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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



VOLUME II

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1971

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ADMIRAL JOHN S. MCCAIN JR.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

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FOREWORD

(U) The mission of the Pacific Command is to defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean and to support U.S. national policy and interests throughout the Pacific, Far East, and Southeast Asia. Geographically, the Pacific Command is the largest of seven unified U.S. commands. The area of responsibility of the Commander in Chief Pacific extends from the west coast of the Americas into the Indian Ocean and from the Bering Sea to the South Pole--approximately 85 million square miles of land and sea.

(U) Prior to the Vietnam War, very austere manning levels were authorized to carry out the CINCPAC's mission. As the tempo of the war increased in Vietnam, however, the preponderance of U.S. military manpower shifted to the PACOM. U.S. Forces in PACOM peaked in 1968 with over a million personnel of all Services. Approximately one-half of this number served in Vietnam.

(U) As a result of the progress made in the Vietnamization Program and in the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, a turn-around in force level authorization was made. Incremental reduction in force levels began in 1969 and continued through 1970 into 1971.

(U) It is important, as we reduce our force levels, that we not leave a total vacuum which would affect the security of the American people or their vital interests in the continued security of our Free World allies. Even as we reduce the American presence we must not lose sight of an urgent necessity to help nations we expect to shoulder more of the burden for their own defense. Therefore, the Nixon Doctrine's success as a key element of U.S. foreign policy depends in large measure on a viable U.S. Military Assistance Program. The goals of reduced direct American involvement can only be met by providing means for self-defense and encouraging self-reliance by our allies.

(U) In addition to a viable U.S. Military Assistance Program, Free World defenses against the continuing communist threat throughout East Asia rest on a combination of U.S.-allies bilateral treaties and SEATO. The combined power of the SEATO alliance continues to be the stabilizing factor in preserving the freedom and independence of nations in the Treaty area.

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(U) There is another major task ahead for the Free World in Asia and that is the vital role it must assume in nation building activities to give internal strength and security to the more than 300 million free people of the area. Business and industry have a tremendous stake in this venture and a great opportunity, too.

(U) As President Nixon has stated, the United States is a Pacific power and it will continue to maintain a presence in Asia as a vital national interest. I have no doubt that our assistance will be required and will be forthcoming in Asia in the years ahead. Our ultimate goal is the encouragement of strong, viable economies and democratic political processes in the nations of the region.



JOHN S. MCCAIN, JR.

Admiral, United States Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific

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PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the standpoint of CINCPAC. Additionally, the required annual report preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS to the extent that major decisions and directives of the JCS concerning the PACOM may be determined by historians of the JCS without research in the records of the PACOM. This 1970 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As in the case of previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those connected with international crises. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and achievements and omits "detailed" activities of subordinate unified commands or of Allied nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history is organized in the same manner as previous histories, primarily in line with the objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and the planning for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) This year's history is published in two volumes. A glossary and an index for the complete history are included in Volume II only. Pagination is complete within each volume. As in previous years, the annual histories prepared by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are included as Annexes A and B, respectively.

(U) The CINCPAC Command Historian, Colonel J. R. Johnson, USA, under the supervision of Colonel William C. Harrison, Jr., USAF, Secretary of the Joint


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Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, planned and published the 1970 CINCPAC Command History as required by CINCPAC Staff Instruction 5750.1D of 20 August 1968. Colonel Johnson personally researched and wrote Chapter IV with exception of several sections of the chapter.

(U) Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, former Senior Historian, outlined Chapters II and III prior to his departure from the CINCPAC Staff in November 1970. Chapters II and III were researched and written by Mr. Carl O. Clever, present Senior Historian. Mrs. Pauline Tallman, Assistant Historian, researched and wrote Chapter I and Section VI of Chapter IV. In addition she prepared the pictorial layout for the history. Colonel Lloyd C. Edwards, Jr., USAF, assisted in the preparation of the history by preparing several sections of Chapter IV and proof-reading parts of the manuscript.

(U) Miss Maggie M. Kaonohi, Clerk-Stenographer of CINCPAC Historical Branch, typed the manuscript in final format. Mrs. Marion M. Berndt compiled the index. Commander Nadine B. LaBonté prepared the glossary and proofread the manuscript. YN1 Thomas R. Heuer, USN, performed many tasks connected with readying the volumes for the printer. Mr. Edward Britos, Graphics Section, J0412, prepared all graphics for the history and Lithographer First Class Edward A. Donlin, USN, Reproduction Section, J0412, supervised the expeditious printing of the draft manuscript which facilitated staff coordination. Finally, the cooperation and assistance rendered by members of the CINCPAC Staff was invaluable.


J. R. JOHNSON
Colonel USA
CINCPAC Command Historian

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CHAPTER III - CINCPAC ACTIONS CONCERNING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES


Introduction

(U) The actions of CINCPAC concerning relationships between the U.S. and other PACOM countries were taken in his capacity as the senior U.S. military commander and spokesman in the Pacific. CINCPAC was the U.S. Military Advisor (USMILAD) to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and, through his representatives in Pacific countries, the military member of the U.S. overseas missions. The members of these missions were known as the Country Team (CT), which was headed by the U.S. Ambassador. Thus, CINCPAC participated in the negotiations and formulation of policy concerning such matters as defense agreements, the conduct of U.S. personnel in overseas areas, and the extent of jurisdiction to be exercised by host governments over U.S. military personnel. These relationships are discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 3.

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SECTION I - CINCPAC ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF SEATO

The Value of SEATO

(S) As the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine proceeded during 1970, including the withdrawal of sizeable U.S. Forces, the combined capability of the remaining U.S. and allied forces to deter aggression in Asia assumed greater importance. The success of this doctrine depended upon the promotion of a spirit of regional cohesion and cooperation among the allies of the U.S. Foremost among the vehicles for such promotion was SEATO. The significance of SEATO as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy was illustrated by an intelligence summary prepared by the CINCPAC staff in December 1970. This report reviewed the proposal by Russia that an "Asian Collective Security" system be established. This proposal was considered to have two main objectives: first, to counter the influence of Communist China; secondly, to undermine the influence and interests of the U.S. in Asia:¹

.....


.... Its actions might sow greater distrust amongst such traditional protagonists as India and Pakistan, or generate rivalries among nominal friends, such as Japan and India since the Soviet may seek Indian patronage to penetrate the area. Other Asia nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia, or Thailand may see opportunities to play the United States against the Soviet Union, or vice versa, and both against China. Under an effective threat of Soviet containment, Communist China could strike out as it did when seriously threatened in Korea....

(S) In 1968, a study had been conducted, under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), to examine possible alternatives to the SEATO alliance. The JCS concluded, and CINCPAC agreed, that no near-term and realistic substitute was feasible. In all of Asia, SEATO was the only multinational security arrangement which included Asians. Other associations, although possibly encouraged by the example of SEATO, were formed for cultural and economic cooperation. SEATO constituted a link in the system of alliances supported by the U.S. in Asia and the Pacific. In Northeast Asia, the U.S. was linked bilaterally with Japan, South Korea, and Nationalist China. In the Southeast, the U.S. was allied with the Philippines, and in the Southwest Pacific to Australia and New Zealand through the ANZUS Treaty. Australia and New Zealand coordinated defense planning

1. Point Paper, J2212, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 70, Subj: Soviet "Collective Security" Plan for Asia.

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NETWORK OF REGIONAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS



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with Great Britain, and these three maintained an external defense and mutual assistance agreement with Malaysia and Singapore. In the Middle East, the U.S. participated in the activities of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), as well as having defense agreements with Turkey and Iran. This elaborate system of alliances almost encircled Red China. Viewed as a means of linking other security pacts and agreements, SEATO constituted a deterrent to aggression across a wide geographical area.¹

(TS) SEATO provided the U.S. with a forum in Asia within which influence could be exerted in political as well as military fields. It had also provided a legal basis for the presence of U.S. forces in Vietnam and for U.S. air operations from bases in Thailand. It had served as an instrument to stimulate an awareness of the need for common action, as witnessed by the creation of exclusively Asian organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). The background of regional cooperation acquired in these organizations was a positive factor in the overall equation of Asian self-reliance.²

(U) These conclusions as to the value of SEATO were translated into a public reaffirmation of U.S. policy by Secretary of State William P. Rogers on the 16th anniversary of SEATO:³

.... The rapid development of the Southeast Asia region in the years since 1954 owes much to the protective shield provided by SEATO. The United States will continue to give the organization our strong support and encouragement....

(U) A more direct expression of the military value of SEATO was the welcoming statement by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., to the 33rd Military Advisors Conference in Hawaii on 15-16 October 1970:⁴


During the past 16 years, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has provided a sense of common purpose which, despite the difficulties of this period, has assisted in maintaining sufficient security for its members in the area to realize marked social and economic gains. The form of the threat

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. II, pp. 256, 257; Point Paper, J514, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Aug 69, Subj: The Future of SEATO as an Effective Security Arrangement, etc.
 2. Ibid.; Point Paper, J5141, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Jun 70, Subj: SEATO.
 3. News of Interest, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Sep 70, citing Associated Press dispatch from Bangkok.
 4. Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, "SEATO Welcoming Remarks," brochure for SEATO 33rd Military Advisors Conference, Hq CINCPAC, 15-16 Oct 70, p. 3.

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UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND



SOURCE: PACOM DIGEST FEB 71

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confronting the SEATO region has changed over the years but its nature has not; it remains a constant danger to past and future progress in the area. Nonetheless, through continued dedication to the collective and individual endeavors which have provided the SEATO shield, we should have no doubt that peace with freedom and stability can be maintained for members of the Organization and also be restored for other nations in the region....

U.S. Funds and Manpower for SEATO Headquarters

(U) Perhaps the most reliable perspective from which to view the value of SEATO to the U.S. was monetarily. The SEATO budget contained military and civil segments. The Chief, MPO prepared the military operating budget for his office, while a SEATO budget subcommittee prepared the civil portion. The total budget was submitted to the annual Council of Ministers meeting for approval. The SEATO budget for fiscal year (FY) 1970 was \$1,419,677, of which the U.S. share was \$354,919 or 25 percent. Source of funds by country was:¹

Australia	13.5%	Philippines	8.0%
France	13.5	Thailand	8.0
New Zealand	8.0	United Kingdom	16.0
Pakistan	8.0	United States	25.0

(U) Although the U.S. paid the lion's share, the status and influence realized by the U.S. in the Treaty area made the contribution one of the most fruitful of many worldwide financial obligations. The FY 71 estimated budget was \$1,314,234. After miscellaneous income inclusion in the estimate, the U.S. share would be \$323,314. The MPO portion of this budget was \$216,818.2

(U) On 27 January 1970, the JCS approved the U.S. military manpower authorizations for the SEATO MPO. Thirteen spaces were authorized effective 1 July 1970, which included three Army officers and two enlisted men, one officer and one enlisted from the Navy and Air Force, and two Marine officers. Two local national employees were also authorized. Approving a CINCPAC request, the JCS increased the total by one Army officer on 3 April 1970. The additional man facilitated the rotation of spaces within the MPO staff.³

SEATO Meetings and Conferences

(U) Conferences of the MILADs to SEATO were held twice a year, usually in April and October. The April meeting was normally held in conjunction with the

1. Point Paper, J5142, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Jun 70, Subj: SEATO Budget
2. Ibid.
3. JCS 8841/271716Z Jan 70; J1312 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70; JCS 4995/031958Z Apr 70; J1312 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.

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annual SEATO Council Meeting in various member countries on a rotational basis. This routine was altered slightly in 1970 because of student violence and instability in the Philippines. The 15th SEATO Council Meeting was originally scheduled to be held on 7-8 April in Manila, and the 32d MILAD Conference (MA 32C) on 2-3 April in the northern Luzon city of Baguio in the Philippines.¹

(C) The 15th Council meeting was held in Manila on 2-3 July 1970. The U.S. Council representative was SECSTATE Rogers. CINCPAC attended as a U.S. delegate, along with his political advisor (POLAD), his representative at SEATO Headquarters (USMILADREP), and his executive assistant. The meeting was chaired by Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo. As reported by the Associated Press, the hotel at which the meeting was held was under heavy guard, but demonstrations threatened by "leftist" students did not materialize.²

MANILA AP - The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization's Council of Ministers opened its 15th annual meeting on a stormy note today [2 July 1970] as Thailand's foreign minister denounced "Western politicians...for harassing and persecuting loyal SEATO members." In an obvious reference to U.S. Senate doves, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman said his own nation and others had been attacked with "unrestrained rage and fury...in a sad display of mental pollution and perversion." U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers sought to reassure the SEATO allies that under the Nixon Doctrine the United States intends to remain a Pacific power and will not withdraw into a shell of isolationism. "We will support the efforts of our Asian friends to maintain their own sovereignty and security," he said. But Rogers again emphasized that the Nixon administration, under the policy of Vietnamization, is turning over the primary responsibility for ground combat to the South Vietnamese and is looking to nations directly threatened by Communist forces to provide the manpower for their defense....

32d SEATO MILAD Conference

(C) The MA32C was held on its originally scheduled date, 2-3 April 1970, and thus preceded the Council of Ministers meeting by three months. The meeting

1. SECSTATE 023790/170042Z Feb 70; AMEMB Manila 1921/060715Z Mar 70; Point Paper, J514, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Mar 70; Subj: 15th SEATO Council Meeting and 32d MILAD Conference.
2. CINCPAC 240427Z Jun 70; SECSTATE 099879/242038Z Jun 70; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 70; Point Paper, J5142, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Jun 70, Subj: Location of SEATO MILAD and Council Meetings; News of Interest, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jul 70, citing AP news dispatch.

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was held in Baguio with Admiral McCain representing the U.S. as MILAD. The chairman was General Manual Yan, the Philippine MILAD. The MILADs approved the "Program of Future Work" to be accomplished by the Military Planning Office (MPO) for the following 12-month period, and a tentative agenda for MA33C. Although the October meetings were normally held in Bangkok, the venue was changed to Hawaii upon agreement between the Thailand and U.S. MILADs.¹

(TS) Agenda items discussed included changes to plans, standard operating procedures (SOP) development, the schedule of exercises, and force planning factors. During the formal statements and presentations by the MILADs, the United Kingdom MILAD noted that the UK would remain a member of SEATO after the withdrawal of British forces from Singapore and Malaysia in December 1971. He also announced that, after 1971, the UK would continue to be represented on the same scale on the permanent military side of SEATO Headquarters. The Thailand and Philippine MILADs discussed the insurgency and subversion in their countries, and the U.S. MILAD presented an overview of the worldwide situation. In particular, Admiral McCain briefed the delegates on the PACOM military situation, the Vietnam conflict, and the modernization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.²

33rd SEATO MILAD Conference

(C) The first MILAD Conference to be held in Hawaii was MA33C, held at Camp Smith, Oahu on 15-16 October 1970. The chairman was the Australian MILAD, General Sir John Wilton. In addition to the CINCPAC staff, administrative support for MA33C was provided by CINCPAC's Army, Navy, and Air Force components.³

(S) Among the agenda items were changes to plans, approval of partially completed SOPs, affirmation of the exercise schedule, and the selection of London for the site of MA34C in 1971:⁴

.....

USMILAD reviewed the military situation in Southeast Asia, pointing out the security dangers posed by the Soviet Union, Red China, North Vietnam, and North Korea. He described the growing naval power and activities of the Soviets in the Indian Ocean and its effect on the western flank of the Treaty area. He reaffirmed that SEATO was an indispensable shield to check the communist threat....

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1. CINCPAC 031130Z Apr 70; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
 2. Ibid.
 3. CINCPAC 021321Z Jul 70.
 4. CINCPAC 172247Z Oct 70; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 70.

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Admiral McCain headed the U.S. delegation at the thirty-third SEATO Conference of Military Advisers. MA33C was the first MILAD conference to be held in Hawaii. Above, Admiral McCain, left, host of MA33C, relinquishes the rostrum to the chairman, General Sir John Wilton, Australia.



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(S) The Thailand MILAD described the communist activities in Thailand, and expressed his belief that the communists wished to establish a regime in Cambodia to serve as a base of operations against Thailand. He noted that his government had supplied equipment, aircraft, river patrol boats, trains, and equipment repairs to the Cambodian Lon Nol government. He also warned that the Chinese Communist road construction from South China through northern Laos toward Thailand indicated Chinese intent to support communist insurgents in Thailand with arms and equipment.¹

Functional Meetings/Activities

(U) During 1970, as in previous years, meetings were held and policy formulated in specific functional areas; i.e., medicine, intelligence, cartography, and communications, by standing committees on which CINCPAC was represented by members of his staff and component command staff personnel. While some of these meetings, because of policy or budget constraints, produced few tangible results, others accomplished significant benefits within the SEATO framework.

Medical

(U) At the 15th Council of Ministers meeting in Manila, it was noted that encouraging economic progress had continued throughout the Treaty area. An example was the Pakistan-SEATO Cholera Research Laboratory (CRL) in Dacca, financed jointly by Pakistan, the U.S., the U.K., and Australia. A cholera epidemic in Thailand in 1958 and 1959 had focused attention on the threat in Southeast Asia and the need for increased research into the causes. Shortly thereafter, in 1960, the CRL was established. This laboratory represented the first formal, organized and continuous attempt to eradicate cholera in Asia.²

(C) A more recent example of progress in the medical area was the result of a proposal that SEATO enter actively into the field of medical civic action. The Secretariat had suggested that an Expert Study Group (ESG) be convened "to determine the most effective way for SEATO to be involved" in medical action in conjunction with its economic improvement programs. The ESG would meet in June 1970 following the scheduled 4th annual SEATO Military Medical Committee (MED4M) on 1-5 June. The view of the U.S. Ambassador, as conveyed to SECSTATE and CINCPAC on 11 May 1970, was that SEATO should act as a catalyst in stimulating and encouraging member nations, rather than be directly involved. After the Permanent

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1. Ibid.; Memorandum, J22 to J3, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Oct 70, Subj: Report of SEATO MA33C, 15-16 Oct 70.
 2. Manju Das Gupta, "A Scourge is Checked," Free World, USIS Manila, Vol. XIX, No. 8, pp. 5-7.

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Working Group (PWG) had revised the proposal, the Ambassador agreed that an ESG meeting could be fruitful. Its purpose would be to inquire into:¹

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- A. Augmenting background information on extent and nature of health problems in three regional member countries;
 - B. Identifying health problems exploited by insurgents;
 - C. Suggesting how regional governments can provide services to alleviate these problems;
 - D. Identifying areas and priorities for member government assistance;
 - E. Considering "ways in which SEATO may be instrumental in stimulating effective action in this field...."

(C) Following the MED-4M at SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok on 1-5 June 1970, the ESG convened to discuss a program of civil and military medical action. This meeting was chaired by Dr. David Gray, and the U.S. delegation was headed by RADM Frank B. Voris, CINCPAC Surgeon. The agenda included the organization of government health services, systems for delivering health care to rural areas, medical and para-medical training, and priorities in the field of health care. Emphasis was given to methods of neutralizing the exploitation of problem areas by insurgents and subversives. As a result of these discussions, the ESG recommended that training in community health be incorporated into the curricula of medical and nursing schools. Another recommendation was to establish training centers for rural health workers and to upgrade the recruitment and training programs for nurses, para-medics, midwives, and sanitarians. Finally, the ESG recommended that SEATO assist in the provision of equipment for first class health centers and rural health units.²

(U) The SEATO Medical Committee Fourth Meeting (MED-4M) was held at the SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok, Thailand, on 1-5 June 1970. RADM Voris headed a U.S. delegation of 12 members. Over 60 delegates and observers from the various SEATO member nations attended. Twenty-two agenda items were examined. These covered communicable disease control, medical civic action, noninfectious environmental health hazard control, aviation medicine, diving medicine, military

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- 1. AMEMB Bangkok 5673/111000Z May 70.
 - 2. J76 History, Hq CINCPAC, 1970.

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nutrition, medical and para-medical training, drug abuse, patient evacuation, and medical organization administration. The most noteworthy agenda items were:¹

- a. Review of the Malaria Situation.
- b. Problems of Circadian Rhythm.
- c. Medical Aspects of Free, Swimming, and Shallow Water Diving Operations.
- d. Evacuation of Casualties to Include Methods, Time Factor, and Resuscitation Policy.
- e. The Abuse of Drugs by Servicemen.

Communications

(S) In the communications field, a SEATO Communications-Electronics Instruction (CEI) had been developed by the C-E specialist committee which consolidated the channel requirements for SEATO plans. In March 1970, the MPO requested member nations to review total channel requirements and to indicate which were common to each SEATO plan. As the Force Commander (Designate) for Plans 4 and 6, CINCUSARPAC was tasked by CINCPAC to provide input for the review, as was COMUSMACV, who was Central Region SEATO Field Force Commander (Designate).²

(S) The updated dedicated and common user needs for all plans were expected to become the SEATO Communications SOP following discussion at the next committee meeting:³

.....

.... Following CEI3M, U.S. may be tasked to perform a detailed engineering study with then existing and planned ICS-SEA assets, Telephone System of Thailand, and Royal Thai Air Force TRC-24 system as a matrix, and identify shortfall of in-country capability to support total C-E channel requirements, for each plan. Additionally, the impact of fixed system phase down and turnover program in Thailand and the RVNAF I&M program will have considerable impact on the U.S. capability to provide SEATO channel requirements

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1. J76 History, Hq CINCPAC, 1970.
 2. CINCPAC 22221Z Apr 70; J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 70.
 3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 202314Z Oct 70.

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and will be a prime consideration during future discussions in this area....

Intelligence

(S) In January 1970, CINCPAC noted, in a message to the JCS, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had developed intelligence studies relating to Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean. However, similar studies on the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and adjacent Southeast Asian waters had not been undertaken by SEATO. CINCPAC believed that SEATO should sponsor a study of the military, political, and economic implications of the Soviet activity. Such a study would enhance the viability of SEATO, enlarge its overall perspective of the communist threat, and eventually lead to a greater commonality of interest among the member nations. Therefore, in his capacity as U.S. MILAD, CINCPAC intended to request that the Chief, MPO obtain the concurrence of the other member nations to initiate such a study. CINCPAC received JCS approval of this proposal on 15 January 1970.¹

(S) In February, CINCPAC responded to a JCS request to suggest agenda items for the Third Naval Coordination Conference of CENTO. Among the topics suggested by CINCPAC was the feasibility of a study, similar to that recommended for SEATO, of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. ".... The threat posed by the increased presence of Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean appears quite similar to the threat to SEATO nations, except for the geographical orientation of the two treaty areas...." CINCPAC suggested that information developed by the studies could be exchanged between CENTO and SEATO to enhance naval coordination and cooperation in the Indian Ocean area. However, because of the comparatively junior level of the participants in the CENTO meeting, this topic was not included on the conference agenda.²

(S) The subject of Soviet intentions was accepted as a legitimate concern of SEATO, and received special mention during the 33d MILAD Conference. The Philippine MILAD noted the marked increase of Russian mercantile, naval, research, and shipping operations in the western and southwestern Pacific Ocean areas. He considered that there was a need to determine the nature of this activity, and suggested that the Intelligence Committee be instructed to report on the affect of this Soviet activity on SEATO's eastern flank. At the same time, he suggested that an up-dated report be submitted regarding Soviet naval

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1. CINCPAC 072342Z Jan 70; JCS 8093/151635Z Jan 70, cited in CINCPAC 110339Z Mar 70.
 2. CINCPAC 110339Z Mar 70; USECTO Ankara Turkey 16/170745Z Mar 70; JCS 5268/070206Z Apr 70; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.

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activities in the Indian Ocean. This suggestion was approved by all the MILADs.¹

(S) Another subject concerning SEATO intelligence was what the Australian MILAD referred to as the, "...delay in incorporating approved intelligence in SEATO plans...." He suggested that the MPO review the current procedure and recommend a method to assure that SEATO plans were continuously related to the latest agreed intelligence. The U.S. and U.K. MILADs concurred without comment. The New Zealand MILAD noted that this was not a new problem, and was not optimistic regarding a solution. The Philippine MILAD stated that the problem must be corrected, while the Thailand MILAD suggested a standing intelligence committee within the MPO. This committee would produce current intelligence instead of that produced by the semi-annual intelligence committee meetings.²

(S) After the MA33C had adjourned, the CINCPAC Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence summarized the problem in a memorandum to Admiral McCain entitled "Delay in Incorporating Approved Intelligence into SEATO Plans." The procedure then in use depended upon two military intelligence meetings each year. One convened in the fall to assess the overall communist threat to the treaty area and update all SEATO military intelligence documents. The report of this meeting had to be approved by each member nation before being made available to the planners. Six months later, an intelligence working group convened to review significant events and update the intelligence. The agreed intelligence report issued by the 15th Intelligence Committee meeting (INT15M) on 10 November 1969 had not been approved by all member nations until March 1970. A working party report of 27 April 1970 had not been approved by all nations until 22 July. Intelligence in the latest planning cycle was from three to six months old. The following actions were suggested to reduce the delay:³

(1) Schedule the intelligence meetings to precede the preparation by the MPO of the position paper for the agenda of the MILAD meeting. In developing the threat estimate and intelligence update during the Intelligence Meeting, emphasis will be focused on changes to plans that are programmed to be reviewed and approved by the MILADs.

(2) Obtain agreement of each nation to delegate approving authority to their senior intelligence representative attending the Intelligence Meeting.

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1. Memorandum, J22 to J2, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Oct 70, Subj: Report of SEATO MA33C, 15-16 Oct 70.
 2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 172247Z Oct 70.
 3. Memorandum, J2 (BGEN Gorman) to CINCPAC (Admiral McCain), 30 Oct 70, Subj: Delay in Incorporating Approved Intelligence into SEATO Plans.

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CURRENT FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE & SEATO PLANS

AGENCY	ALL MEMBER NATIONS (INTEL MEETING)	ALL MEMBER NATIONS	MPO	CINCPAC	JCS	MEMBER NATIONS (MILAD CONF.)
TIME REQUIRED		90-120 days	20 days	30 days	60 days	
PURPOSE	1. INTEL Meet. 2. Develop intelligence for Threat Areas	1. Obtain National approval of intelligence agreed at INT Meeting	1. Prepare plans based on nationally approved intelligence	1. Staff and Review Plans 2. CINCPAC approval	1. Staff and Review Plans 2. National approval	1. MILAD Conference 2. MILAD approval

PROPOSED FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE & SEATO PLANS

AGENCY	ALL MEMBER NATIONS	MPO	CINCPAC	JCS	ALL MEMBER NATIONS
TIME REQUIRED		20 days	30 days	60 days	
PURPOSE	1. Develop intelligence for Threat Area 2. Obtain National approval (*) of intel agreed	1. Prepare plans based on nationally approved intelligence (1)	1. Staff and Review Plans 2. CINCPAC approval (1)	1. Staff and Review Plans 2. National approval (1)	1. MILAD Conference 2. MILAD approval (2)

LEGEND:

- (1) ELECTRICAL UPDATE
- (2) INTEL REPRESENTATIVE ATTEND MILAD MEETING
- (*) National approving authority delegated to senior Intelligence representative


SOURCE: J2, HQ CINCPAC-30 OCTOBER 1970

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(3) In order to furnish the planners with current intelligence during the time lapse between the Intelligence Meeting adjournment and MILAD meeting, establish a system of electrical updating. Emphasis will be directed toward the plans or changes to plans scheduled for consideration and approval at the MILAD meeting. This system would furnish the updated plan with the latest intelligence.

(4) For each MILAD conference, schedule intelligence representation to serve in an advisory capacity to sub-committee meetings and to the MILAD. This would provide the latest intelligence for use in the plans proposed for approval by the MILAD.




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PLAN 4 - DEFENSE SEASIA, INCLUDING PAKISTAN & PHILIPPINES, AGAINST OVERT CHICOM & NVN AGGRESSION


APPOINTED NATION - U.S.



(1) CDR and Staff (Central Region) serve also as CDR and Staff of Ground Component

PLAN 5 - INSURGENCY IN LAOS

APPOINTED NATION - THAILAND



(1) CDR and Staff serve also as CDR and Staff of Ground Component


(2) CDR to be determined later

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
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PLAN 6-DEF. PROTOCOL COUNTRIES AGAINST NVN OVERT AGGRESSION



(1) CSFF and Staff serve also as CDR and Staff of Ground Component

PLAN 7 - INSURGENCY IN REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM



(1) CSFF and Staff serve also as the CDR and Staff Ground Component

(2) CDR to be determined later


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PLAN 8 - INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

APPOINTED NATION - THAILAND



(1) CDR and Staff serve also as the CDR and Staff Ground Component

(2) CDR to be determined later

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SEATO Plans and SOPs

(TS) For each SEATO Operations Plan (OPLAN), one of the SEATO member nations was named as the "Appointed Nation." This nation, as the executive agent for the plan, designated the SEATO "Force Commander." Operational control of combat and combat support forces assigned to the SEATO force was exercised by the Force Commander through a "SEATO Field Forces Commander" (CSFF), who had primary responsibility for the conduct of military operations by SEATO forces. For each plan, the CSFF was provided with ground, air, naval (when applicable), base area, and special task force components. (See adjacent charts for command relationships.)¹

(TS) At each MILAD Conference, changes to plans were submitted by the MPO for discussion and approval. During MA32C and MA33C, SEATO Plans 4 and 6 were updated and assigned the current year (70) designation. Previous CINCPAC Command Histories listed the plans in force, and, for ease of reference, were also included in this chapter:²

MPO Plan 4/70. Defense of Southeast Asia, including Pakistan and the Philippines, against attack by Communist Chinese forces and those of North Vietnam. Appointed Nation for plan is the United States; Force Commander is CINCUSARPAC. Field Forces Commanders: COMUSMACV for Central Region; Republic of Philippines for Eastern Region; and Pakistan for Western Region.

MPO Plan 5/69. Assist the Royal Laotian Government to counter communist insurgency in order to establish conditions which will maintain the security and independence of Laos. Appointed nation for plan is Thailand; Force Commander, Field Marshal Thanom; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACTHAI.

MPO Plan 6/70. Defense of the Protocol States against an attack by forces of NVN. Appointed Nation for Plan is United States; Force Commander, CINCUSARPAC; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACV.

MPO Plan 7/64. Assist the Government of South Vietnam to counter communist insurgency and regain control of its territory so as to establish conditions in which it can resolve

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1. Point Paper, J5142, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Jun 70, Subj: SEATO Command Relationships.
 2. Point Paper, J5142, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Jun 70, Subj: SEATO Plans.

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its problems and maintain its security and independence. This plan is not being kept current due to the fact that the events in Vietnam today have made the plan OBE. Appointed Nation, United States; Force Commander, CINCUSARPAC; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACV.

MPO Plan 8/69. Assist the Royal Thai Government to counter communist insurgency in Thailand. Appointed Nation for plan is Thailand; Force Commander, Field Marshal Thanom; Field Forces Commander, COMUSMACTHAI.

[REDACTED]

(C) In August 1970, the Chief, MPO requested authority to consult directly with the planning staffs of commanders responsible for the preparation of contingency support plans to the SEATO plans. The USMILADREP in Bangkok advised CINCPAC that, while such direct consultation could be of mutual benefit, the review and approval role of the CSFF should be protected and emphasized. On 15 September 1970, CINCPAC informed the U.S. commanders concerned that coordination and consultation between staffs of subordinate and component commanders and the SEATO MPO was encouraged and approved. However, it was to be accomplished in conjunction with, and as deemed appropriate by, the designated Force and Field Force Commanders. This position was passed by the USMILADREP to the Chief, MPO as CINCPAC policy for U.S. planning staffs responsible for the preparation of SEATO plans.¹

(S) SEATO Plan 4 was the only plan which provided for the designation of three regional CSFFs - western, central, and eastern. In July 1970, the Commander Eastern Region SEATO Field Forces (Designate - Philippines) proposed a conference with representatives of U.S. base commanders in the Philippines to discuss policies and guidance. He considered that the development of that part of the Eastern Region Plan 4/70 which provided for the defense of U.S. military installations should be coordinated with the base commanders. On 18 July 1970, CINCPAC requested his representative in the Philippines (CINCPACREP PHIL) to act for him in arranging the coordination between the Eastern Region Commander (Designate) and appropriate U.S. base commanders in the Philippines. This action established a new procedure and precedent in CINCPAC's relationship to CINCPACREP PHIL.²

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1. USMILADREP SEATO, Bangkok 200300Z Aug 70; CINCPAC 150300Z Sep 70; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 70.
 2. CINCPAC 182216Z Jul 70; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.

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(S) Under guidance received during MA31C and MA32C, action was begun to incorporate information common to all SEATO plans into single source documents with the ultimate goal of developing SEATO Force Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in all functional areas. In June 1970, CINCPAC staff planners initiated SEATO Force SOP planning discussions in Bangkok. Representatives of CINCUSARPAC, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAI also attended this planning session. Draft SOPs were developed and circulated to CINCPAC and the commanders of the military representatives who had attended the planning meeting. CINCPAC also requested comments from CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT. He then informed the USMILADREP that, with the exception of implied deviations from accepted command and control procedures, which should be corrected, the SOPs could be presented for review at MA33C.¹

(S) The SOPs were developed in two volumes. Volume I contained policies and procedures pertaining to SEATO Forces as a whole, while Volume II was to contain information relevant to the organization, functions, and internal operations of Headquarters, SEATO Force. CINCPAC agreed in principle with the framework of the SOPs, but recommended that further development adhere to the concept that an SOP at SEATO Force level contain only general, high-level policy and guidance to the force as a whole. Specific direction and detailed guidance should be included in SFF and component command SOPs. He also recommended that Volume II, Headquarters SEATO Force receive priority of effort for future development of SOPs. Information thus developed would be an immediate requirement if the headquarters, and the entire force, were to be able to assemble and deploy as rapidly as envisioned in the SEATO plans. The other major exception taken by CINCPAC to the SOPs as then developed related to Annex H., SEATO Psychological Operations, in which the words and phrases were vague and clumsy. His revised wording and other recommendations were approved by the JCS as the official USMILAD position. The development of the proposed SOPs as presented by the USMILAD was approved by the SEATO MILADs at MA33C in Hawaii on 15-16 October 1970.²

SEATO Exercises

(S) The benefits to be derived from frequent SEATO exercises were recognized by military and civilian officials alike. In June 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand emphasized these benefits in a message to SECSTATE:³

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1. USMILADREP SEATO 37/70/060850Z May 70; CINCPAC 100139Z May 70; CINCPAC 150325Z May 70; CINCPAC 260231Z May 70; CINCPAC 171819Z Jun 70; CINCPAC 010335Z Jul 70; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 70.
 2. CINCPAC 222122Z Jul 70; CINCPAC 140344Z Aug 70; JCS 1614/221547Z Sep 70; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 70.
 3. AMEMB Bangkok 7181/150045Z Jun 70.

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.... While the implementation of any of the plans remains highly unlikely, they are useful in providing the opportunity for joint allied military planning and establishing a framework in which SEATO military exercises can take place. The importance of the exercises lies in their public relations/high visibility factor and their attractions of military components of six member nations for joint maneuvers and study. We should endorse the maintenance of the momentum of staging regular SEATO exercises....

(C) CINCPAC reaffirmed the position of his headquarters when he published Instruction 03550.1D on 15 September 1970. This instruction prescribed policy, procedures, and reporting requirements for the conduct of military exercises in PACOM, and defined SEATO exercises as significant. Enclosure One of the instruction, entitled "SEATO Exercises," outlined channels for organizing planning conferences, specified case-by-case authorization by CINCPAC of direct coordination with exercise directors, and specified that SEATO exercises would be reported by U.S. commanders under Significant Exercise Report criteria.¹

(C) During 1970, CINCPAC's staff was concerned with three SEATO exercises, two of which took place in 1970 and one which was scheduled to be held in March 1971. The first of the 1970 exercises was called SEA ROVER.

SEATO Exercise PX-41 (SEA ROVER)

(S) Exercise PX-41 was a maritime exercise involving the use of naval surface ships and maritime aircraft, combined with a naval control-of-shipping command post exercise. The scenario called for the implementation of SEATO Plan 4. Member nations had transferred control of some naval forces under national command which had been in the area to SEATO. Deployment had commenced and support shipping was converging on the area. Intelligence had determined that aggressor submarines were deployed in the South China Sea, and that ports of entry could be mined. Long range bombers with nuclear capability had been observed at aggressor bases in South China. The Director of PX-41 was RADM William T. Rapp, Commander Patrol Force Seventh Fleet, U.S. Navy. More than 40 naval vessels participated, including an aircraft carrier. Land-based aircraft also took part. The U.S. provided two destroyers, one minesweeper, one mine counter-measures ship, one oiler, two submarines, and six patrol aircraft.²

1. CINCPACINST 03550.1D, J3, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Sep 70.

2. CINCPAC 180027Z Jan 70; J3B15 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70.

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(C) SEA ROVER was held from 23 March to 9 April 1970. The exercise started in Manila Bay and terminated in the Gulf of Thailand near Sattahip. The Exercise Director considered SEA ROVER to be a highly successful demonstration of cooperation and coordination.¹

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3. The willingness and mutual understanding displayed at all levels throughout all phases of this exercise have been outstanding. This has enabled all units and all members of this exercise to achieve new heights of cooperation and coordination and has most assuredly improved the readiness of SEATO maritime forces. I believe the significant improvements in many areas will serve as guideposts for all future exercises within SEATO....

SEATO Exercise PX-46 (AIR CHANDRA)

(C) Preliminary planning for AIR CHANDRA was held in May 1970, when date of the exercise was changed from 1-13 November to the period from 24 October to 6 November 1970. On 6 June, CINCPAC tasked component and sub-unified commands to prepare for the exercise, and, in August 1970, the final planning conference was held.²

(S) Exercise PX-46 was a small-scale symposium exercise on air resupply, combined with a public display of member nation aircraft in Bangkok. The airlift symposium was oriented toward SEATO Plan 4 resupply. Six transport and combat aircraft were provided by the U.S. for display and 12 officers served as exercise players. The U.S. also presented briefings on the Base Area Command operating procedures, airlift operations in Vietnam, and aerial port operations.³

(U) Phase I of AIR CHANDRA, the static display of aircraft, was conducted at Don Muang Royal Thai Air Force Base on 24-25 October. The C-5 Galaxy was one of the 22 aircraft from five SEATO nations on display. The symposium portion of the exercise was conducted under the direction of MGEN L. F. Tanberg, Vice Commander, Thirteenth Air Force.⁴

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1. CTF 470, 090315Z Apr 70.
 2. J3B16 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 70; CINCPAC 060508Z Jun 70; CINCPAC 230538Z Jul 70.
 3. Point Paper, J3B13, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Jun 70, Subj: SEATO Exercise PX-46.
 4. J3B15 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 70; News of Interest, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Oct 70, citing Associated Press dispatch from Bangkok, Thailand.

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Planning for SEATO Exercise PX-43

(C) SEATO Exercise PX-43 was agreed upon by all member nations at MA31C. It was to be an airborne/amphibious assault based upon the counter-offensive phase of SEATO Plan 4. The director was to be provided by the Philippines, with the U.S. and Philippines as co-sponsors. The exercise was designed to provide experience in the technique and coordination involved in mounting a ground/amphibious operation.¹

(S) The exercise scenario envisioned the activation of SEATO Plan 4. The aggressor forces had made advances into SEATO territory. An offensive was launched by SEATO air and naval forces to gain air superiority, delay the enemy advance, and interdict lines of communication. In order to seize the initiative from the aggressor, a ground/amphibious operation was to be mounted against him. On 29 July 1970, CINCPAC directed his subordinate commands to provide delegates to the pre-planning conference to be held in Manila from 31 August through 4 September. Two representatives were to attend from CINCPAC's staff.²

(C) On 21 November 1970, CINCPAC requested that delegates be named to the initial planning conference for PX-43 in Bangkok on 17-20 November. By the end of 1970, Philippine MGEN Espino had been selected as the Exercise Director, and the U.S. had declared 5,095 personnel to participate.³

SEATO/Pacific Defense College

(C) Intermittently since 1956, the feasibility and practicality of establishing a Pacific Defense College (PDC) was discussed by the U.S. with the Philippines and in the SEATO arena. Initially, CINCPAC had supported the idea, and in 1956 had submitted a proposal to the JCS for a Military Assistance Program (MAP)-supported school without SEATO sponsorship. However, during the MA6C SEATO conference in March 1957, the Philippine MILAD proposed the formation of a SEATO Defense College. When the SEATO MILADs deferred action, discussions between the U.S. and the Philippines led to plans for a PDC and the Philippine MILAD withdrew his SEATO proposal in 1958. Preliminary planning continued, with Baguio in Northern Luzon selected as the tentative location for the college.⁴

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1. Point Paper, J3B13, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Jun 70, Subj: SEATO Exercise PX-43.
 2. CINCPAC 292105Z Jul 70; Point Paper, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Aug 70, Subj: SEATO Exercise PX-43; J3B16 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 70.
 3. CINCPAC 210011Z Oct 70; Point Paper, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Dec 70, Subj: SEATO Exercise PX-43.
 4. CINCPAC Command History 1964, pp. 229-231.

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As planning proceeded, however, it became apparent that the Filipinos wanted more out of the college than the U.S. could afford to pay. Not only was the U.S. expected to pay most of the costs, including supplemental living allowances for Filipino staff members, but was also expected to permit appointment of a Filipino commandant.

(C) By October 1959, it became obvious that the differences between the U.S. and Philippine positions could not be resolved. CINCPAC, therefore, sought an amicable withdrawal from the project by means of a jointly-determined re-entry to SEATO consideration. The Philippine MILAD was persuaded to resubmit the PDC proposal to SEATO during the MA13C meeting in November 1960.¹

(S) The SEATO member nations were polled as to their need for a school patterned after the NATO Defense College. The MILADs did not agree that such a school was needed in SEATO, because the service schools in the member nations fulfilled the function. The USMILAD's position matched the consensus; he felt that a SEATO Defense College was not necessary from the U.S. point of view. In late 1963 or early 1964, the SEATO MILADs decided to take no further action toward the establishment of a SEATO Defense College.²

(C) In July 1964, the State Department circulated a paper which postulated the need for a PDC to offset a growing feeling internationally that Communist China, having developed a nuclear capability, was the dominant power in Asia. Both CINCPAC and the JCS considered such a rationale insufficient to alter their previous position:³

CINCPAC considered it doubtful that the establishment of a Pacific Defense College on a unilateral basis would offer appreciable advantages over courses already available to foreign officers in existing U.S. service schools and felt that difficulty would be experienced in student availability since most Asian countries did not have enough talented military men who could be spared for long periods of time. While concluding that there might be cogent reasons from the political-psychological viewpoint for establishing the College, CINCPAC did not consider

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1960, pp. 200-203.
 2. Point Paper, J5126, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Oct 69, Subj: Pacific Defense College; Point Paper, J5142, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Jun 70, Subj: SEATO Defense College; CINCPAC Command History 1964, pp. 229-231. The 1964 history gives the date of the MILAD decision as December 1963; the 26 Jun 70 Point Paper states the decision was made in MA20C, which was held in Apr 64.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1964, p. 231.

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such a school essential to his mission. He therefore recommended to the JCS that the Pacific Defense College not be established. The JCS concurred with CINCPAC's position and informed OSD that the training of foreign officers by the U.S. on a unilateral basis could be accomplished satisfactorily in CONUS schools.

(S) The subject did not surface again until 1968 during a meeting of the joint U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board (MDB). At that meeting, an ad hoc study group was formed which recommended that a PDC be established at Mactan Air Base in the Philippines, in buildings to be rehabilitated by the U.S. at a cost of \$50,000. The Philippines would pay the costs of operations and maintenance, and the school would be open to students from Australia, Burma, Cambodia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, the U.K., the U.S., and Vietnam. CINCPAC's position at that time was that, if such a school were indeed needed, it should be sponsored by SEATO rather than bilaterally.¹

(S) During 1970, the subject came full circle once more, albeit with one variation. In February 1970, CINCUSARPAC proposed to USMILAD that the U.S. revive the SEATO Defense College project because of "...significant changes in the SEAsia foreign policies of member nations," and the Nixon Doctrine declaration emphasizing Asian self-help. In March, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (and CINCPAC's counterpart on the MDB) announced his intention to approach the USMILAD regarding a SEATO Defense College.²

(S) In spite of CINCPAC's position against the establishment of a bilaterally sponsored college, the MDB group had continued its deliberations into 1970. However, in an apparently parallel move to his March 1970 MDB pronouncement about approaching the USMILAD, the Philippine MDB representative proposed on 25 August 1970 that further study on the PDC be held in abeyance. He cited the austere funding of the Philippine Armed Forces, and suggested that, "...either U.S. or Phil panel could raise the issue if further events so dictate." CINCPAC, as the senior U.S. representative to the MDB, agreed with CINCPACREP PHIL's proposal to let the PDC issue lie dormant until raised again by the Philippines.³

SEATO Orientation Courses

(U) As related in the CINCPAC History, approval was granted in 1969 by CINCPAC for a briefing on the Vietnam situation to be presented at SEATO Headquarters

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1. Point Paper, J5126, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Nov 69, Subj: Pacific Defense College.
 2. Point Paper, J5142, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Jun 70, Subj: SEATO Defense College.
 3. CINCPACREP PHIL to CINCPAC (personal to Admiral McCain from RADM Muse), 261247Z Aug 70; CINCPAC 280903Z Aug 70; J5123 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 70.

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and the Thailand National Defense College. This briefing, in conjunction with SEATO Orientation Course 1-70, was to be attended by senior officers from Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, U.K., and 15 U.S. officers.¹

(U) USMILAD advised the JCS, PACOM component commanders, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAI of assigned quotas for 1-70, which was held from 2 March through 9 March 1970. The second course was held from 15 June through 22 June 1970, and the last for Calendar Year 1970 was held from 9 November through 16 November 1970. A CINCPAC briefing team again presented a Vietnam update at the third meeting of Course delegates. In response to a request from COMUSMACTHAI, the team also briefed the MACTHAI staff on 10 November 1970.²

Wearing of SEATO Badge

(U) On 17 December 1969, the Chief, MPO had requested the comments of USMILAD on a proposed SEATO policy for the wearing of the SEATO badge by personnel affiliated with the organization. USMILAD approved the proposal on 7 January 1970. However, he recommended that authorization to wear the badge be subject to the regulations of individual member nations, because, "Individual services, within a single nation, often have separate and varying policies concerning the wearing of badges, awards, decorations, etc....."³

(U) USMILAD also recommended that eligibility requirements be modified to permit those officers with at least one year of service on the staff of the SEATO MPO to wear the badge.⁴

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, pp. 246-247.
 2. CINCPAC 200239Z Jan 70; USMILADREP SEATO 270300Z Apr 70; CINCPAC 080343Z May 70; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 70; CINCPAC 180145Z Sep 70; J5142 History, Hq CINCPAC, Nov 70; USMILADREP SEATO 140335Z Sep 70; CINCPAC 152237Z Sep 70; CINCPAC 200305Z Oct 70; COMUSMACTHAI 020903Z Nov 70; CINCPAC 030354Z Nov 70; J554 History, Hq CINCPAC, Nov 70.
 3. CINCPAC 072313Z Jan 70.
 4. Ibid.; J5141 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70.

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THEORY

The first part of the theory is the definition of the function $f(x)$ and the function $g(x)$. The function $f(x)$ is defined as the function which is continuous at x and the function $g(x)$ is defined as the function which is discontinuous at x .

The second part of the theory is the definition of the function $h(x)$ and the function $k(x)$. The function $h(x)$ is defined as the function which is continuous at x and the function $k(x)$ is defined as the function which is discontinuous at x .

PROOF

The first part of the proof is the definition of the function $f(x)$ and the function $g(x)$. The function $f(x)$ is defined as the function which is continuous at x and the function $g(x)$ is defined as the function which is discontinuous at x .

The second part of the proof is the definition of the function $h(x)$ and the function $k(x)$. The function $h(x)$ is defined as the function which is continuous at x and the function $k(x)$ is defined as the function which is discontinuous at x .

The third part of the proof is the definition of the function $l(x)$ and the function $m(x)$. The function $l(x)$ is defined as the function which is continuous at x and the function $m(x)$ is defined as the function which is discontinuous at x .

The fourth part of the proof is the definition of the function $n(x)$ and the function $o(x)$. The function $n(x)$ is defined as the function which is continuous at x and the function $o(x)$ is defined as the function which is discontinuous at x .

The fifth part of the proof is the definition of the function $p(x)$ and the function $q(x)$. The function $p(x)$ is defined as the function which is continuous at x and the function $q(x)$ is defined as the function which is discontinuous at x .

CONCLUSION

The first part of the conclusion is the definition of the function $r(x)$ and the function $s(x)$. The function $r(x)$ is defined as the function which is continuous at x and the function $s(x)$ is defined as the function which is discontinuous at x .

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SECTION II - CINCPAC POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(S) CINCPAC's mission was to support U.S. national policy in the Pacific area. As described previously in this history, national policy during 1970 included the lowering of the U.S. military profile in Asia, combined with the encouragement of self-help and regional cooperation on the part of friendly Asian nations. Withdrawals of U.S. forces, redeployments to other locations, and the consequent reductions in the employment of indigenous civilian employees led to speculation as to the ultimate policy of the U.S. towards Asia. Political reaction was oftentimes manifested by adverse foreign interpretations of provisions in Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs) and mutual defense agreements, as well as harassment of U.S. overseas personnel. In many instances, these politically motivated actions were rooted in history and were continuing concerns of CINCPAC and other U.S. officials. For example, the problem of increased sentences imposed by appeal courts in Taiwan was first discussed in 1968, and continued to warrant attention in 1969 and 1970. Again, the abrupt abrogation of long-standing practices under the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) by the Philippine Government was a continuing matter for concern in 1968, 1969, and 1970.¹

(S) Purely political developments in PACOM also had a potential for impact on CINCPAC's military responsibilities. Two CINCPAC staff resumes in December 1970 linked the U.S. troop reductions in Vietnam and Korea to the economic and political environment in which national elections would be held in 1971. In Korea, for example, the U.S. troop reduction was considered to be, "...a delicate internal political problem..." which would require economic adjustments. In Vietnam, anti-American student demonstrations had been held during the Christmas week. Although the internal political scene appeared stable, the elections in 1971 could prove to be disruptive.²


(C) Another development which, in its embryo stages, was of purely political interest to CINCPAC was the emergence of the Senkaku Islands from obscurity to economic and political prominence. Other subjects of PACOM-wide orientation included the establishment by CINCPAC of revised instructions pertaining to military custody of U.S. civilians under CINCPAC jurisdiction; the related subject of the need for specific and clearly understood procedures for the imposition of administrative holds on U.S. military personnel; and, the legal status

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1. CINCPAC Command Histories 1968-1969, Vol. II, pp. 314-343 and 249-282, respectively.
 2. Point Paper, J2211, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Dec 70, Subj: Current Situation in the Republic of Vietnam; Point Paper, J2212, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Dec 70, Subj: Prospects for Political, Economic, and Military Affairs of the ROK in the 1970s.

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ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER U. S. FORCES IN THE PACOM



* As to these Specific Programs
OPERATIONS IN ANTARCTICA
AEROSPACE ENGAGEMENTS
AND TRACKING STATION

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 86.

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of U.S. military personnel while in a foreign domain as security guards for U.S. commercial aircraft.

Sovereignty Over the Senkaku Islands

(C) The Senkaku Islands were acquired by Japan after the Sino-Japanese War in 1896, along with Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the Spratleys. After World War II, the Allies returned Taiwan and the other islands to China, but the Senkakus were not included. The U.S. had administered the Senkakus as part of the Ryukyus, and had so stated in several proclamations since World War II. The Senkakus emerged as political bones of contention after the existence of rich off-shore oil reserves was confirmed by U.S. and Japanese surveys. During 1970, it became apparent that a major dispute involving Japan, Nationalist China, and the U.S. was in the making--with Communist China waiting in the wings.¹

(C) In July 1970, the Republic of China (ROC) issued a formal statement claiming the right to tap resources under the seas in the vicinity of Taiwan, while Japan placed signs on the Senkakus warning against fishing incursions. On 13 August, the ROC claimed sovereignty by implication when it granted exploration rights in the islands to the Pacific Gulf Oil Company. In December, Communist China formally claimed the Senkakus.²

(C) In a detailed discussion of the international law relating to sovereignty vis-a-vis the oceanic continental shelf, the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate stated the U.S. position regarding the various claims to the Senkakus as of December 1970:³

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.... The U.S. consider the Islands to be part of the Ryukyu Islands which will revert to Japan in 1972. The U.S. has not, however, indicated recognition of the finality of the Japanese claim to the Islands and favors a resolution of the dispute through agreement among the parties concerned. As between the two Chinas, the U.S. does not officially recognize CC but instead recognizes ROC as having sovereignty of Mainland China as well as Taiwan--and therefore the continental shelf.

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1. Point Paper, J2213, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Dec 70, Subj: Senkaku Islands.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Memorandum, J73, Hq CINCPAC, CAPT Douglass to MGEN Elwood (J3, CINCPAC), 21 Dec 70, Subj: Discussion of the Various Claims to Senkaku Islands in Terms of Rights to the Continental Shelf.

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(C) The staff paper noted that there was no universally accepted international law governing continental shelf sovereignty. On 23 May 1970, President Nixon took the initiative in a U.S. Government proposal that an International Convention be convened by the United Nations Seabed Committee to seek agreement on sovereign rights over seabed resources. At the end of 1970, steps had been taken toward such a convention.

(C) It appeared that, regardless of the eventual decision made by the U.S., it would have some impact on U.S. relationships with the Asian countries concerned. Informal information was that in 1941, the Supreme Court of Japan had rendered a decision which, inter alia, ruled that the Senkaku Islands were considered to be under the Taipei (Taiwan) Prefecture. In order to have as many facts as possible upon which to base future judgments, CINCPAC requested the assistance of the Commander, U.S. Forces in Japan in locating and securing an English translation of that decision. The request was made on 24 December 1970, and no reply had been received at year's end.¹

Military Custody of U.S. Civilians

(C) Early in 1970, CINCPAC began a PACOM-wide survey of procedures in use by U.S. military authorities regarding the issuance of custody receipts to host nation authorities and placing legal holds on U.S. citizen civilian employees and dependents accused of law violations. The purpose of the survey was to obtain sufficient information upon which to base a revised CINCPAC Instruction (CINCPACINST) containing standardized procedures relating to military custody of civilians after the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a foreign government.²

(C) The replies received by CINCPAC reflected considerable variation in procedures. In Taiwan, where a SOFA existed, it was stated that a civilian was required to request U.S. military custody after apprehension by ROC authorities. However, in actual practice, custody was not normally utilized by the ROC; hence, no custody receipts were normally needed. A "legal hold" was placed on military sponsors of dependent civilians and on DOD employees and technical representatives; the actual hold was placed by the Chinese through their own immigration channels.³

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1. CINCPAC 242352Z Dec 70; the nature and extent of U.S. response to possible hostile action against friendly oil-exploration vessels was discussed in Chapter I, Section VIII, p. 150.
 2. CINCPAC 140040Z Feb 70; J732 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 70.
 3. COMUSTDC 160554Z Feb 70.

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(C) In Japan, the SOFA provided for the issuance of custody receipts, and procedures for the placing of "legal holds" on civilians had been formalized.¹

(C) The CINCPAC representative in the Ryukyus answered that criminal jurisdiction over U.S. civilian employees and dependents was exercised exclusively by U.S. Civil Administrator, Ryukyus courts. The Government of the Ryukyus Islands (GRI) was not involved; thus, custody receipts were not needed. Defendants were arrested or summoned upon approval of complaint, and then confined or released on bail or recognizance. Subsequent applications for travel by air or ship were monitored by the military Services, the American consul, and the GRI Immigration Agency.²

(U) The SOFA in Korea entitled U.S. military authorities to take custody of a civilian employee or dependent and to retain such custody throughout all Korean judicial proceedings. USFK required that a prompt request to the ROK for custody be made by U.S. military authorities for all suspects, including civilians. The custody receipt was a standard form. By a separate form, a civilian gave written consent to be placed in military custody, to include confinement. If such consent were rescinded, responsibility for custody was returned to Korean authorities, who could then use measures, "...to insure the presence of the civilian at the Korean judicial proceedings...."³

(C) The CINCPACREP in Australia noted that U.S. military units did not have written instructions or procedures regarding the issuance of custody receipts by U.S. officials and placing legal holds on U.S. civilian employees or dependents. Procedures for requesting custody and restriction of movement were purely administrative, and did not provide a basis for military custody over U.S. citizen employees or dependents.⁴

(C) In Thailand, The Royal Thai Government (RTG) recognized custody receipts for military personnel only. Cases involving U.S. citizen civilian employees or dependents were handled on an ad hoc basis. Release from pre-trial confinement could be obtained, in most cases, only upon posting of bail.⁵

(C) The custody receipts in general use guaranteed to the host country that an accused, whether military or civilian, would be available whenever needed during judicial proceedings. In the Philippines, the MBA provided that custody

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1. 5AF 190350Z Feb 70. In Japan, the Staff Judge Advocate for 5AF was also the Staff JA for COMUSFJ.
 2. CINCPACREP RY 190436Z Feb 70.
 3. COMUSKOREA 270652Z Feb 70.
 4. CINCPACREP Australia 260655Z Feb 70.
 5. COMUSMACTHAI 110231Z Mar 70.

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be delivered to base commanders in all cases. During a visit to Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Base, the PACAF Judge Advocate suggested a modified custody receipt for civilians which could be completed by CINCPAC and used PACOM-wide for all Services. This receipt would not guarantee the availability of U.S. civilians for hearings on trial proceedings. If Philippine authorities refused to accept the modified receipt, bail would be required. The position of Thirteenth Air Force was that the judgment of the commander concerned should be the determining factor. If the commander believed he could reasonably insure the presence of a civilian, through voluntary surrender of passport and administrative hold procedures, he should be permitted to accept custody under the then current procedure. It was:¹

.....

.... Particularly essential to have authority in hard cases or where bail cannot be made either for lack of funds by individual or absence of judge to set bail. Arrest occurring when judge is not available to set bail could result in overnight or more imprisonment under deplorable conditions....

(C) In May 1970, the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate discussed the civilian custody procedures with DOD officials in Washington following a conference with component service Staff Judge Advocates. In June 1970, CINCPAC circulated a draft CINCPACINST which revised procedures governing civilian custody, and on 28 August, the regulation with changes suggested by the SECDEF was published.²

(U) Because of the potential political sensitivity of this subject, and for ease of future reference, the pertinent provisions of the revised instruction follow:³

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b. Custody of Personnel

(1) Whenever, within a foreign country in the PACOM area, U.S. civilian personnel are in foreign custody pending

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1. CINCPACAF 111953Z Mar 70; J732 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 70.
 2. Memorandum, J73, Hq CINCPAC (CAPT Douglass to Admiral McCain), 12 Jun 70, Subj: Revision of CINCPACINST 5820.1C re Status of Forces Policies and Information; Ltr, ser 0746, Hq CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CG FMFP, 22 Jun 70, Subj: Revision of CINCPACINST 5820.1C; J732 History, Hq CINCPAC, May-Jun 70; CINCPAC 120417Z Aug 70; SECDEF 8168/241435Z Aug 70; J732 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 70.
 3. CINCPACINST 5820.1D, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Aug 70, Subj: Status of Forces Policies and Information.

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investigation or awaiting trial the following shall apply:

(a) The term "U.S. civilian personnel," as used herein, means U.S. national civilian employees serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces in a foreign country, their civilian dependents and the civilian dependents of U.S. military personnel stationed therein.

(b) Subject to prior receipt from the civilian concerned of the document specified in subparagraph (c) immediately below, U.S. military authorities should, in appropriate cases, request and accept custody of U.S. civilian personnel in accordance with applicable Status of Forces Agreements. However, due to limitations under current U.S. law on the authority of U.S. military authorities to confine or otherwise restrain the liberty of U.S. civilian personnel, custody receipt forms which guaranty the presence of the accused for investigation, trial, and execution of sentence should not be used. Where the applicable Status of Forces Agreement requires that the custody receipt form contain such a guaranty, or the host country otherwise insists on the use of a form containing such a guaranty, the designated commanding officer for the country concerned will ensure that the appropriate foreign authorities are fully aware of, and understand, the limited scope of the measures which may lawfully be taken by the U.S. to assure the accused's continued presence in the host country. In particular, the designated commanding officer should ensure that appropriate foreign authorities understand that U.S. military authorities are not legally able to compel the return of U.S. civilian personnel who succeed in departing from the host country in violation of their undertakings not to depart.

(c) Before custody of U.S. civilian personnel is received, a signed, written request for such custody will be obtained from the civilian concerned stating that:

1. He understands that he will be placed on administrative hold, that he voluntarily extends his tour or stay in the country concerned, that transfer orders will not be promulgated, and that he will not be transferred or provided transportation for departure from the country until proceedings against him are completed.

2. Under these circumstances, he voluntarily, and without coercion, surrenders his U.S. passport with the

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intent that this shall preclude his departure from the country until it is returned to him;

3. He agrees that his passport will not be returned until a final determination has been made in his case by foreign authorities and they have relinquished their jurisdiction over him;

4. He agrees to hold himself available in the immediate area for any investigation and/or trial by foreign authorities and will keep U.S. military authorities advised of his whereabouts;

5. He understands that if he fails to abide by the terms of his request, or fails to cooperate with U.S. military authorities, such authorities may relinquish him to the custody of foreign authorities.

6. And, where applicable, that he has been advised of, and understands, the contents of pertinent SOFA articles and minutes and had a copy thereof made available to him.

(d) In emergencies, or in cases where foreign authorities will not relinquish custody of U.S. civilian personnel to military authorities, reliance must be placed in bail procedures and on traditional diplomatic authorities and channels to resolve each individual case.

(2) Designated Commanding Officers will promulgate, and review yearly (or more frequently, when warranted), legal hold procedures to ensure that all reasonable precautions are being taken to preclude the inadvertent departure of persons in U.S. military custody under investigation or awaiting trial by foreign authorities.

Administrative Hold Procedures

(U) In October 1970, CINCPAC became aware of action initiated by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (CSAF) to assure prompt and effective administrative holds on USAF personnel for whom custody had been accepted by the U.S. The CSAF stated that it was imperative to have administrative hold procedures which would insure the presence of the individual until the case had been resolved.¹

1. CSAF 091636Z Oct 70 passed to CINCPAC by CINCPACAF 200010Z Oct 70.

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.... It is necessary...that specific directives exist at appropriate command levels for each country in which USAF personnel are present...to assure designation of a specific AF official or officials who will be responsible for accepting the custody of AF members, and that the directives be specific in setting forth the precise procedure for promptly effecting administrative holds in these cases. In particular, these procedures will specifically include provisions for cases involving members on TDY, leave, or not otherwise assigned to an in-country AF unit....

(U) The CSAF recognized the possibility that physical custody of USAF personnel could be accepted by officials of other Services, but insisted that specific Air Force procedures be promulgated which would assure administrative holds regardless of which Service had custody.¹

(U) On 29 October 1970, CINCPACAF invited the attention of all subordinate Air Force commanders to the provision of CINCPACINST 5820.1D (see previous section) which required a yearly review of administrative hold procedures by Designated Commanding Officers (DCOs). In view of that responsibility, it was necessary that USAF administrative hold procedures be harmonious with existing DCO instructions. In November, CINCPACAF replied to the CSAF. All USAF subordinate commands had issued specific directives governing administrative holds except Seventh Air Force in Vietnam, since U.S. military personnel were not subject to criminal jurisdiction in that country. In Japan, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the directives in effect, although more detailed in some cases, did not conflict with existing guidance by the DCOs. However, ".... As we are unable to provide guidance of a directive nature to personnel of other services....," PACAF requested Air Force commanders to establish adequate liaison with Army and Navy counterparts to assure prompt notification when custody of an Air Force member was accepted.²

(U) On 13 November 1970, CINCPAC invited the attention of DOD to the USAF procedures and noted the gap in Service coordination. He expressed his belief that detailed and coordinated guidance from all Services was needed, and recommended that consideration be given to promulgating a tri-Service regulation establishing standard procedures for the imposition of administrative holds.³

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1. Ibid.; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 70.
 2. CINCPACAF 070233Z Nov 70.
 3. CINCPAC 130238Z Nov 70.

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Operation GRID SQUARE

(U) GRID SQUARE was a project to train and employ U.S. military personnel as security guards aboard commercial aircraft on international flights. With the U.S. Army as the executive agent, GRID SQUARE began on 1 October 1970. Training was conducted at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and the first group of trained military personnel were deployed by the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) to John F. Kennedy International Airport on 11 October.¹

(U) On 25 September, the DA requested CINCPAC to provide information regarding the application of SOFA and SOFA-type agreements in PACOM to military personnel assigned to GRID SQUARE operations. CINCPAC requested comments from sub-unified commanders and DCOs upon which to base his reply, which he made to DA on 3 October 1970.²

(U) The countries in which GRID SQUARE personnel would not be covered by applicable agreements included Australia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Hong Kong, and New Zealand. SOFA-type coverage would apply in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. CINCPAC noted the absence of agreements with Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Burma. However, there had never been an exercise of jurisdiction by the RTG in official duty or inter se cases under the ad hoc procedures in effect. CINCPAC suggested that, in countries where GRID SQUARE personnel would not be protected under existing agreements, orders might be issued attaching them to a U.S. military organization in-country. The orders could specify the official duties of the personnel to protect the aircraft, and authorize the use of necessary force. An alternative solution, CINCPAC stated, could be an exchange of diplomatic notes according coverage to GRID SQUARE personnel under existing agreements. Lastly, CINCPAC noted that FAA personnel in Japan were considered to be part of the Embassy staff and were accorded diplomatic status and immunity.³

(U) On 13 October, DA informed CINCPAC, for planning purposes, that a joint services liaison team would be located at the Honolulu International Airport. This team would provide a point of contact and feed-back of information to Washington about GRID SQUARE activities; however, the operation had not been inaugurated in the Pacific by the end of 1970.⁴

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1. DA 131437Z Oct 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 70.
 2. DA 251929Z Sep 70; CINCPAC 260223Z Sep 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 70; ADMIN CINCPAC 030243Z Oct 70.
 3. Ibid.
 4. DA 131437Z Oct 70.

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Country Activities

Australia

(U) On 3 August 1970, Specialist 5 Anthony King, USA, was arrested and charged by Australian authorities with rape of an Australian national. On 8 August, the U.S. Designated Commanding Officer, Australia (USDCOA) requested a waiver of jurisdiction because the "...benefit of a cooperative investigation..." was not provided, as required by treaty. During the negotiations with the New South Wales prosecutor's office, it was discovered that the governing treaty was not fully implemented by Australian domestic law. However, King's defense counsel and the prosecutor met with the magistrate on 26 August 1970, and the case was dismissed. King was discharged from custody and sent back to his unit in Vietnam.¹

(U) In the interest of clarification for future cases of that kind, CINCPAC queried the DCO Australia regarding provisions in effect whereby personnel on R&R leave were covered by treaty in Australia. This question was being discussed at the end of 1970.²

China

(C) The Chinese SOFA provided for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the Republic of China (ROC) over U.S. personnel only by recalling their waiver for certain types of offenses. The intention of the ROC to recall a SOFA waiver of jurisdiction was conveyed to U.S. officials on a case-by-case basis. The recallability of certain offenses; the application of Chinese martial law to U.S. citizens; the changing of charges by Chinese courts without notice to the accused--all of these issues generated copious diplomatic and military correspondence on the part of U.S. officialdom.³

(C) At the end of 1969, two cases on Taiwan were pending which involved various aspects of the SOFA. Three USAF men--Sergeants Kennedy and Bohnenberger and Airman LeBouef--had been convicted of intimidation and sentenced to two years imprisonment by a Chinese court. Upon appeal, the appellate court had increased the charge from intimidation to robbery and increased the sentence from

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1. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 70; USSO/AMEMB Canberra, 260635Z Aug 70.
 2. CINCPAC 280300Z Aug 70.
 3. The following narrative summarizes the negotiations and actions regarding these issues during 1970. While appropriate sources are cited, additional documentation, rich in background diplomatic and legal discourse, was provided to the writer by the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate. These sources are available in the permanent CINCPAC History Archives.

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two to 12 years. The sentence was handed down under Chinese military law because, according to Chinese officials, offenses under Article 328 of the Chinese Criminal Code (which included robbery) were subject to such law. An appeal of this case to the Chinese Supreme Court awaited decision. The second case involved two airmen--Bernard Baio and Richard G. Tipton--who had been charged with "forceful taking" in the stabbing and robbery of a Chinese taxi driver. Notice of recall of jurisdictional waiver had been served by ROC authorities.¹

Baio - Tipton

(C) The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) on the staff of the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC) conferred with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) about the Baio - Tipton case in January 1970. The Chinese representative (Dr. Frederick Ch'ien) was informed that the U.S. could not accept a waiver recall which could subject U.S. personnel to Chinese martial law:²

...the waiver of recall cannot be considered effective in this case because it does not affirmatively state what article of the criminal code of the Republic of China will be applied... neither the summons nor the letter provide this information.... It is essential for the United States to know in advance of submission of any personnel within the purview of the Status of Forces Agreement to the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic of China that only offenses and punishments authorized in the criminal code will be applied in their case. In addition, the United States must know that neither the martial law nor the criminal law of the Armed Forces will be applied to the case at any stage of the proceedings....

(C) On 2 February 1970, the U.S. Ambassador advised SECSTATE that the Baio - Tipton case provided, "...another example of troublesome nature of 'robbery' under SOFA provisions...." While robbery was a recallable offense under the SOFA, Chinese law placed robbery under the criminal law of the armed forces. This conflicted "head-on" with the U.S. position that such law could not be applied to personnel under the SOFA. According to the Ambassador, this was a unilateral U.S. interpretation and was not confirmed in SOFA agreements or other written form.³

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, pp. 255-257.
 2. COMUSTDC 090535Z Jan 70; COMUSTDC 260053Z Jan 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70.
 3. AMEMB Taipei 0523/020700Z Feb 70, passed to CINCPAC by COMUSTDC 030145Z Feb 70.

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(C) Diplomatic discussion on the Baio - Tipton case continued during February. On 18 February, SECSTATE, "...deferred to Embassy' assessment that Ch'ien's assurances are promising and that satisfactory resolution of issue are enhanced by producing men at preliminary hearing...." and authorized the appearance of Baio and Tipton at such a hearing. The hearing was understood to be for the sole purpose of investigating charges of forceful taking. On 19 February, a letter explicitly stating the caveats connected with the preliminary hearing was delivered to Dr. Ch'ien.¹

(C) Prior to the start of the preliminary hearing on 20 February, a similar letter was presented to court officials. The letter stated the U.S. position that Chinese martial law was not applicable to SOFA personnel, and that the appearance of the accused at the hearing did not constitute U.S. acceptance of the waiver recall by the ROC. The hearings were concluded on 2 April, and the case was submitted to the Ministry of Justice for action.²

(C) On 15 September 1970, the base JA at the installation to which Baio and Tipton were assigned, Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) Air Base, received an indictment from the Procurator of the Taichung District Court. The charge was attempted homicide, under the (civil) Code of Criminal Procedure. This indictment eliminated the issue of martial law because insufficient evidence to prosecute for robbery was found. The finding of larceny was noted in the indictment as an offense not recallable under the SOFA. On 20 October 1970, Baio and Tipton were found guilty of attempted homicide and sentenced to three years confinement.³

(C) On 23 October 1970, the SJA of COMUSTDC was informed by the MOFA that, should Baio and Tipton appeal the sentence:⁴

.... MOFA had exhausted all diplomatic facilities at their disposal and their avenues of approach with the Ministry of Justice in attaining the three year sentence for attempted homicide. The ROC representative stated that should Baio - Tipton appeal further, MOFA would have to "wash their hands" of the matter.

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1. SECSTATE 024392/180010Z Feb 70; COMUSTDC 190722Z Feb 70; COMUSTDC 200052Z Feb 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 70.
 2. AMEMB Taipei 1361/260845Z Mar 70; passed to CINCPAC by ADMINO COMUSTDC 270658Z Mar 70; COMUSTDC 220748Z May 70; J73 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, Mar-Aug 70.
 3. 6217 CSG 170318Z Sep 70, passed to CINCPAC by COMUSTDC 180140Z Sep 70; COMUSTDC 180618Z Sep 70; COMUSTDC 220254Z Oct 70; 6217 CSG 230903Z Oct 70, passed to CINCPAC by COMUSTDC 240326Z Oct 70; J73 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, Sep-Oct 70.
 4. ADMINO COMUSTDC 280326Z Oct 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 70.

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(C) Apparently the accused men in this case were told of the Chinese position regarding appeal, because the father of one (Tipton) contacted the USAF headquarters requesting information. The Chief of Staff, USAF (CSAF) queried his unit at CCK Air Base for more detailed information in a direct message. Part of this message was answered by COMUSTDC direct to CSAF; the answer distilled the diplomatic and political ramifications of the case to that date (30 November 1970):¹

4. (U) Baio Tipton case originally recalled for alleged robbery. Because of mandatory application of Martial Law by GRC courts in this circumstance, and because of US position that martial law must not be applied to SOFA protected persons, US solicited good offices of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to find another solution. Under martial law, conviction for robbery could carry maximum penalty of death. Trial was held for charge of attempted homicide, which was not repeat not under martial law, and conviction for attempted homicide carries penalty of five years to life imprisonment, which minimum could be reduced. Baio and Tipton were found guilty of attempted homicide, sentenced to three years imprisonment.

5. (C) In light of Bohnenberger Et Al case, with similar martial law implications, MOFA acting as buffer for US Forces is in delicate position vis a vis executive Yuan, Ministry of Justice, and understandable ill feeling of local community. Victim on basis of medical evidence sustained over 20 stab wounds, head injury and apparent gouging of eyeballs. COMUSTDC rejects interpretation of MOFA washing hands (MOFA's term) as meaning Pontius Pilate discarding nuisance; rather takes view that selection of terms probably masked plea to US side to understand that MOFA's position within GRC would be weakened not only in Baio Tipton case but in any others should further intercession be called for. Taking this interpretation, MOFA statement means that MOFA has exhausted its potential for fruitful intercession, having already succeeded in ameliorating what might have been a

1. CSAF 272129Z Nov 70, passed to CINCPAC by COMUSTDC 280238Z Nov 70; COMUSTDC 300602Z Nov 70. CINCPAC "suggested" to COMUSTDC in CINCPAC 020025Z Dec 70 that future comments on communications such as the message to CSAF be forwarded to CINCPAC for additional comments and further transmission. Examination of the footnoted sources cited in this section of the History shows that much correspondence was readdressed to CINCPAC, even though COMUSTDC was directly involved in negotiations, and was subordinate to CINCPAC.

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death penalty, were the accused Chinese Nationals, to the disproportionately low penalty of three years imprisonment.

6. (C) Further intercession by MOFA could well diminish MOFA's credibility in Chinese eyes, giving MOFA the aspect of standing as advocate for alien force special benefits rather than for interests of own people. Such an outcome would certainly complicate US Forces position in any other martial law cases as well as generally diminish effectiveness of MOFA as channel for US Forces dealing with GRC.

(C) On 23 December 1970, COMUSTDC informed CINCPAC that Baio and Tipton had been summoned to appear in the Taiwan High Court on 14 January 1971 for a hearing on their appeal.¹

Bohnenberger - Kennedy - LeBouef

(C) As previously related, this case had been appealed to the Taiwan Supreme Court after the sentence had been increased from two to 12 years under Chinese martial law. The charge had been changed from intimidation to robbery by the appellate court. On 2 February 1970, COMUSTDC informed CINCPAC that a review of the records had been presented before the Supreme Court. In the meantime (19 January 1970) LeBouef had been sentenced to four months confinement, reduction to basic airman, and a bad conduct discharge by an Air Force court-martial in an unrelated case. On 4 February, PACAF notified CINCPAC that LeBouef had escaped from custody on 2 February. He had been confined at CCK Air Base.²

(U) On 4 March 1970, the case against the three accused airmen was reversed by the Supreme Court, and remanded to the appellate court. The decision cited the failure of the court to inform the accused of the specific charges in advance (change from intimidation to robbery).³

(C) On 13 April, the 6217th Combat Support Group base JA at CCK accepted delivery of a notification of charge and summons for the accused to appear before the Taichung Branch of the Taiwan High Court. However, the notification of

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1. ADMIN COMUSTDC 230305Z Dec 70.
 2. COMUSTDC 020240Z Feb 70; CINCPACAF 040143Z Feb 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 70.
 3. COMUSTDC 040150Z Mar 70, passed to CINCPAC by CINCPACAF 041841Z; COMUSTDC 170200Z Mar 70; in CINCPAC 060135Z Mar 70, COMUSTDC was again requested to include CINCPAC in related correspondence.

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charge specified robbery, while the summons for each accused specified intimidation. The new hearing was set for 7 May 1970. On 16 April, SECSTATE signified concern over the specification of robbery on the notification, which again raised possible martial law applications.¹

(C) The 7 May hearing was confined to examination of facts and did not bring forth a statement of the charges. No further action occurred until 17 July 1970, when the 6217th JA received a summons from the Taichung High Court for the subjects to appear on 22 August in a "case of intimidation." This hearing came and went with no decision. Meanwhile, Thirteenth Air Force expressed concern that LeBouef, who had been recaptured and returned to confinement at CCK, might again escape. His specified court-martial confinement ended on 14 November. Guidance was requested from PACAF regarding continued confinement in view of the unresolved Chinese charges.²

(C) PACAF submitted an extensive postulation of alternative means to assure the continued presence of LeBouef in Taiwan; in essence, the conclusion was that the U.S. could only emphasize to Chinese authorities that continued confinement by the U.S. was illegal. If custody were relinquished to the Chinese, several other issues would arise. For example, under the SOFA, the U.S. undertook to retain custody of personnel accused of Chinese law violations, and to present them for judicial proceedings when necessary. Hence, the release of LeBouef would set an undesirable precedent. Another consideration related to the suitability of confinement facilities. The U.S. and ROC had not jointly agreed on a specific facility in which personnel sentenced to penal servitude could be confined or detained. PACAF noted the danger of continued U.S. custody if LeBouef were to escape to a neutral country, however:³

.... In the absence of specific [U.S.] domestic legislation so authorizing, there is no legal authority to place an individual in pre-trial confinement for the sole purpose of guaranteeing his presence for criminal trial before a foreign court....

(C) On 30 October, CSAF noted that, ".... In view of number, status, and character of cases now in Taiwan courts involving U.S. personnel...." there was

1. 6217 CSG 140509Z Apr 70, passed to CINCPAC by COMUSTDC 160215Z Apr 70; SECSTATE 056913/162329Z Apr 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
2. AMEMB Taipei 2306/251001Z May 70, passed to CINCPAC by AMEMB Taipei 2306/130312Z Jun 70; 6217 CSG 170657Z Jul 70; passed to CINCPAC by CINCPACAF 191942Z Aug 70; COMUSTDC 010317Z Oct 70; 13AF 240352Z Oct 70, passed to CINCPAC by COMUSTDC 270310Z Oct 70 and CINCPACAF 262220Z Oct 70; J73 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, Apr-Oct 70.
3. CINCPACAF 292045Z Oct 70.

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a pressing need for joint agreement on confinement facilities under the SOFA. In any event, CSAF intended to solicit a joint State-Defense position on the case.¹

(C) The joint State-Defense position was stated on 4 November to the U.S. Ambassador. Chinese authorities were to be briefed on LeBouef's history of escapes and announced intention to seek refuge in Sweden. If custody were retained by the U.S. his assignment on Taiwan would continue, and he would be restricted to his base of assignment. However, he would not be confined, and the escape risks involved were to be clearly understood and accepted by the ROC. If the Chinese were not willing to accept these limitations, they were to be advised that the U.S. would favorably consider a request for transfer of custody to the ROC. The need for an agreement on confinement facilities was stressed, and some confusion as to the actual status of the case was evinced. "We are unable to understand the procedures before the Taiwan High Court...."2

(C) On 10 November, COMUSTDC once again attempted to clarify the situation. At that time, the case was pending the result of a lower court hearing on a charge of intimidation. It was "analogous" to a new proceeding, and additional evidence as to the extent of intoxication of the defendants was introduced. Subsequent to the hearing, because of a change in Ministry of Justice personnel, "...an element of unsteadiness was weaved into the case...." On 9 November, Chinese officials had been assured that the charge of intimidation was satisfactory, informed of U.S. limitations regarding LeBouef's confinement, and U.S. retention of custody with base restriction for LeBouef. The ROC officials stated their intention to formally request Joint SOFA Committee consideration of the confinement facilities problem. Based upon the foregoing, COMUSTDC, "...anticipated the case will once again start to move...."3

(C) One week later, on 17 November, CINCPAC requested further clarification from COMUSTDC, citing 17 specific messages for reference and noting apparent confusion and inconsistencies in various status reports. COMUSTDC responded with a detailed description of Chinese criminal and appellate procedure, again assured CINCPAC that an understanding had been reached with ROC authorities, and noted, "...the good offices that exist between COMUSTDC and GRC officials...."4

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1. CSAF 302058Z Oct 70; CSAF 022324Z Nov 70; J73 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, Oct-Nov 70.
 2. SECSTATE 181346/042015Z Nov 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Nov 70.
 3. COMUSTDC 100843Z Nov 70.
 4. CINCPAC 170336Z Nov 70; COMUSTDC 180343Z Nov 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Nov 70.

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(C) CINCPAC continued to request additional facts. He noted that the original trial had been on a charge of intimidation, to which the U.S. had not objected. Upon appeal, martial law had been applied to a different charge with an accompanying increase in punishment. He asked what assurance existed that the same procedure would not be repeated, since the conflict between notification and summons regarding the charge had apparently not been resolved.¹

(C) At the end of 1970, there had been no judicial progress in this case. COMUSTDC noted that CINCPAC's 19 November query had not been received until 18 December. He again assured CINCPAC that the issues had been thoroughly discussed with ROC officials, who had given informal assurance, as late as 22 December that the Minister of Justice would, "...hurry the case, and the disposition would be favorable...."²

Starks - Sweat - Eaton

(C) On 1 May 1970 another case involving USAF personnel stationed at CCK began when Sergeants Jan R. Starks, Dennis Sweat, and LaBruce Eaton were apprehended at their off-base house where marijuana and opium were allegedly found. There was no evidence at that time that Chinese or other country nationals were involved. Narcotics offenses were recallable under the SOFA, except when the offense was "directed against" U.S. military personnel, civilians, or dependents. An investigation under Article 32 of the UCMJ was begun under the authority of the Commander, Thirteenth Air Force, who had general court-martial jurisdiction over USAF personnel on Taiwan.³

(C) This case, the negotiations of which ran concurrently with that previously discussed, raised questions regarding the definition of narcotics under the SOFA (i.e. was marijuana a narcotic), right to recall by the ROC under the circumstances, and the death penalty provisions under certain sections of Chinese law for possession of narcotics. Initially, the 327th Air Division and the State Department concurred in the opinion that the "directed against" portion of the Agreed Minutes to the SOFA ruled out a recall of waiver by the ROC.⁴

(C) COMUSTDC apparently was reluctant to assume such a positive position. He pointed out, on 6 August, that the phrase "directed against" was vague and was, "...as interpretable a phrase as we find in our agreement with the ROC...."

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1. CINCPAC 192016Z Nov 70.
 2. ADMIN COMUSTDC 220934Z Dec 70.
 3. 327 Air Div 020248Z Jul 70, passed to CINCPAC by COMUSTDC 060204Z Jul 70; SECSTATE 111622/132209Z Jul 70.
 4. 327 Air Div 020248Z Jul 70; SECSTATE 111622/132209Z Jul 70; 327 Air Div 160609Z Jul 70.

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Noting that the Article 32 investigation had been completed and reviewed, he asserted that:¹

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F. It is painfully obvious, because of the quantity of narcotics found and devices of sale (Note: Some marijuana was already packaged in plastic bags), that it can be asserted by the ROC that the drugs were for sale on the local economy, just as logically as we can assert they were for sale on the air base....

(C) Again on 31 August, after the ROC had issued a recall of waiver on 5 August, COMUSTDC referred to his 6 August message which, "...sets forth COMUSTDC conclusion, in which AMEMB concurs, that the alleged offense cannot be defined as one 'directed against' U.S. personnel solely...." He went on to explain the logic of the "Statute to Purge Out Narcotics During the Communist Rebellion of 1955," under which statute the subject case was recalled. He also noted that this statute superseded the death penalty provisions of the old Chinese criminal code, and specified penalties of two to five years for opium possession and six months to two years for possession of marijuana:²

...since the only narcotics law in existence at the time narcotics were added to the list of recallable offenses was the statute, USG refusal to make subjects available for Chinese prosecution would be awkward and appear ludicrous....

(C) On 5 September, a joint State-Defense message to the Ambassador and COMUSTDC presented a modified position which found, "...persuasive the analysis of nature of 1955 special statute...." However, it was also noted that the question of local involvement had not been made clear; neither the interpretation of the phrase "directed against," nor possible application of the inter se provision in the SOFA had yet been resolved. COMUSTDC replied that a trial observer had already been appointed to ensure the protection of all SOFA rights; that 18 September 1970 had been set by the ROC for the preliminary hearing in the Taichung District Court; and that, concerning local involvement, ".... We would only point out that the contraband was found on Chinese soil...."³

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1. COMUSTDC 060156Z Aug 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 70.
 2. COMUSTDC 310706Z Aug 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 70.
 3. SECSTATE 146062/050033Z Sep 70; COMUSTDC 090804Z Sep 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 70.

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(S) CINCPAC invited the attention of SECDEF to the switch in terminology from "directed against" to "local involvement," stressing the difficulty of possession being "directed against" anyone. On 16 September, State and Defense jointly addressed the issues in a message to the Ambassador:¹

.....

We will assume that burden of proof is on United States side to show that offense falls within exception...quote directed against a member of the United States armed forces, etc. unquote. We do not seem to be able to prove this in the case at hand given lack of supporting evidence and silence maintained by defendants. Amount of drugs and associated paraphernalia found in their possession on other hands leads to presumption of trafficking...not restricted to exception.... In conveying our agreement on recall to MOFA, you should make clear that our acceptance is based on above reasoning and not merely occurrence of offense on Chinese soil....

The SECSTATE message also stressed the need for full and prompt reporting of all pertinent facets of SOFA cases that would involve political factors and interpretations of agreements, "...before we are faced with deadline."²

(S) The preliminary hearing was held as scheduled on 18 September, with one defendant, Sweat, not present because of hospitalization. On 22 September, the CSAF noted correspondence from the 6217th Combat Support Group at CCK Air Base to the effect that Sweat had been diagnosed as schizophrenic and evacuated to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The CSAF also requested Thirteenth Air Force to provide a copy of the JA advice upon which the Commander, Thirteenth Air Force had dismissed the general court-martial charges against the defendants.³

(U) The foregoing CSAF message was immediately cited by CINCPAC to COMUSTDC, noting that it had been the, "...first notification received here...." that the court-martial charges had been dismissed. Thirteenth Air Force informed CSAF that the advice had found insufficient evidence as to identification, and improper search procedures; whereupon, the charges were dismissed. COMUSTDC stated to CINCPAC that he had not been informed that the court-martial charges were dismissed, but that he had received a copy of the JA advice on 10 August 1970.⁴

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1. CINCPAC 120055Z Sep 70; SECSTATE 152163/162338Z Sep 70.
 2. Ibid.
 3. COMUSTDC 210840Z Sep 70; COMUSTDC 220235Z Sep 70; CSAF 222010Z Sep 70.
 4. CINCPAC 232149Z Sep 70; 13AF 240851Z Sep 70; COMUSTDC 250445Z Sep 70.

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(C) In view of these developments, CINCPAC informed SECDEF that the action by Thirteenth Air Force violated SOFA procedures because the ROC had indicated intentions to recall waiver of jurisdiction. "It further removes any possible USG argument that the marijuana offenses involved can be adequately handled by U.S. military authorities...." CINCPAC therefore recommended that U.S. permit recall of waiver on all charges in the instant case, and to, "...avoid any resolution of the issue as to whether marijuana is a narcotic...."¹

(C) This approach was supported by State and Defense, which authorized the Embassy to advise the ROC of U.S. willingness to consider both aspects of the case (opium and marijuana) as an exceptional case involving a serious offense under the SOFA, thus making both charges subject to recall.²

(C) On 30 September 1970, CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF and COMUSTDC jointly that a lack of coordination between COMUSTDC and the Commander, Thirteenth Air Force had been evident in regard to the Starks, Sweat, Eaton case and the dismissal of court-martial charges. He stated his concern that the court-martial decision could affect adversely the SOFA relationships with ROC authorities. He also noted that COMUSTDC had not ensured advance coordination in his role as DCO under CINCPACINST 5820.1D.³

(C) COMUSTDC replied that off-island general court-martial authorities of "component commands" were not within his coordinating authority; he indicated that he intended henceforth to require written consent from COMUSTDC to his component commanders prior to the initiation of proceedings involving "recallable offenses." CINCPAC answered that, while such procedures would improve the situation, he desired COMUSTDC to establish direct coordination with the Commander, Thirteenth Air Force. To this, CINCPACAF had agreed.⁴

(C) On 28 October, the Ambassador informed SECSTATE that there had been no developments in the case since the 18 September hearing in Taichung. He indicated that it appeared the ROC was pondering the U.S. objection to the inclusion of marijuana in the indictment. The State authorization of 29 September to treat the case as "exceptional" was being held in reserve, so long as there was a chance that the ROC would accept the U.S. position that possession of marijuana was not a recallable offense.⁵

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1. ADMIN CINCPAC 251849Z Sep 70.
 2. SECSTATE 160027/291321Z Sep 70.
 3. CINCPAC 300706Z Sep 70.
 4. COMUSTDC 080800Z Oct 70; CINCPACAF 090130Z Oct 70; CINCPAC 092239Z Oct 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 70.
 5. AMEMB Taipei 4663/280533Z Oct 70.

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(C) On 10 November, COMUSTDC notified CINCPAC that the ROC and U.S. had been able to avoid the issue and that they had agreed to a one-paragraph indictment alleging violation of the "Statute to Purge Out Narcotics During the Communist Rebellion of 1955." The indictment would cite opium, but marijuana would only be mentioned to, "...help explain the violation of the opium article...." COMUSTDC also noted the state of mental health of Sweat, who was still confined at Clark Air Base hospital with a diagnosis of severe schizophrenia. The ROC had been approached in an attempt to have Sweat excused from Chinese jurisdiction, based upon his incompetence to defend himself.¹

(C) Although the year ended with no further judicial action on the indictment, other developments during December 1970 bore on the possible outcome. On 11 December, Eaton departed Taiwan with forged travel orders and identification papers. His departure via USAF C-130 from CCK Air Base raised the question of port-of-entry and egress procedures for personnel assigned in Taiwan. Also, the USAF initiated an in-depth examination of administrative hold procedures and other controls over personnel awaiting foreign judicial action. The wanted man surrendered voluntarily to U.S. authorities at Norton Air Force Base, California on 21 December. He was returned to Taiwan and placed in pre-trial confinement on 27 December, after having attempted suicide in California on 23 December.²

(C) The third member of the accused trio, SGT Starks, notified Air Force officials at CCK that he would not re-enlist at the end of his tour, on the advice of his civilian attorney. The organization to which he was assigned (6217th Combat Support Group) therefore requested permission to discharge Starks on Taiwan on 2 February 1971.³

Contractor Controversy

(C) A possible explanation for the increasing resistance by Chinese authorities to U.S. diplomacy in criminal jurisdiction cases surfaced in February 1970. The Director of Procurement, U.S. Army, Japan awarded the contract to supply dairy products to U.S. Forces on Taiwan to Old Dominion Dairy Products, effective 1 June 1970. Old Dominion's bid was substantially lower than that of Foremost Dairies, Limited, which had been supplying milk to U.S. Forces on Taiwan since 1956. When informed by the Embassy of Old Dominion's status as a U.S.

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1. COMUSTDC 100934Z Nov 70.
 2. COMUSTDC 160353Z Dec 70; COMUSTDC 180402Z Dec 70; CINCPACAF 190300Z Dec 70; ADMIN CINCPAC 190148Z Dec 70; 327 Air Div 190134Z Dec 70; CINCPACAF 222103Z Dec 70; CINCPACAF 242116Z Dec 70; CINCPACAF 282000Z Dec 70; ADMIN COMUSTDC 290713Z Dec 70.
 3. 6217 CSG 180132Z Dec 70, passed to CINCPAC by COMUSTDC 180824Z Dec 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.

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contractor under the SOFA, the ROC found some "troublesome points," one of which was the financial interest in Foremost of several prominent Chinese. The ROC questioned the right of the U.S. to bring into Taiwan any contractor for goods or services without prior consultation.¹

(C) On 2 May, the State Department accepted a compromise which provided that Old Dominion would function as a SOFA contractor solely to fulfill the military contract. The U.S. agreed that separate facilities would be maintained and no connection with any other local company was permitted. Also, the U.S. would offer, without prejudice to its rights, to "consult" with the ROC before bringing in new contractors. To this proposal, COMUSTDC took strong exception. He believed that such assurances would degrade unequivocal rights guaranteed in the SOFA:²

.....

.... COMUSTDC considers that to provide "assurances" as desired by GRC is pernicious, in itself establishing a precedent which is tantamount to giving GRC prior consultation and veto power over U.S. designation of SOFA contractors. The issue...is, in our opinion, specious, and, at best, an attempt to distract attention from local pecuniary interests in Foremost. While COMUSTDC concurs in and appreciates the attempt being made by local U.S. Embassy officials to solve, without giving up the principle involved, a rather difficult impasse, such concurrence does not extend to acquiescing in the action of foreign civilians, in order to protect their own vested interests at the cost of U.S. dollars, from interfering with command judgments of the U.S....

(C) CINCPAC acknowledged the concern of COMUSTDC that efforts to erode U.S. SOFA rights by the ROC not be countenanced. However, as he stated on 17 May, the Departments of State and Defense were aware of the various facets of the controversy, and had proposed a solution which made the best of a bad situation. Therefore, further opposition to the State-Defense position was not warranted.³

(C) On 30 May, State and Defense again emphasized the need to arrive at a mutually agreeable method to permit the new contractor to begin operations, and, on 1 June, COMUSTDC again voiced to CINCPAC his strenuous objections to any

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1. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, May-Jun 70.
 2. Ibid.; COMUSTDC 140437Z May 70.
 3. CINCPAC 172033Z May 70.

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inference that the ROC would be granted veto power on SOFA contractors selected by the U.S.¹

(C) In a summarizing memorandum on 4 June 1970, the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate noted that the Chinese reaction in this case could have been anticipated. Considering the long tenure of Foremost in Taiwan, and the awarding of a new contract without notice to the ROC, a challenge on procedural grounds was typical. Moreover, the scope of the problem was so limited that a confrontation over the treaty interpretation was not appropriate. The CINCPAC JA recommended that CINCPAC continue to support the efforts of State and the Embassy to resolve the problem and that CINCPAC should neither declare a nonconcurrence with COMUS-TDC nor respond to COMUSTDC's objections but should allow negotiations already underway to take their course.²

(C) On 12 June 1970, the U.S. Ambassador in Taipei notified SECSTATE and SECDEF that the MOFA had granted contractor status to Old Dominion.³

Hong Kong

Libel Suit Against R&R Officer

(U) On 3 May 1970, LCDR Robert L. Stanford, U.S. Navy, was sued for libel by Davidson and Partners and Pacific Mail Order System, Limited. Stanford was serving as Officer-in-Charge, U.S. Rest and Rehabilitation (R&R) Office, Hong Kong. The suit was based upon a letter written by Stanford on 11 December 1969 to the Circulation Manager of the Pacific Star and Stripes. The letter alleged that, as the distributors of Stars and Stripes in Hong Kong, Davidson and Partners had illegally inserted advertising in the paper. The firm being advertised, Pacific Mail Order System, Limited, according to Stanford's letter, had a, "... less than desirable reputation" with U.S. personnel. That statement was based upon an article published in the newsletter of the U.S. Army Support Command, Saigon warning military personnel about that particular company.⁴

(U) Upon receipt of the writ of summons, Stanford turned it over to the American Consul, who sent it to the Protocol Office of the Hong Kong Government. A cover letter pointed out that Stanford was acting in the performance of his official duties, was a member of the Consul General's staff, and had been so accredited by the Hong Kong Government. Article II of the U.S.-U.K. consular

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1. SECSTATE 083301/301632Z May 70; COMUSTDC 010640Z Jun 70.
 2. Memorandum 020-70, J73, Hq CINCPAC (CAPT Douglass to RADM Janney), 4 June 70, Subj: Old Dominion Dairies/Foremost Dairies, Ltd.
 3. AMEMB Taipei 2592/121119Z Jun 70.
 4. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, May-Jun 70; AMCONSUL Hong Kong 1761/140815Z May 70, passed to CINCPAC by COMUSNAVPIL 150833Z May 70.

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
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convention stated that a consular officer shall not be liable in court proceedings of his receiving state for acts performed in his official capacity.¹

(U) In reply to query from SECSTATE the American Consul provided the legal status of the Pacific Stars and Stripes, citing CINCPACINST 5720.15, which stated that the newspaper was operated as a revenue - producing, nonappropriated fund activity of CINCPAC. Operational command was exercised by CINCPAC through CINCUSARPAC. The CINCPAC directive also specified that advertisements by, or in behalf of, private firms or corporations were not authorized.²

(U) As advised by the Hong Kong Government, the Justice Department authorized the retainment of counsel for Stanford, and COMUSNAVPHIL and the Consul in Hong Kong both furnished statements attesting to the official duty nature of Stanford's action. The case was settled out of court on 6 June 1970 (when Stanford agreed not to press for solicitor's fees), and the following order was subsequently issued by the Hong Kong court:³

.... The first and second plaintiffs to withdraw this action on condition that the said plaintiffs be precluded from bringing any fresh proceedings against the defendant on the same grounds as this action. No order as to costs.

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1. COMUSNAVPHIL 5822/140513Z May 70.
 2. AMCONSUL Hong Kong 1793/150900, 2 May 70.
 3. SECSTATE 074459/152118Z May 70; COMUSNAVPHIL 5820/160515Z May 70; AMCONSUL Hong Kong 1890/220910Z May 70; AMCONSUL Hong Kong 2138/110700Z Jun 70.
 4. CINCPAC 102048Z Jan 70; J3B51 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70.

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Japan

Security Consultative Committee Meetings

(S) The 11th meeting of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) was held in Tokyo on 19 May 1970. The U.S. was represented by Ambassador Armin H. Meyer and Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC. Japan representatives were Foreign Minister Aichi and Director General of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Nakasone. Aichi reviewed the political situation in Japan, placing emphasis on the Japanese intention to support the continuance of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. I, pp. 198, 199; USDAO AMCONSUL Hong Kong 132/180354Z Jan 69.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. I, p. 135; J3B51 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70.
 3. USDAO AMCONSUL Hong Kong 939/210721Z May 69; ADMIN CINCPAC 212302Z May 69; CINCPAC 260121Z Jul 69; J3B51 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70.


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Mutual Cooperation and Security. Nakasone reviewed Japan defense policy in considerably modified terms from prior statements relating to joint use of bases-- recommending a case-by-case approval which would not entail SOFA revision.¹

(S) Nakasone also urged early planning to ensure a smooth and gradual transfer of defense responsibility in Okinawa. In that regard, Ambassador Meyer stated that U.S. planning had begun, and emphasized the U.S. desire that the Japan Self-Defense Force assume total air defense responsibility as early as possible after reversion. CINCPAC presented a review of the overall Southeast Asia military situation.²

(U) The 12th SCC meeting, held in Tokyo on 21 December 1970, marked the first formal agreement between the U.S. and Japan on the application of the Nixon Doctrine. During the meeting, attended by CINCPAC, the U.S. reiterated its resolve to maintain commitments under the Mutual Security Treaty. In keeping with Japan's increased capability for self-defense, both countries agreed upon a major realignment of U.S. bases and forces in Japan. This agreement was reached after extensive working level discussions and approval at the ministerial level which demonstrated the efficacy of close mutual consultation on matters affecting the security of Japan.³



Criminal Jurisdiction

(S) On 23 June 1970, a USAF civilian employee, Robert A. Muske, was involved in a motor vehicle accident in which two Japanese nationals were killed. Muske subsequently departed Japan by commercial air on 21 July 1970. This was a potentially serious incident with strong political overtones:⁵

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1. J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 70.
 2. Ibid.; Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Dec 70, Subj: US - Japan Security Consultative Committee.
 3. J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.
 4. CINCPAC 211510Z Dec 70 and SECSTATE 185354/110316Z Nov 70, cited in J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.
 5. COMNAVFORJAPAN 5820/250216Z Jul 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 70.

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.... His intentional flight to avoid prosecution can seriously effect [Sic] previous cooperation of Japanese authorities in relinquishing custody of military and civilian personnel to military authorities. This could impair U.S. credibility, lead to widespread adverse publicity and have political repercussions....

(C) Muske had been employed as a school principal at Yokosuka Naval Base. Naval authorities requested that USAF assume responsibility and attempt to return Muske to Japan. However, USAF authorities in Japan, as well as the CSAF, noted the lack of legal jurisdiction over the subject.¹

(C) Efforts to convince Muske to return, based upon verbal assurance from Japanese officials that a summary order would likely be issued specifying only the payment of a fine of 50,000 yen (\$138.88), were to no avail. Japanese authorities insisted that Muske would have to appear in person in order to dispose of the case. Although Muske indicated willingness to return to Japan for summary proceedings, he requested written assurance that the case would be handled as represented by Japanese officials. CSAF suggested that Muske might accept a letter from U.S. military authorities in Japan to the effect that competent Japanese authority had given such assurance.²

(C) At the end of 1970, no solution had appeared. U.S. military authorities in Japan expressed concern that a letter such as that suggested by CSAF could be misused by Muske; i.e., release to the news media in the U.S. Nevertheless, CSAF suggested that the DCO or lower echelon execute the letter of assurance, noting that there existed no guarantee that Muske would accept it at face value.³

Korea

(C) In June 1968, a U.S. Army member in Korea was convicted of murder and arson. His sentence (15 years imprisonment) was imposed on 13 January 1969. Following his indictment, a habeas corpus action was filed on his behalf in a U.S. District Court. Thus began a series of three cases during 1969 in which the constitutionality of the Korean SOFA was challenged (Smallwood, Ogden, Bassett). In the first, the U.S. court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus upon a U.S. Government motion. In the second and third cases, the issues were not decided because the defendants were convicted of lesser charges and withdrew their U.S. court actions.⁴

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1. 5AF 270530Z Jul 70; CSAF 292144Z Jul 70.
 2. COMUSJAPAN 180730Z Sep 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep and Nov 70; CSAF 162247Z Nov 70.
 3. COMUSJAPAN 040001Z, CSAF 112247Z, J73 History, Hq CINCPAC: Dec 70.
 4. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, pp. 260-263.

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Blount - Walter

(C) In 1970, a similar case developed when SGT John W. Blount and SP4 James E. Walter were convicted of robbery and murder by the Seoul, Korea District Court and sentenced to death. On 4 March 1970, the two men allegedly killed a Korean man and wife and stole drugs, watches, and a ring. On 19 March, the Korean Government notified U.S. Military authorities of its intention to exercise its criminal jurisdiction, and the two men were indicted on 5 May 1970. On 4 December 1970, both Blount and Walter were convicted and sentenced to death.¹

(C) Meanwhile, the defendants had filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on 11 September. The suit was to enjoin their transfer into the custody of Korean authorities. On 16 October, the motion to dismiss by the U.S. Government was taken under advisement, and, on 7 December, the petition of the defendants was dismissed. The court order prohibiting the transfer of custody pending the decision was dissolved. On 9 December, the Department of the Army informed CINCPAC that an immediate appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals was anticipated.²

(C) On 7 December 1970, Blount and Walter appealed their sentences to the Seoul High Court. Both were represented by Korean civilian attorneys, and action was pending at the end of 1970.³

New Zealand

(U) The DCO for New Zealand as specified in CINCPACINST 5820.1D was the Commander, U.S. Naval Support Forces, Antarctica, whose in-country headquarters was at Christchurch, New Zealand. U.S. military personnel in New Zealand were governed by the terms of several agreements between the U.S. and New Zealand.

Criminal Jurisdiction - Barker

(U) On 8 August 1970, USAF SSGT Beverly R. Barker was arrested by Blenheim, New Zealand police and charged with assault and theft. At the time of the alleged offense, the DCO was at his headquarters in Washington, D. C.

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1. Memorandum 047-70, J73, Hq CINCPAC (LCOL Shokes to RADM Janney), 4 Dec 70, Subj: Status Report: BLOUNT/WALTER Case (Korea); J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.
 2. CINCPAC 050326Z Dec 70; DA 092116Z Dec 70.
 3. CGUSAE 140142Z Dec 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.

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A PACAF message to the Air Force detachment in New Zealand constituted the first official notice of the offense to the DCO. PACAF included a request for information in behalf of CINCPAC, who also had had no prior official notice of the incident.¹

(U) An initial reading of the charges was set by New Zealand authorities for 9 September, and arraignment was set for 23 September 1970. On 8 September, PACAF directed the 430th Detachment to place Barker on administrative hold, and to give him a direct written order to attend court sessions.²

(U) On 9 September, CINCPAC invited the attention of the DCO to his CINCPACINST 5820.1D, which required incidents in which U.S. military and civilian personnel might be subject to criminal prosecution by foreign authorities to be reported to CINCPAC. He requested the DCO to review procedures in effect, in view of the delay by the parent unit in reporting the case to both CINCPAC and the DCO. In reply, the DCO acknowledged that written implementing instructions had not yet been issued, but would be shortly.³

(U) The Barker case was resolved after his wife committed suicide and New Zealand authorities were requested to approve his departure on emergency leave to attend funeral services. The civil authorities agreed to allow Barker to depart New Zealand, and to drop the charges provided he did not return. Both DCO and PACAF approved the permanent transfer of Barker to another Air Force unit outside New Zealand.⁴

Philippines

(U) Many of the questions and problems relating to criminal jurisdiction and custody of U.S. overseas personnel originated in the Philippines. The instruments which governed U.S. - Philippine relationships were the Military Bases Agreement (MDB) of 1947, as amended, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA). Affairs of the latter were administered through the Mutual Defense Board (MOB), which coordinated such matters as military assistance and operational relationships of the active forces of the two countries. CINCPAC

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1. CINCPAC 040230Z Sep 70; Det 430 RNZAF Base Woodburne 042200Z Sep 70; COMNAVSUPPFORANTARCTICA 042000Z Sep 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 70.
 2. Det 430, RNZAF Base Woodburne 060230Z Sep 70; CINCPACAF 082345Z Sep 70.
 3. CINCPAC 090107Z Sep 70; COMNAVSUPPFORANTARCTICA 101750Z Sep 70.
 4. Det 430, RNZAF Base Woodburne 120145Z Sep 70; COMNAVSUPPFORANTARCTICA 5800/121250Z Sep 70; CINCPACAF 121950Z Sep 70; Det 430, RNZAF Base Woodburne 132235Z Sep 70; COMNAVSUPPFORANTARCTICA 5800/141200Z Sep 70; CINCPACAF 141900Z Sep 70.

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was the senior U.S. military member of the MDB, which met monthly, but was normally represented by his CINCPACREPPHIL. Most of the issues raised in U.S.-Philippine relationships were in connection with the MBA. During 1970, the realignment and reduction in installation activities under the Nixon Doctrine also caused uneasiness among Philippine officials.

Closure of Sangley Point Naval Station

(S) On 10 December 1970, the U.S. publicly announced that Sangley Point Naval Station would be relinquished to the Philippine Government within seven to nine months. The announcement included the intention of the U.S. to withdraw or relocate U.S. Forces then assigned to Sangley. CINCPAC had recommended that re-entry rights for contingency use be obtained prior to the announcement. However, because of strong objections by the U.S. Ambassador on the grounds of political sensitivity, CINCPAC deferred to that objection, and the negotiating objective for re-entry rights was withdrawn:¹

.....
Ambassador Byroade informed President Marcos who was highly pleased with the new U.S. position that the U.S. would not seek re-entry rights.

President Marcos stated that the subject of re-entry rights had been of great concern to him. He had not mentioned the subject to anyone because he did not want the previous U.S. position leaked to politicians and the press.

(S) Typically, President Marcos' pleasure regarding the Sangley negotiations was not unminged. Speculation and doubt about the strategic position of the U.S. in the Philippines and the Pacific were also expressed by Marcos and the Philippine press. According to the Ambassador, Marcos was concerned that ".... things are not going well in SEASIA...", and had raised questions about U.S. long range intentions in the Pacific as well as the extent of planned U.S. reductions. The Ambassador considered that this concern raised, ".... a fundamental policy question which deserves attention at our highest levels"²

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1. Point Paper, J5125, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Dec 70; Subj: Closure of NAVSTA Sangley Point.
 2. Point Paper, J5125, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Dec 70; Subj: Philippine Speculation About U.S. Strategic Intentions.

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Revision of MDAA

(S) Literally since the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1953, the Philippine Government had been displeased with various aspects of the Agreement. The most notable of these was the general issue of how the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was administered, with specific reference to the role of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in determining which items the Philippines would receive. The underlying issue was that of Philippine national sovereignty and the displeasure of Filipinos over U.S. veto power against what they considered to be legitimate MAP needs. As a result of the growth of Philippine nationalism and the U.S. consent to negotiate all U.S. - Philippine military and economic agreements, a position paper was forwarded to CINCPAC by SECSTATE on MDAA revisions. The recommendations and suggestions had been developed by the Interdepartmental Working Group for East Asia (EA/IG)¹

(S) The EA/IG suggested avenues by which the irritants to the Filipinos might be eliminated or decreased, and requested comments from CINCPAC and the Country Team. The Group suggested that some irritation might be eliminated if a method could be devised to provide a more publicly acknowledged and highlighted involvement of the Philippine military establishment in MAP administration. Another recommendation was that, "...if pressed by the Philippines in the forthcoming negotiations on the MDAA, we be prepared to....allow the Philippines a role in agreeing to personnel assigned to the JUSMAG." It was also recommended that the U.S. be prepared to forego the U.S. prerogative in the Agreement to veto Philippines arms procurement from any other country. "This provision.... has been a thorny irritant in our relations and a needless prerogative...."²

(S) In reply, CINCPAC noted that Philippine participation in the MAP had already been increased with the establishment of the Philippine Office of Foreign Military Assistance on the staff of the Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) Headquarters. This agency worked directly with the JUSMAG in reviewing equipment authorization lists, establishing requirements, and determining priorities. The desires of the AFP on item content of the MAP were submitted yearly, and

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1. SECSTATE Airgram CA-3697, 9 July 70; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 70.
 2. Ibid. In the margin of the cited State Department document, opposite the recommendation that the assignment of personnel and the size of the JUSMAG be subject to Philippine approval, an anonymous CINCPAC staff member had scribbled this question: "What about Embassy personnel?" From the military standpoint, it was indeed a pertinent, if rhetorical, question.

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these items were included if dollar ceilings permitted and if consistent with U.S. objectives. CINCPAC concurred in the recommendation that the U.S. be prepared to give up the right to veto arms procurement from third country sources. He did not concur that the Philippine Government should be conceded the right to approve individual personnel assignments or the numbers assigned to the JUSMAG. He stated that such action would project the Philippines into internal U.S. affairs and restrict U.S. freedom to organize and man the JUSMAG in the most efficient configuration for its mission. Further requests for a similar policy on other U.S. agencies would result, once it had been applied to the JUSMAG.¹

(S) After providing comments on the EA/IG recommendations, CINCPAC cautioned against simultaneous negotiation of the MDAA and the MBA. Otherwise, he envisioned Philippine attempts to obtain MAP objectives for MBA concessions on a quid pro quo basis. He conceded, however, that it would be exceedingly difficult to refuse a Philippine initiative to combine such negotiations.²

Renegotiation of the MBA

(S) The MBA of 1947, as amended, was the agreement which authorized the U.S. to maintain military installations in the Philippines. The original agreement was for 99 years, modified to 25 years in 1966. Because of political turbulence and recurring issues regarding criminal jurisdiction, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had requested that the MBA be re-negotiated. To this, the U.S. had immediately agreed. On 30 January 1970, however, the U.S. Ambassador reported that President Marcos skirted the question of timing on negotiations. Marcos stated that the most important, and most difficult, aspect of the problem was the criminal jurisdiction provision of the MBA. Therefore, he had asked GOP officials to make a comparative study of the MBA and criminal jurisdiction procedures in other countries.³

(S) Meanwhile, in anticipation of the eventual MBA negotiations, U.S. officials began to work on a draft U.S. - Philippine SOFA. On 15 January 1970, CINCPACREPPHIL advised CINCPAC that a draft, "... prepared by a drafting committee at the Embassy", would be forwarded by the Ambassador to State-Defense as a joint Embassy-CINCPACREPPHIL draft. A copy of this document was sent to CINCPAC, but such forwarding, according to CINCPACREPPHIL, was premature. He proposed that he act on the draft without prior referral to CINCPAC, who would be afforded an opportunity to comment on the proposal "at the time it was

1. CINCPAC 232140Z Aug 70.

2. Ibid.

3. AMEMB Manila 853/300610Z Jan 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70.

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forwarded to State/DOD."¹

(S) CINCPAC expressed appreciation for, "... the opportunity to review the first draft of the new SOFA." He requested, however, that when in-country U.S. military comments and recommendations had been received, they be forwarded to CINCPAC for review and staffing by his service components. He would then forward a coordinated position on the SOFA to the Embassy through CINCPACREPPHIL for incorporation into a joint Embassy-CINCPAC draft SOFA.²

(S) As the CINCPAC staff coordinating agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans (ACS/P) requested the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) to review the initial draft. In preliminary comments on 26 February 1970, the SJA noted that an absence of cross-pollination of ideas and staffing by other concerned agencies was evident. In more substantive comments on 2 March, the SJA stressed the need to recognize the unique domestic and political climate in the Philippines, and cautioned against a tendency to equate objectives there with existing SOFAs in other countries:³

.....

(b) History has shown that negotiations with Asian countries present particular problems. Bargaining there is a way of life, not just a diplomatic skill. In any negotiations with the Philippines, it will be absolutely essential for the Philippine negotiating team to obtain concessions in addition to those initially offered by U.S. It is therefore imperative that the U.S. open any negotiations with a very strong initial position, regardless of the fall-back position we may be willing to accept.

(S) The SJA went on the record for the retention of the 1965 criminal jurisdiction amendment to the MBA, and against the one-year tenure specified in the initial draft. A five year tenure was the minimum acceptable -- preferably longer.⁴

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1. CINCPACREPPHIL/COMUSNAVPHIL 5710/150953Z Jan 70; J5126 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70.
 2. Ibid; CINCPAC 180031Z Jan 70.
 3. Memorandum 006-70, J73 to J5, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Feb 70, Subj: U.S./Philippine Bases Agreement Revisions; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 70; Memorandum 007-70, J73 to J5, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Mar 70, Subj: U.S./Philippine Bases Agreement Revisions.
 4. Ibid.

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(S) As the year passed, the draft SOFA continued to be revised and modified in accordance with suggestions from U.S. military elements in the Philippines, CINCPACREPPHIL, the Embassy, and CINCPAC. In October, supporting papers to the eventual U.S. negotiating position were reviewed which contained a "fall-back" position that U.S. nominations for base commanders be subject to the prior approval of the MDB. This proposal paralleled that discussed in the previous section regarding the JUSMAG, and warranted these specific comments from CINCPAC:¹

.....

(1) The selection and assignment of U.S. military base commanders is, under U.S. laws and regulations, a prerogative of the Commander in Chief and by extension a prerogative of the individual's parent Service.

(2) If the U.S. were to accede to GOP objections in any instance, a precedent could be established for potential application to other personnel assignments at U.S. bases in the Philippines. In this respect, it is noted that "base commanders" could be interpreted as including COMNAVPHIL and CG 13th AF.

(3) Military succession of command during times of emergency could be delayed, giving rise to legal complications.

(4) Since both the U.S. and the GOP have a veto in the MDB, there is a potential for creating discord if the GOP could prevent or delay replacement of base commanders during times of emergencies. In the event of a GOP veto, there would be two undesirable alternatives. Yielding to the veto would be tantamount to unilateral GOP selection of a U.S. base commander. Not yielding to the GOP veto would negate any practical aspect of MDB concurrence on a nomination.

(5) The mercurial character and anti-U.S. sentiment of many GOP officials could result in making the base commander nominating process a cause celebre.

(S) Meanwhile, CINCPACREPPHIL had advised CINCPAC in July 1970 of a Manila Times article crediting Marcos with the statement that, "...it would be mid-1971 or later before U.S. and R. P. could discuss the MBA...." On 21 November, the U.S. and GOP announced that working groups would be appointed by both sides to lay the ground work for MBA renegotiation. The Ambassador agreed to a Marcos

1. CINCPAC 210409Z Oct 70; J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 70.

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request to delay public announcement until mid-December. The Ambassador and Marcos also agreed that working group discussions would proceed without reaching any conclusions until after the Philippine Constitutional Convention in mid-1971. As of 31 December 1970, no information was available at CINCPAC that any public announcement had been made.¹

(S) At the end of the year, CINCPAC had concurred in the draft SOFA as amended through 27 October, except that on 22 December, he reiterated his strong objections to the proposed U.S. position on tenure. He also repeated the importance of providing a strong initial negotiating position for the U.S. team, and stressed his "understanding" that the draft articles, excluding the fall-back positions, represented the desired end positions. CINCPAC had noted that the desired "draft" objective was an agreement which would remain in effect until September 1991 unless terminated by mutual consent. The proposed "first fall-back position" contemplated an indefinite agreement tied to the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), and would require the MDT to be terminated in order for the GOP to terminate the SOFA. Such cotermination would require a one year notice. The "second fall-back position" contemplated an agreement of unspecified duration which would give the GOP the right to terminate the SOFA upon at least two year's notice, without terminating the MDT. CINCPAC could not accept the second fall-back, which:²

...if ever presented to, and accepted by the GOP, would subject the U.S. to possible political blackmail and encourage such blackmail by the Phil press, political figures, and extremists. Furthermore, if ever exercised by the GOP, such short notice would prevent required detailed planning for withdrawal....

(S) On 29 December, CINCPACREPPHIL acknowledged CINCPAC's remarks of the week before. However, after suggesting alternative phrases and wording which might be acceptable to CINCPAC, the postulation to which CINCPAC had originally objected was repeated: "The objective of such agreements would be, of course, to push the Philippine negotiators back toward the first fallback which is, we believe, the more desirable provision." Comments pertaining to this statement from CINCPAC SJA to the ACS/P were straight to the point: "...the desired goal is to push the GOP back--not to the first fallback position, but--to the draft position...."³

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1. CINCPACREPPHIL 100123Z Jul 70, cited in J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 70; Point Paper, J5125, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Dec 70, Subj: Renegotiation of the US-GOP Military Bases Agreement; J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.
 2. CINCPAC 221203Z Dec 70; J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.
 3. CINCPACREPPHIL 5700/290548Z Dec 70; Memorandum 0050-70, J73 to J5, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Dec 70, Subj: Draft Renegotiation Provisions for Philippine Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.

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Criminal Jurisdiction and Custody

(S) As previously related, the questions of criminal jurisdiction and responsibility for custody were, in part, responsible for the expressed desire on the part of the GOP to renegotiate the MBA. Basic to the problems was a ruling in 1968 by the GOP Secretary of Justice that the 1965 Amendment to the MBA relating to criminal jurisdiction was not binding because it had not been ratified by the GOP Senate. This decision signalled the beginning of chaos in criminal jurisdiction cases, even though it had simplified the exercise of jurisdiction in the Smith case.¹

(C) In 1969, the Moomey case, in which a U.S. Navy man had allegedly killed a Filipino while hunting on Subic Naval Base, caused a furor over jurisdiction. Under the original MBA of 1947, the on-base incident was under U.S. jurisdiction. Under the 1965 Amendment, the off-duty offense was under Philippine jurisdiction. The U.S. requested a waiver of jurisdiction, which was referred by the local Fiscal to the GOP Justice Secretary. Although press reports speculated that the 1968 ruling had been reaffirmed, thus giving jurisdiction to the U.S., the only official word came from the GOP Foreign Affairs Secretary, Carlos P. Romulo. He informed the Embassy that, "...the GOP had no objection to the U.S. asserting its jurisdiction...." Although Romulo had not commented on the 1947 versus 1965 issue, a waiver of jurisdiction was received by Navy officials. Moomey was tried and convicted by a general court-martial; subsequently, he was transferred and discharged. This was interpreted by the GOP as a gross miscarriage of justice, and engendered demands not only to return Moomey for trial by a Philippine Court, but to renegotiate the MBA. Demands for Moomey's return continued into 1970.²

(S) In January 1970, the U.S. Ambassador reported to SECSTATE a conversation with President Marcos in which Marcos had taken under advisement a ruling that the 1965 Amendment be accepted by both governments until the MBA was renegotiated. Old and new incidents involving U.S. personnel and Filipinos continued to cause friction during the ensuing months. Six Navy personnel were arrested in Olongapo City (adjacent to Subic Naval Base) for possession of marijuana; military and civilian personnel were accused of libel by two discharged Filipino employees; Air Force and Navy personnel were charged with rape; in all of these cases, the Philippine officials maintained that the 1965 Amendment was invalid.³

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. II, p. 329. In this discussion, various cases and incidents will be referred to in general terms. As stated in the first footnote of this section, specific details and legal points are available in the History Archives.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, pp. 264-266; AMEMB Manila 1310/140522Z Feb 70.
 3. AMEMB Manila 857/300610Z Jan 70; COMUSNAVPHIL 5213/061000Z Feb 70; COMUSNAVPHIL/CINCPACREPPHIL 5820/170145Z Feb 70.

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(C) At Clark Air Base, court orders pertaining to 12 cases were received from Judge Gaddi on 19 February 1970. Custody receipts had been executed in all cases; however, the court orders specified the issuance of new custody receipts to which a photograph of each defendant would be attached. Also ordered was the fingerprinting of each accused individual in the presence of the court. It was suggested by Thirteenth Air Force that appropriate diplomatic representations be made to the GOP to have these orders quashed, on the grounds that they were beyond the authority of the court. Compliance also would exceed the MBA requirements. PACAF agreed, noting that, because custody receipt procedures affected all branches of the U.S. Military, the matter should be referred to the cognizant DCO.¹

(S) The month of February was marked by several developments which foretold the continuing concern of both governments regarding deteriorating relations. On 11 February, the Ambassador called on Foreign Secretary Romulo at Romulo's request. It transpired that two diplomatic notes protesting unauthorized departures from the Philippines of accused U.S. servicemen had been released to the press before presentation to the Ambassador. Also, Romulo had scheduled a press conference immediately following the Ambassador's departure:²

.....
.... I did not bother to read his notes, but proceeded to talk to Romulo in the strongest language I believe I have ever used with a foreign minister. I said I recognized the element of sovereignty in these cases which concerned him but wanted him to know that as far as the real issues were concerned, which included matters of life and death, the exercise he was trying to put me through paled into semantics. I also told him that I could not believe he was fully aware of the things going on around town and feared that he was unwittingly joining into a pattern which seemed to be both serious and sinister.

I told him I thought there was an obvious effort going on in Manila to divert attention from the Government onto the Americans, and this included efforts to divert the rioters and troublemakers as well. I suggested he think long and hard before he engaged in public polemics about us today in view of the anticipated troubles here in Manila tomorrow. There were rumors around town that there would be an indiscriminate attempt

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1. Hq 13AF 210637Z Feb 70; CINCPACAF 250315Z Feb 70.
 2. AMEMB Manila 1213/111027Z Feb 70.

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to kill some Americans in connection with the demonstrations scheduled for tomorrow. I felt these were serious enough that as a precaution I was making considerable effort to keep Americans in their homes tomorrow, even though I regretted taking this step as it might in a way contribute to the feeling of unease of everyone here. It was for this reason that I have made all my moves in this regard as low-keyed as possible.

I also told him that the charges that he was leveling against us for infraction of rules around the bases paled even more into insignificance when one considered the security situation around these bases. I told him I thought I would be ready soon to present him with facts that I was sure neither he nor the President knew about. In addition to the normal graft and corruption and straight malfeasance of justice situations which had long existed, things were now taking a more serious turn. It appeared to me that a pattern might be developing of periodic, indiscriminate killing of Americans. I said he could not accept forever that publicity would come only from him or his side, and that I might have to start speaking out publicly on these matters. I gave him four or five lurid cases which I must admit had even Romulo speechless.

I said he might likewise not know that he was planning this public attack on us at the very time that I was working closely with President Marcos in an effort to be helpful to him and the Government in their current crisis.

Romulo interrupted and said that he wished he had talked to me earlier as he had already given the notes and comments to one afternoon newspaper. I said in that case I guess it was even too late to see the President, and my only recourse was to consider what I might myself do publicly.

I see now that his note complains about a case involving a Sgt. Moore back in August who apparently left on 15 August without a subpoena being issued to him which was received by base authorities on August 11. I also understand the Embassy was not informed of either this case or Williams for a long period of time. In any event, if I am going to get tough with the GOP on our side of the line, which I am in the mood to do, I would certainly like no more dallying about getting Williams back here as the Filipinos have a fool-proof case on this one. An international agreement has clearly been violated and I must

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say I cannot understand the reluctance of Defense to make amends....

(C) Two weeks later, the Ambassador used equally strong language in a message to SECSTATE, SECDEF, CINCPAC, CINCPACREPPHIL, and the Commander, Thirteenth Air Force. On 25 February, he stated that the, "...recent flurry of departures of personnel under subpoena..." had given the impression of deliberate evasion of our international agreements. He indicated his expectation that extraordinary effort would be instituted to control the departure of personnel for whom custody had been receipted, and his shock that, evidently, this had not been done.¹

(S) The following day, CINCPAC was provided by his SJA with a resume of the major cases which had caused the anxiety of the Ambassador. In addition to the Smith and Moomey cases discussed above, the case which had caused the most furor was that of SSGT Bernard Williams, USAF. Williams had been charged with rape in August 1969. He was released to Clark Air Base officials on a custody receipt which stated he would be produced in court when required. By administrative error, he was allowed to depart Clark on a permanent change of station prior to trial. He had not been returned despite strong invective from the Filipino press and officials; thus, the Ambassador's caustic comment anent DOD dallying in the 11 February 1970 message cited above. Williams had declined to return voluntarily, and Headquarters USAF had determined that he could not be legally forced to return.²

(S) Other cases listed in the CINCPAC resume included SGT Moore, USAF, who had initially been subpoenaed as a witness in a rape investigation. The subpoena had not been served, through oversight, and Moore was rotated. He was subsequently identified as a defendant, but was not available for trial. A U.S. civilian employee of the Pacific Regional Exchange, Donald Peer, had been discharged in January 1970 for stealing from the Exchange. He had implicated several Filipino employees who, in return, charged him with perjury. Although he had been placed on administrative hold, he managed to depart Clark Air Base on a military chartered flight. He also refused to return voluntarily. Tommy Harris, a 14 year old dependent of an Air Force sergeant, had been accused on 19 February 1970 of rape by the family maid. A subpoena had been delivered on the morning of 21 February, but an airman responsible for processing the action left the job at noon. The subpoena was not served and the boy left Clark at 1830 hours local time the same day. Several other cases were listed for which the accused personnel remained in U.S. custody pending trial.³

1. AMEMB Manila 1583/250438Z Feb 70.

2. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan-Feb 70; ADMIN CINCPAC 260702Z Feb 70.

3. Ibid.; 6200 ABW Clark 241015Z Feb 70.

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(S) The most startling development in February was the citation by the Philippine court of the Clark Air Base Commander and Base Director of International Law for contempt. The citation was issued on 13 February because of the failure to present Williams at a hearing scheduled for 6 February 1970. As a result of the foregoing and the concern expressed by the Ambassador, CINCPACAF sent a special fact-finding team, headed by his vice commander, to the Philippines to investigate Air Force hold procedures. CINCPACREPPHIL called all base and station commanders together to discuss improved procedures, and the Commander Thirteenth Air Force also devised methods to close the apparent loop-holes in administrative controls.¹

Williams Case Developments

(C) On 18 March, SECSTATE notified the Ambassador that DEPSECDEF David Packard had directed the USAF to issue orders reassigning Williams from his station at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota back to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The Ambassador notified the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on 19 March, and the USAF Personnel Center directed Williams' unit to issue the reassignment order the same day.²

(C) On 9 April, SECSTATE advised the Ambassador that Williams was seeking a court order preventing the USAF from reassigning him to the Philippines and that a temporary restraining order had been issued on 8 April, with a hearing date initially set for 17 April. However, it was not until 21 May 1970 that the Federal District Court of North Dakota granted a preliminary injunction and directed Williams to assemble his evidence.³

(C) While no further action in CONUS was apparent on the Williams case, Thirteenth Air Force advised CSAF on 7 August that the case against Williams and his three co-accused (Moore, Lane, McDaniel) could be settled for \$2,000. However, the U.S. required that the case be dismissed, which the judge had refused to do. CSAF proposed that a settlement be reached regardless of whether the case were dismissed, but Thirteenth Air Force did not agree because the prosecution had already rested its case and did not need the testimony of the complainant. The judge had refused to dismiss in other instances, even after the prosecution

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1. ADMIN CINCPAC 260702Z Feb 70; COMUSNAVPHIL 5800/270732Z Feb 70; Hq 13AF 281010Z Feb 70, passed to CINCPAC by CINCPACAF 021935Z Mar 70; Hq 13AF 131105Z Feb 70.
 2. SECSTATE 39729/182145Z Mar 70; AMEMB Manila 2396/190925Z Mar 70; USAFMPC 192200Z Mar 70, passed to CINCPAC by CINCPACAF 202106Z Mar 70.
 3. SECSTATE 51885/090005Z Apr 70; CSAF 251949Z May 70.

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had so moved. Lastly, unless dismissal was a condition for settlement, it was doubtful that the Foreign Claims Commission would approve the claim.¹

(U) In October, the 6200th Air Base Wing at Clark forwarded to CSAF some requested records concerning the Williams case. In November, CSAF advised Thirteenth Air Force that 62 interrogatories had been filed with the U.S. Attorney in behalf of Williams, and requested all transcripts and other available records be forwarded. Answers to the interrogatories were served on Williams and filed in the District Court, North Dakota, on 7 December 1970.²

(U) The last court action in the Philippines pertaining to the Williams case was on 1 December 1970. On that date, the Judge Advocate, 6200th Air Base Wing received a subpoena for SSGT McDaniel, TSGT Lane, and SSGT Williams to appear for hearing before the Court of First Instance on 4 December 1970. McDaniel and Lane were present; however, the case was continued until 7 January 1971. At a meeting in the judge's chambers on 4 December, both the judge and the fiscal proposed that the absence of Williams be treated as a waiver of his presence. The fiscal cited precedent that would allow a decision even in the absence of Williams. This proposal was to be studied by Williams' defense counsel.³

Holman - Hodges Contempt Citation

(C) When Williams was inadvertently allowed to leave the Philippines, a chain reaction was triggered which reached crisis proportions in U.S.-Philippine relationships. LCOL Raymond L. Hodges, the Director of International Law of Clark Air Base had signed the custody receipt for Williams. The base commander at that time was COL Averill F. Holman. Williams' failure to appear in court on 6 February 1970 prompted a motion by the prosecution on 13 February that Hodges and Holman be found in contempt of court. The judge issued an order for the appearance of the two men in court for a show-cause hearing on 16 February.⁴

(C) At the hearing on 16 February, the fiscal disclosed to the court that he had received two duty certificates attesting to the official duty status of Holman and Hodges in connection with the Williams case. The fiscal noted that

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1. Hq 13AF 070921Z Aug 70; CSAF 101538Z Sep 70; Hq 13AF 110845Z Sep 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 70.
 2. 6200 ABW 030444Z Oct 70; 6200 ABW 090847Z Oct 70; 6200 ABW 270849Z Oct 70; CSAF 052400Z Nov 70; 6200 ABW 130248Z Nov 70; 6200 ABW 130935Z Nov 70; CSAF 162230Z Dec 70.
 3. 6200 ABW 010906Z Dec 70; 6200 ABW 040926Z Dec 70.
 4. Hq 13AF 131105Z Feb 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 70.

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neither of the men had appeared, nor were they represented by counsel. He therefore again moved that Holman and Hodges be cited in contempt--this time for their own failure to appear.¹

(U) By order of 20 February, the court reset the hearing date to 5 March 1970 for resolution of the fiscal's contempt motion. On that date, the Clark Air Base Staff Judge Advocate, COL C. F. Bennett, attempted to present a Memorandum of Law which would explain the U.S. position regarding Holman and Hodges. Bennett's appearance before the court was ultimately denied, upon which he tendered to the judge a letter from LT GEN Marvin McNickle, Commander, Thirteenth Air Force. The letter, which stipulated that McNickle was acting as an agent of the U.S. Government, carried as attachments two duty certificates regarding Holman's and Hodges' actions in connection with the nonappearance of a Williams case co-defendant. Although disavowing intent to defy the court, each certificate stated the legal position of the U.S. that the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over an alleged violation of an international agreement by officers acting as U.S. agents.

(U) The next day, 6 March, Bennett receipted for copies of a 5 March court order which rejected the McNickle letter; cited the 1947 MBA (sans 1965 Amendment); and labeled the letter and duty certifications as, "...outright interference in court proceedings for the purpose of directly influencing the outcome of litigation...."²

(C) This unprecedented castigation of a senior U.S. military commander by a foreign court elicited two immediate reactions. CINCPAC asked CINCPACREPPHIL to comment on the situation and to detail the legal coordination in-country. The response was that both CINCPACREPPHIL and the Embassy had been consulted regarding Bennett's attempt to present the Memorandum of Law. The McNickle letter had been coordinated with the Thirteenth Air Force SJA and The Judge Advocate General, USAF, who had been on the scene at Clark.³

(C) The second reaction came on 9 March when the Ambassador presented a formal note to the Philippine DFA in which the Holman-Hodges situation was reviewed. The note stated that McNickle's letter informed the court that the two men could not appear, "...since the subject matter at issue is the obligation of the United States Government with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for which Col. Holman and LtCol. Hodges cannot be held personally responsible...." The Embassy note also referred to the strong language in the court

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1. Hq 13AF 160936Z Feb 70.
 2. 6200 ABW 060920Z Mar 70.
 3. CINCPAC 070206Z Mar 70; CINCPACREPPHIL 5820/091143Z Mar 70.

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rejection of McNickle's letter and the inability of the U.S. to produce Williams for trial:¹

.... As the department is aware, the departure from the Philippines of Sergeant Williams and the actions of the USG with regard thereto have been the subject of discussions between the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States Ambassador. Since the subject matter is properly one for intergovernmental discussion and since those discussions have already been initiated, the Embassy would appreciate it if the Department would so inform the Department of Justice of the Republic of the Philippines and Judge Gaddi of Branch IV, Court of First Instance, Angeles City....

(U) Later in March, another incident occurred which did nothing to calm the contempt of court storm. An Airman Albert Wise had been charged in the same court but was absent without leave (AWOL) on his hearing date. His custody receipt had been signed by his unit commander (LCOL William Epperson). On 23 March, the judge issued an order for the base commander (Holman) and Epperson to appear on 30 March to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for failing to produce Wise. On 30 March, duty certificates executed by McNickle and COL John R. Geyer, Epperson's commander, on behalf of Holman and Epperson, were delivered to the judge and the fiscal. The fiscal stated that this was another case of, "...snobbing by base officials...." and moved for the arrest of Holman and Epperson for their, "...flouting judicial process...." The judge "angrily" said that he had previously ruled that duty certificates in his court were invalid, and asked, ".... Why is General McNickle so thick headed?" The same afternoon, 30 March, the base JA received a four-page order from the judge which stated that the court regarded the submission of the duty certificates as, "... gross misbehavior amounting to a stubborn interference with an obstruction of judicial proceedings and disrespect towards the court...." The order declared McNickle and Geyer guilty of direct contempt, and, "both punished with censure...."²

(C) On 2 April, the Ambassador delivered an official note of protest regarding the contempt judgment, and reported what appeared to be a softening of attitude on the part of Romulo. On 16 May, in a personal message to RADMs Kaufman and Lambert and LT GEN McNickle, the Ambassador reported an apparent initiative on President Marcos' part to resolve the criminal jurisdiction issue among GOP

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1. AMEMB Manila 1966/070429Z Mar 70.
 2. 6200 ABW 240212Z Mar 70, passed to CINCPAC by CINCPACAF 302019Z Mar 70; Hq 13AF 300943Z Mar 70.

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officials. He then suggested that U.S. military commanders be, "...particularly cooperative in this period of testing the waters...."¹

(S) Other accounts of official activity as a result of Marcos' prodding prompted the observation by CINCPACREPPHIL that:²

.....
(S-NE) Inasmuch, however, as the foregoing [GOP instructions that the 1965 Amendment would be adhered to by all Filipino officials] represents a defeat for the Justice Department position..., this may be hard pill for the Justice Dept. to swallow. We must therefore do our part to make it go down easily. I urge that all our people who deal with Fiscals in this area do their best to be cooperative and forthcoming. While we must, of course, preserve important rights and positions, now is a time for graciousness.

(C) In spite of the optimism shown, the Ambassador advised SECSTATE on 2 June that the contempt case against Holman and Hodges was very much alive and that the judge, "...feels obligated to proceed...." With the concurrence of CINCPACREPPHIL and Thirteenth Air Force, a joint Embassy-Clark Air Base draft motion was prepared which challenged the court's jurisdiction. As previously agreed the draft was submitted for review to the GOP Chief State Prosecutor at a meeting on 28 May. He was also informed at this meeting that Hodges was scheduled to leave the Philippines for a new assignment on 2 June 1970. GOP officials requested that Hodges' departure be delayed and the Ambassador relayed the request to Thirteenth Air Force. After receiving Air Force concurrence, he notified the GOP that Hodges' departure would be delayed until 11 June. At the same 28 May meeting, the Ambassador reviewed the status of the Williams case, including Williams' challenge of the DOD return order in U.S. courts. Nevertheless, on 2 June, the Embassy received a DFA note inquiring when Williams would return.³

(C) On 12 June, the Embassy informed SECSTATE that Hodges had departed on 11 June. However, considerable pressure from GOP officials to delay the departure was received. On 18 June, Thirteenth Air Force advised CSAF that Holman

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1. AMEMB Manila 2882/021000Z Apr 70; AMEMB Manila 2883/021001Z Apr 70; AMEMB Manila 4468/160425Z May 70.
 2. AMEMB Manila 4577/200533Z May 70; Hq AF 200930Z May 70; CINCPACREPPHIL 5820/210855Z May 70.
 3. AMEMB Manila 5000/020903Z Jun 70.

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was scheduled for reassignment in August 1970. Also on 18 June, a subpoena was received by the Clark JA for Holman and Hodges to appear for the rendition of the contempt citation. The subpoena was dated 17 June, and set the hearing for 19 June.¹

(C) On the date scheduled, 19 June, the 46 page decision found both Holman and Hodges guilty of indirect contempt. Each was sentenced to be fined 1,000 pesos and imprisoned in the provincial jail of San Fernando, Pampanga until Williams had been produced in court.²

(C) After lengthy exchanges of correspondence between CINCPAC, CINCPACREPPHIL, PACAF, Thirteenth Air Force, the Embassy, and SECSTATE, a motion was filed on 2 July for reconsideration of the decision to fine and imprison Holman and Hodges. A delay of 30 days was requested in order to prepare a Memorandum of Law. All concerned discussed the strategy and legal points involved. CINCPAC commented to DOD on a number of desired changes to the proposed trial tactics and memorandum. State and Defense concurred in most of the CINCPAC comments, and acknowledged the assistance derived from CINCPAC's "excellent comments."³

(C) The U.S. Government was not represented at the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, held on 18 August 1970. The motion was submitted without argument. Meanwhile, the Ambassador had discussed the case with Marcos, and told him that the U.S. would have no choice but to oppose enforcement if the motion for reconsideration was denied. ".... We most certainly could not let our base commander go to jail over a case such as this...."⁴

(C) On 22 September, with no decision forthcoming on the Holman-Hodges contempt proceedings, the Ambassador advised Thirteenth Air Force that notification regarding Holman's departure date would be given to the GOP. It would be stressed that he would not be placed on administrative hold. Thirteenth Air Force agreed, and, in turn, advised the Embassy that Holman was scheduled to depart by ship on 24 November 1970.⁵

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1. AMEMB Manila 5391/120432Z Jun 70; Hq 13AF 180850Z Jun 70; 6200 ABW 180450Z Jun 70.
 2. Hq 13AF 190406Z Jun 70.
 3. Hq 13AF 040216Z Jul 70, passed to CINCPAC by CINCPACREPPHIL 060715Z Jul 70; ADMIN CINCPAC 280245Z Jul 70; SECSTATE 123477/311919Z Jul 70; CINCPAC 142232Z Jul 70; CINCPAC 120206Z Jul 70.
 4. 6200 ABW 180855Z Aug 70; AMEMB Manila 7554/150457Z Aug 70; AMEMB Manila 7747/210342Z Aug 70.
 5. AMEMB Manila 8705/220924Z Sep 70, passed to CINCPAC by CINCPACREPPHIL 240657Z Sep 70; Hq 13AF 241016Z Sep 70, passed to CINCPAC by CINCPACREPPHIL 250150Z Sep 70.

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(S) On 20 October, the motion for reconsideration was denied, and the order of 19 June 1970 was continued for the immediate arrest of Holman. The court also recommended that the GOP request the return of Hodges to face the court. One week later, on 27 October, CSAF requested the comment of Thirteenth Air Force regarding the likelihood of a confrontation at the port should Holman leave by ship on 24 November. The reply provided assurance that the situation was being closely monitored by all concerned agencies.¹

(U) On 2 November 1970, the Clark JA received an order of arrest against COL Holman, enclosed in a letter with a request that the Sheriff be allowed to serve the same. The response, signed by COL C. F. Bennett, noted the discussions between the two governments, and stated that he had been ordered by the U.S. Government not to accept the order, which was returned with the response. On 18 November the Embassy advised SECSTATE that press comments and student demonstrations had convinced all concerned that Holman should leave by aircraft from Clark Air Base rather than by ship from the port of Manila.²

(C) Finally, on 20 November 1970, Thirteenth Air Force advised CINCPACREP-PHIL and the Embassy that a warrant of arrest for Holman was held by the Angeles City Police Department. The police had been advised by Philippine Constabulary officers to hold the warrant for five days and then return it as undeliverable. COL Holman departed Clark on 24 November as scheduled.³

Thailand

Thai SOFA Negotiations

(C) Throughout 1970, the negotiations between the U.S. and the Royal Thai Government (RTG) on a SOFA remained at a standstill. COMUSMACTHAI commented on 17 February 1970:⁴

...background SOFA negotiations were suspended by the RTG in 1967 and indications are that they will not resume in the foreseeable future.

Civil Suit Against Commander, USARSUPTHAI

(C) While driving a U.S. Army 5-ton truck on 7 November 1968, U.S. Army Private Stewart collided with a Thai bus about 75 miles south of Korat, Thailand.

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1. 6200 ABW 261120Z Oct 70; CSAF 272159Z Oct 70; Hq 13AF 290712Z Oct 70.
 2. 6200 ABW 020946Z Nov 70; AMEMB Manila 10434/180940Z Nov 70.
 3. Hq 13AF 200849Z Nov 70; CINCPACREPPHIL 5800/020812Z Dec 70.
 4. COMUSMACTHAI 171115Z Feb 70.

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Twenty days later, Stewart returned to the U.S. After filing a claim with the U.S. Foreign Claims Commission, which was denied, the Thai bus driver then brought a civil suit in the Thai courts for \$13,000 against Stewart and BGEN David Ott, Commander, U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand (USARSUPTHAI) as the soldier's employer. On 8 July 1969, the Thai civil court dismissed the case for lack of proper service of process. Although this decision precluded another suit against Private Stewart in Thailand, further action against BGEN Ott was possible.¹

(C) The suit against BGEN Ott was resurrected in February 1970 by the plaintiff. On 12 February the Chief Judge granted a postponement until 9 March, when the counsel for BGEN Ott appeared in court. He petitioned the court for permission to submit answer by reason that his (BGEN Ott) default was involuntary.² Court actions in April avoided a default judgment and dismissed the case insofar as it pertained to Private Stewart. On 15 June, the Provincial Court handed down a final order which absolutely dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. He was ordered to pay the court costs and counsel fees for BGEN Ott.³

The Walker Case

(C) On 1 January 1969, the Thai police arrested MSGT Eugene M. Walker, assigned to the RTAFB at Udorn, on suspicion of murdering his 16 month old adopted daughter of Thai nationality the previous night. From all indications, the alleged crime appeared to be the most serious one committed so far by a member of the U.S. military forces in Thailand and received much press publicity. At the end of 1969 trial was underway but the prosecution had not finished presenting its case.⁴

(C) On 21 January 1970 the prosecution concluded its case. The defendant presented his case on 27 February and 20 March with the court scheduled to announce its findings on 7 April. The final session of the trial was held on 7 April. The court announced a finding of guilty as charged of premeditated murder (which calls for the death penalty under Thai Code) and sentenced MSGT Walker to death. An appeal was filed at the Udorn Trial Court on 17 April. Request for bail was denied by the Trial Court even though unopposed by the prosecutor.⁵

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, p. 274.
 2. USARSUPTHAI 050302Z, 161300Z, and 120700Z Feb 70.
 3. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70; USARSUPTHAI 170936Z Jun 70.
 4. See CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, pp. 277-281, for background data on the Walker case.
 5. 7/13AF 260830Z Jan 70, 7/13AF 020914Z and 250816Z Mar 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.

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(S) The Bangkok Court of Appeals, on 26 May, authorized bail for Walker in the amount of 1,000,000 Baht (approximately \$50,000). Bail was provided by the Base Accounting and Finance Office, Udorn RTAFB, under the provisions of Air Force Regulation (AFR) 110-12 and Walker was released the same day. Administrative precautions were taken to ensure that Walker did not leave Thailand without permission. Oral arguments were submitted by the defense before the Court of Appeals in Bangkok on 25 June. The prosecutor did not appear, having waived argument. The decision of the Court would be transmitted to the Court of First Instance at Udorn and announced by the latter court. It was expected that the announcement would occur within 90 days.¹

(S) In August, Headquarters USAF directed that action be taken immediately for Walker to appear before a board of officers to determine whether he should be discharged from the Air Force because of his conviction of murder. The U.S. Embassy Bangkok recommended to the State Department that the Air Force be asked to reconsider its decision and defer any administrative action until completion of the pending appeals. The Embassy was concerned that initiation of discharge board action at that time might precipitate publicity which the Embassy was anxious to avoid. The CSAF concurred in the Embassy request and deferred action in the Walker case.²

(S) On 9 November, the Udorn Provincial Court announced the decision of the Court of Appeals which found Walker guilty of causing death without intent and reduced his sentence to five years imprisonment. Walker's bail was reduced to 300,000 Baht (approximately \$15,000) and he was ordered to surrender himself to the Court of First Instance on 11 December 1970 to begin his sentence, in the event an appeal to the Thai Supreme Court had not been filed. The prosecution filed an appeal to the Thai Supreme Court on 3 December. As the year drew to a close there was no indication as to when the appeal would be considered, when oral arguments would be heard, or when the court's decision would be announced.³

Club and Black Market Cases

(S) On 17 February, COMUSMACTHAI advised CINCPAC that, as a result of investigations into club and black marketing activities in Thailand, policies governing the MACTHAI relationship with Thai law enforcement authorities in the criminal jurisdiction area had been reviewed. These policies were predicated upon the absence of a U.S./RTG SOFA, and offered four basic alternatives: (1) return all accused for trial in Thai courts, (2) post bail in each case and

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1. 7/13AF 280505Z May 70 and 270308Z Jun 70.
 2. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 020725Z Sep 70; CSAF 032134Z Sep 70.
 3. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Nov and Dec 70.

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transfer accused persons from Thailand with attending forfeiture of bail, (3) continue present ad hoc procedures, and (4) press the RTG for an interim criminal jurisdiction agreement similar to provisions contained in NATO-SOFA pending conclusion of a RTG/U.S. SOFA. After considering all factors bearing on the problem, COMUSMACTHAI stated:¹

...with full knowledge that consequence of any US/Thai investigation will be prosecution of some U.S. personnel for violation of Thai laws, I have authorized our law enforcement agencies to proceed in their enlistment of Thai police aid in conduct of their investigations into these illegal activities. We will, of course, continue policy of firmly resisting any attempt by Thai authorities to prosecute duty or inter se offenses and to best of ability will attempt to retain jurisdiction in other cases. I am hopeful that the number of persons who may be tried in Thai courts for these non-duty/no inter se offenses will be minimal, while the effect of convictions of offenders in court of law will be highly salutary....

CINCPAC concurred in the COMUSMACTHAI proposed action.²

PFC Paul M. Marple, USA

(S) On 17 August 1970, PFC Marple was tried and convicted by a Thai court for characterizing the King as a homosexual. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, reduced to three and one half years for his plea of guilty. When Marple's counsel and U.S. officials attempted to have Marple placed on bail pending appeal, they were informed that the case fell under Thai martial law. Legal representation at trial, bail, and appeal were not permitted, and the trial verdict and sentence were final.³

(C) CINCPAC began gathering information on Thai martial law practices, while U.S. officials in Thailand were discussing with Thai officials the problems of the application of Thai martial law to U.S. personnel. The U.S. Embassy in Bangkok advised that action was also being taken for submission of a petition to the King for a pardon, or to find other means to allow the removal of Marple from Thailand as rapidly as possible. COMUSMACTHAI advised CINCPAC that Thai martial law covered offenses: against the king, queen, the heir apparent and the regent;

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 171115Z Feb 70.
 2. CINCPAC 200105Z Feb 70.
 3. USARSUPTHAI 220735Z and 241400Z Aug 70.

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against the internal security of the kingdom; against the external security of the kingdom; and those pertaining to communist activities.¹

(C) Thai officials took a pardon petition to Marple, which he signed on 2 September. On 17 September, the Ministry of the Interior notified the U.S. Embassy that the pardon had been approved, and PFC Marple was released to U.S. custody within a few hours. Marple was briefed by the Embassy and U.S. military officers including COMUSMACTHAI, who stressed the sensitive nature of the arrangements leading to his pardon and the desirability of continued lack of publicity. Marple gave assurances that he understood the necessity for discretion and departed on 18 September.²

Thai Civil Suit Against U.S. Army Procurement Office

(C) On 21 October 1970, USARSUPTHAI advised that WE FIX IT Enterprise Company, Ltd., had commenced a civil suit against John C. Thompson, a civilian contracting officer employed by the U.S. Army Procurement Agency in Bangkok. The dispute involved the amount due the WE FIX IT Company for work on a building used as the U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer's Open Mess at Camp Friendship, Korat, Thailand. The suit was based upon acts performed by Thompson within the scope of his employment. Therefore, it was not a personal suit against him but rather an effort to sue the U.S. Government. The U.S. Embassy Bangkok stated that, if Thai contractors could ignore appeal procedures in contracts by going directly to Thai courts, it would establish an undesirable precedent likely affecting procurement action by all government agencies. The Ambassador concurred with the USARSUPTHAI recommendation that sovereign immunity be asserted as a bar to suit. At the end of the year the Thai court had not acted.³

Jurisdiction Over U.S. Civilians

(S) Problems concerning the lack of jurisdiction over, custody of, and bail for U.S. civilians were raised in the case of Mrs. Georgetta Mills. Mrs. Mills was arrested by the Thai police on 27 December 1970 and charged with murder of her husband, TSGT Charles A. Mills, USAF. At the time, Mrs. Mills was in Thailand on a U.S. tourist passport with an expired Thai visa and was employed by the U.S. Army Procurement Office, Bangkok, as a contract assistant. The case received headlines in the local English and Thai press with front page stories and

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1. CINCPAC 260305Z Aug 70; AMEMBASSY Bangkok 10744/261009Z and 10919/300515Z Aug 70; COMUSMACTHAI 281139Z Aug 70.
 2. COMUSMACTHAI 090736Z Sep 70; AMEMBASSY Bangkok 11855/180941Z Sep 70 and
 3. 260832Z Oct 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.

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photographs. Mrs. Mills appeared in Bangkok criminal court on 30 December. The magistrate ordered her bound over until 8 January 1971. When a petition for bail was submitted, the court rejected the tendered security of approximately \$14,400 as insufficient. However, through the good offices of the USMACTHAI legal advisor, the Court reconsidered the application and set bail at 400,000 Baht (approximately \$19,200). The Thai legal advisor personally provided title to real property as additional security to meet the Court's requirement. The Commander, 7/13 Air Force commented to CINCPACAF that, as a matter of policy, it did not appear appropriate for employees of the U.S. to provide bail or security out of personal resources in cases of this kind, and recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force be requested to make funds available under AFR 110-12.¹

(S) On 31 December, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI to provide additional data on this case and any previous cases where a dependent or member of the civilian component was the accused. He pointed out that information available in Hawaii indicated that previous conversations with the Thai Foreign Minister regarding criminal jurisdiction matters had resulted in some assurances regarding official duty cases but no assurances regarding inter se cases pertaining to civilians had been reported.²

Vietnam

Civilian Jurisdiction vis-a-vis Averette Decision

(C) During 1970, attempts to devise legal and effective jurisdictional control over U.S. civilians accused of crimes in Vietnam continued. In November 1969, James F. Wills, a U.S. citizen employed as an automobile salesman for a firm under contract to the Vietnam Regional Exchange, was accused of flagrant currency manipulations. The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) had requested permission to seek a jurisdictional waiver from the Government of Vietnam (GVN). At the end of 1969, the U.S. Department of Justice was considering a change in venue to CONUS in order to prosecute for bribery of a postal official.³

(C) On 17 February 1970, SECSTATE notified the Embassy in Saigon that the Justice Department had decided not to prosecute Wills; therefore, a request for waiver of GVN jurisdiction was authorized in order to begin court-martial proceedings. On 24 February, the GVN Minister of Justice informed the Embassy that the GVN had no objection to the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over Wills

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1. 7/13AF 280937Z and 310635Z Dec 70; AMEMB Bangkok 291134Z Dec 70.
 2. CINCPAC 310043Z Dec 70.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, p. 285.

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by the U.S.; consequently, COMUSMACV intended to authorize a general court-martial.¹

(U) On 3 April 1970, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals ruled, in United States versus Averette, that as regards court-martial jurisdiction over U.S. civilians, "the words in time of war as used in Article 2(10), Uniform Code of Military Justice, mean a declared war." This ruling denied U.S. military authorities in Vietnam the jurisdiction to try U.S. civilians by court-martial. A petition for reconsideration was filed on 10 April 1970.²

(S) In addition to raising specific problems concerning the disposition of pending court-martial cases against U.S. civilians, the Averette decision also raised the basic question of how offenses committed by civilians in Vietnam would be handled. Prior to the Averette decision, two U.S. civilians had been charged with the killing, on 20 February 1970, of a Vietnamese civilian. James M. Cecil and Robert G. Ivory had been charged by the U.S. Army, along with two military men, and an Article 32 investigation was opened on 8 April. As a result of the Averette decision, even though sufficient evidence was found to refer the charges for trial by general court-martial, jurisdiction over Cecil and Ivory had been nullified.³

(S) The cases of Wills, Cecil, and Ivory raised some legal points the interpretation of which could adversely affect U.S.-Vietnam relationships. The Ambassador had averred that, as an employee of a U.S. contractor, Ivory was subject to Vietnam jurisdiction. Cecil, however, was a direct-hire U.S. Army civilian who was entitled to immunity under the Pentilateral Agreements of 1950. This conclusion was questioned by CINCPAC in a message to DOD on 22 April 1970. The Pentilateral Agreement conferred immunity upon U.S. military and civilian personnel operating as part of the U.S. diplomatic mission in executing the Military Assistance Program (MAP). In 1961, the U.S. and GVN had jointly agreed that all U.S. military personnel arriving in-country would be accorded the same privileges and immunities as enjoyed by members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). In 1967, the U.S. had announced its policy that GVN sovereign authority would be respected, and had stipulated that:⁴

.....
...in no event will U.S. civilians serving with or accompanying
and having a direct connection with our armed forces in Vietnam

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1. SECSTATE 24056/(DTG unknown) 17 Feb 70, passed to CINCPAC by SECSTATE 24056/271813Z Feb 70; AMEMB Saigon 2756/241010Z Feb 70.
 2. DA 151918Z Apr 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
 3. AMEMB Saigon 6055/211000Z Apr 70.
 4. Ibid.; CINCPAC 220231Z Apr 70.

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be tried by court-martial except where the Vietnamese Government has waived jurisdiction....

Not only had the announcement made no distinction between direct-hire and other classes of civilians, but it had recognized, by implication, GVN jurisdiction over civilians. Thus, CINCPAC questioned Cecil's immunity, as he was not assigned to any official advisory group. CINCPAC concluded by inviting the attention of all concerned to his basic and statutory interest in policy: ".... CINCPAC would welcome the opportunity to study those comments [forthcoming by Embassy] and to make recommendations before any change of policy is announced...."¹

(S) In May 1970, DOD requested CINCPAC's views of the legality and efficacy of a U.S. military commission to try U.S. civilians in Vietnam who were serving with or accompanying U.S. forces. CINCPAC solicited the opinions of his component commands; the consensus was that, while a U.S. military commission could legally be established, its power to try civilians would be limited to violations of international law pertaining to war crimes, spying, or aiding the enemy. CINCPAC replied to SECDEF that a military commission would not solve the problem. He noted the jurisdiction of U.S. Federal courts in some crimes, but the cumbersome procedures and involvement of alien witnesses made such a solution impractical. CINCPAC concluded that firm exercise of the sanctions available to MACV to punish and discipline offenders appeared to offer the only practical solution. These included denial of privileges, denial of access to U.S. facilities, and holding offenders ineligible for employment under U.S. financial contracts.²

Dillon, et. al. Versus Laird, et. al.

(U) Whether the disciplinary sanctions referred to by CINCPAC were legal was challenged in a March 1970 civil suit filed in the U.S. District Court for Northern California. The suit was filed in behalf of 600 employees in Vietnam (R. L. Dillon, et. al.) by Attorney Melvin Belli against SECDEF Melvin R. Laird, et. al. The facts upon which the suit was based were furnished to SECDEF by COMUSMACV on 2 April 1970. On 22 January 1969, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker had ruled that, in order to curb black market activity and illegal currency manipulation by employees of U.S. Government contractors, all employees, among others, found guilty thereof would be barred from U.S. installations. They would also be ineligible for employment on U.S. Government-financed contracts in Vietnam. On 22 February 1970, COMUSMACV had issued MACV Staff Memorandum 190-1 which, with Embassy concurrence, made Bunker's ruling retroactive to all such cases prior to

1. Ibid.

2. CINCPAC 290447Z May 70; CINCPACAF 030431Z Jun 70; ADMIN FMFPAC 5800/050829Z Jun 70; CINCUSARPAC 060017Z Jun 70; CINCPACFLT 5800/062203Z Jun 70; CINCPAC 200308Z Jun 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr-Jun 70.

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January 1969. The MACV Memorandum had been prompted by the return to Vietnam, after imprisonment, of a contractor employee convicted of the theft of 36,000 U.S. owned batteries. He asserted his right to reemployment by a U.S.-financed contractor. Although the Dillon suit named 600 employees in a class action, COMUSMACV advised SECDEF that only about 15 individuals then in Vietnam had been affected by the 22 February Memorandum.¹

(U) On 22 April, DA informed MACV that SECDEF had delegated to the Army the requirement to provide a litigation report to the Justice Department. Accordingly, COMUSMACV was requested to send the report to the Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army. CINCPAC requested a copy of the report from MACV, which was sent on 28 April 1970. On 29 April, COMUSMACV forwarded the list of employees affected by the 22 February Memorandum. Among the 17 names was that of the named plaintiff in the suit, Raymond L. Dillon.²

(U) For the balance of the year, pre-trial maneuvering continued. Except for a temporary order restraining the termination of employment of affected employees pending the trial outcome, no further action occurred.³

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1. COMUSMACV 021035Z Apr 70.
 2. DA 222218Z Apr 70; CINCPAC 231946Z Apr 70; COMUSMACV 20121/280221Z and 20315/290141Z Apr 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
 3. DA 081525Z Jun 70; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, May-Jul 70.

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**CHAPTER IV - ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

(U) The insurgency in North and Northeast Thailand is supported and encouraged by Peking and Hanoi. The Royal Thai Government is moving to meet the threat. The outcome is not yet clear, but there is ground for confidence that unless the external basis of the insurgency is magnified, the Thai authorities will, with continued U. S. material and advisory assistance, progressively bring the insurgency under control.

(U) Regarding the situation in Laos and Cambodia, President Nixon has reported how the North Vietnamese sent tens of thousands of troops into all three countries of the Indochina peninsula across every single common border for the past eight years.

(U) Communist forces in Laos include some 65,000 North Vietnamese regulars and 45,000 Pathet Lao troops that have dealt serious setbacks to the Laotian Armed Forces.

.....

(U) Some 40,000 communist troops are waging aggression against the people and Kingdom of Cambodia. This follows Hanoi's consistent pattern of aggression in Indochina.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

(U) All indications, at the present time, point to renewed fighting on the enemy's part in the future, as the North Vietnamese continue to attempt to maintain an impression of military strength despite the heavy cost in lives of their men. The enemy's actions demonstrate that his ultimate objective of trying to put North Vietnamese leadership in Vietnam remains unchanged.

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(U) It would be unrealistic to hope that a Vietnam settlement, when achieved, will end the threat of aggressive

1. Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC to the Hawaii Chapters of the Society for Personnel Administration and Public Personnel Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, 16 July 1970.

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communism. Backed by U. S. ground, sea, and air power, our allies must develop and maintain conventional forces to help deter the aggressive ambitions of their communist neighbors. The Soviets and Chinese communists have shown great skill in getting others to do the fighting to expand communism. The choice for us is to assist our allies to fight the common enemy, or we will probably have to do it by ourselves.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

(U) President Nixon submitted to Congress a 119 page "State of the World" message on 19 February 1970 that outlined U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's. One of the key elements of his policy statement is that the approach to Asia will recognize that the United States remains involved, that there is a growing sense of Asian identity and concrete action toward Asian cooperation, and that responsibilities once borne by the United States can now be shared.²

(U) Specific policies for Asia and the Pacific encompass defense, economic and political partnership, and issues for the future. It will be the policy of the United States to keep all of its treaty commitments and provide a shield for nations allied with the U.S. or for a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole when the freedom of these countries is threatened by a nuclear power. When other types of aggression occur, the U.S. shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate, but will look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.³

(U) From the economic and political point of view the partnership the U.S. seeks will include not only defense but economic and political assistance. For the future American response to Asian conflicts will require careful study in each case. The U.S. will seek to aid the momentum of Asian regional cooperation without supplanting Asian direction of the effort.⁴

(U) In Vietnam, American forces will continue to be withdrawn as scheduled based on three criteria: the level of enemy activity, progress in the negotiations, and the increasing ability of the South Vietnamese people to assume for themselves the task of their own defense. While spending for purely military purposes in Vietnam can be expected to decrease substantially during the process of Vietnamization, some increase in U.S. spending for economic purposes will be

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1. Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC to the Navy League Western Sectional Meeting, Seattle, Washington, 31 January 1970.
 2. J5 Brief No. 36-70, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Mar 70, Subj: United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's - A New Strategy for Peace - JCS 24 98/1.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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required. Tasks for the future include: continued attempts to establish fruitful negotiations, evaluation of Hanoi's intention on the battlefield with the hope that the level of contact can be further reduced, and careful continuation of the policy of Vietnamization and plans for the transition from war to peace.¹

(U) The implications of this policy statement for CINCPAC indicate that as the war winds down, there will be a very definite tightening of the belts of U.S. military forces with the attendant closing down of U.S. bases, reduction in forces, etc. CINCPAC, however, was already involved in a number of actions evolving from budget reduction guidance. In addition, he had caused a number of studies to be prepared to develop meaningful strategy, forces, and bases in anticipation of base and force reductions - all responsive to President Nixon's policy statement.²


(U) CINCPAC's plans, policies, programs, operations, decisions, and actions, which were associated with his mission of countering Communist aggression and in consonance with the President's policy statement, are discussed in this chapter.

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.

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
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
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
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524,500. A second redeployment of 40,500 troops was completed by 15 December 1969. This reduction, based on progress made in the Vietnamization program, resulted in the Southeast Asia Deployment Program 8 authorized strength ceilings as indicated below (in thousands).¹

	<u>USA</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Total</u>
Vietnam	338.3	30.8	59.4	55.5	484.0
Thailand	12.7 (9.8)*	0.4 (0.4)*	34.5 (31.8)*	-- --	47.7 (42.0)*
Okinawa	15.1	2.2	16.0	15.0	48.3
Japan	7.7	6.7	21.6	2.7	38.7
Philippines	0.3	5.5	19.1	0.7	25.6
Guam	0.1	5.1	5.5	0.3	11.0
Taiwan	1.0	0.7	8.0	--	9.7

*Authorized ceiling for U.S. deployments to Thailand effective 30 June 1970. All other figures indicate authorized ceiling for U.S. deployments throughout PACOM effective 15 December 1969.

Southeast Asia Deployment Program 9

(U) On 15 December 1969 President Nixon, in a report to the nation, announced he would withdraw 50,000 additional troops from Vietnam by 15 April 1970. He said, "There are some who believe that to continue our withdrawals at a time when enemy infiltration is increasing is a risk we should not take. However, I have consistently said we must take risks for peace." He warned, "And in that connection, let me remind the leaders in Hanoi that if infiltration and the level of enemy activity increase while we are reducing our forces, they also will be running a risk."²

(U) Shortly after this announcement, Phase III Redeployment Conference was held at CINCPAC's headquarters 12-16 January 1970. On 11 February Southeast Asia Deployment Program 9 which resulted from the conference was announced. Program 9 provided authorization for 434,000 U.S. military spaces in RVN effective 15 April. This was a reduction of 50,000 spaces authorized in Program 8.³

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1. Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 69, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #8 (U).
 2. News of Interest, CINCPAC Public Affairs Office, 16 Dec 69, p. 1.
 3. J5 Brief No. 0030-70, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Feb 70, Subj: SEAsia Deployment Program 9 JCS 2472/596 of 11 Feb 1970.

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(S) OSD Program 9 established the following Service ceilings:¹

	<u>RVN</u>	<u>Thailand</u> (as of 30 Jun 70)
Army	308,817	9,637
Navy	28,770	395
Air Force	53,803	32,033
Marine Corps	42,610	--
Total:	434,000	42,065

Southeast Asia Deployment Program 10

(C) On 20 April President Nixon announced that 150,000 spaces would be redeployed from RVN by 1 May 1971. On 3 June 1970 he announced that 50,000 of the 150,000 would be out of Vietnam by 15 October 1970.² This action caused the authorized strength ceiling to be reduced to 384,000 spaces by 15 October 1970.³ Thus, Southeast Asia Program 10 replaced Program 9 on that date. Individual Service military space ceilings authorized for RVN by Program 10 were as indicated below:⁴

Army	292,923
Navy	19,044
Air Force	46,434
Marine Corps	25,590
Total:	383,991

Southeast Asia Deployment Program 11

(U) President Nixon announced on 12 October that he had directed redeployment of an additional 40,000 of the 150,000 troops by Christmas 1970. This fifth increment redeployment according to the President was made possible by the "Vietnamization" program, improved posture of the South Vietnamese Army, and the Cambodian incursion.⁵

(C) As a consequence of the 40,000 reduction in troops by the end of December, Southeast Asia Deployment Program 11 superseded Program 10. Individual Service military space ceilings for RVN authorized by Program 11 effective 31 December 1970 were as indicated below:⁶

1. Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Feb 70, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #9 (U).
2. J115 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
3. This was the fourth increment of troops redeployments.
4. Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 22 Oct 70, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #10.
5. News of Interest, CINCPAC Public Affairs Office, 13 Oct 70.
6. FONECON between LCOL L.E. Zimmerman, J5521, and COL J. R. Johnson, CINCPAC Command Historian, 13 Jan 71.

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Army	254,832
Navy	17,744
Air Force	45,834
Marine Corps	<u>25,590</u>
Total:	344,000

Redeployment Planning

Planning During 1969

(TS) Planning for redeployment of U.S. troops from RVN began in early 1969.¹ On 17 January 1969, General Abrams reviewed for President Thieu and Ambassador Bunker the military situation in RVN and discussed possible reductions of U.S. forces at some future date.² On 17 January 1969, General Nazzaro, Acting CINCPAC, advised General Abrams that CINCPAC was preparing to initiate joint planning on redeployment and noted that until 17 January there had been no official indication to CINCPAC of an intention to engage in planning the early withdrawal of any U.S. forces.³ In reply COMUSMACV stated that the only planning conducted by his headquarters was T-Day planning, and that in his discussion with President Thieu only examples of what might happen were brought up.⁴ On 23 January 1969 CINCPAC made preparatory plans to hold a conference on redeployment at Camp Smith, his headquarters, on 27-28 January 1969 to discuss the various factors concerning a reduction.⁵

(TS) To differentiate between the mutual withdrawal of NVN and U.S. forces and a unilateral departure of U.S. forces from RVN, the USIA provided specific terminology to be used. The term "withdrawal" was to be used to describe mutual troop withdrawals of NVN and U.S. forces from RVN on the basis of reciprocity, and "troop reduction" or "reduction in U.S. forces" was to be used to describe a U.S. unilateral departure.⁶

(TS) On 25 January 1969 the CJCS requested that the CINCPAC conference scheduled for 27-28 January be cancelled because the highest U.S. authority

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1. Because of the sensitive nature of redeployment planning, planning details were not included in the 1969 CINCPAC Command History. The redeployment planning presented here is a summary of key decision points leading to Phase I, II, III and IV redeployments. The data was taken from J5A, Hq CINCPAC, Memorandum 00065-70, 17 Feb 70 and a J5 unnumbered memorandum dated 8 Apr 70. Each memo was documented. The message cited in each memo will be cited here as: J5A Memo 00065-70/Hq and message date-time group, or J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/Hq and message date-time group. It should be noted that some messages are BOM, however the memorandums do not indicate which messages are BOM.
 2. J5A Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 171342Z Jan 69.
 3. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 192206Z Jan 69.
 4. J5A Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 211128Z Jan 69.
 5. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 232111Z Jan 69.
 6. J5A Memo 00065-70/USIA 242341Z Jan 69.

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expressed the view that caution must be taken in discussing publicly or privately withdrawal or reductions in U.S. forces from RVN. It was possible that the discussions could adversely affect U.S. interests at the Paris peace talks. The conference was cancelled on 26 January.¹ Three days later the CJCS provided both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV with guidance concerning U.S. and GVN discussions on possible U.S. troop reductions. Continuation of the discussions then underway between the U.S. and GVN were authorized with the understanding that such discussions were to be held on a close hold basis.²

(TS) General Abrams reported to Admiral McCain on 8 February 1969 that during the discussions with Joint General Staff (JGS), RVNAF, the JGS had pressed for a specific plan with designation of U.S. units to be redeployed. General Abrams with concurrence of Ambassadors Bunker and Berger decided COMUSMACV would not provide the JGS with a plan that contained numbers and units.³

(TS) On 22 March 1969 COMUSMACV told CINCPAC that he had made available to the SECDEF and the CJCS a fact sheet with its accompanying matrix which was being used in connection with the MACV JGS planning group discussions. COMUSMACV stated that coordination with CINCPAC staff representatives to discuss redeployment planning suggested by CINCPAC would be helpful. Timing of their visit would be discussed during Admiral McCain's forthcoming visit to RVN.⁴

(TS) During the period 1-3 April 1969 three CINCPAC representatives worked in Saigon with a small MACV planning staff. Information was exchanged and COMUSMACV's concept plan was discussed. Tentatively, COMUSMACV's plans envisioned the reduction of one division equivalent (20 - 25,000 personnel) during the third quarter FY 69 and a second division equivalent (20 - 25,000 personnel) during the fourth quarter of FY 69.⁵ CINCPAC approved this concept plan on 12 April and requested COMUSMACV to provide him a detailed plan.⁶ A draft detailed plan was provided by COMUSMACV on 16 April 1969.⁷

(TS) On 13 April 1969 Admiral McCain notified General Wheeler that CINCPAC and COMUSMACV representatives would be in Washington from 24-28 April to brief the JCS on redeployment planning and that CINCPAC would be present for the briefing of the SECDEF on 28 April 1969.⁸ The briefings were held as scheduled and on 4 May 1969 Admiral McCain notified General Abrams of the results on the 28 April 1969 briefing for the SECDEF, DEPSECDEF and the JCS.⁹

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1. J5A Memo 00065-70/CJCS 252159Z Jan 69.
 2. J5A Memo 00065-70/CJCS 282104Z Jan 69.
 3. J5 Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 081031Z Feb 69.
 4. J5A Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 220624Z Mar 69.
 5. J5A Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 040936Z Apr 69.
 6. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 122225Z Apr 69.
 7. J5A Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 160911Z Apr 69.
 8. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 132238Z Apr 69.
 9. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 042013Z May 69.

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(TS) COMUSMACV requested authority on 19 April 1969 to discuss the specifics of his force reduction proposals with General Vien.¹ On 21 April 1969 the CJCS authorized COMUSMACV to discuss aspects of "reduction" with General Vien within certain restricting guidelines. Numbers could not be used.²

(TS) The SECDEF announced on 30 April 1969 that COMUSMACV had been tasked to provide a mission-coordinated study on Vietnamizing the War (NSSM 36). The study was to cover all aspects of U.S. military, paramilitary, and civilian involvement. The U.S. mission was requested to provide inputs on Vietnamization of civilian programs under mission purview. The plan was to be all inclusive.³ On 11 May 1969 the initial mission coordinated report on Vietnamization was furnished the JCS. It included estimates of phasing and force levels.⁴

(TS) General McConnell, the Acting CJCS, informed Admiral McCain on 7 May 1969 that political realities might force a decision on troop withdrawals sooner than anticipated. Thus he requested that he be furnished by 14 May 1969 with an updated plan which included alternatives of 50,000 and 100,000 reduction in U.S. forces.⁵ CINCPAC notified COMUSMACV on 8 May 1969 that he would send three of his planners to Saigon to assist in preparing the new force level alternatives and recommended that the NSSM 36 planning be used if feasible.⁶ On 11 May 1969 COMUSMACV responded to CINCPAC's request and provided a package for a 50,000 force reduction and another package for a 100,000 force reduction. Supporting rationale and a statement of risk was also provided.⁷

(TS) CINCPAC notified the CJCS on 13 May 1969 that he concurred in COMUSMACV's reduction proposals and recommended that redeployments not be tied to a specific timetable. He also recommended that the 50,000 package be approved for planning purposes and that any decision to implement redeployment be delayed until after the enemy's intention for a May-June 1969 offensive was clarified.⁸ CINCPAC briefers presented this proposal to the JCS on 14 May.⁹ On 15 May 1969 the CJCS informed CINCPAC that Secretary of Defense Laird had approved both the 50,000 and 100,000 concept for planning purposes.¹⁰

(TS) The CJCS notified CINCPAC and COMUSMACV on 16 May 1969 that political pressures might dictate a determination of which of the two courses of action would be selected prior to 1 July 1969.¹¹ CINCPAC, on 18 May 1969, notified the JCS that detailed plans for force reductions would be complete by 24 May.¹²

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1. J5A Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 190819Z Apr 69.
 2. J5A Memo 00065-70.
 3. J5A Memo 00065-70/SECDEF 301633Z Apr 69.
 4. J5A Memo 00065-70/C/S MACV 110201Z May 69.
 5. J5A Memo 00065-70/CJCS 072132Z May 69.
 6. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 080334Z May 69.
 7. J5A Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 110216Z May 69.
 8. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 130455Z May 69.
 9. J5A Memo 00065-70.
 10. J5A Memo 00065-70/CJCS 152157Z May 69.
 11. J5A Memo 00065-70/CJCS 161455Z May 69.
 12. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 180818Z May 69.

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Four days later CINCPAC received COMUSMACV's troop list for both the 50,000 and 100,000 alternative.¹ On 25 May 1969 CINCPAC forwarded the plan for unilateral selective redeployment from RVN for both alternatives.²

(TS) General Abrams told Admiral McCain on 27 May that any requirement to develop a troop list to fit arbitrary selected ratios of support elements would be extremely difficult.³ CINCPAC supported this position and told the Acting JCS that General Abrams should be the one to say "what" within the overall guidance of "how many" troops to be redeployed.⁴

(TS) In a message on 31 May 1969, the CJCS discussed the force level alternatives and requested that COMUSMACV provide more information regarding the feasibility of going ahead on 1 July 1969 with the first increment of 20 - 25,000 troops. This information was needed for the forthcoming Midway conference.⁵ On the same day the CJCS notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF had proposed to the President a reduction of 50,000 troops during the period 1 July - December 1969 with the first increment being 20 - 25,000 troops. The second increment was to follow a "cut and try" approach.⁶

(TS) CINCPAC had recommended to the CJCS that the PACOM Reserve should be reconstituted early in the redeployment. The CJCS agreed,⁷ however, on 11 June 1969 when the Director of the Joint Staff notified CINCPAC of the destinations of redeploying units it was obvious that the reconstitution of the PACOM Reserve would be delayed. Units were scheduled to deploy to CONUS in order to gain the maximum public relations benefit.⁸

(U) On 8 June 1969 the President announced that 25,000 troops would be redeployed by 30 August 1969. (For details of the planning for this redeployment see CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol III, pages 20-22.)

(TS) On 20 June 1969 the JCS in their first message on Phase II redeployment requested they be furnished by 10 August an assessment of the situation and recommendations on Phase II.⁹ Three days later they notified CINCPAC that the President would discuss Phase II redeployments with General Abrams in Bangkok and would seek the feasibility of a 30,000 reduction rather than the planned 25,000 personnel reduction.¹⁰ CINCPAC notified the JCS on 27 June 1969 that a 5,000 increase in the Phase II redeployment would be manageable.¹¹ COMUSMACV,

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1. J5 Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 221139Z May 69.
 2. J5 Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 250320Z May 69.
 3. J5 Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 270434Z May 69.
 4. J5 Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 290313Z May 69.
 5. J5A Memo 00065-70/CJCS 312159Z May 69.
 6. J5A Memo 00065-70/CJCS 312204Z May 69.
 7. J5A Memo 00065-70/CJCS 062059Z Jun 69.
 8. J5A Memo 00065-70/DJCS 112047Z Jun 69.
 9. J5A Memo 00065-70/JCS 07645/201814Z Jun 69.
 10. J5A Memo 00065-70/JCS 09134/231821Z Jul 69.
 11. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 272208Z Jul 69.

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however, on 28 June recommended against the proposed 5,000 increase.¹

(TS) COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC with an assessment of the situation on 2 August 1969 and recommended again that the Phase II redeployment remain at 25,000. This would establish a new MACV military personnel ceiling of 499,500.² CINCPAC forwarded the assessment to the JCS and recommended a 25,000 redeployment during the period October-November 1969.³ On 16 August 1969 the JCS gave additional guidance for Phase II redeployments and requested a force package with a new ceiling of 486,000, a 38,500 reduction rather than 25,000.⁴ COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC with a troop list for a 486,000 ceiling on 20 August⁵ which CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS the next day.⁶ Two days later the JCS requested CINCPAC's views on a new ceiling of 484,000.⁷ CINCPAC replied to the JCS request on 23 August 1969 that the military assessment did not justify a reduction to 484,000.⁸ Nevertheless, the JCS requested CINCPAC to take a look at a force package with a 484,000 ceiling - a reduction of 40,500 personnel.⁹ On 30 August 1969 CINCPAC provided the JCS with the requested force package.¹⁰

(TS) On 3 September 1969 the JCS furnished CINCPAC a copy of a message they had forwarded to the SECDEF recommending that the Phase II redeployment not exceed 25,000. This recommendation was not accepted and the President announced on 16 September 1969 that the Phase II deployment of 40,500 troops would be completed by 15 December 1969. Thus the new MACV ceiling was 484,000 military personnel.¹¹

(TS) Approximately one month later, 15 October 1969, CINCPAC received his first message from the JCS on Phase III redeployments. The JCS requested his comments on a 50,000 redeployment during a January-April 1970 time period versus a 100,000 man redeployment during a January-June 1970 time period.¹² CINCPAC countered the next day with a proposal that the size and timing of future reduction be determined after the enemy's intentions for winter-spring offense became more apparent.¹³ The CJCS advised CINCPAC on 22 October 1969 that both the SECDEF and the CJCS had recommended to the President that he not make a Phase III announcement during his 3 November 1969 speech. The CJCS also informed CINCPAC that he should be prepared to forward a Phase III force package in early December 1969.¹⁴

1. J5A Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 9729/281505Z Jul 69.
2. J5A Memo 00065-70/9967/COMUSMACV 021153Z Aug 69.
3. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 092200Z Aug 69.
4. J5A Memo 00065-70/10161/JCS 161819Z Aug 69.
5. J5A Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 200436Z Aug 69.
6. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 210917Z Aug 69.
7. J5A Memo 00065-70/JCS 230218Z Aug 69.
8. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 230505Z Aug 69.
9. J5A Memo 00065-70/JCS 10489/252036Z Aug 69.
10. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 300441Z Aug 69.
11. J5A Memo 00065-70.
12. J5A Memo 00065-70/JCS 12784/151418Z Oct 69.
13. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 211857Z Oct 69.
14. J5A Memo 00065-70/JCS 13096/221548Z Oct 69.

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(TS) On 18 November the CJCS indicated to CINCPAC that the SECDEF was leaning toward a 50,000 redeployment for Phase III to take place during the period 15 December 1969 - 15 April 1970. CINCPAC was to forward to the CJCS an assessment of the military impact and risks associated with such a program.¹

(TS) On 23 November 1969 COMUSMACV in a message to CINCPAC recommended no redeployments at that time. If redeployments were directed, however, it should be 35,000 rather than 50,000. In addition, COMUSMACV proposed two options for further redeployment planning; one Army-heavy and the other Marine-heavy. COMUSMACV recommended the Marine-heavy option for future planning.² CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV and so notified the JCS. CINCPAC, however, reserved comment on the Army and Marine-heavy options until a later time.³ On 2 December 1969, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the Marine-heavy force be used in the future 50,000 and 100,000 planning.⁴ As discussed earlier in this section the President announced on 15 December 1969 a Phase III redeployment which would be completed by 15 April 1970. The new force ceiling for MACV would be 434,000 military spaces.⁵

(TS) On 17 December 1969 the JCS requested CINCPAC's and COMUSMACV's recommendation on a middle position modification of the 50,000 man Marine-heavy option. The same message also approved CINCPAC's recommendation that only a movement planning conference be held for Phase III and asked if the conference could be held during the period 5-7 January 1970.⁶ The conference was eventually held at Camp Smith 12-16 January 1970.⁷

(TS) The JCS middle position was acceptable to COMUSMACV and CINCPAC for the Phase III 50,000 man redeployment. In addition, both recommended a 50,000 man Marine-heavy Alternative A package for future Phase IV planning.⁸ The JCS on 27 December 1969 approved the last recommended force package for Phase III redeployment and approved for planning the Marine-heavy Alternative A for Phase IV.⁹

Planning During 1970

(TS) The JCS notified CINCPAC on 5 February 1970 that discussions were underway in Washington on a Phase IV redeployment. They requested background information only on force packages of 35,9 and 50,000. The possible redeployment period would probably be 15 April - 15 August 1970.¹⁰ On 12 February COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that no further redeployments be scheduled

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1. JSA Memo 00065-70/JCS 14335/180033Z Nov 69.
 2. JSA Memo 00065-70/COMUSMACV 15171/231135Z Nov 69.
 3. JSA Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 232230Z Nov 69.
 4. JSA Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 020511Z Dec 69.
 5. JSA Memo 00065-70/JCS 15784/162306Z Dec 69.
 6. JSA Memo 00065-70/JCS 15940/172257Z Dec 69.
 7. JSA Memo 00065-70.
 8. JSA Memo 00065-70/DEPCOMUSMACV 16383/190738Z Dec 69; COMUSMACV 16561/230629Z Dec 69. CINCPAC 270211Z Dec 69.
 9. JSA Memo 00065-70/6983(sic)/JCS 271731Z Dec 69.
 10. JSA Memo 00065-70/6983(sic)/JCS 052140Z Feb 70.

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during the spring and early summer of 1970. At the same time he furnished possible force packages of 35,900 and 50,000.¹ CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV and on 14 February so notified the JCS.²

(TS) On 3 March the JCS requested a Phase IV package of 70,000 redeployments and two days later requested an up-grading of the 35,900 package furnished in February to be redeployed 15 April - 30 June 1970.³ COMUSMACV provided the force packages of 36,000 and 70,000 redeployments on 8 March and again recommended no further troop reduction between spring and early summer 1970.⁴ On 12 March CINCPAC concurred in the composition of the two force packages provided by COMUSMACV and strongly supported COMUSMACV's position on redeployments during the spring and early summer of 1970.⁵

(TS) On 31 March the JCS requested CINCPAC to provide any new views that he had on Phase IV redeployments and his comments on whether he preferred announcements of small withdrawals during 45-day periods or announcement of a larger package over an extended period.⁶ COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that he preferred the announcement of a longer period (as opposed to two 45-day periods) with a minimum number of redeployments.⁷ CINCPAC supported this position as did the JCS.⁸ On 3 April the CJCS informed Admiral McCain that the JCS had recommended to the SECDEF that a decision and announcement on further redeployments from RVN be deferred to 15 June 1970. At the same time the JCS requested they be furnished the composition of a force package for a 20,000, 30,000 and 40,000 reduction to include comments on the military impact and risks involved.⁹ The packages were provided by COMUSMACV on 6 April¹⁰ and two days later CINCPAC in a message to the JCS concurred in the composition of the force.¹¹

(TS) The CJCS requested CINCPAC and COMUSMACV on 7 April to provide their views on the maximum redeployment figure they could live with for the period April-August 1970. He also requested their views on an announcement of a 150,000 reduction by 1 June 1971.¹² On 8 June COMUSMACV stated there was no feasible number to be redeployed at that time and recommended against a 150,000 announcement.¹³ CINCPAC, however, indicated to the JCS that the proposed 150,000 reduction was a reasonable planning figure but should not be announced. He also told the JCS that no announcement should be made now but after 90 days

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1. J5A Memo 00065-70/2009/COMUSMACV 121103Z Feb 70.
 2. J5A Memo 00065-70/CINCPAC 140514Z Feb 70.
 3. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/JCS 03110/032112Z Mar 70; JCS 03202/051519Z Mar 70.
 4. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/COMUSMACV 3079/081202Z Mar 70.
 5. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/CINCPAC 120508Z Mar 70.
 6. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/JCS 04400/312031Z Mar 70.
 7. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/COMUSMACV 4272/011230Z Apr 70.
 8. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/CINCPAC 021210Z Apr 70.
 9. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/JCS 04615/032350Z Apr 70.
 10. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/COMUSMACV 4527/061453Z Apr 70.
 11. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/CINCPAC 080208Z Apr 70.
 12. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/JCS 04704/070055Z Apr 70.
 13. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/MACV 4596/080948Z Apr 70.

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an announcement of 20 - 30,000 could probably be made.¹ On the same day COMUSMACV notified CINCPAC that Ambassador Bunker had to reply as to which would be the preferred alternate, a 40,000 announcement now or a larger one in August of 150,000 by 1 June 1971. General Abrams recommended the latter alternative.²

(TS) On 20 April 1970, the President announced the additional withdrawal from Vietnam of 150,000 U.S. servicemen by 1 May 1971.³ This action authorized a new ceiling of 284,000 U.S. military spaces for RVN by that date. CINCPAC received guidance to develop a plan to redeploy at least 50,000 by 15 October 1970 but need not consider more than 60,000 by 31 December 1970. The plan was to be based primarily on one of the President's three criteria - progress in Vietnamization. The "cut and try" process was no longer deemed appropriate. In addition, the development plan was to be flexible to permit either acceleration or temporary delay of redeployments depending upon the situation. Budget considerations were to be considered in light of FY 71 funding problems in selecting units to be deployed.⁴

(TS) On 6 May 1970 COMUSMACV forwarded his recommendations to CINCPAC for the Increment Four Redeployment (by direction of the SECDEF the term Phase which had previously been used with redeployments such as Phase I, Phase II was deleted and the term increment substituted). After reviewing COMUSMACV's recommendation, CINCPAC on 10 May forwarded his recommendation to the JCS. CINCPAC's recommendation like COMUSMACV's had two alternatives for the redeployment of 150,000 troops by 1 May 1971. Alternative A included a reduction of 60,000 by 31 December 1970, of this total 50,000 would be redeployed by 15 October 1970. The second increment of Alternative A consisted of 90,000 troops to be redeployed between 1 January through 1 May 1971. Alternative B provided for the redeployment of 50,000 troops by 31 December 1970 and an additional 100,000 by 1 May 1971.⁵

(TS) Due to the success of the Cambodian Operation, the JCS on 16 May requested CINCPAC to consider the acceleration of the 150,000 U.S. troop redeployment and to consider for the total FY 71 redeployment 174,000 troops by 30 June 1971. This meant an increase of 24,000 troops between 1 May and 30 June 1971. CINCPAC informed the JCS on 24 May that the acceleration might be possible and that the assessments of the situation recommended for June 1971 and December 1971 be the basis for the termination of the size and timing of the increments. Admiral McCain further indicated that the 174,000 figure was a reasonable planned objective to be reached by 30 June 1971.⁶

(TS) On 27 May the JCS forwarded their proposed response to the SECDEF for the 150,000 redeployment and requested CINCPAC's comments. The JCS had proposed

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1. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/CINCPAC 081311Z Apr 70.
 2. J5 Memo, 8 Apr 70/COMUSMACV 4619/081911Z Apr 70.
 3. J115 History, Hq CINCPAC for the month of Sep 70.
 4. Point Paper, J5A2, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 70, Subj: Summary of Future Withdrawals (U).
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.

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an Alternative B that included a 60,000 redeployment between 1 July - 15 October 1970, a 40,000 redeployment between 16 October - 31 December 1970, and a 50,000 redeployment between 15 February - 30 April 1971. On 30 May CINCPAC forwarded his comments on the proposed JCS memorandum to the SECDEF and recommended strongly that CINCPAC Alternative A be recommended for the redeployment of the 150,000 by 1 May 1971. On 2 June the JCS forwarded JCSM 266-70 to the SECDEF which recommended CINCPAC Alternative A be approved for execution.¹

(S) On 3 June 1970 the President announced that 50,000 of the 150,000 troops would be redeployed by 15 October 1970. The next day the JCS requested that CINCPAC forward to them a recommended date for a movement planning conference to be conducted as soon after 1 July 1970 as possible. CINCPAC initially forwarded the recommended date of 21 July for the conference. However, based on additional guidance from the JCS the week of 6 July was recommended. This recommendation to the JCS by CINCPAC was based on the receipt of troop list approval and Service Department guidance on unit and equipment disposition and personnel policies be made available not later than 22 June 1970.² The conference was held during the period 6-11 July.

(TS) CINCPAC was tasked by the JCS on 10 June to provide troop lists for the 50,000 redeployment by 15 October under two options. The first option was that air sorties would remain at current levels through 15 July 1970 and then reduced to 1,200 B-52, 10,000 USAF, and 3,600 USN sorties per month. The other option was that current air sortie levels would be maintained through 15 October 1970. On 15 June 1970 MACV furnished the two required troop lists.³ These lists were reviewed and forwarded to the JCS for approval. On 19 June 1970 the JCS approved a troop list of 47,100 spaces but deferred approval of the remaining 2,900 spaces pending a Presidential decision on sortie levels.⁴ The JCS had supported CINCPAC and recommended the higher level of sorties. The decision on the 2,900 spaces was announced on 14 August, resulting in lower sortie levels due to the budget constraints.⁵

(TS) Because of budgetary and Army manpower constraints, the JCS on 4 August requested CINCPAC to provide comments on a course of action for redeployment of the 150,000 similar to Alternative B (60-40-50 package) vice Alternative A (50-10-90 package). CINCPAC provided the requested comments on 7 August stating that Alternative B or a modification thereof would involve imprudent level of risks. He proposed a new Alternative C (50-40-60 package) if Alternative A could not be adopted. On 24 August CINCPAC was advised that Alternative C had been approved for planning purposes and that preparatory actions were to be undertaken for its implementation.⁶

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. JCS 2993/191814Z Jun 70 cited in J5525 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.

5. J5525 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.

6. JCS 6652/042349Z Jun 70.

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(TS) On 8 September 1970 the CJCS requested a reassessment of the risks associated with redeployment Alternatives A and C.¹ CINCPAC responded on 9 and 10 September and reaffirmed his previous comments. He emphasized that Alternative A or a modification thereof was the only course of action militarily desirable. Alternative C, however, would best accommodate the strengths involved if Alternative A was not feasible.²

(TS) The CJCS on 15 September provided CINCPAC with tentative end of the month manpower space authorizations by Service within the framework of Alternative C. This was to be used for planning purposes.³ To evaluate planning for future redeployments CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV on 15 September to provide a detailed troop list for Increment Five in accordance with the manpower space authorization provided by CJCS.⁴ After coordinating with PACOM Service Component Commanders, CINCPAC forwarded the requested troop list on 30 September and recommended that it be approved if Alternative C was to be adopted. He also recommended that the Movement Planning Conference be held at Camp Smith, Hawaii during 19-24 October 1970.⁵ On 8 October the Acting CJCS approved the Increment Five troop list. The Movement Planning Conference was conducted as recommended by CINCPAC.⁶

(TS) On 30 October, the JCS requested CINCPAC views on an alternative to the current redeployment plans that would retain in the RVN during FY 72 a Marine Amphibious Brigade of about 12,700 in lieu of Army and Air Force units of equivalent strength. CINCPAC responded with a recommendation that the force structure in RVN for FY 72 be based on currently planned authorizations, since the alternative would (1) create problems in the orderly planning cycle, resulting in Vietnamization, stationing plans, base turnovers, and the momentum of U.S. combat operations being adversely affected and (2) impact severely on logistic planning. The JCS subsequently advised the DEPSECDEF that current plans called for an authorization of 260,000 spaces in the RVN at end FY 71 - the minimum desired - and recommended that the required resources be provided to meet this level.⁷

(TS) On 14 November, the JCS advised CINCPAC that even though they had recommended a force level of 260,000 for end FY 71, it must be recognized that

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1. CJCS 12177/082340Z Sep 70 cited in J5525 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
 2. CINCPAC 090820Z Sep 70 and CINCPAC 100225Z Sep 70 cited in J5525 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
 3. CJCS 1027/151545Z Sep 70 cited in J5525 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
 4. CINCPAC 161954Z Sep 70 cited in J5525 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
 5. CINCPAC 300258Z Sep 70 cited in J5525 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
 6. Point Paper, J5525, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Nov 70, Subj: Redeployment Planning (U).
 7. Point Paper, J5525, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Dec 70, Subj: Southeast Asia Redeployment Planning.

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continued U.S. Army and USMC manpower and budget constraints could preclude the establishment of a 260,000 level as currently planned. Consequently, the JCS requested that CINCPAC provide: (1) a reassessment of the situation in the RVN beyond end FY 71, (2) an update of the required end FY 71 in-country strengths, and (3) comments on the feasibility and impact of reducing U.S. forces to 250,000 by end of FY 71.¹

(TS) On 26 November, CINCPAC provided the reassessment requested, indicated that an end FY 71 force level of 250,000 was not feasible, and recommended that (1) a minimum of 255,000 spaces for U.S. Forces in the RVN at end FY 71 be approved for planning purposes, and (2) a U.S. Army strength authorization of a minimum of 198,000 spaces for end FY 71 be approved for planning purposes. This course of action would release USMC forces in June 1971 for complete reconstitution of the PACOM USMC strategic reserve, as planned. If approved, distribution of the 255,000 spaces among the Services would be as follows:

USA	198,000
USN	11,600
USAF	44,750
USMC	650
Total:	255,000

At the end of the year the matter was being considered by the JCS.²

Troop Reductions in Thailand

(S) Southeast Asia Deployment Program 8 authorized 47,696 spaces for Thailand. A major change to the program reduced the space ceiling to 42,065 by 30 June 1970.³

(TS) On 20 February the JCS forwarded a SECDEF memorandum to CINCPAC which requested planning be initiated for further reductions in Thailand. The planning guidance furnished included requirements to reduce overall strength in Thailand to 32,200 by 30 June 1971; reduce U.S. Air Force spaces by 7,300 to a level of 24,600, based upon a program budget decision; reduce U.S. Army spaces by approximately 2,600 spaces; prepare two redeployment packages of approximately 5,000 spaces each; supply rationale if redeploying units were to be retained within PACOM; indicate the impact on the various project and operational stocks located within Thailand; insure coordination with the U.S. Mission so that political implications and impact on Thais would be fully considered; and coordinate the tentative reduction packages with the Embassies in Bangkok and Vientiane.⁴

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Point Paper, J5521, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 69, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #8 (U).
 4. Point Paper, J5524, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Sep 70, Subj: Troop Reductions in Thailand (U).

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(TS) The directed redeployment packages were forwarded to the JCS on 14 April. Verbatim Embassy comments were included as part of the redeployment plan. The plan was forwarded by the JCS to the SECDEF on 30 April. On 11 May in a letter to SECDEF, Ambassador Unger expressed his "grave concern" regarding the impact of the DOD plan. He recommended a reduction of about 6,000 spaces, which he believed could be managed without cutting too deeply into Air Force muscle required for Laos or arousing acute Thai concern over a too rapid withdrawal.¹

(S) Although part of the FY 71 reduction program, Det 6 509 FIS (F-102) at Don Muang had been addressed separately. U.S. Embassy Bangkok had discussed this reduction with the RTG and the RTG had no objections to this redeployment. CINCPAC informed CINCPACAF to execute the redeployment on or about 30 June 1970.² On 10 June the SECDEF approved the redeployment of 10,000 troops with the provisions that no forces were to be redeployed prior to 15 July 1970, except the F-102 Det at Don Muang; action would be taken to provide a WILD WEASEL/IRON HAND capability in order to reduce risk of ARC LIGHT forces; minimum work to keep route 223 open as agreed with the RTG would be accomplished after the 809th Eng Bn was withdrawn; and negotiation with the Thais would precede implementation of the redeployments.³

(TS) On 2 July, Joint STATE/DEFENSE message implementing the BANNER SUN redeployment was received by CINCPAC. This was followed almost immediately with a message from SECSTATE suspending action on the joint message pending further instructions. On 7 July, the JCS informed CINCPAC to take no further action to redeploy or prepare to redeploy, any of the units contained in the FY 71 Thailand redeployment package. On 16 July, CINCPAC informed the JCS that a WILD WEASEL capability would be maintained in Thailand by the retention of six F-105G aircraft. On 8 October CINCPAC approved CINCPACAF's request to maintain six additional planes. SECSTATE on 15 August authorized U.S. Embassy Bangkok to commence negotiations with the RTG. A period of up to 30 days was authorized to negotiate prior to commencing movements.⁴

(TS) On 21 August the JCS authorized CINCPAC, in coordination with U.S. Embassy Bangkok, to execute the BANNER SUN Redeployment Plan with no major redeployments to take place prior to 15 September, while consultations with the RTG were underway. On 10 September U.S. Embassy Bangkok concluded consultations with RTG and cleared the way for executing the BANNER SUN Redeployment Plan. On 12 September CINCPAC executed this reduction, to be completed by 30 June 1971.⁵

(TS) In a message on 22 October, the JCS informed CINCPAC that concern had been expressed recently to "OSD by STATE and CIA" regarding air support in Laos incident to the removal of A-1s from Thailand by 30 June 1971. The JCS informed

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid. CINCPAC 082002Z Oct 70.
 5. Point Paper, J5524, Hq CINCPAC, 22 Oct 70, Subj: Troop Reductions in Thailand.

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CINCPAC that the letter from the State Department referred to remarks by Ambassador Godley and stated:¹

While the B-57-Gs and AC-130s are very effective and will have to be used primarily for interdiction purposes, they do not and cannot fill the roles of cap, assault preparation, supporting troops-in-contact, and striking enemy ground force concentrations under the control of indigenous forward air guides (FAG's) as can the A-1s. Also, as we know, the F-4s are not as capable of meeting these requirements. Thus he feels and I agree, that if at all possible we should find some way of retaining one of the A-1 squadrons for an additional 12 months beyond the present 1971 redeployment date.

The letter from the CIA... states in part: my officers have been in close contact with the Department of State and Ambassador Godley in Vientiane. It is our collective judgment that the A-1 weapon system has a number of valuable characteristics which, for our purposes, are superior to the faster moving jet aircraft. I would like, therefore, to recommend that one squadron of A-1 aircraft be retained for use in Laos after June 1971.

(TS) The JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the State Department and CIA recommendations by 29 October. CINCPAC replied as requested. He pointed out the pros and cons of the requested action and stated:²

In summary, the A-1 aircraft is suitable for the specialized mission requirements of the Northern Lao Campaign but lacks the capability for diversified application in other roles throughout the theater. When viewed in the light of overall sea air requirements, retention of an A-1 squadron beyond 30 Jun 71 appears desirable only if necessary adjustments can be made in the FY-72 budget, SEA end-strength, Thailand personnel ceiling and sortie levels. Retention of an A-1 squadron at the expense of a Thailand based strike squadron is not recommended.

Impact of Force Level Reductions and Fiscal Restraints on Operational Capabilities

(TS) The JCS requested CINCPAC to provide impact statements on the effect of force level reductions and fiscal restraints on operational capabilities as of 1 November 1970.³ Prior to this request CINCPAC had provided the JCS with operational impacts of overseas base closures within the PACOM⁴ and with long range strategic impacts on overseas base closures within the PACOM.⁵

1. JCS 4095/221420Z Oct 70.
2. CINCPAC 291605Z Oct 70.
3. JCS 3195/100001Z Oct 70.
4. CINCPAC 030405Z Sep 70 cited in CINCPAC 212233Z Oct 70.
5. CINCPAC 052155Z Sep 70 cited in CINCPAC 212233Z Oct 70.

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(TS) CINCPAC provided the requested comments to the JCS on 21 October. He pointed out that "in the interest of providing a more meaningful assessment of CINCPAC capabilities versus commitments" he had not limited his comments "to the immediate time frame of 1 Nov 1970."¹

(TS) Regarding operations CINCPAC stated that the U.S. troop withdrawal program had been accelerated despite the frequent reiteration by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC that an unacceptable risk level was being approached. "This is especially true in MR I where the enemy maintains forces capable of inflicting a major defeat on ARVN or US units and of seriously disrupting or reversing the course of Vietnamization." This danger was expected to become increasingly serious after Increment VI reductions during January-April 1971.² Admiral McCain stated that inherent in the Vietnamization program was the recognition that certain U.S. combat support such as artillery, air, and helicopters would be required for an extended period as Vietnamese forces developed. He pointed out that these particular types of forces were the most susceptible to budget-directed reductions because they are high-cost items. "Pressure in the forms of reduced fund availability and directed sortie reductions has forced the redeployment of the types of forces needed in-country to insure the success of Vietnamization in the face of reductions of US ground combat strength." CINCPAC cited the example that increased reliance must be placed on flexible application of all available firepower. While the loss of portions of each of the fire support programs, that is, air, naval gunfire, and artillery had not seriously degraded the individual fire support programs, the cumulative reduction has resulted in a loss in flexible application of firepower.³

(TS) Admiral McCain warned that the troop withdrawal program originally undertaken was based on progress in Vietnamization and the "cut and try" concept. Continuation of accelerated redeployments unrelated to Vietnamization and the "cut and try" concept, however, could degrade the Vietnamization program. Forcing the withdrawal process greatly increased the tactical risk.⁴

(TS) CINCPAC commented that the acceleration of U.S. withdrawals will force the RVNAF to assume full responsibility of all Military Regions. This will require that troops which have been engaged in Cambodian operations be moved into critical areas. The ultimate result will be a lessening of the pressure on the enemy LOCs, a repositioning of ARVN forces countrywide, and a drawdown on the ARVN reserve.⁵

(TS) It was noted by CINCPAC that progressive reduction of TAC air sorties in SEA had resulted in easing the pressures against the enemy and an increase in the level of risk in the RVN when coupled with ground force reductions. The restrictions imposed further precluded trade-offs between types of sorties (fighter for gunship) because of budgetary restrictions. Banking of sorties

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1. CINCPAC 212233Z Oct 70.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

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when operations fall below the authorized 14,000 level is not permitted. The effect is a continuing downward pressure on the authorized sortie level. The reduction in the ARC LIGHT sortie rate from 1,400 to 1,000 sorties per month for FY 71 had also resulted in significantly reducing the amount of firepower available to apply against the VC/NVN.¹

(TS) In regards to the WESTPAC CVA force CINCPAC stated that it would be reduced from four to three in November 1970. This would reduce our capability to react to contingency and General War situations, and directly impact on our operational capability in Southeast Asia. In November 1970, when the CVA reduction becomes effective, two CVAs will be on the line at YANKEE STATION in the Gulf of Tonkin for approximately 18 days each month. Only one CVA Task Group will be on the line in Southeast Asia for approximately 12 days per month. During this period, as a measure of military prudence, this carrier Task Group will move southward out of the Gulf of Tonkin to a position in the South China Sea approximately abeam Military Region I in RVN, depending upon sea and weather conditions. PIRAZ will move southward in the Gulf of Tonkin to the vicinity of 17-40N, 108-00E, where it can be provided mutual support by TF 77. As a result of this southward redeployment of the CVA and reduction in land-based tactical air capabilities in Southeast Asia, no BARCAP will be available in the Gulf of Tonkin to support ACRP, photo reconnaissance or radio relay activities during this approximate 12-day period. Under normal circumstances, no TF 77 BLUE TREE photo reconnaissance missions will be scheduled during this period, and no USN special missions in the upper Gulf of Tonkin, such as those currently being flown by VQ-1, will be scheduled. Approximately 56 attack sorties per day will be flown during the 12-day period when only one CVA is on station, thereby significantly degrading contingency operations against NVN during that time period.²

(TS) In commenting on redeployments CINCPAC pointed out the future redeployments from the RVN are no longer based solely on Vietnamization. Among other things, imposed budget and manpower constraints determine redeployments. For example, previous planning followed a program to redeploy 10,000 personnel during the period 16 October to 31 December 1970. Both RVNAF and U.S. operational planning was based on this program. The inability of the Department of the Army to maintain the personnel fill to the authorized strength coupled with budgetary constraints were two of the factors which forced acceleration of the redeployment program to the extent that the October to December 1970 redeployment package became 40,000 vice the 10,000 personnel upon which previous planning was based.³

(TS) In addressing logistics CINCPAC's comments, among other things, included remarks to the effect that reductions were resulting in a transition from a flexible supply infrastructure to a vulnerable concentration of activities for Western Pacific support, that is, centralization in Okinawa or Subic. These actions also result in a significant intratheater pipeline length, on top of an

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

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already long CONUS supply line. Korea and Vietnam improvement and modernization plans provide for maximum turnover of excess in-country equipment. These stocks do not necessarily represent excesses worldwide thus "we" could be faced with justifying new procurements for like items in other areas. USARPAC current war reserve and operational project stock levels are insufficient to meet existing requirements. War reserve levels are at approximately 60 percent and operational projects theater-wide are at approximately 34 percent fill. Funds for out-of-country supply support for USARV appear inadequate to provide minimum required supplies.¹

Command and Staff Structure in Southeast Asia

(S) On 30 September the JCS notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF had expressed concern that reductions and consolidations of the various headquarters within MACV were not keeping pace with the redeployment of major forces from the RVN. In order to reply to the SECDEF, the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments, recommendations and supporting rationale.²

(TS) In reply on 14 October CINCPAC informed the JCS that reductions, consolidations, and elimination of various MACV command, staff, and logistics headquarters conducted so far had been significant. The size, composition and timing of those actions was based on periodic assessments of progress in Vietnamization. Arbitrary force objectives for such reductions had been avoided to preclude restriction of planning options and the creation of an imbalance in the forces remaining. He cited as an example the command and control elements of the field commands which had to maintain the capability to expand and contract to meet the tempo of operations in their respective areas.³

(TS) Admiral McCain noted that reductions in component command headquarters had been proportionate to troop redeployments. By 31 December 1970 component headquarters would be reduced by 15 percent as compared to a 30 percent redeployment of forces and "another 30 percent reduction is planned between January and July 1971."⁴

(TS) CINCPAC compared the assigned strengths to the authorized strengths of Headquarters MACV, component commands and major field commands. The assigned strengths of MACV and the component commands were below the authorized strengths while overstrengths existed in the XXIV Corps, I FFORCEV and II FFORCEV. The overstrengths in these field commands were the result of the overriding requirement to properly manage the "orderly redeployment of personnel and the retrograding of associated equipment and stocks. The residual task of equipment and supply roll-up associated with redeployments will continue to impact on all headquarters once the bulk of combat forces have been withdrawn." The planned

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1. Ibid.
 2. CINCPAC 140135Z Oct 70 and JCS 2372/302057Z Sep 70 cited in CINCPAC 140135Z Oct 70.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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drawdown in headquarters elements of each of the field commands varied in proportion to the level of the enemy threat.¹

(TS) In planning for the U.S. support force for FY 72 and 73 the command and control elements were to be tailored to fit the size and composition of the support force. CINCPAC noted that "...command appraisal of allied efforts indicates a requirement to reevaluate the U.S. advisory efforts in the Republic of Vietnam. An on-going study is addressing the possibilities of consolidation, reduction, elimination, and relocation of these efforts."²

(TS) Reduction of logistics support commands was based on the ability of U.S. logistics installations to process equipment identified for specific RVNAF usage as part of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization program and processing that equipment declared in excess of requirements for retrograde out of country. The acceleration of current and future U.S. redeployments, and of RVNAF activations had saturated the logistic systems. Reductions within component support commands, however, totaled 3,200 spaces between September 1969 and April 1970. Additionally, "approximately 900 component support command spaces will be reduced before the end of CY 1970. Reductions subsequent to that date will be proportionated to the planned redeployment of combat, combat support, and combat service support during the same period."³

(TS) In addressing the reduction in Headquarters MACV, CINCPAC stated that coordinated planning for the reduction of the MACV staff had been underway for nearly a year. Initially those Headquarters MACV staff positions that were primarily advisory were identified and transferred to a MACV staff advisory element JTD. This provided a manpower base from which Headquarters MACV personnel reductions could commence without serious impact on the advisory effort. A plan published in June 1970 directed a 12.5 percent reduction in the headquarters staff commencing October 1970 with a similar reduction scheduled for implementation on 1 February 1971. Follow-on reductions to the MACV staff were to be implemented as conditions permitted until the headquarters phased down to an advisory and assistance structure. CINCPAC also noted reductions were made even though Headquarters MACV had acquired two additional functions - the administration of the Cambodian MAP (45 spaces) and the activation of the MACV Office of Economic Affairs (18 spaces).⁴

(S) In commenting on the reductions in the headquarters of MACV component commands, CINCPAC advised that the consolidation of Headquarters USARV and the 1st Logistical Command resulted in a 23 percent reduction in associated headquarters spaces. Additionally, the command and control elements were scheduled to undergo successive reductions of 15 percent between October and December 1970, 16 percent between February and April 1971, and 13 percent between May and June 1971. Navy Forces, Vietnam had already experienced marginal reductions since 1969 and between 1 March 1970 and 1 July 1971 that headquarters would be reduced

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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by 38.5 percent (220 spaces). The consolidation of the Naval Supply Activity in Danang with the Naval Supply Activity in Saigon and the redesignation of NSA Danang to a Naval Supply Facility brought about an approximate 48 percent reduction in associated support spaces. The Seventh Air Force Headquarters was scheduled for a 15 percent reduction by December 1970 with additional reductions planned for January-June 1971 contingent upon ongoing operations. "Consolidation of all airlift operational planning and execution with the 7AF and the planned elimination of the 834th Air Division, will result in additional space reductions." The III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was scheduled for a 42 percent reduction after... current redeployment activities terminating on 15 Oct 70.... "Since there are no major Marine Corps combat forces planned for the US Support Force, III MAF Headquarters will be phased out."¹

(S) Admiral McCain concluded his comments by stating:²

Progress in the reduction of the MACV command and staff structure, and of support commands, has been an integral part of overall redeployment planning. Planning was initiated over a year ago to reduce, consolidate, and eliminate headquarters and support command structures. Actions have been coordinated with redeployment and Vietnamization requirements. CINCPAC will continue to eliminate, consolidate, and reduce headquarters and support command structures consistent with the mission accomplishment.

These reductions/consolidations of USMACV command and staff structures are predicated on the present enemy threat and are subject to change based on the continuing reassessment of the overall situation in Southeast Asia.

To provide the flexibility necessary to meet possible changes in the situation, and to provide the capability necessary for continued progress in Vietnamization and orderly redeployment of remaining US Forces, recommend that the above be used as a guideline for future reductions/consolidations of the USMACV command and staff structure.

Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program and Related U.S. Planning

(S) As the title implies the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program and Related U.S. Planning consisted of two main parts. One was the improvement and modernization of the RVNAF and the other the U.S. planning for and redeployment of U.S. Forces from RVN. The objective of each part complemented the other. Redeployment depended to a great extent on the I&M Program.

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.

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(TS) On 21 November 1969 the JCS requested that CINCPAC provide a report for Phase III RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (I&M) Program and Related U.S. Planning.¹ The report was to treat the major trends in Southeast Asia and focus on the three major elements bearing on Vietnamization - the threat, capabilities of the GVN/RVNAF to maintain the current level of security, and the phasing down of U.S. force levels to a support force by 1 July 1971 and then by continuing steps to the level of a MAAG by 1 July 1973.²

(TS) The JCS guidance in tasking the report provided three U.S. force level alternatives - a reduction in forces - to 260,000 by 1 July 1971, 190,000 by 1 July 1972, and a MAAG by 1 July 1973. CINCPAC provided the requested report to the JCS on 7 January. The 190,000 force level was judged to be infeasible by CINCPAC. The report was based on the assumption that resources and funds required to support the plan would be made available. Budget decisions which impact on the force levels required by the report needed to be reassessed to ensure the success of Vietnamization.³

(TS) The JCS forwarded a condensed version of the CINCPAC report to the SECDEF on 29 January. The report included four alternative force levels for planning end FY 71 strength ceilings - 270,000, 260,000, 218,000, and 190,000. The JCS pointed out to the SECDEF that the 218,000 and 190,000 were judged to be infeasible.⁴

(TS) The JCS upheld the CINCPAC position that the "cut and try" principle in managing U.S. redeployments must be maintained. Careful management of the redeployment of U.S. forces would determine, in large measure both the success of the U.S. long term effort in Vietnam (Vietnamization) and the trend of public support for U.S. objectives. They also noted that the FY 1971 budget did not provide sufficient resources to support the extra cost of Vietnamization along with the U.S. force levels. They recommended that:

a. The Phase III RVNAF I&M concept and programs proposed in the report be approved and that such approval be provided expeditiously to permit immediate development of follow-on detailed plans and directives for execution and as a basis for coordination and discussion with the GVN.

b. A U.S. in-country force level of about 270,000 for end FY 1971 and a MAAG structure of about 43,000 spaces by end FY

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1. JCS J5SM 237-70 of 23 Mar 70 directed that the "RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (Phase III)" be referred to as the "Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program." The new program consolidated and superseded previous planning programs.
 2. J5 Brief No. 00022-70, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Feb 70, Subj: Vietnamization - Phase III RVNAF Improvement and Modernization and Related U.S. Planning (U), JCSM 42-70 of 29 January 1970.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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1973 be approved for the purpose of further U.S. planning.

c. Since the FY 1971 budget is stringent to the point of inflexibility, sufficient additive resources be made available to support Vietnamization, U.S. force levels, and sortie rates proposed in this report.

d. The principle of "cut-and-try" redeployment toward the proposed FY 1971 U.S. support force and the FY 1973 MAAG presented in the report be continued.¹

On 19 March the JCS requested supplemental information to the CINCPAC 7 January report. The requirement for the supplemental information stemmed primarily from modifications of two of the assumptions on which the original report was based. The first was that "Resources and funds to support the DOD portion of the program will be limited by existing and foreseeable DOD budget ceilings." The second was that "U.S. Military forces in Thailand will be reduced to a manpower space authorization of 32,200 by 30 June 1971." In addition CINCPAC was requested to comment on an illustrative proposal for reduction of certain forces to meet a \$2.2 billion FY 70 and FY 71 shortfall.²

(TS) In response to the JCS request, CINCPAC forwarded on 10 April the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program which contained four enclosures. These were: (1) GVN Proposals Concerning RVNAF Force Structure and Improvement of Living Conditions; (2) Vietnamization - Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (Phase III) and Related U.S. Planning; (3) Force Planning Thailand; and (4) PACOM Reductions.³

(TS) Based on CINCPAC's report the JCS forwarded a memorandum to the SECDEF on 27 April which pointed out that there was a \$1.025 billion cost that had to be reprogrammed rather than the \$2.2 billion previously indicated. With the exception of \$27 million which was to accrue from USN reprogramming the remainder of the \$1.052 billion would be made up from the following Southeast Asia and other PACOM programs:⁴

a. Reduce to 260,000 U.S. troops in RVN by 1 July 1971 as opposed to 270,000.

b. Reduce 10,000 U.S. military spaces in Thailand by 1 July 1971, leaving 32,200.

c. Redeploy one division from Korea by 15 May 1971.

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1. Ibid.
 2. J5 Brief No. 00096-70, Hq CINCPAC, 11 May 70, Subj: Vietnamization - Consolidated FVNAF Improvement and Modernization and Related U.S. Planning (U), JCSM 202-70 of 30 Apr 70.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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- d. Redeploy two USAF fighter squadrons from Korea by 1 September 1970.
- e. Reduce B-52 sorties to 1,000 per month.
- f. Reduce USAF attack sorties to 10,000 per month.
- g. Reduce Navy attack sorties to 2,700 per month.
- h. Reduce naval gunfire support to three ships.

(TS) The JCS told the SECDEF the above action was not in consonance with the rate of progress in Vietnamization, the level of the enemy threat, or the uncertain situation that existed in Laos and Cambodia. They recommended the SECDEF request supplemental funds which would permit the retention of options for surges in activity levels, especially air, and permit pacing of the 150,000 reduction package with progress in Vietnamization. The JCS noted that the incorporation of the above recommendations concerning limited supplemental funds was considered an emergency measure only and did not strengthen the revised program sufficiently to render it militarily acceptable for implementation with prudent risk. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not concur in the implementation of the program from the standpoint of the trade-offs it required or the level of activity it specified.¹

(TS) In addition to the proposal for meeting the budget shortfall with cuts in PACOM forces, two other substantive changes were made to the CINCPAC report by the JCS - USAF tactical fighter squadrons were reduced from 18 to 10 and USAF tactical airlift squadrons were reduced from 12 to 10. The JCS solution to the FY 70-71 budget shortfall had serious implications for U.S. objectives in Southeast and Northeast Asia.² The actual redeployment planning of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia was discussed earlier in this section.³

RVNAF Improvement and Modernization

(TS) On 21 November 1969 the SECDEF through the JCS requested that CINCPAC review the RVNAF I&M Program with the objective of establishing a plan to raise the RVNAF effectiveness to the point where the GVN can maintain the current levels of security against the current NVA/VC threat while U.S. forces were redeployed.⁴ COMUSMACV completed the review and forwarded it to CINCPAC where it was coordinated with the Service components and forwarded to the JCS in January 1970. Concurrent with the CINCPAC submission to the JCS, COMUSMACV forwarded the GVN's separate recommendation for an increase in the RVNAF force structure on 14 January 1970 to the JCS.⁵

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- 1. Ibid.
 - 2. Ibid.
 - 3. See PACOM Force Requirement and Capabilities.
 - 4. Point Paper, J5A3, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Jan 70, Subj: RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Phase III (U).
 - 5. Point Paper, J5A1, Hq CINCPAC, 28 May 70, Subj: Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (U); CINCPAC 070412Z Feb 70.

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(TS) On 31 January the JCS requested the status of planning on the GVN proposal for a force increase and an estimated date for the submission of the report. CINCPAC replied on 7 February and told the JCS that a MACV-JGS, RVNAF committee was reviewing the RVNAF proposal and estimated that CINCPAC's initial comments would be forwarded on 9 March.¹ CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS on 10 April the fully coordinated recommendations for an increase in the RVNAF force structure. The recommendations included the approval of a food supplement plan to improve the diet of all RVNAF servicemen and the construction of 20,000 dependent shelters each year for five years. The overall force structure recommended is as indicated:²

<u>Regular Forces</u>	<u>Proposed End FY 70</u>	<u>Proposed End FY 71</u>	<u>Proposed End FY 72</u>	<u>Proposed End FY 73</u>
ARVN-Strength	390,824	434,019	441,829	447,456
VNN-Strength	31,645	39,611	39,611	39,611
VNAF-Strength	35,786	38,780	44,712	46,998
VNMC-Strength	13,070	13,462	13,462	13,462
RF-Strength	275,645	294,446	294,446	294,446
PF-Strength	<u>239,390</u>	<u>258,027</u>	<u>258,027</u>	<u>258,027</u>
Total RVNAF	986,360	1,078,345	1,091,087	1,100,000

(TS) On 5 June the SECDEF approved the FY 71-72 RVNAF force structure and the FY 73 structure for planning purposes.³ The SECDEF's memorandum set forth certain guidance, decisions, and levied requirements. Guidance provided by the SECDEF to the JCS included:⁴

FY 72-75 DOD funds may well be reduced because of economic climate, mood of Congress and other federal resources demands - therefore, must look at FY 72-73 force levels and activities that can be supported within DOD funds likely to be available.

Economic impact of RVNAF I&M plan on GVN should not impact on objectives during FY 71. FY 72 will produce problems that may require further U.S. economic aid in form of MASF funds.

(TS) The SECDEF decisions included the following:⁵

Activities which require supplemental funds for SEA must be obtained by reductions in SEA and or other defense funds.

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1. CINCPAC 070412Z Feb 70.
 2. Point Paper, J5A1, Hq CINCPAC, 28 May 70, Subj: Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (U).
 3. J5523 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
 4. Point Paper, J5523, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Aug 70, Subj: Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (U).
 5. Ibid.

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Validated funding requirements for RVNAF I&M plan are approved and related PACOM tradeoffs will be addressed in conjunction with a FY 71 budget review now in progress.

Vietnam MAAG of 25,000 plus 19,000 support spaces is approved for planning purposes. Every effort must be made to hold MAAG at or below these figures.

Approves present sortie level until 15 July - (1,400 B52s; 14,000 USAF; 3,500 USN).

NGS - 3 ships approved.

RVNAF improvement of living standards program is approved for five years.

The C&E program decision will be forwarded separately.

RVNAF recommended equipment list is approved.

Sensor and radar program is deferred until MACV submits sensor study.

(TS) Among the SECDEF requirements were taskings for a CY 70 year-end progress report on improvements in RVNAF leadership, training and morale areas and a requirement for COMUSMACV to review the RVNAF force ceiling with a view toward a "First Incremental Reduction" in the active RVNAF forces to one million personnel. The latter requirement was given a 1 December 1970 suspense date.¹

(TS) On 19 June the JCS forwarded a message to CINCPAC in implementation of the SECDEF's memorandum. CINCPAC was tasked to provide:²

a. Recommendation regarding either scope or timing of the actions outlined in the JCS implementing message by 24 June 1970.

b. Recommendations on WILD WEASEL and maintenance of Route 233 in Thailand by 1 July 1970.

c. By 5 July changes to Southeast Asia strategy; milestones in RVNAF performance; review of U.S. forces versus FY 72 budget; and comments and recommendations on desirability of U.S. support of an RVNAF Special operations capability.

d. Information on RVNAF Signal force structure and requirements for U.S. Signal Troops by 1 September 1970.

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.

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e. Review of RVNAF force structure with view toward reduction by 10 November 1970.

f. Year-end progress report on leadership and morale of RVNAF forces by 15 January 1971.

(TS) In a letter dated 11 October 1970 COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC with his views concerning the initial reduction of the RVNAF to a one million man force. CINCPAC reviewed COMUSMACV's comments and on 9 November transmitted the COMUSMACV letter to the JCS. In his letter of transmittal CINCPAC told the JCS the three alternative plans included in the report for a 100,000 reduction in the RVNAF was based upon various threats and that discussions with the JGS, RVNAF would most likely produce a compromise on the number of spaces to be reduced.¹

(TS) CINCPAC wrote that "any reduction must be based on the tactical situation and predicated on a lessening of the current VC/NVA threat to RVN, vis-a-vis the evaluated effectiveness of the RVNAF at that time. This effectiveness must be fully recognized by the RVNAF Joint General Staff."² He pointed out that when the initial I&M force structure report was prepared, 1.1 million spaces was considered to be the minimum force necessary for the RVNAF to assure successful absorption of additional missions under the predicted VC/NVA threat. MACV and the JGS had formulated the initial report after a limited time because the time allotted to them was short. Since then further study of the individual Service forces revealed significant shortfalls. As an example Admiral McCain cited:

The VNN logistical structure will require more spaces as will VNAF supply and maintenance units. In addition, the contemplated transfer of USA River Patrol Boats (PBR) to the Vietnamese Navy will also require RVNAF manpower adjustments not originally included in the program. Most shortfalls are being resolved in-country by negotiation between MACV and the JGS. As units activate and equipment lists are resolved, more shortfalls may be revealed that will alter the originally planned force structure. Reduction of the force by 100,000 in the near future would not permit RVNAF interservice trade offs.³

(TS) CINCPAC told the JCS that consideration should be given to attendant adjustments to both the National Police (NP), and the Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF). This consideration was in addition to the reductions considered in Alternatives A, B and C. "The maintenance of these paramilitary units is an associated U.S. commitment to the GVN. The recruitment, training, and equipping of the NP and PSDF will impact on budgetary requirements (although not necessarily DOD funds), and should be considered in concert with proposed RVNAF force adjustments."⁴

1. Ltr, Ser 000 410, CINCPAC to the CJCS, 9 Nov 70, Subj: Letter of Transmittal (U).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

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(TS) In summarizing, Admiral McCain concurred with COMUSMACV's views. He cautioned that:¹

Any reductions before end FY 73 would seriously impair the chances for successful Vietnamization. While fully recognizing the budgetary constraints faced, any indications of a plan to reduce the RVNAF force would detract from the successes enjoyed in Cambodia and RVN operations and would impact most unfavorably on the credibility of the Nixon Doctrine throughout SEAsia.

Logistical Aspects of Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program

(TS) The Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) which was approved on 5 June by the SECDEF provided a logistics force that came closer to being self sufficient than any other previously planned I&M logistics force. The logistics portion of the 5 June CRIMP concentrated more on enhancing the capabilities of units already activated or programmed for activation than creating new units. Some new units were projected, however. These were maintenance, highway and terminal service companies, airlift squadrons, and small logistic watercraft units.²

(TS) The RVN Army (ARVN) received the largest number of spaces - 11,914. This figure represented a modest percentage increase in the overall logistic strength. New units projected for activation were limited to one medium and one light truck company, a terminal service company, and a number of transportation teams and detachments.³

(TS) The RVN Air Force (VNAF) logistics additions totaled 2,567 spaces. This was a considerable increase over previous authorized levels. Of this total increase 684 spaces were authorized for two C-7A squadrons (48 U/E aircraft) and 430 spaces for a CH-47 squadron (16 U/E aircraft). The remaining 1,453 spaces provided supply and maintenance support to the these units as well as to fighter, reconnaissance and assault helicopter squadrons being added to VNAF.⁴

(TS) An increase of 7,966 spaces were authorized for the RVN Navy (VNN). Of this total 5,300 spaces could be categorized as logistical. Although only a few sealift assets were added to the VNN, a substantial increase in supply and maintenance personnel was necessary to support a large increase in combat craft, to perform depot level maintenance for ARVN marine craft, and to fill skill vacancies in the VNN shipyard that could not be obtained through civilian recruitment.⁵

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1. Ibid.
 2. Point Paper, J4114, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Sep 70, Subj: Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP), Logistical Aspects (U).
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

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treatment of civilian humanitarian cases has traditionally been authorized in U.S. military medical facilities and the costs of such care has been negligible. Medical materiel is furnished USAID by the U.S. Army Medical Depot, Ryukyus Islands, in support of the provincial (civil) hospital systems in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.¹

(S) The value of these programs to U.S. international relationships is well documented. It is very questionable, however, in the opinion of the CINCPAC Surgeon, that the programs should, in the main, be funded by the military Services and utilize military personnel in critically understaffed military occupational specialties.²

(S) MEDCAP and MILPHAP are presently under study by SECDEF in an AID/DOD Realignment Program which it is hoped will result in a satisfactory solution. CWCP will resolve itself with the withdrawal of U.S. Forces and completion of the Vietnam Improvement and Modernization Program, but should be seriously studied before being approved to such a degree in any future conflict.³

Turnover of U.S. Bases and Facilities to RVNAF

(C) Many bases and facilities have been constructed for the RVNAF. Most of these were built to temporary standards and therefore are expensive and difficult to maintain. In addition to these bases and facilities, temporary high maintenance facilities constructed for U.S. Forces are being transferred to the RVNAF. Some of these are either past their life expectancy or are not located in areas suited to the efficient performance of tasks of RVNAF units. For example, many U.S. bases were originally located away from RVN industrial and population centers. However, the support of industrial and population centers will be a very important factor in the efficient operation of the RVNAF.⁴

(C) As of December 1970, the transfer of 106 bases from U.S. Forces to the RVNAF was initiated. Of this number the transfer of 63 bases had been completed. A total of 309 U.S. Army and Marine bases remained. All U.S. Navy and Air Force bases which are included in the above 106 were in the process of being transferred. A listing of the 309 bases was provided to the RVNAF for screening against RVNAF requirements.⁵

(C) Unfunded facility requirements in support of the CRIMP at the end of 1970 totaled \$131 million. The unfunded facility requirements by Service were as follows (\$ millions):⁶

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Point Paper, J422, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Dec 70, Subj: RVNAF Bases and Facilities (U).
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.

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	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>CRIMP</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	2.4	110.	112.4
Navy	.7	16.	16.7
Air Force	<u>.0</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>
	3.1	127.9	131.0

CINCPAC's Assessment of the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program and Vietnamization

(U) In an address to the members of the Associated Press Managing Editors Association at their 37th Annual Convention, in Honolulu, on 19 November 1970, Admiral McCain discussed the progress of the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program and Vietnamization.

(U) He told the managing editors:

...the military improvement and modernization efforts, we find that this program is ahead of schedule.

The Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces have grown from 274,000 men and women under arms in 1960 to today's 1,200,000. This includes 400,000 Army regulars, 36,000 Navy, 37,000 Air Force, 12,000 Marines, 500,000 territorial force troops, and about 215,000 paramilitary forces including civilian irregulars and national police.

The goal however is quality and not quantity. General Abrams and his staff greatly emphasize the necessity for developing quality manpower and leadership within the armed forces of the South. Since June 1969, when President Nixon ordered the first American troop redeployment and made Vietnamization a priority mission, South Vietnamese infantrymen have replaced American troops in these key regions:

- The capital military district, including defense of Saigon.
- The Mekong Delta.
- The coastal belt along the South China Sea running from north of Danang to the eastern flank of the Demilitarized Zone.
- The Central Highlands.

There are no U.S. infantry units based south of Saigon since the departure of the Ninth Division, Third Brigade.

Since U.S. withdrawals began about 16 months ago, 57 American military installations have been turned over to the Vietnamese.

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The Vietnamese Air Force--gaining strength in both equipment and technical proficiency--now has 20 squadrons of more than 400 aircraft including jet and propeller-driven bombers, helicopters, AC47 gunships, C47 transports and light single-engine reconnaissance planes. Among its 32,000 airmen are 1,200 trained pilots and 1,500 more scheduled for training. Their combat sortie rate within the past year has increased 67 percent for fixed wing aircraft and a threefold increase for helicopters.

One of the problems we are now faced with is training time. Training is not an overnight accomplishment. It takes time. For example, it takes 12 months to train a jet pilot in just the basic skills of flying his aircraft. It takes six months to train a mechanic to maintain that jet aircraft. Before either of these can start his training, 30 to 36 weeks of English language instruction is required.

The U.S. 7th Air Force has transferred to the Vietnamese Air Force nearly 150 troop-carrying helicopters, A37 jet fighter bombers and AC47 twin-engine gunships. Approximately 7,200 of the Republic of Vietnam's military personnel are being trained in the United States this fiscal year. Most are associated with air operations. The number is nearly five times that of two years ago.

Probably the most rapid progress... has been made by the U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam. This is the brown-water navy that patrols the Mekong Delta rice bowl south of Saigon and screens infiltration corridors for enemy troops and equipment leading from Cambodia into the western delta.

The South Vietnamese Navy has reached a strength of 36,000 men and 1,500 vessels. It operates almost entirely in the Mekong Delta which contains more than half of the country's population south of Saigon.

Since the... program began, the U.S. Navy has given the South Vietnamese Navy 658 combatant and logistic craft, including 625 river patrol boats. More than 6,000 Vietnamese have been trained to meet U.S. Naval standards of operation, and the command of two major bases has been given to the South Vietnamese Navy. Significantly, no U.S. patrol boat operating in Vietnamese waters today has an entirely American crew.

U.S. Coast Guard has phased out its Vietnam based combat operations. Coast Guard Squadron One has turned over all of its 26 patrol vessels to the Vietnamese over a 15 month period. The squadron was mostly involved in patrol and surveillance work along the South China Sea coast. Now there are only a few advisory and technical personnel remaining.

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The added significance to what I have just mentioned is this. It is relatively easy to just turn over equipment and bases indiscriminately, but this is not the case in Vietnam today. The Vietnamese Armed Forces are capable and well trained to maintain and continue the fight with the equipment and operational facilities they are receiving. In addition, the men in the field, including the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces, are being equipped with the best weapons. Over 96 percent of the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces are using the M-16 rifle, and they are proving they can use it very well.

(U) In addressing Vietnamization Admiral McCain stated:

In South Vietnam the President's policy is sound. The current plan for reduction of 150,000 men is both safe and reasonable, particularly in view of our success in Cambodia.. It will speed up Vietnamization to insure continued U.S. redeployments from Southeast Asia, and to reduce American casualties. As Secretary Laird has said, "there will be a reduction by next spring in our authorized strength in Vietnam... to our new goal of 284,000... a cut of nearly 265,000 Americans."

Vietnamization as a path to peace in Vietnam fulfills four purposes: Self-determination for the South Vietnamese people. Honors our obligations to the Vietnamese. Systematically reduces American ground combat involvement. Helps restore the credibility of our actions at home and abroad.

Throughout the Republic, the Vietnamese soldier is taking over the combat readiness and combat action in this war. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces continue to train themselves, accept new combat responsibilities, and set out in their combat actions with a renewed determination to defeat the enemy. The Republic of Vietnam Army continues to seek out the enemy and to preempt him at every opportunity, defeating his forces and destroying his caches before they can launch their next attack.

Simultaneous with this is the turnover of military equipment, and bases for their operational and logistical growth.

Let me at this time touch on just a few significant Vietnamization illustrations:

First, the economy: over 95 percent of essential roads and waterways are now open. Rice production is moving towards self-sufficiency. The big problem, however, is control of inflation to insure the economic stability of Vietnam.

President Thieu's government has been and continues to grow in strength. Locally elected governments are spreading

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SECTION II - OPERATIONS SOUTHEAST ASIA

(U) One of the great acts of moral courage and discipline in our search for a just peace in Southeast Asia was when President Nixon ordered the Cambodian operation. The President's move into communist sanctuaries was bold and decisive. The purpose was to protect allied forces by destroying enemy sanctuary areas and supply caches. We did this. Now we have withdrawn all U.S. ground forces from Cambodia. We are out.

.....

(U) All indications, at the present time, point to low level fighting on the enemy's part in the future, as the North Vietnamese continue to attempt to maintain an impression of military strength despite the heavy cost in lives of their men. The enemy's actions demonstrate that his ultimate objective of trying to put North Vietnamese leadership in South Vietnam remains unchanged.

.....

(U) As President Nixon reported to the American people in April, the enemy's three basic strategies have failed. He has not won and cannot win a military victory or a political victory in South Vietnam. And he cannot achieve a political victory in the United States.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

(U) This section of Chapter IV covers operations in Southeast Asia as influenced by CINCPAC. In-country operations are covered in detail in Annex A. Due to the sensitivity of the Cambodian operations, CINCPAC's role in planning and coordinating the operation will receive only cursory coverage in this year's annual report. Passage of time should permit its inclusion in the 1971 CINCPAC Command History. An assessment of the results by Admiral McCain is presented however, along with limited background information.²

Short Range Options and Long Range Strategy for Southeast Asia

(TS) As a result of the Bangkok Conference conducted 29 June - 3 July 1970,

1. Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC, to the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, 37th Annual Convention, Honolulu, Hawaii, 19 Nov 70.
2. See Annex A for COMUSMACV's detailed account of the Cambodian operation.

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Admiral McCain tasked COMUSMACV to consider three categories of out-of-country operations. They were: (1) expansion of RVN conventional and unconventional operations in Laos, (2) riverine operations with RVN and FANK forces up the Mekong to Stung Treng, and (3) four-country operations in Laos and Cambodia.¹

(TS) Later the JCS requested an analysis of options for the short range strategy and a wider range of alternative long range strategies. CINCPAC's response included riverine blockade operations and waterborne raids along the Mekong river; constructing Thai LOCs and attacks across southern Laos or northern Cambodia to Pakse or Stung Treng, respectively; and an ARVN reinforced-division attack along Highway 19 to Stung Treng. CINCPAC considered these operations to be feasible. For the long range, Admiral McCain concluded that initially the U.S. should support a strategy of regional cooperation, however, if Cambodia and Laos should opt for neutrality rather than regional cooperation the U.S. should move to a counterbalanced force strategy.²

(TS) CINCPAC's staff analyzed various operations to determine if the operations: (1) were feasible, (2) would assist in Vietnamization, (3) would help reduce U.S. casualties, (4) would assist in U.S. troop redeployment, (5) would stimulate meaningful negotiations, and (6) were escalatory. The following are some of the operations considered feasible:³

a. Expansion of Present Unconventional Warfare Operations. This operation is an expansion of the present UW operations in an area south of the 16th parallel in Laos from the RVN border to the Se Kong. A variant would involve one to three ARVN Ranger battalions. Another would involve the introduction of one or more exploitation companies after a reconnaissance team has located suitable targets. The operation would assist Vietnamization; decrease U.S. casualties in the long term but would possibly increase casualties in the short term due to U.S. participation; disrupt redeployment of some U.S. helicopter units; and slightly assist in stimulating meaningful negotiations. The operation was not considered escalatory.

b. Riverine Blockade Operation. Operation involves the establishment of eight strong points and river blockade positions at designated intervals along the Mekong from Phnom Penh north to Kratie. Preponderance of force would have to be provided by RVNAF because of lack of capability of Cambodian forces. A variant involving waterborne raids was also considered. The operation would not assist Vietnamization. It was considered not applicable in assisting in the reduction of U.S. casualties and in assisting U.S. troop withdrawal. The effect on negotiations was considered to be negligible. The operation would not be escalatory.

c. Thai Operations Across Southern Laos or Northern Cambodia. This

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1. Point Paper, J555, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Dec 70, Subj: Short Range Options and Long Range Strategy for SEASIA (U).
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

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operation envisions a Thai force constructing a LOC across southern Laos to the Mekong, establishing a forward base and interdicting NVA movement. A variant would be an attack through Cambodia from southeast Thailand to an area near Stung Treng. The operation would not contribute directly to Vietnamization, however, it might induce accelerated withdrawal of the RTAFV from the RVN, thus degrade Vietnamization. While the LOC portion of the operation would not have any effect on reducing casualties the variant might increase casualties due to the need for U.S. air assets. This operation is considered to be escalatory.

d. Reinforced ARVN Division Operation Along Highway 19 to Stung Treng

This variant of the four-country operation involves an ARVN reinforced division seizing Bung Lung by moving west out of Pleiku in Military Region II, a helicopter borne assault on Stung Treng followed by a link up of the Bung Lung and the Stung Treng forces. Operation could be conducted about two and a half months after the decision is made to execute the plan. It would assist in Vietnamization, probably increase casualties due to use of U.S. air assets, might disrupt accelerated U.S. redeployment, would be considered escalatory, and whether it would assist in stimulating meaningful negotiations is purely speculative.

(TS) As a consequence of FANK reverses during the dry season CINCPAC and COMUSMACV submitted to the JCS a number of operational concepts involving RVNAF participation. These included: (1) RVNAF and FANK participation to Kompong Cham/Chup Plantation area; (2) RVNAF relief and security of Phnom Penh either by road and river or by air; (3) operations in the Kampot/Takeo area; and, (4) relief of Kompong Som. In conjunction with these proposed operations CINCPAC recommended: (1) expansion of FREEDOM DEAL authorities to permit unlimited air operations of all types over all of Cambodia; (2) the establishment of a combined TACC to include U.S. participation in Cambodia; (3) authority for U.S. fixed and rotary wing aircraft to operate in Cambodia to include U.S. maintenance personnel positioned at forward bases in Cambodia to maintain RVNAF aircraft; (4) the early establishment of a JUSMAAG; and (5) the early approval of three U.S. observers per Cambodian military region to provide information to COMUSMACV and advice to the GKR.¹

(TS) The CINCPAC staff concluded that the short-term strategy should enhance Vietnamization with primary emphasis on out-of-country operations to preserve the integrity of the GOC. Operations should be within the capabilities of RVN forces without detracting from the primary goal of speeding Vietnamization. The mid-term (FY 72) strategy should include possible adjustment in the priorities of support, specifically with regard to Laos. The long-term strategy (FY 73-76) should initially support the strategy of regional cooperation (encourage two or more Southeast Asian nations to enter into economic and security arrangements). However, if Cambodia and Laos opt neutrality rather than regional cooperation, the U.S. should move toward a strategy of counterbalanced forces which envisions political actions leading to the true neutrality of Cambodia, observance of Laos as a buffer, the continuing development of a strong RVN to off-set North Vietnam's expansion, and U.S. strong ties with and support of Thailand.²

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

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The Cambodian Operation

(S) During the period 29 April - 30 June 1970, 13 separate cross-border operations took place. Only two of these operations involved U.S. ground combat units. The remainder were conducted by ARVN units. U.S. advisors accompanied ARVN units into Cambodia and U.S. tactical air and other combat support units supported all operations as required. U.S. ground forces and U.S. advisors confined their operations to a depth of 30 kilometers. As a general rule the RVNAF confined their operations to the same depth except when requested to penetrate deeper in certain areas by the Cambodian government.¹

(S) The objective of the cross-border operations into the enemy's logistic sanctuaries was to support Vietnamization and prevent the overthrow of Lon Nol's government. The strategy of Cambodia's new government was to control the majority of population and primary LOCs southwest of the line Samrong-Siem Reap-Kompong Thom-Snoul. Nearly 90 percent of the population and most of the rich food producing areas of Cambodia were located within this area.²

(C) The cumulative results of the cross-border operations from 29 April to 1 July 1970 included the capture of the following:³

Individual weapons	20,072
Crew-served weapons	2,534
Rocket/mortar/recoilless rifle ammunition	143,109 rounds
Small arms ammunition	15,693,254 rounds
Rice	6,879 tons
Medical supplies	109,800 pounds

The captured individual weapons could have equipped 55 full strength VC infantry battalions and the crew-served weapons could have equipped 82 to 90 VC battalions. The captured rocket, mortar and recoilless rounds were sufficient to conduct 18,585 attacks by fire. The captured small arms ammunition was sufficient enough to provide a basic load for approximately 52,000 individual soldiers or approximately 122 VC battalions. The captured rice could have fed 25,000 men for one year at a full ration or 38,000 men for one year at a reduced ration. Enough medical supplies were captured to support a 320-bed, division-level hospital for 580 to 760 days.⁴

(U) Of the Cambodia operation, Admiral McCain stated:⁵

...to get into positions to threaten the southern half of South Vietnam, Hanoi must cover a large amount of ground

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1. J3 Memo 0002388-70, 7 Dec 70, Subj: Cambodian Cross-Border Operations.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC, to the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, 37th Annual Convention, Honolulu, Hawaii, 19 Nov 70.

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that is unfriendly. This is a new stress on Hanoi's home front. The resources the Chinese Communists and the Soviets are willing to divert and the problems of transportation, communications, and the exigency of the weather have a great bearing on North Vietnam's ability to launch new offensive operations against South Vietnam.

Previously, the enemy took areas in Cambodia of use to them in their assaults on South Vietnam. The key to the whole thing for Hanoi was its input of supplies and materials from the sea at Cambodia's deep-water port of Sihanoukville. This vital sea and land funnel has now been denied them. Without such input, then Hanoi's ability to mount high level attacks on the southern third of South Vietnam is greatly diminished. Moreover, as Secretary of Defense Laird has indicated, the South Vietnamese Armed Forces are free to operate in a combat role in the former communist sanctuaries of Cambodia. And Hanoi knows the spirit of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam has been given a big lift as they smashed a number of enemy units in the Cambodian operations.

With his lines of supply and communications disrupted, the enemy is now trying to expand them into areas further west in Cambodia. U.S. aircraft are continuing interdiction operations in Cambodia. The President has ordered that air interdiction, as appropriate, will be pursued to interdict the movement of enemy troops and material in order to protect the lives and security of American and other Free World men in South Vietnam.

The Cambodian operation must be considered one of the most consequential events of the war. This is true for a number of reasons.

First, for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the Cambodian operational success offers proof that it has finally arrived. Today one of seven South Vietnamese men is under arms in defense of his country. He serves in the largest Asian army outside of Communist China. He has proven he can hold his own and defeat the enemy.

Second, Cambodia demonstrates that the North Vietnamese Army and communist Viet Cong are not the world's most efficient army as some self-appointed critics have claimed. Hanoi's army certainly has been efficient in terms of its callous indifference to battlefield losses, estimated to be 670,000 killed in action since this war began. And the loss of their Cambodian sanctuary bases and supply caches proves conclusively that they are not independent of an expensive logistics system either.

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Third, what is not so apparent to the public is the fact that the enemy has been steadily pushed off the backs of the overwhelming majority of the South Vietnamese people.

By early 1967 enemy base areas encompassing more than 1,500 square miles in South Vietnam were overrun and cleared out by the allies. One of these base areas, the Iron Triangle, was only 25 miles from Saigon. Then the enemy enlarged established base sanctuaries in Cambodia, principally in the areas called Fishhook and Parrot's Beak. The allied Cambodian operations virtually eliminated these bases. Now it appears enemy strongholds are being situated in northeast Cambodia and southern Laos, approximately 275 miles from Saigon.

The geographical progress since 1967 in reducing the threat to Saigon, and indeed the whole of South Vietnam, is readily apparent today. Hanoi's leaders have been dealt a succession of crippling blows to their ability to attack South Vietnam.

Cambodian troops meanwhile are taking the war to the enemy. In October I was in Phnom Penh for consultations with Cambodia's Premier Lon Nol and other top government and military leaders. I also had an opportunity to examine firsthand several Cambodian fighting units. I came away impressed with their growing ability and determination to counter North Vietnam's aggression. The Cambodian forces are putting U.S.-provided small arms equipment to good use in their efforts against the communist forces illegally present in their country.

(U) Even though strategic results of the cross-border operations are difficult to define, it is evident that the operations successfully forestalled an immediate counter-offensive by the VC/NVA against the Lon Nol government, and extended the period in which the GKR had to prepare to counter the inevitable VC/NVA counter-offensive. In addition to promoting Vietnamization, reduction of the enemy maneuver force capability in Military Regions III and IV enhanced pacification progress generally and substantially eased enemy pressures in those areas. In the long run, however, the most significant strategic result of the cross-border operations is the exacerbation of the enemy's logistical, tactical, and psychological problems within an unexpected, expanded area of conflict. The coincident loss of heretofore secure enemy border sanctuaries exploded the myth of their inviolability, thus making enemy infiltration into SVN population and control centers much more difficult and costly.¹

Holiday Stand-Downs in Vietnam

(U) Prior to 1970, 13 stand-downs (cease fires) were observed in Vietnam:²

1. J3 Memo 0002388-70, 7 Dec 70, Subj: Cambodian Cross-Border Operations.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol III, pp. 66-67.

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1. Christmas 1965 - 30 hours
2. Tet 1966 - over four days
3. Christmas 1966 - 48 hours
4. New Year's 1967 - 48 hours
5. Tet 1967 - over five days
6. Buddha's Birthday 1967 - 24 hours
7. Christmas 1967 - 24 hours
8. New Year's 1968 - 36 hours
9. Tet 1968 - scheduled for 36-hour period.¹
10. Christmas 1968 - 24 hours
11. Buddha's Birthday 1969 - 24 hours
12. Ho Chi Minh's death, 8-10 Sep 1969 - three days
13. Christmas 1969 - 24 hours
14. New Year's 1970 - 24 hours

(S) On 3 February the JCS notified CINCPAC that President Thieu had decided that a "Tet truce" should take place between 1800 hours, 5 February and 1800 hours, 6 February. The JCS authorized CINCPAC to observe the truce during the same period and requested that COMUSMACV consult with the JGS and other Allies in the RVN relative to the conduct of operations during the truce.² On 4 February, CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACV to observe the Tet truce and requested COMUSMACV to coordinate with the JGS and the other Allies in RVN.³ At the end of the stand-down COMUSMACV reported 73 major and 39 minor violations of the Tet truce by the enemy.⁴

(U) The Viet Cong on 1 December announced cease fires would be put into effect for a three-day period during Christmas 1970 and New Year's 1971 as well as a four-day truce during the Tet lunar New Year at the end of January 1971.⁵ On the other hand the Allies announced on 18 December cease fires would be observed from 1800 hours, 24 December to 1800 hours, 25 December and from 1800 hours, 31 December to 1800 hours, 1 January 1971. In accordance with a JCS requirement CINCPAC and MACV reported enemy truce violations for each truce period - 47 major and 41 minor for Christmas and 48 major and 37 minor violations for New Year's.⁶

Joint Personnel Recovery Center

(TS) The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) was activated on 17 September 1966 to establish a capability within MACV for the recovery of Free World

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1. The Allies scheduled Tet stand-down was from 1800 hours 28 Jan - 0600 hours 31 Jan 68. On 29 Jan the Allies cancelled Tet stand-down in the five northern provinces of RVN as a result of an NVN build-up in the DMZ. On the afternoon of 30 Jan, Tet stand-down was completely cancelled due to enemy Tet offensive.
 2. JCS 9341/032150Z Feb 70.
 3. CINCPAC 040300Z Feb 70.
 4. COMUSMACV 062002Z Feb 70.
 5. CINCPAC News of Interest, CINCPAC Public Affairs Office, 1 Dec 70.
 6. J3B31 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.

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Military Forces (FWMF) personnel in a missing or detained status throughout Southeast Asia after termination of search and rescue (SAR) efforts. The JPRC serves as the focal point for intelligence pertaining to missing or captured FWMF personnel in Southeast Asia. Since the JPRC does not have operational forces assigned under its control, forces used in recovery operations normally come from COMUSMACV assets in the immediate vicinity of the proposed operation. Specially trained and equipped U.S.-led MACSOG teams normally are committed for cross-border and PW recovery operations.¹ On 24 September 1966, CINCPAC assigned the unclassified nickname BRIGHT LIGHT for use in electrically transmitted messages and correspondence relating to JPRC.²

(TS) Although teams in search of U.S. personnel are normally U.S.-led, effective 1 July 1970, operations in Cambodia were restricted to indigenous personnel.³ Thus, on 11 August 1970, CINCPAC requested JCS authority to insert U.S.-led teams into Cambodia when there was a reasonable chance of U.S. PW recovery. Approval of this request would provide implicit approval to use U.S. air in support of the U.S.-led teams.⁴

(TS) On 26 August 1970, CINCPAC requested that the JCS urge CAS Washington to intensify their activities in Laos in support of JPRC operations.⁵ CAS Washington agreed to raise the priority for targeting indigenous Lao assets toward more effective PW recovery.⁶

(TS) On 14 September 1970, the JCS granted CINCPAC authority to insert U.S.-led BRIGHT LIGHT teams into Cambodia until 1 November 1970.⁷

(S) Two general types of operations are conducted under the unclassified nickname BRIGHT LIGHT. Search operations are conducted for downed aircrews that have not been recovered by SAR, and raid operations are targeted against known or suspected enemy PW camps or PW's in transit.⁸

(TS) To date, direct BRIGHT LIGHT missions or JPRC coordinated operations have recovered ten downed U.S. aircrew members, 16 U.S. PWs (including two U.S. civilians), and 488 VN PWs. Eighteen U.S. remains have also been located and recovered by these resources. The low ratio of recovery of U.S. PWs is attributed to the apparent desire of the enemy to retain as large a stock of U.S. prisoners as possible. In most cases, the NVA/VC appear to give high priority to the removal of U.S. PWs to rear area detention centers. Also, during PW recovery raids, enemy camp guards have in the past rushed U.S. PWs to safe areas, and abandoned VN PWs.⁹

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1. CINCPAC 160232Z Sep 66.
 2. CINCPAC 240532Z Sep 66.
 3. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70, citing CJCS 1049/272237Z May 70.
 4. J3 History, Nov 70 citing CINCPAC 111935Z Aug 70.
 5. J3 History, Nov 70 citing CINCPAC 260357Z Aug 70.
 6. J3 History, Nov 70 citing JCS 9670/102009Z Sep 70.
 7. J3 History, Nov 70 citing JCS 9953/141908Z Sep 70.
 8. J3 History, Nov 70.
 9. Ibid.

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(TS) Since July 1969, the JPRC has placed special emphasis on encouraging field commanders (who have lost personnel to capture or discover timely PW information) to attempt immediate unilateral recovery action without prior JPRC approval or coordination. This emphasis was reaffirmed in a letter from DEP-COMUSMACV to all subordinate commanders in July 1970.¹

(TS) The JPRC conducts collateral activities related to personnel recovery. They promulgate the leaflet-drop reward program to enhance recovery of evading or captured personnel. Within this program, rewards have been paid for assistance given to five U.S. evadees, and for the recovery of 55 U.S. remains. The JPRC promulgates Safe Area Lists and monthly code letters to be displayed by downed airmen to facilitate identification and recovery.²

Air Operations Southeast Asia 1970

As part of our publicly announced policy and a determined effort to protect American lives we are conducting a limited duration protective reaction air strike against missile and anti-aircraft gun sites and related facilities in North Vietnam south of the 19th parallel.

.....

These protective reaction missions are designed to protect the lives of U.S. pilots flying unarmed reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam and by pilots flying missions associated with interdiction of North Vietnamese military supplies throughout southern Laos moving toward South Vietnam.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird³

(U) During 1970, air operations in Southeast Asia consisted of large-scale interdiction operations in Laos and Cambodia and close, direct air-support operations in SVN. Protective reaction type air strikes were flown in NVN.

ROLLING THUNDER

(TS) All routine offensive operations against NVN were discontinued 1 November 1968. Operations prior to this time were conducted under the ROLLING THUNDER program in which the mission was to conduct an air campaign against NVN with the objective of reducing the flow of men and material to SVN. Air operations during 1970 involved protective reaction type air strikes against SAM/AAA

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Statement by SECDEF Melvin R. Laird issued by DOD, cited in News of Interest, CINCPAC Public Affairs, 21 Nov 70.

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sites and associated equipment below 20 degrees north and air strikes against selective targets specifically approved by the JCS.¹

U.S. Sortie Rates for Southeast Asia

(TS) During the period 1 January - 30 June 1970 tactical air sortie rates were limited to 14,000 USAF, 4,200 USN, and 3,000 USMC sorties per month. The authorized ARC LIGHT sortie rate per month for the same period was 1,400. The USN sortie rate was based on a planned two-CVA capability. The USMC rate was established from historically flown sorties during FY 1970.²

(TS) The sortie rates for the first half of CY 70 actually remained in effect until 14 August 1970 when the JCS provided the following guidance in compliance with decisions by higher authority:³

USAF attack sorties	10,000 per month
USN attack sorties	2,700 per month
USMC attack sorties	1,300 per month
Gunship attack sorties	1,000 per month
ARC LIGHT (B-52)	1,000 per month

(TS) Tactical air attack sorties were to be flown at an appropriate level between 10,000 and 14,000 sorties per month. The higher level of 14,000 tactical air attack sorties was a ceiling which was not to be exceeded in any month. In the event the tactical situation dictated additional gunship sorties, a tradeoff between gunship and tactical air sorties was authorized.⁴ The following table indicates the number of attack sorties flown during 1970 (less helicopters):⁵

	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Gunship</u>	<u>B-52</u>
Jan	14,190	3,993	3,795	682	1,445
Feb	12,783	3,568	2,865	643	1,300
Mar	13,924	3,537	2,698	724	1,443
Apr	12,671	3,221	3,214	741	1,407
May	14,291	3,907	3,628	617	1,443
Jun	10,557	2,013	2,733	382	1,413
Jul	9,035	2,456	2,629	315	1,445
Aug	8,951	2,201	1,946	347	1,231
Sep	7,176	1,781	1,194	327	986
Oct	5,752	1,466	741	304	1,012
Nov	7,034	1,772	1,018	390	974
Dec	<u>8,447</u>	<u>2,700</u>	<u>1,276</u>	<u>640</u>	<u>1,016</u>
Total:	124,811	32,615	27,737	6,112	15,115

1. J3B212 Supplemental History 1970, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Feb 71.

2. Ibid.

3. JCS 7544/142250Z Aug 70.

4. Ibid.

5. J3B212 Supplemental History 1970, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Feb 71.

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Air Rules of Engagement and Operating Authorities

(S) Basic Rules of Engagement for operations conducted in Southeast Asia are contained in documents promulgated by the JCS and CINCPAC. In response to a request from COMUSMACV, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 7 October that the Rules of Engagement for Southeast Asia be updated to reflect the then-current situation with respect to Cambodia. Subsequent discussion between the JCS and CINCPAC resulted in a unified position to be presented to update the Rules of Engagement for Southeast Asia; however, the JCS did not promulgate any changes during 1970.¹

(TS) Air operating authorities historically are time sensitive, either changing with or being promulgated as a result of the changing situation in Southeast Asia. Most of the authorities to conduct air interdiction and similar operations were given for specific periods of time usually from 30 days to 90 days. A major milestone was reached in effective length of air operating authorities when the JCS approved the CINCPAC request to extend through 1 May 1971 those air operating authorities expiring on 1 November 1970. Operating authorities which were approved until 1 May 1971 were:²

a. Laos and NVN Authority.

(1) To strike SAM/AAA sites in NVN below 20 degrees north which fire at or are activated against U.S. aircraft conducting missions over Laos or NVN.

(2) For IRON HAND aircraft to overfly NVN to position themselves between the SAM/AAA threat and the B-52s they are protecting.

(3) To engage enemy aircraft in combat over NVN.

(4) To allow laser-illuminator and electro-optical aircraft to overfly NVN when delivering ordnance on targets in Laos.

(5) To strike in a selected area of the BARREL ROLL East Buffer Zone, and along the Route 7 bypass road.

b. Cambodia Authority.

(1) To conduct U.S. tactical air and B-52 interdiction operations against enemy troops and supply build-ups in FREEDOM DEAL, FREEDOM DEAL ALPHA, and FREEDOM DEAL EXTENSION.

(2) To conduct air reconnaissance, SAR and recovery operations, and use of flare aircraft throughout all of Cambodia.

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1. J3B214 Supplemental History, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Mar 71, citing JCS 170122Z Apr 65, CINCPAC 140035Z Jul 68, and CINCPAC 072306Z Oct 70.
 2. Ibid., citing CINCPAC 172139Z Oct 70, JCS 6220/051452Z Nov 70, and CINCPAC 060645Z, 060646Z, 060647 Nov 70.

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(3) To utilize FAC and flare aircraft in conjunction with third country air strikes.

(4) To utilize U.S. assets to support SAR and recovery operations for VNAF aircraft and aircrews and RTAF and CAF aircrews.

(5) To insert U.S.-lead BRIGHT LIGHT recovery teams into Cambodia and to utilize U.S. helo and tactical air support for such operations.

Request to Strike SAM and AAA Sites

(TS) On 9 October COMUSMACV provided rationale and a request to CINCPAC to conduct tactical air strikes against any occupied SAM/AAA site in NVN below 20 degrees north within 20 NM of the Laotian border or in the DMZ for the duration of the intensified bombing campaign of interdiction points in Laos near the NVN border. CINCPAC supported this request, provided additional rationale, and forwarded it to higher authority for action. On 27 October the JCS advised CINCPAC that any request for authority to strike occupied SAM/AAA installations would have to be submitted to the CJCS and considered on a case-by-case basis.¹

Military Operations in or Near Politically Sensitive Areas

(S) On 9 August CINCPAC directed PACOM subordinate commanders to exercise special care in the scheduling and conduct of operations contiguous to Communist China.² This guidance was provided as a result of an apparent CHICOM intercept attempt against a reconnaissance mission on 2 July. PACOM aerial reconnaissance operations over the Yellow Sea was suspended on 3 July 1970 because of the attempted intercept.³

Augmentation of EB-66 Assets

(S) Due to NVN build-up of air defenses in Route Package-1 (RP-1) and increased ARC LIGHT sorties in the RP-1 pass areas, COMUSMACV⁴ and CINCPACAF⁵ requested additional EW support aircraft. Increased jamming support for ARC LIGHT sorties and increased tactical EW support measures in the RP-1 area resulted in curtailing EW support for drone missions. CINCPAC requested six additional EB-66 C/E aircraft⁶ which were approved by JCS⁷ and furnished by CSAF.⁸ During the draw-down of Southeast Asia forces, the 41st, 19th, and part of the 42nd TEWS were removed from PACOM which depleted EW assets below required

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1. J3B214 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70, citing COMUSMACV 090406Z Oct 70, CINCPAC 100550Z Oct 70, and JCS 14431/272203Z Oct 70.
 2. CINCPAC 092050Z Aug 70.
 3. J3B211 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
 4. COMUSMACV 080718Z Nov 70.
 5. CINCPACAF 100338Z Nov 70.
 6. CINCPAC 131042Z Nov 70.
 7. JCS 5964/162039Z Nov 70.
 8. CSAF 132141Z Nov 70.

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contingency levels. The six additional EB-66s brought the total PACOM EB-66 force up to 21 which still fell short of contingency requirements.¹

COLLEGE EYE Task Force (CETF)

(S) On 14 October 1970 CINCPACAF advised CINCPAC that the EC-121R aircraft supporting the IGLOO WHITE mission were capable of fulfilling the ABCCC requirement in Cambodia and requested redeployment of the EC-121D CETF aircraft at Korat RTAFB.² CINCPAC approved the request³ but later requested suspension of all redeployment action⁴ until 1 December to enable the CETF aircraft to participate in special Southeast Asia operations on 21 November. The aircraft were no longer required in Southeast Asia after 21 November, and were authorized three days later to redeploy to their forward operating location at Itazuke AB, Japan.⁵ The CETF aircraft and personnel ceased operations on 28 November, redeployed from Korat RTAFB to Itazuke AB, Japan starting on 30 November, and were in place at Itazuke as of 020500Z December.⁶

Redistribution of USAF FAC Aircraft

(S) On 24 January CINCPACAF proposed a reduction of 51 UE Forward Air Control (FAC) aircraft from Southeast Asia Tactical Air Control System (SEATACS) assets due to troop withdrawals, turnover of VNAF (I&M), and Project 703 reductions.⁷

(S) CINCPAC approved on 31 January the proposed reduction and distribution of FAC aircraft as requested; however, COMUSMACV requested suspension of the action pending his review. CINCPAC held in abeyance his approval as requested and COMUSMACV later concurred in the proposed redistribution. On 6 February CINCPAC again approved CINCPACAF's original recommendation.⁸

BLIND BAT Operations

(S) On 8 April CINCPACAF recommended to CINCPAC that C-130 BLIND BAT operations be discontinued by 30 June 1970. CINCPACAF advised that the BLIND BAT force provided five FAC/flare sorties per night, supporting 15 night attack sorties. During the Southwest Monsoon, "this force was of marginal value and should be withdrawn permanently to provide headroom for outstanding requirements including the B-57G deployment" during September 1970. "Further, there are highly expensive BLIND BAT MOD programs currently underway. PACAF decision by 10 April is needed to cancel MOD programs which will save estimated five million

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1. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
 2. CINCPACAF 142300Z Oct 70.
 3. CINCPAC 110246Z Nov 70.
 4. CINCPAC 152322Z Nov 70.
 5. CINCPAC 240434Z Nov 70.
 6. DET 1 552 AEWCONWG 020705Z Dec 70.
 7. CINCPACAF DPL 240200Z Jan 70.
 8. CINCPAC 062209Z Feb 70.

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dollars. Unless CINCPAC instructions are received to the contrary by 9 April 1970, the BLIND BAT operation will be discontinued NLT 30 June 1970."¹

(S) CINCPAC approved the recommendation on 9 April subject to COMUSMACV's concurrence.² COMUSMACV concurred on 11 April³ and two days later Ambassador Godley expressed concern over termination of BLIND BAT operations and solicited details on capabilities of B-57Gs proposed as replacements.⁴ CINCPAC advised AMEMB Vientiane that B-57G was not intended as vis-a-vis replacement for C-130 BLIND BAT. CINCPAC pointed out that the B-57G aircraft is designed as a self-contained night attack system and as such requires neither flare nor FAC support. The aircraft incorporates a multi-sensor capability including low light level TV (LLTV), forward looking radar (FLR) and forward looking infrared (FLIR). All sensors are fuselage mounted. Armament includes the capability for accurate delivery of conventional bombs or cluster bomb units (ADUs). A computerized fire control system using inputs from any or all sensors provides the capability for accurate, automatic weapons delivery. The B-57G has no air-to-air refueling capability therefore requires no tanker support. The planned deployment date was 15 September 1970.⁵ Initially, the B-57G was scheduled to PCS to Ubon, Thailand in June 1970.⁶

Loss of SR-71 Over Thailand

(TS) A GIANT SCALE mission over NVN on 10 May 1970 resulted in loss of the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. After completing the first pass over NVN, and subsequent to refueling, both engines flamed out and the aircraft crashed approximately 25 KM north of U-Tapao AB, Thailand. Both crewmen successfully ejected and were recovered.⁷

(TS) COMUSMACTHAI requested information concerning possible press queries, and the recommended response.⁸ CSAF provided information which was authorized for release and requested further queries be directed to OASD/PA.⁹ SECDEF office provided additional background information and advised the Embassy and COMUSMACTHAI of the U.S. position concerning the SR-71 loss.¹⁰ Concurrently, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI to avoid identifying the aircraft by type, and to handle future queries in accordance with CSAF and SECDEF guidance already provided.¹¹

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1. CINCPACAF 080554Z Apr 70.
 2. CINCPAC 090335Z Apr 70.
 3. COMUSMACV 17205/110703Z Apr 70.
 4. AMEMB Vientiane 2596/130241Z Apr 70.
 5. CINCPAC 172041Z Apr 70.
 6. CINCPACAF 101850Z Feb 70; CINCPAC 012323Z Mar 70.
 7. J3B51 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
 8. COMUSMACTHAI 101310Z May 70.
 9. CSAF 101642Z May 70.
 10. SECDEF 8616/121449Z May 70.
 11. CINCPAC 110308Z May 70.

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(TS) To clarify command responsibility in response to queries regarding GIANT SCALE operations, CINCPAC published all current procedures including information cleared for press release, SR-71 crew member conduct, and general security precautions.¹ Action addressees included commanders of all PACOM areas of operation of the SR-71. Component commanders were instructed to pass to subordinate commands pertinent information considered appropriate to insure that proper action would be taken in event of any further incidents.

COMMANDO HUNT III

(S) COMMANDO HUNT was one of two significant plans developed in 1968 for in-country application of sensors to a tactical operation. Phases I and II were conducted during late 1968 and the first part of 1969.²

(S) During the latter part of 1969 and the first part of 1970 COMMANDO HUNT III was conducted by the Seventh Air Force. On 9 July, CINCPAC informed the JCS that he had reviewed a report on the operation prepared by the Seventh Air Force. He stated that it provided a detailed and accurate historical account of the efforts of the NVN during the 1969-1970 dry season in Laos to supply enemy forces in Laos, RVN, and Cambodia, and of the air campaign designed to counter the NVN supply and infiltration efforts.³

(S) Because of the pertinency of CINCPAC's comments on the report his comments have been reproduced below:⁴

3. During COMMANDO HUNT III, the North Vietnamese put forth a higher than usual degree of effort to supply their forces. They doubled the amount of AAA in the COMMANDO HUNT interdiction areas over the preceeding dry season and, when their defensive reaction could not reduce their losses, they shifted from input gates through Mu Gia Pass to Ban Karai Pass, and then, at considerable cost, developed a new route in the vicinity of the DMZ.

4. Despite these massive efforts; however, the enemy's losses were considerable, and the COMMANDO HUNT III Campaign was generally successful.

5. Looking beyond the statistical data derived from bomb damage assessment provided by the report, it is estimated that the North Vietnamese may have suffered on the order of 22,000 personnel casualties. This estimate considers truck drivers and passengers, AAA crews, boatmen, and personnel

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1. CINCPAC 220407Z May 70.
 2. For details regarding the initiation of the program and the first two phases - Phases I and II - refer to CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 19-20 and CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol III, pp. 75-77.
 3. CINCPAC 091025Z Jul 70.
 4. Ibid.

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expected to be in the vicinity of supply dumps and storage areas struck by tactical aircraft and by B-52s. Because of the generally higher skill levels of these types of personnel, they would be more difficult to replace than ordinary foot soldiers.

6. It has also been estimated that the U.S. dollar value of the Sino-Soviet supplied vehicles, AA weapons, and materiel destroyed was in excess of one billion dollars.

7. The COMMANDO HUNT III Campaign has also contributed significantly to the progressively decreasing effectiveness of the VC/NVA, in South Vietnam. During CY 69, VC/NVA forces mounted an average of 8.3 battalion or larger sized attacks per month, as compared with 1.5 per month for the first quarter CY 1970. The monthly average of enemy sabotage incidents decreased by 20 Pct and US/ARVN/FW casualties decreased by 35 Pct on a monthly average basis in 1970.

8. Aircraft sortie resources available for COMMANDO HUNT III operations were considerably reduced from the totals available for the previous year's COMMANDO HUNT I Campaign. Balancing this loss in numbers of sorties was the integration of new "sophisticated" weapons and weapon systems into the campaign. This year's program saw the integration of Navy assets such as the A-6 airborne moving target indicator (AMTI) and all-weather COMMANDO NAIL operations with refined IGLOO WHITE sensor system; the teaming of Navy strike aircraft with Air Force LORAN equipped F-4s. The capability for continued interdiction during bad weather is a valuable asset. Also noteworthy is the integration of AC-130 gunships, particularly in the surprise package configuration, and F-4 aircraft as a truck killing team. The surprise package teams produced nearly six truck kills per sortie on the average.

9. The introduction of the laser guided bomb into the interdiction campaign met with spectacular success, particularly in the destruction of AA sites and for the interdiction of roads. It should be noted that one gun was destroyed for each laser guided bomb delivered. The system developed by Seventh Air Force for night deliveries uses a laser illuminator mounted in the target designator aircraft, AC-130 BLIND BAT Forward Air Control aircraft, of the AC-130 surprise package gunships. These illuminator aircraft were teamed with LORAN equipped F-4s carrying laser guided bombs. Upon acquiring and illuminating a target with the assistance of a night observation device, LORAN coordinates were passed to the orbiting F-4 which maneuvered to the appropriate location and released its weapon which homes on the illuminated target. This procedure was used during marginal weather with a blacked-out designator aircraft orbiting below the clouds while the laser bomb was delivered.

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from above the clouds. The cost of destroying a point target with a laser guided bomb is estimated to be 75 Pct less than using conventional ordnance.

10. The U.S. Navy-developed ROCKEYE weapon, was introduced into COMMANDO HUNT III operations and was also highly effective, both in killing trucks and destroying AAA sites. In ROCKEYE attacks on 45 sites, we note that 40 were silenced or destroyed.

11. The intelligence for the execution of COMMANDO HUNT III improved considerably in quantity, accuracy, and timeliness over that for COMMANDO HUNT I. Targeting for COMMANDO HUNT III was developed to maximize the effects of air strikes on the enemy's logistic efforts. The LOC net was targeted in an attempt to contain the flow of traffic and reduce its capacity. Sensor, photo, and road-watch collection efforts revealed that the enemy was getting through and around LOC interdictions with relative ease. Consequently, the emphasis was shifted to destruction of movers and stored supplies in order to maximize the cost to move supplies and generate the greatest possible loss of supplies in transit and storage.

12. Intelligence on enemy defenses proved invaluable in this campaign. AAA defenses by type, location, and concentration were tabulated and countered effectively. The SAM threat that developed near the border in December 1969 was reduced by selected strikes in NVN. Proof of NVN intentions to defend Laos entry gates provided the basis for obtaining authority for self protection that impacted significantly on the enemy's ability to exploit NVN as a sanctuary from which to defend the LOCs in close proximity to the border. ...of men and equipment into Laos with all its inherent problems resulted. Food for gun crews, ammunition for the guns, and replacements for lost and destroyed equipment placed a severe burden on the enemy. The quality of intelligence on which COMMANDO HUNT III was executed improved the capability to: strike the enemy where he was concentrated; rapidly shift strike emphasis when and to where the target systems were most vulnerable, and to counter the enemy efforts to defend his logistical system.

13. Lessons learned from COMMANDO HUNT III are being incorporated into the planning of next dry season's air interdiction campaign in Laos which may be the most crucial in the history of the war. The NVN are positioning themselves to extend existing, and open new LOCs into Cambodia. The capture of Saravane may presage the enemy's intention to open the Route 23/13 network into Cambodia. If this is true, he will have his current network in eastern Laos, the Se Kong waterway in central Laos and the Route 23/13 network in western Laos. This enlarged

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LOC complex would place an increased strain on available friendly air efforts. The enemy is continuing his efforts to extend POL pipelines into Laos and to open waterways into and through Laos. The enemy supply effort will undoubtedly increase by an estimated 50 Pct. This would place the total truck population in Laos panhandle in the range of 1500-1800. Materiel formerly routed through Kompong Som destined for use in Cambodia and in South Vietnam must be brought in through the Laos panhandle.

14. The opportunities for conducting a successful air interdiction campaign in Laos during the CY 1970-71 dry season may also be better than ever before. The North Vietnamese LOCs will be longer and their movers therefore exposed to air attacks for a considerably longer portion of the trip south. If they are to defend their expanded LOCs, their AAA weapons must be spread over a greater geographic area. Interdiction resources of all kinds, tactical aircraft, both fast and slow movers, B-52s, gunships, and improved ordnance must be made available in sufficient quantities to meet the challenge.

15. COMMANDO HUNT III retaught the lesson that knowledge of the location of enemy supplies is the principal key to increased interdiction effectiveness. While IGLOO WHITE sensors and reconnaissance provided the intelligence for the COMMANDO HUNT III effort of destroying moving trucks, there was insufficient knowledge of enemy truck parks, storage areas, and supplies moving down the rivers and under the jungle canopy. Attacks against truck parks and storage areas accounted for approximately 25 Pct of the total tonnage of enemy supplies destroyed. An increased intelligence effort is needed using indigenous ground reconnaissance and river watch teams, to improve force employment against these stationary and potentially lucrative targets. Consideration should be given to developing techniques such as providing beacons for watch teams to give attacking aircraft a better offset ordnance delivering capability.

16. The arrival of the B-57Gs, and A-6 trim aircraft and the improved AC-130 gunships should significantly improve our interdiction program during the next dry season. The increased use of laser guided bombs against trucks should also increase the efficiency of the interdiction effort. To the degree these weapons can be employed against moving vehicles, they appear to be the most cost effective weapons for interdiction operations. It has been estimated by COMUSMACV that nine or 10 thousand of these laser guided weapons may be profitably used against vehicles, with additional requirements for other point targets in the LOC system.

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17. It is also apparent that the next dry season's campaign is not likely to be a re-run of COMMANDO HUNT III. The enemy will apply the lessons he learned this year to exploit every option available to him to make our job more difficult. It is reasonable to assume that he will respond by taking all possible countermeasures open to him to prevent a recurrence of the effective truck kill campaign of 1969-70. Because gunships made a significant contribution to the overall truck campaign, they would seem to be likely candidates for enemy response. He unquestionably found during COMMANDO HUNT III that he can degrade the effectiveness of the gunships and even in some instances deny them an area of operations by increasing the density of his defenses. At a given level of AAA reaction the gunship is forced to spend more time in evasive action than in searching for and attacking trucks. Particularly dense AAA environments such as those that existed in the Mu Gia and Ban Karai Pass areas and around Tchepone were prohibitive to gunship operations. He must be aware that moonlight (50 Pct illumination or more) forced gunships off the heavily traveled and heavily defended eastern routes onto the less lucrative western and southern routes. Further AAA increases along other sections of the main LOCs would further restrict employment of gunships. The following projections of enemy courses of action for the 1970-71 dry season seem reasonable:

- a. May attempt more daytime movement and movement under cover of weather to avoid gunship operations. This will increase even more if daytime jet fighter coverage is reduced.
- b. Emphasis on movement through area west of DMZ to exploit fully the weather advantages, reduced exposure time and the protection of heavier defenses.
- c. More extensive use of waterways in view of our difficulties this past season in countering this activity.
- d. More extensive use of POL pipelines and use of mobile pumping stations to avoid detection and targeting.
- e. Expanded avenues of movement as he further exploits his rapidly expanding LOC structure and his potential requirements to open up additional arteries for resupply into Cambodia.
- f. Increased dispersal and deception.
- g. Possible introduction of radar control AAA into Laos as the need for vigorous defense increases.

In order to provide an appropriate response to each of these

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eventualities should they occur, it is essential that the tactical forces be provided with a diversity of modern weapons and weapon systems.

18. COMMANDO HUNT III's greatest relevance for the future may apply to the developing crisis over actions necessary to prevent Cambodia's capture by the enemy. The allied intercession into Cambodian base areas was a decisive turning point in furthering the success of Vietnamization, pacification, and U.S. withdrawal of forces. The enemy's response to the neutralization of his southern logistics lift lines has been to seize Cambodia's northern provinces and to undertake the isolation of Phnom Penh. The establishment of new lines of communication from South Laos into Cambodia and into South Vietnam seems central to the enemy's strategy. The COMMANDO HUNT III technology of logistical interdiction assisted by appropriate ground unconventional warfare actions remains the most viable instrumentality for frustrating the enemy's shift in logistic strategy. The decisive time period will commence in September and October of 1970 with the shift in monsoons. The securing of Cambodia against enemy capture now ranks in priority with the Vietnamization program. The latter is not likely to succeed without the other.

19. The mounting of an intensive COMMANDO HUNT IV campaign across southern Laos and North Cambodia where the enemy is now desperately establishing a new base area and LOC structure, stands out as a compelling necessity. Adequate strike sorties, weapons and reconnaissance capability, fully supported by a southward shift and augmentation of improved COMMANDO HUNT technology will be necessary ingredients of such a campaign. Failure to perceive the need for and to implement such a campaign will offer the enemy opportunity to recoup from his recent disastrous setbacks. The Lon Nol government's survival and Cambodia's denial to the enemy are the new strategic imperatives in SEA.

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USAF SORTIES RVN 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	*ATTACK	CAP/ESC	** RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
A-1	269	14	0	0	283
A-37	11677	40	0	150	11867
AC-47	0	0	0	10	10
AC-119	1769	0	0	846	2615
AC-130	8	0	0	0	8
B-52	5130	0	0	42	5172
C-7	0	0	0	141398	141398
C-47	0	0	0	2341	2341
C-123	0	0	0	62984	62984
C-130	0	0	0	67263	67263
EC-47	0	0	7195	363	7558
F-4	9192	160	0	945	10297
F-100	25019	119	0	980	26118
F-105	14	10	0	0	24
HC-130	0	0	0	275	275
KC-135	0	0	0	2962	2962
O-1	0	0	17314	6443	23757
O-2	0	0	30515	28892	59407
OV-10	0	0	8467	10092	18559
RB-57	0	0	844	7	851
RF-4	0	0	3239	135	3374
RF-101	0	0	2100	79	2179
UC-123	0	0	0	987	987
TOTAL	53078	343	69674	327194	450209

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE, FLAK SUPP, ETC.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, ETC.

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USN-USMC SORTIES RVN 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	*ATTACK	CAP/ESC	**RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
USN					
A-4	1780	0	0	7	1787
A-6	51	0	0	0	51
A-7	1801	0	0	0	1801
F-4	353	2	0	0	355
F-8	7	1	0	0	8
RA-5	0	0	2	0	2
RF-8	0	0	2	0	2
TOTAL	3992	3	4	7	4006
USMC					
A-4	7441	4	5	0	7450
A-6	4502	0	0	5	4507
C-117	0	0	0	189	189
EA-6	0	0	1	31	32
F-4	11681	166	19	0	11866
KC-130	20	0	0	3305	3325
OV-10	0	198	4165	1734	6097
RF-4	0	0	733	0	733
TA-4	5	2	833	0	840
US-2	0	0	0	13	13
TOTAL	23649	370	5756	5277	35052

* INCLUDES; STRIKE, ARMED RECCE, FLAK SUPP, ETC.

** INCLUDES; VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, ETC.

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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RAAF-VNAF SORTIES RVN 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	*ATTACK	CAP/ESC	**RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
RAAF					
A-4	0	0	0	160	160
B-57	2821	0	0	0	2821
C-7	0	0	0	11246	11246
TOTAL	2821	0	0	11406	14227
VNAF					
A-1	6980	564	0	4	7548
A-37	15718	37	0	76	15831
AC-47	1861	18	0	208	2087
C-47	0	0	1	596	597
C-119	0	0	4	2134	2138
EC-47	0	0	19	88	107
F-5	3690	12	2	5	3709
O-1	0	0	20569	12806	33375
RC-47	0	0	904	4	908
RF-5	0	0	63	0	63
U-6	0	0	1247	2736	3983
U-17	0	0	3023	6632	9655
VC-47	0	0	0	10	10
TOTAL	28249	631	25832	25299	80011

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE, FLAK SUPP, ETC.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, ETC.

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USAF SORTIES NVN 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	*ATTACK	CAP/ESC	**RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
A-1	0	33	0	7	40
C-130	0	0	910	1	911
EB-66	0	0	975	3156	4131
EC-121	0	0	0	527	527
F-4	439	1105	4	13	1561
F-105	157	1589	0	2	1748
HC-130	0	0	0	9	9
KC-135	0	0	0	697	697
RC-135	0	0	448	136	584
RF-4	0	0	697	54	751
RF-101	0	0	194	0	194
TOTAL	596	2727	3228	4602	11153

* INCLUDES; STRIKE, ARMED RECCE, FLAK SUPP, ETC.

** INCLUDES; VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, ETC.

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USN-USMC SORTIES NVN 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	*ATTACK	CAP/ESC	**RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
USN					
A-3	0	0	5	3777	3782
A-4	93	69	141	2402	2705
A-6	46	27	0	668	741
A-7	133	172	2	1205	1512
E-1	0	0	0	906	906
E-2	0	0	0	992	992
EA-3	0	0	605	10	615
EC-121	0	0	0	251	251
EKA-3	0	0	0	3	3
EP-3	0	0	0	9	9
F-4	15	5791	56	5	5867
F-8	0	5923	32	16	5971
KA-3	0	0	0	14	14
P-3	0	0	3	259	262
RA-5	0	0	89	19	108
RF-8	0	3	143	0	146
TOTAL	287	11985	1076	10536	23884
USMC					
A-6	7	0	0	0	7
EA-6	0	1	342	392	735
F-4	0	625	0	7	632
RF-4	0	0	13	0	13
TA-4	0	0	0	6	6
TOTAL	7	626	355	405	1393

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE, FLAK SUPP, ETC.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, ETC.

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USAF SORTIES THAILAND 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	*ATTACK	CAP/ESC	**RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
A-1	0	0	0	8	8
AC-123	0	0	0	1	1
AC-130	0	0	0	1	1
F-4	0	0	0	16	16
RF-4	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	0	0	0	27	27

* INCLUDES; STRIKE, ARMED RECCE, FLAK SUPP, ETC.

** INCLUDES; VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, ETC.

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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HELICOPTER SORTIES BY TYPE AIRCRAFT/SERVICE RVN 1970

AIRCRAFT		*RECCE	**COMBAT SUPPORT OTHER	ARMED HELO	▲SUPPORT	▲▲NON- COMBAT OTHER	TOTAL
USA	AH-1	20789	16943	383695		62079	483506
	CH-47	23	438762	116	66977	37532	543410
	CH-54		20673	16	438	2884	24011
	OH-6	231113	215738	13799	38017	260397	759064
	OH-13					38	38
	OH-23	261	1289		2681	609	4840
	OH-58	38434	76246		73514	111579	299773
	UH-1	62543	2740191	282142	908916	983097	4976889
TOTAL		353163	1509842	679768	1090543	1458215	7091531
USAF	CH-3			3			3
	H-43		715			608	1323
	HH-3		713			836	1549
	HH-43		2337			3185	5502
	HH-53		112			148	260
	UH-1		39	5738		3085	8862
TOTAL			3916	5741		7842	17499
USMC	AH-1			46406		1695	48101
	CH-46	12887	66526		37242	72344	188999
	CH-53		18767		32797	3256	54820
	UH-1	2560	33069	28298		8898	72825@
	UH-2					1	1
TOTAL		15447	118362	74704	70039	86194	364746
VNAF	CH-34		12		621	347	980
	CH-47		59		2680	970	3709
	H-34		6489	5	2970	941	10405
	UH-1	10	114450	5577	57175	20856	198068
TOTAL		10	121010	5582	63446	23114	213162

NOTES: * INCLUDES ELINT, COMINT, INFRA-RED, SLAR, PHOTO, RADAR, WEATHER, VISUAL, ETC.
** INCLUDES ECM, ECCM, SAR, CARGO, EW, AIR EVAC, LLTV, C&C, ETC.
▲ INCLUDES LOGISTICS TROOPS AND CARGO
▲▲ INCLUDES ADMIN, LN, TNG, MAINT, NON-COMBAT SUPPORT OTHER
@ 7 CAP/ESCORT SORTIES NOT INCLUDED

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USAF-USN AIRCRAFT LOSSES RVN 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
USAF				1			1						2
A-1								1		1			2
AC-119		1		1		1							3
C-7				3									3
						1							1
C-47							1						1
C-123	1							1			2		4
EC-47					1								1
F-4				1	1			2					4
	1		1										2
F-100	1	1	1		2		2						7
	3	1	2		1	1				1			9
O-1	1			1	1	2							5
	1										1		2
O-2	1		1	1	1				1		1		6
		1		1	2				1				5
OV-10		1		1			1	1					4
				1					1			1	3
RF-4					1	1							2
TOTAL	9	5	5	11	10	6	5	5	3	2	4	1	66
USN													
A-4						1							1
A-7					1							1	2
OV-10			1			1			1				3
TOTAL			1		1	2			1			1	6

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USMC-VNAF AIRCRAFT LOSSES RVN 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
USMC													
A-4	1	1		1		1			2				6
F-4		2		1	2	2							7
		2				1			1				4
OV-10				1									1
TA-4							1						1
									1				1
TOTAL	1	5		3	2	4	1		4				20
VNAF													
A-1		1		1									2
		1	1					1				1	4
A-37								2					2
		1	1					1		1			4
C-119												1	1
O-1								1					1
		2	2	1	1			1			1		8
TOTAL		5	4	2	1			6		1	1	2	22

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES NVN 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
USAF													
F-4			1		1								2
F-105	1												1
RF-4											1		1
TOTAL	1		1		1						1		4
USN													
A-3					1		1						2
A-4		1			1								2
E-2				1									1
F-4		1	1	1			1						4
F-8				1	1			1		2			5
TOTAL		2	1	3	3		2	1		2			14
USMC													
F-4		1											1
TOTAL		1											1

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USA-USAF HELICOPTER LOSSES RVN 1970 BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
USA													
AH-1	1	3	2	4	6	2	5		6	1	2	1	33
	4	3	5	2	4	3	5	3	2	2		1	34
CH-47				1	4	1	3	1					10
	2	1	3		3	2		2	2			1	16
CH-54							1						1
OH-6	16	13	20	25	17	13	14	5	8	3	8	10	152
	6	6	7	6	6	4	3	2	3	7	3	7	60
OH-13				1									1
OH-23		1											1
OH-58			1	1		1		3	1	3		2	12
				1			1		2			4	8
UH-1	18	10	22	38	33	18	12	15	11	5	8	4	194
	13	27	29	18	31	18	23	17	15	15	8	4	218
TOTAL	60	64	89	97	104	62	67	48	50	36	29	34	740
USAF													
HH-3				1									1
	1												1
UH-1			2				1						3
									1				1
TOTAL	1		2	1			1		1				6

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USMC-VNAF HELICOPTER LOSSES RVN 1970 BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
USMC													
AH-1			2							1		1	4
		1	2										3
CH-46		2	1	1		1		2	2	1	1	2	13
	1		2					2	1				6
CH-53										1			1
UH-1				2			1	1				1	5
			1		2	1				1	1		6
TOTAL	1	3	8	3	2	2	1	5	3	4	2	4	38
VNAF													
H-34					1						1		2
					2				2				4
UH-1			5	1			1			3			10
			3		1				2	2	2	2	12
TOTAL			8	1	4		1		4	5	3	2	28

U.S. HELICOPTER LOSSES NVN 1970 BY TYPE

USMC													
AH-1		1											1
CH-46		1											1
TOTAL		2											2
USAF													
USN													
TOTAL U.S.		2											2

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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Air Operations in Laos

(TS) U.S. air operations continued in Laos during 1970 to support U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. The major objectives of the Laotian operations were to reduce the flow of enemy personnel and logistics support into RVN, and to increase the cost to NVN of continuing aggression and support of insurgencies in RVN, Laos, and Cambodia. Interdiction and other supporting operations continued in the authorized areas of Laos with the major interdiction effort being expended in the STEEL TIGER operating areas in south Laos.¹

(TS) COMMANDO HUNT III, the dry season campaign initiated in late 1969, continued throughout early 1970 until 30 April. Interdiction operations emphasized daytime attacks against the LOC network and road repair equipment, with gradually increasing nighttime strikes against truck traffic. As the enemy truck traffic increased significantly, more strikes were allocated against trucks. COMMANDO HUNT III truck killing operations accounted for over 10,000 destroyed or damaged vehicles.²

(TS) The Southwest Monsoon season, 1 May - 1 November, forced both sides to change their tactics and priorities. As the roads in Laos became unusable for truck and other supply traffic, the enemy again resorted to stockpiling of supplies in the NVN border areas for a logistics surge through Laos during the next dry season. U.S. interdiction forces attacked the enemy LOCs, but with a decreasing numbers of sorties allocated, as other operations required extensive tactical strike assets.³

(TS) On 10 October COMUSMACV initiated the COMMANDO HUNT V interdiction campaign, designed to disrupt the flow of supplies from NVN through Laos into RVN and Cambodia during the Northeast Monsoon dry season. To provide maximum effectiveness with the forces available and destroy the ability of the enemy to put supplies from NVN into the logistics network, a 24-hour interdiction program was instituted against four interdiction points--Boxes A, B, C, and D. These interdiction boxes lie astride the main input routes coming out of NVN in the Mu Gia Pass, Ban Karai Pass, and Ban Raving areas.⁴

(S) The following strike sorties were flown during 1970 in Laos by combined USAF, USMC, and USN assets. (For a recap of all type sorties flown see following charts):⁵

Jan - 14,283	May - 8,531	Sep - 3,522	
Feb - 12,658	Jun - 4,739	Oct - 4,895	
Mar - 12,760	Jul - 5,854	Nov - 7,214	
Apr - 10,541	Aug - 4,958	Dec - 9,419	Total: 99,374

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1. J3B214 Supplemental History 1970, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Mar 71.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

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Strikes accounted for as high as 70 percent in November to as low as 33 percent in June of the U.S. sorties flown in Southeast Asia with the weight of effort depending on the tactical situation and the volume of enemy personnel and supplies being introduced into Laos.¹ See chart for enemy losses in Laos during 1970 elsewhere in this section.

Air Operating Authorities and Rules of Engagement in Laos

(TS) As a result of a political-military considerations, constraints on air operations in Laos have been imposed. Thus maximum flexibility in the use of air power has not been realized. As air operations were intensified over the years, changes to operating authorities and rules of engagement became necessary. As numerous changes were made misunderstandings in the interpretation of the ROE developed. This led to a conference which was held in Vientiane in August 1969 which was attended by all interested parties. As a result of the conference CINCPAC published a JCS-approved BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER/YANKEE TEAM Basic Operation Order on 27 September 1969 which was an update of authorities pertaining to operating rules and areas in Laos.²

(TS) The operation order defined the geographic limitations of both the BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER area of operations (see following schematic maps of BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER operating areas), and set forth the general rules for air operations in Laos and the operating rules in both the BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER areas. In addition YANKEE TEAM constraints were set forth.³

(TS) On 14 May 1970 CINCPAC modified his 27 September 1969 BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER/YANKEE TEAM Basic Operation Order to reflect an easing of operating restrictions by AMEMB Vientiane. The five NM restricted area around Attapeu and the three NM Laos/Cambodian buffer zone were rescinded. In addition, the 25 NM prohibited area around Vientiane was reduced to 20 NM.⁴

(TS) On 23 June CINCPAC promulgated a JCS-approved change to the basic operation order which deleted the requirement for COLLEGE EYE (EC-121 early warning aircraft) monitor of operations in the BARREL ROLL area. This change was predicated on the requirement to redeploy EC-121 aircraft from Southeast Asia under Project 703.⁵


(TS) On 30 June 1970 CINCPAC extended special operating rules for Laos and North Vietnam from 1 July 1970 until 1 November 1970. These rules covered the authority for IRON HAND and other fighter aircraft strikes against SAM/AAA sites in NVN below 20 degrees, the overflight of NVN by IRON HAND aircraft in support

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1. Ibid.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol III, pp. 84, 99.
 3. Ibid., pp. 102-106. See these pages for details.
 4. J3B2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70, citing CINCPAC 140242Z May 70.
 5. J3B214 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70, citing JCS 9853/252211Z May 70 and CINCPAC 232126Z Jun 70.

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
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NORTHERN LAOS BARREL ROLL (BR) OPERATING AREA



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of B-52 operations in Laos, Laser-illuminator aircraft overflight of NVN, engagement of enemy aircraft over NVN, and an extension of the authority to conduct strikes within the BARREL ROLL East Buffer Zone until 1 November 1970.¹

Strike Authorization

(TS) On 29 January CINCPAC granted COMUSMACV authority to conduct air strikes in a specific area of the BARREL ROLL Buffer Zone. On 24 February COMUSMACV requested continuation of this authority through 31 March 1970. On 27 February CINCPAC extended the authority when he stated, "Authority is granted for the conduct of air strikes within the BARREL ROLL East Buffer Zone in an area bounded by the UG 0080 line on the North, 19 degrees - 00 minutes North on the South, the 10 NM Buffer Zone boundary line on the West, and a line 4 NM West of the NVN border on the East. This authority will expire 312400Z Mar 70." In addition Admiral McCain told COMUSMACV that, "Strikes will be conducted under COLLEGE EYE monitor and FAC control. Every feasible precaution will be taken to preclude inadvertent penetration of the NVN border or attack of friendly elements and active villages. In the event positive geographical location or target identification is in question, the mission will be aborted."²

(TS) On 28 March CINCPAC received JCS approval to extend this same authority through 30 June. In the same message, authority was continued until 30 April 1970 for the conduct of a seven-day air strike campaign along a selected portion of Route 65 within the BARREL ROLL East Buffer Zone to be initiated when deemed appropriate by DEPCOMUSMACV for Air and approved by AMEMB Vientiane.³ This authority was continued again by the JCS through 30 June in a message on 30 May.⁴

(TS) On 15 July COMUSMACV provided rationale and requested authority to conduct air strikes along a new bypass to Route 7 in the BARREL ROLL East Buffer Zone. On 24 July 1970 CINCPAC granted authority to conduct tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance within 200 meters of the new Route 7 bypass from a point two KM west of the NVN border to the western limit of the route, as it may be extended, until 30 September 1970. Strikes were to be conducted under FAC control with every feasible precaution taken to prevent inadvertent penetration of the NVN border and attack of friendly elements and active villages. In the event weather, positive geographical position, or target identification was doubtful, the mission was to be aborted.⁵

(TS) On 2 September 1970 COMUSMACV reported the results of tactical air strikes conducted in the BARREL ROLL Buffer Zone strike area along the Route 7

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1. J3B2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70, citing CINCPAC 302355Z Jun 70.
 2. CINCPAC 272306Z Feb 70.
 3. J3B214 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70, citing JCS 4361/282008Z Mar 70.
 4. J3B2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70, citing JCS 1255/301631Z May 70.
 5. J3B2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70, citing JCS 1255/301631Z May 70.

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bypass during the months of July and August. He recommended that the authority to conduct strikes and armed reconnaissance in this area be extended past the expiration date of 30 September. CINCPAC supported this request and forwarded it to the JCS for approval.¹ The JCS approved on 29 September and CINCPAC promulgated the authorization to continue the air strikes and armed reconnaissance through 31 October 1970.²

Request for a Rules of Engagement Conference

(S) On 16 February COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC concurrence in a proposal to convene a Rules of Engagement conference at Udorn RTAFB in early March. CINCPAC requested the proposed agenda items and following a review of the items he did not concur in the conference since the major agenda items would require approval by higher authority. COMUSMACV was directed to consolidate recommended modifications and submit to CINCPAC for appropriate action.³

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1. CINCPAC 240304Z Jul 70.
 2. J3B214 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70, citing CINCPAC 022136Z Sep 70, JCS 1997/292151Z Sep 70, CINCPAC 270206Z Sep 70.
 3. COMUSMACV 7906/161002Z Feb 70; CINCPAC 212106Z Feb 70; COMUSMACV 9264/241119Z Feb 70; CINCPAC 260212Z Feb 70.

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USAF SORTIES LAOS 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	*ATTACK	CAP/ESC	**RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
A-1	8901	2252	2	9	11164
AC-47	332	3	1	13	349
AC-119	1473	4	6	31	1514
AC-123	147	2	0	4	153
AC-130	1062	1	1	55	1119
B-52	8361	0	0	75	8436
B-57	208	0	0	47	255
C-47	0	0	0	10	10
C-123	0	0	377	1799	2176
C-130	0	0	79	1183	1262
EB-66	0	0	23	10	33
EC-47	0	0	2517	1	2518
EC-121	0	0	0	2078	2078
EC-130	0	0	0	1193	1193
F-4	39466	3287	1396	3413	47562
F-100	3891	14	78	579	4562
F-105	10803	300	0	0	11103
HC-130	0	0	0	1027	1027
KC-135	0	0	0	10099	10099
O-2	0	0	205	8464	8669
OV-1	0	0	4	0	4
OV-10	0	0	578	11008	11586
RB-57	0	0	107	0	107
RF-4	0	1	8137	151	8289
RF-101	0	0	390	0	390
UC-123	0	0	50	246	296
WC-130	0	0	0	299	299
YQU-22	0	0	0	330	330
TOTAL	74644	5864	13951	42124	136583

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE, FLAK SUPP, ETC.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, ETC.

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USN-USMC SORTIES LAOS 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	*ATTACK	CAP/ESC	**RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
USN					
A-3	0	0	1	299	300
A-4	8598	0	9	569	9176
A-6	3593	5	7	110	3715
A-7	14015	9	0	42	14066
E-1	0	0	0	79	79
E-2	0	0	0	46	46
EA-3	0	0	64	0	64
F-4	2450	1230	8	8	3696
F-8	16	439	5	1	461
P-3	0	0	0	5	5
RA-5	0	1	475	90	566
RF-8	0	44	678	1	723
TOTAL	28672	1728	1247	1250	32897
USMC					
A-4	662	2	0	10	674
A-6	1759	0	0	3	1762
EA-6	17	0	50	275	342
F-4	1118	500	0	90	1708
RA-4	0	0	2	1	3
RF-4	0	0	266	0	266
RF-8	0	0	2	0	2
TA-4	0	0	584	607	1171
TOTAL	3556	502	884	986	5928

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE, FLAK SUPP, ETC.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, ETC.

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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MISC. SORTIES LAOS 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	*ATTACK	CAP/ESC	**RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
RTAF					
T-28	1087	0	0	635	1722
TOTAL	1087	0	0	635	1722
RLAF					
AC-47	736	0	0	100	836
O-1	0	0	432	4854	5286
T-28	16820	0	0	1085	17905
U-10	0	0	0	13	13
U-17	0	0	318	1140	1458
TOTAL	17556	0	750	7192	25498
AIR AMERICA					
T-28	128	0	6	348	482
U-10	0	0	0	19	19
TOTAL	128	0	6	367	501

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE, FLAK SUPP, ETC.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, ETC.

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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HELICOPTER SORTIES BY TYPE AIRCRAFT/SERVICE LAOS 1970

AIRCRAFT		*RECCE	**COMBAT SUPPORT OTHER	ARMED HELO	▲SUPPORT	▲▲NON- COMBAT OTHER	TOTAL
USA	AH-1			4008			4008
	CH-47			6			6
	CH-54		17				17
	UH-1		4700	285			4985
TOTAL			4717	4299			9016
USAF	CH-3		223				223
	CH-53		4				4
	HH-3		233				233
	HH-53		1184				1184
TOTAL			1644				1644@
USN	SH-3			1751		3	1754
	UH-1		3				3
	UH-2		2900				2900
TOTAL			2903	1751		3	4657

NOTES: * INCLUDES ELINT, COMINT, INFRA-RED, SLAR, PHOTO, RADAR, WEATHER, VISUAL, ETC.

** INCLUDES ECM, ECCM, SAR, CARGO, EW, AIR EVAC, LLTV, C&C, ETC.

▲ INCLUDES LOGISTICS TROOPS AND CARGO

▲▲ INCLUDES ADMIN, LN, TNG, MAINT, NON-COMBAT SUPPORT OTHER

@ 3 CAP/ESCORT SORTIES NOT INCLUDED

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USAF-USN AIRCRAFT LOSSES LAOS 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
USAF													
A-1	3	1	5	4			1					1	15
AC-130				1									1
B-57												1	1
EC-47				1									1
F-4	2	2	2	5	3	2	2					2	20
F-100	2		2	1	1								6
F-105	1	1	1	1					1		1		6
O-2	1											1	2
OV-10	1		2		1	2		1				1	8
						1							1
RF-4				2			1			1		1	5
TOTAL	10	4	12	15	5	5	4	1	1	1	1	7	66
USN													
A-3					1								1
A-4			2	1									3
			1	1		1		1	1				5
A-6		1	1										2
A-7		1		1	2		1					1	6
			1	1	1	2	1						6
F-4					1								1
RF-8											1		1
TOTAL		2	5	4	5	3	2	1	1		1	1	25

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USMC-RLAF AIRCRAFT LOSSES LAOS 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
USMC													
F-4	1											1	2
TOTAL	1											1	2
RLAF													
AC-47						1							1
O-1			1									1	2
T-28					1	1	1				3		6
				1	2	1	1			1			6
U-17				1									1
TOTAL			1	2	3	3	2			1	3	1	16

USAF AIRCRAFT LOSSES THAILAND 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

A-1	1		1										2
EB-66										1			1
F-4						1							1
F-105				2							1		3
TOTAL	1		1	2		1				1	1		7

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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U.S. HELICOPTER LOSSES LAOS 1970 BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
USA													
AH-1							1		1				2
UH-1								4	1	1			6
TOTAL							1	4	2	1			8
USAF													
CH-3		1											1
										1			1
HH-53	1					1							2
TOTAL	1	1				1				1			4
USMC													
CH-46						1							1
CH-53									2				2
UH-1			1										1
TOTAL			1			1			2				4

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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ENEMY LOSSES-LAOS 1970

DESTROYED/DAMAGED

MONTH	VEHICLES		WBLC	STRUCTURES	BRIDGES	AAA/AW	SECONDARY EXPLOSION
	ATTACKED	DES/DAM					
JAN	6520	1535/819	36/15	795/171	7/4	114/301	3411
FEB	5427	1519/784	17/2	750/156	10/3	89/251	13560
MAR	4636	1227/701	11/3	407/105	1/3	109/258	5167
APR	4430	1194/806	7/12	300/93	2/7	77/185	4330
MAY	2702	595/591	5/4	277/106	2/8	65/64	2265
JUN	1372	275/260	1/1	109/67	1/5	22/17	1869
JUL	825	176/155	8/2	105/51	11/1	18/12	978
AUG	413	87/72	11/14	141/86	4/5	28/9	556
SEP	261	51/41	23/18	204/87	3/2	19/7	471
OCT	314	60/45	12/9	322/137	3/2	25/12	482
NOV	1339	187/135	12/6	260/112	5/3	46/31	1181
DEC	3683	1114/504	14/19	290/134	6/2	119/43	10022
TOTALS	31922	8020/4913	157/105	3960/1305	55/45	731/1190	44292

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Air Operations in Cambodia

(TS) U.S. air interdiction operations commenced in Cambodia on 1 May 1970 in support of allied cross-border ground operations. Along with the VNAF, U.S. tactical aircraft flew a total of 24,650 attack sorties in Cambodia between 1 May and 31 December 1970. Additionally, 1,375 B-52 sorties were flown. Royal Thailand Air Force (RTAF) air support commenced on 4 July 1970. From that date to the end of 1970 they flew 135 attack sorties.

(TS) There are several areas in Cambodia in which air operations were conducted: FREEDOM DEAL, FREEDOM DEAL ALPHA, and FREEDOM DEAL EXTENSION. FREEDOM DEAL is generally an area bounded by the Vietnam and Laotian borders on the east and north, and the Mekong River and Route 13 on the west and south. FREEDOM DEAL ALPHA extends from the Mekong River to the west for approximately 75 miles, bordered on the north by Laos and on the south by Routes 6, 21, and 7. FREEDOM DEAL EXTENSION is an area bounded on the north by Route 13, on the east by the Vietnam border, on the west by the Mekong River, and on the south by Kampong Cham, Routes 7 and 75, and the Kampong Spean River to the Vietnam border.¹

(TS) U.S. air interdiction operations in eastern Cambodia are conducted under the authorities granted by the JCS and promulgated in the CINCPAC Basic Operation Order of 6 June 1970. Unclassified nickname is FREEDOM DEAL. Initially, the basic operation order concerned only the FREEDOM DEAL area. FREEDOM DEAL EXTENSION and ALPHA were authorized later.

(TS) The outline plan and execute directive for the air interdiction campaign in eastern Cambodia received from the JCS restricted implementation until necessary coordination was effected with the FANK and RVNAF. A coordination meeting was held on 28 May 1970 at MACV headquarters with representation from MACV, the FANK, and the JGS/RVNAF. On 29 May a memorandum of agreement on Rules of Engagement - Cambodia was signed by the participants and on 30 May the first strikes under the plan were conducted.²

(TS) The general rules for the conduct of interdiction operations provided sufficient latitude for strike aircraft effectiveness. However, necessary constraints were imposed to protect non-combatants and preserve those areas of cultural value to the Cambodian people. All fixed targets, targets of opportunity, LOCs for armed reconnaissance, and special operating areas must be properly validated by the FANK prior to strike. Air strikes were to be conducted under FAC control except those utilizing all-weather bombing systems, those returning ground fire, or those striking in FANK validated special operating areas.³

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1. J3B211 Supplemental History 1970, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Feb 71.
 2. Point Paper, J3B214, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jun 70, Subj: Air Interdiction Operations in Cambodia.
 3. Ibid.

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(TS) FANK liaison officers were placed in the Tactical Air Control Center at Tan Son Nhut and the Direct Air Support Center at Pleiku to perform validation functions. Additionally, FANK observers flew with U.S. FACs to provide on-the-spot validation of targets of opportunity.¹

(S) On 6 June 1970, CINCPAC promulgated the basic operations order for the air interdiction operations in eastern Cambodia. The mission of the forces involved was to maintain surveillance of enemy activities in Cambodia, east of the Mekong River, and to interdict with tactical air and B-52s those activities considered necessary to protect U.S. Forces in the RVN. The area of operations authorized was encompassed by the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border on the east, the Cambodian-Laotian border on the north, a line 200 meters west of and following the Mekong River on the west, and 200 meters south and west of Route 13 from Kracheh to the border of South Vietnam on the south. This area of operations was valid until 30 June 1970. On 30 June 1970 this interdiction area was redefined, extending the southern boundary to Routes 7 and 75 with operations approved until 1 November 1970. Additionally, reconnaissance operations over all of Cambodia, SAR operations for downed U.S. aircrews over all of Cambodia, and SAR operations for downed VNAF aircrews when deemed beyond VNAF capabilities were approved until 1 November 1970.²

(TS) On 30 July 1970 COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC that there was a significant enemy buildup in Cambodia consisting of both troops and large supply caches in an area outside the authorized air interdiction area. COMUSMACV requested that FREEDOM DEAL EXTENSION be expanded to include this area. CINCPAC supported the request and forwarded it to the JCS for approval.³

(S) Upon approval of the JCS, on 1 August 1970, CINCPAC promulgated authority to expand the area included in FREEDOM DEAL EXTENSION to encompass that area bounded by Route 7 on the north, Routes 75, 155, 1543, and the Prek Kampong Spean River on the west and south to the South Vietnamese border, and the South Vietnamese border on the east. Selective tactical air and B-52 interdiction were authorized against lucrative targets which posed a substantial threat to allied forces. This authority was valid until 1 November 1970.⁴

(TS) On 23 August 1970 CINCPAC requested JCS to approve the addition of an area west of the Mekong River to FREEDOM DEAL on the basis of a request by COMUSMACV that the enemy was making increased use of the area for logistic support of his forces, and that allied airpower was not effectively interdicting the area. Upon approval by the JCS on 26 August 1970, CINCPAC promulgated authority to expand the area included in FREEDOM DEAL to that area west of the Mekong River and bounded by the Laotian border on the north, a line along Route 69 and 10 KM west of Routes 12 and 6 on the west; a line 10 KM west of Routes 6, 21, and 7 on the south; and the Mekong River on the east. Within this area

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1. Ibid.
 2. J3B222 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
 3. J3B214 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
 4. CINCPAC 012116Z Aug 70.

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tactical air and B-52 interdiction against enemy troop and supply buildups was authorized until 1 October 1970. On 29 August 1970, CINCPAC designated this new area FREEDOM DEAL ALPHA.¹

(TS) On 20 September 1970 COMUSMACV reported the results of the interdiction campaign against enemy troops and supply buildups in Cambodia in FREEDOM DEAL ALPHA to CINCPAC and at the same time requested authority to conduct interdiction operations in the area be extended through the Northeast Monsoon season to 1 May 1971. CINCPAC supported the request and forwarded it to the JCS for approval on 23 September. The JCS, however, were unable to obtain long-range approval of the authorities as requested at that time, but as an interim measure approved the extension of FREEDOM DEAL ALPHA authorities until 1 November 1970.²

(TS) By the end of CY 70 operating authorities had been extended to 1 May 1971 for all three areas - FREEDOM DEAL, FREEDOM DEAL ALPHA, and FREEDOM DEAL EXTENSION.³

Employment of U.S. FAC and Flare Aircraft in Cambodia (S)

(TS) On 5 September 1970 CINCPAC granted JCS-approved authority until 1 November 1970, subject to limiting restrictions, for COMUSMACV to: (1) employ U.S. FAC and flare aircraft to coordinate RTAF, VNAF, and CAF strikes within geographical limits and in pursuance of missions already authorized under existing authorities, (2) employ U.S. flare aircraft, in a flare role only, in all of Cambodia, and (3) use either the English or French language; however, aircrews of FAC/flareship and strike aircraft had to be able to comprehend the language selected for control of strike aircraft and validation of targets.⁴

Support of RTAF Operations in Cambodia (S)

(TS) On 7 August 1970 SECSTATE requested CINCPAC to provide proposals for monitoring Thai operations in Cambodia and data for strike/recce sortie levels of 100, 300, 600, and 900 per month. On 26 August 1970, the SECDEF was provided with a summary format which COMUSMACTHAI normally included in the weekly SITREP for reporting air operations in Cambodia. Additionally, estimates of cost data, above that provided in current MASF, for operations in Cambodia for the SECSTATE requested sortie levels was also provided. A 300 sortie per month level was recommended by CINCPAC as a realistic starting point for increased Thai air support for operations in Cambodia.⁵

1. CINCPAC 260354Z Aug 70; J3B214 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70, citing CINCPAC 230319Z Aug 70 and CINCPAC 290337Z Aug 70.
2. J3B214 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70, citing COMUSMACV 200358Z Sep 70, CINCPAC 230227Z Sep 70 and JCS 2072/261925Z Sep 70.
3. FONECON between LCOL C.D. Crabb, USAF, J3B211 and COL J.R. Johnson, CINCPAC Command Historian, 9 Mar 71.
4. J3B211 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70, citing CINCPAC 050338Z Sep 70.
5. J3B211 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70, citing CINCPAC 262314Z Aug 70.

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Search and Rescue

(S) On 11 July 1970, CINCPAC promulgated authority to use U.S. assets in support of SAR operations for the recovery of RTAF aircrews downed in Cambodia in areas beyond the limits for U.S. ground and air interdiction operations. This authority was to be exercised in emergency conditions only and when beyond RTAF capabilities. Forward or on-station deployment in Cambodia of U.S. aircraft for the above purpose was not authorized.¹

Overflights of U.S. Aircraft

(S) In view of the change in political climate in Cambodia in the Spring of 1970, CINCPAC recommended that action be initiated to permit MAC contract, command support and airlift aircraft to overfly Cambodia.² On 26 June the JCS advised CINCPAC of State Department concurrence and authorized CINCPAC to pursue the matter directly with the American Embassy in Phnom Penh.³

(S) The Embassy in Phnom Penh opened discussions with the government of Cambodia and requested CINCPAC provide a monthly estimate of overflight traffic. CINCPAC provided the desired overflight estimate information and on 15 August the American Embassy advised CINCPAC that the government of Cambodia had agreed to allow MAC contract, command support and airlift aircraft to overfly Cambodia under International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) flight rules. The initial authorization covered a three-month period from 1 August through 31 October. In October, overflight authorization was obtained for the three-month period 1 November through 31 January 1971. Overflights of Cambodia were accomplished on a routine basis without incident since approval was granted in August 1970.⁴

SAC B-52 Strikes in Southeast Asia (ARC LIGHT)

(S) ARC LIGHT is the nickname for SAC B-52 operations conducted in Southeast Asia. Beginning 18 June 1965 ARC LIGHT operations expanded from an initial 30 aircraft, 150 sortie per month operation to a peak 104 aircraft, 1,800 sortie per month operation in 1968 to a turn-around point in 1970 when operations were reduced to 57 aircraft⁵ flying a maximum authorized rate of 1,000 sorties.

(S) B-52s were based at Anderson AFB, Guam; Kadena AFB, Okinawa; and U-Tapao AB, Thailand. The last ARC LIGHT flights flown from Anderson AFB, took place on 16 August 1970 and the last flights from Kadena AB, were flown on 19 September 1970. ARC LIGHT flights continued from U-Tapao AB. A total of 71,603 ARC LIGHT sorties were flown between 18 June 1965 and 31 December 1970.

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1. CINCPAC 110527Z Jul 70.
 2. CINCPAC 131155Z Jun 70.
 3. JCS 262305Z Jun 70.
 4. J3B213 Supplemental History, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Feb 71.
 5. 42 of these B-52s were committed to ARC LIGHT and operated from U-Tapao AB, Thailand per J3B221 Supplemental History, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Feb 71.

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USAF SORTIES CAMBODIA 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	*ATTACK	CAP/ESC	**RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
A-1	20	11	0	4	35
A-37	3838	0	44	50	3932
AC-119	1057	0	2	114	1173
AC-123	3	0	1	0	4
AC-130	29	0	2	19	50
B-52	1218	0	0	4	1222
B-57	0	0	0	7	7
C-7	0	0	0	137	137
C-47	0	0	0	27	27
C-123	0	0	0	7	7
C-130	0	0	0	30	30
EC-47	0	0	2164	3	2167
EC-121	0	0	0	103	103
F-4	2599	21	511	263	3394
F-100	6404	8	0	48	6460
F-102	0	0	0	2	2
F-105	118	0	0	2	120
KC-135	0	0	0	534	534
O-1	0	0	529	696	1225
O-2	0	0	1325	1883	3208
OV-10	5	0	772	2265	3042
RB-57	0	0	291	1	292
RF-4	0	0	1011	0	1011
RF-8	0	0	4	0	4
RF-101	0	0	423	0	423
UC-123	0	0	0	48	48
YQU-22	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	15291	40	7079	6248	28658

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE, FLAK SUPP, ETC.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, ETC.

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USMC-VNAF SORTIES CAMBODIA BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT SORTIES				
	*ATTACK	CAP/ESC	**RECCE	OTHER	TOTAL
USMC					
A-4	6	0	0	0	6
F-4	20	0	0	0	20
TOTAL	26	0	0	0	26
VNAF					
A-1	4911	0	0	0	4911
A-37	2421	0	0	0	2421
AC-47	340	0	0	0	340
F-5	1661	0	0	0	1661
TOTAL	9333	0	0	0	9333

* INCLUDES: STRIKE, ARMED RECCE, FLAK SUPP, ETC.

** INCLUDES: VISUAL, PHOTO, IR, ELINT, SAR, ETC.

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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HELICOPTER SORTIES BY TYPE AIRCRAFT/SERVICE CAMBODIA 1970

AIRCRAFT		*RECCE	**COMBAT SUPPORT OTHER	ARMED HELO	▲SUPPORT	▲▲NON- COMBAT OTHER	TOTAL
USAF	CH-3		6				6
	HH-43		6				6
	HH-53		2				2
TOTAL			14				14

NVN 1970

USAF	CH-3		5				5
	HH-3		43				43
	HH-53		34				34
TOTAL			82				82

THAILAND 1970

USAF	CH-3					1407	1407
TOTAL						1407	1407

NOTES: * INCLUDES ELINT, COMINT, INFRA-RED, SLAR, PHOTO, RADAR, WEATHER, VISUAL, ETC.

** INCLUDES ECM, ECCM, SAR, CARGO, EW, AIR EVAC, LLTV, C&C, ETC.

▲ INCLUDES LOGISTICS TROOPS AND CARGO

▲▲ INCLUDES ADMIN, LN, TNG, MAINT, NON-COMBAT SUPPORT OTHER

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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USAF-VNAF AIRCRAFT LOSSES CAMBODIA 1970 BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
USAF													
A-37						1							1
F-4					3	1							4
F-100					1				1			1	3
O-1					1								1
O-2										2			2
OV-10							1			1	1		3
TOTAL					5	2	1		1	3	1	1	14
VNAF													
C-119									1				1
TOTAL									1				1

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL

SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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U.S.-VNAF HELICOPTER LOSSES CAMBODIA 1970 BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
USA													
AH-1					1	2							3
					2								2
CH-47						1							1
OH-6					9	3							12
					1								1
OH-58						1							1
UH-1					9	1							10
					3	1							4
TOTAL					25	9							34
USAF													
USN													
USMC													
TOTAL U.S.					25	9							34
VNAF													
UH-1								1					1

U.S. HELICOPTER LOSSES THAILAND 1970 BY TYPE

USAF													
CH-3								1					1
USA													
USN													
USMC													
TOTAL U.S.								1					1

LEGEND:

COMBAT

OPERATIONAL


SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

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(S) As indicated on following chart, 15,000 sorties were authorized and 15,115 sorties were flown during 1970 - 8,477 of these were against targets in Laos. Significant operations supported by ARC LIGHT strikes were COMMANDO HUNT III, 1969-70 interdiction program developed for in-country application of sensors to tactical operations in Laos; HEADSHED V, Muang Phine operation in Laos; GAUNTLET, Bolovens Plateau operation in Laos; COMMANDO HUNT V, 1970-71 interdiction program in Laos; Phase II, ground interdiction operation also in Laos; and COMMANDO BASKET, Cambodian operation. Laos sorties accounted for 56 percent of the total effort for 1970.¹

(S) In the Republic of Vietnam, 5,263 sorties were flown accounting for 35 percent of the total effort in 1970 - 243 of these were in the DMZ which was 1.6 percent of the total effort. On 4 May 1970 the first ARC LIGHT mission was flown against Cambodian targets. During the remainder of 1970 a total of 1,375 Cambodian sorties were flown accounting for nine percent of the year's effort.²



1. J3B221 Supplemental History, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Feb 71.
2. Ibid.
3. Point Paper, J3B221, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Dec 70, Subj: B-52 Modus Operandi in Threat Area (U).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

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ARC LIGHT SORTIES 1970

MONTH	SORTIES AUTH	SORTIES FLOWN				PERCENT OF EFFORT		
		TOTAL	* LAOS	RVN	CAMBODIA	LAOS	RVN	CAMBODIA
JAN	1400	1445	683	762	0	47	53	0
FEB	1400	1300	787	513	0	61	39	0
MAR	1400	1443	896	547	0	62	38	0
APR	1400	1407	577	830	0	41	59	0
MAY	1400	1443	377	652	414	26	45	29
JUN	1400	1413	562	493	358	40	35	25
JUL	1400	1445	682	572	191	47	40	13
AUG	1200	1231	583	434	214	47	35	18
SEP	1000	986	558	317	111	57	11	32
OCT	1000	1012	923	64	25	91	6	3
NOV	1000	974	935	10	29	96	3	1
DEC	1000	1016	914	69	33	90	7	3
TOTAL	15000	15115	8477	5263	1375	56	35	9

* 2118 INTERDICTION SORTIES FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF COMMANDO HUNT. THIS EFFORT IS 25% OF TOTAL LAOS SORTIES - 14% OF TOTAL EFFORT.

SOURCE: LCOL V. D. LOKEN, USAF, J3B221, HQ. CINCPAC

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Bolovens Plateau

(TS) On 23 November AMEMB Vientiane requested ARC LIGHT strikes on the Bolovens Plateau, 7-8 NM northwest of Attapeu, to forestall further loss of strategic plateau sites. The Ambassador validated the target and stated that three plateau sites had been overrun by the enemy, that friendly morale was low, and that loss of the plateau would give the enemy unrestricted control of major infiltration routes. He also requested an alternate tactical air package in the event ARC LIGHT resources were not available. COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC approval on 24 November for the strike. Approval was granted within two hours and the target was struck by three B-52 aircraft at 1430Z hours on the same date.³

(TS) On 27 November AMEMB Vientiane requested two additional ARC LIGHT strikes on the Bolovens Plateau and validated the targets for strike prior to 30 November. TOTs were requested for first light to obtain maximum BDA through

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Point Paper, J3B221, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Jan 71, Subj: Bolovens Plateau (TS). In addition, the following messages are pertinent to the entire operation: CINCPAC 240225Z Nov 70; OUSAIRA VTN Laos 091048Z Dec 70, 060912Z Dec 70, 281520Z Nov 70, 271223Z Nov 70, 230920Z Nov 70; COMUSMACV 290425Z Nov 70, 280955Z Nov 70, 240043Z Nov 70; CINCPAC 061303Z Dec 70, 290704Z Nov 70, 281227Z Nov 70.

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surprise when enemy was expected to leave the bunkers for short periods of time. The strikes were to be against enemy units which had overrun plateau sites and controlled the eastern slope of the Bolovens Plateau, guarding a major supply route. COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC approval for only one mission of three B-52 aircraft because of a requirement to support the COMMANDO HUNT V interdiction program. CINCPAC approval was provided within three hours and three B-52 aircraft struck the target at 0648G hours on 28 November.

(TS) On the same day the AMEMB Vientiane again requested the second strike because intelligence indicated that the enemy was reinforcing his positions and that morale of friendly forces was crumbling because of the enemy strength. It was stated that the strike could be the psychological turning point in the effort to retain control of this strategic plateau. On 29 November COMUSMACV replied that due to the urgency of the strike request, an interdiction strike would be diverted to the Bolovens Plateau target and requested CINCPAC approval. CINCPAC approved and the target was struck again by three B-52 aircraft on 30 November.¹

(TS) The AMEMB Vientiane on 6 December 1970 requested ARC LIGHT strikes between 061100Z and 062300Z Dec 70 on two tracks near plateau Site 22 which was under attack by the enemy from two directions. The NW portion of the site was in the process of being occupied by the enemy. The strikes were requested against an enemy staging area NE and north of the site where reinforcements were staging for further attacks on the night of 6 December. COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC approval which was given less than two hours after the request. The targets were struck by six B-52 aircraft at 070515G and 070659G hours on 6 December. Between 24 November and 6 December a total of 15 ARC LIGHT sorties had struck against enemy forces on the Bolovens Plateau.²

(S) On 9 December Ambassador Godley expressed appreciation for the job well done by the ARC LIGHT forces on 6 December. He stated that, "Our hats are off to all the personnel that affected the outstanding response to such a short notice request and to the ARC LIGHT crews for their precision bombing." Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma also expressed his admiration and appreciation for the effort through Ambassador Godley.³

ARC LIGHT Secondary Targets in Laos (S)

(S) Prior to November 1969 secondary targeting in Laos was not permitted. This restriction was changed by the JCS on 29 November 1969 at the request of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. This change gave COMUSMACV authority to program secondary targets in Laos for missions with primary targets in Laos.⁴ On 4 February 1970 CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the prerequisite requirement that

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol III, p. 131.

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secondary targets in Laos require the primary target also to be fragged in Laos be deleted. The JCS approved the recommendation on 13 February. This change increased the flexibility of ARC LIGHT sorties recovering through Laos and permitted COMUSMACV to select the most lucrative secondary targets for RVN strikes.¹

Increased IRON HAND Authorities

(TS) On 22 December 1969 CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that certain authorities be granted to protect B-52s.² Based on CINCPAC's recommendation, the JCS on 28 January granted additional authorities for the use of IRON HAND (SAM suppression) aircraft. These authorities were:³

a. For IRON HAND aircraft to fire anti-radiation missiles at AAA (as well as SAM) radar signals emanating from NVN below 19 degrees north when these signals clearly indicate an immediate threat to friendly forces.

b. For IRON HAND aircraft to overfly NVN to the extent necessary to position themselves between SAM/AAA sites in NVN and B-52s operating in Laos and thereby protect the B-52s from attack.

(TS) On 28 March CINCPAC received JCS approval to continue until 30 June the authority for IRON HAND aircraft to overfly NVN to the extent necessary to position themselves between SAM/AAA sites in NVN and B-52s operating in Laos for protection of the B-52s.⁴

ARC LIGHT Overflight

(S) On 21 May CINCPAC removed the last overflight restrictions to B-52s over Thakhek, Savannakhet and Pakse above FL 310. In response to a SAC request CINCPAC approved a change to ARC LIGHT routing in South Laos to take advantage of the lifting of the overflight restrictions. Both an expansion of SAC's central gate and revised exit procedures to permit direct routing to established Laotian departure routes were approved after AMEMB Bangkok and AMEMB Vientiane concurred.⁵

SALOA-HEADSHED V

(S) Task Force Alpha and CAS Vientiane noted the movement of the Pathet

1. J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70; CINCPAC 040259Z Feb 70; JCS 131631Z Feb 70; CINCPAC 142145Z Feb 70.
2. CINCPAC 220618Z Dec 69.
3. J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70, citing CINCPAC 291335Z Jan 70 and CJCS 8940/282001Z Jan 70.
4. J3B214 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70, citing JCS 4361/282008Z Mar 70.
5. J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70, citing CINCPAC 212200Z May 70, CINCPAC 031220Z Jun 70, AMEMB Vientiane 3124/030700Z May 70, AMEMB Bangkok 106611/010515Z Jun 70.

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Lao/North Vietnamese Regional Headquarters on 26 May 1970 to a location north of Muang Phine. On 27 May COMUSMACV requested that a temporary special ARC LIGHT Operating Area (SALOA) nicknamed HEADSHED V be established around the area to facilitate B-52 strikes. Intelligence indicated that it was a major transshipment point for logistics destined for the Route 966 area. CINCPAC granted approval on 30 May for a 15 day targeting period ending 15 June 1970. COMUSMACV scheduled 10 ARC LIGHT missions between 011031Z and 012210Z June and 28 sorties struck the area with a BDA of 35 observed secondary explosions.¹

Naval Surface Operations

(U) The coverage of the U.S. Navy operations in this section is limited primarily to CINCPAC's policies and decisions, and actions by higher authority affecting CINCPAC's mission. Detailed coverage of naval surface operations can be found in Annex A, as well as in the "Pacific Area Naval Operations Review" published by CINCPACFLT and "United States Naval Operations, Vietnam," published by Chief of Naval Operations.

COLUMBIA EAGLE Mutiny

(C) On 14 March the SS COLUMBIA EAGLE, an MSTs charter ship, was enroute to Sattahip, Thailand with a cargo that included 500 and 750 pound bombs and other munitions. At approximately 0630 hours, 24 members of the crew were ordered into lifeboats in the Gulf of Thailand about 240 NM south-southwest of Saigon due to a bomb scare.² At 1430Z hours the SS RAPAHA NOCK picked up the 24 crewmen who were in two lifeboats. The crew of the COLUMBIA EAGLE reported that 15 men were left on board and that the ship was probably proceeding to the scheduled destination.³

(C) SAR operations were started and at 0220Z hours, 15 March, VP-46 aircraft reported sighting the COLUMBIA EAGLE at position 09-13N/102-331E on course 030/speed 12. No distress signals were noticed.⁴ However, at 0552 hours on 15 March, Captain Swann, SS COLUMBIA EAGLE, radioed that the ship was hijacked by two armed seamen and that the ship was proceeding to the central coast of Cambodia with the expected arrival time at approximately 0800 hours the same day.⁵ Based on the estimated track of the COLUMBIA EAGLE from the time located by the VP aircraft to the time anchored, it was apparent that the ship was about 15 NM inside Cambodian-claimed territorial waters at the time she reported the mutiny.⁶ Thirty minutes after the receipt of the initial mutiny message, the presence of the COLUMBIA EAGLE in Cambodian waters was confirmed by a message from

1. J3B221 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70, citing AMEMB Vientiane 3659/260610Z May 70, COMUSMACV 25874/270646Z May 70, CINCPAC 300110Z May 70.
2. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
3. SS RAPAHA NOCK 141600Z Mar 70.
4. COMUSNAVPHIL 150430Z Mar 70.
5. SS COLUMBIA EAGLE 150552Z Mar 70.
6. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.

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the COLUMBIA EAGLE relayed by the USCGC MELLON.¹ The COLUMBIA EAGLE anchored at 10-33N/103-15E at approximately 0845Z hours, 15 March.

(S) In reconstructing the events, it was determined that the SS COLUMBIA EAGLE could have been intercepted if the 24 crew members had any indication of a mutiny at the time they were picked up. Even if the USCGC MELLON, the nearest U.S. combatant ship, had been diverted at the time the VP aircraft sighted the ship, an intercept could not have taken place in international waters, however.² Actually the USCGC MELLON, directed by CTF 115 to proceed to the area, was on her way there at 0804Z hours.³ While enroute CINCPACFLT directed that the MELLON proceed, take custody of the COLUMBIA EAGLE and bring her into international waters.⁴ Based on political and other considerations, CINCPAC directed that no forces enter Cambodian-claimed territory without approval of higher authority. CINCPACFLT cancelled his seizure order.⁵ CINCPAC also directed CINCPACFLT not to conduct SAR operations in Cambodian waters in the event of scuttling or fire on ship, nor to board if the ship got underway without first obtaining CINCPAC permission.⁶

(S) Follow-on actions included the diversion of the USS DENVER (LPD 9), TURNER JOY (DD 951), SAFEGUARD (ARS 25), and two DDs from YANKEE STATION to the area.⁷ The COLUMBIA EAGLE entered the harbor at Sihanoukville and reanchored in position 10-39N/103-23E at 0030Z hours, 17 March.⁸ On 17 March CINCPAC notified CINCPACFLT that further action was to be through diplomatic channels. Therefore, he authorized the release of all forces except for the MELLON which was to remain on station in the vicinity of Sihanoukville.⁹ CTG 76.6 embarked in the DENVER relieved the MELLON as the on-scene commander on 18 March.

(S) The RKG granted asylum to the two mutineers. In the meantime the AMEMB Phnom Penh conducted negotiations for the release of the ship, crew, and cargo. These negotiations were hampered by the upheaval in the Cambodian government on 18 March.¹⁰

(S) On 17 March CINCPAC in anticipation of the release of the ship and crew directed COMUSMACTHAI in coordination with MSTs representatives to be prepared, on order, to transfer necessary COLUMBIA EAGLE crew members from Sattahip by helicopter to the MELLON for further transfer to the COLUMBIA EAGLE. CINCPACFLT was requested to have the MELLON ready to receive the crew members and standby to transfer them to the COLUMBIA EAGLE when that ship entered international waters.¹¹

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1. USCGC MELLON 150735Z Mar 70.
 2. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
 3. USCGC MELLON 150804Z Mar 70.
 4. CINCPACFLT 151032Z Mar 70.
 5. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70; CINCPACFLT 151101Z Mar 70.
 6. CINCPAC 151900Z Mar 70.
 7. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
 8. COMUSNAVPHIL 170112Z Mar 70.
 9. CINCPAC 170600Z Mar 70.
 10. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
 11. CINCPAC 171721Z Mar 70.

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(TS) Based on indications that the RKG would release the COLUMBIA EAGLE on 8 April, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI to transfer the COLUMBIA EAGLE crewmen at Sattahip to An Thoi. CINCPAC then requested CINCPACFLT to embark the crewmen from An Thoi in the USCGC CHASE (WHEC 718) for transfer to the COLUMBIA EAGLE along with an EOD team and two or three personnel from the CHASE. The members of the EOD team and the CHASE crew members were to conduct search/survey for possible sabotage and to provide safety and security watch on sensitive deck cargo during transit of the COLUMBIA EAGLE. In addition, the Master, COLUMBIA EAGLE was to be informed that his next port of call was to be Subic Bay, Philippines and that his ship was not to enter RVN waters. CINCPACFLT was also tasked to provide ship escort for the EAGLE during transit to Subic Bay. Transfer of personnel was to be conducted in international waters well outside Cambodian and RVN territorial waters.¹ All plans were executed and the COLUMBIA EAGLE arrived Subic on 12 April.² Operational control of the COLUMBIA EAGLE passed from CINCPAC to COMSTS effective 100001Z April.³

CVA Force Level in PACOM

CVAs for Northeast Asia

(TS) On 21 February CINCPACFLT recommended that the response time of Northeast Asia CVA Task Group be relaxed from 24 to 48 hours up to 10 days every other month to allow for upkeep and restricted availability (RAV) in Yokuska. His rationale for the proposal was that reduced utilization of facilities in Yokuska had caused difficulties in the manning level for the ship repair facilities (SRF). This was due to an insufficient workload. Further reduction in the SRF manning level would effect responsiveness to repair requirements. Meanwhile the workload at Sasebo had increased to the point that the in-house capability there had been exceeded. CINCPACFLT pointed out that since the initial tasking by the JCS⁴ in June 1969 the situation in the Korean area had stabilized to a point where some relaxation of this continuous tasking could be relaxed.⁵ CINCPAC approved the request based on CINCPACFLT's rationale and the fact that the JCS requirement could still be met.⁶ On 2 May CINCPAC suspended the Northeast

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1. CINCPAC 071939Z Apr 70.
 2. COMUSNAVPAC/CTF 35 071618Z Apr 70; COMUSMACTHAI 080420Z Apr 70; COMUSNAVPAC/CTF 35 082230Z Apr 70, 080823Z Apr 70, 080942Z Apr 70, 081145Z Apr 70, and 081642Z Apr 70.
 3. COMSTS 081941Z Apr 70; CINCPAC 100410Z Apr 70.
 4. As a result of the EC-121 shoot-down by North Korea in April 1969, the JCS in June 1969 required a CVA Task Group be prepared to respond on a 24-hour notice at least 20 days each month to a requirement for the presence of the CVA Task Group in the Sea of Japan.
 5. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70, citing CINCPACFLT 212221Z Feb 70.
 6. Ibid., citing CINCPAC 241030Z Feb 70.

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Asia CVA operations until further notice in order to provide three CVAs at YANKEE STATION for an indefinite period.¹

(TS) On 22 May CINCPACFLT proposed to plan on TF 71 operations, at such time as they are resumed on the basis of the less stringent criteria of the JCS tasking, which provides for one CVA Task Group within 24-hours steaming time of the Sea of Japan for 20-30 days per month, with the proviso that a 48-hour posture be continuously maintained during those periods (maximum of 10 days a month) when standing down from the 24-hour requirement. As rationale for this proposal CINCPACFLT indicated that future budgets will force further reductions in PACFLT WESTPAC Base Structure, and although the total scope of these reductions is not known at this time, it is anticipated that they will necessitate the eventual elimination of either Sasebo or Yokosuka as a fleet support base and substantial cuts at the remaining activity.²

(TS) In view of the information on budget restraints and required reductions of PACFLT WESTPAC Base Structure cited by CINCPACFLT, and the fact that the JCS requirement for a 24-hour response at least 20 days per month would still be met, on 28 May CINCPAC approved CINCPACFLT's proposal.³

CVA Force Level Western Pacific

(TS) The JCS notified CINCPAC on 5 August that the CNO had proposed a reduction in deployed CVAs to the Seventh Fleet from four to three commencing 1 November 1970. CINCPAC's comments were requested.⁴

(TS) CINCPAC advised the JCS that a reallocation of assets would be necessary and that two of the three CVAs could not be maintained at YANKEE STATION. An average of 1.6 CVAs could be kept on station and they could support 2,700 attack sorties per month. However, when there is only one CVA on the line it would be stationed southward towards the South China Sea. This would make the provision of BARCAP/support sorties infeasible in the Gulf of Tonkin. The second CVA when absent from the Gulf of Tonkin would be maintained within 48 hours reaction time from Southeast Asia and provide surge capability if required. If the CVAs deployed to Seventh Fleet were reduced to three from four the following would result: (1) [REDACTED] and (3) contingency plans reaction time would be increased.⁵

(S) On 20 August the JCS approved the reduction of CVAs deployed to the Seventh Fleet from four to three effective 1 November 1970, and granted CINCPAC authority to modify CVA deployment schedules to reflect the reduction.⁶ CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to modify the schedules accordingly.⁷

1. CINCPAC 070855Z Aug 70 citing CINCPAC 020339Z May 70.
2. CINCPACFLT 220431Z May 70.
3. CINCPAC 280419Z May 70.
4. JCS 051840Z Aug 70.
5. CINCPAC 070855Z Aug 70.
6. JCS 7935/201637Z Aug 70.
7. CINCPAC 211511Z Aug 70.

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(TS) On 1 September CINCPACFLT provided a concept of operations for the employment of three CVAs in Southeast Asia to be effective about 1 November 1970. The concept envisioned that during the period 12-15 November the 48 and 96-hour reaction times for the two off-line CVAs would be increased to 84 and 144 hours, respectively, because of CVA reliefs.¹ On 19 September CINCPAC informed CINCPACFLT that since the new mode of CVA operations in Southeast Asia would include periods during which only one CVA would be operating off RVN in a new area south of the Gulf of Tonkin, and that the VC/NVA reaction to these moves was uncertain, it was important that the reaction times for off-line CVAs not be degraded. Therefore CINCPACFLT was requested to modify the CVA schedules to preclude the need for increased reaction times during periods of CVA reliefs.²

Post Deployments of CVAs

(TS) On 25 September CINCPACFLT proposed a concept to redeploy currently embarked air wings from the USS AMERICA (CVA 66) and the USS SHANGRI LA (CVA 38), by flying PACFLT personnel and aircraft direct to CONUS following their WESTPAC relief and deployment. CINCPACFLT supported his proposal with the following rationale:³

a. Both the SHANGRI LA and AMERICA were LANTFLT carriers that would be returning to East-coast homeports via the South Pacific and South Atlantic arriving just prior to Christmas. The total time in transit for each carrier was expected to be approximately 40 days. The air wings embarked on these two ships were the CVW-9, a PACFLT air wing based on the West Coast, embarked on the AMERICA, and the CVW-8, which included three PACFLT squadrons - two F8 and one A4 - embarked on the SHANGRI LA. Due to the requirement for pre-deployment workup with their respective carrier, each of these PACFLT units would be deployed from their home bases nearly 11 months. Furthermore, the SHANGRI LA fighter squadrons had had only a three and one-half month turnaround. Upon arrival East coast ports, CINCPACFLT would be faced with difficult task of flying/transporting the air wing from coast to coast during Christmas week.

b. Execution of the TRANSPAC airlift would be cued to the 48 hour and 96 hour CVA contingency response times and would not commence prior to assumption of this responsibility by their reliefs, the USS HANCOCK (CVA 19) and USS RANGER (CVA 62). Also, the TRANSPAC support requirements would be met with other than SEVENTHFLT assets and execution accomplished on a non-interference basis with Seventh Fleet operations.

(TS) On 26 September CINCLANTFLT indicated his opposition to the proposal. He cited the unstable situation in the Mid-East along with the possibility that these ready, available forces could be further deployed upon arrival in the

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1. CINCPACFLT 010053Z Sep 70.
 2. CINCPAC 192355Z Sep 70.
 3. CINCPACFLT 252106Z Sep 70.

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Atlantic. Therefore CINCPACFLT recommended that the ship-air wing integrity be maintained throughout the transit.¹

(TS) On 30 September CINCPAC approved CINCPACFLT's concept for redeployment of the air wing personnel and aircraft for planning purposes and requested CINCPACFLT to continue coordination with CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT in order to obtain their concurrence. In the meantime Admiral McCain would keep the CJCS informed. When developed the plan was to be submitted to CINCPAC for approval. If approved, prior to its implementation, a timely go/no go recommendation for its execution based on the then existing world situation would be required.² In view of the reduced readiness of the CVAs during their redeployment and the strategic implications thereof, the CJCS was informed of the current planning.³

(TS) In response to the information provided by CINCPAC, on 3 October the CJCS indicated to CINCPAC that the proposed CVA air wing redeployment would be discussed with CINCLANT and an answer provided. Additionally the CJCS indicated that the plan appeared reasonable.⁴ On 5 October the CJCS indicated to CINCPAC that after discussions with CINCLANT there are no objections to continuation of planning for the redeployment of CVA air groups. Additionally, the CJCS indicated, and CINCPAC recognized, that there were some overall readiness implications which required discussion with the SECDEF. A final decision was to be provided during the week of 12 October.⁵ On 14 October, the CJCS informed CINCPAC that after review of the overall readiness implications of the proposed redeployment plan of CVA air group personnel the most prudent plan would be to redeploy to CONUS F-8 fighter squadrons (VF-111 and VF-162) and selected aircraft and personnel of detachments VFP-60 and VAH-10 from the SHANGRI LA (CVA-38).⁶ Based on the information received from the JCS, on 16 October, CINCPAC authorized CINCPACFLT to redeploy to CONUS the following SHANGRI LA assets: F-8 fighter squadrons (VF-111 and VF-162) and selected aircraft and personnel of detachments VFP-63 and VAH-10.⁷ On 20 October, CINCPACFLT expressed appreciation to CINCPAC for support of the proposal to TRANSPAC elements of the AMERICA and SHANGRI LA air wings, and indicated that although the world situation had allowed only limited execution, the planning produced an in-depth examination of PACFLT operational and logistic capability to support such a movement.⁸

Guided Missile Frigate (DLG) Deployment to PACOM

(S) On 18 December the JCS notified CINCPAC that the CNO had submitted a

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1. CINCLANTFLT 261641Z Sep 70.
 2. CINCPAC 300245Z Sep 70.
 3. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70 citing CINCPAC 300700Z Sep 70.
 4. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70 citing CJCS 69003/031844Z Oct 70.
 5. Ibid., citing CJCS 1044/051810Z Oct 70.
 6. Ibid., citing CJCS 13914/140005Z Oct 70.
 7. Ibid., citing CINCPAC 160326Z Oct 70.
 8. Ibid., citing CINCPACFLT 200243Z Oct 70.

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recommendation to the JCS to discontinue the deployment of DLGs to the Pacific Fleet upon completion of the USS WAINWRIGHT (DLG-28) deployment in February 1971. CINCPAC's comments were requested.¹ On 20 December CINCPAC replied that a level of three deployed naval tactical data system (NTDS)-equipped ships was mandatory to maintain a credible AAW posture in WESTPAC. Two NTDS ships were required to maintain one ship continuously on station in the South China Sea/Gulf of Tonkin area for essential PIRAZ/AAW duties. The third was required to provide AAW support for periodic operations of non-NTDS equipped CVAs outside the South China Sea area (one such CVA will be deployed during the third and fourth quarters of FY 71) and for Northeast Asia TDS interface testing. Should the USS STANDLEY not be deployed to relieve WAINWRIGHT, the level of WESTPAC deployed NTDS ships would be reduced to two upon the scheduled outchop of USS JOUETT on 28 March 1971. Because of programmed DLG AAW modernizations/overhauls, CINCPACFLT would be unable to meet a level of three NTDS ships in WESTPAC until July 1971. In addition, the WESTPACNORTH Compatibility Program Phase 3 Inter-System Tests, which included the Government of Japan participation, required an NTDS ship in the Japan area for a period of approximately 16 days during the March-July 1971 time-frame. It was envisioned that these important, final tests of the interface would be accomplished by a DLG, which would at the same time be fulfilling the PARPRO protection picket commitment. A level of only two NTDS ships in WESTPAC during the period March-July 1971 would preclude AAW interface for the non-NTDS CVA operating outside of the South China Sea area and would require the postponement of Northeast Asia TDS interface testing until after mid-July 1971. A reduction in YANKEE STATION PIRAZ/AAW capabilities or utilization of an NTDS-equipped CVA to conduct Northeast Asia interface testing would permit accomplishment of the preceding tasks; however, these alternatives were considered unacceptable. Based on this rationale CINCPAC then recommended strongly that one Atlantic Fleet NTDS-equipped DLG continue to be deployed to PACOM at least until July 1971.² This recommendation was approved on 24 December.³

Proposed Donation of a U.S. PBR and LCU to Cambodia

(S) On 21 February U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh suggested to SECSTATE that two U.S. boats, (a PBR and a LCU) seized by Cambodia, be donated to the RKG on the premise that "...we have lost use of these vessels in any case and might as well try make some mileage out of gesture which would be of real help RKG and would be much appreciated."⁴

(S) CINCPACFLT strongly opposed this proposal and pointed out the far-reaching implications of any such action.⁵ CINCPAC supported this position and advised the JCS that such action would set a dangerous precedent in the matter of government ships and boats seized in territorial waters as a result of

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1. JCS 8350/182152Z Dec 70.
 2. CINCPAC 200216Z Dec 70.
 3. JCS 8766/241640Z Dec 70.
 4. AMEMB Phnom Penh 147/210730Z Feb 70; COMNAVFOR 061333Z Feb 70.
 5. CINCPACFLT 232047Z Feb 70.

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
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navigational error and would make it almost impossible to recover any U.S. assets under future similar circumstances if the government involved chose to retain them. It was also pointed out that if the proposal was approved its application might be extended as a basis for retention of commercial craft in the extensive territorial waters presently claimed by a number of nations. CINCPAC recommended that the suggested release of U.S. boats to the RKG proposed by U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh be strongly opposed.¹

(C) SECSTATE agreed with the CINCPAC position and informed the U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh that outright donation of the captured vessels to RKG would be most inadvisable.² The PBR crew was released by RKG on 28 February and returned to RVN.³

Trawler Infiltration


(S) CINCPAC's involvement in trawler infiltration and surveillance operations in 1970 was limited primarily to recommending rules of engagement and requesting permission of the JCS to board and search surface ships positively identified as known infiltration types and, if found hostile, to confiscate or destroy.




1. CINCPAC 240715Z Feb 70.
2. SECSTATE 27438/242259Z Feb 70.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 2427/280729Z Feb 70.
4. CINCPACFLT 022111Z May 70.
5. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70 citing CINCPAC 072031Z May 70.

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On 19 May CINCPACFLT notified CINCPAC that a dilemma existed between the "restrictive policy" contained in the Southeast Asia rules of engagement and CINCPAC's "liberal interpretation" in his message which provided guidance in a previous case of four trawlers, three of which had penetrated the 12-mile limit. At CINCPACFLT's request CINCPAC cancelled this message on 23 May.¹ On the same day CINCPAC recommended to the JCS one additional indicator to be added to the 10 proposed on 7 May - "detection of more than one contact apparently engaged in a coordinated infiltration attempt."²




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1. Ibid., citing CINCPACFLT 230432Z May 70.
 2. Ibid.
 3. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70 citing JCS 7769/051253Z Jun 70.

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(TS) On 10 June CINCPAC notified CINCPACFLT that his request of 2 May was disapproved. The disapproval was based on the JCS guidance discussed above.¹


(TS) The JCS on 2 December requested CINCPAC to review the ROE concerning trawler infiltration and to provide the JCS with his comments on necessary modifications and ideas regarding methods to increase the effectiveness of action to be taken against NVN infiltration trawlers under existing ROE.²



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1. Ibid., citing CINCPAC 100420Z Jun 70.
 2. J3B42 History, Ha CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70 citing JCS 7121/022040Z Dec 70.
 3. Ibid., citing CINCPAC 040335Z Dec 70.
 4. Ibid., citing COMUSMACV 171435Z Dec 70 and Admin CINCPACFLT 220257Z Dec 70.
 5. Ibid., citing CINCPAC 250211Z Dec 70.

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Electronic Warfare Operations


Although electronic warfare activities in the PACOM were once again primarily devoted to the support of combat operations in Southeast Asia, many training and other preparatory activities were conducted elsewhere in the PACOM

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Memorandum, CDR Segal, J3B42, Hq CINCPAC, to COL Johnson, JO45, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Mar 70, n.s.

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ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA



SOURCE: AIR OPREP 5 (OPREA DATA BASE MAINTAINED BY J3C4)

and are discussed in Chapter I. In Southeast Asia electronic support missions and electronic countermeasures missions were flown in support of air operations over Laos and Vietnam.

(S) In October special electronic intelligence missions were flown in Laos because of the lack of information on enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites there. By that time, increasing numbers of electronic countermeasures sorties were being flown also in support of the ARC LIGHT missions; this support continued through the end of the year. For Route Package I, and in association with increased ARC LIGHT sorties in the pass area, electronic reconnaissance 24 hours a day was initiated in November and this also continued through the end of the year. As a consequence of increased electronic warfare operations, electronic warfare support of drone missions was curtailed in November for the remainder of the year.

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(S) IRON HAND missions were also flown throughout the year to suppress fire control and SAM activity against PACOM Air Forces. These special support operations used SHRIKE, Standard ARM, and other weapons to suppress and destroy North Vietnam's SA-2 missiles subsequent to their engaging U.S. air power. They also reduced the effectiveness of radar controlled antiaircraft artillery.¹

Interface of Tactical Air Control Systems in Southeast Asia

(S) Although a requirement for compatible tactical air control systems in Southeast Asia had been recognized by 1967, the interface of these tactical data systems was not accomplished until 1969.² Configuration management of the interface passed to the JCS from the Air Force Chief of Staff, who had been charged with development of the interface. Changes resulting from or requiring a change to the concept of operations were to be coordinated with the appropriate unified commander. To insure proper configuration management CINCPAC published an instruction early in 1970 that established procedures and responsibilities for configuration management of established joint interfaces, that amplified the guidance prescribed by higher authority, and that established procedures for proper in-theater coordination and smooth flow of change requests through appropriate channels in accordance with Service, Defense Department, and JCS directives.³

(S) CINCPAC continued to closely observe the interface and found that it fulfilled the objectives of enhancing coordination of U.S. air operations, assisting in the prevention of border violations, and passing threat alerts. CINCPAC believed that the "knowledge gained through experience in the SEA TDS interface could be valuable in the planning, development, and use of this and future joint interfaces."⁴ For this reason CINCPAC compiled a statement of lessons learned from the interface experience from CINCPAC's viewpoint, which he forwarded to the JCS, with copies to the Service Chiefs, the National Security Agency, the PACOM Service headquarters, and NSA Pacific.

(S) The 20 lessons learned will not be outlined here; they were principally of a technical nature. For each lesson, however, CINCPAC included comments that provided an explanation or rationale.

(S) No sooner had the interface in Southeast Asia begun to function routinely when the first impact on the system from redeployment planning became apparent. To study the matter CINCPAC convened the PACOM Tactical Data System Interface Advisory Group, which he had established in 1969 to provide continuity in interface planning and operations and facilitate and advise in overall management of installed systems.⁵

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1. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Dec 70.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol III, pp. 147-149.
 3. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70 citing CINCPACINST 4130.1 of 6 Jan 70.
 4. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 31 Jan 70, Subj: Southeast Asia (SEA) Tactical Data Systems (TDS) Interface Lessons Learned (U).
 5. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol III, p. 148.

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(TS) Primary concern was with Marine Corps planning and the fate of the Tactical Data Communications Central (TDCC) computer organic to Marine Air Control Squadron 4. This computer established the interface between the Navy and Air Force and the interface would be destroyed by its removal.¹

(TS) The Advisory Group recommended the following courses of action:

a. Retain the TDCC and necessary Marine support personnel in the country upon removal of MACS-4.

b. Explore the feasibility of Air Force personnel being trained to operate/maintain the TDCC in the event of a long term requirement for the interface in SEA (beyond FY 71).

c. Explore the possibility of retaining a TDCC in country if required beyond FY 71 on a loan basis to the Air Force by Marine Corps or by Air Force purchases of like equipment.²

(TS) CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to coordinate detailed planning for maintaining the interface by retaining the TDCC and necessary support if the Marine squadron was withdrawn. In addition CINCPAC noted, "The need for this real time digital exchange of information will exist as long as air operations over NVN, the Gulf of Tonkin, and applicable areas of Laos are being conducted in any significant numbers."³

(TS) CINCPAC continued to study the matter and reevaluate the need for the interface and CINCPACAF and COMUSMACV requirements. In July CINCPAC notified the JCS that his reevaluation "revealed a requirement for the SEA TDS Interface as long as U.S. aircraft continue to have significant operational missions in SEA."⁴ He explained that he had initiated action to implement a short term solution. Planning actions had been initiated to relocate the TDCC adjacent to the Tactical Air Control Center-Northern Sector (TACC-NS) at Monkey Mountain, RVN for security and support reasons. Marines, he said, would continue to operate and man the TDCC until final Marine deployment from the RVN.

(TS) In view of continued operational requirements in Southeast Asia and the possibility of using TDCC personnel from Southeast Asia in the WESTPACNORTH and Tactical Air Control Systems/Tactical Air Defense Systems (TACS/TADS) interfaces, CINCPAC recommended that the Air Force Chief of Staff "obtain a capability to operate and maintain the TDCC for most effective long term interface solution."⁵ CINCPAC further recommended that the Air Force obtain a TDCC through inter-Service loan with necessary logistic support for the duration of the Southeast Asia requirement. He noted that Air Force personnel could be trained at Marine

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1. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
 2. Ibid.
 3. CINCPAC 280018Z Jan 70.
 4. CINCPAC 230521Z Jul 70.
 5. Ibid.

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schools, and he recommended that the Marines be tasked to support TDCC operations until Air Force personnel were ready.¹

(TS) The JCS replied that they recognized the merits of CINCPAC's plan for both short- and long-term solutions. Considering all of the factors involved, however, they said, "it was concluded that the USMC could more effectively and economically operate and maintain the TDCC for the foreseeable duration of the requirement."² They continued, "The USMC has accepted this commitment and will continue to provide personnel and equipment for the operation of the SEASIA TDS interface."³ CINCPAC then asked COMUSMACV and CINCPACAF to reevaluate their requirements so that appropriate CINCPAC planning actions could be reviewed for accuracy.⁴

(TS) COMUSMACV replied that he recommended retention of the interface, including the SEEK DAWN automated system and the Marine Corps' TDCC "as long as significant USAF/USN air operations are conducted within range of the enemy's capability to react."⁵ He agreed with the idea of relocating the TDCC to Monkey Mountain and its continued operation by the Marines. He recommended phasing out the TACC-NS at Udorn, Thailand as soon as practicable.

(TS) CINCPACAF, on the other hand, citing budget restraints and force reductions, proposed that the SEEK DAWN system be terminated in the third quarter of FY 71 and that operations revert to a "manual command advisory function (CAF) operation."⁶ He did note, however that the real-time interface among Air Force, Navy, and Marine systems had "made an extremely valuable contribution to the coordination and control of combat operations as well as laying the foundation for future interface operations. If extensive air operations are again required at a future date, an interface capability is essential."⁷

(TS) CINCPAC did not concur with CINCPACAF's proposal to terminate SEEK DAWN activities with attendant reversion to manual operations. CINCPAC offered the following reasons. He noted that the threat to U.S. Forces had quantitatively increased with the accelerated withdrawal of in-theater assets. He said that cost was not the paramount consideration in determining requirements, although budget restraints had to be considered. "The costs incurred in continued interface operation must be accepted to maintain a system capability which would materially enhance the exchange of operational intelligence in the event of a rapid upsurge in the air war."⁸ He noted that the Marines would continue to man and operate the TDCC, negating additional manpower or training of USAF personnel. The deactivation of an Air Force Security Squadron, cited as an Air Force consideration, would not eliminate IRON HORSE special intelligence (SI)

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1. Ibid.
 2. JCS 1754/231936Z Sep 70.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCPAC 010006Z Oct 70.
 5. COMUSMACV 55050/201155Z Oct 70.
 6. CINCPACAF 170214Z Oct 70.
 7. Ibid.
 8. CINCPAC 082221Z Nov 70.

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participation in the interface, CINCPAC explained, as the NSA Pacific had indicated that necessary SI support would be provided as long as the interface was maintained.

(TS) CINCPAC then summarized the position of the command. The interface was to be retained as long as significant U.S. air operations were conducted in Southeast Asia. The USMC TDCC should be relocated as soon as feasible to the site adjacent to the TACC-NS and its operation continued by the Marine Corps. The alternate TDCC at Udorn should be phased out as soon as possible.¹ CINCPAC further directed that the TDCC site construction should commence in time to insure readiness concurrent with redeployment of Marine Air Control Squadron 4 scheduled for January 1971.²

(U) The Southeast Asia Tactical Data System Interface requirement would continue to be evaluated.

Herbicide Operations

(C) Herbicide Operations were started in 1962 in the Republic of Vietnam and have continued through CY 1970. Both defoliation and crop destruction operations were conducted during 1970 but at a decreasing rate as the U.S. involvement and the overall hostilities have decreased.

Temporary Suspension of Herbicide ORANGE

(S) During the year CINCPAC continued to seek cancellation of the temporary suspension on use of herbicide ORANGE which was directed by DEPSECDEF on 15 April 1970.³ First request was made on 24 April by CINCPAC⁴ pointing out that all defoliation operations would cease after 12-day supply of WHITE herbicide (only suitable substitute for ORANGE) was exhausted. Procurement of additional stocks of WHITE, requiring several months was necessitated by continuation of the temporary suspension. On 28 May CINCPAC requested that the JCS action⁵ concurring with CINCPAC be expedited to the degree feasible in order that operational and logistical planning and programming could proceed in an orderly manner.

(S) Although CINCPAC continued, with JCS support, to seek cancellation of the temporary suspension on ORANGE, at the end of the year CINCPAC had not yet received the desired authority to use the material to satisfy operational requirements in RVN.

Study of Alleged Genetic Effects

(C) Early in 1970 CINCPAC had been asked for an informal expression of

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1. Ibid.
 2. CINCPAC 060014Z Dec 70; J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
 3. JCS 6135/152135Z Apr 70.
 4. CINCPAC 240335Z Apr 70.
 5. JCSM 232-70.

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opinion in the matter of the desirability of conducting an investigation into alleged birth defects from the use of herbicides in Vietnam. The query came from the deputy to the President's Science Advisor; CINCPAC furnished his reply through the JCS on 24 January.¹

(C) CINCPAC first cited certain studies of the matter already completed. Studies by both the Midwest Institute in 1967 and a team headed by a Department of Agriculture scientist in 1968 had described ecology changes as "small" and the second study noted that "the demonstrated military advantages of the program far outweighed the relatively minor disadvantages."² CINCPAC then discussed some of the rumors and allegations about birth defects, subjects that had been picked up in enemy propaganda and by anti-war groups in the United States.

(C) CINCPAC believed that the conduct of an objective, scientifically valid study of alleged birth defects was "completely infeasible for a variety of reasons." He noted that herbicides had been used in areas of no population or low population density and generally in a hostile environment. Valid statistics on which to base a birth defect comparison did not exist and any study, regardless of the findings "would be inconclusive and would only add fuel to the controversy."³

(C) As an alternative CINCPAC suggested that a study to help resolve the issue be conducted in the United States where herbicide chemical compounds had been in use for over 20 years in larger quantities than in Vietnam and health records were available to support such a study.

(U) The subject subsequently became one of the more emotionally charged issues in the press and in certain segments of the U.S. scientific community, and a demand for further study of the matter was raised to counter accusations and propaganda.

(U) Therefore a far-reaching and comprehensive study was conducted by the COMUSMACV Surgeon in collaboration with the Minister of Health of the Republic of Vietnam. Results of this study, published in December 1970, led to the conclusion that, after extensive review of hospital records in Vietnam, there was no evidence of deleterious genetic effects from use of herbicides in Vietnam. As a matter of fact the report⁴ showed that the stillbirth rate, the mole rate, and the malformation rate all decreased significantly over the 10 year period while herbicide spraying was drastically increasing.

(U) In September 1970 the U.S. Congress requested that a comprehensive study of the ecological and physiological effects of the use of herbicides

1. CINCPAC 240309Z Jan 70.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. "Congenital Malformations, Hydatidiform Moles and Stillbirths in the Republic of Vietnam 1960-1969" by Robert T. Cutting, U.S. Army Medical Research Team (Walter Reed Army Institute of Research), Vatman, et. al.

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in Vietnam be conducted under the auspices of the National Science Foundation. This study continued into 1971. CINCPAC provided technical support for the study and in a parallel effort examined the military effectiveness of the use of herbicides.

U.S. Anti-crop Warfare Program in Vietnam

(S) CINCPAC evaluation of the U.S. anti-crop warfare program in Vietnam was completed on 10 July and reported to JCS.¹ This evaluation drew on the previous work of CINCPAC Scientific Advisory Group,² and an input message from COMUSMACV.³ A concluding paragraph of CINCPAC's message to JCS stated that:

Both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV consider the use of herbicides for the destruction of food crops an essential element of combat support which enables field commanders to conduct critical portions of the resource denial program in an effective and economical manner. It is also considered to be a significant element in the Pacification and Vietnamization Programs.⁴

(S) CINCPAC furthermore strongly recommended⁵ that military employment of herbicides be exempted from the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which was pending in the Executive and Legislative branches of government at the time.

Vietnamization of Herbicide Program

(S) In response to JCS and SECDEF guidance,⁶ CINCPAC promptly initiated planning on 26 December to Vietnamize the Herbicide Program. Completed plan available in early March 1971,⁷ must receive final approval in Washington.

(S) The Vietnamization Plan is designed to provide for uninterrupted herbicide operations during the redeployment of U.S. Forces from RVN. As U.S. herbicide operations are phased out, the RVN herbicide operations would be built up until eventually all herbicide operations would be conducted by RVN Armed Forces.

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1. CINCPAC 111005Z Jul 70.
 2. CINCPAC Scientific Advisory Group Working Paper 10-68 of Aug 1968.
 3. COMUSMACV 34174/101305Z Jul 70.
 4. CINCPAC 240309Z Jan 70.
 5. Ibid.
 6. JCS 2472/668-3 of 9 Dec 1970; JCS 7839/112220Z Dec 70.
 7. CINCPAC 060407Z Mar 71.

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1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year.

2. The second part of the report deals with the results of the work done during the year.

3. The third part of the report deals with the financial position of the organization.

4. The fourth part of the report deals with the personnel of the organization.

5. The fifth part of the report deals with the future plans of the organization.

6. The sixth part of the report deals with the conclusions of the work done during the year.

7. The seventh part of the report deals with the recommendations of the committee.

8. The eighth part of the report deals with the summary of the work done during the year.

9. The ninth part of the report deals with the final remarks of the committee.

10. The tenth part of the report deals with the closing remarks of the committee.

11. The eleventh part of the report deals with the final conclusions of the committee.

12. The twelfth part of the report deals with the final remarks of the committee.

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SECTION III - SPECIAL WARFARE

(U) This section covers in part CINCPAC's actions and decisions pertaining to certain special operations in Southeast Asia. These operations are sensitive in nature and should be treated accordingly.

(U) SALEM HOUSE operations were inadvertently left out of the 1969 CINCPAC Command History. Therefore, the coverage of both 1969 and 1970 operations have been included in this section.

PRAIRIE FIRE

(TS) PRAIRIE FIRE (PF), initially called SHINING BRASS, is the unclassified nickname of a clandestine ground reconnaissance, interdiction, and exploitation program conducted in Laos since October 1965 along the RVN border. PF forces, tailored to the mission, are infiltrated into Laos by foot or air. The primary operational element is the Reconnaissance Team (RT) of 12 men (three U.S. and nine VN). Exploitation forces are restricted to three platoons for any one operation. Fire support is provided by artillery, gunships, and tactical air. Ground reconnaissance, by RTs, is authorized in the western portion of the DMZ south of the PMDL. The PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations (PFAO) is a strip in Laos extending along the entire Laos/RVN border from a point approximately 30 KM above the DMZ, south to the Cambodian border, with a depth variance of 20 KM in the north to 30 KM in the south.¹

Operating Rules and Constraints

(TS) Ground forces developed for PF operations by the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) are under the operational control of MACSOG. The number of U.S. per RT will not exceed three. Forces employed against a single target may not exceed three platoons and battalion sized operations require approval from Washington on a case-by-case basis. Use of STRATA Teams (six to eight VN mercenaries, formerly employed in NVN prior to the bombing halt) and EARTH ANGEL Route Reconnaissance teams (two to three men, former NVA) are authorized. Use of carefully selected and highly trained ARVN personnel to replace U.S. Special Forces leadership in selected RTs is authorized with a view toward eventual ARVN assumption of responsibility for cross-border operations. Use of artillery, gunship and tactical air fire support is authorized.²

(TS) Operations in Laos outside the approved zone require concurrence of AMEMB Vientiane while operations from Thailand also require concurrence of AMEMB Bangkok. During adverse weather in RVN, a launch site at Nakhon Phanom is used to insert teams into the northern portion of the PFAO. A launch site at Ubon, in conjunction with a forward refueling site on the Plateau de Bolovens is used to insert teams into the southern portion of the PFAO. To enhance intelligence

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1. Point Paper, J3B622, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Dec 70, Subj: PRAIRIE FIRE.
 2. Ibid.

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collection, cooperative natives from the PF area may be recruited and extracted to RVN for training as agents and then reinserted into home areas in Laos to establish an expanded intelligence net. To date, however, MACSOG has been unsuccessful in attempts to recruit indigenous Lao personnel for this purpose.¹

Employment of PF Platoons in the DMZ

(TS) In February 1969, CINCPAC requested authority to employ PRAIRIE FIRE platoons in the DMZ south of the PMDL. Experience proved that squad-sized reconnaissance teams were not large enough to successfully capture a prisoner - a primary mission - due to frequent contacts with enemy squad and platoon sized elements.² On 11 June 1970, the JCS advised CINCPAC that action on his February 1969 request had been held in abeyance pending action on a request for employment of battalion and smaller size forces in the DMZ and requested revalidation if authority to use PF platoons in the DMZ was still desired.³ CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV on 13 June to provide information upon which to base a reply.⁴ COMUSMACV revalidated the request stating that authority to conduct platoon sized reconnaissance operations in the DMZ would greatly enhance the intelligence collection effort in this high threat area.⁵ CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's position to the JCS on 20 June.⁶ The JCS advised CINCPAC on 26 June that they had requested authority from the SECDEF to employ unlimited sized patrols to include PF units in the DMZ south of the PMDL.⁷ Action was still pending at the end of 1970. The nickname for the use of PF assets in the RVN western portion of the DMZ south of the PMDL is NICKEL STEEL.

Military Requirement for PRAIRIE FIRE

(TS) CINCPAC was advised by the CJCS on 30 June that the JCS have been requested to examine the military need for and the operating authorities that apply to PRAIRIE FIRE operations in conjunction with the current review of the I&M programming. The objective of the review was to determine if less politically sensitive alternatives were feasible. The requirement was prompted by the State Department's concern over the "exploitation" aspects of PRAIRIE FIRE Phase II operations as opposed to intelligence collection as previously conducted in Phase I, the use of U.S. personnel in Laos, and doubts expressed by the State Department personnel that PRAIRIE FIRE operations as a whole produce results of sufficient importance to justify their cost.⁸

(TS) CINCPAC and COMUSMACV were requested to comment on the military value of PRAIRIE FIRE operation as then conducted; projected military value if U.S.

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1. Ibid.
 2. CINCPAC 230154Z Feb 69.
 3. JCS 2251/112126Z Jun 70.
 4. CINCPAC 132212Z Jun 70.
 5. COMUSMACV 30230/191205Z Jun 70.
 6. CINCPAC 200517Z Jun 70.
 7. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
 8. JCS 3895/302045Z Jun 70.

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participation ceased; projected military value of reconnaissance activities only (Phase I) with and without U.S. participation; and projected shortfall in COMUSMACV ability to protect remaining U.S. forces in the event there were no PRAIRIE FIRE operations. The legal implications of PF operations in relation to the Church amendment and the President's statement of March 1970 on "U.S. Ground Combat Forces" was to be addressed separately at the JCS level.¹

(TS) CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's assistance in preparing a reply.² COMUSMACV responded through other than GENSER channels with specific examples of the military value of the PF Program.³ CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV's conclusion that there were no acceptable alternatives to the program and so notified the JCS on 7 July.⁴

Expanded Paramilitary Operations

(TS) The CJCS on 11 June requested CINCPAC's comments and recommendations on the feasibility of developing a plan to conduct expanded paramilitary operations in the PRAIRIE FIRE area and the general area east of the Sekong River to the RVN border using U.S.-led paramilitary forces.⁵ In reply to CINCPAC's request for comments COMUSMACV stated that it was feasible to develop a plan to conduct the proposed operations. He warned CINCPAC, however, that implementation of such a plan would be at the expense of on-going operations with some degradation to Vietnamization and adjustments to projected U.S. troop withdrawals.⁶ CINCPAC concurred in general with COMUSMACV and requested the JCS to provide the earliest possible decision on the matter, since many actions would be required prior to implementation of the proposed expanded operations. CINCPAC told the JCS that regardless of the decision every effort would be made to continue with Vietnamization and to expand paramilitary operations within current authorities.⁷

Justification of Exploitation Forces

(TS) CINCPAC was advised by the JCS on 20 July that proposals to increase PF activities had received strong negative response from the State Department. State was of the opinion that legally the Church amendment and the President's statement of 6 March required the termination of the U.S.-led ground exploitation phase of PF operations immediately. A State Department memorandum to this effect was sent to the SECDEF. No objection was made to U.S.-led reconnaissance teams. CINCPAC was requested to assess immediately the impact if compelled to cease PF exploitation activities involving U.S. personnel on the ground.⁸

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1. Ibid.
 2. CINCPAC 011510Z Jul 70.
 3. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70 citing MACV 061108Z Jul 70.
 4. Ibid., citing CINCPAC 072214Z Jul 70.
 5. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
 6. Ibid.
 7. Ibid.
 8. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70 citing CJCS 10128/201616Z Jul 70.

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(TS) CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to provide comments and recommendations on which to base a reply to the JCS. COMUSMACV advised that over the short term RVNAF assumption of PF operations without U.S. leadership and participation on the ground in Laos would result in nearly complete degradation in the effectiveness of the PF program. This position was supported in CINCPAC's reply on 21 July. Additionally, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that every effort be made to continue PF operations under existing authorities.¹

(TS) On 12 August the CJCS tasked CINCPAC to develop plans to accelerate training of Vietnamese leaders for Phase II exploitation forces, prepare plans to intensify reconnaissance team operations under existing ground rules, and prepare plans to increase exploitation operations as additional Vietnamese leaders were trained.² CINCPAC told the CJCS that the planning requirement was complex and required coordination with the Vietnamese JGS. Completed plans would be forwarded as soon as possible.³

(TS) CINCPAC forwarded the requested outline plans to the CJCS on 23 September. The CJCS approved the outline plan on 28 September for intensifying paramilitary operations but requested that the time frame for completion of training of Vietnamese leaders be reduced as much as possible because of the enemy's expanded effort to increase infiltration through southern Laos.⁴

(TS) CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV of the CJCS approval and reemphasized the priority for training support of expanded paramilitary operations. CINCPAC also told COMUSMACV that it was highly desirable that the time frame for completion of training be reduced as much as possible and requested CINCPAC be advised of COMUSMACV's capabilities. In his reply COMUSMACV stated that the time phasing for Vietnamizing the six existing exploitation companies was contingent upon selection of competent ARVN leadership and that this program would be pursued with deliberate speed. COMUSMACV also stated that every effort would be made to accelerate the organizing and training of the eight additional exploitation companies but at present there was no valid basis to forecast an earlier completion date. CINCPAC then advised the JCS that the need to expedite training to support these plans was recognized and that the time frame for completion of training would be accelerated as much as feasible.⁵

(TS) On 29 October the CJCS advised CINCPAC that as of 13 October 1970, higher authority had authorized the continued use of U.S. personnel in the exploitation phase of PF operations in Laos for a 90-day period beginning 18 September 1970. This authorization was made with the understanding that Vietnamese replacements for U.S. personnel engaged in exploitation type operations would become available within this period. The CJCS requested a prognosis on meeting the deadline to provide Vietnamese replacements for U.S. personnel and a

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1. Ibid.
 2. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
 3. Ibid.
 4. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
 5. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.


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revised outline plan if necessary. The CJCS also requested an analysis of the impact on PF operations if Vietnamese replacements were not available within the specific time and if an extension of the time limit was not approved. No change in the policy of employing U.S. personnel on purely intelligence gathering of type operations was contemplated at that time. CINCPAC was requested to respond by 1 November 1970.¹

(TS) In reply to CINCPAC's request to furnish information upon which to base a reply² COMUSMACV stated that he had not been aware of the termination date and that in the event U.S. participation in PF exploitation operations did terminate on 16 December 1970, exploitation operations of any consequence would be suspended for a minimum of 60 days. Platoon size exploitation operations in the PFAO with ARVN leadership could be initiated in early February 1971; however, the enemy situation in Laos mitigated against single platoon operations. Company-sized exploitation operations appeared to have the best chance of success. COMUSMACV recommended that no specific date be established for terminating U.S. participation in exploitation operations in the PFAO, until a realistic assessment could be made of ARVN leadership capabilities. If a specific date was required, COMUSMACV recommended 1 April 1971, since that date was in consonance with the plan outlined in previous messages. Every effort would continue to be made to accelerate this program consistent with capabilities of participating ARVN personnel. CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV and provided the JCS with supporting rationale.³ On 16 December the CJCS notified CINCPAC that authority to employ U.S. leadership in PF exploitation operations was extended until 1 April 1971.⁴ On 29 December CINCPAC recommended to the CJCS that the CJCS-approved outline plans of 28 September be modified to reflect a reduced goal of three additional exploitation companies versus the eight companies originally proposed.⁵

Interdiction of Waterways



1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
4. Point Paper, J3B622, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Dec 70, Subj: PRAIRIE FIRE (U).
5. Ibid.
6. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.

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(TS) CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to take appropriate action to obtain several of the requested barrels and bags for shipment to CONUS, if feasible. AMEMB Vientiane was requested to provide any assistance possible to COMUSMACV. Direct coordination between COMUSMACV and AMEMB Vientiane was authorized.¹

(TS) AMEMB Vientiane advised CINCPAC that CAS had intercepted some free floating rice bags and that these bags would be made available upon request. AMEMB Vientiane also stated that due to high river conditions no barrels had been seen by their teams but that efforts would be made to continue to recover a barrel. AMEMB Vientiane told CINCPAC that CAS was undertaking research in the field on various means of interdicting free floating supplies and suggested that CJCS coordinate any research and development efforts with CAS/Washington. CINCPAC provided the CJCS with an interim reply based upon AMEMB Vientiane's response to CINCPAC.²

(TS) COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that the Xe Bang Hiang River (Waterway No. 7), appeared to be the only river within the authorized PF or SALEM HOUSE areas of operation which was used to any degree to free-float supplies. Due to AAA threat and terrain factors in the area, mounting an operation for the specific purpose of retrieving supplies in or contiguous to that portion of the river would be neither practical nor feasible at that time. COMUSMACV also stated that other means of obtaining quantities of desired barrels and bags would continue. He recommended continued experimentation with U.S. barrels to develop devices for an interdiction effort and suggested that consideration be given to means of introducing interdiction devices in view of the existent and anticipated AAA threat.³

(TS) AMEMB Vientiane advised CINCPAC that a barrel had been taken from the Xe Bang Hiang River by villagers and proposed to ship the barrel to MACSOG headquarters. CINCPAC advised the JCS of the barrel being held by AMEMB Vientiane and requested disposition instructions. In view of the numerous enemy security forces and AAA weapons in the area of Waterway No. 7, CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV that a barrel retrieval operation not be mounted at this time. CINCPAC stated that if the barrel procured by AMEMB Vientiane did not suffice, other methods would continue to be explored to procure additional barrels. AMEMB Vientiane advised that it planned to ship the barrel to MACSOG by first available transport unless contrary instructions were received.⁴


(TS) COMUSMACV advised that 33 barrels had been recovered on a beach near Chu Lai and that exploitation was in process. It could not be determined, however, whether or not the drums were the same type as those used in the Xe Bang Hiang River and requested disposition instructions.⁵

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1. Ibid.
 2. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

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(TS) The CJCS reported that efforts would continue in developing a method to interdict the free-float of supplies via the waterways in South Laos and that captured equipment might suffice for study; however, the CJCS requested that the capture of additional barrels or bags remain a high priority task. It was suggested that the captured barrel at AMEMB Vientiane be shipped to MACSOG for determination of the feasibility of producing replicas and developing recommendations for operational use.¹



Use of Mines

(TS) On 10 October 1970 CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's comments on the feasibility of increasing the number of road mining missions in the PF area prior to and during the coming dry season. Intelligence indicated that the enemy planned to initiate his dry season logistical effort through the Laos Panhandle earlier than usual. Indications were that the logistical effort would exceed that of any previous dry season. Any intensive mining effort would be in consonance with higher authority's desires to bring maximum pressure upon enemy LOCs in the Laos Panhandle. COMUSMACV reported that it was entirely feasible to expand and intensify road mining missions and that actions were being taken to do so.⁴

PRAIRIE FIRE Reporting

Statistical Data

(TS) CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV that due to high interest in U.S. operations

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1. Ibid.
 2. COMUSMACV 65875/150848Z Dec 70.
 3. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
 4. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.

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in Laos, the SECDEF furnished the White House with comprehensive data on Laos, including statistics on U.S. casualties for PRAIRIE FIRE operations. CINCPAC also noted that the information furnished to the SECDEF by SACS (MACSOG Documentation Report) was submitted directly to the JCS and, therefore, was not available at CINCPAC. COMUSMACV was requested to furnish CINCPAC with a copy of this report and to insure that all future PRAIRIE FIRE Progress Reports were revised to reflect the corrected data.¹ COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that a reexamination of PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE statistical data on file at MACSOG and MACV Headquarters revealed that operational records for 1965 and 1966 were incomplete and did not differentiate between in-country and out-of-country operations. COMUSMACV also furnished CINCPAC a complete up-to-date statistical report on both programs and stated that all casualty figures reported in PF and SH progress reports were operational statistics only and that administrative casualties were handled through parent units and were not reflected in statistics reported by MACSOG.²

Distribution of MACSOG Reports

(TS) COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC that a review of the addressees of MACSOG clandestine operations reports revealed a broad distribution of this highly classified information to headquarters without a continuing "need-to-know." He recommended that CINCPAC consider reducing information addressees.³ In turn CINCPAC requested that CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, and CGFMFPAC reassess their requirements for the PF and SH progress reports and advise CINCPAC accordingly.⁴ FMFPAC responded stating that no requirement exists for subject reports.⁵ CINCUSARPAC indicated that subject reports were considered necessary and that the reports were stringently controlled, based on absolute "need-to-know."⁶

(TS) CINCPACFLT responded to CINCPAC's request for a reassessment of requirements for MACSOG reports and concurred in deletion of CINCPACFLT from addressee list of FOOTBOY (C) Weekly Reports.⁷ CINCPACAF stated that a request to be placed on distribution for PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL Progress Reports could be withdrawn if PACAF (DIT) could be placed on distribution for CINCPAC PRAIRIE FIRE Monthly Summary.⁸ CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV that a reevaluation of distribution requirements for MACSOG reports had been completed and furnished COMUSMACV a revised distribution list which reduced the number of information addressees on MACSOG reports.⁹

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1. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
 2. COMUSMACV 13830/231133Z Mar 70.
 3. COMUSMACV 12231/140759Z Mar 70.
 4. CINCPAC 200632Z Mar 70.
 5. FMFPAC 5214/202001Z Mar 70.
 6. CINCUSARPAC 260042Z Mar 70.
 7. CINCPACFLT 102317Z Apr 70.
 8. CINCPACAF 111901Z Apr 70.
 9. CINCPAC 150421Z Apr 70.

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PRAIRIE FIRE Casualty and Aircraft Reporting

(TS) On 2 April Ambassador Godley in a message to the SECSTATE, with an information copy to CINCPAC, advised that he was deeply concerned regarding the SECDEF's instructions concerning press treatment of aircraft and personnel losses in conjunction with PRAIRIE FIRE (PF). He further stated, "I personally have never believed that PRAIRIE FIRE was worth the losses in men involved. I therefore would have no objection to PRAIRIE FIRE being cancelled but do not so recommend for I do not consider this to be my business."¹ CINCPAC on 5 April expressed concern to COMUSMACV regarding the statement made by Ambassador Godley and requested COMUSMACV's comments and recommendations. On 8 April COMUSMACV commented as requested and recommended that PF operations be continued and that the JCS take necessary action to retain the overall policy of non-disclosure of casualties and aircraft losses related to covert activities in the PF area of operations.²



(TS) On 10 April COMUSMACV notified CINCPAC that PF personnel losses had not been released through other than the established classified PF Daily Progress Report. In addition, COMUSMACV stated that it appeared Ambassador Godley's message (retransmitted by the JCS) did not differentiate between aircraft losses and casualties and ground forces losses. COMUSMACV recommended that the JCS clarify this subject with the SECDEF and SECSTATE.⁴

Briefing of PF Operations for Selected Thai Military Leaders

(TS) The CJCS advised CINCPAC on 10 December that during negotiations with the Thai government for the 14th Thai Special Guerrilla Units (SGU) for use in Laos, the Thai had repeatedly stated that they felt they were not adequately informed about on-going operations and future planning in Laos. The CJCS requested CINCPAC's views and comments on releasing information in the form of after action reports on the results of PF operations to senior RTA officials.⁵

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 021226Z Apr 70.
 2. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.

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(TS) On 13 December CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's comments in regards to releasing this information. COMUSMACV replied on the 18th that he was prepared to present a one-time sanitized briefing to Thai military leaders on MACV-sponsored reconnaissance and exploitation operations in southeastern Laos. This briefing would not surface the extent of U.S. participation in ground operations nor identify MACSOG's association with covert operations. COMUSMACV recommended that CAS Bangkok coordinate directly with MACSOG for arranging the briefing of the Thai military officials and recommended they receive sanitized DIA Information Reports prepared by MACSOG on a timely basis. CINCPAC concurred and recommended to the CJCS on 21 December that direct coordination between CAS Bangkok and MACSOG be authorized. The CJCS approved CINCPAC's recommendation on 31 December.¹

SALEM HOUSE (DANIEL BOONE) 1969

(TS) DANIEL BOONE, the unclassified nickname for clandestine ground reconnaissance operations in Cambodia was redesignated SALEM HOUSE (SH) on 19 April 1969.² The purpose of SH operations is to obtain and verify intelligence information. The SH area of operation, consisting of three zones, is a 20-30 KM strip along the entire Cambodian-Vietnam border.³

(TS) Only reconnaissance teams, not to exceed 12 men per team, may be inserted into Cambodia. There is no restriction on the number of infiltrations into Zone A; however, infiltrations into Zone C are limited to 10 during any 30-day period, and infiltrations into Zone B are considered on a case-by-case basis. Helicopter gunship and troopship support is authorized throughout the SH operational area while the use of tactical air and exploitation forces is prohibited. The use of self-destructing, sanitized M-14 mines is permitted in the northern portion of Zone A.⁴

(TS) As part of the BLACK BEARD intelligence collection program, COMUSMACV recommended expansion of SH to include all of Cambodia east of the Mekong River, use of tactical air and artillery in support of emergency extractions of reconnaissance teams in Zone ALPHA, and 24-hour intent messages. In the same message COMUSMACV requested authority to launch from Thailand. CINCPAC concurred but recommended to the JCS that the SH area not be expanded. The SECDEF forwarded the request to use tactical air and artillery in support of emergency extractions in Zone ALPHA to the highest authority.⁵

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1. Ibid.
 2. COMUSMACV recommended the change in nicknames when an United Press International article in a Saigon newspaper quoted a Newsweek magazine article connecting DANIEL BOONE with conduct of cross-border operations; MACV JPCCO/1570/190220Z Apr 69.
 3. Point Paper, J3B621, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Sep 69, Subj: SALEM HOUSE (U). See CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol III, pp. 262-269 for detailed discussion of the SALEM HOUSE operating area and restrictions on operations.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

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PRAIRIE FIRE STATISTICAL SUMMARY 1970

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
MISSIONS	27	35	36	45	47	34	38	28	33	47	42	36	448
ENEMY PRESENCE DETECTED	26	31	33	36	37	31	29	19	29	39	32	32	374
ENEMY CONTACTS	16	22	24	31	31	26	27	16	26	35	26	29	309
EXTRACTION UNDER FIRE	7	14	16	18	12	14	12	6	17	15	15	23	169
ENEMY KIA (BODY COUNT)	37	18	39	56	70	35	22	20	498	7	169	45	1016
ENEMY CAPTURED	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
FRIENDLY KIA (US/VN)	0/2	1/12	0/11	2/6	2/3	0/0	1/0	2/5	1/8	0/2	2/1	2/8	13/58
FRIENDLY WIA (US/VN)	4/3	3/5	7/14	16/7	4/5	5/15	3/5	15/16	22/30	3/10	20/41	10/30	112/181
FRIENDLY MIA (US/VN)	0/0	0/4	1/5	0/4	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	3/3	0/1	0/0	4/18
HELO SORTIES (GUNSHIPS)	26	93	81	106	64	65	66	52	96	100	149	182	1080
TAC AIR SORTIES	111	223	216	146	92	93	39	63	152	43	77	143	1398
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS	58	26	55	43	27	61	85	44	24	31	26	25	505
HELO LOSSES (COMBAT/OPNL)	0	3/1	1/1	0	0	1/0	1/1	4	4	1/1	0/1	0/0	15/5
ARC LIGHT SORTIES IN PFAO	478	400	419	491	318	324	493	480	384	429	154	312	4682

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(TS) COMUSMACV, on 25 May, requested authority to commit U.S.-led exploitation forces of platoon size, supported by tactical air and artillery, against well defined, previously determined targets in the SH area of operations. COMUSMACV explained that the increased use of Cambodia as a sanctuary and staging area for VC/NVA forces posed a continuing offensive threat to Allied forces and installations in RVN. He told CINCPAC that the recent introduction of enemy armor capabilities in this area served to emphasize the importance of Cambodia to the enemy as a "safe haven." To counter this situation COMUSMACV believed that the use of exploitation forces in the sanctuaries would force the enemy to increase the forces committed to a defensive role and decrease his offensive capability to infiltrate RVN. Exploitation forces could direct tactical air and artillery against large well-defined installations and troop positions.¹

(TS) CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's request. In a message to the JCS on 29 May he noted that the JCS, on 9 April 1969, had recommended to the SECDEF approval to use organic U.S. reconnaissance and exploitation elements, supported by tactical air and artillery, against VC/NVA forces in Cambodia. Admiral McCain pointed out that COMUSMACV's proposal was supported by cogent reasons. COMUSMACV's proposal would provide limited means of striking the enemy in his Cambodian sanctuaries using SH forces pending approval of the broader authorities recommended by the JCS, at CINCPAC's request, to the SECDEF.² At the end of 1969 action was still pending on the requests of CINCPAC and the JCS.

Request for Authority to Use Tactical Air 1969

(TS) On 25 September 1968, COMUSMACV requested authority be granted to employ tactical aircraft in conjunction with DANIEL BOONE operations to support emergency extractions - SH reconnaissance teams under fire by an enemy force and U.S. lives are in serious danger - and against well defined targets of a transient nature when assets are available and targets warrant their use. COMUSMACV furnished the following rationale to support his request:³

...reconnaissance teams employed in the DANIEL BOONE area of operations have located sizeable forces in Cambodia. These forces were equipped with an employed anti-aircraft fire against support aircraft during team insertions and extractions. Recent contacts made by DANIEL BOONE forces indicate that the enemy is no longer intimidated by helicopter gunships, and is placing intense small arms and AA fire on support aircraft during insertion and extraction.

In order to deny the enemy the freedom of movement and protection he now enjoys, the employment of tacair in Zone Alpha would demoralize the enemy, provide an opportunity to inflict casualties and hinder his war effort.

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1. COMUSMACV JPCCO 31249/250250Z May 69.
 2. CINCPAC 290338Z May 69.
 3. COMUSMACV JPCCO 23414/252300Z Sep 68.

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(TS) CINCPAC, in a message to the JCS on 11 October 1968, recommended approval of COMUSMACV's request. The JCS recommended that the SECDEF approve the COMUSMACV/CINCPAC request and other related requests. Action was still pending at the end of 1969.¹

Suspension of SALEM HOUSE Operations 1969

(TS) During 1969, SH operations were suspended several times for periods of short duration. The first suspension occurred on 10 April when the JCS canceled five targets (Zone ALPHA missions) due to delicate State Department negotiations concerning recognition of Cambodia's borders.² On 12 April, the JCS canceled six additional missions and invoked a two-week suspension on all SH operations southwest of the Mondolkiri - Duc Lap line. The suspension was lifted on 26 April and normal operations were resumed.³

(TS) COMUSMACV, on 12 June, notified CINCPAC that operations in the SH area of operations were being curtailed until a study on FARK dispositions was completed. At the same time the currently planned targets were being reassessed with a view toward minimizing possible contacts with Cambodian citizens or FARK units. Areas were also being studied to determine more suitable locations for patrol bases in the RVN to support walk-in reconnaissance team operations in Cambodia.⁴ Operations were resumed on 18 June.⁵

(TS) On 25 July, COMUSMACV notified CINCPAC that a stand-down in cross border operations in Cambodia was in effect. The stand-down resulted from the temporary grounding of certain support helicopter assets for mechanical reasons. Operations were scheduled to resume on or about 2 August.⁶

Alleged Border Incident 1969

(TS) The JCS on 9 July, notified CINCPAC that a Cambodian Government note received 19 June, alleged that on 25 May, U.S./RVN helicopters disembarked a "commando patrol" about 10 miles inside the Cambodian border and that the patrol opened fire on the inhabitants of the village of Lao Ramiet, killing two. The incident allegedly occurred at YV 675043. In the same message the JCS stated that a SH progress report described a contact with an unknown size enemy force on 25 May in the vicinity of YV 675040, and that this might be the incident protested by the RKG. Because of the sensitivity of possible SH involvement, the State Department had not requested an investigation through the usual Embassy-MACV channels. The JCS requested that an investigation be conducted.⁷

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1. CINCPAC 290338Z May 69.
 2. JCS 6596/101418Z Apr 69.
 3. CINCPAC 110309Z Apr 69; JCS 6819/121919Z Apr 69; CINCPAC 122226Z Apr 69; JCS 7893/261528Z Apr 69; CINCPAC 262123Z Apr 69.
 4. COMUSMACV 2171/121018Z Jun 69.
 5. COMUSMACV 2238/181027Z Jan 69.
 6. COMUSMACV JPCCO 2628/251025Z Jul 69; COMUSMACV JPCCO 2689/311000Z Jul 69.
 7. JCS 4205/092143Z Jul 69; COMUSMACV JPCCO 1982/261002Z May 69.

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(TS) On 12 July, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to make an evaluation of the report of contact reported in the SH progress report of 26 May and its possible relationship with the alleged incident protested by the RKG.1 COMUSMACV reported back to CINCPAC through other than routine channels. Using the same channels CINCPAC reported to the JCS that CINCPAC was of the opinion "that the alleged incident was not caused by SALEM HOUSE operations."2

Reconnaissance Team Leadership 1969

(TS) CINCPAC was notified on 18 August of the initial use of carefully selected and highly trained ARVN personnel to replace the U.S. Special Forces leaders of certain SH and PF reconnaissance teams. ARVN team leaders and members for the most part were furnished by ARVN Airborne Brigade and Ranger battalions. The purpose of replacing U.S. team leaders with ARVN personnel was to implement the concept of turning over cross-border operations to ARVN at some future date. In the past U.S. presence and leadership within the teams tended to insure mission success.3

(TS) On 31 August, CINCPAC was notified by MACSOG that the first all U.S. reconnaissance team was introduced into the SH area of operations. The team had a high priority mission of wire tapping in Base Area 351. Three previous attempts by standard SH teams had failed to accomplish this mission.4

SALEM HOUSE Operations 1970

(TS) Due to increased truck traffic through the Base Area 609 complex, COMUSMACV submitted to CINCPAC a request on 9 January to employ three separate platoons, supported by tactical air and artillery into the SH portion of this complex. The request was for one-time authority for a period of 14-25 days. Operations could commence within seven days after receipt of approval, weather permitting.5 On 15 January in a message to the JCS, CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's request and provided additional rationale in accordance with the SECDEF's newly established five point criteria-planned military actions, risks, cost or penalties, alternative, and anticipated results. CINCPAC pointed out to the JCS that "when the possible political risks as measured against the possible military gains the results strongly favor granting of the authority requested...."6

(TS) The JCS on 30 January advised CINCPAC that the authority requested by him had been considered and approved in principle but not forwarded for

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1. CINCPAC 120408Z Jul 69.
 2. JCS 4205/092143Z Jul 69; CINCPAC 120408Z Jul 69; COMUSMACV JPCCO 1982/261002Z May 69; J3B621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 69 citing COMUSMACV 150756Z 69 and CINCPAC 170113Z Jul 69.
 3. J3B621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69; FONECON report between LCOL Hayes, MACSOG and LCOL C. A. Beckwith, J3B621, 181540W Aug 69 via KY-3.
 4. J3B621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 69.
 5. COMUSMACV 1361/090235Z Jan 70.
 6. CINCPAC 150232Z Jan 70.

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SALEM HOUSE STATISTICAL SUMMARY 1969

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
MISSIONS	42	62	45	34	46	23	28	31	25	37	37	46	456
ENEMY PRESENCE	32	39	35	31	42	20	23	27	20	27	32	38	366
ENEMY KIA (BODY COUNT)	18	18	27	29	37	11	9	26	20	27	35	72	329
ENEMY CAPTURED	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	4
FRIENDLY KIA (US/VN)	7/5	0/0	0/0	1/0	1/1	0/0	0/0	0/1	1/0	1/2	0/0	0/2	11/11
FRIENDLY WIA (US/VN)	2/0	9/7	8/8	6/2	2/2	2/0	3/6	4/3	1/3	2/4	1/1	5/2	45/38
FRIENDLY MIA (US/VN)	0/0	1/0	2/3	0/2	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/0	0/0	2/0	5/6
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS	48	36	112	76	55	45	44	35	35	49	47	48	630

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consideration by higher authority due to the priority of other more sensitive authorities being sought at that time. The JCS recognized the validity for increased operations into Base Area 609. They told CINCPAC they would reconsider his recommendation at a more propitious date. They asked to be notified by 28 February if the requirement was still valid.¹

(TS) Admiral McCain notified COMUSMACV of the JCS action and requested that General Abrams advise him by 25 February if the request and rationale remain valid.² COMUSMACV replied in the affirmative on 7 February and pointed out that over 500 enemy vehicles had been monitored in the area from 9 January to the date of his reply, a period just short of one month.³

(TS) CINCPAC revalidated the requirement on 1 March furnishing additional rationale. CINCPAC's revised request expanded the proposed area of operations nine KM to the south.⁴ The JCS replied on 27 March that "authority requested... has been deferred for JCS action pending stabilization of current political situation in Cambodia. When situation permits, action will be resumed."⁵

Expansion of SALEM HOUSE Area of Operations (SHAO)

(TS) On 27 May the CJCS authorized an expansion of the SHAO, effective 1 July 1970. Zone ALPHA was extended to a uniform depth of 50 KMs; Zone CHARLIE was extended to 30 KMs; and Zone BRAVO from Logo (WT 9775) to the Mekong River (WT 2108) was extended 30 KMs and the remaining area to the Gulf of Thailand was continued at 20 KMs. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV on 28 May of the changes. On 9 June the CJCS further expanded the SHAO to include the entire established air interdiction zone which was bounded by the Laotian border on the north, a line 200 meters west of the Mekong River on the west, the SH border on the east, and Route 13 on the south.⁶

Use of U.S. Personnel and Helicopter Assets in SALEM HOUSE Operations

(TS) On 27 May 1970 the CJCS notified CINCPAC that effective 1 July 1970 SH operations would be entirely indigenous including troop lift and helicopter gunship support. COMUSMACV urged CINCPAC to submit a reclama to the JCS requesting authorization for the continued use of U.S. personnel and air assets in the SHAO after 30 June 1970. COMUSMACV stated that optimum efforts would require the continued use of U.S. personnel on reconnaissance teams; however, as an absolute minimum U.S. helicopter assets would be required if the SH program was to be maintained. CINCPAC strongly recommended to the CJCS that the decision to conduct SH operations entirely by indigenous personnel supported by VNAF helicopter

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1. JCS 9204/302250Z Jan 70.
 2. CINCPAC 042144Z Feb 70.
 3. COMUSMACV 6402/070847Z Feb 70.
 4. CINCPAC 010008Z Mar 70.
 5. JCS 4224/272244Z Mar 70. On 18 March the Cambodian government was overthrown and the Lon Nol government was subsequently established- On 29 April the U.S./SVN cross-border operations began.
 6. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.

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troop lift and gunships be held in abeyance pending the development of sufficient Vietnamese assets. CINCPAC further recommended that until the Vietnamese developed this capability, authority be obtained for the continued use of U.S. personnel and air assets in the SH operational area after 30 June 1970.¹

(TS) On 2 June COMUSMACV also requested authority to conduct SH operations using indigenous reconnaissance teams inserted by U.S. troop lift helicopters throughout the air interdiction zone (FREEDOM DEAL). He further recommended that these operations continue using VNAF troop lift helicopters after 30 June 1970 if the current tactical air authority was extended. CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's recommendations and so notified the CJCS on the same day. CJCS advised CINCPAC on 9 June that immediate authority was granted to conduct until 30 June 1970 SH operations as requested and expanded the AO to include the entire established air interdiction zone. CJCS further stated that contingent on the extension of the air interdiction campaign these operations could be continued after 30 June 1970 using VNAF troop lift helicopters. COMUSMACV again advised CINCPAC that the RVNAF did not have the capability of assuming full responsibility for SH operations due primarily to lack of helicopter assets and requested the following authorities after 30 June 1970:²

a. Use of U.S. troop lift helicopters and helicopter gunships throughout the air interdiction zone.

b. Use of U.S.-led reconnaissance teams to a depth of 30 KMs in SH Zone ALPHA and throughout Zones CHARLIE and BRAVO, as previously authorized.

c. Employment of U.S.-led reconnaissance platoons in the same area requested for U.S.-led teams.

d. Use of all-indigenous reconnaissance teams throughout the air interdiction zone.

(TS) CINCPAC supported the request for these authorities and recommended early approval. ACJCS responded and stated that the recommendation concerning continued use of U.S. personnel in SH operations after 30 June 1970 was disapproved. The use of U.S. tactical air and helicopter gunships to support SH operations, when such support was clearly beyond VNAF's capability, and the employment of SH indigenous forces in up to platoon strength in all authorized areas of operations was authorized, however. ACJCS recognized the critical requirement for the continuation of a viable intelligence collection program in Cambodia and stated that the JCS should be advised if it becomes clear that all-indigenous operations do in fact result in a serious degradation of U.S. intelligence capabilities resulting in a threat to U.S. Forces. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV of the ACJCS decision and stated that any future MACV reclama based upon operational results would receive strong CINCPAC support.³

1. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

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(TS) On 19 June COMUSMACV requested among other authorities authorization to employ U.S.-led reconnaissance platoons to a depth of 30 KM in SH Zone ALPHA and throughout Zones CHARLIE and BRAVO. COMUSMACV stated that these elements were organized and operationally ready and that no increase in authorized personnel was required. In view of the critical requirement for the continuation of a viable intelligence collection program in Cambodia and in order to optimize results from FREEDOM DEAL, CINCPAC recommended that early approval be granted. ACJCS nonconcurred in the continued use of U.S. personnel in SH operations but authorized employment of SH indigenous forces in up to platoon strength in all authorized areas of operations.¹

Use of Ethnic Khmers in SH Area of Operations

(TS) In view of the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Cambodia by 1 July 1970, COMUSMACV proposed on 18 May that authority be granted to employ 10 two to three man teams comprised of ethnic Khmers in the SH area of operations. These teams would initiate limited contact with the civilian population as required to both insure continuity for teams and for information collection purposes. The CJCS approved the recommendation on 27 May and the next day CINCPAC granted COMUSMACV authority to use Khmers as requested.²

Sensor Emplacement in SH Area of Operations

(TS) COMUSMACV proposed to emplace sensor devices in the SHAO to monitor infiltration activities from the tri-border area southward into base areas in Cambodia contiguous to the RVN border. On 8 June CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's proposal and on 9 June the ACJCS granted authority to emplace sensor devices in the SHAO to detect enemy penetration, determine enemy reaction to the systems, and to destroy enemy forces and material by controlled air strikes and artillery fires.³

Coordination of CAS Operations

(TS) COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that eight CAS intelligence teams had been inserted into the air interdiction zone inside Cambodia without coordination with MACV. COMUSMACV stated that the safety of these teams could not be guaranteed and requested they be withdrawn immediately. CINCPAC concurred and informed the JCS that coordination must be effected between all participants and recommended that the matter be discussed with the appropriate agency in Washington.⁴

(TS) AMEMB Vientiane advised CINCPAC that the CAS teams had been inserted into Cambodia at the direction of its Washington headquarters and Washington had been asked to sort out any misunderstandings with SACSA. ACJCS advised that

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. J3B62 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.

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insertion was not coordinated with the JCS or SACSA and that this subject would be discussed with CAS Washington. Also CAS would be asked to effect early team extraction and ensure that procedures were developed for adequate and timely coordination in the future. ACJCS informed CINCPAC that at a meeting on 29 June, CAS representatives stated that although the teams had been inserted without proper and prior coordination, CAS was unable to withdraw these teams without referring the matter to higher authority. CJCS further requested that CAS make no further insertions into the Cambodian air interdiction zone without coordination with MACV and that subject would be an agenda item at the Bangkok meeting. The JCS also requested that MACV representatives meet with CAS representatives in Saigon and Vientiane and attempt to reach agreement on mutual arrangements satisfactory to both agencies.¹

(TS) On 6 July COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC of the results of the CAS/MACV coordination meeting held in Saigon on 5 July 1970. Agreement was reached on the following for all future insertions:²

a. MACV has approval/disapproval authority for the insertion of teams into that area of Cambodia delineated for air interdiction operations.

b. Channels to be used for the purpose of coordinating the insertion of these teams was to be the CAS Vientiane/MACSOG communications link currently in effect and used for coordination purposes in the execution of PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) operations.

c. Since communications available to CAS teams and the problem of language precluded their location being accurately fixed at all times, CAS Vientiane agreed to accept the dangers inherent in this situation. CAS recognized that the air interdiction effort had priority and that a team might inadvertently be struck by tactical air. However, all agreed that the risk was not unacceptable and that the chance of the team being struck by tactical air was small.

d. CAS teams would move out of a target area when so requested and given 48 hours prior notice by COMUSMACV.

(TS) It was further agreed that CAS Vientiane teams currently in place would be permitted to complete their missions subject to the above agreements. CINCPAC informed the CJCS of the terms of the agreement reached at the coordination meeting and recommended approval. CINCPAC advised the CJCS that a representative of COMUSMACV was dispatched to Phnom Penh on 7 July to coordinate intelligence activities with USDAO Phnom Penh. The CJCS informed CINCPAC that agreements reached at the 5 July coordination meeting with CAS representatives was approved. In turn CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV of the CJCS approval and requested CINCPAC be kept informed of on-going negotiations and CAS operations in the air interdiction zone.³

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.


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SECDEF Action on CINCPAC Recommendations on Bangkok Conference Report

(TS) On 13 August the SECDEF in a message advised CINCPAC that he had reviewed the "CINCPAC Report of Conference on Cambodia and Regional Military Strategy Planning." The purpose of the message was to: (1) indicate approval or disapproval of recommendations where possible, (2) indicate action being taken on the proposed recommendations, and (3) request additional information where necessary.¹

(TS) Two of the many actions taken by the SECDEF dealt with the use of U.S. personnel and transport helicopters, and the training of Thai pilots. The SECDEF disapproved the recommendation to use U.S. personnel and transport helicopters in the SHAO. He approved in principle the recommendation to train 20 Thai fixed-wing pilots on CH-47 helicopters and requested CINCPAC's comments on the feasibility of doing the same thing with Laotian and Cambodian fixed-wing pilots.²



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1. SECDEF 130101Z Aug 70.
 2. Ibid.
 3. COMUSMACV 61185/211136Z Nov 70.
 4. CINCPAC 220101Z Nov 70.
 5. JCS 8749/241501Z Dec 70.

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SALEM HOUSE STATISTICAL SUMMARY 1970

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
MISSIONS	49	38	35	39	48	51	52	60	59	62	60	60	613
ENEMY PRESENCE DETECTED	45	33	26	31	31	39	44	51	43	39	34	45	461
ENEMY CONTACTS	35	22	19	25	21	32	24	37	32	26	25	35	333
EXTRACTION UNDER FIRE	22	16	8	17	15	23	14	14	10	13	3	13	168
ENEMY KIA (BODY COUNT)	46	59	16	92	19	36	12	32	23	12	23	29	399
ENEMY CAPTURED	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	6
FRIENDLY KIA (US/VN)	1/3	0/0	1/1	3/1	0/1	2/9	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/3	0/2	0/1	7/21
FRIENDLY WIA (US/VN)	6/8	2/8	5/0	11/11	1/0	7/33	0/5	0/5	0/7	0/17	0/10	0/16	32/120
FRIENDLY MIA (US/VN)	0/0	0/3	7/7	0/0	0/3	0/0	0/0	0/3	0/0	0/0	0/4	0/1	7/21
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS	45	23	22	36	17	31	72	82	41	34	19	38	460
HELO LOSSES	3	1	3	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	13
HELO SORTIES (GUNSHIP)	40	92	44	88	44	84	45	37	26	51	66	80	697
TAC AIR SORTIES	---	---	---	---	369	267	48	111	70	95	94	114	1168
ARC LIGHT SORTIES IN SHAO	---	---	---	---	341	315	225	222	78	6	12	27	1226

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SECTION IV - CINCPAC'S MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(S) A system for measuring progress of the war in Vietnam evolved from the goals established at the Honolulu Conference in February 1966. At the conference, attended by President Johnson, high ranking government officials of the RVN, and others, six goals were established as objectives for operations in the RVN during 1966. These goals became the basis for measuring progress.¹ Changing programs, objectives and emphasis has caused additions, deletions and modifications to the original goals each year.²

CINCPAC's Strategy

(S) Included in CINCPAC's strategy for 1970 were provisions for (1) maximum assistance in developing, training and equipping the RVNAF as rapidly as possible; (2) continued military support for accelerated pacification, civic action, and security programs; (3) conduct of military operations designed to accelerate improvement in the RVNAF and to continue to provide security for U.S. forces; (4) conduct of military operations to reduce the flow of materiel and manpower support for enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam; and (5) maintaining plans for a comprehensive air and naval campaign in Vietnam.³

CINCPAC's Goals

(S) CINCPAC's five goals in the Republic of Vietnam were:⁴

I: Assist the GVN to improve and modernize the RVNAF to enhance RVNAF effectiveness.

II: Assist the GVN to develop a secure environment within the RVN.

III: Assist the GVN to inflict enemy personnel losses to extent which exceeds input.


IV: Assist the GVN to deny the enemy forces' utilization of known base areas within the RVN.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1966, Vol. II, pp. 605-606.
 2. See CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. III, pp. 165-166 for a discussion of the evolution of US goals 1966-1969.
 3. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia, 1st Quarter CY 70, Hq CINCPAC, p. 3.
 4. CINCPAC 280426Z Jan 70.

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GOAL I ENHANCE RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS



SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 4TH QTR, CY 70.
PREPARED BY LCOL W. W. BARTON, USMC, J3B19

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V: Assist the GVN to restore, open, and secure designated roads, railroads, and waterways within the RVN.

(S) CINCPAC's two goals outside the Republic of Vietnam were:¹

VI: Maintain a current assessment of NVN war supporting capability and, as authorized, reduce the enemy's capability to support military operations in Laos and the RVN.

VII: As authorized, reduce enemy capability to interfere with our air operations.

Progress Toward Goals in 1970

(S) Goal I: Assist the GVN to improve and modernize the RVNAF to enhance RVNAF effectiveness. RVNAF Regular, Regional and Popular Forces increased by almost 70,000 during 1970, while U.S. forces in the RVN decreased by more than 135,000. Total RVNAF strength was 1,047,410 at the end of the year, which was only 52,590 below the currently planned ultimate goal of 1,100,000. A significant number of naval craft were transferred to the VNN during the year. Two of the programs under the Accelerated Turnover of U.S. Assets to RVN (ACTOV) were completed with the transfer of 93 "Swifts" (PCF), 26 Coast Guard Patrol Boats (WPB), and 293 River Patrol Boats. The transfer of the Destroyer Escort ex-USS CAMP was delayed from the fourth quarter CY 70 until first quarter CY 71. The Vietnam Air Force personnel increased by more than 9,000 and exceeded the authorized strength by approximately 6,000 due to the acceleration of the CY 71 and CY 72 activation program. VNAF aircrews operationally ready increased from 470 to 558 with steady progress toward the authorized number. The transfer of aircraft to the VNAF progressed at a rate that kept inventories ahead of authorizations. The operational ready (OR) rates of the five principal aircraft (A-1, A-37, F/RF-5, UH-1, and H-34) were above the OR standard of 71 percent at the end of the year. The overall operational effectiveness of the RVNAF was satisfactory. The ARVN/VNMC KIA ratio increased throughout the year and during the fourth quarter approximately 9.3 enemy were eliminated to one friendly loss. The professional skill and confidence of RVNAF Regular Forces was clearly exhibited during operations in Cambodia. RVNAF desertions continued to be a significant problem area. Although the net loss per month per 1,000 strength was down to 9.3 during the fourth quarter, it had been as high as 11.6 during the third quarter. Both the RF and PF continued to show improvement. The more aggressive tactics in going out to meet the enemy and ambush him reduced friendly casualties, especially in the RF. These forces made a substantial contribution to the security of rural areas.²

1. Ibid.

2. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress, 1st-4th Qtrs, CY 70, Hq CINCPAC.

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(S) Goal II: Assist the GVN to develop a secure environment within RVN. There was a steady increase in territorial security throughout the year. Nearly one and one-half million people moved into a more secure status. The increase was evident in all Military Regions, with a significant increase in MR2 during the fourth quarter. Ninety-nine percent of the population in MR3 resided in relatively secure areas. The percent of total population living within relatively secure areas increased from 87.9 percent to 95.1 percent. The population living in contested areas decreased from 8.7 percent to 4.6 percent and the population living in VC-controlled areas decreased from 2.2 percent to 0.2 percent.¹ The status of local governments also improved as there were only 94 hamlets and seven villages which had no government as of the end of the year. Pacification, as in many other areas, has become more difficult to improve the better it gets, and consequently the rate of progress was less than that of 1969. Although terrorist incidents declined during the last half of the year, total incidents for the year amounted to 11,700 as compared to 10,528 during 1969. The GVN established goal to neutralize 1,800 VCI per month was exceeded during the year with an average number of neutralizations per month of 1,864.²

(S) Goal III: Assist the GVN to inflict enemy personnel losses to extent which exceeds input. This goal was achieved during every quarter of 1970. Total enemy personnel input was estimated at 88,300. Infiltration accounted for 54,600 of the total while in-country recruitment contributed 33,700. Total VC/NVA personnel losses in RVN amounted to 176,000. The extended lull in enemy activity for the last half of the year was primarily responsible for the low level of enemy losses. The fourth quarter of 1970 marked the ninth consecutive quarter in which this goal had been achieved.³


(S) Goal IV: Assist the GVN to deny the enemy forces' utilization of known base areas within the RVN. On 1 January 1970, 32 active base areas were identified in the RVN. All base areas were subjected to repeated air strikes and friendly forces conducted operations within each active base area, several of which were operated in with relative freedom. Satisfactory progress was made during the year toward denying the enemy use of known base areas and at the end of the year the number of active base areas had been reduced to 25.⁴

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1. As used in this context HES70 ratings A, B, and C equate to relatively secure areas, ratings D and E equate to contested areas and rating V to VC control. HES70 Pacification Ratings are described in detail in CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia, 1st Qtr, CY 70, Hq CINCPAC, pp. ii-iii.
 2. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress, 1st-4th Qtrs, CY 70, Hq CINCPAC.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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GOAL II POPULATION CONTROL



LEGEND


- (A+B+C) RELATIVELY SECURE
- (D+E) CONTESTED AREAS
- (V) VC CONTROL
- (N) NOT EVALUATED

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 4TH QTR, CY 70.
PREPARED BY LCOL W. W. BARTON, USMC, J3B19

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GOAL II HAMLET STATUS



LEGEND

(A+B+C) RELATIVELY SECURE

(D+E) CONTESTED AREAS

(V) VC CONTROL

(N) NOT EVALUATED


SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 4TH QTR, CY 70.
PREPARED BY LCOL W. W. BARTON, USMC, J3B19

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GOAL II

VC INFRASTRUCTURE NEUTRALIZED BY ECHELON




SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 4TH QTR, CY 70.
PREPARED BY LCOL W. W. BARTON, USMC, J3B19

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GOAL III VC/NVA LOSSES VS INPUT IN RVN



SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 4TH QTR, CY 70.
PREPARED BY LCOL W. W. BARTON, USMC, J3B19

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(S) Goal V: Assist the GVN to restore, open, and secure designated roads, railroads, and waterways within the RVN. During 1970 the status of progress in assisting the GVN to open and secure designated roads, railroads, and waterways within the RVN was measured against goals for designated LOCs. The summary data below indicates the status of progress toward these goals:

<u>1970</u>	<u>ROADS</u>		<u>RAILROADS</u>		<u>WATERWAYS</u>	
	<u>Open</u>	<u>Secure</u>	<u>Open</u>	<u>Secure</u>	<u>Open</u>	<u>Secure</u>
1st Qtr Goal	98.4	68.2	95.9	68.1	100	70.0
1st Qtr Status	(95.0)	(63.3)	97.8	(60.8)	100	74.8
2nd Qtr Goal	98.9	72.0	97.3	72.0	100	70.0
2nd Qtr Status	(95.0)	(63.6)	98.1	(53.9)	100	78.1
3rd Qtr Goal	99.4	76.0	98.7	76.0	100	70.0
3rd Qtr Status	(96.5)	(70.0)	(98.1)	(63.0)	100	80.6
4th Qtr Goal	100	80.0	100	80.0	100	70.0
4th Qtr Status	(97.0)	(71.4)	(98.2)	(78.5)	100	80.6

- NOTES: (1) LOCs are classified according to their average security status during each month as secure, open, or closed.
- (2) For goal measurement purposes, LOCs in the open category include those in the higher classification of secure.
- (3) Goals which were not achieved are shown enclosed in parenthesis.

As indicated above, some LOC goals were not achieved; however, sufficient LOCs were open to support essential civilian and military operations. Therefore, the overall security status of LOCs was satisfactory during the year.¹


(S) Goal VI: Maintain a current assessment of NVN war supporting capability and, as authorized, reduce the enemy's capability to support military operations in Laos and the RVN. At the end of the year, there were 383 targets on the ROLLING THUNDER Target List with 232 in the "worthy of strike" category. Sea-borne imports into NVN were estimated at 1,873,000 metric tons during the year, while NVN exports were 546,800 metric tons. According to the Laos throughput analysis, 65,454 tons of supplies had been input into Laos, of which an estimated 19,403 tons reached the RVN border. Enemy truck losses for the year were 8,020. An analysis of all available data indicates that the enemy's capability to support operations in Laos and the RVN continued to decline throughout the year.²

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

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GOAL V ROAD SECURITY GOALS



* TOTAL KILOMETERS DESIGNATED

LEGEND


- PERCENT OPEN
- PERCENT SECURE
- GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 4TH QTR, CY 70.
PREPARED BY LCOL W. W. BARTON, USMC, J3B19

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GOAL V RAILROAD SECURITY GOALS



* TOTAL KILOMETERS DESIGNATED

LEGEND


- PERCENT OPEN
- PERCENT SECURE
- GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 4TH QTR, CY 70.
PREPARED BY LCOL W. W. BARTON, USMC, J3B19

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GOAL V WATERWAY SECURITY GOALS



* TOTAL KILOMETERS DESIGNATED

LEGEND

- PERCENT OPEN
- PERCENT SECURE
- GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 4TH QTR, CY 70.
PREPARED BY LCOL W. W. BARTON, USMC, J3B19

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(S) Goal VII: As authorized, reduce enemy capability to interfere with our air operations. During the last quarter of 1970, the NVN stepped up their efforts to interfere with our air operations. There was evidence that SAM sites were being moved from the Vinh area southward toward the RVN and Laotian borders. In addition, the NVN began moving heavy caliber AAA into the Ho Chi Minh Trail areas. The number of NVN jet fighters remained approximately the same after the mid-year movement of 48 fighters from Communist China back into NVN. An overall assessment of our efforts and results indicates that very little progress was made toward goal achievement during the year and that enemy capabilities to interfere without air operations actually increased during the last quarter.¹

1. Ibid.

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SECTION V - MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (MAP) - SOUTHEAST ASIA

Introduction

(U) This section of Chapter IV is designed to cover only those items concerning the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) activities in Southeast Asia that are not elsewhere treated in this annual history, specifically the programs of Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

(S) Because of the unique character, complexity, and magnitude of the conflict in South Vietnam, military assistance for that country is covered elsewhere in Chapter IV, especially in those sections dealing with the Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) and Logistics. Moreover, the annual histories submitted by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI for Calendar Year 1970, both of which are attached as Annexes A and B respectively to CINCPAC Command History 1970, contain a wealth of detail on this subject for anyone who is interested. In addition, other topics, such as personnel matters, concerning MAP activities in Southeast Asia are discussed in Chapters I and II of this annual history. This latter chapter also contains the Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) annual evaluations of certain PACOM countries. Chapter II covers in detail the MAPs in Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore, as well as Indonesia and the Philippines, which some geographers insist properly belong in the area encompassed by the term Southeast Asia.

(S) U.S. resolve in Vietnam and MAP support as an integral part of the U.S. assistance program have bolstered both the will and capability of Southeast Asian nations to resist Communist expansionism. However, should the U.S. effort flag or the U.S. Government seek "peace at any price" in Vietnam, they are likely to modify their attitudes and seek some sort of modus vivendi with the Communists while placing correspondingly less reliance on the U.S.¹


(C) The U.S. Military Assistance Program is achieving its primary objectives of providing MAP-supported nations with requisite capabilities to maintain their own internal security and to counter communist directed subversion or insurgency. Military resistance has provided important improvements throughout the region in terms of organization and command, contingency planning, logistics efficiency, and uniformity of weapons and equipment. There remains, however, a wide range in the effectiveness of forces from nation to nation.²

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1. Military Assistance Plan for PACOM Region FY 70-75, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Jul 69, p. 5.
 2. Ibid.

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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

BASIC INFORMATION		U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	
AREA	166,000 SQ MI	TO ATTAIN A STABLE AND INDEPENDENT NONCOMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FUNCTIONING IN A SECURE ENVIRONMENT	U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. ELLSWORTH BUNKER DEPUTY AMBASSADOR HON. SAMUEL D. BERGER U.S. AID DIRECTOR MR. JOHN R. MOSSLER COMMISSIONER GEN CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS, USA
POPULATION	17.0 MILLION	MILITARY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES	
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.4%	(A) To assist in developing and maintaining Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) of sufficient size and operational capabilities to meet internal security requirements after U.S. and allied, and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Forces are withdrawn from SVN.	
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	1.1 ACRE	(B) To defend against both VC/NVA forces operating in SVN with decreasing support from U.S. and allied forces.	
LITERACY RATE	50-65%		
LIFE EXPECTANCY	50-55 YEARS		
CROSS NAT. PROD. 1970(E) (in constant prices)	\$3.2 BILLION		
PER CAPITA	\$178.0		
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED 1970(E)	\$619.0 MILLION		
AS % OF GDP	19.3		
PRESIDENT - Nguyen Van Thieu VICE PRESIDENT - Nguyen Cao Ky PRIME MINISTER - Tran Thien Kiem CHIEF, JOINT GEN STAFF - GEN Cao Van Vien COMMANDER VNAF - MAJ GEN Tran Van Minh COMMANDER VNN - RADM. Tran Van Chon COMMANDER VNMC - LT GEN Le Nguyen Khang			
MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES		COMBAT CAPABILITY	
ARMY (ARVN)	10 INF DIVS., 1 ABN DIV., 11 HONOR GD BN, 17 ARMD CAV SQ, 59 ARTY BNS, 20 RNCR BNS, 1 SF GP, 5 PSYWAR BNS, 8 MP BNS, 27 ENGR BNS, 4 ENG GPs, 2 SEP RNCR COS, PARA-MIL FORCES: 24 BT COS, 1679 COS, 7039 PLATS. SURV AND CONTROL: 161 DE, WHEC, PC, PCE, FGM, PCF, WPB, MINE WARFARE: 52 MSC, MLMS, MSM, MSR, LCM, AMP FORCE: 30 (LST, LSM, LSL, LSSL, LSU), MULTI-PURPOSE: 639 (PBR, ASSAULT, ESCORT), 6 MAR INF BNS, 2 MAR ARTY BNS.	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY IN MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AND ALONG SELECTED LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, AND OFFER EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE FOR LIMITED TIME AGAINST ATTACK BY EXTERNAL FORCES.	
NAVY (VNM)	27 PATROL, 13 MINE WARFARE 203 AMPHIB SHIPS, 85 SERVICE CRAFT, 280 TUNKS, 76 RIVER PATROL CRAFT, 9 MARINE II-F BNS, 3 MARINE ARTY BNS, TOTAL STRENGTH 53,000 (13,000 MARINES).	CHARGED WITH PATROLLING INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL WATERS. SUPPORTS ARMY COUNTER-INSURGENCY ACTIONS. MARINE BRIGADE UNDER ARVN CONTROL AS GENERAL RESERVE ELEMENT.	
AIR FORCE (VNAF)	6 TAC FTR SQS, 7 LIAISON SQS, 1 RECON SQ, 3 TRANS SQS, 12 TAC HELO SQ, 4 TRANS HELO SQS, 5 ACW.	CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING STRIKE OPERATIONS; PROVIDING CLASE TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR ARMY, AND LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF ABN OPNS.	



MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES

10 INF DIVS., 1 ABN INF DIV, 2 INF REGTS (SEPT), 12 ARMD CAV SQDNS., 34 ARTY BNS., 20 RANGER BNS., 1 ABN RANGER BN., 6 MIL POL BNS. TOTAL STRENGTH 986,000 (552,000 PARAMIL)

27 PATROL, 13 MINE WARFARE 203 AMPHIB SHIPS, 85 SERVICE CRAFT, 280 TUNKS, 76 RIVER PATROL CRAFT, 9 MARINE II-F BNS, 3 MARINE ARTY BNS. TOTAL STRENGTH 53,000 (13,000 MARINES).

44 LT BMRS, FIGHTERS: 38 JET, 42 PROP, 32 TRANS, 413 HELOS, 257 OTHERS. TOTAL STRENGTH 39,000.

• Updated By J2
 ○ Updated By J5

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 11/7.

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(C) In Cambodia, the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and the assumption of power by a new government headed by General Lon Nol, on 18 March 1970, resulted in increasing hostile action by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army against the Cambodian populace and armed forces. In order to counter this armed threat, the Cambodian Government was forced to seek external aid. The U.S. and South Vietnam provided immediate response by supplying captured communist weapons and ammunition to Cambodia to supplement those previously received from Communist China and related sources. The President authorized additional assistance, and CINCPAC developed and published a plan to provide follow-on military assistance.¹

(C) The Royal Laotian Government is presently involved in an internal struggle. Although external contributions of ground forces are precluded, outside assistance is required for survival. The Forces Armees Royale (FAR) and Neutralist Armed Forces (FAN) have shown some improvement in coordination and willingness to fight. Progress in organizing and equipping of the FAR/FAN with U.S. material has developed a nominal balance force of infantry and supporting arms. Political and personal rivalries at higher levels of government and command, however, continue to make the situation precarious.²

(C) Subversion and insurgency pose substantial problems in Thailand. The threat is being contained and the central government is not yet directly threatened; however, the threat is growing in the hinterlands and spreading geographically. Thai capabilities for holding the insurgents in check are improving slowly, thanks principally to U.S. aid, but the time when Thailand can root out and destroy these forces within its own means is unforeseen.³

Military Assistance Program - Cambodia

(U) The U.S. military aid policy in regard to Cambodia was succinctly stated by the Honorable William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, on 25 November 1970. He said:⁴

Cambodia's involvement in war is the result of events over which that small country has had little control. The North Vietnamese...decided last April to compound their violations of Cambodia's territories by undertaking action throughout much of the country. This left the Cambodian Government no choice

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1. Military Assistance Plan - Cambodia FY 71-76, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Nov 70, p. 2.
 2. Military Assistance Plan for PACOM Region FY 70-75, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 69, p. 9.
 3. Ibid., p. 6.
 4. Excerpts from a statement by Secretary Rogers made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 25 November 1970.

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but to defend itself...the Cambodians reacted initially by submitting to us a request for \$400 million in assistance. The aid they asked for would have included many expensive and sophisticated weapons. Sympathetic as we were to Cambodia's plight...we did not agree to this approach.... Instead, we decided to use our aid in a totally different way, taking advantage of Cambodia's principal assets; its strong sense of nationalism and patriotic determination to repel the North Vietnamese invaders.... Since last spring, our aid to Cambodia has taken the form of providing weapons and ammunition that the Cambodians are fully capable of using themselves.... But despite a high degree of national unity, Cambodia still lacks the wherewithal to carry on the fight.... For the immediate future... additional aid will be urgently required.

(S) U.S. military assistance to Cambodia was terminated in November 1963, at Cambodia's request, after approximately \$87.1 million in assistance had been provided. Diplomatic relations between Cambodia and the U.S. were severed in 1965 and relations between the two countries remained strained until the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk on 18 March 1970. With a new, more cooperative government in power, the U.S. moved quickly to bolster the new government in the hopes that the use of Cambodian territory by the North Vietnam Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) for lines of communication (LOC) and sanctuary could be ended or at least made more difficult.¹

(TS) On 22 May the SECDEF informed CINCPAC that a Presidential Determination had been signed establishing a FY 70 MAP for Cambodia effective 22 April 1970 with a dollar ceiling of \$7.9 million. The FY 70 program was of limited scope with the goal of providing Cambodia with a capability to sustain its independence and maintain neutrality. The SECDEF requested CINCPAC to submit program data and to comment on the best command to manage the program, expecting that a Cambodia Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) would not be permitted.² On 26 May, CINCPAC recommended to the SECDEF that COMUSMACV be the program manager under CINCPAC supervision. COMUSMACV had already established a Special Supply Support Group (SSSG) co-chaired by logistics personnel of MACV and the Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to manage the Cambodian aid program.³

(S) CINCPAC submitted the FY 70 program to the SECDEF on 1 and 4 June.⁴ On 11 June CINCPAC was informed of a potential add-on of \$2 million and the SECDEF

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
 2. SECDEF 9682/222140Z May 70.
 3. CINCPAC 260501Z May 70.
 4. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.

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requested CINCPAC to provide a list of additional requirements to support a request for transfer of funds.¹ The SECDEF advised that authority had been received to transfer one million dollars to the MAP appropriation and provided a list of approved items, selected from the list provided by COMUSMACV on 16 June, for supply implementation upon call forward by COMUSMACV.²

FY 71 Cambodia MAP Funding

(S) The SECDEF informed CINCPAC that, for planning purposes, he could assume that action would be taken prior to 1 July to make Cambodia an eligible MAP recipient during FY 71. He also provided the following guidance:³

a. A ceiling of \$25 million had been established. Requirements beyond that should be placed in shortfall.

b. Cambodia would continue to be eligible for MAPEX, MIMEX, and SIMEX,⁴ and would receive priority on stocks captured by U.S. forces.

c. Guidelines would be the same as tentative guidelines for FY 70.

d. Training to meet immediate needs should be programmed.

e. All Khmer equipment and resupply costs should be charged to MAP rather than MASF.

On 26 June, CINCPAC submitted the FY 71 program to the SECDEF in accordance with the guidance provided above and recommended additional funding equal to the identified shortfall requirements of \$62 million. In recommending these additional funds he stated that his review of the FY 71 Cambodia MAP "reveals considerable program austerity when compared to the strategic importance attached to survival of the Government of Cambodia."⁵

(S) On 24 July, responding to a SECDEF request for comments on a proposed \$40 million FY 71 Cambodia MAP, CINCPAC stated that in his view \$40 million would provide MAP support for the first six months and that an equal amount would be required for the balance of the fiscal year. He also submitted a \$40 million program to cover the first six months.⁶ The SECDEF informed CINCPAC that a

1. SECDEF 2215/111543Z Jun 70.

2. SECDEF 4178/022306Z Jul 70.

3. SECDEF 2726/162318Z Jun 70.

4. Excess supply redistribution programs. See Chapter II.

5. CINCPAC 261942Z Jun 70.

6. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.

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Presidential Determination of 23 July authorized use of up to \$40 million for FY 71 and stated that by decision at the highest level there would be no supplemental funds authorized in the next few months. Since there was no assurance that any additional funds for Cambodia would be forthcoming, CINCPAC was told that his planning must be on the basis that the \$40 million represents the total for the entire fiscal year.¹

(TS) On 2 October, the SECDEF requested submission of the force structure, material/services and associated costs for FY 71-72 Cambodia MAP in accordance with strategy and funding levels under consideration as provided by the State Department and the guidance provided by the JCS and the SECDEF. This information was provided on 10 and 17 October. On 17 October, the SECDEF informed CINCPAC that the FY 71 program ceiling had been increased from \$40 million to \$165 million. On 25 October, a State/Defense message advised that the FY 71-72 Force Structure proposed by CINCPAC had been approved and that \$165 million was the confirmed MAP level plus \$120 million for economic aid. Definitized programming data was developed and submitted to the SECDEF on 25 November. On 16 November, the SECDEF directed that MAP channels would be used to provide up to \$20 million in combat-related, commercial imports to Cambodia. This was in addition to the previous announced program ceiling of \$165 million. The updated FY 71 Cambodia MAP Plan was submitted to the SECDEF on 11 December.²

FY 72 Cambodia MAP Funding

(S) Detailed FY 72 Cambodia MAP data was forwarded to the SECDEF on 24 December. Identified requirements for FY 72 totaled \$277 million.³

MAP Organization

(S) Military assistance provided under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act required SECDEF supervision over and accountability of end item use. These responsibilities were assigned to CINCPAC for the PACOM MAP countries, and included in-country evaluation of MAP requirements and initial distribution of MAP assets.⁴ To meet his requirement for a militarily responsive MAP organization in Phnom Penh, CINCPAC requested the JCS to authorize the assignment of four officer level and three enlisted positions in Phnom Penh to perform the military assistance functions. He pointed out that a staff of this size would

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1. SECDEF 6091/282215Z Jul 70.
 2. J5321 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jan 71, Subj: Military Assistance Program-Cambodia.
 3. Ibid.
 4. J5311 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Dec 70, Subj: MAP Organization-Cambodia.

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not be able to accomplish all tasks normally associated with a complete MAAG or full compliance with the Foreign Military Assistance Act. It could, however, serve the essential role of a Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT).¹

(S) The U.S. Ambassador in Phnom Penh proposed his Political/Military Counselor as head of the MAP organization using the title "Special Representative of CINCPAC for Military Assistance." Initially the Ambassador had stated that he desired no military personnel to be assigned to the MAP function in Phnom Penh. He later requested four enlisted personnel, then increased the request to four enlisted and one officer. Subsequent to the approval of this request, he asked for an additional officer.² On 21 October, the SECDEF approved a military manning level of two officers and four enlisted men.³ This organization in Cambodia functioned as a MEDT only; its limited size precluded assumption of the programming function, which remained with COMUSMACV.⁴

(S) On 6 November, the CJCS requested CINCPAC views on an increased U.S. military presence in Cambodia, including a proposal for organization of a MAAG or similar unit. CINCPAC responded by outlining an organizational structure for a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), Cambodia of 113 people, 20 of which would be stationed in Saigon.⁵

Communications Equipment

(S) The SECDEF directed CINCPAC to take action to restore Cambodian communications equipment to operational condition as soon as possible in order to improve communications between Phnom Penh and the Military Regions as well as tactical communications. This directive was based on a SECDEF evaluation of a survey of Cambodian signal equipment and spare parts requirements conducted in May (Lilly Report).⁶ CINCPAC advised the SECDEF and the JCS that the Lilly Report was based on a very hasty survey and limited sources of information. The projections of quantities of equipment required were unrealistic when related to organized and trained units able to employ them. CINCPAC concurred in a COMUSMACV assessment of signal equipment required by the FANK and passed this assessment to the SECDEF and the JCS with the comment that the quantities therein supersede those in the Lilly Report.⁷ He stated that equipment and spare parts

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1. CINCPAC 250311Z Jul 70.
 2. J5311 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Dec 70.
 3. SECDEF 4076/212306Z Oct 70.
 4. J5311 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Dec 70, Subj: MAP Organization - Cambodia.
 5. Ibid.
 6. SECDEF 3174/222318Z Jun 70.
 7. COMUSMACV 211440Z Jun 70.

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were being delivered on a realistic basis as reasonable needs develop, and emergencies were handled as they occurred. CINCPAC considered it essential that quantitative requirements be determined by COMUSMACV based on the tactical situation and requested that the SECDEF directive be modified to permit COMUSMACV to adjust the FY 70-71 MAP as he feels justified.¹

(S) On 14 July, CINCPAC proposed to the JCS an alternate course of action to provide a command and control net from Phnom Penh to the six Military Regions, because the JCS worldwide survey of vintage HF equipment had been non-productive. He proposed equipping the command and control net with Collins KWM2A sets from U.S. assets in Vietnam and Thailand and the intra-regional nets with TR-35 assets in Vietnam.² The SECDEF approved the CINCPAC proposed course of action³ and COMUSMACV submitted a program change to add the radios to the FY 70 Cambodian MAP.⁴ The KWM2A radios arrived in Phnom Penh on 3 August. On 15 August the Department of the Army (DA) reported as excess and available 19 BC-610 transmitters and 700 AN/TRC-77 radios. COMUSMACV submitted requisitions for the BC-610 transmitters for use as replacement/backup in existing Cambodian nets. COMUSMACV also requested that DA reserve the AN/TRC-77 radios for Cambodia MAP pending a determination of requirements.⁵

(S) A total of 4,418 tactical radios, AN/PRC-10 and AN/PRC-25, were programmed for FY 70-71 Cambodia MAP. As of 11 December, of the 2,072 which had been funded, 1,109 had been delivered to the FANK and 164 were retained in the RVN for issue to FANK units during training cycles. The remainder of the funded units would be delivered by 1 February 1971.⁶

Unconventional Warfare (UW) Capability

(TS) A concept was developed for the organization, training, and employment of an initial Cambodian UW force at a meeting held in Bangkok on 19 October. Representatives from CINCPAC, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSMACV, U.S. Embassy Bangkok, and U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh were in attendance. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and integration of ethnic Cambodians into the SALEM HOUSE program for operations in northeast Cambodia.⁷ The SECDEF approved the concept on 1 December and requested the U.S. Embassies in Bangkok,

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1. CINCPAC 232033Z Jun 70.
 2. CINCPAC 140257Z Jul 70.
 3. SECDEF 5173/171427Z Jul 70.
 4. COMUSMACV 180926Z Jul 70.
 5. J612 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Aug 70, Subj: HF Communications Support.
 6. J612 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Dec 70, Subj: Tactical Radios for Cambodia.
 7. J5551 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jan 71, Subj: Establishment of Cambodia UW Capabilities.

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Phnom Penh, and Saigon to initiate necessary discussions with the host governments to implement the program.¹ At year's end discussion was underway between CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, and U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh regarding funding arrangements.²

Training of Cambodian Forces

(S) With the expansion of Cambodian forces, providing for their training, both in-country and by third country forces, became a major consideration. In June, COMUSMACV submitted recommendations to CINCPAC concerning the training of Cambodian forces in the RVN. Two locations were to be used, Lam Son and Chi Lang. In addition, Khmer Krom personnel were to be trained at the Long Nai Training Center. On 5 December, COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC with a status report on Cambodian training. A total of 16,616 Cambodian personnel had been trained in Vietnam, and an additional 3,750 were in training.³

(S) On 31 July, the SECDEF directed that \$2 million be deviated from FY 71 Cambodia MAP to support the potential deployment of two Thai Khmer regiments. These forces were included in the CINCPAC FY 71 MAP as shortfall requirements.⁴ COMUSMACTHAI and the U.S. Embassy Bangkok submitted numerous proposals concerning training of Cambodian forces in Thailand. CINCPAC nonconcurred in the majority of these recommendations due to complexity and costs inherent to the proposals. However, a total of 24 FANK Territorial Infantry Companies were scheduled to be trained in Prachinburi, Thailand, during FY 71. Eight companies had been trained by 13 November; the remaining companies would complete training by 1 April 1971. In addition 12 FANK personnel were undergoing pilot training at Khampaeng Saen, Thailand.⁵

MAP Cambodia Supply System

(S) Guidance provided during the initial stages of the reestablishment of the MAP for Cambodia was to the effect that supply action would be based on a "pull" type system. This was in lieu of the "push" type system normally used for MAP items. This policy was necessary to ensure that the FANK had the capability to receive, distribute, and make effective use of available MAP material, and to permit COMUSMACV to exercise positive control of a small but politically sensitive program. As a result of the establishment of a \$165 million FY 71

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1. SECDEF 7038/012351Z Dec 70.
 2. CINCPAC 030133Z Dec 70.
 3. J5321 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Dec 70, Subj: Training of GKR Forces.
 4. SECDEF 6360/311723Z Jul 70.
 5. J5321 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Dec 70, Subj: Training of GKR Forces.

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Cambodia MAP with the increased numbers of request for expedited delivery, increased program visibility, and emphasis at high level in ensuring timely response to Cambodian requirements, CINCPAC proposed to COMUSMACV that the concept of supply support be changed. He proposed that, since all FY 71 MAP items programmed are required during FY 71, all items be accelerated for delivery into U.S. depots in the RVN, where they would be held for onward delivery pending request from Phnom Penh.¹ COMUSMACV generally concurred with the CINCPAC proposal except that he recommended "pushing" only those items which were not available from in-country assets.²

Assistance for the Cambodian Navy

(TS) On 18 July, the JCS requested CINCPAC views on a proposal to turn over up to 25 river patrol boats (PBRs) to the Cambodian Navy.³ The JCS later modified the proposal to provide five PBRs to Thailand and 20 to Cambodia.⁴ Upon receipt of a COMUSMACV cost and funding study, CINCPAC concluded that the Cambodian portion of the project was too expensive to be accomplished within the current aid program (\$40 million) and recommended to the JCS that it be deferred pending supplemental funding.⁵ Upon return from a trip to Southeast Asia and discussions with the Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) and the Political/Military Counselor, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV and Embassy Phnom Penh to reevaluate Cambodian Navy requirements for PBR type craft and other additional assistance to upgrade the Cambodian Navy.⁶ Upon receipt of this evaluation, CINCPAC recommended to the SECDEF that accelerated delivery be accomplished for 20 PBRs and further transfer of up to 16 mechanized landing craft (LCMs) and four assault support patrol boats (ASPBs) to the Cambodian Navy. On 15 October, the SECDEF informed CINCPAC that additional assistance could not be provided to the Cambodian Navy until additional funding was made available. Following the increase in FY 71 Cambodia MAP funds CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV to plan for early introduction of the PBRs into the Cambodian Navy; however, the CJCS requested a reevaluation of Cambodian Navy requirements to include current capabilities and material/training requirements. On 6 November, COMUSMACV and U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh provided the information requested by the CJCS, recommended immediate introduction of PBRs, LCMs, and ASPB type craft, and commented that the Cambodian Navy could absorb these assets with minimal training. CINCPAC again recommended to the SECDEF early delivery of the naval craft

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1. CINCPAC 200445Z Nov 70.
 2. COMUSMACV 270714Z Nov 70.
 3. JCS 181731Z Jul 70.
 4. JCS 111553Z Aug 70.
 5. CINCPAC 230320Z Aug 70.
 6. J5321 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Dec 70, Subj: Additional Assistance for the Cambodian Navy.

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and directed COMUSMACV to initiate PBR training for Cambodian Naval personnel. On 30 November, the SECDEF informed CINCPAC that funding action had been accomplished for 19 PBRs and authorized the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to proceed with delivery of these assets. Additional naval craft were planned for delivery to the Cambodian Navy during FY 72.¹

Assistance for the Cambodian Army

AK-47 Rifles/Ammunition

(TS) The U.S. and RVN began supplying FANK with captured AK-47 rifles and ammunition in April; however, an additional source was needed to meet FANK requirements.



The remaining 1,420 AK-47 rifles were scheduled for delivery on 17 January 1971.²

(TS) On 31 December, Cambodia MAP was supporting a density of 68,973 weapons that fire AK-47 ammunition. After delivery of the remaining Indonesian AK-47s, the density will be 70,393 weapons. The 30-day ammunition consumption rate will be 8.73 million rounds. To provide a guaranteed continuing source of supply to meet the Cambodia MAP requirement for AK-47 ammunition, production is underway in the Continental United States (CONUS) under a contract paid out of Cambodia MAP funds. CONUS production was 20 million rounds for the period October through December. On 8 January 1971, the SECDEF approved CINCPAC's request to increase CONUS production to 9.5 million rounds per month. The first two million rounds of CONUS production AK-47 ammunition was airlifted to the RVN on 20

1. Ibid.

2. J4312 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Oct 70 and 8 Jan 71, Subj: AK-47 Rifles/Ammo for Cambodian MAP.

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November. The first surface delivery arrived on 1 December with 5.96 million rounds delivered by 31 December. An additional 9.180 million rounds was scheduled to arrive by 13 February 1971.¹

[REDACTED] He stated that costs being equal, insertion of M-16s into Cambodia as the standard infantry weapon was much preferred to building a weapons system (AK-47) which was not U.S. supportable without parts engineering or tenuous third country support. However, additional AK-47s could be utilized provided they were procured at no cost to MAP and with no strings attached.²

M-1 Rifles and M-1/M-2 Carbines

(C) Significant quantities of M-1 rifles and M-1/M-2 carbines were provided to Cambodia MAP through the MIMEX excess program. The U.S. Army had 23,000 M-1 rifles available for MAP application. After these assets had been allocated to several European countries, CINCPAC action resulted in SECDEF reallocation of the entire quantity to Cambodia MAP. Pending receipt of these rifles COMUSMACV negotiated a loan of 10,000 M-1 rifles from the RVNAF to be repaid from the Army allocation. The first 13,000 M-1s were delivered to COMUSMACV by surface transportation in early November and 10,000 of these were used to repay the RVNAF loan. The balance of 10,000 rifles had been shipped with an estimated delivery date in early January 1971.³

(C) On 16 July, the Air Force made available 7,219 M-2 carbines for MAP application. These assets were allocated to Cambodia MAP and transferred to Cambodia by COMUSMACV. On 30 September, the SECDEF allocated an additional 39,381 carbines to Cambodia MAP. These carbines were being prepared for shipment by the Air Force in accordance with a COMUSMACV shipping plan for incremental delivery of 7,174 by the end of January 1971, followed by 4,000 every two weeks until shipment of the allocation is completed.⁴

Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)

(S) The SECDEF requested CINCPAC's comments on the possible turn over of M-8 armored cars to Cambodia.⁵ CINCPAC replied that, while he recognized that

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J4314 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Dec 70, Subj: Rifles and Carbines Offered Cambodia MAP via MIMEX.
4. Ibid.
5. SECDEF 201911Z Aug 70.

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the Cambodia forces might be able to effectively utilize up to 20 armored cars, he could not recommend use of the M-8 because it was particularly difficult to maintain, follow-on support costs would have to be met from FY 71 MAP funds, and expenses incurred would result in direct trade-off to the approved program.¹

(S) CINCPAC proposed that 25 of the 130 M113(gas) APCs, being held by Eighth Army as part of a package being negotiated for transfer to Korea, be diverted to Cambodia and requested DA concurrence. Concurrent with this action, COMUSMACV was requested to provide his recommendations on the number of M113 APCs that should be included in the FY 71 Cambodia MAP, the operations and maintenance training requirements for FANK personnel, a recommended delivery schedule, and whether APCs could be made available from RVNAF sources to support a training program. The DA fully supported the CINCPAC effort to provide FANK with a small number of M113s as soon as possible but suggested consideration of a loan from RVNAF or USARV, which would seem preferable to a diversion from the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) package in terms of time and funding. COMUSMACV, in addition to stating that APCs should not be provided in FY 71 Cambodia MAP, advised there were no M113 assets available from the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) or redeploying U.S. Forces in excess of known requirements, and that, if ARVN agreed to train the Cambodian force, 25 APCs should be delivered in time for initiation of training.²

(S) In view of COMUSMACV comments concerning availability, CINCPAC dispatched a message to DA requesting the earliest date 25 M113 APCs could be made available for Cambodian requirements. DA advised that 25 APCs could be made available approximately six months from receipt of funded DOD MAP order from assets scheduled for rebuild and stated that another potential source of supply was diversion of APCs from those carriers scheduled for ARVN attrition. CINC-USARPAC advised that, predicated on priority determination, 25 APCs located in Korea could be made available within 30 days of notification. CINCPAC requested DA authority to divert 25 APCs from Korea and to pay back from DA assets within six months. DA authorized diversion of the 25 APCs to fill Cambodia requirements providing pay back to Korea would be charged to Korea MAP. CINCPAC requested the SECDEF to evaluate the proposal to divert APCs and to determine if payback from Korea MAP was mandatory.³

(S) On 19 November CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV that he planned to issue instructions to divert 25 M113 APCs scheduled for RVNAF modernization to FY 71

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1. CINCPAC 250425Z Aug 70.
 2. J4312 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jan 71, Subj: Availability of M113 Armored Personnel Carriers for Cambodia.
 3. Ibid.

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Cambodia MAP. On 22 November CINCPAC informed the SECDEF that the FY 71 Cambodia add-on contained one Armed Cavalry Squadron and requested authorization to divert assets from the RVNAF modernization or attrition program. He also requested early approval and funding of the entire squadron. On 27 November DA indicated that no objection would be interposed to diversion from the RVNAF modernization or attrition program, and that all assets would be made available by January 1971 upon receipt of a funded DOD MAP order. On 7 December the SECDEF authorized supply action and funding of the Armored Cavalry Squadron as requested by CINCPAC.¹

Assistance for the Cambodian Air Force

Excess C-47 Aircraft

(C) A USAF MIMEX offer and informal coordination with the CSAF indicated that 10 C-47D aircraft, in very good condition, were available for immediate "no cost" disposition to Cambodia MAP.² COMUSMACV submitted a requirement for seven of the C-47 aircraft to replace seven Cambodian aircraft, in poor condition or non-flyable, on a one-for-one basis.³ On 14 July CINCPAC requested the SECDEF to allocate seven of the USAF excess C-47D aircraft to FY 71 Cambodia MAP in accordance with MIMEX procedures on an expedited basis.⁴ The SECDEF approved the CINCPAC request⁵ and CINCPACAF and COMUSMACV arranged for delivery of the aircraft to Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Vietnam for transfer to Cambodian Air Force (CAF) crews.⁶

(C) In a message to SECDEF on 6 August 1970, CINCPAC requested that the three C-47s remaining on the USAF MIMEX offer of 15 July 1970 be allocated to meet the attrition aircraft shortfall requirements of the FY 71 Cambodia MAP. "Allocation of these aircraft," concluded CINCPAC, "will provide timely additional airlift capabilities and avoid high costs associated with removing FY 72 attrition requirements from storage, reconditioning and delivery from CONUS.⁷ On 21 August 1970, CSAF advised that three additional C-47 aircraft available from PACOM excesses had been approved under MIMEX procedures for Cambodia FY 71 MAP.⁸ Before the end of September 1970, COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC that these aircraft had been transferred to the CAF.⁹

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1. Ibid.
 2. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
 3. COMUSMACV 131200Z Jul 70.
 4. CINCPAC 142159Z Jul 70.
 5. SECDEF 5931/271938Z Jul 70.
 6. CINCPACAF 232008Z Jul 70 and COMUSMACV 300738Z Jul 70.
 7. CINCPAC 060042Z Aug 70; J4316 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
 8. CSAF SMSDE 211741Z Aug 70.
 9. COMUSMACV 50806/291246Z Sep 70.

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T-28 Aircraft

(S) In June, the CSAF allocated \$500,000 of FY 70 Cambodia MAP funds to overhaul five of the 13 CAF T-28 aircraft.¹ The Deputy Chief, JUSMAG, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI) agreed to sponsor the repair of the T-28 aircraft on the same basis as if they were DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI-controlled aircraft.² Three of the aircraft were contracted to Air America and two to Thai Am.³ Also, five attrition T-28 aircraft had been included in the FY 71 Cambodia MAP. On 17 September, CINCPAC requested expedited delivery of these aircraft.⁴

(S) As a result of a recommendation contained in the Bangkok Conference report, the SECDEF approved the employment of a nine-man third country T-28 maintenance team.⁵ Reprogramming of funds was accomplished, and the Air America contract was amended so that the team could be located in Phnom Penh to assist the CAF in developing their supply and maintenance capabilities.⁶ DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI identified a requirement for the team chief to be a U.S. civilian.⁷ CINCPAC concurred in this requirement⁸ and the SECDEF approved.⁹

MIG-17 Aircraft

(TS) The CAF had 13 MIG-17 aircraft on hand. Cambodia MAP support for air munitions for these aircraft was programmed to provide a rapid air reaction capability and to complement the T-28 capability. To make the armament system of the MIG-17 compatible with U.S. munitions, a simple thread adapter was inserted in the center plug hole of the MK-82 500-pound bomb. CAF technicians, with assistance from the U.S. Seventh Air Force, developed a gun package which substituted two .50 caliber M-3 machine guns in the MIG-17 gun carriage, in place of the original Soviet guns. By the end of the year, tests had been completed and five MIG-17s modified.¹⁰

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1. CSAF 111527Z Jun 70.
 2. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 081030Z Jul 70.
 3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
 4. J4312 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jan 71, Subj: Status of Cambodia T-28, C-47, and MIG-17 Aircraft.
 5. SECDEF 061936Z Aug 70.
 6. CINCPAC 070458Z Aug 70.
 7. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 141130Z Aug 70.
 8. CINCPAC 190107Z Aug 70.
 9. SECDEF 8344/261318Z Aug 70.
 10. J4312 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jan 71, Subj: Status of Cambodian T-28, C-47, and MIG-17 Aircraft.

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Helicopters

(TS) In August, the U.S. Ambassador in Phnom Penh requested that consideration be given to providing six utility type helicopters and six armed helicopters to Cambodia to be utilized for medical evacuation and resupply missions to remote or isolated troop locations. CINCPAC was requested by the CJCS to examine the possibility of providing the helicopter support requested by the Ambassador. On 21 August, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the six utility helicopters on loan to the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), for support of Cambodian forces, be provided to Cambodia. These helicopters would be staffed with VNAF crews and stationed/maintained at Phnom Penh until such time as the CAF could assume the operational and support mission. The JCS approved the CINCPAC recommendation until 30 June 1971. At that time, either the loan would be extended or the assets given to Cambodia under MAP. CINCPAC was informed, on 6 September, that the six aircraft had arrived at Phnom Penh and were operational.¹

Military Assistance Program - Laos

(U) Regarding the situation in Laos and Cambodia, President Nixon has reported how the North Vietnamese sent tens of thousands of troops into all three countries of the Indochina peninsula across every single common border for the past eight years.

Communist forces in Laos include some 65,000 North Vietnamese regulars and 45,000 Pathet Lao troops that have dealt serious setbacks to the Laotian Armed Forces. The importance of the communist occupation of the long eastern flank of Laos is found in the fact that the Ho Chi Minh trails run through this area into key points that give them access for operations against South Vietnam and Cambodia and potentially Thailand.

One thing that has come out in the newspapers is that the Red Chinese have been building a road network through northern Laos. Obviously, they have not built this road network so they could take an evening drive after dinner.... We must be concerned about this potentially dangerous situation.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.²

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1. J5321 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Oct 70, Subj: Helicopters for Cambodia.
 2. An address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC, before the Associated Press Managing Editors Association at Honolulu, Hawaii, on 19 November 1970.

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LAOS

BASIC INFORMATION				OVERALL OBJECTIVE	U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION
AREA	POPULATION	ANNUAL GROWTH	GROSS NAT PROD		
91,410 SQ. MI.	2,927,000	2.4%	\$202 MIL(EST) PER CAPITA	TO PREVENT COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER IN LAOS.	U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. G. MCNULTREY GODLEY U.S. AID DIRECTOR MR. CHARLES A. MANN DEPUTY CHIEF, USMACV THAILAND COL. PETER T. RUSSELL, USA
KING - Sri Savang Vatthana PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MINISTER OF SOCIAL ACTION, MINISTER OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND LEADER OF THE NEUTRALIST FAC TION Prince Souvanna Phouma VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF EDUCATION, AND LEADER OF RIGHTIST FAC TION - Louang Phongsammay VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND LEADER OF THE COMMUNIST FAC TION - Prince Souphommavong				MILITARY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES	
				(A) To support the armed forces of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) in their effort to defeat insurgency in areas that are or may come under RLG control. (B) To support the Royal Lao Government (RLG) and to assist it to maintain its policy of non-alignment. (C) To disrupt the flow of North Vietnamese forces and materiel through Laos into South Vietnam.	
MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES				MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES	COMBAT CAPABILITY
ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE			
1 INF BNS, 3 ABN BNS, 5 FLD ARTY, 25 VOLUNTEER BNS, 1 PSY WAR BN, 5 RECON GPS, 6 ENG BNS, 1 RIVER GP BN.	NONE	T-28/69, RT-28/5, C-47/24, UH-34/16, OBS/18, UTILITY/8, AC 47-8		18 INF BNS, 4 ABN BNS, 8 CMDO BNS, 33 VOL BNS, 5 ARTY BNS, 4 ARMED RECON GPS, 6 ENG BNS, 1 RIVER GP (BN), 1 PSY WAR BN.	Maintain minimum security in non-communist area main population centers. Provide very limited ground defense against local communist insurgency.
				11 LCMS, 26 RIVER GUNBOATS, 12 LIGHT CARGO TRANSPORTS.	Maintain minimum security of river routes in conservative area and provide limited logistic support for conservative forces.
				63 FTR/DMRS, 24 TRANS, 33 MISC, 16 HELOS, 10 AC-47.	Provide limited fighter bomber, logistic and reconnaissance support to ground forces.

 • FY 72
 • AS OF NOV 1970

DOES NOT INCLUDE PATHET LAO OR DISSIDENT NEUTRALIST MILITARY FORCES.

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 144.

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(S) Military assistance to the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) is a Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program. Requirements are developed by the Requirements Office of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Vientiane with the assistance of the U.S. Embassy Attache Staffs. The requirements are reviewed and submitted by the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI.¹ The MASF program in Laos grew from a modest program of \$12.7 million in FY 63 to \$140 million in FY 70. The program for FY 71 once again increased significantly and was approximately \$235 million.²

FY 71 MASF Funding

(S) While planning guidance for the Laos MASF program stated that programming should be to requirements without regard to ceiling, the SECDEF did establish a ceiling. In the environment of an active war it was extremely difficult to remain within an established ceiling; therefore, the ceiling created significant shortfalls, primarily ammunition. The MASF ceiling for FY 71 was originally established at \$125 million and subsequently increased to \$147.1 million to accommodate special projects.³ On 28 August, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI requested an additional \$1.8 million to support an increase in UH-34 helicopters.⁴ CINCPAC supported this request and recommended to the SECDEF an increase in the FY 71 program ceiling from \$147.1 million to \$148.9 million.⁵ The SECDEF replied, on 22 September, stating that the perennial problem of underfunding and the critical DOD budgetary problems made increases, such as those requested by CINCPAC, difficult to justify and obtain. He further stated that a review of FY 71 Laos MASF program was planned and requested CINCPAC to project planned/anticipated increases to the FY 71 program, establish priorities among requested and possible increases, identify trade-offs, and comment on the possibility of a reduction in ammunition expenditures. He also requested that U.S. Embassy Vientiane comment on the above to CINCPAC as soon as possible.⁶ On 28 October, the U.S. Embassy Vientiane provided CINCPAC a joint Embassy/DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI assessment of the minimum funds required to sustain combat and necessary operations for the remainder of FY 71. A new ceiling of \$207.2 million was requested and a priority system for all increases requested over the \$125 million original program ceiling was established.⁷ CINCPAC concurred in the joint Embassy/DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI

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1. See CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. III, pp. 185-188, for a discussion of the unique role of the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI in military assistance to Laos.
 2. J5322 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Dec 70, Subj: Laos Military Assistance.
 3. Ibid.
 4. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 281031Z Aug 70.
 5. CINCPAC 160102Z Sep 70.
 6. SECDEF 1679/222252Z Sep 70.
 7. Amembassy Vientiane 281157Z Oct 70.

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Note: Previously exempted by USCINCPAC

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assessment and recommended a program ceiling increase to the SECDEF.¹ As of the end of the year, no information had been received from the SECDEF on the requested increase to the program ceiling.²

FY 72 MASF Funding

(S) On 26 October, the SECDEF provided CINCPAC with the tentative FY 72 MAP/FMS program levels for planning purposes. The program for Laos was specified as \$135 million including \$7.15 million for supply operations. He requested that CINCPAC forward detailed data for use in the final stages of budget review process.³ CINCPAC replied on 14 November and included the following major investment items in the recommended program:⁴

- a. [REDACTED] commando cars and related wreckers and fuel vehicles. b.
- b. [REDACTED] M-16 rifles. b.
- c. [REDACTED] M-79 grenade launchers. b.
- d. [REDACTED] 81mm mortars. b.
- e. Nine items of engineer equipment.

CINCPAC cited several problem areas: ammunition shortfall, limited T-28 aircraft availability, increased aircraft support and rebuild costs, shortage of funds to increase artillery capabilities, and an impending problem of adequate third country ordnance depot maintenance support. He concluded by stating:⁵

...it is apparent that the above problems areas are major deterrents to meeting the MASF objectives and adequately countering the enemy threat in Laos. Solution to these problems is not possible if strict budgetary limitations continue to be imposed and degradation of Laos combat effort will increase.

(S) In December, the SECDEF confirmed the \$135 million FY 72 program level for Laos. Additional guidance was provided and included basic support of a Lao regular armed force of 50,000 men and support for irregular forces as directed by OSD. Special instructions directed the following actions:⁶

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1. CINCPAC 312138Z Oct 70.
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
 3. SECDEF 4432/262336Z Oct 70.
 4. ADMIN CINCPAC 140404Z Nov 70.
 5. Ibid.
 6. SECDEF 8372/182236Z Dec 70.

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- a. Special projects would be funded at \$12.9 million and MAPEL would reflect the different units.
- b. A MAPEL would be established to cover the costs of the Requirements Office and budgeted for \$2.1 million.
- c. Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) sortie rate would be based on a monthly average of 2,900 sorties.
- d. A separate MAPEL would be established for the Sisavangvong Military Hospital and the rice and ration subsistence programs.

CINCPAC passed the appropriate implementing instructions to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI and the component commanders.¹

Blueprint for Improvement of the RLGAF

(TS) The U.S. Embassy Vientiane submitted a Blueprint Program for improvement of the Royal Laotian Government Armed Forces (RLGAF) in September 1969 which involved accelerated delivery on some programmed equipment items and provision of several new items. The estimated add-on cost of this program for FY 70-75 was \$29.5 million. In coordination with CINCPAC and the Services, the JCS developed an overall plan for improvement of the RLGAF and submitted it to the DOD on 18 September 1969. The plan was based on actions to increase the effectiveness of the RLGAF by augmenting the current partially accelerated MASF program; achieving better organization for U.S. management, control and direction of U.S. military support activities; improvement in motivation, morale, training, and logistics; and promoting third country support of the RLGAF. The total cost of this plan was estimated at \$96.9 million.²

(S) CINCPAC generally supported the Blueprint Program; however, he did not support the stated requirement for M-41 tanks or an increase in number of T-28s to the requested 112. By late February, supply action had been completed on M-70 launchers, M-16 rifles, PRC-25 radios and some T-28 aircraft (CINCPAC supported an increase to 86 T-28s). The remaining requested major items were held in abeyance pending SECDEF authorization. As of 30 April, the Blueprint Program was considered to be complete; subsequent requirements or those still not approved were listed as shortfall.³

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1. CINCPAC 222211Z Dec 70.
 2. J5534 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Jan 70, Subj: Laos Military Assistance Review. See CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. III, pp. 201-208 for detailed data on the U.S. Embassy "blueprint."
 3. J43 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.

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TDY Funds for FAR Training

(S) The U.S. Embassy reported to the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI that the present and projected budget for the RLG could not support TDY travel in-country for members of the Forces Armee Royale (FAR) to conduct inspections, training, liaison, and instructional visits to [REDACTED] training projects. He requested that this TDY be funded under the FY 71 MASF program.¹ CINCPAC agreed, and requested the JCS to recommend that the SECDEF approve the payment of TDY funds.² The SECDEF approved the request as an exception to policy and stated that TDY would be paid only for fully justified purposes and that in no case would the rate exceed the normal Royal Laotian Army (RLA) TDY rates.³ 4e

In-Country Training Program

(TS) In April, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI developed and forwarded to the U.S. Embassy Vientiane a concept plan to develop an in-country training capability for Forces Armees de Royale/Neutralist Armed Forces (FAR/FAN) infantry battalions. He also made his staff available to the Ambassador for further development of the plan. On 15 May, CINCPAC concurred in the desirability of establishing a Lao in-country training capability. [REDACTED] 4e

DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI was authorized to consult with the Embassies concerned to obtain their views on the proposed concept plan and requested to keep CINCPAC advised.⁴

(TS) On 22 August, [REDACTED] advised the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI that his concept plan represented a good beginning for eventual transfer of infantry battalion training [REDACTED] to Laos. The [REDACTED] visualized development of certain specialist in-country training skills and further exploitation of third country support in technical areas. He indicated that U.S. Army Attache and the USAID Requirements Office (ARMA/RO) were working with the FAR to accomplish an overall analysis of existing training resources and spell out requirements. Funding and Lao ability to develop cadre were seen as the major determinants of the speed of implementation of any plan adopted. Current FAR actions were seen as dovetailing with the concept and would serve to accelerate the program. [REDACTED] closed by assuring DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI of close cooperation.⁵ 2

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 080605Z May 70.
 2. CINCPAC 240245Z May 70.
 3. SECDEF 4724/102229Z Jul 70.
 4. J5534 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Nov 70, Subj: Lao In-Country Training Program.
 5. Ibid.

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(TS) On 4 September, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI outlined to CINCPAC the measures he had undertaken to assist the Ambassador. He pointed out the need to pull the U.S. effort together and to provide training manager expertise, which he considered was not available in-country, for the development of a comprehensive training plan. To this end he proposed the formation of a committee of U.S. representatives and FAR general staff, and solicited CINCPAC support for the concept. The DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI considered that a lack of expertise existed on the ARMA/RO staff in the area of development of a training plan. Consequently, he had offered his services to the Ambassador through the provision of his concept plan and offers to follow up on development. However, the reality of the situation was that he had no charter for in-country training.¹

(TS) On 18 September, CINCPAC advised [REDACTED] of his support for efforts to improve the Lao training program. He suggested that now might be an opportune time to hold a U.S.-only conference to review the requirements and U.S. expertise available to incorporate current budget and manpower planning actions. On 22 September, [REDACTED] responded advising that a conference as proposed would be helpful but that it should await completion of their current survey and development of a strawman proposal. [REDACTED] visualized that PACOM expertise and resources could be utilized at later stages in the program.²

(TS) On 28 September, the SECSTATE disapproved Embassy Vientiane's request for additional training spaces, but was prepared to reconsider with appropriate justification, cost analysis, and alternatives to U.S. in-country trainers. The Embassy training proposal was informally passed to the CINCPAC representative at a conference of the Coordinating Committee for U.S. Missions Southeast Asia (SEA-COORD). CINCPAC provided preliminary comments, noting that considerable further development was required and offered the services of CINCPAC and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI to assist in development of a comprehensive training plan.³


Requirements for AN/PRC-25 Radios

[REDACTED]

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. J315A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.; CG USAMC 191952Z Jan 70, citing DA 141513Z Jan 70.
 3. CGUSAAPSA Joliet, Ill. 232049Z Dec 69.
 4. DA 302212Z Dec 69.
 5. CINCPAC 061905Z Jan 70.
 6. OOAMA 180004Z Feb 70.
 7. CINCPAC 181917Z Feb 70.

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Armored Car Crew Training

(S) On 8 April, CINCPAC advised DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI that the M-706 armored cars requested by the U.S. Embassy Vientiane were scheduled to arrive in mid-May and requested that he plan for preliminary training of a small number of Lao crews to be ready to receive, operate, and maintain these vehicles upon arrival. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI responded with an outline of the training program and indicated that some training had already taken place.⁸

T-28 Aircraft

(S) The T-28 had proven to be the most suitable close support aircraft for use by the RLAF. The primary reasons CINCPAC supported the use of T-28s were:⁹

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1. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 210450Z Feb 70.
 2. ADMIN CINCPAC 212140Z Feb 70.
 3. SECDEF 3507/192126Z Mar 70.
 4. CSAF 062000Z May 70.
 5. CINCPAC 140241Z May 70.
 6. J5322 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Dec 70, Subj: Laos Military Assistance.
 7. CINCPAC 080247Z Apr 70.
 8. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 131003Z Apr 70.
 9. J5322 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, '22 Jan 70, Subj: T-28 Aircraft to Support Laotian War.

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a. The active war in Laos did not permit the transition of Laotian pilots into a new aircraft.

b. The limited facilities made jet aircraft unsuitable.

c. An adverse political reaction could result from the introduction of jet aircraft into the RLAF.

[REDACTED]

(S) In late 1969, the U.S. Embassy Vientiane Blueprint for improvement and modernization of the RLAF had requested the number of authorized T-28 aircraft be increased to 112. CINCPAC did not support the total increase but did support a requirement for 86 aircraft. The JCS supported the CINCPAC position to SECDEF, who authorized the increase. The SECDEF had earlier approved 22 T-28 aircraft for assignment to Laos; however, due to attrition and major combat damage, the 74 T-28s available in December 1968 had been reduced to a total of 57 by December 1969. The assignment of these additional aircraft, which were considered replacements, would bring the total inventory up to 79. The 22 T-28s were delivered during December 1969 and January 1970.¹

(S) During the year the Navy Department released 50 T-28 aircraft for transfer to the MAP/MASF programs [REDACTED]. Five of these aircraft were allocated to Cambodia and 45 to Laos. The USAF contract to repair/rehabilitate the aircraft and place them in T-28D combat configuration was let to the Fairchild-Hiller Company with production scheduled to be completed in October 1971. The original production schedule was for one aircraft in April, three in May, five in June, eight in July, 15 in August, 14 in September, and the final four in October. In Cambodia only nine aircraft were available for combat and in Laos the T-28 assets were insufficient to maintain the desired sortie rate, particularly during the 1970-71 dry season. In view of the critical situation CINCPAC requested that deliveries under [REDACTED] be expedited. As a result, it appeared that the original schedule could be improved to provide a substantial quantity of T-28s by 30 June 1971, with the first 10 aircraft to be air delivered.²

(S) CINCPAC received informal information that an additional 65 T-28s probably would be made available as an add-on to [REDACTED]. On 10 July, CINCPAC

1. Ibid.; J5 Brief No. 00012-70, 13 Jan 70, Subj: Planning for Laos (JCSM-779-69 of 31 Dec 69).

2. J4319 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Dec 70, Subj: T-28 Aircraft for SEA.

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requested DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI to comment and make recommendations for a MASF Laos program ceiling increase which would be required to support additional T-28s.¹ DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI responded by stating that, if the authorized 86 aircraft were delivered, they could not be supported under the current \$125 million ceiling. He further stated that a program ceiling increase of \$63.1 million would be required. The necessary program costs to support 86 T-28s and the associated air munitions were carried in the FY 71 MASF Laos program in shortfall.²

(S) CINCPAC initiated action for a meeting between representatives of COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSMACV, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, U.S. Embassy Bangkok, and U.S. Embassy Vientiane to discuss the T-28 problem. The meeting was held in Bangkok on 8 December. Findings and recommendations resulting from this meeting were:³

- a. Continue action to expedite T-41 delivery.
- b. Effect a firm agreement between the RTAF and the RLAF concerning the loan of 10 aircraft to the RLAF.
- c. Expedite contract negotiations for modification and delivery of the 65 additional aircraft.
- d. Expedite delivery action for T-28 spare parts.

(S) As the year ended, CINCPAC was exploring all avenues to meet urgent Cambodia and Laos operational requirements including expedited CONUS and in-country repair, inter-country loans, CONUS loans, and third country training of RLAF pilots.⁴

T-41 Aircraft

(S) Two T-41 aircraft, authorized for use in the Laos pilot training program, were scheduled for delivery in FY 3/71. CINCPAC requested expedited delivery of these aircraft so that the two T-28Ds utilized for FAC/reconnaissance could be released for strike missions.⁵

AC-47s for Laos MASF (C)

(S) This project, which had evolved in 1968, was treated in detail in last year's history. Providing the RLAF with an adequate gunship capability, as well

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1. ADMIN CINCPAC 102334Z Jul 70.
 2. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 211031Z Jul 70.
 3. J4319 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Dec 70, Subj: T-28 Aircraft for SEA.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

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as eliminating communication difficulties and problems with the existing gun system, was accomplished successfully during early 1970. Previously, on 18 December 1969, CSAF had issued the Aircraft Transfer Order that provided for the delivery of eight AC-47s, configured with the MXU-470 system and standard USAF radio configuration, to the RLAF. "The aircraft, AGE and support equipment," added CSAF, "will be at no cost to RLAF's MASF Program."¹ "The last of these aircraft being transferred to Laos MASF from USAF assets," reported DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, "arrived in-country on 6 January 1970."²

[REDACTED] A

[REDACTED] These eight RLAF AC-47 gunships met the immediate requirements in Laos, since the more complex gunship system--the C-119--was considered too sophisticated for the Laotians. CINCPAC's position was that "no further consideration be given to providing the RLAF with the more advanced system at this time."³

(S) Just two months later, on 19 March 1970, CINCPACAF recommended to CINCPAC the inactivation of the USAF AC-47 operation at Udorn RTAFB as programmed, with the subsequent redistribution of the three AC-47 gunships. CINCPAC, on 8 April 1970, concurred in the deactivation and directed, subject to COMUSMACV's approval, the transfer of the three AC-47s to the VNAF. The following day, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI informed CINCPAC of his:⁴

...immediate requirement for one (1) MXU-470 equipped AC-47 with standard USAF communications equipment installed as a replacement for AC-47 43-49423 that crashed 21 Feb 70. In addition, we have an annual attrition replacement requirement of two (2) MXU-470 equipped AC-47s being added to our FY 71 and outyear programs at this time.

2. Request the three (3) USAF AC-47s assigned to the 432TRW at Udorn be released to the MASF Laos program requirements as attrition replacements at no cost. If you concur, program add change at no cost will be forwarded against the FY 70 program.

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1. CSAF AFSMSDB 181401Z Dec 69; CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. III, pp. 208-10; J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
 2. Ibid.; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 061033Z Jan 70.
 3. J5322 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Jan 70, Subj: AC-47 Aircraft for Laos.
 4. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 091031Z Apr 70; CINCPAC 080408Z Apr 70 and 192131Z Mar 70; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.

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(S) On 15 April 1970, COMUSMACV concurred in the AC-47 deactivation at Udorn RTAF and recommended the allocation of the three aircraft to the more urgent operational requirement of the Laos MASF program, since the "VNAF does not have an urgent requirement for these aircraft at this time."¹ Three days later, CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's rationale and requested CINCPACAF to transfer the three AC-47s at Udorn to RLAF upon inactivation.²

UH-34 Helicopters for RLAF

(S) The stated purpose of an AFLC Directive of 18 March 1969 was to implement "the Military Service Funded Program to place in storage 13 each UH-34Gs to be held for subsequent delivery to the Royal Lao Air Force."³ This directive established CSAF Project MAP9H-11 for the delivery of 13 UH-34Gs against FY 68/69/70 MASF program requirements to the RLAF. These aircraft would come from the USAF "thirteen UH-34 acft now in temporary storage."⁴

(S) The five helicopters delivered in-country in July 1969, reported DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, were "in excellent condition. However, these helos are configured differently than the UH-34s assigned to MAP Laos." Because their "D" configuration was incompatible with RLAF mission requirements, it became necessary not only to reconfigure them, but also the eight UH-34s still in CONUS storage.⁵

(S) The estimated costs for CONUS reconfiguration, versus Air America in Thailand, were \$116,620 and \$50,000 each, respectively. Because of the lower price, as well as Air America's "experience and capability to commence immediately," DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI recommended to CINCPAC on 30 September 1969 that authorization be given for the reconfiguration by Air America of the five helicopters already received.⁶ Three months later, on 12 December 1969, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI further proposed that Air America also reconfigure the eight UH-34s still in CONUS storage. Subsequent to a meeting held by CSAF in mid-January 1970, Project MAPOH-298 was established to provide for CONUS reconfiguration of 21

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1. COMUSMACV 17845/150808Z Apr 70.
 2. ADMIN CINCPAC 180140Z Apr 70.
 3. Ltr, Hq AFLC to WRAMA (WRND/WRNM), 18 Mar 69, Subj: Military Assistance Aerospace Program Directive Number G69-LA-009 (UG-34Gs); J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
 4. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 9112/071032Z Apr 69.
 5. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 9268/051030Z Aug 69; J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70; WRAMA Robins AFB GA 131915Z Aug 69.
 6. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 300132Z and 021031Z Sep 69; WRAMA 131915Z Aug 69; J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.

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helicopters--enough to meet RLAF's requirements through FY 71--with delivery of two each month beginning in September 1970. On 19 February 1970, CSAF also approved Air America's reconfiguration of the five UH-34s already in-country.¹

(C) By March 1970, the scheduled completion of the Air America reconfiguration of the five UH-34s in-country was 30 June 1970. And on 2 July 1970, CSAF advised, as follows:²

Project MAP OH-298 has been amended to reflect latest factory rework schedule. Aircraft should be delivered in country in an even flow during the Dec 70 - May 71 time period.

Security Classification for Military Assistance to Laos

(S) In March the SECDEF informed CINCPAC that the President had directed that, effective 10 March 1970, U.S. military casualties incident to air operations over Laos and those occurring on the ground to U.S. military personnel stationed in Laos would be announced to the public as they occurred.³ The same day the SECDEF reported that the President had directed all U.S. military aircraft losses over Laos and casualties related thereto would be announced without delay.⁴ On 10 April the U.S. Embassy Vientiane informed the SECSTATE that in order to comply with the President's directives it would be necessary to compromise the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI role in relation to military assistance to Laos and recommended that the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI role be declassified.⁵ CINCPAC supported the Embassy position and recommended that the SECDEF downgrade the classification to unclassified.⁶ As of the end of the year no response had been received from the SECDEF.⁷


Military Assistance Program - Thailand

(U) The insurgency in North and Northeast Thailand is supported and encouraged by Peking and Hanoi. The Royal Thai Government is moving to meet the threat. The outcome is not yet clear, but there is ground for confidence that unless the external basis

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1. Ibid.; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 121032Z Dec 69; AFLC 222039Z Jan 70; CSAF 192020Z Feb 70.
 2. CSAF 022307Z Jul 70; J4311 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70, citing DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI RCS: AF-V12 Report as of 31 Mar 70 (CINCPAC Ctrl #001218).
 3. SECDEF 03016/131455Z Mar 70.
 4. SECDEF 03017/131456Z Mar 70.
 5. AMEMB Vientiane 2545/101114Z Apr 70.
 6. CINCPAC 180242Z May 70.
 7. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.

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THAILAND

BASIC INFORMATION					MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES * 4 INF DIVS*, 1 CAV DIV, 1 SF GP, 1 ARTY BN, 1 REG, 1 AAA BDE, 1 AIN BN, 1 IND REGT TEAM. TOTAL STRENGTH 117,900 51 PATROLS*, 19 MINE WAR, 49 AMPHIB, 8 AUX- ILIARY & MISC, 12 SERVICE, 9 MAR BNS, 1 NAVAL AIR SQ. TOTAL STRENGTH 22,100 7 WGS, 93 FTR/BMS*, 34 TRANS, 125 MISC, 68 HELOS, 15 RECC, 116 TRAINER, 15 UTILITY. TOTAL STRENGTH 30,300
AREA	200,000 SQ. MI.	LIFE EXPECTANCY	48 YEARS		
POPULATION	35,416,000	GROSS NAT PROD 1/yr	\$5.0 BIL.		
ANNUAL GROWTH	3-3.3%	PER CAPITA 1/yr	\$164		
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.8 ACRE	DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED	\$220 MIL.		
LITERACY RATE	65.7%	AS % GNP	3.9		
		AS % CENTRAL GOV EXP	16.6		
DEFENSE BUDGET INCLUDES: INTERNAL SECURITY					
KING - Phumiphon Adunbort PRIME MINISTER SUPREME COMMANDER THAI ARMED FORCES - FIELD MARSHAL Thanom Kittakachorn CINC NAVY - ADM Chaothorn Chalermitrakul CINC AF - AIR MARSHAL Phumthong Chantaboksa CINC ARMY - GEN Prapass Charusathien					
OVERALL OBJECTIVES				U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	
PROMOTE THAI/US RELATIONS IN RECOGNITION OF THAILAND'S VITAL IM- PORTANCE TO U.S. MILITARY POSTURE IN SEASIA; INSURE RETENTION OF U.S. BASE RIGHTS; INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THAI ARMED FORCES; AND ENCOURAGE THAI MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO.				U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. LEONARD UNGER U.S. AIR DIRECTOR MR. REY M. HILL COMUSMACV & CHIEF JUSMAG- THAI MAJ GEN LOUIS T. SEITH, USAF	
MILITARY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES				COMBAT CAPABILITY MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION.	
(A) To assist Thailand in cementing its independence and sovereignty against communist aggression, infiltration, insurgency and sub- version. (B) To assist Thailand in increasing the safety and stability, and improving the economic status of the strategically important North, Northeast and Southern Peninsula with particular emphasis on greater counter-subversion and anti-guerrilla capabilities. (C) To assist Thailand to make a force contribution for the defense of Free World countries threatened by Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Cost of Thai force in Vietnam and Laos is paid from the Dollar Guidelines, Annual Programs. (D) To insure availability to the United States of base and port facilities, overflight rights, intransit or staging services, and landing privileges, as required.				LIMITED ABILITY TO CONDUCT COASTAL DEFENSE AND PATROL IN GULF OF THAILAND AND INTERNAL WATERWAYS, LIMITED ASW AND MINE WARFARE; TRANSPORT AND AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT.	
LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AND CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY; DAY AIR DEFENSE. ARMY AIR ARM HAS LITTLE CAPABILITY TO PERFORM OBSERVATION AND SOME LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.					

* AS Of 1 JAN 1971
 Includes Volunteer Division in RVN
 Estimated 54 Total Ships & Craft Operational.
 Includes 12 F5A/B, 20 F6F, and 60 F-28 a/c.

Updated By J2
 Updated By J5

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb. 71, p. 118.

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of the insurgency is magnified, the Thai authorities will, with continued U.S. material and advisory assistance, progressively bring the insurgency under control.

...the Red Chinese have been building a road network through northern Laos. Obviously, they have not built this road network so they could take an evening drive after dinner. These people have ambitions. They have goals. We must be concerned about this potentially dangerous situation. It is sobering to recall five years ago Peking announced Thailand would be the next target for a communist war of liberation after South Vietnam.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

(S) Military aid in Thailand was a Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program. During the period 1946 - 1969 Thailand received more than \$700 million in military assistance. This aid consisted of equipment, essential supplies, and assistance in the construction and improvement of key facilities and installations. The provision of military assistance to the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) was designed to develop forces capable of defeating subversion and insurgency in Thailand and of assisting U.S. or free world forces in military operations when necessary. Operating and maintenance support ensured that the equipment furnished was properly utilized and maintained, and included schooling for skilled personnel. Emphasis was placed on internal security by the country team and CINCPAC; however, much of the program contributed to an improved conventional capability for the RTARF since very little of the equipment provided was designed only for counterinsurgency.²

FY 70-72 MASF Funding

(S) December 1969 changes to the current and future MASF ceiling by the SECDEF resulted in the following ceiling guidelines:³

FY 70	\$65.8 million	FY 72	\$60.3 million.
FY 71	55.3 "		

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1. An address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, before the Associated Press Managing Editors Association at Honolulu, Hawaii on 19 November 1970.
 2. Dept of State Background Notes, "Kingdom of Thailand," Nov 70, p. 6; J5323 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Oct 70, Subj: MASF Program, Thailand.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. III, pp. 225-226.

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(S) On 29 January, the U.S. Embassy Bangkok commented on the December SECDEF action reducing the FY 71 MASF funds by commenting:¹

As you know we are going through a difficult period as our relations with the RTG have absorbed a series of shocks ranging from the TAKSIN controversy to the Symington Hearings. The Thai have, however, been willing to accept tentatively a series of high-level U.S. reassurances that we would continue to provide them with the tools needed to defend themselves. Given the \$10 million cut in this year's program and the major slash in the aid effort, maintaining the credibility of these assurances is difficult. It would be made more so by yet another apparent cut in FY 71.

COMUSMACTHAI concurred in the Embassy assessment and provided additional comments and conclusions regarding the OV-10 and airmobile operations.² CINCPAC supported COMUSMACTHAI comments and conclusions and so advised the SECDEF and the JCS.³

(S) In August the SECDEF authorized two increases in the FY 71 MASF ceiling. One provided \$4.4 million for Project PEACE RIDE II, construction of an aircraft control and warning (AC&W) station in support of the Royal Thai Air Force (an additional \$1.2 million in MAP funds was made available for a maximum authorized total of \$5.6 million). The second increase was \$1.3 million for turn over of ARPA equipment. After these adjustments the FY 71 program ceiling was \$61 million.⁴

(S) On 24 October 1970, a tentative dollar guideline of \$60.0 million for Thailand FY 72 MASF program was established by OASD. In order to insure that Thailand MASF program requirements were included in OSD review of Service budgets, all FY 72 programming data was required to be at the OASD/ISA by 5 November.⁵ This requirement necessitated expedited action on the part of COMUSMACTHAI and the CINCPAC staff. Data was forwarded to SECDEF on 4 November.⁶ In addition, further detailed programming data was required by the SECDEF with suspenses of 16 November and 1 December 1970.⁷ The completed FY 72 MASF program, including deferral priorities, cost data, and detailed impact statements, was forwarded per SECDEF request.⁸

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1. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 291211Z Jan 70.
 2. COMUSMACTHAI 300530Z Jan 70.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
 4. SECDEF 7903/192227Z Aug 70; SECDEF 8704/291348Z Aug 70.
 5. OASD/ISA 240040Z Oct 70.
 6. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
 7. SECDEF 4432/262336Z Oct 70.
 8. CINCPAC 142345Z Nov 70.

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Planning for Improving Thai Capabilities

(TS) As the year ended CINCPAC was involved in two planning actions concerned with improving the self-sufficiency and combat capability of the Thai military in accordance with the President's doctrine calling for material support to the extent necessary for Thailand's defense. Operation BREAKTHROUGH was a MACTHAI-initiated study which analyzed the current insurgent threat in Thailand and Thai countermeasures therefor. The study covered the present disposition of Thai forces, desirable redeployment of Thai assets, identification of Thai weaknesses, and costs for implementing recommendations dealing with construction, training and modernization, logistics, and other improvements needed. The study did not recommend marked changes in Thai structure or drastic reorganization of the current counterinsurgency effort. The concept provided for redeployments and improvements to bases along the Thai-Lao border from which forays into Laos from Thailand might be launched. The total cost of implementing the recommendations was estimated at \$45.1 million. CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI to refine the options/alternatives outlined in the initial and subsequent papers of Operation BREAKTHROUGH and to coordinate his findings/recommendations with the U.S. Embassy Bangkok.¹

(TS) In the second planning action, CINCPAC had tasked COMUSMACTHAI to evaluate the threat to Thailand two and four years forward; determine what the Thai would need to meet that threat; and provide a priority listing of required equipment, supplies and military training necessary to counteract the threat. However, increases in assistance to Thailand to improve its capabilities would necessitate additional funds which budgetary statements by the President and the FY 71 Appropriations Bill suggested would not be forthcoming.²

Reimbursement of Royal Thai Government Expenditures for Royal Thai Forces - Vietnam (RTFV) Related Activities

(S) In February 1970, COMUSMACTHAI outlined a study underway by the Royal Thai Government (RTG) regarding the procedures used to handle claims for expenses incurred by the RTG in RTFV related activities. Included was a statement that the RTG favored a lump sum type payment and indicated they would be asking for such payments.³ CINCPAC responded by recommending that the present procedures (submission of individual Thai claims for actual expenses with detailed justification) be retained.⁴

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1. J551 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Nov 70, Subj: Current Planning for Improving Thai Capabilities.
 2. Ibid.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI 140400Z Feb 70.
 4. CINCPAC 200313Z Feb 70.

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Modernization of the Royal Thai Navy (RTN)

(S) Each year the RTN fleet became less effective due to obsolescence, resulting in low utilization rates and a reduction in capability to counter limited conventional or insurgency threats. Numerous overage U.S. ships, as well as the 12 foreign-built ships, needed replacement. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) and the RTARF Force Structure Plan 1/67 acknowledged the requirement for upgrading the fleet and reflected additions/replacements through the FY 75-78 time period. CINCPAC recommended two PGM, two PCF, and five PBR for FY 71 and 10 PBR for the FY 72 MASF program, with retirement of one or more obsolete ships for each new ship acquired. COMUSMACTHAI reported the following on RTN planning in response to SECDEF and CINCPAC queries.¹

a. The RTN plans to decommission one gunboat and three torpedo boats.

b. The basic problem in decommissioning vintage ships is the RTG policy of funding and manning the Navy based on number of ships only.

COMUSMACTHAI further advised that he had been in contact with the DC/S Supreme Command Headquarters, pointed out the loss of effectiveness and the inefficiency caused by the RTG/RTN manning policies, and suggested a review of these procedures.²

A Second Cost-Shared Patrol Frigate (PF)

(S) On 1 May, COMUSMACTHAI queried CINCPAC about the progress being made on the Thailand-U.S. cost-shared construction of a PF-105 class frigate, which had been programmed late in 1969 for the FY 70 Thailand MASF. The CNO, just the previous month, had reported that a sizeable portion of the U.S. Navy share of the costs--\$1.9 million--was difficult to obtain because of the reduction in the ship construction program by Congress. The RTG, on the other hand, had been meeting the terms of the 26 September 1969 Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries and had already forwarded its share of the program--\$3 million. Fortunately, on 22 May, CNO announced that the program could proceed, since "1.925 million of U.S. share was being released by the OSD Comptroller."³

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1. J5323 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 70, Subj: Modernization of the RTN.
 2. Ibid.
 3. CNO 222057Z May 70; J5323(A) History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70, citing COMUSMACTHAI 011215Z May 70 (BOM); CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. III, pp. 226-27.

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Transfer of Five PBRs

(TS) On 18 July, the JCS informed CINCPAC of the availability and possibility of turnover of up to 25 PBRs to the Cambodian Navy at no cost.¹ CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that five of the PBRs be diverted to the RTN to be used in the counter-insurgency mission to control and limit infiltration of insurgent forces across the Mekong River from Laos. He further stated that the diversion would not detract from the current Cambodia program in that a density of 25 PBRs for Cambodia was not projected until FY 72.² The JCS supported the CINCPAC proposal and requested the SECDEF to approve the transfer.³ Authorization was granted to transfer the five PBRs to the RTN; however, the cost was to be accommodated within the Thai FY 71 MASF program.⁴ CINCPAC requested reconsideration of his proposal to transfer the PBRs at no cost.⁵ On 7 October, the SECDEF increased the FY 71 MASF program from \$61.0 million to \$61.6 million to accommodate the transfer of the PBRs to the RTN during FY 71.⁶

C-123 Aircraft

(S) On 4 March 1970 COMUSMACTHAI reiterated his request for delivery of four C-123B aircraft due in from the prior year program.⁷ In October 1969, the CSAF had quoted an availability date for the C-123s as FY 76.⁸ CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF comments on the allocation of C-123 assets in PACOM.⁹ CINCPACAF reported that there were no C-123s available in the PACOM area for transfer to the RTAF. However, he reported that the 309th Tactical Airlift Squadron, with a UE of 12 C-123K aircraft, was programmed for inactivation in FY 1/71. The C-123K aircraft were B models modified with the addition of two J-85 jet engines. CINCPACAF requested the CSAF to determine if U.S. C-123B assets could be replaced by C-123Ks to make C-123Bs available to the RTAF.¹⁰ On 10 April, the CSAF directed AFLC to transfer three C-123B aircraft from Langley AFB to the RTAF when replaced by C-123Ks and requested COMUSMACTHAI to take the necessary action through MIMEX procedures to effect the transfer at no cost to the Thai FY 70 MASF program. The remaining one C-123 would be provided at a later date based on availability within the USAF inventory.¹¹

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1. JCS 181731Z Jul 70.
 2. CINCPAC 070401Z Aug 70.
 3. JCS 8325/252220Z Aug 70.
 4. JCS 1807/232246Z Sep 70.
 5. CINCPAC 250434Z Sep 70.
 6. SECDEF 2969/072305Z Oct 70.
 7. COMUSMACTHAI 040400Z Mar 70.
 8. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. III, p. 230.
 9. CINCPAC 110056Z Mar 70.
 10. CINCPACAF 142135Z Mar 70.
 11. CSAF 102230Z Apr 70.

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Helicopter Gunships

(S) COMUSMACTHAI in August 1969 advised CINCPAC that the RTG had been making overtures for helicopter gunships for escort in the counter-insurgency operations of northern Thailand. COMUSMACTHAI requested data on gunship availability and information on the XM-93 modification for the UH-1H.¹ The CSAF advised that 125 kits to convert UH-1H helicopters into the gunship configuration were available, but that the programming of these kits to the RTARF would have to compete with other SEA priorities.² COMUSMACTHAI, in January 1970, pointed out that in recent operations virtually all participating helicopters had sustained damage from insurgent ground fire. Prohibitive losses to helicopters would occur unless a gunship capability was provided. COMUSMACTHAI requested CINCPAC approval to program five kits for the XM-93 conversion with funds to be provided by FY 70 deviation. Also noted was the fact that the U.S. Embassy had the proposal under review.³ On 14 March, CINCPAC queried COMUSMACV and CINCUSARPAC on a possible loan of two or three gunships pending receipt of the kits programmed by COMUSMACTHAI.⁴ As a result of their comments it was determined that it was not feasible to loan gunships to the RTG due to limited assets and the technical differences of the UH-1B and C compared to the UH-1H in the RTG inventory.⁵ On 27 March, the SECSTATE advised that the SECDEF had suspended action on the FY 70 MASF programming for the XM-93 kits pending the outcome of the U.S. Embassy Bangkok review and recommendations on the gunship question.⁶

(S) In April, COMUSMACTHAI stated a requirement for XM-93 armament kits to reconfigure Royal Thai Army (RTA) UH-1H helicopters and proposed that FY 70-72 country requirements for the kits be fulfilled in FY 70.⁷ The U.S. Embassy Bangkok requested approval of the proposal, and SECDEF approved the gunship modification kits for the FY 70 Thai MASF program. Additionally, the SECDEF stated that COMUSMACTHAI would be informed when availability of the kits was certain and that the request for immediate delivery of five kits would be considered in that context.⁸ In June, COMUSMACTHAI reiterated his position stating that the XM-93 requirements were still valid and that there was an added criticality due to the increased tempo of insurgent activity.⁹ On 5 June, CINCPAC requested expedited

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 200531Z Aug 69.
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI 290810Z Jan 70.
 4. CINCPAC 142334Z Mar 70.
 5. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
 6. SECSTATE 3276/272201Z Mar 70.
 7. COMUSMACTHAI 170241Z Apr 70.
 8. SECDEF 091642Z May 70.
 9. COMUSMACTHAI 040940Z Jun 70.

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action to effect delivery of five XM-93 kits.¹ On 9 June, the SECDEF advised that all contracted XM-93 kits were planned for the RVNAF and that a contact extension for five kits was being negotiated. Additionally, the SECDEF would reconsider early delivery of five kits from RVNAF if CY 71 production of all units was not sufficient to meet the political requirements of the U.S. Embassy Bangkok.² The DA responded to these events and stated that the five kits could be released for delivery upon receipt from the manufacturer, if waiver of tests by the USA Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) was authorized.³ CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI provide a response regarding waiver of tests and provided the SECDEF with the necessary data to reprogram an additional 11 kits from FY 72 to FY 71 for the RTA and eight kits from FY 72 to FY 71 for the RTAF.⁴ COMUSMACTHAI authorized waiver of tests by TECOM.⁵ The U.S. Embassy Bangkok reiterated the requirement for expedited delivery of five kits, urging strongly that necessary action be taken to insure that the five UH-1H helicopters due for delivery in Thailand on 30 September be delivered already fitted with XM-93 armament kits.⁶ On 14 July, CINCPAC recommended to the SECDEF that five of 29 kits held for RVNAF gunship attrition be diverted to COMUSMACTHAI.⁷ The SECDEF requested that CINCPAC advise of COMUSMACV concurrence in effecting diversion of the kits⁸ and CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI's comments/concurrence on the proposed action.⁹ CINCPAC advised SECDEF of COMUSMACV concurrence and requested COMUSMACV to ship five XM-93 kits to RTG upon receipt of necessary shipping information from COMUSMACTHAI.¹⁰

CH-47A Helicopters

(S) On 1 August, CINCPAC requested expedited delivery of one CH-47A for turnover to the RTG at a ceremony on 4 September. The JCS approved and the SECDEF authorized delivery of the CH-47A to Thailand on 30 August. The CGUSARV was tasked to effect delivery and did an outstanding job in preparing and delivering the aircraft to Don Muang, Thailand in sufficient time for the turnover ceremony and display to the RTG.¹¹ CINCPAC advised the SECDEF that resolution of funding

1. CINCPAC 050502Z Jun 70.
2. SECDEF 092337Z Jun 70.
3. DA 102147Z May 70.
4. CINCPAC 230032Z and 230033Z Jun 70.
5. COMUSMACTHAI 260430Z Jun 70.
6. AMEMBASSY Bangkok 230842Z Jun 70.
7. CINCPAC 142235Z Jul 70.
8. SECDEF 250022Z Jul 70.
9. CINCPAC 252238Z Jul 70.
10. CINCPAC 010338Z Aug 70.
11. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70, citing CINCPAC 012233Z Aug 70; and CGUSARV 180826Z Aug 70.

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problems associated with the expedited delivery was urgently needed.¹ On 3 September, the SECDEF informed CINCPAC that the funding and programming for two CH-47A helicopters for the RTAF would be accommodated within the Thai MASF ceiling.² The second CH-47A was programmed for delivery in FY 72 with a third aircraft carried in shortfall.³

(S) On 19 September, COMUSMACTHAI submitted a plan to provide the earliest possible CH-47 training for three RTAF pilots and 10 maintenance personnel and requested CINCPAC approval. The plan called for use of the USARV CH-47 demonstration team, on TDY to COMUSMACTHAI for pilot transition training, and the CH-47 mobile training team in RVN for maintenance training. Two weeks of follow-on combat crew training would be conducted in RVN by USARV units.⁴ CINCUSARPAC concurred in the COMUSMACTHAI plan except for the pilot transition and recommended that the Thai helicopter pilots be given CH-47 transition training in CONUS due to inadequate training capability in Southeast Asia.⁵ CINCPAC concurred in the CINCUSARPAC recommendation, instructed COMUSMACTHAI to initiate action to program RTA helicopter pilots to CONUS for training, and advised CINCUSARPAC to coordinate the CH-47 maintenance training as recommended by COMUSMACTHAI.⁶

M-16 Rifle Factory for Thailand

(S) COMUSMACTHAI on 16 April informed CINCPAC that the RTG desired to establish a capability to manufacture M-16 rifles and necessary parts. The RTG requested information on the availability of equipment and cost to establish a capability for manufacturing 1,000 - 3,000 M-16 rifles per month. Manufacturing of civilian goods was also planned by using attachments to the machinery. Although COMUSMACTHAI had consistently discouraged any arms manufacturing aspiration, as funds could be more productively used in counter-insurgency operations, COMUSMACTHAI felt that the requested information should be provided to enable the RTG to arrive at a proper decision. COMUSMACTHAI further emphasized that the Thai's have an overriding desire to become self-sufficient in the armament field.⁷ In view of the February delivery of 23,806 M-16s, CINCPAC did not support the establishment of such a manufacturing capability for Thailand under the austere military assistance or purchase programs. However, CINCPAC was in full

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1. ADMIN CINCPAC 020343Z Sep 70.
 2. SECDEF 9129/031858Z Sep 70.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
 4. COMUSMACTHAI 190508Z Sep 70.
 5. CINCUSARPAC 300552Z Sep 70.
 6. CINCPAC 030040Z Oct 70.
 7. COMUSMACTHAI 161142Z Apr 70.

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accord with the Thai goal of gaining greater self-sufficiency. The SECDEF was requested to provide the desired information to the Thais and to comment on the advisability of redirecting the RTG into AID or commercial channels for the cited manufacturing capability.¹

Phitsanulok Radar Transfer to the RTAF

(U) A USAF AC&W radar site had been operating at Phitsanulok, Thailand since 1967. In October 1969 CINCPACAF recommended that the facility be deactivated because the USAF operational requirement no longer existed. The Thai, however, did have an operational requirement for the facility to counter potential insurgent actions in the area. Transfer of the site would qualify as a Project 703 action and would reduce American presence in Thailand in consonance with U.S./RTG objectives. COMUSMACTHAI proposed and CINCPAC concurred in transfer of the radars and associated equipment to the Thai Air Force as part of the MASF program. On 15 May, the CSAF confirmed approval of the transfer to be effective on 30 June 1970.²

Rail Project - Sattahip to Chachoengsao

(S) In May 1969, the JCS had informed CINCPAC that Korat and CONUS rail stocks excess to DOD requirements were available to the RTG through USAID without reimbursement provided a source to fund the transportation costs could be located. The JCS implied that the DOD could not legally transfer excess stock to a non-military segment of a foreign government and that USAID assistance was required as an intermediary. The Thai rail project as envisioned would provide a rail line between the deep water port at Sattahip and the existing rail net at Chachoengsao in addition to rail spurs to the airbases at Korat, Udorn, Ubon, and Takli.³ In February 1970, COMUSMACTHAI reported that the U.S. Embassy Bangkok had advised that USAID had no funds to transport the rail stock from the U.S. to Thailand. The Embassy also advised that the RTG had requested that the rails be transported on Thai ships,⁴ whereupon CINCPAC requested guidance as to whether the use of Thai ships would be legal.⁵

(S) Since efforts to transfer the rail stocks under USAID auspices had been unsuccessful, the DOD initiated efforts to justify the transfer under the SIMEX program. The JCS requested CINCPAC to provide a current assessment of the

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1. CINCPAC 252236Z Apr 70.
 2. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI 070200Z May 70.
 4. COMUSMACTHAI 051120Z Feb 70.
 5. CINCPAC 072322Z Feb 70.

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military significance of the rail project.¹ CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACTHAI to provide the assessment,² which was forwarded on 7 May.³ CINCPAC concurred strongly in the COMUSMACTHAI assessment and stated that the reduction of dependence on motor transport and enhancement of LOCs which would accrue from the project were considered essential to the successful support of contingency and general war plans.⁴ On 15 June, the Chief of Staff, Supreme Command, Ministry of Defense of the RTG notified Ambassador Unger that the RTG would be pleased to accept the U.S. rail stocks, fund the transportation costs, and build the Sattahip-Chachoengsao railroad.⁵

Developments in Thailand Report, CINCPAC RCS 3500-5

(U) CINCPACNOTE 5213 of 1 October 1969 requested COMUSMACTHAI to make a review of its required reports and to submit recommendations for reducing its reporting requirements. Among COMUSMACTHAI's recommendations, which were forwarded by letter on 9 January 1970, was:⁶

d. CINCPAC 3500-5, Developments in Thailand. The Developments in Thailand Report covers the program of the Royal Thai Armed Forces and the status and activities of U.S. Forces in Thailand. Truly significant changes in programs in Thailand do not usually occur within a three-month period. Only in rare cases can trends be identified based upon information compiled and reported quarterly. Much of what appears in the reports, reappears in the subsequent report with only minor and relatively unimportant changes. The Developments in Thailand Report requires one man year of effort in the J3 Section alone. The remainder of the staff contributes at least an equal effort. In view of the above, and considering planned and anticipated force reductions, recommend that the Developments in Thailand Report be required on a semi-annual basis due in January and July each year.

(C) When CINCPAC's Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans indicated that a semi-annual report would satisfy his needs, the CINCPAC Comptroller replied that

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1. JCS 172127Z Apr 70.
 2. CINCPAC 182307Z Apr 70.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI 070200Z May 70.
 4. CINCPAC 100136Z May 70.
 5. AMEMB Bangkok 7487/181036 (local) Jun 70.
 6. Ltr, COMUSMACTHAI to CINCPAC, 9 Jan 70, Subj: Reduction of Reporting Requirements.

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"appropriate instructions should be issued to COMUSMACTHAI making CINCPAC 3500-5 a semiannual report."¹ Accordingly, on 13 February, CINCPAC asked the JCS to review its requirements with "the objective of reducing submission frequency of the report to a semi-annual basis."² After making this review, the JCS answered as following on 28 February:³

2. (C-NF) The report is widely used (OSD, OJCS, Services) and is considered a key reference document on activities/status of counterinsurgency Royal Thai Armed Forces, and U.S. Forces in Thailand. Semi-annual submission would not ensure sufficient currency of information for use in briefings, fact sheets, and joint actions.

3. (U) Accordingly, the requirement for quarterly submission remains unchanged.

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1. Memo, J50 to J72, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Jan 70, Subj: Reduction of Reporting Requirements; Memo, J72 to J5, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Jan 70, Subj: Reduction in Reporting Requirements; J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
 2. CINCPAC 130408Z Feb 70.
 3. JCS 2109/281409Z Feb 70.

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SECTION VI - COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

Post-Hostilities Communications-Electronics Planning - Vietnam

(S) Planning continued in 1970 to pass to the RVNAF a larger share in the operation and maintenance of communications-electronics facilities and systems, but a number of the same old problems continued to delay both the planning and eventual execution of the plans.¹ The biggest problem was that the Vietnamese were not ready to take over many of the managerial, operational, or maintenance responsibilities. And lacking the education and technical background most Americans started with, training them was going to take longer and be more difficult. It was not until August 1970 that the JCS authorized disclosure of specific parts of the basic planning document to the Vietnamese. Working under security restrictions that excluded the Vietnamese caused further delays.

(S) The first part of the year saw development of COMUSMACV's Operation Plan J195, Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan (CEIMP), in response to a CINCPAC request of 10 January.² Published on 20 March, this plan expanded in scope and extended in detail the Communications-Electronics annex of the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program. It was coordinated with the U. S. Country Team and incorporated information received from the RVNAF.³

(S) COMUSMACV's plan projected an integrated U. S.-RVNAF communications-electronics system that would provide U. S., RVNAF, and other Free World Forces with the necessary command and control, logistic, administrative, and specialized communications. Based on military requirements, the plan envisioned the establishment of a Vietnamese autonomous organization to operate, manage, and maintain a Single Integrated Telecommunications System (SITS). The SITS was to include designated portions of the U. S. Armed Forces Integrated Communications System (ICS) that would be turned over to the RVNAF, the RVNAF Military Telecommunications Network Vietnam (MTNV) assets that were to be reengineered to extend and/or interface with the residual ICS, and the civil Vietnamese Postes and Telecommunications (P&T) Systems. The CEIMP integrated the continuing U. S. Navy Accelerated Turnover of U. S. Navy Communications Assets (ACTOVOCOMM) and the U. S. Air Force program to transfer operation and

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 1-7.
 2. CINCPAC 100316Z Jan 70.
 3. Point Paper, J612, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Oct 70, Subj: Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan (CEIMP) (U)

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maintenance of control towers and ground control approach radars and air base communications-electronics facilities to the Vietnamese Air Force. The CEIMP also provided scheduling through 1978 for RVNAF communications-electronics training in the skills necessary to manage, operate, and maintain the systems proposed for takeover.¹

(C) CINCPAC reviewed COMUSMACV's plan and forwarded it to the JCS in April.² At that time CINCPAC advised the JCS that the plan met the JCS requirements, generally, and that because it was to be revised as factors changed it should be the control document for all communications-electronics planning for the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program. He also noted that although the plan had not been officially coordinated with the Vietnamese, it was expected that such coordination would be accomplished prior to publication of the first revision to the plan. He also advised that COMUSMACV, in coordination with the RVNAF Joint General Staff, was reviewing and revalidating all Table of Organization and Equipment documents to insure that the RVNAF personnel structure and equipment authorizations supported the mission projections of the program.

(S) The JCS CEIMP was promulgated on 12 June, based on COMUSMACV's plan. As CINCPAC had recommended, it was designed to serve as the primary management document for major communications-electronics assets and facilities installed, operated, and maintained within the RVN.³

(U) On 13 August the JCS approved disclosure of specific portions of the JCS CEIMP to the Vietnamese.⁴ This permitted full coordination and joint planning. On 8 September the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved for implementation the expanded concept and objectives of the CEIMP.⁵ Finally, on 29 October the JCS directed implementation of the CEIMP and transfer of communications links from U. S. Forces to the Vietnamese in accordance with listed schedules.⁶

(U) Training the Vietnamese began on 1 July with an initial class of 10 students at Vung Tau. Page Communications Engineers, Inc., operated the

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 10 Apr 70, Subj: RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program and Related U. S. Planning (U).
 3. J612 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70, citing JCS SM 454-70 of 12 Jun 70.
 4. JCS 7422/132233Z Aug 70.
 5. JCS 1245/171912Z Sep 70.
 6. J612 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70 citing MSCS 412-70.

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training facility that was to provide training in the technical hard skills necessary for operation and maintenance of the ICS and the dial telephone exchanges. Page was also to train RVNAF instructors so that contract operations could be phased out by July 1973 when the training facility was to be transferred to the RVNAF Signal School.¹

(S) In another matter related to the turnover, on 15 January COMUSMACV stated an urgent requirement for assistance in reengineering the Military Telecommunications Network Vietnam and to engineer, install, operate, maintain, and manage the RVNAF Telecommunications System. On 17 March CINCPAC advised the JCS that the requested engineering assistance could not be fulfilled from existing PACOM assets and recommended that contractor assistance be added on to the contract already granted by the Agency for International Development to General Telephone and Electric. The two efforts were compatible and would have to be dovetailed eventually, CINCPAC said.² On 5 May the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that CINCPAC's proposal to modify the contract be adopted. They further recommended that the Department of the Army be designated department manager for support of combined communications-electronics engineering in the Republic of Vietnam.³ They also provided the concept for a combined agency with contractor engineer augmentation to operate under COMUSMACV and the RVNAF Joint General Staff.

(S) On 12 August COMUSMACV activated this Combined Telecommunications Engineering Agency, a joint agency with the mission of designing, engineering, and managing the installation and rehabilitation of a combined U.S.-RVNAF command and control-common user communications system to serve the needs of both the RVNAF and U.S. advisors.⁴

(S) Plans for turnover of the communications-electronics systems, accompanied by reductions in U.S. Forces, increased requirements for contractor manning until the RVNAF was ready. In April CINCPAC reviewed a U.S. Army plan for contractor manning of the Integrated Communications System, Southeast Asia (ICS-SEA). The plan provided for complete operation and maintenance by the contractor to reduce the U.S. military presence in Vietnam. The contractor was also to provide training for RVNAF personnel who were to take over the system. Contractor costs were to be an additional \$95.4 million from FY 71

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1. J612 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
 2. CINCPAC 170513Z Mar 70.
 3. J6 Brief No. 00501-70, Hq CINCPAC, 12 May 70 of MJCS 167-70 of 5 May 70, Subj: Contractor Communications Engineering Assistance for Reengineering the Military Telecommunications Network-Vietnam (C).
 4. COMUSMACV 46681/090002Z Sep 70.

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to FY 74, but eventual reduction in the CONUS military sustaining base was expected to offset a large portion of the increase. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the Army plan be approved, that the policy apply equally to Thailand, and that the Department of the Army be tasked to develop an implementation plan for Thailand.¹

(S) In still another matter, CINCPAC hosted a conference at Camp Smith, Hawaii on 5 and 6 October on the Military Telecommunications Network, Vietnam. As a result of the conference, Quality Assurance Teams, under the control of COMUSMACV, began inspection of 66 RVNAF communications-electronics sites to determine their current status and to provide the basis for follow-on rehabilitative and reengineering actions to insure that all systems met minimum standards. By the end of the year 54 sites had been inspected. COMUSMACV offered the following remarks based on the reports of the inspectors. Major problem areas were equipment grounding and signal and power lines run together; the supply system was not supporting operations as required; maintenance was not being performed on the equipment as required, partly due to inadequate functioning of the supply system; and line up procedures were not being accomplished as scheduled ("there was found to be quite a bit of hesitation on the part of equipment operators to correct even obvious deficiencies unless orders to do so were received through their chain of command.")² These conditions, COMUSMACV believed, resulted in major part from several of the causes listed in the RVNAF/MACV Communications Electronics Offensive Plan - "lack of adequate leadership, command emphasis, management and well established procedures. The quality assurance reports will be used to add emphasis to the actions in these areas."³

(S) Proposed takeover of the Dial Telephone Exchanges by the RVNAF prompted COMUSMACV to ask for a change in policy to permit those exchanges direct access to the Tandem Switching Centers. Under existing policy, RVN switchboards did not have such access and could not dial out-of-country or AUTOVON Gateway operators directly. U.S. headquarters that would eventually be served by the RVN exchanges would be denied the class of service that they had been having. On 29 April CINCPAC proposed a new class of service be provided to allow direct dialing to any portion of the Automatic Telephone System in-country but with access to AUTOVON and out-of-country trunks denied to RVN subscribers.⁴ COMUSMACV concurred in the CINCPAC proposal.⁵

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1. CINCPAC 232220Z Apr 70.
 2. Ltr, COMUSMACV J6 to CINCPAC, 27 Dec 70, Subj: Quality Assurance Teams.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCPAC 292207Z Apr 70.
 5. COMUSMACV 21522/051110Z May 70.

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Post-Hostilities Communications-Electronics Planning - Thailand

(S) On 29 September 1969 CINCPAC had forwarded to the JCS a recommended concept for post-hostilities use of communications-electronics systems in Thailand. The JCS reviewed the concept, revising it slightly, and passed it to the Secretary of Defense on 6 November 1969. On 24 January 1970 the Secretary directed the JCS to revise their concept to discourage the development of a Royal Thailand Armed Forces (RTARF) integrated communications system and encourage improvement of the civil communications system under Thai civil control. He further directed that the JCS identify the U.S. communications-electronics equipment and facilities that would not be withdrawn with U.S. Forces and recommend disposition of this equipment. Such information and recommendations were to be coordinated with the Country Team before being submitted to the Secretary. He strongly endorsed the attainment of an immediate capability to train Thai personnel for the operation and maintenance of the communications systems.¹

(S) Further guidance was received from the Secretary and passed to CINCPAC by the JCS on 12 February. The concept, he said, should address the earliest possible phaseout of U.S. communications-electronics personnel from Thailand. Consideration should be given to maximum use of the Thai civil communications system for U.S. and allied communications requirements and to the use of contract personnel to replace U.S. military personnel. RTARF requirements should be supported with only the minimum equipment sufficient to provide them with an adequate combat readiness capability, and priority should be given to the support of U. S. Agency for International Development (AID) expansion and improvement of the Thai civil communications system. A phaseout-turnover schedule should be developed, the Secretary said, based on the revised concept with a completion target date for planning purposes of 1 July 1974. Plans for hard skill communications-electronics training should be developed but training should not be delayed awaiting approval of the revised concept. The revised concept, schedule, and training plans should be developed as a complementary package to the Thai Military Assistance Program and coordinated with the Country Team. The Secretary said that combined planning was not authorized yet but that combined discussions on "posthostilities" requirements should be used to determine the anticipated Thai position on requirements, system

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1. J6 Brief No. 00132-70, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Feb 70 of JCS 2469/506-11, Subj: Concept for the Posthostilities Use of U.S. Military Communications-Electronics Facilities in Thailand (U).

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configuration, and manpower priorities.¹

(S) On 27 February CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACTHAI to revise the concept in accordance with the guidance from the Secretary. He noted that planning would proceed despite the lack of information on what U.S. military or civil agency presence might remain in Thailand subsequent to the arbitrary target date of 1 July 1974. CINCPAC saw the revision as a three-stage requirement: revision of the concept plan, then use of the plan to develop the phaseout-turnover schedule and training plans, and then incorporation of the equipment and training requirements into the Military Assistance Program for Thailand.²

(S) On 24 April CINCPAC approved the revised concept plan submitted by COMUSMACTHAI. It provided that the United States would give the RTARF only minimum equipment sufficient to provide them with an adequate combat readiness capability. Priority was to be given to the support of AID expansion and improvement of the Thai civil communications systems.³ In May CINCPAC, in response to a query from COMUSMACTHAI, asked the JCS for guidance in the matter of the transfer of assets to a civil organization, which raised questions as to legal implications and the requirement for a supportable audit trail for the transaction.⁴ The Secretary of Defense provided guidance on 28 October 1970.⁵

(U) The Defense Communications Agency Pacific raised the question of who should have the lead role in posthostilities planning, COMUSMACTHAI or the U.S. AID. CINCPAC advised that no attempt should be made to assign to either military or civil representatives of the Country Team the leading roles, that each would deal with its own areas and in-country coordination would resolve differences. Those disagreements that could not be settled in-country would be passed up through the respective command channels of the two.⁶

(S) COMUSMACTHAI completed his concept plan and forwarded it to CINCPAC in June. CINCPAC approved it, advising the JCS that it was quite comprehensive

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1. J6 Brief No. 00191-70, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Feb 70 of MJCS 55-70, Subj: Concept for the Phase-out or Turnover of U.S. Military Communications-Electronics Facilities in Thailand.
 2. CINCPAC 272336Z Feb 70.
 3. J615 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70; Ltr, CINCPAC to COMUSMACTHAI, 24 Apr 70, Subj: Concept for Phaseout-Turnover of Communications-Electronics Systems/Facilities in Thailand (U).
 4. CINCPAC 131855Z May 70.
 5. SECDEF 4556/280118Z Oct 70.
 6. CINCPAC 270333Z May 70.

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and well written. He thought it was too ambitious, though, with respect to the types and amounts of equipment earmarked for transfer to the Thai military or civil agencies. "It is by no means certain," he said, that the Thai Government's Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) would "accept such equipment for its system, nor that the RTARF will utilize circuits therein if considered too costly."¹ He listed a number of unresolved matters including procedures for turnover of military equipment and facilities to the TOT and the degree to which that organization can satisfy U.S. requirements for service. CINCPAC asked that the plan be approved as a basis for further planning, that the Department of the Army be tasked to develop a plan for training Thai personnel and another for the contracting of operations and maintenance of the Integrated Communications System Thailand including links operated by the USAF, and that the JCS validate or revise basing requirements and target dates assumed in the plan.²

(S) In October the JCS advised CINCPAC that the COMUSMACTHAI plan was approved as a basis for further planning, which was to be the product of the Country Team based on combined U.S.-Thai planning. Although one of the Military Departments would be ultimately tasked to train the Thai nationals, the development of the training plan was to be an integral part of the Country Team effort. Any plan for contract operation and maintenance of the Integrated Communications System was to be developed in-country to insure a viable long-haul civil communications under Thai civil control. The question of validating or revising the in-country basing requirements and targeting dates assumed for planning would be addressed in future force planning actions, the JCS continued, with those decisions incorporated in revisions to the plan. The next revision was due to the JCS early in 1971.³ The schedule for turnover was also approved by the Secretary of Defense for further planning and a detailed schedule was also required in 1971.⁴

(S) Planning contemplated the use of TOT circuitry to satisfy certain Thai, U.S., and allied military long-haul circuit requirements. The reliability of the TOT was generally unknown and COMUSMACTHAI proposed leasing certain circuits on a trial basis to determine their capability. (He identified 69 circuits eligible for test.) On 15 September CINCPAC asked the JCS to approve the COMUSMACTHAI proposal in principle, grant authority to proceed with the trial, and designate one of the Military Departments to fund the trial and

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1. ADMIN CINCPAC 292131Z Jun 70.
 2. Ibid.
 3. J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70 citing SM-706-70 of 2 Oct 70.
 4. Ibid. citing JCSM-467-70 of 2 Oct 70.

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necessary contract services.¹ The JCS asked for additional information, including cost estimates, test dates, and test criteria to be used. COMUSMACTHAI had wanted to conduct tests in as many geographical areas as possible; the JCS thought 69 circuits an "inordinately large number for such a test."² When COMUSMACTHAI provided more information on 23 November, the estimated cost of the program was about a quarter of a million dollars.³

(S) On 18 December CINCPAC asked COMUSMACTHAI to scale down the test in size and scope, while at the same time retaining a trial program that would form an acceptable basis for evaluation of the TOT. CINCPAC established a monetary ceiling of \$50,000 to avoid having to go to the Defense Department for approval for the expenditure and also to keep the costs within reason. On 31 December COMUSMACTHAI advanced a new proposal in which only eight circuits distributed over the various segments of the TOT would be leased. Estimated cost of the test was \$47,850. At the end of the year CINCPAC was preparing to send the details of the latest proposal to the JCS, recommending that the Army be tasked to support the trial and that authority be granted to proceed.⁴

AUTODIN in Southeast Asia

(C) The Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) remained the primary command and control record communications mode in Southeast Asia. Following CINCPAC's August 1969 promulgation of standards for command center AUTODIN support it appeared that certain upgrading of communications-electronics programs in Southeast Asia would be required. Further review led CINCPAC to provide new guidance in April 1970.⁵ No new or major AUTODIN planning or programming would be considered for Southeast Asia in support of those standards for performance established in 1969 except for primary long-term, stabilized Southeast Asia command and control communications requirements, which he identified. These requirements were to be supported only by assets in use or programmed.

(S) In early March the JCS asked CINCPAC for his comments on a proposal to use one of the AUTODIN Switch Centers from Southeast Asia to upgrade communications in Europe. CINCPAC considered the proposal premature, advised of planning actions underway, and recommended that no firm plans be developed

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1. CINCPAC 150336Z Sep 70.
 2. JCS 1615/221559Z Sep 70.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI 231130Z Nov 70.
 4. J623 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
 5. ADMIN CINCPAC 180059Z Apr 70.

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that were dependent on redeployment of switching centers then in use in Southeast Asia.¹

Communications to Cambodia

(S) In 1970 a long-haul communications system linking Phnom Penh, Cambodia with the Integrated Communications System at Long Binh, Vietnam was completed except for some minor terminal changes that were to be accomplished early in 1971. The system included a tropospheric scatter radio link between the Phnom Penh airport and the Long Binh terminal, plus a distribution system in Phnom Penh that consisted of very high frequency radio links from the airport to Cambodian Armed Forces headquarters and to the new Embassy building. The system carried 16 active out-of-country voice and teletype circuits by the end of the year.²

(S) Early planning, dating from a conference in Bangkok in June, had called for two tropo links. Although the system envisioned was a valid long-range planning objective, a system vastly reduced in scope could be installed in a short period of time by no more than 10 personnel in Cambodia at any one time. On 15 July CINCPAC recommended installation of the system that came into being in 1970.³ The JCS approved CINCPAC's proposal on 5 August; they also approved the provision of secure voice service to the U.S. Ambassador in Phnom Penh. On 7 August CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACV to proceed with the installation, coordinating as required with the Ambassador in Cambodia.⁴ CINCUSARPAC was tasked to provide funding and logistic support. The Ambassador pursued the matter of approval through State Department channels and on 12 August he authorized the introduction of the necessary personnel and equipment.⁵

(S) After administrative delays the equipment arrived on a Vietnamese LST on 24 August.⁶ Personnel started to arrive also, and an apparent remark by a representative of the contractor, the Page Engineering Company, that 18-20 persons would be required to operate the system so alarmed the Charge d'Affaires in Phnom Penh that reverberations were felt at the Washington level. The JCS advised CINCPAC that a prime consideration in discussing the CINCPAC

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1. ADMIN CINCPAC 122329Z Mar 70.
 2. Point Paper, J623, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 70, Subj: Communications to Cambodia (U).
 3. J623 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70 citing CINCPAC 152014Z Jul 70.
 4. Ibid. citing CINCPAC 070212Z Aug 70.
 5. Ibid. citing AMEMB PHNOM PENH 1953/121100Z Aug 70.
 6. J623 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.

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proposal with the Secretary of State was the requirement to hold U.S. visibility to a minimum.¹ The JCS said that in approving the implementation of the system it was intended to limit the number of U.S. civilian personnel in Phnom Penh at any one time to 10 and to replace them with third country nationals to the maximum extent possible at the earliest date.

(S) CINCPAC immediately informed the JCS that the information afforded to the Charge was unfounded and that it was and had been CINCPAC's intention to do the job with 10 personnel.² CINCPAC also asked the Charge to seek to clarify, confirm, or squelch such rumors or misunderstandings at the local level in the future.

(S) On 21 August CINCPAC asked the JCS for approval to downgrade the overall classification of the project to CONFIDENTIAL. The very existence of the project had been TOP SECRET and communication with contract personnel had been difficult. The JCS approved the request on 26 August. Prior to downgrading the project, which occurred on 1 September by CINCPAC direction,³ the Secretary of State had prepared public affairs guidance in case there were questions from the press concerning the new installation.

(S) Toward the end of August the question of the number of people working on the project arose once more. The COMUSMACV Communications Liaison Officer in Phnom Penh reported that the Charge d'Affaires told him there would be no more than 10 people working on the project, including local nationals. CINCPAC considered this restriction to be one imposed arbitrarily by the Charge and at variance with previous JCS guidance and intent regarding minimum visibility of the U.S.-third country national profile in Cambodia. From the outset CINCPAC had construed the 10-man ceiling as being applicable to U.S. and third country personnel only and therefore did not prevent the contractor from hiring Cambodian nationals to accomplish such incidental work as was within their capability. On 1 September CINCPAC asked the JCS to intercede.⁴

(S) On 2 September the Secretary of Defense reemphasized that previous guidance was not intended to limit the number of host country nationals employed on the project but applied only to U.S. and third country nationals.⁵ The Secretary also asked CINCPAC to explore the feasibility of providing on-the-job training for the Cambodian nationals with a view to their ultimately

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1. JCS 7772/182227Z Aug 70.
 2. ADMIN CINCPAC 190212Z Aug 70.
 3. ADMIN CINCPAC 012327Z Sep 70.
 4. CINCPAC 010314Z Sep 70.
 5. SECDEF 9063/022200Z Sep 70.

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replacing some or all of the third country nationals.

(S) Throughout the installation process there were two problems that continually hampered work. One was transportation of personnel and equipment from Vietnam, for which reliance was placed, for the most part, on Vietnamese Air Force flights. Irregular flight schedules and competition with other high priority personnel and equipment for space often caused delays in project completion. The situation was ameliorated when the 1st Signal Brigade was authorized to use its own aircraft to fly in urgently needed parts. The second problem was the restriction on the number of personnel that could be in Cambodia at any given time. Assistance from Cambodian or Vietnamese nationals was of a menial nature and the 10 professionals were spread thin. When a certain expertise was not available and somebody had to be called in from Vietnam, he was delayed by cumbersome country clearance procedures and inadequate transportation. And before he arrived another man had to be shipped out to keep within the quota.¹

(S) On 19 September the Commanding General of the 1st Signal Brigade requested immediate authority to increase the task force from 10 to 34.² While the matter was under study the newly arrived Ambassador in Phnom Penh suggested informally to General Abrams that he introduce 10 U.S. military personnel, in civilian clothes, for a 14-day period to expedite completion of the project and to help peak up equipment and improve circuit quality. General Abrams was quick to respond and CINCPAC postponed action on the request from the 1st Signal Brigade.³

(S) On 4 September the tropo system was activated and was cut to traffic on nine channels about a week later. The system was essentially completed by the end of September.⁴ The secure voice terminal was temporarily connected in the Old Embassy building and became operational on 11 November. It was to be relocated to its permanent location in the new Embassy when that building was completed; the transfer was expected to occur early in 1971.⁵

Project COBRA TALON

(S) COBRA TALON was a project to install a space tracking radar in northern Thailand.⁶ Although it was an Air Force project, CINCPAC had an

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1. J623 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
 2. CG 1ST SIG BDE USASTRATCOM LBN RVN 191506Z Sep 70.
 3. J623 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
 4. Ibid.
 5. J623 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Oct, Dec 70.
 6. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 22-23

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interest in the matter, principally regarding the long haul communications in support of the project. On 15 January 1970 the Air Force Chief of Staff directed CINCPACAF to insure CINCPAC's awareness of general requirements in support of COBRA TALON; he stated that specific requirements should be identified to and validated by CINCPAC as early as possible to insure circuit availability when the facility became operational.¹ He also pointed out that use of "available assets" would be necessary to remain within approved funding.

(C) On 17 January CINCPAC indicated a general awareness of COBRA TALON requirements but he asked the Air Force Chief of Staff to define specific requirements so that he could determine the best disposition of certain equipment that might be excess.² After receiving further information CINCPAC reserved the equipment under study for COBRA TALON use. On 4 April CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF that he was not in a position to validate COBRA TALON requirements, first because it was a Military Department requirement not a CINCPAC requirement, and secondly because of inadequate familiarity with project operations and activities.³ He asked CINCPACAF to arrange briefings for CINCPAC and his component commands.

(U) On 15 May CINCPACAF representatives briefed CINCPAC on the background and status of the project. No new information was divulged except that CINCPACAF had begun preparation of an action requesting the programming of long haul communications to support COBRA TALON. This was in accordance with Defense Department directives whenever requirements exceeded \$50,000, the threshold imposed by the Secretary of Defense on increased capability or reconfiguration of communications facilities in the Far East.

(C) COMUSMACTHAI then pointed out the need for consideration of various items related to the long haul communications that apparently had been raised at a predesign meeting. These addressed the inclusion of Integrated Communications System facilities in the COBRA TALON site plan, manning of the communications facility, power requirements, and the required Initial Operational Capability date for the long haul communications.⁴

(S) On 16 June CINCPAC asked the Air Force Chief of Staff for clarification of the questions raised by COMUSMACTHAI. CINCPAC said that he recognized that COBRA TALON was an Air Force project and was to be managed as such. The long haul communications sub-system, however, involved the effort of

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1. CSAF 151819Z Jan 70.
 2. CINCPAC 172216Z Jan 70.
 3. ADMIN CINCPAC 040400Z Apr 70.
 4. COMUSMACTHAI 090432Z Jun 70.

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several PACOM component commands and agencies. "CINCPAC, therefore, has the responsibility of insuring that the actions of the components are coordinated and directed toward successfully fulfilling the requirement."¹ CINCPAC continued that he intended to review program status and to assign tasks as appropriate.

(S) Planning continued with the Air Force Communications Service tasked with the planning, engineering, and installation of the system, including the Defense Communications System extension from Ko Kha to Phitsanulok, Thailand. On 16 September, however, COMUSMACTHAI advised CINCPAC that the Commander of the 29th Signal Group had stated that his group could install the entry link for less than half of the Air Force's estimated cost.² COMUSMACTHAI recommended that tasking be changed from Air Force to Army; CINCPACAF and the Air Force Communications Service readily concurred.³ CINCPAC asked COMUSMACTHAI on 30 September to have the 29th Signal Group prepare a detailed cost analysis in support of their claim. The analysis revealed that the work could be done for about \$130,000--more than half but still considerably less than the CINCPACAF estimate.

(C) CINCUSARPAC indicated a willingness to install the system on the condition the funds and certain equipment were provided and that base power and base communications at Ko Kha would be provided by the Air Force. CINCPAC, therefore, on 17 October recommended to the JCS that tasking for the engineering and installation of the tropo link be changed from Air Force to Army.⁴

(C) On 8 December the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the Army be so tasked, with the Air Force designated to operate and maintain both terminals and to make available to the Army not more than \$30,000 in temporary duty funds.

(U) Time was of the essence because of complications in funding if procurement was not completed before the end of FY 71. The JCS waived the requirement for a sub-system project plan; the Army needed only to formulate an abbreviated management engineering plan and other abbreviated plans that may be required. At the end of the year CINCPAC was waiting for Secretary of Defense action on the JCS recommendations.⁵

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1. ADMIN CINCPAC 162321Z Jun 70.
 2. COMUSMACTHAI 160934Z Sep 70.
 3. CINCPACAF 240031Z Sep 70; AFCS 172142Z Sep 70.
 4. CINCPAC 172208Z Oct 70.
 5. J623 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.

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(S) Earlier, in 1969, COBRA TALON had been a project considered in connection with PEACE RIDE II, a highly controversial aircraft control and warning radar station proposed for construction at Doi Inthanon, Thailand.¹

(S) Construction for PEACE RIDE II and COBRA TALON were approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and cleared by Congress. A combination of Military Construction and MAP funds in the amount of \$10.6 million was identified for construction requirements (\$5.6 million for PEACE RIDE II, \$5 million for COBRA TALON).²

(S) Engineering investigation of the PEACE RIDE II project had been completed by the Officer in Charge of Construction, Thailand, but construction had not been started. There was a basic problem; i.e., inadequacy of funds. The cost estimates for the entire project, including the 58 kilometer road and radar station cantonment on the mountain, varied from \$6.7 to \$8 million, depending on construction options. The U.S. Embassy had informed the Thai Government that only \$5.2 million could be contributed by the United States for construction, and that the Thai's must pick up the difference in cost. Thailand had not made a decision to proceed with the project, and negotiations were still being conducted by the Embassy. Radar gear for the project was procured some time ago under the MAP, and was available in the Continental United States. Although the Thai oriented PEACE RIDE II was not directly related to the conflict in Southeast Asia, CINCPAC supported the project because of prior U.S. commitment and long-range interest involved with COBRA TALON.³

Communications Security

(U) For many years CINCPAC had been stressing the importance of communications security in the PACOM.⁴

(S) CINCPACFLT summarized the dangers in a message to all of his command in May.⁵ He told of the capture of a 12-man Viet Cong-North Vietnamese Army signal intelligence monitoring team, a small portion of the more than 3,975 personnel the enemy was believed to have in the Republic of Vietnam below the Demilitarized Zone gathering signal intelligence. Many spoke English and had

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 21-23
 2. J4221 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Apr 71, Subj: PEACE RIDE II and COBRA TALON Construction.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 14-16
 5. CINCPACFLT 262107Z May 70.

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been very effective at reading (decrypting) homemade codes in real time. They had commented to their superiors, however, that secure voice had foiled their efforts wherever employed.

(C) Late in 1969 the JCS advised CINCPAC that a contract had been awarded to the Research Analysis Corporation to study the operational and administrative problems involved in frequently changing call signs and frequencies for tactical forces. Part of this study was a visit to the PACOM in March and April 1970 to determine what facilities were available to support an automated call sign-frequency assignment system.¹ The problem was that the administrative problems associated with frequently changing call signs and frequencies were great and generally avoided by leaving them in effect for long periods of time, contradicting a basic principle of communications security which required frequent changes.

(S) A new wheel type tactical operations code was introduced, the KAC-288 Wheel Code, and CINCPAC consolidated the requirements of his Service components and submitted them to developers of the code, the National Security Agency.² There had been first the matter of settling certain Service differences in Vietnam that made the use of the code initially non-compatible between Army and Navy units. Service evaluation had found the KAC-288 suitable for combat field use, however.

(C) Use of homemade codes and authenticators persisted. The Director of the National Security Agency had rescinded the publications that authorized local production of tactical operations codes and authenticators and the JCS had promulgated new policy prohibiting local code production. Then, in mid-February 1970 the Director of the National Security Agency sent a message contrary to all previous instructions. He authorized U.S. Army Units to continue allowing local production of operations codes and authenticators.

(C) On 25 February CINCPAC objected to the Director's permissiveness, which he said would open the door for any Army unit to use homemade codes at its convenience. He opposed such authorization and had taken action to eliminate all use of homemade codes, but the Director's message "tends to vitiate these efforts."³ CINCPAC said that the best course of action would be to task the Service cryptologic agencies to be able to provide suitable nationally produced codes available for field commanders when they were needed. If it was determined that it was necessary to allow the Army to make its own

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1. CINCPAC 061959Z Jan 70; J642 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
 2. CINCPAC 060143Z Jan 70; CINCPAC 170312Z Feb 70.
 3. ADMIN CINCPAC 250032Z Feb 70.

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codes in the field, CINCPAC suggested that the National Security Agency provide information for local computer production of standard codes, which would eliminate the non-professional aspects of code construction and the insecurities.

(S) As plans for more and more turnover of equipment and operations to the forces of Southeast Asian allies developed, problems associated with communications security and cryptographic equipment developed. CINCPAC could not authorize the use of such equipment by foreign nationals. Authorization had to be granted at the national level by the U.S. Communications Security Board. All such requests were submitted to the Board on a case-by-case basis and they were considered individually.

(S) In late 1969, however, CINCPAC proposed to COMUSMACV and the Director of the National Security Agency that a comprehensive communications and signal intelligence survey be conducted of the RVNAF's posture in these fields in relation to the hostile threat with the view of assessing the adequacy of U.S. communications security assistance.¹ The results of such a study, CINCPAC believed, would form the basis of future long-range U.S. assistance to the RVNAF to improve and modernize their security posture and capabilities. COMUSMACV objected to the tasking because of personnel shortages, interference with on-going combat operations, and inadequate expertise among personnel assigned to do the job. Subsequently, the National Security Agency Pacific undertook the task of researching and drafting a comprehensive threat study, which was sent to COMUSMACV for coordination. CINCPAC offered general guidance in the matter. COMUSMACV concurred, recommending a few changes that were in turn approved by CINCPAC.

(S) The proposed RVNAF communications security portion of the Improvement and Modernization Plan was forwarded to the JCS by CINCPAC in February.² The JCS concurred and forwarded it to the Director of the National Security Agency, requesting approval from the U.S. Communications Security Board.

(S) The matter of equipment quantities was questioned by the authorities in Washington, but this matter could not be addressed by COMUSMACV or CINCPAC unless and until the plan was released to the Vietnamese for discussion and finalization of RVNAF force structure, operational plans, etc. Late in April the JCS approved release of the communications security portion of the Improvement and Modernization Plan to the Government of Vietnam to effect a

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1. J6421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70 citing CINCPAC 260820W Sep 69.
 2. J6421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70 citing Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 2 Feb 70, Subj: GVN COMSEC Improvement.

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preliminary agreement of quantities of communications security equipment required. Several meetings were necessary to clarify understanding of the plan.

(S) Meanwhile, queries from Washington were received by CINCPAC regarding the correlation of the individual requests for RVNAF communications security assistance with the communications security portion of the Improvement and Modernization Plan. CINCPAC replied that future individual requests would be directly related to the plan.¹

(S) As the plan became more formalized, it became an annex to COMUSMACV's Operation Plan J195; all outstanding individual requests for assistance that had been forwarded to the JCS were cancelled by CINCPAC.

(S) In September the JCS informed CINCPAC that the Secretary of Defense had approved the RVNAF Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan, with all annexes, as a single document for future planning purposes. Modifications to the planning were made as new requirements were developed or old requirements changed.²

(S) Communications security assistance was also provided to Laos forces in 1970. The United States had begun such assistance in 1961 with the loan of a number of M-209 cryptographic converters to be used by the Laotian Army. There was no maintenance agreement, but the United States did agree to replace inoperable converters on a one-for-one exchange basis. This replacement procedure functioned well until 1966 when requests for exchange equipment stopped. There was no assistance provided from that time until 1970, when the U.S. Ambassador requested a briefing on the vulnerabilities of communications to Communist force exploitation. The Ambassador then requested additional communications security assistance for the Royal Laotian Forces.

(S) The U.S. Army Attache in Laos proposed that the Lao forces receive both additional M-209 crypto converters and training in their maintenance. The Director of the National Security Agency approved the furnishing of the M-209s but disapproved the idea of maintenance training.³

(S) Communications security assistance was also provided to Cambodia during 1970. At the beginning of operations in Cambodia the Seventh Air Force

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1. J6421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70 citing CINCPAC 132154Z May 70.
 2. J6421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70
 3. J6421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70 citing DIRNSA 112044Z Sep 70 and ADMIN CINCPAC 120308Z Sep 70.

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asked that certain communications security material for tactical air operations be released to both the Vietnamese and Cambodian forces. Because of the requirement to have national level approval for the release of cryptographic material to foreign countries, and the urgent operational need, COMUSMACV decided to have the Vietnamese handle the required coordination and the requirement was cancelled.

(S) In anticipation of similar future requirements, however, CINCPAC asked the JCS to clarify U.S. policy concerning release of communications security material to Cambodia.¹ The JCS recommended to the Director of the National Security Agency that assistance be provided to consist of a numerical encryption system, an operations code, a secure teletype link operated by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam between Phnom Penh and Saigon, and provision of some communications security training for Cambodian forces. The National Security Agency Director approved the request and authorized provision of various types of assistance to the Vietnamese and Thai as well as the Cambodian forces. He also authorized direct coordination of requirements as required among the parties involved. Shipment of the necessary equipment for Cambodian forces had begun before the end of 1970.²

Communications Support for Operation SEA LORDS

(C) Operation SEA LORDS was an interdiction operation on the waterways of the Republic of Vietnam controlled from Navy Advanced Tactical Support Bases and carried out by combined air, waterborne, and amphibious operations.³ CINCPAC had gotten involved in 1969 as the matter entered joint channels, but CINCPAC believed it was primarily a Service matter to be handled through Navy channels.

(C) The matter of surveying communications assets in support of these operations had been under study at the end of 1969. Early in 1970 the requirements and equipment shortfalls were outlined to CINCPAC, as was information regarding the equipment not available in Vietnam.

(C) On 5 February CINCPAC concurred in the findings of the study group and asked COMUSMACV to task his Navy component commander to address the requirement for that equipment not available in Vietnam through normal Service channels.⁴ On 20 February COMUSMACV asked his component commanders to take

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1. CINCPAC 172213Z Jun 70
 2. J6421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 17-18
 4. CINCPAC 051849Z Feb 70.

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the necessary implementing actions to furnish communications support to SEA LORDS.¹

(U) On 20 March the Chief of Naval Operations directed CINCPACFLT to submit through normal Service channels the consolidated list of equipment required to support these operations in Vietnam.²

(U) On 1 April CINCPAC reiterated to COMUSMACV the JCS policy that interdiction operations in Vietnam were to be aligned to the greatest extent possible to in-country support capabilities and that any requirements that could not be satisfied from in-country assets were to be ordered through normal Service channels instead of being submitted to CINCPAC.³

Communications Requirements - Korea

(C) Planning had begun in 1968 to correct critical deficiencies in the capabilities of communications facilities in Korea to support U.S. Forces. The U.S. Army-operated Korea Wideband Network (KWN) was to be upgraded, as were the Republic of Korea Army and Air Force communications systems.⁴ These systems were also to be interconnected in certain respects. Although austere, the improvements, when completed, were expected to provide the needed alternate routing capability among the three existing independent systems.

(C) In response to a CINCPAC request, CINCUSARPAC on 8 January 1970 submitted a plan for improving communications within the KWN by using assets that could be withdrawn from Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand. In essence the plan, which was entitled the PACOM Communications Improvement Plan (PACIP), involved the transfer of certain microwave and multiplex equipment that was either excess to COMUSMACTHAI's requirements because of the deactivation of certain Integrated Communications System sites or that could be made available through the reconfiguration of certain links of that system by substituting other equipment.⁵

(C) In Korea the equipment would be used principally to upgrade the quality and channel capacity of the backbone segments of the KWN, replacing existing equipment manufactured by the Nippon Electric Company. The Nippon

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1. COMUSMACV 8539/200144Z Feb 70.
 2. CNO 202116Z Mar 70.
 3. ADMIN CINCPAC 011952Z Apr 70.
 4. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 23-26.
 5. J623 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70 citing Ltr, CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC, 8 Jan 70, Subj: PACOM Communication Improvement Plan.

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equipment, in turn, would be used to upgrade the capacity and improve the reliability of the spur links that extended from the backbone to the various posts and camps. Equipment in use on those spur links could be returned to tactical application.

(C) On 12 January representatives of the JCS, the Department of the Army, and the Defense Communications Agency were briefed on the PACIP and the Director of the Defense Communications Agency undertook preparation of Management Engineering Plans (MEP) based on the essential elements of the plan. Separate action was taken to obtain approval from the Secretary of Defense to deploy some transportable equipment to Korea; approval was granted on 28 May with certain conditions--other useable resources were not available within the PACOM, that a quick reaction capability to redeploy them be maintained, that they not be used before the start of overall system upgrading, and that the use of them over a year after the start of upgrading action be again referred to the Secretary for approval. CINCPAC investigated and found that there was no other suitable equipment in the PACOM.¹

(C) Work also proceeded on planning for the interface-interconnect of the KWN and the ROKAF system, which was called BLUE FORTUNE, and between the KWN and the ROK Army system. A meeting held in Seoul, Korea from 12 to 14 January 1970 resulted in a number of agreements about Service responsibility for facets of the plan, circuit requirements, and site security. The major interconnect points were to be at Taegu and Osan.

(C) Despite some other suggestions for more ambitious improvements,² CINCPAC's original guidance on the interface-interconnect remained valid.³ Subsequent meetings resolved other planning matters. Total cost for the interface-interconnect for the two sites was expected to be \$214,931.⁴

(C) The matter of the requirement for a regional Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) switch in Korea was raised again in connection with revalidation of communications requirements based on troop withdrawals. In April 1970 CINCPAC revalidated the urgent requirement for this switch and again on 13 October revalidated subscribers for record communications. At that time CINCPAC reaffirmed his position that an automated communications system in Korea remained a valid and urgent requirement,⁵ but at the end of the year no

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1. CINCPAC 060312Z Jun 70; J623 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
 2. J621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
 3. CINCPAC 072215Z Jan 70.
 4. J621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
 5. CINCPAC 131905Z Oct 70.

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word on this matter had been received from Washington.

(c) In connection with the phase down of U.S. Forces, communications-electronics facilities were being made available for other requirements. An overall realignment, consolidation, and integration of telecommunications facilities was apparent. On 30 October CINCPAC asked COMUS Korea for a draft plan for a Single Integrated Telecommunications System - Korea (SITS-K).¹ The matter was under study at the end of the year.

1. CINCPAC 300314Z Oct 70.

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SECTION VII - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

JCS/CINCPAC Working Group on Phase III - RVNAF Improvement and Modernization

(S) During the month of January, J2 CINCPAC attended a conference in Washington, D. C., as a member of the CINCPAC Working Group. The purpose of the conference was to assist the JCS in preparing a report to the Secretary of Defense on Phase III - RVNAF Improvement and Modernization. CINCPAC prepared the intelligence section of the report in cooperation with the COMUSMACV representative. The intelligence section provided proposed actions for upgrading the RVNAF intelligence community while at the same time maintaining sufficient U.S. resources in-country to insure that both the RVNAF and U. S. combat elements were provided requisite intelligence until such time as the RVNAF attained self-sufficiency. The JCS accepted the CINCPAC proposals and forwarded them to the Secretary of Defense.¹

Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) Survey Trip

(C) During June, J2 CINCPAC personnel conducted a fact-finding trip to the MACV Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) and Seventh Air Force IDHS centers. The purpose of trip was to determine current and planned operations as a basis for future PACOM IDHS planning actions. Manpower resource levels appeared adequate at all centers although problems associated with the short tour of military personnel continued to degrade effectiveness. Another major problem was the inability to maintain a satisfactory level of cleared and trained personnel. On site external contractor assistance was used to help alleviate personnel problems.

(C) MACV and Seventh Air Force IDHS appeared to be providing effective support to the intelligence staffs; however, CICV computer operations appeared to be of marginal utility and probably could be assumed by the MACV center without significantly degrading processing requirements. Specific plans for future MACV/CICV operations had not been fully developed due to a lack of detailed information on the future workload.²

The Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Program

(C) On 19 March 1970 CINCPACAF terminated personnel support to the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD), COMUSMACTHAI Interrogation Team, because of low productivity and a reduction in manpower in Detachment 5,

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1. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
 2. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.

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6499th Special Activities Group (SAG). CINCPAC informed the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that support to COMUSMACTHAI would continue through the 17th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) and that reexamination would be made after six months to determine whether the value of the intelligence obtained warranted continued support.¹

(S) At the June meeting of the CINCPAC HUMINT Board the Commander, Detachment 5, 6499th SAG reported on the difficulties and limitations of his operations/ [REDACTED]

(S) On 15 June COMUSMACTHAI informed CINCPAC that Detachment 5 had been the subject of considerable concern to him in recent months. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He stated that it was his opinion, and that of the U.S. Ambassador, that Detachment K, 500th Military Intelligence Group (MIG), was capable of handling Air Force collection interests in relation to the Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center and recommended that serious consideration be given to deactivating Detachment 5.³ CINCPAC non-concurred with COMUSMACTHAI's recommendation [REDACTED]

Photo Reconnaissance Intelligence (PHOTOINT)

(S) U.S./RVN military operations in Cambodia triggered a requirement for increased photo coverage. This increase placed an additional workload on the PACOM tactical photo reconnaissance assets, the nationally controlled strategic photo reconnaissance assets, and the theater photo processing facilities. Operations were required in all areas of Cambodia with the national assets providing most of the coverage from the Mekong River west to the Thai border. Intelligence data from these missions was provided to the CJCS via the Daily

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1. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
 2. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI ltr ser 1504 of 15 Jun 70.
 4. CINCPAC ltr 233 ser 002292 of 31 Jul 70.

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Report - Cambodia, initiated on 26 June at the request of the Chairman of the JCS.¹

(S) In December DIA established an urgent requirement for the timely delivery of tactical reconnaissance photography acquired of the Loatian panhandle and southern NVN in support of the Chairman of the JCS.⁶ DIA representatives visited CINCPAC 7-9 December to discuss anticipated problem areas. As a result of this visit DIA proposed the use of airmail to forward original negatives, select prints, and select photo negatives on an expedited basis.⁷ CINCPAC advised DIA that the original negative could be airmailed or delivered to the Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS) for shipment within 36 to 48 hours of mission return and that the Pacific Region Postal Office had indicated that the best means for timely delivery of materials to Washington was via ARFCOS instead of airmail.⁸ DIA concurred in the use of ARFCOS and provided detailed guidance for implementation of agreed procedures.⁹

(S) A CINCPAC Staff analysis of all Southeast Asia photo requests levied on national assets indicated that, in many instances, an inordinate amount of time was required for validation by COMUSMACV.¹⁰ To alleviate this problem

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1. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
 2. The Joint Information Center would consist of representatives from the US, RVN, RTG, and Cambodia.
 3. DIA DIAXX-Z 09839/142302Z Jul 70.
 4. DIA DIAXX-Z 11164/121253Z Aug 70.
 5. CINCPAC 182336Z Jul 70.
 6. DIA DC 16192/041318Z Dec 70, DIA DC 16635/162257Z Dec 70
 7. DIA DR 16520/141155Z Dec 70.
 8. CINCPAC 220351Z Dec 70.
 9. DIA 16899/241828Z Dec 70.
 10. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.

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COMUSMACV was tasked to insure that future special collection requirements were fully coordinated by COMUSMACV and the Commander, Seventh Air Force before forwarding a single COMUSMACV message to CINCPAC.¹ In a related action COMUSMACV was also tasked to realign all outstanding special collection requirements in priority precedence each time a new collection action was initiated.² This would enable CINCPAC to identify to CINCSAC those collection requirements of greatest urgency to COMUSMACV.³

Mapping, Charting and Geodesy

Aerial Survey Operations

(S) On 31 March Aerial Survey Team 3 (AST-3) of the USAF Aerospace Cartographic and Geodetic Service completed aerial cartographic operations in Southeast Asia and began redeployment to its home station at Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas. Redeployment was completed on 20 April.⁴

(C) On 4 May U.S. Navy Heavy Photographic Squadron 61 (VAP-61) formally closed its Detachment T in Bangkok, Thailand after completion of the project to provide complete photographic coverage of Thailand for cartographic revision. The program was originated in 1966 based on a joint requirement of the Royal Thai Survey Department and the U.S. Army Topographic Command.⁵

Lease of Hydrographic Boats to the Republic of Korea

(C) Two U.S. Navy Hydrographic Soundboats from the USS MAURY were transferred to the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Transportation in May. The transfer was the result of a CINCPAC recommendation to enhance the coastal survey capability of the ROK to facilitate satisfaction of U.S. and ROK requirements for improved data and charts.⁶

COMUSMACTHAI Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS)

(S) During December a CINCPAC Staff visit to COMUSMACTHAI was made to determine specific details regarding current and planned IDHS application systems and resource requirements. It was found that effective IDHS automatic

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1. CINCPAC 222045Z Dec 70.
 2. CINCPAC 242325Z Dec 70.
 3. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
 4. J26 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
 5. J26 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
 6. CINCPAC 130406Z Jun 69; J26 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.

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data processing support was being provided to COMUSMACTHAI and OUSARMA, Laos, at a reasonable cost. It was also determined that, although there was a continuing requirement for COMUSMACTHAI to maintain an IDHS planning and coordinating capability during any COMUSMACTHAI staff reduction, on-site contractor assistance could be terminated during the fourth quarter of FY 71 without degrading processing support capabilities significantly.¹

Phase Out of the MACV/CICV IBM 1800 Computer

(U) During the month of December the MACV/CICV IDHS International Business Machines (IBM) 1800 Computer System was transferred on an Inter Government Transfer (IGT) to the Department of Agriculture, San Antonio, Texas. Also the CALCOMP 1627 Model 2 Drum Plotter was declared excess to the needs of MACV/CICV IDHS due to the loss of the IBM 1800 Computer System. The phase out of the IBM 1800 computer resulted in a yearly savings of \$87,000 in rental money and did not cause any degradation in user support.

1. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.

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SECTION VIII - PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Personnel Reduction Management in Vietnam

(S) Redeployment of U.S. Forces continued to receive high level attention in 1970. In the spring, as reductions continued, there was one period when there was a temporary increase in strength. This stimulated the Secretary of Defense to voice his concern through the JCS. U.S. strength at the time was below the Manpower Ceiling Authorization, but the Secretary considered any increase, even one within the limit of the ceiling, to have a potential troublesome effect.¹

(S) COMUSMACV provided the information about the situation in Vietnam on which a reply to the JCS was based. He cited the many variables that made him consider it essential that a flexibility of at least two percent fluctuation from the authorized space ceiling to the chargeable troop strength be continued in effect. He recommended that he have freedom to manage personnel strengths within a clearly defined ceiling.

(S) This was the same kind of problem that had been encountered during the buildup of forces--not as much flexibility within established ceilings as was considered necessary by either CINCPAC or COMUSMACV. On 24 May CINCPAC advised the JCS that he concurred with COMUSMACV in the matter of the need for a certain amount of flexibility in the management of in-country strength to provide appropriate skills where they were needed and adequate personnel for casualty replacement.² CINCPAC believed that a flexibility range of one to two percent appeared reasonable. He agreed that immediate action to reduce about 2,000 personnel during a relatively short period to attain a specified strength level appeared inappropriate. CINCPAC "strongly supported" COMUSMACV's position that he be given flexibility for management of forces in Vietnam within the authorized ceiling.³

Combat Zone Tax Exclusion and Hostile Fire Pay

(S) In April the U.S. Army Attache in Laos recommended that CINCPAC reopen the issue of combat zone tax exclusion for personnel serving in Laos. The matter had been under study in 1968, at which time CINCPAC had proposed that personnel in Laos were serving in a hostile fire pay area and should be eligible for the tax exemption,⁴ but CINCPAC's proposal was not adopted.

1. JCS 9471/210041Z May 70.

2. CINCPAC 240206Z May 70.

3. Ibid.

4. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 58.

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(S) In June 1970 CINCPAC advised the Attache that the matter could not be considered favorably at the time. He noted the merit of the recommendation, but said this was overridden by other factors. Authorization for an income tax exclusion, CINCPAC noted, required a specific designation by the President to satisfy the Internal Revenue Service Code. CINCPAC said, "In view of the latest public position of the US Government regarding US intentions in Southeast Asia, a new designation of this type would not be consistent with current national policy."¹

(U) In another matter, on 4 August the Treasury Department announced a new proposed tax regulation that would permit uniform tax benefits for military personnel in all combat areas, including those who served in Cambodia in the spring of 1970. The proposed regulation would provide greater guidance to the Internal Revenue Service in its application of the 1965 Executive Order that designated Vietnam as a combat zone.² No decision had been reached in the matter in Washington by the end of the year, so far as CINCPAC knew.

Rest and Recuperation (R&R)

(C) The Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Program from Vietnam continued to reflect the level of troop strength, and thus was gradually phased down in 1970. U.S. Forces availing themselves of R&R went from 34,538 in January to 20,645 in December, and sites available for such leave were reduced to five by the end of the year.³

(U) Singapore was phased out as an R&R site on 1 February, Manila on 1 July. CINCPAC had studied the matter of phasing the Manila site out on 1 April, but the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines had advised against it, calling it the friendliest and most incident free location. Nevertheless, flights to Manila began being reduced in the spring.⁴ Tokyo was scheduled to be closed 1 October, but this was extended until 8 October to allow a last flight that arrived on 30 September.⁵ Still available to R&R personnel were Hawaii, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Sydney.

(U) Most of the R&R went very smoothly, as had been the case since inception of the program. One incident occurred in Hong Kong on 24 September.

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1. Ltr, CINCPAC to Office of the U.S. Army Attache, Vientiane, Laos, 18 Jun 70, Subj: Combat Zone Tax Exclusion (U).
 2. J113 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
 3. J113 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Dec 70.
 4. J113 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Mar-Apr 70; CINCPAC 280557Z Mar 70.
 5. History of Headquarters, U. S. Forces Japan, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 70, p. 19.

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When boarding for return to Saigon, a Serviceman struck a Pan American Airlines official; three participants continued to be unruly and were removed from the aircraft, where they were joined by 30 sympathizers. The plane left without them. British authorities held the 33 until special aircraft with 67 guards aboard returned them to Vietnam on 26 September.¹

(U) Funding restrictions affecting the R&R program were noted for the first time in 1970. In March the JCS requested that CINCPAC review R&R airlift and provide data identifying project cost increases and recommendations for actions to remain within program funds available.² CINCPAC advised the JCS that increased costs of the Fiscal Year 1970 program were caused by rate increases to short haul sites and additional flights to Hawaii. He noted that neither CINCPAC nor COMUSMACV had been previously advised that a budget limitation had been imposed. CINCPAC recommended that sizable R&R reductions be avoided if possible because of the morale factor and that he be advised if a budget ceiling was to be implemented.³

(U) In June the JCS advised that transportation costs for FY 71 as approved by the Defense Department would be \$39 million.⁴ CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV and the Commander, Military Airlift Command of these limitations, noting that every effort should be made to manage within that limitation and to advise CINCPAC if it should appear not possible to do so and maintain a viable R&R program.⁵

(U) A new concept was introduced in the R&R program by the JCS in July. They proposed that a program be established to afford wives and children of prisoners of war and personnel missing in action privileges similar to those offered wives who met their husbands on R&R in Hawaii.⁶ CINCPAC investigated the matter and found that such a program could be established to closely parallel the existing R&R program with many of the same privileges offered by hotels, restaurants, and shops. CINCPAC recommended certain administrative procedures and recommended that the possibility of reduced air fares be explored.⁷

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1. COMUSNAVPHIL DET HONG KONG 251100Z Sep 70.
 2. JCS 2886/112224Z Mar 70. FY 70 was funded at \$45.4 million.
 3. CINCPAC 270234Z Mar 70.
 4. JCS 3161/222055Z Jun 70.
 5. ADMIN CINCPAC 292116Z Jun 70.
 6. J116 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70 citing JCS Memo DJSM 1033-70 of 27 Jul 70.
 7. ADMIN CINCPAC 152324Z Aug 70.

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Vietnam Leave Policy Modified

(U) COMUSMACV announced in October that effective 16 November 1970 an ordinary leave of 14 days would be granted and that personnel could visit the Continental United States (CONUS) during their leave. This policy changed the leave period from 7 to 14 days and for the first time permitted leave to be taken in the CONUS. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he interposed no objection to the new leave policy.¹ He explained that the leave was considered necessary because we had entered a period when combat commitments were reduced and disciplinary problems increasing. The opportunity to visit the CONUS enhanced morale and reduced gold flow. COMUSMACV's program went into effect in December; participation was based on lift capability.² Leave was to be completed during the fourth through eighth months of an individual's tour in Vietnam and did not preclude his participation in the R&R program. Cost of the round trip to the West Coast was about \$370.

Communist Prisoners of War

(S) Two matters in particular regarding prisoners of war in the Republic of Vietnam were studied by CINCPAC in 1970, although he continued to monitor all programs related to the prisoners and their repatriation. In July the JCS asked CINCPAC to prepare a new plan--a contingency plan for the establishment of an overland corridor across the Demilitarized Zone for the exchange of prisoners.³ COMUSMACV provided the input for this plan, which was forwarded by CINCPAC to the JCS on 17 July.⁴ The plan assumed helicopters would not be used for the delivery of prisoners and was therefore geared to the use of Route 1, the only road through the zone that could be used in all weather, if it was repaired. The bridge over the Ben Hai at Route 1 was out, however, so various alternative options were presented using either rafts, footbridges, or a flotation bridge. The plan also suggested establishment of a corridor on both sides of Route 1 to permit freedom of movement for personnel and equipment associated with the repatriation, with the corridors surrounded by a cease-fire zone. Action to be taken in the event of hostile action by enemy forces was outlined. The plan presented the minimum necessary facilities that could be made available in the shortest period of time, but CINCPAC noted that if a more public repatriation should be directed, facilities would be required for the press, medical personnel, and communications support. CINCPAC concluded that the plan was provided as requested, but he believed that repatriation

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1. CINCPAC 030436Z Nov 70.
 2. J471 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
 3. JCS 4850/132309Z Jul 70.
 4. CINCPAC 170202Z Jul 70.

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by other means would be more desirable. As an example, he recommended seaborne repatriation.

(S) In response to additional information received from COMUSMACV, CINCPAC recommended that because of the weather in the fall and winter season, the submitted plan should not be considered for initiation before the end of December.¹ Nothing further was heard on the plan by the end of the year.

(C) CINCPAC also reviewed conditions at the Phu Quoc Prisoner of War Camp during a staff visit in November 1970. The International Committee of the Red Cross had earlier voiced criticism of the camp, which had resulted in concern in Washington. CINCPAC's review found some deficiencies that had been previously noted by COMUSMACV, but nothing to support the accuracy of the use of the Red Cross description: catastrophic.²

(C) CINCPAC continued to inquire about progress in the upgrading of Phu Quoc. He believed it was essential to apply the rules of the Geneva Convention and recognized the U.S. responsibility for U.S.-captured personnel even if they had been turned over to the Vietnamese. CINCPAC also acknowledged the difficulties that could result, however, if prisoner standards in such matters as food, medical care, and living conditions should become higher than those of the guard or custodial personnel, or higher than the standards of the Army or people of Vietnam in general. CINCPAC, therefore, was also concerned with the feasibility and techniques of offering assistance to the RVNAF for improvement of the living conditions of the guards at Phu Quoc.³

Benefits for Local National U.S. Employees in Southeast Asia

(C) In February the Deputy Commissioner in Hawaii of the Bureau of Employees' Compensation of the Department of Labor asked CINCPAC's consideration of the matter of establishing uniform on-the-job injury and death benefits and compensation schedules for local national employees of the U.S. Government in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.⁴ In Vietnam the proposed changes would result

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1. CINCPAC 060119Z Sep 70.
 2. Point Paper, J111, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Dec 70, Subj: Improving Conditions at Phu Quoc.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ltr, E.F. Ducey, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Labor Standards Administration, Bureau of Employees' Compensation, to CINCPAC, 17 Feb 70, Subj: Federal Employees' Compensation Act: Proposed Revision to Benefits for Local Hire Employees of the United States in Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.

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in a three-fold increase in cost in some cases and a significant disparity would result between employment practices of the U.S. Government and those of the Vietnamese in both public and private sectors. CINCPAC asked for the views of the country commands on the subject.

(C) CINCPAC advised the Deputy Commissioner in July of the results of his inquiries in the matter.¹ The Services, CINCPAC noted, uniformly recommended against the benefit schedule proposed, principally because of the impact the schedule would have in the country with the largest employment, Vietnam. CINCPAC noted that similar increases in benefits would also have to be granted for nonappropriated fund employees as well as contractor personnel; there were large numbers of these kinds of employees.

(C) Although concurrence was given by U.S. agencies in Thailand and Laos, CINCPAC did not consider it practicable to establish the proposed schedule for those two countries. Nonappropriated fund and contractor problems would apply there also. CINCPAC recommended, therefore, that the proposed schedules for the three country areas not be considered for implementation at that time.²

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1. Ltr, CINCPAC to Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Employees' Compensation, U.S. Department of Labor, 1 Jul 70, Subj: Federal Employees Compensation Act--Proposed Revision of Benefit Schedules for Local Hire Employees of the U.S. in Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos.
 2. Ibid.

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SECTION IX - LOGISTICS

(U) In Vietnam a billion dollar construction program to facilitate logistics requirements has been completed. It will remain a tribute to American ingenuity long after communist aggression has been checked. Midway in the buildup, the total short tons of military cargo moved into South Vietnam each month reached nearly 700,000 tons. More than 95 percent of this tonnage moved by sea and almost 1,000 tons of high priority cargo was lifted into Vietnam by air each day.

That we could move combat troops into battle while simultaneously developing the logistics support bases required to sustain them was due to the outstanding support we had from the U.S. transportation industry, the military transportation organizations, and the manufacturers of transportation equipment.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA)

(U) It became apparent in late 1967 that large quantities of long supply and excess material had been introduced into Southeast Asia. As a result, the SECDEF directed CINCPAC to establish a special agency to accomplish screening of PACOM excess and long supply for utilization and to effect redistribution of assets. CINCPAC established the PURA in June 1968 with CINCUSARPAC as executive agent. CINCUSARPAC further designated the responsibility for actual operation to the Commanding General, 2nd Logistic Command, located on Okinawa. CINCPAC closely monitors the operation through the PURA Executive Committee, which is chaired by the CINCPAC J4 and with the Materiel Directors of PACOM Service Components and FMFPAC as members.²

(U) It was recognized last year that the PURA system had shortcomings. After extensive study and analysis CINCPAC submitted his redesigned concept and implementation plan to the SECDEF in November 1969.³ SECDEF approved the plan

1. Remarks of Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief Pacific, to the Fourth International Transportation Seminar of the Pacific at Honolulu, Hawaii, February 9, 1970.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, pp. 72-81; Point Paper, J4623, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 70, Subj: PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA).
3. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 46-48.

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and project "QUICK FIX" was initiated in May with a target date of 1 September for implementation of the new, improved system. Software development proceeded generally on schedule. Some AUTODIN interface problems were surfaced but were solved with coordinated action by CINCUSARPAC and STRATCOM PAC and support from OSD(I&L) and the OSD PURA Coordinator. Some slippage in the hardware program was unavoidable; however, the new system was implemented on 1 October. The redesigned PURA system and procedures will decrease screening time from 120 to 60 days for items having an extended line value of less than \$500, and from 240 to 75 days for items having an extended line value of more than \$500. The improved system is expected to increase utilization of excesses by more than \$100 million a year and will provide complete requisition and shipping status as well as financial data for funding adjustments at departmental level.¹ From May 1968 through September 1970 PURA had redistributed \$181.6 million of the \$828.7 million advertised. Under the improved procedures PURA received \$131.2 million in nominations for the months of October and November, of which material amounting to \$10.1 million was referred for shipment.²

Disposition of Real Property in Southeast Asia

(S) In October 1969, the JCS requested CINCPAC to prepare a plan for the transfer and disposal of facilities assets in Southeast Asia. The plan (CINCPAC Logistics Plan, Facilities - No. F-70) was forwarded to the JCS in December 1969.³ In February, the JCS approved the CINCPAC plan subject to minor revisions which broadened the scope of the plan, increased its flexibility, and added clarity.⁴

(U) On 10 February, the JCS requested that COMUSMACV assist the Commander, Coast Guard Activities, Vietnam, in negotiating the transfer of aid to navigation (NAVAIDS) assets and responsibilities to the GVN.⁵ COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC on the status of the discussions regarding the NAVAIDS. He stated that agreement had been reached between the GVN, senior US Coast Guard officers, and COMUSMACV; however, USAID declined to participate in the funding. In view of the USAID position, COMUSMACV requested waiver of the requirement to identify a source of U.S. fiscal support and authority to complete the transfer on the basis of GVN funding.⁶ CINCPAC recommended that the JCS approve COMUSMACV's proposal.⁷ The

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1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70; Point Paper, J4623, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 70, Subj: PURA.
 2. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Dec 70.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 54-56.
 4. MJCS 60-70, Subj: Disposition of Real Property in Southeast Asia.
 5. JCS 9750/101437Z Feb 70.
 6. COMUSMACV 120755Z Nov 70.
 7. CINCPAC 182001Z Nov 70.

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JCS informed CINCPAC on 23 November that the request was being staffed.¹

Excess U.S. Military Facilities in RVN

(C) On 18 November, CINCPAC concurred in a joint U.S. Embassy, USAID, and COMUSMACV proposal for screening of excess U.S. military facilities in RVN for nation building requirements.² Each facility would be considered individually to determine the most effective disposition in furtherance of U.S. mission objectives. Operation and maintenance costs would influence evaluation of both RVNAF and GVN civilian requirements. Preliminary screening by a joint MACV/USAID Working Group would provide a basis for bilateral discussions with the GVN. At that time the Embassy proposed that a USAID/GVN Survey Group conduct on site inspection of those facilities which have a potential for GVN civilian use.³

Disposition of USAF Hospital at Korat RTAFB

(C) CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI's comments and recommendations regarding the best long-term utilization of the modern 388th USAF Hospital at Korat RTAFB prior to declaring the facility for disposal.⁴ By separate action, the Commander, MEDDAC USARSUPTHAI indicated an in-country requirement for the medical/dental equipment located at the hospital facility complex.⁵

Scrap and Usable Property Disposal in RVN

(C) During the year, constraints and harassment by GVN government officials against buyers of scrap and non-scrap material prevented timely removal of the large volume of Property Disposal Office scrap and usable property inventories. The constraints emanate from the GVN revision of custom regulations in 1967, imposing restrictions on export sales and excessive import duties of 100 percent on scrap and 300 percent to 400 percent on the sale of usable items.⁶

(C) In order to circumvent GVN constraints and permit sale and removal of scrap and usable property an offshore sales plan was developed. The plan envisioned a test sale of 7,000 short tons of usable property in Okinawa and 7,000 short tons of scrap in Japan. The Philippines and Taiwan were also considered as possible sale sites.⁷

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1. JCS 6465/232257Z Nov 70.
 2. CINCPAC 181903Z Nov 70.
 3. Saigon 17592/030800Z Nov 70.
 4. CINCPAC 060407Z Nov 70.
 5. CO MEDDAC USARSUPTHAI 280716Z Nov 70.
 6. Point Paper, J4623, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Dec 70, Subj: Property Disposal in RVN.
 7. Ibid.

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(C) An incremental shipment of the planned 7,000 short tons of usable property arrived in Okinawa on 6 November. Sale bid opening was 21 November. The results of the sale are being evaluated by CINCUSARPAC to determine if offshore sales are economically feasible.¹

MAP Tactical Vehicle Standardization

(C) In view of the improbability of maintaining existing MAP/MASFP country vehicle fleets at authorized ceilings because of increased item costs and reduced MAP appropriations, and the increasing availability of U.S. Army M-standard vehicles and components through long supply/excess programs, CINCPAC recommended that M-standard vehicles be designated as MAP/MASFP alternate standard vehicles for PACOM.² The JCS advised that OASD/ISA had approved Army M-standard vehicles as alternate tactical vehicles to the M600 series for MAP/MASF supported countries in PACOM, but that DA had stated that it may be two to three years before any 1/4 ton and 1-1/4 ton Army M-standard vehicles could be made available to MAP/MASF countries.³

Continuation of Simplified MAP Deviation Procedures - SPEDEPROJ

(U) Based on agreement among conferees during the 19th PACOM MAP Logistics Conference (16-18 February) CINCPAC recommended to the SECDEF that the SPEDEPROJ procedure be extended. Also, due to the phase down of U.S. Army Depot Command Japan support of MAP, it was recommended that U.S. Army International Logistics Center (COUSAILC) take over management of this special MAP procedure.⁴ SECDEF granted authority for the continuation of SPEDEPROJ for PACOM MAP and MASF under auspices of COUSAILC.⁵

Cambodian Aircraft Maintenance

(TS) A recommendation in the Report of Conference on Cambodia and Regional Military Strategy Planning (Bangkok Conference) was that nine USAF, or combination of U.S./Third Country, T-28 specialists be deployed to Phnom Penh to upgrade Cambodian Air Force (CAF) capability, organization, ground support, and maintenance to insure a satisfactory weapons delivery system. On 6 August, SECDEF and SECSTATE authorized CINCPAC to initiate action, on a priority basis, to negotiate

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1. Ibid.
 2. CINCPAC 052135Z Mar 70.
 3. JCS 8363/081644Z May 70.
 4. CINCPAC 282333Z Mar 70.
 5. SECDEF ASD/ISA 2917/071747Z Oct 70.

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a contract with Air America for the employment of nine personnel for support of the CAF T-28 squadron.¹ DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI and COMUSMACV advised that it was imperative to have a U.S. civilian technician with the team for supervisory skills and to enable adequate coordination with the U.S. Embassy and FANK. This view was strongly endorsed by CINCPAC² and approved by the SECDEF and SECSTATE.³ All team personnel were in place in Phnom Penh by 16 October.⁴

(S) In June, action was initiated to input five CAF T-28D aircraft to contractor facilities (three at Air America, Udorn, and two at Thai-AM, Bangkok) for updating configuration and extended IRAN as part of the FY 70 Cambodian MAP.⁵ Air America completed their three aircraft project on 9 September and Thai-AM completed their two aircraft on 29 December.⁶

Disposition of Excess Preengineered Buildings/Structures

(C) Commencing in May, a series of messages addressed the subject of pre-engineered buildings/structures declared excess to Seventh Air Force requirements and the policies and procedures related to disposition of these and other excess items of supplies in the RVN. At issue was the propriety of one Service shipping excess materiel out of the RVN despite the existence of valid in-country requirements of another Service, thereby resulting in to-and-from shipment of like materiel. A disparity in interpretation of the intent of pertinent SECDEF/JCS guidance culminated in a 24 December message to SECDEF which recapped the previous message traffic and provided recommendations toward resolution of the immediate problem and to preclude establishment of restrictive Service conditions that compromise the efficient in-country use of excesses in the RVN.⁷

Distribution of Excess Releasable Assets Held by U.S. Contractors

(U) "As the current phasedown of the cost-plus-award fee contractor in RVN progresses," SECDEF's message on 6 February to CINCPAC read, "increasing quantities of valuable contractor held U.S. Government-furnished assets are being made available for redistribution."⁸ Accordingly, SECDEF issued "revised priorities for distribution of excess assets in order to provide for world-wide DOD

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1. SECDEF 6793/061936Z Aug 70.
 2. CINCPAC 190107Z Aug 70.
 3. SECDEF 8344/261318Z Aug 70.
 4. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 160945Z Oct 70.
 5. DIRMAT MGT 192215Z Jun 70.
 6. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
 7. CINCPAC 251911Z Jun 70 and 242039Z Dec 70; SECDEF 3231/231631Z Jun 70.
 8. SECDEF 9550/061550Z Feb 70.

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screening and the TTPI."¹ CINCPAC, in turn, issued on 16 March a revised CINCPACINST 4551.1B, which contained new procedures for the distribution of excess contractor-held materials in Southeast Asia. "Principle changes include world-wide screening for DOD requirements and inclusion of distribution priority for the TTPI."²

Transportation - Control Measures

PACOM Port Operations Report (RCS 4600-6)

(U) Since July 1969, CINCPAC had required the submission of all RVN water-port throughput tonnages as a part of the PACOM Port Operations Report (PACSHIPS 10-Day Report).³ COMUSMACV, in his RVN Port Capacity Report for the period April-July 1970, advised that certain RVN ports were scheduled for turnover to ARVN forces in the near future.⁴ In order to provide continuity in established reporting procedures, CINCPAC requested that certain guidelines be adhered to when submitting port throughput tonnage information for ports placed under ARVN control. Each port under ARVN control would be identified in "Port Remarks." Where the port was a combined U.S./ARVN port, the "Port Remarks" would specify how much of the throughput was accomplished by the ARVN.⁵

PACOM Retrograde Cargo Report

(U) At the request of the JCS on 23 December 1968, CINCPAC established a requirement for retrograde data to include actual performance plus a one to 10 day and an 11 to 35 day forecast. "The MACV 10-day Retrograde/Container Cargo Report (CINCPAC RCS 4600-18) and the PACOM Port Activity Report (less RVN) (CINCPAC RCS 4600-3) were the instruments utilized to provide the data."⁶ Because of the infrequent use of the forecast data portion by the recipients, CINCPAC recommended on 24 January that the JCS consider deleting the forecast data portion. The JCS' concurrence was forthcoming on 13 February. As a result, on 16 February, CINCPAC dispatched a message, approving the deletion of the forecast data, thus helping to reduce the manual workloads of COMUSMACV and component commands.⁷

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1. J4133 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
 2. J4133 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
 3. CINCPAC 030227Z Jul 69.
 4. COTMA MACV 150445Z Mar 70.
 5. CINCPAC 270114Z Mar 70.
 6. J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70; CINCPAC 080258Z Jan 69, citing JCS 8215/232002Z Dec 68.
 7. ADMIN CINCPAC 240046Z Jan 70; JCS 1043/131518Z Feb 70; CINCPAC 162319Z Feb 70; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.

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Conflict in Reports on the Status of the Port of Hue

(C) As 1970 began, the daily SITREPs of COMNAVSUPPACT Da Nang were indicating that no cargo was being handled at the Port of Hue, while the PACSHIPS Ten Day Port Status Reports were showing cargo tonnage handled at Hue. "The NICTZ ports of Hue/Tan My are considered one port but each is shown separately in the above reports and they were at cross purposes with each showing cargo being handled in one report and no cargo handled in the other report."¹ After commenting on 16 January that "informal information indicates that the Port of Hue is being phased out," CINCPAC requested from COMUSMACV clarification on the "status of Port of Hue and reconciliation of" the two reports "pertaining to the ports of Hue and Tan My NLT 25 Jan 70."² Before the end of the month, CINCPAC received information "that the port of Hue has been phased out and that the two reports would be reconciled."³

Use of Expedited Transportation Service

(U) CINCPAC RCS 4600.15, Use of Expedited Transportation Service, was established in 1968 to provide necessary information to monitor and restrict the airlift of cargo to essential, urgently needed commodities. In view of the effective challenge procedures in effect in PACOM, CINCPAC requested comments from interested agencies on discontinuance of the report.⁴ CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, and PAMPA concurred in the proposed action.⁵ On 30 January, CINCPAC advised all concerned that CINCPAC RCS: 4600.15 was discontinued effective immediately.⁶

Availability of MSTs TAKVs in T-Day Planning

(C) Two of MSTs' total of six TAKVs (Cargo Ship and Aircraft Ferry) had been out of service for sometime. In January informal information received by CINCPAC indicated that three more TAKVs were being deactivated or reduced in status, leaving only one in active service, plus the Sea Train ships, for movement of light aircraft.⁷ As a result, CINCPAC queried COMSTS on the 14th for

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1. J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70, citing COMNAVSUPPACT Da Nang SITREP Report and PACSHIPS 10-Day Port Status Report.
 2. CINCPAC 162306Z Jan 70.
 3. J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
 4. CINCPAC 080059Z Jan 70 (U).
 5. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
 6. ADMIN CINCPAC 300452Z Jan 70 (U).
 7. CINCPAC 142344Z Jan 70.

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verification of availability of MSTs TAKVs for movement of light aircraft under T-Day Planning and for KEYSTONE-type movement planning.¹ In reply, COMSTS indicated that the information was correct and stated that one TAKV could be available within 15 days and four could be available within 60 days. Also that at least four Sea Train ships would be on longtime charter.²

Retrograde Movement of Light Aircraft

(S) FREIGHTER CARGO T-Day planning had programmed a large number of light aircraft to be retrograded from RVN via MSTs sealift.³ On 21 April, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the requirement to maintain Manila Communique (CINCPAC OPLAN 5067) and T-Day (CINCPAC OPLAN 5069) plans was cancelled.⁴ CINCPAC indicated to COMSTS that planning in respect to retrograde movement of light aircraft must now be directed toward incremental type redeployments and that it could be expected that ultimately an air mobile division would be included in a KEYSTONE troop list. CINCPAC recommended that a study be conducted to determine minimum length of time required to transport certain light aircraft from the RVN to CONUS considering MSTs aircraft lift capabilities and possible augmentation from ships in Ready Reserve Status.⁵

One Hundred Percent ARVN Ammo Shipments

(S) During the USARV Ammo Conference of 6-10 May the Cat Lai Port situation and the 25/75 percent ARVN/USARV ammo policy were reviewed. Ammo supply agencies had experienced difficulty in remaining within the 25/75 percent guidelines and port throughput had not been enhanced. The controlling factor appeared to be the amount of ARVN ammo on board each ship. A projection of ammo requirements and scheduled ship arrivals at Cat Lai indicated that three ships were due in June loaded with 80 percent or more ARVN ammo. This loading was required to meet RDDs. It was proposed at the conference that the policy be changed to authorize 100 percent ARVN ammo ship loads as dictated by requirements. With this new policy, ship demurrage charges possibly could be reduced by enhancing the discharge capability at Cat Lai. CINCPAC requested comments from COMUSMACV and CINCUSARPAC plus recommendations for earliest implementation.⁶ COMUSMACV and CINCUSARPAC concurred in the change and CINCPAC requested CG USAAPSA to initiate action to institute a new loading policy as soon as practicable.⁷

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1. Ibid.
 2. J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 91-93.
 4. CINCPAC 140245Z May 70.
 5. CINCPAC 060054Z Jun 70.
 6. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May citing CINCPAC 220411Z May 70.
 7. CINCPAC 062258Z Jun 70.

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KEYSTONE BLUEJAY

(C) On 15 December 1969, President Nixon announced the third troop reduction in RVN. A total U.S. strength in RVN of 434,000 was to be reached by 15 April 1970. CINCPAC immediately took steps to implement the President's directive and scheduled a movement planning conference at CINCPAC Headquarters for 5-9 January.¹ All movement reporting procedures were reviewed for completeness and possible redundancy. CINCPAC requested the JCS, the PACOM Component Commanders, and COMUSMACV to comment on a proposal to cancel the CINCPAC Daily SITREP (RC: CINCPAC 4600.23) and adopt the COMUSMACV Daily Redeployment Report (RCS: CINCPAC 4600.21) as the KEYSTONE movement report.² Concurrence was received from all interested agencies and CINCPAC notified all concerned that RCS 4600.23 had been suspended from further KEYSTONE movement reporting.³

(U) KEYSTONE BLUEJAY was successfully completed on 15 April and, as with previous KEYSTONE redeployments, demonstrated the professional competence of all concerned. CINCPAC extended a "well done" to all involved.⁴

KEYSTONE ROBIN

(C) The fourth troop reduction was announced by the President on 20 April. A total reduction of 150,000 would be achieved by 1 May 1971. Further announcement by the President, on 3 June, authorized a 50,000 reduction by 15 October. CINCPAC designated this movement increment KEYSTONE ROBIN (ALFA) and informed all concerned that several movement planning conferences were contemplated with the first scheduled at CINCPAC Headquarters for 6-10 July.⁵ As a result of the conference a coordinated program was published to achieve the new MACV authorized strength of 384,000.⁶ On 18 October, CINCPAC announced completion of the ALFA redeployments effective 131600Z Oct 70. The required reduction in force levels in RVN was achieved through programmed redeployment of 34,495 personnel and through reduction of the replacement flow to RVN by 15,505 spaces.⁷

(C) The second KEYSTONE ROBIN movement planning conference was convened at Camp Smith, 19-23 October. The resultant movement program, KEYSTONE ROBIN (BRAVO), provided for redeployment of 20,099 personnel from the RVN and

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1. CINCPAC 190233Z Dec 69
 2. CINCPAC 300508Z Dec 69.
 3. CINCPAC 172338Z Jan 70.
 4. CINCPAC 220337Z Apr 70.
 5. CINCPAC 192336Z Jun 70.
 6. CINCPAC 112238Z Jul 70.
 7. CINCPAC 182135Z Oct 70.

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reductions of replacement flow by 19,901 spaces by 31 December.¹ On 29 December, the BRAVO redeployments were completed.²

PACOM Shipping Guidance - Thailand

(U) CINCPAC Publication "PACOM Shipping Guidance - Thailand" established a minimum of 2,000 metric tons per ship on CONUS surface shipments to Thailand. In January, Commander, PAMPA, recommended to CINCPAC that the minimum tonnage be eliminated or at least reduced to 1,000 metric tons because the decline in CONUS cargo generation posed the strong possibility of delay by holding to meet minimums.³ COMUSMACTHAI recommended that minimums established on Thailand cargo be eliminated entirely.⁴ Based on these recommendations CINCPAC eliminated all minimum cargo restrictions to Thailand.⁵

Transportation - Surface

Reefer Service to Southeast Asia

(U) CINCPAC convened a reefer service conference on 26-27 February to discuss means of improving reefer service to SEAsia because of an adjustment in ship assets and expanded container service. Topics covered at the conference were schedules, container service and opportune lift, concept and policy, and future requirements versus ship assets. A 14-day cycle for break-bulk cargo was considered feasible and established for both ship and requisitioning requirements. Allocated in-port time was considered excessive and the following discharge allocation times were established: Qui Nhon - three days, Cam Ranh - three days, and Newport - five days. It was pointed out that reefer products were required on a scheduled basis which was dictated by shelf life, consumption rate, and storage capacity; therefore, pure balancing of tonnage against lift could not be the criteria for establishing suitable reefer service. It was envisioned that future requirements would decrease as a result of the various KEYSTONE series movements. Future adjustments in assets and schedules could be expected and must be fully coordinated prior to institution.⁶


(U) On 21 March, COMSTSPAC proposed that COMSTS and CINCPAC explore the feasibility of reducing reefer ship assets committed to Southeast Asia from five ships to four ships and gave a rationale based on pure tonnage versus lift

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1. CINCPAC 230410Z Oct 70.
 2. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
 3. COMDR PAMPA 271812Z Jan 70.
 4. COMUSMACTHAI 300852Z Jan 70.
 5. CINCPAC 010117Z Feb 70.
 6. CINCPAC 040301Z Mar 70.

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MSTSPAC/FE NUCLEUS (USNS) SEALIFT CAPABILITY


AS OF 1 JUNE 1970



SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 110.

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PACIFIC SEALIFT ROUTES MSTS



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SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 111.

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capability.¹ CINCPAC advised COMSTSPAC and COMSTS that, in view of the fully coordinated policy established at the February conference, he considered the COMSTSPAC proposal inappropriate and restated the CINCPAC position that the 14-day cycle was optimum and must not be changed.²

(U) On 2 April, COMSTS acknowledged that they were committed to providing container reefer service to RVN on a seven-day cycle and break-bulk reefer service on a 14-day cycle and indicated that the goal was to meet all RVN reefer requirements by container service.³ CINCPAC concurred in efforts to ultimately go 100 percent container reefer service to RVN but stated that a shift to full container service would require some coordination in such areas as increased requirement for on-shore electrical outlets, impact on SEA-LAND shuttle service, and impact on depot storage capacity.⁴

(U) On 7 July, COMSTS reported that reefer requirements and SEA-LAND reefer container service to RVN were virtually on balance and proposed discontinuance of break-bulk service.⁵ CINCPAC requested field command comments and on 17 July concurred in the COMSTS proposal provided required delivery dates could be met.⁶

Accumulation of Cargo for Saigon/Newport Ports

(U) In January, DA advised CINCPAC and COMUSMACV of the actions taken to aid in Vietnamization of Saigon Port. These actions were: (1) the assignment of a separate port designator code for Newport, and (2) instructions by MTMTS for commanders to book MASF/AID cargo for Saigon (GR1) and U.S. cargo for Newport (RGU).⁷ MTMTS area commanders were directed to segregate and block stow U.S. cargo in lots of 1,500 M/T or more for Newport and MASF/AID for Saigon of 500 M/T or more.⁸ Additionally, MTMTS announced an intent to limit Saigon and Newport cargo on the east coast to Bayonne, Baltimore, and Beaumont, and to study such a program for the west coast.⁹ On 9 May, the JCS requested CINCPAC comments and details of problems regarding shipments to Saigon/Newport.¹⁰ CINCPAC provided the JCS a summary of the entire problem by providing a digest of all messages

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1. COMSTS PAC 210000Z Mar 70.
 2. CINCPAC 250451Z Mar 70.
 3. COMSTS 021623Z Apr 70.
 4. CINCPAC 081904Z Apr 70.
 5. COMSTS 072217Z Jul 70.
 6. CINCPAC 171933Z Jul 70.
 7. DA 122205Z Jan 70.
 8. MTMTS 131925Z Jan 70.
 9. MTMTS 172235Z Apr 70.
 10. JCS 090052Z May 70.

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pertaining.¹ On 29 May, CINCPAC advised all concerned of his proposed guidelines to be added to the PAMPA Shipping Guidance to include aging of cargo for Army to be limited to transportation priority 3 and 4 and no aging for Navy and Air Force cargo. The aging period to be reduced from 30 to 20 days with the stipulation that it would be increased should the 20 days prove insufficient. Comments on the acceptability of the proposed guidelines were requested.² On 16 June, CINCPAC provided the JCS with guidelines for cargo aging and requested JCS concurrence in an exception to UMMIPS standards.³

Shipment of Apples Donated by the Citizens of Wenatchee, Washington

(U) Early in 1970, the citizens of Wenatchee, Washington, offered to donate approximately 90,000 apples, with delivery during the fall, to the American servicemen in RVN. After stating that he was "aware of OSD policy regarding the transportation of gifts to overseas areas," COMUSMACV on 12 May requested CINCPAC's "assistance in obtaining an exception to this policy and in ascertaining if free transportation can be arranged," since "these donated apples would do much toward informing U.S. personnel in Vietnam of the concern and support by their fellow citizens in the United States for their morale and welfare."⁴

(U) Two days later, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that assistance be given in obtaining this requested waiver and in arranging for appropriate transportation in the event that the waiver was granted. The JCS, in reply on 27 May, granted DA the authority to accept "and ship such apples to RVN as a normal subsistence item for military personnel"; however, free "transportation for the shipment of the apples (estimated at 15 tons) to RVN is not available, and sponsorship of the shipment by the recipient service will be necessary...."⁵ Accordingly, CINCPAC dispatched a message to COMUSMACV two days later, requesting him to take the necessary action in line with the JCS guidance.⁶

Discharge of MK 81 Bombs and Fins at Wrong Port

(C) OOAMA Hill AFB, on 5 January indicated supply action to transfer the MK 81 bombs and fins aboard the SS GARDEN STATE from VAMP to LAMP.⁷ The bombs should have been discharged at Vayama on 14 January but instead went to Cat Lai

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1. CINCPAC 130331Z May 70.
 2. CINCPAC 290425Z May 70.
 3. CINCPAC 160613Z Jun 70.
 4. COMUSMACV 23020/121147Z May 70; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
 5. JCS 1041/272203Z May 70; ADMIN CINCPAC 160443Z May 70.
 6. CINCPAC 290051Z May 70.
 7. OOAMA Hill AFB 052240Z Jan 70.

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where they were discharged. As a result, a very costly back haul was required.¹ CINCPAC requested DEPCHJUSMAG to advise if transfer information had been passed to the port operator for discharge and why subject ammo was not discharged. Further, MACV was requested to provide information as to why the bombs were discharged at Cat Lai.² COMUSMACV and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI reported that the bombs were not discharged as intended due to lack of specific consignment instructions.³ CINCPAC requested that OOMA insure that both transportation agencies and consignees are provided firm cargo consignment instructions to preclude future misunderstanding.⁴

Sea-Land Ammunition Movement (SLAM)

(C) COMSTS advised CINCPAC that CG 1st Logistics Command had requested two Sea-Land containerized shipments of 350 vans each be allocated to Qui Nhon each month to allow phase down of Ammo Supply Depot and to supply forward ammo supply points. Request was based on success of Project TOCSA in RVN.⁵ CINCPAC considered that the request was premature because overall results of Project TOCSA had not been evaluated to the point to support initiation of ammo container shipments to RVN. Further, approval of the request would adversely affect PACOM-wide shipping unless MSTs could provide additional container ships in PACOM service. CINCPAC requested that action on the request be held in abeyance pending assurance that such use of containers could be accomplished without detriment to other PACOM containership service.⁶

Controlled Fleet Ammunition Capability

(C) On 3 June, COMSTS provided information on the declining ability of MSTs to respond to increased ammunition requirements in Southeast Asia in light of the present environment of decreasing maritime assets and economy. Later, he forwarded another message, stating that the purpose of the previous information was:

...to apprise interested commands that COMSTS anticipated some shortfall of assets in July to respond to forecast ammunition lifts, and to request that in theatre turn arounds be accelerated by all means feasible to alleviate shipping shortages foreseen. Highlighted were two specific areas of our common

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1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
 2. CINCPAC 210506Z Feb 70 (C).
 3. CO TMA MACV 231154Z Feb 70 (C); DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 041005Z Mar 70.
 4. CINCPAC 072254Z Mar 70.
 5. COMSTS 030740Z Feb 70.
 6. CINCPAC 042337Z Feb 70.

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rebuttal to CINCUSARPAC's suggestion, COMSTS pointed out to CINCPAC that, if the three transports being utilized for the movement of ROK forces between Korea and RVN were withdrawn, they would be inactivated, thus leaving "no MSTs transports readily and immediately available for contingencies."¹ Two days later, MAC informed CINCPAC that it had the "airlift capability to support ROK rotation and operations can be implemented with 30 days lead time."² Based upon this information, CINCPAC dispatched the following message to CINCUSARPAC on 29 May:

...the normal rotation of ROK Forces from Vietnam by airlift appears to be more cost effective. However, if the troopships are inactivated,...there will be a lack of flexibility to meet contingency requirements during temporary shortages of airlift due to higher priority requirements, airfield saturation, or loss of airfields due to enemy action. This problem should be addressed by the JCS and the Services on the basis of worldwide requirements.³

(C) When CINCUSARPAC proposed a change from surface to air mode for the rotational movement of ROK forces in RVN, he indicated that the DA might realize a possible annual savings of approximately three million dollars. At the July meeting of the PACOM JTB, these projected savings were reduced to approximately one million dollars annually. During this same meeting, a joint working group raised a question of the possibility of an adverse reaction on the part of the Koreans, since the ROK personnel would be separated from their baggage during rotation. After describing the background of this proposal, CINCPAC's message of 7 August to the JCS ended as follows:

4. Recommend the JCS address the total costs to DOD and the worldwide contingency aspects of the DA/CINCUSARPAC proposal for the use of MAC airlift vice MSC sealift for the rotational movements of ROK forces in RVN. Further recommend, if it is determined only marginal overall savings are to be realized by a change in mode, that the present sealift movement capability be maintained.⁴

(C) Just one day later, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that COMSC's proposal of rescheduling the ROK rotational movement from RVN to use only two troopships,

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1. COMSTS WashDC 132124Z May 70.
 2. MAC 152010Z May 70.
 3. CINCPAC 292015Z May 70; J4815 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
 4. CINCPAC 070216Z Aug 70; J4721 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.

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thus eliminating the need for the third relief transport, "also be considered during review of the proposal to change the ROK rotational mode."¹ At the same time, CINCPAC requested COMUS Korea to refrain from "any discussions with ROK representatives on troopship schedules until the ROK rotational mode from sealift to airlift is resolved by JCS."²

(C) The JCS decision was forthcoming in a message to CINCPAC on 28 September:

1. (C) After reviewing the strategic and economic aspects of the various proposals, it has been decided that the present sealift system of rotating ROK forces between the ROK and RVN should be retained for the immediate future.

2. (C) It is requested that discussions be initiated regarding the modification of ROK rotation schedules and improved personnel and cargo space utilization so that ROK troop movement to and from the RVN can be accomplished with 2 troopships without the need for a third backup ship.³

Test of Offshore Discharge of Self-Sustaining Containerships

(U) In November 1969, the Joint Logistics Review Board (JLRB) had requested that CINCPAC conduct a test of discharging containers from self-sustaining ships offshore.⁴ The CG USARV was tasked to develop a test plan, conduct the test, and report results and recommendations to the JLRB via COMUSMACV and CINCPAC.⁵ COMSTS had reported that Sea-Land Service had agreed to participate in the test and authorized MSTSO Vietnam to make arrangements with Sea-Land's local representative.⁶ On 10 April, COMUSMACV advised that project TOSCA had successfully demonstrated the feasibility of transporting containers on lighterage as well as discharging containers over the beach from lighterage. He recommended that the test be cancelled in view of the diversion of personnel and equipment assets necessary to support the test and the lack of a formal agreement between MSTS and the contractor.⁷ CINCPAC concurred in the COMUSMACV recommendation and recommended to the JLRB that the request for the test be withdrawn.⁸


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1. CINCPAC 080109Z Aug 70.
 2. Ibid.; J4717 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
 3. JCS 2166/281957Z Sep 70.
 4. JLRB 201300Z Nov 69.
 5. COMUSMACV 250331Z Nov 69.
 6. COMSTS 051415Z Dec 69.
 7. COMUSMACV 100204Z Apr 70.
 8. CINCPAC 112347Z Apr 70.

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PACIFIC AIRLIFT ROUTES PACAF (DOL/MAC)

EFFECTIVE 1 JULY 1970



NOTE: Special Airlift Missions
Operate to Destinations
As Required

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 113.

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shortfall in airlift support generated by an expanding contingency.¹

(S) To satisfy the post-surge recovery period, JCS approved one C-130 squadron on 72 hour alert in the CONUS. To insure that the gap between the 10 squadron posture and the seven squadron posture planned for end FY 71 did not become overly critical, CINCPAC had proposed to the JCS that an additional squadron of CONUS based C-130 aircraft be identified for a 96 hour on-call alert to CINCPAC.²

C-7A Dedicated Airlift

(S) CSAF, on 29 October 1969, requested data concerning C-7A operations in RVN from CINCPAC, who, in turn, passed this request on to COMUSMACV for action. COMUSMACV forwarded an interim reply almost immediately and indicated that a final reply could be expected in early February 1970. When it failed to materialize by 18 March, CINCPAC dispatched a message, requesting COMUSMACV to "provide status report of reply NLT 24 Mar."³ "Review and analysis of operational experience and the data submitted by the 7th Air Force and USARV," read COMUSMACV's answer only one day prior to this deadline, "indicates the best estimate of C-7A dedicated...is fifty-six (56) operationally ready aircraft on a daily basis."⁴

Utilization of Don Muang and U-Tapao Airports

(S) On 9 December 1969, CINCPACAF briefed CINCPAC on the results of the CSAF directed study regarding the move of the air cargo terminal from Don Muang to U-Tapao. As of 31 December 1969, CINCPACFLT and CG FMFPAC had concurred in the PACAF proposed move.⁵

(S) On 6 January, CINCUSARPAC concurred in the PACAF proposal provided the Stars and Stripes and blood shipments were not disturbed and that cargo and passengers destined for the Bangkok area were still supported by Don Muang.⁶ Based on the above and all other commands concurring, CINCPAC notified CINCPACAF of his concurrence.⁷

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. ADMIN CINCPAC 181917Z Mar 70, citing CSAF AFXDOD/291940Z Oct 69, ADMIN CINCPAC 310226Z Oct 69, COMUSMACV 63062/120441Z Nov 69, CINCPAC 250042Z Jan 70, and COMUSMACV 4722/280708Z Jan 70.

4. COMUSMACV 13834/231152Z Mar 70.

5. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, p. 102.

6. CINCUSARPAC 060344Z Jan 70.

7. CINCPAC 140259Z Jan 70.

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(C) On 15 May, MAC provided CINCPAC with a concept of operation into Thailand after 1 July when the CONUS-Bangkok cargo channels will be changed to CONUS-U-Tapao. Bangkok cargo would be moved from U-Tapao on in-country PACOM C-130 aircraft. MAC requested that CSAF continue efforts to obtain landing rights for contract cargo and mixed passenger/cargo flights at U-Tapao, and asked for CINCPAC comments in regard to the proposal to shift the Stars and Stripes contract C-727 flight to U-Tapao in event approval is granted.¹ COMUSMACTHAI and CINCPACAF were requested to comment.² COMUSMACTHAI and AMEMB concurred in the MAC concept but stated the Royal Thai Government had approved only military air cargo operations into U-Tapao. Commercial contract cargo and passenger flights could not be transferred from Bangkok without Thai approval.³ CINCPACAF concurred in this concept provided procedures could be developed to minimize or circumvent existing problems.⁴ CINCPAC advised MAC of his concurrence and stated that follow-on actions would be addressed at a later date based on the outcome of actions in progress.⁵

(S) On 9 June, MAC expanded on the concept of U-Tapao vice Bangkok channel flights. MAC proposed inaugurating commercial intra-theater mixed passenger/cargo and Stars and Stripes missions to U-Tapao vice Bangkok on 1 August, and inter-theater passenger flights on 1 September.⁶ CINCPACAF advised that, due to facility and resource limitations, he could not concur in the MAC proposal, and recommended convening a coordinating or study group consisting of PACAF, MAC, SAC, and MACTHAI, chaired by PACAF, to determine date of changes, facilities, resources, etc.⁷ CINCPAC supported the early transfer of passenger and cargo operations from Bangkok to U-Tapao and concurred in the CINCPACAF proposal to form a study group with CHWTO as an added participant.⁸ CINCPACAF advised all concerned that the study group would convene 14-17 July at Don Muang.⁹ In July, the Royal Thai Government approval was obtained for landing rights at U-Tapao. The study group meeting in Bangkok established a rerouting schedule of MAC and PACOM aircraft into U-Tapao vice Don Muang. The group advised that the change in operation could commence 1 January 1971 with the establishment of a new channel Travis-U-Tapao-Travis via Clark. It also advised that a Travis-Korat-Travis and Travis-Udorn-Travis channel could commence at the same time (if approval

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1. MAC 152200Z May 70.
 2. ADMIN CINCPAC 162355Z May 70.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI 200412Z May 70.
 4. CINCPACAF 230436Z May 70.
 5. CINCPAC 290052Z May 70.
 6. MAC 092302Z Jun 70.
 7. CINCPACAF 131907Z Jun 70.
 8. ADMIN CINCPAC 170450Z Jun 70.
 9. CINCPACAF 200456Z Jun 70.

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obtained from RTG). The proposal would eliminate six aircraft per month from Bangkok.¹

(S) In August, CINCPAC obtained Service component concurrence in establishing the MAC channel, Travis-U-Tapao-Travis via Clark. Therefore, CSAF was requested to establish such a channel for passengers thereby reducing the number of flights into Don Muang by two each month. Negotiations continued with the Royal Thai Government to obtain MAC commercial contract up-country landing rights. The U.S. Embassy advised that Thai approval to land at U-Tapao was only the first step and subsequent approval for landing at Korat and Udorn would be on an incremental basis and not a blanket approval to be effective 1 January 1971 as proposed by CSAF and CINCPACAF.²

Airline Tickets Sales in RVN

(C) As the result of a Northwest Airlines (NWA) complaint regarding the operation of its ticketing facility at Tan Son Nhut Airport, the JCS had stated that they had no objection to the use of NWA for ticketing of unofficial travel in the same manner as other commercial ticketing facilities are used throughout the world.³

(C) On 8 January, COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that a NWA request to transact business in MPC had been denied on the basis that the NWA facility is a commercial activity servicing local nationals as well as U.S. personnel. GVN law prohibits the use of MPC by commercial firms not in direct and sole support of the U.S. mission.⁴ CINCPAC provided guidance to MACV and subsequently MACV advised that upon completion of the NWA ticket office at the Tan Son Nhut civil air terminal, government transportation requests will be shared equally by NWA and Pan American.⁵

Airlift Support for Duke Ellington Band

(U) COMUSMACTHAI, anticipating that the King of Thailand would request air transport for the Duke Ellington band to visit the summer palace at Chiang Mai, requested favorable consideration in the best interest of the U.S. mission in Thailand.⁶ CINCPAC approved airlift should it be requested.⁷

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1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
 2. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 94-95.
 4. COMUSMACV 080152Z Jan 70.
 5. COMUSMACV 101036Z Jan 70 (U).
 6. COMUSMACTHAI 240731Z Jan 70.
 7. CINCPAC 242239Z Jan 70.

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Military Flights into Thailand

(S) On 11 February COMUSMACTHAI advised CINCPAC that Thai/U.S. negotiations concerning route annexes to bilateral air agreement had raised the possibility of restriction or suspension of some air traffic into Thailand.¹ COMUSMACTHAI further advised that the U.S. Embassy believed only PanAm and TWA would be affected by the restrictions but there was a possibility that it could include MAC charters.² COMUSMACV provided his contingency plans for diversion of R&R flights in the event PanAm charters were not allowed to enter Bangkok.³ CINCPAC requested COMAC to provide his proposed concept for continuing MAC airlift support.⁴ COMUSMACTHAI requested that military aircraft be utilized for transportation of APO mail in the event commercial air was curtailed.⁵ The USAF Postal and Courier Service Pacific Region advised that mail would be diverted to MAC flights, military and contract from CONUS, and MAC military flights intra-theater as required.⁶ PanAm and TWA flights were expected to be restricted on 25 February; therefore, all R&R flights into Bangkok were rerouted to Taipei. MAC provided a concept of operation utilizing C-141s for all intra-PACOM flights into Thailand.⁷ On 24 February, COMUSMACTHAI advised that negotiations had not resolved the problem but it appeared that R&R flights into Bangkok could be resumed on 1 March.⁸

Restrictions on Non-Scheduled Flights into Don Muang

(C) On 16 April, MAC advised CINCPAC that severe restrictions had been placed on MAC contract flights into Don Muang due to ramp construction. MAC requested support in obtaining relief as the restrictions were considered highly discriminatory.⁹ CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI take action on the MAC request.¹⁰ On 12 May, COMUSMACTHAI advised that the U.S. Embassy was endeavoring to obtain relief from the restrictions from the Royal Thai Government.¹¹ On 14 May, the Department of Civil Aviation, RTG, lifted the restrictions and normal operations were resumed.¹²

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1. MAC 210005Z Feb 70.
 2. COMUSMACTHAI 161021Z Feb 70.
 3. COMUSMACV 170742Z Feb 70.
 4. CINCPAC 190030Z Feb 70.
 5. COMUSMACTHAI 190300Z Feb 70.
 6. USAFPCS PAC RGN 210305Z Feb 70.
 7. MAC 210005Z Feb 70.
 8. COMUSMACTHAI 240930Z Feb 70.
 9. MAC 161430Z Apr 70.
 10. ADMIN CINCPAC 210431Z Apr 70.
 11. COMUSMACTHAI 121013Z May 70.
 12. 618 MASS 160403Z May 70.

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Special Airlift Support for the ROK Minister of National Defense

(C) On 12 May, COMUS Korea notified CINCPAC of the planned visit of the Honorable Jung, ROK Minister of National Defense, from 18 to 22 May, to RVN for the purpose of inspecting ROK units and activities in Vietnam. COMUS Korea also requested airlift support for this visit. Two days later, CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF to provide the necessary airlift to take Minister Jung and a party of nine from Kimpo, Korea to Tan Son Nhut, RVN, and return.¹

Passengers in MAAG Aircraft

(U) MAAG China requested an exception be granted to permit the wife of the Chief of Staff, MAAG China, to accompany her sponsor as a passenger on MAAG aircraft when her presence was requisite to accomplishment of official business. In view of the fact that MAAG China has no assistant chief, who would otherwise be authorized such travel, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that an exception be granted.² CSAF approved the exception provided travel was performed at the direction and on behalf of the Chief, MAAG China, and within his sphere of accreditation on official business.³

Space Available Travel, Australia MILADREP, SEATO

(U) The USMILADREP, SEATO, Bangkok, requested determination of authority for space available travel via MAC aircraft for the Australian MILADREP, and his wife, from Bangkok to Saudi Arabia.⁴ CINCPAC advised the USMILADREP that existing directives do not authorize such space available travel.⁵

Establishment of MAC Cargo Channel, Tinker-Ubon

(S) In order to assure adequate logistical support for B57G and AC-130A weapons systems, CINCPACAF on 6 November, requested immediate substitution of Ubon in lieu of Korat as the prime APOD/APOE for the Tinker AFB MAC Cargo Channel.⁶ After checking with his other component commanders and COMUSMACTHAI for their comments and/or concurrence, CINCPAC requested CSAF/MAC to establish a MAC Cargo Channel Tinker to Ubon effective 15 November.⁷

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1. COMUSKOREA 120955Z May 70; J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70; CINCPAC 142306Z May 70.
 2. ADMIN CINCPAC 042025Z Jun 70.
 3. CSAF 250028Z Jun 70.
 4. USMILADREP SEATO MPO 160600Z Jun 70.
 5. ADMIN CINCPAC 202253Z Jun 70.
 6. CINCPACAF DM 060340Z Nov 70.
 7. ADMIN CINCPAC 142010Z Nov 70.

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Logistics Support Activities

Management of M16/M16A1 Rifles

(C) Due to the high priority of demand and short supply of M16/M16A1 rifles over the past four years, allocation and distribution have been reserved to the SECDEF, based on recommendations of the JCS. Early in 1970, production of M16/M16A1 rifles reached 83,000 a month with all high priority requirements filled. The JCS recommended to the SECDEF that the logistic management of M16/M16A1 rifles be returned to the Services. On 6 April, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the recommendation had been approved.¹

RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS)

(U) COMUSMACV conducted a study to determine the support necessary for the development of RVNAF self-sufficiency in the materiel management area. He forwarded this study to CINCPAC with the comment that implementation of RAMMS was vital to the successful accomplishment of RVNAF I&M. In March, CINCPAC forwarded the study to the JCS and recommended that the JCS support the COMUSMACV plan. The JCS approved the plan and requested the Department of the Army act as primary support agency for RAMMS and provide assistance consistent with available resources to achieve timely implementation.²

Navy MAP Materiel Requisitions

(U) At the direction of the Chief of Naval Materiel, Headquarters, Naval Supply Systems Command announced the implementation of grant-aid MAP "push" requisition processing for certain major "each" items and concurrent spare parts (CSP) and requested that MAAGs be advised to ensure that Service components no longer submit requisitions for such items.³ Other grant-aid requirements, e.g., ships, aircraft, missile systems and associated CSP, follow-on spares and military assistance service funded (MASF) requirements will continue to be processed in accordance with existing Navy "pull" procedures. CINCPAC advised his representative in grant-aid MAP recipient countries of the new Navy "push" procedures and requested that MAAGs ensure that Service components no longer submit requisitions to NAVILCO for funded grant-aid requirements with unit of measure "each" and associated CSPs.⁴

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1. J4 Brief, Hq CINCPAC, No. 051-70, 5 May 70, Subj: Allocation of M16/M16A1 Rifles, citing JCS 1725/969-6 of 6 Apr 70.
 2. J4 Brief, Hq CINCPAC, No. 48-70, 29 Apr 70, Subj: General Functional Systems Requirement RVNAF.
 3. NAVSUPSYSCOMHQ NO4910/211448Z Aug 70.
 4. CINCPAC 290453Z Aug 70.

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Military Construction

Military Construction in Support of Southeast Asia

(S) At the beginning of 1970, most of the large contingency construction effort in Southeast Asia had been completed. The work remaining was mostly to fill the minimum essential requirements of the expanded RVNAF that could not be met by the transfer of U.S. facilities and other assets. The RVNAF needed adequate bases for operations, training, personnel and logistic support, equipment maintenance, and other essential functions. There was a severe shortage of housing for dependents of RVNAF personnel. CINCPAC had recommended RVNAF facility and LOC projects totaling \$47.5 million for FY 69 unapportioned MILCON funds.¹ On 31 December 1969, the SECDEF released \$15.5 million of the FY 69 funds for urgent Navy construction requirements.²

Construction Program - Vietnam

(TS) Annex K - Construction, of the CINCPAC Report on RVNAF I&M (Phase III) and Related U.S. Planning submitted to the JCS on 7 January, included \$193 million in unfunded facility construction requirements. These requirements could not be satisfied by in-country funds, or by transfer of U.S. facility assets during the timeframe required. In addition, approximately \$169 million was identified as required for facility construction to support residual U.S. forces and for construction of roads and bridges in support of the LOC program.³

(S) On 15 January, in response to a CINCPAC request,⁴ COMUSMACV recommended projects at \$85 million for inclusion in the CINCPAC priority list of urgent construction projects to be submitted to JCS by 3 February. The COMUSMACV recommendations were based primarily on facility construction to support the RVNAF I&M Program. These projects included \$31 million for construction of roads and bridges and approximately \$54 million for facility support of RVNAF forces.⁵

(S) CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS on 3 February, priority lists of urgent PACOM construction projects recommended for funding during FY 4/70. These lists included projects at \$46 million for construction of facilities in support of the

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1. Point Paper, J422, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Dec 69, Subj: Facilities Requirements.
 2. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 22 Jan 70, Subj: MILCON in Support of RVN, Thailand and Korea.
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00013-70 of 7 Jan 70.
 4. CINCPAC 060440Z Dec 69; CINCPAC 032327Z Jan 70.
 5. COMUSMACV ltr MACDC-BD of 15 Jan 70, Subj: Priority List of Urgent MILCON Projects.

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MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING

SEASIA - SEASIA SUPPORT - KOREA
FY65 THROUGH FY70 MILCON PROGRAMS

(RCS DD-I&L (M) 915)

AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1970

(\$ MILLIONS)

	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
RVN	922.0	446.6	405.3	1,773.9
* THAILAND	116.4	28.5	258.7	403.6
KOREA	81.3	0.0	46.4	127.7
PHILIPPINES	0.0	67.3	22.5	89.8
OKINAWA	25.8	8.7	30.8	65.3
GUAM	0.0	8.1	12.1	20.2
JAPAN	8.7	6.2	2.8	17.7
HAWAII	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.2
MIDWAY	0.0	1.4	0.0	1.4
TAIWAN	0.0	0.2	27.5	27.7
WAKE	0.0	0.0	3.0	3.0
TOTAL	1,154.2	567.0	810.3	2,531.5

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p.102. * INCLUDES LAOS

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RVNAF I&M Program and \$31 million for LOC construction. The projects were for Army funding at \$64 million and \$13 million for Navy funding.¹ No Air Force funded projects were recommended since COMUSMACV had not requested any for inclusion in this submission to the JCS.

(C) On 17 February, SECDEF and Congressional Committee approval was provided in response to the COMUSMACV proposal to realign \$16.6 million in available military construction funds for partial funding of the \$27.045 million project for upgrading of three base depots in Saigon.² The balance of the funds required, \$10.4 million, was requested in the 3 February CINCPAC priority lists discussed above. COMUSMACV considered the upgrading of these depots to be a vital element of Vietnamization and necessary to support a current equipment investment of \$887.5 million.³

(C) Based on CINCPAC's recommendation, the SECDEF on 12 March, released the remaining \$12.425 million FY 69 Navy unapportioned funds; however, he did not take action on the CINCPAC recommendations for apportionment of Army funds at \$64 million for construction in support of the Vietnamese Army and the LOC Program.⁴

(C) On 24 March, COMUSMACV submitted a list of urgent Vietnamese Army support projects at \$55.386 million recommended for funding during FY 1/71 to be considered for incorporation in the next CINCPAC priority lists of urgent construction projects to be recommended to the JCS.⁵ In coordination with in-country Service commanders, COMUSMACV completed, and forwarded to CINCPAC on 26 March, a detailed requirement and condition survey of airfields in the RVN. Based on the results of this survey, 120 airfields were to be retained in operational status. These airfields were rated in accordance with the type aircraft they were capable of supporting. Of these airfields 43 were to be resurfaced. As a further result of the survey, 23 other airfields were to be closed in the future as conditions dictated, and 20 airfields were scheduled for immediate closing.⁶

(C) The JCS approved a CINCPAC recommendation for development of a special Complex Review to provide a consolidated reconciliation of RVNAF and residual

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1. CINCPAC 030241Z Feb 70.
 2. COMUSMACV 1tr MACDC-BD of 15 Jan 70, Subj: Priority List of Urgent MILCON Projects.
 3. SECDEF 01236/171100Z Feb 70.
 4. SECDEF 2898/121402Z Mar 70.
 5. COMUSMACV 1tr MACDC-BD of 24 Mar 70.
 6. COMUSMACV 260524Z Mar 70.

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U.S./FWMA Forces facility assets and construction requirements.¹ COMUSMACV developed a proposed format and submission schedule.² CINCPAC approved the COMUSMACV proposal and, on 31 March, recommended approval by the JCS.³

(C) A revised Annex K - Construction, of the supplemental CINCPAC Report on Vietnamization - Consolidated RVNAF I&M Program (Phase III) and Related U.S. Planning was submitted to the JCS on 10 April. This revised annex included \$150 million in unfunded facility construction requirements for the RVNAF and \$33 million for support of planned residual U.S. and FWMA Forces. In addition, \$61 million was identified as required for unfunded LOC construction. These requirements were developed by COMUSMACV based on planning factors current as of 1 April. These requirements reflected a reduction of approximately \$103 million in unfunded costs as a result of intensive review to reduce construction fund requirements. Since in-country funds were not available, fund programming action must be initiated through CINCPAC priority lists of urgent construction projects recommended to the JCS for funding with unapportioned FY 69 Service or contingency funds held by SECDEF, and in the FY 72 and subsequent military construction programs.⁴

(S) A CINCPAC priority list of urgent projects in support of the ARVN at \$34.2 million was recommended to the JCS for funding from Army FY 69 unapportioned funds. SECDEF apportioned \$15 million on 28 October. As of 30 October, Southeast Asia FY 69 MILCON funds of \$182 million had been apportioned or committed by SECDEF leaving \$19.2 million Army and \$0.3 million Air Force funds unapportioned. SECDEF later approved two Air Force projects in Thailand at \$325 thousand and three MASF projects in Laos at \$3.3 million for funding from funds available to the Air Force. These projects were recommended by CINCPAC in May.⁵

(S) On 24 October, CINCPAC submitted priority lists of urgent projects for funding during FY 3/71. These included: two Air Force projects in Thailand at \$200 thousand for funding from unapportioned FY 69 funds; one Air Force project in Thailand at \$250 thousand and nine Laos MASF projects at \$545 thousand for contingency funding. Additional ARVN projects for funding from the remaining \$19.2 million unapportioned FY 69 Army MILCON funds were recommended to the JCS.⁶

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1. JCS 02439/052124Z Mar 70.
 2. COMUSMACV 250233Z Mar 70.
 3. CINCPAC 310303Z Mar 70.
 4. CINCPAC ltr 5A ser 000123-70 of 10 Apr 70.
 5. Point Paper, J4223, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Apr 70, Subj: MILCON - SEAsia.
 6. Ibid.

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(S) The FY 70 MILCON program provided no funds for Southeast Asia. A \$17.5 million worldwide contingency fund was provided. Remaining FY 69 and FY 70 contingency funds held by the SECDEF totaled \$20.9 million. SECDEF recommended a \$40 million FY 71 MILCON program for RVN and a \$35 million worldwide contingency fund to Congress. The House Armed Services Committee authorized a \$25 million program for RVN and a \$35 million contingency fund. Congressional action on the FY 71 MILCON program is expected to be completed shortly. Preliminary SECDEF FY 72 MILCON program estimates are \$40 million for Southeast Asia and a \$50 million worldwide contingency fund. The CINCPAC FY 72 MILCON program submitted to the JCS recommended \$36.4 million for RVNAF support construction requirements.¹

(S) On 5 November, in response to a request by the JCS,² CINCPAC forwarded data provided by COMUSMACV which definitized the impact on Vietnamization objectives that would result from termination of the Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contractor at end CY 1971 and through military construction MILCON funding constraints at various assumed alternative levels. CINCPAC recommended that plans for phaseout and termination of the CPAF contractor provide for completion of construction vital to the Vietnamization Program and that associated MILCON funds be provided accordingly. These recommendations were based on the premise that the combined lump sum contractor and diminishing U.S. engineer troop capabilities could not satisfactorily accomplish construction of the magnitude remaining within the timeframe required.³

(C) CINCPAC evaluation of data in the initial RVN Consolidated Complex Review submitted by COMUSMACV on 27 September,⁴ revealed rapid obsolescence and diminished usefulness of this document for construction programming. Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the requirement for the RVN Consolidated Complex Review be cancelled and that the monthly updated Annex K to Vietnamization - Consolidated RVNAF I&M Program and Related U.S. Planning be approved as the basis for definition and validation of the remaining RVN construction requirements.⁵

Construction Program - Thailand/Laos

(S) During 1969, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI had justified several construction projects as urgently required but not funded. These included repair of Ban Houei Sai and

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1. Ibid.
 2. JCS 1165/162109Z Sep 70.
 3. CINCPAC 1st End 42, ser 003249 of 5 Nov 70 on COMUSMACV 1tr MACDC-PP of 22 Oct 70.
 4. COMUSMACV 1tr MACDC-PP of 27 Sep 70.
 5. CINCPAC 262059Z Nov 70.

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Savannakhet airfields, aprons and taxiways at Pakse and Luang Prabang, and a water tower for the Vientiane Hospital. He also required additional construction funds to expand the PEPPERGRINDER ammunition storage in Thailand. No FY 70 construction funds had been provided for MASF/MILCON projects in Southeast Asia and a DOD budget decision had ruled out MASF/MILCON funds for FY 71 except for a few minor projects for the U.S. Army. The only source of construction funds, therefore, were unapportioned FY 69 funds and recoupments from FY 69 and prior year projects.¹

(S) On 4 December 1969, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI had requested \$16,000 in design funds for repair of Ban Houei Sai airfield.² CINCPAC requested the funds from CSAF;³ however, CSAF refused to release the funds until the project was approved.⁴ CINCPAC assured the CSAF that he intended to support the project and advised that the project would be included in the 15 January 1970 list of high priority construction projects submitted to the JCS.⁵

(S) On 5 January, the CSAF advised CINCPAC that the previously approved security facility construction at Ubon was being reinstated but the security facility project at Takhli was being withheld because the status of the base continued to be uncertain.⁶ CINCPAC recommended that the CSAF reinstate the construction at Takhli unless there were firm plans to close the base which would clearly negate the value of planned facilities.⁷ On 20 February, the CSAF advised that stringent budget restrictions and the uncertainty of force beddown in Thailand made the reinstatement of the Takhli project inadvisable.⁸

(S) On 25 January, PACNAVFACENGCOM recommended that PEACE RIDE II construction be accomplished by contract.⁹ PEACE RIDE II was a long standing proposal to construct an AC&W radar station at Doi Inthanon in support of Thai air defense and tactical control requirements. The proposal was politically related on a quid pro quo basis to COBRA TALON, a project involving the construction of an Air Force intelligence gathering station. It was proposed that COBRA TALON construction be accomplished by contract.¹⁰ CINCPAC concurred in the PACNAVFACENGCOM proposal.¹¹

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1. Point Paper, J4324, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Jan 70, Subj: MASF Construction Laos.
 2. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 041032Z Dec 69.
 3. CINCPAC 090505Z Dec 69.
 4. CSAF 112221Z Dec 69.
 5. CINCPAC 172243Z Dec 69.
 6. CSAF 052125Z Jan 70.
 7. CINCPAC 250044Z Jan 70.
 8. CSAF 201529Z Feb 70.
 9. PACNAVFACENGCOM 250323Z Jan 70.
 10. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
 11. CINCPAC 232133Z Feb 70.

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(S) CINCPAC supported a CINCUSARPAC proposal to realign \$544,000 in available MILCON funds for construction of additional facilities at Camp Samae San, Sattahip. The additional facilities would allow closing Camp Vayama and consolidating all Sattahip Log Complex troops at Camp Samae San. An estimated \$1.33 million annual savings in R&U and security guard costs would be realized.¹ CINCUSARPAC requested DA approval of the fund realignment.²

(S) On 31 March, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI to provide maximum assistance to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI in resolving the problem of retaining the Don Muang facilities for REDCAP operations, which support the Laos mission. The political implications in American presence at Don Muang and the MAC channel cargo rerouting were expected to generate Thai pressure on DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI to relocate the REDCAP operations. CINCPAC desired a resolution of the problem with absolute minimum disruption of the REDCAP logistic function. Semi-monthly reports on action taken by COMUSMACTHAI to resolve the problem were requested.³

(S) On 21 April, the SECDEF advised that urgent Laos construction projects totaling \$1.743 million and Thailand construction projects totaling \$2.454 million had been approved. The source of funds would be unapportioned FY 69 Air Force Southeast Asia MILCON appropriations.⁴ On 5 May, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS contingency funding for FY 1/71 Laos/Thailand construction projects totaling \$3.69 million.⁵

(S) Verbal agreements with the Thai Government in 1966 committed the U.S. Government to upgrade Thai Route 223 to a class 50 laterite surfaced road. Funds had been programmed for construction by U.S. troops with assistance from a RTA engineer battalion. Planned force reductions required redeployment of U.S. troops prior to completion of the project. As a result, COMUSMACTHAI provided CINCPAC with a concept for completing construction of Route 223 which would satisfy the U.S. commitment. The concept involved a reduced scope of work, but with increased costs due to partial use of contract construction.⁶ CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC to comment on the concept.⁷ CINCUSARPAC concurred in the concept and advised those procedures necessary to obtain DA/DOD approval of the cost increase.⁸ On 9 June, CINCPAC concurred in the proposed construction

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1. CINCPAC 220536Z Mar 70.
 2. CINCUSARPAC 170337Z Mar 70.
 3. CINCPAC 310506Z Mar 70.
 4. SECDEF 6627/211623Z Apr 70.
 5. CINCPAC 052352Z May 70.
 6. COMUSMACTHAI 190740Z May 70.
 7. CINCPAC 200734Z May 70.
 8. CINCUSARPAC 042242Z and 050301Z Jun 70.

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concept and instructed COMUSMACTHAI to place special emphasis on project documents and to include detailed Embassy coordinated background on the U.S. commitment.¹

(U) CINCPAC validated two construction projects for a transient stockade and electric power plant at Camp Samae San and instructed CINCUSARPAC to realign \$183,000 in available Army construction funds to accomplish these projects.²

Munitions

Southeast Asia Air Munitions Expenditures

(S) The JCS reported the concern expressed by the SECDEF regarding recent air munitions expenditures and the political impossibility predicted for the estimated one billion dollars of supplementary funding to sustain such expenditures. The source of concern was evidently the surge of air munitions expenditures for January 1970. Expenditures had totaled 117,677 tons for that month while the CINCPAC allocation was 104,656 tons. The 104,000 ton/month level could be supported through December 1970 but in-theatre assets would drop to such levels to preclude surge expenditure. The surge in January was attributed to:

a. Increased sorties in response to enemy activity and improved weather.

b. Increased usage of MK-82/M117 which increased the average tonnage per sortie.³

(S) CINCPAC responded by enjoining the component commanders to employ every available means to husband the dwindling reserves within operational requirements. In an effort to provide an adequate reserve for the longest possible time to support surges and counter offensives the following measures were to be evaluated and implemented where possible.⁴

a. Phasing down a reduction in sortie rates to avoid precipitous reduction on 1 July.


b. Reducing B-52 sorties per mission and employing tactics to provide greater bomb dispersal.

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1. CINCPAC 090451Z Jun 70.
 2. CINCPAC 302119Z Dec 70.
 3. JCS 3250/162302Z Mar 70.
 4. CINCPAC 200120Z Mar 70.

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**SEASIA AIR MUNITIONS
(Short Tons)
INVENTORY/EXPENDITURES
AS OF 31 DEC 1970**




• Average End of Month Inventory for Past 12 Months
• Average Monthly Expenditures for Past 12 Months

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 105.

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**SEASIA AIR MUNITIONS
(Short Tons)
INTRANSIT SHIPS*
AS OF 31 DEC 1970**



* AVERAGE END OF MONTH TOTAL FOR PAST 12 MONTHS

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 107.

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c. Restricting in-country tactical air sorties to "known" enemy locations as opposed to "suspected."

d. Reducing pre-planned sorties in RVN by using ground alert sorties against lucrative targets as they develop.

e. Alternative weapons loadings to reduce expenditures of critical munitions.

f. Recovering with ordnance when lucrative targets fail to materialize or weather precludes optimum deliveries.

g. Advance use of the ARC LIGHT A/B bomb loads at U-Tapao from 1 May to 15 April.

(S) The CY 1970 Air Munitions Summary comparing PACOM Requirements/Allocations versus Expenditures as shown on the following chart illustrates the favorable response to the request to husband the dwindling assets.¹

Obsolete Air Munitions Purge

(S) In an effort to purify the DOD air munitions inventory of World War II and Korea ordnance and release storage space for more modern munitions, CINCPAC elected to continue the ARC LIGHT expenditure of M44/M65 bombs to stock exhaustion. The factors which were considered to outweigh the degradation of ARC LIGHT effectiveness were:²

a. Excessive maintenance actions on the obsolescent stockpile.

b. M117 stockage at Kadena would be reduced to 20 days supply and subjected to the risks that any operational/logistical complication would cause.

c. Approximately 1/3 of the bomb storage capacity at Kadena was tied up with M44/M65 bombs which severely limited the flexibility of scheduling inputs of MK82/M117 bombs.

Standardized ARC LIGHT Bomb Load

(S) SAC originated a proposal which cited the advantages which would accrue from changing the bomb load on the 862 B-52 sorties per month originating from


1. J3B22 Memo, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Feb 71, Subj: Air Munitions.

2. CINCPAC 010034Z Jan 70.

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SEASIA AIR MUNITIONS
REQUIREMENTS/ALLOCATIONS/EXPENDITURES
(THOUS OF SHORT TONS)
CY 1970





SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 109.

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U-Tapao to 42 M117s internal and 24 MK82 external (A/B load). The existing load was 84 MK82s internal and 24 M117s external (B/A load). The advantages included reduced fuel and manpower requirements plus considerable savings in bomb load costs per sortie without a loss in weapons effectiveness.¹ CINCPAC withheld approval until it could be satisfactorily established that there would be no degradation in overall sortie and firepower effectiveness.² SAC then cited additional weapons effectiveness data to support the contention that there would be no mission degradation. The most important consideration was the capability to operate 17,000 pounds lighter permitting higher altitudes to counter increasing heavy AAA threats.³ CINCPAC then approved the change to take place immediately for those U-Tapao sorties scheduled to fly within an established SAM/100 MM threat area and the balance as soon as the necessary coordination could be effected. The earliest feasible implementation was estimated to be on or about 1 May.⁴ On 31 March SAC recommended earlier phase-in by scheduling one additional A/B loaded sortie each day commencing on 2 April to permit the training buildup of qualified loading teams and also permit the necessary scheduling realignments required by on-going runway repairs. CINCPAC approved, noting that the proposal would permit potential dollar savings of \$3.8 million over 1 May implementation in addition to a more orderly aircraft reconfiguration; minimized ship diversions while readjusting MK82/M117 stocks; and operational flexibility to fit the constraints of the current runway repairs at U-Tapao.⁵



1. SAC 241615Z Dec 69.
 2. CINCPAC 040200Z Jan 70.
 3. SAC 052359Z Jan 70.
 4. CINCPAC 090444Z Jan 70.
 5. CINCPAC 050115Z Apr 70.
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AIM-9D Positioning

(S) On 3 February CINCPACFLT requested authorization to transfer 40 AIM-9Ds from Southeast Asia to MCAS Iwakuni to support PARPRO and contingency plans.⁵ CINCPAC concurrence recognized that, although the number of AIM-9 missiles in Northeast Asia exceeded the authorization level, all were the inferior AIM-9B. Also, while the AIM-9 assets in Southeast Asia exceeded the stockage objective, an unacceptable percentage were incomplete because of unserviceable guidance and control units. Authorization was requested from the JCS to withdraw 40 AIM-9D from Southeast Asia for movement to MCAS Iwakuni to achieve improved operational capability of MAG 15 F4J aircraft.⁶ The JCS approved the movement as requested⁷ and CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to take appropriate action.⁸

Levels of Supply for PACOM Air Munitions

(S) An informal meeting was held on 26 February with representatives from CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT to discuss the problem associated with the method of computing levels of supply. The method of computation was based

- [REDACTED]
5. CINCPACFLT 030542Z Feb 70.
 6. CINCPAC 180354Z Feb 70.
 7. JCS 1383/182131Z Feb 70.
 8. CINCPAC 232128Z Feb 70.

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entirely on allocation. It was agreed that this method was not representative of actual requirements as the allocation was directly affected by production, over which CINCPAC has no direct control, and would not provide for sufficient stocks on hand to support a surge of the magnitude required. It was proposed that the levels of supply be based on stated requirements. This would be more representative of the component commands capabilities in that it considered force structure, sortie rates, load factors, and experience. The revised PACOM Air Munitions Requirements and Allocations Document incorporated the above proposal.¹

PACOM Air Munitions Allocations

(S) The JCS validated CINCPAC's air munitions requirements for the period March through December as submitted. It was noted, however, that, although CINCPAC's planned air munitions allocation was compatible with the air munitions production program, the allocations after 1 July 1970 for CINCPACAF and CINCSAC would not support optimum bomb loading for approved sortie rates. The requirements for air munitions submitted by CINCPAC were based upon anticipated force structures and aircraft beddown. Directed sortie rates in effect as of March 1970 and known approved/directed force structure changes were considered by the component commanders in the development of their requirements.²

(S) At a USAF sponsored conference held at Hill AFB, Utah in January it was revealed that budgetary guidance indicated planning should be accomplished to effect a major reduction in sortie rates for PACAF and SAC after 1 July 1970. Specifically it was stated that during the second half of CY 70 it was planned to produce sufficient munitions to support 1,200 vice 1,400 SAC ARC LIGHT sorties/month and 10,000 vice 14,000 PACAF tactical air attack sorties/month. Allocations for support of RLAF and VNAF (funding responsibility of the CSAF) after 1 July 1970 essentially met stated requirements.³

(S) Sufficient munitions were available to provide support for PACFLT, RLAF, and VNAF through December 1970. Effective 1 July 1970, PACAF and SAC operations would be constrained to the 10,000 and 1,200 sortie/month level, if it was determined necessary and operationally feasible to adhere to the published allocations.⁴

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1. J47 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
 2. J4 Brief, Hq CINCPAC, No. 217-70, 16 May 70, Subj: PACOM Air Munitions Requirements and Allocations.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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Control of Air Munitions

(S) ASD(I&L) memorandum of 16 August addressed to the Director of the Joint Staff and Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force directed that supply distribution functions and responsibilities for air munitions be returned to the Services subject to the following specified limitations:

- a. The current reporting system for air munitions would remain in effect unless changed by subsequent directive.
- b. Requirements in support of Southeast Asia operations for U.S. and Allied Forces would be established by CINCPAC in coordination with component and operational commanders.
- c. The Services would support CINCPAC requirements as first priority.
- d. CINCPAC, in coordination with component commanders, would continue to be authorized to utilize WRM assets to support emergency operational requirements.
- e. The JCS would continue to monitor the status of air munitions in Southeast Asia and the redistribution of assets to fulfill other worldwide requirements.
- f. The JCS reserve was redesignated as Service Reserves.

Semiannual Review of RVNAF Ground Ammunition Rates

(C) The semiannual review of RVNAF ground ammunition for the first half of CY 70 was sponsored by CINCPAC on 19-20 February 1970. Representatives from OSD, JCS, DA, CMC, MACV, AMC, MUCOM, APSA, and USARPAC Staffs participated. Additionally, three Vietnamese officers from the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, ARVN and the Joint General Staff, RVNAF attended. This was the second rate review which included representation from the RVN. The recommended rates, as agreed to by all conferees, were based upon prior months issues with adjustments for increased training requirements, controlled issues and field evaluation factors, projected assets from production, and consideration of the Vietnamization Program. Related areas of interest were also on the agenda. These included reorganization of RVNAF Ammunition Support System, RVNAF reporting system and stock control procedures, RVNAF transportation capabilities, MACV assessment of the impact of the Vietnamization Program, and reduction of RVNAF stockage levels in-country.¹ The minutes of the review were forwarded to all attendees and the

1. J47 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.

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CINCPAC recommended rates and stockage levels were forwarded to the JCS on 16 March.¹ JCS approval was obtained on 21 April.²

(C) The semiannual review of RVNAF ground ammunition for the second half of CY 70 was again sponsored by CINCPAC staff on 13-14 August 1970. In addition to the normal agenda items, several related areas of interest were also on the agenda. These included update briefings on the reorganization of RVNAF Ammunition Support System, RVNAF reporting system and stock control procedures, RVNAF transportation capabilities, MACV assessment of the impact of the Vietnamization Program, and increased training requirements. The minutes of the conference and the recommended rates and stockage levels were approved by the JCS to be effective 1 October.³

Shipment of Small Arms Ammo or Inert Ammo-Related Materiel

(U) In response to a proposal by HQ MTMTS on shipping small arms ammo or inert ammo-related materiel aboard general cargo vessels, COMUSMACV nonconcurred except in emergency situations.⁴ CINCUSARPAC and CGUSAAPSA comments highlighted the need to retain the same controls and visibility accorded any ammo shipments under the existing system and supported retention of shipping subject items aboard ammunition ships.⁵ CINCPAC advised DA that he favored continuation of the current shipping procedures unless evaluation of alternate proposals reflects not only savings but also assures retention of desired visibility and security controls.⁶ DA supported the position expressed by CINCPAC.⁷

M14 and M16A1 AP Mines

(C) On 2 October 1969, COMUSMACV advised that all M14 and M16A1 AP mines were declared excess by III MAF under the revised DUEL BLADE II Program, and requested disposition instructions.⁸ Except for a Seventh Air Force requirement for 12,433 M14 mines, which was fulfilled, coordination with component commands established no operational requirements for the mines in PACOM. CINCPAC requested determination of any worldwide requirement from JCS. An Army survey team was dispatched to ascertain the condition of the mines for possible fulfillment of Army or MAP requirements. The team recommended local disposition rather

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 745 of 12 Mar 70.
 2. JCS 6673/212239Z Apr 70.
 3. J47 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
 4. COMUSMACV 180536Z May 70.
 5. CINCUSARPAC 210410Z May 70; CGUSAAPSA 211910Z May 70.
 6. CINCPAC 240315Z May 70.
 7. DA 281902Z May 70.
 8. COMUSMACV 020406Z Oct 69.

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than renovation and that mines not be offered to MAP in light of their unserviceable condition.¹ In view of the deteriorated condition of the mines, the fact that they were not economically repairable and that their presence increased the vulnerability of storage locations and adjacent facilities to loss as a result of sapper or indirect fire, CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACV to dispose of the mines locally.² On 17 April, CG III MAF reported that disposal action had been completed.³

Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) in Southeast Asia

(U) This portion of the history, which deals with CY 1970 POL matters in Southeast Asia, is designed to cover only those significant topics not treated elsewhere. Chapter I of this history, for instance, discusses POL from a PACOM-wide viewpoint, and its narrative and accompanying charts, of necessity, treats POL in Southeast Asia as a part of the overall PACOM POL picture during 1970. In addition, scattered throughout this history are passing mentions of POL activities as they affect MAP, logistics, operations, etc.

PACOM POL Conference

(U) From 16 through 18 February, a PACOM POL conference was held at HQ CINCPAC. Among the attendees were representatives of the Service Departments and Inventory Control Points, JCS, DFSC, the component commands, and PACOM Sub-Area Petroleum Offices. The meeting agenda covered a wide range of topics including formal presentations and group discussions on the following:⁴

- a. Progress of the U.S. Navy Distillate Program.
- b. Tanker Costs Versus Ocean Terminal Costs.
- c. Phaseout of Handy Size Tankers Under U.S. Flag.
- d. Guidance on Release of Information to the GAO.
- e. RVNAF POL Operations.
- f. Status of Japan POL Storage.

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1. J47 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
 2. CINCPAC 280034Z Feb 70.
 3. CG III MAF 170718Z Apr 70.
 4. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.

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POL Support in RVN

(S) Consumption of POL, after rising steadily since the first introduction of U.S. forces into RVN, had decreased to 2.9 million barrels per month at the end of the year. Thai-based aircraft consumed about 1.3 million barrels each month, and the Navy and USAF Forces in the Philippines consumed 1.4 million barrels per month (including Navy Fleet oilers). Thus direct Southeast Asia military operations currently require 5.6 million barrels of POL costing over \$26.4 million each month.

(S) In RVN, POL supply was handled through use of existing commercial facilities supplemented by military construction. About 1.1 million barrels of commercial tankage (located principally in the Saigon, Da Nang, and Nha Trang areas) and about 2.7 million barrels of military constructed tankage were in use. POL storage was authorized in RVN in amounts equivalent to 30 days consumption. Heavy emphasis was placed on having a strong replenishment system. Thus there were minimal facilities to guard (or lose to enemy action) and resupply was effected on a frequent basis. This CINCPAC policy has proved to be a very workable one.

(S) A T-5 tanker was kept in floating storage at Da Nang until November. For contingency back-up purposes, two T-2 and three T-1 tankers were kept in coastal shuttle service in RVN waters. If a major terminal should be lost, one of the shuttle tankers could proceed to the location involved and assume the function of a floating terminal. For in-country management purposes, the Army was assigned the responsibility for operating POL terminals in all four MRs. Throughout the year, POL support in RVN received close management attention by the CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office and the Sub-Area Petroleum Office on the staff of COMUSMACV.¹

(U) After several lengthy evaluations indicating the feasibility of such an action, CINCPAC directed the release of the T-5 tanker HAMPTON ROADS, which had been utilized for floating storage at Da Nang. This reduction in assets will result in considerable cost savings. A T-2 tanker, previously in coastal shuttle service, replaced the HAMPTON ROADS at Da Nang.²

(U) Shortly following the release of the HAMPTON ROADS, it was concluded by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV that only two T-2 tankers and two T-1 tankers were required to perform coastal shuttle operations in RVN. Accordingly, a further reduction in tanker assets was accomplished by the release of the T-1 CHATTAHOOCHEE on 13 December.³

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1. J4412 Point Paper, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Oct 70, Subj: POL Support RVN.
 2. CINCPAC 240205Z Nov 70; CINCPAC 252322Z Nov 70.
 3. CINCPAC 130025Z Dec 70.

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POL Management in Thailand

(C) CINCPAC, in an attempt to reduce unnecessary fragmentation and simplify POL management in Thailand, recommended to the JCS and the DFSC that:¹

a. A single Air Force Property Administrator be appointed to perform the POL management function for all Services.

b. All Navy POL logistical responsibility in Thailand be eliminated.

c. Procurement inspection responsibility be transferred from the Navy to the Air Force.

d. A contracting officer's representative with direct access to DFSC on contractual matters be established.

(C) In order to eliminate multiple POL requirements submission channels for Laos, CINCPAC also directed that all future JP-4 requirements be submitted through DEPCHJUSMAG vice SAPOTHAI.²

(U) As the year ended, there had been no official reaction from the Washington level to CINCPAC's recommendations.

POL Support to Cambodia

(TS) As a result of events in Cambodia and the decision to provide limited U.S. support to the Cambodian Government, the following POL requisitioning procedures were established:

a. Cambodian requests for military supplies are submitted formally in writing by the FANK J4 to the office of the POL/MIL Counselor (P/MC) AMEMB Phnom Penh. These requests are broken down by type, quantities, daily requirements, and monthly requirements. After adjusting the quantities to reasonable proportions, the P/MC consults with the FANK J4 to establish priority of shipment.

b. When requirements and priorities for receipt have been established, MACV J4 is notified. MACV then screens these requests to insure quantities are realistic, selects the source for requisition, acquires the materiel, arranges transportation, and advises P/MC of quantities being shipped with estimated time of arrival in Phnom Penh. Normal means of transporting supplies is by VNAF

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1. CINCPAC 210317Z Dec 70.
 2. CINCPAC 190204Z Dec 70.

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airlift, VNN waterlift and limited use of roads. On 29 and 30 June nine U.S. air sorties were utilized.

c. P/MC advises FANK on a daily basis of incoming materials; he provides a U.S. official (Embassy/USDAO) to be in place at the air and sea ports at Phnom Penh to join FANK personnel to oversee acceptance of incoming materiel. At this point, FANK furnishes written receipt to the U.S. official accepting the shipment. Cargo is then loaded on trucks and taken to secure areas by FANK where detailed inventories are made. A copy of the inventory is provided the P/MC a few days after delivery. Onward delivery of materiel is accomplished by FANK using C-47 aircraft or trucks as scheduled by the FANK.

d. Military region commanders having requirements are supposed to submit them to FANK J4 by radio or personal messenger. On occasion, friendly Forward Air Controllers (FAC) or other contacts will pick up requests from military region or garrison commanders. When these are received by MACV, they are passed immediately to the P/MC for verification and recommended action. P/MC investigates the requests with FANK. If the request is valid, FANK either provides the materiel from stocks on hand or advises the P/MC of their inability to support. In the latter case, valid requests are passed back to MACV for their support. In several instances, support has been provided by airdrop of supplies to units isolated from supply by other means.¹

(C) Weekly status reports were received from USDAO Phnom Penh which reflected POL held in Phnom Penh by Shell, Caltex, Esso, and Tela Khmer Companies, and the stocks at Kompong Som refinery. The report for 31 October 1970 indicated 50 to 60 tank trucks were arriving in Phnom Penh each day from the Kompong Som refinery and, at the present consumption rates, about 30 days of supply remained in Phnom Penh. Report further indicated ample supplies were reaching Phnom Penh.²

(C) The first major POL problem was noted in late November when the American Embassy, Phnom Penh, advised that interdiction of Route 4 was causing concern regarding resupply of POL to Phnom Penh. Bids for two tankers of about 2,000 ton capacity each to resupply Phnom Penh were being solicited by director of Tela Khmer. At current consumption rates most products would be exhausted by 31 December unless resupply was effected. The Embassy recommended that routes other than the Mekong River be considered for resupply. Two possibilities, depending on the degree of security, were by road from Thailand via Battambang and by road from Saigon.³

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1. J4116 Point Paper; Hq CINCPAC, 27 Oct 70, Subj: Cambodian Logistics Capabilities.
 2. USDAO Phnom Penh 060900Z Nov 70.
 3. AMEMBASSY Phnom Penh 301005Z Nov 70.

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(C) Continued enemy closure of Route 4, which carried POL supplies from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh, caused the POL situation in the Capital to remain serious throughout December. Barge and small tanker shipments from Nha Be via the Mekong were able to reach Phnom Penh at irregular intervals. A contingency plan for the airlift of emergency military requirements was developed by MACV. Tela Khmer continued their efforts to effect a long term solution to the resupply problem by purchase/lease of additional barges or shallow draft tankers.¹ At month's end, Phnom Penh stocks of kerosene were exhausted, but stocks of other products were marginally adequate.²


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1. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
 2. USDAO Phnom Penh 311045Z Dec 70.

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BULK POL DATA, PACOM

AS OF 30 NOV 1970





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SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 114.

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BULK POL DATA BY SUB AREA

AS OF 30 NOV 1970



RECEIPTS DURING LAST 180 DAYS

MILITARY STORAGE AVAILABLE



SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 115.

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BULK POL DATA BY SUB-AREA

AS OF 30 NOV 1970



■ RECEIPTS DURING LAST 180 DAYS ▨ MILITARY STORAGE AVAILABLE


SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 116.

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BULK POL DATA BY SUB-AREA

AS OF 30 NOV 1970



SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 117.

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SECTION X - ACTION TAKEN TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

(U) Without doubt the leaders of Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam are the most formidable problem Free World diplomacy has ever faced. They are not rational in the psychological and political sense which you and I understand. They are insensitive to life and property. Theirs is a long-range goal of territorial and ideological conquest. And to achieve this objective they are ruthless and resolute, patient and persistent.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

The North Korean Threat

(U)the North Korean threat has not diminished in the last two years. Stepped-up infiltration to the South, the brazen capture of the Pueblo, and the shoot-down of an American plane many miles from North Korean air space, reflect a truculence that could escalate sharply into major war. Kim Il-sung makes no secret of his goal to unify Korea by force under his control during the next few years....he launched a carefully planned campaign to this end, highlighted by the 1968 Blue House raid in Seoul designed to assassinate President Park of the Republic of Korea; subsequent events continue to reaffirm his aggressive intentions. Clearly he will not scruple at even the most flagrant measures to achieve his objective.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.²

(S) A close look at the relative military strengths of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea indicated that the ROK had the greater capability

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1. Remarks of Admiral McCain to the participants in the Semi-Annual Orientation Course, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, in Bangkok, 15 Jun 70.
 2. Ibid.

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in many categories. In those areas where this was not the case, the ability of the U.S. to reinforce the ROK effectively denied Kim Il-sung the option of exploitation in support of his goal to reunify Korea on his terms.¹

(S) Politically, the North Korea regime continued on the course of an autocratic military dictatorship. Kim Il-sung further consolidated his hold on the government through placement of his followers in all major positions in the government. Propaganda activities were accented by the 20th anniversary of the Korean War. North Korea invited an unusually large number of visitors from 22 countries to the anniversary celebration, including the Chief of Staff of the Communist Chinese Army and Prince Norodom Sihanouk. This occasion marked the initiation of a month of particularly virulent anti-U.S. propaganda. A significant objective of this campaign was to exhort the North Korean people to fulfill the target of the seven year economic plan, which had been delayed in the past.²

(S) The North Korean military threat remained basically unchanged in 1970. Modernization of the armed forces continued with the acquisition of additional tanks and guided missile patrol boats, and replacement of the MIG-15 and MIG-17 with the MIG-21. The North Koreans maintained the capability to launch a surprise attack against the ROK with its sizeable land forces deployed near the DMZ and, with little warning, could commit most of its force in a large-scale attack with limited objectives. Any attempt to conquer the ROK by force would require extensive support and reinforcement from Communist China or the Soviet Union. The principal active threat to the ROK was the subversive infiltration conducted by North Korea's unconventional warfare organizations.³

North Korean Conventional Armed Forces

(S) The North Korean armed forces include a large army, a modern jet air force, and a small navy. North Korea is allied through mutual defense treaties with its two communist neighbors, Communist China and the Soviet Union. Her military forces are well-trained, rigidly disciplined, well-equipped, and their combat effectiveness is considered to be good. All major weapons systems are supplied by the Soviet Union along with spare parts and POL. The modern weapons provided by the Soviet Union include guided missile patrol boats, the FROG missile system, and MIG-21 aircraft. Nevertheless, these forces were not

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1. CINCPAC 190315Z Jul 70; Point Paper, J2212, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Aug 70, Subj: North Korean Threat (U); and Point Paper, J2212, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Aug 70, Subj: Recent Developments and General Situation (U).
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

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considered to be capable of a successful military campaign to capture, destroy, or neutralize the armed forces of the ROK without direct major assistance from Communist China or the USSR. There were no indications that such assistance would be provided. The ROK on the other hand was assured of U.S. support and reinforcement for defense against armed aggression.¹

North Korean Army

(S) The North Korean Army consisted of 356,000 personnel organized into 20 infantry divisions, three AAA divisions, one tank division, four artillery brigades, and other supporting units. The Army was adequately equipped with Soviet equipment, or Chinese and North Korean copies of Soviet equipment, and was deployed to provide for defense of the DMZ and the coastlines and to provide internal security. In addition, it had a significant capability to conduct offensive operations. Fourteen of the 20 infantry divisions were deployed along the DMZ, with the heaviest concentration along the historical invasion routes. The armor inventory had increased over the past two years and consisted of an estimated 600 Soviet medium and heavy tanks. The offensive capability of the Army was augmented last year by the acquisition of the FROG missile system.²

North Korean Navy

(S) The North Korean Navy, the smallest of the services, was equipped and deployed for defensive patrol and surveillance of North Korean territorial waters. For this mission the Navy had some 148 patrol craft. A limited offensive capability was provided by four Soviet-built "W" class submarines and 14 guided missile patrol boats equipped with the STYX anti-ship missile system, all based on the east coast. The Navy had 20 landing craft in its inventory; however, the lack of major amphibious ships and amphibious training indicated a very limited capability to conduct any amphibious assault.³

North Korean Air Force

(S) The North Korean Air Force was the fifth largest in the communist world. While it was primarily a defensive force, it was also capable of ground attack and ground support operations. A force of 80 IL-28 light jet bombers comprised the principal offensive capability, which could be augmented by up to 300 jet fighters used in the offensive role. The defensive force consisted

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

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of some 376 of the older MIG-15 and MIG-17 and 108 of the more modern MIG-21. Over the past two years the capability of the Air Force had been strengthened by the gradual replacement of the MIG-15 and MIG-17 by the MIG-21 and by the construction of hardened facilities at North Korean airfields. About 45 percent of the Air Force inventory could be dispersed in these hardened facilities. Construction of hardened facilities and fighter aircraft replacement continued during 1970. A limited airborne support capability existed in the 82 transport aircraft, of which 50 were the small capacity AN-2. The 23 helicopters in the inventory provided a potential but limited helicopter assault capability. The North Korean Air Force had the capability of launching an initial surprise attack of some magnitude but of limited duration and effectiveness against protected targets.¹

North Korean Missile Capability

(S) The North Korean missile capability consisted of some 84 SAM launchers, 14 patrol boats equipped with the STYX anti-ship missile, and nine FROG tactical missile launchers. The surface-to-air missiles were deployed to defend important military, industrial, and political complexes. Of the 33 known SAM sites only about half normally were occupied at any one time. The North Koreans had no indigenous missile production capability and were forced to rely on the Soviet Union for weapons and support.²

North Korean Unconventional Forces

(S) The principal threat to the ROK continued to be the subversive infiltrations conducted by North Korea's unconventional warfare organizations. Along the DMZ there were three Foot Reconnaissance Stations capable of harassment, ambush, sabotage, and terrorism against the ROK. In addition, the 17th Reconnaissance Brigade had been trained for airborne infiltration and guerrilla warfare in the event of war. A modest airlift capability of some 50 light transports was available to support such operations. Approximately 50 fast boats provided an excellent capability to infiltrate agents on ROK coasts.³

(S) During 1970, there was a low level of North Korean infiltration attempts, continuing the trend noted since January 1969. The change in number and type of incidents suggested that North Korea had altered its tactics. Its inability to establish a viable guerrilla base in the south during the past two years and the increasingly effective ROK counterinfiltration system

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.


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probably forced this shift. Large scale terror tactics had failed. The 1970 purge of a number of leaders responsible for the agent operations attests to Kim Il-sung's dissatisfaction with the results of past operations. It was noted that the trend of subversion was toward the injection of small agent teams whose missions were to recruit personnel, establish underground organizations, gather intelligence, and to engage in selected terrorist activity. Another trend was the increased use of commercial transportation from Japan to infiltrate agents and the use of repatriated ROK fishermen. In both cases, infiltration was overt and agents were extremely difficult to detect until they committed themselves.¹

U.S. Air Force Posture in Korea

(TS) Following the PUEBLO incident in 1968 and the shootdown of the EC-121 in 1969, U.S. air assets in the ROK had been augmented by deployment of a CONAD F-106 Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS) and two ANG F-100 Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS). The two ANG TFSS were subsequently redeployed to the CONUS and replaced by two USAF F-4 TFSS in June 1969. On 6 November 1969, the JCS designated 31 March 1970 as the redeployment date for the FIS "unless overriding factors dictate otherwise at that time."



(TS) On 18 January CINCPAC addressed the CJCS with respect to an earlier JCS decision to deploy three F-4 TFSS from the Republic of Vietnam to the CONUS. The CINCPAC position was that the three TFSS should be deployed to the ROK to permit termination of the rotational deployment of the two F-4 TFSS

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1. Ibid.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol IV, pp. 151-157.
 3. CINCPACAF 090413Z Jan 70.

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from the CONUS to the ROK and to minimize the impact when it becomes necessary to terminate the F-106 FIS rotational deployment. On 4 February the CJCS reaffirmed the previous decision to return the three TFSSs to the CONUS.¹

(TS) On 21 February CINCPAC replied to a JCS request² for comments on a CINCONAD request³ for advice regarding the validity of a 31 March termination date of the FIS deployment. He stated that there had been no significant change in the threat to the ROK since the October assessment, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recapped the capabilities of other USAF tactical aircraft in the area, reiterated the political impact of any U.S. force reduction in Korea, and recommended that:

a. The F-106 deployment be continued until a relief is provided.

b. One of the F-4 equipped TFSSs of the 12th TFW, when withdrawn from Southeast Asia, be deployed PCS to the ROK to provide the relief for the F-106 FIS.⁴

(TS) On 9 March CINCPAC replied to the JCS request of November⁵ affirming his comments and reiterating his recommendations of 21 February.⁶ He also recommended that U.S. air strength in the ROK should be maintained at the current level in order to:

a. Preserve a reasonable deterrent posture consistent with U.S. strategy,

b. Satisfy unilateral U.S. requirements in the ROK,

c. Demonstrate continued resolve to honor U.S. treaty commitments and,

d. Be prepared for initial defense against a Chinese and North Korean attack.⁷

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1. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70 citing CINCPAC 180031Z Jan 70 and CJCS 041433Z Feb 70.
 2. JCS 9844/111452Z Feb 70.
 3. CINCONAD 062045Z Feb 70.
 4. CINCPAC 210428Z Feb 70.
 5. JCS 4149/062330Z Nov 69.
 6. CINCPAC 210428Z Feb 70.
 7. CINCPAC 092047Z Mar 70.


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The JCS informed CINCPAC on 14 March that a decision on continuation of the TDY deployment of a CONAD F-106 squadron to the ROK involved considerations of strategy, force posture, and the budget which required resolution at higher levels and that recommendations were being developed with a view of obtaining such a decision by 10 April.¹

(TS) On 26 March the JCS recommended to the SECDEF that the CONAD rotational FIS deployment to the ROK be discontinued in April 1970 because of the following considerations:

- a. Critical gaps in the CONAD peripheral defense.
- b. Budgetary constraints.



Subsequently, the JCS directed CINCPAC and CINCONAD to terminate the F-106 FIS deployment on or about 22 April. This would reduce the USAF deployment in the ROK from 137 to 119 fighter aircraft.³


(TS) The JCS, on 21 April, requested CINCPAC's views on a CSAF proposal to terminate the temporary deployment of the two CONUS F-4 TFSS to the ROK when the squadrons then deployed complete their temporary tours of duty on 1 and 8 June 1970.⁴



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1. JCS 3150/141619Z Mar 70.
 2. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70 citing JCSM-129-70 of 26 Mar 70 and JCS 4619/010207Z Apr 70.
 3. JCS 6269/162037Z Apr 70.
 4. JCS 6654/212150Z Apr 70.
 5. CINCPAC 280201Z Apr 70.

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1. JCS 8389/082040Z May 70.
 2. CINCPAC 150339Z May 70.
 3. J5156 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70 citing JCS 9104/161655Z May 70.
 4. J5/Memo/000199-70 of 8 May 70.
 5. CINCPAC 260408Z May 70.
 6. CINCPAC 291436Z Jul 70.
 7. Point Paper, J5115, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 70, Subj: Transfer of F-4 Wing to Korea (U).


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fiscal reasons. CINCPAC replied on 23 July, recommending the transfer of the 475 TFW from Misawa to Korea and cited the operational and fiscal advantages including savings in construction costs of over \$30 million. On 8 August CINCPAC reaffirmed this recommendation, offered additional rationale if desired, and noted the desirability of an early decision. On 20 August CJCS advised CINCPAC that no final determination had been made but was expected at any time.¹ As the year drew to a close the decision as to which TFW would move was still pending.

Reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea

(TS) In December 1969 the JCS had requested CINCPAC to submit a plan for the withdrawal of a division or more of U.S. forces, provided assumptions to be used, and posed a list of questions associated with the withdrawal.² A supplemental message stated that the JCS response to SECDEF would be provided in two phases. The first phase would provide the JCS views on the possible withdrawal plus a plan for carrying out the withdrawal in a manner to minimize the effect on ROK security. The second phase would address questions on U.S. force posture in Korea.³ COMUS Korea and CINCUSARPAC were tasked to provide inputs to CINCPAC and the component commanders were requested to provide representatives to assist in preparation of a response to JCS.⁴ The two planning requirements were submitted to the JCS on 5 January. The short-term requirement included CINCPAC's views on the one division withdrawal and a plan for this withdrawal.



1. J5115 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70 citing CJCS 10309/222244Z Jul 70, CINCPAC 232232Z Jul 70, CINCPAC 080427Z Aug 70 and CJCS 11542/202226Z Aug 70.
2. JCS 5704/032247Z Dec 69.
3. JCS 5802/051417Z Dec 69.
4. CINCPAC 060448Z Dec 69, CINCPAC 070200Z Dec 69, CINCPAC 140008Z Dec 69.
5. J5115 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70 citing CINCPAC ltrs 5115, sers 0002 and 0004 of 5 Jan 70, Subj: Troop Withdrawal Planning - Korea (TS).
6. JCS 9658/072005Z Feb 70.

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1. CINCPAC ltrs 5115 sers 0002 and 0004 of 5 Jan 70.
2. See CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 161-163 for additional data regarding NSSM 27.
3. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
4. CINCPAC 110424Z Feb 70.
5. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70 citing DJSM-248-70 of 18 Feb 70, Subj: U.S. Policy for Korea (U).

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(TS) Planning for the reduction of U.S. force levels in Korea took a more definitive turn when, on 4 April, the JCS requested CINCPAC to prepare a conceptual plan for the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. personnel by the end of FY 71. The JCS commented that the early withdrawal of the bulk of the personnel could assist in the solution of the funding shortfall in Southeast Asia in FY 71. It was to be assumed that the redeployments of the TDY USAF tactical/air defense squadrons (one F-106 FIS and two F-4 TFSs) during late FY 70 would comprise part of the 20,000 figure with the balance of the 20,000 consisting of U.S. Army personnel.¹ COMUS Korea, in coordination with CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF, was tasked to develop a conceptual plan and forward to CINCPAC by 25 April.²

(TS) CINCPAC submitted the requested plan to the JCS on 2 May. The plan provided for the withdrawal of selected U.S. forces from Korea which would result in the reduction of 20,000 personnel during FY 71. The remaining U.S. ground force structure would retain a viable combat capability, place a representative force at the DMZ, and demonstrate U.S. resolve to honor commitments in Korea. However, the capabilities of these forces would be degraded significantly from present capabilities. The reduction would be accomplished by inactivating and/or redeploying some U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force units. The U.S. Army division remaining in Korea would be restructured to include three brigade headquarters, eight maneuver battalions (four infantry, two mechanized and two tank), one armored cavalry squadron, a Chaparral/Vulcan battalion, and the division base. One brigade would continue security operations at the DMZ to secure a narrow sector of about company width (500 meters) in the Panmunjom area. USAF reductions would consist primarily of redeployment of CONUS-based TDY squadrons. Specific spaces identified for withdrawal totalled 1,596 Air Force and 18,403 Army.³



(TS) On 5 May the JCS informed CINCPAC that the joint staff was reviewing the CINCPAC withdrawal plan and requested additional details regarding the number of

1. JCS 5142/041727Z Apr 70.
2. CINCPAC 051019Z Apr 70.
3. CINCPAC 022250Z May 70.
4. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70 citing CJCS 241729Z Apr 70.
5. CINCPAC 092248Z May 70.

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additional MAP-supported ROK spaces which should be generated to activate or augment the ROK units replacing U.S. units, period of time needed for execution of the plan, and the current strengths of ROK armed forces by category.¹ The CINCPAC reply to the JCS stated that the concept for ground personnel withdrawals envisioned that units will be inactivated in Korea and personnel re-assigned or redeployed. The number of replacements entering Korea would be modified so as to achieve a balance over a 9-month time period.

[REDACTED]

(TS) The JCS informed CINCPAC on 18 July that the President had approved the JCS plan for withdrawal.³ The approved plan called for:

- a. Termination of the temporary deployment of the three CONUS-based U.S. Air Force squadrons.
- b. Withdrawal and deactivation of the 2d U.S. Infantry Division from the DMZ and replacement by an existing ROKA division.
- c. Deactivation of I US Corps (Group) Headquarters, corps artillery and other support units and activation of new ROKA units for replacements.
- d. U.S. presence at the DMZ reduced to one brigade.
- e. Restructuring the 7th U.S. Infantry Division as proposed by CINCPAC.
- f. Maximum feasible turnover of equipment, supplies, and facilities to the ROK Army.
- g. Withdrawal of U.S. ground forces in three phases.⁴

(TS) In the interest of accomplishing the withdrawal within the prescribed time period (by 30 June 1971), CINCPAC provided the JCS with his views on the broad actions to be accomplished and recommended that appropriate authorities be tasked to accomplish the following:

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1. JCS 8042/052243Z May 70.
 2. CINCPAC 130419Z May 70.
 3. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for month of Jul citing CJCS 10059/180007Z Jul 70.
 4. Point Paper, J5115, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 70, Subj: US Programs in Korea (U)

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- a. U.S. Embassy in Seoul reaffirm U.S. intentions to the ROK government.
- b. Embassy Country Team initiate conceptual planning with the ROK government and reveal the contents of the approved withdrawal plan to the ROK government.
- c. ROK and U.S. military commanders develop coordinated plans for replacement of U.S. units, equipment, and facility requirements, and time phasing schedules.
- d. Obtain approval for transfer of U.S. equipment to the ROK forces and authority to commence withdrawal of U.S. personnel.¹

(S) On 5 September the JCS advised CINCPAC that Implementation Day for the withdrawal plan was established as 17 July 1970. The JCS understood that the lack of cooperation by the ROKG in combined planning precluded use of the phasing as proposed by CINCPAC. Therefore, CINCPAC was authorized to modify the phasing to accommodate ROK government reaction but emphasized that the directed reduction must be accomplished by 30 June 1971.³ On 15 September CINCPAC modified the withdrawal phasing based on recommendations from CINCUSARPAC and COMUS Korea to provide for a reduction of 5,000 authorized spaces by 31 December, an additional reduction of 5,400 spaces by 30 April 1971, and a final reduction of 8,000 spaces by 30 June 1971.⁴

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1. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70 citing CINCPAC 240309Z Jul 70.
 2. Point Paper, J2212b, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Aug 70, Subj: ROK Government Views on the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Korea (U).
 3. JCS 9347/051639Z Sep 70.
 4. CINCPAC 150350Z Sep 70.

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(S) On 29 September COMUS Korea advised CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, JCS, and DA that in order for critical daily operations to continue certain Eighth Army units were being reduced to caretaker status and would be brought to zero strength. Corollary base closure and Korean local national personnel reduction actions also would be taken.⁴ On 6 October CINCPAC concurred in the proposed actions but directed no action be taken pending concurrence of the JCS and the DA.⁵ On 14 October the SECDEF authorized the actions proposed by COMUS Korea and further authorized COMUS Korea to inform the ROK negotiators that he had been directed to commence withdrawal of the 2d Infantry Division from the DMZ on a date to be selected by COMUS Korea as necessary to achieve the objectives of the approved withdrawal plan. He also requested that he be provided COMUS Korea's implementing plan to include:

- a. Overall plan for base consolidations, closures, and transfer.
- b. Number of military personnel and Korean local nationals to be reduced by location.⁶

(S) On 27 October COMUS Korea advised that the detailed information requested by the SECDEF was not available, but would be developed during the U.S./ROK tactical coordination scheduled to commence on 6 December. He also


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1. COMUS Korea 111604Z Sep 70.
 2. CINCPAC 150350Z Sep 70.
 3. JCS 1338/181534Z Sep 70.
 4. COMUS Korea 292333Z Sep 70.
 5. CINCPAC 062305Z Oct 70.
 6. SECDEF 3449/141316Z Oct 70.

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advised that the DA had given approval to lease to the ROKG non-excess U.S. equipment in Korea which was essential to enable the ROK forces to assume U.S. missions. Pending legislation necessary for transfer of title, U.S. equipment scheduled for turnover which was not immediately mission-essential could be bailed to the ROKG for storage.¹ The SECDEF provided additional amplifying guidance regarding information to be included in COMUS Korea's implementing plan and requested that the plan be furnished as soon as the U.S./ROK negotiations permitted but not later than 31 January 1971.²

(S) By December more than 9,500 spaces in the U.S. Eighth Army had been vacated by attrition. This rapid attrition became a major problem, with U.S. combat capability being reduced before the ROK forces were capable of assuming U.S. missions. On 2 November, the CJCS advised CINCPAC that action was being taken by the DA to bring personnel strength reductions into consonance with the approved withdrawal plans.³



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1. COMUS Korea 270430Z Oct 70.
 2. SECDEF 4515/272132Z Oct 70.
 3. Point Paper, J5115, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 70, Subj: US Programs in Korea (U).
 4. COMUS Korea 111604Z Sep 70.

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[REDACTED]

(S) On 18 September the JCS stated that, in the spirit of consultation indicated in President Nixon's letter to President Park and in view of CINCPAC's doubts about the ROK ability to assume the missions of the I Corps (Group) by 30 June 1971, CINCPAC's recommendation regarding the formation of a small temporary combined headquarters appeared to be of sufficient merit to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, subject to the concurrence of the U.S. Ambassador, CINCPAC was authorized to conduct a joint U.S./ROK investigation of the feasibility and costs of such action.

[REDACTED]

CINCPAC requested COMUS Korea to conduct the investigation under the caveats prescribed by the JCS.³

[REDACTED]

1. CINCPAC 150350Z Sep 70.

[REDACTED]

3. CINCPAC 192357Z Sep 70.
4. COMUS Korea 160515Z Oct 70.
5. CINCPAC 200214Z Oct 70.
6. COMUS Korea 280312Z Oct 70.
7. CINCPAC 281446Z Oct 70.
8. COMUS Korea 300640Z Oct 70.

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U. S. Forces Five-Year Program for Korea, FY 71-75


(S) On 6 October the JCS requested CINCPAC to submit a five-year U.S. forces program for Korea. The program was to be consistent with known budgetary planning, strategy guidance, and assistance programs. It was to include planned total manpower strengths, deployments of major units, and planned U.S. installations in-country.⁸ CINCPAC tasked COMUS Korea to develop a proposed

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1. CINCPAC 310354Z Oct 70.
 2. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for month of Dec 70, citing JCSM-520-70 of 9 Nov 70.
 3. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for month of Dec 70, citing CINCPAC 240306Z Nov 70.
 4. JCS 6672/252201Z Nov 70.
 5. CINCPAC 282116Z Nov 70.
 6. COMUSKOREA 020025Z Dec 70.
 7. CINCPAC 060003Z Dec 70.
 8. JCS 2784/061322Z Oct 70.

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program in accordance with the JCS guidance and to use as a baseline for development of the program the data portrayed in Section IV of the Joint Forces Memorandum FY 72-79. The PACOM component commanders were requested to provide CINCPAC with their comments/recommendations on the proposed program as developed by COMUS Korea.¹ In a separate message CINCPAC provided COMUS Korea with additional specific guidance.²




The US forces program for support of the Korean theater must be flexible and responsive. It must be flexible as to adjustments to offset slippage and shortfalls involved in ROK force improvement and modernization as well as North Korean actions and be responsive to both the political and military climate existent in Korea during this critical period.

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1. CINCPAC 072250Z Oct 70.
 2. CINCPAC 072258Z Oct 70.
 3. CINCPAC 302207Z Oct 70.

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
Additionally, as in the case of the five-year modernization/improvement plan, it must be reviewed on a continuing basis to insure adequacy and consistency with US policy on Korea.



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1. See CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol IV, pp. 148-150 for a discussion of CINCPAC OPlan 27-69.
 2. CINCPAC 310536Z Mar 70.
 3. CINCPAC 310343Z Jul 70.


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6. CINCPACAF 101814Z Aug 70.
7. Basic Rules of Engagement for Korea can be found in CINCPAC 062307Z Jul 69.

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Suspension of Bilateral Intelligence Collection Operations

(S) In July CINUNC suspended all bilateral intelligence collection operations across the DMZ conducted by the ROK Combined Operations Group and the 8th US Army Military Intelligence Group (Provisional) because of the loss of agent personnel and the resultant propaganda exploitation by North Korean personnel at Panmunjom. CINCPAC supported this action and advised DIA. He emphasized that the major problem encountered in conducting these bilateral operations was the lack of U.S. control over the ROK operational personnel and their activities.³

(S) DIA requested CINCPAC to determine the effect of the moratorium on U.S. intelligence collection activities and provide proposed actions to fill intelligence gaps caused by the moratorium. On 30 November CINCPAC reported to DIA on the status of bilateral collection activities in Korea, described the effect on the three HUMINT operations concerned, and outlined several alternative actions being considered. These included:⁴

- a. Reorganization of the Collection Company of the MI Group to improve long range planning.
- b. Provide additional guidance and assistance to the ROK agencies involved.

Plan for Leaflet Dissemination

② [REDACTED]

③ [REDACTED]

response to North Korean provocations.

- 2. CINCPAC 250417Z Aug 70.
- 3. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70 citing CINCPAC ltr J233 ser 009204, 10 Aug 70.
- 4. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for month of Nov 70 citing CINCPAC ltr ser 009276 of 30 Nov 70.

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Construction Program

(U) In response to a CINCPAC request³ COMUS Korea submitted a priority list of urgent construction projects requiring funding in FY 4/70. The list included Army projects of \$5.8 million and Air Force projects of \$4.9 million.⁴ These projects were considered by CINCPAC in compiling his list of urgent projects which was submitted to the JCS in February and included a total of \$6.693 million for Korea (\$5.758 million for Army and \$.935 million for Air Force).⁵ The SECDEF approved only two of the urgent construction projects for Korea. The Air Force Taegu taxiway project was approved in the amount of \$.835 million to be funded by realignment of remaining Air Force FY 68 funds.⁶ The Forward Command Post project was approved for contingency funding in the amount of \$3.729 million.⁷

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1. J56 History, Hq CINCPAC, for month of May 70 citing CINCUNC ltr UNC CJ, 4 Apr 70.
 2. CINCPAC 100138Z May 70.
 3. CINCPAC 032327Z Jan 70.
 4. COMUSKOREA 170300Z Jan 70.
 5. CINCPAC 032041Z Feb 70.
 6. SECDEF 9629/221554Z May 70.
 7. SECDEF 1121/281639Z May 70.

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(S) In March the DEPSECDEF tasked the CJCS to develop a plan for reducing force levels in Korea during FY 71. The OASD(I&L) then requested the JCS to reevaluate the requirement for the Forward Command Post.¹ COMUS Korea and CINCUSARPAC revalidated the requirements and, on 5 April, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the Forward Command Post be revalidated to the SECDEF and that funding be continued as programmed.²

(S) The CINCPAC priority list of urgent construction projects, forwarded to the JCS in October, was comprised of projects in support of facility requirements generated by intra-PACOM troop and unit relocations, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and other urgent projects. Korean projects were a total of \$4.405 million for the Air Force.³ On 31 December, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS revisions to the October list based on additional JCS guidance relative to the basing of nuclear weapons redeployed from Okinawa.⁴

(S) In June 1969 CINCPAC had commented to the SECDEF on an OASD(C) report on O&M funded construction activities in Korea. He had nonconcurred in certain findings and recommendations of the report implementation of which would reduce the unified commander's management flexibility for construction in support of contingency operations.⁵ On 5 March 1970, the JCS supported CINCPAC. The CINCPAC/JCS position supported development of more flexible and responsive procedures, allowing for expedient use of all available resources in the most economical manner during initial stages of a contingency, as opposed to tighter application of peacetime restrictions and reporting procedures.⁶

(U) On 14 November CINCPACAF requested CINCPAC validation of a \$355,000 FY 72 MILCON project to improve the electric power facilities at Osan Air Base to support communications facilities.⁷ CINCPAC validated the project on 12 December after receiving COMUS Korea's comments.⁸

Equipment Allowance for Headquarters UNC/USFK

(U) COMUS Korea advised CINCPAC that Headquarters United Nations Command/

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1. JCS 4759/012233Z Apr 70.
 2. CINCPAC 052011Z Apr 70.
 3. CINCPAC 242226Z Oct 70.
 4. CINCPAC 312344Z Dec 70.
 5. CINCPAC 150028Z Jun 69.
 6. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70 citing JCSM-88-70 of 5 Mar 70.
 7. CINCPACAF ltr DEP of 14 Nov 70.
 8. CINCPAC 122309Z Dec 70.

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U.S. Forces Korea was attempting to identify and quantify operational equipment requirements. COMUS Korea further stated that the Headquarters could not establish the existence of an applicable equipment authorization document, and requested CINCPAC comment and guidance.¹ CINCPAC requested CNO, as the responsible agent for administrative and logistical support, to advise whether a joint table of allowances or other authorization document has been established for UNC/USFK.² If not, UNC/USFK will define and submit equipment requirements in accordance with applicable regulations.³

Air Freight Procedures in Korea

(U) COMUS Korea requested CINCPAC take necessary action to resolve areas of responsibility and alleviate problems which existed at air freight terminals in Korea. Basic issues were: which service is responsible for notification of consignees; documentation; and vehicle loading, blocking, bracing, and tie-down.⁴ In view of the inability of affected components to resolve these issues, CINCPAC advised COMUS Korea of the delineation of responsibilities of the Air Force terminal operator and the supported service.⁵ COMUS Korea supported the CINCPAC decisions and stated that no further problems were anticipated.⁶

Real Estate

(TS) COMUS Korea requested authority to transfer excess real estate and related property to ROK forces, at no cost to the country MAP program in the event of a directed reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea.⁷ CINCPAC requested his component commanders to evaluate the request and identify problem areas involved in the transfer of real property and other related property to the ROKF. Conferences with CINCUSARPAC and COMUS Korea were also held. It was the consensus of all concerned that congressional legislation was needed to ensure flexibility during reorganization of the remaining forces after a directed reduction.⁸

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1. UNC/USFK ltr USFK DJ-0 of 19 Jan 70.
 2. CINCPAC 051010Z Feb 70
 3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
 4. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
 5. CINCPAC 082330Z Jun 70.
 6. COMUSKOREA 260900Z Jun 70.
 7. COMUSKOREA 160015Z May 70.
 8. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of May and Jun 70.

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1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country. It is a very interesting and comprehensive survey of the country's resources and its potentialities. The author has done a great deal of research and has gathered a wealth of material. The report is well written and is a valuable contribution to the knowledge of the country.

2. The second part of the report deals with the agricultural resources of the country. It is a very detailed and comprehensive survey of the country's agricultural resources and its potentialities. The author has done a great deal of research and has gathered a wealth of material. The report is well written and is a valuable contribution to the knowledge of the country.

3. The third part of the report deals with the industrial resources of the country. It is a very detailed and comprehensive survey of the country's industrial resources and its potentialities. The author has done a great deal of research and has gathered a wealth of material. The report is well written and is a valuable contribution to the knowledge of the country.

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GLOSSARY

(U) All abbreviations in this glossary are capitalized, even though some text abbreviations are in upper and lower case letters.

A

AA	Air America; Antiaircraft
AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery; Army Audit Agency
AAW	Antiaircraft Warfare
AB	Air Base
ABN	Airborne
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
ACJCS	Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
ACS/P	Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans
ACM	Air Chief Marshal
ACNSC	Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps
ACRP	Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Patrol
ACTOV	Accelerated Turnover to Vietnamese
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
ADA	Air Defense Area; Air Defense Artillery
ADG	Degaussing Ship
ADM	Admiral
ADMIN	Administrative Office
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AEWCONWG	Airborne Early Warning Control Wing
AF	Air Force
AFADVSYGP	Air Force Advisory Group
AFB	Air Force Base
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFR	Air Force Regulation
AGC	Armed Guard Center
AGE	Associated Ground Equipment
AGS	Surveying Ship
AID	Agency for International Development
AK	Cargo Ship
AKL	Light Cargo Ship
ALCOM	Alaska Command
AMC	Army Materiel Command
AMEMB	American Embassy

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ANG	Air National Guard
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
AO	Oiler; Area of Operation
AOG	Gasoline Tanker
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier; Accelerated Pacification Campaign
APO	Army Post Office
APOD/APOE	Aerial Port of Debarkation/Aerial Port of Embarkation
ARFCOS	Armed Forces Courier Service
ARG/SLF	Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force
ARL	Landing Craft Repair Ship
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARTY	Artillery
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASIC	All-Source Information Center
AST	Aerial Survey Team
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
ATA	Auxiliary Ocean Tug
ATC	Air Target Chart; Air Training Command; Air Traffic Control
AURI	Indonesian Air Force
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications System
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AVN	Aviation
AW	Automatic Weapons; All Weather
AWOL	Absent Without Leave

B

BARCAP	Barrier Combat Air Patrol
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment
BDE	Brigade
BGEN	Brigadier General
BMR	Bomber
BN	Battalion; Burmese Navy
BOM	By Other Means
BTRY	Battery

C

C

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CA	Civil Affairs; Chinese Army; Civic Action; Constituent Assembly (RVN); Container Agreement
CAF	Cambodian Air Force or Chinese Air Force
CAMRA	Consolidated Air Mission Results Analysis
CAP	Combat Air Patrol; Country Assistance Program
CAPT	Captain
CAS	Controlled American Source; Close Air Support
CAV	Cavalry
CBT	Combat
CCA	Chinese Communist Army
CCAA	Chinese Civil Aeronautics Authority
CCO/HRCO	Controlled Collection Objective/Human Resources Collection Directive
C-E	Communications-Electronics
CEI	Communications Electronics Instruction
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CETF	College Eye Task Force
CGEUSA	Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army
CGFMFPAC	Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces Pacific
CGUSASTRATCOM	Commanding General, U. S. Army Strategic Communications Command
CHDLG	Chief, Defense Liaison Group, (Indonesia)
CHICOM	Chinese Communists
CHMAAG	Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CHMEDT	Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICV	Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCAL	Commander in Chief Alaska
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCONAD	Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCNORAD	Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCPACINST	CINCPAC Instruction
CINCPACREP	CINCPAC Representative
CINCPACSTAFFNOTE	CINCPAC Staff Notice
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CINCSTRIKE	Commander in Chief, U. S. Strike Command
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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CJOEP	Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan
CLIP	Country Logistics Improvement Plan
CLOP	Combined Logistics Offensive Program
CLR	Cholera Research Laboratory
CMBT	Combat
CMC	Commandant U. S. Marine Corps; Chinese Marine Corps
CMDO	Commando
CN	Chinese Navy; A riot control agent
CNFK	Commander, Naval Forces Korea
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COACT	Combat Activities Report
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COL	Colonel
COMAFK	Commander, Air Forces Korea
COMAC	Commanding Officer, Military Airlift Command
COMDR	Commander
COMM	Communications
COMNAVFOR	Commander Naval Forces (Country)
COMNAVINTCOM	Commander, Naval Intelligence Communications
COMNAVSUPPACT	Commander, U. S. Naval Support Activity
COMP	Composite
COMSC	Commanding Officer, Military Sealift Command
COMSEVENTHFLT	Commander U. S. Seventh Fleet
COMSTS	Commanding Officer, Military Sea Transportation Service
COMUS	Commander, United States Forces
COMUSFJ	Commander, U. S. Forces, Japan
COMUSK	Commander, U. S. Forces, Korea
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSNAVPHIL	Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Philippines
COMUSSEASIA	Commander, United States Forces, Southeast Asia
COMUSTDC	Commander, U. S. Taiwan Defense Command
CONAD	Continental Air Defense Command
CONUS	Continental United States
COUSAILC	Commanding Officer, U. S. Army International Logistics Center
CPAF	Cost Plus Award Fee
CPR	Chinese Peoples Republic (Communist China)
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRA	Continuing Resolution Authority; Central Research Agency

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CRIMP	Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program
CS	A riot control agent
CSAF	Chief of Staff, Air Force
CSF	Casualty Staging Facility; Combined Service Force
CSFF	Commander SEATO Field Forces
CSOD	Communist Suppression Operations Directorate
CSP	Committed to Scheduled Program; Concurrent Spare Parts
CT	Country Team
CTF	Commander Task Force
CTG	Commander Task Group
CULT	Common User Land Transportation
CVA	Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVAN	CINCPAC Voice Alert Network; Attack Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear)
CVS	Anti-submarine Warfare Support Aircraft Carrier
CVW	Carrier Air Wing
CWCP	Civilian War Casualty Program
CY	Calendar Year

D

DA	Department of the Army
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DAS	Defense Attache System
DATS	Defense Administrative Telephone System
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCCOPAC	Defense Commercial Communications Office, Pacific
DCH	Deputy Chief
DCO	District Central Office; Designated Commanding Officer
DCS	Defense Communications System
DD	Destroyer
DE	Destroyer Escort
DEPCHIEF	Deputy Chief
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI	Deputy Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand
DEPCOMUSMACV	Deputy Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DEST/DAM	Destroyed/Damaged
DET	Detachment
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DHEW	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency

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DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DIV	Division
DJCS	Director Joint Chiefs of Staff
DLG	Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia); Guided Missile Frigate
DMS	Data Management System
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
DTS	Diplomatic Telecommunications System
DV	Distinguished Visitor

E

EA/IG	East Asia - Interdepartmental Group
EASTPAC	Eastern Pacific
EC	Escort Convoy
ECM	Electronics Countermeasures
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
ELT	English Language Training
E&ML	Environmental & Morale Leave
ENGR	Engineer
EOD	Estimated Operational Date; Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ER	Emergency Rescue
ESC	Escort
ESG	Expert Study Group
ESM	Electronic Warfare Support Measures
EUSA	Eighth United States Army
EW	Electronic Warfare; Early Warning

F

FA	Field Artillery
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAG	Forward Air Guide
FANK	Forces Armee National Khmer
FAR	Forces Armees Royale (Forces Armees der Royaume) (Laos)
FARK	Forces Armees Royales Khmer (Old Name)
FASG	Federal Aviation Specialist Group
FAU	Frequency, Allocation and Uses; Frequency Assignment and Useage Record
FFORCEV	Field Force Vietnam

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FIR	Flight Information Region
FIS	Fighter Interceptor Squadron
FLD	Field
FLR	Forward Looking Radar
FLT	Fleet; Flight
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FMTS	Foreign Military Training Students
FOCCPAC	Fleet Operation Control Center, Pacific
FOECON	Telephone Conversation
FORSTAT	Force Status and Identity
FROG	Free Rocket Over Ground
FTR	Fighter
FW	Free World
FWF	Free World Forces
FWMA	Free World Military Assistance
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
FY	Fiscal Year

G

G	Gravity
GAO	General Accounting Office
GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept
GDIP	General Defense Intelligence Plan
GEN	General
GKR	Government of Khmer Republic (Cambodia)
GNP	Gross National Product
GOC	Government of Cambodia
GOI	Government of Indonesia
GOJ	Government of Japan
GOP	Government of the Phillipines
GP	General Purpose
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
GRI	Government of the Ryukyu Islands
GSA	General Services Administration; Girl Scouts of America
GVN	Government of the Republic of Vietnam

H

HELO	Helicopter
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
HICOM	Naval Communication Station

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HICOMRY
HQ
HRCD
HUMINT
HV

High Commissioner, Ryukyus
Headquarters
Human Resources Collection Directives
Human Resources Intelligence
Heavy

I

IBM	International Business Machine Company
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
IDTN	Interim Data Transmission Network
IFA	International Fighter Aircraft
IGCP	Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming
IJCS-PAC	Integrated Joint Communications System, Pacific
I&M	Improvement and Modernization
INF	Infantry
INTELSAT	Intelligence Satellite
IR	Infrared
IS	Inspection Services
ISA	International Security Affairs; International Security Agency
JA	Judge Advocate
JAOCK	Joint Air Operations Center Korea
JASDF	Japanese Air Self-Defense Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSAN	Joint Chiefs of Staff Alert Network
JCSM	Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JGS	Joint General Staff (Vietnam)
JLAC	Joint Labor Affairs Committees
JLPC	Joint Labor Policy Committee
JMA	Journal of Military Assistance
JMAAGK	Joint Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JOPREP	Joint Operational Reporting System
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JOSS	Joint Overseas Switching System
JPCCO	Joint Pacific Command and Control Operations
JPRC	Joint Personnel Recovery Center
JRS	Joint Reporting Structure
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSDF	Japan Self Defense Forces
JSIPS	Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff

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JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JUSMAG	Joint United States Military Advisory Group
JUSMAGPHIL	Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines

K

KIA	Killed in Action
KM	Kilometer

L

LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
LANTFLT	U. S. Atlantic Fleet
LCDR	Lieutenant Commander
LCOL	Lieutenant Colonel
LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized
LCU	Landing Craft, Utility
LCVP	Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel
LLTV	Low Light Level Television
LN	Liaison
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOCCAP	Line of Communication Capabilities/Capacities Data System
LPR	Amphibious Transport (Small)
LSD	Dock Landing Ship
LS&E	Long Supply and Excess
LSM	Landing Ship, Medium
LSSL	Support Landing Ship, Large
LST	Tank Landing Ship
LT	Light; Lieutenant
LTGEN	Lieutenant General
LTR	Letter
LVT	Landing Vehicle, Tracked
LVTA	Landing Vehicle Tracked, Armed Turret Type (N)

M

MA	Military Assistance; Military Advisor
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC	Military Airlift Command; Military Assistance Command
MACSOG	Military Assistance Command (Vietnam), Studies and Observation Group
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

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MAF	Military Assistance Fund; Marine Amphibious Force
MAJ	Major
MAJGEN	Major General
MAM	Military Assistance Manual
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAPET	Military Assistance Program Evaluation Team
MAPEX	Military Assistance Program (Excess Program)
MAPT	Military Assistance Program Training; Military Assistance Program Transfer
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MBA	Military Base Agreement
MCAS	U. S. Marine Corps Air Station
MDA	Military Damage Assessment
MDAA	Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
MDAO	Mutual Defense Assistance Office
MDB	Mutual Defense Board (U.S. - Philippines)
MDT	Mutual Defense Treaty
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MEDT	Military Equipment Delivery Team
MEF	Minimum Essential Force; Marine Expeditionary Force
MGEN	Major General
MI	Military Intelligence
MID	Military Intelligence Detachment
MIDPAC	Mid-Pacific
MIG	Soviet Aircraft
MIJI	Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion
MIL	Military; Million
MILADREP	Military Advisor's Representative
MILCON	Military Construction
MILPHAP	Military Provincial Hospital Program
MIMEX	Major Item Excess Program
MIT	Mobile Information Teams
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MOD	Ministry of Defense; Modification
MOFA	Minister of Financial Affairs; Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOH	Minister of Health
MPO	Military Planning Office (SEATO)
MR	Military Region; Memorandum for the Record
MSC	Military Sealift Command; Minesweeper Coastal (Non-Magnetic)
MSF	Minesweeper, Fleet (steel hull)
MSI	Minesweeper, Inshore
MSL	Missile; Minesweeping Launch

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MSTS	Military Sea Transportation Service (Old)
MTB	Motor Torpedo Boat (Navy)
MTMTS	Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service
MTT	Mobile Training Team

N

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVAIDS	Navigation Aids
NAVCOSACT	Naval Command Systems Support Activity
NAVSTA	Naval Station
NAVSUPSYSCOMHQ	Naval Supply Systems Command, Headquarters
ND	Navy Distillate
NEA	North East Asia
NK	North Korea
NKA	North Korean Army
NLT	Not Later Than
NM	Nautical Mile
NO	Number
NOA	New Obligation Authority
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NOTE	Notice
NP	National Police
NPA	National Peoples Army
NS	No Subject; Northern Sector
NSA	National Security Agency; Naval Support Activity; Naval Supply Activity
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSC	National Security Council; Navy Supply Center
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum
NTDS	Navy Tactical Data System
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
NWA	Northwest Air Lines

O

OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OASD/ISA	Office Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
OASD/PA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs

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OJCS	Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OOAMA	Ogden Air Materiel Area (Utah)
OPCON	Operational Control
OPIC-A	Overseas Processing and Interpretation Center - Asia
OPLANS	Operation Plans
OPNS	Operations
OPNAV	Chief of Naval Operations
OPRED	Program for Reduction of U.S. overseas personnel in MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups
OR	Operational Readiness
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSAIRA	Office of the United States Air Attache
OUSARMA	Office of the U. S. Army Attache

P

PA	Philippine Army; Public Affairs; USAF Program Report, Aerospace Vehicles & Flying Hours for MASF Countries
PAC	Pacific
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACFLT	United States Pacific Fleet
PACNAVFACENGCOM	Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
PACOM	Pacific Command
PACSHIPS	Pacific Command Ship Inventory and Port Status Reporting System
PADIE	Prevention and Detection of Illegal Entry
PAF	Philippine Air Force
PALOS	Pacific Logistic Operations Streamline
PAMEX	Pacific Command Excess Program
PAMPA	Pacific Command Movements Priority Agency (Patma Field Office, Oakland)
PAN AM	Pan American Airlines
PARA	Paragraph; Parachute
PARPRO	Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program
PATMA	Pacific Command Transportation Management Agency
PBR	River Patrol Boat
PC	Patrol Craft
PCE	Patrol Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft, Inshore
PCH&T	Packing, Crating, Handling and Transportation
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PCT	Percent

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PEC	PACOM ELINT Center
PDC	Pacific Defense College
PEG	Performance Evaluation Group
PF	Popular Forces; Prairie Fire
PFAO	Prairie Fire Area of Operations
PICFMS	PACOM IDHS Command File Management System
PIRAZ	Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone
PLANS	Planning Analysis System
P/MC	POL/MIL Counselor
PMDL	Provisional Military Demarcation Line
PNPG	PACOM Nuclear Planning Group
POL	Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants.
POLAD	Political Advisor
POW	Prisoner of War
PROP	Priority Production List; Propellor Aircraft
PROVMAAG-K	Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (Provisional)
PSDF	People's Self-Defense Force
PSY	Psychological
PSYOP	Psychological Operation
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PURA	Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency
PURS	Pacom Unified Reporting System
PW	Prisoner of War
PWG	Permanent Working Group (SEATO)

Q

QTR	Quarter
-----	---------

R

RAD	River Assault Division; Requirements Action Directive
RADM	Rear Admiral
RAMMS	RVNAF Automated Material Management System
RAV	Restricted Availability (Ship in for Repairs)
RCS	Reports Control Symbol
RDD	Required Delivery Date
RECCE	Reconnaissance
RECON	Reconnaissance
REGT	Regiment
RES	Reserve
RESCAP	Rescue Combat Air Patrol (AF)
RF	Regional Forces
RIF	Reconnaissance in Force; Reduction in Force

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RKG	Royal Khmer Government (Cambodia)
RLAF	Royal Laotian Air Force
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RLGAF	Royal Laotian Government Armed Forces
RO	Requirements Office; Requisitioning Objective
ROC	Republic of China
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
ROKAF	Republic of Korea Air Force
ROKF	Republic of Korea Forces
ROKFB	Republic of Korea Forces in Vietnam
ROKG	Government of the Republic of Korea
ROKN	Republic of Korea Navy
ROP	Republic of the Philippines
RO/RO	Roll On/Roll Off
RP	Route Package
RT	Rolling Thunder; Reconnaissance Team; Radio Telephone
RTA	Royal Thailand Army
RTAB	Royal Thailand Air Base
RTAF	Royal Thailand Air Force
RTAFV	Royal Thailand Armed Forces, Vietnam
RTARF	Royal Thailand Armed Forces
RTAVF	Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Forces
RTG	Royal Thailand Government
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (Air Force)

S

S	Secret
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACSA	Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities
SAF	Special Action Force
SALOA	Special ARC LIGHT Operating Area
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile; Space Available Mail; Special Air Mission
SAPO	Sub-Area Petroleum Office
SAR	Search and Rescue; Sea-Air Rescue
SC	Supply Corps (N)
SCA	Service Cryptologic Activities
SCAT	Secure Voice Assistance Team
SCC	Security Consultative Committee (Japan)

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SEA	Southeast Asia
SEASIA	Southeast Asia
SEADAB	Southeast Asia Data Base
SEATACS	Southeast Asia Tactical Air Control System
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SER	Serial
SF	Special Forces
SFARG	SIOP Force Application Review Group
SFF	SEATO Field Forces
SGU	Special Guerrilla Units
SH	Salem House
SHAO	SALEM HOUSE Area of Operations
SI	Special Intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operation Plan
SIMEX	Secondary Item Excess Program
SITREP	Situation Report
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SLAM	Search, Locate, Annihilate, and Monitor
SLAR	Side Looking Airborne Radar
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SOS	Special Operations Squadron
SOSUS	Sound Surveillance System
SPEDEPROJ	Simplified Deviation Procedures
SPINTCOMM	Special Intelligence Communications Network
SPT	Support
SRF	Ship Repair Facility
SQ	Squadron
SS	Steamship; Submarine
SSB	Single Side Band
SSN	Submarine (Nuclear Propulsion)
STRICOM	Strike Command
STYX	Russian Missile
SUBJ	Subject
SVN	South Vietnam

T

TAC	Tactical
TACAIR	Tactical Air
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACS	Tactical Air Control System

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TADS	Tactical Air Defense Systems
TAKV	Cargo Ship and Aircraft Ferry
TALES	Transportation and Logistics Estimation System
TAS	Troop Airlift Squadron
TATIP	Taiwan Administrative Telephone Improvement Plan
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TDC	Taiwan Defense Command
TDCC	Tactical Data Communications Central
TDS	Tactical Data Systems
TDY	Temporary Duty
TEWS	Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
TF	Task Force
TFSQ	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TFWG	Tactical Fighter Wing
TNG	Training
TOR	Terms of Reference; Time of Receipt
TRANS-PAC	A commercial trans-Pacific cable / Trans Pacific
TS	Top Secret
TS-NF	Top Secret - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
TSV	Tactical Secure Voice
TTPI	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
TWA	Trans-World Airways

U

U	Unclassified
UCODE	Unit Identification System Report
UE	Unit Equipment
UK	United Kingdom
UMMIPS	Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARPAC	United States Army Pacific
USARPACINTS	U. S. Army Intelligence School, Pacific
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
USCGC	United States Coast Guard Cutter
USCINCSO	Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command
USDAO	United States Defense Attache Office
USDCOA	U. S. Designated Commanding Officer, Australia
USDLG	U. S. Defense Liaison Group

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USFJ	United States Forces, Japan
USFK	United States Forces, Korea
USG	United States Government
USIA	United States Information Agency
USLO	United States Liaison Officer
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMILAD	U. S. Military Advisor
USMILADREP	United States Military Advisor's Representative
USN	United States Navy
USNS	U.S. Naval Ship
USS	United States Ship
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UW	Unconventional Warfare

V

VADM	Vice Admiral
VAH	Heavy Attack Squadron
VAP	Heavy Photographic Squadron
VC	Viet Cong
VF	Fighter Squadron
VFP	Light Photographic Squadron
VRF	Visual Flight Rules
VN	Vietnam(ese)
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNMC	Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps
VNN	Republic of Vietnam Navy
VNRS	Vietnamese National Railway System
VOL	Volume
VP	Patrol Squadron
VUNC	Voice of the United Nations Command

W

WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WESTPACNORTH	Western Pacific North
WG	Wing
WPB	Coast Guard Patrol Boats
WRM	War Readiness Materiel
WSEG	Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
WX	Weather

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THE HISTORY OF

THE
LIFE OF
SAMUEL JOHNSON
BY
JAMES BOSWELL
IN A LETTER TO
HIS SON, BY
SAMUEL JOHNSON

LONDON:
PRINTED BY
J. JOHNSON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD,
1791.

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(U) Volumes I and II are integrated in this index. Annexes A and B of the CINCPAC 1970 history are not included as each contains its own index.

(U) Priorities for entries are:

Country -- Japan, Korea, etc.

Military function -- personnel, logistics, operations, etc.

Major program -- Military Assistance, etc.

Regional defense organization -- SEATO, etc.

Ships -- by name under "ships"

Aircraft -- by designation under "aircraft"

Program, plan, project or system -- by name, NICE DOG, PALOS, SEEK DAWN, etc.

Concepts of special interest to CINCPAC -- command and control, etc

(U) Generally, a country approach has been followed, with cross-references.

(U) Each volume is paged separately, and volume numbers are indicated by Roman numerals.

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~~SECRET~~

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