), two Special Operations Forces Wings (128 aircraft), two Tactical Electronic Warfare Support Squadrons (36 aircraft), and 120 Tactical Air Control System aircraft.

c. (S) Marine Corps. Two Marine Aircraft Wings, the same as last year.
4. (TS) Objective Major General Purpose Navy Forces are the same as last year except as noted otherwise below:

   a. (S) CVA/CVAN  12
   b. (S) CVS  9
   c. (S) Heavy NGFS ships  9
   d. (S) Major Fleet Escorts  93
   e. (S) Destroyers  152 (5 more than last year)
   f. (S) Destroyer Escorts  40 (5 fewer than last year)
   g. (S) SSNs (PERMIT/STURGEON Class and later  57 (4 more than last year)
   h. (S) SS and Older SSNs  38 (3 more than last year)
   i. (S) Minewarfare ships  132 (5 fewer than last year)
   j. (S) VPRONS (including one RVPRON)  28

5. (S) Airlift and Sealift Forces.

   a. (S) Objective Force Levels.

      (1) 96 tactical airlift aircraft and five air evacuation aircraft, a small increase over last year.

      (2) An intra-theater sealift capability of 175,000 short tons per month, the same as last year.

   b. (S) Requirements for JCS Specified Forces for Contingencies.
(1) The Army should pre-position stocks in the PACOM to equip a two division force for rapid reaction.

(2) POL capabilities in the theater should be expanded to meet the increased demands of the new equipments as they are added to the inventory.

(3) Intra-theater airlift and sealift capability as shown in the preceding sub-paragraph should be dedicated to the PACOM.

6. (U) Review of Contingency Requirements. The JCS guidelines permitted a review of the contingency force requirements developed for JSOP FY 71-78, Volume II last year. This has been done and the requirements are validated in general terms.

7. (TS) New Contingency Requirements. Additionally, the JCS requested the development of General Purpose Force requirements for major aggression in Northeast Asia and in Southeast Asia independent of one another.... The total U.S. General Purpose (GP) Forces (major) required by D plus six months are, additive to appropriate Free World force deployments:

a. (TS) Northeast Asia

(1) GP Land - 18+ US Army DFEs, 3 US MEFs

(2) GP Air - Navy, 10 CVWs - 710^1 fighter aircraft
Air Force, 2812 fighter aircraft, 198 tactical reconnaissance aircraft and related support aircraft
Marine Corps, 3 MAWs, 435 fighter aircraft

(3) GP Navy - 10 CVAs, 3 CVSs, 9 VPRONs, 36 Submarines, 27 Major Fleet

1. Only 600 are committed to the air requirements associated with the land battle; of these an average of 360 would be on station.
b. (TS) Southeast Asia

(1) GP Land - 13+ US Army DFEs, 3 US MEFs

(2) GP Air - Navy, 10 CVSs - 710\(^1\) fighter aircraft
    Air Force, 2221 fighter aircraft,
    234 tactical reconnaissance aircraft and related support aircraft
    Marine Corps, 3 MAWs, 435 fighter aircraft

(3) GP Navy - 10 CVAs, 3 CVSs, 9 VPRONs,
    36 Submarines, 27 Major Fleet Escorts, 113 DDs, 9 Heavy
    NGFS, 53 MSO/MSC, 17 PG\(^2\)

(S) CINCPAC's submission for Volume III of JSOP FY 71-78, concerned with Free World Forces, had been provided to the JCS in September and October 1968.\(^3\) The JCS published Volume III in January 1969.\(^4\) The JCS recognized that the threat, as well as economic and political factors were constantly changing, often in unpredictable ways. They stated, therefore, that it was not their intent to impair flexibility to adjust programs to meet urgent contingencies by strict adherence to the military assistance priority lists, established in Volume III.

(S) The most significant differences in military assistance between Volume III as published and the CINCPAC submission concerned China and Australia. For the China MAP, the JCS added one F-X squadron (UE 16) to be funded in FY 71 for phase-in in FY 72 at a cost of $48 million. For Australia Foreign Military Sales the JCS added 30 maritime patrol aircraft (P-3).

1. Only 600 are committed to the air requirements associated with the land battle; of these an average of 360 would be on station.
2. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
Major objective force level differences from the CINCPAC submission were:

a. **Australia.**
   
   (1) Elimination of six PGM patrol craft.
   
   (2) Increase in PTF patrol craft from four to ten.

b. **China.**

   (1) Earlier phase-out of F-100, RF-101, RF-104G.

   (2) Substitution of three F-X and one RF-X squadrons for CINCPAC-recommended like numbers of F-4 and RF-4 squadrons; also, earlier phase-in.

c. **Indonesia.**

   (1) Decrease of 26 patrol ships.

   (2) Increase of three mine warfare (MSI) ships.

   (3) Elimination of one FIS squadron and three SAM battalions.

   (4) Retention of the present two TFS (MIG 17, F-51 and T-6) through FY 78. CINCPAC recommended phase-out in FY 75-78.

d. **New Zealand.**

   (1) Deletion of one AG/AGS combat support ship.

   (2) Earlier phase-out of Vampire aircraft which are to be replaced by A-4Ks.

e. **Philippine Islands.** Earlier phase-in of an F-102 FIS.

f. **Thailand.** Increase of SC patrol craft from two to four.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Ibid.
CINCPAC continued with planning for the next submission for Volume III. His input was based on the submission of 13 country representatives and the PACOM Service component command commanders. CINCPAC submitted his recommendations for JSOP FY 72-79, Volume III on 8 September 1969. 1

Near-Term Force Posture

CINCPAC prepared his JSOP FY 72-79 recommendations to portray the optimum or objective force requirements. But, anticipating funding and manpower constraints that "might be expected after the end of hostilities in Southeast Asia, particularly in the early post-hostilities years..." 2 CINCPAC prepared a PACOM near-term force posture summary, which he believed to be the minimum force that could meet requirements in the Fiscal Year 1971 period. He submitted it to the JCS in July. 3 He compared these recommendations with those he had submitted in September 1968 for JSOP purposes.

CINCPAC stressed the need for forward deployments to make forces "continually visible and therefore a more credible deterrent...to enable rapid and adequate initial responses...." 4 He also stated, conversely, that if there were too many increments to the military response and if they were over too extended a period, "...the enemy is enabled to keep pace in build-up, strategy and tactics, thereby discarding the advantages that would accrue to the U.S. from the early commitment of a superior force in time to effectively influence the tactical situation." 5 He recommended approval of his proposed near-term force posture and that he be authorized to modify accordingly his T-Day plan force for the PACOM other than for Southeast Asia. 6

In August the JCS responded that it was neither timely nor feasible to address the CINCPAC document with a view of reaching definitive decisions. They did say, however, that it would be retained in active status for consideration both in the objectives and capabilities planning cycles and in ongoing studies of U.S. force posture. 7

1. Ltr, CINCPAC to the JCS, 8 Sep 69, Subj: Volume III (Free World Forces) to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1972-1979 (JSOP FY 72-79).
2. Admin CINCPAC 120332Z Sep 69.
3. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 7 Jul 69, Subj: PACOM Near-Term Force Posture (FY 71).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) was the short range document in the Joint Program for Planning. Its purpose was to provide a statement of military strategy to support the national security objectives based on capabilities during the year covered by the study. It was published in two volumes. The first contained planning guidance, strategic considerations and concepts, and tasks assigned to CINCPAC and the other unified and specified commanders. Volume II listed major combat forces available, for planning purposes, to accomplish the tasks and conduct the operations prescribed in Volume I.

The JCS had published Volume I for Fiscal Year 1970 late in 1968. This was discussed in the CINCPAC Command History for that year. In 1969 the JCS published the regular two editions of Volume II, each for a six-month period of the year under study. In both cases, Volume II(A) for the period 1 July to 31 December 1969, and Volume II(B) for the period 1 January to 30 June 1970, the forces provided for CINCPAC, for planning purposes, changed from those previously provided. In each case this required CINCPAC to review and, if necessary, update his operational plans.

As budget constraints tightened, however, there were still further amendments to those forces available for planning purposes. Late in December CINCPAC received a communication that further revised Volume II(B) forces for the first half of 1970.

Major force changes affecting CINCPAC were as shown below. The OLD figure indicates forces available up to 31 December 1969. The NEW figure indicates forces available during the period 1 January to 30 June 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Army Forces</th>
<th>OLD</th>
<th>NEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Division</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Battalion (Nike-Herc)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 1/4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2. J5 Brief No. 00022-69, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Jan 69, of JCSM-11-69 of 8 Jan 69, Subj: Volume II(A) (Forces), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 1970 (JSCP FY 70); J5 Brief No. 000177-69, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jul 69, of JCSM-402-69 of 24 Jun 69, Subj: Volume II (B) (Forces), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 1970 (JSCP FY 70) (U).
Air Defense Battalion (HAWK) 7 5
AWSP Battalion 0 3

U.S. Naval Forces

Attack Carrier (CVA/CVN) 9 8
Attack Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 9 8
ASW Carrier (CVS) 3 2
ASW Carrier Air Wing (CVSG) 3 2
Battleship (BB) 1 0
Heavy Cruiser (CA) 2 1
Destroyer/Frigate 115 98
Ocean Escort (DE Type/USCG) 27 18
Mine Warfare Ships 41 36
Amphibious Warfare Ships 102 53
Submarine (SS/SSN) 41 44
FBM Submarines (SSBN) 8 7
Patrol Squadron (VP) 15 12
Marine Division 3 2 1/3

U.S. Air Forces

Tactical Bomber Squadron 1 2
Tactical Fighter Squadron 42 35
Tactical EW Squadron 6 5
Fighter Interceptor Squadron 3 2
Tactical Airlift Squadron (C-130/C-123) 13 15
SOF/SOC Squadron 20 13
AC&W Squadron (AD) 3 2
Tactical Auxiliary (AC-130) 1 0

(U) CINCPAC, on receipt of these new force allotments for planning began to review his operational plans to identify any major deficiencies. Such deficiencies, to be accompanied by a summary evaluation of their impact on plan execution, were being readied for forwarding to the JCS early in 1970. 2

CINCPAC Operational Plans Renumbered

(C) In 1969 CINCPAC revised the existing operational plan numbering system as required by the JCS in connection with the Joint Operational

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
Reporting System. 1 The JCS in their Publication 6, Volume VI expanded the scope of the Joint Operational Reporting System to include reporting requirements for planning and analysis. Specifically, this was an integrated reporting system known as the JCS Deployment Reporting System (DEPREP), and it was formatted for automatic data processing. In this regard, commanders of unified and specified commands were tasked to maintain a capability to support the information requirements defined in the publication. Each CINC was assigned a block of numbers from which he was to obtain a permanent, four-digit Plan Identification Number (PIN) for each plan. CINCPAC was assigned numbers in the series 5000-5999.

All CINCPAC plans had to be renumbered in this manner, then. CINCPAC OPlan 25-Year, for example, became Plan 5025. The first digit indicated it was in the series of numbers assigned for CINCPAC, the second digit, "O", indicated it was a CINCPAC originated plan. Codes for CINCPAC's subordinate unified and Service component command commanders would replace that second digit when describing the plans of those commands in support of CINCPAC plans. The last two digits represented the number previously assigned to the plan; all of which were converted without change. Subordinate CINCPAC commands were required to use a three-digit number when numbering their plans that were not in support of a CINCPAC plan. They were to assign a corresponding two-digit number only to plans that supported a/CINCPAC plan.

CINCPAC did not require immediate renumbering of plans when guidance was published on this system to all of his Service component and subordinate unified command commanders in February 1969. 2 He did require that the plans be renumbered when they were revised or by 1 January 1970, whichever came first. For this reason, reference throughout this history to operational plans may be made by their old number, as actions concerning them were taken in those terms in 1969.

A new quarterly publication was prepared by CINCPAC in 1969 to report plan status. This was the Plan Inventory Review of the CINCPAC and First Echelon Subordinate Commanders Operational Plans (PINVA ONE). This report was developed by CINCPAC to provide an automatic data processing formatted status listing of plans for each CINCPAC originated OPlan and PACOM First Echelon OPlans. 3

2. CINCPAC 200340Z Feb 69.
3. J511B History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
Distribution of Operational Plans

(U) In June 1969 CINCPACAF recommended that CINCPAC consider establishing a policy that would authorize elimination of all Military Assistance Advisory Groups and the Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma from distribution of component command operational plans. He believed that adequate guidance for those agencies was contained in CINCPAC OPlans, and eliminating them from distribution would reduce administrative workload.¹

(U) The question had arisen when the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, China asked whether CINCPACAF OPlans needed to be retained in his inventory.²

(U) CINCPAC queried those in his command that were involved and found that the consensus favored elimination of the distribution of component command operational plans. Accordingly, CINCPAC requested "PACOM Service Component Commanders delete all MAAGS, CHMEDT, and CHDLG INDONESIA from distribution of Oplans."³ CINCPAC directed those military assistance agencies to destroy the plans or return them to the headquarters that originated them.⁴

CINCPAC OPlan 43-69 (5043)

(TS) CINCPAC OPlan 43-69 (PACOM Actions in Event of a NATO/Warsaw Pact Conflict (S)), a new plan completed by CINCPAC, was forwarded to the JCS for approval on 29 January 1969. It was prepared in response to JCS guidance in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 69 and a November 1968 message, which charged CINCPAC with certain actions to be taken in the event of a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict.⁵

(S) In this plan, CINCPAC was required to:

a. Defend Hawaii, and defend continental U.S. against attack through the PACOM area.

b. Conduct defensive actions in SEAsia and South Korea.

¹ CINCPACAF 030403Z Jun 69.
² Ibid.
³ CINCPAC 020334Z Jul 69.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ J5116 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69; JCS 4705/012136Z Nov 68.
c. If unable to hold on mainland Asia, hold the general line of Philippines-Taiwan-Okinawa-Japan.

d. Within capabilities, control the seas and strategically significant straits from the Bering Strait to the Bay of Bengal, with emphasis on the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea and South China Sea.

e. Reinforce CINCEUR with significant numbers of land, sea and air forces.¹

The November 1968 guidance from the JCS provided specific guidelines for the deployment of PACOM forces to reinforce the EUCOM. CINCPAC was tasked to prepare a conceptual supporting plan to provide for deployment of major forces as listed in JSCP-69 (Volume II(B)), and to prepare a time-phased deployment listing of all forces to deploy from the PACOM. This listing was to be based on requirements provided by CINCEUR to the JCS.²

CINCPAC planners noted that:

...A major attack against NATO would conceivably be the prelude to general war unless some political means were rapidly used to bring about a cease fire. Consequently, CINCPAC actions in this event are directed toward a posture designed to cope with the worst eventuality.³

The JCS approved CINCPAC's OPlan 43-69 in April, subject to incorporation of a couple of changes and pending development of detailed plans by CINCEUR and the Military Services.⁴ The changes directed by the JCS did not significantly modify CINCPAC actions or previous requirements.

In June CINCRSTRIKE, in order to begin planning, requested the number of tactical squadrons transiting the CONUS and the MEAFSA areas in deployment from the PACOM to the EUCOM in support of CINCPAC OPlan 43-69 (by this time identified by the number 5043).⁵ CINCPACAF was asked to provide the necessary information to formulate a reply. He did so and on 8 July

1. J5116 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. J5 Brief No. 00130-69, 3 May 69, of JCS SM-279-69 of 24 Apr 69, Subj: CINCPAC OPlan 43-69 (PACOM Actions in Event of NATO/Warsaw Pact Conflict (C)).
5. J5111 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
CINCSTRIKE was informed that all USAF forces would be deployed via the CONUS. The deployment schedule was furnished. It was also pointed out to CINCSTRIKE that at the peak of the operation (D+5 through D+22) approximately 70 KC-135s would be required daily to support the redeployment. Combat support and combat service support transportation requirements would require approximately 72 C-141 equivalents daily during the peak period.  

CINCPAC OPlan 95-70 (5095)

(2) The JCS approved CINCPAC's revised version of OPlan 95-70 (Quadripartite Naval Countermeasures (SN)) in July with the exception of the plan's Electronic Warfare annex. This was a unilateral capabilities plan for the conduct of various types of naval countermeasures against ships of the U.S.S.R., East Germany, and Eastern Europe communist countries when those ships were in the PACOM area. The countermeasures would be in support of agreed policy of the quadripartite nations: France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The plan responded to possible increased restrictions by the U.S.S.R. on Allied rights to Berlin and outlined coordinated national plans for the naval countermeasures on a worldwide basis.  

(3) The Electronic Warfare annex had been prepared before the receipt of certain JCS guidance. It needed only minor revision to bring it in line with the terminology of the guidance.  

PACOM OPlan GARDEN PLOT

(2) GARDEN PLOT was a new joint plan developed in 1969 for the employment of Federal military resources in civil disturbance operations in Hawaii, Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the island possessions in the Pacific Command. It was approved by CINCPAC on 23 June. Although it was a joint plan and involved participation by elements of all Services, it was primarily an Army project, with CINCUSARPAC the executive agent. In August CINCUSARPAC nominated the new Commanding General of the U.S. Army Hawaii as the Commander of JTF 110 (PACOM Civil Disturbance Force

1. Admin CINCPAC 082236Z Jul 69.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
(GARDEN PLOT)). CINCPAC confirmed the nomination on 31 August. Later in the year CINCUSARPAC prepared two changes to the plan; these were approved by CINCPAC on 3 October and 10 December.

Electronic Warfare Annexes to PACOM Operational Plans

(U) One of the first major efforts undertaken by the Electronic Warfare Branch of the Operations Division after its formation in July 1968 had been to insure that required electronic warfare support and guidance would be available in the event of hostilities in any area of the PACOM. At that time general electronic warfare direction was contained in the Communications-Electronics annexes of CINCPAC Operational Plans. It was believed that more specific and detailed guidance was needed by commanders, and by the end of 1969 the Electronic Warfare Branch had created individually tailored electronic warfare annexes for all major CINCPAC contingency plans.

Contingency Planning Simplification - The Joint Operation Planning System

(U) Again in 1969 both CINCPAC and the JCS worked toward simplifying and improving contingency planning. In April the JCS proposed a Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) document to consolidate in a single publication the basic procedures and guidance for planning joint operations. The objectives of the JOPS were to minimize the number of operation plans that must be prepared in complete detail; facilitate the preparation, use, and understanding of operation plans by standardizing formats and content; facilitate force planning by establishing a uniform system of force packaging; exploit the advantages of automatic data processing techniques in support of operation planning; provide for more effective review of operation plans submitted to the JCS; and establish a realistic method of identifying and reacting to force shortfalls and provide assistance to the Services in justifying requirements for force development.

(U) There were two categories of operation plans established by the JOPS—complete plans and concept plans. Complete plans were those that

1. CINCPAC 310043Z Aug 69.
2. CINCPAC 032018Z Oct 69.
3. Admin CINCPAC 102245Z Dec 69.
4. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
7. Ibid.
could be translated into an operation order with minimum alteration. They were to include deployment and/or employment phases, as appropriate. A complete plan normally would be prepared for those situations where plan execution would tax total forces available for planning; tax the available logistic or mobility resources under either mobilization or non-mobilization conditions; or be likely to occur within the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan time frame. A concept plan was to be an operation plan in abbreviated format, requiring further development in detail prior to implementation.  

(8) CINCPAC was asked to comment on the JOPS as proposed by the JCS. He did so on 31 May. 2 CINCPAC said that the JOPS represented "a significant improvement in the joint operational planning process." 3 He said that standardization of plan format and review procedures, preparation of concept versus complete plans, exploitation of ADP capabilities, and the use of the force packaging concept were "all desirable and appear feasible through JOPS." 4

(8) CINCPAC noted that development and review of concept plans would somewhat reduce the planning workload. He also noted that the requirement for a detailed statement of objectives, concept of operations, and analysis of constraints would help insure that any required expansion of the concept plan would develop "from a well founded conceptual base." 5 He said it should be recognized, though, that the concept plan objective of rapid expansion of a sound operational concept into an operation order was possible--only after appropriate data bases had been established and ADP manipulative resources were possessed by all planning echelons involved.

(8) CINCPAC noted that:

... properly developed force packages would speed the planning process and provide rapid evaluation of force availability. Procedures for changing and updating the Force Package Data File should provide for simultaneous execution by all users to insure a common data base for exchange of planning information. 6

(8) CINCPAC cautioned that while ADP techniques would ultimately speed the planning process, not all planning organizations involved would have ADP

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 310302Z May 69.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
capabilities initially. If inadequate time were allowed for certain processes, such as preparation of a Time-Phased Force Deployment List, it would tend to reduce time available for necessary coordination and review within the unified command.

(C) CINCPAC summarized:

...because of the vast amount of data to be maintained, it does not appear that in the near future the total planning workload will be reduced as a result of JOPS. However, CINCPAC agrees that the objectives of JOPS are desirable and attainable and that there will be an ensuing improvement in the usefulness, quality and validity of operation plans. In the near term, the main advantages of JOPS will be standardization of plan format, content and review procedures. At such time as force packages are developed and implemented, the major advantage of the JOPS should then accrue. ¹

(U) Based on comments received from CINCPAC and other unified command commanders, the Services, and Defense Department agencies, the JOPS document was revised by the JCS and again forwarded to the field for review prior to discussion at a worldwide JOPS conference held in Washington in November. Based on the results of that conference the JCS were revising the JOPS and publication early in 1970 was anticipated. ²

Reduction in Force Generation Levels

(G) The number of force generation levels for the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) was decreased in 1969 as a result of a proposal by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff to the JCS. Force generation levels were sub-plans of attack options made necessary by a change in the numbers of delivery vehicles available for immediate launch. They related individual unit sortie generation rates to available preparation time. The concept had been developed to provide the JCS with the capability to launch an optimum strike force consistent with preparation time.

(G) Each attack option in Revision E to the SIOP could have been executed under one of 15 force generation levels, which had made the SIOP bulky and its attendant administrative workload overtaxing.

1. Ibid.
2. J5131 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
SECRET

CINCPAC and the other commanders of unified and specified commands concurred in the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff proposal to reduce the number of force generation levels to seven. This reduced administrative workload and still provided the JCS with sufficient latitude for selecting an optimum strike force based on more desirable preparation times.

The JCS approved the recommendations with minor modification and the change was implemented with Revision F, SIOP-4, effective 1 July 1969.

CINCPAC Planners Conference

A CINCPAC Planners Conference was held at Camp Smith from 2 to 5 June 1969. It was the first conference hosted by CINCPAC that involved wide representation of high level PACOM planners addressing the general problems of the joint planning process. The purpose of the conference was to present, discuss, and resolve common problems related to operational planning in the PACOM. Although the conference addressed primarily the specific problems peculiar to the PACOM, problems common to any staff involved in joint planning were also discussed. Attending the conference were 78 representatives from the JCS, the Military Airlift Command, the Military Sea Transport Service, the Services, CINCPAC's subordinate commands, and the CINCPAC staff. Each command made a presentation on planning problems in its area and the JCS presented the proposed Joint Operation Planning System. Part of the period was devoted to working group seminars. A similar conference was proposed for 1970.

Distribution of Plans Outside the Military Establishment

The JCS reiterated and clarified their policy covering the distribution of military plans in August 1969. They specifically directed that military plans not be distributed outside the military establishment, except in specific cases approved by the JCS as they had outlined in their Memorandum of Policy 144, of 13 September 1966.

COMUSMACV interpreted this guidance, however, to exclude the Combined Campaign Plan for Vietnam, AB 145. This plan complemented and supported the Pacification and Development Plan prepared by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. He requested that various U.S. non-military

1. J5161 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
2. Ibid.
3. J5133 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
4. JCS 7704/272207 Z Aug 69.
activities be permitted to receive the plan. These included principally State Department agencies in Saigon and Washington, all directly concerned.

CINCPAC agreed with COMUSMACV and recommended this interpretation to the JCS. The JCS approved this interpretation and word was relayed by CINCPAC to COMUSMACV.

1. COMUSMACV 52890/170753Z Sep 69.
2. CINCPAC 242205Z Sep 69.

6. The text of the resolution: Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting...
armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of... This text was quoted on page 299 of Documents on American Foreign Relations 1955, published for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956). It was taken from the text of the Joint (Congressional) Resolution on the Defense of Formosa, adopted by the House of Representatives, January 25, 1955 and the Senate, January 28, 1955, Public Law 4, 84th Congress, 1st Session.

1. CINCPAC 082105Z Dec 69.
2. A crisis had occurred in 1958. At that time the U.S. State Department had reiterated the U.S. view that "the ties between the offshore islands and Formosa have become closer, and their interdependence has increased." Quoted from Deadline Data on World Affairs, entry for 28 Aug 58 issued 10 Jan 69 by McGraw Hill Publications.
3. These six steps were included in a draft study under consideration by the East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Regional Group. (J5 Brief No. 000430-68, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Dec 68, of J-5 M 2103-68 of 19 Dec 68, Subj: Papers Ancillary to Taiwan Straits SAFC (U). For an explanation of the role of the Interdepartmental Regional Group, see J5 Brief No. 035-69, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jan 69 of JCS 2488/1 of 21 Jan 69, Subj: Reorganization of the National Security Council System NSDM #2 (U); J5 Brief No. 034-69, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jan 69, of JCS 2488/2 of 21 Jan 69, Subj: The Direction, Coordination, and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas – NSDM 3 (U).
CINCPAC concurred without reservation on three of six proposed steps. One was to "Hold the number of MAAG and other official American personnel assigned to Quemoy and Matsu to the minimum compatible with our intelligence requirements and the continuing need to monitor GRC activities in that area." A second proposal with which CINCPAC concurred in part was to "Gradually reduce the incidence of visits by official Americans and avoid statements by those who do make such visits which endorse the importance which the attaches to its position there and the extensive character of its investment in the defense of." CINCPAC concurred with the idea of avoiding statements by individuals, but he noted that visits were already at a low level and that further reduction would invite attention to the issue. He said, "Guidance to keep visits at minimum level compatible with accomplishment of his mission should have the desired effect."

Two steps with which CINCPAC concurred without reservation were as follows:

1. Ibid., CINCPAC 252036 Z Jan 69.
2. CINCPAC 252036 Z Jan 69.
3. Ibid.
(U) In September 1969 the matter of "nerve gas" surfaced also in the press in Hawaii with great emotionalism. The Honolulu newspapers published a story about a "hush-hush military program testing toxic nerve gas" on the island of Hawaii in 1966 and 1967. State and local officials immediately expressed outrage and pursued the matter with Army officials in Hawaii and Washington.

3. Ibid.
4. Whether this was done is not known.
SECTION VIII - WAR GAMING

SIGMA I-69 Politico-Military Game

SIGMA I-69 was a senior level, inter-agency politico-military simulation under the auspices of the Chairman of the JCS and conducted by the Joint War Games Agency from 15 April through 1 May 1969. The game concerned itself with the situation in the Pacific-Asian area after a presumed de facto cease-fire had been attained in South Vietnam. CINCPAC contributed suggested scenarios for consideration by the game staff in preparing for the game. Those submitted were well represented in the substance of the game play. CINCPAC's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence represented him and two other CINCPAC staff officers also participated. 1

The following resulted from the critique:

(1) US forward military strategy is seen as necessary for the foreseeable future. China poses a political threat in striving for hegemony over Southeast Asia. In the absence of a significant US military presence, Peking would rapidly extend its influence in the region. North Vietnam is a military threat. Its unwavering goal is reunification of Vietnam.

(2) Hanoi's loss of control over its political apparatus in South Vietnam could prompt an "all-out" North Vietnamese military attack against the South. North Vietnam views its objectives in northeast Thailand--and in Laos--subsidiary to reunification of Vietnam.

(3) With a phase-down of US military presence, Japan would likely assume an increasing defense role in Asia. Effective rearmament by Japan for defensive or offensive purposes is seen as a possible long-term development.

(4) United States sees its interests as continued access to Asia and prevention of the emergence of a dominant hostile power. 2

1. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
2. Ibid.
Prelaunch Survivability Factors for SIOP Planning

(Confidential) On 27 August the JCS tasked CINCPAC for submission of updated prelaunch survivability factors and provided extensive guidance in the form of war gaming scenarios and threat analyses. CINCPAC's Scientific Advisory Group was asked to conduct studies in coordination with CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT analytical groups to develop a spectrum of possible PACOM prelaunch survivability factor values utilizing this common guidance over a range of force generation factor levels and for several credible variations in force posture.

(TS) Computational methodologies were developed and over 60 different scenario/force posture cases were calculated. Controlling assumptions provided in the guidance were:

a. A threat of 450-500 weapons (half of these surface-to-surface missiles) targeted on PACOM installations.

b. Warning conditions which precluded, in the case of a Red surprise attack, any PACOM aircraft launch until 20 minutes after first RED SSM's detonated on important PACOM land bases.

(TS) The prelaunch survivability factors arising from this study were the first to be recalculated since 1965 and showed some general improvement, particularly in the case of U.S. retaliation to a communist surprise attack. Results of the study were forwarded to the JCS in October.

1. J3A10 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 150209Z Oct 69.
SECTION IX - OPERATIONS OF U.S. FORCES

Peacetime Rules of Engagement for Seaborne Forces

Existing rules of engagement for seaborne forces had been promulgated in 1962. A proposed revision to those rules had been forwarded by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense on 26 April 1967 and returned to the JCS on 14 September 1968 for a reevaluation in light of comments provided by the Deputy Secretary, who said:

...The scope of rules of engagement should be limited to those situations of a fairly local character which urgently require the use of force in self-defense, and that except for the need of individual units of U.S. forces to defend themselves from attack on the high seas, the authority to decide on other uses of force should not be reposed in the commander on the scene. Rules of engagement should reserve to the maximum extent possible to the highest authorities of the Government decisions which involve the use of forces in peacetime.¹

The Deputy Secretary suggested eliminating the terms "hostile act" and "hostile" from the rules, saying it would appear preferable to utilize "a direct and simplified definition of the circumstances involved authorizing self-defense which could be easily applied by the commander concerned."² The JCS asked the unified and specified commanders for their comments, particularly on the major issue to be resolved, which was the scope of the authority to be granted under the rules.

CINCPAC replied on 24 April.³ He noted that modification of the revised rules to place increased emphasis on the concept of self-defense and the reservation to highest authorities of the Government decisions which involve the use of force in peacetime could result in the "undesirable elimination of needed guidance and authority." As CINCPAC explained:

...While decisions concerning the engagement of foreign forces threatening CONUS by attack and the use of

2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 240209Z Apr 69.
CONFIDENTIAL

force to protect the national interests of the U.S. or U.S.
personnel or property abroad should normally be reserved to
authority higher than the commander on the scene, there are
situations in which the on-scene commander must have
authority to act immediately. For example, the strategic
missile-firing submarine is a threat which will not permit
delayed reaction once a launch has been initiated. Similarly,
the launching of an enemy attack in strength against other
U.S. forces in the area will not permit delay.

... Enclosure B to Ref A tends to overemphasize the
fact that improvements in communications have made it
possible for decisions to be made at a high level and does
not give due consideration to the untenable situation which
could result from the combination of a loss of communications
and a lack of authority for action under the ROE. Any require-
ment in the ROE that a commander await decision from higher
authority in all cases except those involving self-defense of
his own unit(s) would be unduly dangerous and restrictive.
Such delays could result in loss of a large portion of the force.
Further, the granting of authority to an on-scene commander
to communicate directly with the JCS in urgent situations,
as recommended..., has the implication that the JCS would
be requested to make a decision without the benefit of evalua-
tion and recommendations by commanders in the chain of
command. 1

CINCPAC recommended that the JCS continue to support the revised
rules of engagement as they had been proposed by the JCS and that if modifica-
tions were made they did not lessen the authority already granted to the on-
scene commander or commanders in the chain of command. 2

In September the JCS again forwarded revised peacetime rules of
engagement for seaborne forces to the Secretary of Defense for approval.
They were substantially the same as those they had submitted in 1967. Among
the more significant changes to the 1962 rules were a number of new and re-
vised definitions; revised examples of hostile acts, to include maneuvering
with a deliberate intent to collide with a U.S. unit; less detailed requirements
for declaring forces hostile; somewhat greater emphasis on self-defense; and
revised supplemental procedures for submerged contacts. 3 The rules of

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J3 Brief No. 219-69, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Sep 69, of JCSM-561-69, Subj:
   Peacetime Rules of Engagement of Seaborne Forces (U).
engagement proposed by the JCS were somewhat more flexible than existing
rules and, as had been recommended by CINCPAC in April, did not lessen the
authority granted to on-scene and other responsible commanders. CINCPAC
heard nothing further on the matter in 1969.

Protection of Peripheral Aerial Reconnaissance Aircraft

(TS) Following the shutdown of the EC-121 by North Korea on 15 April
1969, the JCS tasked CINCPAC to prepare plans for the protection of recon-
naissance aircraft. On 4 May CINCPAC approved and ordered implemented
CINCPACAF OPlan 103-69, which had been prepared in conjunction with
CINCPACFLT. It provided for a minimum of four Korea-based U.S. fighters
to be airborne at any time a reconnaissance flight entered certain areas off-
shore from Korea. At the end of 1969 these almost daily combat air patrol
operations were going well, but they still did not guarantee protection of the
reconnaissance planes from a concerted and dedicated air attack.

(TS) Additionally, on 20 May CINCPAC approved and directed implementa-
tion of CINCPACAF OPlan 106-69, another coordinated CINCPACAF-
CINCPACFLT plan which provided for U.S. fighters on strip alert at Misawa
Air Base, Japan, Tainan Air Base, Taiwan, and Naha, Okinawa as well as
deck alert fighters on the carrier which was occasionally located at the
DEFENDER STATION in the Yellow Sea, whenever a U.S. reconnaissance air-
craft penetrated an area within 200 nautical miles offshore of the U.S.S.R. or
Communist China. At any time the reconnaissance aircraft received a warning
that hostile attack was imminent or probable, the fighters were to be launched
automatically and vectored to assist the reconnaissance aircraft. This strip
alert capability was delayed in implementation because of the sensitivity of
discussions with the governments of Japan and Nationalist China over the
launch and control of U.S. fighters from their bases using their radar and
communications facilities. These matters were resolved, however, and the
program was implemented on 5 June. While the strip alert plan provided a
faster reaction time than was previously the case, strip alert actually provided
"very little protection against hostile attack by CHICOM and USSR fighters
because of the time and distance factor to effect an intercept."

1. Ibid.
2. Which the JCS had designated as areas for which fighter protection was
required.
3. Point Paper, J3B233, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Nov 69, Subj: Protection of Periph-
eral Aerial Reconnaissance Aircraft (U).
4. Four fighter aircraft at each base.
5. Ibid.
6. J3B211 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
Peacetime Peripheral Reconnaissance Guidance

(U) Late in 1968 CINCPAC consolidated into one document his guidance on all matters related to peacetime peripheral reconnaissance and sensitive military operations in the PACOM. This was in line with JCS guidance. The consolidated instructions were effective 1 January 1969. CINCPAC provided general policy guidance and more specific guidance on command and control, operational restrictions and limitations, risk determination, reporting, and mission management. A number of enclosures provided even more specific guidance on various reconnaissance programs.

(U) Some revisions to those parts of the guidance concerned with the delineation of sensitive areas were made in May 1969.

Nuclear Powered and Other Ship Visits to Foreign Ports

(S) For the most part, visits by U.S. ships to foreign ports were uneventful in 1969. While there were still some demonstrations in certain countries and some countries limited or curtailed the number of such visits, the year was not marked by serious incident.

Japan

(S) In Japan, nuclear visits began with a January visit to Yokosuka by the USS PLUNGER (SSN 595). This was the first visit to Yokosuka by a nuclear submarine since the May 1968 SWORDFISH incident in Sasebo. A total of 10

1. J3 Brief No. 177-69, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Jul 69, of JCS 2150/300 of 21 Jun 69, Subj: Protection of Reconnaissance Flights (U).
3. Admin CINCPAC 142306Z May 69.
nuclear submarine visits were conducted periodically during the year without major incident.¹

Ryukyus

(C) In March, Okinawa's Chief Executive, Chobyo Yara, had made a formal request of the High Commissioner for Japanese technical assistance for formation of a Ryukyan monitoring program to study radioactivity during nuclear-powered ship visits to Okinawan ports.² CINCPAC concurred in the proposals on the basis that a small team of experts from Japan's Science and Technology Agency (STA) would visit Okinawa to review Okinawan monitoring arrangements and provide advice, and would after a short period return to Japan. However, "CINCPAC does not concur in the permanent stationing of STA personnel in the Ryukyus."³

(C) The U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo and Japanese government officials continued to study the matter. In commenting on some questions raised by the Government of Japan, CINCPAC indicated his belief that the Okinawa monitoring system should not be patterned after the Science and Technology Agency system at Sasebo and Yokosuka, that the United States should not agree to share any cost of a monitoring system proposed by Japan, and that the United States should not provide prior notification of nuclear-powered ship visits to the Ryukyus.⁴

(C) A seven-man Japanese mission on radiation monitoring visited Okinawa in May. The fact-finding visit was conducted in a low key and the only substantive question raised with the High Commissioner was on prior notification of nuclear ship visits. The team was clearly told that prior notification was not possible, but the possibility was left open that notification could be provided at the time of ship arrival.⁵

(C) On 10 July the American Ambassador in Tokyo provided information on Japanese recommendations based on the May fact-finding trip. Some of these were presented orally. The Ambassador provided a gist of these and asked that the United States consider five particular points. CINCPAC offered the following comments on those five subjects:

1. J3B41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
2. J3B41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
3. CINCPAC 050520Z Apr 69.
4. CINCPAC 100203Z May 69.
5. J3B41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
a. There is no objection to the establishment of a system for official notification of NPW visits to GRI, provided notification is not made prior to date of arrival of the NPW at the port to be visited....

b. Because of the further loss of flexibility in Fleet operations which could result, it would be inadvisable for USG to announce that Naha will not be used for NPW visits in the future....

c. Inasmuch as U.S. and joint GRI-USCAR environmental monitoring programs are currently in effect, and because of its remote location, see no requirement for a permanent monitoring facility at White Beach at this time. The susceptibility of sensitive monitoring equipment to transient disturbances could result in adverse publicity of alleged abnormal readings....

d. No objection to making results of U.S. surveys available to GRI. It would appear that the most appropriate means for release of this information would be through the existing joint GRI-USCAR monitoring organization.

e. If considered necessary, there is no objection to public announcement that only White Beach and Naha have been used for NPW visits.  

(6) CINCPAC also noted that several comments he had made earlier on these matters remained unchanged. Subsequent comments by the High Commissioner and the joint position taken by the Secretaries of State and Defense agreed with the comments made by CINCPAC.  

(6) The matter of prior notification regarding nuclear-powered ship visits was raised again in September. Chief Executive Yara had been asking the High Commissioner for 24-hour advance notice of the arrival of nuclear powered submarines. The High Commissioner commented that there were no U.S. political or technical interests that would be served by advance notification and that the major concern over such a procedure was the matter of

2. U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands.
3. CINCPAC 130010Z Jul 69.
4. HICOMRY OKINAWA RYIS 140445Z Jul 69; DA 282230Z Jul 69.
security, that is, "leaks" by the Ryukyuan government could provide early alert to those who might want to demonstrate over such visits. He proposed to give the Chief Executive "a clear and finite negative reply." CINCPAC concurred in the proposed negative response, reaffirming his July position against prior notification.²

Taiwan

US BAINBRIDGE was the first U.S. nuclear-powered warship to visit Taiwan. The 7-12 June visit to Kaohsiung, during which the BAINBRIDGE anchored outside the harbor, presented no unusual problems in the area of diplomatic clearance and the visit was handled in a low key by both the United States and Nationalist China. No assurance of nuclear safety was requested and the U.S. standard statement on operation of U.S. nuclear powered warships in foreign ports, used to provide such assurance, was not required by the Chinese Government. There were no signs of opposition to or demonstrations against the visit.³

Indonesia

The USS MULLINNIX (DD 944) visited Belawan, Indonesia in April in what was hoped would be the first of a series of such visits to provide the mutual benefits that should result from closer U.S.-Indonesian service-to-service contacts.⁴ In November, CINCPAC asked that the U.S. Ambassador in Djakarta provide comments on the acceptability of USN ship visits to Indonesian ports in 1970 to include a recommended timetable.⁵

Malaysia

On 21 April the U.S. Defense Attache in Kuala Lumpur stated that the volume of clearance requests for ship visits suggested that the frequency and volume of such visits would continue to increase and he asked about CINCPAC's intentions regarding the utilization of Malaysian ports in the future.⁶ CINCPAC replied that it was not anticipated that the frequency of visits would increase greatly over the past average of two or three visits per quarter.⁷ On

1. HICOMRY OKINAWA RYIS 220850Z Sep 69.
2. CINCPAC 250353Z Sep 69.
3. USDAO TAIPEI TAIWAN 130600Z Jun 69.
4. CINCPAC 260249Z Nov 69.
5. Ibid.
6. USDAO KUALA LUMPUR 0217/210835Z Apr 69.
7. Admin CINCPAC 300005Z Apr 69.
16 May, however, the attache notified CINCPAC that, at the request of the Malaysian government, all ship visits to Malaysia were cancelled until further notice.¹

**Operations in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea**

(TS) Operations in the Sea of Japan continued in 1969. The U. S. S. R. had expressed its belief that use of the Sea of Japan should be restricted to countries bordering on those waters. The United States considered it an international body of water and our ships had been kept active there to avoid lending credence to Soviet assumptions by acquiescing or by too infrequently entering those waters.²

(TS) In early 1969 operations in the Sea of Japan north of the eastward extension of the demilitarized zone were authorized by the JCS subject to the condition that notification of operations to be conducted within 80 nautical miles of the coast of North Korea be provided in advance to the JCS. Following the shot-down of the EC-121 off the coast of North Korea on 15 April, the JCS restricted naval task force operations to that portion of the Sea of Japan south of 38° North.³ CINCPAC, in May, pointed out the problems created by this restriction and recommended that it be rescinded. He said:

...a continuing restriction against operations north of 38N would appear to be in contradiction with U. S. recognition of, and firm resolve to demonstrate the principle of, freedom of the seas and air space above. From an operational standpoint, this restriction confines fleet operations to a small, narrow area of the southern Sea of Japan which provides only limited room for maneuvering, and precludes access by naval units to the Sea of Japan via Tsugaru Straits. In order to regain the degree of operational flexibility necessary in naval operations and to permit clear demonstrations of U. S. resolve to operate freely in international waters, restrictions on fleet operations in the Sea of Japan should be lifted....

Recommended that:
A. Restrictions against the conduct of naval operations in the Sea of Japan north of 38N be rescinded.
B. Authority be granted to CINCPAC to approve naval

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1. USDAO KUALA LUMPUR 0291/160500Z May 69.
operations, other than and/or separate from... peacetime peripheral reconnaissance operations... which will take place in the Sea of Japan within 80 NM of the sovereign territory of North Korea north of the eastern extension of the DMZ. Advance notification of any plan for air or surface operations within this 80 NM area will be provided to the JCS. 1

(TS) On 9 June the JCS rescinded the restriction as CINCPAC had suggested and granted CINCPAC authority to "approve air or surface operations to be conducted in or over the Sea of Japan" subject to the following conditions:

... The JCS be provided advance notification of any plan for air or naval operations in the Sea of Japan which would bring US forces within 80 NM of the territory of North Korea north of the eastern extension of the DMZ.... Air or naval operations will not repeat not be conducted in the Sea of Japan within 12 NM of North Korea north of the eastern extension of the DMZ.... The guidance contained above does not alter previous guidance concerning peacetime peripheral reconnaissance missions or the protection therefor. 2

(TS) CINCPAC passed this guidance to his Service component command commanders on 15 June. 3

(TS) Operations in the Yellow Sea also came under study by CINCPAC. In June the JCS granted authority for operations in the Yellow Sea provided they were given advance notification. 4 CINCPAC directed his component command commanders to notify him of any planned air or naval operations in the Yellow Sea in time to provide advance notification to the JCS. He restricted air and naval operations in the Yellow Sea to areas outside a line 12 nautical miles from Communist China and North Korea. 5

Taiwan Strait Patrol

(S) Budget constraints began to impact on operations in the Taiwan Strait

1. CINCPAC 191210Z May 69.
2. JCS 02093/092211Z Jun 69.
3. CINCPAC 150133Z Jun 69.
4. JCS 3136/241834Z Jun 69.
5. CINCPAC 261919Z Jun 69.
in November 1969. On 1 November the Secretary of State asked the U.S. Ambassador in Taipei to inform Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo that a modification to the Taiwan Strait patrol would take place on or about 15 November. U.S. Navy force reductions would not permit the patrol to be manned on a continuous basis in the future. Instead, as explained by the Secretary, "functions performed by Taiwan Strait patrol as now constituted will continue to be performed by elements of SEVENTH Fleet as available in or transiting the area."

On 8 November, following JCS instructions, CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that the requirement for a formal and continuous surface patrol was terminated effective 15 November, and directed that the functions previously performed by the patrol be performed by SEVENTH Fleet ships available in or transiting the Taiwan Strait area. CINCPACFLT was further directed to submit plans for implementing this modification.

The U.S. Ambassador reported that he had informed Vice Premier Chiang on 7 November of the scheduled modification. The Vice Premier said that his initial reaction was that the modification may be interpreted by the Communist Chinese as a change in U.S. policy, and he asked that the United States give careful consideration to the planned change.

During the next week there were numerous meetings among Embassy, COMUSTDC, and Chinese officials in which the Chinese raised arguments concerning the possibility of Communist China's misinterpretation of U.S. intentions, impact of the change on Chinese Navy operations and morale, press releases, etc.

The Secretary of State, however, indicated that he agreed with the Ambassador that the Taiwan patrol was unilaterally assigned and its modification did not require consultation with the Chinese. He said the Communist threat was not likely to increase significantly as a result of the modification and that the "decision to change patrol from permanent to intermittent status is not subject to change." He asked CINCPAC to comment on the feasibility of U.S. ships following previous patrol routes and to provide COMUSTDC with

1. SECSTATE 195493/011956Z Nov 69 quoted in J3B41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
2. JCS 04052/052158Z Nov 69.
3. CINCPAC 080337Z Nov 69.
4. AMEMBASSY Taipei 4509/070831Z Nov 69.
5. SECSTATE 191154/130300Z Nov 69, quoted in J3B41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
an estimate of the frequency of future patrols and other operational information.\(^1\)

\(\text{(S)}\) After he received CINCPACFLT's plan for implementation of the modified patrol, CINCPAC advised the Secretary of State and COMUSTDC that imposition of pre-established transit routes would be undesirable (fixed routes had not been specified in the past) and that an estimated average of 15 ships a month would transit the Strait and perform patrol duties.\(^2\)

\(\text{(TS)}\) On 15 November, prior to a meeting scheduled among the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Admiral McCain, and President Chiang Kai-shek, CINCPAC advised the JCS that unless he were directed otherwise, in view of China's concern, two ships would be retained on the Taiwan Strait patrol for an interim period pending resolution of the matter.\(^3\) He directed CINCPACFLT to continue the patrol as it had been conducted prior to 15 November.\(^4\)

\(\text{(TS)}\) The JCS advised CINCPAC that retention of two ships on patrol had been approved by the Secretary of Defense for a period of five days.\(^5\) In turn, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to retain two ships on patrol until 20 November.\(^6\)

\(\text{(TS)}\) Following the meeting with President Chiang, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense reported that patrol procedures had been clarified for the President and that he had informed Admiral McCain that the modified patrol plan should be implemented immediately.\(^7\) CINCPAC so directed CINCPACFLT and informed the JCS.

\(\text{(S)}\) On 18 November COMUSTDC reported that the Chinese Ministry of National Defense wanted to discuss the matter further, and CINCPAC furnished the following information on the conduct of the patrol:

1. An average of 15 ships per month will transit the Strait and perform patrol duties under OPCON of CTF 72.

2. Destroyer types will be used insofar as practicable to conduct the transits. Other suitable ship types will be

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. Ibid.
\item 2. CINCPAC 150100Z Nov 69.
\item 3. J3B41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
\item 4. CINCPAC 150834Z Nov 69.
\item 5. J3B41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
\item 6. CINCPAC 151913Z Nov 69.
\item 7. J3B41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
\end{itemize}
utilized, when necessary, to ensure that a schedule of approximately 15 transits per month is maintained.

(3) In addition to transiting ships, suitable SEVENTH-FLT ships in Taiwan ports, as available, will be assigned to CTF 72 for use in the event of a contingency.

(4) Under the modified patrol concept, it is not intended nor possible for SEVENTHFLT units to provide continuous underway coverage of the Strait. However, the modified patrol will provide actual and highly visible U.S. participation.

(5) With the above information, and the SEVENTHFLT schedule of designated Taiwan patrol ships and individual ships track data, the GRC can reasonably be expected to develop an employment schedule for their own ships which will result in continuous surface coverage of the Strait.¹

(S) COMUSTDC reported on 26 November that during the course of his discussions with Ministry of National Defense personnel, they had "hedged when asked for specifics on form and extent of planned CN coverage." They had commented that China felt that the SEVENTH Fleet coverage of the Strait since 15 November had been such that the Communists would not detect the modification. COMUSTDC stated:

Apparently the GRC is satisfied with current U.S. arrangements in Taiwan Strait or at least not so dissatisfied that they are willing to signify any willingness to supplement or augment U.S. coverage. As previously reported... Gimo in conversations with DEPSEC Packard implied GRC could relieve U.S. of some of its burdens if the U.S. would furnish wherewithal to give GRC air and navy superiority in Taiwan Strait, and present position may be intended as level for selective military aid.²

Manned Space Flight Recovery

(U) Plans for 1969, which proved to be the most eventful and successful year yet in the history of America's space exploration, began in the PACOM with preparation for a recovery requirements meeting at the Manned Space

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1. J3B41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
2. ADMINO COMUSTDC 2606212 Nov 69.
Center in Houston held 22 January. CINCPACFLT, as CINCPAC Executive Agent for manned space flight recovery operations, sent a representative. CINCPAC's previous request to delay the transfer of the USS YORKTOWN to CINCLANT had been approved by the JCS in October 1968 to meet primary recovery ship requirements for APOLLO 8, which launched 27 December 1968. At the Houston meeting it was concluded that primary recovery ship requirements could be met satisfactorily by an amphibious assault ship (LPH), providing modifications were made to accommodate NASA peculiary facilities, equipment, communications, and personnel.

(U) Four manned space flights were flown as scheduled during 1969. APOLLO 9 was a 10-day earth orbital mission launched on 3 March that provided a checkout of the lunar module. PACOM forces supported secondary and contingency recovery options for this flight while the splashdown was made in the Atlantic primary recovery area.

(U) APOLLO 10, which launched on 18 May on a 10-day mission, provided a checkout of the lunar module in lunar orbit in preparation for the first manned landing on the moon. PACOM forces performed the primary recovery with the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) east of Samoa.

(U) Then came the big one. The mission of APOLLO 11 was to perform the first manned landing, to conduct limited exploration of the lunar environment, and to effect the safe return of the astronauts and their lunar sample to earth. The craft splashed down, following a most successful mission, southwest of Johnston Island on 24 July. USS HORNET (CVS-12) was assigned as the primary recovery ship while recovery operations were under the operational control of Commander Task Force 130 located at the Pacific Recovery Control Center at Kunia. Additional coordination by the CINCPAC staff and the task force commander provided arrangements for President Nixon to be on board the USS HORNET to greet returning astronauts Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins, and Edwin Aldrin.

(U) Admiral McCain made the following statement on that historic occasion:

1. JCS 312304Z Oct 68.
2. National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
3. J3B222 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
4. J3B222 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
5. J3B222 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
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I have just returned after joining President Nixon aboard the USS HORNET for the splashdown of APOLLO 11. I would like to say that this voyage through space is one of, if not the most, important occurrences in the entire history of mankind. Because of this first landing on the moon we are going to live in a different world. Obviously it is going to be a world in which there is going to be much greater accord in the human race. It greatly adds to the type of society that we belong to—democratic with freedom for the individual—if for no other reason than the fashion in which this magnificent achievement was accomplished.

As you are well aware, the United States went about this project with a completely open book. There were no secrets from mankind. Millions viewed this significant occurrence on television and heard it by radio all over the world. It establishes without question or doubt in the minds of millions throughout the world the importance and the lasting type of society to which we all belong.

Interestingly enough, in somewhat of a prophetic nature, Columbus discovered America in the light of the late rising moon. Today we have visited that planet. To those who have misgivings about the exploration of space and the movement of man into this heretofore unknown section of the universe, I would like to ask: Who would stand on the dock today and say to Columbus, as was said in 1492, "Don't make that voyage!"

So, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great privilege to have been the first to arrive in Hawaii to have seen this tremendous and magnificent occurrence. It is a great credit to those who are involved, to the bravery of the men of APOLLO 11, and to the persistence, courage, coordination, and cooperation of many other thousands in this great moon landing.  

(U) Radio frequency support and protection were provided for APOLLO 11 as they had been for previous APOLLO shots. Support and protection also


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had to be provided for the White House Communications Agency during APOLO 11 for the President’s around-the-world visits. As these events occurred concurrently, a heavy demand was placed on PACOM radio frequency resources. Approximately 500 discrete frequencies were dedicated or time shared during these events, but by close coordination among those involved the frequency protection and support were the best yet experienced in the PACOM during manned space missions or Presidential trips.¹

(U) PACOM space flight participation for 1969 ended on 24 November when Admiral McCain officially welcomed the APOLO 12 crew on their return from the moon in ceremonies again on board the USS HORNET. Admiral McCain was the highest ranking official in this welcoming party for astronauts Charles Conrad, Jr., Richard F. Gordon, Jr., and Alan L. Bean. His short remarks were nationally televised.²
SECTION X - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Funding for Psychological Operations Programs

On 12 July 1969 CINCUSARPAC informed that funds were not available to meet the shortfall imposed on the PACOM FY 70 Psychological Operations (PSYOP) program as a result of the FY 70 Operational Maintenance - Army (OMA) funding restrictions worldwide.\(^1\) CINCPAC requested his subordinate commands to review support requests.\(^2\) CINCUSARPAC indicated on 28 August 1969 that the FY 70 PSYOP program could be supported at an 8.3 million dollar level.\(^3\) CINCPAC review of the budget was completed on 22 September 1969 and the PACOM PSYOP Program adjusted in consonance with command priorities. CINCUSARPAC was requested on 27 September 1969 to effect production and procurement action necessary to implement the revised program.\(^4\) Programs were affected as follows:\(^5\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Expense</th>
<th>Original Forecast Cost</th>
<th>Adjusted Program Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Printing and Reproduction</td>
<td>7,555,535</td>
<td>5,132,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies and Materials</td>
<td>2,638,500</td>
<td>1,772,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased Services</td>
<td>206,558</td>
<td>203,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>338,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Cost</td>
<td>1,041,907</td>
<td>1,041,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel and Transportation</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,931,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,300,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reduction of Air Assets Dedicated to Psychological Operations

On 13 November the Air Force Chief of Staff, because of budget constraints, directed the reduction of the 9th Special Operations Squadron in Vietnam from six C-47 aircraft to three effective at the end of 1969 and from three to zero effective 30 June 1970. Objections by COMUSMACV and the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon and nonconcurrence by CINCPAC caused CINCPACAF to ask the Air Force Chief of Staff to reconsider the decision.\(^6\)

1. CINCUSARPAC 120612Z Jul 69.
2. CINCPAC 200506Z Aug 69.
3. CINCUSARPAC 282112Z Aug 69.
4. CINCPAC 270436Z Sep 69.
5. CINCPAC 200506Z Aug 69.
6. CSAF 132137Z Nov 69; CINCPAC 181015Z Nov 69; J5611 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
COMUSMACV proposed that Air Force roles and missions in Vietnam be reviewed with a view toward assigning PSYOP missions a priority commensurate with Vietnamization. As a result of these actions, the Air Force Chief of Staff on 3 December 1969 reinstated the three C-47s through the end of FY 70 and asked CINCPACAF to revalidate the PSYOP requirement with COMUSMACV and CINCPAC for FY 71. CINCPAC revalidated the requirement on 7 December 1969, stating:

...Proposed reductions of USAF PSYOP air assets now or in the foreseeable future will have a degrading impact on critically important PSYOP mission in SEA. Additionally, it is considered essential that a minimum US PSYOP air delivery capability be maintained in the PACOM beyond FY 71 to provide for contingency operations.

Requirement for PSYOP Leaflet and Radio Dispensing System

TS On 7 December 1967 COMUSMACV had requested development of a dispensing system capable of handling multiple PSYOP material, including radios. There was a need to disseminate miniaturized, inexpensive, fixed-frequency radios over North Vietnam, according to COMUSMACV and the U.S. Information Agency.

TS In January 1969 the JCS had approved the idea and recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the Air Force be authorized to develop the radios and appropriate delivery systems for them. On 9 May, however, the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had disapproved the recommendation because he believed that the situation had changed from the time the recommendations had been made and that the requirement for such radios and delivery system was in doubt. He also noted the intense competition for funds even among projects based on clear and acknowledged requirements.

Psychological Warfare Programs Against North Vietnam

In November 1968 all overt PSYOP programs against North Vietnam were suspended, including the leaflet campaign called FRANTIC GOAT. The U.S. Information Agency, however, directed retention of the ability and preparedness to initiate wind-drift leaflet deliveries to North Vietnam in the

1. COMUSMACV 180929Z Nov 69.
2. CINCPAC 070218Z Dec 69.
3. J5621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
4. JCS 8912/092116Z May 69.
event it became desirable to emphasize certain developments to the people of North Vietnam or to reinforce radio broadcasts. Reports from the monitoring of North Vietnam's radio broadcasts indicated that North Vietnam was waging a massive and concerted psychological campaign, claiming the halt in the bombing of North Vietnam as a great victory. Hanoi's Party newspaper, Nhan Dan, carried commentary in its 21 November 1968 issue that summed up the propaganda line: "Great victories of our armed forces and people compelled the United States to unconditionally end all bombing and strafing throughout the North." 1

CINCPAC therefore told the JCS:

... In view of NVN's exploitation of bombing halt as a "victory" rather than as a positive step taken by the Allies toward peace in SVN, a PSYOPS campaign employing wind drift leaflet dissemination from Laos and/or the South China Sea should be launched against NVN. Such a campaign would reinforce radio broadcasts to NVN and help get the truth to NVN populace on a priority basis. 2

He recommended reinstituting his September 1967 FRANTIC GOAT operational order for overt aerial leaflet operations, with some modifications. He recommended the wind drift technique for dissemination and finished by saying, "Continued leaflet 'silence' after years of operations is undesirable because it tends to support the NVN propaganda theme that the US was compelled to cease the bombing." 4

In February 1969 the JCS concurred in CINCPAC's recommendation and asked the Secretary of Defense for authority to resume the campaign. The only significant adjustment made by the JCS to the proposed campaign was that delivery aircraft would not approach the North Vietnamese coast closer than 12 nautical miles (international limits as claimed by North Vietnam) instead of the 20 nautical miles proposed by CINCPAC. 5

On 21 April 1969 the JCS advised CINCPAC of the Secretary's decision. He disapproved the request, stating:

1. CINCPAC 090426Z Jan 69.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
The effectiveness of leaflet operations in NVN is generally unknown. However, the nature of the Hanoi government with its high degree of population and idea control makes it unlikely that a limited leaflet campaign would create any measure of unrest. After several years of conducting an almost countrywide leaflet campaign, there are no indications that we aroused strong enough public opinion to affect seriously Hanoi governmental actions. In fact, a leaflet campaign could possibly be counter-productive in focusing the attention of the populace to the US intrusion in the internal affairs of NVN. A likely accusation to arise is that the US aircraft are intruding into NVN territory and thus violating understandings reached at the Paris talks. The US has countered NVN propaganda by our reasonable stand at Paris. Since the leaflet drops and the bombing halted at the same time, the resumption of the leaflet drops during this time frame could be interpreted an act of US escalation. If future developments negate our present concern, I will entertain a recommendation for a resumption of a leaflet campaign against North Vietnam at that time.  

[S] Late in the year, the whole matter of our PSYOP programs came under more intense study. In December 1969 the U.S. Information Agency, in a joint action with the Defense Department, notified CINCPAC that the White House had requested immediate preparation of an assessment of psychological warfare (PSYWAR) programs designed to lower the morale of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese populace. They specifically requested suggestions for improving the program, particularly against North Vietnam, and for a description of any foreseen problems concerning possible disruption of PSYWAR programs as Vietnamization proceeds.
CINCPAC further suggested that the overall program be a national effort, involving participation by other U.S. government agencies and requiring high-level coordination in Washington. The theater aspects of the program, however, were within existing CINCPAC capabilities, and management by CINCPAC was recommended.²

Voice of the United Nations Command

³The transmitters of the Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) in Korea came under study again in 1969. In December 1968 the JCS had tasked the CINCUNC (who in turn had tasked the 7th PSYOP Group) to proceed with a detailed technical/engineering study of the coverage and effectiveness of the VUNC in North Korea to determine its ability to be heard in desired target areas. (The JCS acknowledged that the Interdepartmental Regional Group⁴ had decided on 12 May 1967 that broadcasts to North Korea be continued "as at present."⁵ But they also stated that while the Interdepartmental Regional Group was "obviously aware that VUNC facilities at some point in

1. J561 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. Ibid.
4. For an explanation of the role of this Interdepartmental Regional Group, see J5 Brief No. 035-69, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jan 69 of JCS 2488/1 of 21 Jan 69, Subj: Reorganization of the National Security Council System NSDM #2 (U); J5 Brief No. 034-69, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Jan 69, of JCS 2488/2 of 21 Jan 69, Subj: The Direction, Coordination, and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas - NSDM 3 (U).
5. JCS 6760/02222092 Dec 68.
time would require rejuvenation, nonetheless IRG will need to review proposal to expand VUNC's facilities beyond those presently in place."

(3) The American Ambassador studied the expanded coverage that was proposed by the study group. He did not agree, however, that the additional expense and expansion of U.S. permanent presence in the ROK was justified if the new recommended site at Kangnung were directed only at a North Korean audience. He felt the new transmitter site should be used to broadcast to South Koreans in the eastern coastal areas, which were regarded as highly vulnerable to agent infiltration. He believed that the new transmitter site "would most effectively contribute to strengthening of ROK defense posture if it assists ROKG in establishing better communications with people of this relatively remote area." Therefore, he agreed to the establishment of the Kangnung site only if it were modified to permit broadcasting to the eastern coastal areas of the ROK and that the Korea Broadcasting System were permitted to use the transmitter on a shared-time basis.

(C) CINCUNC concurred in the Embassy's stipulations and strongly recommended that the JCS approve the study's proposal.

(5) CINCPAC, on 26 August 1969, in view of North Korea's propaganda campaign, recommended that the proposal to establish an additional 50 kilowatt transmitter for the VUNC be approved.

(5) In October the JCS recommended that a joint State/Defense message be sent to inform CINCPAC and the CINCUNC that due to current manpower and budget restrictions additional funds or manpower spaces were not available for any support of the additional transmitter. The Secretary of Defense had not made a decision in the matter by the end of the year.
SECTION XI - JOINT EXERCISES

Joint Exercises

(S) The budget cuts announced in 1969 impacted on the PACOM exercise schedule as they caused cancellation of nearly all of the JCS directed and coordinated exercises falling in the second half of FY 70. In September the JCS asked CINCPAC for his comments concerning the proposed budget reduction actions. CINCPAC replied that SEATO exercises involved tentative commitments to other SEATO nations and should be retained. He also recommended retention of HIGH HEELS, a worldwide command post exercise, and the remaining phases of the LEPRECHAUN LAUGHTER/COMMANDO ELITE series. LEPRECHAUN LAUGHTER involved the airlifting of Oahu-based Army units to a training area on the Island of Hawaii; COMMANDO ELITE was the supporting Air Force effort, which provided close air support training for the Army ground forces. CINCPAC provided the JCS with a list of exercise priorities. In December the JCS announced that the Secretary of Defense had approved funding for certain FY 70 exercises. Only one phase of LEPRECHAUN LAUGHTER escaped cancellation; HIGH HEELS was retained.

(S) Throughout 1969 Congressional investigation of military commitments and their effect on American foreign policy included reviews of combined military exercises, and triggered a growing concern on the part of the State Department over possible misconstruing of U.S. policy that might be brought about by such exercises. In November CINCPAC revised his Instruction CINCPACINST 03550.1C governing the development and conduct of PACOM exercises, including guidance designed to assure required coordination with State Department officials at all levels during the development of PACOM exercises involving foreign countries.

(S) A number of joint exercises were conducted or scheduled to be conducted in the PACOM during 1969. Some of these are highlighted below.

FORWARD THRUST I: This was a combined U.S.-Republic of China unconventional warfare exercise conducted in Taiwan from 24 April to 31 May 1969. The exercise featured the insertion of Special Forces teams into an

1. CINCPAC 160135Z Sep 69.
2. JCS 062111/120092Z Dec 69.
3. STATE 099861/182226Z Jun 69.
4. JCS 4048/072301Z Jul 69; STATE 203653/061946Z Dec 69; JCS 6009/092040Z Dec 69.

SECRET
aggressor-held territory to organize and lead a guerrilla resistance that
climaxed in an overt attack in support of a conventional force offensive.
Chinese Army units approaching a division in size played the parts of suppres-
sion forces, guerrillas, and conventional units. U.S. forces involved included
Special Forces teams, a SEAL platoon, and Air Force elements. 1

CARABAO TRAIL: This was a small-scale combined U.S. -Philippine
excise scheduled for 25 September - 18 October in a remote, mountainous
area of the Philippines. The exercise, involving less than 400 total partici-
pants, was designed to be a low key training vehicle for Philippine Special
Force personnel which would not be publicized. Postponement was recom-
manded by the CHJUSMAGPHIL due to the Philippine presidential elections
scheduled for November 2 and the exercise was moved to a January 1970 time
frame. Finally, at the suggestion of the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,
the exercise was postponed indefinitely. 3

FOCUS RETINA: This was a JCS-directed exercise conducted 16-29 March
that featured the deployment of a CONUS-based airborne brigade to Korea to
participate with U.S. and Republic of Korea units in a field training exercise
addressing overt aggression from the north. One of the two reinforced air-
borne battalions that made up the deploying forces parachuted directly into the
maneuver area. 4

FOCUS LENS: This combined U.S. -Republic of Korea command post
exercise, held 22 October to 1 November, tested plans for the defense of
Korea. Headquarters down to Army division, Air Force wing, and Navy task
element took part. The Commonwealth Liaison Mission to the U.N. Command
also participated. 5

FOG HAZE: This was an exercise similar in scope to Exercise FOCUS
LENS. FOG HAZE had been scheduled for 2-8 May 1969, but it was cancelled
on 10 April because of an unusually high turnover of Army personnel and
because of the inability of the Korea Ministry of National Defense/JCS to partici-
piate fully at that time. Conflicts with other previously scheduled activities
of the U.S. Forces Korea and the Korean Government agencies precluded
delaying the exercise. 6

1. CINCPAC 170020Z Jan 69.
2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 120230Z Jul 69.
3. JUSMAGPHIL 110900Z Dec 69.
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 180140Z Sep 68; COMUSKOREA UK 56842/151232Z
   Jan 69.
5. CINCPAC 060357Z Aug 69; CINCPAC 040344Z Oct 69.
6. History of Headquarters, United States Forces Korea, 1 April - 30 June
Exercise Planning Procedures Expanded

The JCS in July forwarded a number of proposals from the State
Department concerning exercise/operations review by that Department; the
JCS requested CINCPAC's comments. The State Department wanted no exer-
cise circumstance in which the situation, mission, intelligence buildup, con-
cept of operations, politico-military scenarios, or public affairs guidance
dealt with intervention by U.S. forces in a friendly country to support the host
country against insurgency. Exceptions were to be authorized only by the JCS
after consultation with the State and Defense Departments. In cases where
U.S. policy recognized U.S. interest in internal security activity, however,
commanders were to seek exceptions on a specific or continuing basis. And
in the case of "Korea, Thailand, the GRC, and the Philippines, Country Team
approval will suffice." ¹

CINCPAC replied that the proposals "would not adversely affect" the
conduct of the PACOM operations and exercise program. ² He cautioned that
an expanded central approval system, carried to the extreme, could result
in a "procedural ponderousness" that could be "detrimental to Allied military
planning relationships and the conduct of combined training." ³ He thought the
Country Team level should be emphasized "to assure the necessary continuity
and responsiveness to changing situations." ⁴ Expanded information on pro-
posed exercise scenarios, if desired by the State Department, could be incor-
porated in the significant exercise report, CINCPAC concluded.

Exercise HIGH HEELS

HIGH HEELS was an annual worldwide command post exercise
conducted by the JCS. CINCPAC forwarded his final report on the 1968 exer-
cise, which had been held 17-25 October 1968, to the JCS on 16 January 1969.
His final critique for HIGH HEELS-68 was published and distributed on 30
January. The critique was a compilation of 316 critique items submitted by
exercise players, controllers, and observers. ⁵

When the JCS evaluated the reports from all participants, they
indicated general concurrence with all of the CINCPAC recommendations. ⁶

1. JCS 4048/072301Z Jul 69.
2. CINCPAC 161135Z Jul 69.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. J3C311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
6. J3 Brief No. 103-69, Hq CINCPAC, 12 May 69, of DJSM 602-69, Subj:
   Status of Critique Items for Exercise HIGH HEELS-68 (U).
Planning for HIGH HEELS-69, meanwhile, had already begun. The JCS forwarded their proposed concept for the new exercise on 4 January and asked CINCPAC for his comments. CINCPAC replied on 22 January. He concurred in the preliminary concept except for a few particulars. He suggested reducing the active play of the exercise to seven or eight days to lessen its impact on real activities. He also made several recommendations about scenario conditions and assumptions. In addition, he stated that in view of the emphasis being placed on the reconstitution phase of the exercise he recommended that early action be initiated on CINCPAC critique items pertaining to fallout predictions and military damage assessment.

Planning continued throughout the year with numerous exchanges of ideas and conferences (in Washington and at CINCPAC's headquarters), and with preliminary training. An example of the last named was the JOLLY ROGER exercise held 3-6 September.

The actual HIGH HEELS-69 exercise was scheduled to be held beginning 15 October. Its purpose was to exercise the participants (under crisis management conditions) in policies and procedures required during a period of increasing tension, the execution of general war, and subsequent operations. As he had in the past several years, CINCPAC limited participation in his command to organizations and agencies whose efforts in real world activities could be diverted for this period, and he reserved the right to withdraw or reduce the scope and depth of participation if the PACOM situation required.

Primary PACOM participation was to be from the Alternate Command Center at Kunia, but the Emergency Alternate Command Center on Guam was to be activated and those organizations with a SIOP command/control/delivery capability were to participate to the extent of exercising emergency action message procedures. CINCPAC had exempted all message traffic in direct support of military operations in Southeast Asia from the worldwide MINIMIZE condition imposed by the JCS during the exercise.

The exercise was not conducted in 1969, however. It was cancelled just before it was scheduled to begin.

1. CINCPAC 222245Z Jan 69.
2. Ibid.
3. J24 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
4. Admin CINCPAC 230304Z May 69.
5. Ibid.
Tests and Exercises at PACOM Headquarters

(S) In 1969 CINCPAC began a series of peacetime emergency situation exercises to test command, control, and communications procedures to insure "expeditious reaction to emergency situations, as authorized by the Rules of Engagement (ROE)," and by existing command arrangements. The scenarios were designed to be parallel but not necessarily limited to sequences of events surrounding the USS PUEBLO and EC-121 incidents. These exercises evaluated support procedures for operations in sensitive areas. They were to be as realistic and authentic as practicable, but actual movement of forces was simulated. During the exercise period no United States real life forces were to be in sensitive areas.

(S) Exercises conducted in 1969 were BEELINE DELTA on 1 July, FRIDAY ECHO on 10 July, FORWARD PASS on 25 August, and FRIGID ZONE on 17 November.

POLO HAT

(S) Still another type of command and control exercise was POLO HAT, a series conducted by the JCS. These procedural-timing exercises consisted of the transmission of a series of emergency action messages by various modes of communication "to measure the timeliness and accuracy of receipt at the executing level."

(S) POLO HAT-3, for example, which was conducted in three stages from 4 to 9 October, used normal communications routes on a first test, then simulated outages on certain equipment for the second test, and the third was through airborne command post channels (both at the National level and at CINCPAC) using TACAMO7 relay capabilities.

ELK TREE

(S) CINCPAC had developed an alternate method for executing the SIOP

1. CINCPAC 242240Z Jun 69.
2. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69; CINCPAC 280514Z Jun 69.
3. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69; CINCPAC 242240Z Jun 69, which provided the outline plan for these exercises.
4. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
5. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69; CINCPAC 200134Z Jan 70.
8. CINCPAC 270415Z Sep 69.
and General War Plan in which he would act for the JCS under certain circumstances. On 9 January 1969 a representative of the JCS visited CINCPAC to review CINCPAC's plans and procedures and to conduct the first test of this new operational possibility. The tests were called ELK TREE. A taped scenario depicted a crisis situation in which CINCPAC was called upon to make recommendations to the President on SIOP execution, after which the President directed CINCPAC to execute the plan. CINCPAC's procedures were critiqued as "highly effective and only in need of a little polish."  

A second exercise in the ELK TREE series was held on 20 March. In this test the response from the President altered CINCPAC's recommendations (as the test was designed) to test the staff's capability to translate the Presidential guidance and change the execution decision format. The exercise concluded with the dispatch of an accurate and timely execution message to predesignated National Military Command Centers. The JCS representative made special comment on the significant procedural improvements made since the January test.  

JCS staff assistance visits continued to be made on a quarterly basis, testing ELK TREE concepts, among other things. In the last visit of 1969, "Hq PACOM participation in the ELK TREE exercise was outstanding."  

AMAZONE KNIFE and AMAZON BRAVE  

On 12 November and again on 16 December CINCPAC monitored the conduct of the seventh and eighth in a series of North American Air Defense Command's exercises. Enriched PACOM participation, instead of just monitoring, was envisioned for future AMAZON exercises.  

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1. See the Planning Section of this chapter for further explanation.  
2. J3C312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.  
3. J3C312 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.  
5. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Nov and Dec 69.
SECTION XII - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Significant Research and Development Problem Areas in the PACOM

Semi-annually CINCPAC reported significant research and development problem areas to the JCS. CINCPAC noted that the PACOM problem areas were derived from an overall review of operational needs and from the supporting reports of some of his component command and subordinate unified command commanders. "CINCPAC has made no attempt to establish any priority or weight to the reported problem areas. The solution to each is considered significant to the PACOM."  

He did list the eight problem areas he considered to be the most critical:

a. Air-to-Ground Ordnance Delivery Accuracy.


c. Ground Based Personnel/Materiel Detection and Identification Capability.

d. Base Defense.

e. Antisubmarine Warfare.

f. Defense Against Surface-to-Surface Missiles to Include Detection and Kill Capability.

g. Infrared Detection and Countermeasures.

h. Mines and Booby Traps.

After the JCS reviewed CINCPAC's February statement of requirements they stated that extensive efforts were underway by the Services to

1. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 24 Feb 69, Subj: PACOM Significant R&D Problem Areas (U); Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 21 Aug 69, Subj: PACOM Significant R&D Problem Areas (U).
2. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 24 Feb 69, Subj: PACOM Significant R&D Problem Areas (U).
3. Ibid.
solve the problems of mine and booby trap detection and destruction. 1

In his August statement of requirements, CINCPAC identified as the most significant problem areas the detection of mines and booby traps, anti-submarine warfare, and improved reconnaissance capability. Special attention was directed toward the problems of COMUS Korea, and CINCPAC recommended that additional emphasis be placed by the Services on solving them. 2

Scientific Advisory Group Activities

(U) Reports or studies prepared by the Scientific Advisory Group in 1969 consisted of:


**Report No. 2** - MARKET TIME Evaluation (draft).

**Report No. 3** - Discussion of North Korean Belligerency in Political and Economic Terms, 26 Jun 69.

**Report No. 4** - A Study of PRAIRIE FIRE Operations (draft).

**Report No. 5** - Interdiction of STEEL TIGER in 1969 (draft).


**Working Paper 7-79** - Tactical Air Summary, Republic of Vietnam, Sep 69.3

(U) The Scientific Advisory Group was augmented again in 19694 by operations research and analysts under contract by Pacific Technical Analysts, Inc. The contract originally covered the period 15 October 1967 to 15 April 1969, but it was later extended through October 1969. From April 1968 through 30 June 1969 the contract was staffed by seven professional personnel and two direct support personnel. Work was performed principally at

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CINCPAC’s headquarters, but some temporary duty in Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, and the CONUS was also involved.

(U) Over 28 major projects were undertaken under this contract with the results of all research conducted published as CINCPAC Scientific Advisory Group working papers or staff memoranda.

(U) Project subjects included:

a. Force Requirements Analysis: Prepared in support of CINCPAC’s Plans Division; development of a computer model for force requirements.

b. CINCPAC Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study: Computer models for analysis of requirements for air-delivered and antisubmarine-warfare nuclear weapons and provided operational analysis support for a Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study chaired by the Plans Division.

c. ROCKEYE II: Description of the optimum employment characteristics and capabilities of an air-delivered anti-tank and anti-vehicle weapon to be introduced.

d. Support of 7th Air Force COMMANDO HUNT Evaluation: CINCPAC’s evaluation of COMMANDO HUNT using the 7th Air Force’s study as a point of departure. ¹

Vietnamization Study Group Formed

(S) In October CINCPAC’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations had recommended that a study group be formed to investigate and provide recommendations on the research and development effort to support the improvement and modernization program for the Republic of Vietnam’s Armed Forces and the Vietnamization program. In November the Chief of Staff asked the Research and Engineering Consultant to head this group, which would consist of the Chief of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Branch of the Operations Division and the Chief of the Scientific Advisory Group and personnel from their organizations. ² The objective of the study was to:

...identify near, mid, and long-term problems of a technical and scientific nature relating to Vietnamization.

1. J3A10 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
2. JO1/Memo/00235-69, JO1, Hq CINCPAC, to RAEC, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Nov 69, Subj: Study Group.
The results should be in the form of recommendations for CINCPAC action or for CINCPAC to recommend to the JCS for action to solve these problems.¹

(3) The study was to address a review of U.S. and U.S.-supported air, ground, and naval/riverine operations to ascertain the degree to which the Vietnamese Armed Forces might continue to conduct essential operations without U.S. support. In conjunction with this, the group was asked to review the equipment already turned over to the Vietnamese, or scheduled to be turned over, to determine possible modifications or replacement items that would better enhance Vietnamese combat capabilities.² The Chief of Staff asked that the recommendations developed by the group be submitted as they were developed rather than waiting to submit one consolidated report.

Advanced Research Projects Agency Activities and Controls in the PACOM

(9) Two events of significance occurred in 1969 concerning the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)³ in the PACOM. One was the establishment of an ARPA Field Office in Korea and the other was promulgation of the first formal CINCPAC instruction establishing policies governing the activities of ARPA offices in foreign countries in the PACOM.

(9) The Korea field unit of the ARPA was established on 1 August 1969 by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to operate in the headquarters of the COMUS Korea/UNC. An Air Force colonel was the first director of the office; he also served as Scientific Adviser to COMUS Korea.⁴ The office was formed before official terms of reference were approved because of the "urgent and immediate nature of the technological problems in Korea, particularly relating to infiltration."⁵ The unit began operating, then, under provisions of the old "Felt-Godel Agreement"⁶ as an interim measure. Terms of Reference were then formulated and sent to the JCS for approval on 11 August.⁷

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Under the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.
5. CINCPAC 112327 Z May 69.
7. J3 Brief No. 224-69, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Sep 69 of SM 598-69 of 15 Sep 69, Subj: Advanced Research Projects Agency Activities in Foreign Countries Within PACOM.

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(U) Formal guidance for all ARPA Field Units operating in foreign countries in the PACOM was published in CINCPAC Instruction 3920.4 of 13 October. 1 Any prior guidance had been in the form of individual memos or letters. The ARPA Field Units had been operating pretty much independently of the unified command commander. But in June the Secretary of Defense published a directive authorizing CINCPAC to establish policy governing the establishment and conduct of research, development, test, and evaluation projects in foreign countries within the PACOM by the ARPA. Under the new guidance, proposals by any element of the Defense Department for any projects to be conducted by ARPA in a foreign country in the PACOM would be submitted to the Director ARPA with an information copy provided to the JCS, CINCPAC, and the Services, as appropriate. Commanders of subordinate unified commands, specifically designated subordinate commanders, and CINCPAC would then review project proposals to determine their impact on in-country military responsibilities, including the communications-electronics environment, and notify the ARPA of concurrence, nonconcurrence, or concurrence with constraints within 30 days of receipt of the proposal. These policies also applied to major modification of ARP projects.

(U) Command relationships between CINCPAC and ARPA activities in foreign countries were to be in accordance with terms of reference established by the JCS in support of, among others, the following policies:

... The CINCPAC in-country military representative will exercise such control or coordination of ARPA field activities as directed or necessary to ensure that such activities do not have adverse impact on the United States and host country military operations or the communications-electronics environment, are compatible with established in-country relationships, and that agreed-upon support of ARPA field organizations is provided. Such control will not extend to the technical aspects of ARPA projects or to matters of internal ARPA administration. ...

... Projects being conducted in PACOM will be reviewed periodically, at least annually, by CINCPAC and ARPA together, with respect to their continuation, expansion, consolidation, redirection or termination. 2

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1. CINCPACINST 3920.4, 13 Oct 69, Subj: Advanced Research Projects Agency Activities in Foreign Countries Within PACOM.
2. Ibid.

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SECTION XIII - LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES

Relocation of Army Logistic Bases and Functions

Early in October the Army Chief of Staff proposed to the JCS a concept to withdraw Army logistic bases from Japan within two to four years with the exception of some POL facilities, hospitals, and a procurement office. He said, as based on the need for overhauling heavy equipment that would follow the increasing demands in the hands of the Vietnamese Armed Forces in the process of Vietnamization; the run-down, inadequate condition of the Sagami Depot in Japan; and the capability of Nationalist China, with some additional training and new facilities, to take on a great deal of our Far East requirement for equipment maintenance.

In further study of the matter, representatives of the Commanding General of the Army Materiel Command met with CINCUSARPAC personnel to formulate a plan for relocation of facilities and functions. Significant features of their recommendations included:

a. Relocation of supply/medical activities from Japan to Okinawa.

b. Transfer of Sagami Depot (Japan) maintenance to Taiwan with backup on Okinawa and Korea (with the Chinese government to build facilities and perform maintenance).

c. Transfer of POL operations to the Service that is the predominant user.

d. Closing of the Ikego Ammunition Storage Area, Japan.

CINCUSARPAC believed that the whole matter needed a great deal more consideration. He did not think that our base structure, which was useful in peacetime and which in war served as the foundation of our military presence in the Pacific, was susceptible to fragmentation or partial examination. He also thought that major changes to that structure prior to the conclusion of the war in Vietnam prejudged future U.S. objectives and strategy.

1. JCS 1484/032105Z Oct 69.
2. JCS 2049/102110Z Oct 69; J41 History, Hq CINCUSARPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
3. CINCUSARPAC 160030Z Oct 69.
CINCPAC, as the commander of the unified command in the Pacific, then explained his view of the proposals. He said:

...The proposed concept for relocation of most of Army's logistic bases in Japan over the next 2-4 years is a major change in the logistical support base in the Western Pacific and could seriously erode the long standing recognition of Japan's value in the projection of U.S. strategy in the Far East. The existing logistical bases in Japan with expansion capability through availability of the advanced industrial capability and skilled manpower of Japan would be major advantages in support of any large scale U.S. military operation in WESTPAC. Continued retention for U.S. use of key base areas is essential to the execution of contingency plans. Among factors to be weighed are pros and cons of relocating a logistics base from a relatively safe and rear location on the direct LOC from CONUS to forward and less secure in-theater locations. Merits viewed from peace-time budget saving aspects may be contrary to U.S. strategic requirements for Japan as an area from which to bring to bear military power to influence military actions and support National objectives in Asia.

...CINCPAC considers that the Army proposal could have far reaching impact on inter-service support arrangements throughout PACOM, particularly the responsibilities assigned to the Army.... It is recognized and appreciated that current trends in budgetary decision require maximum economies. However, unless net economies to the U.S. are achieved reducing the profile of one service at the expense of another service cannot be supported. A detailed analysis must be made before any decision to transfer support responsibility from one service to another.

...CINCPAC concurs with the phased relocation of Army maintenance facilities from Japan to Taiwan provided no degradation of overall theater maintenance posture occurs. The transfer of maintenance functions to ROC would be beneficial in that quality work would be performed at significantly less cost, while, at the same time, a trained ROC work force would provide valuable potential for future PACOM maintenance support operations. If the ROC assumes responsibility of plant construction it will minimize U.S. investment risk.
... Other areas of major concern follow:

a. Wholesale return of Army facilities to the GOJ may well increase pressure on other U.S. services in Japan to follow suit at a time when these services may be required to augment their presence to assume joint support functions envisioned in the study.

b. Relocation of medical stocks to Okinawa should have little political impact. However, the Army proposal requires the immediate evacuation of medical stocks from Japan. It appears that relocation of these assets should be phased with a reduction in patient workload.

c. CINCPAC OPlan 5027 - Defense of Korea. Japan plays a major support role. Any alternative must be logistically feasible. Sufficient information is not available in the Army proposal for this determination.

d. Decreased ammo storage capability - total ammunition requirement must be validated without consideration of past or future budget restraints. Decreased validated requirements should be the only basis for relinquishing ammunition facilities. After war in Vietnam additional ammo storage will be required to off-set reliance on pipeline (inventory in motion). ¹

(C) CINCPAC then listed various topics that required consideration and study before the implementation of the Army's proposal. These were:

a. What number of U.S. military and their dependents will be on Taiwan for the expanded maintenance mission? Support for additional personnel will require reconsideration of on-going service overseas personnel reductions.

b. Closing of medical activities in Japan required that these facilities be retained in standby status or that alternate locations be identified for off-shore medical support for PACOM contingency plans.

c. Transfer of support functions to another service will require an overlap of personnel for training purposes....

¹. Ibid.
Details of resource costs to other services are not included in the Army estimate.

d. Labor costs on Taiwan could increase should competition develop for scarce maintenance skills.

e. There is no apparent merit to the transfer of the Sanno Hotel to another service. The Sanno Hotel is a self-supporting operation which provided a needed R&R and TDY facility for U.S. military personnel.

(S) CINCPAC did not concur in the recommendation to transfer POL responsibilities to another Service in Japan. He said:

The Army POL depots in Japan are essentially bulk terminals with sufficient storage capacity to permit a portion of it to be used for storing POL PWRS. The Army has water terminal and land transportation responsibilities worldwide in overseas areas. Moreover, to fulfill these responsibilities...the Army has developed a corps of trained POL officers and NGOs. These personnel are specialists in the management and operation of bulk POL terminals, pipelines, barge, rail and tank truck shipments and handling bulk POL. The Army has undertaken a five year program to rehabilitate and repair its POL defects in Japan and should be required to complete the program since the facilities are vital to U.S. Forces. Transfer under the so-called predominant user concept proposed by the Army would, in any case, not result in net savings to USG and could, by fragmenting responsibility for those depots, prove counter-productive.

(S) CINCPAC found no merit in transferring the subsistence mission to another Service. The Air Force was dependent on the Army for this support, which was provided from Sagami, and loss of the support would require creation of an Air Force system with commensurate manpower and budget increases. CINCPAC also discussed the impact the proposals could have on the Defense Communication System and noted that the result could be increased loading on already overloaded communications systems to an unacceptable degree.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

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In summary, CINCPAC found merit only in some aspects of the Army proposals, particularly the use of Taiwan as an additional maintenance base. He noted that the proposals were primarily Army oriented and influenced by budgetary problems. Full recognition was not given to the impact on overall CINCPAC operational and contingency responsibilities nor was full consideration given to Navy and Air Force logistics support that was being provided by the Army. 1

CINCPAC recommended:

a. That areas affecting other services be reviewed and coordinated at departmental level to negate possible interruption of essential services.

b. That any large scale relocation of logistic bases in Japan be considered in consonance with the concepts and goals expressed in The Review of U.S. Bases in Japan, a joint study by U. S. Ambassador to Japan, U. Alexis Johnson and Admiral McCain, 26 September 1967....

c. That except for the phased relocation of Army Maintenance Activities...CINCPAC be afforded opportunity to review and comment on a more detailed proposal prior to final decision. 2

Despite CINCPAC’s comments, planning for the relocation of bases and functions continued. The study came to be known as Pacific Logistic Operations - Streamline (PALOS). CINCPAC established joint working committees among his Service component representatives to assist CINCSAR PAC in developing detailed plans. A CINCPAC representative was assigned as the coordinator for each of the Joint Working Committees, which had been formed for four areas: subsistence, POL, transportation, and miscellaneous services, which included such matters as property disposal, procurement, real estate transfer, and such. 3

Actions associated with PALOS were very closely held and announcements were not to be made "without prior Washington level approval." 4

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 140045Z Dec 69; J41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
4. CINCPAC 140045Z Dec 69.
Strategic Movement Capabilities Study (MOVECAP) FY 70-74

MOVECAP 70-74 was a study prepared by the JCS to assess movement capabilities of segments of the strategic mobility system in the CONUS, and inter- and intra-theater capabilities to meet requirements for rapid deployments to selected areas. It was a continuation of MOVECAP 69-73, which had been prepared in 1967.

The scenarios selected for the study involved deployments to Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East. In the cases of Northeast Asia and the Middle East, concurrent reinforcement of U.S. Forces in Europe was required. (A separate analysis estimated the capability to deploy forces specified in the Draft Memorandum for the President on Mobility Forces to meet contingencies in a different combination of three geographic areas, which included major military conflicts in Europe and Southeast Asia, and a minor contingency in Ethiopia.) The scenarios served as a basis for determining movement requirements, lift resources, and mobility conditions. Movement requirements for three contingency situations and for the 180-day deployments were for the major forces and their support units, resupply, replacements, and fillers. The airlift and sealift resources that were available for the analyses were those programmed for the end of Fiscal Years 1970 and 1974, and the projected available commercial airlift and sealift for those two years.

Principal findings with PACOM implications follow:

a. General

(1) Total unconstrained mobility resources were adequate to move the total cargo tonnages and troops within the 180 days designated. Time phasing and resources constraints would cause many requirements to be delivered later than scheduled.

(2) There will be significant improvements in intertheater lift capabilities from end FY 70 to end FY 74 resulting from capabilities of programmed C-5 aircraft and the proposed fast deployment logistic (FDL) ships....

(3) Reduction of active troop ships and increased dependence on airlift for troop movements will require the CINCs to plan for reuniting troops with their sea-delivered equipment.

(4) Significant amounts of commercial airlift and sealift will be required to accomplish the deployments.

(5) In all intratheater situations there will be great dependence upon host nation resources.

(6) The results of the DPM analysis indicated the simultaneous movement of forces and equipment to Southeast Asia, Europe and Ethiopia in the mid-1970 time frame could not be accomplished in the desired time schedule. There would be significant delays in unit movements to Ethiopia.

(7) Non self-deployable aircraft ferry resources are inadequate in FYs 70 and 74. Use of FDLs would provide the most effective options for reducing the shortage.

b. CONUS findings. When deployment is to the Pacific, ammunition ports and general cargo ports will not have the capability to support demands made upon them and late deliveries will result.

c. Intertheater findings.

(1) Capabilities of intertheater lift resources for FYs 70 and 74 are insufficient to provide deliveries on schedule.

(2) Excess troop airlift capability is available, primarily CRAF. 1

(3) Programmed C-5 aircraft provide a major increase in overall airlift productivity between FY 70 and FY 74.

(4) Programmed FDLs can contribute to delivery of unit equipment in first 30 days of deployments in FY 74.

1. Civil Reserve Air Fleet.
and in addition, they represent an essential resource in ability to sustain sealift cargo deliveries through total deployment. 1

In March the JCS asked CINCPAC to review MOVECAP 70-74 and submit his comments and recommendations. 2 In May the JCS proposed sending a MOVECAP briefing team to CINCPAC's headquarters to present findings and conclusions of the study. 3 The team visited Camp Smith from 20 to 22 May, briefing members of the staffs of CINCPAC and his component command commanders. 4

3. JCS 8901/0920572 May 69.
4. CINCPAC 112009Z May 69; J481A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 69.
5. CINCPAC 310138Z May 69.
6. CINCPAC 170254Z Apr 68.
Base Development Plans Study Group Formed

(U) A Joint Facilities Engineering Conference hosted by CINCPAC in April 1969 indicated a need for a special study group to consider proposed refinements to the PACOM Base Development Planning (BDP) System. The first informal meeting of representatives from the PACOM component Service and CINCPAC staffs was held in September 1969, and addressed measures to simplify existing procedures so as to allow greater effort on improving data. 2

(U) In October 1969 the JCS promulgated instructions on BDP for Joint Contingency Operations. These instructions necessitated significant changes to the PACOM system which was Service and base oriented rather than joint command and operational plan oriented.

(U) At a December 1969 meeting of the PACOM BDP Study Group it was recognized that a continuing need would exist for the services of this group to coordinate the necessary revisions to the system. Accordingly, the Study Group recommended that its procedures be formalized and that CINCPAC establish a charter and provide the chairman and executive secretary. 3

(U) Among the group's recommendations at this December meeting were those to defer actions on previously proposed full area coverage of PACOM for BDPs pending further definition of requirements, to define responsibilities of the subordinate unified command commanders in coordinating BDP actions, and to minimize updating actions to avoid unnecessary or unproductive work. In this last regard, existing BDPs were of limited usefulness and doubt existed that the data maintained was sufficiently accurate or significant to warrant semiannual updating. It was recommended that commanders furnish data on punched cards when significant changes occurred, that CINCPAC enter such data but print updated BDPs only annually or on request, and that plans that were not changed significantly were to be omitted from the annual schedule. 4

1. CINCPAC 310138Z May 69.
3. Memorandum for the Record, J421, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Dec 1969; Subj: Meeting with Component Commanders' Representatives to Discuss Base Development Planning (BDP).
4. Ibid.
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PACOM Airlift Reorganization

(U) Relocation of the Western Pacific Transportation Office (WTO) from Tachikawa Air Base, Japan to Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii was accomplished in the spring of 1969. Operations took place at both locations during the transition period. Then on 8 April the 315th Air Division ceased operations and the CINCPACAF Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations for Airlift (DOAL) took over the functions formerly performed by the 315th. The Chief of the WTO officially transferred all major operations to Hawaii on 2 May. 2

Central Air and Water Clearance Authorities Proposed

(U) In December 1968 the Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility to the JCS asked the unified command commanders to explore the possibility of establishing consolidated air and water clearance authorities. Responsibility for establishing Airlift Clearance Authorities (ACA) and Water Terminal Clearance Authorities (WTCA) was placed with the overseas theater commander, but CINCPAC had delegated authority to his component command commanders and to COMUSMACV. The JCS proposal presented reduced operating costs and clearances based on relative priority of all Services as advantages for consolidation.

(U) CINCPAC did not agree and so advised the JCS in February 1969. 3 He noted that all agencies in Vietnam had been consolidated already under the Traffic Management Agency, MACV and that partial consolidation had been effected in Taiwan, Thailand, Okinawa, and Korea with the dominant Service user normally controlling clearance authority. Further consolidation would fragment existing terminal procedures and would require complete reorganization. Actual reductions in manpower, office space, etc., would be minimal. In some areas consolidation would in reality create an added administrative echelon or communication channel between the shipper and carrier. It would not affect automatic data processing as use of that technique in this area was limited. 4

Logistics Summary (LOGSUM) Discontinued

(U) A CINCPAC review determined that the Logistics Summary (LOGSUM) was no longer required and on 14 November he directed his Service

1. 315ADIV TACHIKAWA AB JAPAN 090245Z Apr 69.
2. CHIEF WESTPAC TRANS OFF TAB JAPAN 290600Z Apr 69.
3. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 20 Feb 69, Subj: Central Air and Water Clearance Authorities.
4. Ibid.

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component command commanders and COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI to discontinue reporting. The report had been instituted in 1966.

Selective Loading of Ammunition Ships

(C) CINCPAC, in November 1968, had asked the Commander of the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service to check the feasibility of selectively loading SUNBATH ammunition ships to allow explosive discharge and inert discharge at different locations in Guam to enhance port throughput capability. The Commander complied with the request and the results were successful in increasing discharge capability and flexibility at the port of Guam. CINCPAC then asked that selective loading of SUNBATH ammunition shipments to Guam be continued whenever possible.

Outsize Airlift Requirements

(C) The Air Force had begun phasing out the aircraft that provided outsize cargo movement capabilities in 1968. At CINCPAC's request, however, the Air Force Chief of Staff had directed continuation of the 50th Military Airlift Squadron (C-124 aircraft) at Hickam Air Force Base through the 4th quarter of FY 70 to insure continued support of outsize cargo needs.

(C) In June 1969 CINCPAC had asked the JCS for advice regarding plans to provide follow-on aircraft for future airlift operations in the PACOM and he had recommended that the phase-out of "MAC tactically responsive outsize airlift capability in the PACOM area be deferred through FY 1971." 4

(C) Despite these plans to retain the 50th Military Airlift Squadron through June 1970, Project 703 budget reduction actions advanced deactivation to December 1969. The squadron completed its last mission in support of the PACOM on 29 November. As a result, CINCPAC had no theater-based outsize airlift capability.

(C) The Military Airlift Command was attempting to satisfy outsize airlift requirements by diverting CONUS C-133s and C-124s of the Air National Guard and Reserve Forces, but CINCPAC believed that this diversionary capability should not be expected to provide the required degree of reliability and

1. Admin CINCPAC 140508Z Nov 69.
2. CINCPAC 050536Z Mar 69; J4814 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
4. CINCPAC 150134Z Jun 69.
5. Admin CINCPAC 130303Z Dec 69.
responsiveness even on a short-term basis. CINCPAC told the JCS that any arrangement was acceptable that met the user's requirement for reliability and responsiveness. He anticipated, however, that any arrangement must include the use of C-124 aircraft as the C-141 was dimensionally incapable of assuming the outsize mission. He hoped for early implementation of a satisfactory arrangement. ¹

**C-130 Squadrons for the PACOM**

(Œ) In December 1968 the Secretary of Defense reversed a previous position and approved assignment of a 13th squadron of C-130s to the PACOM on a permanent basis. The unit was a newly designated squadron and was to operate from Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, Taiwan. ²

(Œ) The review of operational requirements was continuous, however, especially in light of budget restraints, and in August CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to review his C-130 requirements. COMUSMACV stated a need for 68 C-130s for sustained operations and 81 C-130s for emergency surge.³ CINCPACAF indicated that 12 squadrons could handle the requirement and one, the 815th TAS from Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, could be returned to CONUS by the end of 1969 with the proviso that two C-130 squadrons could be maintained in CONUS on 72 and 96 hour alert at CINCPAC's call. ⁴

(Œ) Later in the year the matter of reducing the number of squadrons to 11 was studied. COMUSMACV reconfirmed his previously stated requirements and CINCPACAF concluded that those requirements could be satisfied, as well as all other PACOM requirements, by 11 squadrons, but that flying hours would be a limiting factor under maximum sustained conditions. ⁵ During the 1-4 December meeting of the CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board it was determined that this was an acceptable situation and that therefore no action should be taken to reclaim the loss of the 12th C-130 squadron from the PACOM. ⁶

**References**

1. Ibid.
2. J4 Brief No. 001-69, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Jan 69, of JCS 2339/284-2 of 11 Dec 68, Subj: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Deployment Adjustment Request (AF-68-116) (U); CSAF 071702Z Jan 69.
3. COMUSMACV 101300Z Aug 69.
4. CINCPACAF 160215Z Aug 69.
5. CINCPACAF 031940Z Dec 69.
6. J4821 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
Military Airlift Command Liaison Officer for Korea

(U) In June CINCPAC, in response to an informal query from COMUS Korea, asked the Commander, Military Airlift Command to provide a liaison officer to work with COMUS Korea's staff. He noted that the availability of such an officer on his own staff since 1967 had provided a timely solution to many matters of joint concern and "enhanced the responsiveness of MAC support to CINCPAC under the frequent emergencies that have occurred."

CINCPAC envisioned that the MAC representative would provide inter-command coordination and liaison, technical advisory service to the COMUS Korea staff and component organizations, assistance to the staff in addressing MAC airlift matters, and advice and guidance to the COMUS Korea Joint Transportation Board.

(U) COMAC agreed that such an arrangement would be good and assigned an officer to that task early in FY 70.

PACOM Ship Inventory and Port Status Reporting System (PACSHIPS)

(U) On 1 September 1968 CINCPAC had inaugurated the PACOM Ship Inventory and Port Status Reporting System (PACSHIPS) to provide an automated file of current and historical information about the status of PACOM ports and ships. New ports were added to the system's coverage in 1969 and on 8 July CINCPAC promulgated the PACSHIPS Manual in two parts, Volume 1 (user's manual) and Volume 2 (design and maintenance manual). These were published as part of the CINCPAC Instruction implementing PACSHIPS and replaced the draft manual that had been in use since PACSHIPS became operational in 1968.

(U) In December, when the PACSHIPS systems had been operational for about a year, CINCPAC began a systems analysis review to determine the desirability or feasibility of modifying or redesigning certain portions of the program. The matter was under study at the end of the year.

1. CINCPAC 1510252 Jun 69.
2. Ibid.
3. MAC 251945 Z Jun 69.
5. CINCPAC 1221432 Z Jan 69; J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
6. CINCPACINST 4600, 8, 8 Jul 69, Subj: Promulgation of PACOM Ship Inventory and Port Status Reporting System (PACSHIPS).
7. Admin CINCPAC 100511 Z Dec 69.
Ship Diversion Procedures

(U) Because of the number of ship diversions that were occurring in the PACOM, CINCPAC in March issued a standard procedure for diverting ships by means of messages to standardize methods of requesting, reviewing, approving, and ordering the diversion of MSTS cargo ships, other than tankers. The procedure became effective 1 April 1969.

(U) On 12 December CINCPAC published a CINCPAC Instruction to formalize procedures for ship diversions.

POL Consumption

(U) The slower tempo of operations in Southeast Asia and general operational modifications caused by budget restraints were reflected in a decrease in the consumption of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) for the first time in several years. Overall consumption was off about 10 percent, from about 172 million barrels to somewhat over 154 million, with relatively similar decreases for each of the various kinds of fuel in use (except for diesel fuel, consumption of which increased). The accompanying chart and tables portray PACOM consumption statistics for the year.

PACOM Petroleum Correlation Testing

(U) System specifications and functional descriptions were developed and approved in 1969 for an automated system to receive and process petroleum test results for the various PACOM petroleum laboratories. Tests were being performed by 18 separate laboratories. CINCPAC Automatic Data Processing Project 10L421, therefore, for Petroleum Correlation Testing provided a standard automated reporting system to assist the Joint Petroleum Office in the analysis and maintenance of consistent performance levels among the various laboratories.

Use of Retrograde Airlift to Transport Third and Fourth Class Mail

(U) Low cost retrograde service for third and fourth class mail had been provided by the Postal Service from Southeast Asia beginning late in 1968.

1. CINCPAC 122133Z Mar 69.
3. J412 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
PACOM POL CONSUMPTION
(in millions of barrels)

## 1969 POL Consumption

**By Product**

(in thousands of barrels)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
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<td>13,470</td>
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<td>11,607</td>
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1969 POL CONSUMPTION

BY AREA

(in thousands of barrels)

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<tr>
<th>Area</th>
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<th>Oct</th>
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<td><strong>11,683</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,349</strong></td>
<td><strong>154,472</strong></td>
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</table>
In April 1969 COMUSTDC recommended that the same arrangements be instituted for Taiwan.¹ CINCPAC asked the Air Force Pacific Postal and Courier Region at Hickam Air Force Base to explore the possibility of providing the service throughout the PACOM.² The headquarters advised that the service was planned to be implemented worldwide and that the PACOM area would be the first to receive it. CINCPAC so advised COMUSTDC.³

Airline and Travel Ticket Sales in the PACOM

(U) Airline and travel ticket sales in the PACOM, exclusive of Vietnam, were provided by concessionaires under contract to the Pacific Exchange System. These contracts had been extended several times on a short term basis at the direction of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics until a permanent arrangement for providing this service could be consummated. In September the Office of the Assistant Secretary approved extension of the contracts until 1 January 1970. After consultation with Exchange officials, CINCPAC advised the JCS that the extension date of 1 January appeared impractical from the standpoint of obtaining follow-on service, that service was rapidly deteriorating due to the inability to retain experienced travel clerks, and that morale and service to customers were being affected.

(U) CINCPAC regarded this as a situation that called for early and positive resolution and he recommended to the JCS that they authorize him to extend existing contracts through 30 June 1970 and also initiate actions to replace existing contracts on 1 July 1970 with an arrangement that expanded Pacific Exchange System operations on a permanent basis.⁴ The JCS advised CINCPAC on 12 December that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics had approved extension of existing contracts until 30 June 1970, but that CINCPAC's recommendation for the arrangement subsequently to 1 July 1970 was still under consideration in the Assistant Secretary's office,⁵ and the matter remained there at the end of the year.

(U) On 18 December the Pacific Exchange System advised CINCPAC that its contractor in Japan had lost his certification and requested authority to negotiate a short term airline ticketing service contract in Japan for the first six months of 1970 with a carrier already certified.⁶ CINCPAC recommended

1. COMUSTDC 080128Z Apr 69.
2. CINCPAC 130054Z Apr 69.
3. CINCPAC 200134Z Apr 69.
4. Admin CINCPAC 090256Z Dec 69.
5. JCS 6217/121710Z Dec 69.
6. PACEX HICKAM AFB HAWAII 180001Z Dec 69.
to the JCS that approval be obtained from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense at the earliest possible date in order to assure that ticketing service in Japan would continue without disruption. No action had been taken by the end of the year.

U.S. Procurement Information Office, Australia

(U) In November 1968 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs expressed a desire to assign the U.S. Defense Department Procurement Information Office, Australia to CINCPAC’s staff in order to expand that officer’s span of control and enhance his effectiveness. The request was subsequently forwarded to the JCS and then to CINCPAC for his comments and recommendations. CINCPAC recommended instead assigning those responsibilities to CINCUSARPAC. He provided the JCS with specific reasons that militated against assigning the office to CINCPAC. CINCUSARPAC was subsequently tasked to assume the management and administrative responsibility for the Australian office.

1. Admin CINCPAC 200436Z Dec 69.
SECTION XIV - COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS ACTIVITIES

Communications Center Message Traffic

(U) Messages handled by the CINCPAC Communications Center showed their first downward trend in 1969 (see accompanying graph). The peak traffic during the Vietnam war was reached in 1968, apparently, when an average of 60,808 messages were handled monthly. In 1969 the average was down to 53,947. Graphs depicting message traffic by precedence and security classification are also shown covering part of the year.

Large Volume Data Exchange (Project Mutual Aid)

(U) On 24 March, CINCPAC and the National Military Command Center began testing methods of passing large volumes of data recorded on magnetic tape using AUTODIN (Automatic Digital Network) circuit switching capabilities. 1 CINCPAC had stated his original requirement for such exchange in November 1967. 2 Testing continued sporadically throughout 1969.

(U) The UNIVAC 1004 was to be replaced by the RCA Spectra 70/1600, which was placed in operation in 1969. Certain problems were encountered with the RCA equipment, however, and the UNIVAC disconnect date was postponed until the spring of 1970. 3

(U) Phase I testing was finally completed successfully on 23 December 1969. The results were conclusive: transmission of large volumes of data by means of the circuit switching unit mode of AUTODIN over long distances was feasible. 4 Any unique CINCPAC operating requirements that had not been included in those for AUTODIN Phase III were furnished to the manufacturer (RCA) through Navy channels. 5

Communications Center Power Outage

(U) On 13 October 1969 Hawaiian Telephone Company cables on Oahu going off the island were inadvertently cut by a construction company. The cut

1. J02C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69; J631 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69; CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. I, p. 188.
2. J02C History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
3. J632 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
disrupted CINCPAC and National Military Command and Control Center command and control voice lines both east and westward.\(^1\) Control of the PACOM was transferred to the Airborne Command Post until repairs were completed.\(^2\) As there had been a similar disruption in May 1968, CINCPAC designated the Defense Communications Agency Pacific as the Oahu communications restoral agency and tasked them to establish a joint Oahu long lines emergency restoral team made up of Oahu based U.S. military agencies and the Hawaiian Telephone Company to perform responsive restoral of critical PACOM circuits when major cable breaks occurred.\(^3\)

**Consolidation and Automation of Headquarters Communications Centers**

\((C)\) Efforts to consolidate and automate communications centers at both CINCPAC headquarters, Camp Smith, proceeded in 1969. For proposal was made to automate and consolidate communications facilities for all commands served there. For Camp Smith, the matter of consolidating CINCPAC's communications center with that for the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (co-tenants of the headquarters) was studied.

\((C)\) CINCPAC had stated the requirement regarding facilities at a letter to the JCS on 14 January. He noted that the result would be improved speed of service and reliability for all commands served, a considerable reduction in operating and maintenance personnel and equipment, a large reduction in circuit requirements through consolidation of parallel circuits serving separate commanders, reduction in the scope of corrective action necessary to comply with RED/BLACK\(^4\) criteria at which could serve as the central facility for restoral of communications on Oahu during Wahiawa AUTODIN outages.\(^5\)

\((C)\) The Chief of Naval Operations was tasked by the JCS to study the matter and prepare a plan for fulfilling this requirement.\(^6\) A Navy survey team completed the plan and CINCPAC forwarded it to the Chief of Naval Operations in October. It was expected to reach the JCS early in 1970.\(^7\)

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1. J627 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
2. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
3. CINCPAC 151900Z Oct 69.
4. Cryptographic equipment physical/electrical configuration.
5. J6 Brief No. 0189-69, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Feb 69, of MJCS-71-69 of 13 Feb 69, Subj: Automation and Consolidation of Communications Facilities at ________________.
6. Ibid.
An urgent requirement for automation of message inputs for CINCPAC's Camp Smith Communications Center had been stated by CINCPAC and validated by the JCS. The Naval Command Systems Support Activity had developed a detailed plan for providing improved message handling capabilities through automation of certain off-line message processing functions. Although the off-line system would be adequate for handling the 1969 volume of message traffic, another plan, an on-line system, was also prepared. This would be a plan for orderly growth to handle anticipated traffic volume. It was presented in detail also to provide management with a planning tool to aid them in decisions related to obtaining long lead-time resources.¹

CINCPAC considered the project an urgent operational requirement and wanted it completed prior to 1972, so he maintained close follow-up action regarding its status and funding. In response to a CINCPAC message in this regard,² the Chief of Naval Operations noted that in connection with automating the center the matter of consolidating facilities located close together should be studied.³ He reiterated the strong Congressional and Secretary of Defense interest in this regard, to consider consolidation without constraint by jurisdictional considerations. He recommended that CINCPAC study the feasibility of consolidating the two communications centers at Camp Smith (CINCPAC and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific) into a single facility.

A joint review by the two headquarters indicated basic agreement and CINCPAC so informed the Chief of Naval Operations.⁴ A joint working group was formed to study the details of consolidation. A cost estimate was being prepared but it was believed that construction costs would be more than offset by the savings envisioned.

Staff coordination was conducted to move the Alert Net Terminal to the Marine Communication Center or to have the Marines pick up traffic from the CINCPAC center, and to eliminate the Marines' Joint Pacific circuit. Some problems remained, such as personnel staffing concerns, but total consolidation appeared feasible in conjunction with the automation of the CINCPAC Communications Center. A final determination would be made following a determination of the costs involved and an evaluation of the services that would be provided to both commanders and their staffs.⁵

1. J626 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
2. CINCPAC 110227Z Oct 69.
3. CNO 211725Z Oct 69.
4. CINCPAC 072258Z Nov 69.
5. Admin CINCPAC 202216Z Dec 69; Admin CINCPAC 240311Z Dec 69.
In December the JCS advised CINCPAC that informal information they had received from the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated that approval for automation of the communications center would probably be forthcoming early in 1970, pending resolution of FY 70 funding problems. 1

Automation of Circuit Requirements Data Base

CINCPAC, in coordination with his component command commanders and the Chief of the Defense Communications Agency, Pacific, determined that in the interest of economy and good management a requirement existed to automate communications circuit requirements in the PACOM. Several fragmentary automated circuit requirements listings had been developed over past years and were being maintained. As each listing had been developed to serve a specific purpose, however, different formats were being used to present nearly identical information. 2

To standardize these listings, CINCPAC established a working group to develop a common format for use throughout the PACOM. This Requirements Automation Working Group developed a draft proposal of the data base form and instructions and in December forwarded it to CINCPAC's subordinate unified and component command commanders where it was under study at the end of the year. 3

AUTODIN Improvement - Automated Command Center Communications

On 10 October CINCPAC sent an urgent request to the JCS to automate PACOM command and control record/data communications. The CINCPAC automation concept 4 provided an improved capability for the rapid exchange of operational and intelligence information between commanders and other authorities. CINCPAC noted that implementation of the AUTODIN improvement program would permit phaseout of existing PACOM outmoded manual command and control networks (and about 950 personnel used to operate them). Although the AUTODIN system had permitted significant reductions of manual equipment already, it had not yet been reliable enough to guarantee uninterrupted service and the continued use of the manual systems had been necessary. CINCPAC described the system he proposed:

1. JCS 6699/192319Z Dec 69.
2. J626 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
3. Ltr, CINCPAC to Distribution List, 9 Dec 69, Subj: Automation of Circuit Requirements Data Base.
4. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 10 Oct 69, Subj: Request for PACOM Automated Command Center Communications - Improved AUTODIN Support.
...Basically, the CINCPAC concept calls for installation of small scale automatic message switches in PACOM at key locations to augment, and to act as back-up for, the primary AUTODIN ASCs. These small switches will provide the flexibility, gridding, special handling requirements of command and control and eliminate the high cost involved in the use of alternate routing via additional long haul trunk circuits.

...An annual lease charge of $1.7 million, plus site preparation and O&M, has been estimated for the total PACOM automated command and control message switching requirement, which is a fraction of the overall annual cost of the Pacific portion of the DCS AUTODIN system.¹

(5) The proposal made provisions for dual access subscriber terminals from all PACOM command centers, and regional command control message switches to provide uninterrupted service to command centers during AUDODIN switch outages. The improvement program would greatly enhance the quality, volume, and speed of service of command control message communications.

(U) In November the JCS approved for planning purposes the AUTODIN subscriber requirements in the CINCPAC proposal and tasked the DCA to prepare a plan to satisfy them. The JCS did not address, however, that portion of the CINCPAC proposal that recommended regional command control switches to insure uninterrupted command center service. CINCPAC viewed this with some concern, as the premature deactivation of the manual command control teletype systems without complete implementation of the proposal could seriously impair the PACOM command control posture. CINCPAC heard nothing more on this matter in 1969.²

(U) CINCPAC did take action on the matter of making message formats more uniform. There were two different and incompatible teletype message formats in use, one for the AUTODIN system and another for the older type manual teletype networks. CINCPAC tasked the DCA Pacific to develop the actions necessary to convert all in PACOM to the AUTODIN format, procedures for which were in Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Publication 128.³

1. Ibid.
3. J625 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69; CINCPAC 262204Z Nov 69.
AUTODIN - Automatic Switching Centers

(C) Automatic Switching Centers for the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) had been opened in a number of areas of the PACOM beginning in 1967. Two more switches had been requested in 1968, one for subscribers to the switch and one for rather than interfacing subscribers to the switch. In 1969 CINCPAC got approval for the switch but was still waiting for approval of the one.

(C) In his justification for switch, CINCPAC had noted that existing facilities were manual torn tape systems with very limited access to the AUTODIN system. Installation of the switch would significantly improve record traffic survivability and permit phase-out of numerous manual facilities and thus reduce resource requirements. The proposed switch would be located and service 42 subscribers.

(U) On 26 August the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved the new AUTODIN facility. CINCPAC then revalidated requirements for 44 subscribers for continuous operations.

(C) CINCPAC had revalidated his requirement for switch in June and he provided additional justification in September. He amplified information on the existing shortage of transmission media, the impact of the AUTODIN and Automatic Voice Network Cutover III programs thereon, and the CINCPAC AUTODIN restoral plan and command center support requiring dual access for survivability. Approval had not been granted by the end of the year, however.

PACOM Command and Control AUTODIN Standards

(C) In August 1969 CINCPAC promulgated standards for PACOM command and control AUTODIN communications support very widely throughout his command. These objectives principally involved quick delivery of messages to command authorities upon their receipt.

2. J626 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
3. DCA PAC 152157Z Sep 69.
4. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS and Director Defense Communications Agency, 5 Jun 69, Subj: Regional Switch - Taiwan (U).
5. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS and Director Defense Communications Agency, 22 Sep 69, Subj: Regional Switch - Taiwan (U).
6. CINCPAC 010514Z Aug 69.
Each command center or agency concerned was to be served by dual access AUTODIN terminals situated in such a manner that messages received by either or both of the terminals "can be delivered (not transmitted) to the command center, agency duty officer, commander or agency chief within one minute by either courier or manual (pneumatic tube) means."¹ All PACOM command centers supporting joint operations that required the handling of joint JPCCO/JOPREP JIFFY/OPREP messages were to be served in the same manner for quick delivery.² (JPCCO stood for Joint Pacific Command and Control Operations; JOPREP for Joint Operations Report; JIFFY was the nickname for JOPREP/OPREP messages; and OPREP stood for Operations Report.)

CINCPAC explained that the "uncompromising objective of the standards is concerned primarily with the military aspects of establishing and maintaining rapid and secure communications during military operations. Therefore, they are applicable to that portion of PACOM command and control communications which supports the PACOM weapons systems."³

The primary military objectives, CINCPAC said, were to:

a. Provide a responsive communications capability to insure the means of exchanging time sensitive communications relative to threat warning, alerting, controlling, executing and coordinating the PACOM defense and retaliatory forces.

b. Retain, to the maximum extent possible, effective command and control of PACOM retaliatory strike forces under conditions of a massive atomic attack.

c. Rebuild and maintain sufficient portions of PACOM command and control communications to support forces subsequent to the attack.

d. Provide automatically-switched communications between PACOM forces command and control elements.

e. Provide command and control subscribers with both preemptive switching and automatic restoral capability.

f. Provide the maximum feasible communications security.⁴

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
These objectives for command and control communications were to be ultimately supported by the AUTODIN system. Near-term objectives, however, were to be satisfied by a combination of existing command and control dedicated networks and direct AUTODIN MODE II teletype access terminals.

CINCPAC's component and subordinate unified command commanders were directed to take appropriate action to include these instructions in all current and future AUTODIN operational and requirements planning.\(^1\)

**Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON)**

The Automatic Switched Voice Network (AUTOVON) in the PACOM came several steps nearer to realization in 1969. Already operational in the CONUS, where the system worked through leased commercial telephone lines, it was expected to link about 2,000 military installations worldwide, eventually. Overseas the system was operated by the U.S. Government using its own equipment.

Original plans had envisioned a parallel operation that would provide AUTOVON service to the users of dedicated networks and would allow retention of the dedicated networks for a trial period. After the trial, users were to have been permitted to select the mode of service they desired.\(^2\)

In December 1967, however, the Secretary of Defense extensively cut funds for the transoceanic telephone trunking for AUTOVON service, making it necessary to eliminate as many dedicated networks as possible and to integrate their trunks into the AUTOVON system. An overlap period was provided for conversion of one type of service to another.\(^3\) Equivalent service was provided by assignment of precedence and override capabilities.

A month the effects of the Secretary's fund cuts was a decrease in the number of subscribers served directly and automatically and a corresponding increase in the number served through a manual switchboard. CINCPAC made various reviews of his subscriber requirements to justify them and to allocate priorities for automatic service.\(^4\)

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1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
(C) AUTOVON in the PACOM was expected to consist of six switches, about 355 four-wire subscribers, about 334 PBX (private exchange switchboard) lines, and about 327 trunks. The first cutover to the network occurred in March 1969 for the switch at Wahiawa, Oahu, Hawaii. The second occurred in November for the Finegayen, Guam and [redacted] switchboards. The third, for [redacted], was scheduled for March 1970.

(U) The major portion of the AUTOVON service in the PACOM was by two-wire telephones because of the December 1967 fund reduction by the Secretary of Defense that resulted in a reduction of four-wire subscribers, precedences, and permissible calling areas. At Cutover I, the Joint Overseas Switchboards throughout the PACOM became connected only as "access lines." On the subsequent cutovers the Joint Overseas Switchboards were progressively rehomed as their associated AUTOVON switches were activated. 3

(U) In June 1969 still another restriction was placed on AUTOVON operations. The JCS established a firm policy stating that upgrading the range of service for one subscriber would require compensatory reduction elsewhere. For example, upgrading one instrument from Pacific only to Pacific and CONUS would require that another instrument be downgraded to Pacific only. This policy on trade-offs was expected to prove restrictive in meeting requirements stated by users but it was based on a firm position held by the Office of the Secretary of Defense that overseas trunk costs were to be held to the existing level, at least for the time being. 5

(U) Still another kind of restriction became known to CINCPAC in 1969. The CINCPAC Voice Alert Network (CVAN) provided voice command and control service to critical command and combat elements in the PACOM. The eight long-haul circuits that made up the backbone of the network were leased,

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2. The Hawaiian Telephone Company finished the $3.4 million switching center at Wahiawa in March. The 14,000 square foot, two-story building, which cost $1.4 million, was buried 32 feet underground. It housed $2 million worth of electronic gear. The Hawaiian Telephone Company also provided 24-hour-a-day operator assistance and electronics technicians to provide maintenance for the center. (Honolulu Advertiser, 27 Mar 69, p. A-4.)
5. Ibid.
high-quality, commercial cable and satellite channels. These were shared for command and control purposes by CINCPAC with his component command commanders. They had been specifically excepted from integration into the AUTOVON system until AUTOVON was completely activated. When Cutover III was executed, the trunks were to be integrated into the AUTOVON system and CINCPAC and his components were to obtain corresponding service by means of pre-set conferences established over the AUTOVON system. Pre-set conference requirements of 45, 33, and 30 conferees for CINCPAC had been recommended and defended to the JCS. The JCS had approved the conferences as well as approving the individual precedences and stations. 1

Then in March the JCS advised CINCPAC that although conferences of more than 26 conferees were approved, they would not be implemented until some future time (after Cutover III) and that conferences involving over 26 would be impaired operationally and technically.2 Operational practices would have to be revised to segregate conferees into groups of 26 or fewer and to provide for the establishment and use of two or more conferences simultaneously. No change was indicated in JCS policy regarding the integration of these trans-oceanic trunks into the AUTOVON system, as planned, following Cutover III, or in their policy regarding provision of command and control service by means of the AUTOVON pre-set conferences. 3

CINCPAC had a requirement to retain preemptable rights to the eight common user (CVAN) Pacific circuits to those forces responsible for execution of the SIOP and general war forces until the AUTOVON system proved that it provided equal or better service than the CVAN, 4 not just for some arbitrary time period, as had been suggested by the JCS.

Other problems with AUTOVON Cutover III were anticipated because of delays in completion of the installation of submarine cables for the Integrated Joint Communication System-Pacific (IJCS-PAC). They were not expected to be installed by the March 1970 proposed cutover and DCA had been recomputing AUTOVON requirements within existing spare channels (both military and commercial) that were not being used for dedicated requirements or other automated networks in order to accommodate March 1970 cutover needs.5 Early DCA proposals were not satisfactory but CINCPAC offered several alternatives and final plans were acceptable.6

1. J6 Brief No. 0324-69, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Apr 69, of MJCS 143-69 of 18 Mar 69, Subj: Pacific AUTOVON Preset Conference Requirements (U).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. J621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
CINCPAC also reviewed his dedicated circuit requirements, and those of his component command commanders. In September CINCPACAF notified CINCPAC that his dedicated requirements had increased since he had reported them in March. This increase plus other known requirements exceeded the communications systems capability. CINCPAC informed the DCA of the status of requirements versus system capacity and requested information as to the grade of service subsequent to Cutover III by category for subscribers with precedences of routine, priority, and higher.1

In line with the need for restrictions to be imposed on use of the AUTOVON because of its limitations, CINCPAC prepared "An Interim AUTOVON Access Control Plan" late in November.2 This was in response to a JCS Memorandum of Policy that established policy governing the use of the system, emphasized the need for constraints, and directed that controls be positively imposed. CINCPAC sent his interim control plan to his component command commanders.

The additional controls were necessary because while authorized and approved AUTOVON users had four-wire telephone instruments, designated two-wire, Class A telephone subscribers with less critical requirements were also authorized access to AUTOVON, but existing facilities were not engineered to impose electrical or mechanical restrictions on those base telephones. As a result, direct dial, four-wire subscribers were competing with unrestricted AUTOVON use by thousands of non-essential Class A subscribers, and they could find themselves denied critical service. CINCPAC's interim control plan was designed to restrict access to the system by Class A subscribers and to restrict them to use of only routine precedence. Higher precedence for Class A subscribers would be recognized on an exception basis for certain individuals specifically designated by CINCPAC. Switchboard operators were provided with a list of these individuals. Procedures were tested in Hawaii first before use throughout the PACOM.3

One last matter regarding AUTOVON concerned CINCPAC actions following 15 outages that occurred during June, July, and early August, with most lasting just a few minutes but one lasting almost 5-1/2 hours. When he advised the JCS of these outages, CINCPAC expressed his concern with the failure of the Hawaiian AUTOVON switch and his loss of capability of critical

1. CINCPAC 072344Z Oct 69.
2. Ltr, CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, Chief of DCA PAC, 26 Nov 69, Subj: Policy and Procedures for Control of the Use of the Pacific AUTOVON System.
3. Ibid.
command and control communications to the CONUS. He recommended that the CONUS switch rehome on the Hawaiian Joint Overseas Switchboard in the case of an AUTOVON failure and asked that the DCA be tasked to provide for the necessary interface equipment and to establish procedures that would permit use of the Hawaiian Joint Overseas Switchboard. The JCS so tasked the DCA on 25 August. CINCPAC worked out a number of restoral matters with his component command commanders and with the DCA Pacific.

Automatic Secure Voice Communications System
(AUTOSEVOCOM)

Phase I of the Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) System, begun in 1966, was completed in 1969. Already in 1968, however, relatively poor system performance was being experienced and CINCPAC asked the JCS to task the DCA to organize and direct a joint service technical evaluation and to take corrective action in the field or recommend corrective actions for others to take. The DCA was so tasked and, after consultation among the Services, the DCA accepted a proposal by the Air Force Communications Service that it organize and direct the joint Service teams because of its past experience in the Operations and Maintenance Agency Measurement Program. In December 1968 the Joint AUTOSEVOCOM Evaluation Project (JAEP) was formed and work began in the PACOM in January 1969.

From January through July six teams of crypto and transmission experts visited all areas where AUTOSEVOCOM switching and subscriber facilities were operational. They tested and evaluated equipment and transmission lines and they indoctrinated maintenance personnel in equipment alignment procedures and in line conditioning techniques.

The findings of the JAEP were presented to CINCPAC in a briefing at Camp Smith on 23 July 1969. The findings of the group, as summarized by a CINCPAC Communications-Electronics Division member, were as follows:

a. The present AUTOSEVOCOM system is technically capable of providing satisfactory service.

b. Poor performance of the system is primarily attributable to lack of in depth maintenance on equipment and transmission media.

1. Admin CINCPAC 050300Z Aug 69.
2. JCS 07519/252209Z Aug 69.
4. J624 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
c. Overall maintenance procedures are not understood in the field due to lack of complete and concise guidance.

d. All test equipment required to maintain the system is not available to Operations & Maintenance Units.

e. Maintenance personnel are lacking in system training.

f. Operational management of the network of switches and subscribers in many areas is not centralized resulting in lack of reporting of outages, poor coordination or no coordination on outages affecting subscriber terminals, switches or interconnecting circuitry.1

(U) Recommendations to remedy these deficiencies were made by the JAEP; these would require actions by the DCA and the Services.

(U) In Hawaii an initial effort to improve the maintenance condition of terminal and switching equipment was made by a tri-Service team working from July to October 1969. The team's quality control effort was so successful that CINCPAC recommended that it be continued on a permanent basis.2

(Confidential) After studying the findings of the JAEP, CINCPAC concluded that while many basic problems required resolution at the DCA and Service Chiefs level, many improvements in system management and operation could be undertaken in the PACOM. He formed, therefore, in November, a permanent AUTOSEVOCOM Operational Management Committee, chaired by a CINCPAC representative and consisting of representatives of CINCPAC's component command commanders, DCA Pacific, and [Redacted] Pacific.3 The first meeting of this committee was held on 18 November.4 DCA Pacific also formed and chaired a joint AUTOSEVOCOM Working Group (JAWG) subordinate to the CINCPAC Operational Management Committee to address and resolve on a regular basis problems of operational control of the AUTOSEVOCOM system in the PACOM. The first meeting of the JAWG was held on 8 December 1969.

(U) It appeared that the ceiling established by the Defense Department in 1969 on the total number of subscriber terminals in the system would impact

1. J624 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
2. Admin CINCPAC 140223Z Nov 69.
3. Admin CINCPAC 012127Z Nov 69.
4. J624 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
on previously published JCS policy, and the JCS, in August, reviewed and
revised their AUTOSEVOCOM policy, publishing it as JCS MOP 166, dated 18
August 1969. Among the more significant provisions of the statement of policy
were that all Defense Department subscriber service requirements would be
approved by the JCS, that requirements within the PACOM would be coordinated
by CINCPAC, that any request for additional terminals would, with rare excep-
tion, require the deletion of an existing validated terminal, and that equipment
that had been procured for the AUTOSEVOCOM "although funded by the indi-
vidual services and agencies, is a DOD asset and as such will be allocated to
satisfy the most urgent requirements based upon justified need, relative
priority and availability of equipment."1 This last qualification, about AUTO-
SEVOCOM terminal assets belonging to the Defense Department, impacted on
units with such assets being withdrawn from Vietnam. CINCPAC established
an interim procedure, therefore, for COMUSMACV to follow, in which COM-
USMACV was to establish machinery for interim storage and accounting of such
assets within Vietnam until their ultimate disposition was determined by CINCPAC
and the JCS based on PACOM and other worldwide requirements.2

Defense Satellite Communications System - Phase II

5 The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) Phase II was a
system designed to satisfy operational needs in the 1971-1975 time frame using
military communications satellites. The first priority of the system was
assigned to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System to satisfy
critical requirements for command, control, intelligence, and warning systems
as they applied to strategic offensive and defensive forces. The second priority
was to establish, expand, and upgrade communications systems in direct sup-
port of active combat operations. The third was reconstitution or reconfigura-
tion of systems resulting from realignments and changes in deployments and
missions of forces.3 In January 1969 the JCS asked CINCPAC to reevaluate
his Phase II terminal requirements in light of these priorities.

When CINCPAC asked his component and subordinate unified command
commanders, certain of his representatives, and DCA and agencies, he noted that his purpose was to "stress the importance of the forthcoming

1. J6 Brief No. 817-69, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Sep 69, of JCS Policy Memo 166 of
18 Aug 69, Subj: Joint Automatic Secure Voice Communications Network
Policy.
2. Ltr, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 4 Aug 69, Subj: Interim Disposition of
Deactivated AUTOSEVOCOM Subscriber Terminals in Vietnam (U).
3. J6 Brief No. 0099-69, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Jan 69, of MJCS-27 of 17 Jan 69,
Subj: Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) Phase II Terminal
Deployment (U).
military COMSAT\textsuperscript{1} Systems in PACOM and request special efforts be made by all concerned to derive accurate and detailed requirements information...\textsuperscript{2}

As CINCPAC explained:

...There is a continuing need for additional communications capabilities between most locations in PACOM for the control of forces and military resources during periods of relative calm. Additionally, there exists the need for highly reliable, responsive and relatively invulnerable communications to support nuclear weapons forces and employment of U.S. Forces, as required, during flare-up conflict situations anywhere in PACOM. Properly designed military satellite communications system (TACSATCOM & DSCS-PHASE II) offer the possibility of overcoming many of the deficiencies in our present ability to provide those communications essential for the conduct of successful military operations. No other method of communication provides the combination of reliability, capacity, and quality of service offered by well designed and effectively deployed military COMSAT systems....Early identification and translation of user requirements into engineering data for sizing and configuring each system is essential for achieving this objective with minimum cost and at the earliest possible date.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{(S)} CINCPAC consolidated his Phase II recommendations and forwarded them to the JCS on 22 March.\textsuperscript{4} A consolidated worldwide terminal requirements paper was then prepared and returned by the JCS to CINCPAC for comment. The report did not contain substantive data in sufficient depth of detail to support proposed allocations and deployment by type and location of earth terminal assets in the DSCS Phase I and II for the PACOM, CINCPAC's study revealed. Further, the planned quality of the earth terminals to be made available in support of contingencies and for Presidential support and the proposed means for control and operation of the terminals was not fully realistic or sufficiently responsive to CINCPAC's requirements for restoration of critical command and control links in the post-attack phases of nuclear war.\textsuperscript{5}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Communications Satellite.
  \item \textsuperscript{2} CINCPAC 290324Z Jan 69.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} J621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
  \item \textsuperscript{5} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
When CINCPAC replied to the JCS on 1 July he observed that a detailed worldwide concept of employment that considered all categories of service to be satisfied by Phase II would provide additional information and justification required to verify the guidance furnished in the draft report from the JCS and for making appropriate changes to that draft.  

In this regard, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS his own abbreviated concept of operation for employment of the DSCS Phase II in the PACOM. He believed that if the concept were approved it would permit acquisition and implementation of the improved military satellite capability in an orderly, time-phased manner to fill CINCPAC requirements in the 1971-1975 time period. It would also permit more definitive planning for interconnect facilities between earth terminals and designated technical control facilities.

The concept was intended to support three categories of service: DCS mainline trunking, contingency (including restoral during nuclear war), and special users. The system would be acquired by establishing the DCS mainline trunking through new terminal deployments to Hawaii and Guam. These would activate vital DSCS communications hubs from which to configure and align the western Pacific satellite network. Earth terminal deployments, in order of priority, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Earth Terminal</th>
<th>DCS Technical Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helemano, Hawaii</td>
<td>Wahiawa, Hawaii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finegayan, Guam</td>
<td>Finegayan, Guam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CINCPAC also outlined his contingency requirements and special user needs. He asked that the JCS defer approval of the draft consolidated report pending completion of the concept by the JCS that he had proposed.

In September the JCS provided their direction for the use, location, and application of the Phase II system, including a revised requirements base.

1. CINCPAC 012035Z Jul 69.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
SECRET

It included specific satellite earth terminal requirements as submitted by CINCPAC in July. When and if installed, the Phase II earth terminal deployments recommended by the JCS should greatly improve the quality, capacity, and reliability of wideband communications in the PACOM, CINCPAC believed.  

Plan for Restoration of Communications
Under Strategic Nuclear War Conditions

(S) In mid-1968 the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval a plan prepared by the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to provide for critical Defense Communications System (DCS) communications support for general and limited war. The plan, as approved by the Secretary in September 1968, provided for immediate restoration under general war conditions of minimal DCS communications for command and control between National Command Authorities and the unified and specified command commanders overseas and their major subordinates using mobile/transportable satellite terminals and high frequency equipment. The concept for communications survivability was based upon relocation of the minimum essential satellite and high frequency capabilities from target areas to "safe havens" and their return or relocation as required when restoration actions were directed. In October 1968 the JCS directed CINCPAC (and other unified command commanders) to prepare a supporting plan for the restoration of communications under general war conditions.

(S) CINCPAC's plan included the concept that initial restoral would be accomplished using mobile/transportable ground satellite equipment that had been positioned in safe-haven areas during DEFCON II. The plan assumed a massive Chinese Communist/Soviet nuclear attack with severe damage to the DCS because most fixed communications facilities in the PACOM were located on or near prime target areas. Along with plans for reestablishing the command and control communications structure, the plan listed restoral priorities for reestablishment of the previously existing system.

(S) In addition to existing mobile/transportable satellite terminals and other communications equipment already in the PACOM, six additional

1. Ibid.
4. Defense Condition II, a state of high force readiness but less than maximum force readiness. For further information see CINCPACINST 003010.4F, 29 Jun 68, Subj: PACOM Defense Readiness Conditions (U).
AN/TSC-54 ground satellite terminals were required to support the plan at a cost of $8.4 million. CINCPAC provided justification for this equipment both with this request and with additional documentation for communications requirements under normal conditions or for limited war support with CINCPAC's submission of requirements for the Defense Satellite Communications System Phase II, also under development at this time.1

In September 1969 the JCS forwarded the approved Phase II plan but did not provide additional equipment to meet the general war restoration plan. In fact, the shortfall was increased to nine terminals. CINCPAC, therefore, asked for additional guidance in order to meet his requirements for restoration of communications under General Nuclear War. In late December the JCS advised CINCPAC to hold his planning in this area in abeyance until necessary adjustments were made at the Washington level and new guidance was provided.2

Tactical Satellite Communications Systems

On 21 May the JCS asked the Army Chief of Staff to initiate a contract for a comprehensive analysis of worldwide Tactical Satellite Communications (TACSATCOM) requirements. This analysis was to translate the requirements into a uniform format for validation, presentation, and entry into computer models for analysis. A contract was subsequently awarded to the and their study completed in October 1969. The JCS forwarded that completed study to CINCPAC and asked him to review it for accuracy.3

On 21 November CINCPAC advised the JCS that he generally concurred in the requirements. He noted that in view of the likely employment of the TACSAT in initial DCS restoration under "worst case" nuclear war conditions, terminal equipment should include requisite technical characteristics to meet DCS interface standards. He also advised that additional equipment for alternate command locations and for subordinate command's primary and alternate command locations may be required following development of detailed CINCPAC plans and the supporting plans of CINCPAC's subordinate commanders.4

1. J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
4. CINCPAC 210306Z Nov 69.
(U) An initial tactical satellite communications capability in the PACOM in the summer of 1970 was anticipated, when the first tactical satellite would be positioned over the Pacific Ocean. At that time, terminal assets that had been used in research and development testing would be made available for interim operational use and testing in an operational environment. CINCPAC was asked to identify and forward his requirements for these assets to include support of the fixed and mobile alternate headquarters that directly supported the CINCPAC and the SIOP forces in the PACOM. CINCPAC forwarded terminal deployment recommendations in November under the headings Priority I, Initial SIOP Network, and Priority II, Contingency Network. CINCPAC said:

...The limited number of terminals identified herein represent the highest priority requirements for TACSATCOM in PACOM. They are the minimum essential required to assure that CINCPAC will have continuously available a communications capability between Hawaii and SIOP forces located in the Western Pacific. Vulnerability of present communications dictate that this more survivable type of long-haul communications capability be provided as soon as possible for near real-time alerting of SIOP forces particularly during the trans- and post-attack phases of a nuclear attack on the United States and its allies. This need is based primarily upon the unusual and unique geographic aspects of the Pacific Command. Most major base complexes, along with primary and alternate command posts of CINCPAC subordinate unified commands and Service component commands, are situated on islands or on the periphery of the land mass of Asia, separated by large expanses of open seas. These complexes at present rely heavily on the continued existence of several submarine cables and over water tropospheric scatter links for continuity of communications. The locations and types of TACSATCOM terminals recommended herein are considered the minimum essential to satisfy the initial PACOM requirements.

CINCPAC heard nothing further on this matter in 1969.

2. J621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
3. CINCPAC 292019Z Nov 69.
4. Ibid.
UNCLASSIFIED

Processing Telecommunications Requirements

(U) CINCPAC had long believed that there were two basic problems associated with the processing of telecommunications requirements. One was the failure to include communications support requirements and funds when processing the basic programs that generated the need for them. The other was the requirement from the Secretary of Defense for a large amount of extremely detailed data before communications requirements would be reviewed or processed. 1 Things got worse in 1969.

(U) During hearings before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations inquiring into the total cost of defense communications in connection with Defense Department appropriations for 1970, the Director of the Defense Communications Agency acknowledged that he "was in no position to determine the total cost of defense communications," and the office of the Secretary of Defense could only approximate the total annual cost because there was "no identification of total communications cost or resources in either planning or accounting systems of the Department of Defense." 2 As a result the chairman of the committee, in a 30 September 1969 letter to the Secretary of Defense, cited a need for better overall management of existing communications assets, a need for centralization of control over all communication operations, and a need for singular authority for the validation and approval of all communications requirements, as well as research on the requirements of future systems. 3

(U) The next day a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense was sent to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the JCS, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and the Directors of Defense Agencies. 4 It referenced Defense Department Directive 4630.1 of 24 April 1968, which had provided that approval of the Secretary of Defense was not required in the case of new or increased telecommunications requirements of up to $500,000 in investment cost for Government-owned facilities or $200,000 in annual cost for leased facilities. The Deputy Secretary said:

3. Ibid.
UNCLASSIFIED

...Since CY 1967 communications cost escalations and overruns have occurred in Southeast Asia and the Far East which have not occurred in other parts of the world. This, coupled with the current fluid military and political situation, necessitates special management procedures to preclude non-essential expansion or sophistication of fixed communications systems in Southeast Asia and the Far East.

Accordingly, communications systems in this area are exempted from the cost threshold provisions of the reference. Until further notice, the following policy will govern the programming of new or increased requirements, and reprogramming to meet increased costs of approved programs, for fixed communications in Southeast Asia and the Far East (excluding Guam):

a. Actions which entail costs of less than $50,000 do not require OSD approval and notification of such actions is not required.

b. Requirements which amount to $50,000 or more and are below-the-thresholds prescribed by the reference must be approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Such proposals and supporting documentation will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as appropriate, the Director, DCA. Funds will not be obligated or reprogramming actions carried out without OSD approval...

c. The provisions of the reference concerning above-the-threshold requirements and processing emergency requirements remain effective world-wide.

As to the related issue of "fixed" versus "transportable" communications equipment, all new overseas requirements for communications facilities and equipment must be satisfied through the application of "transportable" configurations unless specifically justified and approved otherwise.¹

(U) On 24 October CINCPAC advised his Service component command commanders that the impact of the Deputy Secretary's memorandum was "far-reaching, although as yet unmeasured." He said that urgent action was

1. Ibid.
necessary to measure the impact on the second half of FY 70 and on FY 71, particularly in view of "current SEASIA redeployments and actions necessary in conjunction with, but not part of" the Integrated Joint Communications System, AUTOVON Cutovers II and III, and the Korea Wideband Network.\(^1\) He called a meeting of representatives of those commanders at Camp Smith on 17 November "to review items of mutual concern which exceed the $50,000 threshold to determine which should be revalidated by CINCPAC and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff."\(^2\)

(U) As the only path for a submission of requirements under Defense Department Directive 4630.1 was through the joint chain of command, with reference to the DCA for actions affecting the DCS, the joint communications staffs would become involved in much more detail than before with a large but not yet measurable increase in workload due both to the number of separate actions and the depth of study required for each.\(^3\)

(U) On 19 November CINCPAC advised his component command commanders that general guidance and procedures and channels for submission of major telecommunications requirements outlined in the existing CINCPAC Instruction (002000.1A) remained unchanged. He did revise certain portions, however, to conform to the revised guidance from the Secretary of Defense. He also said that separate actions in response to the Secretary's guidance "that will result in cancellation, deferment or reprogramming of programs that could adversely impact on the PACOM mission will be coordinated through CINCPAC prior to final action."\(^4\)

Long Lines Communications

(U) The Integrated Joint Communications System - Pacific (IJCS-PAC), a major communications upgrade program in the Western Pacific, was not much closer to realization in 1969 than it had been in 1967. One problem area was that between __________. The United States had wanted to lay a submarine cable between those two countries, but __________ had denied the right to land the cable and the Secretary of Defense had failed to approve the site chosen for the cable landing on __________.\(^5\)

1. Admin CINCPAC 240300Z Oct 69.
2. J621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 191900Z Nov 69.
5. CINCPAC Command History 1968.
One fact that probably influenced was that the Government wanted to lease circuit channels to the United States on their new commercial tropo system between. The system had been engineered to meet DCS standards. CINCPAC reviewed the matter in mid-December 1969 and concluded that, as a result of continuing delays in the matter of the submarine cable site approval, the high grade transmission systems meeting DCA standards required by CINCPAC were not visualized as being available in an acceptable time frame.

Accordingly, CINCPAC made the following recommendations to the DCA:


b. Continue operation of the existing U.S. Army operated 24 channels tropo.

c. Augment the 24 channel military system by lease of channels from the existing commercial tropo system in operation.

d. Proceed with contract award for segment of the LCS-PAC submarine cable.

CINCPAC explained that in view of the "changing political situation in the Western Pacific, the excessive delay in securing landing rights, and the continued there appeared no alternative to abandoning plans for the large capital investment in a U.S. owned and operated cable system, particularly when a short term lease option was immediately available. The continued use of the Army's tropo system augmented by commercial leased channels would meet the stated requirement for 53 channels from.

CINCPAC strongly recommended to the DCA that awarding of the contract for submarine cable proceed as soon as possible as existing systems fell short of validated 55 channel requirements in both quantity and quality. Installation of this cable would permit phase-out of the existing military tropo system and its replacement with the higher quality

1. J622 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. CINCPAC 162138Z Dec 69.
3. Ibid.
medium in a year or a year-and-a-half. CINCPAC asked that the DCA keep him advised of actions in this regard.

(U) One other feature of the IIJCS-PAC was the Military Integrated Telephone System (MITS) for Okinawa, a plan to upgrade 17 local telephone exchanges to improve their quality of service to the level established for the IIJCS-PAC. While IIJCS-PAC was not dependent on the MITS plan, it was realized that subscribers on Okinawa would be denied access to the improved backbone communications system being installed on Okinawa. On 5 November 1969 CINCPAC forwarded a system plan for the MITS to the JCS for approval and implementation. Later that month, however, the President announced that a decision had been reached to return Okinawa to Japanese control. In this light, the JCS directed that processing of the plan as recommended by CINCPAC be continued, but they noted that no funds would be obligated until more information on future U.S. activity in Okinawa was available.²

Communications Support for the National Emergency Airborne Command Post

(U) The JCS tasked CINCPAC to provide communications support for the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (SILVER DOLLAR) while it was in the PACOM from 21 to 31 July. CINCPAC provided one voice and one covered teletype capability between the CINCPAC Command Center and the National Emergency Airborne Command Post during its deployment at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, and U-Tapao Air Base, Thailand.³

Command Arrangements and Effectiveness of the Defense Communications System

(U) The DCA was formed in 1960 to provide centralized management of the DCS, to assist in achieving operational compatibility among the communications systems of the Services, and to integrate those systems if it would make them more efficient or economical. The DCA provided technical direction and advice to the Services, who in turn provided, operated, and maintained the bulk of the DCS facilities. The DCA also allocated communications circuitry and directed the restoration of facilities in the event of a failure.

1. Ibid.
3. JCS 4408/112159Z Jul 69.
In 1965 the matter of command arrangements and relationships came under study at all levels of command culminating in a new charter for the DCA in September 1967. At that time the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked for an 18-month special evaluation of the effectiveness and operational responsiveness of the DCA and the DCS under this revised charter. CINCPAC prepared such evaluations in June and December 1968 and the third in the series in July 1969.

In his last evaluation of arrangements following the 18-month study, CINCPAC concluded that "the DCA and DCS in PACOM are effective and responsive and are showing continued improvement under the new charter." The key question that was to be addressed in the final report was, "Should the DCA be given responsibility and authority for the operation of all DCS facilities including responsibility for associated budgeting, programming, and operating functions?" The CINCPAC position, developed during the evaluation period, was:

... The need for expanded authority and responsibility for the DCA in the operation of the DCS is not apparent. The authority of the Director, DCA to meet his mission responsibilities under the existing charter is considered adequate as evidenced by the continuing improvement in performance and responsiveness of the DCA and the DCS. Continued application of existing authority within the context of DOD Directive 5105.19 should permit further improvements to increase the effectiveness of the DCA and the DCS.

CINCPAC also recommended against "double-hatting" the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics of a unified command as the DCA area or regional chief, a concept that had been proposed for consideration during the evaluation period. CINCPAC had opposed this concept from the beginning.

When the JCS evaluated the matter for the Secretary of Defense they agreed with CINCPAC's position. They said that the completed evaluation revealed that the DCA and DCS were operationally effective and responsive and that gradual improvements continued to be realized under the revised and

2. J616 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
strengthened charter. They said that systems engineering and planning, identified as the major problems confronting the communications-electronics community, were being complicated by rapid, continual changes in technology; changes in the concepts of command and control that have obscured the past distinction between strategic and tactical communications; the lack of adequate technical standards; and the problems created by the Defense Department's planning, programming, and budgetary process. They concluded that the authority of the Director of the DCA under existing arrangements and directives was adequate and that he should not, and need not, be given responsibility and authority for the operation of all DCS facilities, including responsibility for associated budgeting, programming, and operating functions. They thought there was no need to revise the DCA charter and they recommended that the "double-hatting" arrangement not be adopted.¹

(U) Although the 18-month study of arrangements was concluded, CINCPAC was still required to submit semi-annual reports to the JCS and the Director of the DCA on the effectiveness and responsiveness of the DCA field organization and the DCS in the PACOM. In his 18 December evaluation CINCPAC noted that both the DCA and DCS were effective and responsive and continued to show improvement as a result of "cooperation between the joint commanders, DCA field organization, and the DCS operations and maintenance (O&M) managers."² CINCPAC concluded that there was no reason to believe that the trend reflecting continued improvement was likely to change in the immediate future and he therefore recommended that the reporting requirement be reduced to once a year instead of twice.³

Worldwide Analysis and Evaluation of High Frequency Facilities Utilization

(U) In April 1968 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed an immediate comprehensive study of high frequency radio facilities, both those in the DCS and non-DCS, to determine which facilities could be consolidated, collocated, or phased out. While other high frequency radio studies had been made in the past and had resulted in consolidations or phasedowns, they were concerned with larger systems and stations of the DCS calibre. This study was distinctive in that it called for study (for possible elimination) of both DCS and non-DCS (tactical) fixed high frequency radio facilities down to one kilowatt. High

¹ Ibid.
³ Ibid.
frequency radio facilities, because of their size and conspicuous nature, were
natural targets of economy drives. Their assets (real estate, plant, personnel,
and frequencies), once released, could practically never be reclaimed or
reconstituted. Within the PACOM, dependence on high frequency systems for
day-to-day service had decreased in favor of increased reliance on submarine
and satellite systems. Satellite systems, however, were not yet reliable
enough to pick up the load carried by the high frequency systems and while the
cable systems were generally reliable, when they did experience failures they
were usually of long duration (a week or more) and were difficult to locate and
restore. The two major problems associated with high frequency radio
communications—poor quality and frequency restrictions—appeared solvable
and CINCPAC believed that there would be a continuing requirement for a cer-
tain amount of high frequency capability within the PACOM. 1

(C) CINCPAC submitted his recommendations to the JCS on 19 February
1969. He recommended consolidation and elimination of certain facilities. 2
In some areas, such as Japan, definitive conclusions could not be reached
because of the uncertain status of a number of bases and facilities. When
matters regarding the return of bases, or their consolidation or relocation
become more settled, further review of high frequency facilities would be
necessary. 3

(C) CINCPAC's recommendations were incorporated in the recommenda-
tion forwarded by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense. One exception was that
CINCPAC had recommended retention of the Air Force facility at Wettenafl,
Guam as a separate facility and the JCS had recommended collocation with
Navy facilities on Guam. 4 Phase-out or relocation of facilities was to be the
responsibility of CINCPAC's component command commanders, who concurred
in the CINCPAC recommendations.

Mobile/Transportable Communications Support for
Contingency Operations

(C) The DCA was working on a plan to provide mobile/transportable

1. J6 Brief No. 0162-68, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Oct 68, of MJCS-461-68 of 30 Sep
   68, Subj: Worldwide Analysis and Evaluation of High Frequency Facilities
   Utilization.
2. J6 Brief No. 359-69, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Apr 69, of J6M-335-69 of 4 Apr 69,
   Subj: Worldwide Analysis and Evaluation of High Frequency Facilities
   Utilization.
3. History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 January - 31
   March 1969, p. 20.
4. J6 Brief No. 0545-69, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Jun 69, Subj: Worldwide Analysis
   and Evaluation of High Frequency Facilities Utilization.

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communications support for contingency operations. They had selected 15 DCS entry stations, worldwide, which would be preconfigured in support of the plan. With the budget constraints imposed in 1969, however, the DCA did not believe that funds would be available for all 15 stations and offered several alternatives that reduced the number of entry stations and asked for comments from the unified or specified commanders affected. Four of the 15 stations, were designated to support CINCPAC in the plan: [redacted] Elmendorf, Alaska. Suggested elimination as entry stations [redacted] and Elmendorf was proposed. The DCA rationale for eliminating an entry station to be preconfigured was that both [redacted] broad band access, which left [redacted] the logical selection for elimination if funding remained critical. 2

CINCPAC examined PACOM requirements for the type of service to be provided by the DCA plan and concluded that only two of the four DCS entry stations were required to be preconfigured, that elimination [redacted] and Elmendorf would have a negligible impact on PACOM contingency plans. He notified the DCA of his conclusions on 14 November. 3

In a related matter, CINCPAC was notified in November by the JCS that secure voice equipment would be a part of the complete mobile/transportable communications packages prepared by the DCA for crisis situations and not require special request and provisions procedures as it had in the past. 4

Another matter studied was how long manual teletype systems would be required in the PACOM. The DCA requested such information after they discovered that the Air Force had programmed vanized digital subscriber terminals for its mobile communications groups; these were to be in support of contingency requirements for the unified and specified commanders. These transportable data facilities were to use the AUTODIN.

CINCPAC told the DCA that teletype operations would be required indefinitely as some operational plans, especially [redacted] plans, included participation of [redacted] who were not authorized direct access to the AUTODIN system. CINCPAC also explained some of the AUTODIN improvements he had recommended to the JCS on 10 October (see item on AUTODIN Improvement in this section). He continued:

2. DCA 316/300/01079/Nov 69/052154Z Nov 69.
3. Admin CINCPAC 140215Z Nov 69.
In view of the tactical aspects of most contingency planning, it is doubtful that a fixed plant facility (torn tape or Automatic Switch) will support the initial stage of the contingency. Therefore, a transportable contingency comm message switching package with peripheral transportable terminals is essential as an augmentation to the AUTODIN/ELDMX small scale automatic switching facilities network or for deployment to new theater of operations. This equipment is considered necessary for replacement of archaic and cumbersome torn tape operation in a contingency environment.

Transportable DSTEs will continue to be required in support of contingency situations where existing AUTODIN has a probability of survival. 1

He concluded that this communications upgrade for command and control had the same degree of sophistication as that of the forces deployed.

**Frequency Coordination for Guam and the Trust Territory Area**

(U) In July 1969 the Joint Frequency Panel of the Military Communications-Electronics Board in Washington asked for clarification of the area of cognizance for frequency coordination purposes of the CINCPAC Representative to Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 2 The query was prompted by the redesignation of the CINCPAC Representative Marianas to that new title in May. 3

(U) CINCPAC advised that the change did not affect frequency coordination procedures already in effect. Such coordination was accomplished with the Commissioner of the Trust Territories of the Pacific on an "as required" basis for military frequencies between Guam and the Trust Territory and for frequencies proposed for military use in the Trust Territory. Coordination was not effected for non-military frequencies as it had been assumed that civil requirements were referred to the Inter-Departmental Radio Advisory Committee by the Department of the Interior. 4

1. Admin CINCPAC 242332Z Oct 69; J626 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
3. CINCPAC 100338Z May 69.
(S) If informal agreement is reached on the matter, it would then be necessary for CINCPAC to forward the recommendation to the JCS to initiate

2. Point Papers, J616, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Jul 69, Subj: U.S. Military Communications with Singapore (U); J615, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Oct 69, Subj: U.S. Military Communications with Singapore (U).
3. Ibid.
arrangements for a formal agreement between the governments. Representatives of COMUSMACTHAI and British personnel in Bangkok in October were discussing ways and means of providing for U.S. assumption of operations and maintenance responsibilities there. When this is resolved, the existing U.S. - United Kingdom agreement would have to be terminated (which is possible six months after written notification to the other party by either party, or sooner if mutually agreed), ¹ and a new agreement between the United States and Australia negotiated.

Contingency Force Communications with Diplomatic Posts

(3) CINCPAC had begun developing procedures in 1968 for secure radio teletype-writer communication between joint task force commanders and diplomatic posts through a regional relay station of the Diplomatic Telecommunications System at . Detailed procedures for implementation of an interim method of such communication were tested during June and July 1969 and evaluated as adequate. ³ This interim method was being tested on a monthly basis to maintain capability.

LORAN Operations

(3) The first question of retention of LORAN-A (Long Range Navigation) chains in the PACOM arose in June when the JCS informed CINCPAC that the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, because of budgetary constraints, had asked for comments on the feasibility of disestablishing the Philippine LORAN-A chains, among others around the world. ⁴ The Philippine LORAN-A chain was the primary navigation aid for a substantial number of aircraft and surface vessels operating in support of Southeast Asia operations.

(3) On 11 July CINCPAC recommended continued operation of the Philippine chain beyond 1970 and the JCS in August informed the Coast Guard Commandant of the military need for the Philippine chain through 1972. ⁵

(3) The Coast Guard still had the problem of reducing personnel in the PACOM, particularly in Japan and the Philippines, during FY 70.

1. J614 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69; Point Paper, J616, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Jul 69, Subj: U.S. Military Communications with Singapore (U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1968,
3. J616 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69.
5. Ibid.
Commandant of the Coast Guard’s District 14, therefore, asked for CINCPAC concurrence in the matter of closing the LORAN station at Catanduanes in the Philippines and turning over the station at Miyako Jima in the Ryukyus to the Japanese for operation. 1 Regarding Miyako Jima, COMUS Japan stated that it was highly unlikely that the Japanese would take over the operation of the station while the island itself remained under U.S. control, particularly since the station did not operate in conjunction with any of the Japanese stations. 2 The CINCPAC Representative, Ryukyus also nonconcurred because of the political implications during reversion negotiations. 3 Regarding Catanduanes, CINCPAC’s Representative in the Philippines concurred in and interested CINCPAC component command commanders offered no objection to the closing of the station.

CINCPAC therefore recommended to the JCS the closure of the station at Catanduanes but not in the transfer of the Miyako Jima station to the Japanese. He also included the proviso that the Bataan, Philippines station remain in operation. 4 The JCS reply to the Coast Guard Commandant was based on and agreed with CINCPAC’s recommendations. 5

In December the Commandant of the Coast Guard’s 14th District queried CINCPAC about the possibility of discontinuing operation of the navigation aids site on French Frigate Shoals and relocation of LORAN facilities to an island between Johnston Island and Kauai, Hawaii. 6 The French Frigate Shoals facility had been severely damaged during a storm in early December when extraordinarily high seas completely covered the island. The principal users of the system were queried. CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and the Military Airlift Command all cited the need for greater accuracy than the proposed move would provide. 7 CINCPAC therefore recommended to the Commandant of the 14th Coast Guard District the continued operation of all navigation aid services being provided from French Frigate Shoals. 8

1. CCGDFOURTEEN 050019Z Nov 69.
2. COMUSJAPAN 100711Z Nov 69.
3. CINCPACREP RY 260515Z Nov 69.
4. CINCPAC 210043Z and 292311Z Nov 69.
5. JCS 06722/221357Z Dec 69.
6. CCGDFOURTEEN 121832Z Dec 69.
7. MAC231732Z Dec 69; CINCPACFLT 272101Z Dec 69; CINCPACAF 300202Z Dec 69.
8. CINCPAC 030339Z Jan 70.
briefing was presented to representatives of the Japanese Government by COMUS Japan representatives by means of the Frequency Subcommittee of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee on 29 August 1969. COMUS Japan advised CINCPAC on 8 September that no undue interest appeared to have been aroused among the Japanese representatives at the briefing, and that at a later meeting of the Japanese Radio Regulatory Board, at which some of the same Japanese were present who had attended the COMUS Japan briefing, no mention was made of the matter.

Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Procedures

In 1966 agreement was reached between the Defense Department and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) concerning joint use of the military Mark X IFF system and the FAA Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System. This agreement reserved 19 of the 64 available Mode 3 IFF codes for exclusive military use. An additional 28 codes were borrowed from the FAA Pacific Region for use within the PACOM; these were surplus to FAA needs at the time. Published the PACOM Mode 3 IFF tables utilizing 35 of the above codes.

Then in 1969 the FAA Pacific Region notified CINCPAC that they wanted their 28 codes returned. They were revising their national beacon code plan with the intention of placing it in effect on 1 January 1970. The revised plan assigned FAA meanings to many of the codes being used in the PACOM

1. Admin CINCPAC 092219Z Aug 69; J624 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
2. Ltr, COMUS Japan to CINCPAC, 8 Sep 69, Subj: CLARINET PILGRIM.
Mode 3 tables. CINCPAC requested new code tables from [redacted] and asked the FAA for a waiver for the PACOM from the 1 January deadline.

[redacted] to publish new code tables based on 30-degree sectors instead of the 20-degree sectors being used to stay within the number of codes allocated for exclusive military use. It was expected that the codes would be completed and distributed to all PACOM units by 1 March 1970. The JCS had agreed with this plan. In late December the first shipment of code tables was received, containing about a third of the total requirement. A new PACOM IFF Procedure manual was being prepared for distribution with the new code tables.

1. J614 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
3. J614 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.

(Reverse Blank p. 226)
SECTION XV - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Intelligence Collection

(TS) IVY GREEN operations, supplementary collection operations against foreign missile and space activities, were conducted periodically throughout 1969. Soviet intercontinental and medium range ballistic missile tests were collected against in the mid-Pacific broad ocean area and in the Kamchatka Peninsula area, respectively, and against a ZOND series circumlunar probe in the Indian Ocean area. During some of the ballistic missile tests, multiple reentry vehicles were observed. Data collected during these tests included visual, radar, sonar, acoustic, telemetry, and photo intelligence. Forces under the operational control of CINCPAC, which participated in IVY GREEN operations in various combinations, included four destroyer escorts (BRIGHT CRESCENT); VP surveillance aircraft (SCARLET WING); telemetry-configured EA3B aircraft (SEA BRINE); an Advance Range Instrumentation Ship (POLL COUNT); and specially-configured USAF aircraft (TRAP and AACS). 1

COMMANDO PANZER Inactivated (S)

(TS) COMMANDO PANZER was one of several Peacetime Airborne Reconnaissance programs being conducted in the PACOM. This was a photo and electronic intelligence surveillance program covering certain areas in Burma, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Three C-97 aircraft were used. In August CINCPAC and CINCPACAF (who operated the program) reviewed the previous year's operations. The necessity for obtaining diplomatic clearances had resulted in rigid flight schedules without regard to conditions affecting photography; electronic intelligence collection results were negligible because of the area of operations. The low survivability of the C-97 restricted operations to low risk areas with correspondingly low priority targets. No change to these conditions was expected for the next three to five years. 2

(TS) It was concluded, therefore, that the intelligence acquired no longer justified the expense. Both CINCPAC and the Air Force Chief of Staff approved cancellation of COMMANDO PANZER and the last mission was flown on 11 September. 3

1. J 341 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan, Apr-Sep, Nov, Dec 69.
2. J26 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
At the request of the JCS, CINCPAC in October 1968 conducted a study to determine the scope of the permanent defense analysis effort required by the PACOM. The study encompassed the practicability and feasibility of integrating the PACOM Air Defense Analysis Facility (PADAF), which CINCPAC had established to fulfill a CINCPAC requirement, with the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center (PEC). The CINCPAC study stated that such integration was feasible but that it should be deferred pending cessation of hostilities in Southeast Asia.\(^1\) Other recommendations made by CINCPAC were that the 1969 Consolidated Intelligence Program submission for the permanent air defense analysis effort reflect the existing level of PADAF manning to include supporting resources, that CINCPAC conduct a continuing review of PADAF and PEC operations to identify the organizational structure for an integrated center best suited to the assumption of both tasks, that administrative and facility support being provided to the PADAF by CINCPAC/AF continue until integration of the facilities, and that at the time of integration the PADAF portion of the combined facility be manned jointly by the Services with the Air Force providing 60 percent, the Navy/Marines 35 percent, and the Army five percent.\(^2\)

Study of the CINCPAC proposals by the JCS and the Services resulted in a statement that the JCS were considering two alternate proposals for presentation to the Secretary of Defense. One was to state that a joint PADAF-PEC operation would best meet the total PACOM requirements for air defense-electronic intelligence, but that integration would not take place until after hostilities ended in Southeast Asia. The second proposal would defer a decision on the matter of integration until termination of the war in Southeast Asia when the requirements and interrelationships of the intelligence functions could be determined more definitely.\(^3\) CINCPAC recommended that the second alternative be presented to the Secretary.

The JCS directed CINCPAC to continue his studies on the scope, mission, manpower requirements, and relationships between the PADAF and the PEC. They also asked CINCPAC to consider expanding the PADAF mission to include naval and ground defense analysis, which would be significant from

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
joint manning and expanded scope considerations. The matter remained under study during 1969.

CINCPAC/Defense Intelligence Agency
Intelligence Production Conference

(C) CINCPAC hosted an intelligence production planning conference at Camp Smith from 12 to 14 November 1969. Representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency, CINCPAC, the PEC, the Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific, and CINCPAC's component command commanders attended.

The objectives of the conference were to develop a thorough appreciation of general intelligence production requirements in the PACOM, to familiarize PACOM personnel with Defense Intelligence Agency resources for the production of general intelligence on the PACOM, and to review plans for the FY 71-76 period to determine modifications required by both CINCPAC and the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide for realistic, mutually supporting production programs that would satisfy, to the maximum degree possible, the general intelligence production requirements in the PACOM. 2

(C) Several specific matters received particular attention. One was the fact that PACOM intelligence producers in many instances produced products in response to vague or unidentified requirements. The impact of this could be felt more keenly when budget constraints were applied to intelligence production, as they were being applied to all areas of PACOM endeavor. Products should directly respond to requirements clearly defined in command missions, operational plans, or tasking directives. Also, PACOM intelligence producers were in many instances not including all of their products in the PACOM portion of the Defense Intelligence Production Schedule, which resulted in man-hours expended on unaccounted for products and degraded the value of the Schedule as a management tool. CINCPAC was to take action to insure proper validation (or elimination) of all intelligence products produced in the PACOM. 3

First PACOM Participation in Consolidated Cryptologic Program

(S) In November 1968 the JCS asked CINCPAC to participate for the first time in the development and review cycle of the Consolidated Cryptologic

2. J2/1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 69, which contained the Conference Summary, DIA/CINCPAC Intelligence Production Planning Conference, Camp H. M. Smith, 12-14 Nov 69.
3. Ibid.

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Program. Increased reliance of the military commands on Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) had been noted and caused the change. The program was a five-year management program submitted annually to the Office of the Secretary of Defense by the National Security Agency as a projection of resource requirements for all federal agencies engaged in cryptologic endeavors.

CINCPAC provided comments on the timeliness and adequacy of SIGINT support in January as his contribution. These comments were expected to be used by the JCS when they reviewed the National Security Agency's submission. CINCPAC anticipated that his comments would be solicited annually in the future.

Industrial Security Responsibilities

In 1968 a serious industrial security violation had occurred in the PACOM that generated interest in the Department of Defense. Subsequently, a survey was made by the Defense Supply Agency and selected facilities were inspected by the National Disclosure Policy Committee. These studies revealed "considerable misunderstanding of industrial security responsibilities within PACOM, and served to emphasize a need for the establishment of expanded PACOM guidance for industrial security matters."

The result was a letter from CINCPAC to his component and subordinate command commanders, his representatives, and military assistance agencies that outlined industrial security responsibilities in the PACOM in line with the Defense Department's Industrial Security Regulation. This regulation delineated which agencies were responsible for inspection and enforcement of industrial security matters when either U.S. contractors or foreign contractors were involved. The CINCPAC guidance admonished all PACOM agencies to insure that they were aware of, and that they were fulfilling their industrial security responsibilities.

The Human Intelligence Program

On 23 June CINCPAC issued the first of a series of Human Resource Collection Directives. These were tasking documents requiring planning for collection by PACOM Human Intelligence units to satisfy collection objectives

2. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 69.
4. Ibid.
that had been validated by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The directives were expected to result in some redirection of the collection effort of the PACOM.1 By the end of December CINCPAC had completed and levied 18 Human Resource Collection Directives as part of the continuing implementation of the Human Intelligence Program in the PACOM.2

In September CINCPAC formed an ad hoc committee under the cognizance of the CINCPAC Human Intelligence Board to recommend the optimum system of support projects under the Human Intelligence Program. CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, and CINCPACAF were represented on the committee. The committee held a series of meetings in September and October and in November completed a draft CINCPAC Instruction. Comments on the draft were solicited from the Defense Intelligence Agency, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and COMUSMACV. Upon receipt of those comments and their incorporation in the CINCPAC instruction, the committee was to be abolished.3

On 30 October the CINCPAC Human Intelligence Board established a second ad hoc committee, this one concerned with the development of a system of human intelligence overt projects. CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, and CINCPACAF were again represented. This committee reached agreement in November on a draft CINCPAC Instruction on the Coordination of Defense Department Overt Intelligence Operational Proposals. At the end of the year CINCPAC was waiting for comments from the Defense Intelligence Agency.4

Intelligence Data Handling System Communications Network

In September CINCPAC, in response to a request from the Defense Intelligence Agency, completed documentation of the PACOM network concept, traffic load data for communications line analysis, and specifications for data processing equipment for the worldwide communications network being developed by that agency. The communications network was designed to provide on-line access to intelligence data bases on a worldwide basis.5

Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy

Most CINCPAC activities in the fields of mapping, charting, and geodesy were concentrated in Southeast Asia again in 1969 and are discussed in some detail in Chapter IV of this history.

1. J23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
2. J23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
3. J23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Sep, Oct, Nov 69.
5. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
The PACOM Target Materials Review Group held its periodic meetings throughout 1969 to study matters in its areas of interest. This was a group chaired by a CINCPAC representative and composed of members from CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, the Air Force's 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group, and the Navy's Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific. This group concerned itself with many facets of target materials production, including specifications, maintenance of standards, completeness of coverage, and priorities. While many decisions in these matters were made in Washington agencies, the group had opportunities throughout the year in national conferences to present its ideas.

One such idea concerned the amount of textual information to be included on air target charts. An idea was presented in the committee to eliminate such textual data on the grounds that it was often obsolete before the chart was produced in printed form. A recommendation to print only Basic Encyclopedia numbers on such a chart was presented, with other target description and pertinent data to be obtained from periodic machine listings which would have the most current information available. This recommendation was made by the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group representative and endorsed by the Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific representative. At a subsequent meeting, however, the CINCPACAF representative presented the opinion that existing procedures were better, a position that the majority concurred in. The matter was dropped for the time being, but the committee believed that it was a matter for further study and consideration.

Certain naval survey operations were conducted in various areas of the PACOM in 1969. In May the USS SERRANO (AGS-24) commenced survey operations along the east and west coasts of southern Japan. The survey was conducted to obtain hydrographic information for selection of safe submarine test areas. The selected areas were to provide for safe bottom conditions which were greater than test depth and less than crush depth. The SERRANO completed operations in November 1969 after having surveyed 9,237 miles.

In October 1968 the USS TANNER (AGS-15) deployed to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to collect hydrographic data and up-to-date information on the harbors and approaches for the production of new

1. Memorandum for File G108.2; AT 511, from J261, Hq CINCPAC, to J26, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Mar 69, Subj: PACOM Target Materials Review Group (PATMRG); Meeting of (U).
2. J26/Memo/0077-69, Hq CINCPAC, 16 May 69, Subj: PACOM Target Materials Review Group (PATMRG); Meeting of
3. MC&G Summary 1969, Addendum to J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
hydrographic charts and publications. The project was completed in April 1969. ¹

[(S) One other survey ship, the USS MAURY, had been operating in Korean waters and its activities are discussed in Chapter IV. All three ships, however, the MAURY, TANNER, and SERRANO, were completing in these operations their last endeavors prior to their deactivation. By the end of the year all were deactivated, and with them the total coastal hydrographic capability of the PACOM. This lack of capability was expected to be partially offset in 1970 by assignment of the USNS KELLAR. ²]
SECTION XVI - STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE ACTIVITIES

Church of the Crossroads Incident

(U) CINCPAC had occasion to monitor an event of wide community interest in Honolulu in 1969. On 6 August an Airman stationed in Hawaii announced to the press that he had been absent without official leave (AWOL) since 30 July 1969 and that he was going to stay in "sanctuary" at the Church of the Crossroads. ¹ In this action he was aided by a local group calling themselves The Resistance, a group opposed to the Draft and the Vietnam War.² Several other servicemen joined the group living in the church and later others established another "sanctuary" at the Unitarian Church of Honolulu. The number in residence fluctuated as some of the men surrendered to military authorities or were apprehended while they were outside the confines of the churches. The total number involved was 37.³

(U) City zoning and health laws were being violated by those in the churches, according to local authorities, and on 19 August the City of Honolulu Corporation Counsel ordered church authorities to evacuate the Church of the Crossroads building within 10 days. The complaints involved lack of sanitation and other living facilities.

(S) Several of the men in "sanctuary" had unfavorable incidents in their backgrounds, including charges of homosexuality, drug use, larceny, violation of off-limits regulations, and such. Some were having psychiatric problems.

(S) Actions taken by members of the CINCPAC staff during this period included contact with local health authorities by the CINCPAC Surgeon, coordination of the efforts of Service information personnel by the Public Affairs Office and letters prepared for the consideration of the component command commanders for dispatch to the parents of absentees, and information for the Defense Department's Deputy General provided by the Staff Judge Advocate's Office.⁴

¹ A United Church of Christ church near the University of Hawaii.
² Point Paper, J73, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Sep 69, Subj: Church of the Crossroads Incident.
⁴ Point Paper, J73, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Sep 69, Subj: Church of the Crossroads Incident.
A concept for apprehension of the men had been carefully prepared. At a meeting held by CINCPAC and his component command commanders on 8 September, Admiral McCain "directed that the concept be placed into execution." A couple of hours later the Provost Marshals of CINCUSARPAC and the U.S. Army Hawaii met with the U.S. Attorney and the pastors of the two churches. The pastors agreed to let the Army officers address the groups at the two churches later that afternoon. The CINCUSARPAC Provost Marshal went to the Church of the Crossroads, the U.S. Army Hawaii Provost Marshal to the Unitarian Church. Each advised the assembled servicemen of their violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and offered them an opportunity to return to military control of their own volition, noting that there was no large military police force on hand to apprehend the men and return them by force. Each provost marshal had the same response. None agreed to return, in fact when asked what their reaction would be to attempted apprehension they indicated they would "run back into the church" and "call the TV reporters and indicate that the military was trying to forcibly remove them from the church and" that "one individual could not accomplish the apprehension." It became apparent an apprehension could not be made at that time.

As a result of activities on 8 September, CINCPAC concurred in a CINCUSARPAC recommendation that the apprehension of the AWOL/deserters, scheduled for first light on 9 September, be postponed. CINCPAC stated that further action to be taken would be decided on 9 September.

Parenthetically, on 4 September a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent informed CINCUSARPAC that FBI agents would not accompany military authorities into either church to assist in the apprehension of military personnel. He outlined FBI policy which would permit them to enter a church only if the military personnel had been deserters when they entered the church and the FBI had been asked to assume jurisdiction in the case. In cases where personnel entered the church in an AWOL status, no matter how long they stayed, or if a mixed group of AWOL and deserter personnel were in a church, the FBI would not enter the church, with or without military personnel, to apprehend the individuals.

Military action resumed on the morning of 9 September when CINCPAC's Staff Judge Advocate met with the U.S. Attorney and CINCUSARPAC's Provost Marshal. During the meeting the U.S. Attorney spoke with a representative of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department in Washington.

1. CINCUSARPAC 100306Z Sep 69.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
The U. S. Attorney explained that he was thinking of obtaining a mandatory injunction "to enjoin church officials to remove non-military personnel from the churches in order to prevent violence when HASP personnel entered to make apprehensions."  

Justice Department officials replied that they could not concur in the U. S. Attorney's proposal, "primarily because of the private property aspects and the appearance of the US Government attempting to order a church to restrict people from entering its property."  The U. S. Attorney requested that if the military decided to effect apprehensions within the churches that he be given sufficient time to allow him to notify church officials that he could no longer act as a mediator between them and military authorities.  

On the afternoon of 9 September CINCPAC was briefed on these events and he directed that the U. S. Attorney be contacted personally to advise him that military authorities were considering going into the churches to apprehend the AWOL personnel, using whatever force was necessary, and to ask him to determine the minimum time he would need to withdraw himself from the matter. It was further directed that HASP personnel enter the churches at first light on either 11 or 12 September, depending on the time required by the U. S. Attorney. The Attorney said he could clarify his position to church officials by 11 September. He was also requested to ask the U. S. Commissioner to issue arrest warrants to HASP personnel, which he did and such warrants were provided to the U. S. Army Hawaii Provost Marshal on 11 September.  

On 11 September the Religious Society of Friends, a Quaker meeting house, became the third Honolulu church to offer "sanctuary." Their "guest" was a Navyman who had previously been in and out of "sanctuary" at the other two churches and in Tripler Army Hospital for psychiatric care before he had "walked out."  

The Navyman did not enjoy his "guest" status for long. On 12 September, just before dawn, military authorities entered all three churches, arresting one at the Quaker meeting house, eight at the Church of the Crossroads, and three at the Unitarian Church. About 80 uniformed members of the HASP conducted the raids with about 30 more held in reserve. They met with negligible resistance. Very few civilian supporters were on hand and

1. Hawaii Armed Forces Police.
2. CINCUSARPAC 130333Z Sep 69.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
only at the Unitarian Church was there any verbal harassment and an attempt by one man and two women to block the doors of a paddy wagon by sitting down in front of them. These civilians were picked up and moved. The apprehended personnel were asleep and appeared to have been taken by complete surprise. The warrants that had been obtained were not used.

(U) Public reaction to include the press was not adverse to the military action and quickly died down. Church of the Crossroads officials stated that their church had declared a "moratorium" on "sanctuary" and there were no further offers of "sanctuary" from any other church.

(S) Military officials from CINCPAC's staff and those of his component command commanders critiqued actions taken during the operation. In addition, CINCUSARPAC was tasked to coordinate action to determine whether a factual case could be established against any of the dissidents or church officials. Review by CINCPAC and the component command commanders, however, indicated insufficient evidence to make such a factual case.

(S) Not all of the personnel that had sought sanctuary were apprehended and some were still at large at the end of the year. In November, during an anti-war demonstration at the University of Hawaii, two Armed Forces deserters who had earlier been involved at the Church of the Crossroads participated in a rally and then marched to a building on the campus of the East-West Center, where they spent the night. The East-West Center was established by Congress in 1960 for training grantees from friendly Asian and Pacific countries. It was largely financed and administered by the Federal Government. The President of the University of Hawaii, through whom the Chancellor of the Center reported to the Board of Regents, gave approval for the demonstrators to use the hall.

(S) On advice of his Political Adviser, CINCPAC asked the Chairman of the JCS to register the military's concern with the Secretary of State over the use of the East-West Center as a haven for deserters. CINCPAC found it distressing that an activity of the Government was in effect being used to violate Federal law by harboring and encouraging deserters and he was concerned that such activity could compromise the Armed Forces' legal position with respect to other groups that harbored deserters. The JCS replied that the matter had been discussed informally with personnel of the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, who expressed deep concern over

1. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 170405Z Nov 69.
the problem and indicated that it would be discussed at the next meeting with the East-West Center Chancellor. 1

1. JCS 5289/261540Z Nov 69.
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SECTION XVII - PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Civilian Personnel Activities

(U) Matters affecting civilian personnel at CINCPAC's Camp Smith headquarters were routine in 1969, for the most part. In April the annual maintenance review of all civilian position descriptions was completed. The review excluded the Military Assistance Program Data Center. Of the 178 positions reviewed, 43 required changes in classification or rating. Of those positions certified as current by supervisors, 16 were audited by a Navy position classification specialist.¹

(U) The Navy's Office of Civilian Manpower Management had been developing career programs for selected civilian occupations. In March action began to enroll CINCPAC staff civilians in the intelligence, counterintelligence, and cryptologic fields in such a program.²

(U) As an aftermath of events involving two civilian employees who were injured on the job and were refused treatment at Camp Smith in the Fleet Marine Force Dispensary, CINCPAC arranged in June for such emergency treatment as may be required. A list of civilian employees on the staff was provided to the dispensary for identification purposes.³

(U) Three young people worked on the CINCPAC staff during the summer of 1969 under the President's Federal Summer Employment Program for Youth. The young people were enthusiastic about their work.⁴

(U) Mr. Merriman F. Bosley, a communications specialist, was CINCPAC's nominee for Outstanding Federal Manager of the Year Award (for employees in grades GS-13 and above). No candidates were submitted for Outstanding Lady Federal Employee or Outstanding Male Federal Employee (each of these in grades GS-12 and below).⁵

(U) In April certain of the recommendations of the CINCPAC Incentive Awards Committee were approved by CINCPAC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics, and Administration. There were 49 awards

1. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan, May 69.
2. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.
3. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
4. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
5. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.

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recommended, 36 for cash and/or honorary awards and 13 for honorary awards only. Of these, 34 honorary and 11 cash awards were granted. 1

(U) On 24 June the first CINCPAC Staff Instruction for the CINCPAC Incentive Awards Program was issued. This instruction pertained to military personnel as well as civilians and was designed to encourage the fullest participation of all personnel through submission of ideas for improving Government operations and to encourage high quality performance of assigned duties. 2

Temporary Holiday Changes in the CINCPAC Work Week

(U) CINCPAC military and civilian personnel continued to work a routine 40-hour week, but the work was performed Monday through Saturday with Wednesdays and Saturdays half days of work. This caused particular problems when national holidays fell in such a way that personnel were penalized and not granted the same holiday time that other Federal employees and military personnel in Hawaii were granted. To compensate for this, CINCPAC changed the routine work week to Monday through Friday on the occasions of President's Day, 4th of July, Labor Day, and Christmas. CINCPAC personnel also shared in the National Day of Participation on 21 July, declared by President Nixon in observance of the APOLLO XI moon landing. 3

Combined Federal Campaign

(U) CINCPAC submitted his final report on the annual Combined Federal Campaign to the Department of Defense Fund Raising Coordinator on 30 June. 4 The highly successful PACOM campaign resulted in receipts and pledges of $656,912.57, which did not include $23,577.00 collected in Vietnam where no solicitation was made. There was a per capita increase of $.14 over the campaign for the previous year for a total dollar increase of almost $76,000. In regard to next year's campaign, CINCPAC recommended, among other things, that the Overseas Campaign be conducted at the same time as the CONUS drive, that the campaign's first and last days be paydays, and certain simplifications in accounting and reporting. 5

1. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
2. CINCPACSTAFFINST 5305.1, 24 Jun 69, Subj: Incentive Awards Program for CINCPAC Staff; procedures for.
3. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Feb, Jun, Jul, Aug, Dec 69.
5. Ibid.
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Boy and Girl Scout Activities

(U) In January COMUS Japan proposed that funding for the Far East Councils of the Boy and Girl Scouts be furnished out of Combined Federal Campaign resources. CINCPAC asked for further details in March, and, on receipt of them, concurred with COMUS Japan.

(U) When CINCPAC asked the Defense Department's Fund Raising Coordinator for consideration of the matter, he outlined the growth of Scout membership and the increased cost of providing professional advice and assistance to Scouting programs. Funds had been provided principally from non appropriated funds from the military commands that comprised the councils, but these commands were finding it progressively more difficult to provide enough funds from their available assets. CINCPAC therefore asked the Fund Raising Coordinator to consider either adding the Far East Councils to the list of approved agencies included in the Overseas Combined Federal Campaign or granting permission to conduct a separate fund raising campaign for the Scouts. No reply had been received by the end of the year.

Credit Union Activities

(U) A visit to Japan by a subcommittee of the House of Representatives Banking and Currency Committee to review credit union and consumer protection policies revealed a possible need to extend the charter of the United Credit Credit Union, Japan to establish a sub-office facility at Camp Zama, Japan. After consulting the Commanding General, U.S. Army Japan and COMUS Japan, CINCPAC replied to the Secretary of Defense in February that it was "not in the best interest of the United States Government and of no particular added benefit to the military members and civilian component to establish a credit union facility at Camp Zama." The matter was dropped.

(U) In 1968 CINCPAC had received a request from the 824th Combat Support Group at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa regarding a credit union plan for an "Instant Money Program." After an exchange of messages in which

1. Ltr, Hq U.S. Forces Japan to CINCPAC, 24 Jan 69, Subj: Funding of Far East Council BSA/GSA Programs.
3. Ltr, CINCPAC to DOD Fund Raising Coordinator, Secretary of Defense (Admin), 26 Aug 69, Subj: Funding of Far East Council BSA/GSA Programs.
4. SECDEF 9961/232023Z Jan 69.
5. CINCPAC 200337Z Feb 69.

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CINCPAC asked for more details and the 824th replied and requested approval of their program. CINCPAC disapproved the request. He pointed out that the interest rate they proposed, 60 percent per annum, was the very kind of exorbitant rate credit unions were designed to combat and that the Federal Credit Union Act prohibited charging interest in excess of one percent per month on an unpaid balance. CINCPAC agreed that a low-cost "instant money" program was needed on Okinawa, but he asked that other alternatives be explored.1

Environmental and Morale Leave

(U) CINCPAC asked his Representative in Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for his comments on the use of Guam as an environmental and morale leave location for personnel stationed in Okinawa after his Representative in the Ryukyus had asked that such be considered.2 The CINCPAC Representative Guam/TTPI had no objection, but he called attention to the lack of Government operated facilities, the scarcity and high cost of civilian accommodations, limited recreation facilities, and the fact that the military clubs and beaches were operating at near capacity serving those assigned on Guam.3 CINCPAC approved the designation of Guam as an environmental and morale leave site for personnel stationed in the Ryukyus, but he asked that personnel considering selection of the site be advised of the conditions there.4

Personnel Administration of Non-U.S. Citizens in Foreign Areas

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs directed in April that the Military Services delegate to their commands in the Pacific (CINCPAC's component command commanders) the authorities necessary to decide on non-U.S. citizen civilian personnel policy, including wages.5 Previously, decision authority regarding wages and other compensation matters had been held at the Services' departmental level or by the Secretary of Defense. Authority on other conditions of employment had rested with

1. Admin CINCPAC 292301Z Sep 69.
2. Admin CINCPAC 051959Z Sep 69.
3. CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI 100205Z Sep 69.
4. CINCPAC 242035Z Sep 69.
5. J1 Brief No. 19-69, Hq CINCPAC, 10 May 69, Subj: Coordination of Personnel Administration Affecting Local Nationals and Other Non-US Citizens in USEUCOM and PACOM.
the Services, but in the case of the Army and Air Force had been redelegated previously to CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF. 1

(U) In his 23 April memorandum announcing the change the Assistant Secretary had directed CINCPAC to establish a joint personnel committee with Service component command representation to be responsible to CINCPAC for policy determination and implementation, with only matters that could not be resolved by the committee or the CINCPAC to be referred to the Secretary of Defense or the Services as appropriate.

(C) CINCPAC had already formed such a committee, the PACOM Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Group, which served CINCPAC as the advisory body and focal point for tri-Service coordination on civilian personnel policy matters. CINCPAC proposed that this committee, as already constituted, serve to effectuate joint committee actions under the new authority from the Assistant Secretary until a permanent civilian personnel committee structure could be developed. 2

Severance Pay Plan Revised for Korean National Employees

(U) CINCPAC approved a revised severance plan for Local National employees of the U.S. Force Korea on 11 October. 3 Tentative agreement had already been reached with the Korean Government. 4 The revised plan was consistent with local custom and practice as determined by locality wage survey findings. It extended the period on which severance pay was computed from 15 to 25 years. Although voluntary separation allowance rates were increased slightly, the rate for involuntary separations remained unchanged. 5

Implementation of the 1968 Philippine Offshore Labor Agreement

(C) Late in December 1968 the United States and the Philippines reached accord on an offshore labor agreement, which was concerned with conditions of employment for Filipinos employed by the United States in areas outside the Philippines. 6 This agreement included provisions for such matters as the

2. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69; CINCPAC 272256Z Jun 69.
3. CINCPAC 112216Z Oct 69.
4. The U.S. Forces Korea was the single largest employer of Koreans after the Korean Government (CGUSAEGHT SEOUL KOREA EA 90504/100857Z Sep 69).
5. J100 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 69.
 Philippine Social Security System benefits, living quarters allowances, paid holidays, leave, and other fringe benefits. The United States was allowed six months to implement provisions that required administrative actions.

CINCPAC's Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Group was active throughout this period in matters relating to implementing these provisions.

In the matter of Social Security benefits, CINCPAC designated the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines (who was to act in coordination with the American Embassy) as the authority for monitoring and coordinating implementation procedures with both the Philippine Government and U.S. Forces elements.

In the matter of living quarters allowances, general policy was to provide Filipino and other third country national (TCN) employees with government bachelor quarters without cost or to pay a quarters allowances when such quarters could not be provided. CINCPAC authorized Living Quarters Allowances, effective 1 June 1969, as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMUSMACTHAI&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Bangkok Area</th>
<th>Other Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LGS-10 equivalent, and above</td>
<td>$936.00</td>
<td>To be established at later date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGS-9 equivalent, and below</td>
<td>780.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMUSMACV&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Saigon, Da Nang Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LGS-10 equivalent, and above</td>
<td>$1,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGS-9 equivalent, and below</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Okinawa&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Okinawa Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LGS-10 equivalent, and above</td>
<td>$900.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGS-9 equivalent, and below</td>
<td>750.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. CINCPAC 080250Z Apr 69.
2. J100 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 69.
3. CINCPAC 140543Z Jun 69.
4. Local General Schedule.
5. CINCPAC 140544Z Jun 69.
6. CINCPAC 140545Z Jun 69.
Taiwan¹
LGS-10 equivalent, and above $720.00
LGS-9 equivalent, and below 600.00

Korea²
LGS-10 equivalent, and above $1,224.00
LGS-9 equivalent, and below 1,080.00

(1) On 15 June CINCPAC promulgated instructions on implementing the Offshore Labor Agreement's other major economic benefits for offshore Filipino direct hire employees in foreign areas of the PACOM in conjunction with implementing the same benefits for other TCN direct hire employees under the aegis of the PACOM TCN personnel policy manual. Country commands were directed to assure implementation of other Offshore Labor Agreement provisions by 28 June. CINCPAC also asked the CINCPAC Representative to Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to assure compliance by 28 June with terms of the Offshore Labor Agreement for Filipino non-immigrant alien direct hire employees on Guam.⁴

(2) A number of specific problems or questions arose. The question of the interpretation of the applicability of certain provisions of the agreement to contractors and contractor employees was discussed by United States representatives of the State, Treasury, and Labor Departments and Defense Department agencies, including CINCPAC, when they met in Washington in April. Regarding contractors, the previously stated U.S. position was reaffirmed and Philippine Government representatives were so informed.⁵

1. CINCPAC 140545Z Jun 69.
2. CINCPAC 140547Z Jun 69.
4. CINCPAC 190335Z Jun 69.
5. SECSTATE 055751/110145Z Apr 69.
1. J100 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 69.
2. Ibid.
3. SECDEF 07266/212106Z Aug 69.
4. J100 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 69.
5. SECSTATE 173025/110432Z Oct 69.
The Bases Labor Agreement, concluded between the United States and the Philippines in May 1968, provided that a collective bargaining agreement would be negotiated when the employee unions attained sufficient membership.

1. CINCPAC 152122 Z Oct 69.
2. J100 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 69.
2. J100 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 69.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 080232Z Mar 69.
5. CINCPAC 162303Z Apr 69.
6. CINCPACREP PHIL 010857Z May 69.
1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 110302 Z May 69.
3. CNO 122104 Z May 69.
(U) Negotiations proceeded to a successful conclusion and the collective bargaining agreement was signed on 28 July.  

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1. J100 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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SECTION XVIII - PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Public Affairs Activities

(U) World attention continued to focus on Asia and the Pacific in 1969 and CINCPAC, in Hawaii, received a constant flow of visitors. Many of these were enroute to or returning from elsewhere in the PACOM. In addition, CINCPAC’s travels took him throughout his command frequently and occasionally took him to the CONUS. News media gave extensive coverage to these events. Some highlights for 1969 follow.

(U) In March Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stopped in Hawaii on his return from Vietnam. In April CINCPAC met with many distinguished visitors passing through Hawaii enroute to the funeral of President Eisenhower. These visitors included President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, the Republic of Vietnam's Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, Australia's Prime Minister John Gorton, and the Republic of Korea's Prime Minister II Kwon Chung.

(U) Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel visited early in May, followed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who ADM McCain joined for further travel to Southeast Asia for SEATO meetings. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew visited Hawaii for a holiday in May, during which he was greeted and briefed by ADM McCain.

(U) The CINCPAC Public Affairs Office was responsible for accreditation of the local, national, and world press covering the meeting at Midway Island between Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Nguyen Van Thieu. Accreditation cards were issued to 482, excluding the White House press contingent, which had been accredited in Washington. ADM McCain accompanied the President to Midway with other officials, including Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, Chairman of the JCS GEN Earle Wheeler, and GEN Creighton Abrams, COMUSMACV.

(U) From 14 to 18 June ADM McCain visited the Western Pacific area, including the Philippines where President Marcos decorated him with the Philippine Legion of Honor, degree of Commander. ADM McCain also attended the Joint U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board Meeting.

1. Material for this section was taken from J74 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan, Mar, Apr, May, Jul, Aug, Sep, Nov, and Dec 69 and from J74/Memo/332-70, 16 Apr 70, Subj: 1969 CINCPAC Command History; Draft Review.
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(U) In July CINCPAC attended meetings of the U.S.-Japanese Joint Security Consultative Committee in Tokyo and later accompanied GEN Wheeler on a trip to Vietnam. On 23 July ADM McCain joined President Nixon on the USS HORNET to greet the astronauts of APOLLO XI on their return from the moon.

(U) In August CINCPAC accompanied Secretary of State Rogers to a meeting of the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) Treaty Council in New Zealand. While on that journey he visited in Singapore, where he conferred with Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton, Commander in Chief of British Forces in the Far East. CINCPAC returned in time to attend the President's dinner for the astronauts in Los Angeles and then he went to San Francisco later in August to attend honors with the President for the Republic of Korea's President Park Chung Hee.

(U) Early in September ADM McCain enjoyed a rare and sentimental honor when he participated in recommissioning ceremonies for a ship named for his father. Recommissioning of the USS JOHN S. MCCAIN took place at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard; the ship was a guided missile destroyer. The Admiral then traveled to Washington for a White House review of the war in Vietnam. By the middle of the month he was in Korea for change of command ceremonies for the Eighth U.S. Army. In a subsequent ceremony ADM McCain was awarded the Order of National Security Merit, First Class by Korea's President Park Chung Hee.

(U) On 23 September the Joint U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board met at CINCPAC's headquarters at the invitation of ADM McCain. GEN Manuel T. Yan, Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces, represented his country while ADM McCain represented the United States.

(U) The first week in November CINCPAC traveled to Indonesia where he was received by President Suharto and visited principal officers of the armed services and civic action projects of those services. On 24 November he welcomed the second group of astronauts home from the moon, again aboard the USS HORNET.

(U) ADM McCain spent Christmas with the troops in Vietnam, covering a great deal of the country. He also celebrated Christmas at home in Hawaii, thanks to the International Date Line. The next day he again greeted Vice President Agnew, who was beginning a trip to Asian and Pacific countries.

(U) CINCPAC received countless other visitors throughout the year, including many prominent Asian and American journalists, columnists, and businessmen.

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SECTION XIX - COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

Budget Working Group Recommends Economy Measures

(U) CINCPAC had established a Budget Working Group in 1968 to involve the CINCPAC staff more directly in the budget process. When budget reductions became necessary in 1969 because of fund limitations, the group examined operations in the headquarters and prepared a list of recommendations for measures to reduce operating costs. These were distributed to the CINCPAC staff in a memorandum from the Chief of Staff on 15 September. Among the recommendations were: reduce the number of copies of messages sent for "information"; use the blank sides of unclassified messages for memos; reduce the number of telephones and lines; reduce staff-generated publications; reduce subscriptions to periodicals; eliminate non-essential travel; eliminate non-essential off-the-job training; increase emphasis on reports control; reduce excess stocks of supplies and equipment; use the Daily Bulletin instead of individual staff memoranda; eliminate unessential photographic coverage; reduce physical relocations of offices; eliminate the CINCPAC telephone directory and insert more data in the Joint Military Telephone Directory, Hawaii; reduce distribution of CINCPAC directives; discontinue publication of items extracted from Hawaii newspapers (News of Interest); consolidate Xerox and other duplicating equipment; conserve utilities; and reduce automatic data processing machine overtime through elimination of non-essential reports.

Resources Management System - Project PRIME

(U) Project PRIME was a system of resources management initiated by the Defense Department in 1968 to focus accounting efforts on the total cost of resources consumed, including military personnel costs. After months of review and research, CINCPAC decided on 26 March 1969 that further decentralization of funds management within the CINCPAC staff was not warranted by the ratio of benefits to additional costs. CINCPAC concluded that the requirements of Project PRIME had been met at his headquarters; that staff elements would continue to budget for their needs in travel, overtime, and equipment and would be provided expense ceilings for travel and overtime pay; and that further development of Project PRIME would be responsive to local management needs.

2. JO1/Memo/483-69, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Sep 69, Subj: Economy of Operations.
4. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 69.

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Suspension of Per Diem in Vietnam Proposed

(U) In March COMUSMACV recommended that CINCPAC take action to ask the Per Diem, Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee of the Department of Defense to suspend payment of per diem in Vietnam when government quarters and messing facilities were available. COMUSMACV noted that aggressive action had been taken in Vietnam to reduce the payment of per diem. He said that the action he recommended would have no adverse impact on morale, result in considerable savings to the Government, reduce administrative costs and procedures, and incur no cost to the individual as he would be provided with Government quarters at no cost and fed at field ration rates.

(U) CINCPAC replied that his remarks in reply to a similar request in 1968 were still valid. He did not consider suspension of per diem payments consistent with the intent of the Joint Travel Regulation and he thought it would create inequities with other geographical areas where per diem was paid to personnel who were also provided Government quarters and messing facilities.

1. COMUSMACV 18462/261442Z Mar 69.
2. CINCPAC 180306Z May 69.
SECTION XX - MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

Hospital Requirements in the PACOM

(9) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs directed in 1968 that a survey be conducted of hospitals in the PACOM that served Vietnam, principally, but that were located outside of that country. These were called off-shore hospitals and the principal concern was with facilities in Japan.\(^1\) The Assistant Secretary wanted to develop alternative plans for the accomplishment of the mission being performed by the off-shore hospitals. CINCPAC had supported the continued utilization of facilities and manpower in the existing system.

(9) The 1968 survey was completed and forwarded in February by the JCS to CINCPAC for comments. The main question the study asked was whether it was possible to close any PACOM off-shore hospitals. The study group concluded that such hospitals could be reduced by up to 700 beds and that the expansion capability of the 10 hospitals permitted some to be expanded and others closed. They recommended closing the Army hospital at Kishine Barracks and expanding certain other hospital facilities (which would result in a net loss of 700 beds) or, alternatively, closing the Army's 400-bed hospital at Camp Oji, Japan and spreading the workload to other hospitals. Similar proposals relating to Army hospitals in Japan had previously been made by the Secretary of Defense as part of 11 proposals concerning Japan bases made in December 1968. The JCS did not concur with these Defense Department proposals and neither did CINCPAC. CINCPAC believed that the alternatives presented by the study group would reduce PACOM hospital capability for support of Southeast Asia to marginal, with little capability remaining for support of other contingencies.\(^2\)

(9) CINCPAC furnished his comments to the JCS on 8 March.\(^3\) First he noted that the study did not take into consideration the agreements reached between CINCPAC and the U.S. Ambassador late in 1968 by which certain hospital facilities could be released upon relocation to new and equal facilities provided by the Government of Japan. CINCPAC continued that closure of either Camp Oji or Kishine would necessitate additional expenditures, which he considered neither feasible nor desirable. A reduction of Army beds brought about by closure of either facility would necessitate the transfer of Navy and Marine patients to other hospitals. The reason these patients were

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3. CINCPAC 080411Z Mar 69.
in Army hospitals was that the Navy had a severe shortage of hospital beds in the PACOM. If the patients were to be transferred from Army hospitals, CINCPAC recommended adding 400 additional beds and 400 additional personnel for Navy facilities on Guam, where facilities could be expanded by this amount with only minor construction.

Regarding a recommendation to establish a joint service medical group under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, CINCPAC had no objection, but he thought that the recommendations of such a committee should constitute guidance only. "In the final analysis the physician treating the patient must be responsible for and make the judgments concerning the latter's care," CINCPAC said.

CINCPAC did not agree with a recommendation to discuss professional procedures on patients from Vietnam at the CINCPAC Medical Planning Conference. He noted that there were differences of professional opinion regarding management of patients with specific medical conditions just as there were in civilian hospitals and medical schools. He pointed out that the CINCPAC War Surgery Conferences,\(^1\) attended by physicians of all Services, had delved deeply into new and improved ways of handling war casualties, including new methods and procedures for treatment. This approach had proved sound, CINCPAC said.

CINCPAC commented on a few administrative procedural recommendations and offered his conclusion. He did not concur in the closing of a medical facility in the off-shore area until he could be assured that the incidence of illness and injury in Southeast Asia would lessen. He believed this lessening would relate directly to U.S. Force reductions in Southeast Asia.\(^2\) Notwithstanding, a memorandum to the JCS dated 3 September 1969 from the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the Department of the Army to take necessary action to close the 7th Field Hospital, Camp Oji, Japan by 31 December 1969. The medical mission of the 7th Field Hospital was subsequently phased out, and the hospital was closed on 31 December 1969.\(^3\)

The CINCPAC Surgeon's Staff was increased during the year. As of 1 July 1969, the authorized allowance for the Surgeon's Staff was increased from three to six officers, plus one civilian secretary. By August all new

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1. The Third CINCPAC Conference on War Surgery was held at Camp Smith from 20 to 23 Jan 69, the fourth was scheduled for Feb 70 in Tokyo.
2. CINCPAC 080421Z Mar 69.
3. STATE/DEFENSE 153615/110007Z Sep 69.
personnel arrived and made it possible to assume additional responsibilities and perform tasks heretofore assigned to Component Surgeons or not performed.

In October COMUSMACTHAI requested CINCPAC to conduct a study of medical activities in Thailand to eliminate unnecessary duplication between Army and Air Force medical resources. CINCPAC formed a study group which included representatives of CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF. After initial discussions at CINCPAC, a field visit to Thailand was conducted in which the CINCPACAF chose not to be represented. The study concluded that there were duplications of Army and Air Force facilities and overlapping of functions. Accordingly, CINCPAC directed the following major actions by 1 March 1970:

a. The transfer without reimbursement of the 31st Field Hospital, Korat, from the Army to the Air Force for operation;

b. The closure of the inpatient and casualty staging part of the Air Force Dispensary at Korat; and

c. The assumption of all the medical supply missions within Thailand by the Air Force.

In December, CINCPAC issued a new directive\(^1\) establishing the Pacific Command Joint Medical Regulating Office (PACOMJMRO) effective 1 January 1970 to regulate the movement of patients of all Services within PACOM and from PACOM to CONUS or to other designations as required. The establishment of the PACOMJMRO was facilitated by the redesignation of the Far East Joint Medical Regulating Office (FEJMRO). While the mission and tasks of both offices were similar, the PACOMJMRO was a joint agency functioning under the staff supervision of the CINCPAC Surgeon while the FEJMRO was an Army element, tri-Service manned, under the direct supervision of an Army command as previously directed by a 1959 CINCPAC directive.\(^2\)

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1. CINCPACINST 4652.1, 10 Dec 69, Subj: Joint Medical Regulating Office.
2. CINCPACINST 6000.2B (cancelled).

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