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CINCPAC COMMAND HISTORY

1960

PART I
CHAPTER I,
II

NI 7/25/84
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CINCPAC 11/7/92

PART I

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
JO4/memo/58-61
4 May 1961

MEMORANDUM

From: JO4
To: Assistant Chiefs of Staff and Heads of Independent Offices
Subj: CINCPAC Command History, 1960, serial 00094-61

1. The CINCPAC Command History, 1960 has been distributed within the staff for information and use as deemed appropriate. Admiral Felt, in his staff meeting of 5 August 1960, encouraged all officers to read the History and particularly recommended it as required reading for newly assigned officers.
2. Distribution has been made within the staff on the basis of personnel assigned. When copies are no longer required it is requested they be returned to the Classified Control Branch (JO45). Division/Offices will not destroy any copies.

Very respectfully,


W. H. WORLEY

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

CINCPAC (J04)

5750

Ser 00094

28 April 1961

[REDACTED] - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure

[REDACTED] NATIONALS

From: Commander in Chief Pacific

To: The Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Subj: CINCPAC Command History, 1960; submission of (U)

Ref: (a) SM 408-59, 17 Apr 1959

Encl: (1) CINCPAC Command History, 1960, Copies 1 thru 12

1. By reference (a), the Joint Chiefs of Staff established specific requirements for annual historical reports by all commanders of unified commands, and directed the submission of 12 copies of the report by 1 May 1961.

2. The CINCPAC Command History for the Calendar Year 1960 is forwarded in accordance with reference (a).



JOHN E. THEIMER

Deputy Chief of Staff

Foreign Military and Civil Affairs
Logistics and Administration

DISTRIBUTION:

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INTRODUCTION

This historical record of the Pacific Command for 1960 describes the forces and mission assigned to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, including major actions taken in discharging unified command responsibilities. It covers the major areas of communist manipulated dissention specifically describing CINCPAC's actions and reactions to meet all threats, ranging from small scale insurgency to possible all-out war. Much of this historical record is devoted to command actions in support of the national goal for strengthening and improving the free nations in the Western and South-western Pacific.

The over-all mission assigned to the Commander in Chief, Pacific can be summarized as follows: To conduct a strategic defense in the Western Pacific by exploiting the offensive capabilities of assigned U. S. Forces and the capabilities of Allied and other national forces in order to defend the Western Hemisphere against attack through the Pacific, to contain communist advances, and to protect vital areas, bases, shipping, and lines of communications.

There were five principal objectives by the attainment of which CINCPAC sought to fulfill the overall mission. These were:

- a. To achieve the best possible state of readiness of U.S. Forces.
- b. To influence forces of friendly nations in the PACOM area toward the best possible state of readiness.
- c. To improve the military relationships between U.S., Allied, and other national forces in the PACOM area so that they might carry out coordinated actions in the pursuit of common goals. As a corollary objective, to coordinate with other U.S. Government agencies in measures designed to support U.S. national policies concerning foreign countries in

[REDACTED]

the PACOM area.

d. To carry out actions designed to counter communist aggressions and internal uprisings to communist-controlled groups in foreign countries in the PACOM area.

e. To discharge other assigned U.S. joint military responsibilities in fulfillment of his position as the senior U.S. military officer in the Pacific.

Therefore, this command history discusses detailed developments within the PACOM and the actions taken by CINCPAC, to achieve the above objectives. Furthermore, it is organized so that a single chapter is devoted to CINCPAC's actions taken towards the accomplishment of each one of the five specific objectives.

AS OF 31 DEC 1960



SOURCE: J31

CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF READINESS OF U.S. FORCES

Scattered over the far reaches of the Pacific during 1960 were approximately 373,000 United States fighting men serving the common objective of preserving a precarious peace. It was a task that could be done most effectively by a force ready to fight if necessary. The major objectives of the Commander in Chief, Pacific were ultimately dependent on the effectiveness of this fighting force. In turn, its effectiveness was dependent on its training and morale, and the proper deployment of forces in proper balance with the equipment and supplies needed to discourage communist aggression that seemed ready to break out in cankerous sores of discontent at any place along the western fringes of the Pacific Command area. (UNCLASSIFIED)

To maintain this effective force in a high state of readiness for joint operations was CINCPAC's principal concern throughout 1960. This chapter first tells of changes in the communist force. It then describes the U.S. forces and examines the activities that contributed to their support and state of readiness. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMUNIST FORCE STRENGTH CHANGES

The most important developments in the Communist Bloc military posture in the Far East during 1960 took place in the Soviet Union. Although personnel strength in the Soviet armed forces was substantially reduced, there was a significant improvement in the quality of weapons and equipment in the Soviet air force and navy. The Soviets continued to make progress toward achieving an operational capability with their family of missiles, and in their space program the Soviets launched three earth satellites.¹ In Communist China, the most

1. Information for this section was taken from a paper prepared by the CINCPAC J2 Division, entitled "Significant Military/Technological Developments in Far East Communist Bloc in 1960. (S) (In J046 files)

FAR EAST COMMUNIST BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH CHANGES DURING 1960											
USSR			CHICOM			N. KOREA			N. VIETNAM		
	AS OF DEC 1960	CHANGES DURING YEAR		AS OF DEC 1960	CHANGES DURING YEAR		AS OF DEC 1960	CHANGES DURING YEAR		AS OF DEC 1960	CHANGES DURING YEAR
GROUND											
PERSONNEL	335,000	-153,000	PERSONNEL	2,681,300	+24,300	PERSONNEL	329,300	-13,700	PERSONNEL	277,500	+7,500
DIVISIONS	23	-8	DIVISIONS	166	0	DIVISIONS	22	0	DIVISIONS	15	+1
NAVY											
PERSONNEL	164,505	-46,595	PERSONNEL	71,500	+5,500	PERSONNEL	7,000	0	PERSONNEL	2,000	0
MAJOR CRAFT: CA	2	0	MAJOR CRAFT: DD	4	0	MAJOR CRAFT:			MAJOR CRAFT:		
CL	4	0	SS	20	+7	PATROL CRAFT	43	+8	PATROL CRAFT	30-40	+5-10
DDG	1	+1	DE	4	0	MINE CRAFT	33	+11	MINE CRAFT	4	0
DD	32	+2									
DE	18	0									
SS	102	+2									
AIR											
PERSONNEL	100,000	0	PERSONNEL	89,500	-18,500	PERSONNEL	20,500	+500	PERSONNEL	450	+450
MAJOR AIRCRAFT			MAJOR AIRCRAFT			MAJOR AIRCRAFT			MAJOR AIRCRAFT		
JET HEAVY BMR	45	+30	PISTON MEDIUM BMR	20	0	JET LIGHT BMR	100	0	PISTON TRANSPORT LT	10	0
TURBO PROP HVY BMR	20	+20	JET LIGHT BMR	420	-45	JET FIGHTERS	525	-90	PISTON TRAINER	8	0
JET MEDIUM BMR	279	+12	JET FIGHTERS	1,085	+50				HELICOPTER, LT	5	+5
JET LIGHT BMR	115	+485									
JET FIGHTERS	924	-843									

Fig. 2

PACOM MILITARY STRENGTH CHANGES DURING 1960											
PACFLT			USARPAC			PACAF					
	AS OF DEC 1960	CHANGES DURING YEAR		AS OF DEC 1960	CHANGES DURING YEAR		AS OF DEC 1960	CHANGES DURING YEAR		AS OF DEC 1960	CHANGES DURING YEAR
NUMBERED FLEETS											
ATTACK CARRIERS (CVA)	2	0	ARMY HQ	1	0	AIR FORCE HQ	2	0			
ASW SUPPORT CARRIERS (CVS)	8	0	CORPS HQ	2	0	FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQ	5	-2			
CRUISERS (CA)	4	0	INFANTRY DIVISIONS	3	0	TACTICAL BOMBER SQ	3	0			
DESTROYERS (DD, DDG, DL, DDE)	7	+1	MISSILE CND (AT) (INHERIT JOHN)	1	0	TACTICAL FIGHTERS SQ	0	0			
DESTROYERS (DD, DDG, DL, DDE)	104	-1	MISSILE BN (LAGROSSE)	1	+1	TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQ	3	0			
SUBMARINES (SS)	41	-4	ARTILLERY BN (200 MM)	-	-1	MISSILE GROUPS	2	0			
MISSILE SUBMARINES (SSB)	20	-6	ARTILLERY BN (160 MM)	2	-6	TROOP CARRIER SQ (MATS)	3	0			
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS	72	-7	AIR DEFENSE BATTALION (MERCURY) BN	4	+2	TROOP CARRIER GP (MATS) (MVT)	1	0			
AIR ASW BNS (VP)	16	+1	AIR DEFENSE HAWK BN	1	+1	AIR REFUELING SQ	1	0			
AEW BNS (VW)	2	-2				AIR RESCUE SQ	5	0			
CARRIER AIR GROUPS (CVG)	0	0				WX RECONN SQ (MATS)	1	-1			
CARRIER ASW GROUPS (CVSG)	5	0									
FLEET MARINE FORCE (INCLUDES 2 MAR DIV/REG TEAMS)	1	0									

* LOCATED IN HAWAII
** LOCATED IN KOREA

Fig. 3

[REDACTED]

significant change was the addition of seven W-class submarines to the fleet, raising the total from 13 to 20. North Korea had no significant changes. In North Vietnam, there was a modest personnel increase in the army, and a noteworthy improvement in the potential of the small North Vietnamese navy.

Soviet army strength in the Far East decreased from 488,000 to 335,000 - a decrease of 153,000 troops. Qualitatively, however, several infantry divisions were improved through extensive mechanization.

In the Soviet Pacific fleet, there was a decrease of over 66,000 personnel, but the qualitative improvements during the year generally offset this cut in personnel. The missile capability of the fleet was enhanced by the introduction of the first guided missile destroyer, and by the addition of another G-class submarine, making a total of seven missile-configured ships in the Soviet Pacific Fleet (six submarines and one destroyer). In addition, two new non-missile F-class submarines were added to the inventory.

In naval air, all jet fighter aircraft and all jet light bombers were removed from the inventory--a reduction of 460 aircraft (270 jet fighters and 190 jet light bombers). This reduction was countered, however, through qualitative improvements and organizational changes. The role played by the jet fighters was absorbed by the Soviet air defense system (PVO), while the jet light bombers were phased out as obsolete aircraft. Secondly, jet ~~medium bomber strength was more than doubled~~ - from 50 to 110.

The Soviet air force in the Far East underwent considerable change. Tactical combat aircraft were reduced by 1159 aircraft - mainly in jet day fighters and jet light bombers. Here again, however, the emphasis was on qualitative improvement. Obsolete bombers were phased

[REDACTED]

out, and long-range heavy bombers were added. Jet heavy bombers tripled in strength -- from 15 to 45, and 20 BEAR turboprop heavy bombers were introduced into the inventory of the 3rd long range air army.

In the missile field, several accomplishments by the Soviets were noteworthy. Four ICBM's with ranges of 6,500 nm and 6,700 nm, were launched from the Tyura Tam rangehead, impacting in the central Pacific. To fill the range gap between the MRBM and the ICBM, the Soviets developed and made 13 firings of an IRBM having a range of about 2,000 nm. For the first time, an offensive missile was fired from other than a test range head and thus gave evidence of its operational status. This firing involved an 1,100 nm missile, launched from the Sovetskaya Gavan area, impacting on the Kamchatka Peninsula, and thus supporting previous estimates of the deployment during the year of an MRBM division to the Soviet Far East. Finally, a surface-to-air missile site was observed near Irkutsk -- the first instance of any missile site in the Far East positioned east of 100°E.

In Communist China, purely military changes were relatively minor. The ground forces continued refinement of equipment and training, although many units apparently were diverted from military duties to civil works programs and disaster relief. The principal improvement in the Chinese Communist navy came with the addition of seven W-class submarines to the fleet, raising the total from 13 to 20. The Chinese Communist air force achieved some qualitative improvement through the replacement of older MIG-15s by the MIG-17. In the air defense facilities, there was considerable evidence of quantitative and qualitative improvement in radar capability, both early warning and ground controlled

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intercept. There was no indication that Communist China had acquired either a missile or nuclear capability during the period, but analysis of Red Chinese progress in nuclear research indicated that the detonation of a test device could occur before 1965.

In North Vietnam, an additional infantry division was organized, raising the total to 14 infantry divisions and one artillery division. The small North Vietnamese Navy acquired approximately 12 PGMs, probably all of the **SWATOW Class**, from Communist China, in violation of the Geneva Agreement. This addition added considerably to the patrol capability of this coastal defense force. The North Vietnamese air force still had no combat aircraft, but there was evidence of continued training of DRV pilots, both in North Vietnam and elsewhere in the Bloc.

Figure I summarizes the principal strength in Communist Bloc order of battle and the changes that took place in these forces during the year.


(UNCLASSIFIED)

U.S. FORCES DURING 1960

U.S. military strength in the Pacific Command at the end of 1960 showed an increase of 18,761 personnel over the 1959 year-end strength. The largest increase occurred on Okinawa where Marine Corps strength went from 14,400 to 17,800, and an Army airborne ~~battle group added approximately 4,000 to Army strength.~~ In Korea, Army strength was boosted by approximately 6,500, partly as a result of a program to replace with U.S. soldiers the Koreans serving with the two U.S. infantry divisions in Korea. Strengths of all Services in Japan decreased, dropping the total military personnel (not including dependents) from 55,500 to near 49,000.

PACIFIC COMMAND MILITARY PERSONNEL MAJOR CONCENTRATIONS BY SERVICE

AS OF 31 DEC 1960



ARMY NAVY MARINE CORPS AIR FORCE

Fig. 4

T

The distribution and strengths of all PACOM military personnel are shown graphically in Figure 4. (S)

Airborne Battle Group and Logistic Command

Early in 1960, the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on a proposal by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army to deploy during the third quarter of FY 60 an airborne battle group (reinforced) from CONUS to Okinawa and, at the same time, to activate an Army logistic command there.¹ CINCPAC's recommendation favored the deployment.² Although original plans did not include the movement of dependents to Okinawa, this provision was later modified to permit dependents to accompany the battle group providing government quarters on Okinawa were available. (S)

The action was completed during June and July of 1960, when the 2d Battle Group, 503d Infantry moved from Ft. Bragg, N. Carolina to Okinawa.³ CINCPAC had recommended during 1959 the deployment from the United States to the Pacific Command of a fifth battle group for the 25th Infantry Division which had only four battle groups.⁴

CINCPAC's purpose in placing an airborne battle group on Okinawa was to provide a stronger and more flexible forward force, and to augment the 25th Infantry Division most of which was in Hawaii. All troops on Okinawa, including the Marines, were to be used as CINCPAC's forward reserve and, should both units be committed, plans called for the Army battle group to serve initially under the CG of the Marine Division on

SECRET

The mission of the logistic command was to improve PACOM capability to deploy rapidly the ground forces necessary to succeed in contingency operations.

COMMAND RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATION

Only minor changes were made during the year to the command organization through which CINCPAC exercised his operational command authority. Since the CINCPAC organization underwent extensive adjustments during 1959 to adapt the command structure to the increased responsibilities, the organization of PACOM at the beginning of 1960 proved effective throughout the period. The CINCPAC instruction setting forth the organization and command relationships within the Pacific Command was revised during 1960 to eliminate unwanted detail from the original instruction, and to bring it into conformity with the procedures set forth in the JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces.¹

CINCPAC's responsibility extended generally over the Pacific Ocean and islands (excepting the Aleutians), the eastern Indian Ocean area, Japan, and the countries of Southeast Asia. To command this vast area, CINCPAC exercised his authority through three Service Component Commanders (CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF), three commanders of subordinate unified commands (COMUS Korea, COMUS Japan, and COMUSTDC), through commanders of joint task forces (when established), through three Representatives of the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPACREPs) and through Chiefs of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) or Chiefs of Joint U. S. Military Advisory Groups (JUSMAGs). CINCPACREPs were located in

1. CINCPAC INSTRUCTION 003020.2A, 4 Nov 60 (S)

[REDACTED]

the Ryukyu Islands, the Mariana-Bonin Islands, and in the Philippines; MAAGs or JUSMAGs operated in the following seven countries: Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand, and Korea. In addition, a Military Technical Advisory Group was stationed in Indonesia, a Programs Evaluation Office in Laos, and a Military Equipment Delivery Team operated in Burma.¹

All MAAGs and the three similar activities in the Pacific Command were under the direct military command of CINCPAC with the exception of the Provisional Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea which CINCPAC controlled indirectly.

ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION

CINCPAC devoted a major effort during 1960 to the task of improving the command facilities so that he and his staff would be able to cope with the split-second timing and tempo of a modern missile war. It was a continuing effort, complicated by the fact that responsibilities were increasing, by the fact that systems and equipment could become obsolete before they could be perfected, and by the requirement for a staff and command system that would respond instantaneously upon an outbreak of hostilities.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

JCS Approval of 75 Additional Spaces

~~Late in 1959, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a request for 106~~
new spaces for his staff. The majority of the additional personnel requested was to meet deficiencies in areas of communications and operations. The need for the increased strength was the outgrowth of added tasks and responsibilities that had been assigned to CINCPAC

(UNCLASSIFIED)

1. Ibid

CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATIONAL CHART




Fig. 7

since the headquarters was established in 1957.¹ In a January 1960 response to this request, the JCS agreed to an increase, but limited it to 75 manpower spaces for the headquarters.² (UNCLASSIFIED)

Augmentation for MAP EAM Requirement

Soon after receiving the JCS authorization for the 75 additional spaces, CINCPAC again appealed to the JCS for an additional 15 personnel to be assigned to duties in connection with additional Military Assistance Program functions assigned to the headquarters. In implementing the Draper Committee recommendations,³ CINCPAC became responsible for the processing of plans and programs data by the use of electronic accounting machines (EAM) at each Unified Command level. Since CINCPAC did not then have the capability of processing EAM data, and since it was expected that the data would begin to flow to his headquarters within a few weeks, he asked for an early approval of the request.⁴ This request was approved by JCS in March.⁵ ([REDACTED]) (L)

A later request for two civilian billets in the Operations Division (J3) was also approved by the JCS. The request, made in April, stressed the need for scientifically trained personnel with experience in the applied sciences to work with the Operations Analysis Section of the Operations Division.^{6, 7} (UNCLASSIFIED)

-
1. CINCPAC ltr ser 2067 of 14 Sep 59
 2. JCS Memo of 4 Jan 60, subj: Revised Joint TD for CINCPAC Staff. (U)
 3. CINCPAC Command History, 1959, pp 82-86
 4. CINCPAC 292233Z Jan 60 (C)
 5. JCS 111543Z 11 Mar 60 (C)
 6. CINCPAC ltr ser 764, of 2 Apr 60
 7. JCS 112144Z 11 Apr 60

JCS Imposed Reduction in CINCPAC Headquarters Strength

After receiving a total of 92 additional manpower spaces during the first part of the year, the JCS directed in October that the size of CINCPAC Headquarters be reduced by 23 military spaces effective at the end of June 1961.¹ The cut, directed by the Secretary of Defense, stemmed from Congressional action on the FY 61 budget, which included a stipulation that administrative type headquarters be reduced by five percent. During November, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS his recommendations for eliminating 23 spaces but, at the same time, stated his objections to applying an across the board cut to his headquarters, which essentially was operational rather than administrative, and already at an austere staff manning level. To support this position CINCPAC pointed out that the reduction in strength, when accomplished, would leave his headquarters with a total force only 69 spaces above the original joint table of distribution when the Unified Command was established in 1957. Against this slight increase in personnel, his responsibilities had been increased a great deal over those in 1957 when the principal functions were coordination and planning.²

Augmentation for DSTP at Offutt AFB.

~~Final action affecting CINCPAC's staff during the year was a~~ request to the JCS for eight additional officer spaces and three enlisted spaced in order to man the CINCPAC Representatives Section to the Director of Strategic Target Planning, Offutt AFB, Omaha, Neb.³

The JCS approved this request, but asked that because of the relatively

1. JCS 121621Z 12 Oct 60

2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00579 of 3 Nov 60 (S)

3. CINCPAC 160305Z Nov 60 (C)

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temporary nature of the assignment, the requirement for the additional spaces be reviewed upon completion of the Joint Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operations Plan then being prepared at Offutt, AFB.¹

CINCPAC Medical Staff Officer

As directed in June by the JCS, CINCPAC established the position of CINCPAC Medical Officer effective in September. Since it was not necessary to have a full time command surgeon, CINCPAC solved this requirement by having the CINCPACFLT Medical Officer appointed as the CINCPAC Medical Officer as an additional duty. In addition to advising CINCPAC and his staff in medical matters, the Medical Officer became responsible for preparing medical annexes for CINCPAC operation plans, and reviewing medical annexes contained in supporting plans.²

(UNCLASSIFIED)

CINCPAC Chief of Staff

Late in 1960 the JCS announced that Maj. Gen. Verdi B. Barnes, USA, would be assigned as Chief of Staff, CINCPAC, replacing Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley. General Barnes was not expected to assume his new post until mid-April, to coincide with his appointment as lieutenant general.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (J71)

A new CINCPAC Staff element, the Performance Evaluation Group, was established during 1960 to assist CINCPAC with his responsibility for the Military Assistance Program in the Pacific and to help justify MA programs before Congress.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

1. JCS 271930Z 27 Dec 60 (C)

2. JCS ltr SM-591-60 of 17 Jun 60, subj: Medical Representative on Unified and Specified Command Staffs. (U)

[REDACTED]

The PEG was comprised of three O-6 officers representing the Army, Navy and Air Force. CINCPAC teams to conduct inspections of MAP activities were headed by one or more PEG officers and augmented by other CINCPAC staff members as well as representatives from the Component Commands.¹ Approved as part of the Joint Table of Distribution, the PEG became operational by 1 October 1960.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

CINCPAC ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE HIS COMMAND FACILITIES

The primary task connected with improving command facilities was to provide a communication and electronic system that would meet CINCPAC's need during peacetime, during contingency operations, and during general war, and at the same time, eliminate unnecessary duplication of facilities, personnel and instrumentation.

[REDACTED]


The CINCPAC staff section chiefly responsible for improving and developing these facilities was the Command Facilities Development Group, activated during 1959.

[REDACTED]

-
1. CINCPAC J03 Staff Memo 129-60, 9 May 60
CINCPAC ltr ser 1440 of 13 Jun 60
 2. Interview, MAJ R. Gugeler, J0461 with CDR Charles W. Turner
J02C1, 16 Dec 60 (S)

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
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
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- 1. DPWO Invitation to Bid, Nr 25591/59, 10 Feb 60
 - 2. J02C Staff Report for Apr 60
 - 3. J02C Staff Report for Jul and Aug 60 (C)

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START

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1. Interview, MAJ R. Gugeler, J0461 with CDR C. W. Turner, J02C1, 15 Dec 60 (S)
 2. Report, Proceedings of the Fourth Kunia Operations Control Center Coordination Group (KUCOG) Conference, 30 Nov - 2 Dec 60; p A-2-2 (S). In J02C files.
 3. Ibid. pp D-2-1, 2 (S)

~~SECRET~~



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1. Report, Third KUCOG Conference, 16-19 Feb 60; p A-3 (S)
 2. J4 Staff Report, Dec 60 (C)



END

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Operational planning for the PACOM Area continued to be a complex problem. It was by means of operation plans that CINCPAC discharged JCS assigned missions and tasks over an extensive and varied area. Problems of climate and geography covered the extremes as well as the intermediates.

The SEATO and bilateral treaties, which were often the basis for planning, were complex and varied as to procedures and responsibilities of the signatories, and planning was further complicated by the diverse cultural backgrounds and languages separating the people within this largest of unified command areas. The budgetary limitations and available forces were finite factors to be considered in any planning. It was necessary therefore that CINCPAC consider many factors that affected the operational planning.

Planning for the PACOM Area fell within three general categories:
Planning for general war in which CINCPAC must defend the United



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States from an attack through the Pacific Ocean areas; planning for a limited war in which only part of the U.S. Forces would be committed in a specific area in a limited action short of general war; and planning for Cold War wherein there were no actual hostilities.

CINCPAC had ten principal plans during 1960. They were being revised and/or changed throughout the year to meet the needs of the changing situation. The principal CINCPAC Operations Plans for 1960, and the general area in which they would apply, are graphically illustrated on a Pacific area chart, Figures 8a and 8b.

General War Planning

At the outset of the year the plan for general war was the CINCPAC Operation Plan 1-58 (GEOP), responsive to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 1 July 1958-30 June 1959. The JSCP and the plan had been extended¹ to 30 June 1960. When the JSCP for 1 July 1960-30 June 1961 was issued, it became necessary to prepare a new General War Plan (GWP). Work on the new plan started in July. The draft was forwarded^{2, 3, 4} to Service Component Commanders in September, and extensive revisions continued during the rest of the year to reflect changes in three major areas: [REDACTED]

-
1. CINCPAC 262140Z Jun 59
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000164 of 8 Sep 60
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 000165 of 8 Sep 60
 4. CINCPAC ltr ser 000166 of 8 Sep 60

PACIFIC COMMAND

MISSION AND TASKS

31 DEC 1960

MISSION

CONDUCT A STRATEGIC DEFENSE BY EXPLOITING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN ORDER TO
DEFEND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.....
PROTECT RESOURCES, AREAS, BASES AND LOCATIONS

TASKS	DIRECTIVE	CINCPAC PLAN TO ACCOMPLISH		REMARKS
		NUMBER	TITLE	
① Defend the United States against attack through the Pacific, by maintaining a forward strategy on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the Western Pacific	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Single Integrated Operation Plan (SOP)	1-61	General War Plan	Military forces of the US and USSR must be overly engaged
② Support of internal uprisings and revolutions	JSCP	22-60	Uprisings Plan	
③ Coordinate with the British on plans for the evacuation of Hong Kong	JSCP	23-57	Evacuation of Hong Kong	Provides military support to the British in the evacuation of Hong Kong
④ Defend Taiwan and the Penghu	JSCP	25-60	Defense of Taiwan	Now in Phase I - Patrol and Reconnaissance
⑤ Be prepared to blockade the China coast	JSCP	26-60	Control of Maritime Traffic	
⑥ Defend in Korea	JSCP	27-60	Defense of Korea	
⑦ Conduct mining operations in Pacific Ocean the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean and waters contiguous thereto.	JSCP	31-56 31A-56	Pacific Mining Plan	
⑧ Be prepared to counter Communist aggression or insurgency in Southeast Asia	JSCP	32-59	Defense of Mainland SE Asia	
⑨ In coordination with the State Department protect and evacuate U.S. nationals and U.S. sponsored non-combatants	JSCP	60-59	Protection and Evacuation of non-combatants	
⑩ Support and promote U.S. interests and deter Communist aggression	JSCP	70-60	Cold War Plan	

Revisions under preparation

SOURCE: J51

PACIFIC COMMAND MISSION AND TASKS




Fig. 8b

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Limited War Planning

Limited war planning during 1960 was concerned largely with contingency plans for operations in Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and Indonesia. CINCPAC Draft OPLAN 21-59, a proposed consolidation of CINCPAC OPLANs 32-59, 25-60, and 27-60, was shelved as being impracticable. Although many of the same U.S. forces would be involved in the execution of each of these three latter plans, there were a number of dissimilar factors, such as geographical positions, command arrangements, logistical and other national capabilities, which made it desirable to design each plan to meet the requirements of each area. **()**

CINCPAC OPLAN 25-60:

The initial draft of CINCPAC OPLAN 25-60, a plan for the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, was prepared and distributed to Component Commanders in May 1960. After minor changes, the completed plan was distributed.¹ The effective date of the plan was promulgated in September.² The supporting plans from Component Commanders were received in late summer, reviewed and, in general, approved^{3,4} as interim plans pending JCS review of CINCPAC supporting transportation requirements plan to CINCPAC OPLAN 25-60.

COMUSTDC OPLAN 25-60, less Annexes E, N, & Q, was received in October, reviewed by CINCPAC and approved⁵ subject to recommended changes. **()**

-
1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000114 of 10 Jun 60
 2. CINCPAC 032058Z Sep 60 (S)
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 000195 of 17 Oct 60
 4. CINCPAC ltr ser 000205 of 27 Oct 60
 5. CINCPAC ltr ser 000197 of 21 Oct 60

Since CINCPAC OPLAN 25-60 was promulgated prior to receipt of the JSCP (1 July 1960 - 30 June 1961), change No. 1 to this plan¹ effected the revisions dictated by the new JSCP as it pertained to Strategic Air Command support of commanders of unified commands in contingency operations.

CINCPAC OPLAN 27-60:

An operation plan (CINCPAC OPLAN 27-60) for the defense of Korea in a conflict short of general war was prepared and promulgated on 29 March 1960,² superseding the previous CINCPAC OPLAN 27-58. In July the supporting plans from Component Commanders were reviewed and approved^{3, 4, 5} as interim plans pending JCS review of CINCPAC's supporting Integrated Transportation Plan to CINCPAC OPLAN 27-60. (TOP SECRET)

In November CINCPAC received draft COMUS Korea Operation Plan 1-60/27-60, a combined plan designed as a General Emergency Operation Plan and an Operation Plan in case the communists should renew hostilities in Korea.⁶

CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59:

Planning to counter communist aggression in mainland Southeast Asia was contained in CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59. Because of the activity and unrest in this area, a great amount of planning was based on the constantly changing situation.

In January Change One to OPLAN 32-59 was promulgated⁷ to

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000162 of 5 Sep 60
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00064 of 29 Mar 60
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 000172 of 17 Sep 60
 4. CINCPAC ltr ser 000156 of 26 Aug 60
 5. CINCPAC ltr ser 000209 of 31 Oct 60
 6. COMUSK ltr USFK CJ AGJ of 21 Nov 60
 7. CINCPAC 230406Z Jan 60

designate CG, 3d MarDiv, in lieu of CG, FMFPAC, as CJTF 116 for Phase II operations in support of operation in South Vietnam.

A joint planning nucleus, consisting of planners from the staff of CINCPAC and CINCPAC Service Component Commanders, was provided Deputy CINCUSARPAC for the purpose of developing the Phase III and IV plans of JTF 116¹ in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59. At the same time, CINCPAC proposed to the CG 3d MarDiv that a similar joint planning nucleus be made available to CG 3d MarDiv for development of Phase II plans of JTF 116.² CG 3d MarDiv concurred and requested that such a nucleus assemble at Okinawa on 7 March for a period of approximately 30 days.³ He also asked for the assignment of the 7th Communication Battalion FMF Pacific as an addition to the list of forces earmarked for assignment to JTF 116 for Phase II operations in South Vietnam.⁴

JTF 116 plans for Phase II, III, and IV⁵ were reviewed by Joint Staff members and Component Commands and the supporting plan was reviewed and approved subject to minor modifications.⁶

In October CINCPAC directed that CJTF 116 prepare an alternate plan for moving into Laos against opposition should the airfield at Vientiane fall into enemy hands.⁷ This was done and change 4 was published to reflect this requirement.⁸

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1. CINCPAC 172335Z Feb 60
 2. CINCPAC 210018Z Feb 60
 3. CG 3d MarDiv 240050Z Feb 60
 4. JTF 116 Plan for Phase II of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, CPRS 000113-60 and 000114-60; JTF 116 Plan for Phase III & IV of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, CPRS 0001065-60
 5. ADMINO COMJTF 116 210132Z Mar 60
 6. CINCPAC spdltr ser 000128 of 5 Jul 60
 7. CINCPAC 180305Z Oct 60, 1368 (TS)
 8. CINCPAC 302022Z Nov 60, 3069 (TS)

In other actions connected with SE Asia, CINCPAC prepared an "Anti-Guerrilla Organizational Study"¹ to help determine the best means of combatting terrorism in S. Vietnam and Laos, and prepared a counter insurgency study that was forwarded by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense in June.^{2, 3} Subsequently, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a Draft National Plan for Counter Insurgency Operations by the Government of Vietnam.⁴ After approval by the JCS and the OSD, it was forwarded to the U.S. Ambassador for information and comment and with a request that it be delivered to the Country Team for consideration and comment.⁵ A similar plan was prepared for use by the Royal Laotian Government but the decision on this plan was held up pending the outcome of events in Laos.⁶ (~~SECRET~~)

Much of the planning for operations in Southeast Asia relied upon U.S. Naval facilities in the Philippines, the continued use of which was threatened early in 1960 by a reduction of budgetary funds programmed for FY 61 maintenance and operations of Naval aviation facilities. Accordingly, the CNO asked CINCPACFLT to comment on the effect upon Naval air operations that would be caused by reducing facilities at Cubi or Sangley Point in the Philippines. Upon receipt of this information, CINCPAC prepared a study of the strategic value of these facilities to support plans for SEAsia.⁷ The conclusions of the study indicated that any reduction in ~~the status of Cubi or Sangley Point would lower CINCPAC's readiness~~ posture to implement plans for the defense of SEAsia.

-
1. Anti-Guerrilla Organizational Study, Memo to J01, 30 Mar 60
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00212 of 27 Apr 60
 3. JCSM-232-50 of 6 Jun 60
 4. CINCPAC ltr ser 00331 of 30 Jun 60
 5. OSD 162156Z Sep 60
 6. CINCPAC ltr ser 00349 of 14 Jul 60
 7. J5 memo, 0057-60, subj: Strategic Appreciation of Cubi & Sangley Point, w/2 Incls: (1) Proposed draft ltr to ADM Burke; (2) Study on Subject.

CINCPAC OPLAN 22-60:

In response to a task assigned by the JCS,¹ CINCPAC OPLAN 22-60, Support of Internal Uprisings and Revolutions, was published on 27 June 1960. The plan required COMUSTDC and COMUS Korea to develop appropriate plans for their areas. COMUS Korea recommended² CINCPAC Oplan 22-60 in Korea be held in abeyance until the ROK Government became stabilized. Based upon this recommendation, CINCPAC suspended³ the action required of COMUS Korea.

COMUSTDC developed a draft supporting plan⁴ that was under final review by the CINCPAC Staff at the end of the year. ()

CINCPAC OPLAN 22-60 was approved⁵ by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 November 1960 subject to minor modifications. ()

CINCPAC OPLAN 26-60:

In July it was determined that the CINCPAC Plan for Blockade of the China Coast (CINCPAC OPLAN 44-56) was out of date and impractical with Naval forces available to carry out this task. A new plan was drafted which would allow PACOM forces greater operational freedom and at the same time permit a graduated exercise of force in reprisal to communist actions that were injurious to U.S. prestige.

CINCPAC OPLAN 26-60 (Control of Maritime Traffic) superseded ~~CINCPAC OPLAN 44-56~~, and provided for the control during periods of heightened tension of maritime traffic in certain portions of the Pacific near the Asian mainland. The new plan was signed on 25 November 1960.⁶

-
1. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan of 21 Apr 60
 2. COMUS Korea ltr of 9 Aug 60, subj: Operation Plan CINCPAC 22-60
 3. CINCPAC 272023Z Oct 60
 4. COMUSTDC OPLAN 22-60
 5. SM 1192-60 of 17 Nov 60 (JCS)
 6. CINCPAC ltr ser 000235 of 25 Nov 60

CINCPAC OPLAN 33-58:

CINCPAC OPLAN 33-58 provided for action against Communist uprisings in Indonesia. In December CINCPAC¹ declared the plan obsolete and it was rescinded. (S [REDACTED])

Defense of Hawaii

One of CINCPAC's areas of concern during 1960 was the improvement of plans for defending Hawaii against both internal disorders or sabotage, and overt attack. Responsibility for the defense of Hawaii belonged to a subordinate unified command, the Hawaiian Defense Command, until 1957 when CINCPAC disestablished that organization and made the three Service Component Commanders responsible for the defense of Hawaii within their respective areas of operations. In April 1959, CINCPAC determined it would be desirable to place the responsibility for defense of Hawaii upon a single joint commander who would be directly responsive to CINCPAC. CINCUSARPAC was charged with this responsibility² and was directed to prepare a plan to defend Hawaii. When subsequent planning indicated that this solution involved undesirable complexities, CINCPAC, on 4 November 1960, directed the preparation of a CINCPAC Instruction that would recognize as separate threats those pertaining to internal disturbances and those pertaining to overt attack. Responsibility for defense of Hawaii was divided accordingly. The new CINCPAC directive assigned to CINCUSARPAC the responsibility and command authority for providing to civil authorities in Hawaii military assistance during civil

1. CINCPAC 140055Z Dec 60 (S)

2. J51 Staff Report, Nov 60 (TS)

[REDACTED]

defense and domestic emergencies, including military assistance against the threat of sabotage or local subversive activity.¹

Having separated the internal threat, CINCPAC directed that plans for defense against an overt attack on Hawaii be based on the premise that the real threat was from an air attack by either manned aircraft or missiles. Accordingly, since the primary task concerned air defense, CINCPAC directed that a joint task force, to be designated JTF 119 and composed of elements of the three Component Commands, be formed with a PACAF general officer as the commander. This officer, to be appointed by CINCPACAF, was to report directly to CINCPAC for instructions.²

The three Service Component Commanders were also directed to designate commanders to serve under the Commander JTF 119 to prepare plans for the participation of forces under their command in the defense of Hawaii. The Army's main contribution was expected to be the Nike air defense batteries located on Oahu; the Navy would provide defense against missile-launching submarines, and furnish available Navy and Marine fighter aircraft to participate in the air defense; and the Air Force would perform aircraft warning functions and provide fighter interceptor aircraft. The Commander, JTF 119, ~~exercising command through the JTF Service Component Commanders,~~ was responsible for developing the integrated plan of defense, coordinating the training required, and conducting the defense of Hawaii as directed by CINCPAC.² Planning action was still incomplete at the end of the year.

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1. CINCPAC INST 003020.6A, 4 Nov 60
 2. Ibid.

Cold War Plans

Realizing the need for increasing PACOM's contribution to the cold war effort, CINCPAC appointed an ad hoc committee from his staff late in 1958 to initiate such planning. As a result, his plan was nearly complete in the fall of 1959 when the JCS directed him to prepare for each fiscal year a cold war plan that would outline¹

"proposed employment of U.S. military resources in political, economic, cultural, technological and military activities in support of U.S. over-all objectives, and specific objectives with respect to situations, areas and countries which will ensure conditions favorable for the achievement of assigned military missions."

The PACOM Cold War Plan, designated CINCPAC OPLAN 70-60 for FY 1961,² was forwarded to the JCS and PACOM commanders during March, and revised in August in accordance with JCS directions.³

At the end of the year, COMUSTDC was still attempting to overcome objections to the plan that had been raised by the U.S. Ambassador to the Government of the Republic of China.

General Operating Instruction 1-60

The plan to consolidate several existing PACOM instructions within the framework of one General Operating Instruction (GOI) was started in 1959. The instruction was to outline command relationships, assign responsibilities and provide guidance to Component Commanders,

~~Subordinate Unified Commands, CINCPACREPS, and CHMAAGS and~~

JUSMAGS for joint operations to meet cold war commitments and to attain the maximum readiness in event of hostilities. Work on drafting of the instruction and proposed annexes was continuing at the end of

1959. In March 1960 Admiral Felt decided the general (C [REDACTED] AL)

1. JCS SM-1201-59 subj: Military Activities During Cold War, 30 Nov 59

2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00120 of 18 Mar 60

3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00396 of 5 Aug 60

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instruction was too static an arrangement for the ever changing situation and that separate instructions on the various categories would be more flexible. The proposed annexes to the instruction were returned¹ to responsible staff divisions, and work on the proposed combined instruction was abandoned.

Operations Coordination Board Planning

Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff assumed the responsibility for directing the military aspects of the approved Operations Coordination Board (OCB) plans, they had assigned them directly to the appropriate unified and specified commanders for implementation. In the Pacific CINCPAC then assigned the selected courses of action to the appropriate subordinate commander for each Country Plan. A revised CINCPAC instruction² coordinating the submission of the subordinate commanders' views and comment for the revision of each OCB OPLAN was published during 1960. The directive also contained instructions for the submission of a progress report on the implementation of each assigned course of action. During the year a schedule for reporting progress reports and the review and appraisal of each OCB plan was published. At the end of the year all OCB OPLANS had been reported according to the schedule.

CINCPAC COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

The success of joint operations and command must first include secure, reliable, and rapid communications to all areas. (UNCLASSIFIED)

To this end the CINCPAC policies, plans, operations, and exercises developed joint methods and procedures to improve
(UNCLASSIFIED)

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1. J02 memo subj: CINCPAC GOI, dtd 14 Mar 60 (C)
 2. CINCPAC INST 03121. 4B

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communications. A vigorous program was continued throughout the year by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications and Electronics to modernize and improve the communications network and associated facilities of the three military services in PACOM. (UNCLASSIFIED)


PACOM Communications Policies

Throughout the year, CINCPAC continued to stress speed and accuracy of communications within the capabilities of personnel, equipment, and security. Continuous improvement was noted in reduced handling times and reduction of security violations. This was a continuing action that required constant vigilance by all communicators. Communication operating instructions were eliminated or consolidated to simplify and expedite PACOM traffic handling. The CINCPAC Communications Electronics Operating Instruction was rewritten during 1960 to simplify and clarify those areas necessary to efficient operation of PACOM communications. In addition, support of various operations or plans was given through obtaining and assigning proper routing indicators, address indicator groups and such other actions to facilitate the flow of communications within PACOM.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CO [REDACTED]



In March 1960, CINCPAC Instruction 02000.2 was promulgated setting forth overall policies and procedures for PACOM Communications.

An Instruction (CINCPAC Inst 2305.2) to provide for control, operation, maintenance and development of the government-owned communication trunking system jointly used by the three military services on Oahu was promulgated in September 1960. The instruction established a Joint Area Committee comprised of representatives of CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF. The CINCUSARPAC representative was designated as chairman. (UNCLASSIFIED)



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[REDACTED]

Significant construction and installation progress was made during the year. The following lines of the Pacific Scatter System, Phase I, were completed and turned over for traffic use: Honolulu - Philippines, 16 teletypewriter channels; Okinawa - Philippines, 8 teletypewriter channels; Okinawa - Taiwan, 12 voice channels. Work remaining to be completed for Phases II and III consisted of proposed channels between Philippines and Taiwan; Okinawa and Japan; Japan and Korea, and voice channels on the Japanese Islands.

Performance of the completed portion of the Pacific Scatter System was such that reliability of communications in the Western Pacific Area was significantly improved.

Measures to Improve PACOM Communications System and Associated Electronic Equipment

A Frequency Coordination meeting under J6 auspices was held on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of January at Fuchu Air Station, Japan and attended by representatives from each of the CINCPAC subordinate Unified Commands. In addition, several Army, Navy and Air Force officers attended as observers. The purpose of the meeting was to brief newly assigned frequency coordinators, and to conduct general policy (C [REDACTED] AL)

1. CINCPAC 302318Z Nov 60 cite LR 3095

[REDACTED]


discussions relating to the entire field of military frequency coordination problems in PACOM. (C [REDACTED] AL)

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] (C [REDACTED] L)

On 17 March 1960, the Pacific Command Air Defense Ground Environment Requirements Committee was formed to determine to what extent and with what kind of equipment, automation should be introduced into the PACOM Air Defense System. The Committee was composed of Staff members from CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF. Based upon the recommendations of the Committee, CINCPAC advised the JCS,² that there were requirements for the AN/GPA-73 in Hawaii, Okinawa and the Philippines and for the AN/MSQ-28 in Korea. In addition, the Committee recommended the Marine Corps Tactical Data System for the 1st Marine Air Wing. All of the requirements stated above were for U.S. Forces. CINCPAC,³ notified CHMAAG, Japan that he concurred with the need for AN/GPA-73 for the Japanese Air Defense System. The equipment was subsequently included in the FY 62-66 MAP for Japan and approved by CINCPAC. At the year's end, key officers of the Japanese Air Self Defense Force were being oriented on the AN/GPA-73.

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1. Brochure, CINCPAC Strategic Communications, 19 Sep 60
 2. CINCPAC 120206Z Apr 60
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00147 of 21 Mar 60 (S)



1. CINCPAC 042336Z Oct 60 (C)

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 2025 of 25 Aug 60
 2. FAPUSMCEB 061401Z Sep 60 (C)
FAPUSMCEB 261817Z Sep 60 (C)
FAPUSMCEB 171431Z Oct 60 (C)

[REDACTED]

During 1960, the Pacific Command had the first complete electronic radiation survey given to any command. The Communications and Electronics Division had been aware of the fact that this was a "gray area". The radiation interference to missile control, acquisition and ~~communications systems could be controlled fairly well as a known item.~~

However, little was known of the signal strengths and their cumulative effects upon the detonation systems of missiles. In cooperation with Department of the Army, standards were established, preliminary surveys made, a special team organized and flown to the Pacific, and a

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survey made of all PACOM missile sites having minimum prescribed radiation levels. Corrective action was taken in those areas which were suspect.

Measures to Improve Communications on Hawaii

A new microfilm machine, received in June, enabled the communications center to microfilm files after six months, and reduced the critical storage problem in the communication center.

On 24 August, arrangements were completed and the circuit activated to provide direct communications between CINCPAC and CNO. Designated FLASHNET, this circuit was designed primarily to pass Flash and Emergency messages between CINCPAC and CNO. It could be used also to pass Flash and Emergency traffic to DA, HQ USAF, and other Pentagon commanders, and for lower precedence messages to CNO, JCS and SECNAV. (~~SECRET~~)

In September, a new distribution system and revised administrative practices were established at CINCPAC/Kunia. These changes were designed to reduce the delays in handling messages which occurred during Exercise BLACK ROCK.

Measures to Improve Communications in Specific PACOM Areas

SEAsia Telecommunications (SEATELCOM PROJECT):

~~The development of an adequate communications system in~~
Southeast Asia, a project of great importance to SEATO activities and one in which CINCPAC maintained an active interest, progressed from the planning to the production stage during 1960. Recognizing that the existing communications system in that area was inadequate to support

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governmental control, internal security, economic growth and military operations, the United States had been interested in such a project for nearly a decade. The original study on the need for improvement was made in 1951. Additional studies and estimates were prepared in subsequent years leading to a construction contract between the International Cooperation Administration and Television Associates of Indiana, Inc. (TAI) calling for construction, by TAI, of a modern telecommunications system for Thailand, South Vietnam and Laos. The project financing for amounts totalling \$31.5 million, was provided from the Asian Economic Development Fund, the Military Assistance Program, and Country Defense Support.¹

Originally scheduled for completion by the end of 1962, the project encountered difficulties and delays throughout the year and, although a vast amount of architecture and engineering work was done, there was little visible progress. Principal difficulties were connected with recruiting and keeping technically qualified personnel on the job, relations between the contractors and the Thai government, and financial problems that arose because of what appeared to be underpriced estimates and inadequate funding for the project. Although planned as a microwave system, CINCPAC later agreed to the substitution of a single side band ~~trunking system in Laos because of the need for the earliest possible~~ provision for communications in that area and because the lower cost of the SSB system helped to bring the cost back near the original estimates. These problems were largely resolved at the end of the year, but CINCPAC representatives considered the 1962 completion date to be optimistic.

1. J6 Staff Reports for Oct, Nov, and Dec 60 (S)

Thailand:

CINCPAC's awareness of communications deficiencies in terms of quantity and flexibility of modes, i.e., voice-teletypewriter, to and from the Bangkok area prompted actions to establish a 3 voice and 16 TTY single side band circuit from STARCOM Relay, Clark AFB, Philippines to STARCOM Relay, Bangkok, Thailand. Expected completion date was February 15, 1961.

The circuit in use, 4 channel mux (TTY), lacked the capacity and flexibility to meet existing requirements as well as those increases necessitated by contingencies. Additional links between STARCOM Bangkok and the RTAF system terminating in the Don Muang complex were being established to assure gateway connections for contingency, operational and logistical needs.

Events in Laos generated increased interest in the ability of Thai air fields to support various U.S. air operations. A detailed survey showed deficiencies in both electronic flight facilities (UHF Air/Ground communications terminal navigational aids, and precision approach and landing aids) and point-to-point communications. In the area of point-to-point communications, the existing gap between the MAP provided radio relay system and the U.S. Comm Center in Bangkok was being closed by U.S. owned and operated equipment.

Korea:

COMUS Korea recommended¹ that existing informal arrangements for U.S. -ROK coordination and cooperation in communications matters be continued for a maximum period of four years, during which time any

1. COMUS Korea 140745Z Oct 60 (S)

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necessary supplementary communication agreements could be worked out by the appropriate authorities from both countries. COMUSK preferred this informal arrangement, rather than an immediate telecommunications agreement with Korea, in order to retain necessary communications flexibility during the existing military conditions in Korea. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Japan:

Departmental approval was received to permit advertising for bids on the Army over-the-horizon micro-wave system in Japan and Korea. As a result, USARJAPAN was instructed to advertise for bids which would lead to offshore procurement and installation of the system within calendar year 1961.¹ (CONFIDENTIAL)

In May 1960, the Navy completed an important consolidation of communication facilities at Yokusuka, Japan that previously had been divided between Kamiseya, and Yokosuka. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Taiwan:

During the month of February, progress was made on a study pertaining to communications operations between Clark Air Force Base and Taiwan aimed at economies through consolidation.² (CONFIDENTIAL)

A restudy of communications requirements for the Air Force on Taiwan was initiated in March as a result of PACAF proposal³ to build up Air Force activities at Tainan Air Base in Southern Taiwan.

CINCPAC recommended⁴ that a common cryptographic system be provided for coordinated military operations between the United States

1. DA 182301Z Feb 60 passed by U.S. Army Japan 070615Z Apr 60

2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00727 of 24 Nov 59 (S)

3. PACAF 080212Z Mar 60 cite PFEDC 937 (S)

4. CINCPAC ltr ser 000196 of 19 Oct 60 (TS)

[REDACTED]

and the Government of the Republic of China (GRC). Existing plans for coordinated U. S. -GRC military operations indicated a need for a secure and rapid cryptographic system.

PACAF established a requirement for a direct single side band (SSB) circuit (IV, 6TT), between the 13th AF in the Philippines and the forward base at Tainan in Taiwan. CINCPAC supported this requirement as an alternate route to Taiwan until completion of the USA Pacific Scatter link between the Philippines and Southern Taiwan. Although the primary long-haul communications route between Clark AFB and Taiwan was through the communication complex in Northern Taiwan, an alternate link was necessary to insure adequate back-up to facilities serving "Quick Strike" and Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) forces.

(C [REDACTED] L)

Indonesia:

During 1960 CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, and CHMILTAG jointly agreed that the installation of a high capacity telecommunications system, employing the trans-horizon microwave techniques would serve best to attain the MAP objective for Indonesia.¹ Through their combined efforts \$500,000 was included in the FY 60 program for architecture and engineering (A&E) services, \$6,000,000 in the FY 61 program for the Java-Sumatra parts of the system, and \$3,000,000 in the projected FY 62 program for the Celebes-Borneo extension. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The A&E contract was awarded to Nippon Electric Company (NEC) in June.² Because of the excellent liaison established among the U.S. military commands involved, the contractor, and the Indonesian (UNCLASSIFIED)

1. CHMILTAG Djakarta 100731Z Mar 60 cite 182A
2. CINCUSARPAC 052239Z Jul 60 cite MP 48659

Army, the survey of Java was completed, and the one in Sumatra started by the end of October. Hoping to capitalize upon this good working relationship, and possessing data which indicated that NEC would most likely be the successful bidder in competition for the procurement contract, CINCPAC requested in late October that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) authorize a sole-source contract with NEC for the system.¹ (UNCLASSIFIED)

This request collided with the executive directive of November to the effect that U.S. suppliers would be favored in MAP procurement. The request was denied by OSD "at this time" during December,² and at year's end CINCPAC was drafting a reclama on the grounds that the two exceptions to policy allowed in DOD directive 2125.1 pertained. These policy exceptions permitted off-shore procurement if (1) procurement in U.S. would exceed the off-shore procurement cost by more than 25 percent, or (2) off-shore procurement was essential to support overriding U.S. foreign policy and MAP objectives.

Laos:

During most of the year, STARCOM Vientiane operated from an AN/GRC-98 radio set with four teletypewriter channels to Clark AFB including one on-line secure Joint Pacific channel and another on-line secure common user STARCOM channel. Near the end of 1960, 6 members of the 18-man team were ordered to Savannakhet to establish a terminal of a radioteletypewriter circuit between Bangkok and Savannakhet. During December when opposing Laotian forces were fighting in Vientiane, the

- 1. CINCPAC 280458Z Oct 60
2. OSD 302327Z Dec 60 Cite DEF 988023

reduced strength AN/GRC-98 team maintained communications until mortar fire wounded three of the operators. At this time, the team moved the entire station to a relatively "safe haven" to await further orders. When the Kong Le forces were driven from the city, the AN/GRC-98 was returned to operation in a very short period. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Philippines:

The USAF program "QUICK FIX", implemented to modernize the world-wide communication plan, proposed the establishment of an SSB (3V 16TT) circuit between Honolulu and Clark AFB. CINCPAC took the position that sufficient teletypewriter channels were available to satisfy Air Force needs, however, a requirement existed for expanded voice facilities between these two points. The JCS were requested to determine which service would provide the voice service; CINCPAC proposed to recommend allocations in existing service systems to fulfill the USAF


Communication Exercises

A PACOM-wide communications exercise¹ was held on 28-29 January involving the nuclear coordination and command circuitry, (JP network). Preliminary analysis of operational data on the exercise indicated a significant improvement in the handling times. Messages received at the CINCPAC Operations Center Kunia from major commands throughout the Pacific were handled on an average of 31 minutes from originator to action addressee. The best previous exercise average was 50 minutes for the same type of traffic. The greatest improvement involved 13th Air Force and Fleet units, some of which made highly significant gains over previous records.


The Operations Control Center Communication Exercise 1-60, held near the end of January 1960, was studied thoroughly during February in

1. Exercise COMEX 1-60 CINCPAC 060018Z Jan 60

CINCPAC TELECON ACTIVITIES 1960



CINCPAC MESSAGE TRAFFIC 1960



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order to develop the after action report and to indicate the lessons learned. The overall handling time for 4817 operational immediate and higher precedence messages was 38 minutes. This was the best operational record developed in a test in the history of CINCPAC and was due to improved facilities and operating procedures which were a direct result of CINCPAC Staff efforts. Instructions were published for a second exercise.¹

A complete report of communication activities during Exercise BLACK ROCK is included under the section on Joint Training Exercises.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

Communications Traffic

There was a 20 percent increase in the number of messages handled in the Communications Center in 1960 over 1959. The 1960 total was 236,375 messages, compared to 198,916 in 1959. A graphic portrayal of the message traffic and teleconferences is shown for each month in 1960. See Figures 9a and 9b.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

On 18 June, CNO approved the use of the HICOM channel for backlogged NAVOP NET traffic on a "not to interfere" basis. This helped reduce the backlog on the NAVOP NET as 50% of total traffic received was on this circuit. This also improved the reliability of the HICOM circuit since it was more active and trouble could be detected earlier when it developed.

PACOM FORCE OBJECTIVES

Allied Countries

In June, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS his recommendations for U.S. Strategic Force Objectives for Allied countries of Southeast Asia and

1. (COMEX 2-60) CINCPAC 532126Z Mar 60

EXEMPTION = 1

the Far East for the period FY 66-68. In compiling the list of recommendations, CINCPAC listed only those force objectives that he considered the allied countries needed for their own interests, and which would complement his own forces. ^{START} [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In line with his carefully considered policy of providing to U.S. Allies the weapons systems needed for the strategic role visualized for mutual security forces -- in this case a defensive role -- CINCPAC favored providing those conventional major forces with weapons best suited to the defensive role.¹

[REDACTED]

U.S. Forces

In response to the JCS directive, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS during May his comments on the FY 1962 major force and equipment

- 1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00296 of 11 Jun 60 (S)

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objectives prepared by his Service Component Commanders. Through these comments, CINCPAC stated his requirement for substantial increase in PACOM forces. The forces recommended by CINCPAC were the minimum forces that he considered essential to accomplish his mission of countering the communist threat, but were, at the same time, believed to be reasonably attainable from the Service programs to be supported by the FY 1962 budget.¹

Listed below are major units in the PACOM under the command of CINCPAC's Component Commanders. Column 1 shows the number of units then in the PACOM; column 2 reflects the force objectives submitted by the respective Service Component Commanders; and column 3 lists the force objectives CINCPAC considered essential.²

	ON HAND	SUBMISSION BY COMPONENT CINC	SUBMISSION BY CINCPAC
U.S. ARMY UNITS			
1. Divisions, Infantry	3	4	3
2. Fire Support Units			
a. Air Transportable Msl Command	1	2	1
b. Medium Missile Command	1	1	1
c. Nuclear Capable Arty Bns	3	3	3
3. Army Air Defense Units			
a. [REDACTED]			
b. [REDACTED]			
4. Logistic Forces			
Logistic Commands	3	3	3

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000100 of 14 May 60 (TS)
2. Ibid. Encl: 1, 2, 3

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5. Supporting and Ancillary Units

a. Special Forces Gp (abn)	1	1	1
b. PSYWAR R&L Bn	1	1	1
c. Army Aviation Bn	1	2	2

U.S. NAVAL UNITS

1. Warship

a. Fleet Flagship	0	1	1
b. Attack Carriers CVA	8	9	9
c. Support Carriers CVS	4	6	6
d. Cruisers	7	9	9
e. Destroyer Types	103	138	138
f. Submarines	47	69	69

2. Amphibious Warfare Ships	73	120	73
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3. Mine Warfare Ships	31	40	31
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4. Patrol Ships

a. DE	6	25	25
b. DER	13	20	20
c. Small Patrol Craft	0	4	4

5. Auxiliary Ships	98	118	118
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6. Aircraft

a. CVG Air Groups	9	10	10
b. CVS Air Groups	5	7	7
c. VP Squadrons	16	22	22
d. AEW Rons (Barrier)	1	1	1
e. AEW Rons (Fleet)	1	2	2

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f. Fleet Tactical Support Sq	1	1	1
g. Fleet Air Reconnaissance Sq	1	1	1
h. Fleet Photo Unit	2	2	2
7. Marine Corps			
a. Marine Divisions	2	2	2
b. Marine Wing Teams	2	2	2
U.S. AIR FORCE			
1. Air Offensive Forces			
a. Tactical Bomber Wing/Sq	1/3	1/3	1/3
b. Tactical Fighter Wings/Sq	3/9	3/9	3/9
c. Tactical Missile Squadrons	2	2	2
d. Tactical Reconnaissance Sq	2	2	2
2. Air Defense Forces for Land Areas			
Fighter Interceptor Squadrons	5	7	7
3. Combat Support Squadrons			
a. Air Refueling Squadrons	1	2	2
b. Troop Carrier Wings/Sq	2/5	2/7	2/8
c. MATS Air Rescue Squadrons	4	5	5
d. MATS Weather Recon Sq	1	2	2

CINCPAC's recommendations varied from those of his Component Commanders in only a few instances and in each case CINCPAC justified his recommendation. ~~CINCPAC disagreed with CINCUSARPAC's~~ recommendation for a fourth infantry division in the PACOM to be located adjacent to Southeast Asia on the grounds that political factors would prevent stationing a U.S. unit in that area.¹ Concerning CINCUSARPAC's recommendation for an additional air transportable missile command,

1. Ibid. Para 3a.

CINCPAC was of the opinion that the medium missile command already located in Korea would permit the deployment of an air transportable missile command, away from Korea if necessary to support rapidly operations anywhere in the PACOM.¹ CINCUSARPAC's recommendation for Army air defense units in PACOM was for six Nike Hercules battalions (disposed two in Korea, two in Okinawa and two in Hawaii) and for eight HAWK battalions (four in Korea, two on Okinawa and two in Hawaii). CINCPAC agreed with the CINCUSARPAC recommendations for Nike battalions but stated a requirement for two additional battalions, one in Guam and another in the Philippines. He considered six HAWK battalions adequate and indicated that they should be disposed four in Korea, one in Okinawa and one in the Philippines.²

With a few exceptions, CINCPAC supported the recommendations of CINCPACFLT for increases in both ships and planes. In the categories of amphibious warfare ships and mine warfare ships, CINCPAC withheld his support and suggested that qualitative improvement would be more desirable than additional vessels.³ There were no significant differences between CINCPACAF and CINCPAC regarding the required Air Force strength in the Pacific.⁴

PLANNING AND OPERATIONS WITH U.S. COMMANDERS HAVING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ADJOINING AREAS

As directed by the JCS, CINCPAC was responsible for coordinating the activities of his own forces with those of U.S. commanders of adjoining areas. In addition to conducting routine coordination with the Alaskan


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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000116 of 11 Jun 59 (TS)
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000100 of 14 May 60 (TS)
 3. Ibid. Encl: 2, pp 13, 16
 4. Ibid. Encl: 3.

Obtained under the
Freedom of Information Act
by the Nautilus Institute
Nuclear Policy Project
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
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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000116 of 11 Jun 59 (TS)
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000100 of 14 May 60 (TS)
 3. Ibid. Encl: 2, pp 13, 16
 4. Ibid. Encl: 3.

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1. CINCPAC General Emergency Operations Plan No. 1-58 (TS) (CINCPAC GWP 1-61)
2. CINCPACFLT OPlan 80-60, 30 Jun 60 (TS NOFORN)
3. Ibid.
4. CINCLANT 182206Z Apr 60 (S)

~~TOP SECRET NOFORN~~
Command, the Caribbean Command, SAC, MATS, and with CINCNORAD in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Continental Air Defense Command, CINCPAC also coordinated his activities with those of the governments of Canada, certain Latin American countries and with friendly Asiatic forces.¹

~~(TOP SECRET)~~

CINCNELM OPLAN 215-60

In May, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to prepare a plan that would provide for the deployment of PACOM augmentation forces to the Middle East to support CINCNELM OPLAN 215-60. This plan provided for U.S. military action that might be undertaken in the Middle East under conditions short of general war, as directed by the JCS to protect U.S. nationals or to assist local friendly governments under the provisions of the "American Doctrine for the Middle East."²

During 1959, CINCPACFLT had prepared an interim plan to support CINCNELM in Middle East only in the event of armed disturbance in Iraq. As revised, CINCPACFLT's supporting plan provided for the deployment of forces in the Middle East for operations in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Sudan, and Ethiopia. It also delineated responsibilities for initial and continued logistic support of these forces after deployment to the area of operations.³

MAP Planning For Latin American Countries

To prepare the five-year Military Assistance Program for Latin America countries, CINCPAC concurred in a CINCLANT proposal⁴ that the preparation of this plan would be done by CINCLANT who would then

1. CINCPAC General Emergency Operations Plan No. 1-58 (TS) (CINCPAC GWP 1-61)

2. CINCPACFLT OPlan 80-60, 30 Jun 60 (TS NOFORN)

3. Ibid.

4. CINCLANT 182206Z Apr 60 (S)

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OPERATIONS OF U.S. FORCES

Changes in Location or Status of U. S. Forces

The following changes in the status of CINCPAC forces occurred during 1960:

The 11th and 12th TAC Reconnaissance Squadrons at Yokota, Japan, and the 1st Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Anderson AFB, Guam were deactivated commencing on 1 January. The action, in accordance with approved USAF programs,² resulted in a reduction of 30 RB66, 12 WB66 and 25 F86D aircraft from PACAF inventory. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The Marine AF Futema Air Facility was activated on Okinawa effective 2 January. Construction progressed on the base that ultimately would accommodate all Marine helicopter squadrons deployed to WESTPAC.³ (UNCLASSIFIED)

Marine Air Group 11, home based at Atsugi, Japan, moved to Cubi Point, P.I., during January where it remained on a temporary basis while the runways at Atsugi were resurfaced and extended.⁴ (~~SECRET~~)

An additional C-130 aircraft was placed on "Hi Gear" alert at Kadena on 26 January, making a total of nine C-130 assigned to alert mission.⁵ During February this number was increased to 11, but was reduced to 10 before the end of the year.⁶

DER picket ships were withdrawn from the seaward extension of
----- (~~SECRET~~)

1. CINCPAC 250320Z Apr 60 (S)
2. PACAF 150341Z Jan 60
3. MCAF FUTEMA 020154Z Jan 60
4. CG 1st MAW 230257Z Dec 59 (S) & CG 1st MAW 230521Z Nov 59 (S)
5. PACAF 280132Z Jan 60 (TS)
6. CINCPACAF 051930Z Feb 60 (TS)

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the DEW Line during March and April, as approved by the JCS. On 4 March, CINCPACFLT reduced the stations manned from five to three, and on 1 April the last stations were vacated. Two DERs were positioned to provide NAVAIR Search and Rescue coverage for the barrier aircraft.¹
(~~SECRET~~)

The 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Naha, Okinawa commenced a phased deactivation during March. The action, programmed by PACAF because of lack of funds to support the unit, and approved by the JCS, was completed by July 1960.¹
(~~SECRET~~)

The 809th Engineer Battalion (Heavy Construction) was moved from Anderson AFB, Guam to Okinawa. The move was accomplished in two phases; the first echelon was airlifted to its new station during March; the remainder of the unit moved by ship in July.²
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

As a result of a JCS directive, the 7th Fleet was augmented to provide three CVAs in WESTPAC beginning in July, of which one was loaded exclusively with attack aircraft.³ The latter ship served the purpose of providing a large initial strike capability from the northern area of the West Pacific. Fighter protection for the carrier was provided by a land based Marine Air Wing.⁴ The increase in attack aircraft was accomplished by off loading all non-attack aircraft and loading 30 additional attack aircraft.

In response to a CNO message directing an increase in readiness, the following changes were made in PACFLT:⁵

a. The USS CORAL SEA departed the West Coast and arrived in the West Pacific at the end of September.

-
1. JCS 031726Z Mar 60 (S)
 2. USARPAC 102006Z Mar 60 (C)
 3. JCS 291603Z Jul 60 (TS)
 4. Interview, MAJ R. Gugeler, J0461 with CDR J. F. Schremp J311A1 3 Jan 61 (TS)
 5. J3 Staff Report, Aug 60 (TS)

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b. The guided missile cruiser PROVIDENCE deployed to the Western Pacific during October. In addition, the Navy increased the number of DDs in the WESTPAC to 30 during the period of stress created by the Laos situation. This was done by extending some deployments and advancing others.

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Exempting

c. The weapons inventory of the TICONDEROGA was increased to 62 weapons.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, in July, requested CINCPAC concurrence in the deployment of one FMF HAWK battalion to Okinawa to reinforce the 3rd Marine Division, with the movement to take place during the first quarter of FY 1962.¹ Because of the shortage of facilities on Okinawa, CINCPAC asked his Component Commanders to comment on the proposed deployment.² All three commanders agreed to the deployment although CINCUSARPAC recommended that the Marine HAWK battalion should:

~~(SECRET)~~

a. Be in a lower priority and should in no way conflict with the two Army HAWK units programmed for Okinawa.

b. Be under the operational control of the Army Air Defense Brigade when participating in air defense on Okinawa.

~~(SECRET)~~

Additionally, CINCUSARPAC suggested that consideration be given to basing the Marine HAWK battalion on Okinawa with the 1st Marine Brigade, and requested that CINCPAC also specifically concur in the deployment of an Army Little John battalion to Okinawa to provide missile and nuclear support of the Army airborne battle group located there.

~~(SECRET)~~

1. CMC 271705Z Jul 60 (S)

2. CINCPAC 052338Z Aug 60 (S)

~~SECRET~~

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(SECRET)

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1. CMC 271705Z Jul 60 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 052338Z Aug 60 (S)

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By direction of CINCPAC, a staff committee studied the overall problem on Okinawa with respect to requirements for the proposed deployments and the capabilities existing on Okinawa to meet them. After thorough consideration, CINCPAC approved of the deployment of both units to Okinawa.^{1, 2}

~~(SECRET)~~

Defense Condition (DEFCON) Of U. S. Forces

CINCPAC took certain additional steps to improve the readiness status of U. S. Forces as a result of communist insurgency in Laos during the latter part of the year. A description of these steps and the resultant action by U.S. Forces is described in some detail in Appendix A.

~~(SECRET)~~

SPECIAL WEAPONS PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

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1. CMC 271705Z Jul 60 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 052338Z Aug 60 (S)

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- NATIONAL STRATEGIC TARGET LIST
- SPECIAL WEAPONS (NUKES)


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
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
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
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
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

(P. 284)

ALLOCATION TO PACOM



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JOINT TRAINING

Forces subordinate to CINCPAC participated in one world-wide command post exercise during 1960, and conducted planning for a PACOM exercise that was later cancelled. (UNCLASSIFIED)

JCS World-Wide Nuclear Coordination Exercise (Black Rock)

Exercise Black Rock was held during the first week of June with all CINCPAC forces participating. Its purpose was to test the systems and procedures for the control and coordination of nuclear operations, including logistic support aspects and the reporting procedures for nuclear detonation and radioactive fallout.¹

During the play of the exercise, which was conducted during the period 2-4 June, the participating members of the CINCPAC staff

[REDACTED] JCS
messages established the intelligence situation for the commencement of the exercise and controlled intelligence play until H plus 12. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] (SECRET)

In order to test the logistic reporting and JCS reserve nuclear ~~weapons acquisition procedures for nuclear operations in PACOM~~, the Logistics Division devised two different systems that were used during the exercise period -- the manual posting system and the machine records system. (SECRET)

[REDACTED]


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For the Communications and Electronics Division, the exercise represented the first extensive test of the nuclear coordinating communication network since Exercise DICE CUP in February 1959. As a result of Exercise Black Rock, it was apparent that even though major communication hubs, such as Hickam AFB, were destroyed, recovery plans were effective to circumvent the communication problems involved. Although the communication system failed to meet CINCPAC standards, through the development of realistic traffic loads and conditions, the exercise provided the most realistic information obtainable as to what could be expected in an emergency.¹



Cancellation of PACOM Exercise CIGAR BOX


PACOM joint exercise CIGAR BOX, for which planning commenced during 1959, was scheduled to be conducted during 1960. Originally planned for January, the exercise was postponed late in December 1959 because of possible political repercussions the exercise might have on the U.S. - Japanese Security Treaty. It was rescheduled for vulnerability period 22 August - 12 September 1960. The play of the exercise as planned anticipated maximum realism obtained by the actual launching of forces under simulated combat conditions,



In July, the

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1. J6 Staff Report Jun 60 (S)
 2. J6 Staff Report Dec 60 (U)

exercise was postponed again, this time because of



JCS Exercises to Improve Communication Procedures for Alerts

END

During the year, CINCPAC participated in various exercises to test and improve the procedures for notifying all PACOM forces of a change in the status of the defense condition. Although the reaction time decreased, with a view toward further improvement on future JCS directed exercises and actual DEFCONS, CINCPAC in November established an exercise to make frequent tests of reaction times. Labeled EXERCISE TEST PACOMEPP, this exercise would entail communication procedures only, and be confined to PACOM. PACOMEPP exercises would be instituted on a random basis and terminated when CINCPAC had received information to the effect that strike forces had been notified.²

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

Additional PACOM Training Exercises

In addition to the joint CPX conducted during the year, several smaller training exercises were conducted in the PACOM, of which the following were the more important:

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1. J3 Staff Report, July 1960 (S)
 2. J3 Staff Report, November 1960 (C)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Joint Task Force 116 CPX:

The commander of the Joint Task Force 116 proposed a one day CPX and familiarization type exercise to be held on Okinawa during the first week of November in order to improve the readiness of his forces. CINCPAC approved the proposal and directed that the exercise be conducted "immediately and without planning conference."¹ The exercise commenced on 15 October with the activation of an advanced JTF 116 Headquarters followed by an embarkation drill involving actual aircraft and major units on Okinawa, and initial deployment. The U.S. Air Force furnished six C-130 and three R5D aircraft for the airlift plus additional craft for the embarkation drill. The commander JTF 116 evaluated the results as satisfactory.² (SECRET)

Training Exercises Planned for 1961

During September, the JCS proposed to CINCPAC a joint mobility exercise to be conducted during the first of March 1961 in conjunction with a SEATO exercise scheduled to take place in Thailand. The objectives of the proposed exercise were to improve state of readiness, test existing contingency plans, and demonstrate U.S. interest in the area. As suggested by the JCS, the exercise would involve air lifting two airborne battle groups to Thailand: one BG would be moved by MATS from CONUS, ~~the other would be airlifted from Okinawa by equipment available within~~ PACOM. The JCS requested comments on specific dates for arrival and departure of the CONUS BG, staging and objective areas, estimate of funds required for theater support, capability to provide theater airlift,

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1. CINCPAC 122109Z Oct 60 (S)
 2. CJTF 116 msg 160102Z Oct 60 (S)

~~SECRET~~

and an alternate objective area if Thailand was considered infeasible¹ for political reasons.

After considering the advice of his Component Commanders,^{2,3,4} CINCPAC pointed out to the JCS that he considered Thailand a poor objective area because of political considerations, and that it was impractical to conduct the mobility exercise in conjunction with the SEATO exercise for military reasons. As an alternate proposal, CINCPAC suggested that the CONUS BG be lifted to Okinawa in connection with a PACOM weapons demonstration planned for February.⁵

The JCS rejected this alternate proposal, but instead suggested the Philippines as an objective area and asked for comments on a plan that would include use of the forces that were proposed originally.⁶ CINCPAC agreed that the exercise could be held in the Clark-Stotsenburg area during the last two weeks of February 1961, and further suggested to the JCS that the exercise be conducted unilaterally, that the composite Air Strike Forces be deployed in support of the exercise, that Okinawa and Guam be used as staging areas, and that the reaction of the Ambassador to the Philippines be obtained. Theater support for the proposed exercise was estimated at over \$1,000,000.⁷

~~SECRET~~

END

1. JCS 092130Z Sep 60 cite 982643 (TS)
2. PACAF 160602Z Sep 60 (TS)
3. CINCPACFLT 142258Z Sep 60 (TS)
4. CINCUSARPAC 161941Z Sep 60 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 200440Z Sep 60 (TS)
6. JCS 222038Z Sep 60 cite 983241 (TS)
7. CINCPAC 300439Z Sep 60 (TS)
8. CINCPAC 290453Z Oct 60 (S)

EXEMPTION # 1


~~TOP SECRET~~

CINCUSARPAC was designated as the commander responsible for planning and conduct of the exercise on a NOFORN basis, and asked to have a coordinated outline plan for CINCPAC's approval by the end of November.¹ (SECRET)

By the end of 1960, the outline plan Exercise LONG PASS, as it was named, was approved by CINCPAC² and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines had expressed his opinion that the exercise would be helpful in furthering relations between the two countries.³

Exercise SALT SPRAY:

A small scale exercise specifically designed to test the broadcast procedures contained in the CINCPAC SOP for Nuclear Operations 1/59 was approved for early in 1961. [START] [EXERCISE] 1



END

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

CINCPAC's actions to support and advance U.S. national policies by the projection of military power were responsive to, and, to a large extent, dependent upon the intelligence material provided. All of the OpPlans and many of the other activities recorded herein were based

(UNCLASSIFIED)





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upon a setting provided by the intelligence section from information gathered by the U.S. Intelligence Community. Most of the intelligence projects were a team effort to produce instruction, to develop estimates, to present briefs and orientation talks and to perform the numerous routine but important intelligence tasks. The following paragraphs will provide information on the intelligence activities which were not routine and were not in connection with other activities of CINCPAC described elsewhere within the Command History. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Joint Intelligence Policies, Procedures, and Coordination¹ *Exhibit 1*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised² in January that the Director for Intelligence for the Joint Staff was participating in the U.S. Intelligence Board's review of production and dissemination of intelligence publications

 The Joint Chiefs of Staff requested that CINCPAC provide samples of publications, title, frequency of publication distribution, number of J2 personnel involved and the cost of production and dissemination on CINCPAC intelligence publications and those of subordinate unified commands. In addition, since CINCPAC component commanders furnished information to CINCPAC for incorporation in intelligence publications, they were requested^{3,4} to indicate the number of personnel involved and cost figures on their contributions. The CINCPAC reply⁵ to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was forwarded 10 February 1960.



[REDACTED]

COMUSTDC on 26 May 1960 further recommended¹ that non-project procedures also be brought into line with the standard system. CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF concurred. Accordingly, CINCPAC established² new procedures to be effective 1 Sep 1960 to standardize the reproduction and distribution procedures [REDACTED]

CINCPAC Instruction 003800.2, Intelligence Policies and Instructions, was issued on 13 September 1960. This instruction consolidated into a single directive the existing intelligence instructions, devoted to single subjects and having general applicability to CINCPAC component and subordinate commanders.

CINCPAC Staff Instruction 004295.2A was issued on 27 December 1960 to direct the CINCPAC staff actions that were to be taken upon receipt of critical intelligence information. (CONFIDENTIAL)

In August J2 completed a final draft of Annex T [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

END

JOINT LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES

The coordination of logistic requirements among the component services was a major CINCPAC objective during 1960. Normal operations and associated problems were conducted on a routine basis and were not considered of sufficient import to include herein. Significant matters pertaining to joint logistic activities fell within the categories of logistic planning, inter service supply support policies, real estate, and petroleum and associated matters. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Joint Logistic Planning

On 15 July 1960, CINCPAC approved Appendix IV to Annex E, "Atomic Logistics."¹ This nuclear logistic plan provided for a more

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the requirements.^{1,2} MPSA awarded contracts which provided for the supply of requirement for the first five days of operation and continued action to contract for additional quantities.^{3,4}

Inter Service Supply Support Policies

In May 1960, CINCPAC, in a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,⁵ pointed out that, through the medium of Joint Regulations as opposed to JCS instructions, logistic and administrative responsibilities were being placed on the commanders of unified commands. Citing the Joint Regulation on Interservice Supply Support⁶ as an example, CINCPAC explained that such assignment of responsibilities, not directly identifiable with the mission assigned to the commander of a unified combatant command, was inconsistent with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. - (UNCLASSIFIED)

In October 1960, the JCS replied⁷ and agreed in substance with CINCPAC's position. The JCS concluded that Joint Service Regulations that assigned specific responsibilities and functions to the commanders of unified and specified commands should include a statement to the effect that the Joint Regulation had been approved by the Secretary of Defense or the JCS. Further, the JCS indicated that the Joint Service Regulation in question⁶ should be reviewed with a view toward eliminating the assignment of specific functions to the commanders of unified and specified commands. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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1. JTF 116 ltr ser 00JTFA 25660 of 12 Sep 60 (S)
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000215 of 4 Nov 60 (TS)
 3. MPSA 222115Z 1078/22 Dec 60
 4. MPSA 231925Z 1069/23 Dec 60
 5. CINCPAC ltr ser 1054 of 4 May 60
 6. Joint Regulations, C2 AR 700-4/OPNAVIST 4000.47 Ch1/AFR 67-76A NAVMC 1141 Ch 2, 31 Jul 59
 7. JCS 1977/113 of 6 Oct 60 - Issuance of Joint Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps Regulations.

was no longer required by the Federal agency, this decision would be conveyed to the State of Hawaii.

During the period 22 September to 5 October 1960, a Federal interdepartmental group visited Hawaii to explore procedures to be followed in implementing Section 5(e). The group was composed of representatives of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), General Services Administration, and Departments of Defense, Interior and Justice. CINCPAC authorized the components to deal directly with the group.¹
(UNCLASSIFIED)

Ryukyu land again became a problem in November. The High Commissioner of the Ryukyus had been conducting a resettlement program on the Island of Irimote and planned to issue an ordinance permitting sale of certain Japanese government owned land (88.79 acres) to the settlers. When the American Embassy learned of the proposed action, the Ambassador went on record² as opposing it as not consistent with Japanese legal procedures and as possibly offensive to the Japanese as an infringement on their residual sovereignty. The compromise proposed by the Ambassador was that only upon reversion at a future date would the farmers own this land. This proposal was unacceptable to the High Commissioner³ who believed that the suggested provision would add no incentive to the reversion movement and would deter the settlers both from accepting the land and from developing it as their own. From a military point of view the Ambassador's proposal was undesirable because it might interfere with future land acquisition for

1. CINCPAC 200200Z Sep 60

2. AMEMB Tokyo to State 1479, 170800 Nov 60

3. HICOMRY Okinawa RIHCO 423, 230558Z Nov 60

military purposes. The Department of Army directed¹ that the ordinance be held up for the time being.

Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL)

POL activities and events during the year were comparable in intensity and nature with recent years with requirements remaining essentially the same. The problem of corrosive aviation gasoline and associated facilities, the establishment of petroleum procurement inspection responsibilities in PACOM, the improvement of handling petroleum tankage data and petroleum logistical data, and the exclusion of overseas petroleum procurement from the restrictions of the President's Balance of Payments directive (see Chapter V) highlighted the POL logistic events for 1960. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Corrosive Aviation Gasoline:

At the beginning of 1960 there were over 1,000,000 barrels of aviation gasoline in PACOM with a corrosive rating toward copper of 2 or worse.² Bacterial contamination of the water in the bottom of the tanks and limitations in the capability to remove water from the tanks in the principal storage facilities in Yokohama, Japan, were the main causes of the problem. All but one tank in each of the three Army Petroleum Depots were affected. Movement of quantities of the corrosive ~~product to Korea and Okinawa was considered necessary to increase the~~ consumption rate. CINCPAC representatives attended the conference held at the Headquarters of COMUS Japan on 21 January 1960 to determine control and distribution procedures. The first cargo for Okinawa was loaded on 24 January. (UNCLASSIFIED)

- 1. DA 986393 to HICOMRY, 282135Z Nov 60
2. SUBAREAPETO Japan 060429Z Jan 60

A tank cleaning and rehabilitation program was initiated in Japan in order to eliminate the major factor contributing to corrosiveness in the avgas stored in Japan.¹ All avgas tanks at Koshiba, where the major portion of this problem centered, were reported cleaned on 4 November 1960.² Bottom modifications to some of these tanks were still in progress and would continue, but clean storage was then available to receive fresh gasoline deliveries.

A controlled dispensing scheme, coupled with the cleaning program, had reduced the total amount of corrosive aviation gasoline in the terminals, bases and stations in Japan to slightly over 120,000 barrels near the end of the year.

Procurement Inspection:

Petroleum procurement in PACOM has increased steadily but, until 1960, procurement inspection to assure adequate quality control was carried out as an additional assignment of several user activities. Some contract services and products in remote areas were checked only by plane crews or actual consumers. During 1960 area responsibilities were assigned and improved inspection arrangements were completed. The Army became responsible for petroleum procurement inspection on Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan and Korea; the Navy had responsibility in other Pacific Command areas.³ The Army Quartermaster in the area carried out inspections for which the Army was responsible. The Navy placed two petroleum inspectors in the Pacific, one based in Hawaii and one in Manila, to carry out the Navy responsibility.

1. J44 memo of 27 Feb 60

2. CG USARJQM-POL ltr of 4 Nov 60 (CINCPAC Reports Control Symbol 11162-1)

3. MPSA 281845Z Mar 60

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- 1. DA 986393 to HICOMRY, 282135Z Nov 60
2. SUBAREAPETO Japan 060429Z Jan 60

The Department of the Army delegated responsibility for this inspection service to CINCUSARPAC.¹ CINCUSARPAC delegated the responsibility in Japan to CG USARMY JAPAN² and in Okinawa and Taiwan to CG USARYIS/IX CORPS.³ COMUSTDC, through the Sub Area Petroleum Officer, Taiwan, provided temporary aid to CG USARYIS/IX CORPS until 1 October 1960 when the latter assumed complete responsibility.⁴

The Chief of Naval Material was responsible for petroleum procurement inspection in the areas assigned to the Navy in PACOM. He delegated the assignment to the Resident Inspector of Naval Material, Concord, California.⁵ Two representatives of this office toured and inspected in a large portion of the area, principally Southeast Asia, in June and July, and one petroleum inspector was established in Manila in order to provide the inspection capability in the Western Pacific. The results of the new arrangement were improved services and an assurance of quality products.⁶

In order to carry out the petroleum procurement inspection responsibilities in the Mid-Pacific area, the Resident Inspector of Naval Material, Concord, California, assigned a permanent Navy petroleum inspector to Hawaii in November. By December the inspector was ~~established in an office located at the Barber's Point refinery of the~~ Standard Oil of California. The first product, JP-4, from the new refinery was received by the Naval Supply Center, Pearl during December.

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1. QMG DA 042018Z Feb 1960 cite UNCLAS DA 463539 From QMGD-S
 2. CINCUSARPAC 122111Z Mar 60
 3. CINCUSARPAC 152033Z Apr 60 cite MP 45512
 4. CG USARYIS/IX CORPS OKINAWA 232231Z Sep 60 RIQM-P15947 (U)
 5. ONM NOTICE 4355 of 23 Mar 60
 6. J44 Staff Report, Jul and Aug 60 (U)

Petroleum Logistical Data and Reports:

The handling of petroleum logistical data and petroleum tankage data was mechanized through the use of electrical accounting machine (EAM) cards and equipment. This significantly improved the accuracy and timeliness of data, and reduced the manual work previously involved. The Military Petroleum Supply Agency initiated steps to capitalize on the advantages of the procedures initiated and developed in PACOM. The adoption of the improvements was being considered throughout the POL logistic organizations of the Department of Defense.

Petroleum Tankage Report (DD Form 701) data was placed on EAM cards and run off by machine in March 1960.¹ After verification of the data by component commanders these data were submitted to Military Petroleum Supply Agency (MPSA) with the recommendation that EAM listing replace DD Form 701 in PACOM and that this procedure be considered for all other unified command areas.²

By 2 September 1960, CINCPAC INSTRUCTION POO4020.7 (Petroleum Logistical Data for the Pacific Command) was completed and issued. This data included all information formerly in CINCPAC letter serial 00641 of October 1959, and in addition, data on requirements for support of CINCPAC Contingency Plans, POL testing laboratory capabilities, and POL contracts as well as petroleum tankage data. All of this information was recorded on EAM cards and was listed mechanically.

After finding it necessary initially to delay adoption of the procedures and format proposed by the Joint Petroleum Office, PACOM³

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0099, 00100, 00101 of 3 Mar 60
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00266 of 24 May 60
 3. MPSA ltr 13 4020 of 29 Jun 60

the Military Petroleum Supply Agency held a meeting in October to review the proposals and to develop a uniform EAM format and system for petroleum logistics reporting. The system and the format agreed upon were those used in PACOM. These were forwarded along with a copy of CINCPAC Instruction POO4020.7 (PLD-PACOM) to each Joint Petroleum Office and Joint Area Petroleum Office (JAPO) of the Unified Commands for consideration as a uniform reporting system.¹ (UNCLASSIFIED)

Slating and Stocking:

The stock level of JP-5 at Pearl Harbor was increased to 750,000 barrels and additional liftings totaling 500,000 barrels for June were approved in order to assist the BUSANDA budget program.^{2,3,4,5}

Additional slating of NSFO above established levels for June delivery was requested and approved. The amounts were 600,000 barrels of NSFO for each Japan and Hawaii. Target date for return to established levels was established as 30 June 1961. The reason for this temporary change in levels was assistance to the BUSANDA budget program.^{6 thru 14}

In accordance with CINCPAC request,¹⁵ grade 1100 aviation lubricating oil with 2% cyclohexanone additive was designated¹⁶ as a

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1. MPSA ltr 13 4400 ser 001338 of 28 Dec 60
 2. NFSO 261845Z May 60 (C)
 3. CINCPACFLT 020015Z Jun 60 (C)
 4. ~~MPSA 031915Z Jun 60 (C)~~
 5. CINCPAC 040301Z Jun 60
 6. NFSO 211835Z Apr 60 "CAT ALFA" (C)
 7. NFSO 211845Z Apr 60 "CAT ALFA" (C)
 8. NFSO 211840Z Apr 60 "CAT ALFA" (C)
 9. SAPO MARIANAS 220749Z Apr 60 (C)
 10. CINCPACFLT 260605Z Apr 60 (C)
 11. CINCPACFLT 270409Z Apr 60 (C)
 12. NFSO 281930Z Apr 60 "CAT ALFA" (C)
 13. MPSA 281932Z Apr 60 "CAT ALFA" (C)
 14. CINCPAC 290251Z Apr 60
 15. CINCPAC 312257Z Dec 59
 16. MPSA 192200Z Feb 60

slated item to be supplied through joint petroleum office channels.

The Military Petroleum Supply Agency¹ approved the request of CINCPAC² for a change in format for submission of the CINCPAC Bulk Petroleum Products Written Slate. The change resulted in reduction of workload and time required for forwarding of PACOM requirements to MPSA. Implementation of the new format commenced with slate number nine (9).³

Operational requirements of the Pacific Missile Range, Navy and Air Force contingents, created a new need for aviation gasoline and lube oil at Christmas Island which was under British administration. Informal agreements were made whereby products furnished by the British for U.S. operations were replaced in kind by either Navy or Air Force depending on which service was conducting the operations.⁴ thru 7

Soviet Crude in Japanese Refinery:

The Idemitsu Kosan Company, Ltd., Japan, was a contractor for the supply of certain finished petroleum products to the U.S. Armed Forces. The company purchased Soviet crude in addition to Middle East crude. Under the U.S. purchase contract, Soviet crude could not be used to manufacture the products being supplied to the Armed Forces of the U.S. The Sub-Area Petroleum Office (SAPO) Japan reported that ~~representatives of Idemitsu certified that the products refined from~~ Soviet crude were separate from the products refined from Kuwait crude.⁸

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1. MPSA ltr ser 60 4020/1 of 14 Jan 60
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 34 of 8 Jan 60
 3. CINCPACINST 4020.5A CH-1
 4. CINCPAC JPO/SUBAREAPETO HAWAII conference of 8 Oct 60
 5. ADMINO CINCPAC 080215Z Oct 60
 6. MPSA 081723Z Oct 60
 7. MPSA 111450Z Oct 60
 8. SUBAREAPETO JAPAN 040437Z Apr 60 cite APOF-1854 (C)

[REDACTED]

MPSA requested SAPO Japan to confirm by a visit to the Idemitsu refinery that controls were in effect to insure that only products refined from Kuwait crude were supplied in the MPSA contract.¹ Accordingly, SAPO visited the Idemitsu refinery and confirmed that segregated facilities for crude and finished products were available and, although no Russian crude was then in the system, positive checks would be made to insure complete segregation when Russian crude was received.² (CONFIDENTIAL)

War Reserve Mobilization Requirements (WRM):

Middletown Air Material Area (MAAMA) advised CINCPAC³ that HQ USAF had directed that the inventory objective for the overseas War Reserve Mobilization (WRM) requirement was to be reduced from 75 to 60 days. This action was applicable only to the Air Force requirements and the Air Force would continue to fund for the product required to maintain the Army and Navy Mobilization Requirement at the 75 day level.⁴

MAAMA advised CINCPACAF of revised USAF inventory objective effective 30 June 1960.⁵

MAAMA requested CINCPACAF's reason for not maintaining the JP-4 WRM inventory objective in the Hawaiian Area (Hawaii, Johnston Island, Marshall Islands, Midway and Wake),⁶ and also asked CINCPACAF why the WRM level of JP-4 for USAF on Guam was not being maintained.⁷

~~CINCPAC advised MAAMA and CINCPACAF that storage was the governing~~

1. MPSA 062103Z Apr 60 "CAT ALFA" (C)

2. SUBAREAPETO JAPAN 270643Z cite USLAP 040175 Apr 60

3. MAAMA 191850Z Jan 60; 041907Z Feb 60; 041911Z Feb 60; 041928Z Feb 60; 041930Z Feb 60

4. MAAMA ltr MAOSS of 3 Feb 60

5. MAAMA 101901Z cite MAOSS-4255 Mar 60, Passed to CINCPAC for action by PACAF 120331Z cite PFMSS-P 3603, Mar 60

6. MAAMA 242100Z cite MAOSS 4406 Mar 60, Passed to CINCPAC for action by PACAF 260219Z cite PFMSS-P 3641 Mar 60

7. MAAMA 241935Z cite MAOSS 4405 Mar 60, Passed by PACAF to CINCSAC for action with info to CINCPAC by PACAF 252143Z cite PFMSS-P 3639 of Mar 60.

factor in both instances. Upon completion of the storage construction program on Guam, all current requirements could be stored and levels could be maintained. The levels for the Hawaii area, particularly for Hawaii, could not be maintained until additional storage was provided. Hawaii was expected to be below prescribed WRM levels for 12 to 24 months and possibly longer.¹ During discussions between representatives of CINCPAC JPO, CINCPACAF and MAAMA on 17 and 18 March 1960 it was agreed that Air Force levels (Stockage Objective and WRM) would be provided CINCPAC by CINCPACAF; MAAMA would consult Petroleum Logistical Data, Pacific Command (PLD-PACOM) for levels being used as inventory objectives; and any reduction in avgas and JP-4 would be against USAF requirements. The USAF (MATS) requirement for JP-4 at NAS Agana, Guam was cancelled² in March 1960.

Headquarters USAF advised CINCPAC that the Air Force WRM inventories for avgas and JP-4 were to be reduced to a 60 day level by 30 June 1960. Headquarters USAF further advised that the Air Force had not programmed to rebuild the levels during FY 61 to the previous level of 75 days.³

CINCPAC advised the Subordinate Unified Commanders and CINCPACREPS of new avgas and JP-4 inventory objectives for their areas.^{4,5}

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1. CINCPAC 290417Z and 300307Z both Mar 60
 2. MATS 091945Z cite MAMLG 351C "CAT AC" Mar 60
 3. HQ USAF 062022Z Apr 60 cite AFMSS-FL-1 83863 "CAT AC" (S)
 4. CINCPAC 080314Z Apr 60 (S)
 5. CINCPAC 092302Z Apr 60 (S)

Alternate Joint Petroleum Office Pacific Command:

The Sub-Area Petroleum Office Marianas was established as the Alternate Joint Petroleum Office Pacific Command in 1956.^{1,2} Effective 4 April 1960, it was relocated at Headquarters, Western Sea Frontier, San Francisco, California.³ The Commander Western Sea Frontier was made responsible for maintaining in a current status the material submitted by CINCPAC (Joint Petroleum Office).³

Sub-Area Petroleum Office Korea:

The JCS approved the Table of Distribution (T/D) for the Sub-Area Petroleum Office Korea as a staff element of COMUSKOREA. The T/D provided for two Army and two Air Force members during peacetime and two additional members at the time of mobilization.⁴ (UNCLASSIFIED)

Storage in Hawaii:

The work of converting four of the twenty underground storage tanks and associated systems in the Red Hill Storage Facility, Oahu commenced on 6 July 1960. The four tanks were being converted to store aviation fuels where previously they had been used to store navy special fuel oil. The contractors, as announced by the Navy, were Gunther and Shirley Co., and Gibbons and Reed Co.⁵ The firm of Earl and Wright⁶ of San Francisco provided the engineering services for the project. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Tankers

Because of the additional problems of storage and distribution

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1. CINCPAC ltr FF-1 A3-1 ser 05 of 6 Jan 56 (S)
 2. CINCPAC INST 004000.1B (S)
 3. CINCPAC GEOP 1-58 Annex R (TS)
 4. JCS Memo SM380-60 of 19 Apr 60
 5. Contract No. N By 25540, (the three firms were known as "Red Hill" Contractors)
 6. Contract No. N By 25539

generated by super tanker deliveries, it was recognized that the military services as the customer should sponsor and promote the number and sizes of tankers most adaptable to present and foreseeable needs. While problems in connection with super tanker operation were under study, the staff of CINCPAC established that there was a definite need for the T-2 and T-5 tankers as well as the super tankers for joint service logistics. (UNCLASSIFIED)

In July the JCS¹ approved CINCPAC's request² for the assignment of two T-2 tankers, the USNS PISCATAQUA and PETALUMA, to the PACOM Strategic Reserve Merchant Type Shipping.

U.S. CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Civil-military relations are of particular importance in areas subject to local discontent, subversion and guerrilla operations. These conditions could be found in several countries in PACOM that bordered the area of communist control. As a result, during 1960, appropriate consideration was given in CINCPAC plans and operations, to civil-military relations and to other aspects of civil affairs. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Civil Affairs Plans and Operations

Civil affairs annexes were included in all CINCPAC Operations Plans issued in 1960. Of particular significance was the Civil Affairs Annex to the Cold War Plan (OPLAN 70-60) which set forth the CINCPAC Cold War Civil Affairs Mission as designed to "counter communist influence and subversion by promoting political stability, increasing economic opportunity and growth, improving public health, and otherwise contributing to the general advancement of the people of friendly countries of the Pacific Area."

1. JCS 1454/97 of 7 Jul 60

2. CINCPAC ltr 4620/2 ser 00275 of 31 May 60

~~SECRET~~

Civil Affairs Annexes were included for the first time in SEATO plans and in the SEATO Field Forces Commander's plans. These annexes were reviewed by the CINCPAC Civil Affairs Branch and necessary changes were recommended. Civil Affairs concepts and plans were tailored to meet the circumstances peculiar to the type of military operation conceived in each plan.

Commander JTF 116 OPLAN 32-60, Phase II, Laos, was revised during 1960 to provide for a civil affairs staff section consisting of two officers and four enlisted spaces in the JTF 116 organization, in order to:

1. Insure that civil affairs matters were integrated on a continuing basis with other JTF 116 plans and operations;
2. Comply with joint doctrine (Joint Manual for Civil Affairs, FM 41-5, NAVMC 2500); and
3. Maintain consistency with JTF 116 staffing pattern for Phase II, South Vietnam.

Organization and Training

On 7 May 1960 CINCPAC requested¹ a one-time report from CHMAAGs, CHJUSMAAGs and CHPEO Laos to determine the progress made and obstacles encountered in developing a civil affairs capability in MAP-assisted armed forces, and as a basis for furnishing additional ~~CINCPAC support if required. This CINCPAC action preceded by several~~ months the publication of SM 906-60, which directed all unified commanders to review their staffing assignments and training needs in several special fields, including Civil Affairs. Based on the Civil Affairs Reports and

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00234 of 7 May 60, subj: Development of CA Capability in MAP Assisted Armed Forces, request for Comprehensive on

the SM, the CINCPAC Supplement to the Basic Planning Document was revised to include a requirement that MAAGs be prepared to support civil affairs or civic action programs appropriate to local circumstances.

On April 19 and 20, CINCPAC representatives participated in a two-day Civil Affairs Seminar conducted by the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks. The Seminar, under the direction of the Assistant Division Commander, included approximately 50-60 officer and enlisted personnel from all general and special staff sections of the division headquarters and from divisional units. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Civil Affairs Mobile Training Teams

In May 1960 CHMAAG Vietnam requested¹ that two civil affairs officers be furnished MAAG Vietnam for a 90-day period to assist the Vietnamese Armed Forces in developing a civil affairs concept of operations and civil affairs plans. Department of the Army directed CONARC² to furnish a two man Civil Affairs Mobile Training Team (CAMTT) which arrived at CINCPAC for briefing in July.³ This team, consisting of one colonel and one captain, was directed to evaluate MAAG and ARVN needs and make appropriate recommendations on staffing and training programs. (CONFIDENTIAL)

The Mobile Training Team, after completing a 90-day tour in Vietnam, returned and was debriefed at CINCPAC on 7 October. In both its departure report to CHMAAG⁴ (a copy of which was furnished CINCPAC) and its oral debriefing, the two officers presented a dark picture of conditions in Vietnam. They pointed up the need, recognized by the

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1. CHMAAG Vietnam 190127Z May 60
 2. DA 032259Z Jul 60 cite 978221
 3. CGUSCONARC 231941Z Jun 60
 4. Mobile Training Team ltr of 5 Oct 60

Government of Vietnam and the MAAG, for improved relations between the government and the people, and the substantial contribution that an effective civil affairs program could make to the military aspects of this problem. However, deficiencies in organization, planning and use of civil affairs capabilities were preventing implementation of the needed programs. They warned that continued inaction could have serious consequences.

Civic Action Program

The Civic Action phase of civil affairs received continued study and attention during 1960. Based on the one-time civil affairs reports which were received from MAAGs, JUSMAGs and PEO Laos, a CINCPAC summary was prepared and disseminated¹ for use in developing appropriate local programs. The Department of the Army Standing Operating Procedures governing Civic Action Mobile Training Teams also were distributed² to subordinate commands for use in determining the requirement for such teams in each individual country. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Included in the civil affairs reports were comments which expressed some concern that extensive civic action operations used excessive numbers of available military personnel in several countries. A further analysis of these reports was made to ascertain deficiencies and to determine the extent to which possible over-emphasis on civic action programs might have interfered with the primary armed forces training and security mission. The MAAGs and PEO were alerted¹ to the fact that despite the value in developing overall national strength and the desirability of being used to the maximum extent consistent with the countries' (CONFIDENTIAL)

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0780 of 14 Oct 60
 2. CINCPAC ltr 05080 ser 0934 of 1 Dec 60

needs and military capabilities, civic action programs should not be permitted to interfere with the primary training and security mission.

The main conclusions reached on the civic action program for 1960 were:

1. The scope of activities was understandably different in each country since these activities had to be tailored to the specific needs of that country. A "broad brush" treatment could not be used in applying Civic Action programs to an area such as PACOM.
2. Civic action programs have a beneficial effect only in cases wherein a sound relationship between civilians and members of the armed forces has been established. For example, in countries where abuses of the civilian population by the military were condoned, there is little that a civic action team could do to dispel the accumulated antipathy.
3. The security situation in Laos and Vietnam tended to place much-needed civil affairs activities in a lower priority.

Trust Territories Civil Affairs

The J5 Civil Affairs Branch was charged with monitoring U.S. Pacific Island Territories, U.S. military and civilian administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and civil administration of the Japanese "residual sovereignty" areas so as to be alert for changes that ~~might affect the CINCPAC military posture in the Pacific.~~ Several significant events occurred which were considered to have such effects.

The tempo of the Japanese and Okinawan agitation for return of the "Article 3" areas to Japan increased slightly during 1960. The demonstrations during President Eisenhower's visit to Okinawa, the requests for permission to fly the Japanese flag over schools and public buildings,

and petitions by numerous labor, teacher, and other organized leftist groups were evidence of the determination of the Okinawans and the Japanese to force the return of the Ryukyu, Bonin, Volcano, and Marcus Islands to Japan at an early date. As a contrast, the residents of the Bonin Islands continued their efforts to remain under U.S. control by increased use of the English place names rather than the Japanese, for places in the Bonin-Volcano group.

In order to become acquainted with the conditions and problems current in American Samoa, a member of the CINCPAC staff visited the area during 25-29 January. Conferences were held with Governor Coleman High Talking Chief Tuato's and other U.S. and Samoan officials, businessmen and civilians. (UNCLASSIFIED)

It was concluded that the Samoans were a relatively stable community of people who were in the midst of transition from an ample subsistence economy, which provided all of the necessities of life in return for relatively few hardships to a competitive economy which they hoped would provide a western type way of life with its comforts and luxuries. The transition created some difficult problems that were being handled well and with little serious conflict. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The political problems were more serious at that moment because they involved basic concepts of the normal way of life. Change would affect the cultural and economic areas as well as the political. The United States was openly and strongly, but not bitterly, criticized because a democratic way of life had not materialized although democracy had been taught in the schools for fifty years. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The people believed that they were ready to govern themselves on local matters and were seeking the best way to attain this goal. Economic problems were troublesome in that economic expansion was essential if the personal desires of the people for western living standards were to be met. Increased tourism, agriculture, and fishing were the methods proposed. However there was plenty of land and food at the moment, and, though the islands were crowded, there was neither starvation nor population pressure. The social conflicts were basic and involved fundamental family and community relationships. In all of these areas there were potential dangers, but the Samoan approach appeared to be a satisfactory one to attain the necessary compromises. (UNCLASSIFIED)

During the period from 3-29 February 1960, a CINCPAC representative made a field trip through Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, visiting Kwajalein, Majuro, Ponape, Truk, and Yap to observe the progress made in the past 10 years of Department of the Interior administrative programs, U.S. military bases in the Territory and the attitude of the island peoples toward the United States. Though small in land area (600 square miles) and population (60,000), the territory was large in total area (3 million square miles) and in strategic and international significance. Since it was a strategic trusteeship, retained by the United States for the dual purpose of providing locations for advance bases and denying the islands to potential enemies, the political, economic and social developments acquired military significance.

The United States had active military installations on Bikini, Eniwetok, and Kwajalein Atolls, and on Ponape, Koror, and Saipan Islands including installations used by the Pacific Missile Range which

passed through the Islands. In addition to the larger, more permanent bases, observation stations were set up and manned as needed for specific projects. The U.S. Coast Guard maintained several LORAN stations and the U.S. Weather Bureau operated weather stations throughout the territory, providing data needed by the Armed Forces.

The visits disclosed that the islanders were making positive progress in all fields. Physical facilities, public and private, were improved, but there was still need for further improvement.

The attitude of the Micronesians toward the United States and Americans was one of unreserved friendship and cooperation. They did not always like the things done, or the way they were done, but they had confidence in the administration and administrative personnel and desired that United States administration be continued indefinitely. They were beginning to feel that the government of the Trust Territory was really their government, a feeling that increased as Micronesians replaced Americans in progressively higher positions, which they did as they gained knowledge and experience. (UNCLASSIFIED)

There remained some nostalgia for the "good old days" under the Japanese, when some of the islanders had more material comforts than they had at this time. However, there was no genuine desire for the ~~return of the Japanese; as a matter of fact, there was substantial opposition~~ to them. One contact with Japan was almost universally desired: increased trade and direct shipping to provide markets for Micronesian products and a less expensive source for imports. The Interior Department policy required orientation of the Trust Territory economy toward the United States. (UNCLASSIFIED)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable Delmas H. Nucker, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory visited Honolulu during the period of 30 June- 7 July to discuss land requirements for the Pacific Missile Range, the effects on land procurement and use, and the difficulty in settling with Marshallese land-owners for land occupied in those islands since World War II. The Marshallese had taken these problems to the United Nations Trusteeship Council in April 1960. Agreeing to their claims would increase both the cost of land on the Marshall Islands and the difficulty in procuring and paying for needed land.

In November a Senate Subcommittee of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee visited Hawaii enroute to an inspection tour of the U.S. dependent areas in the Pacific. The subcommittee was particularly interested in developing the capability for self-government among the local people and their attitude toward the United States and U.S. administration.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

Another of the continuing problems of the Pacific Islands became active in November.¹ The Japanese, with encouragement from visiting U.S. Senate Delegation personnel, had initiated a request to return again to the Trust Territory, to mine bauxite in Babelthuap. This request was refused since the entry of all aliens for the purpose of engaging in commercial activity has been opposed consistently by the U.S. because it was difficult to admit one alien interest without opening the area to all U.N. members on an equal basis. Furthermore, opening the Trust Territory could affect substantially the military security of this strategic area.


1. CNO 081823Z Nov 60 and CINCPAC 110320Z Nov 60

CINCPAC Representatives were present when Dr. Ryerson, Senior U.S. Commissioner, enroute to a South Pacific Commission meeting, called on CINCPACFLT on 19 September 1960. During the conversation, three matters of particular concern to CINCPAC were discussed: the increased attention that the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands would receive from the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations as the African Trusts were terminated; the forthcoming Pacific Science Congress to be held in Honolulu in August 1961, at which the Soviet Union would be represented and would have oceanographic ships in Hawaii; and plans for a Fifth South Pacific Commission, a meeting of indigenous representatives from dependent areas, to be held in American Samoa in 1962. The JCS was notified of these discussions.

On 14 December the United Nations passed a "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" which created some concern regarding the future of U.S. administration in several Pacific areas. While the United States abstained from voting on this declaration, the U.S. was affected by it because of the twenty dependent areas under its control, most of them in the Pacific. The declaration proclaimed the "necessity of bringing a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations." A study was being made of the potential effects on the PACOM military posture of this declaration and also of the increased attention which the Trusteeship Council would be able to give to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

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VISITS BY U.S. CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS

As in previous years CINCPAC's actions to improve the state of readiness of U.S. Forces in the PACOM were facilitated by briefings and discussions held with the large number of representatives of U.S. governmental agencies who visited the Pacific Command. (UNCLASSIFIED)

In calendar year 1960 there were 616 high ranking officials who visited the Pacific Command as representatives from the Executive Branch of the government, Department of Defense, the military departments, the Congress and other branches of the government. The majority of the visitors stopped in Hawaii on inspection trips through the Pacific Command area, and received briefings from or met with CINCPAC or the Component Commanders. (UNCLASSIFIED)

A list of principal offices or committees visiting the PACOM is included in Appendix B.

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CHAPTER II

CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS OF NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

COUNTRY MISSION STATEMENTS

During 1959 CINCPAC was in the process of developing for each country in the PACOM area a mission statement that would express the U.S. view on the mission for the forces in that country. The mission statements would serve two purposes for U.S. personnel in the area. They would provide a basis for MAP guidance to the U.S. authorities concerned, and also provide a basis for such bilateral operational planning or military discussions as might be appropriate between U.S. and national officials when the political climate permitted. In order that the mission of respective national forces could be related to that of U.S. forces, the statements included three general topics: (1) Simplified concepts for limited and general war in the specified area; (2) Missions that national forces should be prepared to fulfill; and (3) Broad missions of U.S. forces in that area.

After the drafts of mission statements were completed, they were submitted to JCS for approval prior to being promulgated. At the end of 1959, all Country Mission Statements were completed and approved [REDACTED] Mission statements for these countries incorporating the recommendations from Component Commanders were submitted to the JCS¹ and subsequently approved.

CINCPAC promulgated, in the form of a speedletter, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] action to the Chief, Military

1. CINCPAC 232145Z Oct 59
CINCPAC 152115Z Nov 59

~~TOP SECRET~~

Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), and information to interested agencies.¹

~~(SECRET)~~



In January a draft of the Commander's Estimate prepared by the Plans Committee of the Mutual Defense Board (U.S. - Philippines), (MDE) was forwarded to CINCPAC.³ CINCPAC's review of the draft estimate indicated the desirability of certain changes and prompted an exchange of messages between CINCPAC and CINCPACREPPHIL concerning such changes.⁴ CINCPAC concluded this exchange by stating that planning guidance for U.S. planners was designed to ensure that Phil-U.S. combined plans for defense of the Philippines reflect (a) planning limited to defense of Philippine area; (b) that U.S. forces employed under U.S. forward strategy concept were not committed to continued close-in defense of the Philippines; (c) avoidance of the disclosure of U.S. unilateral war plans and; (d) the 14 July 1959 Mutual Defense Board approved concept for defense of the Philippines.⁵

Based on this information CINCPAC submitted for JCS approval the revised Philippines Mission Statement.⁶



- 3. CINCPACREPPHIL ltr ser 008 of 25 Jan 60 and enclosure thereto.
- 4. CINCPAC 072158Z Feb 60; CINCPACREPPHIL 080909Z Feb 60
CINCPAC 132230Z Feb 60; CINCPACREPPHIL 230707Z Feb 60
- 5. CINCPAC 270019Z Feb 60
- 6. CINCPAC 102012Z Feb 60

In May CINCPAC promulgated the revised JCS-approved
Philippine Mission Statement.¹

MAP ACTIVITIES (AREA-WIDE)

All planning and programming at the CINCPAC level in support of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) underwent thorough revision during 1960 in order to implement a long range concept recommended by the President's Committee to Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee). (UNCLASSIFIED)

The Military Assistance Basic Planning Document

The new concept was set forth in the world - wide Military Assistance Basic Planning Document (BPD) received from the Director of Military Assistance and prepared through the coordinated effort of the Departments of State and Defense, and the International Cooperation Administration. The BPD contained policy guidance for the development of MA Plans for the period FY 62-66, and represented the first time that the U.S. Government had attempted to conduct the program on a long range basis. Under the new policy, the five-year period was to begin with the second year after the fiscal year during which it was prepared, so that the first five-year plan, prepared during FY 1960, covered the period FY 62-66 inclusive. It was to be revised annually and projected an additional year in order to maintain the five-year time frame for planning purposes. The requirement for long range planning was intended to assure that the furnishing of military assistance would conform to a consistent purpose and directly promote the military and foreign policy objectives of the United States.²

(UNCLASSIFIED)

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1. CINCPAC spd ltr ser 00096 of 9 May 60 (TS)
 2. Military Assistance Manual, DOD, 1 Nov 60 p 2, (U)

DOLLAR GUIDELINES FY 1963-FY1967

MILLIONS OF DOLLARS




Fig. 10a

DOLLAR GUIDELINES FY 1963 - FY 1967 MILLIONS OF DOLLARS





Fig. 10b.

CINCPAC Supplement to Military Assistance Basic Planning Document

Although the original MA BPD was not published until the end of March 1960, the Department of Defense had furnished draft copies to the CINCPAC Staff during the fall of 1959 for comments, and to be used for advance planning purposes. Since the BPD contained statements of broad policy, it was necessary for the CINCPAC Staff to prepare supplementing guidance for the MAAGs operating in the CINCPAC area. Working from the draft copy, the CINCPAC Staff prepared the draft CINCPAC Supplement to the Military Assistance Basic Planning Document, and had it completed by January 1960 so that only minor changes were required when the Department of Defense furnished CINCPAC the approved BPD in April 1960.¹

The draft CINCPAC Supplement to the BPD converted the broad policy and guidance contained in the BPD to detailed guidance for MA planning and programming in the Pacific Command. For each of the countries in CINCPAC's area of concern for which the United States was furnishing military assistance, the draft CINCPAC Supplement set forth in specific terms the Force Development Objectives for that country, dollar guidelines that applied, and the planning and programming policy factors and criteria.²

A revised CINCPAC Supplement to the BPD was promulgated in November 1960. This document was more comprehensive than its predecessor. Force Development Objectives were separated into combat objectives for each country's army, navy and air force; support objectives

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1. Interview, MAJ. R. Gugeler J0461 with COL. J.H. Patterson, J532, 5 Jan 61 (S)
 2. CINCPAC Supplement to Military Assistance BPD, Section I, II, III, 21 Nov 60 (S)

to include logistical support systems, warehousing facilities, maintenance of equipment, roads, airfields and tactical and long-line communication equipment and facilities; and training objectives.

Training objectives were broken down into general objectives and those that directly related to the country's army, navy and air force. The country dollar guideline section of the Supplement provided the money limits within which each country would deliver all supplies and equipment (including repair and rehabilitation), military construction, and training.¹

Military Assistance Manual

A second Department of Defense document that significantly affected the MA Program in the Pacific Command was the Military Assistance Manual. Published in draft form during the fall of 1959, it was promulgated in final form during May 1960. Whereas the Basic Planning Document was confined to the principal objectives of the Mutual Security Program on a world wide, regional and country basis, the Military Assistance Manual (MAM) outlined responsibilities and procedures for developing and implementing the long range Military Assistance plans and programs to support the objectives laid down in the BPD.² One innovation in the final version of the MAM was the introduction of a new policy on MA program deviations. In general, requested reductions and deletions were to be forwarded and executed as they occurred. Credits from program reductions would accumulate in change order accounts established by each of the three Services under CINCPAC for quarterly submission against amounts reported as

1. CINCPAC Supplement to Military Assistance BPD, Section I, II, III,
21 Nov 60 (S)

2. J53 Staff History Rept, Jan 60 (S)

available for reprogramming in the change order accounts.

CINCPAC Supplement to the Military Assistance Manual

The CINCPAC Staff reviewed the Military Assistance Manual and prepared in draft form the CINCPAC Supplement thereto as CINCPAC guidance and procedural instructions for the preparation and submission of the country MA programs prepared by the MAAGs, JUSMAGs or other organizations connected with the MAP.¹ The CINCPAC Supplement to the MAM was revised during the year as additional information was received from DOD.

CINCPAC Implementation of Long Range MAP Planning

In order to implement as expeditiously as possible the new DOD concept of long range MA planning, a CINCPAC MAP team scheduled conferences during January at Tokyo, Taipei, Bangkok and Saigon to present new planning and programming procedures, to discuss details of the requirements, and to receive recommended changes to published guidance. A follow-up visit to each of the country MAAGs was made during February by two CINCPAC teams to review development of plans and provide advice that would facilitate later program reviews at CINCPAC Headquarters.²

A month later, CINCPAC began the review of the separate country long range plans. To do this, commencing in March, representatives from each of the country MA groups came to Camp H. M. Smith to present their plan. A week was devoted to the review and revision of each plan, after which it was presented to Admiral Felt

(UNCLASSIFIED)

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1. J53 Staff History Rept, Jan60 (S)
 2. J4 Staff Rept of Dec 60 (U) in J046 files.

for his approval. When all country plans were approved, they were incorporated into the overall PACOM MA Plan for FY 62-66 that was presented to OSD.¹ (UNCLASSIFIED)

During October, CINCPAC representatives attended a MA Planning and Programming Conference in Washington to receive OSD guidance for refinement of the FY 62 MAP and for preparation of the FY 63-67 long range plan.² (CONFIDENTIAL)

Several changes were incorporated in the revised Basic Planning Document published by OSD on 20 November 1960 as guidance for MAP activities during the period FY 62-67. The more significant of these were:

a. A new section of the BPD set forth minimum qualitative standards for weapon systems and equipment for the five year planning period. Separate lists were provided for ground forces, naval forces and air forces describing the type of weapon or equipment and its purpose, as well as specific equipment that would be available during the planning period and that was considered acceptable to satisfy the requirements. Although the revised BPD was not intended to establish automatically a requirement for the equipment in all MAP countries, it was the intent of the document to encourage sharing with allied countries the products of modern technology providing an actual need existed within the country and depending upon the country's ability to maintain and use the equipment.³

b. For seven of the 10 PACOM countries receiving military assistance, the revised BPD anticipated for planning purposes certain

1. J4 Staff Rept of Dec 60 (U) In J046 files.
2. OASD/ISA 262243Z Aug 60 cite DEF 982063. (C)
3. OSD Military Assistance BPD, 20 Nov 60, pp 11-40 (S)

U.S. support of military budgets. Field agencies were asked to make a critical evaluation of the total cost of maintaining the military forces projected in the five year period and also an analysis of that country's resources to provide the necessary funds during that period. If the evaluation revealed a significant gap, the field agencies could then develop and justify alternative U.S. aid levels for the support of the country's military budget. The plan included an assumed budget support for all PACOM MAP countries except Burma, Indonesia, and Japan.¹

c. The Mutual Security Objectives Plan (MSOP), a part of the BPD, included among the economic objectives a statement intended to support the principle of freedom of navigation in international waterways, and to discourage among nations that receive assistance such procedures as boycotts, blockages and restriction of the use of international waterways.²

d. One of the MSOP objectives for the Far East as stated in the March version of the BPD was the "eventual reunification under free governments and through peaceful means of the divided countries of the area". This statement was changed in the November plan by deleting the restriction specifying reunification through peaceful means.³

e. Reflecting a CINCPAC recommendation, the MSOP military objectives for the Far East were re-written to include as an objective a strong U.S. military position in the West Pacific area as clear evidence of U.S. capability and intent to fulfill treaty commitments and use military power if necessary to protect allies and friends from communist aggression.³

1. OSD Military Assistance BPD, 20 Nov 60, pp 9-10 (S)

2. Ibid. p 57 (S)

3. Ibid. pp 11-40 (S)

f. As a result of other CINCPAC recommendations, objectives from the MSOP pertaining to Cambodia were restated to indicate increased U.S. determination to support Cambodia's independence and maintain internal security against communist subversion, and to discourage Cambodia from accepting substantial military aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.¹

g. Several significant changes in the MSOP country objectives reflected a firmer U.S. stand in the West Pacific as well as increased capability on the part of several allied countries to protect themselves. Objectives for the Government of the Republic of China were changed to stress the improvement of anti-submarine and air defense capability. The new objectives for Japan recognized Japan's growing strength and ability to defend itself and to finance its own program for the improvement of its forces. There was added the objective of encouraging each country except Japan and Korea to provide a proper balance between combat and logistic units in its armed forces.²

PACOM Add-on List for FY 60

Late in April, CINCPAC furnished the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA) a PACOM \$42 million add-on list for FY 60 MAP consisting of priority requirements recommended for immediate funding to use funds not obligated before the end of the fiscal year.³ OSD advised CINCPAC that a total of \$44 million worth of items from PACOM add-on lists had been funded from FY 60 funds and prior year deviations. This permitted further refinement of the FY 61 program to delete advance funded items and include other

1. OSD Military Assistance BPD, 20 Nov 60, pp 179, 180 (S)

2. Ibid. pp 175, 180, 185, 186, 190, 194, 195, 210, 217, 225, 232. (S)

3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00216 of 28 Apr 60 (S)

material within prescribed ceilings.^{1, 2}

FY 1961 MA Program

The CINCPAC FY 61 MA Program underwent several revisions during 1960. During July, OASD/ISA asked to have the program revised within a minimum figure of \$580 million and a maximum of \$629 million, in anticipation of congressional action that would cut the MAP portion of the Mutual Security Plan appropriation to \$1.8 billion.^{3, 4} The revised program, forwarded to the Director of Military Assistance on 2 July, indicated in order of the priority items amounting to \$49 million for deferral.⁵ Further changes were required in August to meet anticipated fund availability of \$594 million.⁶ Subsequent minor additions to the program, and the inclusion of \$11 million from the president's contingency fund to be used for 11 helicopters and other support in Vietnam boosted the total of the program at year's end to \$613 million.


Shortages of Spare Parts

Early in 1960 it became apparent that funding for air force spare parts had been inadequate. Accordingly, the U.S. Air Force started to curtail requisitions for parts except for certain emergency items.⁷ With the restriction continuing over a four month period, the result was a critical shortage of spare parts and the partial disruption of the orderly process of replenishing spares by procurement. The restrictions were removed in June and the air force spares program slowly recovered from

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1. OSD 072238Z Jun 60 (S)
 2. OSD 302219Z Jun 60 (C)
 3. OSD 152048Z Jun 60 (C)
 4. OSD 172307Z Jun 60 (C)
 5. CINCPAC ltr ser 00333 of 2 Jul 60 (S)
 6. CINCPAC Spd ltr ser 00450, of 26 Aug 60 (S)
 7. USAF 252309Z Jan 60 (C)

SECRET NOFORN

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PROGRAM AND DELIVERIES BY COUNTRY FY1950 through FY1961*



PROGRAMMED
DELIVERED

* INCLUDES FY 1961 ESTIMATES
** EXCLUDES \$715,000,000 SPECIAL FAR EAST RESERVE PROGRAM
*** EXCLUDES MATERIAL FURNISHED DURING WAR

PACOM TOTALS
PROGRAMS \$7,092.
DELIVERIES \$6,505.

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[REDACTED]

this setback.¹ Later the OASD/ISA approved and funded FY 61 air force follow on spares requirements in October, making it possible for the MAAGs to submit requisitions to help re-establish stock levels depleted by the earlier restrictions.²

A similar problem developed toward the end of 1960 when the Department of the Army advised CINCPAC that world wide repair parts requisitions then on hand but not filled exceeded available FY 59-60 MAP authority.³ The PACOM portion of this deficit was approximately \$22.6 million. In addition, the U.S. Army Logistic Depot required an additional \$13 million in FY61 to continue procurement of stock requirements. At the end of 1960 the CINCPAC staff was examining the deficits to determine the amounts recoupable through country voluntary cancellations of requisitions, and to establish valid requirements for the Logistic Depot.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

"Clean Sweep"

Inaugurated by Admiral Felt during 1959 to eliminate from the PACOM MAP countries certain amounts of outdated or excess materiel from equipment that had been furnished by the United States, the "Clean Sweep"⁴ program produced excellent results during its first year. Between 1 July 1959 and 31 July 1960, the Chiefs of MAAGs persuaded the MAP countries to report as excess or salvage, material having an original cost of \$274 million. Of this amount, items valued at approximately \$67 million were redistributed to other countries. Other amounts were sold as salvage or scrap, or disposed of in some other manner.⁵ On the recommendation

1. OSD 032224Z Jun 60 (S)

2. USAF 042012Z Oct 60 cite AFMMS-CD-PC 90608 (S)

3. DA 232244Z Nov 60 cite DA 53263 (U)

4. CINCPAC Command History, 1959, p 96

5. J4 Rpt, Hq CINCPAC, subj: Clean Sweep Rpt on Excess and Redistributable Military Assistance Materiel, 1 Jul 59-31 Jul 60. (U)

[REDACTED]

of the MAAG Chiefs, CINCPAC continued the program with a second major effort planned for 1961. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Reduction of Off-Shore Procurement

In response to an OSD request for recommendations for reducing the existing unfavorable U.S. balance of payments by eliminating CY 61 expenditures for off-shore procurement in the MA Program, CINCPAC recommended the following items totaling \$15.3 million:

1. Defer deliveries and expenditures for Japanese \$7.0 million vehicles.
2. Defer vehicle rebuild for Government of the \$3.0 million Republic of China during CY 61
3. Defer 3d increment of MAAG housing in Korea \$4.9 million
4. Defer a portion of minor shipyard overhauls .4 million in Saigon shipyard

The OSD approved these recommendations.¹

[REDACTED] (L)

Air Defense Units for MAP Countries

Nike:

The PACOM 5-year MA Program contained a requirement for seven Nike (air defense) battalions, of which one Nike battalion for Japan and one Nike and one HAWK battalion for Korea were contained in the FY 1961 program and scheduled for delivery during FY 1963. The future availability of Nike ground equipment and missiles became uncertain because all Nike equipment had been allocated elsewhere and none was expected to become available during the period FY 62-66. Since it was considered not economically feasible to design an adequate ground-to-air defense without Nike weapons, CINCPAC requested DOD to take appropriate action to insure

1. OSD 232243Z Dec 60 cite DEF 987768 (C)

[REDACTED]

the availability of five Nike battalions to meet the minimum requirements in the PACOM MA Plan.¹ OSD explained that action to change the Nike availability situation was not feasible then, but the Nike might be provided at a later date but at a considerably higher cost.² At the end of the year there was doubt about the future availability of Nike equipment from U.S. production since DA production plans called for a cut-off of future procurement orders by December 1960, followed by the cut-off of production under the existing contract.³

HAWK:

Production of HAWK equipment was also expected to be phased out after the beginning of 1961, although the missiles were supposed to be available if funded during FY 1962.⁴ Then, during October, CINCPAC was advised that in order to assure uninterrupted U.S. production of all components of HAWK ground equipment, it was preferable to fund the equipment by January 1961; however, both the equipment and missiles could be obtained from European production by funding in FY 63 at costs similar to existing U.S. costs.⁵ To secure HAWK equipment from U.S. production lines, it would have been necessary for CINCPAC to advance by 1 Feb 61 eight additional HAWK battery sets to the PACOM FY 61 MA Program; funds for the remainder of PACOM HAWK requirements would have to be available not later than 30 Sept 61.⁶ It was not possible to

program the necessary deviations in the FY 61 plan. DOD was advised

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1. CINCPAC 252240Z Dec 60 (S)
 2. OSD 222342 Z Dec 60 cite DEF 987682 (S)
 3. Statement of Problem prepared by J5 Div, subj: Programming of Nike and Hawk Bns (Korea-Taiwan-Japan) 14 Oct 60 (S)
 4. Ibid.
 5. Telecon 061819Z Oct 60 TT #2792 (S)
 6. Telecon of 7 Nov 60, TT #2877/60 (S)

that CINCPAC considered infeasible the deviation of the PACOM FY 61 Program to provide for eight additional HAWK battery sets; however, the PACOM HAWK requirement of seven battalions still existed in the MAP.

Authority to Discuss Nike and HAWK with ROK Personnel

Although no air defense equipment was scheduled for delivery to Korea until FY 63, because of a 29 month training lead time, CINCPAC was anxious to proceed with the necessary planning. In September, CINCPAC informed OSD/ISA that the provision of Nike battalions to Korea required early discussions with Republic of Korea (ROK) representatives concerning interpreter and student training, real estate acquisition, and construction.¹ The restriction on discussions of Nike and HAWK units with ROK personnel was a State Department action placed in effect because of a plan to raise the subject of Korean unification at the United Nations General Assembly where the State Department did not wish to give the communists an opportunity to influence voting in the UN. Before the subject was raised, however, the General Assembly recessed, and was not scheduled to reconvene before March or April 1961. Accordingly, DOD did not expect the State Department to agree to discussions with the ROK on Nike or HAWK units until after April.² This restriction had already caused the operational readiness date of ROK air defense units to fall behind by one year and additional delay appeared probable at the end of the year.³

MAP COUNTRY ACTIVITIES



In the preceding section of this chapter CINCPAC long range MA

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1. CINCPAC 300302Z Sep 60 (S)
 2. OSD 302333Z Dec 60 cite DEF 988020 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 212140Z Dec 60 (S)

MAAG PERSONNEL - PACIFIC COMMAND

* BY SERVICE, CATEGORY AND COUNTRY

AS OF 31 DEC 1960



ARMY NAVY & MARINE CORPS AIR FORCE US & LOCAL CIV DEPENDENTS

planning and area-wide activities of the year were discussed. Even though CINCPAC activities were in general related to the program for the entire PACOM area, it was necessary in the conduct of the program to have many contacts with the individual countries. This section discusses some of the problems facing CINCPAC and the senior members of U.S. Diplomatic Missions as well as significant actions in dealing with individual countries of the Military Assistance Program. Significant matters pertaining to MAP training are related in the next section. A general location map with basic Military Assistance Program information for each country is included for better correlation of historical data.

Burma

Since the United States had no formal mutual security agreement with Burma, support of military activities in that country was carried out under a sales agreement whereby the U.S. agreed, subject to presidential approval, to furnish certain military equipment. Funds for this assistance were not included in the overall MA Program, but were submitted separately to Congress. Military support activities in Burma received the least military support of those countries in the CINCPAC area of administration.¹ Instead of the usual Military Assistance Advisory Group, Military Assistance in Burma was administered by a ~~Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT)~~, a group of approximately 15 personnel.

During the middle of the year, Brigadier Maung Maung, Director of Training for the Burma Defense Service, presented to U.S. representatives a request for additional equipment, including 155mm howitzers, 40mm AAA guns, trucks, communications and engineer equipment for the -----
1. CINCPAC PACOM Digest, Aug 60, pp 92, 93 (S) NOFORN

Burmese Army, and transport aircraft and radar equipment for the Burmese Air Force.¹

In November, a CINCPAC team visited Rangoon to assist the Chief, MEDT in refining the Burmese request. Subsequently, CHMEDT recommended a proposed four-year program in the amount of \$52.7 million (not including training costs).² After review, CINCPAC recommended that the program for Burma be spread over a five year period at an estimated cost of \$36 million, including training costs. Part of the reduction was due to deletion of late model radar equipment, and substituting C-47 aircraft for Caribou aircraft.³

When the matter was presented to the State Department and the OSD, these agencies included the Caribou aircraft and proposed a four-year program at an estimated cost of \$43 million for delivery over a minimum period of five years.⁴ In reply, CINCPAC reaffirmed his previous recommendations.⁵ At the close of 1960 no decision on the matter had been reached.

Burma also asked for a squadron of 8 Vertol 107 helicopters for use over high terrain in northern Burma. Since this aircraft was still in the development stage, negotiations for a suitable aircraft continued over the last half of the year with the problem unresolved at the close.^{6, 7}

Cambodia


The country of Cambodia, a level country with an older race of well

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1. OASD ltr I-14977/60 of 28 Jul 60 (S); CINCPAC R/S 002624-60
 2. CHMEDT Burma 171315Z and 190420Z Dec 60 (S)
 3. ADMINO CINCPAC 020210Z and 100145Z Dec 60 (S)
 4. Joint State/Def 408 to Rangoon 29 Dec 60 (S)
 5. CINCPAC 050111Z Jan 61 (S)
 6. CHMEDT Rangoon 020530Z Jun 60 cite 131 (S)
 7. OSD 212310Z Dec 60 cite DEF 987608 (S)

CAMBODIA

BASIC INFORMATION	
AREA.....	87,000 SQ. MI.
POPULATION.....	5 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH.....	2.2 %
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA.....	1.0 ACRES
LITERACY RATE.....	50 %
LIFE EXPECTANCY.....	50 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1959 (C).....	\$ 400 MILLION
PER CAPITA.....	\$ 80
DEFENSE BUDGET 1959.....	\$ 17 MILLION
AS % OF TOTAL EXPEND.....	2.1
AS % OF GNP.....	1.1

CH. OF STATE-SIHANOUK, NORODOM VARMAN, PRINCE
 MINISTER NATL. DEF - LON NOL, MGEN
 CHIEF GEN STAFF AND C/A ARMY - LON NOL, MGEN
 C/A NAVY - CODES, PIERRE, CAPT
 C/A AIR - NGO HOU, BGEN



OVERALL OBJECTIVE
DENY CAMBODIA TO THE COMMUNISTS, MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY, AND PROMOTE AN ATTITUDE BASICALLY FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES

MAP OBJECTIVE	COUNTRY TEAM
STRENGTHEN THE CAPABILITY OF U.S. SUPPORTED FORCES TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST DIRECTED OR INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY OR OTHER FORCES HOSTILE TO U.S. INTEREST AND TO ENCOURAGE A PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION.	U.S. AMBASSADOR..... MR. WILLIAM C. TRIMBLE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, INA..... MR. CHARLES MAHR CHIEF, MAAG..... BRIG. GEN. C. N. CHASE... USA

1960 MAP SUPPORTED FORCES		COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	20 INFANTRY BNS 1 ARN BN 1 CH BN	LIMITED CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY
NAVY	2 PATROL CRAFT, 1 LANDING SHIP	SECURITY PATROLS ALONG COAST AND INLAND WATERWAYS. PROVIDE ADDITIONAL MOBILITY FOR ARMY ON RIVERS AND WATERWAYS
AIR FORCE	1 COMPOSITE SQDN	LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Fig. 13

SOURCE: J-53, J2

1 NOV 1960

SECRET - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

integrated people, provided a well balanced subsistence economy during 1960, with no starvation in evidence. The armed forces were largely Army (26 out of 28 thousand). The people were decidedly neutral. The country was paying for approximately half of its military requirements. Major problems facing the MAAG in 1960 were: (1) determining ammunition stocks, and correction where necessary; (2) convincing the Cambodians of the necessity to conduct practice firing; and (3) the poor communication system that was incapable of supporting any sustained emergency operations.

Jets for Cambodia:

In February, at the request of the Chief of Staff, Cambodian Armed Forces, CHMAAG Cambodia requested authority from CINCPAC to advise Cambodia that the U.S. would be willing to sell jet aircraft to Cambodia. CINCPAC advised CHMAAG that the subject should be explored on a political basis through the State Department.

Cambodia Request for Increased Military and Police Assistance:

In the early summer of 1960, the Cambodian Government (RKG) presented U.S. officials in Phnom Penh with a request for additional military and police assistance. CHMAAG Cambodia estimated this request would price out at over \$100 million. After U.S. Country Team deliberation, it was recommended that increased assistance amounting to approximately \$39 million be approved for Cambodia over a five year period (FY 62-66).

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00283 of 6 Jun 60 (S)
2. CHMAAG Cambodia 151030Z Mar 60 and 250312Z Mar 60
3. CINCPAC 022311Z Apr 60
4. AMEMB PHNOM PENH Foreign Service Dispatch 93 of 28 Sep 60

CINCPAC's reaction to this recommendation was essentially negative¹ since Admiral Felt considered that the FY 1962-1966 Military Assistance Plan, with minor modification, represented the degree of support necessary to attain the U.S. Mutual Security objective for Cambodia.

Subsequently and in response to a request from Assistant Secretary of State Parsons,² Admiral Felt informed OASD/ISA³ of several impact items which might be moved up to the FY 61 Military Assistance Program in order to make a more favorable response to the Cambodian request, if it were decided to do so on political grounds and if funds could be made available.

In November OASD/ISA advised⁴ the Cambodian Minister of Defense that the U.S. was prepared to furnish the following additional items to Cambodia as part of an expanded FY 1961 MA Program for Cambodia:

- a. Jet training for six Cambodian pilots.**
- b. Equipment for an engineer construction battalion.**
- c. Three additional LCMs. (Since these craft would have to be constructed, they could not be delivered before 18 to 24 months)**
- d. Three additional M-24 tanks.**
- e. Additional modern small arms and crew served weapons for existing regular units.**
- f. 10,000 carbines for paramilitary forces (on the understanding that such forces would be under the control of the Royal Government).**
- g. Additional training and equipment for the National Police Force.**

(CONFIDENTIAL)

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- 1. CINCPAC 241944Z Oct 60**
 - 2. STATE 300250Z Oct 60**
 - 3. CINCPAC 310120Z Oct 60**
 - 4. ASD/ISA ltr 1-9628/60 of 14 Nov 60 (C)**

In addition, the United States agreed that its contribution to Cambodian Army pay and allowances in calendar year 1961 would be reduced only five percent instead of ten percent, as had been the practice in recent years. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Overhaul of Cambodian PCE:

The overhaul of the Cambodian PCE-311, originally scheduled for the Saigon Naval Shipyard and cancelled by Vietnam for political reasons, was rescheduled to the U.S. Navy Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, P.I. The PCE-311, accompanied by the USS OKANOGAN to insure safe passage, arrived in Subic on 2 July to commence its overhaul.¹

Indonesia

The Indonesian economy, bolstered by inflated rubber prices, was still precarious during 1960. However, because of the rich and fertile soil, there was no poverty or hunger. The country had made great strides in its ten years of independence. The Indonesian Army presented the greatest hope for Western orientation of the country.

U.S. aid to Indonesia was administered by the Military Technical Advisory Group (MILTAG). Problems facing the Chief MILTAG in 1960 in addition to a lack of status, were: (1) the Indonesian Air Force was not pro-west and the top commands were untrustworthy; (2) the navy was handicapped by lack of staff know-how; (3) the hodge-podge of army ~~equipment presented unusual maintenance problems;~~ and (4) the desperate need for a fixed communication system.²

Indonesia MA Plans and Program:

An OASD/ISA-Defense message to CINCPAC on 27 Jan 60³ prescribed

1. USS OKANOGAN 010505Z Jul 60 (C)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00283 of 6 Jun 1960 (S)
3. OASD/ISA-Defense 271338Z Jan 60 cite DEF 971541

U.S. guidance and philosophy concerning future MA planning and programming for Indonesia. It stated that the basic motivation for providing military assistance to Indonesia was not that it related to a direct strengthening of Indo forces, but to the achievement of broader U.S. security objectives. MAP requirements for Indo were not requirements in the normal military sense, but rather requirements the U.S. desired to meet in order to gain the basic U.S. objectives there. Accordingly, CINCPAC was requested to proceed with development and refinement of the first long range (5-year) plan for all Indo services using FY59 and FY60 levels as a reasonable annual dollar guideline and then refining the FY60 program on the assumption that a total of \$20 million would be approved.

On 6 Feb 60, the State Department informed the American Ambassador Djakarta¹ that the Mutual Security Coordinator had approved a total of \$20 million for materiel programming purposes for the FY60 MA program, plus \$1.5 million for training.

On 16 Apr 60, CINCPAC forwarded to OSD recommendations for the FY 60 Indo Army MA Program totalling \$13 million. This figure included \$500 thousand, earmarked to fund a sole-source engineering design contract with Nippon Electric Co. for the proposed Indo backbone communications system.² On 10 Jun 60, CHMILTAG submitted recommendations to CINCPAC for changes to the FY 61 MA Program. These were subsequently accepted.³ CINCPAC then requested that Indo prepare and submit the FY 62 MAP funding program, not to exceed \$20 million for materiel and training for all services. This FY 62 ceiling was also to include Army

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1. Joint State-Defense 1256 to Djakarta 6 Feb Noon 60
 2. CINCPAC 160400Z Apr 60
 3. CHMILTAG Djakarta 100731Z Jun 60

training in the amount of \$300 thousand.¹ CINCPAC was informed that Indonesia was activating as part of the Army General Reserve one airborne regiment under the direct command of General Nasution, for employment against rebel forces and to maintain internal security in remote and critical areas of the country.² CINCPAC recommended to OSD that support be provided this unit in the form of 5,000 parachute helmets and 10,000 pairs of combat boots.³ CINCPAC further informed CHMILTAG that OASD/ISA had set the level of the Indo FY 61 program at \$16.6 million, including approximately \$1.0 million for training.⁴

General Nasution accompanied Sukarno to the U.N. meeting in New York in September 1960 and then visited the Departments of State and Defense in Washington to discuss MAP matters. The principal areas of discussion were (1) barracks construction, (2) clothing and individual equipment by 1965 for 350,000 personnel, (3) rifles for training centers, (4) the army's need for LSTs in addition to those included in the navy program, (5) the Indo Army's plan to procure, commercially, 120 fixed wing and rotary type aircraft by 1965, and (6) the need for tanks and armored cars, and additional Indo requirements.⁵ The State Department informed CINCPAC that Nasution had been informed that the U.S. Government had approved, in principle, a grant of 300 million rupiah for barracks construction under PL 480⁶ and the details of Nasution's plan were further amplified on his visit to CINCPAC on 5 Oct 60.⁷ Nasution's

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1. CINCPAC 010329Z Jul 60
 2. CHMILTAG Djakarta 130645Z Jul 60
 3. CINCPAC 102345Z Aug 60
 4. CINCPAC 160330Z Aug 60
 5. USARMA Djakarta 260423Z Sep 60 cite CX-265
 6. State 522 to Djakarta 30 Sep 9PM 60
 7. CINCPAC 080355Z Oct 60

visit was followed by General Jani's (DC/S for Plans and Operations) visit to CINCPAC on 28 Oct 60, whereupon the Nasution list was discussed with CINCPAC staff in greater detail and definitive guidance was provided CHMILTAG by CINCPAC concerning each item.¹ MAP annual dollar guidelines totalling approximately \$20.0 million for equipment, supplies, construction and training were provided CHMILTAG by CINCPAC for use in planning his FY 63-67 MA Plan.² At the end of the year, a Joint State-Defense communication informed CINCPAC that on 9 December 1960, under the provisions of Section 451 (A) of Mutual Security Act, a Presidential determination of up to \$21 million of FY61 funds was provided for use in furnishing military assistance to Indonesia.³

The American Embassy Djakarta⁴ relayed a request from the Indo Air Force for 50 T-34 aircraft. The Office of the Secretary of Defense⁵ reported a Joint State/Defense decision to program 50 T-34s for the Air Force. Delivery schedule had not been announced at the end of 1960.

U.S. -Indonesia Air Force Relations:

CINCPAC⁶ outlined existing U.S. -Indo Air Force relations to the OSD, and reviewed difficulties involved in preparing U.S. air programs for the Indonesian Air Force, when military contacts with Indo Air Force personnel were practically non-existent. Later, CINCPAC⁷ pointed out ~~that U.S. military contacts with the Indonesian Air Force were possible~~ only through the U.S. Air Attache. Efforts to improve U.S. -Indo Air Force relationships continued.

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1. CINCPAC 160349Z Nov 60
 2. CINCPAC 190104Z Nov 60
 3. Joint State-Defense 920 to Djakarta, 14 Dec 8PM 60
 4. Djakarta to State 3628, of 27 Jun 60 3PM
 5. OSD 252329Z Nov 60 cite DEF 986355
 6. CINCPAC 182147Z Feb 60
 7. CINCPAC 050255Z Mar 60

[REDACTED]
Djakarta on 12 August 1960.¹ Ships were met by a large contingent of service personnel and relatives of armed forces and representatives of press and radio. The Indonesians were very impressed by the "like new" condition of the LST and the good condition of PC's. (UNCLASSIFIED)

In view of ADM Martadinata's visit to Moscow and his acceptance of significant Russian assistance, and in order to show U.S. interest in reasonable navy support, as well as to show some concrete result of General Nasution's visit to Washington, CNO proposed that three Reserve T-LSTs be programmed for the navy in FY 61.² CINCPAC concurred in this proposal,³ and programmed accordingly.

CNO⁴ notified CINCPAC that a Presidential determination for Indonesia was signed 9 December 1960 and authorized the activation of 3 LST's contained in FY61 MA Program. The activation was to be performed at Ship Repair Facility, Yokosuka, commencing January 1961. CINCPAC⁵ assigned monitoring of the activation to CINCPACFLT. Activation cost was not to exceed \$1.5 million. (C **[REDACTED]**)

Visit of BGEN Jani:

BGEN Jani of the Indonesian Army and party discussed the Indonesian Army requirements with members of CINCPAC staff in meetings on 28 and 31 October at Camp Smith. After a study of these requirements with relation to the overall Military Assistance Program ,

CINCPAC later informed CHMILTAG Indonesia⁶ for relay to Indo Military

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1. CHMILTAG Djakarta 120705Z Aug 60 (C)
 2. CNO 021603Z Nov 60 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 170750Z Nov 60 (S)
 4. CNO 161945Z Dec 60 (C)
 5. CINCPAC 240444Z Dec 60 (C)
 6. ADMINO CINCPAC 160349Z Nov 60

██████████

Officials (1) that French tanks and United Kingdom armored cars would not be provided under U. S. Military Assistance Programs; (2) that CINCPAC agreed the Indo Army had a need for additional sea transport in the form of LSTs; (3) that uniform cloth was more appropriately an International Cooperation Administration matter than a MAP item; (4) that a recommendation for programming the advance delivery of 11,355 rifles for Indo training centers would be supported by FY60 program deviations provided the total quantity of rifles for 83 infantry battalions was not exceeded; and (5) that all definitive requirements concerning guided missile training for Indo officers should be passed to CHMILTAG for transmittal to CINCPAC.

Japan

Japan's trade economy had shifted from the manufacture of small goods to a hard goods trade of ships, vehicles and large equipment. Japanese defense forces were well organized and were rebuilding prestige within as well as outside the country.

Two major problems faced the MAAG in Japan in 1960; the long range problem of elimination of grant-aid or justification for continuation, and a shorter range problem concerning ammunition. It was indicated the U. S. would no longer furnish ammunition. The country had not decided at the end of 1960 to buy the amount of ammunition required to replace the shortage.¹

U. S. -Government of Japan cost-sharing:

During February, U. S. -Government of Japan (GOJ) negotiations for F-104 cost-sharing production proceeded smoothly. The biggest obstacle

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00283 of 6 Jun 60

[REDACTED]
Djakarta on 12 August 1960.¹ Ships were met by a large contingent of service personnel and relatives of armed forces and representatives of press and radio. The Indonesians were very impressed by the "like new" condition of the LST and the good condition of PC's. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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
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 5. CINCPAC 240444Z Dec 60 (C)
 6. ADMINO CINCPAC 160349Z Nov 60

JAPAN



BASIC INFORMATION	
AREA.....	143,000 sq. mi.
POPULATION.....	93 million
ANNUAL GROWTH.....	1%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA.....	0.2 acre
LITERACY RATE.....	95%
LIFE EXPECTANCY.....	67 years
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1959 (E).....	\$ 30.2 billion
PER CAPITA.....	\$326
DEFENSE BUDGET 1960.....	\$436 million
AS % OF TOTAL GOVT EXPEND.....	7.9
AS % OF GNP.....	1.5
EMPEROR - HIROHITO PRIME MINISTER - IKEDA, RYUZO DIR-GEN DEF AGENCY - EZAKI, MASUMI CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF COUNCIL - HAYASHI, KEIZO, GEN CHIEF, GROUND STAFF - SUGITA, ICHJI, GEN CHIEF, MARITIME STAFF - IHARA, MITSUGU, ADM CHIEF, AIR STAFF - GENDA, MINORU, GEN	

OVERALL OBJECTIVE	MAP OBJECTIVE	COUNTRY TEAM
DEFT CONTROL OF JAPAN TO ANY HOSTILE POWER. INSURE A STRONG, FRIENDLY CO-OPERATIVE NATION FIRMLY ALIGNED WITH U.S.	ASSIST GOJ TO DEVELOP MILITARY FORCES CAPABLE OF (A) MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST DIRECTED OR INSPIRED INSURGENT AND SUBVERSION OR OTHER FORCES HOSTILE TO U.S. INTEREST, (B) ASSISTING IN DEFENSE OF JAPAN AGAINST EXTERNAL COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, (C) PARTICIPAT- ING IN COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGE- MENTS, AND TO SECURE A POLITICAL CLIMATE FAVORABLE TO CONTINUED U.S. ACCESS TO IMPORTANT BASES AND FACILITIES. ACCELERATE NECESSARY INCREASES IN THE JAPANESE DEFENSE BUDGET TO THE POINT WHERE GRANT U.S. ASSISTANCE MAY BE TERMINATED.	U.S. AMBASSADOR.....MR. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, ICA.....GEN. H. THROCKAUX CHIEF, MAC.....MG. T. C. ROGERS, USAF

COMBAT CAPABILITY	
MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT LIMITED DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS	LIMITED ABILITY TO ESCORT COASTAL CONVOYS, 1 ASW SOON OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE, GOOD MINESWEEPING CA- PABILITY
LIMITED-BUT GOOD TRAINING BASE SHOULD ENABLE PRO- GRESSIVE IMPROVEMENT.	

1960 MAP SUPPORTED FORCES	
ARMY	8 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 4 COMBINED BRIGADES 1 AIRBORNE BRIGADE
NAVY	SELECTED ITEMS OF ORDNANCE AND ELECTRONIC- ICS PROVIDED UNDER MAP WHILE SHIPS BEING BUILT. ON COMPLETION, MAP SUP- PORT IS TERMINATED.
AIR FORCE	2 A/W FTR SQDN, 2 TRANSPORT SQDN, 5 D/F SQDN 2 B/F 80 CREW TNG, 1 A/W FTR 50 CREW TNG

had been the Government of Japan's assurance that all MAP furnished aircraft, including the F-104's to be produced, would be used. The GOJ finally approved a utilization plan and submitted it to the United States. CINCPAC went on record as favoring U.S. acceptance of the Japanese approved plan at face value, with realization that if its objectives were not met, some U.S. provided aircraft would not be used in the near future.¹

In June the Secretary of State authorized² CHMAAG to sign a detailed arrangement paper for the U.S. Government regarding the cost sharing production of F-104 aircraft in Japan. This was done in Tokyo on 18 June 1960.³ The arrangement was to provide Japanese Air Self Defense Forces with 180 F-104J and 20 F-104DJ (trainer) aircraft. U.S. portion of total cost would be approximately \$75 million.

The FY60 MA Program for Japan, approved on a cost-sharing basis by Department of State, was implemented by DOD in April.⁴

The USAF authorized⁵ a FY60 MAP deviation to provide Japan 10 H-21B helicopters from USAF excess in PACAF Area at no expense to MAP. The aircraft were to be accepted in "as-is, where-is" condition. Rehabilitation, spares, tools, and equipment were to be obtained by Japan in the future by Mutual Security Military Sales (MSMS).

CINCPAC policy⁶ for provision of Class IV aircraft modification for Japan was established requiring the Japanese Air Self Defense Forces first try to meet the requirement through the GOJ budget or via MSMS sources before programming of such support would be permitted under MAP.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

1. CINCPAC 040421Z Mar 60
2. State 3031 to Tokyo 16 Jun 10PM 60, (C)
3. USAF 282004Z Jun 60 (C)
4. CNO ltr ser 0469P41 of 26 Apr 60
5. USAF 132137Z Jun 60 (C)
6. CINCPAC 270419Z Sep 60

Any subsequent MAP programming would be solely for modification of technical data and, where warranted, one kit for prototype installation or production test. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CVHE/Helicopter Unit for Japan:

In August the Japanese Defense Agency requested MAP support, on a cost-sharing basis, of a CVHE/Helicopter anti-submarine warfare unit.¹ CINCPAC proposed to OASD/ISA that negotiations be opened, based on the supply of specific U.S. equipments, components, and spare parts, with an initial U.S. cost estimate of \$16 million. The total commitment was estimated at \$21.6 million, to include a margin for cost increases during the procurement period. U.S. funding was to be spread over three years. The helicopters were to be provided by the Japanese, with U.S. support limited to selected items of armament, electronics and helicopter components for which manufacture in Japan² was not feasible.

Korea

The U.S. Military enjoyed considerable prestige with Republic of Korea Armed Forces and the Korean people during 1960. The Korean economy, although still weak, was improving in its own right and as a result of U.S. military procurement in Korea in connection with the MA Program. The insistence on quality competitive merchandise improved ~~the ability of Korea to compete in world trade.~~ The internal political rearrangement was completed with a minimum stir, and in general the new government was considered sound.


The main problems facing the MAP in Korea during 1960 were:

(1) getting the Korean Government to take a bigger share of the cost of the

1. CHMAAG Japan ltr of 25 Aug 60 (S)

2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00584 of 4 Nov 60

KOREA



BASIC INFORMATION	
AREA.....	37,000 sq. mi.
POPULATION.....	25 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH.....	2.1 %
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA.....	0.2 ACRE
LITERACY RATE.....	85 %
LIFE EXPECTANCY.....	47 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD 1959 (C).....	\$ 2.3 BILLION
PER CAPITA.....	\$ 93
DEFENSE BUDGET 1959.....	\$ 187 MILLION
AS % OF NATL GOVT EXPEND.....	35.3
AS % OF GDP.....	7.9

PRESIDENT - YUN PO SON
 PRIME MINISTER - CHANG MYON
 DEF MINISTER - KWON CHUNG TON
 CHAIR JCS - KIM CHUNG OH, LTGEN
 C/S ARMY - CHOE KYONG NOK, LTGEN
 C/S NAVY - LEE, SONG HO, RADM
 C/S AIR FORCE - KIM SIN, LTGEN
 COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS - KIM SUN UN, LTGEN

MAP OBJECTIVE	COUNTRY TEAM
TO MAINTAIN ROE FORCES CAPABLE OF DASHING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST DIRECTED OR INSPIRED SUBVERSIVE AND IN-INTERESTS, AND TOGETHER WITH U.S. FORCES AND U.S. COMBAT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT, OF DEFENDING OR SUCCESSFULLY RESISTING COMMUNIST AGGRESSION.	U.S. AMBASSADOR..... HON. WALTER MCCONAUGHY U.S. DIRECTOR, USOM..... DR. ROYAL T. MOYER CHIEF, PROYMAA..... MAJ GEN. ORLANDO G. TROSEL, JR.

OVERALL OBJECTIVE
PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AGAINST REVENED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION. PRESERVE AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, LOOKING TOWARD EVENTUAL PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA UNDER A FREE DEMOCRATIC AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT FRIENDLY TO THE U.S.

COMBAT CAPABILITY	
ARMY	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL AGGRESSION FROM N. KOREA, ASSURING ADEQUATE LOGISTIC & AIR SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES
NAVY	THE ABILITY OF THE ROE NAVY TO PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS ENSURED SATISFACTORILY. THE ROE NAVY HAS ENGINEER CAPABILITY, PROVIDING RECENTAL SIZED LANDING FORCES FOR AIRBORNE ASSAULT OPERATIONS ON LARGES SIZED FORCES IF LEFT AND OTHER SUPPORT IS MADE AVAILABLE.
AIR FORCE	FORCES ARE BEING OPERATIONALLY READY TO SUPPORT GROUND OPERATIONS.

1950 MAP SUPPORTED FORCES	
ARMY	18 INFANTRY DIVS, 10 RES DIVS
NAVY	2 DE / 1000000 / 3000 / 1000000 / 41555 / 11555 8 LST / 12 LST, 1 APB, 1 MAR DIV.
AIR FORCE	5 TACTICAL FTR SQDS, 1 TRANSPORT SQDN 1 TAC RESGN SQDN

1 NOV 1960

SECRET - NOFORN

SOURCE: J-63, J-2

Armed Forces; (2) the high cost of maintenance on Korean military equipment; and (3) the long range problem of reducing Korean armed forces within the capability of the Korean national economy.

APD for Korea:

A high speed naval transport vessel was delivered to the Korean Navy in February under the MA Program. This ship represented the first 5" gun vessel in the Korean Navy and was a substantial addition to the ROK fleet. The APD was funded from FY 59 funds. (CONFIDENTIAL)

280MM Gun Bn for Korea:

CINCPAC requested DA on 16 Aug 60 to amend the Korea Army FY60 MAP to add a 280mm gun battalion with peculiar equipment, spare parts, and ammunition furnished at no cost to MAP.¹ DA approved on 26 Sep 60, for planning purposes only, the transfer of the 280mm gun bn from Eighth U.S. Army to the ROK Army.² Discussion or advise to the ROK or public announcement of this fact was not authorized due to the possible political effect the information might have. CINCPAC undertook a study of the effectiveness and annual maintenance costs providing only high explosive projectiles were used, and subsequently requested CINCUSARPAC and COMUSKOREA to re-study the desirability of transferring this unit to the ROK Army. CINCUSARPAC informed CINCPAC the the CGEUSA's reevaluation of the planned transfer of the 280mm battalion to the ROKA was still pending because of the difficulty of obtaining certain cost data considered essential and available only in CONUS. EUSA staff estimated that January 1961 was the earliest date that

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 160308Z Aug 60
 2. DA 261444Z Sep 60 cite DA 983366

the cost analysis could be completed. The U.S. 280mm battalion was deactivated on 24 December 1960 but a provisional unit was established to maintain equipment and carry personnel pending a final decision.¹

ROK Use of Aircraft:

Twenty-four T-28A aircraft, approved and funded through FY59 MAP were scheduled for delivery to the ROK Air Force during first quarter FY61, programmed as replacement for T-6D/F aircraft in ROKAF training program. COMUS Korea recommended² the T-28's be diverted to the Tactical Control Squadron and T-6G aircraft now in Tactical Control Squadron be used for training. CINCPAC approved the request.³

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

COMUS Korea advised⁴ CINCPAC that the new supply and maintenance depots at Taegu would be completed about the 3rd quarter of FY62, and would provide adequately equipped facilities, increased maintenance support, and a reduction in supply pipeline time to ROK Air Force Units.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

COMUS Korea furnished⁵ the status of planning for an additional airbase capable of supporting high performance jet aircraft not only for the Republic of Korea Air Force but also for the U.S. Emergency War Plan capability. Construction funds for the new base in the amount of \$1.7 million were in the FY61 MAP with an additional \$861,000 for the task deferred to the proposed FY62 MA Program. Facilities for the new base in the amount of \$2.5 million were also included in the FY62 MAP planning. Three

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1. CINCUSARPAC 280139Z Dec 60 cite RJ 96861
 2. COMUSKOREA ltr MOCOT of 2 May 60
 3. CINCPAC 101952Z Jun 60 (S)
 4. COMUSK Seoul 280535Z Oct 60 cite UK 80798 DJ (C)
 5. COMUSFK 170016Z Nov 60 cite UK 80841 (S)

[REDACTED]

potentially acceptable sites in southern Korea were considered since jet facilities there were non-existent. Headquarters USAF advised¹ that the FY 61 portion was approved. Limiting factors were related mainly to the availability of local currency budgeted by the Republic of Korea. This was to provide items of land acquisition, site preparation and supply of sand and gravel to the construction sites.

Reduction in ROK Forces:

COMUS Korea advised² CINCPAC on 2 September that Republic of Korea Government officials felt that an increase in the living standards of ROK military personnel was required and that to finance such action the armed forces budget would have to be increased and the total armed forces strength reduced.

On 18 September COMUS Korea reported³ that a conversation with the Korean Minister of National Defense indicated the personnel reduction would be less than 50,000.

On 18 October COMUS Korea requested⁴ that CINCPAC forward his comments with those of COMUS Korea to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and requested approval of a reduction of 30,000 personnel. In order to have some flexibility, he also requested approval to agree to a total reduction not to exceed 50,000.

Following an exchange of messages⁵ CINCPAC advised the JCS⁶ that it was the view of COMUS Korea that the current combat capability

1. HQ USAF 232251Z Nov 60 cite AFMMS-CD-PC 64117 (S)
2. COMUS KOREA 020703Z Sep 60 cite KA 61409
3. COMUS KOREA 182355Z Sep 60 cite US 80720
4. COMUS KOREA 180924Z Oct 60 cite UK 80779
5. CINCPAC 190211Z Oct 60; COMUS Korea 280840Z Oct 60 cite UK80801
CINCPAC 290425Z Oct 60; CINCPAC 050425Z Nov 60 cite UK 80818
6. CINCPAC 110551Z Nov 60

~~SECRET~~

of the ROK could be maintained with a 600,000 force level, and requested authority for COMUS Korea to agree to a reduction of 30,000 personnel with a corresponding reduction of U.S. support to a maximum of 600,000 ROK armed forces personnel for CY61. JCS granted authority¹ to make this change prior to 31 December 1960.

The U.S. Government support of ROK military personnel, among other things, was contained in Appendix B to the agreed minute of November 17, 1954 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the U.S. In December the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested² comments on a new Appendix B to the agreed minute. The Department of State proposed to establish Appendix B as a continuing document; not subject to review as in the past, and the ROK Minister of National Defense and Commander in Chief United Nations Command were to jointly review and determine semi-annually the maximum ROK force level to be supported by U.S. programs. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CINCPAC concurred³ in the establishment of Appendix B as a continuing document but recommended the joint determination of the size of ROK forces on an annual basis. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The joint State/Defense position, ^{4, 5} as amended, was signed on 30 December by the ROK ambassador and U.S. representatives.⁶ (UNCLASSIFIED)

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1. JCS 281917Z Nov 60 cite JCS 986385
 2. JCS 062126Z Dec 60 cite 986819
 3. CINCPAC 072230Z Dec 60
 4. State 628 to Seoul 22 Dec 7PM 60
 5. State 653 to Seoul Dec 60
 6. Seoul to State 762 of 300800Z Dec 60

Laos

The problems facing the administration of the U. S. Military Assistance Program in Laos in 1960 were many, and complicated by mountainous terrain, a backward people and an insecure political system. A primary problem area was the arrangement whereby aid was administered. Although the U. S. was not a signatory, U. S. aid was restricted by the Geneva Accords. In a separate agreement with the French, the U. S. was responsible for technical training, and French personnel for tactical training. This complex arrangement and divided effort resulted in confusion and uncertainty. Another major problem was the almost complete lack of roads and railway communication system.

Lesser problems were: the lack of medical facilities and personnel, the lack of communications equipment, and finally the problems of infiltration and subversion connected with several hundred miles of border contiguous to communist countries.¹

Country Team Aid Program:


Because of the Saccio Group report on the administration of U. S. aid to Laos and the likelihood of further complications by the introduction of a U. N. aid agency into Laos, the Department of State requested a country team review of aid procedures and the submission of a proposed program to Washington. ~~U. S. military aid to Laos was administered by a~~ small organization called the Programs Evaluation Office (PEO). Since the Forces Armées du Laos (FAL) 6 man civil affairs teams were to assist in maintaining local security and to win the support of people in remote areas through guidance in the fundamentals of civil administration, sanitation, agriculture, etc., the Chief of PEO was advised to stress the following

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00283 of 6 Jun 60

LAOS

BASIC INFORMATION	
AREA	61,000 SQ.M.
POPULATION	2 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.5%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	2.4 ACRES
LITERACY RATE	15 %
LIFE EXPECTANCY	50 YEARS
GROSS NAT PRODUCT 1959.021	\$102 MILLION
PER CAPITA	50
DEFENSE BUDGET 1960	\$1.20 MILLION
AS % OF TOTAL GNP	14.6
AS % OF GNP	17.5

KING - SRI SAVANG VATHANA
PRIME MINISTER - BOUTANNA PHOUMA
MIN. OF NATIONAL DEFENSE - SOUVANNA PHOUMA
CHIEF, GEN STAFF - BOUNTHONE, PATIANGMAVONG, MGEN
COMDR OF THE ARMED FORCES - QUANE, RATHIKICUNE, BGEN
COMMANDANT OF THE AIR FORCE -
SCURITH, DON SASORITH, COL.



OVERALL OBJECTIVE
DEFT LAOS TO THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND B- GONE THAT LAOS GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF NEUTRALITY REMAINS ORIENTED TOWARD THE WEST, BY ASSISTING THE ROYAL LAOS GOV- ERNMENT TO MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENCE AND CONSOLIDATE ITS CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY.

MAP OBJECTIVE
ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST DIRECTED OR INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY OR OTHER FORCES HOSTILE TO U.S. INTERESTS. PENDING THE DEVELOP- MENT OF AN ADEQUATE POLICE FORCE FOR THIS PURPOSE AND TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM FEASIBLE RESISTANCE TO COMMUNIST INSPIRED EXTERNAL AGGRESSION.

COUNTRY TEAM
U.S. AMBASSADOR IN LAOS
...HON. WINTHROP C. BROWN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, ICA
...MR. JOHN TOBLER
CHIEF, PROG. EVAL. OFF.
...MR. J. A. HEINTZES

1960 MAP SUPPORTED FORCES		COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	12 INF BNS, 2 ARN BNS, 3 RECON COS 1 FA BN, 12 VOLUNTEER BNS AUTO DEFENSE (20,000)	MUSCULARLY CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SE- CURITY ALONG MAIN ROADS AND POPULATED AREAS. CAN EFFECTIVELY UTILIZE "SON BEHINDS" TO INITIATE AND CARRY OUT GUERRILLA OPERATIONS.
NAVY	NONE	NO NAVAL FORCES
AIR FORCE	1 COMPOSITE SQDN	LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Fig. 16

1 NOV. 1960

SOURCE: J63-J2

SECRET

[REDACTED]

points in the development of the program:

(1) Necessity to train promptly sufficient 6 man teams to cover recognized requirements.

(2) Need for proper supervision of on-site 6 man teams and full RLG support for them with or without U. N. participation.¹ (CONFIDENTIAL)

Vientiane Airfield:

The airfield at Vientiane was a key airfield in Laos and was vitally needed in support of CINCPAC OpPlan 32-59, and in logistical support by air under the conditions of instability that were current during 1960. The Department of State approved \$300,000 for rehabilitation of the existing main runway. The funds were turned over to BuDocks and a contract awarded. The project was delayed because of the early rainy season.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The Chief PEO, Laos was requested² to provide CINCPAC a bi-monthly situation report during the wet season and thereafter as significant changes occurred on the following:

a. Availability of major East-West, North-South roads, and progress of construction on same.

b. Airfield capabilities at nine selected airfields.

(S [REDACTED])


Budgets:

CINCPAC stated to OSD/ISA³ in August, that in light of the existing situation in Laos, the FAL FY61 budget should provide support for a 29,000 man force. CINCPAC also concurred in Ambassador Brown's recommendation that the U. S. meet the \$1,013,639 FY60 deficit promptly.


(S [REDACTED])


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1. CINCPAC 282200Z Jan 60 to CHPEO Laos (S)
 2. CINCPAC 120320Z Jul 60 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 272349Z Aug 60

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START



~~SECRET~~





END

The Philippines

The Philippine Armed Forces made excellent progress in the past few years with the assistance of the U.S. military advisers and equipment. An independent nation with considerable natural resources, the Filipinos were a worthy ally. The problems of the Chief of Joint Military Advisory Group during 1960 were: (1) the low prestige of the JUSMAG occasioned in large measure by the attitude that the JUSMAG was not the primary U.S. MAP agency; (2) the construction problem due to Filipinos halting the generation of PL 480 money; and (3) the complaint of the Filipinos that they were planning in the dark and did not know what material they were getting until it arrived at the dock.

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1. State 2274 to Vientiane 28 Jun 60
 2. CINCPAC 272037Z Aug 60
CHPEO 232340Z Aug 60 cite 406/24 (S)
CINCPAC 300309Z Aug 60 cite LR 2124 (C)
CINCPAC 032211Z Sep 60 cite LR 163 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 122142Z Aug 60

PHILIPPINES



BASIC INFORMATION	
AREA.....	110,000 SQ. MI.
POPULATION.....	24 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH.....	3 %
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA.....	0.8 ACRE
LITERACY RATE.....	65 %
LIFE EXPECTANCY.....	35 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1959 (B).....	\$9.3 MILLION
PER CAPITA.....	\$275
DEFENSE BUDGET 1959.....	\$83 MILLION
AS % OF TOTAL GOVT. EXPEND.....	14.5
AS % OF GNP.....	1.8

PRESIDENT - GARCIA, CARLOS P.
 SECY NATL DEFENSE - SANTOS, ALEJO
 CHIEF STAFF, AFP - CABAL, MANUEL, LTJEN
 CG, ARMY - ALFRED M. SANTOS, BGEN
 FOIC, NAVY - FRANCISCO, JOSE, COMO
 CG, AIR FORCE - MOLINA, PEDRO, BGEN
 CHIEF CONSTABULARY - BACANG, CAMPO, BGEN

OVERALL OBJECTIVE
TO DEVELOP THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC INTO A STRONG, INDEPENDENT COUNTRY CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY, DEFENDING ITSELF AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK, AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE COMMON DEFENSE UNDER SEATO.

MAP OBJECTIVE	COUNTRY TEAM
TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PHILIPPINE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CAPABLE OF (1) MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST DIRECTED OR INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND INSURGENT OR OTHER FORCES HOSTILE TO U.S. INTEREST. (2) CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA. ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. AND THE CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF NECESSARY U.S. OPERATED BASES.	U.S. AMBASSADOR..... ...MR. JOHN MCKINSON U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, MCA..... ...MR. PAUL D. SUMMERS CHIEF, JCSMAG..... MAJ GEN DERRILL MCG DANIEL, USA

1960 MAP SUPPORTED FORCES		COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	1 INF BN 3 RES BN PHIL CONSTABULARY (12,000)	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL ATTACK AND CONTRIBUTE OCT TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.
NAVY	21 PATROL CRAFT, 2 MINECRAFT 7 LANDING SHIPS 1 MARINE CO	OFF SHORE PATROL AND AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES SATISFACTORY ASW POTENTIAL SATISFACTORY
AIR FORCE	3 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADS, 1 TRANSPORT SQDN, 1 AIR RESCUE SQDN	LIMITED CAPABILITY TO FULFILL MISSION OF ASSISTANCE TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY & CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK.

[REDACTED]

Within the Philippine armed forces the problems were:

(1) maintenance (a lack of supervision rather than capability); and (2) poor budgeting (in the Army 90% of budget went to pay and allowances leaving little for maintenance and operation).¹

MAP Review:

The Government Accounting Office's draft report on its review of the Philippines MA Program was received² in April. CINCPAC advised the OASD/ISA that there were no major objections to the Government Accounting Office draft report; however, discussions at government level might be necessary to attain desired improvements in the major deficiencies reported.³
(CONFIDENTIAL)

Philippine Fourth Reserve Training Division:

In June 1960, CINCPAC recommended JCS approval of a fourth reserve training division for the Philippine Strategic Force Objectives.⁴ CINCPAC then recommended that if Annex J to JSOP-66, which contained the above proposal, was not to be promulgated in the near future, the recommendation for the Philippine Fourth Reserve Training Division be considered separately so that it could be included in the FY63-67 MA Plan.⁵ While the JCS suggested that CINCPAC follow the previously approved FY62-66 MA Plan Strategic Force Objectives,⁶ CINCPAC directed that FY63-67 MA Plan proceed on the basis of four Philippine Reserve Training Divisions.⁷

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00283 of 6 Jun 60 (S)
 2. Review of the MAP for the Philippines, dated Mar 60
 3. CINCPAC 270418Z Apr 60
 4. CINCPAC ltr ser 00296 of 11 Jun 60
 5. CINCPAC 160437Z Dec 60
 6. JCS 231834Z Dec 60 cite 987701
 7. CINCPAC Note attached to JCS 231834Z Dec 60 cite 987701

LSM for Philippine Navy:

The Military Sea Transport Service LSM463 was declared excess to U.S. requirements and offered to the Philippine Navy. This offer was accepted and the LSM was delivered to Ship Repair Facility, Subic for rehabilitation and eventual delivery to the Philippine Navy. The cost of the overhaul, estimated at \$215,000, was to be funded from FY60 Navy MAP Savings.¹

Taiwan

The Government of the Republic of China on the Island of Taiwan occupied an area of constant tension. The Nationalist Chinese armed forces were sizeable and in general well-equipped. The Military Assistance Program had been in progress for a considerable period and the country was strong from a military viewpoint. The problems facing the Chief MAAG Taiwan in 1960 were: (1) a need for reorganization of the GRC forces (the size of the Army was considered excessive from a defense posture and needed a reduction by 100,000 personnel over the next few years to improve quality and reduce cost); (2) direct aid or commitments between governmental agencies reduced the effectiveness of the MAAG; and (3) Chinese were anxious to train a large number of paratroop units which the U.S. opposed.²

Reduction of Forces:

The FY 62-66 Military Assistance Plan for Taiwan contemplated a reduction of standard divisions and an increase in reorganized divisions to the contemplated 15 reorganized division goal. The plan was presented to Chinese officials by CHMAAG Taiwan. Initial response from the Chinese

1. CNO 02017Z Jul 60 (C)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00283 of 6 Jan 60 (S)

TAIWAN

PRESIDENT - CHIANG, KAI-SHENG, GENERALISSIMO
 DEP MINISTER - YU, TA-WEI, MA
 CHIEF, GEN STAFF - PENG, MENG-CHI GEN
 C/8 ARMY - LO, LIEH, GEN
 C/8 NAVY - NI, YU-HEI, VADM
 C/8 AIR FORCE - CHEN, CHIA-MANG, GEN
 COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS - LO, YU-LUN, LTGEN

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA..... 14,000 SQ MI.
 POPULATION..... 11 MILLION
 ANNUAL GROWTH..... 3%
 ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA..... 0.2 ACRE
 LITERACY RATE..... 88%
 LIFE EXPECTANCY..... 66 YEARS
 GROSS NAT. PROD. 1959 (C2)..... \$1.1 MILLION
 PER CAPITA..... \$100
 DEFENSE BUDGET 1959..... 5%
 AS % OF TOTAL GOVT EXPEND..... 54%
 AS % OF GNP..... 13.7


OVERALL OBJECTIVE
 DENY TAIWAN AND PENGHO TO THE COMMUNISTS; IN-
 CREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF ROC ARMED FORCES;
 PROMOTE THE CONTINUED POLITICAL AND ECONO-
 MIC STABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF A
 FRIENDLY, RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT ON TAIWAN.

MAP OBJECTIVE

TO ASSIST THE ROC ARMED FORCES IN ATAIN-
 ING THE CAPABILITY TO (A) CONDUCT JOINT
 OPERATIONS TO EFFECT A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE
 OF ROC HELD TERRITORY, (B) MAINTAIN IN-
 TERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST
 DIRECTED OR INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND
 INSURGENT OF OTHER FORCES HOSTILE TO
 U.S. INTEREST, (C) PARTICIPATE IN COLLECT-
 IVE SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESS-
 ION, (D) DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN NECESSARY
 BASES, FACILITIES AND GROUND ENVIRON-
 NENT FOR JOINT TRAINING U.S. - ROC.

COUNTRY TEAM

U.S. AMBASSADOR.....
 HON. EYENETT F. DORNRIGHT
 U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, RCA.....
 MR. WESLEY MARALDSOR
 CHIEF, MAJAG.....
 MAJ GEN CHESTER A. DAHLEN, USA



1960 MAP SUPPORTED FORCES		COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	21 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 2 ARM DIV, 9 RES DIV (INF) 1 INDE BATTALION	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT EFFECTIVE GROUND DEFENSE OF TAIWAN, PENGHOUS AND OFFSHORE ISLANDS IF PROVIDED OUTSIDE AIR, NAVAL AND LOGIS- TIC SUPPORT. COULD CONTRIBUTE APPROXIMATELY 3 DIVISIONS TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE EFFORT.
NAVY	4 DD / 5 DE / 25 PATROL CRAFT / 11 MINECRAFT 1 APB / 22 LST / 14 LSN / 6 PT / 3 LSSL / 1 MAR DIV 1 MAR BRIG / 2 LVT BN	THE OVERALL ABILITY OF THE CHINESE NAVY TO PER- FORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS CONSIDERED FAIR. THE CHINESE MARINES ARE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING DIVISION SIZED AMPHIBIOUS OPER- ATIONS PROVIDED THE REQUIRED AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT ARE AVAILABLE.
AIR FORCE	19 TACTICAL FTR. SQDN., 1 TAC RECON SQDN 1 COMPOSITE SQDN., 6 TRANSPORT SQDN., 1 AIR RESCUE SQDN	FORCE COMBAT READY

1 NOV 1960

SOURCE: J53-J2

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Defense Minister indicated firm opposition.

CINCPAC reported¹ to the OSD/ISA that the Chief MAAG had discussed the reduction and of the Chinese objections. It was pointed out that the 5-year MA Plan was valid only if reductions contained therein were attained. CINCPAC recommended that as soon as the plan was approved, the U.S. should make it clear that the Chinese should take immediate action to reduce forces in accordance with the 5-year plan.

Equipment Allowance:

CINCPAC provided CHMAAG Taiwan with guidelines for use in screening equipment allowances, with a view to further reductions. CINCPAC also provided CHMAAG Taiwan with a list of peculiar equipment² for Nike and HAWK and SS-10/11. The applicable list was to be used as a guide in developing unit tables of organization and equipment to accommodate equipment included in approved or CINCPAC recommended programs.

F-104s for Taiwan:

The Office of the Secretary of Defense provided information concerning³ the addition of \$14.5 million to Taiwan's FY60 grant aid program to provide 25 F-104 A/B aircraft and related support equipment and training. CINCPAC recommended⁴ reinstallation of M-61 20mm guns on these aircraft. This was subsequently directed.⁵ The feasibility of installing a tactical air navigational system (AN/ARN-21 TACAN) in lieu of AN/ARN-65 prior to delivery was also investigated.

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1. CINCPAC 210415Z Jun 60
 2. CINCPAC ltrs ser 0201 and 0202 of 17 Mar 60
 3. OSD 172010Z Mar 60
 4. CINCPAC 290413Z Apr 60
 5. HQ USAF 051546Z May 60

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The F-104 allocation was known as Project APPLESEED (Taiwan).¹ The object was to provide a tactical fighter capable of insuring Chinese Nationalist air superiority over Communist China. Of the 25 F-104 A/B aircraft, 16 were delivered by the end of the year, with the balance scheduled for delivery in early 1961.

USAF approved² an emergency program deviation to provide 30 life rafts, one-man, type MB-4, to the Chinese Air Force in support of the F-104 aircraft program. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Other Aircraft Procurement:

The USAF approved³ a CHMAAG Taiwan proposal to establish capability for C-119 Inspection and Repair as Necessary (IRAN) within MAP fund availability. The Chinese Air Force ability to overhaul R-3350 engines was the subject of an Air Material Command feasibility study⁴ at that time. The project was still pending at the end of the year. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CHMAAG Taiwan requested⁵ a program deviation to the FY61 MAP to provide two additional SA-16A aircraft as replacements for two which were corroded and declared beyond repair. It was intended that these aircraft be provided from USAF quarterly MAP recoupment funds made available to CINCPAC. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CHMAAG Taiwan requested⁶ approval of an emergency program deviation to provide the Chinese Air Force with 30MN-1A trainers for development of Chinese Air Force bombing proficiency in the F-100A. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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1. OSD 172010Z Mar 60
 2. HQ USAF 232251Z Nov 60 cite AFMMS-CD-PC 64118 (C)
 3. HQ USAF 221845Z Aug 60 (C) cite AFMMS-OP-PC 79637
 4. HQ USAF 212117Z Sep 60 (C) cite AFMMS-OP-G 87224
 5. CHMAAG Taiwan 031045Z Oct 60 cite MGAFF-P/PROG-C-1625 (C)
 6. CHMAAG Taiwan 211100Z Sep 60 cite MGAFF/D/PROG C-1552 (C)

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aircraft. The MN-1A trainer was a bomb dispenser that attached to the aircraft and permitted multiple practice bomb runs on a training flight with miniature bombs or simulated shapes. HQ USAF approved¹ the emergency program deviation and requested immediate supply action. (CONFIDENTIAL)

HQ USAF approved² FY60 MAP deviation to install J-57-21 engines in CAF F-100A aircraft in lieu of the J-57-7 type with which they came equipped. This change reduced the takeoff roll, decreased the time to altitude and the turning radius, increased mach performance and improved the outlook for support through standardization of spares and technical order compliance kits.

BARC Loan to GRC:

CHMAAG Taiwan requested approval for the extension of the loan of Barge, Amphibious Resupply Cargo (BARC) to the GRC until 31 October 1960. A subsequent conference between the CHMAAG Taiwan and the GRC Army resulted in an agreement to retain two BARCs and to a MAAG program deviation to provide funding for these items and minimum support equipment. The BARCs were located at Kinmen. The Chinese Navy did not have the capability to lift these units to Taiwan nor was it considered advisable for them to proceed on their own due to adverse weather conditions during the typhoon season. These units required overhaul which could not be accomplished at Kinmen. A plan was devised for the U.S. Navy to lift these units, in an LSD, and transport them to Okinawa for rehabilitation by U.S. Army Ryukus with funds provided by MAP Taiwan.³ CHMAAG Taiwan recommended⁴ and CINCPAC concurred⁵ in retention of two of the four

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1. HQ USAF 061628Z Oct 60 cite AFMMS-CD-PC 91292 (C)
 2. HQ USAF 211958Z Sep 60 cite AFMMS-OP-G 87210 (S)
 3. CHMAAG Taiwan 040601Z Aug 60(S) and CHMAAG Taiwan 300730Z Aug 60 (C)
 4. CHMAAG Taiwan 300730Z Aug 60 (C)
 5. CINCPAC 200202Z Sep 60 (C)

S [REDACTED]

BARCs together with ancillary equipment then on loan from U.S. The difficulties encountered^{1, 2} in determining correct prices and equipment involved delayed the final decision on the matter.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the OASD/ISA directed^{3, 4} that the planned withdrawal of BARCs from Taiwan be cancelled and stated⁵ that the Department of the Army would extend the Loan.

Ships for Taiwan:

Ten MS/MLs for Taiwan were funded from FY 1960 MAP Category X121 savings.⁶ The USS WHITEMARSH (LSD-8) was delivered to the GRC at Los Angeles on 17 November 1960.⁷ (C [REDACTED] AL)

The termination of GRC Navy MAP contract ship overhauls was recommended⁸ by CINCPAC and approved⁹ by OSD, permitting a \$2, 500, 000 deletion from the FY 61 MA Program.

Thailand

The land area of Thailand was the largest of the MAP supported countries but the easy going attitude of the Thais as a whole tended to increase their national lethargy. Thailand's strategic location made it important that it be retained as an ally and that the will of the nation to resist communism from within and without be strengthened. The major problems facing the Chief of the JUSMAG were: (1) the political insecurity within the military heirarchy made it difficult to get decisions to and from


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1. CINCPAC 242112Z Sep 60 (C)
 2. DA 302230Z Sep 60 (C)
 3. JCS 142215Z Oct 60 cite JCS 984363 (S)
 4. OASD/ISA 141947Z Oct 60 cite DEF 984321 (C)
 5. CINCPAC 152301Z Oct 60 (C)
 6. CNO 171927Z Aug 60 (C)
 7. CHMAAG China 170704Z Nov (U)
 8. CINCPAC ltr ser 00398 of 8 Aug 60 (S)
 9. OSD 242211Z Oct 60 cite DEF 974763 (C)

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THAILAND

BASIC INFORMATION	
AREA	198,000 SQ. MI.
POPULATION	20.8 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.3 %
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.8 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	60 %
LIFE EXPECTANCY	60 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1960 (EST.)	6.25 BILLION
PER CAPITA	300
DEFENSE BUDGET 1961	900 MILLION
AS % OF TOTAL GOVT. EXPEND.	10
AS % OF GNP	1.0

KING - PHUMIPHON ADUNDET
PRIME MINISTER, SUPREME COMMANDER THAI ARMED
FORCES AND CINC ARMY - BANG THANARAT, FIELD MARSHAL
CINC NAVY - CHAMNARN ADHAYUDHA, ADM.
CINC AIR FORCE - BOONCHOD, CHANDARUBEKSA, AIR MARSHAL



OVERALL OBJECTIVE
RETAIN THAILAND AS AN ALLY, AND STRENGTHEN THE NATION'S WILL AND ABILITY TO RESIST COMMUNISM FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT.

MAP OBJECTIVE	COUNTRY TEAM
TO ASSIST THE THAI ARMED FORCES TO DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY OF (A) MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST DIRECTED OR INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY OR OTHER FORCES HOSTILE TO U.S. INTERESTS AND (B) OFFERING MAXIMUM FEASIBLE RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL COMMUNIST INSPIRED AGGRESSION AND (C) CONTRIBUTING TO THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF CONTIGUOUS SEATO AREAS.	U.S. AMBASSADOR MR. UALEXIS JOHNSON U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, RCA MR. THOMAS E. NAUGHTEN CHIEF, USMACV MAJ GEN. BRIARD JOHNSON, USA

1960 MAP SUPPORTED FORCES		COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, PLUS ELEMENTS OF 4TH DIV 1 ACT	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. CAN CONTRIBUTE UP TO 1 REGT TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.
NAVY	4 DESTROYERS-ESORT TYPE, 7 PATROL CRAFT, 3 SUB-CHASERS, 6 COAST GUARD CUTTERS, 4 MINE SWEEPERS, 2 MINE LAYERS, 4 LANDING SHIPS, 5 MARINE BNS	MAINTAIN SATISFACTORY PATROL CAPABILITY IN GULF OF THAILAND AND INTERNAL WATERWAYS
AIR FORCE	2 TACTICAL FTR-SQUAD, 1 TRANSPORT SQUAD, 1 COMPOSITE RECON SQUAD, 1 HELICOPTER FLT, 1 MOSQUITO SQUAD	LIMITED AIR-BORNE OPERATIONS AND CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY.

SOURCE: J-53, J2

1 NOV 1960

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military officials; (2) the ineffectiveness of the U.S. trained mid-military ranks who were willing to take action and make improvements but were caught in the middle; (3) the mal-distribution of personnel within the Thai Forces; and (4) the obsolete ships in the Thai Navy.

Increased MAP for Royal Thailand Army:

CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC comment on a CHJUSMAG Thailand proposal concerning increased MAP support to the Royal Thailand Army (RTA). CINCUSARPAC's comments indicated that there was a need for a fourth division for the RTA, but that it should not be extended full MAP support at that time. CINCUSARPAC concurred in the proposal that MAP support be extended to the fourth division, with priority to the 21st Regimental Combat Team but only after the Royal Thailand Army had improved the use of available personnel, and brought all currently authorized MAP units up to strength, and initiated action to reorganize the overall Army combat and logistical support force structure as recommend by CHJUSMAG. CINCUSARPAC recommended that the airborne capability of the RTA be retained at the current strength of one airborne ranger battalion.¹

In response to a DA query in March 1960,² CINCPAC informed DA that JCS approved Strategic Force Objectives for RTA comprising four infantry divisions and one airborne group would accommodate the 21st RCT ~~when and if it was decided to provide MAP support to that unit.~~³


CHJUSMAG Thailand advised CINCPAC⁴ that he planned to accelerate the development of the cavalry division to provide the fourth division

1. J5 Staff report, Feb 60 (S)

2. DA 222301Z Mar 60 cite 974355

3. CINCPAC 272021Z Mar 60

4. CHJUSMAG Thailand ltr ACAR-AT of 9 Nov 60


included in the JCS approved force objectives for Thailand. CHJUSMAG considered this acceleration necessary in view of the existing situation in SE Asia. He further stated that the FY63-67 MAP and FY62 refinement would reflect this acceleration, commensurate with program limitation and guidance.

Vietnam

The country of Vietnam had its share of internal as well as the more normal national problems of Southeast Asian countries. The progress of the Armed Forces of Vietnam was generally good with the greatest relative progress in the field of logistics. Other areas of organization, administration and training were considered excellent to good with a great deal of improvement possible in the area of training. The employment of the majority of troops in the task of internal security and suppression of communist infiltration and subversion was the biggest single cause for the poor showing in training. Other problems facing the Vietnam Armed Forces and the Chief MAAG were the division of command among the Vietnam security forces; the diverse and poorly disseminated intelligence efforts; and the fact that counter-communist efforts were only partial efforts in the majority of cases. The need for the Government in Vietnam to win the support of the people and to establish a well defined national plan was among its major political problems.¹

MAP Aircraft:

In March 1960, HQ USAF advised² that 25 AD-6 aircraft would be provided Vietnam in lieu of the AD-4 aircraft originally programmed in the FY60 MAP. Substitution was made because the newer type aircraft would be
----- (CONFIDENTIAL) -----

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00283 of 6 Jun 60 (S)
2. HQ USAF 221522Z Mar 60 cite AFMMS-OP-G 79686 (C)


VIETNAM

BASIC INFORMATION	
AREA.....	66,000 sq. mi.
POPULATION.....	13 million
ANNUAL GROWTH.....	2 %
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA.....	1.1 acre
LITERACY RATE.....	20-40 %
LIFE EXPECTANCY.....	55 years
GROSS INT. PROD. 1959 (1).....	\$ 2. million
PER CAPITA.....	\$ 153
DEFENSE BUDGET 1959.....	\$ 175 million
AS % OF TOTAL GOVT EXPEND.....	39
AS % OF GNP.....	8.7

PRESIDENT - NGO DINH DIEM
 SEC OF STATE, FOR NATL DEFENSE -
 NGO DINH DIEM
 CHIEF, GEN STAFF - LE VAN THY, LTGEN
 DEP C/S ARMY - NGUYEN KHANH, BGEN
 DEP C/S NAVY(Air) - HO TAN QUYEN, CDR
 DEP C/S AIR FORCE - TRAN VAN HO, COL
 COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS - KHANG LE NGUYEN, MAJ

OVERALL OBJECTIVE
TO PREVENT FREE VIETNAM FROM FALLING UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL AND TO CONSOLIDATE VIETNAM'S POSITION AS A NEWLY-INDEPENDENT, ANTI-COMMUNIST STATE.

MAP OBJECTIVE	COUNTRY TEAM
TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A VIETNAMESE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CAPABLE OF (A) MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST INSURGENCY OR OTHER FORCES HOSTILE TO U.S. INTEREST, AND (B) PROVIDING MAXIMUM FEASIBLE RESISTANCE TO COMMUNIST INSPIRED EXTERNAL AGGRESSION	U.S. AMBASSADOR.....HON. ELBRIDGE DUBROW U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, ICA.....MR ARTHUR Z. GARDNER CHIEF, MAAG..... ..LIEUT GEN LIONEL M. GARR, USA



1960 MAP SUPPORTED FORCES		COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	7 INF DIVS 1 ARVN GROUP 1 RANGER COMMAND	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE FOR LIMITED TIME AGAINST ATTACK BY EXTERNAL FORCES
NAVY	5 PATROL CRAFT, 11 LANDING SHIPS 5 MINICRAFT, 4 BOAT GROUPS, 3 MARINE BATTALIONS	CAPABILITY FOR PATROLLING RIVERS AND COASTAL WATERWAYS. MARINE CORPS CAPABLE OF BLT LANDING AGAINST LIGHT RESISTANCE PROVIDED AIR, GUNFIRE SUPPORT & SUITABLE LFT FURNISHED.
AIR FORCE	2 LUNAR SQUADS, 1 COMPOSITE SQDN, 2 TRANSPORT SQUADS 1 HELICOPTER SQDN	CAPABLE OF PROVIDING VERY LIMITED CLOSE SUPPORT FOR ARMY LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF AIR OPS.

1 NOV 1960

SOURCE: J-53, J-2

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easier to support in future years. No funding change was required. The Bureau of Naval Weapons advised¹ that the first six AD-6 aircraft would arrive at Saigon by 30 September 1960, the remaining planes to be shipped at the rate of six each quarter. The first six aircraft and initial support equipment departed² Naval Air Station, Alameda, 1 September 1960 on the SS Brenton. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Headquarters USAF notified CHMAAG Vietnam on 22 August 1960³ that seven F-8F aircraft excess to RVNAF requirements were also excess to all known MAP or USAF requirements. Authority was granted to dispose of these aircraft locally in accordance with Air Force regulations⁴ and the country to country agreement. It was determined that the F-8F aircraft would be completely phased-out of the Vietnam Air Force inventory during March 1961.⁵ The Vietnam Air Force would then demilitarize three of the ten excess F-8F's and permanently mount them for monumental purposes at its military installations. Approval for this project was obtained from HQ USAF.⁶ (CONFIDENTIAL)

Increased insurgent action in Vietnam prompted CHMAAG Vietnam to request additional C-47s and L-19s and six H-34s. CINCPAC did not concur in the additional C-47s or L-19s, but recommended OSD approval of the six H-34s.⁷ This request was not approved.

In November CHMAAG Vietnam⁸ again requested emergency action to fund and deliver 16 H-34 helicopters to Vietnam for use in anti-insurgency

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1. BUWEPS ltr ser WPS-CL-45-CLJ of 1 Jul 60 (C)
 2. SMAMA McClellan AFB 082200Z Sep 60 cite SMNH 699 (C)
 3. HQ USAF 221845Z Aug 60 cite AFMMS-OP-G 79636 (C)
 4. AFM 67-1, Vol IX, Section 14, Para 7
 5. CHMAAG Vietnam 210249Z Sep 60 cite MGAFF-ALS 1226 (C)
 6. HQ USAF 262155Z Sep 60 cite AFMMS-OP-G 88550 (C)
 7. CINCPAC 300247Z Apr 60 (S)
 8. CHMAAG Vietnam 011128Z Nov 60 cite MAGCH-SA 1388 (S)

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operations. CINCPAC¹ forwarded the request to OASD/ISA concurring in the provision, on an emergency basis of one squadron UEll. Headquarters USAF advised² that funds in the amount of \$3,534,434 had been made available by the OASD/ISA in the FY61 MAP to provide 11 each H-34 helicopters to Vietnam on an emergency basis. The aircraft, spare parts and supporting equipment were made available from the Department of Army inventory. OASD/ISA directed movement of the aircraft via air with delivery of the first four aircraft in December 1960 and the balance at the rate of three per month.

MAAG Strength:

MAAG Vietnam was operating under a 1 July 1959 Joint Table of Distribution of 342 MAAG and 343 for Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM). In December of 1959 the Office of Secretary of Defense directed³ CINCPAC to prepare new Joint Tables of Distribution (JTD) to reflect the phase-out of TERM.

CHMAAG Vietnam indicated⁴ that the International Control Commission took favorable action on the request to increase MAAG strength to 685. Implementation of this increase involved the conversion of TERM to MAAG during the remainder of the calendar year. CHMAAG Vietnam began assignment of all incoming personnel to the new MAAG JTD on 25 April 1960.

Counter-Insurgency Plan for South Vietnam:

On 27 April 1960, a study on counter-insurgency operations in South Vietnam and Laos was submitted to the JCS by CINCPAC.⁵ On 6 June, the JCS forwarded the study to DOD recommending that the Secretary of Defense

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1. CINCPAC 052313Z Nov 60 (S)
 2. HQ USAF 212303Z Dec 60 cite AFMMS-CD-PC 71433 (C)
 3. OSD 222009Z Dec 59
 4. CHMAAG Vietnam 190907Z Apr 60
 5. CINCPAC ltr ser 00212 of 27 Apr 60

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initiate action necessary to obtain U.S. Government support of counter-insurgency operation in South Vietnam and Laos as outlined in the CINCPAC study. On 30 June, CINCPAC forwarded¹ an outline plan to the JCS specifically directed towards dealing with the insurgency operations in South Vietnam. The JCS approved² the plan and forwarded it to the Secretary of Defense recommending that he initiate action to obtain support of the plan and transmit the plan to CINCPAC and the Ambassador to South Vietnam for necessary action. On 20 October, CINCPAC and the Ambassador were directed³ to develop a detailed plan and submit it to Washington for final approval. As of 31 December, the Country Team was in the process of completing the Counter-Insurgency Plan for South Vietnam.

Vietnam Force Ceiling:

CHMAAG Vietnam recommended to CINCPAC⁴ that the Vietnam force ceiling be increased from 150,000 to 170,000 for duration of the existing emergency. CINCPAC concurred⁵ and recommended inclusion of a 170,000 force ceiling in the counter-insurgency plan being developed by the Country Team in response to a joint Department of State/Department of Defense message.⁶

By memorandum to CHMAAG⁷ Vietnam, the U.S. ambassador opposed an increase in the RVNAF force level. The ambassador forwarded ~~a copy of his memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.~~ CHMAAG Vietnam rebutted the ambassador's comments,⁸

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser00331 of 30 Jun 60
 2. JCS Memo 382-60 of 30 Aug 60
 3. Joint State/DOD msg 192020Z Oct 60
 4. CHMAAG Vietnam Personal ltr to CINCPAC of 19 Oct 60
 5. CINCPAC 290412Z Oct 60
 6. Joint State/DOD-ICA msg to Saigon 576 of 7 Oct 60 8PM
 7. CHMAAG Vietnam Pers ltr to ADM Felt of 21 Nov 60; Encl 1
 8. Ibid. Encl 2

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by providing detailed justification of the need for an increase in strength.

Although the ambassador had previously opposed an increase in the force level, he subsequently stated that developments in Laos, justified the need for additional well-trained forces and withdrew his opposition. The ambassador expressed the opinion that the Viet Cong insurgency situation warranted the use of maximum available forces to meet the threat, taking the calculated risk of reducing the capability of the forces to counter external aggression. At the end of 1960, CINCPAC was preparing action to recommend JCS approval of a force increase of 20,000 for the VNAF as an essential action necessary to support counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam.

The CINCPAC plan for counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam included the transfer of the Civil Guard from Department of Interior to the Department of Defense and having the MAAG assume from U.S. Operations Mission the responsibility for training and equipping the Civil Guard. Department of State and Department of Defense approved this change and details of the transfer were worked out with the Government of Vietnam.¹ A more detailed account of this action is related under MAP training activities.

CHMAAG Vietnam informed CINCPAC on 20 September 1960 that the MAAG received another letter from Lt General Ty, RVNAF, which requested early activation and assistance in the establishment of a Field Operations Intelligence Organization (FOI),² an organization the President had authorized the RVNAF to activate to collect military information in a

1. State-DOD-Saigon 658 msg 192020Z Oct 60

2. CHMAAG Vietnam 200739Z Sep 60 icte MAGER 122

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clandestine manner. CHMAAG recommended early implementation¹ and CINCPAC concurred in the FOI organization, training program, and Military Collection Detachment T/O&E submitted on 22 Jun 60, but stated that the concurrence was contingent upon CHMAAG's capability to support this project within the RVNAF personnel ceiling. CINCPAC further requested that Formats A, appropriate FY61 training programs deviations and materiel requirements to support this FOI, be submitted.² CHMAAG Vietnam then forwarded requests pertaining to the U.S. Mobile Training Teams required to conduct intelligence training³ and also submitted the Formats A and the FY61 materiel requirements, plus additional selected items urgently required.⁴ CINCPAC informed CHMAAG that the Formats A were approved and that, while FY61 funds, were not available to meet materiel requirements, they would be considered with other high priority requirements as funds became available from quarterly recoupments or other resources, meanwhile these requirements would be reflected in the FY62 program and development of the FY63-67 Plan.⁵

Surface Vessels:

Vietnam accepted⁶ the Navy offer⁷ of a Military Sea Transport Service LST in the FY61 MAP in lieu of a reactivated combat LST. Estimated cost of a combat LST was \$1,450,000. Since the MSTs LSTs cost was considerably less, the savings were available to CINCPAC for reprogramming.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

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1. ARVN ltr of 22 Jun 60, subj: Field Operations Intelligence (FOI) Training for ARVNG-2 Personnel. (S)
 2. CINCPAC 102245Z Oct 60
 3. CHMAAG Vietnam 230413Z Nov 60 cite MAGTN-TP 1506
 4. CHMAAG Vietnam ltr MAGCH-OS of 2 Dec 60, subj: Revised MAP Add-on List.
 5. CINCPAC 221924Z Dec 60
 6. CHMAAG Vietnam 130359Z Aug 60 (C)
 7. CNO 221709Z Jul 60 (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Vietnam Naval Shipyard:

It had been the goal of the U.S. agencies since 1956 to maintain the Saigon Arsenal (Shipyard) under military control, organized and equipped to serve the navies of Vietnam and allied nations with the secondary mission of performing commercial work. The operation of the shipyard in commercial status would present the possibility of diversion of MAP funds to commercial work. Also the cancellation of two Cambodian ship overhauls for political reasons led to the recommendation by CINCPAC¹ that the Vietnam Navy MAP contract for minor ship overhauls be deleted. A deletion of \$950,000 from the FY61 MAP was recommended.² The funds from this action were made available to CINCPAC for reprogramming.^{3, 4}

MAP TRAINING ACTIVITIES

In the preceding sections of this Chapter we have seen how CINCPAC discharged his responsibilities in connection with the Military Assistance Program in area-wide activities and significant actions with individual countries. Closely correlated with these actions were the MAP training activities of CINCPAC. In order for each MAP supported country to use fully the equipment supplied in the Military Assistance Program it was of utmost importance that each country's armed forces personnel have complete operational and technical training. Early in 1960 the draft CINCPAC **Supplements to the Basic Planning Document** provided general training objectives, information relative to the preparation of training programs, and the relative priority of training objectives for each country. (UNCLASSIFIED)

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00332 of 2 Jul 60 (S)
2. CINCPAC 101949Z Oct 60
3. OASD/ISA 242211Z Oct 60 cite DEF 984763
4. CNO 281735Z Oct 60

A draft of the revised Appendix F, Training to the Military Assistance Manual (MAM) was received 11 May, with a requirement for comments by 20 May. The document gave CINCPAC more management control over training. Certain functions that would be transferred from the military departments to the Unified Commands were an integral part of the program management process, particularly under the dollar ceiling concept.

CINCPAC¹ included in his comments to OASD/ISA a number of questions on clarification of Appendix F as well as assumptions on those sections which were ambiguous. OASD/ISA² replied that the assumptions were correct and certain portions of the Appendix would be clarified upon redraft of the document.

The revised Training Annex to the Military Assistance Manual published 1 November 1960 required some changes to the CINCPAC Supplement, which was republished on 15 November. In addition to the guidance for preparation of FY 63 training programs and further information regarding the Five Year Plan it was stressed that proper planning must be performed in order to reduce the number of changes to programs.

Refinement of FY-1961 Military Assistance Training Program

The Military Assistance Manual required an annual review and refinement of the Military Assistance training program. The review normally would take place 9-12 months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, and be refined 4-6 months prior to the respective FY program.

Air Force:

Representatives of CINCPAC, PACAF, HQ USAF, ATC, CINCPAC area MAAGs, and other interested agencies met at Fort DeRussy,

1. CINCPAC 190047Z May 60
2. OSD 272155Z May 60 cite DEF 489783

UNCLASSIFIED

Honolulu, from 1 to 13 February to refine the Air Force Military Assistance Training Program for FY61. After formal presentation by the USAF, CINCPAC, PACAF and MAAG representatives, individual country refinement sessions were held. During refinement action, the estimated FY62 program also was reviewed. As refinement action for each country was completed, a HQ USAF/PACAF team costed the FY-61 and FY-62 programs. Thus country representatives, as well as HQ USAF, PACAF, and CINCPAC, knew the costs of their programs at the conclusion of the conference.

The refinement process resulted in excellent, time-phased programs to support the development of the country air forces. In keeping with DOD policy on increased CONUS training, more spaces were programmed in the inexpensive CONUS items. However, it was necessary to program sufficient flight training to support new equipment and maintain within country air forces a knowledge of current USAF operations procedures. There was a great deal of interest shown in medical training, and a large number of medical training spaces, both CONUS and overseas, were included in the program. USAF had initiated a policy whereby officers of MAP supported countries could serve from one to three years in the CONUS USAF organizations. Spaces for this training were included for the first time in the FY-61 MATP. ~~Burma was represented for the first time at the~~ conference, and a \$700,000 training program was developed for the Burmese Air Force for FY61. In keeping with DOD emphasis on proper use of contract technical service personnel (CTSP) and USAF direction that CTSP in the training program were to be used specifically for training, all CTSP requirements were carefully reviewed. This review resulted in a

UNCLASSIFIED

reduction of CTSP spaces, and those remaining in the program were fully justifiable.

Army:

The Army FY-61 MA Training Program was refined during the period 14 January-3 February 1960. The combined DA-CINCPAC-CINCUSARPAC training refinement team reviewed the requirements of Japan and Korea at CINCPAC Headquarters and then traveled to Taipei, Bangkok and Saigon to review the requirements presented by the assembled representatives of the remaining countries.

As a result of the refinement process, workable programs to meet the needs of the countries were developed. In certain instances alternate types of training were provided. For example, the U.S. Army eliminated all basic officer and company and battery officer courses of instruction from the U.S. Army schools, and converted these spaces to requirements for spaces at advanced officers courses.

Since DA representatives indicated that a Congressional sub-committee (Davis Committee) had been appointed to investigate world wide U.S. contractor technician requirements, requests for this type assistance were examined in detail. While some reductions and adjustments were made, the remaining requirements for contractor technicians were fully justified.

Navy:

During the period 9-17 March the FY-61 PACOM Navy MA Training Program was reviewed and refined in Washington, D. C. The refinement conference was held by CNO (OP-632). The Navy and Marine MA Training Officer (J324) represented CINCPAC at the conference which was also attended by representatives of CNO (Op-632) and BUSANDA (F2).

This refinement of the FY-61 FACOM Navy MA Training Program was noteworthy in that it was the first time a unified commander's representative was present during the final refinement of a fiscal year Navy MA training program. Previous fiscal year programs were refined by CNO and the finalized program forwarded to MAAGs for implementation and to unified commanders for information. (UNCLASSIFIED)

**Supplemental FY-60 Air Force Military Assistance Training Program-
(Project: Jig-Jag)**

During May final approval was received for supplemental FY-60 Air Force Military Assistance Training Programs for Korea, Taiwan,¹ and the Philippines,² thus completing the FY-60 AF MATP. The supplemental programs provided for both flying and maintenance training in support of F86D aircraft (Project name: Jig-Jag) to be delivered to the air forces of the respective countries. The supplemental pilot training program for Taiwan originally contained 15 spaces. Taiwan³ had requested and CINCPAC had recommended⁴ approval of six spaces in F86D training and nine spaces in F-100 training; however, the approved supplemental program contained 14 spaces, all in F86D training. Training projects were issued and all training was accepted, with the exception of the cancellation of eight F86D pilot training spaces by Taiwan.⁵ Students entered training from June through August 1960. Values of the programs were: Taiwan (Jig-Jag)-\$198,990; and Philippine (Jig-Jag)-\$830,780.

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- 1. HQ USAF ltr, AFMMS-OT-T, of 6 May 60, subj: Transmittal of FY-60 MA Training Programs for Korea and Taiwan.**
 - 2. HQ USAF ltr, AFMMS-OT-T, undated, subj: Transmittal of FY-60 Program for Philippines (Supplemental)**
 - 3. CHMAAG Taiwan 040818Z Mar 60, cite MGAF-DP C-350**
 - 4. CINCPAC 050318Z Mar 60**
 - 5. CHMAAG Taiwan 060035Z Jun 60, cite MGAG-DP C-934**

SECRET

Third Country MAP Training in Japan

The U.S. -Japan Security Treaty and administrative agreement did not authorize the U.S. to train third country nationals at U.S. military bases in Japan. As a result a large training capability was not being used.

The possibility of opening discussions with the Japanese to attempt to obtain permission for third country training in Japan was discussed with the American Embassy Japan and COMUS Japan in May 1959. Their views were as follows:¹

American Embassy:

"This is an inappropriate time to discuss third country training with GOJ but Embassy is sympathetic to raising question on informal basis after current treaty and agreement matters are concluded.

"Even if agreement is reached in future it would still be necessary to handle third country training on case by case basis."

COMUS Japan:

"Limited number of requests for third country training visits currently arising should continue to be handled on case by case basis primarily between requesting government and Government of Japan."

"If political climate improves we will be able to accomplish our aims without formal agreement but on case by case basis."

Consequently, CINCPAC's MAP training program in Japan was limited to operationally essential visits for the purpose of observation or liaison on a case by case basis. However, in January, CNO announced the planned establishment of a minesweeping auto-degaussing course at Fleet Activities, Sasebo, and requested certain MAAGs to submit requests for quotas to this school with no reference to government to government concurrence.²

1. CHMAAG JAPAN 150331Z May 59
2. CNO 201350Z Jan 60

CINCPAC by message¹ informed CNO that third country training in Japan should conform to CINCPAC's policy. He also asked CHMAAG Japan to notify him of any change in the American Embassy's and COMUS Japan's views on this subject.

COMUS Japan reaffirmed the validity of previously approved procedure and CNO withdrew the offer of minesweeping auto-degaussing course quotas to all MAAGs except for Japan. In turn CINCPAC released JANAFPAC #9 which read as follows:

"Training of third country nationals at U.S. military installations in Japan has long been a delicate subject with the Government of Japan. Government of Japan opposes such training and U. S. is on record as stating that it would not be conducted. Attempts to modify GOJ's position have been unsuccessful to date and no early change may be anticipated in current prohibition on such training."

As the matter stood at the end of 1960, third country training in Japan was prohibited and third country tours were approved only when operationally essential and then only on a case by case basis.

MAP Aircraft Conversion Training Programs

GRC Conversion Program - F86D/F-100A/F-104A:

During 1960, five squadrons of the Chinese Air Force (CAF) underwent conversion programs: three squadrons converted from F84Gs to F100A/F; one squadron converted from F86Fs to F86Ds and one squadron converted from F86Fs to F104As.

Delivery of 18 F86Ds for one all-weather squadron was made in October through December 1960. A nucleus of pilots was trained previously with USAF units in Okinawa, and local check-up was accomplished in country for all remaining squadron pilots. A mobile training detachment,

1. CINCPAC 230357Z Jan 60

~~SECRET~~

flight simulator, maintenance and tactical pilot mobile training teams, and necessary contract technical service personnel were provided to assist in the training and conversion program, which was proceeding smoothly at year's end. The squadron was expected to be combat ready in March 1961.

The CAF had ten F100Fs (two-seater) which were delivered in 1959. Delivery of the 79 F100As allocated to make up three squadrons was made from April through June 1960. The conversion necessitated an extensive in-country training program as well as CONUS flight training for a nucleus of six pilots. A mobile training detachment was provided, and the equipment was turned over to the CAF when USAF instructors completed their temporary duty. A flight simulator also was provided for continuation pilot training and proficiency. Two maintenance mobile training teams, as well as appropriate contract technical service personnel were furnished to provide maintenance assistance and training. By the end of the year the three squadrons were operational with maintenance personnel trained and all pilots checked out. All would be rated combat ready when crews completed some additional tactics and gunnery training.

In March 1960 the OSD¹ approved F-104s for Taiwan. This action generated considerable activity for programming prerequisite training.

The date for delivery of the first increment (two F-104Bs and four F-104As) was August 1960, later changed to April 1960. CINCPAC's message² to the Office of Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and Chief of Staff, USAF, stressed that delivery should be based on the Chinese Air Force capability to operate and maintain the aircraft. CINCPAC recommended adherence to August delivery date and CINCPACAF concurred.

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1. OSD 172010Z Mar 60 cite DEF 974020 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 022306Z Apr 60 (S)

[REDACTED]

This was based on:

a. Phase-in of F-100 and F-86Ds and associated equipment in addition to phase-out of one F86F squadron to accommodate F-104s during the calendar year 1960 would overtax Chinese Air Force technical capabilities should the F104 be introduced on a crash basis.

b. Transition training would be delayed since only two B models could be delivered in the first increment.

c. Sixty to ninety days lead time after arrival of a mobile training detachment (for which the earliest in-place date was 15 May 1960) was required to provide necessary training and orderly conversion.

The Office of Secretary of Defense reduced¹ the first increment to two F-104Bs to be delivered no later than 1 June 1960, with delivery of remaining aircraft to begin in August. HQ USAF confirmed availability of minimum essential support equipment as well as mobile training team personnel to meet the revised schedule.

In the meantime CHMAAG Taiwan indicated^{2, 3} additional firepower was required for the F-104s, and recommended the M-61 gun be re-installed on the aircraft. CINCPAC⁴ concurred and HQ USAF⁵ issued instructions to re-install M-61 guns on the F-104As. They indicated they were conducting a feasibility study on M-61 installation for the F-104Bs. The original estimated delivery date of the last F-104 was December 1960, later revised as follows: two F-104Bs, without the M-61 installation, 1 June 1960; six F-104As, with guns installed, three in August and three in September 1960;

1. OSD 282237Z Apr 60 cite DEF 976342 (S)

2. CHMAAG Taiwan 220330Z Apr 60 cite MGAF-DO-OT C-688 (S)

3. CHMAAG Taiwan 020818Z May 60 cite MGAF-DO-OT C-733 (S)

4. CINCPAC 290413Z Apr 60 (S)

5. HQ USAF 051546Z May 60 cite AFMMS-OT91530 (S)

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remainder, with guns installed on the F-104As delivered at the rate of three per month beginning in October 1960. At this rate, the last of the 25 aircraft (21 F104As and four F104Bs) would be delivered in March 1961.

Action was taken by interested agencies to provide the necessary training facilities and supervisory personnel.

Some difficulties were anticipated because of aircraft delivery before a maintenance and operational capability had been definitely established; however, the action taken was to provide the necessary training in the shortest time possible. At the end of 1960 approximately half of the F104s to be delivered were on hand, and training was progressing satisfactorily. Estimated combat ready date for the squadron was June 1961.

Vietnam - AD-6:

One squadron of 25 AD6 aircraft was programmed for Vietnam in 1960 to replace a squadron of F8Fs. The first six aircraft were delivered in September and another seven in November, with the remainder to be delivered in quarterly increments. Eighteen pilots were scheduled for direct AD6 transition training in Navy schools, and twelve of these completed their training in 1960. Another six pilots received USAF T-28 training from which they would progress to AD6 cross-training in 1961. Eleven mechanics received CONUS training and five UHF radio specialists received overseas training in 1960 in support of the conversion. In addition, a six-man Navy mobile training team conducted transition and maintenance training in Vietnam from September to December. It was necessary to move training to Tan Son Nhut Air Base for a time to permit repair of the runways at Bien Hoa; however, training was progressing satisfactorily at year's end.

Thailand - F86F:

The Royal Thai Air Force began conversion of one squadron from F8Fs to F-86Fs in 1960. The mobile training detachment arrived in Thailand in October and began familiarization training for the pilots and maintenance training for the mechanics. Two non-flyable aircraft also were provided for use as familiarization and maintenance trainers, the first of which was delivered in December. MAAG personnel were confident that the conversion would continue to proceed smoothly.

Cambodia - Jet Training:

As a result of pressures from the Cambodia Government, it was decided, for political reasons, to provide jet training for six Cambodian Air Force pilots as a deviation of the FY-61 AF Military Assistance Training Program.¹ The supplemental program for \$194,760, which included language training and T-37 jet pilot training, was approved 22 December 1960. The pilots were to enter training during January 1961.

Indonesia - UF-2

Mobile Training Teams 1-60, and later 2-60 consisting of officers from the Washington, D. C. area, assisted the Indonesian Navy by advising and instructing in the principles of ship operation and maintenance, communications, naval navigation, staff procedures, and methods of ~~developing plans and estimates.~~

Mobile Training Team 1-61, in support of the UF-2's furnished the Indonesians, was ordered to Indonesia in October 1960 to provide transition training in two UF-2's (which the MTT delivered) for the navy fleet air arm. Despite a severe shortage of high usage spare parts (which required considerable improvisation) and difficult working conditions, the team

1. State to Phnom Penh No. 385 of 11 Nov 60

performed in an outstanding manner. Five navy aviators were trained in the aircraft with an average of approximately 110 flight hours per pilot. These flights consisted of airfield and water landings, tactics, navigation, and general air work.

The team provided over 500 hours of training to the Indonesian aircrewmembers. Ground crewmen were given 2300 hours of ground school and on-the-job training in repair, maintenance, and supply procedures. Two enlisted members of the team were retained in Indonesia to continue assisting the navy in maintenance of the two aircraft. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Nike Battalion Training

CHMAAG Taiwan, on 8 February 1960, indicated that the GRC planned the first annual service practice for the Chinese Nike battalion beginning 28 May 1960, and set forth his recommended support requirements.¹ CINCPAC directed necessary action and direct coordination between CINCUSARPAC and CHMAAG Taiwan to provide the essential support and to ensure a successful service practice.²

During the period 6-11 March 1960, a visit was made by a CINCUSARPAC Nike staff officer and Nike maintenance personnel from the U.S. Nike group on Okinawa. While making a survey to determine the type and amount of support required by the GRC battalion this team learned of ~~serious supply and maintenance deficiencies.~~ The CINCUSARPAC staff officer therefore made recommendation to the CHMAAG Taiwan that the service practice be delayed by at least 1 month. The CHMAAG acted upon this advice and succeeded in gaining GRC approval to delay the commencement date of the practice until 25 June 1960.³

1. CHMAAG Taiwan 080750Z Feb 60 cite MGGC-C-178 (S)

2. CINCPAC 202129Z Feb 60 (S)

3. CHMAAG Taiwan 172300Z Mar 60 cite MGGC C-434 (S)

On 6 May 1960, a second survey team of personnel from the CINCUSARPAC staff and the U.S. Nike group on Okinawa visited the Chinese Nike battalion to determine the state of proficiency prior to the commencement of the service practice. General White, CINCUSARPAC, in a personal message of 16 May to Admiral Felt, stated that the Chinese Nike battalion was not prepared to conduct a satisfactory service practice and a new date could not be recommended without further study. General White stated that a general officer from his staff would head a team and go to Okinawa and Taiwan to determine the remedial action required.¹

CINCPAC also requested that CINCUSARPAC, with assistance of CHMAAG Taiwan prepare a revised plan for preparation of the GRC Nike battalion to conduct service practice, determine the MAP support required and recommend new firing dates for the first annual service practice to be approved by CINCPAC.²

On 4 June 1960,³ CINCUSARPAC reported that a period of six to nine months under qualified U.S. supervision would be required to achieve an acceptable state of combat readiness. A nine month training program, three phases of three months each, was proposed with the final phase being devoted to the preparation for and conduct of the annual service practice.

CINCPAC approved the plan and issued implementing instruction to include provisions for the submission of monthly inspection and status reports.⁴

Training progress was on schedule at the end of 1960.

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1. CINCUSARPAC 162330Z May 60 cite RJ92484 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 202134Z May 60 (S)
 3. CINCUSARPAC 040238Z Jun 60 cite RJ92855 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 102010Z Jun 60 (S)

START

EXEMPTION #1

MAP Supported Special Training ProjectsLaos - Project Monkhood:

99-12H (pp. 160-163)
Obtained under the
Freedom of Information Act
by the National Institute
Nuclear Policy Project

Thirteen U.S. Army Special Forces MTTs from CONUS were introduced into Laos in July 1959 as Department of the Army Civilians to train FAL conventional forces in basic military skills. This project, originally identified as Project Molecular, was a result of the combined U.S. - French training plan and in accordance with the Paris Agreement of June 1959. The project was divided into two phases, the first of which was to train 6,250 FAL officers, potential officer, NCOs and potential NCOs. Phase II envisioned that the MTTs would be sent to field units to supervise company training as soon as sufficient cadre personnel were trained to act as instructors. Due to Pathet Lao insurgency activity in Northern and Eastern Laos, actual training did not commence until September 1959 when training was conducted at centers established at LUANG PRABANG, VIENTIANE, SAVANNAKHET and PAKSE. The original teams were replaced by specially trained CONUS teams in January 60, with a seven day overlap to provide for orientation and property transfer. Due to the insurgency activity and other factors, the FAL were unable to provide the required quotas of officers and non-commissioned officers to the training centers. Consequently, the Paris Agreement objectives were not fulfilled by 1 September 60 when the U.S. - French training agreement was due to expire. Based on the assumption that the training agreement would be extended at least to the end of the year, the second replacement of the SF MTTs was approved in June 1960.¹ Negotiations were underway regarding extension of the training agreement when the 9 August 60 coup occurred in

1. DA 061951Z Jun 60 cite DA 978252

Lacs. At that time the French appeared to favor extending the training program to 31 December with a gradual phasing out of the program during the following six months.¹ Until the situation in Laos became stable, training under Project MONKHOOD was suspended. However, CHPEO Laos was authorized² to use the MTTs in an advisory role in operations and logistics, provided they did not serve with units in combat. Tentative plans were underway to replace MONKHOOD personnel in December as a result of DA notification that the third rotation had been approved.³ Replacement teams from the Army Special Warfare Center closed into Laos on 9 December and would remain in place for a six month period. The future of the project could not be determined at the end of the year.

Laos- Project Erawan:

Project ERAWAN involved U.S. sponsored and funded third country training in guerrilla and antiguerrilla warfare for Laos paratroopers by the Royal Thai Army in Thailand. An initial eight week training cycle for 200 paratroops was approved in Oct 59 and an additional six training cycles for 200 men each were approved⁴ 30 November 1959 with the first group completing training 15 December 1959. Approximately 1000 paratroopers of the 1st and 2d Paratrooper Battalions were trained under this arrangement with the fifth group completing training 30 October 1960. Continuation of the project was uncertain due to the existing situation in Laos. ~~(SECRET)~~

Vietnam:

The increased guerrilla activity in South Vietnam resulted in a Country Team request in July 1959 for a SF MTT to be introduced as

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1. STATE to VIENTIANE 92, 26 Jul 60 8PM
 2. JCS 081653Z Oct 60 cite JCS 984040.
 3. DA 261804Z Nov 60 cite DA 986372
 4. State 1140 to Vientiane 30 Nov 59 6PM (Joint State-Defense msg)

civilian members of USOM to train the Civil Guard. After more than a year of negotiation on various aspects of this proposal, agreement by all interested U.S. agencies was presented on 14 Oct 60 to President Diem by Ambassador Durbrow.¹ The key to the proposal required that President Diem transfer operational control of the CG to the GVN Department of Defense for the duration of the emergency, thus providing centralized control of all internal security forces. When this action was taken on 3 Dec 60, the responsibility for training and logistical support of the CG was assumed by CHMAAG VIETNAM, with the cost being borne by the International Cooperation Administration. CHMAAG VIETNAM would not then require a SF MTT as originally planned but instead would use ten USOM civilians and infantry officers from the MAAG to conduct and monitor this training program. After extensive discussions, agreement was reached between CHMAAG VIETNAM and the RVNAF on a 24 week training cycle for the Civil Guard² the first cycle of which was scheduled to commence 3 Jan 1961 with the arrival of 330 personnel at the QUANG TRUNG Training Center.

~~(SECRET)~~

The JCS noted³ the increasing deterioration of the internal security situation in South Vietnam and certain CINCPAC actions related thereto. Assistance was offered by the JCS in developing an anti-guerrilla capability in the regular armed forces of Vietnam by providing qualified training personnel from Department of the Army resources. As a result on 6 Jun 60, a Counter-Insurgency Training Program commenced under MAAG auspices using thirty SF MTT personnel and three intelligence specialists from CONUS

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1. SAIGON to STATE 805, 15 Oct 60, 6PM
 2. CHMAAG VIETNAM 310601Z Dec 60 cite MAGPO 1652
 3. JCS 301940Z Mar 60 cite JCS 974802

and three PSYWAR specialists from the PACOM. The ultimate goal of this program was to produce well trained Ranger units capable of effectively combatting the Viet Cong in S. Vietnam. Upon completion of the initial program in Nov 60, the Vietnamese Cadre was capable of continuing to operate the three training sites at DANANG, NHA TRANG and SONG MAO with a minimum of supervision. To meet this supervisory requirement, a MTT composed of two SF officers, two SF NCOs and five Ranger officers from PACOM resources arrived in Siagon 30 Dec 60 and were to proceed to the three training sites 5 Jan 1961. END

Korea:

The special forces mobile training team in Korea was extended¹ during 1960 pending the permanent assignment of a resident special forces team. The permanent assignment was delayed^{2, 3} until January 1961 and the tour of the mobile training team extended by DA^{4, 5} provided the total period of temporary additional duty did not exceed 180 days. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~


Indonesia:

In October 1959 the International Cooperation Administration requested⁶ that 20 Indonesian army officers receive eight weeks Ranger Training on Okinawa to begin about 1 April 1960.

A CINCPAC⁷ proposal to conduct the training in Indonesia was not favorably considered due to the existing political situation there.

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1. CINCUSARPAC 242237Z Jun 60 cite RJ 93293
 2. CHMAG Korea 140430Z Sep 60 cite RX 0106
 3. CHMAAG Korea 150200Z Nov 60 cite RX 0135
 4. DA 261730Z Sep 60 cite DA 94839
 5. DA 302233Z Nov 60 cite DA 986535
 6. ICA ltr of 28 Oct 59 to USARPAC via CINCPAC, subj: Ranger Training Eight Weeks Special Course in Okinawa for 20 Indo Officers.
 7. CINCPAC 202322Z Dec 59


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START

EXTENSION #1



END

Korea:


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 7. CINCPAC 202322Z Dec 59



~~SECRET~~

The eight week ranger training was reduced to 10 police officers¹ from Indonesian Mobile Brigade. They were scheduled to arrive on Okinawa 31 March 1960 to commence training 1 April 1960, but were delayed² until 11 April because of Government of Indonesia religious holidays and difficulties encountered in scheduling air transportation. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Burma:

In response to a request from American Embassy Army Attache Rangoon,³ CINCPAC⁴ requested CINCUSARPAC's comment on the need for a Special Forces training program in Burma, and whether such a program, if considered necessary, could be supported from USARPAC resources. USARPAC⁵ answered by stating that SF support was available and recommended that a qualified representative of the 1st Special Forces Group be authorized to proceed to Burma to study the need for Special Forces training in that country. However, in the meantime the increase in overall counter insurgency and unconventional warfare requirements of Southeast Asia, changed the situation and commitments for U.S. Special Forces training teams to Burma were not considered necessary at that time. CINCPAC disapproved of the project.⁶

Thailand:

The U.S. Operations Mission, Thailand requested⁷ that the 1st Special Force Group conduct an eight week course of instruction in ranger training for ten officers of the Border Patrol forces of the Thailand National Police.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

1. ICA to STATE Feb 12, 8PM
2. ICA Washington 300034Z Mar 60
3. USARMA Rangoon ltr M-70-60, of 9 Feb 60, subj: "MTT for Burma, FY 60 (C)"
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 0458, of 8 Jun 60, subj: "Capability to furnish Special Forces Training for the Burmese Army:"
5. USARPAC GPPOP ltr of 16 Jun 60, subj: "Capability to Furnish Special Forces Training for the Burmese Army."
6. CINCPAC 292321Z Jun 60
7. ICA Washington 300020Z Mar 60

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

The training requested was approved and CINCUSARPAC was authorized direct liaison with International Cooperation Administration for the purpose of arranging necessary details. The course was conducted on Okinawa beginning 1 September and was identical to that presented to officers of the Indonesian Mobile Brigade. Costs incident to this training were borne by the International Cooperation Administration. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Japan:

CINCPAC, in a letter² to CHMAAG Japan, outlined policy guidance for the development of an unconventional warfare capability within the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), stating that while the existing sensitive Japanese military-political climate did not favor overt forceful actions in that area, it did not preclude all possible advice and assistance on Japanese Special Forces development by CHMAAG Japan in response to JGSDF solicitation. This policy guidance was in response to a CINCUSARPAC letter³ requesting CINCPAC's comment on the Special Forces training presented to the JGSDF by a U.S. Special Forces MTT. (SECRET)

Civil Affairs MAP Training Activities

Extensive civil affairs training was conducted in connection with the Military Assistance Training Program. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Formal training was provided by in-country schools, mobile training teams, and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School in Fort Gordon, Georgia. Fifty students from eight countries took advantage of the Fort Gordon Civil Affairs courses. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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1. CINCPAC 230249Z Apr 60
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00070, of 4 Apr 60 (TS)
 3. CINCUSARPAC ltr of 20 Jan 60, subj: Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force Training (U)

S [REDACTED]

Briefing of selected personnel ordered to MAAGs and other military missions continued to play a considerable part in the civil affairs training program. Briefings assumed special importance since most of these activities did not have a civil affairs officer on their staffs. Through the briefings, key officers were made aware of the importance that CINCPAC attached to civil affairs and they were given suggestions about civil affairs and civic action activities which could be employed effectively in the countries in which they were to work. Emphasis was placed on implementing the joint Defense-State-ICA civic action program instituted as a result of an amendment to the Mutual Security Act which directed that country military capabilities be employed to help in economic development insofar as such employment did not interfere with military missions or require excess military personnel. (CONFIDENTIAL)

A third training device employed was the civil affairs mobile training team. Teams were furnished to Taiwan and Vietnam, and in the Republic of China the team conducted instruction of GRC personnel and assisted the GRC Civil Affairs School in the revision of its curricula and in the formation of a civil affairs reserve organization. In Vietnam the team made a study of civil affairs needs and made recommendations as to procedures and staffing required to establish an effective civil affairs organization.

One of the weaknesses of the civil affairs (including civic action) organization in PACOM during 1960 was the lack of specialists and personnel in the field to assist the under-developed countries in planning and properly carrying out local programs. Of the MAAGs and missions, only PEO Laos had a full time civil affairs specialist on the staff. In Laos, the very comprehensive six-man team effort was the special target

of PL attack and was not fully implemented prior to the coup in August. In Vietnam there was recognized need for an effective civil affairs program to increase the confidence of the people in the government, especially the operational civil-military rapport in the areas under Viet Minh attack. This personnel shortage was aggravated by general budget and personnel limitations. Despite the shortages, much effective work was accomplished in the civil affairs field.

Civic action programs, which employed military forces in economic or other civil development activities, were given extra impetus by their publication in a joint State-Defense-ICA message¹ on 10 May 1960 and in JCS memorandum.² The joint message gave formal recognition to the importance of such programs in underdeveloped countries in mobilizing the total assets of such countries to increase economic stability and over-all national strength, while the JCS memo suggested increased use of civil affairs means in anti-guerrilla operations.

MEASURES OTHER THAN MAP TO IMPROVE CAPABILITIES OF ARMED FORCES OF NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

The primary effort to improve the capability of the armed forces of free nations in the PACOM by CINCPAC was through the Military Assistance Program. There were also actions taken by CINCPAC not directly related to MAP which were taken to improve the capabilities of the armed forces of the country concerned.

The GRC Air Force lack of capability to effectively use air transport aircraft on hand was a matter of concern to CINCPAC in 1960. It appeared

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1. OSD-STATE-ICA 102204Z May 60 (S)
 2. JCS SM906-60

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the problem was one of improper organization. The two troop carrier wings were responsible for operating and maintaining their aircraft, but the Army was responsible for loading and unloading operations. The split in responsibility and resultant lack of coordination severely limited the airlift capability of the wings. CINCPAC¹ suggested discussion between CHMAAG, COMUSTDC, GRC and possibly the American Embassy in an attempt to stimulate action in reorganization. CHMAAG Taiwan advised CINCPAC in June² that activation of a Chinese aerial port squadron was scheduled for July. This essentially alleviated the condition and better utilization was realized.

During September and October, a Japanese MSDF team visited COMASDEFORPAC and CNO with a view of gaining technical advice and assistance, and seeking U.S. support for their ASW program. They were briefed on ASW concept and tactics in relation to a Japanese surveillance systems for their waters. The team left the U.S. feeling that its visit was successful and that U.S. Navy backing in concepts would enhance chances of increased budget support at home.^{3, 4, 5}

In March 1960, CHMAAG Vietnam submitted a concept for a coastal surveillance plan to General Ty, Chief of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF.⁶ In July, the MAAG learned of Vietnamese Navy plan for coastal surveillance through use of a junk force, which was based on the MAAG Plan.⁷

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1. CINCPAC 090026Z Jun 60
 2. CHMAAG Taiwan 172307Z Jun 60
 3. COMASDEFORPAC 292312Z Sep 60 (S)
 4. CNO 271427Z Oct 60 (S)
 5. COMASDEFORPAC 040240Z Nov 60 (S)
 6. MAAG VN ltr MAGCH-CS of 13 Aug 60 (S)
 7. Pers ltr CHMAAG VN to CINCPAC of 29 Jul 60

NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Obtained under the
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CINCPAC

COMMAND HISTORY

1960

PART II
CHAPTER III,
II,
V

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CHAPTER III

CINCPAC ACTIONS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES

The two preceding chapters described Admiral Felt's plans and effort to improve, first, his own forces, and then the effectiveness of Allied Forces in the Pacific. This chapter is an account of his efforts to increase the combined strength of these free nations in the Pacific Area by improving relationships between the nations; creating extra strength through unity. It was not only the task of improving the relationships between the U.S. and each of its Allies, but also that of improving relations between the Allies themselves. For example, one of the problems during 1960 was to re-establish trade and other relations between Japan and South Korea for the mutual benefit of these two countries, and their allies. (UNCLASSIFIED)

It was a task that required the skills of diplomats, political experts, technical advisers, public relation men, as well as a thorough knowledge of the various peoples and cultures that were joined together against a common threat. (UNCLASSIFIED)

This chapter discusses first the bilateral military planning between the United States and several countries in the Pacific Area, then CINCPAC's actions to strengthen formal military agreements such as SEATO, participation in combined training exercises, and finally associated contributions toward the single goal of strengthening the force to deter or resist communist encroachment. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COORDINATED & COMBINED PLANNING ACTIVITIES

In addition to U.S. unilateral plans for general or limited war in the Pacific Area, and to its commitments formalized by international agreements, the United States also conducted planning with four nations with which it shared a common interest in the Pacific or was exposed to common threat from the Soviet bloc.

UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND




Fig. 21

Coordinated Planning with Canada

Canada and the United States, in their common interest in the defense of the North American Continent, previously had two plans that were revised and combined during 1960 under the title Canada-United States Basic Security/Emergency Defense Plan (MCC 100/12), 1 July 60. This plan was approved by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee and the U.S. JCS, and involved the U.S. forces of Sixth U.S. Army, the Pacific Fleet, the Western Sea Frontier, and the Ninth Air Force, USAF. CINCPAC's interest in the planning arose from the fact that both he and CINCLANT were designated as planning agents for naval operations in support of the plan, excepting anti-submarine warfare for which CINCPACFLT was named as the coordinating authority in the Pacific.


The plan recognized that the U.S. and Canada would have to maintain effective military forces and supporting facilities capable of defending their nuclear retaliatory power, population centers and other military resources. This would involve defense against air attack; against airborne, amphibious and commando-type operations; and the maintenance of sea communications and defense against attack from the sea. The first of these was the responsibility of the Commander in Chief of the North American Air Defense Command. For other operations, each country had primary responsibility for its own territory, although this concept was not intended to restrict forces of one country from extending operations into the area of the other according to mutual agreement.

At the end of the year, the U.S. supporting plan with which CINCPAC was concerned, the Canada-United States Emergency Defense Plan for Alaska, Western Canada-Western United States, was under revision to


[REDACTED] T
make it conform with the supported plan.¹


Coordinated Planning with Japan and the Government of the Republic of China


With the governments of both Japan and the Republic of China, the United States, through CINCPAC, maintained emergency plans for the defense of these countries. The plan for each country was revised during 1960, but no significant changes were made.



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SEATO MPO Plan 5/60 (Counter-Insurgency in Laos)

The MPO initiated preparation of MPO Plan 5/60 in 1958, as the first of several plans to meet the communist threat to the general area of Southeast Asia, including Pakistan and the Philippines. The plan, then titled 5C/59, was submitted to the MILADs for review in 1959. **[REDACTED]**

CINCPAC's initial review indicated modifications he considered necessary, the more significant of which were the need for a more ~~distinct division of responsibilities between the SEATO Force Commanders~~ and the SEATO Field Forces Commander (US); the need for logistic and communication annexes to the plan; provisions for national equipment and supplies rather than the implied concept of "dumping them all into a SEATO hopper"; and detailed and exact information on the composition of the forces

1. Staff Rpt from J514, Dec 60 (TS)

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to be contributed by each nation, all of which was information needed by the MPO to determine realistic force deficiencies.¹

CINCPAC carried these views, incorporated into a paper setting forth the U.S. position and approved by the JCS, to the 12th Military Advisers Conference that met during the latter part of May at Washington, D.C.² At this conference the Military Advisers approved, subject to certain modifications, the MPO Plan 5C/59, and also agreed to consider a French proposal to provide for assembly of SEATO forces for Plan 5C/59 in Thailand should the situation preclude movement of forces directly into Laos. The MILADs also agreed that the U.S. should appoint the SEATO Field Forces Commander, who would prepare the Field Forces plan. Accordingly, following the conference CINCPAC directed USARPAC to nominate a lieutenant general to serve as Field Forces Commander and prepare the Field Force Plan to support MPO Plan 5C/59,³ using a joint planning staff composed of representatives from CINCPAC, the Component Commanders, and FMFPAC.⁴

Meanwhile, the U.S. MILADREP was given official authority to introduce into MPO planning for 5C/59 detailed U.S. force contributions, with certain restrictions on making firm commitments of these forces, mainly to induce representatives from other nations to state their own ~~force contributions at the same time the U.S. forces were committed.~~⁵

Based on decisions reached at the 12th MA Conference and on

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00023, 30 Jan 60 (TS)
2. JCS 201358Z May 60, cite 977477 (S)
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 000127 1 Jul 60 (TS)
4. Staff Rpt, J514, 1960 Command Hist Summary
See also Rpt on MA12C (TS)
5. CINCPAC 290158Z Jul 60 (TS)

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separate MILADs' guidance, the plan, revised as MPO 5/60, was prepared for review by the MILADS at the next scheduled conference. Distribution was made to the JCS, the CINCPAC Staff, and the Component Commanders for review and comment as a basis for the U.S. position at the next conference. The resultant CINCPAC proposed position, approved by the JCS, was generally as follows: ^{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} Plan 5/60, less certain annexes, was in consonance with MILADs' guidance and generally satisfactory for development of supporting plans. Minor revisions were necessary to establish clarity, completeness or accuracy, and further development would be required with respect to communications and logistic annexes.

The 13th Military Advisers Conference, the second held during 1960, met in Bangkok on 16-17 November at which time the MILADs generally agreed to the above U.S. position and approved Plan 5/60 accordingly. Admiral Felt, as U.S. MILAD, reported that a Commander, SEATO Field Forces had been designated and directed to prepare a draft plan, the initial draft of which had been reviewed and was under revision. The MILADs agreed that, when completed, copies of the Field Forces Plan would be furnished all MILADS. At the end of the year, the Field Forces Plan (SFF 5/61) had been reviewed and revised to reflect CINCPAC's views after considering the remarks of his staff and Component Commanders, and ~~would be ready for promulgation prior to the 14th Military Advisers~~ Conference, scheduled during March 1961. ⁶

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1. CINCPAC 200139Z Oct 60 (TS)
 2. JCS 021938Z Nov 60 cite JCS 985206 (TS)
 3. JCS 042251Z Nov 60 cite JCS 985403 (TS)
 4. JCS 041959Z Nov 60 cite JCS 985369 (TS)
 5. JCS 081512Z Nov 60 cite JCS 985513 (TS)
 6. Report of MA13C, Nov 60

At the November conference, the Thai MILAD posed two new planning assumptions regarding Laos:

1. Communist provoked insurgency in Laos threatened the entire Treaty Area, yet the political situation was such that appeal to SEATO for armed forces assistance seemed unlikely.
2. An offer of armed forces assistance had been extended by SEATO and was refused.

The MILADs directed the Chief MPO to make an immediate study of the implications of these assumptions and be prepared to conduct further planning as required.¹

SEATO MPO Plan 4/60 (Defense of SEAsia Including Pakistan and the Philippines, Against Overt Agression by DRV and Chinese Communists)

Plan 4/60 was the second in the series of MPO plans. The plan envisioned a communist course of action designed to seize first Bangkok and Saigon, and later to occupy the entire land mass of Southeast Asia. The plan was discussed at the 12th MA Conference where the MILADs agreed that it was acceptable as a basis for further development by the MPO, in accordance with specific recommendations made at the conference. While preparing the U.S. position paper on this conference, CINCPAC had proposed to the JCS that the U.S. be prepared to commit its forces at the meeting, and recommended a list of forces and the procedure to be followed by the U.S. MILAD to do this.² The JCS did not agree, but instead directed that specific numbers of U.S. units would be determined subsequently in the light of force requirements as developed and other factors.³ At the end of 1960, work by MPO on the development and revision

1. Staff Rpt, J514, 1960 Command Hist Summary (TS)
2. CINCPAC 121833Z May 60 (TS)
3. JCS 201412Z May 60 (TS)
JCS 241944Z May 60 (TS)

[REDACTED] T

of MPO Plan 4/60 was in progress, and a revised Plan 4/60 was expected to be ready for consideration at the 14th Conference.

MPO Plan 6/60 (Defense of the Protocol States Against DRV Overt Attack)

A third SEATO plan, MPO Plan 6/60, for the protection of Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia, was in an outline status. A Theater Estimate for this plan was prepared by the MPO and presented at the 13th MA Conference. The plan was to be developed on the assumption that the Chinese Communists would not overtly intervene but would provide materiel and advice to the North Vietnamese Communists, and that Laos and South Vietnam, if attacked by the communists, would request, or consent to, aid from SEATO. The CINCPAC position was that the Estimate generally agreed with CINCPAC estimates and plans, and should be used by MPO as a basis to develop the plan. As a result of a firm stand taken by the U.S. MILAD during the 13th Conference, the mission of the plan was revised to read: "To defend the Protocol States against attack by the forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and to inflict a quick and crushing defeat on the DRV."¹

Commander and Staff for SEATO Force Headquarters

During October and November the U.S. MILADREF advised CINCPAC that the Thais had instruction from Marshal Sarit, Prime Minister of ~~Thailand, with Thai government approval, to staff SEATO Force Headquarters~~ (a presumed Thailand responsibility in view of expectations that it would be given this task) with Thais occupying the dominant positions. CINCPAC at first considered attempting to dissuade Sarit from placing Thais in key positions, but after checking with the U.S. Ambassador,

1. CINCPAC 290432Z Oct 60, CINCPAC 030235Z Nov 60

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Bangkok and U.S. MILADREP he decided against such action on the grounds that his objection could be misunderstood or cause unnecessary friction in the SEATO forum.¹

In December the Thais formally introduced their proposal to the MPO. The U.S. MILADREP, acting under previous U.S. guidance, interposed no U.S. objection to the Thai proposal.² (S **SECRET**)

Reorganization of MPO

As a result of a proposal agreed to at the 12th MA Conference held during May, and supported by CINCPAC, the Military Planning Office of SEATO underwent reorganization effective 1 July 1960 (See Figure 22). Although it was necessary to modify the U.S. position in order to reach agreement with the other planning officers, the resultant organization was along functional lines and provided for division of responsibility among divisions for Plans, Intelligence, Logistics, Communications, and Training and Standardization. In addition to increasing the size of the staff, the position of US Senior Planner was redesignated as Military Advisers Representative (MILADREP). Most of the new positions were filled and the reorganization was nearly completed by the end of the year.³


Force Contribution to SEATO

In the course of developing the SEATO MPO Plan 5C/59 (see above) the Military Advisers listed forces that might be made available as a part of a SEATO Force upon implementation of the plan. Pakistan offered a brigade group, a fighter squadron, and a destroyer, contingent upon the provision by the U.S. of transportation to the area of operation and full

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1. CINCPAC 290432Z Oct 60,
CINCPAC 030235Z Nov 60
 2. US Senior Planner, SMPO Bangkok, 200850Z Dec 60
 3. Staff Rpt, J514, 1960 Command Hist Summary (TS)

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logistic support thereafter. Several nondefinitive discussions were held during the early part of 1960 between representatives of the Pakistan Government and the U.S. State Department, with Pakistan exerting increased pressure to reach a formal agreement. In June, the OSD authorized CINCPAC to hold military discussions with Pakistan to determine the specified requirement for logistic support to the Pakistan forces in implementation of MPO Plan 5C/59. ([REDACTED])

Four CINCPAC Staff Officers attended a conference at Karachi, Pakistan during August 1960 to discuss informally problems connected with the Pakistan desire. Although the U.S. representatives made no commitments, the Pakistanis were generous with information and, although they did not press for specific commitments from the U.S., they stated their desire at the Pakistan forces be committed initially, and as one package with full payment of the troops to be the responsibility of the U.S. As proposed, the Pakistan joint force was to be composed of a brigade group of approximately 6000 personnel, a fighter squadron of 25 F-86F aircraft, and a destroyer of British origin. (S [REDACTED])

CINCPAC advised the JCS of the Pakistan proposal and stated that after reviewing the requirements, a CINCPAC study and recommendations would be submitted to the JCS. This study was under preparation at the end of 1960.¹

During November, at the time of the 13th Military Advisers Conference, CINCPAC urged the Pakistan representatives to provide the battalion for the Central Force Reserve for MPO Plan 5/60, as politically and militarily desirable in order to expedite the planning. The Pakistanis

1. CINCPAC 022040Z Sep 60 (S)

[REDACTED] T

agreed to this, provided the U.S. moved and supported their forces, and that the U.S. would quickly move and support the remainder of the Pakistan forces.¹

The United States, Thailand and Pakistan were considered the nations that logically should have furnished the Central Reserve Battalion. Since the U.S. had already made a sizeable force contribution, the U.S. had hoped the Thais would provide this unit but when they did not, CINCPAC appealed to the Pakistanis, since they had appeared anxious to be included. At the end of the year the CINCPAC Staff was working on a position paper for submission to the JCS that was expected to recommend agreement in principle with the Pakistan proposal to furnish the battalion for the Central Reserve, and that the U.S. and Pakistan representatives get together to work out the arrangements.²

SEATO Training Exercises During CY 1960

A SEATO document published in April 1960 set forth the procedure for the conduct of training exercises, and the development of the SEATO annual Training Schedule and the Long Term Exercise Forecast. The plan envisaged three exercises annually, with a large scale combined exercise scheduled every three years. It also established the policy of basing the exercise upon problems similar to those expected to be encountered in the defense of the SEATO area, and that, whenever possible, the exercises were to be held in or near the Asian countries most seriously threatened, thereby indicating the ability and determination of SEATO nations to uphold the provisions of the Manila Charter.³

1. KARACHI 1100 to STATE Dec 24 noon (TS)
2. Staff Rpt, J514, Command Hist Annual Summary, 1960, p. 11 (TS)
3. SEAP-4, Apr 1960, subj: Principles and Procedure for Staging SEATO Military Exercises

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During 1960, CINCPAC committed forces to participate in two SEATO Exercises.

TEAMWORK II, a SEATO amphibious reconnaissance exercise, was conducted during the period 28 January - 7 February off the southeastern coast of Thailand. Co-sponsored by Thailand and the U.S., the following forces participated: Thailand 2 LCI, UDT and reconnaissance detachments; U.S. - 1 APD, 1SS, UDT and reconnaissance detachment; Australia - UDT personnel; U.K. - UDT and reconnaissance personnel.¹ Recommended follow-up action included steps to standardize procedures in combined underwater demolition team and reconnaissance operations and the development of a SEATO Standardization Agreement.^{2, 3} (C **SECRET** IAL)

EXERCISE SEA LION All eight SEATO members participated in the maritime exercise SEA LION, held during the period 28 April - 11 May 1960. The exercise was sponsored by the U.K. and New Zealand, and envisioned SEATO nations supporting a country in the area which had requested help to combat aggression against it. The first phase of the exercise, lasting eight days, took place in the Gulf of Siam and Manila Bay area. The second phase consisted of tactical exercises with the two groups joining in mid-ocean and proceeding to Singapore. A CINCPAC observer considered morale and the condition of materiel excellent, that ~~the state of readiness was satisfactory~~, but that additional training time with Hunter-Killer (HUK) groups was required. Main U.S. Navy weakness was the inability of CVS CIC to maintain an efficient air defense capability during the conduct of HUK operations on a sustained basis.⁴

1. SEATO Op O 1-60 for TEAM WORK II, 19 Dec 60 (C)
2. SEATO MS/203/40/60, 2 May 60 (U)
3. JCS 061428Z Jul 60 cite 498507 (U)
4. COMCARDIV 17 180730Z Conf. (TS NOFORN)

SEATO Annual Training Schedule for CY 1961

The following SEATO exercises had been proposed by the SMPOs and, subject to certain changes, approved by the USMILAD for 1961:

1. AIR BULL, 1-5 March, an air defense exercise to be held in Thailand and co-sponsored by the U.S. and Thailand.
2. RAJATA, 8-19 March, an air transported ground CPX to be held in Thailand and co-sponsored by the U.S. and Thailand.
3. PONY EXPRESS, 14 April-7 May, an amphibious exercise to be held in the Philippines, Singapore and North Borneo and co-sponsored by the U.S. and the U.K.¹
4. An amphibious exercise planned for Phil-U.S. co-sponsorship and tentatively scheduled for 10-22 October 61. Under the planned command arrangements, the Filipinos would provide the Deputy Exercise Director but not the Deputy Commander of the Amphibious Task Force or the Deputy Commander Amphibious Troops.²
5. A tactical air exercise under Thai-U.S. co-sponsorship.

6. [REDACTED]

Long Range SEATO Exercise Forecast

At the end of 1960 the following four SEATO exercises were in the planning stage for Fiscal Year 1963:³

1. A ground defense exercise to be co-sponsored by the U.S. and Thailand. As a follow-on to EXERCISE RAJATA, Admiral Felt favored
1. Staff Rpt J31 Summary of Significant Operational Events 1960 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 140317Z Dec 60
3. Staff Rpt for Dec 61, submitted by J3 Div (TS)


an exercise of logical progression in size and scope consisting of a transition from an insurgency situation to SEATO offensive operations to counter overt communist aggression. Participation by member nations was expected to approximate 15% of their contribution as indicated by SEATO Plan 5/60.


2. 

3. An air seaward defense exercise under Phil-U.S. co-sponsorship. The tentative plan envisioned SEATO assistance to combat a communist invasion of South Vietnam, followed by a defense of Manila against a communist threat.

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
EXEMPTION 1





During the year, Admiral Felt as US MILAD, acted on and obtained U.S. concurrence in 13 draft agreements for standardization of procedures related to SEATO cartographic activities. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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SEATO Logistics Planning

During February 1960, at the Third SEATO Logistics Committee Meeting in Bangkok, the Committee accepted and included in its report a considerable amount of specific U.S. guidance from CINCPAC. Of particular significance was the acceptance of the U.S. developed concept of logistic support for the SEATO plan to cope with insurgency in Laos.¹ Later, this action was approved by the SEATO Military Advisers at their 12th Conference. This acceptance and approval of the U.S. concept of logistic support marked a significant step forward in SEATO logistical planning since it established approved guidance with which to refine logistical portions of existing SEATO plans and to construct future plans and doctrine.²

At the end of the year, the CINCPAC J4 Division was preparing the CINCPAC position on items for the Fourth Meeting of the SEATO Logistics Committee scheduled to meet in January 1961. One agenda item of particular significance was a proposed concept of logistic support for a major SEATO operation in defense of Southeast Asia.³ To implement this concept a commander of a SEATO force would exercise command of national logistic units required to provide common logistic services for the SEATO force as a whole. The CINCPAC position on this matter, in consonance with previous JCS guidance, was to change the concept of "command" to that of "operational control" of logistic units performing common services to the extent necessary to obtain the required degree of

1. Staff Rpt, J4 Div Feb 60 (TS)
2. Staff Rpt, J4 Div May 60 (S)
3. MS/752/7/60 of 9 Nov 60 SEATO TOP SECRET

Planning was to be based on a realistic political military scenario and provide for casting forces in rolls which were consistent with the U.S. concept for the employment of such forces in event of actual hostilities.

The areas for training and associated drop zones for the 2nd Airborne Battle Group, in connection with combined exercises was a CINCPAC problem during 1960.

After considering the drop zones that were available, CINCPAC established the following guidelines for training exercises and drop zones for the battle group: (a) Small scale administrative proficiency jumps should be confined to Okinawa. (b) Larger scale tactical training jumps would be held in Korea, Taiwan, or the Philippines. (c) Proficiency jumps, tactical training jumps, and unilateral or combined exercises in Korea were authorized as prearranged with COMUS Korea. (d) Exercises in Taiwan would be confined to larger scale mass drops in combined exercises with GRC and limited to not more than two per year, (where possible, combined Special Forces exercises would be incorporated to reduce the number of exercises in Taiwan). (e) one combined exercise was authorized with the Phils during CY 1961. (f) The proposed jumps in Taiwan during the period 19-26 Jul 60 were not approved.¹

(C [REDACTED] L)

CTF 116 requested permission for 2d Airborne Battle Group to conduct proficiency jumps in Korea, and to participate with approximately 550 personnel in I Corps Exercise SNOW TIGER in Korea during 13-21 Jan 61.² Permission was granted for proficiency jumps, but not on consecutive days while DEFCON 3 was in effect. Permission to participate

1. CINCPAC 090151Z Jul 60 (C)

2. CJTF 116 300759Z Dec 60

[REDACTED]

in SNOW TIGER was contingent on JTF 116 reverting to DEFCON 4.¹ All of the above training for JTF 116 forces was to be suspended upon establishment of DEFCON 2.²

CHMAAG Vietnam reported³ that the Vietnam Navy participated in a combined mining exercise with units of the British Navy on 13-14 July 1960. CHMAAG was informed⁴ that the responsibility for providing military assistance and advise on combined training exercises in Vietnam properly belonged to the U.S. He was further requested to prepare a combined exercise program for the Vietnam Navy to be submitted to CINCPAC for approval. Direct liaison with CINCPACFLT was authorized and encouraged in the development of such a program. The development was still being explored from a legal standpoint at the end of the year.

The CINCPAC Instruction 003500.3 of 27 Jun 60 established procedures for requesting authority to conduct combined Special Forces training exercises within PACOM. The first six months program under the terms of this instruction was submitted by CINCUSARPAC⁵ on 30 Sep 60 and covered the period 1 Jan 61 - 30 Jun 61. Combined U.S. /Allied SF exercises were proposed as follows:

KOREA 7-17 Feb and 13-23 March

TAIWAN 4-15 Mar and 15 Apr - 30 May

THAILAND 19-29 Jun and 10 days during 3rd Qtr FY61

Due to the SEATO Air Defense Exercise and the SEATO Air Transported

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1. CINCPAC 310323Z Dec 60
 2. CINCPAC 311544Z Dec 60
 3. CHNAVSEC MAAG Vietnam ltr ser 074 of 23 Jul 60
 4. CINCPAC ltr ser 0843 of 29 Oct 60
 5. CINCUSARPAC ltr GPPOP of 30 Sep 60, R/S 003101-60

Ground CPX scheduled in March, CINCPAC¹ recommended that USARPAC consider rescheduling the Korean and Taiwan exercises for that month.

Blue Star (PACPHIBLEX 31-60)

The biennial Division Wing Amphibious Exercise was conducted on southern Taiwan and adjacent waters (area lying south of Tung Chiang) during the period 10 Mar-7 Apr 1960. The exercise was a major unilateral U.S. amphibious training exercise with GRC participation on an assistance basis under U.S. operational control.² Navy and Marine forces of the U.S. 7th Fleet were joined by Navy, Marine, and Air Forces of the GRC in the largest amphibious training exercise ever conducted in the Western Pacific. The exercise was designed to develop proficiency in amphibious planning and to provide training in Navy-Marine Corps doctrine and techniques of amphibious operations. Assault waves landed at 230700H³ under near optimum weather. A Short Expeditionary Landing Field (SELF) was constructed early in the initial phase of the exercise. First day's operation was witnessed by a large number of observers including President Chiang Kai Chek, his senior military advisers and Service Chiefs, (w/staffs), students and faculty of all senior (GRC) military schools, all foreign attaches, U.S. Ambassador, senior U.S. officers and Chinese and foreign newspaper men. Problem phases of the exercise were completed at noon 27 March.⁴

FTX Kun Lun

The success of Exercise Hsien Feng conducted on Taiwan in May 59,

1. CINCPAC 290454Z Oct 60
2. COMSEVENTHFLT ltr ser N32-0396 of 8 Dec 59 (C)
3. CTF 133 222335Z Mar 60 (C)
4. CTF 133 msg 270631Z Mar 60 (U)

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prompted CINCPAC¹ to propose that COMUSTDC approach the GRC concerning the conduct of another such exercise in CY 60. COMUSTDC reported enthusiastic reaction from the GRC and a preliminary coordinating conference was proposed in Taiwan to accomplish initial planning.

The combined U. S. /GRC SF training exercise,² began on the night of 22-23 May with an air infiltration of U. S. /GRC Special Forces into Taiwan from other bases in Taiwan. CINCPAC³ approved airdrop of U. S. SF personnel from CAF aircraft and GRC SF personnel from USAF aircraft during the conduct of the exercise. CINCPAC⁴ approved U. S. observation of the Chinese special "blind drop" concept to the extent necessary to obtain a competent evaluation. However, no U. S. participation in the special concept was authorized. The dates and scope of the exercise highlights were:

28-29 May - air resupply drop

30-31 May - night infiltration by air of GRC/US SF

1 Jun - PSYWAR leaflet drop

4-5 Jun - air resupply drop

6-7 Jun - night infiltration by air U. S. /GRC SF

12-14 Jun - link up of conventional and unconventional warfare forces

US/ROKA Special Force Exercise

A proposed combined U. S. /ROKA training exercise scheduled⁵ for the period 23 May thru 31 May was concurred in by COMUSKorea on 21 Mar.⁶ Authority to use U. S. airlift in support of ROKASF participation

1. CINCPAC 030230Z Nov 60 (TS)
2. GRC MND/COMUSTDC ltr ser 061 of 25 Feb 60 (C), subj: Directive for Planning and conduct of Combine US/GRC SF Exercise"
3. CINCPAC 130451Z May 60
4. COMUSTDC 190821Z Apr 60
5. CGUSARYIS/IX Corps 140440Z Mar 60 cite RISF 5242
6. COMUSK 210745Z Mar 60 cite UK 80165 CJ

was not granted¹ in the interest of encouraging development of ROKAF airlift capabilities.

The training exercise was conducted in Korea during the period 23-31 May 60. The concept of the exercise included the air infiltration of U.S. Special Force detachments into Korea from Okinawa, reception by U.S. /ROKA personnel and ground reconnaissance of probable areas of employment during wartime.

Sea Hawk

CINCPACFLT proposed that a U.S. amphibious training exercise with ROK assistance be conducted during June 1960 in Korea, tentative D-Day 14 June. The SEA HAWK scenario envisioned a US-ROK amphibious assault in support of CINCUNC to eliminate AGGRESSOR forces which, having established themselves in Southern Korea by infiltration and coordinated amphibious and airborne attack, were threatening the Pohang area. Proposed force contributions were: US-RLT (-), PHIBRON (-), CA, DESDIV, MINDIV, GAG(-), DABC, ANGLICO, and UDT detachment plus two infantry companies; ROK - RLT, BLT, amphib lift, aircraft and support vessels as available. Command relations provided for U.S. to provide Commander Amphibious Task Force and Commander Amphibious Troops.² CINCPAC approved the exercise as proposed, subject to COMUS KOREA's concurrence and with FIRST MAW staging air support missions from air fields outside JAPAN.³ COMUS KOREA concurred in this exercise as approved, and the ROK accepted the invitation to participate.⁴

1. CINCPAC 262330Z Apr 60
2. CINCPACFLT 050220Z Feb 60 (S)
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 092330Z Feb 60 (S)
4. COMUS KOREA 200710Z Feb 60 (C)

The exercise was conducted as scheduled and was considered as eminently successful by COM 7th FLT.

Hsian Yang

The GRC requested COMUSTDC to provide U.S. naval surface and subsurface vessels, and air offensive aircraft for the amphibious phase of a GRC field army joint exercise conducted in Nov 1960. U.S. forces included two submarines and four destroyers for attacks during the sea movement on D -1; two destroyer attacks in the objective area on D and D -1; single plane photo missions on D -1, D -2 and D-Day; and a total of 161 air attack sorties starting on D -3 and ending on D+12. COMUSTDC recommended that COM7THFLT provide these aggressor forces if available.¹ CINCPACFLT concurred in the request² and stated that the 1st MAW would be deployed in reduced strength to Ping Tung North for a ten day period to provide the requested air strikes.³ CINCPAC concurred in the CINCPACFLT proposal and authorized direct liaison with COMUSTDC.⁴ (C [REDACTED] L)

The exercise was conducted on 21 November with the GRC President and many foreign observers present. The U.S. Air Force Attache, Taipei reported that the exercise revealed a high state of morale, discipline and physical conditioning of the GRC troops involved.⁵ (UNCLASSIFIED)

US/Thai Special Force Exercise

A ten day combined U.S. /Thai SF training exercise^{6, 7} began 28 [REDACTED] (T)

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1. COMUSTDC 042330Z Aug 60 (C)
 2. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 090155Z Aug 60 (C)
 3. CINCPACFLT 161556Z Aug 60 (C)
 4. CINCPAC 202349Z Aug 60 (C)
 5. J3/Memo/0006-61 of 14 Jan 1961
 6. CGUSARYIS/IX Corps 150200Z Feb cite RISF 4241
 7. CHJUSMAG Thailand 240410Z Mar cite 7236

April in Thailand. The concept of the exercise included the establishment of an advance base in Thailand and the air infiltration of U.S. Special Forces operational detachments into Thailand from Okinawa. For the conduct of this exercise, authority¹ was granted to airdrop 40 personnel of the Thai Ranger Battalion from U.S. aircraft. These Thai personnel accompanied U.S. Special Forces detachments and acted as interpreters and guides. Participating forces consisted of approximately 40 U.S. Special Forces personnel, 200 personnel of the Thai Ranger Battalion and appropriate aggressor force furnished by the Royal Thai Army.

The exercise was completed on 9 May 60. Exercise accomplishments were:

- (1) 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) acquired valuable area and language orientation of possible wartime unconventional warfare areas.
- (2) USAF Troop Carrier personnel received training in the aerial delivery of personnel, supplies and equipment.
- (3) Supporting guerrilla forces received practical training in guerrilla activities.
- (4) The aggressor received realistic training in anti-guerrilla operations.

Thai - UK - US Mining Exercises

At a meeting in Singapore between representatives of CINCPACFLT and CINCFESTA, it was indicated that the United Kingdom and Thailand had agreed to conduct a tri-nation minex in the Satahib area 6-18 Jun 61. CINCPACFLT considered such an exercise feasible and desirable and recommended 16-21 Jun 61 for the exercise dates. U.S. participation

1. CINCPAC 290136Z Apr

~~SECRET~~

would be one MINDIV plus MINFLOT ONE flagship (LSD) with 6 MSC's.¹ CINCPAC informed CINCPACFLT that the decision relative to U.S. participation was contingent upon exercise concept, force contributions and command relationships and that any informal discussions with CINCFESTA and Thai Navy must be on a "no commitment" basis. Chief JUSMAG Thai stated that he considered the proposed exercise an excellent opportunity for RTN training and would discuss the matter with the Thais and notify CINCPAC of their attitude.² The proposed exercise would not interfere with any SEATO exercise. As originally proposed, the FY 61 SEATO exercise schedule contained a mine clearing exercise.³ The U.S. Military Adviser's position was that while a mining threat to the approaches to Bangkok was recognized, it was not necessary to conduct a minex each year. Since a Thai-US Minex was conducted in FY60, the U.S. proposed eliminating the FY61 Minex.⁴ CINCPACFLT advised CINCPAC that on 5 Oct Thailand indicated it would not be able to participate until March 61 and that heavy operational commitment by 7th Fleet units precluded participation at that time. The exercise was therefore deferred indefinitely. A suggestion by COM 7th FLT on behalf of CINCPACFLT that the exercise be conducted November 1961 with planning held in July was accepted by Thailand officials as tentative.⁵

US-Phil Training Exercise

CHJUSMAG Phil passed on⁶ a letter from C/S Philippine Armed Forces requesting consideration for a combined training exercise

1. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 202308Z Jul 60 (C)
2. CHJUSMAG THAI 030920Z Aug (C)
3. MS/119/45/59 of 21 Oct 59
4. CINCPAC 24239Z Dec 59
5. J8/Memo/0006-61 of 14 Jan 61
6. CHJUSMAG Phil 060854Z Sep 60 cite 5380A3

S [REDACTED]

employing the Phil 1st Inf. Div. and the U.S. 2d Airborne Battle Group under operational control of the Filipinos. CHJUSMAG was aware of CINCPAC's policy of command relationships with the Phils, but commented that the exercise would be most desirable in furtherance of U.S. policy of cooperation with its allies. He proposed a combined U.S. Army-Phil Army exercise established with a reinforced airborne company, played as a battle group, directly under command of the combined headquarters. The proposal was passed to CINCUSARPAC¹ for his consideration. USARPAC replied² that in view of the 2d Airborne Battle Group participation in the proposed JCS mobility exercise during period Feb-Mar 61, USARPAC did not desire to conduct a U.S. Army-Phil Army combined exercise at that time. Since he had previously agreed to schedule one bilateral exercise with the Phils in CY 61, CINCPAC prepared such an exercise involving an insurgency situation in the Clark-Stotsenburg area simulating a country in SEAsia, and requested CINCUSARPAC to develop further and submit comments thereon.³ A copy of CINCPAC's proposed exercise was furnished CHJUSMAG PHIL. CINCUSARPAC concurred in general with the type of exercise as outline but recommended certain modifications to avoid or minimize the issue of command relationships by creating an exercise which would avoid any requirement for combined operations other than initial planning prior to execution and liaison during the latter phase.⁴ CINCPAC concurred in CINCUSARPAC's proposed changes and transmitted them to CHJUSMAG PHIL for inclusion in the exercise outline to be submitted to the C/S Phil Army as a reply to his original proposal for a

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 130050Z Sep 60
2. CINCUSARPAC 290242Z Oct 60
3. CINCPAC 272246Z Nov 60
4. CINCUSARPAC 240400Z Dec 60 cite RJ96825

[REDACTED]

U.S. /Phil bilateral exercise.¹ The exercise as finally proposed would be a controlled maneuver involving counter insurgency operations by Phil armed forces in an area adjacent to Clark Air Base, U.S. tactical drop to secure Clark Airfield, mopping up operations around Clark and preparation for relief of Filipino units. The Filipinos would effect link-up with U.S. airborne forces and plan for and effect relief of U.S. forces. Each country force would be under its own command for the entire exercise with coordination for link-up and relief of U.S. airborne unit. Proposed exercise date was December 1961.

Counter Punch (FY-61)

Exercise COUNTER PUNCH was a Korea-wide CPX/FTX similar to Exercise STRIKE BACK, which was a test of the readiness posture of UN/USFK forces to defend South Korea during resumption of hostilities in a localized war.² Approval was granted for supporting participation by COM 7th FLT, COM 5th AF and Commander First Special Forces Group.^{3,4} Exercise dates were 11-25 March 1961. (C [REDACTED] AL)

WEAPONS DEMONSTRATION

A weapons demonstration has held in November 1959 and described in detail in the CINCPAC Command History for 1959. During calendar year 1960, a weapons demonstration was not conducted as these demonstrations are normally held about every 18 months. Starting in May 1960 extensive planning was begun to complete the voluminous details and arrangements for a weapons demonstration to be held 3-11 February 1961.

(C [REDACTED] AL)

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1. CINCPAC 310306Z Dec 60
 2. COMUS KOREA 190510Z Nov 60 cite UK 80845
 3. COMUS KOREA 270140Z Dec 60 cite UK 80934
 4. CINCPAC 310236Z Dec 60

[REDACTED] L

Authority to conduct the weapons demonstration in 1961 was requested of the JCS in May 1960¹ and approval obtained from JCS in August 1960.²

The projected demonstration was again designed to bring together the top military leaders of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific to afford them an opportunity to become better acquainted in an exclusively military atmosphere, informally devoid of protocol. The demonstration was planned similar to previous demonstrations in concept, organization, phasing, and execution and again the Philippines, and Okinawa were chosen as the setting. The PACOM Armed Forces were planning a fire-power demonstration to give the guests first hand knowledge of the capabilities of these forces and of the latest weapons and equipment in the PACOM inventory.

PACIFIC DEFENSE COLLEGE

Since October 1959, when it became apparent that agreement was not possible between the U.S. and the Philippines on basic issues in the establishment of the Pacific Defense College, CINCPAC had been seeking an amicable withdrawal from the Pacific Defense College project by a joint return of the project to the SEATO Military Advisers. (UNCLASSIFIED)

During the initial part of 1960, attempts to reach a U.S. -Philippines agreement on return of the Pacific Defense College project to the SEATO Military Advisers were complicated by entry of President Garcia and Foreign Minister Serrano into the discussions. President Garcia was willing to have the Margin Law amended so that the controversy over the peso evaluation of surplus commodity shipments could be settled.³ This

1. CINCPAC 182040Z May 60 and CINCPAC 062225Z Jun 60
2. JCS 262125Z Aug 60
3. CAS Report RPM 2567 of 29 Mar 60

would permit continued generation of local currencies, one of the principal issues over which the U.S. had decided to terminate discussions.

The JCS¹ preferred not to postpone the decision to return the project to the SEATO MILADs but agreed to CINCPAC's proposal to defer action until the 12th Military Advisers Conference (MA12C) May 1960. While in Washington for MA12C, CINCPAC persuaded General Cabal to accept the recommendation that the Pacific Defense College project be returned jointly to SEATO Military Advisers.

In the meantime, Foreign Secretary Serrano had proposed to Secretary Herter and Secretary Gates that the U.S. undertake the project unilaterally and maintain the college financially pending Philippine Congressional approval of amendments to the Margin Law. The Philippine share was to be reimbursed later.

Secretary Herter concluded that the U.S. would be "ill advised" to accept the proposal. He recommended that the U.S. take "early and positive action to terminate all consideration of the Pacific Defense College in the Philippines either as a bi-lateral Philippine-United States project or as an 'initially' unilateral undertaking by the United States."² Secretary Gates concurred³ and requested CINCPAC to inform General Cabal of the decision, and, if the Philippines did not wish to join the U.S. in the return of the project, CINCPAC was authorized to do so unilaterally on behalf of the United States. Accordingly, and in keeping with State/Defense desire for joint action, CINCPAC forwarded to General Cabal a joint letter addressed to the Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office, which in effect

1. JCS 132109Z May 60 cite JCS 977122
2. Personal ltr HERTER to GATES 28 Jun 60
3. OSD 292039Z Jul 60 cite DEF980757

[REDACTED] L

would return the project to the SEATO Military Advisers. In the covering letter¹ to General Cabal, CINCPAC indicated that if the Philippines did not wish to join him in the return of the project, CINCPAC would do so unilaterally.

Foreign Secretary Serrano objected to the U.S. decision and offered to Ambassador Hickerson a compromise formula.² Serrano proposed that, at the next meeting of the SEATO Military Advisers, the U.S. and the Philippine Islands make a brief progress report on the Pacific Defense College and indicate that a final report would be rendered at the first Military Advisers meeting in 1961. This final report would return the project to the Military Advisers. CINCPAC concurred with the compromise formula but recommended to JCS that Serrano's assurances be put in written form.

Ambassador Hickerson, by means of an aide memoire, reviewed³ with Serrano the details including no press publicity of the agreement and Serrano agreed the memorandum was "entirely accurate". CINCPAC preferred that some account of this latest turn of events be put "in the record". He signed and dispatched a joint letter addressed to the Chief, Military Planning Office (SEATO) for General Cabal's signature.⁴ The letter stated substantially the agreement reached between Foreign Secretary Serrano and Ambassador Hickerson but did not outline the conclusions of the "final report". The joint letter was signed by General Cabal, and forwarded to General Wilton, Chief, Military Planning Office. A copy of the letter was given to each of the SEATO Military Advisers during the

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0575 of 2 Aug 60
2. AEMB Manila 151000Z Sep 60
3. AEMB Manila No. 209 of 13 Oct 60
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 0857 of 3 Nov 60

[REDACTED]

13th Military Advisers Conference, (MA13C), 16-18 November 1960.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Negotiations which took place between representatives of the countries of the Pacific Command Area and military or state representatives of the U.S. Government were of particular concern to CINCPAC. Discussions, and agreements concerning installations and facilities, jurisdiction, and other political-military arrangements directly affected the capability of the Armed Forces of the U.S. and the country concerned. In the following paragraphs, the subjects in which CINCPAC took an active role are discussed by geographical area. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Japan

The U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty was signed on 19 January 1960. Following a lengthy period of stormy debates and public riots in Japan, the treaty was ratified by the Japanese Diet and the U.S. Senate and went into effect on 23 June 1960.¹

Since that time two major problems arose- the transfer of U.S. non-appropriated fund employees to a Master Labor Contract² and the continued use of the Fuji-McNair Training Area.³

As to the former the Japanese agreed, in substance, to all important U.S. conditions, except payment by the Japanese Government of the increased costs anticipated by the transfer. CINCPAC was previously informed by Ambassador Mac Arthur that the GOJ had agreed

1. Tokyo 191810Z May 60

2. (a) Tokyo to State 130 of 20 Jul 60

(b) Tokyo to State 334 of 29 Jul 60

(c) State to Tokyo 1582 of 31 Dec 8PM 59

(d) Tokyo 120915Z Aug 60

(e) Tokyo 190815Z Aug 60

(f) Tokyo 081000Z Sep 60

3. (a) Tokyo 231000Z Aug '60

(b) Tokyo 251100Z Aug 60

(c) CINCPAC 272351Z Aug 60

(d) Tokyo 301020Z Aug 60

(e) CINCPAC 272338Z Aug 60

(f) CGard MARDIV 180830Z Nov 60

(g) Tokyo 051010Z Dec 60

S [REDACTED]

to all U.S. conditions including payment. But when preliminary negotiations were undertaken, the Japanese representatives insisted that on the issue of cost there had been a misunderstanding. Their position was that they had agreed to help reduce the cost to the U.S. but had not agreed to pay such costs from the Japanese Treasury. CINCPAC broke the impasse by directing that negotiations proceed with a view toward reducing costs wherever possible. These negotiations were underway at the end of the year.

The latter problem arose when farmers and others in the Fuji-McNair area interfered with the regularly scheduled training of the U.S. Marines by entering the impact areas of the artillery firing range. It was ascertained that the Japanese Government desired the release of significant portions of the area for agricultural purposes. However, CINCPAC agreed to the return of the area to the Japanese Government only on condition that the area would be held by GOJ in its present size and extent for military training purposes. CINCPAC also required that any acceptable agreement must provide positive assurance for flexibility and scheduling of exercises. Firing activities were conducted by the U.S. Marines in the north sector of Fuji-McNair training area during early December 1960 without incident, and the Commander, USFJ, reported to CINCPAC that he was guardedly optimistic that this problem had been solved.

The first meeting of the U.S. - Japanese Consultative Committee was held in Tokyo on 8 September 1960.¹ The American Embassy, Tokyo reported to the Department of State that the meeting went off smoothly in a cordial and informal atmosphere, and that the presence of Admiral Felt was particularly appreciated. Discussion of immediate problems

1. Foreign Service Dispatch 290 from Amemb Tokyo to State of 12 Sep 60

(reported above) was conducted in a spirit of mutual understanding, equality, and give-and-take auguring well for the new era in U.S. - Japanese security relations.

Korea

In February CINCPAC concurred with a proposed draft on the use of facilities and areas by U.S. forces in Korea,¹ which had been submitted to State by the Embassy, Seoul. In early March the ROK again urged early settlement of the facilities problem and also stated that they were under strong pressure to conclude a complete Status of Forces Agreement. The American Embassy again informed the ROK Foreign Minister that the United States was considering only facilities and areas negotiations. In view of this new pressure and the existing political-diplomatic situation with Korea, the Embassy urged that negotiations on facilities and areas be authorized as soon as possible.

In response to the Embassy recommendation stated above, the Department of State on 25 March authorized commencement of discussions on a facilities and areas agreement which, if successful, could be followed by separate and consecutive negotiations on exit and entry, customs duties and taxation. However, criminal jurisdiction was not to be negotiated. This authority was subject to the following conditions:

(1) That a revision of the arrangements set forth in the notes exchanged between the two governments at Taejon on July 12, 1950, would not be proposed by either side; and,

(2) That compensation to the owners or suppliers of any real property in Korea, which had been or would be used by the United States Armed

1. Seoul to State 711 of 11 Mar 60

Forces was the responsibility of the Korean Government.¹

In the negotiations with the Government of Korea concerning facilities and areas,² COMUS Korea recommended that the ROK not be required to compensate the U.S. for improvement to facilities and areas constructed by the U.S. because no such provision was included in the Japanese Agreement. In addition, since the draft also provided that the United States was not bound to restore facilities and areas to their original condition upon release, COMUS Korea was of the opinion that ROK acceptance of an obligation to pay for improvements was doubtful at best.

Okinawa

The major accomplishment in Okinawa during the past year was the satisfactory settlement of the claims arising out of an aircraft accident in Ishikawa in 1959.³ A representative of the Secretary of the Air Force⁴ settled all serious injury claims and two less serious injury claims on 20 Oct 1960.⁵ New increased awards were offered ten less seriously injured claimants and one claim involving an alleged mental disorder was disapproved. Continued medical treatment, including plastic surgery, was made available to those injured parties requiring such treatment.

Settlement of these outstanding claims served to eliminate this matter as an issue of political controversy in the area of U.S. -Okinawan relations during the Okinawan elections in November 1960.

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| 1. (a) State to Seoul 739 of 25 Mar 60 | (h) CINCUSARPAC 300250Z Mar 60 |
| (b) CINCPAC 290416Z Mar 60 | (i) CINCPAC 220436Z Apr 60 |
| 2. COMUSKOREA 140745Z Oct 60 | (j) DA 122108Z May 60 |
| 3. (a) NAHA to State 206 of 10 Feb 60 | (k) HICOMRYIS 140615Z Jun 60 |
| (b) NAHA to State 205 of 10 Feb 60 | (l) USCAR Okinawa 100030Z Sep 60 |
| (c) NAHA to State 210 of 25 Feb 60 | 4. DA 121755Z Oct 60 |
| (d) HICOMRYIS 160730Z Mar 60 | 5. USCAR Okinawa 220500Z Oct 60 |
| (e) HICOMRYIS 170500Z Mar 60 | |
| (f) HICOMRYIS 170545Z Mar 60 | |
| (g) Tokyo to State 3078 of 24 Mar 60 | |

Philippines

The most significant matter concerning the United States and the Government of the Philippines during the past year was the resumption of negotiations for a new Military Bases Agreement.¹ U.S. Ambassador Hickerson worked with Foreign Secretary Serrano in a determined effort to overcome the major obstacle to successful negotiations - the question of the extent of Philippine criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel and members of the civilian component, including dependents. Toward the end of the year Ambassador Hickerson reported that Secretary Serrano had finally agreed to accept the U.S. jurisdiction formula, which was expected to speed the way to a successful conclusion of a new agreement.

However, Fiscal Kayanan, a provincial district attorney with political ambitions whose province included Clark Air Base, continued to seize every opportunity in cases involving American personnel,² remotely or otherwise, to sow seeds of dissension between the U.S. and the Government of the Philippines. His latest effort was deliberate attempt to involve American personnel in the shooting of a Filipino whom the Philippine constabulary had publicly announced was killed by members of the Philippine constabulary, while he was attempting to escape from custody. **The U.S. approach to such problems was to cooperate with the Philippine authorities where appropriate, taking full opportunity to expose such allegations as "bold faced lies".**

1. State 14 Sept 6 PM 1960
2. (a) Manila 101005Z Aug 60
3. (b) Manila 101042Z Aug 60
- (c) Manila 110944Z Aug 60
- (d) 13 AF 140630Z Nov 60
- (e) 13 AF 010800Z Dec 60

~~SECRET~~

During the past year the interest of public safety required that the U.S. bring to the attention of the Philippine authorities the unauthorized presence of a large number of "squatters" and their families on U.S. bases and installations.¹ These people were engaged in farming and other activities, such as retrieving metal scrap from the Crow Valley Bombing range of Clark Air Base. The situation at the Crow Valley range became acute when, despite warnings, a Filipino actually tried to catch a practice bomb before it landed on target. His demise, and other similar though not identical incidents, prompted the U.S. Forces in the Philippines to request assistance from the Philippine authorities in removing these squatters from U.S. bases. Secretary Serrano stated that he had taken a very firm stand within his government in favor of relocating the Clark-Crow Valley area squatters. However, final resolution of this problem was pending.


A long-standing problem concerning land relinquishments by the U.S. in the Philippines remained unsolved.² CINCPAC concurred with Ambassador Hickerson that the U.S. should not consider further concessions with respect to land relinquishments until outstanding issues connected with areas described in the 14 August 1959 Agreement were resolved to the satisfaction of the United States.

Taiwan


On 11 May the Foreign Minister's Representative presented a new status of forces agreement counterdraft from the Government of the Republic of China to the American Embassy. This counterdraft responded to the U.S. drafts submitted to the Government of China on 10 June and 9 November

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1. (a) COMNAVBSUBIC 260950Z May 60
 - (b) Manila 290816Z Aug 60
 2. CINCPAC 010107Z Sep 60


1959.¹ CINCPAC's comments were transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.² Thereafter, in December 1960, the U.S. Department of State authorized Ambassador Drumwright to commence article-by-article negotiation on the GRC counterdraft.³ COMUSTDC completely examined State's comments and recommendations and concurred therein.⁴



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


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EXEMPTION 1



COMBINED ACTIVITIES FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

The PACOM civil affairs objectives of CINCPAC during 1960 were designed to develop the maximum civil affairs capability to counter communist influence and to promote the contribution of the armed forces of both the U.S. and the country concerned to the economic, social, and political development. Civil affairs programs were fully coordinated with the public information, political, and MAP supported training programs which directly or indirectly influenced the attitude of the populace toward

1. COMUSTDC 060825Z Apr 60 (C)
2. CINCPAC 06228Z Apr 60 (C)
3. JCS 082152Z Apr 60 (C)
4. CINCPAC 092235Z Apr 60 (C)
5. COMUSTDC 100705Z Apr 60 (S)
6. CINCPAC 120409Z Apr 60 (S)

the armed forces. The major effort in combined civil affairs activities during 1960 was the civil affairs training as outlined in chapter II. The civil affairs activities also benefited from programs within the under-developed countries aimed at the improvement of roads and communications, construction of public buildings, improvement of public education and agriculture programs. Both MAP and State Department funds were used to support local programs which were designed to help the armed forces furnish direct support to the development of the country.

Since nearly all action in a country would be, in one way or another, a part of the combined civil affairs activities it is not possible or desirable to enumerate them here. In many instances they have been covered in one of the other chapters. Some activities not previously related were the Civic Action Program not coming under MAP support.

The Civic Action Programs, which employed military forces in economic or other civil development activities, were given extra impetus by their publication in a joint State-Defense-ICA message¹ on 10 May 1960 and in JCS memorandum.² The joint message gave formal recognition to the importance of such programs in underdeveloped countries in mobilizing the total assets of these countries to increase economic stability and over-all national strength, while the JCS memo suggested increased ~~use of civil affairs means in anti-guerrilla~~ operations.

On 7 May 1960 CINCPAC requested,³ and by the end of August had received, comprehensive reports of the civic action activities of Cambodia, Korea, Japan, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.

1. OSD Wash DC 102204Z May 60 (S)
2. JCS MEMO SM 906-60
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00234 of 7 May 60 (S)

SECRET

Each country which reported had engaged in some civic action activity. Agriculture, public works, public safety, and civil relief works predominated but the collective activities embraced all nineteen civil affairs specialties. No two country programs were identical, each having been tailored to the individual country's needs and capabilities. In no case was it evident that civic action programs interfered with the basic military mission. In every instance it was evident that well conceived and properly executed civic action programs made a positive contribution to overall national progress, and increased the confidence of the people in the government.

At the invitation of the Government of Republic of China¹ a CINCPAC representative was invited to the graduation of the first GRC Civil Affairs Class on Taiwan. The graduation ceremony for a class of approximately 400 students was held at the Political Staff College on 14 March 1960. General Peng Meng-chi, Chief of General Staff, Chinese Armed Forces, delivered an address on the role of Civil Affairs and Military Government in modern military operations. (C **SECRET** IAL)

General Peng, prior to the graduation ceremony, stressed the vital role that civil affairs plays in military operations, stating that the major single reason they lost the mainland to the communists was because they **had not developed an adequate civil affairs organization trained in civil affairs techniques.** He pointed out that the Nationalists had more and better arms, equipment and soldiers but that the Communist were more adept at "winning the people" which proved fatal for the GRC. He stated

1. CHMAAG Taiwan 170150Z Feb 60 (U)

that GRC strategy was based on the effort being "70% civil affairs (political) and 30% destruction of enemy forces." He emphasized that in the cold war period and in situations where terrorists and insurgents disrupt the orderly governmental processes, civil affairs control was essential for separating the insurgent from the support of the population. Later in a discussion, Lt. Gen. Chiang Chien-Jen, emphasized that they (the GRC) were most pleasantly surprised when they heard Indonesia was sending some officers to the Allied Officers 3 month Civil Affairs Course at Fort Gordon. He felt it was a great achievement for the Americans to obtain Indonesian participation in civil affairs activities and that it was the first tangible evidence they had seen of real pro-West sentiment on the part of the Indonesians.

In January 1960 the Department of the Army (Chief, Civil Affairs) was provided information received from MAAGs and JUSMAGs on the use of foreign military forces in underdeveloped countries in the construction of public works and other activities helpful to economic development.¹

The U.S. Representation, with varying degrees of success, emphasized during 1960 the importance to the countries in the PACOM of adequate well planned civil affairs organizations and programs to establish a close relationship between the armed forces and the civil populace.

VISITING IN THE PACOM AREA

Preceding portions of this chapter describe the activities to improve relationships between U.S. and other countries. The personal exchange of ideas is a very forceful means of improving any relationship between individuals or countries.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 089 of 9 Jan 60

The strengthening of relationships between the U.S. and other countries in the PACOM was materially assisted by visits to CINCPAC Headquarters and the Component Commands by numerous foreign dignitaries and by personal contacts of CINCPAC representatives who visited foreign countries in the area.

Visits by Representatives of Foreign Countries

During the year, 551 high ranking foreign dignitaries visited Hawaii. Some of these visits were stop-overs enroute to and from the mainland, while others were specifically made for briefings or discussions. All directly concerned CINCPAC or the Component Commanders. Many of the visitors came in groups ranging from 2 to 32 persons. There were approximately 70 of these groups. A list of foreign visitors grouped according to countries is included in Appendix B. The visits of CINCPAC and members of the Joint Staff to countries in the PACOM were numerous and where significant have been recorded in the section concerned. The orientation and planning indoctrination trip of the Assistant Chief of Staff Plans, RADM R. J. Stroh to the Southeast Asian Countries is characteristic of visits by CINCPAC staff members. The candid memorandum report of his trip during March contains first hand information on military and economic conditions encountered and the realistic impressions received. The memorandum report is included as Appendix C.

CHAPTER IV

ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND INTERNAL UPRISINGS

The numerically superior ground forces and air strength of the Communist Bloc in Asia continued to comprise the obvious threat to the Free World Nations in the PACOM area. The assigned task of countering communist aggressions and internal uprisings dictated a large percentage of the CINCPAC 1960 activities. Although actions previously recorded were also aimed at stopping the spread of communism, it is the purpose of this chapter to report actions taken to directly counter aggression and the communist inspired internal uprisings. Such actions were centered in two geographic areas and were concerned with two types of activities. The areas were Southeast Asia, and the Taiwan Straits. The activities which were of chief concern were "cold war" activities and reconnaissance and surveillance.

Although there was no large-scale open warfare in the PACOM during 1960 there was no state of peace. The Laos coup and resultant struggle for control, in which the communist inspired insurgents played a major role, flared into a brushfire during latter 1960. The insurgency in Vietnam continued to grow to an all time high. The Taiwan Straits was a small barrier to bristling opponents poised for combat. In Korea, though relatively quiet during 1960, there was only recognized armed truce and an alert deterrent posture was essential.

Against this backdrop of explosive pyrotechnics in a condition of "cold war", CINCPAC directed the joint activities of the PACOM forces and as such guided the efforts of the major friendly forces in defense of the nations of the Free World.

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The international situation in most of the Asian countries, particularly Taiwan and Korea, had been resolved to a period of watching and waiting, with CINCPAC supervising the military assistance deemed necessary and attempting to establish a condition which would assure that any future crises would be resolved in consonance with U.S. national policies. Activities in connection with aid to these countries and measures to improve the relationship with them have already been related in Chapters II and III and will not be repeated here.

During the waiting period extensive surveillance and reconnaissance activities were conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces all along the periphery of the pro-communist territories and in the contiguous ocean areas. Although these activities were conducted by Component Commanders or their subordinates, the results were of vital interest to CINCPAC and he therefore kept fully informed on all phases of their operations.

Because of the importance of psychological warfare in a cold war situation and since a major effort of CINCPAC toward countering communist aggression and influence was contained in the CINCPAC cold war plan and associated PSYWAR efforts, a more detailed account of these activities is presented within this chapter.

The internal situation in Vietnam was precarious throughout 1960. The increased communist inspired activity was of major concern to the CHMAAG Vietnam and to CINCPAC. A brief summary of events and counter-insurgency operations in South Vietnam is included.

In Laos where the communist inspired uprising constituted a major threat to world peace the integrated story and CINCPAC's related

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activities are discussed in some detail.

COUNTERING COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LAOS

Laos was under French domination for a half century until World War II. During the war it was occupied by Japan and then by Chinese troops. The seeds of communism were sown in 1945 when the Pathet Lao (Land of Lao) rebel leaders of the kingdom of Luang Prabang declared their independence. When the Vietnamese Communist invaded Laos in 1953 they joined with the Pathet Lao into a sizable armed revolt under Prince Souphannouvong. As a result of their strong position they won important concessions in the Geneva Accords, one of which was that they be integrated into the Lao Nation. They continued to rule the northern provinces in violation of the terms of the agreement while gaining still further concessions from the RLG. During 1959 the North Vietnamese propaganda campaign and armed clashes against the RLG resulted in the RLG appealing to the United Nations which, in turn, sent a commission to investigate communist activities in Laos. A U.N. representative remained in Laos throughout 1959.

Open conflict in 1959 was the result of organized efforts to integrate the two Pathet Lao battalions into the Forces Armee' du Laos (FAL) in accordance with the merger accords. Attack and counter attacks occurred sporadically throughout 1959 in Northern Laos along the North Vietnamese border (San Neua province) and in extreme Southern Laos in the vicinity of Attapeu.

Political-Military events during 1960:

A military committee consisting of five army general officers with

[REDACTED]

no appointed ministers controlled the Lao government for about one week at the beginning of 1960. King Savang named Nhouy Abhay to form a provisional government to prepare the country for general elections in 1960. A provisional non-communist government was formed and scheduled elections for April. In March Defense Minister General Phoumi instituted a general roundup of all rebels in Southern Laos. This was a sizeable operation (about 5000 government troops), and was launched to gain support of the people in the coming elections. The clean-up ended in May in preparation for the elections which subsequently were held in a relatively calm atmosphere. The validation of election results was delayed by the King until after the Paris Summit Conference to prevent them from becoming an international political football. The escape of Prince Souphannouvong and other jailed leaders of leftist organizations in May presaged an increase of terrorist activities.

The government of Nhouy Abhay resigned as of 30 May and King Savang directed the leaders of the elected party, Laotian Party of Democracy and Social Progress, to select a new premier and form a cabinet. Tiao Somsanith was selected as prime minister but the guiding force was suspected to be General Phoumi. The Lao National Assembly met 5 June and gave overwhelming vote of confidence to the Somsanith Government. The general situation was quiet with only scattered military action against Pathet Lao rebels in mop-up type operations.

On 9 August, a Laotian paratroop battalion under Captain Kong Le seized control of Vientiane in a sudden and unexpected action and established a "High Command of the Revolutionary force".

[REDACTED]

On 13 August, the Lao National Assembly in Vientiane voted the Somsanith government out of office. The Assembly was under heavy pressure from the crowds and from armed rebel troops who held the assembly members in their building for several days. The King subsequently instructed National Assembly President Souvanna Phouma to form a new government, and Souvanna announced his intention of negotiating with the Pathet Lao leaders to bring them legally back into the government. General Phoumi, refusing to accept the Souvanna Government, organized his own government in Savannakhet and began to rally army support against the coup forces by organizing counter revolutionary forces from units located outside Vientiane. General Phoumi was able to gain support from all organized military units except those in the 5th (Vientiane Province) military region. (See Situation Map Fig. 23)

With the support of approximately 10,000 FAL troops General Phoumi planned a three pronged attack against the Kong Le Forces holding Vientiane. The Phoumi plan included air lift of Savannakhet forces to Vientiane and overland and river transport of other forces. Six infantry battalions and one airborne battalion composed the attack forces. (See PHOUMI PLAN MAP Fig. 24)

Phoumi began an offensive in the Nam Ca Dinh areas southeast of Pak Sane on 28 November and advanced his position overland to Pak Sane by 7 December. On 8 December Colonel Kouprasith Abhay, Commander of the 5th Military Region staged a pro-Phoumi "bloodless coup" in Vientiane and held the city briefly, but withdrew to Chinaimo under pressure from Kong Le forces during the night. During this activity





Fig. 23



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Fig. 24

[REDACTED]

Souvanna fled to Cambodia. A National Assembly quorum met in Savannakhet on 11 December and first unanimously voted no-confidence in Souvanna's government and declared it dissolved, and then established a new government headed by Prince Boun Oum. At the same time Kong Le's force was strengthened by substantial Soviet air delivery.

General Phoumi and Kouprasith forces completed the recapture of Vientiane on 15 December as a result of an attack, of about one week.

At the end of the year the King wanted the new Boum Oum government to ask National Assembly approval of his right to govern Laos. Boum Oum's refusal complicated the problems of the country and gave the Communist Bloc propaganda fuel for its contention that Souvanna retained the "legal" power of government and thereby justified continued Communist aid to Kong Le and the Pathet Lao.

CINCPAC Activities in Laos

After the Geneva Accords a U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) carried out aid programs for Laos but it was not capable of the extensive program required. The Programs Evaluation Office (PEO) as representatives of the DOD to work directly under CINCPAC was set up to administer the aid program. Since the aid by PEO was essentially military aid but the agency was civilian, it was manned by retired or ~~reserve military personnel.~~ Under a survey by CINCPAC in 1958 to insure proper "end use" of military items, Brigadier General John A. Heintges U.S. Army was assigned as Chief Programs Evaluation Officer (CHPEO). The "Heintges Plan"¹ introduced in January 1959 to reorganize the PEO and to improve the support to Laos was considered so successful,

1. CINCPAC Command History 1959 (TS)

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CINCPAC recommended¹ that the program be extended another year.

One of the major actions taken during 1960 to counter internal uprisings in Laos was the continuation of Special Forces Mobile Training Teams, which had been training FAL officers and NCOs since the middle of 1959. Under combined U.S. -French training plan known as Project Disallow, 12 highly trained MTTs originally were sent to Laos for six months temporary duty. Because of the success of the program the MTTs were replaced with others from CONUS at six month intervals. Although the French preferred to phase out the teams, CINCPAC was anxious to see them remain until FAL training was complete. At the end of the year, it was difficult to predict how long the teams would remain in Laos.²

In March the Department of Defense formed a special survey mission to Laos to provide CINCPAC and OSD/ISA an objective first-hand analysis of the Laotian Defense Support Budget, with a view to possible economies either then or in the future. The interim report,³ upon which CINCPAC was requested to comment^{4, 5} had 15 recommendations covering the reorganization of the FAL, the establishment of training changes, the reduction or elimination of a number of budget items, and the initiation of other changes which the survey team considered desirable.

In commenting upon the interim report,⁶ CINCPAC summarized the situation facing CHPEO in Laos, i. e., the inexperience of the Royal

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1. CINCPAC 312243Z Dec 59 (S)
 2. See CINCPAC J00 Problem Book, items under Laos Section, In J046 files. (S)
 3. Unnumbered Memo OSD/ISA, subj: "Interim Rpt of DOD Special Survey Team," 3 Mar 60
 4. OSD 112117Z Mar 60, cite DEF 973711
 5. OSD 252325Z Mar 60, cite DEF 974607
 6. CINCPAC ltr ser 00209-60 of 25 Apr 60

SECRET

Laotian Government, the problem facing the RLG in fighting an "internal" threat backed by external countries, the acceleration of insurgent activities in 59-60 with resultant budgetary strains, the handicaps imposed on CHPEO's training and operational activities by the Paris Agreements, and the differences between PEO and US Operations Mission on the role of the FAL in civic affairs. CINCPAC then stated that, although civic action functions eventually should be transferred to civilian agencies, there was none capable of performing these functions in the near future. CINCPAC also proposed that the U.S. support the impending budgetary deficit in Laos brought about by unprogrammed operational costs stemming from emergency operations in 1959. CINCPAC concluded his comments by stating that the interim report was reviewed in the light of the conditions in Laos and his position statements. He stressed the paramount consideration, that Laos must not be allowed to fall into communist hands.

The office of the Secretary of Defense acknowledged receipt of CINCPAC's comments on the interim report and stated that they would be considered in developing the DOD position on the final report.¹ In a separate message,² OSD indicated that the final report³ had been submitted to the JCS for comments to be used in developing a DOD position for further consideration of the matter with the State Department.

The all-weather road link between Pakse, Laos and Kontum, Vietnam was a project under consideration at the end of 1959. The road would provide the link to connect roads between Bangkok, Thailand and Saigon without going through Cambodia, and also provide an access for Laos to

1. OSD 102204Z May 60 cite DEF 976946

2. OSD 111915Z May 60 cite DEF 976969

3. Report of DOD Special Survey Team 25 May 1960

the sea port Binh Binh. The new road link required was approximately 100 KM.

CINCPAC was notified by OSD/ISA that State Department and ICA were not willing to provide funds for the construction of this road.¹ The feasibility of SeaBee-supervised construction of an improved jeep trail to link Attapeu with the Vietnam border was considered.

CINCPAC in a message to OSD,² agreed that SeaBee-supervised construction offered the greatest probability of early link-up of Attapeu-SVN border, with revised cost estimates for the project varying from \$575,000 to \$950,000. Although the road was considered very desirable it was not possible to provide the funds from the FY 61 MAP budget because of higher priority considerations.³

In a message to CINCPAC in May CHPEO indicated⁴ that, in his judgement, CINCPAC should plan to assist and support FAL civic action throughout the 5 Year Plan. CINCPAC advised⁵ that it was not his intention to minimize the importance of civic action programs or need for continuing FAL support of this activity. With respect to the six man teams, however, CINCPAC hoped that the RLG effort to develop civil agencies to assume civic functions would permit progressive transfer of these functions from FAL prior to the end of the 5 Year Plan.

In June CHPEO Laos⁶ requested immediate approval of staff augmentation by one civil affairs specialist officer, one clerk, and five

1. CHPEO 131450Z May 59
2. CINCPAC 190412Z Feb 60
3. Interview: LTCOL D.R. Lyon USA with CDR J. Poindexter, 23 Jan 61
4. CHPEO 031559Z May 60 cite PEO-OPT 1046
5. CINCPAC 20225Z May 60
6. CHPEO Laos 171245Z Jun 60 cite PEO-OPT 1519


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
six-man teams (an organized CA platoon) for use in developing an extensive training program to furnish US-oriented Lao civil affairs personnel. The objective was to improve through U.S. training, the effectiveness of the RLG rural development teams which worked in the remote areas to improve the country's education, agriculture, public works and public administration. This six-man team program was the special target of the Pathet Lao attack and was not fully implemented prior to the 9 August coup.

The essential portions of CINCPAC planning to counter insurgency operations have been related in Chapter I as part of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59. A draft national plan for Laos counter insurgency operations was prepared by CINCPAC in July. The plan was forwarded to JCS for approval and forwarded to Laos via Department of State channels. CINCPAC outlined the planned objectives in Laos, which were: (a) to establish and maintain political and economic control and stability; (b) to suppress and defeat disruptive communist activities in Laos; (c) to interdict aid flowing into insurgents across the Laos borders; and (d) to include both policy and military actions in coordination with adjacent friendly nations.


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
EXEMPTION E-1





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[REDACTED] END

INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Communist inspired insurgency in South Vietnam was aimed at destruction of the authority of the government and was a prelude to the ultimate absorption of South Vietnam into the Communist Bloc in accordance with the Vietnamese Communist (Viet Cong) master plan. The U.S. aid and guidance given by the Military Assistance Program was one of the major deterrent factors in the partial defeat of the Viet Cong plan which called for complete control of the South Vietnamese government by the end of 1960. ([REDACTED] T)

The Viet Cong activity reached an all time high during 1960. Armed clashes increased from a January figure of 180 to 545 during September. Propaganda programs, kidnapping, sabotage and other covert acts of violence by the insurgents were proportionately high.² ([REDACTED] T)

There was public uneasiness in South Vietnam, partly because of the increased Viet Cong terrorism and partly due to the poor economy and faulty administration of the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem. On 11 November 40 members of the 1st Airborne Group attempted to overthrow the Diem government. This group staged a one and one half hour attack on the presidential palace but the attempt was blocked by the skillful manipulation of Diem as he bought time while appearing to make ([REDACTED] T)

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1. CINCPAC 311420Z Dec 60 (TS)
 2. CHMAAG Vietnam ltr 001138 of 3 Dec 1960

S [REDACTED]

concessions, though actually awaiting the arrival of loyal forces.¹ The attempt was conducted by sincere junior commanders to force an improvement in governmental policies and was not of communist origin; neither were the communists able to follow-up on the incident.

The unstable situation created a precarious position for the CHMAAG who, as agent of the U.S. committed to aid the government of Vietnam so long as it was not communist, had to remain friendly though neutral while awaiting the outcome.

COLD WAR/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Cold War Activities

Throughout the Pacific Command, as a result of Admiral Felt's emphasis and action during 1960, military commanders were developing a new concept of their responsibilities during the cold war. Besides the traditional tasks of preparing for a shooting war, CINCPAC stressed to commanders at all levels their responsibility to oppose communist schemes and strategy as employed during the cold war. The cold war, CINCPAC insisted, was not an interim period during which the only responsibility was to prepare for a shooting war when the gains and losses would be scored. The cold war was itself the bitter struggle for power.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

At the April MAAG conference held at Camp Smith, CINCPAC stressed the counter insurgency problem and outlined a plan to meet that threat in South Vietnam and Laos. This led to increased emphasis on programs for special forces, PSYWAR, intelligence and civil action

(UNCLASSIFIED)

training programs in the MA Program and through the mobile training teams attached to PEO Laos and CHMAAG Vietnam. The presentation made by B/Gen George S. Bowman, Jr. USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff, J3, CINCPAC, at the Defense Collateral Planning Conference in Washington D. C. in June also stressed the CINCPAC counter-insurgency plan for Laos and S. Vietnam as a solution for cold war problems in those areas. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Cold War activities were designed to use the full potentiality of U.S. military personnel and dependents overseas in supporting the overall U.S. objective. (UNCLASSIFIED)

This section describes CINCPAC's actions during the year, to counter the communist, threat. Generally, these activities were divided into psychological operations and cold war activities.

CINCPAC Cold War Activities Group

Within CINCPAC Headquarters the Cold War Activities Group, an organization established during 1958 by CINCPAC as a means of extending military activities to include the prosecution of the cold war, was responsible for initiating and coordinating profitable military cold war actions. This group consisted of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, who acted as chairman, and representatives from the principal staff divisions of the Headquarters. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CINCPAC Cold War Plan:

A JCS memorandum received at CINCPAC Headquarters late in 1959 assigned to commanders of unified and specified commands new responsibilities and over-all objectives for the conduct of the cold war.¹

1. JCS memo SM-1201-59, subj: Military Activities During the Cold War 30 Nov 59 par 12. (C)

[REDACTED]

In compliance with this directive CINCPAC prepared the Pacific Command Cold War Plan. Designated as CINCPAC OPLAN 70-60, this plan organized the military resources under CINCPAC's operational command for the conduct of those economic, political, psychological and sociological activities that would strengthen the Free World and work to the detriment of the Communist Bloc. This was a unilateral plan that aligned the PACOM military organization with other government agencies for the prosecution of the cold war, and broadened the type of action required by military personnel. By the end of the year, all subordinate commanders had prepared programs in support of the PACOM Cold War Plan.¹ (C[REDACTED]TIAL)

Activities anticipated under the cold war plan were divided into three general fields -- military operations, community relations, and humanitarian actions. Military operations included the deterrent affect of an effective military force maintained in the PACOM, the positioning of the U.S. Seventh Fleet near South Vietnam during the December Laos emergency, and other show-of-force military exercises held during the year. Community relations programs and humanitarian activities were planned and conducted to foster mutual understanding and support between U.S. military personnel and the peoples of allied nations. There was a marked increase during 1960 in this type of activity, such as an Air Force sponsored program to increase understanding and respect between Koreans and U.S. military personnel, an Eight U.S. Army reforestation and erosion control project, and a Seventh Fleet indoctrination program to enable U.S. Naval personnel to create a better

1. J5 Staff Rpt, Aug 60 (S)

and friendlier understanding of the U.S. through contacts with Asian peoples.¹

(ET)

Psychological Warfare:

Through a revision to the PSYWAR Annex to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, received during May 1960, CINCPAC was given additional responsibilities for planning psychological operations for use during the cold war, a limited war, and general war conditions. At the end of the year, the PSYWAR annexes to CINCPAC operations plans were revised or in the process of revision.

In carrying out the JCS assigned mission of maintaining the psychological offensive in Korea, CINCUNC continued Voice of United Nations Command (VUNC) PSYWAR broadcasts over stations of the Korean Broadcasting System and over U.S. Army PSYWAR transmitters in Korea. The U.S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific acted as CINCUNC's operating agency for these broadcasts.

Prior to 27 June 1960 VUNC broadcasts were also conducted over short and medium wave transmitters of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation. However, upon ratification of the new security treaty, the Government of Japan terminated all VUNC broadcasts over Japanese facilities. Through agreement with GOJ, four U.S. Navy short wave transmitters located in Japan were activated on 27 June to provide stop-gap PSYWAR broadcasts. This agreement, permitting the U.S. to conduct PSYWAR broadcasts from Japan through U.S. facilities, expired on 31 December 1960 and all VUNC PSYWAR broadcasts from Japan ceased on that date.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0023 subj: Report of Significant Military Activities During the Cold War, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 60, 12 Jan 61 (S)

In order to maintain the broadcast activities, CINCUNC representatives were negotiating with the Korean Broadcasting System at the end of the year in an attempt to secure additional time over its facilities.

Because of the delay and the need to continue the broadcasts, CINCPAC requested the JCS to help get permission to broadcast VUNC programs over a high power transmitter of the U.S. Information Agency's Voice of America (VOA) facilities on Okinawa. This possibility was ruled out by USIA on the grounds that the themes and mission of the VUNC station were not consonant with the Voice of America broadcast aims.

The 50 KW transmitter procured from Radio Free Europe by DA was shipped to Korea to provide VUNC with a high power medium wave facility. Upon its arrival in Korea, the transmitter was found to be inoperable and was considered uneconomical to rebuild. At the end of the year, CINCUSARPAC was in the process of procuring a replacement 50 KW transmitter.¹

There were also radio transmitter difficulties in Laos where CINCPAC representatives were helping the Laotian Government improve its PSYWAR and information capability through the operation of a 5KW AN/MRT-5 transmitter on loan from CINCPAC. As a result of the 9 August coup, control of this transmitter and two MAP furnished 10 KW short wave transmitters passed to the coup d'etat committee. Since there was an urgent requirement for communications equipment with which to counter the broadcasts made by the new government,

1. Staff Rpt for 1960, J33 Section, Dec 1960. (TS) In J046 files.

SECRET

CINCPAC arranged for Thailand to loan an AN/GRC-38 to Laos to use in countering communist broadcasts. However, upon regaining control of Vientiane from the coup d'etat committee, the three original transmitters were restored to the control of the RLG.¹ **(SECRET)**

PSYWAR training of FAL soldiers was done by a five man PSYWAR Mobile Training Team that had been on temporary duty in Laos since the fall of 1958. During the year, efforts were made to increase the members of the team to 12 and to have it attached to the Programs Evaluation Office, Laos on a permanent basis. The Department of the Army was unable to provide the 12 spaces for assignment, but offered a 12 man PSYWAR MTT from CONUS to be attached to PEO on a temporary basis. This proposal was acceptable and the team was scheduled to arrive in Laos early in February 1961.²

Taiwan Straits

As the Communists shifted and stirred their trouble spots in the Southeast Asia area, the Taiwan Straits and the off-shore islands remained comparatively quiet as the crisis of the two previous years abated during 1960. Maintaining supplies on the off-shore islands, which had been a serious problem throughout 1959, presented no difficulties during this period. **(CONFIDENTIAL)**

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE


In addition to routine reconnaissance and surveillance of Russian and Communist Chinese aircraft and vessels in the Western Pacific area, PACOM forces twice during the year conducted surveillance of four Soviet

----- **(UNCLASSIFIED)**

1. Staff Rpts, J33 Sect, Aug, Sep, Oct & Nov. 1960 (S) In J046 files.
2. Ibid.

range instrumentation ships positioned in the Central Pacific to participate in tests of Soviet missiles. (UNCLASSIFIED)

On 7 January, the USSR announced intentions to impact missiles in the Central Pacific, and that special ships would be stationed at the impact area. Prior to this announcement, on 29 December 1959, patrol aircraft from the Alaskan Sea Frontier (CTF 93) located the four ships (SIBIR, SUCHAN, SAKHALIN, and CHUKOTKA) and kept them under surveillance as they proceeded Southeast. Later, aircraft from the Hawaiian Sea Frontier took over and maintained the surveillance until the special ships reached the vicinity of the announced impact area. Thereafter, Navy and Air Force aircraft operating from Hawaii, Johnston Island or Midway patrolled the area until the ships departed at the beginning of February.¹



Besides the aerial surveillance ordered, surface vessels were dispatched to rendezvous with the Soviet vessels and maintain close surveillance. These vessels were the following: USS DURANT (DER 389) on the SIBIR; USS SWORDFISH (SSN 579) and a Pacific Missile Range Ship, DALTON VICTORY, on the CHUKOTKA; HAITI VICTORY another Pacific Missile Range Ship, on the SUCHAN; and the USS FALGOUT (DER 324) on the SAKHALIN. These surveillance ships were authorized to close to within four miles of Soviet vessels prior to the impact, but were directed to do nothing that could be interpreted as hostile or provocative.⁴ [REDACTED] ET)

The Soviet range instrumentation ships remained on station until 15 October when they began the return voyage to Petropavlovsk. After approximately seven weeks of surveillance operations, the five U.S. ships were ordered on 17 October to return to their normal operational commands.⁵ Aerial surveillance continued until the Soviet vessels were out of range on 23 October.⁶ The return of Soviet ships indicated that Soviet efforts to fire, if attempted, had been unsuccessful.

EXTENSION 1

- 4. CNO 151405Z Sep 60 (S)
- 5. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 152155Z Oct 60 (S)
- 6. CTF 92 OCC 230644Z Oct 60 (S)

[REDACTED]

Unidentified Submarine Sightings

During April, PACOM forces devoted considerable effort to an attempt to locate two submarines classified as not U.S. or friendly. One was reported in the Kwajalein area, the other in Alaskan waters.² The search for the submarine sighted near Kwajalein started with a vessel sighting on 15 April and continued for seven days with P2V aircraft deployed from Barbers Point.

The search terminated because of failure to sight the vessel again. The Alaskan area search commenced with a visual sighting in Prince William Sound, Alaska on 21 April. A sonobuoy barrier was established but no further contacts were made and the operation terminated on 25 April. The final evaluation in both instances was that of a possible submarine.³

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1. See Incident Reports of J3 Current Operations Branch for 1960 (S)
 2. TG 32.6 msg 152358Z Apr 60 (S)
TG 32.6 msg 181302Z Apr 60 (S)
TG 32.6 msg 180015Z Apr 60 (S)
CTF 32 msg 202025Z, Apr 60 (S)
CTF 32 msg 222025Z Apr 60 (S)
 3. CTF 33 msg 222136Z (S)

CHAPTER V

ACTIONS TO DISCHARGE OTHER U.S. JOINT
MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES

Preceding chapters have listed CINCPAC's responsibilities and have described his actions and plans for carrying out these responsibilities. Included here are several miscellaneous activities that do not properly fall under section headings in other chapters, but were activities requiring coordination or other support, and as the senior U.S. military commander were the inherent responsibility of CINCPAC. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE (PMR)

A growing activity in the Pacific was the Pacific Missile Range. The commander of this organization was responsive directly to the Chief of Naval Operations; however, since he used space, sea and land areas in the PACOM area, and since he depended to some extent upon CINCPAC for support, close ties were maintained to prevent mutual interference of operations. For the necessary coordination of PMR requirements within PACOM, CINCPAC designated CINCPACFLT as his agent.¹

During 1960, CINCPAC furnished to the Commander, PMR several destroyers to assist in operations for the recovery of space capsules, and also provided support for the construction of range and telemetry stations on Pacific Islands.

Responsibility for the Eniwetok Proving Ground (EPG) was transferred from CJTF-7 to Commander PMR effective 1 July. In accordance with his responsibility for general area security of the EPG, CINCPAC notified all concerned that certain provisions of the existing JTF-7 directive concerning entry into the EPG would remain in effect until the Commander PMR issued new instructions.² (UNCLASSIFIED)

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1. CINCPAC 182135Z Sep 58 (C)
 2. CINCPAC 180225Z Jun 60 (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

PROJECT MERCURY

An activity similar to the PMR, but completely unrelated, was CINCPAC's connection with the National Aeronautics and Space Agency's (NASA) Project Mercury, the object of which was to put a man in space. The NASA plan anticipated that the space capsule carrying the astronaut would be recovered in the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, recovery functions in the Atlantic were delegated to the Commander of a Recovery Task Force. However, on 16 March 1960, the JCS directed CINCPAC to designate points of contact in his command and to authorize direct communication between these designees and CINC Atlantic to establish search and rescue plans, procedures and techniques to meet possible Project Mercury emergencies.¹
(UNCLASSIFIED)

CINCPAC designated CINCPACFLT as his agent to develop plans for the contingency recovery of a series of Mercury orbital flights, both manned and unmanned. The plan, in the process of publication at the end of the year, provided for a task force consisting of eight Naval and Air Force search and recovery units in the Pacific to implement the contingency recovery should the capsule fall into the Pacific upon its return from space.²

TRANSPORTATION OF INDONESIAN AND MALAYAN TROOPS TO THE CONGO

At the request of the UN, the JCS directed at the beginning of September that the Pacific Fleet provide transportation for Indonesian troops to the Congo as part of the UN effort in that area.^{3, 4, 5, 6}

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1. JCS SM-247-60 of 16 Mar 60
 2. CINCPACFLT OPLAN No. 205-60 of 6 Jan 61 (C)
 3. USARMA DJAKARTA 300413Z Aug 60 (S)
 4. CNO 012235Z Sep 60 (C)
 5. JCS 041520Z Sep 60
 6. SECSTATE 376 to Djakarta, Sep 60

The USS BEXAR (APA 237) designated as the sealift transport, was ordered to arrive Djakarta on 9 September for embarkation of Indonesian troops.¹ In order to maintain the SEVENTH Fleet lift capability, the USS MONTROSE (APA 212) was directed to sail from the East Pacific to arrive WESTPAC not later than 26 September. The USS BEXAR departed Djakarta on 10 September with the Indonesian 330th Infantry Battalion embarked, a force of 81 officers, 1091 men, and several observers. The destination was Matadi in the Congo.^{2, 3}

A few days later, the Pacific Fleet was directed to transport approximately 500 Malayan troops and some vehicles to the Congo as an additional part of the UN Congo forces. For this lift, COMSEVENTHFLT chose two LSTs -- the WHITFIELD COUNTY and the WINDHAM COUNTY.⁴ The two sealift operations were completed successfully in October. The USS BEXAR, which landed the Indonesian troops at Matadi on 2 October, visited African and South American ports and then returned to San Diego toward the middle of December. The two LSTs, after embarking troops at Port Suettenham, Malaya on 4 October, sailed directly to the mouth of the Congo and arrived there 31 October.⁵

PLAN TO REDUCE U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

In November, as the result of a presidential directive, CINCPAC initiated a comprehensive program aimed at the reduction of the unfavorable U.S. balance of payments.⁶ In the implementation of the directive, the JCS asked CINCPAC to investigate areas of savings in

(UNCLASSIFIED)

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1. CINCPACFLT 042320Z Sep 60 (C)
 2. CINCPACFLT 100056Z Sep 60 (C)
 3. USS BEXAR 102145Z Oct 60 (C)
 4. J3 Staff Report, Sep 60 (C)
 5. COM LST DIV 92 021445Z Nov 60 (U)
 6. JCS 182204Z Nov 60 cite 531519 (U)

personnel, off-shore procurement, and similar means of reducing the flow of gold from the United States.¹ Accordingly, a list of possibilities for reduction of command requirements and increased interservice support was developed and submitted to a CINCPAC Special Action Group for further study.²

The presidential directive had far-reaching effects in the Pacific Command, and would have required a much greater alignment of sources of supply if petroleum procurement in overseas areas had not been excluded from action to shift the balance of payments. At the end of 1960, individual case studies were underway to determine if advantages could be gained from the change.³

SUMMARY

By former standards, 1960 was not a normal peacetime year, but rather a period during which there was an increase in the pace of the transition from "normal peacetime" to what threatened to be all-out cold war. Many of the tasks described in the preceding pages were unfinished, and many of the problems were without solution at the end of the year. Although some of the actions and decisions described were not of major importance, each was planned to increase CINCPAC's ability to bring a halt to the creeping expansion of communism. At the end of 1960, the communist insurgency in Laos was a major and a serious problem but it was one for which all of PACOM was prepared better at the end of the year than at the beginning.


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1. JCS 101736Z Dec 60 987097 (U)
 2. CINCPAC C/S memo, 12 Dec 60 (U) in J4 files
 3. MPSA 202010Z Dec 60 (U)

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
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
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
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
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 2. COMSEVENTHFLT 290746Z Dec 60 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 311430Z Dec 60 (TS)
 4. CINCPAC 311436Z Dec 60 (TS)
 5. COMSEVENTHFLT 311302Z Dec 60 (S)
 6. CINCPAC 311544Z Dec 60 (TS)
 7. CINCPACFLT 310940Z Dec 60 (TS)
 8. COMSEVENTHFLT 311256Z Dec 60 (S)

APPENDIX B

VISITS TO PACOM

Visits by U.S. Civil and Military Officials

The principal offices or committees represented by visitors during the year were:

President of the United States	Justice U.S. Court of Military Appeals
Vice President of the United States	Under Secretary of the Army
Secretary of Interior	Under Secretary of the Air Force
Secretary of Agriculture	Asst Secretary of State for Far East Affairs
Secretary of the Army	Asst Secretary of Army (Log)
Secretary of the Navy	Asst Secretary of Army (FM)
Secretary of the Air Force	Asst Secretary of Army (MP&RF)
Asst Secretary of Navy (Pers & Reserve Forces)	Asst Secretary of Navy (Material)
American Ambassadors to Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Burma, Spain, Korea, Australia, Malaya, New Zealand, and Iran	Senate Armed Services Committee
Dep Asst Secretary of State for Far East Affairs	Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Dep Asst Secretary of State for Mutual Security	Dep Asst Secretary of Defense (MP&R)
Dep Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs	Director of Selective Service
Asst Secretary of Defense (Compt)	Director of Military Assistance of OSD
Asst Secretary of Defense (Health and Medical)	Senate Appropriations Committee
Asst Secretary of Defense (General Counsel)	Senate Sub-Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
Governor of Guam	House Foreign Affairs Committee
High Commissioner of the Trust Territories	House Armed Service Committee
	House Committee on Appropriations

APPENDIX B

House Committee on Science and Astronautics	Department of Defense Research and Engineering Group
House Committee on Education and Labor	U.S. Congressional Delegation to Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference
House Committee on Inter-State and Foreign Commerce	Congressional Army Command and Operations Group
House Committee on Veterans Affairs	American Battle Monuments Commission
Foreign Operations Sub-Committee, House Appropriations Committee	

Visits by Representatives of Foreign Countries

The following indicative listing shows the countries and some of their distinguished representatives who came to Hawaii in 1960:

AUSTRALIA	His Excellency Robert G. Menzies, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs
	His Excellency Malcolm Booker, Australian Ambassador to Thailand
	General Sir Dallas Brooks, Governor General State of Victoria, and Mrs Brooks
	Air Vice Marshal V. E. Hancock, Chief Air Staff, RAAF
	Vice Admiral Sir Roy R. Dowling, Chairman C/S Committee, Australian Armed Forces
	Vice Admiral H. M. Burrell, Chief of Naval Staff Royal Australian Navy
BURMA	Colonel Maung Maung, Director of Military Training, Burma Defense Forces
CAMBODIA	Major General Lon Nol, Minister of National Defense and CINC Armed Forces
	His Excellency Kim-sour Ty, Cambodian Ambassador to Thailand
CANADA	Rear Admiral E. W. Finch-Noyes, CANCOMARPAC

APPENDIX B

CHINA

General Yu Ta Wei, Minister of National Defense

General C. S. Chen, CINC Chinese Air Force

Admiral (sd Cl) Yue-si Ni, CINC Chinese Navy

GERMANY

His Excellency Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of Germany

His Excellency Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Germany

His Excellency Dr. Wilhelm Grewe, German
Ambassador to the United States

Mr. Felix von Eckardt, Secretary of State, Head
of Federal Press and Information Office

INDIA

His Excellency Mohamedali Currim Chagla, Indian
Ambassador to the United States, and Mrs Chagla

INDONESIA

His Excellency Achmed Sukarno, President of the
Republic of Indonesia

His Excellency Dr. Subandrio, Minister of Foreign
Affairs

General Abdul Haris Nasution, Minister of Defense
and Security, Chief of Staff Army

Dr. Mohammed Hatta, Former Vice President of
Indonesia

His Excellency Dr. Suharto, Minister of
Development People's Industries

His Excellency Mr. Tamzil, Director Cabinet of
President

~~His Excellency A. M. Dasaad, Member Supreme
Advisory Council~~

His Excellency Muljadi Djojomartono, Minister
Social Welfare

His Excellency Chaerul Saleh, Minister of
Construction and Development

His Excellency Bambang Sugeng, Indonesian
Ambassador to Japan

APPENDIX B

Rear Admiral Edi Martadinata, CNO Indonesian Navy

Brigadier General Achmed Jani, Dep Ch of Staff II (Ops and Admin)

ITALY His Excellency Manlio Brosio, The Ambassador of the Republic of Italy to U.S. , and Mrs Brosio

JAPAN Their Imperial Highnesses Crown Prince Akihito and Crown Princess Michiko

Their Imperial Highnesses Prince and Princess Takamatsu

His Excellency N. Kishi, Prime Minister of Japan

Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, Former Prime Minister of Japan

His Excellency Zentaro Kosaka, Foreign Minister

Mr. A. Fujiyama, Former Foreign Minister

Dr. Shinso Koizumi, Special Advisor to the Crown Prince's Household

Mr. Shigenobu Shima, Deputy Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs

KOREA Vice Admiral Y. W. Lee, CNO Korean Navy

Lietenant General Kim Shin, Chief of Staff, ROKAF

Mr. P. O. Cho, Democratic Presidential Candidate

LAOS Colonel Sourith Don Sasorith, Commandant AF and Paratroops

MEXICO Vice Admiral Enrique Altamirano, Director, Mexican Naval Academy

NEPAL Their Majesties the King and Queen of Nepal

His Excellency Subarna S. J. B. Rana, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Planning and Development, and Mrs Rana

His Excellency Rishikesh Shaha, Nepal Ambassador to U.S.

Brigadier General Sher Bahadur Malla, Military Secretary to the King

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NEW ZEALAND His Excellency Viscount Lord C. J. Cobham,
Governor General of New Zealand

His Excellency Walter Nash, Prime Minister and
Minister of External Affairs

His Excellency A. H. Nordmeyer, Finance Minister

Major General Sir Stephen Weir, Chairman C/S
Committee, Chief of General Staff

Air Vice Marshal M. F. Calder, Chief Air Staff

PANAMA His Excellency M. J. Moreno, Jr., Minister of
Foreign Relations of the Republic of Panama

PAKISTAN His Excellency Hamid Nawaz Khan, Pakistan
Ambassador to Thailand

Rear Admiral Afzal Rahman Khan, CINC and Ch of
Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy

PHILIPPINES His Excellency Diosdado Pangan Macapagal, Vice
President of the Republic of the Philippines

His Excellency Alejo Santos, Secretary of National
Defense

Lieutenant General Manuel F. Cabal, C/S
Philippine Armed Forces

Brigadier General A. M. Santos, CG, Philippine
Army

SPAIN Captain General Agustin Munoz Grande, Chief of
Spanish High General Staff

THAILAND Their Majesties the King and Queen of Thailand

His Excellency Thanat Khoman, Minister of
Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Phya Srivisar, Privy Councillor

His Excellency Visutr Arthayukti, Ambassador to
~~Thailand~~ United States

General Luang Sura Narong, Chief Aide-de-camp
to his Majesty the King

The Honorable Pote Sarasin, Secretary General
SEATO

APPENDIX B

Admiral K. Abhakorn, Second Deputy Chief,
Defense

Air Marshal Hongskula Harin, Dep CINC RTAF

TURKEY Brigadier General F. Ongor, 10th Turkish Armed
Forces Brigade Commander, UN Forces
(Departing)

SWEDEN Lieutenant General Gustav A. Westexing, Royal
Swedish Air Force, Member Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission in Korea

SWITZERLAND Major General R. Hartman, Councilor of Legation,
Swiss Delegation to the Neutral Delegation in
Korea

UNITED KINGDOM Air Chief Marshal The Earl of Bandon, U.S. SEATO
Representative and the Countess of Bandon

The Right Honorable The Earl of Selkirk, UK
Commissioner for Singapore and Commissioner
General for South East Asia and Lady Selkirk

Air Marshal D. H. F. Barnett, KCB, CBE, DFC,
Air Office CINC, RAF Trans Comd

VIETNAM His Excellency N. D. Thuan, Secretary of State
for Presidency

The Honorable Vinh Le Truong, Leader of
Delegation (Vietnam Parliamentary Delegation)
and President of National Assembly

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APPENDIX C


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TRIP 11-23 MARCH

J5 #0073-60
23 March 1960

SUBJ: Trip Report 11-23 March 1960


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
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
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
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
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Very respectfully

/s/ Robert J. Stach
/s/ ROBERT J. STACH

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CINCPAC LAOS DIARY

29 December 1960

1. Intelligence (Secret)


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


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


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
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
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
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
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zones
AFADGRU	Air Force Advisory Group
ARVN	Army of Vietnam
BARC	Barge, Amphibious Resupply Cargo
BG	Battle Group
BPD	Basic Planning Document
BUDOCKS	Bureau of Docks
BUSANDA	Bureau of Supply and Accounts
CAF	Chinese Air Force
CAMTT	Civil Affairs Mobile Training Team
CEOI	Communications Electronics Operating Instruction
CGUSARYIS/IX CORPS	Commanding General U.S. Army Ryukyus Island Corps
CHMILTAG	Chief Military Tech Advisory Group
CHPEO	Chief Programs Evaluation Officer
CHPROVMAAG	Chief Provisional Military Assistance Group, Korea
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCNELM	Commander in Chief Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCNORAD	Commander in Chief North American Air Defense Command
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CINCPACREP	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative
CINCPACREPPHIL	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative Philippines

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CINCUNC	Commander in Chief United Nations Command
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COMASDEFORPAC	Commander Antisubmarine Defense Force U.S. Pacific Fleet
COMBARPAC	Commander Barrier Pacific
COMNAVFOR	Commander Naval Forces
COMUSKOREA	Commander U.S. Korea
COMUSJAPAN	Commander U.S. Japan
COMUSTDC	Commander U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
CONARC	Continental Army Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSE	Committee of Security Experts
CTSP	Contract Technical Service Personnel
DA	Department of the Army
DEFCON	Defense Condition
DEW	Distant Early Warning
DGZ	Desired Ground Zero
DOD	Department of Defense
DRV	Democratic Republic of North Vietnam
DSTP	Director of Strategic Target Planning (Offutt AFB)
EAM	Electronic Accounting Machine
E&E	Escape and Evasion
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence

EPG	Eniwetok Proving Ground
EUSA	Eight United States Army
FAL	Forces Armée du Laos (Laos Army)
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FOI	Field Operations Intelligence
GEOP	General Emergency Operations Plan
GOJ	Government of Japan
GRC	Government Republic of China
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HICOM	High Commissioner
ICA	International Cooperation Administration
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
IWG	Intelligence Working Group
JANAFAPAC	Joint Army, Navy, Air Force, Pacific Numbered Msg
JDA	Japanese Defense Agency
JGSDF	Japanese Ground Self Defense Force
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JTF	Joint Task Force
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
KMAG	Korea Military Army Advisory Group
KUCOG	Kunia Operations Control Center Coordination Group
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group

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MAAMA	Middletown Air Material Area
MAM	Military Assistance Manual
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MATS	Military Air Transportation Service
MDB	Mutual Defense Board (U.S. -Philippines)
MEDT	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma
MILADREP	Military Advisers Representative
MILTAG	Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia
MPO	Military Planning Office
MPSA	Military Petroleum Supply Agency
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MSDF	Mutual Self Defense Force (Japan)
MSMS	Mutual Security Military Sales
MSOP	Mutual Security Objectives Plan
MSTS	Military Sea Transport Service
MSTSO	Military Sea Transport Service Officer
NAS	Naval Air Station
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Agency
NAVADGRU	Naval Advisory Group
NAVAIR	Naval Air
NAVOPNET	Navy Operations Net
NEC	Nippon Electric Company
NFSO	Navy Fuel Supply Office
NSAPAC	National Security Agency Pacific
NSC	National Security Council
NSTDB	National Strategic Target Data Base


NSTL	National Strategic Target List
OASD/ISA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense- for International Security Affairs
OCB	Operations Coordination Board
OCC	Operations Control Center (Kunja)
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
OSD	Office of Secretary Defense
PACOM	Pacific Area Command
PEG	Performance Evaluation Group
PEO	Programs Evaluation Office
PGM	Motorized Gunboat
PL	Pathet Lao
PLD	Petroleum Logistical Data
PLD-PACOM	Petroleum Logistical Data Pacific Command
PMR	Pacific Missile Range
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PRO	Pacific Research Office
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PVO	Soviet Air Defense System
RKG	Cambodian Government
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
ROK	Republic of Korea
RTA	Royal Thailand Army
RVNAF	Royal Vietnam Air Force
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAPO	Sub Area Petroleum Office, Japan

SEATO	Southeastern Asia Treaty Organization
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SMPO	Senior Military Planning Officer
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
TBC	Taiwan Base Command
TDI	Target Data Inventory
TERM	Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission
USAF	United States Air Force
USARJAPAN	United States Army Japan
USMILAD	United States Military Adviser
USNAVSUPPACTTAIWAN	U.S. Navy Supply Activity Taiwan
USOM	United States Operations Mission
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VUNC	Voice of the United Nations Command
WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WRM	War Reserve Mobilization

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
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
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