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Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861 1977

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CHAPTER VII

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECTION I--PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

Funding the Security Assistance Program During 1976

(U) Actual funds expended for the FY 76 and FY 7T PACOM security assistance program and funds proposed and allocated during 1976 for the FY 77 program are shown on the following two charts.

FY 76 and FY 7T
PACOM Security Assistance Program
(Actual amount in thousands of dollars)

| | FMS C | redit | MA | P | IME | TP* |
|----------------|---------|-------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|
| Country | FY 76 | FY 7T | FY 76 | FY 7T | FY 76 | FY 7T |
| Afghanistan | | | | | 198 | 49 |
| China (Taiwan) | 80,000 | 13,000 | 764ª | 258ª | 470 | 93 |
| India | · | | | , | 113 | 8 |
| Indonesia | 23,100 | · · · · · · | 12,849 | 9,800 | 1,599 | 775 |
| Korea | 126,000 | 134,075 | 59,378 | 1,219ª | 1,865 | 338 |
| Malaysia | 17,000 | | | | 279 | 101 |
| Nepal | | | | | 27 | 8 |
| Pakistan | 1 | | | | 339 | 68 |
| Philippines | | 17,400 | | | 725 | 203 |
| Thailand | | 36,700 | 16,000 | 86 3ª | 1,347 | 493 |
| TOTAL | 246,100 | 201,175 | 88,991 | 12,140 | 6,962 | 2,136 |

- *International Military Education & Training Program
- a. Supply Operations Only

SOUFCE: FY 78 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD)

PACOM Security Assistance Program (Dollars in Thousands)

| | FMS (| FMS Credit | MAP | م ا | WI I | IMETP* |
|----------------|-----------|---|--|------------------------|-----------|--|
| Country | Proposeda | Proposed ^a Estimate ^b | Proposed ^a Allocated ^C | Allocated ^C | Proposeda | Proposed ^a Allocated ^c |
| Afghanistan | | | | | 200 | 190 |
| Bangladesh | | | | , | | 50d |
| China (Taiwan) | 32,000 | 35,000 | 400 | 85 | 200 | 440 |
| India | | | ٠. | | 200 | 170 |
| Indonesia | 23,100 | 23,100 | 19,400 | 15,000 | 3,000 | 2.600 |
| Korea | 275,000 | 275,000 | 8,300 | 4,300 | 2,700 | 1.400 |
| Malaysia | 36,000 | 36,000 | | | 300 | 300e |
| Nepa1 | | i | | | 35 | 31e |
| Pakistan | | | | | 325 | 300 |
| Philippines | 20,000 | 20,000 | 19,600 | 17,000 | 009 | 009 |
| Sri Lanka | | | | | 5 | 10 |
| Thailand | 30,000 | 30,000 | 20,000 | 15,000 | 1,500 | 1,200 |
| TOTAL | 419,100 | 419,100 | 67,700 | 51,385 | 9,375 | 7,291 |
| | | | | | | |

*International Military Education and Training Program CPD FY 77, 8 Mar 76. SOURCE:

J452 HistSum Dec 76. SECSTATE 270572/1/031519Z Nov 76.

SECDEF 092254Z Feb 77; SECSTATE 162231Z Dec 76.

SECSTATE 111412Z Jan 77

(S) Based on FY 77 allocations and estimates, and FY 79 guidance, funding was projected through FY 79 with the following percentage changes:

| | FMS Credit | М | AP | IMETP* |
|-----------------------------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| Country | % Change | % Change | Termination | % Change |
| Afghanistan | | | | +163 |
| China (Taiwan) ^a | - 57 | -100 | FY 77 | + 14 |
| India | | | | ÷ 76 |
| Indonesia | +52 | + 33 | FY 81 | + 46 |
| Korea | 0 | -100 | FY 77 | 0 |
| Malaysia | -44 | | | + 79 |
| Nepal | | | | + 67 |
| Pakistan | | | | +100 |
| Philippines ^D | 0 | + 15 | FY 81 | + 33 |
| Sri Lanka | | | ÷ | +400 |
| Thailand | 0 | - 53 | FY 79 | - 33 |
| TOTAL | -5.8 | - 10 | () () | + 32 |

- *International Military Education & Training Program
- a. Taiwan FY 80 FMS Credit level reduced to \$10 million. Restricted to FMS cash/commercial after FY 80.
- b. Philippine levels subject to outcome of base negotiations.

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976

- (U) On 30 June 1976 the President signed the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Major provisions of the act affecting the PACOM security assistance program were as follows:²
 - MAAGs worldwide were reduced to 34 effective 30 September 1976.
 - All MAAGs except those specifically authorized by Congress were to be eliminated effective 30 September 1977.
 - After 30 September 1977 no security assistance (SA) functions could be performed by Defense Attache Office (DAO) personnel.

^{1.} J452 HistSum Dec 76.

^{2.} J452 HistSum Jun 76.

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- The President could assign no more than three Armed Forces personnel to Embassy staffs to perform security assistance functions where MAAGs were terminated or where there were no MAAGs.
- All MAP grant materiel was to terminate effective 30 September 1977, unless specifically authorized by Congress.
- Authority was provided to terminate, by a joint resolution of Congress, security assistance to any country which engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights.
- Submission of a report on Korea was required within 90 days after enactment, and at least once during the next five years which reviewed the progress of the Korea modernization plan, the role of the United States in mutual security efforts there, and the prospect of phased reductions of U.S. Forces in Korea.
- The President was requested to communicate "in forceful terms," within 60 days after enactment, Congressional concern for the erosion of civil liberties in South Korea.
- (U) At the time of enactment, the status of PACOM security assistance activities was as follows:

| MAAG-Type | DAOs Performing | Countries Receiving |
|----------------------|-----------------|------------------------|
| <u>Organizations</u> | SA Functions | <u> Grant Materiel</u> |
| China (Taiwan) | Afghanistan | Indonesia |
| India | Australia | Korea |
| Indonesia | Burma | Philippines |
| Japan | Malaysia | Thailand |
| Korea | Nepal | |
| Pakistan | New Zealand | |
| Philippines | Singapore | |
| Thailand | Sri Lanka | |

^{1.} J453 Point Papers, 29 Apr 76, Subj: Impact of International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976; and 13 Oct 76, Subj: Impact of Adjustments in Security Assistance Program in PACOM.

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- (b) The immediate result of the Act was disestablishment of the Office of the Defense Representative, India as a separate entity and its incorporation into the U.S. Mission as the Office of Defense Cooperation, India, with two assigned military personnel and no major impact on the small India program.
- (b) In the eyes of the CINCPAC staff, the impact of the Act on PACOM SA activities would be determined by the extent of Congressional action. Elimination of MAAGs or severe reductions in personnel were seen as having a major adverse impact by reducing ability to maintain important military relationships within PACOM, precluding efficient control and management of SA programs, a decline of total force planning, and an increase in third country influence.²
- Termination of grant materiel (FY 76 was the last year scheduled for Korean grant materiel) was expected to result in possible reorientation of allied and friendly force modernization toward third country support and a reduction in U.S. leverage to keep the arms race within bounds. An increase in FMS credit, however, was seen as providing at least a partial balance.³
- (%) The provisions on human rights were seen as a possible problem for Korea and Indonesia, and SA activities in Korea were clearly being subjected to close scrutiny.⁴

Simplification of Security Assistance Operations

- (U) Simplified security assistance procedures proposed by the Secretary of Defense in 1975 were implemented by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) on 1 February 1976. Under these procedures CINCPAC retained direct management control by: 5
 - Commanding MAAGs (except in Korea).
 - Determining requirements for new weapons systems and recommending release of high technology by comment on all such MAAG proposals.

4. Op. Cit., J453 Point Paper of 29 Apr 76.

^{1.} CINCPAC 240410Z Aug 76, 282352Z Sep 76; JCS 7316/302322Z Dec 76.

^{2.} Op. Cit., J453 Point Paper of 13 Oct 76.

^{3.} Ibid.

^{5. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 381; SECDEF 4280/091945Z Jan 76; CINCPAC 150217Z Jan 76 and 021845Z Feb 76.

- Making comments and recommendations on all Military Security Assistance Projections (MSAP) (formerly called Program Objectives Memorandum or POM) forwarded to the DSAA.
- Developing the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) for security assistance (Volume 2, Book 3, Analysis and Force Tabulation Allied and Friendly Forces).
- Scheduling and reviewing Foreign Military Training Programs through hosting the Annual Tri-Service Training Workshop.
- Providing program management documents to MAAGs and PACOM staff.
- Conducting Phase IV training of MAAG personnel in accordance with DOD Directive 2000.10.
- (U) CINCPAC maintained indirect management control by monitoring minor grant aid program changes sent to the DOD by MAAGs. CINCPAC also monitored foreign military sales (FMS) cases. DSAA provided weekly feedback on Letters of Request and Case Listings; information on potential sales cases from discussions between DSAA and foreign representatives; and PACOM statistical data on total FMS credits repayable (principal plus interest), and financial impact. Monitoring also included country material and training dollar levels, excess major items (MIMEX), and non-MAP Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under Military Articles PACOM Excess (MAPEX).
- In July 1976 the Secretary of Defense, in an apparent attempt at further simplification, established 1 September 1976 as the date to complete a reorganization of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) and the DSAA which would assign MAAGs directly to ISA/DSAA. In his response to this plan, Admiral Gayler noted:²

I see no agency better positioned or equipped to oversee MAAGs and render military judgment on PACOM security assistance programs than CINCPAC--charged with military responsibility for the area, able to distinguish real needs from perceived needs....Finally, there are too many stovepipe organizations now. Let's not create more....

J452 HistSum Dec 76.

^{2.} CINCPAC TANGO 11/052340Z Aug 76 (EX); J452 Point Paper, 20 Oct 76, Subj: MAAGs-Retention Justification and New Command Arrangements.

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(S) As of year's end the above-mentioned Secretary of Defense reorganization had not been implemented.

MAAG/MISSION/MILGP Tour Enhancement

- (U) In May 1976, as a result of comments received revealing a growing disenchantment with MAAG/MISSION/MILGP duty, the JCS requested information from the unified commands to determine actions that would enhance such duty. CINCPAC's evaluation of information received from PACOM MAAGs indicated two causes that may have contributed to disenchantment of MAAG personnel: first, a widespread perception among MAAG personnel that such duty was adverse to future promotion and career development; and, secondly, personal and financial hardships experienced by MAAG personnel and dependents, particularly in the remote areas of India, Pakistan, and Indonesia.²
- (U) To alleviate the above causes of disenchantment CINCPAC submitted a list of 20 recommended actions, the following of which were approved by the JCS on 16 November 1976:³
 - Actions to improve overall program:
 - Provide adequate language and country orientation training.
 - Provide adequate security assistance training.
 - Standardize Service regulations pertaining to SA duty.
 - Provide for adequate screening/selection of personnel for SA duty.
 - Actions to improve career-related perceptions:
 - Authorize an Outstanding Unit Award for joint organizations.
 - Insure special recognition (establish SA-related career fields as in Army).
 - Offer personnel choice of assignment following SA duty.
 - Insure prestige of SA-related assignments as a topic to be presented at basic, staff, and senior Service college.
- 1. Op. Cit., J452 Point Paper of 20 Oct 76.
- 2. JCS 4458/241954Z May 76; CINCPAC 260055Z Jun 76.
- 3. Op. Cit., CINCPAC 260055Z Jun 76; J451 Discussion Topic, 1 Dec 76, Subj: MAAG/MISSION/MILGP/Defense Attache System Tour Enhancement.

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- Actions to alleviate specific hardships:
- Authorize space required dependent student travel.
- Provide funded emergency leave travel to nearest overseas MAC aerial port.
- Insure security of military personnel and dependents in foreign countries.
 - Provide adequate medical/dental support.

FY 76 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference

- (U) The FY 76 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference, originally scheduled for 18-20 November 1975, was held at Camp Smith, HI from 3 to 5 February 1976, and was attended by representatives from the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Departments, MAAGS, ODRs, DAOs, PACOM components, and PACOM staff directorates. 1
- (U) The conference agenda included discussion of the following topics of mutual concern: 2
 - Export of high technology and weapons, including relationships with U.S. defense contractors.
 - Grant Aid: benefits compared with FMS (cash and credit), impact if terminated, alternatives and program results.
 - Examination of U.S. regional objectives in post-Vietnam era.
 - Influence of foreign military training and pricing policies.
 - Local defense production in Asia.
 - Phase IV training.
 - Relationships between MAAGs and CINCPAC.
 - Impact of increase in training costs.

^{1.} J454 HistSum Feb 76; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 387.

^{2.} J454 HistSum Feb 76.

- (8) Major conclusions arrived at by the participants of the conference included:
 - The United States had no firm policy on the release of high technology. (See <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u> for discussion on this subject and CINCPAC position.)
 - Termination of grant aid would diminish U.S. influence in decision making regarding force objectives and equipment of affected countries. (See also discussion, this section, under International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.)
 - Foreign military training needed to be retained, and the sudden increase in training costs needed to be smoothed over by an attempt to secure relief at Congressional level. (See also discussion, this section, under Foreign Military Training tuition pricing.)
 - Local defense production in Asia was a "non-starter." (See <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u> for discussion of the problem of local production and recipient country sales of U.S. origin defense items to third countries.)
 - Evaluation of Phase IV training was needed. (See also discussion, this section, under Phase IV Training for U.S. Security Assistance Personnel.)
 - Review of regional objectives in PACOM countries was needed.
- (U) Admiral Gayler closed the conference commenting on the fact that the military was in a period of close scrutiny by Congress, and it could expect to spend more time in the public arena. He noted that the impressions and ideas of visiting political staffers became Congressional reports. He pointed out that the GAO was as interested in American strength and readiness as anyone else and that, approached in that spirit, they would be found to be allies. He stressed the necessity for good public relations and further advised the MAAG chiefs that personal contacts were their "bread-and-butter," an extremely important part of their jobs, and possibly the most important thing they could contribute toward their influence for the United States.²
- 1. Ibid.; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 373-381.
- 2. Ibid.

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FY 77 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference

- (U) The FY 77 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference was held at Camp Smith, HI from 17 to 19 November 1976, with added representation from the National Security Council (NSC). Specific topics discussed included:
 - The elimination of MAAGs and security assistance functions of DAOs. (See also discussion, this section, under International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.)
 - The centralization of security assistance programs. (See also discussion, this section, under Simplification of Security Assistance Operations.)
 - MAAG/MISSION/MILGP tour enhancement. (See also discussion, this section, under this title.)
 - The release of advanced technology and sophisticated systems [also an item of interest for the FY 76 Conference]. (See also <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u> for CINCPAC position; and discussion, this section, under Release of High Technology to PACOM Countries, for developments during 1976.)
 - Relations between the U.S. Government and commercial contractors regarding sales to foreign countries, and an update on MILDEP programs for organization, control, and review procedures in the sales process.
 - The progress of FY 78 legislation and expected future trends.
 - Planning, programming, and resource management techniques.
 - Out-year planning for use of technology acquired through co-production.

^{1.} J454 HistSum Nov 76.

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(Results of the Conference indicated that: 1

- Congress, through such issues as human rights, was attempting to use security assistance to achieve goals for which the program was not intended and which were possibly not attainable.
- Congress was sharply critical of MAAGs, perceiving them as "arms salesmen," and fearing that their presence would lead to intervention.
- While there was Congressional opposition to security assistance, it was not unanimous, and actions were necessary to overcome the existing negative attitudes.
- Security assistance recipients were likely to be limited to those nations providing facilities for the United States and those too poor to finance their own defense effort. Except for training, programs would probably be limited to no more than 8 or 9 countries.
- Sales would increase. Country presentations emphasized host country military preference for U.S. equipment and training. In this regard, it was noted that 60 percent of total sales were for services and non-lethal items.
- Training was still the best investment. Country presentations highlighted strong support for increased dollar levels, not only to offset inflation, but also to increase enrollment. It was noted that a roll-back of training costs could be at the expense of the DOD budget. (See also discussion, this section, under Foreign Military Training Tuition Pricing.)
- U.S. defense policy placed emphasis on security assistance, and all agencies of the State and Defense Departments were actively engaged in review of procedures to overcome deficiencies in the system.
- (U) Admiral Weisner closed the conference noting that the PACOM theater strongly supported the security assistance program. He considered the money spent in the program to have a very high payoff, giving a tremendous return.
- 1. <u>Ibid.</u>

Also, with reference to support for the program, and the need to avoid adversary relationships, he expressed strong feelings about the "we" and the "they" being one and the same, "we" being the "we" here (at CINCPAC) this year and the "they" back there (in Washington) next year. I

Recipient Country Sales of U.S. Origin Defense Items to Third Countries

The representatives at the FY 76 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference noted that production or co-production of small arms, military vehicles, and aircraft by security assistance recipient countries created a desire to sell abroad and to regional neighbors (in obvious competition with U.S. commercial interests); thus, the consensus was that local defense production in Asia was a "non-starter."

The U.S. Government policy on sales of U.S. origin defense items to third countries evolved as a result of several cases arising during 1975. The essence of this policy was to generally discourage third country sales, but make exceptions on a case-by-case basis, generally disapproving requests involving modern standard items still available from U.S. stock or production, and sympathetically considering requests involving items which were obsolete or out of production in the United States. Specific determinations forming this policy during 1975 were as follows:³

| <u>Item</u> | <u>Seller</u> | Buyer | USG Approval |
|--------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------------|
| M-16 Rifles | Singapore | Thailand | No |
| AN/PRC-77 Radios | Singapore | New Zealand | Yes |
| 105mm & 155mm Ammo | Republic of China | Philippines | No |
| Small Arms Powder | Republic of China | Philippines | Yes |
| M-67 Grenades | Republic of Korea | Malaysia | No |
| SB-22 Switchboards | Republic of Korea | Malaysia | Yes |

V.S. Government approval of the Singapore AN/PRC-77 radio sale to New Zealand was clearly an exception to the general sales policy based on political considerations. The M-16 rifle sale to Thailand, on the other hand, was concluded without U.S. Government approval as had been a 1974 sale of M-16s to the Philippines; this illustrated the difficulty of enforcing the third country sales policy and confirming the view that local defense production in Asia was a "non-starter."

Ibid.

^{2.} Report of the 1975 [FY 76] PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference, n.d., p. 3.

^{3.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 373-376.

^{4.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 373-375.

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(U) During 1976 Republic of Korea (ROK) and Republic of China (ROC) third country sales requests were reviewed.

ROK Sales to Third Countries

1

- During 1976 the ROK continued to investigate possibilities to export items to third countries (and even to the United States) as a way to earn foreign exchange by using excess capacity in their production facilities. In April the American Embassy, Seoul, reported that ROK Foreign Minister Park had asked for the U.S. Government reaction to Moroccan interest in ROK military hardware and training advisers. The request included uniforms, M-16 rifles, AN/PRC-77 and AN/VRC-12 radios, 60mm and 81mm mortars, and 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles. The State Department reply was sympathetic to all but the M-16 rifles, and the ROK Government was invited to submit a request. No further action was taken during 1976. 1
- On 3 September 1976 the Korea Tacoma Marine Industries (KTMI) signed a contract for the sale of four guided missile patrol boats to Indonesia. There was initial concern, in this case, that KTMI could have applied data acquired under a U.S. Munitions Control (MC) license to the Indonesian patrol boat design, and as to the possibility of Korea, as a recipient of U.S. Government credit, further providing credit to a third country. KTMI denied any violation of the MC license, and the country team supported the ROK Government extension of credit, claimed to be to KTMI and not the Government of Indonesia, as reasonable commercial practice.²

ROC Sales to Third Countries

In September 1976 the ROC Ministry of National Defense advised MAAG China that Singapore had requested the ROC to sell them 500 M-151A2 (one-fourth ton) trucks and 160 M-825 (one-fourth ton) carriages to mount 106mm recoilless rifles. The M-151A2 was being produced as part of a GROC/U.S. Government co-production program. Chief, MAAG China noted that the additional workload would be welcomed by the ROC's military vehicle plant which already had been supplementing its reduced military workload by manufacture and assembly of commercial trucks and buses. CINCPAC supported the MAAG China request for concurrence, but in November 1976 the Secretary of State advised that the U.S. Government would not approve the sale based on the foreign source of export competition that would be created for U.S. manufacturers.³

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
^{1.} AMEMB Seoul 2552/070719Z Apr 76; J463 HistSum Apr 76.

^{2.} AMEMB Seoul 6759/300309Z Aug 76; J463 Point Paper, 14 Sep 76, Subj: Third Country Sales.

^{3.} CHMAAG Taipei 150801Z Sep 76; USDAO Singapore 1771/240438Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 250011Z Sep 76; SECSTATE 288932/250323Z Nov 76.

Release of High Technology to PACOM Countries

The release of high technology to PACOM countries continued to be an item of great concern to CINCPAC throughout 1976. This concern was expressed to the JCS during October 1975 and CINCPAC's position had been clearly stated in an 18 December 1975 letter from Admiral Gayler to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Philip C. Habib; however, at the FY 76 MAAG Chiefs' Conference one of the major conclusions was that the United States had no firm policy on the subject.



Release of Advanced Technology to the ROK

The United States had provided the ROK with NIKE, HARPOON, HONEST JOHN, Standard ARM, and HAWK missiles, and transfer of technology and equipment had been limited to that needed for inventory maintenance and acceptance testing of those missiles already in the ROK inventory. The ROK Agency for Defense Development (ADD) was trying to acquire a research and development (R&D)

^{1.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 376-381.

^{2.} CINCPAC 050110Z Jun 76.

capability to develop what would result in a strategic surface-to-surface missile in the Korean scenario, but the United States did not support an independent ROK R&D effort in advanced missile technology. As for the transfer of other weapons and technologies, each request was evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The Country Team stressed that ROK requests should receive sympathetic consideration if they were expected to achieve a self-reliant defense posture with reduced dependence on the presence of U.S. Forces. The CINCPAC position on release of advanced systems/technology to the ROK during 1976 was as follows:

Item PAVEWAY I Laser Guided Bomb (LGB) Kits MAVERICK SHRIKE PAVEKNIFE HARPOON System Standard ARM System WALLEYE HARM SAGM CONDOR System BULLDOG PAVE SPIKE PAVE TACK AN/TSQ-73 Air Defense Control System Improved CHAPARRAL

CINCPAC position/remarks Release Release AGM-65A only Release cost & performance data WALLEYE I only No - system in R&D No - system never produced No - not available to FMS No - not available to FMS Release cost & performance data No - system in R&D No - pending completion of ROK study using integrated systems approach

No - technology too advanced

Release of Advanced Technology to the ROC

CHAPARRAL with the goal of improving their air defense system. CINCPAC had nonconcurred with a previous request in October 1975 and remained firm to this position in response to a MAAG Taipei September 1976 request. CINCPAC did recommend, however, that, if a decision were made to release Improved CHAPARRAL (export model) or AIM-9L to NATO or other European countries, the export model should then also be released to Korea and Taiwan.²

 CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 376-377; CHMAAG Taipei 071014Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 240330Z Dec 76.

J463 Point Paper, 10 Sep 76, Subj: Transfer of Advanced Weapons Systems, Production Technology, and Sensitive R&D Technology to ROK; CINCPAC 200147Z Feb 76, 171921Z Mar 76, 080015Z Jul 76, and 212345Z May 76.

Release of the Standard Missile to Indonesia

(6) In August 1976 the Secretary of State disapproved a request by the American Embassy, Jakarta, for a General Dynamics briefing on the Standard Missile system for the Government of Indonesia Department of Defense and Security. In November 1976 the JCS requested CINCPAC's assessment of the possible sale of the Standard Missile and release of associated SECRET data to Indonesia.

Adoption of Guidelines for Release of Advanced Weapons Technology

As a result of CINCPAC's concern in July 1976 over the potential transfer of technology of the AIM-9L air-to-air missile to Australia and Japan, the JCS developed a set of guidelines, which CINCPAC helped to refine, to assess the impact on U.S. national objectives of the transfer of weapons technology, and to provide a framework for policy decisions on the release of advanced weapons technology. These guidelines consisted of a list of questions related to the impact of release on U.S. national military objectives:²

- Will release provide any clearly defined advantages to U.S. interest?
 - What will be the impact on U.S. Forces
 - Readiness?
 - Capability?
 - Combat operational advantages?
- What will be the overall effect if the equipment is not provided?
- Will the sale of this equipment post a military threat to the United States/other friendly nations now or in the future?
- What effect will this transaction have on regional stability?
- 1. SECSTATE 190509/021417Z Aug 76; JCS 9509/050012Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 110016Z Nov 76.
- 2. JCS 3599/072242Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 160123Z Sep 76.

- Can the recipient country provide the necessary
 - technical support?
 - safeguards against compromise?
- What obligations will be incurred by the United States?
- What is the overall effect if the equipment is compromised?
- What military contribution does this equipment make toward existing alliances/total force policy?
- What contribution does this equipment make to regional defense?
- How essential is this equipment for the recipient country in the maintenance of security against subversion?
- How essential is this equipment for the recipient country in defense against external aggression?
- Can the threat [to recipient country] be countered only by the item requested, or can it be countered by an item of lesser technology or complexity?*
 - Can the country afford the system?*
- Can this technology be used by the country in development of a weapon system other than that requested?*
- * CINCPAC-recommended additions.
- If a determination were made to provide advanced weapons, then the above guidelines were to be reviewed again in consideration of the level of technology to be released with the weapons. If, on the other hand, full release of equipment or technology were not recommended, then the explanatory rationale was to include a discussion of possible alternatives.
- (6) CINCPAC concurred in the JCS-developed guidelines with the additions shown above, and further recommended that the procedures include obtaining the unified command's views as part of the JCS military assessment. The

^{1.} JCS 3599/072242Z Sep 76.

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guidelines were first used in November 1976 when the JCS requested CINCPAC's assessment of the possible sale of the Standard Missile and release of associated SECRET data to Indonesia.

<u>Training</u>

PACOM Tri-Service Training Conference

(U) CINCPAC hosted the second Tri-Service training conference at Hickam Air Force Base between 1-10 March 1976. Participants included representatives from the Secretary of Defense (DSAA), the Military Departments, Service training commands, CINCPAC, PACOM Service components, USACSG, and each MAAG/DAO with a sizeable training program. The purpose of this conference was to refine the FY 77 International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP) for each PACOM country, and prepare and submit the initial FY 78 IMETP. Because of extensive CONUS school tuition costing turbulence at the time of the conference, the latter goal was not accomplished until later in the year. 2

Foreign Military Training Tuition Pricing

- (U) While reviewing FY 76 training appropriations, Congressional appropriations committees noted major differences in training costs between the Services for similar training. As a result, Congress directed the Department of Defense to provide definitive, standardized costing guidance to all the Services. This was done in an Assistant Secretary of Defense/Comptroller memorandum of 5 November 1975 which resulted in training cost increases of from 100 to 400 percent, effective 1 January 1976.3
- The sudden and precipitous rise in training costs was a matter of considerable concern to CINCPAC as it was expected to reduce FY 76 student input by about one-third and FY 77 programs by one-half. It could also result in an overall long-range reduction in the numbers of foreign personnel, destined for top military and civilian leadership positions, who would be exposed to U.S. training. The importance of this exposure was emphasized by a PACOM country survey which revealed that there were 400 foreign personnel, trained through the security assistance program, who were currently holding national level military and governmental positions.⁴

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^{1.} JCS 9509/050012Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 110016Z Nov 76.

^{2.} J452 HistSum Dec 76.

^{3.} J452 HistSum Aug 76.

^{4.} J45 Point Paper, 12 May 76, Subj: Foreign Military Training-Value vs Cost.

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(U) Impact statements from the unified commands, numerous MAAGs, and Embassies caused the Secretary of Defense to reevaluate the increases. As a result, on 21 May 1976, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) rescinded previous guidance applicable to FY 76 and FY 7T grant aid training increases, rolling back the prices to those in effect prior to the 5 November 1975 OSD Memorandum. On 27 August 1976 FY 77 prices were also rolled back; however, the increased costs were to be applied to the FY 78 IMETP effective 1 October 1977. Also the rollbacks of grant aid prices did not apply to FMS training programs. 1

Training of U.S. Security Assistance Personnel

(U) Through the first half of 1976 an Office of the Secretary of Defense ad hoc committee had studied and recommended establishing a Defense Institute for Security Assistance, responsible for all security assistance instruction for the Services, at Fort Bragg, NC. CINCPAC strongly supported this concept, designed to eliminate duplication among the Services by standardizing publications, procedures, and reports. By the second half of 1976 Department of the Air Force vice Department of the Army was designated executive agent for all Department of Defense Security Assistance training which was now to be conducted at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH beginning the second quarter, FY 77. At year's end the AFIT had identified five available security assistance courses, and CINCPAC had notified MAAGs/Missions/DAOs of those courses preferred for attendance en route along with instructions for updating Joint Manpower Programs (JMP) to reflect these new training requirements.²

Phase IV Training for U.S. Security Assistance Personnel

- (U) During the period 29 November 10 December 1976, a CINCPAC Mobile Training Team conducted Phase IV training of U.S. personnel assigned to security assistance duties in the PACOM. Training was conducted at Bangkok, Thailand; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Manila, Philippines. Comparing this "circuit rider" concept with the previous single location session, costs per student were reduced to \$365 in 1976, about one-half of the 1975 per-student cost.³
- (U) A total of 42 students from 11 different MAAGs/DAOs attended Phase IV training which consisted of two 21-hour parallel courses stressing needs for two groups of personnel: training requirements planners and programmers, and materiel programmers. 4
- 1. SECDEF 6789/211535Z May 76 and 3093/271518Z Aug 76.
- 2. J42 HistSums Jul, Sep-Oct 76; AFIT 271205Z Oct 76; CINCPAC 300457Z Oct 76.
- 3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 286; J452 HistSum Dec 76.
- 4. J452 HistSum Dec 76.

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U.S. Army War College International Fellows Program (IFP)

In October 1976 the Department of the Army requested unified commander's comments and a prioritized list of countries recommended to attend the first IFP class commencing in August 1977. Ten spaces were being allocated worldwide for officers in grades 05-07 (national level leadership positions). Realizing that the limited input precluded attendance from many PACOM countries, CINCPAC prepared the following prioritized list: (1) Japan, (2) Korea, (3) Philippines, (4) Singapore, (5) Indonesia, (6) Australia, (7) New Zealand, (8) Thailand, (9) Taiwan, and (10) Pakistan.

CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Schedule

(U) During CY 76 the CINCPAC PEG evaluated the following PACOM U.S. security assistance program activities:²

| Program | Period Covered | Date of Evaluation |
|-----------------------------|----------------|--------------------|
| Republic of the Philippines | FY 76 | 22 Mar - 2 Apr 76 |
| Singapore | FY 76 | 24-25 May 76 |
| Malaysia | FY 76 | 27-28 May 76 |
| New Zealand | FY 76 | 31 May - 1 Jun 76 |
| Australia | FY 76 | 2-4 Jun 76 |
| Republic of Indonesia | FY 76 | 20 Sep - 1 Oct 76 |
| Japan | FY 7T | 29 Nov - 1 Dec 76 |
| Republic of China | FY 77 | 2-10 Dec 76 |

(U) Effective 20 August 1976 the frequency of security assistance evaluations for major MAAGs in PACOM was increased to once a year and teams were to include Inspector General representation. Smaller security assistance activities would continue to be evaluated every two years, or sooner if deemed necessary.³

^{1.} J452 Point Paper, 27 Oct 76, Subj: United States Army War College International Fellows Program (IFP).

^{2.} CINCPAC PEG Reports, Republic of the Philippines FY 76, 18 May 76; Singapore FY 76, n.d.; Malaysia FY 76, n.d.; New Zealand FY 76, 29 Jul 76; Australia FY 76, n.d.; Republic of Indonesia FY 7T, 23 Dec 76; Japan FY 77, 8 Feb 77; Republic of China FY 77, 8 Feb 77.

^{3.} J4 WEB 14-20 Aug 76.

SECTION II--COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Australia

<u>Overview</u>

All FMS to Australia were for cash. During FY 76 Australia, with actual purchases worth \$533,736,000, ranked second only to the Republic of Korea in volume of sales. In purchasing U.S. military equipment the Government of Australia (GOA) advocated a program called Australian Industrial Participation whereby the firm selling the equipment or the U.S. Government agreed to make "offset" procurements of components, subsystems, and total systems from Australian industry as a condition of the sale. Offsets of up to 25 percent of each sale were encouraged if they could satisfy U.S. requirements for performance, quality, delivery, and cost. The objectives of the program were to broaden Australian industrial capability, stimulate technological advancement, and improve defense supply capability and self-reliance.

(6) Australia had purchased the following major items of capital equipment from the United States:²

3 guided missile destroyers (DDG)

2 guided missile frigates (FFG-7) (during 1976)

37 C-130 transports (12 during 1976)

24 F-111C fighter bombers

19 P-3 (11 P-3B and 8 P-3C) long-range maritime patrol aircraft

20 A-4G carrier based fighter aircraft

36 P-2 patrol aircraft

17 S-2E anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft Numerous helicopters and vehicles

(S) Major prospective sales of U.S. equipment for the period FY 77-81 included the following: 3

• Replacements for 75 MIRAGE fighter aircraft

 J466 Point Paper, 13 Jul 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Australia; J466 HistSum Dec 76; DSAA Journal, 30 Sep 76.

3. J465 Point Paper, 18 Nov 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Australia; DIA 6930/070614Z Dec 76.

SECREI

^{1.} FY 78 CPD, Vol. I, p. 37; J466 Point Paper, 13 Jul 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Australia.

| MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY | ARMY 6 Infantry Battalions, I Special Air Service Regiment, 3 Artillery Regiments, I Armored Regiment, I Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, 2 Cavalry Regiments. 74 non-jet air- craft in Army Aviation. Strength: 31,500 NAVY I Carrier, I Destroyer type, 4 Submarines, 13 Costal | types, 5 Amphiloses types, 4 line Marface types, 8 Auxiliary types, 73 Service Craft, and 64 Naval aircraft. Strongth: 16,000 which includes 1,600 Maval Air RRBUIL | MS, ASB aircraft, of which 229 are jets. Strength, 71,500 1965 Stand |
|--|---|--|--|
| | CAMBERGA. | U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN HELP MILITARY GOARILLITY TO TO AND MANIST POSSIBLE EXTERNAL THREATS AND GOMERBUTT TO AND CHANALLY PRESENTED. | ASSISTI TH WINDER MECESARY RIGHTS, ANTHORIZATIONS, AND ACTIVE TO RECESSARY RIGHTS, ANTHORIZATIONS, AND TANTITY NARRAGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ELLID FORCES AND INTERSIS. AND INVENTION AND STREAMEL, TOTALEM FROM SELVEN HOST COMPIET AND U.S. HILLIARY PERSONNEL, TOTALEM FORCES, TOWND THE WAITE STATES AND FROM SERVEN OF HILLIARY OF CONTIGIOUS AIREPAGE/SEA AREAS AND STATES AND FROM SERVEN OF CONTIGIOUS AIREPAGE/SEA AREAS AND STATES AND |
| AUSTRALIA BASIC INFORMATION | ANT A | ISTER RESE ETGEN AFFAIRS FONCE STAFF ERAL STAFF, DOD | CHIEF OF MAYAL STAFF, DUD CHEF OF AR STAFF, DUD CHEF OF AR STAFF, DUD (AIR FORCE OFFICE) U.S. PHRASSAUDR U.S. PHRASSAUDR COL. STAFF, DUD COL. ROBER P. NUMEWATER, USAF CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA COL. Jack 1. DETOUR, USAF |


Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 67.

SFARE

- 47 utility tactical transport aircraft system (UTTAS) helicopters (being developed)
 - 104 105mm howitzers
- Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) helicopters
 - Various types of missiles
 - One FFG-7
 - 2 P-3C aircraft
- 18 S-2 ASW aircraft (12 to replace those destroyed by fire in December 1976)

MIRAGE Replacement

During 1976 the Royal Australian Air Force made plans to replace its three squadrons (75 aircraft) of French MIRAGE tactical fighter aircraft. The replacement would be either a multipurpose aircraft or a mix of ground support and air defense aircraft. As of year's end 10 possible U.S. and third country aircraft were under consideration. U.S. aircraft under consideration included the A-7, A-10, F-14, F-15, and F-16. The contenders were expected to be reduced to two or three as early as March 1977.



^{1.} J462 Point Paper, 22 Jul 76, Subj: MIRAGE Replacement-Australia; J465 Point Paper, 18 Nov 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Australia.

2. DIA 6930/070614Z Dec 76; CNO 141835Z Dec 76 and 141920Z Dec 76.

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Transfer of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles to Papua New Guinea

(5) The GOA had been seeking U.S. Government approval to transfer U.S.-origin FMS articles, primarily small arms, related ammunition, and spare parts, to the Government of Papua New Guinea. On 6 October 1976 the Secretary of State authorized the transfer of these items.

Republic of China

The U.S. Advisory Effort

The Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) had been reduced by approximately 35 percent since 1975 to a strength of 43 military, 5 U.S. civilians, and 12 local nationals during 1976. With this manpower reduction, the MAAG had adopted the approach of advising at the ROC managerial vice field level. During 1976 the MAAG had conducted a staff study based solely on a military appraisal to identify items the ROC should procure prior to normalization of U.S.-People's Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic relations. The study was hand-carried to CINCPAC on 11 November 1976 with the MAAG's position that certain proposed items would create either a credible ROC deterrent against the PRC or would be necessary to counter an actual PRC attack. Based upon an abbreviated list of weapons proposed for the ROC, provided by Vice Admiral Snyder (COMUSTDC) to Admiral Weisner on 31 August 1976, and CINCPAC's response to that list, it appeared that there was little hope that the ROC would receive additional FMS credit to support the proposed acquisitions. The abbreviated list was as follows:²

| | Air Force | |
|------|--------------|------------|
| It | em (Quantity | ') |
| F-16 | Fighter (F) | (36) |
| E-20 | EM Plane (1 | -2) |
| ASM | (MAVERICK or | other) |
| RF-4 | E Recon Plan | ie |
| Clus | ter Bomb Uni | ts (CBU) |

| Navy | | Army | | 100 m 100 m 100 m |
|------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------------------------|
| Item (Quantity) | Item | (Quan | tity) | |
| DD (6) | | Missil | | |
| PB (B Class) (6) | M48 | Tanks | (50-1) | 100) |
| SSM HARPOON (120 |) CHAP | ARRAL | (AN/D |)AW-1) |
| Sea CHAPARRAL | VULC | | | 11. |
| (AN/DAW-T) | 40mm | (modi | fied) | |
| SSM PENGUIN | | | | 4.5 |
| Influenced Mine | | | | |

^{1.} J465 Point Paper, 18 Nov 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Australia.

CINCPAC PEG Report, Republic of China, FY 77, 8 Feb 77, pp. I-1, A-6;
 J465 HistSum Sep 76; CINCPAC 110152Z Sep 76.

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| BASIC INFORMATION | , | MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY |
|---|---|---|
| AREA | 4 | AMCE |
| FIN ULATION | TAIPE | 12 Heavy and b traft Intantry Divisious, 3 Armored Britaines. F Armored Infantry Brinade, 2 Armored Cavalry Regiments, 1 Special |
| MANUAL GROWTH | | Marfare Command (Airhorne), 25 Artillery Ballalions, I Aviation |
| LITERAGY PAIF 90 PERCENT | | bettelliet, i ili pereniera dale (present). Streneth: 324.000 |
| HITE EXPLETABLY | _ | |
| ARANUT LAND PER CAPITA | | Maintain internal security to combuct effective ground |
| GROSS NATICUAL PRODUCT 1976 \$17.065 B11.100 | 0,0 | defense of Taiwan, the Penghus, and Offshore Islands against |
| PER CAPITA | | Small-State attack in province doors or in marry and logistic support. Well organized and combat ready. |
| DEFLUSE BUIRET (Self Financed) 1976 | | NAVY |
| AS PLPCIBT OF GAP | | 18 Destroyer tyles, a summer lines, is toastar ration types. 21 Wine Marfare types, 49 Amphibitous types, 20 Auxillary types. |
| PRESTORIST YEN. Chia-Ean | | 2 Marine Divisions, 1 Landing Vehicle Track Regiment. Strength: 67,000 (Includes 34,200 Marines) |
| | | The overall ability of the Chim's Navy to perform its |
| DEFENSE MINISTER | 3 | assigned mission is considered fair. The chinese maines are considered capable of conducting division size amphibious opera- |
| CHIEF, GENERAL STAFF AIM SHIG, Chang-Chih, Navy | MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES | tions, provided the required air and makal support, including |
| CHIC ARMY GIN IN, An-lan | SUPPORT MARRIEDATEON OF EOC FORCES ESSENTIAL TO THITIAL | AMONIDIOUS STIPPING, 15 AVAILABLE. |
| CINCHAVY ADM 1500, Chien | DEFENSE OF LANGUM AND THE PESCADORES WITHIN THE LIMITS | 13 Tactical fighter Sq {2 T-5s, 5 F-100s, 1 F-104, 3 F/TF-104s}. I personales one Sm (8E-104) - 1 Search and Resent Sc (8E-16 - 8E - 8E) |
| CHICARR FORCE GHB SZII, Tu-fu | OF THE ILS. COMMETHERIT. | 6 Transportation Se (C-119), 1 Anticuloarine Marfare Se (5-2), |
| CINC, CORRINED SEPVICE FORCE | ENSURE CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHO- | Tactical Support Sp. (U-1). |
| CHRYGHBAIT, MERINE CARPS. LOCEN HUNIG, KHANG-LO | RIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANSPHINTS FOR U.S. FORCES. | |
| U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION | ENCOURAGE PURSUIT OF HILITARY OBJECTIVES COMPATIBLE WITH | Force is combat ready. The Air force has desensitable its ability to nectors its arisery function, air defense of Tarwan |
| (I. S. AMMSSAUOR. | U.S. FORFICK POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY. | under day visual flight rules conditions. The limited all- menther defense capability is inproving with the introduction |
| COMISTUG | | of new F-St Fighters. Capable of providing Fighter cover for |
| CHIFF, "LAS | - | nacal operations in the area and success support to an very torps. |

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 69.

Ongoing Programs

- (S) Defense priorities for FY 78-82 were air defense, naval protection of contiguous sea areas, and improvement in defense ground force combat effectiveness. Major ongoing programs during 1976 included:
 - Co-production of 180 F-5E/F aircraft
 - Semi-automated air defense system (\$34 million contract with Hughes)
 - Purchase of 16 S-2E aircraft
 - Purchase of second Improved HAWK battalion
 - Co-production of two Patrol Boat Multi-Mission (PGMM) with Tacoma Boat

F-5E/F Co-production Continuation Program

(c) During May 1976 CINCPAC requested the latest status of the ROC Country Team December 1975 request to permit extension of F-5E/F co-production authority from 120 to 200. The request was pending State Department and National Security Council concurrence until July 1976, when approval was given to co-produce an additional 60 F-5 aircraft with an option to co-produce 20 more for a total of 200.²

S-2E Aircraft Program

(%) During January 1976 the ROC purchased 16 Navy S-2E aircraft for a total estimated cost of \$6,443,332 as part of the effort to improve their protection of contiguous sea areas.³

Improved HAWK Missiles

(6) In December 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei advised of the ROC decision to buy an additional 90 Improved HAWK missiles required to complete a third basic

^{1.} J465 Point Paper, 10 Dec 76, Subj: Security Assistance-Republic of China.

^{2. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 406; CINCPAC 180450Z May 76; SECDEF 3341/182109Z May 76, 3742/150005Z Jul 76, and 6560/171917Z Jul 76.

CNO 022326Z Jan 76 and 092127Z Jan 76; CHMAAG Taipei 070803Z Jan 76 and 130803Z Jan 76.

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load for their latest Improved HAWK battalion. Final action was pending at year's end. $\ensuremath{\mathsf{I}}$

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on M-48 Tanks

(N) In September 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei advised that the Premier of the ROC had personally requested revision of the 16 May 1974 MOU to allow for turn-in of M-7 howitzers, self-propelled 105mm and M-8 howitzers, and 75mm assault guns, in lieu of the old M-18/M-24 tanks, for 100 M-48 tanks. Chief, MAAG Taipei, with CINCPAC support, had originally opposed revision of the MOU in 1975 due to the drain on operation and maintenance funds required for the upkeep of M-18/M-24 tanks, and the issue was held in abeyance until the Premier's personal interest was revealed. CINCPAC now concurred with the revision, which was approved by the Secretary of Defense at the end of September 1976.2

Letter of Offer for M-48Al Tanks

- (b) In October 1976 the Secretary of State requested comments and the detailed rationale from the American Embassy, Taipei concerning a ROC letter of offer for 55 M-48Al tanks (by November the request had been increased to 100). The American Embassy noted that, while the Mission felt that the ROC should forego new tanks in favor of using its limited financial resources to enhance its air and naval capabilities, ROC domestic political concerns were an important determining factor favoring approval of this request.³
- equation, and the maintenance of its morale at an adequately high level was recognized as a factor bearing on the political stability of the ROC Government. The current Chief of the General Staff appeared to favor reductions in Army strength, but found it difficult to argue effectively for cuts in the Army when all new and sophisticated weapon systems went to the Air Force and Navy. It was felt that the provision of additional M-48 tanks would not have a significant adverse impact on ROC defense priorities, but would hopefully lessen the Army's resistance to manpower cuts and bring about a more cooperative attitude toward the goal of substituting firepower for manpower.⁴

^{1.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 405; CHMAAG Taipei 230809Z Dec 76.

^{2.} CHMAAG Taipei 220816Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 282109Z Sep 76; SECDEF 4010/292226Z Sep 76; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 407-408.

^{3.} SECSTATE 258538/191851Z Oct 76; AMEMB Taipei 7338/020820Z Nov 76.

^{4.} AMEMB Taipei 7338/020820Z Nov 76.

In fact, there was also a shortage of "good" tanks in the ROC Army inventory. There was an overall shortfall of 279 tanks from the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) authorization level, and a specific M-48 shortfall of 219 from the Army's TO&E requirement. CINCPAC supported the request for M-48Als provided the MOU required one-for-one turn-in or old M-24s or M-18s. At the end of the year the State Department and DSAA indicated general agreement with this proviso, but a final position on the change in requirement from 55 to 100 tanks was pending at the end of the year. I

Acquisition of Long-Range Oblique Photography Aerial Cameras

During November 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei informed the Secretary of Defense that the ROC Ministry of National Defense had submitted a requirement for four long-range oblique photography aerial camera sets, either four KA-102As or KS-127As, or a combination of two of each with a focal length of 66 inches to improve reconnaissance missions no closer than 15 miles off the PRC coast. The JCS suggested that the ROC consider a 24-inch model if the 66-inch models were not approved for release, but Chief, MAAG Taipei advised that the 24-inch model was not acceptable to the ROC. The Chief, MAAG Taipei position was passed by CINCPAC to the JCS for consideration on 30 December 1976.

Advanced Air-to-Ground Munitions

- (S) In October 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei expressed concern over the slow response to efforts since 1974 to obtain approval for release of information to the ROC on advanced air-to-ground munitions systems such as cluster bomb units (CBU), laser guided bombs (LGB), and MAVERICK missiles (AGM-65A).³
- emphasized the requirement for LGBs as a deterrent to PRC STYX missile-armed naval craft and the amphibious threat, without result. In June 1976 CINCPAC queried the JCS on this subject, noting that local studies had indicated that LGBs would provide the ROC a marginally effective counter to STYX and OSA missile boats and a very effective counter to an amphibious capability without risking compromise of advanced technology and without being interpreted as provocative by the PRC.⁴

^{1. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>; CINCPAC 110046Z Nov 76; JCS 7212/162009Z Nov 76.

CHMAAG Taipei 110801Z Nov 76 and 230806Z Dec 76; JCS 4384/031453Z Dec 76; CINCPAC 300431Z Dec 76.

^{3.} CHMAAG Taipei 290804Z Oct 76.

^{4.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 408; CINCPAC 040032Z Jun 76.

- (b) Between July and September 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei requested, and CINCPAC provided, effectiveness information on several air-to-ground weapons. Also in September, Chief, MAAG Taipei requested, and CINCPAC supported, expanded data on the MAVERICK missile, to include characteristics, costs, and other information concerning its use with the F-5E.
- In November 1976 CINCPAC expressed support for the release of information concerning CBU and LGB munitions to the ROC based on military considerations. At year's end the Secretary of Defense replied that the State Department was reviewing the issue of ROC access to these munitions, with the exception of the ROCKEYE CBU, an export license for components of which had been issued on 30 August 1976.²

PEACE EDGE Rotary Coupler Problem

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(U) Project PEACE EDGE provided the Chinese Air Force four AN/FPS-110 search radar systems to upgrade the Taiwan Air Defense System. Since installation of the four systems, nine Rotary Couplers had failed by mid-December 1976. During December 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei advised that, to maintain operation of the four sites, a substitute coupler was installed as a temporary fix; however, this limited the system's operation and resulted in a loss of radar coverage which degraded the Chinese air defense system. Chief, MAAG Taipei requested that additional efforts be expended to correct the situation, and at year's end the Director, Materiel Management, McClellan AFB, CA was working on the problem and had proposed a meeting of all concerned to attain a permanent fix and address other areas of concern. Chief, MAAG Taipei requested that the meeting be held in Taiwan with the date to be determined.³

Coastal Minesweeper (MSC) Decommissioning and Conversion

On behalf of the Chinese Navy to cannibalize and convert ROC Navy MSCs 159 and 160 (formerly USN MSCs 302 and 300 respectively), which had been provided through MAP. Also, CINCPAC provided instructions for cannibalizing and scrapping ROC Navy MSC 163 (formerly USN MSC 101).4

CHMAAG Taipei 270809Z Jul 76, 240807Z Aug 76, and 170805Z Sep 76;
 CINCPAC 100447Z Aug 76, 090426Z Sep 76, and 282105Z Sep 76.

^{2.} CINCPAC 180606Z Nov 76; SECDEF 7491/072145Z Dec 76.

^{3.} CHMAAG Taipei 150402Z Dec 76 and 270807Z Dec 76; DIR MAT MGT McClellan AFB CA 162315Z Dec 76.

^{4.} CHMAAG Taipei 040802Z Feb 76; CINCPAC 092115Z Feb 76; CNO 132148Z Feb 76.

Moderate interceptor and close air support capabilities. Limited Strength: 40,000 Strength: 105,000 3 flight Bomber Squadrons (8(1)58), 11 fighter-Bomber Squadrons (SU-7, sance Squadrons (PR-57, C-121), 10 Transport Squadrons (miscellaneous) Patrol Ships/Craft, 7 Mine Harfare Ships, 6 Amphibious Warfare Ships. (Paramilitary Strength: 433,000)] Antisudmarine Marfare Aircraft Carrier, 2 Light Cruisers, 24 Frigates, 8 Submarines, 12 Patrol Craft (quided missile), 11 Cnastal HF-24, MIG-21M), 17 Fighter Squadrons (GNAT, MIG-21FL), 2 Reconnais-Excellent capability to maintain internal security and good capa bility to resist external anyression. Limited airborne capability. Moderate capability to defend coastline. Limited long-range (offensive), antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, transport, and MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY 7 Corps, 16 Infantry Divisions, 10 Mountain Divisions, 2 Armored Dependent on foreign sources for some suphisticated weaponry. Strength: 1,100,000 14 Helicopter Squadrons (Mf-4, MI-8, Alouette III). AIR FORCE MAVY amphibious capabilities. airmobile capability. Oivisions. TRANSPORT AND RADAR EARLY WARNING ATR DEFENSE SYSTEMS ASSIST INDIA'S ARMED FORCES TO MAINTAIN THEIR AIR FORCE HAINTAIN A MINIMUM-EFFORT SECIRITY ASSISTANCE RELATION-U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES SHIP WITH INDIA CONSISTENT WITH INDIA'S CURRENT POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. REDUCE SOWIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY INFLUENCE. THROUGH PROYISION OF SPARE PARTS FOR CASH. . . . 1,211,000 50 HI AIR CHIEF HARSHAL Hrushikesh HOUGAVKAR COL LEWIS N. GOAD, USA About 42 YEARS COR Albert RYAM, USM \$3.) BILL FON . . 627,000,000 194 BILLION . . 3.0 PERCENT 29 PERCENT Approx 3.3 7 ACRE . . \$149 MR. Basappa Danappa JATTI GEN Tapashaar Narin PAINA (VACANT) INDIA BASIC INFORMATION U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION MRS. Indira CANDHI ADM Jal CURSETJÍ Bansi LAL CHEEF OF MANAL STAFF CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF CHIEF OF AIR STAFF PLR CAPITA DEFENSE BUDGET ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA GROSS HATTOMAL PRODUCT PRESIDENT AS PERCENT OF GNP MINISTER OF DEFENSE USDAO LIFE EXPECTABLEY H.S. AMBASSADOR POPULATION . . MERLY CROWTH LITEPACY RATE USDRI

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 70.

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<u>Fiji</u>

(%) During 1976 Fiji purchased a third coastal minesweeper (ex-USS WOODPECKER) for \$20,000.1

<u>India</u>

At the FY 76 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference the Defense Representative to India noted that the U.S. program (training only) operated in a hostile political environment, and that modification of the arms embargo (1975) did not result in increased interest in U.S. equipment. He did advise, however, that the training program was essential to the maintenance of rapport with the Indian Armed Forces.²

Indonesia

<u>Overview</u>

As a result of Indonesia's invasion of Timor in December 1975 and Congressional concern over the issue of human rights in Indonesia, the grant aid program (MAP and IMETP) remained on Executive Branch "hold" from December 1975 to June 1976 when the new Foreign Assistance Act was passed. An immediate result of this "hold" was cancellation of programmed training until May 1976, when, as an exception to the "hold", the State Department approved funding for five flag/general officers to attend a Senior International Defense Management Course and for six other officers to attend Service command and staff courses.3

During the period 25-29 June 1976 U.S.-Indonesian consultations were held in Washington, DC in conjunction with a visit by GOI Foreign Minister Malik. In staff talks held at the Department of Defense, the U.S. side indicated an intention to continue security assistance to Indonesia and the belief that completion of Congressional action on current legislation would resolve some of the existing technical difficulties. Both sides agreed on the nature of the basic threat to Indonesia as being outside support for insurgency, but the Indonesians had an obvious feeling of urgency which they seemed to think the United States did not fully share. Furthermore, the Indonesians

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CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 410; SECSTATE 084925/081736Z Apr 76.

^{2. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 410; <u>Op. Cit.</u>, Report on the 1975 [FY 76] PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference, p. 9.

^{3.} CHUSDLG Jakarta 060900Z May 76 and 180540Z May 76; SECDEF 6696/122117Z May 76 and 3340/182109Z May 76; J473 Point Paper, 1 Apr 76, Subj: Security Assistance-Indonesia.

| INDONESIA BASIC INFORMATION | ٥١٤ | MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY |
|---|--|--|
| 707 A 27 A | . | ARMY |
| FULARITH 33,240,000 | | 13 Infantry Brigades, 2 Airborne Brigades, 1 Paratroop/ Commando Beniment, 3 Cavalro Brisado & Field Artillano |
| FUNDAL GROWTH 7.6 PERCINT | # T | Regiments, 4 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments, 44 Infantry Hastallers (Konstein) 7 Constant Artistics (Konstein) |
| LITERACY RATE 60 PERCENT | | Artillery Battalions, 7 Combat Engineer Battalions, 5 Airborne |
| LIFE EXPECTANCY | | intantry Battalions, I Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Separate), 3 Signal Battalions, 1 Air Defense Radar Battalion, |
| ARACIE LAMD PI'R CAPITA 43 ACRE | | 2 Quartermaster Battalions, 6 Transportation Battalions, 2 Military Police Battalions |
| SEGSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 1976 (Est) \$20 BILLION | | Strength: 180,000 |
| PEP CAPITA \$180 | | Maintain internal security and effectively repel minor incursions but not a major attack. Limited offensive capabi- |
| DEFENSE BUDGET (Self-Financed) 1976 \$1,262 HILLION | | lity. Overall readiness retarded by long lines of communica- |
| AS PERCENT OF GIP | DAMARTIA OF STATES | NAVY |
| | O Contraction | 7 Destroyer Escorts, 2 Submarines, 25 Patrol Ships/Craft, |
| PRESIDENT GEN SURIARTO | 2 | 5 Mine Warfare Ships, 10 Amphibious Warfare Ships/Craft, |
| HINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SEED DANKERS | フ フ て | Strength: 26,000 Mayy: 12,000 Marines |
| JGN AFFAIRS | | Fartially suppress smuggling and provide limited support |
| | U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES | for amphibious operations. Conduct only token submirthe |
| ARPED FORCES VICE CINC GLM SURONO | PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE INDONESIAN | Interdiction and antisubmarine warfare operations. Marines |
| AGAY CHECANOLR LT CLM MAKHIR | MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND SELF-DEFINSE. | one copuse of providing a regimental size landing force for amphibious assaults. |
| ATR FOOLE CHANGES AND THE STOCKHOLD COLD BE SERVED | PROVIDE TANGIBLE ENIDERICE OF U.S. SUPPORT TO AN INDONESTAR | AIR FORCE |
| · · | | 11 C-130s, 16 C-47s, 16 FV-10s, 2 B-26s, 35 Hiscellaneous Heli- |
| | CONTRIBUTE TO FRIENDRY GOI RELATIONS WITH METCHBORS AND THE UNITED STAFFS. | Lopiers, 13 PM-363, 10 1-335, 20 Miscellaneous Light/Medium/ VIP/Cargo Transports, 46 Fraining Aircraft. |
| U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION | HELP PRESERVE U.S. ACCESS TO INDONESIAN MATERIALS AND | Strength: 28,800 |
| U.S. AMBASSABOR | _ | Forces in being can provide only limited tactical air |
| USAID REPRESENTATIVE | PRINCIE EDUTPHENT COMPONIȚIY, BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY MAIN BECELT CITE FOR THE PARTITION OF PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF | support and air derense. Heasport capability is growing but still can support only minor ground operations. Early warning |
| CHUSDLS: COL WITTIAM N. TOWBAUCH, USA | | radar and antiaircraft artillery defense systems extremely weak. |

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 71.

indicated disappointment at U.S. inability to offer more than a seven-year repayment period for FMS credits, and hesitantly signed the remaining FY 76 transactions just before the 30 June deadline. The U.S. side agreed to review the question of FMS terms during FY 77. CINCPAC had supported improved FMS terms, noting that varying payback periods created misunderstandings, that MAAG chiefs were faced with the dilemma of trying to explain differences without sufficient rationale, and that the decreasing attractiveness of U.S. Government credits might lead to additional third country sales and lessening of U.S. leverage with the host country military.

OV-10 Aircraft

- (U) By December 1976, 9 of the 16 OV-10F aircraft programmed under FY 75 FMS had arrived in country, with 7 remaining to be delivered over the next few months. GOI also contracted a \$1.5 million FMS life support equipment case, portions of which had been delivered in September 1976. Some of this equipment was found to be old, soiled, and generally in a poor state of repair. This created an extreme state of irritation among officers in the highest echelon of the Indonesian Air Force until the situation was corrected. As a result of this incident, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force advised the responsible logistics units to insure that items shipped to Indonesia had at least a 75 percent usable life in accordance with Air Force Manual 67-1 requirements. ²
- (U) The OV-10 Mobile Training Team (MTT) conducted instructor, electronics, engine, and ground support training during November and December 1976. In spite of delays and problems caused by nonavailability of some special tools and parts required to conduct hands-on training, the MTT successfully completed its mission with one member remaining in country through January 1977 to finish ground support equipment training.³
- (S) During November 1976 a Defense Intelligence Agency report noted that two of the OV-10 BRONCO counterinsurgency aircraft had been deployed to East Timor where there was an apparent continuing need for relatively sophisticated firepower in subduing the some 1,000 FRETILIN (National Front for the Liberation of East Timor) troops remaining in remote areas.⁴

^{1.} SECSTATE 166433/1/031718Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 160411Z May 76.

J473 HistSum Dec 76; CHUSDLG Jakarta 090033Z Sep 76; HQUSAF Wash DC 161938Z Sep 76.

^{3.} CHUSDLG Jakarta 061022Z Dec 76, 171003Z Dec 76, and 300404Z Dec 76.

^{4.} DIA 2084/182003Z Nov 76.

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Indonesian Communications System (INDOCOM)

- INDOCOM was a high frequency (HF) radio network designed to provide nationwide military command and control communications. It was begun in 1971 as a 5-year project, but the planned completion date was extended from 1976 to 1980 as a result of program deviation beginning in FY 74 and long lead time associated with equipment (primarily civilian components) procurement. As of 1976 there were apparent problems in equipment maintenance, logistics support, and training which remained to be corrected before sustained operation of Project INDOCOM could be achieved.
- (%) In November 1976 the Chief, Defense Liaison Group (DLG) Jakarta requested guidance on the INDOCOM sub-project installation of communications equipment aboard 52 Indonesian-titled ships, 28 of which were of third country origin. The Secretary of Defense expressed no objection if two provisions were met:²
 - Ships involved could not be of Communist Bloc origin.
 - Prior written case-by-case approval would be required for the transfer of U.S.-origin equipment if the GOI intended to transfer any of the ships containing such equipment to a third country in the future.

Extension of Ship Lease Agreements

- (C) In November 1976 the State Department authorized the extension of lease agreements on the following vessels until 30 September 1978: USS CLARK COUNTY (LST-601), USS IREDELL COUNTY (LST-839), USS TIDEWATER (AD-31), USS ASKARI (ARL-30).
- The GOI had initially requested extension of the leases in September 1975, but positive action was delayed by the U.S. policy preference to sell rather than renew leases.⁴
- 1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, pp. 410-411; CINCPAC PEG Report, Republic of Indonesia FY 7T, 23 Dec 76, pp. I-6-I-7, F-1-F-2; J474 Point Paper, 14 Apr 76, Subj: Indonesian Communications System (INDOCOM).
- 2. CHUSDLG Jakarta 010748Z Nov 76; SECDEF 1313/180031Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 040516Z Nov 76 and 190447Z Nov 76.
- 3. SECSTATE 289639/252159Z Nov 76.
- 4. J473 HistSum Nov 76.

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Transfer of U.S.-Origin F-86 SABRE Jets from Malaysia

(C) In July 1976 the Secretary of State consented to Malaysian transfer of 16 F-86 SABRE jets to the Indonesian Air Force. Originally surfaced in December 1975, the transfer had been delayed, probably as a result of Indonesian involvement in Timor at that time. The GOI gave the required assurances regarding use and third-party transfers and the transaction was made on 22 July 1976.

Replacement of UH-34D Helicopters

(U) In December 1976 the Chief, DLG Jakarta requested price and availability (P&A) data for UH-34Ds to replace two GOI helicopters which crashed in June and November 1976. The CNO advised that UH-34Ds were no longer available in the U.S. Navy inventory, nor were parts or rework capability available. The U.S. Air Force also reported no replacements available.

V-150 Armored Cars

(U) On 1 September 1976 a shipment of 20 out of a total order of 45 V-150 Cadillac Gage armored cars left Mobile, AL for Indonesia. 3

<u>Disposal of Chemical Agent</u>



^{1. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, pp. 445-446; SECSTATE 180098/ 211336Z Jul 76; COMIPAC 240315Z Jul 76.

^{2.} CHUSDLG Jakarta 110122Z Dec 76; HQUSAF 171425Z Dec 76; CNO 211927Z Dec 76.

^{3.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 415; J473 HistSum Sep 76.

^{4.} CHUSDLG Jakarta 240827Z Sep 76; SECSTATE 241305/282304Z Sep 76; AMEMB Jakarta 12926/040340Z Oct 76; CINCPAC 021947Z Oct 76.

| MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY | 12 Infantry Divisions, 1 Hechanized Bivision, 1 Airborne Brigade, Tank Brigade, 4 Combined Brisade, 2 Antiaircraft Artillery Rrigades (HALI), 13 non-divisional Artillery Battalions, 1 Anti- | aircraft Artillery Battalion (Pana gum), 1 Helicopter Brigade. | torenel aggression by a major power. Good discipline, morale, | redership, training, and equipment. Stock levels to support an expanded force are inadequate for sustained operations. Combat units are understrength. | 45 Destroyer types, 15 Submarines, 25 Gastal Patrol types, 9 Harbor Control types, 46 Mine Marfair types, 5 Amphibibus types, 11 Aurillary types, 191 Service Craft. | U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES | # E | o processes and a second bighly mutuated and well-trained. 900 Aircraft, including 9 fighter liter cutor Knuadows (181 | ~ . | Machine M.S. And JARAMESE DEFENSE FOUNDEDT, Journal of His Bis. 14 PF-46.), 2 Transport Squadrons (7 C-46, Bis. Machine Complete Machine Compl | EXPRINGE WAS DIAL GARE IN DEFENSE PLANNING FOR STRENGE WAS A STRENGE WAS A STRENGE WAS A STRENGE WAS A STRENGE COOPERATION. | Harginal capability to defend Japanese afr space, However, Jacks capability to defend against a major conventional penetra- |
|--|---|--|---|--|--|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 2 | \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ | ' ' | | | | SECURITY ASSIST | OMMENTATIVE NUROVENEYS, PROVENEYS, PROVENEYS NA ANTERIOR SHOPERS NAME OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY NAME OF THE | SITION OF MUCLEAR SERVICES. | PROCERENT OF U.S. DE HCC. STANDARBIZATION, (| OFFICIAL OF U.S.: AND JAPANESE DEFENSE FOR THE STREET OF FORESE. | ENPHANES MESALISE BIA OGIE IN DEFENSE ENPHANESE COOPERATION. | |
| JAPAN BASIC INFORMATION | 113,000,000 111,000,000 1.1 fractn | 98.0 PFRCMT 2 | 5580 8H1100 | 55,100 | отпиани | FUTUM Takeo | A Ichiro | SW Riksons | | U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION HEREN | PE T. GALLIFSKII, USAF | CAPT Charles B. COLC. 1858 |

Urce: Command Digact 15, East 22 as 22

Patrol Ship Multi-Mission (PSMM) Purchase from Korea

On 3 September 1976 the GOI signed a contract with Korea-Tacoma Marine Industries for four PSMMs (see also Section I). Originally, under FMS credit, two PSMMs were included as a multi-year buy beginning in FY 76, with four more to be purchased in later years; however, GOI inability to obtain assurances that U.S. FMS financing would be available with sufficiently long-term payback appeared to be at least partially responsible for their decision to deal with the Koreans.

Third-Country Purchase Intentions

- (\$) As of the end of 1976 the GOI was known to be considering the purchase of two submarines from West Germany, a squadron of 16 Italian MB-326KB or MD-339 aircraft, and possibly an Italian-made ship-to-ship missile. These possible third-country purchases appeared to be motivated by more favorable credit terms and less concern with the size and nature of agent's fees than encountered in U.S. purchases.²
- (U) In addition to the above possible purchases, the GOI finally signed a long-expected contract, on 22 March 1976, for the purchase of three Corvette-class destroyers from the Netherlands. Delivery was expected between mid-1979 and 1980.³

Japan

New Defense Plan

- (ℓ) On 29 October 1976 the Japanese Cabinet approved the New Defense Plan (Post-Fourth Defense Buildup Plan) which stressed:⁴
 - Japan's dependence on the security relationship with the United States.
 - The need for qualitative rather than quantitative improvements in Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).

^{1.} AMEMB Jakarta 5377/240245Z Apr 76 and 11713/070710Z Sep 76.

^{2.} J473 HistSum Dec 76.

^{3. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 415; AMEMB Jakarta 3977/ 250840Z Mar 76.

^{4.} AMEMB Tokyo 16355/020915Z Nov 76.

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- The need to develop balanced peacetime forces capable of dealing by themselves with limited small-scale aggression.
- An assessment that full-scale aggression against Japan was unlikely because of the existing great-power balance and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
- (b) The statement of the basic defense concept included an unprecedented phrase which called for "maintaining credibility of security arrangements with U.S. and consolidating arrangements for its smooth operation," thus laying a foundation for possible burden sharing.
- (b) Qualitative improvement of forces included procurement of the following major potential items:²
 - P-3C Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) aircraft to replace aging P-2Js.
 - Future fighter (FX) aircraft to replace F-104s.
 - E-2C Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft.
 - Conversion of basic HAWK batteries to Improved HAWK.
 - Armed helicopters.

Future Fighter (FX) Aircraft Selection

(b) By mid-January 1976 the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) had reduced the FX candidates to replace the F-104J from seven to three: F-14, Grumman; F-15, McDonnell-Douglas; and F-16, General Dynamics. Between 21 May and 13 July 1976 a Japanese FX selection team visited the United States for further evaluations. Between September and the end of the year all indications pointed toward selection of the F-15, although no formal announcement had been made. During the period 29 November-2 December 1976 an Office of the Secretary of Defense briefing team visited Japan to discuss the FX program, and Director General Sakata, JDA requested that data be developed using the F-15 as a pilot model. Total F-15 R&D cost was estimated at \$1.7 billion, and, based on a production run of 1,065 aircraft, production costs were estimated at \$1.6 million each.

^{1.} Ibid.

^{2.} J462 Point Paper, 1 Oct 76, Subj: Japan's Post-Fourth Defense Buildup Plan.

^{3.} CHMDAO Tokyo 8009/270120Z Jan 76, 8099/010815Z Oct 76, 8107/210548Z Oct 76, and 8130/020815Z Dec 76; SECDEF 1566/070257Z May 76.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Aircraft

(S) One major potential sale to Japan at the end of 1975 was the Lockheed P-3C Orion ASW aircraft. Before February 1976 acquisition of this aircraft appeared to be a foregone conclusion; however, in February testimonials before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revealed that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had paid \$12.6 million in fees, commissions, and bribes to sell jetfighters and jetliners to Japan. As a result of this Lockheed payoff scandal in Japan, the P-3C program came into question and the Japanese approach, while still leaning toward P-3C avionics, was to favor a domestically developed airframe. As of December 1976 no decision had been made and the DOD position that the avionics and airframe were inseparable was emphasized.

Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Aircraft

(c) After the Cabinet approval on 29 October 1976, the Japanese National Defense Council (NDC) included a line item for one AEW aircraft squadron in the Defense Buildup Plan. Based on this inclusion, the JASDF AEW study team began to study the E-2C aircraft in greater detail to prepare a request for the Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 1978 budget.²

Improved HAWK

- (b) The JDA's planning objective was conversion of 4.5 HAWK battalions (18 batteries) to the Improved HAWK and production of approximately 500 new missiles in a 5 to 6 year period. At the end of 1976 the JFY 77 (1 April 1977-31 March 1978) budget review with the Finance Ministry made provisions for conversion of .5 battalions (2 batteries) and some (approximately 100) new missiles.³
- (%) As a result of failure to meet some of its Fourth DBP (JFY 72-JFY 76, ending 31 March 1977) objectives, primarily due to inflation, the JDA revealed similar concern for the HAWK conversion program. Believing R&D charges could be more accurately programmed based on showing a larger quantity for acquisition purposes, the JDA desired to amend the 1967 basic HAWK MOU to include the JFY 77 Improved HAWK conversion (2 batteries), while including the remainder of the conversion (16 batteries) in a "side letter" to the MOU. The Office of the Secretary of Defense had no objection to handling the conversion in this manner,

2. CHMDAO Tokyo 8109/020337Z Nov 76.

3. CHMDAO Tokyo 8141/150713Z Dec 76.

CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 418; J462 Point Papers, 1 Apr 76, Subj: Impact of Lockheed Allegations in Japan, and 1 Oct 76, Subj: ASW Aircraft-Japan; CHMDAO Tokyo 8135/060745Z Dec 76; Current History, Apr 76.

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but noted that it would not affect the accuracy of determining R&D charges because a flat four percent of sale price would be levied, regardless of quantity, as the Improved HAWK had been an ongoing program for some years. I

Sale of Landing Ship to the City of Sasebo

(U) On 25 March 1976 a MAP ship (ex-LSSL-14) was sold to the city of Sasebo for \$12,000. The ship was to serve as a breakwater/pier.²

Republic of Korea

Overview |

- Since FY 71 security assistance to the ROK had been provided within the guidelines of the Five-Year Modernization Plan (MOD Plan), which originally provided for \$1.5 billion total obligation authority through FY 75. Of this total, \$1.25 billion was to be in FMS financing and new grant assistance and \$250 million was to be the value of nonreimbursable transfers to consist primarily of grants of EDA under the MAP. At the 1973 (6th) Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), U.S. delegates advised the ROK that the MOD Plan would have to be extended beyond FY 75 (ultimately to FY 77) and that resource transfer regardless of funding source (MAP, FMS financing, EDA, and no cost transfers) would be included in the mutual effort to achieve the \$1.5 billion goal. Restrictions in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1974 on EDA transfers to the ROK, plus the termination of MAP grant aid at the end of FY 76, made it clear that achievement of the MOD Plan goal by FY 77 would be primarily through increased FMS financing. Based on this approach, the State Department concluded that the U.S. Government would actually exceed its commitment to the MOD Plan by some \$14.5 million by the end of FY 77. The ROK, however, continued to view the approximately \$104.3 million shortfall in nonreimbursable EDA as an outstanding U.S. commitment to the MOD Plan.3
- (\$\sigma) In 1975 the Koreans, realizing that they must become increasingly self-reliant in their defense, unilaterally prepared their own Five-Year (FY 76-80) Force Improvement Plan (FIP), which they revealed at the 8th SCM, 26-27 August 1975. Originally estimated at over \$4 billion, the FIP emphasized improvements in air, sea, and land power required for a force capable of defending against North Korea without relying on U.S. Forces. The ROK asked for \$1 billion in U.S. support for the FIP; however, the U.S. position was

2. CHMDAO Tokyo 300801Z Mar 76.

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^{1. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>; CHMDAO Tokyo 8142/160720Z Dec 76; SECDEF 2019/181713Z Dec 76.

^{3. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, pp. 421, 426-427; SECSTATE 239305/ 251637Z Sep 76; CHJUSMAGK 301013Z Aug 76.

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 73,

that the U.S. Government could not enter into multi-year commitments in support of the FIP. Most of the \$275 million in FMS credit for FY 77 was required to finish the MOD Plan, although there would be some available for programs in the FIP. $^{\rm I}$

FY 76/7T Security Assistance Program

(b) The following were the major grant aid (MAP) programs for FY 76/7T:²

| Amount | | , | |
|---------------|--------|---|-----------------|
| (\$ millions) | Number | Program | <u>User</u> |
| 5.8 | | Aerospace Ground Equipment for F-5E Aircraft | ROKAF |
| .3 | | United Nations Forces Support | Tri Hq |
| 12.2 | 6 | F-5B Fighter Aircraft | ROKAF |
| 10.0 | 72 | Radar Warning Receivers for F-5E Aircraft (approximately 1/2 of F-5E Fleet) | ROKAF |
| 4.3 | | War Reserve Munitions | ROKAF |
| 20.1 | 5 | Coastal Patrol & Interdiction Craft (CPIC) | ROKN |
| 9.2 | | Supply Operations (packing, crating, handling, and transportation) | All Services |
| 2.2 | · | Training (\$1.6M supports NIKE- | All |
| 64.1 | | related training) | Services |

(6) Listed below are the major programs funded by FMS credit during FY 76/7T:3

^{1. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, pp. 421-423; J463 Point Paper, 24 Nov 76, Subj: U.S. Security Assistance to ROK (Grant Aid and FMS).

^{2.} J463 Point Paper, 24 Nov 76, Subj: U.S. Security Assistance to ROK (Grant Aid and FMS).

^{3. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>

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| Amount (\$ Millions) | Number* | Program | User |
|----------------------|---------|------------------------------------|--------------|
| 5.5 | 1 | M-16 Rifle Plant (648,000 Rifles) | All Services |
| .5 | 1 | Arsenal Expansion | All Services |
| 4.5 | 800 | AIM-9 Conversion | ROKAF |
| 10.2 | 180 | TOW Missile System | ROKA |
| 3.7 | 10 | F-5B Aircraft | ROKAF |
| 24.8 | 1 | Improved HAWK Battalion Conversion | ROKA |
| 3.3 | 1 | Missile Maintenance Depot | ROKA |
| 16.4 | 19,958 | Radio Co-production | All Services |
| 7.3 | 5 | PSMM Armament | ROKN |
| 10.2 | 12 | HARPOON Systems | ROKN |
| 30.4 | 54 | F-5E Aircraft | ROKAF |
| $\frac{17.2}{134.0}$ | 19 | F-4E Aircraft | ROKAF |

*Most programs are multi-year endeavors. Credit levels shown under \$ are FY 76/7T payments made. Numbers represent total acquisition for project (all years).

FY 77 Security Assistance Program

In FY 77, for all practical purposes, the ROK assumed the responsibility for funding its entire defense effort through FMS and commercial sales. Remaining grant aid was for MAAG costs and payment of packing, crating, handling and transportation (PCH&T) for equipment funded earlier but not yet delivered. Also, \$2.7 million was proposed under the IMETP. The following is a breakout of FY 77 FMS projects:

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^{1.} Ibid.

| Amount | | |
|--------------|-------------|---|
| (\$ Million) | Number* | Program |
| 5.3 | 1 | M-16 Rifle Plant (648,000 Rifles) |
| 1.6 | 1 | Small Arms Ammo Production Arsenal |
| 3.7 | 5 | Patrol Ship Multi-Mission Armament Suite |
| 12.3 | 19,958 | Radio Co-production |
| 4.6 | 800 | AIM-9 Conversion from E to J |
| 6.9 | 180 | TOW Missile Systems |
| 16.7 | 1 | Convert 1 Battalion Basic HAWK to Improved |
| 5.8 | 1 | Missile Maintenance Depot |
| 29.0 | 12 | HARPOON Missile Systems |
| 1.6 | 1 | Aircraft Maintenance Depot |
| 98.4 | 54/6 | F-5E/F-5F Fighter Aircraft |
| 7.8 | 19 | F-4E Fighter Aircraft |
| 35.0 | 421 | Upgrade M-48 Tanks |
| 4.8 | 1 Battalion | Survey & Target Acquisition Equipment |
| 8.9 | 5 | Air Defense Command & Control Equipment |
| 3.0 | 11 | Ground Surveillance Equipment |
| 3.0 | 1 | Helicopter Simulator |
| 1.0 | 1260 | REDEYE |
| 3.0 | 8 | F-5F Aircraft |
| 7.0 | 24 | OV-10 Aircraft |
| 0.5 | 7 | Automation of Aircraft Control & Warning System |
| 0.7 | - | (AIM-7E/CBU-58/MK-82 Bomb) Munitions |
| 1.1 | 90/5 | Smart Bombs/PAVEWAY Illuminators |
| 1.3 | 145 | Radar Homing and Warning Receivers |
| 2.9 | 42 | Electronic-Countermeasure Pods |
| 1.8 | 134 | AN/MRC-108 Communications Central Radios |
| 1.3 | 14 | (AN/FRC-113 Radios) PEACE FORTUNE III |
| <u>6.0</u> | 6 | Transfer of 6 Batteries of U.S. NIKE HERCULES |
| 275.0 | | |

Grant Excess Defense Articles (EDA)

(S) In September 1976 CINCPAC, in response to a Chief, JUSMAGK initiative, recommended that the grant aid EDA program for Korea continue. Using the turnover of in-country NIKE-HERCULES battalions as an example, CINCPAC noted the advantages of grant aid EDA, especially in the wake of possible U.S. Forces drawdowns:

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^{1.} CINCPAC 112213Z Sep 76.

- It would provide a potential means of filling ROK unfunded requirements with a minimum of PCH&T costs.
- It would provide a feasible means of transferring U.S. excesses quickly, thus reducing handling and costs involved in transfers to the Defense Property Disposal Office, storage, scrap sales, etc.
- ullet The U.S. Government could recover residual value at the end of useful equipment life under the provisions of Section 505(F) FAA.
- It would provide for suitable use of equipment in a purpose for which designed, vice transferring to the Defense Property Disposal Office or countries of less strategic importance.
- (S) The Secretary of State, in responding to these attempts to maintain grant aid EDA support to Korea, noted that the MAP for Korea had ended on 30 June 1976, and that this termination applied to EDA as well as non-excess defense articles. The Secretary of State further denied the ROK Government contention relayed by Chief, JUSMAGK that \$104.3 million in grant aid EDA was still outstanding under the Five-Year MOD Plan, noting changes introduced at the 1973 SCM. ¹

Missile Programs

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Capability, especially in the area of surface-to-surface missile systems, led to increased concern on the U.S. side. Chief, JUSMAGK and the American Embassy concluded that the direction of ROK effort was unacceptable. It was agreed that to defuse the situation, the United States should offer to help the ROK with acceptable development efforts and discourage undesirable trends, and a team of experts should be offered to make recommendations on ROK missile development programs. CINCPAC agreed with the idea of offering a team of experts, but was against committing the United States in advance to support the team recommendations. In general, CINCPAC rejected the need to extend the range of ROK missiles, to include the surface-to-surface range of the NIKE-HERCULES, for attack on Pyongyang, and advised that escalation in the ROK missile program could be perceived as threatening by North Korea, thus leading to a further arms buildup. CINCPAC did, however, support, on a case-by-case basis, ROK surface-to-surface missile development or acquisition programs

^{1.} SECSTATE 239305/251637Z Sep 76; CHJUSMAGK 301013Z Aug 76.

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which met valid requirements, were within ROK capabilities, and were consistent with U.S. interests. $^{\rm l}$

NIKE-HERCULES

- In January 1975 the ROK agreed to accept six NIKE-HERCULES firing batteries (one battalion) of the U.S. 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade. To meet the requirements to operate the U.S. sites, ROK trainees were programmed for CONUS training, in-country training at a ROK-established Air Defense School in Taegu, and infusion into U.S. sites. This training continued according to schedule during 1976, and on 30 September 1976 the ROK signed the LOA for turnover of the six batteries by the end of June 1977. The equipment was classified as EDA and was priced at \$5.4 million.²
- During 1976 the ROK continued to press for release of surface-tosurface conversion kits for NIKE-HERCULES missiles. Requisitions for these kits were turned down by the Department of the Army during 1975, probably in conjunction with State and Defense Department opposition to other ROK initiatives to improve NIKE-HERCULES surface-to-surface capabilities. These initiatives included a McDonnell-Douglas study to improve the surface-tosurface capabilities of the NIKE-HERCULES system with respect to range, payload, and guidance accuracy, which would provide the ROK with greater selfsufficiency in intermediate range missiles. McDonnell-Douglas did not pursue this effort beyond the project feasibility phase. When the subject of sale of NIKE-HERCULES surface-to-surface conversion kits was raised again in May 1976, CINCPAC supported the sale if the kits offered no appreciable increased range and payload for the system. In response, the Secretary of Defense posed no objection to ROK acquisition of kits to enable use of the NIKE-HERCULES in a high explosive surface-to-surface role in accordance with the missile systems inherent and current capabilities. The Secretary of Defense, with Secretary of State concurrence, further authorized the Army to prepare an LOA for the ROK for 38 high explosive adapter kits for surface-to-surface firings.3

HAWK

(5) The ROK had three basic HAWK battalions. Approximately \$35 million in FMS credit had been committed to conversion of one battalion to the Improved

1. J461 HistSum Nov 76; CINCPAC 172226Z Jul 76 and 182321Z Nov 76.

3. <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, pp. 432-433; CINCPAC 050142Z Jun 76; SECDEF 8550/181602Z Jun 76.

^{2. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 432; J4 WEB 25 Sep-1 Oct 76; J46 Point Paper, 28 Apr 76, Subj: NIKE-HERCULES Transfer; J462 HistSum Oct 76.

HAWK beginning in May 1977. In August 1976 the ROK requested an LOA for conversion of their remaining two battalions to Improved HAWK for a cost of \$80 million.

(S) In January 1976 the ROK Minister of Defense was approached to determine his interest in acquiring 8 of the 12 U.S. HAWK batteries (2 battalions) located in Korea in the FY 79 time frame. The ROK Minister of Defense agreed in principle with the transfer, but preferred to delay the transfer to the 1980 time frame (after completion of the Korean FIP) due to the high costs involved. During 1976 price information was developed by the Secretary of Defense and initial indications were that the cost was expected to be near 100 percent of acquisition value, or \$60 to \$70 million per battalion.²

HARPOON

On 30 March 1976 the ROK accepted the LOA for sale of 12 HARPOON missile systems and 120 missiles (FMS Case KS-AAP-P6). Subsequently, Chief, JUSMAGK asked for five additional systems for installation on CPIC. The Secretary of Defense authorized the CNO to amend the earlier FMS case and a survey team visited the ROK to evaluate the proposed installation on CPIC. At year's end the amended LOA was still pending release to the ROK.³

TOW Anti-Tank Missiles

(b) The ROK had signed two FMS cases for six companies (18 launchers per company) of TOW anti-tank missiles, two companies of which had been delivered at the end of 1975. In January 1976 Chief, JUSMAGK advised that the ROK had requested additional TOW missiles and equipment for four more TOW companies to bring the total to 10 companies as indicated in the ROK FIP.4

REDEYE

In April 1976 Chief, JUSMAGK requested an LOA for 70 REDEYE missile systems for the ROK armed forces for defense against low flying aircraft in the Northwest Island chain. CINCPAC recommended loan of REDEYE for Northwest Island defense only, but the Secretary of State authorized transfer through

2. COMUSK 090500Z Jan 76; J46 Point Paper, 28 Apr 76, Subj: HAWK Transfer.

3. <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 433; CHJUSMAGK 310151Z Mar 76; SECDEF 3489/200032Z Aug 76; J463 HistSum Dec 76.

4. <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 433; CHJUSMAGK 070910Z Jan 76.

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^{1.} CHJUSMAGK 090950Z Jan 76 and 191340Z Aug 76; J463 Point Paper, 15 Sep 76, Sugj: Conversion of ROKA Units to Improved HAWK.

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FMS with the stipulation that the missile systems be sold back to the United States when no longer required for defense of the Northwest Islands. The National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee granted an exception to national disclosure policy allowing release of the 70 REDEYE missiles to the ROK, and they were sold to the ROK in June 1976 (FMS case URM) from 8th U.S. Army stocks.

Aircraft Programs

Fighter/Attack Aircraft Status

(3) At the time of the 9th U.S.-ROK SCM, 26-27 May 1976, ROK fighter aircraft status was as follows:²

| Aircraft | On-Hand | CY 76 | CV 77 | OV 70 | Projected |
|----------|---------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | <u>CY 76</u> | <u>CY 77</u> | <u>CY 78</u> | <u>Total</u> |
| F-86 | 89 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 73a |
| F-4D | 34 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 34 |
| F-4E | 0 | 0 | 16 | 3 | 7.9b |
| F-5A | 71 | 2C | 0 | 0 | 73 |
| RF-5A | 8 | a jc | .0 | 10 | 9 |
| F-5B | 26 | . gd | 0 | Ô | 34 |
| F-5E | 48 | 25 e | 27f | 27f | 126 |
| F-5F | 0 | 0 | 3f | 3f | 6 |
| A-37B | 0 | <u>20</u> | 0 | 0 | 209 |
| Total | 276 | 55 | 46 | 33 | 394h |

- a. Reflects washout schedule. By CY 80 only 57 to remain in inventory.
- b. Acquired through FMS, project PEACE PHEASANT.
- c. SEA retrograde obtained through FMS.
- d. Acquired through grant aid/FMS mix, project PEACE NEEDLE.
- e. Includes 21 aircraft returned by ROC to ROK under ENHANCE PLUS and last 3 grant aid funded F-5E aircraft.
- f. Acquired under FMS project PEACE FREEDOM.
- g. SEA retrograde obtained through FMS, project PEACE LODE, ROK also desired to purchase seven additional for cannibalization.
- During CY 76-78 time frame, in conjunction with programmed acquisitions, ROKAF was scheduled to phaseout 6 T-33, 6 T-38, 12 C-46, 5 C-54, 6 H-19 in addition to 16 F-86 reflected in note "a" above.
- 1. CHJUSMAGK 201012Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 230400Z Apr 76; SECSTATE 119814/151345Z May 76.
- 2. <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, pp. 429-430; U.S.-ROK SCM Background Paper, n.d., Subj: ROKAF Fighter Aircraft Acquisitions: Status/Program; CHJUSMAGK 270847Z Apr 76; J463 HistSums Apr 76. Dec 76.

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Radar Warning Receivers (RWR) for Fighter Aircraft

In January 1976 the Director of Maintenance Management, Kelly AFB, TX provided a revised estimate for installing AN/ALR-46(V) RWR on ROK fighter aircraft. The estimate was reduced from \$180.2 million for 205 F-5 aircraft to \$72.9 million for 193 F-5 aircraft (12 F-5Es would be properly configured during production by separate estimate) due to the elimination of the requirement for a new environmental control system. To accommodate a portion of this program, Chief, JUSMAGK programmed \$10 million of FY 76 grant aid funds against RWR modifications to 72 MAP-provided F-5E aircraft. The project was designated PEACE HOME.

S-2E ASW Aircraft

(A) During 1976 one squadron (20 aircraft) of S-2Es was delivered to the ROK. As the U.S. Navy was phasing the S-2 out of its active inventory, allies were advised to deal directly with the commercial source (Grumman) for spares and repair parts. The ROK had contacted Grumman, but was slow to sign any contract. At year's end Chief, JUSMAGK requested the CNO to reconsider his position and establish a USN FMS Supply Support Arrangement to provide follow-on support for allies.²

F-16 Acquisition

The ROK recognized the need for an advanced fighter in their FIP. In the past they had asked for various information, including price and availability of the F-16, and detailed cost and performance planning data for the F-4E, F-15, F-16, F-18, and A-10. The ROK informally requested U.S. Government approval for plans, with General Dynamics, to assemble F-16 aircraft in country during CY 79-81. The Country Team did not take a position on the ROK request, but asked for the opportunity to comment on the General Dynamics proposal prior to release to the ROK. In November the Secretary of Defense advised that the U.S. Government had made no decision to offer the F-16 for FMS to the ROK or to approve the assembly or co-production of the F-16 in the ROK. He further advised that the F-16 master plan indicated earliest F-16 availability to the ROK would be in mid-1982, and that the U.S. Government approval of co-production was a separate issue requiring extensive Washington review.³

2. CNO 052110Z Aug 76; CHJUSMAGK 270608Z Dec 76.

CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 431; DIR MAT MGT Kelly AFB TX 162230Z Jan 76; CHJUSMAGK 170636Z Jun 76 and 291003Z Sep 76; HQUSAF 231315Z Aug 76 and 242110Z Sep 76.

^{3.} SECDEF 4814/231338Z Nov 76; CHJUSMAGK 110243Z Nov 76; PACAF 032115Z Nov 76.

Close Air Support Study

(C) At the suggestion of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in August 1975, CINCPAC conducted a study of the F-5E, A-7, and the A-10 to determine which aircraft could best perform the close air support mission in Korea. The CINCPAC study, completed 1 September 1976, concluded that the A-10 was the preferred aircraft primarily due to its larger ordnance carrying capability, lesser vulnerability to the anti-aircraft threat and its decided gun advantage.

Air Defense Systems

Air Defense Control Systems

(S) In view of the North Korean tactical fighter threat, there was concern about the requirement for an integrated system for air-to-air, air-to-ground, and ground-to-air control in the Korea scenario. Both the tactical air and surface-to-air missile (SAM) control elements of the overall ROK system were manually operated. They needed to be automated and integrated. During 1976 the ROK had studied SAM control and was in the process of studying aircraft surveillance and control. In conjunction with these efforts the ROK desired to acquire the AN/TSQ-73 "missile minder" subsystem hardware during 1976. The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) supported ROK acquisition of an AN/TSQ-73, but CINCPAC advised delay in release of any LOA for the subsystem until systems design parameters of an integrated command and control system were established. At year's end CINCPAC had acquiesced in providing planning and budgetary information on the AN/TSQ-73, but still advised withholding the LOA.²

Low Altitude Aircraft Detection System (LAADS)

In December 1976 CINCPAC, in response to a JCS request, recommended against sale of the LAADS to the ROK pending completion of the ROK air defense study.

^{1.} J463 Point Paper, 13 Sep 76, Subj: Close Air Support Study, ROK; J461 HistSums Jan, Jul, Dec 76.

^{2.} J463 Point Paper, 10 Sep 76, Subj: Air Surveillance and Control-ROK; CINCUNC 181600Z Jun 76; CINCPAC 080015Z Jul 76, 060055Z Nov 76, and 042154Z Dec 76; JCS 8779/281420Z Oct 76.

^{3.} JCS 6564/042014Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 232044Z Dec 76.

Air-to-Ground Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)

(\$) Throughout 1976 the ROK continued to indicate a high priority requirement for PGM, to include LGB and other systems. In view of the advanced technology involved in these systems, CINCPAC reviewed requests for release on a case-by-case basis (see Section I, Release of High Technology to PACOM Countries, for CINCPAC's case-by-case position).

Tank Improvement Program

- (\$) By 1976 the ROK tank force, composed of 421 M-47, 140 M-48, and 280 M-48A2C tanks, was approaching a logistically unsupportable state. Life-of-type buys for repair parts for all gasoline engines, and for the M-47 tanks, had been completed and production facilities dismantled. Parts stocks were sufficient only to last through 1980.²
- (S) The ROK Minister of Defense and Chief, JUSMAGK had conducted an analysis of options for improving the tank force, considering both logistical supportability and tactical effectiveness. The most cost effective ways for the ROK to improve the tank force appeared to be:3
 - Replace the 421 M-47 tanks with M-48A1 tanks procured from the U.S. and upgrade these M-48A1 tanks to M-48A3 (diesel, 90mm gun) in Korea.
 - Upgrade the remaining 420 M-48 tanks to M-48A3 configuration.
 - Defer a decision to acquire new tanks until the post-FIP period.
- (S) All U.S. M-48 tanks were originally programmed (SECDEF PDM for FY 77) to be retained and upgraded to the A-5 version in order to help reduce a serious U.S. tank inventory shortfall. Sale of 421 M-48 tanks to the ROK required Defense Department approval because it would exacerbate the U.S. shortfall and delay attainment of the U.S. inventory objective at current budget levels.⁴

^{1.} J463 HistSums Jan, Apr, Jun-Jul 76; J461 HistSum Jan 76.

^{2.} U.S.-ROK SCM Background Paper, n.d., Subj: ROK Tank Improvement Program.

^{3. &}lt;u>Ibid</u>.

^{4.} Ibid.

| AREA | \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ | MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY |
|---|--|---|
| | | 9 Prinades 21 Présente Date 11. |
| Annal Grath 2.7 Percent | \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ | Characters, 51 intentity batted forms |
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| | \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ | (Border Scouts Strength: 1.200) |
| CONC. | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | [Ssentially an infantry force trained and experienced to imple |
| PUR CAPITA | KUALA EUMPUR O | operations. Fairly effective in internal security and counteringur- |
| AS PROCEED AS PROCEED. | | gency missions up to battalion level. Very slight capability at |
| | | allack of onemine in money for resisting a significant external |
| PARAMNHUT RULER VANYA Petra ibni Al Marhum Sultan Ibrahim | *** | able outside assistance. |
| PRIM HINISTER | ~ | |
| ACTING DEFENSE MINISTER, . HUSSELTS bin (nm | | NAVY |
| AFFAIRS Ahmad PITRANDETE | U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES | 2 lostroyer facout types, 30 Coastal Patrol types (7 nonojerational), |
| | PRIVITE TARGETTE EVIDENCE OF CORPORAL COM A CTABLE MAN | fare Craft, 4 Hork Boats, I Survey Vescal I Diving Jandes |
| AFFARES Mohammed GMAZALT him Shafte | THE STATE OF SOLICE TOWN A STATE STATE | · District of the same of the |
| | COMMUNIST INLANSIAM GOVERNMENT. | Strength: 5,000 |
| STAFF ILRAHIP bin Ismail, GLN | | Offshore patrol, defense of sea lines of communication and |
| (NF RAL | ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF FORCES | territorial waters, as well as support of internal security opera- |
| STAFF, ARMY | CADARF DC Acciminate tays name, projection | tions. Limited by small size, maintenance problems, long coastline |
| THE MAYAL | CALLET OF ASSERTING INTERIOR SECURITY AND STABILITY. | and decographic separation of the country into two portions. |
| | AND IN FACILITATING THE SALE OF U.S. MILITARY | |
| LAILE OF AIR STAFF MOHANGO bin Taib, Air Vice Harshal | EQUIPMENT. | AIR FORCE 39 dets. 6 Turbonrons, 41 Pronellor Airrasses (2 Delignations |
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| Co DIATORATIC ALISSION | PERSONAL PROPERTY SECONDS FOR THE PROPERTY AND | CAD'C : EDELLISE |
| U.S. AMBASSABOR HOM. Francis T. UMDERHILL, JR. | AND 115 MM-COMMINST NETGHBONS | Can provide relatively effective transport to Army, Bave, and Polite for internal enemity mission. |
| USOMO COL Michard C. EMMN, JR., USA | | Support capability with (1-41) and (-51 aircraft, |
| | | |

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 74.

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At the 9th SCM Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved a ROK request to purchase 421 M-48A1 from U.S. Army depot stocks at the best possible price (eventually offered through FMS at \$86,162 for serviceable and \$78,329 for unserviceable tanks). In July 1976 the ROK requested sale and delivery of 190 available California National Guard M-48A1s and five complete M-48A3 modification kits for delivery by the end of CY 76. Through the end of 1976 further efforts were directed at preparing LOAs covering radios, CBR protection kits, machine guns, 90mm gun tubes, and 416 more tank conversion kits.

U.S.-ROK Science and Technology Agreement

(b) On 22 November 1976 the U.S. Ambassador and ROK Foreign Minister ratified an agreement for cooperation in science and technology. Data begin exchanged under the agreement would not contribute to the ROK Missile Engineering Program. 2

Malaysia

Approximately 2,000 communist terrorists (CT) posed an internal threat to Malaysia, and over the past year there had been a gradual but steady increase in CT activity on the peninsula, mostly along the Malay-Thai border. Malaysia received "CONUS Training Only" through the International Military Education and Training Program and FMS. The current program, extending over a three-year period and based on an interdepartmental team (DOD-CIA) visit in 1975, consisted primarily of materiel and training appropriate for counterinsurgency operations. The priority of major security assistance items desired by the Government of Malaysia during FY 76-77 was: M-16s, S-61 helicopters, UH-1H helicopters, V-150 armored cars, LSTs, and 105mm howitzers.

New Zealand

[6] FMS to New Zealand were on a cash basis. Sales for FY 76 totaled just over \$6 million and FY 77 sales were projected at \$4 million. New Zealand generally followed Australia's lead in procurement of major weapons systems. Past purchases had included 14 A-4K aircraft, 5 C-130 aircraft, 5 P-3B aircraft, 20 UH-1H helicopters, and training. Current FMS activity involved logistics arrangements (spare parts). Prospective sales for FY 77-81 included mostly aeronautical and naval modifications, missiles, vehicles,

2. J461 HistSum Nov 76; AMEMB Seoul 9243/220658Z Nov 76.

CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 443-444; J472 Point Paper, 5 Oct 76, Subj: Security Assistance for Malaysia; J5121 Point Paper, 2 Mar 76, Subj: Political-Military Situation - Malaysia.

SECREI

^{1.} CHJUSMAGK 060100Z Jul 76; J463 HistSum Dec 76.

NEW ZEALAND

| | | | ı |
|--|--|--|----------|
| NEW ZEALAND BASIC INFORMATION | | MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMMAY CAPABILITY | |
| AREA | 5 | | |
| POPULATION | | | _ |
| | 25 | ARMY | |
| MANUAL GROWTH 2.0 PERCENT | | In Company Despelling 9 Interest Bank and an artist of the second | _ |
| LITERACY RATE 98 PERCENT | \ | interesty betterious, 2 intensity originary, 1 special Air service | |
| LIFE EXPECTANCY | が、連続できる。 | Squadran | |
| | て | | |
| ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA | | Strength: 5,600 | 2 |
| GROSS MATIBNAR PRODUCT | <u> </u> | | |
| OFO CADITA | LAS WELLINGTON | | |
| D/8/58 | | | |
| DEFENSE BBOGET | | WAVY | 1 |
| AS PERCENT OF GMP | | | |
| | - Social Control | Destroyer types, IO Loastal types, 4 Auxillary types | |
| GOYENNOR GENERAL Str Dents BLUNDELL | | 900 6 - 140-00-03 | 9 |
| PRINC NAMISTER | | 0017 : Infantit | ? |
| | | | _ |
| Olek #: | | | <u>-</u> |
| FOREIGN MINISTER TALBOYS |) | AIR FORCE | _ |
| Minister of Defense | • | 121 Aircraft, of which 29 are jets. 2 Attack Squadrons, 3 Transpor- | |
| | | | - |
| CHILL OF MICHAEL STATE AIR PROSMI, RICHARD B. HULL | U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES | tallon squadroms, I mecommaissance Squadrom, Z Battlefield Support | |
| CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, ARMY INC. GEN Ronald D.P. HASSETT | PROMOTE CONTINUED AND ENGANCED COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. AND | Squadrons, 1 Training Mine, and 1 Sase Mine. | |
| CHEEF OF MANAL STAFF | | | |
| | MEN ZEALAND FONCES. | Strength: 4,300 | 2 |
| • [| CHARLEST ON TEACH COMPANY COMPANY STANDARD SCHOOL | | _ |
| U.S. DIPLOMATIC | COMPLICATION AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY | | _ |
| U.S. ANBASSABOR | ACCESS TO NEW ZEALAND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. | | |
| SCORE WITH WITH THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O | | | • |
| 100 mm m | ASSIST ON CHARLESTEES, TALISTAINING, AND STREETHENING FOREIGN | | |
| | SEEF-DEFENSE CAPABILITY. | | |
| | The second secon | | - |
| | FRUITS STANDARD LAND OF THE PROOF, TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES. | - | - |
| | | | _ |
| | | | _ |
| | | | |

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 76.

command and control equipment, 16 105mm howitzers, and training. Also the New Zealand Navy was faced with the problem of replacing aging frigates beginning in 1982. An interest was being shown in U.S. Coast Guard HAMILTON-class cutters.

<u>Pakistan</u>

Overview

(5) After the State Department announced an end to its decade-long embargo on exports of military equipment to Pakistan in 1975, equipment was sold on a case-by-case cash-only basis. The Defense Representative to Pakistan noted at the FY 76 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference that Pakistan appeared pleased with U.S. equipment and logistics support and soured on People's Republic of China and French-provided equipment because of high support costs and failure rates.²

A-7 Aircraft

(S) Early in 1976 a four-man Pakistan Air Force (PAF) team visited the United States to evaluate the A-4, F-5, and A-7 as possible follow-on aircraft for the PAF. Their evaluation resulted in a formal request, 19 May 1976, to purchase 110 A-7s and a complete (except for nuclear weapons) array of weapons systems, munitions, electronic countermeasure (ECM) equipment and target acquisition capabilities. The JCS requested CINCPAC's views to incorporate in their response to the Secretary of Defense. CINCPAC convened the newly-formed PACOM Release Review Group to consider the PAF request, based on the external threat and technology involved in the requested systems and munitions. As a result of this review, CINCPAC recommended sale of only 59 A-7s in conjunction with replacement of aging F-86s as recognized in the JSOP FY 78-85. Furthermore, CINCPAC recommended not including offensive capabilities such as inflight refueling, and not releasing certain systems based on technological grounds:³

- Target Recognition Attack Multisensor (TRAM)
- Laser Tracker

^{1.} J465 Point Paper, 18 Nov 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in New Zealand.

CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 452; Op. Cit., Report on the 1975 [FY 76] PACOM MAAG Chief's Conference, p. 8.

AMEMB Islamabad 5130/190858Z May 76; JCS 5510/192116Z May 76; CINCPAC 020355Z Jun 76.

trenath: 17,600 Sterngth: 408,000 (Paramilitary Strength: 75,000) 1 Light Bomber Squadrom (8-578), 3 Highter-Romber Squadroms (F-86), Chasers, 3 Submarines, 13 Motor Sumboats, 4 Bydrafoil Motor Torpedo Hoderate capability to maintain internal security and limited 7 Fighter Squadrous (MIG-19 and MIPAGE EII), 2 Transport Squadrons 1 Antiaircraft Cruiser, 4 Destroyers, 1 frigate, 2 Large Submarine 6 Corys Meadquarters, 16 Infautry Divisions, 2 Armored Divisions: Incapable of defending coastline and has very limited anti-MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY Aspendent on foreign submarine warfare and mine warfare capability. No transport or Toderate interceptor and limited close air Boats, 7 Inshore Hinesweepers, 3 Auxiliaries. capability to resist external apprecsion. AIR FORCE sources of supply for most war materiel. amphibious capability. (0-130) COUNTRY AND HEVELOP CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY FORCES OF UTHER ALLIED/FRIFUDLY MATIONS ENCOURAGING REGIONAL COUPERA-U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL FOSTIRING FAVORABLE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND ENCOURAGING PORSUIT WITH-ASSIST IN OBTAINING NECESSARY REGITS, AUTHORIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES, "KINTAIN AND STRENCIHEN CONTACTS BETHEREN HOST COUNTRY AND AKISTAN'S THELLARY LINEACTS DEFENSE OF CONTIGUOUS AIRSPACE/SEA AREAS AND TO ASSURE ENTERNAL DEFENSE AND CONVIN TO RESIST AND MEETING THE PARTSTAN FINCOURAGE PAKISTAN IN THE MILITARY INTERESTS AND ST U.S. SECUI CAPABII ITES ON COUNTRY'S CIL Richard F. GIBBS, USAF Mont 7 PERCENT ACM Zulfigar Ali KHAN About 40 YEARS \$12.25 BILLEON Fazal Clahi CHAUDHRY ADM Mohammad SHARIFF 310,000 Sty MI Zulfikar Ali BHUTTO Zulfikar Ali BHUTTO SERG MILLI LINE C.F.N. Mohasmed SHARIF 3.2 PERCENT 14 PERCENT MR. Juseph C. WMEELER Hitl. Henry A. BYROADE 1.1 ACRE GEN 21A-U1-118q \$175 PAKISTAN BASIC INFORMATION U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION CHIEF OF AIR STAFF ARABLE LAND FER CAPITA CHAIRMAN ACS COMMITTEE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PRESTORINE U.S. DRP CHIEF OF NAVAL STRFF AS PERCENT OF CUP CHIFF OF ARMY STAFF MINISTER OF DUFFINSE DEFENSE ROUGET . . . U.S. ALD DIRECTOR PRINT MINISTER . **B.S. AMBASSATOR** LIFE EXFECTABLEY PEF CAPITA THENRY GARRIER LITERACY MATE POPPILATION

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 77.

- Later versions of WALLEYE, HARPOON, HARM, and CONDOR weapons systems.
 - Advanced ECM equipment.
- (U) No further action was taken on this request through year's end.

TOW Missiles

(2) On 4 July 1976 the 24 TOW launchers and 450 missiles purchased by Pakistan in October 1975 had arrived in country. On 8 July the LOA for a follow-on buy of 200 launchers and 3,000 missiles, training set, and ancillary equipment was sent to the Pakistan Embassy. Congressional approval was required as the LOA was valued at \$27 million.

JEZEBEL ASW System

The Pakistan Navy was concerned with their limited ASW capability in the face of India's submarine threat, and had requested the JEZEBEL ASW system to counter this threat. CINCPAC had recommended release of the JEZEBEL system to Pakistan, and by July 1976 the NDPC approved release of AN/AQA-5 JEZEBEL narrowband processing equipment and related confidential material for use on three Pakistani Atlantique aircraft acquired from France.²

T-37 Aircraft

(U) During April 1976 the PAF received 18 T-37 aircraft under lease to increase their trained pilot output from 60-65 per year to 100-150 per year.³

Miscellaneous FMS Cases

On 16 July 1976 the Secretary of State notified the American Embassy, Islamabad that several major FMS cases for Pakistan, which had encountered some delay, were being processed. These cases included transfer of the GEARING-class destroyers and two ocean-going minesweepers, and LOAs on armored personnel carriers, tank recovery vehicles, tractors, and Mark-46 torpedoes. In reference to the destroyers, CINCPAC, on 8 October 1976, supported Commander Mid-East Force and CINCPACFLT views that SW-15 crypto equipment be installed and that antisubmarine rocket (ASROC) equipment be retained. The rationale behind

^{1.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 456; J4 WEB 24-30 Jul 76.

^{2.} J4 WEBs 15-21 May 76 and 26 Jun-4 Jul 76.

^{3.} J4 WEB 10-16 Apr 76.

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this recommendation was the importance of Pakistan's basing and staging facilities for U.S. Fleet operations in the Indian Ocean.

Republic of the Philippines

Overview

Throughout 1976 the major focus in U.S.-Philippine relations was on the base negotiations. While they did not have a significant impact on the FY 76-FY 77 Philippine security assistance programs, levels of assistance beyond FY 77 were subject to the outcome of the negotiations, and its was realized that the <u>quid</u>, in the form of assistance, for use of the bases would be the hardest problem to solve. Ambassador Sullivan had originally thought that a grant aid guarantee of \$15-20 million and FMS credit of \$20-30 million a year could solve the problem. As of November 1976 the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had proposed a five-year financial package totalling two billion U.S. dollars, but on the U.S. side the matter was left for consideration by the new Administration.²

FY 78 Funding Estimates

(S) In November 1976 the Secretary of State forwarded proposed MAP (\$19.6 million) and FMS credit (\$20 million) funding levels for FY 78. Based on these levels, the American Embassy, Manila advised that the FMS credit would be used entirely against payments due for 11 F-5E aircraft, while MAP materiel major items of equipment were estimated in priority order, as follows:³

Item (Number)

Helicopters, UH-1H (5)
Armored Personnel Carriers (15)
105mm Howitzers (8)
Trucks (32)
Patrol Boats, 65-ft MK3 (4)
Medium Landing Craft (2)

^{1.} SECSTATE 177037/162247Z Jul 76; J4 WEB 2-8 Oct 76.

^{2.} J5124 Point Paper, 9 Apr 76, Subj: U.S./Phil Base Negotiations; J5123 Point Paper, 30 Nov 76, Subj: Status of Philippine Base Negotiations.

^{3.} SEXSTATE 283410/1/181354Z Nov 76; AMEMB Manila 18515/260925Z Nov 76.

PHILIPPINES

| PHILIPPINES BASIC INFORMATION | | MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY |
|--|--|---|
| FM (02 000), 811 | | ARMY |
| OPIN ATEM | | 4 Infantiv Mivistons - I Infantry Ericada - I Ilona Cafon a force I company |
| CHEAN MANUEL STATE | <u> </u> | Airborne) |
| THE EAST PART | | Strenoth: 63,500 |
| THE EXPLORAGY 59 YEARS | | Constabulary: 4 Zone (owenands (Brigade), 11 Battalions, 1 Metrocom |
| SPARIT LAND FOR CAPITA | QUEZON CITY POR | (Brinade), Presidential Guard Nattalion. |
| CONTRACTOR FOR CONCENTENT OF STATE OF S | | Strength: 40,200 |
| THE CAPITAL STATES STAT | | In conjunction with the Constabulary, the Army can maintain internal contributed out on the constant internation and cities. The contribute international cities and contribute international cities and contribute international cities. |
| MITHUSE BUNGET (Self-Timanord) 1975 Sala MILLION | | missions. Not capable of resisting a major external attach without |
| AS PERCENT OF GUP | | considerable nutside assistance. Budget limitations, understrength compatunits, and lark of onserational experience and tesimina shows |
| Ferdinand E. EDROS | 2. 6 | battalion level retard combat readiness. |
| SFCRLTARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS Carlos P. IMMU | | |
| SECRETARY NATIONAL DEFLUSE Juan P. EHRILE | | ANN |
| CHILE OF STAFF, AFP GER ROUGO ESPIMO, ARMY | • | 1 Destroyer type, 50 Coastal Patrol types, 4 Mine Warfare types, |
| VICE CHIEF OF STAFF AFP | | 11 Amphibious types, 10 Auxiliary types, 1 Marine Brigade. |
| CG, ARMY | U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES | Strength: 19,900, which includes 6,000 Marinus |
| FOIC, MAYY RAIGH EFNESTO R. ONDENAR | | Townsor, Thereto Diastore patrol and minor amenitous and willi- submaring warfare operations. |
| CG, ATP FORCE SARMIENTO | ABHIFIRIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AND DERY THEM TO FORCES OPPOSED TO U.S. | |
| CHEF COMSTANDEARY | INTER! STS. | AIR FORCE |
| U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION | SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED INTERNAL SECURITY TO MEET | SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED INTERNAL SECURITY TO MEET 3 factical fighter Squadrons (2 F-86, 1 F-5), 1 Attack "quadron (1-28, 1 P-5), 2 P-20, 2 P-20, 3 |
| U.S. ArBASSADOR HIN. MITHIAM IF. SULLIVAN | FACILITIES. | RECONTING HINE MILE PROMILE PROMILED LIE SECURELLE OF U.S. 17-1-100-010-010-010-010-010-010-010-010 |
| U.S. AID DERECTOR HR. Thomas C. NIBLOCK | PREMOTE EQUIPMENT COMMONALITY, BOTH INTERNALLY AND | F-27, C123K, NOWAD N-22), 3 Training Squadrons (T-33, F-41, SF-260KK). |
| CHIEF JUSMAG | REGIONALLY, TO EMHANCE MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY, WHEN | trength: 16,800 limited casebility to assist the Army in maintaining internal |
| | PRANTE SELF-RELTANCE. | security and contributing to the defense avainst external attack. |
| | | |

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 78.

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Transfer of Ships Located in Japan

- Throughout 1976 efforts were made, with the base negotiations in mind, to expedite the transfer to the GOP of a total of 54 ships located in Japan. These ships included 31 already authorized in 1975 for pick up by the Philippine Navy as MAP-redistributable assets, 2 ex-Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer escorts (DE) to be sold under FMS for \$95,000 each, 10 ex-Military Sealift Command LSTs to be sold under FMS for \$200,000 each, and 11 other ex-JMSDF ships/craft. A major obstacle to expediting the transfer was the Status of Forces Agreement with Japan, according to which logistics support from Japan for the transfer of excess ships to third countries was prohibited. Neither the use of grant aid PCH&T funds nor U.S. Navy opportune lift was considered cost effective. The remaining two options considered for transport to the Philippines were:
 - Activate and sail two DEs and three LSTs, and tow or load the remainder at a cost of \$5.3 million.
 - Commercially prepare and tow ships at a cost of \$1.05 million.
- (C) Based on President Marcos' interest in upgrading the Philippine Navy, a special budget was prepared for the ships located in Japan, and at year's end a Philippine Navy survey team was sent to Japan to inspect and survey the ships/craft and develop work packages for subsequent contracting with Japanese commercial shipyards.²

Ship Repair Facilities

In May 1976 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL provided an assessment of Philippine Navy drydock facilities in conjunction with the current increase in Philippine Navy ship acquisition:³


| Identification YD-205-formerly USN AFDL 44 YD-204-formerly USN AFDL 20 YD-200-formerly USN AFDL 24 YD-203-formerly USN AFDL 3682 | 1,000 tons 1,000 tons 150 tons | Construction Reinf concrete Steel Steel Wood | Date 1944 1944 1943 1943 | Condition Marginal Marginal Marginal Unsat/inactive |
|--|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|---|
| Marine railway | 150 tons | HOOG | 1974 | Satisfactory |

- 1. <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, pp. 459-460; CHJUSMAGPHIL 170242Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 212025Z May 76; AMEMB Tokyo 8039/281100Z May 76.
- 2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 040855Z Nov 76.
- 3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 040432Z May 76.

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Plans for installation of a 3,500-ton syncrolift at Cavite Naval Shipyard to replace these aging MAP drydocks had to be shelved in the face of a commercial syncrolift scheduled for installation at the Bataan Shipbuilding and Engineering Company shipyard. In view of this situation CINCPAC requested the CNO to review the availability of USN assets for sale, lease, or loan. The CNO identified AFDL 10 (lifting capacity of 1,000 tons) and CINCPAC recommended its lease to the GOP and a continuing review of U.S. assets for availability of a 2,000 to 3,000-ton drydock. The availability of AFDL 10 was held in confidence pending the base negotiations.

F-5E Acquisition



In August 1976 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL advised that the GOP desired to use \$7.4 million in remaining FY 76 FMS credit as the initial F-5E payment (Project PEACE MAHOGANY); however, as of year's end, the GOP had not signed the LOA because of a desire to make a comparative evaluation of the F-5E with

Ibid.; CHJUSMAGPHIL 250619Z May 76; CINCPAC 080347Z May 76, 190422Z May 76, and 290432Z May 76; CNO 142308Z May 76.

CINCPAC 200029Z Feb 76.

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the F-8H, A-4C, and other aircraft of similar types. The LOA expiration date remained 3 January 1977. $^{\rm l}$

T-28 Aircraft

During 1976 the GOP accepted a total of 60 T-28 aircraft, located in Thailand, under MIMEX procedures:²

| <u>Origin</u> | T-28B | T-28C | T-28D | Totals |
|---------------|----------|----------|-------|-----------|
| Cambodia | 12* | | 23* | 35* |
| Laos | <u>8</u> | <u>3</u> | 14 | 25 |
| | 20 | 3 | 37 | <u>60</u> |

*GOP originally accepted total of 42 (15 T-28B and 27 T-28D); however, on-site inspection revealed that 3 T-28B and 4 T-28D were unsuitable. CINCPAC concurred in deletion and recommended turnover of these aircraft to Royal Thai Government for cannibalization or disposal in accordance with Section 505(F), FAA.

(%) On 2 December 1975 the Secretary of Defense had granted an exception to policy to allow MAP funding for rehabilitation of T-28s, which was to be done under contract with Philippine Airlines. Based on this authorization, and notification from Headquarters, USAF in October 1976 of a requirement for \$198,500 to finance the program through December 1977, Chief, JUSMAGPHIL requested supplemental FY 77 funding for the \$198,500 and Continuing Resolution Authority.

Cooperative Logistics Program

(U) In September 1976 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL advised that the PAF had asked to participate in the Cooperative Logistics Program for all aircraft and systems of U.S. origin. The Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) confirmed PAF eligibility to participate in the Supply Support Arrangement (SSA) Program and began to prepare definitized SSA lists for F-5A/B, C-130, C-123, T-33, and C-47 aircraft. Receipt of the C-123, C-47, and T-33 stock level case lists was acknowledged by Chief, JUSMAGPHIL on 12 November 1976. AFLC also

1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 052326Z Aug 76, 140720Z Dec 76, 220548Z Dec 76, 230540Z Dec 76, and 230836Z Dec 76; HQUSAF 061335Z Aug 76 and 231455Z Dec 76.

2. <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, pp. 460-462; AMEMB Manila 1058/210755Z Jan 76; CHJUSMAGPHIL 220846Z Jan 76 and 130654Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 220057Z Jan 76, 300451Z Jan 76, and 240413Z Aug 76.

3. <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 462; CHJUSMAGPHIL 190822Z Oct 76; HQUSAF 081840Z Oct 76 and 151805Z Oct 76.

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recommended that the PAF develop definitized lists to support F-86 and AT-28D aircraft which could be requisitioned through the SSA program. As of October 1976 the AFLC had also begun to prepare a definitized list for the F-5E in conjunction with the LOA being prepared for that aircraft. $^{\rm I}$

Off-Shore Procurement-Japan (OSP-J) Vehicles

(U) In their FY 76 evaluation of the Philippine Security Assistance Program, 22 March-2 April 1976, the CINCPAC PEG Team noted that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had 3,161 obsolete OSP-J vehicles (primarily 1/4 ton, 3/4 ton and 2 1/2 ton) which were no longer MAP-supportable after FY 76. Based on PEG Team recommendations, Chief, JUSMAGPHIL, in November 1976, requested authority to transfer accountability of most of these OSP-J vehicles from the MAP to AFP ownership. As there was no legal basis for donation of MAP property to a recipient country, CINCPAC recommended they be transferred to the AFP at concessionary scrap value cost (\$15 per vehicle), and uneconomically repairable vehicles be reported to the Defense Property Disposal Office. The Secretary of Defense approved CINCPAC's recommendation and, at year's end, an AFP decision was awaited.²

Purchase of 2 1/2 ton Trucks

(U) In November 1976 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL advised that the GOP had agreed to purchase 250 2 1/2 ton trucks through FMS (\$6,098,063).3

Howitzers

ON During 1976 six rebuilt M-101Al 105mm howitzers, out of an FMS case for 18, had been received in the Philippines. In April 1976 the Commander, Army Armament Command notified Chief, JUSMAGPHIL that shipment of the remaining 12 howitzers had been suspended pending a price adjustment from \$17,003 each to \$45,000 each. Chief, JUSMAGPHIL took exception to the price increase being effected after partial shipment, noting that it would be regarded by the Philippine Government as bad faith by the United States and a breach of contract. He also pointed out that this would not serve U.S. Government interests during the base rights negotiations. CINCPAC, through military channels, and the American Embassy, Philippines, through diplomatic channels, supported Chief,

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^{1.} CHJUSMAGPHIL 080530Z Sep 76 and 241010Z Sep 76; INTL LOG OFC WPAFB 171330Z Sep 76, and 051603Z Oct 76.

^{2.} CINCPAC PEG Report, Republic of the Philippines FY 76, 18 May 76, pp. B-7-B-8; CHJUSMAGPHIL 030045Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 120547Z Nov 76; SECDEF 6687/250200Z Nov 76.

J464 HistSum Nov 76; CHJUSMAGPHIL 200146Z Nov 76.

3 Infantry Brigades, 1 Artillery Command, 1 Armored Brigade, 1 Commando Strength: 15,000 (Police Strength: 7,400) Strength: 1,200 Strength: 2,500 assistance to resist external attack. Ho operational capability above 132 Africaft, of which 100 are jets. This does not include 8 A-4s in Capable of maintaining internal security, but would need outside Potentially good ground support capability with A-45 aircraft, MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY Fair patrol capability in territorial waters. Incapable of 13 Coastal types, 7 Amphibious Warfare (raft, 1 Service type. Battalion, 2 Engineer Battalions, 1 Signal Battalion. limited air defense and transport/rescue capability. AIR FORCE the United States for training purposes. defending against a major naval attack. battalion level. IMPROVED SIMBADORE RELATIONS WITH ITS METCHBORS, PARTIC-BLARLY MALAYSIA AND ENDYMESIA. CONTINUED ACCESS TO SINGAPORE'S NAVAL AND AIR FACILITIES. CONTINUATION OF SINGAPORE SUPPORT FOR THE FREEDOM OF MAYEATTON AND OVERFLIGHT IN AND OVER THE STRAITS OF CONTINUATION OF MODERATE, NONCOPAUNIST GOVERNMENT NOT SUBJECT TO UNDUE PRE OR SOVIET INFLUENCE. CONTÍMUED PROGRESS TOMÁRIOS AN EMMANCED CAPABILITY OF STRGAPORE TO MAINTAIN ITS OWN SECHRITY. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES MALACCA AND SINGAPORE \$5.2 BILL FOW \$335 MILLTON Morray TURMBULL (RAAF), Group Captain 1.6 PERCENT COL Robert E. FOSTER, USAF 20 PERCENT 2,254,000 225 SQ HE 70 YEARS . . . HOW. John H. HOLDRIDGE Winston CHOO Wee Leong, Brigadier OI ACRE \$2,400 AS PERCFUT OF GMP 6.1 Senna thanby RAJARATMAN Benjamin Henry SHEARS COMMUNICR, STHEAPORE HAVY . . . KHOD En Amp. Colonel SINGAPORE BASIC INFORMATION U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION GOH Keng Swee LEE Kuan Yew DIRECTOR, AIR STAFF, (COMMINER) SINGAPORE AIR FORCE DIRECTOR, GENERAL STAFF, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE PRESIDENT MINISTER OF DEFENSE MINISTER OF FORETCH AFFAIRS. GROSS MATIONAL PRODUCT ARABIT I AND PER CAPITA DEFENSE BUDGET LIFE EXPECTANCY. U.S. APBASSADOR ADDUSTAL GROWTH LITEPACY RATE

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 79.

JUSMAG's position, and in May 1976 the Secretary of Defense advised that the unit price would remain at \$17,003 as originally quoted. $^{\rm l}$

Miscellaneous Boat Acquisitions

- (U) On 15 January 1976 a MAP-provided 65-foot patrol boat (65PB732) was turned over to the GOP and was designated PN PCF 338. 2
- (U) In May 1976 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL submitted an urgent request for 20 inflatable rubber boats for the AFP to use in flood relief efforts in the wake of TYPHOON OLGA. The Secretary of Defense, in turn, tasked the Department of the Army which prepared the boats under FMS, with 120-day payment terms, for shipment through Military Airlift Command channels to the Philippines.³
- (U) On 10 September 1976 the Philippine Navy took custody of an ex-U.S. Army tug boat located in Guam.⁴

MAP Support for Philippine Constabulary (PC)

Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance query as to whether or not the PC was equipped by the United States and if this raised a question concerning the provision of equipment to police forces, which was prohibited by Section 660 of the FAA of 1961, as amended. CINCPAC replied that PC combat light infantry battalions (with same TO&E as Philippine Army infantry battalions) and the Presidential security battalion, which had two organic infantry companies currently committed in combat operations, did receive MAP support. CINCPAC advised that these units did qualify for assistance under the applicable legislation, and that no PC police elements were MAP supported. 5

<u>Singapore</u>

<u>Overview</u>

(S) Basic U.S. Pacific strategy depended strongly on a friendly and cooperative relationship with Singapore. Of primary concern was the possibility that the USSR might develop additional positions athwart U.S. lines of

2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 210618Z Jan 76.

3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 260736Z May 76; SECDEF 8925/281538Z May 76; DA 282056Z May 76.

CHJUSMAGPHIL 110200Z Sep 76.

5. SECDEF 7982/090001Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 140424Z Apr 76.

SECRET

^{1.} CHJUSMAGPHIL 130614Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 150200Z Apr 76; AMEMB Manila 5916/290841Z Apr 76; SECDEF 5338/111518Z May 76.

communication. The United States looked to Singapore for Seventh Fleet base support and access for Indian Ocean and Diego Garcia support. Support in the amount needed required favorable Government of Singapore (GOS) attitudes on many issues, and security assistance was the major means of obtaining concessions. Singapore depended heavily on the United States for military equipment and training, which was obtained through FMS cash and commercial sales. As of November 1976 these sales totaled about \$164 million.

The security assistance program for Singapore centered around recommendations made by an inter-departmental team (DOD-CIA) visit in 1975. These recommendations included purchase of UH-1H helicopters, M-113A1 armored personnel carriers, mini armored troop carriers, 105mm howitzers, and a counterinsurgency training seminar for senior officers. The GOS expected the seminar cost to be around \$100,000 and reacted negatively when informed that it was \$225,000. Office of the Secretary of Defense pricing guidance effective 1 January 1976 directed the recovery of all costs associated with instruction preparation, proportionate share of base operations, and pay and allowances of all U.S. personnel involved. The Minister of Defense considered the cost unacceptable and wanted further negotiations cancelled. Prime Minister Lee overruled the Minister of Defense since he felt that the need for the counterinsurgency seminar overrode cost considerations because of conditions in Southeast Asia. The seminar was conducted from 10 May to 4 June 1976 and was given good reviews by attendees. The American Embassy described the cost of the seminar as a "burr in the saddle." By September 1975 final delivery had been made on 200 M-113A1 armored personnel carriers, and during 1976 a commercial sale contract was signed for an additional 246 M-113Al armored personnel carriers for 1977 delivery.²

C-130B Aircraft

(U) On 12 July 1976 the GOS signed the LOA for two C-130Bs for a cost of about \$2.6 million each. Lockheed Air Services Singapore (LASS) had agreed to deal directly with the GOS for interim use of LASS facilities and services leading to self-sufficient GOS aircraft operation. Lockheed was to provide air and ground crew training.³

^{1.} J472 Point Papers, 1 Dec 76, Subj: U.S.-Singapore Security Assistance Relationships; and 29 Nov 76, Subj: Security Assistance for Singapore.

^{2. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, pp. 446-447; J472 Point Paper, 29 Nov 76, Subj: Security Assistance for Singapore.

^{3.} J472 Point Paper, 29 Nov 76, Subj: Two C-130B Aircraft for Singapore.

F-5E/F Aircraft

(6) On 13 July 1976 the GOS requested an LOA for 18 F-5E and 3 F-5F aircraft. As of year's end the LOA had not been signed; however, an LOA for associated air interdiction missiles (AIM 9J-1) was signed on 11 November 1976 to facilitate contract negotiation of a large quantity buy.

Management Training Assistance Team (MTAT) for RSAF

On 1 September 1976 a proposed USAF management training assistance program, designed to develop Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) managerial self-sufficiency at the end of two years, was presented to the GOS. The program covered the functional areas of operations, engineering, manpower, and command and control. A 5-man USAF MTAT was to be assigned to Singapore for two years, and the total cost of the program was estimated at \$957,540. On 12 October 1976 the GOS accepted the basic proposal and at year's end the LOA was being prepared.²

A-4 Training in the Philippines

Government on the subject of continuation training of SKYHAWK pilots at a U.S. base in the Philippines. The U.S. Government had advised the GOS it would be willing to examine the question of what arrangements could be worked out at Cubi Point once the GOS obtained approval from the Government of the Philippines. In April 1976 the U.S. Defense Attache Office Singapore advised that this approval had been obtained. Between 25 April-1 May 1976 an RSAF survey team visited the Philippines to discuss training needs and inspect Cubi Point and Clark Air Base as possible training sites. The RSAF team selected Clark as first choice with Cubi as an acceptable fallback; however, a GOP restriction against the RSAF conducting low-level navigational training outside of the Clark reservation prevented further action on this project through year's end. 3

Sri Lanka

(6) Sri Lanka was designated a "CONUS Only Training" country with an FY 77 training dollar ceiling of \$15,000. The American Embassy and the USDAO consistently supported retention of a small grant aid training line as a counter

- 1. J472 Point Paper, 29 Nov 76, Subj: F-5E/F Aircraft for Singapore.
- 2. J472 Point Paper, I Dec 76, Subj: MTAT for RSAF.
- 3. <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 448; USDAO Singapore 0540/ 020846Z Apr 76; AMEMB Manila 6062/030730Z May 76.

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| ARE LANKA BASIC INFORMATION AREA 25,300 5g HI | | MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY |
|---|--|---|
| | 2 | AHMY 3 Infantry Battalions, I Artillovy Regiment (Battalion), I Reconnaissance Regiment (Battalion). |
| LLIFELACY RATE 82 PYRCTNIT LLIFE LYPECTANCY 62 YEARS | | Strength: 9,000 Ruserves (Volunteer Farce): 9,000 |
| APATE LAID PER CAPITA | | incapable of repelling an invasion. In conjunction with police |
| PER CAPITA | | and other services, can maintain internal security, but has serious |
| AS PERCENT OF CARP | | sources for Togistics support. |
| PRESINCUL. |) | Patrol Escort, Fast Patrul Boat, 5 Hotor Gumboats, 23 Patrol Craft |
| PPINK NIHISTER | U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES SERVE AS A LANCIBLE REMINDER OF U.S. THITRESTS BY: ASSISTING IN THE SKILLS MEDICO FOR EFFICTIVE MAINTE- NAMCE AND OPERATION OF U.S. ACRUIRED FIRITUPS IN | NAVY Strength: 2,600 No capability against even winur enemy naval attack. Adequate in assisting internal security operations. Limited anti-smuggling capability. |
| NAVY. COMMUNICR COMMODORE Don Basil GONESTRARA ALR FORCE COMMUNICR COMMODINE W.D.H.S.M. GOOMETILEKE | OF VELDPTHG NEEDED EXPERSISF FOR EFFECTIVE WANGENENT OF PRESENT. SRT LANKA, OFFENSE ESTABLISHMENT. | OF WELDPING NEEDED EXPERTISE FOR EFFECTIVE NUMBERNIT 1-Tactical Squadron (MIG 17, T-51), 2 Transport Squadron (DH-114, C-1, OF PRESENT SRL LAWKA DEFENSE ESTABLISHMAN). |
| U.S. PREASSADOR | | .csswe 537, Lanvair 490, IN-5, Lessme 150), 1 Helicopter Squadran (UH-13H, Bell 206A, KA-26), 1 Training Squadran (1-51, DHC-1, C-1) |
| | OF SOVET AND PACE IN SAI LARKA. | Strength: 2,300 Limited capability to provide close support to the Aray and in |
| COOK Paul O. CUTOMEN, USAN | | day air defense. Adequate in assisting internal security and in anti- |
| | | smuggling operations. |

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 80.

SEGRET

to Soviet influence. The visit to Hawaii of Lieutenant General Don Sepola Attygalle, Commander, Sri Lankan Army, between 14-20 October 1976 was the first use of training funds allocated to Sri Lanka since 1970. This visit was funded as an exception to policy as an orientation training tour under the IMETP. The visit allowed LT GEN Attygalle to view military hardware that would be appropriate for use by the Sri Lankan Army and to observe small-scale military ground operations. Activities visited included CINCPAC headquarters, CINCPACFLT, USACSG, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, the 25th Infantry Division, and the First Marine Brigade, FMFPAC.

Thailand

Overview

Thailand was faced with new and potentially hostile Communist neighbors on its northern and eastern borders, and a communist-controlled insurgency, with external support, existed within the country. The U.S. security assistance program encouraged the Thai to acquire weapons needed to meet the immediate threat of insurgency as well as to modernize existing conventional defensive military units. The security assistance trend was toward reduction in the grant MAP and increased FMS. The Royal Thai Government (RTG) accepted \$8 million in FMS credit for the first time in FY 75, but failed to use it during 1975. Six million dollars of FY 75 credits were obligated during FY 76 and 77. An exception was granted to Thailand to use these credits towards operations and maintenance (O&M) costs related to the MAP program. All O&M costs would be assumed by the RTG at the end of FY 77. Also, during 1976 the Thai-perceived need for fighter aircraft, not necessarily shared by U.S. officials, finally caused the RTG to sign an LOA for the purchase of 16 F-5E/F aircraft at a cost of \$75 million (FMS Case PEACE ETERNAL).²

Integrated Communications System (ICS)

(S) By the end of 1976 the American Embassy, Bangkok had prepared a revised memorandum of agreement for turnover of the 17-site U.S. military ICS to the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF). Under this agreement the RTARF would assume the responsibility for safeguarding all components and maintaining the property in good condition and repair at their own expense. No components were to be transferred to any third country or be relocated, and the U.S.

^{1.} J471 Point Paper, 12 Oct 76, Subj: Security Assistance for Sri Lanka; J471 HistSum Oct 76.

CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 464-466; FY 78 CPD, p. 79; J476 Point Paper, 13 Oct 76, Subj: General Overview Security Assistance in Thailand; J4 WEB 8-14 May 76.

| MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY ARMY 7 Infautr, Divisions, 1 Peqimontal Combat Team, 3 Special Forces freques, 1 Airborne Battalion, 1 Field Artillery Battalion. Strength: 13,000 Roderate capability to anintain internal security and limited resistance to external angression. Hillary leadership preoccupied with politico - economic affairs. Inadequate senior command and staff supervision of operational missions, shortage of modern equipment, imeffective logistics system, insufficient combined arms training lack of sufficient anti-armor and antisircraft capability. Collural achievement. NAVY 2 Destroyer types, 46 Coastal Patrol types, 31 River Patrol types, 18 Mine Marfare Souderon (5-2), 18 Utility Squaron (Hu-16, 14-174, 5-37). Il Marine Brigade, 5 Marine Infantry Battalions, 1 Marine Retailors, 1 Marine Attility Battalions, 3 Marine Light Infantry Battalions, 1 Marine Attility Battalions, 3 Marine Light Infantry Battalions, 1 Marine Mattalions, 1 Marine Attility Sattalions, 1 Marine Mattalions, 1 Marine Martine Mattalions, 1 Marine Mattalions, 1 M | Limited and internal waterways. Limited antisubmarine warfare, mine and internal waterways. Limited antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, transport, and amphibious Support Warled origin of styles and equipment necessitates use of foreign supply sources. Shortage of trained personnel. AIR FORCE 4 Fighter/Sconnaissance Squadrons (1 F-56/B, R-56); 1 T-334/R-334, 2 G4-10); 3 Fighter/Romber Squadrons (2 T-280, 1 A-37); 2 Helicopter Squadrons (1 G-10); 3 Fighter/Romber Squadrons (2 T-280, 1 A-37); 2 Helicopter Spandrons (1 G-12, HS-748, 1 G-12 Byte/AC(1); 1 Fraining Syradrons (1 G-12, HS-748, 1 G-12 Byte/AC(1); 1 Fraining Syradrons (1 G-12, HS-748, 1 G-12 Byte/AC(1); 1 Fraining Syradrons (1 G-11); forward Air Control Squadron (0-14/5/G, 1-100). Strength: 43,100 Limited airhorne uperations, close support of the Army, and day air defense. |
|--|---|
| | U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE O BJECTIVES LISSIST IN ORIGINAL ASSISTANCE O BJECTIVES FACILITY ARPWERS FOR U.S. FORCES, AND GRIV THEN TO FORCES OPPOSED TO U.S. FINENESTS. PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAI INLITARY THEN TO BILLINES TO DEFEND AGAINST LITIED EXTERNAL MILITARY THREATS AND PROTECT PRATITUE LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS. ASSIST THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT TO DEVELOP THE CAMBILITY SCURITY. FINALLY SUPPORT FOR COST EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS THAT DEVELOP THAI "ILLITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY." |
| THAILAND BASIC INFORMATION ABEA | |

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Government could inspect the Chiang Mai-Bangkok communication service, supporting residual U.S. requirements, with 15-day prior notice. Also, the RTARF was to provide telephonic communications between the Korat ammunition storage depot and JUSMAGTHAI on a 24-hour basis at no cost to the U.S. Government. The American Embassy, Bangkok hoped the State Department would approve the agreements so they could be signed. I

AU-23 Aircraft

(U) Under FMS Case PEACE CHAO PHYA, 13 AU-23 aircraft were delivered to Thailand in April 1976.2

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI)

(U) Since December 1969 the TTPI had acquired \$24.8 million worth of DOD PACOM excess materiel free except for PCH&T. On 14 January 1976 the CINCPAC Representative, Guam, requested assistance in obtaining two landing craft (LCM-8) for use in the Truk Lagoon. A screening of DOD excesses revealed none available. In August 1976 CINCPAC suggested further screening, but as of year's end no excess assets, affordable to the TTPI, had turned up.3

CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 354-355; AMEMB Bangkok 30059/ 011117Z Nov 76.

^{2.} J4 WEB 10-16 Apr 76.

^{3.} J465 HistSum Jun 76; J465 Point Paper, 4 Nov 76, Subj: Security Assistance-Trust Territories Pacific Islands (TTPI).

CHAPTER VIII

PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

CINCPAC Headquarters

Outstanding Performance Ratings (OPRs) for Civilian Personnel

(U) The following were the results of OPRs, including Quality Step Increases (QSI) and Sustained Superior Performance Awards (SSPA) for civilian employees of CINCPAC for the rating period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976:

| | | | Cash Awards | Cash Awards |
|-----------|-------------|----------|-----------------|---------------|
| Civilians | OPRs | OPRs | Recommended | Approved |
| Assigned | Recommended | Approved | QSI SSPA | QSI SSPA |
| 139 | 64 (47%) | 29 (21%) | 23 (17%) 4 (3%) | 2 (1%) 7 (5%) |

Civilian Personnel Activities in PACOM Countries

Japan and Okinawa

Labor Cost Sharing

On 1 June 1976 the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense jointly approved American Embassy, Tokyo and COMUS Japan initiatives to explore with Government of Japan (GOJ) officials the possibilities of sharing the cost of the U.S. Forces (USF) Japanese workforce. The prospect was raised initially as a result of a 1973 COMUS Japan study which revealed that the United States could save up to \$2 billion over a five-year period if the GOJ assumed some or all of the USF Japanese labor costs. That study was endorsed favorably by CINCPAC to the Secretary of Defense, but the proposal was not considered timely, economically or politically, through 1975.²

(8) U.S. Forces' use of Japanese labor and attendant increasing costs was a major item of discussion at the 8 July 1976 U.S.-GOJ Security Consultative Committee Meeting. At the meeting, Admiral Gayler noted that Japanese workforce costs had increased by 100 percent from 1971 to 1975 and that the cost of the

1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 481; J144 HistSum May 76.

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^{2. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 483; SECSTATE 134478/012001Z Jun 76.

- U.S. presence was affecting the ability to maintain USF in Japan. A U.S.-GOJ Joint Committee agreement was also reached in early July 1976 which initiated a joint USF-GOJ Defense Facilities Administration Agency study of labor problems including a number of USF cost-cutting recommendations. COMUS Japan did not see a need to compensate employees in excess of Japanese private sector practices. Principal excesses included a 10 percent USF pay differential and a too generous severance pay/retirement plan. Findings and recommendations were finally reported to the Joint Committee on 1 December 1976, and the Joint Committee was to work out a proposal to solve the issues by 1 November 1977.
- PACOM headquarters, Washington, DC, and the Federal Republic of Germany to obtain information on defense burden sharing arrangements. Major emphasis was on the administration and budgeting arrangement of USF use of host country labor (e.g., budgeting method used, applicability of domestic law). The GOJ delegation findings were expected to be used in support of increased GOJ burden sharing in Japan.²

Labor Strikes

- (U) During March 1976 USF local national (LN) employees scheduled strikes against all U.S. facilities in Japan to protest the delay in concluding USF-GOJ 1975 wage adjustment negotiations. Okinawa strikes were programmed for two hours per day on 17, 18, 23, and 24 March 1976. One hour strikes per day on 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, and 24 March 1976 were scheduled for the rest of Japan. A 48-hour follow-on strike was scheduled against all USF activities beginning 30 March 1976, but was called off. The negotiations were concluded on 31 March 1976.3
- (U) Beginning 28 May 1976 a 24-hour strike was conducted against all USF activities on Okinawa to demand withdrawal of announced large reduction in force (RIF) (600 employees in June), security of employment, and relief measures for unemployment.⁴
- (U) Two hour strikes were conducted at U.S. Army installations on Okinawa on 18 and 19 August 1976, and at all USF installations on Okinawa on 26 and 27 August 1976. The purpose was to protest a U.S. Army Japan announcement of a RIF of 287 Japanese employees on 30 November 1976 and 982 employees on 30 September 1976 as part of Program Budget Decision (PBD) 253R.5
- 1. J121 HistSums Jul and Dec 76; AMEMB Tokyo 10062/020946Z Jul 76.
- 2. AMEMB Tokyo 10308/090035Z Jul 76; COMUSJ 130832Z Jul 76.
- 3. J1 WEBs 8-14 Mar 76, 22-28 Mar 76; J121 HistSum Mar 76.
- 4. J1 WEB 24-30 May 76.
- 5. J1 WEBs 16-22 Aug 76, 23-29 Aug 76.

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1975 Wage Adjustment Negotiations

- (U) Wage adjustment negotiations between U.S. Forces Japan and GOJ Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) for 1975 were concluded on 31 March 1976. Agreement was reached to grant the 26,500 USF LN employees in Japan a pay increase of 10.85 percent retroactive to 1 April 1975. The 10.85 percent included a 6 percent provisional pay increase approved on 2 February 1976 retroactive to 1 April 1975. By agreement with GOJ, the amount and effective day of USF pay adjustments paralled those approved by the Diet for Japan National Public Service employees. A comparable National Public Service increase had received Diet approval in November 1975.
- As part of the wage negotiations, the USF demand for concurrent conclusion of a joint USF-DFAA indirect-hire agreement (IHA) job study was met. One hundred fifty nine USF job categories not common to the Japan National Public Service were reviewed. Information on pay and benefits practices for these occupations was obtained from 127 private sector food service, billeting and retail sales firms. Findings indicated that USF compensation exceeded that of private firms in these occupations. After lengthy and difficult negotiations, agreement was reached to continue the two USF basic IHA wage tables for all IHA jobs, and add three new steps below those in the existing tables for the 159 job categories included in the study. The three steps provided a lower entry level for new hires with a delay in attaining higher step rates. Agreement was also reached to lower four overpaid job categories (kitchen worker, bartender, sales clerk, bowling machine repairer) by one pay level. The 270 LNs currently employed in the latter jobs were to be downgraded effective 1 July 1976, but with pay savings to include the 1975 wage adjustment increase. 2
 - (U) The USF nonconcurred in two DFAA-proposed benefit increases:3
 - The USF would not provide a housing allowance to LN employees living in GOJ subsidized housing.
 - The USF was unwilling to provide longevity pay increases in excess of those on already established wage tables.
- (U) The USF conceded to withdraw seven major proposals in order to achieve agreement on the 1975 wage adjustment. These proposals were for
- 1. COMUSJ 090540Z Apr 76; J121 HistSum Feb 76.
- 2. Ibid.
- COMUSJ 090540Z Apr 76.

changes to pay-setting methods and would receive further, but separate, joint ${\sf USF-GOJ}$ attention. ${\sf I}$

1976 Wage Adjustment Negotiations

- (U) The 1976 wage adjustment negotiations between the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and the GOJ DFAA were concluded on 21 December 1976. Agreement was reached to grant the 24,000 USF LN employees in Japan a pay increase of 6.94 percent retroactive to 1 April 1976. The wage adjustment also included a modest increase to family, housing, and commutation allowances and a decrease in seasonal bonuses from 5.2 to 5.0 months pay. Wage adjustment changes paralleled those approved by the Diet for Japan National Public Service employees in November 1976. They were based on a survey of Japan industrial practices conducted by the GOJ in the spring of 1976.²
- (b) The USF entered negotiations on 1 December 1976 with several proposals to lower labor costs. The objectives of these proposals were:3
 - To preserve the right for the USF to negotiate changes to labor contracts.
 - To minimize the impact of the 1976 wage adjustment on USF labor costs.
 - To continue to advertise the spiraling labor costs in support of long term objectives of the Joint Committee study.
- The proposals caused considerable concern within DFAA and were withdrawn in order to avoid protracted negotiations as had been the case in 1975. DFAA did agree to one cost saving point: to delete from provisions of the Master Labor Contract and Marine Contract the current USF obligation to pay retirement allowance for DFAA headquarters Labor Department personnel beginning Japan FY 75. COMUS Japan estimated a savings on this of some \$400,000 during the period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1978. COMUS Japan sought and received the support of CINCPAC and the PACOM Service components for the cost saving proposals it placed on the negotiating table.

^{1. &}lt;u>Ibid</u>.

^{2.} COMUSJ 230055Z Dec 76.

^{3.} Ibid.

^{4. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, COMUSJ 270201Z Nov 76.

Korea

Revised Wage Schedules for LN Employees

- Revised wage schedules for Korean LN employees were based on data (U) obtained during a survey of 108 private sector firms in four Korean urban areas during August and September 1976. Revised compensation benefits, effective 1 November 1976, resulted in an average increase of 23.1 percent for some 23,000 employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. The increase was comprised of 13 percent to base pay, 5.8 percent as a Consolidated Allowance Payment, a flat 36 Won per hour as a Payment-in-Kind Allowance, and 1.7 percent to increase the year-end bonus from 1 to 1 1/2 months of pay. The Consolidated Allowance Payment was new and represented cash amounts given by private sector employers to employees for such purposes as meals, lodging, transportation, special skills, and cost of living. The Payment-in-Kind Allowance, established first in 1975, represented an amount equivalent to benefits other than cash received by private sector employees in the form of employer-provided meals, bags of rice, uniforms, and transportation. An equivalent amount for these allowances was previously included in USF employee base pay. With allowances identified and paid separately, base pay was effectively lowered and became more representative of private sector pay practices. This also served to lower overall USF labor costs in that base pay, exclusive of allowances, was used to compute employee severance pay. I
- (U) In addition to the above compensation increases, two additional holidays were authorized for observance by USF LN employees. These would coincide with U.S. national holidays to minimize disruption to the USF mission.²

<u>Philippines</u>

Revised Wage Schedules for LN Employees

(U) Revised schedules of wages for some 22,000 USF LN employees in the Philippines were jointly approved and issued by the PACOM Service component commands effective 1 October 1976. The revisions were based on data obtained during a survey of 30 private sector employers in the greater Manila area during July and August 1976, and they resulted in an increase of 19 percent for manual and 11 percent for non-manual employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds.³

2. Ibid.

3. CINCPACFLT Ltr FF1-1 12531 Ser 74/8188 of 14 Sep 76.

^{1.} HQ USF Korea Ltr EACP-K-C&EM, 18 Oct 76, Subj: U.S. Forces Wage and Benefits Survey Findings and Recommendations; USACSG Ltr MOCG-PE, 29 Oct 76, Subj: Authorization of U.S. Forces Wage Schedules-Korea.

<u>Collective Bargaining</u>

After nearly seven months of bargaining with the Federation of Filipino Civilian Employees Associations, a three-year Collective Bargaining Agreement was successfully concluded in January 1976. The agreement resulted in a near status quo on two hard-fought bargaining issues from which the U.S. bases would not retreat. Compensation items were to continue to be based on local prevailing private sector practices as determined by USF-conducted survey; they were not negotiable, a position sought by the Federation. Final appeal on disciplinary cases would remain with U.S. bases top management through use of advisory arbitration; there would be no binding arbitration as sought by the Federation with the support of the Government of the Philippines (GOP) Department of Labor. A formal signing ceremony was held at Subic Bay on 16 January 1976, and a 300 Peso signing bonus, as authorized by the Secretary of Defense, was to be granted to each Federation member of record on 1 March 1976.

Taiwan

Revised Wage Schedules for LN Employees

Revised wage schedules for LN employees on Taiwan were based on (U) data obtained during a survey of 36 private sector firms in the Taipei area in September 1976. The new rates, effective 1 December 1976, resulted in an average total compensation increase of 25.7 percent for some 2,200 general schedule and patron service employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. The high percentage rate resulted, in part, from the fact that it had been over two years since the previous Taiwan wage survey. Part of the increase was to be given as a new Payment-in-Kind allowance of 4.3 New Taiwan dollars to each employee. That allowance represented an amount equivalent to benefits received by private sector employees in the form of employer-provided meals, uniforms, transportation, and other benefits. An equivalent amount was previously included in base pay. It was now identified and paid separately, thereby making base pay more representative of private sector pay practices. This also served to lower overall USF labor costs in that base pay was used to compute other compensation such as overtime, other premium pay, and severance/retirement pay.2

^{1. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, pp. 486-489; AMEMB Manila 0472/090911Z Jan 76 and 1274/160915Z Jan 76; CINCPACFLT 240254Z Dec 75.

^{2.} USTDC Ltr 12000 Ser C-84, 15 Oct 76, Subj: Taiwan Wage and Fringe Benefit Survey-1976; HQ PACAF Ltr DPCC, 29 Oct 76, Subj: Authorization of U.S. Forces Wage Schedules-Taiwan.

- (b) Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command and the Services in Taiwan proposed a 1 November 1976 implementation date. The American Embassy, Taipei, also a survey participant, wanted a uniform implementation date for all U.S. agencies, but required State Department approval of the survey findings and recommendations, which could delay the implementation up to two months. CINCPAC, with the concurrence of PACOM Service commands, appealed to the Secretary of Defense to implement the new schedule on or after 1 November 1976 but no later than 1 December 1976 for USF activities. In response to this appeal, the Secretary of Defense approved a 1 December 1976 implementation date.1
- (U) In conjunction with the revised wage schedules, an interim pay increase was authorized for motion picture theater employees effective 1 December 1976. These employees, paid on a performance basis, had not previously been covered by regular USF wage schedules. The increase amounted to 20.1 percent. A study was also being conducted to convert these employees to regular hourly wage schedule rates.²

Thailand

Civilian Personnel Phasedown

Civilian employment strength of the USF in Thailand had been reduced from a 1970 peak of over 20,000 employees to nearly 9,000 by the start of 1976. Plans were to further reduce and stabilize at about 1,500 by 20 March 1976. By mid-March, however, a decision was made that only the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) and a select group of functions would remain in Thailand after 20 July 1976, with a total expected civilian staffing of less than 100. The rapid phasedown required out-of-country placement or separation for most of the 470 U.S.civilian employees and separation for all but a small number of the 8,500 Thai national employees. The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI) imposed a command-wide hiring freeze, and special exceptions to DOD policy were sought to ease phasedown operations. In November 1975 Thailand was declared a major RIF area for U.S. civilian employees. In February 1976 the Secretary of Defense granted an exception to policy allowing Thailand activities permission to displace U.S. civilians on Overseas Limited Appointments (OSL) with qualified priority placement program registrants stationed in Thailand. March 1976 DOD activities in Thailand were exempted from the requirement to grant U.S. citizen career and career-conditional employees 30 days annual

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^{1.} CINCPAC 300024Z Oct 76; SECDEF 4336/101908Z Nov 76.

^{2.} HQ PACAF Ltr DPCC, 30 Nov 76, Subj: Authorization of U.S. Forces Wage Schedule-Motion Picture Theater Employees.

leave or leave without pay in order to provide 90 days advance notice prior to RIF.

- (U) The Air Force civilian personnel office (CPO) ceased in-country operations on 20 July 1976. COMUSMACTHAI arranged for the Base Industrial Relations Office, U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay (Philippines) to provide personnel servicing of JUSMAG U.S. civilian employees, and the U.S. Embassy, Bangkok to provide personnel and payroll services for Thai national employees of JUSMAG and other USF activities. Concurrently, the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC) authorized the use of U.S. Embassy LN personnel policies and procedures for USF Thai nationals to be serviced by the Embassy.2
- (U) A USMACTHAI in-country roll-up team was organized to close out functions remaining beyond 20 July 1976. Civilian personnel operations were continued until 20 September 1976 to process actions of 19 excess U.S. citizens and 1,000 excess Thai nationals still on the rolls as of 19 July 1976. Actions included RIF, other separations, payroll coordination, processing remaining grievances and appeals, and preparing records for shipment. The last Civilian Personnel Officer of the DOD in Thailand departed country on 21 September 1976.3

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI)

Wage Practices

(U) PACOM Service component commands delegated authority to the Commander in Chief Pacific Representative Guam/TTPI to revise compensation rates and benefits for USF TTPI citizen employees (the U.S. Navy employed four TTPI citizens). Revisions were to conform to pay and benefit changes granted TTPI government employees by the Office of the High Commissioner, TTPI. Such changes were made for TTPI government employees effective 23 November 1975; however, CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI did not become aware of these changes until mid-December 1975, and revised USF rates were not applied until 1 January 1976. To correct this situation, CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI asked for authority to make the pay adjustment retroactive to 23 November 1975. Based on this request, CINCPAC sought advice from the Secretary of Defense on the legality of authorizing retroactive payment, and the Secretary of Defense

CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 490-491; J121 HistSum Sep 76; MACTHAI 230340Z Feb 76; SECDEF 7272/052007Z Feb 76 and 1461/241642Z Mar 76.

^{2.} CINCPACFLT 120110Z May 76.

^{3.} MACTHAI 021015Z Jun 76.

responded by authorizing correction of an administrative error to allow payment effective 23 November 1975, the date of increase to TTPI government employees.

Foreign National Motion Picture Theater Employee Pay

- (U) Under Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service (AAFMPS) administration prior to 29 June 1975, foreign national motion picture theater employees had traditionally been paid on a "per performance" basis, at rates set by the AAFMPS. When the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) assumed personnel administration for these employees, pay setting came within the jurisdiction of the Pacific Command Joint Labor Policy Committee. Accordingly, AAFES-PAC initiated action to determine appropriate pay adjustments for these employees.²
- (U) The first country to come under study was Korea, where no basis could be found for previous pay setting practices. Korean national theater employees had not been granted a pay increase since 1974, so Service commands in Korea, as represented on the COMUS Korea Joint Labor Affairs Committee (JLAC), undertook the task of determining future wage schedules for these employees. As an interim measure, a pay adjustment, as proposed by the COMUS Korea JLAC, was approved by the PACOM JLPC. The adjustment, applicable to some 50 Korean employess, provided for a 33.1 percent increase above 1974 rates effective 1 May 1976. This percentage was the average of total compensation increases that were granted all other USF Korean national employees in comparable level positions on 1 November 1975. With this interim adjustment, the former relationship between motion picture theater employee pay and general employee pay was restored. Local national employee pay practices in other PACOM foreign areas having AAFES motion picture theater operations were to be reviewed along with USF-conducted wage schedules in each area.³

Foreign National Temporary Duty (TDY) Pay

(U) Based on a CINCPAC request for clarification in December 1975, the Secretary of Defense relayed a U.S. Civil Service Commission decision that the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1937, as amended in 1974, were applicable to non-exempt USF direct hire non-U.S. citizen employees when performing TDY from their home country to the United States and other select areas. The matter arose as a result of differing

^{1.} CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI 190424Z Dec 75; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 67 of 12 Jan 76; SECDEF 1846/021614Z Apr 76.

^{2.} J121 HistSum Apr 76.

USACSG Ltr MOCG-PE, 30 Apr 76, Subj: Authorization of U.S. Forces Wage Schedule-Motion Picture Theater Employees.

policy guidance among the Services in the Pacific; the Navy and Air Force required use of the FLSA minimum wage, but the Army did not.

- (U) The 1974 amendment made FLSA provisions applicable for the first time to all non-exempt Federal Government employees when performing duties in the 50 States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, outer continental shelf lands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, Enewetak, Kwajalein, Johnston Atoll, and the Canal Zone. Non-exempt included, among others, clerical, trades, and craft employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. Exempt were those in bona fide executive, administrative, and professional positions. Minimum hourly rates for non-exempt employees were to be \$2.00 from 1 May to 31 December 1974, \$2.10 during CY 75, and \$2.30 starting 1 January 1976.
- (U) The home country pay rate for most direct hire USF local national employees in PACOM was less than the FLSA required minimum. As a consequence, a non-exempt employee TDY to a covered area, receiving the required FLSA \$2.30 minimum wage, would be paid more than his exempt supervisor who would be paid at his lower home country rate while on TDY. To correct this inequity, effective 16 May 1976, the PACOM Service components, under the terms of CINCPAC Instruction 12200.3A, administratively extended the FLSA \$2.30 minimum hourly wage to all exempt direct hire non-U.S. citizen employees when TDY to any area to which the Act applied. 3
- (U) In advising PACOM foreign area commands of the above decision, CINCPAC noted that, in a TDY situation to a covered area, either the FLSA minimum or the home country basic hourly wage rate would apply, whichever was higher. CINCPAC also noted that the U.S. minimum wage paid a LN on TDY would not be considered as base pay for purposes of computing bonuses or other allowances applicable to the employee in his home country. Any such authorized benefits would be based on home country rates.4

^{1.} CINCPAC 082334Z Dec 75; SECDEF 2872/131701Z Apr 76.

^{2.} Ibid.

^{3.} CINCPAC 120212Z May 76.

^{4.} Ibid.

SECTION II--MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Urinalysis Program

Termination of the Random Urinalysis Program for Drug Abuse Detection

(U) Congressional action terminated the random urinalysis program effective 1 October 1976. The random testings were unannounced tests of units/individuals on a revolving area percentage basis which would insure each individual under age 26 was tested a minimum of once a year. Resources previously supporting the random urinalysis program were to be directed to the alcohol abuse program. Other aspects of the DOD urinalysis program remained in effect.

Urinalysis Testing for Cocaine

(U) Reports of increased use of cocaine among civilians prompted a 13 July 1976 ASD/Health Affairs Memorandum directing military urinalysis labs to conduct tests for this drug from October 1976 to January 1977. Analysis of test results was expected to reveal the scope of the problem within the DOD and the necessity for continuation of testing for cocaine. USACSG Drug Abuse Officer reported that the two Pacific drug abuse urinalysis labs, Schofield and Camp Zama, would make the tests.²

U.S. Customs Service (USCS)

USCS Advisors in the PACOM

- (U) The reduction of USF and closure of bases in Thailand eliminated the need there for a full-time advisor. After 15 March 1976 the USCS advisor to the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines provided advisory assistance for continuing operations in Thailand and Diego Garcia.³
- (U) In June 1976 the USCS and the DOD mutually agreed to retain three USCS advisors in the PACOM as follows:⁴

^{1.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 475; J112 HistSum Sep 76.

^{2.} J112 HistSum Sep 76.

^{3.} J112 HistSum Jan 76.

^{4.} DA 041545Z Jun 76.

Home Base

Coverage

Okinawa

Japan (including Okinawa) and Guam

Korea

Korea

Philippines

Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Diego Garcia

(U) In April 1976 CINCPAC, in coordination with the USCS and Department of the Army (DOD Executive Agent for the program) had reviewed the need for continued USCS advisor support. CINCPAC had strongly recommended no reduction in the number of advisors (four) if possible, but retention of a minimum of three as shown above if reduction were mandatory.

(U) The three new USCS advisors to PACOM departed for their duty stations on 5 September 1976, after attending a PACOM orientation conference from 30 August to 2 September 1976.2

Military Customs Inspector (MCI) Grade Requirements

(U) A CINCPAC staff review of DOD guidance outlining minimum grade standards for MCIs revealed conflicting requirements. A September 1976 policy statement from the Department of the Army (DA), DOD Executive Agent for Military Customs, specified GS-5 as the minimum grade for civilian MCIs. January 1975 guidance from the same headquarters listed GS-4 as the minimum. As a result of a CINCPAC query on this matter, DA published revised minimum grades to clarify the issue. Enlisted MCIs remained at E-4 or above and civilians were raised to GS-5 or above. The unified commander was authorized to waive the E-4 requirement; however, DA retained waiver authority for civilian grades. As of FY 7T the PACOM MCI strength included 1,401 military and 35 civilians. Since the CINCPAC staff had been conservative with waiver approvals, no significant impact was anticipated within the command as a result of this policy change.

PACOM Military Customs Staff Visit

(U) The DOD Executive Agent for Military Customs and the CINCPAC staff military customs representative conducted a staff visit at selected locations throughout PACOM from 21 September to 5 October 1976. The visits at activities

1. JIII HistSum Apr 76; CINCPAC 070114Z Apr 76.

2. J112 HistSum Aug 76.

3. J112 HistSum Nov 76.

in the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and Guam confirmed that PACOM military customs inspection efforts were effective in preventing shipment of illegal narcotics, drugs, and other contraband from entering the United States through military channels. Particularly strong efforts were noted in the inspection of aircraft and passengers, household goods, and personal property shipments. Acceptable results were observed in inspection of ships and cargo. Procedures for inspection of mail required strengthening at several locations and additional manpower authorizations required formal validation at most installations. Support of the customs program by senior commanders was evident. As a result of observations made during the visit, the pending DOD Instruction 5030.49R, Military Customs Program, was to be changed to clarify several issues for field units. I

Awards and Decorations

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (AFEM)

(U) In January 1976 the JCS, in response to CINCPAC's September 1975 recommendation, approved award of the AFEM to personnel who participated in Operation EAGLE PULL (11-13 April 1975) and Operation FREQUENT WIND (29-30 April 1975). In December 1976 the AFEM was approved for personnel participation in the recovery of the SS MAYAGUEZ (15 May 1975).²

Change in Awards Procedures

(U) Effective July 1976 the CINCPAC Chief of Staff (J01) directed that the CINCPAC Awards Board contain at least one enlisted member when reviewing award recommendations for enlisted personnel.³

DOD Dependent Schools

Pacific Region Advisory Council

(U) Under the provisions of the FY 76 DOD Appropriations Bill the Office of Overseas Dependent Education (OODE) was established on 1 July 1976. The OODE replaced the former Tri-Service geographical manager arrangement for operating the DOD dependent school system. At OODE request, a DOD Dependent Schools Pacific Region Advisory Council was established with membership composed of a Chairman (CINCPAC J1), Executive Secretary (Director, Dependent Schools

^{1.} J112 HistSum Oct 76.

CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 497; JCS 2581/191653Z Jan 76 and 3660/021557Z Dec 76.

J113 HistSum Jun 76.

Pacific), and one representative from each component headquarters. The Council was scheduled to meet quarterly to discuss school related programs.

Guam Public Schools

- (U) Three representatives from the U.S. Office of Education and the Director of DOD Dependent Schools-Pacific visited Guam between 8 and 10 September 1976 to present a three-phase package for improvement of Guam schools to Governor Bordallo:2
 - Phase I-Immediate Federal assistance to the Government of Guam: The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and DOD would assist in teacher recruiting, transportation of teachers, procurement of equipment and supplies, finding housing for teachers, and provision of low cost temporary classrooms.
 - Phase II-Milestone for the Government of Guam tie-in with Federal assistance: Obtain sufficient qualified teachers, adequate substitute teacher funds, sufficient supplies and textbooks, and submit progress report to U.S. Commissioner of Education by 1 December 1976.
 - <u>Phase III-Education technical assistance plan</u>: Management specialists would visit Guam to determine requirements.
- (U) Schools opened on 7 September 1976 with few problems and the morale of teachers and administrators was reported "high." Fifty-nine teachers were required to fill the existing shortage. One hundred thirty "limited term" teachers (teachers who lacked college degrees, courses, or were graduates of unaccredited colleges) would be dismissed when certified teachers were found. The Teachers Corps In-Service Educational Project provided \$600,000 for inservice training of Guam teachers, and the U.S. Office of Education Federal Resources Coordinator arrived 11 October 1976 and was assigned as special assistant to the Director of Education. 3
- (U) Forty Butler buildings provided by the Navy arrived on Guam on 23 October 1976 for use as portable classrooms. Their arrival eliminated

^{1.} J114 HistSum Aug 76.

^{2.} Ibid.

^{3.} Ibid.; J114 Fact Sheet, 3 Nov 76, Subj: Guam Schools.

double sessions held in some schools. Construction work on permanent buildings was scheduled for completion by January 1977.

Taiwan Phasedown

On 8 October 1976 the JCS directed cancellation on all inbound permanent change of station (PCS) personnel to Shu Lin Kou and placed all other Taiwan inbound personnel in a hold status. On 9 October CINCPAC designated COMUSTDC as the U.S. Taiwan coordinator between Service military personnel centers and on-island commanders to minimize personnel impact. COMUSTDC notified the Services of the support positions affected and directed them to place all PCS inbound personnel on hold until further notice. On 4 November 1976 the JCS directed a reduction on Taiwan to no more than 1,950 personnel by 31 December 1976 and no more than 1,400 by 31 March 1977, and authorized spaces were reduced to 1,400 by 31 December 1976. Also, the JCS tasked CINCPAC to establish new manpower space authorizations on Taiwan and to submit monthly personnel status reports. On 18 November 1976 CINCPAC established individual units, new military and civilian manpower space authorizations, and directed all units to modify their service manpower documents to reflect new authorization figures effective 31 December 1976. On 20 November 1976 CINCPAC submitted the first manpower status report to the JCS, which indicated 2,163 personnel on Taiwan effective 17 November 1976 and projected 1,950 personnel by 31 December 1976. On 24 December 1976 CINCPAC reported that, effective 23 December 1976, 1,907 personnel were on Taiwan.²

Enlistment of Micronesians in the U.S. Armed Forces

- (U) In August 1976 the CINCPACREP Guam requested establishment of procedures whereby Micronesians might enlist in the U.S. Armed Forces. CINCPAC supported the concept in principle, but noted certain problem areas which would have to be dealt with before attempting to authorize recruitment of Micronesians:³
 - Current restrictions in U.S. immigration law.
 - Determination as to whether or not recruitment was acceptable under the provisions of the U.N. trusteeship.

^{1.} J114 Fact Sheet, 3 Nov 76, Subj: Guam Schools.

^{2.} J113 HistSums Nov and Dec 76.

CINCPAC 102317Z Sep 76.

- Charges that U.S. Government was creating a drain of valuable personnel resources by recruiting Micronesians.
- (U) CINCPAC also recognized the problem of recruiting Micronesians for the U.S. Armed Forces as only one aspect of the total negotiation on future Micronesian status. $\bf 1$

FY 77 Combined Federal Campaign-Pacific

(U) PACOM contributions to the FY 77 Combined Federal Campaign totaled \$1,666,746.07 for an 11 percent increase over the previous year. This was a continuation of the steadily increasing trend since FY 74, PACOM's first "million dollar year."2

^{1.} Ibid.

^{2.} CINCPAC 150106Z Dec 76; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 510.

CHAPTER IX

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECTION I -- MANAGEMENT

PACOM Data Systems Center (PDSC)

- (U) In 1975 the Department of Defense (DOD) approved a CINCPAC proposal for a PDSC as a separate command under CINCPAC, with one operating system on a 24-hour per day, seven day per week basis. The PDSC concept consolidated automated data processing (ADP) from five locations using 1,000 programs in 10 program languages and 3 operating systems. The component commands would be served by mini-computers with full access to the PDSC main frame. In November and December 1975 Hickam Air Force Base was tentatively chosen as the site for the PDSC and contractor assistance was being provided to the PACOM Systems Architectural Group (SAG) in developing a specific "required operational capability (ROC)" for improving PDSC increments and in collecting data for PDSC analysis. 1
- (U) In January 1976 ROCs for the Indications and Warning (I&W) data analysis collecting system and the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) were developed, signed by CINCPAC, and forwarded to the Chairman of the JCS on 26 January. Also in January the SAG prepared a letter requesting authority to contract for system engineering/system integration (SE/SI) support to develop and implement the PDSC. The estimated Phase I cost of the SE/SI effort was \$400,000. This letter also requested authority to extend the contract for 2-3 years, as necessary, until full PDSC operational capability was achieved about January 1979. Also beginning in January representatives of the contractor, RCA Corporation, began to work with the SAG on concept development. As viewed by the contractor, five main tasks were identified for eventual accomplishment. These included review of current capabilities, identification of alternative configurations, the organization and analysis of data, the analysis of alternatives, and a final report.²
- (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) validated the I&W and IDHS ROCs in February 1976 and forwarded them to the JCS for review. Meanwhile, the CINCPAC letter requesting authority to contract for SE/SI support reached the CNO. Since the authority requested exceeded \$250,000, the approval of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management was necessary.

^{1.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 516-517.

^{2.} J213 HistSum Jan 76.

Concurrently, contractor bids for Phase I of the SE/SI effort were under evaluation by the Rome Air Development Center (RADC). By the end of February the tasks of the RCA Corporation representatives relating to the PDSC study were complete with the exception of the final report. A representative of the RADC was scheduled to visit CINCPAC to assist in the preparation of the final report.

- (U) By the end of March the final five-volume report on the PDSC was completed by the RCA Corporation. The CNO had advised CINCPAC that the Navy Programs Objective Memorandum (POM) for FY 78 would include \$6.6 million for hardware procurement for the PDSC. In April the CNO granted authority to contract for SE/SI support and initial funding of \$300,000 had been sent to the RADC. CINCPAC was also advised that the Naval Intelligence Command had agreed to add \$400,000 in Operations and Maintenance Navy (O&MN) funds to the FY 78 POM for PDSC computer procurement, making the total PDSC funding in FY 78 \$7.0 million.²
- (U) By memorandum to CINCPAC on 10 May, the JCS advised that the ROCs were responsive to current guidance and requested that CINCPAC develop an implementation plan to support the ROCs and to initiate an overview study to determine CINCPAC's long-range intelligence requirements and resulting resource applications. The contract for SE/SI support was awarded to the Hughes Aircraft Corporation (HAC), and Mr. Al Stone had been designated as the on-site project manager for Hughes. The effective date of the contract was 15 June 1976, and approximately eight HAC personnel began to work full-time with CINCPAC Directorate for Intelligence (J2) personnel at CINCPAC headquarters. 3
- (U) The first major product under the HAC contract was a master Automated Data Systems (ADS) development plan to be provided to the CNO by 1 October 1976. The ADS plan would provide the basis for future budgetary actions regarding the PDSC. During July meetings held by HAC with representatives from the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC), the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group (RTG) at Hickam Air Force Base, and the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC), a software functional architecture document was prepared by the contractor. Also in July, the first J2-initiated PDSC Steering Committee meeting was held, with representatives from CINCPAC, IPAC, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT attending. The purpose of the PDSC Steering Committee was to discuss policy issues and technical matters relating to the concerns of the various commands. Meetings were to be scheduled on an ad hoc basis. During the first meeting HAC advised the committee members that the master ADS development plan to be delivered to the

^{1.} J213 HistSum Feb 76.

^{2.} J213 HistSums Mar-Apr 76.

^{3.} J213 HistSums Jun-Jul 76.

CNO would justify hardware expenditure, and also would serve as the implementation plan requested by the JCS in connection with the ROCs. I

- (U) After considerable coordination by the HAC with CINCPAC J2, IPAC, PACAF, and PACFLT, a 396-page PDSC ADS development plan was completed on 1 October 1976. This development plan was the basis for a fully operational PDSC which would satisfy validated operational requirements of the 1980's. Under organizational relationships prescribed in the plan, the CINCPAC J2 was designated as the PDSC Program Manager, and the IPAC was tasked with responsibility for operation and management of the PDSC host complex along with specific subsystems supporting PACOM I&W and IPAC analysis functions.²
- (U) The ADS plan was delivered to the CNO and the JCS by a CINCPAC J2 personal representative who briefed the plan to all concerned agencies in Washington. By the end of September it had become obvious that a single site location for the entire PDSC would be impossible. Factors ranging from space adequacy to operational responsibility considerations militated against a single site. Tentative site distribution included a message processing and distribution subsystem in separate locations at Camp Smith, Oahu, and a host, front-end processor and Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (WICS) network processor at Hickam Air Force Base. Node resources for PACAF and FICPAC would be located at Hickam and Makalapa, Oahu, respectively. By the end of October the estimated development cost of the PDSC had increased to \$2.144 million over the budget, and CINCPAC J2 and IPAC had begun to plan for the manpower needs of the PDSC. 3
- (U) By the end of the year CINCPAC awaited action on the ADS development plan submitted to the CNO and the JCS on 1 October, and the contractor continued to refine the various complex elements of the PDSC. Also in December CINCPAC J2 convened a meeting of the PDSC Steering Committee to develop a coordinated transition plan for PDSC manning. During the meeting extracts from the IPAC Joint Manpower Program (JMP) document were provided for consideration by the participants. The extracts included requirements for transitional manning of the PDSC in FYs 78-79. Since no compensating billets could be identified for the transitional manning, an alternative manning proposal was developed by CINCPAC J2 and IPAC representatives. Tentatively, this plan incorporated specific requirements, source of personnel, and time-phased manning, with parallel development of figures reflecting the cost differential between a transition to the PDSC with contractor support by 1980 versus a phased acquisition of Government personnel resources. On 30 December IPAC personnel presented

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^{1.} J213 HistSum Jul 76, with atch: Minutes of the PDSC Steering Committee.

^{2.} PACOM ADS Development Plan, 1 Oct 76, pp. 7, 355.

^{3.} J213 HistSums Sep-Oct 76.

CINCPAC J2 representatives with the results of a cost analysis of phased manning requirements for the PDSC organization. The analysis revealed that the phased manning plan was needed if the PDSC development was to be accomplished within projected funding levels.

PACOM IDHSC/WICS Network

- (U) The PACOM Intelligence Data Handling System Communications (IDHSC) Network was designed to provide the intelligence community with communications up to the special intelligence/special activities office (SI/SAO) level for interactive, on-line query and response, and bulk data exchange using internetted IDHS computers on Oahu and the CONUS. Related to this system was the WICS which incorporated the PACOM IDHSC network. For clarity, this intelligence communications structure in the PACOM was labeled the PACOM IDHSC/WICS network; it included PACOM access to community on-line intelligence network systems (COINS) and the DIA on-line system (DIAOLS). Late in 1975 CINCPAC had supported a FICPAC package of IDHSC/WICS switch system operations and procedures designed to assist the DIA in formulating a fully accredited system for inter-leaving of all-source and collateral bulk data transferred between the DIA and PACOM switches.²
- In 1975 the PACAF terminal and computer, located at the 548th RTG, (U) became an operational host computer on the PACOM IDHSC/WICS network. Several new capabilities were developed to access the PACAF-hosted computer whereby PACAF and IPAC cathode-ray tube (CRT) users at Hickam Air Force Base were able to retrieve data from COINS files at the National Security Agency (NSA). CRT users from the PACAF computer attained IDHSC-COINS retrieval capabilities and Strategic Air Command (SAC) was able to make on-line data retrievals directly from the PACAF IDHSC-hosted file. These SAC queries of a PACOM IDHSC-hosted file marked the first regular direct data retrievals from PACOM files by a user outside of the PACOM. Another access mode was developed when, on 7 November 1975, the DIA completed action to allow a DIAOLS interactive terminal user to access the PACAF installations file. Since most DIAOLS interactive terminals were in the Washington area, this marked the beginning of Washington user access to PACOM-hosted IDHSC files. In 1974 and 1975 the IDHSC/WICS system was extended to terminals in the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) at U.S. Forces Korea Headquarters in Seoul, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command Headquaters in Taipei, and had been approved at U.S. Forces Japan/5th Air Force Headquarters at Yokota and 13th Air Force Headquarters at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. PACAF had been tasked by CINCPAC to establish IDHSC/WICS terminals at both Air Forcesupported sites (Clark and Yokota), but operational status was dependent upon

^{1.} J213 HistSum Dec 76; IPAC HistSum Dec 76.

^{2.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 524-525.

the acquisition and installation of an AN/GYQ-21(V) computer at Hickam Air Force Base. The DIA had also formally validated the functional requirement for an IDHSC/WICS terminal at the Fleet Air Intelligence Support Center (FAISC) at Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the Philippines. CINCPAC had tasked CINCPACFLT with the establishment of the FAISC terminal after the January 1976 validation by the DIA.

- (U) In March 1976 arrangements were completed to provide the PACOM IDHSC/WICS network users with WICS I "store and forward" access to 21 DIA files previously available only in the DIAOLS interactive mode. That new access capability made the DIAOLS files available to Oahu CRT terminal users and WESTPAC users who had lacked effective DIAOLS interactive access because of system limitations. The new capability allowed users to access the files in the same manner as COINS files through the PACOM network switch.²
- (U) In April CINCPACFLT identified IDHSC/WICS switch manning problems which could cause potential reductions in switch operating hours from 24 hours to 16 hours per day, five days per week. The main impact of such a reduction would be felt by terminal users in WESTPAC who would lose on-line access to IPAC system electronic intelligence (ELINT)-oriented files during morning working hours. In an April meeting among representatives of CINCPAC, FICPAC, IPAC, and CINCPACAF, the problems were identified and remedial actions proposed. These included efforts to maintain or increase currently authorized manning, redistribution of the bulk data workload, and hardware changes to a future AN/GYQ-21(V) computer, which would permit more hours of operation with a given number of personnel.³
- (U) By the end of April CINCPAC had learned that planning by PACAF and the Air Force Intelligence Service (AFIS) to implement the terminals at Clark and Yokota was dependent upon the delivery of an AN/GYQ-21(V) processor computer to Hickam Air Force Base and the delivery of Teletype Corporation Model 40 CRTs to the AFIS by July 1976. Upon receipt of the Model 40 CRTs the AFIS intended to release their computers for shipment to Clark and Yokota for use as the initial IDHSC/WICS user terminals at these WESTPAC sites. The implementation of the terminal at the FAISC at Cubi Point was planned for 1 January 1977.4
- (U) Action to replace the IBM 360/30 PACOM switch with an AN/GYQ-21(V) progressed significantly with the completion of the PACOM switch WICS subnetwork development plan (SDP) and the ADS plan discussed in the PDSC section.

^{1.} Ibid.; J211 HistSum Jan 76.

^{2.} J211 HistSum Apr 76.

^{3.} Ibid.

^{4.} Ibid.

The SDP was forwarded to the DIA on 24 May 1976 and the ADS forwarded to the CNO in June. These documents requested the acquisition of the AN/GYQ-21(V) PACOM switch replacement by November 1976. In May 1976 the DIA promulgated the WICS Management Implementation Plan (MIP) with a revised implementation schedule which called for full implementation of WICS II in May 1977. The accreditation of full bulk data inter-leaving operations was executed by CINCPAC J2 in May, and in June the full implementation and responsibility for maintaining security levels under DIA regulations for automated intelligence systems was accomplished. Following the completion of a successful operational test in September 1976, authority was granted to commence regular inter-leaving of data.

- (U) In July CINCPAC received approval from the CNO and the Naval Intelligence Command of the SDP to upgrade the PACOM switch. The ADS development plan was approved by the CNO in September and funds were identified in the FY 77 budget for the procurement of the AN/GYQ-21(V) system to replace the IBM 360/30 PACOM switch. In September a contract for \$100,000 was let to INCO Incorporated for the software development of WICS II. The contractor personnel were scheduled to arrive in the PACOM when the 21(V) equipment arrived in order to install the software and supervise the installation.²
- (U) Although in September FICPAC was forced to reduce switch operations by one shift per day, the new authority to inter-leave collateral and general service (GENSER) bulk data with queries had improved response time and data exchange rates. Even though one less shift was available, the new authority allowed service to continue at the same level as before. However, in October the General Services Administration (GSA) determined that competitive bids were required to procure the 21(V) system and refused to delegate procurement authority to the Air Force. Since all planning had revolved around the 21(V) computer as a replacement at the PACOM switch and for the implementation of WICS II, full implementation was expected to slip well into 1977.

Delegated Production Control

In 1974 the DIA initiated a program to delegate production of intelligence data so as to utilize available resources to the maximum extent. In January 1975 the DIA was advised by IPAC that the production of Ground Order of Battle (GOB), both strength and disposition, of all PACOM countries except Russia could be assumed by IPAC. At the same time IPAC recommended to the DIA that the existing production of the Naval Order of Battle (NOB), with strength

J211 HistSum Jun 76.

^{2.} J211 HistSum Dec 76, which updated the period Jul-Dec 76.

^{3.} Ibid.

figures produced nationally and the disposition produced by the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center (FOSIC) in Hawaii, be continued. For the Air Order of Battle (AOB) IPAC recommended that the strength be produced nationally, with IPAC assuming responsibility for aircraft disposition within the PACOM. In March 1975 a format was developed for the IPAC GOB to be placed on-line in the DIAOLS/COINS network by August of 1975. During that meeting, IPAC provided DIA personnel with a sample format for the standard GOB to be used in the Delegated Production System (DPS). Subsequent discussions during 1975 by the DIA with CINCPAC, SAC, and the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) examined other tentatively selected areas of delegation; e.g., GOB, NOB, and the command geographic area of interest, less Russia, to the PACOM. Other tentative delegations included the Space Order of Battle to CONAD and the Strategic Missile Order of Battle (MOB) worldwide to SAC. These delegations would also include associated Automated Installation Intelligence Files (AIF). In April 1975 the first microfiche GOB printouts were distributed to users of the collateral IPAC GOB, and later in the year IPAC developed an on-line data entry system which permitted GOB analysts to input data on the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) terminals for storage in card image format.


During the DIA-sponsored Air and Missile Order of Battle Standardization Conference held in October 1976 in Washington, policy, procedural, and technical aspects of delegated production were discussed. At this conference IPAC proposed the acceptance of delegation of production of 83 data elements on AOB on 4 communist and 18 non-communist countries in the PACOM area. Responsibility for the PACOM AIF was recommended for retention by DIA. However, the position taken by DIA at the conference was that the AIF and Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World (ASSOTW) responsibilities could not be separated for the communist countries even though there was no objection to separating the responsibilities for AIF maintenance in the case of NOB and for separating the AIF and ASSOTW responsibilities from the AOB maintenance for non-communist countries. Worldwide responsibility for the defensive MOB was tentatively divided between SAC and the Ninth Tactical Intelligence Squadron, with responsibility for the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and North Vietnam to be assumed by SAC. IPAC agreed to investigate the possibility of its assumption of production responsibilities for North Korean and Vietnamese defensive MOB.²

Intelligence Exchanges


(S) The ongoing program of bilateral exchanges of intelligence and orientation and familiarization visits by intelligence personnel of various

^{1.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 527-528.

^{2.} J223 HistSum Oct 76, with two encl: Draft Report of AOB/MOB Conference, 4-8 Oct 76; Summary of PACOM Role in Delegated Production.



J221 HistSums Feb, May 76; ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 13/090009Z Nov 76. J223 HistSum Apr 76.




^{1. 5}AF 030745Z May 76 (BOM); there were two such messages, with the same DTG, passed through AFSSO 5AF from BGEN Larson, CINCPAC J2. The same messages were passed to the U.S. Defense Attaches of both countries via GENSER channels.

^{2.} USDAO Canberra 060608Z May 76; USDAO Wellington 100320Z May 76; IPAC HistSun Jun 76.

^{3.} IPAC HistSum Jul 76; CINCPAC 210413Z Jul 76.

IPAC HistSum Oct 76; J233 HistSum Sep 76; CINCPAC 110039Z Sep 76; COMIPAC 150019Z Sep 76.



^{1.} J233 HistSum Oct 76; DIA 1134/082010Z Oct 76; J23/Memo/C426-76 to IPAC, 22 Oct 76, Subj: Foreign Officer Exchange; DIA Ltr to CINCPAC, 13 Oct 76, Subj: Disclosure Guidance, with one atch: DIA/JIO Agreement on Intelligence and Liaison (C).

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^{2.} IPAC HistSum Dec 76; J233 HistSum Dec 76; IPAC/Memo/Cl2-76 to CINCPAC, l Dec 76, Subj: Exception to National Foreign Disclosure Policy, with one encl: Request for Exception to National Foreign Disclosure Policy; J2/Memo/C46-76 to COMIPAC, 22 Dec 76, Subj: Foreign Officer Exchange; J233 Point Paper, 20 Dec 76, Subj: Foreign Officer Exchange-IPAC Project 9-2.

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PACOM Indications and Warning Upgrade

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
- (S) On 18 November 1975 the CINCPAC J2 realigned the headquarters PACOM Indications and Warning (I&W) center by establishing the PACOM Intelligence Watch. This action combined into a single operation those functions previously done by the J2 I&W Center, IPAC, and the National Security Agency Operations Group. The Commander, IPAC was tasked to operate the Intelligence Watch under the guidance and direction of CINCPAC J2. In March 1975 CINCPAC J2 established a small study group to assess the overall structure and capabilities of I&W centers throughout the PACOM. This group was chaired by a J2 representative; other representatives were from IPAC and the NSA/Central Security Service Pacific (NCPAC). The final report of the study group was published under CINCPAC letter in December 1975. The thrust of the study was that the basic ingredients for a reliable I&W system in the PACOM--well-placed, professionally manned centers with reasonably satisfactory communications -- were already in existence. The primary shortcomings discussed in the study included the need for a common I&W goal definition, and the need for one focal point in the theater to actively organize and operate the existing I&W centers. The study group recommended that all system elements be interconnected so that each element was coordinated and interdependent, that each element be organized within the system to form a network in which all elements continuously act and interact, that element system contributions be fused, that flexibility to change from the routine to the crisis be stressed, and that the PACOM I&W system have a central controlling and coordinating authority. Lastly, the study group stressed the need for computer driven I&W support systems because in crisis situations, manual methods of intelligence handling continuously overwhelmed the analysts. 1
- (U) On 29-30 January 1976 the PACOM sponsored a Korean I&W seminar with a special U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) review group. As a result of this seminar, actions were begun to conduct a 90-day Korea I&W test in conjunction with the U-2R deployment to Korea. In support of this test, a Korean Correlation and Sensor Direction Facility (KCDF) was established in the U.S. Forces Korea J2 indications center. The KCDF was manned by personnel from CINCPAC, IPAC, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, PACAF, 5th Air Force, and the DIA. In February 1976 a 100-word-per-minute I&W teletype circuit was established between the PACOM Intelligence Watch and USFK I&W center. The circuit was intended as part of the DIA/PACOM I&W network, and additional I&W circuits were planned for 5th Air Force in Japan, 13th Air Force in the Philippines, and U.S. Taiwan Defense Command on Taiwan. Also in support of

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^{1.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 517-524.

the Korean I&W test, the first IPAC advanced liaison forward area (ALFA) team was deployed to Korea on 27 February.

- (U) In March a 24-hour day, five-day week computer manning schedule was instituted by IPAC to provide support to the ELINT processing function in support of the Korea I&W test. Early in March representatives of Decisions and Design Incorporated (DDI) visited IPAC to begin training IPAC personnel in probabilistic forecasting and to develop a hierarchical model to support the current Korean I&W program. Forty-two analysts were trained on a computer supplied by DDI.²
- In April DDI representatives worked with IPAC Korea analysts on the structure of two models associated with IPAC program 3.0, Advanced Decision Aids and Probabilistic Forecasting. A North Korea preferred strategy model, developed by a DDI representative, was restructured to suit the needs of the analysts and to provide a more comprehensive and accurate set of interactive data elements associated with the basic levels of the model, based upon the current Korea indicators list and detailed discussions with the IPAC Korea analysts. Demonstrations of the computer program developed for the preferred strategy model were provided for CINCPAC, IPAC, component representatives, and the KCDF director at the mid-point Korea I&W test meeting.



(U) The 90-day Korean test was completed on 30 May 1976, and the KCDF, which had been augmented from seven commands and agencies, also terminated

^{1.} IPAC HistSums Jan-Feb 76; J212 HistSum Feb 76; J242 HistSum Feb 76.

IPAC HistSum Mar 76.


^{3.} IPAC HistSum Apr 76.

^{4.} J21 Point Paper, n.d. (circa Apr 76), Subj: Korea Indications and Warning (I&W) Test.

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operations on 30 May. During a DIA I&W seminar conducted on 9-10 June and attended by representatives from the major unified commands and numerous Washington area intelligence agencies, the results of the 90-day I&W test in Korea were briefed. Considerable attention was given to the problem of the "operations/intelligence" interface as it related to the I&W.1

- (U) In June, I Corps requested USFK to initiate action to procure equipment and install an operations communications (OPSCOMM) circuit between SSO I Corps and the USFK indications center. In August CINCPAC concurred in a message to the Commanders of U.S. Forces Korea, I Corps, and the Naval Telecommunications Command that a valid requirement existed to activate an SI circuit between the SSO I Corps Tactical Operations Center and the USFK indications center. CINCPAC tasked the addressees to take all actions necessary to achieve a 1 September 1976 activation date for the OPSCOMM circuit.²
- (U) Meanwhile, IPAC received from DDI the latest tape containing new computer threat models of the Korean I&W support programs. It was in mid-August also that representatives of Aeroneutronic-Ford visited IPAC and PACFLT. Discussions were held with intelligence and targeting analysts, data processing personnel, and members of the Watch Center concerning enhancement of all-source data correlation, display of imagery, and improvement of Command Center capabilities. Aero-Ford was seeking ways to improve the capabilities in those areas and information on "actual" Watch Center and analyst activities.³



On 1-3 December the first PACOM I&W meeting was held at Yokota Air Base in Japan and attended by representatives from each I&W center in the Pacific. Mission, manning, and functions of each center were discussed to give

^{1.} J212 HistSums Jun-Jul 76.

^{2.} CINCPAC 140349Z Aug 76.

IPAC HistSum Aug 76.

^{4.} IPAC HistSum Oct 76.

the attendees a better appreciation for the strength and weaknesses of each I&W operation. Briefings were presented on the various on-going projects to upgrade the PACOM I&W capability. $^{\rm l}$

1. J212 HistSum Dec 76.

SECTION II -- INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ADMINISTRATION

Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT)

HUMINT Presence in Thailand

(S) On 30 April 1976 information was received from the Defense Intelligence Agency that Military Human Intelligence Units would remain in Thailand under the JUSMAG umbrella.

an American Embassy, Bangkok review of the past activities of these detachments led the Ambassador to ask for their prompt phasing out and in November 1976 the DIA reluctantly acceded to the Ambassador's position. A phase-out schedule was forthcoming from the Military Departments at year's end. 1

HUMINT Environment in Japan

COMUS Japan

convened a special HUMINT Board meeting to discuss the changing environment. Operationally it was concluded that the following were appropriate: 2

- Review of on-going activities.
- Emphasize alertness for indicators of asset disenchantment or undue curiosity.
 - Temporarily curtail or eliminate new developments.
- Assess carefully and delay recruitment actions if appropriate.

| 1 | DIA 9858/302024Z | Apr | 76 | and | 2948/ | 091532Z | Nov | 76. |
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
- Avoid panic and any other reaction.
- Use natural reasons for deferral of actions already initiated.

PACOM HUMINT Board Meeting

The PACOM HUMINT Board met on 9 December 1976 in the FMFPAC Conference Room, Camp Smith. Agenda items included the discussion of a proposal by the AFIS to establish a 7602nd Air Intelligence Group Liaison Office at Hickam AFB. The Board agreed that a Liaison Office should be established and recommended working arrangements similar to those between the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency and CINCPAC/IPAC.

Photo/Electronic Intelligence

U-Tapao U-2 Operations



SR-71 Availability and Use in PACOM


(8) CINCPAC considered the SR-71 as a prime resource for providing critical intelligence support during periods of increased tension, developing crisis, or the actual outbreak of hostilities. The SR-71's unique operating and collection capabilities made it an extremely valuable and versatile asset. The range of options varied with the seriousness of the situation and ranged from tasking for special exploitation by the 548th RTG to requests for quick reaction photo coverage, to special coverage requirements under conditions of increased tension, to requests for activation of the Kadena MPC, and culminating in

1. Minutes, PACOM HUMINT Board Meeting, 9 Dec 76.

^{2.} CINCPAC 260219Z Mar 76; J231 Point Paper, 5 Apr 76, Subj: U-2 Operations in Indian Ocean.

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requests for authority to conduct overflights. These options were readily apparent during all major exercise play by CINCPAC, and accurately reflected anticipated real-world contingency actions.



- (2) An example of SR-71 use in PACOM came in November 1976, when film from a SAC SR-71 search and rescue mission near Guam arrived at the 548th RTG for immediate processing. During processing, an object appeared on the imagery which was thought to be a fourteen foot boat. A position was provided, but the boat was not found. Following identification of several other possible boat sightings on the imagery, the search was abandoned.³
- The 548th RTG provided a wrap-up of the exploitation mission and recommended revised measures to improve results of exploitation imagery for search and rescue missions: 4
 - If possible, known ground points should be photographed to insure reference points for correlation of camera systems in the event computer support systems are inoperative.

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^{1.} J231 Point Paper, 2 Apr 76, Subj: SR-71 Availability in PACOM.

^{2.} Ibid.

^{3. 548}RTG 021000Z Nov 76.

 ⁵⁴⁸RTG 060400Z Nov 76.


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- An automatic mission planning (AMPS) track should be provided to the exploitation unit as a backup to onboard computers.
- Using the recon platform, and as part of the mission, an object which resembles the lost object should be photographed to familiarize PI's to size and shape.
- If feasible, operational altitude should be lowered to maximize scale and resolution.

Guam Typhoon PAMELA Damage Assessment

At the request of 3d Air Division (SAC) on Guam, HQ SAC authorized aerial photo coverage of the entire island utilizing a U-2R from SAC OL-OA at Osan AB, Korea to aid officials on Guam in assessing damage caused by Typhoon PAMELA. Flown on 27 May 1976, the U-2R used the 66-inch focal length "H" camera in the vertical mode and obtained excellent photography. The unprocessed film was sent via Armed Forces Courier Station to the 548th RTG for processing and production of a mosaic. The 548th RTG voluntarily worked through the Memorial Day weekend, complying with CINCPAC Intelligence Directorate (J231) film handling instructions and producing a timely quality product which was expedited to the 3d Air Division for distribution.

Activation of Mobile Processing Center (MPC) at Kadena



^{1.} STRATRECONCEN 262229Z May 76; OL-OA (18TFW) 290755Z May 76; CINCPAC 272359Z May 76.

^{2.} CINCPAC 241932Z Aug 76; DIA 252350Z Aug 76; JCS 2485/262339Z Aug 76 and 3622/172131Z Sep 76; SSO SACRECON 311320Z Aug 76; J2312 HistSum Oct 76.

Aerial Photography for Fiji

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In August 1976 the USDAO Wellington, New Zealand relayed an informal inquiry of the Government of Fiji Environmental Advisor as to whether the U.S. Government could assist in taking aerial photographs of selected areas along the Fiji coastline and of the Suva metropolitan area. The photographs would assist the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forests in determining commercial fishing feasibility in coastal reef areas, and the Environmental Advisor in assessing environmental conditions in Suva. CINCPAC noted that, although there were currently no photo assets available in that area, it might be possible to obtain the desired coverage during future scheduled operations in that area, if timeliness were not a factor. Other possibilities would have required a special mission with its attendant costs. No further inquiry was made on this matter during 1976.

Access to PACFLT Ocean Surveillance Intelligence System (OSIS) Data Base

In February 1976 CINCPAC requested access to the OSIS data base by IPAC via the WWMCCS to obtain the identical sanitized all-source OSIS data provided the CINCPACFLT Command Center (FCC). Further coordination with CINCPACFLT resulted in the following amplified requirements by October 1976:

- On-line, 24 hour access to Intelligence Support System (ISS) files (Red surface and sub-surface forces and merchantships) to allow PACOM I&W net controller to obtain past, present, and projected maritime positional data and patterns of foreign naval operations, and to support IPAC hull-to-emitter correlation (HULTEL) analysis.
- On-line, 24 hour access to the Navy WWMCCS software standardized (NWSS) unitrack files (Blue surface force) to allow PACOM I&W net controller to obtain positional data on U.S./allied naval forces.

In November 1976 CINCPAC submitted the desired data elements for the evaluated Red and Blue positional information to be available through interface of CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT WWMCCS H6060 computers. Planning for the project was underway in December 1976 and remote access was anticipated by summer 1977.²

USDAO Wellington 172048Z Aug 76; J2 Current Issues, 18 Aug 76, Subj: Aerial Photos of Fiji Coastal Resources.

^{2.} CINCPAC 060527Z Feb 76, 210246Z May 76, 010321Z Oct 76, and 182015Z Nov 76; CINCPACFLT 190617Z Jun 76 and 200157Z Oct 76; J2312 HistSum Dec 76.

Ocean Surface Surveillance (OSS)

- On 27 October 1976, as a result of coordination during the B-52 OSS Conference (19-20 October 1976), CINCPACFLT provided the guidelines for the conduct of B-52 OSS against Soviet units in the Pacific Ocean. It was anticipated that the initial missions would be conducted by the 3d Air Division, 43d Security Wing, from Andersen AFB, Guam in January 1977. In issuing the guidelines CINCPACFLT advised that these missions would not be conducted under Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) rules because:
 - The areas proposed lay wholly outside JCS-designated PARPRO sensitive areas.
 - Dual reporting procedures (OPREP and RAINFORM) would unnecessarily complicate communications procedures and contribute to communications overload.
 - B-52 OSS of Soviet units was not considered a PARPRO sensitive mission, but was merely an extension of existing OSS training in the Pacific.

<u>Counterintelligence</u>

<u>International Terrorism</u>

- (U) From 1 through 4 June 1976 Dr. Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation visited CINCPAC and held discussions concerning international terrorism. A total of 35 personnel representing 23 different staff elements and organizations attended the various discussions. On 4 June Dr. Jenkins met with analysts from IPAC and discussed their assessments of the threat to the Pacific Command. On 10 June Admiral Gayler, in a memorandum to the CINCPAC staff, emphasized the need for alertness and vigilance to potential terrorist threats in the PACOM, and directed the following staff actions:²
 - A review of existing directives to insure a free and rapid exchange of information concerning terrorism.
 - Preparation by the J3 Crisis Action Group to formulate reactions to any terrorist incident.

^{1.} CINCPACFLT 252204Z Sep 76 and 270520Z Oct 76.

^{2.} J2334 HistSum Jul 76; J00/Memo, 10 Jun 76, Subj: Terrorism.

• IPAC monitoring of terrorist trends on an all-source basis.

Administrative Activities

Freedom of Information Actions

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- During 1976 there were only two requests of note processed under the Freedom of Information Act (FIA) -- one a continuation of a request initiated in late 1975, the other initiated by a Hawaii resident in May 1976. In the first case, an individual had submitted a request, under the FIA, to purchase "Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia," published by CINCPAC from July 1967 to July 1968, and "The Mekong River: An Obstacle to Crosscountry Movement," from the PACOM Intelligence Digest of 17 January 1969. At the end of 1975 the requestor was advised that the "Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia" documents were releasable upon receipt of payment for search and reproduction costs (\$61.30), but CINCPAC had requested and received DIA concurrence to deny the Intelligence Digest article request. On 9 February 1976 the requestor expressed regret at not being able to pay the reproduction costs, noting that he could obtain the documents on inter-library loan from the Air University Library. He further requested CINCPAC conduct a declassification review of the remaining back file of "Measurement of Progress" and inform the Air University Library of the results. He was informed that CINCPAC would advise all holders that the July 1967 through July 1968 issues of "Measurement of Progress" had been declassified, but that subsequent requests would require an advance payment of approximately \$25.00 for each quarterly report. He was also informed that the U.S. Government had expended \$592.95 for the initial efforts made to release "Measurement of Progress."
- (U) Based on DIA reassessment of the PACOM Intelligence Digest article, CINCPAC declassified that document in March 1976 and notified the Judge Advocate General of the Navy that the requestor could obtain the article upon receipt of \$11.90 to pay for search and reproduction costs.²
- (U) In the second case, a Hawaii resident requested access to, and copies of, all files and documents that might be on file at CINCPAC pertaining to himself and the organization he represented. As this request was quite general in nature, CINCPAC advised the requestor that identifying a specific incident,

2. CINCPAC Ltr J233 Ser 579 of 23 Mar 76, Subj: Freedom of Information Act Appeal in the Case of Mr. T. Jeffery Hughes.

^{1. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 542; Ltr from Mr. T. Jeffery Hughes to COL Alan H. Birdsall, CINCPAC, 9 Feb 76; CINCPAC Ltr J233 Ser 397 of 25 Feb 76 to T. Jeffery Hughes.

activity, subject, or time would assist in reducing the manhours required for search, and thus the cost to the requestor. He was further provided the fee schedule for search and duplication of documents and was advised of the minimum fee of \$68.05 due in advance to begin search. On 8 June 1976 the requestor asked for further specifics to aid his request, including a description of the functions of the CINCPAC staff agencies. This information was provided on 22 June 1976, and no further correspondence was received from the requestor during 1976.

Declassification Actions

ROLLING THUNDER - Route Package

(U) In May 1976 Admiral Sharp (Retired), former CINCPAC, requested review of the Operation ROLLING THUNDER (Air Operations against North Vietnam) Route Package Area Map for possible declassification action. The map was declassified by the CINCPAC Operations Directorate on 17 May 1976, and released to Admiral Sharp.²

PACOM Intelligence Digest

(U) On 27 April 1976 the Department of the Army requested a review of pages 8 through 11, PACOM Intelligence Digest of 7 June 1968 for possible utilization by Army historians working on the official history of the United States Army in the War in Vietnam. IPAC analysts recommended the retention of current classification due to the sensitive type of information contained therein. On 17 May 1976 CINCPAC requested the DIA to conduct further review. The DIA, in turn, coordinated with OJCS and Office Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (OASD(ISA)) and requested a final decision from CIA. On 23 July 1976 the DIA notified CINCPAC of the CIA final decision, agreeing to the declassification of the four-page article, "South Vietnam: The Political War."3

2. J2/Memo/S48-76 of 17 May 76, Subj: Declassification Action (ROLLING THUNDER-Route Package Areas) with J3 handwritten approval.

^{1.} Ltrs, American Friends Service Committee, Inc., Hawaii Area Program Office (Ian Yonge Lind, Program Secretary) to CINCPAC, 13 May 76 and 8 Jun 76; CINCPAC Ltrs J233 Ser 1062 of 27 May 76 and Ser 1240 of 22 Jun 76 to Mr. Ian Yonge Lind.

^{3.} DA Ltr DAAG-AMR-S, 27 Apr 76, Subj: Request for Declassification Review: TAG Action 7626311; CINCPAC Ltr J233 Ser C115 of 17 May 76; DIA 6654/261506Z May 76 and 2615/231710Z Jul 76.

Release of Classified Information to Foreign Governments


<u>Japan</u>

<u>Korea</u>

1. USFJ/J2 Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Release of U.S. Military Intelligence to Representatives of the Government of Japan, 28 Sep 76.

2. COMUS Korea 200747Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 202200Z Aug 76; JCS 4637/210018Z Aug 76.

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SECTION III--TARGET INTELLIGENCE

PACOM Target Action Group (TAG)

During 1976 the coordinating body for PACOM targeting activities met a total of eleven times. During 1975, this body, comprised of representatives from CINCPAC (chairman), IPAC, PACAF, and CINCPACFLT (FICPAC), met as the PACOM Target List Review Group (TLRG). For the first five meetings of 1976, this body met as the Target List Review Group/PACOM Target Materials Review Group (TLRG/PATMRG) and, beginning with meeting 6-76, 23 June 1976, and for the remainder of 1976, it met as the PACOM Target Action Group (TAG). Beginning with meeting 3-76, 25 March 1976, membership included representation from the 548th RTG.

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9-76, 10-76, 11-76.

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
CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 553; TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 1-76 1. thru 5-76; TAG Minutes, 6-76 thru 8-76. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 561-564; TAG Minutes, 7-76,

TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 2-76; TAG Minutes, 7-76, and Encl 4, Modification to 3. IOCTL. SECREI

On 19 November CINCPAC Intelligence Director issued a tasking letter to PACAF Division of Intelligence Collection which defined imagery support required in PACOM. The 548th RTG served as the executive agency for the PACOM imagery data base. Also covered in the tasking were IOCTL objectives outside the Unified Command Plan (UCP).

NKTTL

As part of the continuing review, in February 1976 IPAC submitted several revisions to the data and coding of the North Korean Tactical Target List (NKTTL). Included were area codes which reflected five nautical mile circles around population centers vice the former arbitrary geographic areas.²



^{1.} TAG Minutes, 11-76 and Encl 4, Imagery Data Base Responsibility.


2. TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 2-76.

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^{3.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 555-556; TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 4-76, and Encl 3, Target List Modifications; TAG Minutes, 7-76, and Encl 1, Revision of NKTTL Foreword; TAG Minutes, 9-76, and Encl 1, NKTTL Modification to Accommodate 5027N.

Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System (APPS)

By June 1976 PACAF had received APPS equipment intended to support their F-111 and F-4 radar bombing program, and had conducted a one week training program for the other components. By the end of September, PACFLT had also received and used their APPS equipment. Their data base was deployed aboard the USS MIDNAY for flight crew use in planning and selecting aimpoints. Carriers were scheduled to receive the APPS in 1977.





^{1. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, pp. 558-561; <u>TLRG/PATMRG Minutes</u>, 2-76 and 3-76.

^{2.} TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 2-76; TAG Minutes, 6-76 and 9-76.

^{3.} TAG Minutes, 9-76; HQ DMA 161920Z Sep 76, 071200Z Oct 76; DMAAC 191900Z Mar 76.

Target List Distribution in Wartime

On 29 April 1976 the TAG IPAC representative referenced a 19 March 1976 memo suggesting use of AUTODIN cards to provide responsive updating in wartime. PACAF saw no problem with its units, but believed a printout would be preferable to cards for routine applications. PACFLT (FICPAC) stated that the Seventh Fleet had no capability to receive cards or other bulk data when deployed and that tape was considered impractical due to printout speed. The Fleet Auxiliary Intelligence Service Center (FAISC) in WESTPAC could receive cards and fly them to Fleet Units. If in port, Fleet units could receive cards via shore communications. Realizing that these methods would be inadequate under wartime conditions, PACFLT worked through year's end to obtain highspeed communications systems onboard ships.²

Operation PAUL BUNYAN

During the Korean Crisis of 18-21 August 1976, which resulted in Operation PAUL BUNYAN, the Joint Targeting Committee (JTC) was not activated. On 30 September the TAG membership agreed that the JTC should be activated in future crises and that activation during exercises would develop competency. The first exercise for consideration was PRIME TARGET, scheduled for March 1977.3

Target Intelligence/Tactical Target Material (TI/TTM)

During the period 8-12 November 1976 the Chairman of the PACOM TAG served as voting representative at the DIA-sponsored TI/TTM Conference, Lowry AFB, Colorado. A total of 68 agenda items were considered, 17 of which were submitted by PACOM. Of the 17 PACOM items, all but four were passed as is or with minor modification. 4

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^{1.} TAG Minutes, 7-76.

^{2.} TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 4-76; TAG Minutes, 6-76.

^{3. &}lt;u>TAG Minutes</u>, 9-76.

^{4.} J222 HistSums Aug 76 and Nov 76; TAG Minutes, 11-76.

CHAPTER X

POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

SECTION I -- OVERVIEW

Selected Chronology 1976

- (U) This unclassified chronology was compiled from Department of State <u>Bulletins</u>, the periodical <u>Current History</u>, and the wire service chronology submitted by the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office.
 - 3 Jan In India, the national convention of the congress party gave unanimous support to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's policies, including the postponement of parliamentary elections, the continuing state of emergency, and the proposed constitutional changes.
 - 5 Jan U.S. Senator George McGovern (D.-SD) said Pakistan had indicated to him its interest in buying arms from the United States.
 - Cambodia announced that the constitution approved last month goes into effect today and that the country will be known officially as "Democratic Cambodia." Prince Norodom Sihanouk is still Chief of State.
 - 8 Jan The official Chinese press agency, Hsinhua, announced the death of Prime Minister Chou En-lai.
 - Prime Minister of Thailand, Kukrit Pramoj, brought the Opposition Social Agrarian Party into his coalition and took over the Ministry of the Interior.
 - 9 Jan Premier Chiang Ching-kuo visited the U.S. Seventh Fleet flag ship at Keelung Harbor in Taiwan.
 - 10 Jan In Tokyo, Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko discussed a treaty to conclude World War II formally.

- An Indian Buddhist publication carried articles and editorials supporting the Communist government of Vietnam.
- 12 Jan Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj of Thailand submitted his resignation; King Phumiphol Aduldet dissolved Parliament and called for new elections in April. Kukrit agreed to head a caretaker government until the elections.
 - Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko warned Japan that the USSR may "reconsider" its relations with Japan if Japan signs a peace treaty with China.
 - Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser said the United States should build up its naval and military presence in the Indian Ocean.
- 13 Jan Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki said that his government is prepared to sign a peace treaty with China to conclude World War II, despite the objections of the Soviet Union. He said Japan is willing to sign a clause stating that both China and Japan oppose the efforts of any third nation to achieve "hegemony" in Asia.
- 14 Jan Tun Abdul Razak, Prime Minister of Malaysia, died.
 - Australian Prime Minister announced that the development of a major naval base in Western Australia which may be used by nuclear warships of allied nations will be speeded up.
 - Indian Prime Minister told a meeting of international scientists that India will continue to experiment with nuclear explosions.
 - 15 Jan South Korean President Park Chung-hee disclosed the discovery of oil along the country's southeast coast.
 - Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Hussein Onn was sworn in as Prime Minister.
 - 16 Jan The remains of two Americans shot down over China during the Vietnam War were flown to Thailand for processing.

- 18 Jan Senator McGovern has been told that North Vietnam wants economic aid from the United States as a price for normalizing diplomatic relations.
- 19 Jan Saigon radio announced that elections for a joint national assembly will be held on 25 April 1976.
- 20 Jan Secretary of State Kissinger arrived in Moscow to confer with Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev for talks designed to limit the long-range missiles and bombers of the United States and the USSR.
 - New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon strongly backed United States naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
- 21 Jan Kim Young Sam, leader of the opposition in South Korea, was indicted on charges of violating emergency decrees issued by the President.
 - President Ford presented his budget for fiscal year 1977 to Congress. In his budget message, he said that defense spending will rise to \$100 billion in the next year and probably reach \$141 billion by 1981.
 - The Saigon military government officially turned over its ruling authority to a civilian administration, the People's Revolutionary Committee, headed by Vo Van Kiet.
- 22 Jan Britain granted independence to the strategically important Seychelles Islands group in the Indian Ocean effective 29 June 1976.
- 24 Jan A congressional report by the General Accounting Office released by Senator Gary Hart (D.-CO) revealed that to make way for U.S. Navy facilities the Administration secretly paid for the costs of the British evacuation of the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
 - In Madrid, Secretary of State Kissinger signed a treaty with Spain allowing the United States to continue to use military bases in Spain.

- 26 Jan Thailand officials claimed Cambodian soldiers shot and killed 200 Cambodian villagers as they tried to flee to Thailand.
 - In its defense budget, the U.S. Defense Department dropped its plans to expand the 479-ship Navy to a 600-ship Navy.
 - In Athens, U.S. and Greek officials met to discuss the future status of U.S. troops in Greece.
- 30 Jan Philippine Army troops arrested more than 200 striking workers. In the past month, nearly 120 students, labor leaders and social leaders have been arrested on charges of being Communists or subversives.
- 2 Feb In a television interview, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said he believes that the United States should spend enough money on defense to keep a "rough equivalence" with the Soviet Union.
- Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway said the United States has lost its once undisputed control of the Sea of Japan.
 - 3 Feb Commenting on strategic arms limitation at a luncheon in California, Secretary of State Kissinger said as a consequence of decisions made a decade ago by both sides, Soviet missiles are superior in throw weight while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity, and sophistication and we possess more warheads.
 - 4 Feb A U.S. Senate subcommittee in Washington, D.C., reported that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation paid a Japanese rightist leader \$7 million as its "secret agent" to help the company sell planes in Japan.
 - 7 Feb A dispatch from Hsinhua, the official Chinese press agency, revealed the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng, Minister of Public Security and a Deputy Prime Minister, as Acting Prime Minister, succeeding the late Chou En-lai. Teng Hsiao-ping, the senior Deputy Prime Minister, acted for Chou during Chou's year-long last illness.

- 10 Feb Vice Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, said his fleet was capable of meeting any challenge in the oceans it patrols.
 - President Ford signed a \$112.3-billion defense appropriation bill that includes a ban on further aid to forces in the Angolan civil war.
 - Japanese government officials reported that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation has lost a \$1.3-billion order for new planes because of its involvement with a payoff scandal to Japanese officials.
- 12 Feb The new Japanese Ambassador to the United States asked the State Department to provide all information available to the United States Government concerning the payment of some \$12 million to Japanese agents by the Lockheed Corporation.
- 16 Feb President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Anatole Dobrynin to discuss new proposals on strategic arms limitations.
- 17 Feb State Department officials reported that the United States has broken off talks with India on the possible resumption of U.S. economic aid, to show displeasure at India's policies toward the United States.
 - President Ford reorganized America's intelligence community, ordering a committee under CIA Director George Bush to manage all intelligence operations and creating an independent three-man board to report abuses.
- 18 Feb The government closed Thailand's borders to refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
 - Despite last year's collapse of American foreign policy in Indochina, the United States will honor defense commitments in Thailand and the Philippines, according to Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He said there were no plans to withdraw any American troops from South Korea.

- Australia's Defense Minister announced the purchase of two guided missile frigates for the Royal Australian Navy from the United States.
- 20 Feb The Thailand government notified U.S. authorities that all American military advisers who remain after the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Thailand should eventually leave the country.
 - As a private citizen, former President Richard Nixon departed on a trip to China to be the guest of the Chinese government.
- 22 Feb The remains of the last two Americans killed in Vietnam (U.S. Marine guards during the evacuation of Saigon) were turned over to aides of Senator Edward Kennedy (D.-MA) and flown to Bangkok, Thailand.
- 23 Feb A battle in international waters ended when a Thailand Navy ship sank one of five Cambodian patrol boats attacking Thailand fishermen.
 - A Japanese government mission headed to Hanoi for talks with North Vietnamese officials on ways to strengthen ties between the two countries.
 - Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung talked with former U.S. President Nixon in Peking; the meeting was described as a "friendly conversation on a wide range of subjects."
 - The government of Vietnam announced that foreign visitors will be welcome beginning next month. Tourist facilities are being prepared.
- 24 Feb Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev opened the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, noting that he sees "detente as the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction."
 - The U.S. Senate voted to create the Northern Marianas Commonwealth, extending U.S. citizenship to some 14,000 residents of one district of the present U.N. Pacific Trust Territory upon termination of trusteeship in 1981.

- Japanese government officials seized tons of paper in the Tokyo office of Lockheed and in 27 private homes and businesses looking for information on the Lockheed scandal.
- 25 Feb Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan sent a letter to U.S. President Ford asking for full cooperation in getting the names of "high ranking Japanese government officials" who allegedly received Lockheed's payoff in its sales promotion in Japan.
 - Pakistan Prime Minister Bhutto ended a 3-day trip to Canada, where he conferred with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau.

 The Canadian government wishes to exert control over the nuclear power reactors it sold to Pakistan.
- 26 Feb President Ford announced he is withdrawing trade preference status from Laos under the law which bars such benefits to a developing country if it goes communist.
 - In Japan, three Americans were subpoenaed by the lower house of Parliament to testify before a committee investigating the Lockheed bribery scandal.
 - Navy Secretary J. William Middendorf said that the United States could defeat the Soviet Union at sea right now and that his major worry was future shipbuilding trends.
- 27 Feb Cambodia claimed that three U.S. F-111 warplanes bombed and badly damaged the town of Siem Reap. U.S. military and Embassy spokesmen in Bangkok, Thailand, said, "The (Cambodian) report is ridiculous and completely without truth."
 - Premier Chiang Ching-kuo stressed that the alliance between Taiwan and the United States should not be undermined by U.S. "accommodations" with China.
 - Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan met in New York with U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger to discuss matters of mutual interest, including nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

- 1 Mar As reported in the Navy Times, Admiral Noel Gayler, CINCPAC, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the inroads of inflation were undermining the ability of U.S. Forces to do their job and were having a detrimental effect on morale because money shortages were being "taken out of the hide" of military people. Giving an assessment of the status of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Gayler said he is most concerned about anti-submarine warfare capability, ocean surveillance, sealift, and the ability to provide tactical air and sea control.
 - The United States announced the turnover of Camp Samae San to Thailand.
 - President Ford said the term "detente" no longer applies to describe U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China but that he will continue negotiating with them in "a policy of peace through strength."
- 2 Mar Twelve political and religious leaders petitioned South Korean President Park Chung Hee to resign and rescind the emergency decrees issued in 1972.
 - The National Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club and the Union of Concerned Scientists filed a petition with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to bar the shipment of 40,000 pounds of uranium to India, claiming that the shipment would be "inimical to the interests of the United States"; the groups claim that India has refused to sign the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation and has refused safeguard inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- 4 Mar Phnom Penh radio, Cambodia reported that Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary led foreign diplomats from 12 countries and a representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization on a tour of northwestern Cambodia. The diplomats reportedly viewed the bomb site of a town that the government said was bombed by American planes "last week."
- 7 Mar Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said the United States has a "rough equivalence" with the Soviet Union's military power, but could slip to number two if present trends continue.

- 9 Mar The Canadian Government reached an agreement with the Indian Government over the use of nuclear reactors sold to India. The Indian Government promised that the reactors will not be used to develop an explosive device.
- 10 Mar Eleven critics of the Government of South Korea were arrested and charged with plotting to overthrow the Government. One of the 11, Kim Dae Jung, was the opposition party's most recent presidential candidate.
 - The Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers expressed concern at increasing Soviet military activity throughout the world and called on the United States to maintain a global presence to match the threat.
- 11 Mar President Ford personally assured Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki the United States would supply names and other evidence to Japanese authorities investigating Lockheed's acknowledged payoffs in Japan.
 - 12 Mar The Government of Japan agreed to keep secret any information supplied by the U.S. Government for its investigation of Japanese officials involved in the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation scandal. The U.S. Government requested secrecy until all investigations are completed.
 - In recent weeks, under the guise of a new "tenure" law, the Government of South Korea forced the ouster of more than 400 university professors.
 - 13 Mar Lockheed's Japanese "secret agent" was formally charged with evading income tax payments; he was the first to be charged in the Lockheed scandal.
 - 15 Mar The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea resumed; 156 nations were represented. Representatives are trying to reach international legal agreement on the use of the oceans.
 - 16 Mar In an address outlining U.S. foreign policy for the next decade, Secretary of State Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "peace in Asia depends upon the resolution of outstanding political conflicts, most prominently

that of the Korean Peninsula." "Partnership with Japan is a pillar of our Asia policy," and "the process of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China is indispensable."

- 19 Mar President Ford said he has promised Peking to continue reduction of U.S. Forces on Taiwan but not a specific 50 percent cut.
- 20 Mar The Government of Thailand asked the United States to shut down operations in Thailand at midnight and remove all but 270 military personnel by 4 July 1976. The United States hoped to have 3,000 troops in Thailand to man various installations.
 - The Government of Indonesia began withdrawing its troops from Portuguese Timor.
- 21 Mar The U.S. military ceased all operations in Thailand in preparation for its final withdrawal.
- 22 Mar White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen reported that last week President Ford received a written report from former President Nixon on his trip to China and found it "very interesting and useful."
- 24 Mar President Ford signed "a covenant to establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in political union with the United States of America."
 - 25 Mar Supreme Commander Admiral Sa-Ngat Chaloryu said the Thailand military has proposed buying a squadron of F-5 fighter-bombers worth about \$500 million to substitute for U.S. Forces withdrawing from Thailand.
 - 26 Mar Representative G.V. Montgomery announced a message to Hanoi from the Ford Administration which expressed hope that all matters in dispute between the U.S. and North Vietnam could be discussed and eventually resolved; the key issue is the fate of about 850 Americans still reported as missing-in-action.

- The United States and Turkey reached a new 4-year accord to allow American military bases in Turkey to be reopened; in return, the Administration pledged about \$1 billion in loans and grants, which must be approved by both houses of Congress.
- 27 Mar Philippine President Marcos retired three chiefs of the armed forces plus five other generals. This was the first shakeup in the armed forces since the Government declared martial law three years ago.
- 29 Mar The United States, maintaining its hardline stand against any aid to North and South Vietnam, decided to boycott a fund-raising conference opening in Manila on medical assistance to the two war-ravaged countries.

 - 5 Apr Prince Norodom Sihanouk resigned his figurehead position as Head of State of Cambodia. The Cabinet accepted his resignation.
 - Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj was defeated in his bid for reelection to the National Assembly. Party leader Seni Pramoj will become Prime Minister of Thailand.
 - 7 Apr Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping of China was removed from his posts as deputy chairman of the party, first deputy Prime Minister and chief of staff of the armed forces; Hua Kuo-feng was appointed as Prime Minister and first deputy chairman of the Communist Party.
- 12 Apr General Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, met with Secretary of State Kissinger to begin negotiations regarding the use by the U.S. Armed Forces of facilities in Philippine military bases.
- 13 Apr President Ford signed a law that extends the United States fisheries limit to 200 miles offshore.

- 14 Apr The Marshall Islands District of the U.N. Trust Territory asked the United States to open separate negotiations for a political status in unity with the United States.
 - Japan deplored the U.S. establishment of a 200-mile fisheries zone off its coast.
 - Cambodian Information and Propaganda Minister Hu Nim announced the appointment of Khieu Samphan as "Chairman of the State Presidium"; he succeeded Sihanouk as Head of State. Pol Pot was named Prime Minister.
 - The Supreme Court of Japan declared the nation's parliamentary election procedures unconstitutional because equal representation for voters was not assured and each vote was not of equal weight.
- 15 Apr India and the USSR signed a 5-year trade agreement.
 - The U.S. and Greek Governments signed an agreement providing for the United States to use bases in Greece and for \$700 million in U.S. aid for Greece.
- 17 Apr Peking radio reported the dismissal of Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying.
- 18 Apr An article in Pravda said that U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger's remarks that the United States cannot support a country that permits communists in its government violates the Helsinki Agreement.
- 19 Apr Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India offered to resume discussions about reestablishing diplomatic relations with Pakistan. India and Pakistan severed diplomatic relations in 1971.
- 21 Apr An Indian paramilitary patrol unit was fired upon by Bangladesh security forces.
 - The Ford Administration stated that now was not the time to make an arms limitation initiative in the Indian Ocean because of Russian activities in Africa.
 - King Phumipol of Thailand officially appointed the new Government of Prime Minister Seni Pramoj.

- President Ford predicted that Japan would accelerate its military rearmament in the future and said he would favor such action.
- 23 Apr President Ford said he was willing to discuss "some humanitarian efforts" with North Vietnam but his Administration was not prepared to recognize the communist regime.
- 24 Apr Prime Minister Takeo Miki said Japan will not seek a revision of its military security treaty with the United States to ban American nuclear weapons from Japanese soil.
- 25 Apr Elections for 492 seats in the National Assembly were held in North and South Vietnam; these were the first countrywide assembly elections held since 1946.
- 26 Apr The Chinese press agency Hsinhua reported that Cambodia and Burma have established diplomatic relations.
 - Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko, Soviet Defense Minister since 1967, died suddenly at the age of 72.
 - Vietnam radio broadcasts reported a 99 percent voter turnout in some sections to elect 249 deputies in the North and 243 in the South; all candidates had been preselected by revolutionary committees.
 - The Government of South Africa established full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
- 29 Apr Dmitri F. Ustinov, a civilian in charge of the Soviet military industrial complex, was named to replace the late Andrei A. Grechko as Minister of Defense.
- 30 Apr The North Korean radio announced that the 5th Supreme People's Assembly named Pak Sung Chul as Prime Minister to succeed Kim Il, who was appointed "first deputy chairman" of the Communist Party.
- 2 May Government officials in Vietnam announced that Hanoi would become the diplomatic, publishing and international center of the country. Press offices and embassies in Saigon would be closed effective 8 May 1976.

- 6 May Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cambodia.
- 7 May After eight weeks of negotiations by representatives of 147 countries in New York, the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference adjourned with differences still unresolved; representatives agreed to another conference in New York starting 2 August 1976 to try to complete their work, which was begun in 1973.
 - Saying that it would impose "unprecedented restrictions," President Ford vetoed the \$4.4 billion foreign aid bill for fiscal 1976 and July, August, and September 1976. Pursuant to a 1976 law, the 1977 fiscal year started 1 October 1976, instead of 1 July 1976.
- 8 May It was announced that Thuiland and the United States will begin moving an additional 11,000 Indochinese refugees to the United States as soon as processing can be completed.
 - Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev was promoted to field marshal.
- 9 May Representative Les Aspin made public a Central Intelligence Agency report that the United States had outspent Russia almost 2-to-1 in the building of major warships during the last five years, spending \$4.9 billion versus the Soviet expenditure of \$2.5 billion.
- 14 May The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan announced the decision of the two countries to restore diplomatic relations "within a short period of time."
- 15 May During an interview for the NBC "Today" Show taped 15 May and broadcast on 17 May, Secretary of State Kissinger said the absolute precondition without which we cannot consider the normalization of relations with the Government of Vietnam is the accounting for missing-in-action and full accounting for the remains of Americans who were shot down over Vietnam or otherwise killed in Vietnam.

- 16 May The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to approve a 5-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain that provides \$1.2 billion in U.S. aid to Spain in return for the continuing U.S. use of Spanish bases.
- 18 May Canadian Foreign Secretary Allan MacEachen announced the termination of the nuclear cooperation pact with India.
- 19 May The United States transferred Ko-Kha Base to the Thailand Government.
- 20 May The Senate voted to postpone appropriations for the B-1 bomber until 1 February 1977.
- 24 May In Japan, the upper house of Parliament completed ratification of the 1968 international treaty on the limitation of nuclear weapons.
 - Protocol to the Treaty between the U.S. and USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems was ratified by both countries and entered into force this date.
- 27 May The Philippines complained that its military assistance agreements with the United States do not give the Philippines enough help to combat internal subversion.
 - During a meeting held in Honolulu, HI between Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and South Korean Defense Minister Suh Jyong Chul on security matters, Secretary Rumsfeld said that the United States is committed to the defense of South Korea.
- 28 May In simultaneous actions in Washington, DC and Moscow, President Ford and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev signed a treaty which prohibited underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes above the 150-kiloton level and, for the first time, provided for on-site inspection of nuclear tests under some circumstances.
 - Meeting in Indonesia, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries representatives voted to extend the freeze on petroleum prices "for the present"; the decision reportedly reflected the dominance of Saudi Arabia.

- 31 May In Dili, Timor, the People's Assembly voted to become the 27th province of Indonesia; half the island formerly belonged to Portugal.
- 1 Jun Thailand ordered the closing down of the last U.S. base in the country, thus ruling out any American military presence except the 270 advisors who would remain after the 20 July deadline.
 - U.S. Navy and Air Force helicopters ended mercy flights in flood-stricken central Luzon, Philippines.
 - The Philippines and the Soviet Union agreed to establish diplomatic relations.
- 2 Jun Representatives of the U.S. and the USSR resumed discussions in Geneva in an attempt to reach further agreement expanding their 1972 accords curbing strategic nuclear weapons.
- 4 Jun Canada announced the adoption of a 200-mile offshore fishing limit effective 1 January 1977.
- 5 Jun On reaching the mandatory retirement age, President Suharto of Indonesia retired as general of the army; however, he retained his position as supreme commander of the armed forces.
- 8 Jun The New York <u>Times</u> reported that the Chinese Government has opened a new oil terminal in the Manchurian port of Dairen. The new port can handle oil tankers up to 100,000 tons.
- 9 Jun South Korean and Japanese Government leaders met in Tokyo for talks on Korea-Japan cooperation in the diplomatic and economic fields.
- 11 Jun Pakistan and China signed a border trade agreement for 1976.
 - In South Korea, opposition leader Kim Young Sam, president of the New Democratic Party, resigned his party post.
- 16 Jun Japan and Australia signed a basic treaty of friendship and cooperation.

- 18 Jun An agreement providing for Japan's financial contribution for U.S. administrative and related expenses for Japanese fiscal year 1976 pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement went into force this date.
 - The Government of Thailand announced an agreement with Cambodia establishing an Embassy in the other's capital and the demarcation of a 10-mile stretch of common border.
- 19 Jun President Ford asked Congress to approve a U.S.-Turkish agreement that would permit the reopening of U.S. military bases in Turkey.
- 20 Jun The U.S. Government closed its last two military bases in Thailand the Ramasun electronic monitoring facility and the U-Tapao Air Base--and preparations for the withdrawal of remaining U.S. troops began.
- 22 Jun The official Soviet press agency Tass reported the launching of a new Soviet space station into earth orbit.
- 24 Jun White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen said that the U.S. has withdrawn its small military advisory teams from the Chinese Nationalist-controlled islands of Quemoy and Matsu, just off the coast of China.
- 28 Jun India and Pakistan agreed to resume rail traffic between them.
- 29 Jun The 92 Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, formerly a British colony, became an independent republic.
- 30 Jun The President signed the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 limiting the number of military missions, groups, and similar organizations to 34 by 30 September 1976. Under the Act, MAAGs in the following countries were terminated: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, India, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

- 1 Jul The Senate voted to approve a \$32.5 billion appropriation for military weapons, including a start on the construction of the controversial B-1 bomber; the House approved the Bill on 30 June.
- 2 Jul The Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the United States announced its approval of a shipment of low-enriched uranium for use in an Indian nuclear reactor.
 - President Ford exercised his 50th veto, vetoing a \$3.3 billion military construction bill.
 - North and South Vietnam were officially reunited under the name Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
- 3 Jul Hanoi radio announced the composition of the new leadership in Vietnam; most of the 30 Cabinet ministers are men who held high positions in the North Vietnamese Government.
- 6 Jul In China, Marshal Chu Teh, chairman of the National People's Congress and "father of the Red Army," died.
- 7 Jul A manned Soviet Soyuz spacecraft was launched and successfully docked with the orbiting Salyut space station.
 - Indonesian President Suharto signed a bill incorporating East Timor into Indonesia. East Timor had been under Portuguese rule for 400 years.
- 12 Jul The establishment of Vietnamese/Philippines diplomatic relations was announced in a joint communique.
- 13 Jul According to yesterday's communique, the Philippines and Vietnam agreed that no foreign country would be allowed to use the territory of one as a base for aggression against the other countries in the region.
- 14 Jul Pakistan and Bangladesh agreed to set up a joint committee to promote trade between the two countries.
- 17 Jul East Timor formally became Indonesia's 27th province.

- 20 Jul The U.S. House of Representatives voted to allow American Samoa to elect its own governor and lieutenant governor.
 - The last American combat soldier left Thailand; approximately 250 American military advisers remained by mutual U.S.-RTG agreement.
 - Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien in Jakarta following visits to Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, assured Indonesian leaders that his country will help them attain peace and neutrality.
 - Radio Rangoon, Burma announced that the forces of President Ne Win squelched an attempted coup d'etat 18 days ago.
 - The landing vehicle from the American Viking I unmanned spacecraft made a successful soft landing on the surface of Mars after a journey of almost 11 months and half a billion miles; the news of the successful landing was transmitted to earth 19 minutes later. The landing device also transmitted spectacular pictures of Mars' surface, showing what appeared to be a wind-swept rocky desert plain.
- 21 Jul Reports from Viking I showed that Mars has an atmosphere containing 3 percent nitrogen, indicating that there may be or may have been life on Mars.
 - Vietnam agreed to allow all Americans stranded in that country to leave beginning I August and take their Vietnamese families with them.
- 22 Jul Viking I sent back weather reports from Mars, reporting light winds and a temperature range of minus 122°F to minus 22°F.
 - During an interview in Portland, Oregon, Secretary Kissinger proposed a forum with representatives of the United States, South Korea, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China to discuss the Korean situation. Under no circumstances would the U.S. unilaterally withdraw forces from Korea in the absence of a political arrangement.
- 24 Jul India and Pakistan formally reestablished diplomatic relations.

- Peking Mayor Wu Teh, a deputy chairman of the People's Congress and a member of the Communist Party Politburo, succeeded Marshal Chu Teh as chairman of the National People's Congress.
- 27 Jul Former Prime Minister of Japan, Kakuei Tanaka, was arrested and charged with illegally accepting Lockheed money. Tanaka resigned from his post as head of the Liberal-Democratic Party.
- 29 Jul The Royal Thailand Navy took over the first of three faststrike craft built by a Singapore shipyard.
 - President Ford and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser announced agreement on increasing American strength in the Indian Ocean.
 - Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia agreed to form a united front in their dealing with Southeast Asia.
- 31 Jul According to Administration sources, President Ford planned to ask Congress for permission to sell MAVERICK air-to-surface missiles and "smart bombs" to Saudi Arabia.
 - Instruments on Viking I indicated an unexpected amount of oxygen in Martian soil.
 - 1 Aug In a journey arranged by the United Nations, 49 U.S. citizens and their dependents flew from Saigon to Bangkok; they were virtually the last Americans in Vietnam.
 - 2 Aug Cambodia established diplomatic relations with Japan.
 - The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea reconvened at United Nations Headquarters.
 - 3 Aug In a message to Congress, President Ford asked for new legislation requiring American firms to report all substantial payments they make in foreign countries, "whether proper or improper," which are designed to aid their sales to foreign governments.

- 4 Aug Admiral Noel Gayler, retiring Chief of U.S. Pacific Forces, said the Soviet Union is trying to establish port facilities for its fishing fleet in the South Pacific and warned that it could lead to a Soviet military presence.
 - Defense officials of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, completing a two-day meeting in Australia of the ANZUS Defense Alliance, decided to extend more economic aid to South Pacific islands in hopes of heading off Russian penetration.
 - On his return from Seoul, French Minister for Foreign Trade Raymond Barre announced that France is negotiating terms with the South Korean Government to sell it additional nuclear power stations. He also revealed that France has agreed to guarantee the financing of the stations.
- 5 Aug Reversing a district court ruling made 35 months ago, the Japanese High Court ruled that it is legal for the country to maintain military forces.
- 6 Aug The Governments of Vietnam and Thailand agreed to establish diplomatic relations.
 - Hostilities along the 151-mile border separating South Korea and North Korea flared up when troops of both sides fought a brief gunbattle in the mideastern frontline. No casualties were reported.
- 8 Aug Secretary Kissinger met with Pakistan Prime Minister Bhutto in Lahore, Pakistan for talks about Pakistan's determination to construct a French-designed nuclear reprocessing plant.
- 9 Aug At an airport conference in Lahore, Kissinger said that Pakistan Prime Minister Bhutto had agreed to work out a compromise that would make it impossible for Pakistan to divert nuclear material into nuclear explosives.
- 13 Aug A soil sample test for life on Mars by the Viking I landing craft proved negative.

- 14 Aug Prime Minister Pham Van Dong arrived in Sri Lanka for the conference of nonaligned countries. This was the first major international conference attended by a representative of a reunited Vietnam.
- 16 Aug Former Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan was indicted on charges of accepting \$1.6 million in bribes from Lockheed.
- 18 Aug While trimming tree branches near Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea under U.N. Command, two U.S. Army officers were killed and four American enlisted men and five South Koreans were wounded when attacked by about 30 North Korean guards armed with axes and metal pipes.
 - President Ford warned North Korea that they would be held responsible for "the consequences" of the killing of two American officers in the demilitarized zone.
- 20 Aug Secretary of State Kissinger asserted that the United States "absolutely cannot and will not accept" the "premeditated act of murder" of two American officers in the Panmunjom truce zone; he said the United States is demanding "explanations and reparations" for the incident.
 - The United States sent two jet fighter squadrons to South Korea and put its 42,000 troops there on special alert in response to the slaying of two American officers by axwielding North Korean guards.
 - The United States was reported readying the aircraft carrier MIDWAY to move into waters adjacent to Korea.
 - Leaders of 85 nonaligned nations concluded a 5-day meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka with warnings to the have nations to give more of their resources to the have-nots; the conference also deplored "imperialist aggression" in Korea.
 - The Government of Vietnam applied for membership in the United Nations.

- 21 Aug The United States staged a demonstration of military power in and around Korea at the same time as U.N. forces felled a tree that was the center of the dispute in which North Koreans killed two American officers.
 - The U.S. intensified its military preparedness in Korea; two additional squadrons of jet fighter bombers were also ordered into that area.
- 22 Aug North Korean President Kim Il Sung called the slaying of two American officers "regretful"; he said that both sides should take steps to prevent a recurrence of such incidents.
 - Japanese officials reported the Soviet Union has intensified its aerial and naval intelligence activities around Japan recently, including frequent violation of Japanese air space and territorial waters.
- 23 Aug The U.S. Department of State called North Korean President Kim Il Sung's note expressing regrets "a positive step."
 - A 2nd test for organic material on Mars proved negative.
- 24 Aug A Pentagon spokesman said American B-52 bombers have started practice missions in South Korea.
 - Nearly 65 percent of the parliamentary members of the Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party called unofficially for the custer of Prime Minister Miki.
 - Two Soviet astronauts aboard the Soyuz 21 descent module landed safely in Kazakhstan after spending 48 days in the orbiting Salyut 5 space station.
- 25 Aug The French Cabinet announced its plans to complete the sale of a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan, despite U.S. objections.
- 27 Aug Representatives of 52 nations with little or no access to the sea threatened to block the adoption of a global maritime treaty unless their needs were considered. The issue centered around the control of sea beds.

- 28 Aug At the 381st meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, the United States agreed to consider the partition of the Panmunjom truce village into two sectors; it demanded that the safety of U.S. personnel stationed in the joint security area be firmly guaranteed.
- 29 Aug Confirming a series of CIA reports, U.S. officials noted that Taiwan is beginning to reprocess spent nuclear reactor fuel to acquire a stockpile of plutonium that could be used to make nuclear weapons.
- 30 Aug Taiwan authorities denied reports that Taiwan has started reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to make atomic weapons.
 - Admiral M.F. Weisner replaced Admiral Noel Gayler as Commander in Chief Pacific in a change of command ceremony at Hickam Air Force Base, HI.
 - In London, Jane's Fighting Ships reported that the Soviet Union has three times as many submarines as the United States.
- 31 Aug In Washington, DC, Fred C. Ikle, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said that the Soviet Union is attempting to alter the nuclear weapons balance by deploying the SS-X-20, an intercontinental ballistic missile, in East Europe.
 - U.S. B-52 bombers ended 10 days of practice radar bombing runs over South Korea.
 - 1 Sep Speaking to the National Guard Association's annual conference, President Ford warned against unilateral arms reduction by the United States; he said: "We cannot lay down our arms in the simple hope that others will follow our lead."
 - 3 Sep The Viking II landed successfully on the Utopia Plains of Mars and sent signals to earth; the land site was 4,000 miles northeast of the Viking I landing site.
 - 6 Sep A Soviet pilot landed a MIG-25 jet fighter in Hokkaido, Japan and asked for asylum in the United States.

- The U.N. Command and North Korea agreed on a new set of security arrangements, designed to prevent clashes between the two forces in the demilitarized zone.
- In Paris, the Vietnamese Embassy released the names of 12 missing American pilots who were allegedly killed in action in Indochina.
- 8 Sep U.S. troops in South Korea returned to normal alert status as the military situation along the Korean border eased.
- 9 Sep Hsinhua, the Chinese press agency, announced the death of Chinese Communist Party leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
 - The defecting pilot of the Soviet MIG-25 jet fighter left Japan for the United States aboard a U.S. commercial airliner.
- 13 Sep President Ford directed U.S. Representative to the United Nations William Scranton to veto Vietnam's application for membership in the United Nations when the application came before the Security Council.
- 14 Sep The U.S. Security Council postponed consideration of the membership of reunified Vietnam in the United Nations until after the U.S. presidential elections in November, to try to avoid a U.S. veto.
 - In its first public statement since the defecting Soviet pilot landed in Japan September 6th, the Soviet Government charged the Japanese Government with preventing the pilot from returning to the USSR and criticized the United States for granting the airman asylum.
 - It is announced that new security arrangements will go into force at Panmunjom on 16 September separating military guards of the United Nations Command and North Korea.
- 15 Sep Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan dismissed 13 ministers and appointed 13 new members to his Cabinet; he also appointed three new party officials to his ruling Liberal-Democratic Party.

- 17 Sep The U.N. Law of the Sea Conference closed its 7-week session. The 150 participating countries were deadlocked over the regulation of the exploitation of seabed mineral wealth. The next session was scheduled for May 1977.
- 18 Sep South Korea and Nationalist China agreed to step up economic cooperation and expand two-way trade.
- 21 Sep The Indian Ocean island republic of Seychelles was admitted to the U.N. as its 145th member.
 - In Geneva, American and Soviet negotiators resumed their talks on strategic arms limitations.
 - A treaty of friendship and cooperation between the United States and Spain entered into force this date.
- 23 Sep A new biology experiment performed by the Viking II indicated that the possibility of life on Mars is "marginally positive."
- 25 Sep Japanese and American experts began full-scale examinations of a top secret Soviet MIG-25 jet fighter at a heavily guarded air base outside Tokyo.
- 26 Sep Hsinhua, the Chinese press agency, announced the successful explosion of a nuclear device.
- 28 Sep The Senate voted to approve a foreign (including military) aid appropriation of \$5.1 billion for fiscal 1977, over half of which was earmarked for Middle East nations. The House approved the Bill yesterday.
- 1 Oct Japan formally protested China's latest nuclear test.
 - President Ford and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met in Washington to discuss the deadlock in the SALT negotiations.
- 2 Oct Japan officially informed the Soviet Union it would return the MIG-25 flown into the country by a defecting Russian pilot.

- 4 Oct President Park Chung Hee said South Korea will continue a close relationship with the United States on the basis of a Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1954.
 - U.S. officials said that consideration is being given to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's proposals to the U.N. last week; Gromyko said that the USSR was prepared to discuss on-site inspection to insure compliance with a treaty banning all underground nuclear tests.
- 5 Oct In the U.N. General Assembly, Foreign Minister (of China) Chiao Kuan-hua delivered the first foreign policy address since the death of Mao Tse-tung.
- 6 Oct North Korean Ambassador Min Jun Kwon formally rejected Secretary of State Kissinger's proposal for a four-power conference on Korea.
 - The Government of Thailand was deposed during a military coup.
 - After a careful examination of the Soviet MIG-25 which a defecting Soviet pilot flew to Japan last month, Pentagon military experts reported that the MIG was outdated; it was apparently designed for use against the U.S. supersonic B-70 bomber, plans for which were cancelled after a Soviet missile shot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane in 1960.
 - The Federal Energy Research and Development Agency reported that radioactive fallout from a Chinese nuclear weapons test of September 26 had been detected in parts of the eastern United States. The agency declared that the detected radiation levels were well below the danger level.
- 8 Oct Sa-Ngat Chaloryu, leader of the new military government in Thailand, announced King Phumiphol's appointment of Supreme Court Justice Thanin Kraivichien as Prime Minister.
- 11 Oct The military government of Thailand ordered purges of civilian ministries and of the military.
- 12 Oct Unconfirmed reports from China indicated that four prominent leftist members of the Politburo had been arrested; they included Chiang Ching, Chairman Mao's widow, and Chang Chunchiao, senior Deputy Prime Minister.

- 14 Oct The Soviet Union launched two men into earth orbit aboard Soyuz 23.
- 15 Oct The reactivation of the ANZUS Pact had caused "great concern" in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Oceania, according to the Communist Party newspaper Pravda.
- 16 Oct Under a new order permitting the detention of suspected communists for up to 30 days, leftist intellectuals were taken into custody in Thailand.
 - Two Soviet cosmonauts splashed down in a lake during a raging blizzard in the first Russian water landing of a manned spacecraft.
 - In Shanghai, large crowds demonstrate against Chiang Ching.
 - There are reports in Peking that more leftists have been removed from their posts and arrested.
- 17 Oct China successfully conducted an underground nuclear test.
- 20 Oct At a news conference in Washington, DC, President Ford said, "I would not tolerate an Arab oil embargo but...because of the leadership of the Ford Administration, you aren't going to have an Arab oil embargo."
- The new government of Thailand disclosed that nearly 4,000 persons have been arrested since the October 6 coup.
 - 21 Oct China announced the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, succeeding Mao Tse-tung.
 - A report in the <u>Far Eastern Economic Review</u> said that the government (in Cambodia) had ended the large-scale executions of soldiers and civilians.
 - 22 Oct King Phumiphol appointed a 17-member Cabinet in Thailand, with Admiral Sa-Ngat Chaloryu as Defense Minister and General Boonchai Bamroongphong, former army commander in chief, as Deputy Prime Minister.

- 24 Oct In Washington, DC, informed sources reported that government agencies are continuing to investigate charges that South Korean diplomats and businessmen in the United States had bribed officials and otherwise violated U.S. law. Influence peddling and illegal campaign contributions have been charged.
 - Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (in Thailand) Anand Panyarachun was ousted from his position in the foreign ministry and suspended from the civil service.
- 25 Oct An editorial in <u>Jenmin Jih Pao</u>, the Communist Party newspaper, stated that the new government will carry out the economic development program of the late Prime Minister Chou En-lai.
- 27 Oct A country-wide referendum in the Philippines resulted in continuation of martial law.
 - Government sources reported that South Korean influence on U.S. politicians may involve 90 members of Congress.
- 28 Oct President Ford announced a new and complicated program to prevent nuclear materials used in peaceful purposes from becoming weapons of war. The 14-page proposal, released in Washington, DC, asked all nations to exercise "maximum restraint" in the export of reprocessing equipment with military usefulness.
 - Acting on the advice of Secretary of State Kissinger,
 President Ford allowed an affiliate of Control Data
 Corporation to sell two Cyber 172 computers to China as an
 exception to prevailing policy. If final negotiations
 were completed, China would receive a computer with military
 usefulness and be able to make calculations on nuclear tests.
- 29 Oct According to an executive of Control Data Corporation, the company was preparing to deliver a Cyber 172 computer to the Soviet Union and was also negotiating the sale of two units to China.

- 2 Nov <u>Jenmin Jih Pao</u>, the Communist Party newspaper, reported that Chiang Ching, Chairman Mao Tse-tung's widow, and three other leftists have been accused of interfering with the country's economic production.
 - James Earl "Jimmy" Carter, Jr., was elected President of the United States.
- 12 Nov In its 18th veto in the Security Council the United States blocked Vietnam from membership in the United Nations.
 - The Government of Japan returned to the USSR the MIG-25 supersonic fighter plane flown to northern Japan by a defecting Soviet pilot in September.
- 17 Nov In western China, a nuclear explosion equivalent to four kilotons of TNT was detonated.
- 26 Nov The members of the Warsaw Pact proposed a draft of a treaty that would prohibit the first use of nuclear weapons by either side in a conflict. The draft was sent to nations that had signed the Helsinki Agreement on European Security.
- 29 Nov In Washington, DC, a Korean source revealed that the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency had reorganized its U.S. branch under the command of President Park's son-in-law and had recalled its station chief.
- 30 Nov Kim Sang Keun, a senior officer in the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, asked for political asylum in the United States. He said he would cooperate voluntarily with the U.S. inquiry into alleged bribery of members of Congress by Korean lobbyists.
 - Western Samoa applied for membership in the United Nations.
- 1 Dec The Indonesian Government announced the release of 2,500 detainees more than 11 years after their arrest in the wake of a 1965 communist coup attempt.
 - The United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution calling for dismantling of U.S. military bases on Guam and acceleration of independence for the islands.

- 3 Dec The Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress fired Chiao Kuan-hua as Foreign Minister and named Huang Hua, the former Ambassador to the United Nations, as his successor.
- 6 Dec Japan's Prime Minister Takeo Miki and Takeo Fukuda won reelection to the lower house of Parliament.
- 8 Dec China successfully launched its seventh satellite.
- 9 Dec France set off an underground nuclear explosion at its Pacific testing grounds on Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific.
- 13 Dec Delegations from the Soviet Union, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa, South America, and Asia crowded into Hanoi for Vietnam's Fourth Communist Party Congress.
- 21 Dec Malaysia and Thailand agreed to undertake joint security measures to combat internal insurgency without involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
- 31 Dec Trains began running on a regular schedule between North Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) for the first time in 22 years.

Recapitulation of Chronology

- (U) The shifting political winds of 1976 carried the potential for long-range effects on military relationships, not only in the PACOM, but worldwide. In the United States the political campaign culminated in the election of James Earl (Jimmy) Carter as President. As the year ended, Carter's pre-election position on many foreign policy issues, if adhered to, foretold some shift in U.S. foreign relationships and military force posture. In the Pacific Command, Admiral Maurice F. Weisner replaced Admiral Noel Gayler as Commander in Chief on 30 August.
- (U) Early in January the death of People's Republic of China (PRC) Prime Minister Chou En-lai signaled the beginning of a power struggle for political dominance which was intensified by the death of Mao Tse-tung on 9 September. By the end of the year, Mao's widow, Chiang Ching, had been discredited as a political force and Hua Kuo-feng was apparently the leader of the PRC Government. Of less immediately apparent significance was the

death of long-time Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia on 14 January. Razak was succeeded by Deputy Prime Minister Hussein Onn.

- (U) In Japan, the emergence of the Lockheed bribery scandal in February, and the indictment of former Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka, forced Prime Minister Takeo Miki to call a nationwide election on 6 December. After the election, even though he had been reelected to his seat in the Diet, Miki resigned and, on 24 December, Takeo Fukuda became Prime Minister.
- On 18 August about 30 North Korean guards armed with axes and metal pipes killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded four American enlisted men and five South Koreans while the United Nations forces were on a tree-trimming detail in the demilitarized zone. The unmistakable United States reaction to this provocation was the deployment of substantial naval and air forces to South Korea and the removal of the contested tree on 21 August. In the aftermath of this incident, the United Nations Command and North Korea agreed on new security arrangements in the joint security area to separate the military guards of the two forces effective on 16 September. In October allegations began to appear in U.S. information media that South Korean lobbyists exerted undue influence on members of the U.S. Congress. As a result, Korean sources in Washington stated that the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency had reorganized its U.S. branch under the command of President Park Chung Hee's son-in-law and had recalled its station chief. A senior officer in the Korean CIA was reported to have requested political asylum in the United States and to have agreed to cooperate with any investigation of alleged bribery of members of Congress by Korean lobbyists. The potential political and/or military ramifications of the "Koreagate" scandal had not yet surfaced by the end of the year.
- (U) In Thailand, the completion of the U.S. military withdrawal was accompanied by political turbulence which continued throughout the year. After two Prime Ministers and recurrent student unrest, a Thai military junta assumed control of the government in a bloodless coup and installed Thanin Kraivichien as Prime Minister on 21 October.
- (U) In February the U.S. Senate voted to extend a commonwealth relationship and U.S. citizenship to some 14,000 residents of one district of the United Nations Pacific Trust Territory. One month later on 24 March President Ford signed a covenant to establish a commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands in political union with the United States. By the end of 1976, however, the Northern Marianas had not yet ratified the covenant.
- (U) The Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, formerly a British colony, became an independent republic in June and, on 21 September, was

accepted as the 145th member of the United Nations. Another territorial change took place after an election in May when Indonesia announced that Timor had been annexed as its 27th province in July.

- (U) In March, 156 nations were represented as the United Nations conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS) resumed. The LOS recessed in May, reconvened in August, and adjourned in September, once again without substantive results. Meanwhile, President Ford signed into law a bill extending the United States fisheries boundary to 200 miles offshore. About two months later, Canada also announced, in June, the adoption of a 200-mile offshore fishing limit. Both nations deferred the effective date of the new fisheries limits until 1977.
- (U) In addition to the long-established bilateral security consultations held by the United States with Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, other regional alliances appeared to take on new life during the year. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) heads of state met in Indonesia in February. The dominant theme of the communique issued after the conference was economic cooperation. Later in the year, the participants in the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) collective security treaty held an August meeting in Australia. CINCPAC, as the U.S. military adviser to the ANZUS Council of Ministers, was quoted in a wire service report after the meeting as having warned that attempts by Russia to establish port facilities for its fishing fleet in the South Pacific could lead to a Soviet military presence.
 "...The major point is that...the fishing intelligence operations, the merchant fleet, and naval operations are all an integral part of the Soviet state." He also said, according to the article, that the Russian fishing fleet paved the way in Soviet policy.

SECTION II -- DETENTE VERSUS DEFENSE

- (U) The efficacy of detente with the Soviet Union as a national policy was only occasionally questioned in 1974. During 1975 it became a <u>cause celebre</u> when the vital link was made by broad segments of the political community and news media to detente <u>vis-a-vis</u> the growing Russian military threat. The political-military significance of the public debate lay not only in the merits thereof, but also in the increasing amount of space devoted to the subject in the news media. Early in 1975 a local newspaper article described the computerized analysis of international relations conducted over a 12-year period by a University of Hawaii political scientist. The thrust of this analysis purported to show that the path to peace lay not through the development of collaboration, transactions, or cooperation, but rather through sufficient dominance of military power to insure that the perceived cost of aggression outweighed the gains. The alternative was to dismantle power and submit to one's enemies. I
- (U) One year later, in January 1976, the same political scientist was given six-column, full-page coverage in the same local newspaper. The article was adapted from a forthcoming book entitled Peace Endangered: The Reality of Detente, the thrust of which was that Soviet military power in every significant category was overwhelmingly superior to that of the United States. This computer analysis, supported by detailed charts and graphs, concluded that not only was the United States weaker than the Soviet Union, but the trends pointed to even greater weakness and that Russia would soon be able to execute a first strike without fear of retaliation. In his forthcoming book, stated the author, he had established the relationship between his 1975 analysis of detente and his computerized analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the military forces of the United States and Russia.²
- (U) In the same issue of the Honolulu newspaper, the first of two articles by a New York <u>Times</u> correspondent analyzed the background of U.S.-Soviet detente. Noting the beginning of an election year, the writer stated that the backers of the policy of detente with the Soviet Union were on the defensive. Arrayed against the policy, according to the writer, was a formidable list of politicians, intellectuals, labor leaders, and top military men. The attacks, stated the writer, had forced Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to abandon such phrases as "a generation of peace" in favor of "no alternative to detente" in the nuclear age. The writer acknowledged the results of public opinion

^{1.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 587-589.

^{2.} Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin</u>, 6 Jan 76, "Detente and the Russian Threat," by R.J. Rummel.

surveys indicating broad support for detente among the American people, but noted that this support was shallow and accompanied by deep suspicion of Moscow's motives and widespread sentiment that the Russians had had the better of the deal. The writer reviewed the background of previous initiatives toward a relaxation of tension between Russia and the United States made by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson before the formal labeling of detente by President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev in May 1972. As interpreted by a State Department official, the basic difference between detente and peaceful coexistence was that coexistence was passive, while detente was a policy to actively involve the Russians in a continuing series of agreements.

- (U) In the second of the two articles, the writer noted that, in spite of attempts to create formal agreements with incentives and penalties, the Soviets acknowledged mutual interest only in bilateral relationships but stressed divergent interest in peripheral areas. The process of detente, according to the Russian leaders, did not mean and had never meant the freezing of the social-political status quo. Nor did the Soviet version of detente preclude the support of revolutionary struggles and the projection of influence to local areas of military and political tension. The author recited the various pros and cons of the detente debate, and concluded his article by quoting a former Vice President of the United States who stated, "the burden on detente now is mostly up to the Russians."²
- When, in August of 1976, the editor of a local Honolulu newspaper received a copy of the University of Hawaii political scientist's book, he stated that the book was "must" reading for U.S. political candidates. editor's note on the January article had compared the author with the Army private whose detection of planes approaching Pearl Harbor 50 minutes before the Japanese attack had been ignored. In his review of the book, the editor extended his comparison of the author's theme with General Billy Mitchell's warning of a Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor as early as 1923. He noted that no one had paid much attention, except perhaps the Japanese. The editor described a scenario in the book in which a Russian counterforce first strike had crippled U.S. retaliatory power and, since Russia's reserve missiles were targeted on U.S. cities, the President was forced to forego retaliation. Faced with the alternative of destruction or surrender, the President surrendered. The editor then reviewed the charts, explanations, and discussion previously noted, and concluded that the possibility that the author was another Billy Mitchell was much too serious for it to be dismissed out of hand. On the same editorial page was a review of a 12-page monograph by Congressman

^{1. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, "Background of U.S.-Soviet Detente," by Leslie H. Gelb.

^{2.} Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 7 Jan 76, "Mixed Views on Detente," by Leslie H. Gelb.

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Les Aspen (D.-WI) which purportedly accused the Defense Department of using comparisons exaggerating Russia's strength and U.S. relative weakness. The monograph alleged that U.S. defense spending was increasing faster than Russia's and that Americans were being unduly frightened. The editor then noted that, while all the facts about relative U.S.-Russian strength may not be known with certainty to anyone on either side, there was an obligation to maintain U.S. capability and credibility at a level to preclude a Russian attempt to execute the "unthinkable" first strike scenario as the Japanese did Billy Mitchell's.

- "detente" no longer applied to describe U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China, but that he would continue to negotiate with them in "a policy of peace through strength." Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Kissinger was reported to have defended U.S.-Soviet detente, ascribed Ford's statement to the excitement of a political campaign, and criticized the critics of the detente policy and the term itself. In a curious juxtaposition of negatives, Kissinger was quoted in the article as having stated that, "I do not believe that the United States is not still the strongest nation in the world...I do not believe that the Soviet Union has made any unilateral gains."²
- (U) Although not, in every case, rendered in the context of detente versus defense, the views of Admirals Gayler and Weisner received considerable attention from the local media during the year. For example, in March 1976 Admiral Gayler called a press conference in Honolulu to report on his testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington. The result was an approximately one-half page article in one Honolulu newspaper recounting the Admiral's view on a variety of subjects. He discussed what the writer called the "issue" of nuclear weapons on Oahu which had been raised publicly by several pacifist groups concerned about hazards from nuclear weapons. The Admiral neither confirmed nor denied the presence of nuclear weapons on Oahu, but signified his willingness to discuss the subject with the governor of Hawaii on a hypothetical basis. He also was reported to have stated his belief that Hawaiian activists could find places more appropriate than the Island of Kahoolawe as a target for the preservation of historic Hawaiian culture. Kahoolawe had been used by the U.S. military in Hawaii as a training area for aerial gunnery, bombing, and other activities since 1941. During the previous year and a half its use for this purpose had been challenged by Hawaiian ethnic groups on the grounds that religious and cultural

^{1.} Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin</u>, 7 Aug 76, "Hypothesis of Chilling Threat," by A.A. Smyser (Editor), and "The Other Side," editorial (no attribution).

^{2.} Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin and Advertiser</u>, 7 Mar 76, "Kissinger Defends Detente," dateline Atlanta (AP).

values were being destroyed. The Admiral stated that, although he had a strong feeling and sympathy for Hawaiian values, the use of Kahoolawe as a military training area was not an arbitrary whim, but rather militarily essential. Regarding his testimony in Washington, he had stressed the Russian military posture and buildup, "...making particularly the point that Russia has two ends and one of them is in the Pacific. It's inconceivable that we would have a military problem with Russia in NATO and not have a problem in the Pacific." Regarding military cutbacks, the Admiral stated that cost problems in the Pacific were severe and that it was difficult to do the job with the available funds. He also discussed possible reasons for the reported problems with the school system on Guam in connection with military dependents, and categorically denied activist charges that either the Navy on the CIA had placed missiles of any kind on the ocean floor. Regarding political turbulence in Thailand and the withdrawal of U.S. Forces, Admiral Gayler informed the reporters that the United States remained committed to provide assistance in the form of military material to help in insurgency problems.

Late in June, the military writer for one Honolulu newspaper stated that increased signs of Russian military power in the Pacific, coupled with a decline in American strength, posed what the writer called a "...delicate, disturbing dilemma for incoming Pacific Commander in Chief Admiral Maurice F. Weisner." In the context of a special Pacific Basin study conducted by the Defense Department and released in early 1976, the article discussed the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Thailand and initiatives by Russia toward improved relations with the island nations of the South Pacific. The writer noted that, according to the Defense Department study, the Russian initiative was a challenge to U.S. control of Pacific sea lanes. The study also addressed the attitude of Peking toward Russia's presence in the Pacific-Indian Ocean area, the balancing U.S. presence, and Peking's tolerance of the U.S. presence in Asia--especially in Korea. The writer quoted the study as emphasizing the need for U.S. bases in the Philippines, Korea, Japan, and Guam, noting that America needed to maintain conventional military forces in Asia to maintain the power balance and to avoid "total reliance on nuclear weapons." According to the article, the Pacific Basin report warned that Korea was a major danger area and that a U.S. reduction there would risk "renewed hostilities." In conclusion, the writer associated his perceived "dilemma" for Admiral Weisner with presidential candidate Carter's campaign statement that 42,000 men would be withdrawn from Korea within four years. Although Admiral Weisner understood the nuances of power balance in the Pacific Command, stated the writer, his vast experience would not lessen the problems posed by the study.2

^{1.} Honolulu Advertiser, 19 Mar 76, "Admiral Gayler Discusses Kahoolawe, Oahu Nukes, Russia, Guam," by Karen Horton.

^{2.} Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin</u>, 29 Jun 76, "New Pacific Chief Inherits a Dilemma," by Lyle Nelson.

- (U) In July the incoming CINCPAC, in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was quoted by a wire service dispatch from San Diego regarding the expansion of the Russian aircraft carrier fleet. He said there were indications that Soviet carrier production would outstrip that of the United States, and that the U.S. Pacific Fleet carrier force had been reduced from 13 at the height of the Vietnam War to 6 carriers in 1976. He noted that the pattern of Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean had concentrated in the area of the Horn of Africa and that the Soviets were monitoring shipping in and out of the Persian Gulf, from which Japan received 80-90 percent of its oil. I
- (U) As discussed previously, after the ANZUS meeting in Australia in early August, Admiral Gayler, identified as the retiring chief of U.S. Pacific Forces, had publicly acknowledged the efforts by the Soviet Union to establish port facilities for its fishing fleet in the South Pacific. He was reported to have warned that this effort could lead to a Soviet military presence if an international airport obstensibly constructed to support movements to or from the Russian fishing fleet were converted to an operating base for military aircraft. Gayler was reported to have voiced concern about the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and to have welcomed the opening of Australian naval facilities to U.S. nuclear-powered warships.²

- (U) Two days after Admiral Gayler's remarks in Australia were published in a Honolulu newspaper, an editorial in the same paper addressed the subject of the Soviet initiative toward Tonga and Western Samoa discussed in Chapter II of this history. The editor stated that some South Pacific nations apparently had learned how to play off the big powers against each other, noting that Russian overtures to Tonga and Western Samoa had prompted the ANZUS nations to agree to extend more economic aid in the region. After reviewing the Russian overtures, essentially as described in Chapter II of this history, the editor concluded that Gayler's warning in Canberra was welcome evidence that the situation was receiving the official attention it deserved.³
- (U) About one week before he relinquished command, Admiral Gayler again received six-column one-half page coverage of an interview in which he was obstensibly quoted regarding the growth and disposition of Soviet forces, the need for forward deployment of U.S. Forces, and the importance to the United States of allies such as the Philippines, Korea, Japan, Australia,

^{1.} Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin</u>, 13 Jul 76, "Weisner Warns of Soviet Fleet," dateline San Diego (AP).

Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin</u>, 4 Aug 76, "Red S. Pacific Threat Eyed," dateline Canberra, Australia (AP).

^{3.} Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin</u>, 6 Aug 76, "Response in Pacific," editorial.

and New Zealand. In this interview, the writer associated Gayler's remarks with the question of the detente policy:

The former director of the National Security Agency espouses a Christian-like faith in detente with the USSR--but only as a formula for defuzing the nuclear confrontation.

"I'm afraid we've thrown the baby out with the bath water." Gayler said, "The original idea of detente to defuze the nuclear confrontation is as good as it ever was; the hair-trigger aspects in our strategic nuclear standoff with Russia are very dangerous.

"I always thought detente was a good idea," Gayler continued, "it was a way of defuzing the tension. It is not in the Russian interest to get incinerated anymore than it is in our interest. From that simple premise we move to the vague notion that somehow or other the Russians have become benevolent, and that we don't have much to worry about. That's turned sour and caused much disappointment."

Local news coverage of the change of command ceremony was extensive. One Honolulu newspaper included remarks by Admirals Gayler and Weisner, but devoted more coverage to the remarks of William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense. Clements reportedly accused the North Koreans of staging the tree-trimming episode during which two U.S. officers were killed, challenged talk of million dollar budget cuts by political candidates, and related U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean to Russian bases in Aden and Somalia. Admiral Gayler warned of the consequences of a Soviet "drive toward a sevenocean navy," and the incoming CINCPAC, Admiral Weisner, stated that American military posture in the Pacific and elsewhere for the next five years "depends upon the will of the American people." Adjacent to the change of command coverage in the local newspaper was the wire service dispatch covering the most recent Jane's All The World's Fighting Ships report. Jane's, a standard reference of the world navies, reported that the Soviet Navy's growing strength and worldwide deployment appeared designed for a war of aggression against the West. Jane's reported that the Soviet Union had three times as many submarines

^{1.} Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin and Advertiser</u>, 22 Aug 76, "U.S. Can't be Number 2 in Pacific," by Robert C. Miller, dateline Honolulu (UPI).

as the United States and had started to challenge America's years-long supremacy in carriers by building the first two of a planned fleet of six 40,000-ton Kiev-class aircraft carriers.

(U) In a September speech, Admiral Weisner discussed the post-Mao leader-ship in China. He noted that, since Mao Tse-tung's death, China had shown no abatement in its anti-Soviet attacks, but had cut back its criticism of the United States. Weisner reviewed U.S. relations with the various countries in the Pacific Command, cited the buildup of the Soviet Navy, noted the "uneasy truce" between the Governments of North and South Korea, and speculated that neither China nor Russia had achieved dominant influence in Southeast Asia.²

(U) In October, during a conference of the Associated Press Association in Hawaii, Admiral Weisner stated that one of the few benefits of the Vietnam War was that it had made Japan more conscious of security matters. He noted the beginning of, "...an era of full cooperation in a security partnership with the United States...", and said that Japan played a vital role in the world's economy and was America's most important ally in Northeast Asia--"the pillar of our Pacific strategy." Weisner noted the dependence of the Japanese on oil from the Persian Gulf by way of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and ascribed Japanese cooperation with the United States in security matters as a reflection of common concern about the Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean. A Honolulu newspaper reported Admiral Weisner's wide-ranging review of the political-military situation in the Pacific Command:³

North Korea failed in its effort to create an advantageous situation for itself with the recent killing of two Americans in the demilitarized zone. He said Americans on the scene exercised restraint while still presenting a strong reaction.

Vietnam is becoming militarily strong as it recovers from the war and is making advances to neighboring countries, but its military intentions still cannot be gauged.

Communist influence in Laos is switching to the Soviet Union, with the Chinese taking a back seat.

Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin</u>, 31 Aug 76, "Tough Speeches Mark Change of Command," by Lyle Nelson, and "Soviet Navy Viewed as Designed for Aggression," dateline London (UPI).

^{2.} Honolulu Advertiser, 19 Sep 76, "New Pacific Chief Says China Easing Its Attacks on U.S.," no attribution.

^{3.} Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin</u>, 11 Oct 76, "Japan's Efforts Hailed: Weisner Cites Security Steps," by Dave Shapiro.

Cambodia has been faced with "considerable bloodshed... and great instability" since turning communist.

The death of Mao Tse-tung should not hamper efforts of the Chinese to improve relations with the United States, since the factors that led them to believe such improvement was in their interest still exist.

The overthrow of Thailand's democratic government was caused by the government's yielding "to the pressures of new realities resulting from the fall of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos."

Indonesia will take on an increasing military importance in coming years because of its strategic location on the sea lanes used to transport oil from the Persian Gulf to Asia.

Negotiations with the Philippines for continued use of American bases there likely will result in new concessions to the Filipinos, but will end to the satisfaction of both countries.

Australia and New Zealand will continue to be outspoken supporters of America's presence in the Indian Ocean.

As the year ended, and still not directly in the context of detente, the editor of Jane's All the World's Aircraft was reported to have urged the United States to authorize construction of the B-1 bomber, to order urgent replacements for the F-106 interceptor, and to insist on classification on the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber as a strategic plane subject to the limitations of the SALT talks in Vienna. The editor was reported to have stated that Soviet airpower was outstripping America's so fast that the United States might have to use major nuclear weapons to counter a conventional communist attack. He reportedly asserted that Russia had 2,600 manned interceptors plus 12,000 surface-to-air missiles for defense, while the United States had only 315 1956-vintage F-106 interceptors and no surface-to-air missiles "allocated to the defense of the home states." He said that America's force of subsonic 1955-model B-52s was no match for Moscow's growing fleet of BACKFIRE bombers, which fly faster and longer than the 1,500-mile per hour CONCORDE airliner. In the judgment of the Jane's editor, lasting peace, "...can only be a product of precisely balanced strength, on any scale from extravagant overkill to common sense basic self-defense."

^{1.} Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin</u>, 22 Dec 76, "<u>Jane's Warns of Large Gap in Air Power," dateline London (AP).</u>

SECTION III -- REGIONAL PACT ACTIVITY

<u>SEATO</u>

Phase Out

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- (U) The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed to administer the Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty (Manila Pact) in 1954. The eight original SEATO member nations were Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. By the end of 1973 Pakistan had withdrawn and France was inactive. As a result of a proposal submitted by CINCPAC in 1973, the Military Planning Office (MPO) of SEATO ceased to exist as a separate entity on 31 January 1974. The overall manning of SEATO Headquarters was reduced by 50 percent, existing SEATO plans were shelved, and the frequency of exercises and conferences of the Military Advisers (MILADs) was reduced.
- (U) In June 1974 the billet of the U.S. MILAD Representative (MILADREP), stationed in Bangkok, was dropped from the CINCPAC Joint Manpower Program and Joint Table of Distribution, and the MILADREP duties were assimilated under the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) and further delegated to a U.S. Army colonel under COMUSMACTHAI command but attached to the political-military section of the U.S. Embassy, Bangkok. No MILAD-level conferences were held in 1973-1975, and, on 24 September 1975, during the 20th Annual SEATO Council Meeting in New York City, the Ministers agreed that, in view of the end of the Indochina War, SEATO should be phased out "in an orderly and systematic manner."²
- SEATO had completed a phase-out plan leading to the orderly termination of SEATO. Arrangements had been made for the disposition of SEATO chattels, and a majority of the PWG supported the continuation of a modest social and economic program in the fiscal year (FY) 1977 budget. It was anticipated that some of the programs would be picked up bilaterally and others by agencies of Thailand and the Philippines during the ensuing year. In March the State Department noted that the phase-out plan did not mention future meetings of the SEATO Council of Ministers. This was in accordance with the Secretary General's opinion that the plan did not address the future of the Council itself because that subject was outside the scope of the termination of the

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CINCPAC Command Histories 1973, Vol. II, pp. 653-660 and 1974, Vol. II, p. 554.

^{2. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 554-555; <u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. II, p. 576.

SEATO organization. The State Department advised the Embassy that, unless there were compelling reasons to hold a 21st meeting of the Council, the U.S. Government did not support another such meeting.

Retention of SEATO Medical Laboratory

In an Aide Memoire dated 11 May 1976, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) recalled that the SEATO Council of Ministers, at their 6th meeting in Washington in 1960, noted and welcomed the United States proposal that the SEATO Cholera Research Project in Thailand be transformed into SEATO Medical and Clinical Research Laboratories. Subsequently, on 23 December 1960, an exchange of notes between the RTG and the United States established the laboratories under SEATO auspices in Thailand with U.S. participation "as one of the major sponsors" of this "SEATO medical research project." The Aide Memoire also noted a 1 April 1963 Memorandum of Understanding concerning the establishment of the SEATO Clinical Research Center as a joint medical project for professional research, training, and education. Accordingly, the RTG informed the U.S. Embassy that the RTG considered the SEATO Medical Laboratory to be unrelated to the termination of U.S. military activities in Thailand and authorized its continued operation until the scheduled 1 July 1977 phase-out of SEATO. U.S. Embassy requested State Department agreement with a U.S. Aide Memoire advising the RTG that the U.S. element in the SEATO Medical Laboratory would continue operation at or below its current strength. The Embassy noted that the SEATO Medical Laboratory personnel would be treated as Defense Attache Office (DAO) personnel and would not be charged against the residual Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) ceiling strength of 270.2

COMUSMACTHAI requested guidance from CINCPAC, noting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had directed the withdrawal from Thailand of all units except JUSMAG, DAO, and Marine security guards. Accordingly, the Thai withdrawal plan had included the SEATO Medical Laboratory for retrograde from Thailand not later than July 1976. On 25 May the State Department authorized the Embassy to send an Aide Memoire to the RTG Ministry of Foreign Affairs advising that U.S. participation in the SEATO Medical Laboratory would continue at current or reduced strength. On 3 June, after telephonic liaison between CINCPAC and the JCS, CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACTHAI to modify the withdrawal plans to exclude the SEATO Medical Laboratory from retrograde action. 3

^{1.} SECSTATE 63460/161847Z Mar 76, which transmitted AMEMB Bangkok 4074 of 23 Feb 76; SECSTATE 66546/190143Z Mar 76.

^{2.} AMEMB Bangkok 13772/141249Z May 76.

^{3.} J53 HistSum May 76; USMACTHAI 210420Z May 76; SECSTATE 123843/251500Z May 76; CINCPAC 030212Z Jun 76.

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(Proposed) Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Science

In November 1976 the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok informed the State Department of a note from the RTG which requested that the U.S. Army medical component operating under the auspices of the SEATO Medical Research Project and the SEATO Clinical Research Center be retained in Thailand to continue medical research in cooperation with the Royal Thai Armed Forces. The cooperative facility would be named the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Science. The RTG suggested that, if the U.S. Government agreed, the retention of the U.S. Army medical component in Thailand be effected by an exchange of diplomatic notes. The text of the RTG note proposed that, upon reply from the U.S. Government, the agreement come into force on 1 July 1977. The Embassy requested authority to reply with a U.S. Government note agreeing to the proposals and stipulations contained in the RTG note and requested approval of a draft text.

(U) On 28 January 1977, the Embassy delivered a U.S. Government note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to effect agreement on the continuation of U.S. Army medical component operations in Thailand.²

USMILADREP Terms of Reference (TOR)

As noted in the phase-out discussion, the U.S. Military Adviser's Representative (USMILADREP) billet was assimilated within the authorized manning of the DAO in Bangkok. In June the U.S. Embassy advised CINCPAC that the current USMILADREP to SEATO, U.S. Army Colonel Kenneth R. Ebner, would depart Thailand shortly. Colonel Ebner's main duties had been as MACTHAI liaison officer in the political-military section of the Embassy. The Embassy noted that, although SEATO was phasing out, it was likely that the USMILADREP function would continue until SEATO's termination on 30 June 1977. Consequently, the Embassy recommended that CINCPAC designate the Defense Attache/Air Attache, Air Force Colonel Robert W. Koernig, to succeed Colonel Ebner as the USMILADREP. CINCPAC advised the JCS of his concurrence with the Embassy recommendation and submitted revised TOR for the USMILADREP for JCS approval. The TOR stipulated that the designation of the Defense Attache (DATT) as the USMILADREP did not change the command relationship between the Defense Intelligence Agency and the DATT, nor did it change the authority of the Military Departments and DOD agencies and the relationships and responsibilities between the DATT and the Chief of his Service and the Secretary of his Military Department. The

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^{1.} AMEMB Bangkok 32282/260443Z Nov 76.

^{2.} AMEMB Bangkok 2187/281008Z Jan 77.

USMILADREP was under the supervision of, and directly responsible to CINCPAC. Accordingly, the TOR stipulated that the USMILADREP had direct access to CINCPAC.

(b) In November the JCS approved the TOR submitted by CINCPAC for the USMILADREP with minor changes and CINCPAC so advised the USDAO in Bangkok on 20 November 1976.2

SEATO Operational Plans

- (A) Late in 1975 the USMILADREP asked the SEATO Secretary General if SEATO Headquarters had any objection to the screening and destruction of SEATO operational plans and related classified documents by individual member nations. The Secretary General replied that the retention or destruction of national holdings was a national responsibility. He explained that the SEATO Council had shelved the operational plans in 1973 and that the disposition of documents held by SEATO Headquarters would be addressed shortly. The USMILADREP, therefore, recommended to CINCPAC that plans and documents held by various U.S. military headquarters be destroyed because of their limited usefulness. CINCPAC advised the JCS that, unless otherwise directed, he intended to authorize all concerned commands to destroy SEATO operational plans and related documents. In January 1976 the JCS concurred. On 21 January 1976 CINCPAC, as the USMILAD to SEATO, granted authority to all U.S. holders of SEATO plans and related documents to commence destruction. In addition, CINCPAC requested the Central U.S. Registry to determine which SEATO materials were required for historical purposes and to take the necessary action to collect and forward to the appropriate agency.3
- Late in 1976 the State Department and the Embassy in Bangkok addressed the problem of reclassification, downgrading, or destruction of those classified documents held by SEATO Headquarters. State noted that a separate review of each U.S.-originated document would be more time consuming and more expensive than destruction under the current classification. The Embassy replied that the documents in question involved those classified by other nations, as well as the United States, and that the majority of the PWG had agreed to basic guidelines for the downgrading and disposition of SEATO documents. If for political, military, or other reasons, individual member governments did not desire that documents be downgraded, these views would be

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J51 HistSum Jul 76; AMEMB Bangkok 18548/250930Z Jun 76; CINCPAC 072040Z Jul 76.

^{2.} J51 HistSum Nov 76; JCS 1138/172050Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 201907Z Nov 76.

^{3.} J51 HistSum Jan 76; USMILADREP SEATO 160437Z Dec 75; JCS 7669/141623Z Jan 76; CINCPAC 222214Z Dec 75 and 210224Z Jan 76.

respected by the PWG. On the other hand, the Embassy interpreted the State Department position to require the destruction of all U.S.-originated documents held by SEATO and member governments. If that interpretation were correct, the Embassy requested authorization to announce to the PWG the desire of the United States that such documents be destroyed and to dispatch diplomatic notes to member countries listing the documents involved and requesting confirmation that the countries had complied. The Embassy noted that instructions for procedures acceptable to the United States for proper destruction of TOP SECRET documents (or return of the documents for destruction by the United States) should be included in the notes to the member countries. I

SEATEX 53

(U) In addition to the USMILADREP, two representatives of the CINCPAC Inspector General's Office attended SEATO Exercise DAMAYAN (SEATO Exercise 53). SEATEX 53, held on 14-20 February 1976 on the Island of Luzon in the Philippines, was an engineer and signal military-civic action exercise.²

ANZUS

25th Council Meeting

- (U) The Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) security treaty was signed on 1 September 1951. In a normal year, five ANZUS meetings were held—the Council Meeting, official talks, the meeting of the MILREPs, and two staff-level visits.
- (%) The 25th ANZUS Council Meeting was held in Canberra, Australia on 3-4 August 1976. Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson was the senior U.S. representative and Admiral Gayler attended in his role as the U.S. Military Representative to the Council. The communique issued after the Council Meeting made specific reference to the decision by the Australian and New Zealand Governments to permit the resumption of visits to their ports by United States nuclear-powered warships. The ANZUS Council, according to the communique, also welcomed the Australian Government's decision to accelerate the construction of a naval facility at Cockburn Sound in Western Australia. In connection with the increased Soviet military presence and capacity in the Indian Ocean, the Council welcomed the actions taken by the Government of the United States


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^{1.} SECSTATE 270660/031754Z Nov 76; AMEMB Bangkok 30682/080812Z Nov 76.

^{2.} IG HistSum Feb 76; USMILADREP SEATO 102355Z Feb 76.

^{3.} CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 660-663.

to establish a modest facility at Diego Garcia to support United States Forces in the region. $^{\text{l}}$




(U) In addition to the press coverage accorded the comments of CINCPAC after the ANZUS meeting, the appearance of Secretary Robinson at the Australian National Press Club in Canberra at the conclusion of the ANZUS Council meeting evoked positive editorial comment from leading Australian newspapers. One editorial comment agreed with Robinson's theme of renewed emphasis on economic policy as an adjunct to foreign policy. The editorials agreed with that approach, but noted that economic aid, as a countervailing force to present and future Soviet hegemony in countries bordering the Indian Ocean, had little to recommend it. The editorials conceded, however, that such an approach applied in the South Pacific and that, since the ANZUS partners had no reason to believe that Samoa and Tonga preferred Russian aid, they must be given no cause to look elsewhere. One leading newspaper echoed Secretary Robinson's statement that the "ANZUS Pact is more relevant to the future than to the past." This editorial noted three important developments in the area which affected the security of the ANZUS treaty partners. The first was that the treaty collaboration was interpreted to include the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia as well as the Pacific, which had been the only region originally named in the articles of treaty. The original terms of the treaty had not extended to the Indian Ocean since it was presumed to be "a British lake." This had changed so that the facilities provided by the United States at Diego Garcia and the naval base being constructed by Australia at Cockburn Sound were seen as part of the framework of defensive capabilities available to the ANZUS partners. The second development, according to the editorial, was the increased interest by outsiders in the newly independent small nations of the South Pacific. The third element in the changed security considerations concerned Indonesia, where doubts about the continued economic

^{1.} CINCPAC 11220Z Jul 76; SECSTATE 168831/081556Z Jul 76, 178397/192227Z Jul 76, 186772/281851Z Jul 76, and 190163/310111Z Jul 76.

^{2.} AMEMB Canberra 5634/041250Z Aug 76.

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viability of the country were complicated by the Indonesian intention to claim sovereignty over all of the sea within its archipelago. The editorial then linked that last factor with economic development and well-being and stressed the importance of keeping the relationships between the ANZUS partners, and between them and all nations of the region, in good working order.



ANZUS MILREP Meeting

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Because of conflicts in schedules no ANZUS MILREP meeting was held in 1975. In 1976 Admiral Gayler, General Hassett of Australia, and LT GEN Webb of New Zealand held a MILREP meeting following the Council of Ministers' meeting in Canberra. One of the subjects agreed upon during the MILREP meeting was the need for closer coordination of the ANZUS nations' long-range maritime patrol (LRMP) programs. Pursuant to these discussions, CINCPACFLT developed a preliminary concept of operations. Copies of the draft concept were delivered to Australia and New Zealand representatives for discussion during the scheduled ANZUS staff level meeting to be held on 30 November-2 December 1976. Since LRMP was a Navy mission in the United States military, CINCPAC advised the ANZUS partners that CINCPACFLT would have primary U.S. responsibility for the development and coordination of the final concept of operations. In

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^{1.} USIS Canberra 5707/060601Z Aug 76.

^{2.} SECSTATE 240349/280044Z Sep 76.

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October the Australian Chief of Defense Staff advised CINCPACFLT of his agreement with the concept developed for ANZUS coordinated surveillance.

ANZUS Staff Level Meeting

The 5th and 6th ANZUS Staff Level meetings were held in June and December 1975 respectively. These meetings provided a working-level forum for the discussion of military subjects concerning the Pacific area, and were attended by military delegations from each of the ANZUS countries, normally led by flag/general officers. Among the subjects discussed during these meetings were military exercises, combined planning, and exchanges of officers among the military forces. During 1975 the staff level meetings also laid plans for the first ANZUS Staff Level Seminar to be held in March 1976 at Camp Smith in Hawaii. The seminar was planned to include participation at the 04-06 level from the staffs of the three countries.²

The 7th ANZUS Staff Level meeting was held in Auckland, New Zealand on 30 November-2 December 1976. The meeting included the following items on the agenda:

- Functional integration of surveillance effort.
- Real-time dissemination of intelligence for operational purposes.
 - LRMP reporting system.
 - South Pacific surveillance.

ANZUS Seminar


(U) The topic for ANZUS Seminar Number 1, held on 29 March-2 April 1976, was joint and combined theoretical military planning and operations. U.S. participants included representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group. Based on the results of Seminar One and subsequent discussion at the 7th ANZUS Staff Level meeting, it was determined that a document was needed to list all publications used by the ANZUS partners in contingency or exercise planning. As an additional aid to planning, the

^{1.} J51 HistSum Sep 76; CINCPAC 230033Z Sep 76 and 110113Z Oct 76; CDFS Canberra 150710Z Oct 76.

^{2.} J51 HistSums Jun and Dec 75; CINCPAC 200249Z Jun 75 and 202041Z Dec 75; NZDEF Wellington 280300Z Jun 76 and 060130Z Jul 76.

^{3.} Defense Canberra 050400Z Oct 76; J5 HistSum Addendum, Dec 76.

document would also highlight any differences and/or divergencies in doctrine between the various publications. The participants at the 7th ANZUS Staff Level meeting agreed that the objective of Seminar Number Two (tentatively planned for April 1977 at CINCPAC) would be to develop such a reference document. It was also agreed that, by the end of February 1977, the three countries would exchange lists of applicable publications and begin to collect copies of those documents for use during the seminar. In December 1976 CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group to provide a list of publications considered applicable to the ANZUS contingency/exercise planning activities. I



ASEAN.

(U) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 to promote the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development of its member nations. The original declaration had affirmed the position that all foreign bases located within each sovereign state were temporary. In 1971 the ASEAN members declared the neutrality of Southeast Asia and their resolve that Southeast Asia be recognized by the world as a "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality." The sponsor of this resolution was Malaysia. The member states themselves could not agree on the definition of "neutrality," since two of the five (Thailand and the Philippines) had U.S. bases and were committed to the SEATO mutual defense pact against communism. Two of the other members, Malaysia and Indonesia, had experienced

^{1.} J51 HistSum Dec 76; CINCPAC 182140Z Dec 76.

^{2.} J51 HistSum Sep 76; CINCPAC 142149Z Sep 76.

SEGRET

direct confrontations with communism, and Singapore, the fifth ASEAN member, had nursed a mortal fear of communism since achieving independence.

The First ASEAN Summit Meeting

- Beach, Thailand on 9-10 February, the Foreign Ministers were reported to have expressed concern for the region's security and indicated individually that they would like a continued American military presence in Asia. During this session, which was a prelude to the first ASEAN summit conference, Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo told reporters before the conference began that security threats to the region could not be ignored, but that ASEAN would be cautious in discussing military pacts. Another senior diplomat reportedly acknowledged that there would be discussions of security "related to the U.S. troop withdrawal from Southeast Asia" but that there would be no announcement of any possible decision reached on security issues, "since that would only invite enemies."²
- During other preliminary meetings, the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN discussed the Singapore proposal to establish an ASEAN free-trade area. Early in January the U.S. Embassy in Singapore was advised that Singapore had reluctantly concluded that the ASEAN summit would not agree to such a free-trade area. The Singapore Government, however, remained hopeful that ASEAN would eventually accept it and that the summit would endorse a number of joint ASEAN industrial projects and agree to liberalize tariffs on a selected number of products. According to the Embassy, Indonesia was the sole hold-out against the concept of an ASEAN free-trade area, and Singapore intended to press for measures to promote closer economic cooperation between the ASEAN governments.³
- On 11 February President Marcos informed the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines that the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in Pattaya had broken up without having reached final agreement on arrangements for the ASEAN summit meeting. Marcos stated that it was obvious the ministers would have to meet again before the summit meeting could take place, since it would be inappropriate for the chiefs of state to be haggling about words during their meeting. Two days later the U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia informed the Embassy in Manila of a possible reason for the failure of the Foreign Ministers pre-summit conference. The Government of Malaysia had reversed its position favoring an ASEAN Treaty

^{1.} CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 625-626.

Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 9 Feb 76, "Five Asian Nations Ask U.S. to Remain," dateline Pattaya Beach, Thailand (AP).

^{3.} AMEMB Singapore 46/060857Z Jan 76.

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of Amity and Friendship because of suspicion that President Marcos might use the treaty to justify a call for negotiations on the Muslim problem in the Southern Philippines. The U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur cited the failure of the new Malaysian Prime Minister, Hussein Onn, to visit Manila during his calls on other ASEAN chiefs of state as an indication of Malaysian feeling that Marcos sought to twist ASEAN to Philippine purposes. Although the Malaysian Government had been committed to support the treaty, this commitment had been made by the deceased Prime Minister Razak without consultations with his cabinet. One Malaysian official maintained that Marcos had never made good on a secret promise to the Indonesians to publicly abandon the Philippine claim to Sabah; however, this official did not directly link this failure to the withdrawal of official Malaysian support for the Muslim rebels in the Southern Philippines. An official Malaysian source had indicated that the Government of Malaysia would work actively to stop aid to the Muslim rebels if the Sabah claim was categorically dropped. The Treaty of Amity, Friendship, and Cooperation had been intended to cap the Bali summit of ASEAN chiefs of state, but the friction between Malaysia and the Philippines generated by the Muslim rebellion in the Southern Philippines and the Philippine claim to Sabah appeared to rule out its adoption. It had also been intended as a substitute for a highly legalistic section on internal resolution of disputes proposed by the Philippines as part of the framework for an ASEAN zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality.

In a 12 February press conference, Indonesian Prime Minister Malik indicated that two more high-level ASEAN meetings would be held in an attempt to resolve the remaining problem areas before the 23-25 February summit meeting. Malik said the ASEAN Foreign Ministers would meet again following the scheduled 18-19 February conference of ASEAN senior officials in Jakarta. Although Malik publicly expressed satisfaction with the just-concluded Foreign Ministers' meeting in Pattaya, other sources claimed the meeting underscored a continued lack of agreement on several key issues. Both Singapore's advocacy of an ASEAN free-trade zone, which was resisted by Indonesia, and the question of defense relationships in connection with ASEAN remained unresolved. Moreover, the Malaysian objection to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was based upon the possibility that the provision for arbitration of disputes between the two ASEAN members could be used by President Marcos to reopen the Sabah issue. President Suharto of Indonesia was reported to have sent an emissary to convince the Malaysian Prime Minister that it was too late to renegotiate the treaty.2

^{1.} AMEMB Manila 2086/110635Z Feb 76; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 838/130828Z Feb 76.

^{2.} CINCPAC ALFA 12/140909Z Feb 76 (EX).

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- On 23-24 February 1976 the ASEAN heads of state held the first summit conference on the Island of Bali in Indonesia. The day before the summit conference was scheduled to open, press reports indicated that the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN had settled on a compromise for the arbitration of conflicts, paving the way for the signing during the summit meeting of the Treaty of Amity and Friendship. The compromise, according to the press, involved the acceptance by the Philippines of the general principle of consensus for the settlement of problems, thus removing the main stumbling block in the discussions among the senior officials. This was reinforced by a subsequent press report announcing that ASEAN had taken initial steps toward a regional block patterned after the European economic community. This declaration on economic cooperation embraced 230 million people spread out over one million square miles. The Association members reportedly had agreed to share critical supplies of fuel and food in case of shortages or disasters and to set up complimentary large-scale industrial projects within the region. They had also agreed to lay the basis for preferential trading arrangements within the Association to facilitate trade expansion in basic commodities. The press report noted that, although the Philippines and Singapore had pressed for establishment of a free-trade zone, Indonesian objections had blocked that proposal.
- (U) On 8 April the Philippines became the first of the five ASEAN members to ratify the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and an agreement reached during the summit meeting to establish an ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.²

9th Annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting

The 9th Annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in Manila on 24-26 June 1976, with the Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister attending as an observer. President Marcos opened the meeting and emphasized the desirability of major power equilibrium in the region. He stated that dominance by any single power was not desirable, but that Asia remained on the periphery of detente as the role of one superpower waned and another (presumably the USSR) attempted to build up its presence. Philippine Foreign Secretary Romulo stated, in a speech to the delegates, that the Foreign Ministers should propose an ASEAN doctrine, declaring the perimeters of the region as the sphere of influence solely of the countries of Southeast Asia, with support from the big powers in keeping the region free from interference with Southeast Asian internal affairs. He cited the dangers of disequilibrium

Honolulu <u>Advertiser</u>, 23 Feb 76, "S.E. Asian Compromise," dateline Bali (UPI) and 1 Mar 76, "Step Toward Trade Block by S.E. Asian Nations," dateline Manila (UPI).

^{2.} COMIPAC 090807Z Apr 76.

in the post-Vietnam era, citing Sino-Soviet rivalry, the partial disengagement of the United States which could encourage adventurism by other powers, and the unknown factor of a reunified, resurgent Vietnam. The Embassy in Manila reported to the State Department that local press coverage suggested that Romulo's "ASEAN doctrine" proposal was the subject of discussion at the 25 June closed-door session between the Foreign Ministers. According to the press, the Ministers discussed "boundaries" of ASEAN within which the "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality" (and presumably ASEAN "doctrine") would be operative. As examples of the fact that the ASEAN "boundaries" had not yet been established, the press cited competing claims to the Spratley Islands, Malaysian-Thai border problems, and the possibility that membership in the ASEAN might be extended to PNG and the States of Indochina. 1

The Foreign Ministers also signed ASEAN declarations on narcotics and mutual assistance on natural disasters. They took note of the steps to set up a Secretariat to be in action by the fall of 1976 and confirmed Indonesia's General Dharsono as the ASEAN Secretary General. The communique issued at the meeting, however, was largely routine, and did not address the Romulo "ASEAN doctrine" proposal. They noted the hope that bilateral contacts among the states of the region would break barriers of suspicion and misunderstanding, and stressed that these contacts should be on the basis of mutual goodwill and through reciprocal initiatives. The communique gave pro forma attention to the 1971 ASEAN declaration for a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality in Southeast Asia, but acknowledged that this concept remained a future goal. The communique also affirmed an agreement by the ASEAN members to give priority to rice and coal for regional preferential trade in critical circumstances.²

IPAC analysts considered that the Bali summit and the 9th Foreign Ministers' meeting appeared to reflect careful orchestration and the growing determination of the member nation leaders to soft-pedal individual differences in the interest of collective objectives. IPAC noted that, among East Asian nations, ASEAN was viewed favorably by Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, South Korea, Burma, and the PRC, giving the Association good prospects for the future. Overall, ASEAN's prospects for strengthened regional stability appeared good, with world economic and monetary problems posing the greatest threat to the Association's future.³

^{1.} AMEMB Manila 9185/260316Z Jun 76; IPAC Point Paper, 20 Jul 76, Subj: Southeast Asia Regional Stability (ASEAN).

^{2. &}lt;u>Ibid</u>.

^{3.} Ibid.

SECTION IV--PHILIPPINE MBA NEGOTIATIONS

The Background

Renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in the Philippines had been in abeyance for several years. Nothing in the trial balloons, hand wringing, and posturing of the Filipino officials which linked the collapse of Indochina to an imperative reappraisal of the bases status was new. In 1972 United States and Philippine negotiators had reached agreement on the revision of all but 6 of the 29 articles in the MBA. These were criminal jurisdiction, immigration, shipping and navigation, exemption from customs and taxes, personal tax exemption, and the tenure of the MBA. The issue was dormant in 1973, but in 1974 the Government of the Philippines (GOP) indicated interest in resuming the MBA negotiations, setting off a flurry of U.S. exchanges of view already well massaged by all parties in previous years. Even though the negotiations were never officially resumed, "informal" papers were leaked during 1974 which contained many of the points belabored in public by Filipino officials in 1975. These included Filipino base commanders at U.S. bases; rentals for the use of the bases; specific reference to nuclear weapons control; immediate response by U.S. Forces to aggression against the Philippines; and the flying of only the Philippine flag over bases occupied by U.S. Forces. Another concept concerned the writing of a new Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), to which the MBA would be an annex, which portrayed the U.S. bases in the Philippines in a key role either in the defense of the Western Pacific, or perhaps the smaller areas encompassed by ASEAN. Another annex to the Treaty was proposed to "comfort" ASEAN neighbors and to emphasize the defensive nature of the bases.

(S) Formal base negotiations were not officially resumed in 1975, but the provisions of the MBA were discussed by various U.S. and GOP officials throughout the year. In May 1975 U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines William Sullivan, in connection with U.S. actions, initiatives, and posture toward ASEAN after the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, noted that one of the eventual considerations to be confronted would be U.S. military deployments in the Philippines. He noted that, in general, it was assumed that the U.S. naval facilities at Subic Bay and Cubi Point would continue to be required for U.S. strategic purposes in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but:²

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^{1.} CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 637-639.

^{2.} AMEMB Manila 5914/060753Z May 75.

On the other hand, with the collapse or withdrawal of U.S. presence and/or responsibilities on mainland Southeast Asia, there does not rpt not appear to be an exclusively American rationale for the maintenance of U.S. air facilities at Clark Air Base. The only logical Air Force deployment at that facility, in newly changed circumstances, would be U.S. fighter interceptor units, provided for the explicit purpose of assisting in the air defense of the Philippines under our Mutual Defense Treaty. It would be assumed that such units would be deployed only if GOP explicitly request them, and it would seem logical that they should become tenants on a Philippine-controlled Clark Air Base, in much the same way as U.S. units were deployed to Mactan during the height of the Vietnam War.

Since CINCPAC and his Air Force component, PACAF, had been information addressees on the Ambassador's message, CINCPAC immediately challenged the Ambassador's statement that the United States no longer had an exclusively American rationale for the retention of Clark Air Base. In a message to the JCS, CINCPAC stated that Clark was strategically essential to the Pacific Command. He saw no change in national policy relative to U.S. commitments in the Pacific and Far East that would lessen its importance since U.S. Pacific Command military strategy depended on a forward presence as the key to support of U.S. national interests. Clark Air Base was the most important part of that forward base structure, CINCPAC stated, and it provided the essential link in the U.S. capability to project U.S.-based forces into the Southwest Pacific, Northeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean/Middle East areas. It was the only large aerial port in the Southwest Pacific, and its operation by the United States accented U.S. resolve and commitment to Pacific affairs. CINCPAC acknowledged that U.S. military posture would undergo some reassessment, but saw no reason to believe that the key role of Clark Air Base should change. I

On 21 August 1975 the State Department acknowledged an Embassy report of an exploratory conversation with President Marcos regarding the future base negotiations. State noted, however, that a clear statement was needed from Marcos of GOP desires regarding the bases before the issues could be examined realistically. Later in August, during a discussion among Ambassador Sullivan, GOP Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos Romulo, and President Marcos, the Ambassador was assured that a GOP paper on the subject would be forthcoming soon. In October Marcos again raised the question of opening negotiations on

^{1.} CINCPAC 102120Z May 75.

- U.S. military facilities and acknowledged to the Ambassador that the long-awaited GOP paper had not yet been delivered. During President Ford's visit to the Philippines in December 1975, some details of the MBA negotiations were settled. Negotiations were to start on the Ministerial level, with Romulo calling on Secretary of State Kissinger in Washington. The talks would then move quickly to Manila where Ambassador Sullivan would lead the U.S. negotiators. It was agreed that negotiations would not start until after the scheduled ASEAN summit meeting in February 1976. 1
- (U) In mid-December 1975 an editorial in a Honolulu newspaper listed GOP terms for a new MBA as reportedly released by the GOP Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs. As listed in the newspaper, they were:²
 - The United States would pay rent for the use of the bases.
 - Only the Philippine flag would fly over the bases (at present the U.S. and Philippine flags fly side-by-side).
 - Both Clark and Subic would have Filipino base commanders. But operational control would remain in American hands.
 - The Philippines would have jurisdiction over American servicemen charged with crimes against Filipinos.
 - Camp John Hay, a military recreational facility in the mountain resort of Baguio, would be handed over to the Philippine Government.

The Initial U.S. Drafts

- (8) Following the January 1976 Chiefs of Mission conference in Honolulu, Ambassador Sullivan provided CINCPAC with a preliminary draft MBA which he proposed to table at the first session of U.S./Philippine base negotiations. CINCPAC provided comments to the JCS outlining basic concerns with the Ambassador's draft proposal.³
- (%) Meanwhile, the State Department advised the Ambassador that an extensive inter-agency review of the Embassy draft agreement on the military bases
- 1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 641-650.
- 2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 17 Dec 75, "Philippine Bases," editorial.
- 3. J51 HistSum Feb 76; CINCPAC 131830Z Feb 76 (EX).

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was underway in Washington. The Ambassador replied that the Embassy draft should be considered more in the nature of a final negotiating goal rather than an initial bargaining position. He did not think it desirable to approach the GOP for either a formal or informal statement of the GOP position. One reason, he stated, was his belief that any GOP position extracted would be exorbitant and therefore counterproductive. The most ticklish unresolved issue, according to the Ambassador, was "rental." He cited the MBA with Spain and the expected Turkish agreement as establishing a linkage between base utilization and military assistance. For example, according to the Ambassador, the Spanish agreement specified a \$24 million annual grant component which was stated explicitly and an additional \$10 million concealed in the concessional terms. The Ambassador also stated that, in his opinion, the GOP would endeavor to link MBA negotiations with parallel economic negotiations. Although an ostensible agreement to separate the two negotiations could be reached, the Ambassador suggested that there would nevertheless be a correlation. He specifically cited, as GOP goals on the economic front, tariff concessions on mahogany and coconut oil. 1

COMUSNAVPHIL provided recommended changes and modifi-

comusnavphil provided recommended changes and modifications to various portions of the draft MBA with particular reference to articles on facilities, security, the proposed indirect hire of Filipino labor, and criminal jurisdiction. Also noted was the apparently deliberate elimination of the word "bases" in the draft MBA. If the use of the words "installation" and "facility" were continued, consistent definitions would be needed. Lastly, COMUSNAVPHIL noted that the draft MBA made it coterminous with the MDT, thus officially recognizing the lack of stability of the MBA. In summary, stated COMUSNAVPHIL, the draft MBA represented a disturbing document with a much too accommodating position.²

(S) The foregoing statement was supported by CINCPACFLT in a message to CINCPAC which stressed the need for centralized, coordinated security as constituted under the current MBA. CINCPACFLT also supported the comments

^{1.} SECSTATE 31888/100008Z Feb 76, which transmitted AMEMB Manila 1983/090629Z Feb 76.

COMUSNAVPHIL 090620Z Feb 76.

pertaining to the indirect hire of labor, the assignment of a host country base commander, and concessions relating to criminal jurisdiction. After addressing specific portions of the draft MBA in detail, CINCPACFLT further recommended that prior to the development of a final negotiating goal, a more precise determination be made of the desires of the GOP. ¹

Late in February the U.S. Embassy in Manila reaffirmed support of the indirect hire concept, stating that it was one of the most important elements in the draft base package. It helped to demonstrate in a direct and visible way the sovereignty of the GOP over the bases, eliminated U.S. involvement in labor disputes, and provided an important mechanism through which management, service, and other payments could be passed to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as the quid pro quo which could not be provided through rent, military assistance, or any other fixed annual payment. Embassy provided a proposed text for the procedural Annex VII entitled "Labor Arrangements." According to the Embassy, the format of the Spanish agreement had been used, but the language had been especially tailored by labor experts of the civilian personnel offices at Subic and Clark Air Base to cover the Philippine labor environment. The AFP was designated as the executive agent of the GOP to administer the indirect hire agreement because a close structural relationship with the AFP was essential to the acceptability and durability of the overall agreement.2

In March the JCS requested CINCPAC's views and recommendations on a joint State-Defense Department draft entitled "U.S.-Philippine Military Facilities Agreement." CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF comments on the draft for incorporation in a CINCPAC response to the JCS.³

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acknowledged that the second draft did not address labor management, and concurred that this subject should not be included in the base negotiations. However, and referring to the previously discussed Embassy view on the importance of the indirect hire article, CINCPACFLT stated that the concessions intimated in the Embassy message would be inimical to the best interests of

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^{1.} CINCPACFLT 180131Z Feb 76.


^{2.} AMEMB Manila 2788/270221Z Feb 76 (BOM).

^{3.} J51 HistSum Mar 76; JCS 1130/130331Z Mar 76; CINCPAC 130215Z Mar 76.

the military. The other general and specific comments submitted by CINCPACFLT were in consonance with previous remarks, and CINCPACFLT concluded that:

It is understood that the AMEMBASSY draft was prepared without input from the senior military commanders in the Philippines. Further, the labor annex...was prepared after consulting with labor advisers from 13th AF and NAVBASE Subic whose basic advice was not incorporated in text. Because the proposals contained in Reference C [Embassy message on indirect hire of labor] reflect an apparent lack of understanding for some of the practical problems facing the bases and in view of the vital importance of the bases to U.S. military operations and presence in Western Pacific, strongly recommend the assignment of a senior military representative to the base negotiating team.

(S) The review of the State-DOD draft by PACAF addressed specific concerns in Articles II, III, IV, V, and VII pertaining to the use of facilities, command of the bases, security of the bases, mutual cooperation, and operating rights, respectively. PACAF acknowledged that the proposed agreement was far more acceptable than the previous Embassy draft, but believed that the initial U.S. position should be stronger in the areas of command and security.²



^{1.} CINCPACFLT 172117Z Mar 76.

^{2.} CINCPACAF 180215Z Mar 76.

not be addressed in the Military Facilities Agreement. A change to the indirect hire system for 20,000 employees of the U.S. Forces was not in the best interests of the United States. The U.S. Forces would lose significant management and policy control of the work force and incur increased labor costs. The bases labor agreement (BLA) negotiated in 1968 continued to meet the needs of both governments, and the recently negotiated three-year collective bargaining agreement under the BLA promised reasonable labor relations stability. I

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Hence, negotiations pertaining to the return of U.S.-controlled land on Clark Air Base should be carefully studied to insure no adverse effect on Clark operations. CINCPAC conceded that the language in the draft pertaining to the use of facilities for combat operations and long-range missiles might be necessary to reach agreement. However, it was essential that language not be adopted which could be interpreted as limiting U.S. ability to support Indian Ocean operations; e.g., defining the purpose of the facilities as solely for the defense of the Philippines. CINCPAC noted that the major issue in the negotiations would be a quid pro quo in some form. He noted that this was not addressed in the draft Military Facilities Agreement, and suggested that a quid could be provided by some means outside the military such as trade agreements. CINCPAC concluded by urging the appointment of a senior military representative on the negotiating team.²

Representative in the Philippines (CINCPACREPPHIL) the key features of the State-DOD draft agreement. CINCPAC advised that the labor annex, the surrender of jurisdiction over <u>inter se</u> cases, and training of the AFP had been deleted. The word "base" was not used in the draft agreement, and the term "facility" was defined as lands, buildings, and permanent construction within Philippine military installations. In the draft agreement, it was stipulated that the U.S. flag would fly outside the headquarters of the U.S. commander. Under the agreement, the joint use of the John Hay recreational facility was specified, but no other bases were surrendered. The land specified for release at Clark Air Base was the same as that authorized for release to the Philippines since 1970. The MBA would be written as coterminous with the MDT, but no mention was made of a review period and a total of three years for withdrawal was specified.³

^{1.} CINCPAC 191811Z Mar 76.

^{2.} Ibid.; J51 HistSum Mar 76.

^{3.} CINCPAC 221809Z Mar 76.

(à) Late in March, based upon information provided by the U.S. Embassy in Manila, CINCPAC suggested to the Chairman of the JCS that U.S. economic negotiators be contacted through State and other channels to insure their understanding of the importance of the bases and the fact that the GOP officials linked the base negotiations with the economic negotiations. CINCPAC expressed his view that it should be national policy that the bases take primacy over mahogany and coconut oil, and that the negotiators should be so instructed. Economic negotiations, stated CINCPAC, could well be used to provide the necessary quid pro quo which would be difficult otherwise to provide. In reply, the Chairman stated that CINCPAC's views had been passed to DOD and the State Department for possible action. 1

First Washington Meeting

(b) On 12 April 1976 the Philippine and U.S. military base negotiating teams headed by Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Romulo met in Washington, DC. After an exchange of opening remarks, Secretary Kissinger handed Romulo a new draft bases agreement for consideration. The text of this agreement was somewhat different from the original State-DOD 5 March text previously discussed by CINCPAC:²

Article III - Command

- The installations described in Annex I of this Agreement are Philippine military installations. The installation commanders shall be Philippine officers. The Philippine flag shall be flown at the installations.
- The United States shall appoint a United States facilities commander at each installation where there are facilities designated for its use. The United States facilities commander shall exercise command and control over United States personnel, equipment, and material, over the facilities, and over military operations involving United States Forces. The United States facilities commander will coordinate with the Philippine installation commander to insure that activities at the facilities are conducted in a manner consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
- United States military authorities may display the United States flag within buildings and other indoor sites
- 1. CINCPAC 242303Z Mar 76 (EX); JCS 4038/262349Z Mar 76 (EX).
- 2. SECSTATE 88158/130040Z Apr 76 (EX) and 90736/150130Z Apr 76.

at the facilities, outside the headquarters of the United States facilities commander, and upon coordination with the Philippine installation commander, for appropriate outdoor ceremonies such as military honors and parades on the facilities. Ships, aircraft, and vehicles of the United States Forces may use flags and insignia of command as prescribed by regulation.

Article IV - Security

- Within the facilities designated for its use, the United States is responsible for the control, supervision, and protection of its personnel, equipment, and material, and accordingly may take measures to fulfill these responsibilities therein. The United States may also participate in maintenance of security at the entrances and exits of the installations and at the joint bombing range. Procedures for joint participation in security measures shall be established by the Mutual Defense Board.
- The responsible Philippine installation commander will take such steps as may be necessary and appropriate in the circumstances to provide free and continuous access to, and movement within and between, the installations for members of the United States Forces or the civilian component, and dependents.
- During the 12 April meeting in Washington, Secretary Kissinger stressed that, although there might be disagreements during the discussions, the United States was confident that progress would be made and that the Agreement would be perceived as a major step in the relationship between the two nations. Secretary Romulo's opening remarks were very general and did not lay down any concrete negotiating position. He stressed that the MBA and the Military Assistance Agreement had never been satisfactory to the Philippines, and stated "we are not encumbered by provisions of any subsisting military agreements." In return, Secretary Kissinger informed Romulo that the U.S. Government opposed the concept of rent for the bases. It was, however, prepared to look at some sort of security assistance package based on the principle that the bases existed for the common defense. Romulo replied that the Philippines desired compensation for permitting the United States to use the bases, and that this compensation should not be a "sort of an aid or a dole or a grant." It was not necessary, stated Romulo, to call the compensation "rent."

^{1.} SECSTATE 93275/162331Z Apr 76.

- This report of the meeting had been transmitted by the State Department to the U.S. Embassy in Manila by confidential means on the 16th of April. However, on 15 April the Embassy in Manila passed to the State Department, also by confidential means, quotations from the Manila press which gave prominent attention to Romulo's statement in Washington that the GOP was not encumbered by existing military agreements. One headline stated, "RP Abbrogates All Military Pacts with US"; another front page headline stated, "Bases Talks Starting From Scratch-CPR".
- Late in April Ambassador Sullivan reported from Manila that Marcos believed the principal issue of the negotiations to be the question of "compensation." He cited two elements in the financial area, the first being the cost of operating the bases, and the second the GOP need to upgrade its military equipment. Marcos hoped, however, that a formula could be devised which did not look like a "handout program." Both Marcos and Romulo had expressed a preference for Baguio as the negotiating locale and had informed Sullivan that the Philippine team would be headed by the Philippine Ambassador to Washington, Eduardo Romualdez, and would include former Vice President and Foreign Secretary Manuel Pelaez.²
- Earlier in April the Secretary of Defense had nominated RADM Doniphan P. Shelton, CINCPACREPPHIL/COMUSNAVPHIL to be the senior military adviser of the U.S. delegation and MAJ GEN Leroy J. Manor, Commander of 13th Air Force, as the principal deputy. Later, while commenting to the State Department regarding the proposed Washington element of the military bases negotiating panel, Ambassador Sullivan stated that the numbers, "...look a little on the heavy side...", but indicated his confidence that he and Admiral Shelton could work out any "paring back" which would appear to be indicated as time went on. Noting the inclusion of four lawyers on the U.S. negotiating team and his shortage of clerical help, Ambassador Sullivan suggested that, if the lawyers did their own typing, it might mean fewer and briefer briefs. 3
- (S) On 11 June Ambassador Romualdez called on Ambassador Sullivan to discuss the resumption at Baguio on 15 June of the base negotiations. Romualdez stated that the draft agreement tabled by the United States on 12 April in Washington had been found to be "bristling" with vestiges of "extraterritoriality" and was unacceptable. He noted that the GOP was putting the finishing touches on a complete draft agreement which would be presented at Baguio. The Philippine draft agreement was provided to the U.S. delegation on 14 June (the day before the official opening of the talks) and, as analyzed

^{1.} AMEMB Manila 5259/150338Z Apr 76.

^{2.} AMEMB Manila 5817/280657Z Apr 76.

^{3.} JCS 5080/061807Z Apr 76; AMEMB Manila 6651/130621Z May 76.

by the Ambassador, was obviously not an acceptable basis for continued U.S. military presence in the Philippines.

The Baguio Meeting

The U.S. and Philippine negotiating panels met in two separate sessions of two hours each to open the military facilities negotiations in Baguio on 15 June. After brief public statements, and after the press had departed, Romualdez opened the session by expressing disappointment that the U.S. proposals had not significantly changed extraterritorial provisions and formally tabled the Philippine draft.

This information was provided in the first of a series of daily summaries from the U.S. delegation, interspersed with messages relating to specific facets of the negotiations. Complementing the daily summaries were daily official summary records and weekly assessments by Ambassador Sullivan.²

During the negotiations, CINCPAC and his component commanders provided comments to the JCS for consideration during the evolution of State Department positions. Among the more noteworthy developments during the first two weeks of negotiations was authorization by the State Department to address the article in the Philippine draft pertaining to the hire of Filipino labor. The U.S. delegation was instructed to press for an article in the MBA which would not require renegotiation of the BLA. If unsuccessful, the delegation was authorized to state that the United States was prepared to renegotiate the BLA as a separate matter at the conclusion of the MBA negotiations. In response to CINCPAC query, both CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF indicated that the article in the Philippine draft pertaining to labor was unacceptable. During a subsequent meeting of the labor panel, the Philippine Under Secretary of Labor advised the U.S. delegation that the GOP concept included more than labor standards—particularly binding arbitration, collective bargaining, Department

^{1.} AMEMB Manila 8334/110931Z Jun 76; USDEL Baguio 4/151326Z Jun 76.

^{2.} USDEL Baguio 5/151422Z Jun 76, 10/161201Z Jun 76, 13/161332Z Jun 76, 28/211414Z Jun 76, 32/221343Z Jun 76, 40/231443Z Jun 76, 44/250500Z Jun 76, 52/250827Z Jun 76, 35/230439Z Jun 76, 36/230429Z Jun 76, 45/250624Z Jun 76, 46/250626Z Jun 76, 48/250709Z Jun 76, 20/190437Z Jun 76, and 56/251027Z Jun 76.

of Labor control of hiring, and law compliance. Ambassador Sullivan suggested that commitment on this issue by the U.S. delegation be deferred as long as possible. Another subject pertained to the GOP draft Article II on intelligence sharing, which indicated GOP desire for closer relationships in intelligence matters. The State Department advised the U.S. delegation that this was a topic with broad ramifications involving the entire Washington intelligence community; therefore, State directed that discussions be deflected until a U.S. position had been developed.

On 24 June Ambassador Sullivan informed the State Department that the GOP negotiators had requested a change of venue from Baguio to Manila. On 25 June a joint press release was issued stating that the Philippine and United States panels had completed their initial review of the two drafts presented at the outset of the negotiations. Working groups had been formed, and, in order to allow for consultations with their respective governments, the Philippine and American panels had agreed to recess and reconvene in Manila on 1 July 1976.²

The Manila Meetings

(C) The U.S. and Philippine negotiating panels reconvened on the morning of 1 July in the Central Bank complex in Manila following the five-day recess. For the rest of the day on 1 July and on 2 July the panels visited Clark Air Base, Wallace Air Station, San Miguel, and Subic Bay on a familiarization tour. The U.S. Embassy informed the State Department that the Filipinos seemed to have acquired a sobering realization of the complexities of the bases as well as the fact that U.S. Forces were dedicated to combat capabilities and were not occupation troops.³

During the ensuing negotiations in July and August 1976, CINCPAC continued to submit positions on the U.S. delegation proposals to the JCS on a daily basis. On 2 August CINCPAC nonconcurred with a Philippine proposal that Philippine currency (pesos) be the only legal tender on the bases. CINCPAC noted that the fluctuating Philippine currency would pose significant problems in procurement, nonappropriated fund operations, U.S. personnel

- CINCPAC 280041Z Jun 76 and 280042Z Jun 76; CINCPACFLT 240410Z Jun 76, 300331Z Jun 76, 300501Z Jun 76, and 010357Z Jul 76; CINCPACAF 240500Z Jun 76, and 010430Z Jul 76; USDEL Baguio 38/231210Z Jun 76 and 51/250750Z Jun 76; SECSTATE 155032/222328Z Jun 76 and 158482/260053Z Jun 76; DIA 6053/252050Z Jun 76.
- 2. USDEL Baguio 41/241100Z Jun 76 and 43/250449Z Jun 76.
- 3. 13AF 020915Z Jul 76; COMNAVBASE Subic 021032Z Jul 76; AMEMB Manila 9675/030707Z Jul 76/USDEL 69 and 9702/060623Z Jul 76/USDEL 71.

buying power/conversion to dollar instruments, basic pay and allowances for U.S. military, civilian pay (computed in dollars by statute), and that the sale of money orders would have to be discontinued by postal facilities. If it were necessary to accede to the Philippine proposal, CINCPAC recommended that major safeguards be stipulated. Among the safeguards were a guaranteed fixed-term rate of exchange, the ability of U.S. personnel to negotiate dollar instruments promptly at a guaranteed rate of exchange, reasonable limits for repatriation exchange, guaranteed ability to write dollar contracts with U.S. companies, and guaranteed ability for disbursing officers to make regular payroll (military and U.S. civilian) payments by U.S. Treasury check overprinted to insure negotiability in the Philippines in pesos.

Regarding the Philippine proposal to exercise control over aircraft/ ship movements, CINCPAC advised the JCS that this proposal restricted operational flexibility and had a detrimental effect on the capability to respond to unforeseen contingencies in the area; therefore, this proposal was unacceptable. Specifically, any requirement for "prior" notification or diplomatic clearance, for all flights except international flights to and from the Philippine ports of entry, was unacceptable. A requirement in the Philippine proposal that all exercises and operations have prior approval of the Philippine Secretary of National Defense was also unacceptable. CINCPAC concurred that for safety of flight purposes, U.S. military flights should adhere to flight rules and regulations established by the Philippine Civil Aeronautics Administration. However, CINCPAC did not concur in the requirement for flight departure approval by the Philippine authorities. Further, for safety of flight at U.S. military installations, U.S. controllers must direct U.S. aircraft. CINCPAC did not concur with a broad stipulation that U.S. submarines remain surfaced when "in Philippine waters" except when authorized by Philippine authorities, noting that a definition of "Philippine waters" was needed. CINCPAC nonconcurred with a requirement for the Philippine Secretary of National Defense to approve operations and training in Philippine waters, especially without definition. Port control at Subic Bay Naval Base by the Philippine base commander was also unacceptable. Complete flexibility and control of ships entering/leaving Subic Bay must be retained by the United States.²

(6) When, in the course of negotiations concerning the U.S. use of facilities in the Philippines, an impasse developed over the phrase "prior consultation" as submitted in the U.S. draft and "express consent" as submitted in the Philippine draft, CINCPAC commented to the JCS on the tentative substitution of "mutual agreement" suggested by the U.S. delegation. CINCPAC concurred

^{1.} J51 HistSum Jul 76; CINCPAC 020404Z Jul 76.

CINCPAC 042237Z Jul 76.

with the Embassy view that the United States should be prepared to accept that change, reserving it until such time as operating rights in facilities were assured and then only if essential to the agreement. CINCPAC noted that the phrase "prior consultation" was acceptable pertaining to the operational use of the facilities, whereas the phrase "mutual agreement" might not be responsive to possible operational contingencies. Conversely, "mutual agreement" would be a reasonable phrase to apply for the establishment of new capabilities, i.e., long-range missiles. On 20 July the essence of CINCPAC's comments, as expressed to the JCS, was contained in instructions from the State Department to the Embassy in Manila.

Based upon strong positions expressed by CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF, CINCPAC urged the retention of the water shed area at Clark Air Base under U.S. control, and stressed the importance of a minimum of three water sheds at Subic Bay in response to a Philippine proposal that control of all water sheds be relinquished. Regarding water and land areas, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the United States retain control of waters in Subic Bay, that the boundaries of land areas retained for U.S. use should extend into the Bay waters sufficiently to include existing and planned piers, waterfront facilities, and other U.S. construction at Subic, and that the U.S. delegation press for continued and unhindered U.S. access and use of Philippine airspace.²

In mid-July the U.S. delegation advised the State Department of a GOP desire to establish a special joint commission, separate and distinct from the Mutual Defense Board (MDB), to oversee the implementation and operation of the MBA. The Philippine proposal for a special joint commission was defective in organization and skimpy on operational detail. It should be made clear, stated the Embassy, that the joint commission, like the MDB, was under the aegis of the Council of Ministers created pursuant to the MDT of 30 August 1951. CINCPAC commented that, although no requirement for a joint commission in addition to the MDB was evident, the proposal might be worth a trade-off on other important matters. However, CINCPAC cautioned against the proposed joint commission's involvement in operations at the bases. This view was supported by the State Department which submitted changes to the draft article submitted by the Embassy for approval, in which reference to operational involvement was deleted. After consultation with the Philippine delegation, the Embassy

AMEMB Manila 9831/071127Z Jul 76/USDEL 76; CINCPAC 080137Z Jul 76; SECSTATE 179509/202325Z Jul 76.

^{2.} CINCPACAF 162310Z Jul 76; CINCPACFLT 280507Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 240245Z Jul 76 and 312305Z Jul 76.

submitted a revised proposal relating to the establishment of a joint commission, with the clear understanding that operational matters within the purview of the MDB were first submitted to that Board for resolution.

During negotiations on the wording of the preamble to the proposed MBA, which had been reserved for resolution by the Chairmen of the two delegations, Ambassadors Romualdez and Sullivan, the primary difficulty concerned specific mention of the MDT of 1951 in the preamble. CINCPAC acknowledged what appeared to be agreement on the wording of the preamble, but challenged preamble language stating, "for the maintenance of peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific area" and suggested that that sentence be concluded with the word "stability." CINCPAC's objection, based upon the possibility that such language could restrict the activities of U.S. Forces in Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, was supported in a message from the State Department back to the Embassy in Manila. However, negotiations on preamble language, which had appeared to be an area of agreement, disintegrated into continued haggling over subsequent repeated Philippine amendments.²

The official summary record for the negotiating session of 7 July revealed considerable difficulty within the labor working group in establishing a foundation for negotiations. The U.S. and Philippine participants were far apart, each side having rejected the proposal of the other. The Philippine Under Secretary of Labor stressed the Philippine position that the labor article in the new agreement would supercede the BLA of 1968. Ambassador Sullivan countered with the U.S. position that the 1968 BLA should be referred to or made an annex of the MBA and not simply abrogated. On the following day Ambassador Sullivan requested the presence of Mr. William Pankonin, CINCPAC Chief of Civilian Personnel Policy, to participate in the labor working group discussions of the BLA and related issues. His expertise and experience, stated the Ambassador, would be of great assistance. CINCPAC promptly assured the Ambassador that Mr. Pankonin would be made available for the negotiations.³

(X) Citing the wide disparity between the Philippine draft article on labor (XI) and the proposal tabled by the United States, the Embassy requested

 AMEMB Manila 10701/210924Z Jul 76/USDEL 141, 11135/271036Z Jul 76/ USDEL 161, and 11170/290754Z Jul 76/USDEL 163; CINCPAC 220332Z Jul 76 and 300427Z Jul 76; SECSTATE 183397/232213Z Jul 76.

 AMEMB Manila 9917/081201Z Jul 76/USDEL 95 and 9928/090118Z Jul 76/ USDEL 97; CINCPAC 092316Z Jul 76.

AMEMB Manila 10214/131145Z Jul 76/USDEL 116, 10792/221201Z Jul 76/USDEL 147, and 11287/300931Z Jul 76/USDEL 166; SECSTATE 179510/202326Z Jul 76 and 184922/262318Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 190017Z Jul 76.

clearance for a new approach which would retain the 1968 BLA except as modified by the new MBA. During exploratory sessions on 7 and 8 July, stated the Embassy, working drafts based on guidelines provided by CINCPAC had been developed regarding preferential employment, reductions in force, severance pay, recruitment, and payroll deductions. Statements from GOP officials as late as January 1976 had reflected the position that the BLA, with minor modifications, was satisfactory.

In view of the revised hard-line stand by the GOP that substantial revision or total replacement was required during these negotiations, it had become evident that the BLA of 1968 might have to be revised; therefore, State authorized the Embassy to include a statement in the general labor article to the effect that the article would be implemented by appropriate amendment of the BLA. The Ambassador was authorized to inform the Philippine delegation that if they would agree to a brief, general labor article in the MBA, the United States was willing to begin negotiations on amendments to the BLA at the same time. The U.S. delegation was instructed to make it clear that these would be handled as separate and distinct matters, and that it would not be necessary to conclude BLA negotiations simultaneously with the new bases agreement. In this message (12 July) the State Department designated a U.S. team consisting of Pankonin as principal spokesman, Albert H. Burns of CINCPACELT, and Jack V. Compton of CINCPACAF for purposes of negotiation of amendments to the BLA. State directed that this team proceed to Manila and begin preparation for negotiations.

The Embassy replied to State that, in the judgment of the U.S. delegation, it was unnecessary to separate the labor issues from the overall negotiations. Such separation would be significantly counterproductive to the U.S. Forces labor situation in the Philippines by providing an avenue for renegotiation of the complete BLA and the recently completed three-year collective bargaining agreement. The U.S. delegation submitted for State Department review a text for the U.S. draft article on labor which retained the 1968 BLA but modified certain points therein. During the plenary session on 12 July, Ambassador Sullivan introduced Pankonin as part of the labor working group. 3

(c) Both the State Department and CINCPAC concurred with the approach which sought to retain the 1968 BLA with necessary changes included in the MBA then being negotiated. State cautioned, however, that the new approach on the

^{1.} AMEMB Manila 10062/120644Z Jul 76/USDEL 108.

^{2.} SECSTATE 172169/122249Z Jul 76.

^{3.} AMEMB Manila 10275/141027Z Jul 76/USDEL 119, 10354/151049Z Jul 76/USDEL 122, and 10408/160542Z Jul 76/USDEL 128.

labor issue was based on speculation by the U.S. delegation that the labor area was not of critical importance to the GOP and that the discussion of labor would not prolong the talks. If it became evident that that was not the case, the U.S. delegation would revert to the stand that labor was a separate and distinct issue.

delegation toward an agreed position on the labor issue. By the middle of August the latest labor article provisions reflected several new GOP proposals which resulted in a greater difference between the U.S. and GOP positions than was evident one month before. The Embassy attributed the intransigence of the GOP delegation to a basic conceptual difference between the panels on whether they were negotiating modifications to the U.S.-GOP BLA of 1968 or exceptions to Filipino law. Nevertheless, the Ambassador indicated that the labor issue was only one of 25 important issues in the overall negotiations which appeared to require a political decision for resolution. Therefore, he did not consider the labor issue as critical enough to prolong the talks nor to warrant remanding it to separate renegotiation of the BLA.²

The original draft MBA tabled by the U.S. delegation had contained no reference to nor clause on labor. By September this position had been modified to the point where the U.S. delegation submitted for State Department review a proposed labor article and annex in a 15-page message. The subjects covered in the proposed draft included preferential employment, recruitment, uniform standards, social security benefits, payroll deductions, security of employment, severance pay, a new committee of labor, resolution of disputes, regulation of contractors, manpower allocation, mid-year annual bonus, and general provisions. CINCPAC reiterated the importance of holding to the original U.S. Government objective to retain the BLA and its agreed minutes as modified by the terms of the MBA being negotiated. He provided technical comments/recommendations regarding the article and annex text discussed above in the event that its use became a political necessity. On 1 October CINCPACFLT emphasized to the Chief of Naval Operations the imperative that, if the draft submitted by the U.S. delegation were used, the modification and technical comments provided by CINCPAC should be incorporated intact.³

^{1.} CINCPAC 172219Z Jul 76; SECSTATE 180869/212313Z Jul 76.

^{2.} AMEMB Manila 11222/300128Z Jul 76/USDEL 165 and 12161/130640Z Aug 76/USDEL 204.

AMEMB Manila 13900/100746Z Sep 76/USDEL 241; CINCPACFLT 012311Z Oct 76, which cited CINCPAC 250504Z Sep 76.

The Unresolved Issues

At the end of the seventh week of negotiations (31 July) the Ambassador noted that the end of July was the original target date for the completion of MBA negotiations. He advised the State Department that, in his judgment, the end of the negotiations phase was in sight. The two panels, which were surrogates for the Ministerial level, had reached agreement on a number of points, but a number of others were of great political sensitivity. Ambassador Sullivan intended to suggest to Ambassador Romualdez the consolidation of agreements into a single text, with the points of disagreement in brackets. Sullivan also intended to suggest a recess and a joint public announcement stressing the areas of agreement. The length of the recess would depend, to a large extent, on GOP intentions, but the Ambassador expected Marcos to wait for the outcome of the U.S. elections before resumption of negotiations. I

After the ANZUS meeting in Canberra in early August (q.v.) Deputy Secretary of State Robinson and Admiral Gayler visited the Philippines. On 7 August during a call on President Marcos by Admiral Gayler and Ambassador Sullivan, Marcos referred to discussions held on the previous day with Secretary Robinson on the subject of the military base negotiations. He had suggested to Robinson that the two panels draw up a list of agreed and disagreed items. In addition, he suggested that Sullivan and Romualdez draw up a list of items which needed "political decisions." The two Chairmen reached agreement that the panels would prepare a document showing the areas of agreement and disagreement and that a summary of the various decisions needed at the political level would be prepared.²

In mid-August the State Department requested the U.S. delegation to submit the list of the 25 important issues which seemed to require political decision for resolution in order to facilitate a review of the base negotiations at high levels in the U.S. Government. State also agreed that a single text, with points of disagreement bracketed, of negotiations to date would be useful.³

(b) The U.S. delegation replied with two messages, one listing the 25 issues which seemed to require political decision and the other the issues and the respective U.S. and GOP positions on the issues. As listed in the first of these messages, the issues were:⁴

AMEMB Manila 11304/310530Z Jul 76/USDEL 168.

^{2.} AMEMB Manila 11798/090219Z Aug 76 and 11883/100554Z Aug 76/USDEL 189.

^{3.} SECSTATE 203560/172006Z Aug 76.

^{4.} AMEMB Manila 12447/180725Z Aug 76/USDEL 214 and 12527/190311Z Aug 76/USDEL 217.

- The determination and demarcation of the facilities which will be authorized for use by the United States.
- The specific terms of United States use of the facilities for military purposes.
- The Philippine desire to stipulate agreed force levels for United States Forces in the Philippines.
- Whether it is to be "agreement of" or "coordination with" the United States commander that would be required for Philippine forces to use or operate in a facility authorized for use by the United States.
- Whether or not there should be mutually worked-out programs for the activities and technical operation of the facilities.
- Whether or not the Philippines should prohibit, by express provision of this Agreement, the introduction and storage of nuclear and other unconventional weapons in the Philippines, and the laying of mines in Philippine waters.
- Whether or not the Philippines, if its national security so dictates, is to take over the operation and administration of the facilities.
- Whether the entry of U.S. nuclear-powered vessels into Philippine ports should require prior approval or only advance notification, through an express provision of this Agreement.
- Whether the Philippines should allow the passage through Philippine airspace or waters of aircraft, vessels, or submarines carrying nuclear weapons or components thereof, or other unconventional weapons.
- Whether the Philippine base commander shall have authority to issue directives (rules and regulations on general matters involving security, administration, and command) applicable to all personnel within the base.
- Control of the movement of United States vessels within Subic Bay and the harbor areas, including anchorages.

- Whether the participation by the United States Forces in security activities within and off the base, and outside the facilities, shall be expressly provided for in the Agreement or whether such participation shall be at the discretion of the Philippine base commander.
- The ownership of and control over maps and cartographic information which result from surveys conducted by United States Forces in the Philippines.
- Whether the United States may exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed by members of the U.S. Forces in the Philippines. If the Philippines consents to such an exercise of U.S. jurisdiction, a consequent issue is the objective procedure in determining whether a particular offense is one where the Philippine consent applies. In addition, if the Philippines exercise jurisdiction, the issue is whether or not the trial of members of the U.S. Forces, civilian component or dependents, shall be limited to civilian courts only.
- Whether, in the exercise of Philippine sovereign authority, the consent of the United States is necessary in the grant of rights to exploit natural resources within the facilities.
 - Tax exemption.
- Whether employer-employee relations at the facilities authorized for use by the United States shall be governed by Philippine law or by the existing Base Labor Agreement of 1968, subject to the terms of this Agreement.
- Whether Philippine currency shall be the only legal tender within the facilities.
- Whether the ownership of buildings and other constructions which form part of the facilities shall pass to the Philippines upon the effective date of the Agreement or upon the relinquishment of the facilities.
- The nature of and the manner by which "defense support" shall be provided by the United States to the Philippines to modernize its armed forces.

- Whether the United States, upon relinquishment of the facilities, shall be required to convert them at its own expense in consonance with Philippine development requirements.
- The duration and manner of termination of the Agreement.
- Whether any doubt regarding any provision of the Agreement shall be resolved in favor of the territorial sovereign.
- How to resolve the status of the United States installations which will no longer be covered by this Agreement, such as Voice of America, the State Department Regional Relay Facility, and the American Cemetery.
- Whether the Agreement shall be authentic in both the Filipino and English language versions.
- In September the U.S. delegation summarized the unresolved issues confronting the working groups in an analysis by the U.S. working group teams (facilities, command and control, legal, labor, and taxation) of ways by which the issues might be resolved satisfactorily. After a detailed review and analysis of the various component parts of the issues involved, the U.S. delegation addressed the more delicate political issues which had been reserved for the attention of the Chairmen. Although some limited progress was made in sharpening the definition of these issues, the resolution would be dependent upon high level political discussions. In this category were:
 - RP-US cooperation (U.S. support for the modernization of the Philippine Armed Forces); in addition to the grant and credit component of our support, we should carefully consider whether the Services would be willing to provide for training and base management and joint manning procedures in addition to some stepping up of Service-to-Service training. This could be valuable "quid" as well as an investment for the future.
 - Conversion of bases (U.S. support for making relinquished areas or facilities economically viable). We must continue to resist this open-ended obligation.

^{1.} AMEMB Manila 13899/100730Z Sep 76/USDEL 240.

• Interpretation (any doubts in provisions should be settled in favor of the Philippines). This is obviously unacceptable. Term of agreement. Washington has provided us with compromise language which we have not yet tabled.

(5) Early in September the JCS, noting the 25 issues listed by the Embassy as still to be resolved, requested CINCPAC to identify from the 25 issues those considered absolutely critical to continued effective military operations from Philippine bases in support of U.S. interests in the area. CINCPAC's reply on 14 September identified the issues and noted that suggested trade-offs or specific accommodations should be balanced by some reciprocal concession from the Philippine side. CINCPAC provided the following assessment:

• Issue 1: Grant of Facilities.

- Retention of fenced portion of Clark AB proper is necessary to effective U.S. military operations.
- Crow Valley range is vital. Complex is only available area large enough to accommodate an electronic warfare range, realistic tactical range, and conventional air-to-ground gunnery/bombing range. As a result, it is only WESTPAC range that enables integrated training...for PACAF tactical forces. Relinquishment or relocation is unacceptable if air tactical training as now envisioned is to be continued in the Clark complex.
- Camp O'Donnel communications station is essential.
- Water shed at Clark AB (Zone "A" less fenced portion of base) is not vital. Relinquishment of part of water shed is feasible provided further analysis shows negligible effect of such relinquishment on water table supplying artesian wells.
- MPS-11 site in Clark Zone "D" is necessary to safe, efficient operation of Crow Valley range and aircrew training.

^{1.} JCS 3099/071358Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 140003Z Sep 76.

- Exclusive U.S. use of all of Wallace Air Station is not necessary. While we recommend that Wallace remain a base designated for U.S. use, could accept relinquishment provided firm guidelines and operating procedures are developed which insure U.S. rights to operate and maintain essential equipment.
- John Hay is not required from a strict military operational point of view. Its importance to U.S. presence in Philippines lies in its contribution to U.S. personnel welfare and morale. In light of Philippine willingness to consider a no fee license arrangement, U.S. should be ready to make this type proposal. Any such arrangement must avoid jeopardizing appropriated fund support.
 - Subic-Clark pipeline is vital.
- Retention of JAD-JAD water shed at Subic is not essential. However, all other water sheds at Subic...which presently provide the entire water supply for Subic-Cubi complex must be retained. Final water shed arrangement should provide for continued BLT training in the four water sheds and JEST area at Subic.
- Grande Island is very important to effective military operations and security and should not be released.
- Not necessary to retain all water areas of Subic. Some waters, not vital for unhampered operations, could be released; however, concur U.S. position...that agreement must specifically designate waters reserved for U.S. use and access, rather than allowing future designation by Phil Base Commander (PBC).
- Present arrangement for use of impact and troop training areas is satisfactory and should be retained.
 - San Miguel communications station is required.
- With regard to Annex B, in the final analysis, consider "additional facilities" (American cemetery, Voice of America, etc.) as not directly supportive of effective U.S. military operations. Recommend delete "additional facilities" from Agreement proper and handle in exchange of notes. Deletion

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could be used to obtain major Phil concession elsewhere and at the same time would accommodate Phil desires to avoid appearance of expanding extent of facilities in Agreement.

• Issue 2: Terms of use of facilities. U.S. position is critical to effective/unhampered military operations. Phil language is inhibiting and unacceptable. Can envisage no U.S. accommodation which doesn't jeopardize principle.

Hesitant to provide Phils with any figures. If they insist, could, however, offer a "high figure" which represents a saturation level for the facilities.

- Issue 4: Joint use of facilities. U.S. position is essential for effective/unhampered military operations. As possible accommodation without jeopardizing principle, could accept alternate wording "in coordination with GOP, establish mutually agreed procedures for selective use of U.S. facilities." Realize strict interpretation this wording may be questionable and/or precedent setting.
- Issue 5: Mutual programs. Not clear just what Phils have in mind. Believe they are looking for U.S. to suggest something. Object to "mutually agreed" language...but could foresee involving Phils, on a selective basis, in some planning which would not interfere with our operations. Final decision should be reserved for U.S. by addition of language such as "where feasible."



• <u>Issue 7: Phil takeover</u>. Hold U.S. position. U.S. cannot be subjected to unilateral Phil decision of this nature. Recommend strike clause from Agreement. Phil concerns over national survival relate to U.S.-RP Mutual Defense Treaty.

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Release of facilities under other conditions should be addressed, if at all, in Terms of Agreement, Article 22, not as separate issue.

- Issue 8: Entry of NPW.

 [Phil wording...is unacceptable.
- <u>Issue 10: Issuance of directives</u>. Retention of U.S. position is required for effective military operations. U.S. formulation is already an accommodation and we should hold the line.
- <u>Issue 11: Control of movement</u>. Retention of U.S. position on this issue is critical to effective/unhampered operations at Subic. When water areas for U.S. use are agreed, will need suitable language guaranteeing U.S. control within those waters.
- Issue 12: Security.

 Prefer U.S.

 hold to position. Any U.S. accommodation should be reserved
- Issue 13: Ownership of maps. Not essential to effective military operations. Concur accommodation....

for the joint security plan.

- Issue 14: Criminal jurisdiction.
- <u>Issue 15: Natural resources</u>. Fully support U.S. position, however, it is not necessary to hold to language "right to agree upon" as long as assurances of unhampered operations are incorporated in Agreement. Phil proposal

not entirely unreasonable. Possible accommodation at Subic could be to suggest Phil participation in selected, controlled tree harvesting in water shed area.

- <u>Issue 16: Taxation</u>. Support U.S. position....Do not believe accommodation possible without jeopardizing principle and setting unfavorable precedents worldwide.
- Issue 17: Labor. Issue is vital. Effective/unhampered operation is directly related to Filipino work force operating and maintaining support facilities. Could incorporate in the new facilities agreement the essential elements and provisions of 1968 Base Labor Agreement (and its agreed minutes) necessary to protect U.S. Forces interests, as well as any modifications agreed to in present negotiations. We must retain work force management and operational prerogatives outlined...and, additionally, right to select Filipinos referred for employment, to terminate employees by reduction in force, and to discipline without binding arbitration.
- <u>Issue 18: Currency</u>. Not vital to effective military operations. Although undesirable, accommodation, with safeguards, could be made...but only as last resort.
- <u>Issue 19: Title to buildings.</u> Essential. Concerns and position expressed...remain valid.
- <u>Issue 20</u>: "Defense support". Phil position is unacceptable. On the other hand, U.S. position should more clearly state that grants will be in form of materiel and training, not outright cash payment. While issue does not directly affect military operations, the form and substance of guid will be pivotal issue.
- Issue 21: Conversion of facilities. U.S. position is not vital to our military operations in that area. Recognize, however, that the cost of accommodation would be unacceptable, both monetarily and as a precedent. Some Phil falloff on this issue already indicated. U.S. should hold to position simply from a monetary point of view and not agree to obligate itself to this type of undertaking.

- <u>Issue 22: Term of Agreement</u>. U.S. position is critical to continuing use of Phil bases for support of U.S. and Phil interests in area. Have no intentions of leaving Phil bases. Therefore, Agreement should opt for as long term as possible. Believe tie to MDT accomplished this in best way.
- <u>Issue 23: Interpretation</u>. Hold U.S. position. Envisage no U.S. accommodation which doesn't jeopardize principle or establish unacceptable precedent worldwide.
- <u>Issue 24: Activities outside Agreement.</u> U.S. position not necessary to effective military operations. However, U.S. should hold to position and insist on exchange of notes.
- <u>Issue 25</u>: <u>Language</u>. Could accept an authenticated Filipino text.


The AFP Modernization Package

Among the unresolved issues was Article XIX of the Philippine draft MBA which was labeled "defense support", a euphemism for the compensation expected by the GOP from the U.S. Government as payment for U.S. use of the bases. Ambassador Romualdez, as Chairman of the GOP delegation, explained to Ambassador Sullivan the substance of Philippine thinking with respect to Article XIX which, according to Romualdez, resulted from a lengthy internal dispute eventually resolved by President Marcos. According to the Romualdez version, key GOP officials headed by Secretary of Defense Enrile desired to hold out for "rental" or "compensation." They were prepared to call this money "defense support," but wished to have it as a lump sum cash payment with no strings attached. Romualdez and other GOP officials, on the other hand, were prepared to have "defense support" spelled out in terms of security assistance, foreign military sales, and economic aid. Marcos eventually decided in favor of the latter. Enrile refused to redraft Article XIX, but did provide a "modernization plan" as "justification" for "defense support." Ambassador Sullivan believed the modernization plan to have been concocted especially for bargaining purposes.

(\$) On 8 August the U.S. delegation forwarded to the State Department the AFP modernization list provided by Enrile. The modernization list was attached to a letter from Enrile to President Marcos dated 29 March 1976 in which Enrile labeled the program a five-year AFP modernization plan to develop land forces,

AMEMB Manila 10023/100426Z Jul 76/USDEL 105.

upgrade air and sea power and improve command and control over widely dispersed field forces. The list and cover letter carried GOP classification TOP SECRET.



^{1.} J53 HistSum Jul 76; AMEMB Manila 9916/081124Z Jul 76/USDEL 91, 92, 93, 94.

^{2.} SECSTATE 171468/101906Z Jul 76.

^{3.} Op. Cit., AMEMB Manila 10023/100426Z Jul 76/USDEL 105.

Meanwhile, CINCPAC had reviewed the AFP modernization plan and informed the JCS that it appeared to be a unilateral GOP wish list which probably was not associated with any previously established AFP modernization program. CINCPAC informed the JCS that any AFP modernization program should be a coordinated joint effort based upon an assessment of the mutual threat and the capability of the GOP to support a given force structure. On 13 July, three days after CINCPAC's comment, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the Chairman, JCS had been tasked to provide, on an urgent basis, an assessment of the equipment acquisition program envisioned by Secretary Enrile. Specific areas of interest were the validity of the requirements in the list, GOP capability to maintain and operate new weapon systems included in the list, and new facilities required to support the weapon systems.²

/ CINCPAC viewed the list

as a vehicle to express a dollar figure establishing a possible <u>quid pro quo</u> rather than a credible modernization plan. The types of items generally were valid because of the existing Muslim conflict and the projected threat, but the quantities and delivery dates were unrealistic. CINCPAC noted the absence of an airlift requirement and a ship repair facility as two obviously significant omissions. The most critical shortcoming then existing was that the AFP logistics system and facilities already were overburdened by the assets on hand. The AFP could not cope with the proposed acquisitions. CINCPAC provided a detailed line item analysis, and concluded with the observation that if modernization were to be accepted as a <u>quid</u>, both countries' interests would be best served by developing a plan that supported the current force structure while improving the ability to absorb future acquisitions.

^{1.} SECSTATE 173839/140047Z Jul 76 and 181985/230036Z Jul 76.

^{2.} CINCPAC 100417Z Jul 76; JCS 2510/132222Z Jul 76.

^{3.} CHJUSMAGPHIL 150630Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 170346Z Jul 76.

MDT-The Automatic Response

During Robinson's visit, he received an Aide Memoire from President Marcos quoting specific articles of the MDT, citing the U.S. Senate hearings in 1969, and requesting an authoritative and specific statement from the U.S. Government regarding its obligations under the MDT of 1951 relative to the security of the Philippines if attacked by external forces.²

At the same time, Admiral Gayler, who had accompanied Robinson to the Philippines, reported to the Chairman, JCS on a meeting with Philippine Secretary of Defense Enrile. Enrile complained that the Philippines had had the short end of the MDT since 1946 [sic]. Specifically, he cited shortcomings in aid in 1973, various encroachments on Philippine sovereignty, and the lack of a firm multi-year program.

- 1. CINCPAC 312109Z Jul 76; AMEMB Manila 11355/020805Z Aug 76.
- 2. AMEMB Manila 11734/060900Z Aug 76 (EX).

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On the other hand, Enrile gave repeated assurances that there was no intention on the part of the GOP to interfere with the full use of the bases by the United States, aligned the Philippines with the United States in understanding the Soviet threat, and suggested that political and logistics support could suffice in the event of aggression against the off-shore islands.

In response to a tentative proposal by the U.S. State Department that Secretary of State Kissinger visit Manila in October to discuss the MBA issues and the Marcos <u>Aide Memoire</u>, Marcos countered with a proposal to send Romulo and Romualdez to Washington in mid-September for consultation prior to Kissinger's visit in October. The Ambassador informed the State Department that, prior to the Kissinger visit proposal, Marcos had already decided to ask for an "informal" recess in the base negotiations and had instructed Romualdez that there were seven issues upon which he would "insist." Marcos had reviewed the issues compiled by the negotiating delegations and had concluded that many of the issues could be resolved by the working panels.

view of the conflict of views and in the absence of a U.S. reply to his Aide Memoire, Marcos had decided that the negotiations should be recessed, preferably without public announcement. Ambassador Sullivan advised the State Department that Romualdez had proposed a tentative resumption of negotiations on 15 January 1977 and that GOP officials were drafting a paper for the U.S. Department of State based on instructions from President Marcos. However, Romualdez was evasive when Sullivan requested a list of the seven issues referred to by Marcos. 2

Ambassador Sullivan was advised of Marcos' disappointment that no written reply to his <u>Aide Memoire</u> was forthcoming. He stated that it would be "pointless" for Romulo and Romualdez to attempt to discuss the issues in the negotiations without clarification of the obligations of both parties under the MDT. Therefore, Marcos advised Sullivan that Romulo and Romualdez would be authorized to meet with Secretary Kissinger on 22 September provided the first item of business concerned the <u>Aide Memoire</u>. If Kissinger was not prepared to provide a formal answer in writing at that meeting, Marcos expected him to state orally what the United States would be prepared to put in writing

^{1.} CINCPAC 080200Z Aug 76 (EX).

^{2.} SECSTATE 213364/271811Z Aug 76 (EX); AMEMB Manila 13156/280958Z Aug 76 (EX).

at a later date. During the meeting between Sullivan and Marcos, Ambassador Sullivan noted Marcos' statement that he personally thought he and Secretary Kissinger could resolve all of the issues "in a single sitting." Marcos acknowledged certain emotional problems, but thought all of them were "tractable." As an aside, stated the Ambassador, Marcos mentioned the need for a satisfactory "quid" for defense support. Nevertheless, Marcos indicated that he would not be available to meet with Secretary Kissinger until after 16 October and suggested that a more precise time for a meeting could be resolved while Romulo and Romualdez were in Washington.

Ambassador Sullivan suggested to the State Department that, prior to the meeting between Romulo and Kissinger, it would be necessary for the Secretary to have the highest level approval of an answer to the Aide Memoire and a quid pro quo. Sullivan recalled his previously suggested figures for a reasonable quid offer and suggested that both sides should attempt to ascertain the issues upon which they were not prepared to compromise. Later, Secretary Kissinger informed Romulo that he would be unable to attend a 22 September meeting and suggested that it could be rescheduled for October while Romulo was in the United States to attend the United Nations General Assembly. 2

The CONUS Meetings

Regarding the question of modernizing the AFR

Regarding the question of modernizing the AFP, U.S. Government, and Enrile stated that the GOP desired a five-year assistance program, of which the first year's price tag would be about half a billion dollars. Kissinger replied that this was totally unrealistic and suggested that the GOP define its priorities in terms of equipment. Romulo countered that another way of approaching the problem would be in terms of how important the bases really are to the United States.

1. AMEMB Manila 13577/050408Z Sep 76 (EX).

2. AMEMB Manila 13609/070659Z Sep 76 (EX); SECSTATE 225997/132017Z Sep 76 (EX).

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Romulo also requested specific prohibitions in the bases agreement against storage or transit of nuclear weapons. While noting the difference between storage and transit, it was agreed this was a complicated issue the resolution of which would require the participation of President Marcos. The conferees agreed that the discussions during the meeting would be reported to President Marcos and that, in the meantime, the press would be told that the two Secretaries had made good progress in discussing the base negotiations and that the negotiations would continue.

(U) On 21 October a Honolulu newspaper printed an Associated Press dispatch from Washington stating that the Philippines was asking the United States for several billion dollars' worth of military equipment as a price for a new agreement governing the U.S. military bases. This statement was attributed in the press dispatch to "American officials." The article stated that these officials were not taking the bid for massive arms shipments too seriously, and that the military aid component of the new agreement probably would be more in line with base agreements negotiated during the year with Spain, Turkey, and Greece. These agreements, stated the article, provided American aid averaging between \$200 million and \$250 million a year over a four-to-five-year period. The article also attributed to American officials the statement that the two countries had been unable to bridge the gap between the Philippine demands over sovereignty over the bases and the U.S. desire for operational control over them.²

During subsequent conversations between Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Romulo in Washington on 28 October, Kissinger handed Romulo an Aide Memoire from the U.S. Government dated 28 October 1976. On 23 November Romulo provided an Aide Memoire from his Government to Secretary Kissinger. The GOP Aide Memoire stated that the U.S. Aide Memoire had offered \$900 million for a period of five years, one-half in military aid and the other half in economic aid. The GOP Aide Memoire stated that that amount did not meet its requirements, and that the GOP would need \$2 billion for a period of five years, 50 percent to be for military purposes and 50 percent for economic assistance. Of the military portion, the GOP needed 75 percent in the form of grants and the balance in foreign military sales credit. The economic portion could be in the form of development aid and export-import bank credits.

^{1.} SECSTATE 250861/142125Z Oct 76 (EX), which transmitted to CINCPAC the original State message dated 8 Oct 76.

^{2.} Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 21 Oct 76, "Manila Asking Billions in Arms," dateline Washington (AP).

In the GOP <u>Aide Memoire</u>, assurance was given that the GOP did not intend to hamper the United States' operational effectiveness nor infringe on the integrity of United States' command and security. These issues, stated the <u>Aide Memoire</u>, could be expedited so long as Philippine sovereignty in law and in fact was recognized.

Secretary Kissinger informed Romulo during that meeting that he saw no possibility of U.S. agreement to \$2 billion and said the question would have to be left for consideration by the next Administration. Once again it was agreed that response to press inquiries would be that the two Secretaries had again discussed base negotiations, that further progress was made, and that the negotiations were continuing.

The Next Move

On 4 December the State Department informed the Embassy in Manila that wire service reports included somewhat distorted but nevertheless fairly accurate descriptions of the financial package proposed to the Philippines, and indicating that an agreement had been reached. The State Department was responding to press queries that discussions were continuing, that no agreement had been reached, but that the discussions did involve considerations of U.S. military and economic assistance.²

- (U) On 5 December a Honolulu newspaper article cited a "State Department official" in reporting that progress had been made in negotiations with the Philippines for the continuation of the U.S. military bases in that country, but that no agreement had been reached. The article then cited other Government sources as stating that negotiations had provided for \$1 billion in economic and military aid for continued base rights, that an agreement had been reached, and that a formal announcement was likely in several days. These sources, according to the article, said the agreement had been reached in Mexico City by Secretary of State Kissinger during meetings with representatives of the Philippine Government. Financial commitments in the new agreement, according to the article, were evenly split between economic and military aid. 3
- (U) On the following day (6 December) another press dispatch reported that Philippine authorities were upset by a sequence of events which they interpreted

SECSTATE 295632/040215Z Dec 76.

 Honolulu Advertiser, 5 Dec 76, "U.S.-Philippine Talks Reported Progressing," dateline Washington (UPI).

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SECSTATE 287342/272004Z Nov 76 (EX), which transmitted to CINCPAC the original State message DTG 232210Z Nov 76 and 287549/272005Z Nov 76 (EX), which transmitted to CINCPAC the original State message of 24 November.

as a heavy-handed State Department effort to break a stalemate in negotiations over U.S. military bases in the Philippines. Romulo told the press that the Manila Government had rejected a U.S. proposal for \$1 billion in total U.S. aid over the next five years. Romulo said, according to the article, that he had told Kissinger that the GOP wanted \$1 billion in military aid alone over five years, with economic aid to be negotiated in a separate agreement. According to the article, Kissinger and Romulo had met in Mexico City during the inauguration of the Mexican President, but, according to Romulo, there was no agreement and reports that the Philippines was reversing itself following the personal intervention of President Marcos were false. American officials, according to the article, had been taken aback when Manila's initial price tag for military aid had amounted to almost \$1 billion a year.

(U) On the same day that Romulo's perturbation with press reports on the negotiations was reported from Washington, the Embassy in Manila reported an editorial in a Philippine newspaper entitled "U.S. Distorting RP Position on Bases Issues." The article stated that the Philippines had been pictured unfavorably in a canard peddled by the American press which made it appear that the Philippines had agreed to allow the United States to use the military bases in exchange for \$1 billion in military and economic aid. The article cited Romulo's denial that any agreement had been reached and questioned the motives of the U.S. Administration and the U.S. press:²

We do not buy the U.S. line that its maintenance of military bases here is for our protection. From our view-point, the Americans, for strategic defense reasons, need these bases more than we do. That is why we say that if the American military presence on Philippine soil will continue to mean a derogation from Philippine sovereignty, then we can do without these bases, and the Americans can pack up and leave. On the other hand, if the Americans truly recognize our sovereignty, as they claim they do, then they must agree to the following: (1) renunciation of extraterritorial rights on the bases; (2) acceptance of Philippine control (not token but substantial) over bases operations without necessarily hamstringing their effectiveness; (3) recognition of Philippine jurisdiction over a wide range of criminal offenses by American servicemen on or off base; (4)

Honolulu <u>Star-Bulletin</u>, 6 Dec 76, "Philippines Rejects U.S. Aid Proposal: Wants \$1 billion in Economic Assistance Alone," dateline Washington (AP).

^{2.} AMEMB Manila 18899/060852Z Dec 76.

return of portions of the base areas that are no longer in active use; and (5) payment of substantial compensation for the use of these base lands. If the U.S. Government has agreed to pay substantial sums for the use of Spanish, Turkish, and Greek military bases, it should be prepared to do no less with respect to the Philippine military bases.

While the Philippine stand does not make for easy comprehension, let alone simple negotiations, the possibility of misunderstanding it is quite remote. However, distorting it is another matter, and to our mind, this is exactly what Washington and certain sectors of the American press did, when they made it appear that a new RP-US military bases agreement had been reached primarily, if not solely, on the basis of pecuniary considerations.

In a major foreign policy address on 11 December, Marcos said progress in the base talks had been encouraging, but expressed concern at the misinterpretation of the GOP position in negotiations and singled out the report that the GOP had asked for \$1 billion in military and economic aid in exchange for continued U.S. use of the military bases. At the same time, Marcos said that the redirection of GOP foreign policy "in no way connotes the severance of time-tested friendship between the Philippines and the United States." He stressed the GOP belief that the U.S. presence in the Western Pacific was necessary for regional peace and stability and that this view was shared by other nations in Asia. He reiterated that Philippine sovereignty over the bases was not negotiable, but that this should not "prejudice the effective use of facilities by the U.S. in any given situation threatening peace in Southeast Asia." He contended that there had been no agreement in negotiations on many questions "including manner and nature of paying rentals," and that these would await review by the new U.S. Administration. As interpreted by the U.S. Embassy in Manila, Marcos seemed to be assuring his audience that a resolution of the bases negotiations which would be satisfactory to the United States and the GOP was possible under the new Administration. Marcos stated explicitly that a condition for successful MBA negotiations was that the United States "resume" its original obligations under the Military Assistance Pact, and pay rentals in order to build self-reliance on the part of the Philippines. The President also stated that agreement was pending on the powers of the Filipino commander, jurisdiction over offenses, and the kind of weapons to be allowed in the bases, all of which questions were dependent upon the "review and consideration of the new [U.S.] Administration."

^{1.} AMEMB Manila 19306/130912Z Dec 76.

- The U.S. Embassy in Manila advised the State Department on 15 December of another lengthy editorial headlined "U.S. Must Now Make Next Move on Bases Issues." The editorial speculated on the U.S. State Department's motivation in "prematurely leaking" information on the base talks, ascribing the intention of the State Department "to torpedo the negotiations completely so that everything will be set back to zero and the Philippines will have to start again from scratch with the new Carter Administration. Naturally, this would mean more protracted negotiations and a longer lease on life for the status quo on the bases." Concluding with Marcos' insistence on rentals and the fulfillment of the U.S. commitment to provide aid, the editorial stated that the next move was up to the United States."
- (U) On the following day (16 December) Romulo returned to Manila and, commenting on the base negotiations, stated that the GOP had not asked for military aid, but only just compensation for the continued use of the bases. On 17 December Marcos alluded to the "recent furor" about the GOP's reported acceptance of a \$1 billion assistance package in return for use of the bases and stated that the GOP was waiting for the new Administration in the United States before proceeding with the talks. During a press conference on 4 January 1977, following a meeting of the GOP National Security Council, Marcos confirmed that the talks were at a standstill and that it was up to the United States to make the next move. 2
- (U) Meanwhile, on the U.S. military side, a joint State/Defense message on 18 November 1976 acknowledged the assumption of command of the 13th Air Force by MAJ GEN Freddie L. Poston effective 15 October 1976, replacing MAJ GEN Leroy J. Manor, who had been designated as CINCPAC Chief of Staff. The message appointed General Poston to replace General Manor as the principal deputy military adviser to the United States delegation to the MBA negotiations effective 18 November 1976.

2. AMEMB Manila 19553/170848Z Dec 76, and 152/050739Z Jan 77.

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^{1.} AMEMB Manila 19411/150755Z Dec 76.

^{3.} SECSTATE 283570/191915Z Nov 76, which transmitted to CINCPAC the original State message DTG 181840Z Nov 76.

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CHAPTER XI

OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Official Activities of the Commander in Chief

- (U) Admiral Gayler's and Admiral Weisner's numerous trips, speeches, and press conferences are highlighted below. Distinguished visitors and visits by news media personnel are listed separately. Events for the year are listed chronologically.
- (U) San Diego Trip, 7-8 January: Admiral Gayler departed Honolulu for San Diego, CA on 7 January. Upon arrival at North Island Naval Air Station, the Admiral was briefed on the S-3A by RADM James B. Stockdale, Commander, Antisubmarine Warfare Wing Pacific. Later that afternoon, he met with VADM P.D. Stroop and Teledyne Ryan officials to discuss Compass Cope, Mini-Drone, and Vertiwing systems. On 8 January Admiral Gayler met with VADM Robert B. Baldwin, Chief, Naval Air Pacific. That afternoon he went aboard the USS RANGER for change of command ceremonies in which Captain Leon A. Edney was relieved by Commander Samuel Carson Flynn as Commander of the Carrier Air Wing TWO.
- (U) The French Receptions, 9 and 14 January: On the evening of 9 January Admiral Gayler attended a reception in honor of commanding officers and officers of the French ships RIVIERE and ENSEIGN de VAISSEAU HENRY given by the 14th Naval District Commander, RADM Ralph Wentworth. The commander of the RIVIERE reciprocated by being host to Admiral Gayler and RADM Wentworth at a dinner aboard RIVIERE on 14 January.
- (U) <u>Certificate of Merit Presentation, 14 January</u>: Admiral Gayler presented Mrs. Gerald H. Clements, wife of the Chief, Air Force Personnel Branch for PACOM Headquarters, with a CINCPAC Certificate of Merit for her contributions to the Hawaii State educational system.
- (U) <u>Memorial Service, 15 January</u>: Admiral Gayler flew by helicopter to Schofield Barracks where he attended a memorial service for the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., sponsored by the 25th Infantry Division.

^{1.} Material for this section was taken from J003/74 HistSums Jan-Dec 76.

- (U) <u>Retired Officers' Brief, 15 January</u>: In the afternoon of 15 January the Admiral gave a briefing to Oahu retired flag and general officers in the PACOM Command Center.
- (U) <u>CODEL Visit, 16 January</u>: Admiral Gayler was host to a delegation from the House Armed Services Committee at breakfast in the Camp H.M. Smith Flag Officers Mess. That evening, he gave a reception for them at Fort Ruger's Cannon Club.
- (U) Chiefs of Mission Conference, 19-23 January: Chiefs of Mission from most East Asian countries held a three day conference at PACOM Headquarters during the period 19 to 23 January. On the 19th Admiral Gayler and Philip C. Habib, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, co-hosted a dinner at the Admiral's quarters honoring the visiting Chiefs of Mission.
- (U) Honors Ceremony, 2 February: Admiral Gayler attended an honors ceremony for MAJ GEN Joseph Koler, Jr., outgoing Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, at Camp Smith's Bordelon Field.
- (U) MAAG Chiefs' Conference, 3 February: Admiral Gayler gave the opening address to the Military Assistance Advisory Group Chiefs' Conference held in the CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Room. In attendance were senior MAAG representatives from countries throughout the PACOM.
- (U) ANPA Address, 4 February: Admiral Gayler addressed the convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association on the Island of Hawaii.
- (U) <u>CONUS Trip, 12 February 2 March</u>: Admiral Gayler and party departed Hawaii on 12 February and arrived at Ellington Air Force Base, TX on the morning of 13 February. The Admiral then flew by helicopter to Texas A&M University where he made a presentation at the Student Conference on National Affairs (SCONA 21) and met with the delegates over lunch. That afternoon he flew by helicopter to Houston where he met with the editorial board of the Houston Post.

On 16 February the Admiral's party departed Ellington Air Force Base for Buckley Air National Guard Base in Colorado where the Admiral started a 7-day leave.

On 24 February Admiral Gayler joined a party from PACOM Headquarters and flew to Kansas City. He went by motorcade to Fort Leavenworth, KS, where he was met by MAJ GEN John H. Cushman, Commandant of the Army's Command and General Staff College. The Admiral addressed the college before departing for Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

On 25 February the Admiral met with William P. Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense; General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); General Fred C. Weyand, USA, Army Chief of Staff; LT GEN E.F. Tighe, USAF, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and RADM Julian S. Lake, Commander, Naval Electronic Systems Command. That evening Admiral and Mrs. Gayler dined with Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce at her apartment.

On 26 February the Admiral breakfasted with Washington <u>Post</u> columnist Rowland Evans. Later that morning he flew to Boston where he made a luncheon presentation to the Harvard School of International Affairs, and later met with the University's president, Derek Bok. He returned to Washington later that evening.

On 27 February Admiral Gayler attended the Chairman's briefing in the Pentagon and addressed the National War College at Fort McNair, VA. Later that day the Admiral met with Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; General Weyand; and had dinner with Senator J. Bennett Johnston, Jr. (D.-LA).

On 28 February the Admiral had breakfast with Mr. George Bush, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

On 1 March the Admiral met with William I. Greener, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and later testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Armed Forces, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.

On 2 March Admiral Gayler met with Admiral James L. Holloway, III, Chief of Naval Operations, and Secretary of the Army Martin R. Hoffmann.

On 3 March the Admiral met with Representative John C. Culver (D.-IA) before flying back to Honolulu.

- (U) <u>Governor's Luncheon</u>, 17 March: Admiral Gayler attended a luncheon given by Hawaii Governor George Ariyoshi at Washington Place, the Governor's residence, to announce the Bicentennial World Hawaiian Canoe Championships.
- (U) Samoa Trip, 19-20 March: Admiral Gayler departed Honolulu on 19 March for Pago in American Samoa. Upon arrival he was met by the territorial governor and taken for a tour of the island. He returned the following day.
- (U) New Zealand Trip, 24-26 March: The Admiral departed Hawaii on 24 March and arrived in Wellington, New Zealand on 25 March where he was met by U.S. Ambassador Armistead I. Selden, Jr. Admiral Gayler met with Prime

Minister Robert Muldoon and his cabinet and Opposition Party Party Leader Bill Rowling on the afternoon of 25 March. Later that afternoon he held a press briefing for the New Zealand media.

On 26 March the Admiral met with the Minister of Defense and Prime Minister Muldoon, and held a joint press conference with the Prime Minister. Later that afternoon he met with General/Sir Richard James Holden Webb, Chief of Defence Staff, and held a discussion with 20-30 officers of all branches of the New Zealand military.

- (U) <u>Change of Command, 6 April</u>: Admiral Gayler attended a change of command ceremony at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station at which Colonel John Thatcher, USMC, former CINCPAC Protocol Officer, assumed command of Marine Air Group 24 from Colonel J.J. Went, USMC.
- (U) <u>CONUS Trip, 6-17 April</u>: Admiral Gayler and party departed Hawaii on 6 April for Offutt Air Force Base, NE where the Admiral met with Strategic Air Command intelligence and operations personnel to discuss various exercises. He also met with members of the Joint Strategic Planning Staff and the Commander of the Strategic Air Command. The Admiral was interviewed by the Omaha World Herald prior to his departure for Peterson Field, Colorado Springs, CO for a tour of the Air Force Academy and an address to the Cadet Wing.

On 8 April the Admiral and his party flew to Chicago, IL where he addressed the Chicago Council on International Relations and met with news media representatives.

On 9 April Admiral Gayler flew to Maxwell Air Force Base, AL to address the Air War College.

On 12 April the Admiral flew to Norfolk, VA where he met with the Commandant, RADM J.A. Denton, Jr., and addressed the Armed Forces Staff College. That afternoon he flew to Washington where he had dinner with Ambassador Thomas Gates, Chief of U.S. Liaison Mission to Peking.

On 13 April the Admiral met with Senator Sam Nunn (D.-GA), Senator Robert P. Griffin (R.-MI), Representative Melvin Price (D.-IL), VADM H.D. Train, II, and Commander Ed Koczak.

On 14 April Admiral Gayler attended the Chairman's briefing and met with former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird; Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz; General David C. Jones, USAF, Air Force Chief of Staff; VADM E.K. Snyder, COMUSTDC; LT GEN E.F. Tighe, USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and Colonel C.J. Blastos, J5, JCS.

On 15 April the Admiral attended the Chairman's briefing and again met with Generals Jones and Brown, and met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert F. Ellsworth.

On 16 April the Admiral met with Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; LT GEN W.D. Johnson, USAF, Director, Defense Nuclear Agency; Mr. George Bush, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and Mr. George Vest.

- (U) <u>Reception</u>, 23 April: Admiral Gayler attended a reception given by Consul General of the Republic of China Hoh-tu Liu at the consulate.
- (U) <u>NWC Discussion</u>, <u>24 April</u>: Admiral Gayler chaired a roundtable discussion with members of the National War College faculty and students at the Fleet Marine Force Pacific conference room at Camp Smith.
- (U) Reception, 29 April: Admiral Gayler attended a reception in honor of the Emperor of Japan's birthday given by Consul General Masao Tsukamoto at the Consul's official residence in Honolulu.
- (U) <u>Honors Ceremony, 29 April</u>: Admiral Gayler attended an honors ceremony at Camp Smith's Bordelon Field for General Louis Wilson, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
- (U) <u>Japan-Korea Trip, 2-6 May</u>: Admiral Gayler and party departed Honolulu on 2 May for Yokota, Japan where the Admiral conferred on 3 May with 5th Air Force staff members. The Admiral departed Yokota and flew to Seoul, Korea where he was met by General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.
- On 4 May the Admiral met with General Stilwell and his staff; General NO Chae-Hyon, Chairman, ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Honorable SUH Jyong-Chul, ROK Minister of National Defense.

On 5 May the Admiral met with General Stilwell before departing by helicopter for Camp Red Cloud, accompanied by LT GEN John T. Burns, USAF, Deputy COMUS Korea. He met with LT GEN John H. Cushman, I Corps Commander, and returned to Seoul where he met with Ambassador Richard Sneider at the Embassy.

Prior to returning to Hawaii on 6 May the Admiral met with MAJ GEN Don D. Pittman, USAF, Commander of the 314th Air Division at Osan Air Base, Korea.

- (U) <u>Punchbowl Ceremony, 11 May</u>: Admiral Gayler attended and addressed a ceremony honoring the Medal of Honor recipients interred at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific at Punchbowl.
- (U) <u>Eglin/MacDill AFB Trip, 15-19 May</u>: Admiral Gayler and party departed Hawaii on 15 May for Eglin Air Force Base, FL. After arriving in Florida, the Admiral drove to Pensacola Naval Air Station where he toured the Naval Aviation Museum.

On 17 May the Admiral held a series of discussions on air-to-surface guided weapons, air-to-air guided weapons, tactical electronic warfare systems, and other programs.

On 18 May the Admiral discussed armament center resources and test ranges before departing for MacDill Air Force Base, FL.

Upon arrival at MacDill Air Force Base, FL on 19 May, the Admiral was officially welcomed by General Hennessey, attended an intelligence overview by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and participated in a discussion on various topics led by General Brown, CJCS. The Admiral also sat in as Admiral Isaac Kidd, Commander in Chief Atlantic, discussed Soviet submarine operations in the Atlantic.

Other meetings and discussions on 19 May included: General Brown, CJCS, discussing DOD support of President Ford's FY 77 budget request; LT GEN Dennis P. McAuliffe discussing the Panama situation; Admiral James L. Holloway, III, on the Naval shipbuilding program; General Alexander Haig, SHAPE/CINCUSEUR, on fiscal programs; and Admiral Gayler on foreign military training and contingency plans and crisis management.

- (U) U.S.-Korea Security Consultative Meeting, 26-27 May: Admiral Gayler was a delegate to the Ninth Annual United States-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting which was held in the CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Room at Camp Smith. The conference was chaired jointly by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and ROK Minister of National Defense SUH Jyong-Chul, and included high level military and government officials from both countries. The main topic of discussion was the continued security of the Korean Peninsula and the U.S. role in keeping the peace.
- (U) <u>San Francisco-Seattle-Vandenberg Air Force Base Trip, 10-17 June:</u>
 Admiral Gayler flew to San Francisco, CA on 10 June. On 15 June the Admiral visited the Boeing Developmental Center before flying to Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, WA where he was met by RADM William Harris, Commander, Medium Attack Tactical Electronic Warfare Wing Pacific. They discussed the A-6E and

EA-6B programs and took a flight in a TC-4C to demonstrate all-weather attack systems.

- (U) New CINCPAC Announced, 16 June: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that Admiral Maurice Weisner would replace Admiral Gayler as Commander in Chief Pacific. Admiral Weisner was the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and would be replaced by Admiral Thomas Hayward, then Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet.
- (U) <u>lst Marine Brigade Change of Command, 22 June</u>: Admiral Gayler flew by helicopter to Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station to attend the change of command ceremony in which BGEN David M. Twomey assumed command of the lst Marine Brigade from BGEN George W. Smith.
- (U) <u>SSP Trip, 23 June</u>: Admiral Gayler visited the Naval Undersea Center at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station and took a short trip aboard the experimental Semi-Submerged Platform.
- (U) <u>Portrait of America, 2 July</u>: Admiral Gayler participated in the State of Hawaii Bicentennial Pageant "Portrait of America" by giving a brief history of each Service branch as the band of that branch marched onto the field at Aloha Stadium.
- (U) Presentation of the First Class Order of the Rising Sun Award, 9 July: Admiral Gayler was presented the First Class Order of the Rising Sun, the highest Japanese award to a foreigner, by Japan Defense Agency Director General Michita Sakata in ceremonies in Tokyo.
- (U) The Conference Board Speech, 28 August: Admiral Gayler delivered a speech to the Conference Board, an organization of business and industrial leaders of the United States and Pacific, at the Mauna Kea Beach Hotel on the Island of Hawaii.
- (U) Admiral Weisner Assumes Command, 30 August: In a change of command ceremony at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, Admiral Maurice F. Weisner relieved Admiral Noel Gayler as Commander in Chief Pacific. Remarks were delivered by Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements, Jr.
- (U) Admiral Gayler Retires/Transfers Gray Eagle, 31 August: Aboard the USS RANGER (CV-61), Admiral Gayler was officially retired from the U.S. Navy. The retirement ceremony also included the transfer of the Gray Eagle award to RADM Martin D. Carmody, USN. (The "Gray Eagle of the Navy" was the naval aviator with the longest active service.)

- (U) <u>German Television Filming, 16 September</u>: Admiral Weisner was filmed by Dr. Hans Berg, a producer for German Television, for the introductory portion of his production on U.S. military power in the Pacific.
- (U) <u>PS&S Reunion, 17 September</u>: Admiral Weisner gave a Command Briefing and welcoming remarks to the <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> reunion at the Hale Koa Hotel at Fort DeRussy.
- (U) <u>Korea-Japan Trip, 19-27 September</u>: Admiral Weisner and party departed Hawaii on 19 September, arriving at Kimpo Airport on the 20th. Upon arrival Admiral Weisner was met by LT GEN John J. Burns, USAF, Deputy Commander, United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea.

On 21 September Admiral Weisner had an early morning conference with General Richard Stilwell, USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea. Later that morning he met with the Charge D'Affaires, Thomas Stern and the Country Team. That afternoon Admiral Weisner met with the Honorable SUH Jyong-Chul, ROK Minister of National Defense and General RO Chae-Hyon, Chairman, ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. That evening the Admiral had discussions with LT GEN John H. Cushman, I Corps Commander, and visited the Systems Simulation and Analysis Activity at Camp Red Cloud.

On 22 September Admiral Weisner met with MAJ GEN Don D. Pittman, USAF, Commander, 314th Air Division and toured the 314th Air Division Tactical Air Control Center, the Olympic Game operational facilities, and the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade. Later in the day the Admiral observed Exercise COPE STRIKE at Nightmare Range.

Prior to departing Korea in the morning of 23 September, Admiral Weisner met with Prime Minister CHOI Kyu-Hah and President Park Chung-Hee.

Upon arrival in Yokota, Japan in the afternoon of the 23rd, Admiral Weisner was met by LT GEN Walter T. Galligan, USAF, Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan. On the 24th the Admiral met with LT GEN John R. Guthrie, USA, Commander, U.S. Army Japan, and attended the dedication ceremonies of the new U.S. Embassy building.

On 27 September the Admiral met with Ambassador James D. Hodgson; Admiral Samejima Hiroichi, Chairman, Joint Staff Council; and Minister of Defense Michita Sakata before returning to Hawaii that evening.

(U) Address to Associated Press Association, 10 October: Admiral Weisner spoke to the Associated Press Association convention at the Mauna Kea Beach Hotel on the Island of Hawaii.

(U) <u>Soldier's Medal Presentation, 8 October</u>: Admiral Weisner presented the Soldier's Medal to Army Captain Roger E. Urbaniak of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, at Barbers Point Naval Air Station.

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- (U) <u>PASOLS Address</u>, <u>19 October</u>: Admiral Weisner presented the keynote address to the Pacific Area Senior Officer's Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) at the Hale Koa Hotel at Fort DeRussy.
- (U) <u>CONUS Trip, 29 October-3 November</u>: On 29 October Admiral Weisner and party departed Hawaii and arrived in California the following day. While in California the Admiral visited the Naval Air Station, North Island, and the Naval Air Station, Miramar.
- On 1 November the Admiral visited and addressed the students and faculty of the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, PA. A question and answer session followed the Admiral's speech. On 2 November Admiral Weisner visited the Commander in Chief Atlantic and met with staff officers of that command. Also on 2 November the Admiral met with General DePuy, Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
- On 3 November the Admiral addressed the Armed Forces Staff College and visited the Strategic Air Command before returning to Hawaii that evening.
- (U) Marine Corps Birthday Ball, 10 November: Admiral Weisner addressed the 201st Birthday Ball of the United States Marine Corps held at the Hilton Hawaiian Village Hotel in Honolulu.
- (U) <u>Veterans Day Speech, 11 November</u>: Admiral Weisner addressed the annual Massing of the Colors ceremony at the Kawaiahao Church in Honolulu in honor of Veterans Day.
- (U) MAAG Chiefs Conference, 17-19 November: Admiral Weisner sponsored the Military Assistance and Advisory Group Chiefs Conference held in the CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Room.
- (U) Boy Scout Recognition Dinner, 18 November: Admiral Weisner addressed the Aloha Council, Boy Scouts of America, Eagle Recognition Dinner. The Admiral was presented a plaque awarding him the title of Distinguished Eagle Scout.
- (U) <u>Singapore-Hong Kong Trip, 5-9 December</u>: Admiral Weisner departed on 5 December arriving in Singapore on 6 December. On 7 December he met with Ambassador John H. Holdridge; the U.S. Defense Attache Office staff; the Country Team; Dr. Goh Keng Swee, the Minister of Defense; and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.

On 8 December the Admiral flew to Hong Kong where he met with LT GEN Sir John Archer, Commander, British Forces. The Admiral also met with the Consul General and his staff before returning to Hawaii on 9 December.

(U) <u>CONUS Trip</u>, 9-13 <u>December</u>: Admiral Weisner and party departed Hawaii on 9 December and arrived at Andrews Air Force Base the following morning. The Admiral flew by helicopter to the Pentagon where he attended the Chairman's morning briefing and met with several military and government officials throughout the day. That evening, Admiral Weisner had dinner with Admiral Holloway, and attended the Navy Relief Ball at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

On 11 December Admiral Weisner met with General Brown and Mr. George Vest. That evening, he and Mrs. Weisner attended a dinner at the White House hosted by President and Mrs. Ford. On 12 December Admiral Weisner was the guest of Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements at a Hunt Breakfast in Middleburgh, VA.

(U) <u>Daedalians Speech, 14 December</u>: Admiral Weisner addressed a dinner of the Daedalian Society.

Distinguished Visitors to the Command

(U) Distinguished visitors during 1976 included:

6-7 January: Mr. John A. Goldsmith, professional staff delegate to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

9-10 January: VADM Paul Kaufman, Deputy, Joint Strategic Planning Staff.

12 January: RADM Emile Chaline, Naval Attaché to the French Ambassador to the United States.

15 January: MAJ GEN Senjiro Nakajima, Chief J-3, Joint Staff Office, Japan Defense Agency.

17 January: Martin Hoffmann, Secretary of the Army.

26 January: Mr. Takuya Kubo, Vice Minister, Japan Defense Agency.

27 January: MAJ GEN Peter Falkland, designated head of the Australian Defence Staff.

29 January: LT GEN Walter T. Galligan, USAF, COMUS Japan.

- 29 January: MAJ GEN Thomas U. Greer, Commander, U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii.
- 30 January: RADM W.D. Robertson, Jr., Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency.
- 2 February: Mr. Kohno and Admiral Ishida (JSDF, Ret.) of Shin Meiwa Industries in Japan.
- 5 February: Mr. John P. Constandy, Deputy Inspector General for Foreign Assistance, U.S. Department of State.
 - 11 February: Mr. Yosigai of the U.S. Civil Service Commission.
 - 12 February: LT GEN James F. Hollingsworth, USA, CG, I Corps Group.
- 4 March: Ambassador Nicholas Parkinson, Australian Ambassador to the United States.
- 4 March: VADM D.J. Murphy, USN, Director, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Ocean Surveillance Programs.
- 4 March: Former Republic of China Consul General Te-chieh Poo and the new Consul General, Hoh-tu Liu.
 - 8 March: Japanese Counsul General Takaaki Hasegawa.
- 26 March: William H. Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines.
- 29 March: Dr. Don Jackson, Chief, National Security Agency Operations Group B.
 - 29 March: RADM Neil Deitrich.

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- 30 March: Mr. James Grooms, Special Consultant to the Director, National Security Agency.
 - 31 March: Mr. Thomas Street, Grumman Aircraft Corporation.
 - 1 April: General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, CG, U.S. Army Forces Command.
- 5 April: BGEN W.E. Brown, Jr., USAF, Chief, Strategic Operations Division, J3, JCS.

- 6 April: Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, USN (Ret.), former CINCPAC.
- 17 April: LT GEN Vernon A. Walters, USA, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency.
 - 19 April: Incoming Japanese Consul General Masao Tsukamoto.
- 20 April: Dr. Donald R. Cotter, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy).
- 20 April: William H. Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines.
- 21 April: RADM/Baron Gerard deCastel Bajac, French Commander in Chief Pacific Nuclear Test Center and Naval Forces Pacific.
 - 21 April: BGEN Paz, J2, Philippine Air Force.
- 23 April: A Congressional delegation headed by Congressman Melvin Price (D.-IL).
- 23-24 April: Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz, Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs.
 - 28 April: U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand Armistead I. Selden, Jr.
- 29 April: Mrs. Alan M. Schanel, National President of the American Legion Ladies Auxiliary.
 - 29 April: General Louis Wilson, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.
- 29 April: A visiting delegation of members of the New Zealand Parliament.
 - 29 April: Governor of Hawaii, George R. Ariyoshi.
- 30 April: Ambassador Thomas S. Gates, Chief, U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, People's Republic of China.
- 10 May: LT GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army.
 - 10 May: Tongan Crown Prince Tupouto'a.

- 12 May: VADM Hoshinn and VADM Fukuchi, Japanese Imperial Navy (Ret.).
- 20 May: Mr. Charles T. Cross, Consul General, Hong Kong.
- 28 May: Elliott L. Richardson, U.S. Secretary of Commerce.
- 29 May: General Paul K. Carlton, Commander, Military Airlift Command.
- 1 June: Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D.-HI).

- 1 June: LT GEN Devol Brett, Chief, U.S. Element CENTO.
- 2 June: RADM Julian Lake, Commander, Naval Electronic Warfare Systems Command.
 - 2 June: Mr. Richard Peters, Inspector General, Department of State.
- 3 June: RADM Donald Shelton, USN, DOD Representative to U.S.-Philippine base negotiations.
 - 4 June: MAJ GEN Slade Nash, departing Chief MAAG, Republic of China.
- 8 June: COL Winston Choo, Director, General Staff, Singapore Armed Forces.
- 8 June: COL Patrick Sim, Director, Command and Staff College, Singapore.
- 8 June: Dr. Anthony Cardinale, Director of Overseas Dependent Education, and Dr. Edward Killin, Director, DOD Dependent Schools, Pacific Region.
- 9 June: Mr. Donald Brotzman, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
- 21 June: LT GEN W.W. Marshall, USAF, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Readiness Command.
 - 22 June: Mr. John McLeay, Minister of Construction, Australia.
 - 24 June: Mr. Robert Flanegin, incoming Charge D'Affaires, Fiji.
- 24 June: Mr. Benjamin A. Fleck, State Department Deputy Country Director, Philippines.

- 13 July: Sir Thomas Skinner, President, New Zealand Federation of Labor.
 - 15 July: Professor Harry Rowan, Stanford School of Business.
- 15 July: Mr. Forster, Assistant Deputy Director for East Asia. U.S. Information Agency.
 - 27 July: Richard Sneider, U.S. Ambassador to Korea.
 - 13 August: Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D.-HI).
 - 20 August: General Omar Bradley, General of the Army.
- 27-30 August: Mr. William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense.
- 29 September: Mr. William McMenamin, Deputy Chief, International Press Service.
- 5 October: Admiral Hiroichi Samejima, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency.
- 3 December: Philippine General Romeo C. Espino, Co-chairman, Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board.
- 21 December: Mrs. Norma Brown, President of the American Legion Ladies Auxiliary.

Press Conferences and Media Representative Visitors

- (U) The following list reflects press conferences and visits by media representatives to Admirals Gayler and Weisner during 1976.
- 26 January: Mr. Rowland Evans, syndicated columnist for the Washington Post.
- 10 March: Mr. Phil Gialanella, Publisher; and Mr. John Simonds, Managing Editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin.
 - 13 March: Mr. Robert Miller, United Press International.

- 18 March: Admiral Gayler held a press conference at his Camp Smith Headquarters to discuss current events in the Pacific with representatives of the local media.
- 26 April: Admiral Gayler was interviewed by SSG Norman J. Oliver, CINCPAC J003-742 Media Supervisor, on behalf of the <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u>; the article was published on 18 May.
- 11 May: Admiral Gayler was interviewed by Mr. Robert Miller, United Press International.
 - 14 May: Mrs. Dorothy Moses, New Zealand free-lance writer.
 - 18 June: The editors of the Reader's Digest.
- 19 June: Television interview with Mr. Kim of the Korean Broadcasting System.
 - 22 June: Ms. Karen Ahn, KITV Television, Honolulu.
 - 23 June: Mr. John Given, Honolulu Advertiser.
 - 24 June: Mr. Pete Pepper, KHON Television, Honolulu.
 - 28 June: Mr. Bud Smyser and Mr. Lyle Nelson, Honolulu Star-Bulletin.
- l July: Admiral Gayler went to the studios of KGMB-TV in Honolulu where he was interviewed by Bob Sevey and Bob Jones on the public affairs program Camera Nine. The program was aired over that station on 4 July.
 - 14 July: Mr. Bob Barr, Associated Press.

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SECTION II--LEGAL ACTIVITIES

Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica

On 10 September 1976 the Commander U.S. Naval Support Force, Antarctica (COMNAVSUPPFOR Antarctica) sent a letter to CINCPAC requesting assistance in efforts to gain strong DOD support for early enactment of legislation extending criminal jurisdiction over U.S. nationals in Antarctica. The letter pointed out that while the Uniform Code of Military Justice served to hold U.S. military personnel accountable for criminal conduct in Antarctica, the U.S. Supreme Court had consistently held that the Code did not apply to civilians during times of peace, even when such civilians accompanied U.S. Forces to overseas areas. Therefore, no clear basis existed for asserting legal authority over civilian participants in the U.S. Antarctic Program. No Federal statute, principle of common law, or international treaty or convention currently existed which would adequately hold U.S. civilian personnel in the Antarctic Program accountable for conduct which would otherwise be considered criminal. In recognition of this problem, an interagency effort in the late 1960's and early 1970's produced draft remedial legislation designed to amend Title 18 of the U.S. Code. The proposed legislation, initially numbered H.R. 5248, provided that U.S. nationals and certain specified foreign nationals committing a criminal act or omission would be held accountable as if they were subject to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The measure was renumbered H.R. 10548 and subsequently referred to the House Judiciary Committee on 4 November 1975. On 8 November 1976 CINCPAC endorsed the COMNAVSUPPFOR Antarctica letter to the Chairman, JCS, strongly recommending that JCS coordinate efforts with DOD and the Department of State to support early passage of H.R. 10548. The JCS responded that the legislative package had been endorsed to the Office of General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense, with a request that the JCS be given an opportunity to comment on the legislative proposal when it was next introduced. The JCS said they would work to ensure that a favorable endorsement was obtained on the new legislative package.

Publication of International Agreements with Japan

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(6) At the 8 April meeting of the Joint Committee, Japanese representatives made a formal statement expressing disapproval of the release and publication

 COMNAVSUPPFOR Antarctica ltr of 10 Sep 76 with 3 endorsements, Subj: Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica; proposed Federal legislation concerning; J73/Memo/379-76 of 4 Nov 76, Subj: Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica; proposed Federal legislation concerning; JCS/Memo of 24 Nov 76, Subj: Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica; proposed Federal legislation concerning.

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of an Air Traffic Control Agreement concluded in the Joint Committee in 1975. The agreement had been transmitted through DOD channels to the Department of State and submitted to Congress for review in compliance with the Case Act. The procedure was apparently published in the Federal Register, as is customary, and thus became public knowledge to the Japanese. In 1960 both governments agreed that all minutes and attached documents (including agreements) resulting from Joint Committee proceedings would be held confidential and not publicly released without prior mutual agreement. The Japanese feared that public knowledge of U.S. compliance with the Case Act would jeopardize their long-standing basis for refusal to submit agreements to the Diet. This knowledge could force them to release a number of sensitive understandings of a special nature which would be "politically explosive." The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo had requested guidance from the Department of State. The CINCPAC Judge Advocate also discussed the matter with the DOD General Counsel and U.S. Forces Japan Staff Judge Advocate to explore possible solutions.

Executive Order Concerning Treaties

(U) During 1976 the Secretary of State proposed that the President sign an Executive Order pertaining to "Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States," which would require State Department approval before negotiating any international agreement, including arrangements between U.S. and foreign military services. CINCPAC noted, in an August 1976 message to the JCS, that operations in PACOM would be slowed considerably if the military had to obtain approval to negotiate the many routine working arrangements between the U.S. military and foreign governments.²

Dissident and Protest Activities

(U) On 28 April 1976 Judge Samuel King of the U.S. District Court of Hawaii orally announced findings in Butler vs Paxton. The suit was brought by 10 civilians against Colonel Paxton, 15th Air Base Wing Commander, and other military personnel for preventing the plaintiffs from entering Hickam AFB in 1972 for the purpose of a protest demonstration during the arrival of President Nixon and the Prime Minister of Japan. Judge King found that since the base was opened to the public for the day, the discriminatory exclusion of the plaintiffs from the base violated their Constitutional rights. The judge found the plaintiffs were damaged in the amount of \$7,000 but did not award the damages because he found the defendants acted in good faith, with probable cause, and were thus immune. If the decision were appealed and the appellate court did not uphold the finding of immunity, the plaintiffs could still

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^{1.} J73 WEB 19-25 Apr 76.

^{2.} JCS 192146Z Aug 76, and 201548Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 262359Z Aug 76.

collect the damages in the future. The CINCPAC Judge Advocate noted that this case had implications which should be considered in similar situations in the future, such as the 1976 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting.

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI) Residual Legal Functions

(U) The Commander, USMACTHAI anticipated that there would be no military support activities in Thailand after 20 July 1976; therefore, he established a holding detachment to which personnel with pending foreign criminal jurisdiction (FCJ) actions were attached. These personnel were assigned to units outside Thailand in order to avoid the residual Military Advisory Group manpower ceiling. Court-martial jurisdiction and claims authority for the Army in Thailand was assumed by U.S. Army Japan, for the Air Force by 13th Air Force, and for the Navy by Navy Legal Service Office, Subic Bay, Philippines. Administrative support for the 15 FCJ cases remaining in May 1976 was provided by the MACTHAI residual force. In reply to a COMUSMACTHAI inquiry on funds from each Service to support FCJ activities, Department of the Army replied that no special arrangements would be made. Normal procedures as provided in AR 27-50/SECNAVINST 5820/AFR 110-12 would be followed. Navy and Air Force concurred in that position.²

Legal Opinions

Disclosure of Information Concerning Nuclear Weapons

(U) On 31 March 1976, in response to the question of CINCPAC's discussing nuclear weapons information with the Governor of Hawaii, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) advised that the Atomic Energy Act of 1957 did not establish the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons. It was very restrictive, however, on the disclosure of classified information. The Act subjected a person to a fine of up to \$2,500 for disclosure of restricted data to unauthorized personnel, and there was no authorization to disclose restricted data to the governor of a state except in emergency situations.³

International Law Concerning Visits of Warships to Foreign Ports

- (U) On 6 April 1976, in response to a Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate inquiry as to whether the Government of New Zealand could inspect
- 1. J73 WEB 3-9 May 76.

- 2. MACTHAI 210849Z May 76, 240356Z May 76, and 260940Z May 76; DA 262123Z May 76; CINCPAC 290222Z May 76.
- 3. J73/Memo/113-76 of 31 Mar 76, Subj: Disclosure of Information Concerning Nuclear Weapons.

U.S. naval vessels in New Zealand ports, the SJA replied that U.S. warships must respect New Zealand law concerning sanitation, but they were not subject to inspection. The only recourse available to New Zealand was to expel the ships from its harbors for any violations of the laws.

Memorandum of Agreement for Exchange of Intelligence Officers

(U) On 19 May 1976 the SJA concurred in a proposed memorandum of agreement for the exchange of intelligence officers with Australia and New Zealand, but pointed out that the status of forces agreements were not reciprocal. Therefore, the Australian and New Zealand officers would be subjected to Federal and state laws in the United States.²

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction (FCJ)

PACOM FCJ Confinement Statistics

(U) The following is a breakout of U.S. personnel in post-trial confinement in foreign penal institutions in the PACOM as of 29 February 1976:3

| Country | Air Force | <u>Army</u> | Navy | Total |
|--------------------|-----------|----------------|------|----------|
| Australia Japan | 18 | 1 19 | 90 | 1 127 |
| Korea | | 10 | 100 | 10 |
| Taiwan | 3 | | 3 | 6 |
| Thailand | <u>_3</u> | _3 | - | <u>6</u> |
| Total | 24 | 33 | 93 | 150 |

(U) The CINCPAC percentage of the worldwide total personnel confined as of 29 February 1976 (300) was 50 percent, no change from 31 August 1975.4

Philippines Tax Case Against Local Hire U.S. Citizens⁵

(U) In May 1973 eleven U.S. national employees of the U.S. Navy at Subic Bay were tried and found guilty of violating the Philippine National Internal Revenue Code for failure to file income tax returns for the year 1969. The

3. CINCPAC SJA Newsletter (1-76) of 19 Apr 76.

5. J731 HistSum Dec 76.

^{1.} J73/Memo/120-76 of 6 Apr 76, Subj: International Law Concerning Visits of Warships to Foreign Ports.

^{2.} J73/Memo/173-76 of 19 May 76, Subj: Memorandum of Agreement for Exchange of Intelligence Officers.

^{4.} Ibid.; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 739.

U.S. Embassy, through diplomatic channels, expressed the U.S. Government's position that under Article XII, paragraph 2, of the U.S.-Philippines Military Bases Agreement, the defendants were exempt from paying income tax on their U.S. salaries, as well as filing tax returns. This article provided that:

No national of the United States serving in or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines by reason only of such employment, or his spouse and minor children and dependent parents of either spouse, shall be liable to pay income tax in the Philippines except in respect to income derived from Philippine sources or sources other than the United States sources.

- (S) Attempts at appeal by the defendents failed, and the court decision became final in August 1976 when the Supreme Court refused to entertain a plea to file a motion for reconsideration.
- (%) After the criminal conviction, the Philippine Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed back taxes against the defendants. The defendants contested the assessment and the issue was referred to a civil tax court. The first hearing was set for 20 September 1976 in Quezon City where the defendants were represented by an attorney from the Navy Legal Service Office at Subic Bay.

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- (6) When the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered, diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue were intensified. The United States Embassy in Manila sent another note to the Philippine Foreign Office requesting consultation concerning the matter. Previous notes of 6 December 1975 and 16 September 1975 on the same subject had been unanswered. The tax case was also discussed in the Legal Affairs Committee of the Mutual Defense Board but the participants did not reach a satisfactory conclusion.
- On 25 September 1976 the State Department expressed its concern with the ramifications of both the criminal and civil cases. It was viewed that this represented a unilateral interpretation of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement by the Government of the Philippines, as well as an erosion of the general principle that one government should not tax income of another government's citizen-employees. This was particularly significant in view of the recently concluded Taxation Convention which provided in Article 20 for exemption from taxes by the Philippines of wages and salaries of U.S. citizen employees of U.S. Government agencies. Because a number of other DOD employees could be subject to similar suits, the State Department recommended serious

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consideration of a high-level diplomatic effort, such as a personal approach by the Ambassador.

On 5 October 1976 members of the Legal Affairs Committee met with the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Efren Plana, to discuss the tax case. Commissioner Plana took the position that he was bound by the Supreme Court decision in the criminal case to the effect that the defendants must pay their fine and further, that the criminal case would bind the decision of the tax court. Commissioner Plana appeared sympathetic to the problem and interested in exploring a solution. He indicated that he would discuss the matter with the Department of Foreign Affairs. At the meeting, Attorney Firmacion of the Olongapo Bureau of Internal Revenue, the instigator of the initial charges, suggested that a Presidential decree exempting the defendants would settle the entire matter. At the end of the year, however, the problem was still unsettled and the defendants were under the ominous cloud of a criminal conviction and pending civil suits.

Thailand FCJ Cases

Cases Involving Performance of Official Duty

(b) During 1976 there were four cases in Thailand involving the performance of official duty which came to the attention of the CINCPAC SJA. In an injury case involving Sergeant Michael L. Dichazi, Jr., USAF, the local Thai authorities decided not to prosecute. The case was officially closed on 4 February 1976 and Sergeant Dichazi was transferred from Thailand to preclude further involvement. In an accident case resulting in the deaths of two Thai nationals in February 1976, Specialist Five John Brehm, USA, was removed from Thailand, based on State Department instructions, in the face of possible prosecution. In an accident case resulting in the death of a Thai national in September 1975, Sergeant Paul Behrendt, USAF, was removed from Thailand on 25 March 1976, with State Department permission, in the face of impending prosecution. On 25 August 1976 Staff Sergeant William L. Turner, USA, who had been convicted on 22 May 1975 of causing death without intent for killing a Thai national, departed Thailand. Staff Sergeant Turner was originally sentenced to confinement for six years. This was reduced to four years and, on 23 August 1976, he was released from prison based on a royal pardon granted by His Majesty the King of Thailand. Since Staff Sergeant Turner's confinement was considered as not due to his own misconduct, the Secretary of the Army, in August 1976, approved a waiver of Rule 6, Table 1-3-3, paragraph 10314, DOD Pay Manual, which retroactively entitled him to all pay and allowances during his incarceration.

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^{1.} J73 HistSums Feb-Mar and Dec 76.

Residual Cases

(c) On 1 April 1976 American Embassy Bangkok proposed that the remaining FCJ cases in Thailand be handled in accordance with regular procedures with no unusual actions taken to obtain a release of the cases. The Departments of State and Defense concurred in this position. On 2 May 1976 the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force pointed out the problems that would be involved if the FCJ continued in Thailand, and noted that disposition of recent cases and discussions with personnel stationed in Thailand indicated that Thai officials were amenable to a speedy resolution of the cases. As a result of this view, CINCPACAF requested CINCPAC to seek the Embassy's concurrence to permit an early termination of the cases. CINCPAC supported the Air Force position, pointing out that the accused would be a burden on reduced U.S. military support personnel, be a possible irritant to the U.S. and Thai Governments, and pose a possibility of further involvement in international incidents. Therefore, CINCPAC requested that the Departments of State and Defense reconsider their decision to take no action for control of the FCJ cases. On 8 June 1976 Ambassador Whitehouse and Brigadier General Aderholt decided to withdraw from Thailand all military personnel pending FCJ who were not confined. Although the action was not coordinated with the Royal Thai Government (RTG), the Ambassador and COMUSMACTHAI were confident that there would not be a strong adverse RTG reaction to this move. 1

Offshore Fishing Rights

(U) On 13 April 1976 President Ford signed the bill extending American control of fishing rights from 12 to 200 miles offshore. The law was to go into effect on 1 March 1977.2

Seventh Annual South Pacific Forum

The Seventh Annual South Pacific Forum met on Nauru from 26 to 28 July 1976. The forum was composed of representatives from nine South Pacific islands to include New Zealand, Australia, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Cook Islands, Western Samoa, Tonga, and Niue. Unlike previous meetings this session produced considerable agreement and a formal declaration on law of the sea was issued. The declaration assumed that 200 mile exclusive economic zones would be established in the near future whether the LOS conference succeeded or

2. J73 WEB 12-18 Jan 76; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 760.

AMEMB Bangkok 7994/010410Z Apr 76; SECSTATE 081254/1/040156Z Apr 76; CSAF 211945Z May 76; CINCPACAF 221925Z May 76; CINCPAC 290101Z May 76; USMACTHAI 081045Z Jun 76.

failed. The representatives pledged to avoid decisions which could benefit one or more members only, at the expense of the others and of the region as a whole.

1. J73 WEB 2-8 Aug 76.

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SECTION III -- MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

Plans for Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC), Hawaii

- (U) Tripler Army Medical Center was an installation under the U.S. Army Health Services Command (HSC), Fort Sam Houston, TX. In December 1975, in conjunction with Program Budget Decision (PBD) 253, HSC was tasked by the Army Surgeon General to provide a time-phased transfer plan of TAMC to the U.S. Navy by January 1976. CINCPAC expressed concern regarding the failure to solicit his views on the transfer, and the JCS remarked that that portion of the PBD concerning TAMC was not staffed through them either. On 26 January 1976 the JCS further advised that, after careful reassessment, the Secretary of the Army concluded that it would be inappropriate to transfer TAMC to the Navy and the subject was dropped. Important considerations affecting the reassessment centered on the TAMC paramount mission to support WESTPAC contingencies, which included a medical teaching program and medical service sponsorship to the 25th Infantry Division. 1
- (U) On 10 February 1976 the Secretary of Defense tasked the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan within 90 days for an Army-operated tri-Service staffed TAMC. CINCPAC was among those with which the plan was to be coordinated prior to being presented to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment) for evaluation. The plan developed provided:²
 - No change in patient care.
 - Tri-Service staffing of professional medical and graduate medical education spaces only.
 - Retention as Army spaces all command and control elements, administrative and logistical functions, veterinary, health and environment activities, and all civilian spaces.
- (U) The Air Force indicated basic agreement with the Army concept, but the Navy wanted rotation of command and control authority among the Services. CINCPAC voiced reservations regarding any disruptive reorganization. He noted the outstanding patient care currently provided by Tripler and considered that
- 1. JCS 5876/122119Z Jan 76 and 8173/261356Z Jan 76; CDRUSACSG 030252Z Jan 76.
- SECDEF/Memo of 10 Feb 76, Subj: Staffing of Tripler Army Medical Center with Army, Navy, and Air Force Personnel; J76/Memo/97-76 of 27 May 76, Subj: Tri-Service Staffing of Tripler Army Medical Center.

the Army-developed plan appeared to minimize the possibility of disruptive turbulence. He agreed with the plan in general and, more specifically, he supported Army retention of key command and control billets. CINCPAC further recommended that the plan be implemented on a trial basis only, with provision for periodic evaluation.

PACOM C-9 Aeromedical Airlift

(U) On 6 March 1976 CINCPAC expressed his concern to the JCS over a new MAC aeromedical evacuation schedule effective in PACOM 1 March 1976, about which he had not received adequate prior notice. The new schedule, which was viewed as degrading PACOM medical service for military personnel and dependents, was the direct result of withdrawal to CONUS of one C-9A aeromedical evacuation aircraft from the PACOM fleet of four. CINCPAC requested delay in withdrawal of the one C-9A, while the CINCPAC Surgeon reviewed the new schedule for adequacy. The Surgeon's review ultimately resulted in a completely revised definite schedule for PACOM-wide aeromedical evacuation, including the PLP 551 Travis-Clark mission segment effective 6 October 1976, thus relieving the deficiencies caused by the MAC change.²

^{1.} J76/Memo/97-76 of 27 May 76, Subj: Tri-Service Staffing of Tripler Army Medical Center; CINCPAC 020354Z Jun 76.

CINCPAC 280207Z Feb 76, 060325Z Mar 76, 120059Z Mar 76, and 250105Z Jun 76; CINCPACAF 130040Z Feb 76, 270200Z Feb 76, 030102Z Mar 76, 301916Z Mar 76, and 120210Z Jun 76; MAC 281755Z Feb 76 and 221630Z Sep 76.

SECTION IV--RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OFFICE ACTIVITIES

Operations Research/Systems Analysis in the PACOM

- (U) In October 1976 the Systems Analysis Society of the Republic of China and Tamkang College hosted an Asian conference dealing with Operations Research/Systems Analysis (OR/SA) topics. Over 100 specialists in this field from Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States attended. This was the first time that OR/SA people from industrial and defense establishments in the Pacific all came together to discuss OR/SA methodology as applied to their common problems. Mr. Roy F. Linsenmeyer, the Chief of CINCPAC's Research and Analysis Office, was a keynote speaker. In anticipation of that event a memorandum to Admiral Weisner outlined the development of the OR/SA programs throughout the PACOM. A summary follows. 1
- (U) The Pacific Conference on Decision Analysis was a major milestone in a long and continuing program, supported by the Research and Analysis Office, for Asian allies to become self-sufficient and self-confident in analytical skills and capabilities that were applicable to defense planning and procurement problems. When Mr. Linsenmeyer joined the CINCPAC staff (on 31 October 1960, the first civilian employed by PACOM headquarters), he had already been working in this field as a member of CINCPACFLT's staff in coordination with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force. Development of an OR/SA capability was subsequently expanded to include the Ground and Maritime Self-Defense Forces. In 1966 he gave a series of lectures in the Joint Staff Office on the subject of military OR that resulted in establishment of a joint service analysis group. A Japanese Operations Research Society, bringing together defense and industrially oriented specialists, was established in the late 1960's. PACOM headquarters had continued to work with the Japanese OR/SA community, most recently in the KEEN STANDARDS and KEEN WAVE studies.
- (U) Until 1969 Korea had no organized OR/SA program in their services or joint staff. They had a scattered cadre of people trained in OR/SA who began to promote the use of analytical methods in defense planning. With extensive support from CINCPAC and COMUS Korea, the Koreans had come to have OR/SA groups in their Service headquarters, on the joint staff, and in the Ministry of National Defense. In 1974 they established the Korean Military Operations Research Society.

J021/Memo/239-76, 15 Sep 76, Subj: The Pacific Conference on Decision Analysis.

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- (U) Mr. Linsenmeyer had been invited to the Republic of China in 1970 to conduct a seminar on military OR for the Ministry of National Defense. Subsequently, an OR/SA adviser was attached to the MAAG staff and an analysis group was formed in the Plans section of the Ministry. This was followed by OR/SA teams in Service headquarters and the Combined Service Force. Tamkang College established a graduate program in OR/SA for military and civilians, using, in part, faculty members from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (at Monterey, CA) on leave of absence or sabbatical to enlarge the instructor staff in a program arranged by CINCPAC's Research and Analysis Office. In 1974 the Chinese had established the Systems Analysis Society of the Republic of China with headquarters at Tamkang.
- (U) The Indonesians had observed the growth of OR/SA in China and in 1973 decided that they too would like to develop an analysis capability. With PACOM headquarters assistance an OR/SA adviser was attached to the staff of the U.S. Defense Liaison Group. The Indonesians had been slower to develop than the other countries, but small groups in the Indonesian Navy and Department of Defense and Security had been started.
- (U) Thailand had a modest OR/SA program in 1975 when the OR/SA advisory billet was eliminated with other force reductions. Considerable training effort had been expended in preceding years; it was not known how well the program was faring.
- (U) While there had been strong U.S./CINCPAC bond and involvement with those country groups, there had been little cross-talk among the Asian analysts and countries involved. The October conference was significant because it opened that dialogue.
- (U) The basis for a continuing exchange of ideas was established, with Korea expressing an interest in hosting a similar conference in 1977. The Operations Research Society of Thailand and the Asia Institute of Technology had scheduled a Pacific regional meeting in May 1978.

Indian Ocean Undersea Surveillance Study

(S) With the expansion of the PACOM effective 1 May 1976 to 17°E from 62°E, CINCPAC requested that his Review and Analysis Office (subsequently retitled the Research and Analysis Office) investigate the existing PACOM capabilities to provide undersea surveillance in the Indian Ocean.

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^{1.} Memorandum Trip Report, Taiwan and Korea, Director, Research and Analysis Office, 26 Oct 76.

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- The performance of such systems in existence or that were coming into the inventory was projected into the physical and acoustical environment of the Indian Ocean. These systems were the Sound Surveillance Underwater System (SOSUS), the Towed Array Sensor System (TASS), and a system called Surveillance TASS (SURTASS), plus a Moored Surveillance System (MSS). New systems, SPRAY and IOTA, were also examined regarding their estimated and projected acoustic and operational performance. All systems were compared. A TASSRAP computer output of Fleet Numerical Weather Central in Monterey, CA, which predicted the detection performance for the TASS throughout the Indian Ocean, was used as a baseline. Other outputs were compared and plotted to determine the coverage by various surveillance systems against submarine targets.
- The study findings indicated that programmed systems fell extremely short of a reasonable capability to provide adequate coverage in the area. Supplementary systems, specifically two forms of air-deployable acoustic arrays, were found to be effective in filling the deficiency if they were developed and introduced.
- Although the study had not been completed and released by the end of 1976 it was believed that in effect it had already served its purpose. The main thrust of the document had been to encourage the development and deployment of an air-droppable array capability to reduce the undersea surveillance deficiency, particularly in the Indian Ocean. A funded Air Deployable Array System development program had been established at the Naval Air Development Center under the sponsorship of the Naval Air Systems Command. 1

Control of Lava Flow

(U) As explained in the 1975 CINCPAC Command History, military assistance might be sought to disrupt lava flow on the Island of Hawaii in the event a volcano eruption should threaten the city of Hilo. A report on activities in that regard for 1976 follows, summarizing the findings of a November technical conference. CINCPAC's Research and Analysis Office had provided primary technical coordination and CINCPAC's Special Operations Division in the Operations Directorate was action office where the use of PACOM resources might be required. The office worked closely with the State of Hawaii Director of Civil Defense; PACAF; the Army Corps of Engineers, Pacific Division; and the Volcano Observatory of the U.S. Geological Survey.

^{1.} J775 HistSum Dec 76; the Study, dated 30 Sep 76, was published as Research and Analysis Office Working Paper No. 4-76, Subj: CINCPAC Indian Ocean Undersea Surveillance Study (U), distributed 13 Jun 77.

- (U) Bombing tests had been reasonably successful except for certain targets that contained harder, more dense, lava and resulted in impact pre-detonation of delayed action bombs. The Army had found that hand-emplaced XM-180 explosive cratering devices might be modified for use on certain targets, provided that personnel and explosives could be used in the "rough terrain, high temperature environment."
- (U) The diversion techniques under consideration were believed to be a combination of disruption of lava supply channels, spatter cones, and lava tubes using bombs and military explosives; diversion of lava by construction barriers; and diversion and cooling of molten lava by using large amounts of water from the ocean or from nearby streams. The principal focus remained on the first two methods.
- (U) In a series of three tests, PACAF had expended 22 MK82 (500-pound) and 14 MK84 (2,000-pound) bombs. They advised of the effects on spatter cones and lava tubes and channels, but noted that the properties of fresh hot lava were unknown and needed. They recommended further testing and the contingency storage of bombs on Oahu for lava control.
- (U) The 25th Infantry Division concluded from their testing that, because of "optimizing of explosive effects and pin-point delivery accuracy, hand placement of explosives is considered a viable method for attempts at the control of laval flow." They acknowledged that rough terrain and high altitude might hamper hand-emplacement of explosives. In addition to technical recommendations regarding the design of the XM-180 explosive cratering device, they noted the need to "determine the ambient conditions surrounding hot lava." They believed it was necessary to determine the quality of heat insulation if needed for explosives or personnel; the physical properties and chemical composition of hot lava flows should be investigated, and, if it was possible, tests of explosive lava disruption methods under actual hot lava flow conditions would benefit the overall readiness of Army units.
 - (U) The Corps of Engineers outlined their barrier concepts as follows: 1
 - A hasty 2-3 mile ditch-mound about 10 feet high initially, and increased to 20 feet when possible, providing a barrier diverting lava flow to a cleared flow path south and east of Hilo to the sea.

^{1. &}lt;u>CINCPAC Command History 1975</u>, Vol. I, pp. 299-300; J774 HistSum Jan 77, which enclosed MFR of 10 Nov 76, Subj: Summary Report - Technical Conference on Control of Lava Flow.

SEGRET

- Located far enough away from eruption zone to allow maximum time for flow evaluation, decision, mobilization, and construction.
 - Located away from urban area.
- Located above high rainfall belt, if possible, to facilitate rapid construction.
 - Located where vehicle access is possible.
- Use historical flow data (velocity, depth, viscosity).
- Use heavy material for construction (local soil and heavy rock).
- Flow path located in undeveloped area along path of least resistance.

Further planning continued.

Redeployment Strategy Findings

(S) CINCPAC had long been on record questioning existing national level plans to redeploy certain PACOM forces to Europe in support of NATO under certain circumstances. (See discussions of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.) In November 1975 the Chief of Staff directed a study to assess the military implications of out-of-theater redeployment of selected PACOM forces to NATO in a worldwide conventional conflict with the USSR.

(S) The significant findings of the study, conducted by representatives of the Research and Analysis Office, the Plans Directorate, and the Stanford Research Institute, were as follows: 1

The redeployment strategy:

• Imposed significant loss in total worldwide U.S. combat capability (in terms of CV/major surface combatant/division days-in-theater) because of lengthy in-transit times required to redeploy forces to Europe.

^{1.} J773 HistSum Jan 77; CINCPAC Ltr Ser T12, 26 Jan 77.

SECRET

- Degrades force ratios in the PACOM to a level which jeopardizes the survival of remaining U.S. Forces; improves force ratios in Europe only marginally and at a point which is too late to be decisive.
- Reduces forces in the PACOM to a level which provides no alternative other than U.S. accommodation to any strategy chosen by the USSR in the Pacific; increases USSR options for redeploying Soviet forces to Indian Ocean or Europe.

The study was forwarded to the JCS early in 1977.

Extension of Satellite Detection System to Hawaii

(U) The Navy/Air Force Satellite Detection System, Weapon System 434, was being upgraded and extended westward by adding a site on the Island of Maui in the State of Hawaii. The existing satellite fence consisted of a line of transmitter and receiver stations across the southern United States from Georgia to California. Representatives of the Naval Research Laboratory and the Army Engineers chose the Maui site, with the NRL leader subsequently briefing CINCPAC and component command staffs on site selection factors and improved capabilities of System 434 when the Maui station was completed.

BALFRAM Seminar in Korea

(U) In August 1976 COMUS Korea had requested assistance in conducting a two-week seminar on the Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Method (BALFRAM) in support of military planning. The seminar was conducted from 1 to 24 November in Seoul by the Stanford Research Institute representative to CINCPAC under the sponsorship of the U.S.-Republic of Korea Operational Planning Staff of the United Nations Command-U.S. Forces Korea-Eighth U.S. Army. The seminar was divided into two classes, each of one-week duration, for the 15 U.S. and 23 ROK military and civilians who attended. A third week was spent in professional discussions on the use and application of BALFRAM with representatives of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services. COMUS Korea expressed his appreciation for the seminar. 2

Service R&D Representatives to CINCPAC Staff

- (U) In 1973 CINCPAC had first proposed that the PACOM (and Service components) play a larger role than before in "bridging the gap between
- 1. J774 HistSum Jan 77.
- 2. J77 (SRI Rep) HistSum Jan 77; COMUS Korea 070809Z Dec 76.

SECRET

real-world operational environment and the laboratories and development agencies." He had proposed that all Services send representation, but at that time only the Center for Naval Analyses had done so.

- (U) By mid-1975 that agency was no longer represented, but in August of that year a liaison representative of the U.S. Army's Systems Analysis Activity/Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (AMSAA-JTCG/ME) began a one year tour, after which he was replaced by another representative of that agency. That representative was particularly interested in the lava control feasibility testing, described above, and certain other projects. Close Air Support aircraft for the Republic of Korea was one of these projects, and is discussed in the Security Assistance chapter of this history.
- (U) One other program was the potential improvement of the U.S. combat helmet. The lightweight helmet developed by the Republic of Korea was studied and 50 helmets procured for study by U.S. agencies.²
- (U) From 9 to 24 September members of the JTCG staff visited Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Hawaii to review systems analysis activities and capabilities.³

^{1.} CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 38-39.

^{2.} J77 HistSum Dec 76.

^{3.} Ibid.

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GLOSSARY

A

| AAFES | Army and Air Force Exchange Service |
|-------------|---|
| AAFMPS | Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service |
| ABNCP | Airborne Command Post |
| ACFK | Alternate Command Facility, Kunia |
| ADC | Air Defense Center; Aerospace Defense Command |
| ADD | Agency for Defense Development |
| ADP | Automatic Data Processing |
| ADS | Automated Data Systems |
| AEW | Airborne Early Warning |
| AFEM | Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal |
| AFIS | Air Force Intelligence Service |
| AFIT | Air Force Institute of Technology |
| AFLC | Air Force Logistics Command |
| AFP | Armed Forces of the Philippines |
| AIF | Automated Installation Intelligence File |
| AIT / | Ammunition in Thailand |
| ALCOP | Alternate Command Post |
| ALFA | Advanced Liaison Forward Area |
| AMPS | Automatic Mission Planning |
| ANZUS | Australia, New Zealand, United States |
| AOB | Air Order of Battle |
| APPS | Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System |
| ASD(I&L) | Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| ASIF | Airlift Service Industrial Fund |
| ASROC | Antisubmarine Rocket |
| ASSOTW | Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World |
| W SA | Antisubmarine Warfare |
| ASWEX | ASW Exercise |
| AUTODIN | Automatic Digital Network |
| AUTOVON | Automatic Voice Network |
| | |

. <u>B</u>

BALFRAM Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Method
BLA Base Labor Agreement

<u>C</u>

| С | Confidential |
|------------------|--|
| C3 | Command, Control, and Communications |
| CAT | Civil Action Team; Crisis Action Team |
| CBU | Cluster Bomb Unit |
| CCK | Ching Chuan Kang (Air Base, Taiwan) |
| CCTL | CINCPAC Consolidated Target List |
| CCWT | Command Center Watch Team |
| CDRUSACSG | Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CIL | Central Identification Laboratory |
| CINC | Commander in Chief |
| CINCEUR | Commander in Chief Europe |
| CINCLANT | Commander in Chief Atlantic |
| CINCPAC | Commander in Chief Pacific |
| CINCPACAF | Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces |
| CINCPACFLT | Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet |
| CINCPACINST | Commander in Chief Pacific Instruction |
| CINCPACREP | Commander in Chief Pacific Representative |
| CINCPACREPPHIL | Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines |
| CINCSAC | Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command |
| CINCUNC | Commander in Chief, United Nations Command |
| CJTF | Commander Joint Task Force |
| CNO | Chief of Naval Operations |
| CNTL | Command Nuclear Target List |
| COINS | Community On-line Intelligence Network System |
| COMAAC | Commander, Alaskan Air Command |
| COMIDEASTFOR | Commander, Middle East Force |
| COMMARCORBASEPAC | Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific |
| COMNAVSUPPFOR | Commander U.S. Naval Support Force |
| COMSEC | Communications Security |
| COMTHIRDFLT | Commander Third Fleet |
| COMUS | Commander, United States Forces |
| COMUS Japan | Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan |
| COMUS Korea | Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea |
| COMUSMACTHAI | Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand |
| COMUSNAVPHIL | Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines |
| COMUSSAG | Commander U.S. Support Activity Group |
| COMUSTDC | Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command |
| CONAD | Continental Air Defense Command |
| CONPLAN | Concept Plan |
| CPD | Congressional Presentation Document (Foreign Aid) |
| CPLRI | Catalog of PACOM Logistics Rationalization Objectives |
| | |

UNCLASSIFIED

| CP0 | Civilian Personnel Office |
|------|---|
| CPX | Command Post Exercise |
| CROF | Consolidation and Reduction of Okinawa Facilities |
| CRT | Cathode-ray Tube |
| CS | Combat Support |
| CSG | CINCPAC Support Group; Combat Support Group |
| CSS | Combat Service Support |
| CT | Country Team; Communist Terrorist |
| CVAN | CINCPAC Voice Alert Network |
| CVO | Communications Validating Office |
| | |

D

| DA | Department of the Army |
|---------|--|
| DAO | Defense Attaché Office |
| DAST | Disaster Area Şurvey Team |
| DATT | Defense Attache |
| DDI | Duty Director of Intelligence; Decisions and Design Incorporated |
| DEFCON | Defense Readiness Condition |
| DFAA | Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Japan) |
| DFR-PAC | Defense Fuel Region, Pacific |
| DFSC | Defense Fuel Supply Center |
| DIA | Defense Intelligence Agency |
| DIAOLS | Defense Intelligence Agency On-Line System |
| DLSC | Defense Logistics Services Center |
| DMA | Defense Mapping Agency |
| DMZ | Demilitarized Zone |
| DNA | Defense Nuclear Agency |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DPS | Delegated Production System; Dynamic Planning System |
| DRCC | Disaster Relief Coordinating Center |
| DRIS | Defense Retail Interservice Support |
| DSA | Defense Supply Agency |
| DSAA | Defense Security Assistance Agency |
| DSCS | Defense Satellite Communications System |
| DYCIS | Dynamic Command Information System |

E .

| E&ML | Environmental and Morale Leave |
|------|--------------------------------|
| EALG | East Asia Liaison Group |
| EAP | Emergency Action Procedures |
| ECA | Executive Coordinating Agency |

Electronic Countermeasures **ECM** EDA Excess Defense Articles (MAP) **ELINT** Electronic Intelligence

Emergency Relocation Site ERS

F

FAA Federal Aviation Agency; Foreign Assistance Appropriations;

Foreign Assistance Act

FAISC Fleet Auxiliary Intelligence Service Center

FBM Fleet Ballistic Missile FCC Fleet Command Center

FCJ Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

Federal Disaster Assistance Administration FDAA

FDC Forward Defense Concept Freedom of Information Act FIA

FICPAC Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific

FIP Force Improvement Plan Flexible Reporting System FLEXRP Forward Looking Infrared Radar FLIR

FLSA -Fair Labor Standards Act

FLTSATCOM Fleet Satellite Communications **FMFPAC** Fleet Marine Force Pacific

FMS Foreign Military Sales; Field Maintenance Squadron

FOCCPAC Fleet Operations Control Center, Pacific

FORSTAT Force Status and Identity (Report)

FOSCI -Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center

FRD Formerly Restricted Data

FRESH Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii FRETILIN National Front for the Liberation of East Timor

FTX Field Training Exercise

FΧ Future Fighter FY Fiscal Year

General Accounting Office GA0 GAPFILLER Satellite GAPSAT Ground Control Approach GCA

General Service (Electrical Transmission) GENSER

Gross Feasibility Estimator GFE Government of Australia GOA. GOB Ground Order of Battle

GOJ Government of Japan

| GOP | Government of the Philippines |
|-----------------|--|
| GOS | Government of Singapore |
| GSA | General Services Administration |
| | |
| | <u>Н</u> |
| HAC | Hughes Aircraft Corporation |
| HF | High Frequency |
| HLH | Heavy Lift Helicopter |
| HRR | High Resolution Radar |
| HSC | Health Services Command |
| HSM | Hard Structure Munitions |
| HUMINT | Human Resources Intelligence |
| HULTEL | Hull-to-emitter Correlation |
| | <u>I</u> |
| 7.01.1 | Indications and Warning |
| I&W ICBM | Intercontinental Ballistic Missile |
| ICS | Integrated Communications System |
| IDHS | Intelligence Data Handling System |
| | Intelligence Data Handling System Communications Network |
| IDHSC IEMATS | Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System |
| IFP | International Fellows Program |
| IHA | Indirect-hire Agreement |
| IJCS | Integrated Joint Communications System |
| IMETP | International Military Education & Training Program |
| IMM | Integrated Materiel Management |
| INDOCOM | Indonesia Communications Project |
| IOCTL | Indian Ocean Conventional Target List |
| IPAC | Intelligence Center Pacific |
| ISA | Interservice Support Agreement |
| ISS | Intelligence Support System; Interservice Support |
| | $oldsymbol{\bar{u}}$ |
| JASDF | Japan Air Self-Defense Force |
| JCRC | Joint Casualty Resolution Center |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| JDA | Japan Defense Agency |
| JD0 | Joint Duty Officer |
| JFAP | Japan Facilities Adjustment Program |
| JFY | Japan Fiscal Year |
| JISB | Joint Interservice Support Board |
| - | |

| JLAC | Joint Labor Affairs Committee |
|------------|--|
| JLPC | Joint Labor Policy Committee (PACOM) |
| JMP | Joint Manpower Program |
| JMSDF | Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force |
| JOPS | Joint Operation Planning System |
| JP0 | Joint Petroleum Office |
| JSA | Joint Security Area |
| JSCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan |
| JSDF | Japan Self-Defense Force |
| JSOP | Joint Strategic Objectives Plan |
| JTC | Joint Targeting Committee |
| JTD | Joint Table of Distribution |
| JTF | Joint Task Force |
| JUSMAG | Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group |
| JUSMAGTHAI | Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand |
| | |

<u>K</u>

| KATUSA | Korean Augmentation to United States Army |
|--------|--|
| KCDF | Korean Correlation and Sensor Direction Facility |
| KFCP | Kanagawa Facilities Consolidation Program |
| KMR | Kapalama Military Reservation; Kwajalein Missile Range |
| KPA . | Korean People's Army |
| KPCP | Kanto Plains Consolidation Plan |
| KSC | Korean Service Corps |
| KTMI | Korea Tacoma Marine Industries |

L

| LAADS | Low Altitude Aircraft Detection System |
|---------|---|
| LAMPS | Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System |
| LANTCOM | Atlantic Command |
| LASS | Lockheed Air Service, Singapore |
| LGB | Laser Guided Bomb |
| LN | Local National; Liaison |
| LNO | Limited Nuclear Option; Liaison Officer |
| LOA | Letter of Offer/Acceptance |
| LOC | Line(s) of Communication |
| LRC | Logistics Readiness Center |
| LRMP | Long-Range Maritime Patrol |

M

| MAC | Military Airlift Command; Military Armistice Commission |
|------------|---|
| MAP | Military Assistance Program |
| MAPEX | MAP Excess Program |
| MARISAT | Maritime Satellite |
| MBA | Military Bases Agreement |
| MC | Marine Corps; Munitions Control |
| MCAS | Marine Corps Air Station |
| MCI | Military Customs Inspector |
| MDB | Mutual Defense Board |
| MDT | Mutual Defense Treaty |
| MEECN | Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network |
| MIA | Missing in Action |
| MIDEASTFOR | Middle East Force |
| MILAD | Military Advisor |
| MILADREP | Military Advisor's Representative |
| MILPRO-HI | Military Real Property Requirements-Hawaii |
| MIMEX | Major Item Excess Program |
| MIP | Material Improvement Program (Project); Management |
| | Improvement Plan |
| MME | Military Message Experiment |
| MOB | Missile Order of Battle |
| MOD | Ministry of Defense; Modernization |
| MOP | Message Output Processor |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MOVRP | Movement Reports |
| MPC | Mobile Processing Center; Military Payment Certificate |
| MPO | Military Planning Office |
| MSAP | Military Security Assistance Projections |
| MSC | Military Sealift Command |
| MSS | Moored Surveillance System |
| MTAT | Management Training Assistance Team |
| MTT | Mobile Training Team |
| | |

N

| NAMRU | Naval Medical Research Unit |
|----------------|---|
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NAVCAMSEASTPAC | Naval Communication Area Master Station Eastern Pacific |
| NAVCOMMSTA | Naval Communication Station |
| NCA | National Command Authority |
| NCPAC | National Security Agency/Central Security Service Pacific |
| NEA | Northeast Asia |

NEMVAC Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation

NIS National Intelligence Survey; Naval Investigative Service

NKTTL North Korean Tactical Target List

NOB Naval Order of Battle

NOFORN Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

NPW Nuclear-powered Warship
NRL Naval Research Laboratory

NWSS Navy WWMCCS Software Standardized

0

O&M Operations and Maintenance

O&MN Operations and Maintenance Navy

OASD(ISA) Office Assistant Secretary of Defense (International

Security Affairs)

OBCP Okinawa Base Consolidation Plan

ODRI Office of the Defense Representative India
OODE Office of Overseas Dependent Education

OPCOM Operational Command
OPCON Operational Control

OPDS Okinawa Petroleum Distribution System

OPLAN Operation Plan Final Edition

OPPA Operation Plan Package Appraisal
OPR Outstanding Performance Rating

OPREP Operational Report

OPSCOMM Operations Communications

OPSEC Operations Security

OR/SA Operations Research/Systems Analysis

OSI Offshore Islands; Office of Special Investigations

OSIS Ocean Surveillance Intelligence System

OSL Overseas Limited Appointments
OSPJ Offshore Procurement-Japan
OSS Ocean Surface Surveillance

Р

P&A Price and Availability
PACAF Pacific Air Forces
PACFLT U.S. Pacific Fleet

PACOM Pacific Command

PAF Philippine Air Force; Pakistan Air Force
PAL Permissive Action Link: Pancel Airlist.

Permissive Action Link; Parcel Airlift; Price and

Availability List

| PAMIS | PSYOP Automated Management Information System |
|--------|--|
| PARPRO | Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program |
| PASOLS | Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar |
| PATMRG | PACOM Target Materials Review Group |
| PBD | Program Budget Decision |
| PC | Philippine Constabulary |
| PCH&T | Packing, Crating, Handling, and Transportation |
| PCS | Permanent Change of Station; Postal Courier Service |
| PDM | Program Decision Memorandum; Programmed Depot Maintenance |
| PDSC | PACOM Data Systems Center |
| PEB | Pre-Engineered Buildings |
| PEG | Performance Evaluation Group |
| PGM | Precision Guided Missiles |
| PIROP | PACOM Imagery Reconnaissance Objectives Program |
| PNG | Papua New Guinea |
| POL | Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants |
| POM | Program Objectives Memorandum (MAP); Preparation for Overseas Movement (Units) |
| POV | Privately Owned Vehicle |
| POW | Prisoner of War |
| PPDB | Point Positioning Data Base |
| PPGM | Planning Programming and Guidance Memorandum |
| PRC | People's Republic of China |
| PSMM | Patrol Ship Multi-Mission |
| PSYOP | Phychological Operations |
| PWG | Permanent Working Group |
| PWRMS | Prepositioned War Reserve Material Stocks |
| PWRS | Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks |
| | $\Phi_{ij} = \Phi_{ij} = \Phi$ |

<u>R</u>

| R&D | Research and Development |
|------|---|
| RAAF | Royal Australian Air Force |
| RADC | Rome Air Development Center |
| RCA | Riot Control Agent |
| RECA | Residual Capabilities Assessment |
| RIF | Reduction in Force |
| RNO | Regional Nuclear Options |
| ROC | Republic of China (Taiwan); Required Operational Capability |
| ROE | Rules of Engagement |
| ROK | Republic of Korea |
| ROKA | Republic of Korea Army |
| RP | Republic of the Philippines; Release Point; Restoration |
| | Priority |

RS Relocatable Structures

RSAF Republic of Singapore Air Force

RTARE Royal Thai Armed Forces

RTG Royal Thai Government; Reconnaissance Technical Group

RWR Radar Warning Receivers

<u>S</u>

Secret Secret

SAC Security Assistance
SAC Strategic Air Command

SACEUR Supreme Allied Command Europe
SAFASIA Security Assistance Force Asia
SAG Systems Architectural Group

SAR Search and Rescue

SCC Security Consultative Committee (Japan); Space

Computational Center

SCM Security Consultative Meeting (Korea)

SDP Sub-network Development Plan
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organize

SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SE/SI System Engineering/System Integration

SHF Super High Frequency
SI Special Intelligence
SIGINT Signal Intelligence

SIOP Single Integrated Operation Plan

SI/SAO Special Intelligence/Special Activities Office

SITREP Situation Report
SJA Staff Judge Advocate

SKCATL South Korean Conventional Air Target List

SLAR Side Looking Airborne Radar
SLOC Sea Line of Communication
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement

SOSUS Sound Surveillance Underwater System

SRV Socialist Republic of Vietnam
SSA Security Support Arrangement
SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSO Special Security Office

ST Short Tons

SURTASS Surveillance TASS
SW Special Weapons
SZG Sub-Zone Group

<u>T</u>

| TACAMO | Nickname for Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting | |
|----------|---|--|
| TACAN | Tactical Air Navigation | |
| TAD | Temporary Additional Duty | |
| TAF | Tactical Air Forces | |
| TAG | Target Action Group | |
| TAMC | Tripler Army Medical Center | |
| TDC | Taiwan Defense Command | |
| TDCATL | Taiwan Defense Conventional Air Target List | |
| TASS | Tactical Air Support Squadron; Towed Array Sensor System | |
| TDY | Temporary Duty | |
| TEREC | Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance | |
| TFE | Transportation Feasibility Estimator | |
| TFW | Tactical Fighter Wing | |
| TI/TTM | Target Intelligence/Tactical Target Material | |
| TLRG | Target List Review Group | |
| TOR | Terms of Reference; Tactical Operations Room | |
| TPFDD | Time-Phased Force Deployment Data | |
| TPFDL | Time-Phased Force and Deployment List | |
| TRAM | Target Recognition Attack Multisensor | |
| TS | Top Secret | |
| TSP | Test Support Position | |
| TSR | Telecommunications Service Request; Theater Sustaining Rate | |
| TTPI | Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands | |
| TTY | Teletype | |
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| <u>U</u> | | |
| | <u>~</u> | |

| U | Unclassified |
|-----------|---|
| UCP | Unified Command Plan |
| U.N. | United Nations |
| UNC | United Nations Command |
| USACC-T | U.S. Army Communications Command-Taiwan |
| USAF | United States Air Force |
| USARJ | U.S. Army, Japan |
| USCINCEUR | U.S. Commander in Chief Europe |
| USCS | U.S. Customs Service |
| USCSB | U.S. Communications Security Board |
| USDA0 | U.S. Defense Attachė Office |
| USDLG | U.S. Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia) |
| USEUCOM | U.S. European Command |
| USF | U.S. Forces |
| USFJ | U.S. Forces, Japan |

USFK U.S. Forces, Korea U.S. Intelligence Board USIB U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand USMACTHAI U.S. Military Advisor's Representative USMILADREP USN U.S. Navy USREDCOM U.S. Readiness Command Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System UTTAS UW Unconventional Warfare

_____<u>₩</u>s.

WESTPAC
WICS
Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems
WRM
War Reserve Materiel
WRSA
War Reserve Stocks for Allies
WWABNCP
Worldwide Airborne Command Post
WWMCCS
Worlwide Military Command and Control System

SECRET

INDEX

(U) Volumes I and II are integrated in this index. Annexes to the CINCPAC History are not included as each contains its own index. The volumes are paged consecutively. Volume I contains Chapters I-VI, pages 1-276. Volume II contains Chapters VII-XI, pages 277-520, and the glossary. The roman numeral following the subject denotes the volume, and the following figure(s) denote the page(s) in that volume.

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