SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

From: Commander in Chief Pacific
To: Distribution List

Subj: CINCPAC Command History 1970; promulgation of

Encl: (1) Volume I, CINCPAC Command History 1970
      (2) Volume II, CINCPAC Command History 1970

1. The CINCPAC Command History 1970 is promulgated in response to the
direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. This document contains information affecting the security of the
United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.
Code, Sections 793 and 794. Transmission or revelation of its contents
in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The material
contained within this document is to be treated with the utmost discretion.
Under no circumstances shall possession thereof be transferred, or the
information contained therein be imparted, to personnel other than those
whose duties specifically require knowledge thereof. Information provided
any individual will be the minimum required in the performance of his duties.

3. The security classification indicated for each page of this document
is according to the highest classification of any paragraph thereon. In
those instances when the reverse side of a page is intentionally left blank
this is so indicated on the lower right hand corner of the preceding page
by the following notation: Reverse Blank p. and the page number of the
blank page. (For example: Reverse Blank p. 47.) As a result, the pages
of this history will be numbered consecutively with the odd numbers always
appearing on the front of a page and the even numbers on the reverse side.

4. This document will be transported, stowed, safeguarded and accounted
for in accordance with the instructions contained in the effective edition
of the security regulations for handling classified matter of the military
service of the holder. Reproduction of Top Secret portions of the CINCPAC
Subj: CINCPAC Command History 1970; promulgation of
Command History 1970 is prohibited except with the permission of the
Commander in Chief Pacific or higher authority.

JOHN E. MURRAY
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Assistance,
Logistics and Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Command History</th>
<th>ANNEX A</th>
<th>ANNEX B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Cy 1 thru 16</td>
<td>Cy 1 thru 16</td>
<td>Cy 1 thru 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCAL</td>
<td>Cy 25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>Cy 26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Cy 27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSO</td>
<td>Cy 28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCONAD</td>
<td>Cy 29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td>Cy 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSTRIKE</td>
<td>Cy 31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
<td>Cy 32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>Cy 33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
<td>Cy 34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGFMFPAC</td>
<td>Cy 35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Japan</td>
<td>Cy 36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Korea</td>
<td>Cy 37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACTHAI</td>
<td>Cy 38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>Cy 39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSTDC</td>
<td>Cy 40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National War College</td>
<td>Cy 41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army War College</td>
<td>Cy 42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAF</td>
<td>Cy 43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval War College</td>
<td>Cy 44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air War College</td>
<td>Cy 45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASI(HA), Maxwell AFB</td>
<td>Cy 46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP JSTPS</td>
<td>Cy 47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODPRO</td>
<td>Cy 48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC X-RAY</td>
<td>Cy 49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC STAFF</td>
<td>Cy 17 thru 24</td>
<td>Cy 17 thru 24</td>
<td>Cy 17 thru 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50 thru 74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME I
1970

Prepared by the Historical Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII
1971
FOREWORD

(U) The mission of the Pacific Command is to defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean and to support U.S. national policy and interests throughout the Pacific, Far East, and Southeast Asia. Geographi-
cally, the Pacific Command is the largest of seven unified U.S. commands. The area of responsibility of the Commander in Chief Pacific extends from the west coast of the Americas into the Indian Ocean and from the Bering Sea to the South Pole—approximately 85 million square miles of land and sea.

(U) Prior to the Vietnam War, very austere manning levels were authorized to carry out the CINCPAC's mission. As the tempo of the war increased in Vietnam, however, the preponderance of U.S. military manpower shifted to the PACOM. U.S. Forces in PACOM peaked in 1968 with over a million personnel of all Services. Approximately one-half of this number served in Vietnam.

(U) As a result of the progress made in the Vietnamization Program and in the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, a turn-around in force level authorization was made. Incremental reduction in force levels began in 1969 and continued through 1970 into 1971.

(U) It is important, as we reduce our force levels, that we not leave a total vacuum which would affect the security of the American people or their vital interests in the continued security of our Free World allies. Even as we reduce the American presence we must not lose sight of an urgent necessity to help nations we expect to shoulder more of the burden for their own defense. Therefore, the Nixon Doctrine's success as a key element of U.S. foreign policy depends in large measure on a viable U.S. Military Assistance Program. The goals of reduced direct American involvement can only be met by providing means for self-defense and encouraging self-reliance by our allies.

(U) In addition to a viable U.S. Military Assistance Program, Free World defenses against the continuing communist threat throughout East Asia rest on a combination of U.S.-allies bilateral treaties and SEATO. The combined power of the SEATO alliance continues to be the stabilizing factor in preserving the freedom and independence of nations in the Treaty area.
(U) There is another major task ahead for the Free World in Asia and that is the vital role it must assume in nation building activities to give internal strength and security to the more than 300 million free people of the area. Business and industry have a tremendous stake in this venture and a great opportunity, too.

(U) As President Nixon has stated, the United States is a Pacific power and it will continue to maintain a presence in Asia as a vital national interest. I have no doubt that our assistance will be required and will be forthcoming in Asia in the years ahead. Our ultimate goal is the encouragement of strong, viable economies and democratic political processes in the nations of the region.

JOHN C. MCCAIN, JR.
Admiral, United States Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific
PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the standpoint of CINCPAC. Additionally, the required annual report preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS to the extent that major decisions and directives of the JCS concerning the PACOM may be determined by historians of the JCS without research in the records of the PACOM. This 1970 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As in the case of previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those connected with international crises. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and achievements and omits "detailed" activities of subordinate unified commands or of Allied nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history is organized in the same manner as previous histories, primarily in line with the objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and the planning for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) This year's history is published in two volumes. A glossary and an index for the complete history are included in Volume II only. Pagination is complete within each volume. As in previous years, the annual histories prepared by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are included as Annexes A and B, respectively.

(U) The CINCPAC Command Historian, Colonel J. R. Johnson, USA, under the supervision of Colonel William C. Harrison, Jr., USAF, Secretary of the Joint
ff, Headquarters CINCPAC, planned and published the 1970 CINCPAC Command History as required by CINCPAC Staff Instruction 5750.1D of 20 August 1968. Colonel Johnson personally researched and wrote Chapter IV with exception of several sections of the chapter.

Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, former Senior Historian, outlined Chapters II and III prior to his departure from the CINCPAC Staff in November 1970. Chapters II and III were researched and written by Mr. Carl O. Clever, present Senior Historian. Mrs. Pauline Tallman, Assistant Historian, researched and wrote Section I and Section VI of Chapter IV. In addition she prepared the pictorial out for the history. Colonel Lloyd C. Edwards, Jr., USAF, assisted in the preparation of the history by preparing several sections of Chapter IV and proofing parts of the manuscript.

Miss Maggie M. Kaonohi, Clerk-Stenographer of CINCPAC Historical Branch, typed the manuscript in final format. Mrs. Marion M. Berndt compiled the index. Under Nadine B. LaBonde prepared the glossary and proofread the manuscript. Thomas R. Heuer, USN, performed many tasks connected with readying the volume for the printer. Mr. Edward Britos, Graphics Section, J0412, prepared all graphics for the history and Lithographer First Class Edward A. Donlin, USN, in the Production Section, J0412, supervised the expeditious printing of the draft script which facilitated staff coordination. Finally, the cooperation and assistance rendered by members of the CINCPAC Staff was invaluable.

J. R. Johnson
Colonel USA
CINCPAC Command Historian
UNCLASSIFIED

PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the standpoint of CINCPAC. Additionally, the required annual report preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS to the extent that major decisions and directives of the JCS concerning the PACOM may be determined by historians of the JCS without research in the records of the PACOM. This 1970 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As in the case of previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those connected with international crises. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and achievements and omits "detailed" activities of subordinate unified commands or of Allied nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history is organized in the same manner as previous histories, primarily in line with the objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and the planning for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) This year's history is published in two volumes. A glossary and an index for the complete history are included in Volume II only. Pagination is complete within each volume. As in previous years, the annual histories prepared by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are included as Annexes A and B, respectively.

(U) The CINCPAC Command Historian, Colonel J. R. Johnson, USA, under the supervision of Colonel William C. Harrison, Jr., USAF, Secretary of the Joint
UNCLASSIFIED

Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, planned and published the 1970 CINCPAC Command History as required by CINCPAC Staff Instruction 5750.1D of 20 August 1968. Colonel Johnson personally researched and wrote Chapter IV with exception of several sections of the chapter.

(U) Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, former Senior Historian, outlined Chapters II and III prior to his departure from the CINCPAC Staff in November 1970. Chapters II and III were researched and written by Mr. Carl O. Clever, present Senior Historian. Mrs. Pauline Tallman, Assistant Historian, researched and wrote Chapter I and Section VI of Chapter IV. In addition she prepared the pictorial layout for the history. Colonel Lloyd C. Edwards, Jr., USAF, assisted in the preparation of the history by preparing several sections of Chapter IV and proof-reading parts of the manuscript.

(U) Miss Maggie M. Kaonohi, Clerk-Stenographer of CINCPAC Historical Branch, typed the manuscript in final format. Mrs. Marion M. Berndt compiled the index. Commander Nadine B. LaBonté prepared the glossary and proofread the manuscript. YN1 Thomas R. Heuer, USN, performed many tasks connected with readying the volumes for the printer. Mr. Edward Britos, Graphics Section, J0412, prepared all graphics for the history and Lithographer First Class Edward A. Donlin, USN, Reproduction Section, J0412, supervised the expeditious printing of the draft manuscript which facilitated staff coordination. Finally, the cooperation and assistance rendered by members of the CINCPAC Staff was invaluable.

J. R. Johnson
Colonel USA
CINCPAC Command Historian

UNCLASSIFIED
viii
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letter of Promulgation</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title Page</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Illustrations</td>
<td>xvii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter I  THE STATE OF READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES

### Section I  UNITED STATES FORCES DURING 1970

- PACOM-Wide Military Strength

### Section II  KEY PERSONNEL CHANGES IN 1970

### Section III  ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION

- Agency for International Development Adviser to CINCPAC Proposed
- Plans Division to Monitor Economic Affairs in PACOM Countries
- Operations Division Organizational Changes
- Command and Control System Group Name Changed
- Special Security Branch Reassigned
- Logistics Division Reorganization
- CINCPAC Representation to the Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff Discontinued
- War Gaming Functions Transferred from Operations to Plans Division
- Civilian Personnel Branch Transferred from Personnel Division to Joint Secretary
- Preparation of Organization and Functions Manual Assigned to Personnel Division
- PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center Moved to Hawaii

### Section IV  COMMAND FACILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

- Policy Regarding Succession to Command
- Defense Department Inspection of the PACOM
- Command and Control Facilities and Procedures Studied
- Command Relationships for the Ryukyus Following Reversion to Japan
- Reorganization of Taiwan Defense Command and MAAG China Studied
- Establishment of CINCPAC Representative to Laos Proposed (S)
Section IV COMMAND FACILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES (Continued)

Airborne Command Post Activities
CINCPAC Organization for Emergency Operations Formed
Survivable High Frequency Communications for Kunia
PACOM Command and Control System Facilities Visited
Defense Department Audit of ADP Operations
ADP for CINCPAC's Subordinate Unified Command Commanders

Section V CHANGES IN COMMUNIST MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN 1970

Section VI U.S. BASE REQUIREMENTS OVERSEAS
Overseas Base Requirements and Reductions and U.S. Strategy
United States Bases in Japan
Use of Atsugi Naval Air Station Shared with Japan Civil Aviation
Ryukyus Reversion Plans Continue
Weapons Basing Following Okinawa Reversion
Closure of Sangley Point Naval Station in the Philippines
Re-entry Rights to Relinquished Bases
Diego Garcia
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Section VII PLANNING
Changing Foreign Policy and Its Impact on Planning
Impact on Planning of Reductions in Defense Expenditures
Joint Forces Memorandum for FY 72-79
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
The Swing Strategy
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
Operation Plans
Joint Operation Planning System
Operation Plan ROCHESTER
U.S.-Japan Planning
CINCPAC Support of Plans of Other Unified and Specified Commanders
Defense of the Western Aleutians
Realignment of Unified and Specified Commands Proposed
Marine Air Group Basing Studied
Use of Singapore Ship Repair Facilities
Concept Plan for Operations in Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf Area
Personnel Reductions in the Philippines
Typhoon Damage Control in the Republic of the Philippines
Military Civic Action Program for American Samoa
Section VIII OPERATIONS OF U.S. FORCES

Peacetime Rules of Engagement of Seaborne Forces 133
Transit of the Indonesian Archipelago 133
Nuclear Powered and Other Ship Visits to Foreign Ports 135
Reconnaissance Operations 137
  Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) in the PACOM 137
  Naval Surface Reconnaissance Operations 141
  NICE DOG Operations 142
  IVY GREEN Operations 143
Search and Rescue Operations 145
Operations in the Asian Coastal Buffer Zone 146
Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force Training
  and Readiness 146
Airborne/Air Transportability Training 150
Petroleum Survey Operations in the East China Sea 150
Electronic Warfare Contingency Assets 152
Electronic Warfare Training 154
COMBAT ANGEL 156
Western Pacific North (WESTPACNORTH) Interface Test Plan 156
Orientation Tour for Chinese Electronic Warfare Officers 157
Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion (MIJI) 157
Improvement of Reporting Procedures Sought 159
PACOM SIOP Force Application Review Group Meetings 161
CINCPAC Military Damage Assessment Responsibilities 162
Manned Space Flight Recovery Support 164
Disaster Relief 164

Section IX PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 165
Funds for Psychological Operations Programs 165
Psychological Warfare Programs Against North Vietnam 166
Assistance for Cambodia 167
Support for Lao Psychological Operations 170
Leaflet Operations - Korea 171
Voice of the United Nations Command 172
Psychological Operations Support for the Philippines 173

Section X JOINT EXERCISES 175
Joint Exercises 175
Combined Exercises 177
Tests and Exercises at PACOM Headquarters 180
  Peacetime Emergency Situation Exercises 180
  POLO HAT 180
  ELK TREE 181
  JOLLY ROGER 181
Section X  JOINT EXERCISES (Continued)

FOOTBALL POST  182
FORECAST STORM  183

Section XI  RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS  185
Significant Research and Development Problem Areas in the PACOM  185
First Annual Review of ARPA Projects Within the PACOM  186
Scientific Advisory Group Activities  188

Section XII  LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES  189
CINCPAC's Logistics Authority Further Defined  189
Reduction and Transfer of Army Logistic Functions  190
Automatic Data Processing Systems for Logistics Matters  197
General Accounting Office Review of Airlift/Sealift Capabilities  198
Storage of Toxic Chemical Munitions  198
POL Consumption  199
POL Logistics Conference  199
Transfer of Koshiba POL Terminal at Yokohama, Japan from Army to Navy  206
POL Facilities  209
Procurement Activities  209
The C-5 and Its Impact on Logistic Systems  210
Outsize Airlift Requirements  210
C-130 Airlift Capability in the PACOM  211
Airline and Travel Ticket Sales in the PACOM  212
Port and Cargo Operations Reporting Requirements Decreased  213
Continuing Roll On/Roll Off Ship Requirements in PACOM  214
Defense Department Project HOME RUN  214
Ocean Terminal Operations in the Philippines  215
Procedures to Prevent Aircraft Hijacking Studied  216
Assistance for Humanitarian Projects in the PACOM  216
Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality  217

Section XIII  COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS ACTIVITIES  219
Consolidation and Automation of Headquarters Communications Centers  219
Communications Center Message Traffic  220
Large Volume Data Exchange  220
Integrated Joint Communications System-Pacific  221
Satellite Communications  225
Secure Voice Communications  227
Tactical Secure Voice Communications  229
The PACOM Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON)  230
Integration of Dedicated Communications Networks into AUTODIN  232
Section XIII COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS ACTIVITIES (Continued)

AUTODIN Improvement - Automated Command Center Communications 232
Centralized Leasing of Communications Services Within Hawaii 233
CINCPAC Voice Alert Network (CVAN) Upgrading 234
Radio Site Procurement Policy 234
Frequency Management 235
High Frequency Facilities 235
CINCPAC Controls on Deactivation of Circuits 237
U.S. Military Communications With Singapore 238
Secure Communications With Diplomatic Posts 238
COMUSTDC Requests Special Dedicated Teletype Circuits 239

Section XIV PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES
Temporary Holiday Changes in the CINCPAC Work Week 241
Civilian Incentive Awards 241
Combined Federal Campaign 241
Credit Unions 242
Environmental and Morale Leave 242
Drug Abuse 243
Policy for Utilization and Administration of Non-U.S. Citizen Employees 246
Policy Manual for Employment of Third Country Nationals in the PACOM 247
Wage Increases for Korean Local National Employees 248
Personnel Matters Involving Japanese Local Nationals 249
Planning for Okinawa Reversion to Japan 250
Wages for Local National Philippine Employees 250
Further Implementation of Philippine Offshore Labor Agreement 250
Wages for Australian Local National Employees 252

Section XV INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Program 253
Intelligence Data Handling Systems (IDHS) 253
IDHS Data Management Requirements Conference 257
IDHS Communications Network 258
PACOM IDHS Command File Management System 259
CINCUSARPAC IDHS 260
Conventional Air Mission Results Analysis (CAMRA) System 260
Strike Mission Data Exchange 260
Defense Attache System Support to CINCPAC 261
Role of the Defense Intelligence School 262
United States Army Intelligence School, Pacific (USARPACINTS) 262
Clandestine Entry into the United States 264
Section XV INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (Continued)

Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific Facility 264
Overseas Processing and Interpretation Center - Asia (OPIC-A) 265

Section XVI COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES 267
Military Banking Conference 267
Funding Support for Naval Advisory Group, Korea 267
Reporting Requirements 267
Revised Funding Procedures for DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 268
Military Payment Certificate Series Conversion in Vietnam 269
American Legion Use of Military Facilities and Currency in Saigon 269
Philippine Owned U.S. Currency 269

Section XVII PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES 271
Public Affairs Activities 271

Section XVIII MEDICAL ACTIVITIES 275
Hospital Facilities in Thailand 275
Unified Command Control of Medical Resources 277
Health Service Responsibilities in the PACOM 277
Reduction in Medical Support 278
Conference on War Surgery 278
Medical Planning Conference 279
Whole Blood Program in Vietnam 279
Retrograde Cargo Pest and Disease Control 279

Chapter II CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA 281

Introduction 281

Section I PLANNING AND FUNDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE 285
Impact of MAP Legislation 285
Measures to Offset MAP Restructuring in PACOM 289

Section II PACOM THEATER ACTIVITIES 291
International Fighter Aircraft 291
COIN/FAC Aircraft for MAP 293
MAP/MASF Flying Hour Program 295
MAP Training Programs 297
MAPT Funds 297
CONUS MAPT Student Training 299
Section II  PACOM THEATER ACTIVITIES (Continued)

Living Allowances for MAPT Students  300
English Language Training  301
MAP Manpower Actions  301
Evaluations of MAP/MAF Effectiveness  302
  Burma  302
  China  303
  Korea  305
  Thailand  305
  Laos  307

Section III  COUNTRY ACTIVITIES  313
  Burma  314
  China  317
    Impact of FY 71 Program Reduction  317
    History of Excess Materiel Supplied to China  324
    ROC Armed Forces Reorganization  325
    ROC Air Defense/Air Traffic Control  326
    Warships to China  330
    Submarines for China  331
    Vehicle Coproduction Funding  332
    Helicopter Coproduction Program  333
    MAAG China Terms of Reference  333
  Indonesia  334
    Defense Liaison Group (DLG) Funds and Manpower  335
    Broader Scope of Activity for Indonesian MAP  338
    C-47 Aircraft for Indonesia  338
    Lease of LSTs to Indonesia  339
    Lease of Minesweeper, Coastal (MSC) to Indonesia  339
    Close Air Support Aircraft for Indonesia  340
    Increased MAP C-E Support  342
    Indonesian DV Orientation Tour  342
    T-41 Aircraft for Indonesia  343
  Japan  343
    Scope of MDAO Activity  344
    Selection of Chief, MDAO  344
    Reversion of MAP Inventory  345
  Korea  346
    Funds for Korea MAP  348
    Organization and Manning of Korea MAAG  349
    Improvement and Modernization of ROKF  355
    Continuing Korea MAP Items  359
  Malaysia  361
    Special Forces Training for Malaysia  361
Section III COUNTRY ACTIVITIES (Continue).

Philippines
MAP Funds and Manpower
High-Level Interest in Investment Items
Accelerated Delivery of Helicopters
Accelerated Delivery of M-16 Rifles
MAP Ammunition Shortfall
Release of Riot Control Munitions
FORESIGHT SIERRA Communications

Singapore
Singapore Purchase of U.S. Tracked Vehicles
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., Commander in Chief Pacific</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pacific Command</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Arrangements in PACOM</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Relationships</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate Unified Commands and CINCPAC Representatives</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command Personnel</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC Component and Subordinate Unified Command Staff Personnel</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG Personnel - Pacific Command</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available Forces</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Ground Units, 1 August 1970</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Ground Units, 1 February 1971</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Naval Air Units, 1 August 1970</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Naval Air Units, 1 February 1971</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Naval Air and Ship Units, 1 August 1970</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Naval Air and Ship Units, 1 February 1971</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Air Force Flying and Missile Units, 1 August 1970</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PACOM less Southeast Asia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Air Force Flying and Missile Units, 1 August 1970</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Southeast Asia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Air Force Flying and Missile Units, 1 February 1971 (PACOM less Southeast Asia)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Air Force Flying and Missile Units, 1 February 1971 (Southeast Asia)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Strengths of CINCPAC Staff Divisions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key CINCPAC Staff Personnel</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Far East Ground Strength</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Naval Strength Far East and Pacific</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Communist Far East Air Forces</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Communist Far East Missile Forces</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremony for APOLLO 13 Astronauts</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM POL Consumption</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 POL Consumption by Product</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 POL Consumption by Area</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC With Bob Hope in Vietnam, Christmas 1970</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of MAP Appropriations FY 50-70</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP Funds Distribution FY 71</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM MAP Dollar Guidelines FY 71</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo - Republic of China Engineer Training</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Summary, Burma MAP</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNCLASSIFIED**

xvii
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustration</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program Summary, Republic of China MAP</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photos - Republic of China Aircraft Repairs</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo - Republic of China Engineer Construction</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Summary, Indonesia MAP</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo - Deadlined MAP Equipment, Indonesia</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo - Deadlined MAP Aircraft, Indonesia</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photos - Indonesian Armed Forces Activities</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Summary, Korea MAP</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Chart - PROVMAAGK</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Chart - JUSMAGK (Effective April 1971)</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo - Aircraft Repair, Korea</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Summary, Philippine MAP</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I - THE STATE OF READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES

(U) The foremost problem that man faces—that man has faced from the Stone Age and through the centuries—is finding a way that all nations and all households can be free from the scourge of war, so that the men, women, and children of this planet can live in peace.

Considering the 85 million square miles of the Pacific Command, my area of responsibility, I am well aware that the peace and prosperity of the Pacific is of special importance to the United States and to the free people of the area. The Pacific—its shores, its islands, and the vast regions beyond—is a chief theater of world events. The threat to peace and security in the Pacific area is and will remain real. It is but one segment of the threat that we face across the world.

..........................................................

It almost seems inconceivable that we, the United States, live in such a troubled period of history.

Our nation is engaged in the war in Southeast Asia.

There is the border dispute between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The Chinese are developing a nuclear missile capability.

There is the continuing question of the two Germanys.

The Soviet military threat is greater than it has ever been. A major challenge to the security of our country is the expanding projection of Soviet power worldwide through military, political, psychological, and economic means. Especially foreboding is the challenge provided by the recent emergence of Soviet seapower throughout the oceans of the world.

Of great significance is the critically important effort of the forum for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in which the United States and the Soviet Union are participating.
UNCLASSIFIED

Finally, the danger in the Middle East has been vividly and forcefully brought to public attention by the march of recent events in that troubled region of the world.

Now turning to my area of responsibility, we are doing everything possible to end our combat operations in Southeast Asia.... I can report the situation in South Vietnam is very favorable. Our withdrawal of forces there is right on target. I have every confidence that we will continue to meet President Nixon's redeployment announcements. Our progress has been made possible by the "Vietnamization" program, the improved capability and determination of the South Vietnamese Army, and the successful Cambodian operations during May and June. I also think it appropriate to commend the magnificent performance of our Military Services that have fought heroically in South Vietnam in pursuit of our nation's policies in Southeast Asia.

I am proud of the men and women that are serving in the Pacific Command. They are serving courageously and with valor on the field of battle. Certainly they will make definite contributions to the future growth of our nation. There is going to come a time when they will be among the leaders of the United States and what they are doing now is setting a platform for that type of leadership in the future.

Each is doing the difficult and often little understood job of protecting our nation's security. I am proud of every soldier, airman, bluejacket, marine, and coastguardsman in the Armed Services today. They are a credit to the unequaled and great democratic traditions of our nation.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.¹

¹ An Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief Pacific, at the Los Angeles County Veterans Day Observance, Los Angeles, California, on 11 November 1970.
CHAPTER I - THE STATE OF READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES

(U) The foremost problem that man faces—that man has faced from the Stone Age and through the centuries—is finding a way that all nations and all households can be free from the scourge of war, so that the men, women, and children of this planet can live in peace.

Considering the 85 million square miles of the Pacific Command, my area of responsibility, I am well aware that the peace and prosperity of the Pacific is of special importance to the United States and to the free people of the area. The Pacific—its shores, its islands, and the vast regions beyond—is a chief theater of world events. The threat to peace and security in the Pacific area is and will remain real. It is but one segment of the threat that we face across the world.

..........................

It almost seems inconceivable that we, the United States, live in such a troubled period of history.

Our nation is engaged in the war in Southeast Asia.

There is the border dispute between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The Chinese are developing a nuclear missile capability.

There is the continuing question of the two Germanys.

The Soviet military threat is greater than it has ever been. A major challenge to the security of our country is the expanding projection of Soviet power worldwide through military, political, psychological, and economic means. Especially foreboding is the challenge provided by the recent emergence of Soviet seapower throughout the oceans of the world.

Of great significance is the critically important effort of the forum for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in which the United States and the Soviet Union are participating.
Finally, the danger in the Middle East has been vividly and forcefully brought to public attention by the march of recent events in that troubled region of the world.

Now turning to my area of responsibility, we are doing everything possible to end our combat operations in Southeast Asia. ... I can report the situation in South Vietnam is very favorable. Our withdrawal of forces there is right on target. I have every confidence that we will continue to meet President Nixon's redeployment announcements. Our progress has been made possible by the "Vietnamization" program, the improved capability and determination of the South Vietnamese Army, and the successful Cambodian operations during May and June. I also think it appropriate to commend the magnificent performance of our Military Services that have fought heroically in South Vietnam in pursuit of our nation's policies in Southeast Asia.

I am proud of the men and women that are serving in the Pacific Command. They are serving courageously and with valor on the field of battle. Certainly they will make definite contributions to the future growth of our nation. There is going to come a time when they will be among the leaders of the United States and what they are doing now is setting a platform for that type of leadership in the future.

Each is doing the difficult and often little understood job of protecting our nation's security. I am proud of every soldier, airman, bluejacket, marine, and coastguardsman in the Armed Services today. They are a credit to the unequaled and great democratic traditions of our nation.

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.

---

1. An Address by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief Pacific, at the Los Angeles County Veterans Day Observance, Los Angeles, California, on 11 November 1970.
SECTION I - UNITED STATES FORCES DURING 1970

PACOM-Wide Military Strength

Military personnel strength in the PACOM continued the decrease that had begun in 1969. Overall strengths were less for all Services. A comparison follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>1 Jan 70</th>
<th>31 Dec 70</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>455,533</td>
<td>358,298</td>
<td>-97,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>256,665</td>
<td>224,368</td>
<td>-32,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>95,094</td>
<td>82,663</td>
<td>-12,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>169,636</td>
<td>144,302</td>
<td>-25,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>976,928</td>
<td>809,651</td>
<td>-167,277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The major areas of concentration of military personnel and dependents and the changes during the year are indicated in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>31 Dec 70</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Dependents</th>
<th>31 Dec 70</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>9,893</td>
<td>-1,260</td>
<td>13,532</td>
<td>+2,440</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>37,154</td>
<td>-25,956</td>
<td>53,058</td>
<td>+2,723</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>38,131</td>
<td>-1,231</td>
<td>37,842</td>
<td>-1,159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>53,132</td>
<td>-10,692</td>
<td>7,182</td>
<td>+152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>22,872</td>
<td>-1,514</td>
<td>18,130</td>
<td>-2,769</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryukyus</td>
<td>45,927</td>
<td>-5,739</td>
<td>32,727</td>
<td>+326</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>8,838</td>
<td>-104</td>
<td>6,611</td>
<td>+1,018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>35,534</td>
<td>-6,910</td>
<td>4,880</td>
<td>+2,642</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>360,536</td>
<td>-116,816</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM.

1. Figures furnished by J11.
COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN PACOM

Hereafter cited as PACOM Digest Feb 71.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. Military Representative to the following organizations:
   b. ANZUS Council: U.S. Military Representative.
   d. Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser in military defense matters to the Chairman of the U.S. S. Representation.

2. PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:
   b. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).
   c. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF). The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for operating missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for the component representative to CINCPAC as appropriate.

3. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNITED COMMANDS: There are nine subordinate unified commands in the PACOM:
   a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by the Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUSFORKOREA), Seoul, Korea.
   b. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUSFORJAPAN), Tokyo, Japan.
   c. United States Pacific Command (JCS), San Francisco, California.
   d. United States Pacific Command (COMUSPAC), San Francisco, California.
   e. United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV), commanded by the Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV), Saigon, Republic of Vietnam.
   f. Republic of Korea Command, U.S. Forces Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI), commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) serves concurrently as Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CHJUSMACTHAI).

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 72, p. 7.
**SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES**

**FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL**

**UNited Nations Command/United States Forces Korea**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>USAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCUNCUSFK</td>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>John H. MICHAELIS</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoS</td>
<td>LT GEN</td>
<td>Robert N. SMITH</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spec Asst/ROK Ml Aff &amp; ChPRorgMAF Korea</td>
<td>MAJ GEN (D)</td>
<td>Felix M. ROGERS</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spec Asst/Korea &amp; Sr Mbr UNCMAC</td>
<td>MAJ GEN (R)</td>
<td>Francis D. FOLEY</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCOUSF</td>
<td>CCL</td>
<td>Abram V. RINEARNSON, III</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJ5</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>William M. GLASGOW</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cdr UN Forces/Rep</td>
<td>COL (R)</td>
<td>James G. HILL</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch Protocol Sec</td>
<td>LCOL</td>
<td>Herman L. WIRTH</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J1</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Dana F. MCFALL, JR.</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J2</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Albert A. STERNBECK</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J3/Div US/ROK OPLAN Staff</td>
<td>BGEN</td>
<td>Martin G. CILLADAAY</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J4</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Richard T. CANN, IV</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J5</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Frank M. ROMANICK</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J6</td>
<td>COL (D)</td>
<td>Francis M. CLOUTIER</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH, Armistice Aff Div &amp; Secty UNCMAC</td>
<td>COL (R)</td>
<td>Earl E. HENDRICKSEN</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Joseph W. PEDERSON, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM</td>
<td>Victor A. DYBAL, USN</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Robert W. MALOY, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCOL</td>
<td>Gerald H. ROBBINS, JR, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reinforced U.S. Forces, Korea**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>USAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander/CSAF</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Wesley C. FRANKLIN, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J1</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>George B. LIENKIR, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J2</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>John B. PRATT, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J3</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Philip FELDER, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J4</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Richard W. BELY, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J5</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>C. Stuart TOWNSEND, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J6</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Franklin J. HICKMAN, JR., USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch Protocol Sec</td>
<td>CCL</td>
<td>Charles E. ABBET, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer of Info (SAF)</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Alan E. GOLDSMITH, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor (SAF)</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>George M. WILSON, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt (CFS)</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Philip O. GEDD, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**U.S. TAIWAN DEFENSE COMMAND**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>USAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>RADM</td>
<td>WALTER T. MURPHY, JR.</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J1</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Dana F. MCFALL, JR.</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J2</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Albert A. STERNBECK</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J3/Div US/ROK OPLAN Staff</td>
<td>BGEN</td>
<td>Martin G. CILLADAAY</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J4</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Richard T. CANN, IV</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J5</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Frank M. ROMANICK</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J6</td>
<td>COL (D)</td>
<td>Francis M. CLOUTIER</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH, Armistice Aff Div &amp; Secty UNCMAC</td>
<td>COL (R)</td>
<td>Earl E. HENDRICKSEN</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Joseph W. PEDERSON, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM</td>
<td>Victor A. DYBAL, USN</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Robert W. MALOY, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCOL</td>
<td>Gerald H. ROBBINS, JR, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>USAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander/CG USAIV</td>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>Creighton W. ABRAMS</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>Frederick C. WEYAND, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep Commander for Air</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Lucius D. CLAY, JR, USAF</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep to COMUSMAC for CORDS</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>WMAN E. COLBY</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJ5</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>John G. JONES, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J1</td>
<td>BGEND</td>
<td>Lawrence V. GREENE, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J2</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>William E. POTTS, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J3</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Donald R. CLOWES, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J4</td>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td>Hermon N. MAPLES, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J5</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Thomas J. CAMP, JR, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J6</td>
<td>BGEN</td>
<td>Geoffrey CHEARDLE, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J7</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>George D. JACOBSON</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOUSF J8</td>
<td>BGEND</td>
<td>Thomas W. BROWN, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj General</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Walter A. RUTLEDGE, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge Advocate</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Robert K. BEAVER, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>CH(COL)</td>
<td>John W. BETZOLD, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Robert M. COOK, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Robert BERNSTEIN, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Info Officer</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Joseph BRIGANDI, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Thomas J. CAMP, JR, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Training</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Joseph Q. HENSON, USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** PAGM Digest Feb 71, p. 17

*Updated by JIL.*
### U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM (CONT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy CG, USAVCOMMAVL TV</td>
<td>LT GEN William MCCAFFREY, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander/Chief CG I Field Force</td>
<td>LT GEN Arthur S. COLLINS, JR., USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG III MEF</td>
<td>LT GEN Michael S. DAVIDSON, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG XXIV Corps</td>
<td>LT GEN James W. SUTHERLAND, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, VIETNAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General/Cmdr</td>
<td>MAJ GEN Louis T. SEITH, USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, KOREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General/Cmdr</td>
<td>MAJ GEN Oris B. JOHNSON, USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, JAPAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General/Cmdr</td>
<td>MAJ GEN Ray D. BLATT, USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, PHILIPPINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General/Cmdr</td>
<td>MAJ GEN George R. MUSE, USN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, GUAM/TJPI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander 8th AF</td>
<td>LT GEN Sam J. BYRERLY, USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Cdr 8th AF</td>
<td>LT GEN Leo C. LEWIS, USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, AUSTRALIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF Liaison Officer</td>
<td>COL Paul N. SPENCER, USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>COL James C. STANFIELD, USMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Source

PACOM Digest, Feb 71, p. 18;
## U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups
### Far East Region - Key Personnel
#### As of 31 December 1977

### U.S. Military Assistance Group Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>MAJ GEN John S. Lekson, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief/CAS</td>
<td>COL Vincent F. Goodsell, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>CAPT Charles H. Lowry, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS Logistic</td>
<td>COL Donald P. Moore, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS Comptroller</td>
<td>COL Frederick C. MacAueeen, JR, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/Adv ROK MDN</td>
<td>COL Robert O. Van Nist, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>LCOL James F. Guel, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj General</td>
<td>CAPT Jerome J. Kowbel, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### U.S. Military Assistance Office, Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>COL William M. Reynolds, JR, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief</td>
<td>GS C. Lawrence O'Neill, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Military Assistance Advisory Group China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>MAJ GEN Livingston H. Taylor, JR, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>COL Richard J. White, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS Services</td>
<td>COL Lloyd E. Nobles, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/Programs</td>
<td>COL Robert D. Yocom, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/Comptroller</td>
<td>COL John A. Hindsley, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/8/13</td>
<td>COL Jack S. Sargent, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/14</td>
<td>COL Joseph E. Stiles, JR, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/16</td>
<td>COL Robert W. Patterson, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>COL William F., McCorkin, JR, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/Army Section</td>
<td>COL John W. Clifford, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/Navy Section</td>
<td>CAPT John W. Porter, JR, USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/AF Section</td>
<td>BG CAPT Robert R. Seaborn, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/31st Air Div</td>
<td>CAPT Ogden K. Stratton, USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/Combined Service</td>
<td>CAPT Ogden K. Stratton, USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/Force Section</td>
<td>CAPT Ogden K. Stratton, USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### U.S. Military Assistance Group Thailand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander/Chief</td>
<td>MAJ GEN Louis T. Smith, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>COL James J. Gibson, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep Chiysungnathai</td>
<td>COL Peter T. Russell, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>COL Marion F. Caruthers, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/7</td>
<td>COL Dennis S. Greene, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/2</td>
<td>COL Robert L. Cody, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/3</td>
<td>COL Edgar L. Smith, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/12</td>
<td>COL John R. D. Cleland, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/14</td>
<td>COL Alfred L. Grifflin, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/16</td>
<td>COL Charles Kimar, USMC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>COL Ora S. Key, JR, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>CAPT William E. Carter, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>COL Raymond F. Paffrane, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>COL Allan H. Harvey, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>COL Michael A. Orlando, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>COL Robert O. Lewis, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>COL Stanley C. LaMaster, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>COL John E. Lance, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>CAPT Gordon R. Hopkins, USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>COL Harry C. Aderholdt, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/18</td>
<td>COL Glenn W. Rodkey, USMC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Defense Assistance Group Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief, DGCANDO</td>
<td>COL Taylor R. Fulton, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Defense Equipment Delivery Team Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief, MDT, Surmao</td>
<td>COL Kevin F. Carrigan, USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL

### SERVICE - CATEGORY - COUNTRY

**ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>U.S. Civilians</th>
<th>Local Hire Civilians</th>
<th>Dependents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOT</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALASKA</strong></td>
<td>5840</td>
<td>5110</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUSTRALIA</strong></td>
<td>1308</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BHUTAN</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAMBODIA</strong></td>
<td>2701</td>
<td>2392</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHINA</strong></td>
<td>11699</td>
<td>10838</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8641</td>
<td>7181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDONESIA</strong></td>
<td>147</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JAPAN</strong></td>
<td>10162</td>
<td>30831</td>
<td>4927</td>
<td>7892</td>
<td>7157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KOREA</strong></td>
<td>360</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAOS</strong></td>
<td>4999</td>
<td>3882</td>
<td>4465</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MALAYSIA</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PAKISTAN</strong></td>
<td>235</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHILIPPINES</strong></td>
<td>3632</td>
<td>22972</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>7198</td>
<td>3262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SINGAPORE</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THAILAND</strong></td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1086</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 62.
CINCPAC COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAFF</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>MC</th>
<th>AF</th>
<th>TOTAL MIL</th>
<th>U.S. CIV</th>
<th>NIEC CIV</th>
<th>TOTAL MIL AND CIV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS JAPAN</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS KOREA</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS TBC</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS MAC</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMAC THAIL</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTALS</td>
<td>1369</td>
<td>1396</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>1104</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 71, p. 83.
# MAAG Personnel - Pacific Command

**Authorized and Assigned Strengths by Service and Civilian Category**

**As of 31 Dec 70**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>MC</th>
<th>AF</th>
<th>Total Mil</th>
<th>US Civ</th>
<th>Total US Per</th>
<th>Local Hire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>Auth</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG China</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProyMaag Korea</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUSMAG Phil</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUSMAG Thai</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medy Burma</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depco/ing Thai</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG: Indonesia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>715</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 84.
# AVAILABLE FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CINCUSARPAC</th>
<th>CINCPACFLT</th>
<th>CINCPACAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Army Hqs</th>
<th>2 Corps Hqs</th>
<th>2 Field Force Hqs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Hqs U.S. Army Spa</td>
<td>2 Corps Hqs</td>
<td>3 Field Force Hqs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps Spa</td>
<td>Corps Spa</td>
<td>Corps Spa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2 Numbered Fleets
- 8 Attack Carriers
- 1 AW Air Carriers
- 6 Cruisers
- 6 Destroyer Types
- 8 Patrol Ship Types
- 4 Submarine Types
- 4 Amphibious Warfare Types
- 5 Mine Warfare Ships
- 9 Auxiliary Ships
- 9 SOWS Ships
- 1 Light Attack Sq (VA/L)

### 3 Numbered Air Forces, 5 Air Divisions
- 1 Operations Sq G-115, G-124
- 1 Tactical Air Support Group G-115, G-124
- 1 Reconnaissance Sq EC-121, EC-135B
- 1 Fighter Interceptor Wing F-102 (L)
- 1 Tactical Fighter Wings F-4C/D/E (10-40)
- 1 Tactical Airlift Wings C-7 (10-15)
- 1 Airborne Command & Control Sq C-130

### IN PACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC

| USASA Units in Pacific | Army Reserve Units
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA Cp</td>
<td>1 Engr Com Const Sq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 HHD Nat'l Guard</td>
<td>1 Corps Sq (AUG)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MAJOR AUGMENTATION FORCES WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE IN EMERGENCY

| SEE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITY PLAN (JSCP), PART 1, ANNEX A |

**SOURCE:** PACOM DIGEST Feb 71, p. 5.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS
(as of 1 August 1970)

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest Aug 70, p. 22.
Hereafter cited as PACOM Digest Aug 70.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR UNITS
(as of 1 August 1970)

CAM RANH BAY
VP (L) DET (1) 6 P3
MAG 13
VNAF (3) 45 F4B/1

CHU LAI
VNAF (1) 20 A4
MAG 13
VNAF (1) 1 C117D

U TAPAO
VP (L) DET (1) 3 P3
NVA (1) 35 M21/4

YUNG TAU
VNAF (1) 14 NY 10

SINH THUY
VNAF (1) 14 NY 10

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Aug 70, p. 23.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS
(as of 1 February 1971)

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 2h.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS (as of 1 Aug 70)

NAKHON PHANOM

56 SOW
35 SOW

602 SOS
25 A-1
29 A-1

553-1 Recon Sq
5 QU-12B

38-9 ARR(S/MAC)
2 HH-43

PHAN RANG

35 TFW
352 TFS

602 SOS
18 F-100
18 F-100

306 TFS
10 C-123
2 HH-43

TAKHLI

355 TFW
44 TFS

469 TFS
10 F-4E
10 F-105

553 Recon Wg
553 Recon Sq
554 Recon Sq
38-4 ARR(S/MAC)

KORAT

308 TFW
34 TFS

609 TFS
10 F-4E
10 F-105

44 TEWS
44 TEWS

BIN MUANG

2 HH-43

BIENV HOA

3 TFW
8 ATK SQ

90 ATK SQ
25 A-37

504 TASS
504 TASS

19 TASS
590-2/OY-10

38-6 ARR(S/MAC)
2 HH-43

TAN SON NHUT

51 GAR
814 Air Div

460 TRW
2 HH-43

4 HH-57E
10 RF-4E

16 FF-101
16 C-123K

38-14A ARR(S/MAC)
2 HH-43

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Aug 70, p. 25.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE
FLYING & MISSILE UNITS
(as of 1 February 1971)

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE
FLYING & MISSILE UNITS (as of 1 Feb 71)

NAKHON PHANOM
56 SOW
1 SOS 36 A-1
21 SOS 20 CH-3/CH-53
23 TASS 51 0-2/0V-10
606 SOS 10 C-130
554 Recon SQ 1 C YO-128
18-9 ARRS(MAC) 2 HH-43

PHAN RANG
35 TFW
352 TFS
301 TFS 16 F-4E
301 TFS 18 F-4D
604 TFS 18 F-100
615 TFS 18 F-100
315 TAW
310 TAS
310 TAS 18 C-123
310 TAS 16 C-123
36-1 ARRS(MAC) 2 HH-43
14 SOS 6 C-47/18 O-2
11 SOS 16 AC-119
18 SOS 18 AC-119

U-TAPAO
635 CSG
AER(SAC) 7600 H (SAC) (42) D-52
TAS (Rotas) (9) C-130
Recon SAC 2 EC-130
18-12 ARRS(MAC) 2 HH-43
36-12 ARRS(MAC) 2 HH-43

KORAT
306 TFW
24 TFS 16 F-4E
406 TFS 18 F-4D
429 TFS 16 EB-66
429 WW SQ 12 F-101
553 Recon Sq 9 EC-121
18-4 ARRS (MAC) 2 HH-43

BIEN HOA
8 SOW 36 A-37
504 TASC
9 TASS 72 0-2/0V-10
22 TASS 14 0-11
38-6 ARRS (MAC) 2 HH-43

TAN SON NHUT
447 TAF
974 Air Div
446 TFW
460 TFS
460-1
12 TFS 16 RF-4
19 TFS 16 C-130
196 TFS 25 EC-47
360 TASS 16 F-100
38-4 ARRS(MAC) 2 HH-43

NHA TRANG
90 SOS 4 C-110

CAM RANH BAY
116 TFW
16 C-7
457 TFS 16 C-7
535 TFS 16 C-7
536 TFS 16 C-7
20 TASS 16 C-7
20 TASS 21 HH-1
21 TASS 4/9 O-2
39 ARRS(MAC) 11 H-130
AIR (16) C-110
38-8 ARRS (MAC) 3 HH-43

SOURCES: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 25.
## Strengths of CINCPAC Staff Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISION</th>
<th>1 January 1970</th>
<th>31 December 1970</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>CIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Corps, Plans and Operations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Office</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy CSF, Military Assist, Log, Admin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Secretariat</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Division</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Division</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Division</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Division</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans Division</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and Electronics Division</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Evaluation Group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol Office</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Office</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Strategic Target</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM AID Systems</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Group</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Command Post</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM MAP Data Center</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM KLINT Center</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Joint administrative offices serving the CSF and Deputy CSF Plans and Operations.
- Reflects transfer of Special Security Branch from the Intelligence Division to CINCPAC's staff.

**CONFIDENTIAL**
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION II - KEY PERSONNEL CHANGES IN 1970

CINCPAC

(U) Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, continued to serve as CINCPAC throughout 1970. On 31 October CAPT Frederick F. Palmer, USN, relieved RADM John L. Butts, USN, as Executive Assistant and Senior Aide to CINCPAC.

Chief of Staff

(U) LT GEN Charles A. Corcoran, USA, became Chief of Staff on 28 March, replacing LT GEN Michael S. Davison, USA.

Psychological Operations Adviser

(U) Mr. Leslie A. Squires replaced Mr. John E. McGowan as Psychological Operations Adviser to CINCPAC on 8 September.

Research and Engineering Consultant

(U) Mr. Robert G. Gibson became Research and Engineering Consultant to CINCPAC on 3 August, replacing Dr. Theodore S. George.

Deputy Chief of Staff

(U) MAJ GEN Milton B. Adams, USAF, replaced MAJ GEN Chesley G. Peterson, USAF, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations on 1 June.

Assistant Chiefs of Staff

Intelligence

(U) BG EN John J. Gorman, USAF, replaced MAJ GEN George J. Keegan, Jr., USAF, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence on 19 August.

Logistics

(U) BG EN John E. Murray, USA, replaced BG EN Carl R. Duncan, USA, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics on 1 December.

UNCLASSIFIED

25
UNCLASSIFIED

KEY CINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL

CHARLES A CORCORAN
LT GEN USA
CHIEF OF STAFF

H L T KOREN
AMBASSADOR
POLITICAL ADVISER

LESLIE A SQUIRES
PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS ADVISER

ROBERT G. GIBSON
RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING CONSULTANT

MILTON B ADAMS
MAJ GEN USAF
DEPUTY C/S
PLANS & OPERATIONS

FREDERICK E JANNEY
RADM USN
DEPUTY C/S
MIL ASST/LOG/ADMIN

WILLIAM C HARRISON, JR
COL USAF
JOINT SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Heads of Independent Offices

Performance Evaluation Group

(U) COL M. J. Berenzweig, USA, replaced COL Christopher R. Keegan, USA, as Chief of the Performance Evaluation Group on 14 September.

Comptroller

(U) CAPT Hugh D. Byrd, SC, USN, relieved CAPT C. E. Schmeder, SC, USN, as Comptroller on 24 August.

Fleet Operations Control Center, U.S. Pacific Fleet

(U) CAPT Joseph R. Geary, USN, replaced CAPT Donald F. Ryder, USN, as Commanding Officer, Fleet Operations Control Center, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Chief of the Alternate Command Facility, Kunia on 17 July.
SECTION III - ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION

Agency for International Development Adviser to CINCPAC Proposed

(5) The Director of the Joint Staff of the Office of the JCS informed CINCPAC's Chief of Staff on 31 March that the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance had recommended to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), a State Department agency, that an AID adviser be assigned to CINCPAC. The CINCPAC staff began studying the matter.

(5) On 28 April the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance visited CINCPAC's headquarters, where he met with CINCPAC, the Chief of Staff, the Political Adviser, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans. The matter of establishing an Economic Adviser position was discussed.

(5) On 2 May the Chief of Staff notified the Director of the Joint Staff that no additional evidence was presented to warrant establishment of an AID position on the CINCPAC staff. CINCPAC recommended that no further action be taken at that time. On 6 May the Director of the Joint Staff notified CINCPAC that the AID had informed the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance that more experience with existing coordinating mechanisms was required before adding still another, and that "for the present, the issue is closed."

Plans Division to Monitor Economic Affairs in PACOM Countries

(5) The economic strength and programs in countries of interest to the CINCPAC had assumed increasing importance with the announcement of the "Nixon Doctrine" and the diminishing U.S. military role in Southeast Asia. The increasing military concern for economics in these countries was first felt in the late summer of 1970 with a Defense Department recommendation for the appointment of a general officer as economic adviser to COMUSMACV, an officer who became the MACV Deputy Chief of Staff for Economic Affairs.

(5) To examine the role of economic analysis on the CINCPAC staff and to identify the staff element with primary interest in that function, CINCPAC formed a special study group headed by a member of the Comptroller's staff. Based on the recommendations of that group, the Chief of Staff determined on 16 November

1. Mr. Scott Hauer, Jr.
2. J555 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
3. Ibid.
that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans would be assigned CINCPAC staff responsibility for economic affairs in PACOM countries.¹

Operations Division Organizational Changes

(U) Several organizational changes were made in the Operations Division effective 1 May 1970.² The Office of the Deputy for Operational Analysis (J3A) was disestablished. Two of the three branches that had been part of J3A were assigned to the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. These were the Scientific Advisory Group and the Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation Branch. The functions of these two branches remained unchanged. What had been the third branch of J3A, the Studies and Analysis Branch, became functionally integrated with the Operational Plans Branch (J3B1) on 1 May and physically integrated in June.³

Command and Control System Group Name Changed

(U) The name of the PACOM Command and Control System Group was changed to the PACOM ADP Systems Support Group effective 1 October 1970. The new name was more descriptive of missions and functions, which remained unchanged, as did the staff code, J02C.⁴

Special Security Branch Reassigned

(U) The Special Security Branch of the Intelligence Division, J25, was placed under the direct supervision and control of the Executive Assistant to CINCPAC effective 4 May 1970. The Special Security Office was assigned the code J005.⁵

Logistics Division Reorganization

(U) Certain branches and offices of the Logistics Division were redesignated and some realignments took place effective 1 July 1970.⁶ The Materiel and

1. JO1/Memo/179-70, LT GEN Charles A. Corcoran, USA, Chief of Staff, Hq CINCPAC, to RADM Vasey, USN, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Nov 70, Subj: CINCPAC Economic Advisor; J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
2. Daily Bulletin, Hq CINCPAC, No. 100, 29 Apr 70.
3. J3B16 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
4. CINCPACNOTE 5400, 22 Sep 70, Subj: PACOM Command and Control System Group (J02C); change in name of.
5. JO1/Memo/85-70, LT GEN Charles A. Corcoran, USA, Chief of Staff, Hq CINCPAC, to Distribution List, 4 May 70, Subj: Change to Staff Responsibility.
6. CINCPACSTAFFNOTE, 9 Jul 70, Subj: Redesignation of J-numbers within the J4 Division; J5436 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
Services Branch (J46) was formed by incorporating the Munitions Branch (J47) as a section and absorbing the Supply and Services Section from the Logistics Plans and Operations Branch (J41). The Facilities Branch (J42) was redesignated the Engineer Branch. The Military Assistance Branch (J43) and the Joint Petroleum Office (J44) retained both their names and code designations. The Western Pacific Transportation Office was redesignated the PACOM Transportation Management Agency (PATMA), retaining the code J45. The PACOM Movements Priority Agency (PAMPA), in Oakland, California was made subordinate to the PATMA and was redesignated PAMPA, PATMA Field Office Oakland. The Transportation Branch was changed from J48 to J47.

(U) Further refinement of the organizational structure was envisioned for the transportation agencies for the time when the existing High Intensity Logistics Environment in the PACOM could be considered a Low Intensity Environment. The High Intensity Environment was expected to continue until there were further reductions in Southeast Asia or until conditions otherwise indicated the feasibility of a drawdown in the organization structure. At that time, possibly by the beginning of FY 1972, the PATMA would become one of three sections subordinate to the Transportation Branch (J47), with that branch responsible for coordinating and directing all transportation activities of the Logistics Division.¹

**CINCPAC Representation to the Joint Continental Defense**

**Systems Integration Planning Staff Discontinued**

(TS) CINCPAC had assigned a representative to the Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff (JSIPS) since November 1968, shortly after the formation of that group whose purpose was to attain an integrated Continental United States (CONUS) aerospace defense system.² Such liaison had provided excellent means of staying abreast of aerospace defense considerations, but a number of unforeseen but significant changes took place that directly affected strategic defense planning and CINCPAC interest in the role of the JSIPS.³ Increases in systems costs, continued involvement in Southeast Asia, a new national assessment of strategic objectives, domestic needs, and drastic cuts in the Defense Department budget had resulted in substantial reductions in both planned and existing strategic defense systems. In view of the reduced emphasis by the JSIPS on programs of direct interest to CINCPAC, it was considered appropriate to discontinue CINCPAC representation.

---

1. J471A History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
3. JS151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
CINC PAC recommended to the JCS on 7 August that the liaison be discontinued, but he asked to retain the option to reestablish it at a future date if the requirement should be renewed. He also asked that the JSIPS keep CINC PAC advised and informed should programs of direct interest to CINC PAC be reemphasized or arise. The JCS approved CINC PAC's recommendation on 28 August and representation was terminated on 1 November 1970.

War Gaming Functions Transferred from Operations to Plans Division

Lack of an adequate war gaming capability on the CINC PAC staff was a problem that had surfaced in both the 1967 and 1970 inspections of the PACOM by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration. CINC PAC had taken initial steps to acquire such a capability, but shortages of qualified personnel and money had restricted efforts. The 1970 inspection team recommended that CINC PAC's gaming needs be reviewed to determine the level of gaming required in the development and evaluation of plans. CINC PAC was undertaking such a review. With the 1 October 1970 revision to the CINC PAC Organization and Functions Manual the duty to develop war game requirements became the responsibility of the Plans and Policy Branch of the Plans Division. In the previous edition of the manual the Operations Division had been assigned responsibility for supervising the conduct of war games affecting CINC PAC's area of interest.

Civilian Personnel Branch Transferred from Personnel Division to Joint Secretary

In 1966 the military personnel functions involving CINC PAC staff personnel were transferred from the Personnel Division to the Joint Secretary. The Civilian Personnel Branch was not affected at that time. As an extension of that action the Civilian Personnel Branch was transferred to the Joint Secretary on 1 June 1970.

Most of the functions being performed by the branch were concerned with services to the staff and local agencies. The few broad PACOM personnel policy functions performed by the branch when it was in the Personnel Division were absorbed by the Civilian Personnel Policy Branch, emphasizing policy matters in

---

1. CINC PAC 070338Z Aug 70.
2. JCS 8638/282228Z Aug 70.
3. CINC PAC STAFFNOTE 5000, 24 Sep 70, Subj: CINC PAC Representation to the Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff (CINC PACREP JSIPS); discontinuation of.
the Personnel Division while centralizing day-to-day personnel operations and services in the Joint Secretary's Office.¹

Preparation of Organization and Functions Manual Assigned to Personnel Division

(U) The Joint Secretary had been assigned preparation and continuing updating of the staff Organization and Functions Manual. The Personnel Division, however, maintained highly similar information that was required to be submitted to the JCS periodically as part of the Joint Manpower Program. In May, therefore, the Personnel Division recommended that responsibility for maintenance of the Organization and Functions Manual be transferred to that division. The Chief of Staff approved the arrangement and the transfer was accomplished 1 June. The Personnel Division reissued the publication on 1 October, identifying specific portions of the Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) pertinent to each staff element. Changes to either the JTD or the Organization and Functions Manual were to be processed concurrently (or considered concurrently if change to both was not necessary) in order to maintain the integrity of both documents.² The duplicative records were no longer required.

PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center Moved to Hawaii

(U) In May 1968 CINCPAC had determined that the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center (PEC) should be moved from Fuchu Air Station, Japan to Hawaii.³ The site selected for the PEC was Hospital Point at Pearl Harbor. Despite delays in funding, remedied in part by SECDEF approval to transfer $475,000 appropriated under Public Law 90-513 to Military Construction-Navy funds, the JCS directed the relocation to be accomplished by 30 June 1970.⁴ At the same time the JCS disapproved a CINCPAC recommendation regarding the temporary relocation of the PEC to the Alternate Command Facility at Kunia until the Hospital Point facility could be readied.

(U) On 6 February the contract for renovation of the selected building was let to a Honolulu contractor; renovation began 9 February.⁵

1. J1/Memo/231-70, Hq CINCPAC, COL P.C. Hough, Chief Personnel Division, to LT GEN Corcoran, Chief of Staff, 13 May 70, Subj: Proposed Changes in Staff Organization, on which General Corcoran noted his concurrence.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.; JCS 8110/1519452 Jan 70.
5. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
Meanwhile, on 31 January 1970, the PEC submitted a proposal to retain a small detachment of 15 personnel and requisite readout equipment at Fuchu Air Station, Japan after FY 70. In reply to a request for their opinions, CINCPAC's component commanders for Army and Navy forces concurred in the PEC recommendation; CINCPACAF nonconcurred. According to the component commanders, the principal advantages to be gained were continued responsiveness for forward area users in specific electronic intelligence areas and the potential intangible benefits to the United States by maintaining continuity in assisting Japanese Self-Defense Force electronic intelligence programs. Disadvantages, on the other hand, included gold flow considerations; an increased communications and administrative burden and support requirements; dilution of PEC personnel, equipment, and funding resources; and the recurring threat of overseas personnel reduction programs.

Assessing these advantages and disadvantages and the projected political and fiscal environment, CINCPAC decided that the PEC should relocate to Hawaii in total strength. To counter any possible adverse impact from the complete withdrawal, CINCPAC advised the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that a study would be undertaken to identify specific areas of impact and specialized electronic intelligence support requirements in the forward area and to determine ways and means to fill any gaps in electronic intelligence support to U.S. overseas units that might result from the relocation of the PEC to Hawaii.

Preparations for the move continued, with the advance party arriving in Hawaii on 4 May. During the month of June the PEC used a number of temporary expedients, such as using the CINCPACAF Intelligence Data Handling System IBM 360/40 computer while their own was being moved.

All proceeded on schedule. Operations at Fuchu terminated on 26 June and on 27 June the PEC in Hawaii assumed full production responsibility, including publication of the Electronic Order of Battle daily change and Weekly Trend Analysis Report. Some minor construction work continued after that date, but PEC operations were not adversely affected.

At the formal opening ceremony on 10 August, CINCPAC was represented by his Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, MGEN Milton B. Adams, USAF, whose remarks included:

1. PEC PEC-PR 310040Z Jan 70.
2. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 280400Z Feb 70.
4. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
5. CINCPAC 180423Z Jul 70; J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
6. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
UNCLASSIFIED

.... You men and women of the PACOM ELINT Center are contributing in a major way to the important mission of the Pacific Command. You have a critical and vital role in our nation's defense.

You work in the quiet. Not much is heard in the open about what you do because of the nature of your job. This work seldom makes headlines. And that is as true for the work of your knob twisters as it is for the top-level briefings you give.

But I want to say this, especially to your families and friends. This center provides essential information to the Commander in Chief Pacific and to his component commanders in the Pacific. The center also provides intelligence support to National level agencies.

This facility is one of four U.S. electronic intelligence processing centers in the world. It fulfills a two-fold service by a continuous exchange of intelligence information with:

- timely, tactical support to the theater commander, and

- timely, tactical support to operational commanders with emphasis upon Southeast Asia.

The center is responsive 24 hours around the clock. Its interests range from surface to ship to air. In the sprawling Pacific Command, the work of this facility covers the vast region from Burma in South Asia to Mongolia and Siberia in the north.

.... For more than a decade...[PEC] officers and civilian and enlisted personnel have done an outstanding job. I have every reason to believe their continuing efforts will be distinguished. 1

1. Remarks by MG EN Milton B. Adams, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Hq CINCPAC, at the formal opening ceremony for the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center, Hospital Point, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 10 August 1970.
SECTION IV - COMMAND FACILITIES AND RELATIONSHPES
AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

Policy Regarding Succession to Command

(C) CINCPAC provided additional guidance concerning succession to command in October 1970, because of the varying command relationships within the PACOM subordinate commands. CINCPAC noted that during the temporary absence from his area of command or responsibility of the commander of a subordinate unified command or the chief of a Military Assistance agency the interim command or authority associated with that position normally passed to the next most senior officer present for duty in the command or organization, eligible to exercise that responsibility, regardless of Service affiliation. CINCPAC continued:

... By virtue of the planning and coordination authority vested in Subordinate Unified Commanders, the Service Commands within their geographic area of responsibility are considered as part of the organization for purposes of selecting a successor to command...\(^1\)

(U) CINCPAC also noted that his approval was required for absences from commands of the PACOM Service component commanders, subordinate unified commanders, chiefs of Military Assistance agencies, and CINCPAC representatives. Requests for approval of such absences were to include the name of the designated successor to command.

Defense Department Inspection of the PACOM

(U) Periodic inspections of the unified and specified commands were conducted by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Inspection Services) (ODASU(IS)).\(^2\) Planning for the 1970 inspection of the PACOM began in June when a memorandum from the inspecting agency went to the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, the JCS, the Military Departments, and the Defense agencies asking about specific areas in which inquiries should be directed during the inspection. Members of the inspection team made orientation visits beginning in September and the on-site inspection of the PACOM Headquarters was conducted.

1. CINCPAC 090237Z Oct 70, modifying CINCPAC Instruction 003020.2E.
2. See CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I, pp. 37-48 for information on the last previous study conducted in July and August 1967 by the agency then known as the Directorate for Inspection Services (DINS), also under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration.
from 2 to 19 November. The Inspection Services team was headed by VADM Frederick H. Schneider, USN. CINCPAC's Performance Evaluation Group provided the project officer for the CINCPAC staff.

(U) The ODASD(IS) report was completed on 21 December. It contained 58 specific findings. In response to a JCS request, CINCPAC on 27 January 1971 forwarded comments on 46 of those findings. Those two documents provided the basis for the following discussion. The ODASD(IS) report was classified TOP SECRET and not classified by paragraph. That classification has been retained in the discussion that follows, but many of the subjects are discussed in detail elsewhere in the history at a more realistic level of classification control.

(TS) In the overall summary of the inspection it was found:

.... The capability of the Commander in Chief Pacific to accomplish his numerous missions, tasks, and functions is progressively decreasing. His ability to implement present strategy against an increasing enemy threat or to respond to contingencies is constrained by several factors among which are: PACOM SIOP [Single Integrated Operation Plan] degradation, reductions in assigned forces, phase-out of forward bases, unsatisfactory combat readiness and condition of non-Southeast Asia forces, low war reserve stocks, and shortfalls in funding for Military Assistance and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of assigned forces. Within these constraints the Commander in Chief Pacific is discharging his command and management responsibilities most effectively.

The ODASD(IS) then proceeded to discuss the many PACOM facets it studied; these are highlighted below.

**Personnel-Special Staff-Relationships**

(TS) The inspection team reported that although CINCPAC had studied the matter of changing politico-military trends and strategy based on the Nixon Doctrine there was no effort directed to development of an overall plan for the reassessment of existing command-wide relationships and terms of reference to

1. COL Gerald H. Shea, USA.
accommodate a restructuring of the PACOM; the inspectors believed that such a plan should be developed. CINCPAC noted, however, that the organization was reviewed whenever a major force adjustment became apparent but he did not believe there was existing justification for a major departure from current command relationships. He noted that all relationships would be evaluated upon receipt of the revised Unified Command Plan under review by the JCS.

(NAV) The ODASD(IS) noted that although JCS Publication 2 outlined the responsibilities of the Services to report to the unified and specified commands, CINCPAC, "in many cases" involving reductions in forces, bases, or facilities caused by budget constraints, had not been advised of planned reductions by the Services "until too late to provide meaningful comments." CINCPAC's comments, thus, reached the JCS after decisions had been made. The team considered timely consultation among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the Services, and CINCPAC concerning force and base restructuring "essential."

(NAV) Regarding the "continuing problem in interracial relations and racial tension within PACOM," the inspectors suggested CINCPAC consider formalizing procedures of monitoring, assessing, and coordinating the equal opportunity programs of the various Services. CINCPAC later noted that he was in the process of organizing a committee to perform this function.

(NAV) Guidance at all levels of command on the subject of area and country clearance was "voluminous, inconsistent, and redundant" and should be reviewed with the idea of consolidating it all in one joint publication.

(NAV) In the matter of reducing the hardship on local national employees subject to reduction-in-force (RIF) actions, it was noted that CINCPAC had provided effective guidance on a case-by-case basis but had issued no formal policy statement. The team recommended that CINCPAC include such guidance in his Instruction 12200.3, "Personnel Administration for US Forces Non-US Citizen Civilian Employees in PACOM." CINCPAC agreed and noted that the instruction would be revised as suggested.

Intelligence

(NAV) CINCPAC had reported excessive delays by the DIA in their processing and verification of targets for inclusion in the Automated Installation Intelligence File, which contained target lists that supported the General War Plan and CINCPAC's contingency plans. The ODASD(IS) recommended an adjustment of analytical resources in the DIA to speed processing.

(NAV) CINCPAC's Signal Intelligence requirements were incorporated in the U.S. Intelligence Board's publication "Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming"
(IGCP)," the present format for which made them hard to identify and thus limited CINCPAC's ability to manage requirements, assess the status of the PACOM program, or ascertain the impact of resource reduction on his requirements and operations. It was recommended that the IGCP be revised.

(TS) The inspectors noted that both the PACOM ELINT Center and the PACOM Air Defense Analysis Facility were fully responsive to the requirements of CINCPAC and his component commanders. The unique and complementary services they provided indicated that a merger of the two was not warranted.

(TS) CINCPAC had been waiting over a year for clarification of his industrial security responsibilities by the Office of SECDEF. Expedious action by that Office was required to clarify unified command responsibilities.

(TS) The ODASD(IS) asked that the DIA review its procedures for processing and forwarding intelligence reports to improve timely delivery and to insure more careful selection in line with CINCPAC's statement of intelligence interest.

(TS) No provision was made in either the JCS Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) or in the CINCPAC instruction on the preparation of Operations Plans for a requirement for medical intelligence. The ODASD(IS) recommended that the JOPS be so amended; CINCPAC said that when that happened he would revise his planning instruction.

Operations

(TS) The first operations matter addressed was that of readiness (or rather non-readiness) of forces in the PACOM. As of 9 November 1970 approximately 48 percent of 1,021 non-Southeast Asia PACOM units or ships submitting Force Status and Identify (FORSTAT) reports were in either a marginally-ready or non-ready category (with about 29 percent not ready). Personnel and equipment deficiencies were the primary problem areas. CINCPAC's comments noted that these were Service problems. About two-fifths of the units were deficient in personnel, but the Services did not have the men to maintain wartime authorized strength and high readiness capability because of problems with recruiting, draft quotas, early separations, normal expiration of active duty obligations, etc. Equipment readiness deficiencies concerned CINCPACFLT ships in an overhaul, repair, modernization, or deactivation status as well as Marine Corps and Navy units in a stand down status because of post deployment transition, retraining, or deactivating. The inspection team determined that there was a "need for continuing effort by the Military Services to improve the readiness of the forces for which responsible; and, further, there is a need for a JCS review of the missions assigned to CINCPAC with a view toward matching force capabilities with mission requirements."
The inspectors reviewed which established requirements for aircraft and identified basing, but four of the required bases did not exist. Withdrawal of Air Force elements from three large air bases in Japan and Okinawa as already planned would mean that many aircraft required to execute the plan could not be based on the remaining airfields. CINCPAC noted that not all of the aircraft were required at the outset of the plan and that the four bases to be constructed in Korea were to be started as soon after D-Day as possible to be ready, as planned, after D+90. CINCPAC said that the JSCP was in the process of major revision to reflect recent decisions regarding base closures and the absence of funds for pre-hostilities construction.

Further consideration of CINCPAC had already commented on the airfield situation. He noted, however, that the inspectors' reference to the JSCP was apparently to the section concerned with forces available for planning were equal to or greater than those called for in CINCPAC's plan. Naval forces shortfalls were minor and did not invalidate the plan. CINCPAC then addressed the matter of the rapid change in the PACOM in basing and forces, actions that were on-going and that required continuing plan revision, a process then under way. The purpose of the plan, CINCPAC said, as with all war plans, was "to provide a vehicle for examination of CINCPAC's capability to accomplish an assigned task, and to provide a point of departure for producing an operation order when required.... It would be impossible to execute any OPLAN which had not been updated at the final moment." Review of the plan had revealed that transportation deficiencies would delay a force buildup more than had been formerly estimated. Forthcoming revision of the plan would reflect reduced force availability and revised time-phasing.

The complex array of security elements below the national level in the RVN was noted. This proliferation of organizations complicated the detailed coordination necessary to attain rural security objectives. To get a greater return on U.S. money and effort, the Vietnamese organization must be made more effective and economical, the inspectors said.

The inspectors noted that CINCPAC's personnel recovery responsibilities encompassed escape and evasion, search and rescue, unconventional warfare, prisoner of war recovery, the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, and supporting administrative activities. Although these activities were inherently overlapping
and similar, the CINCPAC staff functions were fragmented among the Personnel, Intelligence, and Operations Divisions, the Staff Judge Advocate, and the Public Affairs Office. The team asked that CINCPAC consider assigning primary responsibility to one CINCPAC staff office. CINCPAC agreed, naming the Operations Division as the office of prime responsibility but noting that other offices would assist in their own areas of expertise.

Electronic warfare support measures assets in the PACOM for tactical use consisted of limited numbers of EB-66C land-based and EA-3B fleet-based aircraft. The EB-66Cs were being phased out of the Air Force's inventory in FY 72 for budgetary reasons, but no replacement had been programmed. It was necessary that CINCPAC retain an adequate capability in this regard and Air Force action to continue the EB-66Cs in their inventory until a replacement was developed was the easiest solution.

CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post was comprised of EC-135P aircraft, which had a much more limited range than the EC-135C aircraft that CINCPAC had hoped to substitute. The national level decision to retain the 135P instead of the 135C should be reviewed, the team said.

CINCPAC had implemented the JCS Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) on 1 August 1970 with the PACOM Unified Reporting System (PURS). Wide variations were noted in the quantity and quality of the responses to the PURS among different commands, indicating that the guidance in the JRS was ambiguous. The PURS could be made more effective if the definitions provided by the JCS were clarified and expanded.

The inspectors noted that responsibilities, policies, and procedures for automatic data processing (ADP) support had been outlined in appropriate CINCPAC staff instructions and that the directive on command and control ADP policy and planning was "noteworthy." CINCPAC, however, did not have the necessary authority to insure effective integration of ADP resources in support of theater headquarters' command and control and the Intelligence Data Handling System. The implication that there should be common ADP configuration was not correct, CINCPAC noted, because existing directives permitted each commander the prerogative to determine which configuration best fitted his requirements despite trends toward collocation and consolidation of facilities in the interest of economy of operations.

Lack of compatibility of the computers at Kunia with the Worldwide Military Command and Control-Intelligence Data Handling Systems had been noted.
in the 1967 DINS inspection of the PACOM. The problem still existed. CINCPAC had two IBM 360 computers at Camp Smith, CINCUARPC and CINCPACAF each had one, and CINCPACFLT was scheduled to receive a computer under the Worldwide Military Command and Control System ADP Update Program. The DDASD(IS) said that resolution of this issue was required. CINCPAC noted that the SECDEF decision had eliminated the most direct solution and that the problem could best be solved by acquisition of a 360 computer already in the government inventory.

(NS) More accurate delineation of the office within the Operations Division assigned responsibility for coordinating Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) matters was necessary. The CINCPAC instruction on the subject assigned it to the Scientific Advisory Group when it was in fact the responsibility of the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Branch. This change would be made in the next revision of the instruction.

(NS) The matter of a lack of a war gaming capability on the CINCPAC staff surfaced as it had in the 1967 inspection. CINCPAC had taken initial steps to acquire such a capability, but no further action was contemplated because of resource and fiscal constraints. Consistent with these constraints, the inspectors noted, CINCPAC gaming needs should be reviewed to determine the level of gaming required in the development and evaluation of plans. CINCPAC said he would review his requirements in the light of existing constraints.

Logistics/Military Assistance

(NS) The inspectors noted that a wide range of CINCPAC logistic responsibilities were affected by Southeast Asia priorities, force and base reductions, fiscal constraints, and inflationary effects. The impact of these factors tended to limit effectiveness, create shortages, and curtail flexibility and available options within the command. More specifically, the team noted, "high operational demands for munitions have precluded the maintenance of authorized war reserve stocks; airlift and sealift resources are insufficient for contingencies; maintenance operations are being limited; and a shortage of strike force replenishment ships exists within the US Pacific Fleet." Additionally, reduced military assistance funding, coupled with a restructuring of the Military Assistance Program to provide funds for emergency unfunded programs, had had a serious impact on the readiness and operational capabilities of allied forces in the Pacific. A number of logistics and military assistance matters were then addressed in more detail.
TOP SECRET

CINCPAC OPlan 5043 "PACOM Actions in Event of a NATO/Warsaw Pact Conflict," required the movement within 60 days of certain predetermined PACOM military forces to Europe. Called the Swing Strategy, the matter had come under study by CINCPAC following a report by the JCS that concluded that the 60-day objective was not feasible. Deficiencies in PACOM war reserve stocks, lack of prepositioned stocks in Europe for the "Swing" force, and projected PACOM logistic force reductions further degraded the logistic feasibility of the plan. CINCPAC believed that requirements for forces had to be more specifically stated by the European Command or the JCS before a definitive statement regarding logistic supportability of the plan could be made.

The JCS required CINCPAC to prepare a logistic appraisal for every operation plan and advise them when logistic shortfalls degraded mission capability. Appraisals did not exist for four of 13 required plans and additional command emphasis was required, the inspectors noted. CINCPAC noted that three of the four appraisals were being reviewed or ready for forwarding. The fourth was being revised in connection with another plan.

The ODASD(IS) found that CINCPAC continued to manage the movement of material to and from Southeast Asia in a "commendable manner." Monetary savings and efficiency of operations contributed to the PACOM Transportation Management Agency and its field offices "fully warrant the peacetime retention of at least a framework of this organization to permit its rapid expansion to meet contingency requirements."

The inspectors commented next on the many independent procurement activities within the PACOM. They noted that although some progress had been made in consolidation of specified common supplies and services, little progress had been made in analyzing area procurement operations on a joint basis with a view to consolidating competing procurement activities where feasible. Planned realignments in force strengths and basing would require further review of procurement procedures. CINCPAC noted that all Services in the PACOM were reviewing and restructuring their procurement organizations. Coexistence of several procurement offices in one locality did not necessarily mean duplication or misuse of resources, however, CINCPAC commented. To remain highly responsive to the needs of the activities they service the various Service agencies were as efficient and austere as a consolidated element would be, he said.

Although war reserve stocks were Service responsibilities, CINCPAC was advised that increased emphasis was required on monitoring, feasibility testing, and coordinating individual Service petroleum war reserves and the construction associated with such reserve stocks. CINCPAC commented that he had been and would continue to be aggressive in the exercise of his authority in the field of POL logistics. But while it was possible, CINCPAC said, and perhaps desirable,
for the unified commander to become more active in such matters as the determination of pre-positioning goals and facilities requirements, it was not possible to do so within the framework of existing mission directives and military construction procedures without "serious infringement on traditional Service prerogatives."

(NS) The Army used certain perishable and less desirable "B" rations that it had to occasionally substitute for the more desirable "A" rations in order to use them up. The inspectors said that consideration should be given to eliminating or reducing the amount of "B" rations in the Subsistence Mobilization Reserve.

(NS) The Republics of Vietnam and Korea had imposed political and administrative constraints that precluded the United States from obtaining favorable returns on sales of surplus property in a competitive worldwide market, the inspectors noted. Political discussions were taking place with those governments and other changes would occur as more civilians, including local hire nationals, took over responsibility for property disposal. "Additional timely guidance is required in PACOM," they said. CINCPAC said that he was in the process of reviewing all aspects of surplus property disposal operations in the PACOM and the completed study and recommendations would be furnished to the JCS.

(NS) The Services were required to plan and budget the procurement of war reserve stocks for allies, when required. The Army was responsible for program objectives, to include ammunition levels and rates, for Thailand and the Republics of Vietnam and Korea. CINCUSARPAC was to submit this information to CINCPAC for approval, but he had not done so. CINCPAC commented that computation of these requirements was being done by CINCUSARPAC and was expected about the end of February 1971; after validation by CINCPAC the requirements would be forwarded to the JCS.

(NS) The security of small arms, ammunition, and explosives, particularly to prevent them from falling into the hands of dissident elements, was studied, but
a lack of readily available data on actual losses precluded a determination of the extent of the problem in the PACOM. The inspectors said that a program for examining controls and measures being taken to protect property should be initiated. CINCPAC said he would establish appropriate reporting procedures for his component commands.

A recommendation that CINCPAC required stronger management of the Cambodian MAP than was available through the U.S. Political/Military Advisor on the Ambassador's staff was overtaken by events when the Secretary of State directed in January 1971 that actions be taken to establish a Military Equipment Delivery Team for Cambodia. CINCPAC cautioned, however, that the initially approved organization may not prove adequate to meet all Defense Department military assistance management and supervisory responsibilities and that it did not include the capabilities necessary to perform operational advisory functions.

The inspectors described the organization for military assistance for Laos and the resultant limits on CINCPAC in discharging his responsibilities of evaluation of requirements and distribution of assets. The inspectors said, "A CINCPAC Representative is required to provide adequate management control of the Laos MAP," a position with which CINCPAC concurred.

Plans

The inspectors outlined the nature and complexity of CINCPAC's responsibilities for the development and maintenance of 32 unilateral operation plans, numerous separate annexes, and bilateral and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Plans and for the review of more than 200 supporting plans and annexes prepared by subordinate and component commands. They noted that CINCPAC had subjected one of his major plans to a "searching computer analysis" of intertheater movement feasibility with findings that warranted a major revision of the plan. They also noted that the steady reduction in forces, support facilities, and various other factors resulted in six major plans being out of date. As each CINCPAC plan provided guidance for a broad range of supporting plans, "a pyramidal effect results when major OPLANS are not current." The team said, "Updating of major CINCPAC OPLANS is required, and movement feasibility analyses should be utilized in the development and review process." CINCPAC advised that he was aware of the problem and that some action had been taken to accommodate and adjust to changing resources and authorities. Other actions would be taken as circumstances dictated and CINCPAC staff capabilities permitted.
(TS) The ODASD(IS) noted that CINCPAC instructions for the preparation and review of OPlans were specific in many areas but they lacked the degree of detail necessary to preclude "administrative variations, aberrations in phraseology and terminology, delays, and problems of coordination" that had occurred periodically. The inspectors said there was a need to develop and promulgate improved procedures for the preparation and review of CINCPAC OPlans. CINCPAC acknowledged the continuing problem but explained that neither plans nor procedures could be "instantaneously adjusted." CINCPAC was aware of the conflicts and inconsistencies and was taking action as required when capabilities permitted.

(TS) The inspectors noted that CINCPAC had not yet issued instructions directing compliance with the new JCS Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) or provided detailed instructions on how to do so even though the JCS had promulgated the new system in August 1970. They believed that "expeditious action is required to implement JOPS within PACOM." CINCPAC advised that the JOPS was in the process of being implemented. New plans and major plan revisions for both CINCPAC and his component commanders would be reflecting the new format, with the other plans to be supported by the components reconfigured after CINCPAC has reconfigured his basic plans. Instructions on the subject were being prepared with increased emphasis being placed on a planning guidance manual and on a planning reference manual that would consolidate much of the repetitive material found in most OPlans. CINCPAC said he could not anticipate the impact of implementation of the third volume of the JOPS until the JCS published it.

(TS) Further problems with the JOPS revolved around the amount of detailed data available to satisfy stated requirements for certain countries in the PACOM. CINCPAC advised the inspectors that much of the data required by the JOPS was not available and CINCPAC did not have the resources to collect it. CINCPAC
indicated to the team that "additional conceptual planning and systems analysis are needed." The team's recommendations were as follows: "Prompt action is required to define the automatic data processing (ADP) support requirements. Timely publication of JOPS (Volume III) is essential to implement standardized contingency planning. Additionally, a program is needed stating priorities of data requirements by type and country and the assigning of responsibilities for collection thereof." CINCPAC later commented that future personnel strengths and data processing budgets would have a significant effect on the implementation, expansion, maintenance, and efficient operation of supporting systems. He said that implementation of a fully automated JOPS was "desirable," but in view of the constraints he noted that the third volume of the JOPS should contain a statement of priorities that would permit application of ADP support under varying resource levels.

**Communications-Electronics**

(\$) While some military telecommunications equipment in Vietnam was being considered for eventual turnover to the Republic of Vietnam, it was likely that some of the equipment would be needed elsewhere. Concurrent with this Defense Department planning, the State Department's Agency for International Development was planning for posthostilities telecommunications in Vietnam. The possibility thus existed that the State Department would be recommending the turnover of certain equipment that the Defense Department was planning to use elsewhere. The inspectors believed that an appropriate written agreement between the two departments was needed. CINCPAC noted that the U.S. contractor in Vietnam who was evaluating the equipment there for possible posthostilities use and whose recommendations could result in embarrassment to the United States was about to leave the theater. CINCPAC had recommended to the JCS that no contractor other than the one working on the Communications-Electronics (C-E) Improvement and Modernization Program be involved in these matters.

(\$\$) The development of the posthostilities U.S.-RWN Armed Forces Military Telecommunications Network-Vietnam basically required two steps, a reengineering study of existing networks and subsequent implementation of the study results. Contractor support for the reengineering had been planned and funded, but the ODASD(IS) noted that CINCPAC had neither planned for the implementation phase of the program nor identified funding requirements to complete it. CINCPAC explained some of the problems that had been encountered and that his recommendation to the JCS was that consideration be given to contracting the entire network effort, to include all requirements for establishing the system.

(\$\$) The inspectors noted that CINCPAC OPlans did not, in most cases studied, have the C-E annexes required by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan in order for the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to prepare appropriate supporting...
plans to meet validated circuit requirements. CINC PAC replied that he, in coordination with the DCA-Pacific, was preparing a change to affected plans to list additional circuit requirements not then available. After validation by CINC PAC of circuit requirements, the agency was to engineer circuit requirements by preemption of lower precedence circuits and identification of other circuitry, including that using mobile/transportable equipment (controlled by the JCS), that could be provided as well as circuits that could not be provided. Upon receipt of this information, CINC PAC could identify the equipment under his control or ask for support from the JCS if necessary.

(NAV) The inspectors found that CINC PAC had opted to coordinate the use of contingency communications equipment in the PACOM rather than use JCS resources to meet contingency requirements not satisfied by existing systems. His efforts in this regard had been limited to the establishment of general guidelines and requirements for reports from his component commanders. These reports had been "unsatisfactory," the team noted, and CINC PAC had not taken follow-up action. They said that CINC PAC action was required to identify and control PACOM contingency communications equipment assets and to plan for the use and intratheater movement of that equipment. CINC PAC subsequently commented that CINC PAC plans were being reviewed with the idea of identifying needs for additional DCA support. After review by that agency, CINC PAC was to be advised of which requirements the agency would be unable to satisfy so that he can seek assistance from the JCS.

(NAV) The inspectors found abuse of the Automatic Voice Network (AVON) because of unofficial calls, improper precedence, and calls that were too long. PACOM, as a result, had a call completion rate of 40 percent. CINC PAC had promulgated new procedures designed to reduce abuse and in his comments on the inspection report noted a trend toward a reduction in unofficial calls and precedence abuses.

(NAV) The DCA was proceeding with the planning and engineering necessary to integrate intelligence communications networks into the Automatic Digital Network (ADIN). Terminals of this integrated system would provide special intelligence information to command and control elements. The inspectors found that CINC PAC needed to identify requirements for these terminals throughout the PACOM and establish relative priorities for their installation. CINC PAC commented that he considered the integration of the networks one of the "more important" communications objectives in the PACOM. CINC PAC had implementation directives being prepared but he could not complete them until he received detailed system design information which the JCS had tasked the DCA to provide. When he received the data he would finalize the implementation directive and form a joint staff team to assist commanders throughout the PACOM in implementing the system.
Integration of PACOM dedicated command and control record communication networks into the AUTODIN had not been accomplished, the inspectors noted, although a plan developed jointly by CINCPAC and the DCA had been submitted. The team found that early approval of this plan by the SECDEF and its "expeditious implementation" were required.

Agreements with nations hosting U.S. forces overseas governing U.S. use of communications frequencies were normal, but there was no agreement in sufficient detail with the Philippines. The CINCPAC Representative to the Philippines had repeatedly stated the requirement, but because of the political climate no agreement has been completed. Lack of an agreement could constitute a threat to the electronic capabilities of U.S. forces in the Philippines, the ODASD(IS) team found, and they stated that action was required to consummate one. CINCPAC stated that he would pursue the subject in coordination with his representative in the Philippines and ask Embassy assistance in soliciting comments from the Philippine Government "at the most opportune time."

The consolidation of communications centers for both CINCPAC and the CGF/M/FPAC at their shared Camp Smith headquarters was studied. Consolidation plans had been linked to an approved but unfunded automation project for the CINCPAC Communications Center. Updating of this project to provide for consolidation of Marine requirements was being effected by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The inspectors found that action was necessary to accomplish early consolidation and to provide for orderly implementation of the necessary automation. Additionally, projects in progress to upgrade the still separate communications centers should be suspended.

Command and Control Facilities and Procedures Studied

As part of a year long and worldwide study, representatives of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and the Institute for Defense Analyses visited CINCPAC and the commanders of CINCPAC's component commands during the period 3 to 8 August. The purpose of the visit was to discuss and identify existing and

1. The Weapons Systems Evaluation Group was a Defense Department agency making the study for the JCS; the Institute for Defense Analyses was working on the contract.
foreseeable future problems in command and control as they pertained to the World-wide Military Command and Control System.

(5) Three areas of specific interest to the study group were command facilities, performance measurement, and operational reporting. The group consulted with staff representatives from CINCPAC, his component commanders, and the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific, and toured the command and control and communications facilities of those headquarters.1

Command Relationships for the Ryukyus
Following Reversion to Japan

(5) The U.S. Ambassador to Japan, in January 1970 while preparing for negotiations for reversion, asked, among other things, for the views of CINCPAC, the JCS, and the Defense Department on the post reversion military organizational arrangements that could have negotiating implications.2

(5) CINCPAC forwarded his views on the matter to the JCS on 14 April.3 CINCPAC noted first that underlying the CINCPAC philosophy for the command arrangement for Japan and Okinawa was the premise that the Ryukyus, on reversion, would become a prefecture of Japan and would be governed by the Japanese Government as the other prefectures were. He believed, therefore, that U.S. Forces on Okinawa should be incorporated into the existing unified command relationship already established for Japan. Such an arrangement "would minimize disruption of the military interface among U.S. forces, the U.S. Embassy and the GOJ/JDA [Government of Japan/Japan Defense Agency]. Coordination of US-GOJ military affairs would continue to be conducted with the GOJ at the seat of government."4 The authority of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee organization for administration of Status of Forces Agreement affairs would be extended automatically without fragmentation of the existing organization.

(5) The need for a CINCPAC Representative to the Ryukyus would disappear, but some supplemental command arrangements would be required by the U.S. Forces Japan in view of proper consideration of problems peculiar to Okinawa; the ratio

1. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70; SECDEF 4125/0221082 Jul 70; J01/Memo/047-70, LT GEN Charles A. Corcoran, USA, Chief of Staff, Hq CINCPAC, to J75, 22 Jul 70, Subj: Itinerary for WSEG Visit, 2-8 August 1970; Ltr, CQG Bob M. Johnson, USAF, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group to MAJ Elmer Naber, J3C21, Staff CINCPAC, 14 Jul 70, Subj: Weapons Systems Evaluation Group/ Institute for Defense Analyses Visit to PACOM.
2. AMEMBASSY Tokyo 450/270730Z Jan 70.
3. CINCPAC 142202Z Apr 70.
4. Ibid.
of strength of U.S. Forces in Japan to those on Okinawa after reversion; the need for an on-the-scene, prompt response and coordination mechanism to extend COMUS Japan's command and control responsibilities to the Ryukyus on a day-to-day basis after reversion; and the requirement to accomplish certain residual functions with qualified, experienced personnel in the period immediately following reversion. 1

(C) CINCPAC believed that these requirements could be met by designation by COMUS Japan of a senior Service commander within the Ryukyus as COMUS Japan Representative Ryukyus, who would be supported by continuation of the existing area joint committee arrangement, provided from on-island Service resources and thus retaining existing expertise.

(C) In the final determination of the Service to man the position, COMUS Japan would give consideration to Service component levels of command existing on Okinawa and the extent of logistical and operational forces positioned on Okinawa during and subsequent to the reversion process. 2

Reorganization of Taiwan Defense Command and MAAG China Studied

(C) In 1969 CINCPAC had studied the possibility of combining the Taiwan Defense Command (TDC) and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) China. COMUSTDC agreed with the conclusions of a study that considered the consolidation feasible. The CHMAAG did not support the merger. CINCPAC based his decision on many facets of the situation, including modifications in U.S. Navy patrol of the Taiwan Strait, reductions in the MAP for China, and the downgrading of the role of the CHMAAG, which could imply a lessened U.S. interest in China. He decided in January 1970 not to pursue the idea of consolidating the two organizations. 3

(C) On 14 August 1970, however, the JCS asked CINCPAC to consider manpower reductions through the realignment of functions for the two organizations. CINCPAC considered three options to accomplish the reductions. The first was to keep both organizations separate but reduce each by about 30 percent. The second was to subordinate the MAAG to the USTDC and reduce both by about 30 percent. The third option, and the one adopted for subsequent planning purposes, was to consolidate the two commands and obtain an overall 30 percent reduction. 4

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
On 4 September CINCPAC tasked COMUSTDC to prepare Terms of Reference and a Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for the single organization proposed.

CINCPAC proposed that the new organization, COMUSTDC/MAAG, be commanded by a Navy vice admiral with an Army major general as deputy commander and chief of staff. To provide Air Force representation at suitable rank, an Air Force brigadier general would be Chief of the Air Force Advisory Section. This Air Force officer would be double hatted, as he would also serve as commanding general of the 327th Air Division.

The JMP that was recommended replaced a TDC authorized strength of 192 and a MAAG authorized strength of 378 (total 570) with a COMUSTDC/MAAG authorization of 399, a reduction of 171 spaces or 30 percent.

CINCPAC's component commanders' comments resulted in some minor adjustments to the organization proposal.

Meanwhile, in the Republic of China, the considerable speculation by officials of that country regarding the possible merger of the two commands reached a peak on 29 September. On that day the COMUSTDC and the CHMAAG had an audience with President Chiang Kai-shek. The President said that he viewed the abolition of the MAAG as a matter of serious concern that could raise doubts as to U.S. resolve toward Taiwan. He said that the Chinese Communists could see this as a lack of resolve and be more prone to attack Taiwan, and that other Asian nations could gain the impression that the United States was withdrawing support from Asian allies. He desired that this matter and his feelings on the subject be brought to the attention of the highest U.S. officials.

Political pressures continued to increase in October 1970. Considering the other actions and events which had affected the Government of the Republic of China during the preceding months (reduction in MAP funds, for example) the decision was made not to consolidate the two commands at that time. The decision

1. CINCPAC 040404Z Sep 70.
3. Ibid. When it was subsequently decided not to consolidate the TDC and the MAAG, other means were studied to reduce the two staffs. The matter was under study by the CINCPAC staff at the end of the year with submission of recommendations expected early in 1971.
was announced by Admiral McCain to VADM Walter N. Baumberger, USN, COMUSMARDC; MG F. Livingston N. Taylor, Jr., USA, CHMAAG China; and U.S. Ambassador to China William P. McConaughy during Admiral McCain's visit to Taiwan during the period 2-6 November 1970.

Establishment of CINCPAC Representative to Laos Proposed (S)

(†S) The basic U.S. objective in Laos has been to retain that country as an independent, neutral nation as established by the 1962 Geneva Agreements. The method of achieving this objective has been primarily through diplomatic initiatives and the provision of limited military assistance. Generally the level of assistance provided has been that which was required to maintain the Lao Government's armed forces in balance with those of the communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese Army troops in Laos.

(†S) Despite this assistance, little improvement in the effectiveness of the Lao Government forces has been achieved. There were in 1970 several programs for improvement of those forces either under consideration or being implemented. These plans generally involved comprehensive programs and considerable money. Due to the scale of military support programs and the need for professional assessment and improved management, CINCPAC believed that a general officer should be assigned as Defense Attache and as CINCPAC Representative.1

(†S) This officer would be assigned to manage and control the U.S. military support effort in Laos and advise the Ambassador on military matters.

Airborne Command Post Activities

(†S) On 1 January 1970 CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), called BLUE EAGLE, went on a ground alert status instead of an airborne alert status by direction of the JCS because of budget restrictions and over CINCPAC's vigorous protests.2 Again on 14 May 1970 CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the vulnerability of the CINCPAC Command and Control System be reduced by returning the ABNCP to a continuous airborne alert posture on 1 January 1971.3 On 30 June, however, the JCS replied that although they shared CINCPAC's concern over the survivability of PACOM Command and Control, the fiscal constraints that prompted the original grounding had not been alleviated. The CINCPAC ABNCP remained in a ground alert posture.4

3. J3Cl History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70, citing CINCPAC 140243Z May 70.
4. Ibid., citing JCS 3916/3022092 Jun 70.
(§) On 14 August 1970 CINCPAC published Operations Order 1-71, regarding the ABNCP. The new order incorporated the ABNCP ground alert concept as well as changes in the revised PACOM Continuity of Operations Plan and the CINCPAC Relocation Plan.  

(§) Permanent sleeping facilities for ABNCP personnel were provided in 1970. The personnel had been using the transient airmen's dormitory at Hickam Air Force Base, but this was both too distant from the alert aircraft parking area and too costly to the Air Force, which had been forced to billet the displaced airmen off base. The Air Force let the contract for construction in June with the new sleeping facility first occupied in November.  

(U) An unusually large percentage of personnel rotations had been scheduled for 1971 as a result of force reductions. As 29 of 46 assigned personnel were

1. J3C1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
2. J3C1 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan, May-Dec 70.
3. J3C1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
4. J3C1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70. The PACOM Continuity of Operations Plan was promulgated in CINCPACINST 003120.2F, 9 Jun 70 and the CINCPAC Relocation Plan in CINCPAC 070206Z Feb 70.
5. J3C1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jun and Nov 70.
scheduled to rotate, an offer for tour extension was extended to all; six elected to extend for one year.\(^1\)

\(^{(S)}\) Again in 1970 a number of improvements were made in facilities in or related to the ABNCBP. Some of these were as follows.

\(^{(C)}\) Placing the ABNCBP on ground alert required the capability to send and receive teletype messages in the full duplex mode from the ground alert facility as well as when the ABNCBP was airborne. Teletype service of this type for the ground facility was provided by CINCPACAF and the Fleet Operation Control Center, Pacific.\(^2\)

\(^{(S)}\) On 6 August an ultra high frequency radio ground station was installed in the ABNCBP to provide direct communication between the ground alert duty officer and the ABNCBP alert aircraft after the ground communications line had been disconnected. It also served as a backup communications link with the ABNCBP in the Hawaii orbit area in the event of an ultra high frequency/multiplex equipment van failure.\(^3\)

\(^{(U)}\) Also in August the installation of an ARA-64 communications equipment in the ABNCBP aircraft was begun. All aircraft were so equipped by September. The ARA-64 provided the ABNCBP with a capability to communicate through non-secure teletype with other similarly equipped aircraft and certain ground entry terminals by means of a communications satellite located in the PACOM area.\(^4\)

\(^{(C)}\) Actions were initiated to provide CINCPAC's ABNCBP with the capability to initiate conferences from prescribed orbit areas using the AUTOVON with the capability for direct dialing at precedence level.\(^5\) Interim measures were taken to provide the capability until the aircraft were modified, which was expected to occur in the spring of 1971.\(^6\)

\(^{(S)}\) In 1969 CINCPAC had established a requirement for a direct hot line patch between COMMANDO ESCORT (CINCPACAF's high frequency/single sideband system) and HICOM (Naval Communications Station) stations on Oahu, Guam, the

\begin{enumerate}
\item J3C1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
\item J625 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70; CINCPAC 061855Z Feb 70.
\item J3C1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
\item J3C1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Aug and Sep 70.
\item J625 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70; JCS 4232/231657Z Oct 70.
\item J625 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70; CSAF 111732Z Dec 70.
\end{enumerate}
ABNCP procedures were updated 15 September to provide the phone patch. Difficulties with procedure encountered during early testing appeared to have been resolved by October.¹

On 16 September the JCS replied, indicating that they concurred with the desirability of providing the CINCPAC ABNCP with increased performance to add needed flexibility and enhance survivability. The proposed exchange would not be accomplished, however, because such exchange, without modifying the "P" aircraft, would seriously degrade the SAC Post-Attack Command and Control System capability, and modification of the aircraft plus logistical and support costs involved in the proposed exchange would require approximately $4 million.³

CINCPAC Organization for Emergency Operations Formed

On 14 September CINCPAC promulgated an instruction outlining the organization to be employed in support of the CINCPAC command centers during major emergencies. The instruction established an Evaluation Group, a Planning Group, and Operations Teams to function in emergencies at the primary CINCPAC Command Center. It also provided for the establishment of a Planning Group and Operations Teams to function at relocation sites, such as the Alternate Command Facility, Kunia, or the Alternate Command Facility, Guam. The Evaluation Group was to be chaired alternately by the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations.

2. J3C1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70, citing CINCPAC 1803252 Z Jun 70.
3. J3C1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70; JCS 1143/1618562 Z Sep 70.
The instruction also described the emergency operations of those groups and teams and the relationship between them and the CINCPAC Command Center Battle Staff organization, the various staff divisions, the Service components, and other supporting agencies. Actions to be taken to insure timely response to a situation as it developed were described, as were procedures for selection and presentation of critical matters, including appropriate recommendations to the CINCPAC and to National Command Authorities.

Survivable High Frequency Communications for Kunia

Based on CINCPAC recommendations in January 1970, for a single hardened high frequency facility for the Alternate Command Facility at Kunia, the Strategic Air Command agreed to transfer certain components of their high frequency facility at Kunia to the Fleet Operations Control Center, Pacific, also at Kunia. The Air Force Chief of Staff approved the action in October, and the local SAC unit effected the transfer.

PACOM Command and Control System Facilities Visited

The second of a series of semi-annual visits by CINCPAC staff members to the command and control facilities throughout the PACOM took place 14-30 June 1970. The program of visits was intended to enhance the effectiveness of the command and control centers. The CINCPAC team emphasized Peacetime Emergency Situation Command and Control Procedures and Emergency Action Procedures. All-Source Information Centers (ASIC) received particular attention. At all ASIC visited there appeared to be, in varying degrees, shortages of personnel (both with respect to numbers and clearances) and adequate communications.

ASIC received guidance in two forms a little later in the year. On 17 September a CINCPAC instruction was promulgated, stating the mission, concept of operations and functions of the ASIC and the responsibility for maintaining and supporting them. The mission of the five ASIC was to "effectively gather, correlate, and display on a near real-time basis, all-source information on land,

1. CINCPACINST 03121.9, 14 Sep 70, Subj: Staff, CINCPAC Organization for Emergency Operations (U); J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
2. CINCPAC 130252Z Jan 70 as referenced in J627 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
3. SAC DOPK 092248Z Oct 70.
4. J3c2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
5. Ibid.
6. CINCPACINST 003100.2 of 17 Sep 70 cited in J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
7. They were located in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines.
sea and air activities and to pass that information vertically and laterally to commanders and authorities on all levels."1

(§) On 28 September a three-day ASIC working conference was held at Camp Smith to review ASIC progress and discuss problems.2 The conference aimed to ensure that all attendees had a complete understanding of the missions and functions of the ASIC and "the spirit and intent of the PACOM ASIC program."3

(§) The third semi-annual visit by CINCPAC staff members to command and control facilities, including ASIC, was conducted from 28 November to 12 December 1970.4 It was the conclusion of the team that personnel at all units visited were well informed on all CINCPAC policies and directives pertaining to command and control during peacetime emergency situations.5 All units visited voiced a requirement for a secure teletype net allowing direct point-to-point communications between CINCPAC, the Service components, and the ASIC.

Defense Department Audit of ADP Operations

(U) An audit of the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) and the Command and Control Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Operations was conducted in the PACOM by the Deputy Comptroller for Internal Audit of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). The draft summary of findings was dated 9 May and the final report on the audit was dated 14 August.6 The review was part

1. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
5. J3C2/Memo/00013-70, Hq CINCPAC, from J3C2 to J3C, 17 Dec 70, Subj: PACOM Command and Control Staff Assistance Team Visit to WESTPAC, 28 Nov - 12 Dec 1970.
6. Ibid.
of a worldwide inter-Service audit of the intelligence and command and control computer operations to evaluate the overall adequacy of ADP management within the IDHS and command and control communities in the PACOM. The review disclosed that CINCPAC had initiated several management actions to improve operational performance. The auditors found, however, that there was insufficient correlation and control over IDHS and command and control ADP operations and requirements in the PACOM. The auditors stated that there was a need for a high-level focal point comprised of representatives of all PACOM activities to approve all new computer applications and validate resource requirements on a coordinated basis.

(U) The auditors noted that the main disagreement with CINCPAC while the matter was under study had been because CINCPAC did not believe he had sufficient authority to establish such a focal point that would correlate, review, and approve PACOM IDHS and command and control ADP system requirements. The auditors stated that JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, and DIA Instruction 65-1 "apparently assign this authority and responsibility to the unified command."1

(€) CINCPAC provided his comments to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.2 He noted that the main thrust of the report centered on the need for increased centralized management to effect optimum correlation and control over IDHS and command and control ADP operations and requirements in the PACOM. CINCPAC agreed with the concept of centralized management as recommended, but "the exercise of Service prerogatives resulting from the lack of explicit instructions to the contrary" and interpretations of guidance in an earlier Defense Department directive "by the Services have impinged upon CINCPAC's efforts to implement improved management procedures for, and control over, ADP operations and requirements in the PACOM."3

(€) CINCPAC next cited certain limitations on his authority and said that any revisions would have to be made by the Defense Department. Until these revisions were received, "it is believed that the commanders of unified and specified commands do not have any firm basis for implementing many of the actions recommended in the Report."4 No changes to CINCPAC's directive action in this regard had been received by the end of the year.

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
ADP for CINCPAC's Subordinate Unified Command Commanders

ADP requirements for COMUS Korea had come under study in 1969. The matter had been raised by the SECDEF, who was to be the approving authority. A statement of Required Operational Capability was prepared and forwarded through both CINCPAC, who concurred in the recommendations, and the JCS, who validated the requirement and forwarded it to the Secretary. Before he would approve the requirement, however, the Secretary asked for additional information on costs, including personnel; an examination of the alternative for meeting the combined requirements of U.S. activities in Korea; an examination of the alternative for meeting the requirements of combined U.S. activities in Korea and Japan; and a cost comparison of these alternatives to include consideration of fixed, transportable, and mobile ADP sites.

CINCPAC asked the CNO to authorize resources of the Naval Command Systems Support Activity (NAVCOSACT) to provide assistance in the study. In June and July 1970 a NAVCOSACT team visited COMUS Korea to render assistance and a draft of their report was completed in November. The substance of the report was that a transportable ADP facility was more economical overall and more feasible from standpoints of military planning and relocatability than a fixed or mobile installation. It was determined not to be feasible or cost effective to use the command and control computer system proposed for COMUS Korea to provide centralized ADP support for any users other than the Yongson Data Processing Center. On 17 December COMUS Korea submitted his ADP proposal to CINCPAC and reaffirmed the validity of the requirement for a Command Information System.

CINCPAC also became involved in the COMUSMACV Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) ADP services contract support in 1970. CORDS had been receiving ADP software support for several years through a sole source, non-competitive contract with the Control Data Corporation. Expenditures for the contract had totaled approximately $8.9 million. The original contract had been established for COMUSMACV by the Advanced Research Projects Agency as a research and development project. Contract action using Navy funds was taken by the contract agency of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the U.S. Army Missile Command. On 1 July 1970 the CNO suggested that consideration be given to the use of Navy contracting facilities for contracts for COMUSMACV ADP services support. On 22 November the CORDS requested CINCPAC validation and approval of

2. J02C Memo/0001, J02C to J04, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Apr 71, Subj: 1970 CINCPAC Command History; draft review.
3. Ibid.
the FY 72 ADP contractual support requirements. On 8 December CINCPAC informed the JCS that limited exposure to CORDS operational requirements precluded validation by this headquarters. He recommended to the JCS that they take validation action and ask the SECDEF to approve the requirement. Upon this approval, CINCPAC would take appropriate action regarding the contract.¹ No further word had been received by the end of the year.

¹. Ibid.
SECTION V - CHANGES IN COMMUNIST MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN 1970

Throughout the rest of this history is a record of activities dominated by force reductions or withdrawals, base closures, and fiscal constraints. The reduced capabilities and restricted readiness of U.S. Forces that resulted appeared in sharp contrast to the strengthening of forces, modernizing of equipment, and proliferation of areas of operations demonstrated by the Communist countries of the PACOM in 1970.

The accompanying tables contain summaries of ground, air, naval, and missile forces in the four countries of principal PACOM concern: the U.S.S.R., Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Comparison of these tables with those that have appeared in CINCPAC Command Histories in previous years reveals the specifics of this evolutionary growth and development.

In 1970 the Asian communist strength in the Far East consisted of

...nearly 3.5 million regular ground troops, organized into at least 179 line divisions and numerous smaller combat support and service units. Over 4,000 combat aircraft, most of which are jets, comprise the communists' aircraft inventory. In addition, there are approximately 280 submarines, six cruisers, about 50 destroyer types, and numerous smaller craft.  

The Soviet Union had been significantly building its Far East military capabilities and its forces in Asia "eventually may be stronger than those deployed in Eastern Europe." Communist China was expected to have a credible nuclear capability in the next few years. Both North Vietnam and North Korea were expected to continue the pressure they were exerting but both continued to be dependent on massive aid from either the U.S.S.R. or China if they were to sustain conventional military operations.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
# COMMUNIST FAR EAST GROUND STRENGTH

## USSR (As of 1 Jan 1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Field Units of Soviet Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Combined Arms Army Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Corps Hqs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Motorized Rifle Divisions (TO 10, 535)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Tank Divisions (TO 8, 566)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Artillery (GSM) Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Rifle Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Army Artillery Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 SS-1 (SCUD) Brigades</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERSONNEL:** 289,000+<br>
*Includes Transbaikal FE Military Districts & Mongolia. Does not include: (a) ground units assigned to territorial air defense (PVO); (b) coastal defense forces of Soviet Navy; (c) ground crews & support elements of the air forces; (d) Internal Security Forces and Border Guard Troops (133,250) & (8,750)

## NORTH KOREA (As of 1 Jan 1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4 Army Group Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Infantry Divisions (TO 9, 297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tank Division (TO 4, 888)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Antiaircraft Artillery Division (TO 3, 507)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Missile Division (TO 5, 009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Infantry Brigades (TO 8, 585)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Artillery Brigade (Howitzer-152mm) (TO 1, 403)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mortar Brigades (Heavy - 160mm) (TO 1, 209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Rocket Launcher Regiments (TO 1, 955)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Artillery Regiment (Howitzer - 152mm) (TO 856)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Reconnaissance Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Medium Tank Regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Heavy Tank Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Independent Infantry Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Army Group Artillery Regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Army Group AAA Regiments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERSONNEL:** Total TOE Strength: 431,547

## CHINA (As of 1 Jan 1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14 ARMIES:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>112 Infantry Divisions (TO 13, 910)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**24 ARTILLERY DIVISIONS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15 Field Artillery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 AT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 AAA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5 ARMORED DIVISIONS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15 Field Artillery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 AT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 AAA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3 CAVALRY DIVISIONS (Security):**

| 107 Fire Support Batteries (TO 5, 710) |
| 107 Fire Support Batteries |

**3 AIRBORNE DIVISIONS:**

| 107 Fire Support Batteries (TO 10, 263) |
| 107 Fire Support Batteries |

**23 BORDER DEFENSE/MS DIVISIONS:**

| 107 Fire Support Batteries (TO 8, 538) |
| 107 Fire Support Batteries |

**11 RAILWAY ENGINEER DIVISIONS:**

| 107 Fire Support Batteries (TO 11, 012) |
| 107 Fire Support Batteries |

**139 INDEPENDENT REGIMENTS:**

**PERSONNEL (Army):** 2,440,500

## NORTH VIETNAM (As of 1 Jan 1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGULAR FORCES (Note 1):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Arty Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 AD Command (15 AD regts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armored Command (2 armored regts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Engineer Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Independent Inf Regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Independent Engr Regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95-40 Independent SAM units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Independent Transit Regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sapper Command (9 sapper bns)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MILITIA:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class I - Full Time Militia Members Armed with Semi and Automatic Weapons and Medium Caliber Arty Weapons.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**SECURITY FORCES:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed Peoples Security Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**PERSONNEL:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>149,600 (Note 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Note 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**

1. Strength does not include approximately 177,000 men deployed outside of North Vietnam.
2. Estimated to consist of 1,600,000 active militiamen of a reserve force of 3,000,000.

*Source: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 27.*
## COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH
### FAR EAST & PACIFIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>USSR #</th>
<th>COMMUNIST CHINA</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
<th>NORTH VIETNAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBMARINES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUCLEAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALLISTIC MISSILE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRUISE MISSILE</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORPEDO ATTACK</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALLISTIC MISSILE</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRUISE MISSILE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG RANGE ATTACK</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED RANGE ATTACK</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHORT RANGE ATTACK (OLD)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDETERMINED TYPE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIGHT CRUISERS (MISSILE)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIGHT CRUISERS (GUN)</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTROYERS (MISSILE)</td>
<td>9&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTROYERS (GUN)</td>
<td>21&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCORTS (DE,PCE)</td>
<td>26&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS AND SUPPORT SHIPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINE WARFARE TYPES</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TYPES</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL AUXILIARY TYPES</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVICE CRAFT TYPES</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL STRENGTH</strong></td>
<td>94,000&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>176,500&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10,200&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,000&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
<sup>a</sup> One in reserve
<sup>b</sup> Eight in reserve
<sup>c</sup> Three in reserve
<sup>d</sup> Does not include personnel in Naval Aviation.
<sup>e</sup> Coastal defense, or training
<sup*f</sup> Does not include 25,400 personnel of Naval Air Force
<sup>f</sup> Possibly includes Naval Infantry and Coast Defense personnel
<sup>g</sup> Included in Auxiliary Count

**SOURCE:** PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 30.
# SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR 6</th>
<th>CHINA 6</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA 6</th>
<th>NORTH VIETNAM 5</th>
<th>TOTAL 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMBAT AIRCRAFT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fighter (D)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>2944</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>388 (Day &amp; A/W)</td>
<td>247 (Day &amp; A/W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fighter (A/W)</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
<td>1019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Attack</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Light Bomber</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Medium Bomber</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Heavy Bomber</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston Bomber</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>237</td>
<td></td>
<td>1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUPPORT AIRCRAFT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston Transport, Light</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piston Transport, Medium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Transport, Medium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turboprop Transport, Medium</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turboprop Transport, Light</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Trainer</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recce, Jet</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recce, Turboprop</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recce, Prop</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>157</td>
<td></td>
<td>1041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT</td>
<td>1560</td>
<td>3088</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>3368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL COMBAT SUPPORT</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PERSONNEL STRENGTHS 6</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>283,000</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td>345,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes:
1. Includes aircraft within Transbaikal & Far East Military Districts & all bomber aircraft attached to the 3rd Long Range Air Army (Transbaikal, Far East & Turkestan Military Districts).
2. COMBAT AIRCRAFT: All aircraft assigned to operational units in support of the combat mission, including light and medium transports, helicopters, all types of recon/surveillance aircraft, all types of utility/transport aircraft, & jet fighter trainers.
3. COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT: All other aircraft assigned to operational units in support of the combat mission, including light and medium transports, helicopters, all types of recon/surveillance aircraft, all types of utility/transport aircraft, & jet fighter trainers.
4. Includes 159,300 personnel assigned to A/C & W, SAM & AAA units.
5. Includes 8300 men in training.

---

## SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>USSR #</th>
<th>CHINESE COMMUNIST</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
<th>NORTH VIETNAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sites</td>
<td>Launchers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>as of 1 Dec 70</td>
<td>as of 10 Dec 70</td>
<td>as of 1 Dec 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURFACE TO SURFACE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COASTAL DEFENSE</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>12-20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>256</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURFACE TO AIR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-2</td>
<td>165a</td>
<td>990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-3</td>
<td>47b</td>
<td>188</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-5</td>
<td>21-35</td>
<td>126-210</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71, p. 31.
SECTION VI - U.S. BASE REQUIREMENTS OVERSEAS

Overseas Base Requirements and Reductions and U.S. Strategy

(‡S) CINCPAC had long acknowledged that there would be fewer U.S. bases overseas for many reasons. The "Nixon Doctrine" would place greater reliance on the forces and efforts of friendly countries to help themselves. Budget constraints, growing tighter, would impact heavily as forces and facilities were reduced. (Missions, however, had not yet changed drastically.) And a trend that had begun some years ago continued—many "friendly" countries still wanted U.S. money and U.S. business, but they didn't want our military bases, or at least not so many of them.

(‡S) For a number of reasons CINCPAC considered fewer bases in some areas desirable, but he believed that reductions should be based on missions still assigned rather than on the desire of one or another of the Services to meet an arbitrary cutback without regard for the impact such cuts had on the other Services, on foreign forces, or on our defense posture overall.

(‡S) By late 1970 CINCPAC was able to envision which major bases would still be active and available by about FY 73.1 It was anticipated that retained bases in Japan would include a naval installation at Sasebo, an airbase at Yokota, a Marine installation at Iwakuni, and Army logistics functions at Sagami and certain ammunition storage areas.

(‡S) In Korea the withdrawal of sizable U.S. forces would have reduced requirements to possibly four major airbases (Kunsan, Osan, Kwang-ju, and Taegu), logistical complexes at Inchon and Pusan, and camps and station facilities for the major elements of one U.S. division in the Seoul-Demilitarized Zone area.

(‡S) Okinawa was expected to remain as the major U.S. operational and logistical bastion in the Western Pacific. Even with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan and the relocation of Japan Self-Defense Forces to Okinawa, only Naha Air Base was expected to cease to operate under U.S. control.

(‡S) In the RVN it was envisioned that only one major port and airfield would be under U.S. control and the forces phased down to a MAAG type effort headquartered in the Saigon-Long Binh area. In Thailand all major U.S. operated bases were expected to be phased out except for U-Tapao Air Base and possibly Nakhon Phom Air Base and the port facility at Sattahip.

---


TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

(7) In the Republic of the Philippines the United States was expected to have relinquished control of all major facilities except Clark Air Base and the naval facility at Subic Bay. In the Republic of China the only major facility was expected to be Ching Chuan Kang Air Base.

(7) Completion of all of these reductions would leave a total of 34 major U.S. bases in the PACOM. Re-entry rights to 15 bases could increase this total to 49 in the event of a contingency. Key re-entry rights bases included Itazuke, Atsugi, and Yokosuka, Japan and Naha, Okinawa.¹

(7) CINCPAC considered the impact of these base reductions significant. The reductions would decrease CINCPAC's ability to react in a timely manner to future military situations affecting international peace in the Pacific, particularly the ability to respond to PUEBLO and EC-121 type incidents. The new posture would degrade U.S. logistic support structure to a level at which support of operational requirements, particularly contingencies, was infeasible without extensive and time-consuming reestablishment of closed or released facilities. It would limit flexibility for handling deploying units, lengthen closure times of units and requisite material, and invalidate the operational readiness envisioned in contingency plans. And, among a number of other factors, it would degrade the visible U.S. deterrent to a level at which allies would doubt the U.S. ability to meet security commitments and potential enemies would be emboldened to risk expanded insurgencies.²

(7) CINCPAC believed that the reductions, some precipitous, would impact on planning at every level, to include national strategy.

(7) In this regard, the JCS in August outlined proposed overseas base closures in Japan and requested CINCPAC's comments and recommendations on the impacts on national strategy that could result.³ CINCPAC replied that it was "apparent that adjustment will be required in PACOM strategy to make it compatible with this significant loss of basing capability."⁴ The projected loss of bases, CINCPAC continued, represented a "significant acceleration of the planned orderly transition to an 'offshore posture' outlined in our current strategy."⁵

(7) The strategy guidance from the SECDEF, CINCPAC noted, established the priority of U.S. military posture in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. JCS 312045Z Aug 70, cited in CINCPAC 052155Z Sep 70.
4. CINCPAC 052155Z Sep 70.
5. Ibid.
Yet the probability of U.S. involvement, based on the national objective of assisting in the self-defense efforts of selected countries, appears much more likely in the Western Pacific than in Europe. It is true that our Pacific alliances are less broad, less committal as to specifics than NATO, but, for these reasons, they are more difficult media through which to reflect our intent. By virtue of its vast geography alone, the PACOM presents difficult challenges in providing strong, flexible and responsive military forces capable of meeting our avowed commitments. Reductions and policy adjustments have already raised serious doubts in the minds of our Asian allies as to the extent of our resolve. As the Vietnam withdrawal continues, the additional reductions and redeployments proposed... [by the JCS] can only serve to increase the magnitude of these doubts.

.... The significant successes experienced in the Pacific since WW II, attributable in considerable degree to the presence of a credible U.S. deterrent military force closely interwoven with the U.S. political and military objectives in the Pacific will eventually be negated if the erosion of the PACOM force posture continues as currently proposed. Many of our allies are struggling to achieve stability and are just beginning to realize a military capability which can contribute productively to a regional defense. They must continue to look to us for material support and will require appreciable U.S. presence and assistance for some time to come. Underlying this need is the fact that the integrity and nature of our resolve depends on how the U.S. military posture appears to the Asians - both allies and potential belligerents. In view of the essentiality of a continued substantial presence in the Pacific to U.S. credibility, especially during the test of the Nixon Doctrine in SEA, any readjustment of bases and forces should preserve a credible posture throughout the PACOM, visibly capable of meeting our commitments in the near term and guarding against even more significant political-military risks in the long term.

.... The realities of the fiscal climate are recognized as are the problems associated with force and base tradeoffs;

1. Ibid.
however, the base closures proposed...[by the JCS] may preclude the capability to support the large force deployments required by realistic contingency plans. The long term availability of ready base complexes to support PACOM contingencies must not be dependent upon the moods and whims of a host country. For example, in the event of a major Northeast Asian contingency the requirement for Japanese bases is critical; however, re-entry rights are subject to concession or veto.¹

(TS) CINCPAC then outlined the major logistic and operational shortcomings that would impact on... if the closures recommended by the JCS in their August message were effected. Then he concluded:

... In summary, while the base adjustment plans of the Services reflect the determination of the Services to accomplish required budgetary savings, the Unified Commander should be included early in the development stages of force posture adjustment planning to insure that all of the impacts upon his command are fully considered. Base reductions appear inescapable in view of the current fiscal climate; however, it remains a matter of deep concern that the magnitude of reductions proposed by... the JCS] may not retain a PACOM posture capable of supporting existing U.S. strategy in the Pacific Theater. It is essential that government-to-government agreements which formally release U.S. government facilities and installations in Japan to the Japanese contain effective guarantees for U.S. re-entry rights and activities in the event of actual or anticipated need.²

United States Bases in Japan

(§) Long before severe budget constraints began impacting on the PACOM, CINCPAC had kept a continuous watch on base requirements overseas to keep them at the minimum necessary. One major study in this regard was made in July and August 1968 by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and CINCPAC with a view to determining what could be realistically accomplished in meeting political pressures and reducing local annoyances associated with U.S. facilities and installations.³ It was determined that 54 separate bases and facilities could be released or relocated. These comprised some 54,000 acres, or almost half of all the land we were using in Japan at that time.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
SECRET

By mid-1970, 26 of the 54 facilities had been disposed of.¹ Some had been released entirely (17), some partially (two), some released with usage rights retained (three), and some relocated within Japan (four). This left 128 U.S. facilities in Japan. In the matter of the released facilities, the U.S. Ambassador expressed the view that although only 26 of the proposals had been implemented, the objective of the study had been achieved. The remaining proposals required political and funding decisions on the part of the Japanese Government and rapid progress was not expected.²

Meanwhile, the Services continued with other plans to close bases and reduce forces in Japan, principally as the result of severe budget restrictions.

The U.S. Ambassador to Japan expressed deep concern over these Service-by-Service reductions of facilities in August 1970. He said there appeared to be "a 'pell-mell,' meat-axe treatment" of the reductions that would shock the Japanese Government, play into the hands of those who say the United States ignores Japan's interests and makes unilateral decisions, and give the impression of "US disengagement if not rout" from the Far East.³

The Ambassador pointed out that a coordinated approach was necessary in order to preclude the risk of highly adverse repercussions on the security relationship between the two governments. He acknowledged the inevitability of cutbacks but he wanted to obtain Washington approval to develop the most efficient and economical package of U.S. military facilities for existing and future contingencies. He also wanted to assure, by means of consultations with the Japanese Government and with the mutual security treaty as a cornerstone, that the "US-Japan relationship will survive as [the] 'linchpin for peace in Asia.'"⁴

The JCS responded by initiating joint action to review Service reduction proposals and the Secretary of Defense directed that future actions with respect to Japan were to be carefully planned and coordinated between the Defense and State Departments.⁵ On 31 August the JCS provided CINCPAC with a list of Service proposals and asked for comments on their impact on operations and plans.⁶ After consulting with his component commanders, CINCPAC forwarded his remarks to the JCS early in September.⁷

---

1. Most of these (25) in 1969.
3. Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Sep 70, Subj: Bases and Forces Adjustments in Japan and Okinawa FY 71 - FY 75.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. JCS 312045Z Aug 70.
7. ADMIN CINCPAC 021940Z Sep 70.
CINCPAC said that the force reductions attendant with the proposed force relocations represented a "significant reduction from the pre-SEAsia PACOM force posture." The timely ability to react to future military situations in the PACOM would become increasingly more difficult as the reductions are effected, he said, and "the accompanying risks in the long term may serve to embolden potential belligerents in the PACOM area." He continued that degradation of the U.S. logistics structure in Japan could render support of operational requirements, particularly contingencies, infeasible.

CINCPAC noted a tendency in the Service proposals to consolidate and centralize facilities, actions that may be cost effective but that "seriously increase the U.S. vulnerability to both enemy actions and changes to host country political policies." CINCPAC then listed a number of specific ways the proposals would impact on existing plans and programs. He specifically noted the need for medical support until U.S. combat forces had been redeployed from Southeast Asia. He recommended that medical support, which cuts across Service lines and should not be programmed strictly on a Service basis, should be coordinated by CINCPAC in conjunction with his component commanders to insure an orderly reduction and permit flexibility.

CINCPAC highlighted the problem of the heavy reliance placed on the willingness of the Government of Japan to return released facilities in the event of a major contingency in Northeast Asia. He said:

Although the GOJ [Government of Japan] has recognized the importance of the security of the ROC [Republic of China] and the ROK [Republic of Korea] to their own security, there is no assurance that threats to these two countries will be viewed in the same context as that of the U.S. This factor as well as our decreasing military capabilities in Asia will not go unnoticed by our allies as well as potential belligerents. Finally, the substantial conflicts inherent in the unilaterally conceived Service proposals emphasize the requisite to include the unified commander in the early stages of force posture adjustment planning.

A brief summary of some of the Service reduction proposals follows.

The Army's Pacific Logistic Operations-Streamline (PALOS) plan envisioned final termination of Army logistic activities in Japan by the end of

---

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Fiscal Year 1973. By that time the Army units in Mainland Japan would be limited to a small headquarters and Army Security Agency personnel.\(^1\)

(\$) The Navy proposed the virtual closure of Yokosuka Naval Base and Atsugi Naval Air Station. The Navy plan envisaged centering Seventh Fleet support in Northeast Asia at Sasebo and antisubmarine warfare patrols at the Marine Corps Air Station at Iwakuni (and Naha Air Base, Okinawa). The proposed reductions, all to be accomplished in Fiscal Year 1971, would result in manpower savings of about 3,000 military, 300 U.S. civilians, and 7,000 foreign nationals.\(^2\)

(\$) The Marine Corps planned on maintaining its existing force deployments through Fiscal Year 1975. During Fiscal Year 1971 an additional 2,000-man Marine Air Group was to deploy from Vietnam to the Marine Corps Air Station at Iwakuni.\(^3\)

(\$) The Air Force's plan called for relocating the F-4 wing at Yokota to Kadena (Okinawa), returning all but one squadron of F-105s programmed for Kadena to the Continental United States, relocating the F-4 wing from Misawa to Korea, making Misawa into an air station, inactivating the tactical airlift wing (C-130s) and fighter-interceptor squadron (F-102s) at Naha (Okinawa), and returning Itazuke Air Base to the Government of Japan. The plan, if approved, would save about 5,000 Air Force manpower spaces. F-4 deployments in Northeast Asia would consist of a wing in Korea and one in Okinawa.\(^4\)

(\$) By the end of the year many of the proposed reductions had been approved by both the Defense and State Departments. Approvals had been given for reductions and relocation of units from Misawa, Yokota, Itazuke, Atsugi, Yokosuka, Kamiseya, Camp Drake, and Naha (Okinawa).\(^5\) Personnel reductions possible by the completion of these actions would involve 15,832 military personnel, 458 civilians, and 10,118 Local National employees.\(^6\)

(\$) In one incidental matter regarding all of this base reduction planning, CINCPAC was asked in August to send a couple of officers to assist in preparation

---
1. Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Sep 70, Subj: Bases and Force Adjustments in Japan and Okinawa, FY 71 - FY 75.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
of a study on the review of requirements being prepared by the JCS Directorate for Plans. An officer from J5 and one from J4 assisted with the project in Washington. The final paper prepared by that group was sent to CINCPAC for comment prior to being addressed by the JCS, a precedent setting procedure that had been frequently recommended by CINCPAC but never practiced.1

Use of Atsugi Naval Air Station Shared with Japan Civil Aviation

(6) On 9 June COMUS Japan informed CINCPAC that the Japanese Government, through the facilities sub-committee of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee, had requested that commercial and private aircraft sponsored by the Japanese Civil Aviation Board be permitted to use Atsugi Naval Air Station to alleviate overburdened conditions at Haneda International Airport during the Japan International Exposition (Expo 70). The Japanese asked for use of the air station by up to 10 aircraft per day during the spring and September, and up to 20 aircraft a day during the summer months.2 At the same time there were indications that the Japan Civil Aviation Board would construct an expensive terminal facility and would shift some domestic traffic to Atsugi from Haneda, which gave rise to speculation that civil use of the air station would not terminate at the end of Expo 70.3

(6) COMUS Japan proposed to deny the request based on considerations related to operational commitments, flight safety, and security requirements. CINCPACFLT concurred with the plan to deny use, stating that such use was not in the best interests of the United States, but he proposed that the option should be left open to explore joint use with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces after Expo 70 closed.4 CINCPAC concurred with the denial proposal.5

(6) The American Embassy in Tokyo, however, asked that notification to the facilities sub-committee be withheld and the Ambassador briefed on the rationale for denying the request from the Civil Aviation Board.6 Subsequent to this request the Secretary of State requested the status of the Japanese proposal7 and CINCPAC dispatched queries to COMUS Japan and CINCPACFLT to obtain data with which to reply.

1. J5124 History, HQ CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70; JCS 8425/262312Z Aug 70.
2. COMUSJAPAN 090701Z Jun 70.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPACFLT NO3083/121911Z Jun 70.
5. CINCPAC 140733Z Jun 70.
6. AMEMBASSY Tokyo 4367/150838Z Jun 70.
7. SECSTATE 099390/232305Z Jun 70.
(S) On 25 June COMUS Japan advised that revised Japanese requirements had resulted in a proposal for short term use to relieve Haneda congestion that could be arranged without jeopardizing U.S. operations or security. He asked for CINCPAC approval to notify the Japanese that up to six flights a day could be accommodated during the Expo 70 period. CINCPACFLT concurred, stating that Embassy officials were confident that commercial use of Atsugi could be confined to the remainder of Expo 70 and that the Ambassador agreed that some accommodation to the Japanese problem was highly desirable and would pay dividends for the United States in the long term.

(G) On 27 June CINCPAC concurred in the decision to grant joint use and notified all concerned.

Ryukyus Reversion Plans Continue

(U) In November 1969 it was agreed that the Ryukyu Islands would be returned to the administrative control of Japan sometime in 1972. Although most of the planning for return was being accomplished on the diplomatic level through State Department channels, CINCPAC retained a vital interest in the negotiation of matters involving military bases and the future role of Okinawa, whether used by U.S. or Japanese forces for defense in the Western Pacific. Since World War II the United States had built one of the most formidable staging areas and arsenals in the world on the island of Okinawa and many U.S. plans for the defense of the free countries of Asia were based on the use of such forward bases. Although return of the islands to Japanese administrative control would not require the relinquishment of all U.S. facilities immediately, the Japanese had already requested that many U.S. built and operated facilities be turned over to them after reversion for either military or civilian use. Many other areas that were the subject of negotiations. Some of these in which CINCPAC had special interest are discussed below.

(S) Inherent in the planning was the mutual desire of the two countries to accomplish early reversion without detriment to the security of the Far East. Specific arrangements on which some agreement was reached in 1970 envisaged the assumption by Japan of responsibility for air defense (to include surface-to-air

---

1. COMUSJAPAN 250920Z Jun 70.
2. CINCPACFLT 260111Z Jun 70.
3. CINCPAC 270443Z Jun 70; Point Paper, J512, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Jun 70, Subj: Joint Use of Portions of NAS Atsugi by Japanese Commercial and Private Aircraft (U).
missiles and aircraft control and warning), internal security, maritime patrol, air traffic control, and search and rescue operations.\footnote{1}{CINCPAC supported the gradual assumption of defense responsibility by the Japan Self-Defense Forces. CINCPAC study of the matter acknowledged the eventual requirement for U.S. Forces to make space and facilities available for Japanese forces on U.S. controlled property.\footnote{2}{CINCPAC was striving to avoid a net loss in regionally oriented defense capability by preserving the integrity of a regionally oriented combat ready force with required logistical support. A CINCPAC paper on this subject, approved with minor modifications by the JCS, recommended specifically the accommodation of Japanese forces for air, internal, maritime, and coastal defense.}}

\footnote{\S}{When CINCPAC had tasked his component commanders for input to this study, CINCPACAF requested deferment based on consideration being given to the effects of future budget impacts on the Air Force’s program for Okinawa and the completion of a study on Marine Air Group basing on Okinawa.\footnote{3}{CINCPAC denied the request for deferment, however.\footnote{4}{CINCPAC noted that the transfer of defense responsibility was only one aspect of overall reversion negotiations and that these aspects were interrelated and must progress at a coordinated rate to insure culmination in an acceptable and timely agreement. CINCPAC agreed to the difficulty of identifying specific facilities in a fluid budgetary environment, but he noted that turbulence in fiscal matters was expected to continue into the post-reversion period and identification of facilities could not wait for a stabilized budget climate. CINCPAC stated that identification of facilities would complement U.S. planning for Okinawa and more clearly establish those remaining facilities that would be available for U.S. Forces. “Regardless of whether current Service force programs for Okinawa remain unchanged, JSDF accommodation under the terms stated...must be accomplished even though some U.S. unit dislocations may result.”\footnote{5}{The CINCPAC study, as forwarded to the JCS, made several specific recommendations.\footnote{6}{For air defense it was recommended that an Air Self-Defense Unit...}}}}}

\footnote{1}{Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Sep 70, Subj: Military Aspects of Okinawa Reversion Negotiations.}
\footnote{2}{Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Sep 70, Subj: JSDF Assumption of Defense Responsibility for Okinawa (U); CINCPAC 042148Z Feb 70.}
\footnote{3}{CINCPACAF 310341Z Jul 70.}
\footnote{4}{CINCPAC 032209Z Aug 70.}
\footnote{5}{Ibid.}
\footnote{6}{CINCPAC Ltr 512, Ser 001461, dated 15 May 70 cited in J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.}
Force F-104 squadron be accommodated at Naha Air Base, which was to be vacated by USAF termination of F-102 air defense operations, and by phased turnover of surface-to-air missile and aircraft control and warning sites. Phased introduction of Japanese forces for internal defense was considered for facilities vacated by U.S. Army units at Naha Wheel (adjacent to Naha Port) and Camp Boone. Facilities for the displaced U.S. force were to be constructed at Japanese expense, the CINCPAC study recommended. For maritime defense, Japanese units could be accommodated at U.S. holdings at Naha Air Base and White Beach, provided the Japanese Government constructed additional facilities.1

(§) The study concluded that Japan Self-Defense Forces could assume complete responsibility for air defense by January 1975, for internal defense at the time of reversion, and for maritime defense when required facilities were constructed.2

(§) The matter of planning for air defense received still further attention in 1970. When the Japan Self-Defense Forces planned their initial deployments, information about which was forwarded to CINCPAC by the United States Military Representative to the Okinawa Negotiating Team, it appeared that deployment of surface-to-air missile units prior to the first quarter of Calendar Year 1975 was unlikely.3

(§) CINCPAC, commenting on these plans, stated:

The timing of the proposed deployment of air defense SAM units is undesirable. Our negotiating position should be one which encourages the earliest possible JSDF assumption of the SAM role at an appropriate level of defense.

Recognizing that the JASDF assumption of the air defense role is subject to negotiation, any adjustments should favor an accelerated program rather than slippage. In that SAM introduction

1. Point Paper, J5124, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Sep 70, Subj: JSDF Assumption of Defense Responsibility for Okinawa (U); CINCPAC 0421482 Feb 70.
2. Ibid.
3. J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
involves site-for-site replacement and use of now vacant sites, consideration should be given to pre-reversion deployment as the US negotiating position.\(^1\)

\(^3\) Plans for the deployment of Japanese forces had not become firm by the end of the year. In the meantime, to facilitate planning for the transfer of air defense, COMUS Japan advised CINCPAC that a joint U.S.-Japanese planning group would be formed. The Commanding General of the Fifth Air Force was designated to act as the executive agent for the development of detailed plans and, as such, would chair the Air Defense Planning Group.\(^2\)

\(^5\) CINCPAC concurred with establishment of the Air Defense Planning Group and advised COMUS Japan and the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus that he supported the transfer to Japan of the air defense responsibility for Okinawa as soon as possible after reversion. "In view of PACOM forces programmed to be located on Okinawa, it is essential that final arrangements provide adequate air defense capability,"\(^3\) CINCPAC noted. He asked COMUS Japan to furnish periodic reports of the progress of this and other reversion planning groups.\(^4\)

\(^7\) CINCPAC's logistics staff also continued to study the matter of bases and facilities to be used to accommodate planned Japanese forces deployments. After a review of stated Japanese requirements and a comparison of those requirements with the facilities and areas proposed for Japanese use by the component commands, CINCPAC prepared his recommendations for the JCS.\(^5\) He recommended that this study be used as a "definitive guideline on which to base U.S. actions and U.S.-GOJ negotiations."\(^6\) CINCPAC recommended that U.S. Services that were acting as hosts for facilities that were to be made available to Japanese forces continue in that capacity until they were relieved of that responsibility by the Japanese and that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces provide the necessary resources to accomplish host functions at those bases where they were to be the dominant user.

\(^9\) CINCPAC also discussed the funding arrangements for construction of replacement facilities for U.S. Forces vacating facilities that were to be used by the Japanese, as well as funding for security and maintenance of facilities

1. CINCPAC 130446Z May 70.
2. COMUSJAPAN 100900Z Sep 70; J5126 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
3. CINCPAC 200004Z Sep 70.
4. CINCPAC 012011Z Nov 70.
6. Ibid.
allocated for Japanese forces that would be vacated by U.S. Forces prior to reversion.¹

(§) On 12 November the JCS endorsed CINCPAC's study and recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve it for use by the negotiators.²

(§) In the matter of funding all of these moves and changes associated with reversion, the Secretary of State advised CINCPAC in May that, as a result of negotiation between the two governments, Japan had agreed to pay $200 million in agreed goods and services to cover U.S. military relocation costs and other costs incident to the reversion.³

The $200 million credit was to be limited to general expenditures and all funds were to be obligated not later than five years after the date of reversion. Such compensation could be received only in Japan or in Okinawa after reversion.³

(§) Costs the United States would have to identify to be compensated for included relocation costs of military units on Okinawa, military relocation costs for U.S. units moved off Okinawa as a result of the deployment of Japanese forces to Okinawa, increased operating costs on Okinawa as a result of reversion, increased operating expenses elsewhere as a result of reversion, and costs resulting from the changed legal status of the Ryukyus after reversion.⁴

(§) CINCPAC asked his component commanders to begin gathering data on the status of military holdings, increased operating costs to be incurred, goods and services desired as compensation, and the timing of receipt of the compensation. CINCPAC did not ask that such data be submitted, however, as he considered it premature to submit such data to the JCS because of the lack of specific details on the terms of reversion, the absence of a final position on Japanese force deployments, ⁵

1. Ibid.
2. J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
3. J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70, citing SECSTATE 073229/132359Z May 70.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
(5) As planning continued, CINCPAC compiled a statement on proposed construction or modification of facilities and the costs involved and forwarded it to the JCS on 6 December. Projects were submitted for weapons rebasing ($2.8 million), replacement facilities necessitated by initial Japanese Self-Defense Force deployments ($2.19 million), replacement facilities necessitated by follow-on Japanese deployments ($10 million), support for the 173d Airborne Brigade ($10.3 million), and major follow-on requirements ($55.3 million).  

(5) CINCPAC said, "It should be understood that the personnel support projects included herein, as well as operational type, are highly credible requirements and warrant full support." CINCPAC noted that while he continued to "strongly recommend" that construction requirements be financed from the Japanese $200 million, "there appears to be no alternative but to request initial funding from MILCON [Military Construction] contingency funds for the projects with the most critical design and construction lead-times." He continued that any MILCON funds so used should be replaced in kind when Japanese compensation became available. He also noted that other projects may be necessary as reversion occurs and U.S. and Japanese requirements are further identified.

(6) CINCPAC was involved with a number of other specific studies or actions regarding individual facilities. One matter involved construction of a military port facility at Machinato and another concerned the Machinato-Naha housing area.

(6) Throughout the year certain U.S. leased real estate and U.S. owned improvements were being considered for release to private land owners or the Ryukyuan Government by the U.S. Army. Because of the anticipated role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces on Okinawa, CINCPAC notified COMUS Japan that any

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 062249Z Dec 70.
4. CINCPAC 062249Z Dec 70.
5. Ibid.
6. J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
7. J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
such proposed release should be carefully screened to determine if it might satisfy requirements for Japanese forces.¹

While there was great concern for accommodating Japanese forces, the United States was also greatly concerned with maintaining for U.S. use such military facilities and areas as were required for mutual security, under the terms of the treaty of mutual security and cooperation in effect between the two countries.² Many questions in this regard remained unanswered at the end of the year.

1. CINCPAC 1422422 Feb 70; J5124 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
3. Ibid.
(S) CINCPAC submitted the plan to the JCS on 15 June.  As explained by the action officer:

The major elements of CINCPAC's plan were supported by the JCS and were used as the basis of the JCS recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 10 July.3

(U) Since July the problem had been under continuous study within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and, at JCS request, CINCPAC submitted comments and recommendations on several other possible solutions. At year's end, however, a final decision had not been made by the Secretary of Defense.

Closure of Sangley Point Naval Station in the Philippines

(S) On 10 December 1970 the United States announced that Sangley Point Naval Station in the Philippines would be closed and relinquished to the Philippine Government within seven to nine months.4 Target date for the turnover was 30 June 1971, but the selection of that date had been predicated on anticipation of announcement of the closure about two months earlier than it had been made. CINCPAC noted that the slippage did not invalidate the desire to close Sangley on the date anticipated, but neither did it "invalidate the need for flexibility in the estimated time frame for implementation."5

(S) One big problem, as far as CINCPAC was concerned, was associated with re-entry rights. The U.S. Ambassador had recommended against asking for such rights for political reasons. CINCPAC, however, believed that obtaining re-entry

3. JCSM-343-70 of 10 Jul 70.
5. CINCPAC 220032Z Nov 70.
rights in the agreement for relinquishment remained valid for long-range objectives. He believed that failure to obtain Philippine recognition of the need for re-entry in contingencies would probably be "tantamount to permanent closure...."¹ And he believed that re-entry rights could be obtained under the existing Military Bases Agreement if the Philippine Government agreed to list Sangley in Annex B of the Military Bases Agreement.

(§) The State and Defense Departments concurred with the opinion of the U.S. Ambassador to the extent that a formal demand to negotiate for re-entry rights should not be made. The two Departments envisioned obtaining re-entry rights under the provisions of the Military Bases Agreement as recommended by CINCPAC, but in the event Philippine negotiators balked or found it impossible to agree, the State and Defense Departments would not be prepared to force the issue.² President Marcos had not agreed to granting re-entry rights, but he agreed to further discussion on the subject.

(§) When the matter was raised again President Marcos was negative about it and the Ambassador requested authority to withdraw the request for re-entry rights. CINCPAC told the JCS that his requirement remained valid but that in view of the Ambassador's strong objections he would accept the Ambassador's judgment. He again outlined the rationale for use of the base and concluded "the loss of Sangley without some assurances of mutually agreed re-entry will reduce CINCPAC's ability to respond to contingency requirements."³ The Ambassador informed President Marcos that the United States would not seek re-entry rights.⁴

Re-entry Rights to Relinquished Bases

(§) As CINCPAC considered the matter of relinquishing military bases and facilities throughout the PACOM he also studied the matter of possible re-entry and use of those bases and facilities in the event of actual or anticipated need in the future. The JCS concurred that re-entry rights negotiations for use of bases in contingency operations and as weather safe havens should be accomplished concurrently with finalization of base closure planning. In September the JCS asked CINCPAC and the CINC of the Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) to identify those bases or facilities in the Western Pacific area for which re-entry rights would be required should the facility be closed by the parent Service.⁵ They

1. CINCPAC 190334Z Nov 70.
2. Point Paper, J5125, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Dec 70, Subj: Closure of NAVSTA Sangley Point (U).
3. CINCPAC 210315Z Dec 70.
4. J5125 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
5. JCS 1091/152241Z Sep 70.
also asked that CINCPAC expand on his requirement for re-entry rights in Japan as outlined by him in a message on that subject on 5 September.¹

(5) CINCPAC replied on 7 October.² He noted that "PACOM operations and logistic support plans cannot be predicated upon utilization, within a short span, of many WESTPAC bases after their closure."³ He recognized that there would be long delays for obtaining re-entry agreements from host country governments and for reconstituting skilled work forces, logistic supplies, and ordnance stocks. "Relinquishment of some WESTPAC bases to the host governments will probably be tantamount to permanent closure due to future changes which could occur in the physical characteristics of the facilities and/or the need to relocate host country personnel from those facilities upon which they could become dependent."⁴ Nevertheless, CINCPAC believed, "any future decisions on closure of WESTPAC facilities should explicitly assess the need for re-entry rights."⁵

(5) CINCPAC then discussed re-entry rights for SAC aircraft at certain air bases. Such rights were not necessary for Anderson on Guam because Guam was U.S. territory. Re-entry rights for SAC aircraft at U-Tapao, Thailand and Kadena, Okinawa were not yet necessary because there were no known plans to close those bases. Re-entry rights were recommended for SAC aircraft, however, for Takhli, Thailand and Ching Chuan Kang, Taiwan. CINCPAC cited several operation plans that can be supported by SAC aircraft employed from those bases. He noted that he had previously recommended that Okinawa reversion proceedings include assurance for re-entry of B-52 aircraft to Kadena. CINCPAC had reevaluated that position, however, and he considered that re-entry of B-52 aircraft to Kadena should not be a subject entered into the ongoing negotiations "because of the U.S. plans to retain Kadena as a primary "all U.S." base."⁶ If the U.S. were to discuss this matter,

(5) CINCPAC then listed the PACOM bases for which there were definite closure plans and for which re-entry rights were recommended. He cautioned that omission of bases from this listing should not be construed as invalidating requirements for other bases that were listed in U.S. Base Requirements Overseas.

1. CINCPAC 052155Z Sep 70.
2. CINCPAC 070249Z Oct 70.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
SECRET

§ In Japan CINCPAC recommended re-entry rights at the Yokosuka complex, to support Seventh Fleet and tactical air operations; Itazuke to support intra-theater air lines of communication; Ikego ammunition storage for prepositioned war reserve munitions; Sagami Depot for the rebuilding of armored vehicles, communications-electronic equipment, and general supply; and the Naval Hospital at Yokosuka, the Camp Asaka (Drake) Hospital, and the Kishine Barracks Hospital to provide adequate bed capacity.1

§ Re-entry rights were also recommended for the Naval Station at Sangley Point in the Philippines in support of large scale contingencies, or antisubmarine warfare operations and the United States-Philippine plan for the mutual defense of the Philippines.2

§ CINCPAC concluded that closure and disposition plans for bases or facilities in the Republic of Vietnam, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea were in a state of flux due to ongoing changes in force levels and redeployments. "When base closure plans in these countries become more firmly established, re-entry rights can be recommended."3

Diego Garcia

(U) In December the United States and Great Britain publicly announced a decision to build a communications facility on the British island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.4

§ CINCPAC had long advocated construction on Diego Garcia, and he envisioned a need for a much larger and more complex facility than the austere communications site that was finally funded.5

(U) As reported in the press, the facility would be staffed by 250 personnel and would cost the United States under $29 million. The main purpose of the station was to be for satellite communications, it was reported, but an airstrip and ship anchorage were to be constructed to serve the facility. No substantial increase in the size of the U.S. fleet in the area was contemplated; two destroyers and a seaplane tender were based in the Persian Gulf.6

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid. See item on the closure of Sangley elsewhere in this chapter for information on the denial of re-entry rights to that base.
3. CINCPAC 070249/2 Oct 70.
The station would be the first U.S. installation on an ocean that touched most of the developing nations of eastern Africa and the southern flanks of the Middle-East and Southwest Asia. It was an area in which Soviet naval power had increased markedly in recent years.

Reindeer Station, as the facility was called, would differ in scope from the kind of facility that had been authorized but not funded by the Congress. As funded, the facility would have reduced dredging, reduced POL, and substitution of a mooring/fuel buoy and pontoon causeway for the pier. The Commander of Naval Communications was designated as major claimant for the base instead of the Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet.1

Although Diego Garcia was just outside the PACOM, it was strategically important to CINCPAC in the discharge of his duties in the Eastern Indian Ocean area and in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC believed that Diego Garcia should serve as a base for several purposes: from which to conduct reconnaissance surveillance, to facilitate both air and sea antisubmarine warfare operations that could be vital to maintenance of control of sea lanes between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and staging and to serve as a base from which forces could be staged through the Pacific into the Indian Ocean area in support of operations by other unified commanders, and for communications-electronics support necessary for the other requirements listed here and to facilitate reliable communication between the PACOM and friendly forces in adjacent areas.2

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) continued to be a subject of much CINCPAC interest in 1970.3 The location of the islands, also known as Micronesia, gave them central strategic importance to the United States, particularly as other locations for overseas bases came under increasing scrutiny as the subject of reduction or relocation actions. Basic to U.S. strategic use of the TTPI, however, was the matter of creation of a permanent political affiliation with the TTPI. Although such political matters were outside of CINCPAC's direct responsibility, the divisions between political and military matters were

---
2. Ibid.
not always completely clear and CINCPAC had several channels through which he could make his opinions heard.

6) The United States came to be in the TTPI as a trustee for the United Nations following World War II. The trusteeship agreement allowed the United States to establish military bases in the TTPI and station armed forces there, if necessary, in the maintenance of international peace and security.1 The United States had since sought to form a permanent political affiliation which would insure preservation of the U.S. right for access to Micronesian lands for strategic purposes. The Micronesians, on the other hand, had continued to press to maintain an option for independence. They also desired full control of their lands.2 Negotiations between representatives of the United States and Micronesia, held in the spring of 1970, resulted in the U.S. position being presented to the Congress of Micronesia. On 20 August the Congress of Micronesia adopted resolutions that rejected the U.S. position in its existing form but in essence left the way open for further negotiations toward a compromise. The next session of the Congress was to convene early in 1971.

(C) CINCPAC believed that the United States should develop negotiating options or acceptable compromise positions. An example would be to allow the Micronesians self-government in free association with the United States in return for specified U.S. rights to Micronesian land for strategic purposes. Under this option a period of time could be established after which either side could opt out of the agreement.3

(C) CINCPAC also thought it might be appropriate to increase Defense Department participation in the Program of Action sponsored by the National Security Council's Undersecretaries Committee. This was a program to further Micronesian development and enhance the U.S. image in the TTPI. Ways in which CINCPAC believed U.S. participation might be heightened included an increase in the number of Civic Action Teams (discussed later), a more visible U.S. Navy presence to keep out foreign fishing vessels, provision of excess Navy ships to bolster inter-island transportation, aid to communication, and increased medical and dental support.4

(S) In May CINCPAC was briefed by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Public Land Management.5 (The Secretary of the Interior had been assigned

2. Point Paper, J5155, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Sep 70, Subj: Political Status of the TTPI (U).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. J5155 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
responsibility for the civil administration of the TTPI by Executive Order in May 1962.) The Assistant Secretary briefed CINCPAC on various aspects of negotiations. He indicated that land and free association were still the central points of Micronesian concern. He believed that the military could possibly improve the U.S. position by three actions. One was to review the need for military retention areas with a view toward defining those required, and specifying which could be returned to the TTPI government. The second was to assist in transporting excess material from Southeast Asia to the TTPI. The third was to set aside some land at Tanapag Harbor, Saipan for exclusive civilian use, although Tanapag was a Navy retention area. These and other possible areas of CINCPAC action are discussed elsewhere in this item.

(S) Regarding overall basing requirements, CINCPAC had completed a study in the summer of 1969 that outlined possible use of various islands in the TTPI. In 1970 the JCS completed a similar study that was approved in final form on 9 November. The JCS study envisioned using essentially the same islands for military bases as CINCPAC had the year before. These were Guam, Tinian, Saipan, Babelthuap, Malakal, Rota, and Peleliu. Another similarity between the two studies was that both were based on the assumption that the United States would lose military base rights in the forward Asian-Pacific area. Neither study considered the conclusions reached as the only conclusions, acknowledging that PACOM basing was dynamic and specific requirements would be dependent on the situation at a given time.

(U) A discussion of some specific base development or base use questions raised in 1970 follows. In January CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF to coordinate with the Naval Facilities Engineering Command in the Pacific to prepare a "license" for joint military and civilian use of the military retention area at Isley Field on Saipan. The "license" was to be drafted in accordance with the Isley Field Use and Occupancy Agreement and was to include a provision for termination either by mutual consent of the Secretaries of Defense and Interior or termination on behalf of the United States by the Secretary of Defense in the event of a war or national emergency. The High Commissioner of the Trust Territory had requested use of Isley Field to accommodate expanded commercial aviation operations in the Trust Territory. The JCS advised that action by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Isley Field license was being held in abeyance pending a plan by

2. Ibid.
4. Point Paper, J5155, Hq CINCPAC, 17 Dec 70, Subj: TTPI.
5. CINCPAC 140122Z Jan 70; J42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
the Secretary of the Interior to rehabilitate the airfield.\footnote{1}

(U) Also in January the Navy Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific proposed to "license" the use of Northfield on Moen Island for use by commercial aviation.\footnote{2} CINCPAC concurred.\footnote{3}

(\$) In May the Secretary of Defense raised the question of releasing military retention lands in the Truk Islands, the most populous district in the TTPI.\footnote{4} The Secretary noted that military presence in the TTPI appeared to be a significant deterrent to Micronesian association with the United States under terms giving the United States the right of eminent domain. He acknowledged that a comprehensive, definitive statement of future Defense Department land requirements in the TTPI did not appear feasible or desirable at that time, but he suggested that a selective, voluntary release by the Defense Department of certain military retention areas that were not essential to meet specific, projected military requirements would accomplish a number of things. It would decrease concern over military involvement in the District concerned, provide a concrete demonstration that the Department's probable future requirements were not necessarily expanding or of such extent as to warrant concern throughout the TTPI. An unsolicited return, the Secretary said, in the context of other actions and statements by the United States, "should help to alleviate some Micronesian misgivings over eminent domain."\footnote{5} The Secretary noted that if any favorable political results were to be achieved from returning the Truk retention areas, timely action was essential.

(\$) CINCPAC asked his component commanders about their specific military requirements in the Truk retention areas.\footnote{6} CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF responded that they had no requirements that would preclude termination of existing use and occupancy agreements.\footnote{7} CINCPACFLT voiced no objection to termination of the agreements provided that access and re-entry rights were retained to permit future use of Moen Airfield.\footnote{8}

(\$) CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the Truk retention areas be released.\footnote{9} He did not mention the CINCPACFLT proviso because the United States had

1. JCS 231542Z Sep 70.
2. PACNAVFACENGCOM 150323Z Jan 70.
3. CINCPAC 290007Z Jan 70.
4. SECDEF 8977/151650Z May 70; Moen Island was in the Truk group.
5. SECDEF 8977/151650Z May 70.
6. CINCPAC 230413Z May 70.
7. CINCUSARPAC 270301Z May 70; CINCPACAF 280418Z May 70.
8. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 282258Z May 70.
9. CINCPAC 301952Z May 70.
the right of entry to Truk for strategic contingencies and stipulation for such rights as a condition of release of the area in question would nullify the intended purpose of the release. The Chief of Naval Operations directed the Pacific Naval Facilities Engineering Command, the Navy real estate agent in the Pacific, to release the Navy retention areas at Moen Airfield and the radio station.

Another area under discussion was the retention land around Tanapag Harbor, Saipan. On 11 June CINCPAC received a letter from the Deputy High Commissioner of the TTPI concerning this area. Several areas that had been identified for possible future military use were discussed in the letter; the Deputy High Commissioner explained why certain of these areas were extremely desirable for civilian use because of their prime potential for resort development. In the Micro Beach area, he said, for the past 25 years "the park at the tip of Puntan Muchot has been a favorite recreation area for the whole island community." The main point of disagreement between TTPI officials and military representatives was over these prime areas. CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT for his comments. On 12 August the High Commissioner of the TTPI was advised that CINCPAC concurred in the release of Micro Beach for commercial development. At the same time CINCPACFLT was requested to obtain concurrence from the Chief of Naval Operations for the release of the beach.

In November CINCPAC received a message from his Representative in Guam/TTPI proposing that the United States begin a minimum base buildup in the Marianas because he believed this would have a strong and beneficial impact on U.S.-Micronesian relationships. He noted that the Marianas and Guam were the hub of future military base plans in the area, that the economy on Guam was booming, and that there was observable economic growth on Saipan. These conditions would add up to an ever increasing demand for the military to either declare its requirements or turn the land over for civilian use. The CINCPAC Representative acknowledged that Service money for construction was in short supply, but that the work begun could be an incremental part of a long-range plan.

CINCPAC replied that while he agreed in principle with the suggestion, he believed that it should be held in abeyance so as not to "preempt any

1. Ibid.
2. Ltr, Deputy High Commissioner, TTPI to CINCPAC, 11 Jun 70, n.s.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 122241Z Aug 70.
5. CINCPAC 122240Z Aug 70.
6. CINCPACREP GUAM-TTPI 090445Z Nov 70.
7. Ibid.
favorable effect the recently elected Marianas faction of the Congress of Micronesia could have on the Congress in terms of current US efforts. Also time must be allowed for identification of military requirements in the TPPI in light of fiscal constraints and future base rights denials elsewhere in the Pacific.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Communications circuit requirements came under study in 1970. CINCPAC was tasked in May to comment on a basing concept report prepared by the JCS and the Services.\(^2\) In addition, CINCPAC was asked to provide supporting communications data to the JCS to include total intra-island, inter-island, and out-of-area circuit requirements by island for the various basing patterns contained in the report. CINCPAC provided his comments on 15 July and then on 31 July forwarded a statement on communications requirements.\(^3\) There had been no time for CINCPAC to develop communications requirements to support basing requirements for possible new alternatives he introduced on 15 July, but there would be a continuing need for adjustment as plans evolved.

\(^2\) Military civic action programs had been begun in 1969 with the introduction of U.S. Navy Seabee teams into the TPPI. CINCPAC believed that such efforts would create much good will and at the same time provide needed facilities and improvements.\(^4\) Plans had been formulated in 1969 to provide civic action teams from all the Services, and by the end of 1970 both Army and Air Force teams were in the TPPI, along with the Navy Seabee teams.\(^5\) Palau District legislators had been reluctant to request a civic action team in 1969, but the Palau legislature adopted resolutions on 19 February 1970 requesting a team to assist in the construction of sports facilities for the 1971 Micronesian Olympics and other projects that may be requested by the various municipalities. The Department of the Interior then requested that a team be provided for Palau and one was.\(^6\)

\(^3\) In other civic action matters, the TPPI participated in the Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency Program for material declared excess in Southeast Asia. The TPPI had been given a high priority in the program, following immediately after the Republic of Vietnam and coming before Military

1. CINCPAC 212038Z Nov 70.
2. J613 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70 citing MJCS 229-70 of 12 Jun 70.
3. J613 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70 citing CINCPAC Ltr Ser 000240 of 15 Jul 70 and CINCPAC Ltr Ser 000269 of 31 Jul 70.
5. Point Paper, J41M, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Dec 70, Subj: Military Civic Action in the TPPI (U).
Assistance Program requirements. The TTPI, by December, had requisitioned material with a total value of over $3.6 million, with that government obligated to pay packing, crating, handling, and transportation charges of 7.5 percent. The TTPI established a liaison office on Okinawa with the 2d Logistics Command to more effectively participate in the Utilization and Redistribution Program.\(^1\)

\((\text{U})\) In still another civic action matter, 1970 saw completion of a 1969 program to provide the Department of the Interior with six U.S. Navy LCU-type (Landing-craft, utility) vessels on a loan basis. The last two arrived at the ship repair facility on Guam on 30 July and were readied for turnover. Each of the six districts in the TTPI received one such ship as a result.\(^2\)

\((\text{U})\) A few minor actions regarding the TTPI in 1970 included granting permission to Air Micronesia to turn in some surplus aircraft because civil search and rescue responsibility for the area involved was the responsibility of CINCPACFLT and the Commander of the 14th Coast Guard District, not the commercial firm;\(^3\) the CINCPAC Representative was assigned additional duty as Department of Defense Conservation Coordinator;\(^4\) and CINCPAC coordinated the joint-Service effort to pack and ship 37 donated hospital beds from Hawaii to the Majuro and Ebeye Hospitals in the Marshalls.\(^5\)

---

1. Point Paper, J41M, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Dec 70, Subj: Military Civic Action in the TTPI (U).
2. Ibid.
3. J5155 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70; CINCPAC 0404432 Mar 70.
4. J5 Brief No. 67-70, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Apr 70 of JCS 2326/72-1, Subj: Assignment of the CINCPAC Representative on Guam and in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands as the Department of Defense Conservation Coordinator (U).
5. J5155 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70; CINCPAC 2005222 Jun 70.
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION VII - PLANNING

Changing Foreign Policy and Its Impact on Planning

(U) President Nixon, on 19 February 1970, submitted to the Congress a "State of the World" message in which he outlined U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's. This statement included concepts from many previous Presidential pronouncements, principally the basic concept of the "Nixon Doctrine" as espoused by the President on Guam in July 1969: the commitment of U.S. resources, both financial and human, would be more cautious and our allies would be asked to share burdens more fully than before.¹

(U) Although the President addressed the matter of foreign policy worldwide, only those matters of principal interest to CINCPAC will be discussed here. The approach to Asia would recognize that the United States remained involved, that there was a growing sense of Asian identity and concrete action toward Asian cooperation, and that the responsibility once borne by the United States could now be shared. In the matter of defense, the President said the United States would keep all of its treaty commitments. He said the U.S. would provide a nuclear shield if an ally or a nation we considered vital to our security was threatened by a nuclear power. When other types of aggression occurred, the United States would furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate, but the United States would look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing manpower for its own defense.

(U) The President said that the partnership the United States sought included not only defense, but economic and political assistance. He cited many of the advances in these fields made by Asian nations and some goals still not achieved.

(U) Discussing issues for the future, the President said that American response in Asian conflicts would require careful study in each case. He said that the strength of our Asian policy depended not only on the strength of our partnership with our allies in Asia but on our relations with China and the U.S.S.R.; peace would be endangered by a Sino-Soviet conflict whether it involved the United States or not. He noted that we sought to aid the momentum of Asian regional cooperation without supplanting Asian direction of the effort.

¹ J5 Brief No. 36-70, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Mar 70 of JCS 2498/1, Subj: United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's - A New Strategy for Peace.

UNCLASSIFIED

95
(U) Any President, he said, had two principal obligations in regard to national defense: to be certain that our military preparations deterred aggression, but that they did so in such a way that they did not provoke an arms race that might threaten the very security we sought to protect. He said that four factors had a special relevance in shaping our military posture: military and arms control issues, forward planning, national priorities, and integrated planning.

(U) The President had already reestablished the National Security Council system as the principal forum for Presidential consideration of foreign policy issues. In matters of defense planning, for controlling the defense posture, a Defense Program Review Committee had been established within the Council's structure to review major defense, fiscal, policy, and program issues in terms of their strategic, diplomatic, political, and economic implications and advise the Council and the President on their findings.

(U) The President defined his requirements for general purposes forces to be maintained to fight a "one and one-half war" strategy, which he said was an effort to harmonize doctrine and capability. This force would be adequate, he said, for simultaneously meeting a major communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere. To meet the requirements for this strategy the United States would maintain the required ground and supporting tactical air forces in Europe and Asia, together with naval and air forces. At the same time the United States would retain adequate active forces in addition to a full complement of reserve forces based in the United States.

(U) The foreign policy statement ended with a detailed definition of the peace sought by the United States. The President said that peace required confidence and partnership, peace must be just, peace required strength, peace must be generous, peace must be shared, and peace must be practical.

(U) It was clear that this foreign policy and previously announced budget reductions would result in even further belt tightening by the military forces with attendant closing of more military bases. CINCPAC had a number of studies in progress within his headquarters to develop meaningful strategy, forces, and

---

1. In discussing how he reached this decision on general purpose forces, the President said that the National Security Council had examined five different strategies for such forces and related each to the domestic programs that could be supported simultaneously. For the first time national security and domestic priorities were considered together and two strategies were rejected because they would have thwarted vital domestic programs.
bases in anticipation of base and force reductions.\textsuperscript{1} Certain of the conclusions reached as a result of these studies are discussed in this section of the history.

**Impact on Planning of Reductions in Defense Expenditures**

\textsuperscript{2} Reduced Defense Department expenditures provided the most profound influence on PACOM planning and operations in 1970. The base closures that resulted from these budget cuts had both operational and long-range strategic impacts; these were discussed in the preceding section on U.S. base requirements overseas.

\textsuperscript{3} CINCPAC was asked in October to provide the JCS with a statement on the impact that force level reductions and fiscal restraints would have on operational capabilities as of 1 November 1970.\textsuperscript{2} CINCPAC sent his comments to the JCS on 21 October,\textsuperscript{3} noting that he did not limit his remarks only to the immediate time frame in the interest of providing a more meaningful assessment of CINCPAC capabilities versus commitments. A summary of CINCPAC's comments follows.

\textsuperscript{4} First CINCPAC addressed the accelerating withdrawal of our forces from Southeast Asia. A more detailed discussion of these remarks appears in Chapter IV of this history. He then outlined the effect of the cuts on specific types of ships and aircraft in considerable detail and he noted that the PACOM reserve had not been reconstituted at full strength nor was such anticipated in the near future, probably not until budget cuts and a reduced draft level were overcome. He said, "Without a reconstituted reserve of significant size CINCPAC's capability to rapidly respond to contingency situations is greatly diluted."\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{5} CINCPAC Operation Plans adversely affected by budget actions included those for general war and PACOM actions in the event of a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict (CINCPAC OPplans 5001 and 5043), in which forces were to be sent from the PACOM to the European Command. Force reductions already scheduled, CINCPAC noted, "will preclude the availability of the foregoing level of forces."\textsuperscript{5} Should the means be found to disengage PACOM forces committed to Europe and

\begin{itemize}
  \item J5 Brief No. 36-70, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Mar 70, of JCS 2498/1, Subj: United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's - A New Strategy for Peace.
  \item JCS 3195/100001Z Oct 70.
  \item CINCPAC 212233Z Oct 70.
  \item Ibid.
  \item Ibid.
\end{itemize}
redeploy them in an acceptable amount of time,

any remaining ground forces in the PACOM could be left in an untenable position. With virtually all US surface and air transport capability dedicated to the movement of troops and equipment to NATO, residual US forces in Asia would be hard-pressed to carry out the CINCPAC assigned missions to defend vital areas of the PACOM against attack and to maintain control of essential bases and lines of communication.\(^1\)

(TS) Other adversely affected CINCPAC plans were concerned with maritime activities. (These were OPlan\(\text{----}\), Control of Maritime Traffic Ranging from Harrassment of Communist Shipping to a Blockade (S) and OPlan\(\text{----}\), ASW and Control and Protection of U.S. and Allied Shipping Throughout the Atlantic and Pacific (U)). CINCPAC noted that the formidable Soviet submarine force seriously threatened the CINCPAC mission to control maritime traffic, assure the safe arrival of shipping, deny the enemy the use of his submarines, and protect the United States from attack through the Pacific. Antisubmarine warfare forces had already been reduced to the extent that adequate protection for U.S. commercial shipping would be delayed until augmentation forces were available. "The active ASW forces must be committed primarily to the defense of the CONUS, and to naval forces and military convoys."\(^2\)
was affected to the extent it reduced "PACOM capability to react to NK military actions."

CINCPAC then outlined the impact reductions would have on execution of the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) and on theater forces for the execution of SIOP and other plans. Further, CINCPAC discussed the Military Assistance Program and the effect of reduced Military Assistance funding on the readiness and operational capabilities of allied forces. Finally he discussed the impact of funding reductions on intelligence, personnel, logistics, and communications activities in the PACOM.

CINCPAC summarized as follows:

...a reasonable interpretation of the impacts and trends outlined above is that the current reductions have already placed the Pacific Command near the margin of acceptable risk with regard to US power, influence and prestige in the Far East. The following specific dangers are all heightened by the budget restraints.

.... Allied and non-aligned nations hedging their security prospects by accommodating to one or both of the major communist powers.

.... Increasing host nation pressures on US bases and rights in the Western Pacific as a function of their decreased certainty of the value of US commitments.

.... Increased Communist initiatives as they sense a developing power vacuum. Miscalculations could dramatically heighten East-West tensions and the likelihood of nuclear warfare.

.... For the more distant future, Japan might be encouraged to pursue foreign, economic, or military policies highly inimical to US interests.

.... Serious reduction of the range of options for responses by PACOM General Purpose non-nuclear forces to contingencies in the Pacific area. The alternatives seem to be limited in many cases which can be postulated to be nuclear responses or withdrawal.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
Joint Forces Memorandum for FY 72-79

The Joint Forces Memorandum for Fiscal Years 1972-1979 was a JCS portrayal of force posture recommendations responsive to fiscal and logistic guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense for the period FY 72-79. This memorandum allocated forces to geographic areas where the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan just listed worldwide totals. The memorandum also provided a statement of risks associated with the constrained force levels. In April the JCS accorded CINCPAC the opportunity to comment on the draft memorandum.

CINCPAC said that the general assessment of military risks associated with the premised force posture was considered valid, but that the constrained forces as outlined in the memorandum were "cause for deep concern." CINCPAC continued, "In full recognition of the Nixon Doctrine and the strategic guidance provided the PACOM, there nevertheless remains a binding commitment to come to the assistance of our allies." He noted that the strategy in which PACOM forces must augment European and Atlantic Command forces under certain circumstances would leave the remaining CINCPAC assigned forces with "virtually no capability to effectively respond to a minor aggression."

In the matter of ground forces, CINCPAC noted that reductions severely limited PACOM's flexibility and the ability to meet the requirement for forward defense in the event of overt Chinese or Soviet aggression in Asia. CINCPAC remarked that the mission of the Navy in the PACOM remained unchanged. He noted that it appeared that the constrained force in the memorandum maintained the capability to land the amphibious forces deployed in the Western Pacific, but the capability of this constrained force to support these forces and to provide transport for back-up forces was extremely limited. The ASW mission in the PACOM was "beyond the capability of the constrained ASW forces." CINCPAC noted that forces being deployed from the PACOM to Europe would present a lucrative target that might invite attack, preemptive or otherwise, and in view of the paucity of ASW forces the risks associated with redeployment was considered "extremely high."

1. J5 Brief No. 000107-70, Hq CINCPAC, 21 May 70, of Joint Force Memorandum FY 72-79 (JFM-72).
2. JCS 5714/102049Z Apr 70.
3. CINCPAC 250322Z Apr 70.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
(TS) Regarding Air Forces, the reduction of tactical air forces "greatly reduces CINCPAC's capability to react responsively to a major contingency due to time required to get augmentation forces in action. Augmentation forces must be deployed from CONUS after the decision is made to make such forces available. The deterrence value of the constrained PACOM tactical air forces is questionable."1

(TS) Strategy guidance assumptions were discussed in the memorandum and CINCPAC noted that the statements of risk appeared to address the major areas of concern from the view of the threat posed by enemy forces, but the risk statements did not include the possibility of simultaneous aggression in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. "This possibility is not remote and should be recognized as a high risk situation...."2

(TS) The Joint Force Memorandum FY 72-79, as distributed by the JCS in May, differed in several respects for the PACOM from the draft that had been furnished earlier3 for comment. Principal deployed general purpose forces for the PACOM are listed below.4 These constrained forces are greatly less than current mid-range objective force levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73-76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>1 1/3 Division</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1 Division</td>
<td>1/3 Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>1 Division (only 1/3 Division had been listed in 1st draft)</td>
<td>1 Division (see note for FY 72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/3 Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTPAC only: CVA/CVAN</td>
<td>2 + 1 Part Time (only 2 had been listed on 1st draft)</td>
<td>2 + 1 Part Time (see note for FY 72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
Navy (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73-76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS/SSN</td>
<td>9 (11-1/2 had been listed on 1st draft)</td>
<td>9 (see note for FY 72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MIDPAC/EASTPAC were not shown in the memorandum.

Air Force

Fighter/Attack Squadron (24 aircraft per squadron):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73-76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>6 1/4 (150 aircraft)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td>8 1/4 (198 aircraft)</td>
<td>10 (240 aircraft) (one less squadron than in 1st draft)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (18 aircraft per squadron):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73-76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>2 (36 aircraft)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td>2 (36 aircraft)</td>
<td>2 (36 aircraft) (one less squadron than in 1st draft)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marine Corps

WESTPAC only:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73-76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
<td>6/9</td>
<td>6/9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MIDPAC/EASTPAC were not shown in the memorandum.

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

(U) The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) was an annual publication of the JCS. It provided the principal military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense for a specified eight-year period. It was prepared in two main parts: Volume I, Strategic Concept and Force Planning, and Volume II, Analyses and Force Tabulations. What had been previously termed Volume III, Free World Forces, was published for the period FY 73-80 as Book VII of Volume II.

(U) In February the JCS asked CINCPAC to provide his views and comments to be used in the revision of JSOP Volume I for Fiscal Years 1973-1980. They also stated that a strategy guidance memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense dated 28 January should be considered in the CINCPAC submission.1 The PACOM Service components submissions were considered in preparation of a response to the JCS.

(TS) CINCPAC provided his comments on 28 March, beginning with a statement of his fundamental position on the subject. CINCPAC believed that the United States should maintain a firm, positive posture in the PACOM "backed by adequate military capabilities to provide a strong and constant deterrent influence by virtue of a visible military presence throughout the area."2 CINCPAC continued:

This presence must be such as to permit the timely and selective application of military power in the degree required at any critical point in support of U.S. national objectives. Inherent in maintaining an appropriate military presence in an area the size of the PACOM is the need for forces with the highest degree of mobility, flexibility, versatility and readiness and a carefully planned deployment of these forces, including an adequate, forward logistic posture to support them.3

(TS) CINCPAC then commented on the difficulties involved when two basic strategy documents were being studied: the JSOP draft and the Deputy Secretary of Defense's strategy guidance memorandum. CINCPAC noted that each addressed the same subject but they were not wholly consistent with each other as "different words, phrases, and terms are used when addressing a particular area or subject."4 CINCPAC cited an example of this. He then noted that most of the differences were subtle, but the fact that there were differences "provides opportunities for varying interpretations. Wherever possible, wording differences should be resolved."5 The JSOP, CINCPAC believed, should continue to be a product of military judgment, accompanied as appropriate by statements of the risks associated with strategy determinations promulgated by higher authority when such determinations did not conform to military judgment. Within this context, CINCPAC offered certain specific recommendations regarding wording to be used in JSOP Volume I.

(TS) CINCPAC endorsed specifically the caveats and evaluations of military risk as they pertained to the PACOM, particularly:

1. J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
2. CINCPAC 280337Z Mar 70.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
...the recognition of the serious military risk in planning to rely upon disengagement of substantial U.S. forces conducting operations against CPR forces in order to meet requirements for the initial defense of NATO...the increased risk of CPR aggression by U.S. failing to provide for simultaneous defense of NEA and SEA, and...the risk in accepting the supposition that simultaneous major aggression in Europe and Asia are highly unlikely.\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{(TS)} CINCPAC recommended an individual appraisal and statement of U.S. objectives for each country in Southeast Asia to place their varying problems in better context. Although the countries of Southeast Asia formed an entity geographically, the nature of subversion and aggression varied from country to country. The importance of Laos to U.S. success in the Republic of Vietnam and ultimately to all Southeast Asia, CINCPAC noted, "has only recently been emphasized by responsible U.S. officials."\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{(TS)} CINCPAC recommended the following wording:

... The interrelationships of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), Thailand, Laos and Cambodia require that these countries be treated as integral parts of the same problem in controlling the expansion of communism. In Southeast Asia the first objective is to allow the people to determine their own future without outside interference. As one means of achieving this objective, the U.S. assists selected countries to defend themselves individually and collectively against military and political threats through improvement of their military capabilities. The second objective, to the extent that it is compatible with the first, is to reduce the scope of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{3}

He then outlined our individual goals for the countries of Southeast Asia to counter the threats posed to them by communism.

\textsuperscript{(TS)} The JCS published Volume I for the JSOP FY 73-80 in June.\textsuperscript{4} The differences between the volume as published and the same volume the year before are

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Ibid.} Abbreviations used in this quotation from the JCS paper had meanings as follows: CPR, Chinese People's Republic; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; NEA, Northeast Asia; and SEA, Southeast Asia.

\textsuperscript{2} CINCPAC 280337Z Mar 70.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}

briefly summarized here. The variances in principle were few and were conditioned by the Nixon Doctrine. The military objectives indicated that hostilities would be terminated "under conditions of relative advantage to the US rather than under conditions advantageous to the US, while limiting damage."1 This inferred that a higher level of damage to the United States may be acceptable as long as it was less than that which accrued to the other side.

(TS) The global appraisal included recognition that overseas deployments and a supporting base structure would continue but not necessarily at existing levels or locations. "There will continue to be domestic and/or foreign pressures to reduce US force levels; reduce overseas deployments; and restrict US transit rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements."2

(TS) The post-Vietnam posture in the Pacific indicated that the forward deployment of U.S. forces would continue to be desirable in the Western Pacific and that as a minimum a strategy of offshore containment would be required.

In view of this, the post-hostilities posture for the United States should provide for:

.... Advisory, logistic, security, and combat forces and facilities in the Republic of Korea;

.... Military assistance forces to the extent required in Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam:

.... Backup-ready forces in the United States; and

.... Facilities and materiel in forward areas to permit rapid employment and support for US and allied forces.3

(TS) The section for force planning guidance was essentially the same as it had been the year before.

(TS) In the evaluation of military risks involved in the strategy and force planning guidance one matter that was of continuing interest to CINCPAC was

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
discussed. Under certain circumstances forces were to be redeployed from the PACOM to Europe. The JCS discussion of the matter contained the following:

Forces redeployed from Asia in the event of concurrent aggression by the Warsaw Pact and the CPR may not be able to contribute effectively to the defense of NATO because:

(1) Disengagement of forces, particularly land forces, is hazardous and cannot be done quickly.

(2) The availability of airlift and sealift resources would be severely restricted by concurrent requirements to move forces from CONUS to Europe.

(3) The USSR would be an Asian enemy as well as a European enemy and would pose a threat to the west coast of the US as well as US possessions in the Pacific.

(4) Forces in the process of redeployment would be vulnerable to attack by USSR Forces based in Asia.

(5) Redeployment of tactical aircraft would require extensive use of tanker aircraft, thus removing them from their primary task of supporting strategic bombers at a time when a high state of strategic readiness will be required.

(6) The reduction of US Forces participating in combined operations in Asia could increase significantly the vulnerability of residual US and allied forces.¹

(TS) In March 1970 CINCPAC received Volume II of JSOP 72-79. This was the volume concerned with Analyses and Force Tabulations of U.S. Forces. In their cover letter to the Secretary of Defense the JCS recognized that fiscal realities may preclude attainment of objective force levels. In that case judgments would have to be made between "(1) maintaining national commitments and strategy, and (2) modifying commitments and strategy so that they are commensurate with our ability to fulfill them within prudent levels of risk.² The JCS also reaffirmed their belief that adoption of the new strategic concept and force planning guidance in the face of a growing Soviet threat, without a commensurate reduction in U.S. commitments, involved substantial risk to the attainment of national security objectives.

¹ Ibid.
TOP SECRET

The JSOP 73-80 force level objectives reflected numerous changes from the listings in JSOP 72-79, mostly reductions. As a rule specific objective force levels for the PACOM could not be determined as all forces worldwide were listed. For CINCPAC's general purpose land forces, however, his force objective of 4 1/3 Army division force equivalents and two Marine Expeditionary Forces was reduced by 2/3 of an Army division force equivalent in the Republic of Korea.1

When CINCPAC had submitted his input to Volume II for JSOP 72-79 he had noted that certain requirements were tentative and required further study. One concerned certain USAF offensive missiles. Further study of this matter by CINCPACAF affirmed the same total offensive missile force but with different composition and phasing. CINCPAC recognized the CINCPACAF submission, subject to comments about the threat and the survivability of the missiles, as a suitable basis for further development of the Air Force's submission for the next JSOP.2 Also, the CINCPAC submission for Volume II for JSOP 72-79 included in the general purpose air forces portion certain new and invalidated planning factors with respect to counter-air and interdiction requirements that were not defined clearly. CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF to develop further planning factors, including interdiction restrike requirements, and to provide them for the next JSOP cycle. CINCPACAF did so and forwarded the results to CINCPAC, who validated the planning methodology that had been developed.3

CINCPAC anticipated that the suspense for preparation of the Volume II submissions for FY 73-80 would be less than 60 days and provided preliminary guidance to his Service components. On 20 June he received Volume I for FY 73-80 on which to base his Volume II submissions and on 30 June he received guidelines on preparation from the JCS.4

CINCPAC's Volume II submission, PACOM Objective Force Levels and Contingency Force Requirements, was furnished to the JCS on 11 August.5 In his letter transmitting the voluminous document, CINCPAC noted:

It is considered significant that the number and composition of the General Purpose Forces for the contingency situations, both last year and this year, require more than the active duty objective force levels recommended by the JCS in JSOP 72-79 in

1. Ibid.
2. J5156 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ltr, CINCPAC to Distribution List, 11 Aug 70, Subj: PACOM Objective Force Levels and Contingency Force Requirements (For JSOP FY 73-80, Volume II) (U).
some instances. With a conventional weapons strategy, there could be few, if any, uncommitted General Purpose Land and Air Forces for maintenance of an adequate force posture elsewhere. A situation of this type could invite other contingencies for which there would be few if any forces available other than Strategic Offensive and Defensive and some General Purpose Navy Forces.¹

(U) CINCPAC also noted that time allowed for preparation of the submission had been reduced from a programmed 62 days to 46 days. He felt that the full time programmed was required and requested that in the future commanders be allowed the full time programmed for completion of the annual inputs.

(§) The document contained seven of eight major sections. The seven contained the basis for U.S. force requirements and the scenarios used to develop U.S. contingency force requirements; strategic offensive and defensive objective force levels; general purpose land, air, and Navy forces; PACOM force requirements for independent contingency situations in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia; airlift and sealift objective levels; and certain mobilization planning requirements.²

(U) The eighth section, concerning Free World Forces, was forwarded separately on 14 August.³ This "book" was now part of Volume II; formerly it had been Volume III of the JSOP. CINCPAC based his submission on inputs from the 14 country representatives as coordinated by the Service component commands. The submission updated force structure information for Free World Forces and recommended objective levels for the period under study. (Although this section is identified here as the eighth part of JSOP Volume II, it in fact was Book VII, of eight books. The mobilization planning requirements listed above comprised Book VIII.)

(©) In 1970 CINCPAC staff members worked on one part of an annex to the JSOP that had not been published previously. It was to be Part II of Annex A, which was the intelligence annex. The new document was to address specific intelligence activities in terms of dollars and manpower by fiscal year throughout the JSOP timeframe and was to identify and discuss major intelligence issues that could be related to these specific activities. It was also to contain statements

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
of risk that would include intelligence gaps or deficiencies likely to occur or continue and which were associated with each of the recommendations or major intelligence issues contained in the document. CINCPAC representatives attended a planning conference held by the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington in August. CINCPAC then tasked his component commands and the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center for inputs on the program elements under their cognizance for forwarding to the JCS.1

**The Swing Strategy**

(U) In March CINCPAC was given the opportunity to comment on a study forwarded to him by the JCS, either in connection with his submission for JSOP FY 73-80 or separately. CINCPAC elected to comment separately rather than to add to the workload involved in preparation of the JSOP submission.2

(TS) The study involved the swing strategy, a matter on which CINCPAC had often commented before to the JCS. It involved the movement of forces from Asia to Europe to meet contingency situations. The overall conclusions of the study were that the swing of forces from Asia to Europe with a 60-day closure objective was not feasible even under optimum conditions with the lift resources programmed for FY 72 and that the swing strategy was extremely time sensitive, depending heavily for its success on political warning of a Warsaw Pact attack in Europe and on an early decision to mobilize U.S. Forces.

(TS) On 9 June CINCPAC provided his views to the JCS on the study.3 CINCPAC concurred in the conclusions reached. He also expressed concern at the exposure and vulnerability of remaining forces in Asia if significant forces should be disengaged and redeployed to Europe, as well as concern about the capabilities of the forces remaining in Asia. In addition, he expressed concern about the impact such redeployments might have on Asian allies. CINCPAC concurred in the logistic limitations outlined and recommended study of the possibility of employing allied shipping to augment U.S. lift capability. Finally, he validated the implied requirement to achieve higher levels of readiness of Reserve components in order to minimize the number of forces that would have to be disengaged in Asia and redeployed to Europe.

**Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan**

(TS) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) was the short range document in the Joint Program for Planning. Its purpose was to provide guidance

---

1. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
2. J5156 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
3. Ibid., citing CINCPAC Ltr 000192 of 9 Jun 70.
to the commanders of the unified and specified commands and the chiefs of the Military Services for the accomplishment of military tasks based on capabilities during the year covered by the study. It was published by the JCS in two volumes, the first dealing with strategic considerations and concepts, planning guidance, and tasks assigned to the unified and specified commanders. The second volume listed combat forces available for planning purposes in accomplishing the assigned tasks.

(15) Volume I of the JSCP for Fiscal Year 1971 was published on 7 April 1970, about 3-1/2 months later than usual because there were several issues under contention.1 The strategic concept changes or modifications principally reflected implementation of the Nixon Doctrine and the programmed reductions in military spending. There was no change in the policy that operations in defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would still take precedence over operations in Asia. Basic military objectives remained the same but increasing importance was placed on the development of military self-sufficiency by selected Asian countries to permit them to defend themselves. In this regard, considerable emphasis was placed on Vietnamization.2

(15) In the section on planning guidance the requirement for a continuously airborne alternate command center was deleted. In the matter of command relationships an added paragraph stated:

Where appropriate, in the judgment of the commander of a unified command, senior subordinate commanders in areas selected by him will be predesignated and will be delegated the authority and charged with the responsibility for responding with a timely and effective unity of effort to any short duration, local hostile crisis situation which requires a US defense effort. This predesignation will include the clear authority during a crisis to direct or obtain support from all US Forces in his designated area that he might deem necessary to meet the emergency.3

The JCS were to be informed of any actions in this regard. In the matter of Rules of Engagement, a JSCP 71 addition stated that all rules of engagement proposed by the commanders of unified and specified commands for situations not already provided for in existing directives, or changes or revisions that would

1. JS Brief No. 00083-70, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Apr 70, of JCSM-289-70 of 7 Apr 70 (Revised 9 Apr 70), Subj: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, FY 71 (JSCP 71) Volume I (U).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
expand existing rules, must be submitted to the JCS for review and approval.¹

(TS) Certain tasks for CINCPAC were deleted while certain new tasks were
added. CINCPAC was no longer required to plan for the conduct of cold war activ-
ities, for operations to counter major communist aggression in Southeast or
Northeast Asia concurrently with lesser Chinese aggression elsewhere in the
PACOM, for deployment of forces to the Singapore-Malaysia area to deter formation
of a communist regime in Singapore and keep the Strait of Malacca open, for
assisting the anti-communist elements in Indonesia, or for military withdrawal
from the Republic of Vietnam under terms of the Manila Communique.²

(TS) Volume II of JSCP 71, normally published near the end of December, was
delayed until 22 April 1970 because of continuing reprogramming actions. It was
explained that reprogramming actions, including Project 703⁴ and redeployments
from Vietnam, had necessitated a revision to the data bank, delaying conduct of
the movement analysis in support of JSCP 71. The availability of forces in the

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. See CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. I, pp. 81-82 for an explanation of
   Project 703.
TOP SECRET

JSCP, therefore, represented the best estimate at the time and would have to be revised when more data was available.¹

(TS) Major force changes for CINCPAC are shown below. The old figure indicates forces available up to 30 June 1970; the new figure forces available during 1 July - 31 December 1970.²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4 2/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Naval Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antisubmarine Warfare Carriers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers/Destroyer Escorts</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Ships</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>2 1/3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Air Force Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Fighter Squadrons</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Interceptor Squadrons</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Air Squadrons</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operation Plans

(U) CINCPAC Operation Plans were regularly reviewed and revised as necessary. This process continued through 1970. Certain actions taken are described briefly below.

OPLAN 5021, Deter Formation of a Communist Regime in Singapore and Keep the Strait of Malacca Open (C)

(TS) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Volume I for Fiscal Year 1971 omitted the CINCPAC task to provide such assistance to the Government of

1. J5 Brief No. 00095-70, Hq CINCPAC, 9 May 70, of JCSM-329-70 of 22 Apr 70, Subj: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, FY 71 (JSCP 71) (U).
2. Ibid.
Singapore. CINCPAC informed all holders of the plan that provided for this contingency that the plan would be held in abeyance until further notice.¹

(TS) This plan was submitted to the JCS for approval on 2 March and approval was received on 22 June 1970.² Three substantive changes were noted by the JCS and these were forwarded to all holders of the plan.³

( )( ) OPlan Control of Maritime Traffic

( ) Submitted to the JCS for approval on 2 January, it was approved with minor changes in June.⁴

( ) Change 3 to this plan was submitted to the JCS for approval on 3 February 1970.⁵ On 28 May the JCS approved Change 3 subject to republication incorporating specified changes.⁶ On 11 September Change 4 was forwarded to the JCS for approval.⁷ This change incorporated JCS directed changes to Change 3 as well as provision for the control/coordination of tactical air support in Korea.

( ) The JCS approved revision of this plan in January 1970.⁸

1. CINCPAC 270506Z May 70.
2. CINCPAC 240307Z Jun 70 citing MJCS 212-70 of 12 Jun 70.
3. CINCPAC 240307Z Jun 70.
4. J5 Brief No. 0073-70, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Apr 70 of MJCS 120-70 of 6 Apr 70, Subj: Approval of CINCPAC OPLAN
5. CINCPAC Ltr 5115 Ser 00043 of 3 Feb 70.
6. JCSM-432-70 of 28 May 70.
7. CINCPAC Ltr 5115 Ser 000330 of 11 Sep 70.
8. JCS 103/301406Z Jan 70.
9. JCS 9875/260113Z May 70.
(TS) Change 1 to this plan was approved by the JCS in March.¹

(TS) CINCPAC submitted this plan to the JCS for approval on 16 July. The JCS comments, relating to changes of communications responsibilities that occurred subsequent to publication of the plan, were of such a nature that revision of the entire plan was justified. CINCPAC asked the JCS for permission to revise and update the plan.² The JCS approved the request on 29 October.³

(U) This plan was revised and submitted to the JCS for approval on 19 October 1970.⁴

OPlan[Redacted] Naval Countermeasures (S)

(U) On 26 March the JCS approved Change 1 to the plan, which revised the electronic warfare annex.⁵

Joint Operation Planning System

(TS) In August the JCS forwarded the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), which established the system to be used in the planning and support of joint military operations.⁶ This system was the result of several years of effort to simplify and improve the contingency planning of the unified and specified commands.⁷

(TS) The JOPS stated that commanders who had joint operation plans in advanced states of preparation could request exemption from the specific provisions of the document. On 22 September CINCPAC recommended exemption for CINCPAC OPlan[Redacted], all of which were in such advanced

1. JCS 2290/032355Z Mar 70.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 280102Z Oct 70.
3. JCS 4683/291529Z Oct 70.
4. CINCPAC Ltr 5115 Ser 000375 of 19 Oct 70.
5. JCS 3949/260125Z Mar 70.
6. CINCPAC 220099Z Sep 70 citing SM-597-70 of 13 Aug 70.
stages of preparation that to comply fully with the JOPS would cause excessive delay in publication. \(^1\) CINCPAC stated that all subsequent operation plans would be in the format required by the JOPS. The JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendation on 24 September. \(^2\)

1. CINCPAC 220009Z Sep 70.
2. JCS 1852/241747Z Sep 70.
3. CINCPAC 070330Z Mar 70.
4. JCS 7503/301559Z Apr 70.
6. COMUSTOC 270734Z Feb 70.
7. Ibid.
8. J5152 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 072249Z Mar 70.
3. Ibid.
4. J5165 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
5. Ibid.
6. COMUSTDC 140855Z Aug 70.
7. Ibid.
8. J5165 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
9. CINCPAC 020050Z Oct 70.
The CINC of the Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) asked for clarification of information regarding the number and types of amphibious ships available for augmentation of his command by CINCPAC. The JCS informed CINCLANT that
The augmentation of 3/9 of a Marine Expeditionary Force assault lift from CINCPAC could be used for planning purposes. CINCLANT, therefore, asked CINCPAC for the numbers and types of ships that probably could be made available to him for planning purposes. CINCPAC provided the following list: one amphibious command ship (new class), three amphibious assault ships, six amphibious transports dock, three amphibious cargo ships, four dock landing ships (28 Class), two dock landing ships (new class), and seven tank landing ships.

The JCS approved the plan on 12 June.

Defense of the Western Aleutians

TS In May CINCPAC was advised by the CINC of the Alaska Command (CINCAL) that he was preparing contingency plans for the Western Aleutians, including Shemya and Adak, to counter possible Soviet threats to the area. He asked for CINCPAC's views concerning the importance of Adak to CINCPAC's wartime operations in the Northern Pacific and also whether the deployment of an effective defensive force to that area would require Naval support.

1. JCS 2785/172049Z Jun 70.
2. CINCLANT NO3020/252123Z Jun 70.
3. CINCPAC 282240Z Jun 70.
4. JCS 2398/122219Z Jun 70.
5. CINCLANT 150109Z May 70.
6. CINCAL 150109Z May 70.
CINCPAC considered it unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would mount military operations against the area except in a general war.

He agreed that any defensive forces deployed to the area would need some naval support, but it appeared most likely, he said, that such support forces would be restricted to naval control and protection of shipping and inshore undersea warfare. CINCPAC recognized that the defense of the area with available forces would be difficult and recommended that CINCPAC's contingency planning include "the defense of Adak to the maximum extent possible within force constraints without degrading the capability to defend the main base complexes (Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Kodiak)."

Realignments of Unified and Specified Commands Proposed

Some major realignments in responsibility and geographic areas of operation of certain of the unified and specified commanders came under study in 1970. Although final decisions had not been reached on the matter by the end of the year, it appeared that CINCPAC's area of responsibility might be enlarged as a result of the elimination of the Alaska Command and U.S. Southern Command and reassignment of certain functions of those commands to CINCPAC and other commanders.

In June the subject had first come under study when the JCS informed CINCPAC of a decision by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to recommend to the President that the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) be abolished as a unified command effective 30 June 1971. The JCS were asked to provide recommendations for appropriate revisions of the Unified Command Plan, an implementation schedule, and also a subordinate command structure. The JCS asked CINCPAC for any comments he might have on the forthcoming reorganization and reassignment of missions and responsibilities.

2. Ibid.
3. J5121 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
4. JCS 1809/052308Z Jun 70.
CINCPAC provided his views on 28 June. If the USSOUTHCOM must be disestablished, he said, "it would appear logical to reassign USSOUTHCOM responsibilities to one of the following: CINCPAC, CINCSTRIKE, or CINCLANT." CINCPAC acknowledged that he was not aware of all of the factors bearing on the problem and therefore not in a position to make a complete assessment. He cited, however, the similarity of responsibilities already held for other areas in the matters of Military Assistance and counterinsurgency by both CINCSKI and CINCPAC. He noted, also, that CINCSTRIKE, under existing planning, was the principal force contributor for Latin American contingencies and thus it might be logical to charge him with contingency planning for that area, but this concept of significant U.S. military intervention received less emphasis under current foreign policy and strategic guidance. CINCPAC observed disadvantages to assigning USSOUTHCOM responsibilities to either CINCPAC or CINCSTRIKE, however, because each had his current focus in different areas of the world—CINCPAC in the Far East and CINCSTRIKE in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. "This would tend to relegate Latin America to secondary consideration by either CINCPAC or CINCSTRIKE, and particularly by CINCPAC while deeply involved in Southeast Asia."2

CINCPAC then listed some reasons why, with augmentation and some reorganization, CINCLANT could assume the responsibilities and missions of USSOUTHCOM. CINCLANT would probably be the major contributor of forces in support of Latin American contingencies and there would be less political sensitivity on the part of Latin America to the shift of responsibility from USCINCSO to CINCLANT. CINCPAC recommended:

In deliberations leading to elimination of SOUTHCOM, careful consideration should be given to the political reactions that may be expected from what will be interpreted by Latin America as a de-emphasis of their position in US foreign policy. This reaction will exacerbate the often repeated charges from Latin America that US policy emphasizes Europe and Asia at the expense of the Western Hemisphere.3

In a subsequent message, on 4 September, CINCPAC again provided comments to the JCS, this time considering only CINCSTRIKE or CINCLANT to assume USSOUTHCOM responsibilities. CINCPAC cited our changing national strategy as a result of the Nixon Doctrine, noting that the current trend in national policy "will

1. CINCPAC 282311Z Jun 70; CINCSTRIKE was the Commander in Chief Strike Command and CINCLANT the Commander in Chief Atlantic Command.
2. CINCPAC 282311Z Jun 70.
3. Ibid.
preclude military involvement in anything short of a major external threat to
the region, therefore, US involvement in Latin American internal security prob-
lems would be limited to security measures for US citizens and property.1 This
being the case, he continued, "the command selected should be the one most suited
to rapid deployment for rescue/evacuation type operations and a show of force
with less emphasis upon the capability to deploy major military forces designed
for sustained involvement."2

(C) CINCPAC noted that CINCLANT Naval Forces already conducted antisubmarine
warfare operations with Latin American forces and "have established good rapport
and lines of communication for surveillance and control of shipping which can be
broadened."3 He again cited the political impact the shift in assignment could
have on Latin Americans and his opinion that the shift "to CINCLANT who has no
current geographic land mass would be politically palatable."4 CINCPAC con-
cluded that CINCLANT should be selected to assume the USSOUTHCOM mission.

(U) The study of the proposed reassignment broadened a great deal in
September when the JCS decided that a review of the entire unified command
structure was necessary.5

The matter had been raised following the report of the President's Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel formed to review the organizational structure of the
Defense Department. The report of that study group, released 1 July 1970, recom-
mended a rather complete reorganization of the unified and specified commands,
as well as a number of Service functions. Among their recommendations was the
realigning of the major unified commands to create three: a Strategic Command,
a Tactical (or General Purpose) Command, and a Logistics Command. The Strategic
Command would be composed of the existing Strategic Air Command, the Joint Strat-
egic Target Planning Staff, the Continental Air Defense Command, and Fleet
Ballistic Missile Operations. In the new Tactical Command, the study said, major
organizational and functional advantages would be obtained by merging the LANT-
COM and the STRICOM (Strike Command), abolishing the USSOUTHCOM and reassigning
its functions to the merged LANTCOM and STRICOM, and abolishing the ALCOM (Alas-
ka Command) and reassigning its general purpose functions to the PACOM and its
strategic defense functions to the Strategic Command.6 There would thus be three

1. CINCPAC 040307Z Sep 70.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. J5129 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
6. Report to The President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of
   Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 1 July 1970, Gilbert W. Fitzhugh,
   Chairman.
tactical commands, the PACOM, the European Command, and the merged LANTCOM and STRICOM.

When the JCS asked CINCPAC, in September, to review the whole matter of the unified command structure, he did so with the help of his component commanders. CINCPAC's reply to the JCS on 16 October outlined a number of basic and drastic changes to the existing structure, although he described that structure as "sound." CINCPAC said:

The CINCPAC concept is a worldwide command system consisting of six unified and specified commands rather than the present eight commands. ALCOM and USOUTHCOM would be eliminated from the current command system with CINCPAC assuming the mission and area of responsibility of ALCOM and CINCLANT assuming the mission and area of responsibility of USOUTHCOM. Additionally, CINCPAC and CINCLANT would assume the responsibility for the Arctic Ocean and CINCPAC would assume the responsibility for the Western Indian Ocean area previously assigned to CINCLANT. The remaining command system would remain unchanged. It is envisioned that subordinate unified commands would not be required in either the present ALCOM or USOUTHCOM areas. This concept would effect manpower savings and would not entail additional construction costs, other than normal programmed actions. Operating costs would remain essentially unchanged.1

CINCPAC then enumerated these recommendations and provided his supporting rationale. Regarding the elimination of the ALCOM, he noted that the command was already quite limited and that the threat to that area was the same source as the threat to CINCPAC, the eastern portion of the U.S.S.R. Also, he said, "the threat to the Aleutian Islands is more integral to the threat to PACOM than the threat to North America, and, therefore, more defensible by CINCPAC seaborne forces than by North American defense forces."2

Regarding his proposal for the assumption by CINCPAC and CINCLANT of responsibility for the Arctic Ocean using 100 degrees East and West longitude as the boundary, CINCPAC noted that no CINC had been assigned the specific responsibility for the Arctic Ocean. The NATO area assigned to CINCLANT extended to the North Pole. CINCPACFLT forces regularly operated in the area north of Alaska and the U.S.S.R. but search and rescue responsibilities for the Arctic Ocean had not been delineated in the National Search and Rescue Manual. With the advent of

1. CINCPAC 160021Z Oct 70.
2. Ibid.
the nuclear submarine under-ice operational capability, "it would appear appropriate to identify areas of responsibility." 

(5) When CINCPAC proposed the reassignment of the western Indian Ocean from CINCLANT to CINCPAC, he noted that the boundary line between the two commands should be 20 degrees East longitude between Cape Agulhas, the southernmost point of Africa, and Antarctica. CINCPAC explained as follows: Soviet Navy ships from Vladivostok transiting the Malacca Strait toward the Indian Ocean could be monitored by CINCPAC throughout the greater Indian Ocean area, rather than be limited to the present boundary. With the Suez Canal closed indefinitely and never reliably available during periods of crisis or hostilities, naval reinforcements had an exceedingly long transit from normal operating areas in the LANTCOM; the transit of Seventh Fleet units was much shorter. From a political-military viewpoint, the assignment of all of the Indian Ocean area to one commander was better than the present two-way split between CINCPAC and CINCLANT, CINCPAC said. Assumption of command of the base at Diego Garcia, if one comes into being, by CINCPAC, the unified commander most likely to stage forces through it, would be more appropriate. 

(U) No decision in the matter had been announced in Washington by the end of the year.

**Marine Air Group Basing Studied**

(55) In June 1970 CINCPACFLT proposed the basing of a Marine Air Group on Okinawa and recommended a study by CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF to explore the availability of facilities at Kadena Air Base. He noted that the group would consist of about 52 aircraft and 1,900 personnel. He also noted that CINCPAC had earlier stated that he understood the need to collocate Marine air and ground units on Okinawa.

(5S) CINCPACAF commented on the subject in August. He said that Air Force programming for both Kadena and Naha Air Bases did not then provide a surplus facility situation that could meet the Marine Air Group requirement, but he proposed the relocation of certain PACAF Forces from Naha with that facility then

---

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPACFLT 5050/100302Z Jun 70.
4. CINCPACAF 202024Z Aug 70.
Turned over for Navy use, including use by the Marine Air Group. Some of those PACAF forces from Naha would be relocated to Kadena.

(C) CINCPACFLT cited the disadvantages of locating the group at Naha and said, "it is considered much better if Marine units moved to Kadena and utilized the space and facilities which would be made available there" if certain Air Force units were relocated from Kadena.\(^1\) He reiterated his recommendation for a study aimed at locating the air group at Kadena.

(§) After reviewing these conflicting proposals and the Air Force's proposed beddown for Kadena during Calendar Year 1972,\(^2\) the CINCPAC staff concluded that the Air Force's plans would fully utilize Kadena facilities and that the question of location of the Marine Air Group on Okinawa should not be resolved until force decisions for FY 72 and subsequent years were firm.\(^3\)

**Use of Singapore Ship Repair Facilities**

(U) As the British retrenched, they left a large gap "east of Suez." The huge British naval base at Singapore, for example, was being converted into a commercial facility. The United States had long used ship repair and service facilities there, but in early 1970 the offer of use was extended to the U.S.S.R. on the same commercial basis as other nations. Use of these facilities would permit permanent deployment of an Indian Ocean Fleet, which was in line with Soviet Navy expansionism in many parts of the world.

(§) CINCPAC addressed the matter in a message to the JCS on 7 July. He said:

The strategic importance of Singapore and the need to preserve U.S. military access there assume increased importance when viewed in the context of Soviet efforts to penetrate the area and the apparent amenability of Singapore to offer certain services and access to the highest bidder on a commercial basis. The current policy which precludes a high profile U.S. military presence in Singapore could lead to the loss of valuable support facilities if efforts are not made to exploit low visibility methods for their utilization.\(^4\)

---

1. CINCPACFLT N13000/282313Z Aug 70.
2. CSAF 111542Z Sep 70.
3. J5126 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
4. CINCPAC 072216Z Jul 70.
CINCPAC noted that recent and programmed budget constraints were resulting in a significant phase down of U.S. military utilization of the Singapore facilities, which were excellent and available at relatively low cost.\(^1\) He continued:

It is important to our long term strategic posture to consider the advantages which will accrue from use of Singapore facilities and services and include this factor in all deliberations concerning alternative uses including port calls and contract services.... In view of the seriousness of our declining use of Singapore assets and despite recent British election results, it is requested that consideration be given to increasing the priority of utilization of these valuable facilities.\(^2\)

\(\\) A reply from the JCS on 10 July stated, "CINCPAC concern on this matter is shared here."\(^3\) In order to recommend a policy to the Secretary of Defense the JCS were initiating an action paper, they said, and asked for CINCPAC's contributions on such matters as facts on U.S. usage, an assessment of the risks of Soviet penetration, and an examination of operational and support alternatives.

\(\\) CINCPAC furnished data on Army and Navy usage; the Army had contracts for repair of small marine craft, the Navy has used the facilities mostly for rest and recuperation purposes.\(^4\)

\(\\) In assessing the risk of Soviet penetration, several considerations were pertinent, CINCPAC said. Soviet interest in Singapore could be aimed at the neutralization of Communist China's influence, at establishing a position from which to take advantage of U.S./U.K. retrenchment, or enhanced influence over the Strait of Malacca, through which one day units of the Soviet Mediterranean-Indian Ocean and Pacific Fleets might interchange. Continued naval presence in the Indian Ocean could lead the U.S.S.R. to decide to use its ships in an economic penetration of Singapore, CINCPAC said, although the only Soviet naval ships to call at Singapore so far had been a rescue tug, an oiler,\(^5\) and a research vessel. The Soviet approach had mostly demonstrated an emphasis on industrial development

---

2. CINCPAC 072216Z Jul 70.
3. JCS 4735/102250Z Jul 70.
4. CINCPAC 232205Z Jul 70.
5. Singapore had protested the oiler's call in May when it arrived without notice.
and economic cooperation. The U.S.S.R. might be in a better position to use its expanding merchant and fishing fleets as the vehicle for penetration rather than naval units, CINCPAC surmised. "While it appears that there is no serious risk of Soviet penetration at this time, Soviet intentions remain unchanged."1

CINCPAC then outlined the kinds of work that Singapore facilities could provide for U.S. ships and aircraft and for the Military Assistance Aircraft Maintenance Program.

CINCPAC concluded:

In summary, availability of Singapore facilities is politically, economically and militarily desirable. From a military standpoint, consideration must also be given to the long-range need for alternate facilities for support of CINCPAC operating forces in the event of base denials in other areas. Of paramount importance is the existence in Singapore of excellent repair and logistics support facilities which could be of great value to PACOM units. Future U.S. operations in the Indian Ocean to counter increased Soviet presence could be supported from Singapore.2

The matter of funding for Navy use of the Singapore facilities also came under study in 1970. With the announced withdrawal of all British forces from Singapore in 1971 the navies of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand had begun negotiating both initial and annual cost sharing programs that would permit USN usage of the naval support facilities and insure U.S. presence in the area. Subsequently, Great Britain announced a decision to maintain some naval presence in Singapore after 1971, a force composed of five frigates and a destroyer or guided missile destroyer. In early September 1970, therefore, representatives of the three navies met again to identify their requirements for berthing, real estate, and similar needs. U.S. Navy requirements were as had been stated previously.3

In August, however, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations advised his counterpart in the Australian Navy that the U.K. decision to retain a naval presence had created a "new situation," as the main United States interest was the preservation of essential facilities. He indicated that any U.S. Navy

1. CINCPAC 232205Z Jul 70.
2. Ibid.
contribution would be on an "as used" as opposed to a "cost sharing" basis.¹

(C) CINCPAC, however, believed that regardless of the British decision to retain a skeletal force "East of Suez," the U.S. presence in Singapore was vital. He also believed that the United States should help finance the Naval Support Facility on a "cost sharing" basis. "Cost sharing" would insure that the United States would retain a voice in any discussions relative to the future of the facilities and provide assurance of continued access to this vital crossroads. The possibility existed that costs would be reduced because of continued British support. Also, there was much less risk of an implied U.S. commitment to the area than would have existed if the British had withdrawn. CINCPAC believed that use of the Singapore facility should be increased with active U.S. participation on a "cost sharing" basis.²

Concept Plan for Operations in
Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf Area

(G) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for Fiscal Year 1971 assigned unified commanders a general task: to provide plans that were considered appropriate but for which no specific tasking was provided. In response, CINCPAC prepared a concept plan for increasing the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas. The plan contained 11 options with forces ranging in size from a single ship to an attack carrier task group. The plan, which had the unclassified nickname "FRIDAY GUEST," pertained to antisubmarine warfare units, submarines, amphibious units, and general purpose forces.³

(G) CINCPAC noted that "U.S. and Free World interest in the area lies in the free and unfettered use of sea and air routes in the area and in a friendly association with bordering nations in order to ensure free access to African and Mideast resources."⁴ CINCPAC continued:

The projection of US military power in the Indian Ocean requires that access be maintained to potential staging and support bases in support of possible contingency operations in Africa and the Asian sub-continent, to facilitate intelligence collection efforts against Soviet/CHICOM space missile technology

¹ Point Paper, J5154, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Nov 70, Subj: Utilization of Singapore Naval Support Facility (U).
² Ibid.
³ CINCPAC 222254Z Sep 70; J4119 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
⁴ CINCPAC 222254Z Sep 70.
and to retain and enhance US capabilities to conduct ASW and control of maritime traffic in the Indian Ocean in a limited war or general war environment. The communists have indicated every intention of filling the free-world power vacuum that will be caused by the downgrading of British forces and the minimal US presence in the area. Increasing US Naval presence in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf could assist in opposing the projection of communist influence and creating free-world options for the nations of the area which would not otherwise be available.¹

Earlier, as a result of CINCPAC's query of his Navy component commander regarding the formulation of the concept plan, CINCPACFLT proposed sending a U.S. Navy ship to the area. CINCPACFLT considered it a prelude to increased Navy presence in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf areas and he proposed sending USS BAINBRIDGE, a nuclear-powered guided missile frigate, to operate in the Indian Ocean for about 10 days subsequent to a visit to Singapore planned for the end of July.² CINCPAC concurred in the plan and the proposed concept of operation, which included surveillance of any Soviet westbound combatant force in the PACOM area, or in the absence of a Soviet unit a signal intelligence sweep of the eastern Bay of Bengal (including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) within the PACOM area of responsibility.³ The operation was uneventful.

Personnel Reductions in the Philippines

Planning for personnel reductions was necessary for many areas of the PACOM. For the Philippines, the JCS informed CINCPAC on 2 April 1970 that the President had directed an immediate one-third reduction of the personnel at Clark Air Base and a 25 percent reduction of civilian and military personnel at other agencies.⁴ CINCPAC provided the JCS with his position on both reduction proposals in April but in May the JCS informed CINCPAC of a request by the Secretary of Defense to combine both reductions in a single plan.

When CINCPAC tasked his component commanders to review and modify their previous positions he asked that particular attention be paid to two matters: the movement of U.S. Forces to other countries in the Western Pacific when an attempt was being made to reduce U.S. presence in the area and the fact that a

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPACFLT 140214Z Jul 70.
3. CINCPAC 160243Z Jul 70.
4. J511 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
5. Ibid.
completion date of 30 June 1971 should be used for accomplishment of both reductions but with as many reductions as possible made at Clark by September 1970.¹

(§) CINCPAC completed the combined and refined plan on 9 May 1970,² and on 26 May he submitted a statement of exact phasing by unit and quarter in response to further guidance originating from the National Security Council.³ In connection with this planning CINCPAC was asked four questions, responses to which were to be used in preparing the State-Defense Department plan for reductions. The replies CINCPAC furnished outlined the principal effects and impacts these reductions would have.⁴

(§) CINCPAC first listed the number of Filipino local national employees who would have their employment terminated. These were as follows: direct hire employees, 1,065; non-appropriated fund activity employees, 885; contract and concessionaire employees, 230; and domestic employees, 2,045. Some of these reductions, he noted, were the result of a previously planned reduction in Civilian Personnel Operations and Maintenance, Navy funds.

(§) U.S. base expenditures were to decrease in the following amounts: salaries, $1.3 million; procurement, $1.4 million; payments to local contractors, $.25 million; and private expenditures, $2.3 million. These totals did not include costs or savings for USAF reductions because of the many variables involved.

(§) In regard to the security of the Philippines, CINCPAC said, "There will be no appreciable impact on Philippine security as a result of these reductions."⁵ He noted that Seventh Fleet forces and an F-4 squadron would continue to provide security support.

(§) Lastly CINCPAC commented on the force structure that would remain in the Philippines after Vietnam. The U.S. structure would "return to approximately pre-Tonkin Gulf levels and...missions of remaining forces should continue to play their traditional mutual and regional security roles."⁶ He noted, however, that the reductions at Clark would leave only about 60 airframes in the Philippines compared to about 100 in pre-Tonkin Gulf times.⁷

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 090601Z May 70.
3. CINCPAC 260401Z May 70.
4. CINCPAC 271945Z May 70.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
Periodic typhoons continued to plague the Philippines as they did certain other countries in the PACOM. The subject of typhoon damage control was raised in February 1970 when the Philippine Government sent the U.S. Embassy in Manila a request for assistance. They asked to borrow two aircraft and cloud seeding equipment and they asked that a highly specialized scientist be sent to the Philippines at U.S. expense. President Marcos discussed the matter with U.S. Vice President Agnew when he visited the Philippines in the spring of 1970. Because of this discussion the U.S. Ambassador had not passed to the Philippine Government a reply on the subject received from the State Department just before Mr. Agnew's visit; the Secretary of State's reply had been negative.1

Following conversation on the subject, Admiral McCain had engaged in a personal exchange of letters with the U.S. Defense Attaché in the Philippines. CINCPAC indicated that he could not support the effort as technical procedures involved were experimental and potentially dangerous. He suggested that the Philippines send an observer to an experimental hurricane abatement program being conducted by the U.S. Navy off the coast of Florida.2

In August when the JCS asked CINCPAC officially for his views, he replied that support for the program was not feasible, offering the same rationale he had used to the Defense Attaché.3 He noted the promising but inconclusive results of the U.S. hurricane program. He also noted that while success with a typhoon moderation program could achieve much goodwill, the probable adverse political impact from a seeded typhoon that subsequently caused property damage and loss of life also had to be considered.

The U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines spoke out on the matter to the Secretary of State, the JCS, and CINCPAC on 2 September. He said that the Philippine Government was not asking us to operate their program, but asking U.S. assistance in operating their own program. He "strongly" recommended we offer them assistance.4

CINCPAC's reply on the matter to the JCS noted that because of stringent budgetary limitations, "resources are not available within the PACOM to support U.S. participation to the extent recommended by AMEMBASSY Manila."5 He then

1. J5123 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
2. Ibid.; the project was called STORMFURY.
3. CINCPAC 290344Z Aug 70.
4. AMEMBASSY Manila 8088/020738Z Sep 70.
5. CINCPAC 121020Z Sep 70.
reiterated both the possible benefits that might accrue as well as the matter of his own reservations on the subject, which remained valid, he said. CINCPAC had no further participation in the matter in 1970.

Military Civic Action Program for American Samoa

(1) In 1970 the Governor of American Samoa asked, through the Secretary of the Interior, that the Defense Department explore the possibility of assigning a military civic action team to American Samoa.1 Such teams had been assigned to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands since 1969. Unfavorable comparison could be drawn concerning the lack of attention given to an American territory. The JCS asked CINCPAC to study the matter and report his subsequent discussions with the Governor of the Territory to the Secretary of Defense and provide the Secretary with a basic outline of a civic action program.2 A team of officers from CINCPAC’s staff visited American Samoa from 21 to 24 October and on 24 November CINCPAC advised the JCS of his findings and recommendations.3 Principal needs identified were for water supply, health, sanitation, agricultural, and transportation facilities.

(2) Study revealed that two USAF4 13-man teams could be used, one on the main island of Tutuila (where Pago Pago was situated) and a second on the Manu'a Islands, about 60 miles north. A recommended program, CINCPAC said, would be for two team equivalents for two years. Funds, it was expected, would come from the Interior Department, with some projects completely sponsored and funded by the villages.

(3) CINCPAC envisioned a command and control concept in which CINCPACAF was assigned responsibility as program manager. It was expected that the USAF would provide initial allowances and support the teams from Hawaii.

1. Point Paper, J41M, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 70, Subj: Military Civic Action Program (U).
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 240544Z Nov 70; CINCPAC 250231Z Oct 70.
4. The USAF had existing interests in the area: an active USAF detachment at Pago Pago and other operations that supported U.S. space and missile programs.
SECTION VIII - OPERATIONS OF U.S. FORCES

Peacetime Rules of Engagement of Seaborne Forces

CINCPAC issued revised rules of engagement governing the actions to be taken against seaborne forces in peacetime in an instruction dated 24 August.¹ These rules applied except where modified by other rules of engagement promulgated separately for specific operations, missions, or projects. CINCPAC had already issued peacetime rules for unidentified or hostile aircraft.² In this regard a listing of effective CINCPAC directives for air, ground, and naval operations (less Operation Plans) was forwarded to the JCS on 28 November 1970; these directives included CINCPAC instructions, letters, and messages.³

To insure precise terminology, the Staff Judge Advocate had provided extensive assistance to the Operations Division in preparation of the CINCPAC rules of engagement of seaborne forces.⁴

The CINCPAC instruction included definitions of territorial limits and "hostile acts," the conditions and authority to declare a force hostile,⁵ procedures to follow if a hostile force was encountered, specialized instructions regarding submarine or guided missile fast patrol boat contacts, and reporting procedures.⁶

Transit of the Indonesian Archipelago

In 1960 Indonesia had extended claims that would restrict access to its territorial waters and limit the right of innocent passage. This was contrary to recognized international law and disputed by the United States. Since that time, however, the United States has provided Indonesia with informal notification of ship visits through those waters.⁷

2. CINCPACINST 03710.2(series), Subj: Basic Rules of Engagement - Unidentified or Hostile Aircraft.
3. CINCPAC 280036Z Nov 70.
4. J73 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Apr, Jul-Sep 70.
5. Authority was delegated to CINCPACFLT who was authorized to further delegate it to the Commanders of the First and Seventh Fleets and the Commander of Antisubmarine Warfare Forces Pacific.
(S) On 18 August 1970 CINCPACFLT recommended a reexamination of these transit notification procedures with a gradual reduction of such notification to evaluate the Indonesian reaction, if any. CINCPACFLT believed that if a country could exercise its authority over an area for a sufficient period of time in an "open, continuous, and uncontested manner it could acquire a right to exercise sovereignty over these areas." He thought that the practice of courtesy notification could be interpreted as lending credence to an illegal claim over open seas, which might be observed by other nations and result in additional attempts to turn the high seas into internal waters.

(S) CINCPAC asked the U.S. Ambassador in Djakarta for his comments in order to properly evaluate the proposal to terminate courtesy notification. He said that if courtesy notification to the Indonesian Government was terminated the Ambassador would still be notified in a timely manner "to preclude any potential local embarrassment."2

(c) The Ambassador advised CINCPAC that he had considered the various options and believed that the preferred course of action was to continue the existing very low key and informal courtesy notification procedure.3 Notification was being provided about 72 hours in advance of transit by telephone to the Indonesian Navy's Deputy for Naval Intelligence and Security, a procedure "that works well and no problems have arisen in last three years." The Ambassador believed a reduction or discontinuation of this procedure would precipitate an Indonesian demand for formal written notification or possibly a request for permission to transit. If we acceded to such a demand it would be "clearly more prejudicial to U.S. interests than present practice," and refusal to accede he considered "unacceptable in terms of over-all U.S. interests."5 He believed that Indonesian reaction could range from the certainty of measures disrupting existing cooperation and a mutually beneficial relationship to the possibility of Indonesian efforts to interfere with the transit of U.S. naval vessels. He said that as a practical matter, if the United States ultimately capitulated to Indonesian demands, "critical erosion of U.S. position would have taken place."6 The Ambassador concluded that he hoped that in the course of law-of-the-seas negotiations international pressure would bring about Indonesian acceptance of a position more agreeable to U.S. interests. Precipitating a confrontation over transit notification would make this outcome more difficult, he said.

1. CINCPACFLT 181913Z Aug 70.
2. CINCPAC 230338Z Aug 70.
3. AMEMB Djakarta 6564/010450Z Sep 70.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
1. CINCPAC 132212Z Sep 70.
2. Ibid.
3. J3842 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan-Dec 70.
4. J3842 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
5. J3842 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Feb, May, Jul 70.
6. CINCPAC 290349Z Aug 70. The ports were Colombo, Ceylon; Madras and Bombay, India; Karachi, Pakistan; Diego Suarez, Malagasy Republic; and Mombasa, Kenya.
1. CINCPAC 290349Z Aug 70.
2. J3B42 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Dec 69 and Jan 70.
3. CINCPAC 170210Z Jul 70.
4. CINCPAC 182131Z Jul 70.
5. CINCPAC 302227Z Jul citing OPNAVINST 3128.3H.
1. CINCPAC 302227Z Jul 70.
2. Point Paper, J3B57, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Mar 70, Subj: Current Status of Peace-time Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) in PACOM.
4. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 282044Z Jan 70; J232 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
5. This had been an Air Force program along the Korean DMZ; J2/Memo/0057-70, Hq CINCPAC, from CAPT Casucci to Admiral McCain, 3 Feb 70, Subj: COMMANDO CLINCH (U); J231 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
1. Point Paper, J231, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Mar 70, Subj: Assessment of Risk to Air-
borne Reconnaissance Missions (U).
2. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
3. Ibid.
4. Point Paper, J3857, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Mar 70, Subj: Current Status of Peace-
time Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) in PACOM.
5. Ibid.
1. JCS 9212/311404Z Jan 70.
2. J3B51 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70; J23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
3. The agreement had been concluded jointly by CINCPAC and CINCAL on 29 Jun 64. A copy of the agreement, which had become Appendix II to Annex D to ALCAP, Hq ALCOM, 1 July 69, was enclosed with J3B51 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
4. Ibid.
Naval Surface Reconnaissance Operations

(U) Numerous routine and some not-so-routine naval surface reconnaissance operations were conducted in the PACOM in 1970. Certain of these of special interest to CINCPAC are discussed below.

(TS) Antisubmarine warfare operations by two U.S. destroyers were conducted in the Northern Pacific off the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Aleutian Islands in

1. J3B51 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
2. Memorandum of Agreement Between Commander in Chief, Pacific, and Commander in Chief, Alaska, Concerning Responsibilities Relative to Alaska and the Waters Contiguous Thereto, signed on 16 Feb 70 by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, CINCPAC and LT GEN R.G. Ruegg, USAF, CINCAL.
3. Ibid.
4. J3B51 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
5. ADMIN CINCPAC 202149Z Aug 70; J3B14 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
late August. The operation had been scheduled because of U.S. neglect of the area in recent years and the resulting lack of U.S. knowledge of environmental conditions affecting surface ship sonars and Soviet reactions to U.S. surface forces in the area. Certain rigid modifications were imposed by CINCPAC just before the operations began to avoid any possible incidents during a visit by the Vice President to the PACOM at the same time.\footnote{1}

\footnote{(TS) Late in August two U.S. Coast Guard cutters conducted Northern Sea Route surveillance. Plans were coordinated with the CINC Alaska Command for contingency support forces.\footnote{2}}

\textbf{NICE DOG Operations}

\footnote{(TS) The French resumed atmospheric nuclear testing in the PACOM in 1970. The United States monitored those tests as they had the 13 tests conducted in previous years.\footnote{3} No tests had been conducted in 1969. The 1970 tests were conducted near Mururoa Atoll in the Tuamotu Archipelago, but CINCPAC coordinated appropriate search and rescue procedures for participating aircraft.\footnote{4}}

\footnote{(TS) CINCPAC's principal participation was through a CINCPACFLT ship. The ship was overflown by numerous French surveillance flights and illuminated and photographed on several occasions.}

\footnote{(TS) The ship returned to Pago Pago, American Samoa for replenishment between some of the tests. After the conclusion of the tests CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the unit commander in the future have greater latitude to move closer to replenishment sites unless otherwise directed by a higher authority while waiting for permission to proceed to port.\footnote{6}}

\begin{enumerate}
\item J3842 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
\item Ibid.; J3842 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
\item J3842 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
\item CINCPAC 200902Z Aug 70. Tests had been held on 15, 22, and 30 May; 24 June; 3 and 27 July; and 2 and 6 August.
\item CINCPAC 200902Z Aug 70.
\end{enumerate}
(TS) CINCPAC also noted that many problems had been encountered during pre-
deployment installation, configuration, and tasking because of insufficient
time. He recommended that future POCK MARK platforms be designated at the
earliest possible time to preclude these difficulties.1

IVY GREEN Operations

(TS) IVY GREEN operations were supplementary collection operations against
foreign missile and space activities. Soviet tests monitored by the United
States were conducted periodically during 1970 both in the mid-Pacific broad
ocean area and in the Kamchatka Peninsula area. Substantially the same PACOM
forces participated in these tests in 1970 as had done so in previous years,3
and once again

On occasion ships or aircraft
rendezvoused with Soviet observation ships when no actual tests took place.

(TS) PACOM forces monitored the deployment of Soviet Missile Range Instru-
m entation Ships and movement of such ships to probable test impact sites.
Usually tests were announced in advance by the U.S.S.R., who asked that certain
impact areas be closed to ships or aircraft.

(§) On 5 August CINCPACFLT informed CINCPAC that one of the destroyers
observing a test series had reported impacts at ranges of 3,500 yards east and
2,000 yards down range from him.4

CINCPAC reviewed the problem and forwarded
the request to the JCS.5

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 8441/211320Z Dec 70.
4. CINCPACFLT 050051Z Aug 70.
5. CINCPAC 092022Z Aug 70.
SECRET

In December the JCS provided such guidance, which CINCPAC then forwarded to those who might have collection platforms in the area. He outlined locations for cases where one ship was on station or when two or more were in the area to gain the best collection of data from a strictly technical point of view and then set forth certain moves that could be made for reasons of safety, noting that there were many variables in such an effort, both in collection systems in use and the uncertainty in predicting missile impact points.

A question of deployment procedures arose when the JCS asked CINCPAC on 6 August to comment on a citing by the Director of the National Security Agency that several IVY GREEN collection resources—ships and aircraft—did not reach their stations or staging areas on time to cover Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile tests on 26 and 27 July 1970. CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF and CINCPAC-FLT for their comments on which to base his reply.

CINCPAC told the JCS that although the ship deployed from Pearl Harbor had arrived later than planned it was because of a mechanical failure that could not have been anticipated; no change in procedure was recommended. Regarding Air Force delays, caused by certain equipment not being deployed closer to the testing areas than Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii, CINCPAC recommended that on initiation of IVY GREEN operations the JCS in coordination with the Air Force Chief of Staff alert the Military Airlift Command to arrange for more expeditious airlift. (One aircraft on that mission had also been plagued with breakdown trouble.) CINCPAC also recommended that IVY GREEN resources to be made available to CINCPAC from other commands be released to CINCPAC's operational control as early as feasible to permit timely completion of predeployment arrangements and early deployment to the operating area or advanced base.

IVY GREEN operations off the Kamchatka Peninsula took place in September and October. In preparation for these operations CINCPAC provided CINCPACFLT with some specific guidance in anticipation of operations so close to the U.S.S.R. These instructions were to try to insure that there were no violations of Soviet-claimed territorial waters and that the amount of classified material was kept to the minimum necessary and that plans for its emergency destruction were adequate for operations in the vicinity of Soviet territory.

CINCPAC asked the CINC of the Alaska Command to provide assistance in the event of a contingency involving the ship off Kamchatka, but both that

1. CINCPAC 160502Z Dec 70; JCS 7498/072351Z Dec 70.
3. CINCPAC 140447Z Aug 70.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 260229Z Aug 70.
command and CINCPAC acknowledged that there would be considerable delay before either ships or aircraft could reach the ship in an emergency.\(^1\)

(S) Soviet reaction to the presence of the ship off Kamchatka was limited to air surveillance and non-combatant surface surveillance.\(^2\)

(S) In one other IVY GREEN matter, CINCPAC answered a JCS query regarding projected U.S. military activities for Mauritius Island. He noted that he had no planned military requirements for the island except that from time to time it was used by ships or aircraft assigned on IVY GREEN operations. Such use in the period under study would be contingent on requirements of the Director of the National Security Agency who tasked PACOM forces in connection with Soviet or Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile space events.\(^3\)

**Search and Rescue Operations**

(U) The responsibility of CINCPAC and others in the matter of search and rescue operations was assigned by the Presidential Air Coordinating Committee in the National Search and Rescue (SAR) Manual. CINCPAC was charged with coordination of SAR throughout his area of operational responsibility except for the northeast quadrant of the Pacific Ocean, for which SAR responsibility was assigned to the U.S. Coast Guard. CINPACAF had been designated SAR commander for the major part of CINCPAC's region, including the Southeast Asian land and water areas in which PACOM forces were regularly stationed. Because PACOM forces were not ordinarily deployed in the southeast quadrant of the Pacific, CINCPAC had continued to retain SAR coordination responsibility for this area in his headquarters.

(U) Responsibility for SAR incidents in the Arctic Ocean area came under study by the Pacific SAR Advisory Committee meeting in San Francisco in October. Functional agreement was reached whereby the U.S. Coast Guard would coordinate all missions in the Western Arctic area. Coordination continued to formally implement this decision among CINCPAC, the CINC Alaska, and the Commander of the Coast Guard Western Area. Upon ratification, the agreement would be recommended for inclusion in the National SAR Manual.

(U) Primary SAR activities continued to center on downed combat aircrew members in Southeast Asia, for Vietnamese, Thai, and Cambodian aircrews as well

1. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
2. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70. For further background on IVY GREEN operations see also J3B42 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for Jan-Dec 70.
3. CINCPAC 230401Z Jun 70.
as U.S. Forces. In 1970, 176 combat saves were accomplished, five of which involved foreign military aircrews.¹

**Operations in the Asian Coastal Buffer Zone**

On 24 February the CINC of the North American Defense Command (NORAD) asked that CINCPAC issue instructions recognizing both CINCNORAD and CINC Alaska Command (CINCAL) as competent authority to authorize flight into the Asian Coastal Buffer Zone for air defense operations, with the understanding that CINCNORAD authority would be further delegated to the Commander of the Alaskan NORAD Region, as necessary.² CINCPAC had established the buffer zone to prevent inadvertent overflight of non-friendly borders in the PACOM area. In the area of the Bering Strait the buffer zone crossed to the east of the Alaskan Defense Early Warning Identification Zone and around Little Diomede Island to within five nautical miles of Alaska, placing a constraint on CINCAL air defense operations.³

CINCPACAF, who had coordinating authority in these matters, posed no objection to the CINCNORAD proposal. CINCPAC, therefore, on 20 March authorized CINCNORAD and CINCAL to approve flights for air defense operations into the Asian Coastal Buffer Zone and to delegate this authority as necessary.⁴

**Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force Training and Readiness**

Amphibious Ready Groups/Special Landing Forces (ARG/SLF), which constituted the only readily available PACOM reserve, required periodic amphibious operational training, CINCPAC believed, to maintain an acceptable degree of readiness. The only over-the-beach training facilities under U.S. control in the Western Pacific, located at Okinawa and Subic Bay in the Philippines, were not adequate to support this training.⁵

CINCPAC recommended that unilateral U.S. training operations be conducted, therefore, using foreign beaches, with Taiwan and the Philippines providing the preferred training areas to be supplemented by Korea, Japan, and Thailand locations to preclude undue emphasis in one geographic area.⁶ CINCPAC had

---

¹ J38222 History, Hq CINCPAC, Supplementary History for 1970 dated 5 Mar 71.
² CINCNORAD 242320Z Feb 70.
³ J38222 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
⁴ CINCPAC 200335Z Mar 70.
⁵ CINCPAC 010113Z Jan 70.
⁶ Ibid.
considered combined exercises with host country forces, but the disadvantages of "ponderous" development, political ramifications, and the fact that combined exercises were not responsive to the advanced level of training required by the ARG/SLF caused him to select unilateral training plans. He noted that host country observers or token participation would be welcome.

(§) The exercises CINCPAC envisioned would be small scale, low key, one battalion operations of short duration. No supporting scenarios would be required and they would not be considered Significant Exercises in the JCS meaning of the term.\(^1\) CINCPAC anticipated about two exercises a quarter.\(^2\)

(§) The State and Defense Departments approved a limited exercise concept on 1 September. Low visibility training conducted in connection with port visits by Seventh Fleet ships was to be arranged "through and under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador."\(^3\) This was considered routine training that had long been accepted by host countries. In addition to training benefits derived, "it will also create a degree of acceptance of their presence which would make possible their movement in periods of heightened tension without causing undue notice."\(^4\) The Secretary of State continued:

All routine amphibious training conducted under this guidance must comply with all of the following conditions:

a. Each amphibious landing will be unilateral in nature designed for the training of US forces only. However, this will not be construed to prevent host nation observers from participating if the Ambassador thinks it appropriate.

b. US forces will not exceed one battalion landing team...and necessary supporting forces.

c. The amphibious landings will be conducted in low key and in relatively uninhabited areas of the host country when feasible.

d. No political scenario will be prepared nor will a code name be assigned.

---

1. Those exercises deemed particularly noteworthy by virtue of their size, scope, or political importance.
2. CINCPAC 010113Z Jan 70.
3. SECSTATE 142846/012015Z Sep 70.
4. Ibid.
e. News coverage is not desired or intended [but the Secretary outlined news contingency requirements]....

Coordination with the U.S. Ambassador, once accomplished, is sufficient authority for CINCPAC to conduct the routine amphibious training.... Reports of training proposed or to be conducted under this guidance will be submitted by CINCPAC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for information....

This procedure represents an approved exception to para 2.B. NSAM 316. It does not affect routine military training which does not require approval in accordance with NSAM 316....1

Further guidance was received from the Secretary of State later in September, apparently in response to queries from the U.S. Ambassadors in Canberra and Wellington.2 The Secretary advised those two Ambassadors that the "selection of timing and method of coordination...would be Embassy's prerogative subsequent to request by CINCPAC. CINCPAC would be required to provide full details of proposed training in sufficient time for proper in-country coordination and clearance. Embassy is in best position to determine what 'sufficient time' might be."3 He noted that the intent of his 1 September message was to provide certain embassies with authority to approve training when requested by CINCPAC "without reverting to sometimes lengthy Washington approval procedures."4 The exception to National Security Action Memorandum 316 was sought and approved by the White House for this particular type of training, but if the Ambassadors felt they could not follow guidelines set by the Secretary they could deny CINCPAC's requests or have him seek Washington approval through normal channels. Also, if they envisioned wider host country participation than had been discussed, the special short-cut procedures could not be followed and CINCPAC would be required to seek Washington approval.

Meanwhile, early in May actually, COMUSTDC proposed that a unilateral ARG/SLF exercise be held in Taiwan in late August and early September.5 The U.S. Ambassador in Taipei believed that the matter should be referred to Washington.6 CINCPAC, therefore, sent particulars about the planned exercise to the JCS recommending approval (but noting that his request was made while his 1 January

1. Ibid.
2. SECSTATE 148790/111356Z Sep 70.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. COMUSTDC 040829Z May 70
6. Ibid.

SECRET

148
message regarding ARG/SLF training in general was still pending). The JCS approved the concept for planning as a Significant Exercise and planning proceeded under the name BEARING GUARD. In June that name was changed to BEACH ART and CINCPAC sent more particulars of the planned exercise, which entailed an assault landing, maneuver ashore, and tactical withdrawal, all in an area on the south-west coast of Taiwan.

On 31 July, however, conduct of the parts of the exercise that involved amphibious operations in the vicinity of Taiwan was disapproved by "higher authority." Disapproval, the JCS explained, stemmed "from adverse effects which the exercise might create with respect to delicate state of relations between governments of United States and People's Republic of China." In response to possible queries from the Government of the Republic of China, the explanation should be that budget constraints had forced curtailment of some scheduled training exercises and some ARG/SLF surface units had been rescheduled to assist movement of units during the on-going phased withdrawal of forces from Southeast Asia.

Earlier, in June, CINCPACFLT proposed a unilateral ARG/SLF landing on Mindoro in the Philippines in July. (This area was not considered "sensitive" by the State Department.) CINCPAC concurred and forwarded a request for approval to the JCS. On 16 June the JCS approved the Philippine exercise, after checking with "Washington agencies," providing that any publicity be in very low key. They noted that the basic proposal for such training that CINCPAC had submitted in January was still pending. CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that authority was granted to conduct the exercise.

In the matter of ARG/SLF readiness posture based on considerations other than the training discussed above, several temporary reductions occurred during 1970. Normal readiness posture for the two ARG/SLF was 120 hours. Throughout the period under discussion one ARG/SLF always maintained that readiness posture. There were several cases, however, where one of the ARG/SLF had readiness posture reduced to 168 hours. Some of these reductions were caused by preventive maintenance requirements and some by temporary emergency casualties to the ships.

1. CINCPAC 100140Z May 70.
2. JCS 9604/220211Z May 70.
3. JCS 6280/310002Z Jul 70.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. CINCPAC 120431Z Jun 70.
7. JCS 2719/162243Z Jun 70.
8. CINCPAC 200521Z Jun 70.
transporting the groups. On ARG/SLF was used to provide certain redeployment lift capability from the Republic of Vietnam during 1970.1

(5) A memorandum from the JCS in May advised that JCS approval would be required for any standoff. Accordingly, whenever an ARG/SLF was required for special duty, CINCPAC so advised the JCS, requesting approval.2

Airborne/Air Transportability Training

(5) Budget reductions impacted on airborne/air transportability training in the PACOM in 1970. In April the Military Airlift Command recommended to the Air Force Chief of Staff that such training be limited to support of Continental United States-based ground forces unless more funds were made available.3 The Air Force Chief of Staff approved the recommendation, but he granted additional funds to support training of an infantry division in Europe and stated that action was being taken to arrange supplemental support for troops in the Continental United States from Air Force Reserve and National Guard units.4

(5) CINCPAC protested the exclusion of Hawaii based ground forces from the air transportability training, noting the importance of such training. He recommended that Hawaii based Army and Marine Corps battalions be assigned a high priority among units designated to receive Military Airlift Command joint airborne/air transportability training.5

Petroleum Survey Operations in the East China Sea

(5) Recent petroleum exploration had indicated that the East China Sea Continental Shelf may contain one of the richest oil resources in the world, equaling the Persian Gulf. This discovery raised the issue of the ownership of the Senkaku Islands, a small group of isolated and uninhabited islands situated about 103 miles northeast of Taiwan and about 94 miles from the nearest Ryukyu Island. Both Nationalist China and Japan had claimed sovereignty over those islands; in 1970 they were under U.S. administration as part of the Ryukyus, which were scheduled to revert to Japan in 1972. Their importance to either Nationalist China or Japan was limited to the bearing they would have in delimiting the division of the Continental Shelf under international law.6

1. J3842 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jun-Aug, Nov 70.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 040322Z Jul 70 citing JCSM-261-70 of 28 May 70.
3. MAC 251645Z Apr 70; J3B16 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
4. CSAF 202104Z May 70.
5. CINCPAC 280421Z May 70.
The Taiwan Government had divided the shelf in the East China Sea into five concession zones and signed agreements with several U.S. oil companies granting them exploration rights. The Senkaku Islands fell in Zone 2. In December two oil survey ships, both U.S. owned, were operating in the concession area, which approached Mainland China as close as 40 miles.¹

The oil discovery raised a number of questions for CINCPAC regarding potential military responses in the area. The potential for such hostile acts became even more apparent on 3 December when Communist China laid claim to the entire East China Sea Continental Shelf, including the Senkakus, and subsequently warned that it would never permit the United States or Japan to "plunder" its sea bed or subsoil resources.²

In a message to the JCS on 21 December CINCPAC cited all of these factors and noted that they led to the conclusion that possible harassment of the survey ships or more severe action by Chinese Communist patrol craft could not be discounted. CINCPAC continued:

CINCPAC recommended that the JCS inform the U.S. oil companies that operate in the area regarding the risks involved in possible Chinese Communist

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 210940Z Dec 70.
reactions. He also recommended that survey vessels be asked to provide daily position reports to appropriate U.S. military commanders.¹

(§) One minor encounter occurred near the Senkaku Islands on 16 September when your fishing boats from the Republic of China intruded in waters considered by the Ryukyu Government to be theirs. By the next morning there were five more fishing boats in the area. On 17 September, after a second warning by a Ryukyu Government patrol boat, the Chinese boats left the area without incident.² CINCPAC advised his Representative in the Ryukyus:

In view of the potential ramifications of incidents of this nature, request continue to keep CINCPAC informed of any future developments in this particular case and any other similar incidents which may occur.³

Electronic Warfare Contingency Assets

(§) In 1969 CINCPAC had related his electronic warfare requirements to his major contingency plans, in coordination with his Service components, and forwarded a statement of his requirements for the period 1970-1975 to the JCS on 26 April.⁴ In June 1970 PACOM assets included 18 EB-66 aircraft at Takhli, Thailand and eight at Kadena, Okinawa. Also in June the JCS had approved the redeployment of five EB-66s from the 42d Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron at Takhli to Kadena.⁵

(§) Toward the end of that month, however, CINCPACAF asked CINCPAC concurrence on two proposals designed to help reduce operating costs.⁶ In a message dated 22 June CINCPACAF asked CINCPAC concurrence to inactivate the 19th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (eight EB-66 aircraft) and concurrence to redeploy the five EB-66s scheduled for withdrawal from the 42d Squadron to the Continental United States instead of Kadena in July 1970. He asked CINCPAC to arrange with CINCSTRIKE to provide EB-66 aircraft for WESTPACNORTH contingency requirements.

(§) CINCPACAF explained that the 19th Squadron's contribution to the WESTPACNORTH area during peacetime operations and EB-66 capability to support electronic warfare contingency plan requirements for the Fifth Air Force area did not

¹ Ibid.
² HICOMRY OKINAWA Ryis 160950Z Sep 70; 170532Z Sep 70.
³ CINCPAC 230404Z Sep 70.
⁵ J5158 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
⁶ CINCPACAF 221929Z Jun 70.
appear to be cost effective. Training performed by the EB-66s could be assumed by EB-57s based at Yokota, Japan, he said. He cited certain performance limitations and operational considerations and noted that aircraft could be deployed from the United States within the desired time. Inactivation of the squadron would accrue a savings of about $3.32 million in annual operations and maintenance costs to PACAF.¹

⁽¹⁾ CINCPAC noted that CINCPACAF had addressed WESTPACNORTH contingencies but omitted consideration of contingencies in other PACOM areas; the largest PACOM EB-66 requirement specified in the 1970-75 requirements package was for 27 aircraft under OPlan 41-69, concerned with the Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia. Coordination with the CINCSTRIKE Liaison Officer, in addition, had revealed that CINCSTRIKE did not have EB-66s as available contingency forces.²

⁽²⁾ CINCPAC informed the JCS of CINCPACAF's proposals on 28 June. He stated that he interposed no objection, provided that EB-66 or comparable electronic warfare support aircraft could be obtained from external sources in a timely manner to make up the difference between remaining PACOM assets and the total initial requirements stated in the study for 1970-75. At the same time CINCPAC asked the JCS to determine the feasibility of external support for the PACOM and, if it was feasible, he asked that formal arrangements be concluded to support PACOM requirements.³

⁽³⁾ In July the JCS approved the proposals initiated by CINCPACAF.⁴ They tasked the Air Force Chief of Staff to initiate action to provide the necessary external resources to support PACOM contingency plans.

⁽⁴⁾ Withdrawal of the EB-66 assets depleted CINCPAC's assets to the point where 13 EB-66Es and six EA-6As would constitute PACOM's primary stand-off jamming force.⁵

⁽⁵⁾ In October CINCPAC learned that the Air Force planned to delete all EB-66s from their inventory during the first quarter of FY 72. In a December message to the JCS CINCPAC "strongly recommended that SEA EB-66 assets be retained within PACOM until replaced by comparable EW support system."⁶ He noted that such support was required not only in support of contingency operations but

---
1. Ibid.
2. J5158 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
3. CINCPAC 280013Z Jun 70.
4. JCS 5494/212232Z Jul 70.
5. J358 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
6. CINCPAC 230035Z Dec 70.
in support of current air operations in Southeast Asia such as ARC LIGHT, BUFFALO HUNTER missions, photo reconnaissance, and special electronic intelligence collection missions. He cited support of the Vietnamization program, the need for manned reconnaissance, and the increasing sophistication of the opposing forces' electronic inventory. He continued:

Removal of EB-66 support prior to relief by a tactical ESM/ECM force of equivalent capability will seriously degrade the PACOM EW posture and substantially increase risk of serious losses to forces relying on EW support.¹

He noted that the recently completed draft inspection report on the PACOM by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Inspection Services) had recommended action to insure maintenance of existing Southeast Asia EB-66 electronic warfare support measures capability.²

(5) Early in January 1971 the Air Force Chief of Staff notified CINCPAC that because of such operational requirements and the fact that replacement capabilities were not then available, "the EB-66 program is being extended"³ through FY 72. The Air Force considered this an interim solution to operational needs and stated that "advanced EW jamming support and electronic reconnaissance systems are currently being evaluated to satisfy...requirements.... You will be kept advised of status in obtaining advanced EW support systems."⁴

**Electronic Warfare Training**

(U) CINCPAC engaged in diverse activities related to electronic warfare training in the PACOM in 1970. CINCPAC had learned during the war in Southeast Asia that although electronic warfare made its greatest contribution in the air war over North Vietnam, the importance of electronic warfare in other phases of military operations should not be neglected. CINCPAC, therefore, had endeavored to increase the PACOM Army electronic warfare program by emphasizing electronic warfare in training exercises, including Army requirements in CINCPAC electronic warfare requirements, and coordinating with the CINCUSARPAC electronic warfare staff.⁵

(6) In January 1970 CINCPAC asked CINCUSARPAC to describe the electronic warfare participation planned in certain Army command post exercises.⁶

---

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CSAF 041405Z Jan 71.
4. Ibid.
5. J388 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70 citing CINCPACINST 003430.3 of 5 Sep 69.
6. CINCPAC 132205Z Jan 70.
CINCUSARPAC's reply outlined the objectives and scope of the training to be provided.¹

(S) In a matter involving Air Force training, CINCPAC determined that a need existed for well defined and updated guidance for conducting electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare support measures training flights near unfriendly foreign countries. He believed that electronic warfare officers would be afforded more meaningful training within an unfriendly radar environment than they were exposed to with simulators and friendly radars. Accordingly, on 8 October 1969 he had asked that the JCS approve specific electronic reconnaissance-electronic warfare support measures peripheral training areas and command and control procedures that he recommended.² The JCS reply set forth specific guidance and boundaries within which to conduct such training.³ CINCPAC promulgated guidance to his component commanders in February regarding the training. His guidance defined approved peripheral training areas, listed procedures for conducting training, provided for the protection of training flights, and provided for reporting and coordination of training flights.⁴

(S) CINCPAC admonished that while such flights accomplished realistic training when conducted in a hostile signal environment, they required careful planning and special operational guidance in order that the operations may be conducted without undue hazard. He noted the sensitivity of reconnaissance platforms operating in areas adjacent to communist territory, prerequisite qualifications for crew members, the fact that strict compliance with his instructions was mandatory, and that "extreme caution must be exercised by all participants to avoid incidents during the conduct of ER/ESM training flights."⁵

(S) In still another matter concerned with Air Force training, CINCPAC studied the means of providing training for U.S. and Allied forces in Korea and Taiwan following the deactivation of the 19th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron in August 1970. CINCPAC suggested the use of VMQJ-1 EA-6A electronic countermeasures aircraft which had deployed from Southeast Asia to Iwakuni, Japan in August. He believed that ground radar crews, interceptor pilots, and airborne electronic countermeasures operators would benefit from this training.⁶ CINCPAC-FLT, COMUSTDC, and COMUS Korea all agreed on the desirability and feasibility of EA-6As for training and coordination began to implement the training.⁷

---
1. CINCUSARPAC 292127Z Jan 70.
2. CINCPAC 080109Z Oct 69.
3. CINCPAC 142245Z Feb 70 citing JCS 191409Z Dec 69.
4. CINCPAC 142245Z Feb 70.
5. Ibid.
6. CINCPAC 260005Z Aug 70.
7. J388 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
COMBAT ANGEL

COMBAT ANGEL was an Air Force program to seed slow-fall chaff with drones over high threat areas. It had been held on a 10-day alert status at Davis Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona, prepared for worldwide deployment if required.

In 1970 CINCPAC advised the Air Force that he was considering using the COMBAT ANGEL capability in support of certain contingency war plans as well as in planning for Southeast Asia operations. After sending a staff officer to Davis Monthan to review the COMBAT ANGEL force, CINCPAC concluded that the development of operational concepts and tactics for the drones had fallen behind target dates established by an Air Force test order in June 1969. He asked the Air Force Chief of Staff for information on the status of development of tactics and operational capabilities to facilitate CINCPAC planning for use of the capability. He asked CINCPACAF at the same time for a deployment concept if COMBAT ANGEL was required to support contingency operations in Korea and he asked if the deployment plan for Southeast Asia operations was current.

CINCPACAF advised that there were two DC-130 aircraft and 58 NA/NC 147 drones on hand for the COMBAT ANGEL mission. The three authorized air crews were combat ready and mobility support was 100 percent complete. Testing of the capability in the United States continued in the spring. The Air Force Chief of Staff noted that the Air Staff was continuing to investigate methods of improving the technique and hardware of various subsystems.

Western Pacific North (WESTPACNORTH) Interface Test Plan

The WESTPACNORTH interface was a Defense Department directed program to achieve an interface between the Japanese semi-automated Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system and the U.S. tactical data systems (Navy, Airborne, and Marine) that operated in the WESTPACNORTH area. Provisions had also been made for a manual tie-in of the Korea and Okinawa Air Defense Systems. The Air Force Chief of Staff had been designated as Executive Agent to achieve the interface.

In February 1970 the Electronic Systems Division, acting for the Air Force Chief of Staff, forwarded a WESTPACNORTH draft interface test plan to

2. CINCPAC 042151Z Feb 70.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPACAF 280051Z Feb 70.
5. CSAF 262325Z Mar 70.
6. J3B8 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
CINCPAC for review and comments. The significant points CINCPAC noted in his
review were the failure to provide for an operational evaluation by appropriate
U.S. operational commanders prior to final acceptance of the plan and the lack
of provisions to insure that U.S. tactical data systems involved were not de-
graded due to the interface.¹

CINCPAC sent a representative to a meeting held by the Electronic
Systems Division in April to review the test plan and finalize it. All of
CINCPAC's proposals were included in the final test plan.²

Orientation Tour for Chinese Electronic Warfare Officers

(U) In May CINCPAC received a request from the Chief of the Military Assist-
ance Advisory Group, China for assistance in securing approval and coordination
of a proposed staff visit to the United States for certain key officers in the
Chinese Bureau of Communications. Financed with Chinese funds, the group hoped
to visit electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures schools and conduct
informal discussions with appropriate staff members of CINCPAC, the Air Defense
Command, and the JCS.³ The Chinese officers were in the process of beginning an
electronic warfare program and were interested in the organization, responsibil-
ities, and functions of U.S. electronic warfare staffs.⁴ CINCPAC advised the JCS
that he concurred in the visit.⁵ The JCS also approved the visit and the offi-
cers arrived in San Francisco on 31 June. After visiting several Mainland
schools and bases they arrived in Hawaii on 18 August for briefings and tours of
training and operational sites.⁶

Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion (MIJI)

(U) In 1969 the JCS consolidated the analysis of MIJI incident reporting
worldwide for all Services and assigned it to the Air Force Special Communica-
tions Center for a one-year trial period to end in July 1970.⁷ In April 1970,

¹ Ltr, CINCPAC to Commander, Electronic Systems Division, Laurence G. Hanscom
Field, Bedford, Massachusetts 01730, 2 Apr 70, Subj: Western Pacific North
(WESTPACNORTH) Draft Interface Test Plan (U).
² J388 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
³ CINCPAC 270507Z May 70.
⁴ J643 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
⁵ CINCPAC 270507Z May 70.
⁶ J643 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
⁷ CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. III, pp. 145-147, which also contains
definitions of the MIJI terms.
however, the JCS asked for a review of the program prior to 5 May, citing budgetary actions.¹

(6) CINCPAC strongly endorsed continuation of the project. He said that the joint service program had been of operational value to the entire PACOM and "it is felt that the full potential and widespread utilization of the resultant products are only beginning to be realized."² He considered the MIJI program the most timely and cost effective method of providing a centralized collection and analysis facility. He cited a number of representative examples of how the program had been of operational value to the PACOM. He noted that if the existing program were discontinued, the Services would have to revert to separate reporting systems again, a plan inconsistent with a unified commander's requirement because of lack of standardization, Service orientation, a regional approach, and unnecessary and costly duplication resulting in an inferior product. He strongly supported the need for a worldwide service and noted that the Air Force Special Communications Center had clearly demonstrated its ability to adequately accomplish assigned tasks; he recommended that the center continue to serve as executive agent.³

(6) In July the JCS decision to continue the program was announced. It was to be a centralized, jointly manned program with the Air Force named as executive agent. Additionally, the Air Force was asked to revise and promulgate, in coordination with the other Services, a joint instruction for reporting MIJI incidents.⁴

(U) In November CINCPAC received a draft of the proposed new reporting format for comment. CINCPAC concurred in the content of the draft proposal and recommended that a standard type format be adopted in which the required information was asked for and the report originator merely filled in the appropriate responses. He also recommended that instructions permit field commanders to reproduce local forms containing only that information pertaining to their particular operations.⁵

(6) To provide refresher training for PACOM personnel, the Air Force Special Communications Center sent a briefing team throughout the theater in May to provide MIJI information and encourage maximum participation by all units in reporting MIJI incidents.⁶ Such a team had also visited the PACOM in 1969 but the

1. JCS 579/110158Z Apr 70.
2. CINCPAC 060339Z May 70.
3. Ibid.
4. J643 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70 citing SM-528-70 of 7 Jul 70.
5. ADMIN CINCPAC 180308Z Dec 70.
6. J643 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
normal turnover of personnel required continuing educational efforts.¹

**Improvement of Reporting Procedures Sought**

(U) Work continued at all levels of command in 1970 to reduce reporting requirements and simplify and speed to their destination those reports deemed essential. Consolidation and simplification were goals of the Joint Reporting Structure (JRS), designed by the JCS to replace their Joint Operational Reporting System (JOPREP) and consolidate the information requirements of the National Command authorities, the JCS, the Services, and the Defense Agencies.²

(U) A parallel program to supplement but not duplicate the JRS was the PACOM Unified Reporting Structure (PURS). It consolidated and coordinated the reporting requirements of CINCPAC and his component commanders. Developed in response to a JCS requirement, the CINCPAC Instruction implementing PURS was issued on 8 June.³

(6) Timeliness of reporting remained a matter of major concern to CINCPAC, especially in regard to the reporting of events or incidents. Such reporting from Korea received particular attention in 1970. CINCPAC had prescribed a reporting goal of 5 minutes within the PACOM from the time an incident occurred until receipt of the voice report at CINCPAC.⁴ In response to a CINCPAC query, and Washington interest in the matter, COMUS Korea furnished on 3 September some median incident reporting times that had been experienced on incidents involving Republic of Korea forces. These times by type of incident were air, 15 minutes; sea, 45 minutes; and ground, 2 hours and 45 minutes.⁵

(6) Following two incidents involving U.S. Forces and subsequent delays in reporting, one in September and another in November, CINCPAC urged COMUS Korea to report to him more expeditiously.⁶

(U) Work continued throughout the year on the Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT), a JCS JRS report that was being revised. The new FORSTAT was expected to be implemented in June 1971, although the existing report satisfied

---

3. CINCPACINST 5214.2, 8 Jun 70, Subj: PACOM Unified Reporting Structure (PURS).
5. COMUSKOREA 030111Z Sep 70.
6. J3C42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70; ADMIN CINCPAC 252234Z Nov 70.
CINCPAC's requirements. The Unit Identification System Report (UCODE) was being consolidated with the FORSTAT. CINCPAC consulted his component and subordinate unified commanders regarding the revised FORSTAT and consolidated their views in his submission to the JCS in December. The frequency of proposed report submissions was of particular concern to his commanders, CINCPAC noted. He also noted that a requirement for the JCS to receive data not more than 24 hours old could result in misunderstanding and suggested that instructions be changed to read that reports to the JCS be submitted once every 24 hours.

In a further attempt to cut down the number of reports required, CINCPAC concurred in November in a proposal by COMUSMACV to discontinue or combine the Weekly Assessment of Military Position Report and the Weekly Forecast of Operations Report. These had been required by the JCS since May 1968 to apprise U.S. negotiators in Paris and Washington of changes in offensive operations that might alter peace negotiations. The JCS concurred in the recommendation for a single report. On 11 December CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACV to terminate the two reports and to initiate a single report titled "The Weekly Forecast/Assessment of Military Operations" beginning on 19 December to be submitted weekly to the JCS, CINCPAC, and the negotiators in Paris.

CINCPAC also completed a detailed and comprehensive technical review of the Combat Activities (COACT) Reporting System in 1970. Findings cast doubt on the value of retaining the system in its existing form. The information was not timely or accurate and the costs were prohibitively high for the benefits received. A principal recommendation for either a reduction or a replacement of the system was submitted to the JCS. The JCS concurred in the deletion of 39 data elements and initiated action for a working level meeting in November to address remaining problems. During that meeting, at the Office of the JCS, agreement was reached on replacement of the COACT by a more efficient system based on the 7th Air Force's Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB). Implementing

1. J3C431 History, Ho CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
4. CINCPAC 102041Z Nov 70.
5. JCS 7543/082107Z Dec 70.
6. CINCPAC 112344Z Dec 70.
actions were received from the JCS\(^1\) and disseminated to all concerned.

(\(\S\)) Means of transmission of operational reports also came under study. Certain closely held military operations generated lengthy afteraction reports that were transmitted through the Special Intelligence Communications Network (SPINTCOMM), a system not designed as, say, the AUTODIN (Automatic Digital Network) was to handle large volumes of data. Use of the SPINTCOMM, a manual, low speed system, resulted in late and sometimes garbled reports that saturated the network. CINCPAC supported the JCS concept that only the planning and preparation phases of sensitive operations and the first operational report on them be sent on special security channels and that subsequent reports be transmitted through general service or telecon systems.\(^2\)

PACOM SIOP Force Application Review Group Meetings

(\(\S\)) Two regular meetings\(^3\) of the PACOM Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) Force Application Review Group (SFARG) were held in 1970, one in January and the second in July. These were the first meetings held under provisions of a new CINCPAC instruction,\(^4\) which provided for expanded membership in the group, including flag level representation from CINCPAC and his component commanders, and greater initiative for PACOM SIOP planners. Each meeting was concerned with the SIOP revision to be effective for the half of the year (January to June, July to December) following the half in which the meeting was held. Each meeting consisted of two sessions; the first was attended by staff personnel tasked to prepare the SIOP application, the second by senior staff representatives to review and approve the force application that had been prepared.\(^5\)

(\(\S\)) During the July meeting a major item for discussion was the declining PACOM force posture and concepts for employment of these forces in consideration of the rapidly growing enemy target system. Policy guidance developed at the January 1970 meeting was rapidly being overtaken by events and therefore undergoing major revision.\(^6\)

(\(\S\)) An ancillary body to the SFARG was the PACOM Nuclear Planning Group (PNPG), which had been established to assist the SFARG in the preparation of

--
1. JCS 051439Z Dec 70.
2. Point Paper, J627, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 70, Subj: Communications Channels for Operational Reporting (U).
3. The 23d and 24th meetings of the SFARG.
4. CINCPACINST 003121.8D of 10 Dec 69 cited in J3B721 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
5. J3B72 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Feb and Jul 70.
6. J3B72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
PACOM nuclear force application and to act as a planning staff for actions associated with PACOM nuclear planning. Guidance developed by the group, following approval by CINCPAC, was promulgated as an addition to the CINCPAC Standing Operating Procedure for Nuclear Operations.1

CINCPAC Military Damage Assessment Responsibilities

(9) Certain organizational and operational procedural changes occurred in the PACOM in 1970 in the matter of Military Damage Assessment. CINCPAC aligned his damage assessment program in response to JCS guidance. One of the major changes was that of assigning the CINCPAC staff with direct responsibility for the collection, assessment, and reporting of Military Damage Assessment data during crisis and exercise management periods—a task previously assigned to CINCPACAF.2 To accomplish this new assignment, CINCPAC established a Nuclear Damage Information Center as an adjunct to the Battle Staff at the CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility at Kunia. This center, to be manned by Operations Division personnel 24 hours a day during wartime or exercise periods, was to serve as the focal point for Military Damage Assessment in the PACOM, to provide continuous analysis of PACOM residual capabilities, and to insure the passing of essential information to National Command Authorities.3

(9) The first test of the new procedures occurred in September during JOLLY ROGER'70, discussed elsewhere in this chapter of the History. Overall results of the test indicated that Military Damage Assessment activities were "successful throughout the command and provide promise of competence during future MDA activation periods."4

Manned Space Flight Recovery Support

(U) APOLLO 13 was launched from Cape Kennedy on 11 April 1970 on a scheduled 10-day lunar mission. Enroute to the moon on 13 April, approximately 180,000 miles from earth, an explosion occurred in the service module followed by loss of fuel, oxygen, and power. The flight aborted and a free-return trajectory was established with splashdown targeted in the mid-Pacific.5

(9) When the emergency condition was discovered CINCPAC advised6 all PACOM agencies to review his basic operation order on manned space flight contingency

1. J3B72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
2. CINCPACINST 03401.3E of 10 Aug 70 cited in J3B722 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
3. J3B722 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
4. Ibid.
5. J3B222 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
6. CINCPAC 150214Z Apr 70.
The President and the APOLO 13 astronauts. Below, Admiral McCain and Hawaii's Governor leave the platform as the astronauts and their families greet the crowd that came to the award ceremony.

recovery\(^1\) and be prepared to implement its provisions.

(U) The lunar module provided the means of survival and return for the astronauts and a normal splashdown took place on 18 April. The astronauts, James A. Lovell, Frew W. Haise, and John S. Swigert, were flown to Honolulu and presented with Freedom Medals by President Nixon with Admiral McCain in

---

1. CINCPAC 080230Z Mar 69.
UNCLASSIFIED

attendance.\(^1\) APOLLO 13 was the only manned spaceflight during 1970.

**Disaster Relief**

(U) In mid-October TYPHOON JOAN struck the Philippines and in mid-November a devastating cyclone struck East Pakistan. PACOM forces participated in relief operations in both cases.\(^2\)

(U) Special communications support for the Pakistan relief program was required and the JCS asked CINCPAC if he could provide it. CINCPAC found that there were available assets in the Republic of Vietnam and tasked COMUSMACV to provide men and equipment. There was some misunderstanding in this regard as two different requirements had been stated and the U.S. Army Vietnam was prepared to fill the larger when CINCPAC discovered their plans. A smaller requirement was the final one stated. CINCPAC unravelled the matter and properly tailored teams were dispatched to Dacca, Pakistan.\(^3\)

---

1. J3B222 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
2. J3B42 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70; J3B12 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70; J4712 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Nov and Dec 70.
3. J623 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Nov and Dec 70.
SECTION IX - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Funds for Psychological Operations Programs

CINCPAC approved the Fiscal Year 1971 psychological operations budget program package, including Fiscal Year 1972 forecast requirements, on 8 January 1970 and forwarded the program to CINCUSARPAC for budget action and implementation. The costs are summarized below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Expense</th>
<th>FY 71 Budget Totals</th>
<th>FY 72 Forecast Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>$1,213,200</td>
<td>$1,213,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Benefits</td>
<td>101,000</td>
<td>101,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Travel</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>54,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation of Things</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Charges</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing and Reproduction</td>
<td>4,850,265</td>
<td>4,814,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Purchased Services</td>
<td>373,075</td>
<td>298,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Supplies</td>
<td>2,316,256</td>
<td>2,226,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Transportation Charges</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>305,300</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$9,244,096</td>
<td>$8,738,370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Budget constraints impacted on this planning, however, as they had done the year before. On 12 September CINCUSARPAC informed CINCPAC that the FY 71 program could not be supported at the planned level. There was a shortfall of $944,000 and the revised planning level would be $8.3 million. CINCPAC asked his subordinate commanders to review their requests and the psychological operations program budget was adjusted in conformity with command priorities. On 31 October CINCPAC asked CINCUSARPAC to modify FY 71 program support as he outlined.

Programs for the various areas were affected as follows:

1. CINCPAC O82309Z Jan 70.
3. CINCUSARPAC 120312Z Sep 70.
4. CINCPAC 310320Z Oct 70.
5. J5621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>FY 71 Program</th>
<th>FY 71 Adjusted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Korea</td>
<td>$1,360,202</td>
<td>$1,042,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Japan</td>
<td>44,580</td>
<td>49,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Commissioner, Ryukyus</td>
<td>243,612</td>
<td>151,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSTDC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>3,380,310</td>
<td>3,382,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACTHAI</td>
<td>224,016</td>
<td>147,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI</td>
<td>743,720</td>
<td>718,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC (Special)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>628,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PSYOP Group and Detachments</td>
<td>3,247,656</td>
<td>2,179,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$9,244,096</strong></td>
<td><strong>$8,300,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
leaflet drops there was a difference of opinion, some favoring resumption of the drops and some believing that the price of resumption of the drops would be "unacceptably high." \(^1\)

\((T S)\) CINCPAC raised the matter again on 21 October when he recommended that the Chairman of the JCS obtain interagency approval for CINCPAC to commence, on a limited basis, overt wind drift leaflet operations against North Vietnam to capitalize on the psychological advantage gained by a recent peace proposal by President Nixon.\(^2\)

\((T S)\) The JCS advised on 27 November that the Secretary of State had again decided that leaflet operations should not then be conducted. The JCS noted, however, that a study on the matter by the Secretary had been forwarded to U.S. Ambassadors in Saigon and Vientiane and to the U.S. delegation in Paris. Any resumption of full or limited special situation leaflet drops as proposed by CINCPAC would be dependent on a decision emanating from examination of this study.\(^3\)

**Assistance for Cambodia**

\((T S)\) Following President Nixon's orders to send U.S. Forces into Cambodia in late April 1970, CINCPAC on 4 May sought authority to employ specific psychological operations initiatives in a PACOM-wide psychological offensive "designed to take advantage of the diplomatic and military opportunities offered."\(^4\) The initiatives recommended included a CINCPAC-managed theater psychological operations offensive in support of U.S. and Vietnamese air and ground initiatives in Cambodia and the Lon Nol government, which CINCPAC believed were essential "if the current situation is to be exploited to its fullest extent."\(^5\) The main thrust of the program was to be against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces, but would also entail a psychological bolstering of the resolve of the Cambodian people and forces to defend their homeland in the face of increasing communist aggression.

2. J56 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
3. Ibid.
5. Point Paper, J5621, Hq CINCPAC, 8 May 70, Subj: PSYOP Initiatives to Exploit the Cambodian Situation (U) citing CINCPAC 040329Z May 70.
The concept of operations involved overt and covert COMUSMACV and RVNAF assets in direct support of ground elements in contact with enemy forces in Cambodia and an expanded CAMEL PATH leaflet campaign (discussed below). Psychological assets from PACOM other than those in support of COMUSMACV would be employed in direct support of the U.S. Ambassador in Phnom Penh. This support would include the expertise required for the in-country development and coordination of Cambodian radio, television, and printed media information and propaganda programs in consonance with the national interests of Cambodia, the United States, and the Republic of Vietnam. Programs already in effect were to be maintained or expanded.

The interdepartmental psychological operations community in Washington, however, at that time "was not receptive to the JCS/CINCPAC proposals." CINCPAC actions to assist Cambodia, therefore, consisted of limited support for Radio Cambodia and leaflet and loudspeaker operations. Radio operations consisted of aerial rebroadcasts of Radio Cambodia, initially from Vietnamese airspace and then from Thai airspace. The initial rebroadcast operation was conducted by USN aircraft, PROJECT JENNY, diverted from Vietnam operations and nicknamed Operation SHIP GALLEY. USAF aircraft later assumed this mission and the name was changed to COMMANDO BUZZ. Certain ground radio transmitting equipment was also loaned to Cambodia and Cambodian technicians were trained in its operation.

The COMMANDO BUZZ rebroadcasting technique was to be a temporary operation until a more suitable ground facility could be provided to combat Radio Hanoi and Peking propaganda broadcasting. After delays caused by diplomatic considerations and clearance delays, CINCPAC ordered deployment of a 50-kilowatt air-transportable transmitter and its operators to Aranyaprathet, Thailand, where a suitable radio site had been located. The operation was called FRANK APPROACH. The station began rebroadcasting on 25 December and COMMANDO BUZZ terminated operations the same day.

Meanwhile, the installation of transmitters in Cambodia itself was being studied. The Navy's PROJECT JENNY assets were available and CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the matter of their use in Cambodia be discussed at the

1. Ibid.
3. J562 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
5. J562 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
SECTION X - JOINT EXERCISES

Joint Exercises

The two factors that impacted most on training and readiness exercises in the PACOM in 1970 were the ubiquitous budget constraints and a growing concern by the State Department of the sensitivity of such U.S. operations, particularly when they were performed close to communist territory or when they exercised capabilities of a nature considered more offensive than defensive.

CINCPAC had developed a growing awareness of the attitude of the State Department back in 1969, at which time he had studied certain restrictions imposed on his operations and exercises. The trend was toward stringent requirements for review and control at the national level and within State Department channels. This growing Washington concern, "real, anticipated, or imagined," appeared to stem not only from "interpretation of undefined U.S. policy, but also from congressional and media pressure." Continuation of the State Department's line of reasoning could be used to preclude certain types of exercises within the PACOM, which would impact unfavorably upon the future training and readiness of PACOM forces.

CINCPAC therefore took the question of the need for certain kinds of exercises to his component commanders and his subordinate unified commanders in Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. He asked them about the importance of combined and unilateral training on foreign shores in the maintenance of required force readiness posture and the operational readiness problems that would evolve from undue restrictions on the conduct of such exercises.

CINCPACFLT replied, outlining the impact that could be anticipated on each of his several kinds of forces. In summary he said, "Failure to continue to seek low key training opportunities on/in friendly Asian shores/territorial waters may be misinterpreted [by friendly nations as an indication of our intention to renege on treaty or agreement commitments], will result in derogation of various Navy and Marine capabilities, and will impact adversely on readiness of friendly Asian nations to meet contingencies."

2. ADMIN CINCPAC 212059Z Dec 69.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 220620Z Jan 70.
5. CINCPACFLT 102214Z Jan 70.
CINCPACAF noted that problems encountered in fulfilling responsibilities in support of exercises had emphasized the "intricate and complicated nature of all combined planning and operations." He said that problems concerning techniques and procedures for managing logistic support, weapons systems, lines of communication, facilities, and command and control, among other things, had become apparent. Much of the ambiguity and confusion at the planning level could be resolved by conferences, working parties, or direct communication, but the operators did not "enjoy this same opportunity." The only method an operator had to gain experience and to identify or solve his problems was through either real or simulated implementation of existing plans. "To deny this simulation is to deny evaluation," which made the planning alone of limited value. "Through evaluation or simulation of the total effort by limited scale exercises, many problems, unforeseen in the planning stages, are identified and consequently rectified prior to real plan implementation." Evaluation, through exercises, CINCPACAF concluded, "is the key factor which completes the planning process and therefore must be continued."  

COMUS Korea's reply was in the same vein. "Any restrictions imposed on the conduct of PACOM combined or unilateral exercises in Korea will degrade command staff readiness to plan and execute contingency plans involving assistance from out of country forces." He noted the importance of exercises because of the rapid turnover of personnel in Korea. Finally, COMUS Korea said, "these exercises contribute significant political/psychological benefits to the United States by vividly demonstrating our rapid reaction capability."  

COMUSMACTHAI's comments also supported the requirement for continuing exercises, noting that combined exercises were beneficial to the Royal Thai Armed Forces "in that they tend to broaden the experience base of all participants." He also noted that an "overt indication of PACOM force readiness for SEATO [the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] external aggression contingencies, through periodic exercises, would seem essential to the credibility of SEATO itself. In general, such exercises should be planned, carried out, and widely publicized."  

While the importance of exercises was agreed on throughout the military community in the PACOM, restrictions continued to be applied in Washington. In

1. CINCPACAF 121948Z Jan 70.
2. Ibid.
3. COMUSKOREA 121255Z Jan 70.
4. Ibid.
5. COMUSMACTHAI 120700Z Jan 70.
6. SEATO exercises are discussed in Chapter III of this history.
7. COMUSMACTHAI 120700Z Jan 70.
1969 the JCS had already established certain reporting procedures for operations in areas around the communist periphery or other politically sensitive areas. Early in 1970 the Department of State provided a list of geographic areas "currently considered politically sensitive with respect to military operations." In the PACOM these were the Sea of Japan northwest of a line between the Korean Demilitarized Zone and La Perouse Straits; the Yellow Sea; the Formosa Strait; and waters contiguous to China's territorial seas. The JCS advised the commanders of all unified and specified commands: "Special care should be taken in scheduling military operations which would constitute significant changes in the type, size, or frequency of the US military presence in the above geographic areas. Where a question arises as to the propriety of a particular military operation in any of those areas, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be notified so that the views of the Department of State may be sought." CINCPAC, in turn, advised his component and subordinate unified commanders of these sensitive areas, operations in which required prior CINCPAC approval.

1. JCS 072147Z Jan 70.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 150007Z Jan 70.
6. CINCPAC 060339Z Feb 70.
to the Republic of China and asked for CINCPAC's comments. The reply from CINCPAC's headquarters emphasized the worth of the exercise series, submitted possible alternative exercises, and recommended that a decision regarding the future of the exercises be deferred until the results of the test in progress could be reviewed.

The JCS disapproved CINCPAC's recommendation on 27 October. They said that bilateral exercises were encouraged but that the concepts employed must be consistent with the U.S. bilateral treaty obligations. There was no objection to exercises that emphasized air defense, antisubmarine warfare, naval operations, or command post exercises and the JCS asked that CINCPAC develop such a replacement exercise for the following year.

CINCPAC asked COMUSTDC to develop the required exercises in coordination with CINCPAC's component commanders. He noted that the exercises he considered best suited to the objectives were a command post exercise (similar to the FOCUS LENS series conducted annually in Korea) and (or) an amphibious exercise in which the U.S. amphibious task force simulated the aggressor and the Nationalist Chinese forces the defenders.

1. J3B16 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 230454Z Jul 70.
4. JCS 4516/272140Z Oct 70.
5. Ibid.
6. CINCPAC 302223Z Oct 70.
Korea

(3) FOCUS LENS was a command post exercise conducted by the CINC of the United Nations Command (UNC) from 12 to 22 October 1970. On 23 July CINCPAC approved the concept for the exercise and advised that his command center would participate, to include simulation of JCS implementation directives, to the extent it didn't interfere with real world activities.1 The JCS authorized the UNC Commonwealth Liaison mission to participate, at their request, as they had the year before.2

(3) FOAL EAGLE, originally scheduled as a combined U.S.-Republic of Korea unconventional warfare command post exercise, was changed to a field training exercise and was held in October.3 The objectives of the exercise were to gain experience in combined unconventional warfare procedures and techniques, evaluate the operational proficiency of participating personnel, and identify any problem areas.4

(3) GOLDEN DRAGON was a combined U.S.-Republic of Korea amphibious landing exercise held in April.5

Philippines

(3) FORTRESS LIGHT was a combined U.S.-Philippine amphibious exercise held on Mindoro in the Philippines in October.6 Certain cryptographic material necessary for communications security was needed by the Philippine participants. As SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) equipment was not available, CINCPAC-FLT asked for permission to release some from his resources. The Director of the National Security Agency approved the release and CINCPAC so notified CINCPAC-FLT.7

1. CINCPAC 230535Z Jul 70.
2. JCS 6379/312020Z Jul 70.
3. J3B16 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
5. CINCPAC 042145Z Feb 70.
6. CINCPAC 251914Z Jun 70.
7. CINCPAC 180304Z Sep 70.
Tests and Exercises at PACOM Headquarters

Peacetime Emergency Situation Exercises

(§) In 1969 CINCPAC had begun a series of peacetime emergency situation exercises to test command, control, and communications procedures and to insure expeditious reaction to emergency situations authorized by Rules of Engagement and CINCPAC instructions.² They were to be as realistic and authentic as practical, but the movement of forces was simulated. The scenarios for the various exercises depicted a wide range of possible incidents.

(§) Six such exercises were conducted in 1970: FORMAL GUN on 23 January, FROSTED RIDER on 12 May, FRANTIC FALL on 29 June, FREEWAY HAWK on 30 July, FREEWAY JOCKEY on 25 August, and FREEWAY KOP on 9 November.³

(§) CINCPAC also participated in two of the peacetime emergency situation exercises conducted by the Commander in Chief of the Alaska Command. Similar to CINCPAC's exercises, these served also to validate the memorandum of agreement between the two commanders concerning responsibilities relative to Alaska and its contiguous waters. The two exercises were END RUN/ENAMEL SPEAR on 3 June and END RUN/ENAMEL BEAR on 23 September.⁴

POLO HAT

(§) The POLO HAT series of JCS-conducted exercises continued in 1970. These consisted of the transmission of emergency action messages to measure the timeliness and accuracy of receipt at the executing level.⁵ Several variations in outages of various communications systems were introduced so that alternate means of transmission were used. In the exercise conducted 19-22 October one of the more significant results was the formulation of a contingency plan for using the high frequency Navy/Air Force Voice Cross talk Network for passing emergency messages.⁶ Of particular note to the Airborne Command Post participants was the effective use of very low frequency to pass a message from the Mainland to the

1. JCS 2967/072305Z Oct 70.
3. J3C21 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of May-Aug, Nov 70. These submissions contain scenarios and objectives for each exercise.
4. J3C2 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jun and Sep 70.
6. J3C2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
PACOM. In another test on 8 December the major degradation of normal communications systems was again assumed. This test was designed to evaluate communications procedural changes implemented as a result of the October test.

JOLLY ROGER

(5) Exercise JOLLY ROGER 1-70 was a PACOM-wide (less Southeast Asia) command post exercise conducted 1-5 September 1970. The exercise was notable in that it was the first general war command post exercise in recent years in which extensive participation was required of Western Pacific commands.

(5) Exercise objectives were to improve the overall general war readiness of the PACOM, ascertain discrepancies in existing plans and procedures, and prepare command center teams and planning group personnel for participation in the JCS-sponsored Exercise HIGH HEELS to be held early in 1971. There was wide participation throughout the PACOM.

(6) All exercise objectives were generally attained. Of particular value were the lessons learned in manning, equipping, and organizing the communications

1. J3C1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
2. J3C2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.

7. CINCPAC Exercise-OPlan 1-70 (JOLLY ROGER 1-70).
8. Subordinate command participation included CINCPACAF and numbered Air Force commanders, CINCUSARPAC and major area commanders, CINCPACFLT and type/fleet/sea transfer commanders, COMUS Korea and his Service component commanders, COMUSTDC and his air component commander, COMUS Japan, and the CINCPAC Representatives to the Philippines, Guam/TTPI, and the Ryukyus.
center at the Alternate Command Facility at Kunia to cope with the vast amount of communications record traffic entailed in an exercise of such scope. Of perhaps equal importance was the orientation provided to personnel in the Western Pacific who had not previously participated in an exercise of this nature.

One of the CINCPAC's Battle Staff teams went to the Alternate Command Facility on Guam to monitor and advise facility personnel during the exercise. This was the first time personnel from the Guam facility had operated in this regard without substantial augmentation from the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post. Evaluation of the exercise revealed that there was "still much to be done to improve the plant of the facility but completion of construction currently programmed will greatly alleviate this problem." The problem of a shortage of sufficient personnel to perform Alternate Command Facility duties along with their normally assigned duties during periods of advanced readiness was still existent and a requirement for some augmentation would continue to exist.

This exercise provided the first test for revised PACOM Military Damage Assessment procedures. Analysis following the test indicated that the overall results of such activities were successful throughout the command.

CINCUSARPAC, as a JOLLY ROGER exercise critique item, recommended that similar command post exercises be conducted on an annual basis approximately midway between the worldwide HIGH HEELS exercises in order to enhance PACOM readiness and performance. Current planning was to continue to conduct JOLLY ROGER exercises on an annual basis in the August-September time frame.

FOOTBALL POST

The first in an anticipated series of FOOTBALL POST exercises was conducted on 30 November. This was designed to exercise the procedures used when requesting and acting on nuclear selective release requests, to evaluate the time required for the preparation and processing of selective release messages, and to improve the responsiveness of the PACOM command, control, and communications system.

A CINCPAC control group simulated participation by the National Command Authorities, the Services, and other unified and specified commands.

1. J3CI History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
2. J3CI History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
3. Ibid.
4. J3B722 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
5. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
FORECAST STORM

Nine exercises in the FORECAST STORM series were conducted in 1970. These were emergency communications exercises to test both the communications system and the procedures designed to insure expeditious relay of information. They transmitted a simulated Condition One Abort by an aircraft in the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program. The standard for receipt of voice relayed information at CINCPAC was five minutes.[1]

1. J3 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Aug-Nov 70.
SECTION XI - RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS

Significant Research and Development Problem Areas in the PACOM

(§) CINCPAC submitted two in the continuing series of semiannual statements of PACOM research and development problem areas, one in January and a second in August. Many of the problems and deficiencies cited had already been noted in previous reports.  

(§) The first report was submitted on 27 January. CINCPAC advised the JCS that the most significant problem was the inability to detect mines and booby traps. He also emphasized the need for a high speed language translation capability because of its application to Vietnamization. A third critical area was the need for defensive systems to counter optically/visually directed antiaircraft artillery weapons. In addition to these, CINCPAC identified eight other significant problem areas.

(§) The JCS indicated in March that they shared CINCPAC's concern and provided information on two of the critical problems noted. The Services had been asked, to review programs for mine and booby trap detection so that promising programs could receive added attention and be introduced into Southeast Asia. The translation problem was being studied by a committee chaired by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The first objective was the standardization of technical terms to improve the quality of translation.

(§) CINCPAC submitted his second report for 1970 on 26 August. The two most prominent problems identified were the personnel casualties from mines and booby traps and the lack of an all-weather air capability. Next in relative importance were the antisubmarine warfare/surface ship survivability problems and the requirement for artillery delivered anti-tank/anti-personnel mines. In addition to these high priority items CINCPAC cited the following significant problem areas:

Aircraft defense against small calibre, optically/visually directed antiaircraft artillery.

Air-to-ground ordnance delivery accuracy.

2. J3 Brief No. 41-70, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Mar 70 of MJCS 70-70, Subj: PACOM Significant Research and Development Problem Areas (U).
3. Ibid.
4. J3OR History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
Airborne real time personnel/material detection and ordnance delivery capability.

Infrared detection and countermeasures.

Fighter aircraft radar lookdown/shootdown capability.

Reconnaissance.

Ground based personnel/material detection and identification capability.

Language translator.¹

First Annual Review of ARPA Projects Within the PACOM

(U) The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was a Defense Department research and development agency under the direction and supervision of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Field units of that agency had been operating in foreign countries of the PACOM under only informal guidance from CINCPAC until 1969. In June of that year the Secretary of Defense authorized CINCPAC to establish policy governing the projects in foreign countries within the PACOM and CINCPAC promulgated such guidance in an instruction dated 13 October 1969.² Proposals for ARPA projects to be pursued in the PACOM were to be provided to CINCPAC for his concurrence. The terms of reference established included the proviso that projects being conducted in the PACOM would be "reviewed periodically, at least annually, by CINCPAC and ARPA together, with respect to their continuation, expansion, consolidation, redirection or termination."³

(U) The first such review of PACOM ARPA projects was held 9-11 March 1970 at CINCPAC's Headquarters at Camp Smith. (Only projects conducted under Project AGILE were reviewed.) In a report to the Secretary of Defense following the conference CINCPAC stated that he endorsed the continuation of on-going projects, many of which were nearing completion; he reserved judgment on proposed new projects pending receipt of firm information about them.⁴ In line with the general de-emphasis in the Far East in the years ahead, he said, "it is recommended that ongoing projects be brought to a close on a speed up basis when possible. The

¹ Ibid.
³ Ibid.
CINCPAC intends in the future to review new project proposals for compatibility with the aim of reduced direct military involvement in the Far East.  

During the meeting the Director of ARPA Project AGILE made three proposals that were subsequently examined in detail. In his report to the Secretary of Defense on the conference CINCPAC listed those proposals and his comments on them, as follows.

The first proposal was to improve communications between CINCPAC and the ARPA by establishing an ARPA liaison office at Headquarters PACOM. CINCPAC thought that assignment of such an officer (in grade O-6) had "considerable appeal." In the light of the objective of reducing defense spending, however, he recommended that the proposal be held in abeyance. Methods CINCPAC recommended for improved information exchange involved lengthening visits by CINCPAC staff members to Washington when necessary and beginning dialogue earlier between CINCPAC's subordinates and ARPA representatives to exchange information when proposals were being formulated instead of the present method of review of finalized project proposals.

The second proposal was to provide ARPA support for the Services in a training program to develop managerial skills needed in the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces to enhance successful operation of logistic and maintenance facilities. ARPA proposed to get the program started with the Services assuming responsibility after a one year period. CINCPAC considered this proposal timely and aimed at a recognized deficiency. He recommended that early consideration be given to implementation of the proposal with inputs from the Services forming the basis of whether or not to proceed.

The third proposal was to conduct research related to CINCPAC responsibilities in view of National Security Decision Memorandum 20, the Stennis amendment pertaining to relevancy of research, reduced U.S. presence in some countries, and maximum economy in Military Assistance Program matters—all of which bore upon internal defense. CINCPAC said that he was exploring ways to strengthen the military operations research capabilities on the staffs of the PACOM subordinate unified commanders for the analysis of problems of an operational and planning nature directly related to their respective command missions. "This expanded program should complement the ARPA/AGILE research and analysis efforts oriented toward the development and application of new technology to problems of internal security within PACOM countries."

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
(U) CINCPAC told the Secretary of Defense in conclusion that the conference had been valuable in establishing a closer relationship between his staff and the ARPA and that its success supported existing plans for an annual conference. It was intended to invite the Services to the next meeting, he noted.

**Scientific Advisory Group Activities**

(U) The Scientific Advisory Group in the Operations Division was one of those staff elements that worked most frequently in support of other elements that had primary responsibility. They contributed to programs, projects, or studies frequently, therefore, that are covered elsewhere in the history. Budget constraints had impacted on the size of the group, reducing the time and expertise available to prepare the number of formal or informal papers that had been produced earlier. A list of working papers prepared by the group in 1970 follows. All titles were unclassified; the paper on Attack Sortie Distribution was CONFIDENTIAL, the rest were SECRET.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Paper</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date(s)</th>
<th>Handling Restriction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-70</td>
<td>A Concept for Aerial Surveillance in RVN</td>
<td>Feb 1970</td>
<td>(Limited Distribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-70</td>
<td>Preliminary Analysis of Operations in Cambodia</td>
<td>Mar 1970</td>
<td>(Limited Distribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-70</td>
<td>Attack Sortie Distribution</td>
<td>22 May 1970</td>
<td>(Limited Distribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-70</td>
<td>Interdiction Operations in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>26 May 1970</td>
<td>(Controlled Distribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-70</td>
<td>A Review of Air Activity in Cambodia</td>
<td>1 Jul thru 15 Sep 1970</td>
<td>(Controlled Distribution)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION XII - LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES

CINCPAC's Logistics Authority Further Defined

(U) In February CINCPAC sought to confirm with the JCS what he had believed was his directive authority and responsibility in the field of logistics. The JCS interpretation, however, was quite different and more restrictive.

(U) The matter had arisen over CINCPAC's decision that the best and most efficient use of certain resources would be attained by the transfer of a field hospital in Thailand from Army to Air Force operation, without reimbursement. CINCPAC believed that he had the authority to do this, based on those sections of JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces that had to do with specific guidance on the exercise of directive authority in the field of logistics and with operational command. When CINCPAC advised the JCS of his hospital decision, and of objections from CINCPACAF in the matter, he cited the JCS Publication 2 authority and his understanding of it.1

(U) A memorandum from the Secretary of the JCS was provided to CINCPAC in April. The JCS believed that the concurrence of the component commanders was necessary before the unified commander could issue and insure implementation of a directive for the transfer of functions in the field of logistics between or among his component commanders.2 Further, the JCS specified that no reassignment of existing facilities between the Services, or assignment affecting the owning Service's utilization, would be effected without the concurrence of the Services concerned. This authority was granted under conditions short of war; in time of war the authority of the unified commander was expanded when critical situations made diversion of the normal logistic process necessary in the execution of the approved war plan being implemented.3

(U) Under conditions of war or not, however, the Services retained the responsibility for implementing a directed transfer with the unified commander retaining the responsibility for monitoring, reviewing, coordinating, and taking actions that would lead to resolution of issues.

1. CINCPAC 210402Z Feb 70; the hospital affair is discussed in the section of this chapter on Medical Activities.
2. J4 Brief No. 0049-70, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Apr 70, of SM-328-70, Subj: Authority of the Commanders of the Unified or Specified Commands to Direct Transfer of Functions and Facilities Among the Military Service Components of Their Commands.
3. Ibid.
(U) The JCS noted that the Services had the responsibility to insure that the commanders of the unified and specified commands and the JCS were advised prior to changing logistic support that would affect significantly the capability of the command or its components.

(U) The JCS admonished that the procedures they had outlined were especially important under existing budget constraints. They stressed the need for cooperation and mutual understanding in these actions to insure the most effective and efficient use of resources.¹

( U) Although the JCS stressed the last point, the effect of their ruling was that any CINCPAC proposal to transfer functions or facilities among the Services that met with the non-concurrence of a component commander would have to be resolved at the Service Department or JCS level in Washington. The net effect would be to delay any proposed action on which there was disagreement.²

Reduction and Transfer of Army Logistic Functions

(5) Late in 1969 the Army Chief of Staff announced a drastic change in concept for U.S. Army logistics programs in the PACOM in which many facilities were to be closed and many responsibilities transferred; a program that came to be known as Pacific Logistic Operations-Streamline (PALOS). CINCPAC had reacted sharply; he did not believe the U.S. base structure was susceptible to fragmentation or partial examination. He believed that savings by one Service at the expense of another were not true savings and that full recognition had not been given to the impact of the proposals on overall CINCPAC operational and contingency responsibilities. Despite CINCPAC's comments and objections, Army planning continued.³

(5) The Army planned to relocate, reorganize, or transfer to another Service the majority of their logistic facilities and stocks in the Western Pacific by about 1973. In Japan they were planning to relocate the maintenance facility and medical depot, phase down hospitals, and transfer common support functions to another Service. In Thailand their actions concerned phasing down their depot and general supply activities. The Army was planning to turn over maintenance operations at Camp Carroll, Korea to the Republic of Korea's Army. They were establishing a facility on Okinawa for centralized supply support of the Western Pacific. Because of all of these relocations and their potential impact on the other Services, CINCPAC was concerned over continued PACOM logistic readiness to

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

SECRET
190
support contingency and general war requirements.¹

(§) A number of these individual actions and CINCPAC's activity associated with them are included in the following discussion. CINCPAC, reviewing from a joint Service aspect, was concerned with a broader view than was evident in many of these uni-Service actions, most of which were based on budget limitations rather than on mission fulfillment. CINCPAC sought to examine the roles and missions of the various Services to insure that they were performing in peacetime the part they would be expected to perform in war and to insure for the PACOM a logistic infrastructure capable of supporting requirements.²

(§) In the matter of petroleum storage, no reduction in facilities was planned. The Secretary of Defense had approved transfer of Army facilities in Japan to the Navy effective 1 January 1971.³

(§) Regarding strategic concepts, contingency plans were to be supported with bulk POL and ammunition stored in Japan. Other classes of supply were to come primarily from Okinawa. The residual Army force would become an element or component of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ). CINCPAC considered the centralization of support functions on Okinawa a vulnerable concentration of logistic facilities.⁴ One Army plan concerned closing the Ikego Ammunition Storage Facility by 30 June 1970. CINCPACFLT expressed interest in the facility, which was located near the Yokosuka Naval Base, and the Chief of Naval Operations authorized further study of the matter. CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT submitted a joint plan on 4 February for the phased transfer of the Navy's ordnance stocks from the Kinugasa, Kurihama, and Oppama storage areas to Ikego prior to 1 July; transfer of security and firefighting personnel from Kinugasa to Ikego; and negotiation of the release of Kinugasa and Kurihama to the Government of Japan.⁵ The Chief of Naval Operations approved the plan and the actions took place as proposed.

(§) In the matter of maintenance of vehicles and equipment, the Army had negotiated with the Republic of China to establish on Taiwan a maintenance agency to perform armored personnel carrier and vehicle rebuilding that had been done at Sagami Depot, Japan. The Army Materiel Command was to provide repair parts and support the entire program.⁶ Tank rebuilding was to be transferred to the Camp

---

2. Ibid.
3. See detailed item on this subject elsewhere in this section.
5. CINCPACFLT 042302Z Feb 70.
Carroll Depot in Korea and communications-electronics rebuilding was to be transferred to Okinawa.\(^1\)

(\(\S\)) Regarding subsistence, CINCUSARPAC had recommended that the function be transferred to the dominant user, the Air Force. Because CINCPACAF did not concur, CINCUSARPAC was asked to initiate action through the Department of the Army for a decision at Service Department level. Pending a decision in Washington, CINCPAC directed CINCUSARPAC to continue the mission.\(^2\)

(\(\S\)) In February CINCUSARPAC raised the question of Service responsibility for water terminal operations in Japan.\(^3\) He wanted responsibility transferred to either the Air Force as dominant user or to the Navy, whose Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service operated ocean terminal services for the Military Services in certain ports in Europe and Africa (although none on the scale of the ports in Japan and Thailand). When the matter was first raised, CINCPAC was listed as an "information" addressee on the proposal.

(\(\S\)) On 7 March, therefore, CINCPAC advised CINCUSARPAC regarding the authority delegated to CINCPAC to determine operating responsibilities. While he had no objection to CINCUSARPAC's examining and recommending methods for improving operations, and in fact encouraged such activity, CINCPAC stated that, in view of the overall logistic impact, "proposals to realign existing areas of responsibility will be submitted to CINCPAC for review and approval prior to any action on the part of PACOM components to initiate changes."\(^4\)

(\(\S\)) The matter of both port operations and common user land transportation (CULT) came under further study and on 11 April CINCPAC further defined his policy in these matters for his component commanders. In an elaboration of his policy stated above, and complementing it, CINCPAC said:

.... CINCPAC policy is that logistic roles and missions exercised by the Services within PACOM during peace should be those which they expect to expand and exercise during a wartime situation.

.... To assign a function to one Service which will be the wartime responsibility of another Service may seriously reduce the capability of a command to respond rapidly to a

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCUSARPAC 170050Z Feb 70.
4. CINCPAC 072248Z Mar 70.
contingency situation. Thus to reduce the costs to one Service at the expense of another may not only jeopardize the ability of a command to perform its assigned mission, but it may also increase the total costs to the DOD.

.... Significant transfers of functions from the Service responsible for them under current roles and missions would degrade the training base and expansion capability of that Service in wartime. This degradation would result in the necessity to reorganize and train units for their wartime mission on a crash basis, as was done during the SEAsia buildup.¹

(§) CINCPAC noted that the Defense Department had assigned responsibility for certain logistic functions to specific Services, based on their peculiar capabilities, regardless of the geographic area of their own force deployments. The Department had also directed inter-Service support in accordance with the dominant user concept, where no conflict existed with the peculiar capabilities of each Service.

(§) Any transfer of water port or CULT operations, CINCPAC said, "particularly under current budget and manpower constraints, would not only be inefficient and uneconomical, but would degrade all logistic support functions in Japan."² He directed CINCUSARPAC to continue port and CULT operations in Japan.

(§) Another matter studied in connection with the transfer or release of bases was the possible use of some of those facilities by the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). After being advised by CINCPAC and the U.S. Embassy of certain PALOS facilities intended for release, the Secretary of Defense concurred in the views presented and asked for detailed identification and reasons for transfer or release of U.S. Army Japan facilities. CINCPAC provided the data on 9 May, identifying those facilities for which joint use and re-entry rights were proposed.³ He also noted that actions involving release to Japan could be effected even if there were changes in Service cognizance as a result of PALOS actions. He asked that authority be granted to the Ambassador to inform both the Joint Staff of the Japan Defense Agency and the Director General of the American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry as soon as possible.⁴

(§) The Secretaries of State and Defense granted authority to discuss PALOS associated facilities with the Japanese. They also asked for CINCPAC's thoughts

1. CINCPAC 112316Z Apr 70.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 092227Z May 70.
4. Ibid.
on joint basing. They made it clear that they believed that the Government of Japan should finance their "fair share" of the costs involved. They also said that they assumed that any negotiations involving possible need for re-entry rights to installations being released would be at no cost to the United States. They asked to be advised if these assumptions were incorrect.

CINCPAC replied on 25 June. In the matter of joint basing, CINCPAC believed it necessary to insure full understanding by all concerned of the guiding principles, concepts, current actions, and future intentions "in terms combining protection of essential U.S. requirements with optimum accommodation of JSDF needs." CINCPAC believed that the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee should deal with individual cases in terms of the following overall principles:

.... U.S. facilities and areas in Japan no longer to be fully utilized in terms of space or functional capabilities should be considered for joint use by USFJ and JSDF.

.... Goal is fullest feasible use of each facility and area, in such manner as to enable USFJ and JSDF to carry out their respective missions and operations in a fully effective and most economical way.

.... All joint-use specific arrangements will be worked out in consonance with Mutual Security Treaty and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

.... Operating and maintenance costs of jointly-used facilities should be shared by USFJ and JSDF, in general proportion to respective use.

CINCPAC then outlined which SOFA provisions he thought should be applied in various possible combinations of joint use. Each facility should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, he said, and "each new joint-use arrangement will stipulate respective rights and responsibilities of USFJ and JSDF, length of arrangement, termination notification provisions, and reapportionment of costs if extent of use by either side should change. In some cases arrangements might involve reentry rights for facilities surplus to current U.S. needs but with high contingency value." CINCPAC also stated that these principles would be

1. SECDEF 1612/041608Z Jun 70.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 252234Z Jun 70.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
appplicable to facilities and areas on Okinawa after reversion.

(§) While most of these principles and concepts were known in one way or another to both sides, CINCPAC said, it would be highly desirable to secure explicit U.S.-Japan top level sanction and endorsement of joint-use guidelines language in the near future. "This would enable joint committee to continue its work in this area under fully-agreed terms of reference, and would eliminate or minimize chances for confusion or misunderstanding on either side as to what is being done and sought, and would be helpful in getting lower-level machinery on GOJ side going faster than would otherwise be the case."1 He recommended that the U.S. Embassy be instructed to propose to the Japanese Government that the proposed guidelines be endorsed by Japan as terms of reference for the Joint Committee in the matter of joint use.

(§) CINCPAC then discussed the possible study of matters of temporary use of facilities by one force or the other, and the possibilities of the Japanese forces being bound to release property to private interest in accordance with Japanese law. CINCPAC said, "JSDF status is improving, and as general proposition, time is now past when U.S. has to act as JSDF 'protector' by holding on to facilities because JSDF might lose them to commercial or other non-GOJ claimants after release."2 CINCPAC believed, however, that consideration should still be given on a case-by-case basis to occasional temporary continuation of status as a U.S. facility, despite no U.S. requirement, if "it is clearly in U.S. interest for JSDF to acquire given facility, and if JSDF needs time to make budgetary or other adjustments."3 Such consideration would be contingent on no continuing U.S. costs, and any such arrangements would be terminated as soon as possible, he noted.

(§) The U.S. Army proposals to phase down logistics were not limited to Japan. Among their plans for Thailand were the phase down of the Thailand Army Depot to an installation supply activity following the transfer and disposal of project stocks. By the end of the year CINCPAC had not yet endorsed complete disposition of those stocks.4

(§) The Army also sought to transfer to the Air Force the Army mission in Thailand for POL, ammunition, subsistence, CULT, water terminal operations, the property disposal office, and the Korat Hospital. CINCPAC approved the transfer

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

195
of the hospital, but not the other mission transfers. In the matter of subsistence and POL supplies, CINCPAC advised CINCUSARPAC that the proposed transfer was not in consonance with policy expressed earlier by CINCPAC in that it did not provide any savings to the Defense Department and did not support the roles and missions the Army was expected to expand and exercise in war or contingency operations.

The Army also brought up the possibility of transferring port operations in Thailand to the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS), as had been suggested for Japan. In this regard, CINCPAC advised CINCUSARPAC that he interposed no objection to a visit by the Commander MTMTS for technical discussions of the matter. He reiterated his remarks made in connection with his decision to have CINCUSARPAC continue to perform water port and CULT operations in Japan, noting that the introduction of an agency outside the unified command service (such as MTMTS) must be considered in a manner that insured that operations were completely responsive to CINCUSARPAC and through him to CINCPAC. CINCPAC said:

The direct command line between CINCPAC and each of his component commanders and between component commanders and their subordinate units as well as the practice of tasking the appropriate service component repeat service component to support the logistic mission within PACOM are inviolate.

The policy he had specified for Japan, he noted, was also applicable to other geographic areas of the PACOM where CINCPAC must maintain a logistics infrastructure in support of plans for contingency and wartime requirements.

The Army's proposal for Korea under the PALOS affected only that Service. It envisioned that the PALOS would be extended to Camp Carroll, where the United States would retain command and operation of the supply depot with the Republic of Korea Army conducting maintenance operations on a shared-use basis. The Korean Army (or other Korean Government agency) would provide major maintenance services for both U.S. and Korean forces in such matters as repair of tanks, artillery, and other equipment.

1. Discussed in detail elsewhere in this chapter.
2. CINCPAC 230450Z May 70.
3. CINCUSARPAC 270137Z Feb 70.
4. CINCPAC 120505Z Jun 70.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. J41 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70; SECDEF 03043/131929Z Mar 70.
UNCLASSIFIED

Automatic Data Processing Systems for Logistics Matters

(U) Continued application of automatic data processing (ADP) techniques in a number of logistics matters was noted in 1970. Early in the year the JCS advised of the establishment of an ADP program exchange among the unified and specified commands and the Office of the JCS. The new program used the format originated by CINCPAC in the "CINCPAC Logistics ADP Projects Booklet."\(^1\)

(U) CINCPAC determined during 1970 that there was a need to establish a PACOM transportation line of communication (LOC) planning data file containing information, by country, on seaports, airfields, beaches, highways, railways, and inland waterways. This data file would provide a consolidated source for transportation capability and capacity information for use by transportation and logistics planners. This system would also provide a data base of transportation planning elements to support the CINCPAC Planning Analysis System (PLANS) and the related Transportation and Logistics Estimation System (TALES). Work on the program began following the 19 September request for ADP support. The program was known as the Line of Communication Capabilities/Capacities Data System (LOCCAP).\(^2\)

(U) Work continued also on development of the TALES; the program was being accomplished by the Naval Command Systems Support Activity (NAVCOSTACT). The object of the program was to provide CINCPAC with the capability "to compare time-phased force and materiel requirements with logistics assets to rapidly test the feasibility of OPLANs."\(^3\) The specific objective was to provide a capability that would "integrate and support the iterative development of OPLANs, from force list generation to feasibility testing."\(^4\)

(U) The NAVCOSTACT developed a functional description of the program, which was approved on 16 October with NAVCOSTACT tasked then to develop and implement the system.

(U) When completed the TALES was to be interfaced with the Plans Division's Force List Generation System, which produced Time-Phased Force Deployment Lists. Using these lists the TALES would permit development of a complete set of time-phased movement requirements for any given plan, to include computation of

\(^1\) J4 Brief No. 10-70, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Jan 70 of J4 DM-23-70, Subj: Establishment of a Unified and Specified Command/OJCS (J-4) ADP Program Exchange.
\(^2\) J4721 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
\(^3\) Ltr, CINCPAC to OIC, NAVCOSTACT, 15 Jan 70, Subj: Project 10A021, Phase II Tasks, forwarding of.
\(^4\) Ibid.
resupply and supply buildup requirements in addition to unit movements. TALES would compare these movement requirements to the transportation assets and facilities available for use with that operation plan. It would then produce detailed and summary outputs, in both graphic and tabular formats, to assist in the determination of the logistics feasibility of executing a plan. The TALES would permit the planner to adjust many variable factors in the plan. It was expected that the TALES would be operational in mid-1972.1

General Accounting Office Review of Airlift/Sealift Capabilities

(U) The General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to review U.S. airlift and sealift requirements and capabilities by a Special House of Representatives Subcommittee on Airlift.2 The GAO representative indicated that he needed to visit throughout the PACOM and expressed a desire to participate in informal briefings and discussions with knowledgeable personnel on airlift, sealift, and the prepositioning of materiel. He requested that the talks include PACOM and component command input on such requirements, the adequacy of projected capability to satisfy them, the adequacy of aerial and surface ports of embarkation/debarkation, the adequacy of intra-theater movement capability, and pending plans or decisions that could impact on existing or future requirements and capabilities.3

(U) Meetings were held with the GAO representative at CINCPAC's headquarters and those of his Army and Air Force components late in July. He was briefed on contingency plan development methodology, the PACOM transportation management structure, current movements by sea and air, and a description of the Mobility Requirements Generator and the Gross Feasibility Estimator. He was advised, however, that information contained in CINCPAC Operation Plans and supporting plans could not be released without specific approval by the JCS.4 The GAO representative returned to Washington on 30 July, canceling his proposed trip to Japan, Korea, and Thailand.5

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 5739/2414272 Jul 70.
3. Ibid.
4. J4723 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
5. Ibid.
(U) POL usage in the PACOM reflected reductions in operations throughout the theater caused by force redeployments from Southeast Asia and budget constraints on operations elsewhere. Total consumption was somewhat over 127 million barrels in 1970, a reduction of about 26 percent from the peak of 172 million barrels in 1968. Decreases were experienced in every area and for every type of fuel. A new product was introduced in December: the Navy's new fuel--Navy Distillate--was slated to ultimately replace Navy Special Fuel Oil. First consumption of the new product took place in December 1970. The accompanying chart and tables portray PACOM consumption statistics for the year.

POL Logistics Conference

(U) A PACOM POL logistics conference was held at Camp Smith from 16 to 18 February 1970.4 Attending were representatives of the Service Departments, the JCS, the Defense Fuel Supply Center, Inventory Control Points, CINCPAC's component and subordinate unified commands, and the PACOM Sub-Area Petroleum Offices (SAPO). The presentations highlighted matters of principal interest to the POL community at the time. A summary of those presentations follows.5

1. J4635 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jun and Jul 70.
4. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70 and Ltr, CINCPAC to Distribution List, 4 Mar 70, Subj: Minutes of the 1970 CINCPAC Petroleum Logistics Conference, provided the information for preparation of this item.
5. Certain of these subjects are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this history.
## 1970 POL Consumption

### By Product

*in thousands of barrels*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>6,353</td>
<td>5,815</td>
<td>6,329</td>
<td>6,195</td>
<td>6,025</td>
<td>5,720</td>
<td>5,656</td>
<td>4,997</td>
<td>4,422</td>
<td>4,509</td>
<td>4,497</td>
<td>65,832</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-5</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>5,703</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>4,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOGAS</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>7,961</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>1,659</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>18,311</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSFO</td>
<td>2,286</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>2,642</td>
<td>2,187</td>
<td>2,271</td>
<td>2,041</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>1,944</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>1,880</td>
<td>1,999</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>21,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,168</td>
<td>11,361</td>
<td>12,455</td>
<td>11,552</td>
<td>11,431</td>
<td>10,722</td>
<td>10,584</td>
<td>9,171</td>
<td>9,252</td>
<td>9,305</td>
<td>9,072</td>
<td>127,448</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1970 POL Consumption

**By Area**

(in thousands of barrels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>5,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>12,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,507</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>15,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>8,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>8,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>1,932</td>
<td>1,728</td>
<td>1,969</td>
<td>1,724</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>19,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>3,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1,784</td>
<td>1,601</td>
<td>1,662</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>1,439</td>
<td>1,463</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>17,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,168</td>
<td>11,381</td>
<td>12,455</td>
<td>11,552</td>
<td>11,931</td>
<td>10,724</td>
<td>10,574</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>9,172</td>
<td>9,252</td>
<td>9,305</td>
<td>9,072</td>
<td>127,448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office noted that the reduced numbers of personnel and reduced tempo of operations in Vietnam had resulted in the first year-to-year decrease in POL consumption since the start of the war. Current command interest in RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (FRESH LOOK) was noted. Several individual programs comprised the overall effort toward improving the RVN logistics capability, including the Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP) and the Combined Logistics Offensive Program (CLOP). The Army's Pacific Logistics Operation-Streamline (PALOS) was noted as was the Army's interest in reducing its presence in Japan and Thailand.

The JCS representative addressed the problem of POL storage costs versus tanker costs, particularly in a contingency such as Vietnam. The duration and size of the conflict were considerations as were preparations made prior to hostilities and the availability of commercial facilities and tankers. Increasing tankage and discharge capability could result in savings in total POL supply costs, he noted. He also noted that planning guidance should highlight the need for adequate POL terminals to permit efficient use of larger tankers.

CINCPACAF's presentation reviewed the Air Force POL posture during 1969, in which JP-4 consumption was down to 200 million gallons a month from 239 the year before. Largest consumption occurred at U-Tapao, Thailand; Kadena, Okinawa; Yokota, Japan; and Clark in the Philippines. Problems with the monobuoy at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, Taiwan were described, as was the matter of U.S. Air Force funding to upgrade a Chinese Air Force pipeline that would provide up to 16 million gallons a month in an emergency after its completion in March 1971. Hydrant fueling systems were permanently installed at U-Tapao Air Base, Thailand and a 10-inch pipeline from Sattahip Army Terminal to U-Tapao improved JP-4 resupply capability. Aircraft refueling at Mactan Air Base, Philippines was phased out in December 1969. The posture of the 5th Air Force was expected to be improved as new tankage construction was completed and bases were connected with the Pohang-Seoul pipeline. Aircraft refueling had been phased out at Tachikawa Air Base, Japan in December 1969. The construction of tankage had virtually ceased in the 7th Air Force.

The U.S. Army Quartermaster School's presentation described that school's capability for training POL personnel of all Services and also described certain Navy POL training.

The Department of the Army's representative discussed training in industry so that personnel could be prepared to operate new equipment introduced in supply channels.

CINCUSARPAC noted recent developments in the PACOM including changes in organizational structure, construction of new bulk tankage and pipelines, use
of latest industry techniques in pipeline survey, and repair and renovation of existing facilities. Several actions regarding transfer of POL responsibility to other Services were pending.

The Chief of Naval Operations' representative provided information on the Navy Distillate Fuel Program with emphasis on ship conversion to the use of Navy Distillate (ND) and associated fuel depot conversion plans. Advantages expected from ND over Navy Special Fuel Oil included reduction of the logistic burden of storing, transporting, and issuing several propulsion fuels; improving readiness through reduced plant down time; and reducing maintenance and repair. Installation of the distillate fuel oil equipment aboard each ship scheduled for conversion was the most significant task in the transition program. Such conversion had already been accomplished on certain Navy designated test ships.

The Navy Fuel Supply Office's representative told of the conversion from Navy Special Fuel Oil to the new ND. Worldwide capacity for the special fuel oil was about 31.5 million barrels; after conversion it was expected that there would be an ND capacity of about 28 million barrels. Navy fuel depots were required to deplete their old stocks by utilization or transfer and accomplish the necessary replacement, repairs, modifications, and cleaning prior to stocking the distillate. Revised requirements and plans would be necessary after the effects of budget constraints of FY 70 were known. The stringent funding climate precluded further positioning of ND in an area unless known requirements were forecast that would indicate consumption of ND instead of Navy Special Fuel Oil.

CINCPACFLT's presentation described the ND conversion program in the PACOM. Over 6.5 million barrels of PACOM storage was scheduled to be converted at a cost of over $1 million. This did not include Japan, where requirements for storage and conversion would be considered after the transfer of petroleum responsibilities from the Army.

The First Logistic Command in Vietnam reported on POL operations in that country. Pipelines continued to be the major means of POL distribution with 62 million gallons pumped each month. Much emphasis had been placed on reducing losses from pipeline operations as well as losses from tank truck deliveries. The use of large tankers to deliver to major ports and smaller tankers to smaller ports was satisfactory. The 7th Air Force, the U.S. Army Vietnam, and the 1st Logistic Command had combined to form Petroleum Quality Control Assistance Teams. Despite the number of refueling points, their remote locations, and the scarcity of qualified POL personnel, country-wide coverage was assured through the formation of the teams. A few construction or rehabilitation projects were either in progress or planned including burial of the Qui Nhon-Phu Cat pipeline, installation of dolphins at the T-5 jetty at Cam Ranh Bay, and the new barge offloading jetty at Dong Nai.
The Commander of the Military Sea Transport Service, Far East presentation addressed tanker operations under his control with emphasis on operations in the Japan-Korea-Taiwan area. He noted the changed procurement pattern for JP-4 that had resulted in a rearrangement of coastal shuttle patterns.

The CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus' presentation concerned the two refineries and deep water crude oil redistribution terminal under construction and the third refinery in the planning stage. Costing over $200 million these facilities were expected to provide finished products on the island at possibly attractive prices as well as more storage and an emergency potential. A new electronic pipeline inspection technique had been used to provide data to permit accurate evaluation of the extent of repairs required.

The representative of the Petroleum Distribution System, Korea explained the concept of operations for his facility, approved in January 1969 by the Chief of Staff of the Eighth U.S. Army. This concept established the operation and control of the Trans-Korea Pipeline and other bulk POL facilities by U.S. military and direct hire local nationals. The pipeline, the only facility of its type controlled by the U.S. Army, was the backbone of the Korea distribution system. When completed it was expected to increase the flexibility and improve the efficiency of operations in Korea as well as serve as the training medium for military personnel on high pressure pipelines.

The representative of the Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service addressed the phase-out of handy size tankers under the U.S. flag and noted that his agency worldwide was budgeted to transport 25.6 million long tons in FY 69 but only 22.5 for FY 70. He specified the number and capacity of tankers and the shift to larger tankers despite continuing requirements for smaller tankers. Handy size tankers were on the threshold of virtually disappearing, he said, and unless port and shoreside facilities were improved to accommodate the larger tankers, the Military Sea Transport Service-controlled fleet would be inadequate to fulfill the requirements levied by the Services.

COMUSMACTHAI's representative discussed POL operations in Thailand. With the exception of the Sattahip/U-Tapao complex, POL support of U.S. operations would continue to be based on a commercially oriented distribution system. Ninety percent of the total commercial bulk POL storage was located at three terminals in Bangkok. Consumption early in 1970 required a daily dispatch of from 180 to 200 tank trucks out of Bangkok; these trucks transported approximately 73 percent of the military fuel distribution from commercial terminals. In addition, special trains transported JP-4 fuel to Udorn and Ubon Air Bases. Approximately 55 percent of all fuel used in Thailand was received, stored, and consumed in the Sattahip and U-Tapao areas. The number one problem with POL was theft; a very tight control system was helpful in holding down losses.
(U) The Defense Fuel Supply Center's representative discussed the procurement impacts of past and anticipated reductions in requirements. For the first time since 1965, bid quantities of JP-4 exceeded requirements. There was also a shift in supply patterns for Southeast Asia. Beginning 1 January 1970 all Vietnam and Thailand requirements were being met from Arabian Gulf sources where previously POL from the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico had also been supplied. Future reductions were expected to tend to increase competition for the remaining diminished requirements for a while but if requirements fall sufficiently the oil companies could be expected to stop being interested and look elsewhere for markets. Continued changes in distribution patterns were certain as new refineries in Singapore, Guam, and Okinawa become operational.

(2) COMUS Japan's representative discussed principally the U.S. Army's storage tank rehabilitation program. Storage capacity totaled almost one third of the military storage available in the PACOM. Over 75 percent of the tank storage was either recently repaired or scheduled for repair by FY 73. This was storage for 8.5 million barrels.

(3) The Commanding Officer of the Navy Fuel Supply Office sent a representative who discussed Navy bulk fuel requirements including maintenance of Navy levels of prepositioned war reserve stocks, Chief of Naval Operations special programs, fleet and shore use, transportation, and budget.

(U) COMUSTDC's representative summarized POL operations and activities in Taiwan including facilities, capabilities, agreements affecting POL operations, the monobuoy at Ching Chuan Kang, and the USAF POL assistance package.

(U) The ESSO Company showed a film depicting the trip of the SS MANHATTAN through the Northwest Passage.

(2) A special presentation on guidance on the release of information to the General Accounting Office was furnished by a member of CINCPAC's Performance Evaluation Group. Certain kinds of information could be released only with the approval of higher authority, as required in a Defense Department directive. Particulars for release of the following kinds of reports were provided: Inspector General reports, criminal investigation reports, reports from non-Defense Department agencies, reports from Defense Department's Deputy Comptroller for Internal Audit, internal audit reports of the Military Departments, future budgets, military plans, Military Assistance Plans and Programs, Performance Evaluation Group Reports (CINCPAC), and host government records and reports.

Transfer of Koshiba POL Terminal at Yokohama, Japan from Army to Navy

(2) The United States had about 12 million barrels of POL storage in Japan in 1970, about 5 million barrels of which was in the Sasebo area and 5.8 million...
in the Yokohama area, which included the Koshiba terminal. The Army had been operating all POL facilities, but as part of their major reduction in logistic support in Japan--Pacific Logistics Operation-Streamline--the Army proposed turning POL operating responsibilities over to the Navy. The Army had the least interest in storage facilities from a user standpoint; they were allocated about 22 percent of the storage while the Air Force had almost 37 percent and the Navy over 41 percent.\(^1\) When the transfer was first proposed CINCPAC did not concur. There was to be no net savings to the United States as the mission was not reduced and it was feared that a shift in responsibility might endanger the successful completion of a five-year $27 million Army program\(^2\) for the rehabilitation of Japan tankage begun in 1968. In mid-December 1969, however, the Secretary of Defense decided to transfer the POL responsibility to the Navy.

\(\text{\textbullet} \) A joint-Service POL working committee surveyed the Japan installations in February and March 1970 to assess the facilities and operational procedures. As a result of this report the Chief of Naval Operations advised the Secretary of Defense that the Navy could assume the POL mission at the Hachinohe and Sasebo terminals when personnel were trained and in place. At the Koshiba terminal, however, the investigators found conditions that represented a "serious hazard to safety."\(^3\) Rust and other deterioration were evident and the Navy investigators believed that an earth tremor or abnormal pressure could cause a rupture and possible massive pollution in Tokyo Bay. Any spark near such a rupture in JP-4 fuel tanks could result in a major fire. The Navy believed that urgent repairs, estimated to cost about $6 million, should be completed by the Army before the Navy took over. An alternative proposed by the Chief of Naval Operations was abandonment of the facility with its attendant decrease in the prepositioned war reserve stock levels.\(^4\)

\(\text{\textbullet} \) CINCPAC asked both CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT to study the safety hazard and agree on its actual extent. Based on their survey, CINCPAC advised the Secretary of Defense on 26 April that there was a potential safety and pollution hazard, but that existing operating precautions were prudent and adequate to accept the risk of continued operation, provided that funds for rehabilitation were allocated as soon as possible and repair projects commenced in the immediate future.\(^5\)

---

3. CNO NO4000/271930Z Mar 70.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 260329Z Apr 70.
In a closely related action, the JCS asked CINCPAC to evaluate the continuing need, both short and long range, for the Koshiba terminal.\(^1\) CINCPAC's reply of 29 April first provided figures on prepositioned war reserve stockage totals for the PACOM for both Fiscal Year 1971 and Fiscal Year 1976. It was impossible to break out actual reserve levels for individual storage areas as war reserves were not assigned to individual tanks or storage areas. Koshiba was identified as the principal clean storage area in the Yokohama complex. It provided peacetime support to Yokota Air Base, which had the highest air base POL consumption in Japan. Loss of the facility would aggravate an already serious Air Force prepositioned war reserve deficit, CINCPAC continued, already over 14 million barrels with no appreciable improvement expected through FY 76. CINCPAC said there was no alternative storage area to use as a replacement for Koshiba. Also it was the only facility capable of receiving the larger tankers in the area other than Hakozaki and it provided the only backup in the event of damage to the Hakozaki monobuoy system. Costs of new construction anywhere else would far exceed the cost of necessary repairs to Koshiba. He recommended that the terminal be maintained in service and repaired expeditiously.\(^2\)

The Army made funds available for the necessary repairs at a cost of about $6 million.\(^3\) CINCPAC did not believe it was necessary for the repairs to be completed before transferring the responsibility as repairs could take a couple of years. But delays had occurred and CINCPAC recommended that the 1 July 1970 target date for transfer be abandoned and a new firm date set for 1 January 1971.\(^4\)

The Navy was reluctant to accept that date until more information on the condition of the tanks was known, but after several exchanges of messages the Chief of Naval Operations informed the Secretary of Defense that he would assume the POL mission on 1 January 1971 (but not the POL Procurement inspection mission) on the condition that several badly deteriorated tanks be emptied for safety reasons.\(^5\) The provision of procurement inspection services was another matter, one to be resolved at the Service level. It was finally decided that this function would remain with the Army.\(^6\) Preparations for the transfer of functions designated for the Navy continued through December. All Navy personnel were trained and in place and no problems were anticipated.\(^7\)

---

1. JCS 6461/172351Z Apr 70.
2. CINCPAC 2904431Z Apr 70.
3. COMUSJAPAN 260800Z Jun 70.
4. CINCPAC 260321Z Jun 70.
5. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70 citing CNO 242055Z Sep 70.
6. J44 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
7. Ibid.
UNCLASSIFIED

POL Facilities

(U) A new monobuoy was installed on Okinawa in support of Kadena Air Base. Use of the monobuoy began on 30 July with only minor problems caused by inexperienced personnel. This facility at Tengan was expected to greatly enhance the POL capability of Kadena.1

(U) Problems continued to plague the monobuoy at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base on Taiwan early in the year, however, as they had since its installation in 1967. Leaking sections in the underwater hose were discovered several times and repairs were delayed by the weather.2

Procurement Activities

(U) CINCPAC continued his efforts to improve procurement management within the PACOM in such matters as the avoidance of competitive buying among separate purchasing activities and the consolidation of requirements among the Services when possible. One major organizational change in the matter of procurement was promulgated in a CINCPAC Instruction dated 8 April.3 This change was in line with changes in guidance contained in JCS Publication 3. Joint Procurement Coordinating Boards (JPCB) were established both at CINCPAC's headquarters and where necessary throughout the command,4 replacing the General Purchasing Agencies in the subordinate commands.

(U) The CINCPAC JPCB was charged to provide advice and assistance to CINCPAC on offshore procurement policies, procedures, and practices. The goal was to achieve maximum effectiveness, economy, and uniformity in offshore procurement within CINCPAC's area of responsibility. The CINCPAC JPCB was chaired by a Logistics Division representative and composed of representatives of the component commands with associate members possibly designated by the Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific, the Commander of the Pacific Division Naval Facilities and Engineering Command, and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Engineer Division, Pacific Ocean. The CINCPAC board met at the call of the chairman, usually about once every three months.5

1. CINCPACREP Ryukyus 300548Z Jul 70.
2. J44 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan and Feb 70.
3. CINCPACINST 4200.4, 8 Apr 70, Subj: PACOM Procurement Policy.
4. JPCB were established by COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUS Japan, COMUS Korea, COMUSTDC, and the CINCPAC Representatives in the Ryukyus and the Philippines. Defense Department purchasing coordination for Hong Kong was assigned to CINCPACFLT, in Singapore to CINCPACAF. CINCUSARPAC administered and managed the Defense Department Procurement Information Office, Australia and CINCPACAF did so for the U.S. Military Procurement Office, Manila.
5. CINCPACINST 4200.4, 8 Apr 70, Subj: PACOM Procurement Policy.
(U) Another change in procedure had occurred even before the April instruction. General Purchasing Agency conferences had been held from time to time since the General Purchasing Agency system had been initiated by CINCPAC in June 1966. The sixth such conference, which had been scheduled for January 1970 was cancelled. In its place, CINCPAC directed that working level conferences with individual Purchasing Agency representatives be held at Camp Smith, with active participation by the CINCPAC component commands. The two or three day conferences were held with the seven agencies before the end of April. These agencies later became the JPCB discussed above.

The C-5 and Its Impact on Logistic Systems

(U) The C-5 was the large new aircraft put in service by the Military Airlift Command (MAC) in 1970. It was programmed to perform deployment, employment, and resupply missions, and was expected to impact definitely on existing logistic systems. CINCPAC studied the matter to assess that impact, to identify actions taken by others to correct logistic system constraints and to recommend actions to correct system weaknesses, and to review PACOM contingency plans for adequacy.

Outsize Airlift Requirements

(U) For several years CINCPAC had been working to maintain an outsize airlift capability for the PACOM despite Air Force budget and resource cutbacks. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) had been providing the outsize capability at the end of 1969 following deactivation of the last outsize resource in the PACOM, the 50th Military Airlift Squadron.

(S) In January 1970, however, the Air Force Chief of Staff advised CINCPAC-AF that four C-124 aircraft would be assigned to PACAF about 1 April. In a 9 February meeting involving CINCPAC, his components, the Eighth Army, the U.S. Army Japan, and the PACAF Directorate of Airlift Operations a concept for operations of the four aircraft was devised. The Chief of the Western Pacific Transportation Office was to continue to receive forecasts of outsize cargo airlift requirements. Those requirements over designated MAC channels were to be returned to the Service components for submission through Service channels to MAC. Unforecast off-channel requirements were to be submitted by the Service

2. CINCPAC 2922352 Nov 69.
3. J4114 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
5. CINCPACAF 170710Z Jan 70.
6. CINCPAC 142340Z Feb 70; CINCPAC 040249Z Mar 70.

CONFIDENTIAL

210
components directly to the Western Pacific Transportation Office, but if these could not be supported the Transportation Office would forward them to the MAC for application of their capability.

(5) With minor modification, the MAC concurred in the concept. 1

C-130 Airlift Capability in the PACOM

(5) Requirements for C-130 aircraft in the PACOM came under study again in 1970. In 1969 COMUSMACV had twice reviewed his requirements and stated a need for 68 C-130s for sustained operations and 81 for emergency surge. As Air Force budget constraints continued, CINCPAC had been reduced to 12 C-130 squadrons by the end of the year, which he believed was an acceptable situation, 2 with another squadron, the 817th Tactical Airlift Squadron, scheduled for deactivation in June 1970.

(5) Reduction plans continued, however, for inactivation of the 29th Tactical Airlift Squadron and one other and COMUSMACV was again asked in April 1970 to review his requirements. 3 In both April and May he repeated the needs he had stated earlier, 4 noting in the second response, "There is a tendency to predict that the C-130 surge limit should decrease as the number of U.S. Forces in RVN decrease. This does not appear to be sound logic. As long as the intensity of the war remains constant, the departing U.S. Forces are replaced by RVNAF forces, and the enemy capability remains constant, the need for airlift must remain constant."

(5) Based on another review of PACOM needs, CINCPAC on 27 June concurred in the inactivation of the 29th Squadron by September 1970, contingent on the number of C-130s possessed (as opposed to assigned or authorized) providing sufficient commitment capability to meet all identified requirements held by the Chief of the Western Pacific Transportation Office, including COMUSMACV's sustained and surge requirements of 68 and 81 aircraft respectively. "Any further reduction of C-130 squadrons is not concurred in at this time," CINCPAC said. 5 At the end of the year the number of C-130 squadrons assigned in the PACOM stood at 10.

(5) Further reductions were just around the corner, however. The Office of the Secretary of Defense in December approved the inactivation of the 374th

1. MAC 061800Z Mar 70.
3. CINCPAC 182309Z Apr 70.
4. COMUSMACV 20111/280003Z Apr 70; COMUSMACV 2237B/090920Z May 70.
5. CINCPAC 270415Z Jun 70.

SECRET

211
Tactical Airlift Wing on Okinawa for Fiscal Year 1971. This would reduce the number of squadrons remaining in the PACOM to seven. Representatives of the various interested CINCPAC staff divisions met to consider this reduction on 9 December and determined that requirements could be satisfied by the remaining airlift force and CINCPAC concurred in CINCPACAF's plan to meet the Secretary's directed deactivation. The remaining force would consist of the seven C-130 squadrons plus the C-7 and C-123 aircraft assigned in the Republic of Vietnam. CINCPAC's concurrence was hinged on the conditions that the number of aircraft authorized be actually on hand and that the Air Force "operationally ready" rate be met.

Airline and Travel Ticket Sales in the PACOM

(U) Airline and travel ticket sales in the PACOM, exclusive of Vietnam, were provided by concessionaires under contract to the Pacific Exchange System. Approval of these contracts by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics was necessary in every case. In both 1969 and 1970 the contracts had been extended several times on a short term (six-month) basis, an arrangement that nobody considered desirable.

(U) In April 1970 a new concept for airline ticket sales was studied by a representative group of the membership of the Air Transport Association. They considered a concept by which the U.S. airlines would provide ticketing service in the style of the Joint Airlines Military Traffic Offices. These airline representatives visited various PACOM countries and obtained data from the rest.

(U) CINCPAC considered the new concept as presented before he advised the JCS on 21 October that the best plan for the PACOM was to continue the Pacific Exchange System concessionaire system. The Air Transport Association had advised that the commercial carriers were not in a position to share the savings that would result if they operated ticket sales facilities in the PACOM. Nor could they offer fare reductions to individual ticket buyers or offer a percentage of gross sales to the Morale and Welfare Fund, as concessionaires did. CINCPAC noted that all contracts should be allowed to expire on 31 December with the Exchange meanwhile setting up for individual specified PACOM areas (by country) suitably tailored "master contracts" that would run for two years. The escalating fee for these contractors would be based on total gross sales in the interest of obtaining maximum income for the exchange for subsequent disbursement to troop customer morale and welfare funds. Service was to be provided for

1. J4712 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
3. J4822 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
4. CINCPAC 210411Z Oct 70.
all modes of transportation and for hotel reservations, car rental, tour arrangements, and such, consistent with customer and command needs. Normally services would only be offered on U.S. carriers; in some cases host country travel services could be used but proposals from third countries would not be invited. Use of this concessionaire method was expected to provide the maximum financial benefit to the PACOM through recapturing dollars for welfare funds, minimizing the gold flow, assuring the most efficient and professional quality of service, and standardizing management.1

(U) In November the Secretary of Defense authorized the program as outlined by CINCPAC with certain modifications and on 10 November, at JCS direction, CINCPAC authorized the Pacific Exchange System to implement the program.2 Still another extension to existing contracts was necessary to permit adequate procurement lead time for the new contracts, but the new master contracts were expected to be in effect in 1971.3

Port and Cargo Operations Reporting Requirements Decreased

(U) The PACOM Ship Inventory and Port Status Reporting System (PACSHIPS) continued to be an effective management tool in 1970, and its use resulted in reduction of certain other reporting requirements. For example, the PACOM Retrograde Report was prepared as the result of a December 1968 requirement by the JCS; it included both data on recent shipments and a forecast of data. The forecast data was forwarded by message by various PACOM commands; the data was little used, liaison with using agencies revealed. The data on actual cargo was provided by the PACSHIPS. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 24 January that the forecast portions be deleted4 and the JCS approved the recommendation.5

(U) As the PACSHIPS report had been expanded, the requirement for parallel manual reporting had been discontinued. By June 1970 CINCPAC had expanded PACSHIPS to include all ports reported in the manually-prepared PACOM Port Activity Report (except the Republic of Vietnam) with PACSHIPS reflecting information satisfactorily. The requirement for the manual report was cancelled as of 1 July 1970.6

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 102312Z Nov 70.
3. ADMIN CINCPAC 252316Z Nov 70; J4711 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
4. ADMIN CINCPAC 240046Z Jan 70.
5. J4813 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
6. CINCPAC 020046Z Jun 70; JCS 2322/121359Z Jun 70.
UNCLASSIFIED

Continuing Roll On/Roll Off Ship Requirements in PACOM

(U) The Commanding Officer of the Military Sea Transportation Service proposed on 1 April to release the USNS SEALIFT from Okinawa service for trans-Pacific employment. He noted that there was a continual decrease in a roll on/roll off (RO/RO) cargo requirement and that the USNS TRANSGLOBE and COMET, supported by landing ships and commercial ships, provided sufficient service.

(U) The users of the service in the PACOM denied reductions in requirements and provided new data on performance and forecast utilization, including expanded service to Korea. CINCPAC, therefore, did not concur in the removal of USNS SEALIFT from Western Pacific service.

(U) As a result of CINCPAC non-concurrence, the Military Sealift Command retained SEALIFT in service and considered contracting SS TRANSGLOBE for an additional year.

Defense Department Project HOME RUN

(U) On 10 June the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics advised his Army counterpart that the Secretary of Defense had requested that special action be taken on an urgent basis to expedite the selection and return from the PACOM of items no longer required by the Defense Department that were needed by the General Services Administration and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. On 19 June CINCPAC designated CINCUSARPAC as executive agent for the project (which was known as HOME RUN). The object was to return one shipload of excess material from Japan and Okinawa to the Continental United States by 1 September 1970. The Defense Logistics Service Center screened available material to determine items that were excess to requirements and the SS AMERICAN RACER arrived in Oakland, California ahead of schedule on 25 August with 9,466 tons of cargo.

(U) CINCPAC evaluated the project for the Secretary of Defense on 18 September. He said that although this project was successful in terms of timely arrival it was not a way to handle this material routinely. The recipient agencies

1. The title of the Military Sea Transportation Service was changed effective 1 Aug 70 to the Military Sealift Command.
2. COMSTS WASHDC 010618Z Apr 70.
3. CINCPAC 060447Z May 70.
4. Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of Defense to Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&L), 10 Jun 70, Subj: Expedited Selection of Military Excesses in the Pacific Area by GSA/DHEW.
5. CINCUSARPAC 272340Z Jun 70 citing CINCPAC 190036Z Jun 70.
should be considered with other Federal agencies. The procedures used to expedite this one shipment resulted in backlogs and delays of other routine matters. He recommended that the recipient agencies (the General Services Administration and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare) receive Defense Department excesses, but on the same priority as all Federal agencies and not before unfunded Defense Department requirements. Shipments should be consolidated with other routine movements. There was a danger in setting a precedent regarding requests for this type of project in the future.1

Ocean Terminal Operations in the Philippines

(5) Discontinuing the use of Manila port and routing all Defense Department waterborne traffic destined for the Philippines through Subic Bay was a matter that had been studied by CINCPAC in 1968 at the request of the JCS. CINCPAC at that time recommended the continuation of existing management programs that were designed to gradually reduce the Manila workload to about a third of what it had been, but he considered total transfer from Manila neither feasible nor desirable at that time.2

(5) Later, the Secretary of Defense directed that all Manila cargo operations for the Defense Department be transferred to Subic Bay as of 31 December 1969. The Air Force Chief of Staff asked the Secretary to reconsider3 and the question came to CINCPAC for comment.

(5) After sending a study group to the Philippines, CINCPAC sent his opinion to the JCS.4 He recommended that all Clark Air Base cargo be routed through Subic after 31 May 1970 but that the Manila Defense Department port activity be retained but reduced in size consistent with an estimated port workload of about 5,500 tons a month to handle rate favorable and small lot cargo that should move through that port. Retaining a Defense Department port activity nucleus at Manila would also insure expeditious response to future military, political, or economic developments, CINCPAC said.

(U) The JCS concurred with CINCPAC’s recommendations.5

1. CINCPAC 182305Z Sep 70.
4. CINCPAC 170039Z Mar 70.
Procedures to Prevent Aircraft Hijacking Studied

(3) The rash of aircraft hijackings around the world caused concern for U.S. civil or military transport aircraft. In April 1970 the Secretary of State voiced this concern and asked CINCPAC and the U.S. Ambassadors throughout the PACOM to review local screening procedures for Military Airlift Command chartered flights and report them along with recommendations for intensifying safeguards.¹ CINCPAC replied that anti-hijacking measures probably best centered on the detection of weapons carried on board.² He noted that certain kinds of walk-through metal detectors at passenger terminals appeared to be of considerable actual as well as psychological value, and he recommended maximum use of such devices as well as closer physical check of hand baggage and the frisking of passengers. He also recommended that a standard code of conduct be developed for the crew and troop commander in the matter of resistance or non-resistance under attempted hijack conditions.

(5) CINCPAC noted that Communist countries had a history of returning, in time, passengers on highjacked aircraft and in most cases the aircraft themselves. The United States should attempt to promote "through all available means" acceptance of the Tokyo Convention of 1963 on the part of Asian communist nations and to obtain assurances that it would be "extended to include military unarmed cargo/passenger aircraft."³ CINCPAC also recommended to the JCS that action be taken to develop a uniform Defense Department policy on the subject of highjacking.

Assistance for Humanitarian Projects in the PACOM

(U) Early in 1970 the Secretary of Defense advised the JCS of the many requests received by the Department every day for direct assistance with materials or manpower for worthy humanitarian private projects such as hospitals or schools in the PACOM area as well as help in moving non-military supplies furnished by individuals or organizations in the Continental United States for use by needy persons in the PACOM area. The overall situation in the past had not permitted a positive response to most of these requests, the Secretary noted, but he asked for a review of Department policy with the idea of providing assistance whenever possible at little or no cost and without interfering with the military mission.⁴ The JCS passed the query on to CINCPAC for comment.⁵

1. SECSTATE 059974/221824Z Apr 70.
2. CINCPAC 02224SZ May 70.
3. Ibid.
4. SECDEF 08170/161608Z Jan 70.
5. JCS 8674/232138Z Jan 70.
(U) CINCPAC highlighted some of the civic action efforts by the individual Services in the PACOM, as requested. CINCPAC noted, however, that "Under present conditions of personnel reductions and expenditure limitations, no expansion of the present level of effort in support of humanitarian assistance is possible and reduction of current military capability can be expected." He noted that the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, who continued to evaluate and coordinate proposed humanitarian projects, "should be prepared to accomplish those significant projects which are determined to be in the best interest of the U.S." with U.S. military units continuing to provide assistance to the maximum extent possible as resources permitted and without interfering with the military mission. He recommended no change in Department policy for the foreseeable future.

Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality

(U) CINCPAC expanded his efforts in behalf of environmental quality in 1970. Staff responsibility was assigned to the Logistics Division. A CINCPAC Instruction that had been in effect on this subject since 1966 was updated on 29 October to reflect CINCPAC's greatly increased concern. Component and subordinate unified commanders were tasked to accelerate the pace of their corrective measures to conform to environmental quality standards and to insure appropriate coordination with the local community environmental quality programs. Cooperation with local communities in vigorous programs to protect and enhance the quality of the environment was encouraged. When resources to accomplish pollution control were limited or when military operations conflicted with pollution control programs, CINCPAC directed that priority of effort be afforded in the order first of those situations that constituted a direct hazard to the health of man, second to those having economic implications, and third to those that affected the recreational and esthetic value of natural resources.

(U) Specialists and scientists from the component commands were identified by those commands, at CINCPAC's request, and their names furnished to the State of Hawaii's Board of Environmental Advisors for direct consultation and participation in local activities.

1. ADMIN CINCPAC 312012Z Jan 70.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPACSTAFFNOTE 11000, 20 Oct 70, Subj: Staff Responsibility for Environmental Quality.
6. Ltr, CINCPAC to Governor of Hawaii, 14 Dec 70, n.s.
SECTION XIII - COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS ACTIVITIES

Consolidation and Automation of Headquarters Communications Centers

(U) Efforts to consolidate and automate communications centers at both CINCPAC headquarters at Camp Smith and the Alternate Command Facility at Kunia continued in 1970. For the Camp Smith action, which involved proposed consolidation of the communications centers of CINCPAC and the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, CINCPAC submitted his final study recommendation on the subject to the Chief of Naval Operations on 7 March. He listed three alternative courses of action and the advantages and disadvantages of each. He recommended that one of these alternatives be adopted; in this he had recommended consolidation of the two centers in conjunction with the automation of the CINCPAC center. Only if the CINCPAC center were automated would the consolidation be practical and savings realized. The matter remained under study in Washington at the end of the year.

(S) The consolidation and automation of facilities at Kunia also stayed under study throughout 1970. In January and February the Commanding Officer of the Fleet Operations Control Center, U. S. Pacific Fleet (FOCCPAC) had queried the Commander of Naval Communications concerning the Kunia Consolidation and Automation Sub-System Plan that had been developed during 1969. The plan was still being reviewed and was to be forwarded to the JCS by the Chief of Naval Operations when review was completed. To provide a more current plan, the Chief of Naval Operations asked the parent Services of all Kunia tenants to identify all changes effected in FY 70 and those planned or programmed in FY 71. All of this data on Kunia tenants was forwarded to CINCPAC for consolidation.

(S) In June the JCS asked CINCPAC to furnish additional information on the Kunia facility, as follows. CINCPAC was to determine which commands and activities were recommended for continued tenancy after 1 July 1973, determine the all-source command and control communications requirements for those tenants, restate all validated record communications requirements including command and control, and restate or modify the scope of requirements for consolidation or automation to include only those recommended for continued tenancy.

(S) CINCPAC provided the requested data on 1 October. He listed 21 tenant organizations, a Kunia utilization statement, a list of circuits, record communication requirements, and other factors about the Kunia facility and its role.

2. CINCPAC 070019Z Mar 70.
in CINCPAC affairs, validating the activities and use of the facility beyond 1973. The JCS concurred in the report. By the end of the year the Chief of Naval Operations had directed the Commander of Naval Communications to continue preparation of the Sub-System Plan.¹

Communications Center Message Traffic

(U) Gross message traffic handled by CINCPAC's Communications Center during 1970 totaled 6,156,698, an average of 51,308 messages per month or about 1,710 messages a day.² This total is down about 15 percent from the 1968 average of 60,808 messages a month, the peak reached during the Vietnam War.

Large Volume Data Exchange

(U) Large Volume Data Exchange— the transmission of large volumes of data by means of the circuit switching unit mode of AUTODIN (the Automatic Digital Network) over long distances— was proved feasible in 1969.³ Certain problems had been encountered with the RCA Spectra 70/1600 equipment, however, which was slated to replace the UNIVAC 1004 that had been being used, and testing continued in 1970.⁴

(U) In early January it was determined that Phase II testing would be done on the UNIVAC equipment and the RCA Spectra 70 was subsequently removed.⁵ In May CINCPAC was asked to comment on Government use of the RCA Spectra 70. The query regarding this equipment was from the Defense Commercial Communications Office, Pacific.⁶ CINCPAC advised the Commander of the Naval Communications Command that no action had been taken by CINCPAC to suggest acceptance of this equipment.⁷

(U) As plans continued for the operational phase of the program, CINCPAC

1. More detailed data is contained in the two sources for the Kunia portion of this item: J627 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70 and Ltr, FOCCPAC to CNO, 1 Mar 71, Subj: Command History (OPNAV Report 5750-1); submission of, which cites the 1 October message from CINCPAC to the JCS: CINCPAC 012021Z Oct 70.
2. J630 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months Jan-Dec 70.
4. Ibid.
5. J632 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Jan and Feb 70.
6. J632 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
7. Ibid.
tasked his component commanders, COMUSMACV, and the Fleet Operation Control Center, Pacific to provide data on possible message candidates for transmission by this means.\(^1\) Meanwhile, evaluation of Phase I testing continued.\(^2\)

**Integrated Joint Communications System-Pacific**

(\(\S\)) The Integrated Joint Communications System-Pacific (IJCS-PAC) was a major project to expand and improve communications between Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines and to expand and improve communications facilities on Okinawa and Taiwan. Some facets of the program had been bogged down for years, however, for a variety of causes.

(\(\S\)) One such facet in particular, the communications link between Taiwan and the Philippines, was still not resolved in 1970. The United States had wanted to lay a submarine cable between those two countries, but the Philippine Government had denied the right to land the cable on Luzon. Finally, by the end of 1969 CINCPAC had recommended that plans for the submarine cable be discontinued and communication be accomplished by both military and leased commercial channels on the Philippines-Taiwan tropo system.\(^3\)

(\(\S\)) The Secretary of State raised the matter again in March 1970. He noted that the principal obstacle to obtaining landing rights seemed to be the U. S. refusal to make an advance commitment to lease troposcatter channels in the newly constructed Philippine Overseas Telephone Corporation system at very high tariff rates. The Secretary listed a number of ways the United States could aid the Philippines and the new telephone company to try to make the cable a reality.\(^4\)

(\(\S\)) CINCPAC sent his views on the matter to the JCS on 28 March.\(^5\) Although he revalidated his hardcore circuit requirements\(^6\) between the Philippines and Taiwan, he recommended that no action be taken until his December 1969 proposal to find an alternate to the submarine cable was reconsidered.

(\(\S\)) CINCPAC believed that his circuit requirements would decrease in the

---

1. J632 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
2. Ibid.
4. SECSTATE 043965/260009Z Mar 70.
5. CINCPAC 282306Z Mar 70.
6. For 53 circuits.
near future with the possible withdrawal of major forces from Korea, decreased air defense and air traffic control requirements to be assumed by Japan upon the reversion of Okinawa, the planned integration of intelligence circuits into AUTODIN, the planned reduction of Clark Air Base in the Philippines and reductions of our forces in Japan, and the reduction of forces in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC noted that installation of the Taiwan-Okinawa cable would relieve the main choke-point then existing.

With the uncertainty of the future U. S. Force posture, but with all indications pointing toward "considerable force reduction in WESTPAC and SEAsia areas, a capital investment of the magnitude of the Philippines-Taiwan cable is seriously questioned. CINCPAC reconfirms that plans for installation of this cable should be discontinued or at a minimum held in abeyance until a greater degree of force posture stability is attained." In the interim, he said, channels over and above the capacity of the U. S. military tropo should be leased from a commercial source and terminated as requirements were reduced.

Despite CINCPAC's remarks, on 1 December a joint State-Defense Department message was dispatched by the Secretary of State to the U. S. Embassy in Manila reaffirming the requirement for a 60-channel submarine cable to provide reliable communications under Defense Department control. He asked the Embassy to negotiate landing rights in accordance with the Military Bases Agreement. The reply from the Ambassador stated that he was "deeply concerned" about the possible consequences for both governments if the procedures outlined by the Secretary were followed. "The conclusion that we are now prepared to make a pay-off to a private company in order to get GOP concurrence can be easily deduced...."

On 8 December the Ambassador advised the Secretary that the entire project had been reviewed with the Director of Communications-Electronics of the Office of the JCS who had explained in detail the cost advantages of lease from the new telephone company over the existing long-haul leases and the continued need for the submarine cable. The Embassy, to avoid the appearance of promising to lease from the new company in exchange for cable landing rights, would first negotiate for the cable and then go ahead with a separate agreement with the Philippine Overseas Telephone Corporation for

1. CINCPAC 282306Z Mar 70.
2. SECSTATE 195866/012343Z Dec 70.
3. AMEMBASSY MANILA 10927/050506Z Dec 70.
4. Ibid.
three-year 24-channel leases.¹ No further word had been received by the end of the year.

³ One other matter involving communications in the Philippines arose in 1970. The Navy proposed an alternate communications route from San Miguel to Tarlac to protect the primary route from San Miguel to Dau; the program, called CLARINET BUGLER, was cancelled by the Navy. In June, however, the Defense Communications Agency asked CINCPAC to review the requirement.² CINCPAC said the route was "nice to have" but not a requirement; he recommended that CLARINET BUGLER assets be used elsewhere for the Philippine interconnect project.³

³ On Taiwan, meanwhile, work continued toward improvement of the telephone system. On 19 January 1970 CINCPAC forwarded the Taiwan Administrative Telephone Improvement Plan (TATIP) to the JCS.⁴ This plan would provide for a three phase improvement by rearranging existing trunking facilities, installation of equipment that was excess to several Army projects, and installation of new dial offices that were to be approved separately. The JCS approved the plan on 25 November.⁵

³ On 19 January CINCPAC had also forwarded the Non-Tactical Telecommunications Requirement for the expansion of the Taipei Military Exchange to the JCS.⁶ Expansion of the exchange was required because it was now serving the whole administrative telephone load in the Taipei area. The expanded exchange was to include major rearrangements of trunking and signalling made possible by the IJCS-PAC.

³ On from Taiwan, a cable was proposed to Okinawa. On 16 March 1970 the contract for this Air Force project was awarded to the Underseas Corporation for installation of a cable that was expected to be operational in late January 1971.⁷

¹ AMEMBASSY MANILA 11028/081023Z Dec 70.
² DCA 172058Z Jun 70.
³ CINCPAC 122209Z Sep 70.
⁴ Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 19 Jan 70, Subj: Taiwan Administrative Telephone Improvement Plan, 25 Nov 69 (U).
⁶ Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 19 Jan 70, Subj: Programming of Telecommunications Requirement.
⁷ J622 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
On Okinawa CINCPAC was concerned with the Military Integrated Telephone System. In February the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), through the JCS, presented a plan that recommended that tandem switches from Pleiku and Can Tho in Vietnam be allocated to Okinawa. The original plan had been to procure two new switches. The JCS further inquired about the feasibility of accelerating the removal of the switches to Okinawa.

CINCPAC concurred in principle with the use of the tandem switches from Vietnam but he did not recommend an accelerated schedule for their removal from Vietnam; their removal was not recommended until a reduced tactical force structure was realized.

As the switch capacity of the Vietnam switches was inadequate, the DCA recommended cannibalization of other switches in Vietnam to satisfy the Okinawa requirement. CINCPAC, however, on 23 April recommended that other equipment be procured to augment the switches in order to leave the remaining switches in Vietnam available for use elsewhere.

CINCPAC included the two tandem switches when he validated and forwarded a system plan to the JCS on 5 November. The JCS decided to process all actions but obligate no funds until information on future U. S. activity on Okinawa was available. The DCA continued studying the matter of whether the switches should be from Vietnam or new ones or whether no switches were needed if the Dial Central Offices were upgraded. The matter had not been resolved by the end of the year.

As the IJCS-PAC developed it was expected that other systems could be deactivated.

The question of replacing the tropo links between Japan and Korea with microwave links was raised in December 1970 by the DCA because of growing high-rise building problems at Itazuke and the Government of Japan's desire to move U. S. personnel out of the Itazuke area. The DCA asked CINCPAC and CINCPACAF to gather information on the matter. CINCPAC asked COMUS Japan and COMUS Korea to convene a small working group under the direction of COMUS Japan to compile and consolidate circuit requirements between Korea and Japan on a terminal point to terminal point basis that would remain valid after completion.

1. JCS 1479/192136Z Feb 70.
2. CINCPAC 072217Z Mar 70.
3. CINCPAC 232219Z Apr 70.
4. J622 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
5. DCA PAC KUNIA 050233Z Dec 70.
of approved force reductions in the two countries. Requirements were to be developed considering two alternatives: one was without the regional AUTODIN switch in Korea, the other with that switch and also the AN/MSC satellite terminal in Korea. This preliminary study was expected to be completed early in 1971.1

Satellite Communications

(8) Progress continued on the Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) in 1970. Early in the year the matter of transmitting digital data in the mode required by the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) was studied. CINCPAC had advised the Defense Communications Agency-Pacific on 11 March that there was no objection to use of the system between Hawaii and Washington provided it was understood that CINCPAC could preempt use of the facilities in an emergency or crisis.2 It turned out that the use of the DSCS by the IDHS had not been submitted to the JCS for review and approval. Further study of the satellite system as a means to fulfill IDHS needs would be deferred pending JCS approval.3

(8) On 14 September the JCS advised the unified and specified commands that they were conducting operational, technical, and economic analyses of possible utilization of the DSCS Phase II for intra-theater trunking. They were also reviewing and assessing alternative levels of capability that could be provided by the DSCS in the 1972-1975 time frame. The JCS requested that CINCPAC and the others review their intra-theater requirements for command and control, intelligence, and warning functions and identify those that were most likely candidates for satisfaction by satellite.4

(8) CINCPAC prepared and forwarded a statement of his requirements.5 He advised that in most instances requirements represented individual dedicated circuits. Transmission by satellite would not necessarily result in the deactivation of other media except for those trans-Pacific circuits that used leased circuits in commercial media, both satellite and terrestrial.

(8) In a related action on this matter the Defense Communications Agency-Pacific advised its parent agency that in addition to command, control, intelligence, and warning functions an appropriate number of common-user

1. CINCPAC 150307Z Dec 70.
2. CINCPAC 112234Z Mar 70.
3. J621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
4. JCS 9989/142334Z Sep 70.
5. CINCPAC 140307Z Oct 70.
inter-switch trunks had to be planned for application to DSCS Phase II. Benefits to be derived would be survivability through diverse routing and reduction of leased costs. Planning continued.

(5) Another satellite question involving the DSCS arose on 3 October when CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the AN/MSC-46 satellite earth terminal at Nha Trang, Vietnam be redeployed to Taegu, Korea to enhance the survivability of Korea's out-of-country communications. If approved, the Korea terminal would best serve to form a satellite link with Futenma, Okinawa allowing alternate voice/data access through facilities at Camp Buckner. If the recommendation was approved, CINCPAC link configurations via the Western Pacific DSCS would be Hawaii to Vietnam, Okinawa to Korea, Philippines to Guam, Australia to Guam (dedicated), and Korea to Thailand (contingency). The JCS said they were studying the matter.

(6) The JCS advised CINCPAC on 16 November, however, that the terminal from Nha Trang was needed in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey to be used for personnel training for all Services. The U. S. Army had been tasked to redeploy the terminal by 30 January 1971. CINCPAC asked the JCS to reconsider the matter, but indicated that if the decision remained firm, CINCPAC recommended a total worldwide review of similar assets in light of existing operational requirements and approval of early redeployment of a lower priority terminal to Taegu.

(6) The Defense Communications Agency-Pacific, meanwhile, initiated a reevaluation of DSCS Phase I operations in the PACOM, on the assumption that the JCS would not reconsider their decision to move the terminal to Monmouth. Their assumptions considered a normal communications posture and one during contingency (restoral) situations, both aimed at recommending an improved communications capability to and from Korea. They outlined many technical considerations and noted that the links, in order of priority, would be as follows: Hawaii to Saigon, Korea to Okinawa, Guam to Australia, Guam to Thailand, and Philippines to Hawaii (time shared). They recommended that their proposal be forwarded to the JCS if the JCS did not provide a terminal for Korea as proposed by CINCPAC.

2. ADMIN CINCPAC 032056Z Oct 70.
3. JCS 3024/081928Z Oct 70.
4. J621 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70 citing JCS 5975/162150Z Nov 70.
5. CINCPAC 210247Z Nov 70.
6. DCA PAC KUNIA 110330Z Dec 70.
Several times in 1970 CINCPAC was also concerned with plans for the Tactical Satellite Communications System. On 16 May CINCPACAF had forwarded a Strategic Air Command Required Operational Capability document setting forth needs for a Tactical Satellite Communications System. CINCPAC's review of the document indicated no conflict with CINCPAC's previously stated requirements and objectives for such communications. CINCPAC recommended that the CINCSAC forward his document to the JCS for incorporation in the overall statement of Defense Department tactical communications satellite requirements. In this way the total requirements for the PACOM would be known during the planning stage.

CINCPAC had stated his tactical satellite requirements in March 1969, as had the other unified and specified commanders. These stated requirements were for interim operational use and testing in the operational environment. It was not possible to meet most of the priority requirements of the unified and specified commands, however, with the limited assets available without precluding adequate support for important national requirements.

The use of the interim equipment was for test and evaluation as both satellites and terminals were in the research and development stage. One important objective of their use was to develop confidence in a highly mobile satellite communications capability as a primary method of communications, permitting reductions of existing facilities such as high frequency radio. The satellites and terminals would be managed by the Services, so CINCPAC would normally request support from his Service components.

In another tactical satellite matter, CINCPAC recommended that the developing system be considered for application in his executive transport aircraft to provide continuous, direct, two-way communications between that aircraft and the National Command Authorities and others with whom CINCPAC would need to communicate in emergency situations. Existing communications on the aircraft did not provide that capability. The matter was still under study at the end of the year.

Secure Voice Communications

The Automatic Secure Voice Communications System (AUTOSEVOCOM) came under study in several regards in 1970, including one concerning unsatisfactory

1. CINCPACAF 161944Z May 70.
2. CINCPAC 292207Z May 70.
3. CINCPAC 120245Z Jun 70.
4. CINCPAC 160028Z Oct 70.
voice quality to Southeast Asia and one concerning inability to complete calls at all.

(c) Voice quality performance of the AUTOSEVOCOM system on long distance calls, which used narrowband transmission through the common-user AUTOVON system, could not--because of the low data rate--provide totally satisfactory voice quality to all users despite continuing improvements in the operation and maintenance of switch and terminal hardware. CINCPACAF, specifically, had complained about voice fidelity and quality he required on secure voice calls to Air Force subordinate commands throughout the PACOM and particularly those in Vietnam. CINCPAC recognized the deficiency and felt that the only truly satisfactory solution was to provide wideband rather than narrowband transmission paths between critical subscribers to the system.

(c) This solution was not feasible on a system wide basis, however, because of the lack of sufficient capacity in the Defense Communications System worldwide common-user networks to afford the luxury of the tremendous channel bandwidth required by a single wideband secure voice channel. As classified voice communications between Hawaii and Vietnam were more critical than between any other two locations with the exception of Hawaii to Washington, CINCPAC believed that greater voice fidelity on at least one circuit was needed.

(c) Research and development tests in 1968 by the U. S. Army Strategic Communications Command proved the feasibility of long distance wideband secure voice transmissions using the military satellite system. This effort was known as MUSCLE LINK. Voice quality was excellent. There were limitations on the use of the satellite terminal equipment, however, because of its poor reliability and the difficulty of maintaining it in the field environment. Testing continued. Military satellite channels were being used only five hours a day to transmit COMPASS LINK data and could be made available for secure voice wideband transmissions from Vietnam to Hawaii and back, with modification to the equipment at both places.¹

(c) On 10 February 1970 CINCPAC advised the JCS of the requirement and asked that CINCPAC be advised of the status of development and testing.²

(c) The matter of unsatisfactory grade of service to and from Vietnam was brought to the attention of the Joint AUTOSEVOCOM Working Group in 1970. Only 26 percent of the calls into Vietnam were completed and only 42 percent of the calls out. A Secure Voice Assistance Team (SCAT) was formed to evaluate the

1. J624 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
2. CINCPAC 102326Z Feb 70.
facilities that could be at fault. They started with the switch at Dau in the Philippines and found a number of problems, one with improper wiring that meant that the opportunity for a secure voice call to be completed through Dau had apparently never been greater than 50 percent. The teams continued testing in the RVN.

Also under study was the increasing requirement for secure voice systems and the necessity for technical interface of those systems. The matter had come under study by the JCS as they considered the responsiveness of PACOM communications systems. CINCPAC advised the JCS on 25 November of increasing requirements and the need for technical interface, specifically referring to the Navy's longer range secure voice system called STEAM VALVE, the AUTOSEVOCOM, and PARKHILL, the Navy follow-on fleet system not yet delivered. CINCPAC solicited assistance in the form of an investigation of feasible methods to improve operational and technical interface.

**Tactical Secure Voice Communications**

The PACOM Tactical Secure Voice (TSV) program had been initiated in 1966 to correct communications security weaknesses highlighted as a result of operations in Southeast Asia. Efforts to secure narrowband high frequency tactical radio communications links led to the development of long-term security equipment called AN/USC-20, but budget cutbacks in 1969 caused the Defense Department to delay procurement of that device in abeyance. Meanwhile, a cheaper, less sophisticated security device was developed by the National Security Agency. This KY-65, called the PARKHILL, was a short term device for narrowband high frequency radio communications that would suffice for day-to-day operations containing perishable information only. On 9 January CINCPAC asked his components to reassess their quantitative requirements for narrowband tactical secure voice equipment throughout the PACOM, annotating those requirements that could be satisfied by the PARKHILL on an interim basis.

CINCPAC consolidated and forwarded the narrowband requirements to the JCS on 25 June. CINCPAC advised the JCS that continued efforts should be made...

---

1. J624 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
2. J624 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
3. ADMIN CINCPAC 252018Z Nov 70.
5. J6421 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
6. Ibid.
7. CINCPAC 090310Z Jan 70.
to provide a suitable narrowband TSV capability in the PACOM as soon as possible. He noted that the PARKHILL appeared to present the earliest and best solution to part of this requirement. He listed his long-term requirements for 508 devices, his KY-65 requirement (PARKHILL) for 3,142 devices. Neither of these totals included spares or follow-on requirements.

(8) The wideband TSV communications program for the PACOM neared completion. The program had been delayed by logistic and administrative problems that had led CINCPAC to initiate quarterly reports from his component commands in 1969 showing installation percentages and identifying specific problems. By 31 December 1969 the program was 80 percent completed and problems adequately identified and resolved. CINCPAC so advised the JCS on 17 February 1970, noting that he would not report on the matter again unless requested to do so. He said that specific information concerning equipment available, installed, or operational could be obtained from the Services.1

(8) Before the JCS received CINCPAC's recommendation, however, they asked for specific information on the installation and use of secure voice equipment.2 This request followed a visit to Vietnam by JCS communications people, who noted discrepancies between CINCPAC's quarterly reports and information provided by COMUSMACV and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Vietnam. CINCPAC's data had been concerned with installation of equipment and the Vietnam information concerned utilization of that equipment. The JCS, therefore, asked for a one-time report on both subjects. This type of information was expected to be difficult to collect because the equipment had become distributed to many units as authorized in their Tables of Organization and Equipment. CINCPAC asked to be relieved of making the report,3 reiterating information in his 17 February letter that the Services would be the best source for the information. The JCS disapproved CINCPAC's recommendation however,4 and CINCPAC prepared the report.

The PACOM Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON)

(U) On 1 March 1970 all Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) switches became operational in the PACOM.5 These were the last of 17 switching centers

1. J642 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70, citing CINCPAC ltr ser 00470 of 17 Feb 70.
3. CINCPAC 031912Z Mar 70.
5. J6 Brief No. 361-70, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Apr 70 of JCS SM-278-70 of 3 Apr 70, Subj: Realignment of the Precedence and Overseas Maximum Calling Area Assignments within the Global AUTOVON; see also CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. I, pp. 199-203
worldwide. PACOM switches were added in Japan, Okinawa, and Taiwan. Operational effectiveness of the AUTOVON system depended, however, on a proper balance of call precedence and proper control over users with lesser priority (those with two wire equipment). In the spring of 1970, worldwide, FLASH OVERRIDE and FLASH calls accounted for 22 percent of the traffic instead of the 10 percent stated objective. IMMEDIATE calls accounted for 28 percent of the traffic instead of a proposed 15 percent. PRIORITY and ROUTINE accounted for 22 and 28 percent of the actual traffic respectively instead of the objective rate of 35 and 40 percent respectively. Action continued to attempt to reduce precedence and calling areas to meet the JCS objectives.  

(U) In September the matter was still of concern to CINCPAC. He advised his component commanders that calls from two-wire subscribers would be processed as ROUTINE unless the user specified a higher precedence, in which case a record of the call would be made. Callers from four-wire phones would not be so ticketed unless they used FLASH precedence.  

(U) As a result of the final cutover to AUTOVON, CINCPAC initiated a program to either phase out or phase down the old manual Joint Overseas Switchboard (JOSS) throughout the Pacific. CINCPAC tasked the Defense Communications Agency Pacific to form and chair a committee made up of CINCPAC component and subordinate unified command representatives with the task of developing appropriate plans.  

(U) A question about funding with the new AUTOVON was raised by the Department of the Army in March. The problem revolved around access lines from the AUTOVON switch in the Philippines to JOSS switchboards in Vietnam and Thailand. The Navy had originally been designated as the funding agency for these trunks, but the Navy had subsequently asked that the Army fund the long access lines. The Army asked CINCPAC to review his tasking of his components for circuitry, noting that access lines may have been validated separately from individual component requirements for AUTOVON service. CINCPAC referred the problem to the JCS on 18 March with the recommendation that criteria be established to determine the funding agency for common-user voice circuits between AUTOVON and JOSS switches; that it may be advisable to prorate charges for each Military Department based on the number of subscribers served for each JOSS; or that the DCA

1. J6 Brief No. 361-70, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Apr 70 of JCS SM-278-70 of 3 Apr 70, Subj: Realignment of the Precedence and Overseas Maximum Calling Area Assignments within the Global AUTOVON.  
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 260344Z Sep 70.  
3. J627 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70; CINCPAC 101910Z Apr 70.  
4. DA 032151Z Mar 70; J622 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
role in programming and funding be reevaluated, utilizing the Communication Services Industrial Fund for funding common-user voice circuits connecting AUTOVON switches with JOSS.¹

(6) A number of AUTOVON pre-set conferences were established in 1970 including a command and control conference for the Airborne Command Post, one in support of unclassified peacetime emergency voice reporting, and one for use when CINCPAC elected to conduct a command/advisory conference.² CINCPAC also approved a pre-set conference for CINCPACAF's Air Lift Command Center.³

Integration of Dedicated Communications Networks into AUTODIN

(8) The Interim Data Transmission Network (IDTN) was a JCS network specifically configured to support the coordination of Atomic Operations Network and JCS Joint Operational Reporting System (JOPREP) traffic. In January the JCS called for phase out of the IDTN by integrating it into the Defense Communications System. The IDTN and AUTODIN terminals were both located at Kunia and provided back-up for one another in the event of an outage on either.⁴ CINCPAC had already established the AUTODIN as the primary PACOM command and control record communications support system.

(6) CINCPAC concurred with the JCS plan to integrate the IDTN into AUTODIN to allow deactivation of one of the many duplicative communications facilities in the Kunia complex. CINCPAC advised the JCS, however, that continuity of traffic would be disrupted in the event of failure of the Wahiawa switch, a risk that would have to be recognized until uninterrupted dual accessibility was available at Kunia.⁵ The IDTN was integrated on 15 April 1970.

AUTODIN Improvement - Automated Command Center Communications

(6) On 10 October 1969 CINCPAC had sent an urgent request to the JCS to automate PACOM command and control record/data communications. The concept forwarded by CINCPAC provided an improved capability for the rapid exchange of operational and intelligence information between commanders and other authorities.⁶

1. ADMIN CINCPAC 180323Z Mar 70.
2. J625 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Feb, Oct-Dec 70.
3. J622 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
5. CINCPAC 030206Z Mar 70.
The JCS tasked the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to prepare an appropriate support plan. The DCA informally, and without coordination with CINCPAC on the matter, furnished the JCS with cost estimates that were significantly higher than the CINCPAC estimated cost.\(^1\) The JCS advised CINCPAC of this difference and asked him to review and resubmit his plan. CINCPAC, in turn, asked that the DCA provide the rationale and a summary of their funding estimates so as to assure that the revised CINCPAC plan will correlate with DCA studies and concepts, thus preventing possible further delays and extraneous reviews of the revised plan when submitted by CINCPAC.\(^2\)

To resolve differences of opinion, representatives of CINCPAC and the DCA met at Camp Smith in March. It was agreed by all that sufficient information was held by the DCA to proceed with development of a draft plan for the modernization program and the JCS were so advised on 21 March.\(^3\)

**Centralized Leasing of Communications Services Within Hawaii**

Late in December 1969 the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) recommended that the Defense Commercial Communications Office, Pacific (DCCO PAC) be designated as the centralized leasing agency within Hawaii for all Services.\(^4\) The DCCO PAC, according to the DCA, possessed the expertise that should prove cost effective in performing procurement, accounting, and payment functions if it was determined that the Defense Administrative Telephone System (DATS), as it had come to be called, should be leased from the Hawaiian Telephone Company. The DCA proposal was referred to a DATS tri-Service committee.

After review and study they decided against using the DCCO PAC for this purpose. Computer services and technical advisers for the DCCO were located at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, an arrangement not acceptable for day-to-day operations in Hawaii.\(^5\)

The DATS tri-Service committee recommended that centralized leasing and billing be accomplished by the Navy. CINCPAC approved this recommendation and so advised the DCA on 12 September 1970.\(^6\)

\(^1\) JCS 9915/112248Z Feb 70.
\(^2\) CINCPAC 131857Z Feb 70.
\(^3\) CINCPAC 212216Z Mar 70.
\(^4\) J622 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70; Ltr, DCA to CINCPAC, and others, 29 Dec 70, Subj: Centralized Leasing of Communications Services within Hawaii.
\(^5\) J622 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
\(^6\) ADMIN CINCPAC 120307Z Sep 70.
CINCPAC Voice Alert Network (CVAN) Upgrading

On 15 February CINCPAC asked the Chief of Naval Operations to make proposals to develop a sub-system plan to incorporate the CINCPAC Voice Alert Network (CVAN) into the Automatic Secure Voice Network (AUTOVON) in a manner similar to being engineered for the JCS Alerting Network (JCSAN). The CVAN lacked redundancy of equipment and circuit path inherent in the JCSAN by which the consistently achieved close to 100 percent effectiveness. Realization of objective for CINCPAC's alert network would significantly enhance command and control capabilities.1

On 12 June CINCPAC clarified his requirements for the CVAN to the Service Communications Agency and again stressed the importance of reliable voice communication to the PACOM Single Integrated Operation Plan and General War Plans.2

CINCPAC representatives briefed representatives of the JCS, the Services, and the Defense Communications Agency on 20 and 21 August on the same CVAN trade. The main features of the upgrading, they explained, included dualizing capabilities from CINCPAC to the Philippines and Japan and the capability to initiate the CVAN from CINCPAC's Alternate Command Facility on Guam.3

(NU) Hawaiian Telephone Company engineers were scheduled to conduct a site survey early in 1971.4

Radio Site Procurement Policy

(NU) Following an announcement by the Director of Telecommunications Policy in the Executive Office of the President on the subject, CINCPAC directed that obligation of funds by the component commands for the selection, procurement, development of new radio station sites, or enlargement of existing sites, would be withheld pending assurance of the availability of appropriate frequency assignment support.5

(NU) In view of the austere budgetary climate and the rapidly diminishing frequency spectrum and geographical resources in the PACOM, CINCPAC believed that

1. CINCPAC 1521332 Feb 70.
2. CINCPAC 120301Z Jun 70.
3. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
4. J625 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Nov and Dec 70.
5. J641 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
The JCS tasked the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to prepare an appropriate support plan. The DCA informally, and without coordination with CINCPAC on the matter, furnished the JCS with cost estimates that were significantly higher than the CINCPAC estimated cost. The JCS advised CINCPAC of this difference and asked him to review and resubmit his plan. CINCPAC, in turn, asked that the DCA provide the rationale and a summary of their funding estimates "so as to assure that the revised CINCPAC plan will correlative with DCA studies and concepts, thus preventing possible further delays and extraneous reviews of the revised plan when submitted by CINCPAC." 

To resolve differences of opinion, representatives of CINCPAC and the DCA met at Camp Smith in March. It was agreed by all that sufficient information was held by the DCA to proceed with development of a draft plan for the modernization program and the JCS were so advised on 21 March. 

Centralized Leasing of Communications Services Within Hawaii

Late in December 1969 the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) recommended that the Defense Commercial Communications Office, Pacific (DCCO PAC) be designated as the centralized leasing agency within Hawaii for all Services. The DCCO PAC, according to the DCA, possessed the expertise that should prove cost effective in performing procurement, accounting, and payment functions if it was determined that the Defense Administrative Telephone System (DATS), as it had come to be called, should be leased from the Hawaiian Telephone Company. The DCA proposal was referred to a DATS tri-Service committee.

After review and study they decided against using the DCCO PAC for this purpose. Computer services and technical advisers for the DCCO were located at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, an arrangement not acceptable for day-to-day operations in Hawaii.

The DATS tri-Service committee recommended that centralized leasing and billing be accomplished by the Navy. CINCPAC approved this recommendation and so advised the DCA on 12 September 1970.

1. JCS 9915/112248Z Feb 70.
2. CINCPAC 131857Z Feb 70.
3. CINCPAC 212216Z Mar 70.
4. J622 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70; Ltr, DCA to CINCPAC, and others, 29 Dec 70, Subj: Centralized Leasing of Communications Services within Hawaii.
5. J622 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70.
6. ADMIN CINCPAC 120307Z Sep 70.
CINCPAC Voice Alert Network (CVAN) Upgrading

(‡) On 15 February CINCPAC asked the Chief of Naval Operations to make provisions to develop a sub-system plan to incorporate the CINCPAC Voice Alert Network (CVAN) into the Automatic Secure Voice Network (AUTOVON) in a manner similar to that being engineered for the JCS Alerting Network (JCSAN). The CVAN lacked the redundancy of equipment and circuit path inherent in the JCSAN by which the JCSAN consistently achieved close to 100 percent effectiveness. Realization of this objective for CINCPAC's alert net would significantly enhance command and control capabilities.¹

(‡) On 12 June CINCPAC clarified his requirements for the CVAN to the Defense Communications Agency and again stressed the importance of reliable voice communication to the PACOM Single Integrated Operation Plan and General War Forces.²

(§) CINCPAC representatives briefed representatives of the JCS, the Services, and the Defense Communications Agency on 20 and 21 August on the same CVAN upgrade. The main features of the upgrading, they explained, included dual routing capabilities from CINCPAC to the Philippines and Japan and the capability to initiate the CVAN from CINCPAC's Alternate Command Facility on Guam.³

(U) Hawaiian Telephone Company engineers were scheduled to conduct a site survey early in 1971.⁴

Radio Site Procurement Policy

(U) Following an announcement by the Director of Telecommunications Policy of the Executive Office of the President on the subject, CINCPAC directed that the obligation of funds by the component commands for the selection, procurement, and development of new radio station sites, or enlargement of existing sites, would be withhold pending assurance of the availability of appropriate frequency assignment support.⁵

(U) In view of the austere budgetary climate and the rapidly diminishing frequency spectrum and geographical resources in the PACOM, CINCPAC believed that

-----------------------------------
1. CINCPAC 152133Z Feb 70.
2. CINCPAC 120301Z Jun 70.
3. J3 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
4. J625 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Nov and Dec 70.
5. J641 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
CONCEIRED

continuing action was required to insure against expensive false starts and after-the-fact technical adjustments caused by the expenditure of funds for communications-electronics facility requirements prior to the coordination and assignment of radio frequencies for these facilities. The component commands implemented the CINCPAC policy.

Frequency Management

(U) Three separate matters concerning CINCPAC's frequency management occurred in 1970. The first concerned frequency management during U.S. manned space flight missions. During the APOLLO 11 and 12 missions certain transmitters in Japan were using the same frequencies selected for the APOLLO missions. Through the Radio Frequency Interference Control Center the offending emitters were silenced, but the emitter users complained about the untimeliness of the request and the method by which it was made (through military channels). The two offending operations had been clearly registered with the International Frequency Register under the provision of radio regulations established at Geneva in 1959. Such frequencies were public knowledge and in use before APOLLO began. In February 1970 CINCPAC advised the JCS that any interference from non-U.S. controlled sources would be noted and, depending on its severity, reported to Washington for resolution through the State Department or other appropriate Washington channels directly to the country concerned.

(U) The second matter concerned a proposal to move the Area Frequency Coordinator for Hawaii from Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station on Oahu to the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Barking Sands, Kauai. This was a Navy agency used by CINCPAC and the other components. CINCPAC believed it should not be moved and so advised the JCS in March.

(U) CINCPAC published semi-monthly the CINCPAC Frequency Assignment and Usage Record (FAU). A decision was made to publish this document on microfilm instead of hard copy beginning in January 1971. This was expected to cost only $2,700 a year instead of $38,000.

High Frequency Facilities

(U) A comprehensive, worldwide study of high frequency radio facilities, both those that were part of the Defense Communications System and those that

1. Ibid.
2. J641 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
3. CINCPAC 072224Z Feb 70.
4. CINCPAC 241933Z Mar 70.
5. J641 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
were not, was initiated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in April 1968 with the idea of consolidating, collocating, and phasing out such facilities.¹ CINCPAC submitted his recommendations in February 1969 and most were forwarded by the JCS to the Deputy Secretary.

(¶) On 5 February 1970 the Deputy Secretary of Defense sent a memorandum to the Services, the JCS, and the Defense Communications Agency in which he outlined his decision to close a number of facilities and consolidate others.² In the PACOM he approved for planning purposes the proposed consolidation of Army facilities at Waipio and Marine facilities at Kaneohe Bay with the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu. He also asked that the matter of consolidating Air Force facilities at Wheeler Air Force Base (receiving) and Bellows Air Force Station (transmitting) with the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu be studied.

(¶) For Guam he approved relocation of Air Force facilities from Wettengel to the Naval Communications Station, Guam and asked that the matter of consolidating Air Force and Navy facilities be studied instead of plans to collocate them. He also asked that the JCS investigate savings that could be realized by some consolidation of Service and Federal Aviation Administration facilities on Guam.

(¶) The Deputy Secretary said that action toward consolidation or collocation of high frequency facilities on Okinawa should be held in abeyance pending completion of political negotiations relative to continuation of U.S. occupancy of Okinawa.

(¶) He approved the cancellation of planned expansion of facilities at Atsugi, Japan Naval Air Station. Any requirement for additional transmitter coverage should be met by the Naval Communications Station, Japan, he said.

(¶) Listed in the facilities to be closed on 1 July was the Army's facility at Hsinchuang, Taiwan.³

(¶) On 7 March CINCPAC asked for clarification and further guidance from the JCS on questions raised by the Deputy Secretary's memorandum.⁴ First he

2. Memorandum, Deputy Secretary of Defense to Secretaries of the Military Departments; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Defense Communications Agency, 5 Feb 70, Subj: Study of World-wide Analysis and Evaluation of High Frequency Utilization.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 072218Z Mar 70.
asked if a reversal could be obtained on the decision to hold in abeyance consider-  
ation of actions for Okinawa. CINCPAC said that his recommendations regard-  
ing the closing of Ie Shima and Deragawa were still prudent and economical and  
had nothing to do with political negotiations.

(§) Regarding the Hsinchuang, Taiwan facility, CINCPAC believed the 1 July  
date was in error as the facility was not to be closed until completion of the  
Integrated Joint Communications System-Pacific. He also noted that although this  
transmitting site was listed for closing, no mention was made of the associated  
receiving site at Shu Linku.

(§) In another matter, the closing of the two high frequency trunks that  
terminated in Korea, one from Japan and the other from Okinawa, resulted in a  
recommendation from CINCUSARPAC for concurrent lease of two INTELSAT circuits  
from Hawaii to Korea. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he concurred with the CINC-  
USARPAC recommendation.¹

(§) In still another matter, the two high frequency trunks from Johnston  
Island came under study. On 25 November 1970 CINCPAC approved the deactivation  
of the trunk to McClellan, California effective 31 December 1970. The trunk to  
Hawaii was to be retained as a secondary path with the primary path a submarine  
cable.²

CINCPAC Controls on Deactivation of Circuits

(U) The need to expedite deactivation of command and control communications  
networks and integration of that traffic into the Automatic Digital Network  
(AUTODIN) System had been stressed by the JCS and the Military Departments, and  
CINCPAC sponsored these actions. But by 1970 a trend had developed in which  
PACOM Service components were processing circuit deactivation actions on circuits  
that directly supported the PACOM mission. CINCPAC instructed his components,  
therefore, that no circuits would be deactivated without the specific approval of  
CINCPAC.³

(U) An example of circuit deactivations effected with CINCPAC's approval was  
a CINCPACAF plan that called for deactivation of 108 teletype circuits throughout  
the command, releasing critical communications trunking assets that could be  
applied to other urgent and outstanding requirements.⁴

1. ADMIN CINCPAC 242209Z Dec 70.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 252019Z Nov 70.
3. CINCPAC 130033Z Jan 70.
4. J527 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
U.S. Military Communications With Singapore

(6) Arrangements had begun in 1969 for Australia to assume responsibility for operations and maintenance of the Singapore end of the Singapore-Bangkok high frequency trunk with the United States assuming the same for the Bangkok end. During the impending phase down of U.K. forces east of Suez this arrangement would provide communications to SEATO headquarters and for other U.K. requirements in Thailand and in turn provide Australia with circuits to SEATO and into the Integrated Communications System in Southeast Asia if U.K. forces leave Singapore altogether.

(6) Coordination regarding engineering arrangements for the trunk was initiated between CINCPAC and the U.K. Commander in Chief Far East in early January 1970. CINCPAC forwarded a complete recapitulation of the status of arrangements to the JCS on 19 January.2

(6) On 9 March CINCPAC assigned to CINCUSARPAC3 the responsibility for manning the Bangkok end of the trunk and such responsibility was assumed on 17 March.4 Formal agreements between the United States and Australia had not yet been completed and were not expected until Australia assumed responsibility for Singapore installations following British withdrawal.5

Secure Communications With Diplomatic Posts

(5) CINCPAC had developed procedures to permit establishment of rapid, secure, radio teletypewriter communication between a military task force afloat and diplomatic posts in the PACOM through the Diplomatic Telecommunications System at Clark Air Base in the Philippines.6 This capability was tested monthly.

(5) In early January 1970 CINCPAC suggested to the JCS that tests of the method be expanded to include testing between Pacific Fleet units and Central and South American diplomatic posts to gain experience that might be useful in the event of implementation of CINCPAC's operational plan in support of U.S. Southern Command operations.7

2. ADMIN CINCPAC 192319Z Jan 70.
3. CINCPAC 092112Z Mar 70.
4. J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
5. Ibid., citing JCS 1854/252329Z Feb 70.
7. J6 Brief No. 00383-70, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Apr 70 of MJCS 133-70 of 9 Apr 70, Subj: Secure Radio Teletypewriter Communications to Diplomatic Posts (U).
On 9 April the JCS advised that the necessary coordination with the State Department had been effected and that such tests could be conducted at CINCPAC's convenience.\(^1\) They forwarded the Diplomatic Telecommunications System signal plan and associated data to be used in the tests. On 24 April CINCPAC designated CINCPACFLT as his representative in the planning, scheduling, and conduct of the tests.\(^2\)

COMUSTDC Requests Special Dedicated Teletype Circuits

In January COMUSTDC identified a requirement for three Special Intelligence (SI) accredited teletype circuits from the COMUSTDC All Source Information Center. One was to be to the 327th Air Division Command Advisory Function on Taiwan, one to the Joint Sobe Processing Center on Okinawa, and the third to the CINCPAC Command Center.

CINCPAC concurred in the requirement for direct access to the 327th Air Division for air operations information, but not in the two other requirements which were served by other means.\(^3\) COMUSTDC's requirement did not appear to be sufficiently time critical to warrant direct circuitry in the last two cases, CINCPAC noted.

---

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 242308Z Apr 70.
3. CINCPAC 170311Z Feb 70.
SECTION XIV - PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Temporary Holiday Changes in the CINCPAC Work Week

(U) CINCPAC personnel continued to work six days a week in 1970, with Wednesdays and Saturdays half days. When national holidays fell in such a way that employees would fail to receive the normal holiday benefit, the administrative work week was changed temporarily to permit celebration of the holiday. By working on Wednesday afternoon, for example, employees were granted Saturday morning off to permit them to enjoy the full benefit of a Monday holiday, the three-day weekend that was enjoyed by most other Federal employees.1

Civilian Incentive Awards

(U) The CINCPAC Incentive Awards Committee convened annually in the spring to consider awards for which employees had been nominated. These included the honorary Outstanding Performance Rating and two kinds of monetary awards, the Quality Salary Increase and the Sustained Superior Performance Award. It was likely, but not necessary, that an employee who received a financial reward also received an Outstanding Performance Rating.

(U) The 1970 committee approved awards for 59 Outstanding Performance Ratings of the 62 nominations for that award, 12 Quality Step Increases of 29 nominations, and seven Sustained Superior Performance Awards of 13 nominations submitted.2

Combined Federal Campaign

(U) The 1970 Combined Federal Campaign in the PACOM netted $674,331.72. This included $662,572.33 contributed by 189,593 personnel plus $11,759.39 from Vietnam that was the result of voluntary, non-solicited contributions.3

1. CINCPACSTAFFNOTES 5530, 15 Aug 70, Subj: Temporary Change in Administrative Workweek for 30 August - 5 September 1970; 8 October, Subj: Temporary Change in Administrative Workweek for 8-14 November 1970; and 1 Dec 70, Subj: Temporary Change in Administrative Workweek for the Weeks Containing Christmas and New Year’s Day.
2. Memo, Chairman, CINCPAC Incentive Awards Committee to COL Hough, Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, 11 May 70, Subj: Meeting of CINCPAC Incentive Awards Committee; report of.
Excluding Vietnam, this was about $5,600 more than the year before with 10,000 fewer persons solicited.

(U) CINCPAC's final report to the Defense Department's Fund Raising Coordinator contained a number of the same suggestions that had been submitted at the end of the campaign the year before. He recommended that the PACOM campaign be conducted simultaneously with the one in the Continental United States to avoid dual solicitation of personnel who had already participated. He recommended that campaign dates begin and end on specific pay days. The "Fair Share Giving Guide" was not favorably received, he noted, and he recommended it be eliminated from the individual handouts. He recommended that the payroll withholding statement be changed to include a provision for deductions for any number of months for those personnel departing the command prior to the end of December; many personnel in this category had been hesitant to contribute. He made a number of other administrative recommendations including one for simplification of the final report.

Credit Unions

(U) Late in December 1969 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs forwarded letters from the Chairman of the House of Representatives Banking and Currency Committee complaining because credit unions had not been established at Camp Zama, Japan and Subic Bay in the Philippines. CINCPAC asked COMUS Japan and the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines for information on which to base his reply. The question had been considered numerous times before for both installations.

(U) CINCPAC's reply to the Assistant Secretary on 27 January 1970 stated that he did not recommend establishment of a credit union sub-office at either facility. At Camp Zama the Military Banking Facility provided signature loans at a slightly lower interest rate than the credit union. Interest paid on loans to that facility had reduced U.S. Treasury support by $68,000 in the past three years. CINCPAC also noted that further overseas personnel reductions should be considered prior to the establishment of new facilities.

(U) CINCPAC noted that Telex service between Subic Bay and the Naval Federal Credit Union in Washington, D.C. had begun in 1969 and transactions were accomplished rapidly by this means. CINCPAC also described other features of private financial services available in the Philippines.

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 270339Z Jan 70.
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) CINCPAC concluded that facilities available at both installations were in consonance with Defense Department policy.¹

(U) In an unrelated credit union matter, COMUS Japan asked whether Defense Department credit union personnel were authorized to travel in Military Airlift Command aircraft in the performance of their duties. CINCPAC asked for a determination from the Air Force Chief of Staff, who advised that credit unions were not considered nonappropriated fund activities and therefore their personnel were not authorized MAC transportation.² Exceptions to this rule would be considered on an individual basis when travel was required to an area not served by an American flag carrier. CINCPAC advised COMUS Japan of the decision on 9 September.³

Environmental and Morale Leave

(U) A number of questions about the Environmental and Morale Leave (E&ML) program arose in the PACOM in 1970.

Guam

(U) There weren't enough seats on aircraft used for E&ML from Guam to accommodate all who were eligible or who had been extended the courtesy of such transportation. On 3 April, therefore, CINCPAC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics and Administration advised the Director of the Pacific Region of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that authorization for FAA personnel on Guam to participate in the E&ML program would be terminated on 1 May. He explained that the number of Defense Department military and civilian personnel and their dependents exceeded the number of available aircraft seats for use by E&ML participants. Service regulations had permitted participation by other than Defense Department personnel only when additional space was available.⁴ Authorization for FAA employees at other PACOM locations continued in effect, he said, subject to continued availability of sufficient seats.

(U) A letter from the FAA Regional Director on 6 May caused the Deputy Chief of Staff to reiterate the decision he had relayed on 3 April. On 21 June he

---

1. Ibid.
2. CSAF 020015Z Sep 70.
3. ADMIN CINCPAC 092320Z Sep 70.
4. Ltr. RADM Janney, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics and Administration, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Phillip M. Swatek, Director, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Pacific Region, 3 Apr 70, n.s.

UNCLASSIFIED

243
advised that the matter had been again carefully reviewed but that there was no change in the decision. He acknowledged the significant contribution of FAA employees and the accomplishments of the agency, but regretted that permitting other than Defense Department personnel under existing conditions was "neither within the spirit nor letter of the appropriate regulation."\(^1\)

(U) In another matter, CINCPAC advised the CINCPAC Representative to Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands that dependents who were not command sponsored may participate in the E&ML program provided that space was available.\(^2\)

(U) In still another matter about E&ML from Guam, CINCPAC was concerned with giving equal treatment to all eligible for the program as they competed for the scarce seats. On 22 July the Commander of Submarine Squadron FIFTEEN asked the Chief of Naval Operations through Navy channels plus CINCPAC to consider giving priority to military personnel on E&ML on the non-scheduled flights by Navy aircraft. He said that the decision to allot seats based on a person's total elapsed time on the island favored civilians and discriminated against military personnel, who were unaccompanied by their dependents.\(^3\)

(U) CINCPAC endorsed the letter to the Chief of Naval Operations on 7 October. CINCPAC noted that he shared the deep concern expressed by the writer and other endorsers, but the regulation was quite clear on E&ML: "travel opportunity will be afforded on an equitable basis to officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian employees, and accompanying dependents, without regard to rank or grade, military or civilian, or branch of service."\(^4\) An exception to such policy should not be restricted to Guam, he said, and any such precedent would have wide applicability. Assigning priority to one group at the expense of another was clearly inconsistent with established policy and could jeopardize the success of "this important program." Accordingly, CINCPAC could not concur. He did concur, however, with the concept of expanding the Dependent Air Charter Program to include personnel eligible for E&ML.

---

1. Ltr, RADM Janney, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics and Administration, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. John H. Hilton, Acting Director, Pacific Region, Federal Aviation Administration, 11 Jun 70, n.s.
2. ADMIN.CINCPAC 040215Z Apr 70.
3. Ltr, Cmdr, Submarine Squadron FIFTEEN to CNO, 22 Jul 70, Subj: Travel by Military Personnel Under the Environmental and Morale Program for Guam; recommendation for.
4. CINCPAC endorsement, 7 Oct 70, to Ltr, Cmdr, Submarine Squadron FIFTEEN to CNO, 22 Jul 70, Subj: Travel by Military Personnel Under the Environmental and Morale Program for Guam; recommendation for.
Okinawa

(U) CINCPAC had received a request through the CINCPAC Representative in the Ryukyus for consideration of a recommendation that Thailand be designated an E&ML location for certain additional personnel. CINCPAC's reply of 24 May advised that he could not consider the matter favorably at the time. Increasing the number of U.S. personnel in Thailand was not consistent with the policy of reducing U.S. presence there. Further, the variety of E&ML locations already available for personnel on Okinawa appeared "entirely adequate to satisfy the intent of the E&ML program..."

Indonesia

(U) The Chief of the Defense Liaison Group in Indonesia asked that Indonesia be designated as a depressant base to permit space available E&ML travel on military aircraft. CINCPAC replied that airlift support had been established between Djakarta and Taipei on a bimonthly basis. He also designated Taipei as an additional E&ML location for personnel assigned in Indonesia.

Australia

(U) Personnel from the Naval Communications Station Harold E. Holt in Australia had been having difficulty securing transportation from Christchurch, New Zealand for return to duty after they completed E&ML. The commander of the station proposed that they be authorized preference over enroute space available passengers transiting Christchurch. CINCPAC did not agree and did not approve the recommendation. He noted that such an exception to policy regarding space available travelers could not be restricted to E&ML passengers nor to the Christchurch area. Such a precedent, he said, could "obviously result in significant additional complexities in space available travel." CINCPAC also noted that personnel from the communications station had the opportunity to travel to Sydney on Military Airlift Command airlift, which met the intent of the E&ML program.

Cambodia

(C) Based on a request from the U.S. Defense Attache in Phnom Penh, CINCPAC authorized the E&ML program for personnel assigned there. CINCPAC designated Bangkok as an E&ML location, but conditions precluded so designating Saigon. Efforts were being made to reduce the number of transients in the Saigon area and no leaves or passes were permitted in that area. Exceptions to this policy

1. CINCPAC 240249Z May 70.
2. CINCPAC 212229Z May 70.
3. CINCPAC 060307Z Oct 70.
would be considered on an individual basis for persons from Phnom Penh, however, when there were exceptional compassionate reasons. CINCPAC cautioned that every effort should be made to insure that dependents were accompanied by their sponsors, but when this was "manifestly infeasible" dependents could travel unaccompanied on the mission aircraft to Bangkok on E&ML.¹

(5) In October CINCPAC authorized E&ML for persons in Phnom Penh to additional locations in Manila, Hong Kong, and Singapore, with a decision on Kuala Lumpur held in abeyance. Calcutta and New Delhi were not considered suitable E&ML sites at the time. CINCPAC waived the requirement that crew members be in a leave status "as long as present conditions prevail and minimum air crew is assigned Phnom Penh."²

Drug Abuse

(U) Drug abuse remained one of the most pressing problems of the Services. To provide more meaningful and measurable data on the whole picture of drug abuse in the PACOM, however, CINCPAC initiated a requirement for a monthly report from his component commanders and his subordinate unified commanders in Vietnam, Thailand, and Korea. Each commander was to provide data on the number of admissions to medical facilities when the primary or secondary diagnosis was a drug related condition and on the number of deaths confirmed by autopsy as attributed to drugs. The first report was prepared for October 1970. CINCPAC said, "This factual data indicating the extreme potency of available drugs may achieve the desired impact that our education programs have apparently failed to produce."³

(U) Although data was incomplete for 1970, the first annual summary report was published in February 1971 for Calendar Year 1970.⁴ It listed 51 deaths caused by drugs, 2,900 hospitalized and then released to duty, 420 medically evacuated from the PACOM, and 6,278 outpatients treated. The report cautioned that the majority of drug users did not seek assistance until their problem became acute, so the report did not reflect the full impact of drug abuse on the command. Statistics were provided to show breakdowns by Service, by geographic area, and by type of drugs causing death.

1. CINCPAC 262320Z Aug 70.
2. CINCPAC 062309Z Oct 70.
3. CINCPAC 030439Z Nov 70.
UNCLASSIFIED

Policy for Utilization and Administration of Non-U.S. Citizen Employees

(U) CINCPAC promulgated an instruction prescribing policy for the utilization and administration of non-U.S. citizen civilian employees in the PACOM. In the instruction CINCPAC designated his Service component commanders with primary coordination responsibility for local national wage and personnel policies for specific PACOM country areas. He also provided for the organization and operation of the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC), composed of representatives of CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF (among whom the chairmanship would rotate), with a Pacific Exchange Service non-voting representative and a CINCPAC advisor. This committee was to operate under and be responsible to CINCPAC, exercising the policy making authorities delegated to the Service components by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs in a memorandum of 23 April 1970.

(U) Joint Labor Affairs Committee (JLAC) were also established to coordinate the development of non-U.S. citizen personnel policies in each country area. In-country command representation was the same as on the JLPC; the JLACs operated under and were responsible to the subordinate unified commander or CINCPAC representative.

Policy Manual for Employment of Third Country Nationals in the PACOM

(U) A policy manual for U.S. Forces administration of third country nationals in the PACOM, developed by CINCPAC's Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Group, had been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval in March 1968.

(U) The manual was promulgated on 9 January 1970 in the form of a CINCPAC Instruction. It applied to all direct hire third country national employees.

1. A term preferred to Local National Employee.
2. CINCPACINST 12200.3, 31 Jul 70, Subj: Personnel Administration for U.S. Forces Non-U.S. Citizen Civilian Employees in PACOM.
3. CINCUSARPAC was assigned Vietnam and Korea; CINCPACFLT was assigned the Philippines, Australia, Guam, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and CINCPACAF was assigned Taiwan and Thailand.
4. CINCPACINST 12200.3, 31 Jul 70, Subj: Personnel Administration for U.S. Forces Non-U.S. Citizen Civilian Employees in PACOM.
6. JT History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70 citing CINCPAC Instruction 12200.1 of 9 Jan 70.

UNCLASSIFIED

247
(except mariners) in foreign areas of the PACOM. Most of the manual's major economic benefit provisions had been implemented in 1969. These were based on Secretary of Defense approval of a CINCPAC recommendation that new or increased benefits that the 1968 U.S.-Philippines Offshore Labor Agreement had accorded offshore Filipino direct hire employees be extended to other direct hire third country employees.¹

(U) Wage schedules in a new format and applicable to direct hire third country national employees were developed by the PACOM Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Group.²

(U) Separate schedules of wages for Filipino and Korean third country nationals (for both appropriated fund and nonappropriated fund direct hire employees) were approved and issued by the component commands to be effective not later than 15 July 1970.³ Previously a single schedule for all third country nationals had been used. The new schedules specified basic wage, overseas differential, subsistence allowance, temporary differential, and war risk differential.

Wage Increases for Korean Local National Employees

(U) In April 1969 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs had directed delegation to PACOM Service component commanders of the authorities necessary to decide on non-U.S. citizen civilian personnel policy, including wages.⁴

(U) Revised wage schedules for Korea were developed by the three Service components based on a comprehensive survey of local wages and fringe benefits conducted in October and November 1969. The new schedules became effective 1 January 1970. They applied to 38,609 employees who received basic rate increases ranging from 13 to 16 percent plus an increased bonus and an increased "remote area" allowance. CINCPAC forwarded the revised schedules with supporting information to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs on 4 March 1970.⁵

---

² JI History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
³ JI History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
⁵ JI History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70; Ltr, CINCPAC to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, M&RA (Civilian Personnel Policy), 4 Mar 70, Subj: Revised Wage Schedules for Local National Employees of the U.S. Forces in Korea.
Another local survey was conducted from 30 September to 13 November 1970. As a result, wages were to be raised again, effective on or after 1 January 1971, an average of 21 percent for manual wages, 18 percent for non-manual wages, and 17.7 percent for mariner wages. A new holiday was granted and the daily meal allowance was increased.\(^1\)

**Personnel Matters Involving Japanese Local Nationals**

Reduction in Force (RIF) actions in Japan affecting Japanese nationals came under study in 1970 in anticipation of base closures and force reductions scheduled for early 1971. The U.S. Forces in Japan employed about 41,000 local nationals in December 1970, but that number was expected to be reduced about 27 percent by June 1971. U.S. labor contract agreements with the Japanese Government included the provision that they would be given at least 45 days notice prior to the RIF of local nationals. The Japanese, however, wanted additional advance notice of impending RIFs and had attempted to persuade the United States to provide 90 days notice.\(^2\)

In the major anticipated RIF actions over 9,000 personnel were affected and COMUS Japan asked for CINCPAC approval to provide RIF information to the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Agency on 17 or 18 December 1970 on a confidential basis; this would be prior to the time announcement had been scheduled, which was following a Security Consultative Committee meeting on 21 December.

CINCPAC replied that he appreciated the urgency of the requirement to provide early RIF notification and he regretted that his effort to obtain Washington authority for early release of RIF notices had been unsuccessful. CINCPAC advised that he did not have the authority to release such data, but if the Ambassador should receive such authority through State Department channels, CINCPAC held no objection to its release to the Japanese.\(^3\)

Wages for Japanese employees were raised in 1970 following historical practice in that country in which U.S. paid wages were raised whenever the Japanese Diet approved an increase for Japanese civil service employees. The similar U.S. raise was also retroactive to 1 May and provided an increase of 10.7 percent in basic wages and 12.67 percent overall. Other fringe benefits were also adjusted.\(^4\)

---

1. JI History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
3. COMUSJAPAN 151355Z Dec 70.
4. ADMIN CINCPAC 160033Z Dec 70.
5. JI History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
On 17 December COMUS Japan reported receipt of approval from the U.S. Ambassador to begin negotiations with Japan on conversion of the Master Labor Contract (covering U.S. Forces appropriated fund employees) to a Master Labor Agreement. Negotiation was not expected to begin until February 1971. This conversion would place the entire process of establishing terms and conditions of employment for the local national workforce under an organizational segment of the U.S. Forces Japan, thereby eliminating time and correspondence, reducing administrative overhead, and streamlining the labor management system for both governments. It would also eliminate the only major acquisition of a labor force from a foreign government through use of a procurement contract.

Planning for Okinawa Reversion to Japan

Planning continued regarding personnel matters to be adjusted to make the transition as smooth as possible in these areas when Okinawa was returned to Japan. As one step in this direction, CINCPAC asked his Service components to take the necessary steps to reduce or eliminate those third country nationals on Okinawa that had been identified as occupying jobs that could be performed by local nationals. There were about 180 positions filled by third country nationals that could not be filled by local nationals, but there were about 475 third country nationals still employed. CINCPAC asked that action be taken, as a minimum through attrition, to reduce or eliminate the use of third country nationals that could be replaced before reversion.

Further action on most of these personnel matters was being taken by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but it was necessary to resolve some matters at the diplomatic level. CINCPAC was kept advised.

Wages for Local National Philippine Employees

CINCPAC forwarded revised pay schedules for local national employees in the Philippines to the Office of the Secretary of Defense two times in 1970. The first raise, in January, was about 11.5 percent. The second, effective in July, averaged about 13.7 percent.

Further Implementation of Philippine Offshore Labor Agreement

Late in December 1968 the United States and the Philippines reached accord on an offshore labor agreement, which was concerned with conditions of

1. Ibid.
2. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70; CINCPAC 160237Z Sep 70.
3. CINCPAC 092046Z Mar 70.
4. J121 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of May, Sep, Dec 70.
5. J121 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the months of Feb, Aug 70.
employment for Filipinos employed by the United States in areas outside the
Philippines.\(^1\) Several individual actions were necessary in 1970 to further
implement the provisions of that agreement.

(U) In January the CINCPAC Representative to Guam and the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands recommended that money that had been deducted prior to
implementation of the agreement from Filipino nonappropriated fund employees on
Guam and held in trust for leave and severance pay, and not drawn against, be
refunded to the employees concerned. CINCPAC forwarded joint-Service concurrence
on the matter and his recommendation for approval to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.\(^2\) Approval was received from that office and CINCPAC issued imple-
menting instructions.\(^3\)

(U) In March CINCPAC forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense a
report on actions taken by U.S. Forces employers on Guam concerning increased
benefits for Filipino employees. The objective was to provide uniform treatment
for wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment to eliminate the basis
for complaints from employees and the Philippine Government of inequitable treat-
ment.\(^4\)

(U) In May CINCPAC advised the CINCPAC Representative in the Ryukyus that
Filipino musicians were not subject to provisions of the agreement, but that
terms of employment for them were to be fair and equitable.\(^5\)

(C) Also on 1 May CINCPAC provided guidance to the CINCPAC Representative
in the Ryukyus concerning application of the Offshore Labor Agreement provisions
to Filipino mariners. New or increased benefits were to be effective retroactive
to 28 June 1969. An additional benefit not authorized by the agreement for a
transitional allowance for voluntary reparations was authorized for implementa-
tion effective 1 May 1970.\(^6\)

(U) In May CINCPAC also issued policy and procedures for the administration
of Philippine Social Security System benefits for eligible Filipino employees of
U.S. bases. This CINCPAC instruction consolidated material contained in several
previous message instructions.\(^7\)

1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. I, pp. 208-211; CINCPAC Command History
2. CINCPAC 090307Z Jan 70.
3. SECDEF 08190/162014Z Jan 70; CINCPAC 172005Z Jan 70.
4. JI21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Mar 70.
5. CINCPAC 010448Z May 70.
6. CINCPAC 010447Z May 70.
7. CINCPACINST 12200.2, 8 May 70, Subj: Philippine Social Security for Filipino
Employees of Offshore U.S. Bases.

CONFLICTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

Wages for Australian Local National Employees

(U) Wage schedules for locally hired Australian employees were coordinated with CINCPAC prior to being issued. Wages were based on State of Western Australia Government awards or other pertinent awards granted in accordance with the Industrial Agreement. Wage increases for professional and technical employees had been granted in September 1969 and other categories of employees on 1 August 1969. CINCPAC advised the Office of the Secretary of Defense of these raises on 20 February 1970.¹ Raises averaged about 10 percent.²

1. Ltr, CINCPAC to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, M&RA (Civilian Personnel Policy), 20 Feb 70, Subj: Revised Wage Schedules for Local National Employees of U.S. Forces in Australia.
2. J121 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
SECTION XV - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

The Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Program

On 30 October 1969 the CINCPAC Human Intelligence Board established an ad hoc committee concerned with the development of a system of HUMINT overt projects. The committee met during November and reached agreement on a draft CINCPAC instruction. On 20 October 1970 CINCPAC Instruction 003821.23, Coordination of Department of Defense Overt Intelligence Collection Activities in PACOM, was published and distributed. This instruction amplified and implemented pertinent provisions of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Manual 58-11 of 28 August 1968 and promulgated CINCPAC policy and procedures for the coordination of overt human intelligence collection activities.

The CINCPAC Human Intelligence Board meeting for February was concerned primarily with the forthcoming meeting of the DIA HUMINT Management Review Committee. The Board considered the agenda items for the meeting and recommended a CINCPAC position in regard to reduction of the number of separately organized, administered, and controlled HUMINT elements; improvement and standardization of memoranda of agreement; means of evaluating the results of HUMINT collection; improvement of administration and reporting; and assignment and retention of professionally qualified personnel. The committee's report was received by CINCPAC and, on 24 July, CINCPAC provided DIA with his comments on the committee's recommendations.

2. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
3. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Feb 70.
4. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70 citing CINCPAC Ltr 23, Ser 009195 of 24 Jul 70.
5. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
6. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
(S) On 19 May DIA informed CINCPAC that the Air Force Chief of Staff had proposed a restructuring of the Air Force HUMINT system into a central organization administered from the Washington level. In the PACOM area he proposed to subordinate the 6499th Special Activities Group to the 1127th Field Activities Group. CINCPAC commented to DIA that the full impact of the USAF proposal could not be adequately appraised until more specific details on command and control, tasking, organizational structure, and manning were provided and appropriate formal agreements were negotiated among the PACOM Service component collection organizations. He expressed specific reservations concerning tasking and operational control and stated that retention of CINCPAC tasking authority for all intelligence collection activities operating in the PACOM area was essential. DIA and the Air Force Chief of Staff assured CINCPAC that he would retain tasking and coordination authority and that a memorandum of understanding would be negotiated between the Air Force and CINCPAC to delineate responsibilities. In view of the assurances expressed by DIA and the Air Force Chief of Staff, CINCPAC interposed no objection to the proposed restructuring of the Air Force HUMINT system. The 6499th Special Activities Group was deactivated on 1 October and reactivated as the 1021st Field Activities Squadron. The element remaining in Hawaii would be Detachment 8, 1021st Field Activities Squadron.

(‡) DIA forwarded to CINCPAC a proposed clarification of the policy on Human Source Intelligence activities and requested his concurrence/comments. The proposal reaffirmed that CINCPAC was responsible for all HUMINT activity conducted in the PACOM and charged CINCPAC with insuring effective management.

1. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
2. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
3. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
4. CINCPAC 011518Z Jul 70.
5. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
6. CINCPAC Ltr J233 Ser 002419 of 11 Aug 70.
7. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
control, and coordination of all potentially embarrassing HUMINT activity, including counterintelligence operations.\footnote{1} On 27 June CINCPAC concurred in the proposed policy clarification.\footnote{2}

(\textit{\text{\(\textcircled{9}\)}}) In August CINCPAC forwarded to DIA the first semi-annual review of all HUMINT projects covering the period 1 October 1969 to 31 March 1970. This review contained a detailed discussion of each project and an evaluation of the project's effectiveness. Effectiveness was determined by analysis of the quality and quantity of reports in comparison with funds and man hours expended and took into consideration the operational environment and the project priority.\footnote{3}

(\textit{\text{\(\textcircled{5}\)}}) On 30 March CINCUSARPAC, with CINCPAC's concurrence, realigned the U.S. Army counterintelligence elements in the PACOM and established an integrated, theater-level, vertical intelligence structure. Implementation was completed on 1 July and entailed the assignment of the 17th, 526th, 704th, and 710th Military Intelligence Detachments to the 500th Military Intelligence Group. The realignment was accomplished primarily to reduce the ratio of administrative and support personnel to operational personnel in the forward areas, to provide for a central control for selective personnel assignment and utilization, and to insure maximum effectiveness of the available experience and specialized skills provided to the theater.\footnote{4}

DIA requested that CINCPAC provide data upon which a Defense Department study could be conducted employing military judgment to the collection effort in the PACOM during 1969. DIA also requested that CINCPAC evaluate the quality of the reports from the CINCPAC point of view.\footnote{5} On 20 October CINCPAC provided the DIA with a listing of all Intelligence Information Reports produced by the two major PACOM collection units.\footnote{6}

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] DIA DR 4086/262307Z Mar 70.
\item[2.] J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70 citing CINCPAC 271919Z Jun 70.
\item[3.] J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70 citing CINCPAC Ltrs 233, serials 009205 and 009206 of 15 Aug 70.
\item[4.] CINCPAC Ltr 233 Ser 002655 of 3 Sep 70.
\item[5.] DIA Ltr S-28/5-70/CA-2A of 5 Oct 70.
\item[6.] CINCPAC 2002072 Oct 70.
\end{itemize}
During June CINCPAC prepared and forwarded to DIA comments on the Fiscal Years 1972-76 General Defense Intelligence Plan (GDIP). The comments generally consisted of a review of each GDIP from the perspective of project and operation costs measured against satisfaction of project objectives and the validated Human Resources Collection Directives (HRCD) levied on the collection units for action.

1. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
2. CINCPAC 250140Z Jul 70; CINCPAC Notice 003821, 9 Jun 70.
3. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70 citing CINCPAC 200554Z Jun 70.
On 21 December CINCPAC requested DIA views and comments on CINCPAC plans to designate the objectives, requirements, and Essential Elements of Information in the CINCPAC Intelligence Collection Plan as the informational goals for overt project reporting in the PACOM.

Intelligence Data Handling Systems (IDHS)

IDHS Data Management Requirements Conference

(U) During January, in response to a request from DIA, CINCPAC provided a representative to the IDHS Data Management Requirements Conference held at the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia. A PACOM position paper was developed to provide a basis for coordinated PACOM actions at the conference. The purpose of the conference was to define user requirements concerning capabilities desired in a third generation IDHS Data Management System (DMS). The major

2. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70 citing CINCPAC 250021Z Nov 70.
3. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70 citing CINCPAC Ltr Ser 009293 of 21 Dec 70.
4. DIA Ltr U-17, 261/MS-1 of 10 Oct 69.
5. CINCPAC Ltr 2142 Ser 616 of 19 Jan 70.
portion of the agenda was devoted to the development of DMS requirements specifications. All major requirements in the PACOM position paper were included in the conference recommendations. Additional conference recommendations provided DIA with a comprehensive base for development of a highly capable DMS.¹

**IDHS Communications Network**

(2) In response to a CINCPAC request,² DIA conducted an IDHS Communications Conference at Arlington Hall Station during February. Representatives from the Commander of Naval Intelligence Communications, DIA, CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, the Naval Intelligence Processing System Support Activity, and the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific were in attendance. Primary topics of discussion were implementation aspects of the interim PACOM IDHS Communications/Ocean Surveillance Intelligence System data link and switch and the teleprocessing computer program to be used on the PACOM switch. The requirements identified at the conference were an implementation and operation plan for the interim IDHS Communications/Ocean Surveillance Intelligence System network by DIA and formulation of future IDHS Communications network concepts by DIA and all users.³ CINCPAC requested DIA and the Commander of Naval Intelligence Communications to take the action necessary to fulfill these and related requirements as soon as possible.⁴

(5) In March the Commander of Naval Intelligence Communications advised that, due to budgetary restrictions, funds for leasing the planned Washington to Honolulu IDHS Communications dedicated circuit were no longer available.⁵ The Defense Communications Agency, in a separate action, provided their plans for the upgrade of the Automatic Digital Network to the Special Intelligence mode.⁶ As a result of these developments CINCPAC informed DIA of the requirement for definitive plans, the identification of funds, and firm implementation schedules before CINCPAC could proceed with the implementation of the IDHS Communications network concepts.⁷

(2) DIA informed CINCPAC that, on 30 April, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) had approved the DIA request to acquire two COMCET-40 computers for DIA and Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific IDHS Communications network.

---

2. ADMIN CINCPAC 210314Z Jan 70.
3. DIA MS 8671/232133Z Jan 70.
4. CINCPAC 030041Z Mar 70.
5. COMNAVCINTCOM 251941Z Feb 70.
6. DCA 062232Z Mar 70.
7. ADMIN CINCPAC 112219Z Mar 70.
switches. The Commander of Naval Intelligence Communications subsequently requested priority approval for the interim rental of a COMCET-40 for the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific. In consonance with these actions and the need for the generation of firm PACOM IDHS Communications switch specifications, DIA and Commander of Naval Intelligence Communications representatives visited Hawaii on 20-27 May 1970. In addition to generating data specifications, the team conducted a preinstallation site survey at the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific and the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center. Concurrently the team held discussions with CINCPAC and component intelligence and communications personnel relative to the draft DIA IDHS Communications implementation plan.

It was evident that many gray areas still existed in the DIA planning for implementation of the PACOM IDHS Communications network. PACOM IDHS Communications subscriber terminal planning and procurement action for the IDHS Communications switch computer to be installed at the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific was contingent upon DIA promulgation of the IDHS Communications implementation plan, the time phasing schedule, and the communications medium plan. On 23 September CINCPAC recommended that DIA complete action on these items as soon as possible. Subsequently DIA identified KSR/ASR Model 37 teletype units as suitable for IDHS Communications terminal use and further indicated that the promulgation of formal plans should be completed by mid-October. An evaluation of the DIA action revealed apparent incompatibilities in the interface of the on-board RIXON SEBIT 48M Modems, RIXON 431B Crypto Control Units, and KSR/ASR Model 37 Teletype units. CINCPACFLT was requested to conduct an engineering evaluation and propose a resolution for this potential problem. Also, CINCPACFLT was tasked to seek Chief of Naval Operations approval for initiation of PACOM switch procurement action with the stipulation that such action would be contingent upon satisfaction of planning prerequisites previously delineated. On 4 December DIA approved the reutilization of an IBM 360/30 to serve as the PACOM IDHS Communications switch. The installation of the PACOM switch computer at the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific was planned for March-April 1971.

**PACOM IDHS Command File Management System**

(U) On 31 July 1970 CINCPAC approved the PACOM IDHS Command File Management System (PICFMS) concept and formed the PICFMS working group with representatives

---

1. DIA 8267/072038Z May 70.
2. COMNAVINTCOM Ltr Ser C50/NIC-223 of 12 May 70.
3. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of May 70.
4. CINCPAC 232250Z Sep 70.
5. DIA 3843/192137Z Oct 70.
6. CINCPAC 241756Z Oct 70.
7. DIA Ltr U-2251/MS-1 of 4 Dec 70.
from CINCPAC, the Service components, and the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center. The objectives of the PICFMS were to reduce IDHS automatic data processing cost and improve procedures for multiple processing files within the PACOM. PICFMS, in addition to eliminating duplicate files, would provide the PACOM IDHS Coordination Committee with a capability to evaluate and assist operational management of the PACOM automatic data processing centers. The system would concurrently support and accommodate related efforts in both the data standardization and IDHS Communications programs. The long term goal of PICFMS was to provide CINCPAC and Service component commands with a Command File System that was responsive to all intelligence requirements processed within the PACOM.\(^1\)

**CINCU SAR PAC IDHS**

(U) On 15 October 1970 the CINCU SAR PAC IDHS received an IBM 360/50 Model H computer that had been previously leased by DIA.\(^2\) This computer system provided improved automatic data processing to the Headquarters IDHS/Command and Control; the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea; and other PACOM Army units. IBM personnel completed final installation and test procedures on 27 October and released the 360 system to CINCU SAR PAC for operation and further testing before final acceptance of the computer.\(^3\)

**Conventional Air Mission Results Analysis (CAMRA) System**

(\(\text{C}^\text{C}\)) During October the CINCPAC Conventional Air Mission Results Analysis (CAMRA) System was placed in a production status on the CINCPAC IBM 360 operating system. This system, which was designed to assist intelligence analysts in monitoring the status of enemy installations in the PACOM, was developed over the last three years to overcome design deficiencies of earlier projects (CAMRA, IBM 1410, and Reconnaissance Coverage File, IBM 1410). The CAMRA system was managed by the J2 Target Intelligence Branch and provided approximately 60 recurring reports for use by CINCPAC analysts, operational field commanders, and national intelligence units. The CINCPAC ROLLING THUNDER Target Lists and Korean Tactical Target Lists were products of the CAMRA System.\(^4\)

**Strike Mission Data Exchange**

(U) The exchange of Southeast Asia strike mission data in automatic data processing format was implemented between CINCPAC and CINCPACAF in October.

---

1. CINCPAC Ltr 2142Z Ser 3337 of 31 Jul 70.
2. CINCSAR PAC GPIN-HO 120207Z Aug 70.
3. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
4. Ibid.
CINCPAC requirements were provided to CINCPACAF, and the data produced by the CINCPACAF IDHS replaced the CINCPAC prepared strike data input to the CAMRA System. Significant resource savings were realized through reduction of redundant and duplicative efforts previously employed in preparation, analysis, and keypunching of strike mission data.

Defense Attache System Support to CINCPAC

The assessment noted that 25.6 percent of the Defense Attache billets in the PACOM area had been cut or programmed for cut and that the reductions were not in consonance with the assigned functions and workload of the DAO affected.

(U) On 20 February DIA informed CINCPAC that the Defense Attache System Review Committee had been established by DIA on 9 January to undertake a complete review and assessment of the Defense Attache System (DAS) and to provide recommendations for improved DIA management and interface with the unified and specified commands, the Services, and the State Department. The committee's report was forwarded to CINCPAC on 3 June. CINCPAC reviewed the report and, on 31 July, commented to DIA that the report indicated that while the committee was cognizant of many of the problem areas prevalent in the DAS, several had been overlooked. He pointed out that the report contained no substantive discussion or meaningful recommendation concerning DAO responsibilities and problem areas relative to the Military Assistance Program and training matters where Military Assistance Advisory Groups/missions were not present; lacked significant inquiry and recommendations concerning Service Attaches' role and responsibilities on uni-Service matters; and advanced no examination or constructive recommendations regarding the need to facilitate communications by Service Attaches with respective Military Departments and Service commands.

(U) In May DIA proposed that Attache conferences be held periodically within the PACOM area of responsibility to provide a better understanding of Attache problems and improve the responsiveness of Attaches to unified command and

1. CINCPAC 052342Z Aug, 032253 and 242239Z Oct 70.
2. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
3. J23 Memo 0032-70, Hq CINCPAC, of 17 Jan 70.
4. DIA DR 1554/201813Z Feb 70.
5. CINCPAC Ltr 233 Ser 062291 of 31 Jul 70.
Washington level intelligence and representational requirements. CINCPAC concurred in this concept and recommended that three conferences be held each year. Each of the CINCPAC Service components would be tasked to host their particular Service-oriented conference.  

Role of the Defense Intelligence School

(U) During January CINCPAC representatives attended a DIA sponsored conference at the Defense Intelligence School in Washington, D.C. The purpose of the conference was to solicit the views of the unified and specified commands and Military Departments concerning the adequacy of the instruction and curricula of various intelligence courses being presented at the school to mid-career and senior level officers. The major proposal agreed to by a majority of the conference was the need for a modular schedule of courses in joint intelligence which would permit the user of the school to select only those modules that were required to meet the needs of the individual student at the entry, intermediate, and advanced levels of intelligence experience and training. The school agreed to develop a proposed modular schedule that incorporated the views of the conference.  

(U) In July 1970 a follow-on conference was conducted to brief representatives of the unified and specified commands and the Service Departments on new courses that had been instituted in response to recommendations offered at the January conference. Of particular importance from the intelligence management point of view was a new six-week course. The course was to review management principles and techniques as they applied to intelligence resources at Service Department and unified and specified command levels. This course possessed great potential as a training vehicle for officers who were assigned to management positions with CINCPAC, the Service component commands, and subordinate unified command staffs. It was noted that a deficiency still existed in the training of analysts for duty at the unified command level.  

United States Army Intelligence School, Pacific (USARPACINTS)

(5) The forthcoming reversion of Okinawa to Japan posed a problem for CINCPAC with regard to the USARPACINTS. Several countries in the PACOM area (the Republic of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Nationalist China, and the Republic of Korea) relied on the school for intelligence officer training pending development of adequate, self-sufficient, in-country intelligence training capabilities.

1. CINCPAC Ltr 233 Ser 003164 of 20 Jul 70.
2. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jan 70.
3. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jul 70.
The Status of Forces Agreement with Japan did not provide for training of Third Country Nationals by the United States and it was assumed that similar constraints would apply on Okinawa following reversion.\(^1\) On 17 December 1969 CINC PAC recommended that the subject of continued operation of the school on Okinawa after the reversion date be discussed during the reversion negotiations.\(^2\)

\(^{\text{(C)}}\) In response to a request from CINCUSARPAC, CINCPAC promulgated planning guidance pertaining to the USARPACINTS in the areas of programming, relocation, inter-Service staffing, and future requirements. He stated that current information on negotiations with the Japanese on the reversion of Okinawa indicated that the current location of the school would not be jeopardized prior to the end of FY 72, that planning for relocation should be deferred pending the outcome of the reversion negotiations, and that joint manning of the school staff and faculty remained a CINCPAC goal. He requested CINCUSARPAC to plan for operation of the school through FY 75.\(^3\)

\(^{\text{(E)}}\) On 9 September the U.S. Military Representative on the Negotiating Team asked CINCPAC to provide specific data for use as background information and to assist in developing the U.S. negotiating position.\(^4\) CINCPAC forwarded the following information to the U.S. Military Representative.\(^5\) The requirement for the school would exist through FY 75. Approximately 80 students attended at any one time and approximately 500 attended during a fiscal year. Completion of current programs in Vietnam and Laos should reduce future requirements. The shortest course was one week and the longest 10 weeks. A total of three days processing was required. Since the foreign students were military officers, exposure to the Government of Japan's entry-exit procedures and customs would not affect the program adversely. Japanese participation as students should be encouraged. The primary advantage of the school remaining on Okinawa was budgetary.

\(^{\text{(S)}}\) A related matter that surfaced in September was a request from the Indonesian Army to the Defense Attache to explore the possibility of U.S. military intelligence training assistance by the USARPACINTS on a crash basis.\(^6\) CINCPAC concurred in the proposal and asked that CINCUSARPAC weigh this unusual request in light of the opportunities inherent in the proposal for the long term, and make every effort to accommodate the Indonesian students.\(^7\)

\(^1\) J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
\(^2\) CINCPAC 170402Z Dec 69.
\(^3\) CINCPAC 190533Z Apr 70.
\(^4\) AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7056/090250Z Sep 70.
\(^5\) CINCPAC 192350Z Sep 70.
\(^6\) USDAO DJAKARTA 0505/040903Z Sep 70.
\(^7\) CINCPAC 111910Z Sep 70.
(✓) On 9 November the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, hosted a meeting to discuss the U.S. negotiating position with respect to the school. Representatives from CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, the High Commissioner to the Ryukyus, and COMUS Japan participated. The conferees discussed the options available and determined that any approach to the Japanese for specific recognition of the school and agreement to allow the school to continue probably would elicit a negative response. They also determined that continuation of the school by means of tacit acquiescence of the Government of Japan with students designated visitors for orientation and liaison probably would cause the Japanese future political problems and result in a hasty closing of the school. The conferees recommended that the school be removed from Okinawa to other U.S. territory prior to reversion.1 CINCPAC concurred in this recommendation and requested that the costs incurred in the move be credited against Government of Japan-provided relocation compensation.2 CINCUSARPAC recommended that the school be relocated to Guam and began planning for the move.3

Clandestine Entry into the United States

(✓) Under the coordination of the U.S. Coast Guard, a government-wide, interagency program entitled "Prevention and Detection of Illegal Entry into the United States" (PADIE) was implemented in the PACOM. The military purpose of PADIE was to prevent the introduction of highly lethal weapons into U.S. territory. The public aspects of the program stressed the prevention of smuggling to preclude undue public concern. CINCPAC provided coordination with the Coast Guard for all aspects of program implementation and the PACOM Service component commanders were charged with the fulfillment of PADIE functional tasks.4

Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific Facility

(✓) In May DIA requested CINCPAC comments on the criteria for shore based intelligence support to Fleet operations and CINCPAC conclusions regarding the necessity for retaining the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific facility or a similar unit.5 A conference was held at Camp Smith during June with representatives from CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF to provide inputs to a comprehensive study of the facility's contribution in support of CINCPAC operations.6

1. AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9211/140115Z Nov 70.
2. CINCPAC 220117Z Nov 70.
3. CINCUSARPAC 081425Z Dec 70.
4. J21 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70 citing CINCPACINST 00550.1.
5. DIA Ltr C-0343/AP-1D of 28 May 70.
6. J23 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Jun 70.
CINCPAC replied to DIA's request on 4 July strongly supporting the necessity to maintain a capability in the Western Pacific such as provided by the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific facility.  

Overseas Processing and Interpretation Center - Asia (OPIC-A)  

(§) On 15 December DIA advised CINCPAC of a USAF proposal to deactivate the 67th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron (then designated the OPIC-A) by mid-1970 and that DIA was considering assigning OPIC-A responsibilities to the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, subject to U.S. Intelligence Board approval. DIA requested CINCPAC comments. 2 CINCPAC concurred in the DIA proposal and further advised that the physical plant and equipment of the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group would exceed the capability of the 67th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron and would permit timely accomplishment of both PACOM and national intelligence support functions by OPIC-A. 3

1. CINCPAC 040327Z Jul 70.  
2. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.  
3. Ibid.
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION XVI - COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

Military Banking Conference

(U) The second annual PACOM Military Banking Conference was held in Honolulu from 6 to 11 April 1970 to discuss Military Banking Facilities operations in the PACOM. The CINCPAC Comptroller hosted the seminar jointly with the Comptroller from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Fiscal Service staffs of the Treasury Department. As a result of the conference interest began being paid at the rate of five percent per annum on an account balance of $100 or more during any one month beginning 1 July 1970 (except in Hawaii where this benefit was not available and in Guam where it became effective 1 August). Other benefits also accrued to account users. Another conference result was that uniform loan policies were established by the Treasury Department.

Funding Support for Naval Advisory Group, Korea

(U) Operations and Maintenance, Navy funding had been being provided directly to the Naval Advisory Group, Korea by CINCPAC. This did not coincide with command channels nor did it correspond with funding procedures for the Army and Air Force Advisory Groups, whose funds came from CINCPAC's Army and Air Force component commanders. Accordingly, on 19 June 1970 CINCPAC asked the Chief of Naval Operations for a change in this funding flow. CINCPAC requested that CINCPACFLT become the funding source effective 1 July. The Chief of Naval Operations approved the funding realignment to be effective 1 July, as requested.

Reporting Requirements

(U) In 1970 the President initiated a Government-wide project to reduce reporting and related paperwork. A goal of $2 million in savings was announced for the project, which was to be accomplished in three phases. The first phase, the one completed in 1970, was an inventory of all reports as of 1 January 1970.

1. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Apr 70.
2. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
3. Ibid.
4. Ltr, CINCPAC to Chief of Naval Operations, 19 Jun 70, Subj: O&M
   Funding of Naval Advisory Group, Korea; request for change to
5. CNO 0612442 Jul 70.
CINCPAC compiled the required data and forwarded it on 12 September. All JCS, CINCPAC, and subordinate command reports levied to satisfy JCS requirements were documented; an annual reporting cost of $1.8 million for CINCPAC was reported. The program was to continue in 1971.

(§) On 9 January CHJUSMAGTHAI recommended that his quarterly report on Developments in Thailand be prepared only twice a year. This was agreeable to CINCPAC, but not to the JCS. They described it as a key reference document, widely used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and the Services. Semi-annual submission would not insure sufficient currency of information for use in briefings, fact sheets, and joint actions, they said, and the requirement for a quarterly submission remained unchanged.

Revised Funding Procedures for DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI

(§) As early as June 1969 budget personnel for both CINCPAC and the Chief of Naval Operations had recognized that continued Navy funding for the Project 404 Army Attaché field units in Laos would become questionable as funding levels increased. After coordinating the matter with CINCPAC, the Chief of Naval Operations raised the question with the JCS. On 13 August a ruling was provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), who directed that the parent Service of the field unit personnel (the Army) be responsible for their funding and providing logistic support for their field operations. The Navy was to continue to be responsible for providing administrative and logistic support for the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI headquarters operations. The Assistant Secretary noted the unique command relationship in this case that had not been contemplated when establishing policies under which the Navy provided administrative and logistic support for all unified command headquarters in the PACOM.

(§) An approximate $500,000 annual funding level was involved at the time of the transfer. CINCPAC and the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI identified separate Army and

1. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 72 citing CINCPAC Ltr Ser 002727, 12 Sep 70.
2. Ibid.
3. Ltr, COMUSMAGTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI to CINCPAC, 9 Jan 70, Subj: Reduction of Reporting Requirements.
5. JCS 2109/281409Z Feb 70.
6. Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments (FM), 13 Aug 70, n.s.
Navy funding requirements to the Chief of Naval Operations for a possible interdepartmental transfer of previously allocated funds.¹

Military Payment Certificate Series Conversion in Vietnam

(Ç) The third surprise conversion of military payment certificates was executed successfully in Vietnam on 7 October 1970. The conversion was the smoothest yet performed in that country.² Reconciliation of accounts indicated that the total amount unaccounted for and presumed to be in the hands of unauthorized persons was over $2 million, which represented a gain for the U. S. Government. Total gain in the two previous conversions totalled $11.1 million.³

American Legion Use of Military Facilities and Currency in Saigon

(U) A prolonged controversy with American Legion Post Number 34 in Saigon was believed terminated in November 1970 with a very positive denial by the Office of the Secretary of Defense of the use by the Legion Post of Military Banking Facilities, Military Payment Certificates, commissaries, and exchanges in the Republic of Vietnam. The Legion had argued that its post in Saigon was providing a facility for U. S. military men in direct support of U. S. Government programs and should be entitled to the use of those privileges. Both COMUSMACV and CINCPAC⁴ had previously denied such requests by the Legion, but repeated requests and denials extending over many months had attracted considerable Congressional interest and appeals to the Secretary of Defense. An undated letter from the Defense Department General Counsel provided the final word on the matter. It also provided a firm Defense Department policy statement useful to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV in responding to similar situations. Among other things, the letter stated that the Legion, as a private organization, failed to qualify for the use of such U. S. services under the laws of the Government of Vietnam.⁵

Philippine Owned U. S. Currency

(U) The Central Bank of the Philippines proposed on 4 September 1970 that U. S. disbursing officers in the Philippines accept U. S. currency and coins

¹ J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Aug 70.
² J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Oct 70.
³ J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Dec 70.
⁴ CINCPAC 170024Z Mar 70.
⁵ Ltr, General Counsel of the Department of Defense to Mr. Stuart W. Reichstein, 2139 - R Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., n.s., n.d. but prior to Dec 70.
that the bank was receiving from individuals making deposits to the newly instituted Foreign Currency Deposit System. The CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines was coordinating the response from the U. S. component commands on the feasibility of the proposal. Neither the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Treasury had expressed objection, but they had certain reservations concerning amounts, delivery, timing, discount, and such. The proposal, CINCPAC believed, could conceivably gain financial benefits for both the United States and the Philippines if suitable working arrangements could be developed.¹

(U) In November CINCPAC advised his Representative in the Philippines to study the matter further with the U. S. receiving activity. CINCPAC asked that he be kept advised if it was determined to proceed.²

1. J72 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Sep 70; SECDEF 6257/200159Z Nov 70.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 250320Z Nov 70.
SECTION XVII - PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Public Affairs Activities

(U) CINCPAC continued to play such a vital role in world affairs in 1970 that he and his command hosted many world leaders and other influential persons and CINCPAC visited and spoke throughout his command and the United States. Admiral McCain met repeatedly with the President and the Vice President as much national attention was directed toward the PACOM. The President visited Honolulu and also summoned CINCPAC to his Western White House, particularly in regard to the operations conducted in Cambodia.

(U) The Vice President was a fairly frequent visitor to Hawaii, often enroute to other parts of the PACOM. CINCPAC met with Mr. Agnew on each occasion. CINCPAC also called on or was visited by foreign chiefs of state. In 1970 he met with the presidents of the Republics of China, Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In addition, he met with countless other high ranking officials, military and civilian, of the friendly countries in the PACOM, some in connection with SEATO meetings that he addressed.

(U) CINCPAC was also in frequent contact with officials in the Defense Department—the Secretary and his Deputy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Chairman, the heads of the Military Departments, and many more. Many members of the Congress and other elected officials either visited the headquarters or were visited by CINCPAC. Members of the press continued to seek him out and prominent journalists from the United States and many other countries visited the headquarters for interviews or briefings.

(U) On 9 September in Bangkok the Prime Minister of Thailand awarded Admiral McCain the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant (First Class, Knight of the Grand Cross), Thailand's highest award for meritorious service.

(U) Admiral McCain was in great demand as a speaker. Vibrant and persuasive at the podium, the Admiral addressed many and diverse groups in 1970. To illustrate the variety, the Admiral addressed the Mississippi State Legislature in joint session, the managing editors of the Associated Press, the Air Force Association and Fort Worth, Texas Air Power Council, the graduating class of the U. S. Naval Academy, and the troops near Da Nang, Vietnam

1. Material for this section was taken from J74 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, for the months Jan-Dec 70.
with the Bob Hope troop.

(U) Bob Hope made his seventh consecutive trip to the war zone and his 20th annual Christmas tour to entertain U. S. Forces. It was his 29th year of entertaining military personnel. To honor and thank him for the visits that had become a tradition, Admiral McCain presented him with an elephant hide golf bag decorated with the CINCPAC badge and emblems of some of the principal military units that had served in Vietnam. The bag bore a small brass plaque with this inscription: "Da Nang, Vietnam - Christmas 1970, Bob Hope, A Classic American." It was signed "John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC." The accompanying photos show CINCPAC's arrival in Vietnam as he is greeted by Ambassador Bunker and General Creighton B. Abrams, with the troops, and on stage.
SECTION XVIII - MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

Hospital Facilities in Thailand

(S) In October 1969 COMUSMACVTHAI had asked CINCPAC to conduct a study of medical facilities in Thailand to eliminate unnecessary duplication between Army and Air Force medical resources. As a result of such study CINCPAC directed the transfer without reimbursement of the 31st Field Hospital at Korat from the Army to the Air Force for operation, the closure of the inpatient and casualty staging part of the Air Force Dispensary at Korat, and the assumption of all medical supply missions in Thailand by the Air Force.1

(U) These reassignments, over the protests of the Air Force component, led to a problem that was resolved by the JCS in a way that strictly limited CINCPAC's authority in the logistics field. The transfers and assignment of responsibilities directed by CINCPAC were accomplished by 6 March 1970, but with extreme reluctance on the part of CINCPACAF and only over his strong objections. His final objection stated that he did not have the resources to reimburse CINCUSARPAC for the hospital facility. This last remark was prompted by part of the exchange of messages on this subject; CINCUSARPAC had raised the question of CINCPAC's authority to direct transfer of assets from one Service to another without reimbursement. The Department of the Army had commented that CINCPAC did not have this authority. The Army further stated that transfer of assets should be mutually agreed to by the major Service commands within the PACOM and problems relative to reimbursement should be referred to the respective Services for resolution.2

(S) CINCPAC believed he was acting with the authority of the JCS when he made his decisions. He based this belief on paragraphs 30227 and 30203 of JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, which conferred on the commanders of unified commands directive authority in the field of logistics when this authority was exercised in the interest of effectiveness and economy of operation or to prevent or eliminate unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among Service components. CINCPAC advised the JCS of his position on this matter on 21 February 1970, stating, "CINCPAC intends to continue to exercise directive authority in the logistic area under this interpretation.... Request confirmation of position outlined above."3

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. J76 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
3. CINCPAC 210402Z Feb 70.

SECRET

275
TOP SECRET

(§) The JCS reply of 28 February said that since CINCUSARPAC was not requesting reimbursement from CINCPACAF for the transfer of these specific medical facilities, the transfer did not need to be addressed by the JCS. The question of CINCPAC's directive authority was being studied and would be addressed at a later date.¹

(§) On 10 April CINCPACAF notified CINCPAC that due to fiscal restraints he was closing the 388th Hospital at Korat and reverting it to an Air Force dispensary.² This was the same hospital he had taken over from the Army. Although CINCPAC had not yet received any specific guidelines from the JCS regarding his directive authority in these matters, he directed CINCPACAF to continue operation of the hospital as all of the factors on which the original decision was based were still valid.³

(U) A memorandum from the JCS dated 21 April provided the guidance CINCPAC had asked for regarding his directive authority in logistics matters, but it was not the guidance he had hoped for. The JCS stated that under conditions short of war the commanders of unified commands had the authority to issue and insure implementation of a directive for transfer of facilities and functions in the field of logistics, but only with the concurrence of the Service component commanders concerned.⁴ The effects of this ruling are discussed further in the Logistics Section of this chapter.

(§) The matter of the 388th USAF Hospital became academic later in 1970. On 21 August COMUSMACTHAI proposed to CINCPAC that the hospital be closed and its function assumed by a 20-bed dispensary on 1 January 1971.⁵ The request was based on existing and planned reductions in force levels. CINCPAC sought the concurrence of the two Service commands concerned, the Air Force and the Army. Both concurred, CINCUSARPAC with the provision that dental and emergency surgery services were retained in the area.⁶ COMUSMACTHAI agreed to continue to provide that support and CINCPAC directed him to take the necessary action to close the hospital about 1 January 1971 and realign the other support.⁷

1. JCS 2110/281448Z Feb 70.
2. CINCPACAF 102033Z Apr 70.
3. CINCPAC 150525Z Apr 70.
4. J4 Brief No. 0049-70, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Apr 70, of SM-328-70, Subj: Authority of the Commanders of the Unified or Specified Commands to Direct Transfer of Functions and Facilities Among the Military Service Components of Their Commands.
5. COMUSMACTHAI 210800Z Aug 70.
6. CINCPACAF 290037Z Aug 70; CINCUSARPAC 020025Z Sep 70.
7. CINCPAC 161954Z Sep 70.

TOP SECRET

276
CINCPACAF asked for guidance on disposition of real property and equipment comprising the hospital complex. The hospital was of permanent construction and one of the most modern facilities of its kind in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC believed that the Royal Thai Air Force might have a requirement for its use; such use would enhance U.S. re-entry in future contingencies. On 22 October CINCPAC asked a number of questions about possible disposition of the complex (called the Camp Friendship Hospital Facility Complex) of COMUSMACVTHAI and CINCUSARPAC.1 The matter of final disposition was under study at the end of the year.

Unified Command Control of Medical Resources

In the 1969 Command History2 it was reported that doubling the number of officers on the CINCPAC medical staff would make possible the assumption of additional duties that had either been assigned to the Surgeons of the component commands or not performed at all. The advantage of the enlarged staff was realized on a number of occasions in 1970 when substantial savings were realized as a result of CINCPAC review of changes or increases proposed in medical resources by the component or subordinate unified commands.

Three examples can be cited. COMUSMACV made two proposals in 1970, one to build a teaching hospital in Vietnam to train enlisted technicians at a cost of $4.5 million and another to upgrade the U.S. Army Vietnam hospital program at a cost of about $3 million. CINCPAC non-concurred in both proposals, noting the fallacy, in the second case, of approving a medical support concept for a specific hospital and a specified number of dispensaries for a post war or transitional environment when the future size and disposition of U.S. Forces had not yet been determined. A third example concerned a CINCPACAF proposal to construct a 40-bed addition to the 60-bed USAF hospital at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base in Taiwan, which would have been a duplication of existing facilities at the Naval Hospital at Taipei. Savings in this case were about $128,000.3

Health Service Responsibilities in the PACOM

On 24 June CINCPAC formalized his instructions on health services responsibilities for his component commands.4 The Service components continued

1. CINCPAC 222139Z Oct 70.
3. J76 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
to be responsible for the health services for their assigned forces, including medical facilities and patient evacuation services as necessary. CINCPAC was responsible for coordinating those health services and insure that the services provided by the components satisfied the overall PACOM requirements and used resources most efficiently.

(U) Among the principal features of this instruction was the admonishment of the component commands to advise CINCPAC of certain actions in sufficient time prior to their implementation for CINCPAC review and staffing to obtain the concurrence of the other Service component commands. These actions included changing the number of hospital or aeromedical staging beds, planned opening or closing of hospitals or staging units, changes in aeromedical evacuation routes or schedules, changes in medical material support, activities pertaining to prisoners of war, or changes in any health services involving more than one Service. The Service components were also to advise CINCPAC of public health and preventive medicine matters of significant importance to other Services and they were to refer to CINCPAC problems involving Inter-Service Support Agreements that could not be mutually resolved among the Services concerned.

Reduction in Medical Support

(5) Total hospital beds in the PACOM available for area support or dedicated to support of Southeast Asia were reduced from 10,927 to 7,523 in 1970. Reductions were possible because of troop withdrawals from Vietnam, Thailand, and Korea; a general reduction in the level of hostilities; and implementation of a policy of direct evacuation to the Continental United States in cases where return to duty within a reasonable period was unlikely. The reduction was accomplished by closing hospitals and reducing authorized bed capacities both in Vietnam and offshore and by transferring the USS REPOSE to the Continental United States in a 90-day activation status.¹

Conference on War Surgery

(U) The fourth CINCPAC Conference on War Surgery was held at Tokyo, Japan from 16 to 19 February 1970. Participating in the deliberations were 41 military surgeons representing the three Services. The conference further refined the professional surgical guidance promulgated in the preceding conferences and added a new chapter on ophthalmic injuries with particular reference to the non-specialist management of such injuries. Over 1,000 copies of the proceedings of the conference were made available to military and civilian libraries and military surgeons throughout the world.²

¹ J76 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
² Ibid.
Medical Planning Conference

(U) The sixth CINCPAC Medical Planning Conference was held at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii from 16 to 19 March 1970. Participating were 47 medical personnel representing the three Services and the U. S. Agency for International Development. Discussed at the conference were the medical implications resulting from continued U. S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam, medical participation in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization Program, the PACOM medical posture in post-Vietnam hostilities, and PACOM medical regulating. The proceedings of the conference were made available to the offices of the Service Surgeons General and major military activities in the PACOM as it was believed they would be a valuable aid for planning purposes.1

Whole Blood Program in Vietnam

(S) In September and October 1969 there was a reduction in the number of battle casualties in the Republic of Vietnam without a corresponding reduction in the quantity of whole blood being furnished. As a result the amount of outdated blood exceeded the amount actually transferred to U. S. Forces. When he became aware of this problem, CINCPAC sent a study team to the area. In a report the team pointed out several shortcomings in management of the blood program. Specifically they called for a decrease in the overall quota to reflect actual usage and setting a utilization rate goal of 55-65 percent. They strongly recommended more specific blood type transfusions instead of universal donor transfusions.

(S) Following implementation of these recommendations the overall quota dropped by 1,700 units a week over a two-month period, the outdated blood rate dropped, and the utilization rate increased to the point where it was approaching the target goal. This was accompanied by a more efficient distribution of Type A blood. Using the criteria formulas derived by the CINCPAC team, the quota continued to be revised as necessary so as to be responsive to the demand factor for whole blood, which was the battle casualty rate.2

Retrograde Cargo Pest and Disease Control

(U) The potential risk of exporting agricultural pests and diseases of medical importance into the Continental United States or PACOM areas from Vietnam on retrograde cargo, plus expenditures of time and money caused by

1. J76 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
2. Ibid.
UNCLASSIFIED

quarantine delays, first came under consideration during a May 1968 conference on CINCPAC Operation Plan 67-68, Withdrawal of U.S./Free World Military Assistance Forces from South Vietnam in Six Months. As a result of an in-country analysis by a representative of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Defense Department implemented a program of processing and precleaning retrograde material within Vietnam.

(U) Technical support and expertise were provided by the Armed Forces Pest Control Board and Department of Agriculture and Public Health Service advisors who specially trained in Vietnam the Military Quarantine Inspectors detailed from CINCPAC's Service component commands. These inspectors were strategically assigned throughout Vietnam to supervise basic field preparation of the material.

(U) Material processing requirements included a thorough pressure cleaning of all vehicular equipment to remove organic soil. Rodenticides and insecticides were applied within confined areas. Specially developed insecticide equipment provided adequate vector protection for aerial cargo shipments without detrimental effects to crew, aircraft, or cargo. By late 1970 over 71,000 tons of cargo had been satisfactorily processed with such beneficial results that the Defense Department had directed implementation of a similar program worldwide.¹

¹ J76 History, Hq CINCPAC, for the month of Nov 70.
CHAPTER II - CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

Introduction

(§) During a press conference in Guam on 25 July 1969, President Nixon enunciated a policy governing U.S. military posture in overseas areas. This policy, with subsequent elaboration, became known as the Nixon Doctrine. It stressed the imperative that Asian nations allied with the U.S. assume progressively more responsibility for their own defense against aggression and insurgency. The impending reductions in U.S. force posture at that time constituted evidence that the Nixon Doctrine had already been implemented.1 As these reductions continued during 1970, the scope, purpose, and cost of the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) received much speculative attention. One professional military evaluation of MAP vis-a-vis force reductions was expressed by VADM Richard G. Colbert, President of the Naval War College:2

An expanded U.S. military assistance program will be an indispensable factor in the success of the Nixon Doctrine, the strategy for the 1970's.

We are at the beginning of a new chapter in American history, one in which our Government has asserted that we will no longer carry a disproportionate share of the defense burden of the free world. Therefore, we are moving toward an era in which others must do more in the collective defense effort. This is the essence of that crucial pillar of the Nixon Doctrine: partnership.

But if our friends and allies are to assume a greater share of the defense burden, we will, in many cases have to help them obtain the necessary tools and expertise essential for the development of viable defense establishments....

SECRET

If the past is any indication of the future, we have a long way to go. The historical example of the last few years is not encouraging. As Secretary of Defense Laird recently reported, the appropriation for the Fiscal Year 1970 Military Assistance Program was the lowest in the history of the program, a scant $350 million. Prior to 1967 the appropriation averaged some $2 billion annually!

In the face of severe military assistance cutbacks, we are continuing our own force reductions. As of last fall [1970], there were well over 100 foreign base reductions taken. There have been over 65 foreign base closures since January 1969. These decisions have accounted for a cutback of more than 60,000 civilian and military personnel overseas, and it is estimated that by this spring [1971] the total number of U.S. military forces overseas will be at least 300,000 below the level in force 2 years ago.

Secretary Laird has repeatedly cited the challenge, calling for a vigorous and revitalized military assistance and foreign military sales program. It is an "absolutely essential ingredient of our new Foreign Policy for the 1970's. Without such a program, we will be severely restricted in our determination to honor our obligations, to support our allies, and, at the same time, to reduce present U.S. forces in Asia and elsewhere...."

Until the FY 70 appropriation, which constituted a new low for MAP, the FY 69 appropriation had been the lowest since the program was established in 1948.¹ The effect of this trend was revealed during historical research for CY 1970. It was evident that MAP actions throughout the PACOM had become increasingly homogenized. Materiel, equipment, or monetary allocations to one country were often accompanied by off-setting adjustments in funds for other MAP-funded countries. The need for the broad view afforded to the joint CINCPAC Staff in reviewing priorities throughout the theater was convincingly demonstrated during 1970.

Because Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos were directly involved in the Southeast Asia conflict, military assistance was funded separately by the Department of Defense (DOD) under the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)

¹. Point Paper, J5311, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Aug 69, Subj: MAP Summary.
program. For this reason, and in accordance with the format of previous CINCPAC histories, the discussion of military assistance to these countries has been placed in Chapter IV: "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."
SECTION I - PLANNING AND FUNDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Impact of MAP Legislation

(§) At the beginning of CY 70, funds had not yet been appropriated by the Congress for FY 70 MAP. The Foreign Assistance Act Amendment of 1969, which provided the authority for the U.S. to implement its foreign economic and military assistance programs for FY 70, was signed into law by President Nixon on 31 December 1969. The totals authorized under the Act for economic and military assistance were $1.622 billion and $350 million, respectively, for FY 70 and FY 71. However, when the administration presented an appropriations bill which included $404.5 million for FY 70 MAP, the bill was defeated in the Senate and Congress adjourned its first session without passing an aid appropriation.1

(§) On 3 February 1970, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) notified CINCPAC that the Congress had passed a foreign assistance appropriations bill for FY 70. New obligatory authority (NOA) in the amount of $350 million was provided for MAP. Based upon SECDEF guidance, MAP ceilings were transmitted by CINCPAC to PACOM Service components and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) which totaled $189.7 million for FY 70 and $183.2 million for FY 71. These figures continued the downward trend for MAP funds. The PACOM share of FY 69 MAP had amounted to $199.9 million. By country, the MAP-funded levels established by SECDEF were:2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>FY 70 ($ Millions)</th>
<th>FY 71 ($ Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>140.5</td>
<td>140.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Area</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, pp. 5, 6; J531A History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 70; J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 70; SECDEF 9302/031353Z Feb 70; CINCPAC 060414Z Feb 70.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPOSED FY 1971 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

$392.0 Million

CHINA, REP. OF
INDONESIA
KOREA
MALAYSIA
PHILIPPINES
EAST ASIA AREA

ARGENTINA
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
DOMINICAN REP.
ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR
GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
MEXICO
NICARAGUA
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
L. A. AREA

EAST ASIA & PACIFIC
$183.2

LATIN AMERICA
$16.2

AFRICA
$18.6

NON-REGIONAL
$23.9

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA
$124.0

EUROPE
$26.1

AFRICA AREA

PORTUGAL
SPAIN
EUROPE AREA

GREECE
IRAN
SAUDI ARABIA
TURKEY
NESA AREA

SOURCE: MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES FACTS - MAR 70
The delay in passing the FY 70 appropriations bill, combined with the shifting military and political situation, engendered several major changes in the foregoing dollar guidelines. On 25 March 1970, a joint State/Defense message informed CINCPAC that FY 71 MAP for Indonesia would be increased to an annual level of $15 million. This decision was confirmed on 19 June when SECDEF provided dollar guidelines for FY 72-76 which continued the $15 million set for FY 71.

On 25 July 1970, a world-wide realignment of MAP was announced by SECDEF, the purpose of which was to generate $40 million in MAP funds for Cambodia. Programmed funds for all other PACOM countries were substantially reduced except for Indonesia, which lost only $4,000 of the previous increase to $15 million:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Old $ Ceiling</th>
<th>New $ Ceiling</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>+40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>6,341</td>
<td>-13,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14,996</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>140,800</td>
<td>140,002</td>
<td>-798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>13,196</td>
<td>-3,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Area</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Included in the above guidance was the overall obligational authority for the PACOM MAP for FY 71. With possible recoupments, reimbursements, and reappropriations, the new level was set at $214.7 million.

In October 1970, CINCPAC provided planning guidance to subordinate country MAAGs for FY 71 and FY 72 which provided, inter alia, for an increase to Indonesia of $3 million and a "modernization" increase to Korea from the original FY 71 $140.8 to $290.8. Also, the CINCPAC guidance for FY 72, by country, reflected restorations to previous levels in some instances. However, Burma was deleted for FY 72, and the omission of dollar levels for Cambodia indicated the continuing appraisal of shifting military assistance requirements to that country:

1. SECDEF 3047/1922502 Jun 70; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 70.
2. SECDEF 5825/2500132 Jul 70; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC Jul 70.
3. CINCPAC 280510Z Oct 70.
With the above figures for reference, CINCPAC also requested that the MAAGs submit statements of the estimated impact on individual country programs. These are discussed in ensuing pages of this history.

(S) The dollar guidelines based upon the restructured FY 71 MAP already discussed were again modified based upon a request for supplemental appropriations made by President Nixon on 18 November 1970. The request included $85 million in new MAP funds for Cambodia; replacement of the $40 million diverted from other sources in the original FY 71 program; $150 million in additional MAP funds for Korea; and, $13 million for Indonesia. Thus, at the end of CY 70, the turbulence of the MAP for the preceding 12 months was vividly illustrated by the following figures for FY 71:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>*145,000</td>
<td>185,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>20,017</td>
<td>6,333</td>
<td>13,684</td>
<td>20,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4,996</td>
<td>14,926</td>
<td>3,070</td>
<td>17,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>140,802</td>
<td>140,002</td>
<td>150,800</td>
<td>290,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>16,996</td>
<td>13,180</td>
<td>3,816</td>
<td>16,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Region</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>183,200</td>
<td>214,695</td>
<td>316,505</td>
<td>531,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A/ As originally submitted to Congress.

B/ Restructured levels to cover Presidential determination increases to Cambodia and Indonesia. Represented the adjustment necessary to remain within original Congressional authorization for MAP worldwide.

1. J5313 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.
C/ Funds transferred from other accounts or included in MAP supplemental request to the Congress.

D/ Total program levels finally authorized and appropriated by the Congress, including restored programs and supplemental.

* Includes $60 million transferred to MAP and $85 million in supplemental funds (above dollars in thousands).

** Measures to Offset MAP Restructuring in PACOM

(5) The reduction of MAP funds for various PACOM countries as a result of the expansion of aid to Cambodia was partially restored by supplemental appropriations. However, the revised allocation of funds had applied to MAP countries worldwide, and availability of materiel which was excess to the needs of the U.S. and allied nations continued to be explored as a means of reducing the impact. In the last six months of CY 70, for example, CINCPAC records revealed that excesses in the amount of $79.9 million were allocated to PACOM countries through long supply and excess (LS&E) procedures:

MAPEX (PACOM Excess Program) - Items valued at $15.8 million on the accounts of Property Disposal Officers in PACOM were allocated during the six month period ending 30 December 1970.

MIMEX (Major Item Excess Program) - Serviceable and unserviceable assets held by the service components (world-wide) accounted for $56.4 million allocated to PACOM countries during the six month period ending 30 December 1970.

SIMEX (Secondary Item Excess Program) - Serviceable assets held by service component depots (world-wide) valued at $6.7 million were allocated in PACOM between 1 July and 30 September 1970.

PAMEX (MAP Interface with PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency) - Initiated on 1 October 1970. In two months, $1.0 million in serviceable and unserviceable assets which were excess to PACOM component commands had been allocated under this program.

1. Point Paper, J4312, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jan 71, Subj: MAP Programs, as corrected by J432, LCOL F.P. Sanna, USAF, 19 Apr 71.
(S) By 7 January 1971, however, this program had also been subjected to legislative constraints. CINCPAC was advised by SECDEF that the Congress had limited the acquisition value of LS&E to $300 million under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) legislation. This worldwide limitation for FY 70-71 was much less than the planning figures quoted by SECDEF in March 1970. The earlier ceilings had been tentatively identified as $350 million for FY 70 and $385 million for FY 71-72. As a result, SECDEF directed that component commands suspend issuance of MIMEX offers. He also directed unified commands to notify MAAGs of the suspension of processing for new SIMEX requisitions. Lastly, CINCPAC was directed to withhold further MAPEX releases. A CINCPAC request to SECDEF that Cambodia be exempted from these restrictions had not been answered as of 8 January 1971.1

1. Ibid.; SECDEF 3953/260201Z Mar 70.
SECTION II - PACOM THEATER ACTIVITIES

International Fighter Aircraft

On 28 January 1970, one facet of the Nixon Doctrine was illustrated when Secretary of the Air Force Seamans announced that the U.S. intended to double the size of the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF). This action had been preceded during 1969 by repeated urging on the part of CINCPAC and other military commanders to modernize and improve MAP/MASF country air forces. In November 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) advised CINCPAC that a joint Senate/House Committee had provided $28 million to initiate the procurement of a fighter aircraft for Free World Forces (FWF). Industrial proposals were to be solicited by the USAF for the manufacture of an "international fighter aircraft" (IFA). The objective was to develop an economical, easy-to-operate air superiority fighter for our allies in general, and for South Vietnam and Thailand in particular.

In February and March 1970, the JCS requested CINCPAC to evaluate the capabilities for the IFA as specified in a USAF Requirements Action Directive. (RAD). CINCPAC was requested to submit comments on VNAF requirements separately from those of Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand based upon his assessment of the threat and existing air defense capability.

In his initial reply, CINCPAC addressed the future need for a VNAF air defense capability because of the planned withdrawal of U.S. air defense aircraft. In a subsequent, more detailed, reply the proposed IFA was evaluated from an overall PACOM standpoint. CINCPAC noted that the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) 72-79 force guidelines called for a follow-on tactical fighter and all-weather fighter, but that the IFA proposed by the USAF did not include all-weather intercept capability.

...With one major exception, RAD specifications for the IFA will satisfy JSOP requirements. Valid requirements exist for an all-weather intercept capability in Korea and Taiwan which are not satisfied by the proposed IFA. A minimum all-weather intercept capability can be achieved by incorporating an air-to-air radar system in the IFA with a capability of 50

2. JCS 1949/262255Z Feb 70; JCS 2757/102333Z Mar 70.
3. CINCPAC 250338Z Mar 70; CINCPAC 080407Z Mar 70; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
mile search and 10 mile track. This system need not be integrated with the fire control system. CINCPAC strongly recommends that RAD specifications be amended to include this requirement. A growth potential to provide a fully integrated fire control system with a capability to use all-weather missiles is desirable.

3. (S) It is noted that only a 100 NM radius of action is required for air-to-ground (close air support) missions. This is a minimal capability and any improvement in this range which does not sacrifice the air-to-air capability would be highly desirable.

5. (S) Assuming a three squadron RVNAF requirement for planning purposes, the following total requirement exists for the proposed IFA (as modified...above, i.e., search and track radar):

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam (RVNAF)</td>
<td>3 Sq</td>
<td>54 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan (CAF)</td>
<td>10 Sq</td>
<td>174 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (ROKAF)</td>
<td>4 Sq</td>
<td>72 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand (RTAF)</td>
<td>1 Sq</td>
<td>25 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>325 aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(S) The foregoing force structure was predicated upon CINCPAC's assessment of the ground control intercept (GCI) systems existing or programmed in Taiwan, Korea, and Thailand. The approval and funding of scheduled GCI facilities would provide, "...an adequate radar system for employment of the IFA in an air defense role." CINCPAC considered that a valid and urgent requirement existed for a follow-on IFA, but cautioned that current dollar guidelines would not permit acquisition in the numbers stated above.

(S) In December 1970, the question of the acceptability of the F-5-21, which had been chosen as the IFA, was again raised by the JCS, because of what was considered, "...a significant departure from the long-standing CINCPAC requirement for an aircraft with all-weather kill capability." With the support of views expressed by the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) component of CINCPAC, the position previously taken by CINCPAC was reiterated to the JCS. In elaboration of the joint PACAF/CINCPAC position, it was noted that military assistance was meant to

1. CINCPAC 080407Z Apr 70.
train and equip friendly forces to deter aggression or to provide an effective initial defense against overt aggression. Although the Nixon Doctrine included the improvement of friendly forces, along with progressively less dependence upon U.S. forces, this tenet was coupled with the assurance that the U.S. would honor all treaty commitments. This implied USAF augmentation if necessary to assist allied nations. Addressing the specific need for the all-weather capability in the IFA, CINCPAC stated:

---

**e.** A "pure all-weather" feature is not considered essential for the purpose of achieving a viable air defense force since the current air threat to Free World Asian countries (exclusive of Soviet Far East Forces) is primarily clear air mass. However, a limited all-weather capability will be required by the 1974-75 time period to counter the currently estimated all-weather capability of some 175-200 CHICOM TU-16 BADGERS. Questions appeared to be caused primarily by the meaning attached to the term "all weather intercept capability." The definition contained in JCS Pub 1 does not adequately describe the capability which CINCPAC intended that the selected PACOM Free World Force elements must possess....

(5) At the same time, CINCPAC modified the force requirements for the IFA which he had submitted in April 1970. For Vietnam, in view of the single squadron stated as a firm requirement in the Improvement and Modernization (I&M) Program, the two additional "possible" squadrons cited in the JSEP were deleted. For Thailand, the Unit Equipped (UE) number was changed from 25 to 18 to standardize the UE for MAP squadrons. The requirement for Taiwan was increased to include eight squadrons with UE-20 and two squadrons with UE-18 for a total of 196. The higher number resulted from a change in concept of Taiwan air defense to the maintenance of air superiority over the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan vice the all-weather intercept capability. With no change in the Korea force, the new net force requirement for the four countries was 304 aircraft.2

---

**COIN/FAC Aircraft for MAP**

(5) One of the most doctrinaire controversies to evolve from the war in Vietnam centered around the need to provide close air support for ground forces.

---

1. JCS 8184/162337Z Dec 70; CINCPAC 171928Z Dec 70; CINCPACAF 220010Z Dec 70; CINCPAC 2221117Z Dec 70.
2. CINCPAC 2221117Z Dec 70.
in contact with the enemy. Although the war had started as a counterinsurgency (COIN) effort, increases in the size of the opposing forces had led to more stylized engagements, including some set-piece battles. The one constant in the jungle environment was the need to locate the enemy in order to bring fire power to bear, especially in close support of friendly troops. The aircraft used to accomplish this task ranged from small, single propeller, observation planes to helicopters to F-100 and F-4 jet aircraft. Meanwhile, the countries on the periphery of the war were already concerned with insurgency on the original scale; the need for a simple, easy to operate forward air control (FAC) and COIN aircraft within the means of MAP countries was recognized as a vital factor in their internal defense. In mid-December 1970, CSAF sent a message to USAF commands for action in which the COIN/FAC aircraft problem for MAP countries was summarized.

(§) As postulated by CSAF, the COIN/FAC aircraft in the USAF inventory had to be tailored to stringent specifications in order to operate worldwide in a variety of conflict levels and terrain. These aircraft were required to withstand high gravity (G) stresses and possess sophisticated communications, avionics, and instrumentation. In contrast, according to the CSAF, MAP countries would normally operate in contiguous regions common to all, and would not need aircraft as complex as those of the USAF:

2. (§) In past years the US military assistance program has relied, for the most part, upon USAF excesses or the procurement of those acft which were available from on-going USAF production contracts to meet COIN acft requirements. Due to recent reductions/uncertainties of production acft and lack of future excesses, other sources for acft to meet these requirements must be found. Concurrently, shortage of MA funds severely limits the selection of acft to those of low acquisition cost and of low cost operation and maintenance....

(§) To achieve this objective, CSAF proposed to convene a meeting of USAF representatives to review and consolidate specific MAP country requirements. The ultimate objective of the meeting was to define required operational capabilities for follow-on MAP aircraft for use in lower level (COIN) conflict. Agenda presentations to be made by various USAF agencies included the current status of military assistance programs; the update and review of country air force military

1. CSAF 161746Z Dec 70.
2. Ibid.
assistance requirements; the definition of mission elements and proposed force mix; a resume of current proposals from the aircraft industry; and, the development of the required operational capabilities.¹

(§) Although the proposed meeting had apparently been intended as an Air Force vehicle, the vital interest of CINCPAC in the selection and acquisition of COIN/FAC aircraft for MAP was signalled to CSAF. In order to arrive at a coordinated PACOM position, CINCPAC requested PACAF to host a conference in Hawaii prior to that scheduled to be held under Tactical Air Command auspices at Eglin AFB, Florida. In addition to CINCPAC representatives, the several MAAGs in PACOM were requested to send delegates. Both the PACOM area and USAF meetings were scheduled to be held in January 1971, and will be discussed in the continuing CINCPAC Command History for CY 1971.²

MAP/MA SF Flying Hour Program

(U) By message on 3 December 1969, CINCPAC cautioned his subordinate MAAGs regarding the need to manage closely the flying hour program for the aircraft of MAP/MA SF countries. The program was guided by the CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual (MAM); the USAF Regulation 27-7; the quarterly USAF Program Aerospace Vehicles and Flying Hours for MA SF Countries; and, the annual USAF Military Assistance Program, Aircraft and Flying Hours for MAP Countries (PA-XX-X(M)). Deviations from forecast aircraft utilization impacted heavily on programmed petroleum, oil, lubricant (POL) and aircraft spare parts requirements. Therefore, MAAGs were required to report deviations of more than two percent (or 100 hours) by FY quarter, including the cause of such deviations. PACAF was given the responsibility, after CINCPAC approval, of reporting MAP and MA SF deviations from flying hour allocations to CSAF for program adjustments.³

(U) After reviewing the flying hour allocations for their respective countries, the PACOM MAAGs submitted requests for program changes. PACAF concurred with these changes, except for that of the Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (DEPCJUSMAGTHAI), which PACAF intended to submit, "..."...to Hq USAF in accordance with AFR 27-7."⁴

(§) One week after receiving the above PACAF comments, CINCPAC approved, on 29 January 1970, the flying hour changes requested by all of the MAAGs, including

1. Ibid.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 220414Z Dec 70; CINCPAC 272132Z Dec 70; J5323(A) History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70, Subj: USG Military Assistance Requirements for COIN and FAC Aircraft.
4. CINCPACAF 222116Z Jan 70.
that for DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI. On the premise that USAF PA document data should reflect the CINCPAC MAM flying hour authorizations, CINCPAC approved 85 hours per month for the O-1A/F aircraft used in the Laotian program of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI. The procedures established by CINCPAC for PACAF to report MAP and MASF deviations to CSAF did not exclude the Laotian program. Consequently, PACAF was requested to take action with CSAF to change the appropriate program documents in accordance with the new CINCPAC authorizations.¹

(§) Subsequent quarterly requests for flying hour adjustments in Laos elicited the observation from PACAF that the requested changes could not be evaluated because of insufficient data:²

...The proposed flying hr adjustment relates to sorties and sortie durations fragged by AMEMB, Vientiane. Since sortie info is not available this hqs, PACAF cannot justify or refute recommended changes....

...Since pertinent data regarding the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI operational requirement is not available at this hqs, PACAF cannot validate this request....

(§) While continuing to request PACAF comments and recommendations regarding program changes for Laos, the authority vested in CINCPAC as PACOM monitor for MAP was exercised by approving most program change requests throughout 1970.³

(§) Bearing on the subject of MASF aircraft flying hour allocations was a December 1970 message from the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACHTAI) which compared the documents from which flying hour guidance was obtained for MASF countries. Basic to the review was an item-by-item comparison between the MAM of CINCPAC and the PA of the USAF. After noting the discrepancies, COMUSMACHTAI stated that the MAM appeared to be, "...closer to our capabilities to fly the aircraft based on crew ratio and actual utilization...." and, "...consistent with the present RTAF [Royal Thai Air Force] capabilities...." COMUSMACHTAI concluded that the USAF document data should be revised to conform to the CINCPAC MAM.⁴

(§) On 21 December, CINCPAC approved adjustments for RTAF flying hours based upon the MAM authorizations as listed by COMUSMACHTAI. At the same time, PACAF

---

1. CINCPAC 292141Z Jan 70.
2. CINCPACAF 251641Z Feb 70; CINCPACAF 241817Z Apr 70.
3. CINCPAC 021947Z Mar 70; CINCPAC 010433Z May 70; CINCPAC 012227Z Sep 70; CINCPAC 011950Z Dec 70.
4. COMUSMACHTAI 161130Z Dec 70.
was requested to adjust the USAF program documents accordingly. This adjust-
ment, as directed by CINCPAC, was to include the addition of an authorization
for UH-1H flying hours; i.e., 25 hours per month and 75 hours per quarter.¹

MAP Training Programs

(§) As related at the beginning of this chapter, major realignments in
worldwide MAP funding were triggered by the decision to increase aid to Cambodia.
As a component of overall country MAP planning, the training program (MAPT) was
also adversely affected. Training funds and the scope of in-country training
were drastically reduced, as were the numbers of foreign students authorized for
training in the Continental U.S. (CONUS). The impact of these reductions was
called to the attention of SECDEF by CINCPAC in January 1970. He challenged the
application of across-the-board percentage reductions for all unified commands,
and recommended that the affect of the reduced program in the PACOM area be
reviewed by SECDEF:²

7. Current U.S. policy, which appears to be aimed at
lowering the U.S. military profile in resolution of Asian
matters, engenders a stronger requirement for expanded PACOM
MAP training, particularly in the forward defense countries,
in order to build and maintain self-sufficient indigenous
forces. In certain cases, the phase down of U.S. forces is
predicated on maintenance of PACOM foreign combat forces
capability at present levels. Consequently, it is considered
that PACOM nations should have a significantly higher priority
for CONUS MAP training than MAP supported nations not facing
a direct Communist internal or external threat....

MAPT Funds

(§) The obligated/programmed funds for training in PACOM fluctuated through-
out 1970 as overall MAP adjustments were directed by SECDEF. Excluding MASF
countries, comparative figures for FY 71 programming (in millions) were:³

1. ADMIN CINCPAC 212105Z Dec 70.
2. CINCPAC 182313Z Jan 70; Point Paper, J534(A), Hq CINCPAC, 13 Jan 70, Subj:
PACOM MAP Training Reductions, FY 70 and FY 71; J534(A) History, Hq CINCPAC,
Jan 70, Subj: PACOM MAP Training Reductions, FY 70 and FY 71.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, p. 41; Command Digest, Hq CINCPAC, 15
Aug 70, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 139; Command Digest, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Feb 71, Vol. 13,
No. 1, p. 139.
# Military Assistance Program

## Dollar Guidelines

**Jan 1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>(Millions of Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>290.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>147.1 1/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. of China</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>61.0 1/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>185.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>738.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)

**Source:** PACOM Digest Feb 71
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1 Oct 69</th>
<th>1 Jul 70</th>
<th>31 Dec 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>5.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Region</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

($) The above figures for 31 December 1970 were reached after continuous guidance from SECDEF to CINCPAC, combined with accompanying adjustments and realignments in programs by the MAAG missions in PACOM. For example, on 28 July 1970, revised training levels established by SECDEF included a reduction in PACOM area funds from the above 1 July figure of $130,000 to $79,000. As CINCPAC advised his Service components, $71,070 of the $130,000 were fixed costs for salaries. This left only $7,930 for FY 71 travel and other expenses for Army, Navy, Air Force, and CINCPAC, based upon the new $79,000 allocation. On 28 August, however, SECDEF announced another revision which increased the PACOM area MAPT funds from $79,000 to the $95,490 indicated for 31 December in the above table.1

CONUS MAPT Student Training

($) In addition to the monetary limitations imposed on the MAP, another factor influenced the programming of foreign students for training in CONUS. The Foreign Assistance Act was amended by the Congress to limit the number of foreign military trainees in CONUS. This number could not exceed the number of foreign civilian trainees in CONUS under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act. As a result, the PACOM MAP-supported country authorizations were greatly reduced. The student quota for the five countries affected (Korea, China, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia) was reduced from 1,056 to 929 for FY 70, and from 1,050 to 726 for FY 71 by SECDEF direction on 31 December 1969. Later, the quotas were again revised for CONUS student training:2

1. SECDEF 6004/281420Z Jul 70; CINCPAC 040112Z Aug 70; J5343 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 70, Subj: Revised FY 71 MAPT Levels; SECDEF 8619/282118Z Aug 70; J5343 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 70, Subj: Revised FY 71 MAPT Levels.
2. CINCPAC 182311Z Jan 70; J534(A) History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70, Subj: PACOM MAP Training Reductions, FY 70 and FY 71; Memorandum 024-71, J534, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Apr 71, Subj: Review of Command History.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FY 70</th>
<th>FY 71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As projected above, the armed forces of China, Korea, and the Philippines were most seriously affected. CINCPAC noted that the proposed reductions for FY 71 were of such magnitude as to retard the attainment of self-sufficiency by the armed forces of those countries.

(†) In spite of repeated requests for reconsideration by CINCPAC, the FY 71 quota of 726 was confirmed by SECDEF on 10 April 1970. On 18 April, CINCPAC disseminated a revised training program for CONUS students to the PACOM MAAGs. Eight more spaces were allotted to China and seven more for Korea. The 15 spaces were taken from the Malaysia quota, which was reduced to 40 spaces.¹

(‡) On 28 October 1970, CINCPAC requested 210 additional student quotas from SECDEF to accommodate Indonesian MSC crew transfer training. SECDEF approved the additional quotas on 2 November 1970, raising the PACOM CONUS student quota total to 936. On 4 November 1970, CINCPAC revised the FY 71 quotas as indicated in the table above.²

Living Allowances for MAPT Students

(†) In January 1970, the DOD notified CINCPAC that a study was being conducted to determine the adequacy of living allowances for foreign military trainees in CONUS. Based upon data supplied by the PACOM MAAGs, CINCPAC forwarded information concerning the living allowances then being supplied by the governments of the students.³

1. CINCPAC 030427Z Feb 70; CINCPAC 270233Z Mar 70; SECDEF 5709/101804Z Apr 70; CINCPAC 181933Z Apr 70; CINCPAC 180419Z Apr 70.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 282335Z Oct 70; SECDEF 022206Z Nov 70; ADMIN CINCPAC 042320Z Nov 70.
3. SECDEF 8824/271449Z Jan 70; CINCPAC 300528Z Jan 70; Ltr, Ser 0266, CINCPAC to SECDEF, 25 Feb 70, Subj: Living Allowances for Foreign Military Training Students (FMATS), with 6 encls.; Ltr, Ser 0330, CINCPAC to SECDEF, 11 Mar 70, Subj: Living Allowances for FMATS.
(U) On 27 May 1970, SECDEF informed CINCPAC that, effective on 1 July 1970, living allowances paid by the U.S. to foreign military trainees would approximate the per diem rates paid to U.S. personnel on TDY. As cost factors for planning purposes, unified commands were instructed to use $56 and $25 per week for officers and enlisted men respectively. Previous factors had been $42 and $19. For those foreign trainees authorized to have accompanying dependents, the factor of $112 was to be applied. SECDEF estimated that this increase in allowances would add $1.5 million to the worldwide FY 71 MAP. Military components and MAAGs were advised by CINCPAC that an attempt would be made to minimize the computational workload at country level by use of the MAP Data Center at CINCPAC to compute the comparative figures for programming purposes.  

English Language Training

(S) In July 1970, CINCPAC forwarded to PACOM MAP/MASF countries a review of the FY 70 English language training program status. He noted that more than half of the CONUS MAPT spaces which had been cancelled were withdrawn because of non-availability of qualified students in-country. This suggested that, "...perhaps major deficiencies still exist in the operation and conduct of the MAP (MASF) - sponsored English language training (ELT) programs, even though these programs have been in existence for several years...." CINCPAC listed several deficiencies which had been observed during staff visits to PACOM countries; suggested areas which warranted additional emphasis; and, offered staff assistance to improve the country ELT programs. He noted that dollar costs of the program represented a substantial investment. Based upon the PACOM data base, PACOM-wide expenditures were estimated to be $5.034 million for FY 70 and $3.1 million for FY 71.  

MAP Manpower Actions

(S) The reductions of U.S. military personnel in overseas areas also applied to those assigned to various military assistance elements, and were formalized under a program entitled, "Reduction of Overseas Personnel in MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups (OPRED)." On 15 January 1970, the JCS informed unified commanders that future proposals for increased authorizations for military assistance missions required the approval of the appropriate country chief of mission and the Assistant SECDEF for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA). Regional ceilings for PACOM elements prompted manpower surveys and

1. SECDEF 1036/272153Z May 70; CINCPAC 032137Z Jun 70.
priority reviews by CINCPAC in an attempt to realign MAAG manpower authorizations within overall theater ceilings.\(^1\)

\(\S\) As a result of the DOD-imposed ceilings and the CINCPAC manpower surveys, the Joint Manpower Program (JMP) authorizations for MAP-funded countries as of 1 July 1970 varied substantially from those of one year earlier:\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1 July 1969</th>
<th>1 July 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evaluations of MAP/MAF Effectiveness

\(\S\) As J71 of the CINCPAC joint staff, the Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) conducted periodic visits to military assistance elements in the PACOM area. Evaluations were made during 1970 of the Burma, Korea, China, Thailand, and Laos MAP/MAF programs. The purpose of these evaluations was to assess the progress of the MAP objectives for each country and to recommend actions to be taken by the chiefs of the mission elements to eliminate obstacles or deficiencies. Following are synthesized summaries of the comprehensive formal reports written by the PEG teams, as footnoted.

Burma\(^3\)

\(\S\) The PEG evaluation of the effectiveness of the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT) in Burma was conducted during the period 3-7 February 1970. At that time, MAP-funded aid to Burma was in its sixth and final increment, with approximately 88 percent of the total programmed procurement of military

---

2. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. I, p. 12; JCS 8081/212056Z Aug 70; JCS 8525/11327Z May 70; JCS 6301/162253Z Apr 70; JCS 5502/082307Z Apr 70; JCS 8997/152007Z May 70; JCS 0843/142216Z Jan 70; JCS 9156/181546Z May 70; J13 Staff Histories, Hq CINCPAC, Jan, Apr, May, Aug 70.
equipment either on hand or on order. In the judgment of U.S. Embassy/MEDT personnel, it appeared unlikely that the Government of Burma would request an extension of the MAP.

MEDT personnel were hampered in the performance of their duties by the travel and contact restrictions imposed by the host Government. Visits by MEDT personnel to Burma Armed Forces installations could be made by invitation only. Such restrictions, the PEG team noted, made it difficult to evaluate the MEDT by the same standards as those applied to military assistance elements in other countries. For example, there were many instances when the Burma Ministry of Defense did not even reply to MEDT requests to visit Burmese installations.

Since FY 64, Burma had refused all U.S. MAP training, and no Burmese officers had received CONUS training since 1964. In-country training had been limited to some technical training provided by U.S. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). The Burmese Government policy was one of strict neutrality, and representatives of other countries were subjected to the same limited travel and contact as MEDT personnel. Indicative of the sensitive political nuances of the MEDT mission (and perhaps the geographical location of Burma between Thailand and Pakistan) was the answer by a Burmese naval officer when asked what was the primary threat to the Burmese Navy. His apparently serious answer was that SEATO was considered to be the primary threat.

Based upon the limited scope of the remaining programmed MAP, the PEG team recommended that a plan be developed for the orderly deactivation of the MEDT. The Chief, MEDT concurred, and submitted a plan for gradual reduction of MEDT manpower, to be followed by disestablishment of the MEDT at a propitious future time.

China

The CINCPAC evaluation of MAP effectiveness in the Republic of China (ROC) was conducted between 4-22 May 1970. The overall evaluation by the PEG team was that, although substantial reductions in manpower had already taken place, MAAG China was organized efficiently. Continuing management efforts were evident, despite additional programmed personnel reductions and declining MAP funds, to maintain the momentum of the Chinese Armed Forces toward the achievement of self-sufficiency.

One of the PEG team findings was that emphasis was needed to enhance the Chinese Armed Forces capability in management methods. Also needed were multi-year planning and budgeting programs, automated data systems, and improvements in the military pay structure and pay system. The establishment of realistic force priorities for the ROC, in conjunction with the JSOP submission from MAAG China, was also stressed by the PEG team.

Chinese Army engineer trainees practice bridge erection at the Engineer Unit Training Center.

Other recommendations included the acquisition of Vietnam Lessons Learned reports for use by the Chinese Armed Forces.

In the area of aircraft control and warning (AC&W), the PEG team noted that the ROC had unilaterally changed the configuration of programmed sites and missions. While acknowledging that MAAG could not prevent such arbitrary changes, CINCPAC recommended that PACAF be informed because of the possible effect on USAF contingency usage of the Taiwan AC&W sites.
Korea

(U) During the period 8-25 September 1970, the FY 71 evaluation of the Korean MAP and the provisional MAAG, Korea (PROVMAAG-K) was conducted by the PEG. Previous CINCPAC Command Histories and PEG reports have discussed the unique command structure in Korea. PROVMAAG-K was a staff element within the Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK), and was charged by the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSK) with overall surveillance of the MAP in Korea. PROVMAAG-K was also charged with integrating the Service component MAPs into a single Korean MAP. The Army, Navy, and Air Force advisory organizations were not components of PROVMAAG-K; rather, they were responsible directly to their Service component commands which, in turn, were responsible to COMUSK. At the time of the CINCPAC evaluation, a proposal to establish a typical MAAG structure was under consideration.

(U) The summary of the FY 71 PEG evaluation stated that the PROVMAAG-K and the Service advisory elements were functioning effectively. The personnel strength of all had been reduced by more than 350 spaces since the FY 70 evaluation. A further reduction of 35 percent ordered by the SECDEF was expected to degrade the overall advisory effort, and this order had been rebutted by COMUSK and CINCPAC.

(Š) The PEG team found that the Korean Armed Forces had maintained their combat effectiveness in spite of the austere Korean defense budget and reduced MAP funds. However, the evaluators cautioned that more materiel assistance would be needed in order to maintain the same degree of effectiveness. Overage equipment, shortages of spare parts, and insufficient funds in both MAP and the Korean defense budget were considered to be pervasive major obstacles.

Thailand

(Š) The evaluation of the MASF program for FY 70 in Thailand was conducted between 9-27 February 1970. Military assistance to Thailand was one of three Service funded programs in 1970 - the others were Laos and Vietnam. In a


2. Extracted from Ltr, Ser 001364, CINCPAC to Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand, 7 May 70, Subj: CINCPAC FY 70 Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program in Thailand, with 1 encl., Final Report of the CINCPAC FY 70 Evaluation of the MAP, Thailand.
voluminous (344 pages) evaluation, more than 30 general and specific major findings were summarized. Of these, the first five provided the basic connotations:

a. (U) The JUSMAG was effective in discharging its MAP responsibilities. The high caliber of assigned personnel, their professional and dedicated efforts, and the excellent rapport and relationship with their Thai counterparts contributed immeasurably in the accomplishment of the JUSMAG mission. The COMUSMACTHAI/RTARF Military Assistance Program Evaluation Team, Thailand (MAPETT) was an effective method of evaluating the progress of the US Military Assistance Program in Thailand. This program should be examined by CINCPAC for application in other MAP/MASF countries in the Pacific Command.

b. (S) The Military Assistance Program (MAP) for Thailand was effective even though operating under reduced MAP dollar ceilings. A gradual reduction in expenditures for consumables was being realized and MAP dollars were being programmed to a larger extent for investment items that would eventually result in the RTARF attaining self-sufficiency. As in previous years the RTARF was still plagued with serious personnel shortages, budgetary limitations, and decision authority centralized at only the highest levels. The formation of a committee to administer the Royal Thai Forces Vietnam reimbursement program, and identify the cost elements of expense incident to that program, was considered a significant management improvement. These measures should assist in stabilizing costs and provide additional controls over the program.

c. (U) The original USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI organization of 1966 had remained basically unchanged, in spite of sizeable manpower reductions which had been imposed by DOD. Programmed personnel losses within the JUSMAG could adversely impact on the MAAG effectiveness unless the remaining manpower resources were distributed and employed to achieve maximum productivity. The DOD Civilian Deployment Control System for Thailand had not been implemented fully. Variations existed in the approved DOD ceiling and in the recognized distribution of civilian manpower spaces.

d. (U) Administration in Headquarters USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI was being accomplished in an effective manner. The areas which required additional emphasis were: maintenance of personnel records, procedures for handling blank forms, administrative
security, and the development of more comprehensive emergency evacuation and destruction plans for classified documents.

e. (S) Personnel manpower problems of the Thailand Armed Forces had not been documented. Goals and courses of action to provide advice and assistance to remedy or alleviate these problems had not been developed. Manning levels throughout the RTARF were inadequate to appropriately support MAP objectives, the JSOP and operational requirements. This situation was aggravated by the personnel drawdowns incident to deployments of the RTAFAV.

Laos

(S) Most of the findings in the PEG evaluation of the MASF program of the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI had their roots in the coordination difficulties between the U.S. Aid (RO/USAID) in Vientiane, Laos and the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI in Thailand. Previous CINCPAC Command Histories had recorded this situation as one of long standing, but difficult to resolve because of the political constraints of U.S. policy.

(S) The PEG evaluation for FY 70 was conducted during the period 3-21 February 1970. The findings and recommendations in the report were addressed to two main themes. The most significant, from the point of view of CINCPAC, was the inherent diffusion of control and accountability for military assistance in Laos, summarized in this major finding:

d. (S) Separate geographical location and command channels for RO/USAID and DEPCHIEF had caused loss of effective CINCPAC surveillance/monitorship and control over equipment status and utilization. Reorganization of the RO/USAID and DEPCHIEF logistical, organizational, and functional relationships was required for economy, efficiency, and effective military management and support of the Laotian Armed Forces.

Freer access into country was required to utilize military expertise available in the DEPCHIEF organization. RO/USAID should provide increased logistical advice and assistance at MR level.

(§) The absence of effective military control over the logistic flow and end use of military assistance materiel was pinpointed by several PEG findings and recommendations. In answer to the CINCPAC recommendation that DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI and RO/USAID request the approval of the U.S. Embassy for freer access in-country of military logistical expertise, the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI recognized the political realities of the situation:

(§) As noted by PEG..., the Terms of Reference which place constraint on DEPCHIEF in-country activities are subject to political considerations and the judgment of the Ambassador....

DEPCHIEF does not consider it feasible to establish a formal modus operandi since in-country presence is an Embassy policy matter which, by necessity, must be under continuous review by the Ambassador. In view of the political climate, DEPCHIEF will continue to make available to the Ambassador and Country Team military expertise available from this headquarters and will continue to stress to the Ambassador the availability of military expertise at other headquarters and activities....
The foregoing views were enlarged upon in answer to the recommendation that RO/USAID, with assistance from DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI as required, provide increased assistance and logistical advice to Laotian units in-country. In order to preserve the essence of the basic problems of the MASF program in Laos, the following comments are quoted in full:

DEPCHIEF COMMENT: Concur. As per the Geneva Accords of 1962, strict limitations are placed on the US advisory effort in Laos. The present organization of DEPCHIEF under the restricting "MAAG in exile" concept is satisfactorily providing effective management of MAP stocks and support to the Royal Lao Armed Forces in meeting their logistic requirements.

An increase of RO personnel in each MR field office would definitely enhance RO's ability to monitor the end use of MAP material.

The fact that the Geneva Accords has designated France as the country responsible for advising and training the Lao makes it extremely difficult to improve on present support and functional concepts. If the RLAF is ever to achieve a self-sufficient logistical system, it will require the assignment of US civilian and military advisors at the grass roots level where the need for improvement must be planted and its growth monitored. In order to have a more economic and efficient management of Lao MAP support, it is recommended that RO activities be placed under the operational control of DEPCHIEF. This action would enhance coordination of the MAP effort, facilitate management by reducing the span of control, and make the system more responsive to the needs of the RLGAF. Until the activities of DEPCHIEF and RO are consolidated under one command, loopholes will remain in the management of the MAP for Laos. Additional in-country comments have been requested.
(S) The other main theme addressed by the PEG evaluation team was the ineffectiveness of the overall training program, both in-country and third country. Several of the team's observations pertained to these deficiencies. The PEG finding which elicited the most extensive rebuttal was that in-country management procedures were not conducive to the development of effective training toward eventual Royal Lao Armed Forces self-sufficiency. The U.S. Embassy commented, in part, that:

(S) The country team recognized that the Lao were not capable of carrying on extensive in-country training. With limited manpower, shortage of technically qualified personnel, and involvement in an active war, it would be virtually impossible to expect them to concentrate on training requirements. The situation was further complicated by the provision of the Geneva Accords which established the French as the responsible
agent for Lao military training in Laos. It was decided that
an alternate might be found in third country training. This
avenue was explored. The Thais were receptive and had facilities
and personnel available; therefore, the decision was made to
accomplish training in Thailand.

CINCPAC, in turn, commented upon the Embassy remarks in an extensive
overview of the merits of third country versus in-country training. He stated, 
_inter alia_, that:

Third country training is considered an interim solution
to the development of an over-all effective training program
for Laotian Forces. The general thrust of the PEG Findings/
Recommendations pertaining to training was to highlight the
need for establishment of an in-country training program to
ultimately develop some degree of self-sufficiency.... It is
recognized that the RLG is engaged in an active conflict;
however, consideration should be given to the degree of seasonal
force involvement by military region and, where feasible, formal
in-country training programs should be initiated. The generalization
that third country training is the most effective and
economical method of accomplishing Laotian training is certainly
open to question. CINCPAC is not aware of any cost comparison
or other studies pertinent to in-country versus third country
training....
SECTION III - COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

(U) As a corollary to the reduction of U.S. forces overseas, continued military assistance to friendly countries was imperative. In an address entitled "Collective Security in Asia," CINCPAC stressed the complementary nature of the MAP to the Nixon Doctrine:

It is important, as we reduce our force levels, that we not leave a total vacuum which would affect the security of the American people or their vital interests in the continued security of our Free World allies. Even as we reduce the American presence and the risks to our servicemen and the strain on our economy, we must not lose sight of an urgent necessity to help nations we expect to shoulder more of the burden for their own defense.

The Nixon Doctrine's success as an evolving part of U.S. foreign policy depends on a viable U.S. Military Assistance Program. The goals of reduced direct American involvement can only be met by providing means for self-defense and encouraging self-reliance by our allies; filling political and military voids that would otherwise tempt would-be aggressors; and maintaining U.S. credibility by demonstrating our resolve to honor our treaty alliances.

(U) Assurance that the "total vacuum" referred to by Admiral McCain would not be created was forthcoming from President Nixon, whose message to the Congress on 18 November 1970 stated, in part:

The United States is not going to withdraw from the world. But times are changing; for us to fulfill our responsibility


UNCLASSIFIED

313
now, we must link our efforts more closely with those of our friends to build the foundations of peace.

In July 1969, on my trip through Asia, I reaffirmed our determination to provide security support, while calling upon countries which receive our assistance to assume the primary responsibility for their own defense. Equally important, I emphasized the need to provide the help essential for such nations to assume this responsibility quickly. While reducing the direct participation of our forces we must help these other countries develop the capability to carry out the increased responsibilities they are assuming. In Asia, this approach has provided the basis for a major reduction in our military presence as well as major long term budgetary and balance of payments savings. Authorized troop levels have been reduced by:

- 165,000 in Vietnam; further reductions of 100,000 will be accomplished by next spring;
- 20,000 in Korea;
- 6,000 in Thailand; further reductions of 9,800 are in process;
- 6,000 in the Philippines.

(U) In the real world of budgetary as well as manpower reductions, the execution of the Nixon Doctrine in PACOM was manifested by its impact on each MAP-funded country – most of which were in jeopardy from conventional or insurgent forces of Communism.

Burma

(S) A decision as to whether the MAP would be continued in Burma had been sought for several years. CINCPAC, the MEDT in Burma, and the U.S. Embassy had urged that the program be continued for two reasons. First was the fact that the MEDT was the only foreign mission authorized to operate in Burma, and the contacts established by the team members with Burmese counterparts assisted in maintaining a modicum of U.S. influence. Second, the consensus among U.S.
personnel in Burma was that, if assistance was not forthcoming from the U.S., the Burmese would turn to other sources whose influence would achieve dominance over that of the U.S.¹

(§) On 22 January 1970, SECDEF notified CINCPAC of U.S. policy that any request for additional assistance after the currently authorized program was concluded must originate with the Burmese Government. The provision of materiel aid during FY 71 was not contemplated by the U.S., and, if a request were to be received for such assistance, the response should be that it was too late to include such request in the FY 71 MAP.²

(§) In view of the SECDEF position, the CINCPAC Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations requested his Plans Assistant to recommend a CINCPAC position regarding the future of the MEDT in Burma. He noted that there appeared to be little hope for a follow-on program for Burma, and that about 75 percent of the final increment of aid to Burma had been delivered. The Plans recommendation was that an immediate phase-down of the MEDT begin, and that the MEDT should be completely phased out by 30 September 1970. Residual MAP matters would be disposed of by a small, MAP-funded augmentation of the Defense Attache Office (DAO).³

(§) On 31 March 1970, CINCPAC recommended that JCS approve the phase-down of the MEDT, as proposed by the U.S. Embassy, including integration into the DAO. On 15 April, SECDEF approved the plan for phase-down of the MEDT, with the exception that a "Military Liaison Section" was to be established by 1 December 1971. The existing command relationship, under which the MEDT reported directly to CINCPAC, was to be retained under the new organization. The Burmese Government was to be notified that requisitions would not be accepted after 15 February 1971, and CINCPAC was requested to submit a revised Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) and revised Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Military Liaison Section when established.⁴

(§) In July 1970, CINCPAC submitted a revised JTD for the MEDT, Burma which programmed 16 military and 16 local nationals for FY 71. Authorized manning was

2. SECDEF 8519/221552Z Jan 70.
3. Memorandum No. 83, J02, Hq CINCPAC (MGEN Chesley G. Peterson, USAF) to J5, Hq CINCPAC (RADM Lloyd R. Vasey, USN), 22 Jan 70, Subj: Burma Military Assistance (C); Memorandum No. 0047-70, J5, Hq CINCPAC (RADM Vasey) to J02, Hq CINCPAC (MGEN Peterson), 29 Jan 70, Subj: Burma Military Assistance (C).
4. CINCPAC 310535Z Mar 70; SECDEF 6118/151505Z Apr 70; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
MAP COUNTRIES AND PROGRAM SUMMARIES

BURMA

**Basic Information**

- **Area:** 252,000 sq. mi.
- **Gross National Product (GNP):** 1968
- **Population:** 26,986,000
- **GNP per Capita:** $46
- **Annual Growth:** 2.5% per capita
- **Arms Production:** 2,740,000 (FY 70)
- **Per Capita Arms Production:** $46
- **Literate:** 65 - 70% as % of total population
- **Life Expectancy:** 35 years

**Chairman of Council of Ministers**
- Union of Burma Revolutionary

**Government/Defense Minister**
- Gen. Ne Win

**Major Force Guidelines**

**Army**
- 99 INF Bns, 3 ARty Bns, 1 ARMD BN, 1 ARMD CAR BN, 1 MORTAR BN
- **Total Strength:** 122,000

**Navy**
- 3 Patrol Ships, 37 Patrol Boats, 5 SEALIFT, 4 LCM, 5 MTB
- **Total Strength:** 8,000

**Air Force**
- 2 TAC FTR SQ, 2 TRANS SQS, 2 HELO SQS
- **Total Strength:** 7,200

**Major Country Forces**

**Army**
- 3 INF DEVS, 99 INF Bns, 9 LT INF Bns, 1 ARMD BN, 5 ARTY Bns, 1 ARMD CAR BN
- **Total Strength:** 122,000

**Navy**
- 28 Patrol, 1 Mine War, 33 Amphib, 4 Auxiliary, 31 Service
- **Total Strength:** 8,000

**Air Force**
- 3 WGS, 26 FTR/BM, 24 TRANS, 54 MISC, 32 HELOS
- **Total Strength:** 7,200

**Combat Capability**

- **Not Yet Capable of** FULLY SECURING INTERNAL PEACE AND ORDER, UNABLE TO OFFER SUSTAINED EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE TO DIRECT ATTACK BY CHICOM, NO SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY BEYOND BURMA BORDERS,

- **Capable of Giving Light Support to the Army**
- **Limited Capability to Maintain Internal Security**

**Map Objective**

**Overall Objective**

- TO PROMOTE FREE WORLD INFLUENCES AND RESIST COMMUNISM.

**U.S. Diplomatic Mission**

- **Ambassador:** Hon. Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.
- **Air Representative:** None
- **Chief, MIB:** Col. Kevin F. Carrigan

**General Objectives**

(A) To help assure Burma's continued independence and non-alignment.

(B) To maintain U.S. influence in the Burmese armed forces.

(C) To assist Burma in containing the various factions of ethnic and Communist insurgency.

**Source:** PADM Digest Feb 71

*Inf Bns and supporting arms are not assigned permanently to divisions, but forces are attached for specific operations. Conduct of internal security mission involves primarily rifle company, platoon and squad level fighting, although BN-size operations have occurred in Northeast Burma. **Armed T-33's.*
to be reduced for FY 72 to seven military and 11 local nationals. This structure was approved by the JCS on 21 August 1970. Final action on the organization and TOR of the reduced aid unit was pending at the end of 1970.¹

China

(§) As discussed previously in this chapter, the programmed MAP funds for aid to the Republic of China (ROC) were drastically reduced by the program realignment for Cambodia and Indonesia. Not only were funds reduced by about 65 percent for FY 71, but the MAAG manpower authorizations were also reduced by about 25 percent. These cutbacks were rendered more serious because the programmed fund levels for previous years had not been funded by SECDEF.²

Impact of FY 71 Program Reduction

(§) The originally programmed FY 71 funds for China MAP had been about $20 million. The reduction of $13.7 million ordered by SECDEF in July 1970 allowed $1.9 million for training and $4.4 million for supply and operations expenditures. No money was authorized to be spent for materiel or training grant aid. CINCPAC provided a resume of the impact on China MAP of the revised FY 71 levels in August 1970. He noted that the funds had been mainly programmed for the procurement of missile, aircraft, ship, and communications spare parts. If these items were not supplied, the Chinese air defense units would be inoperable because aircraft would be grounded; aircraft control and warning (AC&W) systems would be degraded; ships would be limited in operation or dry docked; and, anti-aircraft batteries would be inoperable. CINCPAC stated that the deletion of grant aid for O&M would have an adverse affect on ROC planning for future force structure and organization; worse, ROC confidence in the reliability and credibility of U.S. planning guidance would be shaken. CINCPAC concluded his assessment by recommending that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit for both FY 70 and FY 71 be raised from $40 million to $50 million in order to absorb the impact of the MAP reduction.³

(§) The FMS program was closely integrated with the grant aid program; with the reduction in MAP funds, FMS became even more significant to the ROC. Cash

¹. Ltr, Ser 002196, CINCPAC to JCS, 21 Jul 70, Subj: Revised 1 July 1970 Joint Manpower Program for U.S. Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma; JCS 8081/212056Z Aug 70; J132 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 70.
². CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, pp. 8, 100; ADMIN CINCPAC 140107Z Mar 70; J132 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 70; JCS 8997/152007Z May 70; J1312 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 70; SECDEF 5825/250013Z Jul 70; J5311 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 70.
³. CINCPAC 070241Z Aug 70.
## Republic of China

### Basic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>14,029 sq. mi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>14,160 mil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Growth</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>67 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double Land Reclamation</td>
<td>0.24 ACRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Nat. Prod. 1978 (1)</td>
<td>$65.04 bil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita</td>
<td>$458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Budget (Self-Financed)</td>
<td>$384.2 mil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of GDP</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of Self-Trained Personnel/Central Govt. Eff</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **President:** Chiang Kai-shek
- **Vice President:** Yen Chia-Ku
- **Defense Minister:** Huang Chien
- **Chief of Gen Staff:** Gen Lai, Ming-t'ang, CAF
- **CINC Army:** Gen (2d grade) Yu, Hsiao-Chang
- **CINC Navy:** ADM Sung, Ch'ing-Chih, CH
- **CINC Air Force:** Gen Chen, I-Po, CAF
- **CINC Combined Service Force:** ADM (2d grade) Liu, Kuo-Ku, CH

- **Commandant, MARCORPS:** LT GEN Tsai, Kuo-Cheng
- **Minister of Foreign Affairs:** Wei Tao-Ming

### Major Force Guidelines

- **Army**
  - 3 INF DIVS
  - 10 INF DIVS
  - 3 ARMED DIVS
  - 1 ARMED INF DDE
  - 1 ARMED CIV REG
  - 3 ARMY BNS
  - 2 ARM FORCES
  - 1 ST TP
  - 34 ARMY TRS
  - 12 ENG CMBS BNS
  - 1 PSY WAR GRP
  - 13 40MM ADA BNS
  - 15 40 MM ADA BNS
  - 1 XHAWK BNS
  - 2 HEL BNS
  - 3 RES BNS
  - 4 90 MM ADA BNS
  - **Total Strength:** 333,500

- **Navy**
  - 11 DD, 6 DDG, 1 DD, 1 PCC, 11 PC, 12 MHC
  - 1 HMSL, 1 ADG, 1 ACG, 1 ARL, 1 LSD
  - 20 LST, 15 LCM, 5 AV/AGS, 4 AK/ARL, 4 ATR/ATA
  - 2 ACA, 2 MAR DIVS, 1 2LT BNS, 1 LVT BNS, 1 COMM BN, 2 AVN GC
  - **Total Strength:** 111,500

- **Air Force**
  - 1 104 SQ, 9 F-5 SQS, 1 F-100 SQ, 6 FX SQS
  - 1 T-33 SQ, 1 SAR SQ, 2 CAS SQ, 6 C-119 SQ, 1 C-47 SQ, 1 ASW SQ
  - **FTRs:** 307 JET, 9 PROP, RECON: 11 JET, 0 PROP, ASW: 0 JET, 10 PROP, HELOS: 0 TURBO, 1 TURBO
  - **Total Strength:** 80,000

### Overall Objectives

- **U.S. Diplomatic Mission**
  - **U.S. Ambassador:** Hon., Walter P. McNaught
  - **U.S. Air Director:** No Aid
  - **Chief, MAC:** Maj Gen
  - **Livingston N. Taylor, Jr., USA**

### Map Objectives

(A) To maintain RGC armed forces sufficient, in combination with available U.S. forces, to defend Taiwan and the Penghu.
(B) To maintain a climate in which the United States will continue to enjoy existing and, if required, additional overflight, staging and base rights.
(C) To encourage and assist the RGC in the attainment of economically feasible and militarily justified "self-sufficiency" in support of and development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of China.

### Major Country Forces

- **Combat Capability**
  - Maintain internal security & conduct effective ground defense of Taiwan, Penghu & offshore islands against small scale attack if provided outside air, naval & logistic support.
  - Could contribute approx 3 divs. to collective defense effort.
  - Well-organized & combat ready.

### Source

PACOM Digest Feb 71
sales and commercial arrangements for FY 70 FMS had been projected at $24 million. Planned FMS credit levels had been set at $40 million. The items programmed for acquisition by MAAG China had been arranged in two $20 million increments, based upon relative priorities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Increment ($20.12 million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel Carrier (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer, SP, 105mm (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket, M-72, LAW (2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Communications, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Observation Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIKE/HERCULES Support Equip.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16 Rifles (5,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer, Towed, 155mm (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications &amp; ASW Modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-44-1 Torpedo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-104 Flight Simulator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio, SSB (6,185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Equipment, ECM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Items, CAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Communications, CMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Tools &amp; PHE, CMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production &amp; Test Equipment, CAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc Equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second Increment ($20.00 million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase II Helo Coproduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IV Vehicle Coproduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tropo Scatter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition/Modn of Additional Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel Carriers (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF-104G Camera Modification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above program was approved by SECDEF in January 1970. In February 1970, MAAG China revised the list, deleting the RF-104G camera modification, but adding ground support equipment for UH-1H helicopters. An additional 25 armored personnel carriers (APC), making a total of 100 APCs, were listed. The RF-104G

1. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 19 Jan 70, Subj: FY 70 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for China.
camera modification had been deleted. This revision, which had been coordinated with the Country Team and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND), was forwarded to SECDEF with the concurrence of CINCPAC. In April, however, the Chief, MAAG China (CHMAAG) was requested in a joint State/Defense query to explain his rationale for the revised list: ¹

6. In terms of ROC military assistance priorities, we are not clear why RF-104G camera modification (dols 2.8 million) was deleted...and additional 25 APC 113A1 (dols 1.21 million) and UH1H ground support equipment (dols 1.8 million) were added. Air defense has been assigned first priority in our military assistance program for ROC. Gradual improvement of CHICOM air capabilities further points up deficiencies in GRC air defense and we are taking steps to correct some of these deficiencies. GRC, particularly at top level, has professed to be considerably more concerned than we have been on this score. CAF reconnaissance capability would seem a focal concern in GRC air defense, and in addition is important to our own intelligence collection. CAF reconnaissance obviously would be vital to our joint ability to detect CHICOM buildup for action against offshores or Taiwan and Pescadores. Presumably with these requirements in mind, FY 70-75 MAM I made strong case for RF-104G camera modification. Noting that RF-104Gs present cameras were designed primarily for low altitudes, MAM I states that they are "inadequate for high or medium altitude target coverage.... This system also has only limited coverage (2.75 miles at 45,000 feet) and is completely unsuitable for work above 45,000 feet.

7. Over and against this, we would question priority need for additional 25 APCs and helicopter ground support equipment. We assume that additional APCs are to replace M-2 half-tracks and M-3 scout cars in third battalion of second armored division, which in terms of our military assistance priorities is not MAP-supported. In addition, even without additional 25 APCs and helicopter ground support equipment Chinese Army will receive half of FY 70 FMS credit sales package, with approximately three-fourths of this army portion going for improved mobility. Therefore, we wonder if acquisition of

¹. SECDEF 8930/2818142 Jan 70; CHMAAG Taipei, Taiwan MGPR-S, 130824Z Feb 70; CINCPAC 170325Z Feb 70; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70; SECSTATE 056070/1/152218Z Apr 70.
additional 25 APCs cannot be deferred or financed through cash purchases. As regards helicopter ground support equipment, in addition to question of relative priorities, we had not previously considered use of FMS credits for non-production aspects of helicopter co-production project. To facilitate our consideration of this question, we would appreciate your estimate as to what other associated ground equipment costs for operation and maintenance of co-produced helicopters are planned by GRC.

(Σ) Replying to the foregoing State/Defense comments, CHMAAG China noted that the JCS had disapproved the use of MAP funds to purchase and install the RF-104G camera modification. However, no objection had been raised to the

The IRAN (Inspect and Repair as Needed) Facility for the Chinese Air Force was located at Ping Tung, Taiwan. Left, a CAF F-5 awaits IRAN. Below, F-104 structural repair.

PEG CINCPAC Photos
modification if the ROC elected to use its own resources, including FMS credit. China had refused to use FMS credits to finance the camera modification in the belief that:

...the U.S. will provide this item even though MAAG has informed them that it will not be provided from MAP or the USAF. The Country Team recognizes that air defense has been assigned first priority in MAP for GRC and has attempted to persuade the GRC to purchase the RF-104G camera mod, but at this point in time, to no avail....

Use of FMS credit for non-production aspects of helicopter co-production is considered appropriate. As you are aware, GRC attaches highest priority to attaining helicopters through co-production project to improve ground force mobility. The essential ground support equipment, such as special tools and equipment, has been accorded the same high priority. GRC is aware of the $20.6 million credit limit on the co-production agreement, but is not aware of any restriction which would preclude use of credit for ground support equipment....

(S) CHMAAG went on to explain that the additional APCs were needed to continue the modernization of Chinese Army units and increase their mobility. They were included in the FY 70-72 period as high priority items, "...prior to planning procurement of follow-on aircraft.... Once available, purchase of such aircraft will consume virtually all investment funds...."

(S) On 25 June 1970, joint State/Defense approval was received for an FMS credit of $1.8 million to be applied toward helicopter ground support equipment. However, CHMAAG's request for an additional $10 million FMS credit, made after the MAP reduction, was disapproved by SECDEF on 3 September. One week later, on 10 September 1970, State/Defense authorization was received to apply $10 million of the originally programmed $40 million toward the purchase of O&M supplies.

1. CHMAAG Taipei Taiwan MGPR-S 281014Z Apr 70.
2. Ibid.
3. SECSTATE 101167/252218Z Jun 70; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 70; SECDEF 9153/032148Z Sep 70; CHMAAG Taipei Taiwan MGPR-S 021014Z Sep 70; SECSTATE 147755/100106Z Sep 70; J5322 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 70.
(3) By the end of October, ROC officials, including the President, had voiced grave concern that the FY 71 MAP reduction signalled a change in U.S. policy. Adjustments in the ROC armed forces program had been delayed in the hope that the MAP cut would be reconsidered by the U.S. Government. A resume of the status of individual service programs in the ROC armed forces was provided by CINCPAC on 29 October 1970:

Chinese Army (CA)

In FY 71, MAP O&M funds allocated to the CA will go to missile support in keeping with MAM-established priorities for air defense.

CA MAP shortfall as related to MAP objectives is unacceptable. In shortfall are helicopters, armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, M-41 tanks, 155mm howitzers, small arms modernization, and a second HAWK battalion.

Chinese Air Force (CAF)

Although air defense is the number one priority for MAP support, the ROC must provide more than 57 percent of the CAF's total requirements.

CAF MAP shortfall as related to MAP objectives is unacceptable. The CAF requires War Reserve Munitions, an upgraded AC&W system, as well as updated follow-on fighter and reconnaissance aircraft.

Chinese Navy (CN)

MAP provides less than twenty percent of the CN's total requirement although the CN has second priority for MAP support.

The CN shortfall as related to MAP objectives is acceptable but it lacks modern equipment such as target designation systems, automatic tracking, fire control radars and sonars, and communications.

1. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Oct 70, Subj: FY 71 China MAP; Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Oct 70, Subj: FY 71-76 China MAP.
Chinese Marine Corps (CMC)

The lack of MAP investment funds through FY75 precludes the modernization required for the CMC to sustain itself in combat operations.

The CMC shortfall as related to MAP objectives is unacceptable. The CMC requires modern small arms, 8" howitzers, LVTP-7's, helicopters, vehicles, WRM and communications equipment.

($) Dollar level guidance for MAP/FMS in FY 72 was received from SECDEF on 26 October 1970. The MAP total was $25 million, of which $9.05 million was for supply operations. FMS credit sales were pegged at $40 million, and $130 million was projected for the procurement of LS&E items from MAPEX, MIMEX, and SIMEX.1

($) In answer to SECDEF's request for FY 72 programming data, CINCPAC furnished the CHMAAG China schedule of expenditures for MAP and FMS, but stipulated that the dollar levels were, "...not adequate to support the country program's objectives or the intent of the Nixon Doctrine..."2

($) On 10 December 1970, SECDEF requested that revised program listings be submitted on the premise that a supplemental appropriation for FY 71 would restore the originally programmed MAP funds. On this basis, as of 31 December 1970, the allocation of $20 million for MAP FY 71 expenditures was distributed as follows:3

| MAAG Support & Training | $1.4 million |
| O&M                     | 3.2 million  |
| Supply Operations       | 6.1 million  |
| Investment              | 9.3 million  |

History of Excess Materiel Supplied to China

($) Since the inception of the excess distribution program in December 1968, China had received excess U.S. materiel with an acquisition value of more than $172 million. As of November 1970, this equated to about 65 percent of the total dollar value of excess materiel transferred to PACOM MAP/MAF countries.

1. Ibid.
2. CHMAAG Taipei Taiwan MGPR-P 101020Z Nov 70; CINCPAC 152321Z Nov 70.
3. SECDEF 7763/102332Z Dec 70; CINCPAC 310441Z Dec 70; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.
With figures accumulated through 21 October 1970, the releases (in millions) were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 69</th>
<th>FY 70</th>
<th>FY 71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAPEX</td>
<td>$15.0</td>
<td>$16.6</td>
<td>$4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIMEX</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>121.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMEX</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>(no data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$15.0</td>
<td>$141.5</td>
<td>$15.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The $36.5 million of MAPEX materiel consisted of tactical and administrative vehicles, construction equipment, and repair parts. Through MIMEX, items allocated included aircraft, tactical and administrative vehicles, munitions, missile support equipment, and other miscellaneous major items. Secondary items through SIMEX included automotive, communications, construction, and missile repair parts.¹

**ROC Armed Forces Reorganization**

(§) In mid-1968, the ROC requested assistance in planning an armed forces reorganization. The plan, prepared by a team from the Office of the Assistant SECEDEF for International Security Affairs, was reviewed by the JCS and CINCPAC. Major reservations were expressed regarding certain basic assumptions in the plan; i.e., assessments of CHICOM/ROC attitudes, possible confrontation scenarios, and the position of Taiwan in relation to overall U.S. strategy. Nevertheless, the use of the plan was authorized as a source for background discussion with the ROC regarding force organization.²

(§) The ensuing reductions in MAP funds during 1969 and 1970 prompted Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to request a special team of experts from the U.S. to work with the MND on a five year study plan for ROC armed forces requirements. On 28 August 1970, Chiang indicated to the U.S. Ambassador his concern about the MAP reductions in the light of possible political repercussions. He stressed that the programmed reductions could damage relations between the U.S. and the ROC, and that modernization of the Chinese Armed Forces was imperative and would be expensive. He emphasized that he desired to proceed with a five year forces study despite reductions of MAP grant aid. The Ambassador agreed with the principle of a study, but believed that U.S. military advisors in Taiwan might

---

1. Point Paper, J4314, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Oct 70, Subj: Acquisition of Excess Materiel by the Republic of China MAP.
provide more competent consultative advice than experts from Washington. He suggested a team from the MAAG, augmented by advisors from CINCPAC, instead.¹

(§) CINCPAC agreed that the FY 71 MAP reduction would have a detrimental impact on force planning for the ROC. He also agreed that existing in-country resources, such as COMUSTDC, MAAG, and the Embassy were capable of providing competent advice to the ROC. CINCPAC did not agree with the suggestion that advisors from his staff be included:²

...it would be a departure from the US role of advisor and consultant to that of participatory involvement in GRC planning. The introduction, at this time, of outside elements to provide such assistance might also: (a) impair the future effectiveness and weaken the credibility of existing in-country arrangements and, (b) be construed by the GRC as a commitment on the part of the US....

(§) On 12 September 1970, SECSTATE supported the CINCPAC position by stating that, "...U.S. advisors already stationed on Taiwan are probably in better position to provide consultative advice than outside specialists...."³

(§) Considerable progress had been made by the end of 1970 toward reorganization of the Chinese Army, mainly on the initiative of the ROC. Chinese Army personnel had been reduced by 40,000 as a result of unit modernization and reorganization. Many ineffective personnel were eliminated, the Army organizational structure was streamlined, and a more realistic ratio between officers and enlisted men was attained.⁴

ROC Air Defense/Air Traffic Control

(§) The capability of the Chinese Air Force (CAF) in air defense was dependent upon the kinds of aircraft possessed, combined with the AC&W and air traffic control (ATC) facilities available. Linked to these resources were the missile/anti-aircraft batteries of the Chinese Army. In addition, the ATC facilities on Taiwan had a direct influence on the military operations of the USAF in connection with the war in Southeast Asia. Thus, the prospect of possible degradation of ATC capability was of immediate concern to the USAF as well as the long-range concern of the ROC. On 23 January 1970, CHMAAG China requested CINCPAC's

1. AMEMB Taipei, 3757/311005Z Aug 70.
2. CINCPAC 052157Z Sep 70.
3. SECSTATE 149827/120236Z Sep 70; J5151 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 70.
support for the continuation and augmentation of the Federal Aviation Specialist Group (FASG) which had been providing technical assistance to the ROC under a joint USAF/Federal Aviation Agency agreement. By message on 11 February, CHMAAG China asked for the continuance of CINCPAC's support to obtain USAF funding of the FASG during FY 71.

2. (S) The retention and augmentation of the existing FASG advisory team is considered absolutely essential to assist CCAA in improving air traffic control. Extremely limited MAP funds projected for FY 71 preclude funding of this team from MAP resources. Since the USAF is the principle benefactor [sic] of the services provided, the technical assistance required should be USAF funded....

(S) On 16 February, CHMAAG informed CINCPAC that, although the FASG had originally been MAP funded, "...austere MAP program for FY 71 eliminates the use of MAP funds for FASG beginning FY 71 under current program level." The U.S. Embassy, COMUSTDC, and CINCPACAF all supported the recommendation that the FASG be Service funded for FY 71. On 2 March, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the FASG be continued and that it be Service funded by the USAF.

(S) The JCS did not concur with the foregoing recommendations. On 4 April 1970, the decision was passed to CINCPAC.

2. (S) Continuation of the FASG, augmented with 3 specialists, through FY 71 is approved. Service funding of FASG, however, is not considered appropriate because ROC military, civil, and international air traffic benefit primarily from an improved Taipei flight information region. In this regard, a recent reevaluation of air traffic count by Taipei Center and FASG reveals that, over a 5-month period, U.S. military and military contract flights comprised an average of 42.6 percent of the total IFR-controlled air traffic. While this rate of

1. CHMAAG MGPR 110303Z Feb 70; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 70.
2. CHMAAG China MGPR 160502Z Feb 70; CINCPACAF DOCO 2002382Z Feb 70; COMUSTDC 250131Z Feb 70; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 70, citing CINCPAC 1st End, 2 Mar 70, to Ltr, Hq MAAG, 23 Jan 70.
3. JCS 5143/041801Z Apr 70; Brief No. 76-70, J5, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Apr 70, Subj: Technical Assistance and Advice for Modernization of the Air Defense and Air Traffic Control in the Republic of China.
utilization by U.S. aircraft is significant, it should decrease as U.S. forces are withdrawn from SEASIA.

3. (S) Air Force has taken action to extend MAP funding of FASG through the 4th quarter of FY 70. Request appropriate reprogramming action be taken to pool the augmented FASG for FY 71 under MAP. In addition, if further extension of FASG is anticipated, suggest it be planned as a Foreign Military Sales case.

(S) CHMAAG took exception to the JCS decision, holding that at least 42 percent of the total cost of the FASG should be borne by the USAF in proportion to its benefit from the facilities. CHMAAG, therefore, recommended that CINCPAC request the JCS to reconsider, which was done on 22 April 1970.1

(S) On 28 May 1970, the JCS reaffirmed the decision that the FASG not be Service funded. The judgment that the FASG should be either MAP funded or FMS funded was reiterated, and to the suggestion that a pro-rata share of the cost be assumed by the USAF, "...the Department of Defense has determined that there is no legal authority for service funding military assistance to the Republic of China...."2

(S) As previously stated, the numbers and kinds of aircraft possessed by the CAF governed the efficiency and credibility of the air defense environment of Taiwan. Prior editions of the CINCPAC Command History have discussed the inputs under MAP to the CAF inventory of aircraft. In December 1969, the ROC accepted an offer of 20 F-104As and two F-104Bs at no cost to MAP except for packing, crating, handling, and transportation (PCH&T) charges. Authority to deliver the 22 aircraft was issued by the USAF Logistics Command on 3 April 1970. The directive authorized aerospace ground equipment (AGE), spare engines with afterburners, and spare parts. Eight F-104As were delivered in September, and the remaining 12 F-104As arrived in Taiwan in October 1970. These F-104s were equipped with a more advanced J-79 engine than that of previous F-104s provided to the CAF.3

(S) The assignment of the newly arrived F-104s to a squadron which had been flying F-86Fs enabled the MAAG to declare 30 F-86s excess to CAF requirements. The excess F-86s had undergone a wing modification which made it likely that they could be used by another MAP-supported country with unmodified F-86s. The Joint

1. CHMAAG China MGPR 171001Z Apr 70; CINCPAC 222034Z Apr 70.
2. JCS 1176/282239Z May 70; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 70.
The 523d Engineering Battalion of the Chinese Army works on missile site construction at Nan Ping, Taiwan.

U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL), upon learning that the CAF aircraft were in reasonably good condition, suggested that 17 unmodified Philippine Air Force (PAF) F-86s be replaced with CAF excesses. CINC-PAC concurred in the proposal, as did CHMAAG, China, and 17 F-86s were transferred to the Philippine MAP. The remaining excess F-86s would be salvaged in Taiwan for spare parts if no other MAP recipient indicated a need for them.¹

(5) C-119G deliveries to China began during the last CY quarter of 1969. The original program had specified that 37 aircraft would be furnished under the MIMEX redistribution program. On 30 December 1969, two more C-119Gs were added; the total of 39 aircraft had been delivered in Taiwan by the end of March 1970. Ten additional C-119Gs had been programmed at no cost to MAP (except PCH&T) from USAF excesses in CONUS. Delivery was scheduled to be completed by mid-January 1971.²

¹ CINCPAC 102058Z Apr 70; Op. Cit., JMA, Hq USAF, No. 115, p. 110
Rounding out the air defense actions in which CINCPAC was involved during 1970 was a proposal to provide a second HAWK missile battalion to replace obsolete World War II 90mm guns on Taiwan. A second NIKE/HERCULES battalion had already been approved in 1969. Early in 1970, SECDEF had noted high level Washington interest in the improvement of the Taiwan air defense system. This followed the receipt of a letter by President Nixon from President Chiang Kai-shek, and a recommendation from U.S. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to presidential advisor Henry Kissinger. One of the Johnson proposals was that a second HAWK missile battalion be provided to the ROC. At that time (February 1970), U.S. Army requirements, projected through 1975, prohibited the offer of HAWK assets to China. The U.S. Army subsequently announced the possibility that some HAWK assets could be made available to FMS customers because of unit deactivations in FY 72.¹

On 2 December 1970, CHMAAG China reaffirmed that there was a valid ROC need for additional HAWK assets. He pointed out that the FY 71 MAP reductions had increased ROC self-funding of its defense budget to about 98 percent. This amounted to over ten percent of its gross national product - more than any other country in that part of the world. He requested that a five-battery HAWK battalion be provided on a "no cost" basis.²

On 12 December, CINCPAC conveyed his support of the CHMAAG request to SECDEF, but a reply had not been received by the end of 1970.³

Warships to China

On 22 October 1969, the CNO advised CHMAAG China that three destroyers were available for transfer to the Chinese Navy (CN). The ROC had agreed to decommission 25 CN vessels in exchange for the destroyers. On 24 December 1969, SECDEF informed the U.S. Ambassador, in a joint State/Defense message, that a fourth destroyer (USS HAYNESWORTH DD-700) was available for transfer to the CN. SECDEF requested the comments and recommendations of the Country Team (CT) regarding the numbers and types of ships to be decommissioned in exchange for the HAYNESWORTH and a fifth destroyer when it became available.⁴

2. CHMAAG China MGPR 020101Z Dec 70.
3. CINCPAC 122300Z Dec 70.
(§) On 14 January 1970, the U.S. Embassy advised SECSTATE that the CT agreed to the offer of the USS HAYNESWORTH, predicated upon the decommissioning of four CN vessels. The fifth destroyer, when available, was to be in exchange for the decommissioning of five more CN vessels. This was agreed to by SECDEF on 16 January 1970, and, on 21 January, the Embassy advised that the Commander-in-Chief of the CN had assented to the decommissioning of the specified number of CN vessels. However, he had also requested that the decommissioning be deferred for 24 months, instead of 12 months, after the arrival of the fourth destroyer in Taiwan. SECDEF and the CT concurred.

(§) Based upon an exchange of formal notes, authorized by SECSTATE, the sale of the USS HAYNESWORTH for the same price ($225,000) as the first three destroyers was consummated on 7 May 1970. On 12 May, SECDEF informed the Embassy that a fifth destroyer, the USS ENGLISH (DD-696) was scheduled to be stricken from the Naval Register on 15 May. The ENGLISH could be made available to the CN for $225,000 "as is—where is," provided the decommissioning agreement was confirmed.

(§) The stipulation regarding decommissioning was not altered, and the sale of the USS ENGLISH to the CN was completed by the end of 1970.

Submarines for China

(§) A request in July 1969 by the Chinese Government that submarines be made available under the FMS program was not supported by the DOD. The U.S. Embassy, COMUSTDC, CINC PacFLT, and CINCPAC had also agreed initially that the ROC did not need and could not support a submarine capability. MAAG China, however, supported the desirability of a sub-surface capability as a defense measure against potential CHICOM naval blockade, as an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapon, and to assist the CN in ASW training.

(§) After a visit to Taiwan in the company of Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, CINCPAC modified his original position in favor of the acquisition by the CN of two submarines, to be used for ASW training only. On 5 January 1970, SECDEF reiterated DOD opposition to the proposal, observing that the Chinese request for such high cost items as submarines was primarily motivated by the

1. AMEMB Taipei 0217/140515Z Jan 70; SECDEF 8288/162303Z Jan 70; AMEMB Taipei 0343/210809Z Jan 70; SECDEF 8611/231500Z Jan 70.
2. SECSTATE 053150/102054Z Apr 70; AMEMB Taipei 1974/060113Z May 70; CNO NO4920/081736Z May 70; AMEMB Taipei AIRGRAM A-172, 8 May 70; SECDEF 8615/121418Z May 70.
desire of the Chinese President, without adequate staff evaluation.¹

(⃣) One other means by which the ROC might have acquired submarines was through a loan authorized by the U.S. Congress, which legislated a Ship Loan Bill each year. During an executive session of the House Armed Services Committee on 4 February 1970, Chairman Mendel Rivers announced his intention to amend the 1970 Bill to provide a loan of three submarines to the ROC. The Bill was passed by the House, but the Senate deleted the submarines for China while passing the Bill on 5 December 1970. The House accepted the Senate version, and, on 31 December, the Bill was awaiting the signature of the President.²

Vehicle Coproduction Funding

(⃣) The original vehicle coproduction program specified the production of 18,352 M-series vehicles from FY 67 to FY 75. The total cost was programmed at $80 million, with $50 million to be provided by FMS credit in four phases at 5-1/2 percent interest;³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>$10 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(⃣) In July 1969, CHMAAG China requested that the funding of Phase IV for $5 million be accelerated under continuing resolution authority (CRA). He also requested authority to fund a foundry which had initially been programmed in Phase II, but had not been funded. The U.S. Embassy and CINCPAC supported the CHMAAG request.⁴

(⃣) In October 1969, CHMAAG repeated his request to fund the $5 million under CRA, but stated that the foundry requirement was no longer urgent. He noted that, although the ROC had paid a $3.1 million debt to Continental Motors, the $5 million was still urgently needed to procure vehicle engines in FY 70 and

1. Ibid., pp. 107, 108; CINCPAC 222230Z Nov 69; SECDEF 7392/052117Z Jan 70; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 69.
2. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Oct 70, Subj: Submarines for GRC; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70; CNO NO4900/051419Z Dec 70; CNO NO4900/012047Z Jan 71.
4. Ibid.
FY 71, and to procure additional 2-1/2 ton truck bodies. Unless the money was provided, the assembly plant would produce only about 640 vehicles in FY 71 compared with a capacity of 1,218. CINCPAC again concurred, but, on 6 November 1969, SECDEF advised that the justification was too weak for funding under CRA. The $5 million vehicle requirement would be reviewed after FY 70 FMS dollar levels had been determined based upon eventual Congressional appropriations.\(^1\)

(\(\square\)) On 23 January 1970, the Phase IV FMS credit was agreed upon by DOD and Chinese representatives in Washington.\(^2\)

Helicopter Coproduction Program

(\(\$\)) On 5 May 1969, the State Department and DOD jointly approved the allocation of $4 million for the first phase of the UH-1H helicopter coproduction program. The FY 69 program was finalized by a Technical Assistance Agreement between the ROC and the Bell Helicopter Company. Phase I provided for the establishment of facilities and assembly of the first 10 UH-1HSs in Taiwan.\(^3\)

(\(\$\)) On 27 January 1970, representatives of the ROC and DOD signed a $35 million FY 70 FMS credit program which, combined with the previous $5 million for the vehicle coproduction program, made up the $40 million authorized in the entire China FMS credit program. Included in the $35 million credit was $8 million for Phase II of the helicopter coproduction program.\(^4\)

MAAG China Terms of Reference

(\(\square\)) On 4 August 1969, CHMAAG China recommended to CINCPAC that consideration be given to a revision of the MAAG Terms of Reference (TOR). CHMAAG recommended five changes to the current TOR; of these, three were accommodations of previously approved changes in titles or functions. The remaining two were substantive changes. One would have allowed CHMAAG to designate the Chief, Combined Service Force (CSF) Section of the MAAG, regardless of the Service designation in the JTD. This change contradicted a JCS requirement that changes in "key positions" in the MAAGs be referred through the JCS to SECDEF for approval on a

---

2. SECDEF 8930/281814Z Jan 70; J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70.
4. J5332 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70; SECDEF 8930/281814Z Jan 70; Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 29 Oct 70, Subj: Helicopter Coproduction for GRC.
case by case basis upon rotation of the incumbent. The other change suggested would have given CHMAAG control over the scheduling of support aircraft assigned to the MAAG Service sections. Operational and scheduling control, under the current TOR, was retained by the Service to which the aircraft belonged.\(^1\)

\(\&\) The proposed changes were passed to the component Service commands for comment. The Army and Navy components concurred, although the CINCUSARPAC message noted that no rationale had been provided for the requested changes. The Air Force did not concur in the two substantive changes discussed above.

CINCPACAF, by letter, also noted that no rationale had been provided for the changes, but questioned the significance of the option for selection of the Chief, CSF Section, which was already designated on the JTD as an Army 06 (Colonel). Citing the authorized JTD manning of key billets; i.e., six Army, one Navy, and four Air Force, PACAF suggested that a more equitable service balance might be created by changing the billet in question from Army to Navy. Discussing the proposed scheduling control change, PACAF considered it inappropriate because there had been no reported deficiencies while scheduling control was administered by the Air Force section. Also, the expertise essential to flight safety, such as flight range, runway lengths, and crew requirements, was located in the Air Force section. PACAF concluded with the observation that the operation and maintenance of the MAAG support aircraft was funded 50 percent by MAP and 50 percent by the Service owning the aircraft. Mission hours for the (single) C-54 were closely controlled by the Air Force section and reported to the Military Airlift Command. The three minor changes proposed by CHMAAG were concurred in by PACAF.\(^2\)

\(\&\) On 26 February 1970, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the three editorial changes submitted by CHMAAG be included in the next revision to the MAAG China TOR. On the same day, CINCPAC notified CHMAAG that the two substantive changes were disapproved.\(^3\)

\(\&\) In the early portion of this chapter, the low key nature of MAP in Indonesia was clearly indicated in the discussion of MAP funds and manpower. High level interest in possible advantages to be derived from increased aid to

---

1. Ltr, Hq MAAG China to CINCPAC, 4 Aug 69, Subj: MAAG Terms of Reference; J5312 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 70.
2. CINCUSARPAC 270231Z Aug 69; Ltr, Ser 61/6685, CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, 29 Aug 69, Subj: MAAG Terms of Reference (TOR); Ltr, Hq PACAF to CINCPAC, 2 Sep 69, Subj: MAAG Terms of Reference.
3. CINCPAC 261030Z Feb 70; CINCPAC 261035Z Feb 70.
Indonesia was discussed in the CINCPAC History for 1969. However, this interest was confined to means for accomplishment within the programmed $5 million FY 70 MAP.

In his statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 25 November 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird capsulized the rationale for the fund increases requested for 1970:

... The reason for this substantial increase lies in the key position occupied by Indonesia as an important factor in the future peace of Southeast Asia. That nation, with its population of over 110 million, has shown its strong determination to resist threats to its security; and since it can contribute significantly to the stability of the entire region, it is very much in our interest to support recently encouraging developments in that nation. Accordingly, the new $18 million program for FY 71 is designed to supplement Indonesian efforts to create a military organization capable of maintaining internal security, and thus to implement our support of the moderate policies of the present regime....

Defense Liaison Group (DLC) Funds and Manpower

One of the earliest evidences of the widening scope of MAP activity in Indonesia was a CINCPAC manpower management survey conducted between 18-31 January 1970. The recommendations of this study, together with personal observations by CINCPAC, resulted in the submission to the JCS of a proposed increase in DLG manning for FY 71. This increase, from 25 to 40 spaces, was justified in the CINCPAC presentation by the need to prevent the loss or misdirection of expensive equipment and repair parts caused by the lack of follow-up by U.S. personnel. On 11 May 1970, the JCS approved the requested increase.

As previously related, the MAP funds for Indonesia were increased by Presidential order in March 1970. The $15 million figure was modified slightly during the July "restructuring" to $14.996 million; on 5 September 1970, again

3. J132 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70; J132 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 70; Ltr, Ser 00648, CINCPAC to JCS, 3 Mar 70, Subj: Proposed U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia Joint Manpower Program for FY 71; J1312 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 70; JCS 8525/111327Z May 70.
INDONESIA

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA: 787,000 SQ MI
POPULATION: 120,5 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH: 2.75%
HUMAN LAND PER CAPITA: 0.5 ACRE
HUMAN BIKE: 85
LIFE EXPECTANCY: 42 YEARS
GROSS INT. PROD. 1999 [E]: $110 MILLION
PER CAPITA: $90
DEFENSE BUDGET [1993]: $645 MILLION
AS % OF GOV'T EXPENSE: $5.3 BILLION
AS % OF GNP: $3.4 BILLION

PRESIDENT: GEN Subarto
MINISTER OF DEFENSE/SECURITY: GEN Suharto
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Adam Malik
NAVY CDR: VADM Sadono
AF CDR: AIR MARSHAL Sumoto
COMMANDANT MARCORPS: MGGEN Makjat
ARMY CDR: GEN Agus
AF CINC: GEN Soedarto
AF VICE CINC: GEN Pangabese

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES

ARMY
14 INF BN, 6 AIR BN, 1 DIV BN, 5 ENG BN (Combat)
1 TANK BN, 9 FA BN, 20 INF BN (Separate), 10 ENG BN (Combat), 5 ENG BN (Coast)
2 TD, 4 RE, 2 SS, 1 PC, 6 PGR, 17 PRT (Smith), 8 PC (Gunboat), 4 MRF, 8 MEL, 8 LT, 10 LCM, 8 MCL, 1 CSQ
1 HELO SQDN, 1 TRANS SQDN
Marines: 1 RECON BN, 6 INF BN, 1 ARMY BN, 1 ENG BN, 1 AMPHIB TRAC BN

NAVY
1 CLC, 6 DD, 1 TYPHOON, 1 SS, 17 PATROL BARS; 2 JET, 9 PROP, 5 JET, 3 PROP, HELICOPTER, 1 SQN M-14 (USNR)
MARINE: 1 INF BN, 1 FTR BN, 1 AAA BN, 1 FA BN, 1 COMPAT BN, 1 ENG BN, 1 TORPED BS BN
TOTAL STRENGTH 12,000

AIR FORCE
2 TAC FTR SQDN, 1 SAR SQDN, 1 LT SQDN, 2 MEDIUM TRANS SQDN, 1 ENG SQDN
15 INHS, 15 PROP, MIRAE BARS, 24 JET, 9 PROP, 49 JET, 17 PROP, TRAINER: 25 JET, 48 PROP, HELICOPTER, 33 PROP
TOTAL STRENGTH 10,400

OVERALL OBJECTIVE
CONTINUED AVAILABILITY TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES OF SEA AND AIR ROUTES BETWEEN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN AREAS.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION
U.S. AMBASSADOR: MISTER J. LEWIS CARLETON
USAID REPRESENTATIVE: MR. RICHARD M. CASHER
COUNCIL: C. TAYLOR BERNSTEIN, USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

General objectives are:
(A) To encourage the Indonesian government to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia's neighbors and with the United States.
(B) To encourage the Indonesian government to pursue a responsible economic and fiscal policies.
(C) To give the government's use of Indonesian armed forces in its civil rehabilitation program.
(D) To develop and strengthen contacts between Indonesian domestic and their counterparts.
(E) To foster the development of Indonesian Armed Forces as a professionally competent and stable force in the Indonesian society.

COMBAT CAPABILITY

MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL MINOR INCURSIONS BUT NOT A MAJOR ATTACK. LAUNCH AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN BRIGADE STRENGTH.

PARTIALLY SUPPRESS SMUGGLING AND PROVIDE LIMITED SUPPORT FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, CONDUCT ORTL TROOP-SUBMARINE INTERCEPTION AND AEW OPERATIONS. AMPHIBIOUS FORCES ARE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING REGIMENTAL SIZE LANDIING FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTE.

FORCES IN BEING ARE MARGINALLY READY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE BOMBING OPERATIONS AND VFX AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND TO SUPPORT MINOR GROUND OPERATIONS.

AS OF 1 JUL 79

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Feb 71
This crane engine, aboard a MAP-supported LST belonging to the Indonesian Navy Amphibious Command, is inoperative.

by Presidential determination, Indonesia MAP was increased by $3 million more for a total of $17,996 for FY 71.\(^1\)

\(^1\) When the FY 72 dollar guidelines from SECDEF allocated $13 million for Indonesia MAP, he requested that each aid element supply an impact statement defining the program and limitations under the FY 72 levels. CINCPAC transmitted to SECDEF a statement of the impact as assessed by the Chief, DLG. The main emphasis for the FY 72 MAP would be on training, communications, and transportation. Training students and training schools would, as in the past, receive top priority. COMUS training had been programmed for 254 English-qualified students.\(^2\)


2. SECDEF 4432/262336Z Oct 70; CINCPAC 280510Z Oct 70; CHDLG Djakarta 100735Z Nov 70; CINCPAC 050216Z Dec 70.
The bulk of the O&M costs would be expended to restore large quantities of deadlined U.S. equipment to operational status. Therefore, with the foregoing priority expenditures, the dollar guideline of $13 million would decrease the funds available for force improvement investment items. Moreover, CINCPAC stated that, although U.S.-Indonesian relationships were the best in a decade as a result of MAP accomplishments during 1970, further reductions could damage that achievement.  

Broader Scope of Activity for Indonesian MAP

When assistance to Indonesia was resumed in 1967, the primary emphasis had been on civic action assistance. On 21 March 1970, a joint State/Defense message informed CINCPAC that, beginning with FY 71, combat materiel could be included in future programming. Through an exchange of diplomatic notes on 18-19 August 1970, the U.S. and Indonesia agreed to expand the TOR for MAP Indonesia. The agreement stated that, "...subject to the availability of funds, the United States Government will furnish items of combat equipment appropriate for Indonesia's internal defense needs."  

C-47 Aircraft for Indonesia

Based upon a recommendation by the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia,

C-47s of the Indonesian Air Force's 2d Transport Squadron at Djakarta await engines. (PEG CINCPAC Photo)

1. CINCPAC 050216Z Dec 70.

SECRET

338
SECSTATE informed the Embassy and CINCPAC on 9 January 1970 that 10 C-47 aircraft were available from USAF excesses under MIMEX. The aircraft were to be furnished "as is," but were considered to be in good operating condition. The Ambassador informed President Suharto of the offer, which was accepted on 19 January 1970. One of the C-47s was tentatively programmed for the Indonesian Navy; nine were scheduled for the Indonesian Air Force. On 30 January, CINCPAC forwarded the necessary program change data for FY 70 to SECDEF.  

Lease of LSTs to Indonesia  

(§) On 18 May 1970, the CNO notified CHDLG that two tank landing ships (LSTs) were available for lease by the U.S. Navy to the Indonesian Navy on an "as is-where is" basis. The LSTs (No. 601, 839) had been in use as part of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and, although they were not in excellent condition, they were considered by the U.S. Navy to be useful additions to the Indonesian Navy. A condition of the lease would be a scheduled overhaul every three years. Also, that two non-operational LSTs provided to the Indonesian Navy by MAP be scrapped for a spare parts source. The offer had the concurrence of the State and Defense Departments. On 25 May 1970, CHDLG notified CINCPAC and CNO that the offer had been accepted by the CNO, Indonesian Navy.  

Lease of Minesweeper, Coastal (MSC) to Indonesia  

(§) On 10 September 1970, the U.S. CNO informed CHDLG that six MSCs were available for lease to the Indonesian Navy on an "as is-where is" basis. However, the overhaul and weapon conversion costs, which would have to be borne by the FY 71 MAP, were estimated between $250,000 and $300,000 for each ship. The offer of MSCs was placed before Indonesian Navy officials, who posed numerous questions relative to rehabilitation costs, armament, and the impact on FY 71 programmed MAP.  

(§) On 22 October 1970, after considerable discussion pertaining to conversion costs, and based upon the recommendation of CINCPAC, CHDLG notified all concerned that the MSCs would be accepted in their current configuration.  

1. SECSTATE 003785/092204Z Jan 70; AMEMB Djakarta 462/191055Z Jan 70; CINCPAC 300457Z Jan 70; J4316 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70.  
2. CNO NO4950/182100Z May 70; USDLG Djakarta NO4950/250955Z May 70; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 70.  
3. CNO NO4950/101305Z Sep 70; CHUSDLG 170235Z Sep 70; J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 70.  
Close Air Support Aircraft for Indonesia

(5) On 19 August 1970, CHDLG informed CINCPAC that Indonesia was interested in the rehabilitation of its F-51 fighter aircraft. As a result, SECDEF tasked the USAF to survey possible contract sources and, concurrently, to assess the ability of the Indonesian Air Force to operate and maintain the aircraft. At the same time, the Indonesian Department of Defense and Security was informed of U.S. Government efforts to satisfy the request. On 10 November 1970, the U.S. Embassy in Djakarta indicated to SECSTATE that the issue of close air support aircraft had become politically potent:

1. The continued delay in providing support to the GOI in response to its urgent requirement for a close air support capability for the Air Force (AURI) is becoming a matter of embarrassment to me and my staff and could have serious political repercussions to the USG.... It is difficult for me to understand and impossible to explain to Indons why the survey team has not yet arrived in Indonesia to commence a survey due for completion approximately 10 days from now. As I have emphasized before, the need for a close air support capability is one of the highest priorities of AURI today. In earlier messages I have pointed out that the GOI is seriously concerned over its internal security responsibilities particularly as related to national elections in July 1971. AURI has no capability to provide close air support for Indonesian Army elements and it appeared to us that F-51 proposal offered a relatively economical and simple solution to their problem. In past week my DLG Chief has been pressed repeatedly and pointedly by the Indons to explain why we cannot inform the GOI of our intentions concerning this high priority support requirement.

2. I would like to reiterate my conviction that the GOI requirement for close air support aircraft is valid, urgent, and deserving of prompt decision....

(5) CINCPAC strongly recommended that actions to provide F-51 or similar aircraft for close air support be taken prior to the Indonesian national elections. He noted that failure to provide a satisfactory response before the elections could degrade the excellent relationships between CT and Indonesian officials.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Point Paper, J5321, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Dec 70, Subj: Additional Military Assistance - Indonesia; AMEMB Djakarta 8475/1004002 Nov 70.
2. CINCPAC 200058Z Nov 70.
Left, Indonesian Army Engineers at Sukanegara, West Java. Below, static weapons display at the Indonesian Marine Education and Training Center at Surabaya, East Java.

PEG CINCPAC Photos
About one month later, on 11 December, SECDEF notified the Embassy that, on the basis of a report by the Air Force Logistics Command, it would be feasible to restore a number of the F-51s in the AURI inventory prior to the Indonesian national elections. The Air Force recommendation, approved by the SECDEF, provided for a two-phase approach to the F-51 program. Phase I consisted of immediate action to return seven of the disabled aircraft to flyable condition as soon as possible. A spare parts package and cost estimates for two years' support would also be provided. Phase II would provide cost data to upgrade and recondition 12 additional F-51s to a piston-driven configuration, and to purchase three trainer versions (TF-51) with a five year support package.

Increased MAP C-E Support

On 27 March 1970, CHDLG requested CINCPAC to provide a communications-electronics (C-E) team to assist in the development of detailed communications requirements for the Indonesian Armed Forces and the National Police. The team was to reconcile the findings with available MAP-supported equipment. CINCPAC concurred with the DLG request, and, on 22 April, directed the team officers to report as staff officers directly responsible to the CHDLG during the period of TDY.

The team developed a detailed systems and equipment plan for long haul communications between the Indonesian High Command and the six subordinate military regions. Because Indonesian Army, Navy, Air Force, and police units were involved, additional U.S. Service-oriented specifications and information, available only at the Service headquarters in Hawaii, were needed. Accordingly, the team returned to Hawaii on 23 May, and, on 11 June 1970, the completed plans were submitted to the DLG for briefing to in-country officials.

Indonesian DV Orientation Tour

On 28 April 1970, CHDLG requested that the DOD policy which restricted the number of distinguished visitor (DV) tours for MAP-supported countries to one per year be waived. He considered that a visit by RADM Abdul Kadir, Assistant Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy would be in the interest of the U.S. CINCPAC supported the request, which was subsequently approved by the SECDEF.

1. SECDEF 7876/112351Z Dec 70.
2. J5321 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 70; CINCPAC 220300Z Apr 70.
3. CHDLG Djakarta 060831Z May 70; CINCPAC 270304Z May 70; J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 70.
4. Ltr, Ser 014, CHUSDLG to CINCPAC, 28 Apr 70, Subj: FY70 MAPT; Request for DV Orientation Tour; CINCPAC 080341Z May 70; SECDEF 8822/141358Z May 70; J5342 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 70.
On 24 August 1970, RADM Kadir and three senior Indonesian Naval officers visited Admiral McCain, CINCPAC, on the first leg of an orientation tour to CONUS. The visiting party conferred with CINCPAC MAP training and plans officers about possible on-the-job training for Indonesian Naval personnel aboard U.S. Navy vessels. Logistics and management techniques were reviewed, with emphasis on naval shipyard procedures. RADM Kadir subsequently visited the San Francisco Bay Naval Shipyard, Twelfth Naval District Headquarters, the U.S. Navy International Logistics Control Office, the New London Naval Submarine School, DOD, Navy Department, and the Naval Diving and Salvage School.¹

T-41 Aircraft for Indonesia

Based upon an exchange of diplomatic notes in April 1969, nine T-41Ds were programmed and funded for Indonesia under the USAF FY 69 MAP. Delivery was scheduled to start in the second quarter of FY 70.²

Six additional T-41D trainers were funded in the USAF FY 70 MAP, with delivery by surface means to begin in March 1971. Delivery of these six was accelerated at the request of the Indonesian Government; the revised schedule provided for delivery to begin in January 1971. The original nine T-41s had been delivered by mid-1970.³

Japan

Grant aid to Japan under the MAP was terminated at the end of FY 67. Persuant to an exchange of notes between the U.S. Ambassador and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, MAAG Japan was discontinued on 4 July 1969. The MAAG had been established in 1954 under Article VII of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 8 March 1954. Residual MAP functions were divided between the Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan (COMUSFJ) and the newly-created Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO). The MDAO was under the command of CINCPAC, but was located in the U.S. Embassy Annex under the administrative control of the U.S. Ambassador. The residual functions not included in the MDAO TOR were assumed by the Defense Objectives Advisory Branch of J-3, COMUSFJ.⁴

1. OPNAV NOTE 4950, CHO to CINCPAC, et. al., 10 Jul 70, Subj: Orientation Visit of Rear Admiral Abdul Kadir, Deputy Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy; J5343 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 70.
The MDAO was authorized five military, five U.S. civilian, and six local nationals in the first JTD. This authorization was continued for FY 71 by subsequent JCS approval.1

Scope of MDAO Activity

MAP-furnished equipment possessed by the Japan Self Defense Forces (JISDF) amounted to about $1.2 billion in 1970. Beginning in mid-1971, government-to-government sales and government approved licensed production programs were expected to yield FMS returns to the U.S. of as much as $450 million during a three year period. Previously approved programs such as F-4Es, NIKE and HAWK units, and a multitude of components and spare parts accounted for about 40 percent of this amount.2

In a comprehensive resume of the MDAO mission in Japan, CINCPAC noted that its primary mission was to encourage and assist in the attainment of an effective joint U.S.-Japan military defense posture. In the performance of that mission, MDAO stressed the introduction and standardization of U.S. military equipment. The MDAO had a continuing responsibility for logistical support, modernization, and quality control for those U.S. weapon systems already in use by the JISDF in order to assure field reliability and to protect the U.S. reputation for quality and performance.3

Selection of Chief, MDAO

At the time the MDAO was established, there was a delay in the approval of the JTD for the new organization. The U.S. Ambassador had recommended that a civilian chief be designated. CINCPAC disagreed, and stated his position in a message to the JCS on 30 May 1969. The JCS supported CINCPAC, and a military chief with a civilian deputy was subsequently approved by State and Defense. The predecessor MAAG had been headed by an Air Force officer who thus continued as chief of the MDAO.4

As a result of the JCS requirement to submit recommendations regarding the Service affiliation of chiefs or commanders in MAAGs and other military

1. JCS 08048/142216Z Jan 70; JCS 9156/181546Z May 70; J1312 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, Jan, May 70.
3. CINCPAC 070331Z Mar 70.
missions, the desire of the Ambassador for a civilian chief of the MDAO again came into focus in 1970. In the comprehensive review of MDAO activities discussed above, CINCPAC acknowledged the views of the Ambassador:

...in Embassy view one of most important criteria for any MDAO Chief is willingness and ability to deal with JDA [Japanese Defense Agency] civilian leadership which makes ultimate decision on weapons and equipment procurement. Ideal would be man with broad experience, including some in military sales, and well-rounded enough [to] work harmoniously with both military and civilians. Ambassador therefore reiterates suggestion previously made that MDAO Chief position be considered eligible for manning by either military officer or civilian, and that personal qualifications of candidates be major basis of decision...

Reversion of MAP Inventory

(8) In January 1968, CINCPAC recommended to SECDEF that an agreement be negotiated with Japan to sell U.S. reversionary rights to MAP grant aid materiel. Japanese officials were cool to the proposal because of its potential impact on the Defense Buildup Plan budget for FY 67-71. In October 1969, the Chief MDAO advised that the time was propitious to suggest the "residual buy-out" by Japan once more. In November 1969, MDAO notified CINCPAC that discussions could not begin before June or July 1970.3

1. CINCPAC 070331Z Mar 70.
3. Point Paper, J432(A), Hq CINCPAC, 14 Sep 70, Subj: Buy-Out of U.S. Interests in Total MAP Inventory.
In February 1970, CINCPAC was notified by MDAO that the MAAG inventory list of MAP deliveries was incomplete, and that the list prices were different between requisitions, program documents, and delivery invoices. Although a more accurate list was held by JSDF, it was not considered wise to use the Japanese list as a base point in price negotiations. In March 1970, SECDEF requested that an analysis be prepared of the current Japanese MAP inventory in preparation for negotiations between the two countries regarding terms, prices, and conditions.

The analysis was provided to CINCPAC by MDAO on 6 November 1970, and forwarded to SECDEF on 4 December. At the end of the year, no policy decision had been made.

Following the Blue House raid and the seizure of the USS PUEBLO in January 1968, President Johnson asked for and received a $100 million increase in FY 68 MAP funds for Korea. The total dollar level of military assistance to Korea for FY 68 reached $292.3 million, including those items which were Service-funded.

The FY 69 program was designed to provide for a modest modernization of Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. However, when the overall authorization and appropriations were reduced from the amount requested, it became necessary to reduce the planned level for South Korea from $160 million to $139 million. The reduction required that $14 million be deleted from force improvements and $7 million from operating costs.

In response to request from CINCPAC, COMUS Korea had submitted, in June 1969, a plan to improve and modernize ROK forces which included recommendations for increased MAP fund levels. However, in August 1969, CINCPAC informed COMUS Korea that several major proposals to improve and modernize ROK forces were under consideration at the national level.

3. In view of the scope and magnitude of the programs under consideration, it doesn't appear appropriate or timely

1. Ibid.
2. Ltr, Ser 003495, CINCPAC to SECDEF, 4 Dec 70, Subj: MAP Residual Buy Out in Japan, with 1 encl, Inventory List, MDAO, 6 Nov 70, same subject.
5. CINCPAC 200435Z Aug 69; J533 History, HQ CINCPAC, Dec 69.
## Korea

### Basic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>18,000 sq. mi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>50,4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Growth</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARABLE LAND PERCAP</td>
<td>0.17 ACRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>47 YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Nat. Prod.</td>
<td>$5,11 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita</td>
<td>$175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Major Force Objectives

**Army**
- 19 Inf Divs
- 1 ADA BDE
- 2 Armor Bdes
- 2 Ranger Bdes
- 17 FA Bns
- 1 Capital Security Command
- 1 SF GP
- Total Strength 144,000

**Navy**
- 8 DD/DE
- 15 PCE
- 15 LCM
- 12 LCVP
- 20 MSC
- 10 LST
- 17 LSM
- 1 Mar Div
- 1 Island Sec GP

**Air Force**
- 12 A&W Units
- 10 FS SQS
- 1 Recon SQ
- 1 TAC Control SQ
- 1 Helo SQ
- 1 Trans
- 21st JET
- 0 PROP
- Recon
- 19 JET
- 0 PROP
- Trans
- 0 JET
- 37 PROP
- Helos
- 4 Turbo Prop
- Total Strength 27,300

### Major Country Forces

- 19 Inf Divs, 1 ADA BDE, 2 Armor Bdes, 2 Ranger Bdes, 17 FA Bns, 1 Capital Security Command, 1 SF GP, Total Strength 144,000
- 4 DD Types, 1 Marine Div (1-2 Marine Bdes (Provs)), Total Strength 71,300

**As of 1 Jan 71**

**As of 1 Dec 70**

**Source:** PACOM Digest Feb 71
to propose additional ROK force improvement/modernization programs.

(S) In February 1970, SECDEF established guidelines for FY 70 and FY 71 which were essentially the same as for FY 69; i.e., $140.5 million and $140.8 million, respectively. During the remainder of 1970, both funds and plans for improvement and modernization of the Korean armed forces were changed significantly.¹

Funds for Korea MAP

(S) When, in mid-year 1970, the major FY 71 realignments in MAP funds already described took place, the Korean program was reduced by $798,000. Of the $140.5 million guideline for FY 70, only about $133 million had actually been funded.²

(S) COMUS Korea, responding to CINCPAC, submitted two packages, one for ground force improvement and one for balanced improvement of all forces. CINCPAC recommended that the second package be accepted, with the stipulation that the aircraft proposals be modified to increase the ROKAF reconnaissance capability. Also stipulated was the addition of gap-filler radar to improve the AC&W system. CINCPAC noted that funds were limited for critical operating costs, and that the proposed investment items would increase these costs.⁴

1. SECDEF 9302/031353Z Feb 70.
2. SECDEF 5825/250013Z Jul 70; Point Paper, J5313, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Aug 70, Subj: Status of Military Assistance Legislation and Comparative MAP (MASF) Funding.
3. SECDEF 5335/072220Z Apr 70; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
4. COMUSKOREA 160445Z Apr 70; CINCPAC 212108Z Apr 70.
On 24 April 1970, SECDEF directed CINCPAC to submit a five year plan for "austere" modernization of ROK forces as a means of offsetting the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The purpose of the submission was to provide a basis for, and to facilitate, a decision on the dollar levels to be sought in increments of five years. SECDEF advised that the initial 20,000 man withdrawal of U.S. forces in FY 71 could be followed by others later. The five year plan was to exclude the introduction of an international fighter aircraft as a force planning factor.¹

3. (TS/NS) It is recognized that as negotiations progress, there will be additional considerations; however, you should proceed immediately with the development of a five year plan (FY 71-75) to be submitted in sufficient detail to permit Washington level review and decision. Plan data should assume a base program of $1.0 billion and impact statements on funding additional materiel above the base up to $1.5 billion. Assume a level of $290 million for FY 71.²

The above cited $290 million, relative to the initial dollar level and subsequent $100 million package, generated a need for an additional $50 million to be programmed for FY 71. The various proposals for ROK force improvements are discussed in a later section of this chapter. As previously shown, the eventual program level for initial and supplemental MAP funds in Korea was $290.8 million.³

On 26 October 1970, SECDEF provided a tentative FY 72 Korean MAP level of $265 million. CINCPAC advised SECDEF on 15 November that, if the $265 million level were adhered to, the previously submitted plan based on a dollar guideline of $280 million would require substantial alteration.⁴

Organization and Manning of Korea MAAG

As discussed in the 1969 CINCPAC History, COMUS Korea proposed the formulation of a standardized Joint U.S. MAAG, under his command, in place of the existing PROVMAAG-K. Two of CINCPAC's Service components, PACAF and USARPAC, did not concur with the proposal because the operational control exercised over ROK forces by the Service component commanders in Korea through the Service Advisory Groups would be jeopardized.⁴

1. SECDEF 7025/242345Z Apr 70.
2. SECDEF 7201/272028Z Apr 70; SECDEF 7763/102332Z Dec 70.
3. SECDEF 4432/262332Z Oct 70; CINCPAC 152329Z Nov 70.

349
(c) On 18 January 1970, CINCPAC informed COMUS Korea that the reorganization proposal had merit; however, changes in terminology were needed to depict accurate joint terminology relating to command, operational command, operational control, and coordination. In response to query regarding the suggested changes in organizational terminology, PACAF and USARPAC reiterated opposition to the proposed reorganization.

(§§) After evaluation of the comments from his component commands, CINCPAC dispatched a letter to the JCS in which he recommended that the proposed reorganization of military assistance activities in Korea be adopted. One month later, on 1 May 1970, the JCS requested clarification of the rationale for the new organization.

However, the reduction in overall personnel (617 spaces from 30 June 1968 to 30 June 1970), combined with programmed increases in scope of assistance, presented some hard choices. The expansion of MAP would create an imperative for advice at the national level in the areas of force development, high-level management, and large-scale logistics.¹

(§) On 17 June 1970, the JCS recommended to SECDEF that the proposed reorganization be approved, and that the timing of the implementation be left to the discretion of CINCPAC. On 12 August 1970, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the Chairman had received a decision from the Deputy SECDEF. The decision affirmed that the military assistance organization in Korea should be a conventional joint MAAG, but that it should report directly to CINCPAC instead.

1. CINCPAC 251045Z Feb 70; CINCPACAF 121948Z Mar 70; CINCUSARPAC 140345Z Mar 70; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
2. Ltr, Ser 00996, CINCPAC to JCS, 1 Apr 70, Subj: Reorganization of Military Assistance Advisory Activities in Korea; JCS 7669/0122542 May 70.
3. CINCPAC 150507Z May 70.
PROVMAAG-K ORGANIZATION

CINCUS ARPAC → JCS → CINC PACFLT → JCS → SECDEF → CINC PACAF → FIFTH AIR FORCE

CINCUNC → CINCPAC → COMUSK → PROVMAAG-K

CGUSA → COMNAVFORK → ROKA → KMAAG → ROKN/MC → NAVY/MC ADV GP → ROKAF → AFADVGP

NOTE:
- Responsibility for MAP follows Command Channels from the USFK Service Component Commanders to their Respective Advisory Groups

KEY:
- S: STRATEGIC DIRECTION
- COMMAND
- OCM: OPERATIONAL COMMAND
- OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROKF
- COORDINATING AUTHORITY
- M: RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAP MATTERS ONLY
- STAFF SUPERVISION
- ADVICE, INFORMATION, ASSISTANCE AND COORDINATION

SOURCE: J5331, HQ CINCPAC

SECRET
351
JUSMAG-K ORGANIZATION (EFF 1 APR '71)

--- S --- Strategic Direction
--- M --- Responsibility for MAP Matters Only
----- OCM ---- Operational Command
----- OCM ---- Operational Control of ROKF
----- OCM ---- Coordinating Authority

JCS SECDEF

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT
CINCUSARPAC

CCM

COMUSK

CINCPACAF

COMAFK

CH JOINTMAAG KOREA

ROKAF

ROKAF

NAVAL SECTION
ARMY SECTION

AF SECTION

NOTES

Responsibility for MAP follows command channels.

Through 5th Air Force.

The Service Component Commanders are authorized to issue instructions to the Chiefs of the Service Advisory Sections (with information to the Chief, Joint MAAGK) in matters pertaining to operational advice to ROKF and to supervise the execution. Service Advisory Sections will be supported logistically by their respective Services. The Service Component Commanders and Chiefs of the Service Advisory Sections will communicate directly (with information to Chief, Joint MAAGK, when appropriate) on such matters as administration; discipline; personnel; training in the Service doctrines, techniques, and tactical methods; combat development; the provision of logistic support to the advisory sections; and other matters of uni-Service interest.

Direct liaison and coordination on matters of mutual interest is authorized and directed between the USFK Service Component Commanders and the Chief, Joint MAAGK.

SOURCE: J5331, HQ CINCPAC
c. In keeping with the Nixon Doctrine and the planned reduction of U. S. operational forces in Korea, and in view of elimination of functions related to operational control from the JMAAGK mission, the 1,244 personnel spaces currently authorized for PROVMAAG Korea plus the service advisory groups, consisting of 818 U.S. military personnel, 77 U.S. civilian personnel and 349 foreign nationals, should be reduced by not less than 35 percent effective 1 July 1971.

(§) COMUS Korea recommended, and CINCPAC concurred in, reconsideration of the SECDEF instruction to place the joint MAAG under CINCPAC. Because a large North Korean and/or CHICOM force could easily be brought to bear against the ROK without warning, an in-place command structure was essential to supervise the armistice and exercise operational control over ROK forces and U.S. forces if hostilities were resumed. CINCPAC noted that the individual assigned as COMUS Korea was also CINC United Nations Command (CINCUNC), and had the responsibility for planning the defense of Korea in its broadest aspects. Control of the Korean MAP was a key to the exercise of that authority.  

(§) On 8 September 1970, COMUS Korea provided CINCPAC with a JTD and TOR based upon the aforementioned SECDEF decision, including the 35 percent reduction in personnel by 1 July 1971. However, COMUS Korea stated that a reduction of that magnitude would weaken the U.S. advisory effort at a time when a significant increase in equipment and weapons was contemplated for the ROK armed forces. CINCPAC agreed, and recommended to the JCS that the 35 percent personnel reduction be deferred and that a 20 percent reduction be substituted for the 1 July 1971 date. He also recommended that the word "advisory" be eliminated to reflect more accurately the major purpose and, "to make the name more palatable to

2. COMUSKOREA 240730Z Aug 70; CINCPAC 282319Z Aug 70; J5331 History Hq CINCPAC, Aug 70.
the ROK." Thus, the new unit would be called Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea (JUSMAG-K).  

(SS) On 13 October 1970, the JCS informed CINCPAC that approval had been granted to place the "Joint Military Assistance Group - Korea" under the command of COMUS Korea. On 12 December 1970, CINCPAC was advised that the 20 percent reduction in personnel was approved, to be effective 30 June 1971. The JCS also approved the TOR, the reorganization plan, and a 1 April 1971 effective date. CINCPAC then requested COMUS Korea to provide a JTD consisting of 995 spaces (716 U.S. and 279 local nationals).  

(SS) On 16 December, COMUS Korea requested permission to declassify completely, or, as a minimum, to remove the NOFORN restrictions on matters related to the reorganization. The NOFORN restrictions on specified messages and letters originated by CINCPAC were cancelled and all concerned were so notified on 19 December 1970.  

Improvement and Modernization of ROKF  

(SS) At the end of 1970, the $100 million package authorized for FY 68 Korean MAP, previously discussed, had accounted for 639,692 items delivered in-country, or 99.2 percent of the total. In the meantime, decisions relating to the imple-

the same time, a major effort to improve and modernize the Korean Armed Forces was authorized.  

(SS) On 24 April 1970, SECDEF requested CINCPAC to provide a five year improvement/modernization plan as a means of offsetting the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and to "...further develop ROK armed forces capable of deterring or conducting a defense against a conventional or unconventional attack by North Korea...." Based upon detailed guidance and assumptions provided by CINCPAC, COMUS Korea submitted an "Austere Five Year Modernization Plan" for FY 71-75 to CINCPAC on 18 May 1970. The Plan, forwarded to SECDEF on 25 May 1970, contained  

1. Ltr, Hq USFK to CINCPAC, 8 Sep 70, Subj: Reorganization and Establishment of Military Assistance Advisory Activities in the Republic of Korea; Ltr, ser 002848, CINCPAC to JCS, 22 Sep 70, Subj: Reorganization of Military Assistance Activities in the Republic of Korea; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 70.  
2. JCS 3344/131555Z Oct 70; JCS 7914/121538Z Dec 70; CINCPAC 152216Z Dec 70.  
3. COMUSKOREA 162345Z Dec 70; ADMIN CINCPAC 192004Z Dec 70; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.  
4. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, pp. 174-175; JCS 7669/012254Z May 70, which discusses the implications of NSDM 85 on Korean MAP. Also see this chapter "Funds for Korean MAP."
two proposals. The first (Plan I) was based on $1.5 billion in grant aid during FY 71-75; the second (Plan II) was based on $1.0 billion.\(^1\)

\((S)\) The foregoing discussions, proposals, and evaluations regarding ROK force improvement and modernization had been restricted to U.S. personnel by the standard NOFORN designation. However, on 15 June 1970, the ROK Minister of National Defense submitted to COMUS Korea a "List of Five-Year Republic of Korea Force Modernization Program Equipment and Materiel."\(^3\)

\((S)\) Although COMUS Korea and the CINCPAC component commanders acknowledged the validity of many items in the ROKG list of requirements, it was the consensus that the COMUS Korea "Austere Five Year Modernization Plan" was more attainable within existing fiscal guidance. CINCPAC provided his evaluation of the ROKG list to JCS on 16 July 1970. He noted that definitive recommendations concerning the long-range development of the ROKF, in the context of the withdrawal of U.S. forces, would be provided in his submission to the FY 73-80 JSOP.

---

1. SECDEF 7026/24234GZ Apr 70; CINCPAC 280340G Apr 70; Ltr, Hq USFK to CINCPAC, 18 May 70, Subj: Proposed FY 71-75 Korea MAP; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 70.
2. CINCPAC 260206D May 70.
4. COMUSKOREA 070440Z Jul 70; CINCUSARPAC 112047Z Jul 70; CINCPACFLT 110332Z Jul 70; CINCPACAF 110048Z Jul 70; CINCPAC 160352Z Jul 70; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 70.
There could be little doubt that the introduction by the ROKG of its own five year plan complicated the planning and implementation of either of the two plans submitted by COMUS Korea. In connection with the planned reduction of U.S. forces in Korea, COMUS Korea proposed that discussions with the ROKG be in phases. Phase I would involve the turnover of equipment becoming excess to the U.S. Eighth Army (EUSA) because of the receipt of more modern equipment. Phase II would involve the turnover of equipment possessed by withdrawn U.S. forces. Phase III would involve the provision of additional equipment through an increased MAP. From the point of view of expediting negotiations in the field, CINCPAC agreed with the incremental approach. However, he requested JCS guidance regarding the authority for the first two phases. He also noted that the subject of a FY 71 Korea MAP supplemental appropriation had not yet been surfaced by the Administration to the Congress, which limited the scope of any implied improvements for ROKF during discussions.¹

With the concurrence of the JCS, SECDEF replied that any transfer of U.S. owned equipment to the ROKG required statutory authority which would be sought by DOD. No decision had been made on the timing or tactics of a FY 71 supplemental request. Tentative plans were to request a supplemental for other countries as well as Korea, but no dollar amounts for individual countries had been decided.²

1. CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA 080915Z Jul 70; CINCPAC 160312Z Jul 70; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 70.
2. SECDEF 5123/162152Z Jul 70.
3. SECSTATE 137069/212322Z Aug 70; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 70.
On 2 September 1970, State/Defense, in a joint message, advised the U.S. Embassy and COMUS Korea that the White House had approved a $1.5 billion level for balanced modernization of the ROKF. However, the impact on the Federal budget could not exceed $1.25 billion. The balance would have to come from LS&E and material transferred at no cost over the five-year period. COMUS Korea was authorized to discuss details of the modernization within the new ceiling. At the direction of the JCS, CINCPAC tasked COMUS Korea to submit an alternative force improvement/modernization plan based on the latest guidance. On 4 October 1970, COMUS Korea provided the third U.S. plan for ROKF modernization. This plan, "Alternative Plan for ROK Five Year Modernization," was based on a grant aid dollar guideline of $1.25 billion plus $ .25 billion to be provided from LS&E.

On 24 November 1970, the JCS advised CINCPAC of numerous questions raised by the White House Office of Management and Budget during a review of the COMUS Korea Alternate Plan. Most of the questions were in the nature of clarification or relationship to combined force posture vis-a-vis deterrence of aggression. One question, however, confounded previously issued guidance upon which all of CINCPAC and COMUS Korean planning had been based:

3. The DOD [Korea] plan treats $220 million from the MAP transfer program and $75 million of FMS credit as add-ons to $1.25 billion of grant MAP and $250 million in excess stocks and left-behind equipment. How is this plan to be reconciled with the guidance in the Kissinger Memorandum of September 5, 1970 which sets $1.5 billion as a ceiling for the total program and specifies that the MAP transfer program, FMS credit, left-behind equipment, and excess stocks are to be applied within that ceiling to reduce the need for grant MAP as much as possible?

In his detailed reply to the questions passed by the JCS, CINCPAC noted that the Kissinger Memorandum had not been provided to him. Further, he pointed out that the joint State/Defense message containing the reference to White House approval of the $1.5 billion level had stated:

1. SECSTATE 144120/022318Z Sep 70; JCS 1361/182017Z Sep 70; CINCPAC 202236Z Sep 70; J5331 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 70; Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Dec 70, Subj: Korea MAP.
2. JCS 6556/242136Z Nov 70.
3. CINCPAC 052342Z Dec 70.
...FYI. In discussions, possibility of use of FMS credit sales to cover portion of funded level should be kept in mind, and option kept open for use FMS credit should this become necessary as result of congressional action on MAP....

No reference had been made to the application of a MAP transfer program against the dollar ceiling. CINCPAC cautioned that, if the assumed $220 million transfer program and the assumed $75 million of FMS credit sales were applied toward a reduction of the $1.25 billion dollar guideline, the already austere modernization program would be reduced below the objective level.¹

Continuing Korea MAP Items

1. Ibid.
3. Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Jan 70, Subj: Possible Sale of Destroyers to the ROK; J5331 Histories, Hq CINCPAC, Jan-Mar, Jul-Aug 70; J51 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.
An F-5 of the 1st Fighter Wing, Republic of Korea Air Force, undergoes crash damage repair at Taegu Air Materiel Depot.
Grant aid to Malaysia was restricted to the provision of CONUS training from inception in 1965 until FY 71. The program fund level was $200,000 until FY 71, when it was cut to $100,000 during the worldwide MAP realignment. The training restriction to CONUS only was also broadened in FY 71 to include U.S. overseas regional schools. In 1967, an FMS credit sales program was initiated.

**Special Forces Training for Malaysia**

[1] In a joint U.S. Embassy/Defense Attache Office (DAO) message on 29 July 1970, SECSTATE and CINCPAC were advised that U.S. in-country training of Malaysia's special forces was desired by the Malaysia Ministry of Defense. The Ambassador equated such U.S. assistance to the Nixon Doctrine and considered the request as valid. He requested DOD and State Department comments.

[2] CINCPAC's initial position was that the modest training program requested would assist the Malaysia Armed Forces to control insurgency, and would be consistent with U.S. military objectives. SECSTATE and DOD agreed with the views expressed by the Embassy and CINCPAC, and authorized the Ambassador to initiate exploratory discussions.

[3] On 8 October, exploratory talks began with members of the DAO, Malaysian Defense Ministry, and a U.S. special forces contact team in attendance. No U.S. commitment was made, but Malaysian representatives stated that a request for U.S. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) would be submitted. It was understood that, if the U.S. approved the program, the cost would be borne by the Malaysia Government.

[4] The special forces training envisioned by Malaysia included a basic airborne cadre school, a civic action/psychological operations course, an enlisted medical instructor course, and a course in hospital administration. Prior to the inception of the airborne cadre school, technical assistance would be needed to construct a jump tower and buildings for cleaning, drying, packing, and storing parachutes. The Ambassador requested permission to respond affirmatively to the anticipated formal request from Malaysia to undertake the training.

---

1. Point Paper, J5321, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Dec 70, Subj: Military Assistance Program-Malaysia.
2. AMEMB Kuala Lumpur, 2456/290510Z Jul 70.
3. CINCPAC 012235Z Aug 70; SECSTATE 128565/081506Z Aug 70.
4. AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 3356/131000Z Oct 70.
5. Ibid.
On 6 November 1970, CINCPAC advised the JCS and SECDEF that all MTT requirements could be met with PACOM resources and recommended that the U.S. respond affirmatively to the anticipated request. SECDEF and SECSTATE gave joint permission to the Ambassador to agree "in principle" to a formal request, but suggested that Malaysia inform its Commonwealth partners that U.S. training assistance was being requested.1

On 3 December 1970, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the State Department was withholding its decision to provide cadre training to Malaysia based upon objections raised by the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore. Among the issues to be weighed were the five-power alliance, the leadership position of the United Kingdom and Australia, the rivalry between Malaysia and Singapore, and the precedent in initial placement of U.S. Special Forces in-country. The JCS requested that CINCPAC review his previous recommendation that the in-country training be provided by the U.S. in the light of the foregoing issues.2

CINCPAC replied that the Malaysian ground forces had an urgent need for counterinsurgency training because the Communist terrorist organization had increased its strength and its harassment activities. However, the jungle warfare school conducted by the United Kingdom in Malaysia was capable of providing special forces training, as was the Australian Army. CINCPAC noted that U.S. policy had been to let the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand shoulder the burden of security for Malaysia and Singapore. Because a request from Singapore for ranger training was rejected by the U.S., the providing of special forces training to Malaysia would exacerbate Malaysia/Singapore and U.S./Singapore relations. Considering all the issues involved, therefore, CINCPAC withdrew his previous recommendation to proceed with the Malaysian training:3

4. (S) Recommend future responses to Five Power Member requests for military training which is not available within Five Powers be made through a five power control mechanism rather than attempt to respond directly to individual members. This approach should preclude rivalry and suspicion among member nations and strengthen the Five Power organization.

---

1. CINCPAC 060430Z Nov 70; SECDEF 5846/132245Z Nov 70. Among the Commonwealth "partners" was the nation-city of Singapore, which had once been part of Malaysia.
2. JCS 032300Z Dec 70.
4. ADMIN CINCPAC 101900Z Dec 70.
(S) Based substantially on CINCPAC's comments, SECSTATE and DOD agreed that it would be "most difficult" to meet the Malaysian request without providing the training requested by Singapore. Therefore, the Ambassador to Malaysia was requested to inform the Government that the U.S. could not undertake the training in-country, although such training was available in the U.S. Formal notification of this decision was to be withheld until after a scheduled Five Power meeting in Singapore in January 1971.1

Philippines

(S) Military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines was summarized and placed in proper perspective vis-a-vis Philippine-American relations in general by the Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines (CHJUSMAG-PHIL) on 17 September 1969. The purpose of the summation was to provide information pertaining to U.S. military assistance to the Philippines for use by the Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. The basis for the specific goals and objectives of military assistance to the Philippines, CHJUSMAG noted, was provided by U.S. State Department National Policy Papers which outlined U.S. interests and objectives, problems of U.S. policy, U.S. strategy for the ensuing three to five years, and the courses of action to promote the objectives. Based upon these considerations, specific objectives for military assistance to the Philippines had been jointly developed by the State and Defense Departments and passed to the Country Team as guidance.2

(S) In the course of his resume of the MAP in the Philippines, CHJUSMAG answered the question: "What connection, if any, exists between the level of military assistance and our [U.S.] rights to use military bases?" The answer provided some insight to problems in Philippine-American relationships:3

...........................................................................

.... There is no repeat no officially recognized nor absolute connection between the level of military assistance and U.S. rights to use military bases in the Philippines. The initial post WW II US/ROP Bilateral Military Bases Agreement was reached on March 14, 1947. Following closely behind the bases agreement, the initial Bilateral US/ROP Military Assistance Agreement was entered into force on 21 March 1947. Although

1. SECSTATE 206484/190248Z Dec 70; SECSTATE 210435/292322Z Dec 70; Point Paper, J5341, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Dec 70, Subj: Special Forces Training for Malaysian Ground Forces; J5341 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 70.
2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 170900Z Sep 69.
3. Ibid.
PHILIPPINES

### BASIC INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>116,000 SQ ME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>40.1 MILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Grain</td>
<td>0.8 ACRE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### LITERACY RATE

- Life Expectancy: 55 years
- Per Capita Income: $255
- Defense Budget (Self-Financed): $45.3 BILLION

### PRESIDENT

- Ferdinand E. Marcos
- Vice President: Fernando Lopez
- Secy Foreign Affairs: Carlos P. Romulo
- Secy Natl Defense: Gen Juan P. Enrile
- Chief of Staff, AFP: Gen Manuel T. Tan, Army
- VICE C/O AFP: BGEN Romeo C. Espino, AF
- CG, Army: BGEN Rafael Ileto, Army
- FOI, Navy: Commodore Dioscoro E. Papa, Navy
- CG, Air Force: BGEN Jesus F. Sison, AF
- Chief Constabulary: BGEN Eduardo Garcia, PC

### MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>2 INF DIVs, 5 INF BDEs, 2 ENGR CONST BNs, 1 HOME DEF BP GP (ABN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>constabulary: 5 BNS, 152 COS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| NAVY | 1 DE, 44 PC/PE/PCW/PCF/POL, 4 MSC/MIL, 1 LST, 3 LSM, 3 AKL, 2 ARL, 1 ATR, 1 MARINE BLS |
|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------
|      | 1 DD TYPE, 1 MARINE BN, TOTAL STRENGTH 7,700                    |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>2 TAC FTR SQ, 1 COMP AIR COMMOD SQ, 1 LIAISON SQ, 1 COMPARE RESCUE SQ, 2 ACN SQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 JET, 9 PROP, TRANS: 1 TURBO PROP, 11 PROP, HELO: 3 TURBINE, TRAINERS: 14 JET, OTHER: 35 PROP, TOTAL STRENGTH 5,990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

- U.S. Ambassador: Howard Z. D. Fruehbeck
- U.S. AID Director: R. Thomas C. Stibick
- Chief: MG, USA, Gen George B. Pickett Jr.

### MAP OBJECTIVE

General objectives are:

(A) To support the retention of U.S. base rights in the Philippines.

(B) To develop and maintain military/paramilitary forces with a primary mission of maintaining the internal security of the Philippines.

(C) To support a capability to deploy limited Philippine forces within the SEATO area for mutual defense tasks.

(D) To improve the capability of the Philippine armed forces to provide their own logistic support.

### COMBAT CAPABILITY

- Maintain internal security; offer limited resistance to external attack and contribute RENEF INF Bn to collective defense.

- Conduct limited offshore patrol and minor amphibious and ASW operations.

- Limited capability to fulfill mission of assisting Army to maintain internal security and contribute to defense against external attack.

### OVERALL OBJECTIVE

To increase the efficiency of the Philippine Armed Forces; to encourage Philippine military support of SEATO; and to maintain U.S. operated military installations in the Philippines.

**Source:** PACOM Digest Feb 71

**Note:** As of 1 July 70.
U.S. military assistance has never been officially considered quid pro quo for rights provided the U.S. under the bases agreement, there is a view held by many Filipinos that the military bases agreement and the military assistance agreement are concomitant and that military assistance is, at least to some degree, de facto rental for the bases. Furthermore, the introductory, or preamble, portion of the Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 lends further credence to a quid pro quo interpretation since it states, quote: Considering the desire of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to obtain assistance in the training and development of its armed forces and the procurement of equipment and supplies therefor, during the period immediately following independence of the Philippines, considering the agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines concerning military bases, signed March 14, 1947, and in view.......etc. Unquote. There is a similar statement in the military bases preamble. Despite the fact that the official U.S. approach has consistently avoided any representation that military assistance is furnished as remuneration for base usage, and rightly so, the fact remains that military assistance has always had support of retention of base rights in the Philippines as one of its primary objectives. If we are to recognize, openly, a link between military assistance and base rights, however, it would probably bring a request for substantially higher payments.

MAP Funds and Manpower

( ) On 31 December 1969, JUSMACPHIL had been authorized 74 U.S. personnel spaces. However, on 8 April 1970, the JCS advised its component chiefs and CINCPAC that the manpower authorization would be 64 spaces effective 1 July 1970. The JCS message cited the disapproval of additional spaces by the Assistant SECDEF for International Security Affairs:

At the direction of the President, the Under Secretaries Committee has undertaken a post-OPRED review of the military role and functions of US overseas missions and of other military activities under the cognizance of the U.S. Ambassadors. A primary objective of this review is to provide recommendations

1. JCS 5502/082307Z Apr 70; J1311 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
on the redesign of the US military presence in order to achieve a more flexible and efficient structure to perform essential functions and staffing. Further, the current low profile policy with respect to the US presence abroad is particularly applicable in the Philippines at this time. Pending completion of the post-OPRED review and stabilization of US-Philippines relations, it is inappropriate to increase the manning of JUSMAG Philippines above the personnel ceiling authorized by OPRED....

(§) The manpower reduction had been signalled in the funding levels for previous years' MAP in the Philippines. Programmed levels of $22 million for FY 69-75 had been revised to $18.9 for FY 69 and $18.5 for FY 70. These guidelines were again adjusted for FY 70 and FY 71 to $17.5 and $17.0 million, respectively. The major realignment of the FY 71 MAP increased the funds for Cambodia and Indonesia at the expense of other countries in PACOM, including the Philippines, which was again cut to $13.18 million.¹

(§) Based upon the $13.18 million guidance, CHJUSMAGPHIL submitted a program revision containing a deferral priority listing amounting to $3.5 million in investment items. Chief among these were three UH-1H helicopters, two patrol boats, 50 trucks and miscellaneous spare parts and ammunition.²

(§) In October 1970, SECDEF provided a revised dollar level of $17 million for FY 72, vice $22 million previously programmed, but indicated that the FY 71 cuts would be restored. Responding to the requirement for a statement of impact for FY 72, CINCPAC advised SECDEF that the final FY 72 program would be dependent upon the portion of operating costs which the Philippines would be capable of, and accept the need for, funding. CINCPAC noted that the long-range objective was to promote Philippine self-sufficiency, and that the JUSMAG had consistently encouraged the Filipinos to absorb a greater portion of the operating costs.³

1. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. II, pp. 9, 230; SECDEF 8619/282118Z Aug 70; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 70. See also this chapter, "Impact of MAP Legislation," with cited documentation.
2. JUSMAGPHIL 050530Z Sep 70.
3. CINCPAC to SECDEF, as cited in ADMIN CINCPAC 132242Z Nov 70.
At the close of 1970, DOD guidelines (in millions) for Philippine MAP were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 71</th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73</th>
<th>FY 74</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opns/Invest.</td>
<td>$16.0</td>
<td>$15.4</td>
<td>$19.8</td>
<td>$18.8</td>
<td>$17.9</td>
<td>$17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Opns.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$17.0</td>
<td>$17.0</td>
<td>$22.0</td>
<td>$21.0</td>
<td>$20.0</td>
<td>$20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High-Level Interest in Investment Items

Germane to the preceding discussion of funds and operating costs was the continuing pressure exerted by Philippine officials for specific Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) equipment. During a meeting between CINCPAC and Philippines President Marcos, "the President expressed the GOP's need for accelerated delivery of support equipment..." Specifically, mentioned were M-16 rifles, helicopters, M-79 grenade launchers with ammunition, reloaders, miscellaneous ammunition, and the acquisition of excess equipment from Vietnam. CINCPAC requested CHJUSMAGPHIL to review the MAP in conjunction with the Country Team to verify that everything possible was being done within current guidelines.

The detailed reply discussed the status of equipment actions, both delivered and programmed, some of which warranted individual treatment in this CINCPAC History.

Accelerated Delivery of Helicopters

The helicopter force objective programmed in the MAP for the AFP was 24 UH-1Hs. By the end of 1969, seven had been delivered to the Philippines as a result of acceleration over originally programmed delivery times. The last three of the seven had been diverted from scheduled in-puts to the U.S. Army in Vietnam.

On 26 December 1969, the Chief of Staff, AFP, requested that delivery of the remaining 17 UH-1Hs in the Philippine MAP be completed by FY 71. This request was reiterated by President Marcos to CHJUSMAGPHIL on 12 January 1970. With Embassy concurrence, CHJUSMAGPHIL recommended that CINCPAC support the procurement of at least two UH-1Hs of the five programmed for FY 69 delivery as soon

1. Point Paper, J5333, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jan 71, Subj: Philippine MAP
2. CINCPAC 100432Z Apr 70; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 160730Z Apr 70.
as possible. Upon receiving CINCUSARPAC's agreement that a valid military requirement existed for expeditious delivery, CINCPAC recommended, "that delivery of two of the five UH-1Hs in the FY 69 Philippine MAP program, now scheduled for delivery fourth quarter FY 71, be accelerated to first quarter FY 71." 1

(§) On 9 February 1970, the U.S. Ambassador in Manila advised SECSTATE that President Marcos had personally asked that helicopter deliveries be speeded up. Demonstrations and the increasing deterioration of law and order in Manila, combined with the dissident control campaign in Central Luzon, had created a need for more helicopters than were available. For that reason, the Ambassador strongly supported the delivery of the five helicopters programmed for FY 69 as quickly as possible. CHJUSMAGPHIL agreed that delivery of five instead of two helicopters ahead of schedule was justified by the internal situation, and CINCPAC conveyed his concurrence to the JCS on 16 February 1970. 2

(§) The JCS recommended approval on 5 March, and, on 25 April, SECDEF approved the diversion of five UH-1Hs to the Philippine Air Force from U.S. Army, Vietnam scheduled in-puts. Delivery was set for August 1970, but subsequent response from the U.S. Army Aviation Support Command enabled CHJUSMAGPHIL to advise CINCPAC that five UH-1Hs were delivered at the Manila International Airport by airlift on 2 July 1970. 3

(§) In the meantime, President Marcos' approach to CINCPAC relative to sundry equipment, including helicopters, had prompted this observation by CHJUSMAGPHIL: 4

..............................................................

.... In addition to the seven helicopters on hand and the action on five...which is at SECDEF for determination, the additional twelve are programmed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 70</th>
<th>FY 71</th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. JUSMAGPHIL 201150Z Jan 70; CINCUSARPAC 262202Z Jan 70; CINCPAC 012351Z Feb 70; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 70.
2. AMEMD Manila 1116/090841Z Feb 70; JUSMAGPHIL 110752Z Feb 70; CINCPAC 162113Z Feb 70; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 70.
3. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70, citing JCSM 89-70 of 5 Mar 70; SECDEF 7043/250025Z Apr 70; DA 061909Z May 70; DA 142112Z May 70; CHJUSMAGPHIL 080654Z Jul 70.
4. CHJUSMAGPHIL 160730Z Apr 70.
Four helicopters in FY 70 have been funded. Continued pressure from President Marcos can be anticipated until all 24 are in-country....

Accelerated Delivery of M-16 Rifles

(6) On 17 February 1970, CHJUSMAGPHIL passed to CINCPAC a SECSTATE message to the Ambassador regarding Philippine Government interest in M-16 rifle purchases under FMS. The Philippine Embassy in Washington couched this interest in terms of 5,000 M-16s, 50,000 M-16 magazines, and 4.75 million rounds of M-16 ammunition. The coordinated JUSMAG-Embassy response to SECSTATE recommended strongly against the purchase of 5,000 M-16s by the Philippines, and suggested instead that 1,208 M-16s programmed in the FY 70 MAP be provided on an expedited basis. A trade-off in funding was envisioned wherein the FMS money would be spent by the Philippines for diesel fuel. This MAP money would then be used to procure the 1,208 M-16s.1

(5) CINCPAC requested JUSMAGPHIL comments on an alternative proposal. He suggested that the Philippines be permitted to purchase 1,200 M-16s under FMS or commercial sales. Funds in the FY 70 MAP for M-16s could then be reprogrammed for other investment items in shortfall, and Philippine participation in the FMS program would be encouraged at the same time. In reply, JUSMAG advised CINCPAC that the AFP Chief of Staff had voluntarily broached the possibility of assuming the costs of commercial consumables if M-16 delivery could be expedited. JUSMAG cited the imperatives of Huk and student violence, noting that the Huks could be more easily neutralized by military operations than could the students. The AFP probably could not cope with simultaneous major action by both, and early elimination of the Huk threat in Central Luzon would be wise. However,2

In order for the AFP to launch an all out campaign as the President of ROP has indicated, a mental block concerning M-16s must be overcome. The AFP believes it will be quite out-gunned unquote by the dissidents and such a campaign can not repeat not be successful without M-16s; i.e., their belief is that their carbines and the M-1s are no match for weapons in the hands of the NPA [National Peoples Army]....

1. JUSMAGPHIL 171130Z Feb 70; AMEMB Manila 1391/170927Z Feb 70; J533 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 70.
2. CINCPAC 200358Z Feb 70; JUSMAGPHIL 210730Z Feb 70.
Moreover, JUSMAG stated that the U.S. Ambassador was opposed to FMS because of dollar shortages in the Philippine economy.¹

(§) Upon receiving the JUSMAGPHIL reply, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS and SECDEF that the 1,208 M-16s in the FY 70 MAP be provided as soon as possible, along with the necessary ammunition.²

(§) On 4 March 1970, the Ambassador advised that the Philippine Government desired to purchase 2,500 M-16s in addition to the 1,208 to be received under MAP. The Embassy requested that, if the FMS or commercial sale were approved, delivery be withheld until after the MAP M-16s had been delivered. CINCPAC reaffirmed his approval of the MAP delivery, and concurred in the commercial sale with the stipulated delivery sequence.³

(§) On 5 March 1970, SECDEF advised CINCPAC and DA of his approval to provide FY 70 programmed rifles, and requested DA to make delivery by 25 April 1970. SECSTATE notified the Embassy in Manila on 6 March that the commercial sale of 2,500 M-16s had been approved.⁴

(§) On 14 April 1970, JUSMAGPHIL notified CINCPAC that 1,208 M-16 rifles and ammunition arrived in the Philippines on 6 April, and that delivery to the AFP was completed on 8 April. Meanwhile, SECDEF notified CHJUSMAGPHIL that Colt Industries had submitted a contract proposal to the Philippine Embassy in Washington on 3 April. The proposal specified that 2,500 M-16s would be shipped approximately 10 days after a letter of credit or cash payment was received. The Philippine Embassy so notified its government, but no further guidance was forthcoming.⁵

(§) CHJUSMAGPHIL noted that the delivery of 1,208 M-16s provided an in-country inventory of 1,408 rifles. If the 2,500 purchase were consummated, together with 1,292 rifles in FY 71 MAP, the AFP would possess 5,200 M-16s by mid-FY 72.⁶

MAP Ammunition Shortfall

(§) On 10 March 1970, CHJUSMAGPHIL requested assistance in determining sources to eliminate an existing shortfall in ammunition stocks, preferably

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 220051Z Feb 70.
3. AMEMB Manila 040655Z Mar 70; CINCPAC 050439Z Mar 70.
4. SECDEF 02455/052232Z Mar 70; SECSTATE 033602/062241Z Mar 70.
5. JUSMAGPHIL 140042Z Apr 70; SECDEF 7325/282148Z Apr 70; J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
6. CHJUSMAGPHIL 160730Z Apr 70.
through MIMEX or other excess programs at no cost to MAP. The difference between authorized quantities of ammunition and quantities on hand, amounting to about $7.9 million, was the result of funding limitations. CHJUSMAGPHIL further requested that a contingency reserve of ammunition be established in the Philippines to support a proposed four-battalion anti-insurgency campaign in Central Luzon. He requested that these reserves be established from service-funded stocks, but noted that elimination of the total ammunition shortfall would cancel the need for the contingency reserve.1

A survey of PACOM ammunition stock levels disclosed that very small amounts of the ammunition identified by CHJUSMAGPHIL were excess to requirements. Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended to JCS that a one-time MASF total fill of the AFP ammunition shortfall be authorized. If this could not be approved, CINCPAC requested approval of a one-time fill of a dedicated contingency reserve stock level from other than PACOM resources. These would be released only upon Country Team approval, and would be replaced in kind from the Philippine MAP within applicable dollar ceilings. In supporting the complete one-time eradication of the $7.9 million shortfall, CINCPAC stated:2

3. Filling the AFP ammunition requirement is consistent with USG objectives for the Philippines, in that it would enhance the capability of the AFP to perform its primary role, that of maintaining internal security. It would also be consistent with USG doctrine of providing materiel support to friendly nations fighting internal dissidence. Past and current MAP dollar limitations have precluded inclusion of significant quantities of ammunition in the Philippine program for the AFP to mount an anti-dissident campaign of any substance. Since it appears that the GOP is now determined to eradicate dissidence and reestablish government control in central Luzon, it is highly desirable that the USG support the venture by making a one-time MASF fill of AFP ammunition requirements. In addition, USG responsiveness to GOP requirements in this instance could be a salient factor in the forthcoming base rights negotiations.

In April, CHJUSMAGPHIL had informed CINCPAC that, in order to assist the AFP in attaining self-sufficiency in the manufacture of 5.56mm (M-16) ammunition,

1. J5333 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 70, which cites CHJUSMAGPHIL 101144Z Mar 70; CHJUSMAGPHIL 160730Z Apr 70.
2. CINCPACAF 170005Z Mar 70; CINCUSARPAC 190238Z Mar 70; ADMIN FMFPAC 182333Z Mar 70; COMSERVPAC 142138Z Mar 70; CINCPAC 310438Z Mar 70.
a technical data package had been requested from the U.S. Army Materiel Command. Thus, when the Philippine ammunition factory, then under construction, was completed in mid-1971, the AFP could produce its own cartridges. The construction of the ammunition plant had been tentatively approved in December 1968. However, no short-term solution to the ammunition problem appeared during 1970. The JCS informed CINCPAC on 5 June 1970 that, "... Current laws and regulations do not provide for the Service funding of ammunition for the AFP. There are no present stocks of the required ammunition that could be released to support the spring campaign of the AFP."1

Release of Riot Control Munitions

(§) In September 1969, CHJUSMAGPHIL had requested permission to release CS and CN riot control munitions to the AFP. CINCPAC had replied that these munitions, "...should not be released to AFP at this time in view of sensitive pre-election political climate and general adverse reaction to use of chemical agents...." He stated, however, that, "... Should either the pre-election or post-election political climate so dictate, a request to CINCPAC for release of riot control munitions, citing the Ambassador's concurrence, may be initiated."2

(§) On 5 February 1970, CHJUSMAGPHIL advised CINCPAC that local police and AFP units had been used to control student demonstrations and riots in Manila on 25 and 30 January. A "nationwide indignation rally" was scheduled to be held on 12 February. The Chief of Staff, AFP, had requested the assistance of CHJUSMAGPHIL in the procurement of 40mm riot control cartridges and hand grenades for use in maintaining law and order. Since there were no riot control munitions included in the Philippine MAP and no funds available for program deviation, CHJUSMAGPHIL requested authority from CINCPAC to draw the munitions from U.S. Service-funded stocks. He recalled the guidance provided by CINCPAC in 1969 by advising that his request was supported by the U.S. Ambassador.3

(§) Agreeing that the use of riot control munitions by the AFP in civil disturbances was consistent with U.S. objectives in the Philippines, CINCPAC recommended approval in a message to SECDEF on 6 February 1970. Approval from SECDEF was received the next day, with the proviso that the munitions be funded within the approved MAP dollar guidelines. SECDEF also cautioned CINCPAC that:4

3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 051120Z Feb 70; J5333 History, Ho CINCPAC, Feb 70.
4. CINCPAC 060018Z Feb 70; SECDEF 9651/071640Z Feb 70; SECDEF 9705/092140Z Feb 70.
3. Department of State concurs on the assumptions that this information will be closely held because of obvious unfortunate political implication of any US involvement, direct or indirect, in countering demonstrations, and that quantities released are related to immediately foreseeable needs.

(S) CINCPAC directed the immediate airlift of the desired munitions from Japan to Clark Air Base, Philippines on 7 February, and JUSMAGPHIL informed CINCPAC that they were turned over to the AFP on 10 February 1970.1

FORESIGHT SIERRA Communications

(S) FORESIGHT SIERRA was a program to upgrade the command and control communications of the AFP. On 21 March 1970, CINCPAC pointed out to the JCS that the original projected operational date of the system was in late 1969. He noted that the delays and slippage in connection with the program, "...reflect adversely on U.S. government image in meeting commitments to Armed Forces Philippines." The JCS was requested to determine the date of contractor award and a new projected date for activation of the system.2

(U) On 3 April 1970, CINCPAC was advised by the U.S. Army Strategic Command that the FORESIGHT SIERRA contract award had been made to Philco-Ford that day. The contract provided for the main tropospheric scatter link from Tagaytay, Luzon to Mt. Luay, Cebu, with microwave extensions from Tagaytay to Ft. Bonifacio and from Mt. Luay to Lapu Lapu, Cebu. Initial operation was scheduled to being on 3 May 1971.3

(U) On 30 April, CINCPAC answered a query from CHJUSMAGPHIL as to the availability of excess communications equipment in Vietnam for use in the FORESIGHT SIERRA program. He noted that any such excess equipment would be controlled by the U.S. military departments; if not needed by the U.S. Services, it would be considered for MAP requirements at no cost except for PCH&T and rehabilitation. However, in order for such equipment excesses to be used for AFP needs, the items must be programmed in the Philippine MAP, even though in shortfall. CINCPAC also advised JUSMAGPHIL that the FORESIGHT SIERRA plan should be monitored closely to insure that it complied with the principle of maximum use of civil communications systems. To the maximum extent possible, military communications should be integrated into a single system for all service requirements.4

1. CINCPAC 072250Z Feb 70; JUSMAGPHIL 120710Z Feb 70.
2. J611 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 70; ADMIN CINCPAC 210017Z Mar 70.
3. CGUSASTRATCOM 032347Z Apr 70.
4. CHJUSMAGPHIL 150046Z Apr 70; CINCPAC 302323Z Apr 70; J612 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 70.
Although military assistance was not authorized, Singapore was eligible for consideration under the FMS credit program. As previously discussed in the section on Malaysia, assistance to that country was withheld because of possible alarm or suspicion by Singapore. Conversely, attempts to procure assistance from the U.S. by Singapore were viewed with alarm by Malaysia.1

Singapore Purchase of U.S. Tracked Vehicles

In the latter part of 1969, Singapore requested a Letter of Offer from the U.S. for the purchase of self-propelled howitzers, tanks and mine-sweeping vehicles. This proposed acquisition generated immediate and verbal alarm from Malaysia, which considered the items to constitute an offensive military threat to its border. Numerous meetings were scheduled between Embassy officials and representatives of Malaysia and Singapore in order to convey the U.S. position of impartiality. In most instances the host country officials appeared to understand the U.S. position, and, on 12 January 1970, the Ambassador in Singapore recommended that a firm Letter of Offer be made available.2

On 21 February 1970, SECSTATE advised that the self-propelled howitzers (M-109 SP 155mm) requested by Singapore could not be provided because of contract problems between DOD and the manufacturer. The Department of the Army (DA) suggested, and CINCPAC supported, the substitution of 105mm and 8" howitzers; and, on 3 April 1970, DA announced that Letters of Offer for the bridging tanks and mine-clearing equipment would be prepared.3

What appeared to be the last word on the availability of M-109 howitzers for Singapore was contained in the text of the Journal of Military Assistance as of August 1970:4

The SAF's Director of Logistics reportedly holds the view that some M109's may soon become available from assets

in Vietnam, and he appears anxious to arrange such a transaction. In this respect, he recently advised U.S. Defense Attache personnel that he had been severely reprimanded "from the top down" over the SAF's previous failure to obtain M109's from the U.S. He may be in store for another disappointment because M109 howitzer production was terminated on 30 June 1970 and the Department of the Army has advised the U.S. Defense Attache in Singapore that all M109 assets—including any that might become available from Southeast Asia—are already committed....