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WILLIAM G. MOORE, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Chief of Staff

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME I

1973

Prepared by the Command History Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII
1974

~~TOP SECRET~~



ADMIRAL NOEL GAYLER
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

FOREWORD

The United States Pacific Command covers nearly half of the earth's surface--some 94 million square miles, extending from California to Pakistan and from the Arctic Ocean to Antarctica. Our mission is to defend the United States and to support U.S. national policy and interests in Asia and the Pacific.

Early 1973 saw the final withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Vietnam and the return of our prisoners of war. U.S. air operations over Laos ceased in February, and air operations in support of Cambodia were halted in August.

Although this disengagement from combat operations in Southeast Asia was in keeping with expressed national goals, the continued buildup of North Vietnamese military strength and repeated violations of the cease-fire agreement forecast continued instability and turmoil in South Vietnam. In Cambodia, the Khmer insurgents, supported by the Viet Cong and North Vietnam, continued to threaten the survival of the Khmer Republic.

The outbreak of war in the Middle East in October was followed by the Arab oil embargo against the United States. Despite this embargo, Pacific forces were able to maintain high combat readiness and, at the same time, conserve fuel.

Elsewhere in the Pacific, emerging nationalism in the underdeveloped nations was voiced by established governments and dissident opposition alike. The growing awareness among the people of political and economic deprivation had an unsettling influence on the establishment of political, economic, social, and military stability.

The policy of realistic deterrence continued to depend on visible forces in forward bases to protect vital lines of communication, to validate the total force concept, and to defend the approaches to U.S. territory. Thus, even in a time of detente, the reduction of U.S. military strength throughout the Pacific, the "winding down" of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, and the oil crisis all served to emphasize the strategic importance of the remaining mobile and combat-ready air, sea, and ground forces.

We tried harder in 1973 to achieve a more efficient and economical use of these remaining forces, partly by attaining greater coherence of functions and partly by personnel reductions within various Pacific Command headquarters. Studies of the existing command structure in the Pacific were guided by the fact that the Pacific basin is a strategic entity, requiring one integrated command and centralized control.

During this year of political, economic, and military transition, the existence of a unified structure to provide guidance and perspective became increasingly important. This history records the role of the Pacific Command during this transitional period.



NOEL GAYLER
Admiral, United States Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific

PREFACE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The required report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by the JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records. The CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

This history describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters. Beginning with the 1971 history, the organization of subject matter was changed from the previous geographic orientation, with emphasis on Southeast Asia, to a more functionalized format.

The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was the terminal history of that organization. It covered the period from 1 January 1972 until the disestablishment of the headquarters on 29 March 1973. The identification of the MACV history as Annex A to the CINCPAC history will be retained to facilitate future research. Histories of the remaining subordinate unified commands--USMACTHAI, U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, and U.S. Forces Korea--will continue to be identified as Annexes B through E respectively, and are included only for those copies retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is a matter for the subordinate unified commanders.

The 1973 CINCPAC history is published in two volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for the entire work placed at the end of Volume II. Comprehensive notes on sources and documentation may be found in the 1972 history. Briefly, message traffic footnoted in this history other than General Service (GENSER) is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX) as appropriate. BOM is the acronym for "by other means" and EX is used to denote "special category-exclusive" messages. Those CINCPAC messages marked

(NOTAL) are staff information transmissions to CINCPAC while he was away from the headquarters.

Chapters II, V, VII, IX and X of this history were prepared by the undersigned. Pauline K. Tallman prepared Chapters I, III, IV, VI, VIII and XI, and also supervised the physical layout of the product. Mrs. Tallman and the undersigned jointly compiled the glossary and the index.

The manuscript was typed by Roberta E. Putz and Specialist Five Jackie H. Brace, USA. The Navy Publications and Printing Service, Pacific Division, Pearl Harbor printed and bound the volumes.



CARL O. CLEVER
Command Historian

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CHAPTER I

THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

(C) Military forces in the PACOM were reduced for all Services in 1973, continuing the decline begun in 1969. Overall strength was 16 percent less than the year before. The Army showed the greatest percentage reduction with 30 percent fewer personnel, but the Navy showed the greatest numerical reduction with over 31,000 fewer people. A comparison of military strengths by Service follows:

	1 Jan 73	31 Dec 73	Change
Army	79,373	61,241	-18,132
Navy	204,588	173,352	-31,236
Marine Corps	65,989	64,303	- 1,686
Air Force	88,250	80,396	- 7,854
Total	438,200	379,292	-58,908

Major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents and the amount of change from the year before are shown in the following table. The Republic of Vietnam was dropped from the list this year; the 24,044 personnel in that country as the year began were quickly reduced after the cease-fire and only 65 military personnel were there as the year ended.

	Military		Dependents	
	31 Dec 73	Change	31 Dec 73	Change
Guam	9,763	- 308	6,594	- 6,474
Hawaii	42,132	+ 400	79,234	- 6,023
Japan	52,742	-9,343	38,910	-15,571
Korea	37,657	-1,900	7,700	- 1,792
Philippines	16,028	+ 466	19,595	+ 418
Taiwan	4,544	-3,443	4,547	- 1,271
Thailand	35,004	+3,138	5,052	+ 1,163

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM. The chart showing CINCPAC Staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.

THE PACIFIC COMMAND



* JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF/STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

UNCLASSIFIED


COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN PACOM
CINCPAC
CINCPAC LNO TO CINCAL
CINCPACAF
CINCPACFLT
CINCUSARPAC
COMUS KOREA
CHJUSMAG-K
USSAG/ COM 7th AF
CG 8th ARMY
COM NAV FOR KOREA
COM 314th AIR DIV
COMUSMACTHAI
CHJUSMAGTHAI
JCRC
CINCAO SAIGON
COMUS TDC
CG USARF TAIWAN
COM TAIWAN PAT FOR
COM 327th AIR DIV
COMUS JAPAN
COMUSAR JAPAN
COM NAVFOR JAPAN
COM 5th AIR FORCE
CINCPAC REP PHIL
CINCPAC REP GUAM/TTPI
CINCPAC REP AUSTRALIA
CHMEDT CAMBODIA
DATT VIENTIANE
CHMAAG CHINA
CHMAG JAPAN
CHJUSMAG PHIL
CHUSDLG INDONESIA
ODR PAKISTAN
ODR INDIA
OP COMMAND/OP CONTROL
PLANNING AND COORDINATION

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. The mission of CINCPAC, in broad terms, is as follows: To maintain the security of the PACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance the national policies and interest of the United States and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East, South, and Southeast Asia; to prepare plans, conduct operations and coordinate activities of the forces of the PACOM in consonance with directives of higher authority. His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean west of 92 degrees west longitude, the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean west of 95 degrees west longitude and east of 100 degrees east longitude, the Indian Ocean east of 62 degrees east longitude, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast and South Asia (including Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Ceylon and the Himalayan States of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan), and the Islands in all assigned water areas including the Aleutians (excluding air defense) but excluding the Alexander Archipelago, Kodiak, Nunivak, and Little Diomede Island.

CINCPAC exercises operational command of assigned forces through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established). CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. Military Adviser/Representative to the following organizations:

a. SEATO Council: U.S. Military Adviser
b. ANZUS Council: U.S. Military Representative
c. Philippine-U.S. Council of Foreign Ministers: U.S. Military Representative and co-chairman of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board
d. Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser on military defense matters to the chairman of the U.S. delegation

2. PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:

a. Commander in Chief U.S. Army Pacific (CINCUSARPAC)
b. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)
c. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF)

The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM Service Component Commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations under their command which have been assigned to the operational command of CINCPAC. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the appropriate PACOM Service Component Commander in his Service role, and contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate.

The PACOM Service Component Commanders' responsibilities for the Military Assistance Program are prescribed in the current CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual (MAM).

3. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS: There are four subordinate unified commands and one multi-Service headquarters in the PACOM:

a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUS Korea), Seoul, Korea
b. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUS Japan), Fuchu Air Station, Japan
c. United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC), commanded by Commander United States Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC), Taipei, Taiwan
d. United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI), commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI). COMUSMACTHAI serves concurrently as Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CHJUSMAGTHAI).
e. United States Support Activities Group (USSAG), commanded by Commander U.S. Support Activities Group (COMUSSAG), Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. (A multi-service headquarters with an integrated staff.)

4. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPACREPs): CINCPACREPs are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more Services are stationed:

a. Commander U.S. Naval Forces Marianas is the CINCPAC Representative Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI), Agana, Guam.
b. Commander U.S. Naval Forces Philippines is the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACREP Philippines), Subic Bay, Philippines.
c. USAF Liaison Officer to RAAF is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACREP Australia), American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.

5. CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (MAAGs): Military Assistance Programs (including Foreign Military Sales) are administered in the PACOM under the following authorities:

a. Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Republic of China - Taipei, Taiwan
b. Chief Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan - Tokyo, Japan
c. Chief Defense Attache Office, Saigon - Saigon, Vietnam
d. Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand - Bangkok, Thailand
e. Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines - Manila, Philippines
f. Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia - Phnom Penh, Cambodia
g. Chief Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea - Seoul, Korea
h. Office Defense Representative India - New Delhi, India
i. Office Defense Representative Pakistan - Islamabad, Pakistan
j. Defense Attache (DATT), Vientiane, Laos is responsible for MASF functions for Laos - Vientiane, Laos
k. Chief U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia performs the MAP functions of planning and programming for Indonesia - Jakarta, Indonesia
l. DATT Malaysia is responsible for Malaysia MAP functions - Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
m. DATTs Afghanistan, Ceylon, Nepal, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore are responsible for the Foreign Military Sales function for their respective countries

6. SINGLE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES (Coordinating Authorities):

a. Korea--Commander U.S. Forces, Korea
b. Japan--Commander U.S. Forces, Japan
c. Taiwan and Penghus--Commander U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
d. Mariana Islands--Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Guam/TTPI
e. Philippines--Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines
f. Republic of Vietnam--Chief Defense Attache Office, Saigon
g. Thailand--Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
h. Indonesia--Chief U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia
i. Australia--Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Australia
j. Aleutians--Commander Naval Station Adak
k. India--Defense Representative, India
l. Pakistan--Defense Representative, Pakistan

7. CINCPAC Liaison Officer to CINCAL

SOURCE J52

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES

FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

AS OF 31 DEC 73

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

CINCUNC/USFK	GEN	Richard G. STILWELL, USA
CofS	LT GEN	John R. MURPHY, USAF
DCofS	COL	Garland R. McSPADDEN, USA
Spec Asst/ROK Mil Aff & CHJUSMAG-KOREA	MAJ GEN	Hubert S. CUNNINGHAM, USA
Secretary Joint Staff	COL	George B. LINEKER, USA
CDR Hq UNC (Rear)/Secy UN Jt Bd and Dep UN Rep	COL	James S. MILES, USA
Chief Protocol Section	LCOL	Ralph V. GONSALES, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J1	COL	Louis E. HERRICK, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	CAPT	Joseph W. WILSON, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J3 Dir US/ROK OPLAN Staff	BGEN	Carl G. SCHNEIDER, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J4	COL	Jack L. McCLARAN, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J5	CAPT	Wallace E. SHARP, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL	Billy E. HANEY, USA
Chief, Armistice Aff Div and Secy UNCMAC	COL	Samuel L. SMITH, USA

HEADQUARTERS U.S. FORCES, JAPAN

Commander/Commander 5 AF	LT GEN	Walter T. GALLIGAN, USAF
Chief of Staff	MAJ GEN	Lawrence F. SNOWDEN, USMC
Asst Chief of Staff/J1	CAPT	Harry L. BENSON, USN
Secretary Joint Staff	COL	Daryle K. BAXTER, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	COL	Howard R. ROSS, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J3	COL	James P. DAVIS, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J4	CAPT	John V. PETERS, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J5	COL	Pierce E. MOUNTS, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL	Joseph A. NOVAK, USAF
Chief Protocol Section	MAJ	William J. PROUT, USAF
Office of Information (5 AF)	LCOL	William M. TAYLOR, USAF
Director of Safety (5 AF)	COL	Warren J. HUNT, USAF
Chaplain (USARJ)	CH(COL)	Lester E. BURNETTE, USA
Legal Advisory (5 AF)	COL	John H. LEONARD, USAF
Surgeon (CNFJ)	CAPT	Dermot A. MURRAY, USN
Comptroller (5 AF)	COL	Lenore HENSON, USAF
Provost Marshal (5 AF)	LCOL	Stephen J. FRAZIER, USAF

CG USARJ	LT GEN	Welborn G. DOLVIN, USA
COMNAVFORJAPAN	RADM	William H. ROGERS, USN

U.S. TAIWAN DEFENSE COMMAND

Commander	VADM	Philip A. BESHANY, USN
Chief of Staff	BGEN	William C. BURROWS, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J1/J4	CAPT	Terrill F. BECKER, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	COL	James J. FREDERICKS, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J3	CAPT	Charles C. CARTER, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	CAPT	Marvin D. MARSH, USN
Public Information Officer/002	LCDR	Jay COUPE, USN
Legal Officer/J7	CAPT	Thomas F. HAIRSTON, (JAGC), USN

Cdr, 7th Fleet Patrol Force	RADM	Wycliffe D. TOOLE, JR., USN
Cdr, 327th Air Div	BGEN	Lynwood E. CLARKE, USAF
Commander, U.S. Army Forces, Taiwan	COL	Anthony J. DESKIS, USA

U.S. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES GROUP

Commander	GEN	Timothy F. O'KEEFE, USAF
Deputy Commander	MAJ GEN	Ira A. HUNT, JR., USA
Chief of Staff	MAJ GEN	Jack BELLAMY, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff Intel	BGEN (P)	Hilding L. JACOBSON, JR., USAF
Asst Chief of Staff Ops	MAJ GEN	Jack BELLAMY, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff Log	COL	B. CARTER, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff Pers	COL	Peter A. MARINELLI, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff C-E	COL	Frank A. WALL, USAF
Chief Fleet Coordination Group	RADM	Henry P. GLINDEMAN, USN
Chief SACADVON	COL	Eugene W. LOY, USAF
Chief TACLO	COL	Curtis J. PORTER, USAF

SOURCE: J133A

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES

FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

(continued)

AS OF 31 DEC 73

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

Chief JCRC	BGEN	Joseph R. ULATOSKI, USA
Deputy Commander	COL (D)	Vincent A. DiMAURO, USAF

DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE, SAIGON

Chief	MAJ GEN	John E. MURRAY, USA
Chief, Ops & Plans Div	BGEN (P)	Ralph J. MAGLIONE, JR., USAF

U.S. DELEGATION, FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY TEAM

Chief	COL	William W. TOMBAUGH, USA

OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE, PAKISTAN (ODRP)

USDRP	COL	Adrian S. CLONINGER, USA

OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE, INDIA (ODRI)

USDRI	COL (D)	James D. JORDAN, USAF
	COL (R)	Harry J. BROCKMAN, USA

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, GUAM/TTPI

COMNAV Marianas/CINCPACREP	RADM	George S. MORRISON, USN
CofS & Aide	CAPT	William C. DOTSON, USN
Cdr, Eighth Air Force	LT GEN	George H. MC KEE, USAF
Vice Cdr, Eighth Air Force	BGEN	Robert H. GAUGHAN, USAF

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, AUSTRALIA

CINCPACREP & USAF Liaison Officer	COL	Jack T. DETOUR, USAF

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, PHILIPPINES

COMUSNAV Philippines	RADM	Doniphan B. SHELTON
CofS & Aide	CAPT	Robert J. CARDILLO, USN
Commander 13th AF	MAJ GEN	Leroy J. MANOR, USAF
Chief of Staff	COL	Vacant

DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE, VIENTIANE

DATT	BGEN	Richard G. TREFRY, USA

SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

U.S. MILADREP, SMPO	COL	Joseph F. DE RIENZO, USAF

CINCPAC SINGLE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE (SSMR), ALEUTIANS

CO, NAVSTAADAK/SSMR	CAPT	John R. SWADENER, USN

SOURCE: J133A

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS
FAR EAST REGION
AS OF 31 DEC 73

UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, PHILIPPINES

Chief	BGEN	Jack R. SADLER, USA
CofS	COL	Peter B. VAN BRUSSEL, USAF
Ch, Ground Forces Div	COL	William J. CUNNINGS, USA
Ch, Navy Division	CAPT	Jack E. EVANS, USA
Ch, Air Force Div	COL	David S. MELLISH, USAF
Ch, Jt Plans & Programs Division	COL	William L. DEAN, USA
Ch, Personnel & Admin Div/AG	LCOL	Harry L. WISE, USA

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, KOREA

Chief	MAJ GEN	Hubert S. CUNNINGHAM, USA
CofS	BGEN	Leland C. SHEPARD, JR., USAF
ACofS/Services	COL	Wiley McGARITY, USA
ACofS/Plans	COL	Richard C. ROGERS, USA
ACofs/Industrial & Technological Development	COL	George M. MONTGOMERY, USA
ACofS/Logistics	COL	Taylor R. FULTON, USA
ACofS/Comptroller	COL	Harry E. BRANDES, USAF
Secretary Joint Staff	LCOL	William C. COSGROVE, USA
Chief Army Section	BGEN	Louis J. SCHELTER, JR., USA
COMNAVFORKOREA & Chief, Naval Section	RADM	Henry S. MORGAN, JR., USN
Commander, Air Force Korea/Chief, Air Force Section	BGEN	Winfield W. SCOTT, JR., USAF
Deputy Chief, Air Force Section	COL	John S. HARPSTER, USAF

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP CHINA

Chief	MAJ GEN	Slade NASH, USAF
CofS	CAPT	Wick R. HARLAN, JR., USN
Secy Jt Staff	LCOL	Noel S. SCHWANEVELDT, USA
ACofS Admin	COL	James H. NIX, USA
ACofS Plns & Proqs	COL	Freddie W. GRAHLING, USA
ACofS Ops & Tng	COL	Harry C. DELANEY, JR., USAF
ACofS Res & Mgt	COL	Jared B. SCHOPPER, USA
ACofS Comm/Elect	CAPT	Carl F. SOLTERER, USN
SJA	LCOL	Bruce E. STEVENSON, USA
Ch, R&D Section	COL	William H. GOODWIN, USAF
Info/Officer	MAJ	Winston H. SUN, USA
Sr Advisor (CA)	COL	Edwin R. MILES, SR., USA
Sr Advisor (CN)	CAPT	Robert E. BODAMER, USN
Sr Advisor (CMC)	COL	Hugh R. BUMPAS, USMC
Sr Advisor (CAF)	COL	John R. STREIT, SR., USAF

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OFFICE, JAPAN

Chief	COL (D)	Richard N. STODDARD, USA
	CAPT (R)	Charles W. COLE, USN
Deputy Chief	GS	C. Lawrence O'NEILL

MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TEAM, CAMBODIA

Chief, MEDT	BGEN	William W. PALMER, USA
Deputy Chief	COL (D)	Charles E. TURNIPSEED, USAF
Chief, MA Div	COL	Hugh J. LYNCH, USA
Chief, LOG Div	COL	Patrick N. DELAVAN, USA
Chief, P&P Div	CAPT	Homer O. MAINS, JR., USN

USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI

Commander/Chief	MAJ GEN	Thomas W. MELLEN, USA
Deputy Commander	COL	Harry C. ADERHOLT, USAF
CofS	COL	Robert A. CARTER, USAF
SJS	LCOL	Albert C. WALDACK, USA
ACofS/J1	COL	Charles G. RAY, USA
ACofS/J2	COL	Charles T. WILLIAMSON, USMC
ACofS/J3	COL	Raymond H. BEATY, USA
ACofS/J4	COL	Everette W. RACKLEY, USA
ACofS/J6	COL	Carl C. CAMERON, USAF
MAP Directorate	CAPT	James M. FADDIS, USN
Comptroller	COL	John K. ELAM, JR., USA
SJA	LCOL	Bryan S. SPENCER, USA
Public Affairs Officer	LCOL	Arthur M. MATHISON, USAF
Adjutant General	LCOL	Geofrey T. COMELL, USA
Chaplain	CH(LCOL)	John L. SHARP, USA
Ch, Army Advisory Gp	COL	John P. VOLLVER, USA
Ch, Navy Advisory Gp/ CINCPACFLTREPTHAI	CAPT	Charles R. ANDERSON, USN
Ch, Air Force Advisory Group	COL	Leonard VOLET, USAF
Senior Marine Advisor	COL	Byron T. CHEN, USMC
CO USARSUPTHAI	BGEN	John L. OSTEEN, JR., USA

U.S. DEFENSE LIAISON GROUP INDONESIA

Chief, USDLG	COL	John J. McCUEN, USA
Dep Chief, Res Mgt	COL	Robert E. GARDNER, USAF
Dep Chief, Plans Programs & Support	LCOL	Jerry D. RACKLEY, USA
Ch, Army Branch	LCOL	Douglas O. FINGLES, USA
Ch, Navy/Marine Br	CDR	Tom A. LEWIS, USN
Ch, Air Force Branch	COL	Eugene T. ADAIR, USAF
Ch, Plans & Program Branch	MAJ	Ned J. MACCARTHY, USAF

UNCLASSIFIED

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SOURCE: J133A

PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL - SERVICE - CATEGORY - COUNTRY

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DEC 73

COUNTRY	GRAND	MILITARY					U.S. CIVILIANS					LOCAL HIRE CIVILIANS					DEPENDENTS				
	TOTAL	TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF
ALASKA	2735	1456		1367	89												1279		1257	22	
AUSTRALIA	1668	784	2	421		281	160		159		1	242		242			562	7	539		16
CAMBODIA	106	95	57	14		24	10		10								1	1			
FIJI IS																					
GUAM	19833	9763	57	5554	311	3841	3471		3471			5		5			6594	135	6356	103	
HAWAII	141016	42132	16731	8936	8206	8259	19650	5535	10922	480	2713						79234	17555	38490	8202	14987
HONG KONG	72	28	7	13		8											44	20	24		
INDIA	18	3	1	1		1						6		6			9	4	3		2
INDONESIA	198	71	22	13	3	33	4		4			19		19			104	53	27	4	20
JAPAN	56806	18775	2021	3587	6816	7231	2463	648	1856	19	740	17639	5672	7091	1178	3698	17929	4051	6169	786	6923
JOHNSTON IS	244	224	53			171	2	2									18				18
KOREA	61813	37657	30021	234	34	7368	1139	864	103		172	15317	13618	332		1375	7700	5906	151	41	1602
LAOS	49	17	11			6	1		1			9		9			22	22			
MALAYSIA	12	5	4			1											7	7			
MARSHALL IS	338	42	42				50	50									246	246			
MIDWAY IS	1566	927		925		2	64		39		25						575		572		3
NEW ZEALAND	384	184	2	54		48						24		24			176	6	148		22
PAKISTAN	22	7	4			3						6		6			9	3			6
PHILIPPINES	50941	16028	61	4639	1118	10210	1068	8	326		734	14250	59	10941		3250	19595	244	6427	304	12620
RYUKUS IS	71254	33967	7142	1762	15767	9296	2494	1365	23	72	1034	13812	10373	397	1268	1774	20981	9500	706	1135	9640
AMERICAN SAMOA	8	1				1											7		6	1	
SINGAPORE	87	26	2	16		8	16		8		8	16		16			29	9	20		
TAIWAN	10888	4544	553	531	28	3432	179	10	59		110	1530	179	614		737	4547	1009	880	36	2702
THAILAND	46670	35084*	4415	422	47	30120	279	137	63		79	6335	2301	230		3716	5052	2710	142	50	2150
VIETNAM	1050	65	27	7	3	28	815		815			165		165			5		5		
WAKE IS	27	24				24											3				3
WESTPAC	57	57			57																
MIDPAC	13245	13245		13245																	
EASTPAC	59526	59526		59526																	
7th FLEET	33261	33243		30235	3008												18			18	
SUB TOTAL	573726	387748	61235	131422	34687	80396	31865	8619	17059	571	5616	69375	32274	20105	2446	14550	164746	41488	61842	10702	50714
CONUS	71561	71552	6	41938	29616		9	9													
GRAND TOTAL	645287	379292	61241	173352	64303	80396	31874	8628	17059	571	5616	69375	32274	20105	2446	14550	164746	41488	61842	10702	50714

SOURCE: J133

* Thailand military strengths as of 4 Jan 74

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CINCPAC COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DEC 73

STAFF	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MIL		U.S. CIV	LOCAL HIRE CIV	TOTAL MIL AND CIV
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
CINCPAC	180	125	148	192	31	18	186	179	545	514	175	0	1234
CINCUSARPAC	268	105	0	0	0	0	0	0	268	105	518	0	891
CINCPACFLT	0	0	163	255	11	10	0	0	174	265	40	0	479
CINCPACAF	0	0	0	0	0	0	562	867	562	867	354	0	1783
COMUSJAPAN	11	5	8	1	6	3	12	7	37	16	22	8	75
COMUSKOREA	53	34	30	28	7	1	38	27	128	90	39	14	257
COMUSTDC	14	13	22	30	4	1	14	8	54	52	13	3	119
COMUSMACTHAI/ JUSMAGTHAI	152	108	24	20	12	7	80	94	268	229	13	74	510
COMUSSAG	39	38	9	9	3	0	148	212	199	259	6	10	464
JCRC	32	73	7	8	4	4	16	9	59	94	1	14	154
GRAND TOTAL	749	501	411	543	78	44	1056	1403	2294	2491	1181	123	5966

SOURCE: J133A

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP AND SEATO PERSONNEL

PACIFIC COMMAND AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTHS BY SERVICE AND CIVILIAN CATEGORY

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973

CATEGORY	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MIL		US CIV		TOT US PERS		LOCAL HIRE	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
MAAG CHINA	84	69	29	25	8	8	45	42	166	144	27	24	193	168	22	22
MDAO JAPAN	3	3	2	2	0	0	2	2	7	7	5	5	12	12	5	5
CHJUSMAG KOREA	216	183	53	47	27	23	101	97	397	350	62	62	459	412	127	122
CHJUSMAG PHIL	26	26	8	7	1	1	15	14	50	48	9	9	59	57	6	6
CHJUSMAG THAI	SEE COMUSMACTHAI															
SEATO	3	3	2	2	1	1	5	5	11	11	0	0	11	11	2	2
MEDT CAMBODIA	55	48	15	15	0	0	14	11	84	74	0	0	84	74	4	4
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI	45	38	0	0	0	0	27	24	72	62	18	17	90	79	33	40
DLG INDONESIA	19	18	8	7	4	3	14	14	45	42	4	4	49	46	20	19
ODR INDIA	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	4	3	1	0	5	3	5	6
ODR PAKISTAN	2	4	1	0	0	0	2	3	5	7	0	0	5	7	5	6
DAO SAIGON	25	27	5	6	3	3	11	12	44	48	989	801	953	849	0	0
TOTAL	480	420	124	112	44	39	237	225	885	796	1039	922	1920	1718	229	232

SOURCE: J133A

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH IN PACOM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973

	ARMY	NAVY	MC	TOTAL NAVY & MC	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
TOTAL FORCES ASSIGNED *	57,202	165,786	64,110	229,896	59,688	346,786
OTHER OPERATIONAL FORCES IN PACOM**	4,039	7,566	193	7,759	20,708	32,506
TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PACOM	61,241	173,352	64,303	237,655	80,396	379,292

* FORCES ASSIGNED PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS

** FORCES PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN PACOM AREA BUT NOT ASSIGNED PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS

SOURCE: J133A

AVAILABLE FORCES

AS OF 31 DEC 73

CINCUSARPAC	CINCPACFLT	CINCPACAF
Assigned to CINCPAC		
1 Army Hq 2 Corps Hqs 3 Hqs U.S. Army Spt 2 Inf Divs(-) 1 Missile Cmd (AT) 1 Arty Bde Hq (AD) 1 Corps Arty 1 Special Forces Gp 1 Engr Gp (Const) 1 PsyOp Gp	2 Numbered Fleets 8 Attack Carriers 3 Cruiser Types 78 Destroyer Types 7 Patrol Ship Types 48 Submarine Types 33 Amphibious Warfare Types 7 Mine Warfare Ships 65 Auxiliary Ships 9 SOSUS Stations 1 Fleet Marine Force (Consists of 2 MAFs) 8 Carrier Air Wings (CVW) 12 Patrol Squadrons (VP) 2 Fleet Air Recon Sqns (VQ) 1 Photo Sqn (VFP) 3 Helo Utility Sqns (HC) 4 MMCB	3 Numbered Air Forces 4 Air Divisions 1 Fighter Wing 1 Special Operations Wing 1 Tactical Airlift Wing 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing 5 Tactical Fighter Wings 1 Operation Sq, C-9 3 Tactical Air Support Sq, OV-10/O-2A 2 Tactical Electronic Warfare Sq, 2 EC-47/1 EB-66 2 Tactical Reconnaissance Sq, RF-4C 3 Special Operations Sq, AC-130/CH-53/C-130 15 Tactical Fighter Sq, F-4/C/D/E 1 Wild Weasel Sq, F-105 3 Tactical Airlift Sq, C-130 2 Airborne Command & Control Sq, C-130/EC-135 3 Tactical Fighter Sq, 2 F-111A, 1 A-7D
In PACOM but not assigned to CINCPAC		
USASA Units in Pacific Army Natl Guard Units 1 Inf Bde 1 Field Depot 1 Army Band 1 PI Det 1 HHD Natl Guard 1 Svc Co (Acft Maint) Army Reserve Units 1 Inf Bn 1 CA Gp 1 Engr Const Bn 1 Corps Hq (AUG) 1 MI Det 1 Admin Svc Det 1 Finance Det 1 USAR School 1 NPTCO	14 Naval Reserve Training Ships, Group 1 Naval Security Groups, Pacific 15 Mine Warfare Ships - Reserve	1 Numbered Air Force (SAC) 2 Air Division (Provisional) (SAC) 3 Strategic Wg (SAC) 2 Strategic Wg (Provisional) (SAC) 1 Air Refuel Sq (KC-135) (SAC) 2 Air Refuel Sq (KC-135) (Provisional) (SAC) 1 Bomb Heavy Sq (B-52) (SAC) 3 Bomb Heavy Sq (B-52) (Provisional) (SAC) 2 Strategic Reconnaissance Sq (SAC) *1 Tactical Fighter Wg (TAC) *2 Tactical Fighter Sq, A-7 (TAC) 1 Fighter Interceptor Sq (HAWG F-102 Hickam) 1 Weather Reconnaissance Sq (WC-130/WB-57) (MAC) 1 Airborne Early Warning Flt (EC-121) (ADC) 1 Test Sq (C-130, HC-130, CH-3) (AFSC) Air Force Security Service Units (AFCS) Air Force Communications Service Units (AFCS) Air Weather Service Units (MAC) Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Units (MAC)
Major augmentation forces which may be available in emergency		
SEE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITY PLAN (JSCP), PART I, ANNEX A		SEE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITY PLAN (JSCP), PART I, ANNEX A

SOURCE: J31

*Indicates Constant Guard augmentation units/ aircraft.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

(as of 1 Jul 73)



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 20.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973



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DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS

(as of 9 Jul 73)



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 22.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR UNITS

(as of 9 Jul 73)



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 21.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973



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DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS

(as of 1 Jul 73)



Numbers of aircraft indicate U.E. authorization.

*Indicates Constant Guard augmentation units/aircraft.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 24.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE
FLYING & MISSILE UNITS
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973



NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT INDICATE U.E. AUTHORIZATION.

*INDICATES CONSTANT GUARD AUGMENTATION UNITS/AIRCRAFT.

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DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE FLYING & MISSILE UNITS

(as of 1 Jul 73)



Numbers of aircraft indicate U.E. authorization.

*Indicates Constant Guard augmentation units/ aircraft.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 23.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE
FLYING & MISSILE UNITS
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973



UDORN	
13 AF ADVON	
432 TRS	
14 TRS	18 RF-4C
13 TFS	27 F-4D
421 TFS	24 F-4E
555 TFS	24 F-4E
4 TFS	24 F-4D
40 ARRS, DET 5	2 HH-43B

NAKHON PHANOM	
7 AF HQ	
56 SOW	
21 SOS	10 CH53
23 TASS	65 OV-10
361 TEWS	22 EC-47
40 ARRS (MAC)	10 HH-53
	2 HH-43F

UBON	
8 TFW	
25 TFS	21 F-4D
433 TFS	18 F-4D
435 TFS	18 F-4D
497 TFS	18 F-4D
16 SOS	17 AC-130A/E
40 ARRS, DET 3	2 HH-43B

TAKHLI	
347 TFW	
428 TFS	18 F-111A
429 TFS	18 F-111A
40 ARRS, DET 10	2 HH-43B

DON MUANG
635 CSG DET 1

U-TAPAO	
635 CS GP	
TALS (ROTE)	(10) C-130
40 ARRS, DET 12(MAC)	2 HH-43F
99 SRS	2 BC-130
17TH AIR DIV (SAC) (PROV)	
307 SW (SAC) (PROV)	48 B52D
310 SW (SAC) (PROV)	31 KC-135

KORAT			
388 TFW		*354 TFW (TAC)	
34 TFS	24 F-4E	*353 TFS (TAC)	*24 A-7D
42 TEWS	13 EB-66 C/E	*355 TFS (TAC)	*24 A-7D
17 WWS	12 F105G	*522 AEW & C (ADC)	* 8 EC-121
3 TFS	24 A7D	56 ARRS (MAC)	2 HH-43F
7 ABCCS	7 C-130E		6 HC-130

NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT INDICATE U.E. AUTHORIZATION

* INDICATES CONSTANT GUARD AUGMENTATION UNITS/AIRCRAFT.

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AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF CINCPAC STAFF DIRECTORATES

	1 January 1973				31 December 1973				Percent
	OFF	ENL	CIV	Total	OFF	ENCL	CIV	Total	Change
CINCPAC	7	20	0	27	8	25	1	34	+26
Inspector General					5	3	1	9	
Chief of Staff	3	1	5	9	6	2	7	15	+67
Deputy Chiefs of Staff[1]	6	2	11	9	-	-	-	-	
Executive Administrative Office[2]	0	8	0	8	-	-	-	-	
Joint Secretariat[3]	11	44	12	67	6	33	9	48	-28
Personnel Directorate[3]	15	7	7	29	18	18	11	47	+62
Intelligence Directorate	83	100	15	198	42	76	8	126	-36
Operations Directorate	106	62	16	184	76	53	15	144	-22
Logistics Directorate	64	41	25	130	50	24	22	96	-26
Plans Directorate	59	28	11	98	54	26	11	91	-7
Communications-Electronics Directorate[4]	35	109	12	156	32	16	10	58	-63
Comptroller	8	4	7	19	5	3	7	15	-21
Staff Judge Advocate	4	3	1	8	4	3	1	8	-
Public/Legislative Affairs	10	7	5	22	11	7	5	23	-
Protocol Office	2	3	1	6	3	3	1	7	+2
Medical Office	4	3	1	8	3	2	1	6	-25
Security Assistance Directorate	37	27	27	91	41	27	25	93	+2
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff[5]	5	3	0	8	-	-	-	-	
Liaison Officer to CINC Alaska	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	-
Special Assistants[6]	2	0	0	2	-	-	-	-	
Administrative Specialist to DAO Singapore[7]					0	1	0	1	
Total	462	472	146	1,080	365	322	135	822	-24
Airborne Command Post	33	13	1	47	33	13	1	47	-
PACOM ADP Systems Support Group	28	54	28	110	28	54	28	110	-
PACOM ELINT Center	20	91	6	117	20	91	6	117	-
Management Control Detachment Pacific	19	12	0	31	19	12	0	31	-
Grand Total	562	642	181	1,385	465	492	170	1,127	-18

1. Position of one Deputy Chief of Staff abolished on 1 July 1973, and staff consolidated with that of Chief of Staff.
2. Consolidated with CINCPAC's administrative staff.
3. Personnel offices were transferred from Joint Secretariat to the Personnel Directorate.
4. Communications Center personnel (109) transferred to Naval Communications Station, Honolulu.
5. Included in Operations Directorate.
6. Deleted.
7. Added at direction of the JCS.

SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF

Key Personnel Changes in 1973

Chief of Staff

(U) LT GEN William G. Moore, Jr., USAF, became Chief of Staff on 1 October. MAJ GEN John M. McNabb, USAF, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, had been acting as Chief of Staff following the departure of LT GEN Charles A. Corcoran, USA, on 15 August.

Deputy Chief of Staff

(U) As the year opened there were two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one for Plans and Operations and the other for Military Assistance, Logistics and Administration. MAJ GEN John M. McNabb, USAF, served as Deputy for Plans and Operations until his departure from the command on 15 October. In addition, he also served as Chief of Staff from 15 August to 30 September. RADM Lawrence Heyworth, Jr., USN, served as Deputy for Military Assistance, Logistics and Administration until his departure on 8 June. BGEN Charles A. Jackson, USA, the Director for Security Assistance, acted in that capacity until 1 September, at which time a reorganization eliminated the positions of the two Deputy Chiefs of Staff and created one such position. MAJ GEN John R. Guthrie, USA, reported as Deputy Chief of Staff on 29 October; he also assumed command of the U.S. Army Element, Pacific Command on that day, replacing General Jackson. General Guthrie had served an earlier tour on CINCPAC's staff as a colonel in the Operations Directorate from August 1961 to February 1964.

Inspector General

(U) MAJ GEN Lawrence F. Tanberg, USAF, reported for duty as CINCPAC's first Inspector General on 4 June. The office had become operational on 18 April.

Joint Secretary

(U) COL Alan H. Birdsall, USAF, became Joint Secretary on 1 July, replacing COL Leo J. Clark, USAF.

Director for Personnel

(U) BGEN Leslie R. Forney, Jr., USA, became Director for Personnel on 15 October, replacing COL Bernard B. Sapp, USA, who departed on 10 October.

Director for Logistics

(U) RADM Richard E. Fowler, Jr., USN, became Director for Logistics on 3 August. The former director, BGEN Orvil G. Metheny, USA, departed on 20 July.

Director for Plans

(U) RADM Earl Yates, USN, continued to serve as Director for Plans. As his deputy, BGEN Willard W. Scott, Jr., USA, was replaced by BGEN John E. Stannard, USA, who reported on 29 December and took over on 7 January 1974.

Director for Security Assistance

(U) BGEN Charles A. Jackson, USA, became Director for Security Assistance on 1 March, replacing BGEN Alton G. Post, USA, who departed 28 February.

Comptroller

(U) CAPT W.M. Weisskopf, SC, USN, replaced CAPT Hugh D. Byrd, SC, USN, on 22 September.

Surgeon

(U) RADM R.C. Laning, MC, USN, replaced RADM Charles L. Waite, MC, USN, on 30 August.

KEY CINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL



WILLIAM G. MOORE, JR
LT GEN USAF
Chief of Staff



LAWRENCE F TANBERG
MAJ GEN USAF
Inspector General



JOHN R GUTHRIE
MAJ GEN USA
Deputy Chief of Staff



ROBERT G GIBSON
GS-18 (PL 313) CIV
Research and Engineering
Consultant



ALAN H BIRDSALL
COL USAF
Joint Secretary



LESLIE R FORNEY, JR
BGEN USA
Director for Personnel



EUGENE F TIGHE, JR
BGEN USAF
Director for Intelligence



RALPH H SPANJER
MAJ GEN USMC
Director for Operations



JAMES A YOUNG
BGEN USAF
Deputy Director for Operations



RICHARD E FOWLER, JR
RADM USN
Director for Logistics



EARL YATES
RADM USN
Director for Plans



WILLARD W SCOTT, JR
BGEN USA
Deputy Director for Plans



HOWARD E McCORMICK
BGEN USAF
Director for Communications-Data Processing



CHARLES A JACKSON
BGEN USA
Director for Security Assistance



W M WEISSKOFF
CAPT SC USN
Comptroller



HARLAND B COPE
CAPT JAGC USN
Staff Judge Advocate



A J LYNN
COL USAF
Public/Legislative Affairs



WILLIAM R KEPHART
COL USMC
Protocol



R C LANING
RADM MC USN
Surgeon



MORTON I ABRAMOWITZ
FSO-2 CIV
Political Adviser



RICHARD H DUBOIS
PL 313, GS-17E CIV
Director AROP



ROBERT W GARRITY
FSIO-3 CIV
USIA Adviser

The CINCPAC Staff

(U) With the drawdown of forces in the PACOM, and in light of budget and manpower constraints, study of the composition of the CINCPAC staff that had begun in 1971 resulted in a number of organizational changes in 1973. Some were major. One across-the-board change was the change in title of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff. These became Directors and their divisions became directorates. Former branches thus became divisions in many cases, and sections became branches. The J-staff code numbers were unchanged. Major reorganizations occurred within some directorates; these are addressed specifically below.

(U) In August 1972 the Chief of Staff had initiated a review of manpower requirements for CINCPAC's Joint Table of Distribution. The JTD had peaked at 1,755 personnel, and was declining, but further study was required to assure appropriate allocations among the directorates in accordance with good management practices. The results of such study were furnished on 1 December 1972. A number of specific recommendations for reduction were advanced, although some directorates and independent offices recommended none and some required further review. One consideration was that the JCS required compensation of the same Service category for any JTD change (Army officer for Army officer, etc.). Further, on approval by the JCS of reductions in a JTD, the reduced spaces reverted to the respective Services and could no longer be used as compension for JTD changes (such as changing a billet from Army officer to Navy officer) or for JTD increases. This situation was believed to be progressively limiting the ability to accommodate JTD changes urgently needed by subordinate commands as well as changes to the CINCPAC staff.

(U) The Director for Personnel recommended that additional manpower studies of certain staff agencies be conducted by the CINCPAC Manpower Management Team to verify that there were no further areas for reduction or to recommend specific reductions. The personnel recruitment agency was requested to discontinue requisition of personnel to fill 21 spaces identified for reduction.[1]

(U) Studies to effect reductions continued through the year. In addition, on 11 October the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense was persuaded that the Defense Department could achieve "substantial economies in headquarters manpower" without reducing the effectiveness of combat forces. He asked for a study of the impact of reductions of 10, 20, and 30 percent in overall strengths within the headquarters under CINCPAC's jurisdiction (as well as all other commands, world-wide). The goal, the JCS said, should not be a percentage re-

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1. J01/Memo/104-72, 25 Aug 72, Subj: Manpower Resources; J1/Memo/00180-72, 1 Dec 72, Subj: Manpower Resources.

duction across the board, but rather a search for elements that contributed only marginally to the commander's ability to command forces and to accomplish management tasks. The analysis was to include effects on operational capability; effects on officer strengths by grade, and on total enlisted strengths; effects on civilian supergrade positions, and on total civilian strengths; and on time required to achieve the reductions, considering the impacts on operations and on personnel management. Supplemental guidance was provided on 20 October.[1]

(U) CINCPAC's Chief of Staff tasked each of the staff directorates to provide the information required by the JCS, each considering both 20 and 30 percent reductions, as on-going actions had already resulted in modifications that satisfied the 10 percent reduction requirement. After consolidation, the information was provided to the JCS on 26 November. CINCPAC advised that the impacts listed in the study had been derived from elimination or reduction of functions from existing command structures. In some instances two separate reviews had been conducted of joint and Service headquarters at the same location. An effective study to eliminate duplication within the PACOM, however, required simultaneous evaluation of functions of the unified and component headquarters; reviewing each independently precluded identifying functional redundancy. CINCPAC's staff planned to initiate a study to identify not only duplicating headquarters functions, but other redundant activities within the command. It was noted that the Intelligence function was being considered for consolidation on Oahu, but there were numerous other areas offering potential savings through consolidation, elimination, or cross servicing, and it was believed that these should be explored. It was recommended that any directed reductions be levied as a total for the PACOM, giving CINCPAC the option of allocating reductions within his command.

(U) Regarding effects on operational capability, a 10 percent reduction had been identified; it would have a minor impact on operational effectiveness. A 20 percent reduction would occur with the transfer of 109 personnel from the CINCPAC Telecommunications Center to the Naval Telecommunications Command. With the 30 percent reduction a great many programs and services would be reduced in effectiveness or discontinued; CINCPAC listed 24 of these specific anticipated results.[2]

Reduction of General/Flag Officer Billets on CINCPAC's Staff

(U) A change in grade or Service affiliation occurred in many general/flag officer billets on the CINCPAC staff in 1973. On 21 May CINCPAC advised the

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1. JCS 7728/112011Z Oct 73; JCS 8044/201527Z Oct 73.
2. J01/Memo/150-73, 24 Oct 73, Subj: DOD Headquarters Review; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 001342, 26 Nov 73, Subj: DOD Headquarters Review.

JCS that an internal review of his staff justified reduction in the number of general/flag officer billets from 14 to an eventual level of 10, to be accomplished in phases. This did not come about, however, and only one such position was deleted in 1973, that of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics and Administration, a Navy rear admiral. One addition was that of the Inspector General, an Air Force major general. There was also an increase in grade for the Director of Personnel, from an Army colonel to an Army brigadier general. The Deputy Director for Intelligence billet, however, was downgraded from flag rank to Navy captain. Other recommendations for the first phase involved changing the Director for Logistics from an Army major general to a Navy rear admiral, which was accomplished, and upgrading the Director for Security Assistance from an Army brigadier general to Army major general, which was also accomplished, although an Army brigadier continued to occupy the position.[1]

(U) Phase two was to be effective on the departure or reassignment of incumbents. These were the Deputy Directors for Operations (an Air Force brigadier general) and Plans (an Army brigadier general). In November, however, CINCPAC advised the JCS that anticipated diminished activity that had generated the recommendation to reduce the number of general/flag positions had not materialized. To the contrary, CINCPAC pointed out, staff activity, particularly plans and operations, was increasing with no respite in sight. The dynamics of the post-hostilities environment, coupled with PACOM strategic and policy planning tasks that demanded increased planning responsiveness, continued the requirement for general officers in these two billets. These were retained.[2]

(U) Phase three was to become effective on the disestablishment of the U.S. Support Activities Group in Thailand. At that time the position of Inspector General, an Air Force major general, was to be eliminated and the Deputy Chief of Staff, an Army major general, was to be dual-hatted as the Inspector General. On 29 November, however, CINCPAC provided the JCS with his rationale for recommending that the Inspector General remain an independent assignment; he rejected the idea of dual-hatting a general staff officer because of the inherent conflict between functions in such a situation. (Earlier, in March, it had been necessary for CINCPAC to identify the general officer billet to be used as compensation if the Inspector General was not dual-hatted. CINCPAC selected that of his Public/Legislative Affairs officer and that billet was reduced from Air Force brigadier general to Air Force colonel.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 212131Z May 73.
2. CINCPAC 191855Z Nov 73.
3. CINCPAC 290309Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 130304Z Mar 73. See the "CINCPAC Staff Reorganizations" portion of this chapter for more detail on the Inspector General's office.

(U) Thus, the number of general/flag officers at the beginning and end of 1973 was as follows:

Position	Authorization 1 Jan 73	Authorization 31 Dec 73
CINCPAC	Navy Admiral	Navy Admiral
Inspector General	-	Air Force Major General
Chief of Staff	Army Lieutenant General	Air Force Lieutenant General
Deputy Chief of Staff	Air Force Major General) Navy Rear Admiral)	Army Major General
Director for Personnel	Army Colonel	Army Brigadier General
Director for Intelligence	Air Force Major General	Air Force Major General
Deputy Director for Intelligence	Navy Rear Admiral	Navy Captain
Director for Operations	Marine Corps Major General	Marine Corps Major General
Deputy Director for Operations	Air Force Brigadier General	Air Force Brigadier General
Director for Logistics	Army Major General	Navy Rear Admiral (08)
Director for Plans	Navy Rear Admiral (08)	Navy Rear Admiral (08)
Deputy Director for Plans	Army Brigadier General	Army Brigadier General
Director for Communications - Data Processing	Air Force Major General	Air Force Major General
Director for Security Assistance	Army Brigadier General	Army Major General
Public/Legislative Affairs Officer	Air Force Brigadier General	Air Force Colonel

Executive Administrative Offices

(U) Effective 6 August the administrative section serving the Chief of Staff and his deputies was consolidated with that serving CINCPAC. It was titled the Executive Administrative Section and was headed by the Flag Secretary and Aide to CINCPAC.[1]

Joint Secretariat

(U) Several organizational realignments occurred in the Joint Secretariat during 1973. On 10 May the Command History Branch became part of the Headquarters Administrative Division, with the former Command Historian becoming division chief. The Senior Historian became Command Historian. Other headquarters administrative functions remained unchanged. Physical consolidation of the branch began on 3 August in newly refurbished office space that had previously housed the Fleet Marine Force Pacific communications center, which had been consolidated with CINCPAC's communications center. By 9 September the Division Chief, Mail and Records Branch, Security Branch, Area Clearance and Travel Branch, and Command History Branch occupied the area.

(U) On 1 July the Headquarters Personnel Branch was re-transferred from the Joint Secretariat to the Director for Personnel. The military personnel offices had been transferred from the Personnel Division in 1966 and the civilian personnel office had been transferred in 1970.[2]

Personnel Directorate

(U) The Personnel Directorate was reorganized on 1 July, with certain functions realigned. The military and civilian personnel offices were transferred from the Joint Secretariat, intact, as the Headquarters Personnel Branch (J14). The Drug Abuse and Customs Control Branch (formerly J14) was combined with the Personnel Programs Branch (J11) and redesignated the Personnel Services Branch (J11). The name of the Manpower Personnel Actions and Plans Branch was changed to the Manpower, Organization, and Plans/Policy Branch; the designation J13 remained unchanged. The Civilian Personnel Policy Division (J12) remained unchanged. The Personnel Directorate was physically consolidated in November when the Directorate moved to Building 30 in the main headquarters building from one of the smaller, outer buildings in the headquarters complex. This continued a trend toward organization consolidation.

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1. CINCPAC Bulletin, No. 89, 3 Aug 73.
2. CINCPACNOTE 5400, 1 May 73, Subj: Reorganization within the Joint Secretariat; CINCPACNOTE 5400, 3 Jul 73, Subj: Reorganization.

During the buildup associated with the war in Southeast Asia many temporary space allocations had been considered expedient, but it was hoped that as space limitations eased, more logical arrangements would be possible.[1]

Operations Directorate

(U) Effective 1 July the Operations Directorate was reorganized and J-code designations changed throughout the directorate. The Director and his Deputy and their staff remained unchanged. The other two positions as Deputies were replaced by three divisions, and two other agencies were redesignated. The grouping under the former deputy for Current Operations (J3B) was formed into a Current Operations Division (J31) and an Operational Plans Division (J32). The organization of the former Deputy for Command and Control and Chief of the CINCPAC Command Center (J3C) became the Command and Control Division (J33), substantially unchanged. On 28 August further realignments took place between J31 and J32 with the transfer to J31 of the Special Operations and Operations Security Branches (J321 to J318 and J323 to J319 respectively). Further, the name of the Operational Plans Division was changed to the Nuclear Operations/ Safety Division to more accurately identify the duties of the organization.

(U) Code designations were also changed for the Research Development Test and Evaluation Division (from J30R to J34) and for the Scientific Analysis Group (Scientific Advisory Group until Jul 73) from J30S to J35. The librarian for the Scientific Analysis Group's technical library acquired and operated the CINCPAC Reference Library beginning in October. The reference library had been dormant in the Joint Secretariat since the position of CINCPAC reference librarian had been abolished in August 1972 as an economy measure.

(U) Effective 1 December a new Plans and Requirements Branch was formed in the Nuclear Operations/Safety Division from elements of the Requirements and Training Branch and the CINCPAC Command Center. The new branch had cognizance of all World-wide Military Command and Control System requirements pertaining to command and control.[2]

(U) Thus, at the end of 1973, the principal organizational elements of the Director for Operations were as follows:

J3	Director for Operations
J30	Deputy Director for Operations

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1. CINCPACNOTE 5400, 3 Jul 73, Subj: Reorganization.
2. J3351 HistSum Nov 73.

J31	Current Operations Division
J311	Air Branch
J312	Ground Branch
J313	Navy Branch
J314	Reconnaissance Branch
J315	Electronic Warfare Branch
J316	Exercise Branch
J317	Meteorology Branch
J318	Special Operations Branch
J319	Operations Security Branch
J32	Nuclear Operations/Safety Division
J321	Nuclear Operations Branch
J322	Nuclear Safety Branch
J3221K	Nuclear Operations Center, Kunia
J3224	Management Control Detachment, Pacific
J33	Command and Control Division
J331	Airborne Command Post
J332	Requirements and Training Branch
J333	CINCPAC Command Center
J334	Operational Reports/Computer Applications Branch
J335	Plans and Requirements Branch
J34	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Division
J35	Scientific Analysis Group

The directorate lost 40 authorized spaces during the year.

Logistics Directorate

(U) On 22 March 1973, as part of the fiscal year 1974 Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS, the authorized manpower spaces in the Logistics Directorate were reduced from 130 to 96. Concurrently, a new division was created--the Inter-Service Support Division (J43). This management action did not add a new function, but consolidated, with minor augmentation, existing missions and functions. The new division was concerned with all aspects of inter-Service supply and support, including those of duplication, single manager concepts, consolidations, and more economical operations.[1]

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1. J41 HistSum Apr 73; J43 HistSum Mar 73.

Plans Directorate

(U) Among the directorates to be reorganized in mid-1973 was the Plans Directorate, which had been undergoing evolutionary reorganization for over a year. Effective 15 July 1973 the directorate was formed into seven divisions. Principal organizations were as follows:

J5	Director for Plans
J50	Deputy Director for Plans
J5	Policy Planning Division
J511	Oceania Branch
J512	Northeast Asia Branch
J513	South Asia Branch
J514	Southeast Asia Branch
J52	Contingency Plans Division
J53	Force Planning Division
J54	Nuclear Policy Division
J55	Psychological Operations/Unconventional Warfare Division
J56	Projects Division
J57	SEATO/ANZUS Division

Communications-Data Processing Directorate

(U) The organizations of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics (J6) and the Director of the PACOM ADP Systems Support Division (J02C) were combined on 1 July into the Directorate for Communications-Data Processing under the J6. Budgeting and other considerations, however, required that the former PACOM ADP Systems Support Division be continued on a Joint Table of Distribution separate from that for the CINCPAC staff. This continued to be the situation at the end of the year. Organization directories reflected revised codes. The organization was also modified by the transfer of the Communications Center to the control of the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu on 1 September, discussed in greater detail in the chapter on Communications-Data Processing.

(U) In the July reorganization, two positions as Deputy for the Director were established. The former Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-

Electronics became the Deputy Director for Communications-Electronics (J61) with three branches under his cognizance: Systems (J611), Current Operations (J612), and Communications (J613). The Director of the PACOM ADP Systems Support Division (J02C) was designated the Deputy for ADP Systems Support (J62). Under his cognizance were the Requirements and Plans Branch (J621), the Analysis and Programming Branch (J622), the Data Processing Branch (J623), the Systems Maintenance, Quality Control and Audit Branch (J624), and the Kunia Operations Branch (J625). The Chief of the former Communications-Electronics Support Branch (J64) was designated the Chief of the Support Branch (J63) with cognizance for the Administrative Section (J631), the Electromagnetic Compatibility Section (J632), the Communications Security Section (J633), and the Technical Library Section (J634).[1]

(U) As with the other major staff reorganizations during the year, there were some other adjustments required. The changes coincided with a move of 17 December of the Communications-Electronics portions of the organization to Building 35 in the headquarters complex, where the J02C group had been situated. As of the end of the year, the principal organizations in the directorate were as follows:

J6	Director for Communications-Data Processing
J60	Deputy Director for Communications-Data Processing
J61	Systems and Plans Division
J611	Plans Branch
J612	Systems Branch
J62	Operations Division
J621	Airborne Systems Branch
J622	Command and Control Branch
J623	Networks Performance and Requirements Branch
J624	Electromagnetic Compatibility Branch
J625	Communications Security Branch
J63	PACOM ADP Systems Support Division
J631	Requirements and Technical Support Branch
J632	Analysis and Programming Branch
J633	Data Processing Branch
J634	Kunia Operations Branch

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1. CINCPACNOTE 5400, 16 Jul 73, Subj: Reorganization.

Security Assistance Directorate

(U) The Performance Evaluation Group, which had carried the staff code J8E, was redesignated J84 effective 1 December. The J84 code had not been used since the Excess Defense Articles Branch had been dissolved in December 1972 and the functions of that branch incorporated in other branches of J8.[1]

Establishment of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Regional Office Pacific (AROP)

(U) With the phaseout of the Thailand and Vietnam Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) offices, the ARPA Director ascertained that a regional office, established at Camp Smith, would maintain the quality, relevance, and usefulness of the research and development ARPA undertook on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. He therefore requested JCS concurrence in establishing a field office in Hawaii, ARPA-P.

(U) On 14 March CINCPAC concurred with the proposal to establish such an office co-located with CINCPAC. He pointed out the need for Terms of Reference to cover working relationships between that office and CINCPAC staff elements. He suggested that an ARPA representative visit CINCPAC to negotiate an inter-Service support agreement with the Marine Corps, the host at Camp Smith. The following week the Director of the ARPA Program Management Office arrived for this purpose and arranged for required support.

(U) The office opened on 9 April with an acting director. The ARPA-P was an attached unit and the advent of the office did not change the functional responsibilities of other elements of the staff. The ARPA-P director was to keep the CINCPAC Chief of Staff informed on ARPA activities and plans, but control of ARPA assets remained with that organization. It was established that normally the initial contact with the CINCPAC staff on ARPA matters would be through the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Division of CINCPAC's Operations Directorate, the established ARPA focal point, but that follow-on efforts would be between the ARPA-P and responsible CINCPAC staff agencies. The first Director of the ARPA Regional Office Pacific (AROP), as it came to be called, Mr. Richard H. Du Bois, arrived on 2 July.[2]

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1. CINCPAC 122034Z Jan 74.
2. J30R1 HistSum Mar 73; CINCPACNOTE 5400, 9 Apr 73, Subj: Establishment of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Pacific Field Office (ARPA-P); CINCPACNOTE 5400, 2 Jul 73, Subj: Arrival of Director of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Regional Office Pacific (AROP).

Center for Naval Analyses Representative to CINCPAC Staff

(U) The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) was a federally contracted research institution managed by the University of Rochester for the U.S. Navy. It was a direct successor of the Operations Research Group established by the Navy during World War II; it came into its present structure on 1 July 1962 with a general charter to perform operations research and systems analysis on specified Navy problems. CNA representative field billets existed at various commands in the PACOM.

(U) Following a 27 September 1972 visit by the President of the CNA, CINCPAC had initiated action to obtain analytical support to the CINCPAC staff from the CNA and from other agencies, both independently and through the CNA. These included the Rand Corporation, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group under the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and the Institute for Defense Analyses.

(U) One CNA analyst had arrived on 22 October 1972 to join the CINCPAC LINEBACKER Joint Assessment Group for a three-week period, and plans continued for a CNA Representative to be attached to the CINCPAC staff.[1]

(U) Following a 3 November 1972 LINEBACKER briefing, Admiral Gayler outlined his hopes for a major analysis effort concerning the Southeast Asia war. The extensive history of this combat effort, he believed, afforded a wealth of experience to assess our failures and successes--learning why theory was not supported by demonstrated capability or where results were unexpectedly rewarding. To this end, he continued, we should record and review all tactical and material use and results. From the mass of observed weapons-effects data, comparing operational experience with weaponeering theory could lead to a redefinition of our view of operations effectiveness.

(C) The Admiral said that documentation should be made to contrast the "advertised," expected, and demonstrated accomplishments of newer weapons systems to identify misconceptions that were part of their initial development in order to highlight the need for candid, realistic appraisal of the operational objectives and the operational environment that a future system would face before development proceeded too far. We should seek, he said, to identify the critical components of effectiveness in various operations and relate them to delivery accuracy and reliability of various weapons systems. Findings would assist Defense Department development agencies to understand the real-world requirements for weapons.

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1. CINCPAC 182107Z Oct 72.



[redacted]

b1 WPN Defi-ciency

(C) He also asked that all such analysis be directed toward seeking maximum efficiency, at the same time reviewing accepted definitions and standards for "efficiency" in all phases of ground, air, and naval operations with greater emphasis on dollar cost. In this regard he asked, for example, what was being accomplished with the $2½ million worth of 105mm ammo provided to the Vietnamese Army each month. CINCPAC concluded that we must find the energy and identify an adequate number of people to accomplish this task, assuming no re-initiation of previous combat levels.[1]

(U) CINCPAC also expressed his interest in the analysis effort in a letter to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering late in 1972. CINCPAC said that he believed that CINCPAC and the Service component commands should play a larger role than before, "bridging the gap between real-world operational environment and the laboratories and development agencies." He noted that a CNA representative was to be assigned, and he anticipated Army and Air Force representation. He said he'd like to get a representative from the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group or the Institute for Defense Analyses to participate in this program, and he solicited the views of the DDR&E.[2]

(U) Additional representatives were not forthcoming, however. In June 1973 the President of the CNA advised that neither RAND nor the IDA would be joining the effort. Both groups had explained that they were hit hard by budget cuts and preferred to devote their resources to continued support of their traditional sponsors. The Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, which had earlier regretted that analysts were not available, also sent no one.[3]

(U) The new CNA Representative, Dr. Donald J. McGibney, joined the CINCPAC staff in July 1973.

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1. Memo for Record, C.E. Thompson, J35, 4 Nov 73, Subj: Major Analysis Effort on SEAsia War (U).
2. Ltr, Admiral Gayler to John S. Foster, Jr., DDR&E, 11 December 1972.
3. SECDEF 8709/082157Z Nov 72; Ltr, David Kassing, President CNA, to Admiral Gayler, 6 Jun 73.

Changes in Administrative Workweek

(U) Twice during 1973 there were changes in the normal working week for CINCPAC staff personnel. The normal week for many years had been from 0800 to 1700 on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday and from 0800 to 1200 on Wednesday and Saturday. As a result of a poll conducted among the staff concerning the hours for starting and stopping work, a new schedule was directed effective 17 June. Work hours became from 0730 to 1600 hours on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday and from 0730 to 1130 hours on Wednesday and Saturday, with the lunch period reduced from an hour to a half hour.

(U) On 31 August it was announced that effective 9 September the normal workweek would be from 0730 to 1600, Monday through Friday. No longer would it be necessary to make temporary changes to the normal schedule to accommodate holidays that fell on or near Wednesdays or Saturdays to provide the full holidays enjoyed by other government agencies.[1]

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1. J0435 HistSum Jun 73; CINCPACNOTE 5330, 31 Aug 73, Subj: Change in Administrative Workweek for Staff CINCPAC.

SECTION III--COMMAND AND CONTROL

Reorganization of the PACOM Studied

(U) With continuing reductions in forces and funds, CINCPAC continued to seek ways to most effectively organize and manage his resources. One such approach concerned an increase in functional alignment of resources within the command. The commander of a unified command, in fact, had operational command, but little authority over many matters. "Operational command" authority involved the composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Specifically excluded from the unified commander's authority over assigned forces, however, were administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training; these belonged to the component commanders. Their chain of command on these matters was to the chiefs of their Services, not the unified commander. This had been clearly demonstrated in 1970 when CINCPAC had sought to exercise directive authority in the matter of the transfer of a field hospital in Thailand from Army to Air Force operation, without reimbursement. CINCPAC was advised that he could not direct such a transfer, but that he retained the responsibility for monitoring, reviewing, coordinating, and taking action that could lead to the resolution of issues.1

(U) These relationships had been cited in the 1970 report to the President and Secretary of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, which had been chartered to study the organization, structure, and operation of the Defense Department. The panel noted that this constituted "diluted command," in which the forces were under the "operational command" of the unified commander, but for matters other than such "operational command" were in the Service chains of command. The deficiency had been pointed out clearly by President Eisenhower in his message to Congress on the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. In response, the Act had vested in the unified commander "full operational command," indicating a Congressional intent to overcome the deficiencies of authority of the unified commander. The panel noted, however, that despite these actions, the relationship and relative authority remained unchanged. "The net result is an organizational structure in which "unification" of either command or of the forces is more cosmetic than substantive." The panel continued that the resultant organization structure was also layered with large headquarters and headquarters' staffs. The Panel had recommended designating the component commanders as deputies in order to make it unmistakably clear that the combatant forces were in a chain of command that ran exclusively

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1. J561 Point Paper, 26 Oct 73, Subj: Reorganization of Unified Command; CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 189-190.

through the unified commander. CINCPAC studied the matter in 1973, as well as the matter of further functional realignments.[1]

(U) On 14 December the Deputy Chief of Staff established a CINCPAC Organization Task Group, with each staff section providing both input and representatives to work with the Plans Directorate in formulating proposals. The purpose of the group was to determine the possibility of consolidation of common functions beyond such methods as inter-Service support agreements and the assignment of functions to a single Service or command. Each staff agency was tasked to advise of functions that were performed by any of the components for one or more of the other components within the PACOM, and the advantages or disadvantages accruing or anticipated, to include savings of any kind. They were also asked to list other functions that could be assumed by one of the components for one or more of the other components through future negotiations or inter-Service agreements. They were also asked for recommendations for future functional consolidation that would enhance operations within the PACOM, but could not be obtained through such inter-Service agreements. The submissions received by staff members were under study at the end of the year.[2]

~~(C)~~ In late November CINCPAC received a proposal from CINCUSARPAC relating to the Defense Department review of headquarters agencies. CINCUSARPAC noted that in a number of separate actions the primary effort appeared to be to reduce the size of different headquarters. He offered a proposal designed to reduce the number of headquarters and number of layers of command. His proposal was in three phases: the first was creation of a new unified command in Northeast Asia with three components, the 8th U.S. Army, 5th Air Force, and Naval Forces, Northeast Asia. He also suggested considering the Taiwan Defense Command in this consolidation, although he recognized TDC's ties to Northeast Asia as tenuous. In Phase II, he recommended establishment of one headquarters in Southeast Asia, made up primarily of Air Force but with some Army participation.

~~(C)~~ Phase III would result in the inactivation of CINCPAC and activation of a specified command from CINCPACFLT resources that would have responsibility for the oceans with its authority stopping at the water line (similar to the Atlantic Command). At that time, the subordination of the unified commands in Northeast and Southeast Asia would be shifted from CINCPAC to the JCS. CINCUSARPAC proposed reducing the existing Service components to support elements for the appropriate parts of the three commands. They would be engaged pri-

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1. Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 1 Jul 70.
2. J02 Memo/46-73, 14 Dec 73, Subj: PACOM Functional Organization Study.

marily in the fields of logistics, personnel, and administration, and would consist of extensions of the appropriate CONUS support elements of each Service. Air defense of Hawaii would have to be worked out between the Continental Air Defense Command and the maritime specified command. CINCUSARPAC believed that this proposal would reduce personnel requirements, simplify command lines, and streamline operations.[1]



1. CINCUSARPAC 280331Z Nov 73.

developing a PACOM organization with unity and coherence, minimum layering, that is responsive to war requirements and efficient.[1]

Support Requirements for CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility, Kunia

(U) CINCPAC's Alternate Command Facility at Kunia was the hardened emergency command post in central Oahu, about 18 miles from CINCPAC's headquarters at Camp Smith. Since 1966 the Commander of the Fleet Operations Control Center, U.S. Pacific Fleet (FOCCPAC), which was located at Kunia, had reported to CINCPAC for additional duty as Chief of the CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility; he was assigned staff code J02D in this capacity. This assignment of additional duty had been to increase the emphasis on responsiveness of Kunia command and control facilities to the unified commander. In March 1971, however, CINCPACFLT had recommended that the additional duty assignment be terminated, and that CINCPAC task CINCPACFLT directly for support of the Kunia facility in accordance with existing command and financial management channels. (The Navy was responsible for providing or arranging for the administrative and logistic support of the headquarters of the CINCPAC.)

(U) CINCPAC concurred with the recommendation in June 1971, but requested that the additional duty support responsibility not be terminated before substitute tasking directives for CINCPACFLT had been promulgated. In September 1971 the Chief of Naval Operations approved these plans. On 10 September 1973 CINCPAC assigned responsibility for Kunia to CINCPACFLT to provide command and control facilities for CINCPAC and his staff to include communications and data processing centers, in order to assist in the effective discharge of CINCPAC's continuity of command responsibilities. A CINCPAC instruction of that date outlined the tasks and services required.[2]

(U) On 10 September 1973 CINCPAC also advised CINCPACFLT that the additional duty assignment of the Commanding Officer of FOCCPAC was terminated. He asked that he be advised of the CINCPACFLT staff code assigned to the FOCCPAC commander.[3]

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC 220416Z Dec 73.
2. CINCPACINST C5400.18, 10 Sep 73, Subj: Support Requirements for the Commander in Chief Pacific Alternate Command Facility, Kunia (U).
3. CINCPAC ltr Ser 3223 to CINCPACFLT, 10 Sep 73, Subj: Assignment of CO, FOCCPAC to Report for Additional Duty to CINCPAC.

[redacted]

Possibility of Defense Department Coordinators Explored

(C) Throughout many countries in the PACOM there were a large number of semi-independent Defense Department organizations--not PACOM agencies--that reported to parent organizations outside the host country and that were without any mechanism for in-country coordination. The result of this situation was redundancy, and confusion to host governments and other U.S. agencies. The Ambassador in Manila had expressed his concern in this area to the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines, who had advised Admiral Gayler. CINCPAC proposed to send a team to review the situation, beginning with the Greater Manila area, with a view toward recommending units for reduction, consolidation, relocation, elimination, or realignment. He advised the Service headquarters in Washington and his component commanders in Hawaii, as well as the JCS and the CINCPACREP Philippines of this study and asked them to identify non-PACOM units or detachments in the Manila area. He further requested their mission statements and knowledge of any reductions or changes planned for them. Upon completion of this Manila study, CINCPAC continued, he planned to propose methods of improving efficiency and command and control for other areas of the PACOM. CINCPAC's Inspector General conducted the study in December. The JCS provided the list of non-PACOM units or detachments and their functions on 28 December.[2]

(C) In the longer range review of these matters, CINCPAC considered it desirable to have the Defense Department authorize a single U.S. military coordinator in each country to eliminate redundancy and provide a unified PACOM voice with non-Defense Department agencies and host governments. No positive action had been taken on this matter by the end of the year.[3]

Major New Organizations Formed in Southeast Asia

(TS) With the announcements in late October 1972 of a possible cease-fire in Vietnam, the JCS issued a directive concerning contingency withdrawal

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1. FOCCPAC Command History CY 1973, FOCCPAC Serial C15, 1 Mar 74.
2. CINCPAC 300333Z Nov 73; J561 HistSum Nov 73; JCS 5801/281813Z Dec 73; IG Memo to J0425, 18 Jun 74, n.s.
3. J561 Talking Paper, 29 Nov 73, n.s.

planning. The JCS directed that planning be accomplished to execute the following missions when directed:

> a. Execute cease-fire in the RVN and terminate military operations against North Vietnam (NVN). Continue US combat operations in support of the Royal Laotian Government and the Government of the Khmer Republic at about current levels.
>
> b. Commencing on a date to be specified (X-Day), deploy within a 60-day period all US/FWMA [Free World Military Assistance] military forces along with specified materiel from the RVN.
>
> c. Upon implementation of a cease-fire in the RVN on X-Day, insure security of forces, materiel, and facilities during redeployment.
>
> d. In coordination with the US Embassy, Saigon, establish a US Defense Attache Office (DAO), Saigon, of not more than 50 military spaces. This capability is to be fully operational by X plus 60 days. No other US military personnel will be authorized in-country except for Embassy security guards.
>
> e. Establish command arrangements outside the RVN for control of residual US missions and responsibilities in SEASIA which COMUSMACV now holds.
>
> f. Retain the capability for resumption of combat air and naval support to friendly forces in the RVN, Laos, and Cambodia and for the resumption of military action against NVN.
>
> g. Arrange for the necessary US in-country residual support of the RVNAF, to include management, control, and supervision of continued resupply and closed-loop maintenance and contractor support.

The JCS continued that on a date to be determined (after X-Day), COMUSMACV was to relinquish operational control of U.S. land-based combatant air forces in Southeast Asia. Concurrently, a U.S. military command was to be established in Thailand to provide air command and control capability. Also on a date to be established (after X-Day), Thailand based forces were to be reduced to an

interim level capable of 4,700 USAF tactical air combat sorties per month (with a surge capability to 6,700 sorties if required), and 1,000 B-52 sorties per month. One RF-4C squadron and one AC-130 squadron were to be retained. In addition, support aircraft, electronic countermeasures, forward air control, command and control aircraft, etc., required to provide an appropriate level of combat support would be retained.

(TS) A number of operational and logistic particulars were also addressed. CINCPAC was tasked to provide a recommended U.S. force structure in Thailand; a concept for logistic support of the RVNAF, withdrawal of US/FWMA forces, and retrograde of U.S. equipment and stocks not needed to meet RVNAF requirements; the in-country civilian requirements and organization for the effective management and supervision of a program to support the RVNAF; a plan to provide required intelligence capabilities in Southeast Asia; the composition, mission, and functions of a 50-man DAO in Saigon; anticipated civilian contracting and funding requirements to support the RVNAF; proposed rules of engagement and operating authorities for both in the RVN during the withdrawal of U.S./FWMA forces and for U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia outside the RVN after the cease-fire; a conceptual withdrawal plan and schedule for remaining U.S./FWMA forces in the RVN; a phasedown plan for reduction in Southeast Asia air and naval forces; a contingency plan for continued supply support and training for Cambodian forces; and a plan for resuming combat air and naval support to friendly forces in the RVN, Laos, and Cambodia and for the resumption of military action against North Vietnam.[1]

(TS) Basic organizational planning was concerned with formation of the two agencies that were created to accomplish most of these tasks. These were the U.S. Support Activities Group/7th Air Force formed at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Base in Thailand, and the Defense Attache Office in Saigon. Each of these is discussed below. The Joint Casualty Resolution Center is discussed in the Operations Chapter under the subject "Personnel Recovery."

U.S. Support Activities Group/7th Air Force

(TS) The U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG)/7th Air Force was the agency formed to "retain the capability for resumption of combat air and naval support to friendly forces in the RVN, Laos, and Cambodia and for the resumption of military action against NVN." A MACV proposal was included in CINCPAC recommendations to the JCS regarding options for a proposed organization. The three options: establishment of a subordinate unified command, U.S. Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), to conduct land-based air and logistics operations; a

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1. JCS 4907/272238Z Oct 72.

limited Southeast Asia sub-unified command, "Southeast Asia Support Command (SEASO)," with lesser responsibilities and scope of activities than envisioned for the preceding option; and an Air Force unilateral command. While these options were being further developed and studied, the JCS recommended that the headquarters in Thailand be a multi-Service headquarters entitled "U.S. Support Activities Group/7th Air Force."

(TS) This USSAG was a multi-Service integrated headquarters under the operational command of CINCPAC, and not a subordinate unified command; CINCPAC already had a subordinate unified command in Thailand, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI). USSAG was organized with normal J-staff positions. An Air Force general was the dual-hatted commander of both the USSAG and 7th Air Force. The USSAG deputy commander was an Army major general, and the Chief of Staff, an Air Force major general, was also deputy commander of the 7th Air Force. General John W. Vogt, Jr., USAF, was the first Commander USSAG/7th Air Force.

(U) The headquarters was activated at Nakhon Phanom at 0001Z on 11 February 1973 by COMUSMACV. (The Royal Thai Government had approved the activation of the headquarters.) On 15 February operational command passed from COMUSMACV and the organization came under the direct operational command of CINCPAC. Deployment of the advance echelon from Vietnam to Thailand had begun in January and the ADVON closed at Nakhon Phanom on 29 January. The movement of the main body was completed by 18 February. The remaining headquarters and support unit personnel moved from Vietnam over the next 45 days as their MACV functions terminated.[1]

(U) As of 31 March, the following strengths were reported for USSAG:[2]

	Authorized		Assigned	
	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted
Army	44	46	43	46
Navy	11	10	8	9
Marines	2	0	2	0
Air Force	237	238	210	221
Total	294	294	263	276

1. CINCPAC 142355Z Feb 73; History of the U.S. Support Activities Group, 15 Feb-31 Mar 73, pp. 1-9; COMUSMACV 300730Z Jan 73; COMUSMACV 141030Z Feb 73.
2. History of the U.S. Support Activities Group, 15 Feb - 31 Mar 73, p. 13.

(S) Terms of Reference were published by CINCPAC on 23 April. The mission was:

> USSAG/7AF, Thailand, will plan for resumption of an effective air campaign in Laos, Cambodia, the Republic of Vietnam and North Vietnam as directed by CINCPAC; Maintain a command and control structure for the management of air elements which may be committed to it and a capability for interface with VNAF Air Control System; Establish and maintain liaison with RVNAF JGS, CTF 77, and committed SAC forces; and exercise command over the Chief, Defense Resources Support and Termination Office (CHDRSTO). [See following discussion of DAO office for explanation of discontinuation of use of term "DRSTO."]

Under the operational command of CINCPAC, COMUSSAG/7th AF was to exercise operational control of Thailand-based USAF assets (except SAC units and PACOM Transportation Management Agency controlled C-130 aircraft) when committed to him by CINCPAC for combat air operations. The Commander of the 13th Air Force at Clark Air Base in the Philippines commanded the assigned USAF units when the aircraft were not committed to USSAG/7th Air Force for combat air operations. COMUSSAG/7th Air Force was to maintain liaison with the Joint General Staff of the RVNAF, Commander Task Force 77, and committed SAC forces and maintain the capability to interface with the Vietnamese Air Force tactical air control system. COMUSMACTHAI was to remain the CINCPAC Single Senior Military Representative in Thailand. COMUSSAG/7th Air Force would deal directly with the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, Thailand, on matters of mutual interest. He would also be subject to the direction of the Ambassador in making contact with officials of the Thai government, keeping the Ambassador and CINCPAC fully informed. The DRSTO was to be part of the Defense Attache Office, Saigon, but the Chief of the DRSTO was to report to COMUSSAG/7th Air Force concerning in-country Defense Department-contracted activities and Department statutory responsibilities. COMUSSAG/7th Air Force was to coordinate with COMUSMACTHAI for support on matters of mutual interest, such as common user/cross-Service support agreements; administrative and logistic support was to be provided as directed by CINCPAC.[1]

(S) In addition to combat air operations-associated responsibilities and functions, he was charged, among other things, to conduct Joint Casualty Resolution Center activities in Laos, Cambodia, the RVN, and North Vietnam as directed by CINCPAC; to coordinate search and rescue operations in Southeast Asia and adjacent waters; and within his area of responsibility to monitor, evaluate, and make recommendations concerning USAF levels in Thailand. He was also charged to supervise, through the DRSTO, the management and/or coordina-

1. Ibid.

tion of U.S. Defense Department and contracted activities remaining in the RVN to include logistics, intelligence training, RVNAF Joint General Staff liaison, operations, and communications-electronics; and monitor, through the DRSTO, the security assistance planning for the RVN, making recommendations to CINCPAC and the Services as appropriate. (It was noted here that the DRSTO reported directly to CINCPAC for coordination of security assistance planning matters.)

(U) A special instruction concluded the Terms of Reference, noting that they in no way altered the existing TOR of COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI/DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI or their relationships with the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Thailand or CINCPAC.[1]

(S) In the matter of public information and affairs in Thailand, the Ambassador advised CINCPAC on 31 January that he wished to continue to maintain the position with the Thai government that COMUSMACTHAI was the senior military representative in Thailand. In this regard, the chief military information officer in Thailand, the Ambassador believed, should assume the position of chief MACTHAI public affairs officer. He had no objection if CINCPAC wanted this officer to report to him directly, but he said "we should maintain the public image that he is the MACTHAI PAO." Mission information policy, he continued, had been to have a single information release point. Although operational announcements were now being handled by CINCPAC in Honolulu, newsmen working in Thailand would want to provide coverage of numerous stories relating to military affairs, including the Joint Casualty Resolution Center. The Ambassador said he envisioned delegating to MACTHAI PAO release authority on such activities, "consistent with policies and guidelines laid down by the Embassy."[2]

U.S. Defense Attache Office, Saigon

(TS) Following the JCS request for a concept for continued support of the RVNAF after a cease-fire had been signed, for the remainder of 1972 many refinements and modifications for a proposed residual organization in Vietnam were advanced. In November the JCS had authorized the establishment of a Defense Resources Support and Termination Office (DRSTO). Various manning strengths and command arrangements were postulated by COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and the Ambassador in Saigon. None of these proposals, however, altered the basic concept of in-country logistics support by a dominantly civilianized organization. Also in November the JCS authorized CINCPAC to establish as a companion

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1. CINCPACINST S3020.2G, CH-3, 23 Apr 73, Subj: Command Relationships in the Pacific Command (PACOM) (U), Encl 5, Terms of Reference for the U.S. Support Activities Group/Seventh Air Force (USSAG/7AF), Thailand.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 1675/311236Z Jan 73.

organization to DRSTO a "defense attache element" within the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Saigon. The two organizations were to be headed by one individual, an Army major general. Final organization, command relationships, and manpower levels depended on the terms of the cease-fire agreement, which had not been reached by the end of 1972.[1]

(TS) By January 1973 the concept of two separately named organizations was modified to eliminate the DRSTO designation. While the rationale for retaining only the DAO Saigon designation was not clear, it was apparently in response to a COMUSMACV request, on 14 January, to abstain from using the term "DRSTO" in all future correspondence. Thus, even though the reason and/or authority for this change was nebulous, subsequent reference in this history will be to DAO, Saigon as the MACV replacement organization.[2]

(S) The DAO, Saigon was a jointly staffed activity that assumed all Defense Department responsibilities in the RVN following the disestablishment of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) on 29 March 1973. The Defense Attache (DATT) was assisted by an Attache Element consisting of Service attaches and assistant Service attaches who performed traditional attache functions. This attache element was under the supervision of the DATT and the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission to the extent provided by law and in accordance with Executive Orders and such other instructions as the President might promulgate. The Army Attache was designated as Assistant DATT. The DATT was also responsible to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency for all military and political-military intelligence functions. The DATT and his assistant had direct access to the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission on all attache matters and were to keep the Mission chief fully informed. Unresolved differences between the Mission chief and the DATT concerning attache matters were to be referred by the DATT to the Director of the DIA.

(S) Under CINCPAC's responsibility, however, were the DATT's military assistance functions. The DATT was the representative of the Secretary of Defense (and CINCPAC) with respect to the U.S. security assistance program in the RVN and coordinated with the Service divisions in their planning and management of the respective Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) programs in support of the RVNAF. The DATT was CINCPAC's Single Senior Military Representative in the RVN.

(S) For matters pertaining to the coordination of security assistance planning, the DATT reported directly to CINCPAC but he was to keep the COMUSSAG/7th Air Force informed until that organization was disestablished.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 281-284.
2. COMUSMACV 141015Z Jan 73.

The DATT was to keep the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission fully informed concerning existing and prospective security assistance and other DATT plans, programs, and activities.[1]

(S) Both the size and principally-civilian staffing of the DAO distinguished it from normal attache offices. With the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the RVN, the United States placed firm limits on the number of military personnel that would be in that country. The JCS, in mid-January 1973, had provided organization and function statements for the new organization and approved manning levels. These manning levels were finally listed as 50 U.S. military, 1,200 Defense Department civilians, and 5,500 U.S. contractor personnel. No limit was set on the number of third country national personnel authorized. At that time it was planned to phase out the civilians at the end of 12 months. Recruiting civilians for these temporary positions is discussed at greater length in the chapter on Personnel.[2]

(U) The DAO was activated on 28 January with MAJ GEN John E. Murray, USA, as the DATT. The phasing down of MACV functions and the final withdrawal of U.S. and Free World Forces proceeded simultaneously. The DAO remained under the command of COMUSMACV until the deactivation of that command on 29 March, at which time command passed to the Commander USSAG/7th Air Force.[3]

(S) The responsibilities and functions of the DATT, in addition to those listed above, were outlined in CINCPAC's instruction on command relationships. As CINCPAC's Single Senior Military Representative in the RVN, the DATT was to act as coordinating authority in those matters of joint concern. This authority extended to all personnel under the jurisdiction of or accountable to the Department of Defense. He was to develop coordinated U.S.-RVN military plans, as directed. He was to monitor, evaluate, and report on the GVN and its Armed Forces capabilities, plans, military operations, training, logistic systems, communications-electronics systems, support requirements, strengths, and organizations. He was to coordinate all proposed U.S. construction projects in the RVN, to include the coordination of actions pertaining to land acquisition.

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1. CINCPACINST S3020.2G CH-3, 23 Apr 73, Subj: Command Relationships in the Pacific Command (PACOM) (U), Encl 25, Terms of Reference for the Defense Attache Office, Saigon.
2. J41 HistSum, which cited JCSM 25-73 of 15 Jan 73; JCS 8290/251719Z Jan 73. Other pertinent messages include COMUSMACV 270215Z Nov 72, CINCPAC 022036Z Dec 72, and JCS 5977/151425Z Jan 73.
3. The DAO was activated and assigned to MACV by General Order 304 under authority of JCS 2132/182317Z Nov 72 as noted in the History of the DAO, 4th Quarter 1973, 4 Apr 74.

(S) Also, he was to interface with appropriate RVNAF elements and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center regarding prisoner of war-missing in action matters. (The JCRC is discussed in greater detail in the chapter on Operations.) Other tasks concerned intelligence matters, principally collection requirements for signal, photo, and human resources intelligence. In conjunction with the DAO attache element, the DATT was to maintain liaison with and monitor the RVNAF/GVN intelligence, counterintelligence, and security organizations, and exchange information with the Joint General Staff and other agencies, as appropriate.

(S) He was charged with a number of responsibilities relating to the security assistance program. He was to make recommendations concerning the program to CINCPAC and the Services, keeping COMUSSAG/7th Air Force informed. He was to insure that plans and programs were appropriately coordinated with other U.S. Government agencies. He was to provide recommendations to the Services or CINCPAC concerning offshore procurement of material or services. He was to insure that the utilization of material and services furnished, and personnel trained, at U.S. expense complied with regulations.

(S) He was charged to insure that security assistance planning and programming for the military support of the RVNAF were established to facilitate the continued development of the RVNAF's capabilities, and termination of direct Defense Department and contractual support. One specific caveat:

> ...Insure that DOD civilian and military personnel do not function as "advisers" or provide direct training to the RVNAF. DOD civilian employees or contractors in the RVN will not be used to perform in a paramilitary or police role either operationally or in an advisory capacity.

A number of other specific responsibilities and functions were listed by CINCPAC, with the final admonition concerning the release of classified military information to the Vietnamese, and concluding, "Host or third country requests for military advice or information of any nature not covered by these terms of reference will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[1]

(U) For the DATT there was no command relationship with the military commissions in operation in the RVN. These were the Four-Party Joint Military Commission (and the follow-on Four-Party Joint Military Team), the Two-Party

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1. CINCPACINST S3020.2G CH-3, 23 Apr 73, Subj: Command Relationships in the Pacific Command (PACOM) (U), Encl 25, Terms of Reference for the Defense Attache Office, Saigon.

Joint Military Commission, and the International Commission of Control and Supervision. Both MACV and the DAO, however, provided extensive support to members of those commissions in matters such as messing, billeting, facilities, engineering, etc.[1]

(U) The DAO was organized into six main divisions, Army, Navy, Air Force, communications-electronics, operations and plans, and support. The Service divisions corresponded to their predecessor elements in MACV, except for the advisory role, their basic missions being to support self-sufficiency of the RVNAF.[2]

(S) Almost as soon as the DAO was activated and staffed, planning began to reduce the size of the agency. The DAO, at the request of the JCS and CINCPAC, provided a plan for the phaseout of all Defense Department civilians from the RVN by 31 January 1974. This was known as "DAO Saigon OPLAN 001" of 6 May 73. The plan included an assessment of the impact such a withdrawal would have on DAO mission objectives. It recommended the retention of sufficient DAO personnel in the RVN beyond 31 January 1974 to insure the accomplishment of DAO mission objectives and that civilian spaces be reduced only as functions and tasks were Vietnamized, completed, transferred, contracted, or eliminated. On 16 June the DATT provided a preliminary evaluation of the minimum civilian personnel requirements necessary to execute essential DAO functions that must be retained beyond January 1974. The recommended organization structure for this residual organization was being developed with the goal of further eliminating redundant positions and maximizing the overall efficiency of the organization. The impact on each of the divisions was outlined and a residual organization with a civilian strength of 715 was submitted. Contracts managed were expected to be decreased from an original 383 with 5,237 contractor personnel to 37 by January 1974 managed by an estimated 2,543 civilians.[3]

(S) Impacting on planning throughout this period were a number of National Security Decision Memoranda which had levied the continuing requirement to increase in-country piaster expenditures in order to offset the deflationary impact of the U.S. phasedown on the local economy, to provide foreign exchange support to the GVN, and to contribute generally to the long-run economic development of Vietnam. One of these, NSDM-210 dated 11 April 1973, for example, directed the Department of Defense to increase its piaster expenditures in Vietnam to a total of $136 million in 1973.[4]

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1. History of DAO, Saigon, 29 Jan - 31 Mar 73 (U), pp. 9-10.
2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. USDAO Saigon 160825Z Jun 73.
4. Ibid.

(S) These economic and other considerations combined to reveal the impact a zero level civilian presence would have in the RVN. Continuing contracts would have to be managed by the RVNAF or administered from outside Vietnam. Procurement activities would have to be assumed by the RVNAF. Statutory and regulatory requirements such as end-use inspection, audits, one-for-one exchange, etc., could not be accomplished. The requirement to convert to Military Assistance Program procedures and manage the largest such program in the world was beyond the scope of the 50-man DAO unless this was its only function. Property disposal activities would have to be transferred to the GVN with the demilitarization of materiel done by contract or the RVNAF. There would be a lack of U.S. surveillance of contractors. Defense Department economic aid programs to the GVN would have to be transferred to the Agency for International Development or cease. There would be a loss of intelligence capabilities other than Embassy-sponsored activities. There would be greatly reduced planning capability and responsiveness to higher headquarters.[1]

(S) On 2 August the JCS amended their previous guidance. The manning level to be effective on 31 January 1974 was 50 military and 723 civilians. The primary objective of the DAO was to provide essential support to the RVNAF. The DAO also retained primary responsibility for execution of the Defense Department portion of NSDM-210. The mission of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center was to be retained within the DAO.

(S) CINCPAC was tasked to undertake, in conjunction with the components, a critical analysis of OPLAN 001 with the objective of insuring that the residual DAO was reduced to the absolute minimum consistent with the stated objective of providing essential support to the RVNAF. He was to recommend additional areas for termination or transfer of functions; to undertake local coordination relative to transfer of functions to the Embassy, other government agencies, or offshore activities; to conduct a study of Terms of Reference and of residual functions in order to develop a phasedown plan for the period subsequent to 31 January 1974; to implement appropriate reductions in reporting requirements at the PACOM level and to forward recommendations for other reductions to the JCS; and to plan concurrently to reduce the civilians to zero by the end of January 1974 in the event higher authority recommended a complete phaseout.[2]

(S) CINCPAC advised his components of these requirements on 8 August. The review was of the document that by this time was called DAO OPLAN 001, Revised.

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1. J5354 Point Paper, 21 Jul 73, Subj: DAO Saigon - Phase Down (U).
2. JCS 2326/021544Z Aug 73.

Each studied the matter and provided his comments to CINCPAC.[1]

(S) On 31 August CINCPAC submitted a time-phased study plan to the JCS that called for completion of the study effort by 15 June 1974; this proposed study plan was being staffed at the Washington level, the JCS subsequently advised.[2]

(S) On 27 October, however, the JCS provided guidance that rescinded both the requirement to plan for reduction to zero and implementation of the plan to reduce to 723 civilians. The JCS advised:

> ...In view of the state of developments in SEASIA, and the status of implementation of the cease-fire agreements, higher authority has directed that plans be made to maintain the civilians assigned to the DAO, Saigon, at full strength subject to annual review. While observing the principle of nondegradation of US support and assistance to the RVNAF, higher authority wishes to insure that US organization and civilian manning levels are sound and economical from a management viewpoint. Accordingly, DOD civilian and US contractor spaces should only be reduced as functions and tasks are Vietnamized, completed, transferred to other agencies or activities, or eliminated. A residual DAO, Saigon, will be retained with sufficient DOD civilian personnel to insure the accomplishment of essential mission objectives and completion of Vietnamization. Any reductions from the established ceiling of 1,200 DOD civilian personnel which can be effected will be presented for consideration and approval. Each proposed incremental reduction in DOD civilian strength must be fully justified in order to demonstrate that US assistance to the RVNAF will not be diminished.

CINCPAC was asked to submit by 30 November a Joint Manpower Program for JCS review, with any reductions or increases from the authorized 1,200 spaces fully justified. He was also asked to review the impact on recruitment and replacement as affected by the guidance just provided. He was to submit, in

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1. CINCPAC 080357Z Aug 73; CINCUSARPAC 250327Z Aug 73; CINCPACAF 251747Z Aug 73; CINCPACFLT 262138Z Aug 73. This follow-on review was similar to that which had been conducted earlier on the plan; at that time the component responses had been contained in CINCUSARPAC 120512Z May 73, CINCPACAF 121910Z May 73, and CINCPACFLT 131954Z May 73.
2. J5131 Point Paper, 31 Oct 73, Subj: DAO Saigon - Phase Down (C).

preparation for the next annual review, the results of a review and validation of the Terms of Reference and functions of the DAO for approval by the JCS; this submission was due by 31 August 1974.

(S) The JCS also requested that the Services continue to insure that contractual efforts provided for support essential to RVNAF requirements until tasks were Vietnamized, completed, or eliminated. The review of contractor personnel requirements was the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics.[1]

Four-Party Joint Military Commission and Team

(U) In accordance with Protocol 10 to the Agreement on Ending the War, after the departure of the U.S. Delegation to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission on 31 March, a Four-Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) was formed to succeed the Commission to handle matters involving missing in action and recovery of remains. The U.S. Element was under the operational control of CINCPAC, administratively supported by the U.S. DAO in Saigon. It was the interface between the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the FPJMT. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission had been activated on 28 January 1973 to provide the vehicle for establishing effective communications between the South Vietnamese, North Vietnamese, the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG--the Viet Cong), and the United States for negotiating and settling matters concerning the implementation of specific provisions of the Paris agreement and protocols. An important issue for the U.S. Delegation was to insure the proportionate release of U.S. prisoners of war to the withdrawal of U.S. Forces.[2]

Military Assistance Command Vietnam Disestablished

(U) The United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam, which had been established on 8 February 1962, was disestablished effective 1100Z on 29 March 1973.[3]

Defense Attache Office, Vientiane Established

(S) In the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane there had been a Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Attache, but no one designated as the Defense Attache. The Deputy Chief,

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1. JCS 4816/270055Z Oct 73.
2. CINCPAC 311450Z Mar 73.
3. COMUSMACV Command History Jan 72 - Mar 73 (Annex A to CINCPAC Command History 1972), Vol. I., p. 138; COMUSSAG/7AF 051035Z, Apr 73 which referenced COMUSMACV 290915Z Mar 73.

Note: Previously exempted by USCINCPAC

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Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI) at Udorn, Thailand had performed the Military Assistance Program functions for Laos of planning, programming, requisitioning, receipting for, and storage of material [redacted] and for [redacted] shipment to Laos. On 15 August 1973 the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, an Army brigadier general, was reassigned as the Defense Attache, Vientiane. On 4 September the Embassy advised that the Royal Laotian Government had responded to the U.S. request to establish the Defense Attache Office. A Foreign Ministry note stated that the Ministry of National Defense "has no objection to the request to establish in Vientiane a 'Defense Attache Office' as part of the United States diplomatic mission in Laos." The note further stated that the accredited personnel who constituted the DAO "have received the agreement of the Royal Lao Government." Accordingly, BGEN Richard G. Trefry moved from Udorn to Vientiane on 5 September.

(S) The position he left was downgraded to colonel, and subordinated to the new office. Because of sensitivities in both Thailand and the United States, it was believed there should be no change at that time in the title of the DAO rear element from DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI. Also, the relationships of the DEPCH organization to COMUSMACTHAI and Commander, U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand did not change.

(S) The DATT was under the command of CINCPAC and responsible to him for supervision of the Military Assistance Program. He acted as the principal military adviser to the Ambassador. He was responsible to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency for all military/political intelligence functions.

(S) When the Defense Attache moved to Vientiane he brought with him from the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI staff intelligence and support elements (42 people, plus 3 in the DATT). This arrangement was considered to be only temporary, however. With the formation of the Provisional Government of National Union, which had not occurred by the end of 1973, the number of persons authorized to be in the country was to be reduced to 30 military and 15 civilians. Terms of Reference are addressed in further detail in the Security Assistance chapter of this History.[1]

Command Relations/Operations Agreement for Planning with CINCSAC

(S) Early in 1973 CINCPAC concluded with the CINC of the Strategic Air Command a command relations-operations agreement for contingency planning. The agreement was signed by CINCPAC's Chief of Staff on 18 January, and by the SAC Chief of Staff on 6 February, at which time it became effective. The agreement outlined command relations as follows:

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1. J5254 Point Paper, 28 Apr 73, Subj: Defense Attache Office (DAO), Vientiane (C); CINCPAC 051445Z Sep 73, which cited AMEMB Vientiane 041100Z Sep 73.

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...CINCSAC will conduct air operations in support of CINCPAC as directed by higher headquarters. Overall coordination of theater air operations in support of CINCPAC mission will be exercised by CINCPAC. CINCPAC may delegate the coordination authority to an appropriate air component commander.

...Implementation of approved air strike plans involving SAC Forces will be at the direction of National Command Authorities (NCA) and as coordinated between CINCPAC and CINCSAC. Operational command of and execution authority for SAC forces supporting CINCPAC operations will be retained by CINCSAC.

...CINCSAC will provide an advon for planning and pre-execution coordination of CINCSAC air operations.

...CINCPAC will support, as appropriate, CINCSAC Forces operating in PACOM.

...Continuing liaison and coordination will be effected between appropriate subordinate command levels of CINCPAC and CINCSAC to insure mutual support and maximum effectiveness in planning and accomplishing assigned tasks.

Operational procedures were outlined, including a requirement to advise the JCS on all strike planning and strike request messages, and advance notification of the appropriate American Embassy, if applicable. Strike planning and request messages were to contain specific statements regarding source and currency of information that supported conclusions reached as to absence of noncombatants from the target area and/or enemy presence in what might appear to be areas inhabited by noncombatants. Specific procedures for both CINCSAC and CINCPAC were also outlined.[1]

Command Arrangements Agreement with CINC U.S. Readiness Command

(C) A command arrangements agreement between CINCPAC and the CINC of the U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) was concluded in the summer of 1973. It was agreed that operational command of USREDCOM augmenting forces would be passed to CINCPAC at a point mutually agreed upon or as directed by the JCS. Specific information on such transfers, as required by the Joint Operational Planning System, was to be reflected in appropriate CINCPAC plans. Normally, CINCPAC

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1. CINCPAC/CINCSAC Command Relations/Operations Agreement for Contingency Planning (U).

would assume operational command of U.S. Army augmentation forces through CINCUSARPAC upon entry of such augmentation forces into the PACOM area of responsibility as reflected in the Unified Command Plan. CINCPAC was to assume operational command of augmenting Air Force forces at 140° West longitude through CINCPACAF. In order to facilitate mutual planning assistance, the two unified commanders authorized direct planning liaison with and between the subordinate commanders designated to provide planning support, who would in turn be responsible for keeping the unified commanders informed, particularly in those matters that required increased commitment and approval on the part of their unified commander.

(C) In the event of a major emergency in the PACOM that necessitated the use of all available forces, CINCPAC was authorized to assume operational control of forces in accordance with paragraph 30229 of JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces. With regard to redeployment, CINCPAC was to return operational command in the same manner he had acquired it, returning Army forces to USCINCRED when they departed the PACOM area of responsibility and Air Forces at 140° West. The plan was signed by CINCPAC on 13 June and became effective when it was signed by USCINCRED on 2 July.[1]

(C) Although the agreement concerned forces augmenting the PACOM, it had not dealt with PACOM forces that would transit the Continental United States in order to augment the forces of the European Command in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, as provided for in USCINCEUR OPLAN 4102. At a conference held in the Readiness Command on 28-29 November, PACOM and REDCOM representatives jointly prepared a proposal to cover the situation. The REDCOM subsequently formally proposed the arrangements to the PACOM on 21 December. CINCPAC concurred early in January 1974 and the new provisions were added to the arrangements agreement.[2]

(C) The revised agreement called for operational command of PACOM Army forces that augmented USCINCEUR to pass to CINCRED upon their departure from the PACOM geographic area of responsibility. Operational control of PACOM Air Forces passed to CINCRED at 140° West. Operational control subsequently was to pass to USCINCEUR in accordance with USCINCRED-USCINCEUR arrangements.

Command Arrangements Agreement with CINC Atlantic Command

(U) CINCPAC had concluded a command arrangements agreement with the CINC of the Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) on 12 July 1972. That agreement, however,

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1. CINCPAC-USCINCRED Command Arrangements Agreement (U), 13 June 1973.
2. USCINCRED 212040Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 030500Z Jan 74.

had not addressed the situation of PACOM Navy and Marine forces that were to transit the LANTCOM's area of responsibility to augment USCINCEUR in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war as outlined in USCINCEUR OPLAN 4102. At a U.S. Readiness Command planning conference held 28-29 November 1973, PACOM and LANTCOM representatives jointly prepared a proposal to cover the situation. CINCPAC subsequently formally proposed the arrangement to CINCLANT, who concurred and forwarded a proposed draft paragraph for PACOM consideration as an addition to the command arrangements agreement. CINCPAC concurred early in 1974.[1]

(C) The new agreement called for operational command of CINCPAC Navy and Marine forces augmenting USCINCEUR to pass to CINCLANT upon their entry into LANTCOM's geographic area of responsibility. Operational control subsequently passed to USCINCEUR in accordance with CINCLANT/USCINCEUR arrangements.

New CINCPACFLT Single Point of Contact to CINC Alaska Designated

(C) The Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier had been designated as the single point of contact to CINC Alaska for naval operational matters. The Hawaiian Sea Frontier was to be disestablished on 1 June, however, and it was necessary for CINCPACFLT to designate another point of contact. The First Fleet and the Antisubmarine Warfare Forces Pacific were to be consolidated as the Third Fleet on 1 February 1973; at the time of establishment the Third Fleet Commander would become the principal source of naval operational information presently provided CINCAL by the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier and he was thus designated the single point of contact by CINCPACFLT to be effective 15 February. He was tasked to keep CINCAL informed of naval operations and related matters occurring in the sea areas contiguous to the Alaska Command. He was also charged to provide certain operational information, such as regarding operations other than those in the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program that might cause Soviet reaction and might logically require Alaska Command forces to assist in protective reaction; operations where it was likely that ALCOM forces would be called on for search and rescue operations; operations in which ALCOM bases might be called upon to provide support; surveillance operations of Soviet forces posing a threat against logical Alaskan targets; and Royal Canadian Navy operations in combined operations. Information regarding submarine operations was specifically excluded from the operational information to be provided CINCAL.[2]

Electronic Warfare Liaison Officer from USAFSS to CINCPAC

(S) In 1973 a Letter of Understanding was signed to enumerate and define the functions, responsibilities, and duties of an electronic warfare liaison

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1. J5211 HistSum Jan 74; CINCPAC 070311Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 040237Z Jan 74.
2. CINCPACFLT 092121Z Jan 73.

officer stationed at the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center (PEC). The USAF Security Service (USAFSS) had been tasked to provide operational commanders with technical support in planning and conducting EW activities. To assist in insuring effective EW support measures and electronic intelligence support to EW in the Pacific area, an EWLO was assigned to the USAF Security Service Pacific with duty assignment at the PEC. He was to act as an extension of the USAF Special Communications Center (AFSSCOMCEN), a subordinate unit of the USAFSS tasked to perform long-term trend analysis of U.S. operational and all-source intelligence data. He was to coordinate with the PEC and CINCPAC staff points of contact to provide a channel for the exchange of data between the AFSPCOMMCEN and unified command elements, as well as the Service operational commands in the PACOM. He was to coordinate with CINCPAC Intelligence and Operations staffs, and with component commands to insure distribution of AFSPCOMMCEN EW and MIJI reports (meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion), and to explain methodology, data inputs, evaluation, techniques, effectiveness criteria, and utilization of reports. He was also to provide feedback from CINCPAC consumers, forwarding requirements and queries and suggestions.

(S) The EWLO was to be operationally subordinate to the Headquarters, AFSPCOMMCEN and administratively subordinate to the USAFSS/Pacific. Extensive travel was expected to be required; this was to be funded by the USAFSS; the PEC was to provide administrative and typing support.[1]

Service Affiliation of General Officers on Taiwan

(S) Late in December 1972 CINCPAC completed his triennial review of Service responsibility for manning the positions of Chiefs/Commanders of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs), Missions, and Military Groups. Among his recommendations at that time was that the MAAG Chief for China continue to be an Army major general. The JCS approved CINCPAC's other recommendations, but directed that the CHMAAG China billet become rotational, to alternate between the Army and the Air Force, with the Air Force relieving the incumbent upon completion of his tour.[2]

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC 150115Z Aug 73; Letter of Understanding forwarded to USAFSS with CINCPAC ltr Ser 001306-73, 9 Nov 73.
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 002662, 26 Dec 72, Subj: Service Responsibility for Assigning Chiefs/Commanders of MMAGs, Missions and MILGPs (U); JCS 032233Z May 73.



1. CDR USARFT, Taipei 150206Z Aug 73.

[redacted]

(C) On 13 September CINCPAC was advised by the JCS that the Secretary of Defense asked them to consider the possibility of changing the Service affiliation of the position of the Chief of Staff of the Taiwan Defense Command (TDC) from Air Force to Army and then rotating it between the Army and Air Force in concert with the rotation of the Chief MAAG position, so that an Army general was available in country. CINCPAC asked his component commanders and COMUSTDC for their comments.[2]

(S) COMUSTDC did not consider the rotation idea desirable. He noted that the proposal presumed a direct linkage between the TDC and MAAG staffs that did not exist (unless the MAAG were to be incorporated into the TDC). He noted that the overriding military priorities in the defense of Taiwan were air and naval defense, and that he depended heavily and on a daily basis on his Air Force Chief of Staff to provide the expertise and the knowledgeable contact with the ROC Ministry of National Defense regarding air defense matters. The Chinese, he believed, would be more confused than reassured by the continued rotation by Service between two quite dissimilar jobs, since they perceived the commitment of the United States to Taiwan in far more concrete terms than the Service affiliation of our general officers. The day to day and contingency operational requirements of the TDC were overriding considerations, he believed, and these indicated the continued need of a rated USAF general officer as Chief of Staff.[3]

(C) The CINCPACAF concurred in the comments provided by COMUSTDC. CINCPACFLT interposed no objection to the JCS proposal.[4]

(C) CINCUSARPAC, however, advised that he considered the continuous presence of a U.S. Army general officer to be highly desirable and therefore he strongly concurred with the JCS proposal. Traditionally, he continued, the ROC Army had closely identified with the U.S. Army and considered it one of the ROC's formidable supporters. The presence of an Army general was considered important to the maintenance of the prestigious posture of the United States in the ROC and to the success of the U.S. Mission. The absence of a general officer, he concluded, could diminish U.S. influence with the ROC army.[5]

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1. AMEMB Taipei 4995/160932Z Aug 72.
2. JCS 6974/131921Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 140311Z Sep 73.
3. COMUSTDC 170950Z Sep 73.
4. CINCPACAF 180030Z Sep 73; CINCPACFLT 180532Z Sep 73.
5. CINCUSARPAC 180142Z Sep 73.

(C) On 17 October CINCPAC provided the JCS with his comments. He had advised them earlier of a detailed review of the U.S. military presence in Taiwan that included overall command structure; this review had not yet been completed or recommendations formulated. In the meantime, with U.S. emphasis on air and naval defense of Taiwan, he recommended retention of an Air Force brigadier general as TDC Chief of Staff "at this time."[1]

Inspector General Activities

(U) In November 1972 the JCS had advised that the Secretary of Defense had decided to establish at each unified command the position of Inspector General. The effective date for establishment of the office at CINCPAC's headquarters was 18 April 1973. The authority was contained in JCS SM-90-73 of 26 February. The Inspector General (IG) was to be principally concerned with matters of an operational nature. By monitoring and periodic inspection of operational areas essential to mission performance, he would provide the commander with an additional means to evaluate the ability of all echelons of his command to accomplish their missions. Further, he would provide an office responsive through the commander to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense for the evaluation of command and control, joint operational readiness, and operational security programs within the command. The IG was to be responsible to and report directly to the commander. The commanders of the unified commands were to insure that there was a clear delineation between the functions of the command IG and the Inspectors General of the Service component commands. Coordination and cooperation between Service and joint commanders and their respective IGs were considered of paramount importance in this relationship. The IG functions of the unified commands, it was pointed out, were not intended to infringe on the established responsibilities of the Service IGs, and IG activities within the unified commands were to be fully coordinated with the Service component commands to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and overlap into uni-Service administrative and support areas. Matters not within their area of responsibility that became evident during the conduct of inspections or evaluations by the IG of either a unified command or component command would be referred to the appropriate commander for disposition.[2]

(U) On 11 April the JCS approved the 10-billet Joint Table of Distribution for the office, and on 4 June the first CINCPAC IG, MAJ GEN Lawrence F. Tanberg,

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1. CINCPAC 212122Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 172136Z Oct 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 32; CINCPACNOTE 5400, 20 Mar 73, Subj: Establishment of the Office of the CINCPAC Inspector General; JCS SM-90-73, 26 Feb 73, Subj: Expansion of Inspectors General Activities.

USAF, reported for duty. On 3 May two CINCPAC Instructions were published to outline the duties of the office and command inspection responsibilities.[1]

(U) After establishment of the office on 18 April, the Deputy IGs for Command and Control and Operational Security accompanied the CINCPAC Staff Assistance Team on a visit over much of the PACOM in late April and early May. A special visit was made to discuss formation of an IG office at the U.S. Support Activities Group in Thailand, and such an office was subsequently established. (CINCPAC's other subordinate unified commands did not have such offices during 1973 as they had no forces assigned. The JCS charter would apply equally to any CINCPAC subordinate unified commands if such offices were activated.)[2]

(U) Among other activities during 1973, projects included a study of assignment of security classification, the inadvertent release of an "Eagle Pull" message, an inquiry into allegations of abuse of U.S. military commissary and exchange privileges in the Philippines, and a review of Defense Department activities in the Greater Manila area. Also, in September the IG and his staff inspected the headquarters of COMUS Korea, and in November that of the Taiwan Defense Command.[3]

(U) In November CINCPAC outlined to the JCS his reasons why the position of Inspector General should remain a separate flag officer billet, and not be double-hatted with one officer performing as both the IG and the Deputy Chief of Staff, as had been proposed. CINCPAC noted the inherent conflict between functions in such a situation, as well as the great distances within the PACOM and the requirement for the IG to be away from the headquarters for prolonged periods.[4]

Command and Control Facilities

(S) A number of minor changes took place in 1973 in CINCPAC's continuing effort to improve his command and control facilities, considering also efficiency and cost reduction. A number of reductions in access to the Emergency Action Center by telephone and mobile radio were effected as a result of studies con-

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1. JCS 7276/112147Z Apr 73; CINCPACINST 5040.5, 3 May 73, Subj: Pacific Command Inspector General, and CINCPACINST 5040.6, 3 May 73, Subj: Command Inspection Responsibilities.
2. IG HistSum May 73.
3. IG HistSums Jun-Dec 73. The Manila study is discussed in greater detail earlier in this chapter, "Possibility of Defense Department Coordinators Explored."
4. CINCPAC 290309Z Nov 73.

ducted by the Inspector General and the Director for Operations. Reductions included 4 office hotlines, 3 quarters hotlines, and 11 mobile radios (plus a reduction in spare radios from 10 to 5).[1]

(U) A memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCSM 440-73, Policy and Procedures for the Management of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System), received in late October, required, among other things, the submission of a PACOM Command and Control Master Plan, which was to be updated annually. Additionally, it established the channels and format for the submission of command and control operational requirements from field commands to the JCS. The activities required were assigned primarily to the newly formed Plans and Requirements Branch (J335) within the Command and Control Division of the Operations Directorate.[2]

[redacted]

(U) At CINCPAC's Alternate Command Facility at Kunia (in central Oahu about 18 miles from CINCPAC's Camp Smith headquarters) the Emergency Action booth was enlarged, glass enclosed, and equipped with Western Electric Model 304 consoles similar to those in the Camp Smith booth. Although the Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System (EMATS) was Air Force property, it was relocated by the Navy's Fleet Operation Control Center, Pacific (FOCCPAC) so that the work could be done more promptly. This saved over $1,000 in CINCPAC funds. FOCCPAC also relocated the 440L Warning and Display equipment and the Kunia Internal Secure Telephone System (KISTS) phone. This work was completed by 14 March. Construction was finished and the Kunia emergency action booth was operational by 20 August.[5]

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1. CINCPACNOTE 2305, 24 Sep 73, Subj: Reduction of Phone Subscribers and Telephonic Access to the Command Center Emergency Action Center (EAC).
2. J3351 HistSum Nov 73.
3. J333 HistSum Oct 73.
4. Ibid.
5. J62C1 HistSum Mar 73.

Emergency Action Procedures



1. J3C211 HistSum Feb 73; J3 HistSum Sep 73.
2. J3 HistSum Apr 73.

[redacted]

(S) CINCPAC also conducted a command and control staff assistance team visit to the Western Pacific area during the period 23 April - 8 May 1973. The team was composed of representatives of the Inspector General; the Intelligence, Operations, and Communications-Electronics Directorates; and the Army and Navy component commands. The team visited the Military Assistance Command and the U.S. Support Activities Group in Thailand; COMUS Japan, the 5th Air Force, and CINCPAC's Management Control Detachment-Pacific in Japan; the 13th Air Force and the 405th Tactical Fighter Wing in the Philippines; COMUSTDC; COMUS Korea, the 314th Air Division, and the 38th Artillery Brigade (Air Defense) in Korea; and the CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility on Guam. Areas of interest included sealed authenticator systems security and storage, emergency action messages and training programs, and command and control communications. Critiques were conducted at all commands and units visited, with suggestions provided to correct any discrepancies.[2]

GIANT MOON 5 Planning Conference

(C) GIANT MOON tests were in a series to evaluate the Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS). On 5 December at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, a planning conference was held to review the results of GIANT MOON 4 and plan for GIANT MOON 5, scheduled for mid-March 1974. The CINCPAC representative to the conference reported that GIANT MOON 4 had proved highly successful.

[redacted]

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1. J3 HistSums Apr, Oct 73.
2. J3C211 HistSum May 73.
3. J332 HistSum Dec 73.

Alternate Command Facility at Guam Redesignated

[redacted]

Airborne Command Post Activities

[redacted]

(U) On 28 and 29 June an "in-house" exercise that involved three battle staffs was conducted; one was deployed in the Western Pacific area and two flew in the Hawaii area. The exercise involved 31.1 hours of airborne flying time and 29.7 hours of continuous airborne watch time. The exercise established many planning factors for use in future exercises of that kind.[4]

[redacted]

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1. J6332 HistSum Jul 73.
2. J3C10 HistSums Jan-Dec 73.
3. J3C10 HistSum Jan 73.
4. J3310 HistSum Jun 73.

[redacted] b1

(S) During both September and October the CINCPAC Command Center broadcast BLUE EAGLE FOUR launch messages, through high frequency communications nets to the deployed ABNCP, for each sortie flown for about a week or 10 days. Launch times were within the prescribed 15 minutes in most cases. Greater times were usually the result of air traffic control delays. On 19 October, however, an engine fire during the starting of the aircraft caused it to be evacuated. The engine then checked out and takeoff was made with no further incident, but 34 minutes after notification to launch.[2]

[redacted]

(U) In April the ABNCP and TACAMO conducted three airborne sorties for the Defense Communications Agency in support of the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Plan Test Program. The purpose was to obtain range analysis up to 2,000 nautical miles of the systems.[4]

1. J3310 HistSum Jul 73.
2. J3310 HistSums Sep, Oct 73.
3. J3C10 HistSum Jan 73.
4. J3C115 HistSum Apr 73.



(U) Operations security, mentioned above, was a matter of continuing interest. In May an operations/communications security team conducted the first such OPSEC/COMSEC survey of the ABNCP. The team, composed of CINCPAC Operations Division staff and the 6905th Security Squadron surveyed both the Hickam AFB facility and flew with and observed the airborne phase of a mission.[2]

(C) On 24 October, when the JCS directed a world-wide increase in the Defense Readiness Condition, to DEFCON 3, the battle staffs and aircrews had been contacted within an hour and placed on one-hour recall alert. This included an aircraft and team on deployment to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Additionally, the four available aircraft were placed in a ground alert status capable of launch within one hour.[3]

(C) The POL shortage impacted on the ABNCP as it did on everything else. During November, for example, the normal schedule of local flights and deployments to the Western Pacific was cancelled and only three local flights were flown. To maintain proficiency of the battle staffs and communications teams, an extensive ground training and exercise program was initiated. These training periods were conducted on board the aircraft for approximately two hours and there were five periods a week scheduled.[4]

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1. J3C1 HistSum Feb 73; J3310 HistSum Oct 73.
2. J3C10 HistSum May 73.
3. J3310 HistSum Oct 73.
4. J3310 HIstSum Nov 73.

[redacted] 61

Visits of Journalists to Diego Garcia

(S) In mid-May the U.S. Ambassador in London transmitted a letter received from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office giving the British position on the question of visits by journalists to Diego Garcia. They voiced no general objection at the time, but noted that after a year or so matters might become more sensitive. They agreed to a U.S. proposal to designate the Commander in Chief Pacific as coordinator for the visits. They believed, however, that there were a number of conditions that should be embodied in the arrangements for the visits, including a coordinated vetting system under which the final decision for proposed visits should rest with the State Department and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and a preliminary briefing of the journalists covering both the political and military aspects of the facility.

(S) The British noted that while the government-to-government agreements on the British Indian Ocean Territory and the communications facility had been published, the separate agreement between the U.S. and Royal Navy had not. "It must, therefore, remain confidential and there should be no reference to the terms of this RN/USN agreement in any briefing or statement, nor should reference be made to any unresolved problems that may arise from time to time." An example cited was the U.S. Navy's drug amnesty program, which had implications for Royal Navy personnel on Diego Garcia.[2]

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1. Ltr, Fleet Operations Control Center, U.S. Pacific Fleet to Chief of Naval Operations, Serial C15, 1 March 1974, Subj: Command History (OPNAV Report 5750-1).
2. JCS 150408Z May 73.

SECTION IV--U.S. BASES OVERSEAS

United States Bases in Japan and Okinawa

(S) CINCPAC's concept of a developing new partnership between the United States and Japan, based on common perceptions and understanding of security needs, underscored 1973 on-going activities to reduce our force levels and base requirements. Such force and base realignments had been in progress since 1968. In June 1973, commenting in response to a JCS request on a draft National Security Study Memorandum (172), CINCPAC elaborated on the partnership idea. He noted that some U.S.-Japan interests and objectives were divergent, but manageable if the basic political/security/economic relationship was sound, fully understood, and appropriately considered in each nation's planning process. Of immediate interest, CINCPAC said, was the maintenance of an effective U.S. military posture at minimum cost for the defense of Japan and support of contingencies. CINCPAC continued:

> ...considering the sensitivity of military matters in Japan and the variety of frictions which can work against the US-Japan relationship, development of a partnership mutually committed to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region will require: (a) great diplomatic skill; (b) a broadly based common understanding of our goals and game plan; (c) careful attention to security of classified information; (d) time. In the near term the Japanese contribution will most likely be limited to non-military enterprises and economic assistance. In the mid and long term, a true partnership with Japan should lead to the safe and desirable acceptance of greater security responsibilities.[1]

(S) Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) were restricted by the Japanese constitution, public opinion, the availability of funds, and defense concepts associated with their island geography. U.S. efforts toward assuring a degree of standardization between the two forces had been considered modestly successful, and CINCPAC believed that reasonable defense tasks should be shared. The long term partnership envisioned would focus on requirements and boundaries for surveillance (air, surface, and subsurface), air defense, antisubmarine warfare, and defense of surface combatants. U.S. base structure, meanwhile, was evolving toward a steady state that could be afforded economically and accommodated from a domestic political viewpoint, that was mutually supportable from a defense viewpoint, and that would continue U.S. presence in the Western Pacific area

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1. CINCPAC 092359Z Jun 73.

and contribute to area stability. The bases and facilities in Japan and Okinawa had already decreased from over 3,500 in 1952 to fewer than 170 in 1973. These consolidations were proceeding in accordance with the COMUS Japan Master Facilities Study, with Okinawa also under study. They followed a "core concept," which had U.S. Forces drawing down to and concentrating at three main bases in the Toyko area plus minor enclaves at Misawa, Iwakuni, and Sasebo, and to bases on Okinawa. In contingencies, however, the United States would require expanded use of Japanese bases and reliance on the Japanese economic and industrial base. The degree to which the Japanese would provide such support, it was believed, would be directly proportional to their own perceived national interests.[1]

(S) There were problems in the matter of reentry of forces in contingencies. There was no provision in the Status of Forces Agreement for release of facilities with provision for reentry. Outright release, therefore, was tantamount to permanent closure with little possiblility of reentry. The only legal and practical route, therefore, to insure contingency reentry was continued U.S. occupancy through joint use of facilities. CINCPAC established certain "End Point" base plans to outline minimum requirements. This concept provided for:

- Maximum consolidation of service complexes storing Pacific War Reserves (ammunition, POL, etc.).

- Retention of key logistic centers to support reentry of contingency forces through joint use.

- Maximum consolidation of service functions (communications, surveillance, intelligence gathering, etc.).

- Joint use of bases when feasible.

- Reduction of U.S. visibility, especially in densely populated areas.

The primary "End Point" bases and facilities for day-to-day operations CINCPAC considered to be as follows:

Navy: Yokosuka - Naval support facility and homeport for surface ships.

Atsugi - Joint-use base for carrier aircraft when in port at Yokosuka.

Misawa - Joint-use base for P-3s and Navy/Marine fighter and attack aircraft using range facilities.

1. J5262 Point Paper, 22 Jun 73, Subj: Base Evolution (U); J512 Point Paper, 25 Jul 73, Subj: Military Partnership with Japan (U).

Marine Corps: Camp Butler Complex (including Futema) - Housing Marine Corps division, helicopter group, and transport squadron.

Iwakuni - Joint-use base. Home of Marine aircraft wing.

Air Force: Yokota - Terminal airlift facility.

Kadena - Primary base for Air Force tactical fighter and tactical airlift squadrons. Additionally used for Navy P-3s and Navy/Marine aircraft using local targets.

Army: Sagami General Depot - Major maintenance and supply facility.

Machinato Service Area - Logistic force storage and war reserve munitions storage area.

(S) CINCPAC acknowledged that additional facilities would be needed for reentry of forces to support contingency plans. These included one and possibly two Naval port facilities depending on the intensity and duration of the conflict, one Marine base, two Air Force bases, and additional hospital facilities.[1]

(C) Under study at the end of 1972 had been the relocation of flying activities from Naha, in Okinawa Prefecture. These plans were described in some detail in the 1972 CINCPAC Command History. On 23 January 1973 the United States and Japan, at a Security Consultative Committee meeting, agreed in principle to relocate Navy and Marine Corps flying activities from Naha to Kadena Air Base. Tied to this agreement were several other projects, such as construction at Misawa Air Base, Iwakuni and Futema Marine Corps Air Stations, family housing, bachelor officer and enlisted quarters relocation, and extensive renovation of barracks for the Army. The total cost of the package was to be in the range of $100 to $130 million, $30 million of which was to be debited to the $65 million Okinawa Reversion Related Construction Program (ORRCP) fund.[2]

(C) CINCPAC staff representatives chaired a meeting at Kadena from 1 to 5 February 1973 comprised of representatives of the Service components, COMUS Japan, and Okinawa organizations. The conference resulted in agreement by Navy representatives to beddown in a particular area of Kadena (the Charlie area, adjacent to the SAC area), and identified projects to support the relocation agreements. A summary of these agreements was forwarded to the components and

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1. J5122 Point Paper, 26 Oct 73, Subj: "End Point" Base Plans for Japan (U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 68-75, 313-315; J5262 Point Paper, 7 Feb 73, Subj: Relocation of Navy/Marine Flying Activities (U).

COMUS Japan for review prior to a 12 February meeting at which matters were to be finalized for submission to Washington. A recapitulation of anticipated costs follows:[1]

Relocation of Navy/Marine Corps flying activities	$19,255,000
Air Force programmed operational requirements	21,770,000
Navy/Marine Corps/Air Force bachelor officer/enlisted quarters	12,616,000
Directed Projects	3,620,000
Family Housing and community support	48,298,000
Army troop billeting and related support	5,433,000
Total	110,992,000
Preconditions to agreement in principle	17,300,000
Misawa Housing (175 units), utilities, and roads	6,440,000
Grand Total	134,772,000
Balance of $65 million for RORRCP (Revised ORRCP)	35,200,000
Total cost to Government of Japan	$169,932,000

(U) On 9 February CINCPAC asked his component command commanders to revalidate previously submitted reversion projects. These matters were all reviewed at a conference at CINCPAC headquarters on 12 and 13 February. On 26 February CINCPAC revalidated most previously submitted reversion projects to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Some projects, however, were not revalidated and some were changed in scope.[2]

(U) The JCS had tasked CINCPAC to identify $12.5 million worth of projects to provide to the Japanese for reprogramming of their funds for Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 1972. CINCPAC did so on 4 March, listing items in three priorities, the first two of which had to be completed before flying activities were moved

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1. CINCPAC 062239Z Feb 73.
2. CINCPAC 262201Z Feb 73.

from Naha to Kadena. All priority 3 projects also had to be under way prior to relocation.[1]

(C) On 15 March the Secretaries of State and Defense provided a list of projects for the Japanese to use in this $12.5 reprogramming. They listed all of the Priority I projects CINCPAC had validated and most of the Priority II, although some were modified and cost was reduced by approximately $1.5 million to $22 million. The Embassy was asked to remind the Japanese that additional projects were under development for the Army and Air Force. All Priority I projects and $9.5 million worth of Priority II projects were chargeable to the $65 million Japanese account. The Secretary of State advised CINCPAC that his extensive coordinated effort leading to the complete and timely submittal of project listings from the Defense Department was fully appreciated.[2]

(C) On 24 March CINCPAC listed for COMUS Japan the series of projects finally agreed on for reprogramming the $12.5 in JFY 72 funds; projects were from both Priority I and II and totaled $12,487,800. The projects selected were operationally oriented and provided good visibility to the Japanese regarding progress toward relocation of flying activities from Naha. CINCPAC again emphasized that completion of the projects would not allow the scheduled move.[3]

(U) On 2 April the Secretary of Defense commented on procedures recommended by COMUS Japan, which included using the Joint Committee structure. The Secretary recognized that the Joint Facilities Subcommittee was the proper element for presentation of the overall plan and individual, approved Military Construction Project Data documents (DD Form 1391s) to the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA), but the multiple committee-panel structure as outlined by COMUS Japan was considered unwieldy and time consuming. The Office of the Secretary provided a concept patterned after the Director of Construction procedures used in Vietnam and Korea, with the District Engineer, Japan (DEJ) equating to the Director of Construction, the design package to the construction directive, and the DFAA to the design and construction agent. Project requirements were to be programmed to the Office of the Secretary through the Service chain with prior or simultaneous project validation by CINCPAC to the components and through the JCS to the Office of the Secretary, which would approve the projects to the Services with pertinent information provided to all concerned. The Services were to provide copies of the approved Forms 1391 to the COMUS Japan Construction Panel, which would deliver them through the Joint Facilities

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1. CINCPAC 040618Z Mar 73.
2. SECSTATE 047680/1/150041Z Mar 73.
3. CINCPAC 242259Z Mar 73.

Subcommittee to the DFAA. Any comment ensuing would be passed to the DEJ, who represented USARPAC, the executive agency. The DEJ, as the authorized representative of the construction agency and a member of the construction panel, was to retain "responsibility and reinitiate vigorous pursuit of finalizing the agreement, seeking the construction panel's assistance and advice when necessary."[1]

(C) On 10 April the Secretary of Defense issued guidance and a recommended format for an integrated priority list of all RORRCP projects. The Secretary also issued a list of suggested program titles; this was subsequently revised by CINCPAC's submission of the required integrated list in June. The program titles were as follows:

I - Naha relocation projects which must be completed prior to move of flying activities.

II - Naha relocation projects which must be under construction prior to the move of flying activities.

III - Futema projects for upgrade of runway plus helicopter support facilities.

IV - Air Force programmed mission requirements at Kadena.

V - Family housing and community support at Kadena to accommodate Naha housing plus 200 units of (Army-owned, Air Force-dedicated) Machinato Housing. Housing at Misawa in support of P-3 relocation.

VI - Army Naha billeting and related support projects.

VII - Valid Phase I and Phase II ORRCP Projects (from original aircraft relocation plan) not included in other programs.

VIII - Projects identified against $17.3 million JFY 73 funding.

CINCPAC validated the requirements, scope, and estimated cost of all new projects in the list.[2]

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1. SECDEF 7095/022337Z Apr 73.
2. SECDEF 6117/102221Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 162158Z Jun 73. The components submitted their recommendations for inclusion in the integrated list by CINCUSARPAC 300732Z May 73; COMMARCORBASESPAC 022032Z Jun 73; CINCPACFLT 042004Z Jun 73; and CINCPACAF ltr, 4 Jun 73, Subj: Revised Okinawa Reversion Related Construction Program (RORRCP) (U).

(C) On 20 and 27 July 1973 the Secretary of Defense approved 157 projects at a total estimated cost of $145.5 million. He noted that the Office of the Secretary of Defense position on debiting of the approved projects against the $65 million construction credit was as follows: Programs III, VII, VIII, and the first $9.3 million of Program I were debited against the $65 million; the balance of Program I and all of Programs II, IV, V, and VI were outside of the $65 million.[1]

(C) Construction of bachelor enlisted quarters at Misawa became a special problem about this time. The Japanese failed to fund the full $17.3 million in JFY 73, causing the United States to set priorities for use of available funds for Misawa. The U.S. plan had been to rehabilitate and upgrade 20 BEQs for the patrol squadron's use at Misawa. The Japanese had defended their budget before the Diet based on replacement of 10 BEQs with one or more new, reinforced concrete structures. CINCPACFLT was anxious to move the squadron from Iwakuni to Misawa to eliminate dual management problems existing with the split operation at Iwakuni and Misawa, to place the squadron closer to the center of its area of responsibility, to relieve pressure on Iwakuni, and to save money. But the operational facilities had to be completed first; this involved nine construction projects at a cost of $673,000. The Japanese plan for the BEQs would use all available JFY 73 funds for Misawa, and delay moving the squadron until the spring of 1975 at the earliest. The National Security Agency, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Air Force Security Service were pushing for completion of the BEQ as the first priority, believing that if the operational facilities were completed first, the Japanese might never fund the BEQ. On 16 June, the same day CINCPAC had furnished his integrated facilities list, a recommendation was made that the United States no longer stick to its position for rehabilitation of the 20 BEQs because the entire Misawa program might come to a complete halt. As a first preference, it was recommended that the United States accept, with qualifications, the Japanese version of the requirement to replace the 10 BEQs. It was noted that the Japanese had acknowledged that their version was more expensive and had agreed that they would be prepared to absorb additional costs without requesting debits against funds available for construction projects. As a concession to U.S. agreement, the Japanese were to make addidional funds available for JFY 73 construction of certain operational projects at Misawa. A second preference provided a position if the Japanese were unable to make additional funds available. If, during the course of negotiations, it became obvious that insistence on the U.S. position would result in no JFY 73 construction at Misawa, the United States should accept the Japanese proposal to construct replacement BEQs, specifying that they be sited at the security service area.[2]

1. SECDEF 9448/200135Z Jul 73 and SECDEF 7506/272316Z Jul 73.
2. CINCPAC 162115Z Jun 73; J4211 Point Paper, 20 Jun 73, Subj: RORRCP Construction at Misawa Air Base.

(C) On 2 July the Secretary of Defense established the Department's position on the Misawa housing, which was in accord with CINCPAC's. The Secretary of State, on 11 July, advised that the United States had accepted Japan's offer to construct 10 new BEQs as replacements for those not considered economical to rehabilitate; construction was to meet current U.S. BEQ standards. The Embassy was advised to again emphasize the importance of coordinated completion of housing and operational projects at Misawa, and elsewhere, to permit prompt and efficient transfer of functions. On 12 July CINCPAC advised that he did not believe it was in the best U.S. interest to accept a lower or austere standard for this BEQ construction. Regardless of any caveat, it could be considered a precedent for other projects. On 2 August COMUS Japan reported the results of a construction panel meeting and requested approval to accept the Japanese proposal. CINCPAC so recommended on 6 August, and on 8 August the Secretary of Defense agreed with acceptance of the proposal. The Secretary advised the State Department that the Defense Department had agreed, because of the oncoming winter season and Japanese budgetary constraints, to altering the previous position on BEQ construction at Misawa to the extent of expending JFY 73 funds appropriated for Misawa on BEQ construction, but that every effort should be made to obtain additional JFY 73 funds for operational requirements at Misawa.[1]

(C) On 18 September the Embassy advised that the Japanese Foreign Office had checked with both the DFAA and Ministry of Finance and that supplemental financing still appeared impossible. Such supplemental budget requests were designed to cover unexpected events such as natural disasters. The Japanese planned to initiate construction of Misawa operational projects as soon as possible after the beginning of JFY 74, however. The Embassy recommended that the issue be dropped.[2]

(U) In the summer, meanwhile, the name of the RORRCP had been changed by agencies in Japan. The Embassy and COMUS Japan referred to the RORRCP as the Japan Facilities Adjustment Program (JFAP) when discussing it with Japanese representatives. Throughout the rest of the year the program was addressed under both titles by various U.S. agencies.

(U) At a meeting of the construction panel on 24 August an impasse between the two governments was reached in the matter of siting and razing of TOW (termination of war) buildings at Iwakuni. The United States was not willing to have the buildings razed for construction of some Marine Corps BEQs, as they were superior to most U.S. constructed buildings at Iwakuni and razing would defeat the purpose of new construction, which was to reduce existing and projected

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1. SECDEF 5082/022102Z Jul 73; SECSTATE 135468/112003Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 122122Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 062156Z Aug 73; SECDEF 6461/081934Z Aug 73.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 12009/180228Z Sep 73.

overcrowding in inadequate billets. Siting of the new BEQ was considered a U.S. prerogative. The DFAA insisted that the United States designate the TOW buildings to be razed based on their commitment to the Diet; any change of position, they believed, would be very embarrasing to their government. The United States pointed out that this position had been derived subsequent to the 23 January agreement. After the United States had presented a statement of all of the BOQ/BEQ requirements at Iwakuni, including current assets (adequate and substandard), base population loading, shortfall, U.S. Marine Corps overseas space criteria, and the end position shortfalls, the Japanese agreed that perhaps the rationale of net living space requirements could be explored as the vehicle that would allow them to provide the U.S. requirements and still remain within what they had termed their "unified view." They still intended to exhaust every avenue in support of replacement, instead of any other position, they advised.[1]

(U) Still another matter that came under study by CINCPAC was the repair of the runway at Futema. The plan to resurface the runway came under further study when a detailed topographic survey completed by the Japanese revealed serious grade deficiencies that could not be corrected by a simple surface overlay. CINCPAC, therefore, validated correcting these deficiencies by recommending approval of a complete repair job at a cost of $947,000. The Secretary of Defense approved the project at this increased scope on 7 November.[2]

(S) In the matter of costs associated with all of this construction, on 28 November the Security Division Chief of the Japan Foreign Office informed the U.S. Political/Military Counselor that careful Japanese review of U.S. estimates of costs associated with the JFAP indicated that U.S. estimates were substantially lower than those made by the DFAA for projects for which the DFAA had detailed information. In general, Japanese estimates ran approximately 100 percent more than U.S. estimates, but for some projects the Japanese estimates were 600 percent higher. U.S. technical experts were to provide the Embassy with their comments in discussions with the Japanese to resolve some of these particulars.[3]

(U) And so, although the year had begun with the U.S.-Japan agreement-in-principle at the January Security Consultative Committee meeting, it closed without breaking ground on the first construction project. The Japanese had begun to design some of the projects, however, and construction was expected to begin at Futema and Kadena early in 1974.[4]

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1. COMUS Japan 060748Z Sep 73; COMUS Japan 240309Z Aug 73.
2. CINCPAC 310235Z Oct 73; SECDEF 5751/070406Z Nov 73.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 15464/280910Z Nov 73.
4. J42 HistSum Dec 73.

(C) Under continuing study during 1973 was the consolidation and reduction in number of bases on Okinawa. The Master Facilities Study-Japan had been updated in 1972 to include an Okinawa Facilities Readjustment Package. This study had been waiting Washington approval at the end of the year. The Master Facilities Study was subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense, and COMUS Japan was tasked to proceed on 14 April 1973. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs personally passed the lists of all facilities to the Japanese during his visit the week of 21 May. In June the Japanese submitted a list of 46 facilities in Okinawa that they asked be returned, some totally and some partially. The list incorporated some of the facilities from the Master Facilities Study, but others were new proposals. This list was referred to as the Takamatsu List. In another proposal, the U.S. Army Japan had proposed to release approximately 2,000 acres on 13 Okinawa facilities.[1]

(C) COMUS Japan, in coordination with the Services, combined the Okinawa portion of the Master Facilities Study, the Takamatsu List, and the USARJ 2,000 acre proposal plus additional proposals into a Joint Draft Okinawa Base Incremental Consolidation Plan, which was forwarded to CINCPAC on 14 September. The plan potentially provided for the total release of 29 of the 77 areas on Okinawa and the partial release of 19 others. Approximately 8,500 acres that might be released were in high value, high visibility areas, or in areas that had been requested by the Japanese. The plan was being coordinated also with the Embassy, after which it was to be used as a basis for discussions with the Japanese.[2]

(U) On 22 September CINCPAC advised the JCS and COMUS Japan that he concurred in the total and partial release actions proposed by COMUS Japan and in the early use of the study as a basis for discussions with the Japanese. The Embassy received authorization from the Secretary of State (in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense) to discuss the plan in the Security Consultative Group, seeking to establish groundwork for formal negotiations with the Joint Committee. The Secretary advised that such authorization should in no way impinge or compete with already agreed upon projects, such as the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan or the JFAP.[3]

(C) Meetings were held on 2 and 5 November at which a number of major points were emphasized by the Japanese. The total cost of the relocations requested

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1. J4211 Point Paper, 13 Sep 73, Subj: Okinawa Consolidation Progress (U).
2. Ltr, U.S. Forces Japan to CINCPAC, 14 Sep 73, Subj: Joint Draft Okinawa Base Incremental Consolidation Plan.
3. CINCPAC 220426Z Sep 73; SECDEF 200164/092135Z Oct 73.

by the United States was considered "astronomical," and the plan, therefore, appeared to the Japanese to be politically and economically infeasible to accomplish. The 12 facilities that the Japanese could not agree to relocate reflected their effort to reduce ultimate relocation costs. Moreover, none of the 12 presented a high profile with consequent public pressure for release, and the cost of relocation far exceeded any saving that could be realized by elimination of the annual rentals.

(C) COMUS Japan noted:

> ...a realistic appraisal of the U.S. military's position over the next several years can only reveal further reductions in financial and personnel resources. No doubt it will become virtually impossible to continue the current level of operations in the future within resources available. If no agreement is reached with the GOJ, it appears that the U.S. military may be forced, for financial reasons, to unilaterally withdraw from and release to the GOJ numerous facilities which currently afford substantial bargaining leverage.

He recommended that consideration be given to an alternative Japanese proposal regarding the use of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, which would satisfy one of the Japanese political problem areas and allow consummation of agreement while the United States still had some extra bargaining leverage.[1]

(S) At the end of the year agreement had been reached to relocate and thus release 8 total facilities and portions of 4 others. The Japanese had not agreed to relocate 12 bases they had earlier requested. These were small, isolated facilities such as warehouses. Although it had appeared that the Japanese wanted to clear up these widely spread "fly-speck" installations, indications were that they might be holding out to gain return of these costly-to-operate facilities. The 28 bases of the Incremental Consolidation Plan were still under discussion at the end of the year.[2]

[redacted]

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1. COMUS Japan 070407Z Nov 73.
2. COMUS Japan 240825Z Nov 73.

[redacted]

(C) He noted that manpower levels were down 17 percent and bases and facilities down 15 percent since mid-1972. It was also noted that there was some validity to a current argument that the realignments and consolidations would allow the United States to do the same job--or a better job--from one location, as in the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan. COMUS Japan also said, however, that the frequently overlooked corollary to that argument was that consolidation into a central location was facilitated if a general force drawdown was under way. Manpower, facility, and budget reductions were, therefore, not only the effect but also the cause of subsequent economies.

(C) Another argument concerned constant force effectiveness despite reduced manpower, facilities, and budgets, which hinged on the assertion of inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in management of those resources. COMUS Japan contended that if we had been using inefficient managers all along with a full supply of resources, they would be equally inefficient with fewer resources and a reduced net force capability would result.

(C) COMUS Japan continued that the result of resource cuts would continue to be force and effectiveness degradation. He cited, as examples, the Army's reduced depot maintenance capabilities since the closing of certain maintenance lines, and the redeployment from Okinawa to the CONUS of EB-57s, both of which deprived Northeast Asia of capabilities that would have otherwise been available. No amount of increased efficiency in Japan or elsewhere, he said, could substitute.

(C) He listed ways in which Japan might assume a substantially larger share of the security burden, and addressed a number of ways in which this might take place, but even in those areas in which future collaboration was likely, the political and fiscal realities of Japan made it many years in the future.

(S) He concluded that the cutbacks, like those of the recent past, could not be sustained without military degradation. The United States must choose, he emphasized, and if we choose to continue reductions, we must be mindful of the potentially destabilizing influences in East Asia and the impact of U.S. deterrence capability. Whether we were running serious risks should be carefully studied.[1]

Homeporting of MIDWAY in Japan

(S) Agreement had been reached between the United States and Japan in 1972 regarding the homeporting of an aircraft carrier in Yokosuka. This was in addition to the first homeporting phase, which involved six destroyers. The homeporting concept had been considered contingent on U.S. retention of Drydocks 4, 5, and 6. The Security Consultative Committee in 1971 provided Japanese agreement to U.S. retention of Drydock 6 and U.S. agreement to return the Ship Repair Facility and Drydocks 4 and 5 by June 1972. In early 1972, however, the Japanese government agreed to permit the United States to retain Drydocks 4 and 5 while the two countries studied ways to satisfy U.S. Navy requirements after the return of the two to Japanese control.

(S) As plans proceeded for the "extended deployment" of the carrier, there were problems both with political demonstrators and housing for the 1,000 families of the crew. (USS MIDWAY, CVA-41, was the ship selected for homeporting in Yokosuka.) On 21 September, in response to a request from the Japanese Foreign Office, the United States provided a briefing on the Navy's plans for the MIDWAY-based aircraft. This concerned Carrier Air Wing Five, which consisted of about 75 to 80 aircraft. At the briefing it was explained that the majority of flight operations would be conducted at sea, but that some training would be conducted with the aircraft located ashore, including field carrier landing practice and ground controlled approach. This and other training would be conducted at Misawa Air Base, in remote Northern Honshu, and the Ripsaw Range, 14 miles north of Misawa. Some activity would be at Atsugi Naval Air Station in the Toyko area, with operations only between 0600 and 2200 hours except for emergencies, and Kisarazu, a 5,000' strip on the east side of Toyko Bay. There was to be no low level training, Administrative flights would be between Misawa, Atsugi, and MIDWAY at sea.[2]

(U) Housing for dependents presented some problems. By September about

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1. Ltr, LT GEN Robert E. Pursley, USAF, COMUS Japan to CINCPAC 12 Oct 73, n.s.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 64-65; AMEMB Tokyo 11443/060653Z Sep 73; CINCPACFLT 212318Z Sep 73; J5122 Point Paper, 2 Oct 73, Subj: USS MIDWAY Extended Deployment in Japan (U).

300 families had arrived and base housing was available only for about 200 families in Yokosuka and Yokohama. About 800 would have to find commercial houses for rent. The rental for housing that met American requirements was almost $400 a month and rising. House owners were inclined to rent to Japanese salaried men rather than U.S. military, and the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Agency was taking an aloof attitude "on the plea of an agreement reached with the USF last fall that no new facilities will be offered from Japan in connection with the MIDWAY."[1]

(U) Demonstrations against the presence of the ship began on 5 October with its arrival, although the Chief of the Maritime Staff sent a message extending welcome to all. "You can be assured that your deployment to Yokosuka is important in every respect," the Admiral said, "and your arrival is truly an epoch moment for Japan. It is greatly anticipated that through you the partnership between the United States and Japan will be further promoted."

(U) There were five demonstrations at Yokosuka that day, with about 8,000 demonstrators plus a waterborne demonstration with 23 boats. Much larger demonstrations were anticipated by the Japanese police during the period 14 to 28 October, possibly culminating on 21 October when 60,000 were expected to participate in Toyko on International Anti-War Day. The Japanese government asked that MIDWAY depart Yokosuka during the period of the scheduled demonstrations. The U.S. Navy objected to the request, believing that any significant alteration to MIDWAY's schedule for this initial in-port period could cause some difficulties for crew and families faced with finding homes and getting established in a foreign country. After careful appraisal of the matter, however, the Defense Department concluded that it was in the best long-term U.S.-Japan interest to avoid having MIDWAY become a focal point of leftist anti-war demonstrations during its first in-port period. The Embassy in Tokyo was directed to inform the Japanese Foreign Office; the guidance from the Secretary of State on this matter noted that the United States was honoring the Japanese request reluctantly and that the United States "expects and anticipates that GOJ will insure that there will be no obstacles to return of MIDWAY to Yokosuka for extended period beginning Nov 1."[2]

(U) Earlier, in September, in anticipation of the first arrival, a reporter from the Tokyo Shimbun reported on a Japanese press corps visit to Hawaii. Under the headline "Why does U.S. assign offensive carrier to Yokosuka?" he reported a visit to Hawaii and CINCPAC Headquarters in which he noted two faces of Hawaii,

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1. COMUS Japan 232357Z Sep 73.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 11141/300810Z Aug 73; COMNAVFORJAPAN 050905Z Oct 73; COMUS Japan 060510Z Oct 73; J5122 Point Paper, 2 Oct 73, Subj: USS MIDWAY Extended Deployment in Japan (U).

the resort "full of Japanese sightseers" but also another face, with "fully armed soldiers repeating drills just like actual fighting in a sweat and warships standing by for action whenever an order is made." Regarding MIDWAY, Admiral Gayler was quoted as saying that its area of action was along the Asian continent and it was a loss economically and militarily for the carrier to have its home port in the United States mainland for its action in that water zone and to return to the mainland each time for its repair and crewmen's rest and recreation. The reporter calculated the possible cost of the return trip, noting, "This must be a considerable sore for the U.S. which is trying hard to cut down costs and economize in energy resources." The reporter then proceeded, however, to outline the demonstrations and political unrest he was sure would follow.[1]

U.S. Forces and [redacted] TAIWAN

(U) In a joint communique issued 28 February 1972 by President Nixon and [redacted] the United States declared, "...It [the United States] reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement [redacted] question by [redacted] themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. Forces and military installations from [redacted] In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on [redacted] as the tension in the area diminishes."[2]

(TS) The principal planning activity regarding reducing U.S. Forces [redacted] in 1973 involved tactical [redacted] aircraft and tactical [redacted] squadrons. In April the JCS asked CINCPAC to comment on an Air Force plan to relocate the Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) [redacted] (Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Vietnam and the continued requirement for tactical airlift capability provided by the [redacted] had necessitated relocation of the TAW within the PACOM. The [redacted] had agreed to basing the wing on [redacted] CINCPAC's response to the JCS, which considered inputs from his component commanders and subordinate unified commanders in [redacted] and Japan, advised that the Defense Department, as a priority matter, should push for funding by the Japanese government of Kadena Air Base, Okinawa construction to support relocation of the TAW. The 374th TAW, which was the organization under consideration, should remain on [redacted] subsequent to the deployment of two other [redacted] squadrons, CINCPAC believed. He did not consider split basing a desirable option if political considerations necessitated early TAW relocation. The JCS position was in consonance with that of CINCPAC.[3]

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1. COMUS Japan 070610Z Sep 73.

[redacted]

(S) On 3 August the Chairman of the JCS directed the redeployment of one Tactical Airlift Squadron (TAS) from [redacted] to the CONUS to be completed by 15 August 1973. This redeployment reduced the strength at [redacted] Air Base by approximately 1,000 personnel, leaving approximately 3,550 there. The Chairman of the JCS also requested that the Air Force Chief of Staff plan rebasing locations and dates of the remaining [redacted] squadrons, planning to relocate them before the end of the year.

(S) COMUSTDC, in coordination with the Embassy, notified the Acting Chief f the General Staff of the 15 August move on 6 August. Subsequently, the mbassy notified [redacted] of the redeployment of the remainder f the 374th TAW. The Premier voiced concern over the possible adverse impact f the squadrons were redeployed to other nearby locations.[1]

(S) It was understood that precipitate withdrawal of U.S. Forces could have litical symbolism and could be interpreted in [redacted] as a U.S. vote of no nfidence in [redacted] future. The greatest sensitivity centered on actions at were seen as having a direct and immediate effect on the U.S. security mitment. To reduce any such political effects, earliest discussion of with- wal plans with the Premier was encouraged; CINCPAC did not want him con- nted with a move after the fact.[2]

(S) Planning continued for other deployments and on 6 August the JCS pro- d for consideration a planned tasking directive that contained a three- ed phasedown proposal, as follows:

Phase I
- Relocate the 374th TAW by 31 December 1973.
- 1 Nov 73, one C-130 squadron to Clark Air Base, Philippines.
- 15 Nov 73, a second C-130 squadron to Clark.
- 1 Dec 73, one C-130 squadron to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa.

Phase II
- Redeploy one [redacted] Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) approximately July 1974.
- Reduce the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) (in proportion to mission requirements).

Phase III
- Redeploy the remaining [redacted] TFS approximately July 1976.
- Reduce MAAG and support activities.

[redacted]

Phase I was expected to reduce personnel strength to approximately 5,000, Phase II to 4,300, and Phase III to approximately 2,500.[1]

(S) On 18 August CINCPAC provided the JCS with proposed reductions, as follows:

	Beginning Authorized	Programmed Reductions	Retained
Phase I	7,867	3,167	4,700
Phase II	4,700	605	2,095
Phase III	4,095	1,312	2,783

These figures were subsequently revised after a CINCPAC staff survey team visited [redacted] and discovered some reporting omissions, and as a result of PACAF manpower adjustments. The final retained figure was raised to 3,144. These reductions, CINCPAC believed, still permitted PACOM forces to meet existing commitments in intelligence, air defense, telecommunications, weapons storage, and support activities. The execute order was received and Phase I was completed by the end of 1973.

(S) The CINCPAC survey team listed by priority the agencies and functions the team believed should be used in planning further reductions.

Priority I
- 9687th Security Group (intelligence)
- [redacted] Defense Command

Priority II
- STRATCOM (telecommunications)
- [redacted] Air Base

Priority III
- 327th Air Division (air defense)
- 6213th Air Base Group [redacted]
- MAAG

Priority IV
- Other activities

Other reductions under consideration included the merger of separate headquarters (specifically the [redacted] and the MAAG), consolidation of common activities, the elimination or transfer of mission elements, and a reduction in the scope of operations.[2]

[redacted]

2. Ibid., CINCUSARPAC 291944Z Aug 73.

(S) Ultimate basing of the C-130 squadrons redeployed to Clark Air Base, and headquarters of the 374th TAW, was planned at Kadena, but that was probably two or more years in the future and the Secretary of State believed that any public announcement to that effect would be unwise with that much lead time.[1]

(TS). Included in Phases II and III were [redacted] TFSs. To fill ENHANCE PLUS requirements, the United States had negotiated with the [redacted] in November 1972 for the loan of [redacted] aircraft. The United States agreed to [redacted] in [redacted] to fill the air defense gap. [redacted] deployment dates were therefore predicated on the availability of [redacted] aircraft to compensate the [redacted] for the aircraft transferred to the Republic of Vietnam.[2]

(C) The role of Army forces on [redacted] as seen by the COMUSTDC, was outlined in August in comments to the U.S. Army Forces [redacted] He noted that it was important to the mission of the TDC and to the perception of the [redacted] that the U.S. Army maintain on [redacted] a nucleus of people trained in contingency planning, logistics, and field operations. This nucleus would perform contingency planning for the U.S. Army role in support of the defense of [redacted] would work directly with the [redacted] on the ground force sections of [redacted] and would provide the core group to receive and assist U.S. Army augmentees reporting to [redacted] during [redacted] exercises or contingencies. As the MAAG phased down, COMUSTDC continued, it would eventually be unable to provide the necessary U.S. Army exercise augmentees to [redacted] Consequently, [redacted] augmentees would be required, and an operationally oriented U.S. Army element on [redacted] would provide the local expertise and continuity required. The U.S. Army Forces [redacted] performed functions on [redacted] that were important to the [redacted] and the U.S. Army, [redacted] continued, and those functions would have to continue to be performed. The [redacted] provided a focused, efficient means for performance. It was also noted that the [redacted] provided a "personification of the U.S. Army on [redacted] that was meaningful to the [redacted] Elimination of USARFT concurrently with other major reductions and changes "would constitute one more blow to [redacted] perceptions of U.S. resolve to support the [redacted] and the [redacted] supported the retention of a [redacted] structure on [redacted]

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1. COMUSJAPAN 310645Z Oct 73, retransmitting SECSTATE 213982/302356Z Oct 73.

[redacted]

Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(U) The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and Guam will be discussed together in this section because of their proximity to one another and, in many cases, mutual interest. Guam, in the Marianas, was ceded to the United States from Spain in 1898. An unincorporated territory, it was 30 miles long and 4 to 8 1/2 miles wide. In November 1973, for the first time, the Guamanians elected their Governor; formerly he had been appointed by the U.S. President. In 1972, a U.S. law provided Guam one Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, who was permitted to vote in committee but not on the House floor. The Guamanians were primarily of Chamorro stock (Micronesian), with some of mixed Spanish or Filipino descent.

(C) Guam came under special study in 1973. On 11 June the CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI sent his thoughts to CINCPAC, noting that [redacted] had earlier requested an evaluation of Guam as part of the Pacific strategy. The CINCPACREP noted that while Guam was valuable and useful at the present time, it quite possibly could be essential in the future. [redacted]

(Sella Bay was to be the site of an ammunition pier safety zone and required the exchange of land, but there was disagreement between the U.S. and Guam governments, with the Guamanians insisting on an acre-for-acre exchange with 3,720 acres of land involved; the Guam legislature withheld consent to an exhange agreement on 5 December.) The people of Guam, the CINCPACREP continued, wanted, among other things, the right to vote for the U.S. President, a voting Congressional Representative, consultation on the TTPI talks, and more land for park and recreational use. [redacted]

(S) On 20 June CINCPAC enclosed a copy of this report in a personal letter to the Chairman of the JCS, noting, "It appears we are going to have to take careful, complex and long-term actions to preserve a healthy base situation--and start them soon." Admiral Moorer's reply, of 3 July, advised that he had recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the overall study, as proposed by CINCPAC, be initiated as a matter of urgency. The study, entitled "National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Study: Guam," was chaired by a representative of the Department of the Interior. A meeting was held on 1 October to establish Terms of Reference. The study was planned in two phases, the

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1. Ltr, RADM G.S. Morrison, USN, CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI to Admiral Gayler, 11 Jun 73.

first to develop U.S. positions on the matters of interests and objectives on Guam. The Defense Department's goal was that the study would emphasize that there were other issues besides military land to be assessed by the group, which included representatives of the Departments of State, Justice, Transportation, Agriculture, and Commerce.

(S) The first phase was originally scheduled to be completed by 17 December. Two CINCPAC staff officers (Plans Directorate) spent about a month in Washington working on the first two drafts of this phase. At the end of the year, the target date for this phase had been projected to 7 February. Phase II, originally scheduled for completion in January or February 1974, was delayed for a number of reasons, including the delay in completion of Phase I. Phase II was to integrate Guamanian aspirations with U.S. positions and options already formulated; the Guamanians were to participate in this second phase. Originally, the fact that the study was even under way had not been released to the Guamanians. This was to be true until their role in the study effort had been agreed upon by U.S. agencies, but they learned about this and were disturbed. There was some in-fighting over the subject between the Governor of Guam and the Guam legislature. Some Guamanians believed that this study would preempt the work of their own Political Status Commission. Such was the status at the end of the year.[1]

(U) The TTPI (also known as Micronesia), included the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas Islands (except Guam); the TTPI had been acquired from the Japanese in World War II and placed under the United States as a United Nations strategic trust territory in 1946. The trusteeship agreement allowed the United States to fortify the islands. It also obligated the United States to develop Micronesia "toward self government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances and the freely expressed wishes of the people," but no time limit was established. The TTPI encompassed an area of 3 million square miles, with about 105,000 persons living on about 64 of the 2,100 islands. Of the 11 U.N. trust territories, 9 had been dissolved; only the TTPI and Papua/New Guinea remained.[2]

(C) The TTPI was fragmented geographically and politically, and was so located that it was of major strategic importance to the United States. It was a forward area with sufficient real estate for extensive military installations. This became of increasing interest as U.S. bases and facilities in many countries of the PACOM were closed or reduced in size. Until future political

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1. J5112 Point Papers, 25 Oct 73, 30 Nov 73, and 16 Jan 74, Subj: NSC Under Secretaries Committee Study: Guam (U); SECDEF 3615/201938Z Sep 73.
2. J53 Point Paper, 20 Jun 73, Subj: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) (U).

status of the TTPI was determined, however, it was believed that extensive military activity would result in situations that could prove contrary to overall U.S. interests.

(S) The U.S. objectives were to keep as much of the TTPI as possible in close association with the United States in order to insure that no foreign power was able to create a sphere of influence or impinge on the area by military or financial activities, thereby degrading the deterrent posture of the United States. CINCPAC believed strongly in the concept of forward basing in the PACOM.

(S) In 1971 the JCS had tasked CINCPAC to prepare a master plan for Tinian Island (in the Marianas) that addressed land utilization, construction projects, cost estimates, construction phasing, and joint use of facilities, all in the context of the overall basing structure in the PACOM. The original requirement for development had been stated by the Air Force; CINCPAC had requested that the matter be studied in joint channels, however, because he believed that he must coordinate and assign priorities to the individual Service requirements that were to be fulfilled by a joint-use base to insure the ability to successfully and efficiently execute war plans.[1]

(S) On 17 January 1972 CINCPAC had forwarded his "Integrated Plan for Military Development of Tinian (C)," which had been developed in conjunction with Project GATEWAY (Guam Assessment to Ensure Westernmost Appropriate Yield). There were three land use plans for the orderly military development of Tinian to correspond to the three alternative recommendations for utilization of the military land holdings on Guam. In February the JCS forwarded the Tinian Plan to the Secretary of Defense, recommending approval. In June 1972 the Secretary authorized the Services to proceed with programming and planning actions and designated the Secretary of the Air Force as Executive Agent. In October 1972 the Defense Department approved the charter of the Executive Agent and named the development "CRESTED ISLE."[2]

(S) Development was planned in seven phases:

I - Planning and land acquisition
II - Site preparation
III - Bare base capability
IV - Dispersal base
V - Main base
VI - Logistical support base
VII - Dependent support

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 84-85.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 79-80; J5313 Point Paper, 26 Oct 73, Subj: CRESTED ISLE, Genesis.

The prime requirement for development of Tinian had been based on a Strategic Air Command requirement for an alternate airfield to support Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. CINCPAC, however, saw no immediate requirement for Tinian. He believed the option to use the island should be preserved, however, and that the United States should proceed with development to achieve a joint-use, bare base capability, or through Phase III of the plan. In commenting to the JCS on the plan (CRESTED ISLE Programming Plan 73-1 of 15 Sep 73), CINCPAC advised that he supported SAC's immediate requirement for Tinian, but that he greatly preferred the existing base structure for PACOM contingencies, so long as the United States retained forward base rights in Japan, the Philippines, and Korea. Consonant with Defense Department decisions, he continued, he supported the phased base development plan in support of all Services. His near-term requirement, he said, was to preserve the option to use Tinian as a multi-Service joint-use base. "I support acquiring property, accomplishing land surveys and preparing development plans. Development through bare base capability (Phase III) satisfies requirement for contingency use," CINCPAC said. Immediate operational requirements, CINCPAC believed, should be evaluated on a cost-benefit basis in light of austerity in all of the PACOM. In addition to military requirements, he noted, negotiating concessions might require industrial or other activities for local employment. Training exercises, construction site preparation, bare base construction, and preparation of logistic support facilities could provide employment and demonstrate U.S. intentions to fully use the military land acquired. In past years, CINCPAC continued, requirements for Tinian had varied widely. "While preserving our options to adjust operational requirements we should not now proceed beyond Phase III...and should consider all stated requirements beyond Phase III as tentative and speculative." CINCPAC then proceeded to validate specific requirements.[1]

(S) One deficiency in the plan was that it did not include near-term Army requirements. CINCUSARPAC had advised CINCPAC of his needs on 19 October, listing an ammunition storage area, dry storage for watercraft, space for a Nike-Hercules battery, and an administrative area, all totaling 9,020 acres. This would include billets, family housing, storage and office space for the Security Assistance Force Asia (SAFASIA), logistics support, and medical and other administrative personnel. In addition, he stated a requirement for 5,000-10,000 acres for use as a training area that could be made available for use by other PACOM military forces.[2]

(S) These Army requirements would compete for land with previously stated Marine Corps requirements. The Executive Agency and the Services would have

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1. CINCPAC 220345Z Dec 73; J5313 Point Paper, 28 Nov 73, Subj: CRESTED ISLE, Base Development Plan (U).
2. CINCUSARPAC 190507Z Oct 73.

to allocate land among the claimants.[1]

(S) Throughout the year, work continued on both sides regarding future status negotiations for the TTPI. This was outside CINCPAC's area of responsibility, but he watched the matter carefully. One principal issue was land. In May the Secretary of State advised the President's Personal Representative in the matter of Mariana Islands negotiations that he was authorized to undertake, on behalf of the United States, negotiations with representatives of the Marianas with the objective of arriving at an agreement providing for the Marianas' close and permanent association with the United States, satisfying U.S. objectives. One primary objective was:

> ...to fashion on a priority basis a close and permanent political relationship with the Mariana Islands District which will extend U.S. sovereignty to those islands and satisfy U.S. security requirements. The latter include: denial of the area for military use by third parties; U.S. control over the foreign and defense affairs of the Mariana Islands; and the right to establish military bases in those islands.

One secondary objective was to structure the status arrangements with the Marianas in such a manner as to have maximum favorable impact on the negotiations with the remaining five districts of Micronesia. In the matter of land:

> ...The U.S. military and non-military land requirements should be satisfied by arrangements providing for purchase or long-term lease by the U.S. Government to take effect as soon as possible. You should make a serious effort to negotiate the land requirements defined under Alternative I [below] and its variations in order to satisfy our priority land requirements on Tinian.
>
> A. Alternative 1
>
> Tinian. Purchase or lease the entire island (26,200 acres) but offer to lease back the southeast corner for population relocation (about 7,000 acres). The U.S. Government would be willing to sign long-term leases, but would insist on controlling the uses the land can be put to and would not be obligated to lease back to anyone not currently a resident of Tinian.

1. J5313 Point Paper, 28 Nov 73, Subj: CRESTED ISLE, Base Development Plan (U), which contains a statement of operational requirements for the base, including purpose and specific construction requirements for the airfield, port facility, logistics storage area, and a training area.

Saipan. Conclude a joint use agreement permitting U.S. military landing on and access to facilities of the civil airport.

There were several variants on the Saipan alternative, but none for Tinian. In a second alternative for Tinian, the requirement was to purchase or lease the minimum essential U.S. land requirement (18,515 acres), and relocate the population to the southeast corner of the island.[1]

(C) On 6 November, while Marianas status negotiations were in the third session, the United States issued a statement of policy regarding the return of public land in the TTPI prior to the termination of the existing trusteeship agreement if the people of the district so desired. The United States was to immediately undertake in each district a priority study of local views on public lands, including the question of how the transfer to local control could best be managed given the many land patterns and traditions throughout the TTPI. According to calculations, the proportion of public land to the total land area in each of the districts was: Palau, 68 percent; Yap, 4 percent; Truk, 17 percent; Ponape, 66 percent; Marshall Islands, 13 percent; and the Marianas Islands, 90 percent. The Trust Territory code and various TTPI court decisions had defined public lands as all lands acquired by the prior Spanish, German, and Japanese administrations for governmental or other public purposes, as well as those lands that the TTPI government may itself have acquired for public use. The great bulk of this public land was not in use, and would thus be available for the Micronesians to dispose of themselves in accordance with whatever appropriate legal procedures they may choose to establish. Only a limited number of U.S. safeguards on the return procedure appeared necessary, designed to enable the TTPI to continue to meet its responsibilities for public needs during the remainder of the trusteeship and to protect private Micronesian citizens who had acquired property interests in public lands, had leased public lands, or were living on public lands by agreement with the TTPI government. "In the case of public land to be used for defense purposes under proposed future status agreements with the United States title will be passed to the new titleholders when they have formally committed themselves to accommodate those requirements on terms to be mutually agreed with the United States."[2]

(U) The land question had long been considered one of the most difficult and complicated questions facing government authorities in Micronesia. The policy statement made by the United States, it was believed, was a major step toward solving that problem, but it did not automatically take care of all difficulties. The statement itself recognized this, declaring that the U.S.

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1. SECSTATE 087705/1/082331Z May 73.
2. SECSTATE 215991/1/020002Z Nov 73; HICOMTERPACIS Saipan 060640Z Nov 73.

Government had already formally asked the Congress of the United States to appropriate special supplementary funds for the special effort to complete, within three years, a land cadastral program on all public lands. This special contract program would leave the present land management staff to continue work on the private land cadastral program. It was estimated that without the special effort proposed, surveys and other work on public lands might take as long as 30 years to complete. The release of this policy paper came one week prior to the scheduled opening of the seventh round of Micronesian future status negotiations.[1]

(C) Meanwhile, as noted above, the third session of the Marianas status negotiations was slated to conclude on 19 December. Major attention had focused on the Marianas Political Status Commission (MPSC) insistence on formal recognition by the United States Government of maximum self-government. In response, the United States had noted that historically the U.S. Congress had not interfered in the internal affiars of its territories. In the matter of land, the MPSC accepted the 2 November U.S. policy statement with "some grace," but argued that the United States should also complete the cadastral program on private land. After consultations, the U.S. side succeeded in convincing the MPSC that private surveys in critical areas would probably be completed under normal conditions and with necessary overlap from public land surveys at the same time as the public land survey. Informal communication between U.S. and Marianas negotiators was sufficiently candid to make it apparent that the MPSC was not in fact opposed to U.S. land requirements, but they needed considerable additional time to discuss the matter with their constituents, particularly the mutual benefits to be derived from the U.S. presence.[2]

(U) Also in the latter part of 1973 the seventh round of Micronesia status talks was concluded. (The talks had been held in Washington.) One of the problems was money. As explained by Senator Lazarus Salii of Palau, who headed the Joint Committee on Future Status (JCFS) of the Congress of Micronesia, "... we are sorry to have to recognize that no progress has been made. Our initial proposal advanced a year and a half ago in Koror was for an overall level of 100 million dollars annually for the first ten years, plus the continuation of the existing U.S. federal programs provided in Micronesia. Your proposal [the U.S. proposal], advanced this week for the first time, would involve a level of support totalling between 40 and 41 million dollars annually" (plus services provided by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Postal Service, and the Weather Service). The Senator continued:

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1. HICOMTERPACIS Saipan 060640Z Nov 73.
2. CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI 200551Z Dec 73.

> ...The immediate problem ...is the vast difference between us on the level of financing to be provided by the United States. You have suggested that this difference reflects a difference in approach. As we understand your position, the termination of the trusteeship should bring about a significant reduction in the amount of U.S. money directed toward Micronesia. You have suggested that, instead, we should pursue other possible sources of financial support and investment. For our part, we regard the status of free association ...as one which involves a most appreciable measure of continuing United States involvement in Micronesia....[Measures negotiated in a referendum in July 1972] would commit the Government of Micronesia to allow a virtual U.S. domination of Micronesian foreign affairs and the...use of Micronesian territory for U.S. security purposes. We are firmly of the view that the level of U.S. financial support embodied in your present proposal is totally inadequate to justify this degree of continuing association between Micronesia and the United States.

(U) Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams, the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, responded on behalf of the United States delegation "in a tone of considerable disappointment." He noted that many had hoped that November 1973 might have seen the completion of the task begun in July 1972--the joint effort to translate into Compact language the preliminary agreements reached in prior rounds. He regretted that the difference in finances prevented completion of the draft Compact "so that the Congress of Micronesia and the people of Micronesia would have been able to see a complete outline of the whole structural framework of a potential free association agreement." Ambassador Williams noted that in the matter of U.S. financial support in the post-trusteeship period, the U.S. approach had concerned a "need" basis, and had asked the joint committee a long series of questions in this regard. When no answers were received, it became clear that the Micronesian conceptual approach was different. The United States then proceeded to make estimates of needs based on existing data, projections, and the sentiments and statements expressed from time to time by members of the committee and other Micronesian leaders. In addition to amounts provided for some services, the U.S. proposal totalled $43 million annually for the initial post-trusteeship period for five districts (excluding the Marianas), excluding payments for the use of public land, a figure considerably higher than the $40-41 million (for six districts) noted by Senator Salii. The Ambassador continued:

> In summary we considered our proposal, when viewed against the level of current operations, projected need and potential sources of income, to be fair and reasonable...[which]would have...provided for steady forward progress in government services, and a gradual movement

toward greater economic self-sufficiency and economic independence ....Conversely...[the JCFS proposal] would lead...to greater and greater dependency and away from Micronesia's stated goal of self-sufficiency....It seems to us...unrealistic to suppose that once a territory sheds its trustee status that the measures of assistance from the former administering authority should be greatly in excess of the annual level of support provided during the period of the trusteeship itself.[1]

(U) Earlier, also in regard to U.S. expenditures, the CINCPACREP to Guam/TTPI had listed a summary of Defense Department sponsored programs provided to the TTPI in Fiscal Year 1972, including:

Search and rescue and medical evacuation (by air and surface)	$200,000.
Surveillance (air and surface)	450,000.
Material transport (space available cargo on civic action team C-130 resupply flights)	55,000.
Commander Naval Forces Marianas band transportation	43,000.
Commander Naval Forces Marianas community relations fund	11,500.
Seabees Pacific community relations fund	4,000.
Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA) Program	180,000.
Defense Department Property Disposal Office	11,000,000.

Figures represented approximate costs to the Defense Department, not as they would total if procured through other sources. Not included were some costs difficult to quantify, such as the loan of ships.[2]

(C) One other matter of United States interest in Micronesia was the burgeoning or revived Japanese interest in the area. While it appeared to be economic rather than political in nature, according to the U.S. status liaison officer, its implications were of "compelling importance" and "would seem to require close scrutiny by USG in plotting our future course in Micronesia." Private Japanese interests proceeded with plans to form the "Japan-Micronesia

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1. HICOMTERPACIS Saipan 240526Z Nov 73.
2. CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI 130626Z Sep 73.

Association," principally sponsored by pre-World War II "old Micronesia hands" and various business interests. The sponsors appeared to have extensive contacts with various Micronesians.[1]

(e) Regarding the Japanese, there were some problems that had arisen from war claims agreements and the continuing sensitivity of negotiations for foreign affairs responsibility under a "free association" relationship. One example of such sensitivity was raised concerning Japanese use of facilities on Kwajalein for satellite missile tracking. The United States had encouraged the two test launches, one an engineering test satellite to test the capability of the launch vehicle to orbit a satellite, and test satellite controlling and tracking technology, and the other an ionospheric sounding satellite to measure a variety of scientific data. Neither had any military purpose or capability, nor were they in any way "spy" satellites, and nothing impacted in the Marshall Islands area. Some Marshallese believed that this Japanese test monitoring presence violated the spirit if not the letter of the Kwajalein use agreement, and the District Advisor said that such use would be "insulting to Marshallese people" and would in effect void all other agreements regarding use of land in the Marshalls and would make the status negotiations "for naught." Nevertheless, plans for the tests went ahead at the end of the year.[2]

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1. CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI 260445Z Jun 73; AMEMB Tokyo 7997/260515Z Jun 73.
2. SECSTATE 246096/172214Z Dec 73; CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI 180339Z Dec 73; SECSTATE 247151/191829Z Dec 73; CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI 200925Z Dec 73.

CHAPTER II

THE THREAT

The Strategic Threat

(U) Each year in late February or March, top officials of the Department of Defense, both military and civilian, go before the Congress to present statements to justify the Defense budget for the coming fiscal year. The statements by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of particular importance because of their overall perspective. On 26 March 1973, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented his annual military posture statement for fiscal year 1974 to the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The Chairman reviewed the dramatic developments on the international scene during the past year which could encourage the view that the threat to the United States from Russia and China had diminished. These developments included the detente with the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Strategic Arms Limitations (SAL) agreements with Russia, and the cease-fire agreements in Vietnam and Laos. Nevertheless, Admiral Moorer reiterated his statement of the previous year that the relative military power of the United States in the world had clearly peaked and was declining. The United States no longer had substantial strategic superiority which, in the past, had validated a clear-cut margin of overall military power.[1]

(U) Yet to occur at the time of the Chairman's testimony was the termination of all U.S. combat operations in Southeast Asia by Congressional fiat on 15 August 1973; the resumption of war in the Middle East on 6 October 1973; and the Arab oil embargo against the United States on 23 October 1973. These events served only to emphasize the thrust of Moorer's statement to the Senate committee--that detente, the SAL agreements, and the Vietnam cease-fire had not altered the reality of the military power confronting the United States and its allies.[2]

(U) The views of the JCS Chairman were supported by (then) Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson in his 10 April 1973 statement before the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives. In this annual Defense

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1. Report, United States Military Posture for Fiscal Year 1974, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 Mar 73, pp. 1-3; hereafter cited as Moorer FY 74.
2. Ibid.

Department report for fiscal year 1974, Secretary Richardson acknowledged the lessening of tension in the world and the possibility of more normal relations with the communist states as a result of United States initiatives. However, he warned that:[1]

* * * * *

> Regardless of what we hope the ultimate intentions of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China may be, we must keep before us a clear-eyed calculation of their present and future military capabilities. The military balance, at this crucial juncture in world affairs, is very delicately poised. We have a great stake in maintaining that balance while we continue to pursue ways to give it greater stability....

(U) In his discussion of the continuing threat to the United States and its allies, Richardson noted the key role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a shield in Europe; the importance of political and military stability in the Middle East; the imperative of open maritime and aerial lines of communication (LOC) for rapid deployment of forces and access to raw materials; and the need to maintain technological superiority over the Soviet Union to counter the increased Soviet level of effort on military science and technology.[2]

(U) Admiral Moorer and Secretary Richardson both cited the Soviet Union as the only strategic nuclear threat to the United States during 1973. Each detailed the advances in Russian strategic and tactical offensive weapons, with emphasis on multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) development, additional submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), growing naval surface capability, the launching of the first Russian aircraft carrier, and improvements in tactical aircraft performance. Turning to the threat in Asia, Moorer and Richardson noted that, while the PRC did not yet pose a strategic nuclear threat to the United States, China had given high priority to the creation of a theater nuclear capability. These regional nuclear forces were capable of attacking some Soviet targets, as well as U.S. and allied forces in a wide area from Japan through Korea and Taiwan to the Philippines and Southeast Asia. While a missile capable of reaching all of Russia and part of Alaska could be deployed by 1974, the overall Chinese military capability was expected to be regionally oriented until late in the decade.[3]

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1. Annual Defense Department Report for Fiscal Year 1974, Elliot L. Richardson, 10 Apr 73, pp. 2,3; hereafter cited as Richardson FY 74.
2. Ibid., pp. 23-30.
3. Op. Cit., Moorer FY 74, pp. 12-52 and Richardson FY 74, pp. 31-38.

SECRET

SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES

[redacted]

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SECRET

Sino-Soviet Military Confrontation[1]

(S) In the years following World War II, American strategists and planners were forced to consider two major adversaries (and two major wars) in assessing the strategic threat to the United States and its overseas forces. The gradual emergence of an ideological schism between Russia and China became evident when open hostilities broke out along the border between the two countries. Negotiations to settle the dispute had proceeded intermittently for several years, and were resumed once again in 1973. Moscow's minimum demand was believed to be that Peking cease its ideological harangues and withdraw claims to Soviet territory. The Russians had indicated a willingness to cede some islands in the Amur and Ussuri Rivers to China. Peking's minimum demand in the past had been that Moscow drastically reduce and pull back its forces along the border. Peking also demanded that Russian provocations (such as harrassing Chinese boats on the rivers) cease. During 1973, such Soviet harrassment had increased.

(S) The strong concentration of Russian forces north of the border forced Peking to entertain the possibility of a Russian thrust such as the successful invasion of Czechoslovakia or even a preemptive strike to erase the modest Chinese nuclear capability.

(S) While both countries appeared anxious to avoid a major military conflict, the PRC continued to prepare for the remote possibility of a Soviet attack. Its troops were deployed in depth in an apparent decision to trade space for time, and its strategic defensive posture had been reoriented from the south and east to the north and northeast.

(S) At the international level, the Soviets portrayed Peking as a trouble maker when talking to the West and as a traitor when talking to the communist countries. On their part, the PRC lost no opportunity to warn other nations, both formally and informally, of the Soviet threat to world peace in general and to the PRC in particular. It was believed by the American Intelligence community that the possibility of a Sino-Soviet detente was remote. Conversely, major hostilities could result from an internal political collapse in China. The result could be pro and anti-Soviet regional warlords competing for favor in Moscow and Washington. The attitude of the United States probably would influence strongly any Soviet decision to attack China--whether to create the collapse or to exploit it. Moreover, the PRC fear of just such intervention in its internal affairs was likely to militate against an open degradation of its political structure.

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1. J2212 Point Paper, 5 Sep 73, Subj: Sino-Soviet Military Confrontation.

COMMUNIST FAR EAST GROUND STRENGTH

[redacted]

The Threat in the PACOM

The Soviet Union[1]

(TS) The overall Soviet strength threatened not only the Pacific Command, but all potential adversaries worldwide. In strategic forces, Russia possessed 1,657 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 875 medium and heavy bombers, and 63 ballistic missile submarines with 604 missiles. With these forces, which included a variety of nuclear weapons, both intercontinental and peripheral attacks were possible.

(TS) The Soviet ground forces consisted of about 167 divisions totaling 1.6 million troops. Motorized rifle divisions comprised the bulk of the force, but tank and airborne divisions were available. The Soviets envisaged wartime organizations called Fronts, with each Front consisting of three to five ground armies and a tactical air army.

(TS) Tactical aviation, which possessed over 4,500 combat aircraft, would be under the command of the Front commander to whom they are allocated in wartime. Defense of the Front against air attack was their primary mission, but they could also conduct ground attack and interdiction operations in the close air support role.

(TS) The general purpose naval force was equipped with multi-purpose platforms, weapons and sensors. On-going surface ship construction emphasis was on the development of multi-purpose combatants with organic air defense, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship weapons systems. The Soviet submarine force was the largest in the world, and had the potential to interdict sea routes worldwide as well as defend naval surface forces and the Soviet mainland.

(TS) The Russian naval aviation force consisted of 497 bombers, 109 reconnaissance aircraft and 426 ASW platforms. This force could provide some anti-carrier operations, ocean surveillance/reconnaissance and ASW within the effective combat radius of the aircraft.

(S) The analysis of this threat as it pertained to the PACOM also reflected the implications of the Sino-Soviet border dispute. Russia east of 100 degrees East Longitude was divided into two military districts--Transbaikal and Far East. Some divisional units were also located in Mongolia. The ground forces were concentrated along the PRC border astride the traditional invasion routes between

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1. J2212 Point Paper, 5 Sep 73, Subj: Soviet Objectives and Capabilities Worldwide; CINCPAC Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, pp. 26-31.

the two countries. Motorized rifle divisions were also stationed on the Sakhalin and Kamchatka Islands. The troops along the border were believed to be equipped with the most modern weapons and support equipment available to the Soviet Army. While the length of the logistics LOC was a weakness, consumable material was stockpiled for contingency purposes.

(S) Air forces in the Far East area included strategic bombers, tactical aircraft, transports and helicopters. The long range bomber crews were highly trained in all aspects of strategic air operations, including navigation, bombing, staging and deployment techniques, inflight refueling, electronic countermeasures, defense penetration tactics, and the handling and delivery of nuclear weapons. Naval aviation was available for maritime reconnaissance, ASW and the destruction of hostile surface forces or enemy port facilities.

CHINA

[redacted]

1. J2212 Point Paper, 5 Sep 73, Subj: PRC Capabilities and Objectives; CINCPAC Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 29.

SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES



North Vietnam[2]

(S) The North Vietnam Army (NVA) was capable of coordinated division-level offensive and defensive campaigns. It was capable of maintaining internal security and repelling aggression by neighboring countries other than the PRC. It

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1. CINCPAC Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, pp. 26-31.
2. Ibid.

was also capable of invading and defeating military forces of other Southeast Asian nations unless the defending force received external reinforcements and support. The NVA troops were combat trained, inured to physical hardship, and capable of high intensity guerilla and limited conventional warfare in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. The NVA leaders were dedicated and capable, and the cohesive and disciplined organization assured loyalty and Party control. The principal limitations of the NVA were deficiencies in advanced weapons, heavy equipment, logistics, education and technical skills.

(S) The navy was a small coastal patrol force mostly concentrated in the Haiphong area. A minor offensive capability existed for torpedo and guided missile attack, but the navy had no large surface vessels nor minesweepers.

(S) The air force possessed high performance MIG-21s and MIG-19s, as well as some older MIG-15s and 17s. The North Vietnamese Air Force was credited with an efficient air defense, but was dependent upon outside support for maintenance and supplies. The total jet fighter force was about 170 aircraft.

Soviet Operations in the Philippine Sea[1]

(S) The majority of naval ships and submarines transiting to and from the Indian Ocean passed through the northern Philippine Sea and the Bashi Channel. In November 1964, the Soviet Navy established a permanent intelligence collection patrol off the island of Guam. Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft frequently conducted missions against high threat targets in the Philippine Sea and, on occasion, to the Guam area.

(S) A mooring buoy was placed west of Pagan Island in October 1969, but was probably used only once (during Exercise OKEAN in 1970), and was lost in 1972. A new mooring buoy was placed in position west of Pagan Island on 19 November 1973, indicating Soviet plans for operations in the area. Prior to 1969, operations were infrequent, consisting primarily of diesel submarine patrols of short duration. From 1969, the following operations were conducted:

1969 - In September/October a low key exercise was conducted by a surface-to-air guided missile frigate, a destroyer, and three destroyer escorts. Activity consisted of limited anti-submarine warfare operations, gunnery, and formation steaming/maneuvers.

Thirteen nuclear submarine patrols by ECHO cruise missile or NOVEMBER attack units were recorded in 1969.

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1. J2212 Point Paper, 26 Nov 73, Subj: Soviet Operations in the Philippine Sea.



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1970 - In April/May a large task group made up of 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 5 destroyer escorts, 1 subtender, 2 oilers, 2 ocean tugs, and some 15 nuclear/diesel cruise missile and attack submarines deployed to the Philippine Sea as part of Soviet Worldwide Naval Exercise "OKEAN". The Philippine Sea task group simulated a probable U.S. Carrier Task Force and was reacted to by submarines and Naval BEAR "D" reconnaissance aircraft and Long Range Aviation BEAR and BISON strike aircraft.

Twenty-one nuclear and diesel submarine patrols were noted in 1970, however, 12-15 were believed to be directly related to OKEAN.

1971 - No major surface deployments noted.

Nine nuclear submarine patrols by ECHO cruise missile or NOVEMBER attack units were recorded in 1971.

1972 - No major surface deployments noted.

Seven nuclear submarine patrols by ECHO cruise missile or NOVEMBER attack units were recorded in 1972.

1973 - During the period 7 July-28 August an exercise similar to that noted in 1969 was carried out in the Philippine Sea. Participants consisted of 2 guided missile frigates, 1 guided missile destroyer, 2 destroyer escorts, 2 intelligence collectors, 1 submarine tender, 1 replenishment ship, 3 oilers, 3-4 diesel attack submarines and 1 ECHO-I Class nuclear attack submarine. Operations consisted primarily of limited anti-submarine warfare, gunnery, formation steaming/maneuvering, and underway replenishment.

The Threat to PACOM Sea LOC[1]

(S) The Soviet threat to sea lines of communication was estimated to be the greatest in a non-nuclear war of attrition at sea. The submarines in the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet were organized into a strategic attack force, an anti-carrier force to defend the Russian mainland, and a general purpose torpedo attack force capable of carrier and LOC interdiction missions. With a realignment of these

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1. J2212 Point Paper, 17 Mar 73, Subj: Threat to Sea Lines of Communication.



b1

missions, a total force of 86 submarines could be deployed for LOC interdiction. These could include as many as 12 nuclear and 35 diesel submarines which would be available for continuous patrol within 48 hours.

(S) During initial stages of a large conflict, t
strike forces would be the primary mission for Soviet
tion with this mission, control of choke-points on ap
maintained. As the conflict proceeded, wider-ranging
and LOC would occur. Ballistic missile submarines wo
launch areas initially, and after launch could revert

(S) As of 1973, the primary mission of the PRC submarine force was coastal defense, and its training had been restricted to the shallow waters (less than 600 feet deep) of China's extensive continental shelf. With deep water training, and based upon a maximum [redacted] This would cover all PACOM shipping lanes north of Australia and the eastern half of the Indian Ocean.

SUBMARINE ORDER OF BATTLE
(Pacific Fleet)

USSR

Units available for interdiction (except SSB/SSBN)

CRUISE MISSILE, NUCLEAR	1 ECHO-I (6 SS-N-3) 14 ECHO-II (8 SS-N-3 each)
CRUISE MISSILE, DIESEL	4 JULIETT (4 SS-N-3 each) 1 WHISKEY (4 SS-N-3) 1 WHISKEY (2 SS-N-3)
ATTACK, NUCLEAR	5 NOVEMBER 4 ECHO-I
ATTACK, DIESEL, LONG RANGE (Greater than 10,000 NM)	18 FOXTROT 9 ZULU
ATTACK, DIESEL, MEDIUM RANGE (5,000-10,000 NM)	2 BRAVO 25 WHISKEY 2 WHISKEY SSR
TOTAL	86

PRC

(except SSB)

	NORTH SEA FLEET	EAST SEA FLEET	SOUTH SEA FLEET	TOTAL
SSU (HAN)	1	-	-	1
SS (MING)	1	1	-	2
SS (R CLASS)	10	11	12	33
SS (W CLASS)	13	8	-	21
SS (S-I CLASS)	-	2	-	2
	25	22	12	59

Threats and Intentions: The Asian Nations

The Korean Peninsula

(S) The 1972 accord between North and South Korea, considered in the light of the international environment in which this breakthrough occurred, rendered the danger of major hostilities less likely than at any time in the past 20 years. Regardless, the pivotal geographic position of the Korean Peninsula between the PRC, Russia and Japan insured their continued concern with activities there. The United States commitments in Asia added a fourth major power interest.[1]

(S) Despite the gestures toward detente, North Korea continued to pose a potential military threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK). The regular forces of both Koreas were well armed, well trained and generally well equipped. The armies of each side contained the vast majority of military manpower. The air and naval forces were primarily oriented toward the defensive and ground support roles.[2]

(S) The ROK army was capable of defending indefinitely against any unilateral North Korean ground attack. The ROK Air Force was [redacted] Air reinforcements from the United States would rapidly [redacted] It was considered doubtful that either [redacted] which made armed conflict on the peninsula unlikely without drastic changes in the international atmosphere.[3]

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1. J2212 Point Paper, 16 May 73, Subj: Major Power Interests in Korean Peninsula.
2. J2212 Point Paper, 24 Aug 73, Subj: Comparison of ROK-DDRK Military Forces.
3. Ibid.

Threat to Japan

(S) In view of Japan's insular position, as well as the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, a large-scale communist attack against Japan was unlikely short of general war. Nevertheless, Japan's sea routes were vulnerable at any level of attack. If conditions were such that Russia were willing to risk a nuclear response from the United States, a nuclear attack against Japan from the Russian mainland or from submarines was possible. A limited capability within the theater to mount a combined airborne/amphibious attack also existed.[1]

[redacted]

(S) In general, the Japanese did not perceive a military threat in the foreseeable future. Japan's industrialists and military leaders were concerned over the vulnerability of vital supply lines, but not to the extent that they would support the development of Japan's LOC defense. The military was also concerned about internal security. The threat from the various dissident factions was considered to have a high potential. The Japanese appeared willing to depend upon the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as the foundation for foreign policy. Japan's future course did not appear to include rearming, and its nuclear capability was not considered to be useful in the military sense.[3]

Republic of China Views the Threat[4]

(S) Notwithstanding an extremely unfavorable international environment, the Republic of China (ROC) appeared to face the future, in 1973, with less apprehension than when President Nixon visited Peking in 1972. United States reassurances, a flourishing economy, apparently near-term security from external threat, enlightened and pragmatic leaders and a hard working population were the factors which reduced Taiwan's initial resistance to the detente policy. The ROC's appreciation of its reliance on the United States for protection, and its interest in maintaining public confidence, led it to stress the positive aspects of the U.S.-ROC relationship. A gradual acceptance of the idea that

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1. J2212 Point Paper, 18 Sep 73, Subj: Threat to Japan.
2. Ibid.
3. J2212 Point Paper, 15 Mar 73, Subj: Japan Strategic Views.
4. J2212 Point Paper, 18 Mar 73, Subj: Republic of China Strategic Views.

U.S.-PRC rapprochement did not mean abandonment by the United States had built up some tolerance to further U.S.-PRC accomodations.

[redacted] b1

(S) The ROC acknowledged that the current political policies of the PRC helped to restrain Peking from military adventure. Moreover, the ROC appreciated the extent to which the PRC military threat against Taiwan had been reduced by Peking's preoccupation with the Soviet Union. These considerations had the effect of mitigating, to some extent, the ROC concern over the widening gap in comparative military capability.

[redacted] b1

Soviet Intentions in Southeast Asia

(S) Russia had no important security interests directly at stake in Indochina, but was concerned (along with the U.S.) over freedom of passage in the Straits of Malacca. The Soviet Union was expected to try to limit PRC influence in the region, but was concentrating on trade and economic inducements to extend Russian influence in the area.[1]

[redacted] b1

1. J2212 Point Paper, 18 Sep 73, Subj: Soviet Intentions Regarding Indochina.



1. J2212 Point Paper, 18 Sep 73, Subj: Chinese Intentions in Southeast Asia.
2. Ibid.
3. J2212 Point Paper, 17 Oct 73, Subj: US/USSR Non-Nuclear Conflict in Pacific.







1.3.(5)



CHAPTER III

PLANNING

SECTION I--NATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

FY 75 Posture Statement

(TS) In 1973, for the first time, the Chairman of the JCS asked the CINCs of the unified and specified commands to provide input for his annual Posture Statement. These were to be used for more detailed discussion of regional problems by the Chairman than had been the case in the past. This was the first time in the past three years that the format had included any regional discussion in any detail other than for NATO. CINCPAC was asked to comment specifically on the threat in the PACOM, capabilities and deficiencies, special achievements and problems, appreciation of the Korean situation, PACOM forward deployments, and PACOM NATO involvement. Past posture statements had discussed primarily major war. For example, over half of the FY 74 statement had dealt with strategic forces and the discussion of general purpose forces was oriented toward conflicts between the United States and either the USSR or China. A summary of CINCPAC's input follows.

[redacted] The PRC was also a growing threat to lines of communication. The PRC land force had an overwhelming capacity when compared with any forces other than those of the USSR and India. North Korea, however, had a well-equipped army of a third of a million. North Vietnam was building

in the Republic of Vietnam a force superior to the invasion force of April 1972. The Soviet Union was extending its influence in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, while attempting to discredit U.S. and Chinese power. The Chinese, however, were primarily interested in countering Soviet influence in Asia.

(TS) CINCPAC listed his tasks: to deter aggression, promote stability, reduce nuclear war risk to near zero, fight and defeat the enemy if necessary, and stabilize the situation.

(TS) In outlining his capabilities, CINCPAC listed first that forward force deployments were the key to Pacific deterrent strategy. Forward deployments, backed up with ready augmentation forces, he considered the least expensive means of achieving his goals. Swift action of forward forces was most effective, he believed, but he cautioned that PACOM forces were only marginally capable of deterring aggression, and reinforcement would be necessary for major situations. Air Force tactical squadrons in Southeast Asia were in a state of high readiness, but air crew combat experience was being degraded by rotations. Ground forces located in Korea and Okinawa were at full strength, but their effectiveness was being lost due to military exercise restrictions. There was no capability for major ground action. Naval ships and aircraft were in a reasonable state of readiness, but aging equipment and a potential fuel shortage had to be considered. Forces assigned with Republic of Korea forces were sufficient to oppose a North Korean attack, CINCPAC believed. South Vietnam forces could hold against the North Vietnamese provided they were used in a militarily effective way. The United States, with or without forces of the Republic of China, could defeat an attempt by the PRC to take Taiwan. The United States could have a rough time with the USSR, especially in matters of sea lines of communication and local air superiority.

(TS) CINCPAC outlined his deficiencies and requirements. The capabilities of our major potential adversaries had increased while ours decreased. In the PACOM the Army was half of what it had been before the Vietnam war, the Navy 60 percent of what it had been in 1964. Only the Air Force had increased in strength, in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC noted the need for greatly improved surveillance systems. He cited the need for a secure, rapid, and reliable command and control system. The existing system was not flexible, reliable, nor war survivable, he said. There was also a need for improved submarine surveillance and better ASW forces, especially submarines. CINCPAC cited the need for amphibious shipping capable of at least a one-time lift of one Marine amphibious force or equivalent Army force. Turn-around use of such shipping would be feasible only over short distances. He also cited the need for increased follow-on logistic support shipping. Another need was for a qualitative improvement in aircraft capabilities to penetrate high threat areas for conventional missions. Also needed were advanced electronic countermeasures.

The need for training areas in the Western Pacific was cited: gunnery ranges, live firing areas, and training areas for amphibious maneuvers of brigade size to maintain the readiness of forward-deployed amphibious forces. CINCPAC noted the need for Operations and Maintenance funds to exercise both theater and strategic reserves. Shortages of funds restricted the demonstrated capability to use our forces. They also affected the deterrent aspect of our forward deployed forces. Major reductions in Security Assistance funds degraded the overall posture in the PACOM. The capability of Free World forces to counter local threats reduced the U.S. burden, reduced our exposure, and helped stability. Security Assistance funds also supported bases for our forward forces.

(TS) CINCPAC listed a number of PACOM achievements. Pacific forces had contained the conflict in Southeast Asia, he noted, and maintained the independence of South Vietnam against a North Vietnamese military takeover. The final outcome, of course, remained uncertain. Vietnamization, however, had allowed U.S. Forces to withdraw without the loss of Vietnamese independence. U.S. presence and Security Assistance had contributed to the stability of PACOM countries and in a large measure accounted for continued economic and political growth of those nations. The PACOM had provided disaster relief to both Pakistan and the Philippines in 1973.

(TS) CINCPAC then addressed the Korean situation. The Republic of Korea had developed the capability to deter a unilateral threat from North Korea. U.S. Forces stationed there continued to serve a necessary purpose. They lent stability to the region and they reinforced and manifested our mutual security agreements. There were excellent training areas in South Korea and a receptive host government. Increased South Korean capability to defend against invasion from the north would make U.S. Forces there increasingly available as a PACOM reserve to deter aggression elsewhere, CINCPAC believed.

(TS) CINCPAC next addressed PACOM involvement in a NATO contingency. First, he cautioned that Asia should not be undervalued. He noted Japan's industrial capacity, the existence of strategic raw materials, and China as a threat to the Russian flank. A conflict with the USSR in Europe, CINCPAC believed, would trigger war in all theaters. PACOM forces would be engaged and could not disengage without severe losses. The redeployment of major forces from the PACOM to Europe was unrealistic, CINCPAC believed. He cited Soviet interdiction of lines of communication. Such redeployment would invite unacceptable losses of shipping and forces. The time delay in the arrival of forces would mean that they would be beyond the effective point in battle. In addition, existing forces in the PACOM were already marginal to hold vital areas. Redeployment would reduce capabilities below the threshold of survival. CINCPAC could not recommend that we size our forces based on this unrealistic concept.

[redacted]

(TS) In the matter of a Sino-Soviet conflict, CINCPAC noted that hostility between the two countries was a major fact of life and had its effect on our requirements. Improvement in relations between those countries was considered unlikely, but not inconceivable; such improvement would require a rethinking of our basic posture. Escalation of that hostility to conflict would have great consequence on U.S. Pacific force posture, CINCPAC concluded.[1]

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

(U) Among the major documents in military planning were the two volumes of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, the JCS mid-range planning vehicle. In 1973 CINCPAC's inputs were provided for the period FY 1976-1983 for both strategy and force levels.

(S) In February CINCPAC provided his recommendations on the Strategy volume. The principal concept was credible deterrence from forward basing. Forward-based PACOM forces, CINCPAC said, contributed to and created credible deterrence. They protected lines of communication, deterred aggression, provided strategic nuclear deterrence, provided logistic support, and prevented dominance of the area by a single power. This encouraged the relaxation of tensions. The PACOM force and base structure had "evolved" from changing strategic concepts, prior conflicts, and political/budgetary considerations. The forward bases were in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Guam, Tinian, Diego Garcia, and Australia.

(S) Reduction of the force levels and basing, CINCPAC cautioned, would decrease this credible deterrence. It would decrease available combat power, increase reaction time for contingencies, increase mobility requirements and the risk of major aggression. Reductions would decrease flexibility for major operations and increase dependence on carrier air assets. The readiness of embarked forces would also be reduced. Projected force levels for the Western Pacific area follow.[2]

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1. J5323 Point Paper, 25 Oct 73, Subj: FY 75 Posture Statement (U). The CINCPAC comments and recommendations to the Chairman of the JCS were forwarded by CINCPAC 262329Z Oct 73 (EX).
2. J5382 Point Paper, 26 Jun 73, Subj: PACOM Strategy - Credible Deterrence from Forward Basing (U); CINCPAC JSOP Vol. I recommendations were transmitted to the JCS by CINCPAC 100155Z Feb 73 (EX).

Major Forward Deployed Forces in the PACOM

Type Force	FY 73	Joint Force Memorandum - FY 78
Korea		
Army division	1	1
Tactical fighter wing	1	1
Japan		
Marine amphibious force	2/3	2/3
Tactical figher wing	1	0
Aircraft carrier	1	1
Philippines		
Tactical fighter wing	1	1
Western Pacific Naval Forces		
Aircraft carriers	2	2
AAW/ASW ships	28	28
Personnel*	147,400	130,000
Korea	(40,700)	(40,700)
Japan	(30,100)	(26,900)
Okinawa	(45,500)	(31,500)
Taiwan	(6,600)	(6,600)
Philippines	(14,800)	(14,800)
Guam	(9,800)	(9,800)

*Figures in geographic breakout are rounded and do not add to total.

(U) In April a CINCPAC staff member visited the JCS to obtain preliminary JCS requirements for development of input for Volume II. (CINCPAC's submissions concerned U.S. force levels (Books Two through Five) and Free World force levels (Book Seven).) CINCPAC JSOP preparation proceeded based on these expected requirements, as the CINCPAC submission deadline was advanced two weeks

to 16 July and was expanded to include Free World Objective Forces (Security Assistance, Priorities and Supporting Data) and JSOP Annexes. CINCPAC provided a schedule and preliminary guidance for his component commanders, pending receipt (in early May) of JCS strategy and guidelines for JSOP FY 76-83 development. On receipt of these guidelines, CINCPAC provided final guidance and enemy force projections to his component commanders. CINCPAC forwarded the "PACOM Recommended Force Levels for Volume II, JSOP FY 76-83" on 15 July.[1]

(S) CINCPAC had serious reservations, however, about the JCS scenarios and general strategy used to generate U.S. force requirements. As a supplement to his submission, therefore, he forwarded an assessment of priorities for developing U.S. objective forces from U.S. required forces. He provided CINCPAC's overview of major PACOM tasks, estimates that influenced priorities, and priorities for moving from force requirements to objective forces during the period FY 76-83, and he discussed issues and future effects.

(S) In his overview, CINCPAC noted that the requirement to deter or defeat Russian or Chinese aggression by conventional means (major war) during the period under study would contend for attention and resources with the requirement to cope with lesser conflicts (minor war). Those two tasks would size and characterize the forces. Though the likelihood of war with either the USSR or China would be small, the gravity of the potential outcome demanded that this be the priority consideration for structuring U.S. Forces in the PACOM. Deterrence, with a reasonable hedge against failure, would be the most realistic and attainable objective for forces to handle major war contingencies. Conventional forces, in-being, capable of protecting our sea and air lines of communication and defending essential terminals would be sufficient to deter and hedge against major conventional war, assuming that CONUS-based forces, reserves, and mobilization provided timely and adequate reinforcements to defeat the aggression. This capability, CINCPAC continued, coupled with credible SIOP (Single Integrated Operation Plan) forces and dual capable conventional air forces should be able to deter enemy use of nuclear weapons and avoid our own need for their use should major war occur. Minor wars, CINCPAC said, would require ready and rapidly deployable forces designed to respond quickly and precisely to developing hostilities or crises. These somewhat divergent requirements for deterrence of major and minor wars, CINCPAC explained, would generate somewhat dissimilar forces, though there would be considerable overlap.

(S) For the purpose of force structure and basing of general purpose conventional forces, CINCPAC made the following estimates:

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1. J5313 HistSum Dec 73; CINCPAC 190509Z May 73. The JSOP submission was forwarded by CINCPAC ltr Ser 000200 of 15 Jul 73.

- USSR will be strongest potential enemy.
- USSR military presence and interests will be worldwide.
- Conflict between the USSR and the U.S. in the PACOM area is as likely as in Europe.
- Direct U.S. military conflict with USSR anywhere will probably trigger war in all theaters.
- PRC [People's Republic of China] will be second strongest potential enemy in PACOM.
- PRC conventional threat will be substantially limited to PACOM area.
- Interests and military power of both the USSR and PRC in the PACOM area will continue to increase.
- Turbulence and discord will continue in the PACOM area.

(S) CINCPAC listed the overall priorities for forces in the PACOM, which were first to protect sea and air lines of communication and terminals, with first priority those of the United States, then major allies most threatened (i.e., Japan/Korea), then the Middle-East petroleum route, and then others, such as Australia and New Zealand. CINCPAC also listed the priority by which the United States should deter minor conflicts and protect the U.S. allies and interests.

(S) CINCPAC discussed some related issues. In the matter of major war versus minor war, CINCPAC said:

> Forces should be tailored to obtain the best deterrent balance between being able to defeat major aggression and responding to minor conflicts. In most instances forces can and should be structured to contribute to both. ASW forces could be a major exception since they are expected to contribute significantly only to major war; however the submarine threats could be a factor in minor war should the Soviets or Chinese choose to equip their satellite nations with submarines. Where there is divergence in ground forces requirements, emphasis should be placed on mobility and high quality rather than static defense and staying power. This also means reduced emphasis on large scale war reserve mate-

rials. Emphasis in tactical air should be on quick response and precision offense rather than on massive offense and attrition warfare. PACOM forces should place emphasis on high quality surveillance, readiness, precision, control, timeliness and the rapid buildup of initial strength rather than bedding down for the protracted major war. Reserves and mobilization will provide for backup.

(S) In the matter of forward deployed forces versus total forces, CINCPAC noted that forward deployments provided presence, deterrence of major and minor war, and stability. They reduced the total forces required for contingencies and the "cost of having to fight our way back in." The question of whether a given force was a deterrent or a provocation would influence the positioning of forces. Other political considerations would bias decisions, some downward, but in general, forward deployment was preferred.

(S) Technical advances could alter force requirements and improve capabilities. Areas for emphasis were named: surveillance, terminally guided weapons, electronics, mobility, and integrating control systems. Quality and proven capability, CINCPAC noted, should take priority over early delivery and numbers.

(S) Forces developed and deployed within the PACOM area for the FY 76-83 period would be the final synthesis of the following factors: our foreign policy, the developing political and strategic situation, foreign military capabilities, manpower and financial constraints, technical developments, a variety of national and Service priorities, and the persuasion of the various authorities and personalities who influence or make decisions. "Future PACOM efforts to assist in force level developments will be to analyze and understand better these inputs, refine priorities, quantify proposed objective force levels, and make related recommendations for a more effective Pacific Command," CINCPAC concluded.[1]

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(U) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) was the short range document in the Joint Program for Planning of the JCS. Its purpose was to provide a statement of military strategy to support national security objectives based on capabilities during the year covered by the study. It was published in two volumes, the first containing planning guidance, strategic considerations and concepts, and tasks assigned to CINCPAC and the other unified and specified commanders. Volume II listed major combat forces available, for planning purposes, to accomplish the tasks and conduct the operations prescribed in Volume I.

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1. CINCPAC 310452Z Aug 73.

(U) CINCPAC submitted his recommendations for revisions to the JSCP for Fiscal Year 1974 on 21 September 1973. He recommended extensive changes that updated PACOM strategic concepts, distinguished operational tasks from planning requirements, provided commanders of unified and specified commands with more options in preparing plans, and integrated material into a more logical order.[1]

(U) Personnel of the Plans Directorate also began preparation of a completely rewritten draft of Volume I for submission to the JCS, but this document had not been dispatched by the end of the year.

Single Integrated Operation Plan

[redacted]

(U) For each revision, the Deputy Director of the Joint Strategic Target and Planning Staff visited PACOM headquarters and briefed the CINCPAC. Briefings were on 15 February for Revision MIKE, 30 August for Revision NOVEMBER.[2]

The Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS)

(U) In August 1970 the JCS had established the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), the system to be used for planning of joint military operations. The system was the result of several years of effort to standardize and improve the contingency planning of the unified and specified commands. There were two types of operation plan: complete plans were those that could be translated into an operation order with minimum alteration, and concept plans, which were operation plans in abbreviated format and which required further development in detail prior to implementation.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 212120Z Sep 73 and 212121Z Sep 73; J521 HistSum Sep 73.
2. J321 HistSum Dec 73.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 114-115; CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 93.

(U) The planning system was becoming increasingly sophisticated, creating the need for computer support. An interim ADP system was in preparation in 1973 pending availability of an advanced system--JOPS III---which was to be delivered by the JCS in 1976. The interim ADP system was called the JOPS Interim Software (JIS), and certain unified commanders world-wide were in the process of changing their automatic data processing hardware to the Honeywell 6000 series computer and converting their computer programs to this JIS. (The Honeywell equipment was to be used with both the JIS and JOPS III.) The magnitude of this task led to a share-the-work approach by four of the unified commands involved. The JCS chaired a series of conferences on this matter, the first hosted by the CINC of the U.S. Readiness Command (USCINCRED) 16-18 January. This led to a better understanding of the programs involved and served as a preparation for follow-on conferences. The second was hosted by the CINC of the Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) 27 February to 1 March, and resulted in workload assignments for the four CINCs as follows: USCINCRED was to produce a Force Requirements Generator; CINCLANT a Transportation Feasibility Estimator; CINCPAC a Movement Requirements Generator; and USCINCEUR (CINC of the European Command) common utility programs and programs to interface working files. In addition, each CINC was to produce a functional description for a pertinent portion of the total system.[1]

(U) The third conference was held in April in the PACOM, but chaired as the others had been by a representative from the Office of the JCS. The conferees conducted a detailed review of the functional descriptions prepared, refined program and file design, and considered design specifications.[2]

(U) When all of these JIS programs were completed it was expected that they would be adopted by all of the unified and specified commands, with the various JIS programs compiled by the four CINCs actively involved in the program disseminated to all of the unified and specified commanders and the Service headquarters. A briefing for senior officers on this program and its application to JOPS planning was presented at the headquarters of CINCPAC and each of his component commanders in June 1973.[3]

(U) The whole JOPS system embraced both joint and Service requirements--all functional areas of planning and ADP systems support. The planning process, therefore, called for concurrent planning at several levels of command. Close coordination and mutual understanding were considered essential. The JCS, in Volume III of the JOPS, had established and delineated the functions of a JOPS Users Group. The PACOM JOPS Users Group provided CINCPAC and the component

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1. See Chapter V, Logistics, for additional detail.
2. J5162 HistSum Mar 73.
3. CINCPAC 180525Z May 73; J5151 HistSum Jun 73.

staffs with a forum for discussion and coordination of JOPS matters. Meetings were held as needed on a rotational basis with each headquarters in turn serving as host. The May 1973 meeting, for example, was held at CINCUSARPAC, and covered such matters as the USARPAC planning process and its relationship with those of CINCPAC and the JCS, and the results of the April JIS meeting, including a review of JCS changes to the Deployment Report and on the Force Requirements Generator being developed, including descriptions of the techniques of conversational mode with the computer to develop force lists required for an OPLAN.[1]

(U) One administrative change was made in 1973 regarding authority to promulgate joint OPLANs. Although the JCS guidance for plan preparation had indicated only that they be authenticated by "an appropriate officer," CINCPAC's plans had been prepared for the Admiral's personal signature. In view of the many demands on his time, this procedure was revised to relieve him of this unnecessary administrative burden by allowing the promulgation of the plans by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations with only those plans involving new concepts of operation presented for CINCPAC's approval.[2]

(S) In another attempt to improve planning (and reduce redundancy), the Plans Directorate studied an "omnibus" approach to the plans CINCPAC prepared in support of the commanders of other unified commands. It was believed that the full potential of this system would not be realized until the JOPS/JIS system was completed, but tasks and functional areas were consolidated to produce a new plan under development (CINCPAC OPLAN 5125) that would consolidate augmentation/supporting plans for USCINCEUR's Plans 4102, 4224, and 4274; CINCLANT's Plans 2200, 2325, and 2326; CINCSO's Plan 6350; and CINCAL's Plan 1250. A number of other tasks were studied for inclusion in CINCPAC's OPLAN 5001 for General War.[3]

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1. J5162 HistSum May 73.
2. J5/Memo/160-73, 8 Mar 73, Subj: Authority to Promulgate CINCPAC Joint Operation Plans.
3. J5211 Point Paper, 2 Nov 73, Subj: "Omnibus" Planning (U).

should be J54

SECTION II--CINCPAC PLANS

CINCPAC Operation Plans

(U) The CINCPAC staff was continuously in the process of preparing, revising, or studying the continued requirement for planning for many contingencies and operations. The basic CINCPAC Operation Plan series was the responsibility of the Plans Directorate, although other staff elements contributed directly with specialized input, particularly for detailed annexes to plans. And some plans were prepared and revised by the Operations Directorate, in which case they were promulgated by CINCPAC letter or message. The following listing contains the name and number of such plans, the source of tasking to prepare such plans, and the status of recent action. Specific plans that received greater attention or took greater amounts of staff action in 1973 are described in the narrative that follows the listing.

(TS) CINCPAC also maintained certain bilateral plans. Any 1973 action in these planning matters is also addressed in the narrative that follows.

CINCPAC Operation Plans--Plans Directorate

Number	Title	Source of Tasking (JSCP Vol I unless otherwise noted)	Action During 1973
5001	General War Plan (S)	p 35, para 19a	Extensive staff effort devoted to revising the plan into JOPS format. However, the plan requires fundamental basic substantive changes to reflect current strategic concepts.
[redacted]		p 54, para 24d (4)	Updated 25 Aug 73. Approval pending.
5022	Support Internal Uprisings and Revolutions (TS)	ANNEX E	Incorporating into other CINCPAC plans.

Number	Title	Source of Tasking (JSCP Vol I unless otherwise noted)	Action During 1973
[redacted]		p 54, para 24e	Annual review being conducted. Completion FY 75.
		p 51, para 24b(2)	Annual review being conducted. Completion FY 75.
5026	Control of Maritime Traffic (C)	p 40, para 19g	Annual review. Change 1, 28 Sep 73.
[redacted]		p 51, para 24b; p 53, para 24d	Discussed in some detail below.
5028	ASW and Control Protection of Shipping (C)	p 40, para 19t	Current.
5031	Pacific Mining Plan (U)	p 40, para 19t	Annual review. Change 1, 19 Mar 73.
[redacted]		p 51, para 24b(1)	No change. Will be cancelled upon publication of 5083.
		p 51, para 24b(1)	No change. Will be cancelled upon publication of 5083.
		p 51, para 24b(3)	No change.
5049	PACOM Actions in Event of a NATO/Warsaw Pact Conflict (C)	p 52, para 24c	Being revised for incorporation in 5001 and 5125.

Number	Title	Source of Tasking (JSCP Vol I unless otherwise noted)	Action During 1973
5060	Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation (U)	p 39, para 19p(1)	Discussed in some detail below.
5061	Special Contingency Evacuation (U)	JCS 11-68 of 4 Jan 68 & JCS 8577/ 301640Z Jan 68.	Updated 29 Mar 73. Approved 12 Jul 73.
5065	Security of Selected Personnel and Equipment (U)	p 40, para 19p(2)	Updated 3 Aug 73. Approved 17 Oct 73.
[redacted]	Supplementary Collection Operations Against Foreign [redacted] Tests (C)	p. 40, para 19r	Converted to CONPLAN format, 3 Jul 73. Approved.
5068	CINCPAC/FAA Pacific Region Emergency and Wartime Relationship (U)	p 40, para 19s	Annual review. Change 1, 4 Sep 73.
5076	Supplementary Collection Operations Against Foreign Missile and Space Associated Activities (C) PONY EXPRESS (U)	p 40, para 19r	Discussed in some detail below.
(5083)	Defense of Southeast Asia (under development)	p 51, para 24b(1)	Under development.
5085	Operations to Prevent Seizure of the ROK Government (C)	p 54, para 24d(5)	No action taken.
5090	Air Harassment and Reprisal Operations	p 38, para 19g(2)	Updated 7 Sep 73. Approved.
5095	Quadripartite Naval Countermeasures (S)	JCS 004807/292321Z Jan 65; p 38, para 19g	Annual Review. Change 2, 3 Jul 73.

Number	Title	Source of Tasking (JSCP Vol I unless otherwise noted)	Action During 1973
[redacted]		p 55, para 24g(2)	Discussed in some detail below.
		p 55, para 24g(3)	Discussed in some detail below.
	FRIDAY GUEST--U.S. Naval Deployments to Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf Area	p 40, para 19v & p 55, para 24g(1)	No change. Continues to be implemented by CINCPACFLT scheduling.
(5125)	Augmentation/Support of Other Unified Commands (U)	p 36, para 19e & 19f(3)	Under development.
0100	Evacuation of U.S. Nationals from Countries in Africa South of the Sahara ~~(C)~~	JCS CONPLAN 0100 dtd 3 Oct 72.	Approved by JCS 20 Nov 73.
0200	Disaster Relief Operations in Africa South of the Sahara ~~(C)~~	JCS CONPLAN 0200 dtd 3 Oct 73.	Approved by JCS 21 Aug 73.

CINCPAC Operation Plans--Operations Directorate

Number	Title	Source of Tasking	Action During 1973
5020Y	FREEDOM DROP	CINCPAC 010540Z Aug 69	Complete revision issued 30 Jul 73 for planning.
CONPLAN 5100	Personnel Recovery	JCS 8551/052246Z May 71; JCS 7062/241751Z Jan 73.	Discussed in some detail in the Operations chapter.
OPLAN 5104	Continuity of Operations (COOP) (U)	DOD Directive 3020.26 of 25 Aug 67	Published and distributed on 27 Nov.

Number	Title	Source of Tasking	Action During 1973
CONPLAN 5119	Casualty Resolution	JCS 1347/270017Z May 71; JCS 7062/241751Z Jan 73.	Discussed in some detail in the Operations chapter.
CINCPAC 272224Z Feb 73	Contingency Plan (TENNIS RACKET)	JCS 6647/210058Z Feb 73	None
SSO 00051-72	MOUNTAIN MIST	JCSM 701-68 (Vol. II)	1 Feb 73 (Revised) 13 Apr 73 (28 pg change) 28 Jul 73 (Interim change) 1 Aug 73 (Interim change)
CINCPAC 000167-73	FRINGE BARON	JCSM 700/701-68	1 Jul 73 (Original Issue) 17 Aug 73 (Interim change)
CINCPAC 00066-72	Peacetime Reconnaissance and Sensitivity Military Operations in the Pacific Command	JCSM 700/701-68	Interim changes on 14 Feb, 24 Feb, 8 Mar, 8 May, 11 May, and 25 Nov 73.
CINCPAC Serial 001282 of 29 Oct 73	PACOM Command and Control Communications, Computer System Plan (U)	CJCS 5832/301554Z May 73	One-time plan.
	CINCPAC Plan for Management of the Permissive Action Link Program	SECDEF Memo, 19 Feb 72	Message with advance Change 1 promulgated by CINCPAC 310030Z Mar 73.

OPLAN 5027



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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 94-95.
2. J516 Point Paper, 17 May 73, Subj: Synopsis and Status of CINCPAC Plans Affecting Korea (U).
3. CINCPACAF 091800Z Mar 73.



(S) COMUS Korea/CINCUNC was to make recommendations to CINCPAC for air asset allocations; plan for and control all air assets assigned to him; serve as coordinating authority for all air activity operating in his area of operations; in conjunction with other PACOM commands to develop procedures and facilities for the coordination and (as appropriate) integration of air offensive and defensive forces within his area of responsibility; and coordinate planning and air efforts with other PACOM commands for air operations in support of his area.

(S) CINCPAC defined "tactical emergency authority" as follows:

> ...A tactical emergency is defined for purposes of this plan as a combat situation in which the overall mission or friendly troops are in imminent jeopardy and immediate air support is required to ensure accomplishment of the mission or survival of the force.

Should such an emergency occur, and air support allocated to CINCUNC/COMUS Korea or air assets assigned to his operational control were insufficient to cope with the enemy, he was authorized to place an emergency request upon CINCPAC for additional air support. He could not delegate the authority to make this determination, however. And CINCPAC retained the authority to divert air resources to meet a tactical emergency. "In circumstances when it is obvious that CINCPAC recognition of a tactical emergency cannot be obtained in time to counter the enemy threat, and where any delay in response would re-

sult in extreme hazard to friendly forces," CINCPAC's Appendix 12 continued, "CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA may request additional air assets directly from supporting commanders." In such a case, commands having operational control of air units were to respond immediately to CINCUNC/COMUS Korea's declaration, providing air sorties as available and necessary to support the declared emergency. This authority was only temporary, however, and was to remain in effect only until CINCPAC recognition of the tactical emergency occurred, at which time emergency requests were to be approved or disapproved by CINCPAC.[1]



(TS) In the matter of the Joint Air Operations Center, Korea (JAOCK), the CINCPAC plan tasked the components to provide recommendations and plans for the employment of air assets. All four Services were in accord that the JAOCK should be inserted into the plan.

(TS) In matters of command relationships without United Nations authority, under the CINCPAC plan COMUS Korea would exercise operational control of all forces assigned to him. Under study at the JCS was an arrangement by which operational command of ROK forces would be under COMUS Korea or a command arrangement still to be negotiated, such as a U.S.-ROK Combined Command. All of the Services concurred with this JCS position.

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1. CINCPAC 112228Z Aug 73.

(~~TS~~) If the United Nations Command was not terminated, CINCPAC planned to act as executive agent of the JCS for operational control of all tactical air assets. As of the end of the year, all Service and JCS planners rejected this concept of CINCPAC as executive agent of the JCS.[1]

(~~C~~) Earlier, after several delays, CINCPAC distributed the Base Development Plan for 5027 on 16 July. This BDP was required for all major plans that required facilities in excess of those readily available for use by U.S. forces employed by the plan. The BDP identified facility requirements, assets, and deficiencies in terms of Defense Department construction category codes and determined resources required to accommodate the facility deficiencies in terms of manpower, materiel, and money. The integrated Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) was the primary document used to determine these requirements, construction force availability, and required date for facility occupancy. The BDP had originally been scheduled for submission on 31 March 1972, but delays in completion of the TPFDL and a subsequent significant revision in the planned employment of U.S. Forces, which negated much already completed work, required additional time in preparation. This BDP was the first of this magnitude completed in the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) format. It represented the culmination of nearly two years of concerted effort by the BDP personnel of the Service component, COMUS Korea, and CINCPAC headquarters, and it demonstrated the ability to produce in the required Joint Planning format a workable BDP for a plan on the magnitude of 5027.[2]

(~~C~~) CINCPAC transmitted the TPFDL to the JCS and other users on 22 August. The material was transmitted by the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) in a series of 23 reports. The message that identified the transmittal also listed any deviations from standard deployment reporting procedures that had been required.[3]

(U) The next revision of the plan had begun before the year ended. The August 1973 submission had been based on forces listed in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for Fiscal Years 1972-73. The effort in progress at the end of the year would reflect FY 74 forces. A preplanning conference was held on 15 November to begin the process and also to familiarize COMUS Korea and CINCPAC's components with the Logistics Directorate's PACOM Study of Logistics Alternatives, Concepts and Effectiveness (SOLACE). (This SOLACE study is addressed in more detail in the Logistics chapter of this History.) As CINCPAC

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1. J5221 Point Paper, 28 Nov 73, Subj: Status of CINCPAC OPLAN 5027-Defense of Korea (~~C~~).
2. J42 HistSums Jun, Jul 74; J4/Memo/0065-73, 1 Jun 73, Subj: Base Development Plan (BDP) CINCPAC OPLAN 5027 (U).
3. CINCPAC 222020Z Aug 73.

had advised the JCS, the update of the TPFDL Data using FY 74 forces would be completed in conjunction with the SOLACE; use of the FY 74 force list would provide a common reference point for comparing SOLACE alternatives, OPLAN 5027, the Panama Canal Study, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan movement analysis, and other related subjects.[1]

CONPLAN 5060C (EAGLE PULL)

(Ø) Concept Plan 5060 was concerned with Non-combatant Emergency and Evacuation (NEMVAC) Planning. It provided for military support to be rendered by the PACOM to assist the Department of State in the emergency care, protection, and evacuation of U.S. noncombatants and designated aliens located in countries in the PACOM. Cambodia NEMVAC planning had come under study in 1972 with changing organizations and capabilities in Southeast Asia as a result of the drawdown of forces in Vietnam. COMUSMACV had been charged with responsibility to render NEMVAC assistance to the American Embassy in Phnom Penh, but CINCPAC relieved him of that responsibility in December, at which time responsibility was assigned to COMUSMACTHAI. By the end of 1972 COMUSMACTHAI had prepared a concept of operations (which CINCPAC had advised him to be prepared to implement, if required by circumstances) and was working on a complete support plan.[2]

(C) COMUSMACTHAI submitted a draft of his supporting plan on 26 January 1973; it was entitled "COMUSMACTHAI CONPLAN 5060C." Three options were established for the plan, as follows:

> ...Option I: Evacuation directed by Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, Cambodia utilizing AMEMB aircraft resources, scheduled airline and/or charter flights from Pochentong Airport, Phnom Penh, Cambodia to "safehaven" locations as directed by AMEMB. NEMVAC operations under Option I would alert COMUSMACTHAI, CDR, USSAG/7AF and CDR, Thailand ALCC [Airlift Control Center] to prepare for possible military assistance as required in accordance with Option I or III.
>
> ...Option II: As required by the Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, Cambodia and directed by CINCPAC, evacuation would be conducted by military forces under OPCON of CDR, USSAG/7AF and CDR, Thailand ALCC using fixed wing aircraft from Pochentong Airport, Phnom Penh, Cambodia to Don Muang Royal Thai Air Force Base...or Utapao Royal Thai Naval Airfield...Thailand.

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1. J5221 HistSums Oct, Nov 73; CINCPAC 111827Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 170415Z Nov 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 96-97.

POTENTIAL NONCOMBATANT EVACUEES

(BASED ON LATEST DATA PROVIDED TO CINCPAC BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
(as of 1 Aug 73)



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 97.

STATE DEPT EVACUATION CAPACITY PER WEEK (EST)		
Commercial AIR	Commercial SEA	TOTAL
NS	NS	
8100	3400	11500
390	15	405
NS	NS	
NS	NS	
4459	NS	4459
1000	NS	1000
6000	1650	7650
NS	NS	
1200	15	1215
4248	595	4843
#	#	
(1) — # 2933		2933
1000	I	1000
NS	NS	
750	3154	3904
NS	NS	
(2) 4940	1926	6866
#	#	
6300	(2) 48	6348
A	I	
NS	NS	

(1) CAPACITY IN 6 HOUR PERIOD
(2) NORMAL CAPACITY PER MONTH
TRANSPORTATION PROVIDED BY MILITARY
NS NOT SPECIFIED IN PLAN
A ADEQUATE
I INADEQUATE

...Option III: In the event hostile action has denied the use of Pochentong Airport to fixed wing aircraft, helicopter aircraft will be utilized to evacuate designated personnel from preselected landing zones within the city of Phnom Penh and/or at Pochentong Airport. Personnel will be evacuated to Don Muang RTAFB, Utapao RTNA or an appropriate "safehaven" location in Thailand.[1]

(S) CINCPAC asked for and received the comments of his component commanders. CINCUSARPAC, among other comments, suggested establishing a Joint Task Force (JTF) under COMUSMACTHAI to carry out NEMVAC operations in Cambodia. He noted that COMUSMACTHAI was assigned responsibility for coordination of the evacuation while the commanders of the USSAG and ALCC were responsible for the conduct of operations and the operational control of military forces. His recommendation regarding the JTF was in the interest of "unity of command," he said.[2]

(S) CINCPAC requested component comment on this JTF proposal for the Cambodia NEMVAC plan and on the suitability of such an organization for other similar NEMVAC plans. COMUSMACTHAI concurred in the JTF proposal, but both CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF nonconcurred in the use of the concept and, in effect, recommended that other similar plans be handled on a case-by-case basis.[3]

(S) In any case, on 13 April CINCPAC relieved COMUSMACTHAI of the responsibility for the NEMVAC planning and tasked the Commander USSAG to prepare a plan, which was now called USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C and known as EAGLE PULL. COMUSSAG submitted his plan on 17 April and CINCPAC approved it with several changes. These were incorporated and COMUSSAG assumed full responsibility for all matters pertaining to military support to be provided for NEMVAC operations in Cambodia.[4]

(S) The EAGLE PULL plan, promulgated on 27 June, provided for three options. Under Option I the Ambassador would conduct the necessary NEMVAC operations. Under Option II, military assistance would be requested from the PACOM and would be provided by COMUSSAG who would employ C-130 aircraft to evacuate the noncombatants from Pochentong Airport. Under Option III, military assistance would also be requested from the PACOM and would be provided by COMUSSAG who would conduct the operations using helicopters. It was intended that Option III would be used if the use of Pochentong Airport was denied.[5]

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 260740Z Jan 73.
2. CINCUSARPAC 022327Z Feb 73.
3. CINCPACFLT 162317Z Feb 73; CINCPACAF 152236Z Feb 73.
4. COMUSSAG/7AF 090650Z May 73.
5. J526 HistSum Jul 73, which cited USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C of 27 Jun 73.

(S) On 4 May CINCPAC submitted for JCS approval a list of proposed Rules of Engagement (ROE) to be used in planning. The guiding principle was to be to use the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission. The ground support force commander was authorized to use deadly force (live ammunition or any other type of physical force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm) only when all three of the following circumstances were present: lesser means had been exhausted or were unavailable; risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons was not significantly increased by its use; and the purpose of its use was one or more of the following, (1) self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm to U.S. forces, (2) defense of lives of persons to be evacuated, and (3) prevention of destruction of U.S. property or equipment vital to accomplishment of the mission. In the sequence of events to be normally followed in the application of force, CINCPAC listed the use of riot control agents between the use of warning fire and delivery of controlled well-aimed fire by predesignated snipers.[1]

(S) The JCS approved the ROE on 26 May, except for the planned use of riot control agents, which was approved for planning purposes only pending final approval by higher authority. Following JCS approval of the ROE, however, legislation had been enacted in Washington that was believed would have a serious impact on combat activities in Southeast Asia. The JCS advised on 6 July that a detailed assessment of the impact of this legislation would be issued prior to 15 August. CINCPAC, however, requested guidance from the JCS as to the applicability of existing ground and air ROE for evacuation operations after 14 August. Specifically, he asked the JCS about any restrictions or limitations that might be foreseen in the use of tactical air or airlift aircraft, or in the delivery of individual or crew-served weapons, that would adversely affect successful accomplishment of the humanitarian tasks associated with EAGLE PULL operations. The JCS provided the requested guidance on 30 July and CINCPAC retransmitted the JCS message to COMUSSAG and other concerned PACOM subordinate commanders.[2]

(S) On 22 June the Secretary of State retransmitted a message from the U.S. Ambassador in Cambodia that discussed the criticality of the situation and proposed possible courses of action in the event legislation was enacted to stop air combat operations in Cambodia. As an additional safeguard, as the potential for implementing the plan seemed to be increasing, COMUSSAG requested that he be provided with two U.S. Marine Corps infantry companies (reinforced) for possible use in ground security operations instead of the one company that was then assigned. CINCPAC advised that the two would be provided, as requested, and that additional Marine companies and/or a U.S. Army infantry battalion

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1. CINCPAC 040355Z May 73.
2. CINCPAC 252037Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 310220Z Jul 73, which cited JCS 301545Z Jul 73.

(minus) would constitute back-up forces, if required. CINCPAC at the same time also requested that CINCPACFLT provide the additional Marine company. On 15 July COMUSSAG requested authority to modify EAGLE PULL so that CINCPACFLT would be tasked to designate and provide a senior ground support force commander and a small staff to act as a single point of contact with the Ambassador in Phnom Penh and to exercise effective command and control over committed units. Upon his arrival in either Nakhan Phanom or Phnom Penh the commander would come under the operational control of COMUSSAG/7AF. CINCPAC approved the modification and suggested certain changes to the plan concerning tasking and command relationships.[1]

(S) On 5 July the Ambassador in Phnom Penh requested comments from COMUSSAG on the advantages and disadvantages of using Tan Son Nhut in the Republic of Vietnam as the primary safehaven instead of U-Tapao in the event helicopters had to be used for evacuation operations. COMUSSAG provided the Ambassador with a summary of advantages and disadvantages, stating that he intended to continue to use U-Tapao because of the high threat posed by the antiaircraft environment between Phnom Penh and Saigon. CINCPAC concurred with this appraisal, but authorized use of Tan Son Nhut if such use was warranted at the time of an emergency and was approved by the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon.[2]

(S) Because of the continuing threat at this time to Pochentong Airport, COMUSSAG indicated that he was placing increased reliance on the use of helicopters to effect the successful accomplishment of EAGLE PULL. To insure that the helicopters remained operational, COMUSSAG directed that the 18 available HH/CH-53 aircraft be used only for mission-essential operations. As a precautionary measure, to insure that COMUSSAG had sufficient vertical lift capability available, CINCPAC requested that CINCPACFLT provide additional helicopters. In response to CINCPACFLT tasking, the Commander of the Seventh Fleet deployed an Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Amphibious Unit (ARG/MAU) to the Gulf of Thailand to assume a 12-hour response time to Kompong Som, Cambodia not later than 10 August. Designated ARG ALFA/31st MAU (CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4), this naval force was capable of providing COMUSSAG with 13 additional CH-53s for helicopter evacuation operations with a source for additional Marines for the ground support force. In late July COMUSSAG requested approval of two courses of action (under Option III) for employing these additional assets. CINCPAC approved these modifications and provided some additional clarification concerning the command relationships involved. The Marine Corps forces to be employed in the ground security force operations, CINCPAC noted, would come under operational control of COMUSSAG upon arrival at assembly or staging points designated by COMUSSAG,

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1. USSAG/7AF 151030Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 242110Z Jul 73.
2. USSAG/7AF 091130Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 110349Z Jul 73.

and would return to operational control of CINCPACFLT immediately upon completion of EAGLE PULL operations. Marine Corps forces from the ARG ALFA/31st MAU, if employed in ground security force operations, would come under operational control of COMUSSAG upon debarkation from Amphibious Ready Group shipping, and would return to Fleet operational control upon reembarkation. Aviation units of the 31st MAU, when employed in EAGLE PULL operations, "will come under OPCON COMUSSAG upon feet dry and will return to OPCON CINCPACFLT upon feet wet at completion of EAGLE PULL operations." Amphibious Readiness Group ships used as safehavens or for transportation of evacuees were to remain under operational control of CINCPACFLT who was to assume responsibility for evacuees during the period of their embarkation.[1]

(S) By 9 August the ARG ALFA/31st MAU had arrived in the Gulf of Thailand and was assuming a holding position in an area bounded by 9°40'N to 11°N and 102°E to 104°E, with a planned 12-hour response time to Kompong Som.[2]

(S) On 18 August, as the military situation around the Cambodian capital eased somewhat, CINCPAC requested that COMUSSAG review his requirements and recommend, as appropriate, a reduced readiness posture for the EAGLE PULL forces. CINCPAC also asked the JCS for their views on any new political developments that might influence a decision to alter the readiness posture. COMUSSAG recommended that the ARG ALFA/31st MAU assume a five-day response posture to Kompong Som and that the Okinawa-based ground support force assume a "normal" deployability posture. He recommended that all be prepared to assume an increased response time posture on short notice, however.[3]

(S) CINCPACFLT concurred in the COMUSSAG proposals and outlined several specific actions to reduce the readiness posture of the EAGLE PULL forces and permit the overdue rotation of the Battalion Landing Team assigned to ARG ALFA. CINCPAC incorporated these proposals from CINCPACFLT and COMUSSAG in a message to the JCS. CINCPAC was preparing to direct CINCPACFLT to execute the actions noted when informal information was received that a higher-level discussion was then under way in Washington on this subject and that CINCPAC should not release such a message until he received further guidance from the JCS. On 30 August, however, the JCS concurred in the actions proposed by CINCPAC and authorized him to designate the day on which those activities were to commence. CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to reduce the EAGLE PULL posture beginning 31 August. CINCPAC also directed a reduction in the deployability posture

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1. CINCPAC 250158Z Jul 73; CINCPACFLT 251102Z Jul 73; CINCPACFLT 300046Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 012320Z Aug 73.
2. J526 HistSum Jul 73.
3. CINCPAC 182159Z Aug 73; COMUSSAG/7AF 211000Z Aug 73.

of the Okinawa-based ground support force, but subsequent informal discussion, again between CINCPAC and JCS staff personnel, resulted in a determination that it would be more prudent to maintain that force in a higher state of readiness during the modification in the posture of ARG ALFA. Accordingly, CINCPAC modified his earlier proposal concerning the ground support force's readiness posture and directed CINCPACFLT to maintain them in an "Increased Deployability Posture" until further advised.[1]

(S) Throughout October and November the ARG ALFA/MAU maintained a 96-hour readiness posture to Kompong Som. Deployability posture of the ground support force on Okinawa was reduced from "increased" to "normal" in mid-September and during the October-November period it was capable of being at the staging base at Ubon, Thailand within 20 to 24 hours. The 25th Infantry Division backup security force was also on "normal" status.[2]

(S) The number of persons to be evacuated in event of execution of EAGLE PULL had gradually reduced during much of the course of the year. As reported by the Ambassador in Phnom Penh, the number on 20 June had been 350 American citizens and 314 aliens. As of 15 October, that number had been reduced to 289 U.S. citizens and 237 aliens. However, by 5 December the number had increased again to a total of 577 evacuees.[3]

(S) On 14 December the JCS requested a review of EAGLE PULL in light of the beginning of the new dry season. CINCPAC, in coordination with COMUSSAG, reviewed all planning areas and responded to the JCS on 22 December. He advised that EAGLE PULL provided adequate measures and procedures to successfully fulfill identifiable NEMVAC requirements. Available forces and resources were adequate to support required operations. Plans were up-to-date and compatible with the Ambassador's plan in which the Country Team had established effective evacuation procedures. Exercises had provided ample opportunity for extensive evaluation of the plan and the principal participants were constantly alert to EAGLE PULL requirements. In conclusion, CINCPAC advised the JCS that should the situation in Cambodia deteriorate significantly, the readiness posture of EAGLE PULL would be increased as the circumstances required. It had not been necessary to execute the plan by the end of 1973.[4]

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1. CINCPACFLT 222314Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 250045Z Aug 73; JCS 302239Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 310321Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 312109Z Aug 73; and J526 HistSum Aug 73. Explanation of various levels of deployability posture is contained in CINCPAC Instruction 3020.1, the CINCPAC Planning Guidance Manual.
2. J524 Point Paper, 2 Oct 73, Subj: Evacuation of Noncombatants from Cambodia (C).
3. J517 Point Paper, 25 Jun 73, Subj: Evacuation of Noncombatants from Cambodia (S); J524 Point Paper, 7 Nov 73, Subj: Evacuation of Noncombatants from Cambodia (C); AMEMB Phnom Penh 13515/060425Z Dec 73.
4. CINCPAC 220040Z Dec 73; J524 HistSum Dec 73.

OPLAN 5076

(TS) CINCPAC's OPLAN 5076 concerned Supplementary Collection Operations Against Foreign Missile and Space Activity (C) in the program that was called PONY EXPRESS. During review of the plan in 1973, intelligence estimates indicated the possibility that the People's Republic of China could initiate intercontinental ballistic missile testing in the near future with the Indian Ocean as a possible impact area. The existing CINCPAC OPLAN addressed Soviet operations in the Pacific primarily. On 25 May, therefore, CINCPAC requested the concurrence of the JCS in the matter of converting the operation plan into a concept plan format with two separate Appendices to ANNEX C (Operations) to cover specific concepts of operation for both the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean testing. The concept plan format provided more flexibility and eliminated those annexes not required. The introduction of testing in the Indian Ocean required joint planning by the CINC Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) and CINCPAC. Accordingly, representatives of CINCLANT, CINCPAC's air and naval component commands, and the National Security Agency met at CINCPAC's headquarters 16 and 17 July to develop a concept of operations.1

CONPLANS 5096 and 5097

(TS) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) tasked CINCPAC to [redacted] 1.6. (S)

provide assistance to Pakistan against Communist aggression. On 26 October CINCPAC asked the JCS to comment on the validity of this tasking. It was understood that the requirement for air defense support to India was based on a 1963 agreement with that country. CINCPAC questioned the need to maintain an active plan in view of the U.S. detente with China and U.S.-India relations. The requirement for the Pakistan plan was questioned in view of Pakistan's official withdrawal from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization on 8 November 1973. The JCS concurred with CINCPAC's observations and noted that annual review of the JSCP, then in progress, would critically examine the requirement for retention of these planning tasks.2

OPLAN ISLAND TREE

(S) In 1971 Washington interest had been directed toward enhancing the interdiction capabilities of the RVNAF. CINCPAC OPLAN ISLAND TREE had been

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1. CINCPAC 250040Z May 73; CINCPAC 260059Z Jun 73; J5172 Point Paper, 22 Jun 73, Subj: CINCPAC OPLAN 5076, Supplementary Collection Operations Against Foreign Missile and Space Activity (C) (PONY EXPRESS).
2. CINCPAC 261856Z Oct 73; JCS 7928/302335Z Oct 73.

developed at that time and forwarded to the JCS. Preparation of the plan had required review of numerous Service and Defense Special Projects Group Studies for development of a combined U.S.-Allied interdiction plan for Southeast Asia. The complexity of the problems and limited time to complete the plan required creation of a task force at JCS and CINCPAC to expedite preparation.[1]

(S) ISLAND TREE had provided for coordinated interdiction operations during the Fiscal Year 1972 dry season while U.S. Forces were withdrawing from Vietnam and RVN forces were assuming increased responsibilities. The plan took into consideration the air, ground, and naval forces of the United States, the RVN, the Royal Thai Government, and the Royal Khmer Government in Cambodia. The area of operations included the Demilitarized Zone, the Laotian Panhandle, eastern Cambodia, and the RVN. Primary objectives of the plan were to impede the flow of personnel and supplies from North Vietnam and assist the RVNAF to achieve an improved interdiction capability.[2]

(C) On 22 August 1973 CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that ISLAND TREE be cancelled as it had been overtaken by events. CINCPAC, however, suggested the normal 2-year retention of the plan for possible reference purposes. The JCS approved this recommendation on 5 September and CINCPAC notified his Service components and COMUSSAG on 8 September of the cancellation with a requirement for retention.[3]

FRESH MANDATE

(S) In September 1970 the JCS had directed development of a contingency plan for the eventuality of an enemy-initiated offensive in the RVN as U.S. troop strength declined. The CINCPAC plan, called FRESH MANDATE, was forwarded to the JCS for approval on 22 October 1970. The plan provided measures to deny enemy goals, including setbacks to pacification progress, or attempts to inflict a series of local defeats on small Vietnamese units or high casualties on U.S. Forces, or to achieve a defeat of major Vietnamese forces. The plan was promulgated to the component commands and COMUSMACV on 27 February 1971 and on 20 March of that year COMUSMACV disseminated his Concept Plan J210 on FRESH MANDATE.[4]

(S) On 3 February 1972 the JCS requested contingency planning for a possible major assault across the Demilitarized Zone into northern RVN. On 5 February CINCPAC provided the JCS, for review, a revised concept plan, FRESH MANDATE II,

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, p. 149.
2. J524 HistSum Sep 73.
3. CINCPAC 222226Z Aug 73; JCS 9437/051221Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 080545Z Sep 73.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, p. 152; J524 HistSum Aug 73.

specifically addressing the threat of a major enemy thrust across the DMZ and providing appropriate courses of action in that event.[1]

(C) As the United States completed the withdrawal of forces from the RVN the plans were overtaken by events and CINCPAC recommended to the JCS in mid-1973 that the FRESH MANDATE plans be cancelled. Later, on 8 August, be recommended that the mandatory 2-year retention requirement stipulated in the Joint Operation Planning System be waived. Both recommendations were approved and CINCPAC's components and COMUSSAG were provided authority to destroy FRESH MANDATE I and II.[2]

OPLAN FRESH TIGER

[redacted]

(TS) In the spring of 1973 CINCPAC reviewed FRESH TIGER for feasibility, again in coordination with CINCSAC. On 10 August CINCPAC recommended that the JCS delete the requirement for the plan. Because of the increase in the number and hardening of targets since the plan had been developed in 1970, conventional strikes were no longer feasible. The JCS concurred on 4 December. On 11 December CINCPAC advised his component commanders and CINCSAC of the cancellation, noting, however, that in the Joint Operation Planning System the plan had to be retained on file for two years by supporting and supported commanders. This planning task had not been required by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.[4]

Inactive or Superseded Plans

(C) Six Operation Plans maintained by the Plans Directorate had been placed in an inactive status for various reasons. These plans were 5021, Singapore (C):

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1. J524 HistSum Aug 73, which cited JCS 9969/030108Z Feb 72 and CINCPAC 051230Z Feb 73 (both EX).
2. CINCPAC 250237Z Jul 73; JCS 2630/022031Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 080358Z Aug 73; JCS 8293/101645Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 152102Z Aug 73.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 118.
4. CINCPAC 100152Z Aug 73; JCS 9069/040025Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 112315Z Dec 73.

5032, Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia (U); 5039, Contingency Plan for CHICOM Aggression (U); 5067, Post-Hostilities Plan for Vietnam (U); 5069, T-Day Plan for Redeployment of Forces; and 5070, CINCPAC Cold War Plan (U). The Plans Directorate reviewed the plans and found that in all cases the plans had been either superseded by newer plans, had been deleted as a requirement from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), or had been overtaken by events.

(C) In accordance with the provisions of the JSCP and the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), CINCPAC requested that the JCS authorize cancellation of the six plans. In addition he recommended that the two-year retention period required under the JOPS for cancelled plans be waived as the plans had already been held in an inactive status in excess of that period of time.[1]

(TS) Subsequent to submission of this request, a telephone query was received from the JCS advising that while favorable consideration was being given to the basic CINCPAC request, a specific objection had been raised by the Air Force regarding cancellation of OPLAN 5070. The Air Force contended that the intent of the earlier JSCP tasking for a Cold War plan continued to be reflected under the general tasking for plans that assisted countries that qualified for both security and internal defense assistance. CINCPAC's Plans Directorate responded that the specific Cold War tasking had been deleted with JSCP 1971 while the tasking for country assistance had appeared in the same general context for a continuing number of years and simultaneous with the prior Cold War tasking. Additionally, the security and internal defense assistance tasking was being met by programs developed and maintained by the CINCPAC Security Assistance Directorate. The JCS approved CINCPAC's request to cancel the six plans on 8 March.[2]

(S) Another CINCPAC OPLAN, 5064--Establishment of U.S. Supply and Training Mission Laos (C), came under study. Because of the character of the information contained therein, the plan and its supporting plans had been identified as sensitive, close-hold documents. Based on U.S. policy at the time and other plan considerations, CINCPAC had recommended to the JCS in December 1970 that the plan be suspended but retained by identified task organizations for possible future action. The JCS had approved the recommended action and affected commands were so advised.[3]

(C) A review of the suspended plan was conducted early in 1973 and it was concluded that the plan was outdated, inconsistent with the JOPS, and overtaken

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1. CINCPAC 090716Z Feb 73.
2. J518 HistSum Feb 73; JCS 2779/080246Z Mar 73.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 112-113.

by events. CINCPAC requested that the JCS authorize full cancellation of the plan, plus a waiver of the two-year retention requirement. JCS approval to cancel was provided on 21 July, but they directed that in view of the unstable situation in Laos the plan be retained through July 1974.1

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1. CINCPAC 200311Z Mar 73; JCS 2081/211643Z Jul 73.

SECTION III--CINCPAC PLANNING IN ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER COMMANDERS

Support for U.S. CINC European Command Plans

(TS) CINCPAC was tasked by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) to provide support for the U.S. European Command in certain situations. Three of the situations for which plans came under study in 1973 were USCINCEUR OPLAN 4102 for a NATO-Warsaw Pact war; OPLAN 4224, which provided for actions to be taken to counter direct and active Soviet intervention in an Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East; and CONPLAN 4274, dealing with the Defense of Iran. As a required step in the Joint Operation Planning System process, USCINCEUR advised of his intent to convene a plan development conference at his headquarters in Germany on 1 and 2 February for the primary purpose of coordinating development of OPLAN 4224. In accordance with the initial USCINCEUR planning directive and as required in Volume II of the JSCP for FY 72-73, CINCPAC might be tasked to deploy one attack carrier strike group (ACSG) to the Arabian Sea in support of USCINCEUR operations in OPLAN 4224. The primary objective of CINCPAC's representation at the conference was to clarify missions and obtain mutual agreement on such matters as logistic support of the ACSG, suitability of the aircraft mix, coordinating arrangements, required delivery date for PACOM forces, and resupply requirements. As OPLAN 4224 called for deployment from PACOM of Navy forces only, it was considered appropriate to invite CINCPACFLT representation to the conference as well as representatives from CINCPAC's Plans Directorate.[1]

(S) In addition to this conference on OPLAN 4224, which was to be attended by commands world-wide, the USCINCEUR scheduled another conference to be attended by representatives of certain commands while they were already in Germany in order to save travel funds and enhance overall planning for augmentation and support forces. The other conference concerned preliminary planning on a proposed Change 1 to USCINCEUR OPLAN 4102, and was held on 31 January. It concerned discussions on assignment of Force Requirement Numbers, fragmentation of units into deployment echelons, parent unit/subordinate unit relationships, and problems encountered and lessons learned in automatic data processing of the USCINCEUR Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) for OPLAN 4102.[2]

(S) Prior to the conferences, on 20 January, CINCPAC furnished items proposed for discussion. For the 4102 plan he proposed discussion of the PACFLT-recommended deployment scheme for Navy and Marine augmentation, the transportation mode of the augmenting PACOM Marine division, and the integrated TPFDL

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1. USCINCEUR 00404/091334Z Jan 73.
2. USCINCEUR 091344Z Jan 73; J518 HistSum Jan 73.

with emphasis on allocation of lift resources. Regarding the 4224 plan, CINCPAC recommended discussion of logistic support of the PACOM fast carrier strike group in conjunction with CINCEUR's Middle East Force, the suitability of the proposed aircraft mix (the standard carrier wing), and the earliest arrival date and required delivery date for PACOM supporting forces.[1]

(S) On 13 August 1973, CINCEUR invited CINCPAC and other commands to a planning conference for 29 August on CONPLAN 4274 to discuss the EUCOM planning directive issued on 3 August. It was not possible to send a CINCPAC representative to this conference, but comments were provided regarding logistical support, feasibility of placing naval forces in the Persian Gulf, mission, and communications.[2]

(C) Subsequently, in October, CINCPAC did provide representation to USCINCEUR regarding Change 2 to OPLAN 4102. For this conference, CINCPAC proposed discussion of the problem of identification of PACOM Army augmentation forces in the TPFDL; the problem of obtaining logistic data for Marine forces; the possibility of establishing a single Force Requirement Number to identify identical forces that appeared in multiple plans; and Marine transportation problems involving the CONUS (Continental United States) movement of "split-mode" Marines (i.e. personnel travel by air, equipment by sea).[3]

(S) On 5 November 1973 CINCEUR published CONPLAN 4274 on the Defense of Iran; however, it was not received by CINCPAC until mid-December. The plan included one PACOM ACSG and an amphibious task group with up to 3/9 of a Marine Division Wing Team embarked for an opposed landing. The PACOM Marine forces were not reflected for planning in JSCP-74; therefore, CINCEUR requested JCS approval for their use. Another important point concerned the operational control of forces. CONPLAN 4274 established a Commander, Joint Task Force (COMUSJTF) under CINCEUR and required that operational control of PACOM forces pass to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces (COMUSNAVFOR), who was nominated by CINCPAC. USNAVFOR was under COMUSJTF. CINCPAC requested component review of these items in order to provide PACOM comments on the plan to the JCS.[4]

(S) CINCPAC's OPLAN 5125, Augmentation/Support of Other Unified Commands (under development in the Plans Directorate) was the PACOM supporting plan for USCINCEUR OPLANs 4102, 4224, and 4274. The Tasking Directive for OPLAN 5125 was promulgated on 21 September 1973. In addition to the CINCEUR plans, OPLAN

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1. CINCPAC 200200Z Jan 73.
2. USCINCEUR 131144Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 212259Z Aug 73 and 290413Z Aug 73.
3. CINCPAC 220543Z Sep 73.
4. USCINCEUR 281120Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 070310Z Dec 73.

5125 consolidated all JSCP requirements for PACOM augmentation and support forces into one "omnibus" supporting plan. Close working relationships were maintained between the CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT staffs to prepare supporting plans for each of the CINCEUR contingency plans. Initial draft inputs from components were received in October and December 1973.[1]

(S) In September USCINCEUR had completed his draft TPFDL for Change 3 to OPLAN 4102. It utilized JSCP forces for FY 74. More importantly, for the first time in joint inter-unified command planning, the CINCEUR TPFDL explicitly identified by Force Requirement Number those PACOM Army forces for augmentation to the EUCOM. This identification was essential for PACOM and the Readiness Command to accomplish timely detailed planning required to support 4102. CINCPAC believed that it was prudent and appropriate for the PACOM also to use JSCP FY 74 forces in preparing a supporting plan, to avoid non-productive work and to avoid the necessity for immediate revision to the PACOM plan. CINCPAC requested that CINCUSARPAC verify PACOM Army Force Requirement Numbers in CINCEUR's TPFDL and provide them to CINCPAC, with the understanding that they could not be validated by the Department of the Army until Change 3 to the plan was approved by the JCS. Such USARPAC verification was a requirement in order for CINCPAC to prepare an updated force list of PACOM Army augmentation forces to appear in CINCPAC OPLAN 5125.[2]

Mine Countermeasures and Inshore Undersea Warfare Planning for Alaskan Waters

(S) In 1972 the CINC Alaskan Command (CINCAL) had expressed concern regarding the Soviet potential for mining Alaskan waters, principally as a means of blocking crude oil shipments via sea lines of communication. An analysis of the problem led to the initial CINCPAC position that while mining was technically feasible, the paucity of forecast mine countermeasures assets within the PACOM precluded the development of a realistic defense plan for the Alaskan littoral as a whole.[3]

(S) As an alternative proposal to CINCPAC's response, late in December 1972 CINCAL recommended that mine countermeasures and inshore undersea warfare (MCM/IUW) defense planning be limited to the protection of selected major ports and associated waterways, thereby reducing MCM asset requirements to a more realistic level than the minimum of 100 that CINCPAC has estimated would be

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 001158, 21 Sep 73, Subj: Preparation of CINCPAC OPLAN 5125--Augmentation/Support of Other Unified Commands (U); CINCPACFLT letter FF1-1, 4 Dec 73; CINCPACAF letter XP, 24 Oct 73.
2. CINCPAC 261855Z Oct 73; J5211 HistSum Oct 73.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 100.

required to appreciably reduce a sustained Soviet mine threat. Specifically, CINCAL proposed some actions for consideration by CINCPAC: stating a firm mobilization requirement for MCM/IUW forces in Alaska; supporting the formation of several combined MCM/IUW units in those Alaskan ports having a large sea-oriented population; supporting the conversion of the Surface Reserve unit in Anchorage to a ship-oriented unit; and assigning a command to prepare a MCM/IUW plan for specific designated areas.[1]

(S) CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT to assess these proposals. On 6 February CINCPACFLT offered several observations: ships smaller than MSC size were inadequate for use in Alaskan waters; force levels and funding constraints precluded establishing firm mobilization requirements; and existing personnel levels at the Naval Repair Facility at Anchorage (with 38 percent of the enlisted being construction force personnel) precluded assignment of an MCM ship. He also prepared an MCM/IUW concept plan based on forecast capabilities vice requirements and covering the ports of Seward, Whittier, Valdez, and Haines. It was noted, however, that a comparable requirements plan would necessitate an additional 10 minesweepers, a 62 percent increase.[2]

(S) Based on these and other considerations, CINCPAC's response to CINCAL reiterated the view that development of an MCM/IUW defense plan exclusively for Alaskan waters was not appropriate. CINCAL was advised, however, that as part of the overall planning responsibility for the PACOM area, CINCPAC component commanders would be tasked to insure that appropriate existing plans included provisions for MCM/IUW in Alaskan waters.[3]

(S) As a follow-on to these actions, CINCPAC plans that provided for the protection of sea lines of communication were reviewed. It was determined that those most suited to inclusion of MCM/IUW planning guidance were OPLANs 5001 (General War Plan) (C), 5028 (ASW and Control Protection of Shipping (C)), and 5049 (PACOM Actions in Event of a NATO/Warsaw Pact Conflict (C)). During the next annual review of those plans, the new guidance would be incorporated. In the interim, CINCPACFLT was tasked to take action as deemed appropriate to insure that such planning was in effect.[4]

U.S.-Japan Planning

(S) U.S.-Japan combined military planning, initiated in 1952, came under careful scrutiny by both sides in 1973, and the result was a new basis for expanding our partnership with that country. Such combined planning had been

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1. CINCAL 210149Z Dec 72.
2. CINCPACFLT 060142Z Feb 73 and 280623Z Feb 73.
3. CINCPAC 112138Z Apr 73.
4. CINCPAC 260421Z Apr 73.

initiated by the "liberal" interpretation of a Presidential Memorandum of 23 April 1952 (the "Truman Memorandum"), which was rescinded by President Eisenhower on 3 August 1957. The first plan had been published in 1955, however, and has since been updated each year. FORAGE RAID was the unclassified name of the 1973 plan; the title Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan (CJOEP)-73 was SECRET. (The CJOEP for 1973 was approved by the JCS on 23 February 1973.)[1]

(S) Planning was done by a U.S.-Japanese military "Coordination Planning Committee," under procedures established by a 31 March 1963 Memorandum of Understanding issued by that committee. On the Japanese side, only military people and a few selected members of the government were aware of the combined military planning and knowledge of the existence of the plan was classified SECRET. The plan was submitted annually to the JCS for approval in accordance with the Joint Operation Planning System. This had been the practice since 1970; prior to that time CINCPAC had had approval authority. While the CJOEP was a broad outline plan, an attempt was made to insure compatibility with U.S. unilateral plans. Each Service component commander in Japan prepared supporting plans with his Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) counterparts. In contrast to other countries with which the United States had established mutual defense agreements, there was no unilateral defense plan for Japan and the CJOEP, therefore, provided the only current plan for the defense of Japan.

(S) This plan did not commit the United States to provide for the defense of Japan, however. It did support the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security by providing a concept of defense should such be authorized by U.S. national authorities in accordance with constitutional provisions.

(S) From the U.S. point of view the CJOEP had been essentially a cosmetic plan with little substance. In the final analysis the importance of the plan had not been the plan itself, but the fact that a U.S.-Japan military forum was maintained within which substantive future planning might be accomplished. From the Japanese point of view the CJOEP was of great value and formed the very basis for Japanese military planning. It might be considered the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) version of the U.S. Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. In addition, the Joint Staff Office (JSO) fully recognized its limitations regarding authority to conduct bilateral military planning. JDA approval of the yearly CJOEP was caveated by the following statement, "This plan contains provisions to which the JDA alone cannot commit itself under Japanese law, approval is based on the premise that these provisions will be resolved officially."[2]

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1. J526 HistSum Apr 73.
2. COMUSJAPAN 070745Z Jun 73.

(S) On 14 October 1972 the JCS had requested that bilateral planning that went beyond day-to-day liaison and coordination be held in abeyance until examined and approved by higher authority. CINCPAC advised the JCS regarding all bilateral planning being conducted in the PACOM. On 7 November the JCS submitted a list of planning being conducted under previous JCS authorization; routine bilateral planning for the defense of Japan was included in this list. Any new initiatives in the area of bilateral planning would require approval of higher authority, however.

(S) In December 1972 COMUS Japan suspended bilateral approval pending guidance from CINCPAC. He expressed concern over the political dangers of continuing without a clearcut U.S. and Japanese civilian charter for bilateral planning of the CJOEP variety. CINCPAC advised the JCS of this action by COMUS Japan and that he was requesting that COMUS Japan continue work on the FORAGE RAID plan based on previous approval from higher authority. CINCPAC indicated to the JCS that a clear charter from the Secretary of Defense might be helpful.[1]

(S) On 11 January, in a joint State-Defense Department message, CINCPAC was authorized to approach appropriate Government of Japan authorities to discuss general details of FORAGE RAID planning to obtain GOJ understanding of, and support for, continued detailed planning with the JSDF.[2]

(S) Because of the extreme political sensitivity, JSDF planners were reluctant in obtaining GOJ sanction of CJOEP planning. This caused CINCPAC to impose a moratorium on bilateral planning until Japanese policy-level approval was obtained. Japanese military people reacted adversely to this suspension, but agreed that close dialogue on day-to-day planning must continue and every effort be made to obtain appropriate GOJ approval. The JCS agreed that routine planning should be continued and CJOEP planning resumed as soon as possible, when Japanese approval was assured.[3]

(S) On 27 March the JSO informed COMUS Japan that appropriate GOJ authorization had been received to continue bilateral planning. COMUS Japan then outlined to CINCPAC his objectives in further planning. These included a more active role for Japan in its own defense and a coordinated position on Japanese

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1. J5122 Point Paper, 31 Oct 73, Subj: Bilateral Planning (U).
2. J526 Point Paper, 19 May 73, Subj: Bilateral Planning with Japan (U); SECSTATE 006016/111711Z Jan 73.
3. J526 Point Paper, 19 May 73, Subj: Bilateral Planning with Japan (U), which cited CINCPAC 250717Z Jan 73, CINCPAC 100200Z Feb 73; COMUSJAPAN 130845Z Feb 73 (all EX), and JCS 8583/132352Z Feb 73.

support of U.S. operations from Japan in various contingencies. The revised planning effort, he continued, would be directed toward expanding definitions for JSDF support of Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and direct defense of Japan, to include the concept of U.S. deployments into Japan; bases and facilities available to the United States; logistics support; GOJ reimbursement for supplies and services furnished to the JSDF by U.S. Forces; and command and control. The plan would also be prepared in the new Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) format.[1]

(S) CINCPAC concurred in these planning objectives. He also believed:

> ...we should press on to realistically understand:
>
> a. Japanese security interests, strategy and objectives in the Far East.
>
> b. Concept for participation and support of mutual security objectives in the region.
>
> c. Japanese concept of threats to and defense of the home islands and contiguous air and sea space.
>
> d. Specific US and Japanese roles and contributions in the defense of Japan.[2]

(S) Meanwhile, although Japanese authorization had been received, the issue of authorization from the United States side was raised again. Late in February COMUS Japan had advised CINCPAC of some trepidation expressed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard L. Sneider regarding the 11 January State Department clearance to continue detailed planning. The Deputy Assistant Secretary later asked CINCPAC to limit the military to military talks, and planning to "colonel-level discussion of nuts and bolts" of the CJOEP, until he could review policy issues and discuss them with CINCPAC. He expressed his belief that military planning should not establish or infringe upon the development of policy. CINCPAC agreed to meet with representatives of the State and Defense Departments, the Tokyo Embassy, and U.S. Forces Japan in Tokyo to discuss planning in detail and clear up the perceptions of all concerned about existing and prospective military planning activities. He advised the Chairman of the JCS of the meeting, and listed the subjects for which he had authorized COMUS Japan to continue planning. These were common security interests, strategy, and objectives; threats; division

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1. Ibid., which cited COMUSJAPAN 010901Z Apr 73 (EX).
2. CINCPAC 060215Z Apr 73.

of effort; expanded Japanese capabilities in their own defense; coordinated operations and Japanese support for contingency operations in Northeast Asia; basing and facilities; logistics support; cost sharing; and command and control.[1]

(S) During the May Security Consultative Subcommittee meeting in Japan, a tentative understanding was reached with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State on the issue. It was agreed that any planning assumptions that were considered to involve JCS or State Department policy would be forwarded to the JCS for review and coordination by the Defense Department with the State Department.

(S) On 25 July the JCS requested approval by the Secretary of Defense of CINCPAC-COMUS Japan planning assumptions and objectives as the basis for preparation of a revised CJOEP and expanded coordinated planning with the JSDF. These objectives were subsequently forwarded to the State Department for coordination. During meetings at CINCPAC headquarters on 8 and 9 September, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State advised that State Department approval of the bilateral planning objectives would not be given because they were not specific enough and were too politically oriented. COMUS Japan was advised of these objectives and was requested to continue to look for areas of common interest and assist in further defining our views on where "we and the Japanese should be moving."[2]

(S) On 10 November, in a joint State-Defense Department message, apprc.al was granted regarding CINCPAC assumptions and objectives to provide the basis for expanding our partnership with Japan.[3]

(S) On 16 November CINCPAC's Deputy Chief of Staff established the Japan Action Group (JAG). The established goal for the JAG was to arrive at a U.S. position on what the United States and Japan should do to enhance mutual security. The first JAG meeting was held on 20 November with representatives of CINCPAC's major directorates, the Political Adviser, and the Advanced Research Projects Agency Regional Office Pacific. CINCPAC's Director for Plans emphasized the sensitivity of the bilateral planning function and noted that it would be worked separately from the general forum of the JAG. A second meeting was held on 29 November at which sub-action groups were formed to address specific areas. The JAG met for the third time on 13 December, this time with representatives from CINCPAC's components and COMUS Japan, who was

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1. J526 Point Paper, 19 May 72, Subj: Bilateral Planning with Japan (U); CINCPAC 041935Z May 73; CINCPAC 170005Z May 73; CINCPAC 170004Z May 73; J5262 Point Paper, 22 Jun 73, Subj: Joint Planning (U).
2. J5122 Point Paper, 19 Sep 73, Subj: Bilateral Planning (U).
3. Ibid., which cited SECSTATE 100135Z Nov 73.

designated as the action agency for the sub-action groups that had been formed on facilities and bases and on bilateral planning. On 22 December CINCPAC defined the results of the third meeting. COMUS Japan and the component commands were asked to provide initial thoughts on areas in which to enhance U.S.-Japan defense cooperation looking forward to 1980 and inputs to Japan's Fifth Defense Build-up Plan.[1]

Bilateral Planning with [redacted] Military Authorities

(TS) In 1972 CINCPAC had developed a letter of guidance to [redacted] for the conduct of bilateral planning with [redacted] military authorities. The letter designated [redacted] as CINCPAC's principal agent for such planning and identified all possible areas where bilateral planning should be effected, and provided necessary restriction as to areas in which such planning was not to be conducted. All significant bilateral planning activities were to be reported to CINCPAC; major bilaterally developed plans were to be forwarded to CINCPAC for review.[2]

(TS) The JCS approved the proposed CINCPAC guidance document, subject to several changes, one of which deleted all reference to existing combined training associated with [redacted] artillery [redacted] systems that had been going on between the [redacted] and the [redacted] Army for some years. The JCS rationale for the deletion was based on the possibility of erroneous inferences arising from official sanction of existing informal arrangements whereby U.S. personnel would utilize [redacted] systems to augment [redacted] fire support of U.S. artillery. In January 1973 CINCPAC authorized [redacted] to conduct bilateral planning with the [redacted] military and provided him with a JCS-approved document for this planning.[3]

(TS) In December CINCPAC also authorized [redacted] to initiate bilateral planning efforts with the [redacted] against targets outside those contained in CINCPAC OPLANs released to the [redacted] in routine bilateral planning when the planning concerned retaliatory air operations in the event hostilities were resumed.[4]

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1. J5122 Point Paper, 22 Mar 74, Subj: Chronology of Japan Action Group (JAG), which cited CINCPAC 220426Z Dec 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 104-105; CINCPAC 250252Z Nov 72.
3. CINCPAC 192326Z Jan 73; J516 HistSum Jan 73, which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser 00028 of 23 Jan 73.
4. CINCPAC 050213Z Dec 73.

J322 REVIEWS

SECTION IV--PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING

Program and Budget Development

(C) Late in 1972 CINCPAC had announced dates and provided guidance for participation in a PACOM Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Program and Budget Development Conference which was held at Camp Smith 15-19 January 1973. Conferees included representatives of the Air Force Chief of Staff; the U.S. Ambassadors in Vientiane and Phnom Penh; CINCPAC's component commands; the subordinate unified commands in Vietnam (also representing the Joint Casualty Resolution Center), Thailand, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan; the Deputy Chief JUSMAGTHAI, the CHJUSMAGPHIL, and the CHMAAG China; the 7th PSYOP Group; the U.S. Information Agency Adviser to CINCPAC; and an observer from CINCPAC's Operations Directorate. Representatives from the JCS, Department of the Army, and U.S. Defense Liaison Group in Indonesia had been invited but did not attend.[1]

(C) The conferees reviewed the budget submissions and recommended approval with minor modifications; the approved budget for FY 74 amounted to $6.5 million, with FY 75 estimated at over $5 million. This funding was from Operations and Maintenance, Army funds. Military Assistance Program/Military Assistance Service Funded support requirements were not included because the major users, the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI and COMUSMACV could not identify the specific funding support provided to their respective areas. Included in the FY 74 approved budget was $1.7 million for Joint Casualty Resolution Center public communications programs. Subsequent actions assigned responsibility for these public communications to the Department of the Navy (Operations and Maintenance, Navy) funds and CINCPAC provided the Navy with revised estimated requirements (for the remainder of FY 73 at $400,000 and for FY 74 at $1.5 million).[2]

(C) The approved budget is highlighted below, both by area and by summary of the elements of expense.[3]

PACOM Area	FY 74 Requirements	FY 75 Requirements
COMUS Korea	$ 15,230	$ 15,230
COMUS Japan	109,020	94,340
COMUSMACV (DAO Saigon)	91,724	91,724
Cambodia (BIG SHOW)	72,052	49,750
7th PSYOP Group	2,017,100	1,424,000
PACOM Strategic	4,247,200	3,392,200
	$6,552,326	$5,067,244

1. J547 HistSum Feb 73.
2. CINCPAC 132351Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 280037Z Feb 73.
3. CINCPAC 132351Z Feb 73.

Elements of Expense	FY 74 Requirements	FY 75 Requirements
Basic pay (Civil Service)	$ 507,000	$ 380,000
Basic pay (foreign nationals)	384,000	288,000
Contractual personnel	483,000	242,000
Benefits, U.S. personnel	90,000	68,000
Benefits, foreign nationals	54,000	41,000
Personnel travel/transportation	62,000	31,000
Transportation	11,000	11,000
Rent/communications	25,000	20,000
Printing/reproduction	4,338,000	3,397,000
Purchased supplies	80,000	80,000
Supplies	494,000	494,000
Base service charges	5,000	5,000
Equipment	20,000	10,000
	$6,552,000*	$5,067,000*

*Rounded figures do not add to total.

(S) At the February conference, the problems of U.S. military PSYOP activities and programs in the 1970's were addressed. A number of specific recommendations were formulated, as follows. The following objectives for future operations were determined: to assist in the development of confidence in the reality of U.S. military strength and U.S. resolve to keep our commitments, to be accomplished in coordination with other U.S. agencies and the Country Teams; to utilize planned PSYOP, community relations, and civic actions to assist in the maintenance of U.S. bases in the PACOM: to maintain a PSYOP capability to conduct strategic and tactical PSYOP independently and to assist in developing the capability of selected foreign PSYOP in the military force; and to assist in the projection of a positive image of the United States.

(S) A number of goals were outlined. These were to remove any negative connotation from PSYOP and psychological warfare terminology (these terms had proved to be counter-productive among both U.S. and foreign personnel); to establish at the National Security Council level a permanent PSYOP policy group, an inter-agency group similar to the existing PSYOP Pressure Operations Group; to develop definitive, integrated military plans for in-country U.S. military PSYOP, civic action, and community relations programs coordinated with the U.S. Information Service and other interested U.S. agencies; to work toward establishing a regional PSYOP policy/control mechanism in Hawaii, and as a collateral action to establish closer ties with academic and other U.S. Government (non-military) sponsored institutions, particularly the East-West Center affiliated with the University of Hawaii; to develop programs for CINCPAC-sponsored seminars, lectures, and exchange programs for selected foreign military and military-

related civilian personnel; to formalize relationships between U.S. Information Service and CINCPAC subordinate commands; to develop in conjunction with Country Teams, a PSYOP "port visit" program; and to maintain and update CORONET SOLO (USAF) capabilities.[1]

Strategic Psychological Operations in Southeast Asia

(U) The various psychological operations (PSYOP) conducted or planned for Southeast Asia in 1973 are discussed below. Addressed separately is the subject of PSYOP support for the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and its activities.

(TS) As the year opened, Operation FIELD GOAL continued. This had been a new type of program for North Vietnam that had begun in 1972. Leaflets bearing a quality facsimile of [redacted] were dropped in North Vietnam and transistor mini-radios were dropped to North Vietnamese troops in the RVN, Laos, and Cambodia as well as North Vietnam. The [redacted] bore legends such as "The Party is spending your money on a hopeless war. As the war goes on there will be less and less to buy. The war is ruining your country. Your savings will be worthless." The radios, it was believed, would add to the pressures on North Vietnamese leadership by threatening their monopoly on information for domestic consumption.[2]

(b)(1)(a)(6)

(TS) These operations were temporarily suspended effective 151500Z January 1973 by the JCS. The restriction was expanded on 18 January to include all modes of delivery including standoff wind drift material targeted against North Vietnam and the Demilitarized Zone. With the implementation of the cease-fire agreements in Vietnam, FIELD GOAL was terminated, but the concept was to be continued for a contingency operation in the event hostilities with North Vietnam were resumed. Between 18 May 1972 and 19 January 1973 FIELD GOAL disseminated 793,282,500 leaflets and 30,531 mini-radios.[3]

(S) Toward the end of 1972, when anticipation of a cease-fire had heightened, the PSYOP Pressure Operations Group (PPOG) in Washington had tasked the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon and CINCPAC to be prepared for an intensive leaflet and mini-radio effort for a brief period between the initialling of the agreement and the moment it would become effective. The program was called TEMPO SURGE. CINCPAC had asked his components and CINCSAC to prepare stockpiles and be ready to provide dissemination aircraft necessary to support the program.[4]

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1. J547 HistSum Feb 73. CORONET SOLO was the name for Air National Guard EC-121 aircraft with radio, TV, and electronic jamming equipment.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 110-114.
3. J5451 HistSum Feb 73, which cited JCS 5597/150356Z Jan and JCS 9015/180014Z Jan 73 (both EX).
4. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 116-117.

(S) The PPOG directed the execution of TEMPO SURGE on 24 January 1973. CINCPAC tasked his subordinate commands to execute and/or support the operation and requested that CINCSAC provide B-52 dissemination. TEMPO SURGE was terminated 270133Z Jan 73, in conjunction with the effective time of the cease-fire between North and South Vietnam. C-130s in 13 sorties delivered 160 million leaflets and 2 B-52 sorties delivered 7 million into Laos, Cambodia, and the RVN during the operation. The restriction on leaflet operations in North Vietnam and the Demilitarized Zone prevented including FIELD GOAL drops as originally planned.[1]

(S) On 3 February the PPOG informed all commands involved in TEMPO SURGE that all concerned in Washington were well pleased with the accomplishments during the three days the program was authorized.[2]

(S) The pre-Vietnam cease-fire agreement accelerated the PSYOP effort that was continued in Laos and Cambodia until 220500Z February, when all operations against targets in Laos were prohibited in conjunction with the cease-fire agreement (with the exception of Voice of America radio broadcasts). Leaflet operations against Cambodia continued.[3]

(S) On 1 July 1972 CINCPAC had assumed overall responsibility for the strategic PSYOP campaign in Indochina. Operations began at that time in accordance with CINCPAC's Operation Order 5102. On 24 February CINCPAC promulgated an interim change to that order, directing that all references to leaflet operations in North Vietnam, the RVN, and Laos be treated as "be prepared to conduct." RICE RIVER operations in Cambodia continued to be conducted in accordance with this order (RICE RIVER was a high-altitude leaflet operation directed at the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese Army operating in the eastern third of Cambodia).[4]

(S) The Leaflet Development Unit (LDU) of the 7th PSYOP Group, which had been sent to Saigon in 1972, was retained there until 7 April 1973 at the request of the Saigon PSYOP Task Force. The LDU continued to develop and coordinate propaganda materials for use against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia until it was disestablished. The Vietnamese nationals employed by the 7th PSYOP Group for propaganda development and utilized in Saigon by the LDU finally overcame visa problems and relocated to Okinawa in May 1973. This completed the 7th PSYOP Group's offshore capability to develop propaganda materials directed against the Vietnamese.[5]

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1. J5451 HistSum Feb 73, which cited SECSTATE 014140/241831Z Jan 73 and SECSTATE 015947/270133Z Jan 73 (both EX); CINCPAC 242201Z Jan 73.
2. J5451 HistSum Feb 73, which cited SECSTATE 021219/030233Z Feb 73 (EX).
3. JCS RED ROCKET ONE/212330Z Feb 73.
4. CINCPAC 242256Z Feb 73.
5. J5511 HistSum Aug 73.

(TS) RICE RIVER and BIG SHOW operations in Cambodia continued at a level of an average of three sorties a week until the 15 August effective date of the Congressional amendment providing for the cut off of bombing or any other U.S. military activity in or over Indochina. (BIG SHOW was the follow on name for CAMEL PATH, the U.S. PSYOP support program for the Cambodian Government that had begun in 1970.)[1]

(TS) Washington level interpretation of the amendment, however, determined that U.S. PSYOP programs including aerial dissemination could continue. The revised Southeast Asia operating authorities, effective 15 August, authorized:

> ...US Forces are authorized to conduct PSYOP against VC, NVA and Khmer Insurgent target audiences throughout Cambodia. For these purposes, printed media, gift packages and use of US aircraft and crews for dissemination of materials are approved, except where serious risk to aircraft and crew is involved. Moreover, while Phnom Penh, national monuments, shrines and areas of cultural value to the Cambodian people are excluded from operational areas, the authorization does include:
>
> (a) Dissemination of public safety warnings to the Cambodian people in any instances where US operations may be authorized.
>
> (b) Solicitation of assistance from the local populace in areas suspected of harboring US and allied POWs.
>
> ...In addition, US Forces are authorized to provide support in the form of production and dissemination of printed material, to include delivery by US aircraft and crews, when requested by the GKR and approved by the US Ambassador, except where serious risk to aircraft and crew is involved...[2]

(TS) The last paragraph quoted above provided continuing authority for BIG SHOW operations. It was a significant change in operating authority, however, as it expanded the operating area from the eastern third of the country to the entire country and authorized the targeting of Khmer Insurgents as well as Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces. This required development of a new CINCPAC strategic PSYOP campaign and guidance to the field. Operation Order FREEDOM CARE was thus promulgated on 28 August. This was the program that replaced RICE RIVER. It was considered a program to supplement Cambodian programs;

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1. Ibid., CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 167-169.
2. JCS 2474/142336Z Aug 73.

BIG SHOW had priority over FREEDOM CARE. CINCUSARPAC continued to be the coordinating authority for CINCPAC strategic PSYOP programs in Cambodia; he exercised this authority through the Commander of the 7th PSYOP Group.[1]

(C) With the initiation of PSYOP support for Cambodia in 1970, certain radio equipment had been placed in that country to rebroadcast programs from Phnom Penh to more remote districts. One was a U.S. Navy 10 kilowatt transmitter installed in the summer of 1970 until a U.S. Agency for International Development transmitter could be installed at Kompong Som. During a CINCPAC staff visit in May 1973 it was learned that the new transmitter would be operational in mid-June. CINCPAC, therefore, proposed possible use of the equipment by Cambodia and requested recommendations. The Embassy recommended transfer of the equipment for use by the Khmer National Radio Service. CINCPAC queried CINCPACFLT about the Navy's disposition intentions. The Chief of Naval Operations and CINCPACFLT determined it was excess to Navy requirements and available for transfer to the Cambodians under the Military Assistance Program. On 27 September the Embassy advised CINCPAC regarding the other U.S. transmitter. The Cambodian medium wave station at Battambang began relaying Phnom Penh programs on 26 September. The requirement for a relay, therefore, was terminated. On 28 September CINCPAC directed the termination of FRANK APPROACH, as the relay operation had been called. The 7th PSYOP Group personnel dismantled the equipment and turned it in to the U.S. Army Support Command Thailand for shipment back to Okinawa.[2]

Psychological Operations Support for the Joint Casualty Resolution Center

(U) The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), located in Thailand, was the principal agency after the cease-fire with the mission of resolving the status of U.S. and allied personnel missing in action and to recover the not-yet-located bodies of the dead. It was a follow-on to the Joint Personnel Recovery Center that had been in Vietnam. The organization, mission, and operations of the JCRC are discussed in some detail in the Operations chapter of this History. One important support function for the JCRC, however, was psychological operations (PSYOP) support, which is discussed here with other PSYOP matters of CINCPAC interest.

(C) CINCPAC visualized a PSYOP campaign in support of the JCRC similar to his on-going Southeast Asia strategic PSYOP campaign. He called it Public Communications (PUBCOM), and tasked CINCUSARPAC, as coordinating authority, to develop a plan to support JCRC operations. The 7th PSYOP Group was tasked to

1. CINCPAC 282132Z Aug 73.
2. CINCPAC 150416Z May 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 5154/260500Z May 73; CNO 201150Z Jun 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 10342/270317Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 290104Z Sep 73; CDR 7th PSYOP GP 020815Z Nov 73.

execute CINCUSARPAC PSYOP plans, and that agency submitted a draft PUBCOM plan on 29 November 1972, without coordination with the embassies concerned. A memorandum from the JCS in February 1972, which governed the release of operation plans, prevented preliminary coordination with the embassies until authorized by the JCS. The 7th PSYOP Group plan envisioned a PSYOP task force constituted from 7th PSYOP Group resources and located with and under the operational control of the Commander of the JCRC to conduct the PUBCOM campaign after coordination with the JCS and their approval. CINCPAC promulgated his casualty resolution plan (CINCPAC CONPLAN 5119) on 27 January 1973. This was the basis for the establishment and operation of the JCRC and included a PUBCOM annex.[1]

(C) In this Annex N, CINCPAC tasked CINCUSARPAC, as coordinating authority, to plan for and, on order, conduct an overt PUBCOM campaign in support of the JCRC using all available media. Responsibilities included the establishment of a media development element (MDE) at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand attached to the JCRC. CINCUSARPAC tasked the 7th PSYOP Group to conduct the campaign.[2]

(C) CINCPAC revised his Annex N to CONPLAN 5119 on 28 February. He changed the tasking for CINCUSARPAC to that of support for the JCRC; the U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG)/JCRC was designated coordinating authority for the PUBCOM campaign. This resulted from a desire by the JCRC commander to centralize and control the program from JCRC headquarters. The JCRC Joint Table of Distribution authorized two PSYOP-qualified officers for PUBCOM. The MDE to support the JCRC (provided by the 7th PSYOP Group and CINCUSARPAC) came under the operational control of the Commander, JCRC.[3]

(C) In early May the JCRC forwarded a proposed mission statement and concept of operations to the Embassy in Saigon. The JCRC subsequently incorporated the intent of the suggested changes recommended by the Embassy through the Defense Attache Office in Saigon and forwarded the draft plan to CINCPAC. CINCPAC, however, did not concur with the draft plan as written. He listed the detailed changes that would be required prior to his approval. These principally concerned redefining the role of the DAO in Saigon and incorporation of a rewards program. CINCPAC noted that no mention had been made of rewards for information regarding the missing. He commented that although the stress placed on humanitarianism was understood, it was "realistic to expect many potential sources of information will be motivated primarily by the prospect of material rewards/ personal aggrandizement."[4]

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1. J5511 HistSum Oct 73, which cited CINCPAC 060143Z Nov 73 (EX); CINCPAC 270347Z Jan 73.
2. CINCUSARPAC 140153Z Feb 73.
3. CINCPAC 282316Z Feb 73.
4. CINCPAC 051911Z Jun 73.

(C) The revised draft PUBCOM plan generally incorporated the changes directed by CINCPAC. The JCRC provided the rationale for developing a separate plan for a rewards program and for maintaining the DAO, Saigon as the point of contact for PUBCOM matters. On 5 July CINCPAC approved the revised plan.[1]

(C) The draft PUBCOM plan for Laos was submitted by the JCRC on 7 August and approved by CINCPAC on 10 August.[2]

(C) The MDE at the JCRC initially consisted of two civilian Army employees of the 7th PSYOP Group. The Vietnamese nationals scheduled to go remained on Okinawa because of lack of facilities at Nakhon Phanom. On 16 October the JCRC advised that facilities were available and the five Vietnamese nationals were deployed.[3]

(C) Meanwhile, the matter of rewards had surfaced in the press. The DAO, Saigon reported that three daily newspapers there had released information that individuals in Cambodia, Laos, and the RVN would be awarded money, bicycles, and agricultural tools for help in locating aircraft crash sites, mortal remains, and grave sites of U.S. Servicemen. Also, the Stars and Stripes on 2 June had released comments attributed to Admiral Gayler in San Diego which quoted him as saying, "We have got the authorities to offer considerable rewards to the people in remote areas for information about missing Americans." The DAO further stated that no rewards announcement had been made by the JCRC and requested that a transcript of CINCPAC's remarks in San Diego be forwarded to the JCRC. The USSAG was advised that there was no transcript of the remarks; the comments had been made during a discussion with a group of newspaper editors. CINCPAC subsequently advised all concerned that the public in countries involved was to be informed that remains must be undisturbed until JCRC representatives appeared on the scene, that rewards were not to be dispensed until remains were identified as those of U.S. personnel, and that rewards schedules would be promulgated.[4]

(C) On 7 June USSAG requested approval of an interim schedule of rewards, as follows: (1) $50 to $75 for directing casualty resolution personnel to an individual with information about remains, crash sites, or grave sites; (2) $75 to $100 for information leading to the recovery of the body of a person killed in action; and (3) $100 to $150 for guiding casualty resolution personnel to a crash site or the location of the remains of those whose bodies had not been recovered. Rewards were to be paid only on verification of information

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1. USSAG 031007Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 052329Z Jul 73.
2. CINCPAC 100204Z Aug 73.
3. CDR 7th PSYOP Gp 180913Z Oct 73.
4. USDAO Saigon 051020Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 060331Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 062205Z Jun 73.

or identification of remains by the JCRC and were to be paid in equivalent local currency or commodities as determined on a case-by-case basis. The formal program including administration and specific funding was to be provided separately.[1]

(C) CINCPAC approved this proposed schedule and requested information about its applicability in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. He directed that PUBCOM and public affairs activities be consistent in dissemination of information and administration of the schedule, and that all be closely coordinated with the U.S. Embassy concerned. CINCPAC said that it was "imperative that immediate action be taken to both exploit the opportunities that publicity has created as well as to regularize and control the program." A joint State and Defense Department message notified the Ambassador in Saigon that rewards to local nationals for information on U.S. missing were not new, that they had been provided for years by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, whose functions had been assumed by the JCRC. The message also advised of recent Defense Department response to news media regarding rewards: that they were authorized, that specific amounts were undetermined, and that material might be used in lieu of cash.[2]

(C) The Ambassador in Vientiane informed the State Department that local media had not published releases relating to the U.S. rewards policy, and that constraints outlined by the Secretary of State precluded payments in Laos. The Lao Patriotic Forces had not given any indication as to the degree of U.S. participation, if any, that would be permitted for casualty resolution. It would be premature, the Ambassador continued, to surface the idea of rewards in Laos media, but once parameters of casualty resolution activities were established by Lao parties, coordination with the JCRC could effect a program tailored to the Laotian situation.[3]

(C) North Vietnam, it was reported by the Chief U.S. Delegate to the Four-Party Joint Military Team, protested the U.S. intent to interfere in its internal affairs with reference to rewards for information about the missing; the North Vietnamese expressed indignation regarding the proposed rewards as a U.S. effort to "distort the humanitarian policy of the Government of the DRV....Only the DRV Government can take appropriate actions to reward the DRV people. We do not set a price on human remains. We request the US side reconsider its proposal."[4]

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1. USSAG JCRC 070615Z Jun 73.
2. CINCPAC 072315Z Jun 73; SECSTATE 110554/072252Z Jun 73.
3. AMEMB Vientiane 4247/090446Z Jun 73.
4. CH USDEL FPJMT 141000Z Jun 73.

(C) About this same time CINCPAC requested that USSAG provide proposals for rewards concerning the remains of personnel of other foreign countries allied with the United States and the RVN during the war, as the approved schedule previously prepared had been limited to U.S. personnel only. The JCRC provided such a proposal on 23 June. The same reward schedule would be used for foreign remains as had been approved for U.S. personnel, the United States would absorb the cost, the rewards would not be publicized, and would be paid on a case-by-case basis during normal U.S. casualty resolution operations. The rewards specifically excluded the discovery of remains of RVN personnel or former enemies.[1]

(C) The JCRC advised CINCPAC that actions and information for which rewards were to be given upon JCRC identification were applicable in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam, but that separate monetary schedules would be developed on equivalent economic values. These would be dependent on the extent to which casualty resolution personnel would be authorized to conduct individual operations, whether direct payment could be made to individuals, and the specific methods of recovery involved. PUBCOM media in Saigon would include circumstances under which rewards would be paid but not dollar amounts.[2]

(S) On 14 June the Ambassador in Saigon advised that announcements of rewards had been widely circulated and that further publicity would not be helpful at that time, that information stressing the importance of not disturbing the sites should be made available through U.S. Government channels to U.S. field personnel, and that PUBCOM in Saigon make no mention of rewards. The Ambassador further suggested that for the next schedule and implementing instruction that maximum rewards be provided but with the option left to U.S. officials to determine the amounts with Counsel Generals and, as appropriate, Vietnamese officials; prompt approval of extraordinary awards when special circumstances warrant; that Counsel Generals and the DAO be authorized up to 5,000 piasters as reimbursement in recovery of evidence for casualty resolution prior to actual identification of remains; that some rewards be material rather than money, such as rice or radios; and that scrolls or appropriate artifacts be given to foreign government officials and others who assisted but who should not be paid off monetarily by the United States Government.[3]

(S) The USSAG and JCRC concurred with the Ambassador on rewards for information, advised that the PUBCOM would not mention rewards, and recommended that authority to respond to specific news media queries be retained and handled by the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office in Bangkok. CINCPAC concurred.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 081730Z Jun 73; USSAG 230725Z Jun 73.
2. USSAG JCRC 140322Z Jun 73.
3. AMEMB Saigon 10670/141110Z Jun 73.
4. USSAG 230725Z Jun 73.

(C) On 18 July the JCRC forwarded a rewards plan for the RVN to the Embassy for comments and concurrence. On 25 September the DAO, Saigon forwarded a revised "compensation program" (a new name for the rewards program) and stated that it was approved by the Embassy. This response was apparently the answer to the JCRC proposed plan of 18 July. The JCRC sent the revised compensation plan to CINCPAC for approval; it generally reflected the recommendations contained in the DAO proposal. The Ambassador, however, in reaction to the JCRC plan, took exception to the authorization that compensation payments could be made by JCRC and DAO personnel as well as Consuls General. "The actual implementation of this program," the Ambassador said, "must be accomplished in such a way that far more important elements of overall U.S. policy are not inadvertently adversely affected. I have therefore determined to vest in the Consul Generals final authority for the program inplementation within their respective districts...." In view of this position, the JCRC asked CINCPAC to provide clarification of an apparent contravention of authority granted in CINCPAC's CONPLAN 5119 which stated that CINCPAC retained the overall authority for conduct of public communications.[1]

(C) CINCPAC's subsequent review of the whole PUBCOM program in the RVN clearly indicated the essentiality of the program. The most significant success of the casualty resolution operations had been the result of information and assistance received from indigenous personnel. The PUBCOM program envisioned in the approved PUBCOM plan had never been fully implemented, however. Delays in coordination and divergent interpretations among the Embassy in Saigon, the DAO there, the U.S. Information Service, and the JCRC had delayed implementation of even a low-level country-wide program. The problems evolved around the differing viewpoints among the regional Counsuls General and the coordination and approval of materials developed to support the campaign. At the suggestion of the JCRC a public communications task force was formed to meet periodically in Saigon with representatives of all interested agencies to expedite this coordination and approval process. By the end of October four meetings had been held and some progress made, but basic problems still existed involving both the PUBCOM and the compensation program. These were based on divergent interpretations of responsibilities and authorities for the conduct of the campaign. CINCPAC was attempting to resolve some of these problems without escalating the differences. The programs for Laos and Cambodia were being held in abeyance until the completion of on-going political negotiations.[2]

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1. USDAO Saigon 251000Z Sep 73; USSAG/JCRC 160430Z Oct 73; AMEMB Saigon 18087/170900Z Oct 73; USSAG/JCRC 290155Z Oct 73.
2. J5511 HistSum Oct 73.

SECTION V--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Force Deployments and Redeployments--Southeast Asia

(U) Principal decisions regarding deployments or redeployments were made in Washington and accomplished through Service channels, but CINCPAC was involved in many actions in this regard and a number of particulars are addressed here.

Project COUNTDOWN

(S) Planning for the redeployment of U.S. Forces from Vietnam had been accomplished before the cease-fire agreement was reached. The program had been called THUNDERBOLT until the JCS changed the name to COUNTDOWN on 24 January 1973. On 26 January the JCS directed execution of the withdrawal plan. They directed that all U.S. military personnel would redeploy from the RVN during the 60 days following the cease-fire with the exception of U.S. military personnel assigned to the Defense Attache Office in Saigon and the Four Power Joint Military Commission. The forces were to be withdrawn in four approximately equal increments in accordance with the provisions of the protocol for the Joint Military Commissions. The JCS provided approximate numbers for the first two increments, but advised that a determination on the size of the third and fourth increments would be based on the performance of the other side in releasing U.S. prisoners of war. They approved existing plans for the redeployment of Korean forces from Vietnam. Plans for redeployment of naval forces were to be provided separately. Forces in Thailand and elsewhere in the PACOM in support of Southeast Asia air operations were to remain at existing levels pending further review.[1]

(C) Thus, from a strength of 549,000 in mid-1969, U.S. Forces in Vietnam were reduced to fewer than 250 by the spring of 1973 (50 with the DAO, 14 with the Four Power Joint Military Team, and 184 Marines assigned for Embassy Guard duty and not considered included in the ceiling established by the cease-fire agreement). At the time of the cease-fire there had been 23,516 U.S. personnel and 35,396 Koreans in Vietnam. The withdrawal proceeded smoothly. Procedures that had been outlined by COMUSMACV for redeployment of the Koreans were implemented on the effective date of the cease-fire. The Military Airlift Command had located a commercial contract air carrier who could operate into Nha Trang, which permitted movement of the Korean forces from originally planned embarka-

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1. JCS 8465/260029Z Jan 73. The name change was directed in JCS 6913/241522Z Jan 73.

tion points. The Korean forces were redeployed as scheduled by 12 March along with almost 100,000 tons of their equipment. The final 6,000 U.S. personnel had been held as a hedge to insure the return of U.S. prisoners of war until the last 72 hours of COUNTDOWN, but this final withdrawal went as scheduled and was conducted in a smooth and orderly manner.[1]

Thailand

(TS) The U.S. ceiling for forces in Thailand had been established by the JCS in Southeast Asia Deployment Program 20 as follows:

	Authorized	Actual Jun 73
Army	5,147	4,904
Navy	396	432
Air Force	26,658	36,760
Marine Corps	(Included in Navy)	2,164
	32,200	44,260

The JCS had authorized 18,000 augmentation spaces for an on-going total authorization of 50,200 spaces.[2]

(U) The first Royal Thai Air Force Base from which U.S. Forces withdrew was Nam Phong. On 2 September the last of the Marine fighter/bomber aircraft that had been stationed there departed.[3]

(TS) The phasedown of U.S. Forces in Thailand was the subject of much study in 1973. By November there were about 41,000 authorized, with plans to redeploy them until a residual force of about 6,100 remained. This was to be in six increments with the timing to be based on the political and military climate of the region over the next one to three years.

(TS) With Increment I planning, the option to initiate heavy air activity throughout Southeast Asia was retained. On 25 August, however, the JCS authorized the withdrawal of the tactical assets listed under this increment as well as 10 KC-135 aircraft based at U-Tapao that had been listed under

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1. J133 HistSums Jan, Feb 73; J5355 Point Paper, 21 Jun 73, Subj: U.S. Military Strength Ceilings in Southeast Asia (U); J471 HistSums Feb, Mar 73.
2. J5355 Point Paper, 21 Jun 73, Subj: U.S. Military Strength Ceilings in Southeast Asia (U).
3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 2 Sep 73; MACTHAI 101810Z Aug 73.

Increment III. The tactical redeployment included Marine Air Group 15 from Nam Phong to Iwakuni, Japan, one temporary duty F-105 squadron and two temporary duty F-4E squadrons to the Continental United States (CONUS), and 12 F-111s also to the CONUS. CINCPACAF designated the forces for redeployment and they departed Thailand just about as scheduled by 10 September. The remaining force, at six Thai bases, was capable of over 8,000 tactical air, 1,000 B-52, and 400 gunship sorties per month.[1]

(TS) Increments II and III involved reduction to approximately 35,000 U.S. personnel, and were to be executed when the political and military situation was deemed appropriate. They retained the option to support the RVN, Laos, and Cambodia with a hedge to rapidly reinforce and/or expand into North Vietnam. It was a force capable of providing a normal, sustained level of 4,700 tactical air, 1,000 B-52, and 400 gunship sorties per month. It would be a force of nine tactical air squadrons, one RF-4 squadron, one AC-130 squadron, 42 B-52s, and 29 KC-135s, at the same six bases at Udorn, Nakhom Phanom, Ubon, Korat, Takhli, and U-Tapao.

(TS) Increment IV involved reduction to 32,000 with the same land-based aircraft and sortie rates as Increment III consolidated at five bases, with Takhli in caretaker status for purposes of reentry. This would reduce the level of U.S. personnel to the longstanding level authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

(TS) Increment V would redeploy to a level of 24,700 personnel, when it was considered that a return to the bombing of North Vietnam was unlikely and appeared that North Vietnam was adhering to the Paris Pact; this planning retained a hedge for the resumption of limited hostilities in the RVN, Laos, and Cambodia. There were to be four tactical air squadrons, one RF-4 squadron and one AC-130 squadron, 15 B-52s and sufficient KC-135s to provide support. The force was to be capable of providing 1,500 tactical air sorties, 300 B-52 and 400 gunship sorties per month.

(TS) Increment VI would redeploy to a residual force of 6,100 when the political and military situation in Southeast Asia had stabilized and the requirement for U.S. air combat forces was considered remote. Retained would be one RF-4 squadron, elements of one tactical air squadron and one airlift squadron. A B-52 reentry capability was to be maintained so that exercises could be conducted periodically.

(TS) The Navy was to retain its P-3 capability at U-Tapao throughout this

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1. J5142 Point Paper, 29 Nov 73, Subj: Phasedown of US Forces in Thailand (U); J3111 HistSum Sep 73; JCS 3187/251838Z Aug 73.

period. In logistics matters, in the Increment VI posture Vayama would be the munitions port, the Sattahip complex was to provide for Army support activities and storage, and Udorn was to be used for the Military Assistance Program for Laos and support for Ramasun Station.

(TS) The planning also addressed possible consolidation of intelligence activities, communications facilities phaseout or turnover plans, continuing Military Assistance Program requirements, and future command arrangements.[1]

(S) One other specific Air Force redeployment from Thailand was planned in 1973--the EB-66 aircraft of the 42nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron. The original plan had been to redeploy all of them to the Continental United States as part of Increment II, but in September CINCPACAF had requested separate action to redeploy them without delay to Clark Air Base because of maintenance and safety problems that had been encountered. The JCS withheld authority to redeploy them at first, but authorized that they could be relieved from operational mission requirements. CINCPAC relieved COMUSSAG of all EB-66 operational requirements, in the interest of safety, and directed CINCPACAF to accomplish the movement to Clark. It had been decided to withdraw the aircraft from the USAF inventory and reclaim them at Clark. One aircraft was retained at Korat for use in training fire-fighting crews; the other 24 were to be flown to Clark early in 1974.[2]

Strategic Forces

(S) Various strategic forces were reduced in the PACOM with the bombing restrictions imposed. On 15 January the JCS authorized the redeployment of 25 KC-135 tankers from Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The aircraft redeployed to the CONUS 18-21 January 1973. On 10 July the JCS authorized the redeployment of 15 B-52s from Guam to CONUS, with their associated support personnel and equipment. On 21 September the JCS approved the withdrawal of 15 more B-52s from Guam and up to 7 KC-135s from Kadena to the CONUS. As of 21 October, the strategic forces in the PACOM consisted of 133 B-52s and 6 KC-135s at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam; 45 B-52s and 47 KC-135s at U-Tapao, Thailand; 39 KC-135s at Kadena, Okinawa; and 2 KC-135s at Clark in the Philippines.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. J315 HistSums Oct, Dec 73; CINCPAC 150842Z Sep 73; J5142 Point Paper, 5 Nov 73, Subj: Pending Action EB-66s (U); JCS 3890/241803Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 242350Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 280418Z Dec 73.
3. J3B25 HistSum Jan 73; J311 HistSums Jul, Sep 73.

U.S. Nuclear Policy

(TS) Under study by various agencies in Washington in 1973 was the nuclear policy of the United States, with the study group chaired by a representative of the Defense Department. This proposed National Nuclear Targeting and Attack Policy was being considered with National Security Study Memorandum 169 on U.S. Nuclear Policy. CINCPAC provided his views on the Defense Department-proposed employment policy in a message to the Chairman of the JCS on 18 November 1972. He had repeatedly expressed his reservations concerning the impact of the study on planning and forces and he outlined his concerns further in the November 1972 message.[1]

Unconventional Warfare

(U) Unconventional warfare (UW) planning continued in 1973. The UW appendix to Annex C to CINCPAC's Exercise OPLAN 1-73 was completed and signed in February. This UW appendix was distributed to the subordinate commands and the JCS in preparation for PACOM participation in the world-wide Command Post Exercise, HIGH HEELS 73. (CINCPAC participation in the exercise was subsequently cancelled.) CINCPAC also changed his Standing Operating Procedure for UW on 6 March, primarily to revise terminology and organizational structures.[2]

(TS) During [redacted] a member of CINCPAC's UW planning staff visited [redacted] CINCPAC contingency plans and subordinate unified command UW operational base support plans were discussed with the staff at each location. Combined [redacted] UW stay-behind planning was discussed with the staff of [redacted] The CINCPAC staff member also visited each Service component's PACOM UW force stationed on [redacted] The [redacted] and [redacted] Detachment each presented update briefings on on-going activities and future roles and missions.[3]

(TS) In one other matter of interest, in 1970 [redacted] and [redacted] had been authorized to conduct bilateral UW planning, limited to the boundaries of the host country. As a result of the redeployment of forces, the authority to conduct combined UW planning with the Government of the RVN was rescinded.[4]

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1. J353 Point Paper, 25 Apr 73, Subj: NSSM 169 (U.S. Nuclear Policy) (C), which cited CINCPAC 180359Z Nov72 (EX); J542 Point Paper, 5 Nov 73, Subj: National Nuclear Targeting and Attack Policy (NNTAP) (TS).
2. J54 HistSums Feb, Mar 73.
3. J5521 HistSum Oct 73.
4. Ibid.

CINCPAC Staff Officers Visit South Asia

(C) Political situations had been such in South Asia that the CINCPAC had not personally visited the area since it became part of the Pacific Command with changes to the Unified Command Plan on 1 January 1972. The political situation, especially in India, had not yet sufficiently normalized following the India-Pakistani war of December 1971 to support an official visit by CINCPAC or any other flag officer. Indications were that the first such visit would probably be approved for the Commander Middle East Force.[1]

(C) Two members of CINCPAC's Plans Directorate and the Deputy Political Adviser, however, visited Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India from 14 to 24 November. This was the second visit by CINCPAC staff members to the area since it became part of the PACOM.[2]

(C) While planning for the trip, the Ambassador in New Delhi had expressed consternation when the Indian military attache in Washington, Brigadier Singh, had suggested that the officers might discuss the "broad operational and logistic planning situation with regard to Tibet." The Ambassador noted that he welcomed the visit and hoped to do everything to make a success, but that he was sure Secretary Kissinger would agree that it was "wholly inappropriate for such talks to take place at this time." A level of consultation and discussion with the Indian military far beyond what had been anticipated had been alluded to in the message that carried Brigadier Singh's remarks, the Ambassador continued, noting that it had been his understanding the visit was primarily for familiarization and in-house discussions, and "not a general tour d'horizon with Indian military staff and certainly not to discuss operational or logistic planning problems." It should be made clear to the Brigadier, the Ambassador continued, that the CINCPAC staff would not be prepared to discuss subjects that he has raised and that their visit was not intended to be the occasion for major consultative discussions.[3]

International Ocean Exposition (EXPO-75)

(C) Japanese preparation for the International Ocean Exposition in Okinawa for 1975 (EXPO-75) had moved strongly into implementation. The Japanese Government had made a full commitment to its success and was investing up to $2 billion in the EXPO and associated development construction. The U.S. Consulate in Naha expressed concern that U.S. interests in Okinawa would be severely aggra-

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 35-37.
2. J5131 HistSum Nov 73.
3. AMEMB New Delhi 13039/091620Z Nov 73.

vated if the United States did not officially participate. CINCPAC advised the Chairman of the JCS that he agreed with the Consul on the importance of U.S. participation. CINCPAC recommended a strong position on U.S. participation because the Japanese attached great importance to the event, U.S. participation would promote good will and partnership with the Japanese, capabilities of the U.S. military in peacetime roles could be demonstrated, and the United States would offset Japanese local irritation over military presence on Okinawa by contributing to local welfare. He requested that the Chairman and certain PACOM commanders provide ideas and recommendations. CINCPAC believed emphasis in military exhibits and demonstrations should be on the peaceful and humanitarian aspects of such activities. He noted that oceanography, aerology, flood control, and search and rescue might be good subjects.[1]

(C) The JCS concurred and stated that U.S. military participation would be consistent with overall themes and guidelines. A theme paper was circulated by a Washington inter-agency committee laying out the EXPO program. The U.S. Information Agency was to query civilian and governmental agencies regarding their capability to furnish appropriate exhibit contents and necessary administrative and logistic support. The Secretary of Defense was preparing a memorandum to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicating the importance of prompt funding for U.S. participation.[2]

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1. CINCPAC 101928Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 110043Z Oct 73.
2. J5522 HistSum Oct 73.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY OPERATIONS

(U) In 1973 the United States ceased participation in military operations in Southeast Asia, although the fighting continued in many parts of that region. Some U.S. Forces were retained in Thailand in the event air operations should be resumed, but these forces were phasing down. Military assistance continued to be provided.

(U) As the year opened, in the aftermath of the surge of bombing of key military and industrial areas in North Vietnam and the mining of the harbors there, it appeared that the peace negotiations that had been in progress in Paris since 13 May 1968 might come to fruition. Because of the progress made in those negotiations the White House announced the suspension of all military activity directed against North Vietnam to be effective on 15 January. Then, effective 272359Z January, an internationally-supervised cease-fire went into effect for the Republic of Vietnam and the Demilitarized Zone between the two Vietnams.[1]

(S) Effective 220500Z February the United States discontinued all acts of force in Laos, with the exception of certain air strikes that could be authorized if they were requested by the Royal Laotian Government and approved by the U.S. Ambassador there and the JCS.[2]

(U) Then on 30 June the Congress of the United States passed into law a provision directing that no funds appropriated could be obligated to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by U.S. military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia on or after 15 August.[3]

(U) In the discussion of military operations in the PACOM, these matters and the many changes that resulted from them are outlined. Efforts continued in Southeast Asia casualty matters in an attempt to resolve the status of missing U.S. personnel and to locate and recover the remains of those who were dead but whose bodies had not been recovered.

(U) Certain operations were unique in 1973: for the first time in Navy history, airborne mine countermeasures were employed against actual mines in

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1. SECDEF 6148/151756Z Jan 73; JCS RED ROCKET ONE/240456Z Jan 73.
2. JCS RED ROCKET ONE/212330Z Feb 73.
3. SECDEF 3892/040018Z Aug 73.

an operational situation. Also, for the first time CINCPAC dispatched a carrier task force in the direction of the Middle East when war broke out in that part of the world. Many other facets of PACOM operations proceeded, however, as they had throughout the years.

SECTION I--Operations in Southeast Asia

Rules of Engagement and Operating Authorities for Southeast Asia

(TS) In November 1972, as negotiations in Paris indicated a possible cease-fire in Vietnam, CINCPAC began initial efforts to develop a scenario for the employment of U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia in the event the negotiations were successful. A working level conference was convened with representatives of COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT. Draft operating authorities and rules of engagement were developed by these conferees and informally forwarded to the JCS for consideration. There were certain matters to be resolved and these were returned for comment and ultimately concurred in by CINCPAC. These documents were then held at the JCS for implementation at the effective time of a cease-fire.[1]

(U) On 15 January 1973 the White House announced that because of the progress made in the negotiations the President had directed that the bombing, shelling, and further mining of North Vietnam would be suspended. The order went into effect at 10 A.M. Washington time on 15 January.[2]

(TS) On 15 January the JCS temporarily suspended all offensive operations against North Vietnam, to include the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), north of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line (PMDL), and within the claimed 12-nautical mile territorial waters. All air strikes, artillery fire, naval bombardment, and mining/seeding, as well as other fire or munitions expenditure into those areas was terminated until further notice. Further, [redacted] operations involving overflight of North Vietnam or the DMZ north of the PMDL were prohibited. At that time ground, air, and naval operations in the RVN, Laos, or Cambodia were not affected. Immediate pursuit in North Vietnamese territory in response to hostile acts against U.S. and Allied forces operating outside of North Vietnamese territory was authorized. Reconnaissance operations over North Vietnam continued, but were restricted to [redacted] SR-71 aircraft only.[3]

(S) On 24 January the JCS announced that effective 272359Z January 1973 an internationally supervised cease-fire in the RVN and the DMZ was to be instituted. At that time all acts of force initiated by U.S. Forces in North

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1. J3B24 HistSum Feb 73, which cited JCS 6101/230012Z Nov 72, JCS 6123/230051Z Nov 72, JCS 6131/230105Z Nov 72, JCS 6133/230112Z Nov 72, JCS 6136/230121Z Nov 72, CINCPAC 232341Z Nov 72, CINCPAC 300026Z Nov 72 (all EX).
2. SECDEF 6148/151756Z Jan 73.
3. J3B23 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 5597/150356Z Jan 73.

Vietnam, the RVN, and the DMZ were to be discontinued. Further, all air strikes, artillery fire, naval bombardment, and other fire or munitions expenditure, including mines and destructors, were to be terminated. Psychological operations targeted against North and South Vietnam and the DMZ were to be prohibited. All naval surface forces in the Gulf of Tonkin would have to withdraw to south of 16°50'N except as required for PIRAZ (Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone), search and rescue, or notification line operations. Interim guidance was provided by the JCS as follows:

> ...Ground, air and naval operations in Laos and Cambodia, as currently authorized, are not repeat not affected by these instructions. Overflight of SVN is allowed. However, those US Forces based in or operating from bases in the Republic of Vietnam will not repeat not be employed in support of operations in Laos or Cambodia.
>
> ...All [redacted] are authorized throughout the [redacted] as required.
>
> ...US naval and air forces will respect the claimed territorial waters (12NM) and airspace of NVN.
>
> ...Overflight of NVN and the Demilitarized Zone north of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line by military aircraft (including drones, SR-71, etc.) is strictly prohibited.
>
> ...Nothing in these restrictions shall be construed as preventing any commander from taking such action as may be necessary to defend his command. In the event of an attack against US installations/ forces, or combinations of the foregoing, minimum force necessary to protect forces under attack is authorized.

The JCS guidance also noted that no ordnance other than that normally regarded as self-defensive in nature would be carried aboard U.S. aircraft conducting training missions in the vicinity of North or South Vietnam. No naval gunfire was to be initiated in the cease-fire area or against North Vietnamese ships or watercraft of any type except in the defense of U.S. forces or installations. Logistic operations in progress or planned through 60 days after the cease-fire were to continue.[1]

(TS) On 27 January the JCS promulgated both Rules of Engagement and Southeast Asia Operating Authorities to be effective concurrently with the cease-fire

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1. JCS RED ROCKET ONE/240456Z Jan 73.

on 272359Z January. Both are summarized in the listings that follow. In essence, a cease-fire prevailed in North and South Vietnam while war continued under virtually unchanged authorities and rules in Laos and Cambodia.[1]

Rules of Engagement - Post Cease-Fire
[Effective after 272359Z January 1973]

DEFINITIONS

Southeast Asia includes airspace, land mass and territorial/international waters of:

Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and the RVN.
International waters and airspace of:

Gulfs of Siam and Tonkin
South China Sea

Territorial Seas

Thailand - 12 nautical miles
North Vietnam - 12 nautical miles
Cambodia - 12 nautical miles
People's Republic of China - 12 nautical miles
RVN - 3 nautical miles

Hostile aircraft [RVN or Thailand]

Identified/designated
Attacking or intent
Laying mines
Releasing free drops, parachutes, or gliders; landing troops

Hostile vessel

Attacking
Laying mines
Direct support

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1. J3B23 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 9912/270703Z Jan 73 (EX); J3B25 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 9906/270657Z Jan 73 (EX).

Hostile ground forces

Attack U.S./friendly forces, facilities, or population centers

Immediate pursuit

Initiated in response to actions by hostile aircraft or vessel

Continuous or uninterupted

Continued into international and territorial airspace as necessary and feasible

Attacks

Major attack: One in which U.S./friendly forces, facilities, or population centers

Receive numerous rounds of enemy mortar/artillery over short period or sporadically over a period of years.

Receive a multi-company ground attack, with or without supporting fire.

Subjected to one or more acts of terrorism involving extensive use of mines and demolitions.

Minor attack:

Receive one or very few rounds of mortar, rocket, artillery, following an extended period during which no standoff attacks by fire were received.

Receive small ground probe, unsupported by sufficient mortar, artillery, rocket fire, followed by extended period during which no similar attacks received.

Subjected to one or a very few small terrorists attacks, involving use of mines and demolitions, followed by an extended period during which no similar attacks were received.

GENERAL RULES

U.S. Forces operating in Southeast Asia were authorized to attack and destroy any hostile aircraft or vessel, except where operating authority was promulgated separately to limit this authority or preclude introduction of U.S. Forces in the area.

U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia were authorized to attack and destroy hostile ground forces that attacked U.S. personnel in the RVN, or U.S./friendly forces, facilities, material, or population centers in Laos and Cambodia.

Immediate pursuit may be conducted as necessary and feasible, pursuant to above.

No pursuit was authorized in the territorial seas or airspace of the People's Republic of China.

Declaration of aircraft or vessels as hostile was to be tempered with discretion.

Prudential rule applies.

Operating Authorities - Post Cease-fire
[effective after 272359Z January 1973]

North Vietnam

All military operations prohibited, except:

Mine countermeasures, logistic support, and like as promulgated separately.

Search and rescue (SAR) for U.S. personnel (munitions expenditure including CS (riot control agents) must be conducted only under the terms of "defensive response.")

Immediate pursuit (not prolonged or deep penetration)

Defensive response last resort (not to be initiated upon activation of North Vietnamese radars)

Crash/grave site inspections (procedures to be announced)

Ordnance expenditure authorized only against hostile forces in direct support of U.S. personnel (authority expires at completion of withdrawal)

Immediate pursuit authorized after withdrawal of U.S. forces under attack.

Defensive response only to protect U.S. Forces (last resort).

Overflight authorized.

Surveillance activities over water authorized following U.S. withdrawal only when appropriately cleared by GVN.

RVN airbases may be used as emergency recovery following withdrawal.

RVN airbases may be designated weather alternate for flights terminating in the RVN or when approved by the GVN.

U.S. naval combatant vessels and logistic craft operate in RVN waters until withdrawal complete (after withdrawal need GVN approval).

Crash/grave site inspection (in GVN controlled areas, coordinate with the RVNAF; in North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong controlled areas, to be announced; in contested areas, to be announced).

SAR operation throughout the RVN for U.S. personnel.

During period of withdrawal, SAR authorized for friendly aircrews in emergency situations beyond RVNAF capability.

Event of minor attack (see rules of engagement) on-scene commander authorized to use internal firepower.

Event of major attack (see rules of engagement), use integrated firepower (internal, naval gunfire support, tactical air).

No hostile actions or counter-attacks without approval from higher authority.

U.S. Forces may be used for evacuation assistance of certain people or [redacted] equipment (as directed by the JCS).

U.S. Forces based in or operating from based in the RVN will not be employed in support of operations in Laos or Cambodia.

During withdrawal, U.S. Forces can conduct normal training to maintain unit readiness.

No ordnance, except guns and air-to-air missiles, aboard U.S. aircraft conducting training missions in vicinity of the RVN or North Vietnam.

No naval gun fire initiated (in cease-fire area against North Vietnamese ships or watercraft).

Except defensive response.

RVN positive control area (PCA) (that area of Laos and Cambodia within 5 nautical miles of the RVN border extending from 16°54' southward to the Gulf of Thailand).

All strikes in the PCA under forward air controller control.

Except B-52 using all weather bombing systems.

Plan/conduct strikes to preclude ordnance impact in the RVN.

Laos

Tactical air, ARC LIGHT, and fixed wing gunship strikes may be conducted in support of the Royal Lao government (plan/conduct to preclude overfly or ordnance impact in North Vietnam).

BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER areas defined.

SAR authorized throughout for U.S. personnel (emergency situation and beyond allied capability on case-by-case basis as approved by MACV/USSAG/7AF).

CS can be used.

Recovery of aircraft in low risk areas authorized.

Reconnaissance with armed escort/flak suppression, as required, except manned tactical reconnaissance, in BARREL ROLL North, or 5 kilometers of known/suspected [redacted] positions in BARREL ROLL East or BARREL ROLL West, unless approved by the JCS.

High and low [redacted] no closer than 25 nautical mines to the [redacted] border.

SR-71 [redacted] no closer than 10 nautical miles to the [redacted]

Other manned airborne sigint, no closer than 25 nautical miles to the [redacted]

Passive aerial operations (Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, refuelers, early warning, electronic countermeasures, etc.) in support of combat operations.

Tactical air, ARC LIGHT, and fixed wing gunship throughout Laos under approval of the Ambassador in support of the Royal Lao Government.

Strikes in BARREL ROLL North, Sam Neua, or within 5 kilometers of [redacted] positions require JCS approval.

ARC LIGHT strikes may be conducted in Laos against targets approved by CINCPAC and CINCSAC action jointly and in coordination with the Ambassador in Vientiane (approval may be delegated to COMUSMACV/USSAG/7AF).

Forward Air Controller Operations (U.S. forward air controllers may control US, Lao, or third country air strikes in Laos subject to tactical air limitation).

U.S. helicopters in coordination with the U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane(conduct routine day-to-day operations, i.e., medical evacuation, resupply, position and replacement of teams, deployment of battalion-size forces, [redacted] artillery lift, construction equipment, inoperative aircraft).

JCS approval for any operation which is politically sensitive (support of multi-battalion airlift requires JCS approval).

[redacted] authorized against enemy controlled/contested areas [redacted]

U.S. aircrews and aircraft for dissemination authorized.

CAMBODIA

SAR for U.S. personnel authorized throughout.

SAR in emergency and beyond capabilities of friendly authorized.

During SAR (ground fire may be returned, CS employed throughout Cambodia, ground security forces may be employed in SAR on a case-by-case basis determined by COMUSMACV/USSAG/7AF, recovery of U.S. aircraft in low risk areas).

Reconnaissance [redacted] throughout Cambodia--with armed escort as required).

Passive aerial operations in support of combat operations.

FREEDOM DEAL area defined.

Tactical air, ARC LIGHT, rotary and fixed wing gunships may conduct interdiction throughout FREEDOM DEAL.

Strikes south of Route 13 only against confirmed, highly lucrative targets, posing substantial threat to allied forces.

Tactical air, rotary and fixed wing gunships, trooplift, medevac, and logistic support for Mekong River security.

Tactical air may be employed throughout Cambodia.

In any situation which poses threat to Cambodia positions, loss of which constitute psychological blow to country (case-by-case, recommendation of COMUSMACV/USSAG/7AF, beyond allied capabilities)

ARC LIGHT conducted south of FREEDOM DEAL to Gulf (approved by CINCPAC/CINCSAC, inform JCS unless last minute divert due to critical situation).

Forward Air Controllers (forward air controllers may control Royal Thai, Vietnamese, and Khmer Air Forces airstrikes in areas authorized for U.S. strikes).

Target validated by ground commander; positive communication between air and ground.

Outside authorized areas; provide passive support only, i.e., radio delay.

PSYOPS

Against Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army

FREEDOM DEAL

50 kilometer strip from southern edge of FREEDOM DEAL to Gulf of Thailand paralleling the RVN border.

Any areas where U.S. strikes authorized for 7 days following

Printed media

Loudspeakers

Gift packages (U.S. aircraft disseminate or when beyond GKR capability)

Shrines, national monuments, cultural areas, Phnom Penh excluded from operational areas.

BRIGHT LIGHT

Escort/Barrier Combat Air Patrol/MIGCAP authority for protection of intelligence collection aircraft over Gulf of Tonkin.

International waters only.

Avoid PRC and Hainan Island by 25 nautical miles.

Avoid North Vietnam and Paracel Islands by 12 nautical miles.

No operations in Thailand except with approval of U.S. Ambassador Bangkok.

Prudential rule applies.

(TS) In parallel with development of the Vietnam cease-fire, the Cambodian Prime Minister, General Lon Nol, had been pursuing a unilateral plan to cease Cambodian Army (FANK) operations against the Khmer Communists and Insurgents in Cambodia. This plan was supported by the U.S. Government and on 25 January the JCS established procedures for continuation of U.S. air strikes in Cambodia following its implementation. Although these procedures predated and limited the authorities published on 27 January, they took precedence in limiting the extent and purpose of U.S. air strikes in Cambodia. The Lon Nol unilateral cease-fire was implemented on 29 January and the Commander of the 7th Air Force immediately prohibited overflight of Cambodia by U.S. combat, forward air control, and reconnaissance aircraft except as specifically authorized by the 7th Air Force. (The 7th Air Force control element for these operations was called BLUE CHIP.) Based on experience with the new situation and guidance from the Chairman of the JCS, procedures were developed to insure support of Cambodian positions under enemy attack.[1]

(S) On 3 February the Commander 7th Air Force established a Positive Control Area to preclude the inadvertent expenditure of ordnance in North and South Vietnam and to preclude the penetration of North Vietnamese airspace. He directed that all references to the BARREL ROLL East Buffer Zone be deleted, and he defined the Positive Control Areas as "(1) That area of Laos and Khmer Republic within 10NM of the NVN border and the SVN border between 21 degrees 15 minutes North and the Gulf of Thailand, (2) That area of SVN within 10NM of the NVN border."[2]

(TS) From 3 through 21 February the status quo was maintained: no offensive operations were conducted in North Vietnam, the DMZ, or the RVN (defensive operations were limited to the protection of U.S. personnel); there were no offensive

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1. J3B24 HistSum Feb 73, which cited JCS 8281/251712Z Jan 73 (EX); 7AF Saigon 290220Z Jan 73; 7AF Saigon 020745Z Feb 73.
2. 7AF Saigon 030820Z Feb 73.

and limited (Ambassador-approved) defensive operations in Cambodia; but full scale operations continued in Laos. Effective at 220500Z February, however, U.S. Forces were directed to discontinue air strikes and psychological operations against targets in Laos, except in U.S. Ambassador-validated responses to North Vietnamese Army/Pathet Lao initiatives in violation of the Laos cease-fire agreement. Post cease-fire authorities for Laos that had been promulgated at the time of the Vietnam cease-fire (on 27 January) were immediately superseded by this new guidance from the JCS. Concurrently, the rules of engagement were modified to take into account the formal cease-fire agreements for North Vietnam, the RVN, the DMZ, and Laos.[1]

(TS) Almost immediately after the Lao cease-fire was implemented, the U.S. Ambassador requested and the JCS approved one-time ARC LIGHT (B-52) strikes in support of the Royal Lao forces.[2]

(TS) Meanwhile, the situation in Cambodia had deteriorated, and, after meeting with the Ambassador there and members of the Cambodian Army, the Commander of the U.S. Support Activities Group in Thailand requested authority to enhance support of the Cambodian government by streamlining approval procedures for U.S. air strikes. The JCS immediately authorized a 2 1/2 day operation (ending at 260800Z February) employing 60 ARC LIGHT and 200 tactical air sorties against Khmer Communist and Insurgent positions, but JCS approval of the streamlining proposal was held in abeyance. On 4 March COMUSSAG relayed the Ambassador's request to ex,and the criteria for approving U.S. air strikes to include attacks against enemy positions posing a threat to key Cambodian government locations. As approved by the JCS early in March, COMUSSAG was authorized to provide U.S. B-52, tactical air, and gunship air support in those instances in which the Cambodian government requested assistance to meet a threat and the Ambassador validated the request. On 8 March the JCS directed strikes against enemy supplies and forces in Cambodia that were enroute to the RVN. Air operations were further accelerated in response to further JCS direction on 13 March; they ordered 50 to 60 B-52 sorties daily and an appreciable increase in tactical air strikes. Maximum effort was called for on North Vietnamese storage areas and lines of communication located in Cambodia that were supporting the enemy effort in the RVN.[3]

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1. J3B24 HistSum Feb 73, which cited JCS 7811/212337Z Feb 73 and JCS 7805/212332Z Feb 73 (both EX); JCS RED ROCKET ONE 212330Z Feb 73.
2. J3B24 HistSum Feb 73, which cited AMEMB Vientiane 0234/221700Z Feb 73 (BOM) and JCS 8944/222124Z Feb 73 (EX).
3. Ibid., which cited USSAG 231445Z Feb 73, JCS 9876/231715Z Feb 73, USSAG 040945Z Mar 73, and JCS 8955/052223Z Mar 73 (all EX); J3B2 HistSum Mar 73, which cited, JCS 3533/081525Z Mar 73 and JCS 1890/130122Z Mar 73 (both EX).

(~~TS~~) On 29 March new operating authorities for Southeast Asia were issued by the JCS. The principal reason for issuing them was to eliminate authorities that were effective only until the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from the RVN was complete. For authorities for North Vietnam, there was no change. For the RVN, it was no longer authorized to expend ordnance, and the response to enemy attack provisions was deleted. For Laos, the immediate pursuit provisions were changed, but there were no other substantive changes from authorities in effect on 28 March. For Cambodia, geographic strike restrictions were clearly removed (Cambodia: Ambassador validation requirements continued). F-111s were allowed to strike in the RVN Positive Control Area using an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) system without Forward Air Controller control (this had been previously limited to B-52 IFR bombing). Authority was granted for Protective Reaction to surface-to-air missile and anitaircraft artillery firings within the FREEDOM DEAL operating area without validation procedures; outside of that area the Cambodian government and the U.S. Ambassador had to validate.[1]

(~~S~~) During April the operating authorities on target validation and approval in Cambodia were revised to allow for a more rapid response to strike requests, with the exception of ARC LIGHT outside of the FREEDOM DEAL area. The Embassy was no longer involved in the day-to-day validation of ARC LIGHT and tactical air targets, but instead gave blanket validation on a periodic basis. This procedure had significantly streamlined strike approval and allowed more responsive support of Cambodian Army forces.[2]

(U) A major change in United States policy occurred on 30 June when the Senate and House of Representatives agreed to an agreement to a joint resolution making continuing appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974. The amendment stated:

> ...Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by US military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.

The bill was signed and became a public law.

(~~S~~) On 4 August the Secretary of Defense advised that the following Defense Department activities were prohibited in Cambodia and Laos after 14 August:

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1. J3B2 HistSum Mar 73, which cited JCS 2996/291610Z Mar 73 (EX). See the CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 157-162 for FREEDOM DEAL operating area details.
2. J3B21 HistSum Apr 73, which cited USSAG 281030Z Apr 73.

bombing, strafing, rocketing or other expenditure of ordnance; forward air control operations; armed reconnaissance; helicopter gunship operations; comparable hostile actions by U.S. ground and naval forces directly engaged as American units against the enemy; activities by individual personnel in support of indigenous forces including (1) artillery fire control and observation, (2) forward air control, (3) advisors to Cambodian military forces, (4) combat advisors to Royal Lao Army forces; transport of supplies or military equipment when there was serious risk to the aircraft and crew or as an adjunct to combat activities. The Secretary continued that certain types of non-combat air operations, if otherwise authorized, were permitted by this statute in Cambodia and Laos after 14 August provided they were carried out by unarmed aircraft that were unescorted by armed aircraft. These were reconnaissance flights; administrative flights in connection with operations of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and other non-combat personnel; airlift, including air drop of Military Assistance items and humanitarian supplies, to points of entry and to base areas except where serious risk to the aircraft and crew was involved, such as airlift to base areas where forces were in direct contact; in-country movement of Military Assistance items and humanitarian supplies to base areas, including landing and air drops, again when there was no serious risk to aircraft or crew; and emergency airlift and airdropping of humanitarian supplies, such as food and medicines, at any location in Cambodia under the control of the Government of the Khmer Republic, and at any location in Laos under the control of the Royal Laotian Government, except where there was serious risk to aircraft or crew, when other means of delivery, such as indigenous forces or civilian organizations or contractors were not reasonably available.

(S) Certain non-air activities by U.S. military personnel were permitted, the Secretary continued, if otherwise authorized. These included continuation of the Military Assistance Program and Military Assistance Service Funded (including provisions of arms and other military equipment, construction, technical assistance and support); Military Sealift Command transportation from CONUS or other overseas locations under MAP and MASF to points of entry in Cambodia; standard activities of the Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia; standard attache activities including Project 404 (except for advisors with units engaged in combat activities); Marine security guards for U.S. Embassies; and operations of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center.

(U) The Secretary advised that operating authorities or modifications to existing authorities would be provided through the usual channels for the period beginning after 14 August and would take into consideration not only the statutory provisions in the Congressional joint resolution, but also other applicable statutory provisions and the terms of such cease-fire agreements as might be applicable.[1]

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1. SECDEF 3892/040018Z Aug 73.

(~~TS~~) On 14 August the JCS provided new operating authorities to supercede the 29 March authorities (and certain guidance in the 24 January authorities); they were effective at 0400Z on 15 August. U.S. military operations of all types were prohibited throughout the territory and territorial airspace and seas of North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, except as specifically authorized in the guidance that followed. First they addressed defensive responses:

> In the event US Forces are fired upon while conducting approved operations in or over North or South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, every effort will be made to disengage. Defensive responses are authorized to protect US Forces only when other alternatives have failed. Defensive response may be made only after actual hostile fire has been encountered and must be limited to an immediate response against only those forces actually firing at US Forces. Defensive responses will not be initiated solely in response to activation of hostile radars.

(~~TS~~) When U.S. Forces were under attack, they could, if it was essential for their self-defense, conduct immediate pursuit of attacking forces into the territorial waters or airspace of North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Immediate pursuit had to be continuous and uninterrupted and was authorized only to protect U.S. Forces, and only until the hostile aircraft or vessels no longer posed an immediate threat. Immediate pursuit did not include prolonged pursuit deep into hostile airspace. U.S. Forces in immediate pursuit were authorized to attack other forces or installations encountered only when attacked first by them, and then only to the extent necessary for self-defense.

(~~S~~) Overflight of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia was authorized as necessary for the conduct of approved administrative, logistics, and non-combat support operations. Overflight of North Vietnam was prohibited, except for courier and International Commission for Control and Supervision support flights approved by the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon and the North Vietnamese government.

(~~TS~~) Unarmed aerial reconnaissance and the support thereof were authorized pending resolution of certain diplomatic issues as required throughout Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia except as specified. Particulars for several types of reconnaissance were listed.

(~~TS~~) Search and rescue operations could be conducted for U.S. personnel throughout Southeast Asia, but in doing so, munitions expenditures, including [redacted] could be conducted only under the terms of defensive response outlined above.

(S) The recovery of downed U.S. aircraft was authorized throughout South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In areas controlled by the Communist forces, however, or in the contested areas of Southeast Asia, recovery of aircraft was to be arranged in accordance with procedures provided separately. No recovery of U.S. aircraft from North Vietnam was authorized, however, without the approval of higher authority.

(S) Surveillance activities could be conducted in and over the claimed territorial waters of South Vietnam and Cambodia and the international waters of the South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. Surface surveillance operations in South Vietnamese and Cambodian territorial waters, however, were authorized only when appropriately approved by the respective government. This approval was also required for U.S. Navy logistic ships.

(S) In matters of logistics, air and surface operations related to replenishment of consumables and replacements for armaments, munitions, and war materiel (including ammunition) were authorized to South Vietnam within the terms of the cease-fire agreement. This pertained only to movement into the RVN, not intra-country movement. For Cambodia and Laos, airlift was authorized except where there was risk to aircraft and crews; in-country movement of military assistance supplies and humanitarian items was also authorized.

(U) Authorities for psychological operations are discussed in the Planning chapter of this History; those for crash and grave site inspections are in this chapter under the subject "Personnel Recovery."

(TS) The JCS continued that U.S. Forces may be used in response to requests for evacuation assistance in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia for the following categories of individuals and equipment: U.S. military personnel, U.S. nationals, or certain employees of the United States and friendly personnel as may be designated by the Chairman of the JCS. U.S. Forces "may be used ashore as deemed necessary by the on-scene commander, to insure security of evacuation operation." No hostile actions or counterattacks, other than for direct self-defense, were authorized without approval from the Chairman of the JCS.

(S) Administrative and other non-combat support flights were authorized as required in support of authorized operations.

(TS) For escort and combat air patrol operations, it was first noted that non-combat air operations authorized should be carried out by unarmed aircraft, unescorted by armed aircraft. This restriction did not apply, however, to search and rescue or evacuation operations. U.S. Forces could be used to provide escort or protection for intelligence collection aircraft conducting operations over the international waters of Southeast Asia, provided all U.S.

Forces took appropriate precautions to avoid overflight of the land mass or claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam, except in cases of authorized immediate pursuit.

(S) U.S. Forces were authorized to conduct normal training to maintain unit readiness. The JCS then listed the boundaries of the operating areas known as BARREL ROLL NORTH and EAST, STEEL TIGER EAST and WEST, and FREEDOM DEAL; these were retained in effect for reporting purposes.

(S) The JCS concluded that nothing in the authorities should be construed as precluding a commander from using all means at his disposal to exercise the inherent right and responsibility to conduct operations for the self-defense of his forces. They also noted that the message transmitting these authorities, in its entirety, would retain the overall classification of Top Secret, but to facilitate necessary dissemination to the proper operating levels, individual authorities could be downgraded to Secret.[1]

Air Operations--Southeast Asia

LINEBACKER II

(U) The effectiveness of the surge of air strikes in North Vietnam at the end of 1972, the operation called LINEBACKER II, remained under study throughout 1973, but nobody challenged the fact that it was effective in forcing the North Vietnamese to return to the peace table in Paris. The Chairman of the JCS offered the following evaluation:

> ...The 11-day air campaign of December, 1972, will, I am certain, go down in history as a testimonial to the efficacy of air power. Linebacker 2 constituted the use of joint forces in a skillfully coordinated effort the way they should be used. Its success was due to our airmen's qualities of professionalism, skill, dedication, and raw courage in their highest tradition.
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> I am convinced that Linebacker 2 served as a catalyst for the negotiations which resulted in the ceasefire, the return of our POWs, and the complete withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam. Airpower, given its day in court after almost a decade of frustration, confirmed its effectiveness as an instrument of national power--in just 9 1/2 flying days.[2]

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1. JCS 2474/142336Z Aug 73.
2. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, remarks before the 17th annual Tailhook Association reunion in Las Vegas, as quoted in Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 Sep 73, p. 7.

(S) LINEBACKER II had used over 700 B-52 and over 4,000 tactical air sorties of the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. A preliminary briefing on the results of the operation was presented by the Strategic Air Command, CINCPAC's air and naval components, and the Air Defense Analysis Center to CINCPAC and his component commanders on 12 January. At this briefing CINCPAC tasked the CINCPAC staff to perform a thorough and continuing review of the operations to yield lessons learned that might be applied to future operations of such scope and direction. The Intelligence Directorate was tasked to review electronic warfare, electronic countermeasures, and communications intelligence derived from the operations and a special working group was formed. This study was finished on 20 March.[1]

(S) The Operations Directorate's effort was formalized by a message to SAC and the air and naval component commanders. It was noted that while historical wrap-ups were necessary, the real payoff centered in detailed analysis of the what's and why's of the operation, measured against specific objectives. All had had expectations concerning the results of their efforts. Explaining deviations in the results, however, both better and worse than anticipated, would provide the basis for developing future tactics and weapons systems. Representative examples of areas that should be addressed in this context included weather, target selection, scheduling, inter-Service coordination, bomb damage assessment, and losses relationships; signal intelligence and electronic warfare study; the payoff from new weapons; tactics, both comparative between the Services and mutually supporting; hit-miss ratios for munitions delivered by major weapons systems; communications and reporting; and adequacy and technical performance of weapon systems and sub-systems, to include squadron-to-squadron comparison.[2]

(C) The first LINEBACKER II Assessment Committee meeting was held at CINCPAC headquarters on 25 February and a second late in March. CINCPAC's Scientific Analysis Group prepared a draft review and forwarded it to the Air Force and Navy components and SAC early in August. The components furnished their comments, but SAC comments had not been received by the end of the year. It was expected that the report would be finished in the spring of 1974.[3]

ARC LIGHT

(S) ARC LIGHT was the name of Strategic Air Command B-52 operations in Southeast Asia. As part of the cease-fire withdrawals, the last remaining

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1. J35 HistSum Nov 73.
2. CINCPAC 172145Z Jan 73.
3. J35 HistSum Nov 73.

MSQ site in the RVN (Detachment 21 at Bien Hoa) was scheduled for deactivation on 18 March. Subsequent to the cease-fire in Vietnam and Laos, this site was being used for B-52 strikes in Cambodia. Concern was expressed over the marked increase in air activity and the loss of this site. CINCPAC, therefore, advised the JCS, outlining some alternatives available to the ARC LIGHT forces, including [redacted] bombing, using [redacted] aiming points; [redacted] and [redacted] (used as a [redacted]. In addition, it was suggested that a new MSQ site be established in Phnom Penh if a continued requirement for B-52s in Cambodia was envisaged. The JCS decided to decommission the Detachment as originally scheduled, and the site was decommissioned by 28 March.[1]

(TS) With the cessation of LINEBACKER II operations on 29 December 1972, military operations north of 20°North had been halted. South of that line the sortie level for B-52s was 36-45 per day. On 14 January this was reduced to 30. With the Vietnam cease-fire, operations in Laos had been increased to a B-52 sortie level of 15 a day, and on 29 January this was increased further to 30 sorties per day.[2]

(TS) ARC LIGHT activity continued over Cambodia at varying levels until the mid-August cessation of operations. In April, as a result of heavy fighting around Takeo, Kampot, and Kep, the JCS authorized up to 81 B-52 strikes daily. This authority was used from 23 to 28 April. Actual sorties during this period varied from 73 to 78 per day. For the remainder of the month, sorties averaged 55 to 60 per day.[3]

(TS) On 25 May the JCS approved a proposal from USSAG and CINCPAC to reduce the sortie rate from 60 to 39 per day. The capability to continue striking 20 targets daily was retained by employing dual targeting procedures.[4]

(TS) The sortie rate was increased on 4 July again, when the JCS authorized an increase to 60 sorties per day, with the increase from 39 to be gradual during the period 5-12 July. This was modified on 5 July, however, and the sortie level remained at 39.[5]

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1. J3B2 HistSum Mar 73, which cited CINCPAC 160255Z Mar 73 and JCS 2818/201952Z Mar 73 (both EX).
2. J3B23 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 7826/291407Z Dec 72, JCS 5016/132229Z Jan 73, and JCS 8315/251743Z Jan 73 (all EX).
3. J3B25 HistSum Apr 73, which cited JCS 8298/220302Z Apr 73 (EX) and USSAG daily status reports (EX).
4. J3B25 HistSum May 73, which cited USSAG 090120Z May 73, CINCPAC 090427Z May 73, and JCS 2807/252124Z May 73 (all EX).
5. J311 HistSum Jul 73, which cited CJCS 6245/040147Z Jul 73 and CJCS 7599/052356Z Jul 73 (both BOM).

(S) Earlier, the U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane had requested U.S. air support in Laos in April against enemy positions and forces in the Tha Veing area, southeast of the Plaine des Jarres. This operation was given the unclassified nickname PRIME PUNCH. Operations began on 15 April and concluded about 36 hours later. In addition to the 38 ARC LIGHT sorties, 26 F-111 sorties were flown.[1]

Tactical Air Sortie Authorizations

(TS) With the cessation of LINEBACKER II on 292359Z December 1972, the JCS had ceased all military operations in North Vietnam and adjacent waters north of 20°North. SR-71 [redacted] aircraft were authorized to continue necessary operations, however. Air and naval operations, including mining and naval gunfire support, south of 20°North, continued utilizing 140-160 tactical air sorties per day. On 14 January this sortie level was reduced to not more than 100.[2]

(TS) On 25 January the U.S. Ambassador in Phnom Penh outlined plans to suspend all offensive military operations of the Cambodian Army at the end of January. As a result, the JCS directed that all U.S. tactical air (and B-52 strikes) would cease. U.S. Forces were to be prepared, however, to strike designated targets in Cambodia in order to assist Cambodian Army forces as the situation required. Validation and execution procedures were to be established by the Ambassador and COMUSMACV.[3]

(TS) In Laos, when the cease-fire was expected to begin in the RVN, the JCS increased the level of effort to approximately 200 tactical air sorties per day, and later, on 29 January, removed the 200 sortie limit. Future requirements were to be based on tactical requirements and capabilities as determined by COMUSMACV.[4]

Sensor Surveillance System

(S) To prepare for a possible cease-fire in Laos, which would preclude sensor implants, and to extend sensor string usefulness into the next wet season, CINCPAC on 10 February directed COMUSMACV to reseed sensor strings along major North Vietnamese egress routes into Laos (the STEEL TIGER area). The Commander USSAG advised that the sensor string implants (22 strings) had been completed

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1. J3B25 HistSum Apr 73, which cited AMEMB Vientiane 151309Z Apr 73 (EX).
2. J3B23 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 7826/291407Z Dec 72 and JCS 5016/132229Z Jan 73 (both EX).
3. Ibid., which cited AMEMB Phnom Penh 240556Z Jan 73 and JCS 8281/271712Z Jan 73 (both EX).
4. Ibid., which cited JCS 8315/251743Z Jan 73 and JCS 1446/272058Z Jan 73 (both EX).

on 17 February. The life expectancy of the new implants was mid-June.

(S) Lack of [redacted] aircraft had been limiting coverage of the [redacted] in the Demilitarized Zone-Military Region I (DMZ-MR I) area. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV and CINCPACAF that surveillance was essential and directed COMUSMACV to provide [redacted] for all [redacted] in the STEEL TIGER, DMZ, and MR-I areas. Following the cease-fire in Laos, Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center and relay aircraft operating in other areas were moved to cover DMZ-MR I [redacted]. At that time STEEL TIGER [redacted] were covered 24 hours a day, and DMZ-MR I [redacted] were covered 12 hours a day.[1]

Helicopter Support

(TS) Helicopter support on a routine or emergency basis for operations in Laos was a matter under CINCPAC review until operations were discontinued with the cease-fire. Late in January the 7/13th Air Force requested an extension of authority that had been granted by the JCS to provide multi-battalion helilift support for the general defense of friendly positions in the Bouam Long/Long Tieng/Sam Thong areas of Military Region II in Laos. COMUSMACV and CINCPAC recommended approval, and the JCS granted an extension of authority until 28 February. The JCS recommended the use of Project BLACKHORSE (CH-47s) whenever feasible. They later authorized support for specific areas of MRs II and IV through 28 February. CINCPAC subsequently rescinded this authority on 22 February in anticipation of the cease-fire in Laos.[2]

(TS) Another on-going operation at the beginning of the year was support for Operations GOLDEN COBRA in MR III and BLACK LION in MR IV, authorities for which were to expire on 31 January. COMUSMACV and CINCPAC both recommended extensions. The JCS authorized provision of the support requested until 28 February, with the stipulation that 24-hour notification of operations with specific helilift requirements and a risk assessment be provided. Additionally, operations in a higher than moderate risk environment required specific JCS approval.[3]

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1. J3B25 HistSum Feb 73; CINCPAC 102200Z Feb 73; USSAG 190945Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 090145Z Feb 73; 7AF 230310Z Feb 73.
2. J3B31 HistSum Jan 73, which cited 7/13AF 280515Z Jan 73, COMUSMACV 290600Z Jan 73, CINCPAC 291756Z Jan 73, and JCS 6915/021312Z Feb 73 (all BOM); J3B31 HistSum Feb 73, which cited JCS 6909/021310Z Feb 73, JCS 5201/010139Z Feb 73, and JCS 7811/212337Z Feb 73, (all BOM); CINCPAC 230135Z Feb 73.
3. J3B31 HistSum Jan 73, which cited 7/13AF 251000Z Jan 73, COMUSMACV 261050Z Jan 73, CINCPAC 262030Z Jan 73, and JCS 5201/010139Z Feb 73 (all BOM).

(TS) For still another operations, authority was requested to provide short notice helicopter support for Operation SALA PHOU KOUN, which was scheduled to begin on 18 January. The JCS authorized the support requested on or about 18 January until completion of the helilift. Subsequently the 7/13AF requested authority to provide airlift for 1,500 men from a landing zone in the vicinity of SALA PHOU KOUN to Vang Vieng about 2 February. The JCS authroized the provision of support until completion of the helilift. This authority was to expire on 28 February or upon completion of the helilift, whichever came first.[1]

Personnel Recovery

(TS) In 1973 CINCPAC's plans and activities associated with the recovery of U.S. and other allied personnel were managed under three main programs. He remained vitally concerned that every effort be made to return those in captivity and to search for and locate crash and grave sites to trace the missing. The return of U.S. prisoners of war from North Vietnam is discussed in this History in the chapter on Personnel Activities under the title "HOMECOMING." The other two programs were CINCPAC CONPLAN 5100, which provided for the employment of U.S. ground, air, or naval forces for personnel recovery (PR) operations in Southeast Asia, and for the encouragement and support of friendly indigenous military [redacted] forces for PR operations in their respective countries, and CINCPAC CONPLAN 5119 on casualty resolution, which provided for the location, recovery, identification, and evacuation of the remains of deceased body-not-recovered U.S. personnel and the resolution of the status of missing U.S. personnel. Each of these programs is discussed below.[2]

CINCPAC CONPLAN 5100--Personnel Recovery

(TS) CONPLAN 5100 had been under study throughout 1972. Late in the year the JCS had requested that CINCPAC provide a plan for an expanded Joint Casualty Resolution Center to locate and identify U.S. prisoners of war and missing in action throughout Southeast Asia in a non-hostile environment. CINCPAC's revised CONPLAN 5100 had done so, providing a plan for this activity while continuing PR operations as required. Early in 1973, however, the JCS advised that in order to accomplish the assigned mission as expeditiously as possible, more direct U.S. participation was required than was reflected in the CINCPAC-propcsed plan. They recommended that casualty resolution operations, which were planned to be

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1. J3B31 HistSum Jan 73, which cited 7/13AF 151630Z Jan 73, COMUSMACV 160555Z Jan 73, JCS 9983/181925Z Jan 73, 7/13AF 280854Z Jan 73, COMUSMACV 290919Z Jan 73, CINCPAC 291755Z Jan 72, and JCS 6909/021310Z Feb 73 (all BOM); CINCPAC 160615Z Jan 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 202-210.

conducted in a non-hostile environment, should be treated as a separate and distinct task and should be deleted from the 5100 plan. CINCPAC prepared a new 5100 plan and forwarded it to his components, the appropriate Southeast Asia commands, and the JCS on 14 April, asking for comments.[1]

~~(TS)~~ The USSAG/7AF reply, in addition to noting that temporary measures would have to be taken until that headquarters was properly staffed to perform the tasks envisioned in the plan, suggested that the nickname used for the plan, "BRIGHT LIGHT," was by definition in conflict with the plan. (BRIGHT LIGHT had been the name assigned to personnel recovery/crash site inspection operations in the RVN, Cambodia and Laos.) COMUSMACTHAI commented on the use of U.S. Army Special Forces Thailand (USASFT). He noted that the Thai government had previously expressed agreement with the concept of using USASFT personnel for PR operations in Thailand when Thai forces were not available, but the concept of using them outside of Thailand would require specific approval from the U.S. Ambassador and the Thai government. He also noted that there were potential problems in the matter of the USSAG/7AF conducting any operations in Thailand without specific Thai approval (other than search and rescue operations). The requirement for USSAG/7AF to periodically test USASFT quick reaction capability could impinge on training missions and cause objections from the Ambassador and the Thai government, he continued.[2]

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC also considered the comments and recommendations of his component commanders as he prepared his revised plan; he submitted the plan for approval on 18 May. He proposed "FREEDOM FERRY" as the unclassified nickname for these operations to recover detained, evading, and escaping U.S. personnel. CINCPAC was to exercise operational command of PR forces through COMUSSAG/7AF, who would conduct PR activities and operations in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC's subordinate commanders were named coordinating authorities in their respective geographic areas. The Personnel Recovery Task Force (PRTF), when activated, would be under the command of an officer nominated by CINCUSARPAC or CINCPACFLT and designated by CINCPAC. A CINCPACFLT PRTF would conduct PR operations in support of COMUSSAG/7AF in accordance with JCS Publication 2 provisions; a CINCUSARPAC PRTF and COMUSMACTHAI augmentation forces (USASFT) would conduct operations under the operational control of USSAG/7AF. The concept of operations of the plan stated:

> ...COMUSSAG/7AF will conduct PR operations throughout SEAsia for detained, evading, and escaping US personnel. The PR operations will be conducted by US personnel from COMUSMACTHAI, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSARPAC and by indigenous personnel

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1. JCS 7062/241715Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 141910Z Apr 73.
2. USSAG/7AF 221040Z Apr 73; COMUSMACTHAI 230435Z Apr 73.

as available and necessary. COMUSMACTHAI will support COMUSSAG/7AF by providing US personnel to conduct short-duration, quick-reaction PR operations. CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT will organize and maintain off-shore based personnel recovery task forces (PRTF), not to exceed an on-the-ground strength of 300 men, for PR operations. CINCUSARPAC will support COMUSSAG/7AF by providing [redacted] support and by deploying a PR planning group to SEAsia forward operating bases within 48 hours of notification, followed by a main-body PRTF upon request. CINCPACFLT will operate in support of the COMUSSAG/7AF PR operations by deploying a PR planning group to a COMUSSAG/7AF designated location within 48 hours after notification, followed by shipboard based PR operations. CINCPACFLT will support COMUSSAG/7AF by providing tactical air and air reconnaissance as well as airlift, intelligence, communications, and shipboard facilities for US PR forces. CINCPACAF will support USSAG/7AF by providing specially trained air assets (e.g. regular airlift, heavy lift helicopters, armed escort, search and rescue...tactical air, [redacted] transports, FAC, etc.) for PR deployment and operations commensurate with available resources and other requirements/ priorities established by CINCPAC....[1]

(TS) The JCS approved the plan on 22 June with a few modifications. One noted that operations concerned recovery of U.S. personnel in an evadee, detainee, or escapee status beyond search and rescue capability to distinguish between PR operations and normal SAR operations. They also added a paragraph on medical support. They noted that JCS approval would be required if the use of MACTHAI augmentation forces would require an exception to the 300-man ground force restriction in effect; the JCS would coordinate the matter with the State Department and request an exception to the restriction from the Secretary of Defense, if it was required.[2]

CINCPAC CONPLAN 5119--Casualty Resolution

(TS) In mid-August 1973 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a message to all military activities world-wide on the cessation of combat activities in Southeast Asia, noted that although the long conflict had come to a close, certain tasks remained and "in coming months we must make every effort

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1. CINCPACFLT 240105Z Apr 73; CINCPACAF 250346Z Apr 73; CINCUSARPAC 022009Z May 73; CINCPAC 181830Z May 73.
2. JCS 5841/220034Z Jun 73.

to account for those still missing in action." This was the task of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). This organization was an outgrowth of a Joint Personnel Recovery Center that had been formed in 1966 as part of the MACV Studies and Observation Group. Even through 1972 the two functions had been considered jointly--personnel recovery for those evadees, detainees, and escapees, and crash site inspection and casualty resolution to determine the status of those who were missing but whose bodies had not been recovered. Post-hostilities planning revealed, however, a requirement to be prepared to continue and expand upon the casualty resolution operations. There were about 1,300 Americans that were unaccounted for, in the sense that they were listed as missing or captured but did not return with the released prisoners of war.[1]

(S) Early in 1973, however, the JCS directed that to accomplish the mission more expeditiously, the JCRC tasks be deleted from CINCPAC's CONPLAN 5100 on personnel recovery and be treated as a separate and distinct task. The JCRC to be described in the new plan, as a CINCPAC activity, was to be designated a joint task force and its leader a commander responsible to USSAG/7AF to accomplish the assigned mission. Command arrangements after disestablishment of USSAG/7AF were to be addressed later, but the JCRC should continue to be located in close proximity to its proposed areas of operation. The JCS proposed the following mission statement:

> The JCRC will resolve the status of US missing/body not recovered personnel through the conduct of operations to locate and investigate crash/grave sites and recover remains, as appropriate, throughout SEAsia as directed by COMUSSAG/7AF.[2]

(TS) CINCPAC's CONPLAN 5119 was forwarded to CINCPAC's components and the subordinate unified commands in Vietnam and Thailand on 27 January for planning and for implementation on CINCPAC order, whenever an official cease-fire was declared in the RVN, Laos, or Cambodia. The plan envisioned the support of the governments of those countries and some indigenous personnel, the U.S. Ambassadors in those countries, and CINCPAC's advisory and support agencies with Southeast Asia responsibilities. CINCPAC was to exercise operational command of the JCRC and JCRC augmentation forces through COMUSSAG/7AF and would be supported by CINCPAC subordinates in the accomplishment of its assigned mission. CINCPAC subordinate authorities, within their respective areas of responsibility, would support the JCRC in coordinating operations with U.S. Ambassadors and local governments. CINCPAC subordinate commanders were to support the activities of the JCRC in their respective areas of responsibility.

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1. JCS 2645/150401Z Aug 73.
2. JCS 7062/241751Z Jan 73.

BRIGHT LIGHT was designated as an unclassified nickname relating to reports of the operations of the JCRC. VALOR HOME was an unclassified nickname for CINCPAC CONPLAN 5119. The plan noted that the Joint Personnel Recovery Center and the Joint Graves Registration Office had already been combined as a first step in the formation of the JCRC. The JCS approved the plan for implementation on 13 February.[1]

(TS) CINCPAC had directed COMUSMACV to establish the JCRC effective 12 January, but COMUSMACV had advised that establishment on that date would be premature and counter-productive to U.S. military interests in the RVN for several reasons: it would require reassignment of MACV assets being used on other operations, a large number of other-than-intelligence specialists would not be fully utilized if there was an extended pre-cease-fire period, and authorities under which the JCRC would function in a post-hostilities environment were not yet certain. CINCPAC, therefore, directed COMUSMACV to take action to establish the JCRC to the extent necessary to establish an official basis for transfer and requisition of personnel at an appropriate time.[2]

(TS) On 24 January the JCS granted authority to deploy a JCRC advance party of not more than five personnel to Thailand, and requested that they be advised when the JCRC Liaison/Planning Office was established. CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to do so. COMUSMACV established the JCRC on 28 January. An advance party arrived at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base on 29 January. On 20 January the Secretary of State had advised the U.S. Ambassador in Bangkok that effective 15 February the JCRC would function under the operational control of COMUSSAG/7AF and would assume full responsibility for crash/grave site inspection. The Secretary, therefore, desired Thai Government approval as soon as possible for establishment of the JCRC at Nakhon Phanom with approximately 110 personnel and a Liaison Office at Bangkok. On 29 January the Ambassador advised the Secretary of Thai approval.[3]

(U) Also on 29 January the JCS approved a Joint Manpower Program for the JCRC for 139 personnel, subject to a technical review by the Services. Later the JTD was increased to 199 spaces.[4]

(TS) Physical location of the JCRC agencies remained under study. Although the advance party had deployed to Nakhon Phanom, the Commander of the U.S. Army Support Command in Thailand had proposed that the Central Identification

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1. CINCPAC 270347Z Jan 73; JCS 8359/132001Z Feb 73.
2. CINCPAC 032242Z Jan 73; COMUSMACV 131125Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 171844Z Jan 73.
3. JCS 7271/242034Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 242245Z Jan 73; J3B63 HistSum Jan 73, which cited COMUSMACV 250317Z Jan 73, SECSTATE 015898/270040Z Jan 73, and AMEMB Bangkok 1488/291141Z Jan 73 (all EX).
4. JCS 2846/292251Z Jan 73.

Laboratory/Graves Registration (CIL/GR) facility be relocated (from Vietnam) to the Bangkok area, in the Don Muong cantonment area. COMUSMACTHAI, however, on 2 March advised that the Ambassador believed it was politically inadvisable to locate this large and publicly inaccessable supporting facility for a highly publicized activity in the Bangkok area. He believed that the Thai government would be more receptive if an existing U.S. facility could be converted for this purpose, and recommended that the CIL/GR facility be located at Camp Samae San. CINCPAC requested that CINCUSARPAC take immediate steps to establish the facility, and the Army Support Command had it ready for operation on 23 March.[1]

(S) The Commander of the JCRC visited the several Embassies from which support for the JCRC effort was considered essential. He found them all "most receptive" and well aware of the importance of the JCRC mission. It appeared, however, that the Ambassadors had not received positive guidance on the support required. CINCPAC, therefore, recommended that the State and Defense Departments jointly issue a statement clearly delineating the JCRC and Embassy roles in casualty resolution. Such a message was sent on 17 March to the Ambassadors in Vientiane, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh. It outlined the mission and organization of the JCRC and noted that the JCRC plan had adequate flexibility to adjust to any negotiated authorities. The Joint Table of Distribution for the JCRC was described: a headquarters/command element, a recovery detachment of U.S. personnel (with authorization to employ indigenous-hire personnel as required to conduct detailed ground searches), a launch unit to coordinate air support and provide crash site investigators, and the CIL with a pool of graves registration specialists for "on call" inspections. The projected area of operations, it was noted, much of which was in highly remote areas without roads or trails, heavily booby trapped, and with unexploded ordnance, required highly trained persons to lead the searches. These were to be U.S. military, U.S. civil service, or U.S. civilians on contract, in descending priority depending on international agreements.. Recovery detachment teams "should include indigenous-hire personnel recruited, trained, and maintained in each country of interest with the cooperation of the host governments." In remote areas operations would normally include methodical air and ground searches for crash sites. In more inhabited areas, personal contact with the local people would be the primary technique.

(S) These operations would be conducted under authorities resulting from agreements made in the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, or other "appropriate agreements in the case of Laos and Cambodia." The Ambassadors were instructed to perform the following tasks in close coordination with JCRC representatives:

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1. CDRUSARSUPTHAI 070340Z, 151055Z Feb and 061000Z Mar 73; USMACTHAI 020045Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 022216Z Mar 73.

> ...Make clear to host governments the peaceful and humanitarian nature of the JCRC mission, emphasizing the flexibility possible to meet local conditions. Embassies should stress that operations of the JCRC will be entirely open and above board, with no ulterior military purpose whatsoever. Sole reason for JCRC operations is peaceful, humanitarian responsibility for casualty resolution.
>
> ...Prepare to act on behalf of JCRC in communications with host governments, recruiting appropriate local personnel, and publicizing JCRC public information and reward programs....[1]

(S) On 26 March COMUSSAG advised CINCPAC of a requirement to have explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) elements immediately responsive to JCRC needs. The concept for operations, he noted, called for a capability to examine and clear crash or grave sites of booby traps and unexpended munitions, primarily aviation ordnance. In support of this concept, EOD personnel were to be positioned at two or three forward operating bases so as to be quickly available to field teams. He outlined his specific requirements and CINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF to be prepared to provide this support.[2]

(C) Early in May CINCPAC proposed that the 5119 plan be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN to provide adequate field distribution. The JCS approved this request after a number of modifications to update the plan, stress the humanitarian aspects of the mission, and avoid use of terms that might be objectionable or misunderstood.[3]

(U) On 9 May CINCPAC advised that the unclassified nickname "BRIGHT LIGHT," which had been assigned to the MACV Special Collection Program for prisoners of war, was to be used to identify the JCRC data file and the collection and transmission of data concerning U.S. and allied personnel in prisoner of war, missing, and deceased (body not recovered) status. Data concerning the possible location of such personnel, to include PW camps, aircraft crash sites, and grave sites would be so identified.[4]

(S) On 26 May COMUSSAG/JCRC called to CINCPAC's attention the deficiencies in the data base on which JCRC operations were to be based. At the time of its activation the JCRC acquired the records of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center.

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1. CINCPAC 261936Z Feb 73; SECSTATE 049782/1/170059Z Mar 73.
2. COMUSSAG 260111Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 270239Z Mar 73.
3. CINCPAC 040350Z May 73; JCS 8287/221429Z May 73.
4. CINCPAC 090155Z May 73.

"Since that time continuous and intensive efforts have been made to correct deficiencies in the records. The premise that JPRC records were reasonably complete and accurate was erroneous." This, it was explained, was principally because the JPRC mission had been dissimilar to that of the JCRC and the data required was thus different. He cited a number of examples and continued that if the JCRC was to conduct operations with a reasonable chance of success, "it is imperative that we begin from a data base that is as complete and as accurate as possible." He requested that the Services be tasked to conduct a comprehensive one-time survey to provide the JCRC with all data on each case for all missing and body-not-recovered personnel. He further requested that the Defense Intelligence Agency be similarly tasked regarding civilians. He listed a number of specific kinds of information required.[1]

(C) The Chief of Naval Personnel replied that missing information should be requested on a case-by-case basis because much of the data had already been furnished and some was not available.[2]

(U) In November CINCPAC commented on information available as it pertained to next of kin. The majority of those returning from Southeast Asia reported that they were particularly impressed with a visit to the JCRC. Subsequent actions by several of them, however, had emphasized the lack of casualty data reconciliation between the JCRC and the Services. CINCPAC remarked that this had been a continuing problem since the inception of the JCRC. He noted that his and higher headquarters should continue efforts to dissuade visits by next of kin, but that should such visits occur, primary emphasis at the JCRC should be on the operational capabilities of the unit. Although the JCRC should intensify efforts to reconcile casualty data, it was questionable that this data could be, or should be, complete at the JCRC. "We must adhere strictly to the policy that the Services are the principal source of info furnished NOK[next of kin]." CINCPAC noted that he would request that the JCS task the Services to provide casualty office representatives to accompany any next of kin on future visits.[3]

(S) The whole subject of next of kin visits had been raised by the JCRC Commander in March, who anticipated increased inquiries as project HOMECOMING ended. He asked for definitive guidance. CINCPAC advised that existing procedures were considered appropriate. All requests for information were to be referred to the appropriate Service with the information that the JCRC was an investigative organization providing evidence to the Services for their decisions on the status of the missing. He recommended initiation and coordination of

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1. COMUSSAG/JCRC 260440Z May 73.
2. CHNAVPERS 081740Z Jun 73.
3. CINCPAC 051943Z Nov 73.

an information program of the type used for HOMECOMING to keep next of kin advised and to discourage their visits. The JCS commented on CINCPAC's response on 16 March, noting that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services concurred, except that the remark about the Services making decisions about the status of the missing was to be changed to show the JCRC provided all information it secured to the Services "for such action as they deem appropriate." The need for an information program to keep next of kin advised and discourage their visits was recognized; the Services and the Office of the Secretary were initiating such actions.[1]

(U) As CINCPAC passed this revised guidance to the JCRC, he noted that it was becoming quite clear that as the casualty resolution effort unfolded there would be new developments concerning this as well as other areas that necessitated modification or clarification of procedures. He encouraged continuing recommendations from the Commander of the JCRC and the individual Services.[2]

(C) CINCPAC became somewhat involved in special equipment requirements under study by the JCRC. On 13 March COMUSSAG advised CINCPAC that he had learned from the Aeronautical Systems Division of the Air Force at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base of a number of airborne sensor systems that could be used for crash site locations and that could save time and reduce risks associated with the JCRC mission. He asked CINCPAC to inform the JCS of the possible employment of systems and combinations of systems such as SANFRAD, INFRAD, HAVE INK, radiometers, and magnetometers in order for the JCS, CINCPAC, USSAG, and the JCRC to evaluate their potential to assist the JCRC mission. CINCPAC asked each of his components to nominate individuals familiar with Service sensor systems for a visit and brief of the USSAG/JCRC. The Army declined to send a representative, listing an evaluation of projects that might have been applicable to JCRC use, but noting that these systems were considered deficient for the purposes at hand. The Navy and Air Force provided briefings.[3]

(C) The matter of reporting the activities of the JCRC was addressed by CINCPAC on 3 April. He requested that the JCRC initiate a weekly status report to arrive at CINCPAC headquarters on Mondays. The report was to concern the strength and readiness of the JCRC, and be terminated when a longer range study of these matters was completed. In addition CINCPAC requested an update of a number of statistics as they occurred, such as the total crash sites to be located and inspected and the status of personnel whose status was under study, by country.[4]

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1. CDR JCRC 120636Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 142141Z Mar 73; JCS 8867/162315Z Mar 73.
2. CINCPAC 172146Z Mar 73.
3. COMUSSAG 131020Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 132150Z Mar 73; CINCUSARPAC 220503Z Mar 73; ASD WPAFB 211615Z Mar 73; COMSEVENTHFLT 311006Z Mar 73.
4. CINCPAC 030526Z Apr 73.

(S) The reporting system that had been established during the developmental phase of the JCRC came under continuing review. On 13 September CINCPAC advised that because of the political and military sensitivity of JCRC activities, and the close monitoring they received in Washington and by CINCPAC, it was necessary to reappraise the reporting system to insure it was accurate, comprehensive, and responsive. He recommended certain changes, and after a further exchange, issued revised reporting procedures and formats. Situation reports were to be submitted during the conduct of field operations as significant events occurred with an operations summary on completion of each field operation. Monthly statistical summaries were also required.[1]

(S) The U.S. Army [redacted] Thailand [redacted] who among other things provided support for the JCRC, came under study in 1973 following a May proposal by the U.S. Ambassador in Bangkok to reduce the number of such forces from the authorized level [redacted] These forces were to be used for training [redacted] Units, as they had in the past, and "constituting JCRC during the next six months." COMUSMACTHAI, however, envisioned a minimum of 100 personnel for those two missions, exclusive of support and command personnel. He wanted to request that the Ambassador reconsider. CINCPAC agreed, noting that as JCRC operations increased in tempo, additional training would be required; [redacted] augmentation requirements already included up to [redacted] teams and [redacted] He did not believe a reduction of [redacted] strength was desirable for the foreseeable future, but would review the situation periodically with a view to reduction when it was desirable. COMUSMACTHAI advised CINCPAC on 12 July that his office had prepared an estimate of [redacted] strength requirements for the Ambassador, who was expected to continue pressure to reduce the forces. Then on 25 July he advised CINCPAC that reduction of the force by approximately one-third was realistic in view of existing and anticipated MACTHAI missions. He was most anxious, however, to insure that all pertinent CINCPAC considerations were included in final mission assignment. If his estimate was not acceptable, he required CINCPAC assistance in providing justification for maintaining the existing [redacted] strength.[2]

(S) CINCPAC sought ways to better utilize the [redacted] He noted that the reductions in their training commitments had taken place as a result of the Lao cease-fire and completion of Cambodian [redacted] training, but that the contingency nature of their assignments under CONPLANS 5100 and 5119 were less effective in supporting unit retention in Thailand. He offered two proposals, one that [redacted] personnel of the JCRC field teams be provided by [redacted] and that the [redacted] be placed under the operational

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1. CINCPAC 130157Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 300210Z Oct 73.
2. COMUSMACTHAI 160540Z May 73; CINCPAC 192147Z May 73; COMUSMACTHAI 120250Z Jul 73; J321 HistSum which cited COMUSMACTHAI 250955Z Jul 73 (BOM).

control of CINCUSARPAC as was its parent, the [redacted] Command, less operational control, would remain with the U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand. CINCUSARPAC considered these alternatives in his reply of 22 August. He also recommended that COMUSMACTHAI discuss the requirements of U.S. Army and PACOM force structure, forward basing requirements, and contingency plans (including the General War Plan and CINCPAC CONPLANS 5100 and 5119) with the Ambassador in Bangkok in an effort to maintain USASFT at its present strength in Thailand. The Commander of the JCRC commented on CINCPAC's proposals, noting that transfer of spaces from the JCRC to [redacted] would adversely affect the mission of the JCRC. The existing status of the search teams being an integral part of the JCRC was the most desirable to accomplish his mission. "Jeopardizing the smooth and tested structural and operational concepts of JCRC is not desirable." He noted that COMUSSAG/7AF concurred.[1]

(S) The matter continued under study. On 3 December COMUSMACTHAI advised that the Ambassador again commented on CONPLAN 5119, which tasked MACTHAI to be prepared to augment the JCRC with up to [redacted] of [redacted] men each within 48 hours notice, plus augmentation by [redacted] teams. The Ambassador considered this requirement excessive in view of existing and anticipated JCRC operations; he requested that MACTHAI inform CINCPAC of his view that tasking for [redacted] augmentation should be reduced by about [redacted] CINCPAC replied that the JCRC planned to reduce organic field teams from [redacted] because of the level of operations, but this placed increasing reliance on MACTHAI augmentation. The high level of Congressional and State and Defense Department interest in obtaining access to areas denied the JCRC, the Government's obligation to the next of kin, and uncertainty surrounding the extent of future JCRC operations "make it imperative that we do derogate overall JCRC capabilities at this time. Consequently, this headquarters does not intend to reduce MACTHAI tasking under CINCPAC CONPLAN 5119 in the near future."[2]

(C) At-sea casualty resolution also came under considerable study in 1973. Although the idea held promise and the Navy's Supervisor of Salvage had an impressive record of offshore search and recovery missions in the period 1966-73, this effort proved costly and virtually ineffective. The difficulties that were encountered had been anticipated. In high speed crashes at sea, high performance jet aircraft and their occupants normally disintegrated on impact. Pieces of human remains were, for the most part, devoured by sea creatures. Aircraft pieces larger than three feet by three feet were uncommon. The majority of at-sea missing were imprecisely located, the best information often being last reported position. In areas of high wartime activity the sea bottom

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1. CINCPAC 040246Z Aug 73; CINCUSARPAC 220006Z Aug 73; CDR JCRC 150625Z Aug 73.
2. MACTHAI 030308Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 062219Z Dec 73.

was littered with debris from nearly a decade of war. In any case, the JCS advised that discussions with the Supervisor of Salvage indicated a capability to support the JCRC effort.[1]

(C) CINCPACFLT provided a concept of operations on 5 June. Casualty recovery operations were to be conducted by commercial assets utilizing existing contracts held by the U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage (who was under the Commander, Naval Systems Command). Recovery operations were to be directed by a representative of the supervisor who was operationally responsive to the JCRC. Contractor assets were deployed from the Continental United States by airlift. The initial search phase was to be approximately 6 weeks inside the 30-fathom curve off shore in the vicinity of Hue-Danang. CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT to conduct the operations on 6 June. Operations began on 10 July. By 15 August the operations had covered 48 square miles. Search contacts had not been successful and it had already cost $522,000.[2]

(C) The JCRC advised that if CINCPAC funded and directed further operations, he would interpose no objection, but considering costs and results, he recommended that the operations terminate on 21 August. CINCPACFLT concurred. CINCPAC outlined the results of the effort to the JCS on 17 August, recommending that the operations terminate on 21 August, but recognizing, however, that there might be overriding considerations at the Washington level that precluded cessation of the operations. The JCS directed that the operations continue, at least through 25 August to permit time for additional coordination in Washington. The JCS advised that there were considerations that required continuation of the program. They directed it be continued until the onset of the Northeast Monsoon when, in the judgment of CINCPAC continuation became impractical, or until 30 September, whichever came sooner. CINCPAC passed these instructions to CINCPACFLT, requesting also that he evaluate the operations within 30 days of their termination. On 1 October the Commander of Task Unit 73.4.1 advised that they had commenced demobilization of at-sea operations. All operations had terminated on 29 September. The JCRC had requested that they be allowed to add comments to the after action report before it was submitted, but the task unit commander forwarded a copy to CINCPACFLT without going through the JCRC. CINCPAC requested that CINCPACFLT delay submission of the report pending JCRC comments. This was done. The JCRC commander concluded his remarks:

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1. J321 Point Paper, 25 Jul 73, Subj: At-sea casualty resolution activities (U); JCS 8605/122242Z Apr 73; CINCPACFLT 051440Z Jun 73.
2. CINCPACFLT 051440Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 060036Z Jun 73; CDR JCRC 150700Z Aug 73.

> ...Concur that the at-sea CR operation made a positive attempt to locate and resolve crash sites at sea. Considering the cost ($830,000), time (82 days), and results (bone fragments from one crash site) I strongly recommend that future at sea CR operations not be conducted.[1]

(C) One other such effort involved LCU-63, which had capsized with 10 Army personnel who were listed as killed in action, body not recovered. On 11 June CINCPAC had directed CINCPACFLT to begin the survey operation. By late July the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation had developed a plan involving the use of shoring and cribbing to dig out an area around the wreck to expose the sides and bottom of the hull. Work was expected to take 2 months and cost $200,000. The original search in 1971, however, was believed to have been as thorough as would be possible, and the Commander of Task Force 73 recommended no further search. CINCPACFLT and the USSAG/JCRC agreed, so on 8 August CINCPAC directed that any further search or salvage efforts on LCU-63 be discontinued.[2]

(S) Meanwhile, the search on the ground continued. The first casualty resolution operation had been conducted on 7 May. By early October, 11 such operations had been conducted with 21 remains recovered (7 positively identified and 4 tentatively identified; 5 were identified as Asian Mongoloid). Personal items and numerous aircraft parts had also been recovered.[3]

(U) Throughout these recovery operations the United States carried on an information and rewards program. These subjects, as well as public affairs aspects of the operations are discussed in the Plans chapter of this History.

(S) Despite the well-publicized nature of these operations and their humanitarian nature, a JCRC team was ambushed on 15 December. On a site well prepared and marked with "international orange" strips, highly visible, three helicopters were attacked in Gia Dinh Province by B-40 rockets and small arms fire. Of the 13 U.S. personnel and 12 Vietnamese, 1 U.S. person was killed in action and 4 wounded (one seriously); 1 Vietnamese was killed and 3 wounded. The dead American was the ground commander. After being knocked to the ground in the rocket attack, he stood up and raised his hands to indicate that he was unarmed. He was cut down by enemy fire. Both the North Vietnamese Government

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1. CDR JCRC 150700Z Aug 73; CINCPACFLT 170233Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 170308Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 172322Z Aug 73; JCS 5274/291835Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 010326Z Sep 73; CTU 73.4.1 010315Z Oct; CDR JCRC 030930Z Oct 73; CDR JCRC 180325Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 141903Z Nov 73 .
2. COMUSSAG JCRC 301000Z May 73; CINCPAC 112344Z Jun 73; CTF 73 280635Z Jul 73; CINCPACFLT 042202Z Aug 73; USSAG/JCRC 050815Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 080149Z Aug 73.
3. J318 Point Paper, 5 Oct 73, Subj: Joint Casualty Resolution Center (U).

and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the RVN (the Viet Cong) had been notified of the time and intent of this mission. At a subsequent meeting of the Four-Party Joint Military Team this notification was cited, as was the fact that the search had proceeded on the two days before the day of the attack. The Communists, however, continued their intransigent line and called the use of aircraft with Joint Military Commission markings a "wrong act" taking advantage of the markings "for your own business."[1]

Southeast Asia Naval Operations

(S) On 27 January an internationally supervised cease-fire in the RVN and Demilitarized Zone was instituted. The JCS directed that U.S. Forces discontinue all acts of force in North and South Vietnam. All airstrikes, artillery fire, and naval bombardment were ordered terminated as well as other fire or munitions expenditures including mines and destructors. The JCS directed the withdrawal of all naval surface forces in the Gulf of Tonkin south of 16°50'N, except ships required for Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone (PIRAZ), search and rescue, or notification line operations. Units with such duty, plus underway replenishment units, as necessary, were authorized to continue operations in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin as required for search and rescue operations and for implementation of minefield notification procedures in accord with existing Notices to Airmen. (Mine countermeasures instructions were to be promulgated separately and would take precedence over restrictions imposed in this directive.) The JCS noted that nothing in the restrictions furnished should be construed as preventing any commander from taking such action as might be necessary to defend his command; in the event of an attack against U.S. installations or forces, the minimum force necessary to protect the forces under attack was authorized. No naval gunfire was to be initiated in the cease-fire area or against North Vietnamese ships or watercraft of any type except in accordance with the guidance for self-defense, just discussed.[2]

(C) On 27 January the JCS promulgated basic Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces after 272359Z January.[3]

(S) After JCS authorization, on 26 January CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to take action to reduce the emergency evacuation commitment to the level of one Amphibious Ready Group/Battalion Landing Team (ARG/BLT) in order that the necessary amphibious ships would be made available to conduct mine clearing operations in the END SWEEP program (discussed in detail in this section), and

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1. DAO Saigon 151030Z Dec 73; CH USDEL FPJMT Saigon 181030Z Dec 73.
2. JCS/NMCC RED ROCKET ONE 240456Z Jan 73.
3. J3B42 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 9912/272703Z Jan 73 (BOM).

to sail four minesweepers from Subic Bay on 27 January as a first step in the execution of END SWEEP. On 31 January CINCPAC further directed CINCPACFLT to reconstitute non-Airborne Mine Countermeasures-designated amphibious forces into an ARG/BLT as soon as operationally feasible for emergency evacuation contingency operations in Military Region I. When ready for sea, CINCPACFLT was to sail the ARG/BLT to the vicinity of MR I and assume a 12-hour readiness posture until the situation stabilized. Authority to commit the ARG/BLT for emergency evacuation operations was delegated to COMUSMACV. Once evacuation plans had been implemented, the Commander Amphibious Force or Commander Landing Force was authorized by the JCS to use supporting fire power as required. By 13 February COMUSMACV stated that the 12-hour alert was no longer required and CINCPAC directed that they stand down and assume a 120-hour reaction time to the RVN coast for contingency operations, as required.[1]

(TS) There were attendant reductions in carrier strength following the cease-fire. On 5 February, on the authority of the JCS, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to cancel the scheduled deployment of USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43). USS MIDWAY (CVA-41) and USS AMERICA (CVA-66) departed the PACOM on 23 February and 5 March, respectively, without relief. CINCPACFLT was directed to redeploy proportionate numbers of escort and support units with each carrier, keeping in mind the requirements for END SWEEP operations. The redeployments reduced 7th Fleet carriers from six to four. CINCPAC, accordingly, directed that the carrier on-line posture in the Gulf of Tonkin be reduced from four to three, with the fourth available within 48 hours.[2]

(TS) On 17 February CINCPAC recommended approval of a CINCPACFLT request to further reduce the carrier on-line posture from three to two. The JCS replied, "Until such time as an effective cease-fire in Laos is realized it is necessary to maintain adequate CVA support for air operations in Laos. Accordingly two CVA's must be kept on station for this purpose." They continued that they had no objection to reducing the posture to two carriers provided the requirements for the END SWEEP support carrier could be fulfilled by other means. The overall attack carrier posture was to be reassessed after the termination of hostilities in Laos. (The termination of all U.S. acts of force in Laos was directed effective 220500Z February.)[3]

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1. CJCS 8458/260001Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 260035Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 311710Z Jan 73; J3B42 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 9906/270657Z Jan 73 (BOM); J3B42 HistSum Feb 73, which cited COMUSMACV 131110Z Feb 73 (BOM); CINCPAC 140157Z Feb 73.
2. JCS 8374/051456Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 052151Z Feb 73; J3B42 HistSum Feb 73, which cited CINCPAC 052219Z Feb 73 and JCS 8688/052139Z Feb 73 (both BOM).
3. CINCPACFLT 130505Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 170014Z Feb 73; JCS 4914/182048Z Feb 73.

(TS) Thus, on 5 March, the JCS authorized the following posture for attack aircraft carriers:

> a. One CVA on station on ready alert, prepared to provide rapid contingency response to requirements for air operations as requested by COMUSSAG.
>
> b. Second CVA on station provide logistic support for END SWEEP forces while at the same time remaining on a 4-6 hour notice to provide additional response as requested by COMUSSAG.
>
> c. At least one of the two CVAs not on station will be maintained on a 48 hour reaction time to respond to contingency requirements in SEA.

CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to adopt this posture, and the number of carriers on station in the Gulf of Tonkin was reduced from three to two.[1]

(TS) On 7 March CINCPAC requested authority to plan for a reduction in carriers from four to three about mid-March, with one CVA on station in the Gulf of Tonkin to provide contingency air strikes as required within four hours of notification and also logistic support to END SWEEP forces, one on 96-hour reaction time to respond to contingencies in Southeast Asia as required, and one in upkeep status. The JCS, however, disapproved this request in light of the potentially volatile situation still existing in Southeast Asia.[2]

(S) On 22 April CINCPAC authorized CINCPACFLT to reduce the Gulf of Tonkin posture from three to two carriers upon withdrawal of the END SWEEP task force. At least one of the two CVAs not on station was to be maintained on a 48-hour reaction time to respond to contingencies in Southeast Asia.[3]

(S) In order to permit routine employment of U.S. forces in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, and thus accustom the North Vietnamese to U.S. presence, CINCPAC authorized CINCPACFLT at the end of April to operate carrier task forces, PIRAZ, search and rescue, and Mobile Logistic Support Force (MLSF) ships in the northern Gulf. CVA task forces and MLSF support ships were to operate at random intervals as far north as 19°N, with aircraft authorized to

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1. JCS 8735/051745Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 052000Z Mar 73.
2. J3B41 HistSum Mar 73, which cited CINCPAC 070325Z Mar 73 and JCS 2600/080027Z Mar 73 (both BOM).
3. CINCPAC 221550Z Apr 73; J3B4(A) HistSum Apr 74, which cited JCS 8507/221505Z Apr 73 (BOM).

operate to 20°30'N. PIRAZ and search and rescue units were to be positioned as required for forewarning and support.[1]

(TS) On 25 May the JCS authorized the reduction in the carrier level in the Western Pacific area from four to three, effective immediately. At the reduced level, one carrier was to be maintained on station in the Gulf of Tonkin and one maintained in 96-hour readiness for recall. The readiness posture of the third carrier could be relaxed to permit required upkeep or operations as directed.[2]

(TS) POWDER HORN was the name of an aerial mining campaign plan to re-close seven major ports in North Vietnam and certain resupply anchorages using carriers to implant 382 mines and 2,016 destructors. The ordnance was stored on carriers, but late in September CINCPACFLT cited the existing political-military situation when he requested that the mines be put in normal storage in the Philippines. Maintaining the weapons on the ships was also costly; periodic battery changes cost approximately $40,000 plus 2,000 man hours. The mines could be returned to the advanced configuration, if necessary, in seven days. CINCPAC and the JCS both concurred and authority was granted to store the mines ashore at Subic Bay.[3]

Mine Countermeasures--Operation END SWEEP

(TS) Even as the United States had been mining the harbors of North Vietnam late in 1972, plans had begun to counter the mining by U.S. Forces. In January 1973 the nickname for the plan for clearing the mines was changed from FORMATION SENTRY II to END SWEEP. On 25 January CINCPAC, on authority of the JCS, had directed CINCPACFLT to continue the transit from Pearl Harbor to the Western Pacific of the three West Coast-based Ocean Minesweepers (MSO) that had deployed in early December 1972. At this time, also, the restrictions that had been imposed on the assembly, testing, and towing of airborne mine countermeasures (AMCM) sweep gear were removed and authority was granted to conduct AMCM training using the sweep gear as required. The JCS asked that they be kept advised of END SWEEP training and readiness.[4]

(U) The Agreement of Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam, signed at Paris by the United States and North Vietnam, stated:

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1. J3B4(A) HistSum Apr 73, which cited JCS 4194/271328Z Apr 73 and CINCPACFLT 250945Z Apr 73 (both BOM); CINCPAC 251917Z Apr 73.
2. J3B41 HistSum May 73, which cited JCS 2807/252154Z May 73 (EX).
3. CINCPACFLT 250505Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 251812Z Sep 73; JCS 8488/262241Z Sep 73.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 192-195; JCS 6913/241522Z Jan 73; JCS 7572/250110Z Jan 73; JCS 7579/250115Z Jan 73.

> ...A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Vietnam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on January 27, 1973.
>
> At the same hour, the United States will stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by ground, air and naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of North Vietnam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect.[1]

(S) On 25 January the JCS directed execution of Operation END SWEEP effective 272359Z January. In the guidance they provided, the JCS noted that the safety of mine countermeasures (MCM) forces was the paramount consideration. They directed that all possible precautions be taken to minimize North Vietnamese civilian casualties. Clearance of the major ports was to be accomplished to a level of 99 percent. The JCS advised that additional specific MCM negotiations information would be provided as it became available. A daily situation report was to be submitted by the on-scene commander by FLASH precedence. CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to execute the END SWEEP plan at 272359Z January.[2]

(S) On 26 January CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to sail four MSOs from Subic Bay (in the Philippines) toward the Gulf of Tonkin on 27 January as a first step in execution of END SWEEP. On 30 January CINCPAC was advised by the JCS that events had developed that made it necessary to commence coastal minesweeping operations with the MSOs as soon as feasible and not later than 9 February. Because North Vietnam had been previously advised at the Paris meetings that four MSOs were enroute from Subic Bay and would arrive in the vicinity of Haiphong on or about 3 February, a starting date for initial operations could not be delayed much beyond 3 February. Additional constraints on the initial MSO operations were that the area selected should be other than the Haiphong channel or its approaches, should provide high visibility to North Vietnam, and should show some results (detonations) during sweeping. CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to commence initial MSO operations at the earliest feasible date and not later than 9 February, subject to establishment of mutually agreeable conditions with the North Vietnamese. (The Commander of Task Force 78 was the

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1. Copy of extract of Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam attached to J5352 Point Paper, 22 Jun 73, Subj: End Sweep Forces (U).
2. J3B42 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 8280/251705Z Jan 73 (BOM); CINCPAC 251931Z Jan 73.

chief negotiator with the Vietnamese.) CINCPAC further directed that if liaison with North Vietnam was to be conducted off-shore, it was preferred that the meeting be arranged aboard a U.S. ship other than an MSO. No North Vietnamese were to be permitted on board U.S. ships actively engaged in sweep operations.[1]

(U) CINCPAC had maintained a Mine Warfare Analysis (MIWA) computerized data base that provided accurate and up-to-date information about the date the mines were planted, their location and condition, sterilization settings, and the status of MK-36 destructors and MK-52 mines seeded in North Vietnam coastal waters and estuaries. This had been used in connection with POCKET MONEY, the mine delivery program, and was used again in END SWEEP. Copies of this data base were furnished to CINCPACFLT, who in turn provided them to the END SWEEP task force commander; the data base also provided information to CINCPAC and his staff.[2]

(TS) On 1 February CINCPAC again issued guidance to CINCPACFLT based on that which he had received from the JCS. He directed CINCPACFLT to commence MSO precursor exploratory sweeping of the Haiphong LPH/LPD operating area instead of minefield segment 2111D, as previously directed. These operations were not to commence until establishment of mutually agreeable conditions with the North Vietnamese, but it was essential that they begin not later than 9 February. Should the MSOs complete sweeping of this Haiphong operating area prior to arrival of the AMCM units (expected about 26 February), the MSOs could commence check sweeping operations along the approaches to minefield segments 2100 and 2101A (the approaches to Haiphong Channel) while remaining well clear of Haiphong Channel proper. On 7 February USS ENGAGE (MSO-433) began initial operations in the LPH/LPD anchorage area to prepare holding areas for END SWEEP forces. Also about this time CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to sail two more MSOs to augment END SWEEP.[3]

(S) On 24 February CINCPACFLT reported that surface and airborne MCM forces were ready to execute END SWEEP operations in all respects. On 25 February CINCPAC directed him to proceed with airborne MCM operations and wished "every success to the Navy-Marine team on this historic first." On 27 February a Task Force 78 (as the END SWEEP force was designated) helicopter, towing a train

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1. J3B42 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 3538/301519Z Jan 73 (BOM); CINCPAC 310001Z Jan 73.
2. J30S11 HistSum Feb 73.
3. J3B42 HistSum Feb 73, which cited JCS 5927/011751Z Feb 73 and JCS 8364/132005Z Feb 73 (both BOM); CINCPAC 012110Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 132321Z Feb 73. An LPH was an amphibious assault ship, an LPD an amphibious transport dock.

of three minesweeping devices, made the first aerial sweep of the Haiphong main ship channel. The devices, magnetic orange pipes (MOPs), were towed down the channel for 10 miles and then circled around and swept back out of the channel. There were no detonations.[1]

(TS) On one occasion the operations were ordered temporarily suspended by the JCS because of delays in the prisoner of war release schedule. This suspension occurred on 27 February and operations were not resumed until 3 March.[2]

(TS) Operations were again suspended on 16 April as a result of repeated violations of the Paris agreements and forces were directed to get underway as soon as possible after first light on 17 April and proceed to a holding point south of 17°N. On 22 April they were directed to depart for Subic Bay, but Task Force 78 was to maintain sufficient forces from the operational group and the airborne and surface MCM groups to sortie within 48 hours from Subic Bay and resume sweeping operations. On 11 May this response time was extended to 72 hours, and port visits other than Subic Bay were authorized provided readiness was maintained to resume airborne MCM in the Haiphong area within five days of a signal to do so.[3]

(S) The forces remained under these instructions until 13 June, when the Chairman of the JCS directed that they be ready to sortie not later than 72 hours after receipt of instructions to do so and to be prepared to resume END SWEEP operations.[4]

(S) On 16 June additional END SWEEP guidance was provided by the JCS and CINCPAC, in turn, to CINCPACFLT, to become effective when END SWEEP negotiations resumed. Once again they cited that the safety of personnel, ships, and equipment was of primary importance. U.S. positions were to be firmly adhered to, even in the face of threats by the North Vietnamese to accuse the United States of non-compliance with the protocol and the joint communique signed in Paris on 13 June. Under no circumstances was it to be stated that the United States had 100 percent confidence of clearance of any mined field or area. The 13 June communique stated that the United States would resume mine clearance operations within five days from the date of the communique and shall "successfully com-

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1. CINCPACFLT 242014Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 250117Z Feb 73; CTF 78 271252Z Feb 73.
2. J3B42 HistSum Feb 73, which cited CJCS 3889/271859Z Feb 73 (BOM); JCS 9698/020307Z Mar 73; JCS 6670/020912Z Mar 73; JCS 7881/031842Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 031931Z Mar 73.
3. J3B4(A) HistSum Apr 73, which cited JCS 2636/161952Z Apr 73 and JCS 8490/221413Z Apr 73 (both BOM); CINCPAC 112034Z May 73; JCS 7713/111202Z May 73.
4. J313 HistSum Jun 73, which cited CJCS 7782/131515Z Jun 73 (BOM).

plete those operations within thirty days thereafter." Accordingly, the coastal MCM operations had to be completed within 35 days after 13 June. The estimated number of days required for the completion of each port or clearly designated section of a port as well as coastal areas could be provided North Vietnam.

(S) Authority was granted to provide North Vietnam with the numbers of mines laid, their locations, the dates of drops, and the fact that all pre-set sterilization/self-destruction dates had elapsed. Render-safe procedures for the Destructor MK-36 had already been provided to the North Vietnamese in Haiphong in addition to certain technical information on the MK-52 mine and the MK-36 that had been provided to the Vietnamese in Paris. No additional technical information concerning the MK-52 or MK-36 was to be provided to the North Vietnamese. The intent of certain guidance was to withhold information of a purely intelligence nature, but to provide information in order to assist the North Vietnamese in conducting the inland waterways operations.

(S) It was directed that the subject of detecting, locating, marking, deactivating, destructing, or removing mines and destructors not be raised with the Vietnamese by U.S. negotiators, but that if the Vietnamese raised the subject, the following instructions applied. After completion of mine clearing operations in each area and since sterilization or self-destruction dates had passed, the United States would deal with unexploded mines or destructors as follows. For MK-36 destructors, if there was a reasonable certainty on the part of the United States that a definitely located object in the inland waterways was in fact an unexploded MK-36, the United States would provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) advice only, on a case-by-case basis. If the unexploded MK-36 was discovered in a coastal waterway, it would be destroyed, removed, deactivated, or marked, as appropriate, by U.S. Forces. For MK-52 mines, subsequent to the completion of successful transits of MSS-2 (special minesweeping devices) and the receipt of certain information from the North Vietnamese, a reasonable effort was to be made to locate unexploded MK-52 mines in the Haiphong main shipping channel by using MSO mine hunting sonar, the C-MK1 shadow graph, and such other available assets as the Commander of Task Force 78 might be authorized to employ. EOD divers were not to be used at that time, however. The type of information that was needed from North Vietnam in order to determine an estimate of the number of unexploded MK-52 mines remaining was the number and approximate location of mines from the drops of 9 May, 16 August, and 16 December that landed in the channel and outside the channel, the number removed from the channel, and the number in the channel that were swept or otherwise exploded, or that self-destructed.

(S) Upon locating the suspected unexploded MK-52 mines, the locations were to be marked. A decision was then to be reached as to whether an attempt would be made to remove or destroy the suspected unexploded mines after the total

number of suspected unexploded MK-52s that could be located had been determined and the mines marked, and after a recommended course of action and a proposed plan had been received by the Chairman of the JCS. It was anticipated at that time that these actions would be carried out only as long as U.S. personnel were engaged in coastal and/or inland waterway MCM operations.

(S) Operations in inland waterways, the JCS directed, should be conducted by the North Vietnamese with the least feasible number of U.S. personnel involved for the shortest feasible period and with a minimum amount of U.S. supplied equipment. Negotiations were to be based initially on the expectation that all U.S. ships, aircraft, and personnel would depart North Vietnam upon completion of the coastal MCM operations. The JCS requested that they be advised, with any recommendations, if attainment of agreement along this line appeared infeasible.

(S) Again quoting from the joint communique, "The United States shall supply to the DRV means which are agreed to be adequate and sufficient for sweeping mines in rivers." In view of this provision, the JCS advised, authority was granted to negotiate with the DRV representatives concerning the types and amount of equipment to be supplied to the DRV for the sweeping of mines in rivers. It was noted that the term "rivers" as used in the joint communique was to be regarded as synonymous with the term "inland waterways" used in the January 1973 Protocol. The JCS granted authority to loan to the North Vietnamese bulldozers, trucks, remote control boat systems, and associated equipment, some of which was already in place. As negotiations continued, recommendations were to be submitted to the JCS regarding additional types and quantities of equipment, if any, that would be required to attain the mutual agreement cited in the communique. No commitment to provide additional equipment was to be made until so authorized by the Chairman of the JCS.

(S) Regarding announcements on the progress and completion of MCM operations, the joint communique stated that the United States would announce when mine clearance in each main channel was completed and issue a final announcement when all operations were completed. The JCS authorized the separate announcements, but anticipated that on conclusion of coastal MCM operations, the announcement would be made from Washington, the final decision being dictated by existing conditions.[1]

(S) Regarding support forces for END SWEEP, on 17 June CINCPAC approved a CINCPACFLT request to operate attack carrier task forces (CVA), as well as Mobile Logistics Support Force ships in the northern Gulf of Tonkin as might

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1. J313 HistSum Jun 73, which cited JCS 1875/161549Z Jun 73 (BOM); CINCPAC 162048Z Jun 73.

be required. (The carrier, its destroyer escorts, and all PACFLT aircraft not involved in END SWEEP were to remain at least 12 nautical miles from the coast of North Vietnam, 25 miles from Hainan Island and the Chinese border, and south of 20°30'N.)[1]

(S) On 19 June the Commander Task Force 78 reported that minesweeping operations had resumed; on 26 June END SWEEP operations were completed in Haiphong, Cam Pha, and Hon Gai.[2]

(S) On 18 July the JCS directed CINCPAC to instruct the Commander of Task Force 78 to advise the appropriate North Vietnamese official, in private audience, that U.S. mine clearance operations had been completed and that mine clearance forces would depart North Vietnamese waters at sunset on 18 July. No written statement was to be given to any North Vietnamese official on this matter. On 20 July the JCS advised that with that 18 July announcement to the North Vietnamese representative, END SWEEP was considered terminated and CINCPAC was authorized to revert all task force assets to normal operational control. The Chairman of the JCS said:

> ...(U) The tasks demanded by END SWEEP were sensitive, arduous, and extremely time consuming. They were watched closely by highest authority and at all times reflected credit on US armed forces. My personal well done to the members of the Task Force Seventy Eight team.[3]

(U) This operation had marked the first time in U.S. Navy history that airborne MCM had been employed against actual mines in an operational situation. More than 5,000 men, 25 ships, and 40 aircraft of various types were directly or indirectly involved.[4]

MARKET TIME

(S) Operations to detect and prevent waterborne logistic craft from infiltrating into the RVN were called MARKET TIME. With the cease-fire planning, the JCS had requested that CINCPAC review MARKET TIME operations. CINCPAC did so on 2 February, and also 30 days after the cease-fire. He advised the JCS that in the first 23 days of the cease-fire there had been over 3,500 violations, of which 75 had involved Vietnamese Navy (VNN) forces. The initial VNN response

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1. Ibid., which cited CINCPACFLT 162245Z Jun and CINCPAC 171850Z Jun 73 (both BOM).
2. Ibid., which cited CTF 192307Z and 261412Z Jun 73 (both BOM).
3. JCS 7483/180302Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 180334Z Jul 73; JCS 9948/201405Z Jul 73.
4. J35 HistSum Nov 73.

to the cease-fire had been to send to sea all blue water ships capable of sailing. As many as 14 out of 17 had been deployed at one time. By early March an average of 10 operated off the RVN coast daily, an increase of 25 percent in the tempo of VNN operations. The ships served as a blocking force at the 17th Parallel, provided Naval gunfire support for ARVN forces, and patrolled the five outer barrier stations covering the highest infiltration threat areas. CINCPAC listed significant incidents and events since his earlier assessment. He also commented on the capability of the RVNAF to detect and neutralize seaborne infiltration. He noted that it would be difficult to determine the eventual impact of the cease-fire protocols on VNN coastal surveillance operations until the number of cease-fire violations showed a substantial drop and coastal surveillance operations returned to normal.[1]

(S) In the matter of MARKET TIME air operations, on 7 August CINCPAC proposed a realignment of USN participation because of a continuing lack of evidence concerning infiltration trawler activity into the RVN and U.S. manpower and fiscal restraints. He recommended that Ocean Surveillance Air Patrol coverage in the South China Sea, including coverage in the MARKET TIME area, be reduced from 900 flight hours to 500 hours per month with a capability maintained to surge as required to meet MARKET TIME contingencies. The JCS concurred on 28 September.[2]

Escorts for Mekong River Convoys

(S) With the anticipated termination of U.S. military activity in Indo-China effective 15 August, the JCS inquired about the use of Inshore Patrol Craft (PCF) from Cambodian coastal partol areas to Mekong River convoy duty for added protection of convoys. Cambodian maritime forces principally used the River Patrol Boat (PBR) for this type of activity. They had 47 PBRs on the Mekong, with an additional 16 scheduled to arrive early in 1974. Convoy escorts normally consisted of 8 to 10 PBRs, 3 to 4 Armored Troops Carriers (ATC), and 1 to 2 Monitors/River Minesweepers/Patrol Minesweepers (MON/MSM/MSR). PBRs were also used for port security and as support for other Mekong operations.

(S) On 9 August CINCPAC asked COMUSSAG, the DAO in Saigon, and the Chief of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia about the use of PCFs for river duty. COMUSSAG replied that it was feasible to transfer a portion of the 20 PCFs operating along the coast line. He noted that the speed of the PCF would tend to complement the capabilities of the PBR, but that the PBR was more maneuverable, had a lower silhouette, had armor protection, and was less suscep-

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1. CINCPAC 031801Z Mar 73, which also cited CINCPAC 020144Z Feb 73.
2. CINCPAC 072320Z Aug 73; JCS 1246/281619Z Sep 73.

tible to battle damage because of its fiberglass hull compared to the aluminum hull of the PCF. COMUSSAG noted that the Mekong River was "by far" the most important line of communication in Cambodia. "Effective security along this LOC is one of the critical factors that will determine whether the GKR can survive. Unacceptable political, economic and military implications are associated with a prolonged enemy interdiction of the Mekong River." In view of this, COMUSSAG said he supported any initiative that had a potential for providing greater security on the Mekong for convoys. The transfer of sufficient PCFs appeared to offer the possibility of substantial improvement in security and he recommended that the Defense Attache in Phnom Penh be authorized to explore this matter with the Cambodian Army (FANK) general staff.[1]

(S) The MEDTC Chief, however, did not intend to recommend Cambodian use of PCFs for the convoy duty. He noted that with the cessation of U.S. tactical air cover for the convoys, he considered that the addition of more lightly armored and armed escorts would not significantly enhance security. He believed that heavily armored and armed craft, such as Monitors, ATCs, MSRs, and Assault Support Patrol Boats (ASPB) were needed to substitute for U.S. air. For this reason, he said, he had requested expedited delivery of two Monitors and two ATCs.[2]

(S) CINCPACFLT noted that it was considered that adequate protection of a river convoy in a heavy combat environment required troops to provide bank security, sufficient air support and escort craft to suppress hostile fire, and coordinated command and control over these forces. Should one or more of those factors be lacking or be ineffectively employed, the task of convoy protection became increasingly difficult. In considering PCFs for employment, he said, it should be recognized that they were substantially more vulnerable to enemy fire than the PBRs, Monitors, and ATCs that were being used and that the vulnerability would increase appreciably in the absence of adequate air cover. He believed, however, that the use of the PCFs should be further explored.[3]

(S) CINCPAC's reply to the JCS noted that no one queried had indicated that a major problem would exist in the physical transfer of the PCFs to augment Mekong convoy escort duties. He furnished the information that had been provided by CINCPACFLT, however, regarding the vulnerability of the PCFs to enemy fire compared to the PBR, and the appreciable increase in such vulnerability in the absence of adequate air cover. The PCF did have the capability to be em-

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1. USSAG 110920Z Aug 73.
2. CHMEDTC 8422/131357Z Aug 73.
3. CINCPACFLT 170521Z Aug 73.

ployed as a river convoy escort for use in coordination with other Cambodian forces, and the importance of the Mekong suggested that the possible use of the PCFs be explored with the Cambodians.[1]

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1. CINCPAC 180211Z Aug 73.

SECTION II--RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES

PACOM Assumption of Alaskan Command PARPRO Responsibilities

(S) CINCPAC was to assume certain responsibilities in the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) that had been the responsibility of the Alaskan Command as a result of changes to the Unified Command Plan that had become effective 1 January 1972. A number of delays had been encountered, however, in communications requirements and CINCPAC had asked CINCAL to retain the PARPRO support functions until adequate communications were established. The development of communications suitable to allow adequate coordination between PARPRO participants in Alaska and the 5th Air Force, the PACOM PARPRO coordinator, were considered fundamental to CINCPAC's capability to assume the ALCOM support functions. Development of a teletype net and an off-hook AUTOVON (automatic voice network) had been requested and approved by the JCS. The secure-teletype net had been completed in August 1972, but high distortion had been encountered. Tests continued, but it was determined that CINCPAC should wait for completion of the back-up off-hook AUTOVON net to assume complete PARPRO responsibilities. At the end of 1972 the completion of the net had been estimated for 1 April 1973.[1]

(S) Air Force funding problems were encountered, however, and the estimated completion date was postponed. The Air Force Chief of Staff, because of severe cutbacks of funds, had decreed that no new AUTOVON service would be installed prior to 1 July without specific permission from him.[2]

(S) Meanwhile, CINCPAC drafted a document that detailed responsibilities and coordination procedures for support of PARPRO in the Northern PACOM area. The provisions of the document were concurred in (with their recommended revisions incorporated) by the Strategic Air Command, the National Security Agency Central Security Service, the U.S. Air Force Special Security Service, CINC Alaskan Command, and CINCPACFLT. The document was published and distributed on 1 July.[3]

(U) The CINCAL took a personal interest in expediting completion, according to CINCPAC's Liaison Officer, and was instrumental in cutting through red tape that threatened major additional delays in completing communications channels.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 36-37.
2. J621 HistSum Feb 73; Memo, CINCPAC Liaison Officer to CINCAL to CINCPAC Chief of Staff, 8 Mar 73, Items of Interest for February.
3. J314 HistSum Jul 73, which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser 000167 of 1 Jul 73 (FRINGE BARON).
4. Memorandums on Items of Interest to the CINCPAC Chief of Staff from CINCPAC Liaison Officer to CINCAL 9 Jul 73 and 9 Aug 73.

(U) The AUTOVON network was activated on 1 July. A CINCPAC team went to Alaska to test the FRINGE BARON procedures and communications during the period 2 - 15 July after promulgating the plan for these tests. The systems were viable. In consequence, CINCPAC notified the JCS and CINCAL of his assumption of all PARPRO support functions in the PACOM north of 49° North latitude as of 200001Z Jul 73. CINCPAC at the same time advised CINCAL that he greatly appreciated the outstanding cooperation and support of all concerned during communications installation and testing.[1]

Southeast Asia Reconnaissance

(TS) With the cease-fire in Vietnam a number of tactical reconnaissance restrictions were imposed in Southeast Asia. These are discussed by program.

BLUE TREE

(TS) The JCS directed that CINCPAC temporarily suspend all offensive operations against North Vietnam effective 151500Z Jan 73. Reconnaissance operations over North Vietnam were restricted to [redacted] and GIANT SCALE (SR-71) missions. Effective 272359Z Jan 73 the JCS prohibited all reconnaissance over North Vietnam and its claimed territorial waters.[2]

YANKEE TEAM

(TS) Reconnaissance aircraft were authorized to operate in Laos with armed escort and flak suppression as required, except in BARREL ROLL NORTH or within 5 kilometers of known or suspected [redacted] positions in BARREL ROLL EAST or WEST, unless approved by the JCS. (A map of the BARREL ROLL operating areas is in the CINCPAC Command History 1970, Volume II, page 167.) SR-71 [redacted] aircraft were authorized to operate to within 10 nautical miles of the People's [redacted] all other platforms were to maintain a closest-point-of-approach of 25 nautical miles from the [redacted] border.[3]

FACE VALUE

(TS) Effective 290001Z January the 7th Air Force restricted overflight of Cambodia by all U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. Any exception to this restriction was to be approved by the 7th Air Force.[4]

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1. J6123 HistSum Jul 73; CINCPAC 200010Z Jul 73.
2. J3B57 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 150356Z Jan 73 and 270657Z Jan 73 (both EX).
3. Ibid., which cited JCS 270657Z Jan 73 (EX).
4. Ibid., which cited 7AF 280555Z Jan 73 (BOM).

OAK TRAIL

(TS) Air reconnaissance operations, [redacted] were authorized throughout the RVN as required. After final withdrawal of U.S. personnel, surveillance operations over the RVN were to be conducted only when appropriately cleared by the Government of the RVN.[1]

ACRP

(TS) The Southeast Asia Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program (TS) (ACRP) schedule remained unchanged following the cease-fire. On 31 January CINCPAC requested that CINCPACAF reassess the military and political risk to [redacted] Gulf of Tonkin operations. CINCPACAF assessed that political risk was low and military risk moderate, providing that a closest-point-of-approach of 50 nautical miles to North Vietnam and 19 nautical miles from Ile Bac Long (island) was maintained. CINCPAC also requested that CINCSAC re-evaluate the Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP) requirement in view of the new risk assessment. CINCSAC concurred and deleted the BARCAP requirement for [redacted] operations in the Gulf. A new [redacted] track was established in the Gulf of Tonkin for daily coverage.[2]

(TS) Subsequently, on 25 February, the VQ-1 Detachment at Danang was relocated to the Naval Air Station at Cubi Point in the Philippines. As a result of this redeployment (and the cease-fire) a revised Southeast Asia ACRP schedule was implemented on 3 March. The revised schedule released VQ-1 from providing daily 4-hour ACRP coverage, reduced [redacted] sorties from 40 to 30 a month, and continued [redacted] and [redacted] missions at 30 and 60 sorties per month respectively. The released VQ-1 assets reverted to Commander Seventh Fleet for direct support.[3]

(TS) As a result of increased Southeast Asia requirements, however, the ACRP schedule was again revised and implemented on 24 March. The revision increased [redacted] sorties from 30 to 40 a month. [redacted] and [redacted] collection rates remained unchanged at 30 and 60 respectively.[4]

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1. Ibid., which cited JCS 270657Z Jan 73, JCS/NMCC 240456Z Jan 73, and COMUSMACV 250317Z Jan 73 (all EX).
2. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 310409Z Jan 73, CINCPAC 272150Z Jan 73, CINCPACAF 310230Z Jan 73, and CINCPAC 312240Z Jan 73 (all BOM).
3. FAIRRECONRONONE 250730Z Feb 73; J3B510 HistSum Mar 73, which cited CINCPAC 011702Z Mar 73 (BOM).
4. J3B510 HistSum Mar 73, which cited CINCPAC 230305Z Mar 73 (BOM).

(TS) Gulf of Tonkin reconnaissance operations came under study later in the year. On 17 August CINCPAC was asked to provide the JCS with information concerning the applicability of using guidance concerning the [redacted] which was contained in part in SM-700 and SM-701 of 1968. CINCPAC asked his air and naval components, the 5th Air Force (the PACOM coordinator of [redacted] operations), and the National Security Agency, Central Security Service Pacific. All agreed that the [redacted] rules should be extended to include Gulf of Tonkin operations. CINCPAC's recommendation was forwarded to the JCS on 7 September. He stated that Gulf of Tonkin reconnaissance operations such as [redacted] and [redacted] programs could be effectively employed under [redacted] and therefore should be placed under the purview of the SM 700/701 memorandum guidance. CINCPAC had not been advised of any decision by the end of 1973.[1]

Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF)

(TS) Army ARDF assets in the RVN at the cease-fire consisted of 27 RU-8 aircraft located at Can Tho and 14 RU/JU-21 aircraft located at Danang. The RU-8s began their standdown on 28 January for departure from the RVN on 17 February. The RU/JU-21 aircraft were directed by COMUSMACV to continue operations in Military Region I, the Demilitarized Zone, and the Laotian panhandle until 17 February; they were withdrawn from the RVN by 9 March.

(TS) USAF ARDF assets consisted of 17 EC-47s at Nakhon Phanom and 5 at Ubon in Thailand, and 10 at Danang in the RVN. The 10 at Danang were scheduled to be turned over to the Vietnamese Air Force on 1 February, but this transfer was delayed until 18 February to gain maximum intelligence during the first 20 days of the cease-fire.[2]

Paracel Islands Surveillance

(S) In 1973 CINCPACFLT and CINCPAC reviewed the situation involving the 12 nautical mile closest-point-of-approach (CPA) restriction applied to airborne surveillance of the Paracel Islands and recommended that it be modified, but this was not accomplished by the end of the year. Some background information on the islands, as it was furnished in CINCPACFLT's recommendation, is included here.

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1. OJCS 172359Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 212205Z Aug 73; CINCPACFLT 252115Z Aug 73; CINCPACAF 280320Z Aug 73; 5th AF 280640Z Aug 73; J314 HistSum Dec 73, which cited NCPAC 310201Z Aug 73 (BOM); and CINCPAC 070230Z Sep 73.
2. J3B57 HistSum Jan 73, which cited NSACSS 292206Z Jan 73 and DIRNSA 271519Z Jan 73 (both BOM).


Paracel Islands
16°30'
112°
112°30'
17°
16° 30'
16°
North Reef
Tree
West Sand
AMPHITRITE GROUP
Rocky
Woody
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
Lincoln
Pyramid Rock
Pattle
Robert
Money
Drummond
Duncan
CRESCENT GROUP
Vuladdore Reef
Discovery Reef
Passu Keah
Bombay Reef
Triton
0 10 20 30 Nautical Miles
0 10 20 30 Statute Miles
111°30'
112°
112°30'

(S) The Geneva Convention of 1958 on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone provided that an island was a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, that was above water at high tide. The Convention further stated that a low-tide elevation was a naturally-formed area of land that was surrounded by and above water at low tide, but that was submerged at high tide, and that where a low-tide elevation was situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation might be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. While the United States did not formally recognize territorial seas of a breadth greater than 3 miles, the existing 12-mile CPA restriction regarding the Paracels suggested that it was not intended to contest breadths of 12 miles or less. Using 12 miles as the breadth of the territorial seas in the Paracels, several discrete geographic entities could be identified:

(1) The Amphitrite Group, including Lincoln and Woody Islands and Pyramid Rock.

(2) The Crescent Group, including Pattle, Duncan, Robert, Money, and Drummond Islands and extended by low-tide elevations of Discovery Reef, Vuladore Reef, and Passu Keah.

(3) Triton Island.

(4) North Reef.

(5) Bombay Reef.

As conservatively interpreted, a 12-mile CPA envelope surrounding those entities, constructed in accordance with the territorial sea and contiguous zone convention, included over 4,800 square miles (or just over 4,300 square miles if Bombay and North Reefs were excluded).

(S) Over the years there had been some conflicting ownership claims. France had erected a lighthouse and established a garrison on Pattle Island in 1937. Following World War II, claims asserted by the Japanese during the war had been renounced by the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, and France again placed troops on Pattle Island and reestablished its meteorological station. The station, and its small garrison, came under South Vietnamese control in 1956. More recently, the number of Chinese and South Vietnamese on the Paracels had increased and development of the islands had expanded. The following de facto division of the islands had continued since the mid-1960's: Chinese occupation of the Amphitrite Group, Lincoln Island, and North Reef, and South Vietnamese occupation of the Crescent Group.

(S) In 1973 RVN Armed Forces were stationed on the five main islands of the Crescent Group. These forces had been strengthened in 1970 and 1971. Additionally, South Vietnamese commercial phosphate workers were on Pattle and Robert Islands. (The islands contained important phosphate (guano) deposits.)

(S) Chinese occupation of the northern Paracels began in 1955 when 250 civilians were sent to Woody Island to exploit its guano deposits. In 1958 a fishing fleet of 40 ocean-going vessels, manned by 400 crewmen, began to operate from the island. A dozen buildings, apparently associated with the guano diggings, had been built on the northwest coast of Lincoln Island; garrisons manned by small troop contingents had been established on North Reef and Lincoln Island; and a military command post had been established on Woody Island. A weather station, radar sites, a radio station, a power station, and some (probably) antiaircraft artillery sites had been constructed on Woody Island; an early warning radar system was in situation on Lincoln Island; and communications antennae had been erected on Rocky Island and North Reef.

(S) CINCPACFLT noted that a review of Chinese Communist serious warnings issued during 1971 and 1972 tended to confirm the de facto division of the Paracels between the Chinese and the South Vietnamese. He was not aware of any serious warnings issued to protest U.S. surveillance or reconnaissance operations other than in the vicinity of the Amphitrite Group. In view of this, it appeared reasonable to him to recommend that the 12-mile CPA restriction be applied only to the Amphitrite Group and to the North Reef, an area of about 1,700 square miles. He considered that to continue to restrict, unilaterally, surveillance activity in portions of the Paracels other than the Amphitrite Group and North Reef imposed an unnecessary and unreasonable constraint upon freedom of the seas and the operational flexibility required to carry out effective infiltration trawler surveillance and other activities. Further, the restriction--the existence of which was clearly obvious to the Chinese--could be construed as tacit recognition of the validity of Chinese claims to the entire Paracel Archipelago, which might operate to the detriment of claims by the Government of the RVN.[1]

(S) On 8 January CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the existing 12-mile restriction applied to air surveillance of the Paracel Islands be modified to include only the Amphitrite Group, including Lincoln Island and Pyramid Rock, and the North Reef. By the end of 1973, however, CINCPAC had not been advised of any change to the restriction.[2]

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1. CINCPACFLT 280601Z Dec 72.
2. CINCPAC 082131Z Jan 73.

HULA HOOP

(S) French nuclear testing in the vicinity of the Tuamotu Archipelago had become a regular summer event in the PACOM. The long-range program for U.S. reconnaissance of those tests was called NICE DOG. Each season's tests, however, also had a nickname and in 1973 the surface aspects of the tests were called HULA HOOP. On 20 March the JCS informed CINCPAC that the tests were expected to begin about 20 July, providing an opportunity to accumulate data not otherwise available. The JCS requested that CINCPAC provide administrative support to the Defense Nuclear Agency's (DNA) Joint Project Office (DJPO) established for the HULA HOOP operations, and provide operational control of and support for the surface collection platform, USNS WHEELING (T-AGM-8), which was called POCK MARK. Other data collection platforms assigned to HULA HOOP were a KC-135 and an NC-135, but these were under the operational control of CINCSAC.[1]

(S) In anticipation of the testing, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT with operational control and a support plan for WHEELING, a search and rescue plan for the SAC aircraft utilizing WHEELING, a plan for utilizing WHEELING as a communications relay platform for the SAC aircraft, and a joint communications plan to support all units involved in HULA HOOP. CINCPAC requested that CINCPACAF provide administrative support similar to that provided for the 1972 program (DIAL FLOWER) to the DJPO.[2]

(S) CINCPAC subsequently approved a request by the Commander of the Pacific Missile Range at Point Mugu, California to present a HULA HOOP briefing to the civilian crew of USNS WHEELING. The briefing, which was presented early in June, covered the following thoughts:

> ...USNS WHEELING has been assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an essential observation platform to acquire important data from foreign atmospheric nuclear tests to be conducted this spring in the South Pacific Ocean area. WHEELING has been selected for this task due to the modern equipment installed and availability of space for additional instrumentation. A deployment of about 60 days is presently planned with an in-port period at Honolulu included.
>
> ...While the presence of WHEELING in the test area will be known by the foreign power conducting the tests, the U.S.

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1. JCS 2723/201821Z Mar 73.
2. CINCPAC 282220Z Mar 73.

Government will make no announcement of the ship's position or mission. For this reason, the mission of WHEELING must be considered as classified information, and not be discussed at any time while off ship.

...Positioning of WHEELING to acquire the needed data has been carefully determined with the safety of embarked personnel the primary concern. Blast, heat and radiation were each considered in detail to assure that the safety of personnel will not be jeopardized. Knowledge of each effect has been acquired over many years from U.S. tests of much larger magnitude than WHEELING is expected to observe. At the ship's position, blast effects will be detected as a loud retort accompanied by a slight jolt and followed by a noticeable wind (maximum 18 knots). Thermal output will be detected as a slight warming of the skin by topside personnel. No nuclear radiation will be experienced because of the ship's upwind position.[1]

(S) On 18 May the JCS advised that the Director of the DNA had been informed that fleet ship assets were not available to support augmentation of the basic HULA HOOP program with a radar transmission experiment. The use of USNS CORPUS CHRISTI BAY (T-ARVH-1) was offered as a suitable replacement and the DNA Director determined that it was acceptable to meet surface ship support requirements. The JCS requested that fleet SH-3A helicopter assets and required maintenance support be provided to support the radar transmission experiment. Accordingly, on 19 May CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to provide these helicopters to assure continuous availability of two operational units during the test period.[2]

(S) On 30 June CINCPAC informed the JCS that the HULA HOOP Technical Coordination Plan for 1973 had been reviewed as requested. The technical content and platform positioning graphics contained in the plan were considered operationally feasible and acceptable. The ship's tracks were listed.[3]

(S) On 11 July the JCS issued an alert and execute message. They advised that approval had been granted for NICE DOG/HULA HOOP 1973 operations. A series of four nuclear test detonations was expected to be conducted by France on or about 20-25 July and 20-25 August at the Mururoa Atoll South Pacific test site.

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1. CINCPAC 112216Z Apr 72.
2. JCS 5610/182045Z May 73; CINCPAC 190303Z May 73.
3. CINCPAC 302021Z Jun 73.

Data collection tasking was as follows. POCK MARK and USNS CORPUS CHRISTI BAY (nicknamed POT LUCK), with embarked SH-3A helicopters, were to utilize all sectors in the vicinity of the atoll with a closest-point-of-approach of 20 nautical miles to ground zero immediately prior to, during, and immediately after the detonations. The position the ships were to maintain in relationship to one another was outlined. All U.S. monitoring resources were to remain clear of the 12 nautical mile limit of French territorial waters at all times. The SAC aircraft bore the nickname BURNING LIGHT, as they had in previous years. The JCS requested that contingency withdrawal plans be prepared to meet the circumstance in which POCK MARK and/or POT LUCK were ordered out of their operating areas by the French, or in which the ships were asked to stop radiating.[1]

(S) CINCPAC passed the planning responsibilities to CINCPACFLT; CINCPAC subsequently approved the submitted plans for planning and execution, as appropriate. It was not necessary to execute these withdrawal plans, however.[2]

(S) The first French test was detonated on 21 July, the second on 28 July. All platforms were in position; there were no casualties to personnel or platforms. On 30 July the JCS authorized that the forces could stand down, at the discretion of CINCPAC, until the next series of tests was expected. On 31 July CINCPAC directed a standdown for other operations as required by CINCPACFLT, but all were to assume a 72-hour collection alert status by 16 August.[3]

(S) On 18 August the third test occurred, and another on 24 August. On 28 August they concluded a test of an air-dropped device. In this case POCK MARK was not on the proper heading for data collection because it was not equipped with air surveillance radar.[4]

(S) On 30 August the DNA advised that there were indications that the French planned to continue testing in September, possibly to include a high yield nuclear device, and on 1 September the JCS advised that approval had been granted to continue collection operations. The sixth and last detonation of the season was a safety test detonation on 13 September and CINCPAC directed all HULA HOOP forces to return to normal operations on 15 September. The commander of the task unit (CTU 30.2.6) forwarded his summary report on 23 September. He noted that this was the first time the operations had used two surface vessels and helicopters in close proximity to Mururoa, but that the unit's presence appeared to cause no adverse reactions by the French, possibly

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1. JCS 2314/112241Z Jul 73.
2. CINCPACFLT 142253Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 162341Z Jul 73.
3. CTU 30.2.6 211930Z Jul and 290030Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 310135Z Jul 73.
4. CTU 30.2.6 241925Z Aug and 281945Z Aug 73.

because of their being advised in advance of U.S. intentions by the Defense Attache. He recommended that this procedure be continued in future operations. He concluded:

> ...Many elements comprising this task unit were identified and assigned in such late time prior to deployment that no pre-sail opportunity for operational practice was possible although precise positioning and timing were essential. Operational plans and procedures were under continuing change and refinement as the mission progressed. The successes recorded in mission accomplishment are considered primarily the result of the professionalism, skill, imagination, and extreme motivation exhibited by numerous personnel embarked, and in the staffs and supporting commands ashore.[1]

PONY EXPRESS

[redacted]

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1. DNA 302036Z Aug 73; JCS 7253/010057Z Sep 73; CTU 30.2.6 131700Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 150035Z Sep 73; CTU 30.2.6 230515Z Sep 73.



1. CINCPAC 272220Z Jan 73.
2. Ibid; CINCPAC 272230Z Jan 73.





(S) The JCS, however, promulgated additional guidance for the conduct of operations during Mr. Brezhnev's visit. The JCS had placed temporary restric-

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1. CINCPAC 171845Z May 73.
2. CINCPAC 211842Z May 73.

tions on reconnaissance operations during the visit and advised that effective 11 June POLAR BEAR operations would not be conducted within 100 nautical miles of Soviet territory in the Northern Pacific from the Bering Strait to Japan, except where this 100-mile limit would fall east of the U.S.-Russian Convention Line of 1867. The revised TSP was 57°-20'N, 167°-00'E, which was approved during the 13-28 June operation. During transit to the TSP and during collection operations POLAR BEAR was directed to "not approach Soviet territory within 100 NM." On 9 June CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to comply with this guidance.[1]



1. JCS 4144/082223Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 090255Z Jun 73.
2. JCS 7241/122335Z Jun 73; JCS 1739/280638Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 280815Z Jun 73.
3. CINCPACAF 220306Z May 73; CINCPAC 120440Z Jun 73.



CIRCUIT GOLD Employment

(S) On 7 November CINCPACFLT announced the employment of a CIRCUIT GOLD aircraft to monitor units of the Soviet fleet. CIRCUIT GOLD was the nickname for Navy special multi-sensor P-3A aircraft. Two such aircraft were assigned to PACFLT and operated by Patrol Squadron Four (VP-4). During operations on 8 November Soviet naval units fired three white flares at the aircraft. (They had been operating within restrictions prescribed for all PACFLT aircraft, that is they were to maintain a closest-point-of-approach of 500 feet when below an altitude of 500 feet and a minimum overflight altitude of 500 feet.)[3]

(S) Because of this incident and the sensitive nature of the operations, CINCPAC directed that future CIRCUIT GOLD missions would require his approval and would be considered on a case-by-case basis consistent with the political situation and the anticipated intelligence gain. He noted that the existing political situation necessitated close control of such sensitive operations, and that the flare incidents, while not necessarily provocative, indicated a possible concern on the part of the Soviets. "Caution must be exercised by all U.S. Navy ocean surveillance units to avoid what might be considered harassing actions. Approval or denial of each mission would be based on an analysis of the existing political situation compared with the intelligence gain.[4]

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1. ADMIN COMTHIRDFLT 301802Z Jul 73; JCS 1191/232045Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 242335Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 281830Z Aug 73.
2. Reports of the test sightings were enclosed with J313 HistSums for Sep-Nov 73; CINCPACFLT 181148Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 181300Z Oct 73; JCS 2315/022117Z Nov 73; CTU 30.2.9 060800Z Nov 73.
3. CINCPACFLT 070757Z Nov 73; CTG 72.3 081010Z Nov 73.
4. CINCPAC 092315Z Nov 73.

(S) On 22 December CINCPAC determined that his review of individual operations was no longer necessary and he cancelled the requirement.[1]

1.3 (11) (4)

Air Sampling



(S) The 1959 emergency landing of an Atsugi-based U-2 on a glider airstrip at Fujisawa had received extensive press coverage and wide-ranging speculation regarding U-2 operations. Ensuing consultations between the Embassy and the Japanese Foreign Office resulted in the following statement released in Washington on 10 May 1960, "The U.S. Government has given GOJ assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have and will continue to be utilized only for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight purposes." In view of this informal understanding, there might be no necessity to initially inform the Japanese as to the nature of the U-2 operations, only that future flights, utilizing Japanese airspace, would be conducted in conformance with the 1960 understanding. COMUS Japan anticipated acute Japanese sensitivity in the matter of future U-2 use of Japanese airspace, however. He recommended that the AEDS and U-2 programs and requirements be treated as separate entities during initial discussions with the Japanese. He further recommended that the initial approach be low-key and that unless absolutely necessary no reference be made to U-2 air sampling capability or mission requirements. He recommended that the initial approach simply inform the Japanese that because of the phase down of WB-57 activities at Yokota, future missions would be flown on an infrequent basis by U-2 aircraft operating from U.S. bases in Korea. He recommended that we also give reassurances that in accordance with the 1960 understanding these aircraft would be used for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions.

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1. CINCPAC 220154Z Dec 73.

(S) In AEDS discussions with the Japanese, COMUS Japan recommended that the United States announce that it was prepared to provide technical guidance and assistance that would lead to development and improvement of JASDF air sampling techniques, in return for which we would hope that the Japanese would agree to provide the United States with some portion of the material collected. If they agreed to this arrangement, technical assistance could be provided through Mutual Defense Assistance Office channels. He noted that the United States should be prepared to brief the Japanese on U.S. aerial sampling operations and equipment only on a case-by-case basis and with specific Washington-level approval.[1]

(S) CINCPAC agreed with COMUS Japan and advised the JCS that he shared concern that the Ambassador in Tokyo had not been notified. He recommended that the JCS take action to apprise the State Department of the need for formally notifying the Ambassador of the air sampling program.[2]

[redacted]

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1. COMUS Japan 300706Z Nov 73.
2. CINCPAC 042059Z Dec 73.
3. JCS 3315/070040Z Dec 73.

SECTION III--EXERCISES

Exercise HIGH HEELS-73

(S) HIGH HEELS-73, conducted 7-17 March, was a JCS-sponsored world-wide command post exercise, the purpose of which was to exercise participants in command and control procedures in an environment of crisis buildup terminating in general war and execution of the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP). HIGH HEELS-73 was interfaced with the NATO WINTEX, conducted from 7 to 16 March. The HIGH HEELS exercise was conducted [redacted] A b (a 3)

(S) CINCPAC participation had been scheduled, but was cancelled because of the communications load imposed in the PACOM by the withdrawal of forces from the RVN and Operation HOMECOMING, the return of U.S. prisoners of war. In order to simulate PACOM participation, exercise messages were prepared and pre-positioned for injection at the appropriate time by a small control group at the Alternate Command Facility [redacted] Participation by CINCPAC's Intelligence Directorate had passed in November 1972 from the Plans and Policy Branch to the Target Intelligence Branch and that branch became responsible for providing representation on the PACOM Joint Exercise Control Group. It was this Intelligence element that prepared the daily summaries that would have been drafted by CINCPAC exercise players.[1]

Exercise JOLLY ROGER

(C) JOLLY ROGER was an annual PACOM-wide general war command post exercise designed to improve the overall general war readiness of the PACOM, ascertain discrepancies in existing plans and procedures, and prepare command center teams and planning group participation for the JCS-sponsored HIGH HEELS series of exercises. The 1972 exercise had been cancelled because of the situation in Southeast Asia. The 1973 exercise had been initially scheduled for late August, but this was subsequently postponed. By late October, when the exercise was to take place, an advanced state of readiness occurred in the real world with the outbreak of war in the Middle-East. Many procedures that JOLLY ROGER 73 had been designed to simulate were being addressed. Considering the world-wide situation, CINCPAC considered conduct of the exercise not prudent, and postponed it until

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1. J3COA HistSum Mar 73; JCS 5491/162134Z Aug 72; JCS 9100/222340Z Feb 73; J241 HistSum Feb 73.

sometime in the first quarter of 1974, so that the command would be better prepared to participate in the JCS-sponsored Exercise NICKEL PLATE, which was tentatively scheduled for May 1974. CINCPAC advised, "The work and effort which all have expended in preparation for JOLLY ROGER 73 is evident in the manner in which the current advanced readiness actions are being handled."[1]

(S) On 12 November COMUSMACTHAI questioned CINCPAC about certain responsibilities. During preparation for the JOLLY ROGER exercise, he said, it had become apparent while reviewing the operation plan and pertinent directives that the mission, responsibilities, and operational control of forces involved could extend well beyond normal daily functions. For example, he noted, COMUSMACTHAI could become the Commander U.S. Forces Southeast Asia (COMUSSEASIA) designate, or be assigned operational responsibility for the MACTHAI All-Source Intelligence Center (ASIC) area of responsibility. He noted that he had operational control normally over only three Thailand-based units: U.S. Army Support Command Thailand, U.S. Army Special Forces Thailand, and the 93d Psychological Operations Detachment. He believed that his mission and responsibilities should be delineated in order to determine the exercise data base and other reporting requirements in support of the exercise. As he had no operational control over most units in Thailand or elsewhere in the region, he had no authority to task the units to provide the data necessary to develop the logistics data base that might be required to support the exercise.[2]

(S) CINCPAC advised that he was not planning to exercise COMUSMACTHAI as COMUSSEASIA for JOLLY ROGER 74 nor the subsequent JCS-sponsored NICKEL PLATE 74 exercise. Future assignment of COMUSSEASIA responsibility was under study at CINCPAC's headquarters.[3]

(S) COMUSMACTHAI replied that in order to accomplish a realistic analysis of the logistic situation in Thailand, it was imperative that a country-wide real-world data base be developed. It appeared, he said, that other commands in Thailand submitted their data through Service channels, and the consolidation could only be accomplished at CINCPAC. He requested a copy of the individual data bases submitted or a consolidation and daily situation reports so that his command could keep abreast of the changing logistical situation in Thailand during the play of the exercise.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 228; CINCPAC 302116Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 260236Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 262051Z Oct 73; J6331 HistSum Oct 73.
2. COMUSMACTHAI 120919Z Nov 73.
3. CINCPAC 200425Z Nvo 73.
4. COMUSMACTHAI 210836Z Dec 73.

Peacetime Emergency Situation Exercises

(S) Two tests were conducted in the peacetime emergency situation exercise series in 1973. The series had begun in 1969 to test command, control, and communications procedures and to insure expeditious reaction to emergency situations as authorized in the Rules of Engagement and CINCPAC directives. The first of the 1973 exercises was FREEWAY SPEED, which was conducted on 20 February. This exercise portrayed the simulated mid-air collision of a BEGGAR HAWK aircraft (EP-3) and a Russian interceptor aircraft with the subsequent crash of the EP-3 in the Sea of Okhotsk. In the second exercise, FREEWAY TACKLE on 27 June, the scenario concerned the simulated shootdown of a Navy P-3 aircraft on a photo mission by MIG-17s in the vicinity of the Kuril Island Straits. In both exercises information pertaining to the incident was passed laterally and vertically in a timely manner to all commanders capable of support. Simualted reactions were timely and in accordance with existing Rules of Engagement. Utilization of the All-Source Information Center Communications (ASICOM) networks was satisfactory in all respects in both cases. Time sensitive information was passed expeditiously to command centers, permitting the free flow of information and enhancing the capability for prompt reporting within the PACOM.[1]

Exercise FREQUENT RIDER

(S) Exercises in the FREQUENT RIDER Program were conducted to exercise Command Center and augmentation personnel in procedures relating to rapid crisis buildup [redacted] in preparation for exercises in the JOLLY ROGER series. Participants were exercised in matters such as response to increased readiness conditions, emergency action procedures, continuity of operations, contingency plans, relocation plans and procedures [redacted] During October five such exercises were conducted and another was held on 9 November.[2]

Exercise FORECAST STORM

[redacted]

1. J3C212 HistSums Feb, Jun 73; CINCPAC 252145Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 130003Z Jun 73.
2. J333 HistSum Oct 73; J3321 HistSum Nov 73.

[redacted]

Command Relationships for Exercises in Taiwan

(S) On 16 June COMUSTDC requested clarification of command relationships for exercises PORT ARMS and VECTOR THRUST. He noted that the relationships varied between his headquarters and the 327th Air Division and U.S. Army Forces on Taiwan, and the Commander of Task Force 72 in Japan, according to the level of implementation of either CINCPAC's OPLAN 5025 or the bilateral plan, ROCHESter, and not necessarily related to CINCPAC's Instruction on the PACOM Alert System. He believed that command relationships during the two exercises described in the CINCPAC Instruction should be predetermined so that declaration authority and channels for reporting were known in advance by all participants. He noted that command relations with various other military activities on Taiwan were also uncertain for these exercise purposes. COMUSTDC authority as Single Senior Military Representative, he believed, seemed an inappropriate basis for requiring exercise participation and reporting by a number of commands and activities on Taiwan whose operational command chains by-passed COMUSTDC regardless of the level of plan implementation. He wanted to know which commands, if any, were to originate the declaration messages addressed to such activities and consolidate their reports, if this was required.[2]

(C) CINCPAC advised that COMUSTDC was responsible for declaring and reporting for his own headquarters only during the PORT ARMS and VECTOR THRUST exercises. All other units and agencies were to be alerted by and would report through Service channels. CINCPAC believed, however, that the other units and agencies on Taiwan should inform COMUSTDC of changes in or attainment of readiness posture, and his Instruction on the PACOM Alert System would be revised to reflect this guidance. If operational control changes occurred, COMUSTDC would declare and report the status of units that had come under his operational control. CINCPAC asked his components to request that their subordinate units keep COMUSTDC advised of changes in and attainment of readiness posture.[3]

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1. J3C2 HistSums Jan-Jun 73; J322 Hist Sum Aug 72.
2. COMUSTDC 160441Z Jun 73.
3. CINCPAC 232313Z Jun 73.

NUCLEAR SAFETY BRANCH

Exercise UGNAYAN

(S) Although the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty had been signed in 1952, the Mutual Defense Board established in May 1958, and the first bilateral plan published in 1965, it was not until May 1973 that the first combined Command Post Exercise (CPX) of the plan took place in Manila. The plan was general in nature and provided the basis for further detailed combined planning should an emergency arise. It was to be executed in the event of an external armed attack on the Philippines. There was no specific U.S. force commitment, and the plan envisioned U.S. air and naval support only. The Commander of U.S. Forces, Philippines was not to be designated until the nature of the support that would be required could be determined.

(S) The first exercise in the UGNAYAN series, UGNAYAN ALFA, was held 8-10 May at Nichols Air Base in Manila. It addressed questions of command, coordination, and communication within the exercise headquarters and the Joint/Combined Coordinating Center. U.S. agencies represented by participants or observers included the U.S. Embassy in Manila, the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines, the 13th Air Force, and CINCPAC. The exercise confirmed the need for follow-on exercises.[1]

Exercise FREEDOM TORCH

(S) Exercise FREEDOM TORCH, which had been scheduled to be held in Korea 11-17 February was to test Readiness Command, Military Airlift Command, and CINCPAC rapid reaction plans and to provide experience and training in air mobility. Major participants were to have been one airborne infantry battalion, airlift support from the Military Airlift Command, and PACAF tactical fighter support. In December 1972, during required Country Team coordination, the U.S. Ambassador had recommended that the exercise be cancelled. He cited the fact that the ROK was in the midst of negotiations with the North Koreans as well as in the process of establishing a new political structure internally. The Ambassador believed that in the existing situation there was no need for a demonstration of U.S. deployment capacity, and the exercise, he believed, could adversely affect movement towards the U.S. objective of detente on the peninsula. "The airlifting and the paradrop of a U.S. battalion is inherently dramatic and would receive wide publicity. It would be provocative to North Korea and would be politically inappropriate in the current state of South-North contacts." He continued that since talks had begun the United States had maintained delib-

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1. J5163 Point Papers, 22 Mar 73, Subj: PHIL/U.S. Mutual Defense Board (MDB) OPLAN 1-70, and 31 May 73, Subj: U.S./Philippine Command Post Exercise (CPX) UGNAYAN.

erately an unobtrusive, low-key military posture to avoid any misunderstanding or misrepresentation of our desire to facilitate progress, and we should continue to do so. The Ambassador, after "strongly" recommending cancellation, advised that he would continue to examine each military exercise planned in the future and consider its desirability from the U.S. standpoint. As a general rule, he concluded, we should be particularly restrained when the exercise involved bringing in forces from outside Korea (as in the case of FREEDOM TORCH) and under lesser constraints when it involved forces in place.[1]

(C) COMUS Korea, noting that the exercise had become a political question, accepted the Ambassador's assessment. CINCPAC did also, and recommended that the exercise be cancelled.[2]

(S) The JCS, however, advised that they were giving consideration to postponing the exercise instead of cancelling it. They asked for CINCPAC's recommendations, and CINCPAC queried COMUS Korea, whose reply noted that the planned drop zone for the exercise was almost entirely farm land (rice paddies). If the exercise were postponed until the second quarter of 1973, active cultivation would be in progress and the exercise would result in dike and crop damage. After the last two FREEDOM TORCH exercises it had been recommended that they be conducted between 1 November and the end of February because of increased rain and flooding after that time and rice paddy preparation. The exercise, then scheduled for mid-February, could be delayed for approximately two weeks, he said, but no later because of ground conditions. On 12 January the JCS advised that the exercise would not be conducted as originally scheduled. A dialogue continued regarding rescheduling the exercise and the subject was expanded to include discussions of all exercises involving movement of U.S. troops into Korea or Japan, but most of this discussion was in State Department channels.[3]

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1. J3B13 Point Paper, 15 Jan 73, Subj: Exercise FREEDOM TORCH: AMEMB Seoul 6984/050838Z Dec 72.
2. COMUS Korea 070613Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 080153Z Dec 72.
3. JCS 6060/271922Z Dec 72; COMUS Korea 030146Z Jan 73; J3B13 Point Paper, 15 Jan 73, Subj: Exercise FREEDOM TORCH, which cited JCS 3903/122059Z Jan 73.

SECTION IV--RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Joint Research and Development Objectives Document

(U) The Joint Research and Development Objectives Document (JRDOD) was the device by which the JCS translated the broad strategic guidance concerning operational requirements of long-range strategic studies and the strategic concept, force level objectives, and functional area requirements of the Joint Strategic Operations Plan into research and development (R&D) objectives. CINCPAC had submitted his annual recommendations for inclusion in this document in September 1972; the published JRDOD for Fiscal Years 1975-92, received in February 1973, revealed that CINCPAC's R&D objectives had been well supported by the JCS.[1]

(S) CINCPAC submitted his recommendations and comments for the next edition of the JRDOD on 18 September 1973. CINCPAC recommended that the JRDOD be modified to highlight the urgency of the need for improved countermeasures to neutralize both the SA-7 and the more effective infrared systems that could be anticipated in the future. The priorities that could be indicated by contributors were, in descending importance, Critical, High Priority, and Priority. In matters of surveillance (undersea, ocean, and space), CINCPAC raised the requirement priority to "critical." He advised that this change was based on the requirement for immediate response with limited military assets to any act of aggression against the United States or its allies originating in the PACOM area of responsibility. "It is imperative that the location, and the movement and intent insofar as possible, of a potential enemy be known at all times."

(S) CINCPAC added two new logistics requirements in the functional area of combat support and combat service support. One concerned aerial resupply. The R&D objective was to develop an aerial resupply system to deliver supplies on small target areas despite weather, terrain, or restrictions imposed by the enemy air defense environment. He advised that Southeast Asia experience reflected a number of inadequacies in the systems used: inaccuracies in hitting small drop zones; excessive damage to material dropped (particularly high explosive ammunition); damage due to malfunctions within each system such as streamers, early openings, and rigging/packing failures. He also noted that a glider system recently developed was considered too "weight-limited" and expensive to meet broad resupply requirements. A second logistics requirement was to develop a means to discharge a containership where there were no improved port facilities. He explained that in time of peace military containerized cargoes were handled

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1. J34 HistSum Feb 73.

in advanced design commercial terminals located on the major trade routes in countries where trade and commerce were routine. In a wartime environment, however, available military terminal facilities had not been built to accomodate areas where commercial terminals might be denied.

(C) CINCPAC also advised that he was studying the extent of outside assistance necessary to define his future command, control, communications, and computer requirements. He anticipated that the requirements would be confined to the application of concepts of total system engineering to the PACOM command and control function, using state-of-the-art systems. If R&D requirements surfaced, however, he would include them in his next JRDOD submission.

(C) The JCS had asked for comments on the usefulness of a portion of the JRDOD that provided background information on the priority objectives and identified other problem areas that did not justify the assignment of priorities. CINCPAC believed that wide distribution of this part of the JRDOD among all Service R&D people could result in knowledge of complete or partial solutions already available, or perhaps R&D personnel might identify relatively low cost solutions to some of these lower priority problems. CINCPAC concluded that he "strongly" supported the JRDOD and would provide additional information or other assistance, as requested, to insure its productiveness.[1]

Annual Review of Reasearch Projects and Systems Analysis

(U) By Defense Department directive, unified commanders were required to review, at least annually, the status of projects conducted in the theater by the Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). In 1973 in the PACOM this review was expanded to include not only ARPA projects but research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts, operations research/systems analysis (OR/SA) activities, and certain other studies in which CINCPAC had an interest.

(U) The review was held at CINCPAC's headquarters on 5 and 6 February. Briefers were from ARPA field units in Saigon and Seoul and Military Assistance agencies in Thailand, Korea, and the Republic of China. Briefings on the OR/SA effort were presented by representatives from China and Korea. There were also briefers from the Navy Science Advisory Office and the Army Behavioral Research Team, both located in Korea.

(C) During an executive session, the ARPA Director provided an overview of ARPA activities and discussed with CINCPAC flag and general officers projects

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 001149, 18 Sep 73, Subj: Review of the Joint Research and Development Objectives Document for FY 1975 through 1992 (JRDOD FY 75-92) and Recommendations for the Development of JRDOD FY 76-93 (U).

of common interest. CINCPAC tabled two proposals in which ARPA could provide assistance to the PACOM. The first was scientific and engineering assistance to determine future command, control, communications, and automatic data processing requirements at the unified command level. The second was to analyze intelligence requirements, organization, assets, procedures, and training in order to recommend improvements. In this regard, also, to study intelligence operations to recommend measures for effective civic and military counteractions to guerrilla warfare.

(U) The review was particularly valuable as it served to focus CINCPAC's attention on the wide range of ARPA projects either being conducted in the PACOM or of interest to CINCPAC.[1]

Countermeasures for Surface-to-Air Missiles

(TS) The SA-7 (called the STRELLA missile) was a ground-launched infrared homing missile, launched by North Vietnam for the first time in April 1972, with the immediate result a significant number of slow-flying aircraft losses. Even before that time CINCPAC had cited the requirement for a countermeasure to shoulder-fired infrared weapons, but none had been developed. Following the mid-East crisis of October 1973, and based on the successes of the SA-7 and the SA-6 missiles at that time, CINCPAC again expressed concern to the JCS over the lack of effective countermeasures to cope with these systems in the event of future PACOM hostilities. He noted that just as the SA-7 had forced undesirable and costly adjustments to the air war in Vietnam, so the SA-6 "with its quick reaction time/mobility/firing rate/extensive envelope, has significantly offset the effectiveness of Israeli air strikes." With no proved countermeasures available, the ever-present possibility of encountering the SA-6 in the PACOM was a "very sobering contemplation." He recommended that the JCS specifically address the urgency for SA-6 R&D countermeasure efforts in the Joint Research and Development Objectives Document (JRDOD) for FY 76-93, negotiate for recently captured SA-6 hardware, and analyze it for operational details, promulgating any information that might be an aid in arriving at countermeasures solutions. On 1 November the JCS advised that CINCPAC's concern was shared by the Joint Staff and that the JRDOD under development continued to emphasize defense suppression. They concluded, "Be assured that all actions possible are in progress to fully exploit the SA-6 and develop adequate countermeasures. Your HQ will be advised as new developments occur or as new information becomes available on the SA-6 and other pertinent threat systems."[2]

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1. J3OR1 HistSum Feb 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 166; CINCPAC 262255Z Oct 73; JCS 9134/010153Z Nov 73.

(S) The JCS also advised that there was considerable effort in progress designed, among other things, to substantiate the claim that barrage type firing of the SA-7 occurred in the mid-East and, if so, numbers fired, countermeasures employed, if any, and their effectiveness. CINCPAC's continuing concern on the status of SA-7 countermeasures (CM) status within the PACOM prompted him on 10 November to ask his component commanders to provide information on infra-red countermeasures (IRCM) relative to aircraft in the PACOM inventory that could be exposed to SA-7 firings. He wanted to know the percent of each type of aircraft protected by what type of CM, such as flares, suppression kits, paint, etc.; plans to provide additional CM; and brief Service philosophy and guidance on the use of SA-7 CM in the PACOM. Replies were received shortly thereafter.[1]

(S) CINCUSARPAC replied that the Army had no IRCM capability of any type. (It was noted that a year earlier the Army aircraft in Southeast Asia were practically invulnerable to the SA-7 threat--they had paint, suppression kits, and flares--while in November 1973 they were practically defenseless against this same threat.) CINCUSARPAC advised that his headquarters had recommended in April 1973 that all Army aircraft be equipped with IRCM, but that target dates for the issue of such IRCM were unknown. Certain other equipment was being developed for specific aircraft. CINCPACAF replied that he had no passive IRCM capability except for kits on three AC-130s. All aircraft with the exception of F-4s and F-105Gs, however, had at least one flare system. All Air Force retro fitting had been held in abeyance since the cease-fire agreement in January. CINCPACFLT also noted that there was no passive IRCM, but all Navy and Marine aircraft did have at least one flare system with the exception of OV-10s and TA-4s, which were about one-third equipped. He advised of no known plans to provide additional SA-7 countermeasures. CINCPAC Operations Directorate personnel considered this status and the certainty that SA-7 missiles would abound on future battlefields and concluded that the PACOM could not meet reaction times contained in existing contingency plans without exposing its aircraft, particularly slow movers, to unacceptable risk. PACOM readiness posture, it was believed, could be greatly improved with existing IRCM such as low-reflectivity paint and heat suppression kits. And if it was true, as reported in Aviation Week and Space Technology, that Arab SA-7s avoided Israeli flares by screening out those IR wavelengths associated with flares, PACOM's only IRCM capability (the PACAF and PACFLT flares) became suspect.[2]

Research and Development Support in Vietnam

(U) The Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Research and Development Field Unit, Vietnam (RDFU-V) had been established by

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1. JCS 1158/012139Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 100128Z Nov 73.
2. CINCPACAF 140302Z Nov 73; CINCUSARPAC 200450Z Nov 73; CINCPACFLT 242144Z Nov 73; J34 Point Paper, 30 Nov 73, Subj: SA-7 Countermeasures.

the Director of Defense Research and Engineering in 1961 in Vietnam. One of its basic missions had been to advise the Vietnamese Combat Development Test Center (CDTC). In 1972 it had been planned to phase out the unit with that support transferred to COMUSMACV's Technical Assistance Coordinator. With the accelerated withdrawal of U.S. Forces following the cease-fire, the ARPA-RDFU-V closed in mid-March. The responsibility for advising the CDTC was transferred to the Defense Attache Office in Saigon. The responsibility was assigned to the Research and Development Coordinator, essentially a follow-on to the MACV Technical Assistance Coordinator. That position on the DAO staff, however, was the result of a CINCPAC request. The Joint Table of Distribution for the DAO had not included such a billet. Admiral Gayler had indicated that he was in favor of maintaining an R&D advisory capability on the DAO's staff, and his Chief of Staff had discussed the matter with the MACV Chief of Staff, who agreed.[1]

(U) Before the year ended, however, plans were being formulated to continue to provide support to the CDTC after the departure of the R&D Coordinator, which was scheduled for the end of January 1974. The support required was expected to be in the nature of broad guidance and direction in fruitful areas for the CDTC to become involved in, review of on-going programs, and to assure that adequate funds were programmed and available. The DAO explained that the CDTC should soon be capable of standing alone. This was by no means an assured fact, but it was fairly certain they would never do so unless they were presented with no alternative. He considered this approach in the best interest of the RVNAF. He visualized a "circuit rider" approach in which a member of CINCPAC's staff would visit periodically to watch what the CDTC had been doing against what the needs were in such areas as aerial resupply, artillery location, mine and booby trap detection, interrogation of sensor and radar assets, and whatever other programs might be initiated to solve field problems. He would also work on the budget for support of CDTC.[2]

(U) CINCPAC began sending a "circuit rider" to Saigon in October to establish working arrangements. At least at first these visits were expected to be about one a month for about five days at a time.[3]

Joint Research Programs with Australia

(U) In February 1972 the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Defense Department began conducting negotiations with the Government of Australia on four cooperative research and development projects. These concerned the test

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1. J341 HistSum Feb 73; CINCPAC 052226Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 102243Z Feb 73. The R&D coordinator was a GS-16, assisted by a secretary.
2. USDAO Saigon 140600Z Sep 73.
3. J34 HistSums Sep, Nov 73.

and evaluation of ARPA-developed equipment, as discussed below. The United States, it was believed, would gain by an independent evaluation of the equipment as well as gain background data on an important part of the world. Australia would gain technological information that could be applied to its own programs. CINCPAC supported this cooperative effort.[1]

(U) In February 1973 ARPA requested CINCPAC concurrence with a proposal to establish an ARPA field office in Australia to oversee this effort. The office was to consist of one civilian professional and a clerk-typist. The Ambassador in Canberra, the ARPA Director advised, had informally agreed to provide administrative and logistical support for the two. CINCPAC requested comments from his Representative (CINCPACREP) Australia, because under CINCPAC Instruction he was charged with reviewing ARPA projects to assess their impact on in-country military responsibilities.[2]

(U) CINCPAC concurred with the plan. He advised the ARPA Director that the CINCPACREP would be the CINCPAC in-country representative responsible for securing Country Team comments on proposed ARPA projects. Staffing of projects, CINCPAC said, would be in accordance with DOD and CINCPAC Instructions on ARPA activities.[3]

(S) On 27 August, however, the Ambassador provided his thoughts to Washington agencies, furnishing the same information to CINCPAC two days later. He believed that the political climate had cleared to the point where it was appropriate that an ARPA representative be assigned to the "Country Team of this Mission." He noted that several significant joint research programs had been approved by the Australian Government and supervision on the scene by the ARPA officer seemed desirable. While the ARPA representative would need to take his technical and administrative direction from the Secretary of Defense and the ARPA, the Ambassador said:

> I must request that his assignment be as a member of my Mission responsible to me through the Defense Attache. We already have ten (10) separate Defense Department units in Canberra, most of which are autonomous or semi-autonomous and report on parallel lines back to different commands in Honolulu and Washington. I could not approve the addition of another such semi-independent office, particularly dealing in an area of extreme political sensitivity. In fact, with the

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1. J30R1 HistSum Mar 73.
2. SECDEF 3470/162216Z Feb 73.
3. CINCPAC 140131Z Mar 73. The directives were DOD Instruction 5129.46 of 12 Jun 69 and CINCPACINST 3920.4A, 25 Aug 70, Subj: Advanced Research Projects Agency Activities in Foreign Countries within PACOM.

cooperation of the Defense Department, I hope gradually to consolidate the organization of military units in Canberra.... With the understanding that...[the appointed ARPA Representative] would work through my DAO...I welcome his assignment to Canberra....[1]

CINCPAC advised the Ambassador that he understood the concern over the political sensitivity of ARPA activities and the need for close monitoring. He said that he was operating in accordance with instructions from the Defense Department and the JCS that charged him with ARPA responsibilities, none of which could be readily accomplished through the Defense Intelligence Agency. "While I agree with your views on multiple and semi-autonomous Defense Department agencies such as ARPA, I feel we should not burden the DATT with these managerial responsibilities in addition to his DIA and representational functions." In this broader context, he continued, "I charge my CINCPACREP with the responsibility for coordinating matters of joint concern involving relations between DOD personnel and local officials." He noted that the CINCPACREP was also charged with effecting the closest possible coordination with the Ambassador, and CINCPAC guaranteed such responsiveness.[2]

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[redacted]

1. AMEMB Canberra 270620Z Aug 73, transmitted to CINCPAC as AMEMB Canberra 290836Z Aug 73.
2. CINCPAC 111005Z Sep 73. See also Chapter I, "Possibility of Defense Department Coordinators Explored."
3. JCS 8165/142215Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 191850Z Sep 73; J34 Point Paper, 1 Nov 73, Subj: DOD, JCS, and CINCPAC Documents Establishing CINCPAC Relationship to ARPA in the Pacific, which cited SM 475-73, 18 Oct 73, Subj: Establishment of a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Office in Australia.

[redacted]

Technical Coordination with Japanese R&D Efforts

(C) The Chief of the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO) Japan proposed that a team from each Service be sent to Japan periodically to provide a representation to Japan's Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), which was responsible for the administration of defense-oriented R&D in Japan. As at least a portion of all new defense systems came under the cognizance of the TRDI, it was considered an outstanding point of contact to influence the development of systems common or compatible with U.S. systems. Also, coordination would enhance efforts in the area of maximum standardization of weapons, tactics, and training between the two countries. The presentations of the teams would be on Service trends in R&D. CINCPAC concurred in the MDAO proposal, recognizing that a similar program was in effect with European allies, and that such a program would be beneficial within the PACOM. He recommended that if the program were approved by the Services, that the teams brief appropriate CINCPAC staff personnel on the occasions of their visits to Japan.[2]

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1. AROP Point Paper, 20 Jul 73, Subj: Joint ARPA/Australian Research Programs; USDAO Canberra 1247/140410Z Sep 73.
2. J30R1 HistSum Apr 73; MDAO Japan ltr Ser 054, 12 Mar 73, Subj: Technical Coordination with GOJ R&D Efforts, and CINCPAC first endorsement thereto, Ser 0359, 19 Apr 73.

SECTION V--REPORTING

Operational Reporting

(S) Operational reporting requirements in Southeast Asia continued throughout 1973, although there were many modifications in the program as a result of the cease-fire, the drawdown of U.S. Forces, and subsequent organizational changes in the forces that remained in Southeast Asia. Reported information was still required by all agencies up to the highest levels of Government, as had been the case throughout the war. Late in 1972, as the cease-fire appeared imminent, COMUSMACV had proposed reporting procedures to be used after such a cease-fire. His recommendations regarding reporting requirements, CINCPAC's modifications to these recommendations, and JCS subsequent approval for Operational Reports (OPREP) 3, 4, and 5 are discussed individually below.

(S) Late in January the Chairman of the JCS advised of his requirement to provide higher authority with detailed information on post cease-fire activity. In response to these requirements, CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACV make minor modification to the COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal so as to provide the Chairman with as much detailed information as feasible. This report had been scheduled to be cancelled 30 days after the cease-fire went into effect, but this report, which was retitled the "Commander's Status Report of Selected Southeast Asia Activities," was to continue to be required by higher authority and on 28 February CINCPAC directed that it be continued. The JCS also requested that the report be expanded to include the status of U.S. and Vietnamese Army military personnel of the Joint Military Commission deployed in Saigon and each region; the report already listed the deployment of North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong) personnel so employed.[1]

(U) With the cessation of Army air operations in the RVN, the CINCPAC summary of air operations report produced from the OPREA data base was no longer published. Southeast Asia air operations information contained in the Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB) had been recognized by CINCPAC as the official record for Air Force, Navy, and Marine operations since January 1971, and was to be used for air operations information in place of the OPREA. CINCPAC notified the JCS to stop transmission of OPREA cards except for those that reported loss or damage of aircraft.[2]

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1. J3C42 HistSum Jan 73, which cited CJCS 3963/302333Z Jan 73 and CINCPAC 310353Z Jan 73 (both EX); JCS 3234/270146Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 280304Z Feb 73; JCS 5705/101735Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 102202Z Feb 73.
2. J3C42 HistSum Apr 73; CINCPAC 112222Z Apr 73.

(S) Several months after the cease-fire the Defense Attache in Saigon requested authority to change OPREP format and terminology for cease-fire violation reporting for OPREPs 3 and 4. He described the situation as follows:

> ...Active combat is taking place around the clock in all four MRs in Vietnam. Military activity is occurring in many forms to include attacks-by-fire, counter-battery fire, meeting engagements, assaults on fortified positions, sapper attacks, and raids. Over 80,000 casualties have resulted from combat action since 28 January 1973. With this type of activity occurring on a daily basis, the term "cease-fire violation" does not appear to be the best phrase to describe this level of combat. The term implies that a general cease-fire does exist in Vietnam and that the reported incidents are breaches of this condition. The continuing and constant level of armed conflict going on in South Vietnam should be recognized and reported as an ongoing war.

He continued that all violations were being reported as enemy initiated, when, in most cases, a determination could not be made as to whether the activity occurred as a result of RVNAF or enemy initiatives. He recommended that:

> a. Major and minor incidents should be the acceptable pnrase to describe all military activity.
>
> b. All operational reporting reflect the deletion of the term "violation" and insertion of the phrase "military activity."
>
> c. Future reports not include a judgement as to whether the incident was friendly or enemy initiated.[1]

(S) COMUSSAG/7AF recommended to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on 13 November that the reporting changes recommended by the DAO Saigon be implemented. The DIA had earlier commented that the cease-fire was the political context for U.S. observation of military activity and that no change in reporting requirements was forseen. COMUSSAG noted that events such as a rocket attack on Bien Hoa and the overrunning of several Vietnamese outposts and VNAF bombing of Viet Cong territory made use of the term "cease-fire violations" increasingly "misleading." He continued that mounting intelligence indicated that not only was there no cease-fire, but a strong possibility existed that a general offensive could take place. In view of these factors and in the interest

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1. DAO Saigon 010932Z Sep 73.

of more accurate reporting he recommended that the DAO's proposals be implemented. CINCPAC concurred with these recommendations and so advised the JCS.[1]

(S) The JCS, however, on 13 December reaffirmed their original reporting instructions and emphasized the fact that they were still valid. They noted that the requirement for reporting cease-fire violations by all parties was established by the highest authority. They advised that the high level of military activity reported in the RVN had been noted and was being addressed by the JCS in separate but allied actions. They emphasized that on-scene commanders had sufficient latitude within the reporting system to add their observations and conclusions for JCS review and action. These views, whether they concerned operational reports of friendly activity or intelligence reports of other than friendly activity continued to be earnestly solicited. They advised that "care must be exercised to accurately identify who initiated the violation or indicate that such identification cannot be made." They instructed commanders to continue to report in accordance with existing instructions and that the units continue to express command views as these were "vital to JCS on-going actions." CINCPAC passed this decision to the COMUSSAG and DAO on 15 December.[2]

(U) A discussion of specific operational reports and actions concerning them in 1973 follows.

OPREP-3

(C) OPREP-3 reports concerned specific events or incidents of importance throughout the PACOM. Events or incidents of sufficient significance to warrant the immediate attention of National Command Authorities also carried the flagword "Pinnacle." Late in December 1972 COMUSMACV outlined what he anticipated would be post cease-fire requirements. He indicated that MACV would continue to submit OPREP-3s until the headquarters was disestablished, after which USSAG/7AF would submit them as required. The Defense Resources Support and Termination Office (subsequently the Defense Attache Office, Saigon) was expected to initiate them from the RVN after MACV headquarters was disestablished. CINCPAC had concurred with minor modifications to the MACV recommendations and so had the JCS. A subsequent review of reporting requirements by COMUSSAG noted that submission would continue on an as-required basis.[3]

(C) In mid-May CINCPACFLT implemented OPREP-3 non-Pinnacle reporting for use within the Navy only, and forwarded a list of such reportable events and incidents to all PACFLT units. CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that he must be kept

1. COMUSSAG/7AF 131130Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 271850Z Nov 73.
2. JCS 5288/131704Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 150002Z and 150003Z Dec 73.
3. COMUSMACV 230915Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 030030Z Jan 73; JCS 7526/250029Z Jan 73; COMUSSAG 240824Z Mar 73.

informed and requested that CINCPACFLT review these new procedures so that they were in consonance with JCS and CINCPAC directives. CINCPAC also informed CINCPACFLT that CINCPAC staff personnel were available to assist in a reevaluation of the reporting procedures. On 30 June CINCPACFLT acknowledged CINCPAC's request and advised that a representative of his staff was in Washington at the time attempting to establish mutually satisfactory reporting procedures for all commands.[1]

(S) In November COMUS Korea discussed the reporting of the crossing of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) by Korean forces. The NLL was a line that had been established by the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Korea in one of his operational orders. It had been established "a number of years ago to provide a simple means of adhering to the spirit of the Armistice agreement and avoiding incidents, while preserving access to the ROK islands off the northwest coast and the waters surrounding them." It did not form a part of the armistice agreement; the demarcation line laid down in that agreement terminated at the entrance to the Han estuary. Thus, despite the fact that both the South and North Koreans had respected this line for the 20 years since the Armistice, it had no status in International Law and did not provide a basis for territorial waters. COMUS Korea estimated that NLL incidents by North Korea would become commonplace, and he suggested that the crossings be reported by OPREP-3 reports without a flagword. CINCPAC replied that the NLL was a designation provided by U.S. Naval Forces Korea and did not provide a legal basis for territorial waters; routine North Korean naval activity in that area was not a violation of International Law and did not need to be reported by OPREP-3. Such activities could be included in COMUS Korea's OPREP-5s.[2]

(U) Late in November CINCPACAF advised that an Air Force emergency change to JCS Publication 6 directed that OPREP-3 reports on bomb threats would be submitted only when an explosive device was found and/or an explosion occurred. He noted that he would have to accept this policy from the Air Force Chief of Staff unless it differed from CINCPAC policy. CINCPAC replied on 29 November, as follows:

> ...The use of explosive devices by terrorist organizations and criminals to achieve their goals has become extremely widespread during recent months. This wave of activity poses a realistic threat to all PACOM forces and can easily be directed

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1. CINCPACFLT 182037Z May 73; J3342 HistSum Jun 73, which cited CINCPAC 230042Z Jun 73 and CINCPACFLT 300545Z Jun 73.
2. COMUS Korea 300854Z Nov 73; CTF 210/COMNAVFORK 070615Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 010057Z Dec 73.

at senior commanders, troop billeting areas, major items of equipment, and munition storage areas. Timely reporting of such incidents is important as it alerts commands to potential widespread terrorist activities and permits remedial action at all levels. Notification after an explosive device has been found or explodes is not considered timely. Bomb threats are considered by this headquarters to meet the OPREP-3 Event/Incident report criteria.

CINCPAC additionally clarified this policy in his Instruction on such reporting.[1]

OPREP-4

(S) COMUSMACV made the same recommendation about OPREP-4 as he had about OPREP-3 when the cease-fire was anticipated: MACV would continue to submit them until the headquarters was disestablished, after which USSAG and the DAO would submit required reports. He recommended that the format be modified somewhat after the cease-fire and he recommended such modifications. When COMUSSAG provided his assessment of required reports in March, he noted that the surface OPREP-4 submission by DAO should continue with a daily report.[2]

(C) On 2 February the JCS requested that cease-fire violations initiated by friendly forces be described in the ground OPREP-4, and that incidents that were not resolved on the day they were initiated be carried until they were resolved.[3]

(S) In May CINCPACAF requested authority to downgrade to SECRET all remaining special operations that nad not been previously downgraded. CINCPAC provided him with the authorities that downgraded special operations OPREP-4s except those concerned with the mining campaign in North Vietnam, called POCKET MONEY, and notified him that authority to downgrade those had also been requested from the JCS. On 16 June CINCPAC forwarded JCS authority to downgrade POCKET MONEY OPREP-4s and advised CINCPACAF to include POCKET MONEY information in the Southeast Asia data base under a special code.[4]

(S) When CINCPAC forces began operations in the Indian Ocean area in November, CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT to implement Air Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, and Support OPREP-4 reporting for air operations. He gave authority to modify

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1. CINCPACAF 280135Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 291820Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 010251Z Dec 73.
2. COMUSMACV 230915Z Dec 72; COMUSSAG 240824Z Mar 73.
3. JCS 6422/020302Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 032243Z Feb 73.
4. CINCPACAF 252135Z May 73; CINCPAC 050322Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 050323Z Jun 73; JCS 9230/142243Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 160132Z Jun 73.

prescribed report formats as necessary and asked that the reports reflect those missions in which Iranian personnel participated. (At the beginning of the crisis CINCPAC had initiated a requirement for daily SITREP reporting.)[1]

OPREP-5

(S) When COMUSMACV provided his recommendations for reporting after a cease-fire, he recommended that MACV headquarters discontinue submission of OPREP-5s on the day of the cease-fire and that USSAG would not be required to submit any report as it was a compilation of data from friendly and enemy combat operations and would become overtaken by events when the cease-fire became effective. Both CINCPAC and the JCS agreed, noting that any cease-fire violations of a serious nature would be the subject of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE message. When COMUSSAG outlined reporting requirements as they were envisioned by the end of March, however, he noted that U.S. air activity in Southeast Asia reported by means of the Southeast Asia data base and the Air OPREP-5 would be continued by Headquarters USSAG.[2]

(C) To preclude any misconception about air operations in Southeast Asia, on 3 March CINCPAC directed certain modifications to air operational reporting. Sorties flown in the Gulf of Tonkin were to be so reported; these were sorties off the shore of North Vietnam north of 17°N. The South China Sea was defined as the area off-shore of the RVN south of 17°N and east of 105°E. The Gulf of Siam was the area off-shore of the RVN, Cambodia, and Thailand west of 105°E. This was to avoid misunderstanding as the former reports reflected those in the South China Sea in the closest military region of the RVN, and those flown in the Gulf of Tonkin had been reflected as being "off-shore."[3]

(C) In mid-March the USSAG/7AF suffered a computer failure and submitted a manually produced OPREP-5, asking for comments. CINCPAC's reaction to the report was favorable, but he requested that as soon as the computer was fixed a computer-prepared report be submitted. The JCS requested that the manual Air OPREP-5 include a Service breakout of sorties and that the ORDAB (Navy) and COMSUP (Air Force) combat support reports be passed separately during computer failure. USSAG requested relief from the requirement to pass these reports during a computer failure. CINCPAC agreed that the support material was not necessary as the requested information was included in the manually prepared

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1. CINCPAC 130222Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 260145Z Oct 73.
2. COMUSMACV 230915Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 030030Z Jan 73; JCS 7526/250029Z Jan 73; COMUSSAG 240824Z Mar 73.
3. CINCPAC 030414Z Mar 73.

reports. With the concurrence of the JCS, CINCPAC cancelled the requirement for the supporting reports.[1]

(U) Earlier, the U.S. Army in Vietnam had requested notification as to when its daily-weekly OPREP-5 would be discontinued. CINCPAC advised that it would be when that organization ceased to play an active role in Southeast Asia air operations. The final report was submitted on 22 March.[2]

(C) Late in the year CINCPAC learned that in the OPREP-5s submitted by USSAG/7AF certain sorties flown in the RVN were listed in the paragraph on Defensive Reaction Support, but ordnance was expended on them. All such sorties, CINCPAC explained, should be reported in an Attack Mission Function under Defensive Reactions Flown. This information was passed to USSAG/7AF on 14 December.[3]

(C) In December, to insure that on-going activity in Southeast Asia was properly understood, instructions for OPREP-5 reporting were changed to substitute the word "operational" for the word "combat" in portions of the report.[4]

Commanders Situation Reports (SITREP)

(U) In September CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that he delegate submission authority for SITREPs to his component and subordinate commanders for significant political, military, or public interest SITREPs. The JCS approved the proposal, but noted that the responsibility for command amplifying comments, as appropriate, and summary information, as required, and all other SITREP reporting remained with the unified commander. CINCPAC so informed all concerned.[5]

(C) Earlier, the JCS had directed that certain additional information be included in SITREPs submitted for significant military exercises. To be included in the SITREP submitted 48 hours prior to the start of the exercise was to be the exercise task organization; whether there was also allied participation; deployment, employment, and withdrawal dates for major forces; the sequence of major events; the estimated delay required for exercise forces to redeploy in event of an actual contingency; and identification of action officers if further information was needed. CINCPAC advised all concerned on 26 August.[6]

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1. USSAG 140549Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 152125Z Mar 73; JCS 3111/210049Z Mar 73; USSAG 300548Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 022312Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 070526Z Apr 73.
2. USARV 150555Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 230206Z Dec 72; USARV 200600Z Mar 73.
3. CINCPAC 142140Z Dec 73.
4. CINCPAC 120029Z Dec 73.
5. JCS 5959/122003Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 150036Z Sep 73.
6. JCS 3753/271627Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 261445Z Aug 73.

END SWEEP

END SWEEP was the name of the operation in which the United States cleared the mines it had planted in North Vietnam. The JCS had established a requirement for a daily SITREP. CINCPAC, however, recommended that a mid-day status report be provided so that daily reporting would reach Washington in time for inclusion in briefings of the Chairman of the JCS. The JCS decided that the SITREP as submitted satisfied their requirement. On 7 March the Commander of Task Force 78 recommended that the daily END SWEEP operations SITREP be discontinued due to duplication. CINCPACFLT concurred and recommended that force status changes and significant incidents be included in the daily Negotiations SITREP. CINCPAC also concurred and forwarded the recommendation to the JCS, who also concurred. The operation was terminated on 18 July and CINCPAC rescinded the requirement for a combined SITREP effective 22 July.[1]

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1. J3C42 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 8280/251705Z Jan 73 (EX); CINCPAC 272350Z Jan 73; JCS 1062/062315Z Feb 73; J3C42 HistSum Mar 73, which cited CTF 78 070114Z Mar 73 (EX); CINCPACFLT 162252Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 191914Z Mar 73; JCS 8587/262003Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 270330Z Mar 73; JCS 9948/201405Z Jul 73; and CINCPAC 210454Z Jul 73.

SECTION VI--ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Southeast Asia Tactical Data System Interface

(S) The requirement for compatible tactical air control systems among the Services in Southeast Asia had been fulfilled when those systems were interfaced in 1969. In a 1972 evaluation of the system CINCPAC had outlined its operational effectiveness and beneficial results; he considered it an "extremely effective" system for coordinating employment of various Service assets by permitting all participants to enhance warning and control through access to all source information from a variety of radar and signal intelligence sensors. As forces withdrew from Vietnam, however, it was necessary to terminate the interface. CINCPACAF began plans to establish an Alternate Tactical Air Control Center (A-TACC) at Udorn, Thailand to serve as a manual back-up system to the TACC-Northern Sector in the RVN. Late in 1972 the PACOM Tactical Data Systems (TDS) Interface Advisory Group decided the most desirable location for the land-based equipment from Vietnam was at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand and at the end of the year plans had been made to test equipment there to determine if the capability existed to resume semi-automatic data exchange if the situation warranted.[1]

(S) The cease-fire necessitated early action to insure a prototype antenna would be in place at Nakhon Phanom by 15 February, and CINCPAC asked that the JCS initiate action to effect shipment. It was necessary to reschedule the test several times because of delayed arrivals of equipment, power losses, etc., and it was finally conducted between 27 February and 3 March. It involved the capability of a USMC Tactical Data Communications Central (TDCC)/AN/TYQ-3 equipped with a modified log period antenna to maintain a reliable Link 11 data link with a Navy Tactical Data Systems ship (USS REEVES DLG-24) operating in the Gulf of Tonkin. The reports from the on-site test director and the ship concluded that the test successfully demonstrated the feasibility of sky-wave propagation for high-frequency Link 11 data link communications between a TDCC deployed at an inland Southeast Asia site and a Navy TDS ship stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin, without degradation of reliability. The test proved the feasibility and capability to reestablish the Southeast Asia TDS interface if it was required.[2]

SA-3 Missile Threat

(S) In mid-January 1973 the presence of the SA-3 missile in North Vietnam had been confirmed. CINCPAC advised the JCS that this represented a significant

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 171-174.
2. CINCPAC 242223Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 310414Z Jan 73; J3B58 HistSum Feb 73; CINCPAC 302215Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 160028Z May 73.

increase in capability for the North Vietnamese air defense system. He said that a requirement existed for a full capability to respond to this threat and that his Service components had stated immediate requirements for accelerated action to equip forces through Service channels. He asked for any further information to update that furnished by the JCS in July 1972 regarding action underway to upgrade PACOM electronic warfare posture. He also considered it prudent to expedite action reallocating electronic warfare assets to the PACOM. CINCPAC also transmitted his thoughts on the increased threat to COMUSMACV, noting that efforts were under way to upgrade PACOM capabilities. In the interim, he noted, the possibility existed that the SA-3 might be introduced surreptitiously throughout Southeast Asia, particularly into Laos prior to establishment of a bona fide cease-fire. He advised that he considered it prudent to insure that operating forces remained on the alert for this new threat.[1]

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

WESTPACNORTH Compatibility Program

(C) The WESTPACNORTH interface was a Defense Department directed program to achieve an interface between the Japanese semi-automated Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system and the U.S. tactical data systems (Navy, Air Force, Marine) that operated in the area. The interface had been completed in 1971 when the buffer at Shingu Wells, Japan was declared operational, but many changes had occurred and in 1972 it was determined that there was no further use for it. On 22 January 1973 the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had directed the Secretary of the Air Force to deactivate the Shingu Wells

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1. CINCPAC 192327Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 312140Z Jan 73. For a duscussion of CINCPAC interest in SA-6 and SA-7 missile countermeasures see the "Research and Development" section of this chapter.
2. J3B58 HistSum Feb 73; JCS 9716/142043Z Feb 73.

buffer station "as rapidly as possible consistent with the removal of residual political opposition in the GOJ through formation of a working group of US Fifth Air Force and Japan Defense Agency officials." CINCPAC requested that CINCPACAF insure that a new manual concept of operation was ready for data transmission between the BADGE and U.S. Naval units in the Sea of Japan when the WESTPACNORTH interface was terminated.[1]

(C) CINCPACAF advised that the WESTPACNORTH air defense crosstell/liaison net would provide the desired interface; this was an unsecure high-frequency single side band net between land-based air defense facilities and U.S. Navy units. Operational procedures for the WESTPACNORTH net had been established and fully coordinated, CINCPACAF reported. On 1 March CINCPAC advised the JCS of the deactivation schedule and the plans for distribution of the U.S. equipment. A letter to the Japan Air Self-Defense Forces advising of a closure date of 15 March was favorably received and operations terminated on that date. The U.S. equipment was shipped in mid-April and the real estate at Shingu Wells returned to the Japanese Government on 1 August. Deactivation was complete.[2]

Electronic Warfare Support for Japan

(C) In December 1972 a CINCPAC electronic warfare (EW) team had conducted discussions with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) relative to upgrading Japanese EW posture. The results of the conference had been gratifying and had established the basis for future information exchange. On 12 January 1973 CINCPAC reported the results of the conference to the JCS and recommended continued dialogue, with future briefings or discussions to be coordinated through the PACOM.[3]

(C) On 26 April 1973 a PACOM EW team briefed JASDF representatives on selected electronic countermeasures/electronic counter countermeasures (ECM/ECCM) topics. The Chief of the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO) in Japan reported that the briefing was well received and that the JASDF had become aware of ECM environments that might be expected in combat and the types of defensive ECM/ECCM equipment available. Informal discussions had revealed that JASDF programs had not considered all necessary aspects of ECM/ECCM and as a result the JASDF was reevaluating them. This was expected to take three to six months. The Chief of the MDAO anticipated that at that time the JASDF would again request further assistance. He recommended that CINCPAC evaluate ECM equipment to determine what equipment was clearly within the scope of JASDF defensive require-

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 265-267; JCS 4609/221956Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 270031Z Jan 73.
2. CINCPACAF 100131Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 012319Z Mar 73; CINCPACAF 240230Z Mar 73; 5th AF Fuchu 140257Z Aug 73.
3. CINCPAC 122340Z Jan 73.

ments and U.S. objectives and also recommend approval of Department of State export licenses for industry. He additionally recommended that CINCPAC provide information as requested by the JASDF in the 26 April meeting if it was within the scope of release authority and valid requirements.[1]

(S) On 30 May CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF to initiate through Service channels the authority to release certain information, which he outlined. He noted that he considered EW support for the JASDF to be most important, particularly as ECM/ECCM training was fundamental to viable air defense posture. He thanked the Chief of the MDAO for his efforts in stimulating EW interest with the JASDF, and requested that he forward the results of the Japanese program reevaluation when they became available.[2]

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1. CMDAO Toyko 5075/250043Z May 73.
2. CINCPAC 300353Z May 73.

SECTION VII--MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

Mid-East War Related Operations

(S) The fourth Arab-Israeli war, which erupted on 6 October, was outside the area of CINCPAC's responsibility, but the world-wide repercussions of that conflict and the subsequent Arab oil embargo impacted in many ways on the PACOM. (The oil situation is addressed in detail in the chapter on Logistics.) The U.S.S.R. and then the United States began airlifting supplies to the Middle East a few days after the hostilities began. Subsequently the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution advocating a cease-fire. The U.S.S.R. gave the United States what were considered "ambigious" signs that it might send military forces to the Mid-East, ostensibly to insure a cease-fire. [Shortly after consultations at the National level, the JCS declared a world-wide increase in defense readiness, to DEFCON 3. In the scale of five conditions, this called for an increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness. "Minimize" was automatically imposed on all users of record and voice communications facilities. "A-Hour" was not established, however.]

[redacted]

(S) [redacted] the Chairman of the JCS requested that the unified and specified commands comment on the event, including a chronology of events and a checklist of deviations and proposed modifications. The Chairman also asked for recommendations for possible revision of [redacted] concepts and actions. These requests were based in part on the interest of higher officials and the Congress in these procedures in general [redacted]

(S) CINCPAC's comments were dispatched early in 1974. [redacted] On the

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1. JCS 250430Z Oct 73; J333 HistSum Oct 73; J3323 Histsum Oct 73; JCS 3883/260719Z Oct 73.



1. CINCPAC 050455Z Jan 74.



1. CINCPACFLT 032301Z Nov 73, which cited JCS 251742Z Oct 73 and CINCPAC 251805Z Oct 73; JCS 6052/282320Z Oct 73; JCS 9706/011441Z Nov 73; JCS 9715/011457Z Nov 73.



1. JCS 5032/061540Z Nov 73; JCS 5519/032312Z Nov 73.
2. JCS 6660/080005Z Nov 73.
3. USDAO Tehran 130609Z Nov 73.
4. JCS 6616/180304Z Nov 73; CTG 77.6 181038Z Nov 73.
5. JCS 7572/200158Z Nov 73; JCS 5312/282215Z Nov 73.



1. J2 Weekly Executive Brief, 12 Nov 73.





Amphibious Ready Group Posture

(S) On 12 July, with the impending termination of END SWEEP operations, CINCPACFLT considered it desirable to address a post-Vietnam Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) posture. This was CINCPAC's quick reaction force. There were two ARGs, ARG ALFA with a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), and ARG BRAVO with a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT). In July the reaction time of the two was as it had been for some time, ARG ALFA/MAU had a reaction time of 120 hours to the RVN, and ARG BRAVO had a reaction time of 168 hours to be loaded with the BLT

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1. CINCPAC 152215Z Jan 74.

with an L-Form aboard at Buckner Bay, Okinawa. Over the years the number of these ARGs had varied, as had their reaction times, some times to as little as 12 hours to Military Region I. CINCPACFLT believed that in the post-hostilities era it no longer appeared necessary or desirable to define the readiness of the ARGs in terms related to the RVN as those limitations had an adverse effect on overall amphibious readiness. The broad area of responsibility of the PACFLT and the requirement to explore widely separated geographic areas in which to conduct amphibious exercises required a normalization of reaction times to allow for the greatest range of mobility consistent with the requirement for rapid response for emergencies in any troubled area.

(S) CINCPACFLT believed that a less stringent reaction posture would enable the ARG to regain the capacity to respond to wide ranging tasking throughout the 7th Fleet area and to engage in exercises over a geographically more diverse area. Additional benefits to be derived from more liberal reaction times, he continued, would be an improvement in unit material readiness by facilitating an expanded maintenance program for deployed assets, an increased capability to contribute to PACOM transportation requirements, and an increased ability to establish an amphibious presence in areas of political stress, as appropriate. He believed that a readiness posture that permitted a complete loadout of ARGs ALFA and BRAVO in 96 and 168 hours respectively would support this rationale.

(S) Concurrent with the establishment of these less stringent reaction times, CINCPACFLT addressed normalization of Fleet rotation cycles. The ARGs used an LPH--an amphibious assault ship--and it had been the practice to effect a contact relief at Okinawa or Subic with the LPH remaining on station until the relieving ship had embarked the ARG units. A non-contact relief of the LPH could significantly reduce this overlap and would be possible if ARG ALFA reaction time were increased to 168 hours to load for a period of three days every six months. He proposed that these changes become effective upon the completion of END SWEEP operations. CINCPAC approved these revised ARG response time, as proposed, on 13 July.[1]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS [redacted] Security

(TS-FRD) In mid-1973 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that the security of [redacted] be expanded to include an evaluation of [redacted] storage sites to consider their operational necessity versus their vulnerability and the cost of providing necessary security. The total funding projections submitted to the JCS for the PACOM totalled over [redacted]

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1. CINCPACFLT 120943Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 130039Z Jul 73.



Operations Security

(U) Operations security (OPSEC) was defined as "those actions that are necessary and appropriate to deny the enemy information concerning planned, on-going, and completed operations." CINCPAC had developed a vigorous program of OPSEC surveys during the war in Southeast Asia, and these surveys continued throughout 1973. In addition, CINCPAC shared the expertise acquired in this field during the war. In March and again in April CINCPAC OPSEC briefings were presented to commands and units in the Continental United States, including the Air War College. These covered the history, policies, and procedures of OPSEC as well as lessons learned. CINCPAC also prepared a semi-annual OPSEC report

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1. J322 HistSum Dec 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 251-256; J322 HistSum Dec 73.

for the Chairman of the JCS. Early in December CINCPAC representatives attended a meeting of OPSEC personnel in Washington to assist in developing conference goals and agenda items for a world-wide OPSEC conference scheduled for January 1974.[1]

(S) OPSEC surveys were conducted by CINCPAC teams, often augmented by representatives of other commands with special knowledge or interest. Among the OPSEC surveys in 1973 were those of tactical air operations in Southeast Asia in January, with particular emphasis on LINEBACKER II operations; covert patrol squadron (VP) and sound surveillance underwater (SOSUS) operations to assess their security and identify possible sources of Soviet prior awareness of such operations; CINCPAC Airborne Command Post operations to upgrade the security and enhance the survivability of BLUE EAGLE; and the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) to identify and eliminate possible sources of prior knowledge or foreknowledge that the enemy could exploit to possibly degrade the effectiveness of PARPRO operations. Other OPSEC surveys concerned the movement and storage of nuclear weapons and the airlift and resupply of Cambodian forces.[2]

Nuclear Powered and Other Ship Visits to Foreign Ports

(C) CINCPAC continued in 1973 his efforts of many years standing to permit visits to foreign ports by U.S. ships with less restriction. One such restrictive means used by some foreign countries concerned the U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. Naval vessels. A number of specific events regarding ship visits in 1973 are discussed below.

Australia

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 249, J3B9 HistSums Mar-May 73; J319 HistSum Dec 73.
2. J3B9 HistSums Feb, Mar 73; J323 HistSums Jun-Jul 73; J319 HistSums Aug, Sep, Nov 73. For definitions of the terms "prior knowledge" and "foreknowledge" see CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, p. 251.



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Indonesia

(C) A number of ship visits to Indonesian ports came under CINCPAC study in 1973. On 16 December 1972 CINCPAC had concurred with CINCPACFLT's proposals for visits of USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS-3) to Surabaja from 26 January to 1 February 1973 and USS RACINE (LST-1191) to Jakarta from 7-12 February. On 11 January 1973, however, CINCPACFLT informed CINCPAC that draft restrictions in the harbor approaches precluded NIAGARA FALLS from visiting Surabaja. Due to fleet operational commitments, the only alternative that would allow consummation of both visits was for the ships to trade ports, which CINCPAC approved on 13 January. On 23 March CINCPAC approved further visits by U.S. ships, provided that diplomatic clearances were obtained. He approved a visit by USS MACKENZIE (DD-836) for 9-13 April to Jakarta and USS ROGERS (DD-876) to Surabaja 21-25 April, but the ROGERS visit was subsequently cancelled because of operational commitments.[2]

Indian Ocean Excursion Proposed

(S) CINCPAC had long considered it desirable to increase U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean as a counter to the growing weight of Soviet naval effort being directed into this area. By the late summer of 1973 the posture of Navy forces in Southeast Asia freed some of the U.S. Pacific Fleet units to carry out periodic Indian Ocean operations in the PACOM area. The geography of the Indian Ocean region required mobile U.S. forces that could operate throughout the entire area on a rapid response basis, relatively free from support bases. The presence of PACFLT units would directly support a low key military strategy and would contribute to the advancement of broad U.S. objectives for the area.

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1. J5113 Point Paper, 28 Nov 73, Subj: NPW Ship Visits (U); Point Paper, n.d., Subj: Normalization of NPW Visits to Australia (U).
2. CINCPAC 162106Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 130059Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 230148Z Mar 73.

(S) Increased U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, it was believed, would support U.S. politico-military objectives for the area in a number of ways: Denying to either the U.S.S.R. or the People's Republic of China an exclusive influence in the area by providing the nations in the area with a visible and viable alternative. Inhibiting possible Soviet or Chinese exploitation of unrest among the underdeveloped nations of the region. Demonstrating U.S. concern, capacity, and resolve to protect U.S. interests throughout the area. Protecting the right of unencumbered use of international waters and airspace, and safeguarding essential sea lines of communication. Collecting intelligence, oceanographic and meteorological data. Familiarizing ship and air crews with an important geographic area. Demonstrating U.S. good will through the ship visits.[1]

(S) In support of these objectives, CINCPACFLT proposed a low key PACFLT presence with the deployment of a task unit composed to two destroyer types with a flag rank officer embarked. He proposed that the deployment occur from mid-September to mid-October with three to five day port visits at Karachi, Pakistan and Colombo, Sri Lanka. The units he named were to be the USS MARVIN SHIELDS (DE-1066), and USS ENGLAND (DLG-22) with Commander Task Force 75 embarked. The portion of the trip in which the ships would be in Colombo was 3-8 October.

(S) The Defense Department called attention to a political matter of interest that conflicted with the proposed visit as scheduled. The visit was scheduled to take place during the time the 28th United Nations General Assembly was to be considering an Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ) proposal. Removing or reducing the naval presence of non-littoral states in the Indian Ocean was one of the objectives of the IOPZ movement, which was spearheaded by Sri Lanka. A "showing of the flag" excursion by a U.S. task unit with a visit to Colombo at that time could well provide a catalyst for the adoption by the U.N. of a stronger and more united stand in favor of the IOPZ than otherwise would be the case. Such a development, the JCS advised, would be inimical to U.S. interests. The JCS proposed that the excursion proposal should be submitted with scheduled visits to occur following completion of the General Assembly meeting in December.[2]

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1. Previous visits to Sri Lanka had begun in 1972 for PACOM forces and continued in low key with CINCPAC-approved visits by USS LASALLE (AGF-3), USS INCHON (LPH-12), and CHARLES F. ADAMS (DDG-2) in the summer of 1973. Karachi approvals had included USS FISKE (DD-842) in April, USS STRIBLING (DD-867) in June, and USS J. INGRAM (DD-938) in August, CINCPAC 012059Z Mar 73 and CINCPAC 102250Z May 73.
2. J3131 HistSum Sep 73; CINCPACFLT 102341Z Jul and 010307Z Aug 73; JCS 2620/071801Z Sep 73.

(U) The subsequent deployment of a carrier task group to the Indian Ocean is described elsewhere in this chapter under the heading "Mid-East War Related Operations."

Search and Rescue Facilities--Guam Sector

(C) In late July CINCPAC's Representative in the Guam/Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands area discussed the decline in quantity and quality of search and rescue (SAR) assets in the Central Pacific Sub-Region. In June of 1972 the Coast Guard had removed their aircraft from this area as a result of an agreement with the Commander of Naval Forces Marianas in which responsibility for civil SAR was transferred to that Commander. In July 1973 the Air Force deactivated the 79th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) and in July, also, Navy HU-16s were restricted from water landings. The CINCPACREP advised that to the best of his knowledge the Defense Department had never been specifically tasked to provide either SAR or medical evacuation services in all the TTPI, but had been directed to give support when available. Historically, however, since the recapture of Micronesia during World War II the Defense Department (and specifically the Navy) had provided not only emergency, but general humanitarian support to the islands. With the drawdowns and other restrictions however, for the first time since the war the United States was unable to meet what had become a customary obligation. The CINCPACREP had notified the High Commissioner at Saipan and CINCPACFLT, but he asked CINCPAC to consider returning elements of the Air Force ARS squadron, at least temporarily. He concluded that while matters of life or death SAR and evacuation were a foremost concern, it appeared a particularly critical time in Micronesian-U.S. relations for the United States to fail in the eyes of the Micronesian people in what they had come to accept as a U.S. moral commitment.[1]

(S) CINCPAC attempted to reposition in-theater Air Force assets at Guam to resolve this problem, but CINCPACAF advised that the existing and proposed beddown of SAR forces was considered optimum. Post Southeast Asia Pacific rescue forces and capabilities were to be combat oriented and centered around two long-range combat SAR squadrons at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, and Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. The Kadena based squadron was considered essential to support the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program, POLAR BEAR and PONY EXPRESS reconnaissance operations, and general war and contingency plans in the Western Pacific. The Hawaii squadron was similarly committed as an augmenting force and was also heavily engaged in support of Skylab through January 1974. Both units, CINCPACAF advised, would continue to provide civil SAR for the TTPI on a non-interference basis with military missions. CINCPAC continued to search for additional assets throughout 1973 and it appeared that assistance would have to be sought from the JCS.[2]

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1. CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI 260609Z Jul 73.
2. CINCPACAF 200130Z Sep 73; J3111 HistSum Sep 73.

Pakistan Flood Relief

(C) On 19 August the JCS tasked CINCPAC to deploy 10 Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) boats with operators and six UH-1 helicopters with minimum necessary personnel and support equipment for flood relief operations in Pakistan, not to exceed 30 days. The JCS also requested that the Air Force Chief of Staff direct the Military Airlift Command to provide airlift as required to support the deployment. CINCPAC complied and dispatched a tasking message. The JCS later requested that CINCPAC provide and maintain two C-47 aircraft to participate in pesticide spraying operations intended to protect the crops. They also directed extension of the deployment period for the six helicopters to accommodate this requirement, but not beyond 30 September 1973.

(C) On 5 November, however, the Secretary of State informed all concerned that the six UH-1 helicopters were to be presented to Pakistan as a gift and would be financed from the contingency fund as economic assistance on the basis that they would be granted to a civilian agency, for civilian use. The U.S. Ambassador in Islamabad dispatched a final situation report on the Pakistan flood relief operation on 24 September. He reported 428 dead and 186,500 houses destroyed. Over 7 million acres of land had been inundated. The UH-1s flew 237 sorties, evacuated 171, and delivered 184,350 pounds of cargo. The pesticide spraying required 241 sorties and dispersed over half a million pounds of insecticide over 100,000 acres.[1]

Proposed Hawaiian Islands Wilderness Area

(U) On 8 March the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment requested CINCPAC comments on a draft environmental statement prepared by the Department of the Interior for a proposed Hawaii Wilderness Area. In essence, the proposal was to designate the existing Hawaii National Wildlife Refuge as Wilderness within the National Wilderness Preservation System. CINCPAC concurred with the proposed concept on 30 March.[2]

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1. JCS 5691/190031Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 190250Z Aug 73; JCS 7200/312355Z Aug 73; AMEMB Islamabad 1248/241222Z Sep 73.
2. Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment to CINCPAC, 8 Mar 73, Subj: Draft Environmental Statement - Proposed Hawaiian Islands Wilderness Area; CINCPAC 300101Z Mar 73.

CHAPTER V

LOGISTICS

SECTION I--PLANS/POLICY

JOPS Interim Software Program (JIS)

(U) The advent of the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) brought the need for major changes in the development of operations contingency plans, especially in the logistics portions. The four major unified commands (CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCEUR and CINCRED) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) each had adopted separate automated data processing (ADP) systems. Each possessed unique hardware to match unique planning requirements. In January 1973, the JCS called a conference to discuss a common standard ADP system in support of JOPS planning and Deployment Reporting System (DEPREP) communications. From this meeting, the JCS and the four major unified commands agreed to share the workload for ADP system conversion:[1]

Pacific Command - Movement Requirements Generator (MRG)
Atlantic Command - Transportation Feasibility Estimator (TFE)
Readiness Command - Force Requirements Generator (FRG)
European Command - Interface Programs

(U) In July, the Atlantic Command demonstrated the TFE module, and, in August, the Readiness Command demonstrated the system monitor module with cathode ray tube remote terminals. This module was related to production of the FRG. In October and November, a JOPS users group conference was held to explain the JIS system and to establish milestones for program testing, installation and training. The new system was expected to be operational in late 1974.[2]

PACOM SOLACE

(U) In July 1973, a PACOM Study of Logistics Alternatives, Concepts and Effectiveness (SOLACE) was established to review logistics support plans for Northeast Asia. The study objectives were to investigate the amount and location of prepositioned war reserve stocks (PWRS); to examine alternate

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1. J41 HistSum Apr, Aug 73; also see Chapter III, JOPS Planning System.
2. J41 HistSum Nov, Dec 73.

base locations; to examine port capabilities; and, to determine the capability of the Republic of Korea (ROK) logistics systems.[1]

1b(a)(1) Do not release

[redacted]

(U) In the first of a series of actions to determine the status of war resource material, a representative from the U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) briefed CINCPAC staff members on 12 October 1973. USARPAC was the executive agent for the war reserve program in the PACOM; however, each component Service identified, reported and managed its war reserve program differently. As a result of the briefing, CINCPAC personnel determined the need to increase each component's awareness of the total PACOM war reserve program. The promotion of the inter-Service coordination was vital because of contingency plan reliance on a strong interface between logistics and strategy determinations. Equally important was the acquisition of basic data to support the SOLACE quest to resolve WRM alternatives for storage; e.g., CONUS versus available airlift or increased use of Guam and Tinian.[3]

(U) By the end of October, PACOM SOLACE scenarios and assumptions had been incorporated in the study, and the study concept had been accepted by CINCPAC. The Time Phased Force and Deployment Lists (TPFDL) used in the JCS fiscal year (FY) 1974 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) analysis had been reviewed. Data on FY 74 forces had been extracted and forwarded to the PACOM components. Since the objectives of SOLACE and a forthcoming update of Operations Plan (OPLAN) 5027 were compatible, the JSCP data were also forwarded to the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA). On 15 November, the objectives and study requirements for PACOM SOLACE were presented at the OPLAN 5027 preplanning conference. Both the OPLAN update and completion of SOLACE were pending at the end of the year.[4]

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1. J41 HistSum Jul, Aug 73.
2. J4113 Point Paper, 23 Jun 73, Subj: Command Capabilities, Management of Logistics.
3. J41 HistSum Oct 73.
4. J41 HistSum Oct, Nov 73.

Post Ceasefire Logistics-Vietnam

(S) The original concept for a residual organization to carry on the logistics and security assistance functions in Vietnam after a ceasefire evolved into the generally recognized Defense Attache Office (DAO), Saigon. The office of the Defense Attache (DATT) encompassed all Defense Department (DOD) elements remaining in Vietnam. The Attache element of the DAO performed normal attache functions and, in this capacity, the DATT reported through State Department and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) channels. The DOD civilian service elements were also under the command of the DATT, who reported, in this capacity, through U.S. Support Activity Group (USSAG) channels to CINCPAC.[1]

Administrative/Logistic Support to DAO Saigon

(S) In the PACOM, the Department of the Navy (DON) was the DOD-designated administrative agency for arranging or providing administrative and logistic support for military assistance groups and missions. On 5 December 1972, a conference had been held at CINCPAC headquarters to discuss personnel, funding, and logistic support requirements to the DAO Saigon. The conference was chaired by CINCPACFLT and attended by representatives from the PACOM Service Components, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy Office of Civilian Manpower Management, the Comptroller of the Navy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy, and CINCPAC. On 10 December, CINCPACFLT reported the tentative agreements reached and potential problem areas.[2]

(S) In matters of supply support, expense items were to be a Navy funding responsibility through CINCPAC. Supply support for common expense items were to be provided through Navy channels. Following existing Defense Department guidance, investment equipment would continue to be provided and funded via U.S. Army channels. Special purpose Service-peculiar investment equipment would be provided via individual Service funding and supply channels. Regarding commissary services, it was agreed that the Navy would continue funding through CINCPAC for the MACV contract in effect; it was understood that CINCPAC would request that the JCS task the Army to continue to provide commissary stocks and resupply logistic support. In the matter of exchange services, it was assumed that the exchange would be operated by a management contract

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 281-284; J4114 Point Paper, 20 Feb 73, Subj: Command Arrangements for DAO; also see this history, Chapter I, for designation of DAO vis-a-vis DRSTO, which cites COMUSMACV 141015Z Jan 73.
2. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 102031Z Dec 72.

similar to that existing for the commissary. It was understood that CINCPAC would ask the JCS to task the Army and Air Force Pacific Exchange Service to continue to provide exchange stocks and resupply logistic support. The Navy was to assume operation and maintenance funding responsibilities for all assigned vehicles. The representatives agreed that special services support should be included in the new organization, and that the existing Army-Air Force motion picture system would be continued. Embassy recreation facilities, it was believed, should be utilized as feasible, as should Embassy postal support.[1]

(S) It was considered imperative that a civilian personnel office be established immediately to facilitate recruitment, and that all civilians would be on Navy rolls regardless of their Service source. The Navy was to be the prime recruiter of civilian personnel with the other Services assisting as required. The DAO administrative support division was to operate a disbursing office capable of conducting a civilian payroll operation; military pay was to be computed outside Vietnam with a disbursing capability in the DAO. Military and civilian travel, local claims, contracts, and currency conversion were to be within the scope of the disbursing office.[2]

(S) It was considered that the new organization should not be required to perform formal property accounting. It appeared that Department of the Army requirements for accounting of investment equipment could, for the most part, be satisfied off-shore.[3]

(U) These arrangements for administrative and logistic support to the DAO were approved by the JCS; however, the participation of the U.S. Army in certain of these arrangements was predicated upon the guidance to plan for a complete withdrawal of U.S. support to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) by 28 January 1974. In November 1973, a dialogue between the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) and the U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) began regarding support to the DAO after January 1974. On 1 November, USARPAC noted that the provision in the initial agreement for the automatic retrograde of DAO Saigon excess material to U.S. Army Base Command (USARBCO) in Okinawa had been continued temporarily as a part of the U.S. Army supply support mission pending assumption of this responsibility by the DON. In accordance with approved plans to reduce the Army logistics posture in the Pacific, therefore, USARPAC intended to phase down supply operations at USARBCO and to terminate the retrograde of excess material to USARBCO.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPACFLT 072327Z Nov 73, which cited CINCUSARPAC 010452Z Nov 73.

(U) In view of the probable longevity of the DAO Saigon, the related Navy funding and ownership of the operations and maintenance (O&M) supplies supporting the DAO, and the Army requirement to reduce USARBCO operations, USARPAC recommended that PACFLT assume responsibility for disposition of DAO Saigon excess material as of 1 January 1974. USARPAC also recommended that PACFLT issue policy guidance to the DAO for the disposition of excess material through U.S. Navy channels.[1]

(U) PACFLT acknowledged the need to establish revised guidance because of the Army plans. However, PACFLT anticipated that the planned phase down of the U.S. Army logistic posture in the Pacific would ultimately affect other areas in which supply support of the DAO and U.S. contractors was being provided through Army channels with U.S. Navy funds provided by CINCPAC. Accordingly, PACFLT recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that another conference, similar to that of December 1972, be held to establish the scope of supply support for which revised guidance would be necessary.[2]

(U) As a result of the PACFLT initiative, a conference was held on 11-12 December 1973 to discuss follow-on logistics support of DOD activities in Vietnam. A memorandum of understanding was drafted by the conferees summarizing the results of the conference and agreeing that unresolved issues should be identified to the DON and the Department of the Army (DA) for resolution or higher authority decision if necessary. The conferees agreed that Army aircraft on loan to Air America would continue to be supported through USARBCO to CONUS supply sources utilizing the direct support system. Also agreed was that DAO property records should be realigned from DA to DON accounting regulations by 1 March 1974. The reporting of DAO and contractor excess material, it was agreed, should continue in accordance with Army regulations and USARPAC guidelines until the Navy aligned a responsive excess processing system in support of DAO, but not longer that 30 June 1974. Issues which USARPAC conferees considered to require higher level resolution included:[3]

- Responsibility for the funding of the DAO subsistence pipeline and commissary stocks.

- Determination as to whether DON was responsible for the full logistical support function, including medical material; if so, the effective dates. The Navy conferees had acknowledged a partial realignment of the logistical

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCUSARPAC 180538Z Dec 73.

support function by acceptance of the property accountability function effective 1 March 1974; secondary (expense item) supply support effective 1 July 1974; and dining hall operations on an effective date to be established.

- If any common supply support to the DAO from USARPAC sources was to be requested by DON; e.g., medical, it should be sought by execution of an Interservice Supply Support Agreement (ISSA).

- Clarification of responsibility and effective date for operation of the Navy-funded commissary support mission and dining hall operations.

- Determination as to whether funding of transportation costs for material shipments to DAO Saigon, as well as retrograde shipments to USARBCO, should be accomplished by DON or DA.

- Determination as to whether funding for the excess reports processing function, to be accomplished by DON during FY 75, was chargeable to DA on a reimbursable basis.

(U) At the end of 1973, negotiations by the supply support principals were still underway.

Support for ICCS in Vietnam

(S) As part of the ceasefire agreement reached in Paris on 27 January 1973, an International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and a Four-Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) were established to execute the ceasefire provisions. Anticipating the need for in-country logistic support of these organizations, the State Department requested MACV to identify major items of equipment needed for such support. The U.S. Embassy and MACV were also requested to identify facilities for initial contingents. Comments were also solicited concerning the RVN attitude toward releasing equipment and facilities for the ICCS and FPJMC.[1]

(S) In an 8 January 1973 joint reply, the Embassy and MACV provided a list of estimated requirements labeled as U.S. owned, RVN owned but still in U.S. possession, and a shortfall if all equipment were to be provided

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1. SECSTATE 003484/081843Z Jan 73 (EX), which cited SECSTATE 223448Z (Eyes Only) and Joint AMEMB Saigon/MACV 0297/081200Z Jan 73.

from in-country resources. The shortages would have to be obtained from the RVN. The total acquisition cost for the listed equipment (minus aircarft) would be $2.87 million. With UH-1 helicopter and U-21 fixed wing aircraft support to the ICCS and FPJMC, the total acquisition cost would be $12.29 million. Communications could be provided, as could billeting, messing and office space from facilities then occupied by U.S. Forces. Food subsistence, maintenance and spare parts could be provided by attaching ICCS elements to existing U.S. logistics elements for 30 days after a ceasefire. In summary, MACV envisioned that the initial support during the first 15 days would be total, including local national drivers for all vehicles, radio operators, security guards and domestic help. Offices would have to be fully equipped with necessary equipment such as typewriters. Local national clerical help would have to be in place upon arrival of the initial ICCS contingent. The RVN was expected to be receptive to supplementing any shortfall. However, in view of government sensitivity to detailed ceasefire preparations prior to RVN acceptance of a ceasefire agreement, to broach the subject at that time (8 January) would be premature.[1]

(S) On 10 February, the State Department stressed the paramount interest of the U.S. Government to assist the ICCS in obtaining all material support needed to perform its task effectively. Also, any ICCS urgent requirements that could not be filled from U.S. in-country assets or by RVN were to be reported to the State Department with information to CINCPAC by the U.S. Embassy. At the same time, the limits on the ability of the U.S. Government to provide logistics support after withdrawal of U.S. Forces were to be conveyed to the ICCS.[2]

(S) State also informed the Embassy that the U.S. Government would make an initial payment to the ICCS on or before 26 February as required by the Protocol to the 27 January ceasefire agreement. The initial payment of $900,000 would be funded from supporting assistance funds, subject to prior consultation with the Congress as required by U.S. law. Long-term funding for the ICCS for FY 74 and after would be budgeted in the State Department "Contributions to International Organizations" program, also subject to legislative authority and appropriation. During the first few months of ICCS operation, however, State could:[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. SECSTATE 026147/101924Z Feb 73 (EX).
3. Ibid.

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....See no alternative at this time but for Embassy, in consultation with MACV, to continue to make every effort to meet valid ICCS requests and maintain appropriate accounting records. In order to keep ICCS costs to minimum, we believe it preferable to lease rather than sell equipment. Since department plans to seek legislative authority to fund its future contributions to the ICCS through FY 1974 contributions to International Organizations budget, there would be no legal basis to reimburse DOD if cost of leased equipment and services were offset against future payments. The USG will therefore make monetary payments required by protocol to ICCS and look to ICCS for reimbursement in separate transactions for cost of leased equipment and services provided by USG agencies. Nevertheless, we believe it important, in order to avoid future dispute, that ICCS establish common systems to be followed by it with regard to equipment and services provided by any of four parties to agreement. Embassy should therefore find early opportunity to explain USG position to ICCS.

(S) As previously discussed, Army helicopter and fixed wing aircraft were included in the contingency support to be provided the ICCS. The original MACV list of equipment included a requirement for 30 UH-1 helicopters and six U-21 fixed wing aircraft for the ICCS. Also listed was the requirement for 10 UH-1s to be bailed to Air America for residual U.S. unit support and 30 UH-1s for the use of the U.S. delegation to the FPJMC. Of the 28 operationally ready U.S.-titled UH-1s in country, MACV suggested that 10 go to Air America and 18 to the ICCS. The balance of 12 UH-1s for the ICCS and the 30 needed for the FPJMC would be allocated from the 277 RVN-titled UH-1s still possessed by U.S. forces. On 1 February, USARPAC informed MACV that tasking instructions to provide aircraft to the ICCS had not been received.[1]

(S) On 12 February, MACV informed CINCPAC that the ICCS would be fully supported with in-country resources until a contractor was designated to continue this support, but not longer than 30 days after the ceasefire agreement (X+30). MACV intended to allocate only U.S.-titled aircraft assets possessed by the U.S. Army Vietnam for ICCS support, so that the aircraft could be returned to the Army after the need for contractor operation had passed. Of

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1. Joint AMEMB Saigon/MACV 0297/081200Z Jan 73; COMUSMACV 120610Z Feb 73, which cited CINCUSARPAC 010138Z Feb 73.

the revised total of 33 U.S.-owned UH-1s, 10 were committed to Air America, leaving a deficit of seven. MACV, therefore, requested CINCPAC to direct USARPAC to supply seven more UH-1 aircraft, initial spare parts, special tools, ground support equipment, avionics support and initial maintenance support as soon as possible.[1]

(S) On 13 February, CINCPAC requested the JCS to initiate action in support of the MACV requirement for seven UH-1s. However, on 14 February, USARPAC informed DA and CINCPAC that excess UH-1s were not available in the PACOM, and recommended that RVN-titled UH-1s be used for all support after X+30. This recommendation was based on the fact that the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) did not have enough trained aircrews to operate all of the RVN-titled UH-1s. On 15 February, the JCS advised that the order of priority for material support to the FPJMC and ICCS was first, from U.S. in-country assets; second, by the RVN; and third, by the U.S. from off-shore. On 16 February, CINCPAC invited the attention of MACV to the State Department guidance regarding shortfalls in material support to the ICCS; i.e., the priorities stated by the JCS, coupled with the request channel from the U.S. Embassy to the State Department with information to CINCPAC.[2]

(S) Based on the foregoing guidance, MACV cancelled the request for UH-1s and allied support, stating that the requirement would be passed to the RVNAF. In this message, MACV noted that RVN-titled assets provided to the ICCS because of U.S. shortfalls would require eventual replacement. This necessitated that any assets which might be applied against ICCS requirements not be retrograded.[3]

Support Cambodia Out of Thailand (SCOOT)

(S) On 27 October 1972, CINCPAC was directed by the JCS to develop a concept plan to support the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) from other than Vietnam bases. The plan was also to include provisions for the continued logistic support of Cambodia in the event that lines of communication (LOC) were interdicted by the enemy. CINCPAC's original concept plan, as refined during a CINCPAC-convened meeting in Bangkok, was transmitted to the JCS on 6 November. The CINCPAC plan provided for the establishment of a permanent liaison element of the MEDTC in Thailand. Other provisions of SCOOT included the re-location of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) ammunition pipeline from Vietnam to Thailand; the continuation of administrative and logistical

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCUSARPAC 140428Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 160139Z Feb 73, which cited, inter alia, CINCPAC 130007Z Feb 73 and JCS 9935/150028Z Feb 73.
3. COMUSMACV 160215Z Feb 73.

support to MEDTC personnel; and continuation of logistic support to Cambodia, including alternative LOC during enemy interdiction of surface LOC. The ammunition pipeline was to be relocated to Thailand in two phases, after which support procedures would correspond to the COLOGS concept for Laos, with MEDTC forecasting requirements, requisitioning air and ground munitions, calling forward munitions requirements from Thailand to maintain stock levels in Cambodia, and submitting air and surface transportation requirements to USARSUPTHAI. The long range objective of the ammunition support program was to shift from SCOOT to the use of an upgraded storage site at Kompong Som, with debarkation from deep draft vessels and onward surface movement via Route 4.[1]

(S) In Annex A of SCOOT, CINCPAC developed five LOC options, with various combinations of surface and air LOC. In the worst case, with the port of Kompong Som, the Mekong River, and overland routes 4 and 5 closed, all materiel support would be via airlift from U-Tapao to Pochentong Airfield in Phnom Penh. CINCPAC requested the JCS to approve the plan with authority to implement it by 12 November 1972. Qualified approval to implement was received on 14 November. The JCS noted that SCOOT would need to be reconciled and updated in consonance with the terms of a negotiated settlement in Southeast Asia. Also, the introduction of a MEDTC liaison team in Thailand would have to be negotiated with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) by the U.S. Ambassador. On 24 November, a U.S. Embassy message was quoted by COMUSMACTHAI which stated that informal approval had been obtained from the RTG Supreme Command to use the port of Vayama-Sattahip as the transshipment point for ammunition and other supplies to be shipped by sea to Cambodia. It was authorized that a small MEDTC liaison element would be stationed in Thailand, and emergency resupply by air from U-Tapao was also confirmed. The Thai spokesman (LGEN Kriangsak) said that approval in writing would be forthcoming, but that SCOOT could proceed in the meantime based on his oral assurances. At the same time, Kriangsak stated his expectation that sea transportation services would be procurred locally and that two maritime transportation companies owned by the RTG would be invited to bid.[2]

(S) Based on the tentative approval of the RTG, CINCPAC directed that SCOOT be implemented, and CINCUSARPAC directed the Commander, USARSUPTHAI to implement the plan effective 1 December 1972. On 28 November, MACTHAI notified CINCPAC that formal approval of SCOOT had been received by the Embassy from the RTG. The secret written approval stated that the sole stipulation was that the State-owned shipping lines,"...must be used to accomplish the water borne portion of the proposed logistics system...." MACTHAI stated that "bid closing" was

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 286-288.
2. Ibid.

scheduled for 28 November, and that negotiations between the Military Sealift Command, Far East (MSCFE) contracting officer and the "bidders" were scheduled to take place on 30 November.[1]

(S) In December 1972, the contracting agent for the U.S. prepared a request for proposal which was presented to the Thai Maritime Navigation Company (TMAR) and the Thai Navigation Company (TNAV). The proposals of both companies were totally unrealistic and negotiations provided little improvement. On 15 December 1972, the U.S. Embassy formally requested relief from the Thai stipulation that barge service be performed only by State-owned shipping lines.[2]

(C) On 19 January 1973, a conference was convened in Bangkok to discuss the problem. The flag-level conference was attended by representatives of the Thai Supreme Command Headquarters, Forward; MACTHAI; the U.S. Embassy; the TMAR; the TNAV; and the MSCFE contracting officer. The contracting officer reviewed the exorbitant bids submitted, the lower of which was $85 per metric ton, which was approximately three times the rate which could be expected from unrestricted bids in a competitive market. The Embassy representative remarked that logistic support to Cambodia was in the interest of area defense, and therefore, also in the Thai national interest. The position of the Thai representatives was, in essence, that:[3]

- The higher prices were the natural result of Thai wishes to build a broader Thai technological base by accomplishing the mission using Thai assets.
- That the U.S. was not restricted to using Thailand as the support base for logistic support of Cambodia, and that perhaps the U.S. should examine other alternatives.
- Urged that the contracting officer and the Thai company representatives continue to negotiate "with mutual sympathy."

(U) During negotiations conducted in February 1973, the TMAR offered a price of $63 per metric ton. If the U.S. assumed the cost of war risk insurance, the charge would be lowered to $57 per metric ton. The cost if the tugs and barges were furnished by the U.S. Government (GFE) would be only $26 per metric ton. However, the TMAR was not interested in this total GFE concept because it would not provide a sufficient profit margin. The MSCFE contracting

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1. Ibid.
2. J41 HistSum Feb 73; COMUSMACTHAI 180640Z Dec 72.
3. COMSCFE 230646Z Jan 73.

officer then presented a counterproposal to supply GFE barges only (six barges). The TMAR, under this concept, would furnish three tugs for which TMAR would contract. This plan would cost the U.S. $54 per metric ton; if the U.S. paid war risk insurance, the cost would be $48 per metric ton. In the opinion of the MSCFE representative, this was likely to be the best deal to be made under the original SCOOT stipulation, and both he and MACTHAI recommended they be given authority to contract at that figure.[1]

(S) While the negotiations with the Thai companies were underway, the JCS, on 29 January, directed CINCPAC to prepare a contingency plan to supply munitions to Cambodia from a PACOM source other than Thailand. On 10 February, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a formal Annex B to the SCOOT plan. Basically, the plan provided for sea and airlift of munitions from Okinawa to Cambodia. Upon execution, the Chief, MEDTC would advise PACOM Service components on initial munitions requirements. Thailand bound munitions would be diverted to Okinawa, where a 60 day stockage level would be established. On 2 March, the JCS approved the contingency plan, implementation of which required approval by the JCS.[2]

b4

[redacted]

1. USMACTHAI 081021Z Feb 73.
2. CINCPAC 102207Z Feb 73; JCS 6627/021744Z Mar 73.
3. COMUSMACTHAI 150740Z Feb 73; MSCO Thai 020915Z Mar 73.

b4



Consolidation Trends

(U) The concept of common supply support in overseas areas had received intensive study in past years. Joint Logistics Review Board (JLRB) studies had concluded that, while desirable and workable, the application of the common supply principle was handicapped by a lack of true common usage between the Services. More specifically, the JLRB had concluded that Defense Supply Agency (DSA) distribution points should not be established in combat areas. A decision to establish DSA distribution points in any overseas area should be thoroughly evaluated for such military considerations as responsiveness to military requirements, requirements for security, impact on military resources, conflict in demand for local resources and command relationships.[3]

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1. J47 HistSum Aug 73.
2. J47 HistSum Nov 73.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 273.

Management of Wholesale Subsistence Stocks

(U) In June 1972, CINCPAC had been asked to comment to the JCS on a DSA plan for world-wide integrated management of wholesale subsistence stocks. CINCPAC did not concur with several facets of the DSA proposals; e.g., decentralization of stocks to various overseas locations from centralized CONUS depots. Other areas of CINCPAC non-concurrence were in funding of the proposed additional wholesale storage facilities by the Services rather than the DSA and the fragmenting of centralized off-shore procurement by establishing separate subsistence procurement facilities. Referring to the command relationships reflected in the DSA proposal, CINCPAC stated that the major shortcoming was the proposed establishment of various Defense Regional Subsistence Offices in overseas countries. Command control was shown from the DSA to those offices, but command relationships between DSA, the Service components and the unified commands were not shown. This, in effect, introduced another major command right in the middle of forward logistics operations without addressing the issue of Service or unified commander responsibilities. Additionally, CINCPAC did not concur in the separation of inventory management from funding responsibility. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) did not operate overseas depots and was not directly involved. CINCPAC's Navy and Army component Services also did not concur with the DSA proposal.[1]

(U) Regardless of the foregoing, the DOD approved, in May 1973, a time-phased plan for world-wide integrated management of wholesale subsistence stocks by the Defense Personal Support Center (DPSC). The plan provided for overall policy direction and control by the DSA. Inventory management of non-perishable items was centralized at the DPSC. Inventory management of perishable stocks was decentralized to regional subsistence offices to be established in CONUS and overseas. Excluded from DSA ownership and management were military Service stocks for satellite end use customers at posts, camps, stations, bases or ships. Also excluded were PWRS, which remained the responsibility of the Services. A Defense Subsistence Regional Office-Pacific was scheduled for activation in Hawaii on 1 February 1974, concurrently with DSA assumption of control over non-perishable subsistence stocks in Hawaii. Defense Subsistence Offices were also scheduled for establishment in Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, Guam, Thailand and Japan.[2]

Defense Retail Inter-Service Support (DRIS)

(U) The DRIS program existed to encourage and promote the effective use of military administrative, logistics and services support between DOD and non-

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 274, 275.
2. J46 HistSum Nov 73.

DOD agencies in the PACOM. During 1973, the CINCPAC Instruction to implement the DRIS Manual, DOD 4000.19M was revised to reflect the change in terminology from the former Defense Retail Interservice Logistics Support (DRILS). The new DRIS designation emphasized that interservice support at the retail level did not apply only to the field of logistics. Retail level inter-servicing was defined as interservice support between field levels (such as bases, posts, camps, stations or installations) of DOD components and other departments or agencies of the Federal Government. All elements of command and staff involved in retail level support were inexorably involved with DRIS. In addition to logistics, such functions as personnel, administration, family housing, commissary, exchange, and troop support activities as well as retail communications and intelligence support were subject to the DRIS program. DRIS offered a significant means of promoting the effective use of support and eliminating unjustified duplication. Responsibilities for the detailed execution, record-keeping and reporting functions of the DRIS program, as detailed in the CINCPAC Instruction, were:[1]

a. The CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office will continue to exercise jurisdiction over POL matters.

b. Service Component Commanders were to provide and/or request interservice and inter-departmental support whenever such support is available and its provision will increase overall efficiency and economy without impairing military operational capabilities.

(U) Specifically, component commanders were to conduct aggressive programs to make optimum use of consolidation, joint use and interservicing procedures and capabilities consistent with mission responsibilities, efficiency, and economy of operation. Also, they were to insure that retail interservice support concepts and objectives are widely disseminated and understood at all working and staff levels.[2]

(U) An Interservice Support Coordinator (ISC) was to be appointed as the Program Manager (PM) and the single point of contact for all interservice logistic support matters. He also represented his service on the CINCPAC Joint Interservice Support Board (JISB), and was the staff member responsible for program administration and monitorship. Contingency plans for component and subordinate unified commands were to specify requirements for interservice

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1. J43 HistSum Nov 73.
2. Ibid.

support and be fully coordinated with other services to insure mutual recognition of requirements and provisions to accomplish stated missions.[1]

Property Disposal Consolidation

(U) Prior to 30 June 1973, the military services were responsible for the management of property disposal operations in PACOM. CINCPAC designated the component Service responsible for operation of property disposal sales offices and holding activities within specific geographical areas to eliminate duplication of functions. In April 1972, a decision was made by the DOD to integrate the DOD property disposal program world-wide under management of the Defense Supply Agency, and, on 30 June 1973 the Defense Property Disposal Region (DPDR)-Pacific was activated in Hawaii under command of DSA.[2]

(U) The commander of the DPDR-Pacific was responsible for the operational execution of assigned regional disposal functions including reutilization, surveillance, property accounting and the disposal of military assistance program (MAP) property in support of the military services and other authorized customers. He also would implement and monitor the DOD security trade control program for sales of foreign excess personal property and disposable MAP property. All of the subordinate Defense Property Disposal Offices (DPDOs) to be established in the PACOM were under the command and control of the commander, DPDR, who was initially assigned 14 military and 123 U.S. civilian spaces.[3]

(U) There were seven detachments of the DPDR-Pacific located in Guam, Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Okinawa, Japan and Thailand. The detachments were responsible for the operation of 22 DPDOs throughout PACOM. DSA planned to assume mission responsibility for disposal operations in Vietnam by 31 January 1974. DOD directives defined command relationships and provided the unified commander the same authority over DSA elements as he had over service components within his command. Interservice support agreements were negotiated prior to transfer of the disposal mission to assure continued support of disposal operations under DSA.[4]

Environmental Protection

(U) During 1973, CINCPAC was represented on the State of Hawaii Committee on Disposal and Study of Hazardous Chemicals and Materials by the chief of

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1. Ibid.
2. J46 HistSum Feb 73; DSA 301548Z Mar 73.
3. Ibid.; J46 HistSum Mar 73.
4. Ibid.

the Inter-Service Support Division, Directorate of Logistics. This committee identified all types and varieties of chemical compounds and materials available and in use in Hawaii. It also conducted a survey on chemical compounds to determine both the quantity and the means of disposition used. Regulations governing the use and disposition were drafted for submission to the State Legislature for enactment.[1]

(U) The Federal Executive Board was convened to assist the State in developing a data base to provide a Federal inventory of hazardous material; to catalogue disposal sites and treatment facilities used; to catalogue existing disposal practices by Agency; and, to explore improved methods for the disposal of hazardous and toxic chemicals.[2]

Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA)

(U) During the first half of fiscal year 1973, 1,162 ISSAs were continued or initiated between PACOM component Services. By the end of the fiscal year, 1,207 ISSAs amounting to approximately $60 million were in effect. The PACOM accounted for 39 percent of the ISSAs world-wide.[3]

PACOM Utilization and Distribution Agency (PURA)

(U) During calendar year 1973, PURA received reports of excess materiel valued at $301.3 million, and made referrals for $40 million. In October 1973, America Samoa was added as a participant by order of the Secretary of Defense.[4]

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1. J43 HistSum Dec 73.
2. Ibid.
3. J46 HistSum Feb 73; J43 HistSum Sep 73.
4. J46 HistSum Dec 73.

SECTION II

PETROLEUM, OIL, LUBRICANTS (POL)

Arab Oil Embargo

(S) The strategic importance to the PACOM of protecting sea lines of communication (LOC), especially for POL support, had long been recognized by CINCPAC and documented in many official histories. This key consideration was also stressed in all posture statements and war plans. Alternatives to PACOM reliance on mid-East oil had also been addressed in contingency plans and position papers. The oil embargo imposed by the Arab nations as a factor in the Israeli-Arab "Yom Kippur" conflict on 1973 once again focused attention on the strategic implications for the PACOM. To provide historical perspective and to facilitate comparison, the following extract from the CINCPAC Command History for 1967 is quoted:[1]

> The Middle East Crisis and POL for PACOM
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> (S) Weeks before the fighting erupted over the Israeli-Arab frontiers, PACOM planners were already considering a potential POL shortage for the Vietnam conflict. At that time, PACOM was consuming more POL (especially JP-4) than was called for in the existing general war plans. The Arab countries controlled over 45 percent of the world's oil supply and their statesmen well knew the value of petroleum as an economic weapon. Approximately 8 million barrels of the 12 million barrel monthly PACOM requirement came from Middle East sources. Any loss because of an Israeli-Arab confrontation would necessitate substantial increases in the amounts of POL being shipped from the Western Hemisphere. "Until full support from the Western Hemisphere could be realized, additional transportation would be required for increased shuttles from Japan and Hawaii to other PACOM areas in order to redistribute inventories to high consuming areas."
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> (S) Accordingly, on 27 May 1967, CINCPAC requested JCS "to keep CINCPAC informed of Washington plans related to the current and potential Mid East developments." Within two

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I, pp. 157-160.

days, JCS came back with a question as to CINCPAC's capability to sustain operations in the event oil shipments from the Middle East were stopped. Using the existing PACOM inventories and level of inputs from the Western Hemisphere, the following projections were made: JP-4 fuel -- 70 days; automotive gasoline (mogas) -- 100 days; diesel fuel -- 60 days; Navy Special Fuel Oil (NSFO) -- 75 days. Aviation gasoline and JP-5 fuel were already being supplied from the Western Hemisphere sources and no problems were anticipated in sustaining this support.

(S) These projections, however, forecasted a total depletion of PACOM inventories within the time frame indicated, a position which was completely unacceptable. It was considered essential to maintain PACOM inventories at "a 30 day level in order to retain a minimum General War Capability." As a result, CINCPAC recommended to JCS an immediate expansion of the POL input from the Western Hemisphere and stated his requirement to hold a 30-day supply for general war needs.

(S) As predicted, when fighting finally broke out in early June, Arab nations threatened to cut off oil shipments to any nation siding with Israel. Then, as the Israeli Blitzkrieg rolled on, such countries as Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia shut down their petroleum production, while Egypt closed the Suez Canal. It became apparent that oil from Persian Gulf sources could not be relied upon and that alternate supply lines would have to be opened. The question now became the extent of the world's vulnerability to Arab blackmail.

(S) No one knew how long the Arabs would sit on their oil, and one immediate threat for American planners was the POL needs of Vietnam. Since the oil fields of the Middle East were providing 60 percent of the US POL requirements in Vietnam, considerable concern was felt within the US defense community. Moreover, the closing of the Suez Canal had changed the world tanker market overnight from a depressed state to a condition of over-demand.

(S) As early as 6 June, informal contacts between PACOM J4 personnel and JCS sources had indicated "urgent POL meetings between Interior and Industry Advisory Committee, and in JCS and OSD/DFSC regarding PACOM and world-wide POL supply

problems." Two days later, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had ordered "the implementation of the plans to place 35 ships with 6.5 million barrels of cargo afloat in PACOM." Moreover, news releases were quoting the Secretary of Defense as saying that US industry could meet all Southeast Asia POL requirements if Mid-East sources were lost. A prominent news magazine said McNamara was prepared to ship "oil to Vietnam from West Coast and Caribbean refineries--even though the total cost of oil for the war would be more than doubled."

(S) By 12 June, however, the situation had stabilized somewhat and would become serious only if the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) encountered added delays in contracting for Western Hemisphere shipping. PACOM logistics planners closely monitored this aspect of the crisis and, just five days later, could report:

> PACOM POL supply pipelines are beginning to reform in keeping with adjustments made necessary by the Mid-East disruptions. Although there will be some inventory drawdowns, no serious shortages are anticipated. Necessary actions are in process to insure that none of the drawdowns or shortages are felt in SEA or the key island bases supporting combat operations.

(S) By August, the overall impact of the Middle East crisis on the PACOM Southeast Asia POL posture was practically over. Consumption in the war zone for June had hit 4.6 million barrels, but resupply had been met. Moreover, by the end of July, the MSTS liftings from the Persian Gulf were back to 90 percent of pre-Mid East Crisis levels. Early in August, all "except 9 of the 34 tankers which were chartered shortly after the start of the Middle East situation to compensate for the reduced availability of product from the Persian Gulf area have now discharged their cargoes." Eight of the remaining tankers were then enroute.

(S) By the middle of September, no major problems of POL supply availability existed. As JCS reported, when military shipments from the Persian Gulf were denied on 7 June, it only "required approximately 30-45 days to completely reorient the supply system to Western Hemisphere sources." Finally, on 21 September, JCS made "the final report on the

POL implication of the Middle East situation." With the lifting of their embargoes by Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, oil shipments to the US military returned to normal. Although the continuing closure of the Suez Canal maintained a tight balance between tanker supply and demand, the POL crisis was ended for the time being. PACOM logistic planners, of course, would continue to monitor world-wide tanker availability, as well as petroleum supply, to insure a sufficient stream of the essential POL to the trouble spots of Southeast Asia.

Pre-Embargo POL Situation

(C) The foregoing extract from the 1967 history, with minor substitutions, could well have served as the history of POL usage and shortage in the Pacific theater during 1973. The six intervening years, however, had worked some major differences in cause and effect which were historically significant. Foremost among these was the world-wide surge in demand for petroleum products. Increased power generation, pollution control devices and expanded transportation usage were factors in the surge. Militating against a possible solution was the lobby of environmental activists who opposed further exploration and development by the oil companies. Complicating the emerging crude oil shortages was the reluctance of the oil companies to build refineries in the U.S. to process the higher levels of crude being consumed. The result was an energy crisis which had been acknowledged and acted upon by the U.S. military establishment many months before the Arab-Israeli war and the oil embargo.[1]

(C) There was no refinery or storage paucity in the Pacific basin countries. In the years between 1967 and 1973, commercial refineries and storage facilities had greatly increased. The major problem, from CINCPAC's standpoint, was that 90 percent of the POL used by military forces in the PACOM was from the Middle East. Of that percentage, 80 percent was delivered to commercial refineries in the PACOM area, either by contract destination delivery or by Military Sealift Command (MSC) tankers.[2]

(U) A CINCPAC Instruction had existed for several years which assigned the function of advisory allocation of POL and facilities under emergency conditions to the PACOM Joint Petroleum Office/Sub-Area Petroleum Office

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1. J4411 Point Paper, 23 Jun 73, Subj: International Petroleum Situation.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 320; J4412 Point Paper, 23 Jun 73, Subj: Alternate POL Supply Contingency Plans if Arabian Gulf POL Denied PACOM U.S. Military Forces.

(JPO/SAPO) system. Most subordinate command implementing instructions, however, were directed toward temporary shortages to be handled on a case-by-case basis within limited geographical areas. The Defense Fuels Supply Center (DFSC) had also developed a contingency plan (2-70, dated 8 April 1970), the purpose of which was to cope with events such as the Suez Canal crisis of 1967. In April 1973, the DOD Military Logistics Council established a Fuels and Energy Subcommittee to study the impact of a possible military fuel shortage. To support the subcommittee study, the JCS requested information from the unified commanders as to current and future methods of allocating fuel in their respective areas. CINCPAC's response noted that existing plans for comparatively short term shortages were not applicable to extended energy crisis planning. An allocation system over a long term was a new dimension in POL planning. Regardless, CINCPAC considered the existing JPO/SAPO system to be potentially responsive to a prolonged allocation system:[1]

* * * * *

> ...The existing JPO/SAPO system functions well to move malpositioned stocks to cover competing demands. It diverts tankers. It authorizes temporary violations of prepositioned war reserve stock levels when required. Believe that the CINCPAC J4 JPO/SAPO system, operating through an impartial joint command structure, offers best channel through which to process requirements, monitor priorities and manage allocations.
>
> Development of an allocation system must recognize that product is supplied overseas by two subsystems: Local contractor delivery and MSC tanker bulk delivery. Allocation procedure must control defense fuel supply center (DFSC) local delivery subsystem as well as control quantities of product issued by military terminals/supply points. It must provide coordination between theater commander and commander DFSC. In view of the operational responsibilities of the CINC and the tasking of the CINC as agent for execution of the CDR DFSC's material management responsibilities overseas, believe that the joint commander is logical allocating authority within his geographic area.

(S) On 19 May 1973, the Deputy Secretary of Defense implemented the President's national energy conservation program. He directed the Service Departments and Defense Agencies to make every effort to reduce fuel consumption

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1. J44 HistSum May 73; CINCPAC 052208Z May 73.

commensurate with full support of combat operations and the maintenance of military readiness. The CINCPAC component commands immediately instituted programs which reduced consumption of POL products by factors averaging 10 to 15 percent. If deeper cuts were imposed, or if the initial reductions were continued for an extended period, the Service component operational capabilities would be adversely affected.[1]

(S) In mid-1973, the situation in the PACOM had not yet deteriorated dangerously. The CINCPAC logistics staff anticipated no PACOM readiness degradation through December 1973 because all requirements were under procurement, with product and dollars available. Since price increases for 1974 had already been announced, however, more budget dollars to cover price increases would be needed, regardless of the reprogramming and conservation efforts of the Services. Should the existing petroleum situation drastically deteriorate, the consensus was that the use of PWRS would be unavoidable to meet surge requirements. The following table shows the overall status, by product, in the PACOM as of 23 October 1973:[2]

War Reserve Status by Product
(Figures In Million BBLS)

Product	Total Storage	Usable Storage	PWRR	PWRS	(23 Oct) Current Inv.	DOS
AVGAS	.9	.7	.4	.4	.3	69
JP4	10.7*	8.8	10.2	6.3	7.1	74
JP5	4.8	4.5	3.8	2.8	3.0	300
MOGAS	1.0	.8	.5	.5	.5	59
NSFO	3.3	2.1	1.6	1.6	1.3	77
ND	7.3	5.3	3.3	3.3	3.6	185
DIESEL	2.6	2.3	1.1	1.1	1.4	64
TOTALS	30.6	24.5	20.9	16.0	17.2	

* 2.2 million barrels Japan JP4 storage out-of-service.
1.2 million barrels returned by March 1974.

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1. J441 Point Paper, 26 Oct 73, Subj: PACOM Readiness/Conservation of Petroleum Fuels, which cited DEPSECDEF Memo 19 May 73, Conservation of Petroleum Fuels.
2. J4412 Talking Paper, 23 Jun 73, Subj: International Petroleum Situation; J441 Point Paper, 26 Oct 73, Subj: PACOM POL War Reserve Status (Prior to Embargo).

Embargo Declared - 23 October 1973

(S) The denial of Mid-East petroleum had the direct effect of eliminating the sources of refined products brought to the PACOM from Arabian Gulf refineries. This amounted to 35 to 40 percent of consumption. The use of PWRS was required immediately to maintain consumption at current levels. The first impact was felt on the supply of JP4 fuel for the B-52s at Sattahip, Thailand, Navy Special and Navy Distillate for the Western Pacific, and Diesel Fuel for all PACOM areas. By location, the combined fuel status for the PACOM on 23 October was:[1]

PWRR Status By Location
(Figures In Million BBLS)

Country	PWRR	PWRS	Usable Storage
Hawaii	3.6	4.6	7.3
Guam	3.1	2.3	2.7
Okinawa	2.2	1.0	1.8
Japan	5.2	4.8	6.9
Korea	1.7	.7	.9
Thailand	0	0	.9
Taiwan	0	0	.9
Adak	.2	.1	.2
Philippines	4.9	2.5	2.9
Totals	20.9	16.0	24.5

(S) On 23 October, the DFSC advised that it would attempt to obtain replacement sources. In view of the world-wide shortage of product, difficulty in procuring required quantities and possible impact on friendly governments of actions taken by the Mid-East governments, the DFSC considered the situation to be critical. Immediate and stringent fuel conservation measures were imperative. The JCS advised that the loss of Arabian crude oil and refinery products would be felt more in some theaters than others, listing the DOD reliance on Arabian oil as:[2]

CINCPAC	91%	CINCAL	11%
USCINCSO	20%	CINCLANT	63%
USCINCEUR	69%	CONUS	15%

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1. Ibid.
2. J44 HistSum Oct 73; DFSC 231819Z Oct 73; JCS 4528/262020Z Oct 73.

(S) On 28 October, CINCPAC directed the component Service commands and USSAG in Thailand to initiate immediate conservation measures, including curtailed operations wherever practicable. On 31 October, CINCPAC reported to the JCS on the absolutely essential, minimum amounts of fuel, by category, needed to sustain operations through 31 December 1973. The most critical fuels were cited, by Service, as were the projected PWRS violation dates and product shortfalls. A summary of the RVNAF POL situation as projected to the end of 1973 was also provided. Initiatives had been taken in the PACOM as immediate fuel conservation measures which constituted a 13 percent reduction from the peacetime operating consumption of the September-October 1973 period.[1]

(C) By 2 November, the DFSC advised that JP4 inventories at a number of CONUS DFSC terminals were approaching the critical stage. There were indications that refineries throughout the world could be forced to terminate shipments to their U.S. Government customers under threat of curtailment of crude oil supplies from Arab sources. The DFSC warned that further deterioration of DOD POL inventories must be expected. The Department of Interior had approved the implementation of the Defense Production Act (DPA), but approval by higher authority had not yet been given.[2]

Embargo Broadened

(C) In November, the DFSC situation reports stated that the DOD had been accorded a special priority for the purchase of petroleum products from U.S. suppliers under terms of the DPA of 1950. The Department of Interior was authorized to issue directives to U.S. suppliers requiring them, regardless of other existing contracts and orders, to furnish POL products specified by the DFSC. This authority applied to DOD essential requirements through 31 December 1973, which amounted to a combined 19.7 million barrels (less than two percent of total U.S. consumption). The DFSC provided details of a "mandatory middle distillate fuel allocation program" which applied to all U.S. military posts, camps and stations, and to Federal agencies. The products covered were heating oils, kerosene and all diesel fuels. The program was based on a percentage-of-previous-consumption principle. By 16 November, the possibility that the embargo could be extended to friendly U.S. suppliers had become a reality. The crude oil embargo had been extended, regardless of location, to any refinery using Arab crude oil. Such a total embargo involved a potential loss to the U.S. military establishment of approximately 48 percent of its world-wide contract support. In the Pacific theater, the effect had already been severe:[3]

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1. CINCPAC 280100Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 310545Z Oct 73.
2. DFSC 022110Z Nov 73.
3. J44 HistSum Nov 73; DFSC 092022Z Nov 73, 162140Z Nov 73, and 302152Z Nov 73.

- Vietnam, Thailand, Laos: EXXON, CALTEX, Summit and Asiatic had cancelled all product liftings into those countries.

- Guam: GORCO, a major supplier in the Pacific area, faced total deprivation of crude oil by mid-December.

- The Philippines: The Philippine Government, facing critical domestic oil shortage, was exerting pressure to reduce sales to U.S. military forces. EXXON had already terminated deliveries.

- Japan: EXXON had established a 44 percent quota system against all existing contracts. Gulf had cancelled, and other suppliers were expected to reduce quantities.

- Okinawa: Shipments from the EXXON refinery on Okinawa to the U.S. military forces in the theater had been discontinued on 8 November. The Sekiyu refinery had reduced quantity, and Gulf had cancelled.

Operational Impact

(C) Had the Arab embargo been restricted to oil destined for U.S. facilities, the overall impact on PACOM operations would not have been unmanageable. While the world-wide energy crisis had caused conservation measures to be imposed, the key to operations in the Pacific was the continued access to refineries and storage facilities in other Pacific countries. As previously noted, about 80 percent of the petroleum products used by U.S. military forces in the PACOM was obtained from these commercial sources. In the Philippines, the U.S. Embassy reported that all exports of petroleum products refined in the Philippines were suspended. The bunkering of foreign flag vessels and refueling of foreign flag commercial aircraft was limited to a fuel allocation sufficient to make the next port of call or airport. Oil companies operating in the Philippines were directed to reduce supplies to all customers, including U.S. Government installations such as Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. The Embassy also anticipated the sale of ESSO Philippines to the Philippine Government. Also, a separate branch of the parent EXXON company called ESSO Eastern was closed on 31 December 1973, although this was not connected with the proposed sale of ESSO Philippines. It was the Ambassador's opinion that

the progressive inroads on POL access would have a major effect on U.S. military, administrative and propaganda actions on a world-wide basis.[1]

(C) Of more immediate operational impact was the sudden action taken by the Government of Singapore (GOS). On 8 November, an ESSO Eastern representative informed the U.S. State Department that the GOS had demanded the termination of all fuel shipments from the ESSO Singapore refinery to U.S. military installations in Southeast Asia and Guam. Included in the ban was U.S. naval ship bunkering. EXXON International cited an alleged Saudi Arabian Government insistence that all EXXON/ESSO refineries receiving Saudi crude oil not supply U.S. military requirements, and invoked a "force majeure" contract clause negating the existing contract. On 10 November, the GOS officially decreed that no POL product be shipped to any embargoed destination, and specifically not to U.S. military forces. Almost immediately, Shell Oil and CALTEX informed U.S. officials in Singapore that they too would not honor existing contracts. All of the oil companies alleged that their actions were directed by the GOS.[2]

(C) In view of the press guidance issued by the State Department, it appeared to be U.S. policy to treat the GOS directive to the oil companies simply as a matter between private commercial interests and a foreign government. On 13 November, the U.S. Embassy informed the State Department that a Boston Globe correspondent in Singapore had filed a story that, "as of yesterday (November 12) five Singapore oil refineries were notified that they could no longer sell petroleum to U.S. Navy." When queried for verification, the Embassy told the correspondent it was not in a position to comment. The Embassy asked for guidance, since, "...it is widely known in Singapore that oil companies are not filling USN requirements...." However, Ambassador Cronk noted:[3]

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> 3. The GOS has not repeat not raised this matter with us in any fashion, and would be embarrassed and unhappy if we were to involve them publicly in situation. Therefore, it is important in any response to press queries here or elsewhere that we do not state or imply that Government of Singapore has requested oil companies to stop supplying U.S. military requirements even if press reports so allege.

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1. AMEMB Manila 12481/061022Z Nov 73; AMEMB Manila 13465/040943Z Dec 73; Among the U.S. installations affected was the Voice of America facility in the Philippines.
2. J44 HistSum Nov 73; SECSTATE 220962/082245Z Nov 73; AMEMB Singapore 4327/090945Z Nov 73; AMEMB Singapore 4418/150800Z Nov 73; USDAO Singapore 1584/130910Z Nov 73; USNAVOFF Singapore 3435/130810Z Nov 73.
3. AMEMB Singapore 4382/130950Z Nov 73.

(C) The Embassy proposed to reply that, "...Certain oil companies have informed us that they are unable to supply petroleum products under existing DOD contracts...." The State Department concurred in the proposed Embassy response, including the avoidance of any reference to the GOS position.[1]

(C) The next day (14 November) the Embassy advised State that it was under heavy pressure from locally based foreign correspondents seeking more information about the oil cutoff. The most frequently asked questions were:

- What was the tonnage of fuel purchased by the U.S. Navy in Singapore?
- Did fuel for the U.S. Air Force units based in Thailand come from Singapore?
- What were the alternate fuel sources for the Seventh Fleet and Thai-based Air Force units?

The Embassy proposed to answer the first question as soon as pertinent statistics were available, and asked how DOD and State would answer the others.[2]

(C) Two separate messages replied to the 14 November Embassy query. The first provided the text of a press briefing in Washington regarding the Singapore petroleum cutbacks. One press question asked about the effect on the U.S. of the second-hand oil embargoes imposed by the Philippines and Singapore on U.S. requirements, particularly for military forces. The reply acknowledged that the U.S. Government was aware of pressure being applied on the oil companies by their Arab suppliers of crude oil, and that the companies would not be able to continue, "...supplying our Navy requirement out there...." The spokesman denied knowledge of details or impact, but had "the impression" that the Navy could handle the problem. Also, and in reply to a question regarding official protests to Singapore and the Philippines, the spokesman for the U.S. Government indicated unawareness of any such possibility since the actions were taken by the oil companies. The second message noted that answers to specific questions cited by the Embassy would reflect operational and contingency capabilities and limitations of U.S. and allied forces in the Pacific, and therefore were not releasable to the press. State noted that similar questions had been received in Washington, and stressed the low key response given that, "....overall situation in Pacific area is troubling but

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1. Ibid.; SECSTATE 223949/132131Z Nov 73.
2. AMEMB Singapore 4410/140950Z Nov 73.

not crucial. The U.S. has military fuel reserves which could be shipped to the Pacific if necessary."[1]

(C) It was true that the situation in the Pacific was troubling but not crucial. Regardless of the impetus of the secondary embargoes or the political ramifications, the situation could have been disastrous if the U.S. military forces had still been actively engaged in combat operations. As it was, the impact of the Singapore situation was swift and severe. All RVNAF, FANK and DAO Saigon POL requirements previously supplied from Singapore were immediately cut off. The U.S. Air Force up-country Thailand POL resupply from Singapore also ceased. Transiting U.S. Air Force aircraft and U.S. Navy ships could no longer receive fuel at Singapore. The CINCPAC Logistics staff took prompt action to provide the POL needed in Cambodia and Vietnam through 31 December 1973 from PACOM military stocks, including PWRS. The Air Force requirements in Thailand also were met from PACOM stocks.[2]

PACOM Energy Crisis-Impact and Policy

(U) The guidance given to the Embassy in Singapore pertaining to press and public affairs policy was consistent with that previously established as the norm for all energy and fuel problems. In August, the DOD announced the formation of a Joint Defense Energy Task Group to recommend improvements in the overall management of energy resources in the DOD. In September, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD:PA) di.ected that no public comment concerning DOD energy/fuel resources, use, problems pertaining thereto, statistical data or policy be made without prior coordination with ASD(PA). This directive was amplified in November to state that there had been no intent to preclude command-wide or local level internal information programs to educate military and civilian personnel regarding energy conservation measures. Neither were responses forbidden to query on such non-controversial measures as had been instituted locally. If queried as to whether operational readiness or effectiveness had been impaired, the response was to state, "We have been directed to take vigorous conservation measures which will not impair operational readiness or effectiveness, and that is what we are doing." References to specific amounts of fuel shortages and/or levels of savings effected through conservation efforts were prohibited, but general statements describing the types of actions taken were permitted.[3]

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1. SECSTATE 225088/142248Z Nov 73; SECSTATE 226028/152252Z Nov 73.
2. J44 HistSum Nov 73; CINCPAC 172250Z Nov 73.
3. SECDEF 3186/122023Z Sep 73; SECDEF 3211/082118Z Nov 73.

1973 POL CONSUMPTION

(in thousands of barrels)

BY PRODUCT

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
JP-4	5,636.4	4,015.4	3,960.1	4,176.3	4,398.9	3,788.6	3,487.5	3,204.8	2,427.3	2,163.6	1,959.2	1,348.4	40,566.5
JP-5	775.5	546.0	672.8	575.4	471.7	474.4	369.3	323.8	436.6	461.3	245.7	234.4	5,586.9
AVGAS	162.4	141.1	135.3	142.7	129.0	130.7	134.4	132.6	119.6	132.0	82.3	59.2	1,501.3
MOGAS	397.4	292.9	286.2	261.8	250.0	255.0	226.4	214.1	239.3	211.1	208.7	170.2	3,013.1
Diesel	1,105.6	903.6	994.4	754.8	617.4	659.6	620.5	693.9	580.6	615.2	569.8	612.0	8,727.4
NSFO	1,407.4	1,465.4	901.0	776.9	708.9	508.9	647.7	639.5	476.0	521.0	503.9	536.7	9,093.3
NDF	982.9	486.5	726.3	834.9	552.4	581.1	600.0	584.0	593.6	651.9	381.9	528.5	7,504.0
Total	10,467.6	7,850.9	7,676.1	7,522.8	7,128.3	6,398.3	6,085.8	5,792.7	4,873.0	4,756.1	3,951.5	3,489.4	75,992.5

BY AREA

Guam	1,847.9	1,005.7	1,090.0	1,342.5	1,290.6	928.7	985.1	755.8	514.0	457.1	188.7	226.5	10,632.6
Hawaii	881.4	779.0	862.3	817.4	764.0	600.0	674.4	1,002.4	875.6	742.7	558.3	461.6	9,019.1
Japan	1,797.2	1,855.8	1,239.4	1,026.0	1,188.3	962.6	669.7	828.9	768.2	1,022.8	945.1	965.9	13,269.9
Korea	394.0	312.2	309.6	268.1	209.0	283.1	175.0	145.1	188.3	172.0	193.6	225.6	2,875.6
Philippines	2,404.4	1,348.0	1,551.7	1,567.9	1,163.6	1,123.9	1,032.2	886.6	980.6	864.5	612.1	807.5	14,343.0
Taiwan	202.0	215.7	222.8	144.3	87.6	158.2	177.3	107.0	105.9	129.2	130.8	63.1	1,743.9
Thailand	1,736.7	1,572.4	1,592.3	1,709.7	1,823.5	1,776.2	1,652.1	1,385.1	852.5	796.1	916.0	442.6	16,255.2
Vietnam	1,204.0	762.1	808.0	646.9	601.7	565.6	720.0	681.8	587.9	571.7	406.9	296.6	7,853.2
Total	10,467.6	7,850.9	7,676.1	7,522.8	7,128.3	6,398.3	6,085.8	5,792.7	4,873.0	4,756.1	3,951.5	3,489.4	75,992.5

BULK POL DATA, PACOM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973



UNCLASSIFIED


PACOM POL CONSUMPTION
(IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS)
JP-4
JP-5
NSFO
ND
DIESEL
AVGAS
MOGAS
121.3
75.9
200
150
100
50
0
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

(U) Strong support for the nation's energy conservation effort continued to emanate from the highest DOD echelons. On 9 November, the Secretary of Defense directed all DOD agencies to immediately implement the Presidential directive that the speed of all government motor vehicles not exceed 50 miles per hour except in emergencies. All thermostat settings were to be reduced to 65-68 degrees. On 15 November, ASD(PA) noted that, as the nation's single largest user of energy, DOD activities would receive public attention and should be conducted in a manner such as to set an example in the energy conservation program. Such activities as fly-bys, tours, demonstrations and other public affairs support activities were to be closely scrutinized and weighed against the best national interest. On 28 November, the Secretary of the Navy directed all naval agencies to give full and aggressive support to the energy conservation program. Standards and goals were set for heating, lights, cooling levels, training necessity and/or consolidation, equipment support systems, recreational/educational activities, car pools and mass transit and internal indoctrination of personnel.[1]

Allocation of Automotive Gasoline, PACOM

(C) The Arab oil embargo hit the PACOM the hardest of the unified commands. This was partly because its consumption had been the highest, but primarily because of its almost total reliance on Mid-East sources. When the DPA was invoked to direct the American oil industry to support DOD requirements, it became apparent that DOD support, coupled with the denial of normal Arab supplies to the U.S., reduced considerably the amount of fuel available to the American public. Two products in particular were in common use by the military and civilian sectors--diesel fuel and automotive gasoline (MOGAS). In late November, the CINCPAC staff began to formulate a plan to allocate MOGAS usage in the PACOM based on a percentage of previous consumption.[2]

(S) Although Service-directed conservation programs had been instituted, differences in application existed between geographical areas and, in Exchange sales, occasionally between individuals within an area. The CINCPAC concept was to standardize MOGAS allocations by a previous consumption percentage through his subordinate unified commands, and through his CINCPAC Representatives in areas not encompassed in a subordinate unified command. Practically, such a system would conserve MOGAS reserves by extending "run-out" dates and by reducing the quantities shipped from the CONUS for resupply. Tangentially,

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1. SECDEF 3260/090027Z Nov 73; SECDEF 4622/151501Z Nov 73; SECNAV 281744Z Nov 73.
2. J441 Point Paper, 29 Nov 73, Subj: Allocation of MOGAS.

such a theater-wide program would demonstrate to subordinates and higher headquarters, to foreign allies, and to the U.S. civilian sector that positive efforts to conserve fuel had been made by the military in the PACOM. On 15 December, CINCPAC directed the establishment of a formal system of MOGAS allocation throughout the PACOM, based on a rate of 80 percent of the March-June 1973 usage. Consumption was measured by the net drawdown on terminal tankage, which allowed reasonably close control without undue extra workload.[1]

CINCPAC Views the Energy Crisis

(U) As discussed previously, it was U.S. policy, supported by the U.S. military in general and CINCPAC in particular, to meet the energy crisis directly and to take positive measures to conserve the available energy supply. On 4 December 1973, Admiral Noel Gayler was interviewed on the Columbia Broadcasting System Morning News program. The subject was the fuel shortage and its affect on the military. The following excerpts, while not verbatim, aptly summarized the situation in the PACOM:[2]

> For over a month now we've been taking the most drastic kind of economy measures. We've had airplanes sitting on the ground which is a very bad thing; we've cut back on the use of motor vehicles and on the use of electricity; we're turning out the lights; we've been cutting down on heating fuel....Most of the fuel we use, however, is aviation jet fuel. Many people think that the military uses a lot of fuel and we do use a lot but not compared to the total amount that the country uses. The Defense Department as a whole uses less than 4 percent and the Pacific Command uses about 1 percent of the country's fuel, but we are trying very hard to share the problem and to do everything possible we can do to cut down on our fuel usage....

(U) Responding to a question regarding the extent of operational cutbacks in flying time and ship steaming time, the Admiral stated:[3]

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1. Ibid.; J44 HistSum Dec 73; CINCPAC 290407Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 150325Z Dec 73.
2. CINCPAC 050238Z Dec 73.
3. Ibid.

> Well, in the flying time with jets, we're now operating at about half our normal level. With the ships, it's rather more difficult to make drastic changes in that much of a hurry and we're saving about 20 percent of the ship fuel.

(U) Referring to a remark by Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the JCS, that a naval or air force needed to practice to maintain combat capability, Admiral Gayler said:[1]

> Admiral Moorer was totally right....If for example, a carrier pilot, who may be catapulted off in the middle of the black night, hasn't had enough flying under his belt recently then the chances of an accident go up. And that's true for most military flying. In addition, their capability to do the job goes down just like it does with any other difficult and complex skill. It's so very important to us to keep (up) the readiness of those forces and I hope everybody understands that it takes very little fuel. It's very important that we have it. I don't think we should continue at this very low level for too long.

POL in Southeast Asia

Vietnam Shuttle Tankers

(U) It was stated in the CINCPAC Command History for 1972 that, on 9 December 1972, the last MSC tanker to deliver POL to Vietnam departed Vietnam waters. It was also stated that, in mid-December, tankers owned by Shell and ESSO commenced delivery, thus ending seven years of MSC POL deliveries to Vietnam. Shuttle tankers operated by MSC, however, continued in operation. By the end of 1972, only two shuttle tankers remained in service.[2]

(S) On 10 January 1973, MACV stated that the remaining shuttle tankers would not be needed in Vietnam 15 days after a ceasefire was declared. On 27 January, the JCS advised CINCPAC that, under the ceasefire terms, POL products for Southeast Asia consumption were considered consumables. Therefore, they were not subject to stockage objectives nor the one-for-one replacement

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1. Ibid.
2. J44 HistSum Jan 73; COMUSMACV 101045Z Jan 73; JCS 1507/272328Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 310555Z Jan 73.

provisions stipulated under the ceasefire for military armaments, munitions and war material. The existing commercial contracts for Southeast Asian POL resupply and delivery would continue. Based on this information, CINCPAC notified MACV that the remaining shuttle tankers would be released to MSC by 11 February.[1]

(C) MACV responded with a recommendation that the U.S. Naval Ship MILLICOMA, AO-73, be released immediately. CINCPAC concurred and released the T-2 class tanker from Vietnam shuttle service on 3 February. Responding to a MACV recommendation of 18 February, CINCPAC released the last shuttle tanker from Vietnam service on 26 February. The last tanker was the T-1 class U.S. Navy Ship PETALUMA, which, by coincidence, had been the first MSC tanker to discharge POL products in Vietnam when she sailed into Qui Nhon in March 1965. Since that date, approximately 97 million barrels of bulk fuels had been delivered to Vietnam Military Regions I and II by MSC tankers.[2]

POL Support-Cambodia

(S) During the first half of 1973, it was necessary to invoke the "worst case" option of the SCOOT plan--resupply by airlift from Thailand--in order to supply Cambodia with JP-4. This contingency operation was necessary because of Khmer Insurgent (KI) interdiction of land routes 4 and 5 as well as the Mekong River water route.[3]

(S) On 30 June 1973, the U.S. Legislature agreed to amend the Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) for funding of DOD operations as follows:[4]

> Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by U.S. military forces in or over or off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.

(S) This congressional constraint did not prohibit airlift nor airdrop of MAP and humanitarian supplies to points of entry and base areas, provided that

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1. J44 HistSum Jan 73; COMUSMACV 101045Z Jan 73; JCS 1507/272328Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 310555Z Jan 73.
2. J44 HistSum Feb 73; COMUSMACV 030225Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 032147Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 262200Z Feb 73.
3. J44 HistSums Apr and May 73; the transportation aspects of material support to Cambodia, including POL, are discussed in Section III of this chapter.
4. SECDEF 3892/040018Z Aug 73.

serious risk to aircraft or crews was not involved. Also permitted, among other non-air activities, was MSC transportation from the CONUS or other overseas locations in support of MAP or military assistance Service funded (MASF) activities.[1]

(S) On 13 July 1973, the State Department informed CINCPAC and the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh that the U.S. Government was prepared to undertake extraordinary measures to enhance the position of the Cambodian Government prior to and after 15 August 1973. These measures included military, economic and diplomatic assistance. The provision of military articles and services to the Cambodian Armed Forces under this program was assigned the nickname NIMBLE THRUST.[2]

(S) Among the measures specified by the State Department was to top off the existing POL storage facilities in Phnom Penh. Management of bulk POL products in Phnom Penh was an integrated military and civilian operation for storage and convoy reception; the costs were shared by the MAP and Agency for International Development (AID). On 18 July, the Secretary of Defense approved MAP funding for the military portion of the POL top off effort; pending determination of the AID costs, the State Department requested CINCPAC and the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh to take urgent action to fill all existing military and civilian POL storage facilities prior to 15 August. The objective, according to the Chief, MEDTC, was a 40-day POL stockage for military products; the civilian storage goal was 40 days of AVGAS and JP-1, 30 days of industrial fuel oil, and 10 days storage of MOGAS, automotive diesel and kerosene. CINCPAC requested the Embassy to initiate action to supply the civilian POL needs; at the same time, he provided the MSCFE with necessary data to meet the military POL goals. From Sasebo, Japan, 100,000 barrels each of MOGAS and diesel fuel were transported at CINCPAC's direction to the vicinity of Vung-Tau, South Vietnam, for subsequent shuttle tanker delivery to Phnom Penh.3

(C) By 18 August, the Embassy reported that the top off targets had been met or exceeded in all categories of military and civilian POL levels, and that ample stocks were on hand.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. J44 HistSum Jul 73; SECDEF 8246/182137Z Jul 73, which cited SECSTATE 138179/132322Z Jul 73; Project NIMBLE THRUST and other logistics enhancement projects are discussed in the Transportation Section, this chapter, and in the Security Assistance chapter of this history.
3. J44 HistSum Jul 73, with 11 attached messages.
4. J44 HistSum Aug 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 8652/181107Z Aug 73.

Petroleum Distribution Planning - Korea

(C) The foundation of the U.S. military POL distribution system in Korea was the Trans-Korean Pipeline (TKP). The TKP became operational in June 1972, at a cost of $24 million. The pipeline ran from the port of Pohang in Southeast South Korea to Seoul. Storage in six different terminals along the pipeline totalled about one million barrels; the U.S. military moved the major part of its requirements through the TKP, which supported almost no Republic of Korea (ROK) military requirements. The design throughput was 50,000 barrels per day, which capacity would be fully utilized if CINCPAC Operations Plan 5027 (Defense of Korea) were implemented. The TKP was complemented by an offshore POL buoy at Pohang. A spur line, 62 miles long, connected the Korean Oil Company (KOCO) refinery at Ulsan to the TKP at Taegu. The TKP was owned and operated by the U.S. Army.[1]

(C) On 2 May 1973, USARPAC proposed a scenario for possible joint U.S.-ROK time phased sharing of U.S. POL facilities. Eventual transfer of the U.S. facilities to the ROK Government was the objective. USARPAC also requested permission to enter into preliminary discussion with the ROK Government. The DA concurred, with the caveat that the subject of title transfer not be addressed so long as the U.S. was committed to the defense of South Korea. When CINCPAC asked for comments from the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA), the response was that the USARPAC proposal was the coordinated position of the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK), and the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea (JUSMAG-K). COMUSKOREA also stated that USARPAC and CINCPAC approval was sought (and anticipated) prior to presentation to the U.S. Embassy. CINCPAC's approval was requested to initiate discussions which were expected to begin during the first quarter of FY 74, subject to Embassy coordination. On 26 June, CINCPAC requested the approval/concurrence of the JCS to initiate discussions with the ROK through USFK.[2]

(C) The JCS replied on 16 August, concurring in the planning concept, but emphasizing that the ROK be informed that control and operation of the U.S. POL facilities in Korea must remain with the U.S. Government for the foreseeable future. On 21 August, USARPAC was requested by CINCPAC to keep the CINCPAC Logistics staff informed as the preliminary discussions unfold. On 5 September, USARPAC granted EUSA the authority to enter into discussions at a time and place

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1. J4412 Point Paper, 15 May 73, Subj: Petroleum Distribution Planning-Korea.
2. J44 HistSum Jun 73; CINCUSARPAC 020355Z May 73; DA 062111Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 081902Z Jun 73; COMUSKOREA 200339Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 262203Z Jun 73.

agreed upon by the Country Team. No further action, involving CINCPAC, transpired for the remainder of 1973.[1]

Task Group 77.6 POL Support

(S) On 7 November 1973, PACFLT provided CINCPAC a recapitulation of logistics support for Task Group (TG) 77.6, which had been deployed to the Indian Ocean after the eruption of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Bulk POL was provided by the Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLSF), staging primarily from Subic Bay in the Philippines. The estimated POL requirements for a 30 day operating period were 145,000 barrels of Navy Special Fuel Oil, 180,000 barrels of Navy Distillate, and 150,000 barrels of JP-5. These amounts represented approximately 10 percent of the theater-wide stocks. Assuming a 30 day operation in the Indian Ocean, the POL consumed would not have adversely affected the capability to support current CINCPAC operations plans, but some drawdown of PWRS would occur.[2]

(S) By the end of November, arrangements had been made to lift 500,000 barrels of POL (roughly equivalent to 30 days of operations) from the Iranian port of Bandar Mashar to TG 77.6 This oil was procurred from the National Iranian Oil Company. Specific arrangements for loading were made by the U.S. DAO in Tehran with the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Iranian Navy, based on instructions from PACFLT. Payment was to be made as arranged between DAO and PACFLT. The governing caveat of the agreement by Iran to supply oil to the U.S. was that all fuel lifted from Iran was to be used in support of TG 77.6. Most of this fuel was discharged from MSC tankers directly into Fleet oilers in the vicinity of TG 77.6. Some was discharged at Subic Bay to support the logistic pipeline to the task group.[3]

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1. JCS 3865/161512Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 212043Z Aug 73; CINCUSARPAC 052107Z Sep 73; Interview with LCDR L.W. Lavely, USN, CINCPAC J44, 15 May 74.
2. CINCPACFLT 072337Z Nov 73.
3. J441 Point Paper, 29 Nov 73, Subj: Task Group 77.6 POL Support Requirements; also see J44 Point Paper, 28 Nov 73, Subj: Petroleum for PACOM from Iran.

SECTION III--MUNITIONS

PACOM Munitions

(S) Prepositioned war reserve stocks of ammunition in the PACOM were based on the force levels to be supported. Estimated munitions expenditures for daily operations by weapon system; the estimated expenditure rate per end item; and the pipeline time for resupply from the CONUS were calculated. To that total requirement was added a 15 day safety level. CINCPAC plans allocated 60-70 days for pipeline resupply from the CONUS (75 percent from the east coast). The need to support the RVNAF combat operations; the equally pressing demands both before and after the 15 August termination of U.S. operations in Cambodia to support the Cambodian Armed Forces; and the sporadic shortage of selected types of munitions world-wide combined to reduce the overall PACOM munitions posture during 1973. Complicating the maintenance of desired PWRS levels were the oil shortage and the stringent conservation measures. As of 1 January 1974, the PACOM PWRS, expressed in thousands of short tons, was:[1]

Service	Location	Requirement	Available	%Available
Navy	Okinawa	3.8	.8	
	Hawaii	.2	.2	
	Guam	16.3	16.3	
	Philippines	26.0	26.0	
	Japan	30.3	29.0	
	Afloat	26.5	19.6	
	Subtotal	103.1	91.9	89.1
Army	Japan	130.3	69.3	
	Okinawa	95.8	45.1	
	Korea	23.0	14.4	
	Subtotal	249.1	128.8	51.7
Air Force	Taiwan	10.2	1.5	
	Philippines	9.4	0.5	
	Thailand	39.1	0.0	
	Okinawa	37.4	19.3	
	Korea	18.4	15.6	
	Subtotal	114.5	36.9	32.2
PACOM TOTAL		466.7	257.6	55.2

1. J4622 Point Paper, 26 Oct 73, Subj: PACOM Munitions; figures updated by LCOL E.J. Crochet, USA, CINCPAC J46.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AIR MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES

(SHORT TONS)

JAN 1968 THRU DEC 1973



SOURCE: J462

(S) Of these reserves, 79 percent of the U.S. Army munitions storage requirements in Japan and Okinawa were dedicated for use by the combined allied ground forces of Korea, RVN, and Thailand. Approximately one-third of this large allied war reserve stock (181,000 short tons required) was stored in Okinawa and two-thirds in Japan. The overall PACOM munitions posture as of 1 January 1974, including PWRS, basic loads, operational and training stocks, in thousands of short tons, was:[1]

Country	Total Requirement	Total On-Hand	Storage Capacity
Guam	17.6	23.4	43.3
Japan	165.4	116.0	229.9
Okinawa	142.4	76.8	177.9
Korea	53.5	53.0	83.7
Philippines	38.3	84.7	69.7
Thailand	134.3	118.3	132.1
Taiwan	11.5	1.8	12.5
Hawaii	6.1	8.0	12.5
Afloat	28.8	21.8	87.5
TOTAL	597.9	503.8	849.1

Munitions Support-Southeast Asia

(S) Regardless of the termination of U.S. combat operations in Southeast Asia during 1973, the need to provide munitions did not decrease. The conflict in South Vietnam resumed as the year passed in spite of the ceasefire agreement. Comparative peace reigned in Laos after the 22 February ceasefire, but enemy pressure on Cambodia also increased after 15 August. The challenge to the U.S. munitions supply system involved the maintenance of the pre-ceasefire 90 day stock level in Vietnam and the buildup to a 60 day level in Thailand while meeting the MEDTC call ups of munitions for current operations. It was noted in the PILLAR POST discussion that world-wide shortages of selected munitions could be a constraint on the munitions objectives. Very early in 1973, however, chronic shortages of certain munitions were addressed by CINCPAC.[2]

Ground Munitions-Vietnam

(S) In 1972, the supply of ground munitions had reached a critical level in Vietnam. Special air mission resupply had been used, and, by September,

1. Ibid.; J4621 Point Paper, 18 Jan 74, Subj: Munitions Stored in Japan and Okinawa that are Earmarked for SEA.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 325-329.

the only ground munition which remained at critical levels was 105mm high explosive (HE) cartridges. In March 1972, the expenditure rate had been 750,000 rounds. By August 1972, the rate had risen to 2.1 million rounds. The need to stress management controls over munitions expenditures by the RVNAF was conveyed to MACV by CINCPAC.[1]

(S) By December 1972, the expenditure of 105mm HE artillery rounds by the RVNAF had dropped to 967,000 rounds, but in January 1973, depot issues had risen to 1.59 million rounds. In little more than two weeks after the effective data of the ceasefire (27 January to 13 February), the RVNAF expenditure was 990,000 rounds. The production of 105mm HE had stabilized at approximately 1.1 million rounds per month, and the RVNAF had been allocated 900,000 per month, or 82 percent of the total CONUS production. Issues over the allocated quantity were made at the expense of the world-wide inventory. While USARPAC took action to divert shipments to meet the immediate crisis, CINCPAC requested MACV, in February 1973, to advise of projected future expenditures. MACV was also requested to advise the RVNAF of the absolute necessity to reinforce supply management and discipline.[2]

Air Munitions - Laos and Cambodia

(S) The rapid escalation of air operations in Laos and Cambodia after the RVN ceasefire caused a severe drain on theater MK-82 general purpose bomb assets. The MK-82 (500-lb) and the M-117 (750-lb) had also been in short supply in 1972. Substitutions for these bombs by less preferred types had been necessary, and the U.S. Navy had predicted an estimated year-end shortfall of U.S. Air Force MK-83 bombs as a result of their use as substitute munitions.[3]

(S) On 20 February 1973, the CINCPAC Logistics staff assessed the status of MK-82 general purpose bombs for the next three weeks. The assessment was of supply and usage for air operations by U.S. aircraft over Laos and Cambodia, and was, of course, overtaken by the Laotian ceasefire of 22 February:[4]

PACAF (Includes Marine Air):

Average Expenditure Rate: 2,000 per day.
On Hand 18 February: 44,273
Programmed by 15 March: 27,352
Programmed Expenditures through 15 March: 50,000
Low Point: 15 March 21,625 (10 DOS)

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1. Ibid.
2. J4631 Point Paper, 20 Feb 73, Subj: Ctg 105mm HE.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 325, 328.
4. J4633 Point Paper, 20 Feb 73, Subj: MK-82 General Purpose Bomb Status.

PACFLT:

Average Expenditure Rate: 1,000 per day.
On Hand Afloat: 59,000
On Hand Subic: 5,500
Programmed by 15 March: 20,000
Programmed Expenditures through 15 March: 27,000
Status on 15 March: 57,500
All Assets Afloat by 2 March.

SAC Thailand (MK-82 and M-117 bombs used interchangeably):

Expenditures:	MK-82	2,520/day
	M-117	1,314/day
	TOTAL	3,834/day

Total Bombs on Hand 13 February:	15,833
Programmed Due In by 15 March:	121,990
Expenditures through 15 March:	118,854

SAC-Guam

Expenditures:	MK-82	1,188/day
	M-117	972/day
	TOTAL	2,160/day

Total Bombs on Hand 13 February:	58,880
Programmed Due In by 15 March:	0
Expenditures through 9 March:	56,160

(S) A low point was reached by SAC at U-Tapao on 13 February, when only four days of supply were available. However, three ammunitions ships were discharged at Sattahip at that time. If the projected expenditure rates were maintained, the total assets on Guam would have been depleted by 10 March 1973.[1]

(C) Later in the year (28 November), in a paper on munitions support to Cambodia, the CINCPAC Logistics staff noted a world-wide shortage of the following types of munitions:[2]

40mm HE Cartridges	66mm Rockets
60mm HE Cartridges	Claymore Mines
75mm HE Cartridges	

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1. Ibid.
2. J4622 Point Paper, 28 Nov 73, Subj: Cambodia Munition Support.

SECTION IV--TRANSPORTATION

Airlift Fuel Conservation

(U) The world-wide energy crisis, combined with the Arab oil embargo, affected the PACOM more than other U.S. military regions for reasons already stated. CINCPAC, therefore, assessed the overall airlift usage in the theater to determine measures which could conserve fuel by reducing airlift. In November 1973, special sessions of the PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB) addressed the impact of the POL shortage and measures to balance fuel conservation with continued movement of high priority cargo. As a result of these meetings, CINCPAC directed the Service components and subordinate unified commands to institute rigid supply discipline throughout the PACOM. On 30 November, CINCPAC imposed a PACOM embargo against airlift of Priority 2 and below cargo, except for aviation equipment, medical supplies and ship casualty repair parts. Also exempt were MAP Cambodia requirements and shipments to areas not regularly served by surface transportation, such as Diego Garcia, Harold Holt in Australia and the Trust Territories. Headquarters PACOM monitored the use of intra-theater MAC and C-130 airlift based upon previous long term experience, and instituted a cargo tonnage allocation system.[1]

(U) On 4 December, the PACOM JTB announced the CINCPAC component Service monthly allocation for originating intra-PACOM cargo movement on MAC channel aircraft. These initial allocations were 1,319 tons for PACAF; 759 for PACFLT; 1,190 for USARPAC; and, 150 for the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. By the end of 1973, the CINCPAC actions toward fuel conservation had resulted in significant reductions in MAC JP-4 consumption in the PACOM. The MAC daily fuel consumption in October was 776,328 gallons; in November, 646,230 gallons; and, in December, 523,916 gallons. These figures represented a 16.2 percent reduction in November from October and a 32.5 percent from the October figure in December.[2]

C-130 Force Level

(TS) CINCPAC plans for post-ceasefire beddown and location of C-130 forces were two-fold. In the short term, the five squadron level in the PACOM at the end of 1972 would be used to provide in-country support to Vietnam. The main

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1. J47 HistSum Nov 73; CINCPAC 102325Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 102326Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 290402Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 300520Z Nov 73.
2. J47 HistSum Dec 73; 61 MASW 110303Z Dec 73, which cited PACOM JTB Meeting on 4 Dec 73.

force of C-130s would continue to be located in Taiwan. However, basing for intra-Vietnam support in Thailand for contingency operations might be needed. CINCPAC plans in the long term envisioned an eventual reduction of C-130 squadrons in the theater to three.[1]

(TS) In April 1973, the JCS advised CINCPAC of a U.S. Air Force proposal to redeploy the tactical airlift wing from Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) in Taiwan. One of the wing's assigned squadrons, not in the permanent PACOM force structure, was to be redeployed to the CONUS in July 1973. In June, the remaining TDY C-130 squadron was returned to the CONUS, reducing the overall force level to the four squadrons of the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) at CCK.[2]

(TS) In July, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the retention of four squadrons was under review by the DOD. CINCPAC was requested to provide justification if the four squadrons were still needed. On 18 July, CINCPAC responded, noting that force level requirements for C-130s were contingent upon the degree of airlift support to be provided to Cambodia. CINCPAC recommended that the existing C-130 force level be continued through 15 August 1973 (termination of U.S. combat operations) unless Military Airlift Command (MAC) COLD MAP (C-141) assets could be committed to back up the known C-130 average daily commitment.[3]

(TS) On 26 July, the JCS informed CINCPAC that higher authority had directed the relocation of the 374th TAW squadrons--one squadron by 15 August 1973, and the balance by 31 December. The JCS also stated that COLD MAP capability would be available for short term contingencies pending the deployment of tactical airlift assets on a TDY basis. Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended the retention of six specially configured C-130s, to be redistributed within 374th TAW until the situation in Cambodia was clear. The balance of the first squadron to be redeployed (10 aircraft) could be released to the CONUS so long as COLD MAP could fill the gap.[4]

(S) On 3 August, the JCS directed CINCPAC to redeploy one tactical airlift squadron (TAS) from Taiwan to CONUS with 10 aircraft and associated equipment, and to reduce manpower authorizations accordingly. Six of the aircraft from the redeployed TAS were to remain in the PACOM until no longer needed to support airlift operations in Cambodia. The move was to be coordinated with the Embassy

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 338.
2. JCS 7097/171943Z, which cited JCS 1070/051757Z Apr 73.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 180437Z Jul 73.
4. JCS 6327/262140Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 282119Z Jul 73.

in Taipei before execution, and no public announcement was to be made. At the same time, the JCS directed the Air Force to provide plans for relocating the remainder of the 374th TAW from CCK.[1]

(S) On 4 August, CINCPAC directed PACAF to execute the JCS order, and, on 5 August, PACAF directed Thirteenth Air Force to redeploy the 50th TAS, with 10 aircraft, to the CONUS. On 7 August, PACAF advised that the 50th TAS would be transferred, without personnel, to the 314th TAW at Little Rock Air Force Base. The move was completed on 14 August 1973.[2]

(S) Responding to JCS direction, the Air Force proposed to redeploy the 374th TAW, the 21st TAS, and the 776th TAS to Clark Air Base, Philippines not later than 15 November. The third of the TAW squadrons, the 345th TAS, was scheduled to move to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa by 1 December 1973. On 24 September, the State Department confirmed the schedule. The Embassy in Japan was requested to emphasize the temporary nature, pending available facilities at Kadena, of the TAS moves to Clark Air Base. The eventual consolidation of the TAW at Kadena continued to be a valid planning factor for the Kadena construction program.[3]

(S) The 374th TAW, 21st TAS and 776th TAS completed relocation to Clark in November, and the 345th TAS moved to Kadena in December.[4]

Special Use of C-130 Aircraft

(C) By December 1973, the restrictions on the numbers of U.S. personnel authorized to be in Cambodia at one time posed problems for the MEDTC mission of security assistance. The Chief, MEDTC requested CINCPAC to authorize the use of C-130 aircraft, on a space available basis, to shuttle State Department employees between Cambodia and Thailand to relieve the head space constraints for short periods of time. Official orders would be issued, but the moves were to be at no expense to the U.S. Government. Personnel would not receive TDY funds and would be billeted in U.S. military transit billets.[5]

(C) On 4 December, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS and DOD that the Chief, MEDTC request be approved. On 17 January 1974, the DOD granted authority for

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1. J47 HistSum Aug 73; JCS 3635/031938Z Aug 73.
2. J47 HistSum Aug 73; CINCPAC 042110Z Aug 73; CINCPACAF 052215Z Aug 73; CINCPACAF 070330Z Aug 73; 13AF 140920Z Aug 73.
3. J47 HistSum Sep 73; CSAF 241353Z Sep 73; SECSTATE 189760/242040Z Sep 73.
4. J47 HistSums Nov and Dec 73; 13AF 140650Z Dec 73.
5. CHMEDTC 13463/041237Z Dec 73.

non-reimbursable, space available airlift of State Department employees between sites via military aircraft, and the MEDTC was so advised by CINCPAC.[1]

Logistics Transportation Support to Cambodia

(S) After the 15 August termination of direct U.S. air support to the Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK), enabling the Cambodian Government to survive became a test of ingenuity in the selection of LOC options for resupply of vital material. The resupply of POL to Cambodia using the "worst case" LOC option of the SCOOT plan--airlift from U-Tapao, Thailand--was discussed in Section II of this chapter. In fact, various combinations of the SCOOT LOC options were used throughout 1973.

NIMBLE THRUST

(S) As previously stated, Project NIMBLE THRUST was a logistics enhancement effort which provided for accelerated delivery of military articles and services to strengthen the FANK posture prior to 15 August. The Secretary of Defense assigned Project Code 983 to NIMBLE THRUST; all supply and transportation costs were to reflect the 983 code number. Shipment of all equipment/supplies was to be by fastest surface means; the use of premium transportation was authorized, including MAC channel airlift. Conflicts in priority of movement of cargo were to be referred to the Joint Transportation Board in Washington. The high level interest in this logistics enhancement program required modified real time reporting of shipments and receipts. Accordingly, all concerned were to receive running reports on sources, dates, shipping modes and routes. No public comment was authorized concerning NIMBLE THRUST.[2]

NIMBLE VOYAGE

(S) The required delivery date (RDD) for NIMBLE THRUST was 15 August. In early October, the Chief, MEDTC requested immediate funds for another package to improve FANK combat power prior to the next dry season. Approval by the DOD resulted in a project for $8.2 million called NIMBLE VOYAGE, Project Code 9EE, with an in-country RDD of 15 December 1973. The approval authorized the use of premium transportation, if necessary, to transport 1,700 short tons of cargo from the CONUS and approximately 1,050 short tons of cargo originating in the PACOM. The NIMBLE VOYAGE material consisted of wheeled vehicles, tracked vehicles, individual and crew-served weapons, artillery and related items,

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1. CINCPAC 042127Z Dec 73; SECDEF 9511/171949Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 220349Z Jan 74.
2. SECDEF 8246/182137Z Jul 73; the MAP aspects/impact of this and subsequent logistics actions are discussed in Chapter VII, Security Assistance.

communications/electronics items, watercraft, engines, tool kits, chain saws, other miscellaneous items, and seven UH-1H helicopters.[1]

(S) As of 1 January 1974, delivery of 99 percent of the material had been made to Phnom Penh. Undelivered items included the helicopters, which were delayed for gun kit modification; the watercraft (six) were at Subic Bay for reconditioning; two recovery vehicles had arrived at Vung Tau, Vietnam for transshipment, and nine radios were to be supplied from PACAF assets. All NIMBLE VOYAGE items delivered to U-Tapao for subsequent airlift by C-130 to Phnom Penh met the RDD.[2]

PILLAR POST

(S) On 5 November 1973, Rear Admiral R.E. Fowler, Director for Logistics, CINCPAC, accompanied by representatives from the Logistics staff and the JCS, arrived at USSAG in Thailand to survey the Cambodian logistics situation. The primary task of the CINCPAC team was to determine the optimum stockage levels of ammunition, rice and POL to be attained/maintained in Phnom Penh to support the FANK defense during the expected enemy dry season offensive. Since the Mekong River would be used as the primary LOC to achieve these stockage levels, the team also reviewed the security situation on the Mekong and investigated means to improve convoy security, scheduling and management.[3]

(S) The results of the CINCPAC team visit were promulgated as an annex to the SCOOT plan on 14 November 1973. The acronym PILLAR POST, for "Provide Increased Logistics Levels of Ammunition, Rice and Petroleum Over the Short Term," was adopted. The critical assumption of PILLAR POST was that the situation along the Mekong River would remain stable until the supply surge by convoy was accomplished. The goals of PILLAR POST were a 90-day supply of rice in Phnom Penh as soon as possible; a 30-day munitions supply in-country by 31 December, increasing to a 45-day stock by 15 February 1974; and, a 60-day supply of FANK and industrial POL while building toward a 30-day stock for other civilian POL. Terminal facilities at Phnom Penh were adequate to achieve the rice and POL goals, but additional storage capability was needed to accommodate the 45-day level for munitions. Nine bulldozers were needed for the construction of 7,500 short tons of additional storage. Constraints on availability included the complete shipment of rice purchased by Cambodia from Thailand; a world-wide shortage of selected munitions; and the Arab oil embargo to PACOM commercial suppliers which would necessitate the use of PACOM war reserves.

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1. J46 HistSum Nov 73; J47 HistSum Nov 73.
2. J46 HistSum Dec 73; J47 HistSum Dec 73.
3. History, USSAG/7AF Oct-Dec 73, p. 18.

Sufficient transport was available for the rice, when and if released by Thailand. Additional tugs and barges were needed to augment the current SCOOT ammunition contract capability. Sufficient POL tankers were either under contract or available for charter.[1]

(S) On 30 November, a joint State/Defense message reduced the 45-day munitions stockage objective to 30 days because of funding constraints and reluctance to concentrate so much ammunition in Phnom Penh at one time. The primary emphasis for ammunition resupply continued to be on the use of the Mekong LOC, with C-130 airlift used only when necessary to maintain the 30 day level.[2]

(S) To monitor the progress of PILLAR POST, a logistics sub-group to CINCPAC's Cambodia Contingency Planning Group was established by Admiral Fowler on 19 November. The purpose of the sub-group was to develop procedures to obtain real time status of convoy operations; to keep abreast of enemy threats to the Mekong LOC and the capability to counter the threat; and, to monitor the status of the materiel buildup in Phnom Penh.[3]

(S) The ammunition and military POL objectives of PILLAR POST were accomplished by 31 December. The objectives for civil products (POL and rice) were not fully attained, and efforts continued into 1974.[4]

Route 4 Logistics Enhancement: POL Transport

(S) A May 1973 FANK plan for the contingency resupply of POL to Phnom Penh if all LOC except Route 4 were closed had been approved by the U.S. Country Team. This plan envisioned the use of 154 commercial POL tank trucks of 3,000 gallon capacity each. These trucks were intended to provide for a steady flow of POL from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh at a level which would meet FANK POL requirements and civilian needs as well. On 1 September, the Embassy in Phnom Penh cited high cost and long lead time as factors which warranted consideration of alternate means to meet the Route 4 enhancement plan. A joint State/Defense reply agreed with the Embassy, especially since one objective was to provide the transport capability on Route 4 before the next dry season. In place of the 3,000 gallon tank trucks, the use of 500 gallon collapsible bladders or 55 gallon drums or a mix of both was proposed. The Embassy was

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1. J41 HistSum Nov 73; CINCPAC 140324Z Nov 73.
2. SECSTATE 235701/302333Z Nov 73.
3. J41 HistSum Nov 73; J4/Memo/00118-73 of 19 Nov 73, Subj: Cambodia Contingency Planning Group.
4. J41 HistSum Dec 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 14094/180545Z Dec 73.

requested to assess the in-country availability of all trucks which could be made available for Route 4 POL convoys, including MAP, AID-financed, and Cambodian owned. CINCPAC was requested to comment on this proposal.[1]

(S) On 5 September, CINCPAC cited the impracticability of moving 640 bladders or 5,818 drums every fourth day from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh (approximately 320,000 gallons to meet minimum requirements). Also noted was that a minimum of 213 trucks (2½-ton) for the bladders or 416 for the drums would be required. These same trucks, assuming availability, were required to transport commodities other than POL. CINCPAC suggested, as another alternative, the use of U.S. Army 1,200 gallon tank and pump units. These units were skid-mounted, and would cost about $2,800 in rebuilt condition. Although the units would need 2½-ton trucks for towing, they could be detached to free the trucks for other transport when necessary. The Embassy and State Department accepted CINCPAC's proposal and determined that 208 of the skid-mounted units would satisfy the requirement. The Embassy also stated that, under emergency conditions, more than enough trucks would be made available in-country to haul the units on a sustained basis. Therefore, the Embassy requested delivery of 100 tank kits, to be airlifted if necessary, by 15 December, with the balance to arrive in January 1974. The estimated cost of $952,000 was to be borne by AID.[2]

(S) On 20 September, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Army to divert or withdraw 208 tank and pump units from the active Army inventory to satisfy the high priority POL assistance to Cambodia. Delivery dates were advanced to 17 October for 100 units and 21 November for 108 units. The Embassy responded by reducing the number of units to be airlifted to 50. The revised total cost was $1.15 million.[3]

(S) In October, the CINCPAC Logistics staff was able to divert 41 of the 50 units from air to surface transport without sacrificing delivery dates. Two C-5 transport flights, involving over 421,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel and more than $272,000 in premium transportation costs, were saved. As of 31 December 1973,

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1. J44 HistSum Sep 73; SECSTATE 175095/012048Z Sep 73; which retransmitted AMEMB Phnom Penh 9015/28 Aug 73; SECSTATE 175085/012003Z Sep 73. These two State messages were transmitted with August in the date/time group, rather than September, the correct month.
2. CINCPAC 052308Z Sep 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 9486/071335Z Sep 73; SECSTATE 179887/110054Z Sep 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 9788/141200Z Sep 73.
3. SECDEF 3451/201642Z Sep 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 10507/300549Z Sep 73; SECSTATE 194243/282341Z Sep 73.

167 units had been received in Phnom Penh, 34 were scheduled for delivery on 4 January 1974, and 7 were scheduled for delivery on 31 January 1974.[1]

Airlift Support to Cambodia

(C) Airlift support to Cambodia during 1973 consisted of both airdrop and airland missions by C-130 transport from U-Tapao, Thailand. Through June, the airlift was comparatively low key; e.g., in April, airlanded missions consisted of 213 C-130 sorties carrying 2,462 short tons of POL, ammunition and 105mm howitzers. During the same month, 103 C-130 airdrop sorties delivered 1,576 short tons of ammunition and rice to isolated FANK units and surrounded Cambodian villages. Until July 1973, the airlift support was accomplished with 10 C-130 aircraft.[2]

(S) In July, as part of the NIMBLE THRUST project, 254 airlanded sorties were flown, carrying 3,665 short tons of ammunition. This was a dramatic increase over the June level, when 14 sorties transported 169 short tons of munitions. Rice and general cargo airlanded sorties also increased from 44 sorties and 456 short tons to 70 sorties and 874 short tons, including nine 105mm howitzers. The airdrop of rice and ammunition remained about the same.[3]

(S) Because of the increased airlift during late July, and projected levels for August, the Chief, MEDTC requested, on 23 July, that the number of aircraft permitted on the ground at one time at Pochentong Airfield be increased from two to four. CINCPAC approved the request on 28 July, but included any aircraft on the ground for maintenance. In July, the number of aircraft on station at U-Tapao increased to eighteen.[4]

(C) In support of logistics enhancement projects NIMBLE THRUST, NIMBLE VOYAGE and PILLAR POST, the following PACOM C-130 missions were flown from August through December 1973:[5]

Type of Delivery	Short Tons Delivered	Sorties
Airlanded Ammo	29,185	1,935
Airlanded General Cargo	8,037	632
Airdropped Ammo	4,862	348
Airdropped Rice	1,319	91

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1. J471 HistSum Oct and Dec 73.
2. J47 HistSum Apr and Jun 73.
3. J47 HistSum Jul 73.
4. Ibid.
5. J47 HistSum Aug-Dec 73.

Intra-Cambodia Rice Airlift

(C) As previously stated, the rice stockage objective for PILLAR POST depended upon the delivery of Thai rice under previous export agreements. On 24 September, the Embassy advised that rice stocks were approaching a critical level in Phnom Penh because of the uncertainty of Thai rice delivery and the closure of Route 5 by the enemy. The Embassy proposed that 3,306 short tons of Cambodian rice be airlifted from Battambang in the interior to Phnom Penh. The State Department cautioned that a massive airlift of rice within Cambodia should be used as a last resort, and advised the Embassy in Bangkok to expedite the earliest possible surface shipment of Thai rice.[1]

(C) On 27 September, the Embassy in Phnom Penh reiterated that the airlift of rice from Battambang at the earliest time was urgent, notwithstanding surface shipments arriving from Thailand, Korea or Japan. There was no other way during the next few weeks to assure that government stocks of rice would not drop to an explosively dangerous level. The Embassy considered that the psychological and political costs of running out of rice were incommensurate with the budgetary costs of airlifting the 3,306 short tons of rice.[2]

(C) CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the Embassy request for airlift be approved, and, on 29 September, the State Department authorization was received. The airlift was authorized only until the arrival of the next 17,500 tons of rice or until the 3,306 tons were delivered from Battambang, whichever came first. Meanwhile, the Bangkok and Saigon Embassies were instructed to exercise utmost effort to obtain surface shipment as fast as possible.[3]

(C) On 30 September, the request for special airlift was approved by CINCPAC. The operation began on 2 October and was completed on 1 November. The total tonnage requested by the Embassy, 3,306 short tons, was lifted by 228 C-130 sorties.[4]

Vietnam Transportation Actions

Operation COUNTDOWN

(U) Redeployment of both personnel and cargo from Vietnam under Operation COUNTDOWN began on 27 January (X Day). The last 6,000 personnel, retained to insure the return of prisoners of war, were redeployed during the final 72

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1. J4713 Point Paper, 4 Oct 73, Subj: Rice Airlift for Cambodia.
2. AMEMB Phnom Penh 10372/270835Z Sep 73.
3. SECSTATE 194488/290056Z Sep 73, which cited CINCPAC 280247Z Sep 73.
4. CINCPAC 300115Z Sep 73; J47 HistSums Sep and Nov 73.

hours of the X+60 deadline. During that period, 22,959 U.S. personnel were redeployed, and 150,900 short tons of U.S. equipment were shipped to CONUS and PACOM destinations. Also redeployed were 35,396 Republic of Korea Forces in Vietnam (ROKFV), and 97,700 short tons of ROKFV equipment were returned to Korea.[1]

FPJMC

(U) Also supported by airlift during 1973 was the Four-Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC). The Chief, U.S. Delegation had requested a weekly C-130 mission between Saigon and Hanoi for the North Vietnam members of the FPJMC. Such flights were determined to be in the interests of the U.S., insofar as they could influence the attitude of North Vietnam toward the Joint Casualty Resolution Center mission. This service was provided throughout 1973.[2]

Airlift Support of the VNAF

(C) The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace prohibited continued U.S. involvement in South Vietnam. Article 7 of the Agreement and Article 7 of the Protocol permitted piece-for-piece replacement of armaments, munitions and war materials in South Vietnam. In March 1973, the JCS provided guidance concerning interpretations of the ceasefire agreement, including a restriction against the movement of cargo intra-RVN after X+60 by MSC nucleus ships. On 4 April, CINCPAC requested the JCS to interpret the Agreement as it pertained to three categories of logistic airlift support of the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF):[3]

Category I - Airlift service between RVN and offshore repair facilities.
Category II - Airlift service between Clark Air Base and the RVN for delivery of property and return of repairables from RVN to Clark Air Base.
Category III- Airlift service intra-RVN to facilitate distribution of material and peak workload augmentation.

(C) On 16 May, the JCS designated authorized points of entry for controlled items (armaments, munitions, war materiel), and stipulated that, to the maximum extent possible, shipment of non-controlled items should be to designated points of entry where ICCS or Two Party Joint Military Commission teams were located. On 19 July, the JCS specifically addressed the categories cited by CINCPAC.

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1. J47 HistSum Mar 73.
2. J47 HistSums Mar and Dec 73.
3. JCS 9313/192244Z Jul 73, which cited JCS 5379/142158Z Mar 73, JCS 6571/232128Z Mar 73, and CINCPAC 042136Z Apr 73.

The logistic airlift support of the VNAF, using U.S. military aircraft or commercial contract aircraft, was permitted for categories I and II.[1]

Troopship Retirement

(S) In January 1973, the JCS addressed the disposition of the USNS BARRETT and USNS UPSHUR troopships. The JCS noted that the vessels offered a lift capability for repatriation of enemy prisoners of war. In response to CINCPAC query, MACV stated that no plans existed to use the ships for that purpose or any other which precluded their release from the PACOM. With the concurrence of the Service components, CINCPAC recommended that the UPSHUR and BARRETT be released from the PACOM and placed in ready reserve status. CINCPAC acknowledged that MSC-controlled passenger ships were required to support the U.S. Marine contingency force deployments of CINCPAC Operations Plan 5027. However, the annual cost of $9.2 million, based on a per diem rate of $12,587 per ship, did not justify retention of the vessels in fully operational status for contingency purposes.[2]

De Long Pier Retrograde

(C) The retrograde of the De Long piers in Vietnam had been planned in late 1972, linked in part to completion of the ROKFV redeployment to Korea. On 7 January 1973, MACV directed that the De Long piers remain in place until further notice. On 15 February, the DA provided disposition instructions for the Army De Long piers in Southeast Asia. One Navy De Long pier had already been moved from Da Nang to Subic Bay. Two piers at Cam Ranh Bay were to be returned to New Orleans; one was to be retained in the PACOM. Two Qui Nhon pier barges were to be sent to Wilmington, N.C.; two were to be retained in the PACOM. The piers at Vung Tau and Sattahip, Thailand were to be retained in the PACOM.[3]

(U) In March, the Corps of Engineers requested the loan of four "B" type barges for a two year project at Kwajalein, with funds for towing, maintenance and return to storage to be provided by the Corps. USARPAC recommended that four of the seven barges at Vung Tau which were being dismantled for storage be loaned to the Corps of Engineers. The DA approved the loan, and the barges were dismantled at Vung Tau and towed to Poro Point in the Philippines for inspection. Two of the barges were delivered to Kwajalein on 10 October 1973; the remaining two were delivered on 2 January 1974.[4]

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1. Ibid., which also cited JCS 3366/162106Z May 73.
2. J47 HistSum Feb 73; CINCPAC 230438Z Feb 73.
3. J47 HistSum Jan and Feb 73; COMUSMACV 070900Z Jan 73; DA 152004Z Feb 73.
4. J47 HistSums Mar, Apr, Dec 73.

Delta Rock Haul Support

(S) Related to the restoration of LOC in the Mekong Delta discussed in the following Construction section was the support provided by the Delta Rock Agency (DRA). The DRA support consisted of three segments: rock production; transportation of rock; and storage and use. Support and contractual responsibility for this program was vested in the Military Sealift Command Office, Vietnam (MSCOV). On 4 December 1972, MACV had requested MSCOV to officially state that the DRA would continue to be supported during and after FY 73. The MACV request was passed by MSCOV, through Navy channels, to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). On 26 December 1972, the CNO advised CINCPAC that the Navy had programmed O&M funds through FY 74 in support of the DRA.[1]

(S) As planning for post-hostilities organizational relationships progressed, and in view of the nation-building role served by the Delta Rock Haul program, the Navy believed that U.S. military involvement should terminate at the earliest opportunity. Accordingly, the CNO requested CINCPAC to pursue the transfer of the Delta Rock transportation function to AID Saigon. CINCPAC was also requested to initiate action through MACV to develop updated estimates for FY 73 and FY 74 to assist in budgetary planning.[2]

(S) On 30 December 1972, CINCPAC requested MACV to provide updated Delta Rock Haul requirements; estimates for intra-RVN water transportation requirements other than DRA support; and a recommendation as to whether the cost of intra-RVN water transportation should be converted from Navy O&M to the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program. At the same time, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the Delta Rock Haul function be transferred to AID.[3]

(U) MACV provided updated figures for the Delta Rock Haul on 10 January 1973. The monthly requirement in short tons was 100,000 for FY 73 and 150,000 for FY 74. Pre-ceasefire intra-RVN water transportation in addition to rock haul was 44,900 short tons per month for both fiscal years. Post ceasefire tonnage would drop to 8,350 for both fiscal years.[4]

(U) The JCS informed CINCPAC, on 11 January, that the recommendation for AID to assume the DRA responsibility had been referred to the CNO for action. On 1 March 1973, AID assumed overall management responsibility for the Delta Rock Haul system. On 30 June, the MSCFE relinquished all contracting functions for the program, and, on 1 July 1973, AID assumed all transportation and contractual responsibilities for the DRA.[5]

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1. J47 HistSum Dec 72; CNO 262219Z Dec 72, which cited COMUSMACV 040745Z Dec 72.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 301759Z Dec 72.
4. J47 HistSum Jan 73; COMUSMACV 101040Z Jan 73.
5. JCS 2655/112315Z Jan 73; J47 HistSum Addendum, Dec 73; CINCPAC Weekly Executive Brief, J4, 8 Mar 73.

SECTION V--CONSTRUCTION

Ordnance Facilities-Hawaii

Navy Ammunition Depot Retained [1]

(U) In August 1971, in response to a Congressional request, the DOD initiated a full and comprehensive review of all DOD real property holdings in the State of Hawaii. The study was designated Project FRESH (Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii). This review considered, among other factors, the projected force levels to be stationed in Hawaii; the availability of facilities to support these forces; current and future uses of all bases; opportunities for consolidation of joint use of military facilities; and the feasibility of releasing unneeded real estate.

(U) A specific recommendation of Project FRESH was that the Army's ammunition, stored in Aliamanu, Kipapa and Waikakalaua, be relocated to Navy storage areas at the Waikele and Lualualei branches of the Naval Ammunition Depot (NAD), Oahu. However, in April 1973, without mention of Project FRESH recommendations, the DOD announced the closure of NAD Oahu.

(U) On 1 June 1973, the ASD (I&L) requested the Navy, under the auspices of Project FRESH, to consider the impact of the Lualualei closure on retention of other ammunition storage areas. The suitability of Lualualei as a housing site was also to be considered. Additional guidance was received on 12 June 1973. In conducting the study, the total WESTPAC ammunition storage capability was to be considered, including the possibility of future denial of forward bases on foreign soil.

(U) During the period 15 June 1973 to 11 July 1973 the Tri-Service Council for Project FRESH conducted a detailed study of all ordnance storage facilities in Hawaii. The result was a recommendation that NAD Oahu be retained as a joint ammunition storage/housing complex. CINCPAC concurred with this recommendation on 3 August 1973.

Community Concern-Hazardous Underground Structures

(U) On 5 September 1973, the Chairman, Planning and Zoning Committee, Honolulu City Council sent a letter to Admiral Gayler requesting cooperation from the Services in investigating "a potential hazard" to civilian housing

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1. J42 HistSum Aug 73; CINCPAC 030130Z Aug 73.

developments. A copy of the letter was sent to Hawaii's Congressional Delegation. The councilman referred to military underground structures such as fuel storage tanks, fuel lines, and ammunition depots, and requested information as to the locations of these structures and the extent of hazard involved.[1]

(U) On 17 September, CINCPAC staff representatives met informally with the city councilmen to obtain background information on the problem which had prompted the letter to Admiral Gayler. A reply, signed by Admiral Gayler, was sent to the council on 21 September acknowledging the concern of the community. He also designated a CINCPAC Logistics staff member as the military coordinator on the matter. Concurrently, a message was dispatched to the Service components stating that, because of public and congressional interest, CINCPAC would be the single point of contact on the subject. The Services were requested to provide pertinent information by 1 October 1973.[2]

(U) In October, the information gathered was reviewed by Logistics, Public Affairs and Staff Judge Advocate personnel. The data included maps depicting underground fuel lines and safety zones associated with ammunition facilities located on other than Federal land. A cover letter was signed by Admiral Gayler on 20 November, and the letter and maps were delivered to the City Hall on 21 November. The letter explained that the underground structures had been designed and constructed in accordance with applicable criteria, regulations, and safety standards. Trained operators made periodic inspections to assure that proper maintenance was performed and to recommend improvements to upgrade the facilities to current standards. The history of underground facility operation was a record of safety without significant incident. Investigation had confirmed that none of these facilities was hazardous to the public.[3]

Conventional Ammunition Storage Site Security

(U) In September 1973, a forthcoming visit to PACOM by the ASD (I&L) prompted CINCPAC to request his component commands for information concerning conventional ammunition storage site security. This subject was of particular interest to the assistant secretary. USARPAC passed CINCPAC's request to the

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1. J42 HistSum Sep 73; Ltr, Geo. G. Akahane to Admiral Noel Gayler, 5 Sep 73, n.s.
2. J42 HistSum Sep 73; Ltr, Admiral Gayler to Geo. G. Akahane, 21 Sep 73, n.s.; CINCPAC 210300Z Sep 73.
3. J42 HistSum Oct and Nov 73; Ltr, Admiral Gayler to Geo. G. Akahane, 20 Nov 73, n.s.

field units responsible for storage facilities in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, Thailand and Hawaii.[1]

Japan

(U) The U.S. Army ammunition depot complex at Akizuki consisted of three storage sites--at Akizuki, Hiro and Kawakami. The first two areas had definite perimeter boundary security, but Kawakami, which was the largest, was unfenced and heavily wooded. The authorized waivered storage capacity for the entire complex was 118,000 short tons. As a result of reduced ammunition consumption in Southeast Asia and the consequent diversion of ammunition ships to Japan, the Akizuki complex was approaching maximum capacity. For external security, and internal security when boundaries were penetrated, the complex depended upon Japan law enforcement agencies. Limited on-the-scene security was provided by master labor contract (Japanese civilian) guards armed with night sticks.[2]

(C) Japanese national police expected leftist elements, bent on forcing abrogation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, to increase their activities in the near future. Related to the radical elements and political atmosphere generally was a proposed move of Hiroshima University to a site close to Kawakami. Radicals attending the University would have easy access to the ammunition facility since physical security measures were almost non-existent. The U.S. Army, Japan intended to submit an urgent minor construction project request for a perimeter fence around Kawakami. Expeditious approval was recommended for this construction.[3]

Okinawa

(U) The U.S. Army Base Command (USARBCO) reported that the ammunition depot at Chibana in central Okinawa covered 3,300 acres with 190 storage structures, 12 support facilities and 93 open storage pads. Depot security was maintained with a Japanese master labor contract force of 75 men under the direction of the depot commander and the provost marshal's office. A storage area one mile in length on the eastern boundary and two separately enclosed maintenance facilities on the western boundary were located outside the perimeter fence. Construction of two miles of perimeter fence to enclose those two areas had been approved. Pending the fence construction, perimeter security was enforced by patrols.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 132209Z Sep 73, which cited SECDEF 072241Z Sep 73; CINCUSARPAC 142112Z Sep 73.
2. CDR USARJ 170815Z Sep 73.
3. Ibid.
4. CDR USARBCO 180825Z Sep 73.

(U) In northern Okinawa, the Henoko ammunition depot covered 300 acres. There were 30 Army-owned and 12 Marine-owned storage structures, plus two support facilities. No security problems had been experienced with either the Chibana or Henoko sites.[1]

Korea

(U) The Eighth U.S. Army in Korea cited its strict compliance with existing U.S. Army directives for the control of conventional ammunition storage. An asset control organization had been established to oversee the security situation. Upgrading of perimeter fences and construction of rail lines into the facility (at Songhwan) to preclude the use of commercial terminals had been recommended but not yet funded.[2]

Thailand

(U) The U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand (USARSUPTHAI) noted that the physical security of ammunition storage areas was the basic responsibility of the operational commanders. Thai security guards, under contract and supervised by U.S. personnel, provided physical control and security of ammunition in storage at all locations except Takhli and the jointly operated Thai/U.S. Army facility nicknamed SALTSHAKER. At Takhli, the U.S. Air Force, in conjunction with local national civilian guards, provided security under an ISSA with USARSUPTHAI, while internal armed guards and an armed reaction force were provided by the Royal Thai Army. All areas except Vayama were fenced, lighted, patrolled, and possessed guard towers occupied 24 hours each day. At Udorn (PEPPERGRINDER) security dogs were also used. Access to each storage area was controlled by U.S. personnel.[3]

(U) At Vayama, the perimeter fence was inadequate, there were no guard towers, no lights and no road net. Project design to upgrade the physical security deficiencies at Vayama had been completed, construction funds had been approved, but construction had been delayed pending review by the Department of the Army. USARSUPTHAI recommended that funds be released by DA for immediate use.[4]

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1. Ibid.; for details of Japan/Okinawa base requirements and related construction, see Chapter I, Status of Command.
2. CDR USAEIGHT 200758Z Sep 73.
3. CDR USARSUPTHAI 190806Z Sep 73.
4. Ibid.

Hawaii

(U) As already discussed in this section, Tri-Service ammunition storage at Lualualei (NAD) was under consideration as a result of the Project FRESH study. Also discussed was the sudden, but temporary, community concern about underground structures. At that time (September 1973), active Army conventional ammunition storage areas on Oahu consisted of two depot type installations. They were the Aliamanu and Upper Kipapa military reservations. Some Army ammunition was also stored and secured by the NAD at Lualualei. The Aliamanu military reservation was located about four miles from the business district of Honolulu on 509 acres of land in the crater bowl of an extinct volcano. There were 154 hillside tunnels strung along a macadam road--approximately three miles long--which circled the crater bowl. The entire perimeter was enclosed with a seven foot chain link fence topped with triple strand barbed wire. The tunnels in use were equipped with high security padlocks and hasps. Only one of the three gates was open and it was manned 24 hours a day by civilian guards. A civilian guard roving patrol operated 24 hours, seven days per week, and a supervisory guard patrol checked guard effectiveness and efficiency during non-duty hours.[1]

(U) The Upper Kipapa military reservation was located approximately 15 miles from the Honolulu business district. It occupied 220 acres in a gulch about 1 1/2 miles long. It contained 54 hillside tunnels along each side of the gulch on a macadam road 40 feet above the floor of the gulch. The gulch was 200 feet deep with nearly vertical walls, and agricultural land was leased around the gulch as an explosive safety zone. The tunnels in use were equipped with high security padlocks and hasps, and the same guard measures were in effect as at Aliamanu. However, the Upper Kipapa area was not adequately lighted nor fenced. An engineer estimate of $400,000 to upgrade security at Upper Kipapa had been made, but the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii recommended that the Tri-Service storage concept at NAD be adopted.[2]

MILCON in Thailand

Facilities to Support Withdrawal

(S) On 22 November 1972, CINCPAC had requested MACV to submit an estimate of facilities which would be needed to support the U.S. DAO in Saigon and the USSAG at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. CINCPAC forwarded the projects identified by MACV to the JCS on 6 December 1972. They included communications relocation

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1. CDR USASCH 180056Z Sep 73.
2. Ibid.

and reorientation projects to support USSAG and MEDTC by the U.S. Army, and administrative facilities, troop housing and roads and utilities by the Air Force. On 13 December 1972, the JCS notified CINCPAC that all military construction (MILCON) projects costing more than Service approval authority were to be submitted to ASD(I&L) on a case-by-case basis. The JCS stated that no delay was envisioned if MILCON projects were promptly identified through Service channels and validated by CINCPAC.[1]

(S) On 6 January 1973, in response to a PACAF 16 December 1972 request, CINCPAC validated three projects to the JCS for construction of facilities to support the new USSAG mission at Nakhon Phanom (NKP). The projects consisted of administrative facilities, officers quarters, and utilities and ground improvements. The total cost was estimated at $2.17 million, but, because modular and prefabricated structures and some equipment were available, the actual additional money needed was estimated at $978,300:[2]

	Tot Est Cost	Funded Cost
Admin Facilities	443,900	52,100
Officers Quarters	1,140,000	405,400
Util & Gr Imp.	733,100	520,800
Totals	$2,317,000	$978,300

(U) On 11 May 1973, PACAF again proposed for CINCPAC validation projects for bachelor housing and administrative facilities. In addition to support for USSAG, this construction was also needed to support the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), also located at NKP. The estimated costs were $320,000 and $160,000 respectively, plus $28,000 for design. On 22 May, CINCPAC validated the projects, requesting the use of residual RVN MILCON funds.[3]

(S) On 12 July, the JCS requested CINCPAC to re-evaluate the projects. PACAF advised, on 30 August, that the bachelor housing was being erected under two operations and maintenance (O&M) projects vice MILCON funds, and that alterations on 18 wooden housing structures (hootches) had been deferred. However, PACAF also re-stated the urgency of need for the administration facilities. On 8 September, CINCPAC re-validated the $160,000 project for administration building construction. Involved was erection of a 5,000 square foot pre-engineered building, alteration of an existing building, and the construction

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 299.
2. J42 HistSum Jan 73; CINCPACAF 160232Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 060255Z Jan 73.
3. J42 HistSum May 73; Ltr, PACAF to CINCPAC, 11 May 73, Subj: Bachelor Housing and Administration Facilities for JCRC and USSAG; CINCPAC 221830Z May 73.

of 6,000 square feet of covered storage to support the JCRC mission.[1]

(C) After a review of facility requirements and utilization at NKP by the Thirteenth Air Force, that headquarters and PACAF withdrew support for the JCRC administrative facilities. On 27 September, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS and Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force that action be deferred for the project.[2]

(U) In October and November, the reason for the delay surfaced when Thirteenth Air Force advised that 4,000 square feet of administrative space for JCRC would be provided by USSAG. However, when PACAF requested the balance of the requirements to be funded by two O&M minor construction projects, each under $50,000, the question of funding responsibility was raised. The NKP support unit (56th Combat Support Group) cited the ISSA between JCRC and NKP, which stated that all in-house work orders and projects for the tenant (JCRC) would be reimbursed by the tenant on the basis of actual funded cost. Further, projects in excess of $50,000 would be on a non-reimbursable basis. PACAF then directed the 56th CSG to continue to develop the two projects, which, if below $50,000 each, would be forwarded by JCRC through joint channels to CINCPAC for approval and funding.[3]

VIASA Upgrade

(C) In May 1972, USARPAC had requested CINCPAC to validate a $2.9 million, three-phase project at Camp Vayama. This facility was known as the Vayama In-transit Ammunition Storage Area (VIASA). The three phases were to consist of construction of 20 additional ammunition storage pads; repair of 37 existing pads; and improvement of security at the VIASA complex. This facility was central to the single pipeline concepts embodied in SCOOT and COLOGS. In June 1972, the JCS informed CINCPAC that validation of the VIASA project was deferred pending consideration of alternative means of providing munitions support to Cambodia. Having consulted with his Service components and the MSC, CINCPAC ruled out the alternative of off-shore storage and transshipment because of excessive costs, untimely response and political sensitivities. However, CINCPAC requested USARPAC to revise the original proposal to less than one million dollars, which was within MILCON programming authority of the Secretary

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1. J42 HistSum Sep 73; CINCPAC 080405Z Sep 73, which cited JCS 2418/120103Z Jul 73 and CINCPACAF 302045Z Aug 73.
2. J42 HistSum Sep 73; CINCPAC 270306Z Sep 73, which cited CINCPACAF 210217Z Sep 73; J4216 Point Paper, 5 Oct 73, Subj: Administrative Facilities for JCRC.
3. J42 HistSum Dec 73; CINCPACAF 162032Z Nov 73, which cited miscellaneous Air Force correspondence.

of Defense. References to Cambodian support were to be deleted, and the Phase II proposal for repair of existing facilities was to be programmed for O&M funds. On 14 July 1972, the revision was submitted in two phases: one for 12 additional ammunition storage pads; one for improvements in security. The total cost was estimated to be $999,800. The repair and maintenance portion of the original proposal was submitted by USARPAC to DA as an O&M project for $681,000. Once again, CINCPAC validated the projects on 25 July 1972.[1]

(S) On 27 September 1972 the Secretary of Defense approved the VIASA construction for $999,800. The existing 20,000 short tons of ammunition storage capability would be increased to 26,000 short tons, and the security of the installation improved. Further, lower levels of stockage would be possible at PEPPERGRINDER and ammunition for Laos would no longer be required at Takhli.[2]

(S) By April 1973, it was apparent that the VIASA project would also be delayed, although CINCPAC re-stated the validity of the requirement to upgrade the facility and requested USARPAC and the DA to take whatever action was necessary to expedite the project. On 20 August 1973, the DOD deferred Phases I and III construction pending resolution of long term requirements. The DA was directed to resume review of the project upon completion of design.[3]

(S) On 27 October 1973, CINCPAC reviewed the benefits to be derived from the VIASA inprovements in a message to the JCS and DA. The ground ammunition at the Takhli site could be removed; the assets at PEPPERGRINDER could be relocated to reduce safety hazards; and, if PEPPERGRINDER were closed, the VIASA would be the sole resource remaining in Thailand. CINCPAC recommended that Phase I and III construction begin as soon as possible. Regardless, at the end of 1973, action rested with the DA to expedite the DOD hold on construction approval.[4]

MILCON at ASA Location 178

(S) As related in the Intelligence chapter, a COMPASS LINK terminal was soft sited at NKP to provide a short term capability after the JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendation against hard site installation. This decision was

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol I, p. 305.
2. Ibid., p. 306.
3. J42 HistSum Apr 73; COMUSMACTHAI 160655Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 180001Z Apr 73; J4216 Point Paper, 5 Oct 73, Subj: Vayama Intransit Ammunition Storage Area (VIASA)
4. J42 HistSums Oct and Dec 73; CINCPAC 270422Z Oct 73.

related to the cessation of U.S. combat activities after 15 August and the uncertainty of long term need at NKP. However, the COMPASS LINK plans advanced by the JCS in May 1973 had included a long term need for a hardened COMPASS LINK facility at Ramasun Station in support of "other operational requirements". This terminal was installed at a cost of $145,000.[1]

(S) The "other operational requirements" referred to by the JCS involved the key position of Ramasun Station as the most important strategic intelligence collection site in Southeast Asia. The host unit was the Seventh Radio Relay Facility Section of the U.S. Army Security Agency (ASA). Its unclassified designation was ASA Location 178. Originally, the ASA unit had a small U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) tenant detachment. The USAFSS 6924th Security Squadron moved from Da Nang, RVN to Ramasun in June 1971. In 1972, ASA became host to a Navy Security Group detachment. All assigned units of the tri-Service operation were engaged in highly sensitive intelligence gathering activities. In March 1973, the parent ASA Pacific headquarters submitted justification to the DA for four construction projects at ASA Location 178 totaling $2.233 million to be funded in fiscal year 1973. In April, MACTHAI validated the urgency of the requirement and funding under a MILCON Army (MCA) contingency construction program. On 18 April, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the requested construction be approved and funded as soon as possible. The project included a 12,000 square foot addition to an operations building for $467,000; an enlisted men's barracks without mess for 255 men at $550,000; a diesel electric power plant of 2,250 kilowatts at $690,000; a 375,000 gallon capacity sewage treatment plant for $459,000. Design cost was estimated at $111,000, for a total project cost of $2.285 million.[2]

(S) ASD subsequently approved construction contingency funds in the amount of $1,220,000 to provide for additional power and sewage disposal facilities at Ramasun Station, Thailand. ASD (Intelligence) advised that construction of the barracks and operations building addition has been disapproved.[3]

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1. J42 HistSum May and Dec 73; JCS 4467/081419Z May 73; CINCPAC 180403Z May 73; JCS 3810/202224Z Sep 73, which cited CINCPAC 202229Z Jun 73; also see Chapter IX, Intelligence.
2. J42 HistSum Apr 73; Ltr, USARPAC to CINCPAC, 13 Apr 73; Subj: Request for Contingency Military Construction ASA LOC 178; USMACTHAI 120315Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 180302Z Apr 73.
3. J42 Hist Addendum to Dec 73; DA (C) Msg 052125Z Dec 73.

MILCON in Vietnam

Approval Authority-Minor Construction, Maintenance, Repair

(U) On 16 February 1973, USARPAC invited CINCPAC's attention to the imminent disestablishment of the U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV). USARPAC had delegated authority for the approval of minor construction to subordinate unit commanders. Authority to approve maintenance and repair projects had also been delegated commensurate with the ability of the subordinate units to finance, design, review and execute the projects. For USARV, this authority had been up to $50,000 and $200,000 respectively. Upon disestablishment of USARV, Army responsibility for the management, operation and maintenance of real property facilities would pass to the newly-established DAO Saigon.[1]

(U) CINCPAC replied on 28 February, informing USARPAC that approval authority should pass to the Chief, Army Division, DAO Saigon in accordance with functional responsibilities stated by the JCS on 15 January. In May, USSAG requested CINCPAC to confirm that the Army Division of DAO Saigon possessed the authority to negotiate and effect payment of leases and restoration claims under Army regulations. Once again, CINCPAC cited the DAO functional statements disseminated by the JCS, and affirmed that the Army Division was authorized to execute all real property functions. The Army regulation could be used as a procedural guide; however, CINCPAC requested USARPAC to formally authorize the Chief, Army Division to perform necessary real estate functions.[2]

Transfer of Construction Administrative Functions

(U) The extent of the residual construction program in Vietnam after a ceasefire had been addressed by the JCS and CINCPAC in November 1972. On 4 November, the JCS had requested CINCPAC to analyze the MILCON program in Vietnam to determine which projects should be continued, cancelled or changed in the event of a ceasefire. Consolidated information from MACV and the Service components listed projects in two categories: nation-building projects or direct military support projects. Regardless of ceasefire implications, however, both MACV and CINCPAC cited past emphasis on the promotion of Vietnamization by the construction of facilities for the long term support of the RVNAF.[3]

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1. J42 HistSum Feb 73; CINCUSARPAC 162008Z Feb 73.
2. CINCPAC 280438Z Feb 73, which cited JCSM 25-73 of 15 Jan 73; J42 HistSum Jun 73; COMUSSAG/7AF 230750Z May 73; CINCPAC 010452Z Jun 73, which cited JCS 1298/070205Z Mar 73.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 297, 299.

(U) Two of the on-going programs were particularly oriented toward nation building, and, equally significant, were high visibility projects insofar as U.S. intentions were concerned. These were the highway construction program and the dependent shelter program. The highway construction program had been under the administrative supervision of the DOD elements in Vietnam--MACV and the successor DAO organization. On 15 August 1973, the State Department requested DAO and AID, Saigon to prepare a plan to transfer the monitorship of the highway program from DAO to AID as early as possible.[1]

(C) The dependent shelter program had been initiated by the RVN in 1961. In 1967, U.S. participation began by funding a pilot program for the Army of Vietnam (ARVN). In 1969, the U.S. Navy programmed funds for Vietnamese Navy dependent shelters, and in 1970, the U.S. Air Force began a program for the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). Meanwhile, MACV had established a joint U.S.-RVNAF action group called the Dependent Shelter Program Group (DSPG) to provide overall planning and direction; to coordinate U.S. responsibilities; and to monitor the use of U.S. material. Construction responsibility and management remained with the RVN. The DSPG established a requirement for 200,000 shelters to be built over an eight year period at $6 million per year. The U.S. support was to be for such items as lumber, cement, roofing and hardware. In May 1970, President Nixon approved U.S. support for a five year period in a letter to President Thieu.[2]

(C) By the end of fiscal year 1973, there were 116,500 units programmed for completion. Funds had been provided for 66,500 units; 8,500 had not yet been started; and 44,000 were complete. The unfunded remaining 50,000 units were estimated to cost $15 million. The construction had been accomplished by the RVNAF, with DAO Saigon assisting with procurement and delivery of material.[3]

(C) By October 1973, it had become apparent that the projected phase-down of DAO Saigon would impose an unacceptable burden on the remaining staff. Accordingly, the ASD (I&L) proposed a program for continued U.S. assistance for material costs, but the entire management would be assumed by the RVN. Construction would be by contract or self-help, with standards revised to promote the use of Vietnam-produced materials. The RVN would be reimbursed based on the number of units completed prior to 1 July 1975, but not to exceed $300 per unit. The point of contact for the U.S. would be the Embassy, with the Director, AID Saigon as the implementing authority. This proposal applied only to the

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1. SECSTATE 161882/152104Z Aug 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 300, 301.
3. J4216 Point Paper, 5 Oct 73, Subj: Dependent Shelter Program.

remaining 50,000 units. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS, Defense and State that the program be transferred to AID, and the Embassy in Saigon concurred in the transfer.[1]

(C) Meanwhile, the DOD had changed the management of the overall RVN MILCON program effective 1 August 1973. Program management was by the sponsor Service vice DAO Saigon. New projects and scope increases required ASD(I&L) approval, and requests were submitted via Service channels with concurrent joint channel validation.[2]

Construction in Cambodia

(C) The transport of materiel to Cambodia in support of the various logistics enhancement projects, discussed earlier in this chapter, impacted on construction projects underway late in 1973. Among these were airfield improvements at Pochentong Airfield, Ream Airfield, Battambang Airfield, and the Ream Naval Base. The airfield improvements were to relieve congestion, permit dispersal and to support FANK tactical operations and the Cambodian Air Force training program. At Ream Naval Base, pier construction was scheduled to improve support for coastal patrol craft. The Chief, MEDTC acknowledged the efforts of all concerned to expedite the installation improvements, and the competition for limited transportation facilities. On 4 December, MEDTC requested renewed efforts, and submitted the following program status:[3]

	Contract Award Date	Orig. Est Completion	Percent Complete	Current Est Completion	Months Behind
Pochentong Afld	24 Apr 73	25 Apr 74	9	Oct 74	6
Ream Naval Base	27 Oct 73	31 Dec 73	55	Mar 74	3
Ream Afld	7 Feb 73	7 Dec 73	23	Aug 74	8
Battambang Afld	22 Feb 73	25 Dec 73	29	Apr 74	4

MILCON in Korea

Construction Management

(U) Following the Pueblo Incident, Congress appropriated approximately $100 million for construction improvements in Korea. An additional $46 million plus was provided in various follow-on fiscal year MILCON appropriations. By

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1. Ibid.; SECSTATE 166436/1/242035Z Aug 73.
2. J4216 Point Paper, 5 Oct 73, Subj: Residual RVN Construction Program.
3. CHMEDTC 13462/041235Z Dec 73.

SECDEF direction, a Joint-Service Engineer Division was established in 1968 under COMUS Korea/CINCUNC to manage the sizeable construction program. As of 31 January 1973, the program was virtually complete--approximately $7 million in construction left to place--with the size of future construction programs projected to be quite modest. On 2 February 1973, the JCS implemented a SECDEF decision to revert to normal construction programming and management procedures in Korea by 31 March 1973; to identify for deletion those manpower authorizations associated with this decision; and to take necessary action to delete these spaces from joint-staff manpower programs. In effect, implementation of the SECDEF decision meant deletion of all construction management functional responsibility exercised by the USFK/UNC Engineer Division, and assumption of these responsibilities by respective PACOM Service components. The USFJ/UNC Engineer Division was authorized 21 military/civilian manpower spaces. Accordingly, CINCPAC directed COMUS Korea to take necessary action to allow for an orderly transfer of current construction and real estate management functions to appropriate in-country Service components, and to delete corresponding USFK/UNC manpower authorizations. On 24 February 1973, COMUS Korea provided, inter alia, an implementation plan and advised that certain USFK/UNC Engineer Division responsibilities apart from construction management should continue as joint-staff functions. On 27 February 1973, CINCPAC J4 addressed the COMUS Korea position in a memo to the CINCPAC Director of Personnel. The COMUS Korea position, manpower deletions, personnel transfers, and publication of revised functional statements were transferred to the staff jurisdiction of the CINCPAC Personnel Directorate.[1]

(U) On 15 June, and in pursuance of the management reversion directed above, CINCPAC delegated the following project approval authority to COMUS Korea:[2]

Minor Construction	$ 50,000 and under
Repair	25,000 and under
Maintenance	100,000 and under

WWMCCS Computer Mainframe Facility

(C) On 12 February 1973, COMUS Korea requested early approval and funding of an urgent minor construction project to provide a building at Taegu, Korea to house a World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) computer mainframe; estimated cost $283,000. Since the project exceeded a $50,000 cost

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1. J42 HistSum Feb 73; Memo, JCS 23-73 of 2 Feb 73, Subj: Construction Management in Korea; CINCPAC 130213Z Feb 73; J4/Memo/122-73 of 27 Feb 73, Subj: Construction Management in Korea.
2. J42 HistSum Jun 73; CINCPAC 150421Z Jun 73.

estimate, precluding use of O&M funds, it required processing for funding from military construction appropriations. The target date of 2nd Quarter FY74 for installing the computer precluded normal MILCON programming. Accordingly, on 5 March 1973, CINCPAC endorsed the COMUS Korea project into Navy channels, recommending early approval and funding from Navy-held urgent military construction appropriations. On 27 March 1973, the Navy approved the project.[1]

(C) In September, after delays in funding had inflated the cost to exceed the minor construction limit, CINCPAC stressed the importance of the project in the event of contingency plan activation. He advised the JCS that, as a subsystem of the CINCPAC command and control system, the facility in Korea was urgently required, and recommended immediate use of DOD MILCON contingency authority. The project was approved and funded, and the construction contract awarded in December 1973.[2]

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1. J42 HistSum Mar 73; Ltr, CINCPAC Ser 0210 of 5 Mar 73, Subj: Minor Construction Project, WWMCCS Computer Mainframe Facility; Ltr, COMNAVFACENGCOM Ser 0541C of 27 Mar 73; Subj: Urgent Minor MCON Project P-101, WWMCCS Computer Mainframe Facility, Camp Walker, Korea.
2. J42 HistSum Dec 73; CINCPAC 102012Z Sep 73.

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CHAPTER VI--COMMUNICATIONS-DATA PROCESSING

SECTION I--COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command-Control-Communications-Computers

(U) The term "command and control" had become expanded in recent years as systems and procedures had become more sophisticated and with increasingly complex communications and computer requirements an integral part of the total concept. In a command colloquialism, the combined concept of command and control, communications, and computers came to be called C^4.

(S) On 28 April CINCPAC advised the Chairman of the JCS of deficiencies in his C^4 system and requested assistance in correcting them. CINCPAC noted that existing systems "will not provide the flexibility, reliability, or survivability required to support the PACOM mid and long range strategy." The inability, he continued, to provide effective secure voice, quality wide band data circuits, or alternate communications systems or routes in the Pacific typified deficiencies that could adversely affect future operations. Technology already existed, however, or was "clearly on the horizon" that could close the gap. "This technology must be applied to solve the unique Pacific geography-mission problem." He advised that his staff was beginning to define mid and long-range requirements with the goal a unified system capable of satisfying all C^4 needs of PACOM headquarters and component and subordinate commands. Application of improved technology "should permit elimination of obsolete facilities now in use and thus provide significant cost avoidance."

(S) He continued that it was clear that "we need outside system engineering assistance." He noted that modern technology and the myriad options provided mandated the closest relationship between the system architect and the user to define and achieve the most effective way of filling requirements. The systems engineering expertise needed, however, was a very limited resource and available "only through such agencies as the DCA." CINCPAC advised that discussions with the Director of the Defense Communications Agency and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications had indicated their recognition of PACOM needs, and funds ($300,000) would be included in the CINCPAC FY 74 budget to support estimated contractor, travel, and per diem costs associated with the study. CINCPAC requested that the DCA Director be tasked to provide professional systems engineering support (using both their own and contractor resources and supported by the National Security Agency, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and other agencies as appropriate) "to participate with my staff in identifying

and defining our C^4 requirements, and to assure satisfaction of these requirements in follow-on system design actions."[1]

(U) In 1973 a PACOM Command and Control Communications, Computer System Plan, developed by the Operations and Communications-Data Processing Directorates, was designed to provide a basic guideline for system improvements through the 1990 time period. The conceptual plan--Phase I--was completed, coordinated with the component commands, and forwarded to the JCS for approval. Phase II of the program was to develop specific Required Operational Capability (ROC) documents that addressed improvements of existing system deficiencies. The Communications-Data Processing Directorate began development of those ROCs in November for the transmissions system, the secure voice system, the computer internetting system, and the consolidation of communications centers. These had not been completed by the end of the year.[2]

Indian Ocean Communications

(S) Communications arrangements and problems figured heavily in the commitment of a CINCPAC task force in the Indian Ocean during the mid-East war in late 1973. (For details of those operations and CINCPAC's statements regarding lessons learned, particularly in communications matters and requirements, see Chapter IV, Military Operations, "Mid-East War Related Operations.") IN CINCPACFLT's contingency plan it was stated, "there will be total reliance on longhaul HF radio for all communications support. Due to distances involved and inadequacy of shore support facilities, real time command and control will be directly related to reliability of this path. It should be noted that HF communication in the Arabian Sea is barely adequate to support existing MIDEASTFOR units."[3]

(S) On 3 November CINCPAC provided expanded information on these problems to the JCS. He noted that the path mentioned by CINCPACFLT was in reality made up of tandem, extremely long distance dual, or possibly tertiary, HF links. This arrangement completely negated any possible command and control voice capability to or from the task group commander. CINCPAC considered that as a minimum the PACOM Command Center at Camp Smith be provided with reliable emergency voice and teletype service to and from the task group. He listed some possible arrangements that could provide the voice service required and possibly an alternate single channel teletype path. He concluded that he recognized that the suggested arrangements were subject to diplomatic pressures. In this regard he proposed

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1. CINCPAC 282211Z Apr 73.
2. J61122 HistSum Oct 73. The plan was forwarded as CINCPAC Serial 001282 of 29 Oct 73.
3. CINCPACFLT 011221Z Nov 73.

that the JCS coordinate with the State Department and other agencies to determine what other options might be available in the next 5-10 days. He recommended early study of the problem, as the requirement for requested service was at the earliest possible date.[1]

(S) To assist in the reception of emergency action messages, the task group commander was authorized to copy the VLF broadcast from the Naval Communications Station Harold E. Holt in Australia. As an interim measure, a nucleus Air Transportable Communications Unit crew, spare parts, and a Navy commercially-procured earth satellite terminal were deployed to Diego Garcia.

(S) This commercial satellite terminal could not be used, however, until approval was given at a meeting of the International Telecommunications Satellite Board of Governors, which was scheduled for 5 December. Because of adverse political ramifications inherent in obtaining the mandatory approval, however, the JCS cancelled their efforts to obtain approval, and directed the Navy to return the earth station terminal.[2]

(S) Because the need still existed for reliable communications, a Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS) satellite terminal, an AN/TSC-54, was borrowed from the Harold E. Holt Communications Station and installed on Diego Garcia on 7 December. The few minor technical problems that were encountered were overcome.

(S) Bandar Abbas, Iran had been approved for use by certain Navy aircraft on a minimum essential basis. The JCS approved retention of certain USAF mobile communications equipment, an AN/TSC-38, and thus a HF record communications link was established between Bandar Abbas and Diego Garcia.[3]

Management of the National Communications System Restoration Priorities System

(C) In mid-September 1972 the JCS had requested that CINCPAC review all government owned and leased Defense Department circuits (less interswitch trunks) in the PACOM to insure that restoration priorities were assigned in accordance with existing guidance. The assignment of priorities 1 and 2 was limited to minimum essential communications. Specific justification for each circuit so assigned was required, therefore, so that the recommendations could be evaluated by the Manager of the National Communications System.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 030224Z Nov 73.
2. J6232 HistSum Dec 73.
3. Ibid.
4. J6250 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS-SM-489-72 of 15 Sep 72. The restoration priorities guidance was in DOD Directive 4605.2 of 17 Oct 68, Restoration Priorities for Military Communications System Circuit Restoration Priority System as described in NCS Memorandum 1-68 of 18 Jul 68.

(C) CINCPAC forwarded the results of this review to the Director of the Defense Communications Agency on 15 January 1973. It was possible to reduce the priority on a number of the 6,787 circuits reviewed, as follows:

Restoration Priority	Before Review	After Review
1	989	654
2	1,208	841
3	1,276	1,284
4	591	32
00	2,723	3,976

The JCS had directed that the circuits in Vietnam not be included in the review at that time.[1]

Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers Studied

(U) In June 1972 the JCS had advised CINCPAC of increased pressure to improve the speed of service of record communications and of concern for the mounting costs of military telecommunications. An inter-Service working group had been established and was conducting a study to identify locations world-wide where inter-Service consolidation might prove feasible in terms of cost savings and operational efficiency. The island of Oahu had been one of the locations so identified. Oahu had also become the subject of Congressional interest in this regard. The JCS had requested that CINCPAC review military telecommunications requirements and develop a plan for their consideration. The resulting CINCPAC Concept Plan for Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on the Island of Oahu (COTCO) had been forwarded to the JCS on 8 September 1972. There had not been time for detailed planning and the concept required further development and evaluation before a definitive system design and associated implementation plan could be achieved.[2]

(U) In early 1973 a survey of CINCPAC staff internal message coordination was performed as part of a CINCPAC traffic study. The component commands were tasked to study traffic also. Representatives from the Naval Electronics

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1. Ltr CINCPAC Ser 050, 15 Jan 73, Subj: Management of the National Communications System Restoration Priority System (U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 347-349.

Systems Command were present to review the study of Oahu data and familiarize themselves with the missions and locations of facilities on Oahu.[1]

(U) As the traffic study continued, the recommendation regarding the number of terminal requirements was increased from 150 (the original COTCO minimum) to a revised initial requirement for 267 terminals. On 27 February a meeting of the Oahu Joint Action Group with representatives of the JCS and Chief of Naval Operations discussed budgetary constraints, and an Interim Operational Capability phased plan was identified. Each component was requested to review the assignment and identify each terminal to be implemented in one of three initial phases. CINCPAC compiled the results for forwarding to the Naval Electronics Laboratories Center (NELC) at San Diego through the CNO.[2]

(U) The NELC Preliminary System Design Plan as submitted to the JCS encompassed some changes to the original plan that had been requested by the CINCPAC component commands at a meeting held 22 May.[3]

(U) In late August the Director of Communications-Electronics for the JCS visited CINCPAC headquarters to discuss the COTCO. He toured communications centers at Camp Smith, the Service component commands, and the Fleet Operation Control Center, Pacific at Kunia to obtain a sampling of the major centers involved in the consolidation process. Major agreements reached as a result of these discussions were that further engineering and analysis of COTCO alternatives and functional requirements was mandatory; it was desirable to conduct a telecommunication consolidation/automation test program on Oahu; and it was recommended that Camp Smith be the location for the user-terminal portion of the Oahu test program.[4]

(U) On 6 September 1973 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications, subsequently designated as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Telecommunications and Command, Control (DTACC), approved a JCS Joint Action Group consolidation plan and tasked the Navy for implementation, with assistance from other Services and Defense Department agencies. CINCPAC retained a requirements role. During early November, in response to ASD (T) direction, the CNO forwarded a draft funding plan for COTCO to ASD (T). Comments on the draft plan were provided to the CNO on 15 December. The draft was then submitted to the JCS and the DTACC.[5]

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1. J6253 HistSum Jan 73.
2. J62501 HistSum Feb 73.
3. J62C2 HistSum May 73.
4. J61125 HistSum Aug 73.
5. J6/Memo/0005-74, 15 Aug 74, Subj: 1973 CINCPAC Command History, Review of Draft.

(U) Consolidation of telecommunications centers in other areas of the PACOM was also under study in 1973. Under study were plans for Guam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and Okinawa.[1]

Camp Smith Telecommunications Centers Consolidated and Reassigned

(U) While long-range plans continued for consolidation of telecommunications centers on Oahu, CINCPAC's Communications Center underwent a number of drastic organizational and procedural changes in 1973, the result of several years of planning. The center went to a much more mechanized mode of operation. In matters of organization, first the center was consolidated with that of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (the host and joint-tenant at Camp Smith) and then all center personnel were transferred from CINCPAC headquarters to the jurisdiction of the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu, where eventually the personnel of the other Services were to be replaced by all Navy personnel.

(U) A Local Digital Message Exchange (LDMX) had been installed in 1972, and it was this automated system plus the use of the Optical Character Reader and revised message preparation procedures that speeded message processing.[2]

(U) In January, as LDMX testing continued, approximately 70 percent of the incoming messages were assigned distribution automatically. A DCT 2000 remote printer was also under evaluation; after acceptance it was to be moved to the CINCPAC Command Center area for automatic receipt of advance copies of all FLASH and IMMEDIATE precedence message traffic.

(U) In order to expedite operations, a CINCPAC replica system was established at the CINCPACFLT LDMX site. This was tested through the capabilities of the Hawaii AUTODIN (automatic digital network) Switching Center, and when it proved successful, initial "on-line" operations began on 29 January. Problems arose, however, and final testing and acceptance were postponed. Also, Project HOMECOMING, the return of U.S. prisoners of war, had generated increased message traffic.[3]

(U) Meanwhile, staff training continued on preparation of outgoing message forms suitable to be "read" by the Optical Character Reader. Use of a revised form began on 20 February. Initially it was necessary to review prepared messages for a number of details. During April the OCR was linked successfully

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1. J62C2 HistSum May 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 355-356.
3. J6 HistSum Jan 73.

to the LDMX and by 1 May the system was considered to be performing satisfactorily. Subsequently the Communications Center invited the staff to visit the operation; briefings described the new machinery and procedures, increasing understanding of requirements.[1]

(U) Testing of the LDMX was conducted on 10 and 11 March by a team from the Commander of Naval Communications in Washington. The test was considered to go "extremely well." Four broad areas were tested. In the first, saturation testing, the Guam and Wahiawa Automatic Switching Centers were loaded with 300 messages each, addressed to the Communications Center. These were transmitted while outgoing traffic was simultaneously transmitted, to determine how well the system could function under maximum traffic load conditions. In a test of background and support programs, testing involved the addition, deletion, or changing of subject codes, flag words, or routing indicators to determine if the programs were sufficient for daily operations and to ascertain their viability and flexibility under varied operating conditions. In testing outgoing message processing, the whole spectrum of operations was tested. This entailed the assignment of routing indicators, formatting for transmission, and the actual sending of CINCPAC-originated messages. Incoming procedures were also checked for correct logging, duplicate transmission separation, proper assignment of service designation, assignment of internal distribution, editing, and final formatting. A few minor problems were brought to light, but these were corrected.[2]

(U) With successful completion of the testing, the CINCPAC center was prepared to complete consolidation with the Marine center. Phase I began on 16 April; this consisted of processing FMFPAC outgoing messages while testing the LDMX data base for incoming messages. On 26 April the processing of incoming FMFPAC messages began. Phase II, consolidation of the two centers, was satisfactorily completed on 1 May, at which time the Camp H.M. Smith Telecommunications Center was formed. A UNIVAC DCT 2000 remote printer was also installed in the FMFPAC Command center for automatic delivery of advance copies of FLASH and IMMEDIATE messages; this became operational on 1 May.[3]

(U) A number of matters had to be resolved and agreements reached concerning the transfer of the Camp Smith center to the command of the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu, principally involving personnel. The center had been jointly staffed by personnel of all Services; it was intended that eventually all would be Navy personnel.

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1. J63 HistSums Feb, Apr, Jun 73.
2. J6 HistSum Mar 73.
3. J6 HistSums Mar, Apr 73.

(U) On 15 August the JCS approved the plan for the transfer, summarizing manpower actions resulting from the consolidation and management transfer and reflecting a manpower saving of one officer and 59 enlisted. The JCS advised that replacement of Army and Air Force personnel was to commence on 1 July 1974 and be completed by 31 March 1975. On 1 September, at 0111Z hours, CINCPAC transferred command, management, supervision, and administrative control of the Camp Smith Telecommunications Center to the Commanding Officer, Naval Communications Station, Honolulu.[1]

(C) In the matter of Communications Security Material System (CMS) control, representatives of CINCPAC and the Naval Communications Station met and agreed that on the transfer of the control of the center, the CMS account was to be handled by one of the station's accounts, probably the Commander 14th Naval District/Commander Naval Base/Message Center Pearl Harbor account. Subsequently, however, because of objections by the Commander of the Naval Communications Station, responsibility for servicing the Communications Center with CMS material and equipment remained with the CINCPAC CMS account.[2]

World-Wide Military Command and Control System Computer Installed

(U) The Secretary of Defense had authorized 35 upgraded computers world-wide for the command and control system. The first for the command had been installed at the CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility at Kunia in 1972. Each of the components had one, also. The fifth, and last for the PACOM, was installed in CINCPAC's Camp Smith Command Center. Acceptance testing of the equipment, a Honeywell 6060, was completed between 14 and 28 December. "Tempest" testing began on 28 December and was expected to require 30 days.[3]

Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System

(U) The Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System (EMATS) was designed to provide Command Center operations personnel with the means of rapid composition, review, printing, and release of emergency messages into a transmission system (the automatic digital network--AUTODIN) for automatic distribution. Acknowledgement of receipt, from force to national level, was supposed to be within 90 seconds. The Improved EMATS (IEMATS) was projected to overcome existing deficiencies in message composition, release, transmission, and receipt.

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1. JCS 3365/152126Z Aug 73; COMNAVTELCOM Wash DC, 271926Z Aug 73; NAVCOMSTA Hono 010001Z Aug (sic) 73.
2. J6422 HistSums Jan, Apr 73.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 40; J633 HistSum Dec 73. Tempest was an unclassified term referring to compromising electronic emanations problems and related control measures.

Specifically, the EMATS control center at the Alternate National Military Command Center did not meet functional, survivability, or reliability requirements.

(U) Phase I of the IEMATS project, which was designed to provide terminals capable of originating emergency action messages at certain of the fixed primary and alternate command centers of the nuclear-capable unified and specific commanders in chief and the National Military Command System was being implemented. A tentative schedule prepared by the Air Force Communications Service, the project manager, included a target date for procurement of April 1974. Target date for operational capability was approximately one year later. Phases II and III had been approved for planning and programming only. Technical and analysis/cost estimates were necessary to update programming guidance in the next National Military Command Systems Five-Year Master Objectives Program.[1]

Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network

(S) The purpose of the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) was to deliver emergency action messages from National Command Authorities to SIOP (Single Integrated Operation Plan) and Continental United States defense forces in a trans- or post-attack nuclear environment. The idea for the MEECN had stemmed originally from some limited evidence that very low frequency/low frequency transmissions were minimally affected by nuclear blackout that caused havoc with high frequency communications. A network of VLF/LF stations had been formed to provide a survivable command and control communications capability.

(S) Since the mid-1960's both the Navy and Air Force had pursued programs to provide increased survivable, secure, anti-jam communications to SIOP forces. Renewed effort had been under way, however, at all levels of the Defense Department to assure not only improved communications to individual force units, but also to provide inter-operability between communications systems for use by all forces.

(S) In February 1973, based on studies indicating that U.S. communications for general war were considered deficient in reliability and confidence of performance, particularly in the ability to pass messages to SIOP and CONUS defense forces, the JCS promulgated a MEECN Master Plan to present the extent of this problem and to recommend time-phased improvements that would alleviate this situation. Further, the JCS requested a review of this plan. CINCPAC, after

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1. J6121 HistSum Jul 73.

coordinating the matter with his Service components, submitted his recommendations on 9 May.[1]

(S) On 7 September the JCS completed their review of the plan and endorsed or validated the majority of recommendations for improving the MEECN. Additionally, as a result of this review, the JCS highlighted significant new areas of concern. These included: implications of expanding the scope of the MEECN to insure two-way communications capability; inclusion of communications to tactical nuclear forces in the MEECN; feasibility of accommodating additional formatted emergency action messages in the message compression designs; and investigation of alternate means to transmit the information content of emergency action messages efficiently and effectively. CINCPAC was tasked to analyze and report on the following subject by 1 April 1974: "Operational Analysis of Incorporating Communications to the Tactical Nuclear Forces in the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network."[2]

Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON)

(U) On 21 June CINCPAC advised his component commanders that the practice of ticketing priority calls placed from non-AUTOVON instruments had proved to be an ineffective as well as expensive method of controlling abuse of the AUTOVON system. The results of a previous test in which calls were not ticketed had indicated that adequate subscriber service could be afforded as long as personnel were properly indoctrinated as to the usage of the AUTOVON system. CINCPAC advised that he wanted to avoid the unnecessary expense in ticketing priority calls, but "maximum cooperation must be afforded by the Services to assure the AUTOVON system will not be abused or exploited through unauthorized use of the system." CINCPAC proposed to discontinue ticketing the calls effective 1 July for a test period of three months. CINCPAC asked the components to monitor telephone discipline and report any adverse effects resulting from this change of policy. The Army and Navy discontinued ticketing priority calls for this period; the Air Force continued the ticketing practice in accordance with policy from the Air Force Chief of Staff, with CINCPAC headquarters interposing no objection.[3]

(U) At the beginning of the year the number of trunks in the AUTOVON system had been reduced. On 1 January, over the objections of CINCPAC and the Defense

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1. J62A HistSum May 73, which cited JCSM 63-73 of 22 Feb 73 (JACS 1125-72), JCS SM 79-73 of 22 Feb 73, and CINCPAC ltr Ser 00662 of 9 May 73; CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I, pp. 201-202.
2. J6121 HistSum Oct 73, which cited JCS SM 405-73 of 7 Sep 73.
3. CINCPAC 211956Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 282245Z Jun 73.

Communications Agency-Pacific, the total number of Inter-Switch Trunks (IST) between PACOM AUTOVON switches and the CONUS gateway stations had been reduced by 23. A similar proportional reduction had occurred in Europe. The DCA requested that the CINCs document any degradation in their command and control services.[1]

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1. J623 HistSum Dec 72.

SECTION II--PLANS AND PROGRAMS

Post-Hostilities Communications-Electronics Planning--Thailand

(S) Planning for communications-electronics programs and disposition of communications-electronics assets in Thailand after hostilities were concluded had been under study for several years and was discussed in detail in the CINCPAC Command History for 1972. Late in 1972 CINCPAC had provided information to assist the JCS in decision making in this matter. On 15 December 1972, however, the JCS had recommended that CINCPAC cease all actions in this regard. They advised, "Possible expansion of communications requirements in Thailand resulting from significantly increased presence of U.S. Forces/activities relocated from the RVN will place further demands upon existing Thai DCS capability and onward DCS routing. For this reason, any deactivations or retrogrades presently planned for Thailand should be held in abeyance."[1]

(U) On 14 March 1973, CINCPAC requested whether the annual update of the turnover schedule be submitted as scheduled in July or held in abeyance. The JCS said to hold it in abeyance, that new guidance would be provided.[2]

Communications Satellites

Satellite Terminal Installation in Tnailand

(TS) In 1972 a long-standing CINCPAC requirement to establish a Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) earth satellite station at Ramasun Station (at Udorn, Thailand) had been validated. The plan called for the installation of an AN/MSC-46 terminal at Ramasun Station and an AN/TSC-54 mobile terminal at Nakhon Phanom to support the USSAG/7AF. In early March 1973, however, COMUSSAG stated an urgent requirement to receive COMPASS LINK imagery at Nakhon Phanom. In view of the limitations of the AN/TSC-54 light earth terminal, he recommended that the installation in progress at Ramasun Station be curtailed and preparations begun to install the medium terminal at Nakhon Phanom. (The larger AN/MSC-46 was capable of receiving imagery transmitted through the low-powered Phase I satellites, the AN/TSC-54 was not.) When CINCPAC advised the JCS of the USSAG requirement, he noted that in view of "current and proposed cease fire political accords restricting tactical photo collection platforms and attendant anticipated resource draw down in SEA [Southeast Asia], requirement for COMPASS LINK receive capability at NKP becomes highest priority." He said that to sup-

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 343-346; JCS 4449/152156Z Dec 72.
2. CINCPAC 140324Z Mar 73; JCS 9725/271939Z Mar 73.

port the COMUSSAG mission to maintain the capability to renew the air war against North Vietnam, photography from national sources transmitted from COMPASS LINK terminals in Washington and Hawaii to Nakhon Phanom was required for command and control. Additionally, photography required to document cease-fire violations in the RVN and enemy military efforts throughout Laos and Cambodia "must be available to COMUSSAG on real time basis through CL system."[1]

(~~TS~~) Design for installation of the AN/MSC-46, serial number 7, at Ramasun Station was approximately 40 percent complete. (Serial numbers designated each piece of equipment, not a class identification.) Time factors for normal hard-site installation (six to nine months) precluded immediate attainment of the USSAG requirement at either site. Preliminary investigation by CINCPAC and the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), Pacific disclosed the possibility of siting the MSC-46 without the extensive construction required for normal installation. CINCPAC requested that the JCS task the DCA to determine the optimum method of satisfying the USSAG requirement in the shortest time. Meanwhile the DCA Pacific tested the capability of the TSC-54 to receive imagery; tests proved conclusively that the light terminal could not perform satisfactorily and a larger terminal had to be installed to receive transmissions.[2]

(~~S~~) On 18 April the Department of the Army tasked the Strategic Communications Command and the Army Satellite Command at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey regarding actions to be taken. These included preparation of a soft site for an MSC-46, serial 7, at Nakhon Phanom to provide an initial operational capability by mid-August; preparation of a hard site, also at Nakhon Phanom, for installation of an MSC-46, serial 8, then located at Ft. Monmouth, with an operational capability of mid-November; and continuation of hard site preparation at Ramasun Station for installation of the MSC-46, serial 7, after the serial 8 was operational at Nakhon Phanom.[3]

(~~S~~) On 8 May the JCS validated the requirement for a COMPASS LINK receiving capability at Nakhon Phanom. They requested that the Army redeploy the serial 7 equipment from Udorn, Thailand at the earliest possible date and place it on the soft site. They further requested that the Army deploy the serial 8 from New Jersey. The Air Force was requested to insure completion of temporary modifications to COMPASS LINK mission equipment to provide a receive capability by 30 June.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 240145Z Mar 73.
2. J616 HistSum Apr 73; DCA PAC 262138Z Mar 73; NAVCOMSTA Honolulu 070202Z Apr 73.
3. DA 182025Z Apr 73.
4. JCS 4467/081149Z May 73.

(S) Despite heavy rains that delayed site preparation, the soft site was ready for equipment installation on 1 June. Early reports on operation, however, indicated many failures of various components. Replacements were flown from Hawaii and the CONUS. Outages continued through mid-October. According to the debriefing of the Assistant Deputy COMUSMACTHAI in December:

> ...Extensive efforts by CINCPAC and COMUSMACTHAI resulted in Headquarters, United States Army Communications Command dispatching a team of highly qualified technicians to augment Nakhon Phanom personnel. Further, increased spare parts shipments were forwarded to Nakhon Phanom to prevent excessive delays from logistics downtime. Additional steps taken to achieve satisfactory communications included transferring from generator power to station power and installing a radome....The concern shown by the major activities involved (CINCPAC, MACTHAI, USACC-THAI) has enabled this project to move forward toward a satisfactory completion.[1]

(S) Evan as the soft-site installation was beginning operation, however, CINCPAC, as a result of a review of reconfiguration plans for Nakhon Phanom, recommended on 20 June that plans for construction of the hard site for the additional MSC-46 be cancelled.[2]

(S) While the JCS were studying the matter, CINCPAC requested COMUSSAG comments on several possible alternatives. COMUSSAG recommended that the hard site not be constructed, that the soft site be upgraded at that time, and that further construction and transportation costs should be held to an absolute minimum. At that time plans were under way to modify the serial 7 equipment. COMUSSAG recommended that until the modification was completed the already installed AN/TSC-54, serial 11, be retained. During that eight-week modification period, a send-only limitation was acceptable, but he reiterated that the COMPASS LINK/MUSCLE TRUCK capability continued to be required.[3]

(S) The JCS formalized the alternatives under consideration in a memorandum of 14 August. CINCPAC responded that the existing capabilities at Nakhon Phanom would be sufficient to satisfy CINCPAC and COMUSSAG requirements, when the MSC-46 became fully operational. He recommended that a decision on further construction be deferred until the U.S. posture in Thailand was better defined.[4]

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1. J616HistSum Jun 73; Debriefing of Col D. A. Curto, USAF, Assistant Deputy COMUSMACTHAI, 21 Dec 73, CPCS 001406-73.
2. J616 HistSum Jun 73; CINCPAC 202229Z Jun 73.
3. CINCPAC 112231Z Aug 73; USSAG/7AF 170720Z Aug 73.
4. CINCPAC 280424Z Aug 73; J61123 HistSum Aug 73.

(C) On 20 September the JCS approved cancellation of the hard site and directed that the AN/TSC-54, serial 11, be deactivated and shipped to the CONUS on 23 October, as had been scheduled previously. As a result of mid-October failures of the MSC-46 equipment, however, COMUSSAG requested that the TSC-54, serial 11, be held as a backup instead of shipping it out. CINCPAC concurred that the equipment should be retained. He noted that the Army Communications Command was taking various actions to correct the MSC-46 deficiencies, but that the date by which assured reliable performance would be achieved was not known.[1]

(C) The JCS did not concur, however, because of the impact on the TSC-54 modification program and associated costs. The equipment was shipped out on 31 October. On 22 October the Army Communications Command sent a four-man team to Nakhon Phanom to provide maintenance, operation, training, and supply assistance for the MSC-46 terminal. The team was to remain for from 30 to 60 days. That Army command was also negotiating for a full-time service representative from the manufacturer.[2]

Satellite Lost

(C) On 4 June the DCA reported that the only remaining Phase II DSCS satellite had suffered an anomaly and had been lost. The satellite had served the Atlantic area, but was of interest to CINCPAC in light of the possible impact on the second launch of those satellites scheduled for October. One of the two satellites launched at that time served the Western Pacific area in support of PACOM requirements. It was expected that the new satellite would be operational early in 1974.[3]

Air Force Satellite Communications System Site Surveys

(S) The Air Force Satellite Communications System was expected to become operational in 1976. Preliminary surveys were conducted in 1973 to determine the nature of requirements, types of communications interfaces, systems interoperability, and prime locations for earth terminals. Air Force visitors briefed appropriate CINCPAC staff personnel on 27 August, after which discussions of technical and operational parameters to be met by the Oahu earth terminal were held. As a result of these briefings and discussions, a number of modifications to the draft operational concept plan were made. These modifications and other suggestions for improvement of on-island service were submitted for inclusion in the final draft of the plan.[4]

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1. JCS 3810/212224Z Sep 73; USSAG 171020Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 180130Z Oct 73.
2. JCS 7187/192233Z Oct 73; J61112 HistSum Oct 73.
3. J616 HistSum Jun 73; DCA 042104Z Jun and 082109Z Jun 73.
4. J61123 HistSum Aug 73.

Improved MUSCLE TRUNK Service, Hawaii to Washington

(U) The Lenkurt Corporation had been contracted to engineer and modify the microwave system between Helemano (an Army facility) and Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii to accept a third programmed channel that would be connected to a second wideband path to Washington. The addition of the third channel, however, caused certain technical difficulties, and system modifications were necessary. The Naval Communications Command and the Naval Communications Station Honolulu concurred in the proposed modification. The Naval Electronic Systems Command tasked the Navy's Electronic Engineering Activity Pacific (NAVSEEAPAC) to provide engineering cost estimates and milestones to reestablish a capable system. The installation of the third programmed channel as proposed by Lenkurt was completed on 5 March, and conditionally accepted by NAVSEEAPAC for initial operational capability until complete function was restored.[1]

Interface of Communications Systems on Taiwan

(C) On Taiwan there were two independent long-haul multi-channel telecommunications systems. One was the U.S.-operated single axis Integrated Joint Communications Systems-Pacific (IJCS-PAC) (Taiwan) system, which extended from north to south on Taiwan and interconnected with Okinawa and the Philippines. The other was the Military Integrated Communications System (MICS), which served the long-haul needs of all services of the Republic of China's armed forces. This MICS extended completely around, as well as across, Taiwan. The two systems were not interconnected.

(C) On 15 November 1972 CINCPAC's staff informally advised the communications staff of COMUSTDC that it would seem beneficial to both the United States and the Republic of China to interconnect/interface those systems at selected nodal points. This would, in fact, provide a needed alternate path for the forces of both countries and would also facilitate combined operations. The COMUSTDC responded that the idea was generally acceptable, in concept, by communicators of both countries. He advised that a working group was to be convened to work out technical details.[2]

(U) On 1 March 1973 COMUSTDC advised that a conference had been held and interconnect nodals were agreed upon. He requested that CINCPAC arrange for on-site engineering assistance. On 8 March CINCPAC tasked CINCUSARPAC, in cooperation with the Commander, Defense Communications Agency, Pacific, and in coordination with COMUSTDC, to provide the requested engineering assistance.[3]

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1. J6251 HistSum Feb 73.
2. J614 HistSum Apr 73.
3. CINCPAC 080017Z Mar 73.

Communications Support for Japanese Forces

(U) In response to a request from COMUS Japan to support the Japanese Self-Defense Forces by providing four circuits on U.S. backbone systems (one from Okinawa to Japan and three within Okinawa), CINCPAC agreed to provide service on an interim basis. The Self-Defense Force was constructing its own radio system between Okinawa and Japan; this was scheduled for completion prior to 30 June 1973. No commercial communications could be provided by the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation.

(U) CINCPAC studied the assets available within the Defense Communications System and found that sufficient spares were available to provide the service. The three requirements within Okinawa could be satisfied by utilizing circuits on an existing cable that were surplus to U.S. Forces needs. The fourth circuit, from Okinawa to Itazuke, was available via a U.S.-owned tropospheric scatter system.

(U) CINCPAC's authority to provide this service was limited by JCS Policy Memorandum 112 of 16 June 1970 to a period of not more than 90 days. He requested that the JCS concur in provision of the service until 30 June.[1]

Indonesia Communications Project (INDOCOM)

(S) INDOCOM was initiated as a major element of the Security Assistance Program for Indonesia in 1970. Initial planning had provided for a five-year program, but this had been extended for a year. The system was to consist eventually of approximately 100 communications sites and was funded at $17 million. The Department of the Army was the single manager for procurement and installation of the fixed, long-haul system. The Navy and Air Force were to provide assistance as required for Service-peculiar installations. The Army carried out its responsibilities through the establishment of an Army Strategic Communications Command project office in Jakarta. By the spring of 1973 all engineering planning was in the last stages of completion. A radio system connecting the Joint Military Headquarters to six major subordinate commands had been completed in 1971. A net serving the Jakarta garrison and National Police was completed on a crash basis in February 1973. INDOCOM had met with a considerable degree of success and acceptance by U.S. and Indonesian participants.[2]

(U) Until the spring of 1973, procurement for INDOCOM had been handled by the Commander of the Army Strategic Communications Command as all projects had

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1. J621 HistSum Feb 73.
2. J613 Point Paper, 29 Mar 73, Subj: Indonesian Communications Project (INDOCOM).

been Army-related. The program reached the stage, however, where procurement for the Air Force control tower/navigation facility and the Navy maintenance facility were to be addressed. At the request of the Chief of the U.S. Defense Liaison Group (USDLG) Indonesia, therefore, CINCPAC hosted meetings on 21 and 22 May to discuss procurement procedures for Air Force and Navy-peculiar items to support the project. Representatives of the USDLG, CINCPAC's Air Force and Navy components, and the Navy's Electronics Engineering Activity Pacific (NAVSEEAPAC) attended. Following the meeting CINCPAC alerted the Chief of Naval Operations and the Air Force Chief of Staff that phases of the INDOCOM in their functional areas were now ready for implementation (this matter had already been concurred in by the Secretary of Defense). CINCPAC advised them that the CHUSDLG would make appropriate deviation of funds.[1]

(U) Two other INDOCOM projects, the net between the Navy bases and the net between the Air Force bases, were also ready for action at that time. As they were essentially identical to projects already being handled by the Army, CINCPAC asked the Department of the Army to task the Strategic Communications Command to take engineering review and procurement action on the two systems. It was learned informally that STRATCOM was to be so tasked.[2]

(U) Another meeting was held at Camp Smith on 15 and 16 October to establish procurement procedures and responsibilities for portions of the Navy's functional area. It was determined that the Navy Electronic Systems Command would manage the procurement and shipping of materials for shipboard communication. The NAVSEEAPAC would do the same for the Indonesian Navy's electronics maintenance facility. Technical assistance teams were to be provided by NAVSEEAPAC when they were requested by the USDLG in Jakarta.[3]

MARK XII Identification Friend or Foe System

(C) The MARK XII Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) was an improved system that had all of the MARK X capabilities plus an additional crypto secure mode (Mode 4) and airborne equipment capable of air-by-air interrogation. The MARK XII Mode 4 secure IFF was to be employed to provide recognition and identification of friendly military aircraft and ships under conditions of war or peace. Mode 4 enabled positive identification as friendly but not necessarily hostile. This was because possible mechanical, electrical, crypto, or human error could preclude reception of the proper response. The MARK XII was expected to enhance significantly the air defense commander's ability to identify friendly forces

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1. CINCPAC 260411Z May 73.
2. CINCPAC 302002Z May 73; J612 HistSum May 73.
3. J6111 HistSum Oct 73.

rapidly and reliably. MARK XII was being implemented under the AIM program, a Defense Department directed program to provide improved air traffic control and secure identification, with the Air Force as executive agent. AIMS was an "acronym of acronyms" meaning: A--Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon Systems (ATCRBS); I--Identification Friend or Foe; M--MARK XII IFF System; and S--System.

(S) The United States had been in the process of installing MARK XII in U.S. aircraft and ships. In January 1971 CINCPACAF had determined that an operational requirement existed for the equipment to be also available to the forces of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in support of possible military operations envisioned under national strategy. CINCPAC had validated this proposal on 19 June 1971, strongly recommending that the JCS consider release. On 4 August 1972 the JCS authorized release and granted approval to CINCPAC to initiate negotiations, subject to a number of conditions outlined in the authorization.[1]

(S) On 13 November 1972 the Chief of the Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan requested that the Japan Self-Defense Force (JASDF) be briefed on the AIMS program. CINCPAC concurred and CINCPACAF was requested to provide participation. The briefing was presented on 17 January 1973 with a follow-on meeting on 19 January. It was the conclusion of CINCPAC participants that the JASDF wanted the MARK XII system, but that it would be very difficult for them to justify an immediate need to their higher military and government agencies. Their defense build-up program was established in five-year cycles, the existing one continuing through 31 March 1977. Any new programs generated normally would go into the next cycle, April 1977 to March 1982. The JASDF spokesman indicated follow-on briefings would be held for the Joint Defense Agency and the Maritime and Ground Staff Offices.[2]

(S) In July a CINCPAC team visited all three countries; these were the first contacts with agencies in Korea and Taiwan regarding MARK XII. Personnel in the briefing group included representatives of CINCPACAF and the Electronics Systems Division of the Air Force Systems Command, as well as CINCPAC staff members and representatives of the appropriate Military Assistance agency in the countries visited.[3]

(S) No formal presentation was made in Japan; discussions centered around questions the Japanese had asked as a result of their study of the system. JASDF

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1. J617 HistSum Jan 73; CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 345-346; JCS 3960/042214Z Aug 72.
2. J617 HistSum Jan 73.
3. CINCPAC 302218Z Jun 73; AFSC ANDREWS AFB MD 151320Z Jun 73.

representatives understood the technical and operational concepts of the system and continued to express interest in obtaining Mode 4-capable components to update their aircraft control and warning sites. It was not expected that a firm commitment would be made, however, until after they tested the new receiver/transmitter, being built in Japan to MARK XII technical specifications provided by the United States. (Later by telephone, the MDAO project officer suggested that it would be simpler to move the receiver/transmitter to the United States for compatibility testing.) During the discussions the Japanese asked what other Asian countries the United States would release the MARK XII to. In reply the U.S. policy of helping allied and friendly nations develop and maintain their self-defense capabilities by offering the latest systems was restated. They also asked if the briefing team was visiting Taiwan and Korea to discuss the MARK XII. As the Japanese had not requested a visit by the MARK XII team, it was believed it was easy to reach this conclusion and ask the question.[1]

(S) In Taiwan, the U.S. personnel in-country expressed the belief that Taiwan could not afford the system and that it would be a problem to sell it. CINCPAC representatives explained that this was not just a CINCPAC program, that it was a U.S. program of concern at the JCS and Defense Department level, and that the main goal of the initial briefings was to generate interest in the concept. Following the formal presentation, questions concerned compatibility with the MARK X, cost, and funding procedures. The most probable procurement procedures would be through Foreign Military Sales or direct purchase, the briefers advised. In Taiwan they were also asked what other nations the MARK XII was being offered to. They were advised as the Japanese had been.[2]

(S) The briefers found among U.S. personnel in Korea the same attitude encountered in Taiwan: that the Koreans had too many other things to buy so why bother talking to them about MARK XII. The Koreans also questioned costs, funding procedures, how long it would take to implement the program (two to three years as a minimum), and what other countries were involved. From the questions asked, the briefers concluded that the Korean representatives did not seem to understand the technical concepts of the system. It was very difficult, therefore, to assess their degree if interest. The Koreans requested, however, that they be provided with an much written material as could be made available to them for study.[3]

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1. J6121 HistSum Jul 73.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

SECTION III--SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Frequency Management

(U) CINCPAC activities in areas of frequency management continued throughout 1973. The annual PACOM area frequency coordinators conference was held at Camp Smith from 8 to 12 January. There were 50 in attendance: coordinators from throughout the PACOM area and representatives of the Service components, the Electromagnetic Capability Analysis Center (ECAC) at Annapolis, Maryland, and the Joint Frequency Panel and the JCS from Washington. Briefings and discussions covered all areas of frequency management.[1]

(U) Early in the year the existing PACOM base/city geographic coordinates listing was validated, updated, and submitted to the ECAC. This was considered a significant contribution to improvement of the Consolidated Frequency Environment File and was expected to serve as a valuable point of reference for future electromagnetic capability studies.[2]

(U) In February CINCPAC responded to a query from the JCS concerning an expanded frequency utilization reporting program that had been proposed by the Office of Telecommunications Policy. CINCPAC's reply noted that data collection responsibilities and reporting would be a function of the Service component commands. CINCPAC's primary concern, if the proposal were implemented, was the resultant workload on the components, which, due to personnel austerity, would prove detrimental to other frequency management responsibilities in support of the theater commander.[3]

(U) The transfer of an engineer assigned to the Pacific Missile Range Facility caused a personnel review and some reassignments. The Navy had assigned responsibility for area frequency coordination for Hawaii and the "western area" to the Commander of the Pacific Missile Test Range and CINCPAC had designated the area frequency coordinator as the electronic warfare training coordinator. The facility commander proposed the permanent relocation of two facility personnel from Barking Sands, Kauai to Oahu to meet engineering obligations and to eliminate the need for sending temporary duty personnel to Oahu. CINCPAC agreed to provide the necessary office space, communications center support, and partial funding for clerical salary. The relocation was accomplished on 1 September.[4]

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1. J6411 HistSum Jan 73.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 280350Z Feb 73.
4. J6321 HistSums Jul, Nov 73; PACMISRANGAC HAWAREA BARKING SANDS 210256Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 310206Z Jul 73.

(U) In regard to the SKYLAB program, CINCPAC monitored each launch. On 20 May the PACOM Radio Frequency Interference Center was activated to monitor and resolve frequency interference. For SKYLAB 2, the PACOM Radio Frequency Interference Control Center was again activated six hours prior to launch to monitor and correct any degrading interference to recovery or network frequencies. Previous promulgation of frequency protection criteria proved effective in silencing certain PACOM operations, and harmful interference during the mission was minimal. The center was secured on 26 September.[1]

(U) In April CINCPAC advised the JCS that there were indications of an electromagnetic capability problem developing. It had been learned that a commercial broadcast company was interested in locating an FM high power transmitter about a mile and a half from the Pale Hua Solar Radio Telescope (on Oahu, Hawaii). A cursory examination indicated a high probability of interference; it also became obvious that the capabilities of the Pale Hua telescope could also be degraded with the installation of the FM station. The JCS were requested to task the Electromagnetic Capability Analysis Center for a complete compatibility study. The center was so tasked.[2]

(U) When Sangley Point closed in the Philippines, the offices of the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (who was also Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines) were relocated to Subic Bay. The radio frequency coordination function, however, relocated to the American Embassy in Manila and was designated the CINCPACREPPHIL/Joint Frequency Coordination Committee (JFCC). After a good deal of correspondence was misrouted, the Philippine Area Frequency Coordinator suggested redesignating the JFCC the Radio Frequency Liaison Office (RAFLO) in Manila. CINCPAC concurred and the change became effective 15 October.[3]

Communications Validating Offices

(U) CINCPAC studied the matter of a change to the instruction that provided guidance regarding Communications Validating Offices (CVO). He had requested that his subordinate unified commanders and the Defense Communications Agency, Pacific comment on a proposal to delete the five subordinate unified commanders as designated CVOs. The primary reason for the proposal was to establish a clear means for subordinate unified commanders to exercise control of communications within their areas but still permit the identity of circuit use by funding agency vice by the code identifying the subordinate unified commander who validated a Telecommunications Service Request (TSR). The proposed change

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1. J6411 HistSum May 73; J632 HistSum Sep 73.
2. CINCPAC 282152Z Apr 73; JCS 8358/021952Z May 73.
3. CINCPACREPPHIL/JFCC 110213Z Sep 73; J632 HistSum Sep 73.

also established a new procedure for validating the subordinate unified commanders' command and control communications requirements. CINCPAC would validate those specific type requirements.[1] Favorable comments were received from COMUS Japan, COMUS Korea, and COMUSTDC.

(C) As a result of CINCPAC's response to COMUSMACV's nonconcurrence and COMUSMACTHAI's questions, COMUSMACTHAI appeared to reverse his original position that had favored the change. CINCPAC staff personnel, however, summarized telephone coordination and again recommended COMUSMACTHAI's concurrence, which was provided on 18 May but which was subject to further concurrence by CINCPACAF and the Commander, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, Pacific. Both concurred subsequently.[2]



1. J6254 HistSum Feb 73; CINCPAC 022212Z Mar 73.
2. J62N3 HistSums Apr, May 73; CINCPAC 100334Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 262241Z Mar 73; MACTHAI 050446Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 280319Z Apr 73; MACTHAI 181025Z May 73.
3. CJCS 1978/241720Z Feb 73.

Communications Center Message Traffic

(U) Gross message traffic statistics for 1973 were as follows:[1]

	Monthly Message Traffic	Daily Average Traffic
January	42,084	1,358
February	39,811	1,375
March	44,147	1,424
April	39,342	1,311
May	53,887	1,738
June	52,847	1,760
July	51,931	1,675
August	52,188	1,683
September	47,102	1,537
October	44,165	1,425
November	44,926	1,498
December	43,241	1,395

Telecommunications Service Requests and Orders

(U) Telecommunications Service Requests and Orders originating within the PACOM required CINCPAC concurrence or approval. This had been an on-going requirement. In 1973 a realignment of functions in the Communications-Electronics Directorate centralized record keeping on these requests. The following lists reflected those requests or orders for part of 1973 on which CINCPAC took action; CINCPAC-originated requirements, such as for the CINCPAC Voice Alert Network or All Source Information Centers, are not included in this tabulation.[2]

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1. J63 HistSums Jan-Jul 73; Monthly Traffic Reports from Traffic Analysis to NCIOC Operations, CINCPAC Telecommunications Center, Naval Communications Station, Honolulu, Aug-Dec 73.
2. J6233 HistSum Dec 73.

	Telecommunications Service Requests				Telecommunications Service Orders
	Army	Navy	Air Force	DIA	
June	42	39	42	9	36
July	25	24	29	11	33
August	39	51	51	7	50
September	24	37	38	5	23
October	37	35	72	2	36
November	10	12	29	1	38
December	11	18	41	1	25
	188	218	382	37	241

A combined total of requests and orders was 1,066.

Automatic Secure Voice Capability for Federal Aviation Administration Studied

(C) An operations security survey of covert VP (patrol squadron) operations revealed a requirement for the installation of an automatic secure voice (AUTOSEVOCOM) terminal at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Center in Honolulu. The proposed terminal would facilitate secure, timely coordination of "RUFF CUT" areas with the Commander, Fleet Air Wing Two and the FAA Center in Anchorage, and would materially upgrade the communications security posture of covert VP operations. CINCPAC invited the submission of a formal statement of requirement by CINCPACFLT.[1]

(C) CINCPACFLT's reply recommended that the requirement be jointly sponsored, indicating that CINCPACFLT had neither the equipment nor the funds to support the requirement entirely. Through informal liaison with the FAA, the CINCPAC staff was informed that monthly backbone charges could be borne by the FAA after 1 July 1973. This information, plus the indication that equipment would be allocated from other than CINCPACFLT resources, was passed to CINCPACFLT when CINCPAC again invited submission of a formal request.[2]

(U) Upon CINCPACFLT's request for confirmation of funding, however, the FAA Honolulu determined that funds would not be available, stating that AUTOSEVOCOM was not considered essential to the FAA mission. CINCPACFLT recommended that the matter not be pursued further.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 240321Z Feb 73.
2. CINCPACFLT 080027Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 140326Z Apr 73.
3. FAA Honolulu 262210Z Apr 73; CINCPACFLT 282051Z Apr 73.

(U) CINCPAC continued to recognize the need for the coverage, but the project was tabled until such time additional funds were available.[1]

Keying Material for CINCPAC-Nakhon Phanom Circuit

(C) On 24 January CINCPAC, on an emergency basis, requested that the Director, Communications Security Material System (DCMS) assign a MATSYM (Material System) and provide keying material not later than 1 February for a CINCPAC-validated circuit between CINCPAC's headquarters at Camp Smith and the U.S. Support Activities Group at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. This circuit was expected to eventually replace the CINCPAC-MACV circuit. The DCMS assigned the MATSYM AXUI and shipped the material, which was received by both USSAG and CINCPAC before the end of January.[2]

Communications Security

(U) The importance of communications security (COMSEC) received continuing emphasis in the PACOM, both by the CINCPAC staff and throughout the command. To achieve and maintain the highest practical standards of COMSEC awareness among the CINCPAC staff, a program was developed and implemented, consisting of staff briefings, Daily Bulletin reminders, telephone security reminder decals, and telephone security cartoon-type pamphlets. At briefings for all staff personnel in November a member of the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu (COMSEC Training Division) stressed applications of COMSEC as it applied on Oahu in a talk that was informative but not too technical.[3]

(C) COMSEC support for the CINCPAC Command Center and headquarters exercises was also provided. COMSEC support that was scheduled for Exercise HIGH HEELS in March 1973 was to have been the first joint COMSEC effort that was PACOM-wide. CINCPACFLT had been tasked to be the executive planner for the exercise, had submitted a plan, and details of planning had been resolved. In February CINCPAC provided pertinent commands with a letter of instruction. This letter advised that to provide optimum monitoring of non-protected communications and maximum support to designated commanders, CINCPAC joint COMSEC field teams had been composed; the functions of those teams during the exercise period was outlined.[4]

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1. J642 HistSum Apr 73.
2. CINCPAC 242215Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 262236Z Jan 73; 1987 COMMSQ NKP RTAFB THAI 300650Z Jan 73; J6422 HistSum Jan 73.
3. J642 HistSum May 73; J633 HistSum Nov 73.
4. CINCPAC 140219Z Oct 72; ADMIN CINCPACFLT 210051Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 240311Z Jan 73; CINCPACFLT 030348Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 170404Z Feb 73.

(C) PACOM participation in HIGH HEELS-73 was cancelled, however, with the exception of a small exercise control staff that was established at the Alternate Command Facility at Kunia. In lieu of the planned COMSEC support, a survey of the CINCPAC Command Center was conducted from 8-15 March. Although it was a joint effort, the Naval Communications Station Honolulu was tasked by CINCPAC with conducting and coordinating the survey. The report of the survey was received on 25 April and forwarded to the Operations Directorate for corrective actions that may have been necessary.[1]

(C) COMSEC support was also planned for Exercise JOLLY ROGER, but this exercise was also subsequently cancelled.[2]

(S) In February the JCS promulgated their planning policy relative to the testing and implementation of KY-65 and KY-75 PARKHILL narrowband secure voice equipment for the command aircraft of the CINCs of the Atlantic, European, and Pacific Commands. In October 1972 CINCPAC had requested early developmental test models of the PARKHILL equipment to provide a secure voice capability between his command aircraft and his headquarters. The JCS requested that the Director of the National Security Agency provide this equipment. The JCS advised of a couple of technical problem areas and requested that CINCPAC provide for COMSEC surveillance of PARKHILL transmissions whenever the system was in use. Implementation, however, was contingent upon joint Service testing.[3]

(U) In matters relating to COMSEC throughout the command, in January CINCPAC requested that his component and subordinate unified commanders furnish a copy of all future reports of COMSEC inspections, surveys, status, or summaries that in any way pertained to joint or unified commands or to operations within the PACOM. This information was expected to provide CINCPAC with a more accurate and complete picture of the COMSEC posture throughout his command; it did not change the COMSEC responsibilities or authority of those commanders.[4]

(C) In Vietnam, three specific COMSEC matters came under study. During Project END SWEEP, the minesweeping operations in North Vietnam, CINCPAC learned that the Commander Task Force 78 had removed his secure voice equipment from minesweeping helicopters to preclude compromise in the event an aircraft went down over North Vietnam. After informal CINCPAC staff liaison, the equipment

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1. JCS 9100/222340Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 212220Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 240326Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 070224Z Mar 73.
2. CINCPAC 302116Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 232010Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 030135Z Oct 73.
3. J642 HistSum Feb 73; JCS 6141/201716Z Feb 73; J6/Memo/00103-73, 23 Feb 73, Subj: JCS Planning for Testing and Implementation of PARKHILL (U).
4. CINCPAC 262054Z Jan 73.

was replaced at the direction of CINCPACFLT/Commander 7th Fleet.[1]

(S) With the drawdown of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, COMUSMACV advised that COMSEC inspections were being suspended indefinitely because of anticipated problems in obtaining suitable and timely manning for those inspections through the Defense Attache Office (DAO), Saigon, a desire to maintain a low-profile U.S. presence, continued uncertainties regarding the relative security of areas to be inspected, and a need to maintain a posture that would not call unnecessary attention to the fact that COMSEC hardware was being retained on a loan basis. The United States, however, retained the right to reinitiate participation in those inspections at any time it was deemed appropriate and would closely monitor quarterly reports on the subject. CINCPAC concurred, as did the JCS. On 14 March COMUSMACV advised the RVN Joint General Staff of the fact that participation by U.S. personnel was no longer possible, advised that continued inspections were required and that Vietnamese inspectors had been shown well qualified to conduct inspections without U.S. assistance, and required that translated copies of inspection reports continue to be provided to the DAO as they became available. In another COMSEC action, on 14 April the JCS advised that actions outlined in the RVNAF Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Program had been completed and that the requirement no longer existed to maintain the document, with the exception of Annex Victor (on COMSEC), which was to be redesignated and reissued as the COMSEC Assistance Program-Vietnam (CAP-V).[2]

(C) At the beginning of FY 74, funding for the CAP-V was turned over to the Department of the Army and sufficient funds were made available. No provision had been made in the Army computer requisition system, however, for providing administative and repair parts to foreign countries. The DAO Saigon notified the Theater COMSEC Logistics Support Center, which notified CINCUSARPAC. CINCPAC's Army component proposed a solution to the Department of the Army, but the Army Materiel Command sent a counterproposal back. CINCPAC informed the JCS of the problem and recommended that the USARPAC proposal be used. The JCS agreed and directed its implementation.[3]

(C) Both the DAO, Saigon and COMUSTDC requested additional COMSEC support in 1973, the DAO in the form of a telephone monitoring survey and technical sweeps, TDC in general COMSEC awareness training.[4]

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1. J642 HistSum Feb 73; ADMIN CINCPACFLT 060208Z Mar 73.
2. COMUSMACV 120613Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 132244Z Feb 73; JCS 3930/082019Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 100337Z Mar 73; COMUSMACV 141155Z Mar 73; JCS 1054/140143Z Apr 74.
3. J633 HistSum Nov 73.
4. J633 HistSums Aug, Nov 73.

(S) In January CINCPAC provided guidance to COMUSMACTHAI that had been furnished by the JCS following an operational security survey of U.S. Special Forces in Thailand. The JCS had advised that the Special Forces should be cautioned that COMSEC assistance to foreign governments was an extremely delicate area. They recommended that any guidance offered to the Royal Thai Army by those forces be general and in line with OPSEC doctrine. COMSEC policy permitted COMSEC assistance to friendly foreign governments, provided certain criteria were met. To determine whether those criteria were met in this case, the JCS requested further information. COMUSMACTHAI replied that certain elements of COMSEC assistance appeared to be justified, and further requests for assistance would be forwarded in accordance with JCS instructions.[1]

(S) In February 1972 CINCPAC had tasked COMUS Korea with drafting a COMSEC assistance annex to the Single Integrated Telecommunications Systems-Korea (SITS-K) plan, similar to the CAP-V plan discussed above. The annex (an addendum) was forwarded to CINCPAC in early January, but it was not complete in the COMSEC area. CINCPAC sent a draft revision of the Vietnam annex as a guide. On 31 January COMUS Korea projected his possible organization of the annex, but this time referenced a Special Intelligence-category letter of 24 August 1971 to be used as a basis for the annex. On 7 February CINCPAC advised that the referenced letter could be used as a basis for planning purposes, but that the information had to be updated and the Special Intelligence caveat removed. Detailed guidance regarding the information to be included was provided.[2]

(S) On 20 April CINCPAC received a request from COMUSTDC that an exemption be granted to JCS policy in order to provide a secure voice capability to the Republic of China. The request had not contained enough information to evaluate the request effectively, but CINCPAC passed the requirement to the JCS and the National Security Agency, at the same time informing COMUSTDC of the additional information required.[3]

(U) A mid-June request for an operations code from the Chief of the Military Equipment Delivery team in Cambodia was passed to CINCPAC, requesting assistance in expediting the matter. During processing of the Cambodia request, CINCPAC outlined to the JCS and his component and subordinate unified commands his interpretation of his COMSEC responsibilities, noting first that because of its worldwide application and all-echelon scope, JCS joint communications security policy was written in broad general germs. The necessity for this was fully recognized,

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1. CINCPAC 030412Z Jan 73; MACTHAI 300205Z Jan 73.
2. J642 HistSum Feb 73; CINCPAC 190326Z Feb 72; COMUS Korea 310757Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 072247Z Feb 73; COMUS Korea 120801Z Mar 73.
3. COMUSTDC 200735Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 240308Z Apr 73.

but CINCPAC believed that he required specific definition of his COMSEC authority and responsibility within the PACOM. The following are extracts from his interpretation of that responsibility:[1]

> ...Provide direction in joint, combined, and allied COMSEC matters to subordinate component and joint commanders and to military advice and assistance groups.
>
> ...Specify the command channels to be used for submission of joint, combined, or allied COMSEC requirements.
>
> ...Formulate, compile and submit quantitative requirements for COMSEC material of joint, combined, or allied interest and, where appropriate, recommend to JCS the allocation and reallocation of COMSEC material resources.
>
> ...Establish COMSEC objectives and standards for joint operations and exercises and, in coordination with JCS and other appropriate authority, establish and implement such objectives and standards for combined operations and exercises.
>
> ...Validate operational requirements for secure communications between U.S. and allied military forces.
>
> ...Coordinate joint COMSEC matters with appropriate echelons of the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, the Defense Communications Agency, the Service cryptologic agencies, and the Service communications commands.
>
> ...Promulgate or elaborate on national level guidance to controlling authorities for COMSEC keying materials which are used in a joint or combined application....
>
> ...Provide COMSEC assistance...through identification of COMSEC weaknesses occuring in joint or combined operations, exercises, or surveys....
>
> ...Review COMSEC plans of subordinate joint and component commanders....

---

1. CINCPAC 150354Z Jun 73.

...Prescribe standards for COMSEC status reporting by subordinate joint and combined commands....

...Ensure that COMSEC considerations are effectively reflected in joint and Service plans for use of Sealed Authentication System and Permissive Action Link crypto-materials.

...Coordinate and/or direct PACOM wide COMSEC-related actions to reduce or neutralize the threat from hostile signal intelligence collection activities.

...Provide COMSEC guidance and support to international organizations....Monitor and evaluate command-wide COMSEC training programs....

Codes, Keylists, and Sealed Authenticator Systems

(S) Many CINCPAC actions in connection with devices for insuring communications and operations security took place during 1973. Some of these are highlighted below. A Navy reorganization was effective 1 February, when the U.S. First Fleet and the Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces Pacific were merged to become the Third Fleet. The Commander First Fleet had requested transfer of CINCPAC-controlled Sealed Authenticator Systems (SAS) material to USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19) where the material would be held until establishment of the Third Fleet at Ford Island, Hawaii. On 12 January 1973 CINCPAC directed USS BLUE RIDGE to transfer CINCPAC SAS materials to the Fleet Operations Control Center, Pacific (FOCCPAC) at Kunia to be effective 1 February. The JCS had concurred in this action. CINCPAC also directed USS SARATOGA (CV-60) to transfer effective/reserve editions of CINCPAC/JCS controlled SAS to the Commander, Oceans Systems Pacific, who was serving as COMSEC control for the Commander, Third Fleet. This action was completed by 27 January. Subsequently, FOCCPAC advised CINCPAC that a new requirement existed for SAS to be held at Kunia (COMTHIRDFLEET's Emergency Relocation Site). CINCPAC directed COMNAVAIRPAC to transfer spare copies of JCS/CINCPAC SAS materials to FOCCPAC, who held SAS materials for all commands on Oahu.[1]

(S) With redesignation of the CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility on Guam as an Emergency Relocation Site because of manpower cuts for Commander, Naval Forces, Marianas, it was necessary to remove the JCS/CINCPAC SAS. It was decided to place them with the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post in a "fly-away" kit

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1. CINCPAC 120215Z Jan 73; JCS 161431Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 060151Z Jan 73; FOCCPAC 260333Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 020328Z May 73; J6423 HistSum Apr 73.

in the event there was a requirement to deploy a unit to Guam. The Guam facility had also held SAS materials designated for unconventional warfare; CINCPAC directed that these be transferred to the Alternate Command Facility at Kunia.[1]

(C) A new authentication system came under study in 1973 to replace the Triton (AKAA-38). It was to be called the PELE (short title: AKAA-2002) and releasable to the same foreign governments that AKAA-38 had been. Expected in March 1974, it was an improved reader device that was affixed to the code. This enhanced its use as the code itself was contained within a clear plastic envelope with a transmission authentication table printed on the reverse side of the challenge and reply table; this precluded having to remove the code from its container. The JCS asked for comments on the new system. Both CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF had concurred in the production of the new system. CINCPACFLT, however, had indicated a lack of security and difficulty in using the transmission authentication table because of a requirement in the new system that all user's clocks be extremely accurate--this was because transmission authentication tables were based on 2-minute time intervals, a near impossibility for mobile commands because of vibrations and movements that affected clocks. These comments were forwarded to the JCS.[2]

(S) As proposed by CINCPACFLT, several Orestes keylists used in the PACOM were deleted. The remaining lists were expanded to cover Eastern Pacific as well as Western Pacific commands. CINCPACFLT had believed shipboard and field commands communications security material should be reduced wherever possible in the post-Vietnam operational environment.[3]

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC 271933Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 200411Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 200412Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 242230Z Jul 73; JCS 4269/242309Z Jul 73.
2. J6332 HistSum Jul 73; DIRNSA 032047Z Jul 73; JCS 2752/102324Z Jul 73; CINCPACFLT Ltr Ser 8/C 535 to Commander, Naval Security Group Command, 17 Jul 73, Subj: PELE Authentication System (U). It is not known if the name PELE was chosen because of the legendary Hawaiian Goddess of volcanos; the indicated pronounciation (PAYLAY) would make it appear so.
3. CINCPACFLT 022042Z Apr 73.

controlling authority. The SECRET keylist was to be stored and issued from COMSEC depots world-wide. PACOM requirements were submitted on 25 July.[1]

(S) Other matters involved certain operational problems. In the spring of 1973, for example, there had been several reports of possible compromises and mis-use of the AKAC-855 CIRCE numeral code reported by the 1987 Communications Squadron in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. In instances in which Cambodian ground forces had been overrun and the code had fallen into enemy hands, CINCPAC had directed supersession. In some cases, however, the Cambodians had issued the next edition to their forces because of the enemy's ability to follow frequency changes. The Cambodians had attributed this ability of the enemy to the fact that the AKAC-855 had fallen into their hands, when in fact it was due to the enemy's continuous monitoring of frequencies used between Cambodian and U.S. air support aircraft. When the Cambodians issued the next edition of AKAC-855 to their forces, they did not coordinate the matter with U.S. Forces; consequently air and ground units did not hold a common edition of the code. This had a severe effect on communications. Additional information received from Phnom Penh indicated that the Cambodians were issuing entire editions to their forces instead of only one or two day's material. This practice was dangerous to security. In one week CINCPAC had to direct supersession on three separate occasions, causing a burden on the production agency, the Armed Forces Courier Service, and Service crypto-logistics agencies. It also caused the reserve material in each COMSEC account to become dangerously low. CINCPAC directed the Chief of the Military Equipment Delivery Team in Cambodia (CHMEDTC) to instruct Cambodian forces on insuring prior coordination when a possible compromise had taken place to insure that entire editions were issued only in emergency conditions.[2]

(C) In another matter, in mid-June the CHMEDTC had submitted a request for an operations code that would be used by a Third Country National employed by a U.S. contractor. In late July CINCPAC became aware of the problem when the MEDTC Chief requested CINCPAC assistance in expediting the request. Information was evaluated, validated, and forwarded on 28 July, requesting expeditious approval.[3]

(C) Subsequently the Director, National Security Agency provided a special radio net manned by U.S. personnel with one station manned by a Third Country National (an Italian). After initial use, the CHMEDTC stated that this code

---

1. CINCPAC 181743Z May 73; CINCPAC 192154Z May 73; JCS 8330/061920Z Jul 73; DIRNSA S44-368-73/201447Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 252145Z Jul 73.
2. J6332 HistSum Jul 73; CINCPAC 280818Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 250247Z Jul 73; CHMEDTC Phnom Penh 251300Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 010239Z Aug 73.
3. J633 HistSum Jul 73; CHMEDTC 231240Z Jul 73; JCS 8017/131949Z Jun 73.

was too cumbersome; he requested permission to use the AKAC-275 in its place. (This was a CIRCE numeral encryption system.) CHMEDTC's proposal was to make up his own brevity code; assign numerals to each word, number or phrase; and then use the AKAC-275 to encrypt the numerals. The request also entailed releasing the AKAC-275 to the Italian. This was denied by CINCPAC. A separate operations code entitled the USKAC-11 was shipped instead by the National Security Agency for use by the Italian.[1]

[redacted]

(C) In the matter of SEATO crypto material, early in January, in view of declining requirement to hold or issue such material, CINCPAC proposed at a meeting of the COMSEC council that all SEATO material not required be destroyed. In addition, material that was considered to be required was to be transferred to designated depots, including Subic Bay and Japan. CINCPAC policy for handling and distributing such material was also revised by CINCPAC Instruction. Also under study were certain one-time codes that had never been used; some had been in existence since 1962. Study of the matter continued. The proposal for cancellation would have to be presented to all SEATO members before it could be approved.[3]

---

1. J6332 HistSum Sep 73; CHMEDTC 010351Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 080321Z Sep 73.
2. DIRNSA S-125-73/162012Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 192232Z Apr 73.
3. CINCPAC 120326Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 240328Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 012229Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 200343Z Mar 73; NAVCOMSTA HONO 300022Z May 73; CINCPAC 200207Z Jul 73; J6332 HistSum Sep 73.

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME II

1973

Prepared by the Command History Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII
1974

~~TOP SECRET~~



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CHAPTER VII

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECTION I--THE NATIONAL PROGRAM

Resume' of Security Assistance Components

(S) Security assistance (SA) was planned to support U.S. national security objectives by strengthening the capability of selected countries to maintain internal security, defend against external threats, and contribute to regional defense. Security assistance also provided quid pro quo for U.S. bases, facilities, rights and authorizations. It was applied to encourage recipient countries to pursue policies and military objectives compatible with U.S. strategy. In the PACOM, the priorities for grant aid materiel, as listed in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) for FY 76-83 were:[1]

Regional	Country		Worldwide
1	RVN	(MASF)	1
2	Thailand	(MAP)	2
3	Philippines	(MAP)	4
4	Korea	(MAP)	5
5	Cambodia*	(MAP)	6
6	Laos	(MASF)	7
7	Indonesia	(MAP)	13

*Post hostilities; number 2 during hostilities.

(U) The PACOM MAP countries were Afghanistan, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of China, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Grant aid materiel was authorized for Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. All other countries were programmed for grant training only. The MASF countries were Laos and Vietnam. The SA program consisted of the six components listed below:[2]

MAP - Defense articles and services transferred to foreign governments and international organizations as grant aid and loans under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act or successor legislation. Each MAAG, in coordination with the ambassador, determined the needs and costs for its country prior to

---

1. J531 Point Paper, 5 Nov 73, Subj: Security Assistance
2. Ibid.; Grant materiel aid to China terminated as of 1 July 1973.

submission to the unified commanders. The unified commander melded the country requirements into regional programs related to programs for U.S. forces. The DOD formulated a global program; based upon the DOD program, the State Department proposed countries and funding levels to the President for submission to Congress.

FMS - Defense articles and services sold to foreign governments and international organizations under the authority of the Foreign Military Sales Act or successor legislation. FMS dollar amounts for planning were recommended by the MAAGs and unified commanders to the DOD. The Executive Branch requested appropriations from Congress for credit sales programs. The request for credit originated with the country and thence to the DOD and State Department.

EDA - Excess defense articles provided to eligible countries or international agencies, originally procured for U.S. usage but excess to U.S. mobilization reserves when dropped from DOD inventories. EDA were restricted to the dollar value ceiling imposed by Congress on the overall program of one-third of U.S. acquisition costs. No charge was made against the country MAP except for packing, crating, handling, transportation (PCH&T) and rehabilitation. EDA could be sold at stock or depreciated value through FMS to eligible countries as determined on a case-by-case basis.

Security Supporting Assistance - This program financed, either on a grant or loan basis, the import of commodities, capital equipment or technical assistance to enable recipient nations to devote more of their own resources to security purposes without serious economic or political dislocation. Funds were appropriated by the Congress and administered by AID.

MASF - Military Assistance Service Funded program, funded through Service budgets to provide the same benefits as MAP to friendly countries actively engaged in combat, but on a more expeditious basis. During 1973, only two countries, Vietnam and Laos, qualified for Service-funded SA.

PWRSA - The procurement of war reserve stocks for allies was funded by the Services. The purpose was to procure (and retain under U.S. title and control) munitions, equipment and supplies for use by selected allies in the event of hostilities.

Legislative Actions

(U) For the first time in the history of the Security Assistance program, funds to operate the program for fiscal year (FY) 1973 were not appropriated in a total fiscal year appropriations measure. Rather, the FY 73 program was funded by Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) throughout the fiscal year,

but at levels considerably below those requested by the Administration. In October 1972, the Congress had extended CRA for FY 73 to provide interim funds through 28 February 1973. The CRA established grant aid at $550.6 million versus $780 requested; supporting assistance was set at $600 million versus $840 million requested; and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) levels were set at $400 million versus the requested $527 million. These levels continued to be the authorized ceilings through the end of FY 73 (30 June 1973).[1]

(U) Meanwhile, the President and high Government officials doggedly continued their efforts to convince the Congress that the concept of foreign aid was not only valid, but vital. On 1 May 1973, President Nixon conveyed to Congress his annual request for the FY 74 foreign assistance program authorization. In his message, the President stated:[2]

* * * *

> In recent years, as we have sought a new definition of American leadership in the world, assistance to other nations has remained a key part of our foreign policy. Under the Nixon Doctrine of shared responsibilities, we have tried to stimulate greater efforts by others. We want them to take on an increasing commitment to provide for their own defenses, their security and their economic development. Most importantly, we hope they will assume greater responsibility for making the decisions which shape their future.
>
> We must not, however, try to shift the full weight of these responsibilities too quickly. A balance must be struck between doing too much ourselves and thus discouraging self-reliance, and doing too little to help others make the most of their limited resources. The latter course would spell defeat for the promising progress of many developing nations, destroy their growing self-confidence and increase the likelihood of international instability. Thus it is critical that we provide a level of foreign assistance that will help to assure our friends safe passage through this period of transition and development.

(U) Two days later, the President transmitted his fourth foreign policy report to the Congress, entitled "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 373; J815 HistSum Dec 73.
2. Dept. of State Bulletin, 28 May 73, p. 693.

a Durable Peace." In this comprehensive review of U.S. foreign policy since 1969, President Nixon again alluded to security assistance:[1]

* * * *

> Many nations in the world whose security we consider important to our own face military challenges, often instigated or supplied by third countries. A stable international system requires that small countries be secure and independent, and that they be able to protect their security and independence mainly by their own efforts.
>
> For this reason, American support of other nations' defense efforts has always been a vital component of our security policy and an essential element in maintaining international stability. In today's multi-polar world, and as the United States adjusts its role from one of preponderance to one of sharing responsibilities more widely, this supportive role becomes all the more central to our policy.

(U) In a statement to the House Armed Services Committee on 10 April 1973, (then) Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson noted that the total defense posture of the U.S. embodied the "total force concept". The active and reserve forces of the U.S. and those of allied nations were treated as a total force for the pursuit of common security interests. These common security interests were defined as the protection of the U.S. and its allies; the maintenance of political-military stability; the security of air and sea lines of communication (LOC); and the development of mutually useful research and development programs. The connection between security assistance and U.S. military objectives was evident in the Secretary's cryptic summation of those objectives:[2]

> • Together with our allies, deter warfare at all levels of conflict and maintain the capability to defend our interests should deterrence fail.
>
> • Assist in building the capabilities of our friends and allies to defend themselves.

---

1. Dept. of State Bulletin, 4 Jun 73, p. 812.
2. Statement, Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson to House Armed Services Committee, 10 Apr 73, Subj: FY 74 Defense Budget and FY 1974-1978 Program, prepared on 29 March 1973, GPO Stock Number 0800-00187.

- Maintain the current margin of U.S. technological superiority over the Soviet Union to offset the "information lag" and to provide a hedge against technological surprise.

- Provide the strength upon which successful negotiations can be pursued.

(U) On 15 May 1973, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the relationship between the foreign assistance program and the foreign policy goals of the United States. His statement was, of course, in support of the FY 74 foreign aid program presented by the President:[1]

* * * *

Gentlemen, I recognize that, after more than two decades of effort, many Americans wish to shift the burden of development and security to other nations. I am also aware that this year (FY 73) for the first time in the history of the foreign aid program, Congress concluded its deliberations without formal authorization for the foreign assistance program.

We are all heartened, of course, by the changed climate in our relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. We hope that this encouraging trend wil continue and that it will lead to a curtailment of the international turmoil of the past two decades. Through the process of negotiations, our hope is that the spirit of detente will be deepened. But this will not be easy. We cannot assume that the current critical period will pass without stress or crisis. This is not the time to retreat into a spirit of parochialism or to begin to pursue narrow national interests.

A most urgent need exists for the United States to continue to generate a sense of continuity in its foreign policy and, in particular, to sustain its efforts in the field of foreign assistance. If we agree that the world we would like to see is one in which all nations seek peaceful development and international cooperation, then the foreign assistance program can serve as an important vehicle for the attainment of our goals....

---

1. Dept. of State Bulletin, 11 Jun 74, p. 854.

(U) In a statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Admiral Thomas H. Moorer reviewed the Military Assistance Program (MAP) objectives in relationship to the security of the United States. He noted the importance of the total force concept and the increasingly significant favorable impact of MAP and FMS on U.S. balance of payment problems. Moorer listed the following ways in which foreign aid assisted in the attainment of U.S. security objectives:[1]

> 1. First, by enhancing effective self-defense capabilities throughout the free world and, when combined with diplomatic and other actions, by encouraging regional cooperation between the U.S. and its allies.
>
> 2. By enabling U.S. allies and friends to maintain internal security and to counter aggression individually or with regional assistance, without direct engagement of U.S. forces.
>
> 3. By providing all or part of the quid pro quo essential for the rights, authorizations and facilities to preserve the advanced basing demanded by the forward defense strategy of the U.S.
>
> 4. By fostering favorable attitudes toward the United States and its policies, and by encouraging recipients to pursue military objectives compatable with U.S. military strategy.

(U) Perhaps the most pragmatic, lucid and enlightened defense of the foreign aid program was made, not before Congress, but before a meeting of the American Ordnance Association. On 17 May 1973, Major General John O. Moench of the U.S. Air Force addressed this group. At that time, General Moench was the Director for Security Assistance Plans, Policy and Programs Formulation in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA). He stressed the self-interest inherent in the foreign aid program, not only from the standpoint of mutual security, but from the economic standpoint as well. He noted that 99 percent of all money in the grant aid program was spent in the United States; the money was not given away, but was used to buy U.S. equipment, supplies, assistance, advice and services. Moench also noted that the FMS program had generated $32 billion of exports from the U.S. to allied buyers; this provided, by some estimates, work for 350,000 Americans--not to mention tax inputs to federal, state and local governments.[2]

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1. Commanders Digest, 12 Jul 73, pp. 5-7, Armed Forces Press Service (OASD/M&RA).
2. Ordnance, Jul-Aug 73, pp. 38-41, "Military Security Assistance", Maj. Gen John O. Moench, USAF, hereafter cited as Moench on Security Assistance.

(U) On 3 April 1973, Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed a complete reorganization of the SA program. Among other items, his bill authorized only $535 million for all programs. Grant aid was to be phased out completely over a two year period, and recipient nations, meanwhile, would be required to pay 50 percent of the aid value in local currencies. Budgetary support assistance was to be virtually eliminated, and military credit sales were to be placed on a strictly commercial basis. Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) were to be eliminated and their functions assumed by defense attaches.[1]

(U) By comparison, in his 1 May 1973 program for FY 74 foreign assistance, the President's total requested authorization for economic and military assistance was $2.9 billion. Of this, one billion dollars was for development assistance; $632 million for Indochina reconstruction; $652 million for the MAP grant aid; $525 million for FMS credits; and $100 million for security supporting assistance. The latter three items, amounting to about $1.3 billion, were those usually considered as SA oriented. While Fulbright's committee did not approve his proposal, it did report out a cut from the $1.3 billion to $770 million, and a phase-out of grant aid in four years. The four year phase-out was eliminated, but the cut to $770 million was referred to the House. After this action, in June 1973, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona was quoted as saying, "This marks the end of the United States assistance programs. It is a signal to the rest of the world that we are pulling in our horns."[2]

(U) In the previously discussed presentation by General Moench, he had acknowledged the Fulbright proposal:[3]

* * * *

> We are now well into the fiscal 1974 legislative cycle, and another distinguished U.S. Senator has introduced a bill designed, in his words, to give military security assistance "a fitting burial." It is charged that this program is a relic of the past and that the interests of this country rest on its demise.

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1. CINCPAC 060240Z Jun 73, Military Assistance Activities Bulletin (MAAB) No. 11, hereafter cited as MAAB, with appropriate number and date/time group.
2. Ibid.; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 27 Jun 73, Associated Press Washington dateline.
3. Op. Cit.; Moench on Security Assistance.

* * * *

This program does need improvement, but treatment will be difficult as long as major segments of America remain uninformed--or misinformed-regarding the significance and consequences of the "burial" under way. I can in no way conceive that the demise of this program is in the national interest.

Those of us in Government in this business are not employers--we are employees of the American people. We do not press for programs to serve ourselves; we realize no personal profit from the result; our purpose is solely to serve our Nation and its people.

(U) The Senate bill, passed on 26 June, was for military assistance only. On 26 July, the House passed a bill covering both military and economic assistance. A comparison of the MAP portion of the Administration request and the Senate and House bills was as follows (in $ millions):[1]

	Admin	Senate	House
Military Assistance	652	420	550
Foreign Military Sales	525	200	450
Security Supporting Assistance	100	125	125
Training	33	25	30
Totals	1,310	770	1,155

(U) The House-passed bill was an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, re-named the Mutual Development and Cooperation Act. Whereas the Fulbright bill entailed a basic rewriting of foreign assistance legislation, the House bill basically amended the parent Act, and paralleled the Administration request in its significant provisions.[2]

(U) On 14 Novmeber 1973, the House and Senate conferees agreed on a FY 74 economic/military aid program. The total world-wide was $962.5 million, or about $350 million less than the Administration request. For the military assistance portion, the recommended levels were: MAP, $512.5 million; FMS, $325 million; security supporting assistance, $125 million. Training, which had been presented separately by the Administration, was included in the $512.5 million for MAP.[3]

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1. CINCPAC MAAB No. 12, DTG 111950Z Aug 73.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 160456Z Nov 73 (NOTAL).

(U) By the middle of December, the authorization bill had been passed by both houses with the above-cited figures. However, the appropriations bill passed by the House contained $325 million for FMS credit and only $500 million (vice the $512.5 million authorized) for the grant aid MAP. The Senate had cut that amount even more, to $300 million. Meanwhile, the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program for Vietnam and Laos had been authorized at $1,126 million, but, as in the MAP, the appropriations level had been cut by the Senate to $650 million.[1]

(U) On 17 December, President Nixon signed into law the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, covering both military and economic FY 74 assistance. The appropriations bill, signed on 2 January 1974, listed $450 million for the grant aid MAP, $325 million for FMS credits, and $112.5 for security supporting assistance. Key provisions of the Act included:[2]

- No funds made available under the Foreign Assistance Act could be used to conduct any police or related training in a foreign country. This prohibition did not apply to any contract in existence prior to 17 December. Further, it was the intent of Congress that the existing programs, administered by the Agency for International Development (AID), not be transferred to some other agency of the Government to avoid this prohibition.

- The new law contained a statement of the intent of Congress that, whenever possible, excess defense articles be provided instead of new procurement. A ceiling of $150 million was established on the amount of foreign-located EDA which could be granted in any fiscal year without charge to MAP funds. Outside of the $150 million ceiling, MAP funds were to bear the "actual value" cost of grant EDA, as well as the expenses incurred by the Department of Defense (DOD) in the rebuilding and rehabilitation of those items.

- The new Act reduced the number of countries eligible to receive grant aid, other than training, from 40 to 31.

- Although the Administration had proposed that grant military training be separated from the materiel assistance program, the FY 74 Act retained grant military training as an integral part of the MAP. The world-wide line item for this training was $27.5 million.

- Section 514 of the Act, which had required MAP recipients to deposit an amount equal to ten percent of grant articles and services, was repealed.

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1. CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 11-17 Dec 73, microfilm file, CINCPAC History Branch.
2. CINCPAC MAAB No. 13, 122034Z Jan 74.

Billings for foreign currency payments under Section 514 were to end with deliveries for the quarter ending 31 December 1973.

• As a partial offset to the repealed section, a new condition of eligibility was established. Beginning 1 July 1974, funds received by a foreign country in disposing of U.S.-furnished equipment and material were to be paid to the U.S. Government to meet its local currency expenses, including educational and cultural exchange activities.

• Authority was provided to draw down defense articles from DOD and Service stocks up to a ceiling of $250 million. Use of this authority required a presidential determination that such draw down was in the security interest of the United States. The intent was expressed that, of the $250 million total draw down authority, up to $200 million be used to provide emergency military assistance to Cambodia.

• An amendment to the Act required that the MASF program for Laos revert to standard MAP effective 30 June 1974. The remaining country under MASF, Vietnam, was not affected by this change.

• A new section of the Act prohibited the programming of assistance to any country in which (a) a military base, constructed or maintained and operated with U.S. funds, was located and (b) U.S. personnel carried out military operations from those bases, "unless and until the President has determined that the Government of such country has, consistent with security, authorized access, on a regular basis, to bona fide news media correspondents of the United States to such military base."

• The Act re-stated the prohibition of fund expenditures under any law to finance "military or paramilitary operations by the United States in or over Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia." Also prohibited was any fund expenditure under any law to finance "any military or paramilitary combat operations" by third country forces in Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam or Thailand.

After MAP, What?[1]

(S) Obviously, the fluctuating fortunes of the foreign assistance program affected its administration worldwide. Nevertheless, of the seven materiel grant aid countries in the PACOM, six were in the top seven priority countries worldwide as listed in the JSOP. Thus, the total force concept was more dependent upon MAP contributions to allied countries in the Pacific theater than in

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1. J812 Point Paper, 31 Oct 73, Subj: "After MAP, What?"

other parts of the world. Since the potential for termination of MAP funding existed, the question was raised on the CINCPAC Security Assistance staff--After MAP, What?

(S) A paper produced by the Policy Division of CINCPAC's Security Assistance Directorate recognized that an abrupt curtailment of grant aid was not likely. However, certain prudent assumptions could be made. First, it was likely that grant aid for materiel and services would be phased out over the next three or four years. Secondly, the nations receiving grant aid would continue to desire effective military forces and arms. Thirdly, while materiel grant aid would be phased out, some degree of residual grant aid training and services, FMS, and FMS credits would continue indefinitely.

(S) Predicated upon the foregoing assumptions, two concerns were apparent: one was the impact; the other was the need for alternative measures to minimize the impact and still realize the security and foreign policy objectives of the United States. The most significant impacts, from the PACOM standpoint were:

- Potential in the PACOM for increased Soviet influence corresponding to the loss of U.S. political leverage.

- "Total Force" planning with free world forces would gradually decay as the more sophisticated major countries turned more to their own self-defense versus contributing to the strategic interests of the United States.

- United States control over lines of communication, base rights, and natural resource development would deteriorate.

- Allies could lose confidence in traditional alliances and treaty commitments.

- United States domestic industrial involvement would be eroded because of reduced DOD arms procurement.

- Allied and friendly military force modernization could be reoriented toward third country support; e.g., USSR, PRC, France.

(S) Alternative measures which might offset the reduction of grant aid included:

- Expand forward deployment for U.S. Forces to deter and contain Soviet influence.

• Take vigorous measures to increase FMS, loan guarantees and economic aid to insure continued use of U.S. equipment.

• Make extraordinary efforts toward mutual and balanced force reduction between PACOM and free world forces and their potential antagonists.

• Reassure allies with U.S. presence by expansion of joint planning, joint exercises, port calls and home porting.

• Preserve base rights and LOC by emphasizing the mutual security benefits derived therefrom. Use increased rentals, quid pro quo and direct payments only as alternatives.

• Promote a greater magnitude of co-production ventures. Amplify long term capital financing, where necessary, by U.S. Government-sponsored institutions such as the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank.

• Encourage more third country aid from the stronger friendly nations such as Japan and West Germany.

(S) The J8 paper concluded by commenting that preservation of the long term strategic interests of the U.S. in the priority nations was of paramount importance. Every level of government in the friendly nations as well as the U.S. should be encouraged to collaborate in the development of new and dynamic methods of mutual security assistance. The "What" after MAP involved the implementation of well-planned and feasible alternatives.

SECTION II

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PLANNING

CINCPAC Guidance to the Field

(U) The series of Military Assistance Activities Bulletins (MAABs) sent by the Directorate of Security Assistance (J8) to assist SA missions was continued in 1973. The MAABs were dispatched in message format, and summarized significant MAP actions, decisions and trends. In the first MAAB for 1973 (MAAB No. 11), the two-way purpose of the bulletins was summarized. They were meant to serve as a means of exchanging information and stimulating discussion of SA activities. Distribution was made to all PACOM MAAGs, CINCPAC staff elements, Service component commands, military departments, the JCS and the DOD. The MAAGs in the PACOM were encouraged to use the MAAB as a two-way street to share experiences and insights.[1]

(C) In April 1973, the Secretary of Defense had conveyed the concern of the State Department that FMS credit levels for out (future) years might be construed by SA countries as implied U.S. commitments. In the June MAAB, CINCPAC noted that officials from some allied nations were prone to misconstrue discussions on out-year MAP and FMS credit levels as implied commitments. This was a difficult problem which required constant attention. MAAG chiefs were cautioned to conduct business in such a way as to make it clear to foreign officials that SA discussions did not constitute nor imply a commitment.[2]

(C) In other areas, CINCPAC alerted the MAAGs to begin planning for a MAAG Chiefs Conference in December 1973. The field missions were warned that organizational adjustments and manpower reductions could be expected as the nature of the MAP changed. The MAAGs were kept abreast of the status of SA legislation, including the adverse climate evidenced by the Fulbright proposal discussed in Section I of this chapter. The trend toward grant aid reductions, the consequent need for FMS emphasis, and the prospect of continuing austerity in MAP appropriations were stressed in the MAABs.[3]

Funding Competition/Priorities

(U) The "total force concept", as a practical expression of the Nixon Doctrine, required consideration of U.S. active and reserve forces and those of

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1. CINCPAC MAAB No. 11, 060240Z Jun 73; ten MAABs had been published by J8 through Dec 72.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 072231Z Apr 73 (NOTAL), which cited SECDEF 051816Z Apr 73.
3. CINCPAC MAABs No. 11, 12, 13, with DTG of 060240Z Jun 73, 111950Z Aug 73, and 122034Z Jan 74 resp.

friendly and allied nations as a total force for common security interests. The Foreign Assistance Act provided that MAP budget requirements compete directly with those for U.S. forces and other DOD activities. In reality, however, the MAP budget for FY 73 (for example) amounted to only seven-tenths of one percent of the total DOD budget ($553 million compared to $81 billion).[1]

The Bookkeeping Constraint

(U) The need to conform to the desires of Congress, withstand the scrutiny of DOD auditors and the General Accounting Office (GAO), and discharge end-use inspection responsibilities generated an intense managerial and bookkeeping workload. The orderliness obtained thereby was also accompanied by some penalties. Orderly bookkeeping led to inflexibility and inhibited the response to a fast-breaking situation; e.g., the insurgency in the Southern Philippines and the growing war in Cambodia. The primary factor was the long lead time from programming to delivery. Moreover, the use of equipment could not always be under strict control (Cambodia), or the need changed by the time it was delivered (Philippines). One CINCPAC J8 paper suggested the following modifications to existing statutory constraints, while acknowledging that they were contrary to the mood of Congress:[2]

- Multi-year funding.
- Regional rather than country systems.
- Authority for the Secretary of Defense, based on the unified commander's advice, to set the dollar levels of regional programs.
- Authority to transfer money and other resources to cope with changing priorities generated by unforeseen events.

Continuing Resolution Authority

(C) As already noted, FY 73 passed without a formal authorization for foreign aid. The program was administered on a quarter-by-quarter basis as authorized by Congressional CRAs. Also previously discussed was the delay until the middle of FY 74 before the FY 74 authorization bill was passed. In the absence of MAP legislation, Congress authorized CRA for the first quarter of FY 74 in the amount of $123.4 million world-wide. First quarter obligations were limited to the following "fixed expenses":[3]

1. J816 Point Paper, 22 Jun 73, Subj: Foreign Military Assistance Funding Competition/Priorities.
2. J813 Point Paper, 26 Jun 73, Subj: Military Assistance Management.
3. J813 Point Paper, 26 Oct 73, Subj: MAP Funding

- Administration expenses and transportation of MAP materiel.
- Training scheduled to commence prior to 1 January 1974.
- Essential combat resupply to Cambodia.
- Long lead time procurement for F-5E production.

(C) The impact of these constraints was that DOD was unable to meet the programmed major end item procurement of the Military Departments for the first quarter FY 74. Further, countries other than Cambodia received no funding for essential needs, the most critical of which was operations and maintenance (O&M) support. On 30 August, CINCPAC expressed concern to the JCS and DOD about the impact of the limited FY 74 funding situation. In past years, the funding situation had always allocated some money for all countries, and at least a small amount for O&M. This had permitted the continuation of programs until final dollar levels were approved by Congress. The FY 74 situation was aggravated by the substantially lower than programmed levels of FY 73 funding. CINCPAC noted the potential for lost time in the supply line, and that the readiness posture of host countries would be degraded if some relief was not forthcoming.[1]

(C) The passage by the Congress of an extension of CRA to cover the second FY quarter provided no relief. In fact, because of a continuing draw down of MAP resources to support Cambodia, the situation had become more critical. CINCPAC directed the grant aid MAAGs to plan for CRA constraints, with the bulk of the funds going to fixed expenses, Cambodia requirements and long lead time (F-5E) items. The MAAG's were requested to re-examine and re-validate critical program lines; to consider alternate means to provide the minimum essential O&M support for the first half of FY 74; to examine the possible funding of O&M by the host country or by re-programming; to determine the funds which could be made available by re-programming prior year investment lines; and to provide CINCPAC with a list of unfunded, absolutely essential line items in desired funding sequence for the first half of FY 74. CINCPAC acknowledged and regretted the additional workload imposed, but believed that prospects for further FY 74 funding required the re-evaluation.[2]

PACOM MAP Funds

(U) MAP worldwide appropriations had ranged from a high of $5.7 billion in 1952 to a low of $350 million in 1970. In 1966, grant aid for Vietnam and free

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1. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 302012Z Aug 73.
2. CINCPAC 202134Z Aug 73.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

DOLLAR GUIDELINES

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973

COUNTRY	CEILING BY FISCAL YEAR (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)						
	73 2/	74 2/	75 2/	76 2/	77 2/	78 2/	79 3/
CAMBODIA	133.3	173.0	165.0	165.0	165.0	165.0	165.0
CHINA	30.0 4/	28.8 4/	.484	.48	.48	.45	.45
INDONESIA	17.0	22.8	23.3	23.3	23.3	23.3	23.3
KOREA	132.8 4/	241.2	159.0	119.0	78.0	39.0	1.0
LAOS 1/	353.5	100.0	92.5	87.2	86.9	86.65	86.5
MALAYSIA	.18	.2	.284	.23	.23	.2	.2
PHILIPPINES	15.7	19.9	20.0	20.0	18.0	17.0	16.0
THAILAND	35.9	57.2	45.0	45.0	40.0	30.0	20.0
VIETNAM 1/	2,257.7	1,085.0	909.6	804.2	781.8	777.4	715.0
AFGHANISTAN	.215	.215	.211	.200	.200	.200	.200
SRI LANKA	.055	.050	.015	.015	.015	.015	.015
INDIA	.143	.200	.134	.120	.100	.100	.100
NEPAL	.038	.030	.038	.030	.030	.030	.030
PAKISTAN	.285	.243	.352	.350	.300	.250	.250

1/ Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)
Source: Laos-SECDEF 111707Z Aug 73
Vietnam-SECDEF 111654Z Aug 73

2/ Source: OASD/DSAA Table 704 of 6 Jun 73
(Includes Material and Training)

3/ Source: FY75-79 Program Objectives Memo

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world forces in Vietnam was transferred from the Foreign Assistance Act authorization to the DOD budget under the MASF program. In 1967, Laos and Thailand were added to the MASF program, and, effective 1 July 1972, Thailand funding reverted to MAP once again. For FY 73, only Vietnam and Laos were Service-funded. The PACOM MAP for FY 73 was dependent upon CRA extensions throughout the fiscal year in the absence of formal legislation.[1]

(S) The Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) for the FY 73 program was presented to the Congress in early 1972. In November 1972, interim CRA funding levels for FY 73 (MAP) were provided by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). These two funding levels for PACOM countries are compared below with the final FY 73 CRA MAP funding levels (in thousands):[2]

Country	FY 73 CPD	FY 73 CRA	FY 73 Final CRA
Afghanistan (2)	215	215	215
Cambodia	209,541	133,275	133,275
China	7,121	12,350	2,650
India (2)	234	234	143
Indonesia	28,409	16,975	16,975
Korea	211,727	132,775	118,875
Malaysia (1)	181	180	180
Nepal (2)	29	29	38
Pakistan (2)	243	243	285
Philippines	20,659	15,675	15,675
Sri Lanka (2)	15	15	55
Thailand	58,779	35,875	35,875
Regional	267	267	41,467 (3)

1. Training Only.
2. U.S. Training Only.
3. Included ENHANCE PLUS Paybacks.

(S) The above table reflects a shortfall from CPD to final FY 73 figures for all countries except Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, for which the training level was increased a total of $91,000. The key MAP countries--Cambodia, [redacted] Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand--were reduced significantly. Meanwhile, on 5 January 1973, the DSAA announced a tentative Presidential budget

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1. J811 Point Paper, 22 Jun 73, Subj: Military Assistance Program Evolution and Prospects.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol II, pp. 380, 381; J811 Point Paper, 7 Jan 74, Subj: MAP in PACOM.

decision for FY 74 security assistance guidelines in the PACOM:[1]

Country	MAP ($Millions)	FMS Credit ($Millions)
Afghanistan (1)	.2	-0-
Cambodia	173.0	-0-
[redacted]		
India (1)	.2	-0-
Indonesia	22.8	-0-
Korea	200.0	25.0
Malaysia (2)	.2	19.0
Nepal (1)	.03	-0-
Pakistan (1)	.2	-0-
Philippines	19.9	3.0
Sri Lanka (1)	.02	-0-
Thailand	57.3	15.0
Region	.3	-0-

(1) MAP Training Only.
(2) U.S. Training Only.

(S) MAP grant aid for the [redacted] was terminated beginning in FY 74 except for training. [redacted] remained eligible to purchase EDA subject to availability and priority on an as is-where is basis at five percent of acquisition value. Detailed constraints on the MAP for Cambodia, included in this guidance, are addressed under the Country MAP Section of this chapter. The CPD presented in April 1973 reflected essentially the same levels as in the previous table, except that the Korean program had been increased about $41 million to $241.2 million. The only other change was an increase of Sri Lanka training funds from $20,000 to $50,000.[2]

(S) After the appropriations bill for FY 74 (Public Law 93-240) was signed on 2 January 1974, the country funding levels were changed once again, and tentative FY 75 dollar guidelines were provided. The final funding levels for FY 74 and guidelines for FY 75 (in millions) were:[3]

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1. J815 HistSum Jan 73; SECDEF 5600/052339Z Jan 73; SECDEF 5603/052340Z Jan 73.
2. J811 Point Paper, 7 Jan 74, Subj: MAP in PACOM
3. J812 Point Paper, 7 Feb 74, Subj: PACOM Security Assistance Program.

Country	FY 74		FY 75	
	MAP	FMS	MAP	FMS
Afghanistan (1)	.2	-0-	.2	-0-
Cambodia (3)	325.0	-0-	362.5	-0-
China (1)	.4	60.0	.4	80.0
India (1)	.2	-0-	.1	-0-
Indonesia	17.6	-0-	22.7	-0-
Korea	112.3	25.0	161.5	52.0
Laos (5)	(MASF)		85.2	-0-
Malaysia (2)	.2	19.0	.3	10.0
Nepal (1)	.03	-0-	.04	-0-
Pakistan (1)	.2	-0-	.3	-0-
Philippines	16.8	3.0	17.9	5.0
Sri Lanka (1)	.02	-0-	.02	-0-
Thailand	35.8	10.0	56.0	-0-
Regional (4)	28.6	-0-	.4	-0-

1. U.S. Training Only.
2. Training Only.
3. Includes $200 million drawdown authority.
4. Includes $28.3 million ENHANCE PLUS payback.
5. Change from MASF to MAP on 1 July 1974.

Funding for Laos and RVN

(C) In February 1973, the DOD requested CINCPAC and the Service chiefs to comment on the problems to be resolved if Congress enacted legislation transferring military assistance for Laos and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) from MASF to MAP funding. Also requested were comments on the feasibility of placing RVN under MAP management procedures regardless of Congressional action. On 20 February, DOD directed that the MASF program for RVN be changed from Category I to Category IV on 1 July 1973, with CINCPAC to manage the program. Category I was a program for which the total approved military assistance requirements for the country were funded by the U.S. military Services, as implementing agencies, under MASF procedures. The flow and control of data was through the component Services, with funding direct from the budgets of the military departments. Category IV, applicable to Laos, was a program using normal MAP procedures but still funded by the Services within specific dollar ceilings established by the DOD or Congress. The flow and control of data and program management was by CINCPAC.[1]

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1. J834 HistSum Mar 73; SECDEF 6063/201557Z Feb 73, which cited SECDEF 020306Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 280346Z Mar 73 (NOTAL).

(C) CINCPAC was also directed to establish a consolidated delivery and loss reporting system for RVN materiel and to prepare plans for the complete transition to MAP funding for Laos and/or RVN if that transition were required at a future date with minimum notice.[1]

(C) CINCPAC promulgated initial guidance for a consolidated reporting system on 3 March, and draft guidance for conversion of the RVN either to Category IV MASF or transition to MAP on 6 March. From 12-16 March, CINCPAC convened a working group representing all concerned Defense agencies to resolve problems and refine the initial plan. The final draft guidance resulting from the working group conference was forwarded to the DOD and JCS on 27 March for approval or issuance by the Director, DSAA. In this message, the CINCPAC staff position was stated that RVN MASF funding should continue through FY 74 in order to provide flexibility of support under the terms of the cease-fire agreement.[2]

(C) The day after the proposed plan was submitted, the J8 staff provided Admiral Gayler with additional background on the transfer and implications if CINCPAC assumed management of the RVN program. No big problems were anticipated if Laos were transferred to MAP funding in FY 74, since the CINCPAC staff was already managing the program. Only the source of funds would change. However, the staff recommended that MASF Category I funding continue for RVN unless the many policy limitations imposed by Category IV procedures were not applied to RVN. These limitations (funding, programming, lead times) would reduce the flexibility of the Service-funded and managed program. If Category IV procedures were imposed, the program management for RVN would be a new task for CINCPAC. The management tasks were being accomplished by large numbers of people in the military departments and the component Services. CINCPAC's assumption of control would require a staff increase; close coordination with the component Services would be imperative to assure a smooth turnover; and the terms of reference of the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Saigon would need revision to reflect the CINCPAC role as program manager and the need to train DAO personnel in MAP procedures.[3]

(C) On 6 April, the DSAA directed the shift of the RVN MASF program to Category IV procedures effective 1 July 1973. On 22 May, the DSAA approved CINCPAC's implementing instructions, but with several modifications. The thrust of the DSAA guidance was that the Services would retain control of the FY 74 program, with CINCPAC reviewing the program after approval by the military

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1. Ibid.
2. J835 HistSum May 73; CINCPAC 030446Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 060400Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 270205Z Mar 73.
3. CINCPAC 280346Z Mar 73 (NOTAL).

departments. CINCPAC was to forward the total recommended program to the DSAA. On 1 June CINCPAC passed implementing procedures to all concerned.[1]

(C) During initial planning in February 1973 for the program transition, the DSAA had considered it essential to bring the RVN program under centralized control by 1 July. The reason for the obverse decision--that the RVN program would remain a Services responsibility--apparently was resistance by the Services to loss of control over a Service-funded program.[2]

Training of PACOM Security Assistance Personnel

(U) The selection and training of security assistance personnel was guided by a DOD policy directive which specified four phases: selection; preparatory training; Washington orientation; and regional/country orientation. The first session of Phase IV--regional/country orientation--had been held by CINCPAC in July 1972. In the first Phase IV class of 34 MAAG personnel and observers from CINCPAC component commands, only six students had received prior military department training in security assistance duties.[3]

(U) From 9-13 July 1973, CINCPAC conducted Phase IV SA training at Taipei, Taiwan. Thirty-one materiel and 18 training advisory students attended from 13 PACOM countries. The span of the on-the-job experience ranged from two days to more than one year. Sixty-one percent of the students had been in their countries for less than six months and 35 percent less than three months. A significant increase was noted in the number of personnel who had received Phase II preparatory training for this course over the two classes conducted in FY 73 (35 percent versus 25 percent). Seventeen had attended a Continental U.S. (CONUS) security assistance course of some type prior to their MAAG assignments. All but one of these had been on the job less than nine months.[4]

(U) Some of the students expressed a desire for more "CINCPAC Policy", rather than permitting free exchange of individual country approach and situations. The CINCPAC staff instructors believed this evidenced a desire for a "school solution" which, given the diversity of country programs, was neither practical nor advisable. Questions based on standard or established procedures

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1. J835 HistSum May 73; SECDEF 8683/222122Z May 73, which cited SECDEF 060053Z Apr 73.
2. J834 Point Paper, 5 Feb 74, Subj: Management of RVN Military Assistance Service Funded Program.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 385, 386.
4. J853 HistSum Jul 73; J85/Memo/812-73 of 2 Aug 73, Subj: After Action Report, Phase IV Training, July 1973.

could be answered; however, a training team could not and should not expound "policy" based on individual opinion and incomplete staff coordination.[1]

(U) The problem of funding the CINCPAC Phase IV training was brought to the attention of the DOD in August. The training of U.S. MAP personnel was budgeted and approved for $65,500 in FY 74. However, as of 6 August, the program had been funded at only $30,000. Historically, the personnel assignment policy of the military departments and the availability of CINCPAC instructors to conduct training had dictated that such training be conducted in July and November each year. Since the July session had already been held, and similar sessions were planned for October and Novmeber 1973, CINCPAC requested full funding of this (N50) budget item by October 1 to meet scheduled costs.[2]

(U) In September, the J8 staff conducted Phase IV training for 12 personnel newly assigned to the CINCPAC staff and the component commands. From 29 October to 2 November, another session for MAAG/Mission personnel was conducted in Bangkok, and from 5-9 November, the CINCPAC team was in Seoul, Korea. The Bangkok and Seoul sessions were attended by 74 materiel and training advisory students.[3]

(U) For these two sessions, student on-the-job experience ran from zero to over one year in-country. Sixty-nine percent of the students had less than six months in-country and 46 percent less than three months. The overall percentage of students with Phase II training prior to assignment dropped to 23 percent from 35 percent in the summer session.[4]

(U) After the two DOD-directed courses in Bangkok and Seoul, the J8 training staff chief assessed the composition of the instructor team. The existing team had operated in the same configuration for two major cycles (FY 73/74). It was considered an excellent mix of personality and expertise, with cohesion and continuity. While most team members would not rotate until the next (FY 75) cycle had begun, gradual substitution of personnel was recommended to maintain a workable experience level for instruction.[5]

Riot Control Agents in MAP (S)

(S) The DSAA informed CINCPAC in December 1973 that policy concerning the provision of riot control agents (RCA) in the MAP was under review. CINCPAC

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1. Ibid.; CINCPAC MAAB No. 12, DTG 111950Z Aug 73.
2. CINCPAC 220348Z Aug 73.
3. J853 HistSum Sep 73; J851 HistSum Oct 73; J856 HistSum Nov 73.
4. CINCPAC MAAB No. 13, DTG 122034Z Jan 74.
5. J85/Memo/1131-73 of 20 Nov 73, Subj: After Action Report, Phase IV Training, October 1973.

was requested to provide the quantity, type, value and purpose for which provided by country for FY 73 and prior, FY 74, and those RCA proposed for FY 75 and subsequent years.[1]

(S) CINCPAC requested his subordinate MAAGs to provide the necessary information, and provided guidance pending the outcome of the policy review:[2]

- RCA would not be included in programs without specific prior approval of CINCPAC headquarters. This restriction applied to the preparation of detailed data for plans or POM updates as well as the current year program.

- If approved for programming, RCA would not be procured, called forward nor delivered to the recipient country without the prior approval of CINCPAC headquarters.

(S) On 21 December, CINCPAC's reply to the DOD provided the requested information:[3]



B. Cambodia

(1) FY 73 and Prior: Total quantities could not be verified.

(2) On hand as of 15 December 1973:

190 Gren, Hand Riot, CS-1, M25A2 $ 750

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1. SECDEF 4151/072115Z Dec 73.
2. CINCPAC 080427Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 150427Z Dec 73.
3. CINCPAC 212016Z Dec 73.

1,273 Gren, Hand Riot, CN, M7A1 5,100
7,500 E-8 Dispensers 2,500,000
(3) FY 74
1,728 Gren, Hand Riot, CS, M25A2 8,640
PURPOSE: Riot control and combat operations.

C. Indonesia
(1) FY 73 and Prior Years: None
(2) For each of FY 74-79:
1,000 Gren, Hand Riot, CS-1 $4,000
PURPOSE: For use of national police in riot control training.

D. Thailand
(1) FY 73 and Prior:

11,684 RCA, CS-1	$37,272
561 CS Capsule	1,683
6,722 Gren, Hand Riot, CS-1	26,888
269 Gren, Hand Riot, CS	1,076
5,550 Gren, Hand Riot, CS-1	21,899
11 CS Capsule	33

PURPOSE: Item 2 used in training. Item 5 furnished to RTAVF for operations in RVN. Item 6 furnished RTAVF/ORTC for training prior to deployment. All others for denial operations in isolated areas.
(2) FY 74 and Subsequent Years: None

E. Philippines
(1) FY 73 and Prior Years:

6,900 Gren, Hand Riot, CS-1	$26,407
4,128 Gren, Hand Riot, CS	13,416
1,000 Gren, Hand Riot, CN-1	(Excess)

PURPOSE: Riot Control.
(2) FY 74 and Subsequent Years: None

F. Korea - None

SECTION III--MAP/MASF COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Cambodia

Military Force Structure

(S) The Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) had provided CINCPAC with his projection for the MAP-supported Cambodian military forces by end-FY 73 in October 1972. By January 1973, this projection had been reduced, because of CRA-impelled program changes, from 220,000 to 216,179--198,829 for the Cambodian Army (FANK); 7,350 for the Navy; and 10,000 for the Air Force (KAF). The Chief, MEDTC had also stated that the achievement of these MAP and JSOP force goals, under the continuing budgetary constraints, was dependent upon a valid cease-fire and a consequent reduction in ammunition costs. During 1973, hostilities continued, ammunition costs rose, and U.S. air support to the Cambodian war ended on 15 August.[1]

(S) The perilous situation of the Khmer Republic (GKR) after termination of direct American combat support was recognized by U.S. officials at all levels. On 11 August, the U.S. Ambassador in Phnom Penh addressed plans to recruit Vietnamese of Cambodian origin for the FANK. Recruiting teams were to be sent to the Delta region of Vietnam; enlistment bonuses were to be offered; and airlift from Vietnam to Cambodia was to be provided by U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft. Another plan advanced by the Ambassador concerned the organization of a MAP-supported self-defense force by the GKR. This program became a political football over control at national level. The Prime Minister objected to FANK control, even though he had been told that MAP support depended upon control by the military. The organization of the self-defense units appeared to be popular among the people; however, the Ambassador observed that this interest could stem from lack of enthusiasm for national conscription.[2]

(S) Regarding conscription, a conscription bill had been passed by the National Assembly in March 1973. However, the Prime Minister reportedly opposed the draft because of political implications. An order for all Phnom Penh males eligible for the draft to report to local review boards was largely ignored during the first week of 23-28 July. The national Gendarmerie had rounded up

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 409-411; J832 HistSum, Jan 73; JCS 4984/262029Z Dec 72; CHMEDTC 0027/020940Z Jan 73; SECDEF 3892/040018Z Aug 73.
2. AMEMB Phnom Penh 8333/110935Z Aug 73 and 8663/190400Z Aug 73.

KHMER REPUBLIC (CAMBODIA)

(as of 1 Aug 73)

BASIC INFORMATION J8

SIZE.....66,000 SQ. MI.	LIFE EXPECTANCY.....44 YEARS
POPULATION.....7.3 MIL	GROSS NAT. PROD. 1973..$920 MIL
ANNUAL GROWTH.....2.2%	PER CAPITA 1972..... $126
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA...1.2 ACRE	DEFENSE BUDGET SELF FINANCED
LITERACY RATE.....31.2	1973.....$124 MIL
	AS % GNP.....13.5%

President and Supreme Commander - LON NOL
Prime Minister - IN TAM
Minister of National Defense - U SAY
Minister of Foreign Affairs - LONG BORET
Commander in Chief, FANK - MGEN SOSTHENE FERNANDEZ

J2



OVERALL OBJECTIVE J8

TO ASSIST COMBODIA IN MAINTAINING ITS STATUS AS AN INDEPENDENT NEUTRAL STATE.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

PAI

AMBASSADOR:
HON. EMORY C. SWANK

U.S. AIR REPRESENTATIVE:
MR. MILES G. WEDEMAN

CHIEF CMEBT: BGEN JOHN R. CLELAND, JR., USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

1. Develop Armed Forces sufficiently capable to overcome insurgency.
2. Support the stabilization and neutrality of the Cambodian Government.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES * J53

ARMY	8 LT INF DIV (34 MOBILE INF BDES OF 144 INF BNS AND 32 ARTY BATT), 1 MECH BDE, 1 ARTY BDE, 1 ENG BDE, 1 SIG BDE, 1 MT BDE, 1 SF CMD, 1 POLMAR BN, 27 TERRITORIAL INF BDES (210 INF BNS, 31 ARTY BATT). STRENGTH 246,900.
NAVY	1 COASTAL SURVEIL SQDN (2 PC, 20 PCF, 15 85' PC) 5 RIVER ASSAULT INTERDICTION DIV (5 CCB, 10 MON, 15 ATC, 4 ASPB ETC), 5 RIVER PATROL GROUPS (100 PBR), 1 MINE COUNTERMEASURE SQDN (6 PBR), 1 LOG & SPT SQDN (38 LCM + 6/8 ETC), 10 NAV INF BNS. STRENGTH 16,000.
AIR FORCE	3 FTR FIT SQDN, 3 OI SQDN, 1 UHIB GUNSHIP SQDN, 1 AC-47 SQDN, 1 A-37 FIT SQND, 1 C-47 SQDN, 1 C-119 SQDN, 3 UHIB TRANSPORT SQDN, 1 CH47C HELO DET. STRENGTH 20,000.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES J3535

ARMY	4 LT INF DIV, 19 INF BDE, 66 INF BN, 1 INF BDE(M), 1 SF CMD, 1 ARTY BDE, 466 RF INF CO, 33 RF ARTY BTRY. TOTAL STRENGTH 167,367. AS OF: 1 JUL 73
NAVY	20 COASTAL PATROL TYPES, 53 RIVER PATROL TYPES, 6 MINE WARFARE TYPES, 30 AMPHIBIOUS TYPES, 49 AUXILIARY TYPES, 3 NAVY INF BN. TOTAL STRENGTH 6,000. AS OF: 1 JUL 73
AIR FORCE	2 FTR SQ(T-28), 1 FAC SQ(0-1), 1 GUNSHIP/FAC SQ(AU-24), 1 TRANS SQ (C-47), 1 LT HELO SQ(UH-1H). TOTAL STRENGTH 9,000. AS OF: 1 JUL 73

COMBAT CAPABILITY J3B3

ARMY	CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING LIMITED DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION FOR KEY POPULATION CENTERS AND SELECTED LOCs FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. LIMITED OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY AGAINST INTERNAL INSURGENT FORCES.
NAVY	LIMITED INLAND WATERWAY PATROL AND CONVOY ESCORT CAPABILITY. COASTAL DEFENSE, ASW, MINE WARFARE AND TRANSPORT MISSIONS ARE NOT BEING ADEQUATELY ACCOMPLISHED DUE TO LACK OF BOATS AND CRAFT.
AIR FORCE	LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OR TRANSPORT MISSIONS DUE TO CURRENT PILOT SHORTAGES AND INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE/ LOGISTICAL SYSTEMS IN COUNTRY.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 132.

* 77 Objective

large numbers of "eligible" males, but two-thirds of them were found to be exempt from the draft.[1]

(S) In a conversation with the Prime Minister, the Ambassador had emphasized that the most pressing problem facing the military was recruitment, and that the Prime Minister should take personal leadership of the recruitment campaign. The concern expressed by the Ambassador was shared by the Chief, MEDTC, who considered recruitment as the most pressing problem. Complicating the entire personnel picture was the lack of central personnel procurement, distribution, assignment, and strength accounting/reporting procedures. During a meeting of MEDTC, Country Team, GKR and FANK officials, the U.S. representatives had pressed for an effective national draft, a national recruiting drive and a monthly combat pay bonus. Agreement was reached on the need for a national recruiting campaign and a combat pay bonus. However, the GKR officials reportedly refused to make radio broadcasts to publicize the campaign. Another adverse aspect was the stated opposition by President Thieu of Vietnam to the Khmer Krom (Cambodians in Vietnam) recruitment program.[2]

(S) While the members of the U.S. Country Team were encouraging GKR initiatives toward force size goals, U.S. military agencies within and outside Cambodia were seeking means to strengthen the existing force structure. These efforts intensified after the mid-August termination of U.S. Air Force support, when it became imperative to identify the immediate needs of the Cambodian military as contrasted with the orderly programming of the JSOP. On 21 September, the Chief, MEDTC advised CINCPAC that the period from October through December 1973 was critical to the survivability of the GKR. Preparations to resist the expected enemy dry season offensive of early 1974 were mandatory. At the same time, the FANK containment of current enemy initiatives could not stop. While considerable progress had been made in FANK capability, there remained many areas for improvement. The MEDTC noted that personnel acquisition was dependent upon impetus originating within the GKR. The major deficiency which might be overcome by U.S. effort was firepower. Therefore, CINCPAC was requested to approve increases to the FANK force structure of two infantry division bases, three armored cavalry squadrons (troops) of M-113 personnel carriers, and eight riverine craft. These would increase FANK capabilities to withstand the expected dry season offensive.[3]

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1. AMEMB Phnom Penh 8695/200435Z Aug 73; J5311 Point Paper, 5 Oct 73, Subj: FANK Personnel Strengths.
2. Ibid.
3. J5311 HistSum Nov 73; CHMEDTC 10121/211645Z Sep 73.

(S) CINCPAC supported the validity of the MEDTC request to the JCS, noting that the momentum of the FANK would be sustained by the requested items, but that ammunition costs would continue to be a pacing factor in MAP programming. When the Chief, MEDTC forwarded new requirements which incorporated proposed changes to the JSOP cycles for FY 75-79, CINCPAC demurred. The MEDTC was asked, on 6 October, to submit JSOP out-of-cycle changes for FY 76-83. The MEDTC replied by letter on 22 October, modified by message on 19 November, with a detailed Cambodian force structure for the FANK Army, Navy and Air Force.[1]

(S) Meanwhile, the JCS requested CINCPAC's views on what steps were necessary to prepare Cambodia for the next dry season campaign. CINCPAC asked the Chief MEDTC and the Commander, USSAG to comment. Such steps as intensified training, attainment of stockage levels for rice, POL and ammunition, and release of funds to execute the FY 2/74 program were cited. CINCPAC conveyed these comments to the JCS, emphasizing the need for supporting arms, combined arms and tactical air support training by U.S. or third country Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) in Thailand.[2]

(S) No sooner had CINCPAC, MEDTC and the Service components resolved the query from JCS regarding the dry season needs of FANK when still another query was received from the DOD. In this 26 October message, the DOD requested the JCS to ascertain that the KAF had not been overlooked in the consideration of Cambodian force structure and capabilities. The DOD message cited 26 references (A-Z) on the subject, all but four of which denoted previously expressed views on Cambodian MAP from CINCPAC, his subordinate commands, or his Service components. The thrust of the DOD concern was to provide the KAF with "essential tactical air self-sufficiency." Specifically, the JCS was requested, as a matter of priority to:[3]

* * * * *

A. Develop a recommended KAF force structure on basis of the foregoing [no more U.S. air power].

B. Develop a time-phased and costed program to achieve the recommended KAF structure.

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1. CINCPAC 220240Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 060228Z Oct 73, which cited CHMEDTC 10247/251216Z Sep 73; CHMEDTC 12731/191300Z Nov 73.
2. JCS 1078/232045Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 240152Z Oct 73; USSAG/7AF 241330Z Oct 73; CHMEDTC 11646/241125Z Oct 73; J852 Point Paper, 25 Oct 73, Subj: Cambodian Dry Season Requirements.
3. SECDEF 4410/261846Z Oct 73.

C. Determine what interim steps may be taken to improve short-term KAF capability pending implementation of longer range solutions.

D. With reference to A. above, develop such other force structure changes as are necessary to insure the maintenance of a balanced GKR force.

E. Review existing FY 75 and out-year funding projections for Cambodia in light of fundings developed in accordance with the above and develop recommendations as appropriate.

(S) In passing the DOD query to CINCPAC for action, the JCS requested CINCPAC to consider other possible roles for the KAF, such as photo reconnaissance, psychological warfare, air defense and ground control intercept (GCI). CINCPAC also was requested to investigate the feasibility of long term KAF training by the 56th Special Operations Wing (SOW) in Thailand. The 56th had trained the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) at Udorn, Thailand for several years, but RLAF training was programmed for termination by April 1974.[1]

(S) The question of 56th SOW assumption of the KAF training mission over the long term was an outgrowth of the short term assimilation of KAF T-28 training by the SOW concurrently with on-going RLAF training. On 16 October, Detachment One of the 56th had advised CINCPAC that, if KAF training were to continue beyond the April 1974 RLAF phase-out, early action was needed to assure replacement of the RLAF ground support and special support equipment. Also, more AT-28Ds than possessed by the KAF would be needed. On 20 October, the MEDTC recommended against KAF training by Detachment One at Udorn beyond April 1974 because the KAF needed higher skill CONUS training to provide cadre for a training center at Battambang, Cambodia. On 26 October, Detachment One pointed out to CINCPAC and the MEDTC that the RLAF training program had been highly successful. Further, the knowledge and experience gained in organizing and training the RLAF to conduct its own combat crew training could be used profitably in the KAF training program.[2]

(S) On 31 October, CINCPAC recommended to the Chief, MEDTC that the expertise available in the Detachment One unit be seriously considered to provide

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1. JCS 8556/311524Z Oct 73. Specific KAF short term training for 1973 is treated in the following section of this chapter.
2. Det 1, 56 SOW 160500Z Oct 73; Det 1, 56 SOW 260100Z Oct 73, which cited CHMEDTC 201155Z Oct 73.

the KAF with quality T-28 pilots and combat crew training supervisors and instructors. CINCPAC noted that an immediate decision was necessary to halt the phase-out of Detachment One. This was the situation when CINCPAC received the JCS message, also on 31 October.[1]

(S) Thus began two separate but parallel reviews and responses to higher headquarters' request for information. One addressed the overall structure needed for the KAF to achieve "self-sufficiency"; the other dealt with the options for training the KAF personnel. On 1 November, CINCPAC requested the Chief, MEDTC to provide information upon which to base the response to the JCS. The Service component commands were requested to provide comments on the MEDTC reply. The MEDTC was also requested to submit a JSOP revision up-date corresponding to FANK force structure changes for FY 76-83.[2]

(S) On 5 November, the MEDTC provided a new KAF "self-sufficiency" program, and included changes to the FANK Army and Navy structures needed to maintain a balanced force posture. In addition to the required numbers and types of aircraft, the MEDTC recommended a photo reconnaissance capability, to be attained by adding camera kits to the AT-28D strike aircraft. Night and all-weather capability was needed, and should be attained by CONUS training. The night/instrument flying would require upgrading of all Cambodian airfield facilities; other facilities construction would also be needed at all bases. Tactical communications would need upgrading for aircraft command and control and a direct air request net. Aircraft training priorities were: (1) A-37; (2) C-123; (3) AU-24; (4) UH-1H (gunship); (5) UH-1H (transport); (6) U-17; (7) AC-47; and (8) C-130. The KAF maintenance and supply systems would need attention to make them compatible with those of the U.S. For the ground forces, the MEDTC recommended a ground-to-air missile air defense capability and the acquisition of M41 tanks. A substantial increase in all naval forces was recommended because of increased mission responsibilities assigned to the Navy in LOC and port defense.[3]

(S) After receipt of the CHMEDTC recommendations and the comments of the Service components, CINCPAC's Director for Plans submitted his views to the JCS on 13 November. He noted that the DOD had asked for a plan focused on long term requirements to develop FANK air self-sufficiency. He acknowledged the excellent and detailed response from the MEDTC, but stated that, in his judgment, the DOD should have asked, "What total actions and forces are required for short term survival, extended into the out years?" Before addressing the

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1. CINCPAC 310356Z Oct 73.
2. CINCPAC 010046Z Nov 73.
3. CHMEDTC 12100/051400Z Nov 73.

specific recommendations in the MEDTC plan, he stated the caveats that "self-sufficiency" was a difficult concept to grasp as applied to the KAF; that near term survival should be the main focus; and that more than air power was involved if the GKR were to survive. Moreover, even over the long term, FANK self-sufficiency, once defined, would be inhibited by poor leadership, critically limited manpower and skills, and U.S. budgetary constraints. For example, the added cost of the proposed force structure was estimated at $96.4 million for the KAF, $3.6 million for the ground forces, and $45.3 million for the FANK Navy. Installation and facility upgrading would cost many millions more.[1]

(TS) The CINCPAC message then addressed specific portions of the proposed long term plan, dissenting to the fitting of AT-28Ds with photo reconnaissance kits, the early introduction of the A-37, and the introduction of C-130s at any time before 1985. If the Khmer were to achieve air self-sufficiency, CINCPAC agreed that CONUS-based training for KAF pilots should be reactivated. However, the validity of that goal was debatable when money for immediate survival was so short. Rather, in-country training, third country programs, MTTs and continued U.S. Air Force training by the 56th SOW should be stressed to meet near term KAF improvement needs.[2]

(S) It will be recalled that the question of retaining the 56th SOW Detachment One to train the KAF at Udorn, Thailand was among those posed by the DOD. The MEDTC had addressed this briefly in his overall posture statement of 5 November, and, on 7 November, stated specific reasons why the MAP-supported RLAF training program should not be applied to KAF training. The MEDTC reviewed the on-going efforts to train KAF personnel to meet short term combat qualifications while a training base was being established in Cambodia. Also, the continued training of KAF in Thailand would reduce the airframes available for in-country combat and training, and the language schools could not assimilate a large influx of new students. Finally, a radical change in the overall FANK MAP program would disrupt prior programming of funds and equipment. On 26 November, the Chief, MEDTC once again provided CINCPAC with a detailed list of aircraft and pilot requirements for the KAF, stated his view that most of the required training could be accomplished in Cambodia, and reiterated that undergraduate pilot training in the CONUS was, in any case, preferable to Detachment One training in Thailand when versatility, course costs and training time was considered. The Chief MEDTC re-stated the concept, expressed in his messages of 5 and 7 November, under which he considered that additional training by Detachment One could be of significant value:[3]

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1. CINCUSARPAC 062106Z Nov 73; CINCPACFLT 070241Z Nov 73; CINCPACAF 072000Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 132045Z Nov 73.
2. Ibid.
3. CHMEDTC 12143/070110Z Nov 73; CHMEDTC 13052/261211Z Nov 73.

(1) Det 1 would be a fully operational USAF facility, not relying on MAP Cambodia funds to remain in operation.

(2) All airframes, POL, support equipment, spares, training aids, etc., would be furnished by sources other than KAF.

(3) English language training beyond a minimum level of 55 would be provided by Det 1 for those courses requiring a fluency in English.

(4) The course costs for training by Det 1 would be comparable to course offered within PACOM area or in CONUS.

(S) On 19 November, the Chief MEDTC submitted an update to his out-of-cycle changes to the FY 76-83 JSOP, based on his last overall FANK posture proposal. Once again, the Service components commented and CINCPAC forwarded the recommended out-of-cycle change. Once again, CINCPAC stated the need to focus on near term Khmer survival--the need to acquire the equipment and flesh out existing units to prepare for the dry season fight. CINCPAC cautioned against diversion from this near term goal in force planning and funding. Having said that, CINCPAC provided detailed force objectives which would be capable of executing the Cambodian national strategy over the long term.[1]

(S) During the compilation of the detailed JSOP revisions, meanwhile, the JCS had addressed another query to CINCPAC. This message, on 15 November, asked CINCPAC to provide a brief statement of the nature of the threat to be countered by the revised force structure. Also, CINCPAC was asked to comment on the extension of 56th SOW training for the KAF past April 1974. On 28 November, CINCPAC replied that the MEDTC had developed the proposed Khmer force structure primarily against a Khmer communist local and main force threat judged to exist from FY 74 through FY 78. CINCPAC recommended that the 56th SOW remain operational in FY 75 to develop a KAF training base cadre in flying and maintenance skills. This cadre could provide in-country training self-sufficiency in FY 76. The conditions under which the MEDTC had considered Detachment One training to be acceptable were referenced in the CINCPAC message, but no other comment was made.[2]

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1. CINCPACFLT 220451Z Nov 73; CINCPACAF 220300Z Nov 73; CINCUSARPAC 212347Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 280057Z Nov 73.
2. JCS 4832/151933Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 281740Z Nov 73.

(S) In December, the JCS forwarded a memorandum to the DOD stating that the JCS did not consider attainment of Khmer tactical air self-sufficiency a realistic goal. The JCS did not recommend major upgrading of airfield capabilities or support facilities because of costs and higher priority near term requirements. To improve FANK capabilities during the dry season, the JCS authorized eight additional riverine craft, four air radio control consoles, and MAP support of two additional division bases. The divisions were authorized two 155mm howitzer artillery batteries, one armored cavalry troop, and miscellaneous trucks and weapons. The JCS had also recommended for approval the following deliveries and actions:[1]

For the KAF:

- 24 additional T-28Ds
- 5 additional AC-47s
- Deactivation of the C-47 squadron and filling of the mission by contract
- Defer delivery of additional aircraft until pilots were available
- Expansion of out-of-country pilot training

For the Navy:

- 2 assault patrol boats
- 1 command and control boat
- 7 LCM-6
- 3 LCM-8
- Transfer nine of 35 craft from coastal patrol to riverine forces

Funding the Program

(S) In Section II of this chapter, it was shown that FY 73 Cambodia MAP funds were reduced from the requested level of $209.5 million to the interim

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1. CINCPAC J5 Weekly Executive Brief, 10-16 Dec 73.

and final CRA level of $133.3 million. Two immediate effects resulted from this reduction--programmed investment items were deferred, and the funding of ammunition expenditures became critical. In December 1972, perhaps as a result of wishful thinking, the JCS had requested projections of MAP funding with and without combat operations. When President Lon Nol declared a unilateral ceasefire for GKR forces in January 1973, CINCPAC requested the MEDTC to estimate future ammunition costs for six months based on continuation of the bilateral ceasefire in Vietnam and a unilateral ceasefire in Cambodia. This was to be compared with bilateral ceasefires in both countries. The MEDTC replied in February 1973, that the unilateral ceasefire declared by the GKR had not noticeably decreased ammunition consumption. In fact, enemy activity had increased and the GKR ammo consumption had also increased. Therefore, he projected the already programmed costs of $7.6 million for March; $8.2 million for April; $8.2 million for May; $8.2 million for June; $9.2 million for July; and $9.2 million for August. The MEDTC figures for a bilateral ceasefire in Cambodia were considerably lower, but, since no ceasefire occurred, were moot. As of the date of CINCPAC's request, 9 February, $79.5 million had been programmed for FY 73 ammunition costs; $49.6 million had been funded under CRA; and $29.4 million had been delivered.[1]

(S) As of 30 April, $125.3 million of the $133.3 million CRA level MAP funding had been received, but the MAP program was in critical condition. On 30 April, CINCPAC received an assessment of the FY 73 Cambodian program from the Chief, MEDTC. His assessment included a resume of the FY 73 and prior year programs for undelivered items which could be deleted or deferred to pay for ammunition, POL deliveries and other immediate needs. The conclusion was that deletions or deferrals would have to be from the FY 73 program because the remaining FY 71 and 72 items had been reprogrammed with high priorities. The Chief, MEDTC estimated that, even with the receipt of the balance of FY 73 CRA funds, $14.6 million more would be needed. Therefore, and even though force improvements for the FANK would be delayed, he recommended FY 73 investment items for deferral. More than that, the Chief, MEDTC noted that, if initial funding for FY 74 were delayed, an additional $9.2 million would have to be funded from the FY 73 program. This would result in the deletion or deferrment of essential spare parts and operating support items.[2]

(S) On 16 May, CINCPAC submitted a $24 million program change (sum of increases/decreases) to the DSAA which brought the FY 73 Cambodian MAP within

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 409-411; J832 HistSum Feb 73; CINCPAC 090353Z Feb 73; CHMEDTC 1359/141310Z Feb 73.
2. CINCPAC 010425Z May 73 (NOTAL); J833 HistSum Apr 73.

the FY 73 ceiling. Long lead time items were deferred to generate funds for ammunition expenditures through 30 June 1973.[1]

(S) Meanwhile, the FY 74 program had been presented to the Congress, requesting $173 million for MAP Cambodia. The guidelines conveyed to CINCPAC for programming FY 74 Cambodia MAP were:[2]

* * * * *

A. End FY 74 MAP supported FANK force level will not exceed 220,000.

B. A plan to maintain MAP supported units at full strength and to insure that sufficient personnel are present for duty to maintain combat effectiveness at all times will be developed in coordination with FANK.

C. Force improvement/reorganization may continue within budgetary limitations. However, in planning force modernization the following guidance applies:

1. The T-28 will be retained as the primary tactical air support aircraft until a replacement aircraft is identified and accepted by DOD.

2. Equipment for ground forces will continue to be for a light infantry capability with appropriate supporting weapons. No tanks or heavy artillery will be programmed or included in out year MAP plans. No further medium artillery will be programmed.

3. Development of intelligence gathering and reconnaissance units will be accelerated.

4. Equipment for naval forces will continue to be oriented primarily toward supporting naval forces operating on inland waterways and secondarily providing coastal surveillance.

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1. J833 HistSum May 73; CINCPAC 162153Z May 73; J832 HistSum Jun 73.
2. J815 HistSum Jan 73; SECDEF 5600/052339Z Jan 73; also see Section II, this chapter. As was shown in the preceding force structure discussion, many of these guidelines were altered after U.S. tactical air support was withdrawn on 15 August.

D. Paramilitary organizations directly concerned with internal security may be provided MAP support IAW the following limitations:

1. Development/support of FANK will receive first priority.

2. CHMEDTC will exercise principal operational responsibility within the mission.

3. Out year programs will emphasize a shift from FANK territorial forces to unpaid local paramilitary internal security organizations, assuming the threat decreases.

E. FANK self-sufficiency in training and logistics will continue to receive priority attention IAW the following:

1. An overall officer and training cadre improvement program will be developed in coordination with FANK.

2. CONUS schooling for officers and training cadre will be used to the maximum extent feasible to improve professional quality and competence in all branches of service and to enhance development of in country training capability.

(S) In early July 1973, CRA for first quarter FY 74 Cambodia MAP was established initially for $33.2 million. In anticipation of the 15 August bombing halt, and to place FANK in the best position possible, the Chief, MEDTC asked for an additional $22.8 million in FY 1/74 funds. Ten million dollars were added, for a total CRA in FY 1/74 of 43.2 million. During the month of August, CRA first quarter funding remained at $43 million. The Chief, MEDTC requested $9.3 million more for ammunition after costs rose dramatically during the month. On 24 August, the JCS advised CINCPAC that $2 million could be made available by DOD, but action was deferred on the $7.3 million balance.[1]

(S) By the end of October, it was apparent that the FY 74 ceiling of $167.2 million was woefully inadequate to support Cambodia after the cut-off of U.S. air support. The MEDTC estimated required funding for FY 74 of $278.5 million

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1. J8311 HistSums Jul and Aug 73; CINCPAC 072053Z Aug 73; JCS 2669/242359Z Aug 73 (EX); J833 Point Paper, 24 Jul 73, Subj: FY 74 Cambodia MAP funds.

would provide minimum combat support; $227.2 million of that total would be required for ammunition alone.[1]

(S) On 26 November, the DOD advised CINCPAC of the probability that Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act would be reenacted by Congress. This section authorized the President to order defense articles from the DOD and the military Services to be applied, under the drawdown authority, against MAP requirements. On 27 November, the DOD directed CINCPAC to prepare a revised Cambodian MAP program in the amount of $325 million in anticipation of final drawdown authority. As previously shown in Section II of this chapter, the final appropriations bill for FY 74 authorized $125 million in new obligational authority (NOA) and a $200 million drawdown authority for Cambodia.[2]

(C) Even though the Cambodia MAP guideline for FY 74 had been increased to a more realistic $325 million, the mix of NOA and Section 506 presented problems. At the end of 1973, the program generated in response to the new authority was (in millions):

	NOA MAP	506 MAP	TOTALS
Investment (Equip & Tng)	34.7	21.7	56.4
O&M (Supplies and Services)	108.9	159.7	268.6
	143.6	181.4	325.0

As the figures show, $18.6 million more NOA than the $125 million authorized was needed.[3]

(S) On 27 December, the Chief, MEDTC provided a list of units and major items in FY 74 MAP shortfall:[4]

2 Military Region Logistics Bases
5 Ordnance Companies
15 Bailey Bridge Sets
2 Combat Engineer Battalions
12 Navy Craft (2 ASPBs, 10 Barges)
25 Vehicles
28 Aircraft (4 AC-47; 10 AU-24; 8 C-123; 6 UH-1H)

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1. J831 Point Paper, 25 Oct 73, Subj: Cambodia Military Assistance Program.
2. J8311 HistSums Nov and Dec 73; SECDEF 3104/261758Z Nov 73; SECDEF 4199/271950Z Nov 73; J812 Point Paper, 7 Feb 74, Subj: PACOM Security Assistance Program.
3. J8311 Point Paper, 3 Jan 74, Subj: FY 74 Cambodia MAP.
4. CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 4-14 Jan 74.

(C) Complicating the funding problem was the increased ammunition consumption, especially after U.S. combat support was withdrawn. The increase was the result of intensified combat activity by the FANK and higher weapons density. The proportion of ammunition costs to the overall ceiling had risen from 39 percent in FY 70-72 to 65 percent in FY 73 to a projected 78 percent for FY 74. Between March and December 1973, the average daily consumption had risen from 150 short tons to over 300 short tons. By January 1974, the rate had risen to 350 short tons daily and was expected to reach 400 short tons during the remainder of FY 74.[1]

MAP Equipment Programs

(S) Some actions taken to enhance the materiel position of the FANK were discussed briefly in the Logistics chapter of this history. These included the SCOOT plan, NIMBLE THRUST, NIMBLE VOYAGE, and PILLAR POST. The plan to support Cambodia out of Thailand (SCOOT) provided an ammunition pipeline from Thailand to Cambodia using combinations of land, sea and air LOC. The SCOOT plan was initiated by CINCPAC in 1972. Also pre-dating logistics enhancement projects in 1973 was the accelerated delivery of equipment initiated by the MEDTC in 1972. In November 1972, the Chief, MEDTC requested that items in the FY 71/72 MAP which were funded but undelivered be considered for accelerated delivery. CINCPAC concurred and the DSAA approved the request. The top priority items in this request were meant to provide sufficient equipment to establish the necessary combat units to balance the FANK force structure. Included were equipment for two FANK light infantry divisions, one cavalry troop and three artillery batteries, plus acceleration of various other major weapons, aircraft, naval craft and armament subsystems. On 25 January 1973, the DOD requested that the requirements for accelerated delivery be reviewed to verify those items still considered appropriate for accelerated delivery. The MEDTC responded with a revised priority list based on the fiscal constraints associated with CRA funding for FY 73. On 13 February, the DSAA authorized extraordinary supply actions and accelerated delivery of specified items, with delivery not later than 11 May 73.[2]

(S) Based on input from MEDTC and CINCPAC, the DSAA directed the execution, on 18 July, of Project NIMBLE THRUST. This logistics enhancement project had as its goal the provision of military articles and services to the FANK by 15 August in order to place the FANK in the best possible posture to continue military operations after that date. First quarter FY 74 CRA funding was estab-

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1. J831 HistSum Dec 73; J831 Point Paper, 3 Jan 74, Subj: Cambodia MAP Ammunition Funds.
2. J832 HistSums Jan and Feb 73; SECDEF 7514/250016Z Jan 73; CHMEDTC 0913/311100Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 060105Z Feb 73; SECDEF 8426/132108Z Feb 73.

lished at $43 million; withdrawal or diversion from U.S. reserve or active military resources was authorized; and premium transportation was authorized when necessary to meet the deadline. NIMBLE THRUST provided for the accelerated delivery of the following:[1]

Armd Cav Trp (21 APC, 3 Mort Carr)	1
2½ T "Gun Truck"	20
Radios	35
Rome Plow (Dozer w/kit)	6
Mortars (60mm/81mm)	165
105mm Howitzer	36
Truck Tractor	4
Trailers	16
Forklift Trucks	12
Armored Troop Carrier (modified LCM)	1
Monitor (LCM w/105mm How)	1
T-28D Acft	15
C-123 Acft	3
UH-1H Helicopters	4

(S) On 24 July, the DSAA added six tractors, three C-123s and 15 T-28Ds to the list. On 27 July, four UH-1H helicopter gunships (with XM-93) and one 1,800 cubic foot refrigerator were added, and, on 31 July, the DSAA approved CINCPAC's request to add four 155mm howitzers.[2]

(S) On 24 August, the Chairman, JCS advised the military agencies involved in NIMBLE THRUST that the project was virtually complete, and commended all concerned for exemplary performance.[3]

(S) Project NIMBLE VOYAGE was a so-called "dry season package" of equipment authorized for accelerated delivery by the DOD on 30 October. The in-country required delivery date (RDD) was 15 December 1973. Premium transportation was approved, if necessary, to transport 1,700 short tons of cargo from the CONUS and approximately 1,050 short tons originating in the PACOM. On 8 November, the MEDTC requested and CINCPAC approved the addition of seven UH-1H gunships, not originally part of the dry season package, to NIMBLE VOYAGE. By 1 January 1974, 99 percent of the dry season package had been delivered; however, the one

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1. J831 HistSum Jul 73; SECDEF 8246/182137Z Jul 73.
2. J831 HistSum Jul 73; SECDEF 3885/241552Z Jul 73; SECDEF 7521/272333Z Jul 73; SECDEF 1315/312301Z Jul 73, which cited CINCPAC 280510Z Jul 73.
3. J8312 HistSum Aug 73; JCS 2621/242251Z Aug 73.

percent included major items such as the helicopters and six of eight water craft.[1]

Tanks for Cambodia

(S) The original guidelines for FY 74 Cambodia MAP had excluded the programming of tanks or heavy artillery in out-year programs. As with other constraints, this stipulation was challenged after 15 August. In late November 1973, CINCPAC supported the introduction of two light tank companies to the FANK force structure. The Chief, MEDTC had originally asked for M-41 tanks, none of which were available in the U.S. inventory. On 14 December, the MEDTC advised CINCPAC that the M-24, some of which were already possessed by the FANK, would be an acceptable substitute. The two companies of light tanks would, when operating with the anti-personnel carriers of the FANK, provide the combat power and shock action of the tank/mechanized infantry combat arms team. This combination had been highly effective in land LOC operations. CINCPAC supported the MEDTC request; however, on 2 January 1974, the DOD recalled that tanks had not been part of the recommended MAP-supported FANK force structure and asked CINCPAC for stronger justification for an out-of-cycle JSOP change. At the end of 1973, this issue had not been resolved.[2]

Congressional Reviews and GAO Audits

(S) Periodic visits by Congressional delegations and personnel of the General Accounting Office (GAO) to the PACOM continued in 1973. The purpose of these visits was to inform the Congress regarding various aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the Pacific and the manner in which Congressionally approved MAP and economic assistance funds were being used. One such visit to Cambodia was by Senator Daniel Inouye, chairman of the Government Operations sub-committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. On 16 January 1973, Inouye and other members of his sub-committee arrived in Cambodia, where they spent 21 hours. During this time, they interviewed most of the Cambodian leadership and members of the U.S. Mission. Questions were raised about the political situation, the scope of the Mission and U.S. activity, economic programs, payroll padding by the FANK, and MAP administration/accountability procedures. The Congressional delegation seemed surprised by the small size of the U.S. Mission, and particu-

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1. J46 HistSums Nov and Dec 73; J47 HistSums Nov and Dec 73; J8321 HistSum Nov 73; CHMEDTC 12220/081232Z Nov 73, which cited SECDEF 2469/302117Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 090403Z Nov 73; also see Logistics chapter, this history.
2. J8312 HistSum Dec 73; CINCPAC 280058Z Nov 73 (EX); CHMEDTC 13958/141135Z Dec 73; CHMEDTC 0114/031447Z Jan 74, which cited CHMEDTC 14398/270601Z Dec 73 (EX); CINCPAC 280320Z Dec 73 (EX), and SECDEF 021640Z Jan 74 (EX).

larly by the 74-man MEDTC. They probed for possible violations of the Cooper-Church injunction against military advisors; and appeared satisfied (if again surprised) that there were none. The main substantive issue raised by the delegation concerned the matter of payroll padding. However, the Embassy was requested to submit detailed papers on eight separate aspects of U.S. involvement in Cambodia.[1]

(S) On 16 May, the State Department forwarded the conclusions and recommendations concerning the Khmer Republic in the Inouye committee report. The report charged that Khmer military programs were stigmatized by widespread corruption, again alluding to the padding of payrolls. A re-ordering of U.S. priorities in Cambodia was recommended by the committee. Assistance in support of troop pay should be reduced and refugee assistance increased. The report stated that U.S. military support for and involvement in the Khmer Republic was too high, and that a large standing army and high military expenditures would not solve Cambodia's security problems. The sub-committee directed that the U.S. Mission in Cambodia, "...take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that United States assistance to the Khmer Republic is properly managed and accounted for." The GAO was directed to monitor the corrective measures taken and to report on the effectiveness of such measures by 12 June 1973.[2]

(S) The Inouye report and subsequent visits to Cambodia by the GAO prompted a spate of messages from MEDTC and the Embassy to CINCPAC and the State Department. The MEDTC, Defense Attache Office (DAO) Saigon and the Embassy in Phnom Penh all addressed the allegation that the Vietnam Army had sold U.S. military equipment to the FANK. The thrust of the replies was that this charge was more than one year old, and that corrective measures had been applied.[3]

(C) The Embassy also addressed measures to improve accountability of materiel and equipment deliveries to Cambodia; the workload in FANK military hospitals; the procedures regarding title transfer of ammunition supplied under the SCOOT plan; and the need for computer assistance for the MEDTC in order to assimilate the statistics derived from the FANK equipment reporting system.[4]

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1. AMEMB Phnom Penh 0547/191210Z Jan 73.
2. J832 HistSum May 73; CHMEDTC 4787/170505Z May 73, which transmitted SECSTATE 093030/160107Z May 73.
3. CHMEDTC 4909/200524Z May 73; USDAO Saigon 270605Z May 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 5454/030935Z Jun 73; CHMEDTC 6478/281246Z Jun 73.
4. AMEMB Phnom Penh 5453/030935Z Jun 73; 5458/031146Z Jun 73; 5459/031147Z Jun 73; CHMEDTC 9629/111049Z Sep 73.

(U) Apparently no amount of effort by the U.S. Mission and the MEDTC to respond to Congress and the GAO could alter the resistance to the MAP concept. On 16 October 1973, the GAO released a report in Washington which was highly critical of U.S. assistance to Cambodia. It was true that the MEDTC, in order to oversee the utilization and maintenance of U.S. equipment supplied to Cambodia (and to avoid Congressional criticism), went into the field to discharge this duty. The GAO report, however, charged that the MEDTC functioned as a military advisory group, a function banned by the Cooper-Church amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The GAO charged that its investigation was hindered by State and Defense officials, and made the following charges:[1]

- Concealment of costs for 300 GIs who trained Cambodian soldiers in Vietnam and for "excess" equipment turned over to Cambodia.

- Continued existence of large numbers of "phantom" soldiers on Cambodian military payrolls.

- Diversion of weapons by Gen. Lon Non, brother of Chief of State Lon Nol, from a legitimate military unit to his personal bodyguard.

- Aid requests for funds in excess of what the military team allegedly knew Cambodia could absorb.

(S) Meanwhile, the FANK had initiated a new payroll system in response to pressure from the Embassy and the MEDTC. In February 1973, a test of the new procedures was made in one Cambodian military region. All responsibility for payroll preparation was withdrawn from field units. The previous system had provided payroll funds to unit commanders for computation and payment of their own personnel. By May 1973, all FANK units except the Central Administrative Center (CAC) were being paid under the new, centralized system. The CAC was a holding unit formed for the specific purpose of accounting for and administering to special categories of personnel such as invalids, wounded and missing personnel returned to duty, underage personnel and reassignees. Personnel who could not be accounted for by their unit commanders or were not fit for duty were assigned to the CAC. In June, the MEDTC informed CINCPAC that progress was being made in sorting out these personnel and in regularizing their assignments to FANK units or eliminating them from the rolls. On 5 September, the Embassy reported that the centralized (regional) pay system was Phase I of a planned five-phase pay modernization plan. Phases two through five were the

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1. News Article, Honolulu Advertiser, 17 Oct 73, Wash (UPI), "GAO Raps 'Advisers': Military Violations Charged."

issuance of individual soldier pay cards; the establishment of regionalized individualized soldier pay files; limited mechanization of the pay system; and, based on the first four, improved accountability of FANK dependents.[1]

[redacted]

MAP/FMS Funds

(S) The originally requested level of FY 73 grant aid for the [redacted] in the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) was $7.1 million. The estimated eventually funded FY 73 MAP under year-long CRA was only $2.65 million. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit level was about $45.2 million. In January 1973, the DSAA informed CINCPAC that, except for $.5 million for training, grant aid for the [redacted] would not be requested in the CPD for FY 74. The requested FMS credit level would be $65 million. The [redacted] would also remain eligible to purchase excess defense articles through FMS credits at costs reduced from the acquisition value. Total FMS cash and credits for the three preceding fiscal years had been $84.2 million ($41 million credit) for FY 71; $81 million ($46 million credit) for FY 72; and $84.9 million ($45.2 million credit) for FY 73. The CPD for FY 74 had proposed the following items to be eligible for the $65 million FMS credit:[2]

F-5B/E Sales and Assembly Program	$22.5M
UH-1H Helo and T53 Engine Assembly	10.7M
Mod. AIM 9B/E Missiles	3.0M
Nike and Hawk Depot Maint	3.0M
Navy Ship Mod.	4.0M
PG Boat Assembly	5.0M
Vehicle Mod. Assembly	6.0M
Misc. Ordnance and Ammunition	4.5M
Communications-Electronics	3.3M
Misc. Production Equip.	3.0M
Total	$65.0M

Co-production/Assembly Programs

(S) The [redacted] and [redacted] programs conducted in PACOM MAP countries had probably shown the most progress on [redacted] of any Asian nation.

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1. J83 HistSums Mar, Jun, Sep 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 2919/291140Z Mar 73; CHMEDTC 5997/180128Z Jun 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 9327/050325Z Sep 73.
2. J815 HistSum Jan 73; SECDEF 5600/052339Z Jan 73; J811 Point Paper, 7 Jan 74, Subj: MAP in PACOM; J812 Point Paper, 7 Feb 74, Subj: PACOM Security Assistance Program; J825 Fact Sheet, 7 Jan 74, Subj: FMS to [redacted]



In 1971, the Chief, MAAG had proposed strong U.S. backing for a [redacted] proposal to undertake co-production of equipment in support of other PACOM countries. This proposal was broached once again by the MAAG in 1973 on the grounds that [redacted] rebuild and production capability should be broadened in scope. An integrated, planned approach to other Asian nations could also contribute to a concept of regional cooperation in which differing views of necessary military posture could survive. In any case, by 1973, [redacted] projects underway or programmed on [redacted] with U.S. manufacturers included vehicles, patrol gunboats, helicopters and engines, [redacted] aircraft, [redacted] rifles and [redacted] machine guns.[1]

(C) Several of these programs--including vehicle and patrol gunboat (PG) --came under scrutiny in 1973 because of the funding uncertainties of CRA action. Both had been continued for FMS credit funding in the FY 73 and FY 74 programs. In February 1973, the Chief, MAAG noted that these programs had apparently been dropped from the FY 73 package. This was confirmed by the DSAA because they were under review in Washington, and substitutions had been made in order to negotiate a $30 million private bank loan. In April, the State Department approved continued vehicle co-production for FY 73, but reserved judgment for FY 74. Accordingly, the MAAG submitted a revised FY 73 FMS credit program for $30 million, including $1.16 million for vehicle co-production.[2]

(C) In August, the MAAG advised that the [redacted] was aware of a potential curtailment of FY 74 FMS credit, especially country allocations under FY 74 CRA. However, vehicle modernization kits used in the [redacted] program were scheduled for production phase-out in the CONUS, and the [redacted] desired to make advance purchases. The U.S. Mission supported the [redacted] request, and recommended approval of six million dollars FMS credit for FY 74 vehicle [redacted] In addition, the Mission proposed that the [redacted] be notified that FY 74 would be the final year for credit, with the balance of the program (FY 75 - FY 78) requiring cash procurement. The DSAA replied that a decision on the possible use of FY 74 FMS credit for continuation of vehicle [redacted] depended upon eventual Congressional action. Meanwhile, the MAAG was requested to submit priority lists of FY 74 credit requirements based on eight possible ceilings ranging from $31.1 million to $65 million.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, pp. 389-399; CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 417-419; [redacted] 220503Z Jun 73; J826 Point Paper, 21 Feb 74, Subj: U.S. Security Assistance and FMS to the [redacted]
2. J825 HistSums Feb, Apr 73; [redacted] 150906Z Feb 73; SECDEF 8958/ 222150Z Feb 73; [redacted] 190703Z Apr 73, which cited SECSTATE 063480/ 052302Z Apr 73.
3. J825 HistSum Aug 73; [redacted] 160902Z Aug 73; SECDEF 8655/221522Z Aug 73.

(C) In 1971, the [redacted] had expressed interest in a [redacted] program for the [redacted] ship, and, in 1972, the Ambassador in [redacted] had advised of coordinated Country Team support for the program. This approval was based on a 1971 study by the U.S. Naval Ship Systems Command which concluded that the [redacted] Navy had the capability to construct [redacted] boats under close supervision.[1]

(C) In April 1973, the Embassy transmitted the Country Team recommendation that the U.S. promptly approve an appropriate FMS cash/credit mix for [redacted] of five [redacted] ships. Ten more ships desired by the [redacted] would be on an FMS cash basis. The Embassy stated that the [redacted] had placed a very high priority on modernization of the [redacted] Navy defenses, and suggested that, if FMS credit could not be arranged without delay, the cash transaction should be approved as soon as possible. The State Department authorized the Embassy, in May 1973, to inform the [redacted] of FMS cash basis approval for the [redacted] boat project. The project was to be re-evaluated after first phase [redacted] of five boats before any commitment to proceed with the additional ten boats. The U.S. Navy was to provide technical advice and guidance to the [redacted] Navy, and was prepared to meet with [redacted] and U.S. contractor representatives.[2]

(C) By mid-June, [redacted] officials had arrived in [redacted] to discuss the program and contract terms. Industrial engineers of the [redacted] were scheduled to arrive in July, the [redacted] Navy planned final contract discussions at Tacoma, Washington in August, and contracts were to be signed in September. The [redacted] had proposed that one [redacted] be built at the Tacoma yards for on-the-job training. However, the contract had not been signed by the end of the year.[3]

(C) Another area of [redacted] in which the [redacted] had shown interest was in fighter aircraft--specifically the [redacted] In May 1972, the Chief, MAAG had received a request from the [redacted] Chief of General Staff for grant aid assistance to [redacted] Discussions with the manufacturer, [redacted] resulted in a [redacted] recommendation against a full [redacted] effort. Instead, direct procurement or [redacted] was suggested. The chief obstacle to either [redacted] or procurement, according to the MAAG, was the [redacted] reluctance to use FMS credits vice MAP grant aid. The original [redacted] program for [redacted] as stated in the Program Objectives Memorandum for FY 74-78, had proposed [redacted] aircraft under MAP grant aid, and [redacted] for [redacted] purchase through FMS credit. Funds for [redacted] grant aid in FY 74-75 were deleted in September 1972.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 417-418.
2. J825 HistSums Apr and May 73; AMEMB [redacted] 2351/200858Z Apr 73; SECSTATE 099776/241424Z May 73.
3. J825 HistSum Jun 73; CHMAAG [redacted] 290705Z Jun 73.

The same month, the [redacted] signed a $50,000 contract with [redacted] for a [redacted] survey. In December 1972, the [redacted] agreed to deposit $5 million credit with the [redacted] company to insure procurement of long lead time materials. The Country Team had recommended that $5 million be approved per the [redacted] request, regardless of the method of acquisition; i.e., direct procurement, [redacted] or [redacted].[1]

(C) On 9 February 1973, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between the U.S. Government and the [redacted] for procurement of [redacted] aircraft and [redacted] of [redacted]. The MOU was signed by [redacted] for the [redacted] and [redacted] for the U.S. On 15 June 1973, the Chief, MAAG advised the DOD that the funds deposited with the [redacted] of New York by the [redacted] had been spent by [redacted] which had requested the [redacted] to deposit an additional $10 million. The [redacted] did not seem hesitant about signing another agreement with [redacted] but was uncertain as to the source of the $10 million. This uncertainty had its origin in previous U.S. Government commitments to repay the [redacted] for aircraft sent to Vietnam in the [redacted] program prior to the cease-fire agreement. The co-production MOU had stipulated that the balance of the [redacted] commitment of $45.9 million would be due in FY 74. This amount ($28.3 million) was sorely needed in the FY 74 FMS credit program for the [redacted]. The Ambassador advised the State Department that radical cutbacks in funding would impact most severely on the [redacted] program. If the United States were to cancel its portion of the [redacted] program, "...it would produce shock and consternation in the [redacted] compounding feelings of anxiety caused by the drawdown of U.S. forces [redacted]. Support was not only set forth in the February 1973 MOU, but also in the Aide Memoire of 8 November 1972 regarding [redacted]. Funding for [redacted] was included in the programmed $65 million FMS credit for FY 75, but the problem had not been solved at the end of the year.[2]

(C) On 26 November 1973, the Secretary of State notified the Embassy in [redacted] that support for [redacted] of [redacted] helicopters and [redacted] engines would cease after FY 74. The Embassy was instructed to notify the ROC so that necessary budgetary adjustments could be made if the programs were to continue.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 418-419.
2. J825 HistSum Feb 73; CHMAAG [redacted] 090908Z Feb 73; CHMAAG [redacted] 150705Z Jun 73; AMEMB [redacted] 6288/150956Z Oct 73; for sources of [redacted] aircraft, see CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 277-278.
3. SECSTATE 231476/261716Z Nov 73.

Submarines for the [redacted]

(S) In past years, the [redacted] had expressed intense interest in the acquisition of submarines for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and defense. This interest had initially received a cool reception from U.S. military agencies, but, by October 1971, State and Defense had jointly agreed to provide submarines. No announcement of this decision was to be made until after [redacted] It had also been agreed that submarine crew training for [redacted] crews would begin in March 1972. The entire subject was to receive very low key treatment.[1]

(S) The beginning of [redacted] crew training received considerable press notice, along with speculation regarding the effect on [redacted] relations. After considerable soul-searching at high levels of U.S. Government, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) advised, on 4 December 1972, that the transfer of [redacted] submarines to the [redacted] had been approved. The [redacted] and the [redacted] were available for FMS on an as is-where is basis in April and October 1973, respectively. The sale price for each was $153,000, subject to [redacted] agreement that the submarines would be used for ASW training exclusively. The Chief, MAAG notified all concerned that the [redacted] Navy had accepted the offer on 8 December 1972.[2]

(U) The [redacted] was de-commissioned and transferred to the [redacted] in [redacted] At the time the [redacted] was de-commissioned and transferred, the [redacted] was still on the West Coast undergoing maintenance. The [redacted] arrived in [redacted] waters on [redacted] as the first [redacted] owned submarine to be placed in service.[3]

[redacted] Tanks for the [redacted]

(S) As early as 1970, the [redacted] had expressed interest in obtaining [redacted] tanks through the EDA program to replace obsolete older tanks. In late 1972, the DOD had tentatively agreed to supply [redacted] as a pilot project. In February 1973, the DSAA informed the Chief, MAAG that [redacted] tanks were not available for transfer to the [redacted] Even if they were, stated the DSAA, the cost would be $64,000, compared to $5,300 for an [redacted] The DSAA information was evidently erroneous, for, on 1 August 1973, the Department of the Army

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, p. 401.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 421-423.
3. J825 HistSum Jul 73; CNO 131945Z Jul 73; CNO 172230Z Oct 73; J826 HistSum Dec 73; COMUSTDC 070135Z Dec 73.

announced the FMS cash sale to the [redacted] tanks at a cost of $41,970, or a total cost of $2.5 million.[1]

(C) In November, the Chief, MAAG suggested that the [redacted] would demonstrate excellent capability to maintain and operate the [redacted] tank, and that this pilot project would be highly successful. Therefore, and in order to begin planning for the next step in updating the [redacted] tank inventory, the Army Materiel Command in Washington was requested to quote the price and availability for 100 more tanks.[2]

Sale of Ammunition

(S) In August 1973, the Chief, MAAG advised DOD of an oral request from the [redacted] for U.S. Government consent to a sale of ammunition by the [redacted] to the Philippines. The Republic of the Philippines (ROP) had requested such a sale on an urgent basis to support the campaign against the Muslim uprising in the Southern Philippines. Approval for the sale was required by the U.S. Government, in accordance with the Military Assistance Agreement between the U.S. and the [redacted] because the ammunition was designed by the United States and produced on MAP-furnished production equipment with a technical data package provided by the United States. The MAAG recommended and CINCPAC agreed that permission for the sale should be granted. The DOD approved the sale on 13 September with the caveat that payment of royalties by the [redacted] to the U.S. Government be made in advance of shipment.[3]

(C) In December, the Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (CHJUSMAG), Philippines notified the MAAG in [redacted] that the ROP intended to purchase additional ammunition from the [redacted] Once again, the Chief, MAAG and CINCPAC recommended DOD approval; the DOD approved a one-time sale of 35,000 rounds of [redacted] ammunition, also subject to the payment of royalties. As of 31 December 1973, royalty payments had not been made for either of the approved sales.[4]

MAP Support for [redacted] Army Reserve

(S) In October 1972, the Chief, MAAG proposed that the [redacted] Army reserve divisions be certified eligible for limited MAP support. To encourage the [redacted]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 419, 420; J825 HistSum Feb 73; SECDEF 4709/092043Z Feb 73; J825 HistSum Aug 73; Hq USAMC letter of 1 Aug 73, Subj: Approved Foreign Military Sales Case DA [redacted]
2. J826 HistSum Nov 73; CHMAAG [redacted] 290911Z Nov 73.
3. J826 HistSum Sep 73; CHMAAG [redacted] 240913Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 052204Z Sep 73; SECDEF 7058/132038Z Sep 73.
4. J826 HistSum Dec 73; CHJUSMAG Phil 070904Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 200418Z Dec 73; CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 4-14 Jan 74.

INDONESIA

(as of 1 Aug 73)

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	736,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	128 Mil
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.5 + 3.0%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.5 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	60%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	47.5 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1973 (E)	$14.87 Bil
PER CAPITA	$109
DEFENSE BUDGET 1973	$437 Mil
AS % OF GNP	3.2%

PRESIDENT - GEN Suharto
MINISTER OF DEFENSE/AND SECURITY - GEN Panggabean
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Adam Malik
NAVY CDR - VADM Subono
AF CDR - CHIEF AIR MARSHALL Saleh Besarah
COMMANDANT MARCORPS - GEN Anwar
ARMY CDR - LTGEN Surono
AF CINC - GEN Panggabean
AF VICE CINC - GEN Sumitro



OVERALL OBJECTIVE

CONTINUED AVAILABILITY TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES OF SEA AND AIR ROUTES BETWEEN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN AREAS.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S.AMBASSADOR
HON. FRANCIS J. GALBRAITH
USAID REPRESENTATIVE
MR. RICHARD M. CASKIN
CHUSDLG
COL JOHN J. McCUEN, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

1. Provide tangible evidence of U.S. support of the Suharto Government.
2. Contribute to maintenance of friendly Government of Indonesia (GOI) relations with the U.S. and Indonesia's Free World Neighbors.
3. Provide support for the development of an effective military establishment capable of maintaining internal security and self-defense, and acting as a stabilizing element in the Indonesian society, but without reviving fears among its neighbors or generating domestic political tensions.

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES*

ARMY	11 INF BDE (33 BNS), 2 ABN BDE (6 BNS), 1 PARA/CMDO REGT, 2 CAV BDE, 1 FA REGT, 1 ADA REGT, 20 INF BN (SEP), 2 ABN BN (SEP), 8 FA BN (SEP), 1 ADA BN (SEP), 10 ENG BN (CMBT) 5 ENG BN (CONST), 1 AVN UNIT.
NAVY	5 DE, 2 PCE, 13 PC, 6 PTH, 1 PT, 5 PTF, 11 PT, 6 MSC, 4 MSF, 10 LST, 8 AKL, 4 OILERS, 1 AO, 1 AT, 2 AS, 5 AUX, 2 AP, 1 A/C UTIL SQDN, 1 HELO SQDN, 4 MAR INF BN, 1 ART BN, 1 ENG BN.
AIR FORCE	1 FIS, 3 TFS, 3 LT TRANS SQDN, 1 MED TRANS SQDN, 1 SAR SQDN, 1 HELO SQDN.

(AS OF 10 APR 73)

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES*

ARMY	15 Inf Bde, 2 AB Bde, 1 Para Com Regt, 1 Cav Bde, 6 FA Regt, 4 AAA Regt, 41 Inf Bn (SEP, 6 Cav Bn(SEP), 5 FA Bn, 7 CET Eng Bn, 3 AEN Inf Bn, 1 AAA Bn(SEP), 3 Sig Bn, 1 Air Def Radar Bn, 2 QM Bn, 6 Trans Bn, 2 MP Bn, LAVN Total Strength 225,000
NAVY	5 DE, 2 SS, 10 PC, 11 MSC, 9 LST, 13 Auxiliary, 7 Service, 1 Helo Sqdn, 1 Trans Sqdn, 2 Bdes Total Strength 27,000 (Navy) 16,000(Marine)
AIR FORCE	8 C-130, 10, C-47, 5-F-5I, 2 B-26, 20 Misc Helicopters, 16 F-86 22 Misc Jt, Med VIP/Cargo Trans, and various Russian acft i.e., MIG 17, MIG 21, TU-16, helicopters, IL-14 and Misc helicopters, many of which are non-operational. Total strength: 30,400

COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL MINOR INCURSIONS BUT NOT A MAJOR ATTACK. LIMITED OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY. OVERALL READINESS RETARDED BY LONG LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS.
NAVY	PARTIALLY SUPPRESS SMUGGLING AND PROVIDE LIMITED SUPPORT FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. CONDUCT ONLY TOKEN SUBMARINE INTERDICTION AND ASW OPERATIONS. INDONESIA MARINES ARE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING REGIMENTAL SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS.
AIR FORCE	FORCES IN BEING ARE MARGINALLY READY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE BOMBING OPERATIONS AND VFR AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND TO SUPPORT MINOR GROUND OPERATIONS. A MAJORITY OF THE RUSSIAN PROVIDED AIRCRAFT ARE INOPERABLE DUE TO THE LACK OF SPARE PARTS.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 133.

to reduce the size of the active Army force, MAAG [redacted] also proposed that units converted to reserve status continue to be authorized the same equipment levels as when active. As newer and more modern equipment was acquired by the active units, the World War II vintage equipment could be used to bring the reserve units up to equipment strength. CINCPAC had agreed with the long-term JSOP goal to reduce [redacted] active ground units in favor of improved air and naval defense. On 5 December 1972, the DOD authorized the transfer of excess vintage MAP materiel to the [redacted] reserve units.[1]

(C) On 3 February 1973, CINCPAC requested approval for the retention of MAP-supplied equipment by reserve units of all [redacted] armed forces. The DOD approved the request on 10 April. CINCPAC was granted authority to authorize such equipping levels as deemed to be realistic and justifiable. CINCPAC requested the Chief, MAAG to submit a draft MOU for MAP support of the [redacted] reserves, and, on 6 June 1973, the DOD approved the MOU.[2]

Indonesia

(U) The Security Assistance Program for Indonesia was administered by the U.S. Defense Liaison Group (USDLG) under the command of CINCPAC. The Chief, USDLG was an Army colonel through 1973. In December 1972, CINCPAC had recommended that the Chief position be upgraded from Army colonel to Army brigadier general. This recommendation was based upon previous Ambassadorial concurrence expressed in April and June 1972. This concurrence in the logic of upgrading the position was again expressed in December 1972, but with the caveat that implementation should be delayed pending consultation among the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Mission in Jakarta. When the JCS approved the upgrade in May 1973, the Ambassador expressed concern that the change appeared to be imminent. CINCPAC assured the Ambassador that the administrative approval for upgrade on the manning document did not imply immediate action, and that no action would be taken without prior consultation.[3]

MAP Funds

(S) A modest MAP program had begun in Indonesia in 1951 and continued through 1964, when the expanding gap in Indonesian-United States political relations caused its demise. When the incumbent president, General Suharto, came

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 423, 424.
2. J825 HistSums Apr and Jun 73; SECDEF 5862/101824Z Apr 73, which cited CINCPAC 032259Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 200455Z Apr 73; SECDEF 1877/061718Z Jun 73.
3. CHUSDLG 180946Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 180146Z May 73; CINCPAC ALPHA 113/250236Z May 73, which cited JCS 9636/032233Z May 73 and AMEMB Jakarta 6063/220520Z May 73.

into power in 1965, Indonesia began a normalization of international relations. Subsequently, U.S. MAP was resumed by presidential directive in 1966. Initial dollar guidelines were in the vicinity of $3-5 million. As a result of the Washington Inter-Agency Study Group report (Flanagan Report), Indonesian MAP was established at $15 million for FY 71, and later increased to $18 million. The thrust of the report triggered decisions at the highest levels which culminated in a redirection of Indonesia MAP policy. The USDLG was selected as the prototype security assistance agency to test the Nixon Doctrine; i.e., joint MAP planning with the Government of Indonesia (GOI) began with planning for FY 72. A MAP ceiling of $25 million was established for FY 72 and out years.[1]

(S) The "Indonesian Experiment", as it was called in DOD circles, was not destined for clear sailing. When MAP levels were reduced by Congress for FY 72, the Indonesian ceiling was reduced from $25 million to $18 million. A programmed retrenchment level of $30 million for FY 73 was reduced to the CRA level of $18 million, and the FY 74 ceiling for CRA funding and the final appropriations bill was also $18 million.[2]

Effect of Funding Constraints

(S) During a vice-presidential visit to Indonesia on 6-7 February 1973, the Minister for Defense and Security made a long speech to the Vice President. He outlined Indonesia's positions on threats to security, regional cooperation, the Vietnam cease-fire, Armed Forces strategy and objectives and the MAP. In addition to deploring MAP reductions and slow deliveries, the speech contained four new requests:[3]

- Additional destroyers and patrol boats.
- Additional vehicles for the National Police.
- An early warning system for sea defense/surveillance.
- A rifle factory for M-16s or AR-18s.

(S) When the FY 73 MAP was reduced from $30 million to $18 million, the Ambassador expressed great distaste for the chore of officially informing the GOI that the new level was irreversible. On 13 March 1973, he requested the State Department to consider several means by which the blow could be softened. These included more excess defense articles, the initiation of FMS credit, additional destroyer escorts, more National Police vehicles, an early warning

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 424-427.
2. J823 Point Paper, 27 Mar 73, Subj: MAP Funding Levels; also see preceding Section II for country ceilings.
3. J823 Point Paper, 27 Mar 73, Subj: Vice President Agnew's Trip to Indonesia.

system for sea defense and financial assistance for a small arms manufacturing facility. The last four of these, of course, were identical to the requests made of Vice President Agnew. CINCPAC concurred with the need to exhibit a willingness to explore, with the Indonesians, means to soften the impact of the reduction. He supported more EDA, but with high visibility and appropriate publicity; some FMS credit for FY 74; additional destroyer escorts at reduced prices; and, additional police vehicles. CINCPAC recommended that the early warning system and the small arms facility be reserved for a possible joint study proposal.[1]

(S) The State Department replied to the Ambassador on 26 March. The Ambassador was asked to officially inform the GOI of the MAP level, pointing out that such countries as Cambodia, Thailand, ROC and Korea had also received reductions on the order of 35 percent. State also noted that EDA requests from the GOI were already accorded the highest priority, and more specific details were therefore in order. The initiation of FMS credits was strongly opposed, and no naval craft were available except steam-driven vessels. State concurred in the provision of more police vehicles, and advised the Embassy that the U.S. Navy was prepared to send, at Navy expense, a small technical team headed by a flag officer to conduct a survey of the proposed sea defense early warning system. The establishment of a small arms manufacturing facility was already being negotiated on a commercial basis. On 28 March, the Ambassador requested permission to be, "...somewhat more forthcoming..." regarding the possible availability of diesel-powered destroyer escorts during his approaching meeting with the GOI defense minister. State replied that none was available, and that the availability of steam-powered craft of recent vintage in the near future was unlikely.[2]

(S) The reluctance of the Ambassador to enter the lion's den was apparently assuaged somewhat by the arrival in Indonesia of CINCPAC, Admiral Gayler, on 4 April. The Ambassador reported to the State Department that he had taken the occasion, during his call on the Defense Minister with Admiral Gayler, to broach all of the foregoing subjects. He reported that the Defense Minister seemed genuinely appreciative of U.S. efforts to make up the MAP shortfall, and appeared to concentrate on the positive rather than the negative aspects.[3]

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1. J823 HistSum Mar 73; AMEMB Jakarta 3017/130630Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 210351Z Mar 73.
2. J823 HistSum Mar 73; SECSTATE 055366/1/262202Z Mar 73; AMEMB Jakarta 3711/281032Z Mar 73; SECSTATE 058437/292313Z Mar 73; J823 Point Paper, 27 Mar 73, Subj: Ambassador's Request for Additional Aid.
3. AMEMB Jakarta 4032/050156Z Apr 73.

(S) By year's end, the position of Indonesia as a source of crude oil bade fair to introduce another influence on U.S.-Indonesian relations. Increased oil revenues, and the resultant increased prosperity, had the potential to reduce Congressional and/or public sympathy for continuation of the grant aid program.[1]

Indonesian Armed Forces Abbreviations

(U) Early in 1973, the formerly used abbreviations and acronyms used by the armed forces were changed. To facilitate research in various increments of the CINCPAC Command History, some commonly used service designations follow:[2]

Department of Defense	HANKAM
Indonesian Army	TNIAD (formerly ADRI)
Indonesian Navy	TNIAL (formerly ALRI)
Indonesian Air Force	TNIAU (formerly AURI)
Indonesian Marines	KKO
Regional Unified Command	KOWILHAN
Army Regional Command	KODAM
Air Force Logistics Command	KOLOG
Tactical Air Command	KOOPS

Project PEACE MODERN

(C) PEACE MODERN was a program for the TNIAU to receive 16 T-33 jet trainer aircraft. The T-33s were to be located on the same base (Iswahyudi) as an F-86 Sabrejet squadron to be provided by Australia. The United States was to provide a runway barrier and flight simulators, while Australia was to provide tower facilities, navigational aids and technical advice on runway resurfacing. All 16 of the T-33s had been delivered by 30 June 1973. Instructor flying training was completed on 21 July and the mobile training and technical assistance teams departed Indonesia on 25 July.[3]

Project PEACE PONY

(U) A two-phased project to provide the TNIAU with a close air support capability through MAP support was approved by the DOD in December 1970. Phase

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1. J823 Point Paper, 22 Feb 74, Subj: Indonesia MAP.
2. J823 Point Paper, 27 Mar 73, Subj: Indonesian Armed Forces Abbreviations.
3. J823 HistSum Dec 73; 13AF 300408Z Jun 73; Ltr, CHUSDLG to Ambassador Galbraith, 3 Aug 73, Subj: Monthly Program Report Indonesia MAP, with 1 encl, USDLG Monthly Progress Report; J823 Point Paper, 29 Mar 73, Subj: Indonesia Air Force (TNIAU) Map.

I was to rehabilitate seven in-country F-51 aircraft. Phase II, to be funded by FY 72 or later MAP, was to upgrade the initial seven, plus five more F-51s, to the Mustang II configuration. One new TF-51 was also in the package. The first phase of PEACE PONY was completed in September 1971.[1]

(U) The six F-51s of the Phase II program were delivered and assembled by the end of 1973. The U.S. teams for training in assembly and maintenance departed Indonesia in November 1973.[2]

Project PEACE ROTOR

(U) In April 1972, the deletion of programmed UH-1H helicopters from the FY 72 MAP caused the HANKAM and TNIAU to express deep concern and disappointment. The Indonesian military had planned to use the helicopters during counterinsurgency operations later in 1972. As an alternative, the modification of excess H-34Ds to a twin jet pack configuration was suggested. The U.S. Air Force indicated that H-34s were available, and it was decided that 12 excess H-34s would be modified by Air America at Udorn, Thailand. The project was designated PEACE ROTOR, with an initial goal of four deliveries to Indonesia by October 1972. This goal was met.[3]

(U) On 22 January 1973, the USDLG acknowledged receipt of four more H-34s, and in April the USDLG was advised that the balance would be delivered upon request. In August, the Chief, USDLG advised CINCPAC that training assistance past the scheduled 16 November termination date would be necessary. The pressing need was for squadron level, middle management guidance from helicopter airframe specialists and reciprocating engine specialists.[4]

Project PEACE FIX

(U) In September 1971, the Chief, USDLG solicitated CINCPAC's support to develop an Inspect and Repair as Needed (IRAN) capability for TNIAU C-130 aircraft. Eight C-130s possessed by the TNIAU were in need of IRAN, last accomplished in 1968. CINCPAC concurred with the DLG proposal that IRAN of two C-130s be accomplished by the Lockheed Air Service, Singapore (LASS), with concurrent training of TNIAU maintenance technicians. The remaining six C-130s could then be processed in-country, using the on-the-job trained personnel as

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, p. 411.
2. J823 HistSum Dec 73; CHUSDLG 200146Z Nov 73.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 429, 430.
4. J823 HistSums Jan and Dec 73; CHUSDLG 221029Z Jan 73; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 021003Z Apr 73; CHUSDLG 300725Z Aug 73.

the nucleus of a formal IRAN facility. Supervision and technical assistance in-country would be provided by LASS personnel.[1]

(U) On 12 February 1973, the USDLG advised that a decision had been made to accomplish IRAN of the second aircraft in Indonesia rather than in Singapore. Completion of the first aircraft had been delayed from the originally scheduled date of 15 January to mid-April. Parts shortages and extensive corrosion had caused problems for LASS. Consequently, a conference at Warner-Robbins Air Materiel Area (WRAMA) was scheduled to discuss the program. During the 5 April conference, the conclusion was reached to revise the LASS contract to accomplish IRAN on the remaining C-130s at Bandung, Indonesia.[2]

(U) The IRAN on the first C-130 was completed by LASS and the aircraft returned to Indonesia on 7 June 1973. Effective 21 June 1973, a new contract was signed with LASS to provide in-country supervision, planning, training, technical assistance and continuous quality audit during the IRAN of seven C-130 aircraft at Bandung, Indonesia. By the end of 1973, work was progressing satisfactorily and the first aircraft was scheduled for completion in early 1974.[3]

C-130 Center Wing Modification

(U) In June 1973, the HANKAM and TNIAU decided to finance a center wing modification from MAP funds. WRAMA advised that, if an outer wing modification was also desired, both modifications should be done at the same time. Both were expected to cost about $377,000 per aircraft. In September, WRAMA advised that, in order to prevent a gap in the wing modification production line, a commitment must be received by 1 October. In response to CINCPAC query, WRAMA stated that the minimum amount necessary for input of the first aircraft was $340,000. The remaining total funding for eight aircraft was $2.676 million. On 20 September, the DSAA cited the severe FY 74 CRA funding constraints as grounds to suggest an FMS case to the GOI.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 428.
2. J823 HistSums Feb and Apr 73; CHUSDLG 120611Z Feb 73; CHUSDLG 280936Z Feb 73; CSAF 242021Z Apr 73.
3. J823 HistSum Dec 73; USNAVOFF OL DET 11 AFCMC Singapore 080050Z Jun 73; DIRMATMGT WRAMA 131245Z Sep 73; during 1973, the term IRAN was changed to Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM).
4. J823 HistSums Jun and Sep 1973; CHUSDLG 290956Z Jun 73; DIRMATMGT WRAMA 282051Z Jun 73; DIRMATMGT WRAMA 062035Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 080101Z Sep 73; SECDEF 3667/202025Z Sep 73.

(S) On 8 November, WRAMA requested an additional $890,000 by 12 November to keep the wing mod production line going. In response to strong representations by USDLG and CINCPAC, the DOD authorized FY 74 CRA funding for the additional $890,000. At year's end, input of the initial C-130 was scheduled for May-June 1974.[1]

MAP For Indonesian Navy (TNIAL)

(S) In early 1973, the MAP for TNIAL was focused on two major projects. Regardless of the lack of encouragement for future acquisition of destroyer and destroyer escorts (DEs) previously discussed, up to four DEs had been programmed for the TNIAL MAP. The U.S.-furnished DEs were destined to replace aging Russian and Italian vessels acquired in previous years. The other main objective of MAP for the TNIAL was the upgrade of the Surabaja shipyard. After a slow start in late 1972, caused by a purge of communist sympathizers and old people who were nevertheless skilled technicians, considerable progress was apparent in the first months of 1973. Some $800,000 had been allocated for FY 73 rehabilitation projects such as roads, utilities, etc., and about one million dollars was programmed for FY 74.[2]

(S) In addition to the F-86 aircraft provided by Australia, an agreement was reached in January 1973 for Australia to provide, under grant aid, two 100-foot attack class ships, six 51-foot patrol craft, and six Nomad patrol craft. The State Department, DOD, and the U.S. Country Team agreed that Australia should be allowed to retain their initiative in providing patrol craft.[3]

(U) In November 1972, CINCPACFLT had advised CINCPAC of the forthcoming de-commissioning of the USS JOHN R. PERRY (DE-1034). In December, the CNO announced that the transfer of a DE to Indonesia had been approved, and that the PERRY would be available on an as is-where is basis in February 1973. The sale price was $147,000. The USDLG made the formal offer of the PERRY, and, in January 1973, the GOI accepted the offer.[4]

(U) On 20 February, the PERRY was de-commissioned, transferred to the GOI, and commissioned by the GOI as the R.I. SAMADIKUN. As an exception to policy

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1. J824 HistSums Nov and Dec 73; AFLC 081907Z Nov 73; CHUSDLG 120100Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 150339Z Nov 73; SECDEF 4673/151609Z Nov 73.
2. J823 Point Paper, 29 Mar 73, Subj: Indonesian Navy (TNIAL) MAP.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 431; J823 HistSum Jan 73; CHUSDLG 160447Z Jan 73.

requested by the DLG and CINCPAC, the DOD approved the use of MAP funds for a post-transfer overhaul at Guam. The SAMADIKUN arrived in Indonesia in May 1973.[1]

(S) In September, as the result of President Nixon's letter to President Suharto, the U.S. Navy made three DEs available for sale to the GOI with the same sales arrangements as for the USS PERRY. The ships offered and proposed transfer dates were the USS CHARLES BERRY (DE-1035) on 31 January 1974; the USS CLAUD JONES (DE-1033) and the USS MC MORRIS (DE-1036) in December 1974. The GOI accepted the offer with enthusiasm, and, at the end of the year, preparations to transfer the USS CHARLES PERRY were underway.[2]

MAP For Indonesian Army (TNIAD)

(S) The MAP for the TNIAD was oriented toward the building up of the National Strategic Reserve Force. The force goals were two airborne brigades, one armored cavalry brigade and two separate battalions--one each on the islands of Kalimantan and Sumatra. Another high priority MAP project was the development of one regional maintenance facility at Bandung.[3]

(S) One of the obstacles to execution of MAP for the TNIAD had been the insistence by HANKAM that all MAP matters be conducted at that level, rather than at individual Service levels. Consequently, rapport between the USDLG and the Service chiefs had been difficult to establish.[4]

(S) Gradual softening of that attitude had allowed closer working relationships to develop between the DLG and the TNIAU and TNIAL; the TNIAD, however, had maintained a policy of independence from the HANKAM. In early 1973, this situation was altered when the Chief, USDLG met, for the first time in more than two years, with the TNIAD commander. By March 1973, the TNIAD was using the DLG as a channel to communicate with HANKAM officials.[5]

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1. J823 HistSum Feb 73; SECDEF 1119/070001Z Feb 73, which cited CHUSDLG Jakarta 180945Z Jan 73 and CINCPAC 272008Z Jan 73; J823 Point Paper, 29 Mar 73, Subj: Indonesian Navy (TNIAL) MAP.
2. J824 HistSums Sep and Dec 73; SECSTATE 188387/212002Z Sep 73; AMEMB Jakarta 11536/270945Z Sep 73; CINCPACFLT 202324Z Dec 73; CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 4-14 Jan 74.
3. J823 Point Paper, 27 Mar 73, Subj: Indonesian Army (TNIAD) MAP.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, p. 408.
5. J823 Point Paper, 27 Mar 73, Subj: Indonesian Army (TNIAD) MAP.

(S) As the result of a joint in-country review of the equipment and support for the armored cavalry brigade in June 1973, the Chief, USDLG requested CINCPAC to solicit information from CONUS services regarding armored cars. Specifically the TNIAD was interested in the V-100 and V-150 model armored cars manufactured by the Cadillac-Gage company. CINCPAC requested the Department of the Army to provide an interim reply regarding comparative capability, configuration, cost and lead times. The Army replied to the effect that the V-100 commando car was available through MAP procedures even though the vehicle was not a military standard type. On 1 August, the U.S. Army Tank Command enlarged upon the DA reply, citing cost, lead time, armor configuration, and other optional equipment for both models. On 12 December, a representative of the manufacturer presented a cost proposal to the TNIAD. Discussions centered on programming the V-150 model in funding increments, with ten percent in FY 74 and the remainder in further fiscal years. During a stop-over at CINCPAC headquarters on his return trip, the representative informed the Security Assistance staff that the proposal was for 56 V-150 vehicles at an estimated cost of $8 million. A decision by the TNIAD on quantity and weapon configuration was pending at the end of 1973.[1]

National Police MAP

(S) The Indonesian National Police operated as the paramilitary arm of the HANKAM, with almost 130,000 personnel assigned. In the politically charged post-coup environment, the loyalty of the National Police had not been verified, and MAP funding had been limited to almost nothing by the HANKAM. From funding of less than $100,000 in FY 72, the HANKAM increased the Police share of MAP to about $400,000 in FY 73. The vehicle rebuild capacity of the Police was considered to be good, but a lack of shop equipment limited the numbers of vehicles which could be rebuilt in a given time. The HANKAM objective was to merge the TNIAD and Police vehicle rebuild programs under a single manager by FY 76.[2]

(C) In December 1973, the Ambassador expressed concern regarding the prohibition against MAP funding of "public safety activities overseas" addressed previously in this chapter. He noted that there was no public safety program in Indonesia under MAP, and that the Country Team had resisted establishing one in the past. Also, the National Police were considered to be a military organization under the HANKAM, and as such, had been receiving limited MAP support. The Ambassador reviewed the success achieved by Police projects within MAP, and requested the State Department to rule favorably on continuation of such support. No reply had been received at the end of 1973.[3]

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1. J823 HistSums Jun and Dec 73; CHUSDLG 080634Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 132047Z Jun 73; DA 201502Z Jun 73; CDRUSATACOM 011700Z Aug 73; CHUSDLG 180106Z Dec 73.
2. J823 Point Paper, 27 Mar 73, Subj: National Police MAP.
3. AMEMB Jakarta 14950/211000Z Dec 73.

KOREA

(as of 1 Aug 73)

BASIC INFORMATION J8

AREA	38,000 SQ. MI.
POPULATION	32 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	c. 64%
ARABLE LAND PERCAP	0.17 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	90%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	47 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. (E) 1972	$9.183 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$284
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED(E) 1972	$367 MILLION
AS % OF GNP	4.0%

PRESIDENT - GEN Park, Chong Hee, ROKA (Ret) J2
PRIME MINISTER - Kim Chong-Pil
DEFENSE MINISTER - Yu, Chae-Hung
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Kim Yong-Sik
CHAIRMAN JCS - GEN Han Sin, ROKA
C/S ARMY - GEN No Chae Hyon, ROKA
CNO - ADM Kim Kyu Sop, ROKN
C/S AIR FORCE - Ock, Man Ho ROKAF
COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - Yi, Pyong Hun ROKMC

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES FY 77 J53

ARMY	15 INF DIV, 10 RES DIV, 2 ARMD BDE, 1 ABN BDE, 1 SF GRP, 30 CORPS/ARMY ARTY BNS, 34 ENGR BN (CMBT), 6 HELO CO, 1 PSYWAR BN.
NAVY	8 DD/DE, 4 PC, 3 SCE, 8 PGM, 8 PB, 35 PBF, 31 PTF, 18 MSC, 1 LSML, 16 MSF, 6 LST, 10 LSM, 12 LCU, 26 LCM, 2 ATA, 4 AOR, 8 AKL, 1 ARL, 1 MAU DIV, 1 ISLAND SEC UNIT, 1 HELO CO, 1 RES BLT
AIR FORCE	1 FIS, 12 TFS, 1 HELO SQDN, 2 TRANS SQDN, 1 OCEAN SURV SQDN, 2 TAC AIR SPT SQDN, 1 TAC RECCE SQDN.



OVERALL OBJECTIVE J8

PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AGAINST RENEWED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND MAINTAIN CINCUNC OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION PA1

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. PHILIP C. HABIB

U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. MICHAEL H. B. ADLER

COMUS KOREA
GEN RICHARD STILWELL

CHIEF, JUSMAG-K ..... MAJ GEN
HUBERT S. CUNNINGHAM, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

1. Assist ROK in maintaining modernization forces capable of deterring/defending against North Korean aggression with U.S. air and logistics support or, alternatively, with U.S. logistics support only, dependent upon U.S. G. decision.
2. Assist in maintaining ROK Forces capable of defending against NK/PRC agression with U.S. augmentation.
3. Assist in obtaining and maintaining necessary rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements for U.S. and allied Forces, and deny them to forces opposed to U.S. interests.
4. Protection of U.S. facilities.
5. Assist ROK in maintaining an effective counterinfiltration capability.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 134.

SECRET

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SECRET

Sec 1.3 (a) (1)

Korea

....In 1971 we began a modernization effort for Korea aimed at enhancing the deterrent of its own forces against aggression or pressures from the North. This effort, coupled with our earlier security assistance, has permitted increasing reliance on South Korea's capabilities. Thus, we have been able to withdraw some 20,000 U.S. troops, while South Korean soldiers have assumed responsibility for front-line defense across the entire peninsula....

But the job is not yet done. While Korea is far more capable of defending itself today than it was when the decade began, we have not yet reached the day when no U.S. Forces would be needed in a contingency.

* * * * *

Over time, the development of their resources will permit them to assume an increasing share of their own defense costs. We expect this to further reduce the requirements for our security assistance--particularly grant aid--in years ahead....[1]

FY 73/74 Funds

(S) As shown in Section II of this chapter, the FY 73 grant aid program for Korea was reduced from the originally presented figure of $211.7 million to final funding under CRA of about $118.9 million. The reduced incremental FY 73 ceilings raised the problem of O&M funding versus investment, supply, excess defense articles (EDA) and packing, crating, handling, transportation (PHC&T) levels. The dollar guidelines reduced the amounts to be allocated for O&M with each decrement in the overall ceiling. In January 1973, the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA) advised CINCPAC that the reduced O&M had deteriorated the readiness of the Republic of Korea Forces (ROKF) to an unacceptable level. His request for additional O&M money was refused and he was advised to consider the use of programmed investment money to supplement the O&M requirements. Subsequently, the CNO nominated $4.8 million in FY 72 and $6.6 million in FY 73 money funded for the Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft

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1. SECSTATE 092776/1/152312Z May 73, which quoted Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson in open testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 8 May 73 (UNCLASSIFIED).

(CPIC) program to resolve the ROK O&M problem. The JCS and DOD approved another $13.3 million in unfunded FY 73 CPIC money for O&M in FY 73.[1]

(S) For FY 74, the original dollar guideline for MAP had been $200 million. This was increased in the CPD to $241.2 million and the money was programmed to be spent thusly (in millions):[2]

	Operating	Investment	Training	Total
Army	23.0	95.4	.96	119.4
Navy	2.4	41.2	.10	43.7
Marine	1.0	5.6	.08	6.7
Air Force	10.8	59.4	1.30	71.6
	37.2	201.6	2.44	241.2

The FMS credit of $25 million and EDA valued at $43 million raised the total program proposed by the Administration to $309.2 million. As shown in Section II, the $241.2 grant aid figure was reduced in the FY 74 appropriations bill to $112.3 million.[3]

(S) By the end of 1973, the future of the ROK five year modernization plan was not promising. The originally approved FY 71 - FY 75 plan had been for $1.25 billion in grant aid and $250 million in EDA, for a total of $1.5 billion. The planned schedule for this total (in millions) had been:[4]

	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	TOTAL
"O" Cost	109.7	92.9	98.6	98.9	100.0	500.1
"I" Cost	155.3	158.5	125.6	93.9	88.3	621.6
PCH&T	30.0	28.6	25.8	22.2	21.7	128.3
Subtotal	295.0	280.0	250.0	215.0	210.0	1,250.0
EDA *	178.5	24.9	19.7	11.4	15.5	250.0
TOTAL	473.5	304.9	269.7	226.4	225.5	1,500.0

*At legal value (one-third acquisition cost)

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1. J822 Point Paper, 16 May 73, Subj: FY 73 O&M Funds for the ROK; CINCPAC 040405Z Apr 73 (NOTAL).
2. J822 Point Paper, 27 Aug 73, Subj: FY 74 Security Assistance Program-Korea.
3. Ibid.
4. J821 Point Paper, 8 Jan 74, Subj: Korean Modernization Program; also see CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, p. 412.

The reduced funding levels authorized by Congress during the first three years of the program resulted in a deficit for grant aid of $234.8 million and $83 million for EDA. If the shortfall of the FY 74 appropriation were added, the total grant aid deficit would be $337.5 million:

(In $ millions)

	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	TOTAL
Planned	295	280	250	215	210	1,250
Funded	288.2	152.5	149.5	112.3*	-	
Shortfall	(6.8)	(127.5)	(100.5)	(102.7)	-	(337.5)

*Incomplete fiscal year; level of appropriations for FY 74.

The shortfall of $83 million in EDA for the first three fiscal years resulted from deficits of $122.7 million in FY 71; a partial recoupment in FY 72 when $68.9 million was funded against the programmed $24.9 million, for a two year deficit of $78.7 million; and $15.4 million funded against $19.7 programmed in FY 73, for a total cumulative deficit of $83 million.[1]

Korean Force Requirements Study

(S) In January 1973, the DOD informed CINCPAC of a forthcoming study of the ROK force structure based on the current and projected military situation on the Korean Peninsula. The initial input to the study was to be prepared by COMUSKOREA for the FY 73-78 time period. An inter-agency steering group on Korean force modernization had been established, chaired by Rear Admiral Charles P. Tesh of the DOD International Security Affairs office. Based on CINCPAC and COMUSKOREA comments, the DOD agreed that the study should be on a low profile, close-hold basis. The DOD encouraged input from the Country Team on relevant political and economic factors directly bearing on the military requirements.[2]

(S) The COMUSKOREA study, based on parameters established in consultation with the Steering Group, was forwarded to the DOD by CINCPAC in March 1973. The original Korea modernization plan had been designed to counter a combined North Korean/PRC attack. The re-examination considered the threat to be essentially from North Korea. The Inter-agency Steering Group of the National Secu-

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1. Ibid.
2. J821 HistSum Jan 73; SECDEF 4028/122231Z Jan 73; SECDEF 1217/182311Z Jan 73, which cited COMUSKOREA 170910Z Jan 73 and CINCPAC 172220Z Jan 73; also CINCPAC 241614Z Jan 73 (NOTAL).

rity Council Undersecretaries Committee completed its report on 31 May 1973, based on the COMUSKOREA report. On 27 July, a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) was issued setting forth guidance for future MAP in Korea. The basic decisions in NSDM 227 were:[1]

- Extend the modernization plan with no termination date for grant aid.

- Strive to provide $1.5 billion as orginally planned; i.e., to provide the end FY 73 balance of $665 million funded and $110 million EDA transfer.

- Maintain the programmed grant aid request levels--no rapid shift from aid to FMS credit.

- Encourage the ROK to increase the defense budget from 4.1 percent to about 5.1 percent of the gross national product.

- Modernize 16 of the 19 ROK Army (ROKA) divisions.

- Shift the force structure thrust from ground defense to active and passive air defense.

- Provide 72 F-5Es already programmed as replacements for the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) F-86s. Defer additional sophisticated air assets.

(S) At the September 1973 meeting of the joint Security Consultative Committee in Korea, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements presented the U.S. position regarding the Korean MAP. He stated that the modernization plan must be stretched over more time than the original five years; that the ROK must assume a greater share of the costs through FMS; and, suggested the shift in emphasis to air defense. The Secretary also proposed that a joint ad hoc review committee be formed to plan the shift of priority to air defense. The ROK Minister of National Defense agreed with this proposal.[2]

(S) On 28 November 1973, CINCPAC provided guidance for the ad hoc committee discussions. The U.S. side was to stress the need to stretch out the plan. The U.S. Government expected the ROK to assume responsibility for an increased share

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1. J5312 Point Paper, 24 Aug 73, Subj: Korean Force Modernization.
2. J5312 Point Paper, 25 Oct 73, Subj: Korean Force Modernization; COMUSKOREA 080229Z Nov 73.

of the modernization through FMS credit and cash projects. To that end, the ROK-U.S. deliberations were to develop alternate plans to include priorities and funding sources. The lack of O&M funding in FY 75 and beyond was to be emphasized. The degree of emphasis on high performance aircraft was generally limited by NSDM 227. Rather than considering more than the F-5s already programmed, the ROK was to be encouraged to concentrate on site hardening of aircraft shelters, developing the capability to employ surface-to-air missiles effectively, improving command, control and communications, and enhancing ground force mobility. CINCPAC also cautioned that the CPIC production program would be constrained by proven operational capability and competition for available funds.[1]

(S) The ad hoc committee of joint ROK-U.S. members reached agreement that increased emphasis would be placed on air defense; that an overall funding constraint of $550 million would be used; and that program funding would consist of a grant aid/FMS combination. On 18 December, the Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea (JUSMAG-K) reported that the ROK officials were sensitive to the $550 million negotiated ceiling, which was $105 million less than the balance of original five year plan projections. While they had agreed on the lower ceiling, and the use of FMS credit as part of the figure, they were concerned as to the ultimate proportions of grant aid and FMS. The ROK officials were pressing for the U.S. to provide this information. The Chief, JUSMAG-K suggested that, in the interest of moving the ad hoc negotiations toward implementation of the force structure objectives, some tentative split of the $550 million between grant aid and FMS be provided to the ROK representatives. The DOD reply asserted that the ROK was really asking for a U.S. commitment as to the amount of grant aid which could be expected in completing the modernization plan. In view of the funding uncertainties connected with all foreign aid programs, the DOD forbade any implied commitment as to fund proportions. A split for planning purposes was not considered to be necessary to establish important and essential equipment priorities.[2]

Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) FY 75-79 Update

(S) In January 1973, the DOD exempted JUSMAG-K from the March update of the POM for FY 75-79 until the Korean Force Requirements Study (KFRS) was approved. In September, CINCPAC requested guidance from the DSAA for the FY 75-79 POM submission. On 6 November, the DSAA responded, stating that the KFRS, as modified by NSDM 227, had been approved as the general basis for military assistance planning. The security assistance objectives for Korea were:[3]

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1. CINCPAC 280355Z Nov 73.
2. CHJUSMAG-K 180910Z Dec 73; SECDEF 2801/212203Z Dec 73.
3. SECDEF 5374/062106Z Nov 73, which cited CINCPAC 251307Z Sep 73 and SECSTATE 024957/090118Z Feb 73.

- Assist the ROK in achieving modernized forces capable of deterring/defending against North Korean aggression with U.S. logistics support only.

- Assist in developing ROK forces capable of defending against combined North Korean/PRC aggression with U.S. augmentation.

- Assist in obtaining and maintaining necessary rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements for U.S. and Allied forces, and deny them to forces opposed to U.S. interests.

- Protection of U.S. facilities.

- Assist the ROK to maintain an effective counter-infiltration capability.

(S) Program guidelines for FY 75-79 directed that O&M costs were not to be programmed without strong justification, and not more than $14 million regardless. All O&M was to be terminated after FY 75. Modernization of ROKA divisions beyond the 16 active and three ready reserve divisions should receive low priority. Re-ordering of priorities was to be pursued in the ad hoc committee to shift emphasis to air defense programs. FMS credit and cash sales, EDA and other "no cost" transfers should be used whenever possible in order to reduce the amount of NOA in the plan. Twenty-seven of the programmed F-5Es were to be included for FY 75. The dollar guidelines for POM planning (in $ millions) were:

	Grant Aid	FMS Credit
FY 75	204	45
FY 76	184	65
FY 77	168	90
FY 78	149	110
FY 79	136	135

These levels did not include U.S. commitments to Korea under ENHANCE PLUS, nor were supply operations costs included. The DSAA noted that the dollar levels had been established by NSDM 227, and that these funding levels had been challenged by the DOD and State Department. No decision had been made, but the funding levels could change.[1]

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1. Ibid.

(S) CINCPAC provided amplifying guidance to the JUSMAG-K, noting that time constraints to meet the DSAA suspense of 3 December would prohibit submission of a complete POM. Only Part I, the recommended POM force structure, and Part II, narrative would be required. Assumptions to assist in FY 74-79 planning included FY 74 total funding of $141 million; FY 74 funding for 24 F-5Es for $54.108 million; and O&M funding at $20 million. JUSMAG-K was also to assume no further FY 74 funding of the CPIC program, but additional CPIC guidance would be forthcoming.[1]

(S) The JUSMAG-K POM submission was delivered to CINCPAC on 26 November, but did not include the comments of the diplomatic mission. The programming of $14 million O&M funds for FY 75 was challenged by the Embassy on 28 November on the grounds that the ROK was sufficiently strong economically to pay the O&M costs. On 29 November, COMUSKOREA stated that, while economic reasons for O&M support in FY 75 may not exist, valid military reasons did. He cited the long lead time to buy spare parts through FMS procedures, and stated that operational requirements demanded a more responsive system. CINCPAC forwarded his comments to DSAA on the O&M FY 75 funding and the question, also raised by the Embassy, of grant aid after FY 76:[2]

* * * * *

6. (S) Major conflicting issues which affect this program are O&M for FY 75 and Grant Aid MAP support beyond FY 76. Current POM guidance allows Korea to program O&M MAP support costs for FY 75. COMUSKOREA elected to program the full $14 million for O&M in order to meet operational requirements in the event the Korean Government is unable to establish satisfactory alternative procurement channels before the end of 2nd quarter, FY 75. Embassy Seoul believes that the ROK has the capability to cover all their O&M costs without significant negative economic impact. CINCPAC supports $14 million for O&M in FY 75. However, he will restrict the spending of O&M Grant Aid in FY 75 to that necessary to maintain readiness of ROK Forces, and only if fully justified on a case-by-case basis.

7. (S) SECDEF POM guidance and dollar planning data do program MAP Grant Aid support to FY 79, and this guidance

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1. J821 HistSum Nov 73; CINCPAC 090402Z Nov 73.
2. J821 Point Paper, 30 Nov 73, Subj: FY 75-79 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Korea; J822 HistSum Dec 73; CINCPAC ltr Ser 001377 of 7 Dec 73, with 2 encl: POM for ROK Security Assistance FY 75-79 and AMEMB Seoul 7980/280933Z Nov 73.

has been followed in this document. Embassy Seoul believes that Grant MAP after FY 76 is not defensible on economic grounds, and states that economic and budgetary data in the POM demonstrate that Korea has the capacity to achieve full financial self-sufficiency in the defense area through substantially increased use of FMS credit, and a slight annual increase in the percentage of GNP allocated to defense. Whatever the economic merit of that belief, it assumes that the FMS credit levels needed will be available to Korea in FY 77-78. Reasonable assurance that these credit levels will indeed be available to Korea remains to be determined. CINCPAC supports MAP Grant Aid levels shown in this POM submission contingent upon further validation of the requirements.

Net Additional Costs-ROKFV Equipment Payback

(S) Under the provisions of the U.S. agreement relative to the deployment of ROK military forces to Vietnam in 1966, the U.S. had agreed to provide Korean currency support to the ROK budget equal to all of the net additional costs (NAC) of the deployment. Also to be reimbursed to the ROK was the cost of reconstituting its forces in Korea--mobilizing and maintaining activated reserve divisions, brigades and supporting elements. The amount of NAC each year was determined jointly by the JUSMAG and the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND), subject to approval by the U.S. State and Defense Departments. The amount was then included in the final ROK defense budget presented to the ROK National Assembly. The fact that the two governments operated under different fiscal years presented problems in 1971, when the U.S. Senate prohibited the use of DOD-appropriated funds for pay and allowances of Korean troops in Vietnam. Thus, the NAC for calendar year 1970, based on the assumption of Congressional approval of the FY 71 budget, involved about $8.7 million which could not be paid under the MASF appropriations for Vietnam. The problem of finding a mutually acceptable basis for payment had still not been resolved by the end of 1972. However, by that time, the options for settlement of the NAC deficit had focused on the forthcoming transfer to the RVN by the ROK Forces in Vietnam (ROKFV) of U.S.-titled and MAP equipment under the ENHANCE PLUS project.[1]

(S) In anticipation of an early cease-fire in the RVN, the DOD had approved the turn over to the RVNAF of four sets of ROKFV brigade equipment. Thus, the issue of ROKFV paybacks under the original NAC agreement; the paybacks to compensate for ENHANCE PLUS turnover; and the carry-over NAC deficit from 1971 became interwoven, if not indistinguishable. In broad terms, two regiments of

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, p. 418; CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 658.

the ROKFV would return to Korea equipped essentially as when they departed--with MAP-titled equipment and equipment provided to replace attrited or battle damaged MAP equipment losses. The title transfer to the RVN was completed on 9 December 1972.[1]

(S) In November 1972, COMUSKOREA requested that the U.S.-titled U-21 aircraft then assigned to the ROKFV be removed from the list of equipment reserved as inappropriate for transfer and offered to the ROK as non-long supply and excess (LSE) equipment. On 5 February 1973, COMUSKOREA reiterated his request, citing high-level ROK interest and the sensitive negotiations underway regarding the FY 71 NAC obligation. Attempts were underway to convince the ROK that the value of all U.S.-titled equipment then being returned with the ROKFV or being provided the ROK as payback for ENHANCE PLUS turnovers be considered as a write-off of the FY 71 NAC deficits. The preliminary estimate of the value of U.S.-titled equipment being returned was $6.8 million. The value of the U-21 at 56 percent was approximately $200,000, which would strengthen the U.S. quest for a write-off of what COMUSKOREA then stated was the FY 71 obligation under NAC of $7.5 million.[2]

(C) On 22 March, the DOD authorized, as full discharge of the FY 71 obligation, the offer of three UH-1Hs then assigned to the Overseas Replacement Training Center (ORTC), one U-21 aircraft, and that non-LSE equipment then assigned to the ORTC not needed for ENHANCE PLUS payback. COMUSKOREA was instructed to obtain agreement that the aircraft would not be supported by MAP funds, and that this package must be accepted by 23 March or the offer would be withdrawn.[3]

(C) Under the terms of the MOU on ENHANCE PLUS reached in December 1972, a joint agreement was reached in Seoul during a meeting in April 1973 on an equipment payback list. The list contained 147 separate items valued at $12.4 million, of which $1.9 million had been MAP funded and $10.5 million MASF funded.[4]

(S) During the April meeting, it was learned that payback of some transferred equipment would exceed ROK MAP authorization. The solution was to substitute equipment of equal value to the payback agreement so long as the substitutions were in the programmed MAP. It also transpired at the April meeting that COMUSKOREA had traded off seven line items of ORTC assets during the FY 71 NAC

1. J41 HistSum Nov 72; SECDEF 9972/092222Z Nov 72.
2. J822 HistSum Feb 73; COMUSKOREA 050950Z Feb 73, which cited COMUSKOREA 300450Z Nov 72.
3. J822 HistSum Dec 73; SECDEF 5439/222251Z Mar 73.
4. J41 HistSum Apr 73.

deficit negotiations. While this action had been in consonance with DOD guidance, it was subsequently determined that like amounts of the seven ORTC items would be applied to the payback obligation and charged to the MAP.[1]

(S) On 27 July 1973, the U.S. completed its equipment (less ammunition) payback obligation to the ROK. This payback discharged the 1966 original agreement on NAC for equipping returning ROK forces from RVN with the same quality and types of equipment with which the ROKFV deployed. On the last day of 1973, COMUSKOREA submitted to CINCPAC a strong reclama to GAO criticism of maintaining combat-ready reserve divisions by MAP funding. He cited the 1965 agreement, made on strict instructions from State and Defense, to provide [redacted] authorized equipment. This was an additional quid pro quo relating to the deployment of ROK forces to Vietnam. Moreover, the provision of equipment for these divisions had been acknowledged [redacted] and their state of combat readiness would directly affect the execution of CINCPAC Operations Plan [redacted][2]

Continuing MAP Items

(C) In 1972, CINCPAC and COMUSKOREA had agreed not to program C-119 cargo transport aircraft for the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) because of prohibitive O&M costs for maintenance. During 1973, the DOD allocated 16 C-123K transport aircraft to Korea as part of an EDA transaction involving Cambodia, Thailand, the Philippines and Korea. This program is discussed in the following section.[3]

(S) The programmed acquisition of T-37 aircraft for the ROKAF was caught in the budget squeeze of FY 72 and FY 73. Eleven T-37s had been funded in FY 71, but no decision or funding was made in FY 72, primarily because the costs per aircraft were steadily rising. In March 1973, mainly to fund pressing O&M expenditures, the CNO, DOD and JCS approved the withdrawal of $24.7 million from funded and unfunded CPIC money. This was based on delays in the CPIC program. COMUSKOREA reprogrammed $15.4 million of the CPIC money for O&M and $3 million to fund seven T-37s in the FY 73 program. Since the original total programmed had been 25 T-37s, seven remained to be funded in future years.[4]

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1. J411 Point Paper, 16 May 73, Subj: ROKFV Equipment Payback.
2. J41 HistSum Dec 73; CINCUNC/COMUSK 310340Z Dec 73; CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 4-14 Jan 74.
3. COMUSKOREA 250556Z Apr 73, which stipulated the capability of the ROKAF to operate the C-123K; CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 439-440.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 439; J822 HistSum Mar 73; CNO 271258Z Mar 73; SECDEF 3523/292319Z Mar 73; SECDEF 8339/051414Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 040405Z Apr 73 (NOTAL).

(C) Two naval craft co-production programs were underway in 1973--the CPIC and the multi-mission patrol gunboat (PGMM). The PGMM program consisted of three craft, two to be built by the TBBC at Tacoma and one in Korea. In June 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had committed the U.S. Government to provide $15 million in FMS credits for this program at no charge against the MAP for the basic five year program. The PGMM was funded for $11 million of FMS credit in FY 73. After the TBBC changed ownership, the ROK Government re-negotiated the PGMM program with the new owner (Reinell Industries). On 19 December 1973, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., requested COMUSKOREA to transmit his personal message to the ROK MND regarding the PGMM program. The Secretary informed Minister Suh that the U.S. Government had released the $1.549 million unexpended balance of the $11 million FMS credit for FY 73. He also signified approval to allocate $5 million of FMS credits for FY 74 to the PGMM. By this message, the $16 million committed by Secretary Laird in a 27 June 1972 MOU was discharged.[1]

(S) The original fast boat program called for 20 craft at a cost of $23 million. The contract for nine to be produced at Tacoma by the TBBC and eight under co-production in Korea was signed in December 1971. By the end of 1972, propulsion and weapon systems problems in the prototype CPIC had suspended obligation of funds. Based on a U.S. Navy progress report dated 1 February 1973, which presented alternative gun configurations for decision and set dates for operational testing of the prototype craft, the DSAA called a CPIC conference on 14-15 March 1973. Representatives of CINCPAC, COMUSKOREA, CINCPACFLT, JCS, CNO and DOD attended. At this conference, CINCPAC, COMUSKOREA, CINCPACFLT, and the JCS representatives reconfirmed the need for the CPIC craft, as currently (30mm heavy machine gun) configured. Because of the age, slow speed and obsolescence of the ROK Navy (ROKN) patrol craft, the CPIC was considered to be an essential element in the modernization of the ROKN against the threat from North Korea. It was agreed by the conferees that the CPIC program would proceed as far as the completion and testing of the prototype with the Oerlikon 831 30mm gun system. The decision to begin production would be based on extensive sea tests and further study of weapon configurations. It was recognized that delay in production decisions would incur significant cost increases, and that because of the program ceiling of $52.2 million, a reduced number of craft could be built.[2]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 437, 438; J821 HistSum Oct 73; SECSTATE 206772/182007Z Oct 73; J822 HistSum Dec 73; SECDEF 192258Z Dec 73 (EX); CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 18 Dec - 3 Jan 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 437, 438; J821 HistSum Feb 73; SECDEF 8339/051414Z Feb 73; J821 HistSum Mar 73; SECDEF 1561/191752Z Mar 73.

(C) In April, the DSAA advised the conferees of the March meeting that the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) had recommended against the 30mm heavy machine gun configuration for the CPIC, based on procurement and maintenance risks as well as comparative (20mm) kill capabilities. The CNO, CINCPACFLT and COMUSKOREA nevertheless reaffirmed their positions that prototype testing continue as agreed during the March meeting.[1]

(S) The primary test and evaluation of the seaworthiness of the prototype was completed on 15 August 1973. The tests confirmed the capability of the craft to perform its mission. Installation of the gun system began on 10 September, with completion of the entire system scheduled for mid-1974. Meanwhile, CINCPAC had deleted the CPIC from the FY 75-79 POM pending a production decision. The POM as submitted from COMUSKOREA had programmed $26.1 million in FY 75 and $13.1 million in FY 76. On 24 December 1973, CINCPAC changed his position and directed that these items be included in the FY 75-79 POM. The purpose was to preclude funding delays if the CPIC received production approval. CINCPAC stipulated that the final production decision should be contingent upon certification by the U.S. Navy and CINCPAC approval of the CPIC prototype.[2]

(U) In other ROKN actions, the CNO received authority to offer two destroyers for FMS to Korea on an as is-where is basis as replacements for two older ROKN destroyer-type vessels. The cost was $229,000 per ship. On 29 November 1973, the USS W.L. LIND (DD-703) was transferred to the ROKN at San Diego. The USS DE HAVEN (DD-727) was transferred on 5 December at Long Beach.[3]

(C) In March 1972, studies had been proposed to determine ROK capability to co-produce 2½ ton trucks and AN/PRC-77 tactical radios. Meanwhile, and in order for the ROKA to operate, action was taken to expedite delivery of tactical wheeled vehicles and radios. In November, the DA had advised CINCPAC that 1,000 2½ ton trucks could be programmed in FY 73-74 Korea MAP. By August 1973, the number of rebuilt 2½ ton trucks available to Korea was reduced to 500. In December 1972 and early 1973, COMUSKOREA requested the DA to provide a delivery schedule for funded but undelivered AN/PRC-25/77 radios. Of 4,739 funded in FY 68, only 1,100 had been delivered. Of 2,504 funded in FY 71, none had been received. This large deficit was scheduled to be eliminated during 1973.[4]

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1. J821 HistSum Apr 73; SECDEF 5945/191431Z Apr 73; J5362 Point Paper, 12 May 73, Subj: Armament System for CPIC.
2. J821 Point Paper, 3 Jan 74, Subj: CPIC.
3. J821 HistSum Sep 73; CNO 272259Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 040320Z Dec 73 (NOTAL).
4. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 440; J822 HistSum Dec 73; CDRECOM 201226Z Jul 73; DA 072105Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 300539Z Aug 73.

(C) In May 1973, the Joint Vehicle Co-Production Study Group completed an evaluation of ROK industrial capacity. The study concluded that the ROK had the capability to fabricate and assemble 2½ ton trucks. The estimated MAP cost to manufacture 5,000 trucks was $1.5 million for design and development; $5 million for equipment and tooling; and $35 million for production, for a total of $41 million. In view of austere MAP funding, however, JUSMAG-K had deferred action on truck co-production.[1]

(C) A few months later, in August 1973, an MOU was signed between the Chief, JUSMAG-K and the MND relating to co-production of the AN/PRC-77 family of tactical radios. A contract was signed between the contractor (E-Systems, Inc.) and the ROK Government on the same day, 14 August 1973.[2]

(S) The funding of a second VULCAN missile battalion for the ROKA was addressed in late 1972, when $8.017 million was allocated to the procurement of 48 M167 missile systems in FY 73. A price increase from $167,000 each to $205,000 prompted a review of options. On 26 January 1973, COMUSKOREA requested CINCPAC to approve the procurement of 40 vice 48 missile systems in order to stay within the $8 million previously programmed. Also requested was an extension option in the contract to allow the procurement of eight systems in FY 74.[3]

Evaluation of Korea MAP Program[4]

(S) The CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) report on the MAP in Korea was promulgated on 12 December 1973. This examination of the MAP was in consonance with CINCPAC's responsibility as the executive agent for security assistance in the PACOM. The following summarizes the findings of the PEG team:

Personnel/Organization

(U) There has been a progressive reduction in the JUSMAG JTD strength from an initial 1,244 authorization on 1 April 1971, when JUSMAG-K was activated, to 995 spaces on 1 July 1972 and to 586 on 1 July 1973, with a further proposed reduction to 444 spaces on 1 July 1974.

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1. J821 Point Paper, 16 May 73, Subj: JUSMAG-K/ROK Self-Reliance Projects; J822 HistSum Aug 73; CHJUSMAG-K 140943Z Aug 73.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 440, 441; J822 HistSum Jan 73; COMUSKOREA 260634Z Jan 73.
4. CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group Report on the U.S. Security Assistance Program, Republic of Korea, Fiscal Year 1974, Part I., Summary of the Report, pp. 1-9.

(U) JUSMAG-K intends that the Air Defense Artillery Division be a continuing entity with 22 authorized spaces through FY 79. JUSMAG-K should continue its efforts to modernize the ROKA ADA posture and encourage ROK MND to negotiate a Supply Support Arrangement (SSA) for the support of ROKA surface-to-air missile units. This would permit reduction or elimination of on-site ADA advisory teams, with attendant re-evaluation and possible realignment of the Headquarters JUSMAG-K ADA element.

(U) JUSMAG-K should request formal CINCPAC authority to participate in the Eighth Army KATUSA Program. This authority does not now exist but JUSMAG-K has 150 KATUSAs assigned. (80% of the KATUSAs assigned are used for the operation of JUSMAG-K vehicles.) JUSMAG-K conducts a drivers' training course for KATUSA personnel who normally rotate after about 20 months. This is considered inconsistent with the mission of JUSMAG-K. Additionally, CHJUSMAG-K should conduct a study to determine if the retention of the KATUSAs would be the most cost-effective means for providing trained personnel to operate the assigned vehicles.

Plans and Programs

(U) The MAP planning and programming functions of JUSMAG-K were being accomplished in an effective manner. An excellent working relationship exists between JUSMAG-K personnel and their ROK counterparts. Programmers were found to be knowledgeable and were following correct programming techniques and procedures with a few exceptions.

(U) Disposition of excesses continues to be a problem. The key requirement is to determine the amount of the excesses. This can be accomplished through accurate listing of asset authorizations. JUSMAG-K had undertaken an exhaustive project to update the major asset authorization listing, and this listing was expected to be completed about 1 October 1973.

[redacted]

(C) To accomodate the vagaries of Congressional attitude toward MAP and to facilitate adjustments to impending reductions in Grant Aid, JUSMAG-K should attempt to encourage the ROK MND to voluntarily shift certain large-value and long-term programs from Grant Aid to FMS credit. With respect to O&M support, CINCPAC should continue to press for permission to provide early funding level information to the ROKG to assist the ROKs in their budget planning.

Training

(U) JUSMAG-K was accomplishing its training assistance mission effectively. The effective advisory training efforts of JUSMAG-K were manifested in the continuing trend toward increased ROK self-sufficiency. CONUS-trained personnel were monitored by JUSMAG-K to assure that ROK personnel were assigned to duties for which they were trained. It was noted that CONUS-trained individuals were utilized in the operational units to supervise and conduct effective OJT programs.

[redacted]

(U) English language training (ELT) was being accomplished at three separate centers, and a marked shortage of training aids, instructors, and materials was prevalent. Austere facilities and shortages could possibly be alleviated by consolidating the ELT schools. The recent assignment of a Defense Language Institute (DLI) English language instructor from CONUS should provide impetus to a flagging program which impacted on the CONUS training objectives of the ROK. Equipment and training material shortages were also prevalent in the ROKFs training centers. While the initiative toward training of several units visited was commendable, JUSMAG-K should continue to urge the ROKFs to place a higher priority and more command emphasis on training.

(U) Indicative of the results of JUSMAG-K's advisory training efforts were: the operation of a tactical air control center system by the ROKAF within a short time after organization of the ROKAF 36th Tactical Air Control Group; projected completion of the MTT T-37 checkout training of ROKAF instructor pilots ahead of schedule; the excellent planning and preparation for C-123 training of ROKAF personnel prior to arrival of the MTT; and the assistance provided to the 10th Fighter Wing at Suwon to improve combat readiness in air-to-air operations.

Logistics

(C) The newly organized Industrial Development Division of JUSMAG-K was providing valuable assistance to the ROK MND toward self-sufficiency in materiel acquisition. There was a significant increase in the logistical advisory responsibility of JUSMAG-K since the last PEG visit in 1971. The response to

this expanded workload while undergoing internal reorganizations and personnel reductions reflected efficient personnel resources management. Added JUSMAG-K mission workload resulted from the planning and implementation for ROK forces modernization, assisting with the expansion in the functionalization of ROK logistical activities, and the logistic actions attendant with the restructuring of ROK forces resulting from the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

ROK Army:

(C) Logistics Management: The introduction of the ROKA Review, Analysis and Evaluation Report, the institution of a requisitioning priority system, and the increasing utilization of locally procured items were prime examples of the improvement in overall logistics management in the ROKA. However, increased attention by tactical field commanders was required to alleviate shortcomings in the supply and maintenance areas. The Inventory Control Group at Pusan was effectively providing logistical support to its customers. However, positive steps should be taken to retain military systems analysts and programmers, which has been a problem. Additionally, early training of technical service supply managers on the automated logistical system was required.

(C) Maintenance: ROKA maintenance programs were being accomplished effectively; however, high cost depot production of vehicles, and general support level rebuild of major assemblies required review to improve quality and conserve manpower, including development of an equipment "life extension" program utilizing GS resources. Field maintenance operations were hampered by: (1) make and model proliferation of equipment throughout all support areas; (2) wasteful practice of replacing serviceable with unserviceable assemblies before evacuation of end items for depot rebuild; and (3) the lack of visibility into actual maintenance condition of supported units resulting from inaccurate reporting practices. Low repair parts levels at field units dictated early implementation of priority transportation systems to take advantage of newly-developed priority-related requisitioning procedures. Development of depot stocks to support the Vulcan Air Defense System was required and capabilities of depot maintenance facilities to support the Vulcan system required examination.

(U) Transportation: Actions taken by JUSMAG-K in the area of vehicle consolidation, driver training, and a self-imposed vehicle reduction program were examples of sound management programs. Additional improvements can be realized by substituting commercial design for tactical vehicles at the ALC Detachment, Pusan to minimize repair parts problems. Expanded efforts should be made to consolidate transportation support requirements where feasible for both EUSA and JUSMAG-K by operating a single ground vehicle support activity at Seoul, Pusan and other areas at which both activities are located. This action

would parallel current aviation support practices which were recently implemented and proven satisfactory. The feasibility of EUSA to assume the port mission of JUSMAG-K at Pusan should be explored. Review of the ROKA 235th Transportation Truck Battalion showed a current deadline rate of 7%. Unit maintenance operations, shop layout, and training programs were above average. Shortages in organizational maintenance equipment and prescribed load lists (PLL) were the only major discrepancies noted. The shortages were directly attributable to the current shortfall in O&M funding. Motor transport capabilities within the 3d Transportation Port Command could be used more effectively to move high priority supplies from Pusan depots to divisional support units to increase combat readiness. Although the rail mode was more economical and convenient, motor movement would assist in reducing in-country order and ship time, of which, according to ALC, the desired goal was 30 days.

1b
(2)(i)

[redacted]

ROK Navy:

(C) The capability of ROK Navy to fulfill its basic logistics mission was considered marginally effective due to the meager amount of Won and MAP O&M funding available, inadequate ability of the ROK Navy to absorb the increasing burden of MAP transfer and commercial type items costs, and the additional demands created by the gradual modernization of the ROKN Fleet and shore support establishment. Additionally, the relative adolescence of the ROKN, the historic balance of politico-military power within the ROKG, and the nature of the perceived national threat appeared to relegate the ROKN to a level of defense funding priority which could not be expected to adequately support either the current fleet or a modernized Navy.

(C) Notwithstanding this assessment, the ROKN Fleet had demonstrated an unusual capability to keep a majority of its ships on the line performing at a rigorous operating tempo. It did not appear that this type of performance could continue in light of steadily decreasing supply effectiveness ratios and shipyard productive workloads, and increasing equipment deadlines and zero balance supply items.

ROK Air Force:

(U) ROKAF Air Materiel Command (AMC): The AMC had increased its resources management significantly since the last PEG Team visit. The assembly and rework of the T-41 and O-1G aircraft, the construction of the ROKAF PL-2 trainer aircraft, and the major repair work being done on the F-4D aircraft attested to the high level of capability and self-sufficiency attained by the ROKAF. The plan to consolidate precision measurement equipment calibration for all ROK forces under ROKAF was encouraging, but will require additional ROK/JUSMAG-K staff actions prior to implementation.

(U) ROKAF POL Systems: When the 1968 and 1971 MAP supplement programs for POL tanks are completed and operational, ROKAF should have an excellent aviation fuels capability to support the training mission and contingency requirements. Continued advisory efforts should be directed toward convincing ROK MND that fuels storage and handling capability are a vital portion of any weapon system planning program.

(C) ROKAF Aircraft Shelter Program: Construction of aircraft shelters for tactical aircraft required additional assistance by JUSMAG-K in identifying locations and determining the appropriate program years for the additional 62 double aircraft shelters. The total requirement of 135 units to achieve final configuration, while ambitious, showed great appreciation on the part of ROKAF for adequate aircraft protection.

Marine Corps:

(U) The logistics system employed within the ROK Marine Corps was considered to be effective. The ROK Marine Corps was operating under very austere allocations of training ammunition and fuel. The limitations severely reduced the demands/usage on the logistic system and, in turn, degraded the experience level of supply and maintenance support. Of concern was the diversified types of equipment making up the ROK Marine Corps inventory. However, maintenance deadline rates were very low, indicating that supply and maintenance support was being adequately provided for these items under the limited usage being generated. Noteworthy in the 1st Marine Division was a self-help program for repairing and extending the life of individual equipment. Maintenance of equipment was excellent throughout the 1st Marine Division.

ROK Forces Logistics:

(U) Production Activities: The ROK has shown considerable progress in their initiation and expansion of defense-oriented production programs. Both the M-16 Rifle Plant and the Ammunition Arsenal Expansion/Conversion Program

were significant examples of effective security assistance in Korea. Current and proposed changes to ammunition production programs have not always been in agreement with changes in small arms weapons inventory. In the area of maritime construction, the ROK Navy, together with other ROK Government agencies, had made significant progress in the development, evaluation and limited production of small patrol boats and craft. Accomplishments were noted in the design and production of wooden landing craft, steel, wood, aluminum and fiberglass patrol craft, ferro-cement hull experimentation, and development of hydrofoil technology. CPIC was experiencing delays on the in-country start of production, due mainly to lack of U.S. authorization.

(U) Safety: The overall industrial safety program in the ROK Armed Forces had improved based on the conditions observed at manufacturing activities. There was an apparent increased awareness of the need for safety, and safety efforts at the depot maintenance and supply level had been given appropriate emphasis. The decrease in deaths, injuries, and accident costs for the first half of CY 73 were positive gains resulting from these efforts. While the current advisory efforts have been oriented towards higher management echelons, field observations suggested the need to concentrate in those areas necessary to improve safety awareness and practices at the lower echelons of the ROK Army and Navy.

(U) Translation and Publication of Technical Manuals: There was a minimum of technical publications translated into Hangul (Korean) available to using units of the ROKMC. This was considered to be a problem throughout the ROKF and indicated a need for establishment by MND of a standard system for acquisition, translation, printing and distribution of U.S. technical publications.

Communications-Electronics:

(U) The JUSMAG-K management and direction of the communications-electronics military assistance program was considered to be effective; the placement of the staff element concerned solely with C-E matters at a "submerged" level within the JUSMAG-K Headquarters continued to restrict the full performance of the C-E staff functions. C-E personnel resources appeared to be diverted into other areas of logistics, consequently limiting C-E staff to logistics matters. This observation was also made in the 1971 PEG Report. With the continued reduction of personnel in the JUSMAG-K staff, it appeared desirable to consolidate all C-E manpower resources in the headquarters by creating either an ACofS, C-E, or a separate C-E Division under one of the ACofS. This would provide for an integrated and strengthened C-E capability to: (1) assist in and/or coordinate on US/ROK C-E matters; (2) manage the SA C-E programs more effectively; and (3) provide increased assistance staff advice to ROK forces. C-E equipment utilization and maintenance in units of ROK forces visited was excellent

in all areas observed. Of primary concern, however, was the shortage of repair parts, age of equipment, lack of delivery of funded equipment, and equipment delivered without manuals.

Comptroller:

(U) The comptroller function in JUSMAG-K was being performed effectively except for internal review and executive level management information system development. Both of these functions were responsibilities of the Management Analysis Division which had been short one officer, essentially, for the entire period since the previous PEG report. However, the division was brought up to full strength in August 1973. One particularly outstanding effort in the comptroller field was the analysis of the economic posture of the ROK and the relative contribution it has made toward its own defense requirements vis-a-vis the U.S. The analysis showed that in 1961, the U.S. supplied 95.8% of the Won in support of the ROK Defense Budget; but in CY 74 U.S. support will be zero. The ROK will have absorbed 95.8% of the Won budget for defense in 13 years, while at the same time the defense budget will have increased from $130 million in 1961 to $447 million at the end of CY 73. Because of the location of various U.S. Army activities in Korea, CHJUSMAG-K should examine the feasibility of increasing consolidation of duplicative common support activities such as motor vehicle operations and maintenance in the Seoul area, and cargo handling at the Pusan port. JUSMAG-K should also determine the kinds and quantities of facilities and services required by JUSMAG-K which would be susceptible to support through additional assistance-in-kind (AIK) and request the ROKG to provide such AIK support to JUSMAG-K.

Host-Country Activities:

(U) Visits by PEG Team Members to various host-country staff elements and units indicated that all organizations were effectively performing their missions. Personnel of the units visited were impressive in their complete dedication, professional competence, and determination to eventually stand on their own. One common area that was affecting all organizations to varying degrees, however, was the shortage of O&M funds, which was a problem recognized by all concerned. The organization, while struggling at times under the lack of O&M funds, appeared to be capable of responding to any emergency situation or contingency requirement.

Laos

(S) The armistice in Laos on 22 February, and the Protocol to the armistice of September 1973, laid the groundwork to form a Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU). While the PGNU had not yet been established by the

LAOS

(as of 1 Aug 73)

BASIC INFORMATION J8			
AREA	91,430 SQ. MI.	ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	4 ACRES
POPULATION	2,927,000	LITERACY RATE	20%
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.8%	LIFE EXPECTANCY	35 YEARS
GROSS NAT PROD	$202 MIL(Est)	PER CAPITA	66.00 (Est)

KING - Sri Savang Vatthana J2
PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
MINISTER OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND LEADER OF THE NEUTRALIST FACTION -
Prince Souvanna Phouma
VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF EDUCATION, AND LEADER OF RIGHTIST FACTION - Leuam Insisiengmay
VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF National Economy AND LEADER OF THE COMMUNIST FACTION
Prince Souphanouvong Absent



J8 OBJECTIVE	U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION PAI
TO ASSIST LAOS IN MAINTAINING ITS STATUS AS AN INDEPENDENT, NEUTRAL STATE.	U.S. AMBASSADOR HON CHARLES S. WHITEHOUSE (designate) U.S. AID DIRECTOR MR. CHARLES A. MANN DEPUTY CHIEF JUSMAG THAILAND BGEN RICHARD G. TREFRY, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

(A) To support the armed forces of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) in their effort to defeat insurgency in areas that are or may come under RLG control.
(B) To support the Royal Lao Government (RLG) and to assist it to maintain its policy of non-alignment.
(C) To disrupt the flow of North Vietnamese forces and materiel through Laos into South Vietnam.

	MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES J53	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES ** J53	COMBAT CAPABILITY J3
ARMY	49 INF BNS, 15 ART? BNS, 1 PSYWAR BN, 10 RECON CPS, 5 ENG BNS, 1 RIVER FLOTILLA, 1 TANK CMP. STRENGTH 58,033.	123 INF BNS, 5 ARTY BN, 1 RIVER FLOTILLA, 3 RECON CMPS, 5 ENG BN, 1 PSY WAR BN, STRENGTH 69,800 (AS OF 1 JUL 73)	Maintain limited security in western half of the country against incursions by local insurgent and NVA forces with US air support. Not capable of blocking a determined NVA offensive without considerable outside assistance. Limited offensive capability. Overall combat readiness fair to poor.
NAVY	NONE	11 FOM-11, 3 FOM-12, 13 LCM-6, 14 PONTOON Power Boats, 2 Transports, 2 Utility Craft Total 45	Maintain limited security of river routes in government controlled area and provide limited logistic support for RLG forces.
AIR FORCE	5 COMPOSITE SQDNS (70 T28, 20 O-1, 5 U-17, 25 [illegible], 10 A/C-47, 20 C-47), 1 TRAINING SQDN [illegible]1, 16 T 28, 3 O1, 4 C-47, 4 [illegible], 2 U-17). STRENGTH 2,600.	5 COMPOSITE SQDNS (55 T 28, 20 O1, 5 U-17, 22 H-34, 10 C123, 10 A/C-47, 15 C-47), 1 TRAINING SQDN (16 T-28, 7 T-41, 1 C#/, 3 O1), 2 H34, 4 C47. STRENGTH 2,196 AS OF 1 JUL 73	Provide limited fighter bomber, logistic and reconnaissance support to ground forces.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 135.

*** DOES NOT INCLUDE PATHET LAO OR DISSIDENT NEUTRALIST MILITARY FORCES.
**AS OF 16 MAY 73
+FY 73

SECRET

Note: Previously exempted by USCINCPAC

end of 1973, the Protocol had specified that all foreign military personnel would be withdrawn from Laos by within 60 days after the PGNU was established. Thus, the political situation in Laos had come full circle since the Geneva Accords, when, in 1962, the United States had withdrawn its MAAG from Laos as required by the Geneva Protocol. In order to provide U.S. military support to the anti-communist factions in Laos, the position of Deputy Chief, JUSMAGTHAI was established in Bangkok (moved to Udorn in 1971). In-country representation was delegated to civilians assigned to the Requirements Office, U.S. Agency for International Development (RO/AID). The Ambassador, through RO/AID, developed military requirements with the assistance of the U.S. Army and Air Force Attaches (ARMA/AIRA). These requirements were reviewed by the Deputy Chief, Udorn, developed into a fiscal year program, and submitted to CINCPAC for approval. In 1973, these procedures were changed.[1]



1.3(a)(4)

1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 441; Part Six, Articles XV of the Protocol to the Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos.
2. J5253 Point Paper, 20 Feb 73, Subj: Post Cease-fire Organization for U.S. Military Assistance to Laos; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 070805Z Mar 73.

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4) b.

(S) Effective 15 August 1973, BGEN Richard G. Trefry assumed the position of DATT at Vientiane. General Trefry had been the Deputy Chief at Udorn. On 12 October, the DATT advised CINCPAC that he had reorganized the DAO along the lines originally proposed in order to test that concept, and to prepare for expeditious out-processing of those elements which would have to leave after the PGNU was formed. It was necessary to accredit DAO members, from resources available, with the foreign ministry prior to that post being occupied by a Pathet Lao minister. He noted that only he and the previously accredited ARMA and AIRA had been accredited, and that no JTD had been received to define the 30 military and 15 civilian spaces which had previously been proposed. Therefore, General Trefry, [redacted] b.

(S) On 12 October, the JCS passed an approved JTD to CINCPAC for 24 military and nine civilian spaces. The Ambassador took exception to the reduction from the proposed JTD, stating Country Team conviction that the JTD submitted by the DATT would best serve the objectives of the U.S. Government in Laos after formation of the PGNU. The matter had not been resolved by the end of 1973, and no formal DAO JTD had been established, although the DATT functioned as specified in the approved TOR.[3]

(S) The TOR had been approved by the JCS for the DATT on 20 November 1973. The DATT was charged as the principal military advisor to the Ambassador; he represented the Secretary of Defense with the host country military establishment; [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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1. JCS 2867/162349Z Apr 73, which cited JCSM 113-73 of 16 Mar 73; DEPCH Udorn 251030Z Apr 73; JCS 6268/262054Z Jul 73, which cited, inter alia, CINCPAC 160224Z May 73.
2. AMEMB Vientiane 5711/161151Z Aug 73; USDAO Vientiane 120633Z Oct 73; AMEMB Vientiane 6927/081102Z Oct 73.
3. AMEMB Vientiane 7233/200733Z Oct 73; Phonecon with LT COL Wilford Harrell, CINCPAC J13 on 22 Jul 74.

and, he managed the MASF/MAP for Laos. The Deputy Chief JUSMAG Udorn assisted and supported the DATT in the management of the security assistance program. The forward support element of Deputy Chief provided the DOD interface with the RLG armed forces for MASF/MAP matters. Pending resolutions of the JTD proposals, the office of the Deputy Chief was carried on a CINCPAC JTD; that of the DAO on a DIA JTD; and that of Project 404 on a JCS JTD.[1]

FY 73/74 Funds

(S) In August 1972, the DOD set the FY 73 dollar ceiling for the MASF program in Laos at $360 million. At the same time, levels for FY 74 and FY 75 were set at $300 million and $150 million respectively. The signing of the cease-fire on 22 February enabled the Deputy Chief (DEPCH) Udorn to reduce the program by about $2.346 million [redacted] On 28 March 1973, DEPCH Udorn submitted a program change to CINCPAC reducing the figures for ground and air munitions consumption by $45 million. The ceiling set in 1972 of $360 million had been reduced by the DOD to $335 million. The further reduction for ammunition set the FY 73 MASF level at $290 million.[2]

1.3(a)(5)

(S) In April, the DEPCH and the Ambassador revised the FY 74 program downward to $79.8 million, on the premise that the cease-fire in Laos would continue. CINCPAC's transmittal of the new program to the JCS and DOD expressed concern that money was not included in the program for contingencies. By July, the need for CRA funding of the FY 74 program prompted the DOD to establish a $31.8 million CRA level. At that time, the DEPCH program had been adjusted to $91.9 million, with a DOD ceiling of $100 million.[3]

(S) In December, the DOD requested FY 75 program detail to support a funding level of $84.7 million, exclusive of $4.8 million for supply operations and $.9 million for administration. As shown in Section II, the program for Laos was shifted from MASF to MAP beginning 1 July 1974.[4]

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1. JCS 8211/201904Z Nov 73; Project 404 was the code name assigned to the operations and intelligence advisory war time augmentation of the ARMA and AIRA in Laos.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 444; J834 HistSum Mar 73; DEPCH JUSMAG Udorn 280831Z Mar 73.
3. J834 Point Paper, 21 Apr 73, Subj: FY 74 Laos Military Assistance Service Funded Programs; J834 HistSum Apr 73; J8322 HistSum Jul 73.
4. CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 4-14 Jan 74.

Contract Air Service Support-Laos

(S) The cease-fire in Laos resulted in drastic reduction in the airlift support being provided in Laos by Air America (AA) and Continental Air Services, Inc. (CASI). In March 1973, the DEPCH initiated action to reduce the total flying hours per quarter previously contracted for, and also to reduce the numbers of aircraft under contract. On 30 March, the JCS advised CINCPAC that, in view of the unstable situation and uncertainties of the Laotian cease-fire, no action should be taken to reduce any operational capability for Laos. The DEPCH provided a rationale for contract air service reductions which CINCPAC supported. The State Department advised all concerned on 31 March that United States and Laotian combat capabilities were to be maintained until further notice, and this guidance was confirmed by the DOD on 6 April. Consequently, the DEPCH recommended minimal cuts in FY 73 contract air service capability, stating that those recommended would not degrade operational capability.[1]

(S) CINCPAC supported the FY 73 reductions recommended by the DEPCH, and, on 4 May, the JCS approved the reductions. On 24 May, the JCS requested CINCPAC to provide comments on certain JCS-proposed reductions to be applied for FY 74 to the contracts of AA and CASI, still within the guidance issued by State and DOD. The rationale was that FY 73 flying-hour minimums had been negotiated based on operational requirements prior to the cease-fire, and that a general reduction in contract minimums should be negotiable for FY 74. The FY 73 cost for contract air services had been $34 million for AA and $12.7 million for CASI. On 5 June, the DEPCH recommended, with Country Team concurrence, that FY 74 contracts be reduced to $35 million--$26 million for AA and $9 million for CASI. The DEPCH also recommended deletion from air contracts of C-123s, C-180s, U-4s and H-500s. The contracts would include 18 helicopters and 29 fixed wing aircraft for AA, with 43,475 flying hours minimum and 54,960 hours maximum. The CASI would fly fixed wing aircraft with 20,665 flying hours minimum and 23,395 maximum. The high maximums were specified to allow for a surge capability, if needed.[2]

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1. J834 HistSums Mar and Apr 73; DEPCH JUSMAG Udorn 231032Z Mar 73; JCS 4614/302039Z Mar 73; DEPCH Udorn 310930Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 010033Z Apr 73; DEPCH Udorn 110815Z Apr 73, which cited State 59985/311833Z Mar 73 and SECDEF 2673/062202Z Apr 73.
2. J836 HistSum May 73; JCS 1842/242000Z May 73, which cited CINCPAC 240212Z Apr 73 and JCS 1566/041908Z May 73; J836 Point Paper, 21 Jun 73, Subj: Contract Air Services Support - Laos; J836 HistSum Jun 73; DEPCH Udorn 050200Z Jun 73.

(S) On 27 June, the DOD authorized $25.6 million for FY 74 contract air service and stated that contracts should be negotiated for the first quarter only. In November, CINCPAC cited problems encountered when utilizing interim rates for billing purposes, and, on 21 November, the DOD authorized negotiation for the balance of FY 74.[1]

Post Cease-fire Aircraft Actions

(C) On 26 January 1973, just under one month before the cease-fire, 10 C-123K aircraft were title transferred to the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF). [redacted] By March, two of these aircraft had been lost. On 8 May, as part of the mass allocation of C-123Ks in the PACOM discussed in Section IV, this chapter, four aircraft were tentatively allocated to the RLAF, but were considered at-large potential attrition replacements. In June, the DEPCH cited the progress of the RLAF C-123K training program, and advised that, by September, some 12 of 13 C-47D aircraft would be excess to Laos MASF requirements.[2]

(C) In actions involving helicopters, Project [redacted] had provided CH-47C helicopters for the Laos program as GFE. The aircraft were flown by AA pilots to lift artillery and heavy supplies into outposts not accessible by road. After the cease-fire, the DOD approved the transfer of two aircraft to the 147th Aviation Company in Hawaii, and, in December 1973, the DEPCH deleted two more CH-47C's from the AA contract. [redacted]

a. (S) A twin project was [redacted] which provided UH-1M helicopters [redacted] for air medical evacuation and associated gunship support to ground forces in Laos. The JCS approved the reduction in operational UH-1Ms from nine to four and directed that the balance be maintained in flyable condition by AA pending disposition instructions.[4]

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1. SECDEF 1454/272252Z Jun 73; J836 HistSum Nov 73; CINCPAC 170249Z Nov 73; SECDEF 9330/212003Z Nov 73.
2. J834 HistSums Jan, Feb, Mar; DEPCH Udorn 080818Z Mar 73; J836 HistSums May and Jun 73; SECDEF 4904/082113Z May 73; DEPCH Udorn 011003Z Jun 73.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 448; CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 4-14 Jan 74.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 447; CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 4-14 Jan 74.

The Philippines

FY 73/74 MAP Funds

(S) As previously stated in this chapter, the FY 73 MAP program was conducted by interim CRA levels. For the Republic of the Philippines (ROP), the original CPD proposal had been for $20.66 million. The interim and final CRA level was $15.675 million. For FY 74, $19.9 million in MAP funds had been proposed, with $3 million in FMS credit. The appropriation was $16.8 million, of which $.5 million was for training.[1]

MAP Proposals by the ROP

(S) In 1971, the ROP had bombarded various U.S. officials with shopping lists of equipment which it hoped to acquire through the MAP. At the end of 1971, a ROP five year plan (a la Korea) to improve and modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was presented to the ROP/U.S. Mutual Defense Board (MDB). In September 1972, the Executive Secretary to President Marcos delivered an Aide Memoire to Ambassador Byroade requesting specific equipment under a proposed five year acquisition program. The list, characterized by the Country Team as unrealistic, included 10 C-130s, 36 OV-10s, 24 UH-1Hs, 30 F-5Es, 17 LSTs, etc. Also in 1972, the Filipinos had begun to by-pass the normal JUSMAG and CINCPAC channels for the MAP, taking their case directly to Washington officials. The ROP had also begun to negotiate with third countries for military equipment, i.e., Italy and West Germany.[2]

(S) In early March 1973, President Marcos requested Admiral Gayler's assistance in obtaining approval for a new list of requirements, the urgency of which was related to the Muslim rebellion on Mindanao and Sulu. On 5 March, the Chief, JUSMAG Philippines recommended that the U.S. Government support an increase in the force structure of the AFP in accordance with the JSCP for 1975-1982. He recommended that one change to the JSOP be made to accommodate a temporary 26 infantry battalion level with a long term 22 battalion level. The Chief, JUSMAG asserted that the requirement for increased forces was being brought into focus by the Muslim crisis--not caused by it. The problem was to meet that crisis and still be able to react to Maoist-oriented insurgents in Luzon and the Visayas. The ROP maintained that the Muslims were receiving outside assistance, and rebel forces were said to be equipped with modern crew-

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1. J824 Point Paper, 22 Feb 74, Subj: Philippine Security Assistance Program.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 448-456.

PHILIPPINES

(as of 1 Aug 73)

BASIC INFORMATION (U) J825

AREA	116,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	40.0 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.5%
ARABLE LAND PER CAP	0.8 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	75%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	55 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. FY74	$8.58 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$215
DEFENSE BUDGET (SELF-FINANCED) FY73	$178.3 MILLION
AS % OF GNP	2.08%

PRESIDENT-Ferdinand E. MARCOS J2
VICE PRESIDENT-Fernando LOPEZ
SECTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS-Carlos P. ROMULO
SECTY NATL DEFENSE-Juan P. ENRILE
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP-GEN Romeo ESPINO, ARMY
VICE C/S AFP-MGEN Rafael ILETO, AF
CG, ARMY-BGEN Rafael ZAGALA, ARMY
FOIC, NAVY-COMMO Hilario RUIZ, NAVY
CG, AIR FORCE-BGEN Jose RANCUDO, AF
CHIEF CONSTABULARY-BGEN Fidel RAMOS, PC



OVERALL OBJECTIVE J8

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES; TO ENCOURAGE PHILIPPINE MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO; AND TO MAINTAIN U.S. OPERATED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR (designate)
HON. WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. THOMAS C. NIBLOCK
CHIEF JUSMAG
BGEN James A. GRIMSLEY, Jr. USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

1. Assist in obtaining and maintaining necessary rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements for U.S. and Allied Forces and deny them to forces opposed to U.S. interests.
2. Promote the security of U.S. facilities.
3. Support the development of improved internal security and anti-smuggling capabilities.
4. Promote increased military self-reliance.

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES FY77 ** J53

		MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES J3	COMBAT CAPABILITY J3
ARMY	2 INF DIV, 2 SEP INF BDE, 2 ENG BDE (CONST), 1 HOME DEF ARM CO, CONSTABULARY: 5 BDE EQUIV., 2 PHS.	2 Inf Div, 4 Inf Bde, 1 Arm Cav Sq, 1 Abn Bn, 1 Arty Grp, Total Strength 28,000. Constabulary: 4 zone Cmd(Bde), 3 Bn, 1 Metrocom(Bde), 1 Pres Guard Bn, Total Strength 23,500. As of: 1 JUL 73	IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CONSTABULARY, CAN MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND PERFORM COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND CIVIC ACTION MISSIONS. NOT CAPABLE OF RESISTING A MAJOR EXTERNAL ATTACK WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. BUDGET LIMITATIONS, UNDERSTRENGTH COMBAT UNITS AND LACK OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING ABOVE BATTALION LEVEL DETRACTS COMBAT READINESS.
NAVY	1 DE, 8 PF, 4 PC, 9 PCM, 71 PB/PSR, 4 PHM, 2 MSO, 2 MSC, 9 LST, 3 LSH, 2 LCU, 15 LCM, 5 AKL/AK, 2 AKL, 1 ATR, 3 AG, 1 MAR BDE	1 DD type, 66 Coastal Patrol types, 4 Mine Warfare types, 55 Amphibious types, 11 Auxiliary types, 1 Mar Bde. Total Strength 15,015(includes 3,200 Marines). As of: 1 JUL 73	CONDUCT LIMITED OFF SHORE PATROL AND MINOR AMPHIBIOUS AND ASW OPERATIONS.
AIR FORCE	2 TFS, 3 AIR COMMDO SQDN, 1 LN SQDN, 1 AIR RESCUE SQDN, 2 AIR TRANS SQDN	2 TAC FTR Sq(1 F-86, 1 F-5), 1 Air Commando Sq(UH-1H), 1 LN Sq(U-17), 1 Air Rescue Sq (UH-1H, HU-16), 2 Trans Sq(C-47). Total Strength 10,000. As of: 1 JUL 73	LIMITED CAPABILITY TO FULFILL MISSION OF ASSISTING ARMY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 136.

FY 77 OBJECTIVES

served weapons, 30 and 60 cal machine guns, rocket launchers, 60 mm mortars and a wide variety of high powered rifles.[1]

(S) On 9 March, the Ambassador advised CINCPAC and the State Department that he had received the official ROP request for military equipment based on the internal security situation in the Southern Philippines. The following day, the Chief, JUSMAG provided CINCPAC the list and his preliminary estimate of its accuracy and validity based on ROP MAP data. The ROP delineated two categories--the first for equipment funded in FY 73 and prior years but undelivered; the second for "supplemental" equipment specifically in support of combat troops in the Mindanao area of operation. Subsequent messages from JUSMAG and the Ambassador supported all of the funded but not yet delivered items, and part of the supplemental list.[2]

(S) CINCPAC requested that the funded items be expedited; he also asked the JUSMAG to submit the unfunded FY 73 items in priority sequence for DSAA funding. On 22 March, CINCPAC was informed by his security assistance staff that DSAA had approved accelerated delivery of UH-1H gunships, ammunition and landing craft. A delay was forecast for PRC-77 radios because of production delays.[3]

(S) The detailed schedule for delivery of the MAP items funded in FY 73 or before, as of 22 March 1973, was:[4]

- Most ammunition shipped or available from stock.
- M79 Grenade Launchers, shipped on 7 March.
- 3,950 M16 rifles, estimated delivery 31 March.
- SS M23 Armament for UH-1H, available from stock.

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1. CINCPAC 060401Z Mar 73 (NOTAL), which cited CINCPAC 051452Z Mar 73 (EX); CHJUSMAGPHIL 050844Z Mar 73.
2. J824 HistSum Mar 73; CHJUSMAGPHIL 100304Z Mar 73, which cited AMEMB Manila 2769/091005Z Mar 73; CHJUSMAGPHIL 111200Z Mar 73; and CHJUSMAGPHIL 170136Z Mar 73, which cited AMEMB Manila 3073 of 16 Mar 73.
3. CINCPAC 220025Z Mar 73 (NOTAL); J824 Point Paper, 22 Mar 73, Subj: Military Security Assistance Program for the Republic of the Philippines; for discussion of radio shortage, see Korea.
4. J824 Point Paper, 22 Mar 73, Subj: Philippine Request for Emergency Defense Material.

- Two UH-1Hs due 30 March; five shortly thereafter (air shipped).
- T-53 Engines for UH-1H available 10 April.
- 65 foot Patrol Boat: 2 FY 4/73; 4 by July 74.
- Landing Craft awaiting shipment from San Diego.
- AN/PRC radios; 11 shipped March, balance (1,250) unknown.
- APCs due FY 3/and 4/74.
- 373 ¼-ton trucks shipped 9 March.

(S) The Country Team had listed the "supplemental" items in four groups: Support Intermediate Requirements - FY 73; Support Near Future Requirements - FY 74; Support Long Term Requirements - FY 75 and beyond; and Unsupported Items. The supported groups were estimated at $15.363 million, $26.822 million, and $13.966 million respectively. The main thrust of the Country Team appraisal was an urgent plea for the $16 million supplement to the FY 73 MAP. The CINCPAC staff position was to continue efforts to accelerate funded items, but that force structure changes must receive JCS approval to permit MAP support. Further, the supplemental equipment, ammunition and weapons needed should be included in a restructured FY 74 program.[1]

(S) On 9 April, the Ambassador transmitted a letter to him from Carlos P. Romulo, the ROP Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Romulo asserted that the U.S. Government had been lax in compliance with the MAP, and requested renewed attention to the same list of requirements previously passed to Admiral Gayler. The State Department, addressing the tone of Romulo's remarks, cited the accomplished and imminent equipment deliveries, noting that normal MAP programming scheduled deliveries over a three year period. State acknowledged, as had CINCPAC and the DOD, that a serious internal security problem confronted the ROP. Nevertheless, no supplemental funds for FY 73 were available.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. J825 HistSum Apr 73; J826 HistSum Dec 73; AMEMB Manila 3972/090503Z Apr 73; SECSTATE 075787/210335Z Apr 73.

(C) By October 1973, all of the funded MAP items had been delivered except long lead time (24-36 months) high value items. Major items which had been delivered included 373 ¼-ton trucks, 6,036 M16 rifles, 200 40mm grenade launchers, 7 UH-1H helicopters, 5.3 million rounds of ammunition and 352 AN/PRC-77 radios. More rifles and radios were programmed for delivery, as well as 20 M113 armored personnel carriers, five 65-foot PT boats and five 40-foot rescue boats.[1]

(S) The ROP move toward third country equipment sources recorded in this history for 1972 continued in 1973, in spite of the excellent response time for delivery of FY 73 and prior year items by U.S. MAP agencies. The ROP contracted to buy one 120-foot patrol boat from Vosper Thornicraft of Singapore, including complete blueprints for future in-country construction. One patrol boat was also purchased from the Sumidagawa Shipyard Company in Tokyo. Philippine Air Force (PAF) pilots and maintenance men were training in West Germany preparatory to the purchase of light helicopter components for in-country assembly. The purchase plan was for five Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm aircraft without engines. The engines were to be purchased from the United States. Also negotiated was the purchase of 50 rebuilt Mercedes-Benz engines from West Germany for use in patrol boats. Companies from England, Belgium, Germany and France were scheduled to make offers for armored reconnaissance vehicles to be used by the Philippine Constabulary. The CINCPAC J8 staff recommended that the ROP be advised that O&M costs for purchases from third countries could not be MAP funded. Also, these purchases adversely affected standardization and could jeopardize Congressional sympathy for grant aid to the ROP.[2]

Philippine Rifle Manufacturing Project

(C) The ROP had begun negotiations, in October 1972, with various firms for the indigenous production of small arms, including rifles. The ROP goal was 150,000 rifles within five years. The two companies considered to be the foremost contenders for the proposal were Colt Industries with the M-16 and the German company of Heckler and Fuch with the HK-33. Colt officials had informed JUSMAG that the total package of technology, equipment and materials was estimated to be about $22.5 million.[3]

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1. J826 Point Paper, 4 Oct 73, Subj: Status of GOP Request for Emergency Defense Material.
2. J825 Point Paper, 4 Oct 73, Subj: GOP Interest in Third Country Military Material.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 456.

(C) On 19 June 1973, the Chief, JUSMAG informed CINCPAC that the ROP had requested approval of an FMS loan to finance in-country manufacture of 150,000 M-16 rifles, plus the equivalent of 22,500 M-16s in spare parts. The same day, an agreement was reached between the ROP and Colt for the direct purchase, in-country assembly (initially) and production (eventually) of the rifles over a six year period. On 28 August, the JUSMAG received the ROP request for a loan of $15.614 million, with two annual installments of $8.622 million in FY 74 and $6.992 million in FY 75. The Country Team and CINCPAC recommended approval of the ROP request.[1]

(C) On 15 December, the DOD informed CINCPAC of its support for the project, and, as of 31 December 1973, further action awaited State Department concurrence. Meanwhile, on 28 December, the Ambassador updated his comments on the proposal, again strongly supporting approval of the FMS loan. He acknowledged the basis of the DOD concurrence--that the ROP would turn to a third country for assistance if not supported by the U.S.--and noted what he considered to be a lack of appreciation in Washington for the predicament of the Philippines:[2]

> ...To suggest, as some of the comments imply, that the Philippines should continue indefinitely with Armed Forces of some 60,000 out of a total population which is approximately forty million, is to evade the realities of the ground defense posture for our Asian allies implicit in the Nixon Doctrine....a stock of 180,000 rifles in reserve for the fifteenth most populous nation in the world is, in our judgment, entirely appropriate....

Evaluation of Philippine MAP

(C) The Performance Evaluation Group (PEG), a division of the CINCPAC Security Assistance (J8) staff, conducted an evaluation of the MAP in the Philippines from 6-22 December 1973. The following is a summary of the report:[3]

Personnel and Administration:

(U) Personnel and administrative requirements of the JUSMAG were being accomplished in a highly professional manner. Living conditions were good,

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1. J826 HistSum Sep 73; CHJUSMAGPHIL 190936Z Jun 73; AMEMB Manila 10627/ 180842Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 252027Z Sep 73.
2. J825 HistSum Dec 73; SECDEF 151833Z Dec 73 (EX); AMEMB Manila 14351/ 280934Z Dec 73.
3. CINCPAC PEG Report, U.S. Military Assistance Program, Republic of the Philippines, FY 74, Part I, pp. 1-7.

morale was high, and all personnel were highly motivated toward the attainment of improved military readiness of the AFP. Personnel turbulence within the Navy Division has resulted in a condition where all personnel are newly arrived with no experience or training in MAP program requirements. One position considered critical to the effective MAP advisory effort, that of the Ship Repair and Maintenance Officer, has been vacant since September. This same position is planned for elimination in FY 77. Because of the critical nature of this position, the PEG believes it should be filled as soon as possible and not eliminated in FY 77. JUSMAG agrees, and has taken action to expedite assignment of an appropriately trained officer. JUSMAG also will re-evaluate the tentative decision to eliminate the space in FY 77.

Plans and Programs

(U) The U.S. Military Security Assistance Planning and Programming functions within the JUSMAG were being performed in an effective manner. Particularly noteworthy was the fine relationship existing between the JUSMAG Plans and Programs Division and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This relationship has facilitated more effective development, implementation and management of the Security Assistance Program. Shortcomings existed in the planning and programming functions performed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines; yet, they were not deterring effective planning and programming.

(U) An improvement was noted in the financial support provided by the Philippine Government to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This improvement is attributed to the stabilizing effort of martial law on the economy which has resulted in an increase of funds available for support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Air Force Activities

(U) The CHJUSMAGPHIL Air Force Division is accomplishing its assigned mission in an extremely effective manner. Outstanding logistical, communications, operations and training advisory efforts are manifested in the highly visible trend of increased self-sufficiency within the PAF. The Air Force Division has instituted unique innovative methods for assisting the PAF in its rapid expansion efforts. One example is the establishment of an Air Force Communications and Electronics Coordination Committee which has greatly enhanced resolution of communications technical planning and interface problems. Close monitoring of PAF activities in the C-123K AGE/spares support program has resulted in an unprecedented early completion of the USAF MTT Aircrew Training Program. The Air Force Division is continually reviewing overall PAF deficiencies and insuring that timely advice on corrective measures is

provided. Training programs are closely coordinated with subsequent monitoring of personnel and assignments to insure duties are compatible with training accomplished.

(C) The PAF as a whole is a viable, well structured organization which is aggressive and composed of competent personnel. It is capable of effectively accomplishing its mission in providing air defense of the Republic of the Philippines and providing air support for the Philippine Army, Navy and Constabulary forces. Air transport capability will soon become excellent as a result of acquisition of 16 C-123K aircraft thru MAP excess programs. Flying and technical training programs are effectively producing required skills and in this regard, the PAF is extremely self-sufficient. Recent PAF acquisition of six Italian Saimachetti training aircraft has alleviated previous pilot training problems associated with the T-28. T-28's are now being modified into attack aircraft for close air support in anti-dissident operations in the southern provinces. The major concern at this time is C-123K aircraft utilization. Well defined plans for employing this aircraft are not apparent. As a result an element of uncertainty exists that there will be excess airlift capability over the near term. This situation will prevail until concepts are developed and the evolution of productive airlift missions occur.

(U) The major problem within the PAF is a lack of spares. The primary cause of this problem is the failure of maintenance personnel to follow established supply procedures for the requisitioning of parts. The PAF is not devoting sufficient effort to correcting the cause. Maintenance personnel need to be adequately trained in correct supply/requisitioning procedures, and good supply management needs to be enforced throughout the PAF.

Joint Logistics and Army Activities

(U) While the AFP continues to experience many problems in the management of logistical systems, deficiencies and suggested corrective action are continually brought to the attention of responsible AFP officials by the JUSMAG. Although these logistical deficiencies are serious by U.S. standards, the AFP is able to accomplish its basic internal security mission in the Philippine environment. Of particular significance are the additional AFP missions, both military and civilian, imposed as a result of martial law. Compounding the logistics problem are the rapid personnel increases during the last year, and the chronic shortage of adequate funding to support additional AFP programs. However, the success with which the Philippine forces have expanded and continue to meet the vastly increased operational requirements demonstrates the basic capability of the logistics system and its personnel.

(U) The supply system operated by the AFPLC is less than adequately responsive to requirements of supported units and is considered to be the most significant problem in the effective maintenance of MAP provided equipment. This situation has apparently resulted from the non-enforcement of sound supply management practices through command channels from top to bottom within the AFP. In the field, many PLLs/ASLs have not been properly prepared, updated or submitted; equipment is being cannibalized beyond repair; and requisitions in many instances are being unexplainably delayed more than a month between initiation at forward supply points and initial processing at the Inventory Control Division. Within the Directorate for Supply and Services (AFPLC) accountable records do not accurately indicate the level of stocks on hand; and inventories and location surveys have only recently been reinitiated after a four year void. Requisitions at the depot were routinely delayed by cumbersome administrative and accountability procedures for thirty days or more before being prepared for shipment, even though the items are physically on hand.

(U) AFPLC Depot Maintenance programs reportedly suffer from lack of repair parts when in numerous instances they are in fact available in depot stock. Untimely retrograde of repairable assets, both end items and major assemblies, contributes to less than full utilization of depot maintenance capabilities which results in a detrimental effect on equipment readiness by precluding constant flow of serviceable items back into inventory.

(U) Technical Publications. Shortage of technical publications continues to be a critical problem in the delivery of acceptable levels of supply and maintenance support to field units. Shortage of parts manuals necessitates unusual delays in processing supply requests due to lengthy editing requirements. The shortage of technical literature in maintenance facilities unnecessarily weakens and delays maintenance efforts and places added burdens on maintenance shops because of repeat jobs resulting from poor quality control.

(U) AFP Transportation System. Improvements could be realized in both organization and operating procedures in the transportation system of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Total requirements could not be readily evaluated based on lack of experience data. While an increase in capability in all modes is being programmed within the system by current addition of 16 C-123Ks and the two LCM 6s programmed for FY 75, additional capability is required in line haul and port operation areas.

(U) Distribution of Repair Parts. Recent efforts to "push" repair parts to forward MSPs based only on support density consideration was an appropriate response to the low rate of customer satisfaction. Although necessary to prime the stockage of MSPs, prolonged use of this push technique of distribution may become detrimental to the overall effectiveness of the supply system. For the

total system to become effective, the MSPs must develop stockage objectives necessary to support supported units, requisition these requirements and take aggressive follow-up actions on a timely basis to assure availability of items when needed. Once items are issued to one MSP, their visibility is lost to the Inventory Control Division, AFPLC, and urgent requirements from another MSP, which could have otherwise been satisfied from stock, would then have to be placed on back order.

(U) AFP Engineer Units. Deadline of engineer construction equipment remains a chronic problem within the AFP despite programs directing intensive effort toward improved equipment readiness. Deadline rates are little worse than those for other essential military equipment and probably less critical to effective combat operations because of severe shortfalls in personnel and program funding in engineer units.

(C) The AFP is critically short of most items of ammunition required for stockage in support of MAP provided weapons. Virtually no funded ammunition remains to be delivered against prior year programs and upon receipt of FY 74 funding authority only a small portion of the ammunition shortfall is expected to be funded and placed on order. The principal problem seems to be that within current funding levels AFP considers other items of equipment to be of a higher priority than the development of adequate ammunition stocks. The initiation of FMS cases has been suggested to AFP as a means of insuring steady input of ammunition items although to date funds for this purpose have been limited. There is a possibility that the ordering of priorities within the AFP with respect to use of FMS funds will continue to discount ammunition requirements in favor of other requirements. There appears to be no appreciation on the part of the AFP as to the need for adequate stockage levels or for the long order and ship time anticipated to prevail on all deliveries from the U.S.

(U) Equipment Utilization Within the Philippine Armed Forces. The rapid expansion of the Philippine Armed Forces, the deployment of the greater proportion of all army units to Mindanao and the restrictions imposed by the U.S. Embassy on travel of advisors have combined to make equipment utilization surveys impossible for the preponderance of MAP provided equipment.

(U) CHJUSMAGPHIL Ground Transportation. Review of motor transport records indicated an apparent excess of eight vehicles or 18% of total assigned assets. It was further noted that there are currently both centralized and de-centralized dispatch procedures. It appears that a single centralized system would improve utilization and provide the basis for subsequent evaluation of ground transportation requirements.

(C) Both the Philippine Army and the Constabulary have completed a rapid and reasonably successful mobilization during the past twelve months. Faced with an active insurgent threat in several parts of the archipelago and simultaneously tasked with new and demanding missions stemming from the implementation of martial law, both services responded in a truly commendable manner. The magnitude of this military establishment is evidenced in the threefold increase in the number of army combat battalion as well as in the two fold increase in constabulary battalions. This effort has been paralleled by an equally well planned and executed formation of the necessary joint headquarters for command and control. All of this occurred during a period in which the major portion of the ground forces were actively committed to operations throughout the Republic of the Philippines.

(C) The Philippine Army has accomplished in little more than one year an expansion which was originally conceived and planned for at least a three year timeframe, by utilizing every available resource and devising a new system of incorporating twenty-year-old trainees into units cadred by seasoned veterans.

(C) The major tasks in the implementation of martial law and the re-establishment of peace and order throughout the Republic have been assigned to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Like the Army, the Constabulary has expanded its maneuver strength rapidly, fielding five new battalions in less than a year and providing the bulk of the leadership required in joint operations against the insurgents. It is a great credit to the flexibility and ingenuity of the Constabulary that they also rose to the non-military challenges of the martial law situation and successfully carried out such tasks as providing certain local government services and supervising the control and distribution of prime commodities.

(C) Concurrent with the military efforts of the ground forces, both the Philippine Army and Constabulary have participated fully in establishing broad peaceful means for cementing relations between the government and the people and improving living conditions of the population as a whole through the Home Defense Program.

Navy, Marine and Coast Guard Activities:

(U) The organization within the JUSMAG to manage the Navy portion of the Philippine MAP is considered to be effective within certain well defined limitations. The major problems impacting on efficiency appear to be:

- Lack of personnel continuity caused by a recent wholesale turnover of Navy Division personnel, a general lack of prior MAP training and orientation and the vacancy of one important billet in the logistics area (Ship Repair & Maintenance Officer).

• The inability (Primarily a U.S. policy problem) of the Navy Division to speak to their counterparts authoritatively on Philippine Navy force development matters, particularly in the area of USN ship transfer planning. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Navy Division is capable of fulfilling its mission and is performing well.

(U) The Philippine Navy is tasked with an extensive and manifold national mission using available resources not equal to the task. The fleet is, for the most part, obsolete, and available U.S. support for it in the form of spare parts, and MAP funding in general, is necessarily dwindling. Equally serious is an apparent insufficient level of national defense budget funding allocated to the Navy, and a current government policy greatly limiting local procurement authority. However, the basic logistics framework of the Philippine Navy appears to be well founded, with an organized command and staff network at headquarters level and below, plus a reasonably well developed industrial plant at the Cavite and Sangley Point depot level logistics facilities. Training is considered adequate with minor exception in some technical areas. Specialized Navy units such as the Marine Corps and the Underwater Operations Unit have expanded rapidly in the recent past without a requisite increase in either MAP or national priorities. Notable, however, in the Philippine Navy is the momentum of its self-reliance effort, the substantial physical improvements at Cavite Naval Shipyard, the small ship/craft development and construction initiatives, and the superior state of training of the Marine Brigade.

Communications-Electronics

(U) The communications-electronics function within CHJUSMAGPHIL is being performed effectively. Communications within the Armed Forces of the Philippines were considered marginal due to the critical shortage of tactical radios, lack of a complete longlines communications system, and the age and condition of equipment in the PAF Air Defense Communications System. Efforts to procure more tactical radios by the JUSMAG and GOP are considered positive and appropriate. The half-completed longlines system, Foresight Sierra, is progressing well and is on schedule. JUSMAG has initiated a program to upgrade the Air Defense Communications System through CINCPAC, and CINCPAC has in turn tasked PACAF to assist the JUSMAG. Internal communications support to the JUSMAG is considered essential and is adequate. There is an immediate need to provide an improved and expanded calibration capability to the Philippine Ground Force.

Comptroller

(U) The comptroller function within CHJUSMAGPHIL was being performed in a most efficient manner considering the diversity of responsibilities stemming from divergent fiscal relationships with component services, the Embassy and

the AFP. Shortcomings identified in audit of funds and administration of the agent cashier fund account were considered minor in nature.

Thailand

FY 73/74 MAP Funds

(S) The security assistance program in Thailand changed from Service funding to MAP funding under the Foreign Assistance Act in FY 73. MASF dollar guidelines in FY 72 increased from the original $68 million to a final FY 72 figure of $92.24 million. This increase was partially the result of the one-time program called Additional Assistance to Thailand. By the end of calendar 1972, the DOD had set an interim CRA level for FY 73 of $37.875 million, reduced from the initial dollar guideline of approximately $60 million. This reduction had elicited lengthy and detailed protests from the U.S. Ambassador to the State Department.[1]

(S) The strong representations from the Ambassador were supported by CINCPAC, whose concern over the political and military implications of the reduced MAP funding was stated on 6 January 1973. Nevertheless, the State Department affirmed that the CRA level of $35.8 million, excluding supply operations, was probably the most that would be available, given the mood of Congress regarding foreign aid. Since, by 1 February 1973, $30 million of that amount had already been obligated, and in view of the important political aspects of the Thai MAP, State and DOD jointly requested a re-examination of funding priorities for the $6 million balance. On 12 February, program changes were submitted by the Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI) amounting to $5,884,067.[2]

(S) On 10 March, Admiral Gayler invited the attention of the Chairman, JCS to the Thai MAP level. CINCPAC and the U.S. Ambassador were in agreement that every effort should be made to identify major EDA items which could be used to offset the FY 73 MAP fund reductions. They also agreed that the maintenance of the planned level of $57.3 million for FY 74 was very important to the preservation of U.S.-Thai relationships. In the immediate months, however, CINCPAC suggested some project with high visibility; specifically, he urged the support of the Chairman to have the C-123Ks then in the PACOM declared excess to satisfy area MAP requirements, with 16 allocated to Thailand. On 30 March, the DOD informed CINCPAC that the Service departments had offered a large list of EDA for consideration by the Royal Thai Government (RTG). The

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 457-461.
2. J837 HistSum Feb 73; SECSTATE 019425/011945Z Feb 73; MACTHAI 120745Z Feb 73.

THAILAND

(as of 1 Aug 73)

BASIC INFORMATION [18]

AREA	200,000 SQ. MI.	LIFE EXPECTANCY	48 YEARS
POPULATION	39,700,000	GROSS NAT PROD FY74	$8.26 BIL
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.6%	PER CAPITA	$208
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.8 ACRE	DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED FY74	$301.5 MIL
LITERACY RATE	65-70%	AS % GNP	3.65%

DEFENSE BUDGET INCLUDES INTERNAL SECURITY

[12]

CINC - Thanniphon Adundet
PRIME MINISTER AND COMMANDER THAI ARMED FORCES - FIELD MARSHAL Thanom Kittikachorn
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND CINC ARMY - FIELD MARSHAL Prapass Charusathien
CINC NAVY - ADM Kamol Sitakalin
CINC AF - AIR CHIEF MARSHALL Boonchoo Chandrubeksa



OVERALL OBJECTIVES [18]

ASSIST THAILAND IN SUSTAINING NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN STRENGTHENING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY AND RESISTING POSSIBLE OVERT AGGRESSION PROMOTE REGIONALISM AND ASSURE US BASE RIGHTS

U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR (DESIGNATE)
HON WILLIAM R. KINTNER
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. REY M. HILL
COMUSMACTHAI & CHIEF JUSMAG-THAI
MAJ GEN
Thomas W. Mellen, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES [18]

1. Assist in obtaining and maintaining necessary rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements for U.S. and allied forces, and deny them to forces opposed to U.S. interest.
2. Assist RTG to develop the capability to suppress Communist insurgency and to maintain internal security.
3. Provide support for the development of Thai military capabilities to defend against limited external military threats.
4. Minimize any adverse impact of military programs on Thai economic and social development.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES [53] FY 78

ARMY	6 INF DIVS, 1 MECH BDE (SEP), 3 SF GP, 1 ABN BN, 1 LRRP CO, 1 AIR DEF CMD, 3 AIR MOBILE CO, 1 LT AVN CO, 1 MI BN, 2 ENG BN, 1 PSY OPS BN. STRENGTH: 171,300.
NAVY	2 DF, 6 PF, 2 PC, 7 PCF, 1 PGM, 40 PBR, 23 RIVER WARFARE CRAFT, 47 AMPHIB LANDING CRAFT, 1 LFS, 2 AKL, 2 AO, 1 ASW PATROL (S2F), 1 UTIL SQDN (HU-16 & C-47), 1 RECON SQDN (O-1). STRENGTH 22,453.
MARINES	6 INF BN, 1 HQ, 1 ARTY REGT, 1 HQ BN, 1 SVC BN, 1 MT BN. STRENGTH: 16,747.
AIR FORCE	1 TFS (JET), 7 TFS (COIN) 3 TRANSPT SQ, 2 TAC SPT SQ 3 HEL SQ, 7 ACW SITES 42,100

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES [33]

ARMY. 5 INF DIV, 3 SF GRP, 1 RCT, 1 ARN BN, 40 RGR TM, 2 ADA BN, 1 ARTY BN, 1 LT AVN CO, 3 AMBL CO. TOTAL STRENGTH 133,300. AS OF: 1 JUL 73

NAVY. 1 DD TYPE, 28 COASTAL PATROL TYPES, 31 RIVER PATROL TYPES, 18 MINE WARFARE TYPES, 48 AMPHIBIOUS TYPES, 4 AUXILIARY TYPES, 1 ASW SQ (S-2), 1 UTILITY SQ (HU-16, C-47), 1 RECON/CLOSE SPT SQ (O-1), 1 MAR BDE, 4 MAR INF BN, 1 MAR ARTY BN. TOTAL STRENGTH 27,390 (INCLUDES 8,890 MARINES AS OF: 1 JUL 73

AIR FORCE. 7 TAC FTR SQ (1 F/RF-5, 3 T-28, 1 OV-10, 1 A-37, 1 AU-23), 1 TAC RECON SQ (T/AT/RT-33), 2 TAC SPT SQ (1 O-1, 1 AC/EC-47), 2 HELO SQ (1 UH-1B, 1 CH-34), 2 TRANS SQ (1 C-123, 1 C-47), 1 UTILITY SQ (T-41). TOTAL STRENGTH 40,519. AS OF: 1 JUL 73

COMBAT CAPABILITY [13]

MODERATE CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. LACK OF EFFECTIVE LOGISTICAL SYSTEM; TOO MUCH DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES.

LIMITED ABILITY TO CONDUCT COASTAL DEFENSE AND PATROL IN GULF OF THAILAND AND INTERNAL WATERWAYS, LIMITED ASW AND MINE WARFARE; TRANSPORT AND AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT.

LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AND CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY; DAY AIR DEFENSE. ARMY AIR ARM HAS LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PERFORM OBSERVATION AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 139.

list included tanks, trucks, artillery, ammunition and several kinds of aircraft, including eight C-123Ks.[1]

(S) Unfortunately, as the CINCPAC J8 staff noted, rehabilitation, support equipment, spare parts and training to assimilate this infusion of EDA would require a sizable sum of money; the only money immediately available was the FY 73 unobligated balance, which was needed for O&M costs. The DOD granted authority to discuss with RTG officials the possible assumption of O&M costs by the RTG budget, and "low key" discussions were begun between U.S. advisors and Thai Service counterparts. The general reaction of the Thai Service chiefs was favorable, but the inflexibility of the RTG budget made accurate projections of U.S. fund levels imperative. Since the U.S. security assistance advisors could not predict future grant aid levels, and since, in any case, investment items generated high O&M costs, it was manifesty impossible to provide definite figures for Thai budgeting purposes. In what appeared to be an attempt to solve the O&M versus investment dilemma, the DOD proposed that fixed percentage levels be established for investment and O&M in the POM for FY 75-79. The POM already projected the phase-out of O&M funding in the Thai MAP by 1979. CINCPAC did not agree, noting that MAP objectives could not be met unless a degree of flexibility was allowed in the MAP. CINCPAC recommended that the POM not be so modified, and that the guidelines which deliberately phased out O&M support by 1979 be deleted.[2]

(S) By October 1973, it was apparent that the alarm expressed by the U.S. Mission in Thailand and CINCPAC regarding FY 73 funds had not registered in Washington. Except for administration and training, FY 74 CRA funds had not been allocated to Thailand. Shortages in spare parts and other O&M requirements had already reduced the operational capability of the RTG Armed Forces (RTARF). As noted previously in this chapter, the worst was yet to come. The final appropriation for FY 74 was at the same level as the CRA for FY 73--$35.8 million.[3]

Disposal of Surplus Equipment

(S) The procedures to be used by the United States to dispose of surplus property in Thailand during the phased withdrawal of U.S. Forces caused consider-

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1. J838 HistSum Mar 73; CINCPAC 102229Z Mar 73; J837 Point Paper, 30 Mar 73, Subj: Low Level of Thailand Military Assistance Program.
2. Ibid.; J838 HistSum Jun 73; COMUSMACTHAI 040830Z Jun 73; J8331 HistSum Jul 73; J833 HistSum Jul 73; CINCPAC 180118Z Jul 73.
3. J8331 Point Paper, 3 Oct 73, Subj: Thailand FY 74 MAP CRA Funding; also see Section II, this chapter.

able discussion concerning their impact on U.S.-Thai relationships. Also involved in these discussions was the Unger-Dawee agreement pertaining to the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) in Vietnam. A third factor bearing on equipment disposal was the reduction in strength and eventual withdrawal from Laos of the paramilitary Special Guerilla Units (SGUs). The most long standing of these considerations was the matter of the RTAVF equipment. On 9 November 1967, the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Leonard Unger, consummated an agreement with the Air Chief Marshall Dawee, Chief of Staff, RTARF, regarding the deployment of a Thai division to Vietnam. Among the commitments made by the U.S. to assist the RTG in funding this deployment was the transfer of equipment possessed by the Thai forces in Vietnam to the RTG upon redeployment to Thailand. In 1971, the redeployment of the RTAVF began; as they redeployed, their equipment was transferred to the RTG. A review of the RTAVF equipment revealed shortages, based on the pre-embarkation inventory, amounting to $3.9 million. In April 1972, the DOD authorized an increase to the FY 72 MASF program to compensate for the deficit.[1]

(S) Because some of the needed equipment was not available within the FY 72 cycle, only $1.06 million of the RTAVF shortfall was funded, leaving a deficit of $2.87 million carry over to FY 73 and FY 74. High priority items and FY 73 fund cutbacks precluded the funding of the $2.87 million in FY 73.[2]

(S) In April 1973, a joint DOD/State/CIA decision was made to retain a Thai SGU at least through FY 74. The force was to be garrisoned and trained in Thailand after withdrawal from Laos. In June, MOUs were executed between the RLG and the U.S. pertaining to the phased deactivation of the SGU battalions and the return of equipment to U.S. control (less 34 trucks and 12 105mm howitzers). At the same time, it was agreed that the SGU equipment would be transferred to the RTG as it became available. In August, MACTHAI requested guidance as to whether the SGU equipment would be charged against the EDA ceiling for Thailand. CINCPAC supported the MACTHAI recommendation that, instead, the equipment be provided under an exception to policy and at no cost to the funded program. CINCPAC also suggested that consideration be given to off-setting the $2.877 million RTAVF equipment shortage with SGU equipment. On 16 August, the DOD advised CINCPAC that the SGU transfer to the RTG would be on the basis of a one-time EDA procedure at no cost to the MAP. The DOD witheld a decision on the RTAVF recommendation pending receipt of Country Team comments.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 459, 460; for a discussion of U.S. Force reduction in Thailand, see Chapter III.
2. J833 Point Paper, 4 Oct 73, Subj: RTAVF Equipment Shortages (TOE).
3. CINCPAC 110241Z Apr 73 (NOTAL); J833 HistSum Aug 73; COMUSMACTHAI 070640Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 120230Z Aug 73; SECDEF 4294/162308Z Aug 73.

(S) The Embassy and MACTHAI did not agree with CINCPAC's suggestion that SGU equipment be offered to the RTG as compensation for the RTAVF shortages, partly because of potential political repercussions and partly because the SGU equipment was not compatible with the RTAVF shortages. The Embassy noted that the RTG request for SGU equipment was based on the turnovers of equipment to Vietnam and Korea following conclusion of the wars in those countries. The Thai considered the RTAVF equipment and the SGU equipment to be different, unrelated matters. To press them on the point would, "...probably be abrasive and would doubtless raise questions of our good faith...."[1]

(S) CINCPAC acknowledged the views of the Country Team, and supported the MACTHAI recommendation for one-time authority to supply the Thai Border Police Patrol and Thai National Police with 4,600 M-16s as an exception to MAP policy. On the last day of August, the DEPCH Udorn advised CINCPAC that the first increment of SGU equipment was ready for transfer to the RTG. On the same day, the Embassy informed the State Department that the RTG was not pressing MACTHAI to fill the RTAVF equipment shortfall, apparently because the Thai were experiencing some difficulty in absorbing previously furnished RTAVF equipment. The Embassy suggested, therefore, that the RTAVF deficit be established as a separately identifiable item in the world-wide MAP presentation for FY 75 and FY 76. This delay would allow time to re-structure the FY 73 and FY 74 programs to adjust to the new funding levels. As an alternative, the Embassy suggested that EDA might be located which could be rehabilitated, but stressed that the U.S. commitment was for equipment in like-new condition.[2]

(S) The Embassy/MACTHAI request for an exception to policy transfer of rifles to the Thai police was disapproved by State and Defense. In September, the first offer of SGU equipment amounting to approximately $2.5 million was accepted by the RTG, but no solution to the RTAVF impasse had been found by the end of the year.[3]

(S) Meanwhile, the issue of property disposal in connection with planning for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Thailand was raised by MACTHAI. A portion of the MACTHAI comment on this issue was related to the actions discussed in the Logistics chapter of this history regarding consolidation of functions:[4]

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 13273/231203Z Aug 73; MACTHAI 280855Z Aug 73.
2. CINCPAC 290453Z Aug 73; J833 HistSum Sep 73; DEPCH JUSMAG Udorn 311030Z Aug 73; AMEMB Bangkok 3616/310354Z Aug 73.
3. J8331 Point Paper, 4 Oct 73, Subj: Returned SGU equipment.
4. COMUSMACTHAI 281006Z Aug 73.

* * * * *

Prior to the assumption of world-wide property disposal responsibility by DSA in June 1973, the Air Force, based on lessons learned at Takhli, determined that for future base closures in Thailand, the abandonment method of transfer of surplus property was the most feasible and generally acceptable. All other alternatives being rejected for political, legal, economic or procedural reasons. With AMEMB priority interest, CSAF took over one year to make this unilateral determination. If such CSAF determination is honored by DSA, as has been recommended, we would expect the method to apply to all sources. We expect the legality and mechanics of who can make a determination to abandon or donate surplus property will be questioned at all levels, although normally the sums involved are relatively low. The problem appears that no single agency, including DSA, is charged to make the determination of total cost for surplus property redistribution or sales, to include political considerations, versus return to the U.S. The USAF has appointed 13AF as agent to make such cost determination for USAF tenanted bases in Thailand. Formalization of the same methodolgy for all services and activities for base close-outs in Thailand is required.

(S) Based on the foregoing, MACTHAI requested authority to conduct the property disposal program in Thailand on the same basis as had been delegated to MACV in Vietnam. CINCPAC did not address the delegation of authority, but recommended that EDA generated as a result of base closures and granted to Thailand be accounted for separately and not charged against EDA ceilings. He concurred in the MACTHAI postulation of universal application of a donation policy, and cited the Defense Property Disposal Manual as authority for the Embassy to establish procedures which best serve U.S. foreign policy. On 15 December, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the Service secretaries had been tasked to review equipment in the hands of U.S. Forces in Thailand in order to identify:[1]

- Which equipment is surplus to readiness needs or would be more efficient to leave in Thailand.

- What equipment can be properly utilized by the RTAF.

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1. Ibid.; JCS 7196/151848Z Dec 73.

- Significant legal, operational or budgetary constraints identified in equipment transfer.

(S) On 21 December, CINCPAC transmitted to the JCS some comments regarding the overall planning for reductions of U.S. Forces and headquarters in Thailand. In reference to the disposal of equipment, CINCPAC stated that the decision on equipment to be donated to the RTG should be made by the Services based on need and budgetary constraints. Equipment provided should be in accordance with JSOP specifications; the sophistication of the equipment and O&M costs should be primary considerations in determining what equipment could be used. Regarding communications equipment, CINCPAC believed that much of the fixed Integrated Communications System (ICS) assets could be used by the RTARF if test/maintenance equipment, parts and training were made available. However, such a turnover would exceed MAP funds programmed for communications-electronics items for several years. CINCPAC and MACTHAI awaited further guidance at the end of the year.[1]

Termination of MAP Support to Thai R&D

(S) In September 1973, the DSAA questioned the authority by which MAP support was provided to the RTARF Military Research and Development Center (MRDC). The establishment of the MRDC in 1971 had been followed by the cessation of all joint research projects and the inactivation of the U.S. Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in 1972. CINCPAC responded to the DSAA on 29 September, citing the joint State/Defense authority for MAP support to the MRDC; recommended continued MAP support; and requested release of the FY 73 funding which had been withheld by DSAA. Subsequent correspondence did not resolve the objections of DOD, and, on 6 November, the DSAA advised that MAP support was terminated, effective that date. The question of MACTHAI advisory spaces for R&D was in limbo at the end of the year. MACTHAI recommended that the advisory spaces be eliminated by the end of FY 74. However, the CINCPAC Operations staff supported retention of the spaces through FY 76.[2]

Republic of Vietnam

(S) The possible reversion of the security assistance programs for Laos and Vietnam from MASF to MAP funding was discussed in Section II of this chapter.

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1. CINCPAC 210114Z Dec 73.
2. J342 HistSum Sep 73; SECDEF 8371/262045Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 290322Z Sep 73. J83 HistSum Nov 73; SECDEF 5362/062058Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 080309Z Nov 73; MACTHAI 150430Z Nov 73; J833 Point Paper, 4 Oct 73, Subj: MAP Support of Thai Military Research Projects.

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

(as of 1 Aug 73)

BASIC INFORMATION J8

AREA	66,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	18.8 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.4%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	1.1 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	50-65%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	40-45 YEARS
GROSS NAT PROD 1967(E) (in constant prices)	$5.2 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$278
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCE 1971(E)	$1.1 BILLION
AS % OF GNP	35.0

PRESIDENT - Nguyen Van Thieu
VICE PRESIDENT - Than Van Huong J2
PRIME MINISTER - Tran Thien Khiem
CHIEF, JOINT GEN STAFF - GEN Cao Van Vien
COMMANDER VNAF - MAJ GEN Tran Van Minh
COMMANDER VNN - RADM Tran Van Chon
COMMANDER VNMC - LT GEN Le Nguyen Khang



OVERALL U. S. OBJECTIVES J8

TO IMPROVE AND MODERNIZE THE RVN FORCES AND TO ENABLE THEM TO COPE WITH THE ENEMY THREAT AS U. S. AND OTHER FWMAF REDEPLOY FROM SEASIA.

U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION PA1

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. GRAHAM A. MARTIN

U.S. AID DIRECTOR
HON. JOHN R. MOSSLER
DAO
MGEN JOHN E. MURRAY

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

(A) To assist the Republic of Vietnam in developing an improved and modernized Armed Force which is self-sufficient with manpower and operational capability to:

- Defend against the NVA/VC threat both internal and external with decreasing support from U.S. and Allied Forces.
- Assist in creating and maintaining an environment within which the people of South Vietnam can be self-governing.

	MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES FY78 J53	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES J3	COMBAT CAPABILITY J3
ARMY (ARVN)	11 INF DIVS, 1 ABN DIV, 18 ARMD CAV SQ, 3 TK BNS, 61 ARTY BNS, 4 ADA BNS, 12 RNGR BNS, 33 RNGR BORDER DEF BNS, 10 MP BNS, 34 ENG BNS, 16 SIG BNS, 5 POLWAR BN, STRENGTH: 450,367.	11 INF DIV, 1 ABN INF DIV, 2 INF REGT, 1 RGR CMD, 1 RGR/ABN BN, 1 A M CMD, 1 ARTY CMD. TOTAL STRENGTH 488,953. AS OF: 1 JUL 73	CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY OF MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AND PRIMARY LOCs AND OFFERING EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE AGAINST AN ATTACK BY EXTERNAL FORCES. PROLONGED RESISTANCE MUST BE SUPPORTED BY US AIR, NAVAL AND LOGISTICAL ASSETS.
NAVY (VNN)	PRIN COMBATANTS 165: (DE, WHEC, PCE, PF, PGM, PCF, WPB); HARBOR DEFENSE 93: (PRB, LCPL, BW); RIVERINE 592: (PBR, RPC, LCM, ATC); COASTAL PATROL 238: (JUNK, RAIDERS); AMPHIB 13: (LST, LSSL); LOG CRAFT 379: (BW, LCM, LCVP), MINE WARFARE 47(LCM, MSM). 40,951	2 DD Types, 7 WHEC Types, 156 COASTAL PATROL Types, 23 COASTAL JUNK PATROL Types, 592 RIVERINE FORCE, 93 HARBOR DEFENSE, 47 MINE WARFARE Types, 13 AMPHIBIOUS Types, 348 LOG & SPT FORCE. TOTAL STRENGTH 40,951. AS OF: 1 JUL 73	CHARGED WITH PATROLLING INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL WATERS. SUPPORTS ARMY COUNTER-INSURGENCY ACTIONS.
AIR FORCE (VNAF)	19 TAC FTR SQNS, 8 LN SQNS, 2 RECON SQNS, 5 TRANS SQNS, 25 HELO SQNS, 6 SPEC MISSION SQDN. 64,507.	19 FTR SQ(3 A-1, 6 F-5, 10 A-37), 2 RECON SQ(1 EC-47, 1 RC-47), 25 HELO SQ(21 UH-1, 4 CH-47), 5 TRANS SQ(3 C-7, 2 C-130), 3 GUNSHIP SQ (1 AC-47, 2 AC-119), 8 LN SQ (0-1, 0-2, U-17), 1 SPT SQ(VC-47). TOTAL STRENGTH 64,507. AS OF: 1 JUL 73	CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING STRIKE OPERATIONS; PROVIDING CLOSE TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR ARMY, AND LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF ABN OPNS.
MARINES	1 INF DIV (9 INF BNS, 3 ARTY BNS, 1 ENGR BN, 1 COMMO BN) 14,145.	1 DIV. TOTAL STRENGTH 14,402 AS OF: 1 JUL 73	MARINE DIVISION PROVIDES STRATEGIC RESERVE.
TERRITORIAL FORCES	360 RF BN HQ RF RIFLE CO 1810 STRENGTH: 324,799. 6,699 PF PLATOONS STRENGTH: 223,401	1,810 RF CO. TOTAL RF STRENGTH 324,501. 6,699 PF PLAT. TOTAL PF STRENGTH 200,028. AS OF: 1 JUL 73	CONDUCT UNILATERAL AND COMBINED OPERATIONS AGAINST LOCAL FORCE VC UNITS TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR HAMLETS AND VILLAGES AND SECURE LOC'S.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 73, p. 138.

The Laos program was changed from MASF to MAP effective 1 July 1974 by Congressional action. By DOD direction, the Vietnam MASF program was changed from Category I to a modified Category IV effective 1 July 1973. The procedures of normal MAP funding, programming and lead times were imposed, but the flow and control of data was through the component Services with funding direct from the budgets of the military departments. Until the cease-fire, the administration of MASF and other assistance to Vietnam was accomplished within the COMUSMACV command structure under guidelines specified in the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan (CRIMP). As negotiations in Paris for the cease-fire progressed, projects ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS accelerated the delivery of MASF-supplied equipment.[1]

CRIMP/Vietnamization[2]

(S) As the force structure goals for the RVN Armed Forces (RVNAF) were melded with the massive infusions of equipment under the logistics enhancement projects, the use of the CRIMP acronym gradually decreased. Vietnamization emerged as the phrase to describe the post cease-fire assimilation of equipment and the RVNAF advancement toward self-sufficiency. At the end of FY 73, the RVNAF strength, in thousands, was:

	Actual 1 Jul 73	Authorized FY 74
Army (12 Div)	457	450
Navy (1,622 Craft)	41	40
Marines (1 Div)	15	14
Air Force (66 Squadrons)	60	65
Reg. Forces (1,679 Co.)	301	325
Pop. Forces (6,669 Plat.)	215	206
	1,089	1,100

(S) The ground units had been planned to develop a viable combat capability by the end of FY 71, with the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) assuming the major combat role. Project ENHANCE (May 1972) had added two air defense artillery battalions, three 175mm artillery battalions, two M48A3 tank battalions and 141 ground-mounted TOW anti-tank missile launchers to the ARVN. All of these units were activated between August 1972 and January 1973. By mid-1973, the major problem continued to be inexperienced leadership at lower officer and NCO level and lack

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 276-279 and Vol. II, p. 463.
2. J5354 Point Paper, 4 Oct 73, Subj: Status of Vietnamization.

of middle management effectiveness in combat service support. Vietnamization was being hampered by the inability of the ARVN to account for and operate an automated supply system.

(S) The long lead times needed to train pilots and maintenance technicians had limited the expansion of the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF). ENHANCE PLUS (November 1972) had added over 800 aircraft to the VNAF: two C-130 squadrons; five F-5A squadrons; three A-37 squadrons; five UH-1H squadrons and two special operations squadrons of UH-1s. Because of the pilot and maintenance personnel shortage, squadrons were activated with reduced equipment and programmed flying hours. The VNAF projected 100 percent manning by the end of 1973 and complete operational readiness (OR) of all squadrons by the end of FY 74.

(S) Because of the skilled mechanic shortage, the VNAF was heavily dependent on U.S. contractor support for aircraft maintenance and facilities engineering. Serious problems were evident in the C-130 OR rate. The 32 aircraft were habitually at 35 percent OR, and the contractor projected no get-well date. The overall VNAF OR was between 60 and 70 percent, but, without U.S. contract maintenance and support, the OR rate would drop significantly. As of 1 July 1973, the following was the VNAF force structure:

Squadrons	Activated	Aircraft
Fighter	19	455
Gunships	3	52
Liaison	8	256
Transport	5	80
Training	2	47
Special Ops.	1	10
Helicopter	25	894
Recce	2	60
	65	1,854

(S) All ships and craft programmed for the Vietnam Navy (VNN) had been turned over by September 1972. The VNN had assumed the riverine mission in 1970; the coastal interdiction mission in mid-1971; and the trawler infiltration (MARKET TIME) mission in 1972. However, the VNN support structure had been unable to keep pace with the operational requirements. The VNN ship overhaul output was increasing, but the shipyard was still unable to meet scheduled overhaul completion dates.

(S) The intelligence units of the RVNAF had achieved satisfactory in-country capability, but had almost no out-country capability. Shortfalls in Signal Intelligence recruiting, which were of long standing, continued to exist.

(S) The communications-electronics (C-E) program had made the RVNAF self-sufficient in that area. The single integrated military (telecommunications) system (SIMS) was owned, managed, operated and maintained by the RVNAF. Progress in the C-E program had allowed a decrease of 607 U.S. contractor personnel and 175 third country nationals between April and June 1973. Contractor costs were reduced from $2.6 million per month in March to one million dollars at the end of June 1973.

Future RVNAF Force Structure

(S) The future RVNAF force structure depended on the willingness of the United States to continue the high level of financial support provided in past years (in $ millions):1

FY 66*	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74**
677.4	1,203.5	1,054.5	1,608.2	1,684.1	1,874.5	1,839.5	2,387.7	1,099.4

* Includes $94.3 MAP.
**Programmed (incomplete fiscal year).

(S) The cease-fire agreement had included a condition that the RVN and North Vietnam begin to demobilize their forces. The RVN Joint General Staff (JGS) had initiated a study to reduce forces, excluding Popular Forces, by 150,000 to 200,000 in FY 74. This proposal was overtaken by the continued buildup of North Vietnam strength in the RVN after the cease-fire. From the U.S. standpoint, the U.S. Ambassador, DAO Saigon and the JCS were opposed to any demobilization during FY 74, but the DAO had been directed to forward a plan for general demobilization of the RVNAF during a time frame of FY 75 through FY 80. This study had not reached CINCPAC by the end of 1973. Meanwhile, CINCPAC had forwarded the JSOP submission for FY 76-83 which specified only 268,197 total RVNAF in a low-threat environment (effective cease-fire and withdrawal of major North Vietnam combat and combat support forces.[2]

RVN POM FY 75-79

(S) The trend of Congressional debate on foreign assistance in mid-1973 was toward the elimination of MASF programs. In preparation for the possible transfer of the RVN program from MASF to MAP, the DOD directed CINCPAC to submit a POM for Vietnam for FY 75 through FY 79. The DOD instructions were to assure the then current RVNAF force structure of 1.1 million men through FY 79, inclu-

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1. J5354 Point Paper, 29 Nov 73, Subj: Future RVNAF Force Structure.
2. Ibid.; J5311 Point Paper, 3 Jan 74, Subj: RVNAF Demobilization Study.

ding a 66 squadron VNAF capable of generating 12,000 attack sorties per month by the end of FY 75. The dollar guidelines were $895 million for FY 75; $792 million for FY 76; $772 million for FY 77; $770 million for FY 78; and $710 million for FY 79. These figures did not include training or supply operations costs.[1]

(S) During the development phase of the POM, the DATT, Saigon and the Ambassador concluded that the funding guidance could not be followed without reductions in force structure goals and substantial shortfalls of equipment and services. MGEN John O. Moench (OASD/ISA), during a visit to Vietnam, agreed to this approach. Accordingly, CINCPAC approved the POM as submitted by DAO Saigon for FY 75 which amounted to $1.341 billion, including PCH&T and training.[2]

(S) The basis for the permission granted to exceed the DOD guidelines was apparently a message transmitted to the State Department by the Ambassador some three weeks before CINCPAC approved the POM as submitted. In his message, the Ambassador advised State of his intention to submit the FY 75 figure of $1.314 billion, part of which was justified by his interpretation of Article 7 of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement. Article 7 limited the replacement of war materiel, on a piece-for-piece basis, to that which had been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire. The Ambassador noted that, despite ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS, authorized equipment shortages existed on 27 January 1973. The POM included items for both attrition and fill to authorized levels. It also included replacement of items on the basis of age or obsolescence (M-48 tanks for M-41s), and even programmed the replacement of F-5A aircraft by F-5Es of greater capability. The $1.3415 billion was itemized in the Ambassador's 6 September message (and in the POM) as $241.8 million for Investment; $940.4 million for O&M; $26.4 million for Administration; $14.6 million for training; and, $118.3 million for PCH&T. Of the $241.8 million for Investment, $86 million was to cover those items authorized the RVNAF which were not possessed on 27 January.[3]

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1. J834 HistSum Sep 73; SECDEF 9255/111654Z Aug 73.
2. J834 HistSum Sep 73; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 001179 of 27 Sep 73, Subj: Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) for Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Grant Aid FY 75-79, with 1 encl: POM for RVN Security Assistance FY 75-79; for previous mention of MGEN Moench, see Section I, this chapter.
3. AMEMB Saigon 15958/060445Z Sep 73; J834 Point Paper, 4 Oct 73, Subj: RVN POM FY 75-79; J834 Point Paper, 25 Oct 73, Subj: CINCPAC Support RVN War Materiel Replacement.

(S) On 4 December 1973, the position of the U.S. Mission in Vietnam relative to the security assistance program was presented for use during the MAAG Chiefs conference at PACOM Headquarters on 4-6 December. The DAO stated:[1]

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3. (S) Program Guidelines: It is the U.S. Mission position that U.S. security assistance for RVN must remain under MASF procedures as long as the level of current hostilities and enemy threat persist. If MAP procedures are directed, the continuing threat of major hostilities dictates the need for special legislation to program RVN security assistance separately from other MAP countries and under the more liberal parameters of the following program guidelines:

A. Maintain and modernize the present RVNAF force structure of 1.1 million men through FY 80, including a 66 squadron air force capable of generating about 12,000 attack sorties per month.

B. Provide equipment and munitions to support combat activity at the level since the cease-fire and provide reserves to meet a major offensive.

C. Provide for 100 percent fill of authorized requirements or maintain 28 Jan 73 inventory level, whichever is higher.

D. Authorize in-country procurement of specified commercial consummables and other items/services to enhance Vietnam self-sufficiency.

E. Base dollar value of program on the cost of validated requirements.

F. Finance from FY 74 MASF funds major item combat and attrition losses that have been identified during FY 74 as "deferred call forward" requirements.

(S) The DAO further stated that the dollar requirements submitted in September 1973 had already (December) been overtaken by price increases and

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1. USDAO 040849Z Dec 73.

adjusted requirements. Moreover, a project had been initiated to identify additional requirements to meet the increasing enemy threat. The DAO then submitted projected dollar guidance for FY 76-80, with the caveat that items not provided in the FY 74/75 programs would have to be added to these figures (in $ millions):[1]

FY 76	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80
1,205	1,223	1,281	1,284	1,278

(S) On 7 January 1974, the DOD directed CINCPAC to align the FY 75 RVN MASF program with what seemed to be an adjusted FY 75 POM level of $1.45 billion. On 11 January 1974, CINCPAC was also advised that the FY 74 MASF NOA for Vietnam was $820.5 million, which was $264 million less than the initial request to Congress.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 4-14 Jan 74.

SECTION IV - MAP TRAINING

The PACOM-Wide Program

Summary for FY 73

(C) Of the total PACOM grant aid program for FY 73 ($348 million), grant aid training costs were $9.56 million, or 2.76 percent of the total. There were 1,492 foreign military trainees trained in CONUS, and 4,856 trained at overseas locations. The MASF training programs for Vietnam and Laos were funded at $20.8 million for 1,396 trained in CONUS and 1,883 trained overseas. The PACOM country programs were:[1]

COUNTRY MAP	NUMBER TRAINED CONUS/OVERSEAS	COST
Afghanistan	13/0	198,810
Cambodia	165/4233	3,054,558
China	149/23	541,365
India	0/0	0
Indonesia	197/2	1,486,569
Korea	306/132	1,180,878
Malaysia	35/0	170,760
Nepal	6/0	33,215
Pakistan	81/0	284,180
Philippines	175/237	707,220
Sri Lanka	0/0	5,000
Thailand	365/229	1,610,830
PACOM Region	0/0	287,585
MAP Totals	1492/4856	$9,560,970
MASF		
Vietnam	1230/662	19,182,130
Laos	166/1221	1,615,448
MASF Total	1396/1883	$20,797,578
PACOM/MASF Training Totals	2888/6739	$30,358,548

1. J853 HistSum Jun 73.

FY 74 Training Program

(C) In Section I of this chapter, reference was made to the Administration proposal for a separate International Military Education and Training Program element for the Foreign Assistance Act. The Senate-House conference committee agreed to retain the training program as an integral part of MAP, and added $27.5 million to the authorization for grant military assistance.

(C) The FY 74 PACOM MAP training program contained 1,682 trainees programmed for CONUS training, and 7,395 programmed for overseas training at a cost of $11.813 million. For Laos and Vietnam, the MASF training program scheduled 2,005 CONUS and 1,057 overseas trainees, at a cost of $34.28 million.[1]

Value of MAP Training

(U) As a result of conclusions reached during a Washington conference on MAP training in August 1973, the Secretary of Defense (DSAA) requested information to aid in fund allocation decisions and effective evaluation. During the PACOM MAAG Chiefs Conference in December 1973, similar needs were expressed to cite examples of successes which supported the value of MAP training to the U.S. Government as well as the recipient countries. In the DSAA query, unified commanders were asked to determine, for each country, the objectives most applicable to that country; to obtain MAAG/Country Team views regarding the training needs of the host country by priority; to assess the views of the host country regarding its own training needs; to assess areas in which self-sufficiency had been attained, shown significant progress, or appeared unlikely within five years; the extent of MAAG influence over the content of the program; the degree of host country participation in program composition; and how, in countries with MAP and FMS, it was decided which requirements should be MAP-funded.[2]

(U) Illustrative of the country MAAG replies were those from the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) and the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea (JUSMAG-K). Both were MAP countries--one in Southeast Asia and one in Northeast Asia. The Chief, MEDTC identified the two most important objectives for MAP training to be effective operation and maintenance of MAP-furnished equipment and development of an indigenous training capability. The most urgent training needs of all Khmer Armed Forces (FANK) were in the broad areas of professional development and management. Within those areas, managerial skills, tactical proficiency and technical expertise were important to generate the confidence requisite to effective leadership. Considering the

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1. J853 HistSums Jul, Dec 73.
2. SECDEF 1147/232007Z Aug 73; CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 18 Dec 73-3 Jan 74, microfilm file, CINCPAC History Branch.

state of development of the FANK, the MEDTC listed ten training needs for all services in order of priority, but emphasized that all were of the highest priority. The FANK concurred with the priorities assigned, which ranged from training in command, combat, procurement, supply and maintenance at the top to health service, welfare and special services training at the bottom.[1]

(U) The FANK was necessarily self-sufficient in army recruit training since they could not be trained outside Cambodia, but much improvement was needed. The Cambodian Navy was self-sufficient in Navy boat crew training. Progress toward self-sufficiency was evident in English language training, rotary-wing pilot training and naval technical training. The lack of qualified indigenous instructors was the limiting factor in all areas. The MEDTC predicted self-sufficiency in all areas of training within five years, except for technical skills associated with newly-acquired equipment. The MEDTC exerted influence on the MAP training program primarily through fiscal constraints, equipment delivery schedules and end-item inspections. Training requests were joint MEDTC-FANK efforts based on identified training needs, availability of training, fiscal constraints, equipment delivery schedules, availability of qualified students and consideration of in-country training capability.[2]

(U) The reply from JUSMAG-K named the same two most applicable objectives for the Korean training program as had the MEDTC--ability to operate and maintain the MAP equipment and the development of indigenous self-sufficiency. The training needs of the Republic of Korea (ROK) armed forces were listed by service priorities. The Army needed air defense training, resources management training (supply, maintenance, fiscal), research and development training, technical training, and career specialists courses. The Air Force needed training to support the introduction of new equipment such as the F5-E, electronic countermeasures, radar modifications and radar training simulators. Resources management training was needed for procurement, personnel management, research and development, intelligence, communications and electronics. The Navy also needed training to support new equipment, such as destroyers and gunboats, technical instructors, and resources management training in ship engineering, maintenance, shipyard repair and senior officer management.[3]

(U) Self-sufficiency had been attained in English language training and Air Force flying training (except for new aircraft). Training progress had been made in automated data processing, precision measurement equipment, and air defense operators. The JUSMAG noted that the ROK armed forces had achieved basic

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1. CHMEDTC 12734/191440Z Nov 73.
2. Ibid.
3. CHJUSMAG-K 150929Z Nov 73.

self-sufficiency in most areas except the maintenance of air defense (missile systems) or other highly technical maintenance areas. Training facilities were austere by U.S. standards and training aids, facilities and courses needed to be upgraded. Self-sufficiency in the training required for new equipment and air defense training was not likely within five years. Most ROK training requirements were developed by the armed forces because U.S. advisors were not present at the field level. The programs were forwarded by the field units to the Ministry of National Defense (MND) for approval. After receipt, the JUSMAG determined the program content based on dollar ceilings, objectives, guidance from higher headquarters and in-country capabilities. Close coordination was exercised between the JUSMAG-K and the MND.[1]

(U) The later, and somewhat similar, survey requested by CINCPAC as a result of the PACOM MAAG Chiefs Conference was based upon examples of significant MAP training successes in these categories:[2]

* * * *

(1) Current national level leadership (military or civilian) whose ability has been developed through MAP training.

(2) Specific training programs which have materially enhanced the ability of a country to survive or to increase its viability/capability/stability.

(3) Training programs of such significance as to permit reduction of on-scene U.S. Force posture.

(C) Taking the same two country replies, the differences in cultural and political background, as well as the time periods of U.S. involvement, were evident. The MEDTC noted that most Cambodian senior leadership had been trained in France. A few senior military officers (brigadiers) had had MAP-supported training, but they were not in the highest echelon of national leadership. All of the military services had personnel who had attended U.S. Service schools under MAP CONUS training, but they were too junior to assume national leadership. These officers did, however, fill important staff positions and provided exemplary unit leadership in the field. Leading up to his final justification for MAP training of Cambodian military forces, the Chief, MEDTC stated:[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC MAAB No. 13, DTG 122034Z Jan 74.
3. CHMEDTC 14193/201236Z Dec 73.

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(1) The U.S. MAP program provided training for 78 mobile operations battalions, 268 regional infantry companies, 21 engineer companies and 5384 specialists for the Khmer Army in Vietnam, and 44 rifle companies, 22 special forces detachments and 87 military intelligence specialists in Thailand. Combined with 101 graduates of combat arms, combat support and service support schools in the United States, these trainees form the nucleus of the Khmer Army Forces.

(2) 843 Khmer Air Force maintenance specialists were trained in Vietnam, 50 pilots and 240 specialists received training in Thailand, 3 pilots and 13 specialists received training in CONUS. These coupled with 8 pilots and 24 specialists trained in CONUS under previous MAP, French and Communist Bloc programs form the nucleus of the Khmer Air Force.

(3) 61 boat crews, 1 1/2 naval infantry battalions and 223 navy maintenance specialists were trained in Vietnam; combined with 44 officers and specialists trained in the United States, these personnel form the nucleus of the Khmer Naval Forces.

(4) It is significant that the FANK expanded from 30,000 men to an approximate 230,000 man force in a period of 3 years, and fought a war for survival of the Khmer Republic in the midst of their expansion.

(5) MAP trained units and individuals constitute the difference between the untrained but enthusiastic volunteers who flocked to the colors after the fall of Sihanouk, and the much improved military force which has held its own against NVA/VC trained and supported Khmer Communist troops after the cessation of U.S. combat air support on 15 Aug 73.

(6) The cease fire in Vietnam on 28 January 1973 caused the closing of ARVN/US training centers for Khmers in Vietnam. Emphasis was shifted to in country training in the Khmer Republic. Six National Training Centers (5 MAP supported) were established, using instructor personnel trained in Vietnam, Thailand and the United States. A significant degree of training self-sufficiency has been achieved and continues to improve as additional trained instructor personnel return from CONUS and Thai training and are assigned to the training centers and Armed Forces Service Schools.

(7) Since the Khmer Government Forces are terrain limited (they must defend population centers), and since the harsh discipline of Communist forces is not going to be matched by a government dependent on popular support, military survival and eventual success depends on the efficient application of their most significant advantage, firepower. MAP supported U.S. mobile training teams have trained Khmer MTT's who have in turn trained Khmer artillery crews. Their professional use of artillery to replace U.S. combat air support has been a major factor in the survival of the Khmer Republic under determined and sustained enemy pressure, most recently in the defense of Kompong Cham, and in the effort to re-open Route 4 from Phnom Penh to the deep water port of Kompong Som.

(C) The Chief, MEDTC concluded by stating:[1]

(8) The real record of MAP training for the Khmer Armed Forces worthy of note in testimony before Congress is that the Khmers have been able to fight their own war, without U.S. advisors in the field, and without U.S. combat air support for the last five months, despite the judgment of many that they would collapse as soon as U.S. combat air support ceased. MAP supported training helped build that capability.

(C) By contrast, the JUSMAG-K cited an impressive aggregation of active and retired senior military officers who had received MAP training. Many of the retired officers had also assumed national leadership in the Korean Assembly, as Cabinet ministers, ambassadors and heads of Korean business concerns. The participation of these men in the MAP training program had proven to be of inestimable benefit to U.S.-Korean rapport and pro-American influence.[2]

(C) The most significant facet of the MAP training program accomplishments had been the establishment of a ROK in-country training base which produced sustaining military forces tailored to the environment in which they are likely to operate. The ROK Armed Forces had achieved a virtually self-sufficient training base in all areas except air defense, some resources management areas, and training required by introduction of new equipment. Effectiveness of the in-country training system was demonstrated by the performance and accomplishments of ROK forces which participated in the Vietnam conflict, and by the assumption by ROK forces of the defense duties along the DMZ separating North and South Korea.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. CHJUSMAG-K 190719Z Dec 73.
3. Ibid.

(C) Another significant facet of the MAP training program had been in the resources management area. Resources management training provided to the ROK influenced the evolution of the ROK defense organization to its current reasonably sophisticated structure. The past few years had seen the establishment of such resources management oriented organizations as the Ministry of National Defense, Agency for Defense Development, Korea Institute of Science and Technology and the Joint Procurement Agency. In the logistics area the ROK Air Force supply system had been partially automated, and automation of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps supply systems was programmed for the near future.[1]

(C) JUSMAG-K stated that, as a result of the MAP training program, the ROK Army was able to assume a HAWK missile battalion air defense mission in 1971. Moreover, the training program had contributed to a Korean military force strong enough to enable the U.S. to withdraw one infantry division and to reduce the JUSMAG-K strength from over 1,000 to less than 350 personnel in the past five years.[2]

The C-123K Training Program

(C) The C-123 transport aircraft had been the mainstay of the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) for many years. These MASF-furnished aircraft became surplus to the VNAF needs when large numbers of C-130s were delivered to Vietnam under the ENHANCE PLUS program in 1972. After initial allocations to Laos and Cambodia, the remainder of the C-123Ks were allocated to Thailand, the Philippines and Korea by the DOD in April 1973. Eight were allocated to Thailand, eight to the Philippines and 16 to Korea. Of the remaining 12, eight were designated for later allocation to the Philippines and four for PACOM C-123K attrition requirements.[3]

(C) Training of C-123K crews and ground maintenance personnel for Cambodia had already been approved by the Royal Thai Government (RTG) in March. Ground training was authorized at Don Muang Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB) and flying training at Kokethiem RTAFB. The allocations of C-123Ks to the other countries raised problems concerning scheduling of U.S. Air Force Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and Field Training Detachments (FTDs), as well as sufficient aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and spare parts to support air and ground crew training for the Philippines, Korea and Thailand.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 272-280; CINCPAC 072231Z Apr 73 (NOTAL), which cited SECDEF 052107Z Apr 73; 16 C-123Ks later allocated to Philippines, CINCPAC 040353Z May 73 (NOTAL).
4. CSAF 051925Z Mar 73; CHMEDTC 2083/081050Z Mar 73; MACTHAI 140215Z Mar 73; CSAF 112121Z May 73.

(C) In May, the Air Force advised CINCPAC that MTTs for Philippine Air Force (PAF) training would not be available until July. Also, the departure of MTTs from the CONUS to the Philippines would expend C-123K MTT resources since the Cambodian training had already begun in Thailand, and the limitations imposed by shortages of support equipment were again cited. Flyable storage training on C-123Ks was conducted from 22 May to 5 June at Clark Air Base for 22 PAF personnel in preparation for the receipt of 16 C-123Ks in June. The U.S. Air Force training personnel departed Clark Air Base for Taegu, Korea in June to instruct the ROK Air Force in flyable storage maintenance.[1]

(S) After proposals to combine Korean and Filipino aircrew and groundcrew training at Clark Air Base and to combine all training at Don Muang RTAFB in Thailand, CINCPAC recommended that the MTTs conduct training in each country separately. The CINCPAC position, based on political realities and funding problems, was supported by PACAF, MEDTC and the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI). On 20 June, CINCPAC advised all concerned that separate MTTs for the Philippines and Korea had been programmed.[2]

(C) CINCPAC also addressed the emerging support problems of AGE and spare parts. While acknowledging the priority of Cambodian C-123K training, CINCPAC expressed concern that available assets might be insufficient to support training and operations by the Khmer Air Force (KAF), operations by the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) and training for the other PACOM countries. The approximate programmed MTT schedule, as of 20 June, was an overlapping of dates: Until 1 October for the KAF; 11 July through 1 October for the PAF; 23 September through 12 December for the ROKAF; and Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) training concurrently with the KAF--from July through 5 November. CINCPAC recommended that a priority management system be applied to assure at least minimum support for all countries:[3]

- Attainment of operational status by the KAF and PAF.
- Continued operational support of the RLAF and training support for Korea.
- Training and operational support of the RTAF.

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1. CINCPAC 232354Z May 73 (NOTAL); J853 HistSum May 73.
2. CSAF 301903Z May 73; TAC 012205Z Jun 73; CINCPACAF 080045Z Jun 73; CHMEDTC 5776/120448Z Jun 73; COMUSMACTHAI 180735Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 200435Z Jun 73.
3. J815 Point Paper, 21 Jun 73, Subj: C-123K aircraft; CINCPAC 202225Z Jun 73.

(C) In July, CINCPAC requested DOD and the U.S. Air Force to expedite all actions necessary to insure early operational capability for the PAF. The Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF) acknowledged the CINCPAC request, noting that funds to deploy the MTT to the Philippines required a Presidential waiver before a MAP order to deploy the team could be issued. On 14 August, the CSAF advised the Tactical Air Command (TAC) that the Presidential waiver had not yet been signed for FY 74 funds. Moreover, the AGE and spare parts needed to conduct a viable training program had not yet been declared to be available. TAC had notified CSAF that the instructor pilots who would be deployed as part of the PAF MTT were unable to maintain proficiency because C-123s were unavailable in the active TAC force. On 12 October, the CSAF ordered the deployment of the MTT for flight maintenance to the Philippines.[1]

(U) Meanwhile, the MTT at Don Muang completed the flying training portion of the C-123K KAF flight crews on 2 October. On 16 October, the Chief, MEDTC expressed his personal appreciation for an outstanding training effort by the MTT, and noted the major role played by the KAF aerial resupply aircraft in the defense of Kompong Cham as evidence of training effectiveness.[2]

(U) The maintenance and flying training of PAF C-123K squadron cadre was completed on 21 December 1973, almost three weeks ahead of schedule. Maintenance training in Korea was completed on 20 December and the ground phase of flying training by FTDs was scheduled to begin on 21 January 1974. The spare parts situation was anticipated to be the best of any previous C-123K training program. AGE could still be a problem; however, the acquisition of these aircraft achieved a high priority goal in the PACOM--the significant improvement of the light/medium airlift capabilities of the recipient countries.[3]

Consolidation of Southeast Asia Air Training

(S) In November 1970, COMUSMACTHAI had proposed the establishment of a Southeast Asia Air Training Center. After staffing, CINCPAC concluded that this would not be beneficial. The proposal was revived by the DSAA in December 1972. Based on comments by CINCPAC and the CSAF, a JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommended against the proposal. The JCS found that the concept offered neither economic benefits nor improved efficiency. Moreover, the programmed attainment of training self-sufficiency by the Southeast Asian nations militated

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1. CSAF 132110Z Jul 73, which cited CINCPAC 040510Z Jul 73; CINCPACAF 142151Z Aug 73, which passed CSAF 132037Z Aug 73 to CINCPAC.
2. Det 11 AFCMC 030634Z Oct 73; CHMEDTC 11226/161320Z Oct 73.
3. CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Briefs, 18 Dec 73-3Jan 74 and 4-14 Jan 74; J85 HistSum Dec 73.

against a firm long range need for a consolidated center. The JCS recommended that no further action be taken.[1]

Country Training Programs

(S) Calendar year 1973 began with six MAP "training only" countries--Afghanistan, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The [redacted] became the seventh "training only" country on 1 July 1973, when grant material aid was terminated for FY 74 (see Section II, this chapter). The two most significant developments for training only countries during 1973 concerned India and Sri Lanka--the largest and the smallest, respectively, of the countries for which CINCPAC administered MAP programs. Of the major MAP recipients--Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, RVN and Thailand--the training program for Cambodia, where open hostilities continued throughout 1973, received priority attention.

India

(C) On 7 August 1973, the Office of the Defense Representative for India (ODRI) advised CINCPAC and the DOD that the Indian Army and Navy had accepted courses offered under MAP training for two officers. These acceptances represented the first since October 1971, and reportedly were the result of a policy review and decision by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.[2]

(C) CINCPAC's request for the ODRI views of the rationale for this policy change was answered by the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi on 23 August. The Embassy believed the change to be part of a slow movement toward improved relations between the U.S. and India, and could signify a lessening of suspicion of U.S. motives. The apparent change in policy could also reflect acceptance of U.S. initiatives for improving relations, a willingness to accept limited U.S. assistance in programs which would otherwise be funded by the Government of India (GOI) and a belief expressed in some GOI circles that the Government had tilted too far toward Russia and become too dependent on the Soviets. In any case, the Embassy noted that policy decisions with respect to the U.S. seemed to be made by Gandhi herself or within the circle of her closest advisors.[3]

(C) On 28 August, the DRI met with Indian Air Force (IAF) representatives to discuss the training programs for FY 74 and FY 75. The IAF accepted all

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 400, 401; J856 Point Paper, 11 Apr 74, Subj: Regional Training Centers for Asian Countries.
2. ODRI/New Delhi 319-73/071215Z Aug 73.
3. J853 HistSum Aug 73; AMEMB New Delhi 9827/231733Z Aug 73, which cited CINCPAC 182325Z Aug 73.

MAP TRAINING PROGRAM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1973

COUNTRY	FY74 1/	FY75 2/	FY76 2/	FY77 2/
AFGHANISTAN	$ 215,000	$ 210,600	$ 200,000	$ 200,000
CAMBODIA	5,806,000	4,789,000	3,100,000	2,800,000
CHINA	500,000	483,800	480,000	480,000
INDIA	200,000	133,900	120,000	100,000
INDONESIA	1,974,000	2,322,500	1,800,000	1,800,000
KOREA	2,411,000	1,500,000	500,000	–
MALAYSIA	200,000	284,300	230,000	230,000
NEPAL	30,000	37,500	30,000	30,000
PAKISTAN	243,000	352,400	350,000	300,000
PHILIPPINES	631,000	519,000	390,000	350,000
SRI LANKA	50,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
THAILAND	1,450,000	1,600,000	1,500,000	1,500,000
REGIONAL COSTS	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000
TOTAL PACOM	14,010,000	12,548,000	9,015,000	8,105,000

1/ Source: FY74 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD)

2/ Source: FY75-79 Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)

SOURCE: J812

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courses proferred for FY 74, which resulted in programming for 23 students in the CONUS at a cost of $182,890. For FY 75, the DOD informed the ODRI that the training program for India would be limited to $133,900, with smaller amounts for subsequent years. Since the ODRI had requested $250,000 for FY 75, the Embassy requested State Department assistance in obtaining reconsideration of the DOD-established level. The Embassy noted the close contacts maintained by Soviet military personnel with the Indian Armed Forces through sales to India and the manufacture in India of Soviet-licensed military equipment. The apparently receptive attitude of the GOI to the U.S. program made the contacts resulting therefrom especially important.[1]

(C) Although CINCPAC supported the request for an increase in India's FY 75 MAP training ceiling from $134,000 to $250,000, the DOD did not approve the request.[2]

Sri Lanka

(S) The other noteworthy development among the "training only" countries was the decision on 9 February 1973 by the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) not to pursue a request for Air Force training in the CONUS. This decision, according to the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, was apparently based on the Prime Minister's wish to maintain a balance between the U.S. and Russia. By deferring consideration for U.S. training, the GSL could also avoid sending trainees to Russia. The chief of the Sri Lanka Army, who had had a MAP training request for FY 75 already prepared, told the U.S. Defense Attache that he was surprised at the Prime Minister's decision. Upon query with the GSL, the Army general was authorized to convey, informally, the dilemma of the Prime Minister vis-a-vis pressure from "left-wing" cabinet mimisters to accommodate the Russians. The door was open for U.S. military training teams to enter Sri Lanka, since Russia and the PRC had had teams there in the past. However, the Ambassador recommended against this course because U.S. military presence would not be in consonance with the current U.S. policy of low visibility. Further, an in-country MTT would not provide the desired exposure to U.S. concepts envisioned in the CONUS training program. The Ambassador recommended that the GSL line item for training in the MAP budget be maintained in case of reconsideration by the Prime Minister; as of the end of 1973, however, no training program had been requested.[3]

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1. J853 HistSum Aug 73; ODRI/New Delhi 371-73/301345Z Aug 73; AMEMB New Delhi 10862/160456Z Sep 73.
2. CINCPAC 160456Z Nov 73 (NOTAL).
3. J853 HistSum Feb 73; USDAO Colombo Sri Lanka 071/070411Z Feb 73; AMEMB Colombo 0379/091140Z Feb 73; USDAO Colombo 583/031045Z Dec 73.

Cambodia

(C) Since the resumption of military assistance to Cambodia in late 1971, and continuing through 1972, most Cambodian military training had been conducted outside the country. By far the largest numbers of troops had been trained in Vietnam, but some training had taken place in Thailand. By late 1972, it was apparent to CINCPAC, the MEDTC and MACTHAI that the prudent course was to anticipate the pending Vietnam ceasefire provisions for withdrawal of all foreign forces from the RVN. The consensus was that Thailand offered the most feasible alternative location for Khmer training. Thus began a concerted effort by all U.S. organizations to establish Thailand as the training base for the Cambodian military forces.[1]

(C) The three main political events of 1973 in Southeast Asia--the Vietnam ceasefire, the Laotian armistice and the termination of U.S. Air Force operations in support of Cambodia--had the end result of generating ever-increasing pressure on the Cambodian military. The need for training became progressively more vital, and the acquisition of more and newer equipment from the U.S. accentuated this need. In November 1972, MACTHAI had advised CINCPAC and the MEDTC that RTG approval would be required for all additional Cambodian training programs, and that the RTG expected to provide that training which was within the ability of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) and Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF).[2]

(C) This stand by the RTG was unacceptable to the U.S. since the capacity for U.S.-conducted training in Thailand was finite, and the alternative was more expensive CONUS training for the Khmers. By the end of 1973, the RTA and RTAF had undertaken to conduct training courses in English, undergraduate pilot, air traffic controller, C-47 maintenance, O-1 flight, vehicle maintenance, communications supply, fuel quality control and artillery maintenance.[3]

(C) As of 31 December 1973, the RTA had trained 6,172 Cambodian Army students and the RTAF had trained 23 KAF students.[4]

(C) Meanwhile, the scope of U.S.-conducted military training for Cambodia in Thailand increased tremendously during 1973. Detachment One, 56th Special

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 396-401.
2. COMUSMACTHAI 021350Z Nov 72, cited in CINCPACAF 190131Z Jan 73.
3. J853 Point Paper, 19 Sep 73, Subj: Khmer Training Being Conducted by the Thais in Thailand; CINCPAC 040405Z Apr 73 (NOTAL); CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 11-17 Dec 73; CHMEDTC 5826/121232Z Jun 73.
4. J853 Hist Addendum, 2 Jul 74, which cited MACTHAI Ltr, J34 to CINCPAC, 9 Jan 74, with encl: Khmer Training Report, 9 Jan 74.

Operations Wing at Udorn began T-28 pilot training on 23 April. Maintenance training for T-28s began on 4 May. The C-123K aircrew and maintenance training discussed previously began on 9 May by U.S. Air Force MTTs. Training by a U.S. Air Force MTT for UH-1H helicopters began at Korat RTAFB on 30 April. Twenty-two students graduated on 24 May and the MTT returned to CONUS. Subsequent additional UH-1H pilot upgrade training by the U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand (USARSUPTHAI) was approved by the RTG on 7 August. This training was conducted by the 70th Aviation Detachment and completed in November.[1]

(C) The drawdown of C-47 pilots to furnish students for the C-123K training generated a "crash" program in June to train basic KAF pilots as C-47 co-pilots. Limited U.S. in-country Air Force instructor capability, however, prompted CINCPAC, MEDTC and MACTHAI to consider either CONUS training or Air America contract. The RTG disapproved KAF C-47 training by contractor, even though the RTAF could not provide French speaking instructor pilots to conduct the training. Further, the CSAF stated that the language barrier would render both CONUS and MTT training unsafe. By October, it appeared that an impasse had been reached in a training program described by MEDTC as becoming "more critical with each passing day."[2]

(C) A possible solution to the C-47 co-pilot dilemma was initiated when the State Department approved the concept that Cambodia approach the [redacted] for training assistance. The draft letter of request, prepared by MEDTC, was delivered by the KAF to the [redacted] Mission in Phnom Penh in October. On 5 November, the MEDTC explained the desired training to the MAAG [redacted], and on 5 December, the [redacted] approved the training of ten KAF C-47 co-pilots by the [redacted] The MAP Cambodia budget was to bear the tuition costs of $44,400. Ground school training was completed on 18 December, and flying training began on 19 December. Completion was estimated for mid-February 1974.[3]

(S) The association of the [redacted] with Cambodian training took an unexpected turn in August, apparently because of the 15 August cessation of operations by the U.S. Air Force. The [redacted] recalled from in-country its T-41 instructor pilots, artillery instructors and C-47 pilots. The C-47 pilots had been used to fly logistics missions in-country because of the shortage of KAF pilots. After

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1. MACTHAI 301105Z May 73; MACTHAI 071035Z Aug 73; MACTHAI 010652Z Nov 73.
2. CHMEDTC 6199/221050Z Jun 73; CSAF 041722Z Sep 73, which cited CINCPAC 042326Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 081852Z Sep 73; MACTHAI 201009Z Sep 73; CHMEDTC 10246/241215Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 310338Z Oct 73 (NOTAL).
3. J852 Point Paper, 25 Oct 73, Subj: Training for KAF O-1D FAC's and C-47 Co-Pilots; CHMEDTC 12095/051240Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 060441Z Dec 73 (NOTAL); CINCPAC J8 Weekly Executive Brief, 4-14 Jan 74.

high-level diplomatic representations between Cambodia, the [redacted] and the U.S., the T-41 and artillery instructors were returned to Cambodia in late September. The C-47 pilots had not returned by the end of the year.[1]

(S) Another indispensable element of KAF capability in the absence of operational support from the U.S. Air Force was the forward air controller (FAC). In August, discussion began concerning the use of RAVEN FACs of the U.S. Air Force as an in-place MTT for KAF training. The RAVEN FACs had been used in Laos and Cambodia to support RLAF, KAF and U.S. operations, and were on stand-by for possible contingency reentry to Laos by order of the State Department. Cambodian O-1D aircraft would be used to train ten KAF students as qualified FACs. On 16 August, CINCPAC concurred with the O-1D FAC proposal. On 31 August, the office of the U.S. Air Attache in Laos advised that release of the RAVEN FACs would violate the March 1973 State Department admonition to "take no steps which might impair existing U.S. or RLG military operational capabilities." On 6 September, CINCPAC requested the JCS and DOD to coordinate with the State Department for the release of five RAVEN FACs to form a KAF O-1D MTT. The DOD notified CINCPAC, on 10 September, that State concurred, provided that the capability to reconstitute the RAVEN force within 24 hours was retained.[2]

(S) After RTG approval, ten KAF student pilots entered ground phase training at Udorn RTAFB on 24 October. The RAVEN FACs were assigned to MEDTC on temporary duty, and the O-1Ds were maintained by contract. The course length, including ground and flying training, was estimated to be 20 weeks.[3]

(S) Another program which began in 1973 was KAF pilot training in the short takeoff and landing (STOL) AU-24. On 9 December 1972, COMUSMACTHAI had informed CINCPAC that the RTG had received a formal request from Cambodia to place U.S. MTTs in Thailand to train KAF AU-24A crew members and maintenance personnel. Sites under consideration by the RTG for this training included Takhli and Koke Kathiem RTAFBs. On 22 December, MACTHAI advised that the RTG had approved the training.[4]

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1. CHMEDTC 8340/111136Z Aug 73; AMEMB [redacted] 5383/040926Z Sep 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 9435/070245Z Sep 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 9496/081030Z Sep 73; AMEMB Phnom Penh 10059/201230Z Sep 73.
2. MACTHAI 221051Z Aug 73; CINCPACAF 060330Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 062317Z Sep 73, which cited CINCPAC 162102Z Aug 73 and SECSTATE 159126/102333Z Aug 73; SECDEF 4233/102220Z Sep 73, which cited SECSTATE 060000/312217Z Mar 73.
3. MACTHAI 181002Z Oct 73; J852 Point Paper, 26 Oct 73, Subj: Training for KAF O-1D FAC's and C-47 Co-Pilots; CHMEDTC 11745/271103Z Oct 73.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 398; CHMEDTC 0763/261057Z Jan 73, which cited COMUSMACTHAI 220754Z Dec 72.

- (C) After considerable discussion among CINCPAC, MEDTC, MACTHAI, CSAF, TAC and PACAF regarding the maintenance support for the AU-24 program, it was decided that maintenance would be by Air America contract. By 12 May 1973, 62 KAF air and ground crews had completed AU-24A training at Takhli.[1]

(S) Among the FANK training programs affected by the Vietnam ceasefire was that for Intelligence students. On 11 January 1973, an Intelligence course had begun in Vietnam under U.S. advisory auspices. The FANK had foreseen the possibility that events might require this training to be transferred; accordingly, they had made a formal request by letter to the RTG to that effect on 10 January. If approved, it appeared likely that a U.S. MTT would be needed to complete the course in Thailand since a U.S. Army MTT was already presenting the same course to the Thai. On 26 January, the RTG approved the transfer of the Intelligence MTT and the FANK students from RVN to Thailand. By mid-May 1973, 35 FANK students had completed the course, thus ending programmed Intelligence training for FY 73.[2]

(U) In March, USARPAC had proposed an Intelligence training program for FY 74, with a scheduled starting date of 20 August 1973. MACTHAI advised that, as of 8 August, the RTG had not received a formal letter from Cambodia requesting approval of the FY 74 program. Approval was received on 21 August from the RTG, and training for this course began on 2 September 1973.[3]

(C) To meet the requirement for accelerated expansion of the FANK artillery, the Chief, MEDTC requested assistance in the form of a U.S. Army artillery MTT in February 1973. An 11-man MTT from the U.S. Army Artillery School arrived in Thailand in April 1973 and established a base of operations at Koke Kathiem, Thailand, the location of the RTA artillery school. From April through June, the MTT provided instruction to Khmer artillery officers and non-commissioned officers of two 155mm howitzer batteries. Additionally, the MTT trained instructors from the Khmer artillery school on artillery procedure unique to the 155mm howitzer. The two increments of battery training were of six weeks duration, while the instructor course lasted an additional 12 weeks.[4]

(C) While the MTT was providing the training for a nucleus of FANK artillery expertise, the need to increase the quality and quantity of firepower available to entire FANK batteries was broached by the MEDTC in August 1973. The MEDTC

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1. CINCPACAF 010115Z Feb 73; AMEMB Bangkok 7865/210255Z May 73.
2. CHMEDTC 0734/251030Z Jan 73; MACTHAI 261045Z Jan 73; AMEMB Bangkok 7865/210255Z May 73.
3. MACTHAI 090703Z Aug 73; MACTHAI 270758Z Aug 73
4. CHMEDTC 201045Z Oct 73.

and MACTHAI had initiated negotiations for the RTA to conduct the training at the Thai artillery school. Because of initially exorbitant costs quoted by the Thai and their demands for improvement of artillery school facilities, the Chief, MEDTC requested CINCPAC to explore the alternatives. The MEDTC suggested the ROC, ROK or other capable PACOM country might provide the training at reasonable costs in their own country with their own equipment. The scope of training would involve up to three batteries of 94 men at one time, with up to nine batteries in all receiving the training. The trainees, both officers and men, would have had little or no formal artillery training, and interpreters would be used.[1]

(C) Answering CINCPAC's query, USARPAC stated that the 25th Infantry Division could conduct the artillery training in Hawaii. However, the cost would be prohibitive; the operational readiness of the 25th would be degraded; suitable barracks were not available; and the presence of so many Cambodian troops in Hawaii could draw national/international attention resulting in excessive press coverage and popular reaction not favorable to DOD and White House policy.[2]

(C) The Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSK) responded that the ROK reaction would probably be favorable, but at a price. COMUSK stated that the ROK possessed the capability to conduct the training, but any agreement would be preceded by hard bargaining caused by ROK awareness of basic U.S. interest in the program. The major problem area would probably be 105mm training ammunition, since the ROK possessed none.[3]

(C) Based on these replies, CINCPAC suggested another alternative means to train the 105mm batteries--forming an in-country MTT with the seven returning ROC artillery instructors. The MEDTC, however, preferred to use the ROC personnel in Cambodia to insure that combat operational batteries were produced to meet immediate operational requirements. Consequently, MACTHAI negotiated a revised proposal from the RTG for training to be conducted by the RTA, and the MEDTC initiated the necessary MAP program changes.[4]

(C) At the close of 1973, U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force units in Thailand had trained 1,127 Khmer students. With the figures previously cited for training conducted by the RTA and RTAF, a total of 7,322 FANK and 359 KAF students were trained in Thailand during 1973. By categories the totals were:[5]

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1. CHMEDTC 8654/181205Z Aug 73.
2. CINCUSARPAC 311917Z Aug 73, which cited CINCPAC 241934Z Aug 73.
3. COMUSKOREA 140110Z Sep 73, which cited CINCPAC 082215Z Sep 73.
4. MACTHAI 201005Z Sep 73; CHMEDTC 10245/241214Z Sep 73, which cited CINCPAC 190121Z Sep 73.
5. J853 Hist Addendum, 2 Jul 74; MACTHAI Ltr to CINPCAC, 9 Jan 74, with 1 encl: Khmer Training Report, 9 Jan 74.

Companies (44)		5,412
Leadership		118
Specialists		1,012
Pilots/Co-pilots		96
Aviation Support		263
Unconventional Warfare		421
	Total	7,322

SECTION V

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

Background

(C) Many of the countries eligible for grant aid were also able to finance the procurement of military equipment and services for cash or credit on appropriate terms. This FMS program, as part of the security assistance concept, was also designed to encourage self-reliance among the Free World partners of the United States. Equally significant was the contribution of the FMS program to the positions of U.S. exports and balance of payments. Analysis of the FMS figures in the Pacific Command indicated that final FY 74 sales could be greater than in any previous year (in $ millions):[1]

	FMS Credit	Commercial	Total
FY 71	219.5	109.6	329.1
FY 72	170.5	54.7	225.2
FY 73	255.8	110.0	366.8
FY 74	516.5	146.6	663.1*

*Estimated

FMS to Australia

(C) Historically, Australia had been the largest FMS purchaser in the Pacific Command. More than one billion dollars worth of military equipment and services had been purchased between FY 50 and FY 73. The greatest volume was in FY 65 (326.2 million), but the lowest was the last full fiscal year of record, $27.6 million for FY 73. The major weapon systems purchased through FMS included F-111, A-4, TA-4, and F-4 (on lease) aircraft. Potential buys were believed to include M-60 tanks, patrol frigates, P-3 aircraft and an air superiority fighter aircraft.[2]

FMS to Japan

(C) MAP grant aid to Japan was terminated in FY 64 after a total of $855 million had been provided. Deliveries ceased in 1967. FMS deliveries from

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1. J825 Fact Sheet, 7 Jan 74, Subj: FMS Programs in PACOM Countries.
2. J825 Point Paper, 28 Jan 74, Subj: FMS to Australia.

FY 50 to FY 70 amounted to $197.5 million. In FY 71, FMS totaled $21.1 million, primarily for support of existing weapon systems. Commercial sales in FY 71 amounted to $71.5 million, also for existing systems and the start of the F-4E program. In FY 72, FMS and commercial sales amounted to $73 million, and for FY 73, the total was about $88.5 million. The estimated total for FY 74 was $139.1 million.[1]

Sales Link to DBP

(C) The Fourth Japan Defense Buildup Plan (DBP) was for FY 72-FY 76. In February 1973, the Chief, Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO) submitted an analysis of the Fourth DBP as it related to standardization between U.S. and Japanese military equipment. He noted the continuing trend toward domestically designed items, even though Japanese-designed items required considerable imports of raw or semi-finished material and licensing of major components, particularly for aircraft. In general, U.S. military influence in defense equipment was steadily diminishing. Equipment previously programmed under grant aid was phasing out because of wear, age, or obsolescence, and no major U.S. purchases or licensed production programs were scheduled under the Fourth BDP. All major U.S. licensed production or purchase programs in the Fourth DBP were either follow-ons or outgrowths of the Third DBP. The Chief, MDAO stated that the most likely prospects for Fourth DBP consideration were in the anti-submarine warfare and electronic warfare aircraft areas. The major areas for U.S. standardization and influence were in aircraft, missiles, command/control systems, and air defense systems, which were also Japan's primary defense concerns.[2]

(C) By mid-1973, a CINCPAC J8 analysis concluded that the projected sale of U.S. defense articles during the period covered by the Fourth DBP could amount to $631 million. The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) had additional requirements for defense which could be met with U.S. weapons and equipment; however, Japan was likely to look to its own resources or defer procurement unless strong top-level U.S. Government encouragement was given to procurement from the U.S. Such sales would aid in standardization, improve the balance of payments and provide more U.S. control over Japanese force development and modernization.[3]

(C) The overall percentage of U.S.-JDA standardization, counting only major items such as guns, tanks, ships, aircraft and missiles, had dropped from 80 percent in 1964 to 65 percent in 1970. A dip to 35 percent by 1977 was forecast.

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1. J825 Point Paper, 7 Jan 74, Subj: FMS to Japan.
2. J825 HistSum Feb 73; CMDAO Japan 121011Z Feb 73.
3. J825 Point Paper, 25 Jun 73, Subj: Sale of Defense Articles to Japan.

This trend had the potential to affect efforts and planning for complementary forces and could lead to Japan's failure to acquire a credible anti-submarine/electronic/air defense posture, with resultant increased U.S. responsibilities during contingencies.[1]

(C) On 2 November 1973, the Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ) chaired a conference in Toyko to discuss the ramifications of the security assistance program. The U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force components attended, along with representatives from the MDAO. At this meeting, the Chief, MDAO emphasized that, although the promotion of sales of U.S. equipment was important, the standardization and compatibility of U.S./Japan defense hardware and software systems in support of CINCPAC operational requirements was equally important. The conferees agreed that a policy defining the means and goals for U.S. efforts towards standardization was desirable, and that a study should be undertaken soon.[2]

MDAO-USFJ Relationship

(C) What appeared to be an overlap of function and responsibility between the Chief, MDAO and the Commander, USFJ was acknowledged during the CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) report on the U.S. security assistance program in Japan for FY 74. The following extract pertained:[3]

> A. (C) Provision of Planning/Policy Guidance to MDAO. CHMDAO has specific responsibilities as a result of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1954. Also, there are specific responsibilities associated with the implementation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan which are assigned to COMUS Japan. CHMDAO has expressed his concern because of an apparent lack of a common National/Military policy to guide MDAO's Activities. Guidance from higher authority that deals with MAP/FMS matters does funnel down to MDAO; but matters of U.S. national or strategic military interest that flow to COMUS Japan do not normally filter down to MDAO. This could be due to a CINCPAC staff inadvertent oversight or "Embassy supervision" could probably be a factor. It was learned during the evaluation, however, that there had been a meeting between COMUS Japan and CHMDAO, called by the former, and that

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1. J825 Point Paper, 17 Jan 74, Subj: Standardization in Foreign Military Sales to Japan.
2. COMUSJAPAN 060645Z Nov 73.
3. CINCPAC PEG Report, U.S. Security Assistance Program, Mutual Defense Assistance Office, FY 74, 28 Nov 73, Part II, pp. 1, 2.

such meetings would be held on a more frequent basis in the future. This may partially resolve CHMDAO's concern over the lack of integrated military policy/planning guidance applicable to Japan and provide appropriate direction to his efforts.

Recommendation 1: (C) That CINCPAC provide appropriate planning/policy guidance for non MAP/FMS matters to MDAO through COMUS Japan who is designated Single Senior Military Representative (SSMR) in Japan. COMUS Japan/CHMDAO should be encouraged to have frequent interaction in order to enhance formulation/coordination of integrated planning and actions designed to further US interests in Japan.

B. (C) TERMS OF REFERENCE: The Terms of Reference (TOR) for MDAO, Japan, specifies, among other things, that the Chief MDAO: (a) is the authorized representative of the Government of the US under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 14 March 1954; (b) is the representative of the Secretary of Defense and CINCPAC with the GOJ for his mission responsibilities; (c) operates under the direct military command of CINCPAC; (d) is responsible to and receives directions from CINCPAC on all military planning objectives, Military Assistance Program (MAP) matters, and residual MAP materiel and equipage and (e) functions under the general supervision of the Chief of the US Diplomatic Mission to Japan to the extent provided by law and in accordance with Executive Orders and such other instructions as the President may, from time to time, promulgate. This TOR provides CHMDAO with a wide latitude for interaction and communication with all levels of US/GOJ Commands, thereby creating a semblance of another co-equal subordinate command element under CINCPAC in a country of principal concern to US interest. The TOR of COMUS Japan somewhat fosters this notion by suggesting that COMUS Japan is in a supporting role. COMUS Japan's TOR states that he will insure that Chief MDAO Japan is kept informed of activities of the service components of the Pacific Command in Japan which may affect the accomplishment of the MAP Mission as set forth in the CINCPAC and DOD Military Assistance Manual. On the other hand, COMUS Japan's TOR also states that he is responsible for coordination of matters affecting US-Japan relationships among and between elements under the jurisdiction of, or accountable to, the Department of Defense; and between these

elements and the US Ambassador; and in consultation with the US Embassy, between these elements and the Government of Japan. In view of (1) the dual status of CHMDAO as CINCPAC representative for Security Assistance in Japan and also being under the "direction" of the Ambassador and (2) the interrelationship of Security Assistance and Mutual Security, it is necessary for CINCPAC to assure full coordination on policy matters affecting these programs. Therefore, if CINCPAC guidance is desseminated in parallel channels to MDAO and COMUSJ, it would enhance coordination between the two subordinate CINCPAC elements on Security Assistance and Mutual Security matters and facilitate coordination with the Embassy.

Recommendation 2: (C) That CINCPAC review the TOR's of COMUS Japan and CHMDAO to refine and clarify their relationships so as to enhance common understanding of US military policies/guidance pertaining to Japan and the formulation of procedures for integrated military planning/actions to promote US interests in Japan.

FMS to Malaysia

(S) Malaysia was the recipient of about $200,000 of grant aid for training only. FMS had amounted to approximately $60 million prior to FY 74. The major program underway in 1973 was the purchase of 16 F-5 aircraft by FMS credit at a price of $39.24 million. Delivery was scheduled to begin in March 1975 and be completed by August 1975. In November 1973, a team of U.S. Air Force personnel led by Maj Gen H.L. Price, Director of Military Assistance, visited Kuala Lumpur to discuss Malaysian officials' fear that unnecessary and unjustified increases in the cost of the F-5s were contemplated. During the visit, high-and-working level meetings between the team and Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) personnel thoroughly covered all aspects of the F-5 program. The RMAF was shown that the project was running below the initially quoted cost, and the Minister of Defense and other Malaysian officials expressed deep appreciation of the high level U.S. interest. The U.S. Ambassador and Defense Attache felt that the expertise and sincerity manifested by General Price and his team overcame a potentially difficult problem for U.S.-Malaysian political and military relationships. The CINCPAC staff noted that the introduction of the F-5 aircraft into Malaysia represented almost a textbook case of efficiency. Definite planning and training support had been initiated by the U.S. Air Force almost two-and-one-half years before delivery, and there had been active participation by the manufacturer.[1]

1. J823 Point Paper, 27 Mar 73, Subj: F5B/E Squadron for Malaysia; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 5283/030903Z Dec 73; J826 Point Paper, 21 Feb 74, Subj: Security Assistance/Foreign Military Sales to Malaysia.

FMS to Singapore

(S) In January 1972, the Government of Singapore (GOS) accepted the offer of 40 excess A-4B aircraft as an FMS case at $40,000 per unit plus $254,000 for rehabilitation. In July 1972, the GOS signed an agreement with Lockheed Aircraft Service, Singapore (LASS) to rehabilitate and upgrade the 40 A-4s at a cost of $25.5 million.[1]

(S) On 23 March, CINCPAC was brought up to date on the Singapore A-4 program when six messages were re-transmitted dating back to November 1972. At that time, the GOS Defense Ministry had requested a letter of offer from the U.S. to purchase 200 SIDEWINDER air-to-air-missiles for installation on the A-4Bs. At the same time, the GOS official had requested the assignment of two active duty U.S. Navy officers to provide assistance in the assimilation of the A-4 into the Singapore naval forces. The messages sent to CINCPAC pertained to the U.S. DAO and Embassy efforts to procure suitable assistance in response to the GOS, and to State/Defense resistance against active duty personnel being assigned. On 24 March, the U.S. DAO Singapore summarized, in a message to CINCPAC, the difficulties encountered, and reconfirmed Embassy support of the GOS request for a two-man U.S. Navy Team to, "insure successful integration of A-4 aircraft into Singapore Armed Forces."[2]

(S) After reviewing the message traffic, Admiral Gayler signified to the Chairman, JCS his concern that U.S. Government interests in Singapore could be damaged by an unsuccessful A-4B program. He noted the repeated high level representations and assurances from GOS officials that they had no intention of holding the U.S. Government responsible for the performance of the contractor. While he was aware of U.S. Government reluctance to be involved in an adversary relationship with the contractor, Admiral Gayler believed that it would be feasible to provide a U.S. Navy technical assistance field team (TAFT).[3]

(S) A joint State/Defense message to the Ambassador and CINCPAC on 11 April confirmed the previous decision not to provide active duty naval officers to assist Singapore with the A-4B program:[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 468.
2. USDAO Singapore 1506/230810Z Mar 73; AMEMB Singapore 3073/230723Z Mar 73; 0085/230720Z Mar 73; 0085/230750Z Mar 73; 0615/230740Z Mar 73; SECSTATE 037637/231304Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 280346Z Mar 73 (NOTAL); J823 HistSum Mar 73; USDAO Singapore 240430Z Mar 73.
3. J823 HistSum Mar 73; CINCPAC 281018Z Mar 73.
4. J823 HistSum Apr 73; SECSTATE 6438/112236Z Apr 73.

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....The basic issue is the employment of the USG by the GOS to monitor and advise GOS on the activities of the GOS-selected U.S. contractor. The GOS disclaimer of USG responsibility for the program and intent of direct communication with the contractor provide no relief for the issue....

A review of GOS requests for assistance indicates three parts; i.e., technical expertise, direct access to CNO, and a USG watchdog over Lockheed. The first already has been offered and rejected, the second is considered to exist through the USDAO, and the third is not considered appropriate.

(S) Addressing CINCPAC's support of a TAFT, the joint message stated that assignment of a TAFT or MTT would still involve the U.S. Government as an adversary to Lockheed and was not considered appropriate. However, the DOD offered to send a knowledgeable representative to discuss the overall program with the Ambassador and the GOS. The Ambassador accepted this offer on 13 April, and a U.S. Navy captain was dispatched in May 1973.[1]

(S) Apparently, the GOS reservations regarding LASS performance were resolved, since, in November 1973, the Embassy advised that discussions were underway with Lockheed to purchase a substantial portion of A-4 surplus inventory from the U.S. Government. Either Lockheed or the GOS would purchase, with funds provided by the GOS. LASS would rebuild and reconfigure the aircraft in Singapore, with subsequent sale by Singapore to third countries after obtaining the approval of the U.S. Government. The State Department, on 1 December, advised that the expanded A-4 program was under preliminary consideration by interested Washington agencies.[2]

(S) It was in November also that the GOS asked Lockheed assistance to determine the sales availability and technical feasibility of GOS acquisition of one squadron of used U.S.-owned F-4 aircraft. The Ambassador commented that, since the original A-4 program was well under way, it appeared that the proposal to expand the A-4 program and the simultaneously expressed interest in used F-4s could signify mutual Lockheed-GOS interest in maintaining the LASS workload. In any case, the State Department informed the Ambassador that a negative reply

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1. Ibid.; AMEMB Singapore 1525/130850Z Apr 73; SECSTATE 075136/202301Z Apr 73.
2. J826 HistSums Nov and Dec 73; AMEMB Singapore 4326/090920Z Nov 73; SECSTATE 235881/010120Z Dec 73.

had already been given to the informal Lockheed query in Washington. No used F-4s were available from the U.S. Air Force inventory, and none were expected to be.[1]

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1. J826 HistSums Nov and Dec 73; AMEMB Singapore 4555/260845Z Nov 73; SECSTATE 235881/010120Z Dec 73.

CHAPTER VIII - PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

The Drug Abuse Counteroffensive

~~(C)~~ Drug abuse continued to be a matter of major CINCPAC concern, particularly regarding the actual and potential detrimental effect of abuse on the ability of the PACOM to accomplish its mission. Drugs were generally available throughout the PACOM. The primary drug of abuse was alcohol, but other drugs of abuse, both licit and illicit, were easily obtainable and varied from country to country. Thailand replaced the RVN as the primary source for narcotics, primarily cheap and highly potent heroin, and high grade marihuana. Ready availability and low prices combined to make drug trafficking by U.S. Servicemen for either personal use or others very attractive. In conjunction with the U.S. Customs Service, CINCPAC had instituted a vigorous military customs program within the PACOM that specified procedures for all personnel, baggage, household goods, cargo, mail, ships, and aircraft that crossed international boundaries.[1]

(U) On the national level, drug abuse programs continued to receive both attention and money. In 1969 only $82 million had been budgeted by the Federal Government for law enforcement, prevention, and rehabilitation in the field of drug abuse; by 1973 the amount budgeted for 1974 was increased to $785 million, nearly 10 times as great. The Federal Strategy document for 1973 did not propose the legalization or decriminalization of marihuana. It did, however, establish a Federal commitment to continue expanding treatment until no one could say he committed a crime to get drugs because there was no treatment available. This strategy document praised the Defense Department's approach of early detection through random urinalysis and its related early treatment for the drug abuser. The study stated that from June 1971 to December 1972, 1.6 percent of the randomly tested military personnel were clinically confirmed drug abusers. It identified Europe as an area of primary concern as the rate of positive tests had increased there. It also stated that while the drug abuse problem in the Armed Forces had not been eliminated, it was largely under control. Future programs were to be more carefully evaluated and audited, something that had not been possible with the rapid growth of programs in the past few years.[2]

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1. J141 Talking Paper, n.d., Subj: Drug Trafficking in Thailand (U).
2. Encl 1, General Observations in Reviewing the Strategy Document, to J1/Memo/294-73, 5 Jun 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 29 May 1973.

(U) A number of specific PACOM programs in which CINCPAC either participated or was interested are discussed below.

VAGABOND CLIPPER

(S) Thai fishing trawlers were used by international narcotics smugglers for moving opium, morphine base, and heroin. The principal route was from Thailand to Hong Kong, around the southern tip of the RVN. There was no legal basis for unilateral search and seizure of those vessels by U.S. Forces in international waters, even when the vessels were known to be engaged in narcotics traffic. The Government of the RVN, however, had declared narcotics to be contraband and could, therefore, search and seize vessels within the contiguous zone of the RVN with units of the Vietnamese Navy in accordance with provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention of the territorial sea and contiguous zone. The trawlers were limited in navigational capability and utilized visual fixes in rounding the southern tip of the RVN and it was believed that at that point interdiction was most likely. In order for the extremely limited assets of the Vietnamese Navy to intercept them effectively, it was believed that search and surveillance by U.S. Forces was required. On 25 November 1972 CINCPAC had requested that CINCPACFLT prepare on a priority basis a concept plan for interdiction of the narcotics carrying trawlers, an operation known as VAGABOND CLIPPER.[1]

(S) On 7 January 1973 CINCPACFLT submitted the concept plan, which provided for the search, surveillance, and trail of narcotics trawlers originating in Thailand and bound for Hong Kong. The plan, when approved by CINCPAC, would be executed by CINCPACFLT when intelligence sources indicated that such a trawler operation was imminent or under way. Forces involved would be U.S. air, surface, and subsurface units as available and required for any given operation. VAGABOND CLIPPER operations were to be coordinated with South Vietnamese forces as required. CINCPAC asked for the comments and concurrence of COMUSMACV, the U.S. Ambassadors in Bangkok and Saigon, the U.S. Defense Attache Office in Hong Kong, COMUSMACTHAI, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in Bangkok.[2]

(S) The plan, as approved by CINCPAC on 3 March, was essentially the same as that which had been submitted by CINCPACFLT, although a number of minor changes had been required, principally reflecting changing organizational structures in Southeast Asia. In concept, VAGABOND CLIPPER operations were to be conducted in five phases. In Phase I (the alert phase), the U.S. Embassy in

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1. CINCPACFLT 270217Z Feb 73; CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 482-486.
2. CINCPACFLT 070052Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 090224Z Jan 73.

Bangkok was to maintain an alert for information concerning the impending departure of a narcotics vessel. The Embassy was to provide as much detailed information as possible to all concerned. Information provided was to include the point, date, and time of departure; a description of the vessel; whether or not an electronic surveillance device was on board; frequency of the device; destination of the vessel; and photos of the vessel and a description of its cargo.

(S) In Phase 2 (the search phase) the Commander Seventh Fleet would conduct search operations. Daily P-3 search flights were to be conducted generally within a defined area. In Phase 3 (the surveillance phase) the Commander Seventh Fleet was to conduct around-the-clock surveillance of the vessel. Although covert surveillance was desired, effective radar ranges and the numbers of similar vessels in the area might require the maintenance of visual contact with the trawler. In the event that surveillance or communications support by U.S. naval units was desired, the commander was to make available such units as were capable of reaching the surveillance area prior to termination of Phase 3. It was envisioned that surface units would remain at maximum practicable range from the narcotics vessel, keeping it between the coast of the RVN and the surveillance ship. Phase 4 (the intercept-search-seizure phase) was to be conducted by the South Vietnamese Navy. Operations by U.S. Forces during Phase 4 were to be coordinated by the Defense Attache Office in Saigon. The goal of this phase was to intercept the trawler in the vicinity of Hon Khoai, off the southern tip of the RVN, with Con Son and the Catwick Islands as backup points. U.S. Customs Service or Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (later renamed the Drug Enforcement Administration) personnel might be made available by the Ambassador in Saigon to advise the Vietnamese Navy should their assistance be required.

(S) Phase 5 was to be initiated upon receipt of reliable information that the narcotics vessel had avoided interception by the Vietnamese Navy or upon the decision that time and distance factors indicated that the vessel had passed beyond the contiguous zone surrounding the Catwick Islands. The goal of this phase was to provide locating information to Hong Kong authorities in preparation for seizure of the narcotics cargo within the authority of the Hong Kong government. Although the primary means of accomplishing this surveillance was by the use of P-3 aircraft, other Seventh Fleet units could be made available to assist. As the narcotics vessel approached the vicinity of its destination, it was expected that transshipment to junks or other local craft might be effected to counter government attempts to intercept the cargo. In the event it became apparent that the vessel was making for a port other than Hong Kong, Commander Seventh Fleet was to inform the JCS, CINCPAC, and CINCPACFLT, including his recommendations for follow-on coordination and action.

(S) In matters of command relationships, CINCPAC was to exercise operational command. CINCPACFLT, in turn, was to exercise operational control of VAGABOND CLIPPER operations through Commander, Seventh Fleet, who was to coordinate air operations in the search and surveillance phases with the Chief of the Navy Section, Defense Attache Office, Saigon.[1]

(S) On 20 April CINCPACFLT reported that after initial operations the procedures contained in the plan had proved to be effective. He noted that extensive coordination among all concerned was essential to the successful conclusion of an operation. In this regard, "the plan's effectiveness would be dramatically enhanced by an international agreement which would permit U.S. Navy ships to exercise jurisdiction over vessels suspected to be carrying narcotics on the high seas. The desirability of such an agreement is vigorously reaffirmed."[2]

(S) CINCPAC advised the JCS that he strongly supported the agreement concept proposed by CINCPACFLT. He believed, however, that such an agreement, at least initially, should be undertaken between the governments of Thailand and the United States rather than on an international scale. Therefore, in order to enhance the effectiveness of subsequent VAGABOND CLIPPER operations, he recomended that discussions be opened between the Royal Thai Government and the United States to effect an agreement that would permit embarkation of Thai naval officers on U.S. Navy ships for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction over Thai vessels suspected to be trafficking in narcotics on the high seas. This was disapproved by the JCS on 2 July.[3]

(S) On 19 June CINCPAC approved certain changes to the VAGABOND CLIPPER plan to eliminate any possible confusion in execution authority. The command relationships portion of the plan was revised: CINCPAC continued to exercise operational command and CINCPACFLT operational control of operations through the Commander, Seventh Fleet, who was to execute VAGABOND CLIPPER operations when intelligence sources indicated that a Thai narcotics trawler operation was imminent. The Commander Seventh Fleet was to coordinate air operations in the search and surveillance phases. The Chief of the Navy Section, Defense Attache Office in Saigon, was to coordinate operations in Phase 4. Commander Seventh Fleet was to coordinate operations in Phase 5. In matters of plan execution, the plan would continue to be implemented as directed by CINCPACFLT. Execution of the supporting Seventh Fleet plan, however, could be directed by the Commander Seventh Fleet when intelligence sources indicated that a Thai trawler operation was imminent. Additionally, in view of the importance of prompt initiation of

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1. CINCPACFLT 270217Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 030354Z Mar 73.
2. CINCPACFLT 200710Z Apr 73.
3. CINCPAC 282243Z Apr 73; JCS 4863/021645Z Jul 73.

Phase 2 operations, the Commander of Task Force 72 was authorized to commence that phase upon receipt of information from the Ambassador in Bangkok that a narcotics vessel voyage was imminent. The Task Force commander was to notify all concerned of his search intent as soon as possible. Direct liaison among subordinate commanders was authorized for the planning and coordination of operations.[1]

(S) In April the plan was executed for the first time and was successful in that the Vietnamese Navy intercepted a Thai trawler with 12,220 pounds of raw opium and 281 pounds of morphine base on board. The vessel and its crew were towed to Nha Trang by the Vietnamese Navy.[2]

(S) A working level meeting was held in Saigon on 16 and 17 May. It was concluded that the April seizure had been due primarily to luck. The importance of early alert, detailed descriptions (to include photos), and electronic homing devices was once again reaffirmed.[3]

(S) At a tri-country narcotics conference in Bangkok conducted 18 to 20 September, the DEA Bangkok stated that four trawlers had been siezed prior to their departure from Thailand.

(S) CINCPAC fielded an operations security team in November. The results of their survey, published early in 1974, revealed that the U.S. Navy's role had probably been compromised through public disclosure, that unprotected telephonic and radio communications had been used, and that the nickname had been compromised.[4]

(S) Of the eight requests initiated by the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok during 1973, only one resulted in a confirmed sighting and subsequent seizure.[5]

Drug Education Field Teams

(U) The Drug Education Field Team (DEFT) program had been developed by COMUSMACV in 1971 in an attempt to bring the drug abuse control problem down to small-unit level. The DEFTs consisted of a few military personnel and a couple of civilians who were ex-addicts. The team concept had been held in high regard in MACV, and when plans were made to disband the teams in December

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1. CINCPACFLT 162132Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 192347Z Jun 73.
2. CINCPACFLT 200701Z Apr 73; J313 HistSum Oct 73, J112 HistSum Oct 73.
3. CTG 72 180917Z May 73.
4. CINCPAC 192001Z Oct 73; CINCPAC ltr J319 Serial 0011 of 9 Jan 74.
5. J1/Memo/0030-74, 1 Aug 74, Subj: 1973 CINCPAC Command History.

1972, COMUSMACV recommended that the capability be retained within the PACOM. CINCPAC sought and received approval to keep the two DEFTs in Thailand into 1973.[1]

(U) Early in 1973 CINCPAC requested assistance from all Service personnel centers in expediting assignment of DEFT menbers to COMUSMACTHAI, who had agreed to make one team available to assist Navy units stationed on Diego Garcia following an excessively high rate of positives in the random urinalysis testing on that island.[2]

(U) In anticipation of DEFT requirements beyond 1973, and possible use of DEFTs in PACOM areas outside of Thailand, CINCPAC asked the Office of the assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment) for information on the contracts and terms of agreement for civilian members of the DEFTs. He asked COMUSMACTHAI to provide a summary of privileges granted civilian members, a list of team presentation objectives, an evaluation of command and audience acceptability of the teams, and recommendations for their future employment. COMUSMACTHAI provided the requested information. He noted that the DEFT operated with a single objective: to ameliorate the abuse of drugs. MACTHAI "firmly believes that the DEFT must be a single-goal oriented presentation. DEFT is essentially a road show and any attempt at an in-depth diversification of objective in the limited time available would be confusing and therefore unproductive." This philosophy had received little acclaim from psychiatric social workers, COMUSMACTHAI continued, "but since it has the single advantage of working where nothing else seems to, it is not a matter of undue concern."

(U) COMUSMACTHAI noted that the format and thrust of the presenatations changed to respond to user critiques and analysis of local conditions. The key, he said, was credibility. "There can be no inaccuracy in any of the information presented and opinions can never be presented as facts." The presentations consisted of an introduction and statement of purpose, a clarification of terms or jargon that might be used, a short laymen-oriented review of pharmacology, and an instructor-led discussion period that gradually worked into an unstructured group discussion. Evaluation reports submitted by individual bases throughout Thailand had been universally favorable. The centralized concept of operations, however, while it had undeniable attractions, needed careful study. A DEFT, COMUSMACTHAI believed, that had a high effectiveness in the RVN, Thailand, Indonesia, or Singapore, would probably be ineffective in relatively low-threat areas such as Japan or Hawaii, and vice versa. The team had to be

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 479-480.
2. J1/Memo/81-73, 8 Feb 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 6 February 1973.

intimately familiar with the area of operations on a current basis or credibility would erode rapidly. There were other problems, he concluded, none insurmountable, but all should be resolved prior to any move toward centralization. He believed, based on experiences in Thailand, that the DEFT concept would be viable world-wide. While day-to-day problems had been legion, the solid record of accomplishment indicated a worthwhile return on time and funds invested.[1]

(U) The Office of the Assiatant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment) indicated that the four civilian team members in Thailand at the time cost approximately $62,000 a year, plus transportation.[2]

(U) In August, in an effort to improve administrative and operational control of DEFTs in Thailand, CINCPAC drafted Terms of Reference to be forwarded to Washington for negotiations between the Assistant Secretary and the National Council for Prevention of Drug Abuse (NCPDA). He asked COMUSMACTHAI for his comments on the draft. A team was described as consisting of one officer, two enlisted instructors, and two civilians. The civilians were to be provided through the office of the Secretary of Defense by the NCPDA, who would also pay their salaries. Mandatory qualifications for the team civilians were as follows:

> ...At least two or more years experience with abuse of psychedelics (cannabis & hallucinogens) or depressants (alcohol, barbituates, inhalants, narcotics or tranquilizers) or stimulants (antidepressants, cocaine or amphetamines).
>
> ...In addition...at least two of the four [one for each of two teams] will have one year experience in heroin abuse because of the severe heroin threat in Thailand.
>
> ...Each member will have at least two years experience in drug rehabilitation staff work.
>
> ...Male with minimum age 21.

Additional desired qualifications were that they be high-school graduates, ex-Servicemen, and that at least two of the four be non-caucasian and a member of a minority group. Other conditions of work and privileges were outlined. It was noted that the civilian team members might be requested to render specimens of body fluid (urine/blood/saliva) as directed by COMUSMACTHAI, to determine

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1. MACTHAI 110545Z Jun 73.
2. J1/Memo/398-73, 10 Jul 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 2 July 1973.

illegal drug use. DEFT members might be required to travel outside Thailand to make presentations at various PACOM locations, in which case travel expenses would be paid by the Defense Department.[1]

(U) The Terms of Reference were forwarded in draft form to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on 6 November, substantially as proposed by CINCPAC.[2]

(U) Earlier, in mid-September, the Office of the Secretary had advised CINCPAC that DEFT funding existed through FY 74, but that subsequent to that time CINCPAC should program funding for this activity. If it was determined there was no further requirement for the teams in Thailand, however, Washington could provide funds for a one-time move to an area in the Pacific where there was a need. The Director of the NCPDA was expected to visit CINCPAC headquarters early in 1974. CINCPAC had asked his Service component commanders for their FY 75 requirements for DEFT assistance, the possibilities of providing military manning for the teams, and to share costs for the civilian team members. Indications were that the teams would not be required beyond FY 74, and the National Council Director would be so advised.[3]

(U) Plans that had been made to evaluate the DEFT early in 1974 were abandoned late in 1973 as a result of shrinking manpower. COMUSMACTHAI was doing a modified evaluation with available assets. A proposed project to prepare a historical audio-visual documentation of the DEFT program in Thailand was also abandoned for lack of resources.[4]

(U) In late November-early December a DEFT visited Japan. DEFTs had earlier visited Diego Garcia and Taiwan, remaining in Thailand the rest of the time.[5]

Military Customs Activities

(U) As a means to reduce the threat of military personnel smuggling drugs into the United States from Southeast Asia and between countries in the PACOM, CINCPAC had initiated a military customs program in May 1971. Military customs agents operated throughout the command. At the beginning of 1973 there were also three Bureau of Customs (BOC) advisers in the PACOM who assisted and advised CINCPAC and the subordinate commands.[6]

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 2977, 16 Aug 73, Subj: Draft Agreement for Civilian Members of Drug Education Field Teams (DEFTs).
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 3785, 6 Nov 73, Subj: Draft Agreement for Civilian Drug Education Field Team (DEFT) Members.
3. SECDEF 9799/172319Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 190031Z Dec 73; J114 HistSum Dec 73.
4. J114 HistSum Dec 73.
5. J114 HistSum Nov 73.
6. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 489-491.

(U) Early in 1973 CINCPAC received a copy of a BOC message pertaining to customs procedures for Project HOMECOMING, the return of U.S. prisoners of war. HOMECOMING flights, passengers, and crew members were to be pre-cleared at the HOMECOMING reception center by military customs inspecting officers under the supervision of the BOC regional adviser for Guam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. This would negate the requirement for further customs examination at U.S. ports of entry, such as Hickam or Travis Air Force Bases. Unaccompanied hold baggage would also be pre-cleared and accompanying forms would be marked in order to expedite customs clearance in the Continental United States.[1]

(C) With the establishment of the principally-civilian Defense Attache Office in Saigon with the Navy as "employer," the Chief of Naval Operations outlined a concept for military postal service in the RVN. Based on a CINCPAC request, the CNO indicated that the postal facility could accept outgoing mail without inspection or examination and specifically mark mail sacks for U.S. Customs or military customs inspections at points of entry in the United States or overseas destinations, respectively.[2]

(C) Effective 14 March, customs inspections and examinations in the RVN ceased for passengers and carry-on baggage. Effective 17 March such inspections ceased for household goods and unaccompanied baggage. CINCPACAF, consequently, established procedures for flights departing the RVN. For passengers and carry-on baggage, customs inspections would be performed at the first stop en route in which passengers deplaned.[3]

(U) CINCPAC learned in February that the Commissioner of the BOC had approved a proposal to change the status of BOC advisers from temporary duty to permanent assignment (for an 18-24 month period vice 90 days). Also, assignment of a fourth adviser to the PACOM had been approved. CINCPAC advised on 24 April that he agreed with these changes. He proposed an assignment scheme for the four as follows: (a) one adviser for Thailand under operational control of COMUSMACTHAI, (b) one for Japan (and Okinawa) under operational control of COMUS Japan, (c) one for Korea and Taiwan under operational control of CINCPAC with duty station in Seoul, Korea, and (d) one adviser for Guam and the Philippines

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1. J1/Memo/81-73, 8 Feb 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 6 February 1973.
2. J1/Memo/022-73, 24 Mar 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 20 Mar 1973 (U).
3. J1/Memo/1016-73, 9 Mar 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 6 March 1973 (U), which cited CINCPAC 221933Z Feb 73.

under operational control of CINCPAC with duty at Subic Bay Naval Station in the Philippines.[1]

(U) A number of matters surfaced in 1973 regarding customs activities on Guam. Toward the end of 1972, U.S. military officials on Guam had expressed doubts regarding the legality of implementing a military customs inspection program on Guam, and the question was passed to CINCPAC for consideration. The 9 January reply stated, "CINCPAC sees no legal objection to implementation of customs inspection/examination of household goods leaving Guam contemplated by [a Defense Department regulation]....Such measures apply to shipments at USG expense and are reasonable to prevent the flow of restricted or prohibited items via DOD channels and facilitate duty-free entry of qualifying personal effects of DOD personnel."[2]

(U) Lack of federal enforcement assistance was considered to be severely restricting efforts by the Government of Guam to detect and counteract illegal drug trafficking. CINCPAC had made some recommendations in this regard, and on 16 June recommended that a fifth BOC adviser be assigned solely to Guam. At the same time CINCPAC advised the Governor of Guam of this recommendation and asked him for comments. The Governor replied that he was pleased to receive CINCPAC's letter expressing support for an intensified counteroffensive program against drug trafficking throughout the world. He concluded:

> ...Because of the overwhelming influx of incoming and outgoing surfacecraft and aircraft activities, the booming business and investment ventures, and the increase in our population, it has now become practical and feasible to establish a subfunction of BNDD [Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, subsequently renamed the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)] on this island in order to maximize control of narcotics violations and increase effectiveness of application techniques in conducting investigations. I hope that our mutual endeavors to physically locate and establish a subfunction of BNDD on Guam would be considered by the appropriate agencies.[3]

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1. J1/Memo/1016-73, 9 Mar 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 6 March 1973 (U); J1/Memo/0029-73, 7 May 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 1 May 1973 (U).
2. CINCPAC 090239Z Jan 73.
3. J1/Memo/398-73, 10 Jul 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 2 July 1973; CINCPAC 162138Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 280118Z Jul 73, which quoted Governor of Guam letter of 17 Jul 73; JCS 2553/242146Z Aug 73.

(U) CINCPAC staff representatives met with DEA officials in October and again in December to discuss representation in Guam. At the December meeting the 14th DEA Regional Office in Los Angeles decided to recommend to DEA Headquarters in Washington that an agent be sent for 90 days temporary duty in early 1974. The agent was to work in the U.S. Attorney's office and be the focal point for coordination of military and local drug investigation and drug enforcement schooling. On 6 October CINCPAC informed his Representative on Guam that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had advised the U.S. Attorney on Guam that it was not feasible for the bureau to establish a resident agency on Guam, but would send an agent when requested specifically. CINCPAC asked his Representative in Guam to advise him if he experienced any problems concerning FBI coverage.[1]

(U) Customs inspections of Military Sealift Command time-charter vessels continued to be a problem. In November, as a result of another drug trafficking incident aboard such a vessel, CINCPAC reinitiated the proposal to the Department of the Army (as Defense Department executive agent for military customs matters) to renew discussions with the Department of the Navy to obtain military customs authority with respect to these time and voyage charter vessels. Due to the effort involved, CINCPAC envisioned that vessel, crew, and passenger searches would only be undertaken by military customs inspectors based on reliable intelligence. The authority itself, however, would create a deterrent effect, thereby contributing to drug traffic prevention within the PACOM, CINCPAC concluded.[2]

(U) CINCPAC's staff, in coordination with the Mail Branch of the U.S. Customs Service, the DEA, and the Oakland Army Base, developed a rapid notification of drug violations system to apprehend those using APO/FPO channels for drug transmittal, and to deter trafficking by APO mail. Local Service investigative agencies alerted overseas postal and investigative agencies on a real-time basis in order to apprehend offenders. By the end of 1973, nine reports had been received. Both heroin and marihuana had been discovered in November, only marihuana in December.[3]

(U) By the end of the year, 78 military installations throughout the PACOM had received credibility recommendations by U.S. Customs Service advisers.[4]

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1. J112 HistSums Oct, Dec 73; CINCPAC 211855Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 060415Z Oct 73.
2. CINCPAC 100329Z Nov 73.
3. J112 HistSums Oct-Dec 73; CINCPAC 312320Z Oct 73.
4. DA/SALO-TRM-C4 067/092032Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 250230Z Jan 74.

Drug Abuse Problem Among Dependents in Bangkok

(U) There had been seven drug related deaths and 21 cases of drug overdose among the American community in Bangkok during the 1971-1972 school year. To work toward a solution, COMUSMACTHAI and his staff developed plans for drug alternatives for the teenage community. A family recreation center and teen club were established. The most unique facility established in the community, however, was the Youth Treatment Center. This was established under the supervision of the Embassy, but with MACTHAI assistance and support, in February 1973 to provide a focal point in the community for the teenage children to request assistance and advice in either drug-related or psychological problems. Additionally, the schools, parents, or hospital could refer children to the center with its well-trained staff of 15. The center had a short resident capability as well as an extensive out-patient treatment facility. The center had drastically reduced the incidence of drug abuse among the teenage population and had provided a viable alternative to returning the family to the Continental United States at great expense to the Defense Department.[1]

(U) The first year of operation had been funded by an operational grant of $234,000 from the Special Action Office for Drug and Alcohol Prevention (SAODAP). As this was to expire on 1 February 1974, COMUSMACTHAI asked for CINCPAC's support in urging continued funding. He advised CINCPAC that the center had been an "overwhelming success" since its opening, with no deaths, only two overdoses, and only eight families returned to the United States. When it appeared that funds would expire, the American and third-country-national community began a fund drive that raised $14,000 in two months. The Ambassador had proposed to the State Department that each U.S. Government agency represented in Bangkok contribute to the support of the center in proportion to the number of high-school-age dependents through a shared administrative agreement. COMUSMACTHAI asked that CINCPAC provide whatever support he could to arrive at a solution for funding the center to keep it operational. On 8 December CINCPAC requested that the JCS arrange the Defense Department share of the required funding. He noted that the merits of the Youth Treatment Center program well justified the expenditure involved and, until the drug problem in Bangkok subsided, the benefits of continued operation would more than balance the annual investment.[2]

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1. Debriefing of Col D.A. Curto, USAF, Assistant DEPCOMUSMACTHAI, 21 Dec 73, CINCPAC Route Sheet 00-1406-73.
2. COMUSMACTHAI 290139Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 080250Z Dec 73.

Medical Evacuation for Drug Abuse

(U) Drug abuse was the primary diagnosis for a decreasing number of personnel per day medically evacuated from Southeast Asia in 1973. For 1972 the most accurate figures available on such evacuation were as listed in the following table:

	Army	Navy/Marine	Air Force
Vietnam	5,385	71	280
Thailand	32	-	138
Philippines	3	254	164
Okinawa	98	100	13
Guam	-	27	7
Korea	21	-	-
Japan	2	6	18
Taiwan	-	-	1
Totals	5,541	458	621

In 1973 with the drawdown of forces from Vietnam, as high an average as 10 per day were being evacuated aeromedically during the first part of February. By mid-summer, however, with forces in Thailand, this average nad been reduced to slightly over one a day.[1]

Urinalysis Testing

(U) Urinalysis continued to be one of the means by which commanders could identify drug abusers, and such programs were governed world-wide by a Defense Department instruction. On 1 September CINCPAC had requested a waiver of that instruction to permit command-directed testing vice random testing for numerous small and isolated military detachments such as Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Missions. The Secretary of Defense directed that such command-directed testing be permitted world-wide, but required that appropriate testing frequencies directed in the instruction be maintained. CINCPAC recommended that when the Department's instruction was revised that the frequency of command-directed testing at remote MAAGs and Missions should not be levied by the

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1. J76/Memo/15-73, 23 Jan 73, Subj: Drug Abuse Counteroffensive; subsequent memos, all from J76, same subject, as follows: 35-73 of 6 Feb, 45-73 of 20 Feb, 55-73 of 6 Mar, 71-73 of 3 Apr, 87-73 of 1 May, 96-73 of 15 May, 99-73 of 29 May, 117-73 of 3 Jul, 129-73 of 17 Jul, and 140-73 of 31 Jul.

Secretary of Defense. "Commander-directed testing should remain a commander's option, suspect oriented, and judiciously exercised to avoid harassment and discriminatory practices," CINCPAC said.[1]

Smuggling in Human Remains

(C) On 17 December 1972 the press had reported that heroin had been sewn into human remains and the lining of caskets prior to departure from Southeast Asia. Although it was believed that the news article may have exaggerated the smuggling attempt, the potential existed and CINCPAC requested that his component commanders provide information on the processing, preparation for transportation, and evacuation of military human remains.[2]

(C) Replies to CINCPAC's query indicated that procedures varied widely from Service to Service. For example, neither the Navy or Air Force required customs certification and the Air Force did not use transfer case seals. CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF indicated that sealing and certification procedures as recommended by CINCPAC would be put into effect. CINCPACFLT believed that existing procedures were adequate.[3]

(C) CINCPAC requested that CINCPACFLT and the Navy's Bureau of Medicine follow certain minimum customs procedures: the first was for serially numbered wire and lead seals affixed to the head and foot of the transfer case with the serial numbers recorded on accompanying documentation; the second was certification at the originating mortuary that the remains and transfer case had been examined and contained no contraband or controlled substances.[4]

Drug Exemption Program in Australia

(C) Implementation of the U.S. Military Drug Exemption Program in Australia had been held in abeyance for over a year while U.S. and Australian officials worked out a means of accommodating the exemption program within the framework of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). These negotiations had been based on the assumption that drug "use," as indicated by the Serviceman's admission and positive urinalysis tests, constituted a crime under Australian law (and Australia had the primary right to exercise jurisdiction under the SOFA). The

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1. SECDEF 2874/011521Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 041909Z Oct 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 492.
3. J1/Memo/04-73, 11 Jan 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 9 January 1973 (U); CINCPAC 182111Z Jan 73.
4. J1/Memo/08-73, 27 Jan 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 23 January 1973 (U).

Secretary of Defense, however, on 16 March 1973, advised that the validity of those procedures had been taken for granted, but that further examination raised the question of whether they were correct as a legal matter. "Insofar as the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (21 USC 801) is concerned, drug 'use' as distinguished from 'possession' is not a crime. This same distinction holds true, we understand, in other countries," the Secretary said. Accordingly, for those countries where drug use per se was not a crime, neither the United States nor the host government had any criminal jurisdiction to exercise under the SOFA, and consequently, information derived from the drug exemption program as to the identity of drug users was not evidence of a crime that the United States was obligated to furnish to the host state. The Secretary asked CINCPAC, who in turn asked his Representative in Australia, for information on provisions of Australian law with respect to existence of a criminal offense for "use" as opposed to "possession" of drugs.[1]

(C) The U.S. State Sending Office in Australia advised that "use" as well as "possession" was a criminal act under Australian law. Consequently, adopting the Secretary's proposed approach would be considered highly undesirable in Australia. However, as a separate action, negotiations on military exemption programs were under way, and it was expected that the Government of Australia would make proposals through diplomatic channels for accommodation of drug programs. CINCPAC advised the Secretary of Defense of these matters and that he believed the best course was to wait for Australian action.[2]

Joint Military Council on Alcohol Abuse

(U) On 10 July CINCPAC asked his Service components, the Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and the 14th Coast Guard District to comment on the organization of a Joint Military Council on Alcohol Abuse for Oahu. CINCPAC believed that such a council could serve as a very useful means of addressing and solving many military alcohol abuse control problems on the island.[3]

(U) The response was very favorable, and the first meeting of the group was convened at CINCPAC's headquarters on 9 August. The first purpose was to define the goals and objectives for the council, and to determine how CINCPAC could best serve the needs of the council.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 493; J1/Memo/022-73, 24 Mar 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 20 March 1973 (U); SECDEF 8898/162353Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 172242Z Mar 73.
2. J1/Memo/027-73, 6 Apr 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 3 April 1973 (U); USSSO Canberra 230202Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 270045Z Mar 73.
3. J1/Memo/453-73, 21 Jul 73, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee Meeting of 17 July 1973, which cited CINCPAC 100142Z Jul 73.
4. CINCPAC ltr Ser 3063, 23 Aug 73, Subj: Joint Military Council for Alcohol Abuse Control (JMCAAC).

(U) On 31 October CINCPAC had assigned the Hawaii Area Joint Committee responsibility for establishing an Alcohol Abuse Control (AAC) Field Panel, and that panel had been established on 6 November.[1]

(U) On 20 November CINCPAC asked the members of the Hawaii Area Joint Committee for their recommendations regarding a proposed code of uniform alcohol sales practices for military clubs and similar military establishments in Hawaii. CINCPAC believed that as a minimum the code should address policies for:

- Number of Happy Hours per week at clubs and time of day during which they should exist.

- Availability of non-alcoholic drinks at either reduced prices or no-charge during Happy Hours.

- Availability and types of food provided during Happy Hours.

- Eliminating coercion/influence that encourages attendance at Happy Hours.

- Discouraging: (1) two-for-one drinks to a single customer; (2) doubling amount of alcohol per mixed drink; (3) stacking alcoholic drinks for customers just prior to closing; (4) open bars at parties where charges are determined on an equal or pro rata basis; (5) serving alcoholic drinks to one who is or appears to be intoxicated; (6) alcohol abuse at unit parties, picnics, celebrations, and other functions.[2]

(U) The proposed CINCPAC Instruction on Standards to Prevent Immoderate Use of Alcohol (CINCPACINST 6330.1) was sent in draft to the component commanders on 27 December. CINCPAC advised the components:

> ...Detailed studies conducted by the Army and Navy in the past year showed alcohol abuse to be our most serious drug problem, particularly among young people. I am deeply concerned with the impact of this alcohol abuse on operational readiness ....I think there are a couple of principles we should observe in regard to the use of alcohol. First, we should not push alcohol on people, and second, people who prefer not to drink should not be disadvantaged....I...recognize that the competitiveness of military clubs in PACOM makes it difficult for a

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1. Ltr, U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, Hawaii Area Joint Committee, Ser No. 20-74, 28 Nov 73, Subj: Alcohol Abuse Control Field Panel.
2. CINCPAC 201915Z Nov 73.

> service unilaterally to implement an effective program to avoid encouraging the use of alcohol. To achieve uniformity, I am forwarding a draft [instruction] outlining alcohol control standards....Let's come up with some alternatives to alcoholic recreation and get more of our people out of the clubs and on the playing fields.[1]

It was expected that the CINCPAC Instruction would be issued early in 1974. In the proposed instruction, in addition to the practices CINCPAC had sought to discourage in his 20 November message, a number of practices were encouraged, such as ready availability of non-alcoholic drinks at reduced prices during Happy Hours, special attention and creativeness in developing and promoting non-alcoholic drinks, and designating areas in clubs for other leisure activities, such as reading, TV viewing, or games.

Briefings on PACOM Drug Abuse Programs

(U) The vigorous on-going PACOM drug abuse programs were frequently the subject of briefings at CINCPAC's headquarters and on occasion in Washington. An example of interest in the program was demonstrated when a CINCPAC staff member was invited to address the Service Secretaries Breakfast in Washington on 15 August on such matters as international narcotics control, VAGABOND CLIPPER, and the PACOM military customs programs. The speaker was asked how CINCPAC could be assisted in these matters, and he urged continued support, particularly resources for the military customs program, which was considered essential for continued interdiction of controlled substances and other contraband.[2]

PACOM Findings of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment)

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment toured the PACOM, following which he visited CINCPAC's headquarters for a debriefing that outlined his findings in the various parts of the command he had visited. His overall observation of the PACOM drug abuse control program was one of noticeable improvement and very satisfactory progress, although be believed that the alcohol abuse control programs were generally in need of more command attention. The summary of his conclusions was coordinated in Washington before CINCPAC released the findings to his Service component and subordinate unified commanders on 27 September.[3]

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 4200, 27 Dec 73, Subj: Alcohol Abuse Control.
2. J112 HistSum Aug 73.
3. CINCPAC ltr Ser 3421, 27 Sep 73, Subj: OSD (H&E) Debrief - 16 August 1973.

(U) Briefly, his findings were as follows. For the USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI he noted that overall there appeared to have been significant progress in the alcohol and drug programs, but more emphasis was needed. The SEATO Lab was operating extremely well. At Nam Phong there was vast improvement in alcohol abuse identification, a program that should continue to receive firm command emphasis. Procedures for determining confirmation of drug abuse had to be continually supervised in order to insure accurate reporting; the urinalysis testing site was simple, but effective. Regarding the Youth Treatment Center in Bangkok, the Assistant Secretary found that drug alternatives appeared to be exotic abstractions rather than typical American sports or hobbies; the center appeared to be making headway in reducing the number of drug related problems among teenage dependents in Bangkok, however.

(U) Regarding Drug Education Field Teams (DEFT), the Assistant Secretary saw a need to expand the number of teams, and for the teams to devote more time to the subject of alcohol. In this regard, assignment of a recovered alcoholic or former serious alcohol abuser could be required, not necessarily a civilian. If the teams were expanded, he believed that their training ought to be standardized; also that consideration be given to placing civilian team members under contract with the option of releasing them if they proved unsuitable. He noted that the use of the DEFTs had drawn favorable response from nearly all locations where they had presented their program. By group discussion of the psychological reasons underlying drug abuse, and alternatives to drug use, they presented drug education, not merely drug information.

(U) Commenting on the USTDC, the Assistant Secretary noted that programs appeared to be aggressive, but that more emphasis should be placed on identifying and treating alcoholics and problem drinkers in all commands. Better utilization could be made of Alcoholics Anonymous. It appeared that the individual Service efforts should be better coordinated to prevent unnecessary duplication of efforts. There appeared to be significant improvement in the overall drug program, which attested to excellent command support. Efforts to involve local officials in drug suppression activities were considered commendable. Activities of the Family Advisory Center, Taiwan (FACT) were reviewed; this was an agency that used a more classical approach to counseling--professional staff, mostly one-to-one sessions, no general rap sessions, and intake of most clients through referrals. This facility did not require parental consent in counseling of adolescents; it was noteworthy that there was no decrease of clients during the summer months.

(U) The Assistant Secretary believed that a more intensive local alcohol program was needed by the CINCPACREP Guam, who was Commander Naval Forces Marianas. The only asset for the treatment or rehabilitation of alcoholics was one recovered-alcoholic counselor, and he had to divide his time with drug

abusers as well. Guam had a significant alcohol problem, and needed an in-resident capability.

(U) The organization of the CINCPACREP Philippines/Commander, Naval Forces Philippines was in dire need of an additional recovered-alcoholic counselor. The one on duty could not continue to maintain the pace he was keeping, and if another counselor was not forthcoming, the result would be "like many other Navy areas where the alcoholic is identified but does not receive immediate treatment due to lack of facilities and/or trained personnel." The Assistant Secretary noted that the CINCPACREP was to be commended for "tremendous improvements" in the drug and alcohol programs since he took command; the 50 percent "decrease in drug and alcohol related deaths over the same period last year is not the least of the indications."[1]

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1. Ibid.

SECTION II--JOINT MANPOWER PROGRAMS

CINCPAC Joint Manpower Program

(U) CINCPAC's request, late in December 1972, to extend the CINCPAC Staff FY 73 Joint Manpower Program for FY 74 was approved by the JCS on 29 January 1973. This authorization was for 1,080 spaces on the staff, 110 in the PACOM ADP Systems Support Group, 117 in the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center, 47 in the Airborne Command Post, and 31 in the Management Control Detachment Pacific, for a grand total of 1,385. (A chart showing personnel distribution by staff directorate is included in Chapter I.) The next revision had not been approved by the end of the year.[1]

(U) A number of specific staffing matters came under study. In mid-March, in view of a forthcoming transfer of the CINCPAC Communications Center to the Commander of the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu, CINCPAC requested the concurrence of the Chief of Naval Operations regarding retention of three existing but vacant GS billets to provide needed expertise in achieving command control communications improvements in the PACOM. On 26 March the CNO nonconcurred, stating that the billets had been earmarked for other use; he requested compensation. Three GS spaces from U.S. Forces in Japan were offered, but these were indirect hire spaces and thus ineligible; these were refused by the CNO, as was another offer. On 15 June CINCPAC offered other Navy spaces from CINCPAC headquarters and the CNO concurred. On 27 June CINCPAC advised the JCS of Navy concurrence and advised that formal changes would be included in the next JTD revision.[2]

(U) Another action concerned a request from the Defense Attache Office in Singapore for administrative assistance to handle Foreign Military Sales matters. CINCPAC determined that such assistance was warranted and requested that the Secretary of Defense authorize the Attache to hire one GS clerk typist on a shared administrative support agreement. The Secretary disapproved the request, stating that the space requirement should be on CINCPAC's JTD. CINCPAC proposed a change to his JTD on 19 June and on 19 December it was approved by the JCS.[3]

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1. JCS 2845/292251Z Jan 73.
2. CINCPAC 170237Z Mar 73; CNO 262324Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 310047Z Mar 73; CNO 051530Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 090243Z May 73; CINCPAC 152146Z Jun 73; CNO 221614Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 270111Z Jun 73.
3. USDAO Singapore 090830Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 050100Z May 73; SECDEF 9433/231502Z May 73; CINCPAC 190332Z Jun 73; JCS 9809/192158Z Dec 73.

(C) CINCPAC studied the manning of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in the [redacted] in 1973 as plans continued to reduce the size of headquarters throughout the command. In March CINCPAC reviewed a manning study prepared by the MAAG, placing particular emphasis on an evaluation of the assumptions on which that study was based. CINCPAC also recommended that several considerations be incorporated in the study: was the phasedown of manpower and functions, as proposed, considered by the Country Team to be in consonance with U.S. national policies and objectives, and was the proposed gradual phasedown considered by the Country Team to be in consonance with maintaining close U.S.-[redacted] political-military relations notwithstanding other reductions in military presence that might be contemplated by individual U.S. Services? CINCPAC said that the study could be discussed with other Country Team members to the extent necessary to validate these considerations. He also noted that there should be no personnel increase in any individual function over the FY 73 authorizations.[1]

(U) On 23 August a CINCPAC Manpower Management Team completed a 4-week study of the MAAG. The existing manpower authorization was 218 (166 military, 27 civilians, and 25 local nationals). The MAAG Chief had recommended a reduction from that total to 195. CINCPAC's team recommended further cuts, however. The team's recommendation was as follows:[2]

FY 74 - 157 (117 military, 23 U.S. civilian, 17 local nationals)
FY 75 - 121
FY 76 - 84
FY 77 - 37
FY 78 - 33 (24 military, 6 U.S. civilian, 3 local nationals)

(U) These totals were modified slightly before the FY 74 recommendations were submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS on 5 October. The proposals were as follows: officers from 103 to 75, a reduction of 28; enlisted from 63 to 44, a reduction of 19; U.S. civilians from 27 to 23, a reduction of 4; and local nationals from 25 to 17, a reduction of 8, for a total reduction of 59 spaces. This reflected a phasedown to a "core" configuration, which was the organizational structure and manning posture of the MAAG when phasedown of MAAG programs and functions had been completed. The study recommended that non-Security Assistance activities and functions be transferred out of the MAAG. CINCPAC was taking action to transfer the air anti-submarine warfare advisory function and

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1. CINCPAC 201921Z Mar 73.
2. J132 HistSum Aug 73.

the Fleet exercise function to other units on an as-required basis. The study further recommended that the Services consider the development of a Service Academy instructor exchange program between the two countries.[1]

Joint Manpower Program for the U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia

(U) The organization of the U.S. Defense Liaison Group (USDLG), Indonesia came under study during FY 72 and 73. A CINCPAC manpower management study recommended reorganization from a "flat" organization of six branches to a "taller" organization of dual deputy structure, an increase in the FY 74 manning by 14 spaces, and upgrading of the chief's position to that of brigadier general (Army). On 6 February the JCS advised that action on the authorization increases was to be held in abeyance until CINCPAC provided compensation in Security Assistance spaces; the recommendation to upgrade the chief's billet was not approved. CINCPAC proposed that the program be approved for FY 74 instead of FY 73 and identified spaces in the JUSMAG Korea as compensation.[2]

(C) Certain matters remained under study, including the grade of the chief. On 22 August the U.S. Ambassador voiced a strong objection. He cited the possible misinterpretation of this change by the Indonesian government; the possible effect on the position of the Defense Attache, traditionally the senior U.S. military representative in Indonesia; a stabilizing of Security Assistance rather than an expected increase during the next few years; and the attendant elevation of other positions in the group which would produce a higher profile of U.S. presence rather than a lower one, which the Ambassador believed was called for in Indonesia. CINCPAC, after reevaluating the position, concurred with the Ambassador and recommended to the JCS that the position remain a colonel.[3]

Joint Manpower Program for JUSMAG Korea

(U) The Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea (JUSMAGK) was approved by the JCS for FY 74 on 1 June 1973. They approved a total authorization of 586 spaces, of which 200 were officers, 197 enlisted, and 189 civilians. The approval was for FY 74 only, however. The joint projected manpower requirements for FY 75-78 were not approved. The JCS said they should be reviewed in consideration of comments provided by the Office

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 001202, 5 Oct 73, Subj: Revised FY 74 Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Republic of China (MAAG ROC).
2. J1331 Point Paper, 26 Mar 73, Subj: Reorganization and Increased Manning/JMP for USDLG.
3. CINCPAC 020210Z Oct 73.

of the Secretary of Defense in April. The proposed projection, the JCS continued, revealed that in essence all organizational elements performing at the end of FY 78 were at the same approximate level as FY 74. It also appeared, they said, that the functions listed suggested a "continuance-in-perpetuity rather than a planned transference of appropriate responsibility to the ROK" in accordance with the President's principle of self-sufficiency. In contrast, they continued, there were significant reductions in MAP and economic development assistance during this same period. CINCPAC was requested to conduct a detailed review of the JMP for the FY 74 period, as well as for the "out years." Spaces were to be fully justified and reflect the downward trend of military assistance provided.[1]

(U) On 27 July CINCPAC provided an out-of-cycle change to the FY 74 program that would reduce the authorized strengths by 31 military and 7 civilian spaces, as follows: 193 officers, 173 enlisted, and 182 civilians, for a total of 548. The program for the following years was to be prepared and forwarded separately.[2]

(U) Early in July the Chief JUSMAGK visited CINCPAC headquarters to present his proposals to reduce the strength and reorganize the JUSMAG during the following 4 years.[3]

Joint Manpower Program for USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI

(U) A CINCPAC manpower management team completed a 5-week survey of the U.S. Military Assistance Command/Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand (USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI) on 16 November. The existing authorization had been 621, composed of 287 officers, 245 enlisted, and 89 civilians. The team recommended the following authorizations:

FY 75 - 519 (225 officers, 201 enlisted, and 93 civilians)
FY 76 - 490
FY 77 - 327
FY 78 - 288
FY 79 - 266

Additionally, the team recommended that those organizations begin planning immediately for conversion to a "pure MAAG" configuration by FY 77. The recommendations were still under study at the end of the year.[4]

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1. JCS 2350/012055Z Jun 73.
2. CINCPAC 270129Z Jul 73.
3. J1331 HistSum Jul 73.
4. J132 HistSum Nov 73.

Joint Manpower Program, Office of Defense Representatives in India and Pakistan

(C) One space was deleted from the authorization of the Office of the Defense Representative, India on 11 July, in compensation for an increase in Thailand, resulting in a total authorization of 15. On 15 October this was revised to a total authorization of 10, consisting of 3 officers, 1 enlisted, and 6 civilians.[1]

(C) The JCS approved on 19 October an authorization of 10 spaces for the Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan with 3 of those officers, 2 enlisted, and 5 civilians.[2]

Joint Organization for Pacific Stars and Stripes

(U) The Pacific Stars and Stripes, the Armed Forces newspaper, had been a non-Joint Table of Distribution organization jointly staffed under the operational command of CINCPAC. Administration and supervision had been delegated to CINCUSARPAC. In March CINCPAC approved CINCUSARPAC's request for the organization to become joint; he requested that a Joint Manpower Program for FY 74 be submitted to CINCPAC. This would be approved by the JCS and manned as other joint organizations were. Based on Service strengths in the PACOM, CINCPAC recommended that the organization should be staffed with 20 percent Army, 35 percent Navy, 31 percent Air Force, and 14 percent Marine Corps. A CINCPAC team studied management of the organization in the spring of 1973.[3]

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1. JCS 2186/112031Z Jul 73; JCS 152006Z Oct 73.
2. JCS 7009/192026Z Oct 73.
3. J132 HistSum Mar 73; CINCPAC ltr Ser 980, 10 Mar 73, Subj: Joint Manpower Program (JMP).

SECTION III--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Civilian Staffing of Defense Attache Office, Saigon

(S) A unique organization was created in Saigon in 1973, the Defense Attache Office (DAO) Saigon. Principally civilian, the office was responsible not only for traditional attache duties, but for the Military Assistance Program in the RVN as a follow-on agency of the MACV. Details of the organization and mission of the agency are outlined in Chapter I, "Major New Organizations Formed in Southeast Asia." Staffing for the organization, however, required major effort throughout the Defense Department, partly because of the urgency with which the employees were recruited and partly because of the uncertainty of their tenure as the life of that organization remained under study through much of 1973.

(U) In preparation for activating the office, civilian staffing policies and procedures peculiar to the agency were established. A Tri-Service Agreement covering recruitment, placement, and return placement policies was issued by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. In this memo the Department of the Navy was named the lead agency for coordinating all U.S. civilian recruitment and processing actions, and employees assigned would be carried on Navy rolls for administrative support services. The Department of the Army and Air Force were tasked to provide necessary support to accomplish emergency and high priority recruitment. The Navy Overseas and Return Placement staff coordinated all recruitment efforts; that staff forwarded vacancy requisitions from the Army and Air Force branches of the DAO to the overseas recruitment offices of those Services for action. Employees of Defense Department components selected in the United States were granted reemployment rights back to the component from which they were recruited. Upon completion of his DAO tour, an employee could be given, with his concurrence, renewal agreements for a total period not to exceed five years. These and certain other provisions were agreed to by the Service civilian personnel chiefs.[1]

(U) Meanwhile, as permanent positions and personnel requirements were being firmed and recruitment actions initiated, emergency temporary duty requirements were identified by the DAO. Beginning in November 1972 CINCPAC had tasked his Service components and other elements of their departments to supply those temporary needs.[2]

(U) In anticipation of the need to staff the agency on a priority basis, COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and the JCS initiated and acted on U.S. civilian personnel

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1. Memo ASD (M&RA), 17 Jan 73, Tri-Service Agreement for Staffing DRSTO.
2. J1 HistSum Mar 73.

policy measures to meet the objectives. In response to a CINCPAC request, the JCS obtained exception to the President's freeze on hiring and promotions. COMUSMACV and CINCPAC recommended and obtained a blanket waiver to the Defense Department's five-year overseas service limitation for the 53 in-country career personnel in that category. Subsequently they obtained a waiver on this limitation to facilitate time-limited employment in-country of non-career employees. Also obtained was U.S. Civil Service Commission authority extension to make non-career appointments to DAO of persons from outside the overseas area. The DAO increased the authority for out-of-country recruiting agents to make employment commitments for the DAO up through the GS-12 level. To facilitate temporary duty assignments, CINCPAC obtained Navy department authority to also reimburse personnel releasing agencies for employees' salary and home station allowances.[1]

(U) CINCPAC obtained clarified policy from the Office of the Secretary of Defense as to how Code 26 recruiting agencies were to arrange for personnel administration support for their personnel assigned to the DAO. Code 26 referred to personnel on permanent change of station who were attached to the DAO, but who still officially remained on the rolls of their home agency. Also, to facilitate regular salary payment for all in-country personnel, DAO arranged to provide in-country payroll support to Code 26 personnel.[2]

(S) By the day the USMACV was disestablished, 29 March, the staffing of the DAO was 100 percent complete for the 50 military spaces, and nearly 100 percent filled or committed for the 1,200 civilian spaces. Of those civilian spaces, 691 (58 percent) were on site by permanent change of station and 309 (26 percent) through temporary duty. An additional 232 were recruited or committed to permanent positions and in the "transfer" pipeline, as were some 42 other temporary duty personnel.[3]

(C) On 13 February the Office of the Secretary of Defense had raised the subject of retired military personnel on the DAO staff. The nature of the organization and the international implications involved required the closest scrutiny of the appointment of such retired people. "Unless it is considered absolutely necessary to obtain required skills, a policy should be followed that personnel who have retired from the military service within the preceding three years would not be appointed to any civilian position" in the DAO, the Secretary's office advised. Exemptions for those retired from 1 to 3 years were possible on an individual case basis, CINCPAC being designated the exception

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1. CINCPAC 142039Z Dec 72; JCS 5232/161725Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 111816Z Jan 73; SECDEF 6081/012030Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 282150Z Feb 73; SECDEF 1049/062132Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 070346Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 142059Z Mar 73; and CNO 232124Z Mar 73.
2. CINCPAC 270455Z Feb 73; SECDEF 5954/011512Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 030417Z Mar 73.
3. CINCPAC 291115Z Mar 73.

authority for positions GS-13 and above, and the Navy's Office of Civilian Manpower Management for GS-12 and below. On 31 March, in response to a CINCPAC request, the DAO advised that retired military on permanent assignment to the DAO were as follows: retired less than 3 years, 3 officers and 3 enlisted; retired over 3 but less than 5 years, 3 officers and 8 enlisted; and retired over 5 but less than 10 years, 16 officers and 16 enlisted.[1]

(U) On 6 February the JCS had established the requirement for a weekly DAO civilian manning status report, but this was later modified to report U.S. contractor data only. On 14 April CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the report be changed from a weekly to a monthly report, and he recommended inclusion of additional personnel information. On 21 April the JCS concurred and on 24 April CINCPAC requested that the DAO Saigon implement the new procedures.[2]

(S) Plans for the phase out of the organization had begun almost as soon as it had been established, but national policy subsequently had determined that the organization should continue until its functions and tasks were Vietnamized, completed, transferred to other agencies or activities, or eliminated, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter I. Actually, the 1,200 ceiling was never reached; strength stood at 1,095 in November, and was expected to decrease. When the matter of possible reductions-in-force had been under study, the U.S. Civil Service Commission granted special authority for the DAO to establish each division and office as a separate competitive area for RIF purposes. Each division and office was identified as having a distinctly different mission, and as being independent of the others in operation and personnel administration. This authority had been sought to maintain the stability of the work force while at the same time protecting the rights of all employees to the maximum degree consistent with mission requirements. CINCPAC had earlier advised the DAO that considerations would be complicated by a workforce comprised of career status employees with statutory or administrative return rights with previous employers, career employees without such rights, some with overseas limited appointments, and veteran's preference requirements. He had asked the DAO to provide details for a system for executing a RIF that would assure continuation of mission accomplishment.[3]

(U) Prime cognizance for joint-Service coordination of non-U.S. citizen wage and personnel policies for Vietnam was reassigned by CINCPAC from CINCUSAR-

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1. SECDEF 8186/131733Z Feb 73; SECDEF 3751/170254Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 270236Z Feb 73; DAO 311855Z Mar 73.
2. CINCPAC 140317Z Apr 73; JCS 8123/211557Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 240313Z Apr 73.
3. DAO Saigon 071146Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 172035Z May 73; DAO Saigon 290815Z May 73; DAO Saigon 290817Z May 73; CINCPAC 080516Z Jun 73; OCMM Ltr 0261.3.yaw, 22 Jun 73, Subj: DAO Civilian Personnel Policy - RIF.

PAC to CINCPACFLT on 30 March. The DAO became the sole U.S. Forces direct-hire employer of non-U.S. citizen personnel in Vietnam following the disestablishment of MACV and the Service commands there.[1]

Wages for U.S. Forces Local National Employees

(U) CINCPAC (and the CINC of the U.S. European Command) had been tasked by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to establish joint personnel committees, with Service component representation as applicable to the situation. For direct hire employees these joint committees sought to establish a uniform position with respect to salaries, wages, fringe benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment for non-U.S. citizen employees, coordinating negotiations with employee unions. The following agreements were reached in the PACOM in these matters in 1973.

Japan

(U) A 15.39 percent wage and benefit increase was approved by the Service components in Japan for some 38,000 Japanese employees, retroactive to 1 April 1973. By agreement with the Japanese Government, the amount and timing of U.S. Forces pay adjustments paralleled those approved by the Diet for Japan National Personnel System (NPS) employees. A comparable NPS increase for 1 April 1973 retroactivity had received Diet approval in September 1973. Fringe benefit increases included higher allowances for family members, housing, communting, and performing night duty work.[2]

Korea

(U) Revised schedules of wages were issued in December to be effective 1 January 1974. Revisions were based on data obtained during a survey of 94 private sector firms in October and November. The new wages resulted in an increase of 17 percent for some 23,000 employees paid from appropriated and non-appropriated funds.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 302306Z Mar 73.
2. J1 HistSum Nov 73; Commander, U.S. Forces Japan ltrs, 13 Aug 73, Subj: Prospective Increases in Wages of Japanese Employees of USFJ, and 5 Nov 73, Subj: Pay Increases for Local National Employees Working With US Forces in Japan.
3. Ltr, Commander U.S. Forces Korea, 17 Dec 73, Subj: US Forces Wage and Benefits Survey Findings and Recommendations; USARPAC ltr, 21 Dec 73, Subj: Authorization of US Forces Wage Schedules - Korea.

Philippines

(U) Revised schedules of wages for some 23,000 employees in the Philippines were jointly approved and effective 1 July 1973. Revisions were based on data obtained during a survey of private sector employers in April. The new rates resulted in an average increase of 5.6 percent for manual and 3 percent for non-manual employees.[1]

Taiwan

(U) Revisions for Taiwan were based on data obtained during a survey of 51 private sector firms in August and September 1973. The new rates, to be effective 6 January 1974, resulted in an increase of 17 percent for some 4,000 general schedule and patron service employees paid from appropriated and non-appropriated funds.

(U) COMUSTDC and in-country commands had recommended that pay for 1,812 patron service manual (blue collar) employees be at rates lower than those authorized under provisions of the Foreign Service Act and Defense Department regulations. This recommendation was disapproved by PACOM Service components.[2]

Thailand

(U) A special Marine Wage Schedule plan was formulated. This was a compensation plan and wage schedule peculiar to Thai National Marine employees of U.S. Forces Thailand established following joint approval of the PACOM Service components. The new schedule, effective 3 June 1973, was based on a U.S. Forces-conducted survey of maritime industrial practices in Thailand. It was applicable to some 80 employees of the U.S. Army Support Command engaged in barge operations between the ports of Sattahip and Bangkok.[3]

Vietnam

(U) Pay increases for some 3,000 Vietnamese employees of the Defense Attache Office, Saigon were implemented on 11 November 1973. Increases were based on data obtained during a U.S. Mission survey of private sector pay

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1. CINCPACFLT ltr Ser 741/3550, 7 Jun 73, Subj: Non-Manual (PG) and Manual (PW) Wage Schedules for Non-U.S. Citizen Employees in the Republic of the Philippines.
2. CINCPACAF 290430Z Dec 73; Ltr TDC, Ser 084, 4 Oct 73, Subj: Taiwan Wage and Fringe Benefit Survey - 1973 (U).
3. PACAF ltr, 17 May 73, Subj: Authorization of US Forces Marine Schedule - Thailand.

practices conducted during August and September in the Saigon-Cholon metropolitan area. Survey findings resulted in a nearly 75 percent average increase and supported the impression that in the 3 years since the last survey the U.S. Government had lagged considerably behind local wage practice. An earlier 3,000 piaster per month across-the-board increase had been granted on 1 August. Cost of implementing the new scale through 30 June 1974 was estimated at $623,200 for Defense Attache Office employees.[1]

(U) In August CINCPAC had sought clarification of matters that arose as a result of local national wage increase actions required for Vietnam. The Secretary of Defense advised that the American Embassy in Saigon was the lead-agency for compensation matters pertaining to local national employees of the Defense Attache Office, Saigon. This advice, in effect, negated previous delegations to PACOM Service component commanders over those matters for Vietnam, which had been implemented under CINCPAC directive. Embassy leadership resulted from a 1962 State-Defense Department agreement covering all Defense Attache Offices. Under the agreement the DAO retained a full voice in all aspects of local national compensation, including participation in local wage surveys.[2]

Funding for Labor Costs in Japan

(U)(C) In August CINCPAC forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a proposal from COMUS Japan that representations be made to the Government of Japan to have that government pay or share the cost of U.S. Forces local national employee labor. The proposal was made as part of the U.S. Balance of Payments Program with the intent to have Japan assume labor costs to be incurred in the mutual defense of Japan.[3]

(U)(C) The proposal resulted from a CINCPAC-approved feasibility study conducted by COMUS Japan and the Service components in Japan. It identified nine possible options for use in gaining Japanese contributions that ranged from a low objective of the Japanese assuming only certain labor administrative costs, at a U.S.-projected 5-year savings of about $11 million, to a high of the Japanese government paying all appropriated and nonappropriated fund U.S. Forces local national labor costs and accrued local national retirement obligations at a U.S.-projected 5-year savings of some $3.5 billion. CINCPAC and his Service components recommended the $3.5 billion option as an initial negotiating

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1. CINCPACFLT 112228Z Aug 73; AMEMB Saigon 18265/200440Z Oct 73.
2. CINCPAC 210307Z Aug 73; SECDEF 6873/311745Z Aug 73.
3. CINCPAC ltr Ser 0658, 8 Aug 73, Subj: Labor Cost Sharing by GOJ/USG in Support of Mutual Defense of Japan (C).

position. COMUS Japan had recommended to CINCPAC that approval be sought on at least the option covering all appropriated fund local national labor costs and accrued retirement obligations (at a U.S.-projected 5-year cost savings of nearly $3 billion). CINCPAC, because of interdepartmental and U.S.-Japanese implications, recommended that the Secretary evaluate the proposal, determine an appropriate course of action, and provide CINCPAC with early guidance on this subject.[1]

Benefits for Local Nationals in the Philippines

(U)(C) In September the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs informed CINCPAC that the General Accounting Office had advised that the Department of Defense should not pay severance allowances to Filipino employees entitled to immediate Civil Service retirement annuities because such payments were inconsistent with prevailing local practices. They were also inconsistent with the purpose of a severance allowance, which was to sustain involuntarily separated employees who might have no other source of income for a limited time in which they sought other employment. The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense initiate action to have the 1968 U.S.-Philippine Bases Labor Agreement modified to exclude this double benefit. It accrued to some 900 of 23,000 U.S. Forces employees, and only in the event of a reduction in force.[2]

(U)(C) In response to an inquiry from the Office of the Assistant Secretary, the Ambassador in Manila, the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines, and CINCPAC urged that the United States not seek renegotiation of the Bases Labor Agreement. The Ambassador had concluded that chances were nil that the Philippine negotiators would accept reduction of a benefit already authorized, and had cautioned that the Filipino unions wanted the Government of the Philippines to request that the BLA be renegotiated to achieve demands unacceptable to the United States: the right to strike, compulsory arbitration of grievances, and strengthening preferential U.S. Forces employment of Filipinos vis-a-vis U.S. citizens.[3]

(U) CINCPAC's Representative in the Philippines took action to reduce instances of severance benefit payments by not allowing U.S. Civil Service retiree eligibles to volunteer for reduction in force.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 090220Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 060412Z Oct 73.
2. SECDEF 9807/052034Z Sep 73.
3. AMEMB Manila 10678/190803Z Sep 73; CINCPACREP PHIL 190322Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 220234Z Sep 73.
4. CINCPACREP Phil Instruction 12550.3, 15 May 73, Subj: Personnel Actions Leading to Payment of Severance Pay to Filipino Employees Eligible for U.S. Civil Service Retirement; command guidance concerning.

Local National Exchange Employees Strike in Thailand

(U) From 13 to 19 December some 2,000 local national employees of the Thailand Regional Exchange (TRE) went on strike throughout Thailand. Principal demands were for an immediate across-the-board pay increase of 250 baht per 2-week pay period, a major increase in severance pay benefits, and full pay for time on strike without punitive action.

(U) Settlement terms, made applicable by regulation to all U.S. Forces local national employees, including those exchange employees, included authorization by the PACOM Service component commands, as follows. A pay increase on settlement of the strike of 120 baht per four weeks for lower grade employees, graduated to no increase for top level employees, with management agreement to initiate in January 1974 (rather than February, as scheduled) a wage survey of private sector pay practices. Revised U.S. Forces wage schedules, based on survey findings, were to be implemented on 10 February 1974, with any additional increases granted at that time. Strike settlement increases were verified as being warranted by a spot check with a number of firms to be surveyed in January. Another agreement was to conduct a fringe benefit survey of private sector severance pay, retirement, and providence fund practices with findings to be reviewed by the PACOM Service components to determine if a change in U.S. severance pay practices was warranted. A third matter concerned pay while on strike; the United States held to a PACOM-wide policy of no pay while on strike, but strikers were offered an opportunity to make up work for time lost, with a promise of no management reprisals.[1]

(U) A wave of strikes against private firms and the Thai Government had occurred since the change in government in October. Principal demands, including significant wage hikes, had met with little or no management resistance in most cases. The strike against the exchange was considered reflective of the general labor discontent in Thailand.[2]

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 131620Z Dec 73; COMUSMACTHAI 181514Z Dec 73; CINCPACAF 190135Z Dec 73; COMUSMACTHAI 191407Z Dec 73; J121 HistSum Dec 73.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 19956/271220Z Dec 73.

SECTION IV--MORALE AND WELFARE MATTERS

Southeast Asia Benefits

(S) Combat Zone Tax Exclusion benefits in Southeast Asia came under study in 1973. In February the JCS asked CINCPAC to comment on a proposal to revoke Executive Orders 11216 and 11255. The second dealt with free first class postage privileges from Vietnam and adjacent waters, and CINCPAC recommended revocation as troop withdrawal had virtually eliminated the value of the order. Order 11216, however, designated Vietnam and adjacent waters as a combat zone for income tax purposes. At the time, all enlisted pay and up to $500 per month for officers was tax free. CINCPAC recommended that this order remain in effect until disestablishment of the existing Defense Attache Office, Saigon structure or the disestablishment of the U.S. Support Activities Group, whichever occurred later. CINCPAC noted that the tax exclusion for those serving in, or flying over, Cambodia and Laos was directly dependent on combat zone status for Vietnam. Daily reports continued to reflect existence of combat environments in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Personnel on the ground and those flying missions over those countries continued to be subject to the hazards of combat. Also, CINCPAC said, it was presumed totally impractical to attempt designation of either Laos or Cambodia as combat zones "now or in conceivable future." Public announcements had reflected U.S. concern regarding unauthorized enemy troop and materiel infiltration from North Vietnam and had contained a warning that the President had not excluded the possibility of further military force if violations of agreements continued. CINCPAC also noted that most of the U.S. people in Vietnam were civilians who received 25 percent post differential allowances, presumably based on combat conditions. "Though financial benefits which accrue to military members, as a consequence of combat zone status, are considerably less that the 25 percent post differential there is some measure of equality of treatment in continuing the tax exclusion," CINCPAC continued.[1]

(S) The tax exclusion continued until 30 June, at which time a technical linkage to authority for the draft caused it to die with the draft. The JCS asked for CINCPAC comments that might justify continued exclusion for personnel in Laos and Cambodia, and certain aircrews in Thailand. CINCPAC solicited the views of subordinate units. Continued exclusion was strongly supported by all except the Deputy CHJUSMAGTHAI and CINCUSARPAC, who did not believe that sufficient justification could be provided to warrant continuance. COMUSSAG/7th Air Force advised that the basis for the exclusion revolved around the security of the RVN, where the situation continued as it had in the past, with U.S. Forces

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1. JCS 3177/270013Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 242052Z Mar 73.

experiencing constant exposure to the hazards of war on the ground and in the air. Violations of the cease-fire continued and personnel were vulnerable to injury, capture, or death.[1]

(U) CINCPAC's reply of 21 July recommended that the same tax exclusion entitlements in effect prior to 30 June be reinstated retroactive to 1 July and continue until such time as hostilities in Southeast Asia had in fact ceased or U.S. personnel were withdrawn. As a minimum the exclusion should be extended to the bombing halt in Cambodia, CINCPAC believed. He continued:

> ...The no-notice termination of subject benefit due to technical linkage with expired draft authority considered a serious breach of faith with both volunteers and non volunteers assigned RVN, Cambodia, Laos and certain combat aircrews assigned Thailand.
>
> ...Presence of U.S. Forces in SEA is for purpose of promoting conditions that will lead to cessation of all hostilities. Under existing circumstances, however, violations of the cease fire agreement places these people in continuing jeopardy from ground fire, sapper attacks, booby traps and attacks on installations. The threat to their security has not diminished. Aircrews involved in combat operations remain subject to hostile fire with ever present possibility of capture or death....Failure to reinstate subject benefit may have deleterious effect upon morale of personnel involved.[2]

(U) Although the legislation that would reinstate the exclusion remained under study in Washington throughout the year, the exclusion stopped 1 July. It was believed that when the legislation was ultimately passed, the exclusion would be retroactive. In November the Chief of the Military Equipment Delivery Team in Cambodia requested that CINCPAC take appropriate action to keep the subject an active part of the Defense Department legislative program. "Reasons for cessation of combat zone tax exclusion are still not understood by rank and file," the chief said. He noted that the Khmer Republic remained an official active combat zone. The total number of U.S. personnel affected was approximately 100, and the beneficial effect of the exclusion was very large to the individuals concerned, particularly when compared with the nominal cost involved.

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1. J111L Point Paper, 25 Jul 73, Subj: Combat Zone Tax Exclusion (CZTE); J111S HistSum Jul 73; CINCUSARPAC 190118Z Jul 73; COMUSSAG/7AF 190320Z Jul 73.
2. CINCPAC 212126Z Jul 73.

The entitlement was a "distinct advantage in obtaining voluntary extensions in a small specialized unit where hard-earned experience must be reacquired in yearly cycles." CINCPAC advised the JCS that he agreed with the team chief, reiterated his previous position, and recommended that the exclusion legislation be "vigorously supported."[1]

Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire

(C) Hostile fire pay came under considerable study by CINCPAC in 1973 for Southeast Asia and the Demilitarized Zone of Korea. The Defense Department pay manual, since the Pueblo Incident of 1968, had authorized hostile fire pay for service in the Korean DMZ, at $65 a month. The pay manual required that commanders of unified commands continuously appraise conditions existing within a designated area to insure that service there was subject to hazards to warrant continuation of such designation, and when appropriate to recommend to the Secretary of Defense that specific locations be excluded from such designation. On 7 December 1972 CINCPAC, in accordance with this instruction, initiated a review of the situation. COMUS Korea's 15 January 1973 reply strongly recommended retention of the designation. He noted that while casualty-inflicting incidents had declined, a marked increase in minor violations by the North Koreans had been noted, including the introduction of unauthorized automatic and crew served weapons, improved fortifications, and openly provocative acts toward U.S. personnel by North Koreans in the Joint Security Area. He said the North Korean tactics in the designated hostile fire area had shifted from active military confrontation to a determined psychological campaign designed to test to the fullest extent the fiber and resolve of U.S. military personnel serving in the area, creating a potentially explosive situation in that hostile fire could be initiated or exchanged in reaction. He noted that Korean personnel serving in the DMZ received extra pay, amounting to 200 percent of base pay for lower-grade enlisted personnel, solely in recognition of the dangers inherent in serving in the DMZ.[2]

(C) A study of incidents in the DMZ revealed a decline from 542 in 1968 to 97 in 1969, to 64 in 1970, to 47 in 1971, and 3 each in 1972 and 1973 with no U.S. personnel involved in either 1972 or 1973. In response to CINCPAC's query, COMUS Korea advised that the average number of personnel receiving the special pay over the last six months had been 2,016, with about 8 of these Navy and Air Force, and the great majority Army personnel.[3]

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1. CHMEDTC 11946/011220Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 092040Z Nov 73.
2. J113 Point Paper, 15 May 73, Subj: Hostile Fire Payments (HFP) for personnel serving in Korean DMZ (U); CINCPAC 072321Z Dec 72; COMUS Korea 150954Z Jan 73.
3. COMUS Korea 220146Z May 73.

(U) On 30 May the JCS requested that the matter of hostile fire pay be reevaluated. They noted that disbursements in the area had varied widely over the last few years. "In view of budgetary constraints and the general reduction of tension along the DMZ, it appears advisable to reevaluate the necessity for continuing this designation." CINCPAC requested that COMUS Korea take the JCS message for action. He advised COMUS Korea, however, that information available at CINCPAC's headquarters did not appear to support continuance of the pay for Korea assignees on any scale. Therefore, if COMUS Korea should determine it necessary or desirable to continue it, he must provide solid justification and a proposed plan to control troop participation.[1]

(U) COMUS Korea's reply of 8 June noted that existing conditions within the area did not justify continuation of the hostile fire pay area designation. He said there had been isolated instances of hostile fire within the area in the past 18 months, and it was expected that they could occur in the future, but that personnel in those cases could be awarded hostile fire pay under other pay provisions. He recommended that the pay be terminated effective 1 July 1973. CINCPAC concurred and so advised the JCS.[2]

(U) On 7 August the JCS advised of a memorandum from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated 1 August, deleting the area as a hostile fire pay area to be effective 1 September 1973. The area was described as follows:

> That portion of the Republic of Korea, north of the Imjin River and south of the DMZ extending from the intersection of the river and the DMZ on the west (coordinates 969930) along the DMZ to a point in the vicinity of Pinil (coordinates 097095), then southeast to the north bank of the Imjin River in the vicinity of Chajip'o (coordinates 119060)....[3]

(U) In mid-August the JCS requested justification for continuance of hostile fire pay for Navy forces off Vietnam at the location called YANKEE STATION. They proposed to exclude off-shore waters beyond the 12-mile limit, which would eliminate a large portion of the Gulf of Tonkin, including YANKEE STATION. CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT agreed, and the area was redesignated effective 1 October 1973 as follows:

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1. JCS 5836/301555Z May 73; CINCPAC 012059Z Jun 73.
2. COMUS Korea 081027Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 151917Z Jun 73.
3. JCS 5423/072133Z Aug 73.

> ...the hostile fire area of Vietnam is redesignated so as to include the total land area of North and South Vietnam including inland waters and the adjacent sea area west of a line from a point on the east coast of Vietnam at the junction of North Vietnam and China southeastward to a point 12 miles seaward from the base line from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured; then continuing on that 12 mile seaward line to 10-16N, 103-83E, thence northeast to 10-21N, 103-44E, thence on straight lines to 10-23N, 103-49E; 10-26N, 103-54E; 10-30N, 103-55E; 10-30N, 104-01E; 10-28N, 104-06E; 10-28N, 104-06E; 10-16N, 104-14E thence northeast to the juncture of the Cambodia and Vietnam border; and the airspace thereover.[1]

(U) At about this same time, following the cease-fire in Vietnam and Laos, the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments regarding Southeast Asia hostile fire pay. CINCPAC recommended on 10 September that Cambodia remain a designated hostile fire pay area, but that Vietnam and Laos be excluded. COMUSSAG and the DAO Saigon, however, requested reconsideration of CINCPAC's position. CINCPAC provided his thoughts on the matter on 21 September to COMUSSAG, "CINCPAC wants anyone shot at to receive HFP." JCS approval of the CINCPAC recommendation to exclude Vietnam and Laos as designated areas would not preclude payment to qualifying personnel. Other pay regulations authorized hostile fire pay when a member entitled to basic pay actually participated in a hostile encounter. No geographical limitations were imposed. A member who participated in a hostile encounter while on duty or on board the same vessel or aircraft that was subject to hostile fire, qualified for the pay. In land encounters, personnel assigned to the same military unit and performing duty with the unit at the time were entitled to the pay. Certification as to eligibility rested with the appropriate commander or official designated according to the regulations of the Services. CINCPAC asked COMUSSAG to identify those provinces or regions outside Saigon and its environs where empirical data showed a high rate of hostile encounters since the cease-fire date. With adequate justification, those regions or provinces might possibly be designated hostile fire areas, CINCPAC concluded, with qualifying personnel enabled to draw the pay without having to resort to a certifying statement.[2]

(U) As a result of information received, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that his 10 September recommendation be revised. He recommended that all of the Republic of Vietnam except the metropolitan area of Saigon be designated a hostile fire area.[3]

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1. JCS 4664/171516Z Aug 73; CINCPACFLT 280418Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 310450Z Aug 73; JCS 2846/011342Z Oct 73; SECNAV 282148Z Sep 73.
2. CINCPAC 212116Z Sep 73.
3. CINCPAC 021910Z Oct 73, which cited USSAG/7AF 011100Z Oct 73.

Rest and Recuperation Program

(U) The Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Program, which had been initiated in the PACOM in 1962, continued throughout 1973, although at the end of 1972 the question of phasing the program out with the cease-fire had been studied. On 27 January CINCPAC advised the JCS that termination of combat operations in Southeast Asia would require a reassessment of the R&R program. The concerned PACOM organizations had provided their comments, which CINCPAC had considered in preparing his recommendations to the JCS. He recommended that X-Day should be established as the termination date of the program for entitlement accrual purposes and that all travel should be completed prior to X+120 days. He listed proposed eligibility criteria. He noted that USSAG/7AF should assume primary responsibility for operation and administrative management of the program for assignees from Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia; MACV, however, should transfer to the DAO Saigon the responsibility for assisting USSAG/7AF in providing administration and processing for RVN assignees. Passengers destined for Honolulu from Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia should originate in Bangkok; RVN passengers should originate in Saigon. (Bangkok and Honolulu were the only two remaining R&R sites.) CINCPAC believed that the Department of the Air Force should continue to fund the program to its conclusion. At the time it was estimated that participation would approximate 75 per month from Saigon and 355 per month from Bangkok.[1]

(U) Although no formal approval of CINCPAC's proposal for termination had been received, on 24 February CINCPAC promulgated tentative ground rules for operating the program to its conclusion, subject to JCS approval.[2]

(C) On 6 March the JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendations, as follows. The R&R program was to be terminated for accrual purposes on 28 March in the RVN, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand; all travel associated with the program was to be completed within 3 months after that date. CINCPAC was authorized to continue the out-of-country R&R program on an exception basis for personnel who were regularly engaged in combat missions. The Commander USSAG/7AF was to assume primary responsibility for operation and administrative management of the R&R program for the RVN, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. The precise date of this transfer of responsibility was left to CINCPAC's discretion. COMUSMACV was to transfer to the DAO Saigon the responsibility for assisting USSAG/7AF in providing administration and processing for the RVN assignees. The out-of-country R&R program, the JCS continued, should be converted to an Environmental and Morale Leave Program in areas where adverse environmental conditions existed,

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1. CINCPAC 270042Z Jan 73.
2. CINCPAC 242257Z Feb 73.

in accordance with Defense Department regulations on that program. The Air Force was to continue to fund the R&R program to its conclusion. CINCPAC was asked to apprise the JCS of progress on R&R program curtailment by 15 May and 15 July.[1]

(C) CINCPAC advised all concerned of the JCS guidance, and asked that they advise CINCPAC of their views and recommendations regarding a possible requirement to continue the program beyond established dates for those regularly engaged in combat missions. He also established some reporting requirements.[2]

(U) The phasedown of the program proceeded smoothly with COMUSSAG assuming administration of the program. On 7 April, however, COMUSSAG advised that he believed the program ought to be extended. He said:

> ...This headquarters does not feel that the RVN cease-fire in itself warrants a complete termination of the SEA out-of-country R&R program. As long as there is a requirement for selected US military personnel assigned in SEA to participate in combat missions, then these individuals should be deserving of benefits formerly associated with service in, or support of, the RVN.

He said that the rationale for R&R was still valid. He also said that the cease-fire had not affected military operations in Cambodia; in fact, intensity of enemy activity had increased. Personnel assigned in Thailand who were regularly engaged in Southeast Asia combat missions "should qualify for R&R under eligibility criteria established prior to the RVN cease-fire. These individuals should continue to be offered an R&R opportunity until that time when there is a cessation of involvement on the part of US personnel in SEA combat missions." COMUSSAG forecast the number who would be eligible, and criteria for continued participation. He also noted that if the number of personnel participating did not justify retention of existing R&R centers in Bangkok and Honolulu that R&R operations could be incorporated into existing Military Airlift Command terminal facilities.[3]

(C) On 7 May CINCPAC authorized continuation of the program for military personnel permanently assigned in Cambodia and Laos.[4]

(U) The program continued throughout the year. A question of civilian participation was raised later in the year. On 7 December CINCPAC advised that civilians may participate in the Environmental and Morale Leave program, not R&R.[5]

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1. JCS 1150/062313Z Mar 73.
2. CINCPAC 100425Z Mar 73.
3. COMUSSAG 070300Z Apr 73.
4. USSAG/7AF 290430Z Oct 73, which cited CINCPAC 072233Z May 73.
5. CINCPAC 072334Z Dec 73.

Environmental and Morale Leave

(U) In September 1972 CINCPAC had reviewed the principles and practices of the Environmental and Morale Leave (E&ML) program and recommended a need to modify travel entitlements of the program to serve the Defense Department population "more equitably." He first noted that according to the Defense Department regulation on the subject, there was no differentiation between the entitlement of a military member and a civilian employee insofar as E&ML priority was concerned. He outlined the requirements for an E&ML origination site, a place with extraordinarily difficult living conditions, notably unhealthful conditions, and excessive physical hardships. The identical conditions, he continued, constituted the basis for post differential payments to U.S. civilian employees at both foreign and non-foreign locations. These differential payments ranged up to 25 percent of basic compensation.

(U) CINCPAC said:

> ...It is apparent from the above that DOD civilians are compensated for adverse environmental conditions and are additionally granted E&ML travel opportunities, to ameliorate the effects of the identical adverse environmental conditions, on an equal basis with military personnel. Military personnel, however, are not monetarily compensated for the adverse environmental conditions that pertain.

He recommended that the Defense Department regulation be amended, as follows:

> ...A normal prerequisite for designating an E&ML site origination site should be the qualification of that site for post differential payments....Space available transportation from such a site will be in accordance with the following priorities:
>
> (1) Priority One: Military members and their authorized accompanying dependents without regard to grade or branch of service.
>
> (2) Priority Two: DOD U.S. citizen civilians and their authorized accompanying dependents.
>
> (3) Priority Three: Federal non-DOD U.S. citizen civilians and their authorized accompanying dependents. (It is intended that all priority one applicants be accommodated before available space is offered to others.)

> ...Only under unusual and specially justified circumstances will a place be designated an E&ML origination site when no post differential is authorized....However, should circumstances justify the designation of such a location as an E&ML origination site, equal priority will be assigned the military and DOD civilian personnel and dependents of each.[1]

(U) On 20 February the JCS advised CINCPAC that it was the view of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that no distinction should be made between military and civilian personnel eligible for travel under the E&ML program.[2]

(U) Almost simultaneously, however, the Office of the Defense Representative, India raised tha same issue that had prompted CINCPAC's request: apparent gross inequality of treatment of military personnel relative to their civilian counterparts in environmentally deprived areas. They noted that disestablishment of the Military Airlift Command's Embassy flight in November 1972 and the earlier removal by the Indian Government of the Ambassador's plane had eliminated all means of U.S. Government transportation to those assigned in India. Only commercial travel at an individual's own expense was available; for all intents and purposes this was prohibitive, especially for enlisted men. Therefore, in effect, the E&ML program for India no longer existed. The program recommended was similar to one enjoyed by State Department personnel. In the absence of military airlift, they proposed that commercial transportation be provided to Tehran for further Military Airlift Command transportation to Europe or Hong Kong, with this commercial travel funded by means of excess rupees held by the United States in India. It was understood that this would require Congressional action, but they noted that concern was great and would become more so with the arrival of the hot season in April, the monsoons in late June, and the unpleasant conditions prevailing through September.[3]

(U) On 28 February CINCPAC advised the JCS that this problem and another raised by the Defense Attache in Colombo should be considered representative of a worldwide problem in preparing a legislative proposal for a funded, space required, E&ML program. The pronounced inequity in situations cited was considered seriously detrimental to morale. "Unequal opportunity and treatment are compounded in such situations by post differential payments made to Federal civilian employees for the same conditions that provide basis for existing E&ML travel." This resulted in the civilians being compensated for enduring adverse

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1. CINCPAC 230409Z Sep 73.
2. JCS 6243/201848Z Feb 73.
3. DRI New Dehli 74-73/161425Z Feb 73.

conditions and being additionally compensated for periodic rest and recreation trips away from such conditions. "Although CINCPAC fully supports these benefits it must be noted that military personnel serving in the same environment, without access to military airlift, are denied both benefits. The proximity of the inequitable treatment is especially demoralizing." CINCPAC "strongly" endorsed a travel program that would provide periodic funded transportation to reduce extraordinary personal expense and enhance tours of duty for those who must serve under clearly adverse environmental conditions.[1]

(U) The JCS advised that the Department of the Army had presented a legislative proposal supporting such a program to the Secretary of Defense on 1 March.[2]

(U) The determination of Okinawa as an originating site came under study in 1973. It had been removed from the list of originating sites in late 1972, but further review resulted in it being reinstated, with Taipei and Toyko authorized destinations.[3]

Special 30-Day Leave Program

(U) A special 30-day leave program had been initiated in Southeast Asia to encourage voluntary extension to improve combat unit continuity and reduce the requirement for more than one involuntary tour in Southeast Asia hostile fire areas. The program had been popular and had served its purpose well, but the withdrawal of forces from Vietnam had eliminated the basis for the program. CINCPAC advised the JCS that it was imprudent to request a legislative extension of the program, and on 21 April he recommended that the program be allowed to lapse. On 29 June the JCS announced termination of the program effective 30 June.[4]

HANDCLASP/SAFEHAVEN

(C) On 29 January COMUSMACV requested that authorizations for the SAFE HAVEN/HANDCLASP programs be continued. As part of a plan to extend tours in Vietnam for MACV staff officers, certain officers were offered the option of locating their families at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, and certain general/flag officers were authorized leased quarters in Bangkok for their dependents. As an additional incentive for officers serving long tours, wives were

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1. CINCPAC 280127Z Feb 73.
2. JCS 1569/191756Z Mar 73.
3. JCS 5076/172323Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 242130Z Aug 73.
4. CINCPAC 212107Z Apr 73; JCS 3313/292134Z Jun 73.

permitted to travel between their SAFE HAVEN and Saigon under the control of COMUSMACV; this same privilege was later allowed for children. Because of the insecurity of roads and lack of commercial air transportation in Vietnam, the JCS had also authorized in-country transportation of wives between Saigon and the Military Region or province headquarters of the sponsor when approved by COMUSMACV. On 29 January COMUSMACV anticipated that approximately 20 participants in the program would remain after the cease-fire, and that the number of participants might rise if the USSAG and DAO continued to function longer than existing projections. He requested authority for unaccompanied, space-available travel on military aircraft for dependents in the military SAFE HAVEN program between Clark, Bangkok, Udorn, and Nakhon Phanom under the control of COMUSSAG. Bangkok and Udorn were both authorized ports of entry into Thailand, and dependents would then travel to Nakhon Phanom to visit their sponsors. Authorizing them unaccompanied travel would allow their sponsors to remain at their duty location, the intent of the program. He also requested continuance of the option for six sets of Government-leased quarters in Bangkok, for key officers selected by COMUSSAG in coordination with the Services.[1]

(C) CINCPAC concurred in the proposal. The JCS granted authority for COMUSSAG to control unaccompanied space available travel in project HANDCLASP. Authority for continued house leasing in Bangkok (SAFE HAVEN) was approved by the Secretary of Defense on 5 March.[2]

Joint Service Commendation Medal

(U) On 5 March the Chief of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia requested assistance in developing methods to expedite processing and approval of his award recommendations. On 20 March CINCPAC granted authority to COMUSMACTHAI to award the Joint Service Commendation Medal to individuals assigned to the MEDTC. The Chief MEDTC was advised that all other award recommendations had to be forwarded to CINCPAC, but that they would be given priority consideration.[3]

(U) On 10 August COMUSMACTHAI queried CINCPAC regarding awarding the Joint Service Commendation Medal. He said that in addition to recognizing the achievements or service of assigned personnel, MACTHAI had occasionally had cause to tender special recognition to others, such as personnel neither assigned or attached, but who contributed to the MACTHAI mission while assigned to units

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1. COMUSMACV 291230Z Jan 73.
2. COMUSSAG/7AF 201030Z Jul 73, which cited CINCPAC 240227Z Feb 73; JCS 9827/272114Z Mar 73; J114 HistSum Mar 73.
3. J114 HistSum, which cited CHMEDTC 051030Z Mar 73 (BOM); CINCPAC 201925Z Mar 73. See related item on CINCPAC Certificate of Merit.

that directly supported MACTHAI or the JUSMAGTHAI, or personnel who contributed to the MACTHAI mission while on temporary duty, other than for exercise purposes. He had been awarding the medal, he said, for meritorious service to personnel of attached units, and he wanted confirmation that this was in accord with CINCPAC policy.[1]

(U) Both the Defense Department directive on the subject and the CINCPAC instruction stated that an individual must be assigned to a joint command or activity to be eligible for the award. This CINCPAC policy was confirmed by telephone with JCS personnel people. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACTHAI on 17 August that awarding of the medal to other than assigned personnel was not in accord with CINCPAC policy.[2]

CINCPAC Certificate of Merit

(U) The CINCPAC Certificate of Merit came under study in 1973. The award was a sheet of parchment picturing the flags of the United States and the four Services with room for a paragraph of text explaining the reason for the award. It was considered an award to provide tangible recognition for acts of noteworthy service or achievement not considered of sufficient magnitude to merit award of the Joint Service Commendation Medal. It was not included in earlier editions of the CINCPAC Instruction on Awards and Decorations (1650.4) until an 8 May revision that authorized that the Certificate could be awarded to members of subordinate unified commands and activities.[3]

(U) While the instruction delegated approval authority to heads of subordinate unified commands or activities, a question arose from COMUSMACTHAI, who was the approval authority for the award of the Joint Service Commendation Medal to personnel of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia. He wanted to know if his approval was necessary or if the Delivery Team Chief could approve such recommendations locally. CINCPAC advised that the MEDTC was a subordinate unified activity and that its chief was authorized to award the Certificate of Merit.[4]

Vietnam Campaign Designations

(U) The war in Vietnam had been compartmented into a series of 17 campaigns with the last ending 28 January 1973. In 1972 the 15th and 16th campaigns had come under study with the Services operating without joint development. At that

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1. MACTHAI 100730Z Aug 73.
2. CINCPAC 172212Z Aug 73.
3. CINCPACINST 1650.4D, 8 May 73, Subj: Awards and Decorations.
4. MACTHAI 300801Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 310230Z Aug 73.

time COMUSMACV had requested that future development be jointly coordinated. In September 1972 COMUSMACV had recommended that the designation of the Army and Navy 15th and 16th campaigns be Vietnamization I, from 1 July 1971 through 30 November 1971, and Vietnamization II, from 1 December 1971 through 29 March 1972. On 14 March 1973, however, the Department of the Army recommended that the names be changed to Consolidation I and II, as the formal Vietnamization program had predated the period in question by several years, describing the major object of U.S. Forces since July 1968, not just the period covered by the two campaigns. Besides being anticlimactic and misleading, the Army considered it cumbersome and difficult to pronounce.[1]

(U) COMUSSAG voiced no objection, subject to concurrence of the Navy. CINCPAC concurred and so notified the JCS on 21 April.[2]

(S) On 5 March COMUSMACV had proposed, meanwhile, the 17th campaign designation to cover the period from 30 March 1972 to 28 January 1973. He recommended that this final campaign be called "Peace with Honor."[3]

(U) Earlier, with the drawdown of forces from Vietnam, the RNVAF Joint General Staff waived time periods for eligibility for certain awards; this was subsequently reflected in U.S. regulations. Effective 28 January 1973 the time spent in-country (in the RVN) for U.S. military personnel necessary to earn the Vietnam Campaign Medal was reduced from six months to two months. This was to be effective until further notice. CINCPAC passed this information to the JCS so that they might amend the U.S. award regulations.[4]

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal

(U) On 2 May the JCS asked CINCPAC about some proposed changes to the Defense Department instruction regarding the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal. They noted that with the establishment of a termination date of 28 March 1973 for the Vietnam Service Medal, consideration of the applicability of the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal to operations in Southeast Asia became appropriate. They also asked about the desirability of establishing a termination date for the criteria for receipt of the medal in Korea.[5]

(S) CINCPAC concurred with the JCS Southeast Asia proposal, which had concerned principally Cambodia and Vietnam, but he recommended that certain per-

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1. DA 141820Z Mar 73.
2. CINCPAC 212045Z Apr 73; J1 HistSum Apr 73.
3. COMUSMACV 051045Z Mar 73.
4. JGS/RVNAF J1 Memo #149, 23 Feb 73, Subj: Award RVNAF Medals to FWMAF Personnel after Cease-Fire in Vietnam; CINCPAC 040311Z May 73; DAO Saigon 230115Z May 73; CINCPAC 260402Z May 73.
5. JCS 8169/021617Z May 73.

sonnel in Laos and Thailand should also be eligible for the medal. These personnel had been eligible for the Vietnam Service Medal until 28 March 1973. Regarding forces in Korea, CINCPAC recommended termination of most eligibility because of the decline in military operations there. The Defense Department instruction said that the degree of participation required to gain award of the medal was to be engaged in actual combat, or duty equally as hazardous as combat duty, during the operation with armed opposition, regardless of time in the area. Since award of Hostile Fire Pay required exposure to hazardous duty, it appeared to CINCPAC that such exposure would also qualify personnel for the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal. Therefore, he recommended that personnel who arrived in Korea on or before 30 June 1973 be awarded the medal upon completion of 30 consecutive days in Korea; personnel who arrived on or after 1 July 1973 were to be awarded the medal only if they gained entitlement to Hostile Fire Pay.[1]

Approval to Accept RVN Gallantry Cross

(U) In March 1973 COMUSMACV requested permission to accept award of the RVN Gallantry Cross for personnel of COMUSMACV, the U.S. Army Vietnam, and the 7th Air Force, and both the Gallantry Cross and the Civil Actions Medal for Naval Forces, Vietnam, if offered. The Joint General Staff's letter of intent stated that throughout their commitment to the combat mission in Vietnam, those units had worked energetically and performed brilliant as well as immeasurable feats of arms, thus contributing materially to the fight against the Communists in order to preserve freedom, independence, and peace in the Republic of Vietnam.[2]

(U) On 23 March the JCS granted approval for COMUSMACV to accept, as well as subordinate units including advisory units and those directly assigned to MACV headquarters from February 1962 to 28 March 1973. Army approval was also granted, but it became increasingly unclear to CINCPAC whether Air Force and Navy permission had been granted. In July the RVNAF Joint General Staff announced its intention to award the Civil Actions Medal to U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam and the Defense Attache Office in Saigon requested authority to accept it. As this matter had been addressed in the original COMUSMACV request, CINCPAC queried the Chief of Naval Operations. He also inquired about Air Force approval through the JCS. Both Services had already granted approval, the Navy by a personal message from Admiral Zumwalt to General Weyand (who was COMUSMACV at the time), and the Air Force by a message that had not included CINCPAC as an addressee. While all had thus approved receipt of the awards, authority for individual wear had to be granted by the Military Departments.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 252252Z Jun 73.
2. COMUSMACV 200021Z Mar 73.
3. J1 HistSum Jul 73; JCS 6544/232059Z Mar 73; DA 231922Z Mar 73; USSAG/7AF 190330Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 212145Z Jul 73; CNO 232319Z Jul 73; AFMPC Randolph AFB 241843Z Jul 73.

Exchange and Commissary Privileges in Thailand

(U) Early in August COMUSMACTHAI advised CINCPAC that all duty-free privileges enjoyed by U.S. personnel in Thailand were being questioned by the Thai Government and the newspapers with increasing frequency. U.S. operation of those services was provided under the general authority of the 17 October 1950 Thai-U.S. agreement regarding Military Assistance; there was no Status of Forces Agreement. Thai officials were seeking increased controls and restrictions on the operation of the exchange, commissary, and APO insofar as they provided duty-free goods to U.S. personnel in their personal capacity. Receipt of privileges by retired people and their dependents was a particularly vulnerable topic in view of the fact that their presence in Thailand did not contribute to Thai-U.S. security. There were approximately 150 retired military with dependents known to be in Thailand. Another 210 with 200 dependents were in Thailand, but derived their privileges from their status as contractor employees.[1]

(U) On 24 September COMUSMACTHAI advised CINCPAC of a letter forwarded by the Thai Chief of Staff Supreme Command to the Prime Minister on this subject that expressed major concern over the disruptive effect of lack of Thai control over exchange patron access and disposition of duty-free merchandise on the Thai economy. COMUSMACTHAI said that he had been informally advised regarding certain proposals that were forwarded to the Prime Minister for his consideration. Merchandise should be identified with a special stamp; only U.S. Servicemen assigned to duty in Thailand should enjoy privileges, excluding retired military and civilian government personnel, contractor personnel, and others granted diplomatic privileges; the value, quantities, and types of goods sold should be limited proportionately to what was considered by both sides to be suitable according to the numbers and income of the users in Thailand; Thai officials should be given authority to periodically inspect the facilities; a system of controls should be set up so that before an American was granted exit clearance he would have to declare his purchases and pay any necessary customs tax; and the Ministry of Finance should devise a schedule of tax amortization on the resale of duty-free merchandise (appliances such as refrigerators 2 years, cars 5 years, for example).

(U) COMUSMACTHAI anticipated that these proposals would be formally presented and offered his preliminary analysis. He advised that merchandise could be specially marked, but this would cost more. Regarding retired military (142 sponsors, 168 dependents), without any Status of Forces Agreement, the only basis for extending privileges was U.S. Service regulations and custom, none of which were recognized by the Thai Government. The U.S. Embassy had long advo-

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 070910Z Aug 73.

cated revoking all privileges for retired military, COMUSMACTHAI noted, and as a consequence he expected little sympathy or support from that quarter. Civilian Government personnel included State and Defense Department employees and their dependents (1,095 sponsors, 1,582 dependents) who were granted full duty-free privileges. Although they received a 10 percent pay differential, revocation of the privileges would undoubtedly require additional offsetting compensation. COMUSMACTHAI anticipated that the Embassy would provide its support for this category of personnel and that the Thai authorities would not press too hard. Contractor personnel included U.S. citizen employees and their dependents (1,277 sponsors, 929 dependents) employed by the Federal Electric Corporation, Trans-Asia, Air America, etc., and various technical representatives. These people enjoyed only limited privileges, but these were part of their contracts, and any revocation would necessitate renegotiation. The undoubted result would be increased cost to the U.S. Government. COMUSMACTHAI believed the Thai would press hard for this revocation, and that the U.S. fallback position should be retention of privileges at least through the lifetime of contracts in an effort to avoid costly and disruptive renegotiations.

(U) In the matter of controlling or rationing merchandise, there was already a quota system, but Thai officials did not monitor it. COMUSMACTHAI continued, "It is believed the reference to income means limiting the purchasing power of an individual based on his pay grade. Any such limitation is unacceptable to the USG."

(U) COMUSMACTHAI asked for CINCPAC comments or guidance on the proposals. "Considering the absence of existing agreements in these matters and fact that RTG can direct us to institute these measures I believe it reasonable for us to accept most of their proposals. In my judgment, I think we can accept in principle all proposals except...[those regarding retired military, civilian government, and contractor personnel]." He reinterated his request for CINCPAC comments and guidance on 5 October.[1]

(U) CINCPAC asked his component commanders and the Commander of the Army and Air Force Pacific Exchange System for their comments. All were in basic agreement with what CINCPACFLT termed COMUSMACTHAI's "reasonable approach."[2]

(U) CINCPAC advised the JCS, his components, and COMUSMACTHAI of his position on these matters on 6 October. He requested that the Secretaries of Defense and State be asked to determine the U.S. Government position for negotiations

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 240815Z Sep 73; COMUSMACTHAI 050315Z Oct 73.
2. PACEX Hickam AFB 290400Z Sep 73; CINCUSARPAC 291350Z Sep 73; CG FMFPAC 291954Z Sep 73; CINCPACFLT 020157Z Oct 73; and CINCPACAF 040240Z Oct 73.

with the Thai government and notify the Ambassador in Bangkok and all concerned as soon as possible. He recommended that the following points be given emphasis:

> ...Special stamp identification requirement should be limited to merchandise that sells for one dollar or more, as is presently being done.
>
> ...Categories of privileged personnel.
>
> (1) All active duty U.S. Servicemen who are in Thailand (including leave, TDY, etc.,) should enjoy the privileges--not just those assigned there.
>
> (2) Military retirees should retain, as a minimum, limited PX, commissary, and APO privileges. Furthermore, retired personnel benefits should not be used as a bargaining pawn.
>
> (3) U.S. civilian government employees and contractor personnel should retain their current privileged status thru the duration of their present contracts. If privileges are to be withdrawn for future personnel, DOD/State must be prepared for higher costs or lower quality personnel.
>
> ...Rationing is not a problem but limiting purchases based on pay grade is totally unacceptable.
>
> ...[Thailand Regional Exchange] internal operations should not be subject to control of an outside, non-Service, non-USG agency.
>
> ...Decisions on the movement of merchandise in and out of warehouses should not be made by the RTG. This would, in effect, hamstring TRE operations.
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> ...Tax payment as a result of sale of duty free merchandise should be borne by purchaser, not seller.[1]

The matter remained under study at the end of the year.

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1. CINCPAC 060340Z Oct 73.

Commissary and Exchange Privileges on Guam

(~~C~~) Late in 1972 CINCPAC had been advised by the CINCPAC Representative in Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands of dissatisfaction in the Trust Territory political community regarding alleged abuses of commissary and exchange privileges on Guam that were having an adverse effect on TTPI negotiations. During an economic conference sponsored by the Saipan Chamber of Commerce, one presentation had been very anti-military with the general message that the military must be kept out of Saipan. "A military take-over of the beaches 'like Guam,' unfair competition with local merchants due to exchange and commissary abuses 'like Guam,' and the opinion that the military would be much worse guests than present tourists are, were key points of this presentation."[1]

(U) CINCPAC addressed the matter to CINCSAC and CINCPACFLT early in January 1973. Beside the possible effect on TTPI negotiations, he advised that the Commander Naval Forces Marianas had reported some dissatisfaction on the part of local-hire Federal employees concerning privileges afforded CONUS-hire Federal employees and privileges extended to exchange employees. He asked CINCSAC to request that the Commander 8th Air Force coordinate with the Commander Naval Forces Marianas in developing appropriate joint policies and control measures to alleviate these problems. He recommended that the Navy commander, in his capacity as CINCPACREP, take the lead in joint studies or actions required. In March CINCPAC was advised that the commanders had formed an ad hoc committee to evaluate means of control and preliminary measures had been instituted.[2]

Cost of Living and Housing in Hawaii

(U) Early in January CINCPAC endorsed and forwarded to the Chairman of the Per Diem, Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee in Washington the cost of living allowance survey and report for 1972, which had been prepared by the Hawaii Area Joint Committee. The voluminous supporting documentation justified recommendations that the station housing allowance for Oahu be increased to compensate for the higher cost of private rentals incurred by the majority of personnel; that personnel making monthly mortgage payments on occupied housing be permitted to complete Housing Cost Data Sheets for future surveys; that the price lists from the Pearl Harbor and Hickam Air Force Base commissaries be compared with price lists of average CONUS commissaries and the differences be considered in any cost of living allowance (COLA) determination for Oahu; and that the COLA be increased for personnel on Oahu, Maui, Kauai, and Hawaii.

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1. CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI 040644Z Dec 72.
2. CINCPAC 042335Z Jan 73; J114 HistSum Mar 73.

On 4 April the Washington committee announced a tripling of the COLA for Oahu and a rise in the Station Housing Allowance (SHA) index from 160 to 175 effective 4 April. On the other islands, the allowance for Hawaii went to 175 for both officers and enlisted, Kauai to 135, and Maui to 135 for officers and 160 for enlisted. COLA on the other islands varied and was specified in the 4 April message. The Washington committee subsequently requested a full report on costs experienced by Servicemen occupying Federally subsidized housing in Hawaii. CINCPAC provided a detailed response recommending the status quo regarding station housing allowance treatment of cases concerned.[1]

Credit Unions

(U) In December 1972 CINCPAC had requested that the Navy Federal Credit Union establish wire services to Yokosuka, Japan for service to fleet personnel. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs approved the request on 10 April, and CINCPAC so advised COMUS Japan on 23 April.[2]

(U) On 22 May the Commander Fleet Activities at Sasebo applied for similar wire service. The request was endorsed to CINCPAC by CINCPACFLT, but CINCPAC returned it to COMUS Japan for his comments and recommendations on 14 August. On 13 September the COMUS Japan comments were returned and CINCPAC forwarded the recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Nothing further had been heard by the end of the year.[3]

Postal Service - Vietnam

(U) On 4 December 1972 CINCPAC had recommended procedures for postal service in Vietnam after 29 March. Delays had been encountered in Washington. The CINCPAC recommendations were acted on by the JCS and Office of the Secretary of Defense in mid-February 1973, when it was announced that a single postal facility would be designated FPO 96620, and would be operated by the Navy by Defense Department civilian employees.[4]

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1. CINCPAC first endorsement of Hawaii Joint Area Committee ltr Ser 14-73 of 2 Jan 73, Subj: Cost of Living Allowance Survey and Report transmitted as CINCPAC ltr Ser 411 of 10 Jan 73; Per Diem Tvl and Alws Comte Wash DC 041729Z Apr 73; CINCPAC ltr Ser 1596, 1 May 73, Subj: Hawaii Housing Authority Controlled Housing.
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 1494, 23 Apr 73, Subj: Credit Union Service for Seventh Fleet Personnel Visiting Yokosuka.
3. Ltr, Commander Fleet Activities, Sasebo, Japan, Ser 265, 22 May 73, Subj: Credit Union Service for Sasebo; establishment of; and CINCPAC 4th endorsement, 14 Aug 73 and 6th endorsement, Ser 3420, 27 Sep 73.
4. J113 HistSums Jan, Feb 73; JCS 6864/121430Z Feb 73; CNO 191417Z Feb 73.

Housing Allowance for Up-Country Advisors - Thailand

(U) Advisors "up-country" in Thailand had not been compensated on an equitable basis because there were different assignment procedures among the Services, a change to the Joint Travel Regulation (JTR) had eliminated station housing allowances for many members, and a change to the JTR had eliminated eligibility of many dependents. To correct this, COMUSMACTHAI conducted a study of housing allowances in Thailand, which was forwarded to CINCPAC on 17 September. CINCPAC endorsed the letter, recommending approval as soon as possible. The request was approved and the JTR was changed to include the housing allowance.[1]

Equal Opportunity and Treatment

(U) On 8 December 1972 CINCPAC had promulgated an instruction on the formation of equal opportunity and treatment coordinating committees at subordinate unified commands to complement the PACOM Committee that had been established in January 1971. The primary purpose of those joint committees was to provide a forum for the exchange of views to promote improved race relations. Initial response appeared spotty. The committees that met in January were hastily convened and apparently not well organized to deal with the subject. As delay or non-receipt of the instruction appeared to be the primary problem, the distribution was duplicated.[2]

(U) CINCPAC continued to hold quarterly meetings of the PACOM Equal Opportunity and Treatment Coordinating Committee. Potential problems, particularly regarding clubs in Taiwan and Okinawa, were studied at the 10 May meeting. At that meeting, also, and at the 30 October meeting the names of EO&T committees used by the different Services were addressed. It was agreed that the exact titles were not significant as long as the committees reflected the goals of Defense Department policy and concentrated their energies on coordinating and solving racial/discrimination/social problems within the military sphere of influence rather than all of society's ills. The Service titles in the PACOM were as follows: Air Force - Social Actions; Navy - Human Goals; Army - Equal Opportunity/Race Relations; Marine Corps - Human Affairs.[3]

(U) On 21 May the Commander USSAG advised that while military personnel assigned to his headquarters and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center partici-

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1. USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI ltr, 17 Sep 73, Subj: Housing Allowances in Thailand, and CINCPAC First Indorsement, Ser 0857, 11 Oct 73; J1/Memo/0030-74, 1 Aug 74, Subj: 1973 CINCPAC Command History.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 257; J113 HistSum Jan 73.
3. J113 HistSums May, Oct 73.

pated in race relations seminars conducted by local base authorities, Defense Attache Office, Saigon, military personnel did not have such support available. He requested that the requirement be waived, in view of the small number involved and the unique mission and location of the organization. CINCPAC's recommendation for a waiver included not only the DAO Saigon but the personnel assigned to the Office of the Defense Representatives in India and Pakistan, the U.S. Defense Liaison Group in Indonesia, and the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia. The Services authorized the waivers and CINCPAC advised all concerned on 23 July. He noted that the waivers should not preempt race relations training should an internal training capability develop.[1]

(U) Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) for civilian employees on the CINCPAC staff first came under study in 1973. On 30 January three employees attended the first Civil Service Commission-sponsored training session concerning EEO, and late in February the Supervisory Personnel Management Specialist on the staff attended another Commission-sponsored course entitled "Equal Employment Opportunity - Affirmative Action Plans." On 1 March an Affirmative Action Plan was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and on 7 March a senior-level staff briefing was conducted by the Hawaii-Pacific Area Manager of the San Francisco Region of the Civil Service Commission. The Affirmative Action Plan was announced by a CINCPAC Instruction on 3 April.[2]

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1. Ltr, USSAG to CINCPAC, 21 May 73, Subj: Race Relations Seminars; CINCPAC 111854Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 232315Z Jul 73.
2. J0435 Chronologies Jan-Apr 73.

SECTION V--MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Operation HOMECOMING

(U) The CINCPAC staff had started planning for the eventual release of U.S. prisoners of war in the PACOM in early 1968. The result was the publication of an "EGRESS RECAP" plan in 1972. The name of the operation was changed to HOMECOMING on 8 January 1973. The HOMECOMING Operations Center was established at PACOM Headquarters under the supervision of the Director for Personnel on 30 January and closed on 5 April. Support was provided through the Command Center with dedicated communications channels through the Emergency Action Booth. Facilities included three lines on the JCS Alert Network/CINCPAC Voice Alert Network, four dedicated AUTOVON (automatic voice network) lines in the emergency action booth, four off-hook Flash lines, and six dedicated Hot Lines between the emergency action booth and the HOMECOMING Operations Center.[1]



U.S. prisoners of war en route home.

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1. CINCPACINST 3461.1C, 3 Aug 72; J3C3 HistSum Feb 73.

(U) Operation HOMECOMING was executed in three phases. Phase I, included the initial acceptance of returnees back to U.S. control and their onward aeromedical evacuation to the Joint Homecoming Reception Center (JHRC) at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The JHRC was activated by CINCPAC on 28 January. This initial reception included appropriate greetings, initial medical evaluation, identification, and reporting. A total of 20 Military Airlift Command C-141 and PACAF C-9A medevac flights brought returnees to the JHRC from Hanoi, Saigon, and Hong Kong. Phase II included the processing of the returnees at the JHRC prior to their onward aeromedical evacuation to the United States. From 12 February to 4 April, 566 U.S. military, 23 U.S. civilians, and 5 third country nationals were processed at the JHRC. Returnees completed their medical and administrative processing in an average time of 68 hours. The JHRC operation was described by Time magazine, "The exercise was worthy of a major offensive, except that now the object was almost extravagantly peaceful. The U.S. military's planning for the operation had been meticulous and even loving, in an official way." To meet the requirements of Phases I and II the JHRC Commander was augmented by 1,307 personnel from other U.S. military installations, and 1,573 Clark-based personnel. Phase III was the detailed processing of the returnees in the United States at the various Service hospitals. A total of 36 MAC C-141 medevac flights took the returnees from the JHRC to the United States. CINCPAC was responsible for and conducted phases I and II.[1]

(U) On 26 January the Prisoner of War Liaison Division was officially activated by MACV General Order as part of the U.S. Delegation to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. This division was charged with responsibility for representing the United States as a party to the Four-Party Commission for the purpose of insuring implementation of the Protocol of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam that was concerned with the return of captured persons. The release of prisoners was accomplished in phases based on verbal agreement reached in Paris and amplified through negotiations in Vietnam. They were originally intended to follow a 15-day incremental pattern, but delays in negotiations on exchange sites and release dates made this more irregular.[2]

(U) The first 116 U.S. military prisoners were released by the North Vietnamese at Gia Lam airfield on 12 February and flown to Clark Air Base. That same day the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG--the Viet Cong) released 19 military and 8 civilian prisoners at Loc Ninh in South Vietnam. All were transported to Tan Son Nhut and all but one on to Clark. One civilian opted out of the HOMECOMING system and was handled by the American Embassy in Saigon.

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1. J1 Memo 0030-74 of 1 Aug 74, Subj: 1973 CINCPAC Command History; Time, 19 Feb 73, p. 13
2. J1 HistSum Dec 73.



Admiral Gayler personally greeted all returning prisoners of war, either at Clark Air Base or Hickam Air Force Base. Here he and President Marcos greet returning U.S. prisoners.

The releases continued as follows:

14 February--PRG released one Canadian detainee.

18 February--North Vietnam released 20 U.S. military at Gia Lam.

4 March--North Vietnam released 106 military and 2 Thai Nationals at Gia Lam.

5 March--PRG released 27 U.S. military and 3 civilians at Gia Lam. (As has been the case on 12 February, one military was listed as a civilian. In addition, 2 Filipinos were released to U.S. control. Also 2 West Germans were released in Hanoi to the Consulate General of the German Embassy in Saigon, one the only known female prisoner of war.)

14 March--North Vietnam released 107 U.S. military and 1 U.S. civilian, the only known non-U.S. Government, U.S. civilian prisoner acknowledged by North Vietnam.



Admiral and Mrs. Gayler greet LCDR John S. McCain, III, USN, whose father, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., had served as CINCPAC from July 1968 to September 1972. The younger McCain was in the group of prisoners released on 14 March; he had been taken prisoner on 26 October 1967.

15 March--The PRG released 27 military and 5 U.S. civilians.

25 March--The PRG released one South Korean non-commissioned officer at Duc Pho.

27 March--The PRG released the last increment of U.S. prisoners at Gia Lam, 27 military and 5 civilians.

28 March--The Pathet Lao released 9 U.S. personnel at Gia Lam, 7 military and 2 civilians. They also released 1 Canadian to the Charge de Affairs of the Canadian Embassy in Manila.

28 March--North Vietnam released 40 U.S. military at Gia Lam.

29 March--North Vietnam released its last increment of 67 U.S. military at Gia Lam.

1 April--The PRG released one U.S. military in Vinh Binh Province, South Vietnam.

During this same period three Americans were released from China, one civilian and two military. All were picked up in Hong Kong and flown to Clark, where the two military entered the HOMECOMING pipeline; the civilian was flown to CONUS because of illness in his family. During this period, 591 Americans and nine third country nations were repatriated.[1]

(U) Most activity in the JHRC went according to CINCPAC and Service planning, but the timetables were speeded-up because of the excellent condition of the returnees and their desire to be reunited with their families as soon as possible. The general requirement for bland food also did not prove necessary.

(C) The CINCPAC mechanism for HOMECOMING remained in being after the repatriation. On 2 October the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs advised that there was no evidence that any U.S. Serviceman unaccounted for in Southeast Asia remained alive and in captivity by hostile forces. CINCPAC advised the JCS of his plans to phase down the HOMECOMING posture, noting that his headquarters would retain responsibility for reception and processing of any future U.S., allied, or third country releases within the PACOM area. On 23 October the JCS advised that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (the PW Task Force) had approved these plans. As a planning factor a maximum of five releases at one time would be used. The receiving center on Guam was phased out with a contingency plan to reestablish it on 30 days notice; the facility at Clark was phased down, retaining minimum reaction time provisions, on 1 December.[2]

Combined Federal Campaign

(U) Two Combined Federal Campaign fund raising campaigns were conducted in 1973 as the program changed from a calendar year to fiscal year basis so that both overseas and domestic programs could be conducted simultaneously.

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1. Memorandum U.S. Delegation, Four-Party Joint Military Team to FPJMT Staff, 10 April 1973, Subj: US and Third Country National Prisoner of War Release; J74 HistSums Feb, Mar 74.
2. J111 HistSums Sep, Oct 73; SECDEF 3897/021728Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 120004Z Oct 73; JCS 1165/232205Z Oct 73.

Command support continued strong. The 1973 campaign, for which solicitation concluded on 31 March, was the most successful up to that time in PACOM history. Despite continuing declining personnel strengths, contributions for this campaign were over $704,000, exceeding the former PACOM record set in 1970 by some $40,000.[1]

(U) Earlier, in anticipation of queries concerning the possibility of donations specifically for sickle cell anemia research, CINCPAC had asked the Office of the Secretary of Defense for guidance. CINCPAC noted that the National Foundation (the March of Dimes) was devoting major effort to such research. CINCPAC's report on the campaign reiterated his request for guidance in this matter.[2]

(U) The next campaign was held from 20 September to 31 October. This was again, by far, the most successful ever held. Over $1,122,479 was contributed and the sum was expected to go higher when results were final. This exceeded the previous record by over $418,000. Of 117,810 solicited, 138,562 contributed, with 46,965 authorizing payroll deductions.[3]

Security Support for Defense Property Disposal Offices

(U) The Defense Property Disposal Region, Pacific was established on 1 July 1973. There were 22 Property Disposal Offices within the PACOM. Physical security for those facilities was considered of prime importance (and those agencies had minimal U.S. military and civilian personnel assigned, and usually no one with physical security experience). To assist in this regard, therefore, CINCPAC tasked his component and subordinate unified commanders and his representatives to provide assistance to those offices in their areas by assuring that physical security and crime prevention surveys were conducted when requested.[4]

Reports on Violations of Federal Statutes and Civil Frauds

(U) In response to a Department of Justice request forwarded by the JCS, CINCPAC established a reporting requirement in the PACOM that required that CINCPAC be notified of violations of Federal criminal statutes and civil frauds occurring outside the United States and committed by Defense Department

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 1996, 4 Jun 73, Subj: Department of Defense Combined Federal Fund Raising Campaign - Pacific - 1973.
2. Ibid., CINCPAC 221916Z Jan 73.
3. J113 HistSum Dec 73.
4. CINCPAC 100343Z Nov 73.

civilians and other U.S. civilians not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. CINCPAC outlined required reporting procedures. The Federal Bureau of Information retained responsibility for reporting such violations as occurred in the United States or its territories and possessions.[1]

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1. JIII HistSum Sep 73; CINCPAC 272008Z Sep 73.

CHAPTER IX

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT

Intelligence Center-Pacific (IPAC)

(C) In March 1973, the Department of Defense (DOD) requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to recommend means to consolidate military intelligence production and production support resources. On 1 May, the JCS tasked CINCPAC, in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), to develop terms of reference (TOR) for the review and to identify alternatives to existing intelligence manning, operations, management controls and facilities.[1]

(C) The CINCPAC TOR set forth the scope of the review, command relationships and support requirements for the Pacific Command Intelligence Resource Study Group (PIRSG). On 28 July 1973, the CINCPAC study was forwarded to the JCS. Five alternative proposals were presented which recommended reduced manpower, a joint intelligence center on the island of Oahu, the transfer of selected production support to the Continental United States (CONUS), and the establishment of four intelligence sub-centers. These sub-centers were to discharge the functions of photo intelligence, ocean surveillance, intelligence training of foreign personnel, and mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G).[2]

(C) In his transmittal letter to the JCS, Admiral Gayler noted that the PIRSG study undertook to balance effectiveness and efficiency, and provided for the priority needs of wartime as well as peacetime. The various alternatives provided for phased manpower reductions and the sharing of facilities, basic functions, and activities in single service and jointly operated facilities. While acknowledging greater short term savings in Alternative Four because of compressed implementation, Admiral Gayler recommended that Alternative Five be approved because it extended over a five year period, thus avoiding the turbulence of impacted changes.[3]

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1. JCS 7303/011910Z May 73, which cited ASD(I) Memo of 21 Mar 73, Subj: Intelligence Center Issue.
2. CINCPAC Ltr Ser 00965 of 28 Jul 73, Subj: Intelligence Management and Production Study, with 1 encl: Report of Intelligence Management and Production Study.
3. Ibid.

(C) In October, the JCS recommended to the DOD that CINCPAC reduce the manpower of existing intelligence activities, combine the CINCPAC Intelligence (J2) staff with that of the PACOM Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Center, and transfer selected production to CONUS. On 15 November, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) announced his decision. In the PACOM, a manpower reduction within the intelligence community was to be applied; selected functions and resources were to be transferred to CONUS; and a joint PACOM intelligence center was to be established. The four common function sub-centers recommended by CINCPAC were also to be established. The photo processing/exploitation sub-center was to be operated by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), ocean surveillance by the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), MC&G and the intelligence training of foreign personnel by the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC).[1]

(C) At the close of 1973, the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) was scheduled for establishment on 7 January 1974. The CINCPAC staff, assisted by supporting activities, had developed initial cost estimates, prepared a draft Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) and an implementation plan for an operational IPAC in FY 75.[2]

IDHS Actions

(C) The Defense Department's Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) consisted of the facilities, computer equipment, special data communications, doctrine, procedures, and personnel supporting the intelligence data processing requirements of theater and national command levels. Several management tools were developed to use the various components of the IDHS more effectively.[3]

PICFMS

(U) Among these tools was the Pacific Command (PACOM) IDHS Command File Management System (PICFMS), the objective of which was to eliminate duplication of effort. In August 1972, CINCPAC had designated the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC) as the executive agent for the PACOM Automated Installation Intelligence File (AIF). This action was taken in accordance with the established PICFMS and fiscal year (FY) 1973 CINCPAC Intelligence Plan objectives. In April 1973, FICPAC processed all CINCPAC AIF requirements. This consolidation resulted in manpower and computer cost savings of more than $35,000.

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1. JCS 7743/010156Z Dec 73, which cited JCSM-455-73 of 24 Oct 73 and SECDEF Memo to CJCS of 15 Nov 73.
2. J21 HistSum Dec 73; CINCPAC 172304Z Dec 73.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 529-532.

Consolidation of the PACAF and USARPAC AIF files at FICPAC increased the overall savings during 1973.[1]

PACOM IDHSC Network

(C) The PACOM IDHS Communications (IDHSC) Network was designed to provide the intelligence community with Special Intelligence (SI) communications for on-line query/response and bulk data exchange using internetted IDHS computers. It was envisioned that the IDHSC Network would reduce the number of computerized intelligence bases, promote a more effective division of labor, and provide real-time SI data on a worldwide basis.[2]

(U) After considerable testing of bulk data exchange between CINCPAC and DIA in 1972, an Interim Operating Capability (IOC) test period between the DIA and PACOM began on 1 August 1972. The IOC evaluation of the IDHSC network ended on 1 February 1973. It had been conducted by PACOM IDHSC users with data terminals located at USARPAC, PACFLT, the PACOM ELINT Center, FICPAC and CINCPAC headquarters at Camp Smith. The evaluation demonstrated that the IDHSC was an effective way to provide data handling support to the intelligence agencies in the PACOM.[3]

(U) On 1 May 1973, the IDHSC network was upgraded to Special Activities Office (SAO) security level, and, by June/July 1973, important new order of battle and Installation Data Files (IDF) were operational on the DIA On-Line System (DIAOLS)/Community On-Line Intelligence Network Systems (COINS) host computers accessible to the PACOM IDHSC. On 4 October, the PACOM IDHSC switching center completed a move from Ford Island to a new FICPAC headquarters building at Makalapa. The move provided better facilities, more space, and easier access to other PACOM IDHSC users. In November, a multiplexor was installed at the PACOM IDHSC switch at FICPAC, thus providing IDHSC interactive access to the DIAOLS files at DIA.[4]

(U) On 1 December 1973 the DIAOLS Intelligence Support System (ISS) security and user access procedures were implemented in PACOM. This action provided the PACOM IDHSC Network users access to 17 DIAOLS files in an inter-

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1. J214 HistSum Apr 73; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 001697 of 2 Aug 72, Subj: Installation Files, consolidation of; J214 HistSum Dec 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 521-524.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 532; J21 HistSum Mar 73; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 0335 of 9 Apr 73.
4. J21 HistSum Dec 73.

active mode via the communications multiplexor installed at the PACOM IDHSC Switch installation at FICPAC, Makalapa. CINCPAC was delegated significant authority by DIA to administer the DIAOLS ISS security and user access system. The responsiveness and flexibility of the DIAOLS ISS mode of IDHSC use demonstrated a significant increase in IDHSC Network capability. By mid-December efforts were underway to establish the capability in PACOM IDHSC to input data directly into the national level Preliminary Imagery Nominations (PIN) and Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICR) Files maintained at DIA. A visit of DIA ICR file managers to CINCPAC staff in January 1974 was proposed to implement PACOM online use of the ICR file.[1]

(U) The first PACOM IDHSC Host computer entered a testing phase on 3 December 1973 with operational testing of the software linking the FICPAC 360/50 host computer, the PACOM IDHSC Switch (FICPAC 360/30), and the PACOM IDHSC Terminals. Beginning 17 December three data files--Naval Order of Battle (NOB), Contingency Planning Facilities List (CPFL), and a Test file-Airport--were placed on the host computer for short daily periods of online query by PACOM IDHSC terminals. An Interim Operating Capability (IOC) evaluation period for the FICPAC Host Computer was envisioned during January - March 1974.[2]

Defense Attache Activities

DAO Saigon

(S) At the beginning of 1973, approximately 120 authorized spaces assigned to the Defense Attache Office (DAO) Saigon were manned by National Security Agency (NSA) personnel. In February 1973, the JCS requested CINCPAC to submit a recommended phasedown plan for the DAO Saigon. In April, the Director NSA (DIRNSA) requested that the portion of the phasedown plan involving NSA billets and functions be developed at the Washington level rather than in the field. On 5 May, the JCS approved and requested DIRNSA to provide the NSA phasedown plan to the JCS and CINCPAC. As proposed by DIRNSA, all of the 121 NSA billets in the DAO would be eliminated by the end of January 1974.[3]

(S) Counterintelligence support to DAO Saigon was rendered by informal memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the chief of the Intelligence Branch, DAO and the commander of Detachment K, 500th Military Intelligence Group (MIG)

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. JCS 2493/051629Z May 73, which cited JCS 9431/061313Z Feb 73 and SSO DIRNSA 202036Z Apr 73; DIRNSA 102214Z May 73.

stationed in Bangkok, Thailand. On 24 August 1973, USARPAC requested DAO Saigon to formalize the MOU because of budgetary and manpower constraints. If such counterintelligence support was to continue, USARPAC requested CINCPAC approval of the support agreement. Further, USARPAC imposed restrictions against participation by Detachment K personnel in counterintelligence investigative activity involving direct contact with foreign nationals not employed by the U.S. Government.[1]

(C) On 27 August, DAO Saigon submitted its request for CINCPAC approval of the existing counterintelligence MOU. CINCPAC concurred in the principle of continued support, but recommended that the MOU be renegotiated to reflect the restrictions imposed by USARPAC.[2]

DAO Cambodia

(S) To offset the loss of interrogation and document exploitation support formerly provided DAO Cambodia by Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) resources, CINCPAC Intelligence Plan 2-72 of 26 December 1972 specified that the 500th MIG Detachment K in Bangkok would provide this support to DAO Cambodia. Detachment K was also responsible for the collection requirements of the U.S. Support Activities Group/Seventh Air Force (USSAG/7AF) at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. On 11 May 1973, USARPAC queried CINCPAC regarding the extremely limited utilization of the interrogation/document exploitation team designated by Detachment K to support DAO Cambodia.[3]

(S) Responding to CINCPAC's request that DAO Cambodia advise of anticipated need for the team capability over the next 12 months, DAO replied that the need was constant. The exploitation effort of the Cambodian Army (FANK) lacked expertise, background and motivation to exploit human resources thoroughly. The FANK effort needed the support to be derived from U.S. intelligence expertise, but utilization of the Detachment K team was limited by the ceiling on U.S. Government personnel on duty in Cambodia. Nevertheless, the DAO proposed to request exploitation team assets on an "as required" basis for a specified in-country duration as coordinated with and authorized by the Ambassador. Such utilization, similar to the "go team" concept formerly used to obtain support from MACV, was dependent upon the availability of spaces within the overall ceiling.[4]

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1. MOU, 500th MIG/DAO Saigon, 10 May 73; CINCUSARPAC 240349Z Aug 73 (BOM).
2. J23 HistSum Aug 73; J23/Memo/472-73 of 30 Aug 73, Subj: Counterintelligence Support to DAO Saigon; DAO Saigon 270250Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 282042Z Aug 73.
3. CINCUSARPAC 110211Z May 73.
4. CINCPAC 141855Z May 73; USDAO Phnom Penh 060435Z Jun 73.

(S) CINCPAC concurred with USARPAC that the "go team" concept was not the most efficient use of manpower. However, in light of the Cambodia in-country manpower ceiling, and the stated requirements of DAO, the utilization of Detachment K assets on an "as required" basis was the only feasible alternative.[1]

Attache Conference

(S) The PACOM Army Attache Conference was held at USARPAC from 19-23 March 1973. CINCPAC Intelligence personnel participated in all planning phases of the conference with the DIA, USARPAC and various attache offices, and provided briefers and other support needed. The Deputy Director for Attache Affairs of the DIA noted that the attache conferences provided a vehicle for airing problems and improving relationships among DIA, Service, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department, and attache personnel. These relationships were steadily improving as it became more likely that the attaches could become the only remaining military presence in several areas of U.S. interest overseas.[2]

Disclosure of Information to Foreign Governments

(S) CINCPAC had delegated authority for MACV to disclose certain classified information to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and other Free World nations in 1965. Subsequent formalized guidance from the JCS and DIA reaffirmed that delegation authority but specified that the only types of information which could be released were those delineated in National Disclosure Policy-1 of 17 December 1969.[3]

(S) In April 1973, CINCPAC requested JCS approval to delegate similar disclosure authority to USSAG, which had assumed some of MACV's mission and responsibility in Southeast Asia. On 22 May 1973, the disclosure authority requested by USSAG was granted by CINCPAC in accordance with JCS SM-583-69 of 11 September 1969. The USSAG disclosure authority was granted subject to the same specification as to the types of information which could be released as had governed MACV.[4]

(S) Another matter bearing on USSAG authority to release intelligence information was the distribution given to the USSAG Daily Intelligence Summary

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1. CINCPAC 270129Z Jun 73, which cited CINCUSARPAC 200336Z Jun 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 536; J23 HistSum Mar 73; J23/Memo/00141-73 of 27 Mar 73.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 532-534.
4. J23 HistSum Apr-May 73; CINCPAC 240039Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 220501Z May 73.

(DISUM). A similar publication originally was disseminated by MACV [redacted] On 20 April 1973, USSAG requested concurrence to release the DISUM to the other three countries as well. Based on the precedent of MACV distribution and CINCPAC's belief that such release would be beneficial to the U.S., the DIA approved the USSAG request.[1]

(U) In response to a DOD proposal for a PACOM foreign disclosure and foreign disclosure automated data (FORDAD) system survey, CINCPAC proposed a seminar to be attended by all disclosure/FORDAD authorities in the PACOM. The seminar was held on 12-13 September with participants from DOD, CINCPAC, the PACOM Service components and subordinate unified commands.[2]

(U) One fall out of the conference was the information that a new DOD Instruction on FORDAD (5230.18 of 10 July 1973) was forthcoming which negated the need for the CINCPAC FORDAD Instruction published in April 1972. Accordingly, CINCPAC Instruction 5510.5 was cancelled. Subsequent to the seminar, action was also initiated to update the CINCPAC instruction pertaining to the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and international organizations.[3]

Special Reporting Facility Distribution

(U) In January 1973, the DIA notified all unified and specified commands that the CIA had implemented restrictive distribution procedures for CIA clandestine service reports to unified commands and attaches. The restrictive measures were the result of unspecified operational security leaks. Initial discussions among CINCPAC Staff personnel revealed no insurmountable problems were anticipated; however, CINCPAC requested proposals, recommendations, or comments from component and subordinate unified commands pertaining to the precautionary constraints imposed by the CIA.[4]

(U) On 13 March, CINCPAC verified his interim reply of 17 February to the DIA. No major problems were anticipated with the changes to Special Reporting

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1. CINCPAC 212152Z Apr 73; DIA 2162/151955Z May 73; CINCPAC 192223Z May 73, which cited AFSSO NKP 200145Z Apr 73 (BOM).
2. J23 HistSum Aug 73; SECDEF 6508/202016Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 070155Z Sep 73.
3. J23 HistSum Sep-Oct 73.
4. J23 HistSum Feb 73; DIA 9153/261753Z Jan 73; DIA 5983/011852Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 170445Z Feb 73.

Facility (SRF) distribution and dissemination procedures. Reports, studies and briefs prepared by CINCPAC analysts from sensitive clandestine service reports would be stamped with the specified special handling caveats, and these would be retained if distribution was made to component and subordinate unified commands. Requests from these commands for clarification were identified as matters for local resolution between the commands and the SRF representatives. CINCPAC did request, within the constraints imposed, that SRF provide, whenever possible, sanitized items of major significance for dissemination by component commands to subordinate elements.[1]

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1. J23 HistSum Mar 73; CINCPAC 170444Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 130209Z Mar 73.

SECTION II--INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT)

Revised Directives

(S) In April 1973, the Collection Management Division (J23) rewrote CINCPAC Instruction S3821.61A, "HUMINT Intelligence Collection Requirements." On 5 April, J23 forwarded to the appropriate subordinate commands a "Human Resources Collection Directive" (HRCD) to assure long term military and related intelligence reporting in the Republic of Vietnam and contiguous areas. This directive was prepared in anticipation of the complete withdrawal of U.S. military intelligence collection units from Vietnam.[1]

(U) On 13 July 1973, CINCPAC Instruction C3810.24C, "Human Resources Intelligence Collection Boards," was published and disseminated throughout the Pacific Command and to the national level. The HUMINT Boards directive governed establishment and procedures in the PACOM.[2]

(S) Later in July, CINCPAC Instruction S3821.27B, "Coordination of DOD Sensitive [redacted] Intelligence Activities within PACOM (S)," was published and disseminated in the PACOM and to national level agencies. This instruction implemented and amplified the "DIA Human Resources Intelligence Collection Management Manual" (DIAM) 58-11, Volume I. It established CINCPAC policy and procedures for the coordination of sensitive [redacted] intelligence collection activities. In October, Intelligence Directorate Instruction S3821.1A, "Procedures for Handling and Processing RODCA Material" was published by the J23 Division. It established policy and procedures for the safeguarding of RODCA material by PACOM headquarters and CINCPAC Intelligence staff personnel.[3] b(1)

HUMINT Facilities Inventory Update

(C) In February 1973, the DIA requested CINCPAC to provide data on U.S. Army HUMINT elements which were organic to the PACOM. Information was needed to update the inventory of overseas HUMINT facilities to include the physical description and size of each facility and their authorized and assigned personnel strengths. On 5 April, CINCPAC provided a complete list of HUMINT ele-

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 561; J23 HistSum Mar-Apr 73.
2. J23 HistSum Jul 73.
3. J23 HistSum Jul-Oct 73; INTELDIRINST S3821.1A of 9 Oct 73. RODCA is an unclassified abbreviation for a classified reporting system.

ments by location, size of facilities, use of facilities, authorized and assigned strengths, and projected fiscal year 1974 strength for the 500th Military Intelligence Group and the Eighth U.S. Army. Both of these units were assigned to USARPAC.[1]

Collection Activities Study

(S) In conjunction with the previously discussed study of the intelligence function by the PIRSG, the PACOM HUMINT Board was tasked to review all PACOM-based intelligence collection elements. The objective was to reduce or consolidate units in foreign countries; to make all collection activities more responsive to the subordinate unified commands and CINCPAC; and, to transfer as many support activities as possible to the CONUS base. The HUMINT Board met on 31 May 1973 to address the issue and develop a course of action. Representatives from USARPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, the 500th MIG, and Commander, Task Group (CTG) 157.4 attended.[2]

(S) In meetings of 4 June and 6 June, it became apparent that the divergent views of the participants would render a consensus impossible to achieve. The Navy position, based on guidance from Washington, was that consolidation or collocation of HUMINT resources was not desirable:[3]

> The vertical structure of the Navy's HUMINT effort (TF 157) provides for an absolute minimum of staff layering; direct control from a single headquarters; rapid reaction to collection opportunities on a worldwide basis; for a minimum of resources devoted to providing operational, administrative and logistical support; and strategic location of small field collection units.

(S) USARPAC and PACAF had agreed to a CINCPAC-proposed concept for joint facilities to provide common services and support in each country and to a "dominant Service" executive agent proposal. Subsequently, PACAF withdrew from participation in the Board study based upon altered guidance from Air Force headquarters. The Air Force position had apparently been based on the misconception that the HUMINT study was an integral part of the IPAC production and

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1. J23 HistSum Apr 73; DIA 4030/272136Z Feb 73; CINCPAC Ltr, Ser 0319 of 5 Apr 73, Subj: Overseas HUMINT Facilities Inventory Update.
2. J23 HistSum May 73; J2/Memo/0054-73 of 30 May 73, Subj: Studies by the PACOM HUMINT Requirements Board.
3. J23 HistSum Jun 73; CTG 157.4 Ltr Ser 538 of 5 Jun 73; Also see CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 567.

production support consolidation. To further confuse the issue, USARPAC advanced a recommendation that, instead of executive agents in the field, USARPAC headquarters be appointed executive agency for management of PACOM-wide HUMINT activities.[1]

(S) As a result of these developments, the executive secretary of the PIRSG requested the HUMINT Board chairman to submit a "position" paper for the record and to close out the Board study. The CINCPAC "position," as advanced by the Board chairman, was that complete consolidation/merger of HUMINT units operating in the PACOM would not be desirable or practical. However, a degree of consolidation would be feasible. Through the use of joint facilities, collection elements could be collocated for common support and services needed for collection operations. The operation of such facilities under a designated executive agent would eliminate duplicative tasks and functions being performed unilaterally by each separate collection unit. Collection assets, operating from the joint facilities, would continue as separate entities with collection management arrangements unchanged.[2]

(S) Regarding the transfer of HUMINT management elements to the CONUS base, it was noted in the paper that the vertical structure of the Air Force and Navy HUMINT collection organizations provided a minimum of staff layering and that their management and support activities were centrally located in the CONUS. Existing Army doctrine for organization and management of HUMINT would have to be revised to provide for centralization/verticalization. Prior to relocation of USARPAC HUMINT management resources to the CONUS, the impact and disadvantages should be analyzed and weighed against the advantages.[3]

PACOM Collection Effectiveness

(S) Similar to, but separate from, the foregoing HUMINT Board study was a PIRSG-instigated analysis of all collection resources in the PACOM to determine satisfaction rates. Based on replies from PACOM ICR originators, including the CINCPAC intelligence staff, the Collection Management Division of J2 compiled a report showing a response/partial satisfaction rate of 73.4 percent. This figure, based on calendar year (CY) 1972 data, included all validated PACOM ICRs levied on theater DOD HUMINT collectors.[4]

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1. Memo for Record, HUMINT Board Chairman (J233), 7 Jun 73, Subj: Studies by the PACOM HUMINT Board.
2. Memo/HUMINT Board Chairman to Executive Secretary, PIRSG, 8 Jan 73, Subj: PACOM HUMINT Board Studies.
3. Ibid.
4. J23 HistSum Jun 73; Memo, PIRSG (Exec Sec) to CINCPAC (J23), 26 May 73, Subj: Efficiency/Effectiveness of Collection and Processing; CINCPAC 050320Z Jun 73; Memo/J23/00278-73 of 5 Jun 73, Subj: Intelligence Resource Study.

(S) The analysis revealed that collectors tasked directly by PACOM commands provided the bulk of responses. These included the 500th MIG, the 502d MI Battalion, the 7602d Air Intelligence Group, MACV J2, and the [redacted] The major collectors not controlled nor tasked directly in the PACOM were the U.S. DAOs. The significance of the response/satisfaction rate was a general indication that the PACOM HUMINT collection resources and the U.S. DAOs were performing their missions of supporting PACOM commanders. Considering the relatively short period of time (4-6 days) allowed the ICR originators to compile data, the Collection Management Division memorandum stated a probability that the degree of support percentage reflected in the data would have been significantly higher with more time to substantiate available figures.[1]

Control and Dissemination Analysis

(S) On 3 July 1973, the DIA requested CINCPAC to report on the quality control and dissemination methods and procedures applied to Intelligence Information Reports (IIR). This information was needed for a U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) Human Resources Committee review.[2]

(S) Replies from CINCPAC component and subordinate unified commands, as well as IIR producers not controlled by CINCPAC, were referenced in the final response to the DIA. In the PACOM, CINCPAC's response noted, IIRs were produced by HUMINT collection units under CINCPAC or military department control, by several subordinate unified command headquarters, by PACFLT naval units, by U.S. DAOs, and by the Office of Special Investigation (OSI). The IIRs were disseminated either by standard form or electrical means to the intelligence community and/or military commands when, in the professional judgment of the approving authority, the information was responsive to an ICR. No IIRs were produced at the headquarters of CINCPAC, USARPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, U.S. Forces Korea, USSAG, U.S. Forces Japan or U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI).[3]

U.S. Provincial Observers in Vietnam

(S) On 20 March 1973, the DIA informed CINCPAC of DOD participation in a plan to assign U.S. observers to provinces and regions of South Vietnam. The basic objectives, scope and requirement for a provincial collection program

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1. Memo/CINCPAC (J23) to PIRSG (Exec Sec), 16 Jun 73, Subj: Effectiveness of HUMINT Collection.
2. J23 HistSum Jul 73; DIA 6017/032133Z Jul 73.
3. CINCPAC 310240Z Jul 73.

were detailed in CINCPAC Intelligence Plan 2-72 and in the DIA Posthostilities Intelligence Plan for Southeast Asia. The provincial observers were to have freedom of movement and be identified to local officials as official U.S. "eyeballs." In that capacity, their liaison with local Vietnamese agencies would provide access to information which might not be available through any other means.[1]

(S) Ten in-country billets had been authorized by the State Department for DOD use. All of the provincial observers would be [redacted] attached to newly established consulates general in Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho. Administrative support was to be provided by the CIA, but operational control was vested in the DOD. Financial reimbursement would come from the participating DOD agencies.[2]

(S) After querying interested units in the PACOM, CINCPAC concurred in principle with the concept, but asked the DIA to clarify aspects concerning spaces, funds, control and support. The DIA replied that operational control of the 10 authorized observers would be exclusively within DOD channels, while general supervision for cover, security and administrative matters would be under State Department direction. The 7602d Air Intelligence Group (AIG) and the 500th MIG (each with five spaces) would exercise indirect operational control as coordinated with and approved by USSAG and DAO Saigon. Actual operational control would be assumed by the U.S. Embassy in Saigon with CINCPAC concurrence. The 500th MIG and 7602d AIG would publish and disseminate IIRs resulting from the DOD observer activity. Observation and reporting requirements included communist and Republic of Vietnam (RVN) post-ceasefire military operations, orders of battle (OB), personnel infiltration, movement of supplies and equipment from North Vietnam, and other information of priority interest to the Services.[3]

(S) On 20 July 1973, the DIA identified 15 validated ICRs as possibly appropriate for collection action by the provincial observers. After review, CINCPAC recommended to USSAG that five of the DIA-validated ICRs be levied on the provincial observers for action, and the remaining 10 be provided for information. Because of the high level interest in the provincial observer mission, CINCPAC also directed USSAG and DAO Saigon to advise CINCPAC on a continuing basis of all ICRs levied on the provincial observers in the future.[4]

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1. J23 HistSum Mar 73; DIA 2678/201730Z Mar 73.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 212313Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 280312Z Mar 73; DIA 4833/302347Z Mar 73.
4. J23 HistSum Jul 73; DIA 1257/202007Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 010302Z Aug 73.

Photo Intelligence Activities

Southeast Asia Reconnaissance

(S) At the end of 1972, and for most of January 1973, air reconnaissance activities in North and South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were at a high level. The bombing of North Vietnam under the nickname LINEBACKER II was in full swing, as was the mining of North Vietnam waters including Haiphong harbor. The major programs supporting these operations and other sustained or one-time reconnaissance objectives were GIANT SCALE, using SR-71 aircraft; [redacted] using [redacted] and the [redacted] program. These Strategic Air Command (SAC) assets were supplemented by tactical reconnaissance aircraft assigned to PACAF units.[1]

(S) On 11 November 1972, another sustained maximum reconnaissance effort had been directed by the JCS called POST WATCH. This project was an effort to establish a photographic data base of North Vietnam in anticipation of a ceasefire. As a result of the Vietnam ceasefire, which was effective on 27 January 1973 at one minute before midnight, Zulu time, the JCS cancelled POST WATCH, POCKET MONEY and LINEBACKER II special reconnaissance coverage and reporting requirements. Realigned imagery reconnaissance requirements were specified in North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos areas which would be accessible under post-ceasefire operating authorities for reconnaissance.[2]

(S) While the ceasefire altered the objectives and priorities of air reconnaissance in Southeast Asia, the need for both strategic and tactical photo intelligence continued. On 31 January, MACV requested high priority [redacted] coverage of an area near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to monitor enemy movements. CINCPAC approval and the assignment of two drones to the task was requested.[3]

(S) The SAC Reconnaissance Center warned that, should a [redacted] of the [redacted] occur, an [redacted] of the [redacted] airspace was possible. Nevertheless, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS approve the mission based on the importance of the intelligence objective. The JCS agreed and approved the MACV request, but cautioned against [redacted][4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 547; On 4 Jan 73, SAC changed the [redacted] J23 HistSum Jan 73; SSO SACRECONCEN 042315Z Jan 73; SSO DIA 00203/082144Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 081926Z Jan 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 550; J23 HistSum Jan 73; JCS 2909/300023Z Jan 73; SSO DIA 262223Z Jan 73.
3. J23 HistSum Jan 73; COMUSMACV 311035Z Jan 73.
4. CINCPAC 312310Z Jan 73; CINCSAC 312036Z Jan 73; JCS 5285/010340Z Feb 73.

(S) (b)(1) (b)

[redacted] The DIA provided guidance for special expeditious processing, exploitation and handling of the derived imagery. Accordingly, CINCPAC requested dispatch of the [redacted] mission film by the fastest available means to the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group (RTG) in Hawaii for processing. [redacted] (b)

(S) These photography requirements proved to be the forerunner of intensified photo reconnaissance in Cambodia and Laos. On 7 February 1973, the DIA advised CINCPAC and SAC of the need to assess the magnitude of logistics flow and possible ceasefire violations. Enemy controlled lines of communication (LOC) and logistics areas throughout Laos and Cambodia required especially close surveillance and the information was needed by the highest national level. This urgency was reaffirmed by the JCS on 11 February, when the need for almost daily coverage of logistics nets, depots and LOC was emphasized. The JCS also enlarged upon the more frequent needs for peripheral coverage of North Vietnam coastal areas, and stressed the overall requirement for broad area coverage. CINCPAC assigned the missions for Laos and Cambodia to tactical reconnaissance assets in Southeast Asia, but noted that only GIANT SCALE and [redacted] aircraft could provide the peripheral coverage of North Vietnam coastal areas. CINCPAC also listed the essential elements of information (EEI) as enemy vehicle traffic, truck parks, storage areas, depots and related logistical activity, with particular emphasis on field artillery, armor, anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air-missiles.2

(S) In April, the first two GIANT SCALE reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam since the ceasefire were flown. The first, on 19 April, while handicapped by 95 percent cloud cover, nevertheless revealed that a steel plant apparently remained inoperative; that five airfields were operational; and that a railway and bridge had been repaired. The second mission, on 24 April, had 60 percent cloud cover, but revealed two more airfields repaired, railways from Hanoi to the DMZ being repaired rapidly, and heavy transshipment of supplies and equipment.3

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1. J23 HistSum Jan 73; JCS 1136/182202Z Jan 73; DIA 2129/191650Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 190056Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 200236Z Jan 73; JCS 2793/292212Z Jan 73; SSO DIA 00970/011512Z Feb 73.
2. J23 HistSum Feb 73 with 8 related messages, on file in CINCPAC History Branch.
3. J23 HistSum Apr 73; J23/Memo/00197-73 of 26 Apr 73, Subj: GIANT SCALE Missions of 19 and 24 April 1973.

(S) Meanwhile, in February, CINCPAC directed component commands and USSAG to accomplish a complete reassessment of Southeast Asia photo requirements. This reassessment was to include justification and EEI applicable to the post-war environment. From September through 2 November 1973, changes to almost all PACOM reconnaissance requirements, including Southeast Asia, Northwest Asia, South Asia, Russia and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) were forwarded to the DIA in increments. Total collection objectives were reduced to 7,610; total annual collection requirement actions were reduced from 38,398 to 21,337.[1]

Crash Site Photography

(C) On 7 December 1972, MACV had requested CINCPAC to task an appropriate agency to screen past and current photography in support of crash site location and/or inspection. The purpose was to assist the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) in resolving missing in action (MIA) and bodies not recovered (BNR) cases in Southeast Asia. Past experience had shown that the accumulation of jungle growth made it extremely difficult to locate crash sites either by ground or air search. On 3 January 1973, CINCPAC promulgated instructions concerning the screening of aerial photography in support of the JPRC mission. Imagery for 1972 and 1973 was to be reviewed by the component commands and MACV. The DIA was to review that filed prior to 1972.[2]

(C) Exploitation and print production responsibilities were assigned as follows:

a. CINCPACAF: 1972/1973 imagery of North Vietnam route packages 1, 5, and 6A.

b. CINCPACFLT: 1972/1973 imagery of North Vietnam route packages 2, 3, 4, and 6B.

c. CINCUSARPAC: 1972/1973 imagery of Laos and Cambodia.

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1. J23 HistSum Feb and Oct 73; CINCPAC 162047Z Feb 73; CINCPAC Ltrs Ser 001141 of 14 Sep 73; 001237 of 16 Oct 73; 001245 of 17 Oct 73; 001253 of 19 Oct 73; 001252 of 19 Oct 73; 001293 of 2 Nov 73; all with enclosures re Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Portugese Timor, Papua/New Guinea, Burma, Thailand, South Vietnam, Paracel Islands, USSR, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Ceylon, North Vietnam, North Korea, PRC.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 551, 552; J23 HistSum Jan 73; CINCPAC 032215Z Jan 73; DIA 9091/092222Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 130014Z Jan 73; COMUSMACV 141130Z Jan 73.

d. COMUSMACV (assumed by the 432d Reconnaissance Technical Squadron (RTS) at Udorn, Thailand after 27 January 1973): Current imagery of South Vietnam.

The JPRC was tasked to provide BRIGHT LIGHT crash site files and subsequent updates, to include accession numbers, aircraft types, call signs, mission dates, aircraft year and serial numbers, service, whether an air search was conducted, the crash site location or inspection status, persons on board and remains recovered, whether the site was photographed, site coordinates and how obtained. This information was to be provided by inspection priorities as follows:[1]

Priority 1: Crash seen. Persons on board MIA.

Priority 2: Crash seen. Persons on board BNR; or, seen on radar acquired ejection but persons MIA or BNR.

Priority 3: Last radio, position, area, but persons on board MIA or BNR.

Priority 4: Site location unknown or occurred at sea; persons on board MIA or BNR.

(C) On 2 May 1973, USSAG requested CINCPAC to approve one-time photo coverage of some 70 specific crash sites in support of JCRC efforts. CINCPAC requested PACAF to search its film holdings for the recent coverage requested by USSAG. Also, CINCPAC recommended to USSAG that Seventh Air Force or Seventh Fleet tactical reconnaissance assets be used since CINCPAC intended to reserve requests for SAC assistance to those high interest areas not suitable for tactical coverage. CINCPAC also requested the DIA to provide a list of photo materials transmitted to the JCRC since the initial effort had begun on 3 January.[2]

(C) In July, the JCRC provided CINCPAC with the current status of the project to provide aerial photography of all known or suspected aircraft crash sites in Southeast Asia. Of about 1,000 potential sites, 493 had been covered by photos from various sources. The JCRC noted the excellent support from all units, and reiterated the need for complete photo coverage to support the casualty resolution mission.[3]

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1. J23 HistSum Mar 73; J23/Memo/0146-73 of 29 Mar 73, Subj: Aerial Photographs of SEA Crash Sites.
2. J23 HistSum May 73; USSAG 020330Z May 73; CINCPAC 050127Z May 73.
3. J23 HistSum Jul 73; CINCPAC 232145Z Jun 73; CDR JCRC 020710Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 052328Z Jul 73; USSAG 170130Z Jul 73.

COMPASS LINK

(S) COMPASS LINK was a system for transmitting imagery by military satellite. Transmission originally was from Vietnam through Hawaii to Washington. Early in 1972, plans to relocate the COMPASS LINK terminal from Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Vietnam to Udorn, Thailand were begun. The 12th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron (RTS), operator of Vietnam Terminal, had been scheduled to deactivate on 1 June 1972 and tactical reconnaissance/ [redacted] processing and exploitation tasks of the 12th RTS had been scheduled for assumption by the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) at Udorn. These actions were delayed indefinitely because of the North Vietnamese Easter offensive of 1972.[1]

(S) Concurrently with the move of U.S. assets from South Vietnam after the ceasefire, MACV announced that COMPASS LINK service from the RVN terminal would cease as of 31 January. The COMPASS LINK-associated satellite terminal (AN/MSC-46) was to be deployed and installed at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB) along with all associated equipment. On 28 January, the JCS acknowledged CINCPAC's recommendation that the AN/MSC-46 not be deployed to Nakhon Phanom (NKP) until the AN/TSC-54 satellite terminal already installed there had been tested for COMPASS LINK support suitability. Instead, CINCPAC recommended that the AN/MSC-46 be packaged and moved into temporary storage in the NKP/Udorn area. In view of the ceasefire and relocation of COMPASS LINK, CINCPAC also requested the DIA to canvas national level customers for possible changes in requirements and priorities for COMPASS LINK products.[2]

(S) Deactivation of the COMPASS LINK terminal in Vietnam occurred on 2 February 1973, and MACV established a required operational date of 10 February for the new location at NKP. Also, CINCPAC advised all concerned of the revised COMPASS LINK mission in support of USSAG.[3]

(S) In March, CINCPAC established a very high priority requirement for a COMPASS LINK receiving capability at NKP. In May, the JCS recognized the validity of this requirement, and set in motion a chain of actions designed to satisfy it. The AN/MSC-46 terminal which had been placed in storage was to be moved to NKP and installed in soft site configuration to establish a communications link with the westward-facing AN/MSC-46 satellite terminal in Hawaii. Subsequently, and using an MSC-46 from the CONUS, a hard site terminal was to

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 556, 557.
2. J23 HistSum Jan 73; COMUSMACV 271015Z Jan 73; 12 RTS 282200Z Jan 73; JCS 1576/280151Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 280056Z Jan 73; CINCPAC 310251Z Jan 731.
3. J23 HistSum Feb 73; CDRUSASTRATCOMPAC 030335Z Feb 73; COMUSMACV 071035Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 070204Z Feb 73.

be constructed at NKP. A target date of 30 June was set for completion of the soft site terminal. At the same time, a COMPASS LINK imagery receiving van was to be operational by 13 July. Meanwhile, CINCPAC and the commander of USSAG had agreed that a hard site follow-on installation was not necessary, since the soft site would meet operational requirements through May 1974. The JCS approved the cancellation of the hard site plans on 20 September. The first successful imagery reception for the soft site MSC-46 was on 16 August.[1]

(C) To assist the DIA in imagery selection for future transmission to the PACOM, CINCPAC's Intelligence staff limited requests to specific perishable imagery and analytical products. These products were identified to the DIA on 1 December as intelligence appraisals, SAO briefing items, weekly summaries/updates, selected imagery from the JCS morning briefing, and DIA intelligence summary imagery. Two successful tests were completed in December 1973 involving the Washington COMPASS LINK half-duplex (transmit) modification. Upon achieving fully operational status, a direct tie for access to imagery would be established between the national level and CINCPAC, USARPAC, PACFLT, PACAF and USSAG.[2]

Photo Processing/Interpretation

(S) With the advent of the Vietnam ceasefire, the processing, duplication and interpretation of reconnaissance imagery was expected to decline in volume and urgency. On 6 February 1973, the DIA requested CINCPAC to prepare for the resumption of initial processing, duplication and exploitation of GIANT SCALE (SR-71) imagery by the Overseas Processing and Interpretation Center-Asia (OPIC-A) at the 548th RTG, Hickam AFB, Hawaii. These functions had been performed since May 1972 by the SAC Mobile Processing Center (MPC) at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa. CINCPAC replied that an orderly transfer could be effective by 1 March; however, on that date the DIA advised CINCPAC to defer the transfer in view of the continuing U.S. offensive air operations over Laos and Cambodia.[3]

(S) The initial processing and exploitation of GIANT SCALE imagery surfaced again in September, subsequent to the Laotian ceasefire. The U.S. Air Force proposed, in view of the cessation of bombing and reduced photo reconnaissance effort in Southeast Asia, that the previously considered transfer of function to the OPIC-A be executed. The MPC would remain at Kadena in a caretaker status

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1. J23 HistSum May, Jun, Dec 73; CINCPAC 260302Z May 73; JCS 4467/081419Z May 73, which cited CINCPAC 240145Z Mar 73; PACNAVFACENGCOM N11000/260412Z Jun 73, which cited CINCPAC 202229Z Jun 73; COMUSSAG 190120Z Jun 73; JCS 3810/202224Z Sep 73.
2. J23 HistSum Dec 73; SSO PACOM 010042Z Dec 73.
3. J23 HistSum Feb 73; SSO DIA 060003Z Feb 73; CINCPAC 160033Z Feb 72; SSO DIA 011721Z Mar 73.

for at least 180 days in case of need. CINCPAC concurred, provided that the transfer did not affect continued deployment and operation of the SR-71s in the PACOM. After receiving PACAF and SAC concurrence, the Air Force requested DIA to provide an implementation date. In accordance with the SAC recommendation, the Air Force also specified that electro-magnetic radiation data and high resolution radar be processed and exploited at the 9th RTS, Beale AFB, California. Only the photo processing portion of the MPC would remain at Kadena. The transfer of function was effective on 9 October 1973.[1]

(C) In continuing efforts to reduce film processing costs, CINCPAC also investigated the possibility of eliminating selected duplication of tactical reconnaissance film products. Tactical reconnaissance mission film products were duplicated and distributed throughout the PACOM in accordance with existing instructions. The 548th RTG at Hickam ARB was one recipient of these duplicated copies in order to provide CINCPAC, PACAF and PACFLT with the same access to photography as enjoyed by managers at the national level. The film was stored by both the 548th RTG and the 432d RTS in Thailand for six months and then destroyed. Original negatives were stored in the DIA film library indefinitely. The J2 Collection Division, therefore, recommended deletion of the 548th from distribution, noting that any Oahu production requirements could be met by the 432d TRS, and that distribution to the 548th could be reinstated in periods of crisis. On 3 July 1973, CINCPAC directed this deletion at an estimated yearly saving of $396,000.[2]

(S) In another film duplication area, CINCPAC requested DIA approval, on 14 July 1973, to reduce national film duplicating requirements for each GIANT SCALE and CHURCH DOOR mission. At that time, CINCPAC was required to provide one duplicate positive for each mission to the DIA, the National Photo Interpretation Center (NPIC) and the CIA. To reduce costs, CINCPAC proposed that only one duplicate positive from each mission be sent to the Washington area. The reply from the DIA rescinded all requirements for CHURCH DOOR duplicate positives. The requirements for three copies of Korean GIANT SCALE missions remained valid. Two duplicate positives of Southeast Asia GIANT SCALE missions (for the DIA and CIA) were authorized (vice three), but three Mission Coverage Traces (MCTs) were required as before. CINCPAC passed this decision to all concerned on 21 July 1973.[3]

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1. J23 HistSum Sep 73; AFSSO USAF 192205Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 202147Z Sep 73; AFSSO PACAF 210310Z Sep 73; SSO SAC 281515Z Sep 73; AFSSO USAF 291325Z Sep 73.
2. J23 HistSum Jun 73; J23/Memo/0321-73 of 27 Jun 73, Subj: Elimination of Selected Tactical Reconnaissance Film Duplication; CINCPAC 030238Z Jul 73.
3. J23 HistSum Jul 73; CINCPAC 140405Z Jul 73; DIA 9956/201413Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 210447Z Jul 73; CHURCH DOOR was reconnaissance by high altitude aircraft along the PRC coast.

(S) Another potential processing problem, forestalled by coordination of CINCPAC, the DIA and PACAF, pertained to the new [redacted] system. Each KS-120 was capable of exposing 6,400 feet of 70mm film, which represented a significant increase over the original [redacted] Because of the large film load anticipated when the [redacted] was approved for operation, the 432d RTS was authorized to cut the original negative film before processing. This would allow several segments to be developed simultaneously, and reduce overall mission time from about 23 hours to slightly more than 10 hours. Operational evaluation of the new camera was begun in December 1973 and test completion was scheduled for 15 January 1974.[1]

(S) The subject of release authority for aerial photography arose several times during 1973. In February, for example, photographic evidence of cease-fire violations in Vietnam posed the question of whether such photography should be released to the International Commission on Control and Supervision (ICCS) and the Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC). The appearance of surface-to-air (SAM) missiles in areas of Vietnam and contiguous border areas where not previously noted could provide evidence of one-for-one replacement violations. PACAF voiced concern over the proliferation of SAMs and suggested that, should the RVN decide to lodge complaints with the ICCS and/or the FPJMC, USSAG be authorized to declassify and provide photos as exhibits. Accordingly, CINCPAC requested the DIA to determine the release policy to the ICCS and FPJMC. The DIA responded that weekly assessments were being made by the DOD and CIA of ceasefire violations from all supporting evidence, including photography. Therefore, and based upon guidance from the Chairman, JCS, decisions on the release of such material and information would be made at the national level on a case-by-case basis.[2]

(S) Since mid-June 1972, the disclosure and release of GIANT SCALE imagery to the RVN had been authorized by the DIA. In June 1973, CINCPAC requested permission to reduce the reporting requirement for such release from monthly to an "as occurring" basis. The DIA concurred to an "as occurring" frequency, but not less than once each year.[3]

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1. J23 HistSum Jul and Dec 73; DIA 3454/191346Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 031953Z Jul 73; DIA 3396/122149Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 142131Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 200204Z Dec 73; CINCSAC 111318Z Oct 73.
2. J23 HistSum Feb 73; CINCPAC 212209Z Feb 73; CINCPACAF 212225Z Feb 73; DIA 5980/011536Z Mar 73.
3. J23 HistSum Jun 73; CINCPAC 162030Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 222254Z Jun 73.

ment (BDA) photography of North Vietnam. The CAF also requested information regarding a "television reconnaissance and imagery system" being used by the U.S. The stated need for the BDA was to train Chinese photo interpreters. CINCPAC requested DIA comments regarding the television system and guidance for release of the BDA photography. The DIA replied on 20 September that no current television reconnaissance program was known, and authorized the release to the Republic of China of certain tactical reconnaissance prints. The imagery was to be of the STEEL TIGER area in Laos or of South Vietnam, and of no higher classification than that originally controlled as "for official use only." The DIA also suggested that the prints be selected and supplied from the files of the 432 RTS in Thailand. This authorization was passed to PACAF on 22 September and to USSAG on 1 October.[1]

Support of Mid-East Contingency

(S) On 28 October 1973, the JCS had directed the deployment of Task Group 77.6 to the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf. This "show of the flag" stabilization operation during the Arab-Israeli war generated the need for photo reconnaissance of Persian Gulf, Hormuz Strait and Gulf of Oman coastal areas. By 5 November, the following actions had been taken to support the Commander, Task Force (CTF) 77.6 operations:[2]

a. Provide SAO coverage of contingency areas to the Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific (FICPAC).

b. Validate PACFLT requirements for SR-71 (GIANT REACH) coverage of the contingency areas.

c. Arrange for IPIRs from the GIANT REACH missions to be disseminated to CINCPAC, PACFLT, FICPAC and the FICPAC facility in the Philippines.

d. SAO IPIRs to be screened by PACFLT for transmission to the CTF 77.6.

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1. J23 HistSum Sep 73; COMUSTDC 120825Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 130125Z Sep 73; DIA 3457/201644Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 220339Z Sep 73; CINCPACAF 012100Z Oct 73.
2. J23 HistSum Nov 73; J23/Memo/00581-73 of 5 Nov 73, Subj: Support of Mideast Contingency.

SECTION III--TARGET INTELLIGENCE

Withdrawal from Alternate Command Post



Weaponeering and Target Selection

(S) During 1972, the PACOM Target List Review Group (TLRG) considered means by which to provide more responsive weaponeering support for CINCPAC contingency plans. Dwindling personnel resources, combined with the conventional weaponeering workload in support of Southeast Asia, had curtailed drastically the ability of the component commands to provide up to date nuclear weaponeering for contingency plans. Weaponeering of targets other than those preplanned for strike (assigned to a particular unit and planned to be struck with a particular weapon system and weapon) was accomplished by using a table developed by PACAF weaponeers. The table provided a "ball park" identification of the minimum yield weapon to cause a desired probability of destruction (POD) of the target when detonated at a prescribed height at a given location. The major disadvantage of this method of weaponeering was that it did not incorporate the capability of co-priming under one desired ground zero (DGZ) two or more relatively proximate targets.[2]

(S) After TLRG discussion of the problem, it was decided to contact the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) for information regarding a computer program of the type needed by CINCPAC to weaponeer contingency plan targets. After a visit to the JSTPS by a CINCPAC Intelligence staff officer, CINCPAC requested that the JSTPS computer (CRUSADER) and soft ware programs be made available. Following a briefing by JSTPS members on the specifics of the

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1. J24 HistSum Apr 73; J2/Memo/187-73 of 20 Apr 73, Subj: Kunia Alternate Command Post.
2. J24 HistSum Jan 73.

programs, it was decided that the CRUSADER program did not meet CINCPAC's needs.[1]

[redacted]

(C) At an October TLRG meeting, the component command members were requested to recommend procedures for translating the textual selection criteria of the plans into specific target categories and category parameters amenable to automated data selection. Responses received in December 1973 were under study at year's end. Following TLRG agreement on the automated target selection methods, the required computer programming support would be requested.[3]

Real-Time Target Positioning

(TS) On 19 October 1973, the JCS requested the unified and specified commands to analyze operational requirements for real-time target positioning. This request was prompted by improvements in flexibility being incorporated into weapons and intelligence systems and the command and control capabilities in the fixed command centers. These improvements made feasible an examination of the concept of world-wide target positioning capabilities. To assist in the conceptual planning the unified and specified commanders were asked to answer five basic questions:[4]

1. To what degree can current and future weapon systems respond to a real/near real time target positioning capability?

2. To what degree can a real/near real time target positioning capability be useful in employment of strategic weapons?

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1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 012120Z Dec 72; JSTPS 0011/032000Z Jan 73.
2. J24 HistSum Jul 73; J2/Memo/00024-73 of 19 Jul 73, Subj: Use of Revised Target Selection Criteria for CINCPAC Oplans; J5/Memo/16-73 of 26 Jul 73, Subj: Use of Revised Target Selection Criteria for CINCPAC Oplans.
3. J24 HistSum Dec 73.
4. J24 HistSum Oct 73; JCS 6742/191655Z Oct 73.

3. To what degree can a real/near real time target positioning capability be useful in employment of tactical nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons?

4. At what levels of command should a real/near real time targeting capability be available?

5. What overall improvements to C3 and weapon systems capabilities would be required if a targeting capability could be implemented at the fixed national and CINC command centers?

(U) In order to comply with the JCS request, members of the CINCPAC and component commanders staffs met at Camp Smith on 30 October to discuss the subject and define input requirements. The components and appropriate CINCPAC staff directorates were subsequently directed to submit and coordinate the information. At a meeting on 14 November, the inputs were correlated, and CINCPAC's response was submitted on 20 November.[1]

(~~TS~~) The summation of the CINCPAC reply was that a real/near real time target positioning capability would enhance greatly the PACOM Forces' employment of [redacted] weapons during contingencies and [redacted] operations. Specific comments, keyed to the JCS questions, were:[2]

1. Degree of response for the Army weapon systems would depend upon proximity to firing positions and state of readiness. If units had moved to firing positions and were in maximum readiness, response times would range from a high of 30 minutes with target data not available to as low as one minute with target data available. Response time for tactical naval weapon systems would range from a few minutes to a few hours. In general, a [redacted] submarine system could respond to new target coordinates in about [redacted] If target positioning data were available to the weapon system operator, the Air Force weapon system response was almost [redacted] up to the time of actual weapon release. Time would be needed, however, to arrive at the weapon release point. For an unplanned single [redacted] sortie, PACAF had a proven response time [redacted] from receipt of the planning directive to takeoff.

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1. J24 HistSum Oct 73; CINCPAC 311120Z Oct 73; J2/Memo/482-73 of 2 Nov 73, Subj: Operational Requirements for Real Time Target Positioning; J24 HistSum Dec 73.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 200509Z Nov 73.

2. Employment of NUCLEAR [redacted] weapons on targets during [redacted] and [redacted] operations would be greatly enhanced by the real/near real time target positioning capability. The assured destruction strategy of compounding damage expectancy could be changed to a shoot-look-shoot strategy over [redacted] ranges. [redacted] could be [redacted] while en route or deployed from an [redacted] holding pattern.

3. In the case of [redacted] an improved capability to identify and target fleeting and residual targets during transitional/post [redacted] time would be provided by real/near real time target positioning. In this context, however, CINCPAC cautioned that conflict resolution could be a major problem for strikes in areas where other [redacted] strikes are taking place. Fratricide, blast, or [redacted] from concurrent strikes were conflicts peculiar to [redacted] weapons.

4. A real/near real targeting capability should be available down to the levels at which the fire support could be immediately responsive. The target positioning data base should be available at the command level conducting the targeting function. Tactically, this would be at field command level. [redacted] placement could be as high as national level. Regardless of placement, the data base should encompass the entire area under the purview of the command element in which targets could evolve.

5. Command and control of a real/near real time target positioning capability would require real time communications capable of handling large volumes of data between commands. Weapon system improvements should include a remotely controllable, completely self-contained delivery system not restricted by weather phenomena.

Standardization of Target Data Base

(C) On 18 May 1973, the DIA proposed to use Interim Basic Encyclopedia (IBE) numbers, assigned by operational units, in the national level Automated Installation File (AIF). The DIA proposal was based on "lessons learned" from the Southeast Asia conflict. Primarily, the DIA recognized that previous procedures by which DIA revalidated the target and changed the Basic Encyclopedia (BE) number did not meet the need for immediate and permanent identification of newly discovered targets in a war zone. Under the new procedure, the DIA would recognize and accept all IBE numbers originated and validated by the PACOM. This would standardize the target data base for all echelons of command and allow input

directly to the AIF. After considering the views of the component commands and USSAG, CINCPAC concurred in the DIA proposal on 26 June.[1]

(S) On 10 September, the DIA published a letter which set forth the procedures to be used in the data standardization program. In that letter, the DIA also changed the term Interim Basic Encyclopedia number to Imagery Basic Encyclopedia number (IBEN).[2]

(C) An ad hoc committee met at Camp Smith on 18 October to discuss implementation of the new procedures in the PACOM. Attendees represented CINCPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, USARPAC and the PACOM ELINT CENTER (PEC). During the meeting, conferees concurred in the PACAF proposal to phase out the CPFL data base as IBEN were fed into the AIF. Also adopted was the PACAF proposal to review all IBEN currently in the CPFL to eliminate all unnecessary numbers in two phases. Phase I would eliminate selected non-military categories of targets which had been abandoned, removed, overgrown, or negated for other reasons. Phase II would establish selection criteria for various installations prior to AIF input; e.g., 100 foot bridges or 1,000 barrel POL storage capacity.[3]

(C) Two meetings of the ad hoc committee were held in November. The attendees reported that all Phase I elimination of selected IBEN from the PACOM CPFL had been completed. The committee also agreed on the criteria for Phase II review. IBEN to be retained were those with permanent facilities, such as structures, buildings or POL tanks. Installations without permanent facilities would be considered transitory and eliminated from the data base. In December, CINCPAC directed the execution of Phase II and the submission of monthly progress reports. [4]

Tactical Intelligence/Target Materials Conference

(C) In February 1973, the DIA proposed to expand the scope of future DIA Target Intelligence (TI) conferences to include the Tactical Target Materials

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1. J24 HistSum Jun 73; DIA ltr C-1616/DI-7 of 18 May 73, Subj: Use of Interim Base Encyclopedia (IBE) Numbers as AIF Installation Identifiers; CINCPAC 022249Z Jun 73; CINCUSARPAC 112207Z Jun 73; USSAG ltr INT of 12 Jun 73, Subj: Use of Interim Basic Encyclopedia (IBE) Numbers as AIF Installation Identifiers; CINCPACFLT 3800/N2OP 131832Z Jun 73; CINCPACFLT 201924Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 260031Z Jun 73.
2. J24 HistSum Sep 73; DIA ltr S-1780/DI-7 of 10 Sep 73, Subj: Use of Interim Basic Encyclopedia (IBE) Numbers as AIF Installation Identifiers.
3. J24 HistSum Oct 73; CINCPAC 300106Z Oct 73.
4. J24 HistSum Nov 73; CINCPAC 062041Z Dec 73.

(TTM) program. The DIA proposal was based on the fact that the TI and TTM programs were managed within the Targets activities of the DIA, unified and specified commands. Also, the Automated Tactical Target Graphics (ATTG) program involved the production and maintenance of textual data in separate automated data bases derived from, or directly related to, the AIF. Based on discussions of the proposal by the PACOM Target Materials Review Group (PATMRG) and the TLRG, CINCPAC concurred in the DIA proposal that the two functions be addressed in a combined conference.[1]

(U) In May, the DIA accepted CINCPAC's recommendation to establish conference procedures and agenda prior to convening the conference. In June, the DIA disseminated detailed procedures, with which CINCPAC concurred in July. Among these was the planned continuation of the NO FOREIGN DISSEM aspect of the main TI/TTM conference.(C)

[redacted]

(U) At a joint meeting of the TLRG and PATMRG in December, members were briefed on the combined conferences, scheduled for 3-7 June 1974 at MacDill AFB, Florida. The briefing stressed the need to discuss and formulate positions concerning all agenda items, and the requirement to separate TI and TTM agenda or discussion items.[3]

Australian TTM Production

[redacted]

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1. J24 HistSum Mar 73; DIA ltr C-1548/DI-7 of 21 Feb 73, Subj: Target Intelligence/Target Materials Conference; CINCPAC 212339Z Mar 73.
2. J24 HistSum May and Jul 73; CINCPAC ltr Ser 1827 of 18 May 73, Subj: Tactical Intelligence/Target Materials Conference; DIA ltr U-1659/DI-7 of 31 May 73, Subj: Combined Target Intelligence (TI)/Tactical Target Materials (TTM) Conference; DIA ltr C-1669/DI-7 of 12 Jun 73, Subj: Target Intelligence (TI)/Tactical Target Materials (TTM) Conference Guide; CINCPAC 070825Z Jul 73.
3. J24 HistSum Dec 73.



1. J24 HistSum Jan 73; RAAF ltr, 22 Nov 72, Subj: Request for Aerial Photography; CINCPAC 171902Z Nov 72; DIA 2227/221636Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 130208Z Jan 73.
2. J74 HistSum Mar 73; DEPAIR Australia 130032Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 161858Z Jun 72; DIA Ltr S-64,276/DS-6B of 8 Feb 73, Subj: Exception to Policy-United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (NDPC Case No. 6502.72), with encl: NDPC ltr RA-003/73 of 9 Jan 73, Subj: same, with list of independent countries and dependencies within the British Commonwealth; DIA 2769/201853Z Mar 73; CINCPAC 231748Z Mar 73.
3. J24 HistSum Jun 73.

[redacted]

Discontinuance of Korean Tactical Target List (KTTL) (U)

(U) In accordance with CINCPAC's continuing effort to determine more economical means of performing target intelligence functions, the TLRG recommended, on 24 May 1973, that the KTTL be discontinued. Since the data in the KTTL was available in other publications, such as the AIF and ATTG, CINCPAC and the components agreed that continuation of the KTTL was not necessary. In the absence of strong justification for its continuance from the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, CINCPAC formally discontinued the KTTL on 7 July 1973.[3]

Target Activities-Southeast Asia

(U) Three distinct events in 1973 influenced the conduct of offensive air operations in Southeast Asia and the targeting activity pertaining thereto. The first was the Vietnam ceasefire of 27 January; the second was the Laotian ceasefire agreement of 22 February; the last, in July 1973, was the U.S. Congressional dictum against the obligation or expenditure of funds to finance combat activities by U.S. forces in Southeast Asia after 15 August 1973.[4]

North Vietnam

(U) From 1 January through 15 January 1973, LINEBACKER II strikes were authorized in North Vietnam south of 20 degrees north latitude. While a wide variety of targets was struck, the primary emphasis was placed on military storage/staging areas, LOC interdictions and motor vehicles supporting the southward logistics flow. Route Package 1, just north of the DMZ, received

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1. J24 HistSum Apr and May 73.
2. Ibid.
3. J24 HistSum Jul 73; CINCPAC 222121Z Jun 73; COMUSKOREA 290930Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 070402Z Jul 73.
4. J24 HistSum Jan-Aug 73.

the greatest weight of effort. On 15 January, all air strikes over North Vietnam were cancelled, and, on 27 January, all air operations north of the DMZ were stopped in accordance with the ceasefire agreement signed in Paris.[1]

Laos

(S) Upon cessation of LINEBACKER operations in North Vietnam, the main thrust of allied air strikes was directed against North Vietnam efforts to secure additional territory in the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ) and Bolovens Plateau areas of Laos. The total weight of effort in both sorties and targets doubled in January over that of December 1972. Air strikes were concentrated against troops, staging/supply areas, truck parks and motor vehicles, and the overall BDA increased significantly over that reported in December. Secondary explosions tripled to 1,483, and secondary fires totaled 1,173. ARC LIGHT (B-52) support in Laos gradually increased until, by the end of January, some 50 sorties per day were scheduled against special interest targets nominated by the Embassy.[2]

(TS) In February, the concentration of air power against Laos continued. The number of secondary fires more than doubled over January, to 2,402 reported, while secondary explosions increased from 1,483 to 2,208. In accordance with the Laotian ceasefire agreement, all air strikes ceased on 22 February; however, when an enemy attack was mounted after the ceasefire, three cells (nine aircraft) of B-52s attacked enemy troop locations in the Bolovens Plateau area near Paksong. Responding to another enemy violation of the ceasefire agreement, B-52 and F-111 strikes were conducted against enemy positions and troops in April. These strikes, involving 38 B-52 sorties and 26 F-111 sorties, were directed to the Tha Vieng area southwest of the PDJ.[3]

Cambodia

January

(S) Meanwhile, air strikes in support of FANK forces in the field continued. As with Laos, the cessation of operations over North Vietnam allowed a greater direction of air resources against Cambodia. While the numbers of sorties and targets doubled over December, the BDA reflected manifold increases. The number of secondary fires reported increased from only 39 in December to 192 in January, and the number of secondary explosions from 114 to 639. ARC LIGHT support in Cambodia peaked during the period 20-23 January, when 168 B-52s struck 59 special interest targets nominated by the Embassy.[4]

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1. J24 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 150356Z Jan 73 (EX).
2. J24 HistSum Jan 73.
3. J24 HistSum Feb and Apr 73, which cited JCS 151925Z Apr 73 (EX).
4. J24 HistSum Jan 73.

February

(S) During the month of February, air strikes in Cambodia decreased significantly from the January level. The total weight of effort in both sorties and targets attacked decreased to 459 and 541 respectively, (approximately the same level as December 1972). Primary emphasis remained on tactical targets in support of FANK forces in the field. These targets consisted of troop concentrations, military areas, bunkers, storage and support buildings. The number of fires decreased from 192 to 51 and the number of secondary explosions decreased from 639 to 66. ARC LIGHT support in Cambodia was limited to 61 sorties against 30 special targets nominated by the Embassy for strike on 25 and 26 February 1973.[1]

March

(TS) During the month of March, air activity in Cambodia and resulting bomb damage assessment reports increased significantly from the February level. On 5 March, the JCS provided authorities for ARC LIGHT/TACAIR air strikes in support of FANK forces in Cambodia. On 31 March, the Chairman, JCS, directed a significant increase in the air effort in Cambodia including authorization for 60 B-52 sorties per day. The Chairman further directed that in addition to air support to Cambodian troops in contact, maximum effort be focused on North Vietnam storage areas and LOC's located in Cambodia in support of enemy forces in South Vietnam. In response 1,234 ARC LIGHT sorties were directed against 462 special request targets nominated/validated by the Embassy or COMUSSAG. These B-52 strikes, conducted against Khmer Insurgent (KI) and North Vietnamese base camps, troop concentrations, logistics areas and resupply corridors, produced 539 secondary explosions. TACAIR assets flew some 4,700 sorties, concentrating along highways 13 and 19 in support of FANK forces in the field and interdicting enemy efforts to infiltrate personnel and supplies. In comparison to February BDA results, the total number of fires increased from 51 to 1,122, and total secondary explosions increased from 66 to 811.[2]

April

(TS) In April, air activity in Cambodia, and the resulting bomb damage assessment, continued to increase significantly above the February - March level. On 22 April 1973, the JCS authorized an increase in B-52 strikes from 60 to 81 per day in support of FANK operations during heavy ground fighting in the general area of Takeo, Kampot and Kep. On 29 April 1973 ARC LIGHT strikes

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1. J24 HistSum Feb 73.
2. J24 HistSum Mar 73, which cited JCS 052223Z Mar 73 and CJCS 130122Z Mar 73.

returned to 60 per day. For the month, 1,875 ARC LIGHT sorties were directed against 652 special request targets nominated/validated by the Embassy or COMUSSAG. These B-52 strikes continued to concentrate on North Vietnam/KI logistics targets and produced 583 secondary explosions. TACAIR assets flew some 5,700 sorties, concentrating along the Mekong River, in support of FANK forces in the field and interdicting North Vietnamese infiltration of personnel and supplies along Highways 13 and 19. In comparison with March results, the BDA trend was up in all target categories except motor vehicles and waterborne logistics craft. The total number of fires increased from 1,222 to 1,285 and the total explosions increased from 811 to 1,075.[1]

May

(TS) In May, air activity in Cambodia remained at about the same level as that accorded for April. However, the resultant BDA continued to increase above the levels observed during the previous month. On 28 May 1973, ARC LIGHT sorties were reduced by the JCS from 60 to 39 per day; 1,670 ARC LIGHT sorties were directed against 617 special request targets nominated/validated by the Embassy or COMUSSAG. (This was a decrease of 205 sorties and 35 special request targets from April.) The B-52 strikes concentrated on North Vietnam/KI logistics targets and the Mekong River corridor from Phnom Penh to the South Vietnam border. Results included 312 secondary explosions and one secondary fire (decrease of 271 secondary explosions from April). TACAIR assets flew some 6,200 sorties, concentrating along the Mekong River in support of FANK forces in the field, and interdicting NVN infiltration of personnel and supplies along Highways 13 and 19. In comparison to April results, the BDA trend increased in all target categories except motor vehicles (e.g., total number of targets destroyed increased from 2,481 to 4,849). However, the number of fires reported decreased from 1,285 to 555 and the total secondary explosions decreased from 1,075 to 653.[2]

June

(S) During the month of June air activity in Cambodia remained at about the same level as that recorded for May. The resultant BDA reflected a slight decrease from the levels observed during the previous month. ARC LIGHT sorties totaling 1,085 were directed against 574 special request targets nominated/validated by the Embassy or COMUSSAG (a decrease of 685 sorties and 43 special request targets from May). The B-52 strikes concentrated on North Vietnam/KI logistics targets and the Mekong River corridor from Phnom Penh to the South

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1. J24 HistSum Apr 73, which cited JCS 220302Z Apr 73 (EX).
2. J24 HistSum May 73, which cited JCS 252154Z May 73.

Vietnam border. Results included 96 secondary explosions reported by air crews. (This was a decrease of 216 secondary explosions from May). TACAIR assets flew some 6,400 sorties, concentrating along the Mekong River in support of FANK forces in the field, and interdicting NVN infiltration of personnel and supplies along Highways 13 and 19. In comparison to May results, the BDA trend decreased in most target categories. Exceptions included a slight upward trend in buildings/bunkers, POL drums and water vehicles reported as destroyed or damaged. The total number of targets destroyed decreased from 4,849 to 4,451. The total number of fires and explosions remained at approximately the same level as the previous month.[1]

July

(S) During the month of July, air activity in Cambodia remained at about the same level as that recorded for June. The resultant bomb damage assessment reflected a slight increase from the levels observed during the previous month. The 1,123 ARC LIGHT sorties were directed against 547 special request targets nominated/validated by the Embassy or COMUSSAG. (This was an increase of 38 sorties and a decrease of 27 special request targets from June). The B-52 strikes concentrated on North Vietnam/KI logistics targets, troop concentrations and the Mekong River corridor from Phnom Penh to the South Vietnam border. Results included 55 secondary explosions reported by air crews. (This was a decrease of 41 secondary explosions from June and continued the downward trend observed during the past quarter.) TACAIR assets flew some 6,500 sorties in July, concentration along the Mekong River and the LOCs to the south and east of Phnom Penh in support of FANK forces in the field. In comparison to June results, the BDA trend for July was up slightly. Target categories reflecting an increase in BDA included military areas and staging/supply areas, while attacks against LOCs, motor vehicles and troops indicated a decrease. The total number of targets destroyed/damaged increased from 4,963 to 5,375 while the total number of fires/explosions decreased from 1,091 to 885.[2]

August

(U) Combat air activity was conducted during the period 1-15 August 1973. All combat operations in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia ceased on 15 August as a result of the Joint Resolution of Congress which stated that no funds could be obligated or expended to finance combat activities by U.S. Forces.[3]

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1. J24 HistSum Jun 72.
2. J24 HistSum Jul 73.
3. J24 HistSum Aug 73, which cited JCS 062009Z Jul 73 (EX).

(TS) On 31 July 1973, COMUSSAG forwarded a list of 60 special logistic targets in Cambodia along the RVN border developed by DAO Saigon at the suggestion of the Ambassador. These targets were derived from RVN Intelligence, a six month RVN enemy logistic area study, prisoners of war, ralliers and RVN army returnees. On 3 August, the Chairman, JCS modified the current Rules of Engagement to permit air strikes within two nautical miles of the RVN border. TACAIR and B-52 assets struck 25 DAO targets and 15 USSAG developed targets which were validated for strike. Twenty-two of the DAO targets were struck twice and one was struck three times. Agent reports from the target areas provided positive BDA on nine of the DAO targets. During the first two weeks of August, 578 B-52 sorties struck 281 targets, including 25 DAO Saigon border targets. Fourteen of the 281 B-52 targets produced 24 crew-reported secondary explosions. During the period 1-15 August TACAIR assets flew some 3,860 sorties concentrating on support to FANK forces in the defense of Phnom Penh. Based on air activity reported during the first 15 days in August the BDA trend was up slightly from that reported during the month of July.[1]

Post-Hostilities Targeting-RVN

(S) On 17 April 1973, CINCPAC convened an ad hoc committee to discuss the need for a South Vietnam CPFL. Representatives from CINCPAC, FICPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, USARPAC and the 548th RTG attended. Each component was queried as to whether a South Vietnam CPFL was needed by its staff elements or operating units. All agreed that a consolidated listing in the form of a CPFL was needed.[2]

(S) In order to consolidate and coordinate the entry of all newly-discovered IBENs in South Vietnam, a central validating agency was necessary. The conferees agreed that the 548th RTG was the logical validating agency, since it was already tasked with Phase One readout of GIANT SCALE photography. It was also agreed that FICPAC, which produced and distributed CPFL documents for four other PACOM countries, was the logical production facility for the South Vietnam CPFL. FICPAC therefore, was tasked to produce the document on a quarterly basis, with cummulative monthly additions, changes, and deletions. USARPAC was responsible for maintaining LOC data related to standard alignments, designators and linear segments. On 27 April, CINCPAC delineated these procedures and assigned responsibilities to the component commands, and directed a starting date as soon as possible after 1 May 1973.[3]

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1. Ibid.; CJCS 2878/030142Z Aug 73.
2. J24 HistSum Apr 73.
3. Ibid.

Infiltration Estimates-Vietnam/Laos

(S) The CINCPAC Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG) continued to estimate infiltration by North Vietnamese personnel into South Vietnam and Laos until 1 December 1973, when USARPAC assumed primary responsibility for analysis of infiltration/exfiltration. On that date, the CINCPAC ICG was terminated. In the following tables, the estimated infiltration figures were subject to revision as more information became available. This was the final analysis by the CINCPAC ICG:[1]

South Vietnam

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
January	24,100	5,900	5,800	13,600	10,000	12,553
February	15,400	9,500	5,400	16,000	31,900	5,318
March	31,700	13,500	3,900	6,200	13,700	19,267
April	22,900	15,300	12,000	6,600	15,200	13,998
May	28,700	17,300	9,500	4,800	18,000	5,683
June	29,800	21,100	6,800	4,300	7,500	3,058
July	25,100	5,400	5,200	7,400	11,100	2,338
August	27,500	5,400	1,400	5,900	20,400	591
September	13,900	2,800	700	0	6,700	5,478
October	6,600	300	3,400	0	3,000	1,845
November	8,600	800	2,000	2,200	8,300	131
December	7,400	2,800	900	3,300	1,100	727
Total	241,700	100,100	57,000	70,300	146,900	70,987

Grand Total: 686,987

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1. J24 HistSum Dec 73.

Southern Laos

	1970	1971	1972	1973
January	100	1,100	-	1,566
February	100	4,000	1,300	593
March	-	3,600	600	24
April	-	2,300	1,200	64
May	700	2,500	100	84
June	700	-	-	599
July	900	-	400	52
August	700	-	500	1,216
September	2,700	-	100	475
October	3,200	5,100	2,600	5,307
November	2,900	1,600	2,500	13,385
December	500	100	7,000	2,768
Total	12,500	20,300	16,300	26,133

Grand Total : 75,233

CHAPTER X

POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

SECTION I--DETENTE AND RUSSIAN POWER

(U) Early in 1973, the Vietnam cease-fire agreement prompted the final withdrawal of U.S. military forces. Concurrently, Pacific Command personnel assisted in the release and return of U.S. prisoners of war. Shortly after the 27 January 1973 cease-fire in Vietnam, an armistice was signed in Laos and U.S. air operations over Laos ceased on 22 February. In accordance with Congressional enactment, air operations over Cambodia were terminated on 15 August, thus closing out all combat involvement in Indochina by U.S. military forces. This disengagement from combat operations in Southeast Asia was consonant with expressed national goals; nevertheless, by the end of the year, the intensive buildup of North Vietnamese military strength and repeated violations of the cease-fire agreement presaged continued instability and turmoil in South Vietnam. In Cambodia, the Khmer insurgents, supported by the Viet Cong and North Vietnam, continued to threaten the survival of the Khmer Republic.[1]

(U) It would not be meet to dismiss so abruptly the military contribution to this most politically directed war in American history. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, dispatched to his forces in the field the following acknowledgment of "performance of duty":[2]

> ...Upon the termination of the longest and in many respects the most difficult period of combat in our nation's history, I give you my personal salute for a job well done. The tremendous sacrifices and, in particular, the supreme effort by our comrades who were lost during the war have not been in vain. We were called upon by our nation's leaders, as we have been in the past, to carry out orders in furtherance of national policy and objectives. Few can argue against the common will and determination shown by our armed forces while attaining these objectives. You have performed superbly; your spirit and elan have remained steadfast throughout; the human qualities and greatness handed down from past military generations have remained undiminished.

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1. JCS/NMCC RED ROCKET 240456Z Jan 73; JCS RED ROCKET 212330Z Feb 73; SECDEF 3892/040018Z Aug 73.
2. JCS 2645/150401Z Aug 73.

> Now the long conflict has come to a close, but our tasks remain. In coming months we must make every effort to account for those still missing in action, while we prepare ourselves for the future. As we move ahead, I have every confidence that when your accomplishments are chronicled in the pages of history, it will be written that you performed second to none, in the longest, most difficult and in many cases, the most frustrating and complex war in the history of our nation.

(U) While it was unlikely that the "pages of history" to which Admiral Moorer referred were those of contemporary military history, there could be no question that his tribute should be part of the institutional memory of the Pacific Command. The torrent of political and military events, on the U.S. domestic scene as well as internationally, emphasized the fleeting importance of what once would have been a major coup on the international scene. Recalling the Vietnam cease-fire agreement just nine months after it was signed, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger mused:[1]

> ....It is strangely difficult now to recapture the emotion of that moment of hope and uncertainty when suddenly years of suffering and division were giving way to new possibilities for reconciliation.

(U) In this address, two days after the outbreak of the "Yom Kippur" Israeli-Arab conflict, Secretary Kissinger noted that the Middle East conflict was a reminder that international stability was always precarious and never to be taken for granted. His theme was the need to re-think the definitions upon which a rational foreign policy for the United States should be based. Having noted that international stability was precarious, he nevertheless cited a diminished danger of global conflict. Historic allies had regained strength and self-confidence, and relations with adversaries had improvec. All of this had given rise to uncertainties not only over the sharing of burdens with friends, but also the impact of reduced tensions on the cohesion of alliances. It was time, Kissinger stated, to define true national interest in a proper perspective:[2]

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1. Dept. of State Bulletin, 29 Oct 73, p. 525, Address by Henry A. Kissinger on 8 Oct 73, "Moral Purposes and Policy Choices."
2. Ibid.

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> It is characteristic of periods of upheaval that to those who live through them they appear as a series of haphazard events. Symptoms obscure basic issues and historical trends. The urgent tends to dominate the important. Too often goals are presented as abstract utopias, safe havens from pressing events.

(U) The outbreak of war in the Middle East was followed by the Arab oil embargo against the United States. In the Pacific, emerging nationalism was voiced by established governments and dissident opposition alike. The growing awareness among the Asian people of political and economic deprivation exerted a volatile influence on the establishment of stability in CINCPAC's political and military relationships. In some countries, the highest political and military officials used the occasion of CINCPAC's visits to press for a larger share of security assistance money. In most, reassurances were sought that the reduction of U.S. Forces in Asia did not forecast total withdrawal, even though some had wanted the very reductions which they now viewed with alarm. Meanwhile, high U.S. officials cited the reduced tensions between the United States and Russia and the United States and China as grounds for reducing U.S. defense forces by one-third, including a seventy percent reduction in Asia. At the same time, these officials acknowledged that additional withdrawals and/or reductions would be foolhardy, since the detente environment was not irreversible.[1]

(U) While the thrust of the Nixon Doctrine had resulted in a lower U.S. military profile in Asia and renewed effort to encourage friendly nations to bolster their mutual security contributions, Russia had gone in the opposite direction. In the past ten years, the Soviet Union had increased its military manpower by thirty percent, doubled its published military budget, and vastly increased its nuclear forces. By the end of the 1960s, the Russian drive to expand and modernize every sector of strategic and conventional military forces had shifted the military balance. By 1973, a condition of relative strategic parity, at best, existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. The controversy over the SALT agreements relating to missiles, warheads and megatons was of world-wide strategic significance. But the facet of increased Soviet strength with the most potential impact on CINCPAC's relationships with Asian

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1. Inter Alia, see Dept. of State Bulletins, 14 May 73, 15 Oct 73, 25 Feb 74, 15 Apr 74 for views of President Nixon, Secretary of State William Rogers, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, and Assistant Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll.

nations was naval power. The submarine fleet of the Russians, numbering more than 300 vessels, was the largest in the world, and the surface fleet had grown to equal that of the United States. With the vast ocean areas in the Pacific Command, control of sea lines of communication was essential. However, the Soviets had boasted that they could challenge the ability of the United States to control the sea lanes, which were vital to economic and security interests.[1]

(S) What were the potential political effects of the increase in Soviet military strength in the Asian-Pacific region? In October 1973, a paper written by the Political Adviser to CINCPAC addressed this question from the standpoint of Asian perceptions. The presumptions upon which the assessment was based were that, although the United States retained an assured destruction capability, there had been a relative increase in Soviet strategic capabilities; that Soviet naval capability in the Indian and Pacific Oceans had increased; and that Russia would continue to be able to supply military and economic assistance to Asian nations. Perceptions of this situation would vary by country and by leaders. Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) had the most sophisticated leadership. The premier of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, would have a broader grasp of strategic matters than the premier of Malaysia, Tunku Rahman. Geography would determine the perception of some Asian and Pacific nations. For example, Australia's attitudes were conditioned by isolation from mainland Asia and proximity to Indonesia and Oceania. The perceptions of the Asian people were likely to be unsophisticated and simplistic. Once the notion of increasing Soviet strength was accepted, it would be difficult to erase.[2]

(S) By country, Japan was considered to pay more attention to the global military balance than all Asian nations except the PRC, especially pertaining to control of the sea lanes. As the Russian military position vis-a-vis the United States improved, Japan was likely to seek to improve its ties with the Soviets, Europe and the PRC. Dependence on the United States for mutual security would be minimized, while a move toward improvement of Japanese military capability could ensue. The perception of impact within the PRC would possibly be delayed until the post-Mao era, when the increased Soviet pressure, sabre rattling and political leap-frogging into Taiwan, Southeast Asia and the

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1. Dept. of State Bulletin, 14 May 73, p. 590, Address by Secretary of State Rogers on 23 Apr 73, "The Necessity for Strength in an Era of Negotiation"; Ordnance, Jul-Aug 73, pp. 30, 31, Article by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, "The Narrowing Gap."
2. Point Paper, CINCPAC POLAD, 19 Oct 73, Subj: The Political Effects of an Asian Perception of an Increase of Soviet Military Strength in the Asian-Pacific Region.

Indian/Pacific Oceans would confront the new leadership. Little change would occur in South Korean policy, but increased efforts to seek diplomatic ties with Russia and the PRC could result, as well as significant adverse effects on South Korean domestic stability. On the other hand, confidence in the ability of the United States to read North Korean intentions would decline. The Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand would increase their overtures to Russia and the PRC, and there would be increased opportunity for Soviet involvement, including military assistance, in the whole area. This visible Soviet presence would increase the pressure on the PRC, and would inhibit the ability of the United States to conduct multi-polar diplomacy.[1]

(U) Another view of Asia was presented by U.S. News and World Report in January 1974. The thrust of this article was that a new Asia was taking shape under the umbrella of U.S.-PRC detente. The concern of Chinese Communists in Hong Kong was two-fold: on the one hand, they were concerned with U.S. policy if a change occurred in the U.S. Administration; on the other, whether detente would survive the deaths of Mao and Chou. The consensus of the China watchers in Hong Kong was a cautious yes to continued detente after the change in Chinese leadership. In Taiwan, the main political concern was whether the United States would recognize Peking and renounce its security treaty with the Nationalist Chinese. Political and economical stability, however, appeared to have enabled the Republic of China to adjust to the detente. Not so with the Thai, who, more than most Asians, were suspicious of--and fearful of--detente between the United States and the PRC. To the Thai, the umbrella was considered to be less than leak proof. Thailand, having committed itself to the war in Southeast Asia on the side of the United States, was uneasy at the prospect of coalition governments in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. From the Thai viewpoint, a united communist Vietnam would be a menace to all of Southeast Asia. The North and South Koreans had initiated the first tentative moves toward their own detente, and South Korea had made trade gestures to both Russia and the PRC. In Japan, economic growth was the bellweather of nationalism. Resistance to Japanese aggressiveness had been shown in many Asian nations, however, and Japan was seeking accommodation with both Russia and China. In none of these countries, with the possible exception of Japan, had indications appeared that the growth of Russian military power, as compared with the United States, had yet become a primary perception or concern.[2]

(S) The relative increase in Russian power was just one, albeit perhaps the most important, aspect of changing political and military relationships. There was evidence that the political situation in the United States could render

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1. Ibid.
2. U.S. News and World Report, 14 Jan 74, pp. 34-39, "Out of Three Decades of Turmoil - A New Asia Emerges."

U.S. representations to Asian nations subject to skepticism. This aspect was brought to Admiral Gayler's attention prior to one of several Washington consultations. The CINCPAC Political Adviser considered it important, during the Admiral's talk with the Deputy Secretary of State, to stress the political benefits to be derived from the forthcoming visit to Japan by Secretary Kissinger. The reason went deeper than the usual deference to Japanese sensitivity about political consultation. There had been indications that the Japanese entertained doubts that the United States had an effective government--one capable of solving problems. The visit by Kissinger could do much to dispel such ideas and convey to the Japanese that the United States Government was indeed functioning.[1]

(U) Secretary Kissinger addressed the impact of Watergate on foreign policy during a news conference on 23 August 1973, the day following his nomination as Secretary of State:[2]

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> Now, your other question on the impact of Watergate on foreign policy. The foreign countries have to assess what sort of a country they are dealing with, how steady it can be in the carrying out of its commitments, and the degree of authority possessed by its leaders.
>
> To the extent that these are affected, there is a long-term effect on foreign policy.
>
> Our intention will be, as I have stated prior to this appointment, to emphasize those aspects of foreign policy on which most Americans agree, to carry out a foreign policy that has the widest possible support on a bipartisan basis, and since I am confident that that can be achieved, I believe that the effect of Watergate on the conduct of foreign policy can be minimized.

(U) The conduct of foreign policy, of course, was not the province of the U.S. military. CINCPAC's concern, and that of other senior military commanders, was for the defense of the country, especially in view of the documented surge

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1. Point Paper, CINCPAC POLAD, 26 Oct 73, Subj: Meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush.
2. Dept. of State Bulletin, 17 Sep 73, p. 372, Transcript of News Conference, San Clemente, Ca., on 23 Aug 73.

of Soviet military capability. On 26 October 1973, CINCPAC provided his views of U.S. military posture for fiscal year 1975. He began by stressing the key position of his area of responsibility in any strategic study:[1]

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(U) I think it particularly important that the Congress recognize the importance of the Pacific community and see it in proper perspective. By any measurement, such as economic, political, or military, the strategic importance of the Pacific and Indian Ocean is growing rapidly. Nearly two thirds of the world's people live in the PACOM area and the world's four major powers converge there. Trade, travel, and industry are growing more rapidly there than in other areas in the world. The main sources of energy and many other important raw materials are within or around these areas. Change, increasing economic and political demands, unrest, and uncertainty characterize the region. As the leading power in the Pacific our continuous forward presence and dedicated best effort will be essential to stability and orderly evolution so U.S. interests can grow productively and safely and so we can deter those aggressions that could lead to costly conventional war or disastrous nuclear war.

(U) Concluding his posture statement, Admiral Gayler again stressed the need for proper perspective:[2]

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In summary, I urge that we do not allow the aftertaste from the Vietnam war, the preoccupation with current problems in Europe and the Mideast, and economic problems with Japan to obscure the long range difficulties we can set in motion for ourselves by withdrawing our interest and our forces from the Western Pacific. Now is the time to hold fast to our own military strength as the world adjusts to the conditions and pressures of instability.

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1. CINCPAC 262329Z Oct 73 (EX).
2. Ibid.

SECTION II--REGIONAL COOPERATION

(U) CINCPAC continued to participate in the activities of the two major multi-national military security alliances in the PACOM, as discussed below. Of interest to the PACOM also were the activities of numerous other regional associations formed for political, economic, or cultural purposes. The history of East Asia had worked against regionalism, however. Colonialism, it was believed, had probably overridden other common experiences, such as agrarian economics, religion, or culture. With the decline of colonialism after World War II, strong voices in support of nationalism emerged. There was evidence, however, that the new generation of leaders "may be wearying of sterile ideologies and anticolonialist sloganeering," and were seeking pragmatic paths to economic and social progress. The United States encouraged indigenous regionalism when the initiative came from within the area, but it did not want to take any lead in such organizations. Those regional cooperation associations contributed to regional development and stability, and ultimately, it was hoped, to tangible economic and security benefits.[1]

SEATO

(U) The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed to administer the Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty (Manila Pact), signed by eight nations in 1954 as part of the security system that the United States had fostered in Asia. A number of significant changes occurred in that organization in 1973. In particular, a lowered military profile was decided upon at a meeting of the Council of Ministers in New York on 28 September.

(U) The eight original SEATO member nations were Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. In 1964 France had withdrawn from active participation in the council meetings, and, in 1965 from exercise participation as well. France also withdrew personnel assigned to the Military Planning Office (MPO) in Bangkok. In the spring of 1973, France advised that their contributions to the MPO budget would cease effective 1 July 1973 and to the civil budget effective 1 July 1974.[2]

(U) After a long period of inactive membership, Pakistan had announced an intention to withdraw on 8 November 1972 and after the required one-year waiting period, did so.[3]

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1. J512 Point Paper, 30 Oct 73, Subj: Regional Associations in the Pacific.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 591-604; AMEMB Bangkok 8520/ 311012Z May 73.
3. Dept. of State Bulletin, 1 Apr 74, p. 347.

(U) With the elections of Labor Party governments in both Australia and New Zealand in 1972, both of those countries had reexamined their participation. At the 37th Military Advisers' Conference, which had been held in Bangkok in October 1972, the advisers had directed the Chief of the MPO to examine that organization with a view toward placing more emphasis on counterinsurgency. The Council representatives had requested that the Secretary General conduct a similar review and submit recommendations for changes in SEATO's structure and role.

(S) The U.S. Military Adviser was Admiral Gayler, and in April 1973 he submitted a proposal to the JCS for a reorganization of the MPO. Essentially he proposed abolishing the MPO as a force planning organization, integrating military personnel into the Office of Countersubversion/Insurgency to perform a counterinsurgency role under the Secretary General, and shelving existing overt aggression plans. If implemented, it was believed that the proposal would almost eliminate the "military" image of SEATO. The MPO, specialist meetings, working parties, MILAD conferences, etc., with associated publicity, would no longer be required. Military personnel, integrated under the Secretary General, would provide counterinsurgency advice to regional members covering techniques, tactics, and doctrine. They could also sponsor symposiums, seminars, presentations, the exchange of counterinsurgency experts, the sharing of intelligence, and such. The JCS approved CINCPAC's proposal, and on 9 June 1973, Admiral Gayler submitted the proposal, as U.S. Military Adviser, for the Secretary General's review.[1]

(U) Meanwhile, the working parties and committees continued. From 15 January to 2 February 1973, the Communications-Electronics Working Party met in the MPO to consider means of meeting SEATO communications channel requirements for MPO Plan 4 (Central Region) and supporting operation plans. All member nations were represented except France and Pakistan; Australia chaired the working party. The U.S. delegation of 11 was led by a member of CINCPAC's Communications-Electronics Directorate staff.[2]

(U) The SEATO Medical Committee Sixth Meeting was held at the Bangkok headquarters 19-23 February 1973. CINCPAC's Surgeon headed a U.S. delegation of eight members. Over 59 delegates and observers from SEATO member nations attended. The committee examined 12 agenda items. These covered a review of all medical SEATO Standardization Agreements and the medical portion of certain plans. They also discussed communicable disease control with particular emphasis on malaria, schistosomiasis, and respiratory and diarrheal diseases.

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1. J5272 Point Paper, 19 Apr 73, Subj: Reorganization of SEATO MPO; CINCPAC 190021Z Apr 73; JCS 3214/072228Z Jun 73.
2. J611 HistSum Jan 73.

Drug abuse, modern concepts of seaborne medical facilities, and medical factors affecting combat effectiveness of troops on arrival in Southeast Asia were also discussed. Recommendations for improvement in all areas were advanced and it was agreed that the next meeting should take place in mid-November 1974.[1]

(S) In September 1972 Council representatives had approved the convening of the third meeting of the SEATO Expert Study Group (ESG) on countersubversion and counterinsurgency to study SEATO's role and effectiveness in such matters. The report of this third meeting was submitted on 26 January. The group had recommended that SEATO activities emphasize support and advice contributing to the improvement of social, administrative, training, intelligence, and communications programs to enhance long-term stability. To accomplish this, the report proposed certain organizational changes for the MPO and the civil side of SEATO. The group also recommended development of a SEATO counterinsurgency plan for the Philippines, which had been requested by the Philippine Military Adviser. In May, however, CINCPAC provided his comments on the report, noting that the subsequent study of SEATO's role and structure being conducted by the Secretary General would obviate action on most of the organizational changes recommended, but that the philosophy proposed should be considered in the Secretary General's review. Also, CINCPAC recommended that a quiet approach should be made to effect Philippine withdrawal of their request for a counterinsurgency plan.[2]

(C) Meanwhile, the various member nations were considering their positions on the future role and organization of SEATO. In May the New Zealand position was forwarded through the MPO to member nations (except Pakistan). The New Zealand council representative provided the text of an aide-memoire in which it was noted that New Zealand welcomed the initiative of the Thai government in proposing such review, and continued:[3]

> ...We consider this to be a most timely undertaking. The New Zealand government intends to maintain its adherence to the Manila Treaty. We do not, however, attach the same importance to the SEATO organization. We consider that some of its activities, and the prominence of the organization as a whole, are an unnecessary manifestation of a confrontation era that has now passed and an obstacle to the development of new and more positive relationships in Asia. Accordingly, the New Zealand government considers that the organization should be progressively phased down to permit a substantial change in its activities and a steady reduction in the level of New Zealand's participation.

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1. J76 HistSum Mar 73.
2. J527 HistSum May 73; CINCPAC 120510Z May 73.
3. USMILADREP SMPO Bangkok 041127Z May 73.

(C) New Zealand also recommended that future meetings of the Council should be informal, low-key, and without publicity, a process that had already started with arrangements agreed on for the next meeting. Military Advisers should meet no more than once a year and should not be included in the ministerial council meeting unless they were specifically required. A number of other specific recommendations were also included.[1]

(C) Australia also sought to deemphasize SEATO military matters but intended to continue membership on a reduced scale. The Prime Minister had stated publicly that a remodeled SEATO continued to be useful because of the importance of SEATO to Thailand. It was believed in U.S. diplomatic circles, however, that his real reason for agreeing to continue Australian participation, which was unpopular in the Australian Labor Party, was that the United States appeared to attach considerable importance to SEATO. Moreover, the new Australian government had already demonstrated its independence of the United States on other issues.[2]

(S) Thus, with most member nations in favor of a reduced SEATO organization, the 18th SEATO Council Meeting was held at the United Nations in New York on 28 September 1973. (The meeting had been postponed from May to coincide with the U.N. General Assembly to allow time for a thorough review of the future role and structure of the organization, and also to assure the ministerial attendance of Australia and New Zealand.) Admiral Gayler did not attend the meeting; he was represented by his Director for Plans. The meeting was considered successful from the U.S. point of view in that it approved recommendations for streamlining the organization; the continued participation of Australia and New Zealand in a modified organization was obtained; and the small, business-like, one-day meeting avoided publicity and the attention of SEATO critics in several SEATO member countries, including the United States where SEATO had been under Congressional scrutiny.

(S) The remarks of the Council members were summarized in a Department of State report on the meeting. Secretary-General Sunthorn Hongladarom tended toward a pessimistic view of the Indochina situation, stressing that there was no clear indication of detente in the future. He asked that the diminution of SEATO activities not go too far too soon and requested more economic assistance to compensate for the reduction in the military side of SEATO. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush of the United States spoke of the policy to create a vested interest in mutual restraint among the major powers. He praised the

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1. Ibid.
2. J571 Point Paper, 20 Jul 73, Subj: Australian Position on SEATO Military Matters; AMEMB Canberra 5154/260706Z Sep 73.

movement to strengthen regional identity and cooperation in Southeast Asia, and stressed the need to tailor SEATO to fit the changed circumstances of a changing region (and to keep the organization under continuing study), and at the same time, maintaining the validity of the Manila Pact itself. Australia took the line that SEATO should not be an impediment to the development of a relationship of the Asian states to the People's Republic of China, and that it was no longer realistic to have SEATO military exercises directed against Peking or Hanoi. New Zealand, even more strongly that Australia, emphasized its belief that SEATO had largely outlived its usefulness; only with modifications to the organization would they continue to support it. The United Kingdom stressed the continued threat of subversion and pressure on Thailand and Malaysia; the world-wide threat of the Soviets who were trying to fill the vacuum between the Atlantic and Pacific; and the linkage of SEATO, ANZUS, and the Five Power Defense Arrangement as a necessary deterrent. Thailand endorsed this U.K. assessment and outlined concern about a growing problem of subversion in Indochina, specifically in Thailand, and the continued need for SEATO to serve a collective security purpose. Thailand opposed a "low-profile SEATO that was barely alive."[1]

(S) The afternoon session, concerning recommendations for changes in the organization, was over in less than an hour. The Council approved several recommendations for reshaping SEATO. In matters of counterinsurgency, the phrase "counter-subversion and counter-insurgency" was to be replaced by "security/development," as a more positive approach to the programs in Thailand and the Philippines. The primary function of SEATO would be to assist security/development projects of those two countries in the fields of intelligence and insurgency analysis through provision of advice and expertise. In matters of military planning, because of varying national requirements, all military plans (there were 33) were to be retained, but would effectively be shelved. Moreover, all military activities were to be suspended (as of 28 September) until such time as the Military Advisers decided otherwise. Consideration of a counter-insurgency plan for the Philippines was to be suspended until such time as directed otherwise by the Military Advisers. The frequency of maritime and command post exercises would be determined by the Military Advisers and would be aimed at improving joint operational and security/development techniques. The Military Advisers would meet once a year, separate from the Council meeting. (The next meeting was expected to be held in the spring of 1974.) There would be no further SEATO effort in cultural affairs. Economic assistance would be concentrated on security/development-related projects.[2]

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1. Dept. of State Airgram A-8541, 12 Oct 73, Subj: The 18th SEATO Council Meeting in New York.
2. Ibid.

(S) In organizational matters, the Military Planning Office was to be reduced in size and integrated into the civil Secretariat. The Chief of the MPO, a military officer, was to replace the retiring Deputy Secretary-General (who was a civilian). The final decision as to whether this position would be occupied by a civilian or military person would be reviewed at the completion of his tour, about 18 months later. The new Secretariat would contain four offices: Security Affairs (the major one), Social and Economic Affairs, Administration, and the Secretary General's Office. The Information Office would be abolished upon completion of tour by the incumbent. There was to be a consolidated civilian/military budget. Council representatives in Bangkok were directed by the Council Ministers to consider and agree on a suitable budget-sharing formula as soon as possible; this had been made necessary by the French and Pakistani withdrawals.

(S) The Council also directed the representatives to negotiate the time and place of the next Council meeting. New Zealand was next in line to host the meeting under the old rotation system, but had declined. Bangkok as a possible site for all future meetings was to be studied, but the problem encountered prior to this meeting of obtaining full ministerial attendance might make it necessary to again use the meeting of the U.S. General Assembly.[1]

(C) Meanwhile, pending the review that was to take place at the Council meeting, the exercise known as PX-49 was postponed indefinitely. It was believed that Australian participation was the key to the future of such exercises. The Council had agreed at the New York meeting to one every other year, and Australia had seemed in agreement, provided that the exercise was not held in ab objectionable area. The PX-49 postponement placed it closer to PX-51 scheduled for the fall of 1974. (Australia had scheduled a KANGAROO I exercise for the spring of 1974.) PX-51 was considered the preferable exercise; it included amphibious assault with air drop/air landed Army forces as well as antisubmarine warfare. The matter was under study at the end of the year.[2]

(C) When plans went ahead for the 19th Meeting of the Intelligence Committee, the Australian Military Adviser requested that his thoughts be passed to the U.S. Military Adviser. He expressed surprise that the meeting would be held and advised that his representative would not participate, at least not in regard to most agenda items. "It is the understanding in Canberra that the SEATO Council at its recent meeting agreed to discontinue military planning activity

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1. Ibid.; J57 HistSum Oct 73; J571 Point Paper, 2 Oct 73, Subj: SEATO
2. USMILADREP SMPO Bangkok, 170353Z Aug 73; J571 Point Paper, 8 Nov 73, Subj: GOA Views on SEATO?

....our own national position on the review of SEATO was (and remains) that Australia would not participate in military planning activity after 28 September 1973." Australia, however, would "of course participate in those future intelligence activities which were recently endorsed by Council."[1]

(S) The Intelligence Committee 19th Meeting was held in Bangkok as scheduled, from 29 October to 8 November 1973. Participants represented the United Kingdom, the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, and the United States. The Australian Military Adviser's Representative attended as an observer only. The matter of terms of reference for future SEATO Intelligence Committees was discussed. When the Australian Military Adviser had advised that they would not be participating, he addressed the subject of this future organization, noting, "I would have thought it would have been more appropriate, and more consistent with what the Council envisaged, for this matter to have been taken up by the Council Representatives when they next meet, or else for it to be discussed at the February meeting or by the old Intelligence Assessment Committee, rather than for the Intelligence Committee of the MPO to attempt itself to define its own future terms of reference." He continued that he was asking his representative in Bangkok for clarification.[2]

(S) This was indeed what took place, despite the New Zealand delegate's expression of his view that the 19th Intelligence Committee Meeting was not the appropriate group to make comprehensive or considered recommendations concerning the future of SEATO's intelligence activities. The other members "disassociated themselves from the New Zealand delegate's comments." The Committee believed that the suspension of SEATO military planning reinforced the need for periodic assessment of the overt military threat to provide timely warning. It considered that the terms of reference, therefore, should include the requirement to estimate the Communist military threat to the Treaty area for the next two years. Detailed intelligence, however, would no longer be required. A three-section format was devised. The future of certain military intelligence publications was considered, and it was agreed to maintain only the handbooks on Chinese, North Vietnamese, Laotian, Khmer, and South Vietnamese Forces. Others, if the need arose, could be reactivated and updated. It was anticipated that, in the future, the new Intelligence Committee would produce political, insurgent, and subversive intelligence estimates, as well as the overt military threat estimate discussed above.[3]

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1. USMILADREP SEATP MPO Bangkok 240405Z Oct 73.
2. Ibid.
3. J20 Memo to J2, n.d., Subj: Report of SEATO Intelligence Committee Nineteenth Meeting (INT19M) (U).

(S) Two SEATO orientation courses were conducted in 1973. Members of the CINCPAC staff participated in each of the eight-day courses in March and July. The third was cancelled because of changes envisioned in the role and structure of SEATO. The courses had provided orientation on SEATO military plans and associated communications and logistics matters.[1]

(U) In another matter, SEATO adopted the NATO Glossary of Terms in lieu of a separate glossary, to reduce the workload and insure a more current glossary. All members were asked to reduce their distribution requirements if possible; the United States reduced its requirement from 44 to 24.[2]

(S) Continued United States support for SEATO remained under study in the Senate. On 25 September 1973, Senators Church, Aiken, and Robert Byrd introduced a resolution urging that the planned review of U.S. participation in both the Manila Pact and the treaty organization be completed in the Foreign Relations Committee no later than 31 March 1974. But as 1973 ended, U.S. participation in the low-profile, less-militarily-oriented SEATO continued as it had in the past.[3]

ANZUS

(S) The ANZUS Security Treaty had been signed by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States on 1 September 1951. Since that time, Australia and New Zealand had pressed for more frequent meetings, and especially for more military consultation, which the United States had resisted. Neither Australia or New Zealand sought to de-emphasize this organization as they had SEATO, even though the meetings held to maintain the ANZUS alliance had been held in concert with those for SEATO.[4]

(C) The changed role and structure of the SEATO organization impacted on ANZUS meetings in 1973. Normally, five ANZUS meetings were held annually: a Council Meeting, Official Talks, a Military Representatives Meeting, and two staff level visits. The 23rd ANZUS Council Meeting had been scheduled following SEATO meetings that were scheduled for April-May 1973. The SEATO Council meeting had been postponed until late September, however, and the ANZUS Council meeting was not held at all. At the end of the year it was expected that an ANZUS Council meeting would be held in February 1974, with New Zealand the host in Wellington.[5]

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1. J57 HistSum Aug 73.
2. J571 HistSum Nov 73.
3. Dept. of State Airgram A-8541, 12 Oct 73, Subj: The 18th SEATO Council Meeting in New York.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 604.
5. J571 Point Paper, 8 Aug 73, Subj: ANZUS Council Meeting Dates (U); J57 Point Paper, 31 Oct 73, Subj: ANZUS.

(C) Member nations did not call for either Official Talks or a Military Representatives meeting in 1973, at least partly because of timing confusion resulting from the SEATO changes.[1]

(S) The two ANZUS staff level visits were held, however, with CINCPAC's staff participating in both. The first took place in Auckland, New Zealand on 28-30 March 1973. The idea for the resumption of staff level visits had evolved from a U.S. suggestion at the March 1972 ANZUS Military Representative discussions. This was the first such staff-level visit since 1958. CINCPAC's Deputy Director for Plans led a four-man delegation; Australia was represented by a party of three. New Zealand briefed the visitors on the size and organization of its military forces and provided a tour of facilities in the Auckland area. The visit was held in an "atmosphere of remarkable cordiality, friendship, and hospitality." The U.S. participants [redacted] any indication of a desire to expand or formalize U.S. commitments under the [redacted] The impressions received by the U.S. delegation were summarized in a message to the JCS on 4 April 1973. The New Zealand hosts had gone to considerable length to prepare for the meeting and to insure that it had more than a "tea and crumpets" impact on both the Australian and U.S. delegations. The level of New Zealand military and Defense Staff participation made it clear that the delegation had the knowledge and authority to speak with a single voice on a broad range of subjects. It appeared that New Zealand was to be striking out on a more independent course, away from "the shadow of Australia." The U.S. delegates inferred that New Zealand was prepared to stand the expense of independent actions in the Pacific area if "she is convinced these actions are in her national interests."[2]

(S) In contrast, the [redacted] in their approach to the conference, CINCPAC advised the JCS. They had originally requested a delay in the meeting scheduled for January in order to determine the direction of their [redacted] Further, there was probably some apprehension over possible results that could occur when the defense issue was addressed, such as cutbacks and/or a [redacted]

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1. J572 Point Paper, 2 Oct 73, Subj: ANZUS; J571 Point Paper, 8 Nov 73, Subj: ANZUS MILREP Meetings (U).
2. CINCPAC 042311Z Apr 73.

(S) All three delegations agreed on the desirability of increased exercise participation. There was no political opposition in either country to such exercises and more frequent participation in relatively small-scale endeavors by the three Services of all countries "would be welcome." The clear opposition of both Australia and New Zealand to operating under the aegis of SEATO was discussed. [redacted] but CINCPAC would work with his component commanders to insure that the land-sea-air exercise opportunities offered by Australia and New Zealand were fully utilized on a reciprocal basis.[1]

[redacted]

(S) The second ANZUS Staff Level Visit has held at CINCPAC headquarters on 15-16 August "in an atmosphere of continuing respect and cordiality." In a report to the JCS the highlights of the meeting were summarized. After a review of the Southeast Asia situation, Australian representatives raised questions relating to continued U.S. assistance to that area, and what U.S. forces would be retained at U-Tapao if we should drawdown to that base. The U.S. response was that the decision would be made at a much higher level, based on political as well as military considerations. The growing world-wide demand for petroleum was discussed, as was the PACOM Security Assistance Program, with continuing emphasis on programs leading to self-sufficiency. U.S. military export sales policy to Australia and New Zealand would remain unchanged; that is, where the United States had a competitive product, it would be available, as would their access to our technology and material.[3]

(S) New Zealand presented a general historical review of ANZUK (the Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom alliance) since 1971 and a specific briefing on substantive and organizational changes decided on in the last six months. [redacted] "currently integrated national forces will be deassigned from ANZUK and become national

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 182150Z Aug 73.

components of the UK and NZ by the end of CY 74." Only the integrated air defense system would remain. New Zealand would remain "as long as required."

b1 [redacted]

(S) Another matter discussed was Japan's role in Asia and the new Japan-People's Republic of China relationship. Japan was considered the key, as China feared a Russia-Japan lineup and Moscow feared a Sino-Japanese alignment.

(S) In a discussion of PACOM strategy, there was general understanding reached on the military considerations that made a U.S. forward military presence important.

(S) In the matter of upcoming exercises and training, the Australian delegation announced that the Minister of Defense had approved issuance of an invitation for U.S. Forces to participate in KANGAROO ONE. What had begun as a unilateral U.S. amphibious demonstration had thus evolved into an Australian-sponsored combined exercise of the forces of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Australia was also preparing to suggest company-sized exchanges as an outgrowth of existing platoon-size exchanges. All three countries agreed on the desirability of planning or discussing combined exercises "up to two years in advance."[2]

(U) All agreed that the ANZUS Staff Level Visits provided an excellent forum for the exchange of information on subjects of mutual interest. It was expected that Australia would host the next meeting. (One meeting each year was to rotate between Australia and New Zealand; the other was to be held in Hawaii.) The Australia meeting was tentatively scheduled for mid-February 1974.[3]

Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN)[4]

(C) ASEAN had been established in 1967 to promote the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development of its member nations, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The original declaration

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 182150Z Aug 73; J527 HistSum Mar 73. See the CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 229-230 for a discussion of KANGAROO ONE.
4. J525 Point Paper, 29 Mar 73, Subj: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (U).

in 1967 had also affirmed that all foreign bases were temporary. In 1971 ASEAN members had adopted a "declaration of neutrality" and stated their resolve to take initial steps in establishing Southeast Asia as a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality." Senior officials had met in 1972 to develop an interpretation of that zone, and tentative definitions were accepted. When the foreign ministers convened informally later, however, one of the most controversial matters was neutralization; all expressed approval but each had individual views on how it might be implemented. It was decided that proposals for neutrality should go back to technical committees for further study.

(C) In 1973 the foreign ministers of ASEAN countries met in Kuala Lumpur on 15 February. The consensus of the members was that the Vietnam cease-fire would bring peace to Southeast Asia, but that the long-term prospect was for a Communist takeover of South Vietnam. The members desired establishment of a dialogue with North Vietnam to encourage peaceful relations with neighbors, but the matter of diplomatic relations with Hanoi was not directly addressed. Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik reportedly raised the neutralization issue. Malik recognized the legitimacy of the security concern of Thailand and the Philippines, which had U.S. bases. He stressed, however, that such bases should be viewed as temporary. If a zone of neutrality was to be achieved, the bases must be removed. This appeared to be counter to the thinking of other Indonesian officials, particularly Indonesian military. Minister Ingles of the Philippines stated that "neutralization" remained a long-term goal. Obviously, the members of ASEAN, although professing neutralization, found it difficult to agree. Ethnic, cultural, economic, and national objectives differences existed that inhibited the effectiveness of the organization and precluded agreement on timing of the implementation of neutralization. It was believed that ASEAN initiatives toward achieving regional cooperation were commendable, but that careful consideration had to be given to the impact that "neutrality" might have on U.S. military assistance and cooperation in the region.

SECTION III

PACOM POLITICAL AND LEGAL POLICY

(U) Various subjects with political, military and/or legal overtones were addressed by the office of the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) during 1973. The following narrative concerns subjects which either affected the entire Pacific Command or were primarily of interest to the U.S. military community.

Law of the Sea

(C) The adoption of world-wide conventions governing seabed exploration was complicated by existing territorial sea boundaries ranging from the three miles recognized by the U.S. to 200 miles claimed by several nations. Questions regarding off-shore mineral resource exploration, fishery grounds, and environmental controls were raised by conflicting claims pertaining to the continental shelves and to free passage through, over, and under the straits of the world. On 17 December 1970, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution which established a Law of the Sea Conference for 1973.[1]

(TS) The topics which were most important from the U.S. strategic point of view were the maximum breadth of territorial seas, and the right of free transit through, over, and under international straits. These two subjects were considered as one question by the U.S., since an extension of territorial sea limits to even 12 miles would result in overlapping territorial claims in more than 100 of the world's straits. The fourth preparatory meeting for the 1973 conference took place from 17 July to 18 August 1972. This Geneva meeting saw the emergence of a coalition of 56 lesser developed countries and straits nations in the formation of an agenda of subjects and issues. The coalition resisted the inclusion of the U.S.-sponsored topic, "Free transit through straits," insisting on the nomenclature, "innocent passage." A last-minute compromise resulted in the inclusion of "question of right of transit" in addition to "innocent passage." Although the eventual result could not be predicted, a U.S. compromise on the economic issues to the coastal emerging nations could be necessary in order to save the straits transit issue.[2]

(TS) On 14 March 1972, the JCS requested CINCPAC to reply to a series of questions, the answers to which could reinforce the U.S. position on the right to unimpeded transit through, over, and under international straits. In his reply, CINCPAC named five straits considered to be essential to U.S. interests: Tsuguru, La Perouse, San Bernardino, Malacca, and Sunda. Tsuguru Strait provided

1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 587-589.
2. Ibid.

direct northern passage between the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean. La Perouse Strait provided a passage between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. San Bernardino Strait/Verde Island Passage provided the most direct sea route between Guam and Subic Bay in the Philippines. The Malacca/Singapore Strait was the primary sea route to the Indian Ocean. The Sunda Strait was the primary sea route to the southern Indian Ocean and the northwest coast of Australia.[1]

(TS) CINCPAC noted that, even with the three-mile territorial limit espoused by the U.S., three of the five essential straits were already territorial straits because their breadth at the narrowest point was less than six miles--the San Bernardino, Sunda, and Malacca/Singapore Straits. However, the right of free passage had not yet been challenged by the contiguous countries--the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. CINCPAC concluded his assessment by providing four principal reasons why the retention of the right of free passage was of vital concern in the PACOM:[2]

* * * *

a. Inability to utilize straits which provide the most direct routing to contingency areas could increase significantly the time required to introduce, reinforce, and support logistically U.S. Forces committed in the execution of contingency and other operations plans. In addition, a requirement to effect prior consultation with foreign governments to acquire consurrence in transit through and over straits subjects contingency planning to adverse political factors and indeterminate timing factors which degrade the validity of time phased deployment planning.

b. Political trends throughout the Asian-Pacific area indicate that U.S. military presence is and will be required for the foreseeable future to provide a credible deterrent to Soviet and PRC expansionism. This presence cannot be projected effectively into the Sea of Japan, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean without free passage through straits with a breadth of 24 or less nautical miles. Denial of this free transit would result in degradation in reaction time, endurance, and flexibility of U.S. forces in responding to contingencies and advancing U.S. interests in the PACOM.

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

c. Inability to utilize essential and important straits within the PACOM would reduce significantly transit route options, thus affording a potential enemy a much less complex problem in locating and intercepting U.S. forces. Concurrently, U.S. surveillance of the activities of potential enemy forces would become more costly, less extensive, and less effective if transit and/or overflight of straits by U.S. warships and military aircraft were to be denied.

d. Operations against the USSR or the PRC would be affected directly by strait transit restrictions in the case of submarines acting in a supporting role [redacted]

(S) At the fifth and sixth preparatory sessions, held in March and August 1973, the Republic of the Philippines sponsored draft articles on navigation of territorial seas and international straits and on the archipelagic concept which were counter to the position held by the United States. Countries joining with the Philippines included Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Spain, Yemen, Fiji and Mauritius. Variations of the archipelagic concept had been accepted by the Organization of African Unity, the United Kingdom, Russia and Australia. The United Stated had held firmly to a position against the archipelagic concept, but, in view of the support for it, the JCS representative to the sixth preparatory session recommended an internal assessment of the matter.[1]

(C) A potential modification of the United States position became apparent as the result of discussions with Micronesian officials during 1973. A United States LOS Task Force visited Micronesia in October to explore the Micronesian LOS positions. The visit established that the Micronesians were clearly interested in resources in general and particularly in tuna. The Task Force submitted a report to the U.S. Interagency Task Force on LOS recommending a modified U.S. archipelagic position. The report recommended some type of archipelagic lines which would be of significance for resource purposes only and for some type of system which would give the Micronesians some hegemony over tuna in the territorial sea surrounding the archipelago. Such a concept, if applied internationally, would allow free passage in and through archipelagic waters while conceding the right to resources.[2]

(U) The inaugural session of the LOS Conference was held in December 1973 in New York. The various committees and working groups for the 1974 substantive

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1. J73 Point Paper, 23 Nov 73, Subj: ADDENDUM to Law of the Sea.
2. J73 Point Paper, 18 Jan 74, Subj: Law of the Sea and Micronesia.

conference were formed. The United States obtained seats on the important General (steering) Committee and the Drafting Committee. The substantive LOS Conference was scheduled to begin on 20 June 1974 in Caracas, Venezuela. As of the end of 1973, the United States had not abandoned its original position that the questions of territorial seas and free transit were inseparable.[1]

Indian Ocean Policy

(S) The Indian Ocean policy of the United States was closely related to the LOS position regarding free transit on the high seas and in international straits. For several years CINCPAC had stressed, in presentations to Congress, in speeches, and in military posture statements, the increasing Russian presence in the Indian Ocean. In 1971, the National Security Council approved port visits and small exercises by Pacific Fleet ships in order to maintain a modest, but persistent, presence in the Indian Ocean. Also approved was increased use of Singapore logistics facilities, continued development of the Diego Garcia facility in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), and periodic maritime air patrols.[2]

(U) The first post-World War II U.S. military presence in the Middle East area was introduced in 1948, when the U.S. Navy established the Middle East Force. This small force consisted of a flagship homeported at facilities made available by the British at Bahrain, with two destroyers periodically deployed on a rotational basis from the Atlantic Fleet. Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean began in earnest in 1968, and had grown steadily since then as Soviet policy interests expanded. The record revealed a dramatic rise in the number of ship-days spent in the Indian Ocean, from just over 1,000 in 1968 to more than 6,500 in 1973. By comparison, U.S. ship-days remained relatively constant at about 1,150, with a modest increase to just over 2,000 in 1973.[3]

(C) The Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean and the subcontinent was an aspect of ambition to become a global power in general and an Asian power in particular. It reflected increasing Soviet awareness of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean littoral in a contest with the PRC and to a somewhat lesser degree, the United States. As previously mentioned, the policy of the United

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1. J73/Memo/284-73 of 17 Dec 73, Subj: Weekly Executive Brief, 10-16 Dec 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 584, 585; Ibid. for Diego Garcia background.
3. Dept of State Bulletin, 8 Apr 74, p. 372, Statement by Seymour Weiss, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs to Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 6 March 1974; hereafter cited as Weiss Statement to Congress.

States was to continue its past practice of periodic port visits, transits and naval exercises; however, there was no effort to match the Soviet naval presence ship-for-ship in the Indian Ocean.[1]

(S) Little reaction by the littoral nations of the Indian Ocean to the "show of the flag" presence of the Pacific Fleet ships was perceived until the India-Pakistan war in 1971. In August 1971, the Government of India (GOI) and Russia had entered into a formal "Treaty of Friendship, Peace and Cooperation." One month later, the GOI denied permission for a port call to Cochin, India by the USS TUCKER because the United States refused to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard the TUCKER. The U.S. policy was based on long-established tradition that host countries did not inquire regarding visiting ship armament, which tradition was observed by the United States as well. More important, however, was the potential harm to U.S. security and intelligence which could result from confirmation or denial. CINCPAC had registered strong concern to the JCS, stating that, in spite of the GOI-Russian treaty, "...the ideal time to increase our presence in the unstable politico-military environment of that area is now or never...." In mid-March 1972, the GOI stated its policy regarding the Indian Ocean area. The GOI noted that, while India had not protested the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal during the India-Pakistan war, the GOI considered that deployment to have been a dangerous and unfriendly act. India had also co-sponsored, with Sri Lanka, a "zone of peace" resolution in the United Nations to neutralize the Indian Ocean, and thus opposed the establishment of foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean area. Additionally, the GOI stated its opposition to the presence and operation of fleets of major powers in the Indian Ocean because tensions and rivalries would develop to the detriment of the interests of the littoral nations.[2]

The Israel-Arab Conflict

(U) It was with the October 1973 hostilities in the Middle East that the vital necessity of having a demonstrable U.S. capacity in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area was so sharply brought home. It was a classic case where the fact that the United States had a presence in the area, and was seen by all to have it there, made it highly unlikely that it would ever have to be used.[3]

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1. J22 Point Paper, 22 Jun 73, Subj: Soviet Regional Ambitions and Successes/Failures in SEA/Japan/Indian Ocean; J51 Point Paper, 19 Mar 74, Subj: Indian Ocean.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 586.
3. Op. Cit., Weiss Statement to Congress.

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> In the first instance it was a reinforcement for the signally successful efforts of Secretary Kissinger to bring the parties in the conflict to the peace table. It impressed upon both sides that the United States was interested in a resolution of the conflict. In short it played the traditional role which military power should play, that of supporting diplomatic initiatives. By this, I do not mean to suggest that military power was used to lend coercive force to our diplomacy. Rather, our visible military presence in the area demonstrated the importance we attached to our diplomatic objective of bringing the parties together to seek a peaceful resolution of the issues that have produced so much discord and strife in the Middle East.

(C) The deployment of the presence referred to in the above quotation--a Pacific Fleet task force--through the Malacca Strait, and the resultant controversy, were also related to the U.S. position in the LOS conference. Malaysia and Indonesia had declared, in November 1971, that the Strait of Malacca was a territorial water. Both nations adhered to the 12 mile territorial limit, and much of the Strait is less than 25 miles wide. The United States was willing to accept the 12 mile claim provided that free transit was guaranteed. This was a basic LOS position.[1]

(C) When, on 29 October, the Defense Department announced the deployment of a Seventh Fleet task force headed by the aircraft carrier HANCOCK to the Indian Ocean, the first reaction came from the U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka. He informed the State Department that both afternoon newspapers (30 October) in Sri Lanka carried banner headlines on the task force deployment and requested background and guidance. On 31 October, the Japanese press carried a story attributing the deployment to an unprecedented reinforcement of the Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean Sea. Also attributed to a U.S. Defense Department spokesman was the statement that the task force consisted of the HANCOCK, five destroyers and a tanker, and that the Soviet Union had sent conventional naval forces with 20 ships to the Indian Ocean in addition to the Mediterranean reinforcement.[2]

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1. J525 Point Paper, 29 Mar 73, Subj: INDO-MALAY Territorial Claims in Strait of Malacca.
2. AMEMB Colombo 2695/300900Z Oct 73; AMEMB Colombo 2704/301120Z Oct 73; COMUSJAPAN 310707Z Oct 73.

(C) The same day, 31 October, the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Jakarta, Indonesia began an exchange of information which, once again, confirmed the U.S. position on free transit. The DAO advised CINCPAC that the task force deployment had received local press coverage, and that one newspaper had contacted the Embassy to inquire if the Government of Indonesia (GOI) had been notified of transit through the Malacca Strait. The DAO noted that neither DAO nor the American Embassy had known of the transit prior to the press coverage. Questions were anticipated from the Indonesian military officials as to why they were not given "the courtesy notification" of transit. The DAO requested guidance from CINCPAC. The DAO message was followed by several from the Embassy posing questions regarding the policy on prior notification. On 3 November, CINCPAC queried the JCS as to whether guidance previously issued and CINCPAC's interpretation of that guidance was correct. The established policy, based on information previously provided by the JCS, had been transmitted to the DAO in Indonesia by CINCPAC in January 1969. This policy had authorized the Commander, Seventh Fleet to provide notice to the DAO, with courtesy notification to the Embassy, the Pacific Fleet, the CNO, the JCS and CINCPAC, of intent to transit the Indonesian Archipelago so that the DAO could give courtesy notification to the GOI. This policy applied only when the Archipelago was transited, and not to waters outside the Archipelago, even though these waters may be claimed by Indonesia. Thus, courtesy notification had not been given when the Malacca Strait was transited, since the Archipelago was not transited, but skirted. Courtesy notification was given when the Archipelago was transited through such passages as the Wetar, Karimata, Lombok and Sunda Strait or through such seas as the Java and Flores. CINCPAC noted that, prior to this incident, no question had been raised as to the usage of the Malacca Strait by the Pacific Fleet. He did not believe that courtesy notification for passage through the Malacca Strait was in the best interests of the United States in view of the LOS position regarding free transit through international straits.[1]

(C) The JCS replied that the CINCPAC interpretation of guidance relating to courtesy notification was correct. Meanwhile, the State Department addressed the questions raised by the Ambassador regarding the notification policy. State was "surprised and concerned" if, in the past, the practice had been to give oral courtesy notification to the GOI on U.S. warships transiting the Malacca Strait. Specifically, State asked to whom, when, and in exactly what manner and how many times the GOI had received a courtesy advisory from the Embassy regarding Malacca Strait passage; whether it was in connection with a planned or prior transit of the Lombok or Sunda Straits; whether specific mention of the

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1. J73 HistSums Oct and Nov 73; USDAO Jakarta 0994/310840Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 030324Z Nov 73, which cited CINCPAC 262253Z Jan 69.

Malacca Strait had been made; and, whether an advisory had been given in any case without specific information having been received from the Fleet Commander.[1]

(C) The Embassy answered that all previous advisories had been in connection with passage through archipelagic waters, but that the Malacca Strait had been mentioned if it were part of the intended deployment. However, the Ambassador stated that high level GOI interest appeared to present two alternatives: to provide notice of Malacca Strait passage and avoid "injuring Indonesian sensitivities"; or refuse to give courtesy notification of the passage of U.S. warships through the Malacca Strait and "stonewall political consequences." On 10 November, the State Department advised the Embassy that there were no alternatives. It was U.S. policy not to provide advance notice of passage through international straits. A precedent set in Indonesia could redound to the detriment of the United States in the LOS conference since the U.S. proposal of free transit through and over international straits intentionally excluded any form of notification:[2]

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> 3. For above reasons, we cannot rpt not agree that you should express regrets to [Foreign Minister] Malik for any alleged failure notify GOI of transit Malacca Strait. For same reasons, you should avoid any future Embassy actions which could be construed as notification of transits of Malacca Strait. In case of future courtesy advisories to GOI of ship movements through Indonesian claimed waters other than Malacca Strait, Embassy should avoid any specific reference to Malacca, even if ship movement includes Malacca as well as, for example, Sunda or Lombok.

(S) On 16 November, the Embassy which had been the first to react to the task force deployment provided the official Sri Lanka view. The Ambassador had informed the Sri Lanka Prime Minister that the U.S. Government appreciated the restraint demonstrated by her government in its official reaction to the deployment of the HANCOCK task force. Moreover, in keeping with U.S. policy regarding freedom of the seas, U.S. naval vessels would continue to make periodic visits to the Indian Ocean. The Prime Minister acknowledged that there was some pressure within the government to issue a public statement in view of Sri Lanka's sponsorship of the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal. However, after soliciting the views of her ambassador in Washington, she had decided that no official statement would be made.[3]

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1. JCS 1678/122101Z Nov 73; SECSTATE 217834/052126Z Nov 73.
2. AMEMB Jakarta 13047/061016Z Nov 73; SECSTATE 222096/100105Z Nov 73.
3. AMEMB Colombo 2858/161255Z Nov 73.

(C) In the last days of 1973, the Ambassador at Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania informed the State Department that the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had issued a press statement regarding the presence of the task force in the Indian Ocean. The statement noted the flagrant disregard by the United States for the United Nations resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace, and called for the withdrawal of U.S. warships from the Indian Ocean. The State Department advised that press guidance had been prepared, to be used only in response to query on the subject. The guidance stated that the United States, along with most of the major maritime countries including Russia, abstained from voting on the United Nations General Assembly resolution. "The U.S. view is that special restrictions to navigation beyond territorial waters would run counter to existing international law. Accordingly, we hold that a nation can dispatch its ships anywhere on the high seas."[1]

PACOM Legal Conference

(U) After a hiatus of several years, the CINCPAC SJA convened a PACOM Legal Conference on 29 January 1973 at John Hay Air Base, Baguio, Republic of the Philippines. Forty-three conferees attended, including several Washington representatives of the military legal community. Among the recommendations of the conferees was that selected trial observer reports be distributed to field SJAs by CINCPAC.[2]

CINCPAC SJA Newsletter

(U) On 14 September, the CINCPAC SJA published the first Newsletter, the purpose of which was to circulate and exchange information on international law matters within the Pacific Command. The Newsletter was distributed to component command SJAs and Designated Commanding Officer's SJAs, who were authorized to reproduce and distribute the Newsletter to judge advocates and legal officers within their commands or areas of cognizance. Enclosed with the Newsletter was thr first entry for a continuing "Legal Handbook" of items intended to provide background information to the field. Such enclosures would consist of trial observer reports with endorsements, foreign court opinions, unpublished research papers, and other pertinent legal information. Recipients were encouraged to submit inputs and suggestions as to format, content and distribution of the Newsletter and inputs or suggestions for Legal Handbook subjects.[3]

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1. J73/Memo/015-74 of 14 Jan 74, Subj: Weekly Executive Brief, 4-13 Jan 74, which cited AMEMB Dar Es Salaam 0026/040800Z Jan 74 and SECSTATE 002882/ 072138Z Jan 74.
2. J73 HistSum Feb 73.
3. J73 HistSum Sep 73; CINCPAC Ltr (J73), 14 Sep 73, Subj: CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate Newsletter (1-73), hereafter cited as SJA Newsletter.

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction Policy

(U) On 27 June 1973, the CINCPAC SJA promulgated a revised CINCPAC Instruction on foreign criminal jurisdiction (FCJ) over U.S. military and civilian personnel in the Pacific Command. Execution of and responsibility for Status of Forces policies and information was vested in CINCPAC Designated Commanding Officers (DCOs):[1]

Country	Designated Commanding Officer (DCO)
Australia	Officer in Charge, United States Sending State Office, Canberra, Australia
British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)	Commander, Naval Communications Station, Diego Garcia
Hong Kong	Representative of the Commander in Chief Pacific in the Philippines
India	Defense Representative, India
Indonesia	Chief, Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia
Japan	Commander, United States Forces, Japan
Korea	Commander, United States Forces, Korea
New Zealand	Officer in Charge, United States Sending State Office, Canberra, Australia
Pakistan	Defense Representative, Pakistan
Philippines	Representative of the Commander in Chief Pacific in the Philippines
Singapore	Representative of the Commander in Chief Pacific in the Philippines

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1. CINCPACINST 5820.1E of 27 Jun 73, Subj: Status of Forces Policies and Information; For discussion of DCO system, see CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 582-584.

Taiwan	Commander, United States Taiwan Defense Command
Thailand	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand

NOTE: In PACOM countries other than those listed above, Defense Attaches will perform the duties of Designated Commanding Officers in accordance with the Joint Service Regulation.

(U) The revised directive, inter alia, designated CINCPAC's Representative in the Philippines (CINCPACREPPHIL) as DCO for Hong Kong and Singapore to improve FCJ administration in those areas; added a section pertaining to racial discrimination by foreign officials against U.S. nationals; added a section stating the need for local emphasis on the reduction of incidents involving U.S. overseas personnel; and clarified requirements and routing procedures for various reports.[1]

Security of NUCLEAR [redacted] Weapons

(S) In July 1973, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) sought CINCPAC comments and recommendations to assist in the development of long-range policy guidance for the [redacted] of [redacted] weapons which had fallen into unauthorized hands. Specifically, the JCS postulated the question: "What is the extent of military jurisdiction in cases where a stolen [redacted] weapon is outside a Federal reservation within U.S. Territory, or outside a military base on foreign soil, particularly where the crossing of national boundaries is involved?"[2]

(S) The CINCPAC reply, originated by the SJA, suggested the provisions of 10 U.S. Code 333 for theft within U.S. territory, although the statute did not include Washington, D.C. or U.S. Territories and possessions. The use of armed forces by the President was authorized to suppress insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination or conspiracy. A broader theory was advanced in a U.S. Air Force manual (AFM 110-3) which recognized an emergency in which the possibility of [redacted] demanded swift, effective action to preclude loss of life and extensive property damage. The SJA recommended the development of procedures which incorporated advance Presidential decisions and authority for local military authorities to proceed off post to recover a [redacted] weapon in hot pursuit situations.[3]

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1. Op. Cit., SJA Newsletter; J73 HistSum Jun 73; J73/Memo/117-73 of 5 Jun 73, Subj: Revision of CINCPAC INST 5820.1D (Status of Forces Policies and Information); For discussion of FCJ administration in Hong Kong, see CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 583.
2. J73 HistSum Jul 73; JCS 6111/032315Z Jul 73.
3. J73 HistSum Jul 73; CINCPAC 312245Z Jul 73.

P. 676 missing

(U) Other report recommendations concerned the protection of the rights of the accused, including the right to counsel. Responding to a query from Admiral Gayler regarding the right to civilian counsel for any military member liable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the CINCPAC SJA responded that such was not a right. Any person subject to the UCMJ could retain and consult with a civilian counsel of his choice, provided it was done at his own expense. No authority existed for the U.S. Government to pay civilian counsel fees for UCMJ purposes. The DOD Task Force had made only one recommendation pertaining to civilian counsel--that the feasibility of contracting at government expense for a pool of minority civilian defense counsel be explored. No other reference to civilian counsel was made.[1]

(U) Another aspect of the administration of military justice by and for U.S. military personnel was addressed in connection with the U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG), in Thailand. USSAG was an integrated headquarters, and the USSAG commander was also commander of the Seventh Air Force. Subordinate to USSAG (but not to the Seventh Air Force) were the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Saigon, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), and the Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT). Early in May, the U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) had notified the USSAG commander that the U.S. Army elements of USSAG and its subordinate organizations had been attached to the U.S. Army, Japan headquarters for administration of military justice. USARPAC specifically mentioned general court martial jurisdiction, but did not refer to non-judicial punishment (NJP). The USSAG commander asked USARPAC whether the attachment included NJP, and also noted that attachment instructions or orders for other Service elements of his organization had not been received. CINCPAC was requested to clarify the authorities of a joint headquarters and its subordinate joint units relating to Article 15 (NJP) actions under the UCMJ. CINCPAC cited JCS Publication 2, which specified that disciplinary action was a Service responsibility, and that, as a matter of policy, NJP should not be administered by a commander of one Service upon a member of another Service. CINCPAC also requested his Service component headquarters to provide detailed guidance to USSAG concerning NJP and court martial jurisdiction for their Service members assigned to USSAG and subordinate units. By the end of May, the components had complied.[2]

(U) A similar situation arose in August, when the Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group (CHUSDLG) Indonesia requested CINCPAC's assistance and guidance as to

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1. J001/Memo/15 Jan 73; J73/Memo/17-73 of 17 Jan 73, Subj: Civilian Counsel under the UCMJ.
2. J73 HistSum May 73; CINCUSARPAC 050248Z May 73; COMUSSAG 220949Z May 73; CINCPAC 230415Z May 73; CINCUSARPAC 242133Z May 73; CINCPACFLT 250531Z May 73; CGFMFPAC 251730Z May 73.

his authority to convene a formal investigation and/or impose punitive action. This query was prompted by the alleged passing of bad checks by a U.S. Navy member of the USDLG. Once again, CINCPAC cited the JCS publication, but noted the propriety of informal investigation or inquiry by the CHUSDLG, so long as the rights of the suspect under the UCMJ were not violated.[1]

Project PACE Suit Dismissed

(U) In the fall of 1972, the people of Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands had filed suit to stop the test program called Pacific Cratering Experiments (PACE) from being conducted. Named as defendents were the U.S. Defense Department and several individuals, including Admiral Gayler. On 11 June 1973, the U.S. Air Force announced that the PACE II program, involving cratering explosions, would not be carried out. Instead, a thorough geological study of the Atoll, formerly called PACE I, would be carried out under the name of EXPOE (Exploratory Program on Eniwetok). EXPOE would be limited to six-ounce blasts in 229 drilled holes and one mild, non-cratering 200 pound blast. The people of Eniwetok had agreed to the EXPOE project, and, on 12 June 1973, the Federal court in Honolulu, Hawaii dismissed the suit.[2]

Project FRESH Suit

(U) Project FRESH (Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii) was a comprehensive review of all Department of Defense real property holdings in Hawaii. The study considered, among other factors, the projected force levels to be stationed in Hawaii; the availability of facilities to support these forces; current and future uses of all bases; opportunities for consolidation or joint use of military facilities; and the feasibility of releasing unneeded real estate. On 17 September 1973, the Life of the Land, et al, brought suit against the Secretary of Defense on the grounds that certain Project FRESH recommendations were in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. On 26 December 1973, the CINCPAC SJA was notified that the Secretary of Defense had been served with a copy of the complaint. The Secretary passed action on the suit to the Navy Department, which in turn, directed the Pacific Naval Facilities Engineering Command in Honolulu to coordinate any required action with the U.S. Attorney's office. No trial date had been set by the end of 1973.[3]

1. CINCPAC 250359Z Aug 73, which cited CHUSDLG Jakarta 230958Z Aug 73.
2. J73 HistSum Jun 73; OSAF 111627Z Jun 73; J73/Memo/119-73 of 11 Jun 73, Subj: Civil Suit-Project PACE; J73/Memo/124-73 of 13 Jun 73, Subj: Civil Suit-Project PACE.
3. J73/Memo/211-73 of 19 Sep 73, Subj: Suit re Project FRESH; J73/Memo/293-73 of 26 Dec 73, Subj: Suit re Project FRESH. For discussion of Project FRESH recommendations concerning ordnance storage facilities on Oahu, see Chapter V, Section V, this history.

Parker Civil Suit

(U) On 27 April 1973, RM1 K.G. Parker, assigned to the Fleet Operations Center, Pacific, brought suit against several naval officers in Hawaii, including Admiral Gayler, and against the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court in Honolulu in behalf of Parker, and all armed forces personnel who are or may be involuntarily hospitalized for psychiatric treatment without a prior hearing, by the American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii. Two days before the suit was filed, Parker sent a letter to Admiral Gayler requesting that his complaint under Article 138 of the UCMJ be forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, also named as a defendent in the suit. Admiral Gayler complied, and that was his sole connection with the case, since other local Navy officials, not Admiral Gayler, had ordered Parker sent to the hospital. The defendents show cause appearance before Federal judge Martin Pence was initially scheduled for 25 May 1973. The hearing was subsequently delayed twice, and, on 11 October, Judge Pence dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.[1]

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1. ADMIN COMFOURTEEN 042136Z Mar 73; J73 HistSum May 73; J73/Memo/97-73 of 3 May 73, Subj: Lawsuit of RM1 K.G. Parker, FOCPAC, Against Admiral Gayler Among Others, which cites Parker Ltr to Admiral Gayler of 25 Apr 73; COMFOURTEEN 010103Z Jun 73; ADMIN COMFOURTEEN 110031Z Jul 73; COMFOURTEEN 160140Z Oct 73.

SECTION IV--COUNTRY RELATIONSHIPS

Australia

U.S.-Australian Relations

(S) Two of the staunchest U.S. allies in the Pacific, New Zealand and Australia, experienced changes in their governments during 1972. Prime Minister Norman E. Kirk was elected in New Zealand, and Prime Minister Edward Gough Whitlam in Australia. Both were leaders of political parties considered to be critical of their countries close alliance with the United States. Both headed labor governments with policies stressing independence from "big power" domination and an increase in their own regional influence. The emphasis for both countries was on a political-economic approach and a de-emphasis of the military aspects of foreign policy. Australian relations with the United States were based on a professed appreciation of the value of the ANZUS mutual security agreement, coupled with a movement to reduce U.S. military and economic presence in Australia. At the root of the military presence question was [redacted]

(C) At a press conference in New Delhi, India on 6 June 1973, Australian Prime Minister Whitlam responded to questions on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal:[2]

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> ...Now it's true that there are some military installations in Australia under agreements with the United States. There is one particular one at North West Cape in Australia, whose title describes where it is...The installation at North West Cape operates under an agreement which was made 10 years ago for a space of 25 years....Our Minister of Defense is proposing later this year to go to the United States to seek modifications of that treaty, both as to the duration of it, and also as to the scope available to Australia under the treaty....

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1. J57 Point Paper, 22 Jun 73, Subj: Australia/New Zealand POL/MIL Status and Future; also see CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 576.
2. AMEMB New Delhi 6742/081500Z Jun 73.

....I think I should say that the agreement which was made in 1963 was one which America would not expect any country now to undertake. But it is there until 1988. Its conditions are not satisfactory in the present climate of international opinion....

(C) Whitlam also commented at length on Asian regional organizations, saying SEATO was moribund and, "Dulles, we hope is dead."[1]

North West Cape Negotiations

(S) Shortly after Whitlam had stressed Australian independence of the United States during his India visit, talks had begun in Australia on the [redacted] Five days later, however, the Ambassador noted Whitlam's defense of U.S. installations in Australia during a conference of his Australian Labor Party. The Ambassador conjectured, therefore, that existing U.S. and joint Australian-American defense installations could be maintained without change or with relatively minor changes acceptable to the United States.[2]

(U) On 9 January 1974, the Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense announced in Washington that he had secured an agreement to amend the 1963 agreement on [redacted] He said the amendments would provide for [redacted] New arrangements for consultations would insure that the Australian Government was being kept fully informed of U.S. policy as circumstances developed. The Defense Minister said that, for the first time, Australia would [redacted]

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1. Ibid.
2. J51 Point Paper, 20 Jul 73, Subj: Political Overview of Australia since November 1971, with AMEMB Canberra 3927/160815Z Jul 73 attached; J51 Point Paper, 21 Jul 73, Subj: U.S.-Australian Talks on Northwest Cape, with AMEMB Canberra 3828/110915Z Jul 73 attached.
3. J51 Summary Paper, 28 Jan 74, Subj: Joint US/Australian Bases, with attached press release by the Australian Consulate-General in New York City dated 16 Jan 74.

Shipping Levy on U.S. Navy-Chartered Vessel

(S) In December 1973, a question arose regarding the liability of a vessel chartered by the U.S. Military Sealift Transport Service (MSTS) to pay a levy under an Australian domestic law entitled "The Pollution of the Sea by Oil (Shipping Levy) Act of 1972." The U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) considered vessels time chartered by the MSTS to be vessels of the U.S. Armed Forces, and hence included within the agreed minute to Article 23 of the SOFA. Accordingly, the Navy JAG instructed CINCPAC to direct that no levy be paid pending further discussion. The vessel in question, the SS AMERICAN CHALLENGER, had departed the North West Cape without payment, but a promise of payment had been made. CINCPAC requested copies of the Australian statute and implementing regulations so that the Navy JAG and CINCPAC could review and generate future guidance on the matter. Subsequent messages advised of the Australian Government position that only U.S. Government owned and operated vessels were exempt from payment of the levy. At the end of the year, the matter was under study by CINCPAC and the Navy JAG.[1]

Review of DOD Functions/Activities in Australia[2]

(U) During a review by CINCPAC of Defense Department functions and activities in Australia, the CINCPAC SJA was requested to comment on those legal aspects which were primarily SJA areas of interest. These pertained to the administration of the U.S.-Australian SOFA and the two U.S. activities in Australia which shared responsibility for that administration.

(U) CINCPAC Instruction 5820.1E of 22 June 1973 appointed the U.S. Sending State Office (USSSO) in Australia as Designated Commanding Officer (DCO) for Australia and New Zealand. The DCO was responsible for the protection of the rights of U.S. personnel who might become subject to criminal trial by foreign courts and imprisonment in foreign prisons. By DOD directive and U.S. Navy delegation, the USSSO was also responsible for the processing of foreign claims against and in favor of the United States in Australia. The supervision of FCJ and the processing of foreign claims were both essentially judge advocate functions, but could be accomplished by an activity headed by a line officer provided that a judge advocate were assigned. The USSSO was a field activity of the U.S. Navy JAG, and the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), USSSO reported directly to the Navy JAG. There were two Navy judge advocates assigned to the USSSO--a captain (also the OIC) and a lieutenant as staff counsel.

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1. J73 HistSum Dec 73 with six attached messages.
2. J73 HistSum Nov 73; J73/Memo/00269-73 of 28 Nov 73, Subj: Review of DOD Functions/Activities in Australia.

(U) The U.S. Air Force Liaison Officer (USAFLO) in Australia had been designated as the CINCPAC Representative (CINCPACREP) for Australia. The legal officer for USAFLO/CINCPACREP was an air force lieutenant colonel. The CINCPACREP performed functions which, as attributes of command, were reserved in the Services to officers of the line rather than the staff corps. For example, Navy regulations pertaining to succession to command of a Navy shore activity provided that a staff officer could succeed to command only at such activities as appropriate to his corps. For this reason, the CINCPAC SJA did not consider it feasible for the OIC, USSSO to also be designated CINCPACREP. The CINCPACREP was also Senior Single Military Representative (SSMR) for purposes of implementing the SOFA except for the FCJ and claims articles, for which the USSSO was considered to be the SSMR.

(S) The CINCPAC SJA also addressed a JCS statement that the OIC, USSSO and the USAFLO legal officer administered the same portion of the SOFA relating to military justice. The JCS statement was not correct, since the USSSO alone administered Article 8 of the SOFA covering the exercise of FCJ. The USSSO did depend upon Service inputs of information concerning potential FCJ cases; ergo, the USAFLO legal officer would be involved in providing such information for U.S. Air Force members. In addition, once it had been determined by the USSSO, in coordination with appropriate Australian authorities, that a case was properly one for U.S. criminal jurisdiction, the various Service activities were responsible for the criminal processing of the case. The USAFLO, however, had no responsibility for administration of the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the SOFA.

(U) Since the purpose of the CINCPAC study was to isolate areas of overlapping responsibility and consider consolidations of functions, the CINCPAC SJA recommended a consolidation of the USAFLO/CINCPACREP and the USSSO, deleting one officer space. The consolidated office could be titled "Joint U.S. Liaison Office-JUSLO," and could be designated CINCPACREP Australia and DCO for Australia and New Zealand.

(U) The CINCPAC SJA also recommended against assigning either the CINCPACREP or the DCO function to the Defense Attache (DATT). The day-to-day implementation of the SOFA often involved give-and-take discussions with appropriate authorities within the various bureaus and departments of the Australian Government. In those unusual circumstances when such discussions reached an impasse, it sometimes became necessary to refer the matter to the Embassy for higher level contacts between the Ambassador and/or members of his immediate staff and their Australian counterparts. If the DATT, an accredited member of the Embassy staff, performed the function of implementing the SOFA, it could result in at least the impression of high-level interest in all matters being discussed. The

objective, stated the CINCPAC SJA, should be to solve problems at the lowest possible level.

[redacted]

U.S.-[redacted] Relations

(S) The replacement of the [redacted] by the [redacted] on the [redacted] of the United Nations in [redacted] produced shock, but no discernable political or economic reversals on [redacted] The Shanghai Communique of 28 February 1972, issued during President Nixon's trip to the PRC, had a more lasting effect on U.S. [redacted] relationships. The Communique had pledged the progressive reduction of U.S. military forces and installations on [redacted] as tension in the area diminished. On 23 July 1973, the White House directed the Defense Department to relocate the [redacted] based at [redacted] Air Base, [redacted] by 31 December 1973. On 3 August 1973, the JCS tasked CINCPAC to plan for a three-phased force reduction on [redacted] the first phase of which was the removal of the [redacted] Airlift Wing from [redacted] by the end of the year. As discussed in the Logistics chapter of this history, the phase one goal was met. Phases two and three concerned the redeployment of [redacted] and a reduction in manpower of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and various supporting units for the U.S. military on [redacted] The two [redacted] had been deployed to [redacted] to fill the air defense gap caused by the [redacted] loan of [redacted] during the U.S. [redacted] effort in Vietnam. On 18 August, CINCPAC provided the JCS with a tentative personnel reduction schedule. From the original strength of 7,867 U.S. military personnel, the end strengths of the three phases were 4,700; 4,095; and 2,783 respectively.[1]

(S) The CINCPAC staff was concerned about the political impact on the [redacted] of the personnel and unit reductions on the one hand, and the potential impact on U.S. basing options on the other. The Prime Minister, [redacted] was credited with considerable political skill in making decisions beneficial to the [redacted] continued stability. He was particularly sensitive to U.S. actions which could be interpreted as eventual abrogation of the U.S.-[redacted] Mutual Security Agreement. At the same time, and considering the long-term U.S. military posture, [redacted] was a valuable strategic location in the Pacific, and irrevocable commitments to eliminate U.S. forces could boomerang if U.S.-[redacted] relations were to deteriorate in the future.[2]

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1. J53 Point Paper, 2 Oct 73, Subj: U.S. Military Presence on [redacted] for discussion of [redacted] and C-130 relocation, see Ch. V, Logistics.
2. J51 Point Paper, 24 Oct 73, Subj: [redacted] J53 Point Paper, 5 Nov 73, Subj: Reduction of U.S. Military Presence in [redacted]

(C) The [redacted] problem, culminating in the [redacted] expulsion from the United Nations and the [redacted] detente, had been a foreign policy dilemma for many years. The rank and prestige of U.S. representation on [redacted] had been considered as politically sensitive as other manifestations of U.S. support. For almost as many years, the subject of U.S. military command and control arrangements on [redacted] had been discussed by CINCPAC, the JCS, and the Departments of State and Defense. Recommendations to eliminate overlapping functions and clarify command channels had been complicated by the implications of "face" for the [redacted] if long-standing arrangements were drastically changed. In August, September, and November 1973, three in-country examinations of the U.S. presence and command arrangements were made by the CINCPAC staff. The SJA was asked to comment on the legal/international law aspects of a possible merger of the [redacted] Defense Command [redacted] and the MAAG, [redacted] The CINCPAC staff studies had recommended the merger of the two headquarters in two steps: subordinate the MAAG to the [redacted] as soon as possible, but maintain two separate headquarters; and, merge the two organizations when reduction in functions and manpower would allow housing in one headquarters, but retain both titles. The SJA comments addressed the second of those steps.[1]

(C) The proposed merger involved organizations of substantially different status. The [redacted] was a U.S. [redacted] SOFA organization, and its personnel derived their status and benefits from the SOFA. The MAAG, however, was considered an element of the U.S. Embassy, pursuant to the U.S. [redacted] Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. The privileges and immunities of its personnel were specified in that document. If the merger plan envisioned double-hatting the commander, no legal problems were posed. However, in his role as Chief, MAAG, his military assistance relations with the [redacted] would have to be conducted as a part of the U.S. Embassy, under the direction and control of the Mission Chief. The merger of the TDC-MAAG staffs was more complicated because of the distinct legal status of each. In order to comply with the language of the 1951 MAAG agreement, that portion of the staff dealing exclusively with military assistance matters would have to be maintained separately and distinctly from the rest of the merged staff; i.e., remain as an element of the U.S. Embassy under the operation and control of the Mission Chief. The support functions common to both organizations (judge advocate, protocol, public affairs, etc.) could be combined under the Commander, [redacted] but servicing both staffs.[2]

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1. J5122 Point Paper, 29 Nov 73, Subj: Command-Control Arrangements [redacted] J73/Memo/0252-73 of 12 Nov 73, Subj: Merger of [redacted]
2. Ibid.; although one goal of the reorganization was to eliminate the dichotomy of existing command and control, apparently the placing of all merged personnel under the SOFA had not yet been considered.

(C) The foregoing considerations were in the context of U.S. national strategy, foreign policy, and force posture. On the local level, military problems concerning various provisions of the SOFA were also politically oriented. The [redacted] SOFA provided for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the [redacted] over U.S. personnel only by recalling their SOFA-stipulated waiver for certain types of offenses. The intention of the [redacted] to recall a SOFA waiver of jurisdiction was conveyed to U.S. officials on a case-by-case basis, and usually involved crimes of violence or the possession, use and sale of narcotics. In past years, certain cases had surfaced disagreement between [redacted] and U.S. officials on various aspects of the SOFA and Chinese law. Some of these involved the application of [redacted] martial law to U.S. personnel; the definition of narcotics; the definition of the inter se and "directed against" provisions of the SOFA; and the changing of charges and raising of lower court sentences by appellate levels of the [redacted] judiciary.[1]

Altering of Sentence-Lutz

(U) The case of SGT Ronald A. Lutz originally offered no challenge to the SOFA. Lutz had been charged with the murder of a Chinese female in 1972. While the proceedings were replete with discussions of pubic hair in the victim's vagina and the preferred copulatory positions of the accused, he was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for negligent homicide on 10 January 1973.[2]

(U) Lutz appealed the sentence, and, on 12 July 1973, was found guilty of homicide, under a different article of the Chinese criminal code, and sentenced to five years imprisonment. Lutz appealed to the Supreme Court, which, on 30 November, ordered the case returned to the Taiwan High Court. No date had been set for the re-hearing by the end of the year.[3]

Status of Alien SOFA Dependent - Grobes

(U) On 1 February 1973, a Chinese female spouse of a U.S. Air Force member was arrested for possession, use and sale of heroin at her husband's off-base quarters. Since the female was a ROC citizen, Chinese officials stated that she was not entitled to trial as a SOFA dependent. This involved her right

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1. CINCPAC Command Histories 1970, 1971, 1972, Vol. II, in which detailed accounts of specific cases may be found. This and subsequent CINCPAC histories will acknowledge individual cases in passing, but will address only specific aspects of the SOFA.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 621, 622; J73 HistSum Jan 73; 374 CSG 100615Z Jan 73.
3. J73 HistSums Feb-Dec 73 with 18 messages, filed in CINCPAC History Archives.

to confrontation of witnesses against her. At her original trial, the court denied the defense request that a missing (U.S. military) witness be returned to [redacted] to testify, and the woman was sentenced to 13 years for sale, use and possession on 28 April. In June, TDC officials strongly protested the [redacted] interpretation of the SOFA, and stated that all U.S. dependents were entitled to SOFA protection regardless of nationality. The question was not resolved on the [redacted] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) level during 1973. However, when the woman appealed, the court allowed the U.S. Air Force to return the witness to [redacted] Since the testimony of the witness was damaging, the appellate court sentence was 12 years imprisonment. The tacit consent by the court to confrontation had implied due process as a SOFA dependent, but no official commitment by the [redacted] was made.[1]

Combining of Non-Recallable and Recallable Indictments - Young[2]

(C) In March 1973, a case involving an automobile accident was elevated to the attention of [redacted] MOFA because the indictment cited a non-recallable as well as a recallable offense. A U.S. Air Force member was indicted for negligent homicide (recallable) and causing bodily harm (non-recallable). The procurator ([redacted] prosecutor) interpreted the SOFA to permit trial of the latter offense when a recallable offense was involved. The [redacted] disagreed, and advised the MOFA of the U.S, Government position that U.S. military personnel could not be made available for trial in a case which included a non-recallable offense. The [redacted] position, however, was complicated by an earlier case in which a U.S. Navy member had been convicted on a bill including both kinds of offenses. The facts of the routine indictment had escaped notice until examination of the trial observer's report.

(C) The MOFA initially advised [redacted] that both offenses of the instant case should be tried jointly by the [redacted] which had primary (recallable) jurisdiction over the more serious offense of negligent homicide. The MOFA position was based on [redacted] law which specified punishment only for the most severe offense when unequal offenses arose from the same act. At a subsequent meeting the [redacted] adhered to its original position, and proposed that the [redacted] either amend the indictment of that the judge dismiss the lesser offenses before trial for lack of jurisdiction. While the MOFA and Ministry of Justice unofficially agreed with the [redacted] position, they nevertheless cited political constraints on amending the indictment or raising the jurisdictional question. Further, the [redacted] desired to exchange letters establishing a modus operandi in which the

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1. J73 HistSums Jan-Nov 73, with 35 messages, filed in CINCPAC History Archives.
2. J73 HistSums Mar-Sep 73, with 16 messages on file in CINCPAC History Archives.

government having jurisdiction over the most severe offense would dispose of that offense first. Jurisdiction would then be exercised over the less serious offense.

(C) The MOFA finally agreed to a two-phase hearing. In the first, the procurator would seek severence and dismissal of the non-recallable bodily harm offense. If granted, the accused would then be made available for trial on the negligent homicide charge. This procedure was apparently followed, and the accused was convicted of negligent homicide. His original sentence was two months confinement, commutable to a fine. The sentence was subsequently changed to a fine only, which was paid on 5 September to the procurator of the Kaoshiung District Court.

Interpretation of Inter Se in Narcotics Cases - Snow, Sanders

(C) In 1972, Airman First Class Samuel L. Snow was apprehended by Chinese authorities off-base for possession of opiates. After the apprehension, but before he was indicted, narcotics were discovered in his quarters on-base. This information was given to the Chinese procurator by the local Office of Special Investigation (OSI), which had also collaborated in the original off-base apprehension. The procurator proceeded on the assumption that the two incidents constituted one narcotics violation which was recallable under the SOFA. However, the U.S. Air Force authorities, who had delivered a notice of serious incident after the off-base arrest, did not believe that a similar notice was required for the on-base incident on the grounds that it was an inter se offense "directed against" the U.S. Government. While Snow was eventually convicted of possession of heroin under an indictment citing both off-base and on-base evidence, the broader implications of SOFA administration were debated by U.S. officials.[1]

(C) Contributions to the development of an agreed U.S. position were made by the local base and Taiwan U.S. Air Force units, the TDC, CINCPAC, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force and the General Counsel of the Defense Department. The DOD Counsel advised against a "broad interpretation" of the inter se provisions of the SOFA, noting the world-wide campaign of the U.S. Government to enlist the cooperation of foreign governments in the control of narcotics. The TDC responded that the joint Embassy-TDC interpretation of the term "directed against" was unilaterally strict. The intent of this interpretation was to retain U.S. jurisdiction over as many dependents as possible. Both the Embassy and the TDC were reluctant to concede, even if one U.S. individual sold narcotics to another in the Chinese community, that that offense was not inter

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 617-620.

se. In any case, SOFA negotiations with the ROC were pending regarding interpretation of the inter se and "directed against" stipulations of the agreement.[1]

(C) Thus matters stood until, in August 1973, SGT Thomas Sanders of the U.S. Air Force was arrested for possession of heroin in his off-base quarters. As in the Snow case, heroin was found in Sanders' on-base quarters two months later, but before formal indictment on the first charge. The on-base finding was also known by the Chinese authorities; however, a notice of serious incident was not conveyed to the ROC officials. Rather, the base authorities intended to court martial Sanders for the on-base offense. In October, shortly after the on-base incident, Sanders was indicted for the first offense. Later in November, the chief procurator of the Taichung District Court stated that a notice of serious incident should have been filed for the on-base incident because, he said, China had the right to recall its waiver of jurisdiction in all narcotics cases. He signified his intention to report the circumstances of the case to the Ministry of Justice for a decision as to jurisdiction and contact with American authorities through the MOFA if necessary. Exchanges of views between various U.S. military echelons, including reference to the previously mentioned guidance from the DOD Counsel, were inconclusive. The TDC reviewed the negotiations to date with the MOFA regarding the inter se article of the SOFA, but, as of the end of 1973, no agreement had been reached. Meanwhile, base officials had been informed that the ROC would not recall its waiver for the on-base incident, and Sanders' trial was held on 28 December 1973. No judgment had been rendered at year's end.[2]

Japan

Influences on U.S.-Japan Relationships

(C) CINCPAC's political-military relationships with Japan were carried out within the framework of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC); the Security Consultative Subcommittee (SCC), and the SOFAs pertaining to U.S. personnel and United Nations forces. During 1973, a potentially disrupting influence on U.S.-Japan relations was the Japanese reaction to the oil crisis. Since Japan was almost completely dependent upon mid-east oil for economic survival, the Japanese position with the Arab states was modified considerably in late 1973. This position went so far as to announce economic assistance from Japan to certain Arab nations, and the issuance of a statement calling for the withdrawal of Israel to pre-war

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1. Ibid.
2. J73 HistSums Oct-Dec 73, with 18 messages on file in CINCPAC History Archives.

positions. Japan's policy was apparently driven by a consensus that it would do whatever was necessary to obtain oil.[1]

(S) Complicating the move by Japan toward accommodation with the oil-producing countries was its sensitivity to press reports that the United States was making shipments of materiel to support Israel from Japan. Officials of the U.S. Mission expressed U.S. Government appreciation for the complexity of the problems presented to Japan by developments in the Middle East, but cautioned the Japanese Government that the Israel-Arab conflict and its political ramifications presented an extremely sensitive situation to the United States as well. If Japan were drawn into a position of public opposition to U.S. support of Israel, from whatever source, overall U.S.-Japan relationships could be adversely affected.[2]

(S) Illustrative of the Japanese sensitivity to the appearance of involvement in international military affairs was the reaction to the homeporting of the USS MIDWAY in Yokosuka. The MIDWAY deployment was planned for a period of two years, and the families of the crew were to be quartered in the Yokosuka/Yokohama area. The MIDWAY's arrival in Japan would raise the total of U.S. Naval ships homeported in Japan to eight, and raise the number of families in the area by 1,000. Government of Japan (GOJ) officials were fearful that a prolonged initial visit by the MIDWAY would increase the tempo of leftist anti-war demonstrations, expected to peak about two weeks after its scheduled arrival on 5 October 1973. The GOJ requested that the MIDWAY depart Yokosuka during the period 17-31 October during the scheduled anti-war demonstrations. The U.S. Navy objected on the grounds that any significant alteration to the MIDWAY's schedule for the initial in-port period would cause difficulties for the crew and families faced with finding homes and getting established in a foreign country. After careful appraisal, however, the U.S. Defense Department concluded that it was in the long term best interests of the U.S.-Japan relationships to avoid having the MIDWAY become a focal point of anti-war demonstrations during the first in-port period. Joint State/Defense guidance stated the position to be passed to the GOJ by the Embassy as reluctant agreement to honor the GOJ request. However, "the U.S. Government expects and anticipates that GOJ will insure that there will be no obstacles to return of MIDWAY to Yokosuka for extended period beginning Nov. 1."[3]

(C) Other influences on U.S.-Japan relationships included the progress of Japan's rapprochements with the PRC and the Soviet Union; the Japanese concept

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 623, 624; J512 Point Paper, 28 Nov 73, Subj: Japan; COMUSJAPAN 210730Z Dec 73.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 14031/291057Z Oct 73.
3. J51 Point Paper, 5 Nov 73, Subj: USS MIDWAY Extended Deployment in Japan.

of the three-way relationship among the United States, Korea and Japan; and, the limitations of the U.S.-GOJ mutual security treaty. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking in 1972 had added a new dimension to Japan's foreign relations, but progress toward normalization had been slow. In August and September 1973, there were indications of an upbeat in trade agreements and visitor exchanges. Since this step was parallel to the budding U.S.-PRC detente, the slow and cautious pace with which Japan and the PRC were moving was realistic and congruent with long range U.S. interests.[1]

(S) Military cooperation between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan would benefit U.S. interests and promote regional security objectives. However, there were historical and continuing Korean apprehensions about Japan's potential military expansion. In Japan, moreover, there were positive Japanese public and constitutional constraints which would limit the military to homeland defense. In the past, the Japanese had considered the U.S. presence in Korea as pivotal to maintaining a military balance in Northeast Asia. The major role played by the United States in Korea for 25 years had made it possible for Japan to play a minor one. Were this not the case, Korean dislike, distrust and resentment, while not as great as it was, would make it much more difficult for Japan to play even a limited role. However, the Koreans had registered concern that U.S. security responsibilities in Korea might be assumed by Japan, and the ROK was highly sensitive to any speculation about Japan playing a greater role in ROK defense.[2]

(C) There was also a limit to the U.S. defense partnership with Japan. Despite the existence of the U.S.-GOJ mutual security treaty, the United States did not have a unilateral defense plan for Japan. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces were restricted by the GOJ Constitution, Japanese public opinion, availability of funds and defense concepts associated with their island geography. In his contribution to the articulation of the latest National Security Study Memorandum on U.S. policy for Japan, CINCPAC emphasized that the development of a partnership mutually committed to peace and stability in the region would require:[3]

- Greater diplomatic skill at all levels - civilian and military.
- A broadly based mutual understanding of common goals and foreign policies.

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 14164/310806Z Oct 73.
2. J51 Point Paper, 18 Sep 73, Subj: Korea-Japan Security.
3. J51 Point Paper, 25 Jul 73, Subj: Military Partnership with Japan.

- Careful attention to the security of classified information while promoting bi-lateral military planning and equipment standardization.

- Recognition of the fact that the near term Japanese contribution to area stability would stress non-military enterprises and economic assistance.

- Positive effort to define and attain acceptance of major mutual interests, and not be distracted by relatively minor differences of opinion.

(S) The fact that understanding existed in Japanese official military circles of the importance of U.S.-GOJ relationships was evidenced by a Japanese Security Service study of the problems regarding U.S. bases in Japan. The main points of this paper were:[1]

- U.S. bases were needed to maintain peace and security in the Far East.

- The Mutual Security Treaty allowed Japan to maintain small defense forces.

- Japan must obtain the return of surplus bases.

- Japan must guarantee the use of essential bases to the United States.

- If U.S. Forces were withdrawn, Japan must maintain the bases for U.S. use in an emergency.

(C) A later paper, published by the Security Research Council of the Liberal Democratic Party, presented another view of Japan's security policy. Although the study had no official status, it was likely to be the basis for the Japanese Fifth Defense Buildup Plan. The basic policy points expressed in the 27 July 1973 paper, entitled "Our Country's Policy for Ensuring Peace" were broad in scope:[2]

- Revision needed in the structure and charter of the UN.

- Promote friendly relations with other Asian nations.

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 054/020313Z May 73.
2. J51 Point Paper, 28 Sep 73, Subj: LDP Defense Policy Paper dated 27 Jul 73.

- Reform Japan's industry and trade structure.
- Proposals for an Asian security system should be studied closely.
- Chemical weapons and nuclear tests should be banned.
- China and France should participate in nuclear disarmament.
- Promote public understanding and cooperation concerning the Security Treaty.
- Increase defense consultations with the U.S.
- Promote consolidation and integration of military bases.
- Seek cooperation of residents living near bases.
- Maintain U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
- Against mutual non-aggression pact.
- Against armed neutrality.
- Affirm constitutionality of self-defense capability.
- Maintain three non-nuclear principles.
- Constitution does not prohibit participation in a UN police force.
- Self defense power includes deterrent power.
- Promote understanding of the importance of defense among the people.
- Strengthen National Defense Council.
- Study emergency countermeasures.
- Control unlawful activities and consolidate national security system.
- Make effort to secure stable sources of supply for raw materials.

- Increase stockage of oil reserves.
- Develop atomic energy.
- Develop resource and energy saving techniques.
- Consolidate domestic agricultural production.
- Educate public in patriotism.
- Civilian control over military.
- Elevate Japan Defense Agency to Ministry status.
- Improve Self Defense morale.

(C) The foregoing rather lengthy synopsis of an even lengthier paper was an indication that the long range objectives of a mutually beneficial political-military partnership were within reach. That the road would not be easy was apparent when a challenge to the constitutionality of the Japan armed forces was upheld in a Japanese court on 7 September 1973. The Sapporo District Court held, in the Naganuma case, that the existence of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) violated Article 9 of the Constitution, which stated, "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." The ruling was appealed by the Government, which maintained that Article 9 did not deny the right of self defense and, therefore, the right to maintain sufficient armed forces for that purpose. The Naganuma ruling was the most recent pronouncement in a constitutional debate begun in 1950 with the creation of the SDFs predecessor.[1]

(C) The constitutional issue raised in the Naganuma case was not related directly to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty. On that matter, the GOJ maintained that the Article 9 prohibition did not apply to foreign troops. This interpretation had been upheld in a 1959 Japanese Supreme Court ruling that the war potential prohibited by Article 9 was that over which Japan could exercise command and control; i.e., the war potential of Japan. The provision was not applicable to foreign military forces, even those maintained in Japan.[2]

(U) Visits of Japanese businessmen and journalists to the United States sometimes produced reactions with the potential, however transitory, to influ-

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1. J732 Point Paper, 14 Sep 73, Subj: The Naganuma Court Case.
2. Ibid.

ence U.S.-GOJ political-military relationships. For example, during a visit to Washington by a group of Japanese businessmen, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements met with them to discuss mutual security problems and prospects in Asia. The first question asked of the Secretary was whether, along the lines of increasing Japanese participation in the U.S.-Japanese security relationships, he could conceive of any situation arising in the future that might require the deployment of Japanese combat forces abroad. The Secretary replied that he could not rule out any possibility concerning the hypothetical future. A question was then asked if this would not be in violation of the Japanese Constitution. Clements reply that "rules are made to be broken" was meant only to indicate that, as a matter of realism, extraordinary steps sometimes are taken by nations in the interest of national security. Later, Clements addressed a question on Japan's energy requirements and the necessity for imports of oil from the Middle East. He stated that he was referring to the possibility that Japan at some future time might have to deploy units of her maritime self-defense forces on defensive patrol to help protect Japanese sea lines of communication.[1]

(U) By the time the report of Secretary Clements remarks reached Tokyo, via an Associated Press article in the Pacific Stars and Stripes of 14 May 1973, the sense of Clements remarks had been somewhat distorted:[2]

* * * * *

> Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements produced some diplomatic shock waves here and in Tokyo this week with a broad hint to a group of visiting Japanese business executives that Japan's no-war constitution be revised to permit sending troops overseas.
>
> According to qualified sources, Clements was asked by businessmen whether Japan should consider sending her troops overseas. He replied that he would not rule it out, sources said. When reminded that Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution forbids such deployment, the hard-line former Texas oil drilling executive answered, according to first hand reports, "Confucius say rules made to be broken."
>
> In the same meeting, Clements suggested that Japan consider expanding its navy in order to convoy oil tankers to and from Middle East supply points.

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1. SECSTATE 093975/162310Z May 73.
2. SECSTATE 095285/181018Z May 73, which cited AMEMB Tokyo 6036/15 May 73.

(S) Another aspect of the U.S.-Japan relationship was stressed in a CINCPAC Plans Staff paper--the need to understand the distinction between the economic and security issues affecting that relationship. Military, political and economic issues had a bearing on international relationships separately and in connection with each other. The U.S. military, in dealing with Japan, was compelled to be carefully attuned to economic and political factors. As guests of a foreign nation, cooperation was essential and, in fact, was continually stressed. Unfortunately, there were indications that some Japanese leaders and segments of the public were convinced that the basic U.S. policy was to inhibit Japan's growth--economically and politically. Accordingly, it was important that the United States attempt to de-couple long term mutual security interests from the more pressing and attention-arresting economic problems and issues of the day. Otherwise, the Japanese could misread the ultimate intent of the United States, become more reticent, or resort to "shocks" of their own. Particularly from the military standpoint, it was necessary to avoid interchanging of the words "inform" and "consult."[1]



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1. J512 Point Paper, 25 Jul 73, Subj: US-Japan Economic and Security Relationships.
2. J526 HistSum Jan 73.

[redacted]

Security Consultative Group (SCG)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Security Consultative Subcommittee (SSC)

[redacted]

Pre-reversion Land Claims on Okinawa

(C) On 18 October 1972, the Defense Department directed that a quasi-judicial adjudicative body be established on Okinawa to succeed the Land Tribunal whose existance terminated upon Okinawa's reversion to Japan. The body was to be created using existing manpower resources, and attached to the senior U.S. Army headquarters on Okinawa.[3]

(C) The Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (COMUSJAPAN) designated the U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ) as the executive agent, and, on 28 February 1973, transmitted a proposed U.S. Army Base Command (USARBCO) regulation to all concerned for concurrence and comment. The regulation established the position of U.S. Land

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1. J526 HistSum Apr 73; COMUSJAPAN 050701Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 090955Z Apr 73; AMEMB Tokyo 5056/240824Z Apr 73; for discussion of SCG origin and prior consultation provisions of the MST, see CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 624-626.
2. J526 Point Paper, 21 May 73, Subj: Security Consultative Subcommittee (SSC) Meeting; J512 Point Paper, 2 Jan 74, Subj: Subcommittee of Security Consultative Committee (SCC); AMEMB Tokyo 6718/301135Z May 73.
3. J73 HistSum Mar 73; COMUSJAPAN 010550Z Mar 73, which cited SECDEF 181716Z Oct 72.

Claims Hearing Commissioner and specified his terms of reference and claims procedures. COMUSJAPAN also directed that the U.S. Army would provide the Commissioner, the U.S. Air Force the investigator-interpreter, and the U.S. Navy the court reporter.[1]

(U) On 28 February, COMUSJAPAN requested CINCPAC to seek declassification of the subject matter prior to initiating discussions with Japanese officials. The Defense Department authorized such declassification on 18 April 1973.[2]

(C) The USARBCO regulation specified that pre-reversion land claims petitions must be filed by mid-November 1973. Because of the complexity of the filing process, the GOJ requested that the deadline be extended until 30 June 1974 to allow processing of claims already filed. Since the Embassy and COMUSJAPAN recommended approval, CINCPAC concurred on 5 December 1973.[3]

Japanese Maritime Traffic Safety Law

(C) Beginning in January 1973, a series of consultations between United States and GOJ officials was conducted regarding the application of the Japanese Maritime Traffic Safety Law (MTSL) to U.S. Forces vessels. The new law was effective on 1 July 1973, and required advance notification and acknowledgment for passage of dangerous cargo carriers and "huge vessels." Huge vessels were defined as more than 200 meters in length. Special signal lights and day shapes were required, as well as notification of destination. On 28 June, COMUSJAPAN was informed by the GOJ that U.S. Forces vessels carrying dangerous cargo would be exempt from the MTSL, including ships carrying ammuntion and oil, except those more than 200 meters long. A subsequent concession by the GOJ included relief from declaration of cargo and destination of outgoing vessels. The GOJ agreed that, if the port to which a ship was proceeding could not be identified at the time of passage notification, the word "undecided" or an area description such as "Western Pacific" could be used. In September, U.S. officials sought agreement that high priority treatment would be accorded to U.S. Navy "huge" vessels if emergency operational or weather conditions required short notice departure from Japanese ports. By December, the response had only been that the GOJ would, "make every effort to give favorable consideration within the framework of present laws and regulations."[4]

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1. J73 HistSums Feb and Mar 73; COMUSJAPAN 280705Z Feb 73, 010550Z Mar 73, and 010615Z Mar 73.
2. J73 HistSums Feb and Apr 73; COMUSJAPAN 280530Z Feb 73; SECDEF 4707/ 181426Z Apr 73.
3. J73 HistSum Dec 73; CINCPAC 050215Z Dec 73.
4. J73 HistSums Jun and Dec 73 with 10 messages filed in CINCPAC History Archives.

Republic of Korea

U.S.-Korea Relations[1]

(U) The first United States security commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK) ante-dated the Korean Conflict by about six months, when the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed on 26 January 1950. Concurrently, the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the ROK was established. The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) entered into force on 17 November 1954. Under Article IV of the MDT, a SOFA was signed on 9 July 1966.

(U) Related to these agreements was the agreement regarding the status of United Nations forces in Japan, signed on 19 February 1954 authorizing the use of bases in Japan to conduct operations of the United Nations Command. Under agreed minutes between the Governments of the United States and the ROK, in July 1954, ROK armed forces were to remain under the operational control of the United Nations Command so long as that Command had responsibility for the defense of the ROK. This agreement was temporarily abrogated when a successful coup d' etat placed Major General Park Chung Hui in control of the South Korean Government in early May 1961. On 26 May 1961, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (ROK) announced that operational control of ROK armed forces had been returned to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.

(U) Since the Korean Armistice in 1953, the primary objective of the United States in the Korean Peninsula had been to prevent a recurrence of violent conflict between North and South. To avoid the danger of miscalculation by North Korea, U.S. Forces were committed to the defense of the ROK and to assistance in building a strong and self-reliant ROK defense force. With sustained U.S. support as a basis for self-confidence, the ROK proposed talks, in mid-1971, between the Red Cross Associations of the North and South aimed at reuniting families divided by the Korean Conflict. In September 1972, Red Cross delegations from the two sides met successively in Pyongyang and Seoul, the first such interchange in over 20 years.

(U) A new and separate avenue of communication was opened when the ROK Government began secret discussions, early in 1972, with North Korean officials. These talks culminated in a joint announcement on 4 July, in which both parties

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1. J512 Point Paper, 7 Jan 74, Subj: U.S. Security Commitments Relative to Area in General and to Korea in Particular; J512 Point Paper, 5 Jan 74, Subj: Republic of Korea; SECSTATE 164197/172205Z Aug 73; AMEMB Tokyo 11476/060948Z Sep 73; CINCPAC Alpha 078/040320Z Dec 73; AMEMB Seoul 8570/200757Z Dec 73.

agreed to work toward reunification of the Peninsula and to establish a joint coordinating committee to that end. The step-by-step process of establishing amd improving communications between the two Koreas had begun; the coordinating committee was functioning; telephone links between Seoul and Pyongyang had been established; propaganda attacks by the two sides had been curtailed; and newsmen from both sides had accompanied their respective official delegations at the Red Cross meetings.

(U) These welcome steps toward stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula coincided with the cessation of armed infiltration by North Korea. There were only three firing incidents in the Demilitarized Zone during 1972, and no reported incidents of infiltration. This trend continued in 1973; however, in December North Korean incursions around five islands off the west coast of the Peninsula, controlled by the United Nations Command, had caused concern, not only to the ROK but to U.S. military officials as well.

(U) Martial law, which had been imposed by the Government in October 1972, was rescinded in December 1972 after a referendum on a revised Constitution which, in effect, concentrated power in the presidency. Events in 1973 indicated an increasing disenchantment with the repressive measures of the Park regime. The press, student Christian Church groups and intellectual pressures resulted in some lessening of administration controls. Then, in August 1973, the kidnapping of former presidential candidate Kim Tae Chung from Japan to Korea aroused concern in the United States and indignation in Japan. The result was a delay in scheduled talks between the GOJ and ROK and the eventual ouster of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency chief.

Sixth Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)

(C) The purpose of the SCMs was to permit full discussion of mutual security problems between the ROK and the United States. The genesis of the first SCM was a tandem of events in 1968--the North Korean raid on the ROK presidential residence (Blue House), and the seizure of the PUEBLO by North Korea. In 1971, the ROK and the United States agreed to broaden the participation to include ROK foreign affairs and U.S. State Department representation, as well as that of high defense officials.[1]

(S) The Sixth SCM was held in Seoul on 12-13 September 1973. CINCPAC, Admiral Noel Gayler, attended the meeting as a U.S. delegate, with other CINCPAC staff members as observers. The chief of the U.S. delegation was Deputy Secre-

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1. J512 Point Paper, 24 Jul 73, Subj: Sixth Annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).

tary of Defense William Clements. As stated in the Security Assistance chapter of this history, Secretary Clements' main observations were related to the Korean MAP and the Five Year Modernization Program for the ROK Armed Forces. The most significant point made by the ROK Ministry of Defense was that their threat assessment was different from that of the United States. The Secretary responded that the threat assessment discrepancies originated because one side assessed enemy capabilities, while the other focused on enemy intentions.[1]

New ROK Constitution and FCJ

(C) The declaration of martial law by President Park on 17 October 1972 changed the terms of reference for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction under the SOFA. Per Article XXII, the United States had the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of the U.S. armed forces, the civilian component and dependents until martial law ended. During the two month period, from 17 October until 13 December 1972, of martial law, the FCJ provisions were suspended.[2]

(C) In November 1972, the Embassy and COMUSKOREA noted a potential problem in the revised ROK Constitution. The new constitution generally diminished individual rights and gave the president greatly expanded power, including the suspension of civil rights and control of the judiciary under some circumstances. The most serious problem in terms of the impact on the SOFA was posed by Article 53 of the new constitution. That article gave the president the right to suspend the, "freedom and rights of the people" and to "enforce emergency measures with regard to the rights and powers of the executive and judiciary" when an emergency existed or was anticipated. While the SOFA gave protection against court martial trials, Article 53 was so broad that the executive branch could invoke courts martial and/or suspend civil rights, and use the judiciary as an instrument of the government's will, without resorting to a martial law declaration.[3]

(C) If invoked, Article 53 could create a situation analagous to martial law, adversely affecting the guaranteed rights under the SOFA of U.S. personnel brought before Korean courts. In January 1973, a draft text was presented to the SOFA Joint Committee by the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA) calling for automatic suspension of SOFA Article XXII if Article 53 of the ROK

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1. J5121 HistSum Oct 73; J5121 Point Paper, 1 Nov 73, Subj: ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting: Seoul, Korea, 12-13 Sep 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 633; J732 Point Paper, 23 Aug 73, Subj: US-ROK SOFA.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 633, 634.

constitution were invoked. The ROK declined to accept automatic suspension of the FCJ provision, but was agreeable to suspension upon mutual agreement that SOFA-guaranteed rights of U.S. personnel could not be provided under Article 53. After several attempts by U.S. officials to devise more definitive terms, an "agreed interpretive understanding" of the continuance in force of SOFA Article XXII if Article 53 of the constitution were invoked was adopted by the SOFA Joint Committee:[1]

> Acknowledging that emergency measures under Article 53 of the ROK constitution would, under some circumstances, impair the right of the U.S. personnel as guaranteed by the pertinent provisions of Article XXII, its agreed minutes and agreed understandings thereto, and may be equivalent to martial law within meaning of agreed minutes re para 1(B) of Article XII of the ROK-U.S. SOFA, the representatives of the Republic of Korea and the United States, following invocation of Article 53, and upon request from the authorities of either of the governments, shall consult on this matter.

FCJ - Swiger Case

(U) The case of William L. Swiger, a Department of the Army civilian, was reminiscent of other cases which caused embarrassment to U.S. military authorities in foreign countries. Specifically, the problem of U.S. military jurisdiction over civilian employees of the U.S. Government overseas was involved. In this comparatively minor case, Swiger had been found guilty, on 25 June 1973, by the Seoul Criminal District Court of a traffic violation and obstruction of justice. He had been sentenced to eight months imprisonment. On 27 June, Swiger filed notice of appeal, but, on the same date, he failed to report for duty. It was later learned that he had departed Korea by commercial air and was in the United States. CINCPAC queried whether assurances had been given to the ROK authorities that he would be available and whether a custody receipt had been signed by U.S. military officials. COMUSKOREA replied in the negative. Efforts to convince Swiger to return to Korea failed, and, in fact, Swiger resigned from Federal service. In July the ROK was informed of his departure, and no adverse reaction had been received at the end of the year.[2]

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1. J73 HistSums Jan-Jun and Dec 73; AMEMB Seoul 0350/190510Z Jan 73; SECSTATE 013365/232050Z Jan 73; AMEMB Seoul 1807/240239Z Mar 73; SECSTATE 075339/210040Z Apr 73; AMEMB Seoul 8159/050854Z Jun 73; AMEMB Seoul 8410/140255Z Dec 73; J732 Point Paper, 23 Aug 73, Subj: New ROK Constitution and FCJ Under SOFA.
2. For background on Military Custody of Civilians, see CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 34-38; J73 HistSums Jun, Jul and Dec 73; COMUSKOREA 270305Z Jun 73; COMUSKOREA 050528Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 061948Z Jul 73; COMUSKOREA 110731Z Jul 73.

Republic of the Philippines

The Political Scene

(U) On 23 September 1972, almost one month before President Park of South Korea declared martial law, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines announced his own declaration, effective the day before. Among the repressive general orders, decrees and letters of instruction was General Order No. 3, issued pursuant to the martial law declaration. As with the Korean Article 53, this general order deprived the civil courts of jurisdiction over certain types of criminal offenses. Thus, the rights of U.S. Forces personnel under the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) could be subrogated to martial law and court martial.[1]

(C) In early 1973, it appeared that domestic law and order had been enhanced by the martial law declaration, except for the insurrection in the southern islands. The foreign policy objectives of the Philippines included a move toward bilateral and multilateral regional cooperation; cautious approaches to the Soviet Union and the PRC, coupled with foreign trade initiatives; and, establishing greater independence in relationships with the United States without forfeiting U.S. military and economic assistance.[2]

(C) Two weeks after the Vietnam cease-fire, President Marcos ordered a study by the Philippines of the effects of the Vietnam agreement on Filipino domestic and foreign affairs. The Government-sponsored Daily Express indicated that major government concerns were the fields of foreign affairs and national security, noting the "forte" of the communists in stirring up problems in one area after cessation of hostilities in another. The specifics of the article, however, focused on bilateral U.S.-Philippines relations. Marcos was quoted as saying studies would center on security problems, both internal and external; negotiations on other military arrangements with the United States, particularly the mutual defense pact and the military assistance pact; and, the Laurel-Langley economic agreement.[3]

(S) Prior to the U.S. Ambassador's departure for Washington consultations in early January, he received a package which consisted primarily of a shopping list for U.S. military assistance. The covering aide memoire recalled the

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 635.
2. J526 Point Paper, 23 Jun 73, Subj: Philippine Assessment.
3. J527 Point Paper, 30 Jan 73, Subj: Assurances to GOP Leadership; AMEMB Manila 1227/010900Z Feb 73.

Marcos-Johnson meeting during the summit conference in Manila in 1966, referring to early discussion on a new instrument to replace the Laurel-Langley agreement, which expired in July 1974. The Marcos-Johnson communique also stated that negotiations on military bases should be continued. Marcos suggested a renewal of negotiations on a new treaty of economic relations and resumption of negotiations on the, "overall question of the RP-US Mutual Defense, Military Bases and Military Assistance Agreements." He also expressed concern that Middle Eastern and Arab leaders had organized support for the Muslim secessionist movement in the Southern Philippines. The Ambassador was also urged to bring the "facts" of the martial law situation to the attention of the people and Government of the United States.[1]

(S) The Arab-Israeli war and subsequent oil embargo placed the Philippines in a delicate position. Philippine overtures to the Arab nations antedated the oil crisis, having been undertaken in an effort to dissuade Islamic states from meddling in the Muslim rebellion problem. As a result, Islamic foreign ministers had visited the Philippines in August 1973. With the advent of the oil crisis, the nature of Philippine concern for Arab sensitivities became more acute. In December, Marcos told the Ambassador, "with some delicadeza", that he considered a conspicuous U.S. presence or program in the Muslim area of the Philippines a source of potential embarrassment to his international politics. The presence to which Marcos referred was for economic assistance and rural development programs by the U.S. Agency for International Development. The Ambassador assured Marcos that the United States had no "passionate yearning" to be involved in Muslim Mindanao, and would be quite willing to limit U.S. presence in the area.[2]

U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board

(C) The Mutual Defense Board (MDB) was established on 15 May 1958 under the Philippine-United States Council of Foreign Ministers provided by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). The purpose of the MDB was to allow direct liaison and consultation between appropriate authorities of the two countries on military matters of mutual concern. The Republic of the Philippines (ROP) provided a permanent MDB office, and administrative costs were shared. CINCPAC was the U.S. co-chairman, but was normally represented by the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines (CINCPACREPPHIL). The co-chairman for the ROP was the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces. Monthly meetings had been held since

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1. J527 Point Paper, 30 Jan 73, Subj: Philippine Negotiating Objectives (Marcos Aide Memoire); AMEMB Manila 0894/240421Z Jan 73.
2. AMEMB Manila 13692/100934Z Dec 73.

9 June 1958, and the anniversary meetings each year were usually attended by CINCPAC.[1]

(C) The Fifteenth Anniversary Meeting was held on 7 June 1973 in Manila. Admiral Gayler and the Charge' d' Affaires of the Embassy represented the United States, and Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo and General Romeo Espino represented the ROP. The council of ministers' portion of the MDB meeting consisted of remarks by Romulo and the U.S. Charge' reiterating the respective policy lines of their governments. The regular MDB meeting included an intelligence briefing by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in which the Muslim situation in the South was pictured as stabilized; the briefer noted that outside aid to the Muslims continued to arrive from Sabah. Prior to the MDB meeting, Admiral Gayler met privately with Romulo, paid a call on the ROP Secretary of Defense Ponce Enrile, and met with President Marcos prior to a dinner given in Gayler's honor by Marcos.[2]

(C) Since the MDB meetings were monthly, the only other of the 1973 meetings of more than routine interest was that on 27 November, which was hosted and chaired by CINCPAC in Hawaii. Espino again headed the Filipino contingent. The formal meeting was preceded by staff discussions on security assistance.[3]

(S) One outcome of the MDB liaison in 1973 was a controversy which arose between the Philippine and U.S. panels of the MDB Intelligence committee. The ROP contingent disagreed with the U.S. estimate of the external threat to the Philippines, as had their Korean counterparts with the U.S. assessment of the North Korean threat. The Philippine contingent recommended the continued inclusion of Indonesia as an external threat to the Philippines in the 1 January 1974-31 December 1975 intelligence estimate. They also recommended the inclusion of Malaysia, with the rationale that foreign support of insurgent forces, in terms of armament and supplies, constituted foreign aggression and, therefore, external armed attack. In response to CINCPACREPPHIL request, the CINCPAC staff position was forwarded which stated that neither Indonesia nor Malaysia should be considered an external threat to the Philippines.[4]

MDB Operations Plan 1-70

(S) The MDB published the first bilateral plan in August 1965. Two updated versions had since been published: Operations Plans 1-68 and 1-70, the

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1. J527 Point Paper, 22 May 73, Subj: US-GOP Mutual Defense Board (MDB).
2. AMEMB Manila 6612/071009Z Jun 73.
3. J563 HistSum Nov 73.
4. J22 Point Papers, 3 Jun 73, Subj: Philippine-U.S. Intelligence Controversy; and 1 Jul 73, Subj: Indonesian Threat to the Philippines; and 1 Jun 73, Subj: Threat to the Philippines from Malaysia.

latter of which was the effective plan in 1973. The plan was general in nature, providing the basis for further detailed planning should an emergency arise. It would be executed in the event of an external armed attack against the Philippines, but there were no specific U.S. force commitments. The first combined Command Post Exercise (CPX) of the plan was held on 8-10 May 1973, entitled UGNAYAN.[1]

(C) In January 1973, CINCPAC reviewed the CPX draft plan and considered it to be too ambitious for an initial exercise. UGNAYAN was then changed to be a series of CPXs with increasing complexity and involvement. UGNAYAN ALPHA addressed questions of command, coordination and communications within the exercise headquarters and the Joint/Combined Coordinating Center.[2]

Renegotiations of the MBA

(S) In the volatile political climate of the Philippines, the presence of U.S. military bases as "sovereign enclaves" had long been a political football. During 1971, Philippine and U.S. negotiating panels had worked toward a renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA). By the end of 1971, considerable progress toward agreement had been made at the working level, but some key issues had not yet been resolved. Among those were shipping and navigation, immigration, tax exemption, criminal jurisdiction, base lands relinquishment, and the term of the agreement. It was little wonder that the final item--term of the agreement--had not been settled, because the State Department, DOD, CINCPAC and the Ambassador had not been able to arrive at an agreed position after many months of discussion. President Marcos had proposed to the Ambassador, in December 1971, that the MBA be co-terminous with the MDT; however, the MDT had an indefinite tenure and could be terminated within one year after notice by either party. CINCPAC had cautioned that more than one year would be needed to reposition U.S. forces and facilities from Philippine bases if the MBA and MDT were co-terminated. CINCPAC agreed that co-termination could be accepted, but only on condition that there be a separate, concurrent exchange of notes (possibly classified) stating that a reasonable length of time for withdrawal of up to four years would be allowed. The Ambassador did not agree, maintaining that the additional withdrawal period should be left for future determination.[3]

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1. J516 Point Paper, 22 Mar 73, Subj: Phil/US MDB OPLAN 1-70.
2. J516 Point Paper, 31 May 73, Subj: US/Philippine Command Post Exercise (CPX) UGNAYAN.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 643; J731 Point Paper, 21 Nov 73, Subj: Renegotiation of U.S.-Philippine MBA.

(C) The last formal meeting during 1972 of the negotiating panels took place on 24 January. No further negotiations took place in 1972 or 1973. As previously discussed, the Ambassador had received an aide memoire in January 1973, prior to a trip to Washington, in which Marcos had expressed a desire to negotiate the "overall" aspects of the MDT, the MBA, the Military Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) and the Laurel-Langley trade agreement. On his return from Washington, the Ambassador forwarded to the State Department a number of messages reviewing the status of negotiations. He commented on the items on which agreement had not been reached, and suggested a thorough review of the U.S. positions pertaining. Subsequently, CINCPAC received from the Chairman of the JCS a statement of U.S. policy toward the Philippines, as approved by the highest authority. The Marcos administration would continue to be considered the effective government of the Philippines and the one with which the United States would negotiate. Further, in consideration of U.S. interests in long-term stability in the Philippines, so long as the Marcos administration remained the effective government, the United States would continue its security and economic assistance. While U.S. military assistance, in conjunction with other U.S. programs, should be provided in an amount sufficient to assure continued access to U.S. bases in the Philippines, the establishment of a direct linkage of assistance programs to base access should be avoided. The required level of grant aid assistance to assure such access was estimated at $20 million to $25 million. The United States would make no effort to gain an extension of the Laurel-Langley Agreement when it expired in July 1974.[1]

(C) On 8 May 1973, in a radio-television interview with local newsmen and wire service representatives, President Marcos stated that the re-shaping of U.S.-ROP special relationships required renegotiation of defense and military bases pacts, preferably in a package including economic and extradition agreements. Marcos stated that, while the U.S.-Philippine cooperative relationship remained vital, it must assume a new form appropriate to the ROP policy of opening windows to the outside world. The tentative impression of the Embassy was that the presentation was aimed at the establishment of an image of hard-line nationalism for domestic and international consumption and for future bargaining with the United States. In replying to questions, however, Marcos took a distinctly cautious tack regarding termination of the MBA. He noted that the 1991 termination date could be subject to negotiation, but suggested that 1991 might be quite soon enough for Philippine interests. He counselled a study of all the facts before reaching a decision, acknowledging that foreign

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1. J73 HistSum Mar 73; AMEMB Manila 3122/190724Z Mar 73, 190800Z Mar 73, 190805Z Mar 73, 190810Z Mar 73, 190815Z Mar 73, 190820Z Mar 73, 190823Z Mar 73, 190850Z Mar 73; J526 Point Paper, 20 Apr 73, Subj: Renegotiation of GOP-U.S. Agreements; CJCS 03099/031531Z Apr 73 (EX).

exchange receipts from the U.S. bases were $130 million per year, and that base spending contributions to the national infrastructure might be three times that amount, not to mention thousands of Filipinos employed by the bases.[1]

(C) Not so cautious was the stance of Foreign Secretary Romulo, during the same interview. When asked what was the major source of irritation in the MBA, Marcos unhesitatingly said, "jurisdiction", and invited comments by Romulo, who also underlined criminal jurisdiction as the main problem. He asserted that the bases, "erode the integrity of our sovereignty"; that the base lands could be used in the land reform program; and, that elimination of the bases would allow a more flexible Philippine stance in its relations with other countries. Romulo concluded by saying that as long as the bases remain, Philippine sovereignty was always under question.[2]

(C) Philippine press stories on 16 May credited the Secretary of Public Information with the statement that the Philippine Foreign Policy Council had reached a decision to request a package renegotiation of all U.S.-ROP agreements. At that time, the Embassy had received no specific official request to renegotiate either the MDT or the MDAA, other than the aide memoire given to the Ambassador in January. However, on 27 June, the Embassy received a note from the Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 25 June, and referring to the aide memoire of 23 January 1973. The note reiterated the suggestion that talks on the agreements be held together. The Embassy acknowledged the receipt of the note, and notified the State Department that the need existed to determine the extent to which the Department of Foreign Affairs (headed by Romulo) reflected the thinking of the diverse ROP elements concerned with the range of subjects involved in the proposed package negotiations.[3]

(C) Whether or not the June note reflected the thinking of diverse ROP elements, it apparently reflected the views of Marcos as well as Romulo. On 18 July, the Embassy received a letter signed by Romulo, but invoking instructions by Marcos, which recalled the June note and indicated ROP readiness to begin the talks in August 1973. The Charge' D' Affaires indicated his intention to await the arrival of the new Ambassador, William Sullivan, "barring further needling from GOP side." Whether or not the new Ambassador influenced the views of the ROP officials, or whether the flare-up of the Muslim insurrection diverted their attention (see Security Assistance chapter), no further developments were apparent regarding renegotiations after the Romulo letter of July 1973.[4]

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1. J73 HistSum May 73; AMEMB Manila 5436/101004Z May 73.
2. Ibid.
3. J73 HistSum Jun 73; AMEMB Manila 5688/161022Z May 73 and 7516/300507Z Jun 73.
4. J72 HistSum Jul 73; AMEMB Manila 8303/200917Z Jul 73.

Continuing FCJ Issues

(C) The major criminal jurisdiction issues which Marcos and Romulo had cited as causing irritation involved the application of "inter se" provisions and the execution of official duty statements by which the U.S. military retained jurisdiction. On the other hand, issues which irritated U.S. military officials included those two, plus the backlog of drug offense cases (especially U.S. Navy personnel) which detracted from mission performance for extended periods, and the occasional subjection of U.S. military personnel to military rather than civilian courts. Illustrative of the inter se problems were two cases in which the Filipino wives of U.S. servicemen brought charges of concubinage against the husbands. This charge related to the ROP position that the category headings of its criminal code were determinative and that concubinage was not a crime against person or property, but rather against the state. The U.S. position was that category headings were not determinative, and that the concubinage charged in these cases was an inter se offense against the dependent of a U.S. military member. In these cases, the U.S. base officials were served with a subpoena and a criminal complaint, which was returned to the Fiscal (prosecutor) with the assertion that jurisdiction properly belonged to the United States since the offense was inter se. These and other cases involving the inter se interpretation prompted copious correspondence between various military headquarters, the Embassy and the State Department.[1]

(C) In January 1973, the Embassy formally presented to the State Department a proposal that inter se cases be submitted to arbitration. Embassy officers had informally broached a similar proposal in the first meeting of the Criminal Jurisdiction Implementation Committee (CJIC) in November 1972. CINCPACREPPHIL and Clark Air Base authorities opposed the arbitration proposal, as did CINCPAC, who favored instead referral of inter se cases through the CJIC and then to diplomatic channels, if necessary. The State Department agreed, vetoing the arbitration proposal and suggesting that cases, not principles, be solved by the CJIC. All concerned were directed by State, jointly with the Defense Department, to refrain from attempting to resolve the inter se provision of the MBA until negotiations on criminal jurisdiction had been concluded.[2]

(C) Other issues highlighted by specific FCJ cases involved martial law, duty certificates, and attempts to reduce the backlog of U.S. military personnel

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1. J73 HistSums Jan-Dec 73, with attached messages on file in the CINCPAC History Archives.
2. Ibid.; For discussion of CJIC formation and purposes, see CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 638-640.

on international hold for legal action. At the end of 1973, significant reductions in U.S. Navy men detained on international hold at Subic Bay had been made. Some progress had been noted for U.S. Air Force detainees at Clark Air Base also.[1]

Thailand

(C) The political-military relationships of the U.S. military in Thailand were influenced by two unrelated events in 1973--the termination of U.S. combat operations in Cambodia on 15 August and the "student coup" which changed the Royal Thai Government (RTG) leadership on 15 October.

The Bombing Halt

(C) When it became apparent that the U.S. Congress would direct the termination of U.S. air operations over Cambodia as of 15 August 1973, CINCPAC and the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) began plans for press coverage of the final missions by U.S. air crews over Cambodia. On 7 August, CINCPAC requested Defense Department authorization for press visits to U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Base (RTNB) and Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB). U-Tapao was the base from which B-52 missions were staged, and tactical strikes were staged from Korat RTAFB. The press would document the aircraft returning from the last strikes and interview the crews. The Defense Department approved CINCPAC's request on 10 August, and RTG approval was received by COMUSMACTHAI on 14 August.[2]

(C) On 13 August, the Defense Department advised CINCPAC of the public affairs guidelines to be observed during media visits to the two Thai bases and Anderson Air Force Base in Guam, the headquarters of the Seventeenth Air Division B-52s stationed at U-Tapao. There were to be no planned ceremonies or activities that could be construed as celebrating the end of the Cambodian bombing campaign or the war in Southeast Asia. A formal press conference atmosphere was to be avoided; instead, an informal "ready room" setting with access to the last mission air crews and their commanders was advised. No special ceremonies, commemorations or other activities were authorized, and U.S. military participants were to reflect no more than routine professional reaction so far as possible.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. MACTHAI/PAO 130745Z Aug 73, which cited CINCPAC 070246Z Aug 73 and SECDEF 100133Z Aug 73.
3. SECDEF 1429/132215Z Aug 73.

(C) During the Korat visit, the CINCPAC Public Affairs Liaison Officer attached to COMUSMACTHAI reported that some of the 23 newmen, representing 11 major U.S. and foreign news media, felt that there was something "phony here," and personnel appeared to be too disciplined to reflect their "true" feelings. There were no "wild parties" held at the end of the bombing missions and this tended to disappoint the press. At U-Tapao, 25 newsmen representing 14 major U.S. and foreign news media witnessed the return of the last B-52s from Cambodia. Also on hand were representatives of the RTG Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Supreme Command Forward headquarters. Two members of the U.S. House of Representatives arrived just before the end of the commander's briefing. Interviews with the crews were generally low-key, and no untoward reactions were detected by the MACTHAI staff.[1]

The "Student Coup"

(U) On 15 October 1973 (local time), the incumbent RTG officials resigned following three days of demonstrations by Thai students. An Agence France-Presse dispatch from Bangkok began, "Student power appears to have beaten back 32 years of military rule in Thailand." The new Prime Minister was a civilian, Sanya Thammasak. The whereabouts of the former prime minister and supreme commander of the armed forces, Thanom Kittikachorn, remained, "shrouded in mystery 24 hours after he had fled the country...". The former deputy prime minister and army chief of staff, Praphas Charusathiare, accompanied by Col. Narong Kittikachorn, son of the former prime minister, and their families had been located in Taipei on Taiwan.[2]

(C) The initial impact of the unrest in Bangkok on U.S. military operations was a suspension of all PCS travel transiting the Bangkok area. No leave was authorized in Bangkok, and travel was restricted to official business only. This MACTHAI guidance was amplified by the Ambassador, who addressed the actions of U.S. military personnel already in Thailand. In the event that demonstrators/agitators approached RTAFBs where U.S. personnel were stationed, the U.S. security personnel manning gates or common entrances were to be withdrawn, leaving "any confrontation to the Thais." If such confrontation appeared to be imminent, U.S. personnel were to be restricted to their living and working areas. There was to no use of weapons by U.S. personnel except in "dire case of self defense." The Ambassador emphasized that the current problem was a Thai problem, which must be resolved without U.S. military involvement or provocation.[3]

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1. MACTHAI/PAO 151546Z Aug 73 and 151600Z Aug 73.
2. MACTHAI 240741Z Oct 73; Article, Honolulu Advertiser, 17 Oct 73, p. A-11, Agence France-Presse, "Student-Backed Government Wins in Thailand."
3. MACTHAI 150520Z Oct 73; COMUSMACTHAI 151540Z Oct 73.

(U) On 17 October (local), COMUSMACTHAI advised that Prime Minister Sanya appeared to be firmly in power, and that calm had returned to Bangkok. However, there was no bus service or other public transportation. Many businesses and most RTG offices were closed, and would remain closed through 17 October. There were no normal police services, and traffic was being directed by boy scouts in areas where signal lights were inoperative. U.S. military support transportation was limited because the Thai national employees had not reported to their duty stations. Only emergency services could be provided by the U.S. Army hospital in Bangkok. The exchange and commissary were closed.[1]

(U) Two weeks after the change in government, the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement of the official ROC position concerning the continuing presence of Praphas and Narong in Taipei. The ROC spokesman stated that the two men were allowed to come to Taipei at the request of the RTG, and that no question of political asylum was involved.[2]

(C) Before the change in government, the RTG had proposed the establishment of a joint Thai-U.S. planning committee for military operations. COMUSMACTHAI had suggested that an acceptable alternative for the United States might be to brief selected RTG individuals as to joint aspects of the U.S.-Thai military relationship. In view of the governmental upheaval, CINCPAC had requested that the proposal be reevaluated. On 5 November, COMUSMACTHAI reported a meeting attended by the U.S. Support Activities Group commander, members of the Embassy and the chief of staff, Supreme Command Headquarters which was meant to be responsive to the Thai joint planning request. Despite efforts of the U.S. representatives to address the subject, the Thai attendees were evasive. Nevertheless, COMUSMACTHAI believed the near term requirement to be responsive was satisfied, and recommended the subject to be dismissed pending further initiatives by the RTG.[3]

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

(C) No SOFA or other formal agreement existed between the U.S. Government and the RTG relating to jurisdiction over U.S. military and civilian personnel. In practice, the Thai did not usually claim jurisdiction over duty or inter se cases, but regularly exercised jurisdiction over U.S. personnel in off-duty cases. In May 1973, the Embassy reported a case involving that most sensitive profile of American presence in a foreign country--The U.S. Commissary in Bangkok. Front page treatment was given in Bangkok English language newspapers on 26 May to arrests by Thai police of Thai suspects involved in the theft of

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 160610Z Oct 73.
2. AMEMB Taipei 6570/301000Z Oct 73.
3. COMUSMACTHAI 050932Z Nov 73.

tax-free commissary items which presumably were destined for the black market. The stories correctly reported that the arrests were the outgrowth of a joint Thai-American investigation, and that American employees of the commissary were involved in the theft ring. The investigation indicated that 14 Thai commissary employees, three Thai policemen and three U.S. military personnel assigned to the commissary were involved. The Thai police arrested all of the Thai suspects, and had indicated that prosecution of the Americans would be left to the U.S. military authorities.[1]

(C) Apparently, the RTG law enforcement officials had second thoughts about the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over the three U.S. Army personnel implicated in the case. They were SGT Richard G. Cortes and Specialist Fours Peter T. Harrison and Craig A. Smith. The MACTHAI SJA advised that the trial of these men by Thai courts had become of serious concern to the RTG in view of complaints in local newspapers about the duty-free U.S. Forces commissary and post exchanges. COMUSMACTHAI and the Embassy had attempted to secure RTG approval for FCJ by U.S. authorities. A strong written protest had been lodged by the Embassy; however, negotiations as of 24 July indicated that the letter would not influence the RTG. Until the question of jurisdiction was resolved, MACTHAI had instructed U.S. Army authorities in Thailand not to convene courts martial or take any other disciplinary action involving the suspects.[2]

(U) Contrary to expectations, the RTG acknowledged the right of the U.S. Army to exercise jurisdiction, and the subjects were removed from Thailand for subsequent court martial by U.S. authorities.[3]

(U) In another case, which illustrated the cultural impact of confinement in a foreign prison, SGT Charles R. Clayton was convicted on 18 June 1973 for illegal possession of heroin. The sentence for this U.S. Air Force member was one year, and he was confined in a Thai provincial prison. Clayton was not allowed a bed in his cell because of Thai custom since it would elevate him to a position above fellow inmates. This deprivation prompted the exchange of numerous messages in Air Force channels. The lack of a bed had still not been resolved when Clayton was released on bail pending review of his appeal. No further action was reported during 1973. The most significant observation made during this case came from the judge advocate of the Thirteenth Air Force element in Thailand, and was a portent for future U.S.-Thai relationships. He stated

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1. J73 HistSum May 73; AMEMB Bangkok 8287/260622Z May 73.
2. J73 HistSum Jul 73; MACTHAI SJA 270400Z Jul 73.
3. J73 HistSum Sep 73; MACTHAI SJA 060955Z Sep 73.

that all levels of contact with local and national officials had experienced increased difficulty in all dealings. Oral understanding and customary practice did not, "carry much weight." It was a "new phase entirely."[1]

Vietnam

(S) The most significant development relating to political-military relationships in Vietnam during 1972 had been the establishment of the combined Defense Attache Office/Defense Resources Support and Termination Office (DAO/DRSTO). This organization was to replace the MACV organization when a cease-fire agreement was signed. On 13 December 1972, the CINCPAC SJA outlined a tentative provision for the conduct of legal affairs. The SJA paper stated that legal support for military personnel should be provided by DRSTO to the extent practicable, with backup support provided by the appropriate out-of-country Service activity. The SJA advised that a SOFA was not necessary because the Pentalateral Agreement granted immunity from Vietnamese civil and criminal jurisdiction and provided other diplomatic privileges to U.S. military, DOD civilian, and other civilian direct-hire employees. The SJA also advised that the delegation of court-martial authority to the Chief, DAO/DRSTO was not acceptable. The power to authorize a commander of a joint command to convene courts-martial was delegated by the President only to the Secretary of Defense. It was therefore recommended that the Services should process military justice matters involving DRSTO military personnel in the same manner as these matters were handled for DAO personnel world-wide.[2]

Processing of Foreign Claims

(S) Prior to the disestablishment of MACV, the CINCPAC SJA requested U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) to coordinate with MACV and the U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV) to establish procedures for the processing of foreign claims by the DAO after MACV disestablishment. The U.S. Army had been designated by the Defense Department as having single service responsibility in Vietnam for this matter.[3]

(S) Because the tenure of DAO/DRSTO in Vietnam was not expected to be permanent, the DAO published an operations plan (001) for the phased termination of DAO/DRSTO functions. As part of CINCPAC's review of the DAO plan, the CINCPAC SJA discussed the processing of foreign claims in Vietnam. The plan

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1. J73 HistSums Jun, Jul, Aug 73 with 13 messages on file in CINCPAC History Archives.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, p. 652.
3. J73 HistSum Jan 73; CINCPAC 051955Z Jan 73.

proposed to transfer the supervision over the Foreign Claims Office, Saigon to the U.S. Embassy. The SJA did not agree. He noted that single service responsibility for foreign claims was vested in the Army, and that a Foreign Claims Commission, located at USARPAC in Hawaii, actually adjudicated the claims since there was a statutory requirement for one to three service judge advocates to perform the adjudication. The Foreign Claims Office, Saigon, which was staffed entirely by Vietnamese, ordinarily processed claims to the point of adjudication, and in-country legal advice and supervision was vested in a U.S. civilian staff attorney of the DAO. The in-country presence of a Defense Department attorney familiar with foreign claims processing was desirable because of the complexity of the legal issues involved in processing claims. Embassies did not normally have staff attorneys attached, and, in any case, since foreign claims were a military responsibility, State Department attorneys were unlikely to be familiar with the foreign claims adjudicative process.[1]

(S) If the function were transferred to the Embassy, the lack of legal advice from a Defense Department attorney in-country could slow the claims adjudication process, and there would be a risk that non-meritorious claims and/or improper claimants would be approved. Retention of the function within DAO, on the other hand, would allow the backlog of pre-cease-fire claims to be reduced more quickly.[2]

(U) On 25 August, a CINCPAC Plans staff message recommended that the supervision of the foreign claims processing function be retained by the residual DAO legal staff.[3]

FCJ over Military Absentees

(U) In September 1973, the fact that government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) civil authorities were holding U.S. military absentees in RVN prisons was brought to CINCPAC's attention. The absence of a SOFA in Vietnam prevented the DAO from asserting any kind of military control over U.S. absentees, and this was interpreted as restricting its authority to intervene on their behalf with Vietnamese authorities. The DAO maintained a "hands off" policy and did not arrange transportation out of Vietnam unless the absentee signed a statement indicating his desire to return to military control. At the time this matter came to the attention of the CINCPAC SJA, two U.S. Army absentees were being confined by RVN civil authorities. Seven absentees, all Army personnel, had

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1. J73 HistSum Jul 73; J73/Memo/00148-73 of 12 Jul 73, Subj: DAO Saigon OPLAN 001, Revised.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 252035Z Aug 73.

been evacuated by U.S. military aircraft from RVN to Thailand since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from RVN in March 1973. After coordination with the CINCPAC Political Adviser, the SJA contacted the Consulate in Saigon to obtain more information. The Consulate advised that military prisoners were treated in the same manner as any other U.S. civilian in the custody of RVN authorities. The problem was to identify military members, arrested by RVN authorities, who used assumed names. One of the men in custody, for example, had maintained that he had been discharged from the Army and was not an absentee. The Consulate expected more absentees to surface as the employment situation got worse for Americans.[1]

(U) In October, a member of the CINCPAC SJA staff visited Saigon to investigate the administration of legal matters concerning U.S. personnel in Vietnam. During discussions between the DAO staff attorney and the SJA representative, the lack of authority (according to customary international law concepts) of U.S. military authority remaining in Vietnam to apprehend, arrest or take custody of deserters was discussed. The CINCPAC attorney suggested that the possibility be explored of securing an understanding or agreement with RVN authorities to allow the application of such procedures in Vietnam. Although the problem of control over deserters had not been solved at the end of 1973, the two individuals in custody had been returned to military control by their own acquiescence.[2]

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1. J73 HistSum Sep 73; J732 Memo for Record, 21 Sep 73, Subj: Military Absentees in RVN.
2. J73 HistSum Oct 73; J732 Memo for Record, 24 Oct 73, Subj: Staff Visit to USDAO, Saigon, 18-21 Oct 73; DAO Saigon 220504Z Nov 73.

CHAPTER XI

OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Official Activities of the Commander in Chief

(U) CINCPAC's numerous trips, speeches, and press conferences are highlighted below. Distinguished visitors and visits by news media are also listed. Events for the year are listed chronologically.[1]

(U) Washington, D.C. Trip--3-5 January: Admiral Gayler spent three days conferring with top Defense Department and civilian officials, including Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, Chief of Naval Operations; Representative F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee; and Frank Shakespeare, Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

(U) World Affairs Council Meeting, Los Angeles, 18 January: Admiral Gayler addressed a luncheon meeting of the council, presenting a pragmatic assessment of the situation in Asia and the Pacific. Prior to the speech he told a press conference that the PACOM was ready to comply with Vietnam troop withdrawals and to handle the homecoming of American prisoners of war. After the speech the Admiral met informally with the Los Angeles Times editorial board.

(U) U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Tokyo, 20-26 January: Admiral Gayler flew to Tokyo to attend the 14th session of the committee and discuss the framework of defense cooperation between the two countries under the mutual security treaty. U.S. representatives were U.S. Ambassador Robert S. Ingersoll and Admiral Gayler. During the meeting the United States agreed to return some military bases in Japan and Okinawa to Japanese control. The committee also discussed problems regarding the implementation of the security treaty. Admiral Gayler called on Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka with Ambassador Ingersoll. He also consulted with Lieutenant General Robert E. Pursley, USAF, Commander of U.S. Forces Japan and General Hayao Kinugasa, Chairman of the Japan Defense Agency Joint Staff. A press background briefing was held at the Embassy on 23 January by the Ambassador and the Admiral.

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1. All material for this section was taken from J74 HistSums Jan-Dec 73.

(U) Seventh International Transportation Seminar, Hawaii, 5 February: The Admiral delivered introductory remarks to 200 guests at the Ilikai Hotel.

(U) Return of U.S. Prisoners of War, February-March: Admiral Gayler was waiting at Clark Air Base when the first contingent of U.S. prisoners of war returned. He greeted each American returnee personally, either at Clark or Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii over the two-month release period.

(U) Philippines-Okinawa Trip, 10-15 February: While the Admiral was in the Philippines for the return of the first U.S. prisoners of war, he had an audience with President Ferdinand E. Marcos and met with other high government officials in Manila. He then flew to Subic Bay where he met with Vice Admiral James L. Holloway, USN, Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The Admiral flew to Okinawa on 14 February, where he met with General Donald V. Bennett, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea and Lieutenant General Pursley.

(U) Pearl Harbor Chief Petty Officers Club, 15 February: Admiral Gayler addressed 370 chief petty officers and their guests at a luncheon. His remarks centered on his personal reactions to the prisoner of war repatriation and his expectations for the PACOM during the post-war era.

(U) Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, 22 February: The Admiral told 250 Chamber of Commerce members that more military money would be spent in Hawaii in 1973 but that there would be no increase in manpower. He also discussed the prisoner of war release. After the speech the Admiral met with 10 local reporters for a brief press conference.

(U) Philippine-Vietnam-Thailand Trip, 1-9 March: Admiral Gayler met with U.S. Ambassador Henry Byroade and toured Manila. On 4 March he joined President Marcos, the Ambassador, and Lieutenant General William G. Moore, Jr., USAF, Commander of the 13th Air Force, in greeting returning prisoners of war. The Admiral flew to Saigon on 6 March, where he met with U.S. military and civilian officials before continuing on to Thailand for consultations with General John W. Vogt, Jr., USAF, Commander of the U.S. Support Activities Group at Nakhon Phanom. He also met with Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn and was given an audience with King Bhumipol Adulyadej. In addition, he met with U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger and other U.S. officials in Bangkok.

(U) Philippines Trip, 12-16 March: In a planeside press briefing on his arrival at Clark Air Base, Admiral Gayler told newsmen that the rate of withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam had been changed to match the rate of return of American prisoners (which had been slowed), but he reaffirmed the U.S. intention of completing withdrawal by 28 March. He also said there were

no plans to court-martial any of the returning prisoners. In Manila the Admiral met again with President Marcos and Ambassador Byroade. Later the Admiral flew to Subic Bay, where he toured the attack carrier USS RANGER (CVA-61) and met with Rear Admiral John H. Dick, USN, who was Commander U.S. Naval Forces Philippines and CINCPAC Representative Philippines.

(U) Washington, D.C.--Air and Army War Colleges--Armed Forces Staff College, 19-23 March: The Admiral visited Washington for talks with Admiral Moorer, Admiral Zumwalt, and other defense officials. On 22 March he participated in a Pentagon news conference; he said that the United States would render harmless all lethal mines laid in North Vietnamese harbors, but would not remove them. The Admiral delivered addresses to three military colleges: the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base on 20 March with an audience of about 250; the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia on 22 March with an audience of 275; and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania on 23 March with an audience of about 250.

(U) Philippine Trip, 26-29 March: Admiral Gayler met with the final contingent of returning prisoners of war.

(U) Indonesia-Thailand-Malaysia Trip, 2-12 April: Admiral Gayler arrived in Jakarta on 3 April for a five-day official visit as guest of the Indonesian Defense and Security Department. During the visit he made courtesy calls on President Suharto, the Minister of Defense and Security/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the Chiefs of Staff of the service branches, and the Chief of Police. During his stay the Admiral also visited Bandung and Surabaya to inspect Indonesian armed forces projects and the Naval Base at Ujung, Surabaya. On 7 April he flew to Bangkok for talks with General Vogt, U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger, and General Alexander M. Haig, Special Presidential Envoy, who was in Thailand for consultations with U.S. and local officials on the tense military situation in Cambodia and other Indochina problems. On 9 April the Admiral flew to Kuala Lumpur for discussions with Malaysian leaders including Prime Minister Abdul Razak, the Chief of the Armed Forces Staff, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense, and the Deputy Defense Minister. On 11 April the Admiral laid a wreath at the National Monument and attended a luncheon hosted by the Armed Forces Staff. Before departing Kuala Lumpur, he held a press conference at Subang Airport.

(U) Honors Ceremony for Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific, 24 April: Admiral Gayler attended ceremonies at Fort Shafter honoring the incoming CINCUSARPAC, General Frederick C. Weyand, USA.

(U) Federal Employee of the Year Luncheon, Honolulu, 26 April: Admiral Gayler attended the annual Federal Employee of the Year Luncheon and presented

awards to Defense Department winners. Two civilians on his staff were recipients of those awards: Mr. Merriman F. Bosley, a Supervisory Communications Specialist, was named "Outstanding Federal Manager of the Year" and Mrs. Marilee Gilkerson, Civilian Personnel Management Specialist, was named "Outstanding Federal Woman of the Year." Nominees had been named by all Federal agencies in Hawaii.

(U) Washington, D.C., 29 April-7 May: Admiral Gayler flew to Washington for a round of talks with Defense Department and other government officials. On 2 May he called on the Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency. While at the capital he also conferred with Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., Admiral Moorer, Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner, and Secretary of the Army Robert F. Froehlke. On 3 May he was interviewed by Michael Getler of the Washington Post.

(U) Air Force Association, Hawaii Chapter, 17 May: Admiral Gayler spoke to this group at the Hilton Hawaiian Village Hotel.

(U) Korea-Japan-San Diego Trip, 21-31 May: Admiral Gayler arrived for a four-day visit to U.S. Forces Korea and Republic of Korea military installations. While in Korea the Admiral visited prominent U.S. and Korean civilian and military officials, including President Park Chung-hee, U.S. Ambassador Philip C. Habib, Minister of National Defense Yu Jae-heung, and acting COMUS Korea, Lieutenant General Robert N. Smith, USAF. Before leaving Seoul he taped an address to U.S. Forces for broadcast on the Armed Forces radio and TV network. On 26 May he arrived in Tokyo for a four-day visit to discuss with U.S. Embassy and State Department officials long-term policy issues that included the presence of U.S. bases and plans to consolidate them. While in Japan he attended change of command ceremonies for the Commander Fleet Air Western Pacific at Atsugi Naval Air Station and was interviewed by Hal Drake of Pacific Stars and Stripes. Admiral Gayler arrived in San Diego on 30 May to attend retirement ceremonies for Vice Admiral Thomas J. Walker, USN, Commander, Naval Air Pacific. While there he also conferred with Admiral Zumwalt and met with the San Diego Union editorial board.

(U) Hong Kong-Manila Trip, 4-8 June: Admiral Gayler arrived in Hong Kong for a one-day visit that included calls on Governor of Hong Kong Sir Murray Maclehose, U.S. Consul General David Osborn, and Commander of British Forces Lieutenant General Sir Richard Ward. On 7 June, the Admiral arrived in Manila for a closed-door meeting with top Philippine military and government leaders to discuss U.S. military assistance and the future of U.S. bases. While in the Philippines the Admiral conferred privately with President Marcos and met with Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo and Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile.

(U) Change of Command, Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii, 8 June: Admiral Gayler was guest speaker at the change of command ceremony.

(U) Kamehameha Day Parade, Honolulu, 9 June: Admiral Gayler was an official guest on the reviewing stand for this annual parade in honor of King Kamehameha I.

(U) Philippine Independence Day Celebration, Honolulu, 12 June: The Admiral attended a celebration at the Philippine Consulate marking the 75th anniversary of Philippine independence from Spain.

(U) Washington, D.C.-San Diego Trip, 26-30 June: Admiral Gayler arrived in Washington for a four-day visit that included meetings with Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, Secretary of the Navy Warner, Admiral Moorer, and other top military and civilian officials. On 30 June he flew to San Diego where he addressed the American Fighter Aces convention.

(U) Press Meeting, Honolulu, 13 July: Admiral Gayler met with 14 local newspaper, radio, and TV representatives at his Camp Smith headquarters.

(U) Washington, D.C. Trip, 30 July-2 August: Admiral Gayler met with Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, Deputy Defense Secretary Clements, Air Force Secretary John L. McLucas, Navy Secretary Warner, Representative Hebert, and other top military and government officials.

(U) Alaska Trip, 2-5 August: Admiral Gayler arrived at Elmendorf Air Force Base for a four-day visit to discuss subjects of mutual interest with General James C. Sherrill, USAF, Commander in Chief Alaska and to visit military installations. The Admiral was briefed on the Alaskan Command, the cost of stationing forces in Alaska, climatology, and the Alaska pipeline. The Admiral visited the Northern Warfare Training Center at Fort Greeley and the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory at Point Barrow. The next day he toured the Prudhoe Bay facility and met with the press on his return to Elmendorf.

(U) Japan Defense Agency Press Corps, Honolulu, 6 August: Admiral Gayler briefed 19 members of the Japan Defense Agency press corps and was host to a reception for the group.

(U) Press Conference, Honolulu, 10 August: Admiral Gayler announced at a news conference that American troops would remain in Southeast Asia after the 15 August bombing halt in Cambodia to act as a deterrent to the North Vietnamese. The briefing was attended by representatives of both local newspapers, the three principal local TV stations, the wire services, and one radio station.

(U) American Legion Convention, Honolulu, 19-24 August: The 55th annual national convention of the American Legion, attended by an estimated 25,000 people, met in Honolulu with Admiral Gayler participating in five of the scheduled events. On 17 August he attended a reception and luncheon at the Pearl Harbor Officers' Club in honor of the Legion's National Security Commission Committee. The next day he joined other top military commanders in addressing the committee, which developed resolutions on military subjects for the Legion's national convention. American military strength in the Pacific was particularly emphasized by Admiral Gayler and General Bennett. General Lucius Clay, USAF, Commander U.S. Pacific Air Forces and Lieutenant General Louis Wilson, USMC, Commander Fleet Marine Force Pacific also spoke. On 20 August Admiral Gayler was Grand Marshal for the Legion Parade, which officially opened the convention. Later he attended the Commander's reception. On 22 August, acting as military speaker for the convention, Admiral Gayler addressed the morning session.

(U) Korea-Mexico Trip, 10-17 September: Admiral Gayler arrived in Seoul to attend the 1973 ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting as part of a 13-member U.S. delegation headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements. While in Korea the Admiral called on President Park, Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil, Minister of National Defense Yu, as well as top U.S. officials. The Admiral arrived in Mexico City to attend the Mexican Independence Day parade as an official guest. While in Mexico the Admiral called on President Luis Echeverria, Navy Secretary Admiral Bravo, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Uribe, and U.S. Ambassador McBride.

(U) Los Angeles-New York Trip, 20-28 September: Admiral Gayler arrived for a five-day visit in Los Angeles. On 21 September he visited the Hughes Aircraft Company and was given a briefing. Later that day he was interviewed by Frank Macomber of the Copley News Service and had a telephone interview with the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company. On 22 September he attended a Navy League reception and ball at the Beverly Hilton Hotel. On 24 September the Admiral was given a briefing on advanced research and development in ocean surveillance by the Lockheed Company. In the afternoon he was interviewed by Bob Abernathy of KNBC-TV and in the evening he met with the Southern California Arms Control Group. The next day Admiral and Mrs. Gayler were interviewed by KNXT-TV for the "Noontime" show. On 26 September the Admiral arrived in New York for a luncheon speech to the Overseas Press Club. Before the speech he met with the New York Times editorial staff and that evening he met with Reader's Digest editors. On 27 September the Admiral visited the headquarters of the International Business Machines company in White Plains, New York.

(U) CINCPACFLT Change of Command, Pearl Harbor, 29 September: Admiral Gayler attended ceremonies in which Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, relieved Admiral Bernard A. Clarey, USN, as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Also attending the ceremony were Navy Secretary Warner, Admiral Moorer, and Admiral Zumwalt.

(U) Thailand-Cambodia-Vietnam Trip, 10-15 October: CINCPAC arrived in Bangkok to begin a round of talks with local and U.S. officials and a tour of military installations in Southeast Asia. He met with Ambassador Unger and talked with representatives of the POW/MIA League of Families. He paid a courtesy call on Field Marshal Thanom and visited several Thai military bases including U-Tapao, Don Muang, and Camp Samae San. On 13 October he flew to Phnom Penh where he met with Marshal Lon Nol and toured Cambodian military sites. He flew to Nakhon Phanom for discussions with General Timothy F. O'Keefe, USAF, Commander, U.S. Support Activities Group/Seventh Air Force. He also toured the Joint Casualty Resolution Center. On 15 October he flew to Saigon where he met with Ambassador Graham Martin and was briefed by U.S. officials. On 16 October he received briefings and held discussions with local area commanders at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, before returning to his headquarters in Hawaii.

(U) Naval Reserve Association Speech, San Diego, 20 October: Admiral Gayler was the banquet speaker for a meeting of the Naval Reserve Association at the Hotel Del Coronado. Approximately 800 members and their guests attended.

(U) Washington, D.C. Trip, 28 October-2 November: During this five-day stay that included talks with top Defense and State Department and Congressional officials, the Admiral also spoke at the Naval Aviators Association luncheon at Fort Myer Officers' Open Mess on 31 October. He called on Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary Clements, Admiral Moorer, Air Force Secretary McLucas, Air Force Chief of Staff General George S. Brown, Admiral Zumwalt, and others. He also called on Senators John McClellan, Henry Jackson, and Barry Goldwater; Representative Hebert, and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush. On 2 November he met with U.S. Ambassador (designate) to Thailand, William R. Kintner.

(U) Japan Trip, 13-17 November: Admiral Gayler arrived in Tokyo to attend the annual Pacific area Chiefs of Mission meeting. The meeting, which was opened by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on 15 November, consisted of discussions by U.S. ambassadors of countries in the western Pacific as well as other high ranking American officials. While in Japan the Admiral met with Ambassador Ingersoll at the Tokyo Embassy, with COMUS Japan, General Pursley, and high ranking Japanese military officials. He was interviewed by Don Oberdorfer, Tokyo bureau chief of the Washington Post and Herman Nickel, Tokyo bureau chief of Time Magazine.

(U) U.S.-Philippine Defense Board Meeting, Honolulu, 27 November: Admiral Gayler attended a meeting of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board at Camp Smith. He also met privately with General R.C. Espino of the Philippines, co-chairman of the board.

(U) Press Conference, Honolulu, 29 November: Admiral Gayler met with 14 local media representatives to explain the impact of the national fuel shortage on the PACOM.

(U) Washington, D.C.-Virginia-California Trip, 1-8 December: After two days leave in Greensboro, North Carolina, the Admiral returned to Washington for a five-day stay that included meetings with government officials, interviews by prominent media representatives, and speeches to Service staff colleges. He met with Senator John Stennis and Secretary of the Navy Warner, Admiral Moorer, and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. He was interviewed by Bob Schieffer of the CBS Network and Frank Tomlinson of ABC. On 5 December he met with Admiral Zumwalt. That same day, after speaking to the combined students of the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, he attended the funeral of Admiral Richard G. Colbert, USN, at Fort Myer. On 6 December he met with Seymour Weiss, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (a State Department agency), Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, and Arthur I. Mendolia, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics. The following day he was interviewed by Alan Horton of the Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance. He flew to Norfolk, Virginia that afternoon to speak to students at the Armed Forces Staff College; a press conference followed the speech. That evening he left for Palm Springs, California where he spoke to a meeting of the Southeast Commanders of the Naval Order of the United States.

(U) Media Representative Interviews, Honolulu, 11 December: Admiral Gayler discussed PACOM fuel and energy policies during three separate interviews with Hal Lewis (Aku) of KGMB radio, Don Baker of KITV, and Bruce Benson of the Honolulu Advertiser.

(U) Briefing for Retired Flag/General Officers, Honolulu, 12 December: Admiral Gayler hosted a briefing on the situation in the PACOM for 24 retired flag and general officers who resided in Hawaii; the briefing was held at Camp Smith.

(U) Elementary School Student Interviews, Honolulu, 17 December: Six students of the Nuuanu Elementary School interviewed Admiral Gayler at his headquarters. The fifth and sixth grade students were acting as special correspondents for the Honolulu Advertiser's 1974 Progress Edition entitled "Hawaii: The Youthful State" to be published in February 1974.



Admiral Gayler meets the press (sixth grade variety).

Distinguished Visitors to the Command

(U) On 28 January Vice President Spiro Agnew stopped over in Hawaii en route to top level post-war discussions in the Republic of Vietnam and other Asian nations. Admiral Gayler met him at Hickam Air Force Base and the two conferred for an hour about the Vietnam cease-fire and responsibilities of the Pacific Command.

(U) Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti arrived at Hickam Air Force Base on 20 April for a two-day stopover en route to Japan. Hawaii Governor John A. Burns and Honolulu Mayor Frank F. Fasi were also in the welcoming party. On 21 April Admiral Gayler hosted the Prime Minister's party for luncheon and a barge tour of Pearl Harbor.

(U) Mexican President Luis Echeverria arrived on 24 April for a two-day stopover en route home from a visit to China. On the next day the Presidential party was hosted at a luncheon and Pearl Harbor tour by Admiral Gayler.

(U) Several distinguished visitors arrived in July. On 13 July Secretary of State William P. Rogers arrived for an over night stopover en route to economic talks in Japan. On 23 July Prime Minister Gough Whitlam of Australia arrived en route to Washington, D.C., Mexico City, and Ottawa. On 28 July New Zealand Prime Minister Norman E. Kirk stopped en route to Canada for a meeting with heads of British Commonwealth governments.



Admiral and Mrs. Gayler (left) and Prime Minister and Mrs. Whitlam of Australia visit the Captain Cook Memorial on the island of Hawaii.

(U) En route back to Australia, Prime Minister Whitlam again stopped over in Honolulu, 12-14 August. During his three-day stay, Admiral Gayler accompanied the Prime Minister on an air tour of the Hawaiian Islands and a tour of the Kona Coast aboard the Coast Guard cutter CAPE SMALL, as well as a tour of Pearl Harbor and a visit to the Arizona Memorial.

(U) On 7 September Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., arrived for a two-day stopover en route to Korea for the 1973 ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting. While in Hawaii he met with Admiral Gayler for private talks and was given a strategy briefing and helicopter tour of Oahu. On his return from Korea Deputy Secretary Clements stopped again for two days; during this visit a press conference was held for local media representatives.



Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements and Admiral Gayler meet the press.



(U) Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (photo at left) arrived in Honolulu on 17 October following a state visit to Peking, China. He left the next day for Canada.



Admiral Gayler greets Governor Ronald Reagan.

(U) Admiral Gayler welcomed Governor Ronald Reagan of California on 25 November. The Governor stopped over briefly en route to Australia for a 10-day visit to the Western Pacific as a special representative of the President.

(U) Other distinguished visitors in 1973 included:

6 February--Vicente Romero, Consul General, Republic of the Philippines.

7 February--Vice Admiral Mack A. Whalen, USCG, Commander, Pacific Area, U.S. Coast Guard.

15 February--Lord Peter Carrington, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defense.

21 February--Siarif Thajeb, Indonesian Ambassador to the United States.

13 April--Vice Admiral P.D. Stroop, USN (Ret.)

14 April--Kenneth L. Rush, Deputy Secretary of State.

26 April--David Barre, Consul General of Great Britain.

27 April--General Hunter Harris, USAF (Ret.).

4 June--General Robert Cushman, USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.

17 July--Vice Admiral Donald L. Curtis, USN, Chief, Bureau of Surgery.

18 July--Vice Admiral George Steele, USN, Commander (designate), U.S. Seventh Fleet.

19 July--David Wadham, Consul of Australia in Honolulu.

23 July--Admiral Suteo Ishida, Chief, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

24 July--Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Australia.

28 July--General Richard Stilwell, USA, Commander U.S. Forces Korea (designate).

11 August--General Lai Ming-tang, Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China.

14 August--Senator John Stennis (D-Miss.), Chairman, Armed Services Committee.

16 August--Richard S. Wilber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment.

16 August--Robert Kimnach, President, General Aircraft Corporation.

27 August--Philip Habib, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

30 August--Ambassador Yoon Hee Lee, Korean Consul General, Hawaii.

31 August--Admiral Kim Kyu-sop, Republic of Korea Navy.

31 August--William Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines.

7 September--Charles S. Whitehouse, U.S. Ambassador to Laos.

19 September--Edwin M. Cronk, U.S. Ambassador to Singapore.

20 September--General Ryuhei Nakamura, Chairman, Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency.

3 October--Robert E.L. Eaton, National Commander, American Legion.

19 October--Howard H. Callaway, Secretary of the Army.

23 October--Marion S. Ramey, Assistant Director, Survey and Investigative Staff of the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee.

6 November--Representative Glen R. Davis (R-Wis.)

9 November--Ambassador Yoon Hee Lee, Korean Consul General, Hawaii.

13 December--Dr. William P. Raney, Deputy and Chief Scientist, Office of Naval Research.

14 December--J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr., Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

28 December--Representatives Phillip Burton (D-Calif.) and Craig Hosmer (R-Calif.).

Media Visitors to CINCPAC

(U) The following media representatives also called on CINCPAC during 1973:

30 March--Hiroshi Shinohara of Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo.

23 April--Karsten Prager, San Francisco Bureau Chief of Time Magazine.

3 May--Mike Getler, Washington Post.

11 May--John Bitter, Montgomery Advertiser and Alabama Journal.

28 May--Hal Drake, Pacific Stars and Stripes.

30 May--San Diego Union Editorial Board.

21 June--Colonel P. Lee Mason, Editor of Pacific Stars and Stripes.

29 August--Selig Harrison, Washington Post.

2 October--A group of newsman on a tour of military installations sponsored by the Strategic Air Command included Robert Betts, Copley News Service; Robert Mahoney, Shreveport Journal; William Pearman, Kansas City Star; Howard Silber, Omaha World-Herald; Ed Ulsamer, Air Force Magazine; and Fritz Updike, Rome (N.Y.) Sentinel.

25 October--Bill Kreh, Assistant Editor of Navy Times.

29 November--Murray Sayle, Asia Editor of Newsweek Magazine.

SECTION II--COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

Military Banking

(U) Military banking facilities in the PACOM continued to be reduced in number in 1973; there were 79 in February but only 68 as of the end of the year. Only one Military Banking Facility remained in the RVN, operated by the American Express Company. The U.S. Treasury had applied one condition: any net operating losses sustained would not be reimbursable. This was necessary as the selection of the bank was based on bid proposals submitted.[1]

(U) The reevaluation of currency in Japan, inflation, and sizeable local pay increases for local nationals throughout the PACOM had increased the deficits of most of the Military Banking Facilities in the command.

(U) Special banking arrangements that provided 5 percent interest on checking account funds were terminated in the RVN effective 1 July. No change was made to those special arrangements in Thailand, the only country that continued to offer them.[2]

(U) The Treasury Department advised in October, however, that with the cessation of hostilities there was no justification for continuing the special banking arrangements in Thailand either. They advised that with CINCPAC's concurrence this special arrangement would terminate on 1 January 1974. CINCPAC concurred.[3]

(U) Interest paid on savings accounts in Military Banking Facilities was raised in all areas of the PACOM to 5 percent; in some areas it had been only 4 3/4 percent.[4]

Currency

(U) In the RVN the piaster continued to devalue periodically, as follows: 484 to 1 on 27 April, 500 to 1 on 1 July, and effective 19 November, 535 to 1.[5]

(U) On 17 July Thailand revalued the baht. Earlier, on 13 July, the Bank of Thailand had suspended baht sales for use by U.S. Forces. On 17 July U.S.

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1. J72 HistSum Dec 73; SECDEF 6474/021359Z Mar 73.
2. J72 HistSum Dec 73; SECDEF 4270/082323Z Jun 73.
3. SECDEF 6577/012014Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 170104Z Oct 73.
4. J72 HistSum Dec 73; SECDEF 1734/231958Z Nov 73.
5. J72 HistSum Dec 73.

Forces were authorized to purchase baht from commercial banks (Chase Manhattan and the Bank of America) at the Exchange Equalization Fund (EEF) rate of 19.575 to $1., a 5.21 percent revaluation. During the subsequent period, the two commercial banks earned excess profits of approximately $400,000. On 15 October incumbent Thai Government officials resigned following three days of demonstrations and political instability. A new government was formed on 15 October and normal business activity resumed on 17 October. On 18 October the official rate of exchange was increased to 20.325 baht to a dollar. At this time COMUSMACTHAI decided to hold in abeyance his planned actions concerning establishment of a MACTHAI Currency Control Office (MCCO) to fund baht requirements for U.S. Forces in Thailand.[1]

(U) The Departments of Defense and Treasury (in a joint message) concurred in a temporary delay in establishing a currency control office, but advised that permanent and long-range plans should continue to provide for establishment of the MCCO. It was noted that as a matter of policy, when the United States must purchase foreign currencies from commercial sources, such purchases were based on the most favorable rate bid. Thailand was the only area where local peculiarities in the foreign exchange market had made it necessary for the United States to be more or less dependent on the rates offered by commercial sources rather than on rates based on a conventional bid basis. Recent operating experience, the joint message continued, had been less than satisfactory from the U.S. standpoint. As U.S. requirements for baht exchange probably constituted the major source of foreign exchange, any advantages generated from purchases should accrue to the United States rather than an intermediary. It was suggested that COMUSMACTHAI make sampling purchases of baht from local money markets for use by U.S. Forces to test the currency market; these single purchases of up to $500,000 would be used to determine if it would be more economical to remove the "middle-man" in providing currency for U.S. Forces. This test was expected to be completed by January 1974.[2]

(U) The conversion from Military Payment Certificates to dollars in the RVN was conducted on 23 March. Of the over $214 million that had been placed in the RVN, $1.4 million was unaccounted for in the final accounting. This amount was presumed lost or destroyed (such as in combat or fire) or left stranded in the custody of unauthorized persons. As the Treasury would not have to redeem those certificates, the sum represented a gross potential profit to the U.S. Government.[3]

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1. Ibid.; MACTHAI 100135Z Aug 73; MACTHAI 240741Z Oct 73; MACTHAI 170847Z Jul 73.
2. SECDEF 4248/272046Z Nov 73.
3. J72(2) Memo/196-73, 8 Jun 73, Subj: Conversion of MPC Series 692 to U.S. Dollars in RVN.

(U) Military Payment Certificates in Korea were converted to U.S. dollars in a surprise move on 19 November. Initial reports indicated that of the $42.2 million in circulation, over $1 million was not turned in and presumed to have been destroyed, lost, or left stranded in unauthorized hands. Korea had been the last country in the PACOM to use Military Payment Certificates.[1]

Recurring Reports

(U) On 7 August the JCS advised of a requirement for CINCPAC (and other unified and specified commanders) to inventory, cost, and reduce internal requirements for data, information, and reporting. He was to inventory all reporting requirements and estimate costs, re-justify each requirement, and identify areas where reductions could be made. CINCPAC's reply of 9 October revealed an inventory total of 182 reports at an estimated annual cost of $2.3 million. In addition to specific reductions forecast in his report, CINCPAC estimated a 15 percent decrease in reporting requirements by 31 December 1974. The JCS were advised that this headquarters had closely monitored and tightly controlled recurring reports through the PACOM Uniform Reporting Structure (PURS) for the past three years. In 1972 a comprehensive review had resulted in a reduction of 123 reports. In conjunction with the phasedown in Southeast Asia, a study of reporting requirements for MACV and the Defense Attache Office in Saigon had resulted in the cancellation of 56 of 74 reports.[2]

(U) CINCPAC's review of requirements continued and on 14 November CINCPAC deleted the requirement for 12 more recurring reports prepared by the Defense Attache Office in Saigon.[3]

Audits

(U) Throughout the year CINCPAC's staff reviewed and commented on a number of audit reports prepared on PACOM agencies. In 1973 these included the reports of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Audit on the Joint Support Fund Program for the RVN, the Military Assistance Program for the Philippines, an inter-Service audit of communications-electronics systems in the RVN, the Military Assistance Program in Indonesia, and the Military Assistance Service Funded program in Laos. A review of a General Accounting Office draft report

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1. COMUS Korea 190821Z Nov 73; CDR USAEIGHT 140646Z Dec 73.
2. JCS DJSM-1318-73, 7 Aug 73, Subj: Inventory and Review of Information Requirements; CINCPAC ltr Ser 3499, 9 Oct 73, Subj: Inventory and Review of Information Requirements (RCS-DD Comp (AR) 1283).
3. CINCPAC ltr Ser 2868, 14 Nov 73, Subj: USDAO Saigon Reports.

on the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance to the Republic of Korea was completed and comments forwarded on 3 December.[1]

PACOM Funding Conditions

(U) Continued operation of three new organizations in Southeast Asia--the Defense Attache Office in Saigon, and the U.S. Support Activities Group and Joint Personnel Recovery Center in Thailand--established in 1973 caused a substantial increase in the total FY 73 Operations and Maintenance, Navy funds required. Total funds allocated by the Chief of Naval Operations for FY 73 increased from the initially-proposed total of $32,992,000 to $41,014,000 on 30 June. At the Washington level, funding support for U.S. participation in the International Commission of Control and Supervision and the Four-Party Joint Military Commission was determined to be a State Department responsibility, but U.S. participation in the follow-on organization to the Joint Military Commission--the Four-Party Joint Military Team--was funded by the DAO, Saigon.

(U) Military Assistance Executive funding for Southeast Asia organizations remained stable and operation under Continuing Resolution Authority permitted all essential operations to be accomplished for FY 73. Funding support for the first half of FY 74 had also been adequate to meet all essential and approved programs.[2]

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1. CINCPAC ltrs Ser 0228, 9 Mar 73, Subj: Report on Audit of the Joint Support Fund Program for the Republic of Vietnam (U); 00883, 6 Jul 73, Subj: Report on Review of Military Assistance Program for the Republic of the Philippines (D73-115) (U); 00913, 12 Jul 73, Subj: DASD Report on Interservice Audit of C-E Systems, RVN (Report #387 dtd 16 May 1973) (U); and 0872, 15 Oct 73, Subj: Final Report on Review of the Military Assistance Program, Indonesia; CINCPAC 021824Z Nov 73; CINCPAC ltr Ser 001370, 3 Dec 73, Subj: GAO Draft Report, Effectiveness of U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of Korea (OSD Case #3719).
2. J72 HistSum Dec 73.

SECTION III--MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

PACOM Optical Fabricating Support

(U) CINCPAC promulgated an instruction in September that put into directive form the policies and procedures for medical optical fabricating support throughout the PACOM previously agreed to and authorized by each of the Service components and the Chief of the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. The issuance of this instruction culminated three years of effort on the part of CINCPAC to realign and consolidate medical optical fabricating facilities within the command.[1]

Pacific Command Joint Medical Regulating Office

(U) The withdrawal of U.S. Forces personnel from the Republic of Vietnam reduced the PACOM patient regulating workload for 1973 by 49 percent compared to previous years. Consequently, the Pacific Command Joint Medical Regulating Office (PACOMJMRO) staffing was reduced to three members, one each Army, Navy, and Air Force. Analysis of the workload during the year revealed only minor reductions in Navy and Air Force patient movements. Projected patient movement activity justified continuation of the command regulating activity, therefore. Further review of staffing requirements was to be conducted during 1974.[2]

Defense Attache Office, Saigon, Medical Support

(U) In January 1973 the United States of America Embassy in Saigon entered into an agreement with the Saigon Adventist Hospital in conjunction with Lama Linda University School of Medicine for the continued operation of the U.S. Army Hospital, Saigon facilities following the withdrawal of U.S. Army medical personnel, to provide quality medical care to U.S. Mission, Defense Department civilians, Defense Department contractor invited personnel, and other U.S. citizens in the Saigon area. The provisions for inpatient care proved satisfactory. However, the delivery of outpatient care was complicated by limited hospital staff coupled with heavier than anticipated outpatient workloads. The DAO subsequently established and staffed a dispensary located in the DAO administrative complex which has proved to be more satisfactory.[3]

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1. J76 HistSum Sep 73; CINCPACINST 6810.1, 28 Sep 73, Subj: Pacific Command Optical Fabricating Support.
2. J76/Memo/213-74, 12 Aug 74, Subj: 1973 CINCPAC Command History.
3. Ibid.

(U) Certain other activities of the Surgeon are discussed in other chapters of the history, including medical evacuation statistics in the section on the Drug Abuse Counteroffensive in the Personnel Activities chapter, and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization activities in the chapter on Political-Military Relationships.

GLOSSARY

A

AA	Air America
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
ACSG	Attack Carrier Strike Group
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AFB	Air Force Base
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFSCC	Air Force Special Communications Center
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AID	Agency for International Development
AIF	Automated Installation Intelligence File
AIG	Air Intelligence Group
AIRA	Air Force Attache
ALCC	Airlift Control Center
ALCOM	Alaskan Command
AMCM	Airborne Mine Countermeasures
AMEMB	American Embassy
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States (Treaty)
ARDF	Airborne Radio Direction Finding
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
ARMA	Army Attache
AROP	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Regional Office, Pacific
ARPA-P	Advanced Research Projects Agency-Pacific
ARRS	Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASA	Army Security Agency
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD (I&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics
ASD (PA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs
ASD (T)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASIC	All-Source Information Center
ASICOM	All-Source Information Center Communications
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare

A-TACC	Alternate Tactical Air Control Center
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
ATTG	Automated Tactical Target Graphics
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network

B

BADGE	Base Air Defense Ground Environment (Japan)
BARCAP	Barrier Combat Air Patrol
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment
BDP	Base Development Plan
BE	Basic Encyclopedia (Number)
BEQ	Bachelor Enlisted Quarters
BIOT	British Indian Ocean Territory
BLA	Base Labor Agreement
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
BNDD	Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
BNR	Bodies Not Recovered
BOA	Broad Ocean Area
BOC	Bureau of Customs
BOM	By Other Means

C

C	Confidential
CAC	Central Administrative Center (FANK)
CAF	Chinese Air Force
CASI	Continental Air Service, Inc.
CCK	Ching Chuan Kang
CDTC	Combat Development Test Center
C-E	Communications-Electronics
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CGFMFPAC	Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
CHJUSMAGTHAI	Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand
CHMAAG	Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CHMEDTC	Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
CHUSDLG	Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICV	Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam
CIL/GR	Central Identification Laboratory/Graves Registration
CINC	Commander in Chief

CINCAL	Commander in Chief Alaska
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCONAD	Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCPACINST	Commander in Chief Pacific Instruction
CINCPACREP	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative
CINCPACREPPHIL	CINCPAC Representative, Philippines
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJIC	Criminal Jurisdiction Implementation Committee
CM	Countermeasures
CMS	Communications Security Material System
CNA	Center for Naval Analyses
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COINS	Community On-line Intelligence Network Systems
COLA	Cost of Living Allowance
COMAFK	Commander Air Forces Korea
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMUS	Commander, United States Forces
COMUS Japan	Commander U.S. Forces, Japan
COMUS Korea	Commander U.S. Forces, Korea
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSNAVPHIL	Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines
COMUSSEASIA	Commander, United States Forces, Southeast Asia (Designate)
COMUSTDC	Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
COTCO	Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on the Island of Oahu
CPA	Closest Point of Approach
CPD	Congressional Presentation Document (Foreign Aid)
CPFL	Contingency Planning Facilities List
CPIC	Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRA	Continuing Resolution Authority (Budget)

CRIMP	Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program
CS	A Riot Control Agent
CSAF	Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
CSG	Combat Support Group
CTF	Commander Task Force
CTG	Commander Task Group
CVA	Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVO	Communications Validating Office
CY	Calendar Year

D

DA	Department of the Army
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DART	Disaster Assistance and Relief Team
DATT	Defense Attache
DBP	Defense Buildup Plan (Japan)
DCA-PAC	Defense Communications Agency Pacific
DCO	Designated Commanding Officer
DCS	Defense Communications System
DDR&E	Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DOD)
DE	Destroyer Escort
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DEFT	Drug Education Field Team
DEPCH	Deputy Chief
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI	Deputy Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand
DEPREP	Deployment Reporting System
DFAA	Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Japan)
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DGZ	Desired Ground Zero
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAM	Defense Intelligence Agency Manual
DIAOLS	Defense Intelligence Agency On-Line System
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DISUM	Daily Intelligence Summary
DJPO	Defense Nuclear Agency Joint Project Office
DLG	Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia)
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency

DOD	Department of Defense
DON	Department of the Navy
DPA	Defense Production Act
DPDO	Defense Property Disposal Office
DPDR	Defense Property Disposal Region
DPSC	Defense Personnel Support Center
DRA	Delta Rock Haul Agency (RVN)
DRIS	Defense Retail Inter-Service Support
DRSTO	Defense Resources Support and Termination Office
DSA	Defense Supply Agency
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
DSPG	Dependent Shelter Program Group
DTACC	Deputy Secretary of Defense, Telecommunications and Command, Control

E

ECAC	Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center
ECCM	Electronic Counter Countermeasures
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
EDA	Excess Defense Articles (MAP)
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
ELT	English Language Training
EMATS	Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System
E&ML	Environmental & Morale Leave
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EO&T	Equal Opportunity and Treatment
ERCS	Emergency Rocket Communications System
ERS	Emergency Relocation Site
ESM	Electronic Support Measures
EUSA	Eighth U.S. Army
EW	Electronic Warfare
EXPO-75	International Ocean Exposition in Okinawa, 1975

F

FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FANK	Forces Armees Nationale Khmeres (Cambodia)
FCJ	Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

FICPAC	Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FOCCPAC	Fleet Operation Control Center, Pacific
FORDAD	Foreign Disclosure Automated Data (System)
FPDA	Five-Power Defense Arrangement
FPJMC	Four Party Joint Military Commission
FPJMT	Four Party Joint Military Team
FRD	Formerly Restricted Data
FRESH	Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii
FRG	Force Requirements Generator
FTD	Field Training Detachment
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
FY	Fiscal Year

G

GAO	General Accounting Office
GATEWAY	Guam Assessment to Ensure Westernmost Appropriate Yield
GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept
GENSER	General Service (Electrical Transmission)
GFE	Government Furnished Equipment
GKR	Government of the Khmer Republic
GNP	Gross National Product
GOI	Government of India; Government of Indonesia
GOJ	Government of Japan
GOS	Government of Singapore
GS	General Schedule
GSL	Government of Sri Lanka

H

HANKAM	Indonesian Department of Defense and Security
HE	High Explosive
HF	High Frequency
HistSum	Historical Summary
HRCD	Human Resources Collection Directive
HUMINT	Human Resources Intelligence

I

IAF	Indian, Indonesian Air Force
IBEN	Interim (Imagery) Basic Encyclopedia Numbers

ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICCS	International Commission of Control and Supervision
ICR	Intelligence Collection Requirements
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IDF	Installation Data Files
IDHSC	Intelligence Data Handling Systems Communications Network
IEMATS	Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System
IFF	Identification, Friend or Foe
IG	Inspector General
IIR	Initial Information Report
IJCS-PAC	Integrated Joint Communications Systems-Pacific
INDOCOM	Indonesia Communications Project
INTELSAT	International Telecommunications Satellite
IOC	Initial Operational Capacity; Interim Operating Capacity
IOPZ	Indian Ocean Peace Zone
IPAC	Intelligence Center, Pacific
IPIR	Interim Photo Interpretation Report
IR	Infra-red
IRAN	Inspect and Repair as Necessary
IRCM	Infrared Countermeasures
ISC	Interservice Support Coordinator
ISS	Intelligence Support System
ISSA	Interservice Support Agreement
IUW	Inshore Undersea Warfare

J

JAG	Judge Advocate General
JAOCK	Joint Air Operations Center Korea
JASDF	Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JCFS	Joint Committee on Future Status
JCRC	Joint Casualty Resolution Center
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JFAP	Japan Facilities Adjustment Program
JFY	Japan Fiscal Year
JGS	Joint General Staff (RVN)
JHRC	Joint HOMECOMING Reception Center
JIDC	Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (Taiwan)
JIS	JOPS Interim Software Program
JISB	Joint Interservice Support Board
JLRB	Joint Logistics Review Board
JMP	Joint Manpower Program

JMRO	Joint Medical Regulating Office
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JPO	Joint Petroleum Office
JPRC	Joint Personnel Recovery Center
JRDOD	Joint Research and Development Objectives Document
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force
JSO	Joint Staff Office
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
JTB	Joint Transportation Board
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
JUSMAGK	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea
JUSMAGPHIL	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines
JUSMAGTHAI	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand

K

KAF	Khmer Air Force (Cambodia)
KATUSA	Korean Augmentation to United States Army
KFRS	Korean Force Requirements Study
KI	Khmer Insurgents
KISTS	Kunia Internal Secure Telephone System
KOCO	Korean Oil Company

L

LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
LASS	Lockheed Air Service, Singapore
LDMX	Local Digital Message Exchange
LF	Low Frequency
LN	Local National
LOC	Line(s) of Communication
LOS	Law of the Sea
LPD	Amphibious Transport Dock
LPH	Amphibious Assault Ship
LSE	Long Supply and Excess
LSG	Laos Support Group
LWIR	Long Wave Infrared

M

MAAB	Military Assistance Activities Bulletin (CINCPAC)
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACTHAI	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit
MBA	Military Bases Agreement
MC	Medical Corps
MCA	Military Construction, Army
MCCO	MACTHAI Currency Control Office
MCM	Mine Countermeasures
MCT	Mission Coverage Traces
MDAA	Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
MDAO	Mutual Defense Assistance Office
MDB	Mutual Defense Board (U.S.-Philippines)
MDE	Media Development Element
MDT	Mutual Defense Treaty
MEDTC	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
MEECN	Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
MIA	Missing in Action
MICS	Military Integrated Communications System (Taiwan)
MIG	Military Intelligence Group
MIJI	Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion
MILCON	Military Construction
MIRV	Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle
MIWA	Mine Warfare Analysis
MLSF	Mobile Logistic Support Force
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOGAS	Automotive Gasoline
MOP	Magnetic Orange Pipe
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPC	Mobile Processing Center
MPSC	Marianas Political Status Commission
MR	Military Region
MRG	Movement Requirements Generator
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSCFE	Military Sealift Command Far East
MSCOV	Military Sealift Command Office, Vietnam

MSO	Ocean Minesweepers
MST	Mutual Security Treaty
MSTS	Military Sealift Transport Service
MTSL	Maritime Traffic Safety Law (Japan)
MTT	Mobile Training Team

N

NAC	Net Additional Cost (Korea)
NAD	Naval Ammunition Depot
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSEEAPAC	Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific
NCPDA	National Council for the Prevention of Drug Abuse
NCPAC	National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Pacific
NELC	Naval Electronics Laboratories Center
NEMVAC	Non-combatant Emergency and Evacuation
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NJP	Non-Judicial Punishment
NKP	Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base
NLL	Northern Limit Line (Korea)
NM	Nautical Mile
NOA	New Obligational Authority
NOB	Naval Order of Battle
NPIC	National Photo Interpretation Center
NSA	National Security Agency
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam

O

OASD (ISA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OB	Order of Battle
ODRI	Office of the Defense Representative, India
ODRP	Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan
OIC	Officer-in-charge
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OPCON	Operational Control
OPIC-A	Overseas Photo Interpretation Center-Asia
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPREP	Operational Report
OPSEC	Operations Security

OR	Operational Readiness
ORRCP	Okinawa Reversion-Related Construction Projects
OR/SA	Operations Research/Systems Analysis
ORTC	Overseas Replacement Training Center
OSI	Office of Special Investigations

P

PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACFLT	United States Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAF	Philippine Air Force
PAL	Permissive Action Link
PARPRO	Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program
PATMRG	PACOM Target Materiels Review Group
PBR	River Patrol Boat
PC	Philippine Constabulary
PCA	Positive Control Area
PCF	Inshore Patrol Craft
PDJ	Plaine de Jarres (Laos)
PEC	PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center
PEG	Performance Evaluation Group (CINCPAC)
PG	Patrol Gunboat
PGNU	Provisional Government of National Union (Laos)
PGMM	Multi-mission Patrol Gunboat
PICFMS	PACOM IDHS Command File Management System
PILLAR POST	Provide Increased Logistics Levels of Ammunition, Rice and Petroleum Over the Short Term
PIN	Preliminary Imagery Nominations
PIRAZ	Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone
PIRSG	PACOM Intelligence Resource Study Group
PM	Program Manager
PMDL	Provisional Military Demarcation Line
POD	Probability of Destruction
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum (MAP)
POW	Prisoner of War
PPOG	PSYOP Pressure Operations Group
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government
PRTF	Personnel Recovery Task Force
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PUBCOM	Public Communications

PURA	Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency
PURS	PACOM Uniform Reporting Structure
PWRS	Pre-positioned War Reserve Stock

R

RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RCA	Riot Control Agents
R&D	Research and Development
RDD	Required Delivery Date
RDFU-V	Research and Development Field Unit-Vietnam
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
RIF	Reduction in Force
RLAF	Royal Laotian Air Force
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RMAF	Royal Malaysian Air Force
RO/AID	Requirements Office/Agency for International Development
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan); Required Operational Capability
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKFV	Republic of Korean Forces, Vietnam
ROKN	Republic of Korea Navy
ROP	Republic of the Philippines
RORRCP	Revised Okinawa Reversion Related Construction Program
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTAFB	Royal Thai Air Force Base
RTAVF	Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force
RTG	Royal Thai Government; Reconnaissance Technical Group
RTS	Reconnaissance Technical Squadron
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S

S	Secret
SA	Security Assistance
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAFASIA	Security Assistance Force Asia
SAL	Strategic Arms Limitations
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SAO	Special Activities Office

SAPO	Sub-Area Petroleum Office
SAR	Search and Rescue
SAS	Sealed Authenticator System
SC	Supply Corps (USN)
SCC	Security Consultative Committee (Japan)
SCG	Security Consultative Group (Japan)
SCM	Security Consultative Meeting (Korea)
SCOOT	Support Cambodia Out of Thailand
SDF	Self-Defense Forces (Japan)
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEADAB	Southeast Asia Data Base
SEASIA	Southeast Asia
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SGU	Special Guerrilla Unit (Thailand)
SHA	Station Housing Allowance
SI	Special Intelligence
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operation Plan
SITREP	Situation Report
SITS-K	Single Integrated Telecommunications System-Korea
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOLACE	Study of Logistics Alternatives, Concepts and Effectiveness
SOSUS	Sound Surveillance Underwater
SOW	Special Operations Wing
SPECAT	Special Category
SRF	Special Reporting Facility
SSB	Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSBN	Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSC	Security Consultative Subcommittee (Japan)
SSD	Special Security Detachment
SSMR	Single Senior Military Representative
STOL	Short Take-Off and Landing
STRATCOM	Strategic Communications Command (U.S. Army)

T

TAC	Tactical Air Command
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACAMO	Nickname for Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting

TAS	Tactical Airlift Squadron
TAFT	Technical Assistance Field Team (Navy)
TAW	Tactical Airlift Wing
TBBC	Tacoma Boat Building Co.
TDC	Taiwan Defense Command
TDCC	Tactical Data Communications Central
TDS	Tactical Data Systems
TF	Task Force
TFE	Transportation Feasibility Estimator
TG	Task Group
TI	Target Intelligence
TKP	Trans-Korean Pipeline
TLRG	Target List Review Group
TMAR	Thai Maritime Navigation Company
TNAV	Thai Navigation Company
TNIAD	Indonesian Army
TNIAL	Indonesian Navy
TNIAU	Indonesian Air Force
TOM	Technical Operations Manager
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOW	Termination of War
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Lists
TRDI	Technical Research and Development Institute (Japan)
TRE	Thailand Regional Exchange
TRW	Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
TS	Top Secret
TSP	Test Support Position
TSR	Telecommunications Service Request
TTM	Tactical Target Materials
TTPI	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

U

U	Unclassified
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UNC	United Nations Command
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFLO	U.S. Air Force Liaison Officer
USAFSS	U.S. Air Force Security Service
USARBCO	U.S. Army Base Command, Okinawa
USARFT	U.S. Army Forces, Taiwan
USARJ	U.S. Army Japan
USARPAC	United States Army Pacific

USARSUPTHAI	U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand
USARV	U.S. Army Vietnam
USASFT	U.S. Army Special Forces Thailand
USCINCEUR	U.S. Command in Chief Europe
USCINCRED	CINC, U.S. Readiness Command
USDAO	United States Defense Attache Office
USDLG	U.S. Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia)
USFJ	United States Forces, Japan
USFK	U.S. Forces, Korea
USG	U.S. Government
USIB	U.S. Intelligence Board
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USSAG	U.S. Support Activities Group
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USSSO	U.S. State Sending Office
UW	Unconventional Warfare

V

VC	Viet Cong
VIASA	Vayama In-Transit Ammunition Storage Area
VLF	Very Low Frequency
VNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force
VNN	Republic of Vietnam Navy
VP	Patrol Squadron

W

WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WESTPACNORTH	Western Pacific North
WRAMA	Warner Robbins Air Materiel Agency
WWMCCS	World-Wide Military Command and Control System

INDEX

(U) Volumes I and II are integrated in this index. Annexes to the CINCPAC 1973 History are not included as each contains its own index. The volumes are paged consecutively. Volume I contains Chapters I - VI, pages 1 - 404. Volume II contains Chapters VII - XI, pages 405 - 740, and the glossary.

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