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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY





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VOLUME I

1971

Prepared by the Historical Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII
1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOREWORD

(U) The threat of communism in Asia continues to affect the peace of the Pacific area and to complicate the problem of collective security throughout this vast region. The significance of this threat is underscored by the fact that in the area of responsibility of the United States Pacific Command live more than one-third of the people on earth under 27 different flags.

(U) As the Commander in Chief of all United States Pacific Forces, I have the responsibility for the defense of our national interests in this entire area. In geography, the Pacific Command covers about two-fifths of the earth's entire surface, some 85 million square miles of ocean, continents, and islands. It extends from the shores of California to India, an east-west span of about ten thousand miles; its north-south axis extends from the Bering Sea to Antarctica.

(U) On 1 January 1972, the Pacific Command will take on added responsibilities for U.S. military forces and elements in the Indian Ocean, Southern Asia, and the Arctic area under the worldwide unified command reorganization. To the north, the PACOM will assume responsibility for a portion of the Arctic Ocean and for the Aleutian Island chain presently under the Alaskan Command. Under the reorganization plan, the Pacific Command area will be increased to approximately 94 million square miles.

(U) Within this vast area, Southeast Asia has been the focal point of our problems for over a decade. At long last, however, allied efforts in the Republic of Vietnam are progressing satisfactorily. Vietnamization is progressing well. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces will reach their maximum strength of approximately one million men well ahead of schedule. Effective cross-border operations against enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos have helped the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to improve its position over 1970. The enemy's protracted war tactics have failed to stall the pacification drive. Successful Vietnamization and pacification programs have permitted continued disengagement and redeployment of U.S. Forces.

(U) At the heart of the Nixon Doctrine is the principle of partnership, of shared responsibility for peace and security. The President has stressed that the United States will keep its treaty commitments, with the expectation that our friends and allies will assume greater responsibility for their own defense. This evolutionary development is a major change in U.S. foreign policy; it means continued U.S. leadership of the Free World, but with a reduced American presence.

PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The required report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by the JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records. This 1971 CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) As with previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, especially those relating to international crises. This history records CINCPAC's command decisions and activities, but does not cover in detail activities of the Component commands or the subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the historical reports of those headquarters.

(U) Changing conditions in the PACOM, particularly in Southeast Asia, during 1971 have dictated a change in the organization of this history. The separation of discussions of events in Southeast Asia from those in other areas of the PACOM seems no longer warranted, and the time is at hand to treat the entire PACOM as a single entity. The new functionalized format will provide transition to what will be, hopefully, a peacetime environment.

(U) The 1971 history is published in two volumes with consecutive pagination, with the glossary and index for the entire work placed at the end of Volume II. Histories of the subordinate unified commands--COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSJAPAN, COMUSTDC, and COMUSKOREA--are included as annexes to this history, only for those copies being retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS; further distribution of those histories is a matter for the subordinate unified commanders.

(U) Research and writing of the 1971 history was divided among three professional historians. The undersigned exercised general supervision and prepared Chapters I, III, VII, IX, X, and XII. Mr. Carl O. Clever prepared Chapters VI, VIII, and XI. Mrs. Pauline K. Tallman prepared Chapters II, IV,

A NOTE ON SOURCES AND DOCUMENTATION

(U) The following comments are provided to explain the footnoting procedures used in this edition of the CINCPAC Command History and some variations used in prior annual histories of the Command since 1959. Certain records disposition practices of the headquarters are also explained in order to facilitate document retrieval in the future.

(U) The principal reliance of the headquarters since its inception has been on the electrically transmitted message; the letter, while always an available means, has been used less and less frequently. Each message had been assigned by its sender a six-digit number based on the date (the first two numbers) and time (the last four numbers--representing the 24-hour day and minute, Greenwich time) it was transmitted, followed by the month and year. The date-time group (DTG) has been the principal control and file number used in this headquarters, although other log numbers assigned by the senders are listed if known. Messages have generally been cited in the CINCPAC Histories without further identification.

(U) All message transmitted and received by the headquarters have been microfilmed and coded by DTG by the J6 Communications Center for rapid retrieval. Messages are kept on file at Camp Smith for three years, then retired to the Federal Records Center (FRC), Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, 17055. By early January 1971 the volume of messages of various security classifications that carried the additional special handling caveat "Special Category-Exclusive" had increased to the extent that it was necessary to separate them from the General Service (GENSER) message traffic, and from 5 January 1971 these have been microfilmed separately in a system parallel to that of the GENSER traffic. These messages will also be retired to the Mechanicsburg FRC.

(U) All message traffic transmitted through the Special Intelligence Communications System (SPINTCOMM) channel has always been kept separate; these are the messages described as "back channel" or "by other means" (BOM). When messages in this system are exclusive, they bear the caveat "Eyes Only" for designated recipients. These messages are also microfilmed and retrievable by DTG. Microfilm of all messages since the system was established in mid-1965 is available in the Intelligence Division Special Security Office; none has been retired.

(U) In addition to the active and retired message files, since about October 1968 most cited messages have been furnished to the Historical Branch in support of monthly staff historical summaries. All of these summaries since

(U) Another frequently cited document until its discontinuance in mid-1970 was the brief of a JCS paper. All JCS publications and memoranda received in the headquarters were briefed by appropriate staff officers for those with a need-to-know. These were cited in the histories by staff division code and a "Brief Number." There was no staff-wide system for retiring these and most have been destroyed.

(U) A copy of every CINCPAC Command Digest is retained in the Historical Branch indefinitely. The daily 0730 Command Center Briefing Notes from their inception in July 1965 through the end of 1971 are retained on microfilm in the Historical Branch. The originals are retired to the Washington National Records Center, Washington, D. C., 20409.

(U) Occasional footnotes in the Command History will refer to bound publications of other headquarters, e.g., intelligence digests of subordinate unified commands. Such publications are retained in this headquarters for the current year only, and are then usually destroyed; they will be retired by the issuing headquarters or agency.

(U) All photographs used in the Command History, unless otherwise noted, are from official Department of Defense sources.

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CHAPTER I

A YEAR OF STRATEGIC CHANGE

Significant Changes in Foreign Policy

(U) The year 1971 witnessed many far-ranging changes, some publicly announced and others evolving behind the scene, in the relationships between the United States and both its allies and its adversaries. Emerging friendships and the decline of old ties, particularly in Asia, appeared to forecast major shifts in the balance of power among nations and blocs of nations. Nowhere was this trend more apparent, or the effect more marked, than in the far reaches of the United States Pacific Command. In 1971, the only predictable constant in the PACOM was change--changing military strengths, changing foreign relationships, even subtly changing national goals.

(U) Shortly after the close of 1971, President Nixon summed up the many changes that he had initiated during the year:

> 1971 was the watershed year. The foundation laid and the cumulative effect of the actions taken earlier enables us to achieve, during the past year, changes in our foreign policy of historic scope and significance:
>
> --An opening to the Peoples Republic of China;
> --The beginning of a new relationship with the Soviet Union;
> --The laying of a foundation for a healthier and more sustainable relationship with our European allies and Japan;
> --The creation of a new environment for the world's monetary and trade activities.[1]

(U) The President went on to review past relationships, some of which had shaped national policy since shortly after the end of World War II, and to express hopes for the future. Almost all of his discussion had a direct impact upon the Pacific Command:

> With respect to our two principal adversaries, the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union, we faced

---

[1] All quotations of the President in this chapter are taken from his Report to the Congress on Foreign Policy, 9 Feb 1972.

As I write this Report, our troop level has dropped below 139,000--and will be no higher than 69,000 by the first day of May /1972/ In December 1971 our combat deaths were down to 17. Air sorties, budget costs, draft calls--all have sharply declined.

Those facts represent the transformation of the American role in Vietnam. We have done this, as we promised to do, without abandoning our commitments to our allies. As our role had diminished, South Vietnam has been able increasingly to meet its own defense needs and provide growing security to its people.

.....

During the year there were several sharp disappointments.

--The greatest was the failure of our intense public and private efforts to end the Vietnam War through a negotiated settlement. Such a settlement continues to be available to our enemy whenever he is prepared to negotiate in earnest. The only serious barrier to a settlement which remains is the enemy's insistence that we cooperate with him to force on our ally at the negotiating talbe a solution which the enemy cannot force upon him in the field, and is unwilling to entrust to a political process. That we are not willing to do....

--In South Asia, we made a determined year-long effort to prevent a war. We did not succeed. Our deep interest in the well-being of both India and Pakistan compounded our disappointment.... The violation of peace in South Asia had ominous implications for the stability of other areas of tension in the world and for our efforts to establish a more hopeful relationship with our adversaries.

(U) In the field of Security Assistance, a matter of increasing importance to the CINCPAC and his staff as the U.S. military presence was sharply reduced in Southeast Asia, the President spelled out clearly the national goals, strssing again the policy statement--the Nixon Doctrine--that was to point the way for the evolving strategies in the PACOM:

Security assistance is a cornerstone of our foreign policy and

forces which is essential if Korea is to provide for its own defense.

.....

Our security assistance, like our other programs, reflects our vision of a future structure of peace in a world in which independent states cooperate for mutual benefit. Our friends can be assured that we will continue to help them meet their defense needs through a well managed and flexible security assistance program.

Changing Strategies in the PACOM

(U) In the Pacific, of course, the military realities of Asia were even closer to Camp Smith than they were to Washington. Evolving national policies, and particularly those enunciated with dramatic suddenness, often created considerable turbulence where military planning cycles had been based on relatively long-established doctrine. For the military commander, it is axiomatic that the differentiation between friend and foe is often subject to radical changes as diplomacy succeeds--or fails--where military operations have been indecisive. Delicate alliances, painfully wrought and carefully nurtured, may be dislocated or even destroyed by events and decisions beyond the control of the military commander. With the advent of instantaneous, worldwide communications, major policy changes reach far-flung commanders with the speed of light, requiring overnight reassessment of military strategies, troop requirements, logistical practicalities, and intelligence capabilities. The watchword for the military commander, as pounded home at staff schools and war colleges, is maximum flexibility.

(U) No individual was more aware of the imminence of change and of the need for the greatest flexibility, both in thought and deed, than the Commander in Chief Pacific. For a decade his headquarters had viewed the ebb and flow of events in Asia, watching priorities shift, emphasis change, and attention focus on one area after another. A massive buildup of troops in Southeast Asia was followed by a sudden, equally massive redeployment program. The firmest of allies suddenly became less predictable. Implacable enemies suddenly showed signs of thawing. Commanders and staff officers throughout the vast PACOM could only agree with Dickens: It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.

(U) To the CINCPAC, one point stood out clearly during the turbulent decade that ended with 1971--the compelling need to stress collective security among the many and diverse free nations within the boundaries of the Pacific

A major problem in mutual security is the continuing growth of worldwide Soviet expansion. In recent years the Soviets have been actively pursuing a strategy aimed at extending USSR influence on a global basis.

This strategy, which I call the "Strategic Island Concept," is designed to spread USSR influence throughout the world. In this concept, strategic "islands" are not necessarily islands surrounded by water. In a broader sense, they are entities, or centers, either on land or at sea, from which the USSR can and does project power. This power may be political, economic, military, or psychological.

This "strategic island concept" is an insidious policy. It has achieved for the Soviets the global power status they have long sought, and in pursuing this policy the Soviets are leapfrogging throughout the world.

This Soviet strategy in action takes many different forms. It may be the actual or implied use of military force, the rendering of economic or military aid, the extension of commercial air service, or the wide-ranging deployments of the merchant and fishing fleets. It might also take the form of humanitarian aid, diplomatic and trade activities, or scientific and space efforts. Any or all of these measures may be applied as the situation requires.

.....

Russia, endeavoring since the days of the Czar to protect and bolster her southern flank, has emerged as a naval power. She has finally succeeded in operating fleets in the great oceans of the world. Soviet naval and air maneuvers have been seen in the Norwegian Sea, the North Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Sea of Japan, and the Philippine Sea. Clearly, the Soviets do not use their navy in a parochial sense. They have grasped the significance of seapower and its importance to trade, fisheries, and oceanographic research.

.....

The use of military and economic aid is another means by which the Soviets have expanded their influence. When the

such a way that we can win a just peace for all the people of this region. Our Nation must not be turned aside from its proper course in Southeast Asia. The pressures of some public frustrations with the war must not cause our people to abandon what we have helped to win for the free people of Southeast Asia. We must not initiate an abrupt and consequential pull-back of U.S. forces in Vietnam.

I am convinced that the months immediately ahead are critical for the preservation of all that United States and Allied Forces have achieved in Indochina. In the confusion of the public debate we must remember that we have performed the tasks delineated by every President since President Eisenhower first announced support of the Vietnamese government.

It is a fact that today South Vietnam has an excellent chance of survival. We have prevented external conquest and encouraged internal progress and regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.

It is important, as we reduce our force levels, that we not leave a total vacuum which would affect the security of the American people or their vital interests in the continued security of our Free World allies. Even as we reduce the American presence and the risks to our servicemen and the strain on our economy, we must not lose sight of an urgent necessity to help nations we expect to shoulder more of the burden of their own defense.

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CHAPTER II

THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

(U) Principally reflecting the drawdown of forces from Southeast Asia, military personnel strength in the PACOM continued the decline begun in 1969. Additional factors contributing to the reduction were the closure of many U.S. bases throughout the PACOM and the generally reduced Armed Forces levels resulting from both budget constraints and the national attitude toward the size of the military establishment. A comparison of military strengths, by Service, follows:

	1 Jan 71	31 Dec 71	Change
Army	358,298	179,882	-178,416
Navy	224,368	195,983	- 28,385
Marine Corps	82,683	64,412	- 18,271
Air Force	144,302	115,987	- 28,315
Total	809,651	556,264	-253,387

The major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents and the amount of change from the year before are shown in the following table:

	Military		Dependents	
	31 Dec 71	Change	31 Dec 71	Change
Guam	9,455	- 438	12,060	-1,472
Hawaii	35,103	- 2,051	56,501	+3,443
Japan	27,107	- 1,024	32,274	-5,568
Korea	38,512	- 4,620	7,201	+ 19
Philippines	15,651	- 7,221	20,012	+1,882
Ryukyus	41,969	- 3,958	31,958	- 769
Taiwan	8,068	- 770	5,984	- 627
Thailand	31,187	- 4,347	5,505	+ 625
Vietnam	156,975	-203,561	100	+ 48

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM.

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN PACOM



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 71, p. 6.

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES
FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

CINCUNC/USFK	GEN	John H. MICHAELIS, USA
CofS	LT GEN	Robert N. SMITH, USAF
Spec Asst/ROK Mil Aff & CH USMAG-K	MAJ GEN	John S. LEESON, USA
Spec Asst/Armistice Aff and Sr Mbr UNCMAC	MAJ GEN	Raymond P. MURPHY, USA
DCofS	COL	David L. JONES, USA
SJS	COL	Robert M. CHAMBERS, USA
Cdr Hq UNC (Rear) (Secty UN & Rep & Dep US Rep	COL	James S. MILES, USA
Ch Protocol Sec	COL	Herman L. WIRTH, USA
ACofS/J1	COL	Dana E. McFALL, JR., USAF
ACofS/J2	CAPT	Albert A. SEIFERBECK, USN
ACofS/J3 Div US ROK OPLAN Staff	BGEN	Martin G. COLLADAY, USAF
ACofS/J4	COL	Richard T. CANN, IV, USA
ACofS/J5	CAPT	Frank M. ROMANICE, USN
ACofS/J6	COL	Earl E. HENDRICKSEN, USA
Ch, Armistice Aff Div and Secy UNCMAC	COL	David W. AFFLECK, USA
Ch, Army Sec JUSMAG-K	MAJ GEN	Bert A. DAVID, USA
COMNAVFOREKOREA and Ch, Naval Sec JUSMAG-K	RADM	Victor A. DYBDAL, USN
Cdr, Air Force Forces/Ch, Air Force Sec JUSMAG-K	MAJ GEN	Robert W. MALOY, USAF
Dep Ch, Air Force Sec JUSMAG-K	COL	John S. HARTSTER, USAF

HEADQUARTER U.S. FORCES, JAPAN

Commander/Cdr 5AF	LT GEN	Gordon M. GRAHAM, USAF
CofS	MAJ GEN	Richard M. LEE, USA
SJS	CAPT	Llewellyn D. BOWEN, USN
ACofS/J1	COL	George B. LINECER, USA
ACofS/J2	COL	Andrew J. ROACH, USA
ACofS/J3	COL	Philip FETLER, USAF
ACofS/J4	CAPT	Richard W. BELT, USN
ACofS/J5	COL	William F. PAFFRATH, USA
ACofS/J6	COL	Franklin J. HICKMAN, JR, USAF
Ch Protocol Section	COL	Charles E. ABBEY, USAF
Office of Information (5th AF)	COL	Alan E. GOLDSMITH, USAF
Director of Safety (5th AF)	COL	Murray JARES, USAF
Chaplain (USARJ)	LCOL	James W. MORRILL, USA
Legal Advisor (5th AF)	COL	John H. LEONARD, USAF
Surgeon (CINCPAC)	CAPT	John J. DEMPSEY, USN
Comptroller (5th AF)	COL	Milton L. SCOTT, USAF
Provost Marshal (5th AF)	COL	John F. HUTTER, USAF
COMNAVFORJAPAN	RADM	Julian T. BURKE, JR., USN
CG USARJ	BGEN	Ross R. GONDER, Jr., USA

U.S. TAIWAN DEFENSE COMMAND

Commander	VADM	Walter B. BAUMBERGER, USN
CofS	BGEN	Clarence L. DOUGLAS, JR., USAF
ACofS/J1	CAPT	Terrell E. BECKER, USN
ACofS/J2	COL	Haven R. BURCHFIELD, USAF
ACofS/J3	CAPT	Charles E. RAY, USN
ACofS J5	COL	Don D. JENNINGS, JR., USA
ACofS/J6	CAPT	Marvin D. MARSH, USN
Public Info Officer/J02	CDR	Charles W. LARSON, II, USN
Legal Officer/J7	CAPT	Loyal E. BLACKWOOD, USN
Cdr, Taiwan Patrol Force	RADM	Richard E. FOWLER, JR, USN
Cdr, 327th Air Div	BGEN	Donald H. ROSS, USAF

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

Commander/CG USARV	GEN	Creighton W. ABRAMS, USA
Deputy Commander/ DEPCOMUSMACV/FC RECORDS	GEN	Frederick W. WEYAND, USA
Deputy Commander for Air /CDR 7 AF	GEN	John D. LAVELLE, USAF
CofS	MAJ GEN	Donald H. COWLES, USA
SJS	COL	Edward P. CROCKETT, USA
ACofS/J1	MAJ GEN	James B. ADAMSON, USA
ACofS/J2	MAJ GEN	William E. DOLVIN, USA
ACofS/J3	MAJ GEN	John T. CARLEY, USA
ACofS/J4	MAJ GEN	Herren D. MAPLES, USA
ACofS/J5	CAPT	Raul B. PEREZ, USN
ACofS/J6	BGEN	Floyd H. TROGDON, USAF
ACofS/CORDS	Mr.	George D. JACOBSON
DCofS Economic Affairs	BGEN	John A. WICKHAM, Jr., USA
Adjutant General	COL	Walton A. PETTIGREW, USA

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 17.

U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS
FAR EAST REGION
AS OF 31 DEC 1971

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP PHILIPPINES

Chief	BGEN	James A. GRIMSLEY, JR. USA
CofS	COL	Eric LINHOF, USAF
Ch, Ground Forces Div/ Sr Advisor Philippine Army	COL	George H. RUSSELL, USA
Ch, Navy Division	CAPT	William L. McGONAGLE, USN
Ch, Air Force Division	COL	Robert M. RYAN, JR., USAF
Dep Chief, Ground Forces Div/Sr Advisor Philippine Constabulary	COL	Steven T. CLARK, USA
Ch, Jt Plans & Programs Div	COL	William L. DEAN, USA
Ch, Personnel & Admin Div/AG	MAJ	George R. IVERSON, USA
**********		
Cdr, 13th Air Force	LT GEN	Marvin L. McNICKLE, USAF
Vice Cdr, 13th Air Force	MAJ GEN	Lawrence F. TANBERG, USAF

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, KOREA

Chief	MAJ GEN	John S. LEKSON, USA
Cofs	COL	Maurice L. MULLEN, USAF
ACofs/Personnel and Administration	COL	James F. CULP, USA
Secretary Joint Staff	LCOL	Martin B. MAIT, USA
ACofs/Plans, Prog and Training	CAPT	Charles H. LOWRY, Jr., USN
ACofs/Logistics	COL	Marshall D. JOHNSON, USA
ACofs/Comptroller	COL	Frederick C. MACQUESTEN, Jr., USAF

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OFFICE, JAPAN

Chief	COL	Richard N. STODDARD, USA
Deputy Chief	GS	C. Lawrence O'NEILL

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP CHINA

Chief	MAJ GEN	John W. BARNES USA
CofS	COL	Alma R. FLAKE, USAF
ACofS/Services	COL	Ardie E. McCLURE, JR., USA
ACofS/Programs	COL	Thomas H. SAYES, USA
ACofS/Comptroller	COL	William D. JENKINS, USAF
ACofS/J2/J3	COL	Joseph E. STILES, JR., USAF
ACofS/J4	COL	Robert W. PATTERSON, USA
ACofS/J6	COL	William F. McCORMICK, JR., USA
Ch, Army Section	COL	Eugene M. PERRY, JR., USA
Ch, Navy Section	CAPT	Phillip W. PORTER, JR., USN
Ch, Air Force Sec/ Cdr 327th Air Div	BGEN	Donald H. ROSS, USAF
Ch, Combined Service Forces Section	CAPT	Ogden K. STRATTON, USN
Senior Marine Corps Advisor	COL	William F. GATELY, JR., USMC

MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TEAM, CAMBODIA

Chief	BGEN	D Theodore C. MATAXIS, USA
	BGEN (R)	John R. D.CLELAND JR. USA

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP THAILAND

Commander/Chief	MAJ GEN	Andrew J. EVANS, JR., USAF
Deputy Commander	MAJ GEN	James J. GIBBONS, USA
CofS	COL	Domenico A. CURTO, USAF
SJS	LCOL	James J. LINDSAY USA
ACofS/J1	COL	Robert L. CODY, USA
ACofS/J2	COL	Ronald E. LANE, JR., USAF
ACofS/J3	COL	Paul B. McDANIELS, USA
ACofS/J4	COL	James J. HEYMAN, USA
ACofS/J5	COL	William H. MULVEY, USMC
ACofS/J6	COL	Thomas J. CAVANAUGH, USAF
MAP Directorate Comptroller	CAPT COL	James M. FADDIS, USN Raymond F. RUYFFELAERE, USA
SJA	LCOL	Rupert P. HALL, USA
Public Affairs Officer	MAJ	Hubert C. MOORE USAF
Adjutant General	LCOL	Billy M. MOHON, USA
Surgeon	COL	J. P. DOYLE, USA
Chaplain	LCOL	Stanley C. McMASTER, USA
Ch, Army Advisory Gp	COL	George E. NEWMAN, USA
Ch, Navy Advisory Gp/ CINCPACFLTREPTHAI	CAPT	Gordon R. HOPWOOD, USN
Ch, Air Force Advisory Group	COL	Harry C. ADERHOLT, USAF
Senior Marine Advisor	COL	Glenn W. RODNEY, USMC
**********		
Dep Cdr 7AF/13AF	MAJ GEN	Dewitt R. SEARLES, USAF
CG USARSUPTHAI	BGEN	John W. VESSEY, JR., USA

DEFENSE LIAISON GROUP INDONESIA

Chief, USDLG	COL	Taylor R. FULTON, USA
Dep Chief, USDLG	LCOL	Richard D. NOE USAF
Ch, Army Branch	LCOL	Irvin D. KENNEDY USA
Ch, Air Force Branch	LCOL	John C. TAYLOR USAF
Ch, Navy/Marine Br	CDR	Robert D. SCHMIDT, USN
Ch, Plans & Program Branch	LCOL	Clifford H. JOHNSON, USMC
Ch, Military Services Branch	LCOL (D) LCOL (R)	Richard W. STATHAM USA William MORGAN USA

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 19.

(R) Reporting
(D) Departing

CINCPAC COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DEC 1971

STAFF	ARMY		NAVY		MC		AF		TOTAL MIL		US CIV	LOCAL HIRE CIV	TOTAL MIL AND CIV
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
CINCPAC	208	176	186	265	33	28	205	208	626	677	189	-0-	1492
CINCUSARPAC	327	201	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	327	201	708	-0-	1236
CINCPACFLT	-0-	-0-	243	563	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	243	563	51	-0-	857
CINCPACAF	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	687	1029	687	1029	370	-0-	2086
COMUS JAPAN	14	12	10	5	3	-0-	11	7	38	24	22	44	84
COMUS KOREA	48	30	32	21	7	1	38	22	125	74	35	18	234
COMUS TAIWAN DEF CMD	18	31	27	62	3	3	15	13	63	109	13	4	185
COMUSMACV	526	593	61	55	36	9	111	122	734	779	76	814	1589
COMUSMAC THAILAND	178	118	25	22	11	11	90	109	304	260	10	774	574
GRAND TOTALS	1319	1161	578	993	93	52	1157	1518	3147	3716	1474	954	8337

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 87.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVAILABLE FORCES

CINCUSARPAC	CINCPACFLT	CINCPACAF
ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC		
1 Army Hqs 3 Corps Hqs 1 HQ US Army Force 3 Regional Asst Comd 1 Hqs U. S. Army Spt 2 Inf Divs(-) 1 Abn Div (Airmobile)(-) 1 CAV Bde(Airmobile) 1 Inf Brigade 1 Missile Cmd(AT) 1 Logistical Cmd 2 Arty Bdes (AD) 1 Corps Arty 1 Special Forces Gp 1 USA Medical Cmd Vietnam 1 USA Engr Cmd Vietnam 1 Engr Gp(Cmdt) 4 Engr Gps (Const) 1 Engr Const Agency 1 PsyOp Gp 2 Separate Bns/Sqds 3 Engr Bns(Cmbt) 9 Engr Bns(Const) 2 Nike-Hercules Bns 4 Hawk Bns 2 AW Bns (40mm)(SP) 2 AD Btrys (50 Cal MG) 1 Arty Gp 1 Sergeant Bn 2 CHAP/VULC Bn 1 175 mm/8in Gun Bn(SP) 1 155 mm How Bn 7 105 mm How Bns 1 Honest John Bn 1 Avn Bde 5 Avn Gps 8 Avn Bns (Cmdt) 2 Air Cav Sqs 1 155/8in How Bn(T)	2 Numbered Fleets 8 Attack Carriers 1 ASW Carrier 4 Cruiser Types 71 Destroyer Types 30 Patrol Ship Types 43 Submarine Types 39 Amphibious Warfare Types 22 Mine Warfare Ships 70 Auxiliary Ships 9 SOSUS Stations 8 Carrier Air Wings (CVW) 2 Carrier ASW Air Groups 12 Patrol Squadrons (VP) 2 Fleet Air Recon Sqs (VQ) 1 Photo Sq (VFP) 4 Helo Utility Sqs (HC) 1 Helo Attack Sq HA (L) 7 SMG B 1 Light Attack Sq VA(L) 1 Fleet Marine Force (Consists of 2 MAFs)	3 Numbered Air Forces, 1 Air Divisions 1 Operations Sq (C-118) 1 Tactical Air Support Group (5 Sq O-2, 1 OV-10) 1 Reconnaissance Sq QU-22 1 Reconnaisance Sq C-130 2 Tactical Electronic Warfare Sq EC-47 1 Tactical Electronic Warfare Sq EB-66 1 Tactical Reconnaisance Wing (RF-4C(2Sqs) 1 Special Operations Wing (A-1, A-37, Ac-119, C-47 C-130, O-2, Ch-3, UH-1, Ch-53) 1 Fighter Wing (1 Sq F-101) 1 Wild Weasel Sq (F-105) 5 Tactical Fighter Wings (1 -4C/D/E (16 Sqs); 1 105 (8 Sq) 3 Tactical Airlift Wings (5 Sq C-130); 1 Sq C-123; 2 Sq C-7) 2 Airborne Command & Control Sq (C-130/EC-135) 1 Tactical Control Group 1 Bombardment Tactical Sq (B-57)
IN PACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC		
USASA Units in Pacific Army Natl Guard Units 1 HHD Nat'l Guard Army Reserve Units 1 CA Gp 1 Engr Const Bn 1 Corps Eq (AUG) 1 AG Co 1 St Det 2 MI Dets 1 Engr Det 1 Sig Co (CABLE CONST)	1 Naval Reserve Training Ships, Group 1 Naval Security Groups, Pacific 10 Mine Warfare Ships - Reserve	1 Air Refuel Wg(SAC KC-135)PACAF Mission Young Tiger 1 Air Refuel Wg(SAC KC-135)Arc Light & Rollex 3 Bomb Heavy Sqs(SAC B-52)Arc Light & Rollex 1 Ftr Intcp Sq(HANG F-102 Hickam) 2 Wea Recon Sqs (WC-130 WC-135) 1 AEW Flt(ADC EC-121) COLLEGE EYE 1 Test Sq(AFSC C-130 & CH-3) Air Force Security Service Units (AFSS) Air Force Communications Service Units (AFCS) Air Weather Service Units (MAC) Air Rescue Service Units (MAC)
MAJOR AUGMENTATION FORCES WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE IN EMERGENCY		
SEE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITY PLAN (JSCP), PART I, ANNEX A		SEE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITY PLAN (JSCP), PART I, ANNEX A

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 5.

SECRET

SECRET

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

(1 February 1972)



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 22.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR UNITS

(1 February 1972)



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 23.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS

(1 February 1972)



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 24.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS (1 August 1971)



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 71, p. 25.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS (1 February 1972)



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 25.

SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF

(U) As a result of budget constraints and personnel cuts, a review of organizational structure was begun by many CINCPAC divisions and independent staff offices within the headquarters. A number of changes would be considered as the headquarters assumed a post-war posture. While such study was begun in 1971, changes within the larger divisions had not yet occurred. The major change in the staff in 1971 was the creation of the Security Assistance Division, discussed below and in Chapter VIII, which gathered into one organizational element the staff functions associated with what had been called for many years the Military Assistance Program. The assumption of new tasks as a result of the revision of the Unified Command Plan, scheduled to take place on 1 January 1972, was managed largely within the existing organizational structure, although much formal and informal liaison with other commands had been necessary in such a major change. In some cases the continuing need for such liaison was recognized and assignments to that effect formalized.

(U) The staff authorized by the Joint Tables of Distribution decreased almost 14 percent from the year before, down to a total of 1,457 spaces (see chart). CINCPAC policy, as promulgated in October by the Chief of Staff, was that this total of 1,457 spaces was to be a self-imposed ceiling. Increased workloads for the headquarters, caused by changing missions that generated additional manpower requirements, would be satisfied from existing assets.[1]

Special Security Office Reassigned

(U) On 4 May 1970 the Special Security Branch of the Intelligence Division had been placed under the direct supervision and control of the Executive Assistant to the CINCPAC. On 6 July 1971 this Special Security Office was returned to the Intelligence Division, where it resumed the staff code J25. Reversion of the office to the Intelligence Division returned it to what was the traditional position of such an organization in a unified or specified command because of its relationship with the Defense Intelligence Agency. Personnel assigned to the Special Intelligence Communications Facility, however, remained under the direct supervision of CINCPAC's Executive Assistant in order to provide direct support to the CINCPAC.[2]

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[1] Memorandum for Record, COL L. J. Clark, J13, 29 Oct 71, Subj: Manpower Requirements Associated with the Revised UCP.

[2] J01/Memo/79-71 of 6 Jul 71, Subj: Change of Staff Responsibility.

Office, that office was assigned such cognizance on 13 March 1971. Congressional interest in PACOM plans, programs, and operations had increased steadily over the preceding few years and it was anticipated that actions associated with execution of the Nixon Doctrine would receive close Congressional scrutiny. Requirements for additional personnel and budget to accomplish the legislative affairs function were to be determined by the Public Affairs Office based on a four-month experience factor.[1] The subsequent result was the addition of one Army lieutenant colonel to the Public Affairs Office with duties as Legislative Affairs Officer. (During 1971, 90 members of Congress visited CINCPAC.)

Security Assistance Division Organized

(U) A major new staff division was created in 1971, consolidating in the Security Assistance Division all functions associated with what had been the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Proposals to reorganize the CINCPAC staff in this manner had been considered from time to time and one 1969 result had been the transfer of the MAP training function from the Operations to the Plans Division.[2] The new Security Assistance Division, given the staff code J8, was established on 1 October 1971. It was to be the "CINCPAC interface with the newly formed Defense Security Assistance Agency and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)."[3]

(U) In addition to the Performance Evaluation Group (formerly J71), the division consisted of branches as follows: Security Assistance Policy, the North Asia/Pacific and the South and East Asia Country Plans/Program Branches, the Long Supply and Excess Redistribution Branch, the Training Branch, and the Data Processing Branch. This data processing branch had formerly been called the PACOM MAP Data Center.

(U) The first Assistant Chief of Staff for Security Assistance was BGEN Alton G. Post, USA, who reported on 3 January 1972. His deputy, who had been acting Assistant Chief of Staff since the reorganization took place, was COL G. F. Oholendt, USAF. A more complete discussion of the new organization is contained in Chapter VIII.

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[1] J00/Memo of 13 Mar 71, Subj: Legislative Affairs; J74/Memo/214-71 of 5 Mar 71, Subj: Staff Study Regarding Establishment of Legislative Affairs Function in J74.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. I, pp. 34-35.

[3] CINCPACNOTE 5400 of 13 Sep 71, Subj: Reorganization of CINCPAC Staff.

Heads of Independent Offices

Surgeon

(U) RADM Frank B. Voris, MC, USN, retired on 30 April. On 1 May RADM Charles L. Waite, MC, USN, assumed the duties of CINCPAC Surgeon in addition to his primary duty as CINCPACFLT Medical Officer.



BERNARD B SAPP
COL USA
AC/S Personnel



JOHN J GORMAN
BGEN USAF
AC/S Intelligence



ROBERT P KELLER
MAJ GEN USMC
AC/S Operations



LESLIE J WESTBERG
BGEN USAF
DAC/S Operations



JOHN E MURRAY
BGEN USA
AC/S Logistics



LLOYD R VASEY
RADM USN
AC/S Plans



ANDREW J GATSIS
BGEN USA
DAC/S Plans



GEOFFREY CHEADLE
BGEN USAF
AC/S Comm-Elec



ALTON G. POST
BGEN USA
AC/S Security Assistance

SECTION III--COMMAND AND CONTROL

PACOM Responsibilities as the Result of Unified Command Plan Changes

(U) A major change took place in the division of unified and specified command responsibilities in 1971 with realignments effective 1 January 1972. The transfer of functions and responsibilities among the commands was arranged throughout 1971 and the actual changeover occurred smoothly, as scheduled. Planning for the change had begun in 1970;[1] many facets of planning, military assistance, and liaison responsibilities were considered among the various staffs throughout 1971 to permit the command change without the loss or reduction of command and control.

(U) The PACOM was already the largest of the unified and specified commands.* On 1 January 1972 the PACOM area increased from about 85 million square miles to about 94 million. Additions included the countries of Southern Asia extending westward to the eastern border of Iran, and much of the Indian Ocean as well as the Aleutian Islands and parts of the Arctic Ocean.

(U) Specifically, the changes throughout the unified and specified command structure were as follows: The U.S. Strike Command was disestablished. The Commander in Chief of the Strike Command had also been U.S. Commander in Chief Middle East, Southern Asia, and Africa South of the Sahara (CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA); this command was divided, as explained below. In the place of the Strike Command at MacDill AFB, Florida, the U.S. Readiness Command was established. This was an austere headquarters to control U.S.-based major combatant General Purpose forces not assigned to other unified commands. It was to provide a reserve of combat-ready forces to reinforce other unified commands and to assist the JCS in joint training requirements and doctrine. The Alaskan Command (ALCOM) retained responsibility for U.S. Forces on the continental land mass of Alaska as well as the islands of the Alexander Archipelago and Kodiak, Nunivak, and Little Diomede Islands. CINCPAC assumed responsibility for the Aleutian Chain and the islands in the Bering Sea (except for air defense responsibilities which were retained by CINC Alaska /CINCAL/ acting in his capacity as the North American Air Defense Command /NORAD/ Alaskan Region Commander). The Atlantic Command had responsibility for U.S. military forces and elements in the Atlantic and Caribbean and the waters around Central and South America and Africa. CINCPAC lost responsibility for the sea and air defenses for the western approaches

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 119-123.

to the Panama Canal and for evacuation of U.S. non-combatants from the western coast of South America. The European Command, which already had responsibility for Western Europe including the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean Sea area, gained from USCINCMEAFSA the Middle East land mass to the eastern border of Iran, North Africa, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf.[1]

(U) Some changes that had been contemplated earlier did not occur. On 3 March the JCS announced that the ALCOM would be retained, although the Aleutians would go to CINCPAC. Also, the disestablishment of the U.S. Southern Command had been under study. On 21 July, however, the Deputy Secretary of Defense advised that it had "been decided that USSOUTHCOM will continue as a unified command."[2] There were no changes in the responsibilities of the Continental Air Defense Command or the Strategic Air Command. No unified commander was given responsibility for Africa south of the Sahara as no U.S. Forces operated in that area. USCINCEUR was given responsibility for Africa south of the Sahara Military Assistance Program matters. The JCS retained planning responsibility for the area, however.

(U) Specifically, the area of the PACOM:

> ...is adjusted to interface with EUCOM east of Iran and with Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) west of South America and east of Africa in such a way that LANTCOM has area responsibility for those waters surrounding South America and Africa. Specific boundaries of PACOM are Pacific Ocean West of 92 degrees W longitude, the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean West of 95 degrees W longitude and east of 100 degrees E longitude, the Indian Ocean East of 62 degrees E longitude, Japan, the ROK, and the countries of Southeast and Southern Asia (including Pakistan and India), and the islands in all assigned water areas including the Aleutians (excluding Air Defense) but excluding the Alexander Archipelago, Kodiak, Nunivak, and Little Diomede Island.[3]

(C) A number of formal agreements were executed between CINCPAC and other unified commanders during the summer of 1971 to provide for the transition period and the changeover. A memorandum of agreement between CINCPAC and the CINC Alaska was signed by Admiral McCain on 15 September and by LT GEN R. G. Ruegg, USAF, on 20 August. This agreement provided for the exchange of

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1 SECDEF 1937/051531Z Jul 71.
2 JCS 2183/262243Z Jul 71.
3 SECSTATE 116130/290014Z Jun 71.

combat forces available for contingency planning that were assigned to CINCPAC but which would be deployed in support of USCINCSO as necessary. Therefore, continued support of USCINCSO country plans by CINCPAC (through CINCPACFLT) was predirected and would continue to be provided. CINCPAC so advised CINCLANT.[1]

(TS) A formal agreement was signed by Admiral McCain on 14 July and by the Deputy Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command, General David A. Burchinal, USAF, on 23 July regarding command arrangements between the two commands. Because operational command of the Middle East Force was vested in USCINCEUR, but these units would be operating in and making port calls in the PACOM area of responsibility East of 62° E Longitude, the agreement provided for control of [redacted] by Middle East Force units under operational command of USCINCEUR operating in the PACOM area of responsibility.[2]

(U) CINCPAC coordination with the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA was necessary to insure the phased transfer of Military Assistance, intelligence, and planning responsibilities and support therefor to assure continuity of operations, but no formal agreement was necessary between CINCPAC and that command. In May CINCSTRIKE had asked for CINCPAC comments on the question of a continuing requirement for the CINCSTRIKE Liaison Officer assigned to CINCPAC. CINCPAC replied that the assignment of the officer was of significant value to the PACOM and that, particularly because of the Unified Command Plan changes, the assignment should be continued for at least 12 months.[3]

(U) Five new organizations became part of the PACOM as a result of the changeover. Under CINCPAC's operational command would be the Office of the Defense Representative, India (ODRI) and the Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP). For Military Assistance matters only, CINCPAC would be dealing directly with Defense Attaches in Kabul, Afghanistan; Colombo, Ceylon; and Kathmandu, Nepal. For other matters the chain of command to the Defense Attaches was through the Defense Intelligence Agency. There were no U.S. representatives with whom CINCPAC dealt directly in the other Himalayan States of Sikkim and Bhutan.

(S) Administrative support for the ODRI and ODRP came under study. Prior to the changeover, administrative and logistic support for these offices had been a Department of the Air Force responsibility, and the support was rendered by

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[1] CINCLANTFLT 111624Z Sep 67 and 152018Z Dec 71; ADMINO CINCPACFLT 200137Z Sep 67; ADMIN CINCPACFLT 210339Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 310233Z Dec 71.
[2] CINCPAC 250240Z Jun 71.
[3] CINCPAC 120425Z Jun and 230033Z May 71.

(S) Considerable coordination was necessary between the PACOM and the ALCOM in connection with transition of command support of the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO). CINCPAC personnel from the Joint Reconnaissance Center visted the Alaska headquarters in May to study the matter. The conferees concluded that the PACOM monthly schedule should include the ALCOM area PARPRO missions; that Fifth Air Force, as PACOM PARPRO coordinating agent, should assume the same responsibility for ALCOM area PARPRO; and that reliable communications had to be developed to satisfy the scheduling and reporting requirements among activities in the ALCOM area, CINCPAC, and Fifth Air Force.[1]

(S) After Fifth Air Force studied the situation, the survey team recommended formation of a joint CINCPAC-CINCAL All-Source Information Center to accomplish CINCPAC Alaskan PARPRO support responsibilities. CINCAL believed, however, that existing agreements provided for an immediate exchange of information concerning hostile crises and he did not concur in the joint-agency proposal. Consequently it was decided to task Fifth Air Force to schedule, monitor, and report Alaskan PARPRO missions and to develop the communications required. Initial communications engineering cost estimates from CINCPACAF indicated that costs would be prohibitively high and CINCPAC asked to use the National Security Agency AUTOLINE system; the NSA Director opened AUTOLINE service to Fifth Air Force on 15 December. Further communications support was required and on 30 December the JCS approved a CINCPAC request for support and designated the Air Force Chief of Staff as the inter-theater coordinator for the development of appropriate PARPRO links between Fifth Air Force and required locations in Alaska. CINCPACAF was designated as program manager.[2]

(S) At the end of the year it became apparent that communications adequate to support increased CINCPAC PARPRO responsibilities would not be available in time to meet the 1 January 1972 revision date. CINCPAC therefore asked that CINCAL retain PARPRO support functions until adequate communications were established.[3]

(S) Also under study at the end of the year was a supplement to the CINCPAC-CINCAL Memorandum of Agreement of 15 September 1971. The supplement was to refine command and control relationships; it was nearing completion at the end of the year.[4]

(U) Command arrangements and relationships effective 1 January 1972 were as shown on the accompanying pages.

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[1] J3B1 HistSum Jul 71; ALCOM-PACOM PARPRO Conference Memorandum of 21 May 71.
[2] CINCPAC 020100Z Sep 71; CINCAL 090142Z Sep 71; J3B56 HistSum Dec 71, which cited DIRNSA 152229Z Dec 71; JCS 302046Z Dec 71; CSAF 291838Z Dec 71.
[3] CINCPAC 290123Z Dec and 302323Z Dec 71.
[4] J3B56 HistSum Dec 71.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. The mission of CINCPAC, in broad terms, is as follows: "To maintain the security of the PACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance the national policies and interest of the United States and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East and Southeast Asia; to prepare plans, conduct operations and coordinate activities of the forces of the PACOM in consonance with directives of higher authority." His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean west of 92 degrees west longitude, the Bering Sea, the Artic Ocean west of 95 degrees west longitude and east of 100 degrees east longitude, the Indian Ocean east of 62 degrees east longitude, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast and South Asia (including Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Ceylon and the Himalayan States of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan,) and the islands in all assigned water areas including the Aleutians (excluding air defense) but excluding the Alexander Archipelago, Kodiak, Nunivak, and Little Diomede Island.

CINCPAC exercises operational command of assigned forces through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established.) CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. Military Adviser/Representative to the following organizations:

a. SEATO Council: U. S. Military Adviser.
b. ANZUS Council: U. S. Military Representative.
c. Philippine-U. S. Council of Foreign Ministers: U. S. Military Representative and co-chairman of the Philippine-U. S. Mutual Defense Board.
d. Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser on military defense matters to the Chairman of the U. S. Representative.

2. PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:

a. Commaner in Chief U. S. Army Pacific (CINCUSARPAC)
b. Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)
c. Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF)

The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM Service Component Commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations under their command which have been assigned to the operational command of CINCPAC. Other individuals units, detachments, organizations or installations may operate directly under the appropriate PACOM Service Component Commander in his Service role, and contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate.

The PACOM Service Component Commanders' responsibilities for the Military Assistance Program are prescribed in the current CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual (MAM).

3. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS: There are five subordinate unified commands in the PACOM:

a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (CCMUS Korea), Seoul, Korea.
b. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUS Japan), Fuchu Air Station, Japan.
c. United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC), commanded by Commander United States Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC), Taipei, Taiwan.
d. United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI), commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMSMACTHAI). COMUSMACTHAI Serves concurrently as Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CHJUSMAGTHAI).
e. United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV) commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV), Saigon, Republic of Vietnam.

4. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPACREPS): CINCPACREPs are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more Services are stationed. There are four:

a. Commanding General, U. S. Army Ryukyu Island/IX Corps is the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus (CINCPACREP Ryukyu I), Fort Buckner, Okinawa.
b. Commander U. S. Naval Forces Marianas is the CINCPAC Representative Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI), Agana, Guam.
c. Commander U. S. Naval Forces Philippines is the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACREP Philippines), Subic Bay, Philippines.
d. USAF Liaison Officer to RAAF is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACREP Australia), American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.

5. CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (MAAGs): Military Assistance Programs (including Foreign Military Sales) are administered in the PACOM under the following authorities:

a. Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Rep of China	-Taipei, Taiwan
b. Chief Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan	-Tokyo, Japan
c. Chief Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand	-Bangkok, Thailand
d. Chief Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines	-Manila, Philippines
e. Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia	-Phnom Penh, Cambodia
f. Chief Joint U. S. Military Assistance Group, Korea	-Seoul, Korea
g. Office Defense Representative India	-New Delhi, India
h. Office Defense Representative Pakistan	-Islandbad, Pakistan

i. Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand performs the MAP functions for Laos of planning, programming, requisitioning, receipt and storage in Thailand, and onward shipment to Laos and maintains liaison with USAID Laos and with Attaches, -Bangkok, Thailand
j. Chief U. S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia performs the MAP functions of planning and programming for Indonesia, -Djakarta, Indonesia
k. DAT Malaysia is responsible for Malaysia MAP functions -Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
l. DAT Afghanistan, Ceylon, Nepal, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore are responsible for the Foreign Military Sales function for Afghanistan, Ceylon, Nepal, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore respectively.

6. SINGLE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES (COORDINATING AUTHORITIES):

a. Korea-Commander U. S. Forces, Korea
b. Japan-Commander U. S. Forces, Japan
c. Ryukyu Islands-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Ryukyus
d. Taiwan and Penghus-Commander U. S. Taiwan Defense Command
e. Mariana Islands-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Guam/TTPI
f. Philippines-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines
g. Republic of Vietnam-Commander U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
h. Thailand-Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
i. Indonesia-Chief, Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia
j. Australia-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Australia
k. Aleutians-Commander, Naval Station Adak
l. India-Defense Representative, India
m. Pakistan-Defense Representative, Pakistan

7. CINCPAC Liaison Officer to CINCAL

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 7.

[redacted]

(TS) Twice in 1971, in April and late October, teams comprised of representatives from the National Military Command Center and CINCPAC's Component commanders whose facilities were studied, visited the PACOM. They reviewed sealed authenticator security, the Human Reliability Program, and Emergency Action Procedures. Following the April survey, the JCS representatives noted a few deficiencies, but declared that the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) executing forces studied had displayed a high degree of professional knowledge and proficiency in fulfilling their requirements in emergency actions. Deficiencies noted concerned [redacted] and inadequate procedures and training for [redacted]

(TS) Following the second visit, the JCS representative noted that a review of real-world emergency action checklists revealed numerous discrepancies or errors, primarily due to a general lack of understanding of the procedures by which real-world messages would be processed and transmitted. There were no training programs to correct this in the units visited. CINCPAC, therefore, promulgated a letter of instruction to all applicable commands for the establishment and conduct of the necessary training programs. The JCS representatives also questioned the validity of the requirement for [redacted] to hold JCS Sealed Authentication Systems, since [redacted] had SIOP executing forces, nuclear delivery forces, or immediate SIOP actions. The matter was to be studied by the JCS with the results forwarded for CINCPAC's comments.[3]

Airborne Command Post Activities

(S) The CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (ABNCP)--called BLUE EAGLE--completed its second full year in a ground alert posture on 31 December 1971. The budgetary constraints that had necessitated this posture instead of the previous continuous airborne alert had not been alleviated. The JCS shared CINCPAC's concern over the vulerability of the PACOM command and control system and had indicated that the CINCPAC ABNCP would be returned to a continuous airborne alert status when fiscal considerations permitted.[4]

(U) The ABNCP was again allocated 2,000 hours of flying time during 1971 to exercise support and communications facilities as well as to provide for

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1 J3B721 HistSum Jul 71.
2 [redacted] HistSum Apr 71.
3 J3C21 HistSum Nov 71.
4 CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. I, pp. 54-57; J3C10 HistSum Dec 71.

CINCPAC AIRBORNE COMMAND POST GROUND ALERT FLYING STATISTICS

CY	Time on Station			% Time on Station		Non-Alert Time	Battle Staff	
	Available	Actual	Cumulative By Year	By Month	By Year		Flying Time	Cumulative Flying Time
1970:	8,760:00	1,265:37	1,265:37	0	14	0	1,373.5	1,373.5
1971:								
Jan	744:00	87:50	87:50	12	12	0	98.1	98.1
Feb	672:00	59:52	147:42	9	10	0	64.8	162.9
Mar	744:00	125:06	272:48	17	13	0	135.3	298.2
Apr	720:00	94:45	367:33	13	13	0	101.1	399.3
May	744:00	112:48	480:21	15	13	0	121.3	520.6
Jun	720:00	64:13	544:34	9	13	0	70.1	590.7
Jul	744:00	72:22	616:56	10	12	0	77.3	668.0
Aug	744:00	113:49	730:45	15	13	0	123.0	791.0
Sep	720:00	70:05	800:50	10	12	0	73.3	864.3
Oct	744:00	138:18	939:08	19	13	0	147.6	1,011.9
Nov	720:00	75:10	1,014:18	10	13	0	81.1	1,093.0
Dec	744:00	68:25	1,082:43	9	12	0	75.7	1,168.7

of Battle Staff Team One members who augmented that facility's Battle Staff during the exercise. An August deployment of the ABNCP had been cancelled so that the flying time saved could be used in flying continuous airborne alert for approximately 32 hours during the exercise. Three sorties were flown of 12.7, 9.2, and 12.8 hours respectively. Air-to-air refueling was accomplished on both the first and last missions, those over 12 hours. This was the first time that CINCPAC ABNCP Battle Staff Teams had been aboard an aircraft during aerial refueling operations. The exercise terminated on 27 August with all major objectives accomplished.[1]

(S) The ABNCP also participated in CINCPAC Exercises FREQUENT RIDER on both 15 October and 29 November. These were one-day tests of Command Center and augmentation personnel in procedures relating to rapid crisis buildup culminating in General Nuclear War. In both cases the BLUE EAGLE aircraft assumed a strip alert configuration before they were launched to simulate continuous airborne alert without expending additional flying time. Similarly, in both instances BLUE EAGLE assumed control of PACOM forces because of the simulated communications outage at the Alternate Command Facility at [redacted] which was the primary command center for the exercises, after which the ABNCP relinquished control to the [redacted] facility. Both exercises were considered successful.[2]

(S) During the worldwide command post exercise HIGH HEELS-71, BLUE EAGLE Battle Staff teams were dispatched to the CINCPAC Alternate Command Facilities at [redacted] and Guam. This left only two teams available to the ABNCP, insufficient to maintain a continuous airborne alert. To overcome this, an additional team was formed using some personnel from the four teams with augmentation from the CINCPAC Command Center Procedures, Training, and Standardization Branch. With an increase in exercise defense conditions, the decision was made to simulate placing the ABNCP on continuous alert, which was done on 28 January. Simultaneously the CINCPAC ABNCP dispersal plan was implemented.[3]

(U) The number of Battle Staff teams continued to be a matter of concern. The teams had been organized as they were because only 40 team members were authorized and the minimum essential number required for a team was eight. Two men were required to remain behind to comply with JCS Sealed Authenticator security requirements when the ABNCP was launched. Only four ten-man teams could thus be constituted with the personnel authorized and the ABNCP had been so organized since 1 April 1970. By altering operating procedures and making suitable storage arrangements for the sealed authenticator systems, however, it was

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[1] J3C10 HistSum Aug 71.
[2] J3C10 HistSums Oct and Nov 71.
[3] J3C1 HistSum Jan 71.

(U) Emergency auxiliary power was installed in 1971 in the BLUE EAGLE ground facility. On 15 June the installation was completed and the system accepted for use. The unit was completely automatic and provided full restoration of power within 20 seconds of a commercial power failure.[1]

(S) In one other operational matter, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF in October to determine the feasibility of providing BLUE EAGLE back-up aircraft for senior officials transiting Hawaii in VC-137 special air mission carriers. CINCPACAF responded that the BLUE EAGLE ground alert was continuously available for such purposes and that it had been so used in the past. Communications systems were compatible and operators could be integrated. Comfort standards for passengers were suitable and a standby posture associated with VC-137 departures presented no problems. Back-up for such aircraft transiting Hawaii was inherent in the normal BLUE EAGLE alert posture without resource cost or without imposing restrictions on existing operational or maintenance procedures.[2]

PACOM All-Source Information Centers (ASIC)

(S) As part of the CINCPAC program to enhance the effectiveness of the PACOM Command and Control System,[3] the fourth in a series of staff assistance visits was conducted during the period 4 to 19 May 1971. Headquarters visited were those of Taiwan Defense Command, U.S. Forces Korea, Fifth and 13th Air Forces, and 313th Air Division. The visit revealed a general improvement in the operation of the ASIC program since the last staff assistance visit in December 1970. Improvement was noted in training programs, which had been written or updated, and personnel were better informed and had a better understanding of the ASIC concept and associated directives. Plans for improved facilities and communications equipment had been approved and in some cases improvements had been initiated. Additional emphasis on OPREP-3 reporting was required, however, and the ASIC operated by COMUS Korea would continue to operate in a marginal manner until it was jointly manned on a 24-hour basis by operations and intelligence personnel.[4]

(S) Instead of a follow-on visit in 1971, a PACOM ASIC working conference was held at Camp Smith 27-29 September. The objective was to review progress, discuss problems, and update applicable CINCPAC instructions. Represented, besides CINCPAC and his Component commanders, were COMUS Korea; COMUSTDC; COMUSMACTHAI; National Security Agency, Pacific; Fifth and 13th Air Forces; and

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1 J3C1 HistSum Jun 71.
2 J3B211 HistSum Nov 71; CINCPAC 220413Z Oct 71; CINCPACAF 120055Z Nov 71.
3 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 58-59.
4 J3C231 HistSum May 71.

[redacted] Data Processing Requirements

(S) CINCPAC was still using the old AN-FYK-1 computer system at the Alternate Command Facility at [redacted] which was about [redacted] miles from his headquarters at Camp Smith. This system was not compatible with the system used at Camp Smith or with the World-wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). The matter had been brought to the attention of the JCS regularly since 1968, and it was necessary to do so again in 1971. In July CINCPAC revalidated the requirement. When a compatible system was installed, CINCPAC said, it would provide ADP support for command and control of PACOM general war and contingency requirements; provide a degree of compatibility with the national system and the systems of the Component and subordinate unified commands in the PACOM; substantially reduce support manning and costs at the [redacted] provide transition without degrading CINCPAC command and control when the IBM 360 second standard was replaced; release idle non-compatible computers and peripherals for use by other Defense Department agencies; and provide an alternate and separate facility capable of sustaining crucial ADP support to CINCPAC. In periods of increased tension, without new equipment, the [redacted] Battle Staff would not have ADP support readily available in the areas of SIOP force generation and execution, SIOP following, reconstitution of forces, nuclear weapons control, logistic requirements, and force status reporting. CINCPAC, therefore, again recommended that [redacted] be included in the next increment of computers in the worldwide system.[1]

(S) CINCPACFLT, meanwhile, was scheduled to get a WWMCCS new standard system computer for his headquarters. When it was installed, Navy requirements at the [redacted] would have to be reevaluated. CINCPAC did not believe it cost-effective to maintain the FYK-1 without Navy use of the machine.

(S) The JCS advised CINCPAC that they recognized that CINCPAC needed a general war program processing capability more compatible with the national system and other components of the WWMCCS than was possible with the AN/FYK-1 at [redacted] Action to resolve the question would be initiated subsequent to the Navy review of future ADP requirements by the [redacted] and by the receipt of guidance from the JCS from the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the phaseout of WWMCCS second-standard and non-standard ADP equipment.[2]

Transfer of Functions from COMUSMACV

(C) In June CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV to review functions that might be

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. I, pp. 49-50; CINCPAC 170403Z Jul 71.
2 JCS 6363/111922Z Aug 71.

COMUSMACV concurrence. CINCPAC, on 8 May 1971, authorized direct liaison between COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI to effect the transfer of operational control. Space authorizations for the Udorn, Thailand-based ARDF unit (consisting of three RU-8D aircraft) remained under the COMUSMACTHAI country ceiling. COMUSMACTHAI recommended a date and the transfer was effected in June 1971.[1]

Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma Terminated

(C) The Military Equipment Delivery Team Burma had been established on 24 September 1958 to provide technical and logistics assistance to the Burmese Armed Forces as part of the Military Assistance Program (MAP). It also had provided training to Burmese military personnel in the use and maintenance of U.S. weapons, when requested to do so. It was a joint Service unit and had been composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, commanded by an Army colonel. Because of Burma's avowed policy of strict neutrality, there were no official advisory activities and gradually the program had diminished. The Burma Military Assistance Program was officially terminated on 30 June 1971, although one U.S. enlisted man was attached to the U.S. Embassy at Rangoon until 31 December 1971 to close out team records and handle final delivery of MAP materials.[2]

Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia Activated

(U) To meet the demands of an expanded military assistance program for Cambodia, activation of a Military Equipment Delivery Team for that country was authorized in Washington in January 1971.[3] U.S. participation was kept to the minimum and Americans provided neither training nor advisory functions. The military command channel was from the Secretary of Defense through CINCPAC to the Chief of the Cambodia team. No more than 16 personnel were authorized to be domiciled in Cambodia; the other 44 personnel authorized were domiciled in the RVN. Assumption of command by BGEN T. C. Mataxis, USA, on 7 February 1971 was announced by CHMEDTC General Order #2.

Special Assistants for Embassy in Cambodia

(C) The Chairman of the JCS advised CINCPAC on 23 July that two French-speaking U.S. Army lieutenant colonels would be assigned as special assistants

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[1] J3B510 HistSum May 71; CINCPAC 030438Z Nov 70; COMUSMACV 051020Z May 71; CINCPAC 080425Z May 71; COMUSMACTHAI 030920Z Jun 71.

[2] CHMEDT Burma ltr, 25 June 71, Subj: Debrief Report; J5322 Point Paper, 27 Aug 69, Subj: Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT) (U); JO1 Memo 83-71 of 14 Jul 71, Subj: MEDT Burma; Phase Out.

[3] SECSTATE 003780/082351Z Jan 71.

were performed by such a representative or through a U.S. Forces Japan Liaison Group. CINCPAC tasked COMUS Japan, in coordination with the CINCPACREP Ryukyus, to submit a plan that recommended the mechanism by which the residual military functions of the High Commissioner and the CINCPAC Representative would be accomplished.[1]

(S) The result was the Joint CINCPACREP Ryukyus/COMUS Japan Outline Plan for Transfer of Functions, dated 27 July. The plan provided for an Okinawa Area Coordinator to be appointed from one of the on-island Service organizations, and established a temporary coordinating mechanism, an Okinawa Field Office (15 personnel), under his direction. This local field extension of COMUS Japan would, on Reversion Day, absorb the joint Service coordinative functions of the High Commissioner Ryukyus, the U.S. Civil Administration Ryukyus, the Joint Services Labor Committee, the Information Coordinator, the Reversion Coordination Group, and the CINCPACREP Ryukyus Secretariat. In recognition of the transitional nature of the Field Office, provision was made in the transfer plan for a review of the need for the temporary structure within one year after reversion. The plan for transfer of functions was approved by the JCS on 10 December by SM-758-71. The coordination mechanism, implementation schedule, and terms of reference contained in the outline plan were all approved. By the end of the year the Okinawa Area Coordinator had not been nominated by COMUS Japan for CINCPAC approval. A joint table of distribution for the Okinawa Area Field Office was included in a revised COMUS Japan Joint Manpower Program and forwarded to the JCS for approval early in 1972.[2]

Command Relationships and PACOM Forces for CINC Atlantic OPLAN [redacted]

(TS) CINCLANT Operation Plan [redacted] provided for the defense, reinforcement, and holding of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in the event of a threat to the base. In support of such action, CINCPAC was tasked to provide certain Marine augmenting forces to CINCLANT. The command relationships agreement between the two commands stated that operational command of any CINCPAC augmenting forces "will be passed to CINCLANT at a point mutually agreed upon..." or as directed by the JCS and that such agreement should be reflected in the appropriate CINCLANT plan. In order to conform with this procedure, CINCLANT proposed a command relationships statement for inclusion in a forthcoming revision to OPLAN [redacted]

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[1] CINCPAC 172324Z Apr 71.

[2] J5126 Point Paper, 7 Dec 71, Subj: Command Relations, Okinawa; J5126 Hist-Sum Dec 71.

delineated the responsibilities of those two commands in the deployment or redeployment of TAC forces in the PACOM. The agreement was revised on 28 July 1971 (superseding a 4 December 1968 agreement) and received by CINCPAC early in August. There was no change in basic responsibilities; rather, the agreement redefined the extent and type of control exercised by the TAC in moving forces through the PACOM.[1]

Combined Korean-U.S. Corps (Group) Headquarters

(S) COMUS Korea requested the views of CINCPAC and the JCS on the desirability of retaining the combined Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. Corps (Group) Headquarters beyond its scheduled phaseout date of 31 December 1972. CINCPAC asked for additional information and rationale on which to base a position, which COMUS Korea provided. COMUS Korea recommended that the combined headquarters remain under U.S. operational control for as long as there were substantial U.S. forces remaining in Korea. He also recommended that retention of the combined headquarters be a matter for annual review. CINCPAC then tasked CINCUSARPAC to provide his comments and recommendations on the proposal to retain the headquarters beyond the scheduled phaseout date. CINCUSARPAC's reply had not been received by the end of the year.[2]

Unannounced Visit of Thai Army Comptroller to USARPAC

(S) On 29 September CINCUSARPAC advised CINCPAC of an unannounced visit by the Comptroller of the Royal Thai Army, General Kajbundit, and a party of four other Thais. The General stated that he had been led to believe that the visit had been announced to USARPAC by COMUSMACTHAI. He addressed the possibility of assistance from the Seventh Psychological Operations Group in preparing leaflets for the counter-insurgency program and the current level of U.S. assistance, especially as it affected counter-insurgency efforts. USARPAC was noncommital to these overtures and advised the General that any changes or increases in U.S. assistance would have to be handled through MACTHAI channels. The group attended a command briefing and a luncheon hosted by the USARPAC Comptroller. A CINCPAC query to COMUSMACTHAI revealed that that command was unaware of the visit and had made no arrangements for it. No further information came to light after further questioning of possible sources. [redacted]

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[1] J5118 HistSum Jul 71.

[2] J5115 HistSum Dec 71, which cited COMUSKOREA 220525Z and CINCPAC 270404Z, both Nov 71 (EX), and COMUSKOREA 170736Z Dec 71 (EX).

[3] J5511 HistSum Oct 71, which cited CINCUSARPAC 292114Z Sep 71.

SECTION IV--U.S. BASES OVERSEAS

Coordinated Approach to U.S. Base Reductions

(S) Long before severe budget constraints began impacting on the PACOM, CINCPAC had kept a continuous watch on base requirements overseas to insure joint coordination and operational effectiveness. Although the bases themselves were Service matters, the facilities and services provided often affected other Services directly and major changes or reductions had a profound effect on CINCPAC's capability to fulfill his mission and execute his plans. He believed that a coordinated, joint approach to the whole subject was in the best interest of the United States.

(S) CINCPAC addressed the subject to the JCS in August. A recent JCS decision, he noted, had again emphasized the essential nature of coordinated planning for significant military adjustments abroad. CINCPAC continued:

> Particularly in this era of changing US international policy, the closure of military facilities and relocation of forces are regarded as signficant portents in the minds of our allies. We must face the fact that regardless of repeated US assurances that we will honor our commitments and remain a Pacific power, our allies are questioning our intentions based upon a pragmatic view of recent US actions. This questioning attitude on the part of our allies is reinforced by force and base adjustments which are accomplished in an abrupt piecemeal fashion without prior diplomatic warning.... As was so aptly stated by Ambassador Meyer in Tokyo, the "meat ax" approach to military basing adjustments is not in our long term interests.

To try to insure proper coordination of future overseas force and facilities adjustments, CINCPAC recommended two additions to JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces. In the section on Common Functions of the Military Departments and Services (paragraph 20101), he recommended the addition of the following:

> Obtain the views of the commanders of the unified commands concerned during the initial planning stages and prior to taking action outside service department channels with regard to changes in the disposition of forces, bases and logistics which would have joint impact or affect US military relationships with a foreign country.

Communications sites; and the Mito Air-to-Ground Range, which was located outside the Plain) were to be released as a quid pro quo with Japan for needed facilities construction at Yokota Air Base. The plan was phased from FY 72 through FY 74; when fully implemented the Air Force presence would be reduced by about 50 percent and significant high-value properties in the Kanto Plain would have been released. On 6 August the State and Defense Departments directed that the plan be briefed to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo in order to initiate the consultative process.[1]

(S) An addition to the plan was made in October when COMUS Japan advised of a proposal to move Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan plus the Headquarters, Fifth Air Force from Fuchu Air Station to Yokota Air Base and to release most of Fuchu Air Station and all of the Kanto Mura Housing area to Japan in exchange of new replacement construction at Yokota.[2]

(S) The Ambassador, on 13 October, expressed concern that the total quid pro quo package might create problems for the Japanese in view of their agreed commitments to major relocation costs in the following few years (Grant Heights, Green Park, and the Okinawa reversion), and asked for instructions with regard to the additions to the plan. CINCPAC recommended that the plan, including the Fuchu-Kanto Mura addition, be discussed with the Japanese at the earliest practicable time in order to avoid weakening the U.S. bargaining positions as U.S. programmed reductions became more visible to that government. Inclusion of this high-value, high-demand real estate, CINCPAC said, should enhance the attractiveness of the entire plan for the Japanese.[3]

(S) As a result of some private off-the-record discussions with trusted Japanese officials, it was revealed that the administrative machinery of Japan was nearly saturated with a host of actions involving issues critical to the interests of both countries. Critical issues such as relocation compensation, dollar-yen conversion, lease costs for U.S. facilities on Okinawa, textile-trade discussions, U.S. dollar defense measures, and the U.S.-Japan policy toward China could completely overshadow the Kanto Plain plan in the competition for funds. CINCPAC, therefore, recommended to the JCS that any amending negotiating instructions afford COMUS Japan the maximum flexibility in timing the opening of discussions of the plan within the current session of the Japanese Diet.[4]

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 72-76; J5124 Point Paper, 11 Nov 71, Subj: Timing of Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan Briefing to the Government of Japan; SECSTATE 143663/062101Z Aug 71.

[2] COMUSJAPAN 070545Z Oct 71.

[3] CINCPAC 161550Z Oct 71.

[4] J5124 HistSum Oct 71; CINCPAC 220409Z Oct 71.

a coordinated total facilities consolidation approach would be more satisfactory than a piecemeal individual approach.[1]

(S) Based on unofficial views of officials in the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Agency, Japanese interest in the Itazuke Family Housing Annex was so low that they probably would not respond until after 1 April 1972 and the beginning of the new Japanese Fiscal Year. Actions would have to be started, however, to implement U.S. plans to close the annex by June 1972, which would inevitably present to the Japanese "a visible contradiction to our negotiation position." CINCPAC, therefore, again stated the desirability of allowing COMUS Japan negotiating flexibility to permit securing the best possible position for the United States. Before he could recommend this to higher authority, however, CINCPAC asked for more possible modifications for the Itazuke-Hakata quid pro quo package and an evaluation of the follow-up quid pro quo study as it related to Hakata.[2]

(C) Another base that had come under consideration earlier in the year, and, again, one for which COMUS Japan needed the authority to negotiate with some flexibility, was the facility called Chitose III. In October 1970 the Secretary of Defense had confirmed closure of the base with release to the Japanese to occur on 1 April 1971. Only one U.S. Air Force element was to remain at the base, and that to be operated by personnel on an unaccompanied tour. On 24 February 1971, however, CINCPACAF requested that negotiations be extended to allow retention of additional facilities so that Air Force personnel could be accompanied by their dependents. Chitose III had been an Army base, but on 1 March COMUS Japan recommended that the USAF assume responsibility for the base so that negotiations could continue, but without U.S. Army Japan's credibility with its Japan Self-Defense Force counterparts being degraded. The Ambassador expressed concern over the last-minute reversal of plans, questioned the Air Force's expanded requirements, and pointed out that last-minute changes of this nature cast doubt on the validity of U.S. statements. He pointed out that, after originally fighting against the closure and being informed by Washington that it must be closed, he must now ask that our plans proceed for turning the facility over to the Japanese.[3]

(C) On 4 March the Secretaries of State and Defense indicated that although some modification of the closure might be necessary to meet USAF requirements, no modification would be at the expense of facilities already agreed for release

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[1] CINCPAC 272339Z Feb 71; SECSTATE 090625/242205Z May 71; CINCPAC 270359Z May 71.

[2] CINCPAC 192245Z Sep 71; J42 HistSum Sep 71.

[3] SECDEF 4145/222125Z Oct 70; COMUSJAPAN 010902Z Mar 71; J5124 HistSum Mar 71, which cited AMEMB TOKYO 1858/021005Z Mar 71 (EX).

[redacted]

(U) Some other considerations regarding the use of Japanese facilities are discussed in the following item on the reversion of the Ryukyus.

Ryukyus Reversion Plans Continue

(U) On 17 June 1971, in simultaneous ceremonies in Washington and Tokyo, the United States and Japan signed an agreement for the reversion to Japan of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands. These islands had been placed under U.S. administration by the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers. Okinawa, in the Ryukyus, was the largest and most populous of the islands, and was a major base for U.S. military forces. The 17 June agreement provided that on the day agreed for reversion the United States would relinquish and Japan would assume the exercise of all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and its inhabitants. U.S. civil authority would cease and the islands would again be governed as the other 47 prefectures of Japan. The agreement specified that under the terms of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty the United States could continue to use certain facilities and bases. These numbered 88 and included Kadena Air Base and Camp Sukiran. In addition, the agreement listed 34 installations or sites that were to be released in whole or part to former Okinawan owners or to the Japanese government; these included such important facilities as Naha Air Base and the Naha Wheel area. Twelve additional facilities were to be released to the Japan Self-Defense Forces or the Japanese Ministry of Transportation. In conjunction with the signing of the reversion agreement, an arrangement was concluded on 29 June under which Japan confirmed its intention to assume the mission for the immediate defense of Okinawa after reversion and set forth a specific schedule of deployment of Japanese forces for this purpose.[2]

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[1] Interview with COL R. A. Peters, J5124 by Hist, 14 Mar 71.

[2] News of Interest, CINCPAC Public Affairs Office, 3 Nov 71, p. 4; Arrangements Concerning Assumption by Japan of the Responsibility for the Immediate Defense of Okinawa, approved by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee at its meeting of 29 June 1971 (copy retained in Historical Br); see also CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 77-83.

(S) One matter that came under consideration early in 1971 involved dependent housing. Because of a number of informal reports of actions under way in Japan and Washington, CINCPAC voiced his concern that certain agreed basic military requirements in Okinawa were being eroded to accommodate the hardening Japanese negotiating position. Of particular concern, he said, was the indication that replacement facilities for those to be released to the Japan Self-Defense Forces might not be forthcoming, and that the Machinato Housing Area might be offered up with compensation being made from the $200 million compensatory fund. Of equal concern, CINCPAC continued, were the continuing tactics of the Governments of Japan and the Ryukyus aimed at improving their negotiating positions through the public airing of controversial issues. In the shuffle of economic and financial negotiations and through what appeared to be a calculated publicity campaign to soften U.S. negotiating resolve, it appeared that the retention of a basic U.S. military capability to meet commitments was becoming secondary to obtaining agreement acceptable to the Japanese and to maintaining an atmosphere void of conflicts that might impact on U.S.-Japanese relationships. CINCPAC recommended that dependent housing not be released as part of the $200 million package, but negotiated after reversion as a separate quid pro quo funded outside the $200 million, and that facilities programmed for release to the Self-Defense Forces for which there were continuing U.S. requirements be approved for release only after agreement that, prior to release, replacement facilities would be provided from compensatory funding. He also restated his hope that the terms of the Nixon-Sato communique (of November 1969) be adhered to as the basic U.S. approach to the reversion agreement. CINCPAC's recommendations regarding the Machinato Housing Area were subsequently adopted in Washington by the Okinawa Coordinating Conference that was held in April.[1]



[1] CINCPAC 230128Z Mar 71.
[2] CINCPAC 250413Z Jun 71.

[redacted]

(S) In August a survey team from the Office of the Secretary of Defense visited the PACOM to study the matter; CINCPAC representatives accompanied the team. The findings of the team verified CINCPAC's recommendation that the activities be relocated elsewhere on Okinawa, the primary option being Futema.[2]

(S) As the matter was studied further, in October CINCPAC considered several options provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and recommended approval of the option that expanded CINCPAC's previous recommendation. The expanded option provided for the KC-130s at Futema to relocate to Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Japan, thereby providing space for the Naha squadron at Futema. The patrol squadron at Iwakuni was to be relocated to Misawa Air Base, Japan. On 18 December the State and Defense Departments approved this relocation plan. The decision stated that the move from Iwakuni to Misawa did not preclude the use of Atsugi for all or a part of the patrol squadron's activities should the Navy desire such an arrangement, and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo did not foresee any significant objections by the Japanese Government.[3]

(S) The Embassy in Tokyo, however, reported that agreement already reached with the Japanese made relocation of the squadron to Atsugi impossible. The Japanese had also raised the question as to whether the United States planned to remove all Navy support activities from Naha Air Base before reversion. CINCPAC checked the matter with CINCPACFLT, who confirmed CINCPAC's position that there was no plan or possibility of relocating support activities prior to reversion. The State and Defense Departments also confirmed this and asked the U.S. Ambassador to strongly urge the Japanese to agree to expanded use of Atsugi.[4]

(S) CINCPACFLT recommended that due to the fact that operational, training, political, and facilities factors strongly favored Misawa, the Iwakuni VP

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1 CINCPAC 250413Z Jun 71.
2 J5124 HistSum Aug 71.
3 J5124 HistSum Dec 71; SECSTATE 227781/1/182053Z Dec 71.
4 SECSTATE 230820/232346Z Dec 71.

Defense Agency and the U.S. Defense Department had reached agreement on these arrangements, which were formalized at the SCC meeting in Tokyo on 29 June. Japan was to assume, at the earliest practicable date subsequent to Reversion Day but not later than 1 July 1973, the mission for the immediate defense of Okinawa. Interceptor air defense alert, ground defense, maritime defense patrol, and search and rescue missions were to be assumed by Reversion Day plus six months. Surface-to-air missile defense and aircraft control and warning missions were to be assumed by 1 July 1973.

(S) Within six months after Reversion Day, Japan was to deploy approximately 3,200 personnel to Okinawa. The Ground Self-Defense Force was to deploy two infantry companies, an engineer company, an aviation unit, and a supporting unit. The Maritime Self-Defense Force was to deploy a base unit and an antisubmarine patrol unit. The Air Self-Defense Force was to deploy a headquarters, a fighter interceptor (F-104) unit, and an aircraft control and warning (AC&W) unit. Additionally, Japan was to deploy a NIKE group (three batteries), a HAWK group (four batteries), and appropriate supporting troops to carry out the SAM defense and operate the AC&W system. The fighter interceptor squadron, aviation unit, and antisubmarine patrol units would be based at Naha Air Base. The infantry and engineer units would be at the Naha Wheel area. Other Maritime Forces would be accommodated under joint use arrangements (under the Status of Forces Agreement) at White Beach and Naha Port. The NIKE, HAWK, and AC&W elements would take over facilities in use by like U.S. units now deployed.[1]

(S) The provision of planning contacts concerned with the beddown of most of these units had not been clearly defined. On 26 May, therefore, CINCPAC directed that COMUS Japan act as the focal point for channeling Japanese Forces planning to the appropriate Service component counterpart, thereby making maximum use of existing U.S.-Japanese planning groups and U.S. Service commands in both Japan and Okinawa.[2]

(S) Recognizing that certain functions and responsibilities would reside with the High Commissioner and the CINCPAC Representative up until reversion, CINCPAC directed COMUS Japan to develop plans and coordinate the implementation of those plans jointly with the High Commissioner. COMUS Japan, the CINCPACREP, and the Service Component commands were authorized to proceed expeditiously with the planning for the implementation phase of the Japanese Forces beddown and facilities turnover, with COMUS Japan tasked to keep the U.S. Military Representative on the Okinawa Negotiating Team and CINCPAC informed of the planning progress.

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[1] J5124 Point Paper, 7 Jul 71, Subj: Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibility on Okinawa (U).

[2] CINCPAC 260410Z May 71.

of increasing interest as U.S. bases and facilities in many countries of the PACOM were closed or reduced in size.

(S) While actual political status negotiations were not in CINCPAC's purview, he closely monitored events in this regard and sent an observer to the third round of status discussions held at Hana, Maui, in Hawaii, from 4 to 13 October. The U.S. delegation was headed by Ambassador Franklin Hayden Williams, the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations. The Joint Committee on Future Status of the Congress of Micronesia was headed by Senator Lazarus Salii of Palau; his co-chairman was Representative Ekpap Silk of the Marshall Islands. The Micronesians presented four principles as mandated by the Congress of Micronesia. The first three, with which the United States agreed, were that the sovereignty in Micronesia lies with the people, that Micronesians had the right of self determination, and that they had the right to adopt their own constitution. The fourth principle presented a problem. It was, according to the Micronesians, that any compact should be revocable by unilateral termination. The United States believed that termination of any agreement must be mutually agreed upon. This was the major unresolved issue at the end of the meeting. In other matters, the United States outlined its land requirements. These included the use of Tinian in the Marianas, the Kwajalein complex in the Marshalls, and the right for future use and development of Malakal Harbor anchorage and 40 acres of land, as well as a staging area and maneuver land on Babelthaup, all in the Palaus. An improved airfield for joint use was also outlined. Long-term leases were desired, although the right of eminent domain was not desired. Only emergencies could generate additional land requirements, the United States delegation said. As the round of negotiations ended, it was considered successful by the U.S. Ambassador as a dialogue had been reopened and tentative agreement reached on a number of issues. The Ambassador and the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations had a major coordinating effort to accomplish before the next meeting, which was not to be held until April 1972, after adjournment of the Congress of Micronesia 1972 session.[1]

(S) Until the political status of the TTPI was determined, it was believed that obvious military activity would result in situations that could prove contrary to overall U.S. interests. In 1969 CINCPAC had advised his Component commands and his Representative to Guam and the TTPI that the Secretary of Defense had directed that military interest or planning efforts were to be cautious and low key. To insure this, CINCPAC had directed that all military activities in the TTPI were to be considered of joint concern, and as such required CINCPAC coordination. Early in 1971 CINCPAC began receiving reports that Service personnel had been making contacts with the TTPI administration, the CINCPACREP

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[1] J5153 Point Paper, 4 Nov 71, Subj: TTPI Political Status (U).

Guam-TTPI, or otherwise entering the territory without either prior approval by CINCPAC or the post-visit debriefings that were required by CINCPAC instruction on the subject. On 25 February, therefore, CINCPAC reaffirmed the policy that all military activities were matters of joint concern and required CINCPAC coordination.[1]

(S) The land requirements that had been presented at the October negotiations were located in the Mariana, Marshall, and Palau Districts. No requirements were stated for the Yap, Truk, or Ponape Districts (these six districts made up the territory). Earlier, however, on 23 April the JCS had advised CINCPAC that Ambassador Williams had asked whether there were uninhabited islands in the Western Carolines area with no water or other economic value to the Micronesians that had potential for anchorage or basing use by the United States. The JCS asked CINCPAC to study the matter while exercising care to avoid causing public speculation. Specifically, they asked CINCPAC whether any uninhabited islands in the Western Carolines were suitable for long-range development into satisfactory military bases or anchorages; the magnitude of development costs for each facility, in sufficient detail to support a broad determination of economic practicability; and, assuming loss of U.S. eminent domain rights and unreasonable Micronesian rental demands for leases or options to lease, to estimate the island or atoll developments, if any, that would be militarily desirable over the long term if adequate funds were provided.[2]

(S) CINCPAC provided the requested data on 22 May. He identified eight islands or atolls as potentially suitable for development, and compatible facilities were postulated for each location. Cost estimates were included for those facilities. He defined the Western Carolines as west of 148° E Longitude, involving the Palau and Yap Districts. There were many islands and atolls, mostly uninhabited, but most of these were not suitable. Based on mid- and long-term objectives, missions, and functions, there appeared to be no requirement for Army facilities, and so no Army facility development data was included in the report. To develop an Air Force base facility (airfield, troop support facilities, utilities, and roads) was estimated to cost about $58 million and require about 1,300 acres. Navy estimates ran much higher, with costs for an airfield running from $145 million to $170 million. This was because the Navy had included the cost of necessary cutting and filling to prepare the airfield site; the Air Force had not included specific costs for cutting and filling, but had estimated that it would involve costs in the "tens of millions" of dollars. Other Navy cost estimates had been for a logistics base ($75 or $80 million depending on the site chosen), ammunition storage ($60 or $90 million), POL

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[1] CINCPAC 210313Z Nov 69; ADMIN CINCPAC 252346Z Feb 71.
[2] JCS 5406/230811Z Apr 71.

Command. The plan was to address, as a minimum, land utilization, construction projects, cost estimates, construction phasing, and joint use of facilities, all in the context of the overall basing structure in the PACOM.[1]

(S) CINCPAC requested and was granted an extension of the deadline for the plan so that proper consideration could be given to the study in conjunction with another study being conducted on facilities and property holdings on Guam. The Guam study came about in response to inquiries by the White House Property Review Board and was a study of existing and planned utilization of all Defense Department facilities and properties, identifying those that were not being utilized or that were being underutilized, plus development of alternative plans aimed at "justifying the retention of present DOD holdings and/or reducing the DOD holdings on Guam considering short and long-range requirements." The study was to cover 26 facilities that encompassed 50,000 acres and were valued in excess of $444 million. Included were Andersen Air Force Base, Northwest Field, the Naval Air Station at Agana, the Naval Station and Naval magazine, the Public Works Center, supply depot, hospital, communications stations, and other sites and facilities.[2]

(S) CINCPAC made a number of recommendations on the subject to the JCS on 20 October. Regarding the general parameters of the study, CINCPAC said:

> The most important aspect of Guam is its potential for supporting Pacific operations during contingencies and serving as the westernmost operating complex in the event other WESTPAC bases are denied for use. Degradation of Guam's potential, coupled with the occurrence of a contingency after denial of other WESTPAC bases, would place the U.S. in an untenable position in WESTPAC. While the DOD study charter includes wording such as "based on long-range requirements" and "planned missions," the potential in the study for degradation of military capability is so great that explicit recognition of contingency and base denial requirements should be included.

CINCPAC also addressed the fact that possible future acquisition of land should be noted and studied as some such actions were already programmed, although "the aim is to not increase net DOD land holdings." The study was scheduled to be conducted by the Defense Department, but CINCPAC proposed that he direct it. "Since CINCPAC has the responsibility for directing the execution of war plans in the PACOM, the distribution of land, facilities and resultant capabilities

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[1] JCS 2663/291504Z Nov 71.
[2] JCS 6863/132143Z Oct 71.

Subsequently, at CINCPAC's request CINCPACFLT submitted a preliminary plan for a series of Marine training exercises on Tinian. CINCPAC advised the Chairman of the JCS of plans for the entry of a small reconnaissance team, and the Chairman had no objection. Consultation with Ambassador Williams, the President's personal representative, resulted in his request that any unusual military activity be avoided until agreement fulfilling U.S. land needs had taken shape. He visualized no problems in coordinating small administrative surveys or visits that could be considered usual activity. CINCPAC believed that a graduated series of Marine training exercises was a feasible means of increasing military presence and demonstrating use of the military retention lands. The entry of a small reconnaissance team would enhance planning for subsequent training exercises. Between 8 and 12 November, therefore, a small "administrative survey" was accomplished, with no over-the-beach operations.[1]

(S) The Marines, evaluating the survey, concluded that the beaches were unsuitable, with peacetime safety considerations, for amphibious landing exercises for a Marine Amphibious Unit or larger. They further indicated that dense jungle areas would severely hamper effective use of military retention lands for maneuver areas. The Fleet Marine Force Pacific, however, indicated that they were still interested in using Tinian for maneuvers and had under consideration a platoon or company size reconnaissance exercise for the first quarter of FY 73.[2]

Base Closures and Force Drawdowns in Korea

(S) In Korea, as in many other places, U.S. presence was diminishing as bases were closed and forces reduced. On 14 October 1970 the Secretary of Defense had requested information on plans for the interim drawdown of the 7th U.S. Infantry Division, disposition of property, and associated personnel actions in Korea. Between the bulky nature of the information and some delays in receipt of complete information from COMUS Korea, the requested information began being forwarded to the JCS on 25 January 1971. CINCPAC told the JCS that the CG, Eighth U.S. Army planned to close 106 installations by the end of FY 71. Of these, 21 had been closed during FY 70. Of the 85 remaining, 23 had been closed by 31 December 1970. Under consideration for closure during FY 72 were 31 more installations, of which 16 were major training areas comprising 298,000 acres. The Department of the Army had designated the 7th Infantry Division for redeployment, with the 2d Infantry Division to remain in Korea. CINCPAC then provided

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[1] J3B16 Point Paper, 9 Nov 71, Subj: TTPI Amphibious Operations (S); J5153 Point Paper, 10 Nov 71, Subj: Marine Training Exercises in the TTPI (U).

[2] J51 Memo, 2 Feb 72, Subj: Marine Training Exercises in the TTPI (S), which cited FMF, Seventh Fleet (TF79) ltr of 6 Jan 72.

CHAPTER III

CHANGES IN COMMUNIST MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN 1971

The Communist Threat in Asia

(S) The overall assessment of the Asian communist threat did not change significantly during 1971. The threat to the Far East was established as nearly 3.5 million regular ground troops, organized into at least 179 line divisions and numerous smaller combat support and service units. Over 4,000 combat aircraft, mostly jets, comprised the communists' aircraft inventory. In addition, there were approximately 280 Soviet ballistic missile launchers, about 160 submarines, six cruisers, about 50 destroyer types, and numerous smaller craft. Modernization of these forces will continue, and they will remain numerically superior to the forces of their non-communist neighbors.[1]

(S) The threat to the Pacific Area continued to be the capability of the Asian communists to pursue their ultimate objective of communization of the Far East by direct or indirect use of their military forces. Communist China--being referred to as the Peoples' Republic of China as 1971 came to a close--was still recovering from the effects of the Cultural Revolution, but was expected to continue to develop a credible nuclear capability during the 1972-75 time frame. The Soviet Union continued significant building of its Far East military capabilities, and its forces in Asia eventually may be stronger than those deployed in Eastern Europe. North Korea maintained consistent pressure in attempts to subvert the Republic of Korea through unconventional warfare.

(S) Communist-inspired insurgencies or even limited wars remained a serious threat in Asia during 1971. War between the PRC and the U.S.S.R. is a continuing possibility. The ability of North Korea or North Vietnam to sustain conventional operations continues to be dependent on massive aid from either of the major communist powers.[2]

(U) The communist threat to Asia was further polarized, at least temporarily, by the Pakistani-Indian war of December 1971 which "liberated" East Pakistan and resulted in the creation of the quasi-independent state of Bangla Desh. The U.S.S.R. having supported the victorious Indians against the Chinese

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[1] J2212 Point Papers, 28 Jan 71 and 6 Dec 71, Subj: The Asian Communist Threat to the Far East, 1970-1975.

[2] Ibid.

(S) The assessment of the Chinese nuclear threat remained unchanged during 1971. Communist China had available both fission and thermonuclear weapons for medium and light bomb delivery, and fission warheads for MRBM delivery. Three surface-to-surface missile (SSM) sites were known, but there was no evidence that an operational system had been deployed to any of the three sites. At the end of 1971 the assessment remained that within a year, or by early 1973, the Chinese would have an ICBM capable of delivering a one-to-three megaton warhead, but did not have an operational missile for their single ballistic missile submarine.[1]

The Situation in Northeast Asia

(U) The situation in northeast Asia, as viewed from CINCPAC headquarters, did not change significantly until the last weeks of 1971, when the results of the Pakistani-India war threatened to exacerbate further the relationship between China and the Soviet Union. Long-range effects of the conflict, and the resulting creation of Bangla Desh, cannot as yet be evaluated. Similarly, the effects of the changing balance of power in the Asian communist community may have some effect upon the future actions of North Korea.

(S) During 1971 there were some changes in the CINCPAC assessment of the degree to which the U.S.S.R. had increased its force posture in the Sino-Soviet border area. In January it was estimated that the Soviets had some 36 divisions in the region, in varying categories of combat readiness; by March the figure had been upgraded to 40. Although the estimate in May had dropped to 38, by October 1971 the CINCPAC assessment had increased to 41 divisions. While it cannot be confirmed, some strategic missiles may have been reoriented toward China. The majority of the buildup appears to have occurred during 1969 as a result of increased tensions due to border clashes.[2]

(S) There has been no parallel buildup of Chinese ground forces. The Chinese had five divisions in the border region before the 1965 rift, and there were now estimated to be seven full divisions plus elements of others. About 115 Chinese divisions could be deployed to the Soviet and Mongolian borders, but such large-scale movements were not expected unless China attacked the U.S.S.R. The year saw no increase in the estimate of about 1,500 jet fighters in northern China at some 50 airfields.[3]

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[1] J2212 Point Papers, 28 Jan and 6 Dec 71, Subj: The Chinese Nuclear Threat.

[2] J2212 Point Papers, 28 Jan, 11 Mar, 13 May, and 27 Oct 71, Subj: The Situation in Northeast Asia. Slightly different estimates are contained in J2212 Point Papers for the same dates, Subj: Soviet Far East Military Forces.

[3] J2212 Point Papers, 28 Jan, 11 Mar, 13 May, and 27 Oct 71, Subj: The Situation in Northeast Asia.

along with assistance from several western and neutral nations. Although Ceylon has limited and restricted the Soviet presence, the recently signed fisheries agreement provides Moscow with an additional avenue for increasing its influence. In several countries wherein the Soviets' presence is not extensive, e.g., Burma, Australia, and New Zealand, the intent to increase their influence remains present.[1]

(S) The late-1971 events in India and Pakistan clearly show increased Soviet influence with India and in the Indian Ocean. The probable Soviet policy goals include the following:

a. The neutralization or leftist polarization of the littoral nations by pre-empting present and future western influence.

b. The expansion of Soviet influence over distribution and transportation of mid-eastern oil LOC's.

c. The establishment of space support activities.

d. The establishment of a capability to monitor probable future Chinese missile tests.

e. The development of economically and politically profitable trading partners secured by the expanding Soviet merchant fleet.[2]

Soviet Encroachments in Singapore

(S) The forthcoming expansion of the PACOM has also caused the CINCPAC to view with increasing interest recent Soviet encroachments in Singapore. Soviet interest in Singapore may be designed to achieve several goals: to neutralize Communist China's growing influence, to take advantage of opportunities stemming from the western withdrawal from the region, and to extend Soviet influence over the Strait of Malacca. The most important Soviet objective may be to set up unit interchange with the Soviet Indian Ocean and Pacific Fleets through the Strait of Malacca. It is likely that the Soviets intend to develop a supporting facility in Singapore to service their ships operating in both ocean areas.[3]

(S) The Moscow discussions of September 1970 between Prime Minister Lee of Singapore and Soviet officials were renewed in June 1971, and some type of

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 J2213 Point Paper, 6 Dec 71, Subj: Soviet Encroachments in Singapore.

COMMUNIST FAR EAST GROUND STRENGTH

USSR* AS OF 1 DEC 1971

MAJOR FIELD UNITS OF SOVIET ARMY
- 1 Combined Arms Army Hqs
- 1 Corps Hqs
- 26 Motorized Rifle Divisions . . . . . (TO 10,535)
- 6 Tank Divisions . . . . . (TO 8,506)
- 2 Artillery (Gun) Divisions
- 2 Rifle Brigades
- 5 Artillery Brigades
- 5 SS-1 (SCUD) Brigades
- PERSONNEL: 290,000**

* Includes Transbaikal FE Military Districts & Mongolia

** Does not include: (a) ground units assigned to territorial air defense (PVO); (b) coastal defense forces of Soviet Navy; (c) ground crews & support elements of the air forces; (d) Internal Security Forces and Border Guard Troops (33,250) (8,750)

NORTH KOREA AS OF 1 DEC 1971

- 5 Army Group Hqs
- 20 Infantry Divisions. . . . . (TC 9,297)
- 1 Tank Division . . . . . (TC 4,888)
- 3 Antiaircraft Artillery Divisions . . . . . (TC 3,507)
- 1 Missile Division . . . . . (TO 5,000)
- 4 Infantry Brigades . . . . . (TO 8,315)
- 1 Artillery Brigade (Howitzer-152mm). . . (TO 1,493)
- 2 Mortar Brigades (Heavy - 160mm) . . . (TO 1,200)
- 3 Rocket Launcher Regiments . . . . . (TO 1,095)

- 1 Reconnaissance Brigade
- 6 Independent Tank Regiments
- 2 FRCG Battalions
- 1 Independent Infantry Regiment
- 10 Artillery Regiments
- 9 Army Group AAA Regiments
- PERSONNEL: Total TOE Strength. 410,547
  Current Est Strength (80%) . . 361,500
  Paramil/Sec Forces 38,000

CHINA AS OF 14 DEC 1971

- 35 ARMIES:
  - 112 Infantry Divisions (TOE 13,910)
- 25 ARTILLERY DIVISIONS:
  - 15 Field Artillery . . . . . (TO HOW-6, 344) (TO GUN-5, 378)
  - 3 AT . . . . . (TO 4,220)
  - *7 AAA . . . . . (TO 3,143)
- 5 ARMORED DIVISIONS . . . . . (TO 8,004)
- 3 CAVALRY DIVISIONS (Security) . . . . (TO 5,710)
- 3 AIRBORNE DIVISIONS . . . . . (TO 10,263)
- 23 BORDER DEFENSE/MIS DIVISIONS . . (TO 8,538)
- 11 RAILWAY ENGINEER DIVISIONS. . . . (TO 11,012)
- 167 INDEPENDENT REGIMENTS **
- PERSONNEL (Army) 2,505,200

* 23 additional AAA divisions subordinate to Air Defense Command of the CCAF.

**Includes 1 Infantry, 6 Tank, and 6 Cavalry, 63 border/internal defense, 18 artillery, and 71 engineer, signal, anti CW and service support.

NORTH VIETNAM AS OF 1 DEC 1971

REGULAR FORCES (Note 1)

11 Inf Div	TO	10,400(est)
1 Arty Command	TO	14,100(est)
1 AD Command (36 AD regts)	TO	45,500(est)
1 Armored Command(1 armored regt)	TO	1,300(est)
1 Engineer Command	TO	13,600(est)
24 Independent Inf Regiments	TO	2,500(est)
8 Independent Engr Regiments	TO	1,750(est)
35-40 Inoepenent SAM Bns	TO	150(est)
5 Independent Trans Regiments	TO	450(est)
1 Sapper Command (9 sapper bns)	TO	4,500(est)

MILITIA:
- Class 1 - Full Time Militia Members Armed with Semi and Automatic Weapons and Med Caliber Arty Weapons.

SECURITY FORCES:
- Armed People's Security Forces 16,500

PERSONNEL:
- Regular Army . . . . . 393,000-320,000 (Note 1)
- Militia . . . . . (Note 2)

NOTES:

1. Strength does not include approximate 190,250 men deployed outside of North Vietnam.

2. Estimated to consist of 1,600,000 people's militia/self defense forces and 3,000,000 reserve forces.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 27.

COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH

FAR EAST & PACIFIC

CATEGORY		USSR #	COMMUNIST CHINA *	NORTH KOREA *	NORTH VIETNAM **	TOTAL
SUBMARINES	NUCLEAR					
	BALLISTIC MISSILE	6	0	0	0	6
	CRUISE MISSILE	16	0	0	0	16
	TORPEDO ATTACK	8	0	0	0	8
	DIESEL					
	BALLISTIC MISSILE	10	1	0	0	11
	CRUISE MISSILE	7	0	0	0	7
	LONG RANGE ATTACK	24	0	0	0	24
	MED RANGE ATTACK	39	48	4	0	91
	SHORT RANGE ATTACK (OLD)	0	4	0	0	4
	UNDEFERMINED TYPE	0	0	0	0	0
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS	LIGHT CRUISERS (MISSILE)	3	0	0	0	3
	LIGHT CRUISERS (GUN)	3 [a]	0	0	0	3
	DESTROYERS (MISSILE)	9	1	0	0	10
	DESTROYERS (GUN)	13 [b]	3	0	0	16
	ESCORTS (DE,PCE)	25 [c]	9	0	0	34
MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS AND SUPPORT SHIPS	MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS	156	719	169	45	1,089
	MINE WARFARE TYPES	82	85	0	0	167
	AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TYPES	57	450	20	0	527
	NAVAL AUXILIARY TYPES	102	232	0	0	334
	SERVICE CRAFT TYPES	[g]	767	121	50	938
PERSONNEL STRENGTH		94,000 [d]	177,600 [e]	10,200 [f]	3,000	

\# AS OF 1 DEC 71
* AS OF 1 DEC 71
** AS OF 1 JUN 71

a. One in reserve
b. Eight in reserve
c. Two in reserve

d. Does not include personnel in Naval Aviation, Coastal defense, or training
e. Does not include 31,500 personnel of Naval Air Force
f. Possibly includes Naval Infantry and Coast Defense personnel
g. Included in Auxiliary Count

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 30.

SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES

AS OF 1 OCT 71 USSR *		
TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS
SURFACE TO SURFACE		
ICBM	220	244
IRBM	0	0
MRBM	0	0
COASTAL DEFENSE	6-10	12-20
TOTAL	226 -230	256 -266
SURFACE TO AIR		
SA-2	201 [a]	1206
SA-3	50 [b]	200
SA-5 [e]	21-35	126-210

AS OF 1 DEC 71 CHINESE COMMUNIST		
TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS
SURFACE TO SURFACE		
ICBM		
IRBM		
MRBM		
COASTAL DEFENSE	6	12
TOTAL	6	12
SURFACE TO AIR		
SA-2	84	150-300 [c]
SA-3		

AS OF 1 DEC 71 NORTH KOREA		
TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS
SURFACE TO SURFACE		
ICBM		
IRBM		
MRBM		
COASTAL DEFENSE	3	6
TOTAL	3	6
SURFACE TO AIR		
SA-2		45-90
SA-3		

AS OF 26 JUN 71 NORTH VIETNAM		
TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS
SURFACE TO SURFACE		
ICBM		
IRBM		
MRBM		
COASTAL DEFENSE		
TOTAL	0	
SURFACE TO AIR		
SA-2 [d]		203
SA-3		

a. Forty plus sites occupied intermittently or no history of occupancy. 2 training sites.
b. Fifteen sites occupies intermittently or no history of occupancy.
c. Chi Com SA-2 sites may consist of 3-5 launchers.
d. Only a few are occupied; battalions frequently move between prepared sites. Estimated 35 to 40 battalions (three to six launchers per battalion).
e. 7 SA-5 complexes may consist of 3 to 5 launch sites of 6 launchers each.
*in area east of 100° E.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 34.

(Reverse Blank p. 100)

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING

SECTION I--THE JOINT PROGRAM FOR PLANNING

(U) The JCS prepared five basic planning documents annually, as a rule, although two additional long-range documents were prepared from time to time. CINCPAC was tasked to contribute to the preparation of certain of these. The completed JCS documents were used as the basis of further planning by CINCPAC and his staff. The discussion of three of these documents, which follows, stresses matters of particular interest in the PACOM. The Joint Research and Development Objectives Document is discussed in Chapter V.

Joint Long-Range Strategic Study

(S) The Joint Long-Range Strategic Study being prepared in 1971 was projected for the period 1 January 1982 through 31 December 1991, the long-range period from 10 to 20 years in the future. This was the first such study prepared since 1968 when the period covered was from 1979 through 1988. The long-range study dealt with the strategic implications of worldwide and national economic, political, social, technical, and military trends. It identified national objectives, policies, and military constraints and related these to world and regional courses of action. The document was analytical in concept and intended to stimulate more sharply-focused studies; it did not set forth a definitive position or policy of the JCS. The study made in 1971 did not present any significant departures from existing concepts pertaining to U.S. policies or international relations over the long range.[1]

(S) The national objectives addressed were of two types. First were the survival objectives, which were concerned with the preservation of the United States as a free and independent nation as well as the preservation of national institutions and national values. Another survival objective was the protection and advancement of the welfare of the nation's people. Also addressed were national objectives concerned with dignity, growth, and influence. These concerned the maintenance of an international environment hospitable to the interests of the United States and the Free World, one that would facilitate development and minimize the probability of war. Other objectives included the promotion of the economic, political, and military position of the United States in

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. I, pp. 95-96.

possible aggressive enemy action--one concerned with Northeast Asia, the other with Southeast Asia. CINCPAC provided his Components with copies of these scenarios and they, in turn, developed the forces that would be required in each case.[1]

(TS) The inputs from the Components were similar to those of the prior year. All were required to provide more detailed rationale and justification for their recommendations. Informal coordination with the Components helped speed preparation. THe CINCPAC Volume II JSOP 74-81 submission for U.S. Forces (Books Two through Six and Eight) was forwarded to the JCS on 29 July.[2]

(U) Book VII provided CINCPAC's recommended military force objectives for the PACOM "Free World" countries. CINCPAC prepared his input based on submissions from U.S. representatives in the 13 countries of the PACOM that were U.S.-aligned or oriented. The Component commands reviewed the data before it was forwarded to the JCS on 28 July.[3]

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(S) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) was the short-range document in the Joint Program for Planning. The plan in effect at the beginning of 1971 was for FY 71 and was normally replaced by a new plan before the beginning of the new fiscal year. High-level delays were encountered in Washington, however, while the Unified Command Plan revision was under study. The changes under study were to take effect during FY 72 and it was necessary to make decisions on a number of matters before the new Unified Command Plan could be issued.

(S) CINCPAC, meanwhile, was encountering some planning difficulties. The force structure was changing in the PACOM and there was only limited data on the availability of forces during FY 72. Among the most troublesome areas for the CINCPAC staff were those related to the preparation of the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List for plans that were being revised to conform to the format of the Joint Operation Planning System.[4]

(TS) The JCS recognized the planning workload imposed by the Unified Command Plan changes and the delay in JSCP production. On 25 June they advised the unified and specified commands that in order to maintain a capabilities planning base, the effective period of JSCP FY 71 was extended through 31 December 1971.

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[1] CINCPAC 170455Z Apr, 040053Z Jun and 150500Z Jun 71 (J5153 HistSum Jul 71).
[2] CINCPAC ltr Ser 000216, 29 Jul 71.
[3] J5154 HistSum Jul 71, citing CINCPAC ltr Ser 001690 of 28 Jul 71.
[4] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 114-115.

SECTION II--CINCPAC OPERATION PLANS

(S) By the end of 1971 there were 31 numbered Operation Plans in existence, although the number of plans was constantly changing as new responsibilities were assumed, some plans overtaken by events, and some plans consolidated with others. In addition, CINCPAC maintained three bilateral plans. The accompanying list shows actions taken regarding these plans during 1971.[1] Additional data on certain of these plans follows in this section.

CINCPAC Operation Plans

Plan	Title	Action During 1971
[redacted]	General War Plan (U)	Revised by CINCPAC in Apr 71; approved by JCS in Jul 71.
	Permissive Action Link (PAL) (U)	Minor changes approved by JCS in May and Sep 71; complete revision to be completed by mid-1972.
	Korea Contingency Plans (U)	Revised by CINCPAC in Jan 71; Change 1 promulgated in Jul 71; revision and change approved by JCS in Oct 71.
	[redacted] (S)	Scheduled for review in early 1972.
	Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens from Hong Kong (C)	Revised by CINCPAC in Jun 71; approved by JCS in Aug 71.
	Defense of Taiwan/Penghu (C)	Revision scheduled for completion in late 1972.
	Control of Maritime Traffic (C)	Revised by CINCPAC in Nov 71; under review by JCS; approval anticipated in early 1972.

[1] Information for this tabulation submitted by J511, except as follows: OPLAN 5003 by J3B73, OPLAN 5044 by J516, and OPLAN 5071 by J552.

Plan	Title	Action During 1971
[redacted]	Security of Selected Personnel and Equipment (U)	Revised by CINCPAC in Jan 71; approved by the JCS in Apr 71.
	Supplementary Collection Operations [redacted]	Revised by CINCPAC in Nov 71; JCS approval anticipated in early 1972.
	CINCPAC/FAAPAC Relationship (U)	Reviewed in late 1971. No changes.
	CINCPAC Cold War Plans (U)	Being held in abeyance pending possible cancellation.
	A Redeployment Contingency Plan for Southeast Asia (S)	JCS suspended all action on plan in Dec 71; CINCPAC to retain plan.
	ROK Forces Vietnam (C)	Undergoing revision. Completion anticipated in early 1972.
	Supplementary Collection Operation [redacted] (S)	Revised by CINCPAC in Apr 71; approved by JCS in Jul 71.
	Support of USSOUTHCOM Operations (U)	Under review; completion anticipated in mid-1972.
	[redacted] (S)	Revised by CINPAC in late 1970; approved by JCS in Jan 71.
	Air Harassment and Reprisal Options (U)	Revised by CINCPAC in Dec 71; under review by JCS; approval anticipated in early 1972.
	Quadripartite Naval Countermeasures (S)	Scheduled for revision in early 1972.
	Defense of India (S)	Promulgated by CINCPAC in Dec 71; under review by JCS; approval anticipated in early 1972.
	Defense of Pakistan (S)	Scheduled for initial promulgation and review by JCS in early 1972.

capability of conducting early conflict-free reconnaissance when high priority intelligence requirements or tactical situations so dictated. CINCPAC also directed planning for dispersal of land-based photo-reconnaissance aircraft and support resources. He suggested that consideration be given to establishing a sortie priority system to permit concentration on the most essential reconnaissance objectives in the event that fewer than the preplanned number of sorties were available.[1]

(TS) In another matter of SIOP planning, the 25th PACOM SIOP Force Application Review Group held its 25th meeting on 16 and 19 February 1971 to consider PACOM force application for SIOP Revision JULIET, to be effective from 1 July to 31 December 1971. With the implementation of this revision, CINCPACFLT had programmed [redacted] essentially replacing PACFLT SIOP launch station [redacted][2]

CINCPAC OPLAN [redacted]

(TS) CINCPAC OPLAN [redacted] consisted of a number of unilateral capabilities concept plans that could be executed in retaliation for North Korean hostile or provocative acts against U.S. Forces or against the ROK. Throughout 1971 there were several changes to parts of the plan, or recommendations for changes. On 13 April, for example, COMUS Korea advised that [redacted] CINCUSARPAC supported the recommendation. CINCPAC did not concur. He pointed out that the [redacted] Further, the CINCPAC [redacted] plans called for punitive type retaliation to North Korean provocations, not necessarily involving the destruction of the installation from which a hostile act may have been launched. CINCPAC proposed as alternate targets some [redacted] but CINCPACAF analysis determined that they should not be listed as targets in the [redacted] plan either. CINCPAC advised COMUS Korea that the [redacted] should be part of the day-to-day operational planning of that command based on daily intelligence assessments.[3]

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1 CINCPAC 060432Z Apr 71.
2 J3B721 HistSum Feb 71.
3 COMUSKOREA 130759Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 271211Z Apr and 252349Z May 71; J5113 HistSum May 71.

Requirement for Deputy COMUS Korea for Air Studied

(S) The question of the need for a Deputy for Air to COMUS Korea, who was also CINC of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC), had been under study for several years. The original purpose of the Deputy for Air billet, as reflected in Change 2 to CINCPAC OPLAN [redacted] in December 1968, had been to exercise control over all U.S. tactical air forces involved in a Korean contingency. In May 1969 CINCPAC had asked for designation of a senior USAF general officer for the billet.[1]

(TS) As the Deputy for Air was also assigned duties as Commander Air Forces Korea (COMAFK), who exercised operational control over the ROK Air Force as CINCUNC's air commander, control of all tactical air operations in the Korean area was vested in this one position. Strong Service objections to the "single manager" concept resulted in the OPLAN being changed to assign responsibility for in-country air operations to COMAFK and for out-of-country air operations to CINCPAC. The Deputy for Air billet was retained, but was assigned only responsibility to provide advice and guidance to CINCUNC/COMUS Korea on air matters. To provide coordination between the two, Change 4 to the OPLAN designated CINCPACAF as coordinating authority for tactical air operations against targets outside the area of CINCUNC/COMUS Korea jurisdiction and established a Joint Air Operations Center, Korea (JAOCK) with COMUS Korea (COMAFK) representation. This action essentially satisfied the original need for overall control and coordination of the air effort.[2]

(S) Late in 1970, during a review of Change 4, the JCS deleted reference to the Deputy for Air and assigned responsibility for providing advice and guidance on air matters for CINCUNC/COMUS Korea to COMAFK. On 10 April 1971 CINCPAC cancelled his earlier request for designation of a Deputy for Air.[3]

Joint Air Operations Center, Korea

(TS) In CINCPAC OPLAN [redacted] CINCPACAF was tasked to establish a Joint Air Operations Center, Korea (JAOCK) for the Korean area. Upon implementation of the plan it was to be the responsibility of the JAOCK to coordinate the employment of tactical air resources in the Korean area outside the area of jurisdiction of CINCUNC/COMUS Korea. It was also to coordinate the provision of air resources allocated by CINCPAC to support CINCUNC/COMUSK. CINCPACAF, or his designated

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1 J5115 HistSum Apr 71; CINCPAC 200747Z Mar 69.
2 J5115 HistSum Apr 71.
3 J5115 HistSum Apr 71, which cited SM-826-70 dated 23 Dec 70; CINCPAC 102333Z Apr 71.

"U.S. Supply and Training Mission Laos." On 9 October 1970 the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI had addressed the possibility of placing the plan and his supporting plan in suspended status indefinitely until political/military exigencies dictated updating or implementation. CINCPAC asked him (and CINCUSARPAC and COMUSMACTHAI) for comments or recommendations on 28 October. All responses were in favor of suspending the plan. On 26 December CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the plan be placed in suspended status, but that it be retained by task organizations in the event that such a plan might be required at some future date. CINCPAC based his recommendation on a careful analysis of the plan to determine the feasibility of implementing it and the need for maintaining it. The analysis revealed that with existing budgetary restrictions and the need for close management of resources the plan no longer warranted the expenditure of manhours and dollars devoted to its upkeep. Further, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan did not obligate CINCPAC to maintain a plan of this type.[1]

(S) The JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendation on 23 January 1971. On 29 January CINCPAC advised holders of the plan of the suspension, but task organizations were requested to retain the plan for reference in the event that circumstances changed to the extent that such a plan of action was required at some future date.[2]

CINCPAC OPLAN [redacted]

(TS) CINCPAC OPLAN [redacted] was concerned with ROK Forces in Vietnam. On 22 January CINCPAC advised the JCS of his intention to rewrite the plan to reflect a situation in which it would be necessary to return the Korean forces in Vietnam to Korea as rapidly as possible, but without the CINCPAC [redacted] plan (Defense of Korea (C)) being implemented. Both plans had been responsive to the same situations and thus were duplicative. The JCS concurred in CINCPAC's recommendation on 1 February.[3]

(TS) Earlier, on 4 December 1970, COMUS Korea had advised CINCPAC that the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff were unilaterally preparing a plan for the return to Korea of ROK Forces in Vietnam in the event hostilities should break out in Korea. To preclude inconsistency in ROK planning, COMUS Korea asked that certain data contained in CINCPAC Plan [redacted] be downgraded to SECRET and made releasable to the Koreans. COMUS Korea's request was held in abeyance while the [redacted] plan was undergoing review. On 13 March, however, CINCPAC asked that the JCS approve for release to Korea a statement containing the general data needed. The statement recommended for release follows:

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1 ADMIN CINCPAC 282229Z Oct 70; CINCPAC 262151Z Dec 70.
2 JCS 1895/231428Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 290209Z Jan 71.
3 CINCPAC 221912Z Jan 71; JCS 2919/012252Z Feb 71.

(TS) CINCPAC advised that the language relating to [redacted] was eliminated from the CINCPAC OPLAN in order to conform to JSCP tasking and that revision according to COMUS Korea's recommendation was not considered appropriate. The supporting plans of subordinate commands should reflect the mission as stated in the approved plan.[1]

CINCPAC CONPLANS [redacted] and [redacted]

(S) The JSCP for FY 72-73 directed CINCPAC to prepare concept plans for Air Defense Support to India [redacted] and the Defense of Pakistan [redacted]. CINCPAC prepared, in CONPLAN format, proposed mission, concept of operations, and tasking paragraphs and forwarded them to the CINCPAC Service Component commanders for review and comments on 23 October 1971.[2]

(TS) The proposed mission paragraph for providing air defense support to India was: [redacted] The concept for execution of operations contained provision for a U.S. Joint Task Force India under the command of CINCPAC and supported by other commands as directed by the JCS. The task force was to be headed by an Air Force commander with an Army deputy. Operations were to range from an augmentation of the Indian early warning and control system through active air defense operations against Chinese forces in Indian airspace. No offensive operations under this plan were foreseen, so commitment of U.S. forces was restricted to air defense units and personnel required to support the plan. The nature of the plan precluded planning with Indian authorities prior to execution. Security operations and escape and evasion operations could be required for U.S. forces, so two airborne infantry battalions and unconventional warfare forces would be "on call." Initial liaison would be conducted under the supervision of the Defense Representative, India. The deployment of forces and tasking associated with the plan were then described in some detail.[3]

(TS) The Component commanders were in general agreement with the proposed [redacted] paragraphs, except that CINCPACFLT felt that the Joint Task Force deputy commander should be a U.S. Navy officer qualified in air operations, while CINCUSARPAC felt that the deputy commander should be a U.S. Army officer.[4] CINCPAC determined that since the operations envisioned in this plan were primarily air operations and

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1 CINCPAC 230445Z Feb 71.
2 J5118 HistSum Oct 71.
3 CINCPAC 232150Z Oct 71.
4 CINCPACFLT 302325Z Oct 71; CINCUSARPAC 031903Z Dec 71.

Evacuation Plans for India, Pakistan, and Nepal

(S) On 19 August the JCS requested that CINCPAC develop and submit by 1 September a concept plan (CONPLAN) for military operations to assist the State Department in the evacuation of U.S. nationals from India, Pakistan, and Nepal. Following planning conferences held at Camp Smith on 20 and 24 August with representatives of the Component commands, a proposed CONPLAN was drafted. The CINCPAC staff was in general agreement with the proposed plan. CINCUSARPAC concurred, generally, but took exception to the part of the plan's command structure calling for CINCPACAF to act as a coordinating authority. CINCUSARPAC recommended that a single commander be established for the execution of the CONPLAN and that this commander be given coordinating authority prior to such execution. Neither CINCPACFLT nor CINCPACAF had significant disagreement with the provisions of the plan. When CINCPAC was briefed on the plan on 30 August he concurred in the proposal. He stated that he desired that command of an operation of this nature be retained at the unified command level. The CINCUSARPAC recommendation, therefore, was not accepted. The plan was submitted to the JCS on 1 September.[1]

(S) On 2 September the JCS asked for additional data concerning reaction times if PACOM ground forces were to be used in a security role as indicated in the CONPLAN. After obtaining data from his Component commands, CINCPAC submitted the requested information on 9 September. The data concerned both Army and Marine forces under conditions of both advance and no advance warning. On 20 September the JCS expressed concern with the reaction times used for possible deployment of these ground forces from Hawaii or Okinawa to the objective area under conditions of no advance warning. They asked that CINCPAC advise what actions could be taken or recommended to reduce those times, and to provide adjusted response times that the actions would effect. The JCS also advised CINCPAC that although the CONPLAN would probably be approved as written, future planning should consider the possibility that refueling might not be available in the objective area.[2]

(U) CINCPAC convened a conference with representatives of the Component commands on 22 September to discuss this latest JCS tasking and to assist in the development of a coordinated response. Further refinements were made to the specified reaction times by CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT and the requested data was submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS on 26 September. The refinements had been possible, CINCPAC noted, for a number of reasons: an increase in the number of C-141 aircraft made available by the JCS; additional tailoring of forces/equipment;

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[1] JCS 4513/192354Z Aug 71; CINCUSARPAC 302324Z Aug 71; CINCPACFLT 302352Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 010246Z Sep 71; J5114 HistSum Sep 71.

[2] JCS 7621/021450Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 090251Z Sep 71; JCS 202022Z Sep 71.

direction. The capability to execute the plan, as approved, was confirmed by the Operations Division's Contingency Action Team. This team develcped three new options to give the plan greater flexibility, two involving aircraft for short field or vertical lift operations, the other a floating platform concept that envisioned the use of helicopters flown from the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea.

(S) During the war between India and Pakistan in December, CINCPAC assets were available but it was not necessary to execute the plan. HH-53 helicopters with HC-130 refuelers were deployed to U-Tapao, Thailand to await further instructions when the runway at Dacca, East Pakistan was damaged, making evacuation by large, fixed wing aircraft improbable. Evacuation was required from both East and West Pakistan, but U.K. C-130s managed to land and evacuate all noncombatants to Calcutta, India for further transfer to designated safe havens.[1] See also "Indian Ocean Naval Operations" in Chapter V regarding the U.S. task force headed by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE.

Base Development Plan Appendixes to CINCPAC OPLANs

(S) Base Development Plans (BDPs) were prepared as appendixes to the Logistics Annexes to CINCPAC OPLANs. In October the JCS asked CINCPAC to submit a schedule for the submission of planned CINCPAC BDPs, identify those plans for which a BDP was not recommended and provide a brief rationale for the omission, and identify existing or potential BDP problem areas. CINCPAC's reply, of 28 November, recommended to the JCS that a BDP be prepared for only three of his OPLANs, [redacted]-Defense of Taiwan/Penghus (S), [redacted]-Defense of Korea (S), and [redacted] (an as-yet-unnamed plan that was to combine the former [redacted] and [redacted] plans). He listed planned submission dates in 1972. CINCPAC identified two problem areas; one concerned variations in guidance received on addressing the impact of enemy damage on BDP planning and the other was that the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) format did not provide guidance on the application of self-help labor to satisfy certain deficiencies, it addressed only the use of Service engineers.[2]

(S) The BDP to the Logistics Annex to OPLAN [redacted] was completed and forwarded to the JCS for approval on 28 April. On 29 July the JCS approved it subject to one change pertaining to the provision for the initial establishment of a Directorate of Construction in the Taiwan Defense Command (TDC) under COMUSTDC. On 3 August CINCPAC specified, in a change to the BDP, that COMUSTDC might request the establishment of a Directorate of Construction from the JCS through CINCPAC channels should the scope and complexity of the construction program warrant.[3]

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[1] J3B10 HistSum Dec 71.

[2] CINCPAC 280012Z Nov 71.

[3] CINCPAC ltr Ser 00949, 28 Apr 71, Subj: Base Development Plan (BDP) Appendix to Logistics Annex, CINCPAC OPLAN [redacted]; JCS 4302/290032Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 030735Z Aug 71.

recommended to the JCS on 15 January that the COMUSMACV requests be approved, and requested clarification as to whether copies of noncombatant emergency and evacuation (NEMVAC) plans could be distributed to Defense Attaches serving on ambassadorial staffs without prior approval by the JCS.[1]

(S) On 30 January the JCS approved the CINCPAC reocmmendations and advised that CINCPAC was authorized to distribute pertinent NEMVAC plans to Defense Attaches serving on ambassadorial staffs within the PACOM on a case-by-case basis. The decisions by CINCPAC were to be based on consideration of existing circumstances and need-to-know. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV that his requests of 14 January had been approved. On 3 February CINCPAC advised his subordinate commanders concerned with NEMVAC plans that future requests for authority to distribute copies of NEMVAC plans to USDAOs would require adequate justification and would be handled by CINCPAC on a case-by-case basis.[2]

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[1] COMUSMACV 140735Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 150333Z Jan 71.
[2] JCS 2574/300220Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 302319Z Jan and 031837Z Feb 71.

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SECTION III--CINCPAC PLANNING IN ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER COMMANDERS

U.S.-Japan Planning

(S) The Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan, a bilateral outline plan for the defense of Japan against attack, was revised in 1971. This was an extremely sensitive plan, [redacted] published annually by the U.S. Forces Japan and the Japan Joint Staff Council. In earlier years the plan had been reviewed and approved by CINCPAC, but beginning in 1970 the JCS had specified that they would review the plan. The 1970 plan--called [redacted]--had been submitted to the JCS for approval in August 1970. The JCS approved the plan (plus change 1) on 31 December, subject to five substantive changes. CINCPAC advised COMUS Japan of the approval on 16 January 1971. After incorporating the JCS changes in Change 2 to the plan, holders of the plan were notified of the approval.[1]

(S) The 1971 plan--[redacted]--was submitted for JCS review in August 1971 and approval was received in November. CINCPAC informed COMUS Japan of the approval on 1 December.[2]

CHJUSMAGPHIL Plan Requirements

(C) The Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in the Philippines reviewed his requirements for holding or maintaining a number of plans not directly associated with his area of interest or activity. In October he asked to be changed to an inactive status on CINCPAC OPLAN [redacted] the CINCPAC Cold War Plan, and to be deleted from the distribution of CINCPAC OPLAN [redacted] and CINCPAC Peacetime Reconnaissance and Sensitive Military Operations in the PACOM. As the [redacted] plan was inactive, the JUSMAG's plan was changed to inactive. As the JUSMAG had no requirement to receive or maintain the other two plans, he was deleted from further distribution and directed to destroy the copies he had.[3]

(C) In December Chief JUSMAG asked to be relieved of making supporting plans for CINCPAC OPLAN [redacted] and CONPLAN [redacted] CINCPAC's review confirmed that the CHJUSMAG Philippines had no combat functions and merely continued to perform his normal functions in war time. CINCPAC therefore suspended his requirement for a

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 116-117; J5116 HistSum Jan 71, which cited JCS SM-838-70 of 31 Dec 70; CINCPAC 160013Z Jan 71.

[2] J5116 HistSum Nov-Dec 71; JCS 1763/271714Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 010006Z Dec 71.

[3] CHJUSMAGPHIL 090012Z Oct 71; CINCPAC 160012Z Oct 71.

SECTION IV--PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP Policy and Programs for Southeast Asia

(TS) The whole matter of psychological operations (PSYOP) policy and programs for Southeast Asia came under extensive study in 1971. On 29 July the JCS advised that [redacted] (MACCORDS was COMUSMACV's ACofS for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.) CINCPAC was asked to comment on associated time phasing and organizational restructuring. On 3 August COMUSMACV stated that the disestablishment [redacted] would be untimely and harmful. On 6 August CINCPAC provided the JCS with a review and consolidation of the primary PSYOP functions being executed by MACV, [redacted] MACV's Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG), and the GVN [redacted] information agencies. Programs were also reviewed, considering both existing and projected phased down MACV PSYOP assets. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that an inter-agency conference be held with participation by interested field agencies, to address PSYOP support for the Vietnamese. The JCS approved the conference recommendation, directed that it address PSYOP requirements in Indochina, and said that the conference report would serve as the basis for the Defense Department's position on the subject.[1]

(U) The conference was held at CINCPAC's headquarters from 19 to 23 October. Conferees included representatives of CINCPAC's Component commanders, COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, [redacted] and the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, with observers from [redacted] the JCS, and the Departments of the Army and Air Force.[2]

(TS) The conferees identified three primary objectives for the U.S. military PSYOP [redacted] programs in Indochina through FY 73. In order of priority, these were developing and maintaining the loyalty and fighting spirit of the host country armed forces, developing and maintaining support within the civilian population for the local government, and conducting psychological warfare against the common enemy in Indochina. These objectives and their relative priority were based on the premise that in Indochina the various host country military and paramilitary organizations represented the largest, relatively cohesive, existing institutions. They were, therefore the most important groups to influence.[3]

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[1] JCS 4801/291444Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 060313Z Aug 71.

[2] CINCPAC ltr Ser 000320, 2 Nov 71, Subj: CINCPAC Report on Indochina PSYOP/POLWAR (U).

[3] Ibid.



(TS) The U.S. Ambassadors in Saigon, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh commented on the conference recommendations; all disagreed with CINCPAC's proposals. The Ambassador in Saigon said the proposals did not adequately recognize the progress made in Vietnamization. He saw no need for a CINCPAC detachment in Saigon, particularly in view of the desirability of reducing the U.S. military presence there. He said that motivation of both the fighting forces and the civilian population could better be accomplished by the country doing the fighting than by foreigners, and that the election campaign had demonstrated that Vietnam had an apparatus that in combination with other government activity had generated action on the part of the citizenry. He noted that while the military and paramilitary were effective organizations, one object of the U.S. Government had been to encourage greater GVN attention to the need and value of doing more through civilian institutions and influencing civilian attitudes. The Ambassador said that the proposed shifting of U.S. Government emphasis from advisory to direct support of host country PSYOP [redacted] systems was contrary to Vietnamization[2] and Mission policy was to phaseout that type of direct support. The goal was not to take over what the GVN could do and was willing to do on its own. While improvement of the GPWD was always desirable and necessary, whether thrusting additional responsibilities on it would help achieve this goal was, in the Ambassador's judgment, doubtful.[3]

(TS) The Ambassador in Vientiane believed CINCPAC overestimated what could be accomplished by use of U.S. military PSYOP assets. He said that experience had proved that it was futile for the United States to try to do effective PSYOP work for foreign governments, that locals knew how best to communicate with local target groups and therefore PSYOP programs should be conducted by the host government. He noted that the major limiting factor on progress in Laos was a lack of qualified personnel in the local PSYOP establishment, not inadequate U.S. support. CINCPAC, he said, should recognize that there was a very definite limit on how much support or advice local counterparts in Laos could absorb at any given time. Although he said he believed PSYOP to be important, the

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[1] Ibid.

[2] This had not been recommended by CINCPAC. CINCPAC had recommended increased emphasis on POLWAR advisory functions.

[3] AMEMB SAIGON 18193/171050Z Nov 71.

of a staff officer to expedite the process. The Ambassador again declined the offer. He told of a concept that envisioned sending selected Cambodians to Vietnam for PSYOP training, however. He stated that he did not wish to encourage over-reliance by the Cambodian Government on outside support in a field that they were handling reasonably well on their own.[1]

(S) CINCPAC's conference on Cambodian PSYOP on 23 May 1971 noted that little success had been achieved. The basic deficiency identified was the Cambodian Government's inability to develop and coordinate PSYOP programs and campaigns. The Cambodians, it was noted, did not have the necessary managerial skills to develop a viable national-level PSYOP [redacted] structure nor the required technical skills to support this effort. CINCPAC recommended that among other actions a small U.S. PSYOP liaison detachment be assigned to the MEDTC (Forward) to coordinate U.S. support. Other recommendations concerned PSYOP/POLWAR planning, production, and dissemination improvements, in particular the establishment of a Cambodian Army POLWAR structure. On 22 June the Chief MEDTC advised that in discussions of the subject the Ambassador had reaffirmed his instructions that the MEDTC make no contact with the Cambodian Government on PSYOP [redacted] matters. The Ambassador stated that his Special Assistant for Press and Cultural Affairs served as his staff officer for PSYOP [redacted] and was the point of contact for these matters with the Cambodians. The basic thrust of the remarks, the Chief continued, was that the Ambassador desired that in the matter of PSYOP [redacted] the MEDTC participate only to the extent of providing Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding.[2]

(S) On 4 December the Ambassador did consent to temporary duty by a CINCPAC staff officer to assist in PSYOP program funding for FY 73 and 74.[3] PSYOP programs were developed to the satisfaction of the Ambassador, the CHMEDTC, and CINCPAC. The programs reflected the perceived needs and priorities of the Cambodian Army and were considered "realistic and reasonable" in terms of the Cambodian ability to absorb and the U.S. ability to fund under the MAP.[4]

(S) Two specific programs were proposed for Cambodia in 1971, one of which came into being. RICE RIVER was the name given to the U.S. loudspeaker and leaflet operation directed against North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces in Cambodia. On 5 February 1971, with a view toward rallying the Khmer communists to the Cambodian Government, CINCPAC proposed that RICE RIVER be expanded geographically,

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[1] J56 HistSum Feb 71, which cited CINCPAC 072217Z Feb 71 (EX) and AMEMB PHNOM PENH 161100Z Feb 71 (EX).

[2] J56 HistSum Dec 71, which cited CHMEDTC 220745Z Jun 71.

[3] AMEMB PHNOM PENH 6224/040521Z Dec 71.

[4] CINCPAC 240329Z Dec 71.

For FY 72 Requirements, elements of expense were listed as follows: personnel salaries, $1,474,654; personnel benefits, $122,730; travel and transportation, $117,065; printing and reproduction, $5,349,606; purchased supplies, $373,482; supplies, $1,144,070; and equipment, $119,030. Funds were allocated for the publication of over 5.6 billion pamphlets, posters, calendars, magazines, etc.[1]

(S) On 18 March the Secretary of State provided funding guidance for future PSYOP programs in the PACOM. He said that PSYOP funds were intended for the conduct of PSYOP by U.S. Forces, that PSYOP funds could be used for support to Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) countries within dollar ceilings, that non-MASF countries should fund PSYOP under Military Assistance or Agency for International Development programs, and that equipment should be furnished through Military Assistance or purchased in-country using counterpart funds generated by the Commodity Import Program. CINCPAC informed the JCS on 1 April of the actions he intended to take to transfer PSYOP funding in accordance with the Secretary's guidance, and the JCS concurred on 9 April.[2]

(S) CINCPAC implemented the change on 10 April. CINCPAC stated that his policy was that PSYOP was a vital and viable instrument in the conduct of warfare in Asia and as such "must be a component of all US military and political activities conducted within the PACOM." His policy with regard to Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Korea (where PSYOP were not conducted solely by U.S. Forces) was that reasonable programs were to be included in FY 72 and subsequent MAP/MASF programs and that those programs should be funded in FY 72 in the dollar amount approved prior to receipt of the Secretary of State's funding guidance. CINCPAC requested that the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, CHMEDT, COMUSMACTHAI, and COMUS Korea develop MAP/MASF programs for FY 72 and requested that CINCUSARPAC continue to fund FY 71 programs from Operations and Maintenance Army funds so that the transition from that type of funding to MAP/MASF funding could be accomplished with the minimum disruption to operations.[3]

(S) Subsequent command action effected the transfer of funding support, but the level of funding was considerably reduced. In the case of Cambodia, the overall FY 72 program was curtailed in the face of more pressing military hardware requirements.[4]

Funding Support for Lao Psychological Operations

(S) Funding for Mobile Information Teams that conducted face-to-face

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1 CINCPAC 302319Z Dec 70.
2 SECSTATE 045967/182348Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 010240Z Apr 71.
3 CINCPAC 100558Z Apr 71.
4 J56 HistSum Dec 71.

therefore advised the Ambassador in Saigon and the Chief of Naval Operations that he was cancelling his hold on the PROJECT JENNY equipment.[1]

[redacted]

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 168-169; CINCPAC 232243Z Jan and 202338Z Feb 71; JCS 8582/270019Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 280412Z Apr 71.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; J56 HistSum Jun 71; SECSTATE 055602/021801Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 070311Z Apr, 190832Z Jun, 030830Z Jul, and 300116Z Jun 71.



SECTION V--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Southeast Asia Strategy

(TS) On 12 April the Secretary of Defense asked for a broad reassessment of military strategy in Southeast Asia. The JCS, with the assistance of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, had periodically conducted such reassessments--the last had been completed in July 1970. The Secretary asked the JCS to prepare a new study "in view of the major achievements of the past year and the fundamental changes in the situation now existing in SEA." The JCS were admonished to consider fully the constraints imposed: "dollar costs of the proposed strategy must be supportable within the resources we can realistically expect to have available in FY 72 and FY 73. Any proposals affecting the RVNAF should not require significant added financial or manpower resources." The Secretary remarked that past studies "provided me with important new perspectives on our options for the future and pointed to new directions for our policies and programs." He then listed a number of major developments that had occurred since the last study or trends that had become more evident. Among these were U.S. force reductions, the continued improvement of the RVNAF, a decline in the size and effectiveness of NVA/VC forces in and adjacent to South Vietnam, a continued reduction in the intensity of the war, the survival of a friendly government in Cambodia, successful RVNAF operations in Laos, and continued economic, political, and pacification progress in South Vietnam. Among the topics the Secretary asked to have considered were the roles and methods of operation of U.S. Forces once their direct responsibility for combat operations ended, required shifts in location or missions of the RVNAF to compensate for withdrawal of U.S. and other Free World Forces, the nature and extent of future RVNAF cross-border operations, alternative ways to interdict enemy material infiltration that the South Vietnamese might adopt when the U.S. air interdiction effort was greatly reduced or eliminated, and required actions by the RVNAF to preserve gains of the pacification program and to insure continued security and political-economic development.[1]

(U) CINCPAC convened a conference at Camp Smith 5-7 May 1971 to discuss strategy for Southeast Asia. Representatives of COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, CHMEDTC, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, and CINCPAC Service component commanders attended. A detailed evaluation by country (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and the RVN) was made of the capbilities, limitations, and potential to determine what could be expected to support the strategy. This force assessment was based on inputs

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[1] JCS 9850/132257Z Apr 71.

was reassessed, new levels arrived at, and planning continued. On 7 April the President announced the reduction that would have forces down to 184,000 by 1 December, the Secretary of Defense confirmed the force level milestones, CINCPAC provided phasing of the increments, and COMUSMACV provided the recommended troop lists.

(C) In response to CINCPAC tasking, COMUSMACV revised his CONPLAN 208 of 8 March 71 and submitted it to CINCPAC as COMUSMACV OPLAN J208 on 28 August. CINCPAC believed that this updated plan was the most realistic model for future redeployment planning, and so advised the JCS on 30 May in response to their request for alternative force structures for the RVN for mid-1972. The CINCPAC-approved plan was forwarded to the Chairman of the JCS and CINCPAC's Component commanders on 7 September. [1]

(C) Reductions continued, and on 16 October CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to prepare for planning purposes two detailed troop lists, of 62,000 and 100,000, for Increment 10 redeployment. COMUSMACV provided them in late October and early November and these were coordinated with the CINCPAC Component commands. On 12 November, however, the President announced the redeployment of 45,000 troops during December 1971 and January 1972. CINCPAC, therefore, tasked COMUSMACV to prepare a troop list for this number, which was provided on 21 November. Planning continued at the end of the year, including one alternative of a force level of less than 60,000 by 1 July 1972.[2]

(C) As of the end of December 1971 COMUSMACV reported a strength of 156,975, which was 17,975 personnel above the new ceiling for 1 February 1972 of 139,000.[3]

Redeployment of U.S. Forces from Thailand

(TS) The question of retaining a squadron of A-1 aircraft in Thailand had been raised in 1970. The State Department and the CIA had favored retaining such a squadron, although all had been scheduled to be redeployed in the BANNER SUN reductions of 1971. On 31 December 1970, however, the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had agreed to retain one squadron during FY 72. The previously approved personnel strength for Thailand for the end of FY 71 of 32,200 troops was unchanged by this action; there was also no change in approved sortie rates.[4]

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[1] J5525 HistSum Aug 71; J5525 Point Paper, 24 Jun 71, Subj: Redeployment Planning.
[2] J5525 HistSum Nov 71.
[3] J5115 HistSums May and Nov 71; COMUSMACV 010748Z Jan 72.
[4] CINCPAC COMMAND HISTORY 1970, Vol. II, pp. 107-109; JCS 9176/312150Z Dec 70.

in the Air Force proposal to redeploy the 480th TFS from Southeast Asia to the CONUS.[1]

(TS) On 8 September CINCPAC again stated to the JCS his need for relief from the Thailand manpower ceiling. On that same day, however, the JCS quoted from a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense in which he offered some temporary relief but little long-range hope. In response to a 17 August request from the JCS, the Secretary authorized temporary relief to accomodate the continued deployment of a B-57G squadron. The USAF manpower authorization of 26,044 spaces could be exceeded temporarily by up to 343 spaces. The authorization was valid until the end of 1971, by which time the Secretary said he hoped to be able to provide additional guidance regarding the ceiling for the end of FY 72. The Secretary said:

> This decision on a temporary adjustment will in no way prejudice the ultimate decisions on future US military manpower levels in Thailand. I recognize the difficulties in performing assigned missions within tight manpower and budget limits. Nonetheless, we must be realisitic in expecting those limits to be more constraining rather than less.[2]

(TS) On 14 October CINCPAC asked CINCUSARPAC to review Army spaces with the view of possibly transferring spaces to the Air Force, and he asked CINCPACAF to consider the transfer of an F-4 squadron and other USAF assets from Thailand to Vietnam, to aid personnel pressures in Thailand and to provide a greater tactical air capability in Vietnam. CINCUSARPAC said he could not generate spaces to assist the Air Force at that time. He noted that the COMTETS contract had been signed on 8 October 1971, and implementation of a similar program in Vietnam earlier had taught that a minimum of 180 days was required before the commencement of the phase-in of contractor personnel and the phase-out of Army personnel, with probably an additional 90 days required before the transfer was completed.[3]

(TS) CINCPACAF objected to transferring Air Force assets from Thailand to Vietnam. He listed several considerations, including the probability of accelerated redeployments from Vietnam while some USAF units were retained in Thailand, in which case units might have to be moved back within a short period of time; previous mention by the Secretary of Defense about relocating all

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1 J5522 HistSum Aug 71; CINCPAC 110351Z Aug 71.
2 J552 HistSum Oct 71, which cited CINCPAC 081114Z Sep 71. The Secretary was quoted in JCS 3787/082213Z Sep 71.
3 CINCPAC 142244Z Oct 71; CINCUSARPAC 190448Z Oct 71.

announced in-country strengths. The Marine Security Guard, for the time being, was to continue to be accountable within the Southeast Asia Deployment Program.[1]

(S) The subject surfaced again in May 1971. The matter of exclusion of a unit from accountability procedures was raised on 1 May when COMUSMACV asked that CINCPAC initiate changes to force structure guidance and control documents to exempt the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia. CINCPAC submitted the proposal to the JCS on 12 May. On that same day COMUSMACV made a parallel request--again to exclude the U.S. Embassy Marine Security Guard. CINCPAC recommended that the two proposals be considered together and that procedures be developed for considering force reductions of units not under the operational control of COMUSMACV.[2]

(S) Again the JCS denied the exclusion of units, citing again possible loss of credibility if changes were made. They concurred in the need for development of procedures, however, for considering force reductions of units not under the operational control of COMUSMACV or with missions that were not RVN oriented, and earmarking them within the Southeast Asia Deployment program. On 2 June CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to provide a list of these units.[3]

(C) One other strength accounting matter caused some concern when CINCPACAF noted an interaction of procedures in Thailand and Vietnam whereby some temporary duty (TDY) individuals were simultaneously reported on the weekly strength reports of both COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI. CINCPAC notified the JCS of the situation on 25 May, recommending that procedural guidance be changed to allow the exclusion of short-term TDY (less than 30 days) from ceiling comparison strengths in the RVN.[4]

Post-Vietnam Stationing of the 173d Airborne Brigade

(S) The 173d Airborne Brigade was removed from the PACOM in 1971, despite CINCPAC's recommendations in the matter. On 24 April the Department of the Army advised CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC that a review of force basing alternatives concluded that the 173d should not be relocated to Okinawa upon redeployment from Vietnam. The status of reversion negotiations, construction funding problems, Army-wide fiscal constraints, and the political climate in the United States and Asia were major factors considered in this decision. The

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1 JCS 1152/150021Z Jan 71.
2 COMUSMACV 011309Z May 71; CINCPAC 122253Z May 71; COMUSMACV 120920Z May 71.
3 JCS 4085/290525Z May 71.
4 CINCPACAF 070215Z May 71; CINCPAC 252040Z May 71.

PACOM contingency plans.[1]

Military Personnel Ceiling for Laos

(S) On 7 January the Secretary of Defense advised of his decision to establish a military personnel ceiling for Laos of 290 spaces, to be effective 1 February 1971. He envisioned a simple strength report with the Embassy reporting monthly on the number of attache personnel, Project 404 personnel, Embassy guards, and other personnel, by Service. On 9 January CINCPAC recommended that action not be taken to include the Laos ceiling within the Southeast Asia Deployment Program (Program 11) in view of the small number of personnel involved. He had no objection to the monthly report required, but he said that maximum flexibility for adjustment among the Services within the proposed ceiling should be retained to meet shifting requirements. [redacted] Vientiane.[2]

Redeployment of Korean Forces from Vietnam

(TS) Despite a request from President Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam to keep all Korean forces in Vietnam until 1973, the Korean government in June began planning for the withdrawal of 17,000 troops. The Chairman of the JCS passed to CINCPAC a message from the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon advising that the ROK government would send a team from Seoul to Saigon to initiate discussions regarding the withdrawal. The Secretary of State forwarded the text of National Security Decision Memorandum 113, which stated that the United States would support the presence of two ROK divisions until 1973. The matter was handled in diplomatic channels. As a result of discussions between the two governments, the Koreans decided to withdraw only 10,000 troops in the first phase of the redeployments, beginning toward the end of 1971. The ROK commander in Vietnam advised COMUSMACV that the 10,000 would consist of the ROK Marines and logistics spaces and would redeploy between December 1971 and June 1972. The ROK Defense Minister had stated earlier that Korea intended to withdraw all of its forces in Vietnam before total withdrawal of U.S. troops.[3]

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[1] J5151 Point Paper, 12 Aug 71, Subj: Redeployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade (U).

[2] SECDEF 9482/070017Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 090822Z Jan 71.

[3] J5524 HistSum Jul 71, which cited CJCS 9608/232146Z Jun (BOM), SECSTATE 114661/252250Z Jun 71 (BOM), AMEMB SEOUL 3921/030349Z Jul 71, COMUSMACV 040955Z Jul 71; AMEMB SEOUL 3824/300333Z Jul 71 (BOM).

1972 and the unsettled and possibly worsening situation in the Far East and Indian Ocean areas.[1] This transfer was subsequently directed by the JCS.[2]

(S) On 7 January the JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments in the matter of CINCLANT's intentions to not replace the USS STANDLEY, a guided missile frigate, when that ship returned to the LANTCOM in the summer of 1971. CINCPAC consulted CINCPACFLT on the matter and learned that further LANTCOM augmentation would not be required after about that time. By then the minimum of four ships equipped with the Navy Tactical Data System that were required would be available without augmentation from the LANTCOM. In April all concerned agreed that the STANDLEY would be returned to the control of the LANTCOM on 18 July.[3]

CINCPAC Involvement with Aircraft Requirements

(S) In some cases CINCPAC became involved in requirements for specific aircraft in Southeast Asia. For example, in March CINCPACAF requested CINCPAC support in obtaining three Tactical Air Command (TAC) AC-130 gunships for use in Southeast Asia until completion of the dry season interdiction campaign then in progress: CINCPAC fully supported the requirement and asked for JCS approval and initiation of action to obtain country clearance. The addition of the three TAC PAVE PRONTO AC-130 gunships to the existing gunship fleet, CINCPAC said, would enable the USAF to maintain maximum effort in gunship employment. The JCS, on 12 March, requested that the Air Force deploy two AC-130s; the possibly available third aircraft was being used for training. Country clearance, obtained through State Department channels, was granted on 15 March.[4]

(S) A February request from COMUSMACV for two additional C-47 aircraft could not be satisfied. COMUSMACV stated a requirement for the aircraft to support the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing and indicated unacceptable mission degradation if the aircraft were not provided. CINCPAC asked about the capability of CINCPACAF to provide the aircraft, and was advised that the only C-47s available were destined for Cambodia. Two aircraft, not operationally ready, should be made ready and available for assignment to the 460th by 30 June 1971. CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV that no aircraft could be provided at the time.[5]

(S) One aircraft that had not been working out too well was the PAVE EAGLE II (QU-22B). It had successfully completed its theater evaluation and was declared capable of performing the Southeast Asia IGLOO WHITE sensor data relay mission

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[1] CINCPAC 200037Z Nov 71.
[2] J5/Memo/00089-72, 13 Apr 72, Subj: 1971 CINCPAC Command History; Draft Review.
[3] JCS 051806Z Jan 71; ADMIN CINCPACFLT 132317Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 182022Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 170430Z Apr 71.
[4] CINCPAC 100256Z Mar 71; JCS 6195/122339Z Mar 71; COMUSMACTHAI 150640Z Mar 71.
[5] CINCPAC 020410Z Mar 71; CINCPACAF 050036Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 090307Z Mar 71.

Air Defense for Southeast Asia

(S) One long-range objective for Southeast Asia was a common air defense system that included the RVN, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, but this concept was a long way from realization in 1971. In April the JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments and recommendations on the JCS examination of such a system, prior to submission of a report on the matter to the Secretary of Defense. CINCPAC noted that although the examination was quite complete and theoretically sound in itself, there were some reservations about the possibility of successful implementation of such an air defense system. A number of considerations, he said, should be fully addressed if they had not already been duly considered. It would appear essential that an order of priority be established encompassing the whole threat concept, not isolating any one program. In Thailand, for example, provision of interceptor aircraft should not be to the detriment of counter-insurgency aircraft. The suggested system would require a continued high U.S. presence and involve a heavy U.S. financial burden for investment costs as well as operations and maintenance. The capacity of the national economies of countries involved to support the program, and whether the political climate in Washington would permit adequate budgeting to carry out the program, without sacrificing other programs, appeared highly questionable. In addition, "it is doubtful that long-standing animosities and suspicions among the countries concerned will permit realization of an integrated, viable Air Defense system in the near future and it may be necessary to settle for something less." He also recommended that some cost and U.S. personnel parameters be tied to the proposal if and when it was forwarded to the Country Teams for their views.[1]

(S) The Secretary of Defense indicated general agreement with the conclusions forwarded by the JCS, particularly in the matter that undue sophistication should be avoided and additional air defense improvements should be kept in perspective with overall requirements. Recommendations were approved to the extent that existing bilaterial relationships between the Governments of Vietnam and Thailand should be improved for more effective coordination of the air defense effort. Additionally, U.S. air defense capability was to be incidental rather than the primary reason for the existence of the U.S. capability. The Secretary saw no overriding need for multilateral regional agreements at the time. Although it was acknowledged that additional equipment would improve air defense capability, the use of existing resources was stressed.[2]

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[1] CINCPAC 240310Z May 71.

[2] J5514 HistSum Jul 71.

Combined Interdiction Campaign Plan

(TS) Continuing Washington interest had been directed toward enhancing the interdiction capabilities of the RVNAF. This culminated in a tasking to prepare a Combined Interdiction Campaign Plan for FY 72 that reflected increasing RVNAF participation in and responsibility for the interdiction effort and included concepts for the eventual transition to the RVNAF. CINCPAC submitted the required OPLAN (ISLAND TREE) to the JCS on 7 August 1971. The JCS forwarded on outline interdiction plan, based on the CINCPAC plan, to the Secretary of Defense on 23 August.[1]

Informant Programs in the RVN

(S) The payment of monetary rewards to Vietnamese citizens for information on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), on the location of mines and booby traps, and on U.S. personnel missing, held prisoner, or dead, continued to be a matter of study at all levels in 1971. On 13 April the JCS solicited recommendations from CINCPAC concerning expanded GVN and U.S. funding of the overall monetary reward programs in Vietnam. CINCPAC, in turn, solicited comments from COMUSMACV; these were forwarded to the JCS by CINCPAC on 22 April. Further answers to specific questions were required. These were forwarded to the JCS on 1 May. At that time CINCPAC provided additional commentary on the informant rewards program. CINCPAC emphasized that one significant, overall objective of the reward programs was to contribute to the neutralization of the clandestine VCI, which was regarded as the key to VC insurgent capabilities. "If allowed to continue taxing, proselyting, propagandizing, terrorizing the rural population, recruiting and controlling VC local forces, and administering VC-controlled areas, ultimate political success in Vietnam may be questionable," CINCPAC said. He noted the exhaustive efforts that had been made to develop methods for stimulating activities and programs designed to help cut into insurgent strength. Much remained to be accomplished, however, and increasingly it would have to be a GVN effort.[2]

(S) Reward programs instituted by the United States, CINCPAC continued, probably would have to be indefinitely U.S. funded. Otherwise the GVN would be left with the problem of replacing the program without money and with a developed appetite for monetary rewards. Increased rewards, however, as opposed to "patriotic duty" did not appear to be in

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1 J5553 HistSum Aug 71.

2 JCS 9803/131606Z Apr 71; COMUSMACV 201712Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 220805Z Apr 71; JCS 6227/232203Z Apr 71; COMUSMACV 291225Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 010442Z May 71.

the major share of the burden in producing PSYOP to support the informant and reward programs, but considerable U.S. support for both production and dissemination activities might be required. CINCPAC then addressed the concept of establishing a monetary incentive program rewarding the locating of caches and reporting check points and other infiltration information. He noted that existing programs had excluded rewarding RVNAF personnel or GVN officials because they were doing what supposedly they were legally and morally obligated to do, and because such rewards appeared to be in conflict with loyalty objectives and counter to the basic Vietnamization Program. The incentive recommendation, CINCPAC said, was not designed to supplant the sense of patriotic duty and public trust of these two official groups, but rather to advance a possible method for stimulating improved interdiction results. CINCPAC solicited the recommendations of other U.S. and Vietnamese agencies concerning additional incentives that might attract additional participants in the informant and reward programs in the RVN.[1]

Study of Future CORDS Advisory Program

(S) The number of personnel necessary to permit a viable future advisory program for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) came under study in 1971 in response to a 23 June message from the JCS in which they discussed a proposal to telescope the reductions proposed for CORDS for FY 72 and 73 into FY 72. They requested clarification of the positions on this subject held by COMUSMACV and the U.S. Embassy. CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to provide the required information with which to respond to the JCS, as copies of certain referenced messages were not held at CINCPAC's headquarters. COMUSMACV provided comments that clarified his position on the future of CORDS and the impact of reducing to the proposed end FY 73 manning level by the end of FY 72. CINCPAC answered the JCS specific queries on 2 July, and stated a strong concern regarding the proposed telescoping of CORDS reductions.[1]

(S) Meanwhile, the Ambassador had outlined his requirements for the future of the advisory program in a joint State-Defense-AID (Agency for International Development) message on 4 June. On 19 July the JCS indicated that they, in concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, had supported the Mission statement during deliberations on the subject. They asked CINCPAC to furnish the current field position relative to this matter without delay. CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV, who provided the latest projections of the FY 72 personnel figures on 21 July. These had been thoroughly staffed

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[1]CINCPAC 132012Z Jun 71.

[2]J5526 HistSum Jul 71, which cited JCS 9627/232204Z Jun 71, CINCPAC 262051Z Jun 71, COMUSMACV 301035Z Jun 71, and CINCPAC 020930Z Jul 71 (all BOM).

[redacted]

(S) On 15 July the JCS tasked CINCPAC with responsibility for supervision of the study without imposing a deadline for completion. CINCPAC, in turn, tasked COMUSMACV to conduct the study, emphasizing that the analysis should be of sufficient depth to insure that underlying causes of problem areas were exposed, thereby providing the clearest possible picture of capabilities that could significantly impact on high-level Washington decisions. On 20 July COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC with an expected completion date of 20 August based on data and sources available within Vietnam. No support was required from COMUSMACTHAI.[1]

Use of Singapore Ship Repair and Other Facilities

(S) In 1970 CINCPAC had addressed the matter of the strategic importance of Singapore and the need to preserve U.S. military access there, based both on British reductions and increased Soviet interest and activity. CINCPAC commented to the JCS on this subject again in March 1971. "Within the next few months," CINCPAC said, "some U.S. options, which could effectively blunt Soviet penetration into Singapore might become irrevocably foreclosed." He noted that warming relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Government of Singapore presaged formal arrangements leading to increased servicing of commercial shipping and future repair of Soviet naval ships on an "emergency" basis. Present U.S. courses of action, CINCPAC continured, "seem limited to diplomatically opposing any Soviet naval presence, positively affirming future (but definite) U.S. interest, participating in small scale aircraft and ship repairwork, and providing limited ship visits." These activities were important, he noted, but inadequate for achieving our twin objectives to stem imminent Soviet penetration and to assure the unrestricted future support of U.S. and other free-world military forces in Singapore. Those objectives, he said, "can now only be achieved by promptly commencing adequate long-term U.S. participation in Singapore's military oriented industrial repair facilities."[2]

(S) CINCPAC strongly recommended that there be no delay in examining all options for long-range participation in Singapore by the United States and

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[1] J5511 HistSum Jul 71, which cited SECSTATE 119181/012341Z Jul 71 (BOM), CINCPAC 040340Z Jul 71 (BOM), AMEMB SAIGON 10938/120941Z Jul 71 (BOM); JCS 151518Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 170501Z Jul 71; COMUSMACV 201129Z Jul 71.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 124-127; CINCPAC 190355Z Mar 71.

directed to use these revised instructions in preparation of the next edition, which was due to the JCS on 1 March 1972. The next USBRO was to be submitted using new standard reporting codes for certain entries so as to create all new records.[1]

Aleutian Island Wilderness Areas

(S) On 31 December CINCPAC approved a statement to be submitted to the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife emphasizing the necessity for military installations in the Aleutians and agreeing that only those lands necessary for operations should be excluded from being designated as wilderness. CINCPAC also advised his liaison officer to CINCAL that development of a contingency plan for defending the Aleutian Chain and using the plan to justify retention of maneuver areas was not necessary since an attack on the Aleutians--U.S. territory--would probably lead to expanded hostilities and the use of all land necessary for wartime operations.[2]

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[1] CINCPAC ltr Ser 00057, 1 Mar 71, Subj: Changes to U.S. Base Requirements Overseas (USBRO); forwarding of; J42 HistSum Jul 71; CINCPAC ltr Ser 2948, 23 Jul 71, Subj: Reporting Instructions for U.S. Base Requirements Overseas (USBRO).

[2] J42 HistSum Dec 71; CINCPAC 311928Z Dec 71.

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CHAPTER V - MILITARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND OPERATING AUTHORITIES

Rules of Engagement/Operating Authorities for Southeast Asia

(TS) Throughout 1971 CINCPAC was concerned with Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Operating Authorities for air operations in Southeast Asia. As a rule, and as had been the case in the past, CINCPAC asked for wider authority than was granted. At the beginning of 1971 the following Operating Authorities were in effect:

For Laos and North Vietnam, authority to:

A. Strike SAM/AAA sites below 20°N in NVN that fire on or are activated against U.S. aircraft conducting missions in authorized areas.

B. Overfly NVN by IRON HAND /missions to suppress fire control and SAM activity against PACOM air forces/ aircraft to extent necessary to protect B-52s.

C. Engage enemy aircraft over NVN with friendly aircraft and SAM missiles when enemy aircraft display hostile intent toward friendly aircraft operating outside the borders of NVN.

D. Overfly NVN by Laser-illuminator and electro-optical (EO) delivery aircraft to position themselves for delivery of ordnance on targets in Laos and recovery maneuvers.

E. Conduct strikes in the BARREL ROLL EAST BUFFER ZONE in a specified area and along the Route 7 bypass road from 2 KM west of the NVN border to the western end of the route.[1]

For Cambodia, authority to:

A. Conduct tactical air strikes, to include fixed wing and helicopter gunship, and B-52 strikes against targets in Cambodia in three areas: (1) FREEDOM DEAL, bounded by the

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[1] J3B214 HistSum Jan 71, which cited CINCPAC 060645Z Nov 70.

2. IRON HAND overflight of NVN: To allow overflight of NVN by IRON HAND aircraft whenever it is necessary to do so for protection of any forces, and not just for B-52s.

3. MIG Authority, NVN: Original authority to engage over NVN, as stated, but modified by expansion to indicate that when MIG forces do any of three things: (1) operate in NVN below 20°N, (2) exist on the ground in NVN below 20°N, or (3) operate within 20 NM of the BARREL ROLL EAST area of Laos, they are, by definition, hostile and therefore can be engaged.

4. Cambodian Authorities: To combine the three interdiction areas, FREEDOM DEAL, FREEDOM DEAL ALPHA, and FREEDOM DEAL EXTENSION, into one area called FREEDOM DEAL.[1]

(TS) Two of CINCPAC's four recommendations were approved when the JCS modified and extended the operating authorities to 1 November 1971.[2] IRON HAND forces could protect any forces, not just B-52s, and the three FREEDOM DEAL areas were combined. CINCPAC's recommendations regarding SAM/AAA and MIG authorities were not approved. Several air operating authorities that had no previous "effective until" date were given the 1 November date. Further requests for continuation of air authorities would have to contain rationale for continuation. CINCPAC provided information on air authorities on 30 April, as follows:

The following authorities are effective until 1 November 1971:

Laos: Operating authorities for the conduct of air operations in Laos are contained in the CINCPAC BARREL ROLL/ STEEL TIGER/YANKEE TEAM OPORD, coordinated with JCS, CINCPAC, and AMEMB Vientiane. In addition, air operating authorities granted by the JCS provide for:

- Special Interdiction Strikes.

- Air Strikes may be conducted within the BARREL ROLL EAST BUFFER ZONE in an area bounded by the UG0080 line in the north, 19°North in the south, 10 NM buffer zone boundary

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[1] CINCPAC 130340Z Mar 71; J3B214 HistSum Mar 71, which cited CINCPAC 010042Z Apr 71 (EX).

[2] J3B214 HistSum Apr 71, which cited JCS 3130/300049Z Apr 71 (EX).

line in the west, and a line four nautical miles west of the border of NVN on the east.

- Tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance may be conducted within 200 meters of Route 7 by-pass from a point two kilometers west of the NVN border to the western end of the route, as it may be extended. Strikes will be conducted under FAC control.

- Air Strikes: throughout Laos under the general approval of AMEMB Vientiane; exclusive of BARREL ROLL NORTH, Sam Neua, Khang Khai, or the Buffer Zone which require JCS approval.

- SAR may be conducted for U.S. personnel throughout Southeast Asia.

NVN: Air operating authorities granded by the JCS provide for:

- SAM/AAA Strikes in NVN. Fighter aircraft, including IRON HAND, may strike any SAM/AAA site in NVN below 20 degrees north, which fires at or is activated against U.S. aircraft conducting missions over Laos or NVN. Activity under this authority is limited to immediate protective reaction, without subsequent retaliation.

- Enemy Aircraft Engagement. Friendly aircraft and surface-to-air missiles may engage enemy aircraft over NVN, which by their (enemy aircraft) actions indicate hostile intent against U.S. or Allied aircraft operating outside the borders of NVN.

- IRON HAND Overflight, NVN. IRON HAND aircraft may overfly NVN to the extent necessary to position themselves between SAM/AAA sites in NVN and U.S. or Allied aircraft operating over RVN or Laos to protect the aircraft from attack.

- Laser-Illuminator Overflight, NVN. Laser-illuminator aircraft may overfly NVN, not to exceed three nautical miles, in order to guide ordnance onto selected targets in Laos close to the NVN border. Aircraft delivering laser-guided ordnance may overfly NVN for egress after releasing ordnance on targets in Laos. Aircraft delivering electro-

optical (EO) guided ordnance may overfly NVN to position themselves for delivery of ordnance on targets in Laos.

- Manned Tactical Reconnaissance. Manned tactical reconnassiance, including escort and other support, over NVN, limited to the area south of 19°. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, tactical reconnaissance in authorized except that tactical reconnaissance operations in BARREL ROLL NORTH require JCS approval. High- and low-altitude drone and SR-71 missions are authorized over all of Southeast Asia. U-2R missions are authorized over all of Southeast Asia except NVN.[1]

Cambodia:

- Interdiction: U.S. interdiction operations in Cambodia are conducted under authorities granted by the JCS and promulgated in the CINCPAC Basic Operation Order - unclassified nickname FREEDOM DEAL. Tactical air, fixed wing and helicopter gunships, and B-52 interdiction operations may be employed in the FREEDOM DEAL area and along Route 4. Additionally, air support is authorized in support of Mekong River security operations. Authorities for support of Toan Thang 9/71 are valid until termination of the operation.

- FREEDOM DEAL Area. In Eastern Cambodia bounded by the Laotian border on the north; on the west by a line 10 kilometers west of routes 69, 12, and 7 to the Mekong River; on the south from the Mekong River along Route 7 and 75A to the Prek Kampong Spean River, then to the RVN border; on the east by the RVN border to the junction with the Laotian border.

- SAR. The utilization of U.S. assets in SAR operations in Cambodia for both U.S. and third country aircrews has been granted by JCS and promulgated by CINCPAC to provide for (1) the recovery of U.S. aircrews and aircraft over all of Cambodia, (2) the recovery of Vietnamese Air Force aircrews and aircraft in emergencies when such efforts are beyond the VNAF capabilties, (3) the recovery of Thai aircrews in emergencies when beyond RTAF capabilities, (4) the recovery of CAF aircrews in emergencies when beyond VNAF and CAF capabilities. This authority will be exercised only in exceptional

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[1] Ibid.; CINCPAC 300625Z Apr 71.

cases and must be conducted with extraordinary controls. Ground fire may be returned during conduct of SAR operations.

- Reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance may be flown over all of Cambodia, with armed escort and flak suppression throughout the air interdiction area.

- Flare Operations. Flare aircraft may be employed in a flare role throughout all of Cambodia. They may be employed outside the air interdiction area only to meet high priority requirements and when no third country assets are available.

- FAC Operations. U.S. FAC aircraft may be employed in a FAC role to coordinate RTAF, VNAF, and Cambodian air strikes in that area where U.S. aircraft are authorized to conduct strikes.[1]

(S) CINCPAC promulgated the basic operations order for air interdiction operations in Cambodia, FREEDOM DEAL, on 11 May, providing guidance and authority for the conduct of air operations there. COMUSMACV was tasked in the operational order to control and direct air operations in Cambodia.[2]

(S) CINCPAC convened a conference at Camp Smith in mid-September to further review the air operating authorities that were due to expire on 1 November. At the time these had been outlined in CINCPAC's messages of 30 April (300625Z and 300626Z Apr 71), the 11 (0601Z) May 71 FREEDOM DEAL Operations Order, and CINCPAC 272318Z Sep 69 (plus changes 1 through 9), which was the BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER/YANKEE TEAM basic operation order. As a result of the 13-17 September conference, CINCPAC, on 26 September, requested that the air operating authorities due to expire on 1 November be extended through 1 May 1972. CINCPAC also recommended that certain of the authorities be modified and changed. The existing authorities were extended by the JCS to 15 November, then to 1 December, and finally to 1 January 1972, pending further review of the total CINCPAC request package.[3]

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[1] J3B214 HistSum Apr 71; CINCPAC 300626Z Apr 71.
[2] CINCPAC 110601Z May 71.
[3] J3B211 HistSum Sep 71; J3B215 HistSum Nov 71, which cited CINCPAC 260310Z Sep 71 (EX), JCS 9117/262226Z Oct 71 (EX), JCS 7120/131605Z Nov 71 (EX), and CINCPAC 290106Z Nov 71 (EX).

(U) Numerous other individual questions or requests for additional operating authorities arose from time to time in 1971. Several of these are described below.

(TS) In March CINCPAC asked for authority to take action against enemy artillery that posed a threat to fire support bases just south of the DMZ. Such guns were located near or within the DMZ and CINCPAC asked for authority to conduct tactical air armed reconnaissance to locate and destroy the field artillery pieces in North Vietnam south of 17°10'N and to conduct a one-time air strike against three field artillery positions in North Vietnam just north of the DMZ. Authority was not granted; the JCS stated that higher authority had concluded that other means (ground and Naval gunfire, tactical air) were adequate.[1]

(TS) SAM/AAA and MIG problems were encountered. CINCPAC's 1 April recommendations, discussed above, had not been approved. CINCPAC believed, however, that authority was required to attack and destroy any SAM/AAA target located in North Vietnam below 19°North in order to insure the safety of reconnaissance forces in the pursuit of their intelligence gathering mission and to enhance the safety of all friendly air forces in the adjacent areas of Laos and the RVN. On 25 April CINCPAC requested continuing authority to strike any SAM/AAA installation and/or equipment in Route Package I upon detection, to include follow-on strikes. He further requested that the authority be expanded to include all of North Vietnam south of 19°North. The JCS advised on 1 May that the request was not favorably considered, and they believed that CINCPAC's request did not present a strong enough case to support a reclama.[2]

(TS) CINCPAC had also asked for authority to conduct LOUISVILLE SLUGGER missions against two separate identified SAM equipment locations in Route Package I. The JCS forwarded to higher authority a strong recommendation to strike the sites, but higher authority concluded that existing countermeasures, tactics, and operating authorities were adequate protection for our aircraft and crews. In May the SAM/AAA buildup continued and CINCPAC again requested authority to strike, strongly supported by the JCS, but again the JCS were advised that higher authority had carefully considered the factors involved and determined that it would be inappropriate to conduct the SAM strikes at the time.[3]

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[1] J3B212 HistSum Apr 71, which cited CINCPAC 282306Z Mar 71 (EX) and JCS 9677/101716Z Apr 71 (EX).

[2] J3B212 HistSum Apr 72, which cited CINCPAC 252135Z Apr 71 (EX) and JCS 4904/011345Z May 71 (EX).

[3] J3B212 HistSum Apr 71, which cited JCS 4808/242054Z Feb 71 (EX) and JCS 5317/022319Z Mar 71; J3B212 HistSum May 71, which cited CINCPAC 250945Z and 280631Z Apr 71 (EX), JCS 4904/011345Z May 71 (EX), CINCPAC 112138Z and 151820Z May 71 (EX), and JCS 4764/202129Z May 71 (EX).

(TS) In regard to the MIG threat, on 14 April CINCPAC repeated his 1 April request that air operating authorities be modified to allow attacks on MIGs that were operating in North Vietnam below 20°North or operating within 20 nautical miles of the BARREL ROLL EAST area of Laos, or that were deployed in North Vietnam below 20°North. To provide the required protection, CINCPAC wanted to execute the FRACTURE DEEP plan. The JCS forwarded the request, but it was again disapproved. MIG attacks kept occurring and again on 1 May and 14 May CINCPAC asked for approval to implement FRACTURE DEEP, but both requests were disapproved, the JCS advising in the second case that a plan with a lower profile than FRACTURE DEEP had also been disapproved. Also in connection with the MIG threat, on 24 May CINCPAC requested JCS authority to use anti-radiation missiles against active ground control intercept (GCI) radar sites south of 20°North when MIG aircraft were airborne in the area. The JCS advised CINCPAC that higher authority considered existing authorities adequate to handle the North Vietnamese air defense threat and disapproved the request.[1]

(TS) On 29 November CINCPAC recommended authority to conduct protective reaction strikes against air defense, logistical, and other military targets in the southern portion of North Vietnam. The operation, called PROUD DEEP/ HAI CANG TUDO II, was approved by the JCS on 19 December, commenced on 26 December, and terminated on 30 December. The USAF flew 641 tactical air sorties during the 5-day period, the USN flew 307. Three U.S. aircraft were lost; bomb damage assessment was extremely limited by bad weather.[2]

DMZ Operating Authorities

(TS) On 26 June COMUSMACV requested authority to employ tactical air, heavy artillery, naval gunfire, area denial munitions, and ARC LIGHT strikes if the SAM threat permitted, throughout the entire DMZ. CINCPAC affirmed that the enemy threat to northern MR I appeared to be growing in light of accumulating intelligence, stated that existing authorities did not enable COMUSMACV to employ available resources above the Provisional Military Demarcation Line to blunt enemy capability, and recommended granting the requested authority as soon as possible.[3]

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[1] J3B214 HistSum May 71, which cited CINCPAC 140220Z Apr 71 (EX) and JCS 1936/282315Z Apr 71 (EX); J3B212 HistSum May 71, which cited CINCPAC 010540Z and 140600Z May 71 (EX) and JCS 2287/271951Z May 71 (EX); J3B212 HistSum May 71, which cited CINCPAC 241450Z May 71 (EX) and JCS 5922/121936Z May 71 (EX).

[2] J3B213 HistSum Dec 71, which cited CINCPAC 292117Z Nov 71 (EX) and JCS 6784/190038Z Dec 71 (EX).

[3] J3B32 HistSum Jul 71, which cited COMUSMACV 260124Z Jun 71 (BOM) and CINCPAC 260824Z Jun 71 (BOM).

(TS) On 8 July the JCS advised that additional authorities were denied. They asked for information relative to ARVN willingness to conduct ground operations to counter this threat in the DMZ and the level of U.S. firepower and logistical support they might require. Although the ARVN were not enthusiastic, the information was provided. CINCPAC reiterated to the JCS the importance of being able to assure the ARVN of the full range of U.S. fire support north of the DMZ. The Chairman of the JCS stated that no assurances could be provided for support of such ARVN operations. CINCPAC urged COMUSMACV to continue to develop plans for reaction against possible North Vietnamese Army incursions from across the DMZ.[1]

(TS) On 12 August COMUSMACV requested authority to conduct preemptive strikes with tactical air and artillery against 122mm field gun positions north of the DMZ. On 15 August COMUSMACV requested additional authorities with which to counter the enemy's road construction through the DMZ. In both cases CINCPAC strongly recommended that the authorities be granted, but the Chairman of the JCS disapproved both requests. When he advised COMUSMACV of the disapproval, CINCPAC urged him to continue to utilize existing authorities to their fullest extent.[2]

Restrictions on Navy Ship Approaches

(TS) CINCPAC believed in free use of international waters by all ships. As some nations began claiming as their own the international waters far off their shores or large bodies of water roughly encased by peninsular or island extensions of their land, however, CINCPAC believed that U.S. observation of such improper claims was tacit approval of them. The Sea of Okhotsk was such a body of water, claimed by the Soviets as a closed sea. On 19 August CINCPACFLT advised that Soviet naval activity indicated that a major exercise was developing with major combatant vessels and submarines and that he wanted to conduct [redacted] collection efforts against the Soviet units. He also requested authority to proceed into the Sea of Okhotsk if the Soviet units entered that area to demonstrate that the United States regarded the sea as international waters. He assessed that the surveillance effort presented high military risk, was required to fill urgent intelligence collection requirements,

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[1] Ibid., which cited JCS 4577/081938Z, COMUSMACV 240750Z Jul 71, and CINCPAC 270205Z Jul 71; J3B32 HistSum Aug 71, which cited JCS 8179/022351Z Aug 71 (BOM), CINCPAC 032238Z Aug 71 (BOM).

[2] Ibid., which cited COMUSMACV 121215Z Aug 71 and 151018Z Aug 71, CINCPAC 122208Z Aug 71 and 152057Z Aug 71, JCS 9581/251756Z Aug 71, and CINCPAC 260231Z Aug 71 (All BOM).

and was of very high political sensitivity (estimates of these conditions were required to support each specific operational request forwarded to higher headquarters). CINCPAC approved the CINCPACFLT request and forwarded it to the JCS on 20 August. On 24 August the JCS advised that since the Soviet units did not appear to be entering the Sea of Okhotsk, further action would be withheld; they concurred in the desirability of reaffirming the U.S. position in relation to the Sea of Okhotsk.[1]

(TS) On 27 August CINCPACFLT advised that since the Soviet units were operating very close to the 25-mile sensitive area, it would be desirable that U.S. units be authorized to proceed to 12 miles from land along the Kamchatka Peninsula and Kuril Island chain. Soviet surveillance units, CINCPACFLT said, routinely operated up to the three-nautical-mile territorial limit of the United States without protest. The U.S. Government did not recognize, but it respected, the Soviet claim to territorial waters out to 12 nautical miles. "With the Soviet exercise presently being conducted near or within the 25 mile sensitive area, the activities of the U.S. surface surveillance units are considerably restricted. It is estimated that the Soviets will be able to determine that U.S. units are in fact restricted to 25 NM." He recommended that authority be granted to operate up to the 12-mile claimed limit of the U.S.S.R. for the duration of the exercise. He assessed the mission as involving very low military risk and as being of low political sensitivity.[2]

(TS) On 27 August CINCPAC forwarded the request to the JCS, but he assessed the mission to be of moderate military risk and high political sensitivity. In the matter of military risk he thought that there was only a limited chance of an incident arising from the operation; a reaction in force was not expected. He did think that the possibility of a diplomatic protest or the use of U.S. surveillance activities as a propaganda ploy was high, but experience indicated that such a protest or propaganda attack could be expected from just having a U.S. combatant on the scene of the Soviet fleet exercise. Based on the JCS reply of 28 August, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to take steps to break off surface surveillance in sufficient time to avoid the appearance of validation of Soviet claims to the Sea of Okhotsk. On 31 August the JCS advised that the request to operate within 12 miles of Soviet territory had been deferred, but would be addressed if it appeared that such authority was imminently required.[3]

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[1] CINCPACFLT 192255Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 200834Z Aug 71; J3B4 HistSum Aug 71, which cited JCS 8514/241716Z Aug 71 (EX).

[2] CINCPACFLT 270515Z Aug 71.

[3] CINCPAC 271745Z Aug 71; J3B4 HistSum Aug 71, which cited JCS 3833/281707Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 282014Z Aug 71; JCS 5919/312030Z Aug 71.

(TS) On 5 September the matter of the Sea of Okhotsk arose again. On 5 September CINCPACFLT advised that Soviet force movements had included transiting the Aleutian Chain into and out of the Bering Sea and anchoring 12 miles off Analaska Island. He stated that these Soviet actions presented a most appropriate opportunity for a quid pro quo relative to the U.S.S.R. claim to the Sea of Okhotsk. Transit of that sea by a surface ship would also eliminate the existing ambivalent situation in which Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) flights were authorized in the area while U.S. surface ship passage was denied. CINCPACFLT advised that USS FOX, a guided missile frigate, had been detached from surveillance of the major Soviet naval force and was proceeding to the South China Sea with a fuel stop in Japan enroute. He proposed that FOX transit the Sea of Okhotsk and exit into the Sea of Japan through La Perouse Strait. He assessed the mission as having high military risk and very high political sensitivity, and provided his rationale for those assessments. CINCPAC forwarded the proposal to the JCS on 6 September and approval was received on 8 September. FOX was directed to remain 12 miles from Soviet territory and to exert maximum precautions to avoid incidents. The "completely unremarkable and without incident" transit was completed on 10 September.[1]

(TS) A question regarding operating limits of helicopters was raised in September by CINCPACFLT. He pointed out that a scheduled Canadian antisubmarine warfare exercise, MARTINI GLASS, afforded an opportunity to operate helicopters with dipping sonar in the Bering and Chukchi Sea areas. PARPRO restrictions introduced some confusion into such an undertaking, however, as surface vessels were restricted to 25 nautical miles or greater and aircraft to 75 miles. Thus the helicopter was conceivably illegal whenever it left the ship within 75 miles of Soviet territory. He requested clarification and CINCPAC, on 18 September, forwarded the request to the JCS. The JCS advised that the problem of non-reconnaissance activities within JCS-designated sensitive areas would be reviewed, but they provided interim guidance to the effect that helicopters operating from ships were considered relatively short-range extensions of the ship, and as such could conduct flights without further approval provided that they remained under the positive control of the parent ship.[2]

Infiltration Trawler Rules of Engagement

(TS) Since 1964 North Vietnamese steel-hulled infiltration trawlers had been attempting to land war materiels on the shore of the RVN. There had been 34

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[1] CINCPACFLT 052135Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 061315Z Sep 71; JCS 3358/081500Z Sep 71; CTU 70.0.1 (FOX) 101024Z Sep 71.

[2] CINCPACFLT 060345Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 130153Z Sep 71; JCS 5216/301750Z Sep 71.

known attempts by 1971, with 13 of them in 1970. In general the vessels came south from the vicinity of Hainan Island, following the sea lanes until they were in a position to make a run for the beach, under cover of darkness or bad weather, most often in the southern portion of the RVN. These vessels could normally be identified by visual and photographic means as North Vietnamese infiltration trawlers. Of those detected by April 1971, 4 had succeeded in landing their materiel, 10 had been captured or destroyed, and 20 had returned to enemy waters, fully loaded, after they came under positive surveillance. If the trawler was caused to abandon its mission, the objective of stopping it was considered to have been accomplished.[1]

(TS) Revisions to the rules of engagement regarding infiltration trawlers had been under study at the end of 1970. Late in December CINCPAC had recommended a number of proposals to be incorporated in the revised guidance. While CINCPAC was concerned with the rights of all ships on the high seas, he was also concerned with formulation of the criteria to be used by the on-scene commander to delcare a vessel hostile and subsequent steps that were to be taken to prevent infiltration. He listed 10 criteria that might be used to declare a vessel probably hostile, and a subsequent series of steps to resolve the question further.[2]

(TS) The JCS forwarded operational guidance on 13 March 1971 for Southeast Asia Rules of Engagement (ROE), specifically including authority to visit and search in international waters, provided that appropriate procedures and good judgment were employed in any determination of hostility. The JCS agreed that the difficulty in taking action in international waters had not been with existing ROE, but with their application. They said that from a legal and practical standpoint the suspicious ship must be identified as a possible infiltrator, and at the time action was taken to thwart the suspected infiltration attempt the vessel must be judged within reasonable certainty to pose a threat. "While such determination of hostility permits destruction, to preclude the possibility of an irreversible error, visit and search procedures may be instituted at this point. Once the intent to initiate visit and search procedures has been conveyed, the action may be continued even though the hostile vessel changes course and/or speed. Additionally, once visit and search procedures are initiated, the action must be continuous to a completion which could range from acceptable identification to destruction." The JCS continued that if prior to the conveyance of the intent to initiate visit and search procedures the vessel demonstrated its intent, not simply to escape for the moment but to abandon what might have been classified a hostile act, then the threat had been effec-

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[1] CINCPAC 170417Z Apr 71.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 200-204.

tively neutralized. The JCS said:

> The ROE-SEASIA require that all available information and intelligence be assembled, evaluated, and utilized in order that the determination to declare a vessel hostile can be tempered with sound judgment and discretion. Therefore, it is considered logical that the commander to make such judgments be COMNAVFORV or COMSEVENTHFLT (depending on which command has operational control of the on-scene commander). However, at the time action is actually initiated, such as visit and search, the hostile vessel must constitute a threat. Therefore, because of the short time in which a declared hostile vessel could change its hostile nature, i.e., by abandoning its intended mission, the logical commander to make the final decision of hostile intent immediately prior to initiating action would ordinarily be the on-scene commander.[1]

The JCS also noted that it was consistent with Vietnamization objectives that the Vietnamese Navy be encouraged to assume as large a portion of the MARKET TIME role as was within its capability, including action in international waters against infiltration trawlers. CINCPAC passed the guidance to COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT on 14 March.[2]

(TS) Further guidance was provided by CINCPAC on the subject on 17 April. He outlined essential elements in determining hostility, indicators supporting the hostility determination (adding 3 to the 10 he had proposed in December 1970), and detailed operational instructions. Implementation of these instructions, CINCPAC said, should optimize attainment of the primary objective: assured prevention of successful infiltration into SVN of enemy men or materiel.[3]

(TS) CINCPAC modified his recommendations for visit and search procedures on 5 May because of the self-destruction capabilities of North Vietnamese trawlers. The vessels carried explosives for this purpose and presented inherent hazards to a boarding party. CINCPAC directed that once visit and search procedures had been directed by CINCPAC, the trawler was to be directed to proceed to an appropriate RVN port under escort. If the trawler displayed the flag of the RVN, NVN, or the Republic of China, it was to be escorted to the

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[1] JCS 6217/131427Z Mar 71.
[2] ADMIN CINCPAC 141950Z Mar 71.
[3] CINCPAC 170417Z Apr 71.

RVN port. If it displayed the flag of Communist China or another foreign country, surveillance was to be contined but no further action taken. If the trawler refused to disclose its nationality and refused to proceed to the RVN port, it was to be harassed by high speed runs or blocking. CINCPAC directed that then a shot be fired in the general vicinity but not at the trawler and "if she refuses to proceed to RVN port....destroy the trawler."[1]

U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Talks

(TS) CINCPAC commented in December on an agenda item proposed for talks between the United States and the U.S.S.R. concerning incidents at sea. The proposed item would require both governments to "strictly instruct their pilots to display aircraft navigational lights during darkness and when flying under instrument conditions over the high seas." CINCPAC believed that such a requirement would cause a loss of flexibility in operations. He considered it essential that operations not be inhibited by agreements that would derogate the ability to carry out missions vital to U.S. security. CINCPACFLT on 7 December had provided more detailed reasons for rejecting the proposal. He believed that it was essential to preserve the freedom to operate in the completely darkened ship and silent modes. Operation of illuminated aircraft on such missions was an unacceptable derogation of operations. Detection of aircraft engaged in covert surveillance might result in modification of actions of the unit under surveillance and lead to incorrect conclusions regarding foreign capabilities and intentions. Degrading U.S. capability in this vital area by showing navigational lights at night on such missions was untenable unless agreement on the subject was to be used as a quid pro quo for other higher-priority U.S. objectives.[2]

Restrictions on Aircraft Approaches

(S) CINCPAC's 1969 Instruction entitled "Prevention of Inadvertent Overflight of Non-Friendly Borders" (CINCPACINST 3710.1) established a 20-nautical mile buffer zone extending seaward from the coastlines of the U.S.S.R., Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. The instruction also designated CINCPACAF as coordinating authority to implement the provisions of the instruction. On 31 August 1971, CINCPACAF imposed specific flight route restrictions on all aircraft under his operational control in the Western Pacific area. This resulted from concern expressed by the Air Force Chief of Staff about the political sensitivity on an inadvertant overflight of a non-friendly border during the time frame of the President's anticipated visit to China in February 1972.

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[1] CINCPAC 051141Z May 71.
[2] JCS 7293/032036Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 070805Z Dec 71; CINCPACFLT 070225Z Dec 71.

On 1 September CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF to review existing PACOM safeguards with other PACOM commanders to insure that they were adequate. After the review, CINCPAC concluded that existing guidelines were adequate but that this did not preclude Component commanders from establishing more stringent requirements for forces over which they had operational control as they might from time to time believe necessary.[1]

(S) Also in connection with the President's proposed visit the JCS asked for CINCPAC's views about changing the closest approach to the Paracel Islands by surveillance flights from 3 to 12 nautical miles. On 8 October CINCPAC recommended against imposition of the restriction because of the potential loss of intelligence information and the fact that it could be politically difficult to return to the former limit after the President's visit. The JCS agreed with CINCPAC, but still ordered the 12-nautical mile restriction on Paracel patrols until after the visit. The restriction did not apply to [redacted][2]

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1 CINCPACAF 310055Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 102052Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 252206Z Sep 71.
2 JCS [redacted] Oct 71.

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SECTION II--SOUTHEAST ASIA OPERATIONS

Southeast Asia Sortie Levels

(TS) Monthly sortie levels for tactical air attack, gunships, and ARC LIGHT B-52s were determined in Washington, at rates lower than those recommended by CINCPAC and with less flexibility than CINCPAC believed was desirable. Sortie levels as 1971 opened were as set by the JCS in August 1970 for FY 71. The monthly rate for tactical air attack sorties was set at 14,000 (10,000 USAF; 2,700 USN; and 1,300 USMC), for gunships at 1,000, and for ARC LIGHT B-52s at 1,000. Tactical air attack sorties were to be flown at an aggregate level of between 10,000 and 14,000 sorties a month. The higher level was a ceiling that was not to be exceeded in any one month. If the tactical situation required additional gunship sorties, a tradeoff between gunship and tactical air sorties was authorized.[1]

(TS) After assignment of the sortie levels in 1970, CINCPAC had made several recommendations: authority for tradeoffs among the Services, conversion of gunship sorties to tactical air sorties, and authority to "bank" sorties, or fly at an average rate rather than operate under a hard ceiling. The Chairman of the JCS disapproved the CINCPAC proposals, however, stating that the intent of the decision by the Secretary of Defense was to fly an average rate as close to the 10,000-sortie level as the military situation permitted, but not to exceed 14,000 sorties in any one month. Banking, for the purpose of overflying the monthly ceiling, was not permitted. The Chairman advised that the monthly planned tactical air sortie rate should be flown at the lowest level authorized commensurate with the situation. Under emergency conditions, such as a major enemy attack, the restraints would be set aside as necessary to enable the field commander to counter the attacks.[2]

(TS) On 23 January 1971 COMUSMACV requested increased flexibility to manage tactical air sortie levels as required to meet varying levels of enemy activity. Specifically, General Abrams requested that sortie levels be managed on an annual instead of a monthly basis. CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's request and requested JCS approval. The JCS approved the request and authorized the monthly ceiling of 14,000 tactical air sorties to be extended until 1 July 1971, as long as expenditures remainded within the FY 71 funded program. On

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, p. 142; J3B212 HistSum Jun 71, which cited JCS 7544/142250Z Aug 71 (EX).

2 J3B212 HistSum Jun 71, which cited CINCPAC 060126Z Sep 70 (EX) and JCS 12471/151532Z Sep 70 (EX).

1 June, however, the level was returned to 1,000 a month by JCS direction.[1]

(TS) In July, pending a final decision by highest authority, the Secretary of Defense directed an interim sortie level for FY 72. The Secretary also suggested a "banking" concept to manage the sortie level under an annual ceiling. The concept closely approximated the recommendations made by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. The interim sortie levels for FY 72, which also closely approximated those recommended by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC, were as follows:[2]

	1st Quarter	2d Quarter	3d Quarter	4th Quarter
Tactical Air				
Beginning of quarter	12,100	10,000	10,000	10,000
End of quarter	10,000	10,000	10,000	8,300*
Monthly Average	11,100	10,000	10,000	9,700*
(USAF)	(9,000)	(6,900)	(6,700)	(6,400)
(USN)	(2,100)	(3,100)	(3,300)	(3,300)
B-52 (Average)	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Gunship (Average)	700	700	700	700

* Surge capability to 10,000

(TS) No firm decision had been made on the FY 73 sortie levels, but the Secretary of Defense had provided some planning figures that were considerably lower than those recommended by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. The Secretary's tactical air sortie rate was 5,300 a month (3,500 USAF; 1,800 USN) compared to 8,000 recommended by CINCPAC. For B-52s and gunships the Secretary recommended 650 and 350 per month, respectively, compared to CINCPAC's 1,000 and 700 respectively.[3]

ARC LIGHT

(S) ARC LIGHT was the name assigned to B-52 operations in Southeast Asia. Details regarding ARC LIGHT operations are contained in the MACV 1971 Command History. CINCPAC was directly involved with these operations, however,

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[1] Ibid., which cited COMUSMACV 230210Z Jan 71 (EX), CINCPAC 232300Z Jan 71 (EX), and JCS 3830/112059Z Feb 71 (EX); JCS 4051/302011Z Apr 71.
[2] J3B212 HistSum Jul 71.
[3] Ibid.

especially when requirements changed, as when additional sorties were required; when validating Special ARC LIGHT Operating Areas or Partially Validated ARC LIGHT Areas (in Laos); or in such matters as disagreement over appropriate bomb load.

(S) The two bomb loads that had been used were called A/B and B/A. The A/B load consisted of 42 M117 (750-pound) bombs (carried internally) and 24 MK82 (500-pound) bombs (carried externally). The total weight was 46,302 pounds of which 20,820 was high explosive weight; the total cost was $18,450. The heavier B/A load consisted of 84 MK82 bombs (carried internally) and 24 M117 bombs (carried externally) for a total bomb weight of 63,780 pounds and a high explosive weight of 25,392 pounds. The B/A cost $24,600. Savings per month, using the A/B load, at the rate of 1,000 sorties per month, amounted to over $6 million, and at the beginning of 1971 U.S. Forces were using the A/B load.[1]

(S) On 25 February COMUSMACV requested immediate return to the B/A load to exploit the superior fragmentation characteristics of the MK82 bomb against heavy concentrations of enemy troops. Logistical analysis indicated that immediate implementation of the recommendation was not feasible with the surge of sortie rates in support of LAMSON 719 operations. CINCPAC, therefore, proposed on 27 February a plan to provide for an orderly phase-in to the heavier load. The plan entailed switching to 35 A/A (66 M117) and 5 B/A loaded sorties per day and then converting an additional one of the A/A loads each day to the B/A load until complete conversion was accomplished.[2]

(S) The proposal was accepted by COMUSMACV and the JCS. On 5 March CINCPAC ordered the Components to implement the phase-in proposal as soon as possible with conversion programmed for completion on 10 April. On 5 April COMUSMACV recommended that the B/A load be retained. He reiterated his position on 29 April, noting that a reduction in the total ARC LIGHT contribution could adversely affect COMUSMACV's overall objectives.[3]

(S) The Air Force Chief of Staff, on 21 April, recommended returning to the lighter A/B load as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June. He cited the continuing, unacceptable drawdown of the MK 82 stock level, the fact that LAMSON 719 had ended, the better maneuverability at high altitudes by the B-52s

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1 J3B221 Point Paper, 29 Apr 71, Subj: ARC LIGHT Bomb Load Decision 71 (U).
2 J3B22 HistSum Feb 71, which cited COMUSMACV 251140Z Feb 71 (EX) and CINCPAC 270314Z Feb 71 (EX).
3 J3B22 HistSum Feb 71, which cited COMUSMACV 010825Z Mar 71 (EX) and JCS 042357Z Mar 71 (EX); CINCPAC 050714Z Mar 71; J3B221 Point Paper, 29 Apr 71, Subj: ARC LIGHT Bomb Load Decision 71, which cited COMUSMACV 051230Z and 290318Z Apr 71 (EX).

with lighter loads, and the studies that indicated little difference in effectiveness between the A/B and B/A loads unless troops were struck in unprotected open terrain.[1]

(S) CINCPAC considered these matters, but, as he believed COMUSMACV's operational requirements to be the overriding consideration, he supported COMUSMACV's request to continue the B/A load. On 30 April, however, the JCS directed return to the lighter load to begin immediately.[2]

Joint Service Delivery of Laser Guided Bombs

(S) On 3 November CINCPACFLT provided stockage objectives for Laser Guided Bombs (LGB), which were to be introduced into the Navy inventory about 1 December. The Navy, however, did not have deployable laser illuminators, and in order to enhance the Navy's efforts during COMMANDO HUNT VII operations, on 10 November he asked that Air Force laser designator assets be authorized. CINCPAC authorized CINCPACFLT's request on 16 November and requested that CINCPACAF and COMUSMACV make available the laser designators for Joint Service use within mutually acceptable time frames to enhance the success of COMMANDO HUNT VII. CINCPACAF concurred and asked 7th Air Force to coordinate required actions with Commander Task Force 77; on 28 November 7th Air Force advised that sufficient aircraft were available to support the requirement. CINCPAC asked for further information from CINCPACFLT regarding stockage objectives; after receiving it he approved CINCPACFLT's proposals.[3]

Electronic Warfare Operations

(S) Electronic warfare (EW) activities in the PACOM continued to be primarily devoted to support of combat operations in Southeast Asia. Support was provided for ARC LIGHT, photographic reconnaissance, EW support measures, gunship operations, and drone activites to provide protection against the enemy's sophisticated air defense system with its surface-to-air missiles and MIG aircraft.[4]

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[1] Ibid., which cited CSAF 211955Z Apr 71.
[2] CINCPAC 300332Z Apr 71; JCS 4051/302011Z Apr 71.
[3] CINCPACFLT 032012 and 100351Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 160412 Z Nov 71; 7th AF 280230Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 100421Z Dec 71. Southeast Asia LGB kit requirements and storage objectives were 270 a month KMU-388/B (for MK82) with 810 as a stockage objective; 30 a month KMU-351/B (for MK 84) with 90 as a stockage objective.
[4] J3B8 HistSums Jan-Dec 71.

Electronic Warfare Deficiencies

(TS) Several times in 1971 CINCPAC reported to the JCS on EW deficiencies and capability gaps. In May CINCPAC reported on a survey of PACOM EW capability versus the existing and potential threat, taking into consideration the USSR's capability of deploying systems not then located within the PACOM. The survey revealed that the existing threat in Southeast Asia was adequately covered, but U.S. Forces were not equipped to counter existing [redacted] It was estimated that effective U.S. countermeasures for those systems would be developed in late FY 72. Severe USARPAC EW deficiencies also were brought to the attention of the JCS. CINCPAC recommended that an EW direct support detachment, equipped for an active communications/non-communications ECM (electronic countermeasures) role be assigned to USARPAC to enhance the Army EW effort.[1]

(S) In reply to CINCPAC's 11 May message, on 28 September the JCS advised that U.S. Forces in Europe faced a wider range of threats and therefore would have first priority on newly-programmed EW forces. They also noted the limited progress in development of infra-red countermeasures, battlefield radar countermeasures, and an Army lightweight warning receiver. They provided little assistance in resolving PACOM EW capability gaps.[2]

(S) On 26 September CINCPAC reported to the JCS on specific deficiencies and lessons learned for the period September 1970 to September 1971. Primary deficiencies he cited were insufficient EW support aircraft, which resulted in lack of EW support for various operational missions flown over North Vietnam and Laos; lack of significant EW training capabilities for U.S. Navy shipborne radar operators in the Western Pacific area; insufficient electronic counter-countermeasures throughout the PACOM except for Southeast Asia; and the continuing complete lack of non-communications EW capability within USARPAC. CINCPAC advised, again, of his belief that EW preparedness was an essential ingredient of sophisticated weapons and command and control systems. The time permitted to match the enemy threat, particularly in the early stages of a conflict, was rapidly becoming shorter because of technological advances. "It has been learned the hard way that expedited 'catch-up' efforts to respond to new and changing threats are far more expensive and much less effective than orderly, planned programs," CINCPAC concluded.[3]

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1 CINCPAC 110230Z May 71.
2 J3B8 HistSum Oct 71, which cited JCSM-620-71 of 28 Sep 71.
3 CINCPAC 262100Z Sep 71.

Electronic Warfare Assets in Southeast Asia

(TS) Electronic warfare assets in Southeast Asia remained under constant review in 1971 to provide, despite force drawdowns, for surges of activity to counter enemy air defense. Some actions in this regard are discussed here. To support increased B-52 strikes associated with Operation LAMSON 719, for example, COMUSMACV stated a requirement for additional EW assets, which CINCPACAF quantified as four EB-66s and three F-105G IRON HAND aircraft. The JCS tasked the Air Force Chief of Staff to provide the forces until the termination of LAMSON 719 and COMMANDO HUNT V.[1]

(S) On 29 March COMUSMACV stated a requirement for additional EW assets because of expanding enemy air defense activity in Laos and North Vietnam. Though 10 EB-66s were already in Southeast Asia on a temporary basis, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to deploy the entire PACOM EA-6A force, which consisted of six aircraft, from Iwakuni, Japan to Da Nang. CINCPAC requested that the temporary duty for the EB-66 force be extended for 90 days.[2]

(S) CINCPAC had directed the EA-6As to terminate on 15 May, by which time the SAM threat was expected to diminish with the onset of the Southwest Monsoon. The aircraft were returned to Iwakuni in early May. In addition, the JCS disapproved CINCPAC's request for extension of the EB-66 aircraft and requested termination of all 10 EB-66s. CINCPAC strongly recommended that the JCS reconsider and he reiterated his position following the implementation order from the Air Force Chief of Staff to withdraw the 10 EB-66s. Despite CINCPAC's strong objections, the JCS reaffirmed their decision to withdraw the temporary duty force, with the result that there were only 15 EB-66s remaining in Southeast Asia. At about this same time CINCPAC noted an increase in low-level drone losses and requested that CINCPACAF provide required ECM support for the drones. CINCPACAF replied that the lack of EW assets would make provision of such support highly unlikely. The remaining EB-66s were not capable of fulfilling the total desired support during the monsoon season, so drone and leaflet drop operations were generally not supported. These aircraft had been used in support of ARC LIGHT operations, particularly during dry season campaigns against high threat areas. On 30 September COMUSMACV requested additional EB-66s for the upcoming dry season operations. CINCPAC supported the request for deployment of two additional aircraft through 15 May 1972. The JCS concurred and the forces arrived in Southeast Asia on 25 November.[3]

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1 COMUSMACV 061157Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 100358Z Mar 71; JCS 6147/122132Z Mar 71.
2 COMUSMACV 291025Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 040109Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 211115Z Apr 71.
3 JCS 4840/111946Z May 71; CINCPAC 162009Z and 190128Z May 71; JCS 7825/241813Z May 71; CINCPAC 130244Z May 71; CINCPACAF 182209Z May 71; J3B8 HistSum Sep 71; COMUSMACV 301141Z Sep 71; COMUSMACV 030439Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 050424Z Nov 71; JCS 4867/111619Z Nov 71.

Southeast Asia Tactical Data System Interface

(S) In late December, as North Vietnamese MIG activity over Laos and North Vietnam increased, it became apparent that additional warning and surveillance aircraft were required to counter the threat of the MIGs and surface-to-air missiles. Accordingly, a COLLEGE EYE Task Force (CETF) of four EC-121T aircraft was deployed from Kwang Ju Air Base, Korea to Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. This type of air frame had the capability for an automatic digital data link to display air operational data at the Tactical Air Control Center, North Sector. CINCPAC approved the deployment of the air frames in addition to the AN/GYK-14 ground terminal van that was necessary to establish an air-to-ground digital link compatible with the Southeast Asia Tactical Data System Interface. CINCPACAF implemented the concept.[1]

Augmentation of Bangkok Air Control Center

(U) On 22 February COMUSMACTHAI recommended augmentation of the Bangkok Air Control Center (ACC) under Defense Department sponsorship. He addressed the anticipated termination of the Civil Aviation Assistance Group (CAAG) project and recommended that a permanent augmentation group be established. On 30 March, to insure the continued adequate manning of the Bangkok ACC, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the existing U.S. Operations Mission-sponsored CAAG project be extended through FY 72 or that action be taken to establish an augmentation group under Defense Department sponsorship. The Secretary of Defense authorized two Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) personnel for a year in lieu of continuation of the CAAG, noting that the primary requirement was to continue training of Thai personnel for eventual takeover of the entire ACC operation. COMUSMACTHAI, however, on 29 April stated a requirement for five FAA personnel and eight USAF traffic controllers to augment the ACC. CINCPAC concurred and recommended JCS approval. On 12 May the JCS advised that the USAF was preparing a letter of intent to the FAA and would fund the five FAA controllers through FY 72; the eight USAF controllers would also be provided. CINCPAC asked COMUSMACTHAI to coordinate necessary administrative actions.[2]

Naval Gunfire Support

(S) On 7 April 1971 the JCS requested an assessment of Naval Gunfire

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[1] J3B8 HistSum Dec 71; CINCPACAF 232246 and 310215Z Dec 71.

[2] COMUSMACTHAI 220807Z Feb 71; CINCPAC 300113Z Mar 71; SECDEF 1093/161439Z Apr 71; COMUSMACTHAI 290957Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 300452Z Apr 71; JCS 6181/122323Z May 71; CINCPAC 140250Z May 71.

Support (NGFS) in the RVN. After querying COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC described NGFS as accurate and effective; it would, he felt be required for the foreseeable future to provide important tactical advantage during the withdrawal of U.S. Forces. On 13 May the JCS requested information for further evaluation of the subject in response to a query from higher authority. CINCPAC's 24 May reply contained the information requested as submitted by COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT; it included damage assessment and types of targets engaged for the period under study (1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971). CINCPAC said that there was a valid need for NGFS for forces in contact with the enemy, that the mere presence of a NGFS ship along the coast deterred the enemy from moving freely through the area and must be considered as having a significant effect. ARVN artillery capabilities were being increased but not to the extent of U.S. artillery drawdowns; the resultant void was being filled by NGFS. NGFS ships provided some support to MARKET TIME operations when not engaged in their primary mission. CINCPAC summarized that the NGFS capability to provide a high volume of accurate fire from secure, mobile, all-weather platforms made it a valuable adjunct to air and artillery fire support in the RVN. It would continue to be required for "the immediate future," particularly in consideration of the withdrawal of U.S. Forces. CINCPAC recommended that termination of U.S. NGFS not again be considered until redeployment of U.S. combat forces was completed, at which time the basic situation should be reassessed.[1]

MARKET TIME

(S) In May the JCS, responding to a request from "higher authority," asked CINCPAC for an evaluation of the effectiveness of MARKET TIME operations. These were operations to detect and prevent waterborne logistic craft from infiltrating into the RVN. CINCPAC furnished a detailed reply on 2 June. He said that although only 2 of 17 known steel-hull trawler infiltration attempts had been considered successful since March 1970, numerous PW, Hoi Chanh, and agent reports had indicated in recent months that infiltration "from the sea" in other than steel-hull trawlers might have been occurring. Although it was believed that this activity represented for the most part coastal transshipment by wooden junks and sampans of various sizes, out-of-country points of origin in some cases were considered possible. These reports, CINCPAC noted, although individually not confirmed, were collectively too numerous, too detailed, and, in some cases, too closely spaced geographically to be discounted. Infiltration activity appeared concentrated along the coast line of MR IV. Because of the stepped-up activity and observed shortcomings in the VNN MARKET TIME units, such as poor material condition, lack of aggressive patrols, and failure to

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[1] CINCPAC 130557Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 190557Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 240305Z May 71.

conduct assigned patrols, COMNAVFORV conducted a review of MARKET TIME operations. CINCPAC provided those findings to the JCS. As a result of cross-border operations, he said, the enemy had probably placed increased emphasis on sea infiltration. The mainstay of MARKET TIME surveillance was the P-3 aircraft; P-3 patrols had a probability of detection against steel-hull trawlers of about 65 to 80 percent, but this probability could result in overestimation of the barrier's effectiveness. "The only penalty paid thus far by any trawler as the result of overt (or detected covert) surveillance is aborting that particular infiltration attempt."

(S) The present effectivensss of the Vietnamese surface MARKET TIME forces against the transshipment threat, CINCPAC continued, was very low. Major factors were the unsatisfactory state of maintenance of their craft and inadequate supervision of the young VNN officers charged with carrying out the single craft patrols. He noted deficiencies in the existing organization and command and control structures and made a number of recommendations for improving both organizations and procedures. He also explained a number of considerations that had been examined, such as whether the withdrawal of U.S. advisors had been too precipitous, to what degree VNN deficiencies were attributable to motivation vice abilities, whether the conduct of periodic surprise inspections by seniors in the chain of command would assist in increasing effectiveness, the potential merit in the establishment of airborne command posts to supervise and coordinate inshore barrier ship patrols, and the use of helicopters. The Vietnamese Chief Of Naval Operations had stated general acceptance of the conclusions and recommendations of the study made by COMNAVFORV and had indicated that he intended to move ahead with the task unit concept. He requested VNAF participation in the conduct of coastal air surveillance and placed emphasis on the improvement of the material condition of the VNN ships and craft. COMNAVFORV was implementing the actions that were within his province and had shifted advisory emphasis to concentrate even more intensively on logistics and maintenance. The risk involved in the reorganization and change in concept of operations was considered to be substantially less than the risk involved in continuing the existing operation.[1]

(S) The subject of extended MARKET TIME operations in Cambodian waters was discussed in 1971. On 13 March CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to provide information as to Vietnamese and Cambodian Navy MARKET TIME operations along the Cambodian coast. On 15 March the U.S. Defense Attache in Phnom Penh advised that no official agreement existed between the two navies for such operations. On 19 March COMUSMACV advised that there was no indication of any

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[1] CINCPAC 020440Z Jun 71; J3B41 HistSum Jun 71.

agreement or division of responsibility formalized or even of a coordinated effort.[1]

Narcotics Vessel Surveillance

(S) As there had been 15 reported departures of suspected narcotics smuggling vessels from Bangkok since January 1971, on 27 May CINCPAC asked the U.S. Defense Attache in Bangkok to provide follow-up information on the outcome of surveillance of those vessels by U.S. Forces. He asked for the outcome of each incident to measure surveillance effectivensss and to be able to inform his subordinates of any successes achieved as the result of their efforts. The reply from the Embassy was dispatched on 4 June. The Ambassador advised that following departure of the ships from Bangkok there was no further contact except as reported by ships of the Seventh Fleet. The "local situation," he explained, had precluded effective seizures by Thai authorities either ashore or in Thai waters. The reporting of departures and subsequent tracking by the Seventh Fleet had proved to be the most effective method yet devised to intensify pressure on seaborne smugglers and to cause a positive reaction on the part of the Hong Kong police. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Ambassador continued, was unable to relate specific departures with seizures in Hong Kong, but Hong Kong authorities had seized four tons of opium so far in 1971 known to have been shipped on trawlers, compared to practically none in 1970. He said he would provide further information on successes as it became available.[2]

(U) Additional coverage of this subject is contained in Section I of Chapter IX.

LAMSON 719

(TS) LAMSON 719 was a dramatic operation begun in late January in which ARVN forces entered Laos, with U.S. support. On 19 January the Chairman of the JCS had approved the LAMSON 719 operation and stipulated operational authorities. Prince Souvanna Phouma and the U.S. Department of State opposed the operation, the JCS advised on 26 January, and on 27 January COMUSMACV recommended that the operation be cancelled. That same day CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's recommendation with reservations along purely military lines. Again, that same day, the JCS requested a recommendation on execution of the operation based on military considerations alone; COMUSMACV recommended that the

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[1] CINCPAC 130347Z Mar 71; USDAO PHNOM PENH 0397/151230Z Mar 71; COMUSMACV 191330Z Mar 71.

[2] CINCPAC 270346Z May 71; AMEMB BANGKOK 7668/040157Z Jun 71.

operation go as scheduled, and CINCPAC strongly supported the recommendation.[1]

(TS) On 28 January the JCS approved execution of the operation, at least through Phase I, and CINCPAC ordered COMUSMACV to execute. On 29 January the JCS established reporting requirements for the operation and CINCPAC implemented them. The operation was initiated 291601Z January 1971 and COMUSMACV named Phase I DEWEY CANYON II. On 2 February COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC and the JCS that the earliest Phase II (the ARVN assault across the Laos border) could commence would be 8 February and requested no delay in the planned initiation date. CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV in his request for no delay. On 4 February the JCS authorized employment of U.S. assets in LAMSON Phase II and subsequent phases through 5 April. Any extension of this authority was to require an additional request.[2]

(TS) On 5 February the JCS requested details regarding Phase II of the operation. COMUSMACV replied on 6 February and CINCPAC amplified details on enemy capabilities and estimates. The JCS requested confirmation that Phase II would begin on time; COMUSMACV confirmed the initiating date, to the exact hour. On 10 February the JCS added to the reporting requirements for the operation and changed reporting times because of an adjustment in reporting times to higher authority in Washington. On 14 February they asked that COMUSMACV provide a personal appraisal of the operation.[3]

(TS) On 17 September COMUSMACV renewed a request for a new Special ARC LIGHT Operating Area in support of LAMSON 719 to include the area around and to the north of Tchepone. Specifically, he requested that the normal restrictions on placing ARC LIGHT strikes no closer than 3,000 meters to PW camps be reduced to 1,500 meters on six PW sites in question. The U.S. Ambassador to Laos did not concur and COMUSMACV requested the assistance of CINCPAC and the JCS to resolve the matter. CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's request; he stated that B-52 strikes had been made down to within 1,000 meters of U.S. troops, particularly during the battle of Khe Sanh. The JCS replied on 19 February that they believed that 1,000 meters was adequate for occupied PW camps and that they

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[1] J3B32 HistSum Feb 71, which cited JCS 192121Z Jan 71; JCS 262240Z Jan 71; COMUSMACV 270620Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 271153Z Jan 71; JCS 271421Z Jan 71; COMUSMACV 271550Z Jan 71; and CINCPAC 271644Z Jan 71 (all BOM).

[2] Ibid., which cited JCS 280125Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 280534Z Jan 71; JCS 292318Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 300204Z Jan 71; COMUSMACV 302225Z Jan 71; COMUSMACV 010720Z Feb 71; COMUSMACV 020830Z Feb 71; CINCPAC 021255Z Feb 71; and JCS 041600Z Feb 71 (all BOM).

[3] Ibid., which cited JCS 051435Z Feb 71; COMUSMACV 061125Z Feb 71; CINCPAC 061517Z Feb 71; COMUSMACV 071015 and 071205Z Feb 71; JCS 100047Z, 102143Z, and 140130Z Feb 71 (all BOM).

believed that B-52 bombing should be done without question in the Tchepone areas under study. Further, the JCS stated that the Secretaries of State and Defense concurred. On 20 February the Ambassador stated that he concurred with the decision taken by Washington. CINCPAC immediately approved the new area around Tchepone; the 1,000-meter restriction was to apply only during LAMSON 719.[1]

(TS) Official termination of the operation was at 091000Z Apr 71. The impact of LAMSON 719 on other operations in Southeast Asia is discussed under various other headings in this chapter. Final results of the operation were as follows:[2]

	Friendly		Enemy
Killed in Action	1,705	(176 U.S.)	16,244
Wounded in Action	6,465	(1,042 U.S.)	
Missing in Action	693	(42 U.S.)	
Detained			81
Individual Weapons Destroyed/Captured	3,060	(15 U.S.)	4,872
Crew-Served Weapons Destroyed/Captured	198	(7 U.S.)	1,889
Vehicles Destroyed/Captured	255	(50 U.S.)	422
Tanks Destroyed/Captured	75	(19 U.S.)	106
Helicopters Lost	112	(107 U.S.)	
Rice Captured			1,250 tons

Special Warfare

(TS) PRAIRIE FIRE was the unclassified nickname of a clandestine ground reconnaissance, interdiction, and exploitation program that had been conducted in Laos since 1965 along the RVN border. SALEM HOUSE was the unclassified nickname for clandestine ground reconnaissance operations in Cambodia. On 31 March 1971, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the nicknames were considered compromised and asked that COMUSMACV be tasked to provide Vietnamese language replacements. On 7 April COMUSMACV recommended THOT NOT to replace SALEM HOUSE and PHU DUNG to replace PRAIRIE FIRE.[3]

(TS) On 21 January the Chairman of the JCS had asked CINCPAC to reexamine

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1 COMUSMACV 171107Z Feb 71; AMEMB Vientiane 981/180504Z Feb 71; J3B221 HistSum Feb 71, which cited CINCPAC 191000Z Feb 71 (EX), JCS 192352 Feb 71 (EX), and AMEMB Vientiane 200518Z Feb 71 (EX); CINCPAC 201726Z Feb 71.

2 COMUSMACV 211000Z Apr 71; J3B3 HistSum Apr 71.

3 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol II, pp. 213-233; JCS 7623/311908Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 072212Z Apr 71.

the feasibility of organizing five additional exploitation companies (instead of three) with possibly less-experienced cadre or with fewer cadre per unit in support of the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE programs. He stated that resulting deficiencies might be alleviated by increased training with additional U.S. advisors and that additional training time might be required. CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV, who provided detailed rationale for organizing only three additional companies. The six companies undergoing training at the time revealed that about a third were rated as unsatisfactory in a combat training environment. CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's recommendation that only three additional companies be organized. On 19 February the JCS advised that the recommendation for three vice five companies was approved.[1]

(TS) On 5 February the JCS advised CINCPAC that all U.S. personnel participating in PRAIRIE FIRE reconnaissance, intelligence collection, or exploitation operations in Laos had to be extracted by 8 February 1971 or as soon thereafter as possible. No further insertions of U.S. personnel were authorized. (The one exception was for U.S. PRAIRIE FIRE personnel tasked to provide support for the proposed EXPLORER II facility.) The JCS authorized the continued use of indigenous teams and stated that they appreciated the problems that would be presented, but that the decision had been made after consideration at the highest level. In order to reply to the JCS, as directed, CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV of the directed termination and asked to be informed when the action had been completed. On 7 February COMUSMACV advised that all U.S. personnel (except as noted above) had been extracted and CINCPAC so advised the JCS.[2]

(TS) On 10 April COMUSMACV stated that upon termination of LAMSON 719 there would be an urgent requirement to intensify the intelligence collection effort in Laos and that there were insufficient ARVN-led reconnaissance teams to provide the requisite coverage in the PHU DUNG area of operations. He pointed out that the disposition of NVA forces in Laos necessitated the acquisition of accurate intelligence information from the area and said that the reinsertion of U.S.-led ground reconnaissance elements would provide essential information on the enemy's reestablishment of infiltration routes and storage areas that had been interdicted or destroyed during LAMSON 719. He said that it was equally important that reconnaissance operations be expanded north of the Tri-border area because of the upsurge of enemy activity in that area. CINCPAC

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[1] J3 HistSum Jan 71, which cited CINCPAC 302347Z Jan 71; COMUSMACV 271009Z Jan 71; J3 HistSum Feb 71, which cited JCS 4445/192249Z Feb 71 (EX) and CINCPAC 200338Z Feb 71 (EX).

[2] J3 HistSum Feb 71, which cited JCS 3360/052332Z Feb 71 (EX), CINCPAC 060242Z Feb 71 (EX), COMUSMACV 081200Z Feb 71, and CINCPAC 082012Z Feb 71 (EX).

concurred and stated that with the drawdown of U.S. forces the need for continuous intelligence collection in the Laos Panhandle was greater than at any other time.[1]

(TS) When the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense needed additional information on the subject, COMUSMACV provided it on 19 May. The U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane's comments to CINCPAC appeared to reinforce the military requirement to employ U.S. leadership in the PHU DUNG operations. CINCPAC provided the information requested by the JCS on 21 May.[2]

(TS) No U.S.-led teams were inserted, however, and in September the matter of discontinuing U.S. helicopter support came under study. The JCS advised that the decision to withdraw such support was inevitable and they suggested that all possible alternatives be explored and clarification of the exact VNAF capability be determined. CINCPAC, based on information from COMUSMACV, advised the JCS that U.S. helicopter support would be required for PHU DUNG/THOT NOT and the planned ISLAND TREE interdiction operations through FY 72. CINCPAC recommended that the option to continue U.S. helicopter support of PHU DUNG remain open until COMUSMACV completed his examination of the entire spectrum of MACSOG activities.[3]

(TS) On 1 July 1970 the authority to use U.S. trooplift helicopters had been terminated for SALEM HOUSE activities; on 7 March 1971 COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC of an urgent requirement to reinstate that authority. Activity by the VNAF 219th Helicopter Squadron had, since LAMSON 719, steadily deteriorated to the point where normal SALEM HOUSE operations were in jeopardy. CINCPAC concurred, noting the implications if U.S. assets were not used.[4]

(TS) On 30 April the Chairman of the JCS provided CINCPAC with a number of THOT NOT operating authorities, including authority for the use of U.S. transport aircraft for airborne insertion and resupply of reconnaissance and intelligence teams in Cambodia. Also granted was authority to conduct BRIGHT LIGHT operations with U.S.-led indigenous assets supported by U.S. helicopters and tactical air throughout Cambodia in evadee/PW rescue operations until 1 November 1971. Not authorized at the time, but to be addressed at a later date, was the

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1 J3B622 HistSum Apr 71, which cited COMUSMACV 100630Z Apr 71 (EX) and CINCPAC 102310Z Apr 71 (EX).

2 J3B621 HistSum May 71, which cited JCS 3045/122301Z May 71, AMEMB Vientiane 200034Z May 71, and CINCPAC 210428Z May 71.

3 J3B63 HistSum Sep 71, which cited JCS 2433/272159Z Sep 71 (BOM), COMUSMACV 290645Z Sep 71 (BOM), and CINCPAC 291515Z Sep 71 (BOM).

4 J3 HistSum Mar 71, which cited COMUSMACV 071525Z Mar 71 (EX) and CINCPAC 082332Z Mar 71 (EX).

emplacement of anti-personnel/anti-vehicular mines with self-destruct devices in areas other than THOT NOT Zones Alpha and Charlie. CINCPAC summarized the standing authorities and supplemental authorities. Among the standing authorities were that THOT NOT operations were authorized utilizing indigenous forces, including troopship and gunship support; employment of up-to-platoon strength forces was authorized; emplacement of anti-personnel/anti-vehicular mines with self-dstruct devices was authorized throughout Zones Alpha and Charlie. Supplemental authorities (valid until 1 November 1971) were that THOT NOT operations were authorized throughout the FREEDOM DEAL Air Interdiction Zone (AIZ); that U.S. tactical air and helicopter gunship support was authorized throughout the AIZ and the THOT NOT area of operations; that use of U.S. transport aircraft for airborne insertion and resupply of THOT NOT teams was authorized; and that BRIGHT LIGHT operations with U.S.-led indigenous assets, supported by U.S. helicopters and tactical air, were authorized throughout Cambodia in evadee/PW rescue operations.[1]

(TS) The Secretary of Defense specifically disapproved, however, the use of U.S. helicopters for trooplift in support of THOT NOT. The Chairman of the JCS quoted the Secretary, "I would much prefer that we assume responsibility for other in-country helo missions for the South Vietnamese when necessary, thereby releasing sufficient VNAF assets to allow them to conduct SALEM HOUSE missions successfully without US participation."[2]

(TS) On 17 May the Chairman of the JCS provided additional authorities, expanding the Alpha Zone and permitting mining in the expanded zone following coordination with the Cambodian government through the Embassy to preclude jeopardizing friendly troops or civilians. U.S. tactical air and helicopter gunship support for THOT NOT operations was authorized through the operations area but was to be conducted only when clearly beyond VNAF capabilities.[3]

(TS) On 17 April CINCPAC advised the Chairman of the JCS that a requirement existed to provide COMUSMACV with the option to employ aerial-delivered riot control agents (CS) throughout the THOT NOT area of operations to assist in the extraction of indigenous THOT NOT elements under emergency conditions. He defined the emergency condition as that time when the ground element became heavily engaged with an enemy force and was unable to disengage because of heavy enemy fire, the lives of the THOT NOT personnel were clearly in jeopardy, and existing fire support authorities were inadequate to accomplish the extraction. Also, occasionally there were situations when elements, under emergency

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1 J3B621 HistSum May 71, which cited JCS 3538/031156Z May 71 (BOM) and CINCPAC 060831Z May 71 (BOM).
2 Ibid., which cited JCS 2932/122059Z May 71 (BOM).
3 Ibid., which cited JCS 2379/171420Z May 71 (BOM).

situations, requested tactical air or helicopter gunship support and the enemy fire was so intense that the supporting aircraft were downed. The use of aerial-delivered CS in those emergencies would complement the existing air support authorities and provide an additional means for reducing friendly casualties. It was envisioned that this option would need to be employed only on an infrequent case-by-case basis and every caution would be taken to avoid civilian exposure to the CS.[1] No CS authorization was granted, however.[2]

Khmer Special Forces

(TS) Meetings had been held in Bangkok on 19 October 1970 and general agreement reached on a concept of unconventional warfare (UW) operations in Cambodia. Attending the meetings were representatives of the U.S. Ambassadors in Bangkok and Phnom Penh, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, and CINCPAC.

(TS) The long range objectives were to determine resistance potential and to develop a 250-man Khmer UW capability for the purpose of establishing Khmer presence north of the Lon Nol Line. The concept that was developed at the Bangkok conference envisioned the employment of Khmer Special Forces assets north of the Lon Nol Line in the Northwest and integration of ethnic Khmer into the existing SALEM HOUSE program for operations in the Northeast. About 20 Cambodian Army personnel were to receive about 30 days training in Thailand and then deploy to northwest Cambodia. A six-month training program was to be conducted at the Thai Special Warfare Center at Lopburi to train six 140-man Special Forces detachments. After training, these forces were to be deployed to the Northwest and the program there was to become totally Cambodian in its operational aspects after 1 July 1971. For operations in northeast Cambodia, about 20 to 25 ethnic Cambodians were to be integrated into the SALEM HOUSE program under MACSOG (MACV's Studies and Observation Group) direction (the project was nicknamed CEDAR WALK) with four officers selected to receive concurrent managerial training in the planning, support, and execution of intelligence collection operations.[3]

(TS) The concept was approved and the Secretary of Defense, in a joint State/Defense Department message, requested that the U.S. Ambassadors in Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Saigon initiate discussions with the governments concerned to implement the program. On 9 December 1970 COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that direct negotiations relative to final recruiting for MACSOG operations were in progress between MACSOG and the Political-Military Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh.[4]

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1 J3B622 HistSum Apr 71, which cited CINCPAC 172230Z Apr 71 (EX).
2 Interview, LCOL Beckwith, J3B6, by ComdHist, 27 Apr 72.
3 J5551 HistSum Feb 71; CINCPAC 252223Z Oct 70.
4 SECDEF 7038/012345Z Dec 70; COMUSMACV 090350Z Dec 70.

(TS) Revised funding arrangements were submitted by CINCPAC on 6 January 1971. The Khmer government was to pay all personnel costs involved in the program. All equipment and training costs for the initial Khmer Army personnel assigned to SALEM HOUSE were to be absorbed by MACSOG. Equipment costs for Khmer forces deployed with Thai Special Forces would be paid for by the Cambodian Military Assistance Program. Training costs for those personnel were to be negotiated between the Cambodian and Thai governments.[1]

(TS) The 23 CEDAR WALK personnel were sent to Vietnam to begin training on 1 February 1971; those to be sent for managerial training had not been selected. Negotiations between the Thai and Cambodians had not gone smoothly, however, and a conference was scheduled to review the entire UW program. The 16 February conference was attended by representatives of the Ambassadors in Bangkok and Phnom Penh, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, CHMEDTC, and CINCPAC. It was reported that CEDAR WALK was proceeding smoothly. Misunderstandings that had caused delays in Thai-Cambodian negotiations had been resolved and 30 Cambodian personnel were expected to be in Thailand for training in early March with an additional 100 who should be ready to move by mid-March for six months of training. The unclassified nicknames FRAME DOOR and FRESH BAIT were assigned to the two projects, the first for training and the second for subsequent operations in northwest Cambodia. On 24 May COMUSMACTHAI requested that the name FRESH BAIT be changed because it had unpleasant psychological connotations when used to describe the small detachment-type operations envisioned. On 26 May CINCPAC changed the name to FREEDOM RUNNER.[2]

(TS) On 6 June CINCPAC asked Phnom Penh for support in two areas of primary concern. One was creation and training of a Khmer Special Forces "C" Detachment--a command and control element. The other was Khmer government support for FREEDOM RUNNER operations. CINCPAC indicated that the restoration of Cambodian control and presence in northern Cambodia was essential to the long-range survival of the country and that personnel directing activities in this remote area had to be of the highest caliber. CINCPAC noted that he realized that competent Khmer Army leadership might be difficult to identify in this regard, but he suggested that every effort be made to evaluate and capitalize on any latent or budding special forces leadership potential. He discussed means of training these personnel. Although the Khmer desired to maintain control over any UW programs there, the assistance of Third Country personnel in the CEDAR WALK and FRAME DOOR programs had been an essential expedient. He asked to be kept advised of any UW recruitment potential identified by FREEDOM RUNNER and Thai Special Forces assets.[3]

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[1] CINCPAC 060413Z Jan 71.
[2] CINCPAC 020342Z Mar 71; COMUSMACTHAI 240150Z May 71; CINCPAC 260231Z May 71.
[3] J3B621 HistSum Jun 71, which cited CINCPAC 060140Z and 200946Z Jun 71 (BOM).

(TS) COMUSMACTHAI informed CINCPAC that 110 personnel, all volunteers, had arrived at Lopburi on 12 July for FREEDOM RUNNER training.[1]

(TS) Later in the year CINCPAC visited Cambodia and, among other things, discussed with Marshal Lon Nol the status of the Khmer Special Forces. CINCPAC also stressed the need for the Khmer to develop a concept of operations for the employment of their Special Forces. On 26 September CINCPAC had tasked COMUSMACTHAI to provide a detailed concept plan to support FREEDOM RUNNER. CINCPAC stressed that the effort had to be conducted by the Cambodian Government. On 9 October the Ambassador asked CINCPAC for his comments on the extent to which U.S. plans would be modified to reach a mutually acceptable compromise with the Cambodians. The Ambassador noted that thus far the training programs had involved mostly Thailand and the RVN and that the program in Cambodia was just getting underway. The Special Forces Command had just been designated as a recognized element of the Army. The Khmer concept of operations for Special Forces, the Ambassador explained, did not exactly parallel the U.S. concept of classic Special Forces UW activities. They planned to use their forces in phases of activity; the first was to conduct reconnaissance, assessment, and political warfare missions into enemy controlled or contested areas in northwestern and later northeastern Cambodia; the second was to attempt to establish "discreet" partisan or guerrilla forces if the assessment phase indicated a potential existed. This second phase implied to the Khmer a modest armed underground or infrastructure type organization rather than more formalized guerrilla battalions or companies that operated in independent or semi-independent paramilitary units. Not as a third phase, but as a separate activity associated with the other two phases, the Cambodians planned to use a portion of their Special Forces Command as the cadre for elite commando-type units that would conduct direct action missions against identified enemy targets in enemy held or contested areas. The Ambassador expressed the belief that the development of the Special Forces capability was quite well organized and directed and that the project had been given a high enough priority to insure satisfactory and steady progress, but he also noted the many high priority Army interests to which they had to apply limited materiel resources and high-level staff attention.[2]

(TS) CINCPAC provided his comments on 15 October. Advising that he had reviewed the Ambassador's message, he said, "it is believed that a significant milestone has been reached in the development of the people's war concept... and toward reestablishing GKR presence north of the Lon Nol Line." Modification of U.S. plans, capabilities, and concepts was not seen as a major concern,

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[1] COMUSMACTHAI 150530Z Jul 71.

[2] J3B63 Hist Sum Sep 71, which cited CINCPAC 260312Z Sep 71 (BOM); AMEMB PHNOM PENH 5092/090206Z Oct 71.

however. The Cambodian program was in accord with CINCPAC's intent. While he supported the direct action commando concept, CINCPAC suggested that it be carefully reviewed toward preventing a potentially adverse effect on the UW program. "In this regard, compromise of the underground structure is a subject for careful study. Use of other resistance forces might be a more appropriate solution." On-going actions to finalize tables of organization and equipment and funding arrangements would be held in abeyance pending confirmation of requirements. CINCPAC advised that he stood ready to help with the Khmer UW effort.[1]

Personnel Recovery - Southeast Asia

(TS) Recovery of prisoners of war remained a matter of great CINCPAC concern in 1971 as additional means were sought to effect such recovery. In September 1966 the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) had been established within MACV as the primary agency to monitor and supervise all post-search and rescue (SAR) recovery operations affecting U.S. and other Free World Military Forces personnel missing-in-action or detained in Southeast Asia. Operations conducted under JPRC aegis had been only moderately successful, however, and in May 1971 the JCS directed CINCPAC to provide a general concept for a dedicated and immediately responsive prisoner recovery task force that would allow the most effective and expedient execution of recovery operations. COMUSMACV stated that planned force redeployments precluded formation of a totally dedicated task force for the sole purpose of PW recovery, but he proposed a concept calling for the utilization of existing MACSOG personnel and assets on a non-dedicated basis to augment JPRC activities.[2]

(TS) CINCPAC agreed that the MACV concept was a pragmatic approach to the immediate recovery problem, but he went on to propose a Joint Personnel Recovery Task Force (JPRTF) to be established at the PACOM level and dedicated to the identification, location, release, and recovery of prisoners and those missing in action. CINCPAC's concept called for the additional establishment of a Special Action Task Group (SATG) to actually effect recovery operations. The JPRTF/SATG concept was expected to satisfy the critical requirement for a dedicated recovery force in the post-July 1972 time frame. The JCS concurred in the interim concept submitted by COMUSMACV and directed CINCPAC to prepare a detailed concept for the long-range JPRTF/SATG plan. COMUSMACV prepared a

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[1] CINCPAC 151334Z Oct 71.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, 139-141; J3B612 HistSum May 71, which cited JCS 8551/052246Z May 71, COMUSMACV 150630Z May 71 (both BOM).

detailed concept for the plan, which was reviewed by CINCPAC and forwarded to the JCS recommending approval.[1]

(TS) CINCPAC prepared a draft CONPLAN [redacted] Joint Personnel Recovery Task Force, distributed it to his Component Commanders for comment in July, and sent a draft copy to the JCS on 14 August. He asked COMUSMACV to prepare a recommended TOE, which was provided on 23 September, as was a MACV estimate of the capability to staff the organization.[2]

(TS) On 2 November COMUSMACV presented a modification of the CINCPAC proposal for activating a CINCPAC JPRTF. He proposed using the residual organization of MACSOG as a base, to build upon the knowledge and trained assets available in MACSOG, and adding a JPRTF for a total increase of 99 spaces. CINCPAC concurred in the proposed modification and asked that MACV representatives be prepared to elaborate at a conference scheduled by CINCPAC for 10 November. CINCPACAF concurred, with the exception of proposals regarding operational control of the 90th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) and direct support by the 20th SOS. CINCPACAF recommended that air assets for the JPRTF be provided by tasking PACAF to designate the supporting force.[3]

(TS) Following the 10-13 November conference, CINCPAC forwarded a proposed course of action to continue personnel recovery/crash site inspection (PR/CSI) operations in the post-July 1972 time frame throughout Southeast Asia. (In view of the developing concepts for the formation and organization of the JPRTF, the JCS advised that they were holding CINCPAC's CONPLAN [redacted] in abeyance.) In November CINCPAC's Army and Navy Component commanders commented on the subject: CINCUSARPAC concurred in the proposed concept for activating the CINCPAC JPRTF; CINCPACFLT nonconcurred and recommended adoption of CONPLAN [redacted] COMUSMACV concurred in the proposed course of action, subject to further detailed analysis of space limitations, resource availability, and command control arrangements. He recommended that the course of action be approved for planning purposes, but be subject to refining as planning progressed. CINCPACAF concurred on 7 December, requesting consideration of numerous general comments and recommendations.[4]

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1 Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 160435Z May 71 (BOM) and JCS 1347/270017Z May 71 (BOM); J3B612 HistSum Jun 71, which cited CHMACSOG 181002Z Jun 71.

2 CINCPAC ltrs Ser 000211 of 24 Jul 71 and 000232 of 14 Aug 71, Subj: Joint Personnel Recovery Task Force.

3 J3B64 HistSum Nov 71, which cited COMUSMACV 020150Z Nov 71 (BOM), and CINCPAC 040718Z Nov 71 (BOM); CINCPACAF 100242Z Nov 71.

4 Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 170400Z Nov 71 (BOM), CINCUSARPAC 230406Z Nov 71 (BOM) and CINCPACFLT 230315Z Nov 71 (BOM); JCS 2839/182203Z Nov 71; J3B64 HistSum Dec 71, which cited COMUSMACV 030950Z Dec 71 (BOM) and CINCPACAF 070405Z Dec 71 (BOM).

(TS) On 10 December CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS amendments to his 17 November proposals based on the comments and recommendations of COMUSMACV and the Service Components. He asked that JCS review of the plan be expedited to permit its implementation prior to 1 February 1972, but approval had not been received by the end of the year.[1]

(TS) BRIGHT LIGHT operations had also been under study in 1971. BRIGHT LIGHT was the name given to on-going search operations for aircrews that had not been recovered by SAR, raid operations against known or suspected enemy PW camps or PW's in transit, and rescue operations to recover evadees and escapees. On 9 June the JCS had advised CINCPAC that the Secretary of Defense had requested a PW Recovery Task Force concept. CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV that the Secretary had authorized BRIGHT LIGHT operations in Laos as well as Cambodia at COMUSMACV's discretion in those circumstances when there was not time to seek Washington approval. Also, he had authorized the employment of U.S. and Allied Forces numbering up to 300, with helicopter support as necessary. Approval for larger operations had to be requested on a case-by-case basis.[2]

(TS) Authorization of crash site inspection operations in Laos and Cambodia had been provided by the Secretary of Defense, the JCS advised on 25 August. These operations were to be conducted, however, only when there was a reasonable assurance of no contact with enemy forces and when there was minimal risk of incurring casualties. Further, the use of bases in Thailand to support recovery efforts was being discussed with the Thai government. Until agreement was reached, CINCPAC was authorized on a case-by-case basis to coordinate directly with the U.S. Ambassador in Bangkok and COMUSMACTHAI, provided that the JCS were informed. Subject to concurrence by the Thai government, authority was granted for staging, launch, and recovery operations from bases in Thailand for BRIGHT LIGHT operations in Laos and Cambodia. CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV of these authorities on 26 August.[3]

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1 Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 100243Z Dec 71 (BOM).
2 J3B612 HistSum Jun 71, which cited JCS 32400/092308Z (BOM) and CINCPAC 100809Z Jun 71 (BOM).
3 J3B61 HistSum Aug 71, which cited JCS 9593/251801Z Aug 71 (BOM) and CINCPAC 260232Z Aug 71 (BOM).

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SECTION III - PACOM-WIDE OPERATIONS

Nuclear-Powered and Other Ship Visits to Foreign Ports

(S) CINCPAC continued his efforts to have all U.S. Navy ships welcome in foreign ports, but opposition to nuclear-powered ships was still apparent in several areas of the PACOM. On 12 July CINCPAC issued an instruction (3128.3) that codified overall policy on port visits by U.S. Navy ships. CINCPAC noted that he delegated responsibility and authority for the administration of port visits to CINCPACFLT, but reserved approval authority for himself for a number of geographic areas. CINCPAC directed that prior to initiation of port visit procedures, CINCPAC approval be obtained for visits to Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Indian Ocean littoral (except Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand). Previous directives had required such approval for Cambodia and Indonesia; the third restriction was announced in July. In regard to ship and port visits to the Indian Ocean area, CINCPAC reiterated his desire to maximize such visits on a continuing basis and he asked CINCPACFLT to continue to propose such visits and to provide comments or recommendations in relation to increasing U.S. Naval presence in the Indian Ocean.[1]

(U) Specific visits that took place in 1971 or specific problems that arose in connection with planning for those visits are discussed below by country.

Australia

(S) On 3 July the U.S. Defense Attache in Canberra advised of increased Australian government concern regarding the hazards, risks, and safety implications of visits to Australian ports by nuclear-powered warships. The Attache concluded that the nuclear-powered guided missile frigate TRUXTON would be cleared to visit Perth in July 1971 because of her isolated anchorage mooring assignment, but would not be cleared for a Sydney visit because of a lack of information on which to judge the risk to the port in Australia's largest city. The refusal was confirmed on 15 July, at which time the Defense Attache also relayed the Australian desire that no further nuclear-powered warship port visits be submitted until the United States and Australia reached agreement on the issue, a view that was confirmed by the Australian Prime Minister.[2]

(S) The Secretary of State provided information to the Defense Attache

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 135-137; CINCPACINST 3128.3, 12 Jul 71, Subj: Port Visits in PACOM; CINCPAC 140355Z Jul 71.

[2] USDAO CANBERRA 030200Z Jul 71; USDAO CANBERRA 150900Z Jul 71.

on 15 July to use in discussions with the Australians, to the effect that U.S. berthing criteria were no different in foreign countries than in the United States, and that both practical considerations and U.S. law precluded the U.S. Government from providing reactor technology to host governments. The Secretary also advised that all possible cooperation would be extended in the matter.[1]

(S) On 16 July the U.S. Ambassador in Canberra advised that the clearing of TRUXTON for Perth and disapproval of the Sydney visit underlined Australian concern at the extent of risk and consequent liability in the event of a nuclear accident and the inability of the Government of Australia to evaluate the risk without further technological information. The Australians pointed out that nuclear-powered warships had been allowed to visit New York only on the occasion of a presidential inauguration. The Ambassador said that he had informed the Australian government of the position of the U.S. Government that to provide Australia with more detailed information would mean that the U.S. Government would have to provide the same information to other countries visited by nuclear ships, some of whose safeguards on security were frequently not up to Australian standards. As the Australian position had been approved at the highest level, views could be exchanged but there was no resolution of the matter by the end of the year.[2]

Fiji-Samoa

(C) Nuclear-powered vessels visited both Suva, Fiji and Pago Pago, American Samoa without incident in 1971 for "crew morale enhancement" and logistic support.[3]

India

(S) When a port visit to Cochin, India was denied by the Indian Government, that country joined those that refused permission to U.S. ships because the presence of nuclear weapons aboard would not be confirmed or denied. On 1 September CINCPAC had approved for planning purposes an 8 September visit by the HENRY W. TUCKER (DD 875) to Cochin, with a proposed random patrol enroute. On 2 July, however, the Chagos Archipelago and the Andaman Sea had been added to the State Department's list of politically sensitive areas, for which special policy and guidance were furnished for military operations. The JCS reply, dispatched on 1 September, noted the difficulties associated with obtaining approval for operations in or near those politically sensitive areas. Continuing

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1 SECSTATE 127798/152007Z Jul 71.
2 AMEMB CANBERRA 4034/160019Z Jul 71.
3 J3B4 HistSum Jun 71.

efforts were underway, the JCS reported, to delete some areas considered sensitive or to be able to handle routine military operations under less stringent approval or notification procedures than were required under existing policy. The prevailing India-Pakistan situation, the JCS continued, militated against the possibility of gaining concurrence in the random patrol that had been planned and to press the issue in the light of strong State Department objections could jeopardize the port visit. The JCS approved the port visit, pending receipt of final diplomatic clearnace, but they directed that the transit between Singapore and Cochin be by means of normal direct routes under conditions of generally low profile. The JCS also advised that they had submitted a reclama to higher authority on the designation of politically sensitive areas in the Indian Ocean areas and would keep CINCPAC advised.

(C) On 4 September the U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi advised the TUCKER's visit to India had been disapproved because the Embassy refused to deny that nuclear weapons were aboard the ship, with the standard statement that the United States practiced a policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of such weapons aboard U.S. Naval vessels. Indian officials who inserted the denial requirement in ship clearance procedure knew of U.S. policy and "must have calculated the consequences." Clearance of USS LAWE to visit Cochin in late July was described as "inadvertence." The Embassy noted that the practical effect of rigid application of this new Indian policy would be no further U.S. ship visits to Indian ports.[1]

Indonesia

(S) Timing was often a matter of great importance in the arrangement of ship visits. In December 1970, for example, a proposed visit by the guided missile cruiser CHICAGO to Djakarta came under study. CINCPACFLT proposed a 13 February visit, but the U.S. Ambassador in Djakarta advised CINCPAC that the proposed visit should be postponed until late summer or early fall because of the sensitive political atmosphere in the pre-election period (elections were to be held 5 July) and the fact that the visit would fall soon after a visit by Admiral McCain and might be misunderstood. The Ambassador also suggested that a missile destroyer-type ship be selected for the late summer-early fall visit because the shallow depths at Tandjung Priok precluded anchorage of a larger ship.[2]

(S) On 12 March CINCPACFLT requested clearance for a submarine to visit

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1 CINCPAC 010417Z Sep 71; JCS 3329/071405Z Jul 71; JCS 7037/012204Z Sep 71; AMEMB NEW DELHI 14157/040942Z Sep 71; JCS 9966/041652Z Sep 71.

2 CINCPACFLT 120328Z Dec 70; AMEMB DJAKARTA 211030Z Dec 70; CINCPAC 260926Z Dec 70.

Djakarta beginning 30 April and on 14 March he requested clearance for a visit there by a guided missile light cruiser, the USS OKLAHOMA CITY. CINCPACFLT said that the objections expressed earlier by the Ambassador might not apply to the OKLAHOMA CITY visit since the added prestige of having Commander Seventh Fleet embarked would tend to mitigate the political objections. The U.S. Ambassador, however, reaffirmed his objections and expressed the hope that a ship visit might be arranged in the fall.[1]

(C) In mid-June Commander Seventh Fleet requested that courtesy notification to the Indonesian government be made for transit of Indonesian-claimed waters by two U.S. destroyers and a submarine. The U.S. Ambassador strongly urged that the transit not take place earlier than 4 July because of the Indonesian national elections. CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT of the possibility that the transits could be misinterpreted as U.S. interference with Indonesian elections and "it would appear prudent to avoid providing any credence to such allegations." He requested that the transit schedules be modified to insure that the ships did not enter the Indonesian Archipelago earlier than 4 July. CINCPAC noted, however, that this modification in no way constituted an endorsement of the Indonesian government's claims as to the limits of their territorial waters nor was it intended to infringe on the basic right of ships to operate in international waters.[2]

(C) When CINCPACFLT proposed the visit of a guided missile frigate to Djakarta in late September the U.S. Ambassador concurred "heartily."[3] A visit by a fleet ocean tug to Surabaja in late October in conjunction with the escort of Indonesian minesweepers from Long Beach was also concurred in.[4]

Japan

(S) A number of successful visits were made in Japan in 1971. All port calls were made at Yokosuka. Some port calls to Sasebo had been proposed, but none occurred. From 1 to 4 March the USS TRUXTON made the first visit by a nuclear-powered surface warship to Yokosuka, a visit that was "considered a success in all respects." A proposed visit by TRUXTON to Sasebo in April was deferred because of Diet deliberations and changed to Yokosuka. July visits proposed for USS BAINBRIDGE, another guided missile frigate, were also permitted at Yokosuka but not Sasebo. Okinawa negotiations were cited as the reason for Embassy refusal of a visit by the submarine tender PROTEUS to either port in November. Nuclear-powered submarines that visited Japan in 1971, some several times, were BARB, SNOOK, TAUTOG, SWORDFISH, PUFFER and QUEENFISH.[5]

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1 CINCPAC 230349Z Mar 71.
2 CINCPAC 240233Z Jun 71.
3 CINCPAC 080305Z Jul 71; AMEMB DJAKARTA 5879/091020Z Jul 71.
4 CINCPAC 130349Z Aug 71.
5 J3B41 HistSums Jan-Nov 71.

(S) The U.S. Ambassador advised on 6 May that the Government of Japan desired to conduct maintenance of monitoring equipment and requested certain periods when no nuclear-powered warship visits would be conducted. CINCPAC advised the Ambassador of certain periods when no ship visits were scheduled, but he recommended that the schedule not be disclosed to the Japanese. He noted that although control of Japanese ports rested with the host country, the United States enjoyed blanket clearance for visits of U.S. Navy ships processed through a 24-hour notification procedure. Disclosure of a schedule could ultimately restrict nuclear-powered ship visits by creating a no-visit period while equipment maintenance was being accomplished, CINCPAC warned. He continued:

> Special procedures for NPW are detrimental to ultimate normalization actions for these visits. It is recommended that no acknowledgement be made to any procedure which lends reinforcement to this demarcation. CINCPAC position is that waterborne and underwater radiation monitoring of NPW is not required by inherent physical characteristics or operating procedures of NPW.[1]

(S) The Embassy reported in mid-June that the Japanese still wanted blocks of time to overhaul underwater equipment, but they had agreed to explore (with the Japanese Science and Technology Agency) the feasibility of separating overhauls at Yokosuka and Sasebo and also lesser periods of time for overhaul completion.[2]

(S) The subject of a visit by USS ENTERPRISE, a nuclear-powered attack aircraft carrier, arose in the Japanese press on 20 July with the announcement that the ship had been transferred from the First to the Seventh Fleet. Japanese officials told U.S. Embassy officials that they believed that ENTERPRISE should not plan a visit until after the Diet session that was to discuss and approve the Okinawa reversion agreement, which was scheduled to begin in mid-October and extend for several weeks. An ENTERPRISE visit would provide the opposition with another opportunity to attack the reversion agreement on the grounds that ENTERPRISE was a symbol of the U.S. nuclear strike capability. The Japanese were withholding judgment on visits after the negotiations were completed. At the same time the Japanese discussed a certain distance restriction that was to be imposed on nuclear-powered ships. In July they defined these restrictions to describe an arc of 1,200 meters for nuclear-powered surface ships and 650 meters for nuclear-powered submarines from the nearest residential areas (excluding U.S. facilities and areas). These restrictions, plus the close-in monitoring required by the Japanese Science and

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1 CINCPAC 150416Z May 71.
2 AMEMB TOKYO 5947/181050Z Jun 71.

Technology Agency, combined to prohibit any Japanese port visits by ENTERPRISE. CINCPACFLT strongly recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations that representation be made to the Japanese to modify the 1,200-meter restriction to make it the same as the 650 meters required for submarines.[1]

Philippines

(S) On 2 March the U.S. Ambassador in Manila withdrew earlier concurrence in a recommendation for a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine visit to Subic Bay. He asked that such visits be withheld until the Military Bases Agreement negotiations were completed. The Ambassador noted that the "Magnet Theory" (that our bases attracted rather than deterred attack) was a favorite theme of the anti-Nationalist press and the presence of POLARIS submarines would provide them with attractive new material. This could force the Philippines to put nuclear matters on the bases agreement negotiation agenda and seek to impose some nuclear restrictions.[2] The bases agreement had not been concluded by the end of 1971.

U.S.S.R.

(S) On 14 October 1970 CINCPACFLT had proposed that diplomatic clearance be obtained for a U.S. ship visit to a Soviet Far East port. CINCPAC, in March 1969, had requested clearance for such a visit but the State Department had declined to make such a request. The last previous visit by a USN ship had been in 1963 when USS REHOBOTH, a surveying ship, visited Nakhodka. (While a visit to Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk would have been preferable, it was considered doubtful by CINCPACFLT that the Soviets would permit a visit to either.) CINCPAC concurred in the proposal on 20 October 1970 and asked CINCPACFLT to propose the ship, the port to be visited, and the date. Just about a year later, from 18 to 22 October 1971, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter GLACIER visited Nakhodka, received about 330 visitors, and termed the visit "highly successful."[3]

Soviet Ship Visits to U.S. Ports and Waters

(S) Several times during 1971 Soviet vessels entered Hawaiian waters--in one instance a task force of seven warships. On 13 September a cruiser, two destroyers, two submarines, and a submarine tender passed between the islands of Maui and Hawaii, a 26-mile channel. An oiler sailed through the 23-mile

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1 AMEMB TOKYO 7111/210810Z Jul 71; CINCPACFLT 250033Z Jul 71.
2 AMEMB MANILA 1866/020631Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 252218Z Mar 71.
3 CINCPACFLT 142207Z Oct 70; CINCPAC 230232Z Mar 69, CINCPAC 200141Z Oct 70; CINCPACFLT 272031Z Oct 70; USCGC GLACIER 220345Z Oct 71.

channel between Molokai and Oahu. An eighth vessel, a nuclear submarine, was sighted heading for Hawaii but it did not pass through Island waters. Admiral McCain was quoted in the Honolulu Advertiser as saying that it was "good sea manners" to ask permission to pass through territorial waters, but that this was not essential in every case. "They certainly have the right of peaceful passage. You can pass by without being questioned," the Admiral continued. As in every case involving Soviet ships, however, CINCPAC advised his Component commanders that the group had to be assumed to have electronic intelligence-gathering capability and one of their significant objectives could be the monitoring of micro-wave telephonic transmissions, as many of the military telephone circuits in Hawaii were micro-wave and thus vulnerable to intercept. Component commanders were asked to take appropriate steps to deny useful intelligence collection opportunities.[1]

(TS) On 21 September CINCPACFLT asked that authority be sought for U.S. units that had the Soviet task group under surveillance to enter the Sea of Okhotsk should the Soviet ships go there. CINCPAC asked the JCS for such authority on 23 September, but the JCS replied that they were unable to authorize the surveillance. They suggested termination in a manner that did not imply any fixed restrictions on U.S. operations.[2]

(S) Just about the time the Soviet task force was steaming through Hawaii, high level government discussions had been begun on some aspects of the U.S. port security program as they applied to Soviet ships. Of key importance was the impact that the increase in the number of Soviet port visits would have on military security. The Chief of Naval Operations had requested information on the impact on Hawaii and Alaska.[3] CINCPAC asked his Component commanders.

(S) On 9 September CINCPAC consolidated replies of the Component commanders and forwarded the composite to the JCS, including the following comments. The transfer of Soviet fishing activities from the Atlantic to the Pacific in late 1970 to take advantage of the larger catches and warmer climate had resulted in a substantial increase in Soviet ship visits to Honolulu. Between July 1970 and 3 August 1971, 11 Soviet ships had been allowed to use berth facilities in Honolulu port. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service had allowed crew members of these ships ashore, but restricted their activities to the Honolulu district. CINCPAC noted that increased ship visits involved increased potential security problems, particularly in covert activities, but

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[1] CINCPAC 140342Z Jul, 141941Z Aug, and 112108Z Sep 71; Honolulu Advertiser, 14 Sep 71.

[2] CINCPACFLT 210335Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 231247Z Sep 71; JCS 9535/242208Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 250117Z Sep 71.

[3] CINCPAC 030346Z Sep 71.

the direct impact on military security in Hawaii was considered minimal due to standard base entry restrictions. Opportunity for low-level collections of operating patterns, base loading, and significant intelligence would vary directly with visit numbers. The ability of the Coast Guard and FBI to protect against covert actions was limited by available resources. CINCPAC noted the vulnerability of telephone circuits routed via microwave; he said that notable impact to military activities would be felt from the standpoint of restricted communications if Soviet vessels with electronic intelligence capabilities were allowed in Honolulu port. He voiced no objection to increased ship visits, but asked that a 14-day advance notice requirement be maintained (24-hour notice was considered inadequate). CINCPAC recommended reciprocal visits by U.S. ships to Soviet ports and that CINCPAC concurrence be obtained for proposed visits in each case. He also recommended that simultaneous visits of Soviet ships to multiple U.S. ports be carefully scrutinized.[1]

Indian Ocean Naval Operations

(S) CINCPAC held the firm conviction that U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean should be increased at every reasonable opportunity, although the remote location and lack of staging areas impacted on any operations there. A proposed excursion by USS TRUXTON came under study in July although no port visits in the Indian Ocean were scheduled. In connection with a visit to Perth, Australia,[2] the ship was scheduled to sail as far west as the Seychelles Islands and return to Perth. While the JCS posed no objection to the transit, the Secretary of State and the White House staff had been notified and the operation was held in abeyance pending receipt of the view and comments of the Secretary. CINCPAC strongly recommended that the cruise be held as scheduled. On 8 July the JCS rescinded the temporary hold on the cruise, advising that the State Department had no objections so long as no publicity was given to the excursion. The JCS advised that they fully concurred in CINCPAC's opinions on the subject and "every effort will continue to be exerted to support our stated objectives in the area and to gain approval for this type operation in the future."[3]

(S) Navy air patrol operations also came under study. Seventh Fleet patrol forces had been routinely conducting Ocean Surveillance Air Patrol (OSAP) flights in the East Indian Ocean, Bengal Sea, and Andaman Sea since 1969. The flights were conducted according to standard international procedures and for the most part they originated and terminated at U-Tapao, Thailand. In July,

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1 CINCPAC 090134Z Sep 71.

2 See also "Nuclear-Powered and Other Ship Visits to Foreign Ports" elsewhere in this chapter.

3 JCS 3329/071405Z Jul 71; J3B41 HistSum Jul 71, which cited CINCPAC 070340Z Jul 71 (BOM); JCS 4473/081737Z Jul 71.

when the Andaman Sea was added to the list of areas designated "politically sensitive" by the State Department, the Indian Ocean operations were reviewed. CINCPACFLT concluded that low military risk was involved in the flights and that adverse political impact was not expected. He recommended continuing the flights on a routine basis.[1]

(S) CINCPAC concurred. He observed that a discontinuation or reduction of the OSAP would constitute a significant change in the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean, which would be contrary to the provisions of JCS guidance for State Department-designated sensitive areas. CINCPAC notified the JCS of his rationale and directed CINCPACFLT to continue operations at the existing level.[2]

(TS) Twice in 1971 the U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE transited the Indian Ocean. From 20 to 23 September ENTERPRISE and the nuclear-powered guided missile frigate BAINBRIDGE made an uneventful excursion in the area. On 10 December, following the outbreak of major hostilities between India and Pakistan on 3 December, the JCS directed CINCPAC to order a carrier task group to the southern entrance of the Malacca Strait as soon as it was ready and be prepared to go to the Indian Ocean when it was directed. Major ships were the ENTERPRISE, the helicopter carrier TRIPOLI with a battalion of 800 Marines, seven destroyers and frigates, and an oiler. This task group was to be available to conduct evacuation of civilian personnel from East Pakistan during the war with India if it should be required. On 15 December, CINCPACFLT recommended that the task group be augmented [redacted] CINCPACFLT asked that approval be obtained to use Gan Island Airfield in the Maldive Islands as an emergency divert field for aircraft from the task force (TF 74), but the JCS denied the request unless exceptional operational requirements arose that would warrant further consideration.[3]

(U) Although the task group was not actually required in operations connected with the India-Pakistan war, strong political repercussions followed the transit of ENTERPRISE. Indian anger at U.S. backing of Pakistan was compounded by knowledge of the task force, and there were rumors that the Navy had been sent to rescue Pakistani troops and that the United States was about to intervene in the war. A U.S. weekly news magazine reported that one Indian

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1 CINCPACFLT 112128Z Jul 71; JCS 3329/071405Z Jul 71; SM-427-70, 27 May 70, Subj: Military Operations in or Near Politically Sensitive Areas (U).
2 CINCPAC 150101Z Jul 71.
3 J3B41 HistSums Aug, Sep, Dec 71; CINCPAC 192233Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 250048Z Dec 71.

leader in Parliament demanded, "Blow the ENTERPRISE out of the water."[1]

Oil Survey Operations in the East China Sea

(C) Petroleum exploration had indicated that the East China Sea Continental Shelf might contain one of the richest oil resources in the world, equaling the Persian Gulf. This had raised questions about ownership of the Senkaku Islands, about ownership of various concession zones that had been granted in the area, and about potential military responses to hostile acts against vessels of U.S. oil exploration companies.[2]

(TS) Japan and the Republics of China and Korea had identified specific areas, known as concession zones, on the North Asian Continental Shelf, extending from the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea to the Yellow Sea, for petroleum exploration and exploitation, but the boundaries of these areas were in dispute. Both Communist and Nationalist China claimed roughly half of the entire shelf area, while Japan and North and South Korea each claimed more localized areas. Contracts had been negotiated by Japan and the Republics of China and Korea with U.S. and foreign oil companies for the conduct of survey operations by specially equipped oil survey ships in some of the concession zones. Operations of these ships had generated strong objections from Communist China regarding exploitation of resources the Chinese claimed. It was considered possible that Chinese reaction to the operations could increase to harassment of an oil survey ship, or in the extreme, to its boarding, seizure, or destruction. The intransigence demonstrated by North Korea suggested its preparedness to carry out similar actions against ships operating near its claimed waters.

(TS) Toward the end of 1970 CINCPAC had provided the JCS with information on oil exploration activities in the East China Sea and noted the Chinese threat to the exploration vessels, the lack of rules of engagement (ROE) for this situation, and the unresolved political and legal ramifications of the problem. He had provided his instructions to his subordinate commanders and recommended to the JCS that the oil companies be apprised of the risks involved. The Secretary of Defense advised that the legal and technical aspects of the survey operations were under high-level consideration and that the State Department had contacted the companies regarding the potential danger and asked them to delay sailing (with no assurance that the request would be honored). The State Department would advise them they should not anticipate military support in case of Chinese intervention. If Chinese forces attempted to interfere with the commercial vessels or equipment in the East China or Yellow Seas or in the Formosa Strait, CINCPAC was not authorized to engage communist

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1 U.S. News and World Report, 27 Dec 71, p. 20.
2 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 150-152.

Chinese forces, but he was to report any indications of hostility immediately. A position log of survey vessels was to be maintained in the National Military Command Center. Among the reasons for these interim decisions, the Secretary cited:

> (A) We wish to avoid any military confrontation with Communist China.
>
> (B) We do not wish to have U.S. firms put USG in the position of having to get involved in military confrontations because those firms take risks in hazardous areas.
>
> (C) We do not wish to be forced to take a legal position on the validity of claims in this area. If we supported concessionaires we would implicitly be supporting the position of the country which granted the concession.
>
> (D) We do not wish to adopt a policy of military intervention to protect U.S. nationals unless there is a clear legal basis for doing so.
>
> (E) We find it hard to justify protecting U.S. business operations in an area under legal dispute when we do not protect U.S. business operations in an area where the United States has a clear legal position such as off the west coast of South America.[1]

On 6 March the Secretary of State confirmed the interim guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense and provided additional instructions.[2]

(TS) On 1 February the American Consul in Hong Kong drew attention to the escalating level of Chinese warnings against the operations and emphasized that the real possibility of a U.S.-Chinese military confrontation over the issue made the interim decision of not providing U.S. naval protection sound and compelling. On 7 February CINCPAC advised the JCS that a requirement for prolonged surveillance of oil operations would have a severe impact on both antisubmarine warfare and ocean surveillance air patrol operations and recommended that consideration be given to dropping the surveillance

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[1] SECDEF 9201/011727Z Jan 71. This was dispatched by the Secretary but headed as a Joint White House/State/Defense/JCS message.

[2] SECSTATE 038026/1/060234Z Mar 71.

requirements for the oil operations.[1]

(TS) On 10 March CINCPAC provided the JCS with a number of possible courses of action (and the advantages and disadvantages of each) that would have to be considered in the event the United States decided to protect the survey ships. These recommendations were passed by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense. On 7 May the JCS requested that CINCPAC develop contingency plans and ROE to support the courses of action, but with the assumption that restrictions on protective measures imposed by the Secretaries of State and Defense had been removed and that U.S.-owned or contracted oil survey vessels would be afforded protection while conducting oil survey operations in international waters.[2]

(TS) Based on a March 1971 force posture, and considering only the most feasible method of operation, CINCPAC forwarded a concept plan to the JCS on 2 June that included expansion of PACAF Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO)/Air Defense alert capabilities. The concept of continuous PACAF Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP), with the existing force structure, was considered unrealistic because of the large force that would be required. CINCPAC believed that it was unlikely that there would be any advance warning of an enemy attack on, or attempted seizure of a U.S. flag or U.S. contract survey ship unless a substantial dedicated surface or air surveillance program existed in the area. CINCPAC specified four courses of action and listed a number of operational constraints and limitations. CINCPAC included a number of recommendations:

> A. That higher authority define the basic U.S. government responsibility to protect U.S. lives and property on the high seas, including specific reference to operations involving the continental shelf of a foreign state.
>
> B. That a worldwide U.S. policy be established which would permit the development of peacetime ROE for reaction of U.S. military forces to hostile acts directed against ships which are U.S. flag, foreign registry under U.S. contract, and foreign registry but owned by U.S. interests engaged in lawful occupations in conformity with international law and treaty obligations.
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> C. That action be initiated to authorize certain ships, other than public vessels, to qualify for briefings by CINCPAC ...preparatory to commencing operations in sensitive areas.

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1 AMCONSUL HONG KONG 554/011030Z Feb 71; CINCPAC 072359Z Feb 71.
2 CINCPAC 100420Z Mar 71; JCSM-175071, 9 Apr 71, Subj: Oil Survey Operations on the Continental Shelf (U).

D. That CINCPAC be advised as to the best available information pertaining to GRC, GOJ, and ROKG concession zone geographical coordinates for dissemination to subordinate commanders.[1]

(S) On 7 October the Secretary of State identified the only three oil survey vessels known to be operating in behalf of American firms on the North Asian shelf as not "U.S. interest" vessels. "The term 'U.S. interest' as now defined," the Secretary said, "for purposes of this and any future instructions concerning oil exploration and exploitation activities in this area, means relating to vessels, platforms and equipment (a) flying US flag or (b) carrying US citizens or (c) carrying sensitive equipment as listed /in earlier guidance/. Vessels, platforms or equipment are of US interest when characterized by any one of these conditions."[2]

(S) CINCPAC advised those in his command and interested Embassies of the revised definition. The determination of whether or not a newly arrived ship, platform, or equipment was of "U.S. interest" would be made by superior authorities and CINCPAC would so advise. CINCPAC's Air and Navy Component commanders, his subordinate unified commanders in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, and his Representative and the High Commissioner in the Ryukyus were asked to report, for all U.S. interest ships and for ships for which it had not yet been determined that there was no U.S. interest, their location and movements, planned areas of operation, any indication of interference with exploration/exploitation activities, and other useful information. Information was to be obtained in as discreet and low-key a manner as possible. This should be understood to mean, CINCPAC said, passive collection in the course of normal activities or, as required, active collection by means that would not lead informants or others mistakenly to conclude that the U.S. Government encouraged activities of American oil companies in this disputed area or supported claims of certain disputants against others.[3]

Search and Rescue (SAR) Conference

(U) Planned changes to the Unified Command Plan expanded the area of CINCPAC's search and rescue (SAR) responsibility. On 4 and 5 November 1971 a SAR conference was convened at Camp Smith to evaluate the proposed establishment of a Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) and the impact of changes to the Unified Command Plan pertaining to the South Pacific, Indian, and

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[1] CINCPAC 020145Z Jun 71.
[2] SECSTATE 184385/071920Z Oct 71.
[3] CINCPAC 072333Z Nov 71.

Arctic Ocean areas.[1] Conferees were unanimous in recommending that a JRCC be established. The joint operation would provide increased effectiveness in addition to substantial savings by combining the 14th Coast Guard District, the Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and the PACAF Rescue Coordination Centers. Other conference comments or recommendations were addressed by area. For the South Pacific, the new eastern boundary of the PACOM resulted in assigning a considerable area of the Pacific to CINCLANT. It was recommended that CINCPAC forward a SAR agreement to CINCLANT and CINCSOUTH to identify respective SAR responsibilities in that area. The Indian Ocean, it was noted, had no rescue coordination centers or SAR facilities even though CINCPACFLT operations in the area were increasing. The 13th Air Force had responsibility for the Southwest Pacific Sub-Region, and the Indian Ocean was an extension of that responsibility. The conferees recommended that 13th Air Force retain responsibility and that CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT initiate an agreement interfacing SAR operations. For the Arctic Ocean, CINCPAC would be assigned the area from 95°W to 100°E. The Pacific SAR Advisory Committee in October 1970 had recommended that the Pacific Maritime Region (U.S. Coast Guard) be increased to include that portion of the Arctic to 90°N between 141°W and 105°E. Based on this prior recommendation, the CINCPAC SAR conferees recommended that the U.S. Coast Guard area of SAR responsibility in the Arctic be extended to 100°E vice 105°E. Indorsement by the Service Component commanders and the Commander, Western Area, U.S. Coast Guard, was received before the end of the year and plans were under way to establish a JRCC on Oahu on or about 1 March 1972.[2]

Electronic Warfare Assistance to Korea

(S) In 1971 it became apparent to CINCPAC that the Republic of Korea (ROK) had requested U.S. EW assistance from various U.S. organizations in Korea. CINCPAC encouraged U.S. EW support to the ROK but he noted the various uncoordinated attempts by the ROK to obtain assistance and the lack of EW personnel on the staff of COMUS Korea to serve as a focal point for EW matters. He believe that this had hampered EW progress in the ROK, and that only insignificant EW assistance had been extended. CINCPAC believed that assistance to the ROK in developing an EW program of concept, doctrine, and tactics, in addition to attaining their own EW training capability, would provide a stronger PACOM capability. With this viewpoint, he asked COMUS Korea to evaluate the requirement for deployment of a Joint-Service Electronic Warfare Mobile Training Team (EWMTT) to Korea. When COMUS Korea replied that evaluation of the matter might take quite a while, CINCPAC asked that action be expedited;

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[1] Attending were representatives of CINC Alaska, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, the 14th Coast Guard District, and Commander, Coast Guard West Area.

[2] J3B211 HistSum Nov 71.

he suggested that a request for an EWMTT, if warranted, be addressed through Military Assistance Program channels.[1]

Western Pacific North (WESTPACNORTH) Interface

(C) The WESTPACNORTH interface is a program, directed by the Department of Defense, to achieve an interface between U.S. and friendly foreign air defense systems operating in the WESTPAC area. Plans include tie-in with Japan and the ROK, as well as the Okinawa air defense system. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, was designated as Executive Agent for the project.[2]

(C) PACOM completed the first operational tactical data systems interface between U.S. forces and a foreign air defense system during June 1971. The final phase of the WESTPACNORTH (WPN) Interface testing was completed and resulted in successful digital exchange of air defense information between the Japanese Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) and U.S. Naval Tactical Data Systems without degradation to either system. The WPN buffer, heart of the WPN Interface, demonstrated that buffer requirements had been satisfied during an operational environment.[3]

(C) Subsequent to final testing the WPN Interface buffer was turned over to the interface user, 5th AF, and entered a limited operational status. No major deficiencies exist regarding the design and operation of the buffer software. Two deviations from the Interface Design Plan have occurred. First, the LINK-14 teletype system between the buffer and the manual Korean and Okinawan Air Defense Sectors is incomplete. Finalizing of this link was deferred pending CSAF's decision on a teletype output format. Secondly, removal of USAF Air Defense Operations Teams from BADGE radar sites resulted in lack of voice communication links. As a result CINCPACFLT desired to reinstall U.S. personnel to perform automated track coordination at the BADGE Kasuga site instead of the current Fuchu site which caused untimely relays of information. CINCPAC notified the JCS of the WPN Interface and tasked appropriate Component commanders to conduct an operational evaluation of current track coordination and crosstell systems.[4]

(C) In accordance with CINCPAC tasking, an operational evaluation of the WESTPACNORTH Interface was completed in October 1971. The purpose of this

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1 COMUS Korea 220146Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 282220Z Apr 71 and 210420Z May 71; COMUS Korea 120957Z May 71; CINCPAC 072120Z Jul 71.

2 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 156.

3 J3B8 HistSum Jun 71.

4 CINCPACAF 172200Z Jul 71; CINCPACFLT 100342Z Jul 71; CINCPAC's 230206Z and 231946Z Jul 71.

evaluation was to determine if sufficient coordination and crosstell was possible despite a lack of U.S. personnel located at Japanese Air Defense Centers and lack of voice communications between these centers and U.S. Navy ships. The WPN Interface user, 5th AF, proposed a WPN Interface Design Plan change (11-9) which had an impact on crosstell and coordination capability. This change would eliminate direct voice communications between Japanese BADGE sites and U.S. Navy forces, thereby causing a relay of information through Fuchu. CINCPACFLT objected to this proposed change, and subsequently CINCPAC directed that an operational evaluation be conducted to resolve the adequacy of the design plan change. Upon completion of this evaluation, CINCPACAF recommended that change 11-9 be implemented immediately, but CINCPACFLT recommended that change 11-9 be held in abeyance until the WPN voice coordination was improved to the satisfaction of Seventh Fleet and 5th AF. In view of ongoing corrective actions to resolve communications problems, CINCPAC directed that change 11-9 be held in abeyance until WPN coordination requirements were satisfied.[1]

Special Forces Operations

(TS) Several matters regarding Special Forces training came to CINCPAC's attention in 1971. Late in 1970 the MACSOG (the MACV Studies and Observation Group) had advised the 1st Special Forces Group Airborne (SFGA) on Okinawa that MACSOG would commence a High Altitude - Low Opening (HALO) parachute training program in the RVN about 4 January 1971 and requested assistance from the 1st SFGA in scheduling the high altitude chamber on Okinawa for physiological evaluation of nine U.S. personnel and nine Vietnamese. CGUSARYIS responded, pointing out that the adverse publicity in the Okinawan press resulting from previous Vietnamese participation in HALO training on Okinawa militated against further training of RVN personnel there. CGUSARYIS advised that a high altitude chamber was located in Bangkok and requested that requirements for physiological training assistance at that location be addressed to CINCPAC. COMUSMACV advised that the high altitude chamber did exist in Thailand but it was not used by U.S. personnel because of language differences; he requested CINCPAC approval for use of the chamber at Kadena, on Okinawa. CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's request and authorized direct coordination. In February COMUSMACV advised that MACSOG was continuing HALO training and CINCPAC assisted in arranging for future training for U.S. personnel at Kadena.[2]

(TS) In another matter, COMUSMACTHAI requested that CINCPAC provide eight Special Forces Operational Detachments "A" (SFOD-A) to support the training

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[1] J3B8 HistSum Oct 71; CINCPACAF 120132Z Nov 71; CINCPACFLT 160232Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 202041Z Nov 71.

[2] J3 HistSums Jan, Feb 71; CINCPAC 100417Z Feb 71.

of 36 battalions in Thailand between October 1971 and June 1972, upon approval of the U.S. Ambassador in Bangkok. Approval and country clearance were granted and five teams had departed Okinawa by mid-November. It appeared at the end of the year that the other teams might not be required, but the five detachments deployed would have to be replaced at the end of their 180-day deployment period in accordance with the limitations placed on temporary duty assignments. In mid-November it appeared that support would be required through FY 72 and for an indefinite period thereafter.[1]

(S) In a third matter, training for the Special Forces came under study. On 16 December 1970 COMUSTDC and CINCUSARPAC had advised CINCPAC that 1st SFGA had conducted discussions with COMUSTDC and requested assistance concerning U.S. attendance at the Republic of China Army's (ROCA) Rough Terrain Parachute Training Course on Taiwan. On the basis of those discussions and because of the presence of the right terrain and training facilities on Taiwan not available on Okinawa, CGUSARYIS formally requested that 11 personnel from the 1st SFGA attend the new course to be conducted by the ROCA about 26 January 1971. He further stated that an evaluation had been conducted on rough terrain parachuting techniques by his headquarters and it was concluded that this technique was "valid and may revolutionize Special Forces airborne infiltration techniques" for both unconventional warfare and disaster relief operations. COMUSTDC advised CINCPAC of his belief that repetitive training in Taiwan was a politically sensitive issue and recommended either an appraisal of the ROC techniques for possible adoption as U.S. doctrine by the resident Special Forces detachment or a comprehensive official evaluation by the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command in consonance with the approach recommended in the 1970 CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group Report on the Military Assistance Program.[2]

(S) CINCPAC asked CINCUSARPAC how frequently the SFGA visualized sending teams to the course and if the SFGA could establish a course on Okinawa using cadre previously trained. CINCUSARPAC advised that there was a small cadre trained in the basics of military rough terrain parachuting who could conduct training for limited numbers of personnel on Okinawa, but that the obvious potential for application of this special technique in a disaster assistance role made it desirable to expand expeditiously the U.S. capability. Because in-theater expertise rested with the ROCA, who provided the only known formalized training in these skills, it would be advantageous to continue to develop cadre through the ROCA school. Such training would have a corollary diplomatic value as the U.S. request would result in ROCA pride of accomplishment and promote greater goodwill between the two countries. CINCUSARPAC believed that

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1 J3B63 HistSums Oct, Nov 71.

2 J3 HistSum Jan 71; CGUSARYIS 120745Z Jan 71; COMUSTDC 250700Z Jan 71.

such training should not be politically sensitive from a U.S. point of view as it would be U.S. requested and solely for U.S. benefit.[1]

(S) CINCPAC approved U.S. participation for the last quarter of FY 71 and first three quarters of FY 72 with a quota of 10 men per quota. He asked that the 10-man quarterly attendance by Special Action Force Asia (SAFASIA) personnel be supported by COMUSTDC and stated that such limited attendance should not generate the political problems broached by COMUSTDC earlier. CINCUSARPAC was asked to develop a data base for the parachute techniques so that formal evaluation by the Combat Developments Command could be accomplished. Out of this training evolved the DART concept--Disaster Assistance and Relief Teams--discussed elsewhere in this chapter.[2]

Operational Readiness of ARG/SLF Forces in the PACOM

(TS) The readily available PACOM reserve consisted of two operational elements, Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG)/Special Landing Forces (SLF) ALFA and BRAVO. At least one of those ARG/SLF was standing by to maintain a 120-hour reaction time to land in Vietnam, if necessary. Since May 1970 JCS approval had been required if a standdown from that readiness posture was proposed. In January 1971 it was proposed by CINCPACFLT that ARG BRAVO be authorized to standdown from 29 January to 1 May 1971 in order that the ships of that force could be used for other forces redeploying from Vietnam at a significant cost saving. SLF BRAVO, CINCPACFLT said, could be landed in Vietnam, by ARG ALFA, 168 hours after its own SLF was landed. CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV for his comments, and was advised that the proposal would have negligible impact on MACV operations for that period. CINCPAC therefore recommended to the JCS that the proposal be approved; the JCS agreed on 22 January and CINCPAC so advised CINCPACFLT.[3]

(S) Subsequently CINCPACFLT requested that the standdown be extended until 6 June, and CINCPAC passed the request to the JCS. On 25 March the JCS authorized CINCPAC to act on ARG standdowns at his own discretion, provided that the ready ARG/SLF could be maintained in 120-hour reaction time to Vietnam, that the second SLF was maintained in readiness for landing in the RVN 168 hours after completion of landing of the ready SLF using a turnaround lift by the ready ARG, and provided that there was no adverse impact on

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1 CINCUSARPAC 270203Z Feb 71.
2 CINCPAC 030521Z Mar 71.
3 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 146-150; CINCPAC 060425Z Jan 71; COMUSMACV 140921Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 150211Z Jan 71; JCS 1832/222222Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 232302Z Jan 71.

other essential commitments. CINCPAC notified CINCPACFLT of the standdown extension.[1]

(S) Still a further extension was requested, this one to extend the standdown until 16 August. After checking with COMUSMACV, CINCPAC granted the extension on 17 April.[2]

(S) In July CINCPACFLT reassessed projected force levels in FY 72. One problem was that an LPH (amphibious assault ship) would not be continuously available to the ARG/SLF forces. CINCPACFLT therefore requested that the force posture be modified, subject to the following. Under existing conditions it was understood that ARG/SLF ALFA would have an over-the-beach and vertical envelopment capability and would not operate outside the 120-hour readiness area unless ARG BRAVO had an LPH attached and could provide the same capability in 120 hours to Vietnam. When ARG/SLF BRAVO operated intact, it would have a 168-hour readiness reaction to Vietnam. When ARG BRAVO was operating with its SLF (a BLT) ashore in Okinawa, it would be on 168-hour reaction time to be underway from Buckner Bay with the SLF embarked. CINCPAC approved these arrangements on 13 July, advising that the posture assumed would remain under continuous review to insure that there was no adverse impact on other essential commitments.[3]

SIOP Force Readiness

(TS) The Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) was revised [redacted]. Revision JULIET, implemented on 1 July, remained in effect until 31 December 1971. A team from the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff briefed CINCPAC and the Component commanders on the revision on 30 and 31 July. In addition to the threat, the briefing concerned the forces committed to the SIOP and trends in vehicle and weapons commitment, the force application, the damage analysis of the application and how it conformed to JCS guidance, the consequences of execution of the SIOP, and considerations for future SIOP planning. The threat, the team stated, had not grown much for this revision, while in contrast the number of U.S. weapons had increased significantly. The growth had been primarily in MIRV (multiple independent reentry vehicle) systems. In addition, the quality of U.S. missiles in terms of reliability and accuracy had improved and we had more missiles with penetration aids that would complicate the Soviet defensive problem. The increased number of hardened missiles decreased the impact of a Soviet pindown attack on the U.S. missile force.

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1 CINCPACFLT 112133Z Feb 71; CINCPAC 182301Z Feb 71; JCS 7205/252240Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 270245Z Mar 71.
2 CINCPAC 172243Z Apr 71.
3 CINCPACFLT 030442Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 132125Z Jul 71.

[redacted]

(TS) Several specific matters arose in regard to PACOM naval nuclear forces during 1971. [redacted]

(S) The nuclear submarine cycle consisted of a 58-day alert patrol and a 28-day upkeep period. The requirement to maintain a 15-minute missile launch response and to remain quiet and undetected during patrol constrained training opportunities. A four-day-at-sea refresher at the end of upkeep had not resulted in sufficient engineering department training to maintain required proficiency. Commander Submarine Force Pacific recommended that five days of each patrol be designated as a modified-alert period to improve operational training; a modified-alert submarine had the same survivability as an alert one and could resume alert status within 24 hours. The modified alert status had been adopted by Atlantic Command submarines. On 24 May 1971 CINCPAC approved the temporary adoption of the concept for the PACOM. He emphasized that the concept was an interim expedient, however, that would expire on 30 June 1972, and that the nuclear-powered-submarine training program had to be effectively employed at all times so that the minimum impact on alert target coverage resulted.[3]

(S) On 9 November USS DANIEL WEBSTER conducted a five-missile Follow-on Operational Test (FOT), the first of the FY 72 program. It was also to be the last in order to conserve assets for use in acquiring an adequate data base for the 598-class submarines that were to deploy to the PACOM early in 1978.

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1 J3B721 HistSum Jul 71.
2 J3B721 HistSum Jun, Jul 71.
3 J3B721 HistSum Jun 71.

The FOT was the first in the PACOM to be initiated under conditions of darkness in the launch area. Emergency action procedures employed a message format closely paralleling an actual war message and affording realism in exercising retaliatory command and control procedures.[1]

JSIPS Satellite and Missile Surveillance Study FY 74-81

(S) The Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff (JSIPS) was a joint planning staff that supported the JCS on matters concerning the planning for an integrated aerospace defense of the Continental United States to include air, missile, and space defense, and related command and control, communications, and surveillance activities. The JSIPS was directed to study specific satellite and missile surveillance system mixes for the period FY 74-81. One result of the study was a consolidated list of categories of wartime operations that could be enhanced by satellite and missile surveillance. The JSIPS asked CINCPAC (and the other unified and specified command commanders) to rank-order the list of categories by their relative importance in the performance of his mission.[2]

(S) CINCPAC's reply on 20 April furnished rationale as follows. Of first priority were those categories of operations that provided CINCPAC with notification that a missile or space attack was under way. Here it was vital that CINCPAC know that allied nations, as well as the United States, were under attack, in consonance with the tasking of CINCPAC to plan for assisting in the defense of allied nations in the PACOM. CINCPAC added this to the list of categories furnished by the JSIPS. Concomitant with notification of attack, CINCPAC continued, the characteristics and nature of the attack should be determined. In next priority were those categories of operations to be done immediately following notification of attack. Subsequent priorities pertained to operations accomplished during trans- and post-attack phases of nuclear conflict.[3]

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1 J3B721 HistSum Dec 71.
2 J3C23 HistSum Apr 71.
3 ADMIN CINCPAC 200449Z Apr 71.

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SECTION IV -- RECONNAISSANCE

Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program

(TS) Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) operations continued in 1971, but, as with many other programs, there were cutbacks. In March CINCPACAF requested that the requirement to maintain fighter aircraft on strip alert at Tainan Air Base, Taiwan, to support the PARPRO program be reconsidered. The fighters there were on alert when PARPRO aircraft flew along the coastline of Communist China in the South China Sea. Although they had been on such alert since June 1969, they had never been scrambled to support the PARPRO. In the cases of Chinese reaction to PARPRO aircraft in the North Yellow Sea, Korean-based rather than Tainan-based fighters were scrambled. CINCPAC agreed with the rationale, although he considered it an inopportune time to discontinue the alert because of operations in Southeast Asia that the Communists might consider as against their national interests. On 27 May CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the Tainan alert requirement be discontinued; such approval was granted on 5 June with termination to be at CINCPAC's discretion; the alert was terminated at 100001Z June 1971.[1]

[redacted]

[1] CINCPACAF 120340Z Mar 71; ADMIN CINCPAC 170034Z Mar 71; JCS 050408Z Jun 71; CINCPAC 062147Z Jun 71; CINCPACAF 092110Z Jun 71.

[2] J3B56 HistSum May 71, which cited CINCPAC 012247Z Mar 71 (BOM).



[redacted]

[1] Ibid., which cited COMUS Korea 030853Z Mar 71 (BOM); CINCPAC 050421Z Mar 71; J3B56 HistSum May 71, which cited COMUS Korea 020447Z Apr 71 (BOM); CINCPAC 090133Z Apr 71.

[2] CINCPAC 180435Z May 71; CINCPAC 270340Z May 71.

[3] J3B56 HistSum May 71, which cited JCS 211840Z May 71; CINCPAC 240310Z May 71, and JCS 272257Z May 71.

[4] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 143-145; CINCPAC 302024Z May 71.



1 CINCPAC 210501Z Sep 71.
2 JCS 3059/281444Z Sep 71.
3 J3B41 HistSums Apr, Jun, Jul 71.



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1 J3B41 HistSums May-Aug 71.
2 CINCPAC 112029Z Sep 71; CINCPACFLT 240523Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 060138Z Oct 71.
3 JCS 1183/151838Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 270057Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 280350Z Aug 71; J3B41 HistSums May-Sep 71.

Reconnaissance Escort Requirements

(TS) On 31 March COMUSMACV requested authority to fly manned reconnaissance missions in the ROLLING THUNDER Route Package I area without armed escort. This authority was to be used on a case-by-case basis, only after carefully considering the risk versus the anticipated results. Because CINCPAC had a request pending for extension and modification of Southeast Asia air operational authorities, he deemed it prudent to withhold approval of General Abram's request.[1]

(TS) On 30 April the JCS extended the air operating authorities (discussed elsewhere in this chapter). After assessing these, CINCPAC determined that there would be no conflict with the request and on 7 May he approved 7th Air Force unescorted, manned, tactical reconnaissance flights in Route Package I on a case-by-case basis. Armed escort was approved at the discretion of COMUSMACV based on the relative risk assessment.[2]

Southeast Asia High-Altitude Photo Capability

(TS) Recurring high-altitude drone losses in Southeast Asia caused the JCS in August to initiate an in-depth evaluation of the platform requirement and to ask for CINCPAC's comments on withdrawing the drone capability from Southeast Asia and maintaining a contingency force at Davis Monthan AFB, Arizona. CINCPAC solicited the views of his Air and Navy Component commanders and COMUSMACV, to include impact on PACOM intelligence collection capabilities. Both CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF advised that such withdrawal would have no material effect on their photo requirements. COMUSMACV, however, stated that the high-altitude drone capability should be retained because of its potential employment for area SAM search.[3]



[1] J3B510 HistSum May 71, which cited COMUSMACV 310740Z Mar 71 (EX) and CINCPAC 102328Z Apr 71 (EX).

[2] Ibid., which cited JCS 300049Z Apr 71 (EX) and CINCPAC 071110Z May 71 (EX).

[3] J3B53 HistSum Dec 71; JCS 7034/121418Z Aug 71; CINCPACFLT 142215Z Aug 71; CINCPACAF 242346Z Aug 71; COMUSMACV 230504Z Aug 71.

[4] CINCPAC 312215Z Aug 71; COMUSMACV 080710Z Sep 71.

[redacted]

(U) For additional discussion of this subject, see Chapter X, Intelligence Activities.

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[1] COMUSMACV 120856Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 152156Z Sep 71; JCS 7208/100148Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 110349Z Dec 71.

SECTION V -- EXERCISES

Exercise HIGH HEELS 71

(S) HIGH HEELS 71, conducted 27 January to 6 February 1971, was a JCS-sponsored worldwide command post exercise, the purpose of which was to exercise participants in command and control procedures in an environment of crisis buildup terminating in general war and execution of the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP). HIGH HEELS 71 was interfaced with NATO's WINTEX 71 exercise, nicknamed GOOD HEART, from 27 January to 4 February. HIGH HEELS was executed generally in three phases, a crisis buildup of 2½ days, an outbreak of conventional hostilities escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons for a phase of 5½ days, and the last phase of 3½ days concerned with SIOP execution and post-SIOP reconstitution and redirection. The PACOM participated fully in the exercise, with all major subordinate commands except those employed in Southeast Asia operations playing an active role.[1]

(S) The Alternate Command Facility at [redacted] Kunia was activated for primary play and control, as were the [redacted] facilities of the PACOM Component commanders. The Alternate Command Facility at Guam and the Airborne Command Post also participated actively. The Commander of Battle Staff Team Three reported that the capability of personnel at the Guam facility had improved considerably since previous HIGH HEELS and JOLLY ROGER exercises.[2] In his initial reaction report to the JCS on 27 February, CINCPAC advised that from his point of view the exercise appeared extremely well planned, organized, and executed. "All exercise objectives were attained, and great training benefits were realized by all PACOM participants." Earlier, on 7 Febraury, Admiral McCain had conveyed his appreciation to the participants. Terming the exercise a "complete success," he said, "This would not have been possible without the great zeal, exuberance, imagination, and professionalism exhibited by all concerned."[3]

JOLLY ROGER

(S) JOLLY ROGER was an annual PACOM-wide (less Southeast Asia) general war command post exercise. It was designed to improve the overall general war readiness of the PACOM, ascertain discrepancies in existing plans and procedures, and prepare command center teams and planning group personnel for participation in the JCS-sponsored HIGH HEELS series of exercises. Thus, this series was conducted about half way through the year from the HIGH HEELS exercises; in

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1 J3COA HistSum Feb 71.
2 J3C1 HistSum Feb 71.
3 CINCPAC 270301Z Feb 71; CINCPAC 072223Z Feb 71.

1971 the JOLLY ROGER was conducted from 23 to 27 August. Participants were all who participated in HIGH HEELS 71 or who were expected to participate in HIGH HEELS 72. The Alternate Command Facility at Kunia was the primary facility, but the Airborne Command Post was airborne during certain times and participated actively, and the Alternate Command Facility at Guam was activated and augmented for exercise monitoring purposes. The exercise was considered successful.[1]

FORECAST STORM

(S) Exercises in the FORECAST STORM series continued to be conducted in 1971. These were emergency communications exercises to test both the communications systems and the procedures designed to insure expeditious relay of information. Twelve such exercises were conducted in 1971, usually about one a month. The exercises simulated a Condition One abort of a Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) aircraft, which transmitted the timing message over appropriate frequencies using the standing operating procedures. The standard for receipt of voice-relayed information by CINCPAC was five minutes, and most of the time that standard was met no matter where in the world the CINCPAC happened to be at the time. Some of the messages were transmitted through the Command Center of CINC Alaska, depending on the location of the PARPRO aircraft. In one case the total elapsed time from origin of the message to the time CINCPAC's Executive Assistant was notified in London, England was four minutes. In a few cases the time exceeded the specified five minutes; in one case when eight minutes was required the cause was identified as separate conferencing of the aircraft transporting the CINC and subsequent repeat of the message. In the one case where the message took 12 minutes the excess time was related to the procedure used by the reporting station in Adak, Alaska and the inability to reach the office of CINCPAC's aide during three separate AUTOVON (Automatic Voice Network) calls using FLASH precedence. The last test for the year, on 28 December, had an elapsed time of three minutes, well within the established five minute criteria.[2]

POLO HAT

(TS) Exercises in the POLO HAT series continued in 1971. These were JCS-controlled timing exercises organized to measure the speed and accuracy of SIOP execution and termination messages transmitted to U.S. nuclear delivery forces. The exercises were designed to provide training for operations and communications personnel at all participating levels, evaluate the reliability

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 181-182; CINCPAC 131915Z Mar 71; J3C21 HistSum Aug 71.

[2] J3C2 HistSums, Jan-Apr, Jun-Dec 71.

of specific communications means, evaluate existing and proposed means and routing for the minimum essential emergency communications network, and evaluate new JCS emergency action procedures. The exercises in 1971 began with POLO HAT 71-1 on 29 and 30 March. This exercise continued concepts developed in 1970 in that outages of various communications systems and destruction of ground relay sites were assumed during different phases of the exercise. All PACOM subordinate commands participated with both the CINCPAC Command Center and Airborne Command Post acting as primary command centers.[1]

(U) POLO HAT 71-2, which had been scheduled for 10-12 May, was cancelled to permit further study of the previous exercise before conducting another. Exercise 71-3 was conducted by the JCS on 12 and 13 July. This was the first JCS exercise conducted under the revised emergency action procedures that had become effective on 1 July. Exercise 71-4 was conducted on 21 and 22 September.[2]

(S) POLO HAT 71-5, on 21 October, was conducted in conjunction with a SAC test of the Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS). In this test the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post was concerned with its ability to receive transmissions from a MINUTEMAN missile launched from Vandenberg AFB, California. The missile was equipped with a tape recorder programmed to transmit an encoded Emergency Action Message over two different UHF frequencies. The message was received on both frequencies for a period of 13 minutes by a Battle Staff team aboard a CINCPAC BLUE EAGLE aircraft orbiting approximately 150 miles south of Oahu, Hawaii. A second CINCPAC Airborne Command Post aircraft, parked on the ramp at Hickam AFB, Hawaii received the message on only one frequency for a period of 5 minutes, while the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post Alert Duty Officer successfully received the message on his receiver for a period of 12 minutes. The test was considered to be "extremely successful" and accurately portrayed the capability of the Airborne Command Post to receive successfully an Emergency Action Message transmitted by that means.[3]

(TS) POLO HAT 71-6, a three-phase exercise, was initiated on 22 November. The first phase, beginning on that date, was conducted using normal communications; the second, on 23 November, assumed degraded communications with the Airborne Command Post acting as the Primary Command Center. The third phase was initiated on 29 November and consisted of a series of unannounced Emergency Action Messages. These required only verbal after-action reports. It was the first POLO HAT exercise that had included this third phase of unannounced messages. This exercise completed the POLO HAT series for 1971.[4]

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[1] J3C2 HistSum Mar 71; CINCPAC 192354Z Mar 71; CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 180-181.
[2] J3C21 HistSums Jul, Sep 71.
[3] J3C10 HistSum Oct 71.
[4] J3C211 HistSum Nov 71.

Peacetime Emergency Situation Exercises

(C) In 1971 CINCPAC conducted four more in a series of peacetime emergency situation exercises that had begun in 1969 to test command, control, and communications procedures and to insure expeditious reaction to emergency situations, as authorized by Rules of Engagement and CINCPAC instructions. These were FREEWAY LULU on 23 April, FREEWAY MOVER on 1 June, FREEWAY NICKEL on 27 July, and FREEWAY OUTLAW on 2 November, making a total of 14 exercises in this series. The exercises were designed to be as realistic and authentic as practical, but the movement of forces was simulated.

(S) The April exercise portrayed two incidents--the shootdown of a PARPRO aircraft and an attack by Chinese gunboats on an amphibious transport--to assess the capability of the PACOM command and control system to handle two situations simultaneously. In the November exercise the situation was the harassment and subsequent attack on a "U.S. interest" oil survey vessel operating in the East China Sea, a twofold exercise to test a contingency plan concerning oil survey vessels and also the peacetime emergency procedures of the All-Source Information Center Communications (ASICOM) Network. Utilization of the ASICOM was "exceptional" and further justified the existing requirement for the ASICOM loop. Time sensitive information was immediately available to subscribers without regard to classification, thereby promoting the free flow of information.[1]

FREEDOM VAULT

(U) Exercise FREEDOM VAULT was a joint-combined strategic mobility exercise conducted at Osan, Korea. The exercise opened on 3 March with a combined airborne assault of 683 U.S. paratroopers from Fort Bragg, North Carolina jumping from 12 C-141 aircraft. One representative load of heavy equipment was dropped; this consisted of one 3/4 ton truck, one 105mm howitzer, and a load-bearing platform with a palletized load. U.S. and ROK Air Forces supported with a fly-by and simulated air strikes with F-4, F-5, and F-86 aircraft controlled by combined forward air controllers. The demonstration portion of the exercise was viewed by approximately 250 special guests, including President Park Chong-hui. All scheduled events went as planned with no serious injuries and minimal property damage. The exercise continued with a relief in place by insertion of a ROK Marine battalion by heliborne landing in the airhead. The exercise was terminated on 5 March with U.S. Forces returning to their U.S. bases by Military Airlift Command C-141 aircraft beginning on 7 March.[1]

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 180; J3C23 HistSum Apr 71; J3C212 HistSum Jun 71; J3C231 HistSum Jul 71; J3C212 HistSum Nov 71.

[2] J3B10 HistSum Mar 71.

Amphibious Ready Group Exercises Proposed

(S) Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) constituted the only readily available PACOM reserve. Their requirement for periodic amphibious operational training to maintain an acceptable degree of readiness had been a cause for concern during 1970. Over-the-beach training facilities under U.S. control for these forces were located on Okinawa and at Subic Bay in the Philippines, but CINCPAC did not consider these adequate to support all training requirements for the ARG. The State Department had placed a number of constraints on ARG exercises in other places, however, and in July 1970 an amphibious exercise in the vicinity of Taiwan had been disapproved by Washington, the disapproval stemming, the JCS had explained, "from adverse effects which the exercise might create with respect to delicate state of relations between governments of United States and People's Republic of China."[1]

(S) The subject of an amphibious exercise in Taiwan came up again in 1971. It is discussed below under the subject "Disaster Assistance and Relief Team Civic Action Exercise on Taiwan."

(TS) The next area that came under study for an amphibious exercise was the RVN. On 10 April CINCPAC asked for comments on such an exercise, including a turn-away landing as one of the options, to demonstrate that the Vietnamization program was progressing so well that the United States could hold amphibious exercises there. On 19 April COMUSMACV non-concurred in the idea of any such exercise in Vietnam for the reason that the insertion of troops was contrary to National policy. CINCPACFLT, however, had concurred in the turn-away landing concept and CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV for his comments on this. (A turn-away landing was an unopposed exercise in which the forces went through the landing approach but then turned away before landing.) COMUSMACV responded on 22 April that the proposed amphibious exercise would be neither desirable nor practical, since such an exercise would be termed a defeat by enemy propaganda. On 27 April CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT that the proposed exercise would be held in abeyance until such time as it might become feasible.[2]

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 146-150.

2 J3B41 HistSum Apr 71, which cited CINCPAC 102316Z Apr 71 (EX), COMUSMACV 191015Z Apr 71 (EX), CINCPACFLT 201502Z Apr 71 (EX), CINCPAC 210121Z Apr 71 (EX), COMUSMACV 220930Z Apr 71 (EX), and CINCPAC 271209Z Apr 71 (EX).

Disaster Assistance and Relief Team Civic Action Exercise on Taiwan

(S) FORMER PIONEER exercises, combined U.S.-Republic of China unconventional warfare exercises, were discontinued in 1970. The matter of the kinds of exercises permitted in Taiwan had come under study in 1970, with the JCS encouraging only exercises that were consistent with U.S. bilateral treaty obligations, i.e., those that provided for the defense of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and, subject to decision by higher authority, the Offshore Islands. The JCS had ruled out participation in exercises that implied support for which the United States was not committed or that were primarily offensive in nature. There was no objection to exercises that emphasized air defense, antisubmarine warfare, naval operations, or command post exercises. CINCPAC at the end of October 1970 had asked COMUSTDC to develop the concept for such exercises in coordination with CINCPAC's Component commanders. He noted that the exercises he considered most suitable to the objectives were a command post exercise similar to the FOCUS LENS series in Korea or an amphibious exercise in which the U.S. amphibious task force simulated the aggressor and the Nationalist Chinese forces the defenders.[1]

(S) COMUSTDC commented on the proposal to conduct an amphibious training exercise in the fourth quarter of FY 71 in a message to CINCPAC on 26 February 1971. He noted that he had made proposals earlier to CINCPAC for U.S. Marines to conduct a unilateral landing against Chinese forces who were acting as defenders. This involved some combined training while retaining the features of a unilateral landing. Both CINCPACFLT and the Commander Seventh Fleet objected to using Marines in an aggressor role, however, and previous Washington guidance, COMUSTDC said, seemed to preclude a landing in which both U.S. and Chinese Marines participated. A variation in which Marines of both countries would be assigned separate and geographically displaced landing sectors was considered, but COMUSTDC felt that although it provided the semblance of a combined exercise, it suffered two disadvantages. First, the U.S. effort to skirt the combined exercise issue would drive home to the Chinese our reluctance to join in a combined exercise, and secondly, the scenario would be unacceptable at the Washington level. The U.S. Ambassador had therefore been approached again on a unilateral amphibious exercise by U.S. Forces in Taiwan, but he noted that the Seventh Fleet commander had raised a number of objections to using U.S. amphibious forces as aggressors, as this could be misinterpreted and used in propaganda by the Chinese Communists. COMUSTDC summarized that it appeared impossible in view of all of the considerations to conduct an exercise in the period under consideration. No exercise was conducted.[2]

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 177-178.
2 COMUSTDC 260941Z Feb 71.

(S) To help fill the void created by the cancellation of the FORMER PIONEER series, on 18 January 1971 the Commanding General, U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS) provided COMUSTDC with a proposed concept to test, exercise, and demonstrate the Special Action Force Asia (SAFASIA) Disaster Assistance and Relief Team (DART) capability on Taiwan in conjunction with Chinese counterparts. The concept called for a fast reaction force of about 200 personnel of the SAFASIA to fly to Taiwan on short notice, in reaction to a simulated natural disaster, to provide U.S. assistance on the ground to the Republic of China and its people. He visualized a two-week exercise. CINCUSARPAC supported this concept, stating that it would offset the cancellation of FORMER PIONEER and mitigate attendant Chinese concern regarding the credibility of U.S. defense commitments. He requested CINCPAC support for the DART exercise concept as proposed. He also supported the request of the 1st Special Forces Group Airborne (SFGA), principal element of the SAFASIA, for additional quotas for attendance at the Chinese Army Rough Terrain Parachute Training.[1]

(S) COMUSTDC advised CINCPAC that the basic idea of DART training had been proposed as a small-scale substitute for FORMER PIONEER, but he noted the size of the proposed force and raised several points. He noted that since FORMER PIONEER had been cancelled at the direction of Washington, any exercise proposed as a substitute should be sanctioned in Washington. Notwithstanding the apparent humanitarian nature of the proposal, he said, the 200-man force, which was greater than the SAFASIA force in FORMER PIONEER, and the military connotation of air-dropping the force in conjunction with Chinese airborne-qualified counterparts in roughly equal numbers, was likely to meet with a negative Washington reaction. The view was apt to be that the "scenario" was a thinly disguised version of FORMER PIONEER with decreased Chinese participation for U.S.-Chinese Special Forces training. COMUSTDC stated that he was most anxious to increase combined training in joint exercises and was fully appreciative of SAFASIA for training, but believed that any proposal involving SAFASIA personnel in anything like the numbers proposed would be politically unacceptable at the time.[2]

(S) CINCPAC advised CINCUSARPAC on 10 February that the DART Field Training Exercise concept appeared to have merit, but he recommended that any future comparison of the proposed DART exercise to FORMER PIONEER or discussion of using it as a replacement for FORMER PIONEER be discontinued. Such a comparison to a simulated combat, offensive operation exercise could possibly jeopardize the DART status as a humanitarian, civic-action type exercise. In addition, CINCPAC recommended that instead of calling it a Field Training Exercise (FTX)

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[1] J3 HistSum Jan 71; CG USARYIS 180415Z Jan 71; CINCUSARPAC 260226Z Jan 71; see also "Special Forces Operations" elsewhere in this chapter.

[2] COMUSTDC 260726Z Jan 71.

it be called a CAX (Civic Action Exercise) and be submitted for approval solely on its own merit. He further recommended that upon completion of a finalized DART concept, it be forwarded to COMUSTDC for comment and Country Team coordination.[1]

(S) When CINCUSARPAC tasked CGUSARYIS to finalize the DART CAX proposal, he recommended that several alternate concepts be developed. The first was for a full-scale annual exercise involving a DART task force of about 200 U.S. personnel. Second was to be a phased annual exercise, with a task force headquarters to be deployed with about 50 DART personnel. After some specified period of time, a week or 10 days perhaps, the initial complement would be exfiltrated and a second DART complement deployed, with the sequence continuing until all forces had been exercised. The third concept involved monthly or bi-monthly small-scale training involving a task force headquarters and three DART teams (approximately 50 personnel) exercising for five or six days. This concept could be tied to a program of basic DART training serving as the end-of-course exercises. (This concept traced back to Rough Terrain Parachute Training.)[2]

(S) CGUSARYIS proposed only two concepts, either of which he felt would meet U.S. training objectives. Both included the use of some type of airborne or helicopter insertion of DART teams, participation by ROC Army Special Forces, and a short duration civic action and medical civic action program exercise on the ground for the deployed teams. The first concept was for a full-scale exercise. The one that was endorsed by both CINCUSARPAC and COMUSTDC was the second concept, which was a three-phase exercise involving one command-liaison element and 12 DART teams, with a total strength in Taiwan at any given time of 72 personnel. The command element of about 24 personnel would be in Taiwan for about 40 days, the DART teams would rotate four at a time, and each team would not be in Taiwan over 10 days.[3]

(S) COMUSTDC requested that a detailed concept plan for the exercise be developed by SAFASIA and submitted to CGUSARYIS, CINCUSARPAC, COMUSTDC, and CINCPAC. In the meantime, SAFASIA was planning a short exercise in the Ryukyus to test the DART concept and more effectively determine capabilities, limitations, and problem areas.[4]

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[1] CINCPAC 102246Z Feb 71.
[2] CINCUSARPAC 182108Z Feb 71.
[3] CG USARYIS 030050Z Mar 71, CINCUSARPAC 082133Z Mar 71; COMUSTDC 230419Z Mar 71, J3 HistSum Mar 71.
[4] J3B622 HistSum Apr 71.

SECTION VI -- RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Joint Research and Development Objectives Document

(S) CINCPAC contributed annually to the Joint Research and Development Objectives Document (JRDOD). In 1971 his recommendations were forwarded to the JCS on 14 November, under a new format limiting the number of topics to 10. New guidelines were designed to improve the effectiveness of the document by giving the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) a smaller list of areas (40 topics) in priority order within Force Categories for emphasis in the research and development process. The 40 topics would be determined by the JCS based on recommendations of the commanders of unified and specified commands. The Force Categories were strategic offense, strategic defense, strategic control and surveillance, tactical air forces, mobility forces, land forces, and naval forces. The subjects had already been surfaced by CINCPAC, both in his periodic reports on significant research and development problem areas and in previous recommendations for the JRDOD.

(S) Topics were listed in priority within each Force Category. First under tactical air forces was the requirement for improved all-weather air operations. Needed was an improved capability for the tactical air force to perform close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, rescue, and airlift missions in all-weather (reduced surface visibility) conditions. Secondly, the tactical air forces needed aircraft with a defense against electromagnetic threats. The third requirement was for an improved capability for collecting and presenting timely, valid, accurate, and comprehensive intelligence information to tactical commanders for support in making tactical decisions.

(S) For land forces, the first priority item was a safe and reliable method for clearing mines and booby traps for variable periods of time in areas of tactical ground operations, logistical ground operations, and ship or boat operations on inland waterways. Second was a new system of sensors or devices capable of searching over a wide area and providing real-time detection and location of enemy infiltrators, infiltration routes, communications-liaison stations, and bivouac areas, with sufficient accuracy to permit effective interdiction. Third was the means to deny enemy ground forces the ability to operate freely and effectively in selected areas. Fourth was the means to defend bases in friendly territory against infiltrator attack and defend bases in semi-hostile, forward, and remote areas against infiltrator or sapper attack and against surprise, large force attack.

(S) For naval forces the first requirement was for means to counter the enemy submarine threat to U.S. and allied shipping and to counter the threat of strategic attack on the United States posed by enemy nuclear missile-carrying submarines. Secondly was a requirement to provide surface ships with an adequate defensive suit to counter the existing and projected enemy aircraft and cruise missile threat.

(S) For strategic defense, the need was for improved air, surface, and underwater detection and tracking systems capable of detecting and tracking sea, air, and space vehicles launched against the United States from eastern Asia.[1]

PACOM Research and Development Problem Areas

(S) CINCPAC sent semi-annual reports to the JCS identifying significant research and development problem areas in his command, at the same time forwarding lists of problem areas cited by his Component commanders, COMUSMACV, and COMUS Korea. The two most critical areas identified by CINCPAC had been listed often before: one was mine and booby trap detection and clearing, the other was improved all-weather air operations. CINCPAC acknowledged that considerable effort had gone into mine and booby trap studies already, but "acceptable solutions" had not been developed and mines and booby traps continued to be the most serious casualty producers in Southeast Asia; use of such weapons could be anticipated in all future insurgency situations. CINCPAC noted that a new technological breakthrough might be required to provide a device or system to solve the problem. In the matter of all-weather air capability, CINCPAC noted that serious deficiencies remained in such areas as close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, rescue, and airlift missions. Further effort was urgently needed, CINCPAC said, to develop reliable systems that would allow aircrews to perform their missions in all weather without undue risk to themselves or the ground forces they supported.

(S) CINCPAC listed additional problem areas as next in relative importance. These were wide-area personnel detection and location devices or means; electronic warfare deficiencies; antisubmarine warfare and defense against naval surface-to-surface missiles, to include detection and kill capability; and artillery-delivered anti-tank and anti-personnel mines as a means of providing route and area denial. CINCPAC identified 10 additional problem areas of significance but of relatively less importance.[2]

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[1] J3ORI HistSum Nov 71.

[2] CINCPAC ltr Ser 002009 of 9 Sep 71, Subj: PACOM Significant Research and Development Problem Areas (U).

CINCPAC Review of Advanced Research Projects Agency Activities

(U) Defense Department directive 5129.46 of 12 June 1969 required commanders of unified commands to conduct annual reviews of activities of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) conducted in their area of responsibility. The second annual review for CINCPAC was held 16-19 March 1971 and the third was scheduled for mid-February 1972. These reviews examined ARPA projects with respect to their continuation, expansion, consolidation, redirection, or termination. There were three field offices in the PACOM under the Tactical Technology Officer of ARPA, the principal agency with which CINCPAC had interest and contact; these were the Research and Development Field Unit - Vietnam, the Research and Development Center - Thailand, and the Research and Development Field Representative, Korea.

(U) The ARPA had not always been entirely responsive to the need of CINCPAC and had engaged in projects that were not considered to be within their purview or that could have been more appropriately handled by the Serivces. This was not entirely ARPA's fault, however, as few definite requirements had been placed on them by the unified command. CINCPAC believed that the work of the ARPA should be channeled to be more responsive to PACOM needs. More requirements generated by the PACOM commands, for example, would perhaps eliminate questionable work being performed by that agency. Such was the goal of the annual review.[1]

(U) During the March review CINCPAC endorsed the continuation of ongoing projects in Thailand, Vietnam, and Korea. CINCPAC also proposed that the ARPA undertake two efforts to help the Koreans. One was a study/consulting effort to assist the ROK Navy in selection of propulsion systems for 100- to 600-ton combatants. This study would analyze such matters as availability, maintenance, training requirements, and personnel manning requirements. It was envisioned that the Korean Research Agency for Defense Science and the ROK Navy ship acquisition group would do the study with assistance from ARPA-provided marine architects, propulsion experts, and possibly systems analysts. The second effort was a small study/analysis aimed at improving the physical security of sensitive fixed installations. A secondary objective of such a study was to address the feasibility of reducing security manpower. Recognizing the large effort that had been ongoing in the areas of base defense and sensors, it was believed that the terrain and climate peculiarities or Korea, along with a reduction of forces, merited such a study.[2]

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1 J3OR1 HistSums Mar, Dec 71.
2 CINCPAC 302330Z Mar 71.

(U) Routinely, throughout the year, specific ARPA projects were submitted to CINCPAC for review in accordance with DOD Directive 5129.46, which also required that ARPA activities in foreign countries be cleared with the responsible unified commander. Almost all of these were approved by CINCPAC in 1971.[1]

(U) One exception occurred in April. ARPA had proposed a task concerning Thailand that was entitled "Feasibility Study for the Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) Military Systems Studies Development." As envisioned by the ARPA, this task would constitute an assessment of the MRDC potential to perform analytic studies of force structures and weapons systems. Under this concept a major portion of the task effort would have been to decide what subjects could be studied by Thai analysts who were being trained in the United States and scheduled for assignment to the MRDC. CINCPAC noted in his nonconcurrence that there was a strong possibility of interference with the host country's military organization--that problems of force structure and weapon system selection were the responsibility of the military commands, in this case the major Joint Staff agencies of the Thai Ministry of Defense with the advice and assistance of MACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI. As the scope and objectives outlined in the task impinged on the responsibilities of COMUSMACTHAI, and as a disturbance of the relationships between MACTHAI and the Thai Ministry of Defense could impact adversely on the joint planning and programming of the Thai military force structure, CINCPAC recommended modifications of the task. The development of force planning methodologies was considered an appropriate area of research, but the use or application of such methodologies should be made by the Ministry of Defense assisted by the JUSMAG staff. The task was modified as recommended by CINCPAC.[2]

Research and Development Advisory Effort in Thailand

(C) The ARPA Research and Development Center - Thailand (RDC-T) had been participating since 1962 in a joint research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) effort with the Thai Military Research and Development Center (MRDC). The main thrust of the program in recent years had been counterpart development, the training of the MRDC staff through jointly conducted programs funded by the ARPA.

(C) In March 1971 COMUSMACTHAI recommended transferring responsibility for support and advice of the MRDC from ARPA's RDC-T to JUSMAG. His reason

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 166-167; J30R1 HistSums Jan-Mar, Jul, Aug, Dec 71.

[2] CINCPAC 010314Z Apr 71; J30R1 HistSum Apr 71.

was that the counterpart relationship between the MRDC and the RDC-T, adopted over a decade earlier to meet a desire to conduct U.S. defense research in Thailand and to develop an RDT&E capability in the Thai military establishment, "needs to be rationalized in terms of today's environment and needs." He noted that between August 1970 and early March 1971 the RDC-T had submitted nine proposals for Mission review and approval, but that the Embassy and MACTHAI had been able jointly to approve, or recommend approval, for only two, in spite of what COMUSMACTHAI believed to be a sincere and concerted effort by all staffs concerned to assist in developing a useful ARPA program. COMUSMACTHAI believed that a fundamental difference in viewpoint existed, that ARPA programs were aimed for the most part at demonstrating the value of RDT&E to the Thai government and at training the MRDC staff through jointly conducted programs funded by the ARPA. Unfortunately, COMUSMACTHAI continued, many of the projects proposed were not relevant in a practical way to Thai military requirements as he saw them, they did not ease the burden on MAP/MASF efforts, and some transgressed on other Ministry of Defense Joint Staff functions.

(C) COMUSMACTHAI therefore recommended that CHJUSMAGTHAI assume, on 1 July 1971, responsibility for the advisory RDT&E effort to the Royal Thai Armed Forces, that there be established in JUSMAGTHAI the post of Chief of Research and Development to be staffed from Service sources (possibly transferring some individuals from the RDC-T staff), and that the Director of the RDC-T carry out the task of wrapping up the counterpart relationship with the MRDC during the remainder of 1971 under the supervision of the CHJUSMAG, with the ARPA/RDC-T to be terminated after 1 January 1972.[1]

(C) Another reason set forth for terminating RDC-T's relationship with the MRDC was the U.S. policy that all elements of the U.S. Mission should close activities requiring joint participation with Thai counterparts. All components had complied except for ARPA. The Director of ARPA/RDC-T believed that existing relationships with the MRDC should continue until 1 July 1974. He also indicated that he could not release his military personnel for transfer to MACTHAI.[2]

(C) In April, after a review of COMUSMACTHAI's plan for the transfer of responsibility, the U.S. Ambassador in Bangkok proposed a modified plan that was supported by COMUSMACTHAI. He recommended that commencing 1 July 1971, the transition of the RDC-T organization and program to a residual military R&D advisory organization be initiated by COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI. He set a target date of 1 October 1972 for the Royal Thai Government to assume budgetary responsibility for manning and operating the MRDC and supporting its R&D activities, with liquidation of the RDC-T by 31 December 1972.[3]

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1 COMUSMACTHAI 051141Z Mar 71.
2 J30R1 HistSum Jun 71, which cited COMUSMACTHAI 120525Z Mar 71 (EX).
3 AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 5576/230906Z Apr 71.

(C) CINCPAC supported the Ambassador's position to the JCS and concurred in the timetable recommended. He also supported COMUSMACTHAI's request for a transfer of personnel and spaces from the ARPA RDC-T to the JUSMAG. Subsequently the Ambassador's recommendations were approved jointly by the State and Defense Departments. All parties were requested to proceed with the implementation of the recommendations. The joint message stressed the importance of developing a scientific and technical capability in the Thai Ministry of Defense by concurring in an earlier statement by COMUSMACTHAI: "The goal of self-sufficiency will never be reached if the development of research and scientific capabilities, over the long term, is not actively pursued or is neglected in favor of the short term purchase of hardware." The message further stated that the ARPA would assist COMUSMACTHAI in the formation and staffing of an effective R&D section by the temporary loan until December 1972 of two spaces and two RDC-T personnel as initial staff.[1]

Research and Development Assistance for the RVNAF

(U) In connection with the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) and related U.S. planning, CINCPAC had recommended to the JCS on 7 January 1970 that a system be implemented by which U.S. military advisors identified requirements for R&D assistance to support the RVNAF and forward those requirements through Service channels for appropriate R&D or technical support. This concept was supported by the JCS and implemented by a MACV directive of 20 May 1971. ARVN and Regional/Popular Force requirements for urgently required new material were to be identified by the appropriate U.S. advisory element and submitted through appropriate U.S. channels to MACV. Vietnamese Navy, Air Force, and Marine requirements for new materiel were to be identified by Naval and Air Force Advisory Groups and processed as prescribed by the Service concerned.

(U) As joint Tables of Distribution (JTD) of the various elements of MACV reached CINCPAC's headquarters for comment, however, it was noted that no staff section was charged with the function of identifying and forwarding requirements for new materiel in accordance with the MACV directive on the subject. This was true of JTDs for the Headquarters, MACV Staff Advisory Elements and the II Corps Field Advisory Effort in April, the Third regional Assistance Command in May, and the Capital Military Advisory Team in June. In each case CINCPAC's RDT&E branch in the Operations Division recommended that such deficiencies be corrected.[2]

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[1] CINCPAC 110226Z May 71; SECSTATE 111157/221837Z Jun 71.
[2] J30R1 HistSums Apr-Jun 71.

Agency for Defense Development - Korea

(C) In 1971 the ROK government established a new organization called the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), which was responsible to the Minister of National Defense for military RDT&E and for in-country production of military equipment. The ADD concept had first been introduced by Defense Minister Jung during meetings at Camp Smith in July 1970. In April 1971 Minister Jung stated that the fundamental purpose of the ADD was to develop a material acquisition capability for Korea--primarily production of items and parts required to maintain U.S. MAP-supplied equipment. In this context the ADD would be analogous to a U.S. Systems Command.

(C) CINCPAC was interested in the new agency because a successful ADD would support the Nixon Doctine by permitting the Koreans to move toward self-sufficiency. CINCPAC sent a study team led by his Research and Engineering Consultant to Korea in March to evaluate ROK objectives in the fields of RDT&E and to examine potential U.S. support for ADD. The team concluded that the ROK government was firm in its intention to develop a military RDT&E production capability, directed by the ADD; that the technical manpower and industrial base would support the development of a military R&D and production capability; that U.S. support to the ADD would provide long-range benefits to the United States; and that the ADD required immediate U.S. technical and financial assistance to begin. The study team recommended that the United States provide financial and advisory support, that the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea (JUSMAGK) be designated as the responsible element in Korea to advise and support the ADD, and that an ad hoc team of RDT&E and production experts, responsive to the CHJUSMAGK, provide the initial assistance.[1]

(C) COMUS Korea concurred in the conclusions and recommendations except that he recommended that the Defense Department's ARPA office in Korea be the focal point for all support to the Korean RDT&E effort instead of the JUSMAGK. He also recommended that funds for support of the ADD come from sources other than the MAP Korea Five Year Modernization Plan. U.S. Ambassador Porter was originally opposed to any support for the ADD and the Secretary of State expressed some skepticism, but these differences were resolved. On 1 July the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the CINCPAC proposal be approved and supported through the initial phases with periodic review to determine necessary actions.[2]

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[1] J30R1 HistSum Sep 71; J30R Point Paper, 14 Sep 71, Subj: Agency for Defense Development (ADD).

[2] Ibid.

(C) A meeting was held in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on 27 July among representatives of DDR&E, ARPA, the Department of the Army, the JCS, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and CINCPAC. It was agreed that ARPA would recruit and send to Korea within 90 days a high-level advisory team; that ARPA would fund both the team and follow-on advisory support activities, until 1 July 1973 if necessary; that ARPA would not fund "material support" such as equipment or buildings; that there should be a continuous process wherein the team identified advisory needs with follow-on action initiated to provide support; that JUSMAGK participation and policy guidance were desirable; and that a review would be conducted at the end of 60 days in Korea to determine further support, or termination if the effort was unproductive. On 11 August the Secretary of Defense advised the Korean Ministry of National Defense that the management team would be deployed for about three months, after which time "we will make a determination of the need for further support and the form it might take." The ARPA began recruiting team members in September and the team was expected to begin work in Korea in January 1972.[1]

Operations Division Monitors Sensor Activities

(U) In February the RDT&E Branch of the Operations Division assumed responsibility for monitoring the activities of the Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG) and also responsibility for matters concerning sensors in general. This change was brought about by a change to the DCPG charter; in the future the efforts of that agency were to be primarily "to undertake special high-priority development and/or production efforts as directed or approved by the Secretary of Defense." The DCPG was in the process of transferring its function of developing sensors to the Services.[2]

Use of Project SHORT TIME for Qui Nhon Studied

(S) In late August Commander Military Sealift Command, Far East asked CGUSARV the means by which security at ARVN ports might be improved. He mentioned two incidents in March, one in June, and a fourth in August in which sappers had damaged merchant ships and "amply demonstrated the vulnerability of harbor security."

(S) CINCPAC recommended that the port of Qui Nhon be surveyed to determine the feasibility of employing a Navy R&D project know as SHORT TIME, which was using trained dolphins to detect enemy swimmers. The dolphins had been stationed at Cam Ranh Bay since December 1970 and worked by making sonar search of an area

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1 Ibid.

2 CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. III, pp. 79-80; J3OR1 HistSum Feb 71.

after being released from their pens by their handlers. COMNAVFORV conducted the survey requested by CINCPAC, but determined that use of SHORT TIME was not feasible. The size of the area to be guarded required more dolphins than were available and the current often reached 2½ knots, which could degrade the dolphins' sonar.[1]

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[1] J3OR1 HistSum Sep 71; COMSCFE 200410Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 050020Z Sep 71; COMUSMACV 140740Z Sep 71.

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SECTION VII -- REPORTING

Operational Reporting in Southeast Asia

(S) Operational reporting, which was being accomplished in greater detail than ever before, came under continuing study in 1971, both with respect to reducing the number or frequency of reports prepared by U.S. Forces as the number of troops was reduced and with providing an adequate and workable reporting structure for the RVNAF. In the matter of Vietnamization of reporting, CINCPAC convened the PACOM Allied Reporting Conference at his Camp Smith headquarters from 15 to 18 June 1971; it was attended by representatives of COMUS MACV and the CINCPAC Component commands. The conferees recommended that all RVNAF data be removed from the U.S. Operational Reporting (OPREP) system so as to emphasize reliance on RVNAF reporting; that formats and instructions for a daily operational summary for the separate Services, and an RVNAF Significant Incident Report, be evaluated and forwarded to the JCS; and that the JCS and U.S. political authorities persuade the GVN that it would be in its best interest to keep the United States informed of RVNAF operations and incidents through this recommended reporting structure.[1]

(S) As RVNAF operational and incident data was being provided to U.S. agencies entirely by U.S. advisors in the field or by U.S. personnel in the Joint Operations Center of the RVNAF JGS, the conferees recommended development of the simplified system for the RVNAF to retain sources of essential operational information following the drawdown of U.S. personnel. The proposed simplification would result in daily (vice twice-daily) ARVN operational summaries, with more time allowed for preparation. Also, significant incidents would be reported as expeditiously as possible through RVNAF channels rather than by (U.S.) PINNACLE reports through U.S. channels, which would become progressively more limited. The new reporting structure would be one that could be implemented worldwide for all Allied forces after being fully tested by the RVNAF.[2]

(S) The conference report was sent to the Component commanders and COMUSMACV for review. The Component commanders were in general agreement. COMUSMACV, however, did not concur with the basic recommendation that the RVNAF Joint General Staff report directly to the U.S. National Military Command Center

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[1] J3C34 HistSum Jun 71; Conference Report on PACOM Allied Reporting, enclosure to CINCPAC Ltrs Ser 0707 and 0708 of 6 Jul 71, Subj: PACOM Allied Reporting Conference.

[2] J3C44 Point Paper, 19 Jul 71, Subj: Proposed RVNAF Reporting System.

(NMCC). He said that as long as there was a senior U.S. military commander in Vietnam, his mission should include being the interface between the RVNAF and the United States. He noted the problems of the existing RVNAF reporting system and also the need for accuracy of reporting, which was essential to the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence and combat support. He believed that an attempt to impose a new system at a time when the question of U.S. military presence had not been resolved was not timely. He recommended improving the existing structure through refinements and command emphasis as "most appropriate."[1]

(C) CINCPAC proposed that CINCPAC staff representatives visit MACV to discuss provisions for continued timely operational reporting as U.S. withdrawals proceeded in order to more fully understand the COMUSMACV position and to insure maximum effectiveness of the CINCPAC reporting system.[2]

(C) Following the team visit and further review of the reports of the conference, CINCPAC concluded that he was satisfied with the continuous efforts being made by COMUSMACV and the JCS to insure and improve the responsiveness of RVNAF units in reporting significant military and political events. CINCPAC indicated to the Chairman of the JCS that he was aware that we were not fully "out of the woods" and that there was still a reluctance on the part of RVNAF commanders to report pertinent information, but that a continuing monitoring of the system should detect weaknesses and dictate appropriate future action.[3]

(U) CINCPAC was involved in numerous studies of individual U.S. reports during 1971, as the following examples indicate. On 28 August COMUSMACV requested that the Trends in Territorial Forces Report be changed from monthly to quarterly, pointing out that a monthly report could not be expected once full responsibility for the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) was transferred to the Vietnamese. CINCPAC concurred and forwarded the matter to the JCS, who replied on 17 September that Washington agencies using the report had no objections to changing to a quarterly provided that the TFES Inventory Summary and Master File were submitted monthly.[4]

(U) COMUSMACV had asked in May if the Weekly Forecast/Assessment of Military Operations report could be discontinued or modified to lessen the total reports burden. This report had consolidated two separate reports in 1970. The JCS concluded that the report could not be eliminated, but certain modifications were permitted to simplify the report. COMUSMACV also requested

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1 COMUSMACV Ltr to CINCPAC, 9 Aug 71, Subj: PACOM Allied Reporting Conference.
2 CINCPAC 312309Z Aug 71; COMUSMACV 050058Z Sep 71.
3 J3C HistSum Sep 71, which cited CINCPAC 260331Z Sep 71 (EX).
4 CINCPAC 172354Z Sep 71.

that the monthly report on War Victims be made a quarterly, but the JCS requested monthly continuance for the forseeable future because of continuing Washington community interest in the status of war victims.[1]

(C) Early in 1971 the Combat Activities Report (COACT) was cancelled. CINCPAC had so recommended in late 1970; a simplified reporting system was to be adopted that would use OPREP-4s for input to the 7th Air Force Strike Computer's Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB). The JCS wanted a parallel test of both systems during February 1971 with 1 March proposed as the date for the changeover. CINCPAC reported, however, that parallel testing had already been underway without increasing the workload. Successful testing of Marine integration into the SEADAB resulted in 7th Air Force's assuming responsibility from the Marines for certain follow-on reporting, and CINCPAC recommended that the system be changed over on 1 February. The JCS responded that the COACT could not be terminated unless the new system could satisfy Washington requirements for certain air ordnance delivery data and selected bomb damage assessments. CINCPAC assured the JCS that the information was available in the new file and could be provided by either CINCPAC or CINCPACAF in a report format. The JCS concurred in the proposal to terminate the COACT and the changeover occurred when all missions flown up to 311600Z Jan 71 had been reported. Under the SEADAB system an OPREP-4 was transmitted to the 7th Air Force Strike Computer for each strike mission in Southeast Asia. A summary report was provided to the computer for combat support and logistic support missions. These reports were furnished the computer, which provided in turn the OPREP-5 and a historical data base. The SEADAB was a more efficient and less costly system; annual savings as the result of cancellation of the COACT in the PACOM were estimated at approximately $526,500.[2]

(S) In matters of ground operations, reports concerning U.S. personnel were modified to reflect combat losses in Cambodia and Laos, and RVNAF personnel losses in Cambodia. There were problems with classification in the reporting of losses in Cambodia because of the TOP SECRET SPECIAL CATEGORY EXCLUSIVE classification of the special reports used to report casualties in Operation LAMSON 719. To facilitate reporting of casualty data, CINCPAC recommended that the casualty statistics be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL.[3]

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 160; CINCPAC 222229Z May 71; CINCPAC 110008Z Jun 71.

[2] JCS 7415/051439Z Dec 70; ADMIN CINCPAC 080334Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 131959Z Jan 71; JCS 2107/270314Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 290230Z Jan 71; J3C44 HistSum Apr 71.

[3] CINCPAC 030445Z Feb 71; CINCPAC 061917Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 260359Z Mar 71.

(TS) Several special operations required special reporting procedures to allow for ease in handling and to secure the required information required by the JCS. Among these, in addition to LAMSON 719, were SON TAY/FREEDOM BAIT, TOAN THANG 01/71, PRIZE BULL, and PROUD DEEP ALPHA. The JCS granted special authority to downgrade and remove all special caveats as necessary to insure effective handling of each operation and its information.[1]

(TS) In connection with the SON TAY/FREEDOM BAIT request, CINCPAC was provided instructions by higher authority for reporting future sensitive operations. These instructions advised that specific reporting procedures would be included in the execute message, but that advanced authority to classify as SECRET OPREP-4 and 5 reports for future sensitive operations could not be granted.[2]

(S) In another OPREP-5 matter, CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACV report daily sorties by function and by named operation when directed by the JCS or CINCPAC. COMUSMACV explained in detail the effort that would be required to do so and indicated that this was not considered feasible. CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV that the requirement to report daily sorties was envisioned to apply only to limited and extremely important operations, in which case COMUSMACV reported that it could be accomplished.[3]

(S) Statistical data on enemy truck losses continued to be required and refined in 1971. In January the JCS approved a request to change the format of the COMMANDO HUNT/IGLOO WHITE OPREP-5 report to provide additional information.[4] Criteria for measuring the assessment of bomb damage to trucks were revised in 1971. In 1968 CINCPAC had established such criteria for reporting whether a truck was destroyed or damaged. In order to accommodate newly-developed non-visual sensor systems as well as visual observations, CINCPAC directed the following revised criteria.

> Destroyed: A destroyed truck is one observed visually or by means of sensors to: (a) have suffered a large secondary explosion; (b) be burning with sustained flames; (c) be a mass of twisted metal after strike; (d) physically removed from the strike location as a result of direct ordnance hit. Destroyed count based on large secondary fires or explosions will be the lesser number of either (1) vehicles present/attacked, or (2) secondaries at such a location and of suf-

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1 CINCPAC 270411Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 280151Z Sep 71; J3C42 HistSum Dec 71.
2 CINCPAC 060232Z Feb 71.
3 J3C42 HistSum Apr 71.
4 J3C42 HistSum Jan 71; CINCPAC 290231Z Jan 71.

ficient size to represent a destroyed vehicle. Trucks possibly destroyed will be counted as damaged....

Damaged: A damaged truck is one observed visually or by means of sensors to (a) have sustained direct ordnance hit, without secondary fire or explosions at the vehicle locations; (b) have parts, such as hood, fenders, wheels or a portion of the undercarriage missing; (c) be over-turned without fire or explosion. Trucks possibly damaged will not be counted as damaged.[1]

(S) With the mass of data generated in Southeast Asia, it was inevitable that there were discrepancies among various reports. For example, in July the JCS, because of a Congressional query, asked that CINCPAC provide a list of U.S. protective reaction strikes against North Vietnam for the period 1 November 1968 to 30 June 1971. CINCPAC did so on 5 July, listing all such reactions as obtained from machine retrievals and processed by the CINCPAC Data Processing Center from the COACT and SEADAB files. He noted that it was possible that some statistics in the public domain could vary from those he provided, depending on the period for which they had been reported. He noted that some operations results had not been included in the data base because the information was of a "close hold" nature; that in some cases target names and locations might vary; and that in other cases the date of press release of information could not be completely reconciled with sortie dates in the COACT or SEADAB. COMUSMACV provided some additional data on protective reactions and noted that there were three different lists--one at CINCPAC, one at 7th Air Force, and one at MACV. Henceforth the MACV Office of Information would notify 7th Air Force and CINCPAC of all announced protective reactions and identify the operational report that supported the public announcement. CINCPAC dispatched additional protective reaction data to the JCS.[2]

Significant Event/Incident Reporting

(S) CINCPAC continued to voice his requirement to obtain the highest level of reporting responsiveness for events and incidents of high-level interest within the PACOM, with the ultimate goal of five minutes from time of incident to time of receipt of information at CINCPAC's headquarters. These were reported in OPREP-3; the requirement was expressed in CINCPAC Instruction C3480.6A. Several examples illustrate the kinds of events and incidents with which this

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[1] CINCPAC 181215Z Jun 71. See also J3B2 HistSums May, Jun 71.

[2] JCS 9352/022314Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 052225Z Jul 71; COMUSMACV 201155Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 241835Z Jul 71.

reporting structure was concerned.

(S) A series of disturbances involving patients at the Cam Ranh Bay Drug Treatment Center had occurred several hours before it was reported to CINCPAC, leading CINCPAC to request that COMUSMACV comply with the provisions of the CINCPAC instruction on incident reporting. In an incident in Korea that had racial overtones, CINCPAC was advised within two minutes after the COMUS Korea command center knew of it, but as the incident had occurred several hours earlier, CINCPAC asked COMUS Korea to stress the importance of prompt reporting to his subordinate elements. USS MANATEE had experienced an oil spillage, but the commander had not considered it a significant incident and had not reported it promptly; CINCPAC cited the interest placed on ecological matters by news media and noted the sensitivity of incidents of that nature and the high interest attached to timely reporting. "If in doubt - report," CINCPAC directed.[1]

Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT)

(U) Problems continued to delay implementation of the new FORSTAT report. In April, anticipating implementation in October, CINCPAC representatives visited the JCS to discuss and clarify procedures and policies. Organizations within the existing Unit Identification System File were to be used as the basic framework for the new FORSTAT data base. The Services would submit basic identity data for their respective organizations. The JCS in conjunction with the unified commands were to submit data for joint and foreign organizations. Complete initial status data, less personnel data, was to be submitted during the implementation by reporting units. The procedure and policy for reporting personnel data had not yet been resolved by the JCS at that time. The JCS had, however, established policy regarding Combat Readiness Reporting. As a supplement to readiness data reported by the FORSTAT, CINCPAC was to submit quarterly reports (SITREP) summarizing factors that substantially impacted on satisfying JCS approved plans. The basic unit level for reporting readiness remained fundamentally unchanged for the Services, except the Army. It was proposed to have Army units report combat readiness at separate battalion level, but units organic to a division, separate brigade, or armored cavalry regiment would not individually report readiness. This procedure had been in practice as an exception to JCS policy. CINCPAC supported the system of battalion-level reporting.[2]

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[1] CINCPAC 172319Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 210419Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 250341Z Aug 71.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 159-160; J3C43 HistSum May 71; Memorandum for Record, LCOL W. R. Curtis, J3C431, 15 May 71, Subj: FORSTAT Trip Report April 1971, with Enclosure A, Implementation Plan ; JCS SM-256-71, Subj: JCS Policy for Combat Readiness Reporting, dated 21 Apr 71.

(U) Planning continued throughout the year and reporting under the new FORSTAT began on 25 October. It was suspended by the JCS on 10 November, however. The FORSTAT processor was unable to keep track of report numbers; there were excessive report header card errors, causing a majority of incoming reports to be rejected; and there were many discrepancies in error detection logic, and inadvertent loss of data caused by programming malfunctions. At the end of 1971 the new FORSTAT was scheduled to begin on 17 January 1972, with dual reporting necessary for about a month after that.[1]

Reporting Current Operational Information

(U) On 1 July the JCS invited the commanders of unified and specified commands to submit briefs of significant activities for inclusion in the Daily Operational Summary of the NMCC. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he accepted the offer, which he considered an excellent opportunity to present to the Chairman of the JCS and other officials in the Washington area certain information that did not deal directly with operations in Southeast Asia and was not normally reported by other means. It was envisioned that the summaries would concern high-interest logistical matters, administrative topics, significant exercises, and special command control information.[2]

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[1] JCS 3939/101843Z Nov 71; JCS 4188/302356Z Nov 71.
[2] JCS 8245/012256Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 122038Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 131237Z Jul 71.

SECTION VIII - OPERATIONS SECURITY[1]

Evolution of Operations Security

(U) Operations Security (OPSEC) is defined as "those actions that are necessary and appropriate to deny the enemy information concerning planned, on-going, and completed operations."[2] Ostensibly an outgrowth of the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, OPSEC was actually a new name for an old subject. The application of security measures designed to deny the enemy information and to achieve surprise has always been fundamental to the achievement of optimum results in the execution of military operations. However, in much the same way that the introduction of the term "logistics" served to consolidate and focus attention on various supply-related activities essential to the conduct of military operations, so the identification of OPSEC as a separate branch of military discipline has served to integrate and focus attention on the separate security functions that had been performed throughout military history.

(U) The fundamental objective of OPSEC is to preserve the advantage of tactical surprise, and thereby enhance the probability of successful mission accomplishment. OPSEC, therefore, involves the protection of all operational information of possible value to the enemy, prior to, during, and subsequent to military operations, in order to minimize the enemy's use of effective countermeasures to degrade U.S. and Allied mission effectiveness.

(U) As it evolved in the PACOM, OPSEC involved two separate but closely related facets: staff cognizance over OPSEC matters and the conduct of OPSEC field surveys. The Operations Security Branch of the Operations Division had many important contributions in both areas, and at the end of 1971 was the only viable PACOM organization that was active in the latter.

(S) The evolution of the CINCPAC OPSEC effort was tracable to a briefing of the JCS by the Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA) in July 1966, in which significant enemy awareness of U.S. air operations in Southeast Asia was highlighted. On 15 September of that year the Chief of the special Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) planning group, which had been established at

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[1] Information for this section was furnished by Mr. Joseph W. Maguire, the National Security Agency Representative assigned to the CINCPAC Operations Division, Operations Security Branch. Comprehensive data on this subject has not been published previously in CINCPAC Command Histories.

[2] JCS SM-469-71 of 23 Jul 71, Subj: Operations Security.

JCS direction to deal with that problem, briefed CINCPAC and recommended tne preparation of a plan for a centrally-directed examination of all factors bearing on hostile awareness of U.S. air operations in the combat zone. A DIA spokesman reiterated this recommendation in a 5 October briefing of the JCS. On 7 October the JCS approved it and directed the Services to provide communications security and counterintelligence support to CINCPAC.

(S) The CINCPAC survey plan for investigating enemy awareness of U.S. strategic (B-52) bombing operations in the RVN and of tactical airstrike and drone reconnaissance operations in NVN was forwarded on 12 November 1966 and approved by the JCS on 10 December. At that time the nickname PURPLE DRAGON was assigned to the PACOM OPSEC effort and since has been extended to encompass OPSEC activities throughout the U.S. Military Establishment. The initial surveys were conducted at various locations throughout Southeast Asia by personnel assigned from field units on a temporary duty basis. Coordination and direction of this effort were furnished by an ad hoc CINCPAC staff group.[1] Team findings were forwarded to CINCPAC for analysis and correlation with signal intelligence information. The consolidated CINCPAC report, submitted to the JCS on 26 April 1967, represented a significant milestone because it synthesized the contributions of specialists in the fields of air operations, intelligence and counterintelligence, communications and communications security, and signal intelligence. The report further provided a comprehensive review of the overall security posture of the operations surveyed. Combining the applicable features of those diverse disciplines constituted the essence of OPSEC, as it permitted commanders to view the exploitable aspects of their operations or activities as the enemy might see them.

(S) CINCPAC believed that the period of time covered by the initial PURPLE DRAGON effort (November 1966 through March 1967) had been too short to be conclusive and, in order to insure a capability for countering new sources of enemy awareness of U.S. air operations, recommended that personnel be allocated to the CINCPAC staff to permit establishment of a permanent OPSEC function. The JCS concurred and authorized 17 officer and enlisted personnel for this purpose. The JCS also extended the scope of the CINCPAC OPSEC effort to include ground and naval activities. Since that time, CINCPAC has led the way in developing OPSEC doctrine and procedures, particularly in the area of field OPSEC surveying.

(S) Staffed by specialists in operations, communications, and intelligence, and augmented by a representative of the NSA, the CINCPAC OPSEC Branch

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[1] In light of hindsight, it appeared that much of the viability and impact of the CINCPAC OPSEC effort could be attributed to the fact that the program evolved under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations.

conducted surveys throughout the PACOM. A major contribution of this group was the development of the techniques of inquiry and information collection associated with its surveys. Unlike the discrepancy oriented survey activity associated with inspector general inquiries, OPSEC surveys were not necessarily concerned with violations of prescribed doctrine, procedure, or instructions. What the OPSEC survey attempted to determine was the degree of security afforded a given operation or function, to identify the specific weaknesses that could be exploited by hostile interests, and to evaluate the actions necessary to improve its security. In essence, the OPSEC survey was primarily concerned with that which was actually done in the field, as it might appear to an enemy or potential enemy. Violations, per se, were of interest to the OPSEC survey teams only when they became the norm or were so common as to constitute a continuing and reliable source of possible hostile exploitation.

(S) CINCPAC OPSEC surveys were generated from a variety of sources. Some were proposed by staff elements; others were suggested by Component and subordinate commanders in semi-annual OPSEC reports to CINCPAC; some were identified by the OPSEC Branch itself, largely on the basis of information developed during prior surveys; and some surveys were directed by the JCS or were proposed by commanders outside the PACOM, such as CINCSAC. Once it was determined that OPSEC weaknesses might be providing hostile interests with prior knowledge or foreknowledge[1] and an OPSEC survey was decided upon, CINCPAC promulgated a survey notification message to inform the command(s) to be surveyed and their military seniors of the timing, objectives, and composition of the survey effort. Frequently CINCPAC OPSEC personnel were augmented by functional specialists from other staff elements or from the CINCPAC Component or subordinate headquarters responsible for supervision of the operation being surveyed. Prior to going afield, the survey team members acquainted themselves to the maximum practicable extent with the operation to be surveyed through briefings and the review of operation orders and available files.

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[1] Prior knowledge was enemy awareness of the details of an operation, exercise, or force deployment prior to execution and based on knowledge obtained during the planning or preparation phases. Foreknowledge was enemy awareness of any event associated with an on-going operation obtained during the execution of the operation and before the operation was completed. The preparation phase of a military operation included all activities required for support of the operation, such as deployment and mount-out of forces, pre-positioning of supplies, preparation of logistic support areas, and the like, which took place prior to commencement of the actual operation.

(S) Upon deployment, the OPSEC survey team members briefed the commander exercising general field supervision of the operation being surveyed. During those initial contacts, a detailed itinerary for the survey was developed. Subsequently, the team chief sent his personnel to cover all aspects of the operation that he felt might be the source of enemy prior awareness. At the conclusion of the field portion of the survey, the team members frequently provided the responsible field commander with an informal, tentative "out-brief." The team then returned to CINCPAC Headquarters to correlate and analyze its findings and observations and to draft the survey report. The report was then staffed with the appropriate CINCPAC staff sections and transmitted for comment to the Component or subordinate commanders responsible for the operation or function surveyed, with copies to subordinate commanders controlling or participating. Comments normally related to the efficacy of the findings[1] and to the corrective actions taken or planned to eliminate the possible sources of hostile awareness highlighted the survey report. Such comments were then circulated to the cognizant CINCPAC staff sections for evaluation of the adequacy and appropriateness of corrective actions. Under the CINCPAC concept of OPSEC, follow-up actions based on survey findings were the responsibility of the functional staff sections, rather than of the OPSEC Branch. The final step in the OPSEC process was to summarize the findings, comments, and corrective actions in the semi-annual CINCPAC OPSEC report to the JCS. This report was afforded wide dissemination within the PACOM and throughout the other major elements of the U.S. Military Establishment for possible application of the lessons learned through the OPSEC surveys to similar operations in other areas and environments.

(C) The availability of its virtually unique OPSEC Branch afforded the CINCPAC staff a number of important operational advantages, not the least of which was that the operationally-oriented, function approach to field surveying that had characterized the effort brought staff personnel into frequent and close contact with subordinate personnel at all operational echelons. Consequently, the OPSEC specialists had acquired a detailed working knowledge of PACOM operations far more specific than that held in most large staff elements. On occasion this detailed insight proved invaluable to CINCPAC, but

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[1] Although they might not always be considered OPSEC accomplishments, survey findings substantiated the singularly most important assumption on which OPSEC was based--that it was possible to determine sources of enemy prior awareness. Furthermore, before any realistic and effective changes could be introduced to deny the enemy information, the sources of the information had to be identified. Because findings were the basis for all OPSEC-induced operational changes, it was not unreasonable to place them in the general category of OPSEC accomplishments. OPSEC findings might be categorized as those that identified possible sources that could be exploited by hostile interests, but for which exploitation was either tenuous or lacking.

more importantly the development within the PACOM of the prototype OPSEC survey element made a sustained and significant contribution to the upgrading of the OPSEC posture of U.S. combat forces during the Southeast Asia conflict.

Operations Security Branch Activities

(S) The following listing of operational entities that were surveyed at least once by the CINCPAC OPSEC Branch illustrates the breadth of the scope of the effort.

Air Combat Environment

ARC LIGHT - SAC Strategic Bombing Operations in North and South Vietnam [redacted]

ROLLING THUNDER - Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Tactical Air Strikes in North Vietnam.

BUFFALO HUNTER/BUMPY ACTION/BUMBLE BUG/BLUE SPRINGS - Air Force Unmanned Photographic Reconnaissance Drone Operations.

COMMANDO HUNT - Air Force and Navy Tactical Air Operations in Laos.

GIANT SCALE - Air Force High-speed/High-altitude Manned Photographic Reconnaissance Operations.

TROPIC MOON III - Air Force RB-57 Reconnaissance Operations.

IGLOO WHITE - Air Force and Navy Anti-infiltration Operations in Laos and Northern Areas of the RVN.

MARKET TIME Air Operations - Naval Patrol Aircraft Operations in Support of the RVN/US Coastal Surveillance Effort.

ARDF - Air Force and Army Airborne Radio Direction Finding Operations in Southeast Asia.

SAR - Air Force Search and Rescue Operations in Southeast Asia.

Tactical Air Control - Air Force and Marine Corps Tactical Air Control Operations in Southeast Asia.

Gunship - Air Force AC-130 and AC-119 Gunship Operations.

Rotary Wing - Army and Marine Corps Helicopter Operations.

Naval Air Support - Navy Helicopter and Fixed-Wing Air Operations in MR III and IV of the RVN.

Navy GOT Air - Navy (TF-77) Air Operations in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Army Aviation - Army Aviation Operations in the RVN.

[redacted]

Ground Combat Environment

Army Ground Operations in the RVN.

Marine Corps Ground Operations in MR I of the RVN.

Army Road Convoy Operations in MR II of the RVN.

Army Artillery Operations in the RVN.

Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG) Unconventional Warfare Operations.

Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and Rural Development (MACCORDS) National Police Operations in the RVN.

Naval Surface Combat Environment

ARG/SLF - Navy/Marine Corps Amphibious Ready Group and Special Landing Force Operations in the Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea.

NGFS - Naval Gunfire Support Operations in Coastal Waters of the RVN.

SEA LORDS - Navy "Brown Water" Operations Conducted Under the Lake, Ocean, River and Delta Strategy Concept.

MARKET TIME - Navy Surface Operations in Support of the RVN/US Coastal Surveillance Effort.

U.S. Operations Outside the Combat Zone

EASTPAC Amphibious Operations - Navy and Marine Corps Contingency and

Exercise Procedures for Amphibious Operation Planning, Load-out, Move to the Objective Area, and Landing.

FOCUS RETINA - STRICOM Airborne Troop Reinforcement Exercise, CONUS to Korea.

Korea Tactical Air Support - Army and Air Force Air Support Procedures for U.S. and ROK Ground Forces in Korea.

Korean Air Defense - Air Force and Army Air Defense Operations in Korea.

PARPRO - Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program Operations [redacted]

COMBAT DAWN - Air Force Unmanned SIGINT Reconnaissance Drone Operations in the Yellow Sea Area.

Air Traffic Control - Peacetime Air Traffic Control Procedures Throughout the PACOM.

TSV - Utilization of the KY-3, KY-23, and KY-38 Tactical Secure Voice Equipments Throughout the PACOM (Including Southeast Asia).

POLARIS FOT - Navy POLARIS Missile Follow-on Testing in the MIDPAC Area.

Army Aviation Korea - Employment of Army Aviation Resources in Korea.

Other OPSEC Branch Activities

(S) Since its inception, the CINCPAC Operations Security Branch has participated in a variety of activities aimed at fostering the introduction and acceptance of OPSEC. The more significant among these are listed below:

JCS Briefings - Between April 1967 and June 1972, 14 briefings have been prepared for delivery to the JCS.

World-wide OPSEC Conferences - CINCPAC representatives participated actively in the 1968 and 1969 JCS-sponsored conferences aimed at fostering the introduction of OPSEC concepts in the unified and specified commands outside the PACOM.

NAVFORV OPSEC Manual - CINCPAC OPSEC Branch representatives assisted materially in the drafting of an OPSEC Manual prepared by COMNAVFORV.

ROKF OPSEC Assistance - Branch representatives briefed ROK Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine officials on the concepts and practices of OPSEC and assisted the ROK forces in initiating an OPSEC program through the provision of briefing materials and an OPSEC manual.

RVN OPSEC Assistance - Branch representatives actively supported the development of an operations security capability within the RVNAF through the provision of an OPSEC manual, briefings, and other materials. CINCPAC OPSEC personnel also cooperated with RVNAF officials in the conduct of pilot OPSEC surveys of RIVERINE and Ranger Border Operations.

Briefings and Staff Visits - The CINCPAC OPSEC Branch has also conducted a number of briefings of PACOM Component and Subordinate Joint Commanders, their staffs, and their subordinate field elements and has visited various PACOM units to assist responsible commanders in developing OPSEC programs within their respective forces.

VC/NVN COMINT Threat in RVN - With the assistance of representatives of Headquarters, National Security Agency Pacific, the CINCPAC OPSEC Branch prepared and disseminated a comprehensive study of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese communications intelligence threat in the Republic of Vietnam.

OPSEC Input to Operation Plans - Operations security was a relatively new discipline and no standard body of information pertaining to it had been promulgated. To fill this void, the CINCPAC OPSEC Branch drafted correspondence recommending extensive revisions to the JCS Joint Operation Planning System manuals providing format examples and substantive guidance for the inclusion of a mandatory OPSEC Annex in each operation plan prepared within the U.S. Military Establishment. Similar guidance was also inserted in the CINCPAC Operation Planning Guidance Manual.

OPSEC Report Special Interest Items

(S) In addition to the foregoing, the CINCPAC Operations Security Branch has included in its periodic reports to the JCS a number of other items dealing with matters of interest in the OPSEC field; some of the more noteworthy of these are listed below:

Security weaknesses inherent in the use of fixed or infrequently changing tactical radio frequencies and call signs and the operational requirements for devising viable systems for changing these operating data.

Evolution of the so-called "ten-minute rule" under which no plain language radio transmission might be made that revealed the time, place, or force involved in a tactical operation further in advance of the actual occurrence than ten minutes.

Confirmed VC and NVA - information sources were highlighted, as a basis for increased communication security training of U.S. military forces.

Enemy use of public news media releases for intelligence and propaganda purposes was discussed several times, with a view toward general adoption of more stringent controls on news coverage and technical magazine articles dealing with U.S. military operations, programs, and weapons.

The application of OPSEC survey findings to cover and deception programs was also covered in several special interest items, including one that dealt specifically with the 7th Air Force Cover and Deception Program.

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CHAPTER VI

LOGISTICS

SECTION I--THEATER LOGISTIC REALIGNMENTS

(S) The reduction and realignment of U.S. Forces in the Pacific Command (PACOM) as a result of the Nixon Doctrine had a direct affect on theater logistics. The initial impact of the "changing" strategy and the "winding down" of the Vietnam war was discussed in the CINCPAC Command History for 1970. During 1971, the progressive deterioration of CINCPAC's logistic capability became a major concern. In June, CINCPAC initiated a command-wide study of the situation. In a letter which solicited the support of the Component Commands, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics stated:[1]

> 1. (S) There appears to be a growing reduction in the logistics capability of the PACOM due in large part to a gap in current strategy guidance versus restrictive fiscal guidance. Budgetary constraints, force reductions, Okinawa reversion, and continuing redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam, Korea and Thailand have all had and will continue to have an impact on our logistic support system.

(S) Although several studies had been made on an individual Service basis, a detailed examination of the overall problem had not been attempted. The projected study was to be coordinated through CINCPAC's Joint Logistics Council, with the following objectives:[2]

a. To determine capabilities of the current PACOM logistics infrastructure to support joint contingency operations;

b. To determine projected (FY 76) capabilities of the PACOM logistics infrastructure to support joint contingency operations;

c. To compare logistics requirements, based on joint contingency operations, to logistics capabilities both current and projected;

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 43-44, 70-72; CINCPAC ltr, Ser 00214-71 of 28 Jun 71, Subj: Special Logistic Infrastructure PACOM Study (SLIPS); J4121 HistSum Jun 71.

[2] Ibid.; J4121 HistSum May 71.

d. To identify deficiencies in logistics capabilities limiting the implementation of joint contingency operations;

e. To assess the impact of unreconciled deficiencies;

f. To make recommendations to reconcile identified deficiencies.

(U) By November 1971, studies of the PACOM logistic realignment included an analysis of common supply support overseas initiated by the Logistics Systems Policy Committee of the Department of Defense (DoD). The agent for the DoD study was the Defense Supply Agency (DSA).[1]

(S) Late in 1969, the U.S. Army had announced a drastic change in PACOM logistic concepts known as Pacific Logistic Operations - Streamline (PALOS). The Army proposed to close some facilities and to transfer mission responsibility in certain Pacific areas from the Army to another Service. CINCPAC registered strong objections to any unilateral realignment of logistic support in the theater. Despite CINCPAC's views, the Army had continued to program the changes. Based upon U.S. Air Force (USAF) nonconcurrence with some of the proposed PALOS actions, CINCPAC asked the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CINCUSARPAC) to refer those facets of the PALOS which involved common support to Department level for negotiation.[2]

(S) Early in January 1971, the problems posed by the Army reorganization plans in Thailand were outlined by the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI). The U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand (USARSUPTHAI) had proposed the reduction of supply, storage, and maintenance facilities at Camp Friendship, which was located adjacent to Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB). The transfer or deletion of these support functions from Camp Friendship would permit this installation to be closed or turned over to the Royal Thai Government (RTG). However, the remaining austere support capability would limit Army support of unprogrammed or contingency operations. CINCPAC noted that contingency plans provided for the storage in Thailand of sufficient materiel to support rapid re-entry of a sizable combat force if such a decision were made. Moreover, the storage of war readiness materiel (WRM) in-country provided tactical and political evidence to the RTG and a potential enemy that the Unites States would, and could, react to overt aggression.[3]

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[1] SECDEF 7298/232323Z Nov 71; J4622 HistSum Nov 71.

[2] CINCPAC Command Histories 1969 and 1970, Vol. I, pp. 169-173 and 190-196 respectively.

[3] COMUSMACTHAI 040636Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 130038Z Jan 71; J4121 HistSum Jan 71.

(S) On 11 February 1971, the Department of the Army (DA) notified CINCUSARPAC that no progress could be expected in the negotiations for transfer of logistics functions to the USAF. Therefore, CINCUSARPAC was directed to include common Service missions in all planning, programming, and budget actions for Thailand and Japan until further notice.[1]

(C) A related logistic realignment called the Logistic Support System - 1971 (LSS-71) had been surfaced by CINCUSARPAC in late 1970. This provided for the centralized financial and supply management of Army logistics in the theater on Okinawa, and a single requisitioning pipeline to the Continental United States (CONUS). Worldwide, the centralized logistic plan was labeled the Standard Army Intermediate Level System (SAILS). In PACOM, the proposed centralization of support functions on Okinawa, combined with the proposed PALOS actions, constituted a fragmentation of U.S. base structure and logistic planning which CINCPAC stated was unwise. CINCPAC believed that savings by one Service at the expense of another were not true savings, and that CINCPAC's overall operational and contingency planning responsibilities had not received full recognition.[2]

(S) Meanwhile in June 1971, the SECDEF directed CINCPAC to plan for improved coordination and support of friendly indigenous military operations in Laos. Among other improvements desired was the use of the DoD logistic system for the support of all forces in Laos effective FY 73. The plan submitted by CINCPAC was approved by the JCS on 9 August 1971 and implementation directed on 20 August, except for the logistics portion. Known as the Consolidated Logistics System (COLOGS), Thailand, this portion was approved for implementation in three phases during the first half of calendar year 1972. The COLOGS plan relieved Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI) from the responsibility of operating the logistic pipeline in Thailand, and assigned this responsibility to USARSUPTHAI through USARPAC. CINCPAC directed implementation of COLOGS on 2 Dec 1971 upon receipt of the USARPAC supporting plan. The major improvements to be derived from COLOGS included provisions for USARPSUPTHAI to fill urgent requirements in Laos from Army stocks in Thailand; methods to screen supply excesses in the PACOM for identified Laotian requirements; and closer surveillance of U.S. support to Laos which could be exercised when DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI was relieved of routine logistical matters.[3]

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[1] DA 112157Z Feb 71; J4113 HistSum Feb 71.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 190; J4113 Point Paper, 10 May 71, Subj: Pacific Logistic Operations - Streamline (PALOS); J4113 Point Paper, 8 Apr 71, Subj: Army Logistics Plans (LSS-71) and SAILS.

[3] J4117 Point Paper, 25 Jan 72, Subj: Consolidated Logistics System Thailand (COLOGS); CINCPAC 012153Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 022031Z Dec 71.

SECTION II--DISPOSITION OF EXCESS ASSETS

PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA)

(U) The screening of PACOM long supply and excess material in Southeast Asia had begun in June 1968. CINCPAC, by means of a PURA Executive Committee headed by his Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, reviewed the performance of the program on a quarterly basis. In FY 71, PACOM supply units reported $678 million in excess materiel. PURA made referrals for over $84 million, and recorded actual shipments of approximately $31 million. During CY 71, PURA received nominations for $648.2 million in excess materiel, and made referrals for almost $102 million.[1]

(U) In April 1971, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) approved the transmittal of funded Military Assistance Program (MAP) requisitions through PURA. However, subsequent conferences between the Services revealed differences regarding policy and procedural guidance from Departmental level to the field. The CINCPAC staff; Chief of Staff, USAF (CSAF); and the Navy Supply Systems Command suggested a meeting to resolve these Service differences. Among the items to be discussed was the reporting of funded and unfunded PURA deliveries under MAP. Procedural guidance had raised questions regarding the distribution of supply status reports, the type of status to be included in each report, and the de-obligation of funds when a nonreimbursable asset was available for a funded requisition.[2]

(U) In the meantime, PURA had been authorized to process unfunded MAP requisitions for shortfall requirements. In FY 71, shipments of excess material amounting to $2.4 million had been made to MAP countries outside of Southeast Asia.[3]

Excess Construction Assets

(C) In December 1970, CINCPAC had requested SECDEF guidance concerning the disposition of pre-engineered buildings and structures excess to the needs of the owning Service in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). At issue had been the

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[1] J4624 HistSum Jan-Dec 71; J4623 Point Paper, 4 Dec 70, Subj: PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA).

[2] J46 HistSum Sep 71; J4624 Point Paper, 13 Sep 71, Subj: MAP/MASF Requisitioning Through the Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA).

[3] Ibid.

propriety of shipping excess materiel out of RVN by one Service despite the existence of valid in-country requirements by another Service.[1]

(U) Based upon replies from SECDEF in March and April 1971, CINCPAC reiterated his policy regarding assets excess to the needs of the owning Service. He restated his position that the requirements of other Services in RVN would receive priority over out-country requirements of the owning Service. If replacement in kind and reimbursement were involved, these should be negotiated between the owning Service and the receiving Service. However, CINCPAC stipulated that:[2]

.....

> .... If agreement cannot be reached, the problem will be referred to the in-country Unified Commander. If the in-country Unified Commander is unable to resolve the problem, he should forward it to CINCPAC for decision.... The owning Service shall take no action to transfer the construction assets in question pending resolution by the Subordinate Unified Commander/CINCPAC.

GSA Interest in Excess Materiel

(U) In 1970, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) ASD(I&L) had requested priority attention be given to the selection and return to the CONUS of excess materiel needed by the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). This project, nicknamed HOME RUN, was completed when 9,466 tons of cargo arrived at Oakland, California on 25 August 1970. CINCPAC subsequently had recommended against affording certain U.S. Government agencies special consideration in the disposal of excess materiel. CINCPAC had noted that assets given to GSA had not first been made available to DoD agencies in the PACOM, and that special handling had caused delay and backlog of other scheduled shipments.[3]

(U) Project HOME RUN cargo had been comprised of excess items from Japan and Okinawa. In March 1971, ASD(I&L) (Mr. Shillito) informed Admiral McCain that the GSA Administration had appointed an advisor to COMUSMACV to facilitate the transfer of excess DoD materiel in RVN to the GSA. CINCPAC assured the ASD of his

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, p. 329; ADMIN CINCPAC 242039Z Dec 70.

[2] CINCPAC 210247Z May 71, which cites SECDEF 241431Z Mar 71 and 062211Z Apr 71; J42 HistSum May 71.

[3] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 214-215.

support, and emphasized that PURA would provide GSA representatives with a listing of items as soon as they had been declared excess to DoD requirements. However, the assignment of the GSA representative was the forerunner of another HOME RUN effort based on RVN excess materiel. On 28 April, DoD announced "Project HOME RUN Extended," with the objective of returning three shiploads of excess materiel to Federal civil agencies by 31 July 1971. The target date was later extended to 31 August at CINCPAC's request.[1]

(U) By 22 June, only 430 short tons of excess materiel had been identified and selected by GSA. Considering that about 21,000 short tons were needed to fill three shiploads, CINCPAC recommended to SECDEF that the target date be slipped to the end of the year. Contributing to the difficulty of selecting items for GSA was the competition in-country from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for non-military standard equipment. By CINCPAC and SECDEF direction, GSA was in the last priority group to be considered for disposal of excess RVN materiel, and USAID was in the next highest category. For example, priorities for the redistribution of contractor-held releasable assets under the control of the Officer-in-Charge of Construction (OICC), RVN were:[2]

a. In-country screening not to exceed 45 days, distribute as follows:

(1) Priority 1: U.S. military units engaged in MCP funded projects including approved RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Facility projects and Line of Communication (LOC) program.

(2) Priority 2: U.S. military units engaged in non-MCP funded projects.

(3) Priority 3: Other Service approved projects.

(4) Priority 4: Other approved Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) projects and programs.

(5) Priority 5: Agency for International Development (AID)/DoD programs that were DoD funded.

b. Upon completion of redistribution in RVN or Thailand, respectively, the subordinate unified commander directed inter RVN/Cambodia/Laos/Thailand

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[1] J46 HistSum Mar 71; ASD(I&L) ltr, 11 Mar 71, n.s., personal, Shillito to Admiral McCain; CINCPAC ltr, 18 Mar 71, n.s., personal, Admiral McCain to Shillito; J4622 Point Paper, 22 Jun 71, Subj: Project HOME RUN Extended.

[2] J46 HistSum Aug 71; SECDEF 5537/311331Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 040226Z Sep 71.

distribution as follows (15 days):

(1) Priority 1: U.S. military units.

(2) Priority 2: Cambodia MAP.

(3) Priority 3: Military Assistance Service Funded forces.

(4) Priority 4: USAID programs that were DoD funded.

c. At the end of the overall 60-day screening period, the balance of the requested items were distributed in the following order of priority: (Release of assets to meet MAP requirements was made only on the basis of a MAP Release Order.)

(1) Priority 1: Other DoD funded requirements within the Pacific Command (PACOM).

(2) Priority 2: Other authorized and funded DoD requirements outside of PACOM.

(3) Priority 3: War reserve/project stocks using shipping cost to resolve duplicate request.

(4) Priority 4: Other Service approved projects both within and outside of PACOM (Services made requirements known through the PACOM Service Component Commanders).

(5) Priority 5: Department of Interior Trust Territory of Pacific Islands (TTPI) requirement:

(6) Priority 6: Korea MAP.

(7) Priority 7: Other PACOM MAP.

(8) Priority 8: Other USAID programs.

(9) Priority 9: Other U.S. Government agencies.

d. Claimant conflict within priorities was resolved by CINCPAC.

e. Any releasable assets remaining after PACOM screening and distribution action were reported to the appropriate PDO for disposal. Further screen by DLSC was not required. Transfer documents to PDO were to be clearly marked "DoD Excess" to preclude repeat screening by PDO/DLSC.

(U) Ultimately, in order to generate enough excess cargo, Okinawa was included as a source, and the second HOME RUN project was completed on 29 November 1971, when the third shipload arrived at Long Beach. Approximately 17,600 measurement tons of cargo valued at $15 million were returned to the CONUS under this project.[1]

Disposition of Herbicide ORANGE

(S) As recorded in the CINCPAC History for 1970, the use of herbicide defoliants and crop destruction agents in RVN had been "temporarily" suspended. Insofar as ORANGE defoliant was concerned, this suspension came to be permanent. In January 1971, DoD requested that a plan be developed for the disposition of in-country stocks of the ORANGE herbicide. At that time, approximately 1.7 million gallons of ORANGE were stored in RVN at an estimated value of $12 million. In March, COMUSMACV presented four alternative methods of disposing of this stock: consumption by U.S. or RVNAF in support of RVN operations; incineration, under U.S. or RVNAF control; retrograde from RVN; and, sale in-country or in theater. The advantages, disadvantages, and cost of each were discussed, with emphasis on the number of UC-123 (defoliant-equipped aircraft) sorties needed to spray all of the ORANGE and the fighter escort required. COMUSMACV recommended that retrograde from RVN be the first priority option. The caveat to this option was that, although probably the least politically sensitive and most rapid method of disposal, the ORANGE would require repackaging from bulk to drum containers prior to shipment. Also, in-country transportation costs to nearest port, plus the cost of escort, storage at destination, and surveillance could be high. In order, COMUSMACV recommendations for disposal were first, retrograde; second, incineration in-country under RVN control.[2]

(S) On 14 March 1971, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS the information contained in the COMUSMACV assessment, but did not maintain the order of preferred disposal. Instead, CINCPAC recommended as number one priority the use of ORANGE by U.S. Forces in support of RVN operations. Although not recommended courses of action, CINCPAC listed the other alternatives in order of preference as retrograde, incineration by RVNAF, and incineration by U.S. Forces.[3]

(S) It was evident from message traffic in October and November that a decision had been made to ship the ORANGE stocks back to the CONUS. The USAF (Seventh Air Force) was apparently the executive agent, and, by November, had

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[1] J46 HistSum Nov 71; J4724 HistSum Nov 71.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 209-211; COMUSMACV 081537Z Mar 71.

[3] CINCPAC 140402Z Mar 71.

informed CINCPACAF and CINCPAC that the packaging, moving, and cleaning of unserviceable drums and containers would be done by contract. In response to a COMUSMACV suggestion that drums containing ORANGE be loaded inside CONEX containers for CONUS shipment, Seventh Air Force noted that the comparative costs militated against this procedure. Each CONEX would hold 12 drums at 9.1 measurement tons, when 12 loose drums weighed only 3.6 measurement tons.[1]

(S) On 11 December, COMUSMACV agreed that loose shipment of drums was more economical, and requested early determination of CONUS storage cites. Illustrative of the political sensitivity of this subject was the forwarding from the JCS to CINCPAC of an inquiry relating to herbicides from Senator William Fulbright in November 1971. The questions posed by the Senator included the amounts, usage. receipt of stocks in 1971, and planned disposition. CINCPAC's reply addressed the entire herbicide question during CY 71:[2]

a. Quantities of herbicides on hand in RVN as of 25 October 1971:

Agent	Quantity	Custody
BLUE	165,455 gals ($376 thousand)	GVN
WHITE	53,460 gals ($344 thousand)	GVN
ORANGE	1,411,265 gals ($10.2 million)	US for retrograde to CONUS.

b. Disposition and use of present BLUE and WHITE stocks:

(1) Disposition (in gallons)	BLUE	WHITE
Da Nang	50,105	25,465
Phu Cat	43,545	9,295
Bien Hoa	75,405	18,700

(2) Use: To control vegetation around perimeters of fire bases and installations in order to enhance the security of U.S. and Allied Forces. Use is authorized only when other means such as burning are impractical or impossible due to mines, booby traps, tactical wire and terrain. In a request to use herbicides BLUE and WHITE, COMUSMACV has cited instances where eight U.S. personnel have been killed clearing excess vegetation around fire bases. Several other deaths and injuries have resulted from personnel striking booby traps, dud arounds and grenades concealed in tall grass.

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[1] 7AF 230401Z Oct, 040910Z Nov, 110800Z Nov, and 190900 Nov 71; COMUSMACV 281124Z Oct 71; CSAF 011540Z Nov 71.

[2] COMUSMACV 240338Z Nov and 111115Z Dec 71; JCS 8290/242049Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 280004Z Nov 71.

c. Quantities of herbicides received in the RVN during CY 71: BLUE, 45,980 gallons; none for WHITE and ORANGE.

d. Quantities of herbicides used by U.S. Forces during CY 71: BLUE, 15,205 gallons; WHITE, 5,850 gallons; ORANGE, none.

e. Estimated quantities of herbicides issued by GVN to RVNAF during CY 71: BLUE, 106,235 gallons; WHITE 93,575 gallons; ORANGE, none. U.S. advisors confirm known actual use by GVN as follows: BLUE, 100,030 gallons; WHITE, 77,000 gallons.

f. One U.S. fixed wing (C-123) crop destruction mission using agent BLUE was performed on 7 January 1971 in Military Region II. Termination of crop destruction operations was publicly announced in February 1971. Ten helicopter spray missions using agent WHITE were performed in support of RVNAF in Military Region IV during January 1971. Purpose of these missions was to defoliate fire base perimeters. Technical advice and assistance on proper use of BLUE and WHITE was provided throughout RVN during the period 1 January to 30 April 1971.

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

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[1] J4223 Point Paper, 28 Dec 70, Subj: MILCON in SEA.

[2] Service Departments Construction Status Report, RCS (DDI&L 915), In Support of Southeast Asia, 31 Dec 71.



1 SECDEF 2461/291706Z Jan 71.
2 CINCPAC 242343Z Feb and 082006Z Mar 71; J42 HistSum Feb and Mar 71.
3 CINCPAC 240033Z Jun 71; J42 HistSum Jun 71.



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[1] CINCPAC 310450Z Aug 71; J42 HistSum Aug 71.

[2] Ltr Ser 0264, CINCPAC to JCS, 13 Mar 71, Subj: PACOM Contingency MILCON Projects; CINCPAC 192212Z Jun and 260412Z Jun 71; AMEMB Vientiane 4555/241134Z Jun 71.

[3] CINCPAC 090413Z Mar, 230219Z Jun and 060023Z Jun 71; J42 HistSum Mar and Jun 71.

[4] SECDEF 3860/081700Z Jun 71; J42 HistSum Jun 71.



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[1] CINCPAC 202106Z Jul and 242135Z Jul 71.
[2] CINCPAC 172127Z Aug 71; J42 Hist Sum Aug 71.
[3] CINCPAC 312217Z Aug, 230543Z Oct and 290251Z Oct 71; CSAF 242146Z Sep 71; CINCPACAF 091852Z Oct 71; J42 HistSum Oct 71.
[4] DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 0428/131250Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 200407Z Nov 71; CINCPAC ltr Ser 01307 to CINCPACAF, 22 Nov 71, Subj: DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI Headquarters Facilities.



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[1] CINCPAC 040434Z Sep and 140255Z Sep 71; J42 HistSum Aug and Sep 71.
[2] J4221 Point Paper, 10 Jan 72, Subj: School Construction at Udorn.





1 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, p. 357; CINCPAC 262059Z Nov 70; ADMIN CINCPAC 170220Z Mar 71; J52 HistSum Mar 71.

2 J422 Point Paper, 1 Sep 71, Subj: MILCON in RVN.



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[1] CINCPAC 202341Z May 71, which cites CINCPAC 082006Z Mar 71.

[2] CINCPAC ltr, Ser 00699, 27 Mar 71, Subj: Release of MILCON Funds for RVN; COMUSMACV ltr, 24 Mar 71, Subj: Release of MILCON Funds for RVN.

[3] J42 HistSums Mar, May and Jun 71; COMUSMACV 120505Z May 71; CINCPAC 192300Z May 71; SECDEF 7682/112259Z Jun 71.

[4] SECDEF 8263/231931Z Sep 71, which cites DEPSECDEF Memo, 7 Jul 71 to SECNAV/JCS; CINCPAC 280341Z Jul 71; JCSM-370-71, 11 Aug 71.

[5] Ibid., which cites SECNAV Memo, 26 Aug 71 to SECDEF; UNDERSECSTATE ltr, 21 Aug 71 to DEPSECDEF.



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1 Ibid.
2 SECDEF 8263/231931Z Sep 71.
3 CINCPAC 272310Z Feb 71.
4 J42 HistSum Feb and Apr 71; COMUSK ltr, 3 Feb 71, Subj: Priority List of Urgent MILCON Projects; CINCPAC 232302Z Feb 71.



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[1] J42 HistSum Apr 71; CINCUSARPAC 052046Z Apr 71; CINCPACAF 130200Z Apr 71; ADMIN CINCPAC 282104Z Apr 71.

[2] J42 HistSum May 71; CINCPAC 262305Z May 71, which cites COMUSK 070120Z May 71.

[3] Ibid.



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[1] J42 HistSum Dec 71; COMUSK ltr, 23 Nov 71, Subj: Reprogramming of FY 70 Military Construction, Army, Program; COMUSK 230926Z Nov 71; Memo, J42 to CINCPAC Staff, 9 Dec 71, Subj: Reprogramming of FY 70 Military Construction, Army, Program in Korea; CINCPAC 240405Z Dec 71; CINCUSARPAC 240148Z Dec 71.

[2] J42 HistSum Oct 71; CINCPAC 010407Z Oct 71.

SECTION IV--PETROLEUM, OIL, LUBRICANTS (POL)

POL Consumption

(U) Total POL consumption in the PACOM continued to decline in 1971 as a result of reductions in operations and additional force redeployments. Consumption of all POL products dropped from about 127.5 million barrels in 1970 to about 97.3 million barrels in 1971. Peak PACOM consumption had been reached at 172 million barrels in 1968. By area, almost 50 percent more POL was used in RVN for 1971 than in Thailand, the next highest area (see accompanying charts).

Management of Bulk Petroleum

(U) Early in 1971, CINCPAC was requested to provide comments and recommendations on a proposal to centralize bulk petroleum management functions under the DSA. The proposal was contained in a memorandum from the ASD(I&L) to the Deputy SECDEF, and was apparently related to POL administration and procurement inspection difficulties in Thailand. Some unfortunate publicity had resulted from the Thailand problem, and, in December 1970, CINCPAC had recommended two remedial actions: the assignment of property administration and procurement inspection responsibility to a single Service in Thailand; and, the strengthening of contract administration by assigning a contracting officer's representative (COR) in Thailand with direct access to the Defense Fuel Service Center (DFSC).[1]

(U) In his reply to the centralization proposal, CINCPAC noted that positive corrective action to the Thailand problem had not been taken by the DSA, and that there was no assurance that such action would be taken even if the proposal were adopted. The DSA had been unwilling to take the steps necessary to solve that localized contractual problem, and it was doubtful, CINCPAC stated, that integrated DSA management worldwide would result in any overall improvement. In conclusion, CINCPAC stated:[2]

.....

> 5. The proposal fails to identify any improvement in mission support or responsiveness. Nor does it address specific manpower or monetary savings. General statements about simplified procedures and increased standardization do not justify the drastic reorganization of a proven system. Clear evidence of

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[1] CINCPAC 290853Z Apr 71.
[2] Ibid.; J44 HistSum Apr 71.


PACOM POL CONSUMPTION
(in millions of barrels)
200
150
100
50
0
97.3
JP-4
NSFO
DIESEL
MOGAS
AVGAS
JP-5
ND
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

1971 POL CONSUMPTION

(in thousands of barrels)

By Product

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
JP-4	4,583.1	4,476.1	4,798.7	4,517.4	4,165.1	3,885.3	3,743.1	3,570.1	3,443.4	3,237.0	3,425.1	3,749.2	47,593.6
JP-5	446.9	412.2	508.8	594.1	507.8	551.1	484.2	489.8	392.2	560.5	476.0	515.1	5,938.7
AVGAS	327.6	316.3	318.9	309.7	358.3	287.8	255.4	275.5	262.3	232.9	281.5	255.9	3,482.1
MOGAS	633.3	557.6	599.5	643.5	514.4	482.3	480.0	465.7	449.0	470.0	453.6	453.7	6,202.6
Diesel	1,574.4	1,462.8	1,390.9	1,341.4	1,214.3	1,033.2	954.2	1,089.1	1,065.1	1,037.8	1,068.2	1,209.3	14,440.7
NSFO	1,811.3	1,766.2	1,653.7	1,948.3	1,664.0	1,716.7	1,353.0	1,112.1	1,367.8	1,284.2	1,331.6	1,235.0	18,243.9
ND	.1	20.0	13.4	21.0	60.9	91.9	80.9	86.6	118.3	311.6	220.5	362.2	1,387.4
Total	9,376.7	9,011.2	9,283.9	9,375.4	8,484.8	8,048.3	7,350.8	7,088.9	7,098.1	7,134.0	7,256.5	7,780.4	97,289.0

By Area

Guam	365.4	329.9	393.5	375.1	426.6	367.7	444.1	451.5	389.6	321.4	349.1	379.7	4,593.6
Hawaii	898.1	905.4	1,001.9	936.0	960.8	1,097.8	1,194.0	877.0	681.3	1,073.8	1,002.8	783.1	11,412.0
Japan	1,224.0	1,087.3	1,250.0	1,285.7	952.5	976.3	689.7	958.6	1,029.3	885.0	994.4	937.8	12,270.6
Korea	1,051.4	999.7	680.3	511.4	267.1	258.6	132.0	195.1	231.2	274.8	329.4	444.4	5,375.4
Okinawa	410.2	428.5	543.3	431.3	443.1	451.4	468.8	363.5	342.9	378.1	338.3	367.7	4,967.1
Philippines	1,290.5	1,274.4	1,334.9	1,688.6	1,451.3	1,310.7	1,093.3	965.7	1,183.9	1,147.9	1,148.2	1,425.2	15,314.6
Taiwan	202.9	167.8	73.2	74.4	163.4	161.5	151.6	78.5	58.4	76.8	85.4	71.0	1,364.9
Thailand	1,382.7	1,309.8	1,654.7	1,598.4	1,515.2	1,251.3	1,120.8	1,164.9	1,184.2	1,187.2	1,327.8	1,741.5	16,438.5
Vietnam	2,551.5	2,508.4	2,352.1	2,474.5	2,304.8	2,173.0	2,056.5	2,034.1	1,997.3	1,789.0	1,681.1	1,630.0	25,552.3
Total	9,376.7	9,011.2	9,283.9	9,375.4	8,484.8	8,048.3	7,350.8	7,088.9	7,098.1	7,134.0	7,256.5	7,780.4	97,289.0

the specific advantages of centralized management has not been shown, Accordingly, CINCPAC must strongly oppose such a far-reaching change to a system that has served well in support of PACOM.

(U) The strong objections to centralized POL management under the DSA voiced by CINCPAC did not forestall the proposal. On 16 August 1971, the Deputy SECDEF directed the DSA to centralize and integrate the management of bulk petroleum. By the following month, the implementation plan evolved by a Washington level working group prompted CINCPAC, once again, to voice his concern. The working group proposals were, in CINCPAC's opinion, based upon too broad an interpretation of the Deputy SECDEF memorandum. The working group concept called for the assumption of DSA management worldwide from the beginning, whereas the SECDEF memorandum had postulated a phased implementation after successful application in CONUS. Although the target date for the DSA to assume ownership of all stocks down to the "base boundary" was not until 1 January 1973, CINCPAC disagreed with the approach thus far revealed. For example, the SECDEF memorandum had envisioned that some personnel reductions would result from the new management system. But, CINCPAC noted, the proposed establishment of DFSC field offices collocated with unified command Joint Petroleum Offices (JPOs) was a duplication of existing capability. Instead, CINCPAC recommended that the chief of the JPO be designated DSA representative for POL management; also, that the existing Sub-Area Petroleum Offices (SAPOs) function as contracting officer representatives (CORs).[1]

(U) Another area which concerned CINCPAC was the management of facilities. The Deputy SECDEF memorandum had stated that ownership of bulk inventories would be vested in DSA, but that operation of the terminal facilities would remain with the Services. Proposed, however, was a plan whereby the Services would be reimbursed for operating costs by the DSA, thus implying DSA participation in facilities management. CINCPAC noted that, although the DSA role was not clearly defined, it appeared to be broader than originally anticipated. CINCPAC stated that ownership of POL in overseas terminals should be separated from operational control, which should remain with the unified commander through his components.[2]

(U) CINCPAC also conveyed his position on several other provisions of the working group concept:[3]

There was no need for Interservice Supply Support Agreements and reimbursement from DSA to the Services for terminal

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[1] J44 HistSum Sep 71; CINCPAC 090130Z and 170559Z Sep 71.
[2] Ibid.
[3] J4412 Point Paper, 9 Nov 71, Subj: Management of Bulk Petroleum.

BULK POL DATA BY SUB-AREA

AS OF 30 NOV 1971



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 122.

BULK POL DATA BY SUB-AREA

AS OF 30 NOV 1971



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 123.

BULK POL DATA BY SUB AREA

AS OF 30 NOV 1971



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 121.

operations. The responsible Service should fund 100 percent for such operations and provide common Service support.

The responsibility for establishing minimum and maximum inventory levels should remain with the operational commander.

The introduction of another logistic agent in overseas areas was not necessary. The existing JPO-SAPO structure provided the logical vehicle to discharge effectively the DSA responsibilities.

Quality Assurance personnel, who have the responsibility for inspecting the product received from the contractors, should function under CINCPAC operational and administrative control through the SAPOs.

(U) At year's end, a final determination had not been made on the adoption of the DSA plan.

Ownership of POL Facilities in Thailand

(S) The reduced U.S. Forces presence in Southeast Asia, including Thailand, meant that changed procedures for logistics management, distribution, and storage were imperative. On 28 September 1971, the CSAF requested information regarding the agreements between U.S. and RTG agencies which governed ownership of U.S. built facilities in Thailand. The CSAF request was primarily directed to ownership of POL storage facilities. Citing legal principles and other U.S. facility and base agreements, the CSAF questioned the legality of a demand by the RTG for exclusive use of a particular structure on a base installation while an agreement for U.S. occupation and use of the land remained in effect.[1]

(S) Based upon information furnished by COMUSMACTHAI, the apparently precarious position of the U.S. in Thailand was explained to the CSAF by CINCPAC. The foundation of all U.S. military actions in Thailand was the Military Assistance Agreement between the U.S. and Thailand, dated 17 October 1950, entitled "Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Thailand." Emanating from this agreement was the 19 March 1963 Agreement for the strengthening of logistics facilities in Thailand and the 28 June 1963 Agreement for the acquisition of real estate to construct an ammunition storage facility, a logistics depot, and a U.S. Army communications facility at Udorn. Of these, only the 19 March 1963 Agreement specifically mentioned an

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[1] CSAF 281729Z Sep 71.

air base (Nakhon Phanom), stating that upon completion, the base would become the property of the RTG. In 1966, the U.S.-constructed base at U-Tapao had been turned over to the RTG, as had the military port facility at Sattahip, including the POL jetty, in 1968. Standard U.S. military real estate reports listed aviation gas storage tanks at Ubon and Udorn as owned by the RTG; those at Korat and Sattahip by the U.S. Army; and, those at U-Tapao and Nakhon Phanom by the USAF. Tanks at Takhli had already been transferred to operational control of the RTG.[1]

(S) There were no tenant agreements between the U.S. and RTG for bases. All U.S. military organizations occupied and used RTG facilities at the convenience of the RTG, without written formal or informal agreements. Approval for the introduction of U.S. military units was acquired by verbal negotiations between U.S. and RTG officials. In conclusion, CINCPAC noted that generally accepted legal principles or agreements made by the U.S. in other countries were not consistent with the modus operandum in Thailand, and thus could not always be applied to Thailand's unique problems and conditions. Practical recognition of the lack of tenancy agreements was necessary by all concerned.[2]

POL Support to Cambodia

(C) The interdiction of Route 4 in Cambodia by enemy action posed a critical problem for POL resupply to Phnom Penh, beginning in late 1970. Increasing enemy resistance was encountered by river convoys during January 1971, and a number of POL vessels were destroyed. The U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia acknowledged the hazards of continued reliance on surface transport for POL, but did not think airlift was "desirable or necessary." Nevertheless, COMUSMACV notified the Ambassador that two C-130 sorties per day would begin on 15 January 1971 with aviation gas cargo. Later in January, additional C-130 sorties were flown carrying diesel fuel.[3]

(S) Meanwhile, U.S. officials encouraged closer cooperation between RVN and the Cambodian Government to protect surface POL convoys. By mid-January 1971, the two governments had agreed that the RVN would provide security escort to military and commercial convoys from Na Bhe, RVN to Phnom Penh and return until 1 March 1971. The convoys were to be protected by RVN and Cambodian naval vessels, fixed and rotary winged gunships, tactical air, and observation aircraft.[4]

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[1] J42 HistSum Oct 71; CINCPAC 220510Z Oct 71.
[2] Ibid.
[3] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 373-374; J44 HistSum Jan 71; AMEMB Phnom Penh 72/071310Z Jan 71; COMUSMACV 141149Z and 280727Z Jan 71.
[4] J3B41 HistSum Jan 71; CINCPAC 152053Z Jan 71.

(C) Intensified enemy action in Cambodia and the border areas throughout 1971 jeopardized the POL logistics effort. In March, an attack on the refinery at Kompong Som destroyed about 60 percent of the 718,000 barrel storage capacity. In September, a night sapper attack on the Esso and Shell storage facilities in Phnom Penh destroyed 8,700 cubic meters (about 60,000 barrels) of storage capacity.[1]

POL in the Philippines

(U) In June 1971, the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines (CINCPACREPPHIL) and his staff moved from Sangley Point Naval Air Station to the Subic Bay Naval Supply Depot (NSD). In conjunction with the move, CINCPACREPPHIL proposed that the SAPO, also located in the Manila area, be combined with the office of the Fuel Department Director at Subic. The NSD Fuel Director would assume the SAPO functions and duties, thus allowing the elimination of one civilian and one military space assigned to the SAPO. In support of his proposal, CINCPACREPPHIL noted that only one POL project of significance remained to be accomplished in the Philippines, and that agreement on the need for that project had been reached between USAF and the Navy. CINCPAC approved the consolidation as of 1 July 1971. 1971.[2]

(C) The project mentioned by CINCPACREPPHIL was the development of a capability to resupply Subic's automotive gasoline (MOGAS) and diesel fuel needs by barge and/or tanker, along with modification of the Subic to Clark Air Base pipeline to meet Air Force needs for these products. Agreement had been reached in May between USAF and NSD representatives on a plan to supply Clark's diesel requirements via the existing pipeline. At the same time alternative means of meeting the MOGAS requirements were discussed. The possibility of Clark and Subic base operations being paralyzed by labor strikes or interdiction of fuel truck distribution by dissident groups was the key reason for tank and pipeline modification and multi-product POL transmission by pipeline.[3]

(U) Based upon information acquired during a visit to the Philippines by the Chief, Joint Petroleum Office, PACOM, approval was granted by CINCPAC to effect the necessary modifications. The projects were approved by CINCPACAF and action initiated to obtain funds from USAF headquarters. Construction was scheduled to begin by 30 May 1972.[4]

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[1] J44 HistSum Mar and Sep 71; USDAO/Phnom Penh 050100Z Mar 71; AMEMB Phnom Penh 4844/270748Z Sep 71.
[2] J44 HistSum May 71; CINCPACREPPHIL 131206Z May 71; CINCPAC 182105Z May 71.
[3] J44 HistSum Aug 71; CINCPACREPPHIL 050641Z Aug 71.
[4] J44 HistSum Oct and Dec 71; CINCPAC 010505Z Oct 71.

POL in Japan

(C) In 1968, the U.S. Army had POL operating responsibility in Japan, and had initiated an extensive program for the rehabilitation of tank storage. However, the U.S. Navy assumed responsibility from the Army on 1 January 1971.[1]

(U) On 28 April 1971, the CINCPACFLT provided detailed documentation of critical repair needs for various POL facilities in Japan. Prior to submission through Navy channels, CINCPACFLT requested CINCPAC validation of the need for urgent contingency funding by DoD. CINCPAC validated the $6.392 million request to the SECDEF, stressing the need for full operational capability of the POL storage capability in Japan, which constituted one-third of all PACOM storage facilities.[2]

(C) No funds had been allocated for the repair project by October, so CINCPAC reiterated the urgency previously stated in May. The POL facilities in Japan had continued to deteriorate, and the hazardous conditions could cause international repercussions if an accident were to occur. The SECDEF responded with a request for additional and specific justification in order to qualify the request for the use of SECDEF contingency funding authority.[3]

(S) In order to demonstrate the effect of out-of-service tanks on PACOM POL readiness, CINCPAC provided a summation of the storage situation as of November 1971. Included were terminals at Tsurumi, Hachmoke, Hakozaki, Koshiba, Yokose, Iarizaki, and Akazaki. This total capacity was compared with reserve requirements of logistical area 5H, which consisted of Japan, Korea, and Okinawa, for all Services (figures in thousands of barrels):[4]

	AVGAS	JP-4	JP-5	MOGAS	Diesel	NSFO/ND
Japan Total Available Storage	551	3675	1704	657	1148	3456
Out of Service, Repairs	52	1357	358	128	0	378
% Out of Service, Repairs	9.4	37	21	19.5	0	11
Area 5H PWRR (Required)	524	7151	1006	548	1295	2316
Area 5H PWRS (Available)	481	2815	648	508	846	1938
Area 5H Deficit	43	4336	358	40	449	378

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 206-208.
2 J42 HistSum May 71; CINCPAC 270405Z May 71.
3 J42 HistSum Oct 71; CINCPAC 190450Z Oct 71; SECDEF 2043/282026Z Oct 71.
4 J42 HistSum Nov 71; CINCPAC 160422Z Nov 71.

(S) CINCPAC noted that available tanks were used to store both pre-positioned war reserve stock (PWRS) and peacetime operating stock. Because peacetime stock levels were adjusted on a current use basis with established procurement patterns, it was the reserve level which was lowered when tanks were removed from service. This had a direct impact on PACOM support of general war and contingency plans. With more than 20 percent of the largest military POL storage complex in the PACOM out of service. CINCPAC emphasized the urgency of providing the fire protection and pollution reduction repairs on the facilities (Yokosuka and Sasebo terminals) cited in the Navy funding request. Concluding his justification, CINCPAC mentioned the U.S. military and civilian personnel stationed in Korea. In the event of sudden hostilities, these forces relied on an early and massive increase in land and sea-based support for survival. To meet this surge requirement, the full POL capability in Japan would be vital.[1]

(U) At the end of the year, no response nor fund allocation information was forthcoming from DoD.

Monobuoy in Taiwan

(C) The off-shore monobuoy at Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) Air Base on Taiwan had been plagued with problems since its installation in 1967. Rough weather delayed repairs to hose leaks, and delayed tanker off-loading operations as well. A supplemental POL distribution capability was a Chinese Air Force pipeline extending the length of the island from Keelung Harbor in the north to Kaosiang in the south. The capacity of the pipeline was up to 16 million gallons per month under emergency conditions.[2]

(C) Based on the pipeline capacity, CINCPACAF requested the concurrence of CINCPAC, in May 1971, to remove the POL monobuoy from anchorage and place it in long-term storage. In October 1970, the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC) had advanced a rationale for retention in place of the buoy system, less the floating hoses, as an alternate means of resupply. In his reply to CINCPACAF, CINCPAC recalled the COMUSTDC position, and concluded that immediate removal of the buoy would be premature at that time.[3]

(S) In June, CINCPACAF requested reconsideration of the proposal to remove the buoy and place it in storage. Noting that beach storage tank construction was nearing completion, after which the POL tank farm at CCK would be capable of storing 97 percent of WRM requirements, CINCPACAF also stated that peacetime daily

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[1] Ibid.
[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 203, 209.
[3] J44 HistSum May 71; CINCPACAF 220005Z May 71; CINCPAC 270404Z May 71.

requirements for JP-4 (jet) fuel had dropped from 6,300 barrels in September 1970 to 800 in June 1971. Upon receipt of this information, CINCPAC concurred in the removal from service of the monobuoy, with storage location on Taiwan.[1]

(S) Subsequently, CINCPACAF stated that the cost of maintaining the buoy and associated equipment in storage would not justify its retention. Because of the reduced WRM requirements, improved pipeline resupply capability, and added storage facilities, CINCPACAF suggested that the CCK monobuoy be released to the U.S. Army for installation at Pohang, Korea. CINCPAC approved this action, and, on 23 August 1971, the Chinese Air Force was formally advised of U.S. intentions to remove the buoy from service. The monobuoy was removed and placed in storage ashore on Taiwan pending disposition instructions. Along with the original, but smaller, CCK buoy previously replaced, two monobuoys were in storage on Taiwan at the end of the year.[2]

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[1] J44 HistSum Jun 71; CINCPACAF 040100Z Jun 71; CINCPAC 160424Z Jun 71.
[2] J44 HistSum Jul and Aug 71; CINCPACAF 232045Z Jul and 060220Z Aug 71; COMUSTDC 270003Z Aug 71.

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SECTION V--MUNITIONS

RED HAT Relocation to Johnston Island

(S) In October 1969, the SECDEF had announced a decision to relocate all chemical munitions from Okinawa. However, it was not until 4 December 1970 that a public announcement was made that Johnston Island had been selected as the new storage site. The first shipment of chemical munitions arrived on Johnston Island from Okinawa on 22 January 1971. Construction of additional storage igloos was necessary before the balance of the munitions could be removed from Okinawa. The storage facilities were completed by June 1971, and the last of the RED HAT munitions were off-loaded at Johnston Island on 21 September 1971.[1]

Air Munitions Management

(S) Prior to 1966, air munitions requirements were submitted within military Service channels. The Southeast Asia user worked directly with his Service chief in procuring, managing, and distributing air munitions. Because of problems resulting primarily from mal-distribution of bomb bodies and matching fuzes and fins, CINCPAC was given control of air munitions management by the JCS in April 1966. This authority included all air munitions in PACOM, whether enroute or in Southeast Asia. Thus, CINCPAC consolidated the munitions needs of each user Service, based on aircraft sortie capability and allocated sortie levels. The statistics were forwarded to the DoD through the JCS, and became the basis for CONUS production requirements. The production levels established by the DoD in response to CINCPAC/JCS requirements were transmitted to CINCPAC as production forecast schedules. CINCPAC then allocated the available assets to each Component Service; if sufficient assets were not available, CINCPAC allocated proportionate shares of specific munitions.[2]

(S) On 16 September 1970, a DoD memorandum returned the supply distribution functions and responsibilities to the Services. Component Commanders were requested to submit revised CY 71 requirements and stockage objectives for conventional air munitions. On 15 January 1971, CINCPAC rescinded the document entitled "PACOM Air Munitions Requirements and Allocations," and promulgated a new document with a revised format, entitled "PACOM Air Munitions Requirements and Stockage Objectives." The change reflected the fact that CINCPAC would no longer specify

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 198-199; J46 HistSum Jan-Sep 71.
2 CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. IV, p. 173.

SEASIA AIR MUNITIONS
(Short Tons)
INVENTORY/EXPENDITURES*

AS OF 31 DEC 1971



* Average End of Month Inventory for Past 12 Months
Average Monthly Expenditures for Past 12 Months

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 111.

quantitative allocations unless a Service was unable to support the requirements for which it was responsible. CINCPAC retained the perogative of transferring assets within the theater as needed to meet emergency operational requirements. The new document no longer specified minimum and maximum supply levels but, instead, established a stockage objective. The stockage objective was defined as that quantity of an item, as determined by the user, normally required to sustain the expenditure rate and provide a reasonable safety level. At the beginning of 1971, the projected monthly sortie rate ceilings, which determined the expenditure rates, were:[1]

	Jan-Jun 71	Jul-Dec 71
USAF TacAir	10,000	7,500
U.S. Navy/Marine	4,000	2,700
USAF Gunship	1,000	450
ARC LIGHT	1,000	850
VNAF	3,720	4,680
RLAF	2,500	2,500

(S) The change in munitions management procedures had been predicated on an apparently adequate stock level/production capability. CINCPAC was obliged to assert his allocation perogative, however, when a sudden demand for CBU-25 cluster bomblets by the VNAF and the U.S. Seventh Air Force developed in April 1971. The VNAF had not been willing to use CBUs since 1969, purportedly because of friendly casualties caused by high dud rates. Based on effective close air support using CBU-25 during an Army of Vietnam (ARVN) operation, this opinion had been changed. In April, the combined VNAF/USAF requirement for the CBU-25 rose from 0/300 to 2250/2135 respectively. With a previously validated RLAF requirement for 1,080 per month, the total stated need was for 5,465 CBU-25s monthly. Queried by CINCPAC, the CSAF reported that only 2,700 CBU-25s were available per month through December 1972.[2]

(S) In June 1971, CINCPAC informed CINCPACAF and CSAF of his decision to allocate the originally validated 1,080 CBU-25s per month to the RLAF, with the remaining 1,650 to be used by Seventh Air Force as requirements dictated. CINCPACAF requested CINCPAC to reconsider the division of resources, suggesting that each claimant--i.e., VNAF/Seventh Air Force and RLAF/DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI--be allocated half of its stated requirement.[3]

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[1] J3B22 HistSum Jan 71; CINCPAC 292053Z Nov 70; CINCPAC ltr Ser 0099, 15 Jan 71, Subj: PACOM Air Munitions Requirements and Stockage Objectives.

[2] J3B22 HistSum May 71; CINCPACAF 100005Z and 140115Z Apr 71; CSAF 281923Z May 71.

[3] J3B213 HistSum Jun 71; CINCPAC 060144Z Jun 71; CINCPACAF 250002Z Jun 71.

(S) Upon receiving a revised availability figure of 2,800 CBU-25 per month from CSAF, CINCPAC reaffirmed the retention of 1,080 units per month by the RLAF, and awarded the additional 100 to Seventh Air Force/VNAF, for a total of 1,720 per month.[1]

(C) Another redistribution of munitions assets was validated by CINCPAC as the result of a mission change in Southeast Asia. In July 1971, the RLAF assumed the flare drop (CANDLESTICK) mission formerly flown by the U.S. 606th Special Operations Squadron. The 606th had provided flare drops in the BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER operations areas in Laos until its deactivation on 15 June 1971. Based on the assumption of the mission by the RLAF, the Ambassador in Vientiane and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI requested redistribution of 10,000 MK-24 flares from Seventh Air Force to the RLAF. CINCPAC recommended that USAF affect redistribution in time to support the RLAF CANDLESTICK mission.[2]

(TS) The sortie rates tabulated above for FY 71 were modified for FY 72 by DoD in April 1971. Tactical air sorties, for munitions expenditure planning purposes, were: 7,500 USAF; 2,700 US Navy; 3,000 RLAF; 6,500 VNAF. Monthly average gunship sortie levels were 700 for USAF, 800 for the VNAF, and 200 for the RLAF. Sortie level for ARC LIGHT in FY 72 was to continue at 1,000 per month vice the planned reduction to 850 as of 1 July 1971.[3]

(S) These sortie rates generated the expenditure, during CY 71, of 763,000 short tons of munitions in Southeast Asia, at a cost of about one billion dollars. From the peak of 1.44 million tons in 1968, total munitions expenditures had declined slightly to 1.39 million tons in 1969. The first significant reduction occurred in 1970, when 977,000 tons were used.[4]

VAMP/LAMP Evolution

(S) Ammunition supply procedures in Southeast Asia before 1963 had been those established in accordance with military assistance guidelines. The surge of Viet Cong activity in RVN in 1963 caused the expenditure of substantial quantities of ammunition by the RVNAF, and created a situation quite different from that envisioned by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. That Act, oriented toward a less warlike internal situation than existed in RVN, provided no resupply system equal to the demands of a shooting war. The flow of ammunition into RVN was

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[1] J3B213 HistSum Jul 71; CINCPAC 182037Z Jul 71.

[2] J3B213 HistSum Jun-Jul 71; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 71-1826/211014Z Jun 71; CINCPAC 042336Z Aug 71.

[3] J3B212 Point Paper, 10 Sep 71, Subj: PACOM Air Munition Requirements.

[4] CINCPAC Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 114; J46 HistSum, Jan-Dec 71.

in response to year-by-year military assistance programs submitted in minute detail, and change procedures were awkward and unresponsive to rapidly changing operational situations. CINCPAC proposed that ammunition supply to RVNAF be placed on a war footing--that ammunition resupply be based on the amounts consumed. This proposal was approved by DoD as of 1 July 1963; under the new system, called Vietnam Ammunition Procedures (VAMP), deviations from types and quantities forecast were permissible so long as the military assistance fund ceiling was observed.[1]

(S) A year later, on 1 July 1964, air and naval munitions expended by the RVNAF were incorporated into the VAMP system; two months later, effective 1 September 1964, ammunition resupply to Laos was included as LAMP.[2]

(S) The crescendo of operations in 1965 accentuated the unrealistic restrictions of military assistance programming and funding to support combat requirements, and, in March 1966, all funding for the war in RVN was transferred from the formal military assistance program to Service funding. In 1967, the MASF concept was extended to include Laos and Thailand. Since that time, the VAMP/LAMP support for indigenous forces had been funded by the U.S. counterpart Services, although reporting and control channels were separate from U.S. munitions control and reporting channels.[3]

(S) By late 1970, the USAF had instituted joint VNAF/USAF air munitions resupply procedures. In April 1971, the Army proposed a Single Ammunition Logistic System (SALS) in Thailand to support operations in Laos. Phase I of the SALS implementation was to dedicate a portion of the pre-positioned war reserve (PPWR) levels in Thailand to absorb surge requirements in Laos. CINCPAC concurred in the single supply system concept, and the DA approved Phase I actions in May 1971.[4]

(S) Effective 1 November 1971, Phase II of SALS-Thailand was placed in motion. Prior to this time, ground ammunition received at Thailand ports was moved through three different logistics systems. One provided the ammunition requirements of USARSUPTHAI; one met the needs of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI under LAMP; and the third system provided ammunition for Project ZAE, an irregular force under the operational control of another U.S. agency. Except for port operations in Thailand, the systems were independent of

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1964, pp. 325-327.
2 Ibid., pp. 289-292.
3 CINCPAC Command History 1966, Vol. I, pp. 173-176.
4 CINCPACAF 230055Z Jan 71; J4636 HistSum Feb, Apr, and May 71; CINCUSARPAC 261952Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 060027Z May 71; DA 172118Z May 71.

SEASIA AIR MUNITIONS
(Short Tons)
INTRANSIT CONUS
AS OF 31 DEC 1971



Average end of month total for past 12 months.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 112.

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SEASIA
AIR MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES (SHORT TONS)
JAN 1967 THRU DEC 1971



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 114.

SECRET

each other. Phase II implementation combined the systems of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI and ZAE under the management of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI as provided in a memorandum of understanding between the DoD and the sponsoring agency of Project ZAE. Phase III of SALS, the integration of the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI system into that of USARSUPTHAI, was scheduled for the third quarter of CY 72.[1]

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[1] J4631 HistSum Nov-Dec 71; also see COLOGS discussion, Section I, this chapter.

SECTION VI--TRANSPORTATION

(U) The PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB) was established in 1966 to provide effective and economical utilization of PACOM transportation resources. The chairman of the JTB was the CINCPAC Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics. Board members were the CINCPAC Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, the principal logistics officers of the Component Commands, plus the logistics officer of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC).[1]

(U) In January 1971, CINCPAC established a secretariat to the JTB which functioned as a working level adjunct to identify problem areas and prepare accommodations for their solution for consideration by the JTB. The JTB Secretariat was headed by the Chief, Transportation Branch, Staff CINCPAC; other members included the principal transportation officers of the Component Commands (plus FMFPAC) and an Operations representative from the CINCPAC staff.[2]

LOCCAP Data System

(C) In the past, transportation LOC data had been developed at various joint and Service component command levels within the PACOM to meet specific planning needs on an "as required" basis. These multiple source data were not entirely responsive to the needs of transportation and logistics planners because of conflict or obsolescence. On 9 February 1971, CINCPAC published the Logistics Capacities/Capabilities (LOCCAP) data collection system. The LOCCAP consisted of selected information on key PACOM airfields, ports, highways, railroads, inland waterways, and beaches in 14 PACOM countries and the State of Hawaii. On 29 April, the initial machine run of airfield and seaport data available in CINCPAC headquarters was disseminated to the Service components for updating and expansion.[3]

(U) By October 1971, a catalog of collected data was published containing logistical planning information on 286 transportation activities in PACOM. At the first Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) Users Group conference in Washington, D. C. on 7-10 December, the LOCCAP was briefed to the group by a

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, p. 58.

[2] J471 HistSum May 71; CINCPACINST 4600.5A, Ser 543, 15 Jan 71, Subj: PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB).

[3] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 197; J472 HistSum Feb, Apr 71; CINCPACINST C4600.9, 9 Feb 71, Subj: Logistics Capacities/Capabilities Data System.

CINCPAC staff representative. As a result, LOCCAP was to be considered by the JCS for inclusion in the data file of JOPS III.[1]

MOVECAP FY 71-75 (Southeast Asia)

(TS) The Strategic Movement Capabilities Study (MOVECAP) was a periodic JCS-directed analysis of the movement capability of segments of the strategic mobility system in the CONUS. It also tested the inter-and intra-theater capabilities for rapid deployment to selected areas. The Southeast Asia MOVECAP 75 study was conducted in 1971, with a scenario of reaction to overt Chinese Communist intervention against on-going U.S. operations in Southeast Asia. This scenario required the deployment of 6-2/3 Army division equivalents and supporting units, two Marine amphibious forces, 46 tactical fighter squadrons and supporting units, and 18.4 tactical airlift squadrons, in 120 days.[2]

(S) The airlift and sealift resources projected for this study were those military assets programmed for FY 75, augmented by the projected available commercial airlift and sealift. A strategic warning time of 30 days was assumed (M-day), so that D-day was M + 30 days. Only one Army brigade closed at the port of debarkation (POD) in the allowable time, but all personnel closed by D + 120. Of a total 3.037 short tons of cargo, 95 percent was delivered to PODs by the 120th day. The primary problems in PACOM were saturation of ports and airfields, inadequate facilities and equipment to support a container operation, shortage of truck companies to clear port areas, shortage of terminal transfer companies, and a shortage of materiel handling equipment at PODs, aerial PODs, and transfer points.[3]

Intra-Theater Airlift (C-130)

(S) In December 1968, 13 C-130 Hercules transport aircraft squadrons were assigned to PACOM under the operational control of CINCPACAF. These tactical airlift squadrons were normally comprised of 16 aircraft each; ergo, there were about 208 aircraft possessed. At that time, COMUSMACV asserted the requirement for 68 C-130s in daily operation and 81 for emergency surge. By the end of 1969, although COMUSMACV had restated his 68/81 level, two of the C-130 squadrons had been withdrawn from the theater. One more was redeployed in 1970, so that, at the beginning of 1971, ten squadrons remained.[4]

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[1] J4721 HistSum Oct and Dec 71.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. I, p. 174; J472 HistSum Sep 71.

[3] Ibid.

[4] CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. I, p. 181; CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 211-212 and Vol. II, pp. 344, 347.

CONFIDENTIAL

PACIFIC AIRLIFT ROUTES
PACAF (DOL/MAC)
AS OF 1 JAN 1972



NOTE: Special Airlift Missions Operate to Destinations As Required

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 119.

CONFIDENTIAL

PACIFIC AIRLIFT ROUTES

MAC

AS OF 1 JAN 1972



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 118.

(S) Continued pressure to reduce airlift capability was the order of the day. A Presidentially directed reduction of U.S. personnel in the Philippines resulted in the scheduled inactivation of one C-130 squadron at Clark Air Base, and the inactivation of three squadrons at Naha Air Base in Okinawa had already been directed by December 1970. CINCPAC acceded to the three squadron reduction to seven, but maintained that seven was the absolute minimum. In the event of a contingency airlift requirement, intra-theater augmentation would be needed from C-141s assigned to the MAC, of which about 41 were in the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) at any given time. In February 1971, the JCS noted that CINCPAC's tactical airlift requirements must be considered in the context of worldwide requirements. The JCS stated that six squadrons of C-130s appeared adequate to support possible MACV contingency surge requirements, and agreed that the C-141 assets of MAC could augment the theater tactical airlift resources for the first 36 hours of planned contingency operations. At the same time, the JCS released the Strike Command from C-130 aircraft alert status for response to Southeast Asia contingencies.[1]

(S) In March, the JCS directed Strike Command to place ten C-130 airframes on loan to CINCPAC, without crews or maintenance capability, to bring the seven remaining C-130 squadrons up to authorized strength. THis loan was to terminate on 1 July 1971. The JCS again stressed the need for austere programming of airlift missions worldwide. The previous suggestion that MAC C-141s could be used to support PACOM contingency needs was amplified to suggest that this support be accomplished by Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAMs). CINCPAC initiated action toward PACAF/MAC accord on the use of C-141s, but also informed the JCS that the daily C-130 requirements in the PACOM could not be met with six or seven C-130 squadrons, and requested additional C-130 augmentation.[2]

(S) Subsequently, procedures were agreed upon for the use of MAC C-141 in-theater assets on SAAMs; use of these assets on short term contingency missions was assigned the nickname COLD MAP. The July 1971 C-130 strength in the PACOM was reduced to six squadrons. CINCPAC and CINCPACAF determined that the level of support capability which the new posture provided was sufficient to satisfy revised known and/or forecast requirements during the July-September 1971 time frame. Any need in excess of the six squadrons would be deemed a short-term surge condition which could be offset with MAC resources available to CINCPAC in-theater.[3]

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[1] Ibid.; J4712 HistSum Feb 71; JCS 4186/171812Z Feb 71.

[2] J4712 HistSum Mar 71; CINCPAC ltr, Ser 0244 of 8 Mar 71, Subj: Military Airlift Command Augmentation of Pacific Command Airlift Capability in Contingency Operations; JCS 6158/122245Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 190408Z Mar 71.

[3] J4712 HistSum Apr 71; J4712 Point Paper, 18 May 71, Subj: Airlift Support in PACOM.

Force Withdrawals from RVN

(C) Under the code names KEYSTONE ROBIN, KEYSTONE ORIOLE, and KEYSTONE MALLARD, the CINCPAC JTB programmed the withdrawals of U.S. military personnel and equipment from RVN during 1971. The strength levels directed by the President were 284,000 by 30 April; 184,000 by 30 November; and, 157,000 by 31 December. These redeployments of passengers and cargo were closely coordinated by the PACOM and CONUS sealift and airlift agencies, under the direction of the JTB, and the 157,000 goal was met.[1]

Retrograde Cargo

(U) Early in 1970, retrograde cargo movement forecasts had been eliminated by mutual consent of all concerned in the PACOM, including CINCPAC. In an apparent reassessment of this need, especially regarding the accelerating troop withdrawals from RVN, conferences were held by USARV, MACV, and USARPAC in late 1970 to develop a retrograde movement program forecast for a six month period. In November 1970, a tentative movement from RVN of 465,000 short tons for the period December 1970 through June 1971 was developed.[2]

(C) In March 1971, CINCPAC representatives attended a USARV-sponsored conference at which the tentative conclusion was that sufficient port capability existed to accommodate projected FY 71 and 72 retrograde requirements. As a result of this conference, and those held in November and December 1970, CINCPAC developed a reporting format, to be prepared by MACV, which included all the data elements needed by interested agencies. The reporting format was transmitted to MACV on 25 August 1971, and included four categories: total retrograde material on hand; retrograde material on hand by Service and type; responsiveness of Military Sealift Command (MSC) to move material; and, a forecast of the amount of material to be moved, port capability, and cargo processing capability.[3]

(C) The first monthly report received by CINCPAC from MACV under the new reporting requirement (CINCPAC RCS 4600.19) estimated the total in-country retrograde cargo as of 31 August 1971 at 1.51 million short tons with a value of $3.6 billion. By 1 December 1971, this total had been reduced to 1.1 million short tons of cargo valued at about $2.64 billion.[4]

(U) In the interest of reducing ship turn-around time and of more efficient loading procedures in Southeast Asia, the MACV Transportation Management Agency

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[1] J4713 HistSum Jan-Dec 71; also see this history, Chapter IV, Section IV.
[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, p. 330; J472 HistSum Mar 71.
[3] Ibid.; J4722 HistSum Aug 71; CINCPAC 100223Z Aug and 250440Z Aug 71.
[4] J4722 HistSum Aug 71; COMUSMACV 120722Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 182033Z Sep 71; J4625 Point Paper, 7 Jan 72, Subj: RVN Retrograde Program.

PACIFIC SEALIFT ROUTES

MSC

AS OF 1 JAN 1972



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 117.

(TMA) proposed, in August 1971, that RVN retrograde cargo be consolidated and consigned to a limited number of PODs worldwide. The TMA recommendation was to ship to one major port in PACOM area countries and to one west coast and one gulf coast port in the CONUS. From January through June 1971, an average of 33 PODs worldwide were consignees monthly for retrograde RVN cargo. However, 75 percent of the total had been shipped to Naha, Oakland, Port Hueneme, Beaumont, Mobile, and Keelung/Kaohsiung in Taiwan.[1]

(U) CINCPAC agreed that the proposal to reduce PODs had merit and requested the Commander, Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (CMTMTS) to staff the proposal with CONUS agencies. CINCPAC acknowledged, however, that additional handling costs at break bulk points and additional transportation costs for overland movement to final destinations were limiting factors.[2]

(U) Because the TMA/MACV request involved PODs outside the CONUS as well, CINCPAC switched his request for consideration to the JCS, which disapproved the concept on 24 September 1971. The central theme of the JCS response was that any arbitrary reduction in PODs would not be compatible with DoD policy to supply customers in a timely and economical manner. The JCS referred to MTMTS guidance issued in March 1971, which offered optional POD selections based on available shipping via commercial and MSC services.[3]

(U) In November, COMUSMACV again requested that a reduction of PODs be considered, citing the fact that 78 percent of retrograde cargo had gone to the seven PODs of Naha, Keelung, Sattahip, Yokohama, Pusan, Oakland, and Mobile. Once again, CINCPAC sought JCS approval, noting that volume for specific PODs other than those mentioned above built up too slowly to make timely bookings. Calling in ships to pick up small volumes of cargo was expensive and wasteful of sealift resources. CINCPAC requested authority to ship cargo destined for CONUS to either Oakland or Mobile when POD shipment closer to the ultimate destination was not available. JCS approval of this proposal was passed to COMUSMACV on 24 December 1971.[4]

Transportation Appraisal-Cambodia

(S) In Section IV of this chapter, the hazards of transportation LOC in the

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[1] J4722 HistSum Aug 71; CO TMA/MACV 030832Z Aug 71.

[2] CINCPAC 010424Z Sep 71.

[3] CINCPAC 022006Z Sep 71; J4722 HistSum Sep 71; MTMTS ltr, 25 Mar 71, Subj: Selection of CONUS Ports of Discharge for Retrograde Shipments; JCS 9120/241459Z Sep 71.

[4] J4722 HistSum Dec 71; COMUSMACV 271031Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 100002OZ Dec and 240402Z Dec 71; JCS 9929/221908Z Dec 71.

supply of POL to Cambodia were discussed. In May 1971, a complete assessment was made of the Cambodian transportation system by CINCPAC staff personnel. Included were ports and terminal operations, airfields, highways, railroads, and island waterways. In general, the assessment revealed that military action in Cambodia had caused extensive damage to large portions of the land LOC. The resulting loss of rail and highway facilities caused the near isolation of the country's only deep draft water port from the rest of the country. The Mekong River thus was the life line for surface supply. The survey stressed that terminal facilities at Phnom Penh would have to be upgraded to bring port capability to its potential of 65,400 short tons per month. At the same time, the airfield at Phnom Penh was vital to resupply in Cambodia, and its security deserved concentrated tactical interest.[1]

(S) This assessment, based upon data and statistics available at CINCPAC was reinforced by an in-country survey of transportation and warehouse facilities by CINCPAC personnel in September and October 1971. This team also included CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, and MSC personnel. All facets of the in-country distribution system were scrutinized, as well as potential alternative LOC support from outside Cambodia. The latter included the possibility of moving supplies into Cambodia through the port complex at Vayama/Sattahip in Thailand, with onward truck or rail transportation to Phnom Penh.[2]

(S) The CINCPAC Distribution Survey Team also recommended that concentrated efforts be made to secure the resupply LOC through the Kompong Som deep water port, via land LOC (Routes 5 and 4) to Phnom Penh and the interior. To that end, a "systems test" of this port was planned, with the ultimate objective of shipping all routine surface cargo through Kompong Som by 1 April 1972. On 18 November 1971, CINCPAC directed the Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (CHMEDTC) to arrange for cargo diversions from RVN to the Kompong Som Port. Although, on 19 November, a bridge on Route 4 was destroyed by enemy action, cargo continued to flow using the RVN-Mekong River LOC.[3]

(S) Meanwhile, the plans continued for the test of the Kompong Som alternative. The U.S. Ambassador suggested that the initial "test" be limited to shipment of 25 trucks via MSC-chartered commercial vessel. With CINCPAC's concurrence and the coordination of all concerned, the 25 vehicles were off-loaded at Kompong

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[1] J4722 HistSum May 71; J47 Memo to J41, Ser 00147-71 of 5 May 71, Subj: Logistical Appraisal (Cambodia).

[2] J472 HistSum Oct 71.

[3] CINCPAC ltr, Ser 01264 of 10 Nov 71, Subj: Report, CINCPAC Distribution Survey Team, Cambodia; J4723 HistSum Nov 71; CINCPAC 180045Z Nov 71; CHMEDTC 250735Z Nov 71.

Som on 1 January 1972 from the SS TRANSGLOBE. The vehicles remained at Kompong Som for approximately two weeks, awaiting the next scheduled convoy to Phnom Penh. A second test was not planned until the trucks reached their destination.[1] tion.[1]

(TS) All of the foregoing was apropos of a JCS message in October 1971 which tasked CINCPAC to develop a logistical contingency plan to shift Cambodian logistical support from dependence on RVN materiel, LOC, and protection. CINCPAC chose the development of the Kompong Som Port and peninsula area as the primary terminal and in-transit storage location, mainly because the deep water capability would allow for a direct logistical pipeline from CONUS to Cambodia. The CINCPAC plan specified that the Cambodian Government assume complete responsibility for all cargo as it arrived in the docking area. The plan would also relieve USARV and Seventh Air Force in RVN of the responsibility to provide ground and air munitions for Cambodian operations. Future munitions support was to be via direct logistic pipeline through the Kompong Som Port. As of 31 December 1971, the CINCPAC plan was under review by the JCS.[2]

Airlift Service to Diego Garcia

(S) In December 1970, the United States and Great Britain jointly announced that a communications facility would be built on the British island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean archipelago of Chagos. Although Diego Garcia was outside the PACOM area of responsibility during 1971, it was to be included in the PACOM after 1 January 1972, when a realignment of unified command areas was scheduled to take effect. Construction at the site by U.S. Navy Construction Battalion personnel began in late 1970, and, as the airstrip neared operational capability, the means for logistical support of the facility were examined.[3]

(C) On 10 July 1971, a MAC cargo channel was established from Dover Air Force Base, Delaware to Diego Garcia. However, until the interim runway was extended to accommodate the MAC C-141 transport aircraft, the channel terminated at U-Tapao Air Base in Thailand. The final leg of the airlift support was provided by PACOM C-130 intra-theater assets based on Ching Chuan Kang Air Base in Taiwan. CINCPAC concurred in this mission in June 1971, and, on 19 July, the first C-130 landed at Diego Garcia. The route was from Taiwan to U-Tapao to Diego Garcia.[4]

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[1] J472 HistSum Dec 71; CHMEDTC 041041Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 1000024Z Dec 71; COMSCFE 4610/160429Z Dec 71; MEDTC FWD Phnom Penh 0054/051007Z Jan 72.

[2] J4116 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: Logistical Contingency Plan (Cambodia); J472 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: Cambodian Logistics.

[3] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 87-88; J4711 HistSum Jul 71.

[4] CSAF 301454Z Jun 71; CINCPAC 212256Z Jun 71; LOGSUPCOM, Diego Garcia 4630/161205Z Jul 71; CINCPACAF 152257Z Jul 71; NMCB FOUR ZERO 11013/251230Z Jul 71.

(C) At about the same time, the possibility was raised by the U.S. Ambassador to Mauritius of fortnightly extensions of the C-130 flights from Diego Garcia to Mauritius for procurement of fresh fruits and vegetables and short liberty for construction personnel. CINCPAC, responding to query from the Chief of Naval Operations, acknowledged that the mission could be scheduled to provide airlift for fresh provisions. However, the four hour flight time each way would allow only about two hours liberty on Mauritius for Diego Garcia personnel unless the aircraft remained over night, which was not feasible. CINCPAC suggested the alternative of procurring fresh provisions on Taiwan--the origin of the support airlift--and returning Diego Garcia personnel to Thailand for rest and recuperation (R&R) leave as part of the round robin shuttle.[1]

(C) The Ambassador at Port Louis (Mauritius) replied that the C-130 flights for provisions would provide recurring economic benefits to Mauritius. He noted that such economic benefits had been the theme of earlier State-Defense correspondence, but expressed his awareness that, "...wholesome and inexpensive recreation..." afforded by Mauritius could not compete with, "...bright lights of Bangkok...."[2]

(U) On 29 July, the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand approved weekly R&R for 30 Diego Garcia personnel in Bangkok, and in September, the JCS approved a monthly C-130 trip from Diego Garcia to Mauritius to procure fresh fruit and vegetables.[3]

Passenger Traffic Flow-Thailand

(C) During the height of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, more than 75 percent of the air operations against North Vietnam and Laos were staged from bases in Thailand. Although the RTG supported the U.S., it had often expressed concern over the number of U.S. military personnel flowing through the Don Muang Airport (Bangkok International), which was the port of entry for all U.S. military--whether arriving PCS, TDY, or on leave. This concern, political in nature, pertained to the RTG image in the eyes of its people and other foreign nationals as a vassal or client state of the United States.

(C) In response to this sensitivity, the U.S. had built a cantonment area and terminal processing facility which was geographically separated from the Don Muang Airport complex, and all U.S. military passengers were bused from the flight line to the separate terminal area. These passengers were then booked on in-country C-130 aircraft for travel to other bases, or, in the case of those

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[1] CINCPAC 170249Z Jul 71.
[2] AMEMB Port Louis 0626/160442Z Jul and 0649/201000Z Jul 71.
[3] AMEMB Bangkok 10406/290510Z Jul 71; J4712 HistSum Sep 71.

whose destination was the Bangkok area, housed in the cantonment area or dispersed to contract hotels in Bangkok.

(S) The opening of U-Tapao RTAFB in 1968, and the gradual reduction in the scope of air operations from up-country bases, prompted consideration of the feasibility of moving the aerial port facilities from Don Muang to U-Tapao, and, at the same time, establishing MAC contract passenger and cargo channels directly to U-Tapao and the other bases.

(S) In 1970, PACAF had proposed the contracting of essential services at Don Muang, which would reduce the number of USAF personnel in the Bangkok area. Potential manpower space reductions were projected as 161 U.S. military and 179 local nationals, with a net saving of over one million dollars. CINCPAC, COMUSMACTHAI, and the U.S. Ambassador had agreed.[1]

(S) Because this proposal would eliminate the need for the cantonment area, PACAF had initiated action to remove the relocatable structures in preparation for turnover of the remaining facilities to the RTG. However, in April 1971, the CSAF directed PACAF to cease action to close/release the Don Muang cantonment area, and to submit a plan to relocate all possible USAF activities from the airport to the cantonment area. Closure of the cantonment area would again be considered when the bed utilization rate for PCS and TDY personnel fell below 275 per day for a three month period. At the same time, the CSAF directed that the relocation of excess structures be continued.[2]

(S) On 22 April, CINCPAC requested CINCPACAF to provide the reason for the revised decision. Although the RTG had approved the direct routing of MAC channel traffic to U-Tapao, CINCPACAF replied, such traffic directly to bases up-country did not appear to be economical in view of the current and projected force reductions. Therefore, traffic in and out of Bangkok would remain highly visible at the International Airport unless the cantonment area were retained. Responding to CINCPAC's request for a coordinated U.S. Mission opinion, COMUSMACTHAI voiced several objections. First, the USAF decision to retain the cantonment area did not appear to be economical; second, the U.S. Mission did not object to Bangkok passengers being dispersed to hotels from a political standpoint as compared to the continued occupation of, "...a fairly large and visible US enclave...." Phaseout of the cantonment area and consolidation of the remaining necessary functions along the flight line was the course preferred by the Mission.[3]

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[1] J5524 HistSum Jan 71; AMEMB Bangkok 327/081155Z Jan 71; ADMIN CINCPAC (ALPHA 457) 090207Z Jan 71.

[2] J552 HistSum May 71; CINCPACAF 202215Z Apr 71.

[3] CINCPAC 222136Z Apr 71; CINCPACAF 270245Z Apr 71; COMUSMACTHAI 060700Z May 71.

(S) Parallel to the discussion regarding the handling of military traffic through Don Muang was the availability and feasibility of other routing channels. In May 1971, the CSAF had directed PACAF to develop optional plans for implementing either MAC contract or USAF C-141 (MAC) channel service to up-country bases, and had briefed COMUSMACTHAI and the U.S. Embassy as well. On 2 July, CINCPAC convened a meeting at his Camp Smith headquarters to discuss the MAC Thailand service. It was agreed that MAC contract passenger and cargo service should begin by 1 September 1971, to which CSAF agreed.[1]

(S) On 14 July, the Ambassador informed the State Department and DoD that the RTG would not approve MAC contract flights to up-country bases, but would approve the use of MAC C-141s with USAF markings. At the same time, the RTG official accepted the plan to reduce USAF activity at Don Muang, and appointed Thai staff people to assist in the transfer of the cantonment area from U.S. to RTG control.[2]

(S) One of the anticipated benefits of the new channel service was a reduction in the number of airlift missions flown in-country by C-130 aircraft. These aircraft had provided round robin flights to bases in Thailand with Don Muang as the hub of the service. However, the closure of the base at Takhli (for U.S. operations) left U-Tapao and the northeastern bases of Korat, Ubon, Udorn, and Nakhon Phanom as the main centers of U.S. activity. No provision was made for C-141 service to lesser activity at Phitsanulok, Takhli (caretaker), Lampang, and Chiang Mai--all north of Bangkok. CINCPAC directed that these locations be serviced by two C-130 flights per week. The inception of the Diego Garcia service required one airframe per week, and the PACOM continued to retain responsibility for cargo, mail, and air evacuation missions between bases in Thailand. Finally, the drug testing program at the USAF hospital at U-Tapao would generate additional intra-theater airlift for confirmation of positive specimens at Clark Air Base in the Philippines.[3]

(U) The scheduled MAC C-141 channels to up-country bases went into effect on 1 September with the establishment of a daily C-141 mission originating at Clark Air Base. All USAF personnel destined for Thailand traveled to Clark via MAC contract flights and transferred to C-141 aircraft for onward movement. Movements of U.S. Army personnel continued to be via MAC contract direct from CONUS to Bangkok.[4]

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1 CSAF 242107Z Jun and 071840Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 230315Z Jun 71.
2 AMEMB Bangkok 9621/140925Z Jul 71.
3 CINCPACAF 200330Z Jul 71.
4 J4712 HistSum Sep 71.

Malaysian Flood Relief

(U) On 5 January 1971, the U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia requested the Secretary of State to arrange for U.S. support in flood relief operations. He asked for helicopters and C-130 transport aircraft to expedite the distribution of relief supplies in Malaysia. In response, C-124 and C-130 aircraft and helicopters were made available from PACOM units. The first helicopter mission was flown in Malaysia 43 hours after the initial request. PACOM airlift aircraft flew nine missions into and three from Malaysia carrying disaster relief equipment, material, and personnel, including the airlift of the helicopter detachment from RVN to Malaysia and return. In addition to in-country distribution of materiel by helicopter, seven C-130 cargo/passenger missions were flown in Malaysia. The last of the task force returned to home stations on 27 January.[1]

West Coast Dock Strike

(U) On 28 June 1971, the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen Union (ILWU) went on strike against the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA), closing all CONUS west coast ports. By 30 September, in the 93rd day of the strike, military cargo continued to move, but the attitude of the ILWU seemed to harden as the month progressed. In a major change of policy, they refused to load military cargo if the vessel had previously discharged CONUS-bound commercial cargo at Canadian or Mexican ports. Shipping space and cargo containers were becoming increasingly more scarce.[2]

(U) On 3 September, the SECDEF granted authority to use militarily-controlled shipping to transport cargo to outlying areas which had been deprived of health and comfort items. This authority, given as a result of a request by the Governor of Guam, enabled CINCPAC to provide emergency supplies which normally were received by commercial carrier. On 24 September, the HAWAII BEAR departed Oakland with 38 dry vans and eight reefer vans of cargo bound for Guam. The OLD DOMINION STATE departed Oakland on 28 September with 35,000 pounds of chlorine gas, and, on 10 October, the SEATRAIN GEORGIA departed Oakland with the final shipload of items approved for Guam under the emergency procedures.[3]

(U) On 1 October, the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) closed the east and gulf coast ports. Work continued, however, at all military ocean terminals and outports without interruption.[4]

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[1] J471 HistSum Jan 71; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 33/051450Z Jan 71, passed to CINCPAC by JCS 060022Z Jan 71.

[2] J4714 HistSum Aug and Sep 71.

[3] J4724 HistSum Sep-Oct 71; SECDEF 9192/032149Z Sep 71.

[4] J4714 HistSum Nov 71.

Space Available Embargo-Okinawa

(U) On 13 July 1971, the CINCPACREP in the Ryukyu Islands announced that water would be rationed on Okinawa. The water supply was shut off for 24 out of each 48 hour period. CINCPAC immediately requested all U.S. military agencies in the PACOM to restrict visits to those considered mission essential.[1]

(U) On 31 July, CINCPAC notified all concerned that an embargo on space available travel to Okinawa was in effect. The only exceptions were personnel returning to duty and emergency leave travel. The embargo continued until 6 October 1971, when the supply of water on Okinawa was no longer considered to be critical.[2]

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[1] CINCPAC 132323Z Jul 71, which cites CINCPACREPRY 130115Z Jul 71.
[2] J471 HistSum Aug-Sep 71; CINCPAC 312313Z Jul 71.

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CHAPTER VII

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

SECTION I--C-E PLANS AND PROGRAMS

Project COBRA TALON

(S) COBRA TALON was a project to install a space tracking radar in northern Thailand. The engineering and installation of supporting DCS communications was initially an Air Force project; however, by September 1970 there were indications that construction by the Army's 29th Signal Group would result in lower costs. COMUSMACTHAI recommended that the tasking be changed from Air Force to Army; CINCPAC concurred, and on 17 October 1970 so recommended to the JCS. In turn, the JCS forwarded a favorable recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on 8 December.[1]

(C) On 8 January 1971 the Secretary of Defense issued necessary directions to the Army, Air Force, and DCA for the accomplishment of a DCS tropo system between Ko Kha and Phitsanulok, Thailand. In recommending the ICS station at Phitsanulok as the DCS entry for COBRA TALON, CINCPAC had noted that if this station were selected, its phaseout, then scheduled to occur by January 1973, would have to be postponed or canceled. Also, inasmuch as the COMUSMACTHAI C-E Phaseout/Turnover Plan, OPLAN 1-70, called for eventual phaseout or turnover of all the ICS facilities between Phitsanulok and Bangkok, a method of bridging the resulting gap would have to be found. The entire matter was additionally clouded by the extent to which communications systems supporting COBRA TALON must remain under U.S. control. If U.S. control should not be necessary, it might be possible to utilize the facilities of the Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) to interconnect Phitsanulok with a permanent ICS station in the south of Thailand. Neither the JCS nor the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Executive Agency for COBRA TALON, had ruled on the issue of U.S. control. In view of the high priority of supporting circuit requirements, the highly critical and perishable nature of the information to be transmitted, and particularly in view of the as-yet unknown reliability of the TOT, CINCPAC took the position that the U.S. would maintain control of all COBRA TALON communications.[2]

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 301-303.

[2] DEPSECDEF Memo, 8 Jan 71, Subj: DCS Extension to Support COBRA TALON; CINCPAC ltr Ser 002699 of 10 Sep 70, same subj; J623 HistSum, Feb 71.

(C) With these thoughts in mind, CINCPAC and COMUSMACTHAI, in conjunction with the 29th Signal Group based in Thailand, conducted a series of studies to determine the optimum means of providing the required long-range, U.S.-controlled communication support. As a result, it was concluded that a tropo system linking Phitsanulok with Bang Pla would be the most feasible method. Of the other possible entry points, Udorn and Takhli, Phitsanulok provided the most technically reliable path. Additionally, it was the only station which had the power and space immediately available to permit installation and activation of a system in order to meet the IOC date. Finally, the costs of installation would be cheapest. Had Takhli or Udorn been chosen, there would have remained the matter of U.S. control to the rear, since the connectivity to these stations was also scheduled for phaseout or turnover under OPLAN 1-70.

(C) In revising OPLAN 1-70, COMUSMACTHAI included provisions for U.S. control of COBRA TALON communications via a Phitsanulok-Bang Pla tropo system, and earmarked equipment which would become available as a result of phasedown in Southeast Asia. On 12 January, CINCPAC directed CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF to set aside this equipment, when deactivated, for future use in support of COBRA TALON. At the same time CINCPAC requested DCA-PAC to examine the possibility of providing long-range support through use of satellite communications under the DSCS Phase II Stage 2 program, projected for FY 75.[1]

(C) On 22 January the Army Chief of Staff delegated to CGUSASTRATCOM the responsibilities for executing those specific tasks assigned to the Army with respect to the Ko Kha-Phitsanulok link. The system was to be made ready for operation and turnover to the Air Force as soon as possible but not later than December 1971. In the interest of time, engineering plans were to be coordinated with DCA and the Air Force at the lowest possible level. On 30 January, CINCUSARPAC requested authority to utilize the LRC-3 equipments which would become available from the Green Hill-Vung Tau link, soon to be deactivated, on the Ko Kha-Phitsanulok shot. COMUSMACTHAI had earmarked the Green Hill assets for subsequent use on the Phitsanulok-Bang Pla link. The LRC-3 assets originally designated for the entry link were still in storage in Bangkok; their condition was as yet undetermined. On 10 February CINCPAC concurred, subject to the continued rehabilitation of the assets in storage for future use.[2]

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[1] CINCPAC 121908Z Jan 71.

[2] DA ACSE-E 221748Z Jan 71; CINCUSARPAC 300300Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 100325Z Feb 71.

(C) On 17 February, after investigating the feasibility of supporting COBRA TALON through the use of satellites, CINCPAC advised the Air Force Chief of Staff that DSCS Phase I would be inadequate from a reliability standpoint. It was noted, however, that from a long-range standpoint, Phase II Stage 2 might prove to be the most cost-effective and technically proficient means for meeting the project's communications requirements. Therefore, USAF was requested to evaluate the merits of down-stream satellite communications vis-a-vis the use of U.S. tropo system or TOT facilities. Although AFCS was requested to make this determination, action had not been completed pending the results of ongoing tests of the TOT and the determination of the cost of a Bang Pla-Phitsanulok link. It was understood, however, that the Air Force had submitted a requirement to JCS for a terminal at Ko Kha during Phase II of the DSCS program. CINCPAC included a parallel requirement for a light earth terminal subsequent to a review of the Phase II terminal deployment plan.[1]

(C) On 1 March, the JCS directed that COBRA TALON circuitry should remain under U.S. control, subject to change at a later date if results of the trial TOT circuit lease indicated a change was advisable.[2]

(C) On 1 September, the CO USASTRATCOM Signal Group Thailand reported that a delay in the Ko Kha antenna installation due to an unusual amount of rainfall might impact the 1 December 1971 project completion date by 14 days. On 15 September, COMUSMACTHAI expressed concern over this possible delay and requested the cooperation of all involved in meeting the 1 December date.[3]

(C) On 22 September, CINCPAC emphasized the necessity of completing the Ko Kha-Phitsanulok link by 1 December in order to provide AFCS sufficient time to bring up and check out all circuits prior to the ROD date of 1 January 1972. CINCPAC further announced that it was imperative that Project COBRA TALON be given priority among conflicting demands for resource inputs, such as manpower, in order to complete this project on time.[4]

(U) On 18 September, CGUSASTRATCOMPAC reported that the completion date was in jeopardy due to defective coolant pumps used in the heat exchanger of the ten KW RF power amplifier, and unless the problem was resolved by 24 September, the completion date would slip. On 1 October, USASTRATCOM reported that a replacement pump had been procured on 24 September and sent by motor freight from

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1 CINCPAC 172209Z Feb 71; CINCPAC ltr Ser 00998 of 5 May 71, Subj: DSCS Phase II Terminal Deployment.

2 J623 HistSum, May 71.

3 COMUSMACTHAI 150749Z Sep 71.

4 CINCPAC 220307Z Sep 71.

San Francisco to Travis AFB. Because of the dock strikes, the backlog of air freight was beyond the capability of existing airlift facilities, and a slippage in delivery of the pump was anticipated.[1]

(C) Despite potential difficulties, the equipment and logistics problems either failed to materialize or were overcome. On 22 November the Army completed the DCS interface facilities on schedule and turned them over to the Air Force. That aspect of Project COBRA TALON involving DCS communications was at that point completed.[2]

Single Integrated Telecommunications System-Korea (SITS-K)

(S) On 10 April 1971, CINCPAC directed COMUSKOREA to undertake the development of a national telecommunication system for the ROK, capable of serving both civilian and military requirements. The plan for such a system would minimize duplication of existing facilities, enhance the ROK capability to assume total C-E support, and provide for retention of U.S. control over U.S. command and control and special/integrated networks. CINCPAC indicated that the U.S. Mission should be consulted in the preparation of the plan, and that plans to utilize DCS equipment or facilities would have to be approved by the JCS.[3]

(S) The SITS-K plan, modeled generally after the Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Program (CEIMP) developed for Vietnam and a similar plan for Thailand, has these objectives:

a. Provision of a comprehensive program for C-E support to the ROK during and subsequent to the Five-Year Modernization Plan.

b. Analysis of ROK requirements and capabilities to attain C-E self-sufficiency, and reduce U.S. presence in Korea.

c. Provide appropriate disposition instructions for C-E systems/facilities presently under U.S. control.

d. Outline training requirements of C-E personnel for takeover of the SITS-K.

The plan has concept approval by J6 of the JCS, although formal approval had not been received by the end of 1971. When approved, the SITS-K will provide a

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[1] J623 HistSum, Oct 71.
[2] AFCS 171225Z Nov 71.
[3] CINCPAC 100603Z Apr 71.

coordinated C-E program for the ROK during the FY 72-75 time frame, consolidating the many existing programs.[1]

U.S. Defense Communications Responsibilities in the Philippines

(U) By CINCPACINST 2000.5 of 27 November 1970, the U.S. Air Force was designated the single operation and maintenance manager of Defense Communications Systems (DCS) facilities in the Republic of the Philippines. An exception to this designation was the DCS stations at Dau and Cabuyo, where the U.S. Army had maintenance responsibilities for two radio terminals, fulfilled by contractor effort. When the current contract expires and a new one is negotiated, it is planned to have the U.S. Air Force administer the contract, thus relieving the Army of all DCS responsibilities in the Philippines. By agreement between CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF, this will become effective within 90 days of 1 January 1972.[2]

RVNAF Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Program (CEIMP)

(S) The CEIMP promulgated by the JCS on 12 June 1970 had included the requirement for semi-annual review, with recommendations for desired changes to be submitted to the JCS on 1 September and 1 March. On 20 February 1971 the first revision to the RVNAF CEIMP was promulgated by the JCS to incorporate recommended changes and expand its concept and objective.[3]

(S) On 30 August 1971 a second major revision was promulgated to provide communications-electronics planning and implementing instructions and serve as the primary management document for major communications-electronics assets and facilities installed, operated, and maintained within the RVN. As a result of review and change instructions incorporated in this document a change was distributed on 26 October 1971 which updated information to reflect the changing status of portions of the program.[4]

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[1] Ibid.; J615 HistSum, Apr 71; interview LTC Kesterson, J615, by ComdHist, 27 Jan 72.

[2] J614 Point Paper, 8 Dec 71, Subj: U.S. Defense Communications Responsibilities in the Philippines.

[3] JCS SM-86-71 of 20 Feb 71.

[4] JCS SM-566-71 of 30 Aug 71; note by the Secretaries to holders of SM-566-70 of 26 Oct 71.

(S) Concurrently with the 20 February 1971 revision of the CEIMP authority was granted to release selective portions of that document on a strict need-to-know basis to RVNAF and Free World Military Assistance Forces in order to facilitate communications-electronics planning. This provision has also been included in the 30 August 1971 revision.

(U) On 14 January 1971 COMUSMACV forwarded to CINCPAC the RVNAF portion of the CEIMP entitled "RVNAF Non-Tactical Telecommunications System Implementation Plan 1-70," prepared in both English and Vietnamese. The plan contained provisions for the integration of RVNAF telecommunications systems with certain U.S. communications facilities identified for turnover to the RVNAF. It provided for the establishment of a single integrated common-user telephone system, a single integrated teletype tape relay system, command and control, and other sole-user requirements of the RVNAF, U.S. advisors, and certain specific GVN agencies. The plan also provided for the management, training, operation, and logistical support of the system.[1]

Communications-Electronics Engineering in the RVN

(S) During 1970 CINCPAC had recommended to the JCS that contractor assistance be provided, over and above that furnished by General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GT&E), to the RVNAF C-E engineering effort. The JCS validated the requirement to re-engineer the Military Telecommunications Network Vietnam (MTNV), and concurred in the need for an engineering agency. The concept was that C-E engineering would be accomplished by a combined engineering agency operating under J6 MACV and J6 JGS, as an add-on to the existing USAID contract with GT&E. By early 1971, however, CINCPAC advised the JCS that the concept as approved had been overtaken by events, that the efforts of the Combined Telecommunications Agency (CTA) had reduced the overall requirement for C-E engineering assistance, and that COMUSMACV indicated USAID dissatisfaction with GT&E capabilities.[2]

(S) In April the JCS implemented various CINCPAC recommendations by tasking CINCPAC with the single system management of the communications engineering effort in the RVN, and by providing for contractor engineering assistance to the Combined C-E Engineering Agency through competitive procurement within a previously approved funding limitation of $800,000. CINCPAC in turn tasked MACV with the single system management of the communications engineering effort in the RVN.[3]

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[1] MACV J6 ltr of trans, 14 Jan 71; J612 HistSum Jan 71.
[2] CINCPAC 172012Z Jan 71.
[3] J612 HistSum Jun 71.

(U) On 30 June 1971 a contract for RVNAF communications engineering assistance was awarded to Philco-Ford. This contract was to support the U.S./RVNAF Combined Engineering Agency in the review, analysis, engineering, and re-engineering of U.S./RVNAF C-E systems, facilities, and projects (including MTNV projects) to achieve a combined U.S./RVNAF communications system in accordance with the RVNAF CEIMP.[1]

(U) On 18 November 1971 Page Communications Engineers, Inc. was awarded a contract to provide engineering support and management advice to the RVNAF Communications Management Agency (CMA), which had been activated in October 1971 to manage and control long-haul communications. The CMA will also perform the engineering and planning functions previously assigned to the U.S./RVNAF Combined Telecommunications Engineering Agency.[2]

Post-Hostilities Communications-Electronics Planning - Thailand

(S) Before the end of 1969 CINCPAC had forwarded to the JCS a recommended concept for post-hostilities use of C-E systems in Thailand. Guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the JCS during 1970, passed on to COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI, resulted in the refinement of a concept for phaseout/turnover of substantial amounts of U.S. military communications equipment to the Royal Thai Government (RTG), for the use of the RTG's Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) or of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF).[3]

(S) The COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI C-E Phaseout/Turnover Plan, revised as of 1 December 1970, was reviewed by CINCPAC during January 1971 and forwarded to the JCS on 16 January, recommending that the plan be approved for implementation. In June 1971 the JCS approved for implementation the following portions of the plan:

a. Offshore training.

b. Detailed discussions with the RTARF concerning the revision of appropriate RTARF TOE/unit allowance lists to provide the personnel and authorization to accommodate the planned types of equipment for turnover.

c. Detailed discussion with the RTARF concerning development of the RTARF logistic base to assimilate the support requirements necessitated by the types of equipment planned for turnover.[4]

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[1] J612 HistSum, Jul 71.
[2] MAC J62/270844Z Nov 71; J612 HistSum, Nov 71.
[3] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 295-298.
[4] CINCPAC 160312Z Jan 71; JCS 2916/252229Z Jun 71; J611 HistSum, Jun 71.

(C) CINCPAC's earlier request to run a scaled-down test of TOT circuitry was approved by the JCS on 3 February, with the understanding that the test not exceed 90 days or a total cost of $49,000, and that circuits would be chosen so that no cable interconnect construction would be required. The test was conducted, on a staggered basis because of circuit activation dates, from June through September 1971.[1]

(C) The final report of the test indicated that voice circuits tested were habitually within the specifications of V-1 requirements. No TTY or data circuits were tested due to restriction on cable interconnect construction; this proved to be a serious restriction to the test and is pointed out as the most important item for consideration in any future plans for long-term leasing arrangements. The reports recommended, among other things, that the concept of replacing tactical systems, used to augment or extend the ICS, by leased circuits be considered valid and pursued on a system-by-system basis. CINCPAC, after review of the test report and consideration of comments elicited from components and COMUSMACTHAI, submitted comments and recommendations to the JCS. Noted was the fact that any sizable utilization of TOT in the future would entail appreciable expenditures for installation of cable interconnect facilities. It was pointed out that the test gave no clear indication of the frequency and magnitude of outages experienced and that TOT restoral of inoperative circuits was unsatisfactory at those up-country terminals not continuously manned by Thai technicians. Detailed guidance for future leasing action and the following recommendations were provided:

a. The use of TOT to satisfy residual U.S., Allied, and RTARF military requirements in Thailand be adopted as a valid concept.

b. That COMUSMACTHAI be tasked to develop plans for gradual increase in use of TOT.

c. That JCS advise the Department of State of the implications of leasing actions as related to provision of services to State organizations within Thailand and the Political/Economic aspects of nation-building inherent in future leasing arrangements.

At year's end, the JCS had curtailed future action in this matter until Defense review of the test had been completed, and previous guidance either reaffirmed and/or changed as required.[2]

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 297-298; MJCS 32-71 of 3 Feb 71, as cited in J622 HistSum, Dec 71.

[2] CINCPAC 140035Z Dec 71; JCS 202229Z Dec 71.

(S) The subsequent revision of the C-E phaseout/turnover plan was completed by COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI and forwarded to the JCS on 13 July 1971. CINCPAC comments included recommendations of the Component Commanders, and CINCPAC recommended that the JCS approve the revised schedule for implementation. In October, however the JCS indicated in part that because of the uncertainties of force planning, which impacted on the schedule, approval for implementation could not be considered at that time.[1]

(C) As of the end of 1971, the PACOM Communications Improvement Program was essentially complete insofar as realignment/retrograde of equipment in Thailand was concerned. Two outstanding items include the following:

a. UDORN - UDORN RRFS. The AN/FRC-109 equipment has been replaced by LRC-3 units. The LRC-3 path presently shoots through the ASA AN/FLR-9 antenna. Efforts are underway to realign the path by using a passive reflector at the NE corner of Ramasun Station.

b. Sattahip Port - Hill 272. The AN/FRC-109 link have not been deactivated as yet, waiting for correction of certain deficiencies in the expansion of the Hill 272-Utapao link. These are expected to be completed in January 1972.[2]

C-E Contingency Planning for Evacuation of India, Nepal, and Pakistan

(S) The increasing tension between India and Pakistan during 1971 dictated that a contingency plan for evacuation of India, Nepal, and Pakistan be created. J6 was tasked to prepare the C-E Annex to this plan. The immediate problem was the dearth of adequate connectivity to the Pacific area to provide for reliable command and control communications from this communications-bare area. Use of JCS-controlled assets would greatly enhance this connectivity.

(S) Initial planning involved positioning of three CINCSTRIKE JACC/CP aircraft (JACKPOT) at Bombay, New Delhi, and Karachi, and a JCS-controlled TSC-54 earth terminal at New Delhi to provide entry to DCS at U Tapao, Clark, or other DCS stations. These assets would be augmented by the commercial satellite terminal at Bombay if necessary and if available.[3]

(S) In determining the availability of PACOM assets to satisfy in-country

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1 CINCPAC 040300Z Aug 71; JCS 8957/151904Z Oct 71.
2 J62A HistSum, Dec 71.
3 CINCPAC 130042Z Nov 71; J623 HistSum, Nov 71.

tactical C-E requirements, CGUSARV initially reported equipment and personnel problems generated by troop strength reductions and redistribution of assets. Extensive assembly, inspection, refitting of equipment, and reconstitution of operating teams would be necessary to provide the capability to support mission requirements as set down by CINCUSARPAC.[1]

(S) CINCPAC expressed a desire to deploy the TSC-54 located at Seoul vice configuring the U Tapao unit for movement out-of-country, because the possible activation of a JOCC Forward at U Tapao would create a need to terminate a satellite link from the deployed unit at that location. The Seoul unit was scheduled for redeployment in early 1972 and was a logical choice if a TSC-54 must be uprooted. CG Eighth Army reported that the Seoul TSC-54 equipment and personnel could be prepared for air movement within 24 hours after notification. Consideration was also given to possible deployment of a TSC-54 from the JCS pool in CONUS; it was estimated that one of the three available units could be deployed and on the air within 72 hours.[2]

(S) ODRI/New Delhi provided information concerning the capability of DTS Regional Facility, New Delhi to provide a secure communications circuit between CINCSTRIKE contingency forces operating in Southeast Asia and any of the U.S. Embassies and Consulates in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Ceylon. This capability could also be made available to CINCPAC Task Forces after the first of the year.[3]

(S) After a meeting with the Component Commands, CINCPAC could make more definitive plans in support of the C-E Supplement to the CONPLAN. Basically, two communications conditions were considered: Condition One which would provide C-E support of evacuation not requiring insertion of U.S. Ground Forces, and Condition Two covering additional support in the event Ground Forces were employed. Employment of JACC/CP (JACKPOT) and AN/TSC-54 was confirmed as initially planned. DCA-PAC was requested to provide DCS entry points for JACKPOTs located at Karachi and Bombay, and to initiate action to ensure that those stations as well as DCS Clark are prepared to terminate systems and extend circuitry as dictated by requirements resulting from the meeting.[4]

(S) DCA-PAC submitted an interim plan to satisfy the long-haul requirements of the Components. PACAF was not satisfied with AUTOVON access to JOCC Forward at U Tapao, and forwarded the problem for further consideration by DCA-PAC. No

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1 CGUSARV 151120Z Nov 71; CINCUSARPAC 110305Z Nov 71.
2 CINCPAC 170230Z Nov 71; CGUSAEIGHT 010714Z Dec 71.
3 ODRI/New Delhi 230530Z Nov 71.
4 CINCPAC 202250Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 012233Z Dec 71.

other adverse comments were received from other Components. To assist in resources planning and to avoid last minute assimilation of information associated with request for JCS-controlled equipment, a message including all such information for deployment of a TSC-54 was prepositioned at JCS.[1]

(U) In effect, all problems associated with the Comm Plan were solved adequately and the plan was ready for implementation. The plan was, of course, overtaken by the events in India and Pakistan at the end of 1971, and no further action is now contemplated.[2]

CINCPAC/CINCAL Communications Planning

(S) The Unified Command Plan revision to be effective on 1 January 1972 will increase CINCPAC responsibilities for area support of the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO), hitherto assumed by CINCAL. CINCPAC therefore tasked CINCPACAF to assign to Fifth Air Force the responsibility for performing the scheduling, monitoring, and reporting functions outlined in JCS SM 700-68/701-68 (and revisions) as they pertain to PAR programs conducted north of 49° N. The stations involved are COMFAIRADAK, Eilson AFB, and ALCOM Indication Center, Alaska; Fuchu Air Station, Japan; and the CINCPAC Command Center at Camp Smith. As PARPRO responsibilities are phased out of the ALCOM Indication Center and assumed by the Fifth Air Force Center, communication circuitry to support the new mission will be required.[3]

(S) Under Fifth Air Force recommendations, CINCPAC would have to establish an agency at ALCOM Headquarters, as the PARPRO functions north of 49° N would have to be performed by that agency. CINCPAC did not concur, preferring instead a concept whereby the Fifth Air Force facility at Fuchu, Japan would perform all monitoring, scheduling, and reporting functions; CINCPAC would continue to provide a JRC office for coordination of PARPRO activities. Requests for approval of the necessary additional circuitry were forwarded to the JCS. The JCS, however, did not concur, stating that the intelligence support presently available to ALCOM for PARPRO missions could be furnished to Fifth Air Force through existing teletype and secure voice terminals at the pertinent sites; action on the CINCPAC request was deferred pending further study.[4]

(S) A major problem area in any solution to the circuitry requirements is the lack of an SI secure area at COMFAIRADAK. Operational factors, TDY/TAD

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[1] DCA-PAC 040241Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 042215Z Dec 71.
[2] J622 HistSum, Dec 71.
[3] Details of the circuitry required are outlined in CINCPAC 162002Z Sep 71.
[4] JCS 131607Z Oct 71.

short tour personnel assignments, and other problems involving lack of SI clearance problems at NAVCOMMSTA Adak will apparently inhibit the successful completion of this program throughout its life cycle.[1]

(S) While awaiting JCS approval of CINCPAC communication requirements, it became increasingly obvious that CINCPAC could not effectively assume PARPRO responsibilities in the Alaska area on 1 January 1972 due to lack of adequate communications. CINCPAC appealed to the Air Force for assistance. CSAF replied by approving CINCPAC communication requirements in principle and directing Air Force units to begin engineering and installation of required equipment, advising also that it was unlikely that circuitry for PARPRO communications for the Alaska area would become operational by 1 January 1972. So as to assure end-to-end operation, CSAF selected CINCPACAF as program manager for installation of the system.[2]

(S) Since COMFAIRADAK does not have an SI facility and the other units involved have or will have terminated their circuits in an SI facility, it was programmed to terminate the SI circuit in the ALCOM SI facility and refile to Adak over a dedicated TS network. This requirement is dictated by security restrictions imposed on the operation of non-SI circuits in an SI facility, which precludes collocation of non-SI and SI terminal equipment. The proposed refile action could not be accomplished because of space limitations at ALCOM Headquarters, nullification of the usefulness of the hubbing device, and ALCOM Headquarters objection to the arrangement. To expedite the installation of the system, as an interim measure until COMFAIRADAK SI facility is completed (scheduled for March or April 1972), CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT to terminate the circuit in the SI facility at NAVCOMMSTA Adak and to refile the data over a dedicated TS circuit to COMFAIRADAK (8 miles away). This arrangement, although cumbersome, allows for compliance with the security regulations.[3]

(S) Based on information provided by the JCS, the Air Force is developing a proposal for relaying all PARPRO information by interconnection of 5AF CAF with a comparable facility planned for early FY 72. This date appears to be optimistic; early FY 73 would be a more realistic date. ALCOM Headquarters requested from JCS that ALCOM not install the interim system, but rather maintain the PARPRO monitoring responsibilities, as presently performed, until such time as the permanent communication facility is constructed. CINCPAC has agreed

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1 J621 HistSum, Oct 71.
2 CSAF 291838Z Dec 71; J621 HistSum, Dec 71.
3 CINCPAC 052228Z Jan 72.

to this arrangement, with provision for authority to use COMFAIRADAK SI facility (1.5 miles) to terminate the SI facility.[1]

Third PACOM Senior C-E Officers' Conference

(U) The CINCPAC J6 hosted the third PACOM-wide conference of senior C-E officers at Camp H. M. Smith from 28-30 April 1971. The purpose of the conference was to achieve improved management of communications assets, to provide a common understanding of communications problems, and to improve coordination of present and future communications programs. The conference was addressed by LT GEN R. P. Klocko, Director DCA, and by MAJ GEN A. T. Shtogren, J6, JCS. Agenda items included the following:

a. Status of CEIMP (presented by MACV)

b. Status of Thailand Post-Hostilities Plan 1-70 (MACTHAI)

c. Status of SITS-K (USFK)

d. CVAN Upgrade (CINCPAC)

e. Status of DSCS (CINCPAC)

f. HIGH HEELS 71 Results (CINCPAC)

g. Integration of SPINTCOMM/CRITICOMM into AUTODIN (CINCPAC)

h. AUTOVON Control Procedures (DCA-PAC)

i. Status of AUTOSEVOCOM (CINCPAC)

j. Status of PACOM HF Deactivations (CINCPAC/DCA-PAC)

k. AUTODIN 8-70 Plan, Improvement for Command and Control (CINCPAC).[2]

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[1] JCS 302046Z Dec 71; CINCAL 052057Z Jan 72; COMFAIRADAK 062248Z Jan 72; J621 HistSum, Dec 71.

[2] CINCPAC 160340Z Jan 71; J613 HistSum, Apr 71.

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SECTION II--COMMAND AND CONTROL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

AUTOVON Equipment and Procedures

(U) The Hawaii AUTOVON switch at Wahiawa is owned and operated by Hawaiian Telephone Company, which provides AUTOVON Assistance Operator (AAO) services as part of the DECCO-managed contract. A DCA-PAC study determined that it would be more cost effective to have AAO services provided at the Guam AUTODIN switch and to eliminate the service at Hawaii. Effective 1 July 1971, the Hawaii service was absorbed by the Guam AAO facility at Finegayan, with the Wahiawa switch programmed to route AAO calls automatically to Guam.[1]

(U) To avoid confusion in AUTOVON conference calls caused by a dial tone which apparently indicated an open line, DCA developed a modification to dial tone generators installed in AUTOVON switches. This modification, activated for a five-second period, produces a wobble tone which alerts subscribers that a conference call is being set up and that they are to hold the line open for the start of the conference. All AUTOVON switches were modified by 30 July 1971.[2]

(C) On 22 March 1971 CINCPAC took steps to revalidate and where possible reduce the number of AUTOVON Preset Conferences available to CINCPAC and the Component Services, on the basis that a large number was not being utilized sufficiently to warrant retention. As a result of a study, CINCPAC on 4 June requested the JCS to delete 15 preset conferences, add three subscribers to one conference, and delete ten subscribers from three other conferences; the same message requested DCA to eliminate two preset conferences. On 14 July the JCS concurred in the CINCPAC-requested deletions and adjustments, adding: "The action by your headquarters in collaboration with the Component Commands to improve the use and responsiveness of the AUTOVON system in your area is most commendable."[3]

Automatic Secure Voice Switch (AN/FTC-31)

(C) On 12 January 1971 the Automatic Secure Voice Switch (AN/FTC-31) in Hawaii developed an intermittent failure, causing calls in progress to be interrupted at random times without regard to precedence. The switch was operated in

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1 J622 HistSum, Jul 71.
2 DCA-PAC 040607Z Jun 71.
3 CINCPAC 040252Z Jun 71; JCS 142152Z Jul 71.

manual mode for about 20 hours while technicians isolated and replaced a faulty module in the computerized switch. Although the switch appeared to be operating normally, call interruptions over the next ten days plagued the system. On 21 January NAVCOMMSTA Honolulu, which had maintenance responsibility, requested factory technical assistance. A Philco-Ford technical representative finally discovered and corrected the problem: A short-circuited printed-circuit board in which the defect was underneath the protective varnish coating, indicating that the defect had been present since the original installation of the Hawaii switch. The board was replaced on 8 February and there have been no further difficulties.[1]

CINCPAC Voice Alert Network (CVAN) Upgrading

(U) The upgrading of the CVAN, begun in early 1970, continued throughout 1971. A team from Hawaiian Telephone Company (HAWTELCO) completed a survey trip during the period 6-26 January 1971, and reported its findings informally at a meeting on 8 February.[2]

(U) Discussion revealed that no significant variations or discrepancies in equipment configuration had been encountered. Each site was surveyed for equipment space, availability of power, maintenance of equipment, and access for cabling from frame to console. Major reconfiguration was indicated for Phu Lam and Fuchu, while realignment or provision of capability was necessary for Subic Bay and Sasebo.[3]

(U) Maintenance of the CVAN system is provided by two full-time and one part-time HAWTELCO employees. The representative in Japan also covers Okinawa and Korea, while the Philippine representative also covers the RVN and Thailand; Taiwan may be covered by either, depending on workload at the time. Guam is handled on a part-time basis.[4]

(C) By October 1971 CINCPAC had determined that the CVAN was badly in need of upgrade action, and a conference on that subject was convened at CINCPAC on 18 November 1971, with the objective of reaching agreement on the methods and means, as well as the extent, by which the system could be improved to meet more precisely CINCPAC's requirements. Representatives from the Components, subordinate unified commands, other concerned agencies (USAF, NAVCOMMCOM, DCA-PAC, COMFOURTEEN), and HAWTELCO participated. Specific attention was directed to the

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1 J624 HistSums, Feb and Mar 71.
2 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 234.
3 J625 HistSum, Feb 71.
4 Ibid.

following subjects: Preemption and signalling level realignment throughout the system; reorientation of circuitry to achieve path diversity; establishment of tested and reliably responsive alternate routes; the critical impact of electrical power failure and other system vulnerabilities; funding capabilities and limitations; and production and promulgation of technical standards. The conference served to focus attention on CVAN requirements, its present and projected configuration, its vulnerabilities, and the command emphasis necessary for effective monitoring.[1]

Communications Damage in Taiwan from Typhoon Nadine

(C) Typhoon Nadine, with winds gusting up to 140 knots and heavy rains, struck Taiwan on 25 July 1971, causing major damage to communications facilities. As a result, Taiwan was isolated for a short period of time from communicating off-island due to extensive damage at Shung Shan and Chen Tow Shan communications sites. Swift restoral reaction by operator and maintenance personnel, with guidance from DCA-PAC elements, kept isolation time to a minimum, under the prevailing conditions, of 15 minutes. DCA FE Region and DCA SEA Region managed successful unprogrammed and unplanned reroutes between Okinawa/Philippines and Taiwan. Operator and maintenance personnel assigned to USASTRATCOM elements in Taiwan and Okinawa, and the 1961st COMMGP in the Philippines, responded with rapid restoral of vital communications for Taiwan. Throughout the course of the typhoon, timely reporting by all concerned elements assisted commanders and staffs at all levels in keeping abreast of communications problems caused by Nadine. On-going actions are directed toward ways of improving response time to outages and improving reliability of systems.[2]

Voice Excited Vocoder

(C) A Voice Excited Vocoder (VEV), one of which has been in use between CONUS and Europe since mid-1970, provides narrowband secure voice communications with voice quality significantly better than that of the equipment it replaced. On 18 January 1971 DCA proposed the installation of a VEV at the Hawaii and Saigon Automatic Secure Voice Switches (AN/FTC-31), stating that the installations could begin in May 1971.[3]

(C) CINCPAC agreed to the proposed installation, and recommended that DCA-PAC be nominated as project manager. On 26 January DCA-PAC was so nominated, and provided equipment and engineering planning and other assistance. The VEV

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[1] CINCPAC 212123Z Oct 71.
[2] J622 HistSum, Aug 71.
[3] DCA 182026Z Jan 71; J624 HistSum, Feb 71.

between Hawaii and Saigon, completed during June 1971, was declared operational by DCA on 29 July. The VEV circuit provides improved voice intelligibility over that provided by HY-2 equipped circuits.[1]

Washington-Hawaii Wideband AUTOSEVOCOM Link

(C) A wideband AUTOSEVOCOM link between the Hawaii AN/FTC-31 and the Washington 758C switches was planned as part of the Phase II Defense Satellite Communication System. However, because of an urgent need for greater reliability and intelligibility in secure voice calls, CINCPAC requested that an interim capability be provided on existing satellite, using MUX/MODEM equipment which, although not in production, was available and had been successfully tested. DCA replied with a project directive establishing a test start date of 21 June 1971 for the link. The project was nicknamed MUSCLE TRUNK I.[2]

(C) Testing of the MUSCLE TRUNK I proceeded as scheduled by DCA until the final stages, at which time numerous small problems postponed the interim operational date from 28 June to 3 July 1971. During July MUSCLE TRUNK I was used as an operational circuit, but circuit reliability remained poor, owing to technical problems relating to the various interface, modulation, and multiplying equipments, which were newly-designed one-of-a-kind devices.[3]

(U) At a meeting of CINCPAC, DCA-PAC, and NAVCOMMSTA Honolulu representatives on 15 July 1971, administrative procedures were established to provide improved secure voice service to the CINCPAC. Procedures adopted included rehoming and reconfiguration of office and quarters telephones, processing all calls as flash traffic, and instituting close operator surveillance.[4]

(C) Although the MUSCLE TRUNK I link was declared operational on 19 July, circuit reliability remained poor through August. From September through November considerable improvement was noted, as shown by the following analysis of calls by the CINCPAC and his Chief of Staff to Washington during the period 21 August-26 November:[5]

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[1] CINCPAC 202210Z Jan 71; DCA 262158Z Jan 71; DCA 292052Z Jul 71; J624 HistSum, Aug 71.

[2] CINCPAC 030254Z Apr 71; DCA 062242Z Apr 71; J624 HistSum, May 71.

[3] DCA 480 ltr, 27 Apr 71, Subj: Multi-Channel Secure Voice Link Tests (MUSCLE TRUNK); USASATCOM Agency MUSCLE TRUNK I Implementation and Test Plan, May 1971; J624 HistSum, Jul 71.

[4] CINCPAC ltr Ser 2906 of 20 Jul 71; J624 HistSum, Aug 71.

[5] J624 HistSum, Nov 71.

	21 Aug-15 Oct	16 Oct-26 Nov
Calls attempted	40	35
Calls completed on MUSCLE TRUNK	14 (35%)	25 (71%)*
Calls not completed due to: Not available	12 (30%)	8 (23%)
Down for maintenance	10 (25%)	1 (3%)
Operator error	4 (10%)	1 (3%).

*From 16 October - 18 November, 25 calls were completed on MUSCLE TRUNK out of 28 attempts, for an average availability of 86 percent. From 22-24 November MUSCLE TRUNK was not available because no satellite was visible, requiring the seven calls during that period to be completed on VOCOM and reducing the MUSCLE TRUNK reliability to 71 percent.

(C) The reliability of the MUSCLE TRUNK I link decreased considerably during December, dropping to 40.7 percent for the week of 21-27. The primary causes for this poor performance were failures in prototype equipment and climatic factors, particularly heavy rains.[1]

Taegu Automatic Switching Center

(U) In April 1968 CINCPAC initially formulated an emergency requirement to automate record communications in Korea. After a long series of justifications and rejustifications the requirement, identified as Subsystem Project Plan 4-71, was finally approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 30 August 1971.[2]

(U) As a result of meetings at DCA on 16 and 23 September 1971, involving ALCOM and PACOM representatives respectively, it was determined that the Automatic Switching Center (ASC) at Wildwood AFB, Alaska would be relocated to Taegu, Korea, and the 54 Alaskan subscribers rehomed to three CONUS ASCs. This would be the first time that the Services themselves had relocated a switch--the Nha Trang switch had been relocated by Philco-Ford. The Air Force will disassemble and ship the ASC from Wildwood, to arrive at Taegu by 1 June 1972, and will install the 100-line ASC and the DSSCS Patch Facility. The Army, in conjunction with DCA, developed plans for relocating the Taegu relay to permit new construction in the building by 21 March 1972. DCA and the Army are to provide the software support for the Taegu ASC. The target operational date is

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[1] DCA-PAC 302344Z Dec 71; J624 HistSum, Dec 71.
[2] DCA 071525Z Sep 71; J626 HistSum, Oct 71.

31 December 1972, with phaseout of the dedicated circuits to follow after a 15-30 day proving period.[1]

Accelerated Phaseout of Phu Lam Automatic Switching Center

(S) COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC on 4 October 1971 that under the terms of the CEIMP, the Phu Lam ASC was to be phased out when no longer required for support of U.S. forces, a date initially forecast for FY 74. Pointing out that subsequent planning emphasized the accelerating of all CEIMP actions, with a target date of 30 June 1972, COMUSMACV proposed that the phaseout of the Phu Lam ASC be accelerated.[2]

(S) DCA, however, proposed to proceed with the DSSCS modification of the Phu Lam switch, and considered it unlikely that the AFCS could remove Phu Lam prior to January 1973 because of the relocation of the Wildwood ASC to Taegu, Korea. If the Phu Lam ASC were removed prior to that date, a contract effort would be a possible alternative. COMUSMACTHAI pointed out some of the effects of an accelerated phaseout of Phu Lam on Thailand subscribers.[3]

(C) Before acting on COMUSMACV's proposal, CINCPAC requested guidance from the JCS regarding the 31 DSSCS subscribers validated to be homed to the Phu Lam ASC. The JCS advised that the DSSCS program would not preclude the early phaseout of the Phu Lam ASC, and requested that a rehoming and phaseout schedule be developed in coordination with DCA.[4]

(U) Based on the JCS guidance, and on a CGUSARV recommendation that the target phaseout date be 1 May 1972, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to analyze all requirements and to develop a proposed rehoming and phaseout schedule. COMUSMACV indicated that the study would be completed about 31 December 1971.[5]

Utilization of PACOM DSCS Phase I Terminals

(C) The JCS advised on 22 January 1971 that in view of the impending deployment of the Nha Trang AN/MSC-46 satellite earth terminal to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, it was planned to terminate on a permanent basis the Guam AN/MSC-46 link with NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. Holt (HEH), Australia. This action would allow the AN/TSC-54 at Guam to be relocated to Londonderry, U.K., as an early step in

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1 J626 HistSum, Oct 71; DA 232029Z Dec 71.
2 COMUSMACV 040856Z Oct 71; J626 HistSum, Nov 71.
3 DCA 081520Z Oct 71; DCA 122030Z Oct 71; COMUSMACTHAI 130950Z Oct 71.
4 CINCPAC 170003Z Oct 71; JCS 9602/162204Z Nov 71.
5 CGUSARV 190510Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 242253Z Nov 71; COMUSMACV 280357Z Nov 71.

the attainment of the connectivity required. On 26 January, however, CINCPAC notified the JCS that he did not concur in the AN/TSC-54 redeployment. CINCPAC's position was that the requirement between Australia and Guam could be met most economically through continued use of an AN/TSC-54 at each location, as the capabilities of those terminals were matched to satisfy the validated circuit requirements. Use of the AN/MSC-46 on Guam with the AN/TSC-54 in Australia would result in loss of at least four DCS quality voice channels or 11 tactical quality voice channels which could be ill-afforded in PACOM at this time. Similarly, on 26 January 1971 DCA-PAC advised DCA of their nonconcurrence in proposed redeployment of Guam AN/TSC-54 and noted this would adversely affect the DCA-PAC proposal to satisfy CINCPAC's urgent requirement for deployment of an AN/MSC-46 to Korea at an early date.[1]

(C) On 10 March, CINCPAC reiterated a prior recommendation to move the idle AN/MSC-46 terminal at Guam to Taegu. On 7 June the JCS requested CINCPAC comments on several alternative means of providing diverse communications into Korea, including among others the use of the Philippines or the Okinawa terminals in Korea in lieu of the Guam terminal. On 9 June, CINCPAC recommended immediate steps to lease three INTELSAT circuits, pursuant to a separate action which CINCPAC had previously initiated; deployment of the AN/TSC-54 at Seoul to Londonderry; and continued lease of INTELSAT circuits after relocation of the MSC-46 to provide highly reliable backup/dual access command and control communications and to increase overall out-of-country channel capacity. As an alternative, the lease of the INTELSAT circuits would be terminated upon installation of the AN/MSC-46.[2]

(C) On 26 August the JCS announced a decision to move the AN/MSC-46 from Wildwood, Alaska to Taegu, vice the unit at Guam, with an expected operational date of December 1971. The Taegu terminal would establish a link with the MSC-46 at Guam. The TSC-54 at Seoul would continue to operate with the one in Thailand until a spread spectrum (SS) capability was achieved between the TSC-54s in Thailand and Guam. Subsequent to this, the TSC-54 at Seoul would be moved to Londonderry, in early 1972. The Guam TSC-54 would, in addition to operating with Thailand in the SS mode, continue to operate with HEH, Australia, in the FM mode, until the advent of Stage 1B Phase II.[3]

(C) On 30 August, Department of the Army issued the necessary tasking instructions to USASTRATCOM and USASATCOMA to accept transfer of the Wildwood terminal from the Air Force and to accomplish all other actions necessary to its

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[1] JCS 1846/222349Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 260130Z Jan 71; DCA-PAC 260219Z Jan 71.
[2] CINCPAC 102218Z Mar 71; JCS 2713/071633Z Jun 71; CINCPAC 092121Z Jun 71.
[3] JCS SM-561-71 of 26 Aug 71.

relocation, installation, operation, and maintenance at Taegu. The terminal was transferred from Air Force to Army and was airshipped to Korea in early October.[1]

(C) On 17 September, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the Taegu terminal be used to link the Okinawa instead of the Guam AN/MSC-46 terminal, since a Taegu-Okinawa link would provide tremendous restorational flexibility among the Korea-Japan-Okinawa triad. The Philippine terminal, which then linked Okinawa, would be reconfigured to link with Guam. On 6 October the JCS approved the recommendation, and also requested CINCPAC comments on the expected redeployment availability of the AN/MSC-46 terminal located at Ba Queo, RVN, in view of the continuing reduction of the U.S. presence in the RVN.[2]

(C) On 30 October, CINCPAC responded to the JCS query by stating that since the key operational commitment of the Ba Queo terminal was in support of the COMPASS LINK imagery transmission of photo intelligence from the RVN to Washington in satisfaction of a DIA requirement, that organization was in a better position to forecast more accurately the date by which the terminal would no longer be required. Additionally, since the Ba Queo terminal figured prominently in DCA-PAC's WETWASH Alpha restoration plan, alternate arrangements would have to be made in this area prior to actually relocating the terminal, even though the COMPASS LINK requirement might no longer exist. In summary, it was stated that it was too early to forecast an availability date, but that if and when the terminal became available, CINCPAC recommended that it be used to fulfill CINCPAC's next most urgent requirement for a satellite terminal in support of the 7th RRFS located at Ramasun Station, near Udorn, Thailand.[3]

Phasedown and Consolidation of High Frequency Facilities

(C) CINCPAC policy is to deactivate high frequency (HF) radio circuits, providing alternate routes are available from an area. On this basis the HF trunk between Fort Buckner, Okinawa, and Clark Air Base, Philippines, was selected for deactivation, and all circuits were rerouted on other transmission media through the leasing of commercial tropo circuits. The remaining two HF trunks terminated at Fort Buckner to Taegu, Korea and Australia were deactivated allowing HF facilities at Fort Buckner to be dismantled.[4]

(C) As a result of deactivation of DCS HF trunks, Taegu-Wahiawa and Taegu-Fort Buckner, only one trunk terminated at Taegu: 77CB13 to Japan. A review of usage indicated that the utilization of the trunks was limited and that

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[1] DA 302117Z Aug 71; J623 HistSum Aug 71.
[2] CINCPAC 172228Z Sep 71; JCS 1428/062239Z Oct 71.
[3] CINCPAC 300305Z Oct 71.
[4] J622 HistSum Feb 71.

their retention was not supportable. CINCPAC recommended that two INTELSAT circuits be leased from Hawaii concurrent with the close-out of the HF trunks. It was estimated that each circuit would cost $18,000 per month or approximately $432,000 per year for the two circuits. This cost compared with the O&M costs of operating the HF trunks would result in a savings and provide better service. COMUSKOREA had no objection to the Japan-Korea path in support of circuit requirements. However, an additional path out-of-country was required to meet CINCPAC alternate route requirements in regards to command and control communications. Upon activation of three commercial satellite trunks Wahiawa-Taegu, tne remaining HF trunk, Taegu-Japan, was deactivated in September and HF facilities at Taegu dismantled.[1]

(C) The Secretary of Defense directed the consolidation of HF facilities on Oahu, Hawaii. A COMNAVCOMM team conducted a study and forwarded a proposed plan to CINCPAC for comment. DCA-PAC commented that the manpower/time costs within the proposed plan appeared excessive. CINCPACFLT favored consolidation of facilities wherever monetary savings could be realized, but felt that the proposed consolidation of Kaneohe HF facilities with those of NAVCOMMSTA did not appear to be cost effective.[2]

Message Traffic and Communications Support

(U) Figures for the gross message traffic, by month, and the average daily number of messages processed by the CINCPAC Communications Center during 1971 were as follows:

	Monthly Message Traffic	Average Daily Traffic	% Change from Previous Month
January	53,286	1,719	---
February	52,026	1,858	+ 8.1
March	68,961	2,224	+19.7
April	72,103	2,403	+ 8.0
May	68,660	2,215	- 7.8
June	66,082	2,203	- 0.5
July	59,973	1,935	-12.2
August	61,441	1,981	+ 2.3
September	53,469	1,782	-10.1
October	51,137	1,649	- 7.5
November	48,385	1,613	- 2.2
December	57,508	1,855	-15.0.
Average:	57,753		

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1 COMUSKOREA 290506Z Jan 71; J622 HistSum Jan 71.
2 DCA-PAC 030106Z Mar 71; CINCPACFLT 280023Z Feb 71; J622 HistSum Mar 71.

(U) This average of 57,753 messages per month represented an increase of 12.6 percent over the traffic for 1970 (51,308 per month), but was still five percent below the all-time high figure of 1968 (60,808 messages per month).[1]

(U) Communications support for the Commander in Chief while away from his headquarters continued to be an important function of the Communications Branch of J6. Monthly ALFA messages sent to and TANGO messages received from the CINCPAC were as follows:[2]

	ALFA Sent	TANGO Received
January	500	71
February	720	64
March	172	15
April	1,105	112
May	1,012	122
June	629	70
July	708	101
August	354	24
September	696	106
October	737	95
November	1,257	159
December	1,012	113.

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[1] J63 HistSums Jan-Dec 71; CINCPAC Command Histories 1968, Vol. I, p. 183 and 1970, Vol. I, p. 220.

[2] J63 HistSums Jan-Dec 71.



[1] CINCPACAF ltr DO of 19 Jan 71, Subj: Implementation of the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) MARK XII System.



(U) The recommendation became the subject of lengthy JCS study, and by the end of 1971 no firm decision had been reached on the CINCPACAF proposal.[2]

AUTODIN Terminals for American Embassies in the PACOM

(C) On 27 February 1971 CINCPACAF advised that his staff was studying the feasibility of phasedown/phaseout of the manual command and control relays in Thailand and the RVN (CCRT and CCRV), and that the American Embassies in Bangkok and Saigon had circuits to these facilities. Furnishing AUTODIN service to those embassies would facilitate their planning actions for the disposition of the CCRs, but because of funding requirements for AUTODIN backbone charges, CINCPACAF requested CINCPAC suggestions for approaching the problem.[3]

(C) CINCPAC requested comments and necessary action by COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSMACV, Department of State, and DCA, and agreed to the use of Mode II AUTODIN terminal operations based on the phaseout of dedicated circuits. State concurred in the use of Mode II at Bangkok and advised that Saigon did not require service, but took the position that as the requirement was in direct support of

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1 CINCPAC 190015Z Jun 71.
2 Interview LTC Bird, J613 by ComdHist, 27 Jan 72.
3 CINCPACAF DCO 271921Z Feb 71.

U.S. military activity in Southeast Asia, DCA should provide the funding. DCA did not concur in the use of Mode II, noting that its policy precluded Mode II operation except as interim terminals pending Mode I or Mode V installation.[1]

(C) CINCPAC requested State and USAF to resolve the question of operational requirement and funding for Embassy AUTODIN services, and to program service accordingly. CINCPACAF was advised to continue the CCRT/CCRV phasedown on the assumption that neither Embassy would require a terminal. CINCPAC reiterated concurrence in the use of Mode II operation.[2]

(U) Upon query by AFCS, the Air Staff concurred in Mode II AUTODIN service on a semi-permanent basis for the Embassy Bangkok to facilitate phaseout of the CCRT/CCRV. AFCS and CINCPACAF were tasked to program the AUTODIN service with USAF funding for backbone charges. DCA was requested again to authorize Mode II service, and on 29 April 1971 concurred in this mode.[3]

All-Source Information Center Communications Support

(S) All-Source Information Centers (ASICs), which serve as focal points within selected command centers or operations centers, must be capable of assimilating and correlating information affecting U.S. operations in PACOM geographical areas on a near real time basis. To enable the PACOM Command and Control Systems to cope more readily with emergency situations, it was necessary to develop an integrated system of ASICs within the framework of the existing system. At the beginning of 1971, ASICs were located in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In order to tie in the Component command centers and the CINCPAC Command Center itself, an engineering plan was needed which would provide direct communications from the ASICs to the CINCPAC and the Component command centers, and laterally between the ASICs.[4]

(S) The task of developing the necessary communications engineering plan was passed on 11 February 1971 to Commander Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Activity, Pacific (NAVSEEAPAC). On 10 March NAVSEEAPAC responded, proposing a simplex, KW-7 covered 100 WPM teletype system; near real time requirements would be met by provision of dedicated paths with high restoration priorities. Two net control stations were indicated: CINCPAC would be the on-island and Primary

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[1] CINCPAC 020312Z and 030057Z Mar 71; STATE 043250Z/152239Z Mar 71; DCA 232148Z Mar 71.

[2] CINCPAC 300041Z Mar 71; J626 HistSum Apr 71.

[3] AFCS 311825Z Mar 71; CSAF 221828Z Apr 71; DCA 291623Z Apr 71; J626 HistSum Mar 71.

[4] J625 HistSum Feb 71.

Net Controller, while COMUSTDC would function as the WESTPAC and Secondary Net Controller. The system would consist of two loops: the North Loop would net CINCPAC, ARPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, COMUSK, 5th AF, and COMUSTDC; the South Loop would net CINCPAC, ARPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, 13th AF, and COMUSTDC. A CINCPAC requirement to establish an ASIC on Okinawa was added subsequent to the NAVSEEAPAC proposal, and the Okinawa ASIC was incorporated into the South Loop.[1]

(S) The NAVSEEAPAC plans were approved by CINCPAC and returned for implementation. On 17 July 1971 CINCPAC forwarded the engineering diagrams to CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF and requested provision of the equipment and facilities necessary to support the ASIC as soon as possible. An interim capability, using CINCPAC resources, was provided through activation of a circuit to COMUSTDC and COMUSK.[2]

Integration of the Defense Special Security Communications System into the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN)

(C) In February 1970 the Deputy Secretary of Defense had approved the DCA recommendation to integrate the Defense Special Security Communication System (DSSCS) into the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). The DSSCS is that portion of the Defense Communication System (DCS) that serves the DoD intelligence community, and is composed of the Critical Intelligence Communications Network (CRITICOM) and the Special Intelligence Communications Network (SPINTCOM). DCA designated the Army as the cognizant Service, who in turn delegated the authority to STRATCOM. The integration is scheduled for completion in March 1973, with initial operating capability in March 1972, and requires a $25 million procurement program. The integration of DSSCS into AUTODIN is a matter of economics. It is anticipated that DoD manpower requirements will decrease by 2,000 personnel, and substantial savings will be realized with the deactivation of 32 of the existing 40 DSSCS manual relay centers (MRCs) and the associated, dedicated circuits.

(C) Since the CRITICOM and SPINTCOM Networks handle highly sensitive information requiring very limited access, the AUTODIN system is being modified to segregate general service (GENSER) traffic from the DSSCS traffic. The AUTODIN software has been extensively modified to provide this segregation and to provide special handling for CRITIC messages. Routing indicators (RIs) beginning with "Y" is being used to identify DSSCS traffic and RIs beginning with "R" identify GENSER traffic. The precedence indicator "W" in the DSSCS traffic will provide super flash (flash over-ride) precedence handling for

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[1] J625 HistSum Jul 71.

[2] Ibid.; J625 HistSum Aug 71.

CRITIC messages. Additionally, separate red patch facilities are being provided at the AUTODIN Automatic Switching Centers (ASCs) for the GENSER and DSSCS communities of traffic. This will prevent inadvertent patching of DSSCS traffic into a GENSER terminal. Since DSSCS traffic requires SI access, and the AUTODIN switch technicians will have access to the DSSCS traffic, SI access is required for all ASC personnel. These modifications are being made to ASCs worldwide--by Western Union in the CONUS and by Philco-Ford overseas.

(C) The DSSCS/AUTODIN integration consists of four phases:

a. A test bed, composed of an operational overseas ASC and one each of the various types of terminals to be used by the DSSCS community, has been established at the Philco-Ford Plant in Willow Grove, PA. The Nha Trang ASC is being installed as a STRATCOM facility at Fort Detrick, MD, in anticipation of the test bed function being transferred from Willow Grove to Fort Detrick in February 1972. The test bed sites develop, test and prove the hardware and software necessary for the DSSCS integration into AUTODIN. As the hardware and software are tested and accepted, kits are produced to modify the ASCs worldwide.

b. ASC modification includes new operating, test and diagnostic computer programs, expansion of the core storage capacity to accommodate the expanded software requirements, and, in some ASCs, an increase in the line termination capacity to accommodate the additional AUTODIN subscribers (the DSSCS subscribers).

c. The Nha Trang ASC, now located at Willow Grove, PA will be installed at the Consolidated Intelligence Facility at Site 300, in Augsburg, Germany. This will be the fourth ASC in Europe.

d. Rehome some 350 tri-service and agency terminals from DSSCS manual relay centers to AUTODIN ASCs. In this regard and in the interest of economy, the intelligence community will use existing input/output (I/O) devices to satisfy their terminal requirements. To make these I/O devices compatible with AUTODIN, a Teletypewriter Adapter Module (TAM) has been developed. The TAM interfaces the I/O devices and the Common Control Unit (CCU) of the Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment (DSTE), yielding 11 new AUTODIN terminal configuration, identified as CA through CK, to be used in the DSSCS program.

(C) The switch modification program is underway, and the Guam and Clark ASCs are completed. The various tests conducted prior to, during and after the modification are collectively called CONTEST. The Philco-Ford team is currently modifying the Phu Lam ASC. The Korat ASC was modified, but damaged equipment had to be returned to the CONUS for repair, and half of the modification had to

be disassembled. To avoid program slippage, Philco-Ford assigned a second team to the Pacific to reconfigure Korat for operation until replacement/repaired equipment is received. Tentative plans call for the Philco-Ford team, now at Phu Lam, to modify the Fort Buckner (22 Nov 71 - 4 Jan 72), and Camp Drake (1 Jan - 9 Feb 72) ASCs, and return to complete Korat ASC in February 1972. The Wahiawa ASC is a CONUS type ASC and is scheduled to be modified by Western Union between 3 January-11 February 1972.

(C) SI access for ASC personnel is a continuing action and all ASC personnel will have SI access by March 1972.[1]

(U) The initial draft of the AUTODIN/DSSCS Pacific Area Cutover Plan was presented for review and comments at the 4 November 1971 DSSCS/AUTODIN Panel Meeting. The initial draft was approved by the panel members with minor changes. DCA-PAC presented the final draft to the panel at the 6 December 1971 meeting.[2]

(U) The USAF Security Service distributed Program Action Directive 71-20 of 9 November 1971, DSSCS/AUTODIN Integration; short title is USAFSS PAD 71-20. The objective of the PAD is to establish a time-phased schedule and outline responsibilities for actions necessary to insure the timely implementation of the DSSCS/AUTODIN Worldwide Integration by 30 June 1973. The PAD is for Air Force units only.

(U) The Phu Lam ASC was modified and CONTEST ran successfully, and the Philco-Ford team moved to Fort Buckner on 23 November 1971 to modify that switch. The switch modification program in the Pacific is on schedule except for the faulty Address Data Interface Controller (ADIC) cabinet for Korat ASC. Latent difficulty, which could not have been detected earlier, was discovered after the unit had been wired into the ASC and tested. The ADIC cabinet was dropped and damaged during delivery to the Korat ASC. The cabinet was removed from the ASC and returned to the contractor (Philco-Ford) for repair. After repair, the ADIC cabinet will be returned to Korat for re-installation. Consequently, the Korat ASC will be the last ASC in the Pacific to be completed, in February 1972.[3]

INTELSAT Circuits to Korea

(C) In October 1970, CINCPAC had proposed the deactivation of the HF trunks

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[1] All of the foregoing is based on J626 HistSum Oct 71.
[2] DCA-PAC 270536Z Oct 71 and 250650Z Nov 71; J626 HistSum Nov 71.
[3] J626 HistSum Nov 71.

from Taegu, Korea to Camp Drake, Japan and to Fort Buckner, Okinawa; this would permit deactivation of the HF facility at Taegu, for an annual saving of $690 thousand in O&M costs. COMUSKOREA nonconcurred, as these HF circuits, although little used, would be the only out-of-country channels should the Changsan-Itazuke tropo/LOS systems fail; he indicated that he would concur, however, upon establishment of a military satellite earth terminal in Korea, or the leasing of two-voice circuits carried over commercial satellite facilities. These INTELSAT circuits would provide an interim capability pending installation of a military earth terminal (AN/MSC-46).[1]

(C) CINCPAC agreed with COMUSKOREA's reasoning, and at the end of the year recommended to the JCS that two INTELSAT circuits be provided. On 17 February 1971, however, the JCS advised that the cost of the leased circuits would exceed the $50 thousand ceiling established by DoD Directive 4630.1, and requested that the requirement be revised and resubmitted.[2]

(C) Faced with a general shortage of funds at all echelons, CINCPAC asked the Components and DCA-PAC to recommend appropriate trade-offs of other circuits traversing the PACOM, but neither these headquarters nor DCA itself were able to find a satisfactory solution. On 5 May 1971, therefore, CINCPAC directed COMUSKOREA to submit an emergency requirement for three INTELSAT circuits between Hawaii and Korea--two to provide AUTOVON access from the Seoul JOSS to the Wahiawa switch, and the third to serve as a combined AUTODIN DSTE circuit to provide access to the Wahiawa AUTODIN switch for six high-priority subscribers requiring dual AUTODIN access for command and control purposes.[3]

(C) The JCS approved COMUSKOREA's requirement on 9 July 1971. The Army was directed to fund for the AUTOVON circuits and that portion of the AUTODIN circuit serving Army subscribers, and to deactivate the Taegu HF facility upon acceptance of the leased satellite circuits; the Air Force was directed to fund the remaining portion of the AUTODIN circuit. DCA was directed to provide the service as soon as possible.[4]

(C) The three AUTOVON circuits were officially accepted on 5 August 1971. The HF trunks from Taegu to Camp Drake and Fort Buckner were deactivated on 1 September. The third AUTOVON circuit had not been cutover to AUTODIN use by the end of 1971, pending receipt and installation of terminal and building equipment in Korea.[5]

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1 CINCPAC 170308Z Oct 70; COMUSKOREA 280106Z Oct 70.
2 CINCPAC 242209Z Dec 70; JCS 4253/172321Z Feb 71.
3 CINCPAC 230029Z Feb, 112232Z Mar, and 052208Z May 71.
4 J623 HistSum Sep 71.
5 J62A HistSum Dec 71.

PACOM Radio Frequency Interference Control Center

(U) The PACOM Radio Frequency Interference Control Center (RFICC) had been established in collocation with Pacific Recovery Forces (CTF 130) to provide radio frequency support to Pacific recovery forces of the Apollo Program and to the NASA/astronaut communications circuits. The center has been activated during every manned space flight, and was activated twice during 1971, both time with excellent results.

(U) Support of the Apollo 14 recovery forces was conducted from 30 January-9 February 1971, with CTF 130 reporting that the recovery communications had been virtually free of RFI problems and that the Apollo 14 mission had had the best frequency environment seen aboard any primary recovery ship up to that time.[1]

(U) From 26 July through 7 August 1971 the PACOM RFICC was activated in support of the Apollo 15 mission. On 4 August CINCPAC requested the AFSC RFICC at Andrews AFB, MD to assist in eliminating potentially harmful interference emanating from a Sixth Army MARS Station. Upon notification, Department of the Army issued an appropriate directive which eliminated the MARS interference. All other interference to network or recovery frequencies was resolved quickly and without incident. CTF 130 indicated that the efforts of all concerned had resulted in excellent communications.[2]

Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion (MIJI)

(C) The Air Force Special Communications Center (AFSCC) at San Antonio, Texas, which in 1969 had been assigned the responsibility for conducting the meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion (MIJI) analysis program, in April 1971 expressed concern over the apparent decline of interest in the program, and asked CINCPAC for assistance in maintaining program interest.[3]

(C) CINCPAC agreed fully with the need to stimulate interest in the MIJI program, and on 17 April he addressed a message on the subject to his Component Commanders, subordinate unified commanders, and CINCPACREPs, with information to the JCS. The JCS backed CINCPAC's position completely, and retransmitted the message to all unified and specified commands worldwide. The text of the message was as follows:

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[1] CTF 130 101111Z Feb 71; J6412 HistSum Feb 71.

[2] CINCPAC 040255Z Aug 71; CTF 130 080641Z Aug 71; J6412 HistSum Aug 71.

[3] AFSCC 021400Z Apr 71; for background on the program and definition of MIJI terms, see CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. III, pp. 145-147.

1. (S-NF) Since the end of World War II, the Soviet development of electronic jamming devices has progressed steadily to the point where they no doubt now possess the means to degrade the operational effectiveness of the majority of U.S. and Allied electromagnetic systems. This growing capability of Communist countries to degrade U.S. communications-electronics efforts has caused increasing concern to the U.S. The Soviets have shown a great awareness of the importance of the development of Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) to be used against western communications and radar systems. A formidable jamming capability against foreign broadcast transmissions has been demonstrated. The Soviets demonstrated extensive use of ECM during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in Aug 1968. Again, in Jul 1969, the Soviets held a large scale exercise staged over East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and the evidence of well planned and rigidly controlled chaff drops and active ECM was impressive. Within the past eighteen months to two years, both the Soviets and Chinese Communists have increased their level of ECM activity in the PACOM area.

2. (S) In order to develop an effective program to counter this potential threat area, uniform instructions and procedures for reporting and evaluation of potential enemy efforts in the field have been promulgated by the JCS in the meaconing, interference, jamming and intrusion (MIJI) program. The purpose of the MIJI program is to process and evaluate all reports of harmful interference and jamming of U.S. communications-electronics systems in order to uncover hostile MIJI efforts, trends, and capabilities on a worldwide basis and to effect timely dissemination of evaluated results.

3. (S) It is often extremely difficult for the MIJI victim to ascertain the difference between harmful friendly interference and hostile MIJI efforts. It is therefore necessary that all users of communications-electronics equipment report immediately all forms of interference which disrupts normal operations. Only through proper reporting procedures can the task of MIJI evaluation be properly performed. An effective MIJI analysis program affords us the opportunity to evaluate the hostile threat in this area and to identify friendly electromagnetic compatibility problems, which will enable us to maintain the capability to operate communications-electronics systems with acceptable effectiveness when faced with enemy ECM and/or other unwanted electromagnetic radiations or responses.

4. (S) I therefore feel that it is incumbent upon all commanders to strongly emphasize the importance of the MIJI program. The growing capability of Communist countries to disrupt U.S. communications-electronics efforts is a very real and definite threat to the successful accomplishment of our mission. The MIJI program is an excellent vehicle for further exploitation of the extent of this threat. I therefore request that you give the MIJI program your personal support and re-emphasize to all concerned the importance of timely reporting of all known/suspected MIJI attempts.[1]

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[1] CINCPAC 172325Z Apr 71; JCS 222115Z Apr 71 (retransmittal).

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME II

1971

Prepared by the Historical Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII
1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

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CHAPTER VIII

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECTION I--THE NEW APPROACH

(U) In September 1969, President Nixon appointed a Task Force on International Development chaired by Rudolph A. Peterson. In its report, the task force recommended the creation of separate and distinct programs for economic, humanitarian, and security assistance. Based on the Peterson Report, the President proposed, in a message to the Congress on 15 September 1970, that the foreign assistance program be reorganized. On 29 January 1971, the budget message used the term "security assistance" instead of "military assistance." In his budget message, the President stated his intention to submit legislation to implement the International Security Assistance Program, which would consist of the Military Assistance Program, Foreign Military Sales, supporting assistance, and public safety assistance.[1]

(U) On 21 April 1971, the president submitted to the Congress his proposals for enabling legislation to reform foreign assistance. He transmitted two bills --the International Security Assistance Act and the International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act. Along with tentative administrative actions, these bills would distinguish clearly between security, development, and humanitarian assistance programs and create separate organizational structures for each. They would combine all security assistance efforts, except those Southeast Asia countries funded in the DOD budget, into one coherent program. Development assistance would be administered by a new U.S. International Development Corporation and a U.S. International Development Institute. Of the two Acts proposed by the President, the International Security Assistance Act concerned the programs over which CINCPAC exercised executive authority in the Pacific Command (PACOM).[2]

(U) Among the provisions of the new Act was authorization to finance the sale of military equipment on concessional terms, which would fill a gap between the choice of grant aid and foreign military sales (FMS) on hard credit terms. The Act would also provide the President with greater flexibility in the transfer of funds from one kind of aid to another. To fund the FY 72 program, the President requested $778 million for supporting economic assistance, $705 million for grant military assistance, and $510 million for military credit sales. He

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[1] Bulletin, Dept of State, 22 Feb 71, p. 221 and 6 Apr 70, p. 447.
[2] Bulletin, Dept of State, 10 May 71, p. 614.

also requested $100 million for worldwide contingencies in security, development, and humanitarian assistance be authorized for his FY 72 Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund. Of the $1.993 billion requested for international security assistance (excluding $100 million for contingencies), $1.344 billion was programmed for the East Asia region: $767.75 million for economic supporting assistance, $501.1 million for grant military assistance, and $75 million for military sales credit.[1]

(U) As was customary, many U.S. officials testified in support of the proposed reorganization of foreign assistance before various congressional committees. Among those invited to testify before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives was Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. In both written and oral statements, CINCPAC strongly supported the continuance and strengthening of the security assistance program as presented by the Administration. It was Admiral McCain's position that, regardless of the labels attached to the execution of the program, it was imperative that the budgetary levels of the Administration program be approved. In what was probably the most straightforward statement presented to that Committee, the Admiral said:[2]

> With respect to furnishing economic and military aid, I, as Commander in Chief Pacific, cannot execute the Nixon Doctrine unless the United States is willing to come forth with military aid, and it is just as simple as that.

(U) Regardless of the testimony in favor of the foreign assistance reorganization, the House of Representatives passed, on 3 August 1971, a bill which continued the separation of economic and military assistance funds. The effect of the bill was to extend the current foreign aid program for two years pending further Congressional consideration of the Nixon proposals. Under this authorization bill, $6.91 billion was authorized for economic and military assistance over the next two fiscal years (FY 72 and 73). For FY 72, $1.4 billion was authorized for economic and $2.0 billion for military/defense related aid.[3]

(U) Unfortunately for the near-term foreign assistance program, the United Nations vote to seat Mainland China and expel Taiwan from that body occurred during U.S. Senate debate on the House bill. In what was interpreted by some observers as reaction to the United States vote, the Senate rejected the House

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[1] Ibid., Bulletin, Dept of State, 31 May 71, p. 714.

[2] Hearing, House Comm on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Cong, 1st Session, Part 3, p. 461.

[3] The Journal of Military Assistance, HQ USAF, n.d., No. 117, p. 7, hereafter cited as MA Journal, with appropriate identification.

bill on 30 October 1971. The Senate subsequently voted to revive foreign aid, but maintained the division between economic and military assistance and cut the figures cited in the House Bill. The House then amended the Senate bill, and consequent joint conferences failed to resolve the differences. Continuing Resolution Authorities (CRA) were passed, the last during CY 71 being passed on 17 December 1971. This CRA permitted foreign aid spending at an annual rate of $2.84 billion through 22 February 1972, by which time it was expected that regular legislation to finance the program through the balance of the fiscal year would have been passed.[1]

(U) Meanwhile, under the terms of DOD Directive 5105.38, dated 11 August 1971, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) was established, effective 1 September 1971. The purpose of the DSAA was to carry out the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and various Executive Orders and Directives pertaining to those Acts. On 13 September 1971, CINCPAC announced a reorganization of his staff which consolidated the military assistance activities of several staff agencies under a new Security Assistance Division, headed by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Security Assistance. The new division, which became operational on 1 October 1971, assumed the CINCPAC military assistance planning, implementation, evaluation, and data processing functions under the staff designation J8.[2]

(U) In the ensuing discussion, the military assistance program (MAP), FMS, and military assistance Service funded (MASF) programs are defined as grant aid, cash or credit sales, and DOD-funded grant aid respectively. These were the increments of security assistance during FY 71, as in prior years. Economic supporting assistance continued as a separate program.

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[1] MA Journal, No. 118, p. 3; Murray Marder, Washington Post Service, Honolulu Star Bulltein and Advertiser, 31 Oct 71.

[2] CINCPACNOTE 5400 of 13 Sep 71, Subj: Reorganization of CINCPAC Staff; MA Journal, No. 118, p.3; also see this history, Chapter II, Section II.

SECTION II--PLANNING

Fiscal Year 71/72 Funds

(S) It was not until 31 December 1970 that the Congress passed the appropriations bill for FY 71. Five days later, on 5 January 1971, the supplemental funds requested by the President for FY 71 were appropriated. The final adjusted MAP fund levels for FY 71 in the East Asian (PACOM) area were (in thousands):[1]

Burma	66
Cambodia	185,000
China	20,017
Indonesia	17,996
Korea	290,802
Malaysia	224
Philippines	16,996
PACOM Region	99
Total	$531,200.

(S) In the MASF countries of Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos, the dollar guidelines for FY 71 were $1.6 billion, $61 million, and $147.1 million respectively.[2]

(U) Incorporated in the bills passed by the Congress for FY 71 was a worldwide limit on the disposal of excess defense articles of $100 million, valued at one-third of original acquisition cost. However, grant transfer was authorized of defense equipment located in Korea on 1 July 1970 to the ROK. This authority expired on 30 June 1972. Finally, the Congress prohibited the expenditure of appropriated funds for the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces into Cambodia, or providing U.S. advisors to or for Cambodian military forces.[3]

(S) As related above, approval of the FY 72 security assistance program was withheld by the Congress, and, by the end of CY 71, approved fund levels

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 288; MA Journal, No. 115, pp. 211-214.

[2] PACOM Digest, 15 Feb 71, p. 140.

[3] MA Journal, No. 115, pp. 211-214.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

DOLLAR GUIDELINES

DEC 1971

(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

COUNTRY	CEILING BY FISCAL YEAR						
	72	73	74	75	76	77	78
LAOS	125.8	128.0	121.7	119.8	119.8	118.8	
PHILIPPINES	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	
REP OF CHINA	19.5	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.0	5.0	
THAILAND 1/	66.5	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0	50.0	
CAMBODIA	200.0	275.0	225.0	175.0	125.0	125.0	
MALAYSIA	.34	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	
INDONESIA	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	
KOREA	239.4	255.0	240.0	225.0	100.0	75.0	
VIETNAM 1/	1,783.9	1,517.8	1,323.9	1,201.9	1,317.6	1,300.0	

1/ Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)

° Program Requirements (No dollar guidelines furnished)

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 135.

were not available. However the dollar guidelines used by CINCPAC for planning the FY 72 program, as of 31 December 1971, were (in millions):[1]

Cambodia	$ 200.0
China	19.5
Indonesia	25.0
Korea	239.4
Laos (MASF)	125.8
Malaysia	.34
Philippines	17.0
Thailand (MASF)	66.5
Vietnam (MASF)	1,783.9

Security Assistance Manpower

(C) During 1971, there were seven military assistance advisory elements assigned to CINCPAC. The Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) in Korea was assigned to the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA). Two JUSMAGs (for Laos and Thailand) were located in Thailand, and one in the Philippines. The MEDT in Burma was deactivated, and a new MEDT was activated under CINCPAC's command for Cambodia. The remaining three elements were the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Taiwan, the Defense Liaison Group (DLG) in Indonesia, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO) in Japan. Authorized manning for these elements on 31 December 1971 was:[2]

Organization	U.S. Military	U.S. Civilian	Local Nat.	Total
MEDT Cambodia	112	1	0	113
MAAG China	190	26	26	242
DLG Indonesia	45	4	20	69
MDAO Japan	7	5	6	18
JUSMAG Korea	645	68	282	995
JUSMAG Philippines	50	8	6	64
JUSMAG Thailand	601	12	79	692
DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand	89	5	124	218

(C) Several changes in assigned manpower took place during the year before the above final figures were reached. In April 1971, the JCS approved an increase from the original authorization for 60 spaces in MEDT Cambodia to 113,

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[1] PACOM Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 135.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 314-317, 349-354; PACOM Digest, Feb 72, p. 88, as corrected by JCS 5282/022135Z Mar 71, which reduced DEPCH spaces.

and MAAG China strength was reduced 136 spaces to 242. In May, the strength of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand/JUSMAGTHAI headquarters in Bangkok was reduced 44 spaces to 692. Also in May, the JCS increased the DLG strength in Indonesia by 29 spaces to 69. In August, one military space for MEDT Cambodia was deleted and one civilian space added. The reorganization of the Service MAAGs in Korea into a JUSMAG, which was effective in April 1971, resulted in a decrease of total spaces from 1,244 to 995. That figure was affirmed for FY 72; the FY 71 authorization of 64 spaces for JUSMAG Philippines was also approved for FY 72.[1]

(S) On 12 November 1971, the SECDEF announced a worldwide reduction in the number of U.S. military personnel assigned to MAAGs and other assistance elements. Unified commanders were requested to provide reduction schedules which would reflect cutbacks of 10, 25, and 30 percent of total military MAP spaces under their jurisdiction. In CINCPAC's reply, he specified 1,453 spaces which would figure in his calculations. He excluded MEDT Cambodia, DLG Indonesia, and MDAO Japan:

Organization	10% (143)	25% (363)	30% (436)
MAAG China	0	36	43
JUSMAGPHIL	0	4	5
JUSMAGKOREA	93	202	243
USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI	52	116	139
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI	0	5	6
Total:	145	363	436

CINCPAC invited the SECDEF's attention to the severe personnel reductions which had been imposed over the past several years. For example, MAAG China had been reduced 67 percent since 1967; JUSMAGPHIL had sustained a 44 percent reduction since 1967; JUSMAGKOREA had lost 20 percent for FY 72; and, CINCPAC had already recommended a 10 percent reduction in JUSMAGTHAI strength in October 1971 from the FY 72 level. He stated that further accelerated reductions in MAP strength would impact adversely on the achievement of projected goals, and recommended that, if cuts were unavoidable, they be restricted to ten percent.[2]

(S) In his area-by-area comments on the effects of the 25 and 30 percent reductions, CINCPAC noted that, for MAAG China, the further reductions required

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[1] J131 HistSums 1971; JCS 2446/291445Z Jan, 4830/242222Z Feb, 6765/200701Z Mar, 1859/192139Z Apr, 8146/030211Z Apr, 8337/251717Z May, 1268/171609Z May, 8455/142134 May, and 2349/172136Z Aug 71.

[2] CINCPAC 132228Z Nov 71.

in a 25 or 30 percent PACOM cutback would have a severe impact on MAAG efforts to improve resource management and national level force planning within the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and to enhance the GRC technology base in such areas as defense production, communications, logistics systems, and maintenance procedures. Total military assistance planning and programming requirements in China should be considered in light of FMS and excess defense article delivery levels along with the current grant aid dollar levels. There was no doubt that further reductions to MAAG China within the proposed time frame would be viewed by the GRC as another indication of lessening U.S. interest and support--adding another blow to Chiang's political posture. In the Philippines, internal reorganizations had been effected to partially compensate for the loss of personnel. Considering our long standing traditional arrangements with the Philippines, any further reduction in MAAG personnel would be interpreted as another example of diminishing U.S. interest, although the impact would have greater political than military significance. In Korea, an additional reduction of 25 or 30 percent would have the net effect of reducing JUSMAG-KOREA by about 50 percent in a one or two year time frame. Such a reduction would have a severe impact on the assistance effort and could well have political implications. A significant plan for the modernization of ROK Forces during FY 71-75 was currently underway. When fully implemented/funded, it would provide approximately $1.5 billion in modernization/improvement equipment. Thus, a concerted effort would be required in the next few years to assist the ROK forces in absorbing, maintaining, and operating this new equipment. Further, the recent withdrawal of about 20,000 U.S. forces from the ROK resulted in the transfer of the majority of the well-used U.S. equipment to ROK forces, requiring additional U.S. management assistance. Probable further U.S. troop withdrawals from the ROK would require continuing strong assistance effort in the ROK. The modernization of ROK forces, coupled with the withdrawal of U.S. forces, was a prime example of the Nixon Doctrine at work, but the ROK forces would still need substantial help. In Thailand, a 25/30 percent reduction would accelerate the transfer of advisor efforts from the field/squadron level to the higher headquarters level at a pace inconsistent with Thai capabilities. Plans called for gradually raising the advisor effort to management levels as logistic operating activities become proficient in basic fundamental supply and maintenance functions. In operations, emphasis was still required on individual training, equipment operations, joint maneuvers, and logistical activities necessary to support field operations. The reduction of lower echelon advisory effort should be carried out much less precipitously, and advice to the headquarters staffs on advanced management and planning continued at current levels for the time being. The specific impact of the reduced advisory effort was difficult to measure; however, the Thais should be given a clear statement of the long range U.S. assistance objectives and programs planned for Thailand in order to provide a rational context for

any sharp reduction of MAAG personnel. The same could be said for the significantly rapid reductions of U.S. advisors in other U.S. Security Assistance recipient countries. Regarding DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, CINCPAC noted that the MASF ceiling for Laos had tripled since 1969, growing from $91.0 million in FY 67 to $297.4 million in FY 73. This made the Laos program second only to Vietnam in monetary size. DEPCH was currently carrying out the daily administration, the logistics and some training functions of this vast and complicated program with a staff considerably smaller than that of previous years when the program was much smaller. In addition to the greatly increased monetary size of the program, SECDEF had recently increased the scope of operations and responsibilities of DEPCH to include the monitoring of all air support in Laos and the validation of all logistic support provided that country. Any reduction in the current minimal staffing of DEPCH would be self-defeating and would quite probably result in waste and mismanagement of U.S. military resources being applied to Laos. CINCPAC concluded his assessment by requesting that, whatever the outcome in terms of total space reductions, he be allowed to determine the activities and numbers of spaces to be deleted.[1]

Security Assistance Improvement

(S) On 29 October 1971, CINCPAC solicited the views of security assistance chiefs and Component commanders on various means to revitalize the security assistance system. Based upon the replies received and staff analyses, CINCPAC submitted comprehensive, pragmatic recommendations to the JCS, in December 1971, on steps necessary to inject the security assistance program with renewed vitality.[2]

(S) CINCPAC introduced his remarks by noting that some of the views expressed might not be politically palatable, either internally or externally. However, the existing procedures for military assistance were not tenable when examined in the light of declining U.S. political support for foreign assistance in general, and military assistance in particular. The principle of security assistance was the foundation of the Nixon Doctrine in which our allies were encouraged to solve their own problems with our help. "Encouragement without assistance has an empty ring."

(C) First, CINCPAC suggested that security assistance should be related to realistic and achievable national objectives in specific host countries. Our objectives in each country should be mutually determined within U.S. security interests, and they should be credible, with a reasonable hope of achievement in a reasonably finite time frame. Further, these objectives should be

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[1] Ibid.

[2] CINCPAC 040352Z Dec 71; all of the narrative under this heading is based upon this cited message.

articulated by defining projects which were visible and the progress of which would be measurable. These objectives should lead to self-sufficiency--that is, the ability and desire to counter internal, and to resist external threats. Every Asian ally did not necessarily need supersonic aircraft, a sophisticated air defense system, an arsenal or weapons manufacturing capability.

(C) Secondly, CINCPAC stressed the need for increased host country participation in the planning and management of security assistance. Host country personnel should be able to enter into a combined planning process with a positive attitude and a determination for successful plan execution. This participation, CINCPAC suggested, should include the disclosure of dollar ceilings for country MAP guidelines. Linked to this disclosure, timetables should be set which would schedule the termination of fund support for operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. This timetable would necessarily be different for each country, but the combined plan should be directed to self-sufficiency in O&M. At the same time, increased FMS should be programmed as the O&M costs decrease. The timed phaseout of O&M support could force a given country to reduce unrealistic MAP-supported force levels, and overly sophisticated equipment would not be as attractive because the related O&M costs would be prohibitive. Along with disclosure of dollar ceilings and time-phased assumption of O&M, cost sharing would encourage host country participation. Examples cited by CINCPAC were the M-16 factory and arsenal expansion programs in Korea, co-production programs on Taiwan, and the furnishing of MAP aircraft only if the recipient nation paid for the spare parts and other upkeep. It would be essential that a long term commitment be made by the U.S., and that the necessary legislative support be assured; otherwise, there would be no guarantee that our part of the agreement could be sustained. This could be accomplished by the dedication of funds to cost sharing projects in the authorizing legislation.

(C) CINCPAC also recommended increased participation by unified commanders in the formulation of the entire security assistance program, He noted that program content, and key issues such as priorities, dollar ceilings, and excess quotas were often decided in State-Defense joint action without reference to the field. For example, a cut in MAP funds for Malaysia to benefit the Cambodian program was made, but CINCPAC would have preferred to redistribute the money from other PACOM programs.

(S) The importance of increased skill levels and more sophisticated training for personnel assigned to security assistance organizations in the PACOM was noted by CINCPAC. Selection criteria should be at least equivalent to that for attache duty because of the shifting emphasis from operational advisory effort to management advisory fields. Experience in such disciplines as economics, industrial engineering, procurement, operations research, systems

analysis, public communications, operational test and evaluation, resource allocation, and decision making was needed. CINCPAC recommended joint school emphasis on such education, with special acknowledgement by the Services that security assistance assignments would receive recognition for promotion and selection to senior Service Schools.

(C) CINCPAC suggested that cumbersome administrative procedures, devised when MAAGs and MAGs were larger, be modified to ease the workload on diminishing manpower. He recommended that unified commanders be consulted before FMS based upon transactions of cash or commercial credit sales between U.S. firms and MAP countries were consummated. He also suggested that a standard system of charges for packing, crating, handling, and transportation be devised which would allow some optional method of programming such costs.

(C) In his resume, CINCPAC stated that the single, most important area which should be changed was the current system of legislation. Talk of combined planning, mutual objectives, and increased participation was meaningless without assured funds. Once the Executive Departments have agreed on national objectives for each country, a country team plan with a program level of funding for three to five years should be authorized by the Congress. Only in this way could the U.S. make meaningful approaches to host countries, let them know the level of our commitment, obtain their agreement to an O&M phase out schedule, and eventually shift from grant aid to FMS.

(U) Summarizing his views, CINCPAC stated:

> Security assistance is entering a new era. In this era it could decline or disappear as an instrument of our national policy; or, it could be revitalized into a pillar of strength in conducting foreign policy. We can and must revitalize the Security Assistance system by the introduction of new ideas and initiatives. It can become an effective vehicle for implementation of the Nixon Doctrine. To accomplish this, we need our best people in the business...

Operational Readiness of MAP Forces

(C) In November 1971, the JCS proposed that a system for reporting the operational readiness of countries receiving security assistance, patterned after the USAF V-12 report, be established. Comments were requested from unified commanders on the feasibility of rendering quarterly reports on the forward defense countries of Korea, China, Cambodia, Iran, Greece, Turkey, and/or all other MAP countries.[1]

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[1] JCS 7263/032348Z Nov 71.

(C) In answer to CINCPAC's request for comments from his Component Commands, the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) reply noted that the V-12 report was already required from each chief of Air Force sections of MAAGs and comparable organizations charged with representing DOD on military assistance matters. While conceding that the V-12 supplied reasonably current data on allied air forces, and that similar data on other Services might be useful to the JCS, PACAF did not consider it appropriate to comment on the adaption of the V-12 to other U.S. Services.[1]

(C) The U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) noted that major modifications to the V-12 report would be required if a report on the operational readiness of PACOM MAP/MASF country ground forces were to be of value. Further, USARPAC noted that the continual reduction in security assistance mission personnel would make such a detailed report exceedingly difficult to accomplish. Many other reports provided information concerned with management, programming, and training matters, but the most useful information to USARPAC would be the use and condition of end items. USARPAC suggested that available intelligence reports from national agencies could supply operational posture more suitable for JCS use, and recommended that the V-12 not be "...imposed on the Army elements of MAAGs/missions...."[2]

(C) The Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) response also noted the reduction in security assistance personnel. More important, however, was the tendency in the Asian military community not to report to superiors or peers any information which would reflect negatively upon performance. Thus, the reliability of readiness information would be of questionable use to U.S. operational planners. PACFLT also noted that considerable modification of the V-12 would be necessary, and recommended against the application of that report.[3]

(C) Based on the foregoing comments, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the V-12 type report not be made standard for ground and naval forces, but that the desired information on operational readiness be obtained from existing Service reports and summaries. CINCPAC amplified his recommendation by inviting attention to the inclusion of Cambodia as one of the reporting "forward defense countries." The acquisition of dependable raw data would present genuine difficulty because of the limitations placed on U.S. military presence in that country.[4]

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1 CINCPACAF 170134Z Nov 71.
2 CINCUSARPAC 2000005Z Nov 71.
3 CINCPACFLT 3100/202154Z Nov 71.
4 CINCPAC 250126Z Nov 71.

Planning Guidance - FY 74 and Outyears

(S) On 1 December 1971, the SECDEF transmitted general guidance for security assistance planning for FY 74 and subsequent years. The SECDEF acknowledged that such planning would be heavily dependent on congressional actions, particularly in the current session. The guidance was placed in the context of the Presidential proposal to reorganize the international security assistance program, which, as already discussed in this chapter, was not approved by the Congress. However, the basis for planning, stated the SECDEF, was to be the Nixon Doctrine premise of optimum use of combined recipient and U.S. resources (the total force concept). Whenever practicable, program analysis and planning were to be performed jointly by the respective U.S. and host government staffs. The goal was a level and composition of forces which would be reasonable and creditable in relation to the threat, overall U.S. and allied forces, worldwide U.S. interests, and competing domestic economic claims. To that end, each plan should analyze and evaluate the threat against which allied capabilities were being developed; the establishment of self-sufficiency timetables, including the assumption of all grant aid elements by the host country; the economic impact on the host government of the transition from grant aid to credit/cash sales; and the relationship of security supporting assistance with mixes of grant aid, credit and cash sales on country and regional integrated effort. The SECDEF stated that the various plans should be developed in a manner which would facilitate subsequent adjustment to dollar constraints. Projected orders by line item and type for the budget year were to be annotated on a priority basis for at least 50 percent in five percent decrements of the original projected requirement. For each deferral decrement, the impact of non-achievement was to be estimated.[1]

(S) On 31 December, CINCPAC replied to the SECDEF guidance with a request that the requirement for five percent decremental impact statements be reconsidered. Such a requirement levied a heavy programming workload involving the development of 11 separate programs for each country if the five percent decremental impact statements were to be valid. Instead, CINCPAC recommended that program levels and impact statements be developed which would entail 15, 30, and 45 percent reductions from planned dollar guidelines. This would allow country programs based on weapon systems, in which the impact statements would address the deletion of specific portions of an approved program. CINCPAC stressed that deferral priorities should be used to accomplish what the name implies--to defer funding for items in an approved program. The use of deferral priorities to delete items from a program should be avoided, because the situation in the field might be different at the time of deletion than it was when the deferral priorities were developed.[2]

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[1] SECDEF 4768/011501Z Dec 71.

[2] CINCPAC 312247Z Dec 71; J811 HistSum Dec 71.

SECTION III--TRAINING

Evaluation Report on MAP Training

(C) In October and November 1970, Dr. John H. Sullivan, Staff Consultant to the Subcommittee on National Security Policy of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, visited the PACOM area to review the training programs under MAP (MAPT). On 2 April 1971, a report based on Sullivan's trip was submitted by the subcommittee to the House committee. CINCPAC concurred with the basic recommendations in the report. He agreed that Section 510 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which limits the number of foreign students to be trained in the U.S. under MAP, should be eliminated. This Section placed the limit on the numbers of MAP students equal to the number of foreign civilians brought to the U.S. in the preceding year under the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. Although the restriction applied only to MAP countries --and thus did not affect RVN, Thailand, or Laos--CINCPAC cited the need for flexibility on the assignment of MAP quotas where they were most needed.[1]

(C) Regarding tour lengths for MAP personnel, CINCPAC agreed that tours of three years, with optional extension to four, would help to maintain continuity and stability in the country programs. Although agreeing with the report statement that U.S. military missions should emphasize interservice cooperation, CINCPAC noted that PACOM training programs had not been prepared in Service isolation. Rather, an integrated, multi-Service approach had always been used. In the locations (China and Korea) where U.S. military assistance personnel were collocated with the host country military headquarters, CINCPAC agreed that other arrangements should be made.[2]

Student Quotas and Funds

(C) At the beginning of 1971, the student quotas for CONUS training of PACOM MAP-supported countries totalled 936. This FY 71 figure was adjusted, in January 1971, by the addition of 20 quota spaces. CINCPAC allocated ten of these spaces to Malaysia, which raised that country's allowance to 40, and increased the PACOM total to 956.[3]

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[1] J534 Point Paper, 22 May 71, Subj: Final Report on MAP Training.
[2] Ibid.
[3] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 300; J5343 HistSum Jan 71; CINCPAC 220203Z Jan 71; SECDEF 2285/281727Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 302321Z Jan 71.

MAP TRAINING PROGRAM

FY 1972

AS OF 31 DEC 1971

COUNTRY	ARMY	NAVY-MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
CHINA	$ 265,500	$ 555,030	$ 237,930	$ 1,058,460
INDONESIA	621,895	649,745	526,080	1,797,720
KOREA **	4,160,860	305,685	393,435	4,859,980
LAOS*	2,032,350	1,300,000	789,780	4,122,130
MALAYSIA	76,100	3,120	51,040	130,260
PHILIPPINES	316,745	512,660	242,090	1,071,495
THAILAND*	770,235	1,314,180	482,390	2,566,805
VIETNAM*	3,326,250	709,510	17,306,825	21,342,585
PACOM REGION	89,590	4,400	6,010	100,000
CAMBODIA	4,566,716	21,790	101,384	4,689,890
TOTAL	16,226,241	5,376,120	20,136,964	41,739,325

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 134.

* Service Funded

** Includes MASF Supplement for Korea

(C) The FY 71 MAP/MASF training program for the nine participating countries in the PACOM amounted to $55.75 million. Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines were included under MAP. Laos, Thailand, RVN, and the Korean forces in RVN were included as MASF trainees. COMUS training was provided for 5,475 students, and 12,607 students received training at U.S. or third-country bases overseas. The FY 71 MAP/MASF training program, by country:[1]

COUNTRY	DOLLAR VALUE	TOTAL STUDENTS CONUS/OVERSEAS	TOTAL STUDENTS
CAMBODIA	5,300,000*	1/1853	1854
TAIWAN	1,202,707	59/47	106
INDONESIA	1,165,210	358/72	440
KOREA	4,949,518	304/302	606
MALAYSIA	228,194	63/7	70
PHILIPPINES	772,820	147/277	424
LAOS	3,976,180	200/6074	6274
KOREA (RVN ONLY)	454,060	38/8	46
THAILAND	3,868,405	669/492	1161
VIETNAM	33,736,985	3626/3475	7101
REGION	92,640	0/0	0
TOTAL	$55,746,719	5475/12,607	18,082

* Includes approximately $4.0 of FY 71 training costs funded from Cambodia materiel program.

(C) In April 1971, CINCPAC submitted the proposed PACOM FY 72 training requirements to the SECDEF. Training was programmed for about 3,600 students in CONUS, and 53,264 overseas trainees. The cost, including MAAG support, was estimated at approximately $52.8 million. The initially approved guidelines allotted $51,866,860 to train 3,299 CONUS students and 54,588 in overseas locations. The allocations by country reflected a marked increase in Cambodian training and a sharp decrease in RVN student training when compared with the FY 71 program:[2]

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[1] J5343 HistSum Jun 71.
[2] J5343 HistSum Apr and Jul 71.

COUNTRY	DOLLAR VALUE	STUDENTS CONUS/OVERSEAS	TOTAL STUDENTS
CAMBODIA	12,854,153	44/45,564	46,608
TAIWAN	1,067,310	184/93	277
INDONESIA	1,656,120	217/144	361
KOREA	4,949,518	304/302	606
MALAYSIA	228,194	63/7	70
PHILIPPINES	1,081,425	240/206	446
LAOS	3,976,180	200/6,074	6,274
KOREA (RVN ONLY)	454,060	38/8	46
THAILAND	2,535,625	373/205	578
VIETNAM	22,964,275	1636/985	2,621
REGION	100,000	-/-	0
TOTAL	51,866,860	3,299/54,588	57,887

(S) By the end of CY 71, however, the $12.8 million FY 72 guideline for Cambodia had been reduced to $4.7 million and the total number to be trained under FY 72 programming was 39,576--54 in CONUS, 39,268 in RVN, and 254 in Okinawa. The dollar reduction resulted from a program refinement which deleted training material costs and placed them in the MAP material program. Another deletion resulted from a decision by the Ambassador that subsistence costs associated with Cambodian battalion training in RVN would be funded by Cambodia.[1]

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[1] J8241 Point Paper, 5 Oct 71, Subj: Training of GKR Forces.

SECTION IV--MAP/MASF AIRCRAFT

International Fighter Aircraft

(S) In 1970, the selection of the F-5-E (Freedom Fighter) as the "International Fighter Aircraft" (IFA) was announced. The IFA was intended to provide MAP/MASF countries with a relatively inexpensive, but modern, jet fighter aircraft. CINCPAC had submitted his recommendation for a force requirement of 304 F-5s for Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, and the ROC Air Force (ROCAF), to be allocated on the basis of one squadron (18) for RVN, one squadron (18) for Thailand, four squadrons (72) for Korea, and ten squadrons (196) for the ROCAF. CINCPAC also stipulated that the F-5 should be modified to include a limited all-weather air-to-air radar search and track system.[1]

(S) Subsequent to the exchange of communications in December 1970, the JCS requested all unified commanders to provide an evaluation of the F-5 capability to fill the role of an improved fighter aircraft as specified in the Joint Strategic Operations Plan (JSOP). The JCS furnished projected production schedules for the F-5, and requested that requirements be identified by country as addressed in the JSOP. Also requested was a recommendation as to the method of procurement; i.e., U.S. grant aid, FMS, or commercial sales, and the order of priority command-wide for allocation. An assessment of the aircraft control and warning (AC&W) systems of possible recipients was requested (excluding RVN, Thailand, Taiwan, and Korea) to determine whether a lack of capability would hamper F-5 effectiveness in an air defense role.[2]

(S) Based on replies from the CINCPAC representatives, subordinate unified commanders, and CINCPACAF, a reply was submitted to the JCS on 31 January 1971. CINCPAC reaffirmed the F-5 requirement for the four countries of RVN, Thailand, Taiwan, and Korea which he had stated in December 1970. Referring to the force levels projected in the JSOP, CINCPAC commented on the other Free World countries in the PACOM. He noted that the 12 aircraft (one squadron) programmed for the Philippines were adequate during peactime, and would provide a combat ready cadre for a wartime expansion. For Indonesia, the two squadrons (36 aircraft) programmed would be suitable replacement for the present MIG (Russian) aircraft which formed the nucleus of the Indonesian Air Force. The two squadrons (36 aircraft) for Malaysia, and one (18 aircraft) for Singapore would assist these countries in the joint defense roles with the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. In summary, CINCPAC stated that the requirements identified

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 291-293.
[2] JCS 9530/072238Z Jan 71.

(406 aircraft) were appropriate for JSOP objectives vis-a-vis the F-5. He did not recommend F-5s for Australia or Japan because those countries were scheduled to receive superior aircraft, while New Zealand should be programmed for aircraft compatible with Australian forces. Lastly, CINCPAC did not consider the F-5 suitable for Burma, Cambodia, or Laos. He suggested that a less expensive, counterinsurgency type aircraft would be more suitable for those countries.[1]

(S) The order of F-5 allocation recommended was: RVN - 1st (UE-18); Korea - 2d (UE-18) and 3d (UE-18); Taiwan - 4th (UE-20); Korea - 5th and 6th (UE-18 each); Taiwan - 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th (all UE-20); Thailand - 11th (UE-18); Taiwan - 12th, 13th, 14th (UE-20) and 15th, 16th (UE-18). In order the remaining countries were Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Also, if additional F-5s were to be allocated to the RVN in the future, CINCPAC suggested that these precede Indonesia in the allocation order. All requirements were recommended for grant aid except Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, for which FMS was suggested.[2]

(S) CINCPAC reiterated that the F-5 should possess a minimum all-weather intercept capability, such as an air-to-air radar system with 50 mile search and 10 mile track capability. Except for the four countries exempted by the JCS query (RVN, Thailand, Taiwan, Korea), CINCPAC also stated that the installation of fixed or mobile AC&W elements would be necessary before the F-5 would be effective in an air defense role.[3]

(S) In July 1971, CINCPAC revised his recommended Free World Force objectives for JSOP FY 74-81 when he submitted the following F-5 objectives, by country: ROC, 10 squadrons (196 aircraft); Korea, 4 squadrons (72 aircraft); Philippines, 1 squadron (12 aircraft); Thailand, 1 squadron (18 aircraft); and the RVN, 2 squadrons (36 aircraft).[4]

Counterinsurgency Aircraft for SEA Allies

(S) The search for an inexpensive, unsophisticated counterinsurgency (COIN) aircraft suitable for use by developing nations was discussed in the 1970 history under the heading of "COIN/FAC Aircraft for MAP." The need for a new aircraft was dictated by the declining numbers of low-performance aircraft in the inventories of U.S. military forces. Pending a decision on the

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[1] CINCPAC 312308Z Jan 71.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.; J5152 HistSum Jan 71.
[4] CINCPAC Ltr, Ser 001690 of 28 Jul 71, with 1 enclosure, JSOP FY 74-81, Book VII, Vol. II.

design and procurement of a COIN aircraft for MAP countries, the propeller-driven T-28 had evolved as the primary COIN/strike aircraft used by Laos, Cambodia, and Thai forces.[1]

(S) During 1971, the key role of the T-28 in the COIN/strike operations in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand by indigenous forces drew increasing attention from U.S. security assistance personnel. The effort to provide more aircraft was addressed in the context of the total numbers needed in Southeast Asia, and the T-28 had become known as the COIN aircraft for our SEA allies. Early in 1971, CINCPAC reviewed the overall situation in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, including programmed numbers and projected attrition of T-28s. In March, only 122 of 168 aircraft authorized for the three countries during FY 71 were possessed.[2]

(S) In 1970, the U.S. Navy had released 50 T-28s for transfer to the MAP/MASF programs, and a contract for repair and modification had begun under the project title PEACE PROP. Delivery of these planes in SEA was scheduled to begin in mid-1971. By June, 22 more had been added under PEACE PROP, and the first two had been delivered to Udorn, Thailand for assembly and eventual use in Laos.[3]

(S) Meanwhile, on 21-22 January, the normal attrition rate of the T-28 was accelerated by an enemy sapper attack on Pochentong Airport outside of Phnom Penh, Cambodia. This raid, which destroyed or damaged a major part of the Cambodian Air Force inventory, aggravated the congenital T-28 shortage. Contributing to the problem was the situation in Laos, where, in February, only 68 of 86 authorized T-28s were possessed by the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF). A joint Defense/State Department decision was made to restore the lost Cambodian air capability under the MAP rpogram, and action was begun by CINCPAC to accomplish this. CINCPAC suggested that negotiations between Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand be encouraged to effect loans of T-28s from the Thais to the other countries.[4]

(S) In November 1971, CINCPAC again provided a summary of the T-28 picture to the JCS, SECDEF, and the CSAF, entitled "Aircraft for SEASIAN Allies." CINCPAC noted that source selection for the new COIN aircraft for Southeast Asian allies would not be completed until March or April 1972, and that aircraft

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 293-295 and Vol. II, pp. 263, 267, 272-274.

[2] J4 HistSum Mar 71; CINCPAC 190204Z Jan 71.

[3] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, p. 273; MA Journal, No. 117, p. 124.

[4] J5321 HistSum Jan 71; SECSTATE 012422/251634Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 270313Z Jan 71; MA Journal, No. 116, pp. 113, 134.

deliveries would not begin for another 12 to 18 months. Therefore, he presented his views on T-28 current (Nov 71) and projected status. Cambodia possessed 19 of 40 authorized; Laos, 77 of 86; and Thailand, 48 of 60. By June 1972, Cambodia was projected to be short by 14 aircraft; this was expected to increase to 19 by June 1973. For Laos, the shortages were estimated at 15 in June 1972 and 42 by June 1973. Thailand would be short three and four respectively.[1]

(S) Although the possibility of obtaining 51 T-28s from USAF sources had been broached, deliveries could not begin for 16 months after a decision was reached to procede. Together with the 18 month delay before the COIN light strike aircraft could be delivered, the situation could lead to a degradation in capability of the SEA countries to continue their self-generated tactical air support sorties. As an interim solution, CINCPAC suggested a quid-pro-quo trade with the Thais, who possessed the only immediately available T-28 resources for use in the Laos and Cambodian hot war.[2]

(S) CINCPAC noted that a critical element relating to the eventual acquisition of the proposed COIN aircraft by our allies was the cost factor. This applied whether FMS cash or credit, MAP, or MASF assistance was considered. The figure released as the likely cost ($600,000 +) would greatly reduce its desirability when compared to other U.S. and foreign aircraft. CINCPAC urged that a major effort be devoted toward the development of imaginative, functional, yet austere packages, truly tailored for developing countires. Needed was a tough, easy to maintain, inexpensive, verstile, no-luxury aircraft.[3]

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1 J8223 HistSum Nov 71; CINCPAC 130248Z Nov 71.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.

SECTION V--MAP/MASF COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Burma

(C) In 1970, CINCPAC, SECDEF, and the State Department jointly agreed that the MEDT in Burma be phased out in 1971. In January 1971, the JCS directed the disestablishment of the MEDT by 1 July 1971. One enlisted U.S. military space was to be retained in-country after 30 June to close out the MEDT records and process the final equipment deliveries. Funding from FY 72 MAP of $6,000 was authorized by CINCPAC to offset the costs from 1 July through 31 December 1971 of the military member and his three dependents. The MEDT activity ceased as of 30 June, and all CINCPAC staff personnel were directed to cancel all operating procedures, guides, or instructions.[1]

(S) Military assistance to Burma began with a grant aid program of $1.9 million during 1950-1952 to provide boats, ammunition, training, and advisors. In 1958, military assistance was again initiated with an agreement to provide $43 million in equipment and services over a four year period. This commitment was designated Phase I, and was accompanied by the establishment of the MEDT on 24 September 1958. Phase II was implemented by annual increments based upon exchanges of Notes between the U.S. Ambassador and the Foreign Minister of Burma. The Phase II ceiling was also $43 million.[2]

(C) By mutual agreement, the presence of U.S. military personnel in Burma was maintained on a "low profile" basis. Once equipment was delivered, end use inspections were not permitted by the Government of Burma (GOB). The term "advisor" was not used in reference to U.S. personnel, all of whom were required to wear civilian clothing. Access to Burmese military units and installations was closely restricted, as were social contacts between GOB and MEDT personnel.

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 314-317; J72 HistSum Apr 71; CHMEDT Burma MCX-026/090415Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 130052Z Apr 71; CINCPAC Memo, J01/83-71, 14 Jul 71, Subj: MEDT Burma Phase Out, which cited JCS 4024/081924Z Jun 71.

[2] J5322 Point Paper, 27 Aug 69, Subj: Burma Military Assistance; Ltr, MEDT Burma (CHMEDT) to CINCPAC, 25 Jun 71, Subj: Debrief Report, with attached report; the following narrative on Burma is based on this report by COL Kevin F. Carrigan, USA, CHMEDT. A copy will be retained permanently in the CINCPAC Historical Archives.

(C) By October 1970, only $190,671 remained to be spent by the U.S. Service elements on the last (sixth) increment of Phase II. At that time, the GOB asked that all funds be consolidated and used to purchase 500 additional M-79 rocket launchers and M-79 ammunition. This deviation was approved, and CINCPAC directed that top priority be given to effect delivery by 30 June 1971. All major items of equipment had been delivered by that date. Remaining for closing action during July-December were 550 requisitions for less than $300,000 of minor line items. In his final report, the out-going Chief, MEDT Burma made six recommendations based upon the environment of the Burma MEDT:

a. Maximum use of air transportation should be provided for when program effectiveness could be hampered by the delays of indirect surface shipment. Any agreement should specifically provide for entry of U.S. cargo aircraft.

b. The rate of supply of large quantities of ammunition should be restricted to an amount which could be consumed before deterioration sets in, unless packaging compatible with climatic conditions is provided.

c. Funding provisions should allow termination of funds not used in any one year or allow them to be transferred forward to the current operating year. This would eliminate the need to juggle money and items for several years simultaneously with limited manpower.

d. The status of U.S. personnel stationed in a country to receive U.S. equipment should be established by agreement. Such items as entry and exit visas, customs privileges, personal mail, export and import of personal property, and the export and import of U.S. property used by the unit should be covered.

e. A central facility should be provided, by agreement, for receiving and inspecting all in-bound items prior to release to the host country.

f. A centralized requisitioning and fund management system should be used for joint Service teams such as the MEDT. This would allow the Chief to designate key elements of information to be presented to him in a format independent of the records-keeping procedures of each Service.

(C) Because the Burma program was terminated, and for ease of future research and reference, following is a list of major items of equipment furnished under the Burma MAP:

ARMY-(Ordnance)

Item	Quantity
Carbine, Cal. .30 M-2	28,972
Howitzer, Light, towed 105 MM	90
Rifle, 75MM M-20	372
Launcher, Rocket, 3.5 In	895
Fire Direction Control Plotting Boards, Fire Tables, Graph Tables	605
Miscellaneous Vehicles, Military and Commercial	3,528
Trailers	834
Tool Sets, Kits, Maintenance	425
Telescopes and Binoculars	230
Launcher, Grenade M-79	3,000

ARMY-(Signal)

Radio Set, AN/PRC-6	735
Radio Set, AN/PRC-10	398
Radio Set, AN/GRC-87	358
Radio Set, AN/GRC-19	49
Radar Set, AN/MPQ-10	5
Assorted tools and test sets	715

ARMY-(Engineer)

Boats, Assault	340
Bulldozers	65
Tractors	36
Outboard motors	200
Welding trucks	5
Topographic Repro. Sets	8
Chain saws	15
Scrapers, semi tractors	24
Road Graders	15
Scoop Loaders	8
Cranes	15
Front Shovels	47
Compressors	20
Generators	127

ARMY-(Ammunition)

Item	Quantity
Cal. .30 Carbine	54,451,880
75 MM Recoilless Rifle	96,840
105 MM High Explosive	174,214
3.5 in (Rocket Launcher)	46,105
M-79 (Grenade Launcher)	101,740

NAVY

PCE Coastal/River Patrol	2
PGM River/Harbor Patrol	6
AMGB River/Harbor Patrol	7
LCU Troop/Cargo	1
LCM Troop/Cargo Lift	8
Ships Characteristics Demonstrator	1

AIR FORCE

C-47 Troop-Cargo	6
T-33 Jet Fighter	15
T-33 Jet Trainer	8
H-43 Helicopter	17
H-21 Helicopter	12
Fuel Trucks	3
Runway Barrier	6
Altitude Chamber	1
Instrument Simulator Trainer	1
Air to Ground Rockets	2,000
Bombs, 100 lb. Frag Cluster	835
Precision Measuring Equip. Laboratory, Field Level	1

Cambodia

Establishment of MEDT

(TS) On 8 January 1971, CINCPAC and the U.S. Ambassadors to RVN and Cambodia were informed of a decision "at the highest level" to authorize the activation of a MEDT for Cambodia. The originally authorized strength was not to exceed 60 people. No more than 16 people were authorized in Cambodia. The Chief, MEDT was to be located in RVN, along with the balance of the people, and the military command channel was from the SECDEF through CINCPAC to the Chief,

MEDT. CINCPAC was directed to develop terms of reference (TOR) and a Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) in coordination with the Ambassador in Phnom Penh. The importance of a low profile in Cambodia was emphasized, and the TOR were to exclude training and advisory functions in Cambodia. CINCPAC was authorized to form the MEDT as soon as the RVN Government had concurred in the Saigon location. Selection criteria and the designation of key personnel were to be based on consultation between CINCPAC and the Ambassador.[1]

(TS) CINCPAC requested the Ambassador to provide his views on the desired qualifications and reporting dates of the Temporary Duty (TDY) personnel who would complete the initial 16 man MEDT detachment in Cambodia. He also appointed a working group from CINCPAC to meet with representatives of the Embassy and COMUSMACV to prepare and coordinate TOR and JTD.[2]

(TS) The working group met in Saigon, and, on 15 January, submitted a draft TOR to CINCPAC, and a recommended JTD of 113 spaces. The Chief, MEDT billet was designated as U.S. Army Brigadier General. On 19 January, CINCPAC invited the attention of the JCS to this key position, requesting early approval and expeditious personnel action to fill the billet. On 26 January, the DA nominated BGEN Theodore C. Metaxis as the first Chief, MEDT, and, on 30 January CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to assign General Metaxis pending issuance of formal Army orders.[3]

(TS) On 25 January, CINCPAC was informed by the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon that the establishment of a MEDT rear echelon element in Saigon had been approved by RVN. On 27 January, CINCPAC directed the establishment and activation of a joint U.S. Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia, effective 0400 hours, Greenwich Mean Time, 30 January 1971.[4]

(S) The TOR and JTD were approved by DOD in March. A total of 113 spaces was approved, 23 of which were in Phnom Penh under the supervision of the Embassy Political/Military Counsellor, who was designated Special CINCPAC Representative for Military Assistance (SRMA) in Cambodia. As the tempo of material shipments increased, the contingent in Cambodia could not keep abreast of mobilization requirements, much less determine the efficiency of use of the delivered material. The DOD pressed for approval to station the entire team in Phnom Penh; a compromise position between DOD and the State Department

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1 SECSTATE 003780/082351Z Jan 71 (EX).
2 J5311 Point Paper, 11 Jan 71, Subj: MAP Organization-Cambodia; ADMIN CINCPAC 092202Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 112115Z Jan 71 (EX).
3 MACV Cmd Ctr (RADM Vasey from CAPT Carroll) 151020Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 190354Z Jan 71 (EX) and 302342Z Jan 71 (EX).
4 AMEMBSaigon 1161/251003Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 270312Z Jan 71.

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CAMBODIA

BASIC INFORMATION ○

SIZE	66,000 SQ. MI.	LIFE EXPECTANCY	44 YEARS
POPULATION	6.7 MIL	GROSS NAT. PROD. 1970	$982 MIL
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.2%	PER CAPITA 1970	$147.8
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	1.2 ACRE	DEFENSE BUDGET SELF FINANCED 1970 (E)	43 MIL
LITERACY RATE	31.2	AS % GNP	4.6

Chief of State - Cheng Heng ●
Prime Minister & CINC FANK - Lon Nol
Minister of National Defense - Siril Matak
First Deputy Prime Minister - Tim Sisuon
Second Deputy Prime Minister - Sok Chhong
Third Deputy Prime Minister - Hang Thun Hak



OVERALL OBJECTIVE ○

TO ASSIST CAMBODIA IN MAINTAINING ITS STATUS AS AN INDEPENDENT NEUTRAL STATE.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

AMBASSADOR:
HON. EMORY C. SWANK
U.S. AID REPRESENTATIVE:
MR. MILES G. WEDEMAN
CHIEF CMEDT BGEN THEODORE C. MATAXIS, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES *

(A) To provide the Khmer Armed Forces the capability to sustain national independence and neutrality.
(B) To develop Khmer Armed Forces sufficiently capable to disrupt NVA/VC base areas and LOC's in the Khmer Republic with a corollary objective of facilitating Vietnamization of the war in South Vietnam.
(C) To encourage and assist third country efforts in support of the Khmer Republic.

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES ○

ARMY	18 INF BDES, 74 INF BNS(SEP), 561 INF COS (SEP), 1 MECH REGT, 2 ARTY REGTS, 16 ARTY BTRYS(SEP), 1 ENG BDE, 1 SIG BDE, 1 TRANS BDE, 1 MIL POLICE BDE, 1 SPECIAL FORCES GP, 1 LOGISTICS COMMAND.
NAVY	1 COASTAL SURVEILLANCE SQ, 1 MIN COUNTERMEASURES SQ, 1 RIVER ASSUALT INTERDICTION DIV, 1 RIVER PATROL GP, 1 LOGISTICS OPS/SUP SQ, 2 SUPPORT BASES, 5 MARINE BNS(SEP).
AIR FORCE	2 T-28 SQS(UE 32), 1 AC-47(UE 8), 1 0-1 FAC SQ(UE 25), 1 C-47 TRANS SQ(UE 13), 1 UH-1H HELO SQ(UE 16), 1 T-28 TRNG SQ(UE 8), 1 T 41 TRNG SQ(UE 10), 1 LT HELC TRNG SQ(UE 4), 1 BASE COMM SQ, 6 AIR FORCE SEC BNS(SEP).

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES ◇

ARMY	319 INF BN, 1 ARMORED BDE, 1 ARTY BDE, 1 AAA BDE, 2 PARACHUTE BDE, 1 ENGR BDE, 1 SIGNAL BDE, 1 TRANS BDE, TOTAL STRENGTH 180,000
NAVY	100 SHIPS AND CRAFT TOTAL STRENGTH 5,400
AIR FORCE	TACT SPT: 16 T-28, TRANS: 15 C-47, 24 OI, TOTAL ACFT: 102 H UH, 3 AC47, 9 T41, 17 UI, TOTAL STRENGTH 5,000

COMBAT CAPABILITY ○

ARMY	CAPABLE OF PERFORMING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS FOR KEY POPULATION CENTERS AND LOC's WITH LIMITED OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY.
NAVY	LIMITED INLAND WATERWAY PATROL AND CONVOY ESCORT CAPABILITY. COASTAL DEFENSE, ASW, MINE WARFARE AND TRANSPORT MISSIONS ARE NOT BEING ADEQUATELY ACCOMPLISHED DUE TO LACK OF BOATS AND CRAFT.
AIR FORCE	LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OR TRANSPORT MISSIONS DUE TO CURRENT PILOT SHORTAGES AND ADEQUATE MAINTENANCE/LOGISTICAL SYSTEMS IN COUNTRY.

● Updated By J2 ◇ Updated By J3
○ Updated By J5 * Updated By J8

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 136.

SECRET

raised the MEDT Forward element from 23 to 50, with emphasis on French language qualification for the augmentees. This authorization was increased to 62 in December 1971, but additional personnel were withheld pending review by a CINCPAC manpower survey team.[1]

Cambodia MAP Funding

(S) On 29 January 1971, SECDEF informed CINCPAC that the approved FY 71 MAP fund level for Cambodia was $185 million. Nine days before, on 20 January, CINCPAC had passed to MEDT Cambodia the program guideline for FY 72 of $200 million established by the SECDEF--$76.7 million less than the $276.7 million in the original CINCPAC FY 72 program. Thus ensued a struggle throughout 1971 to obtain a sufficient dollar guideline level to sustain a Cambodian force of 220,000 men. In an interesting exercise of Chief of Mission perogatives, the U.S. Ambassador in Phnom Penh had requested CINCPAC to provide background information on his FY 72 $200 million plus $76.7 million shortfall program. This query, which came in February, was preceded on 27 January by a State Department message to the Ambassador which stressed the need for limitations on Cambodian defense expenditures, while placing these expenditures in the context of concern about the growth rate of Cambodian military forces. The subject of this communication was "Next Steps on Economic Assistance."[2]

(TS) On 26 February, MEDT Cambodia submitted a realignment of the FY 72 MAP which brought the total to about $289.9 million, or an $89.9 million shortfall. In March, the SECDEF reiterated the ceiling of $200 million for FY 72, and established the outyear ceilings as $275 million, FY 73; $225 million, FY 74; $175 million, FY 75; and $125 million for FY 76-77.[3]

(S) On 1 July 1971, CINCPAC submitted a revised FY 72 MAP plan which provided for about $348.2 million to support a Cambodian force level of 220,000. On 8 July, the SECSTATE directed that an updated assessment be made to determine the force structure which could realistically be supported by $200 million, less $28 million for supply operations. In reply, CINCPAC emphasized that the basic FY 72 plan had been developed after a careful analysis of the enemy threat, the forces required to counter the threat, the ability of the Cambodian Army to train the forces, and the basic strategy developed to achieve U.S. objectives in Cambodia. CINCPAC provided itemized

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1 Ltr, HQ MEDTC to CINCPAC, 12 Feb 72, Subj: End of Tour Report, with one atch: End of Tour Report, BGEN Theodore C. Metaxis.

2 J5321 HistSum Jan 71; SECDEF 2527/292350Z Jan 71; SECSTATE 013772/1/270023Z Jan 71; CHMEDTC 091144Z Feb 71.

3 J5321 HistSum Feb and May 71; CHMEDT 261125Z Feb 71; SECDEF 6067/112252Z Mar 71.

force and equipment alignments which would equate to the $200 million ceiling, but with the original $11.8 million for support supply. This, CINCPAC stated, was the rock bottom amount which would sustain a 220,000 level force structure. If the $28 million were adhered to for supply operations, the force structure would be reduced to 184,000.[1]

(S) In August, a conference was held at CINCPAC to develop absolute minimum funding for FY 72 in order to support a Cambodian force structure of 220,000. From that base monetary figure, force increments costing $25 million were to be developed and applied in descending order until the $200 million ceiling was reached. During this meeting, a base line figure to support 220,000 Cambodian troops was established at $252 million. If the $200 million ceiling held, only 176,000 Cambodian personnel could be supported.[2]

(S) The last budgetary development under MAP Cambodia funding was notification from the SECDEF that the dollar guideline for FY 73 was revised to $259.5 million, but excluded supply operational costs, which were to be assumed by DOD.[3]

Australian Aid To Cambodia

(S) On 3 September 1970, the Australian Government announced that aid to Cambodia amounting to about $2.24 million in U.S. dollars would be provided during Australia's current (1970/1971) fiscal year. The assistance was in the form of logistic support items of equipment, dual purpose items, and arms, if necessary. Detailed arrangements were made in bilateral Australia/Cambodia agreements, and items such as Land Rover vehicles and radios had been delivered by the end of 1970. Early in 1971, CINCPAC was informed of an urgent need for vehicles to transport the Cambodia rice harvest to protective storage, out of reach of the North Vietnam/Viet Cong forces. The rice in question constituted over 50 percent of Cambodian exports. On 20 January, the U.S. Defense Attache Office (USDAO) in Canberra, Australia transmitted to CINCPAC a detailed proposal from the Government of Australia (GOA) to provide trucks to Cambodia. CINCPAC passed the propsal to the SECDEF, noting that the proposal was predicated on a U.S.-GOA memorandum of understanding relative to the procurement of defense articles and services.[4]

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[1] J5321 HistSum Jun and Jul 71; SECSTATE 122316/081438Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 131155Z Jul 71.

[2] J5721 HistSum Jul and Sep 71; CINCPAC 210336Z Jul; Ltr, CINCPAC Ser 001940 of 30 Aug, Subj: Conference Report on Cambodia MAP.

[3] J831 Point Paper, 17 Jan 72, Subj: MAP Cambodia.

[4] J4312 HistSum Jan 71; CINCPAC 130108Z Jan 71; USDAO Canberra 0093/200839Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 220310Z Jan 71; MA Journal, No. 115, p. 104.

(S) In February, the SECDEF notified CINCPAC that an arrangement between the U.S. DOD and the GOA Department of Supply had been signed pertaining to the procurement of defense articles and services in Australia. Also, a memorandum had been submitted to the President which recommended that he authorize the procurement of the vehicles from American Dodge and International Harvester subsidiaries in Australia. In was understood that Australia would provide, from its own funds, all necessary technicians in Cambodia for up to one year, to assure that the vehicles were utilized effectively.[1]

(S) On 1 March 1971, Presidential Determination (PD) 71-8 was signed. The PD waived the various restrictions against off-shore procurement of defense articles and supplies embodied in foreign assistance legislation. It authorized the use of MAP funds to procure vehicles for Cambodia from Australia, and, on 4 March, the final arrangements were signed by the U.S. and GOA. Up to $7 million was authorized for this purpose by the President.[2]

(S) On 5 April, 100 vehicles were off-loaded at Vung Tau, RVN. Armed Cambodian truck drivers manned the convoy to Cambodia, with air cover by Seventh Air Force. The trucks arrived in Phnom Penh on 8 and 9 April, without incident. Six hundred 7-ton trucks, 100 trailers, and spare parts--the complete order--had been delivered to Phnom Penh by 13 September 1971.[3]

(C) In January, the GOA offered to furnish six C-47 aircraft to Cambodia (one commercial DC-3, five GOA airforce C-47s), at a cost of $250,000. The offer was accepted in February and delivery began in March. In addition to technical assistance, the Land Rovers and radios previously mentioned, trucks, trailers, and aircraft, the GOA had also provided some 3,000 .45 cal machine guns.[4]

Training of Cambodian Forces

(S) With the expansion of Cambodian military forces which began in 1970, various means for training, both in and out of country, were considered. In June 1970, CINCPAC had concurred with a COMUSMACV proposal to establish training centers in RVN for Cambodian troops. By 30 November 1971, 52,132 Khmer military personnel had received out-of-country training under MAP auspices. Of

[1] J4312 HistSum Feb-Mar 71; SECDEF 4677/232202Z Feb 71 and 4725/240142Z Feb 71; SECSTATE 035085/1/022335Z Mar 71.

[2] MA Journal, No. 116, p. 105; SECDEF 5428/032249Z Mar 71; DA 082250Z Mar 71.

[3] J4312 HistSum Apr 71; CHMEDT 071001Z Apr 71; AMEMB Phnom Penh 1745/121120Z Apr 71; J8112 Point Paper, 13 Nov 71, Subj: Australian Assistance to Cambodia.

[4] J5321 HistSum Jan-Feb 71; SECSTATE 015661/291809Z Jan 71; AMEMB Canberra 1466/020620Z Feb 71; J8112 Point Paper, 13 Nov 71, Subj: Australian Assistance to Cambodia.

these, 49,815--including 350 members of the Khmer Navy--had been trained in RVN. Most of the remainder represented Territorial companies trained in Thailand under bilateral Thai-Khmer agreements. These were trained without cost to MAPT funds, but were equipped from MAP material funds. In addition to these companies, 140 Cambodian Army Special Forces troops and 48 Khmer Air Force pilots were trained in Thailand during FY 71.[1]

(S) FY 72 programming included the training of 580 Cambodian Army personnel to be formed into cadres for use at training centers in Cambodia. In November 1971, agreement was reached between Thailand and Cambodia to train 20 Army companies during CY 72. By the end of 1971, more than half of the 238 Khmer personnel scheduled for training in the U.S. Army Intelligence School on Okinawa had completed the course.[2]

(S) Beginning in May 1971, the U.S. Government began to explore the possibility of obtaining Australian and New Zealand participation in the Cambodian training effort. To that end, exploratory talks were held at the Ambassadorial level between the U.S. and the Governments of Australia (GOA) and New Zealand (GNZ). The GOA agreed to discuss the matter with the U.S., RVN, and Cambodia, and, on 3 December 1971, agreed to provide 30 GOA military instructors to train Cambodian troops in RVN. The GOA instructors were to be in addition to Australian instructors already in-country to train RVN troops, and were to join the U.S. training effort on 3 January 1972. Apparently because of internal political objections, the GNZ declined initially to participate. However, in December 1971, this decision was reversed when the GNZ Defense Minister announced joint participation with the GOA and the U.S. in Cambodian training.[3]

(C) That the emergence of Cambodia in the military equation of Southeast Asia was politically sensitive in the U.S. has already been discussed. The amendment (Cooper-Church) to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 which prohibited the provision of advisors to or for the Cambodian military forces also affected the provision of English language training. The representatives of the U.S. Defense Language Institute (DLI) to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV were U.S. civilian employees of the DA. In July, the SECDEF pointed out that an Army civilian from DLI as an administrator of a language school owned by the Cambodian Army would be contrary to the intent, if not the letter, of the Cooper-Church Amendment. On 16 July 1971, CINCPAC authorized the Chief MEDT Cambodia to contract for third country nationals to provide English language

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, p. 257; J853 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: Training of GKR Forces.
[2] Ibid.; CINCPAC 102340Z Aug 71.
[3] J853 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: Joint Training of FANK in SVN.

instruction at Cambodian MAP expense. The DLI representatives of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV would provide guidance by periodic visits. CINCPAC suggested that the U.S. contract which provided Filipino teachers of English in Laos might be amended to included Cambodia.[1]

Republic of China

China MAP Funding

(S) On 25 January 1971, the SECDEF advised CINCPAC that, in applying the FY 72 China program reduction from $25 million to $19.5 million it was apparent that deferral priorities would apply the entire amount to O&M and training costs. The SECDEF inferred, therefore, that the acquisition by the ROC of large quantities of excess defense articles (EDA) had driven up the O&M costs beyond the capability of the ROC to fund, and that the MAP would be used almost exclusively to make up the difference. The SECDEF stated a program was desired which would reflect decreasing O&M and increasing investment costs, and requested reprogrammed submissions for FY 72 which would include a significant level of investment at the $19.5 million level, less $7.8 million for supply operations. At CINCPAC's request, the Chief, MAAG submitted two program adjustments within the $19.5 million ceiling--one without investment items, and one with $3 million in investments. However, the MAAG voiced strong disagreement with the SECDEF inferences vis-a-vis the FY 72 MAP, stating that O&M costs in China MAP had declined steadily. Fluctuations in fund ceilings, program changes, and supplementary funding, if reviewed together, would support the rationale for the original FY 72 program. CINCPAC supported the Chief, MAAG position.[2]

(C) The changing dollar ceilings for FY 71 and FY 72 MAP were accompanied by modifications in the FMS dollar levels as well. On 23 January, the State Department advised that $40 million had been allocated for the FY 71 FMS. In February, the MAAG China submitted a revised list of FMS credit items, including an additional $6 million, for a total of $46 million. CINCPAC also supported this program. In March, the Chief, MAAG requested an increase in the FY 72 FMS ceiling, which had been reduced to $45 million. The total amount requested was $60 million, which would allow the funding of the final phase of the ROC vehicle coproduction program. CINCPAC concurred, and recommended to the SECDEF that the credit ceiling be restored to the $60 million level, with the added $15 million specifically allocated to coproduction-oriented FMS items.[3]

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1 J5343 Hist Sum Jul 71; CINCPAC 160105Z Jul 71.

2 J5332 HistSum Jan 71/ SECDEF 1919/251547Z Jan 71; CHMAAG Taipei 270800Z Jan 71; CHMAAG Taipei 281123Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 290411Z Jan 71.

3 J533 HistSum Feb-Mar 71; CHMAAG Taipei 111009Z Feb 71; ADMIN CINCPAC 130325Z Feb 71; CHMAAG Taipei 231016Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 300341Z Mar 71.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

BASIC INFORMATION ○

AREA	14,000 SQ. MI.
POPULATION	14.16 MIL.
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.2%
LITERACY RATE	90%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	67 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PERCAP	0.2 ACRE
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1970 E)	$5.01 BIL.
PER CAPITA	$348
DEFENSE BUDGET (E)	$561.2 MIL.
AS % OF GNP	10%
AS % OF SELF FINANCED PROVINCIAL/CENTRAL GOVT EXP	47%

PRESIDENT- Generalissimo Chiang, Kai-shek ●
VICE PRESIDENT- Yen, Chia-Kan
DEFENSE MINISTER- Huang, Chieh
CHIEF, GEN STAFF- Gen Lai, Ming-T'ang, CAF
CINC ARMY- Gen(2nd grade) Yu, Hao-Chang
CINC NAVY- ADM Sung, Ch'ang-Chih, CN
CINC AIR FORCE- Gen Ch'en I-Fan, CAF
CINC, COMBINED SERVICE FORCE- ADM(2nd grade) Liu, Kuang K'ai, CN
COMMANDANT, MARCORPS- LT GEN Ho, En-Ting
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Chow Shu-Kai



OVERALL OBJECTIVE ○

TO DEFEND TAIWAN AND THE PENGHUS FROM COMMUNIST ATTACK AND TO RETAIN APPROPRIATE U.S. BASE RIGHTS ON ROC TERRITORY.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. WALTER P. McCONAUGHY

U.S. AID DIRECTOR
NO AID

CHIEF, MAAG MAJ GEN
John W. BARNES, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES *

1. Assist the ROC in maintaining forces for the effective defense of ROC administered territory within limits of U. S. commitments.
2. Insure continued availability of essential rights, authorizations and facility arrangements.
3. Protection of U. S. facilities.
4. Insure, as appropriate, a country environment and infrastructure compatible with possible U. S. contingency deployment requirements under the Mutual Defense Treaty.

	MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES** ○	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES* ○	COMBAT CAPABILITY ○
ARMY	11 INF DIVS, 3 ARMD BDES, 1 ARMD INF BDE, 2 ARMD CAV REGS, 3 AVN BNS, 1 ABN FORCE, 1 SF GP, 30 ARTY BNS, 11 ENG CMBT BNS, 1 PSY WAR GP, 12 40MM ADA BTRY, 12 40MM ADA BNS, 2.25 HAWK BNS, 2 NIKE BNS, 11 RES DIVS.	12 HV INF DIVS, 6 LT INF DIVS, 3 ARMORED Bdes, 1 ARMORED INF BDE, 2 AIRBORNE INF BDE, 2 ARMORED CAV REGTS, 1 SPW CMD, 1 ACNS CORPS, 25 FA BNS, 3 MSL BNS, ACFT(22 Fixed Wing, 9 Helos) TOTAL STRENGTH 328,900	Maintain internal security & conduct effective ground defense of Taiwan, Penghus & offshore islands against small scale attack if provided outside air, naval & logistic support. Could contribute approx 3 divs. to collective defense effort. Well-organized and combat ready.
NAVY	16 DD, 11 PF, 5 PG, 10 PGM, 12 MSC, 1 AD, 1 LPR, 1 ARL, 3 LSD, 18 LST, 4 LSM, 3 AO/AOG, 4 AK/AKL, 6 ATF/ATA, 2 AGSS, 1 APB, 2 AGS, 2 MAR DIVS, 2 LVT BNS, 1 LVTA BN, 1 COMM BN, 1 AVN SQ.	18 DD TYPES, 25 PATROL TYPES, 24 MINECRAFT, 31 AMPHIB, 22 Aux Types, 2 MARINE DIVS, 1 LVT REGT. TOTAL STRENGTH 7[illegible] (INCLUDES 36,700 MARINES)	The overall ability of the Chinese Navy to perform its assigned mission is considered fair. The Chinese Marines are considered capable of conducting [illegible] amphib operations, provided the required air & naval support, including amphib shipping, are available.
AIR FORCE	8 FTR INTERCEPT SQ, 7 TAC FTR SQ, 1 RECON SQ, 1 SAR SQ, 6 TRANS SQ, 11 OBS SQ, 1 ASW SQ	FTRS: 316 JET, 0 PROP, RECON: 8 JET, 0 PROP, ASW: 0 JET, 10 PROP, HELOS: 3 TURBO, 7 PROP, TRANS: 0 JET, 196 PROP. TOTAL STRENGTH 82,600	Force combat ready. The Air Force has demonstrated its ability to perform its primary function, air defense of Taiwan, under day VFR conditions. The limited all WX defense capability has improved since the F-[illegible] operational. Air defense against a low altitude threat remains a problem. Capable of providing tactical [illegible] operations in the area and tactical support for [illegible]

*AS OF 1 JAN 1972
**FY 77 OBJECTIVES
● Updated By J2 ○ Updated By J3
○ Updated By J5 * Updated by J8

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 141.

(S) By the end of 1971, the continuing downward trend of China MAP appeared inevitable. Projected funding for FY 72-77 reflected a steady decline in MAP grant aid, until, by FY 76, the dollar guideline was only $5.0 million. On 23 December 1971, the SECDEF announced a revised dollar level for FY 73 grant aid of $7.7 million, reduced from the $20.0 million shown on the chart on page 6A of this chapter. However, this figure excluded costs for packaging, crating, handling, and transportation (PCH&T). Based on the guidance provided by the end of 1971, cost allocations were:[1]

	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76	FY 77
MAP Ceiling	$19.5	$7.7	$15.0	$10.0	$5.0	$5.0
PCH&T	7.8	0	9.2	4.8	2.3	2.3
Trng & MAAG Spt	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0
O&M	5.6	1.9	1.4	0	0	0
Investment	5.0	4.7	3.3	4.1	1.7	1.7

CHMAAG China End of Tour Report

(U) In December 1971, the Chief MAAG from March 1970 to December 1971, MAJ GEN Livingston N. Taylor, USA, submitted an exit debriefing report to CINCPAC. The general tone of the report was optimistic, and detailed comments on all aspects of the MAAG mission were included. Although the report did not necessarily reflect the views or position of CINCPAC, selected extracts follow verbatim for ease of research and reference:[2]

MISSION AND FACTORS AFFECTING MISSION (U)

1. Pending a restatement or clarification of U.S. objectives as they relate to the Republic of China in light of the ROC's expulsion from the United Nations, MAAG-China continues to execute its standing charge. Negative after effects on the part of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) Ministry of National Defense or GRC Armed Forces were not apparent after the UN expulsion and they are not anticipated. To the contrary, the spirit of friendly cooperation between GRC defense agencies and MAAG-China appears to be waxing. The statement made by General Lai, Chief of the General Staff, to the assembled MND and MAAG conference members on 27 October, set the keynote for continued friendly cooperation. (Statement transmitted by message: 280508Z October.)

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[1] J825 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: FY 72-77 China MAP.

[2] Report, Exit Debriefing, MAJ GEN L. N. Taylor, USA, CHMAAG, China, 4 Mar 70 to 15 Dec 71; complete report filed in CINCPAC Historical Archives.

5. Reorienting the advisory effort from lower echelon contacts to Service GHQ and Ministry of National Defense level--a process begun by MAAG-China when the need for unit advisors could no longer be justified nor supported--requires sustained effort and a continuity of clearly defined programs recognizable by both the host country and its MAAG. Force planning, development of management techniques, ADP application, Research and Development and the like require continued attention if they are to be brought through their incubation and birth to become viable long-range programs. The credibility test applied by the GRC to any MAAG-initiated program is a simple one: How much time and effort does MAAG itself allot to the program? Will MAAG stay with it, or is the project a spur-of-the-moment affair which will fade away with the passing of the MAAG, Service or Staff Section Chief, or as a result of additional personnel reductions?

MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS (S)

1. MAAG Strength.

a. It would appear that MAAG-China's personnel strength has been tied to the declining Grant Aid monies available through MAP to the Republic of China. No consideration apparently has been given to the variety of MA Programs--FMS, EDA, Co-production--managed by the MAAG in addition to the barely visible Grant Aid. While Grant Aid was nearly halved from FY 69 to FY 71, FMS to the ROC doubled and EDA received has tripled. Co-production programs are showing commensurate gains. Managing the traffic on these additional avenues of military assistance requires administration of a magnitude greater than that formerly required in the halcyon days of Grant Aid.

2. Interservice rivalry and competition has caused inefficiencies in both operations and logistic areas. For example, the historic CN refusal to employ indirect fire techniques and to conduct shore fire support missions when the target is masked from the direct support ship has severely restricted the development of proficiency in this facet of supporting arms. In the logistic area, the required washout of World War II vehicles is an example of an action, long understood to be a requirement by the separate Services, which will require close attention by MND to ensure Service compliance. Turn-in and redistribution of assets is a problem area where the Services can and should be more cooperative. A good example is the $300,000 worth of WWII vehicle repair parts on-hand in the CMC; while a need for some of these parts is justified, the excess should have been turned over to the CA.

4. A problem has risen concerning the tax-exempt status of MAAG technical representatives in the Republic of China. Technical representatives are

generally MAP funded employees of U.S. firms brought into China by the USG for the purpose of providing technical assistance to the GRC Armed Forces. They are not GS employees, but are given many U.S. privileges and benefits by virtue of the contract between their companies and the USG. The question of just how technical representatives fit into the MAAG scheme has been under discussion since 1955, with the problem still unresolved. Technical representatives are not expressly covered by the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements with the RC. They have been; however, accorded personal customs and tax exemption by the GRC primarily because they perform vital services in support of the MAAG mission. Such temporary treatment was afforded through exchanges of diplomatic notes. This state of understanding remained undisturbed until last year. Now the GRC has demanded through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that MAAG technical representatives pay fuel tax and road tax on their privately owned automobiles. The assessing authorities for these taxes are the Provincial and Municipal Governments. In the case of an average American car, this amounts to about $250 a year. The amenability of technical representatives to Chinese taxes has been under discussion with MND for sometime to no avail. It would appear that a solution should be obtained via diplomatic channels.

LESSONS LEARNED (C)

1. We have encouraged the ROC to promulgate a Five-Year Plan reflecting future material requirements in order of priority. The ROC has accomplished this to some degree and is continually refining their plan. The 72-77 plan submission made allowances for materiel requirements in the outyears. While requiring the host country to plan ahead we do not give them any idea of projected MAP. This disparity is not conducive to long range planning and becomes even more critical with the reduction of Grant Aid Funds in the outyears. The host country will have to be given some outyear MAP planning in the future so the two plans will support one another. This is particularly important in the area of annual budget planning as the host country picks up more and more of the defense tab.

3. A direct transfer of U.S. technology to the Republic of China does not necessarily create self-sufficiency. [redacted]

4. The GRC had not reached self-sufficiency in the areas of systems analysis and ADP systems design but bringing in experts from the U.S. to conduct seminars is not as effective as conducting workshops. In a workshop arrangement, the advisor works closely with the GRC personnel and assists them in

developing feasible solutions which will satisfy their particular problems.

6. Firm commitments should be established prior to seeking GRC support of specific programs. The GRC has demonstrated the willingness and ability to accept new programs. They will gear up to get a program authorized, and in some cases this has caused embarrassment. An example is the barter/scrap proposal that was offered the GRC in August 1970. The GRC was requested to remove scrap from RVN. The GRC consented and established an office to manage this program (Vocational Assistance Commission for Retired Servicemen). After several months of message/letter traffic to responsible agencies, it was determined that scrap was not available in quantities indicated and that scrap from RVN would not be sold to 3d countries. Cases such as this impinge upon MAAG and U.S. credibility; therefore, future commitments in areas that require GRC support should be firm.



9. Some of the items produced by CSF arsenals require U.S. manufactured components and raw materials. The continued use of these materials often makes the Chinese as dependent on the U.S. as if they were not involved in end item manufacture at all. U.S. Services procure components required for the manufacture of ammunition in economic order quantities (quantities required by the Chinese seldom are large enough by themselves to justify new production runs and exceptionally long delays in deliveries may result). In cases such as these, completed items may be more readily available from U.S. Service supply systems for Military Assistance Programs than the components required to manufacture the item. Two lessons have been learned

from this. First, when a make/buy decision is being made, insure that this economic/production factor is fully taken into consideration. The non-availability of components will become increasingly critical as U.S. production programs in support of Vietnam operations are sharply cut back. Second, once a decision to produce components required for manufacture of an end item has been made, long range requirements planning must be accomplished and firm orders placed for consolidated multiple year needs (three to five years in advance of the year of use).

13. Instructions pertaining to the excess programs state that country requirements for excesses offered must relate to previously approved, defined and unfunded shortfall requirements. It should be recognized that "items of opportunity" do and will become available through the excess programs. It should also be recognized that as "Excess" assistance replaced Grant Aid assistance realistic programming will become more and more difficult due to the inherent unpredictability of excesses.

15. A year of experience is required for any individual to acquire an effective knowledge of military assistance programming. A two-year tour provides one year of really useful contribution to the work. The assignment, therefore, should be for at least three years, and the individual should be schooled prior to arrival at the military assistance duty station.

16. A re-orientation of advisory effort that emphasizes modern management systems must allow sufficient time for the education and training of host country personnel in the fundamentals of these new techniques. Formal programs should not be established until a sufficient number of qualified personnel have completed the necessary training.

18. Greater effectiveness can be achieved in teaching operation, maintenance, and trouble shooting of new equipment through the employment of mobile training teams (MTT's) and Technical Assistance Teams (TAT's). These teams can train more personnel for the same cost than is possible through individual training under MATP and FMS; also, instruction can be tailored to satisfy unique situations and requirements. In addition, the use of in-country interpretors will minimize English language requirements and the technicians who will actually work on the equipment will receive direct training.

19. Advisors must continue to show patience when progress is not as great or rapid as we know it could be. Participation in joint training and operations is normally accomplished with less than wholehearted enthusiasm. When advisors point out the lack of aggressive cooperation in an area, the GRC Armed Forces will ask for additional aircraft or equipment. They will invariably use a deficiency or shortcoming as a means of asking for

additional equipment or assistance, even though the deficiency is due primarily to their own inaction. In the area of joint operation cooperation, the GRC Armed Forces will move at a pace suitable to their desires and to a point which serves the interests of their particular branch of service.

ANNEX A

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (S)

1. The U.S.-sponsored military assistance program for the Republic of China includes the following:

a. Grant Aid

b. Foreign Military Sales - Credit

c. Foreign Military Sales - Cash

d. Excess Defense Articles (EDA)

2. In addition to the U.S.-sponsored programs, MAAG-initiated programs in being within the ROC include the following:

a. Co-production

b. Repair and Overhaul of U.S. military equipment

c. GRC Self-sufficiency

3. Grant Aid monies have continued to decline during the period covered by this report, from $36 million in FY 69, to $25 million in FY 70. to $20 million in FY 71. The bulk of Grant Aid funds must be spent to pay for the packaging, crating, handling and transportation (PCH&T) charges attendant to acquisition of Excess Defense Articles. This leaves very little Grant Aid for investment item purchases after MAP training costs have been deducted.

5. The GRC continues to shoulder an increasing share of her own defense costs. (91% in FY 69; 95% in FY 70; 96% in FY 71; an estimated 97% in FY 72.) The trend of FMS is upward: $39.6 million in FY 69; $62.7 in FY 70, and $78.8 in FY 71. Major acquisitions desired by the GRC now to be procured under FMS, include: F-5E aircraft, LVTP-7, and naval communications, Radar and ECM equipment.

9. The Combined Service Forces (CSF), the unique fourth service of the GRC Armed Forces, has steadily increased her production capacities while she concurrently expands into new lines of manufacture. The CSF factory system produces indivdual equipment, uniforms, batteries, rubber goods and shoes, and combat rations. CSF arsenals produce most munitions required, some weapons to include M-14 rifles and M-60 machine guns, the 106mm recoilless rifle, and co-produce 1/4-Ton and 2-1/2-Ton trucks. Since March 1970, CSF has gained new capabilities and enhanced the self-sufficiency of the ROC as a whole.

10. In June 1970, a new production facility for the manufacture and loading of 5"/38 caliber projectiles was opened at the 61st Arsenal in Taipei. This is the first facility in the Chinese arsenal system capable of producing Navy ammunition. It can produce at the rate of 10,000 rounds per year on a one shift basis.

11. Also in June of 1970, CSF initiated operation of an IBM Model 360-20-5 computer for the Logistic Bureau. This was the first computer operation in CSF.

12. In November of 1970, construction was completed on a new roll powder plant for making mortar propellant increments at the 26th Arsenal. This plant and a previsouly completed double base powder facility are located at a new site about 15 miles north of the main 26th Arsenal installation at Kaohsiung.

13. In December of 1970, a 60mm and 81mm mortar projectile shop was opened at the 44th Arsenal, Taipei. The facility can produce projectiles for explosive, white phosphorus-smoke and illuminating loads. Annual production capability is 40,000 rounds per year. Facility cost was U.S. $629,000 of which $379,000 was MAP provided ($250,000 GRC).

14. In February 1971, the President of the ROC awarded CSF the first medal of commendation ever given to the Armed Forces of the ROC. This unprecedented award exemplifies the outstanding achievements of CSF.

15. In June 1971, the 60th Arsenal opened a new facility for manufacture of 7.62mm tracer ammunition. This was the first facility for tracer loading of small arms ammunition in the Chinese arsenal system.

16. In September 1971, a new facility for the production of 76mm Armor Piercing-Tracer (AP-T) ammunition was completed and opened. This line also could be converted to the production of 90mm AP-T with tooling changes and some equipment. The equipment, which was paid for by FMS credit funding in

the amount of U.S. $900,000, can produce 30,000 rounds per year on a single shift basis. Construction of the facility was paid for by GRC for approximately U.S. $100,000.

20. While CSF has no areas that require special monitoring by the CINCPAC staff during the changeover period, we can point forward to capabilities now being developed that will enhance the self-sufficiency of the GRC. These are:

a. Plans for production of gas masks (the type has not been decided upon).

b. Plans for production of 8" projectiles.

c. Plans to enhance capability to support 5"/38 caliber ammunition requirements by producing 5"/38 auxiliary detonating and base detonating fuzes.

d. Plans to produce caliber .50 and 20mm ammunition.

e. Plans to produce 5.56mm ammunition to support the M-16 rifles recently purchased.

f. Formative planning for the production of 105mm Howitzers, light tanks and armored personnel carriers.

21. A natural corollary of CSF's native production capabilities is the co-production program. In addition to the aforementioned "M"-series vehicles being co-produced by CSF plants and the M-14 rifles and M-60 machine guns, the GRC has embarked upon a helicopter co-production program under Chinese Air Force supervision. During FY 69, 70 and 71, the GRC obtained slightly over $20 million FMS Credits to co-produce fity UH-1H helicopters. Major assemblies, including engines, were provided under contractual agreements with the Bell Helicopter Company. Continuation of the helicopter co-production to produce an additional sixty-eight (68) helicopters is desired by the GRC by the end of 1976. Additionally, GRC desires to deviate from the current arrangements by establishing a separate engine manufacturing facility for the T-53 engine used in the UH-1H helicopter. New Memoranda of Understanding for continuation of the helicopter co-production program and for the T-53 engine program will be required. Funding requirements for both the helicopter and engine co-production programs have been included in the FY 72 FMS Plan. Full details of these programs, especially those concerning the engine co-production, have been furnished SECDEF/SECSTATE by joint AMEMB/MAAG message. Announcement of AMEMB support of the program has

been deferred pending further study.

22. Production and co-production are but two of the capabilities present among the GRC Armed Forces. Using assembly line methods and techniques developed in the manufacture of items, existing materiel can be renovated to "like new" condition. The rebuild/overhaul capacity of the GRC is not limited to CSF facilities; each of the combatant Services--Army, Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force--has Service-peculiar capacities which have been employed in renovating EDA and contract materiel.

23. U.S. Government and 3d Country Contract Rebuild Program. This program, initiated by MAAG and subsequently taken over by the Taiwan Materiel Agency, has grown to the point that a significant capability has been developed by the Chinese. This program has created the following major benefits:

a. Rebuild of equipment at a substantial monetary savings to the U.S. Government. (30 contracts have been completed, 23 are in progress, and 2 are pending.)

b. Development of the capability, personnel and facility wise, by the Chinese to overhaul and rebuild modern equipment. This capability presents a vast potential for regional rebuild to accommodate needs of other countries in the Pacific area.

c. The contract rebuild program has made a significant contribution to the economy of ROC and to the goal of self-sufficiency.

26. The contract rebuild program has grown from a $2.6 million FY 70 beginning to $4.4 million in FY 71; FY 72's estimated volume is $5.9 million. A striking illustration of the dollar savings which the U.S. can realize by taking advantage of GRC/s rebuild/overhaul capabilities is in the IRAN of F-100 aircraft. The same job that would cost approximately $235,000 if performed by a U.S. contractor cost $25,000 when performed in Taiwan. A secondary benefit is the comparable proportionate savings in time.

28. The GRC's growing self-sufficiency in the production and maintenance of military materiel can be capitalized upon by means of the PACOM Regional Cooperation concept. As proposed by MAAG-China, participating free Asian nations would exchange services for their mutual benefit; the exchanges would benefit the U.S. by reducing the requirement for Grant Aid programs and the U.S. personnel to manage them. The GRC could actively enter such a cooperative arena now if the diplomatic climate would permit.

29. New Self-Sufficiency Programs.

a. As the GRC Armed Forces refined their basic military techniques and accomplished force and weaponry modernization, advisory effort emphasis has been directed into assisting in the development of a self-sufficiency program which will sustain the ROC after MAP has ceased. In keeping with objectives of the Nixon Doctrine, MAAG-China has within resources available stepped up advice and assistance to the individual Armed Forces in those areas which will directly contribute to expanding their capacity for self-help.

f. The Chinese Navy Research and Development organization initiated a project of construction of cement boats. An LSU craft was being constructed as a test boat but many problems existed during an inspection of the Research and Development organization shipyard. Recommendations were given to improve the existing test boat and arrangements were made with the Republic of Vietnam to allow Chinese officers to visit their cement boat shipyard and obtain instructions from the RVN personnel who have experience in cement boat construction.

g. Under CN supervision, GRC facilities are beginning an LST ship building program at the rate of one every six months until a total of 12 have been constructed. Twelve P-42 (42 foot, 40 knot gunboats, with a cruising range of 400 nautical miles, armed with 20mm cannon, 2.75" rocket launchers, and 50 caliber machine guns) have been completed within the past year. They have also built one P-60 (60 foot, 41.8 knot gunboat with similar armament except 40mm vice 20mm). They are planning to build PGM's similar to the U.S. Navy's new line of PG's; however, the state-of-the-art of Chinese Navy technicians and shipyard personnel is not yet adequate to take on electronics and advanced weapons systems.

Military Assistance Security Objectives-ROC

(S) On 1 December 1971, the SECDEF forwarded to CINCPAC the security assistance guidelines for FY 74 and outyears. Included were the new objectives for MAP in China which were referred to in the first paragraph of the preceding report:[1]

1. Assist the ROC in maintaining forces for the effective defense of ROC-administered territory within limits of U.S. commitments.

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[1] SECDEF 4931/011617Z Dec 71

2. Insure continued availability of essential rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements.

3. Protect U.S. facilties.

4. Insure, as appropriate, a country environment and infrastructure compatible with possible U.S. contingency deployment requirements under the Mutual Defense Treaty.

(S) Guidelines to achieve these objectives were:[1]

1. U.S. will not provide arms transfers for support or use of ROC forces as a theater reserve or a return to the mainland.

2. Accord first priority to effective air defense capabilities, followed by naval capabilities to protect contiguous sea areas.

3. Encourage modernization and increased combat readiness of armed forces with, as necessary, commensurate manpower reductions in ground forces.

4. Propose FMS credit in amounts compatible with projected foreign exchange position.

5. Continue to improve in-country logistics organizations, procedures, and administration.

6. Continue to expand production/co-production projects essential to defense capabilities within ROC economic and technical capabilities, including ROC assistance to third countries under regional cooperation concept.

7. Establish in-country training programs, allowing phaseout of basic training by U.S. by FY 78.

8. Seek development of 5-year costed-out plan for projected force structure and weapons.

9. Attempt to limit ROC military expenditures to ten percent of GNP.

Equipment and Project Activities

(C) Various end items of equipm ent were provided to the ROC during 1971, and programs for cost sharing and co-production were pursued. On 8 January 1971, the Chief of Staff, USAF advised CINCPAC of a ROC request for ten T-33

[1] Ibid.

trainer aircraft. The CSAF acknowledged that sufficient T-33s were in storage to meet the requirement, and requested CINCPAC's comments on the delivery of the aircraft in "as is" condition, with reconditioning to be financed by the ROC. The Chief, MAAG agreed that the expressed need was legitimate because of increased student quotas in the ROC Air Force Academy. CINCPAC agreed to the conditions, and requested CSAF to establish a delivery program under the major item excess (MIMEX) procedures. Five of the aircraft were available in the PACOM, and could be flight delivered. The remaining five, which were in the CONUS, were to be transported by surface vessel. Delivery was scheduled for completion by January 1972.[1]

(S) In 1970, CINCPAC had deferred a decision on a MAAG request to retain UH-19 search and rescue (SAR) helicopters until sufficient modern HH-1H SAR helicopters had been received by the ROC. Although some HH-1Hs had been received by 1971, no more were scheduled until FY 73. On 7 December 1970, MAAG reaffirmed the need to retain seven UH-19s, and, after coordination with USAF materiel agencies, CINCPAC granted approval for retention through FY 72, with the cost of operating and maintaining the helicopters to be borne by the ROC.[2]

(S) On 5 May 1969, the State Department and DOD jointly approved the first phase of a co-production program in China for UH-1 helicopters. Funding for the initial production of 50 UH-1s was approved in three phases--$5 million in FY 69 FMS credits, $9 million for FY 70, and $8 million for FY 71. Phase I of the program specified the fabrication, assembly, test and acceptance of one Bell UH-1 at Forth Worth. This helicopter was to be disassembled and crated for ocean shipment to China by Bell-trained Chinese technicians. After that, nine sets of major assemblies were to be shipped for in-country assembly and flight testing. Beginning with the second aircraft, assembly was to be performed by the Aero Industry Development Center of the Chinese Air Force. Phase I also specified the buildup of facilities by the ROC to support the program. Phase II provided for 16 sets of major assemblies to be shipped to China, mated with Chinese-produced parts, assembled, and tested. Phase III was identical to Phase II, and would involve the balance of the 50 UH-1s. The first co-production UH-1H was delivered to the Chinese Army on 14 December 1970. Phase I shipments were completed during February 1971. Phase II shipments were scheduled for completion by January 1972, and Phase III by October 1972.[3]

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[1] J5332 HistSum Jan 71; CSAF 081750Z Jan 71; CHMAAG Taipei 190030Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 260119Z Jan 71; MA Journal, No. 118, p. 104.

[2] MA Journal, No. 115, p. 110; J5332 HistSum Jan 71; CHMAAG Taipei 071001Z Dec 70; DIR MAT MGT Robins AFB 071625Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 230253Z Jan 71.

[3] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 333; MA Journal, No. 116, pp. 115-116; J8232 Point Paper, 9 Nov 71, Subj: Helicopter Co-production for GRC.

(S) In September 1971, the Chief, MAAG submitted an evaluation of two stated ROC military equipment requirements to CINCPAC. These were a change from S-2A anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft to P-3 for the one ROC ASW squadron, and additional air defense missile launchers together with an increased missile basic load. The MAAG supported both, citing the obsolescence of the S-A2, and the enhancement of the missile kill capability if the air defense launchers and missiles were increased. Upon query, CINCUSARPAC supported the air defense expansion, and, on 21 October, CINCPAC advised the MAAG to submit appropriate program changes.[1]

(S) The standard tank used by the ROC Army had been the M41, of which 635 had been acquired before they became unavailable. Electing to fill the remaining ROC Army shortfall of 415 tanks by switching to M48A1s, efforts began in late 1970 to acquire M48s through excess sources. In December 1970, CINCPAC proposed that 415 M48 tanks be allocated to the ROC from U.S. excess assets, basing his proposal on the ROC capability to rebuild, arm, and maintain this weapon. However, the Defense Control Group determined that, after meeting the needs of more pressing country allocations outside the PACOM, the remaining assets would not be viable for the ROC from an economic standpoint. In August, the U.S. Ambassador in Taipei urged that M48 tanks be provided to the ROC. The Ambassador conceded the higher priority allocated to air defense and naval capability, but considered the political benefits of tank procurement to be substantial. CINCPAC strongly endorsed the Embassy position, but, as of the end of 1971, no decision had been made by DOD.[2]

(S) In past years, the ROC had expressed an intense interest in the acquisition of submarines for ASW training and defense. U.S. military agencies had gone on record against providing this capability. The Chinese officials were insistent, however, and, following a visit by CINCPAC to Taipei in June 1971, it was determined that efforts to obtain submarines for the ROC were warranted. The Ambassador concurred in the same message in which he had supported the M48 tank procurement, and CINCPAC also supported the submarine procurement. The SECDEF decided that submarines should be delivered to the ROC, but, in conjunction with the State Department, agreed that no announcement of the decision be made until after President Nixon's visit to Peking, which was scheduled for February 1972. At the end of 1971, State and Defense had agreed that submarine crew training could begin in March 1972, but the entire

[1] J5332 HistSum Sep 71; J8232 HistSum Oct 71; CHMAAG Taipei 170501Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 242222Z Sep 71; CINCUSARPAC 090350Z Oct 71; CINCPAC 212112Z Oct 71.

[2] J5332 HistSum Jan and Aug 71; ADMIN CINCPAC 092210Z Dec 70; JCS 9898/122030Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 230244Z Jan 71; SECDEF 2071/262217Z Jan 71; AMEMB Taipei 3866/060454Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 130350Z Aug 71; J825 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: Medium Tank Requirements.

matter was to be kept in very low key.[1]

CINCPAC Evaluation of China MAP - FY 71[2]

(U) The CINCPAC evaluation of MAP effectiveness during FY 71 was conducted in May 1971 by the CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG). The evaluation found the MAAG to be functioning effectively, even though personnel strength had declined. Further reduction in assigned manpower was scheduled for FY 72. The high caliber of assigned personnel, their professional and dedicated efforts, and the extremely fine rapport and close relationship established with their ROC counterparts had contributed immeasurably to the successful accomplishment of the MAAG mission. The MAAG advisory and assistance efforts had resulted in outstanding success in the development of a growing self-sufficiency on the part of the ROC to meet its own defense requirements. With assistance and guidance from the MAAG, the ROC had aggressively undertaken production of selected defense materials and had entered into several highly successful co-production/cost-sharing arrangements with U.S. firms and government agencies. One of the the most significant examples of progress was the effective application of automatic data processing procedures in the field of supply and maintenance management, introduced through MAAG assistance in all ROC services. Even in the face of severe personnel reductions, the MAAG continued to effectively perform those functions necessary to the continued improvement of the ROC defense capability.

(S) The CHINA MAP was effective within the funding ceilings prescribed by higher headquarters. From a recent high of $95 million in FY 66, U.S. grant aid to the ROC had decreased to $20 million in FY 71. However, during this same period, foreign military sales to the ROC had increased from $6 million to $79 million. The ROC had assumed an increasing portion of the national defense budget to a point where 96 percent of defense costs were self-financed. The level of U.S. grant aid O&M support to the ROC had been phased down, and was expected to be eliminated by FY 75, at which time grant aid funds would primarily go toward purchase of major investment items. With a growing defense budget and decreasing U.S. grant aid support, the ROC had very actively participated in various U.S. excess materiel programs in an attempt to meet national defense needs. The ROC was expected to receive $66 million (acquisition value) in U.S. excess defense material during FY 71. This level was limited by Congressional ceilings imposed.

[1] J825 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: Submarines for GRC; J82 Hist Sum, Oct & Dec 71; SECDEF 6409/131256Z Oct 71; CNO 4950/171809Z Dec 71; SECDEF 7955/202207Z Dec 71.

[2] Ltr, CINCPAC, Ser 001522 of 12 Jul 71, Subj: Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program in China, with one encl; Final Report on the CINCPAC FY 71 Evaluation of the MAP in China.

(S) The MAP planning and programming functions of MAAG China were being effectively carried out within the guidance provided by higher authority and within assigned resources. MAP planning and programming was centralized at HQ MAAG under the Assistant Chief of Staff, Programs, where close and effective coordination was maintained with all Service and staff sections, and with the Ministry of National Defense (MND).

(U) Meaningful end-use surveillance of material funished and personnel trained at U.S. expense had become increasingly difficult because of severe MAAG personnel reductions. Althought the level of U.S. grant aid support to the ROC had decreased, other forms of military assistance such as FMS and excess materiel deliveries had increased. A need still existed for adequate MAAG personnel staffing to manage the total military assistance program, notwithstanding a low level of grant aid support.

(C) In light of reduced U.S. grant aid support and the heavy burden on the ROC economy for defense requirements, continued delivery of defense articles through U.S. excess programs was essential to support the needs of the ROC Armed Forces. The ROC had achieved remarkable success in increasing its self-sufficiency through various cost-sharing and co-production projects, rebuild facilities and in-country production of items such as ammunition and repair parts.

(S) The MAAG China training advisory effort was effective and should continue to remain so even with the reduction in the MAAG China staff. The coordination between U.S. advisors and their ROC counterparts was outstanding. The ROC training base was well developed and effective. The Armed Forces were self-sufficient in established programs, needing advisory effort only in planning and programming and for establishing priorities in training on new systems and equipment. MAAG liaison effort will continue to be required between Chinese schools and their U.S. counterparts in order to keep the teaching methods, lesson plans and course material current.

(C) The logistics effort of MAAG China to accomplish the MAP objectives was considered effective. Logistics advisors were competent and well-motivated, and the result of the advisory efforts was readily apparent in the improvements in the Armed Forces. These included implementation of improved logistics management systems and a high degree of success in developing means of improving self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency had progressed to a remarkable degree, not only by the construction of new factories and capabilities, but within the services at all levels from units to commands. The only limiting factors were retention of skills in the face of civilian competition, and the lack of funds for procurement of production equipment. Much ingenuity had been displayed in producing machines which will do the job. The concurrent reduction of MAP

funds and MAAG personnel had created a difficult situation. It had been surmounted to a great degree by the dedication and professionalism of MAAG personnel, skillful reprogramming actions to meet the most critical needs of the Armed Forces, and by the aggressive use of MAPEX procedures for obtaining PACOM excess materiel for the Armed Forces. Much newer type materiel had been obtained which would not otherwise be available because of the critical shortage of MAP funds.

(S) Within the communications-electronics advisory area, the ability of CHMAAG to effectively perform the assigned advisory and program development functions had been adversely affected by past and programmed manpower reductions. Elimination of all communications advisors from the Army, Navy, and Marine Service advisory sections was degrading Republic of China C&E modernization programs. The MND had effective command control of the force for peacetime operations and short-term defense of Taiwan, but the command control communications system would not be able to support sustained combat. The reasons for this were the shortages of tactical equipment within the Army, obsolescence of strategic communication equipment in each of the Services, and high vulnerability to destruction of the long haul point-to-point Military Integrated Communications System. An area in each of the Services which required improvement was communications systems management. To achieve complete self-sufficiency, the ROC Armed Forces must develop organic capability to perform requirements analysis, system engineering, resource management, requirements priority, procurement and contract negotiation for communications-electronics systems.

(U) The Comptroller function of the MAAG China was being performed in an effective manner. Compliance with all pertinent regulations and directives was being accomplished. The MAAG China Comptroller had established an effective advisory program and the efforts expended in this area were well received at all levels of the GRC Armed Forces. The rapport established with GRC counterparts was excellent and effective strides were being made in the updating of high level management techniques. Continued MAAG Comptroller efforts in this regard were considered highly desirable with the aim of providing the GRC with an integrated management program that can eventually lead to a capability for economic trade-offs.

(U) From the personnel viewpoint, MAAG China was appropriately organized, morale was high and the MAAG was functioning effectively. It was evident that the relationship established between the MAAG and host country personnel was outstanding; however, manpower reductions were curtailing the extent of the advisory effort throughout all MAAG agencies, placing greater reliance on the centralized service advisory sections.

Indonesia

(S) Prior to 1970, Indonesia MAP was oriented toward civic action. In 1970, a shift in policy took place in which the U.S. Government would, subject to the availability of funds, provide combat equipment appropriate to the internal defense needs of Indonesia. The resultant increase in the flow of MAP items was accompanied by an increase in authorized personnel for the Defense Liaison Group (DLG), which was the U.S. MAP element in Indonesia. Authorized manpower for the DLG increased from 25 in FY 70 to 40 in FY 71, and, as previously recorded in this chapter, to 69 for FY 72.[1]

(S) The shift in security assistance policy to the furnishing of combat equipment, combined with the increased presence in-country of U.S. military personnel, was considered by the U.S. Ambassador to have potentially significant political sensitivity. In March 1971, the Ambassador reviewed the discussions and correspondence leading to the manpower increase. He noted the requirement for surveillance of the end use of MAP-supplied U.S. equipment imposed under the Foreign Assistance Act, but cautioned that the size of the official American presence in Indonesia was approaching the ceiling above which, in his judgment, political problems would emerge. At the same time, the Ambassador stated that his views were, " not meant to be critical or in any way to downgrade magnificent support we have had from CINCPAC on every hand...."[1]

Interagency Study Group

(S) In January 1971, the SECDEF notified CINCPAC that an Interagency Study Group (ISG), representing DOD, State Department, JCS and the National Security Council, would visit Indonesia to develop a proposed security package within the $25 million dollar ceiling. The ISG was headed by RADM W. R. Flanagan, Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA).[2]

(TS) The ISG report to the National Security Council, dated 24 February 1971, contained three optional program packages. On 16 March 1971, the JCS recommended to the SECDEF that the third option, with modifications, be adopted. This provided for a modest strike force, an upgraded logistic facility for each Service, and a modest major item equipment program for the Indonesian Navy and Air Force. The modifications included a program to upgrade the Indonesian training structure in-country, a restriction on funds for

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 12, 335, 338.
2 AMEMB Djakarta 2740/310900Z Mar 71.
3 J5321 HistSum Jan 71; SECDEF 1153/150031Z Jan 71.

INDONESIA

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BASIC INFORMATION *

AREA	736,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	122.5 MIL
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.7 %
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.4 ACRE
LITERCY RATE	60%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	42 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1971 (E)	$9 BIL
PER CAPITA	$90
DEFENSE BUDGET 1971 (E)	$430 MIL
AS % OF CENTRAL GOVT EXP. (SELF FINANCED)	24%
AS % OF GNP	11%

PRESIDENT - GEN Suharto ●
MINISTER OF DEFENSE/AND SECURITY - GEN Suharto
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Adam Malik
NAVY CDR - VADM Sudomo
AF CDR - AIR MARSHAL Suwoto
COMMANDANT MARCORPS - MGEN Anwar
ARMY CDR - GEN Umar
AF CINC - GEN Suharto
AF VICE CINC - GEN Panggabean



OVERALL OBJECTIVE *

CONTINUED AVAILABILITY TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES OF SEA AND AIR ROUTES BETWEEN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN AREAS.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S.AMBASSADOR ---------
HON. FRANCIS J. GALBRAITH

USAID REPRESENTATIVE
MR. RICHARD M. CASLER

COL TAYLOR R. FULTON, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES *

1. To encourage the government of Indonesia (GOI) to maintain friendly relations with their neighbors and with the United States.
2. To encourage the Indonesian government to pursue responsible economic and fiscal policies.
3. To give tangible support to the government's desire to maintain an effective military establishment for defense and the Armed Forces Civic Rehabilitation Program.
4. To foster the development of professionally competent GOI Armed Forces as a stabilizing element in Indonesian society.

	MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES* *	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES* *	COMBAT CAPABILITY *
ARMY	11 Inf Bde(36 Bns), Abn Bde(6 Bns) 1 Para/Cmdo Regt, 1 Cav Bde 1 FA Regt, 1 ADA Regt, 20 Inf Bn(Sep) 10 Eng Bn(Combat, 1 Eng Gp(Const) 1 AVN unit Total Strength 160,000	15 Inf Bde, 2 AB Bde, 1 Para Com Regt, 1 Cav Bde, 4 FA Regt, 4 ADA Regt, 52 Inf Bn (SEP, 6 Cav Bn (SEP), 5 FA Bn (SEP, 10 Eng Bn (SEP) (COMBAT), 1 AVN Total Strength 256,000	MAINTAIN EXTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL MAJOR INCURSIONS BUT NOT A MAJOR ATTACK. LAUNCH AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (- BRIGADE STRENGTH).
NAVY	2 DD, 4 DE, 26 PC, 9 PGM, 6 MSC, 4 MSF, 10 LST, 2 AP, 8 AKL, 2 AO, 2 ARL, 1 HELO Sqdn, 1 Recon Sqdn, 1 Trans Sqdn Total Strength 20,000 1 Recon Bn, 4 Inf Bn, 1 Arty Bn, 1 Eng Bn, 1 Trec Bn(Amphib) TS 10,000	6 DE, 4 SS, 26 PC, 6 MSC, 9 LST, 1 ARL, 1 Helo Sqdn, 1 Trans Sqdn, 2 Bdes Total Strength 300,000(Navy) 16,000(Marine)	PARTIALLY SUPPRESS SMALL SCALE AND PROVIDE LIMITED SUPPORT FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. CONDUCT COAST SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS AND ASW OPERATIONS. INDONESIA NAVY IS INCAPABLE OF PROVIDING REGIMENTAL SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS.
AIR FORCE	1 Ftr Intep Sqdn, 2 TAC Ftr Sqdn, 1 SAF Sqdn, 3 Lt Trans Sqdn, 2 Med Trans Sqdn, 3 Helo Sqdn Total Strength 20,000	8 C-130, 30 C-47, 5 F-51, 2 B-26, 5 UH-1, 11 T-41, 30 T-34, 12 Czech L-29 and various Russian acft i.e., MIG 17, MIG 21, TU-16, helicopters, IL-14 and Misc helicopters.	FORCES IN TEJU ARE MARGINALLY READY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE BOMBING OPERATIONS AND VER AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND TO SUPPORT MINOR GROUND OPERATIONS. A MAJORITY OF THE RUSSIAN PROVIDED AIRCRAFT ARE INOPERABLE DUE TO THE LACK OF SPARE PARTS.

*AS OF 1 JAN 1972
● Updated By J2
○ Updated by J5
* Updated by J8

SECRET

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 137.

Indonesian intelligence functions to essential in-country activities, and the establishment of element priorities for the third option package.[1]

MAP Policy Guidelines

(S) On 7 May 1971, the SECDEF advised that, based on the ISG report, the FY 72-73 dollar guideline was approved at $25 million. The program would include equipment for two elite air transportable brigades, jet trainers, combat jets, communications equipment, destroyers, and the upgrading of maintenance and training facilities. The SECDEF further advised that discussions were authorized with the Indonesian Government about the program on a selective, close hold basis, but only after force levels and funding had been approved. CINCPAC expressed reservations to the SECDEF regarding the introduction of jet aircraft and destroyers to the detriment of items programmed to improve the current operational capabilities of the Indonesian military forces.[2]

(S) The reservations expressed by CINCPAC were overtaken by the alacrity with which the Ambassador briefed the President of Indonesia on the program. On the same day, 10 May, that CINCPAC's views were sent to the SECDEF, the Chief, DLG had been instructed by CINCPAC not to open discussions with Indonesia prior to receipt of formal approval. Also on 10 May, the Chief DLG notified CINCPAC that the State Department had authorized the Ambassador to discuss the future MAP in general terms with the President of Indonesia. On 11 May, CINCPAC requested the Ambassador to exclude the provision of jet aircraft and destroyers in his discussions, because of CINCPAC's expressed reservations.[3]

(S) On 13 June, CINCPAC advised the SECDEF of his reasons for nonconcurrence with the jet aircraft and destroyer proviso in the proposed MAP. The cost of operating and maintaining jets, including the jet trainer which would be required, was cited, as well as the limited maintenance and overhaul facilities of the Indonesian Navy. Specifically, CINCPAC noted that the acquisition of destroyers by the Philippines had not been supported, and that if they were provided to Indonesia, the Philippine demands would be renewed. Potentially, a Navy arms race could develop among PACOM nations. CINCPAC, therefore, requested authority to exclude the jets and destroyers from DLG discussions with Indonesia. The following day, CINCPAC and the State Department were informed by the Ambassador that his briefing to President Suharto on 10 May had included the programmed jets and destroyers. The Ambassador added that since

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[1] J5334 HistSum Mar 71, citing JCS 7227/252348Z Mar 71 (EX).
[2] J5333 HistSum May 71; SECDEF 1800/072335Z May 71; CINCPAC 102011Z May 71.
[3] CINCPAC 112142Z May 71.

the inclusion of these items had been greeted with pleasure by Indonesian officials, he did not see how the U.S. could renege on this offer.[1]

(S) On 16 June, CINCPAC authorized DLG to initiate discussions with the Indonesian Department of Defense and Security (HANKAM). The Chief, DLG report on this meeting indicated that special emphasis was placed by U.S. briefers on the options open to HANKAM with respect to adjustments in funding or timing. Indonesian reaction indicated the likelihood that communications and the equipping and supporting of the two airmobile brigades would be high on their list of priorities. It was indicated to the DLG that HANKAM would be the single point of contact for DLG on all matters concerning the development of MAP plans and the execution of future MAP programs. The Service sections of the DLG were to confine their activities with Indonesian counterpart Services to the execution of currently approved programs. All matters concerning future requirements and projects were to be dealt with by the newly-established HANKAM/USDLG coordination office. The Chief, DLG interpreted these instructions to indicate that HANKAM intended to be the controlling voice in all aspects of individual Service operations.[2]

(S) On 13 July, the HANKAM delivered formal notice to the Chief, DLG outlining the major projects desired in the FY 72-73 Indonesian MAP. Included were two airmobile brigades, one destroyer type vessel, and T-33 jet trainers, C-47D transport aircraft and HU-1H helicopters, in addition to other items previously approved under the original MAP for FY 72.[3]

(S) In September, CINCPAC advised the SECDEF that HANKAM had expressed a strong desire to participate in joint planning for Indonesia MAP through FY 78. The Chief, DLG concurred, and CINCPAC requested SECDEF approval to reply affirmatively to the HANKAM request. The SECDEF approved with the caveat that HANKAM be informed that such mutual examination of outyear planning did not constitute a commitment to support by the U.S. Particularly, it was to be stressed that U.S. military security assistance support was subject to review and approval through the annual U.S. budgeting process.[4]

Air Defense Aircraft vs. COIN Aircraft

(S) The HANKAM strongly favored the programming of T-33 jet trainers in the FY 72-73 MAP, vice the T-37 or other alternatives. The choice apparently was based on the low cost of the T-33s and the short lead time for acquisition.

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[1] J533 HistSum Jun 71; CINCPAC 130001Z Jun 71; AMEMB Djakarta 5117/140936Z Jun 71.
[2] CINCPAC 161402Z Jun 71; CHDLG Djakarta 190541Z Jun 71.
[3] J5331 HistSum Jul 71; CHDLG Djakarta 170815Z Jul 71.
[4] SECDEF 8320/0420357 Oct 71; J8233 HistSum Oct 71

However, neither the HANKAM nor the Indonesian Air Force (AURI) had decided on the type of tactical aircraft desired to follow the T-33 jet trainer project. Although air defense aircraft had been a stated requirement for the late 1970s, some key HANKAM and AURI planners were questioning the wisdom of spending limited MAP funds for expensive air defense aircraft when no external air threat was foreseen during that period. This view held that a more immediate and realistic requirement was a COIN aircraft and additional transport aircraft to support possible COIN operations. The Chief, DLG and CINCPAC concurred in this rationale, and CINCPAC requested that the USAF Chief of Staff provide available data on the new standard COIN aircraft after tests, evaluations, and selection had been accomplished.[1]

(S) On 25 September 1971, the JCS notified CINCPAC of an Australian proposal to provide Indonesia with 16 Sabre Jet aircraft, plus a substantial quantity of spare parts. The initial JCS reaction was favorable if Australia intended to provide sufficient training and support so that Indonesia would not seek to use limited U.S. MAP funds to support the aircraft. CINCPAC concurred in the JCS evaluation that this development was beneficial to all concerned; however, CINCPAC added that it should be closely monitored and evaluated because the Indonesians already had large numbers of obsolete aircraft. On 27 September, the U.S. State Department notified Ambassador Galbraith that the Australian Embassy had been advised that the Australian plan was compatible with U.S. programs, and that the U.S. wished to encourage Australia to go ahead with detailed discussions with Indonesia. After reviewing all the factors involved, especially the rapidly shrinking U.S. MAP dollars, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS, on 21 November 1971, that the United States reevaluate its support of the Australian proposal to the extent that "we insist that the Australians be prepared to provide MAP type support to the Indonesians so long as they operate the F-86 squadron which they will apparently receive from Australia." CINCPAC also apprised Ambassador Galbraith of his reservations on this matter in messages of 3 and 11 December 1971. On 22 December, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the U.S. position with respect to the Australian plan to provide the 16 Sabre Jets to Indonesia had been reviewed. The Departments of State and Defense had agreed that the United States should continue to encourage the Australians toward consummation of the transfer, and that it was not politically feasible for the U.S. to insist that Australia provide any particular level of assistance to Indonesia. The JCS further advised that the U.S. had a number of reasons for expecting that the Australians would make every effort to support the proposed Indonesian F-86 squadron with an adequate

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[1] J5333 HistSum Aug 71; CHDLG Djakarta 050945Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 071959Z Aug 71.

level of military assistance.[1]

Indonesian MAP Communications Program

(S) In October 1970, CINCPAC described to the SECDEF a project to provide a command control communications system to the Indonesian armed forces under MAP. The program was expected to extend over a five year period at an estimated equipment cost of about $10.3 million. CINCPAC requested SECDEF to appoint a Military Department as project manager and that the possibilities of an Engineer, Furnish and Install (EF&I) contract be explored. This was because of the magnitude of the project, the short time contraints on installation of the first phase, and the lack of communications expertise in-country. The SECDEF assigned the Indo Comm project to the U.S. Army with USASTRATCOM being the action agency. STRATCOM listed the priorities for all systems and networks within the Indo Comm project over the FY 71 through FY 75 time period. These priorities were developed by a STRATCOM survey team during January 1971 in conjunction with the DLG and Indonesians. STRATCOM pointed out that the required Initial Operational Capability (OIC) date for the HANKAM and police nets was 1 June 1971, but that specific dates had not been established for the remaining priorities. On 16 February, the Chief, DLG, concurred in the priorities and IOC dates for the systems; however, he pointed out that the program and priorities would probably require adjustment during following years as a result of changes in the "environment." The "environment" referred to the development of a commercial communications system being installed by Australia and Japan under the auspices of the International Group for the Government of Indonesia (IGGI). This system, scheduled to be completed by 1973/74 would potentially be used to satisfy some military communications requirements. If this program developed as envisioned the system being installed under Indo Comm would be converted to satisfy FY 74/75 tactical communications requirements. In addition, the word "environment" referred to the relationship of project Indo Comm costs to the total Indonesian MAP dollar guideline during follow-on years while considering the priority of other planned weapon systems. CINCPAC hosted a conference during the week of 1 March 1971 which included the Chief, DLG and CGUSASTRATCOM. The purpose of the meeting was to receive a "how goes it" summary of the project status, as well as to resolve FY 71 funding difficulties and reach understandings regarding organizational relationships, numbers of personnel that could be in-country, and support requirements to be provided by Chief, DLG.[2]

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[1] JCS 1212/251527Z Sep 71 (EX); CINCPAC 260335Z Sep 71 (EX); SECSTATE 177751/272245Z Sep 71, CINCPAC 210109Z Nov 71, CINCPAC 030311Z Dec 71 (EX); CINCPAC 111001Z Dec 71 (EX); JCS 1119/222257Z Dec 71.

[2] CINCPAC 170242Z Mar 71.

(S) On 2 June 1971, the U.S. Government formally transferred to Indonesia the first increment of the communications system. The network provided point to point communications from the HANKAM to six subordinate unified command areas, at a cost of $2.3 million. This was followed by a technical working group meeting in Djakarta during the week of 14 June, attended by CINCPAC representatives. The second system to be installed, according to priorities established by HANKAM and DLG, was the Army MABAD to KODAM network. The MABAD was the Army headquarters in Djakarta, and the KODAMs were 17 Army regions throughout the Archipelago.[1]

Project PEACE PONY

(S) A two-phase project to provide the AURI with a close air support capability through MAP support was approved by the SECDEF on 11 December 1970. The USAF was tasked to oversee the project. On 20 January 1971, CINCPAC forwarded MAP changes amounting to $1,036 million to fund Phase I, which was to rehabilitate seven in-country F-51 aircraft. Phase I also provided for a two-year spares support package and two new TF-51 trainer aircraft. Phase II, to be funded by FY 72 and later MAP, was to upgrade the initial seven, plus five more F-51s to the Mustang II configuration, provide a five-year spares support package, and one additional new TF-51. The estimated cost of Phase II was $1,386 million.[2]

(C) The purpose of the reconditioning program was to replace World War II vintage avionics, hydraulics, electrical instrumentation, fuel systems, engines, and propellers with modern versions. The first phase of PEACE PONY was completed on 24 September 1971.[3]

Korea

(C) After almost a year of behind-the-scene negotiations between the U.S. Government and the Republic of Korea (ROK), a joint statement was issued simultaneously at Seoul and Washington, D.C. on 6 February 1971. The statement announced the completion of satisfactory talks on the program for the modernization of the Korean armed forces and arrangements for the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. The U.S. had agreed to assist the ROK through a long range MAP, and consultations on the announced reduction of U.S. troop strength in Korea by 20,000, with consequent repositioning of in-country U.S. and Korean forces, had been concluded in a spirit of mutual understanding and close

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1 J614 HistSum Jun 71; CINCPAC 052335Z Jul 71.
2 J43 HistSum Feb 71; SECDEF 7876/112351Z Dec 70; CINCPAC 200040Z Jan 71; AFLC 182303Z Jan 71; CSAF 151430Z Jan 71.
3 J824 HistSum Dec 71; CHDLG Djakarta 240954Z Sep 71.

cooperation. Continued U.S. support of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 was affirmed, and high level security consultative meetings were to continue annually to assess the threat against the ROK. On 12-13 July, the security consultative meeting for 1971 referred to in the announcement took place in Seoul, Korea. The principal U.S. delegates were Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Admiral McCain, CINCPAC. Assessments of the threat in the PACOM were presented by CINCPAC and the ROK Minister of Nation Defense (MND) representative.[1]

(S) On 9 June 1971, the Commander, U.S. Force, Korea (COMUSKOREA) appeared before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives to discuss U.S. programs in Korea. While discussing MAP objectives and accomplishments in Korea, COMUSKOREA stated that the ROK military was continuing to develop and to shoulder more of the burden of national defense. However, modernization of the ROK military was necessary if the Armistice and in-country stability were to be preserved. The joint U.S.-ROK five year modernization plan, which amounted to $1.25 billion in grant aid, $250 million in EDA credits, and a ROK contribution of $210 million for operating costs, represented, "...the minimum amount of modernization equipment considered necessary to provide the ROK with an adequate deterrence against NK threats...."[2]

Korea MAP Funds

(S) On 29 January 1971, the SECDEF advised CINCPAC that, with Congressional approval of the supplemental appropriation for FY 71 requested by the President, the Korean MAP level was $290.8 million. Ten days before, however, the SECDEF had informed CINCPAC that the FY 72 budget program level for Korea would be $239.4 million, which was $40 million less than the FY 72 dollar guideline used to develop the FY 72 MAP for Korea.[3]

(S) In February, CINCPAC recapitulated the funding for the five year plan in response to a COMUSKOREA request for restoration of funds for FY 72. CINCPAC noted that the original plan assumed a dollar level of $295 million, of which $290 was approved. Added to the $40 million shortfall for FY 72, the total was $45 million. However, it was anticipated that, when Presidential approval of the five year plan was formally given, the SECDEF would announce total dollar guidelines of $720 million for FY 73-75. This amount, added to

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 348, 349, 354-358; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXIV, No. 1653 of 1 Mar 71, p. 263; J5331 HistSum Jul 71.

[2] J5331 HistSum Jun 71; COMUSKOREA 041216Z Jun 71.

[3] J5331 HistSum Jan 71; SECDEF 2527/292350Z Jan 71 and 1494/192229Z Jan 71.

KOREA

BASIC INFORMATION *

AREA	38,000 SQ. MI.
POPULATION	30.4 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.64%
ARABLE LAND PERCAP	0.17 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	90%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	47 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. (E) 1971	8.64 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$284
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED(E) 1971	$308.9 MILLION
AS % OF GNP	3.6%
AS % OF CENT GOVT	20.4%

PRESIDENT - GEN Park, Chung Hee, ROKA (Ret)
PRIME MINISTER - Kim Chong-Pil
DEFENSE MINISTER - Yu, Jae Hung
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Kim Yong-Sik
CHAIRMAN JCS - GEN Shim, Henng Sun, ROKA
C/S ARMY - GEN Suh, Jyong Chul, ROKA
CNO - ADM Chang Chi-su, ROKN
C/S AIR FORCE - Ock, Man Ho ROKAF
COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - Lee, Byung Moon ROKMC



OVERALL OBJECTIVE ○

PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AGAINST RENEWED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND MAINTAIN CINCUNC OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR * HON. PHILIP C. HABIB

U.S. AID DIRECTOR . . . . . MR. MICHAEL H. B. ADLER

COMUS KOREA . . . . . GEN JOHN H. MICHAELIS, USA

CHIEF, JUSMAG-K . . . . MAJ GEN John S. LEKSON, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES *

1. Assist ROK in maintaining modernized forces capable of deterring/defending against North Korean aggression with limited U. S. support or against NK/PRC aggression with U. S. augmentation.
2. Assist in providing effective counter-infiltration capability.
3. Insure continued availability of essential rights authorizations and facility arrangements.
4. Protection of U. S. facilities.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES * *

		MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES ** *	COMBAT CAPABILITY ○
ARMY	19 FTF DIVS, 10 RES DIVS 7 TANK BNS, 1 SP FORCES GP, 1 NIKE BN, 3 HAWK BNS, 37 ENGR CBT B.S, 6 HELO COS, 10 RANGER CS, 1 PSYWAR BN, 33 CORPS/ARMY ARTY BNS.	19 INF DIVS, 1 ADA BDE, 2 ARMOR BDES, 2 RANGER BDES, 21 FA BNS, 1 CAPITAL SECURITY COMMAND, 1 SF GP, 361 ACFT(239 FIXED WING, 98 HELOS). TOTAL STRENGTH 542,183	Maintain internal security and effectively repel aggression from North Korea, assuming adequate logistic & air & naval support from outside sources.
NAVY	8 DD/DE, 9 PCE, 20 PG, 28 LCM, 48 PTF, 20 MSC, 8 LST, 10 LSM, 1 MAR DIV, 1 ISLAND SEC GP.	6 DD TYPES, 39 PATROL TYPES, 10 MINE WARFARE, 20 AMPHIBIOUS, 11 AUXILARY, 6 PG/APD TYPES, 1 MARINE DIV(-), 2 MARINE BDES(PROV). TOTAL STRENGTH 51,375	With the exception of mine countermeasures the ability of the ROK navy to perform its assigned mission is considered satisfactory. The ROK Marines are considered capable of providing regtl bn size landing forces for amphibious assault ops or larger sized forces, if lift & other support is made available.
AIR FORCE	10 TFS, SQS, 1 RECONS, 1 ASW SQ. 1 TAC CONTROL SQ. 2 HELO SQ, 3 TRANS SQS,	FTRS: 217 Jet(79 F-5A; 9 F-5B; 17 F-4D; 95 F-86F; 17 F-86D) RECON: 10 Jet (10 RF-3G) TRANS: 37 Prop (24 C-46D; 13 C-54D) TRNG: 41 Jet (41 T-33A); 21 Prop (21 T-28A) OTHER: 31 Prop (1 U-9; 11 U-10B; 17 O-1A; 2 S-2F) HELOS: 5 Turboprop (5 UH-1H; 6 Prop (6 UH-19 B/D. TOTAL STRENGTH 22,670	Forces in being operationally ready to support ground operations, and conduct VFR air and limited A/W defense missions.

*AS OF 1 JUN 71 ● Updated By J2
** AS OF 1 JUL 71 ○ Updated By J5 * Updated by I8

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 138.

the $290 million for FY 71 and $240 million for FY 72, would reestablish the total plan amount of $1.25 billion. COMUSKOREA replied that the net effect of such an approach was the deletion of force modernization hardware and weapon systems investments in favor of O&M imperatives. This would not be in consonance with the original concept, which was the creation of a credible ROK deterrent force keyed to the timing of U.S. troop withdrawals. He strongly recommended restoration of the original FY 72 $280 million. CINCPAC forwarded the COMUSKOREA rebuttal to the SECDEF, and recommended restoration of the $280 for FY 72, or, as a minimum, a return to the $265 million later issued as guidance. If neither of these was possible, CINCPAC recommended that the $45 million shortfall be added to the FY 73 programmed level of $250 million. That would allow for the early reprogramming of major items which would be deleted from the FY 71-72 program.[1]

(S) On 29 March, the SECDEF replied stating that the FY 72 Korea dollar level was established by Executive Branch decision and had been presented to the Congress at the $239.4 million level. Moreover, the SECDEF noted that, during FY 71-72, the total resources to be provided to the ROK military establishment raised questions regarding its ability to absorb the large amounts of equipment and the impact on O&M costs. In addition to the MAP of $290 million and $239.4 million for the two years, $176.4 million (acquisition value) equipment of withdrawing U.S. forces; $165 million in EDA (acquisition value); and $30 million in FMS credit were programmed. Also, to compensate for the $210 million in MAP transfer costs to be assumed by the ROK, Public Law 480 (economic aid) incentives had been offered.[2]

(S) In May, the SECDEF provided CINCPAC with Korean MAP guidelines for FY 73-77. Grant aid was $255 million for FY 73, and $240, $225, $100, and $75 millions for successive years. In October, SECDEF advised that reductions of $25 million to $75 million could be possible for FY 72, and $55 million for FY 73. As previously stated in this chapter, FY 72 appropriations had not been passed by the end of 1971; however, a reduction of as much as $100 million was expected for FY 72, and SECDEF issued a revised dollar guideline for FY 73 of $215.7 million.[3]

(S) As the year passed, it became evident that joint State/Defense efforts to coordinate military economic assistance had surfaced divergent views. In October, the SECDEF advised CINCPAC of positions advanced by the Inter Agency

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[1] J5331 HistSum Mar 71; ADMIN CINCPAC 240443Z Feb 71; COMUSKOREA 051226Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 200417Z Mar 71.
[2] SECDEF 7433/292113Z Mar 71.
[3] J5331 HistSum May 71; SECDEF 5685/121538Z May 71; J821 Point Paper, 17 Jan 72, Subj: Korea MAP; J821 HistSum Dec 71.

Study Group relating to an expansion of the MAP transfer program, with offsetting increased PL-480 funds. This position, held by the State Department, was based on U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reports from Korea which purported to have the concurrence of the CHJUSMAG-K. Included in the State Department position was the principle that, if FMS items acquired by the ROK had been included in grant aid programs, the dollar value should be deducted from the MAP dollar level. The DOD concurred that if either investment or operating items included in the funded portion of the five year plan were acquired by FMS cash or credit, a reduction in MAP would occur. However, such programs as in-country co-production of M-16 rifles, expansion of ammunition arsenal capability, patrol boats, and cost overruns of MAP items were excluded from the DOD concurrence.[1]

(TS) In October, the Chairman, JCS stated his support, and that of the DOD, of efforts to ensure that FMS would not be charged against the $1.5 billion modernization plan, and advised CINCPAC of a SECDEF memorandum to Dr. Henry Kissinger, presidential assistant for National Security Affairs, which coincided with the positions taken by COMUSKOREA, CINCPAC, and JCS on the subject. On 16 October, the State Department notified CINCPAC and the U.S. Ambassador to Korea that the FMS for M-16 rifles and ammunition facility predated the five year plan, and would not be assessed against the MAP. No decision had been rendered by the end of 1971 regarding the FMS of Tacoma Class Patrol Gunboats (PG), or the cost overruns on F-5E aircraft and Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft (CPIC) procurement.[2]

(S) The CHJUSMAG-K noted that his alleged concurrence with USAID statements was only within terms of reference and caveats predicated upon restricted assumptions. The USAID study in question purported to show that, if the ROK third five year economic program targets were met, a greater degree of defense financing could be assumed in the ROK defense budget. The study did not assert that the targets would be met. Further, CHJUSMAG-K stated that the then current economic picture for Korea did not look promising, and cited a USAID projection of a potential trade deficit of $1.27 billion instead of $800 million previously forecast. Finally, CHJUSMAG-K noted that becasue of fund reductions already imposed on MAP, substantial amounts previously programmed for O&M would be applied to investment items in FY 73-75. This deficit in O&M would either be added to the MAP transfer program or be unfunded. The ability of the ROK to absorb additional O&M costs by MAP transfer, whether or not assisted by PL-480 increases, was doubtful.[3]

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1 SECDEF 6711/222229Z Oct 71.
2 J8231 HistSum Oct 71; JCS 1061/061619Z Oct 71 (EX); JCS 7825/142036Z Oct 71 (EX); SECSTATE 190118/160123Z Oct 71.
3 J8231 HistSum Nov 71; COMUSKOREA 080730Z Nov 71.

ROK MAP Transfer Program

(S) The MAP transfer program referred to in the foregoing narrative originally was designed to transfer the cost of commercial items available in Korea from MAP to the ROK defense budget. The purpose was to free MAP dollars to provide for more rapid ROK force modernization and improvement. At the request of the ROK, the program was suspended indefinitely in FY 66 as part of a quid pro quo for the deployment of ROK forces to RVN. The U.S. Government had agreed to continue the suspension as long as at least two divisions of Korean troops remained in Vietnam. In March 1970, the State Department proposed to provide PL-480 funds at an annual level of at least $50 million if the ROK would agree to resume the MAP transfer program. As part of the five year modernization program submitted in October 1970, $220 million in ROK-funded operating costs under MAP transfer were included. On 16 January 1971, the U.S. Ambassador in Korea was informed that the ROK was prepared to present "proposals" for the resumption of the MAP transfer program. These "proposals" included a guarantee of a $140 million MAP minimum for at least five years. Also stipulated was that the provision of hardware equipment and materials procured by funds made available by the MAP transfer would be in addition to, and without prejudice to, the five year ROK modernization program already agreed to. The items and contents of the hardware were to be determined by the ROK in consultation with the U.S., and items to be removed from the MAP list were to be determined by the ROK. The ROK proposed to assume $20 million for CY 71, $20 million for CY 72, and equal amounts for succeeding years, to a total of $210 million, provided that PL-480 funds were provided of $125 million. The ROK proposals were sent to Washington for evaluation, and, on 22 January, the State Department passed interpretation of the ROK proposals to CINCPAC. The ROK were to be informed "in clearest terms" that the amounts approved by Congress for FY 72 and future year MAP would cover the total U.S. military assistance expenditure for ROK forces. MAP items procured in Korea, and hardware supplied, were to be considered part of, and not in addition to, the modernization program value. Finally, the items and contents of hardware would be those mutually agreed to, and not those determined unilaterally by the ROK.[1]

(S) On 30 March, the State Department informed CINCPAC that agreement had been reached between the two governments which provided for ROK funding of MAP transfer in the amount of $20 million beginning in CY 71. The U.S. Government had agreed to compensate the ROK for 100 percent of the cost in CY 71, 100 percent in CY 72, and 50 percent in CY 73. As projected, the MAP transfer agreement would be:[2]

[1] J5331 HistSum Jan 71; AMEMB Seoul 264/160350Z Jan 71; SECSTATE 9577/222012Z Jan 71.

[2] J5331 HistSum Mar 71; SECSTATE 52748/1/300028Z Mar 71.

MAP Transfer Amounts (Operating Costs)

(To be funded by the ROKG)

($ in millions)

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	
	$20	$20	$20	$20	$20	
		$20	$20	$20	$20	
	____	____	$10	$10	$10	
Total	$20	$40	$50	$50	$50	= $210

Table 2

PL 480 Support to ROKG

(Compensation to the ROKG)

($ in millions)

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	
	$20 (100%)	$20 (100%)	$10 (50%)	0	0	
		$20 (100%)	$20 (100%)	$10 (50%)	0	
	____	____	$10 (100%)	$10 (100%)	$5 (50%)	
Total	$20	$40	$40	$20	$5	= $125

Because the ROK operated on a calendar year budget basis, while the U.S. budget was developed by fiscal year, the amounts agreed to by the ROK were (in $ millions):[1]

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[1] J5331 HistSum Apr 71.

FY71	FY72	FY73	FY74	FY75	FY76	Total
$7.0	$33.0	$45.0	$50.0	$50.0	$25.0	$210.0
CY71	CY72	CY73	CY74	CY75		Total
$20.0	$40.0	$50.0	$50.0	$50.0		$210.0

Funding of ROK Net additional Cost

(S) Under the provisions of the U.S. agreement relative to the deployment of ROK military forces to Vietnam in 1966, the U.S. had agreed to provide Korean currency support to the ROK budget equal to all of the net additional costs (NAC) of the deployment. Also to be reimbursed to the ROK was the cost of reconstituting its forces in Korea--mobilizing and maintaining activated reserve divisions, brigades, and supporting elements. The amount of NAC each year was determined jointly by the U.S. military assistance element in Korea (PROVMAAG-K until 1971) and the ROK MND, subject to approval by the U.S. State and Defense Departments. The amount was then included in the final ROK defense budget presented to the National Assembly. The fact that the two governments operated on different yearly bases presented problems in 1971, when the Senate prohibited the use of DOD appropriated funds for pay and allowances of Korean troops in Vietnam. Thus, the CY 70 NAC, based on the assumption of Congressional approval of the FY 71 budget, involved $817 million which could not be paid under the Military Assistance Service Funded program. By the end of 1971, the tentative solution was to provide grants to the ROK under the PL-480 local sales provisions if the Congressional restriction was retained.[1]

MAP Action Items

(S) MAP and FMS actions to modernize the ROK Navy (ROKN) continued during 1971. The main items under discussion included patrol gunboats (PG), coastal patrol and interdiction craft (CPIC fast boats), and destroyers. On 15 October 1971, after considerable discussion between the ROK, JUSMAGKOREA, CINCPAC, and DOD, the first PG was transferred to the ROKN on a no-cost navy-to-navy lease basis. On 29 October, the ROK requested FMS credit to purchase from three to five additional PGs provided such funds would not be applied to reduce the FY 71-75 grant aid dollar guideline. CINCPAC supported the lease of the first PG, and also supported the FMS credit request for commercial purchase of three Tacoma Class PGs. No action had been taken by the ROK to procure the boats at

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[1] J7223 Point Paper, 6 Dec 71, Subj: Net Additional Cost (NAC), Republic of Korea.

the end of the year.[1]

(S) Twenty CPICs had originally been scheduled for procurement in the five year modernization program, at a cost of $22.9 million--one for FY 71, five in FY 72, none in FY 73, and five in FY 74. On 21 June 1971, the ROK was informed that the U.S. would provide a prototype fast boat, plus the technology for the ROK to co-produce in Korea. In August, the ROK proposed that ten CPICs be built in Korea and the remaining ten in the U.S. On 16 October, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations confirmed that a contract would be let to manufacture a prototype and eight PCICs in the U.S. at an estimated cost of $2.5 million each. In November, COMUSKOREA and the ROK proposed that 17 CPICs be built--nine in the U.S., including the prototype, and eight in Korea. Further, COMUSKOREA recommended that construction of a prototype in Korea begin as soon as possible. CINCPAC agreed, in December, that construction of 17 PCICs proceed, but did not concur that a Korean prototype should be built before the U.S. prototype had entered test and evaluation. On 23 December, the U.S. Navy announced that a contract was awarded, on 20 December, to the Tacoma Boatbuilding Company to construct the U.S. CPICs.[2]

(S) At the beginning of 1971, the ROKN had three destroyers (DD)--one was acquired in 1963 and two in 1968. The FY 73-80 Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) provided for five DDs in the ROKN. Two DDs had been programmed in the five year plan, one each in FY 71 and 72. Because the necessary ship loan legislation was not passed in FY 71, the two DDs were reprogrammed for FY 72 and 73. As of 31 December 1971, the ship loan legislation had not yet been passed by the Congress. It was doubtful that, even if ship loan legislation were passed, sufficient MAP funds would be available because of the anticipated severe reduction in Korean MAP discussed previously.[3]

(S) The program to modernize the small arms used by the ROK military continued in 1971. At the end of 1970, the ROK and Colt Industries had begun negotiations for co-production of M-16 rifles. Approximately 600,000 rifles were needed to equip the ROK forces with small arms firepower equal to the AK-47 possessed by North Korean Forces. In March 1971, a formal agreement was signed between the ROK and Colt Industries, and DOD agreed to allocate $43 million in FMS credit from FY 71 through FY 76. On 31 March, $15 million was approved for FY 71, and, in July, $10 million was approved for FY 72. At the

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1 J5331 and J821 HistSums Jan, Aug-Oct 71; J821 Point Paper, 24 Jan 72, Subj: Provision of USN Patrol Gunboats (Tacoma Class) to ROKN.

2 J5331 and J821 HistSums Jan-Jun 71 and Aug, Oct, Nov-Dec 71; J821 Point Paper, 24 Jan 72, Subj: Provision of Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft-CPIC (Fast Boats) to the ROK.

3 J5331 and J821 HistSum Mar, Dec 71; J5331 Point Paper, 12 May 71, Subj: Provision of Additional Destroyers (DDs) to the ROK.

end of 1971, $17 million remained to be funded. Full production of M-16 rifles, at a monthly rate of 10,000 was planned by May 1974, and the entire quota of 600,000, plus 48,000 spares, was expected to be met by February 1979.[1]

(C) Related to the co-production of M-16 rifles was the proposed conversion and expansion of the ROK Army Arsenal. The Arsenal, located in Pusan, Korea, was established by the U.S. to manufacture small caliber ammunition. The ROK desired to convert the facility so that 5.56mm ammunition, used by M-16 rifles, could be produced by 1974 to coincide with the production of M-16s. The objective was to produce all .30 and .50 caliber and 5.56mm training ammunition for active ROK forces and reserve forces. Total FY 72-77 cost was estimated at $80 million--$29 million FMS credit, $15 million MAP, and $36 million, ROK Won budget. In August 1971, COMUSKOREA advised CINCPAC that a memorandum of understanding would be negotiated between the ROK and DOD to provide FMS credit for converting and expanding the Arsenal. On 8 December 1971, CINCPAC was advised that FY 72 FMS credits for $5 million had been signed, and that CHJUSMAG-K was authorized to complete the negotiations for Arsenal conversion/expansion.[2]

CINCPAC Evaluation of Korean MAP[3]

(C) The evaluation of MAP Korea for FY 72 was conducted by the CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) from 30 August 1971 through 10 September. The primary concern and thrust of the evaluation was to determine the degree of self-sufficiency attained by the ROK armed forces, what assistance was still required, and in what form this assistance should be rendered.

(C) The shift in emphasis toward assisting, rather than advising, the ROK military concentrated major attention to logistics and logistics management. For example, previously there were U.S. advisors to the ROKA whose primary concern was with training and tactical matters. Under the recently reorganized JUSMAG-K, these advisors had been removed from corps headquarters and formed into Logistics Assistance Teams.

(S) The ROK Modernization Plan provided for $1.25 billion in grant aid during FY 71-75. However, the funds available for operating costs, coupled

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[1] J821 Point Paper, 17 Jan 72, Subj: Production of M16A1 Rifles in the ROK; J5331 and J821 HistSums, Jan-Dec 71; CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 328.

[2] Ibid.; J821 Point Paper, 25 Jan 72, Subj: Conversion/Expansion of ROK Army Arsenal.

[3] CINCPAC ltr Ser 002616 of 15 Nov 71, Subj: Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program in Korea, with one encl: PEG Report, MAP Korea, FY 72.

Note: Previously [illegible]

with the $210 million being funded by the ROK, would not adequately provide for all necessary operating and maintenance costs for ROK units and equipment. Since additional MAP funds were not anticipated, it was recognized that the ROK must be encouraged to devote more of its own funds toward its defense costs.

(C) The Joint U.S. and ROK plans for future year budgeting of defense expenditures were being hampered by the inability of the JUSMAG-K to provide the ROK with SECDEF projected MAP ceilings for FY 73-77. While the U.S. representatives were aware that a significant shortfall in annual O&M costs would result, they were unable to provide the necessary data to ROK representatives.

(S) The JUSMAG-K training effort was effective. The training effort was focused on improving overall logistical and resource management capabilities with U.S. assistance personnel being employed on a contact team rather than counterpart basis. The ROK Armed Forces had an effective training base and required minimal assistance from U.S. personnel. There was a need for continued MAPT in CONUS for air defense, aviation, resource management, and selected courses on newly introduced equipment. Where possible, OJT with U.S. units was being conducted on new equipment to reduce CONUS training requirements.

(S) ROKA effectivenss would be reduced in a sustained combat environment due to overaged equipment and repair parts shortages. The ROKN was effectively executing its primary mission of counterinfiltration patrol within the constraints imposed by the capability of the ships available. The ROKN had a marginal capability to perform missions of sea-borne logistic support, ASW, air defense, mine sweeping, amphibious landings, naval gunfire support, underwater demolition and salvage operations. The ROK Marine Corps was considered to be capable of executing all operational missions assigned by MND, as was the ROK Air Force. Training self-sufficiency had progressed and, if the present trend continued, CONUS space requirements could be substantially reduced after FY 74 except for those courses necessary to maintain a training cadre well versed in U.S. tactical doctrine and techniques.

Laos

(S) Military assistance to Laos was a military assistance Service funded (MASF) program. [redacted] b. The U.S. had withdrawn its MAAG from Laos in 1962, as specified by the Geneva Agreement on the neutrality of Laos. In order to provide U.S. military support to anti-communist factions

1.3(a)(5)

in Laos, a separate MAAG with the [redacted] title of Deputy Chief, JUSMAGTHAI was established in Bangkok, complete with a MAAG staff. The in-country representation was then assumed by civilians in a Requirements Office (RO) under USAID. The RO/USAID developed the military requirements with the assistance of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force Attache offices. These requirements were then refined into a formal program by DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI and submitted to CINCPAC. After obtaining Component command coordination, CINCPAC submitted his recommended program to the SECDEF for approval.

b. [redacted]

Laos MASF Structure Studied

(S) CINCPAC had long advocated the assignment in Laos of a general officer who would serve as Defense Attache/CINCPACREP Laos. As a result of conferences in Washington with JCS, CINCPAC, and Service participation, this proposal had been included in a JCS recommendation to the SECDEF on 18 December 1969. Because of the political implications the recommendation was not adopted. No further action was taken during 1970 to improve the management of the military effort in Laos despite continued CINCPAC effort, JCS support and DOD concurrence. On 5 April 1971, the JCS invited CINCPAC to participate on an Interagency Ad Hoc Committee on Laos which was to examine questions pertaining to expanded paramilitary operations in Laos. Because solutions to some problems related to an effective management system, several options were developed to achieve the desired measure of coordination.[2]

(S) As related in Chapter IV, on 8 June 1971 the SECDEF directed CINCPAC to relocate DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI from Bangkok to Udorn, Thailand. The purpose of the move was to enable the DEPCH to exercise closer supervision over the MASF program, and, "...to become the nucleus of a possible military assistance coordinator at Udorn...." CINCPAC was also directed to prepare a plan for the emplacement of such a coordinator, whose mission would be to act as the

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[1] J5534 Point Paper, 19 May 71, Subj: Defense Attache/CINCPACREP Laos (S); J834 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: Administration of Laos Military Assistance.

[2] J5534 Point Paper, 19 May 71, Subj: Defense Attache/CINCPACREP LAOS (S); J834 Point Paper, 17 Jan 72, Subj: U.S. Support for Military Activities in Laos (S).

LAOS

BASIC INFORMATION ○

AREA	91,430 SQ. MI.	ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	4 ACRES
POPULATION	2,927,000	LITERACY RATE	19%
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.4%	LIFE EXPECTANCY	35 YEARS
GROSS NAT PROD	$202 MIL(Est)	PER CAPITA	72.00(Est)

KING - Sri Savang Vatthana ●
PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
MINISTER OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND LEADER OF THE NEUTRALIST FACTION -
Prince Souvanna Phouma
VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF EDUCATION, AND LEADER OF RIGHTIST FACTION - Leuam Insisiengmay
VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF National Economy AND LEADER OF THE COMMUNIST FACTION
Prince Souphanouvong Absent



OVERALL OBJECTIVE ○

TO ASSIST LAOS IN MAINTAINING ITS STATUS AS AN INDEPENDENT, NEUTRAL STATE.

U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON G. McMURTRIE GODLEY
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. CHARLES A. MANN
DEPUTY CHIEF JUSMAG THAILAND
COL Robert J. KANTZ, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES *

(A) To support the armed forces of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) in their effort to defeat insurgency in areas that are or may come under RLG control.
(B) To support the Royal Lao Government (RLG) and to assist it to maintain its policy of non-alignment.
(C) To disrupt the flow of North Vietnamese forces and materiel through Laos into South Vietnam.

	MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES *, **, *** ○	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES ** ●	COMBAT CAPABILITY ○
ARMY	18 INF BNS, 4 ABN BNS, 5 FLD ARTY, 33 VOLUNTEER BNS, 1 PSY WAR BN, 4 RECON GPS, 6 ENG BNS, 1 RIVER GP BN, 8 COMMANDO BNS.	18 INF BNS, 4 ABN BNS, 8 CMDO BNS, 33 VOL BNS, 5 ARTY BNS, 4 ARMD RECON GPS, 6 ENG BNS, 1 RIVER GP (BN), 1 PSY WAR BN.	Maintain minimum security in non-communist area main population centers. Provide very limited ground defense against local communist insurgency.
NAVY	NONE	11 LCMS, 26 RIVER GUNBOATS, 12 LIGHT CARGO TRANSPORTS.	Maintain minimum security of river routes in conservative area and provide limited logistic support for conservative forces.
AIR FORCE	T-28/49, RT-28/5, C-47/16, UH-34/43, OBS/30, AC 47-10.	63 FTR/BMRS, 24 TRANS, 33 MISC, 16 HELOS, 10 AC-47.	Provide limited fighter bomber, logistic and reconnaissance support to ground forces.

*** DOES NOT INCLUDE PATHET LAO OR DISSIDENT NEUTRALIST MILITARY FORCES.
** AS OF 30 JUNE 1971
* FY 72

● Updated By J2 ○ Updated By J5 * Update by J8

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 139.

b/d principle military advisor [redacted] regarding U.S. support of indigenous military operations in Laos, and to manage the Laos MASF program under CINCPAC. This plan was to be submitted by 15 July 1971. The SECDEF also advised that logistics costs for all friendly forces were to be assumed in the FY 73 MASF program, and that the DOD logistics system would be used for all forces in Laos beginning in FY 73.[1]

(S) CINCPAC convened a conference in Bangkok on 24-25 June, at which a draft plan was discussed with representatives of all concerned agencies. The proposed CINCPAC plan was submitted to the JCS on 12 July;

b. [redacted]

MASF Funding

(S) At the end of 1970, CINCPAC had requested an increase in the FY 71 dollar ceiling of $60 million, from $147.1 to $207.2 million. The additional funds were a joint Embassy/DEPCH estimation of the minimum amount necessary to sustain operations for the remainder of the fiscal year. In response, the SECDEF approved an increase of $15.1 million, the bulk of which ($12.8 million) was for air munitions expenditures, and raising the FY 71 country ceiling to $162.2 million. Considering the original CINCPAC program submission of $235.2, a shortfall of $73 million, primarily in ammunition, was not funded.[3]

(S) In April 1971, on the assumption that the Laos military assistance program would continue to be Service funded, the SECDEF provided CINCPAC and the Service Departments the dollar levels to be used for FY 72-76 in the development, budgeting, and programming of the MASF program:[4]

FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76
208.1M	235.0M	150.0M	100.0M	50.0M

(S) Illustrating the difficulty in applying formalized funding procedures

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1 J5322 HistSum Jun 71; SECDEF 3860/081700Z Jun 71.

2 CINCPAC 132127Z Jun 71; J5322 HistSum Jul 71; CINCPAC 120855Z Jul 71; JCS 5160/201340Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 240319Z Jul; J5322 HistSum Aug 71, which cites JCSM 367-71 of 9 Aug 71.

3 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, p. 266; J5322 HistSum Feb 71; SECDEF 3082/022025Z Feb 71; J5322 Point Paper, 19 May 71, Subj: Laos Military Assistance.

4 J5322 HistSum Apr 71; SECDEF 5751/231449Z Apr 71.

in a combat situation, the SECDEF reduced the ceilings for FY 72 and FY 73 from those listed above to $197.3 million and $224.2 million respective in June. In October, the FY 73 ceiling was increased to $297.4 million, which reflected the assumption by DOD of all paramilitary unit support, an increase in the numbers of those units, and operating and ordnance costs for six additional gunship helicopters. Also, the FY 72 ceiling was increased $400,000 to a total of $197.7 million. This increase was to finance the introduction of M-60 machine guns, mostly for paramilitary forces who had been using .30 caliber machine guns. In November, CINCPAC noted the likelihood that some costs programmed for FY 73 were likely to occur before the end of FY 72, and the need to fill logistic pipelines for support of paramilitary units, and requested the SECDEF to increase the FY 72 dollar level to $217.5 million. On 30 November, the SECDEF approved $3.5 million for gunship support, and, on 14 January 1972, set a new FY 72 dollar ceiling of $251.6 million, or about $43 million more than the level set in April. The latest figure covered special projects, medical evacuation gunship support, long lead time items, establishment of a pipeline for consummables and ground ammunition for the remainder of FY 72.[1]

(S) As of January 1972, therefore, the dollar levels for Laos MASF were (in millions):

FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76
251.6	297.4	150.0	100.0	50.0

The Symington Amendment to the Defense Procurement Authorization Act (Public Law 92-156) limited the total U.S. aid to Laos for FY 72 to a $350 million ceiling. In order to establish effective cost controls over the MASF portion of the ceiling, CINCPAC was assigned the responsibility to develop a delivery reporting system for all defense articles and services subject to CINCPAC and DEPCH control. Expenditures amounting to $88.8 million were reported to the State Department for the period from 1 July through 31 December 1971.[2]

Helicopters for Laos

(S) In early March 1971, the SECDEF authorized the assignment of six UH-1D

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[1] J5322 HistSum Jun 71; SECDEF 5381/092344Z Jun 71; J8222 HistSum Oct 71; SECDEF 1753/181418Z Oct 71; CINCPAC 030445Z Oct 71; SECDEF 2763/291352Z Oct 71; J8222 HistSum Nov 71; CINCPAC 142055Z and 260518Z Nov 71; J834 Point Paper, 17 Jan 71, Subj: Laos Military Assistance.

[2] Ibid; J835 Point Paper, 13 Mar 72, Subj: Symington Amendment to Defense Procurement Authorization Act (Sec 505(F)).

helicopters for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and resupply missions in Laos. The helicopters were assigned to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI and made available for use by Air America under contract. Protection for the unarmed MEDEVAC helicopters was provided by A-1 aircraft controlled by the Deputy Commander, Seventh/ Thirteenth Air Force (7AF/13AF) at Udorn. On 28 April, the SECDEF authorized the temporary transfer of six UH-1C helicopter gunships to the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLGAF) under FY 71 Laos MASF from U.S. assets in RVN. These gunships were to support the six MEDEVAC helicopters. The gunships were loaned until 1 June 1971, when they were returned to MACV control.[1]

(S) On 30 November 1971, the SECDEF approved the temporary transfer of eight UH-1M helicopter gunships from the U.S. Army to the RLGAF for the purpose of escorting MEDEVAC helicopters. The aircraft were to be loaned to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI as a MASF transaction from 1 December 1971 to 31 May 1972, when they were to be returned to the U.S. Army. Support costs, including a fair fee for rental, loss, or depreciation, were to be charged to FY 72 MASF for Laos. No U.S. military personnel were authorized to be deployed to Laos or to fly missions in support of the MEDEVAC escort. However, U.S. military could be deployed on TDY to Thailand to provide maintenance and flight training. The first four gunships arrived in-country on 4 January 1972, [redacted]

4e AF

Impact of Combined Funding on MASF Laos

1.3(a)(5) (S) Because of the separate funding and support provided to some paramilitary operations in Laos [redacted] the assumption by DOD of all funding responsibility in support of friendly forces dictated that means to effect a transfer be found. Among the problems to be resolved were centralization of airlift support and maintenance contracting, and the materiel support of the paramilitary units. In September 1971, the SECDEF requested CINCPAC's views concerning the handling of contract air support for Laos in FY 73, as well as the need, previously discussed, to program long lead time items 1.3(a)(5) in FY 72 to support the irregular unit operations [redacted] CINCPAC replied that procurement action should be initiated as soon as possible for the long lead time items. He also agreed that a new approach to the contracting of air support was advisable. Responding to CINCPAC query, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI agreed that all contract requirements in support of Laos missions should be contracted by DOD after 1 July 1972, citing $50 million in contracts to be negotiated. [redacted]

6.

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[1] J4319 HistSum May 71; SECDEF 5901/101439Z Mar and 1741/282013Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 290559Z May 71.

[2] SECDEF 3966/301926Z Nov 71; J836 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: Helicopter Gunship Support for Laos MEDEVAC.

[redacted] In November, CINCPAC convened a conference at Udorn to duscuss the divergent views. At the end of the year, no decision had been made on the contract consolidation proposal. Meanwhile, CINCPAC had provided DOD with a list of materiel items which would require funding under MASF in support of the Lao regulars and the paramilitary forces in Laos.[1]

b.

CINCPAC Evaulation of MASF Program-Laos[2]

(C) The CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) conducted an evaluation of the MASF program in Laos during the period from 9-26 February 1971. The report was based entirely upon observations and deductions derived from discussions with staff personnel of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI and visits to DEPCH activities in Thailand. The PEG team was not permitted to travel in Laos.

(S) The PEG findings were similar in most respects to those stated during the FY 70 evaluation, discussed in detail on pages 307-311 of the CINCPAC Command History 1970, Volume I. As could be expected by the thrust of DOD actions initiated during 1971 toward reorganization of U.S. support to Laos, the PEG inspection, conducted in February, summarized conditions already recognized by CINCPAC and DOD. [redacted]

b.

Malaysia

(S) MAP for Malaysia was restricted to training funds under grant aid and FMS. On 24 June 1971, an FMS agreement was signed for the purchase of radios

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1 J8222 HistSum Oct-Nov 71; SECDEF 4075/181621Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 252314Z Sep 71; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 241030Z Sep 71; AMEMB Vientiane 7170/281200Z Sep and 7598/151255Z Oct 71 (EX); CINCPAC 260510Z Nov 71.

2 CINCPAC ltr, Ser 001065 of 13 May 71, Subj: Evaluation of MAP/MASF, Laos and Deputy Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand, with one encl: PEG Report, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, FY 71.

and miscellaneous minor items amounting to $2.17 million. On 5 July, after some discussion regarding the turnover site, the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY Tank Landing Ship was transferred to the Malaysian Navy on a no-cost navy-to-navy lease. Also, negotiations had been undertaken by the Malaysian Government to purchase 20,000 M-16 rifles and five million rounds of ammunition.

(C) Of major importance was the visit during 1971 of Malaysian officials to the U.S., United Kingdom, and France to compare supersonic aircraft costs, capabilities, and availabilities. CINCPAC concurred that high performance aircraft should be acquired by Malaysia, and recommended special effort to promote an American purchase under FMS or direct purchase. On 21 December, the U.S. Ambassador was notified that the Malaysian Government had tentatively decided to purchase 16 F-5 aircraft, including two trainers. Delivery would be sought to coincide with the phaseout of F-86s. The decision was influenced by the relatively low cost of F-5s, and the Ambassador stated that consummation would depend on the terms offered to Malaysia, which was interested in an FMS credit arrangement.[1]

Philippines

MAP Funds

(S) During the period 1950-1970, deliveries and expenditures of some $408 million had been contributed to Philippine defense requirements under MAP. For FY 71, the program had been reduced from $17 million to $13.2 million when funds were diverted to support Cambodia in July 1970. The $17 million level was restored when supplementary funds were appropriated for FY 71. Dollar guidelines for Philippine MAP, as of December 1971, had been established at $17 million for FY 72 through FY 77, subject to legislative action.[2]

(S) On 19 February 1971, the U.S. Ambassador in Manila, with the concurrence of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL), requested State Department support to obtain supplemental increases to the dollar ceilings for FY 72 and 73. The Ambassador requested $5 million increases for each year, which he stated was the minimum funding necessary to cope with the threat to law and order in the Philippines. CINCPAC's Component commanders concurred with the rationale offered for proposed investment items, and CINCPAC recommended, on 28 February, that SECDEF support the increases.[3]

[1] J3B41 HistSum Jan 71; CINCPAC 062151Z Jan 71; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 66/140900Z Jan 71; MA Journal, No. 116, p. 136; J5331 HistSum Jul 71; CINCPAC 230405Z Jul 71; J823 HistSum Dec 71; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 4397/220930Z Dec 71; J8223 Point Paper, 6 Dec 71, Subj: Military Assistant Program-Malaysia.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 288, 365.

[3] J5333 HistSum Feb 71; AMEMB Manila 1504/190213Z Feb 71; CINCPAC 282122Z Feb 71.

PHILIPPINES

BASIC INFORMATION ○

AREA	116,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	40.1 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.5%
ARABLE LAND PER CAP	0.8 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	75%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	55 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1970	$5.5 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$265
DEFENSE BUDGET (SELF-FINANCED) 1970	$71.5 MILLION
AS % OF	1.3%

PRESIDENT-Ferdinand E. MARCOS ●
VICE PRESIDENT-Fernando LOPEZ
SECTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS-Carlos P. ROMULO
SECTY NATL DEFENSE-Juan P. ENRILE
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP-GEN Romeo ESPINO, ARMY
VICE C/S AFP-BGEN Rafael ILETO, AF
CG, ARMY-FGEN Rafael ZAGALA, ARMY
FOIC, NAVY-CMDR Hilario RUIZ, NAVY
CG, AIR FORCE-BGEN Jose RANCUDO, AF
CHIEF CONSTABULARY-BGEN Fidel RAMOS, PC



OVERALL OBJECTIVE ○

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES; TO ENCOURAGE PHILIPPINE MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO; AND TO MAINTAIN U.S. OPERATED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. HENRY A. BYROADE
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. THOMAS C. NIBLOCK
CHIEF JUSMAG
BGEN James A. GRIMSLEY, Jr. USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES *

1. Maintain essential rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements.
2. Protection of U. S. facilities.
3. Improvement of internal security and anti-smuggling capabilities.
4. Improvement of logistical support.

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES FY73-76 ○ / MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES* ◇ / COMBAT CAPABILITY ○

	MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES FY73-76 ○	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES* ◇	COMBAT CAPABILITY ○
ARMY	2 INF DIV, 2 SEP INF BDES, II ENGR CONST BDE, 1 ARTY GP, 1 ARMD CAV TROOP CONSTABULARY: 5 BNS, 132 COS.	2 LT INF DIVS, 2 INF BNS, 1 ARM CAV TRP 10 ENGR CONST BNS. TOTAL STRENGTH 17,900 CONSTABULARY: 5 BNS, 131 COS. TOTAL STRENGTH 24,500	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL ATTACK AND CONTRIBUTE REINF INF BN TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.
NAVY	1 DE, 44 PC/PCE/PCF/PGM, 4 MSC/MSI, 6 LST, 3 LSM, 3 AKL, 2 ARL, 1 ATR, 1 MARINE BLT.	1 DD TYPE, 45 PATROL CRAFT, 13 RIVER PATROL 35AMPHIB, 8 AUX, 2 MINESWEEPERS, 1 MARINE BN. TOTAL STRENGTH 8,000(INCLUDING 1,190 MARINES)	CONDUCT LIMITED OFF SHORE PATROL AND MINOR AMPHIBIOUS AND ASW OPERATIONS.
AIR FORCE	2 TAC FTR SQ, 1 COMP AIR COMMDO SQ, 1 LIAISON SQ, 1 COMPAIR RESCUE SQ, 4 AC&W SITES, 2 AIR TRANS SQ.	FTRS: 36 JET, 0 PROP. TRANS: 10 TURBO PROP, 29 PROP, HELO: 2 PISTON, 11 TURBINE, TRAINERS: 15 JET. OTHER: 36 PROP. TOTAL STRENGTH 9,200	LIMITED CAPABILITY TO FULFILL MISSION OF ASSISTING ARMY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK.

*AS OF 1 JAN 1972 ● Updated By J2 ○ Updated By J5 ◇ Updated By J3 * Updated by J8

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 140.

SECRET

(S) In March, the State Department replied that preparations for the FY 72 presentation to the Congress had progressed to the point at which alterations were not advisable. It was suggested that the EDA program offered a means to stretch MAP dollars. Under the worldwide ceiling for acquisition of long supply and excess for FY 71 of $300 million (see discussion, this chapter), the Philippines had been allocated $4 million. The Ambassador responded by noting that the long supply and excess program had been used to acquire three LSTs, 17 F-86 aircraft, 600 vehicles, and excess ammunition. However, he noted that the items for which the increases had been requested had not been available through the excess program. These included C-130 or C-123 aircraft, fast patrol boats, and UH-1H helicopters. He reiterated his request for a higher MAP budget for the Philippines. CINCPAC supported the renewed request, so long as other PACOM funds were not shifted. As stated above, the dollar ceilings remained at $17 million at the end of 1971.[1]

Philippine Government MAP Proposals

(S) In 1969, during President Nixon's PACOM trip, six Aides Memoire were handed to the President by President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines. These had contained proposals for improvement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), U.S. assistance to establish bases in the Southern islands, highway construction assistance, logistical assistance for the anti-dissident campaign in Central Luzon, and increased ammunition levels. The various proposals amounted to over $80 million in MAP support, but more pertinently, were not feasible from a programmed capability viewpoint. They were not supported by CINCPAC or the State Department, and, at the suggestion of the Ambassador, were not acknowledged by the U.S. Government.[2]

(S) On 20 May 1971, President Marcos delivered an Aide Memoire dealing with MAP matters to Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green. It contained a request that the "Military Assistance Pact" be reviewed so that an indigenous capability could be established in the Philippines for the production of small arms, communications equipment, and land vehicles. Also, the Aide Memoire requested that priority attention be given to the procurement of UH-1H helicopters, C-130 aircraft, and LSTs. CINCPAC supported the procurement of the MAP equipment items, but pointed out that the U.S./Philippine Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1953 did not, and should not, obligate the U.S. to provide funds or resources for the establishment of defense production

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[1] J533 HistSum Mar 71; SECSTATE 36775/042309Z Mar 71; AMEMB Manila 2239/110825Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 230358Z Mar 71.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, pp. 199-200; J5333 HistSum Dec 69; SECSTATE 206418/121755Z Dec 69; CINCPAC 300314Z Dec 69; AMEMB Manila 221006Z Dec 69.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE BACKGROUND

Republic of the Philippines

HISTORY OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE - ROP (FY 68-71)

FY 68	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72
$21.5	$18.9	$15.9	$17.0	$17.0

- The reduction in Grant Aid to the ROP over this period results both from ceilings imposed and from increased self-sufficiency.

- The ROP has been enoouraged to assume a greater share of AFP operating costs and continued improvement in the ratio of MAP operating costs to investment costs is expected.

- Current efforts of MAP are aimed at improved mobility and communications for the AFP.

SECRET

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FY 72 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ($ MILLIONS)

CATEGORY	AMOUNT
AIRCRAFT	0.5
SHIPS/CRAFT	1.9
VEHICLES/TRLRS	1.1
WEAPONS/SPARES	0.6
AMMUNITION	0.8
COMM EQUIP	0.6
OTHER SUP EQUIP/SVCS	2.0
SUPPLIES/MAINT	5.3
SHIP OVERHAULS	1.5
SUPPLY OPERATIONS	1.6
TRAINING	1.1
TOTAL	$17.0

MAJOR ITEMS (QUANTITIES)		
UH-1H HELO		2
PGM GUNBOAT		4
LANDING CRAFT MECH		6
WEAPONS		7750
VEH/TRLR		238
UTILITY BOAT		3
TYPE BOAT		
INVESTMENT		4.2
OPERATING:		
OPERATING:	10.2	
PCH&T	1.6	11.8
TRNG		1.0
TOTAL		$17.0

facilities in the Philippines.[1]

(S) In a companion move designed to increase the level of U.S. MAP, the AFP Chief of Staff, General Manuel Yan, referred to a new five year plan to achieve a more self-reliant posture for the AFP during an August 1971 Mutual Defense Board (MDB) Executive meeting. The new plan was compared to Vietnamization and the ROK Five Year modernization program in support of the Nixon Doctrine, and was called "Philippinization." Preliminary information was that the plan envisioned adding 300 million pesos annually to the Philippine defense budget and 23,000 men to their then-constituted 60,000 man total force strength. The new plan was scheduled to be presented at the MDB meeting of 13 December 1971, which both Marcos and Admiral McCain were expected to attend.[2]

(C) In a twin offensive, the Executive Secretary to President Marcos delivered yet another Aide Memoire to the State Department. It outlined a broad plan for the general realignment not only of the AFP, but of the Ministry of Defense as well. The concept proposed was of an AFP Home Defense Program, oriented toward AFP participation in national development through community relations, civil assistance, and agro-military activities. CINCPAC was requested to provide comments on the proposal to the State Department by 1 January 1972. The initial CINCPAC Staff reaction was that the proposed realignment would require a substantial shift in MAP support priorities and a virtually complete reprogramming of current MAP.[3]

Assistance to Philippine Air Force

(S) The objective of modernizing the transport aircraft possessed by the Philippine Air Force (PAF) was established in the JSOP, and had been planned for in the FY 73-76 time frame. In December 1970, after witnessing the use of C-130 aircraft, flown by the U.S. Air Force, in typhoon and flood relief, President Marcos had requested JUSMAG to procure one C-130 for the PAF through MAP. Because of the high acquisition and maintenance cost of the C-130, JUSMAG suggested to CINCPAC that C-123K might be substituted, and requested CINCPAC's comments. Before CINCPAC could reply, JUSMAG advised that he had received a formal request that two C-130s be included in the FY 72 MAP on a first priority basis. On 13 January 1971, the CSAF advised that C-123K aircraft would not be available for MAP consideration. The CSAF also advised that C-130s would cost $3.95 million each, plus $1.25 million for aircraft spare parts, $145,000 for

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[1] J8232 Point Paper, 6 Dec 71, Subj: Urgent Military Equipment Requirements for the Philippines.

[2] J5125 Point Paper, 28 Oct 71, Subj: Philippinization Program; J5128 Point Paper, 7 Dec 71, Subj: PHIL Armed Forces Long-Range Defense Plan.

[3] J5122 Point Paper, 7 Dec 71, Subj: Proposed AFP House Defense Program.

each of the four engines, and $250,000 for ground support equipment if procured in FY 72. These costs would increase to $4.25 million, $1.34 million, $155,000 and $267,000 respectively if procurement were in FY 73. The USAF did not possess enough C-130s to permit the loan or other use by any MAP country, and, if the aircraft were procured under FMS credit, the cost would be as cited. Finally, the CSAF stated that the only aircraft in the C-130/C-123 class available as excess was the C-119G. In view of the stated nonavailability of C-123Ks and C-130s under MIMEX or loan, and the high cost of C-130s to MAP or under FMS, CINCPAC suggested that JUSMAGPHIL consider the C-119G as an alternative.[1]

(S) In March, JUSMAG provided a resume of the impact if the two C-130s requested were funded by MAP. Investment items needed for internal security, as well as overall operating costs, would be entirely eliminated. However, even though the cost of the C-119G was only $229,000, JUSMAG did not believe that aircraft to be an economical or politically wise choice. Because it had been phased out of the USAF, and was supportable only until 1976, JUSMAG did not believe that it met the stated request of the Philippines for a modern transport aircraft. Both JUSMAG and the Embassy advanced a proposal that two C-130s possessed by USAF at Clark Air Base in the Philippines be designated as joint use aircraft; however, the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) component of CINCPAC did not concur, citing the existing shortages of C-130 assets in the PACOM.[2]

(S) In April, CINCPAC advised the SECDEF that he supported the need to modernize the PAF air transport fleet, and also agreed with JUSMAGPHIL that the acquisition of C-130 aircraft by grant aid would be expensive and inimical to the U.S. MAP objectives. CINCPAC recommended, therefore, that an FMS case with favorable long term credit terms be arranged. At this stage, the Aid Memoire to Secretary Green entered the picture, and CINCPAC again provided his views to the SECDEF. On 6 June 1971, CINCPAC reminded SECDEF that the primary reason listed in the JSOP for military assistance to the Philippines was, "base rights/quid pro quo," and that the Philippines was included as a strategic priority one country because, "bases it controls provide significant advantages with respect to operations in the western Pacific." Further, the DOD and CINCPAC Military Assistance Manuals both stated that one of the MAP objectives in the Philippines was to support the retention of base rights. The foregoing, CINCPAC stated, along with hostility toward the U.S. by some segments of the Philippine population and the stated austere level of MAP funds during FY 73-77, presented a case for an increase in FY 72 and 73 MAP ceilings to

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[1] J5333 HistSum Feb 71; CHJUSMAGPHIL 071114Z Dec and 220622Z Dec 70; CSAF 132104Z Jan and 091555Z Feb 71; CINCPAC 120402Z Feb 71.

[2] J533 HistSum Mar 71; CHJUSMAGPHIL 230510Z Mar 71; AMEMB Manila 2706/240927Z Mar 71; CINCPACAF 300235Z Mar 71.

procure two C-130s. If an increase were not possible, CINCPAC suggested that the provision of C-123Ks through MAP, as a special exception, be considered, or that the possibility of Service funding be examined. On 19 June, a joint State-Defense message indicated that MAP levels could not be increased, FMS credit would aggravate the Philippine foreign debt balance, and C-130s were not available. Again, the U.S. Ambassador and JUSMAG were advised to recommend that the Philippines settle for C-119Gs.[1]

(S) Following briefings and an in-country demonstration of C-119K capability, the Philippines agreed that replacment of C-47 transports by the C-119K would be acceptable. Tentative requirements for 12 aircraft, at an estimated $12 million cost, were determined, but supplemental funds would be needed. By the end of 1971, the Philippines had approved the acquisition of four C-119Ks (two each in FY 72-73), from existing MAP. The funding uncertainties discussed at the beginning of this chapter precluded MAP reprogramming because the dollar ceilings might be reduced.[2]

(S) Of 24 UH-1H helicopers programmed under the Philippine MAP, 12 had been delivered by the end of 1970--five of these by acceleration of fiscal year delivery schedules. As the Chief, JUSMAGPHIL had predicted, pressure for faster UH-1H deliveries continued in 1971, based on the internal upheavals activated by dissident elements. On 24 April 1971, JUSMAGPHIL requested accelerated delivery of five helicopters from January-June 1973 to July-December 1972. It was noted that, although these helicopters had been funded since April and June 1970, scheduled deliveries were still one year away. CINCPAC supported this request to the JCS with the proviso that deliveries scheduled for other PACOM countries not be diverted.[3]

(S) Agreement was reached that the U.S. Army could meet the requested delivery schedule, but attrition rates and operational requirements in RVN delayed delivery. On 8 June, CINCPAC authorized delivery to the Philippines by diversion from RVN schedules and requested the U.S. Army to effect delivery of the five UH-1H helicopters. The Army complied, with delivery completed on 10 September 1971. On 27 August, following notification by JUSMAG that two PAF helicopters had received severe battle damage, CINCPAC requested the Army to provide accelerated delivery of three more UH-1Hs and requested advanced funding for the balance of the programmed helicopters. The Army Materiel

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[1] J5332 HistSum Apr, Jun 71; CINCPAC 040242Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 060239Z Jun 71; SECSTATE 110117/1/191928Z Jun 71.

[2] J5332 HistSum Aug-Sep 71 and J8232 HistSum Nov-Dec 71, with nine atch documents.

[3] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 366-368; J5332 HistSum Apr 71; CHJUSMAGPHIL 240132Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 281330Z Apr 71.

Command advised that five rebuilt UH-1Hs could be made available within 60-90 days; JUSMAGPHIL and CINCPAC agreed on acceptance; and, by the end of 1971, the Philippines had taken delivery of 22 of the 24 MAP-authorized aircraft. In each case, delivery had been expedited.[1]

Assistance to Philippine Navy

(S) On 9 November 1971, the Chief, JUSMAGPHIL notified CINCPAC that the Philippines had accepted an offer of three LSTs to be made available from Military Sealift Command assets on loan, lease or purchase. By the end of the year, the Philippine Navy had inspected the vessels, but the terms for transfer had yet to be determined.[2]

(S) During 1971, the Philippine Government evinced interest in acquiring destroyers on loan or no-cost lease. The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations explained that the cost for overhaul, spare parts, ammunition, and training could be as high as $4 million per vessel, and that activation and modernization costs for a destroyer from the inactive fleet would cost about $9 million. Based on the cost, limited MAP funds, and the lack of a valid external naval threat to the Philippines, CINCPAC advised JUSMAG that the matter should be deferred. In like fashion, the desire of the Philippines to acquire naval missile systems was discussed, but disapproved by JUSMAG, CINCPAC, DOD, and the State Department.[3]

Assistance to Philippine Army

(S) In 1970, the AFP had requested delivery of M-16 rifles, and expedited delivery was made of 1,208 M-16s under FY 70 MAP. This had raised the total possessed to 1,408 M-16s. At that time, JUSMAGPHIL had cited the existence of a mental block which prevented effective AFP action against the Huks and other dissidents without the added fire power of the M-16 rifle. On 30 December 1970, the AFP Chief of Staff requested approval for the purchase of 4,000 M-16s through FMS. This request was supported by the U.S. Ambassador and JUSMAG, and CINCPAC requested SECDEF support on 6 January 1971.[4]

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[1] J5332 HistSum Jun 71; CINCPAC 080357Z Jun 71; J8117 Point Paper, 2 Dec 71, Subj: Accelerated Delivery of UH-1H Helicopters to the Republic of the Philippines; J824 HistSum Dec 71; CINCPAC 100533Z Sep 71.

[2] J8232 HistSum Nov-Dec 71; CHJUSMAGPHIL 091030Z Nov 71; CNO 4900/102125Z Nov 71; SECDEF 9194/152215Z Oct 71.

[3] J533 HistSum Feb, May 71; SECSTATE 23169/102354Z Feb 71; CHUSMAGPHIL 181136Z Feb 71; CINCPAC 260631Z Feb 71; CHJUSMAGPHIL 120726Z May 71; CNO 4900/172025Z May 71; CINCPAC 270341Z May 71.

[4] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 368-369; J5333 HistSum Jan 71; CHJUSMAGPHIL 300200Z Dec 70; CINCPAC 060620Z Jan 71.

(S) Again, on 11 January, the Ambassador advised that President Marcos had expressed personal interest. Marcos indicated his desire that delivery be made within 60 days, if possible. CINCPAC requested favorable action, and, on 16 January, the State Department notified all concerned that the sale had been approved and that DOD would submit a Letter of Offer as soon as possible. On 20 January, State notified the Embassy that a delivery date of 28 February could be met, provided that the Letter of Offer was signed by the Philippine Government by 29 January and that a check for the purchase accompany the Letter. On 28 January, JUSMAG notified the Army that forms had been signed, and that a check for $780,042.38 had been tendered covering the purchase of 4,000 rifles. Delivery was completed in February 1971.[1]

Project FORESIGHT SIERRA

(C) The first increment of Project FORESIGHT SIERRA was completed and turned over to the Philippine Government on 24 November 1971. FORESIGHT SIERRA was a long range program to upgrade the fixed communications available to the AFP using MAP support. The first contract established a main tropospheric scatter link from Tayaytay, Luzon to Mt. Luay, Cebu, with microwave extensions from Tayaytay to Ft. Bonifacio and from Mt. Luay to Lapu Lapu, Cebu.[2]

(S) On 28 August, JUSMAGPHIL submitted a plan to extend the system by adding Cebu-to-Cagayan and Cagayan-to-Zamboanga links. Excess U.S. Army equipment from RVN, worth about $3.5 to 5.0 million, together with $500,000 to be reprogrammed into the FY 72 MAP, would geographically double the span of control, via communications, of the Philippine Government. CINCPAC strongly supported the expansion, and, as of 28 December 1971, some excess items had been released from RVN by the SECDEF.[3]

Thailand MASF Program

(S) On 31 August 1971, COMUSMACTHAI, who also held the post of Chief, JUSMAGTHAI, summarized the importance of Thailand to U.S. strategy. He stated that Thailand, traditionally an ally, had a cultural and political history with the best promise for immediate and long range stability in Southeast Asia.

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1 AMEMB Manila/JUSMAGPHIL 110610Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 130312Z Jan 71; SECSTATE 7864/160013Z Jan 71 and 10305/202349Z Jan 71; CHJUSMAGPHIL 280510Z Jan 71; MA Journal, No. 116, p. 140.

2 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 372; J614 HistSum Nov 71; J614 Point Paper, 6 Dec 71, Subj: Armed Forces Philippines Communications System, FORESIGHT SIERRA.

3 J824 HistSum Dec 71; CHJUSMAGPHIL 280530Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 202143Z Sep 71; SECDEF 4816/281455Z Dec 71.

SECRET

THAILAND

BASIC INFORMATION *

AREA	200,000 SQ. MI.	LIFE EXPECTANCY	48 YEARS
POPULATION	35,015,000	GROSS NAT. PROD 1971	7.1 BIL
ANNUAL GROWTH	3%	PER CAPITA, 1971	$164
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.8 ACRE	DEFENSE BUDGET SELF FINANCED 1971	243 MIL
LITERACY RATE	65-70%	AS % GNP	3.4
		AS % CENTRAL GOV EXP	18.0

DEFENSE BUDGET INCLUDES INTERNAL SECURITY

KING - Phumiphon Adundet ●
DIRECTOR NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SUPREME COMMANDER THAI ARMED FORCES - FIELD MARSHAL Thanom Kittikachorn
CINC NAVY - ADM Tharil Rayananon
CINC AF - AIR MARSHAL Boonchoo Chandrubeksa
CINC ARMY - GEN Prapass Charusathien



OVERALL OBJECTIVES ○

ASSIST THAILAND IN SUSTAINING NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN STRENGTHENING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY AND RESISTING POSSIBLE OVERT AGGRESSION PROMOTE REGIONALISM AND ASSURE US BASE RIGHTS.

U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. LEONARD UNGER
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. REY M. HILL
COMUSMACTHAI & CHIEF JUSMAG-THAI
MAJ GEN ANDREW J. EVANS, JR., USAF

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES *

(A) To assist Thailand to develop the capability to sustain its integrity against internal subversion.
(B) To help develop Thai Armed Forces capable of participating in defense against aggression by North Vietnam or Communist China.
(C) To foster continued Thai participation in selected programs regarding Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Korea.
(D) To encourage Thai cooperation that will be required in the event the United States decides to retain the use of bases in Thailand after a Vietnam settlement.
(E) To foster the continuation of a major Thai role in promoting the growth of regional organizations interested in internal development and resistance to would-be aggressors.

	MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES ○	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES * ◇	COMBAT CAPABILITY ○
ARMY	1 INF DIVS, 1 PSY WAR BN, 1 RCT(SEP), 2 SF GP, 1 ABN BN, 6 ENGR BNS, 1 MECH CAV REGT(SEP), 11 ARTY BN(LT), 1 AAA BN, 4 HELO COS, 1 ARTY BN(MED), 1 AVN CO(LT).	4 INF DIVS^, 1 CAV DIV, 2 SF BNS, 1 ARTY BN, 1 INF REGT 1 AAA BDG, 1 ABN BN, 178 PROP, 51 HELO) TOTAL STRENGTH 118,000	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION.
NAVY	8 DE/PF, 47 PATROL CRAFT, 31 MINEWARFARE, 1 ASWRON, 2 MMC, 44 LANDING SHIPS, 2 MAR REGTS.	58 PATROL TYPES, 17 MINE WAR, 49 AMPHIB, 1 DE, (14 PROP, 2 HELO) TOTAL STRENGTH 22,500 (INCLUDES 8,000)	LIMITED ABILITY TO CONDUCT COASTAL DEFENSE AND PATROL IN GULF OF THAILAND AND INTERNAL WATERWAYS, LIMITED ASW AND MINE WARFARE; TRANSPORT AND AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT.
AIR FORCE	2 TACTICAL FTR/RECON SQS, 1 TRANSPT SQ, 1 RECON SQ, 5 TAC COIN, 2 HELICOPTER SQS, 1 AWX CNTR SQ, 3 ACW, 1 TAC SUP SQ.	FTRS-24 JET, RECON-1 JET, 14 PROP TRAINERS-37 JET, 99 PROP, UTILITY-15 PROP, OTHER-3 JET, 18 PROP, 4 HELO, HELOS-39 PISTON, 23 TURBINE	LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AND CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY; DAY AIR DEFENSE, ARMY AIR ARM HAS LITTLE CAPABILITY TO PERFORM OBSERVATION AND SOME LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

* AS OF 1 JAN 1972 ^ Includes Volunteer Division in RVN

● Updated By J2 ◇ Updated By J3
○ Updated By J5 * Updated BY J8

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 143.

SECRET

The level and effectiveness of our presence in Thailand had been maintained at less overall cost to the U.S. than in any other mainland Southeast Asian nation. Further, should our efforts in Vietnam or Cambodia fail, the strategic and political importance of Thailand would be increased. Therefore, the advisory effort in Thailand should receive high priority.[1]

MASF Funding

(S) From FY 50 through FY 70, Thailand had received grant aid of about $916.4 million, purchased $27.1 million through FMS, and had trained 10,514 people through MAP/MASF in the U.S. Security assistance dollar guidelines were $61 million for FY 71, $60 million for FY 72, and $60 million for FY 73. Investment costs for FY 72-73 were programmed primarily for aircraft, communications equipment, and patrol craft. Of the original $60 million programmed for FY 72, however, only $16.6 million was for investment items. By October 1971, the dollar ceiling for FY 72 had been increased to $66.5 million as compensation for deletion of a HAWK missile battalion from a previous fiscal year commitment under the MASF program. Dollar guidelines for FY 73-76 were $60 million, dropping to $50 million for FY 77.[2]

(C) Related to the regular MASF program, which provided O&M and investment funds to the RTARF in support of counterinsurgency and internal security items, was the proposal called "Additional Assistance to Thailand" (AAT). The initial concept had materialized under the title of "Strengthening Thailand for Defense" (STFD), but was changed to AAT by direction of the JCS on 23 August 1971.[3]

(S) The initial concept of STFD was to encourage the RTG to accelerate the improvement of RTARF capabilities, especially in counterinsurgency operations, by allocating more MASF and PL 480 funds. In exchange, the RTG was to increase its defense budget. The new proposal by the U.S. Government under AAT specified the addition of $15 million to the FY 72 MASF grant aid program, $15 million loan under PL 480 funds in FY 72, and $15 million PL 480 in FY 73. The RTG would allocate $10 million additional to defense from the RTG budget in FY 72 and $10 million additional in FY 73. Capsulized, the U.S. had offered $15 million MASF add-on and a $30 million PL 480 loan, and the RTG would increase its defense expenditures by $20 million. This proposal, made in August

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1 COMUSMACTHAI 311130Z Aug 71.
2 J8223 Point Paper, 10 Nov 71, Subj: Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) Program, Thailand.
3 J5323 HistSum Aug 71; JCS 232119Z Aug 71 (EX): This discussion downgraded from TS per CINCPAC J8, which cited AMEMB Bangkok 091111Z May 72.

1971, engendered little enthusiasm on the part of the Thai.[1]

(S) The AAT package specified that the additional $20 million in Thai military expenditures and the $15 million in MASF grant aid would finance RTA manpower augmentations; the extension of RTA training programs; an increase in the scope of current counterinsurgency operations; upgrading of RTARF logistic facilities; and, the improvement of RTARF capability to conduct sustained operations against insurgency or aggression. Upon presentation to the Prime Minister and other Thai officials on 24 August, the stress by the Thai was on the difficulty of adding $20 million to the RTG military budget in Thai FY 72, which began on 1 October 1971.[2]

(S) In October, the RTG made strong representations in Washington toward the separation of the PL 480 and MASF arrangements, with the grant aid to be supplied without rigid details on force structure improvements. To influence the U.S. to relax the rigidity of the AAT package, the RTG made a verbal commitment to reprogram $2.5 million in FY 72 to defense for AAT purposes. By November, an additional factor had been introduced--whether the U.S. would provide the A-37 squadron programmed in the regular FY 72 MASF.[3]

(S) On 17 November 1971, on the same day that martial law was reinstated by the Prime Minister, the RTG and U.S. agreed on a guidance paper to be used in future detailed discussions between the RTARF and COMUSMACTHAI. On 24 November, the Ambassador proposed to the State Department that letters of agreement be exchanged between COMUSMACTHAI and the RTARF Chief of Staff to confirm mutual understanding.[4]

(S) At the end of the year, negotiations were continuing on the AAT package, which, excluding the PL 480 provision, involved a total defense increase of $35 million--the FY 72 MASF add-on of $15 million, the FY 72 RTG add-on of $10 million, and the FY 73 RTG add-on of $10 million. Agreement had been reached that the RTA would receive $22 million, the RTAF $10 million, and the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) $3 million. Still unresolved were the PL 480 loan provisions and the question of providing the A-37 squadron.[5]

[1] J5323 Point Paper, 26 Aug 71, Subj: Additional Assistance to Thailand (AAT).

[2] Ibid.; J5323 HistSum Sep 71; J5323 Point Paper, 23 Sep 71, Subj: Additional Assistance to Thailand (AAT).

[3] J8223 HistSum Oct 71; J8223 Point Paper, 10 Nov 71, Subj: Additional Assistance to Thailand (AAT).

[4] J8223 HistSum Oct 71; COMUSMACTHAI 171010Z Nov 71 (EX); AMEMB Bangkok 15779/241157Z Nov 71 (EX).

[5] J837 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: Additional Assistance to Thailand (AAT).

(S) The immediate benefit to be derived by the U.S. from the AAT proposal was connected with RTAF operations in Cambodia, which had begun in 1970. In October 1971, COMUSMACTHAI had raised the question of legality regarding MASF items used by the RTAF on missions into Cambodia--specifically, 7.62mm ammunition, 2.75mm rockets, and spare parts. COMUSMACTHAI had requested CINCPAC guidance, and on 13 October, CINCPAC queried the JCS. On 23 October CINCPAC solicited the active support of the Chairman, JCS for the AAT proposal because the continuation and improvement of RTAF operations in Cambodia hinged largely on successful AAT negotiations. On 10 December, a joint State-Defense answer agreed that the only solution rested on favorable negotiation of the AAT proposal. MASF items provided to the RTG could legally be used only for the defense of Thailand, and the RTAF could continue operations in Cambodia only if a method was found to legally provide consummable items.[1]

Unger-Dawee Assistance

(S) On 9 November 1967, the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Leonard Unger, consummated an agreement with Air Chief Marshal Dawee, Chief of Staff, RTARF regarding the deployment of a Thai division to Vietnam. Among the commitments made by the U.S. to assist the RTG in funding this deployment was the transfer of equipment possessed by the Thai forces in Vietnam to the RTG upon redeployment to Thailand. Another commitment was to construct and equip a Thailand Overseas Replacement Training Center (ORTC), which would revert to RTG ownership when training of Thai personnel for the RTA Volunteer Force in Vietnam had been completed. Still another commitment had been the deployment of a HAWK missile battery to Thailand, including training and equipment. In 1971, redeployment of the Thai forces from RVN to Thailand began, and, as they redeployed, their equipment was transferred to the RTG. By the same token, training at the ORTC for troop use in Vietnam ended, and about $15 million in equipment and consummable items were transferred to the RTG.[2]

(S) On 30 July, the U.S. Embassy was officially informed that the RTG had agreed to accept substitutes for the HAWK missile battery. On 16 August, the Embassy informed the State Department that the substitute package desired by the Thai was 18 UH-1 helicopters and two CH-47 helicopters. On 21 August, an increase to the FY 72 dollar ceiling of $6.5 million was authorized to fund the substitute package with the stipulation that any amount exceeding the $6.5

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[1] J551 Point Paper, 7 Jan 72, Subj: RTAF Operations in Cambodia; J8223 HistSum Oct 71; CINCPAC 131607Z Oct 71 (EX).

[2] J4115 HistSum Jul-Aug 71; COMUSMACTHAI 030304Z Jun 71; CINCPAC 030151Z Sep 71; J4315 HistSum May-Jun 71 and 080358Z Jun 71; J8223 Point Paper, 10 Nov 71, Subj: HAWK Substitutes.

million would be accommodated within the new ceiling of $66.5 million.[1]

(S) The decision by the RTG to accept helicopters in lieu of the HAWK battery left two possible continuing commitments under the Unger-Dawee agreement. These were U.S. support for Thai residual forces in Vietnam, and personnel liability claims. The Ambassador noted the strong possibility that the U.S. would continue to receive claims for some personnel expenses, such as medical treatment, beyond the end of FY 72. The State Department and DOD agreed that claims beyond FY 72 attributable to this commitment should not impinge upon the regular MASF program in Thailand.[2]

Tactical/COIN Aircraft for RTAF

(S) In November 1969, the RTG consummated the purchase of 16 OV-10 aircraft for $15 million as the initial step in the modernization of the RTAF. Programmed for FY 71/72 acquisition were 15 A-37Bs. During a visit to Thailand by DOD representatives, it was suggested that MACTHAI program T-28s in place of A-37s because T-28s were more readily available. Consequently, authority was requested to add T-28s as replacements for T/RT-33s being phased out by attrition. In March 1971, the need for T-28s in Laos and Cambodia cancelled the likelihood of their availability to the RTAF, and COMUSMACTHAI proposed a restructuring of the RTAF fighter force through a combination of FY 71/72 MASF and FMS purchases by the RTG. This proposal reinstated the FY 71/72 MASF purchase of 15 A-37Bs, and included an FMS credit purchase by the RTG of 15 OV-10s in FY 71. Also programmed was a FY 72 purchase of 15 A-37Bs under FMS and a combination MASF/FMS procurement of 15 COIN/utility (Peacemaker) aircraft in FY 72, provided these aircraft were successfully tested. COMUSMACTHAI proposed that the Peacemaker be tested in Thailand. CINCPAC strongly supported the restructuring proposal, and the support of JCS was requested for an early decision because production lines for the OV-10 and A-37 aircraft were scheduled to shut down.[3]

(S) On 20 April, the JCS advised CINCPAC of the approved allocation of T-28s in SEA for FY 72. Laos was allocated 86, Cambodia 18, and Thailand 60, which was the level already authorized for the RTAF. The JCS advised that an operational test of two short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft such as the

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1 Ibid.; J5323 HistSum Jul-Aug 71; AMEMB Bangkok 10514/301047Z Jul 71; SECSTATE 154054/212206Z Aug 71.

2 J5323 HistSum Sep 71; AMEMB Bangkok 11980/010757Z Sep 71; SECSTATE 175007/231514Z Sep 71.

3 J5323 HistSum Apr 71; COMUSMACTHAI 170500Z Apr 71; ADMIN CINCPAC 210124Z Apr 71; J5323 Point Paper, 18 May 71, Subj: Tactical/COIN Aircraft for RTAF and Cambodian Air Force.

Peacemaker would be conducted in Thailand by the USAF, and that the Secretary of the Air Force had been directed to conduct an evaluation of off-the-shelf COIN aircraft to be provided for SEA countries. On 19 May, the SECDEF approved the RTAF fighter force realignment, except for A-37s in FY 71. The SECDEF suggested that A-37s be programmed in FY 72, but cautioned that an 18 month lead time should be planned.[1]

(S) On 6 August 1971, a joint State-Defense message outlined a proposed offer of F-5E aircraft to Vietnam, Korea, China, Turkey, and Thailand. Proposals to furnish the IFA varied from pure MAP/MASF funding to combinations of MAP/MASF and FMS. The proposed offer to Thailand was to provide one aircraft under MASF for each two aircraft purchased by the RTG, which, as the U.S. Ambassador pointed out, was the least favorable of all country offers. The Ambassador doubted that the RTG would be in a position to finance two-thirds of the cost of F-5s, and stressed the potential political reaction if the terms of the IFA proposal became public knowledge.[2]

(S) Complicating the COIN/tactical aircraft picture was the AAT package, and the pressing need to provide T-28s for Laos and Cambodia. Thus, the four squadrons of T-28s owned by the RTAF had been considered as a source, to be replaced by A-37s or a new COIN aircraft. The various proposals and possible force structures being considered for the RTAF had caused confusion even at the Washington level, where the originally programmed A-37s had come to be considered replacements for T-28s instead of the F-86, as initially planned. On 9 November, COMUSMACTHAI reported that he had been unable to separate the MASF A-37 squadron from AAT discussions, but believed it imperative that special effort be applied to early procurement of A-37s. RTG acceptance of the AAT package was being delayed because a decision on A-37s had not been reached. CINCPAC urged the Chairman, JCS to expedite such a decision.[3]

(S) On 29 October, the Secretary of the Air Force proposed to the SECDEF that an A-37B squadron be assigned to the RTAF at the earliest possible date at a cost to the MASF program of $9.43 million. On 7 December, State and Defense agreed to provide an A-37 squadron, but only as a replacement for a Thai T-28 squadron. As the year ended, the RTG had made a counter proposal to release nine T-28s for an A-37 squadron, and no answer had been made from the Washington level.[4]

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1 J5323 HistSum May 71; JCS 2390/201924Z Apr 71; SECDEF 3825/192158Z May 71.

2 J8223 Point Paper, 10 Nov 71, Subj: F-5E Aircraft for Thailand; SECSTATE 143746/1/062148Z Aug 71; AMEMB Bangkok 11050/111319Z Aug 71.

3 J8223 Point Paper, 10 Nov 71, Subj: A-37 Squadron for Thailand; COMUSMACTHAI 030420Z Sep 71 (EX); CINCPAC 180149Z Sep 71 (EX).

4 J8223 Point Paper, 15 Dec 71, Subj: A-37 Squadron for Thailand; SECSTATE 220233/070230Z Dec 71; J837 Point Paper, 25 Jan 72, Subj: A-37 Squadron for Thailand; AMEMB Bangkok 240505Z Dec 71.

Patrol Gunboat for RTN

(S) On 1 November 1971, COMUSMACTHAI advised CINCPAC of RTN interest in a fast patrol gunboat, and noted the possibility that procurement might be from other than U.S. sources unless such craft were available. Foremost among the RTN reasons to possess a boat capable of 40 knot speed, apparently, was that the Malaysian Navy possessed such boats. Joint Thai-Malaysian border patrol operations had emphasized the disparity between the 25 knot capability of the RTN and the 40 knots of the Malaysians. COMUSMACTHAI requested CINCPAC to assist in exploring possible means by which the U.S. could meet the RTN requirement. CINCPAC, referring to on-going CPIC negotiations for in-country production in Korea, requested COMUSK to submit his views on a possible regional cooperative project between Korea and Thailand. He also requested the Chief of Naval Operations to provide guidance, alternatives, or sales recommendations for use by COMUSMACTHAI in discussions with the RTN. The Navy response offered no encouragement, stating that no U.S. Navy excess PGs were available for loan or lease. A possible future solution could be the CPIC then under development, but production was not scheduled before late 1973.[1]

Evaluation of Thailand MASF Program[2]

(U) The CINCPAC PEG evaluation of the Thailand program for FY 71 was conducted during the period 8-26 February 1971. The report noted the excellent rapport between the U.S. advisors assigned to JUSMAG and their Thai counterparts. Special attention had been given to adoption by the RTARF of centralized management techniques. The best example was the single maintenance and supply program in support of RTAF and RTA helicopters.

(S) Regarding funds, the team found that the combined MASF-RTG programmed expenditures for FY 72 were insufficient to continue the modernization of the RTARF, and, at the same time, increase the Thai war readiness material stocks to minimum essential levels. Both the RTARF and JUSMAG had recognized that soaring MASF-supported O&M costs caused by force expansion must be reduced. Complicating agreement on proper allocation of funds was a disparity between RTG and U.S. assessments of the threat to Thailand. The Thai had become increasingly concerned about the external threat because of increased enemy activity in Cambodia and Laos. The U.S. viewed the primary threat to be internal, but encouraged Thai participation in selected programs to assist neighboring countries. The U.S. restriction on disclosure of future MASF funding

[1] J8223 HistSum Nov 71; COMUSMACTHAI 4900/010600Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 050229Z Nov 71; CNO 9820/061800Z Nov 71.

[2] CINCPAC ltr, Ser 001066 of 13 May 71, Subj: CINCPAC FY 71 Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program for Thailand, with 1 encl: PEG Rpt, Thailand MASF, FY 71.

levels hindered the exchange of information between Thai and U.S. planners and fostered doubt concerning U.S. intentions in regard to the stability and security of Thailand.

(S) Associated with the limited funding was the question of maintaining bases and facilities being vacated by U.S. force withdrawals. The PEG team advised the early identification of fund sources for austere, but essential, maintenance of facilities needed under contingency plans before deterioration rendered these facilites unusable.

Republic of Vietnam MASF Program

(TS) The program to provide security assistance to RVN was, of course, interwoven with the active war effort. Administration of MASF and other assistance to RVN was accomplished within the COMUSMACV command structure under a framework specified in the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan (CRIMP). The overall goal of CRIMP was to assist the RVN to attain a force structure sufficient to provide internal security against aggression or subversion within its borders. The program was subject to continuing analysis of the enemy threat, RVNAF performance, status of pacification, and political and economic stability. The CRIMP goal was to increase the size of the RVNAF from the 801,215 of 1968 to 1.1 million by the end of FY 72:[1]

RVNAF Strength (in thousands)	Auth FY 71	Auth FY 72
Army (12 Div)	434	444
Navy (1636 Craft)	40	41
Marines (1 Div)	13	14
Air Force (51 Sq)	39	47
RF (1679 Cos)	294	296
PF (7698 Plat)	258	258
TOTAL	1,078	1,100

(TS) On 2 March 1971, the JCS tasked CINCPAC and COMUSMACV to re-evaluate CRIMP goals and objectives in light of the developing situation in Southeast Asia, and also requested an assessment of the capability of the RVNAF to sustain its own air defense and to interdict North Vietnamese infiltration of men and supplies. On 14 March, CINCPAC answered that the RVNAF could conduct

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[1] J5523 Point Paper, 7 Dec 71, Subj: Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan (CRIMP) Discussion Topic for TCC; for in-depth assessments of the situation in RVN, see MACV History 1971; for measurements of progress, see Appendix, this history.

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

BASIC INFORMATION ●

AREA	66,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	18.8 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.1%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	1.1 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	50-65%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	40-45 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1970(E) (In constant prices)	$1.2 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$78.0
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED 1971(E)	$1.1 BILLION
AS % OF GNP	35.0

PRESIDENT - Nguyen Van Thieu ●
VICE PRESIDENT - Than Van Huong
PRIME MINISTER - Tran Thien Khiem
CHIEF, JOINT GEN STAFF - GEN Cao Van Vien
COMMANDER VNAF - MAJ GEN Tran Van Minh
COMMANDER VNN - RADM Tran Van Chon
COMMANDER VNMC - LT GEN Le Nguyen Khang



OVERALL U. S. OBJECTIVES

TO IMPROVE AND MODERNIZE THE RVN ○ FORCES AND TO ENABLE THEM TO COPE WITH THE ENEMY THREAT AS U. S. AND OTHER FWMAF REDEPLOY FROM SEASIA.

U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. ELLSWORTH BUNKER
DEPUTY AMBASSADOR
HON. SAMUEL D. BERGER
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. JOHN R. MOSSLER
COMUSMACV
GEN CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES *

(A) To assist in developing and maintaining Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) of sufficient size and operational capabilities to meet internal security requirements after U. S., and other allied, Forces are withdrawn from RVN.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES ○

ARMY (ARVN)	10 I.F DIVS, 1 ABN DIV, (1 HONOR GD DIV), 18 ARMD CAV SQ, 59 ARTY BNS, 20 RANGER GPS, 1 SF GP, 5 PSYWAR BNS, 8 MP BNS, 27 ENGR BNS, 4 ENG GPS, 2 SEP ENGR COS.
NAVY (VNN)	SURV AND CONTROL:161(DE, WHEC, PC, PCE, PGM, PCF, WPB), MINE WARFARE: 52(MSC, MLMS, MSM, MSR, LCM). AMP FORCE: 10 (LST, LSM, LSIL, LSSL, LSU). MULTI-PURPOSE: 39(PBR, ASSAULT, ESCORT), 9 MAR INF BNS, 3 MAR ARTY BNS.
AIR FORCE (VNAF)	11 TAC FTR SQS, 8 LIAISON SQS, 2 RECON SQ, 6 TRANS SQS, 16 TAC HELO SQ, 2 TRANS HELO SQS, 3 ACW.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES * ◇

11 INF DIVS., 1 ABN INF DIV, 3 INF REGTS(SEP), 18 ARMD CAV SQDNS., 58 ARTY BNS., 6 RANGER GPS, 22 ENGR BNS, 13 SIG BNS
TOTAL STRENGTH 401, 526

472 PATROL TYPE CRAFT, 13 MINE WARFARE, 654 AMPHIB SHIPS AND CRAFT 1 AUX, 259 SERVICE CRAFT
TOTAL STRENGTH 55, 900 (13, 700 MARINES)

FIGHTERS: 118 JET, FTR BOMBERS 72 PROP, RECON: 5 JET, 135 PROP TRANS: 46, PROP TRAINERS: 21, OTHERS: 58 PROP, HELOS: 397 TURBINE, 24 DISTCN, TOTAL STRENGTH 49, 800

COMBAT CAPABILITY ○

MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY IN MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AND ALONG SELECTED LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, AND OFFER EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE FOR LIMITED TIME AGAINST ATTACK BY EXTERNAL FORCES.

CHARGED WITH PATROLLING INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL WATERS. SUPPORTS ARMY COUNTER-INSURGENCY ACTIONS. MARINE BRIGADE UNDER ARVN CONTROL AS GENERAL RESERVE ELEMENT.

CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING STRIKE OPERATIONS; PROVIDING CLOSE TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR ARMY, AND LIMITED AIRLIFT SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF ABN OPNS.

* AS OF 1 JAN 1972 ● Updated By J2 ◇ Updated by J3 ○ Updated By J5 * Updated By I8

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 142.

limited interdiction raids, but large scale cross-border operations would not be possible after the redeployment of U.S. forces had been completed. The Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) would not have an air interdiction capability by the time the then current CRIMP goals were met, nor had such capability been planned. However, a limited air defense capability would be operational by FY 74.[1]

(TS) On 31 March, the JCS requested CINCPAC to recommend changes to the CRIMP based on projected U.S. deployment levels. CINCPAC recommended no substantive changes, and was again queried, on 12 April, for a detailed analysis of equipment, firepower, communications, logistics, intelligence, and personnel needed to expand and improve the RVNAF. Once more, CINCPAC recommended that the 1.1 million force goal be retained, and that no other major changes be made. The following month, based on continuing reviews, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV determined that an additional armored battalion, equipped with the M48A3 tank, was needed to provide a cadre for future change-over of the RVNAF tank force. On 24 July, the Chairman, JCS recommended that the SECDEF approve the M48 tank battalion, and on 10 August, approval was received.[2]

(TS) Meanwhile, based upon a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM 118), the JCS forwarded another request that RVNAF problem areas in leadership, morale, training, personnel management, and force structure be reviewed. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV forwarded replies on 4 August and 7 August. Another query was received in September, the reply to which stated, in substance, that the activation of a new ARVN infantry division was planned. No change in overall force level would be needed, as the division would be formed around a nucleus of units already operational in Military Region I. The new Third Infantry Division was activated on 1 October 1971.[3]

(S) On 2 October, the JCS quoted a SECDEF memorandum in which the rate of reduction and end position of the U.S. advisory effort in RVN was discussed. Replies to questions posed in the SECDEF memorandum were forwarded from COMUSMACV and strongly supported by CINCPAC. It was noted that the nature of the advisory effort had changed considerably since 1965, and now encompassed a large measure of joint civil-military advice in place of the former dominantly military advice at low tactical levels. In the years since 1965, many new and innovative elements had been added to the advisory effort. For example, the

[1] J5523 HistSum, Mar 71; JCS 022134Z Mar 71 (BOM); CINCPAC 140407Z Mar 71 (BOM).

[2] J5523 HistSum, Jul, Aug 71; JCS 7576/310031Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 042248Z Apr 71; JCS 9735/122046Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 120510Z May 71; (all BOM); JCSM 347-71 dtd 24 Jul 71; JCS 5488/102133Z Aug 71.

[3] J5523 HistSum, Sep 71; JCS 9475/232330Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 070356Z Aug 71; COMUSMACV 010736Z Oct 71.

civil-military approach embodied in the Civil Operations and Rural Development (CORD) organization was added. Also, a Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System (SIMS) was being used by the RVNAF, as was automated data processing and a centralized logistics system. It was stated that, as U.S. forces withdrew, the importance of the advisory role would increase. Military advisory functions which would increase in importance were command control, personnel, logistics, training, communications and electronics, and intelligence. In the CORD area, effort would be focussed on the development of effective and representative local government and assisting the RVN Government in political, economic, security, and social development. As military operations assumed a lesser role, the importance of the economic effort would increase in order that Vietnamization could progress smoothly. Finally, both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV agreed that it would be feasible to designate a small corps of highly qualified advisors to concentrate on the weaker RVN military units and provinces.[1]

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[1] J5525 HistSum, Oct 71; JCS 7100/021553Z Oct 71; COMUSMACV 141302Z Oct 71; CINCPAC 252053Z Oct 71.

SECTION VI -- FOREIGN MILITARY SALES COUNTRIES

(U) Four countries in the PACOM received FMS cash or credit assistance only; these were Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore.

Australia

(C) The total FMS for Australia from FY 66 through FY 70 amounted to $369.5 million. On 15 December 1971, the Australian Government approved the purchase of 24 F-111C aircraft for delivery beginning in March 1973. The estimated FY 71 and FY 72 FMS for Australia were (in millions):[1]

	1971	1972
Aircraft and Support	70.4	30.0
Helicopters	8.8	5.0
Tartar Missiles	1.7	2.0
Ammunition	3.3	4.0
Communications Equipment	3.7	5.0
Other articles and Services	48.7	43.0
TOTAL	136.6	89.0

Japan

(C) Grant aid to Japan terminated in 1964, and deliveries stopped in 1967. From FY 50 through FY 70, FMS amounted to $197.5 million. In FY 71, FMS totalled $20 million, primarily for support of existing weapon systems. Commercial sales in FY 71, including licensed production, amounted to $74 million for support of weapon systems and initial F-4E procurement. The estimated FY 72 FMS and commercial sales were $120 million.

(C) Japan's Fourth Defense Buildup Plan was scheduled to begin in FY 73 for the ensuing five years. The Third and Fourth Defense Buildup Plans were programmed to include NIKE and HAWK missiles, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile ship systems, helicopters, continuation of F-4 procurement, SEA SPARROW missiles to arm the F-4s, and reconnaissance F-4s. The total estimated FMS and commercial sales for these two increments of the plans were estimated at $1.152 billion. This would average about 50 percent return to the U.S. on gold flow, with FMS at 100 percent and licensed production at between 30 and 60 percent.[1]

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[1] J823 Point Paper, 22 Feb 72, Subj: Foreign Military Sales - Australia.
[2] J825 Point Paper, 22 Feb 72, Subj: Foreign Military Sates - Japan.

New Zealand

(C) From FY 66 through FY 70, FMS to New Zealand amounted to $62.2 million. Estimated sales for FY 71 were $8 million, and $10 million for FY 72:[1]

	1971	1972
Aircraft	2.0	5.0
Minesweeper	4.0	-
Ammunition	-	2.0
Communications Equipment	2.0	2.0
Other Articles and Services	-	1.0
TOTAL	8.0	10.0

Singapore

(S) Credit dollar guidelines for Singapore FMS were $7.5 million annually from FY 72 through FY 77. The Government of Singapore (GOS) had expressed interest in the purchase of supersonic aircraft, and briefings had been presented on the F-4 and F-5E. In February 1971, the GOS decided not to purchase supersonic aircraft until the mid-1970s. When offered excess A-4B aircraft, the GOS submitted a Letter of Intent to purchase 40 of the excess at a unit cost of $40,000. Delivery of the first 16 A-4s was to be on an expedited basis, and the balance were to be placed in storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base pending rehabilitation. The estimated FY 72 FMS for Singapore was $2 million for armored personnel carriers, $5.5 million for small arms and ammunition, and $6.5 million for miscellaneous ordnance equipment.[2]

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[1] J823 Point Paper, 22 Feb 72, Subj: Foreign Military Sales - New Zealand.
[2] J8233 Point Paper, 15 Dec 71, Subj: Foreign Military Sales - Singapore.

CHAPTER IX

PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--THE DRUG ABUSE COUNTEROFFENSIVE

The Drug Problem in the PACOM

The Scope of the Problem

(U) One of the many critical problems facing the United States during 1971 was the increasing use of addictive drugs by American youth, both in and out of uniform, at home, and overseas with the Armed Forces. The magnitude of the problem was spelled out by President Nixon in his message to Congress on 17 June 1971:

> Not very long ago, it was possible for Americans to persuade themselves, with some justification, that narcotic addiction was a class problem. Whether or not this was an accurate picture is irrelevant today, because now the problem is universal. But despite the increasing dimensions of the problem, and despite increasing consciousness of the problem, we have made little headway in understanding what is involved in drug abuse or how to deal with it.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> While by no means a major part of the American narcotics problem, an especially disheartening aspect of that problem involves those of our men in Vietnam who have used drugs. Peer pressures combine with easy availability to foster drug use. We are taking steps to end the availability of drugs in South Vietnam but, in addition, the nature of drug addiction, and the peculiar aspects of the present problem as it involves veterans, make it imperative that rehabilitation procedures be undertaken immediately.[1]

(C) The Secretary of Defense, on 23 October 1970, had issued a directive establishing worldwide policies for the prevention and elimination of drug abuse

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[1] Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXV, No. 1672, 12 Jul 71.

by personnel of the Armed Forces. The Secretary assigned specific responsibilities in connection with the drug abuse to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&RA), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Directors of Defense agencies. CINCPAC's involvement in the drug abuse area prior to August 1970 had been limited to monitoring the overall Service programs, including evaluating their investigative statistics, in order to assess the effect of drug abuse on the operational capability of the PACOM. Beginning in late 1970, however, with the revelation of a sudden increase in the use of hard narcotics and of deaths related to drug abuse in the RVN, CINCPAC became much more directly involved in the drug abuse problem, which gave every indication of impacting severely on the military effectiveness and operational capability of his command.[1]

(C) On 3 January 1971 the CINCPAC addressed a personal message to the Component Commanders, the subordinate unified commanders within the PACOM, and the CINCPACREPs, stressing the criticality of the drug-abuse problem and his own keen interest in the matter of drug-abuse control. He asked each addressee to comment on the problem as it affected his area, and to make recommendations for appropriate action. The replies to this message were thorough and informative, and on 10 February the CINCPAC followed up with a message to the same addressees which summarized the major aspects of the problem, asked specific questions concerning both assessment of the magnitude of the problem and ways to combat the situation, and urged a free exchange of information on the subject among all commanders in the PACOM.[2]

(S) By mid-1971 it had become clear that the most threatening source of opium and its derivatives, as far as the PACOM was concerned, was in Southeast Asia. Opium poppies were grown in the Thailand-Burma-Laos border area at elevations between 3,000 to 7,000 feet--areas where little government control was exercised. Raw and prepared opium is transported by man-pack, mule, and horse caravans, protected in many cases by paramilitary forces, to refineries for processing into morphine base, smoking heroin, or #4 white heroin. From the refineries, located primarily in the tri-border area, the opium derivatives are transported by land, sea, and air routes to major cities such as Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Saigon, and Hong Kong, for local consumption or transshipment to other world markets. The syndicates and individuals coordinating the illicit drug traffic have in some cases been identified. The financial stakes involved are clearly illustrated by the fact that the 36 tons of raw opium processed annually by one specific Lao refinery would, when refined into #4 heroin,

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[1] J112 Point Paper, 11 Mar 71, Subj: Drug Abuse.
[2] CINCPAC 032200Z Jan (EX) and 100441Z Feb 71 (EX).

cut and retailed in the United States, yield between one quarter and one half billion dollars.[1]

Initial Command Actions to Combat Drug Abuse

(C) To create specific machinery to assess and combat the drug-abuse problem, CINCPAC on 11 February 1971 established the PACOM Drug Abuse Control Committee, consisting of representatives of CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and CGFMFPAC, under the chairmanship of the CINCPAC Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, J1. The mission of the committee was two-fold: To insure the mutual exchange of information between CINCPAC and his Component Commanders concerning drug-abuse policies and programs; and to provide information to CINCPAC and recommend appropriate joint action on matters pertaining to drug-abuse statistics, education, rehabilitation, and suppression.[2]

(C) As the committee held its initial meeting, on 5 March 1971, it took as a point of departure the incomplete but alarming data on drug abuse within the PACOM as reported (and estimated) for CY 70. The PACOM-wide figures were as follows:

Deaths (autopsy confirmed)	51
Deaths (drug suspect--autopsy pending)	56
Hospitalization	3,041
Out-patient treatment	5,986
	9,134 (12.02 per 1,000).

As these figures were admittedly incomplete, it was estimated by the committee that as many as 24,000 military personnel could possibly have received medical treatment for drug-related problems--an alarming possible rate of 31.6 per 1,000.[3]

(C) Other CINCPAC staff actions taken during the first quarter of CY 71 to assess and combat the drug-abuse problem were the following:

--A first generation system was established for collecting drug-abuse statistics in the PACOM and publishing a report thereon.

--Each Component Commander was tasked to insure that all personnel of his Service within the PACOM were aware of the Service policies regarding amnesty and rehabilitation for drug abuse.

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[1] J111 Point Papers, 20 Jul and 25 Sep 71, Subj: Drug Abuse; interview COL Suddaby, J14, by ComdHist, 14 Mar 72.
[2] CINCPACINST 5370.2 of 25 Mar 71, Subj: PACOM Drug Abuse Control Committee.
[3] J112 Point Paper, 11 Mar 71, Subj: Drug Abuse.

--CINCPAC requested that he be provided with PACOM-pertinent information generated by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to aid in suppression activities by the military within the PACOM.

--Within the CINCPAC staff, the J1 was appointed the single manager and his office that of primary interest for drug-abuse matters. (The increasing importance of the subject impelled the J1 to create a separate Drug Abuse Control Branch /J14/ on 26 July 1971.)

--A drug-abuse educational campaign was inaugurated through the Pacific edition of Stars and Stripes (the "Cold Turkey" campaign), through which drug-abuse literature was provided in response to coupon mail-in.

--CINCPAC requested the appropriate subunified commanders and CINCPAC-REPs to assist their Country Team chiefs in responding to a joint State/Treasury/Justice/Defense requirement to improve inter-mission communication and coordination on drug-trafficking suppression efforts.[1]

(C) The Drug Abuse Control Committee, early in its efforts, identified what it considered the basic requirements for a more efficient military attack on the problem. These included the need for better quantitative measurement of the scope, nature, and extent of drug abuse; the identification of the most useful, applicable, and effective drug rehabilitation techniques; the development of more credible, factual, interesting, harder-hitting, and relevant educational materials on drug abuse; and some means of preventing "amateur" drug smuggling by servicemen. The Committee recommended to CINCPAC that there be a detailed survey of the drug problem in the PACOM, carried on with the assistance of professionally qualified neuropsychiatrists and social psychiatrists, to provide expanded and improved statistical data on the drug problem. As a result of initial Committee discussions, it was concluded that the CINPAC position on the problem would be as follows:

--Unified commands properly have a coordinating role in the campaign to eliminate drug abuse, and that such a coordinating role can be accomplished without infringing upon Service prerogatives.

--The U.S. military should bear some of the burden involved in attempting to reclaim drug abusers in the Service and restore them to useful duty.

--The best results in dealing with the drug problem would be achieved

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[1] J111 Point Paper, 29 Mar 71, Subj: Drug Abuse.

if there were basic standards and principles on the subject common to all Services.[1]

CINCPAC Staff Responsibilities for Drug Abuse Control

(U) To implement the findings of the PACOM Drug Abuse Control Committee, and to assign specific areas of responsibility to the CINCPAC staff, the CINCPAC Chief of Staff on 26 June 1971 directed the formation of the CINCPAC Staff Subcommittee for Drug Abuse Control. As a result of the first meeting on 29 June, areas of staff responsibility were delineated as follows:

J1 - Overall responsibility for the PACOM Drug Abuse Control Program. Responsible for action on all matters pertaining to drug abuse that are not delegated by the Chairman to other CINCPAC staff elements.

J2 - Obtain, evaluate, and publish (or present briefings as appropriate) information and intelligence on drug sources and traffic. (Although it is recognized that this is not normally an intelligence function, it is nevertheless, in this case, considered appropriate and necessary.) Develop tasking to locate poppy and marijuana fields and opium refineries in PACOM. Assess and provide periodic reports on the extent of communist involvement in drug trafficking.

J3 - Provide for surveillance of narcotic smuggling when U.S. military aircraft or vessels are used. Coordinate aerial photography of poppy and marijuana fields and opium refineries. Evaluate and report the operational impact of drug abuse and drug abuse testing, detoxification, and rehabilitation on U.S. military forces in PACOM.

J4 - Monitor equipment availability (except medical equipment) to support drug-abuse control programs and expedite movement of critical end items or repair parts.

J5 - Assist in developing CINCPAC drug abuse control programs for implementation with regard to future force structures.

J73 - Provide legal advice on appropriate CINCPAC drug-abuse actions. Assess legal problems which may occur due to control measures implemented by subordinate commands. Monitor the education of unit commanders pertaining to all legal aspects of drug-abuse control to include the tools available to the commander for the punishment of offenders.

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[1] Ibid.; interview COL Suddaby, J14, by ComdHist, 14 Mar 72.

J74 - Action staff element on congressional inquiries pertaining to drug abuse. Determine types of educational material and news media material that is most likely to have the desired impact on potential, casual, and habitual drug users. Responsible for the collection and development of news media material on drug abuse and the design of saturation educational campaigns.

J76 - Monitor, coordinate, and maintain statistics on drug abuse testing, detoxification, and evacuation of identified drug users. Develop plans to test and detoxify, as appropriate, all military personnel in PACOM. Responsible for the PACOM Drug Abuse Reports and statistics pertaining to rehabilitation programs being conducted within the PACOM.

The Chief of Staff noted that the effectiveness of the subcommittee would be dependent upon all members and their alternates remaining abreast of all drug abuse actions pertaining to the military forces and the countries in the Pacific. He indicated his desire that all drug abuse actions be given an emergency priority.[1]

CINCPAC Positions on Drug Abuse Problems

(S) By mid-summer of 1971, CINCPAC had established the following positions on significant aspects of the drug abuse counteroffensive:

--The mission of the National Clearing House for Drug Abuse Information should be expanded to include the screening of all published drug abuse educational information and the promulgation of factual and meaningful material oriented on specific target groups.

--A national level agency should be designated or established to coordinate the activities of all agencies involved in the suppression of drug sources and traffic. This agency should have an operating group located in Southeast Asia, probably in Bangkok, with authority to coordinate and possibly direct the intelligence collection effort and suppression activities of all concerned government departments.

--The U.S. should initiate unilateral and bilateral actions to reduce the amount of heroin on the illegal market. Unilateral action could be taken to destroy poppy fields and opium refineries, neutralize chemists and interdict chemicals used in heroin refining. Bilateral action could be taken to purchase the opium crop, pay the farmers not to grow poppies or purchase a substitute crop as a long-range program.

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[1] Memos, LT GEN Corcoran, 73-71, 26 Jun 71 and 78-71, 3 Jul 71.

--In the expansion of the urine testing program to the other countries in PACOM, consideration should be given to the establishment of joint-use laboratory facilities and detoxification centers.

--In-country rehabilitation of identified drug users is necessary to maintain adequate force levels in PACOM and to satisfy our moral obligation to afflicted servicemen. To achieve any significant degree of success, adequate resources must be made available to allow early identification of drug users, effective treatment and continual monitoring through urinalysis.[1]

PACOM-Wide Actions and Recommendations

(C) As the Drug Abuse Counteroffensive gathered momentum through the end of FY 71, CINCPAC had taken or recommended the following additional actions, among others, on a PACOM-wide basis:

--Inaugurated planning for an updated recycling of the so-called "Cold Turkey" Stars and Stripes campaign for the summer of 1971.

--Authorized surveillance of narcotic-smuggling ships in Southeast Asia waters.

--Tasked the subordinate unified commanders to reinforce and extend measures to prevent drug smuggling.

--Coordinated assistance to the Honolulu Customs Office for implementation of a "100 percent inspection rule" for U.S. servicemen returning from Southeast Asia and the western Pacific.

--Sought authority to inspect CONUS-bound mail (except first class) in the three aerial mail terminals in the RVN, and for designated Service postal personnel to inspect CONUS-bound First Class Mail.

--Tasked the Pacific Stars and Stripes to publicize the facts about certain specific misconceptions regarding drugs and to emphasize the anti-smuggling measures currently in effect.

--Arranged for distribution of additional drug-abuse literature and established contact to this end with the National Clearing House for Drug Abuse Information.

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[1] J14 Point Paper, 23 Sep 71, Subj: Drug Abuse.

--Initiated a PACOM-wide evaluation of amnesty and rehabilitation programs to achieve standardization and optimum results.

--Recommended that the JCS explore the possibility of developing a heroin "substitute" with which to upset the market and perhaps tag users.

--Recommended that the JCS support a program of aerial photography of poppy-growing areas to aid in suppression measures.

--Recommended that the JCS study the possibility of herbicidal destruction of poppy fields under United Nations auspices. (This recommendation was disapproved.)

--Coordinated assignment of additional customs inspectors to the RVN to assist the new GVN narcotics traffic-control effort, and asked the JCS to arrange for the U.S. Customs Service to provide training in advanced inspection techniques to certain military customs elements.[1]

(C) During the second half of CY 71 the CINCPAC staff increased its efforts to coordinate the control of drug abuse. Additional measures undertaken included the following:

--Expanded and reinforced drug suppression efforts throughout the PACOM, including concentration on efforts to prevent drug smuggling between countries of the Far East and into the United States.

--Prepared courses of action to reduce and eliminate drug sources, refineries, and trafficking in Southeast Asia.

--Initiated on 15 August a second news media campaign, utilizing lessons learned from the earlier campaign, to insure that factual information on drug abuse was made available to all servicemen, DoD civilians, and their dependents in the PACOM.

--Conducted a comprehensive survey of drug abuse detoxificational/treatment programs existing in the RVN, Thailand, Okinawa, and the ROK, and developed proposed policies and programs for rehabilitation which incorporated all lessons learned to date.

--Monitored closely the Service Department programs for the urine testing and identification of drug users, and provided advice and assistance

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[1] J111 Point Paper, 20 Jul 71, Subj: Drug Abuse.

where appropriate; recommended the establishment of joint-use laboratories in every PACOM major command.

--Monitored closely statistics which indicated the extent of the drug-abuse problem in an attempt to identify areas where CINCPAC assistance is warranted. Recommended that JCS/DoD establish Service-wide criteria and procedures for reporting statistics pertaining to drug abuse.[1]

Specific Command-Wide Efforts to Combat Drug Abuse

U.S. Customs Activities in the PACOM

(C) In April 1971 the Bureau of Customs of the U.S. Treasury Department proposed a tentative plan to provide training in U.S. customs inspection procedures and techniques to appropriate agencies in the PACOM. The purpose of the proposed training was to provide instruction in the principles and techniques of customs inspections used to detect attempted drug smuggling. A CINCPAC inquiry to subordinate unified commands indicated that the majority was in favor of having selected personnel receive such training. On 13 May, therefore, CINCPAC requested the JCS to coordinate with the Treasury Department to determine the feasibility of conducting a customs training program at the earliest practical time. The JCS informed CINCPAC on 23 July that the Treasury Department would support CINCPAC's request for customs training. Each training course would require 20 hours, and could accommodate up to 30 students; upon completion of training, students would be officially designated as acting U.S. customs inspectors.[2]

(C) The U.S. customs training program commenced in the PACOM on 30 August 1971. A CINCPAC representative accompanied one of four teams provided by the Bureau of Customs, observing the first training cycle conducted in Thailand. Throughout September formal training sessions were completed in Thailand, Taiwan, Guam, and the Philippines. During October similar sessions were completed in Japan, Okinawa, and Korea. On 28-29 October a debrief session was held at CINCPAC by four customs inspectors who had been in the PACOM for 60 days; the debrief was attended by Washington representatives of the Bureau of Customs, Component Command representatives, and selected CINCPAC staff officers. Implementation of further customs control in the PACOM were to be held in abeyance pending Department of Defense guidance on the subject.[3]

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[1] J14 Point Paper, 23 Sep 71, Subj: Drug Abuse; interview COL Suddaby, J14, by ComdHist, 14 Mar 72.

[2] ADMIN CINCPAC 230334Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 130258Z May 71; JCS 9133/231729Z Jul 71; J113 HistSums Apr-Jul 71.

[3] J113 HistSums Aug-Oct 71.

(C) In response to a CINCPAC request for specific recommendations for action which should be taken by higher headquarters to assist in reducing illicit drug traffic, COMUSMACV in April 1971 identified a problem in connection with spot customs inspection of CONUS-bound U.S. mail. The recently-formed Joint Customs Group (JCG) in the RVN had the responsibility for inspection of second, third, and fourth class mail, and had been successful both in recoveries of government property and in seizures of contraband through its mail inspection at 46 APOs. However, the three aerial mail terminals (AMT) at Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Tan Son Nhut, operated by the U.S. Air Force Postal and Courier Service (USAFP&CS), had not allowed members of the JCG to enter their facilities for customs inspection of mail. COMUSMACV appealed to CINCPAC for assistance, pointing out that access to the three AMTs, together with the existing access to surface mail terminals, would make unnecessary the JCG customs inspections at APOs throughout the RVN, at a considerable savings in manpower and funds. CINCPAC agreed, and on 18 April requested the JCS to obtain a waiver of the USAFP&CS policy which prohibited JCG operations at the three AMTs in the RVN. As of the end of 1971, however, the requested waiver had not been granted.[1]

(C) By November 1971 the threat posed by illicit first class mailing of drugs and other contraband from one APO or FPO to another within WESTPAC, never entering U.S. sovereign territory, had been recognized. On 8 December CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that authority be provided for military customs inspectors, as recently trained by the Bureau of Customs throughout the PACOM, to enter overseas military postal facilities (including AMTs) for the purpose of conducting external inspection of intra-WESTPAC First Class Mail for possible drugs or other contraband. CINCPAC pointed out that the recommendation was made with full knowledge of existing Air Force policies restricting entry to AMTs, but felt that the importance of the drug traffic interdiction program justified a limited exception to those policies.[2]

(U) In November 1971 the Department of the Army recommended that a JCG similar to that in the RVN be formed in Thailand from within existing resources. CINCPAC did not favor the formation of a JCG in Thailand as a separate organizational entity, holding that the separate efforts by the Services in Thailand, if placed under the supervision of a single focal point such as the MACTHAI Provost Marshal, would be sufficient to accomplish the customs inspection mission.[3]

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[1] COMUSMACV 130849Z Apr 71; CINCPAC 182337Z Apr 71; J113 HistSum Apr 71; interview LTC Bartlett, J113, by ComdHist, 15 Feb 72.

[2] CINCPAC 080414Z Dec 71; J113 HistSum Dec 71.

[3] DA 122040Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 022209Z Dec 71.

Regional Cooperation to Control Drug Traffic

(U) On 17 June 1971 President Nixon outlined to the Congress his plans for seeking international cooperation in reducing drug abuse, particularly heroin addiction:

> To wage an effective war against heroin addiction, we must have international cooperation. In order to secure such cooperation, I am initiating a worldwide escalation in our existing programs for the control of narcotics traffic, and I am proposing a number of new steps for this purpose.
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> First, on Monday, June 14, I recalled the United States Ambassadors to Turkey, France, Mexico, Luxembourg, Thailand, the Republic of Vietnam, and the United Nations for consultations on how we can better cooperate with other nations in the effort to regulate the present substantial world opium output and narcotics trafficking. I sought to make it equally clear that I consider the heroin addiction of American citizens an international problem of grave concern to this Nation, and I instructed our Ambassadors to make this clear to their host governments. We want good relations with other countries, but we cannot buy good relations at the expense of temporizing on this problem.
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> Second, United States Ambassadors to all East Asian governments will meet in Bangkok, Thailand, tomorrow, June 18, to review the increasing problem in that area, with particular concern for the effects of this problem on American servicemen in Southeast Asia.
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> Third, it is clear that the only really effective way to end heroin production is to end opium production and the growing of poppies. I will propose that as an international goal.[1]

(U) Slightly over three months later, the President's program for international cooperation bore fruit in the PACOM. On 23 September 1971 the Royal Laotian Government promulgated a royal ordinance prohibiting, for the first time in Laotian history, the growing, processing, trading, and use of opium and the opiates. The following week, on 28 September, the United States and Thailand signed a memorandum of understanding by which the two countries pledged mutual

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[1] Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXV, No. 1672, 12 Jul 71.

action against the supply and trafficking of illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs.[1]

(S) The Regional Ambassadorial meetings on Drug Production and Traffic Control, to which the President had referred, met approximately monthly during the summer and fall of 1971. CINCPAC's primary areas of interest in these meetings were in the control of aircraft involved in narcotics traffic, and the establishment of an interagency organization in Southeast Asia to receive and correlate all narcotics distribution intelligence information from the numerous agencies involved in enforcement and suppression. On the basis that intelligence and surveillance capabilities would be the principal CINCPAC contributions toward regional drug traffic suppression, the CINCPAC staff was directed to assist as follows: J2 would compile and make available a listing of all U.S. police and intelligence agencies, on a country-by-country basis, that were capable of providing drug-traffic intelligence; J3 would identify the surveillance aircraft capability of the military forces on a country-by-country basis.[2]

(S) Since July of 1971, CINCPAC has advocated the establishment of a permanent interagency organization which would receive, evaluate, and disseminate all information and intelligence concerning drug sources and traffic in the Far East. In the interim period, this concept had been expanded to include an operational function. On 13 October, CINCPAC sent a message to the JCS urging the establishment of a Regional Interagency Intelligence and Operations Center (RIIOC) as an operational arm of the Washington level subcabinet level working group on international control of narcotics.[3]

(S) The JCS reply on 19 October indicated general agreement with the concept of the RIIOC, but added that was not full support "for an organization of the scope proposed." It transpired that the JCS were reflecting Defense Department sensitivity to pressures by other governmental agencies for extensive commitment of DoD assets, particularly in the area of customs controls. CINCPAC did not, however, anticipate DoD resistance if the RIIOC were established and DoD was tasked to contribute a proportionate share of the resources.[4]

(S) At the Sub-Regional Conference on Narcotics Control held in Bangkok on 8 November, CINCPAC representatives gave a presentation on the RIIOC concept, to include a complete discussion of PACOM intelligence and communications assets and how these assets could be utilized to focus and manage narcotics

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[1] Op. cit., Vol. LXV, No. 1691 (22 Nov 71).
[2] J1/Memo/00121-71 of 24 Sep 71.
[3] CINCPAC 131615Z Oct 71.
[4] JCS 2863/191719Z Oct 71; J1/Memo/00147-71 of 4 Nov 71.

intelligence on a regional basis. Although most of the conferees agreed that there was a need for regional interchange and analysis of narcotics intelligence, the consensus was that "collection and evaluation on a country-by-country basis corresponds better to the field situation and to Washington back-stopping organizations" than a regional structure.[1]

(S) On 16 November the Staff Coordinator of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control (CCINC) visited CINCPAC Headquarters and discussed the RIIOC concept, concluding that the concept should be considered by the Intelligence Subcommittee of the CCINC. CINCPAC subsequently received a memorandum from the Executive Director of the CCINC which advised that the RIIOC concept had been referred to the Intelligence Subcommittee for evaluation on 29 November. CINCPAC will monitor the status of the proposed concept through the DoD representative on the Intelligence Subcommittee.[2]

Aerial Identification of Drug-Producing Areas

(C) Since May 1971, CINCPAC has supported the use of DoD assets to obtain aerial photographic coverage of the opium poppy fields and suspected refineries in the golden triangle area of Burma, Thailand, and Laos. The current project in Thailand, consisting of a feasibility flight and associated ground check, is on schedule, and the Royal Thai Government has concurred with this aspect. JCS tasked SAC to fly the feasibility flight, using GIANT NAIL (U-2) assets, and that flight was completed on 2 December with the results being furnished to DIA for reproduction and distribution. Year-end information from the Chairman of the Southeast Asia Regional Subcommittee of the Interagency Working Group in Washington indicated that the overall opium poppy field survey in Laos and Thailand was currently stalemated pending results of the feasibility flight and cross-departmental funding arrangements.[3]

(S) As the result of requests originated by both CINCPAC and the Southeast Asia Regional Conferences, the U.S. Government Working Group on International Narcotics Control identified certain target areas for photographic support from DIA. On 24 September 1971 the JCS issued a requirement for specific photographic coverage targeted against narcotics production facilities in northwest Thailand (three two-square-mile areas, 20 to 30 miles from the Burma border). On 2 October 1971, CINCPAC, with the approval of JCS, sought concurrence from American Embassy Bangkok for appropriate tactical reconnaissance flights to be conducted

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[1] AMEMB Bangkok 15353/151031Z Nov 71.

[2] J1/Memo/00167-71 of 3 Dec 71.

[3] J141 Point Paper, 7 Jan 72, Subj: CINCPAC Support of Aerial Photography as a Means to Identify Opium Poppy Fields in SEA.

by COMUSMACV assets. After coordination with the RTG and clarification from the State Department to differentiate this requirement from routine surveillance of poppy fields, the Embassy on 20 October concurred in proceeding with these photo missions on a unilateral basis, the operation to be conducted as inconspicuously as possible. CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV to provide the required photo coverage on 21 October. The mission was completed by Seventh Air Force assets on 3 November, with results pending processing and analysis at year's end.[1]

(S) COMUSMACV, on 26 November 1971, requested CINCPAC assistance in deploying to the RVN, by 15 February 1972, a sophisticated aerial survey method of identifying marijuana. MACV drug suppression personnel provided information concerning two aerial camera systems which have been utilized by U.S. civilian agencies to locate marijuana growth, but it was not known whether either of these systems would operate in the Southeast Asia environment. CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to provide additional details on marijuana growth in the RVN, and asked DIA to furnish information concerning U.S. agencies which have and are now using aerial photography to locate marijuana growth. At the end of 1971 a feasibility study was planned for the RVN, utilizing a camera system developed in the Geology Department of the University of Nevada.[2]

(U) Additional material on the use of aerial photography is in Chapter X, Intelligence Activities.

Interdiction of Seaborne Smuggling of Narcotics

(S) Intelligence reports were received during 1971 indicating that Thai trawlers were being utilized by international narcotic traffickers. Morphine base and opium were being carried in these trawlers from Thailand to Hong Kong, via Gull Island, located in the Catwick Island group approximately 150 miles east southeast of Saigon. Heroin and prepared opium destined for Saigon were transported to a point off the west coast of Vietnam in the general vicinity of Phu Quoc Island. From there the contraband was transferred to Vietnamese fishing vessels.

(S) On 17 August 1971 the American Embassy, Bangkok reported that Thai officials had inquired as to the feasibility of utilizing U.S. Seventh Fleet assets to interdict Thai trawlers enroute to Hong Kong. It was felt that U.S. Navy assets would be more effecti.e than either VNN or Thai Navy vessels, and that the presence of a Thai naval officer aboard a U.S. Navy vessel would obviate any legal problem insofar as Thai law was concerned.

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[1] J14(A) Point Paper, 11 Nov 71, Subj: Narcotics: Aerial Survey (S).

[2] COMUSMACV 261049Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 022055Z Dec 71; J23/Memo/00710-71 of 30 Nov 71, Subj: Drug Abuse; interview LTC Shirar, J23, by ComdHist, 16 Feb 72.

(S) CINCPAC advised the Embassy on 20 August that the exercise of jurisdiction on the high seas by vessels of one state over another is generally prohibited, and that the presence of a Thai naval officer aboard a vessel of the U.S. Navy would not alter the fact that the contemplated action was taken by a U.S. warship and such action would be the responsibility of the U.S. Government. Recognized peacetime exceptions whereby vessels of one state may be permitted to stop, board, and/or seize vessels and crews of another state on the high seas were also described, and these exceptions are recognized by Articles 22 and 23 of the 1958 Geneva Convention of the High Seas, 13 UST 2312, TIAS 5200. CINCPAC further stated that the only known exception to authorize the use of U.S. warships for the purpose set forth in the Bangkok request would be an agreement between the United States Government and the Royal Thai Government authorizing such action. Article 35 of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs on 18 UST 1407, TIAS 6298 to which both the United States and the Royal Thai Government are parties, is pertinent as it provides that to control the illicit traffic in narcotics, parties to the convention shall "make arrangements at the national level for coordination of preventive and repressive action...and shall assist each other in the campaign against illicit traffic." It would appear that the U.S. Government and the RTG could enter into an international accord authorizing U.S. warships to take desired action in regard to Thai vessels. CINCPAC is of opinion that any such agreement should be made in writing and be entered into only upon approval of appropriate Washington military and diplomatic authorities.

(S) At the Sub-Regional Conference on Narcotics Control held in Bangkok on 8 November, representatives from the Narcotics Working Group (NWG) U.S. Mission Vietnam, recommended that the U.S. Missions in Bangkok and Saigon encourage the formulation of an agreement between the GVN and the RTG authorizing VNN naval vessels to take necessary action in regard to Thai trawlers suspected of transporting narcotics. This accord could be included in a joint GVN-RTG statement on narcotics control similar to the recent joint U.S.-RTG statement on narcotics control. The U.S. Mission Vietnam believed that the actual utilization of VNN vessels would be limited to those cases in which hard intelligence indicated that a narcotic shipment had left Thailand and was in fact in transit to Hong Kong or the RVN. The locating and interception of these trawlers could well be assisted by aerial surveillance conducted by U.S. Navy coastal surveillance aircraft. These aircraft would direct VNN assets to the area of the suspected Thai trawler. Further, the Mission was of the opinion that such an agreement between the RVN and Thailand would serve to ease any possible friction. To enable timely response to intelligence reports concerning the suspected trawlers, State Department communications facilities could be utilized to pass this intelligence to action agencies.

(S) At the end of 1971 the CINCPAC proposal to place a Thai official aboard a Seventh Fleet vessel for interdictory purposes was still under consideration by the Department of Defense and the Department of State.[1]

PACOM Drug Abuse Treatment and Rehabilitation Programs

(C) Beginning on 26 April 1971, a CINCPAC Drug Abuse Survey Team conducted a detailed analysis of drug abuse detoxification, treatment, and rehabilitation facilities and procedures in the RVN, Okinawa, Thailand, and the ROK. The survey, completed on 31 July, formed the basis for a CINCPAC study entitled "Evaluation of PACOM Drug Abuse Treatment and Rehabilitation Programs," which was released early in September. In making distribution to the JCS and to subordinate commands within the PACOM, CINCPAC noted that the survey had been the most comprehensive one ever conducted in the PACOM, and probably in the entire Defense establishment. He then emphasized the following points to amplify the major conclusions of the study:

A. A potential for successful in-country rehabilitation does exist if:

(1) Drug users are identified early. (The majority of the personnel in rehabilitation programs during the survey had been using heroin for five months.)

(2) Qualified personnel are assigned to treatment facilities and at unit level to provide effective treatment, reorientation and follow-on counseling and assistance.

(3) Ex-drug users are closely supervised and given tasks that are meaningful and achievable.

(4) Frequent urine testing is conducted to insure early identification of drug users and to monitor their progress throughout the treatment and rehabilitation process.

B. In-country rehabilitation of personnel who abuse alcohol and drugs is necessary if we are to maintain required force levels in undesirable areas. Many men will accept a general discharge for drug abuse rather than serve in countries such as Vietnam, Korea and Okinawa.

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[1] All paragraphs of this subject are based on J141 Point Paper, 7 Jan 72, Subj: CINCPAC Support of Surveillance and Interdiction of Thai Trawlers Involved in Narcotics Smuggling.

C. Most servicemen who use drugs are weak and easily influenced. With close supervision and concerned leadership, these personnel can become useful members of the military. A combination of frequent urine testing and an effective rehabilitation program provides the tools needed to achieve success. Conversely, evacuation and hospitalization will only reinforce the feeling of failure that many of these men already possess.

D. In-country treatment and rehabilitation efforts in PACOM have been unsuccessful to date for the following reasons:

(1) Qualified personnel have not been authorized nor available to establish and conduct effective in-patient treatment and reorientation programs.

(2) Follow-on counseling and assistance for detoxified drug users at the unit level have either been nonexistent or partially provided by untrained personnel.

(3) Officers and noncommissioned officers have not possessed the experience and training to cope with the drug abuse problem and have not been sufficiently motivated to actively participate in rehabilitation programs.

(4) A mechanism to insure early identification of drug users and monitor their progress during treatment and rehabilitation has not been available.

E. With adequate urine testing equipment, laboratory technicians, qualified medical personnel, trained counselors and concerned leadership, the treatment and rehabilitation concept proposed in the CINCPAC study can achieve the degree of success needed to maintain an adequate force level in PACOM and to satisfy our moral obligation to the military personnel serving in the Pacific.

F. If the team's findings are sustained by higher authority (that early detection of drug users and in-country rehabilitation are necessary), then laboratory facilities to perform urine testing are required in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii. As it is not feasible for each military service to establish a separate laboratory facility in each of the countries listed, it is necessary that joint-use facilities be established.

These joint-use laboratories can be operated by a single service but should be under the operational control of the appropriate subunified commander to insure maximum effectiveness.

It is recognized that the equipment and personnel required to establish joint-use laboratory facilities within each major command in PACOM represents a massive commitment of DoD assets. However, the drug abuse problem in Vietnam and the increasing use of heroin by servicemen throughout PACOM are sufficiently serious to warrant such a commitment. Drug abuse among servicemen in PACOM is a problem with which we will have to live for some time to come. We should therefore commit the resources now to contain the problem. Although tremendous effort is being devoted to suppression and education, the prevalence of heroin in PACOM will continue to spread until overt action is taken by the United States to eliminate the source.[1]

Extension of Detoxification Period for RVN Returnees

(C) One area in the drug abuse counteroffensive in which CINCPAC was forced to take a strong stand in opposition to Department of Defense involved the length of the detoxification period for drug abusers detected during processing for return from the RVN. The problem surfaced in September 1971 when the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment (Dr. Wilbur) observed to members of the CINCPAC staff that he felt that more time was needed in detoxification of drug abusers before their rotation from the RVN. CINCPAC queried COMUSMACV on the feasibility of establishing a minimum period of seven days detoxification for all Services in the RVN. COMUSMACV replied that while Seventh Air Force and COMNAVFORV could comply with such a requirement, USARV was unable at that time to establish a seven-day detoxification period because of a shortage of both beds and manpower.[2]

(C) CINCPAC efforts to establish a minimum seven-day detoxification period in the RVN were progressing well, with USARV making every attempt to comply with the requirement, when Dr. Wilbur held a press conference at OASD(H&E) on 15 October 1971 and discussed plans by his office to make mandatory a 14-day hold period in the RVN for all Service personnel identified by urinalysis screening. The PACOM subordinate commands concerned at once expressed to CINCPAC unanimous and unequivocal opposition to extension of the detoxification period, on the

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[1] J14 HistSums, Aug-Sep 71; CINCPAC 130746Z Sep 71.

[2] J76/Memo/054-71 of 21 Sep 71; CINCPAC 150339Z Sep 71; COMUSMACV 200627Z Sep 71.

basis of lack of resources for such a massive commitment, the deleterious environmental influences involved, and specific patient treatment and management considerations which had been established by extensive in-country experiences. CINCPAC agreed completely, and expressed strong opposition to the plan to the JCS, urging that the JCS prevent promulgation of the OASD(H&E) plan.[1]

(C) CINCPAC was notified unofficially by the Deputy ASD(H&E) (BGEN Singlaub, USA), that a decision had been made to overrule the military objections to the expanded detoxification period in the light of stronger political pressures and civilian medical opinion. Accepting the decision, CINCPAC nevertheless addressed a strong caveat to the JCS on 20 November:

> The current OSD proposal appears to address the following three primary objectives:
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> A. To ensure that RVN DEROS detected drug abusers receive maximum (7 days) treatment and counseling prior to medical evacuation, with specific orientation toward preparing individuals for receptive acceptance of CONUS rehabilitation programs.
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> B. To expand the inpatient treatment period for drug users detected prior to DEROS to a minimum of 14 days, with primary emphasis on evaluation of potential for return to duty or administrative elimination.
>
> C. To encourage more personnel to volunteer for treatment under the exemption program and to establish a deterrent to drug experimentation by automatically extending for 14 days the DEROS of individuals detected by urine screening (other than at DEROS). CINCPAC concurs with a standard 7-day detoxification period for all DEROS detected drug abusers. However, since approximately 40% of these individuals are medically evaluated as minimally involved and/or classified as excellent rehabilitative prospects within the current 5-day treatment time frame, attending physicians should be permitted flexibility to evacuate such patients prior to completion of 7 days detoxification if warranted by competent clinical observation and professional judgment.

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[1] J14 Talking Paper, 11 Nov 71, Subj: Extension of Detoxification Period for RVN DEROS Personnel; CINCPAC 300904Z Oct 71 (EX).

went to both military and civilian personnel, not only in the PACOM but in CONUS and Europe as well. Since the completion of "Cold Turkey I," emphasis on the drug abuse problem was continued in the Stars and Stripes and also through the Armed Forces Radio and Television Network. Specific emphasis was placed on the heroin problem--identifying the dangers of this drug and attempting to destroy existing myths that cocaine, not heroin, was being sold in the RVN and that personnel would not become addicted by smoking or sniffing heroin. Also highlighted were the numerous control measures that have been imposed to prevent U.S. servicemen from smuggling drugs into the United States. These measures were considered effective and have reduced attempts to smuggle narcotics.

(U) Cold Turkey II. On 15 August 1971 the second "Cold Turkey" program was initiated. In the design of this program, a concerted attempt was made to use the lessons learned during the first campaign. This effort was targetted on first-term enlistees and inductees, between the ages of 18 and 25, the group that statistics indicate are most susceptible to drug abuse. Sunday newspaper supplements in the Pacific Stars and Stripes were published containing drug abuse information. Increased distribution of the Sunday newspaper from a ratio of 1:5 to 1:3 was arranged during the campaign. This supplement was made available to PACOM forces in Hawaii and on the west coast who do not normally receive the Stars and Stripes. Personnel were encouraged to submit letters to the editor for publication dealing with their experience with drug abuse or their questions on the subject. To increase confidence and further credibility, troops' opinions, pro and con, on the subject of drug abuse were presented. To insure that the drug education message reached the target audience, Armed Forces Radio and Television increased emphasis on drug abuse information and highlighted the Pacific Stars and Stripes campaign. "Cold Turkey II" was terminated after ten weeks on 17 October 1971.[1]

Year-End Summary of Drug Abuse Control Measures

General

(S) The emphasis placed on all aspects of drug abuse control during 1971 achieved significant results. Lessons learned in education, treatment, and rehabilitation have been made available to all commands throughout the PACOM, with resultant improvement and standardization of approaches and procedures. A large percentage of the military law enforcement and investigative capability has been devoted to drug suppression, which has resulted in increased seizures and has increased the probability of apprehension for drug abuse involvement. The military intelligence community and other U.S. Government intelligence agencies

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[1] J14 summary of media campaigns, based on J74 year-end report.

have increased their emphasis on the identification of drug sources, routes, and traffickers. Drug abuse educational material is readily available down to the lowest level in every command. Urine testing now provides an accurate indicator of the extent of the drug abuse problem and is a major deterrent to drug use. Although there is no indication that the availability of illegal drugs or their use has been appreciably reduced, with the tools now available and continued emphasis at all levels of command, a significant reduction can be expected in drug abuse among military personnel in the PACOM in the months ahead.

Status of Ongoing Programs.

(U) Drug Education Field Teams (DEFTs)--CINCPAC has been impressed with the achievements of the DEFTs in the RVN during 1971, and is encouraging the Service Departments, the Component Commands, and the subordinate unified commands to adopt this type of educational concept to augment existing educational programs.

(U) Educational Material--All reports on the availability of drug abuse educational material at the unit level indicate that servicemen in the PACOM are being well informed. Although sufficient material is available, emphasis is still required to insure that educational material is creditable and meaningful to the target audience. In this regard, the mission of the National Clearing House for Drug Abuse Information has been expanded to include the review of all drug abuse educational material.

(U) Educational Media Campaigns--In addition to the CINCPAC-sponsored media campaigns "Cold Turkey I and II" conducted during 1971, the Pacific Stars and Stripes and Armed Forces Radio and Television made major contributions to the education of personnel, revealing the facts concerning myths about drug abuse and publicizing existing control measures to prevent smuggling by DoD personnel. At the close of the year, CINCPAC began planning to participate in the DoD "Come Home Clean" campaign.

(U) Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation Centers--Lessons learned during 1971 concerning the treatment and rehabilitation of drug dependent personnel have been disseminated to all commands in the PACOM. Although there is still much to learn in dealing with this problem, standardized programs have been established throughout the PACOM that reflect the knowledge and experience acquired through trial and error.

(U) Urinalysis--Urine testing to detect the abuse of narcotics, barbiturates, and amphetamines has become the most effective deterrent to drug abuse. This program continued to expand during the last half of 1971 until standard requirements were established by DoD for each geographical area in the world. The continuation of this program should insure that drug-dependent personnel are

detected and receive treatment before they become seriously addicted. The U.S. Army has been assigned responsibility for the establishment of urine testing laboratories to service all commands in the PACOM.

(U) Drug Abuse Statistics--The varying criteria and reporting procedures utilized by the Service Departments have made it impossible for CINCPAC to obtain meaningful statistics that indicate the extent of the drug abuse problem, or significant trends, in each country in the PACOM. Department of Defense is staffing a directive that will establish a unified reporting system which will eliminate this problem area when implemented.

(C) Customs Controls--The Department of the Army, as the DoD Executive Agent for Customs Controls, is promulgating a directive on customs controls. When approved in 1972, this directive will specify that unified commands are responsible for the establishment and enforcement of customs controls in overseas areas. The CINCPAC implementation of this directive should significantly reduce smuggling of narcotics and contraband by DoD personnel in the PACOM.

(C) Interagency Coordination--By the end of 1971, CINCPAC had been advised that consideration of the CINCPAC proposal on the establishment of a Regional Interagency Intelligence and Operations Center (RIIOC) had been deferred, as Europe was considered the major conduit for narcotics being smuggled into the United States. Owing to the present availability of narcotics in many countries in the PACOM and the probability of increased efforts by Southeast Asian drug traffickers, CINCPAC will continue to press for the establishment of a regional narcotics intelligence center.

(S) Aerial Photography--During 1971, CINCPAC supported the requirement for an aerial survey in the "Tri-Border" area to identify the location of poppy fields. Near the end of the year, a decision was made at the national level that such a survey was not required. This issue remains unresolved, with the operators in the field supporting the requirement and the Washington agencies opposing the project. CINCPAC is exploring the feasibility of detecting marijuana fields by aerial photography using the I2S Mark I camera.

(S) Thai Fishing Trawlers--CINCPAC support of an operation by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to interdict Thai narcotics-smuggling trawlers was not effective during 1971, owing to a lack of coordinated effort by all U.S. Government agencies involved. This problem is being studied at the national level, with the objective of establishing operational procedures which will insure at least some degree of success.

(S) Narcotics Smuggling by Aircraft--The movement of illicit narcotics by civilian and military aircraft between countries in Southeast Asia received

significant emphasis during 1971. Although some measures were taken to prevent smuggling by this means, the lack of effective controls over the international movement of light civilian aircraft and military aircraft precludes any short-term solution to this problem. Even with increased controls over civilian aircraft, this problem will continue to exist. Local government customs officials are authorized to inspect aircraft operated by their military forces.[1]

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[1] J14 Paper, 14 Mar 72, Subj: Summary of Drug Abuse Control During 1971.

SECTION II--REST AND RECUPERATION (R&R) AND LEAVE PROGRAMS

Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Program

(C) The PACOM R&R program began in February 1962, when the JCS requested CINCPAC to develop a program of rest and recuperation for personnel stationed in the RVN. Initially conducted at in-country sites, the program progressed to out-of-country locations, utilizing military aircraft, on a leave basis. At the end of 1964 CINCPAC and the JCS approved a COMUSMACV recommendation that one R&R period during each 12-month tour in the RVN be authorized and not charged as ordinary leave. By early 1966 the R&R program had expanded to the extent that commercial carriers, under contract to Military Airlift Command (MAC--formerly MATS), were utilized. By the end of 1967 the program reached a peak, with military personnel in the RVN and certain other nearby areas taking advantage of flights to R&R sites at Hong Kong, Bangkok, Singapore, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Taipei, Tokyo, Manila, Guam (for servicemen of Guamanian origin), and Sydney, as well as Honolulu. With the cutback in U.S. troop strength in the RVN, the number of R&R sites was gradually reduced, so that by the end of 1970 the sites remaining available to R&R personnel were Hawaii, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Sydney. Similarly, the numbers involved in the program declined steadily: For the month of December 1970, as CINCPAC advised the JCS, 20,645 U.S. and 1,768 FWMAF personnel participated in the R&R program.[1]

(C) At the end of 1970 COMUSMACV had proposed to CINCPAC the implementation, on a trial basis, of a program combining R&R to Hawaii and leave to the CONUS. The JCS pointed out in March 1971 that the Civil Aeronautics Board was expected to approve a rate increase, retroactive to August 1970, and that the increased costs would probably prevent implementation of the Hawaii/CONUS program during the fourth quarter of FY 71. CINCPAC agreed, and noted that COMUSMACV would undertake a study to determine whether such a program would be feasible during FY 72. As a result of the MACV study, which took into consideration both operational requirements and individual preferences, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS in April that the R&R program be modified to allow personnel to combine CONUS leave with R&R to Hawaii, beginning 1 October 1971. On 2 June the JCS approved the recommendation, noting that the combined CONUS/Hawaii leave option would have to be accomplished within funds currently approved for the FY 72 R&R program. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV on 5 June to proceed with implementation of

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1965, p. 590 and CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, p. 320; CINCPAC 132214Z Jan 71; J116 HistSum Jan 71.

the program, but to make no public disclosure of the new program until a detailed plan was announced.[1]

(C) MAC advised CINCPAC on 24 May 1971 that R&R flights to Sydney, Australia had been rerouted through Manila International Airport because of a work stoppage at Darwin during the period 18-20 May. Although labor difficulties at Darwin were resolved on 20 May, Pan American continued to schedule Sydney flights through Manila instead of Darwin and proposed that the Manila routing become permanent. MAC requested CINCPAC and AMEMB Manila concurrence prior to accepting the Pan American proposal. Queried by CINCPAC, CINCPACREPPHIL advised that AMEMB Manila desired that the matter be treated low-key and continue to operate in the same manner as past flights. No difficulty was anticipated regarding continued use of ID cards and civilian clothes by transiting R&R personnel. Subject to continuation of prevailing conditions, a low-key approach as stipulated by AMEMB Manila, and the understanding that the level of service provided the R&R program by Pan American remain unchanged, CINCPAC concurred in the routing of Sydney flights through Manila.[2]

(U) The steady decline of the R&R program was evident in mid-1971, when CINCPAC reported to the JCS that 15,294 U.S. and 1,607 FWMAF personnel had participated in the R&R program during the month of June 1971. This represented an overall reduction of 20 percent from the same figures for December 1970.[3]

(C) As a result of the reduced R&R program, COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC on 14 August that the R&R site at Hong Kong be closed on or about 1 October 1971. CINCPAC concurred, and recommended JCS approval. On 15 September JCS approved the recommendation, and CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV and CINCPACREPPHIL to take necessary action to close the Hong Kong site on 1 October or as soon thereafter as possible. The site was officially closed as of 1 October. At the same time the USDAO, Hong Kong appraised CINCPAC of possible impacts upon military personnel visiting Hong Kong after closing of the R&R center, regarding "emergency" assistance matters (need for transportation requests, finance and disbursing transactions, medical and legal assistance, etc.). USDAO Hong Kong after discussions with COMUSNAVPHIL and CINCPAC representatives, concluded that those "emergency" assistance matters with exception of finance, billeting, and messing could be solved by USDAO. CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT to provide "emergency" finance and disbursing, billeting and messing services to U.S.

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[1] JCS 5596/052128Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 232009Z Mar and 290854Z Apr 71; J116 HistSum Apr 71; JCS 021547Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 052229Z Jun 71; J116 HistSum Jun 71.

[2] MAC 242020Z May 71; CINCPACREPPHIL 260906Z May 71; CINCPAC 280433Z May 71; J116 HistSum May 71.

[3] CINCPAC 210103Z Jul 71.

military personnel from all Services finding themselves destitute in Hong Kong.[1]

(C) Similarly, COMUSMACV recommended in mid-August that the R&R site at Sydney, Australia be closed on or about 1 January 1972. CINCPAC concurred, and recommended to the JCS that intergovernmental negotiations be opened on the subject. A joint State/Defense message of 17 September approved the closing of the Sydney site on 1 January 1972. COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that the last R&R flight would depart Sydney on 5 January 1972, but that Sydney would remain an authorized leave site.[2]

(U) In connection with the termination of the Australia R&R program, CINCPAC desired to extend formal recognition and appreciation to certain Australian organizations and individuals who had supported and served the R&R program in Australia for some four years. CINCPACREPPHIL, COMUSMACV, and the American Consul, Sydney concurred in the concept of recognition and suggested those to be recognized and modes of recognition. CINCPAC submitted a concept plan which was generally accepted by all concerned, except for the proposed date of 4 January 1972, which fell in the middle of the Australia Christmas and summer holiday seasons; the concept date was then changed to 21 January. Citations, plaques, and certificates of merit, to be presented by the CINCPAC, were prepared by the staff. A letter of appreciation to the people of Australia, to be co-signed by Admiral McCain and U.S. Ambassador Walter L. Rice, was prepared as follows:

> On behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command and all Americans, we wish to convey to the people of Australia our wholehearted appreciation for their most gracious hospitality and work in support of the US Forces Rest and Recuperation Program in Australia. During the past four years more than 280,000 personnel of the Pacific Command have visited Australia as part of this program. The continuing and unstinting support which has been so freely given to the R&R program by the Australian people was largely responsible for making these visits to the Commonwealth of Australia a warm and memorable experience.
>
> During four wars the people of Australia and of the United States of America have stood shoulder to shoulder to defeat or contain aggressive challenges to free men. These

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[1] J112 HistSum Aug 71; COMUSMACV 141245Z Aug 71; JCS 1174/152213Z Sep 71; USDAO Hong Kong 300820Z Sep and 200455Z Oct 71; CINCPAC 020236Z Nov 71; J112 HistSum Oct 71.

[2] J112 HistSums Aug-Sep 71.

challenges have been met and defeated both in global and regional struggles. In two World Wars, we have fought as allies to preserve individual liberty and human justice. Twice since, in Korea and in Vietnam, we have shared similar objectives to help other free people determine their own future. A firm and enduring friendship between our two peoples has ensued. Significantly, at no time has our common bond and esteem for one another been greater than it is today.

The warm and generous hospitality by the Australian people in supporting the R&R program--by so unselfishly assisting our military personnel--by taking them into both their homes and their hearts--will long be remembered by the Government and the people of the United States of America.

Australians and Americans alike have faith and confidence in the future. Our strength is the tradition of friendship and a shared love of liberty which binds our people and reinforces our mutual heritage of independence.

In addition to the CINCPAC letter, a letter of appreciation from COMUSMACV was to be read during the Sydney ceremonies by the MACV J1. Although Admiral McCain had from the start planned to attend the ceremonies in person, last-minute official obligations elsewhere prevented his attendance; on 31 December he advised Ambassador Rice and others concerned that he had designated LT GEN Charles A. Corcoran, the CINCPAC Chief of Staff, to represent him at Sydney on 21 January 1972.[1]

(C) The continuing reduction in the scope of the R&R program was evidenced by CINCPAC's report to the JCS that for the month of December 1971 9,804 U.S. and 917 FWMAF personnel had participated in the program. This represented an overall decrease of 31 percent from the June 1971 figure and a cumulative decrease of 52 percent from the experience of the month of December 1970. Effective with 1 January 1972, the only remaining R&R sites were at Taipei, Bangkok, and Honolulu.[2]

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[1] CINCPAC 310239Z Jul 71; CINCPACREPPHIL 201309Z Aug 71; COMUSMACV 040926Z Sep 71; AMCONSUL Sydney 270500Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 232151Z Oct, 120249Z Nov and 290801Z Nov 71; AMEMB Canberra 142110Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 310243Z Dec 71; J11 HistSums Oct-Dec 71.

[2] Interview LTC Steffey, J11 by ComdHist, 24 Jan 72.

Environmental and Morale Leave (E&ML)

(U) In 1967 CINCPAC had established a general policy, implementing Service directives, for a program of Environmental and Morale Leave (E&ML) under which eligible Department of Defense military and civilian personnel and their dependents stationed at designated overseas bases within the PACOM could be afforded space available travel privileges on military aircraft for leave purposes. This program did not apply to personnel stationed in the RVN, who were covered by the R&R and similar programs.[1]

(U) In January 1971 COMUSMACTHAI requested CINCPAC to modify the E&ML program to authorize personnel stationed in Thailand to take their leave in Singapore. Upon being queried, AMEMB Singapore approved the designation of Singapore as an E&ML site, but noted that concurrence of the Government of Singapore (GOS) would be delayed because of holidays. Not until 9 February was GOS approval obtained. On 10 February CINCPAC notified COMUSMACTHAI that Singapore was designated an E&ML site for personnel from Thailand, and that CINCPACINST 1700.2B would be changed accordingly.[2]

(U) In reply to a JCS request in September 1971, CINCPAC provided an overall evaluation of the E&ML program as it was then operating. Based on replies from throughout the PACOM, CINCPAC advised the JCS on 13 October that he continued to support the E&ML program strongly, but noted certain problem areas. Generally, the "space available" requirement had not yielded enough military aircraft seats to provide adequate distributions of the E&ML travel privilege. Where assigned or committed military aircraft were used, adequate advance scheduling was possible for personnel in areas distant from the airfield, but inability to forecast space available seats on MAC charter flights virtually restricted their use to personnel living near MAC terminals, particularly as MAC required that space available travelers be present in the terminal when seats were allocated. CINCPAC discussed other minor problems involving inequities, and indicated that he would pursue some of these problems. From the morale aspect, CINCPAC strongly supported a program which allowed recreational travel opportunities for personnel in remote areas which were not available through other means. In some areas, he noted, E&ML was the single most important morale factor; in all areas, curtailment or cancellation of the program would be detrimental to morale.[3]

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[1] CINCPAC Instruction 1700.2B, Subj: Environmental and Morale Program for Designated Overseas Areas, 25 Sep 1967, with subsequent changes.

[2] COMUSMACTHAI 120748Z Jan 71; AMEMB Singapore 149/190435Z Jan 71; USDAO Singapore 114/090835Z Feb 71; CINCPAC 100302Z Feb 71.

[3] JCS 6572/011431Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 130138Z Oct 71.

(U) On 1 November 1971, CHUSDLG Indonesia pointed out to CINCPAC that existing regulations prohibited dependents of aircrew members, who were on TDY, from traveling on USAF aircraft with their sponsors for E&ML purposes. Noting that there was a limited number of aircrew members available for duty in Indonesia, CHUSDLG requested a waiver of the regulation. CINCPAC approved the exceptions to policy on 10 November.[1]

(U) CG Eighth Army requested in April 1971 that Hawaii (Oahu) be included in the list of E&ML sites open to personnel stationed in Korea. He pointed out that limiting E&ML only to Tokyo, Manila, and Hong Kong was not consistent with efforts to reduce the "gold flow," and felt that the morale benefits to both military and civilian personnel would be substantial. Approval was specifically urged in time for the summer season of 1971. COMUSKOREA and CINCUSARPAC both recommended approval, the latter on 20 April 1971. Not until 10 November, however, did CINCPAC grant approval for Oahu as an E&ML site for personnel in Korea, reminding COMUSKOREA at the same time that there were no scheduled MAC passenger flights from Korea to Hawaii, that E&ML participants would have to transit Okinawa or Japan and then arrange onward transportation to Hawaii, and that very few seats were available on this leg of the itinerary.[2]

(U) In view of the pending suspension of Pan American World Airways service to Wake Island effective 7 December 1971, the Acting Director of the Pacific Region of the Federal Aviation Administration requested CINCPAC, on 19 November, to extend space available travel on MAC aircraft from Wake Island to Guam for FAA employees and dependents, noting that no commercial transportation would be available to or from Wake Island. CINCPAC approved the request on 3 December, pointing out that FAA employees would share the privilege on an equitable basis with U.S. military and DoD civilians assigned to Wake Island.[3]

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[1] CHUSDLG DJAKARTA 010824Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 102141Z Nov 71.

[2] CG Eighth US Army ltr, EACP-RP&TS, 4 Apr 71, Subj: Addition of Environmental and Morale (E&M) Leave Area, with inds by COMUSKOREA and CINCUSARPAC; CINCPAC 100105Z Nov 71.

[3] FAA Pacific Region ltr, 19 Nov 71; CINCPAC ltr Ser 4497 of 3 Dec 71.

SECTION III--PRISONERS OF WAR

(U) CINCPAC has two roles with regard to prisoners of war (PWs) in Southeast Asia. He supervises COMUSMACV's discharge of certain U.S. responsibilities for enemy prisoners captured by U.S. forces, and he coordinates the plans and preparations of the PACOM Service Component commanders relating to reception and processing of recovered U.S. prisoners.

Enemy Prisoners of War

(U) Until U.S. combat forces entered the conflict in early 1965, all enemy personnel who came into custody of the Government of the RVN (GVN), as insurgent Viet Cong (VC), were considered to be domestic civil criminals and so treated. Beginning in 1965, significant numbers of regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) military personnel were captured. The United States, as a signatory to the Geneva Convention, was obliged to insure that persons captured by its forces were treated and accounted for as prescribed if they satisfied the definition of a PW. To assist the United States and to facilitate its own adherence to the Convention, the GVN changed the official prisoner designation from "Communist Rebel Combat Captives" to "Prisoners of War."

(U) Entitlement to PW status under the Geneva Convention is dependent upon a uniform (or distinctive markings) being worn, arms being carried openly, the existence of a chain of command responsibility, and operations having been conducted in accordance with the "laws and customs of war." The prevailing mode of combat employed by the enemy in Vietnam, however, often satisfied none of these conditions. Women, children, and older persons also were customarily used by the enemy as "combat troops." Most detainees wore black "pajamas" and no "uniform" or military gear at the time of their seizure. But this was not conclusive. While persons who committed warlike acts, without meeting all of the criteria, technically had no entitlement to protection if captured, the evidence of warlike activity was not always clear and the circumstances of detention were sometimes ambiguous.

(U) To resolve this difficulty, COMUSMACV and the RVNAF evolved, in late 1966, a set of definitions to be applied to the screening process through which all detainees were passed. These definitions gave PW status to any captured member of a VC main force or local force unit and to any captured member of the NVA. In addition, PW status was accorded to any VC self-defense, secret self-defense, or guerrilla members (including self-confessed or probable members) who were engaged in belligerent acts other than terrorism, sabotage, or spying. These latter, moreover, were entitled to PW status whether captured in combat or

not; uniforms, insignia, and open carrying of weapons were not prerequisites. This liberalization of the Geneva definition was considered by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to be "generous in the extreme" and a significant humanitarian advance in the customs of war.

(U) After intelligence exploitation, the problem of what to do with prisoners captured by the United States was usually solved early in the buildup by the expedient of informally transferring them to the GVN. There were no PW camps at the time (1965)--either U.S. or RVNAF operated. Some prisoners were held by the GVN in civil prisons; others were released. U.S. forces kept no records, or inadequate records, of those they had captured until late 1966. Without the sanction of any formal arrangement, the U.S. forces were, in fact, implementing provisions of the Geneva Convention which authorized transfer of prisoners to another power, if such a third power abides by the terms of the Convention. On 27 September 1965, however, a joint memorandum was signed by General Westmoreland, for the United States, and Defense Minister Nguyen Huu Co, for the RVN, pertaining to PWs. One clause of this document provided for official transfer of those prisoners taken by the U.S. or other Free World Military Assistance Forces to RVNAF custody. This arrangement spared the United States the necessity of establishing a PW command within its Vietnam force structure and saved both U.S. manpower and logistical support requirements in the combat theater. COMUSMACV accomplished the physical verification of Vietnamese compliance with Geneva rules through advisors. With direct access to the RVNAF Joint General Staff, he also had overall policy development and coordination functions with respect to enemy PWs captured in Vietnam by U.S. forces.

(C) After conclusion of the Co-Westmoreland Agreement and after the GVN recognized in early 1966 that the Geneva rules applied to the conflict in the RVN, the construction of a detention system exclusively for PWs was inaugurated. By mid-1966 those detainees classified as PWs started being interned in the camps. U.S. units were required to deliver U.S.-captured PWs to the camps immediately after screening, interrogation, and medical treatment. The basic plan called for completion of one camp in each of the four corps tactical zones.

(C) Shortly after the basic camp system was started, it was recognized that special facilities for female prisoners would be necessary, and in January 1967 construction of a camp near Qui Nhon was begun. Almost all female PWs were subsequently transferred to that location. Construction of a large "central" PW camp on Phu Quoc Island was started on 22 April 1967. Additional capacity at the III Corps Camp was constructed to accommodate those who were under 18 years of age and those who were disabled as a result of war wounds. In mid-1971 the entire RVN PW detention system could hold up to 47,500 and about 38,000 enemy were in the enclosures.

(U) The Saigon resident delegation of the ICRC exercised its right to inspect the RVN PW camp system and other PW facilities with considerable frequency. Through mid-1970, the committee in general found no significant departures from the provisions of the Convention in the RVNAF operation of the camps. Minor defects were corrected on the spot or suitable corrective action initiated. In June 1970, however, an ICRC team visiting the Phu Quoc Central PW Camp, which held nearly 24,000 prisoners at the time, concluded that conditions were "catastrophic" and so reported to Geneva. Subsequent inquiry both by U.S. and GVN investigating teams, headed by general officers, satisfactorily disproved the "catastrophic" allegation. Nevertheless, a number of deficiencies were verified and measures to correct them were inaugurated. Actions to improve medical care and rations were taken; lumber for more bunk-pallet construction was provided; and increases in availability of water were arranged. Yet the ICRC continued its complaints about Phu Quoc and as late as May 1971 claimed no improvement there since February 1971.

(C) Operation of the camp systems was not without incident. As of 31 December 1971 an aggregate of 228 prisoners had successfully escaped from the camps and 899 deaths from all causes had occurred in PW camps.

(U) Notwithstanding North Vietnamese refusal to admit the presence of their forces in the RVN, the GVN succeeded in repatriating 188 NVA prisoners through the end of 1971. Also through 1971, 3,986 former VC PWs had been released to resume lives as useful citizens. From 1969 onward it was U.S. policy to urge the GVN to be as liberal as possible in releasing prisoners, even while hostilities continued.

(S) In June 1969 CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV to plan, in conjunction with the RVNAF, for ultimate repatriation of the North Vietnamese. Although the tasking was made in the T-Day Plan it was intended that implementation could be accomplished at any time. In attempting to draft such a plan, the MACV staff was unable to secure the essential cooperation of the RVNAF Joint General Staff. In consequence, COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC permission to hold such planning in abeyance while efforts were inaugurated to obtain RVN agreement in principle with the planning effort. CINCPAC agreed in October 1969. In January 1970 a proposed PW policy position paper was forwarded by COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, who recommended approval to the JCS, at the same time that an identical paper was forwarded by the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon to the State Department. In October 1970 an approved joint U.S. State/Defense Department position on PW policy was issued. In anticipation of planning progress, the COMUSMACV staff drafted in late 1970 its "half" of a joint U.S./GVN repatriation plan. The Saigon Embassy,

however, through late 1971 had been unsuccessful in persuading the GVN to issue planning guidance to the RVNAF in this matter.[1]

(U) Meanwhile, in default of adequate and detailed instructions on the subject by the Army or the Department of Defense, CINCPAC prepared and promulgated on 2 July 1971 an all-inclusive CINCPAC Instruction entitled: Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons. This instruction stressed the fact that "in matters relating to detained persons programs in the PACOM, CINCPAC has the responsibility for providing broad policy guidance and supervision of implementation of such policy." Although issued too late to have any significant effect on enemy PW operations in the Vietnam conflict, the instruction provides a useful base upon which to administer prisoners, internees, and detainees should the United States become a party to any future military operations in the PACOM area. It provides the guidance necessary to ensure appropriate record-keeping and to avoid the confusion and to preclude the inadvertent violations of the Geneva Convention by U.S. forces which occurred in the RVN during the early stages of U.S. involvement.[2]

(C) CINCPAC requested JCS guidance in August 1971 as to whether or not COMUSMACV should proceed with his attempts to undertake combined planning with the RVNAF on enemy PW repatriation. The JCS indicated that the planning should continue. COMUSMACV advised that the RVNAF would not cooperate in planning, and that a MACV unilateral plan was being prepared. At the end of August, however, COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC that the RVNAF was suddenly expressing interest in the subject of enemy PW repatriation planning.[3]

(C) CINCPAC sponsored a staff visit to the RVN on enemy PW matters from 11-20 October 1971. Representation included officers from OASD/ISA and the Army's Provost Marshal General, who also represented the JCS. The CINCPAC representative found significant improvements in MACV/RVNAF counterpart relationships and coordination, and in the operation of the RVNAF PW camp. Increased command emphasis by COMUSMACV, and the assignment of a new camp commander and new senior U.S. advisor at the Central PW Camp at Phu Quoc, have led to significant improvements and overall resolution of problems which had recurred during 1971.[4]

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[1] CINCPAC Command Histories 1965-69; J111 Point Paper, 22 Apr 71, Subj: PW in SEA; interview LTC Rowland, J11, by ComdHist, 7 Mar 72.

[2] CINCPACINST 3461.3 of 2 Jul 71, subject as indicated; interview LTC Moller, J11, by ComdHist, 8 Mar 72.

[3] CINCPAC 180323Z Aug 71; JCS 201818Z Aug 71; COMUSMACV 221039Z and 311204Z Aug 71.

[4] CINCPAC 100257Z Sep 71; J111 HistSum Oct 71.

(C) Surprisingly, the ICRC agreed that conditions in the RVNAF PW camps had improved greatly during the second half of 1971. At a meeting with U.S. Embassy officials in Saigon early in 1972, the ICRC Senior Delegate, M. Jacques Ruff, stated that on balance his team had been favorably impressed by what they had seen during their visits. He said that there had been marked improvement in internment conditions and in the general physical condition of PWs during the past year. He noted with pleasure that the PWs and ARVN personnel now receive exactly the same treatment in ARVN military hospitals. He expressed appreciation for the assistance rendered his team by MACV both in the matter of transportation and in facilitating ICRC contacts with the GVN camp authorities. Another ICRC delegate pointed out that there had been a marked change of attitude toward the ICRC inspection teams on the part of GVN camp authorities since July 1971. As a result of the freer ICRC access to the camps and the prisoners, the ICRC now understood that GVN camp authorities were doing their best within the limited means available to them. He observed that there was more regular distribution of supplies to the camps than had been the case in the past, but the GVN cannot afford as much as is needed. The improvement of camp conditions is most notable at the Central Prisoner of War Camp on Phu Quoc Island, for which he believed the new camp commander deserved most of the credit. He said that the policy of segregating PWs of differing political tendencies (new life PWs as opposed to hard core PWs) at the Phu Quoc, Can Tho, and Pleiku Camps had been very beneficial, and predicted that the institution of the same policy at the three remaining PW camps would reduce the problems facing these camps by 50 percent. For the first time, on their latest visit to Phu Quoc, the ICRC discovered no cases of death attributable to ill treatment.[1]

(C) Near the end of 1971, the CINCPAC staff assessed the enemy PW situation in the RVN as generally excellent. Certain problems for the future, however, were noted:

- Logistical support of PW camps, particularly Phu Quoc, must continue to receive high command emphasis.

- Incidents will continue to occur in PW camps, particularly Phu Quoc and the women's PW camp at Qui Nhon.

- Although GVN released almost 3,000 VC PW on the occasion of President Thieu's inauguration, more releases and repatriations are needed. Lowering the camp population increases the guard/prisoner ratio and tends to decrease the chances of serious incidents.

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[1] AMEMB Saigon Memorandum of Conversation, 17 Feb 72, Subj: ICRC Inspections of PW Camps in 1971.

- However, if releases/repatriations are instituted in large numbers, the PW population will become increasingly hard core and an increase in minor incidents and confrontations might be expected.[1]

(C) As of 31 December 1971, the enemy PW camp population in the RVN stood at 35,596. Of this total, 9,468 were NVA or former RVN citizens who infiltrated from NVN, and 26,128 were VC. The Phu Quoc camp alone held 26,471 enemy PWs.[2]

U.S. Prisoners of War

(U) Because of the enemy's refusal to provide the names of those held as PWs, the United States assumed that some of those listed as missing in action were, in fact, PWs. This was particularly true of pilots or other aircrew members, where observation of successful parachuting or other evidence suggested that the individual had reached the ground alive. All consideration of U.S. prisoners, therefore, including preparations for processing upon their return, assistance to their next of kin, and pressure on the other side to conform to the Geneva Conventions, was based on the possibility that a high percentage of the combined total of verified prisoners plus those missing as a result of hostile action could ultimately be recovered from the enemy. On 31 December 1971, for example, the number of U.S. military personnel considered to be prisoners of the enemy was 476, while the total then currently missing in hostilities was roughly 1,140. Of those classified as PWs, 381 were believed to be in North Vietnam, while 88 were believed to be in South Vietnam. Of the MIA, about 400 were lost over North Vietnam, more than 250 over Laos, and about 470 (mostly Army and Marine) missing in South Vietnam.[3]

(C) The immediate thrust of U.S. approaches to the enemy regarding U.S. PWs from 1968 through 1971 was for immediate release of the sick and wounded, provision of adequate care, notification to the United States of the names of those interned, allowing mail exchange and impartial inspection of facilities, all required by the Geneva Convention, plus agreement to repatriation or exchange of prisoners as an issue that need not wait for the termination of hostilities. In this connection, the United States also consistently urged the GVN to make unilateral releases of VC and to offer repatriation of NVA prisoners through any channel acceptable to North Vietnam. Through 1971, the enemy had released 27 U.S. PWs (all in 1969 or earlier). These releases were politically motivated rather than humanitarian. The enemy expected either world approbation or encouragement of dissident U.S. domestic groups in each case.[4]

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[1] J111 Point Paper, Nov 71, Subj: Enemy Prisoner of War Operations, RVN.
[2] Interview LTC Rowland, J11, by ComdHist, 7 Mar 72.
[3] J111 Paper, 17 Jan 72, Subj: American PW and MIA in Southeast Asia (January 1, 1972).
[4] J111 Point Paper, 22 Apr 71, Subj: PW in Southeast Asia.

(C) Slow return or recovery of all surviving prisoners on a piecemeal basis had to be considered, while immediate, organized return of the entire group as a result of some arrangement was the optimum hope. In either of these cases, or for any intermediate combination, some plan for the reception and processing of the returnees was required. The experience of "Big Switch" at Panmunjom in 1953, when the bulk of U.S. PWs were returned from North Korea to U.S. control, indicated the need for some reception and processing guidance common to all Services. In neither the Korean nor the Vietnam war did the captors differentiate between the U.S. Military Services in their treatment of our men who were taken prisoners. Left uncontrolled, significant Service differences in the treatment of returnees could be expected to occur. Awareness of these differences would impact adversely on the morale of some of those recovered. From a public relations standpoint, obvious Service differences in treatment of returnees would invite uncomplimentary comparisons.

(U) Therefore, the Secretary of Defense issued policy statements on 9 June 1968 and 18 January 1969 which preserved the inherent responsibility of each Service for processing its own returned personnel but at the same time directed all efforts toward the goal of assuring uniformity of treatment of returnees. The unified commander in the area of recovery was to exercise initial control of all returnees, including central processing when required.

(U) While the policies and directives to govern the processing of recovered U.S. personnel were evolving, the USS PUEBLO with a crew of 80 was seized by North Korea in international waters in January 1968. The crew was interned by the North Koreans for nearly a year under conditions approximating those of PWs (as that condition is administered by Communist powers), i.e., total exploitation for political purposes and total disregard or contempt for humanitarian considerations. U.S. Navy planning for the reception, processing, and debriefing of the PUEBLO crew was thorough and highly coordinated. The plans were executed flawlessly when the crew was finally released in late December 1968. Yet the interest of the press and public, and the eagerness of the next of kin, were such that some of the PUEBLO crewmen were hindered rather than helped in their struggle to readjust to freedom. Some of the news coverage secured under emotionally tense conditions was not in the best interest of the individual crewman nor in the best interest of the United States.

(C) Observing this additional burden imposed on the PUEBLO crew, Admiral McCain hoped to spare others similar torment when they returned to U.S. control. Accordingly, on 27 February 1969 he incorporated certain additional guidance in his instructions on returnee processing, to the effect that returnees should be spared immediate direct contact with the news media, the public, and even their families until they were properly prepared for the experience. Only after doctors had agreed that the returnee was psychologically able to undergo the

strains of such contact, and officers responsible for overall reception care had determined that processing could be interrupted without damage to the returnee's welfare or to the interests of the United States, would he be made available to the press.[1]

(U) As the war in Southeast Asia dropped in tempo during 1969 and 1970, it became clear that the U.S. PWs in the hands of the enemy were to be exploited as pawns in the overall bargaining for peace in the area. President Nixon addressed the subject at the end of 1970:

> As we approach 1971 we face above all the question of the release of our men. On October 7, in my Indo-China peace initiative, I proposed the immediate release of all POWs on both sides. On December 10 we proposed, as a first step, the release of all North Vietnam prisoners of war held in South Vietnam in return for the release of all American and free world prisoners in Indo-China and any South Vietnamese prisoners held outside South Vietnam. This is as generous a prisoner-release proposal as history has known. We have, in effect, offered to exchange 8,000 North Vietnamese prisoners for 800 free world prisoners. I have sought to approach this subject on a humane basis and to keep it separate from the political and military issues of the war. Despite the other side's abrupt rejection of our proposals they remain in effect. You have my assurance that we are ready instantly to proceed toward arrangements for the release of all prisoners of war on both sides.
>
> In the meantime, to demonstrate our readiness to comply with the appropriate international standards, the South Vietnam Government each year has released groups of sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners. Another such release will take place shortly.
>
> Hanoi, however, has so far rebuffed every effort to obtain release of our men or to verify the conditions of their treatment. This attitude violates not only the Geneva Convention, which Hanoi had pledged to observe, but all common standards of human decency. It is barbaric. It has been universally and justifiably condemned.[2]

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[1] J1 Paper, 31 Jul 71, Subj: CINCPAC's Perspective of the War in SEA.

[2] Text of ltr from President Nixon to wives and families of U.S. PWs in SEA, 26 Dec 70, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXIV, No. 1647, 18 Jan 71.

(U) Similarly, in March 1971, the Congress requested the President to mark the seventh anniversary of the capture of the first U.S. serviceman still being held by the enemy (26 March 1964) by proclaiming the week of 21-27 March 1971 as a "National Week of Concern for Americans Who Are Prisoners of War or Missing in Action."[1]

(C) The Department of Defense had first issued guidance in June 1968 on policies for processing recovered U.S. PWs and other detained personnel. In consonance with this guidance, the Services initially had prepared their own plans and assigned their own code names to individual processing plans. In late 1969, however, it was felt that there should be one single name for the repatriation program, and on 17 December 1969 the JCS informed CINCPAC that the nickname EGRESS RECAP had been assigned and would be used with all material associated with the processing of returned U.S. military personnel.[2]

(C) CINCPAC took action in early September 1971 to insure that his staff was fully prepared to implement EGRESS RECAP procedures:

> Any future events which involve the reception and processing of U.S. returnees is expected to be a subject of intense concern at the highest levels of government. Although excellent plans for processing exist at all levels, the handling of these personnel, particularly if they are from different Services, is expected to generate a number of unanticipated problems and questions which will require immediate CINCPAC action on a 24-hour-a-day basis for several days, especially if large numbers of returnees are involved. Consequently, the following actions and procedures are directed:
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> a. J2, J3, J74, and J76 will designate officers who are fully knowledgeable of EGRESS RECAP matters who will be available for duty with the Battle Staff on 6-hour notice.
>
> b. J1 will designate an officer and an alternate, both of whom will be prepared to act as Assistant Battle Staff Watch Chief (EGRESS RECAP) on 3-hour notice.
>
> c. J3 will assure that sufficient space and appropriate facilities are made available in the CINCPAC Command Center for a special EGRESS RECAP Battle Staff Watch Team (BSW Team).

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[1] Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXIV, No. 1659, 12 Apr 71.
[2] CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 33-36.

d. Upon notification that an EGRESS RECAP event has occurred or is impending within PACOM:

(1) During duty hours, J1 in consultation with the Chief, BSW Team (BSC), will determine the need for activating all or part of the EGRESS RECAP BSW Team. Appropriate notifications will be accomplished by the BSC.

(2) During non-duty hours, the BSC will notify the J1 and alert duty officers of the Staff Sections listed above, to stand by for possible activation of the EGRESS RECAP BSW Team. The J1 will have his representative report to the CINCPAC Command Center without delay. The remainder of the EGRESS RECAP BSW Team will be activated when determined necessary by J1 and/or the BSC.[1]

(U) On 27 August 1971 the JCS advised CINCPAC that OSD had completed arrangements with four airlines to provide reduced-fare airline travel to and from Hawaii for wives and children of servicemen in a PW or MIA status. CINCPAC outlined his concept of the program to his Component commanders (and CG FMFPAC) on 5 September; after receiving their comments and concurrences, CINCPAC on 25 September announced the policies to be followed for the visits:

a. The appropriate PACOM Component Commander or CG FMFPAC will designate a contact representative for each wife who elects to take part in the program. This contact may be an officer, NCO, or other suitable and responsible individual.

b. The appointed contact will be responsible for the following actions with regard to the visit of each lady:

(1) Maintain coordination with the OIC Fort De Russy R&R Center.

(2) Assure that all suitable accommodations are arranged.

(3) See that she is properly greeted and bade farewell at the airport.

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[1] J01/Memo/017-71 of 7 Sep 71, Subj: Special EGRESS RECAP Battle Staff Watch Team.

(4) Provide her with an information/guidance packet and a card to be used to claim R&R type privileges.

(5) Extend her an invitation for a brief visit with the CINCPAC or his designated representative at CINCPAC Headquarters, Camp Smith.

c. Wives of captured/missing personnel who reside in the State of Hawaii will be individually invited to take advantage of R&R type privileges by appropriate PACOM Component commanders (or CG FMFPAC).

d. After consideration of all factors, including the /Civil Aeronautics Board/ 15-day limit on travel under the program, the authorized period for R&R type privileges for these wives in Hawaii is extended to a maximum of 14 days.[1]

(U) The first wife to take advantage of the new program was Mrs. Harding E. Smith, whose husband had been missing in action since 3 June 1966. She arrived in Hawaii with her son and other relatives in late October 1971.[2]

(C) Although by Defense policy the unified commander is responsible for coordinating the initial reception of returned or recovered U.S. PWs, the processing itself will be accomplished by personnel of the Service to which the returnee belongs, under unified auspices. Processing will include immediate medical care, a phone call home if desired, spiritual solace, uniforms, pay, and other things necessary to welcome and reintegrate the returnee. Care will be taken to protect him from harrassment by the media, although interviews will be allowed after Defense approval. The returnee will be presented any awards earned by him (but not yet presented) up to the time he was lost. He will, of course, be debriefed, but medical care and speedy processing will take precedence over debriefing. Returnees will be flown as patients to CONUS Service hospitals near their homes as soon as they can travel and are emotionally able to withstand the shock of family reunion. All processing will be accomplished no matter when a returnee is recovered or how many come back at one time. If only small numbers or single servicemen are recovered or repatriated, they will be processed individually. But if larger numbers are recovered--15 or more at a time--their PACOM processing will be done on a centralized basis before return to their separate Services in CONUS.[3]

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[1] JCS 3074/272244Z Aug 71; CINCPAC 050001Z and 252310Z Sep 71.
[2] J111 HistSum Oct 71.
[3] CINCPACINST C3461.1B of 27 Sep 71.

(C) Within the PACOM five commands--COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSJAPAN, COMUSKOREA, and CINCPACREPPHIL--were designated to be ready to undertake large-scale initial processing on minimum notice. It had been anticipated that COMUSMACV coordination of central processing at Cam Ranh Bay would be the most probable eventuality, but by the latter part of 1971 the continuing drawdown of units and personnel in the RVN was seriously reducing MACV's capability to accommodate large-scale processing. It therefore became necessary for CINCPAC to consider the necessity of using other sites for EGRESS RECAP central processing.[1]

(C) As a result of CINCPAC studies and recommendations from the subordinate commands, on 31 December 1971 CINCPAC directed that the following sites be designated as primarily and equally responsible for readiness to conduct centralized and unified processing of U.S. personnel returned from captured status:

a. Clark Air Base, Philippines, with Commander 13th Air Force acting as CINCPAC's unified agent for EGRESS RECAP.

b. U.S. Naval Station, Guam, with COMNAVMARIANAS (CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI) as CINCPAC agent.

c. Camp Kue, Okinawa, with CG USARYIS (CINCPACREP Ryukyus) as CINCPAC agent.

In addition, COMUSMACV and COMUSKOREA were directed to retain a CINCPAC EGRESS RECAP agency responsibility for conducting initial unified processing prior to arranging onward medical evacuation to one of the three primary designated processing sites. COMUSMACTHAI and COMUSJAPAN were relieved of responsibility for detailed planning and preparation for EGRESS RECAP operations, but were to continue to be prepared to conduct a brief initial reception for returnees who might be returned to U.S. control in or near their areas.[2]

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[1] CINCPAC 032321Z Nov 71; J111 HistSum Nov-Dec 71.
[2] CINCPAC 312235Z Dec 71.

SECTION IV--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Revised Wage Schedules for U.S. Forces' Local National Employees

Vietnam

(C) A wage survey of local industry pay practices in the RVN, conducted during the summer of 1970, had indicated that a 35 percent wage adjustment increase for local national (LN) employees would be required if local industrial practices were to be met. The U.S. Mission Council in Saigon, however, would not sanction such a large increase, pointing out such factors as concern for the stabilization program of the GVN and the high priority of restoring an economic balance between the private and public sector in the RVN. The revised wage schedules for LN employees were issued jointly by CG USARV, COMNAVFORV, and Commander Seventh Air Force; to take effect from 20 December 1970, the new schedules reflected increases of from 8.8 percent to 13.8 percent.[1]

(U) A revised severance pay plan for LN employees of both U.S. forces and U.S. contractors in the RVN was approved by the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee, acting under terms of CINCPACINST 12200.3, to be effective 1 November 1971. The revised plan generally doubles the previously authorized severance pay rates for involuntary separations--not for cause--and for the first time accords employees severance pay for voluntary separation after ten years' service with the same agency and after reaching the age of 55. The change had been proposed originally by the U.S. Mission Council, concurred in by the MACV Components and urged strongly by the Ambassador, to offset the negative economic and morale impact of scheduled large reductions in force and to lessen criticism of U.S. forces.[2]

Taiwan

(U) New wage schedules for LN employees of U.S. Forces in Taiwan were developed by the three Service Components, based on a full locality wage and fringe benefit survey conducted during September and October 1970. Of three new schedules, one covers basic non-manual skills, another covers basic manual skills, and a new special schedule has been developed for skills related to

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[1] AMEMB Saigon 19958/190450Z Dec 70; COMUSMACV 191344Z Dec 70.

[2] AMEMB Saigon 16534/151055Z and 16683/190210Z Oct 71; COMUSMACV 120924Z, 220821Z, and 290105Z Oct 71; J121 HistSum Oct 71.

retail sales. For the first time in Taiwan, each schedule is applicable to employees of both appropriated and nonappropriated fund activities. The new schedules were effective on or after 12 January 1971.[1]

Australia

(U) New wage schedules for LN manual employees of U.S. Forces in western Australia (NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. Holt) were approved for implementation the first pay period following 1 January 1971. Wage increases averaged seven percent and were based on adjustments authorized by the Australian Commonwealth and State industrial courts under terms of the U.S. NAVCOMMSTA Industrial Agreement of 1967.[2]

Philippines

(U) Revised schedules of wages for U.S. Forces LN employees in the Philippines were approved and issued by the PACOM Service Components. The schedules were based on data obtained during a wage change survey of local private sector employers in April 1971. The new schedules, effective 30 May 1971, resulted in an average increase of 14.8 percent for manual employees and 9.9 percent for non-manual employees. The survey was conducted at this time in order to bring the U.S. Forces in line with private sector wage increase practices brought about, in part, by the floating rate of the peso on the world market.[3]

Okinawa

(C) Revised schedules of wages for U.S. Forces LN employees in the Ryukyus Islands were approved and issued by CINCPACREP Ryukyus, effective 1 July 1971. The schedules resulted in an average of a $.095 per hour differential increase and a 15 percent increase in regularly scheduled bonus payments to employees. Basic wage rates were not affected. Schedule increases were based on two principal criteria: data obtained during a survey of local private sector employer wage practices in April and May 1971, and an intensive review and analysis of current U.S. Forces Okinawa employment compensation practices vis-a-vis U.S. Forces Japan compensation practices expected to be in effect at the time of Okinawa reversion to Japan. This analysis was necessary to help insure, insofar as possible, like treatment in Japan and Okinawa of U.S. Forces employment

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[1] COMUSTDC ltr Ser 3453, 9 Dec 70; CINCPACAF ltrs DPCS, 2 Nov 70 and DPCW, 12 Jan 71; J122 HistSum Jan 71.

[2] J122 HistSum Feb 71.

[3] CINCPACFLT ltr Ser 74/3300, 26 May 71; J122 HistSum Jun 71.

conditions and compensation practices on R-Day. Development of compensation increases, as reflected in the schedules, was accomplished through joint action of the CINCPACREP Ryukyus Joint Services Labor Committee (JSLC) and the COMUS Japan Joint Labor Affairs Committee. Subsequently, the JSLC met in collective bargaining sessions with the Military Base Workers' Union and agreed to the scheduled increases.[1]

Labor Relations at U.S. Bases

Okinawa

(U) The Okinawa Military Base Workers' Union (ZENGUNRO) conducted a strike against the U.S. bases on 10 and 11 February 1971 in protest primarily of the December announcement by U.S. Forces (USF) of plans to separate (RIF) some 3,000 Okinawan employees prior to 30 June 1971. Other strike issues included opposition to a cut in work hours at certain installations, the contracting out of regional exchange functions formerly performed by USF employees, a demand for more advance notice on RIFs, and a plea for increased separation allowance benefits. The USF necessarily stood firm on the issues, as the RIFs relate to worldwide budget reductions. In hopes of averting the strike, the Government of Japan (GOJ) announced that supplementary severance benefits would be underwritten by GOJ. This gesture did not forestall the strike, which was attended by disorderly elements, but major violence was averted. About 70 percent of the 23,450 Okinawan employees of USF did not report for work. Some 44 military installation gates were picketed by 2,620 persons at the peak period. All essential base activities continued to operate.[2]

(U) ZENGUNRO conducted its "second wave" strike on 2 and 3 March and a "third wave" on 14 and 15 April. These strikes were conducted generally in the same manner as the "first wave," without major disturbances or major confrontation with U.S. personnel. U.S. action to close Kadena Air Base Gate 2, resulted in complete absence of ZENGUNRO pickets and supporters in that key location and again defused a potentially explosive situation in the Koza area. Chief Executive Yara expressed relief at generally peaceful nature of the "second wave" strike and called on U.S. officials to deal with ZENGUNRO problems with "responsibility and sincerity." The second and third waves were marked by progressively reduced enthusiasm of the rank and file union members for active participation. Absenteeism averaged 68 and 76 percent (13,571 workers) for all Services for the second and third strikes respectively. The only departure from the

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[1] CINCPACREPRY ltr R1JC-L, 1 Jul 71; HICOMRY 300800Z Jun 71; J122 HistSum Jul 71.

[2] J121 HistSum Feb 71.

generally mild tone of the strike was ZENGUNRO's refusal, in the third wave strike, to permit operation of Okinawan driver contract school buses, which necessitated a two-day closure of DoD dependent schools. To this point, USF had not acceded to any of the union's demands.[1]

(U) On the evening of 18 May 1971, a 24-hour general strike began. Hailed as the first such in Okinawa, this strike was under the sponsorship of FUKKIKYO (Council for the Reversion of Okinawa to the Fatherland) and included as participants ZENGUNRO, other unions, "democratic groups," and ordinary citizens. (This was not considered the "fourth wave," which was estimated to be postponed until June.) Except for DoD dependent schools, all essential base activities continued to operate and picketing at U.S. installations was generally light. Approximately 20,000 people participated in the Naha rally, and about 14,000 in the march to the U.S. Civil Administration (USCAR) gate. The rally, march, and attendant demonstrations were well arranged and orderly except for a new element, a right wing group called NISSHI-KAI (Society for the Propagation of Japanese Thought), which attacked the demonstrators and attempted to disrupt the rally and parade, resulting in some injuries on both sides, before being put to flight. The strike ended at 1700 hours on 19 May.[2]

(U) On 30 June, ZENGUNRO and the Okinawa Prefecture Council of Trade Unions (KENROKYO) joined the All Okinawa Port Workers Union (GUNKOWANRO) in a one-day work stoppage at the Naha military port. This was in support of the GUNKOWANRO's strike against the Kokuba Stevedoring Company which began 26 May 1971 with no termination date indicated. Again, on 27 July 1971, the Machinato Branch of ZENGUNRO began a two-day work stoppage to support the Chibana Ammunition Depot workers who were not reporting to work during operation RED HAT. That strike, with attentant rallies and picketing, failed to affect adversely the RED HAT operation. A 48-hour strike planned for the period 30 September - 1 October by the Okinawa Regional Exchange (ORE) Branch of ZENGUNRO was called off as a result of negotiations between officials of the ORE Branch, USCAR representatives, and the ORE.[3]

(U) The Naha branch of ZENGUNRO conducted a strike from 1745 hours, 4 October to 2130 hours, 8 October 1971. The purpose of the strike was to protest personnel actions by the U.S. Government such as downgradings and involuntary transfers. The strike occasioned no major incidents or confrontations and impact was minimal. On 20-21 October the Kadena branch of ZENGUNRO, with ZENGUNRO Headquarters approval, conducted a 48-hour strike to protest RIF, downgradings, and

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[1] HICOMRY 060700Z Mar, 171130Z and 280650Z Apr 71; J121 HistSum Apr 71.
[2] HICOMRY 211345Z May 71; CGUSARYIS 200931Z May 71.
[3] J121 HistSum May-Dec 71 (Labor Affairs-Okinawa).

transfers. The strike was supported by FUKKIKYO, which conducted a rally and parade to commemorate anti-war day the evening of 21 October. The strike produced no visible results.[1]

(C) FUKKIKYO sponsored a second 24-hour general strike on 10 November 1971 with ZENGUNRO, OTU, and KONKORO in the vanguard. The strike was the culmination of a series of demonstrations opposing diet ratification of the reversion agreement. Participation was about the same as in the 19 May strike. However, violence flared and the strike marked three firsts:

a. Death of a GRI policeman whom students beat to death.

b. Attempt at throwing of fire bombs into Machinato/Naha housing area.

c. Use of tear gas by GRI police.

There were no incidents involving U.S. personnel and the flare-up of violence may have been sobering to all concerned, including Chief Executive Yara, whose pre-strike statements were interpreted by some as encouraging the violence.[2]

(U) Strikes by ZENGUNRO continued on a piecemeal basis for the remainder of the year in protest of RIFs and reductions in hours. These were conducted by the ORE Branch at Camp Mercy (29 November - 5 December); Sukiran Branch, a two-day sitdown strike in the vicinity of USARYIS Headquarters (7-8 December); island-wide concentrating on the larger military gates including Machinato, Kadena, Naha Air Base, and Machinato/Naha housing area (15-16 December); and the U.S. Army Club Workers Branch, concentrating on the main gate to the plaza housing area and adjacent to the American Legion Club near HQ USARYIS (30 December 1971 - 1 January 1972).[3]

(U) Following the USG-GOJ agreement on Okinawa reversion, it was necessary to develop several significant measures to implement the agreement's labor provisions. The agreement called for all USF employees in Okinawa to be employed on and after R-Day in the same manner as those USF employees in mainland Japan on R-Day according to the SOFA (the GOJ will become the legal employer). To convert from a direct-hire system in Okinawa to an indirect-hire system as in Japan involved USF development of and coordination on over 30 major employment and compensation issues, all of which were to require further negotiation with and agreement by GOJ officials.

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1 Ibid.
2 HICOMRY 111530Z Nov 71.
3 J121 HistSum May-Dec 71 (Labor Affairs-Okinawa).

(U) For the purpose of developing USF bi-country positions, the USFs in Okinawa and Japan formed an ad hoc Advisory Labor Group (ALG) in July 1971. The ALG was composed of the Component Services' Civilian Personnel Directors (six) from Okinawa and Japan, chaired by the Joint Service Labor Committee Chairman (Okinawa) and co-chaired by the Assistant Chief of Staff, J5, USFJ. It was supported by working panels comprised of USF personnel specialists from both countries. The ALG and its work committees met frequently in both countries during the remainder of the year to develop a coordinated USF position on each of the issues.[1]

(U) In November and December 1971, particularly, certain of the USF positions were discussed and negotiated with the GOJ officials through the established mechanism of the labor subcommittee, SOFA Task Group. The U.S. element for this subcommittee was the ALG's chairman and co-chairman and an additional member, the Labor Attache, American Embassy, Tokyo. The USF civilian personnel directors were designated from both countries to serve as official observers/advisors to the subcommittee. At year's end, good progress had been made in negotiations and reaching tentative agreement on some of the issues with the GOJ side of the labor subcommittee.[2]

Philippines

(C) A wildcat strike of concessionaire employees at Clark Air Base began on 1 March. Other base employees were precluded from entering the base as were dependents and, at times, U.S. military personnel. On 3 March, the Filipino civilian employees union of Clark AB joined the strike, illegally. This strike was settled with minor concessions to the union. Both Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Department of Labor proved unwilling and/or unable to provide effective assistance. Ambassador Byroade's personal appeal to President Marcos on 11 March resulted in promise of GOP's assistance on remaining issues and provision for physical security in any follow-on strike.

(C) On 25 July 1971, leaders of the Clark AB union called a walkout of over 5,000 employees. The strike continued through 8 August, at which time base officials concluded an agreement with the local union. Major economic dispute issues of "pay while on strike" and "cancellation of RIFs" were labeled by USG and GOP leaders as non-negotiable and this position remained firm. This strike, as with the March walkout, was illegal under the terms of the U.S.-RP Base Labor Agreement (BLA) and the USF-Federation Collective Bargaining Agreement, in that the union did not follow the agreed provisions for airing and resolving labor

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[1] HICOMRY 160055Z Aug 71.
[2] J12 HistSum Aug-Dec 71 (Okinawa Reversion-Labor Affairs).

disputes. Primary concern during the strikes was for the welfare of some 2,400 Americans living off Clark AB. Strike contingency plans, finalized after the March walkout, were put into operation in July and appeared to meet the main safety and essential mission requirements. With violence contained at relatively low level, it appeared that the base could have withstood a longer strike had it been necessary.

(C) From the time of the second strike threat through post settlement, cooperation among U.S. agencies and with GOP officials was excellent. Ambassador Byroade met early with President Marcos and obtained assurance of PC and Philippine Labor Department assistance. All possible official and unofficial machinery was put into play to resolve the disputed issues and the strike in an appropriate way. The strike actually ended when union leaders at Clark saw the USF, Embassy, Philippine Labor Department, and Clark AB officials take a firm, sustained stand on the agreements officially reached on 3 and 6 August, netting minimal management concessions. Since August radical union leadership has been displaced at Clark AB and other actions are being taken to strengthen union leadership more representative of the employees.

(C) During the strikes, it became apparent that U.S. and GOP officials are not equipped by terms of the BLA to settle strikes expeditiously and to enforce joint committee determinations. Officials of both governments appear to agree that the BLA needs revision to provide the U.S.-RP joint committee (labor) with such authority.

(C) The U.S. Bases-Federation of Filipino Employees' Association's Collective Bargaining Agreement is due to expire on 27 July 1972. USF preparations for renegotiation are underway. While forceful union demands for increased compensation and other benefits can be expected, no critical problems are foreseen at this time aside from lengthy and active negotiations.[1]

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[1] J121 Point Paper, 7 Dec 71, Subj: Labor Relations at U.S. Bases-Philippines.

SECTION V--MORALE AND WELFARE MATTERS

Credit Unions in the RVN

(U) In connection with the proposed charter services to offer reduced fares for leave travel between the RVN and CONUS, the JCS in November 1970 requested CINCPAC's position on the potential of establishing a sub-office of a U.S.-based federal credit union in the RVN to support credit extension for such services and other needs. CINCPAC replied on 10 January 1971 that he did not concur in the establishment of credit union sub-offices in the RVN, for several reasons: Such sub-offices would add logistical burdens to the military effort; a loan service would introduce additional U.S. funds into the economy; and personnel turbulence and installations restructuring in the RVN might preclude recoupment of loans. CINCPAC felt that such loans for CONUS leave would not be necessary, as tax exemptions and increased allowances granted individuals in the RVN provided sufficient funds to finance CONUS leave and R&R during a normal tour.[1]

Overseas Combined Federal Campaigns - Pacific

(U) CINCPAC notified the Defense Department Fund Raising Coordinator on 21 June 1971 that the Defense Department's Combined Federal Fund Raising Campaign for 1971 had been highly successful throughout the PACOM. Effective planning and organization, together with enthusiastic responsiveness by members of the command, resulted in total contributions of $608,488.69. While no dollar goals were established, the effectiveness of the campaign and generosity of the participants were reflected in an increase of 24 cents in the per capita gift and 60 cents in the average gift over 1970, despite a reduction of approximately 34,000 in personnel solicited. Although no campaign was conducted in the RVN, there were unsolicited donations from that area of $11,400.75, which increased the PACOM totals to $619,889.44.[2]

(U) On 28 September 1971 CINCPAC issued final implementing guidance for the 1972 Overseas Combined Federal Campaign - Pacific, to be conducted during the period 15 February - 31 March 1972.[3]

PACOM Equal Opportunity Matters

(U) The administration of equal opportunity policy and procedures is a

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1 JCS 6684/252253Z Nov 70; CINCPAC 102014Z Jan 71.
2 CINCPAC ltr Ser 2485 of 21 Jun 71.
3 CINCPACNOTE 5340 of 28 Sep 71.

personnel management function accomplished by the Service Component commanders; CINCPAC is not assigned equal opportunity implementing tasks under DoD directives or Service regulations. Prior to January 1971, CINCPAC had monitored all equal opportunity matters within the PACOM but had no formal program for such monitorship. It was determined in early January 1971 that formalization of the procedures for monitoring, assessing, and coordinating the various equal opportunity programs within the PACOM would be of benefit to all Services and to the overall program. To this end, the PACOM Equal Opportunity Coordinating Committee was established on 21 January 1971. The purpose of the committee is to coordinate equal opportunity programs within PACOM and to serve as a focal point for the formal exchange of information among the Service Components. The committee meets four times a year with additional meetings as required. The regularly scheduled meetings are held on the second Tuesday of January, April, July, and October. Committee members are at the action officer level.[1]

(U) From 21 March through 12 April 1971, Mr. Frank W. Render II, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity), visited the PACOM. His party included Judge Howard Bennett, Director for Equal Opportunity for Military Personnel, and officer and enlisted representatives of all Services. The party toured the PACOM and conducted on-site assessments of the effectiveness of Defense Department and Service policies and programs in the fields of interracial relations and of equal opportunity and treatment. The CINCPAC member of the PACOM Equal Opportunity Coordinating Committee joined the team in Tokyo and traveled with it throughout the PACOM.[2]

(U) Mr. Robert J. Brown, Special Assistant to the President, visited Hawaii from 27 November through 4 December 1971. Mr. Brown's visit had two purposes: to participate in a panel discussion conducted by the National League of Cities, and to discuss equal opportunity and race relations matters with officers and enlisted personnel of all Services in Hawaii. Mr. Brown spent one day with each of the Services and visited each Component headquarters.[3]

Tour Length for Personnel of Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand

(S) The Secretary of Defense in June 1971 directed the relocation of the Office of the Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI) (DEPCH) from Bangkok to Udorn, Thailand. In connection with the relocation, DEPCH proposed that all his key personnel operating from Udorn be assigned two-year tours; this was, in effect, a request for exception to the

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[1] CINCPAC 212107Z Jan 71; interview LTC Bartlett, J113, by ComdHist 29 Feb 72.
[2] J113 HistSum Apr 71.
[3] J113 HistSum Nov 71.

DoD-prescribed policy on tour lengths. CINCPAC concurred in recommending to the JCS approval of two years for key DEPCH personnel. The JCS pointed out, however, that there were certain drawbacks concerning living conditions, dependent schooling, etc., at Udorn (dependents would be authorized under a two-year tour policy), and suggested that these be considered.[1]

(S) On 8 September 1971 DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI requested CINCPAC approval to lease government quarters for DEPCH. CINCPAC concurred in the need to lease quarters for DEPCH, but requested that implementation of the lease be held in abeyance until Defense approval could be solicited for an exception to the DoD policy (DoD Directive 1315.7) on tour length, as an approved 24-month accompanied tour was considered a prerequisite to leasing quarters. On 28 September DEPCH urged early action on leasing authority, as only two sets of quarters considered appropriate for a MAAG Chief were available in Udorn, and both were under consideration by other U.S. agencies. In order that the desired quarters would not be lost, CINCPAC on 5 October granted DEPCH authority to proceed with negotiations for leasing the quarters up to the point of signature, pending a request for Defense approval of the 24-month accompanied tour.[2]

(S) After soliciting and considering the views of CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, COMUSMACTHAI, and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, CINCPAC reaffirmed concurrence in the two-year tour at Udorn, and recommended to the JCS that an exception to DoD policy be sought for 28 key DEPCH spaces to be designated as two-year tours and accompanied by dependents. The JCS asked for certain additional items of information as to medical facilities, dependents' schools, housing, security, and the like, and replies to these queries were furnished by CINCPAC, COMUSMACTHAI, and DEPCH during November 1971. By the end of the year, however, no firm decision as to a two-year tour for key personnel at Udorn had been announced by the JCS or the Secretary of Defense.[3]

Acceptance of Foreign Decorations

(U) In August 1971, COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC a change in the wording of DoD Directive 1005.3--Decorations, Awards, and Gifts from Foreign Governments--which specifically prohibited receipt of foreign awards by members of the Armed Forces and civilian employees performing any duty whatsoever in connection

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[1] SECDEF 3860/081700Z Jun 71; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 291037Z Jun 71; CINCPAC 030857Z Jul 71; JCS 5360/201720Z Jul 71.

[2] DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 081006Z and 281006Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 150415Z Sep and 050243Z Oct 71.

[3] CINCPAC 090421Z Oct and 152231Z Nov 71; JCS 9456/052338Z Nov 71; COMUSMACTHAI 110830Z Nov 71; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 131120Z Nov 71.

with the Military Assistance Program (MAP). COMUSMACV pointed out that in November 1966, military assistance to the GVN had been transferred from the MAP to the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) Program, after which date only certain MASF managers were involved in performing duties which influenced or authorized the issuance of MAP material or funds to the GVN. Specifically, the change proposed by COMUSMACV would allow MACV personnel to receive and accept awards offered by the RVNAF if the individual was not in a position to influence the authorization of goods, services, or funds to the GVN.[1]

(U) CINCPAC referred the COMUSMACV proposal to the JCS, who indicated that the change of wording would be in consonance with the provisions of DoD Directive 1005.3 and that JCS approval was not required. CINCPAC thereupon advised COMUSMACV that his recommendation was approved.[2]

(U) On 20 October 1971 a similar request for exception to the provisions of DoD Directive 1005.3 was made by Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodian (CHMEDTC). CINCPAC on 27 October approved the CHMEDTC request, advising that all correspondence in connection with such awards would include a statement that the recipient of the award did not perform duties in which he could influence or authorize issuance of MAP material or money to the GKR.[3]

Incidents of "Anti-Americanism" in the RVN

(C) On 24 September 1971 CINCPAC provided the JCS a routine resume of vehicle accidents, confrontations, demonstrations, and other incidents involving U.S. and RVN personnel. The JCS evidenced interest in the subject, and advised CINCPAC on 15 October that higher authority had requested a current review and report on the trend of "anti-Americanism" in the RVN, to include social and political aspects, the rash of fire-bombing incidents, and the recent high incidence of vehicle accidents and related confrontations, together with a brief analysis of the possible causes, actions being taken, and results of such actions. Because of the immediate need for the report, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to provide the required information directly to the JCS.[4]

(C) When COMUSMACV forwarded his assessment of the problem and his actions to reduce the magnitude of the subject, CINCPAC advised the JCS that he fully endorsed COMUSMACV's assessment and actions. It was pointed out that the matter had been the subject of recent discussions between Admiral McCain and General

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1 COMUSMACV 120730Z and 220336Z Aug 71.
2 CINCPAC 090402Z and 212146Z Oct 71; JCS 1785/181504Z Oct 71.
3 CHMEDTC 201036Z Oct 71; CINCPAC 270140Z Oct 71.
4 CINCPAC 240047Z Sep 71 (EX); JCS 9191/152210Z Oct 71.

Abrams. CINCPAC reminded the JCS that frequent news criticism of the U.S. role in the RVN probably had the effect of intensifying the problem of accidents, incidents, and confrontations between U.S. and RVN elements. On the one hand, CINCPAC pointed out, a hostility toward Americans might be generated or brought into forcus by media carping against U.S. efforts, while on the other hand a negative press could undermine the sense of purpose in U.S. personnel and breed an impatience both with the Vietnamese and with service in the RVN; in such a climate, consideration, tolerance, mutual respect, and understanding were weakened. CINCPAC assured the JCS that the actions taken by COMUSMACV were being analyzed for possible application in other areas of the PACOM where U.S.-indigenous personnel incidents might have the potential for causing significant embarrassment.[1]

Mail Service in the PACOM

(S) In October 1971, CINCPACAF queried CINCPAC as to whether provisions for parcel post shipments of maintenance material were included in the mail service which was to be provided by the administrative branch of the proposed U.S. Navy office in Singapore. CINCPAC requested comments from the American Embassy in Singapore, and was advised that expansion of the existing military post office by a greatly augmented parcel post service would require a formal military postal agreement, which the Government of Singapore would probably decline as apparently indicating preferential treatment for U.S. needs over those of other countries. Agreeing that there was no inexpensive alternative to parcel post, the Embassy suggested that scheduled or unscheduled dedicated military airlift from MAC airfreight terminals in the Far East might be the best solution. Based on this advice, CINCPAC recommended that CINCPACAF consider utilization of MAC channel, MAC Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM), or PACOM Transportation Management Agency (PATMA) support to accommodate the movement of repair parts for U.S. aircraft maintenance in Singapore.[2]

(U) COMUSMACV reported irregularities in the delivery of personal mail to and from individuals stationed in RVN and requested CINCPAC assistance in examining mail handling procedures within CONUS. CINCPAC recommended to JCS that mail delivery irregularities be reported to postal officials for corrective action and suggested increased surveillance of carrier performance. Reports from COMUSMACV reflected that Flying Tiger Airlines was the responsible agent for the overflights, which were depositing igloos of mail at points other than their scheduled destination.[3]

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[1] CINCPAC 171839Z Oct 71.

[2] CINCPACAF 210015Z Oct 71; AMEMB Singapore 120537Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 280006Z Nov 71.

[3] COMUSMACV 070044Z Dec 71 (BOM); CINCPAC 080114Z Dec 71; J113 HistSum Dec 71.

Temporary Changes in Administrative Workweeks - CINCPAC Staff

(U) Three-day holidays were enjoyed by the CINCPAC staff, on the same basis as for those government agencies observing normal five-day workweek, on the following occasions during 1971:

Washington's Birthday - third Monday in February (14 February)
Memorial Day - Monday, 31 May
Independence Day - Monday, 5 July
Labor Day - first Monday in September (6 September)
Veterans' Day - fourth Monday in October (25 October)
Christmas - Friday, 24 December
New Year's Day - Friday, 31 December.

(U) On the holidays listed, the CINCPAC authorized a temporary change in the administrative workweeks by adjusting the weekly schedule to provide for Wednesday workday of 0800-1700 instead of 0800-1200, to compensate for the normal Saturday 0800-1200. In order to insure the three-day weekends, holiday routine was observed on Saturdays.[1]

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[1] J0435 HistSums Jan-Dec 71.

CHAPTER X

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT) COLLECTION OPERATIONS

The DoD HUMINT Collection Management System

(S) Effective with the publication by DIA by the Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Management Manual (DIAM 58-11) on 20 August 1968, CINCPAC began implementing a new major program in the PACOM. Under the provisions of DIAM 58-11, CINCPAC assumed operational command and control of all assigned PACOM HUMINT[1] elements, through the Component Commanders and COMUSMACV. In addition, CINCPAC assumed approval and coordinating authority for Departmental HUMINT activities in the PACOM. CINCPAC's concept of implementation was to adopt a phased approach, to take advantage of working with the experienced staffs and units of USARPAC and PACAF before applying it to other commands. (PACFLT has no HUMINT collection capability.) Thus the 500th Military Intelligence Group (MIGp) (USARPAC) and the 6499th Special Activities Group (SAG) (PACAF) were brought into the new program on 1 January 1969; HUMINT collection agencies within MACV and Eighth Army were incorporated on 1 July and 1 October 1969 respectively. Other elements were incorporated and the program was expanded during 1970 as CINCPAC policies and instructions were developed and procedures were proven.[2]

CINCPAC Coordination of the HUMINT Collection Program

(S) The problem of establishing project files for proper management of overt intelligence operations in PACOM was addressed by the CINCPAC HUMINT Board on 7 January 1971. With the publishing of CINCPAC Instruction 003821.23 (Coordination of Department of Defense Overt Intelligence Activities in PACOM), overt projects had been brought into the HUMINT Project Management System as required by DIAM 58-11. It was agreed that some documentation was required for the initial files at CINCPAC. This could be in the form of a short summary of

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[1] The acronym HUMINT identifies the intelligence collection function which uses human beings as both sources and collectors.

[2] J233 Point Paper, 29 Dec 69, Subj: Human Intelligence Collection Operations; J233 Point Paper, 17 Mar 70, Subj: The DoD HUMINT Collection Management System.

on-going projects and a copy of the Overt Operational Proposal (OVOP) for new projects.[1]

(S) On 19 January 1971, CINCPAC dispatched implementing letters to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and COMUSMACV to inform addressees that CINCPAC Instruction 003821.33, HUMINT Program Support Projects, which was effective upon publication, was to be fully implemented by Component Command submission of the required Semiannual Support Project Reports no later than July 1971. This instruction, which was published in December 1970, amplifies and implements those provisions of DIAM 58-11 which provide command, general intelligence, and operational support for human resources intelligence collection operations in PACOM. The letter to COMUSMACV also restated the COMUSMACV responsibilities to provide reports only on those operational support projects which support out-of-country collection operations, per agreement between CINCPAC and COMUSMACV.[2]

(S) On 27 January 1971, CINCPAC Instruction S3821.11, PACOM HUMINT Collection Policies, Procedures and Responsibilities (U) was published and distributed. The purpose of this instruction is to state CINCPAC policies, procedures and responsibilities for the management, direction and coordination of the HUMINT collection system.[3]

(U) CINCPAC informed Component Commands and DIA on 31 March 1971 that CINCPAC Instruction S3821.34, PACOM HUMINT Project System Evaluation and Analysis, was being printed and that the major change would be the change from Quarterly Operations Evaluation and Analysis Reports to Semiannual reporting. CINCPAC wished to inform Component Commands to allow them not to prepare and forward a quarterly report, but instead to prepare for the initial semiannual report, which covers the period 1 January to 30 June 1971. Component Commands were informed that this initial report would be due at CINCPAC not later than 31 July 1971.[4]

(U) On 7 April 1971, CINCPAC notified DIA that CINCPAC Instruction S3821.33, HUMINT Program Support Projects in PACOM, had been implemented to amplify the support project provisions of DIA Manual 58-11, 20 August 1968. DIA

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[1] J2333 HistSum Jan 71. The CINCPAC HUMINT Board consisted of representatives of CINCPAC, the Component Commands, and the two major PACOM collection units, the 500th MI Gp (Army) and the 1021st Field Activities Squadron (FAS) (USAF). (The 1021st FAS was the redesignation, on a reduced scale, of the 6499th SAG; see CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 254.) In July 1971, the Board membership was expanded to include representatives from Departmental HUMINT Units operating in PACOM (US Army Field Activities Command and Commander Task Force 157).

[2] CINCPAC ltr Ser 094 of 19 Jan 71; CINCPAC ltr Ser 00154 of 21 Jan 71.

[3] J2333 HistSum Jan 71.

[4] CINCPAC 312337Z Mar 71.

was informed that the first Semiannual HUMINT Support Project Reports, which were promulgated by this CINCPAC Instruction, are to be prepared and forwarded by PACOM collection units through appropriate Component Commands. Initial reports will cover the period 1 January to 30 June 1971 and will be due at CINCPAC not later than 31 July. They will be forwarded to DIA with CINCPAC comments within 15 days of receipt.[1]

(C) CINCPAC disseminated to major PACOM Component Commands, on 25 May 1971, information pertaining to the results of a DIA study of problems in the timely distribution of completed, national level DD Forms 1480 (Intelligence Evaluation Reports). The DIA study had been conducted following a similar study at CINCPAC, which pointed out inordinate delays in receipt of DIA evaluations of PACOM Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs). The DIA study resulted in the decision at the national level to insure their completing and forwarding of evaluations within 36 days of their receipt. DIA also took steps to assure the timely delivery of legible copies of all completed evaluations.[2]

(C) On 24 July 1971, CINCPAC disseminated to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and COMUSMACV a DIA announcement of the beginning of a comprehensive analysis of the expected role of HUMINT in the coming decade and a consequent requirement for the submission of data to assist in the analysis. The analysis, conducted at the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence, required CINCPAC and Component Commands to forward subjective assessments of the contribution of HUMINT during 1970 in fulfillment of theater requirements, with emphasis on tactical needs. CINCPAC furnished the required, detailed analysis to DIA on 14 August 1971.[3]

(S) On 9 October 1971, CINCPAC replied to a JCS request for a review of all Intelligence Collection Programs in the PACOM, with an analysis of the value of HUMINT in comparison with other intelligence collection systems. This review was for the purpose of identifying duplication of reporting because of the continuing DoD Austerity Program. Although HUMINT is not conducive to comparison with other intelligence programs (especially the reconnaissance programs mentioned specifically in the JCS request), CINCPAC decided to identify and report all collection programs in order to accomplish a complete study. Specifically, CINCPAC's reply to JCS emphasized that HUMINT endeavors to secure that information which is not available by any other means, and therefore is not duplicative of other methods. The reply also described the HUMINT Project Management System implemented by CINCPAC on 1 January 1969, which seeks to eliminate or reduce

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[1] J2333 HistSum Apr 71.
[2] CINCPAC ltr Ser 009029 of 3 Mar 71; CINCPAC ltr Ser 009083 of 25 May 71.
[3] CINCPAC 240039Z Jul and 240040Z Jul 71; J2333 HistSum Aug 71.

redundancy through continuing scrutiny of all phases of the intelligence cycle applicable to HUMINT. The reply also cited several recent analyses of HUMINT covering the period 1969 through 1971 to provide additional backup information for JCS.[1]

(S) On 23 November 1971 a special meeting of the PACOM HUMINT Board was convened at CINCPAC to discuss the anticipated effects upon HUMINT operations in the command as a result of two CINCPAC messages concerning intelligence by-product reporting. The two messages concerned CINCPAC determination that an increasing number of IIRs were not reflective of requirements in Controlled Collection Objectives/Human Resources Collection Directives (CCOs/HRCDs) and Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR). CINCPAC noted in the messages to Component and subunified commands and to DIA the need for strict adherence to completion of item 11 of the IIR Form (DD Form 1396) so that reliance could be established in the automated data base between requirement determination and requirement satisfaction. Additionally, CINCPAC's current program to automate completely the HUMINT Project Management System would depend upon proper requirement references. One result of a failure to apply intelligence collection to properly validated requirements has been a greater number of "by-product" reports--reports which are determined to be of value by the collector but which are not responsive to highest priority objectives. The CINCPAC representative explained the purpose of the two messages to the satisfaction of all members and sought their fullest cooperation in securing SICR references (or other valid reference) in all IIRs.[2]

(S) The withdrawal by USAF from direct CINCPAC control of the 1021st FAS, and its placement under the operational command and control of the 1127th FAG in the CONUS, required CINCPAC to take steps to regularize the relationship between CINCPAC and the 1021st FAS with regard to its operational activities within the PACOM. On 9 December 1971 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was negotiated among CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, and HQ USAF, for the purpose of delineating policies and procedures which would govern activities of the 1127th FAG elements (specifically detachments of the 1021st FAS) in the PACOM, and to ensure that CINCPAC and CINCPACAF intelligence needs, as derived from assigned missions, was met in a timely and responsive manner. The MOU was signed by the ACofS, J2, CINCPAC; the DCS/I, CINCPACAF; and the ACS/I, HQ USAF.[3]

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[1] J2333 HistSum Oct 71.

[2] J2333 HistSum Nov 71.

[3] MOU for Operational Activities of 1127th USAF FAG Elements in the PACOM Area, 9 Dec 1971.

DIA Service Attache Conferences in Hawaii

(S) A conference of DIA Army Attaches to all PACOM countries was held at HQ USARPAC from 8-10 February. Attending were representatives from DIA; OACS/I, DA; and CINCPAC. The purpose of this first annual conference included enhancement of the Service image, promotion of better understanding among national and command level offices and Attaches, and creation of more productive and responsive relationships. The CINCPAC representative, J233, presented a briefing on current intelligence collection activities in the PACOM, relating the briefing specifically to the mutual HUMINT interests of J2 CINCPAC and the PACOM Army Attaches. Other points covered during the conference were substantially as indicated in the following paragraph.[1]

(S) During the period 15-19 November 1971, CINCPAC hosted the DIA Naval Attache Conference. J23 CINCPAC was the proponent branch, although many CINCPAC personnel attended and participated in the conference. Welcoming remarks and a short overview briefing were given by Admiral McCain. J2 conducted a portion of the conference, consisting primarily of a symposium on PACOM intelligence operations. During the SIGINT and HUMINT portions of the briefing, CINCPAC policy in regard to the release of intelligence information to Allied countries in the CINCPAC area was covered, stressing that because of U.S. drawdown of forces (to include intelligence resources), CINCPAC believes that expanded intelligence exchange and cooperation with our friends in the Pacific is one of the best ways to offset our losses. It was explained that CINCPAC concurred in the current release arrangement, with the Services acting as the channel for the actual exchange; however, with the subordinate unified commanders and CINCPACREPs being kept informed on all exchange which takes place, to include that engaged in by the Defense Attaches. In countries with no subordinate commander or CINCPACREP, the Defense Attaches would be the coordinating point. The Naval Attaches were also informed of the current on-going action between CINCPAC and DIA, intended to allow CINCPAC to forward requirements of a short-term nature directly to the Defense Attaches for satisfaction, with requirements of a longer-term nature being forwarded to DIA for levy on Defense Attaches. The Naval Attaches, in the questioning period which followed the SIGINT and HUMINT portion of the J23 briefing, took no exception to the above briefing. The J2 CINCPAC's role in HUMINT management (to include the PACOM HUMINT Collection Management System), drug suppression, and an orientation on the PACOM HUMINT community (to include missions and relationships) were also covered. It was emphasized throughout the conference that the attaches will be required to fulfill additional collection requirements as U.S. personnel and other intelligence collection assets are drawndown. In many areas, the attache will be the only source of information.

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[1] J233 HistSum Feb 71.

This amplifies the great need for more and better communication and cooperation between CINCPAC and the attaches.[1]

Intelligence of U.S. Prisoners in Laos

(S) On 14 March 1971, CINCPAC informed the JCS that CINCPAC had the resource potential to provide a capability to collect information on military targets in Laos, to include information concerning United States prisoners of war. This information was reported because of indicated Secretary of State expressions of high national concern about the fate of U.S. personnel missing in Laos. CINCPAC recommended that JCS extend the CINCPAC offer of all possible assistance to national level agencies for consideration. Previous CINCPAC offers (during periods of less urgency) to use these resources to assist in the collection mission in Laos had met with objections from CAS/Vientiane and from the American Embassy in Laos. JCS replied to the CINCPAC offer on 26 March, indicating that initial contacts had been made to extend the CINCPAC offer. In addition, CINCPAC was requested to provide specific capabilities, locations, and time frames of resources and language capabilities of interpreters, prior to final coordination between JCS and the appropriate national agencies.[2]

(S) CINCPAC requested from the Component Commands the specific data required, and on 17 April provided to the JCS a description of assets available within PACOM to augment existing capabilities for intelligence collection on military targets in Laos, to include information on U.S. PWs. The information provided included numbers and language qualifications of proposed interrogation/production teams and estimated time required for deployment following authorization. Listings of all collection projects/operations were provided, but CINCPAC pointed out that controlled collection operations offered limited success because of the time required for direction or redirection of effort in these sensitive operations. CINCPAC recommended to JCS that CINCPAC retain control and coordination over any elements deployed under this concept.[3]

(S) DIA on 22 October 1971 requested an update of the PACOM capabilities for intelligence support for PW recovery, and an identification by CINCPAC of the national level support required to increase intelligence collection capabilities in the PACOM. After querying the Components and the subunified commands, CINCPAC

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[1] J23/Memo/00717-71 of 6 Dec 71, Subj: Interim Report on Navy Attache Conference.

[2] CINCPAC 140410Z Mar 71; JCS 7320/262314Z Mar 71.

[3] CINCPAC 272155Z Mar and 172240Z Apr 71.

provided the desired information on 24 November. As of the end of 1971 no further action had been taken on this subject.[1]

J2 Utilization of DoD/PRO Field Reports

(C) In June 1971 the Director, Department of Defense Pacific Research Office (DoD/PRO) requested informally an analysis of J2's use of the DoD/PRO Field Information Reports. The analysis was conducted by the use of checklists attached to DoD/PRO reports arriving in J2 and completed by analysts of J22 and J24. An initial analysis indicated that the reporting was of continuing value to J2 analysts, primarily in providing timely information for the Command Briefing and for maintaining the currency of the CINCPAC Data Base. Approximately 89 percent of the information received was considered "usable," with 58 percent rated as of "great" or "moderate" value.[2]

(C) During August 1971, CINCPAC replied to a similar DoD/PRO request, this time asking for an analysis of the use of DoD/PRO Field Information Reports throughout the PACOM. CINCPAC J2 requested the Component Commands, as well as J3 and J5 of the CINCPAC staff, to undertake a one-month utilization study during the period 15 August - 15 September 1971. As an interim report, CINCPAC provided to DoD/PRO on 16 August 108 completed utilization worksheets prepared by J2 analysts. The study was terminated and all results--over 10,000 evaluations-- furnished to DoD/PRO on 16 December 1971.[3]

Collection Operations in Korea

(S) On 6 October 1971, CINCPAC forwarded to DIA the expressed concern of COMUSKOREA over continuing of HUMINT operations in Korea. CINCPAC reviewed COMUSKOREA's questioning of the advisability of continuing bilateral and unilateral HUMINT activity in Korea by intelligence units under his command. COMUSKOREA had expressed concern because of the U.S. Forces Korea mission of maintaining the armistice, President Nixon's impending visit to Communist China, and U.S. interest in continuing to decrease world tensions. In forwarding COMUSKOREA's concern, CINCPAC expressed an opinion regarding continuing HUMINT against North Korea under the following stringent guidelines (and this CINCPAC position was forwarded to COMUSKOREA):

a. While protecting current U.S. interests and exerting absolute

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[1] DIA 6732/222252Z Oct 71; CINCPAC 242203Z Nov 71; interview LTC Stevens, J2332 by Comd Hist, 4 Mar 72.

[2] J23/Memo/0301-7 of 13 Jul 71; J23 HistSum Jul 71.

[3] CINCPAC ltr Ser 001737 of 6 Aug 71; J2333 HistSums Aug and Dec 71.

control to protect those interests, planning should be continued to consider unilateral operations employing third-country bases and third-country nationals.

b. Selected bilateral operations with the ROK should be carefully planned and conducted from third-country bases. This approach would afford wider options in the means for inserting carefully trained personnel and would allow plausible U.S. denial.

c. There should be planning for bilateral operations mounted from the ROK, using imaginative methods of inserting agents and benefitting from lessons learned from historically unsuccessful "piston" operations.[1]

(S) DIA replied to the CINCPAC message on 15 October, with an expression of general agreement with the CINCPAC position that there was a need for continuation of carefully considered and professionally executed HUMINT operations against North Korea. All operations, of course, must consider current worldwide political repercussions. DIA emphasized that there were no current restrictions against HUMINT operations targeted against North Korea.[2]

(S) On 17 November 1971, CINCPAC replied to COMUSKOREA emphasizing that CINCPAC shared the concern of COMUSKOREA in protecting the U.S. Forces Korea mission of maintaining the armistice and the correct political profile in view of President Nixon's impending visit to Communist China. However, CINCPAC emphasized that the CCOs/HRCDs against North Korea were still valid and that DIA had just informed CINCPAC that there remained no restrictions on HUMINT operations against North Korea. CINCPAC emphasized also that intelligence on North Korea was extremely limited and that all means of collection had been restricted for some time because of the changing political situation and budgetary restraints. CINCPAC concluded by stating that if, upon examination, COMUSKOREA determined that the political or military risk of particular intelligence operations outweighed any possible results, he had the prerogative of disapproving them. Additionally, it was emphasized that if COMUSKOREA determined no need for HUMINT operations, he might recommend cancellation of the collection requirements.[3]

Intelligence Aspects of Cambodia Planning Conference

(S) During the period 14-18 May 1971 CINCPAC convened a Cambodia Planning Conference in Saigon. The purpose of the conference was to review on-going actions, refine plans, identify problem areas, and develop recommendations

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[1] CINCPAC 060250Z Oct 71; J2333 HistSum Oct 71.
[2] DIA 152021Z Oct 71.
[3] CINCPAC 171831Z Nov 71; J2333 HistSum Nov 71.

pertaining to the overall military capability and requirements of the Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK). CINCPAC J2 was represented on the conference Intelligence Subcommittee, whose primary concern was the review of FANK G2 activities. Subcommittee responsibilities included the identification of problem areas; discussion of FANK G2 capabilities, shortcomings, and on-going actions; and recommendations to improve the intelligence capability of FANK G2. The Intelligence Subcommittee completed an assessment of the FANK G2 structure and identified FANK G2 problem areas. In summary, the intelligence portion of the Committee's report stated that the FANK G2 lacked qualified personnel and materiel resources and must depend greatly on external assistance for the foreseeable future. A sizeable training effort would be required to provide sufficient skilled intelligence personnel. In addition, necessary materiel and appropriate facilities would be required to support the FANK G2 intelligence efforts.[1]

Estimates of Infiltration into the RVN

(S) The CINCPAC Intelligence Coordination Group all-source estimates of North Vietnamese infiltration into the RVN, from 1 January 1968 through the end of 1971, were as follows:[2]

	1968	1969	1970	1971
Jan	24,100	5,900	5,800	13,600
Feb	15,400	9,500	5,400	16,000
Mar	31,700	13,500	3,900	6,200
Apr	22,900	15,300	12,000	6,600
May	28,700	17,300	9,500	4,800
Jun	29,800	21,100	6,800	4,300
Jul	25,100	5,400	5,200	7,400
Aug	27,500	5,400	1,400	5,900
Sep	13,900	2,800	700	0
Oct	6,600	300	3,400	0
Nov	8,600	800	2,000	2,200
Dec	7,400	2,800	900	3,800
Total:	241,700	100,100	57,000	70,800

Grand Total: 469,600.

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[1] J2333 HistSum May 71.
[2] J24 HistSum Dec 71.

SECTION II--PACOM INTELLIGENCE DATA HANDLING SYSTEM (IDHS)

(C) The DoD IDHS consists of the facilities, computer equipment, special data communications, doctrine, procedures, and personnel required to support the intelligence data processing requirements of both theater and national levels of command. It was established in response to DoD Directive 5105.21, of 1 August 1961, which tasked DIA with the responsibility to:

a. Assemble, validate, and establish priorities for all DoD automated intelligence systems and supporting equipment requirements, and prepare DoD-wide automatic data processing plans for intelligence data processing.

b. Assign tasks to various DoD components in support of such plans.

c. Develop policy and program guidance for all DoD ADP intelligence plans.

d. Specify standards for intelligence data systems.

e. Provide for the integration of all DoD ADP intelligence systems.

Under overall DoD guidance and DIA direction, the unified and specified commands are responsible for:

a. Providing guidance to their Component and subordinate unified commands on the development, management, and operation of IDHS in support of theater and national level intelligence objectives.

b. Evaluating the functional requirements, automation proposals, and requests formulated by their Component and subordinate unified commands for improving IDHS capabilities. Such evaluation will include recommendations on the command-wide aspects of equipment selection actions, and identifying compatibility and survivability considerations relevant to equipment selection.[1]

PACOM Intelligence Data Handling Systems Communications (IDHSC) Network

(C) The DoD IDHSC Network generalized plan was promulgated by DIA in August 1968. The plan was designed to provide the intelligence community with Special

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[1] J214 Point Paper, 15 Dec 68, Subj: The Current Status and Future Development of the PACOM Intelligence Data Handling Systems (IDHS).

Intelligence (SI)-level, high-speed communications media for on-line file query/response and bulk data exchange using internetted IDHS computers. It was envisioned that the IDHSC Network would stem the proliferation of computerized intelligence data bases, promote a more effective division of labor, and provide worldwide, timely access to intelligence data bases.[1]

(C) The CINCPAC concept for the PACOM IDHSC provided for a data link from the DIA switch to terminate in an automated switch located at the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC). CINCPAC and on-island Component command subscriber terminals would be internetted with the PACOM switch, providing local analysts with access to intelligence data of other network subscribers. Pending DIA approval of the CINCPAC concept, interim provisions were made at FICPAC during 1970 for both the Navy Ocean Surveillance Intelligence System (OSIS) and the CINCPAC Special Intelligence Communications (SPINTCOMM) facility. Although DIA had validated the PACOM IDHSC concepts, no implementation plans had been promulgated by the end of 1970.[2]

(C) In anticipation of the issuance of a DIA/PACOM IDHSC Implementation Plan by early 1971, the PACOM IDHSC Working Group forwarded to DIA on 9 February 1971 a three-phase PACOM IDHSC plan, as follows:

--Phase I: Commencing with switch computer installation on or about 1 March and ending 30 September 1971. During this phase the DIA-COINS software will be installed and the COMNAVINTCOM appropriated high-speed data link from Washington, D. C. to Oahu activated. Concurrent activation of a local loop terminal (Model 37 teletype or similar) at FICPAC for testing and training is planned.

--Phase II: Commencing on 1 October 1971 and extending to 30 September 1972, or until such time as all subscriber low-speed terminals have been implemented. All terminals will be ASR/KSR Model 37 teletype devices as recommended by DIA. Training, development of bulk data exchange capabilities, and local on-line queries against Washington area data bases will be emphasized during this phase.

--Phase III: Phase III is projected for implementation on or about 1 October 1972. This phase will emphasize the development of operational query capabilities against on-line PACOM Data Bases.

As indicated, Phase II would address Component participation as subscriber terminals using the ASR/KSR Model 37 teletype (TTY) units. During Phases I and II,

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[1] J2142 Point Paper, 16 Mar 70, Subj: IDHSC Network.
[2] Ibid.; CINCPAC 092217Z Feb 71.

the PACOM IDHSC Network could require up to six TTY Model 37 units and six additional KG 13/Model 37 TTY compatible crypts control/Modem units (five Rixon units were on hand). It was noted that equipment acquisition was contingent upon DIA guidance, as well as the requirements of CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and the PACOM Elint Center.[1]

(U) DIA advised CINCPAC on 23 February 1971 that the phased development schedule was approved, and noted that the DIA IDHSC Implementation Plan was scheduled for forwarding to CINCPAC on or about 25 February.[2]

(U) On 10 March 1971 an IBM Model 360/30 computer was installed at the FICPAC to be used as the PACOM IDHSC switch. The initial operating capability of the PACOM IDHSC switch was dependent upon the activation of the high-speed communications link between Washington and Hawaii.[3]

(C) During the week of 12 June, Phase I of IDHSC implementation continued with the installation of the IDHSC switch software by DIA. Throughout the week extensive testing of the software package and IDHSC switch communications equipment was accomplished. On 18 June a telecommunications service order (TSO) for the Washington-Honolulu IDHSC data circuit was issued by DCA, requesting line activation by 15 July 1971. Subsequent to line activation, testing would begin on switch to switch communications between Washington and Honolulu.[4]

(C) Phase I PACOM IDHSC implementation actions were marked during the first week of August 1971 by the activation of a high speed (300 char/sec), full duplex data link between FICPAC (Ford Island, Oahu) and DIA (Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, VA). Testing of the line and PACOM switch computer program continued during the month. Line problems of excessive band width and noise to signal ratio were encountered, precluding formal DIA acceptance of the data link. By the end of the month error rates as low as one error in 160,000 bits were evolving. It was anticipated that DIA would accept the link and terminate it into DIA's IBM 2703 Telecommunications Control Unit during the month of September, thus establishing switch-to-switch communications.[5]

(U) On 3 August 1971, DIA promulgated the DIA-PACOM IDHSC Network Implementation Plan. Three weeks later, on 24 August, the PACOM IDHSC Implementation Plan for FY 72-74 was promulgated.[6]

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1 CINCPAC 092217Z Feb 71.
2 DIA DP-3 231715Z Feb 71.
3 J21 HistSum Mar 71.
4 J21 HistSum Jun 71.
5 J21 HistSum Aug 71.
6 Ibid.; CINCPAC ltr 2142A Ser 001893 of 24 Aug 71.

(C) The IDHSC data link to Washington, D. C. (DIA) performed 99.6 percent error free, on a data test loop from FICPAC to DIA and return, during the first week of October. DIA indicated that this data link from PACOM to DIA had been accepted in July, although the total circuit, which includes the government furnished equipment (GFE) associated with the circuit, had not been accepted. During the third week of October, FICPAC reported that the Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity Pacific (NAVSEEAPAC) had completed installation of necessary modems, crypto units, and crypto control units (CCUs) to support data circuit activation between CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and FICPAC terminals. Model 37 Data Terminals had been delivered to CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and PEC; PEC modems and crypto units had not been installed. Further, FICPAC reported that a copy of the FICPAC developed bulk data transmission software had been forwarded to DIA.[1]

(U) The CINCPAC IDHSC Model 37 Data Terminal was delivered and installed in Room 315A of Building 4, Camp H. M. Smith on 26 October 1971. Circuit activation between the CINCPAC terminal and the FICPAC switch was delayed pending resolution of engineering problems.[2]

(C) Activation of the IDHSC Bulk Data Transfer capability between PACOM and DIA was held up pending a DIA review of the bulk transfer program developed by FICPAC analysts. By mid-December, FICPAC had been authorized by the Naval Security Group to send and receive SI data; however, software problems at the DIA IDHSC switch prevented initiation until early 1972 of on-line query/response against the test files located at DIA, even though DIA had indicated earlier that on-line testing could commence 24 November.[3]

(C) Termination of the PACOM Elint Center (PEC) IDHSC circuit at FICPAC was completed and testing underway by 11 December. Electronic TEMPEST tests were conducted at the CINCPAC IDHSC terminal site on 20-23 December. The results of these tests were used in requesting authority for SI data transfer over the IDHSC circuit between CINCPAC and FICPAC. (SI accreditation was necessary prior to initiation of on-line query statements against test files at DIA.) DIA authority for SI data transfer was received in early January 1972.[4]

PACOM IDHS Command File Management System (PICFMS)

(C) CINCPAC had approved the PACOM IDHS Command File Management System in

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[1] FICPAC 090248Z Oct and 230300Z Oct 71; DIA 122019Z Oct 71.
[2] J21 HistSum Oct 71.
[3] DIA 222148Z Nov 71; interview LCDR Butz, J2142A ComdHist 2 Mar 72.
[4] FICPAC 110140Z Dec 71; interview LCDR Butz, J2142A by ComdHist 2 Mar 72.

July 1970, and formed the PICFMS working group, to reduce IDHS ADP cost and improve procedures for multiple processing files within the PACOM. The ultimate goal of PICFMS was to provide CINCPAC and the Component commands with a Command File System responsive to all intelligence requirements processed within the PACOM.[1]

(C) During the 4 February 1971 PACOM IDHS Coordinating Committee meeting, the PACOM Service Components and the PEC gave formal concurrence in the implementation to eliminate areas of duplication associated with the Master Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) File. Concurrently, PEC was designated as the file executive agent responsible for the maintenance, production, and exchange of EOB data in the PACOM.[2]

(U) The objectives of PICFMS are to promote an effective division of PACOM intelligence data processing file responsibilities and achieve economies by eliminating duplication of effort. During 1971, PICFMS-implemented policies have effected savings of over $50,000, improved data exchange within PACOM and with external commands, reduced overdistribution of products, and established common goals for PACOM IDHS activities. With the concurrence of the PACOM Components, the receipt of and maintenance of the Detailed Photo Index File (DPIF) has been eliminated. Six command files have been assigned to executive agents. The executive agent is responsible for maintaining the file and producing all products that are required and approved by CINCPAC. The following are the command files that have been assigned to executive agents:[3]

File	Executive Agent
Contingency Planning Facilities List File (CPFL)	FICPAC
Conventional Air Mission Results Analysis (CAMRA)	CINCPAC
Electronic Order of Battle File (EOB)	PACOM Elint Center
Installation File (IN)	CINCPACAF
PACOM Automated Targets File (PATF)	CINCPAC
PACOM Imagery Reconnaissance Objectives Program (PIROP)	CINCPAC.

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 259-260.
2 J21 HistSum Feb 71.
3 J21 HistSum Dec 71.

Photographic Reconnaissance (p. vi)



1 USMACV Command History 1970, Vol. I, Chap VI, pp. 34-35.
2 CINCPAC 210030Z Dec 70 (BOM); SAC 231825Z Dec 70 (BOM); J2311C HistSum Jan 71.



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[1] CINCPAC 312340Z Dec 70 and 132146Z Jan 71; JCS 072034Z Jan 71.
[2] J2311 Point Paper, 16 Sep 71, Subj: SEA High-Altitude Photo Capability.



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1 DIA 15527/231538Z Mar 71 (BOM); J2311 HistSum Mar 71.

2 CINCPAC 242159Z Mar 71; CINCPACAF 261925Z Mar 71; interview CDR Eakle, J231, by ComdHist, 16 Mar 72.

3 DIA 301059Z Jul 71; JCS 241307Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 301122Z Sep 71; J23 HistSum Sep 71.



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1 AMEMB Bangkok 141136Z and 151014Z Oct 71; CINCPAC 212120Z Oct 71.
2 AMEMB Bangkok 161058Z and 241013Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 222007Z Nov 71; JCS 9927/ 261957Z Nov 71.
3 AMEMB Bangkok 200351Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 222257Z Dec 71.
4 SECSTATE 232103Z Dec 71.



[redacted]

[1] J23 HistSum Jul 71.



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1 CINCPAC 312210Z Jan and 230131Z Feb 71; DIA 3377/060113Z Feb 71.
2 DIA 4848/242327Z Feb 71 and 6909/230031Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 172111Z Apr 71.
3 J2311 HistSum Apr 71; interview CDR Eakle, J231, by ComdHist, 16 Mar 72.

SECTION IV--INTELLIGENCE PLANS AND POLICIES

Counterintelligence and Security Matters

(C) CINCPAC counterintelligence and security staff visits were conducted during the period 30 May - 19 June 1971 to headquarters of COMUSJAPAN, COMUSKOREA, COMUSTDC, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAI. The purpose of the visits was to establish liaison with the counterintelligence staff officers of the commands visited, and to provide assistance in the following areas of interest:

a. Counterintelligence/security policy, plans, estimates, and operations

b. Key indigenous persons program

c. Industrial security

d. Disclosure of classified intelligence to foreign governments and international organizations.

e. Special means implementation of cover and deception activities.

f. Armed Forces, civil, and PW/civilian internee censorship.

g. Counterintelligence aspects of the drug abuse program.

The last previous CINCPAC staff visit on the subjects of counterintelligence and security had been in 1967.

(S) The Indigenous Persons (KIP) Program was discussed at length with all commands visited. There exists a unanimous impression that the program (Annex W to CINCPAC OPLAN 5060) may need significant reconsideration in view of the general drawdown of the U.S. military presence in the Pacific and the general considerations of the Nixon Doctrine. Stated simply, there is a suspicion that execution of the actual evacuation of KIP cannot be reasonably assured. Each of the commands expressing such doubts has indicated that the situation, as seen from that command, will be made a matter of record and submitted to CINCPAC for consideration.[1]

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[1] J213 HistSum Jun 71.

Cryptologic Space Problems - Thailand

(S) The Vietnamization Program in the RVN will necessitate relocation of certain essential U.S. Forces from the RVN to Thailand. Previously negotiated ceilings must be modified to accommodate units and activities nominated for relocation. [redacted]

(S) Both the American Embassy Bangkok and COMUSMACTHAI are aware of the necessity to review U.S. ceilings in Thailand as an essential element of the Vietnamization Program and U.S. withdrawals from the RVN. [redacted]

Relocation of USARPAC Intelligence School

(S) The reversion of Okinawa to Japan by 1 July 1972 necessitated relocating the USARPAC Intelligence School (USARPACINTS) from Okinawa to elsewhere in the PACOM, because of anticipated Government of Japan objections to military training of third-country nationals within Japan for which there is no legal basis under the Mutual Security Treaty. Relocating to the United States, including Hawaii, had been ruled out by the MAP trainee ceiling imposed by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Discussions with CINCPACREPs and Commanders in Guam, Taiwan, Australia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines identified Guam as the only politically acceptable location for the intelligence school. Of the five siting options within Guam, the Air Force-controlled facilities at Marbo Annex (two of six permanent three-story barracks) were determined to be the most feasible. Marbo Annex at Andersen AFB was the only option that could economically provide the USARPACINTS with interim but adequate facilities that would

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[1] J212 Point Paper, 24 Sep 71, Subj: Cryptologic Space Ceiling -Thailand.

satisfy the school's physical and environmental requirements within the 1 July 1972 (Reversion Day) time constraint.[1]

(S) Based on the site survey, CINCPAC routinely requested the Air Force to provide CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI with the necessary facilities and real estate data on USAF properties on Guam, and with planning assistance toward developing facilities required for the relocation of the USARPACINTS to Guam. However, an impasse developed when the Air Force denied availability of the two barracks in question, owing to requirements to house the 60th Bomb Squadron and Filipino employees through 1 July 1972.[2]

(S) Failing to reach any agreement on facilities with the Air Force, CINCPAC raised the issue with the JCS. Noting that alternate facilities (Northwest Field) proposed by USAF were not adequate, CINCPAC continued to support the Marbo Annex site as being the most desirable site on Guam for the USARPACINTS. It was, he pointed out, the most economical alternative in that minimum renovations were required to provide USARPACINTS with interim but adequate facilities to satisfy the school's physical and environmental requirements within the 1 July 1972 time constraint. Such time constraint was an immediate problem which made selection of other options impractical because of the long lead time necessary for major new construction or extensive rehabilitation of existing substandard facilities. CINCPAC then reviewed for the JCS his estimate of the importance of the project:

> The USARPACINTS gives CINCPAC an important alternative capability to conduct essential basic combat intelligence training not available elsewhere following the imposition of constraints on the numbers of foreign military trainees in CONUS. While foreign training self-sufficiency has been a long standing CINCPAC goal, recent U.S. assessments of Laotian and Cambodian combat intelligence capabilities indicate the objective will not be realized in the immediate future. In this connection, the CINCUSARPAC presently has under consideration an urgent request from the CHMEDT Cambodia to train about 500 FANK officers in tactical intelligence skills at the USARPACINTS. While CINCUSARPAC is making every effort to accommodate the request, it is apparent that FANK requirements cannot be satisfied by July 1972. Meanwhile, Indonesia has requested training for a substantial number of students and Laos desires to increase its input to the school.

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[1] STATE/DEFENSE 051815Z Feb 71; CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI 120237Z May 71.
[2] CINCPAC 182339Z Apr 71; CSAF 282133Z May 71.

The USARPACINTS has over the past 11 years trained over 4,000 Army, Navy, and Air Force officers of 16 foreign countries in combat intelligence and security techniques. In addition to its vital teaching role, the school continues to produce friends of United States Armed Forces in intelligence positions in their home countries. This should result, as a minimum, in a high potential for an increased number of future foreign intelligence exchanges and for bilateral operations in which the home country would provide the larger part of the resources needed and the U.S. would share jointly in the intelligence gained.

Air Force need for all six barracks at Marbo Annex is projected on future programs. Relative merits of the projected Air Force requirement to retain all six barracks versus that of the USARPACINTS' to acquire two of these barracks must be determined by the JCS/SECDEF.

In view of the ramifications of the Nixon Doctrine in the Far East, the importance of the intelligence function to Pacific Command, and the value of rapport with Pacific nations, recommend urgent action to obtain SECDEF approval to relocate USARPACINTS to Guam and CSAF concurrence to release on an interim basis two of the six barracks at Marbo Annex to allow continuity of training by the intelligence school. Further assessment of all options for long term continuance of the mission is currently being undertaken and recommendations will be submitted in the near future.[1]

(S) The JCS forwarded CINCPAC's argument to Defense Department, recommending approval of CINCPAC's position. To assist Defense in reaching a decision, it was announced on 19 August 1971 that a survey team from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics (ASD/I&L), which was going to Guam on other matters, would also consider the problem of relocation of USARPACINTS.[2]

(S) On 1 September, the ASD/I&L Ad Hoc Group, headed by Mr. E. A. Rogner and accompanied by CINCPAC representatives, made an on-island review of the siting and facilities options on Guam for the USARPACINTS. Mr. Rogner indicated in his debrief at CINCPAC Headquarters that Marbo Annex barracks would not be recommended as the interim relocation site for the USARPACINTS because of the Air Force planned requirement for these barracks, and that Asan Hospital Annex

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[1] CINCPAC 042134Z Jul 71.

[2] SECDEF 3548/190130Z Aug 71.

(temporary metal siding two-story buildings used as Navy hospital facility) would likely be recommended. As to the long-term solution, OSD would initiate action to obtain relief from MAP trainee ceiling to allow Hawaii to become the long-term school location. On 6 September, CINCPAC submitted to JCS a reclama on Mr. Rogner's recommendation to use Asan Hospital Annex as the interim school site. CINCPAC strongly recommended that JCS support the Marbo Annex barracks as the interim school site, and urge DoD action to obtain relief from the MAP trainee ceiling to allow Hawaii to be the long-term school location.[1]

(S) The JCS advised CINCPAC on 21 September that their position on site selection and facilities allocation remained as expressed earlier--resolution by the Service Secretaries involved. The JCS supported relief from the MAP trainee ceiling, but considered it inadvisable to surface the matter at that time because the FY 72 legislation on the Foreign Assistance Act, then being acted on by Congress, made no mention of a trainee ceiling.[2]

(S) On 17 November 1971 the JCS forwarded to CINCPAC the decision by the Secretary of Defense that the Navy's Asan Hospital Annex would be the interim facility for the USARPACINTS. It was noted that should early relief be granted from the ceiling on the number of foreign military personnel to be trained in the United States, the permanent facility would be relocated to Hawaii; otherwise, the Army could consider programming for a permanent facility on Guam.[3]

(S) On 21 December, in a major position reversal, CINCUSARPAC recommended to the Army and CINCPAC that the USARPACINTS be deactivated on Okinawa and that the staff and faculty be relocated to Hawaii for use in Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) for host-country training. This recommendation superseded all previous planning to relocate the school on Guam, and was precipitated by anticipated significant intelligence resource cutbacks for FY 73 and the uncertainty of sustained MAP support for the program. CINCPAC concurred in the proposal of using MTTs. However, the long-term PACOM requirement for a facility similar to the present school, so that a full range of instruction/indoctrination may be accomplished in a U.S.-controlled environment, was reemphasized.[4]

All-Source Information Center (ASIC) Exchange Agreement

(C) CINCPAC was represented at the ASIC Exchange Agreement Conference at MACTHAI during the period 8-11 December 1971. The purpose of the conference was to complete the ASIC Exchange Agreement for the Bangkok ASIC. The working copy

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[1] J42 HistSum Sep 71; CINCPAC 060555Z Sep 71.
[2] JCS 212234Z Sep 71.
[3] JCS 171400Z Nov 71.
[4] CINCUSARPAC 211931Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 292319Z Dec 71; J21 HistSum Dec 71.

of the Thailand Information Exchange Agreement (THINEXAG) was completed. In addition, the following areas were discussed at great length and agreed upon by representatives:

a. Intelligence support requirements and subsequent arrangements for receipt of data.

b. Intelligence manning requirements for a functional ASIC.

c. Proper coordination required by intelligence, operations, and communication personnel to provide a functional ASIC.

d. Service Components' requirements to provide the MACTHAI ASIC with the most current situation concerning political and military aspects of friendly and enemy countries in the MACTHAI area of interest. Those countries are:

(1) Thailand
(2) Cambodia
(3) Laos
(4) Burma
(5) India
(6) Pakistan
(7) Southern China
(8) Bhutan
(9) Sikkim
(10) Kashmir
(11) Nepal, Singapore, and the Malacca Straits.

(C) This ASIC conference is considered to have been the most successful thus far, for two primary reasons: All contributing agencies were present, which provided for a sound and thorough review of all aspects of establishing an ASIC at MACTHAI; and liaison established during the conference will enhance the subsequent staffing and completion of the THINEXAG. A salient feature which developed in the first conference in MACTHAI in September 1970 appeared again during this conference--how the withdrawal from the RVN is to affect the ASIC at MACTHAI. The impact of this situation upon ASIC capabilities in this area of the PACOM is estimated to be incisive and urgent. CINCPAC is monitoring the situation and will take appropriate actions as the U.S. drawdown continues.[1]

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[1] J2322 HistSum Dec 71.

CHAPTER XI

POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

SECTION I--THE YEAR IN REVIEW

(U) In his report to the Congress on 9 February 1972, President Nixon labelled the year 1971, "a watershed year" for U.S. foreign policy. He described initiatives taken toward rapprochement with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union, noting the fragile nature of the first, but possibly fundamental improvement in the second. Then, the President cautioned:[1]

> There were, however, other developments in 1971 which make it unclear whether we are now witnessing a permanent change in Soviet policy or only a passing phase concerned more with tactics than with a fundamental commitment to a stable international system. Soviet weapons development and deployment activity, Soviet arms policy in the Middle East, Soviet behavior during the India-Pakistan crisis and the expansionist implications of Soviet naval activities, all raise serious questions.

(U) In the President's report to the Congress one year earlier, on 25 February 1971, he noted the sense of national identity and destiny which had emerged in the less-developed nations of Asia:[2]

> the new strength in Asia is a fact, and it requires a different and more restrained American approach, designed to encourage and sustain Asian regionalism, Asian self-reliance, and Asian initiatives.
>
> "Asian regionalism has an essential role to play in the future structure of Asia. It is already a source of growing strength to the individual Asian nations. Through joint action, their potential influence on the future of the region far exceeds that which they can exert acting individually."

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[1] Richard Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1970's", Report to the Congress, GPO, 9 Feb 72, pp. 1, 4-6.

[2] Richard Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1970's", Report to the Congress, GPO, 25 Feb 71, pp. 94,98.

(U) The foregoing passages from presidential foreign policy speeches comprised the basic parameters of CINCPAC's role in the Pacific Theater--to be on guard against overt hostile action which could threaten the U.S., and to encourage and assist friendly nations to pool their resources in the name of continued independence and self-determination. Directly affecting this role were the military and political developments on the world scene as well as in the Pacific. Among the events in 1971 with the potential to influence CINCPAC's political and military relationships were:[1]

- 25 February - President Nixon made his second report to the Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1970's.

- 15 July - President Nixon announced that he would visit the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)in 1972.

- 9 August - India signed a mutual defense treaty with Russia.

- 3 October - President Thieu of South Vietnam was re-elected in a one-man election.

- 12 October - President Nixon announced that his PRC visit would be followed by a trip to Russia.

- 20 October - Prime Minister Lon Nol of Cambodia suspended the constitution.

- 25 October - The PRC was admitted to the United Nations and Nationalist China was expelled.

- 29 October - The U.S. Senate defeated the foreign aid bill, which (temporarily) cancelled all economic and military assistance to other nations by the U.S.

- 17 November - Prime Minister Thanom of Thailand suspended the constitution.

- 21 November - Indian troops invaded East Pakistan.

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[1] Chronology 1971, United Press International, Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, 2 Jan 72; J.S.L. Girling, "Strong Man Tactics in Thailand: The Problems Remain", Pacific Community, Vol. 3, No. 3, Apr 72, pp. 532,533.

- 4,5,13 December - Russia vetoed a United Nations plan for an India-Pakistan truce.

- 6 December - President Park of South Korea declared a state of national emergency, and assumed broader presidential powers.

- 16 December - Pakistan troops surrendered in East Pakistan. India proclaimed a free nation of Bangla Desh.

Indian Ocean Policy

(S) For several years, CINCPAC had stressed, in his presentations to Congress and speeches to civic groups, the increasing Russian presence in the Indian Ocean. In 1970, CINCPAC developed a contingency plan for the increase of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The plan contained eleven options, ranging from a single vessel to a carrier task force in show-of-the-flag operations called FRIDAY GUEST.[1]

(U) In 1971, CINCPAC continued to emphasize his concern regarding expanding Soviet influence world-wide, and specifically in the Indian Ocean. He compared the Russian spearheads of influence to a strategic island concept, in which the "islands" were not always islands surrounded by water, but projections of political, economic, military, or psychological power on land or sea. On 28 July 1971, the director of the State Department Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs acknowleged the growing encroachment of Russian naval power in the Indian Ocean. However, he stated that the reaction of the U.S. to threatened trade routes and military access was constrained by the desire of the U.S. to avoid a competitive buildup of military force in the area by the major powers of Russia, China, and the U.S.[2]

(U) The problems posed by the growing strength of the Soviet navy were illustrated in two memoranda prepared for CINCPAC consideration by his Staff Judge Advocate. The first defined U.S. policy regarding the limitations of the territorial sea around the islands of the State of Hawaii. In September 1971, a Soviet naval task force anchored south of Maui to replenish and then passed within visual distance of Pacific Command headquarters before proceeding north. Based upon a 1964 policy letter from the State Department to the

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 127.

2 Admiral John S. McCain Jr., "A Strategic Appraisal", Honolulu Kiwanis Club, 7 Dec 71; Ronald I. Spiers, "U.S. National Security Policy and Indian Ocean Area", Statement to House Subcommittee on 28 July 71, State Department BULLETIN, 23 Aug 71, pp. 199-203.

Attorney General, the Russian Force did not violate U.S. waters if it remained at least three miles from an island coast. According to the stated policy, each island was considered to have its own three mile limit, and waters seaward of such three-mile belts were considered high seas. This point had also been confirmed in a Federal Court decision rejecting a theory of "internal waters" or "historic waters."[1]

(S) The second memorandum addressed the indiscriminate placement of mooring buoys in the Indian Ocean, and the placement of such a buoy in the Philippine Sea near Guam during 1971. It was noted that the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas provided, "the high seas being open to all nations, no state may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty." For many years, however, beacons, buoys, and other markers had been placed on the high seas by many nations as aids to navigation. For some years, nations had also placed objects on (and under) the high seas for economic and defense purposes --e.g., U.S. radar stations, Texas oil towers, and submarine detection. The U.S. had probably placed more of these objects, including buoys, on and under the high seas than any other nation. The memorandum suggested that the JCS be requested to provide information and a comparison of the Soviet buoy problem with similar buoy dispersion by the U.S. Also, a specific U.S. policy was needed as to whether the Guam buoy could be removed, and if not, the navigational hazard presented by its emplacement without notice should be raised throughout diplomatic channels and publicized throughtout the international community.[2]

(U) Thus, through 1971, no clear-cut policy had been declaimed by the U.S. in the Indian Ocean region. CINCPAC's view of the urgent need for such a policy had been strongly supported in a supplemental statement by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel on 30 September 1970 to its report of 1 July 1970. This statement described a shifting balance of military power against the U.S. in favor of Russia. In addition to a growing superiority in strategic missile deployment, the Soviet naval buildup was a major element in the shifting balance:[3]

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[1] J73/Memo/140-71 of 13 Sep 71, Subj: U.S. Position on the Width of Territorial Seas and Its Position as to Such Seas Around the Islands of Hawaii; Op. Cit., McCain, "A Strategic Appraisal", 7 Dec 71.

[2] Ibid.; J73/Memo/32-71 of 25 Sep 71, Subj: Soviet Mooring Buoys in the Pacific (S).

[3] Supplemental Statement, Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 30 Sep 70, "The Shifting Balance of Military Power", pp. 17,18.

> For some three centuries the British Navy preserved freedom of the seas and fostered international trade. There were also other naval powers, including the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, and Italy. All of this has changed beyond recognition in a dramatic shift of sea power. All of these navies (except that of the U.S.) have ceased to exist as blue water fleets. England has dismantled its great bases around the world, and the vacuum thus created is being filled by the Soviet Union. The Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean east of Malta are already dominated by Soviet naval power. There are no limits to the seas in which the Soviet navy now operates, as demonstrated by its naval maneuvers.

(S) The above-stated U.S. Government intention to avoid naval competition with the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean did not rule out some U.S. presence in the area. Therefore, CINCPAC encouraged port visits and small exercises by U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) ships in order to maintain a modest, but persistent presence in the Indian Ocean. This course of action had been approved by the National Security Council, along with increased use of Singapore logistic facilities, continuing development of the Diego Garcia facility, and maritime air patrols. The objective of this limited activity was to offer political and economic options to Indian Ocean littoral nations other than those offered by the communists; to ensure access to African and Mid-East resources vital to the economic survival of the free world; to maintain free and unrestricted use of sea and air routes; and, to facilitate intelligence collection efforts. In this endeavor, CINCPAC considered the development of Diego Garcia as a logistic support facility to be essential to the maintenance of an effective U.S. naval presence in the whole Indian Ocean area. This would demonstrate direct U.S. interest, and allow a more consistent presence than transitory port visits.[1]

(U) Germane to the question of major power influence in the Indian Ocean was the signing by India, on 9 August, of a formal alliance with Russia. The treaty was entitled "Treaty of Friendship, Peace, and Cooperation". Ratified by Russia on 13 August, the treaty consisted of 12 articles pertaining to mutual cooperation and defense. Two of the articles, however, contained verbiage strongly implicit of aggression, rather than purely defense. Article 3 disapproved of colonialism and racism, and warned of Russian and Indian,

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[1] J3B42 Point Paper, 2 Dec 71, Subj: Indian Ocean Presence; J5154 Point Paper, 7 Dec 71, Subj: Soviet and Friendly Naval Involvement in the Indian Ocean Area, 1971-1975 (S).

"determination to strive for their final and complete elimination." In Article 9, attack or the threat of attack upon either of the signatories would call for "eliminating this threat and taking appropriate collective measures to secure the peace and tranquility...." of the two nations.[1]

(S) In September, one month after the Russia-India treaty was signed, permission was denied by the Indian Government for a port call to Cochin, India by the USS TUCKER. The basis for denial, according to Indian officials, was U.S. refusal to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard the TUCKER. This U.S. policy was based on long-established tradition that host countries did not inquire regarding visiting ship armament, which tradition was observed by the U.S. as well. More important, however, was the potential harm to state security and intelligence which could result from confirmation or denial. The State Department requested the U.S. Ambassador to India to register the serious concern of the U.S. Government about the denial of permission to make the port call. CINCPAC strongly endorsed State efforts to rectify the situation, and expressed his concern to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In spite of the recently concluded treaty, CINCPAC stated, "...the ideal time to increase our presence in the unstable politico-military environment of that area is now or never..." It was CINCPAC's firm conviction that U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean should be increased and maintained.[2]

(U) Still another inhibition against U.S. efforts to counter the growing Russian influence in the Indian Ocean area was the outcome of the India-Pakistan war. When Pakistan surrendered and India declared the free nation of Bangla Desh, the newspaper Times of India stated: "It is obvious India could not have liberated Bangla Desh (without) the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union." In a U.S. News and World Report article, it was speculated that the Indian victories had placed the U.S. on the sidelines, and that Russia had suddenly achieved the position to become the number one power in the Indian Ocean with the full support of the New Delhi Government. The Article noted that, while India had insisted that the super powers, and their nuclear weapons, stay out of the Indian Ocean, now it was likely that this dictum would apply only to the U.S. and the CPR. It was also likely that the Indian insistence on nuclear weapons disclosure before allowing foreign ships to visit would not apply to Russian vessels. In addition to free use of India's facilities, the Soviet Union could reap great benefits in countries bordering the Indian Ocean as a

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[1] Lawrence Griswold, "No Ocean is Neutral", Seapower, Vol. 14, No. 10, Nov 71, p. 27, 29.

[2] J3B42 Point Paper, 15 Sep 71, Subj: U.S. Ship Visits to India; USDAO New Delhi 943/031111Z Sep 71; SECSTATE 163010/032213Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 040402Z Sep 71 (EX).

result of its support to India in the face of PRC support of Pakistan.[1]

(S) CINCPAC had recognized the potential influence which would derive from the placement of a U.S. military element of consequence in the Indian Ocean to discourage third country force involvement on the Indian sub-continent. Before the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan, CINCPAC requested permission of the JCS to designate one carrier task group as a contingency force, prepared to sail on 48 hours notice into the Indian Ocean. The JCS approved this request for planning purposes. After the outbreak of the war, the JCS requested CINCPAC's views and recommendations for emergency evacuation of non-combatant U.S. and foreign nationals from East Pakistan. CINCPAC recommended that evacuation be accomplished by helicopters based on a floating platform stationed in the Bay of Bengal. The JCS was informed that Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) Alpha had been ordered to Singapore to await further orders, and that a carrier (CVA) task group was available to protect ARG Alpha. On 10 December 1971, the JCS directed CINCPAC to deploy one CVA, with necessary escorts, to the southern entrance of the Malacca Strait as soon as possible. The task force (TF 74) was to continue into the Indian Ocean only when directed. CINCPAC was directed to include in the task force one vessel carrying helicopters prepared to conduct evacuation operations if required.[2]

East Asian Policy[3]

(S) In May 1971, CINCPAC attended a meeting of East Asian Chiefs of Mission in Baguio, Republic of the Philippines. All East Asian missions were represented by their ambassadors, plus the consul from Hong Kong and the U.S. Ambassador to India. In opening remarks, the Undersecretary of State discussed the Nixon Doctrine and interpreted two issues which CINCPAC had long felt needed clarification. First, the Nixon Doctrine did not mean withdrawal from either political or military influence in the Western Pacific. Secondly, it did not necessarily imply a low profile. The place and circumstance would dictate the degree of American profile, and a low profile was not to be applied across the board. The Undersecretary also raised the issue of the 200 mile territorial waters claimed by some nations, and the potential implications in deployment of U.S. Naval Forces. He cautioned all conferees to oppose extensions of territorial waters, and to express the concern of the U.S.

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[1] Article, "New Worries for U.S. in Asia", U.S. News and World Report, 3 Jan 72, pp. 14, 15.

[2] J3B42 Point Paper, 25 Feb 72, Subj: TF 74 Operations; CINCPAC 120401Z Nov 71 (EX);JCS 7115/131554Z Nov 71 (EX); JCS 6640/091441Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 100227Z Dec 71; JCS 8100/101933Z Dec 71; JCS 7144/100025Z Dec 71 (EX).

[3] Undated draft msg, CINCPAC to CJCS, circa 21 May 71, Subj: East Asia Chiefs of Mission Conference (EX).

(S) Following the opening remarks, CINCPAC spoke on the military situation in his command, with stress on the military assistance program. The conferees also discussed a State Department paper submitted for consideration as future policy guidance entitled "East Asia in the Mid-1970s". The paper postulated a gradual development of a multi-lateral equilibrium brought about by more small nation participation in diplomatic maneuvers, and a blurring of the containment line which had featured U.S. policy in the past. Several Southeast Asia ambassadors shared CINCPAC's concern that the State Department paper also postulated that, over the long term, Mainland Southeast Asia was of significantly lesser importance to the U.S. than other parts of East Asia and the Western Pacific.

(TS) Other subjects discussed included the need to continue substantial security and economic assistance to U.S. allies; budgetary constraints which effect U.S. capability to meet its operational commitments; Japan's role in East Asia; the effect on neutral and friendly nations of the U.S. rapprochement with the PRC; the serious nature of the drug abuse and narcotic traffic problem in Southeast Asia; and, an assessment of Vietnamization. Two additional items were entered into the record with general agreement but little discussion. The first was the increasing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and its potential impact on security in East Asia. The second was the growing importance strategically of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). Three of the more specifically worded recommendations to emerge from the conference were:

- U.S. military power in the Pacific area must be kept at a level which makes credible our capability to meet our treaty commitments to Asian countries.

- If the Nixon Doctrine is to be successfully implemented, military and economic assistance must be provided in generous quantities for some years to Asian nations expected to assume increasing responsibilities for their own security.

- In addition to logistic support, U.S. air and naval power must continue to be available for employment in those countries of Southeast Asia engaged in active hostilities.

(S) CINCPAC concluded his preliminary report on the conference by stating that it had been a beneficial meeting, and had strengthened his already excellent rapport with all of the ambassadors in the area. He again stressed his reservations to the JCS regarding the State Department policy paper which implied a downgrading of the importance of Southeast Asia and a reduction in the leadership role of the U.S. in the entire Far East region.

Law of the Sea

(C) The adoption of world-wide conventions governing seabed exploration was complicated by existing territorial sea boundaries ranging from the three miles recognized by the U.S. to 200 miles claimed by several nations. Questions regarding off-shore mineral resource exploitation, fishery grounds, and environmental controls were raised by conflicting claims pertaining to the continental shelves and to free passage through the worlds straits and other narrows. For example, the Senkaku Islands had emerged, in 1970, as a potential source of international friction after the likelihood of substantial off-shore oil reserves was established. The PRC, Nationalist China, and Japan had all claimed the Senkakus, which were on the Asian continental shelf, but had been administered by the U.S. as part of the Ryukyus.[1]

(C) Anticipating the legal confusion which could result from the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan in 1972, CINCPAC requested his representative in the Ryukyus to provide some background on the legal status of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) and its authority to act and make claims relating to the Senkaku Islands and continental shelf matters. In reply, the High Commissioner stated that the GRI had been established by civil administration fiat in 1952. In 1957, a Presidential Executive Order specified the legal status and powers of the GRI, vesting responsibility for conduct of foreign relations in the U.S. Secretary of State. Administration of public lands, which include territorial waters and seabed, was retained by the U.S., thus requiring High Commissioner approval for allocation of off-shore mining or prospecting rights. Upon reversion to Japan, the GRI would be replaced by a Japanese Prefecture.[2]

(S) The thrust of the conflicting sovereignty claims over the Senkakus and other off-shore areas was toward the oil resources. In the East China and Yellow Seas, four governments had claimed portions of the continental shelf--the PRC, Republic of China, Republic of Korea, and Japan. A fifth, North Korea, could conceivably assert a claim. Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea had granted concessions for petroleum exploration, a number of which were held by American oil companies. During 1971, as in 1970, U.S. policy prohibited the engagement by U.S. forces of PRC forces if they attempted to interfere with commercial oil survey ships. In fact, a State Department spokesman was quoted, on 9 April 1971, as stating that U.S. oil companies risk the seizure of their ships if

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 150-152 and Vol. II, pp. 31, 33-34; PACOM Intelligence Digest, June 1971, pp. 36, 37.

[2] ADMIN CINCPAC 060343Z Jan 71; HICOMRY Okinawa 080805Z Jan 71; J73 HistSum, Jan 71.

they persist in oil exploration operations near the Senkakus.[1]

(S) In 1971, the Philippines advanced a claim to the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea, in spite of long-standing claims by the PRC, South Vietnam, and Taiwan. Imperial China's extended back to 200 B.C., and Vietnam documents mention the Islands as early as 1816 and 1834. France, from Vietnamese colonial times, and Japan during World War II, also had exercised dominion over the Spratleys. Since the 1950s, Taiwan had maintained a garrison of marines on the largest island, Itu Aba. In July, the Philippines announced the deployment of 200 troops to three islets in the group, and plans to construct an airfield and permanent garrison facilities. The Philippine claim appeared to be motivated partly by an estimate of oil reserves equal to those near the Senkakus, and partly by a politically inspired move to divert attention from internal unrest.[2]

(U) Because of immediate proximity to the PRC, the East China and Yellow Seas occupied center stage insofar as political and military sensitivity were concerned. However, the South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand had also been surveyed for off-shore oil resources. South Vietnam had passed a petroleum exploration and exploitation law in late 1970; however, no off-shore concessions were granted during 1971. Thailand had granted concessions to Union, Amoco, Gulf, Conoco, Marathon, and Phillips--all American firms. These companies operated under provisional agreements until 24 February 1971, when the Thai Parliament passed the Petroleum Act and the Petroleum Income Tax Act. Cambodia had granted a concession to a French petroleum company in November 1969, but no American company held a Cambodian concession.[3]

(C) In October 1971, the Deputy Foreign Minister of RVN informed the U.S. Ambassador that RVN was considering extending its territorial sea to 12 miles, although informed of the U.S. preference that multi-lateral action at the 1973 Seabed Conference be awaited. The Ambassador also voiced the concern of the U.S. Government that such unilateral actions on the part of other nations brought entire straits under the sovereignty of arbitrary territorial boundaries, thus negating the international principle of free passage. The RVN official did not agree, and informed the Ambassador that a bill to extend the territorial waters might well pass the legislature.[4]

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[1] J3B42 Point Paper, 9 Aug 71, Subj: Oil Exploration; Current History, Jun 71, p. 378; also see Chapter V, this history, for discussion of rules of engagement for protection of U.S. Flag vessels.

[2] J2213 Point Paper, 17 Aug 71, Subj: Philippine Claims to the Spratley Islands.

[3] BULLETIN, Dept of State, Vol. LXIV, No. 1658, of 5 Apr 71, pp. 491-494.

[4] J73 HistSum, Oct 71; AMEMB Saigon 17241/290430Z Oct 71.

(S) In May 1970, the President had proposed that the United Nations sponsor a Law of the Sea conference to develop international conventions concerning use of seabeds, territorial sea boundaries, fishery waters jurisdiction, marine pollution, and scientific research. On 17 December 1970, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution which established a Law of the Sea conference for 1973. Based on the political developments in the PACOM, and after intensive CINCPAC staff coordination, a position paper was generated which defined the U.S. position on the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference. The U.S. favored a three mile limit; however, if possible to achieve international agreement, and if free transit through and over international straits were guaranteed, the U.S. would agree to a 12 mile limit. With regard to jurisdiction over seabeds, the U.S. proposed to divide the seas into three basic zones: coastal state jurisdiction extending to the limit of the territorial sea or to a depth of 200 meters, whichever is greater; a trusteeship zone, from the 200 meter depth to a line defining the continental margin, administered by the coastal state under broad internationally agreed guidelines, and with some revenues to be paid to an International Seabed Resource Authority for the benefit of developing countries; and, the deep ocean floor, exploitation of which would be under the direct authority of the International Seabed Resource Authority.[1]

Military Custody of U.S. Civilians

(C) Criminal jurisdiction by foreign governments over U.S. military forces in general, and over U.S. dependents and civilian employees of the Armed Forces in particular, had been a politically sensitive problem throughout the PACOM. The DOD made CINCPAC responsible for the administration of criminal jurisdiction matters in the PACOM under Status of Foreign Agreements (SOFA) or other governing pacts. To carry out that responsibility, CINCPAC designated, in each country where military forces are regularly stationed, a Designated Commanding Officer (DCO) to coordinate such matters and to provide liaison with U.S. Embassy and foreign government officials. A continuing problem, for many years, was the provision in SOFAs and other agreements for U.S. Military authorities to accept custody of civilian personnel covered by agreements when they were under investigation for, or had been charged with, violations of foreign laws. This requirement conflicted with U.S. domestic law, which limited the authority of the military--no restraint, no confinement, no coercion. Consequently, when the military accepted custody of civilian personnel in foreign countries, and signed a custody receipt, it had no

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[1] BULLETIN, Dept of State, Vol. LXIV, No. 1649 of 1 Feb 71, p. 139; J73 Hist Sum, Oct 71; J73/Memo/36-71 of 20 Oct 71, Subj: Law of the Sea Conference Point Paper; J512 Point Paper, 7 Dec 71, Subj: 1973 Law of the Sea Conference, U.S. Position; see adjacent chart.

way to "guarantee" the civilian's continued presence for trial or other action. In 1970, after unauthorized departures of civilians from the Philippines and Japan, it was learned by CINCPAC that varying and contradictory procedures were in effect because existing State-DOD policy had not been disseminated. After written approval of the language by the DOD General Counsel, CINCPAC published Instruction 5820.1D on 28 August 1970. This CINCPACINST standardized civilian custody procedures, specifying that civilians would sign requests to be taken into custody by U.S. military authorities before custody was accepted by the U.S. Government. Further, it prohibited the inclusion of "guarantee" of civilian appearance in custody receipts unless such "guarantees" were incorporated in existing SOFAs or other agreements. If such "guarantees" were part of the SOFA (i.e., between U.S. and Philippines), the DCO was instructed to ensure that the appropriate foreign authority was aware of the limited scope of measures which could lawfully be taken by the U.S. to assure an accused's continued presence in the host country.[1]

(C) During 1971, CINCPAC monitored the implementation of CINCPACINST 5820.1D throughout the PACOM. On 16 January, CINCPAC's subordinate unified commands were requested to provide the specific guidelines used by each to implement the provisions relating to custody of civilian personnel. The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) replied that no agreements, formal or informal, existed between the U.S. and Thailand which provided for the release of U.S. civilians into the custody of U.S. military authorities. Informal procedures had been established by the Director General of Thai police for release of U.S. military by receipt, but U.S. civilians were released only after posting bail. On 27 January, the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC) provided the exact wording of a form which U.S. civilian personnel were required to sign before U.S. military authorities would take responsibility for custody. This form, when signed by the subject, acknowledged that he had agreed, without coercion, to surrender his passport and to remain in Taiwan until released by the Republic of China Government (GRC) or U.S. authority.[2]

(U) CINCPAC acknowledged receipt of the COMUSTDC civilian statement form, but, in February, cautioned COMUSTDC that his implementing instruction was faulty. The section pertaining to custody did not distinguish between, but authorized custody receipts to be issued for, both civilian and military personnel. The form of the custody receipt to be used included a guarantee, which, because it applied to both military and civilians, implied a guarantee

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 34-38, 57-58, 70.

[2] J73 HistSum Jan 71; CINCPAC 162114Z Jan 71; COMUSMACTHAI 180918Z Jan 71; COMUSTDC 270742Z jan 71.

to produce a civilian presence. This was contrary to the State-DOD policy upon which CINCPAC's directive was based. COMUSTDC notified CINCPAC that his directive would substitute the words "has agreed" in the passage pertaining to a request for custody by a U.S. civilian. Also, the words, "...the U.S. military authorities will endeavor to assure..." were incorporated regarding civilian availability.[1]

(U) As with COMUSTDC, on 23 February 1971 CINCPAC provided guidance to the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA) on the civilian custody question. The CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate requested his counterpart in Korea to change the form statement by which U.S. civilians requested U.S. custody. The form purported to have the civilian agree to U.S. military confinement, whereas CINCPACINST 5820.1D had expressed the DOD policy that U.S. military authorities did not have the power, "to confine or otherwise restrain the liberty of U.S. civilian personnel."[2]

(U) In April, CINCPAC advised COMUSKOREA of a possibility for misinterpretation of the reporting requirements of CINCPACINST 5820.1D. A report was required in each instance that an incident involving U.S. military and civilian personnel, "may be subject to criminal prosecution by foreign authorities". This portion was subject to the unintended interpretation that an incident in which an official duty certificate had been issued became non-reportable since, because of the official duty certificate, the offender would not be subject to criminal prosecution by foreign authorities. CINCPAC requested that the required reports be submitted regardless of the issuance of an official duty certificate, pending revision of CINCPACINST 5820.1D. This was particulary important in the event that the official duty certificate was contested by the host government.[3]

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1 J73 HistSum, Feb 71; CINCPAC 060213Z Feb 71; COMUSTDC 090746Z Feb 71.
2 Ltr, CINCPAC (SJA), 23 Feb 71, n.s., personal to COMUSKOREA (SJA).
3 J73 HistSum, April 71; CINCPAC 090240Z Apr 71.

UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS
IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 2.

SECTION II -- REGIONAL COOPERATION

(U) The United States continued, during 1971, to participate in the activities of two formal, multi-lateral, military security alliances in the Pacific Command area -- the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Treaty. Continuing in force also were four bi-lateral mutual defense agreements -- with Japan, Korea, Republic of China, and the Philippines. In the Middle East, the U.S. supported the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and also had defense agreements with Iran and Turkey. A third military alliance of friendly powers emerged in 1971 when the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) among Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdon became effective on 1 November.[1]

SEATO

(TS) SEATO was formed on 8 September 1954 in Manila, Republic of the Philippines (ROP). Member nations included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, ROP, the U.K., and the U.S. As an example of regional cooperation, and as an instrument to stimulate among Asian nations an awareness of the need for common action, SEATO served the national interests of the U.S. It involved the member nations, to some extent, in the U.S. national policy of containment, and had been of some value as a deterrent to overt agression by the PRC. It was the principal legal instrument for U.S. security commitments in Southeast Asia and for Thailand's participation in the Vietnam war. SEATO also was a legal instrument by which Thailand justified the prosecution of the air war by U.S. aircraft from bases in Thailand.[2]

SEATO Council Meeting

(U) The SEATO Council of foreign ministers held its sixteenth meeting in London on 27-28 April 1971. The meeting was chaired by Sir Alec Douglas-Hume, Foreign Secretary of the U.K. All member governments, except France, participated. The RVN, a protocol state, was represented by an observer. The Council reiterated its support for the principles in the Pacific Charter, which linked the need to "strengthen the fabric of peace" with the promotion of "the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area." It welcomed the increasing acceptance of the principle of regional cooperation in the Southeast Asia area, and noted with approval the growing strength of regional organizations concerned with maintaining stability and the pace of economic and social

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[1] J512 Point Paper, 20 Oct 71, Subj: Brief Summary of Treaties with PACOM Countries; UPI Dispatch datelined Singapore, 1 Nov 1971, CINCPAC News of Interest, 1 Nov 71, p. 16.

[2] J5141 Point Paper, 12 Apr 71, Subj: SEATO.

SEATO ORGANIZATION



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 3.

development. The Council noted the report of the military advisors, and commended the excellent work done by the military planning officer in updating plans and designing exercises.[1]

34th Military Advisors' (MILAD) Conference[2]

(C) The SEATO 34th MILAD Conference (MA34C) was held in London, just prior to the sixteenth Council meeting, on 22-23 April 1971. The meeting was held in the Lancaster House and chaired by Air Chief Marshall Sir Brian Burnett, the U.K. MILAD. In an address to the conference, SEATO Secretary General Jesus Vargas presented a very comprehensive summary of the military and political developments which had occurred in the treaty area since October 1970. He termed the U.S. initiative in relaxing trade relations with Communist China "a positive step in the direction of peace" which would lead to lessening of tension in the treaty area. General Vargas also stated that the Five Nation (Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Singapore and Malaysia) defense alignment was a worthwhile contribution to the security and stability of the region, and provided an update of the work of the recently established office for Counter-Subversion.

(C) The first agenda item was the progress report of the Chief, Military Planning Office (CMPO) for the period 16 October 1970 to 21 April 1971. The report covered major plans. MPO assistance to SEATO Field Force commanders, specialist meetings, SEATO military exercises, and work accomplished on SEATO publications. Next on the agenda was a discussion of the SEATO Force Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). The MILADS noted that work had begun on the second stage of SOP development, and directed the CMPO to proceed with actions to complete the SOPs. Changes to the SEATO "Planning Factors" were approved, and this guidance was to be issued, after further revision, under the title SEATO Planning Guide.

(C) A major change to MPO Plan 9/69 was approved of such magnitude that the plan was up-dated to MPO Plan 9/71. The MILADS also reconfirmed approval of the SEATO exercise schedule and forecast, subject to minor adjustments which would allow the exercise objectives to be more obtainable. The MILADS agreed that the ROP would provide the successor to the current CMPO; approved the tour extension of the Deputy MPO to November 1972, and agreed that the next Head of Planning was to be provided by the U.K. Dates and tour lengths would be determined at a later date.

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[1] BULLETIN, Dept of State, Vol. LXIV, No. 1666 of 31 May 71, pp. 683-685.
[2] J5141 HistSum, Apr 71; CINCPAC 261550Z Apr 71.

(U) The conference also included presentations by the U.S., U.K, Thai, and ROP MILADS. The U.S. MILAD, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., discussed the security of the Pacific area and reviewed the world-wide communist threat, with specific reference to the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. Admiral McCain again stressed the importance of SEATO to member nations and all of Southeast Asia. Air Chief Marshall Dowee reviewed the status of the insurgent threat against Thailand, and emphasized that additional military actions would be required to completely control the insurgent areas. General Manual Yan of the ROP presented a proposal for the use of SEATO military forces to provide assistance in natural disaster areas. The MILADS expressed their appreciation for the presentations, and general sympathy with the suggestion for SEATO assistance in natural disaster areas. They noted that the Philippine MILAD may raise the subject at a future Council meeting.

(S) The U.K. MILAD made a statement of force declaration to SEATO plans which was warmly welcomed. Declarations in support of MPO Plans 4 and 9 were three frigates or destroyers; one submarine and afloat support; one battalion group; and, up to four NIMROD long range maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The NIMRODs were also declared for MPO Plan 8.

(C) CINCPAC's report of the meeting noted that each MILAD stated his conviction that the conference had been fruitful, mutually rewarding, and productive. The strong confidence and support evidenced by the collective MILADS was indicative of the benefit to be derived from continuing support of the organization by the U.S.

35th MILAD Conference (MA35C)[1]

(C) MA35C was held in Bangkok on 30 September and 1 October 1971. The conference was chaired by LGEN Sir Leonard Thornton, the New Zealand MILAD and Chief, New Zealand Defense Staff. Preceding the meeting, the MILADS made a trip to northeast and north Thailand as guests aboard CINCPAC's C-118 airborne command post. The MILADS had an opportunity to observe and be informally briefed on the security situation with reference to communist insurgency. Counter measures being taken by the Thai were inspected at Nakhon Phanom, Chieng Mai, and Phitsanulok.

(C) Upon their return to Bangkok, the formal session was opened by the Secretary General, General Jesus Vargas of the ROP. He noted the continuing threat to the area by Peking, pointing out that the PRC Army Chief of Staff

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[1] J5141 HistSum, Oct 71; CINCPAC Airborne 011509Z Oct 71.

had again declared, on 7 September, the PRC support of the revolutionary struggle of the world's people. He was hopeful that the limited detente between the PRC and the U.S. would lead to renunciation by the PRC of its support to insurgent and subversive activities. However, General Vargas noted that, unless this renunciation took place, any improvement in relations between the PRC and non-Asian nations would be of marginal value to free Asians.

(S) The agenda was begun by a CMPO report on the progress of planning, assistance to SEATO Field Force commanders, specialist meetings, SEATO exercises, and other MPO activities since the April 1971 meeting in London. The frequency of specialist meetings was questioned by the Australian MILAD because of budget constraints. The MILADS agreed that proposed future meetings should be carefully balanced against necessity, but generally noted that such meetings promoted cohesion within the organization.

(S) The MILADS also agreed that the SOPs would be more appropriately titled "standing orders" because of their content. They approved the remaining sections, and directed that Volume I (General, SEATO Force) and Volume II (Headquarters, SEATO Force) be published under the title SEATO Force Standing Orders. Changes to MPO Plan 5/69 were made, and the plan was updated to 5/71. Evolving from the Plan 5 discussion was a directive to the CMPO that new procedures be examined to provide for rapid up-date of the intelligence content of all SEATO plans. MPO Plan 8/69 was also changed and re-titled 8/71.

(S) After some discussion, it was agreed that the roles and functions of the MPO in the implementation of SEATO plans be expanded. Changes to the direction on liaison responsibilities and planning responsibilities beyond the purview of the Commander, SEATO Force were to be resolved by out-of-session approval. The SEATO exercise schedule and forecast was again approved, with minor adjustments and changes in force participation. The U.S. agreed to provide the PX-47 exercise director and Australia the deputy. The director for PX-50 would also be provided by the U.S., and the deputy by Thailand. The desirability of submarines to provide realistic anti-submarine warfare (ASW) play in PX-47 and PX-49 was noted, as was the need for at least one permanent exercise planner from each nation at exercise headquarters when planning was begun.

(S) In individual presentations by the MILADS, General Yan spoke on insurgency and subversion in the ROP, including urban querilla warfare and the countermeasures employed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). He stated that communist subversion continued to be the greatest threat to

Philippine national security, and that, while the military situation could be controlled by the AFP, the real battle was for the minds of the people. Admiral McCain discussed the growing range of Soviet global activities, including the growing incursions into the Indian Ocean area, and then brought the overall communist threat into perspective by focusing on the treaty area. He emphasized the importance of military aid programs in support of the Nixon Doctrine, the objective being to enable the recipient nations to become more self-reliant. Admiral McCain stated that the U.S. would honor all treaty obligations, and reiterated the importance of SEATO as a deterrent force. Air Chief Marshall Dawee stated that communist terrorism had increased in northeast Thailand, but had decreased somewhat in the north and extreme south. The Thai MILAD expressed concern over the Chinese road building activity in northern Laos, which he called a "serious threat to northern Thailand."

SEATO Orientation Courses

(U) Tri-annual SEATO orientation courses continued to be held during 1971. The courses were attended by representatives of CINCPAC, JCS, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, and various levels of CINCPAC's Service component commands. Course 1/71 was held in Thailand during the period 15-22 February 1971 with 25 attendees from U.S. SEATO planning staff elements. CINCPAC provided a two-man Vietnam briefing team for Course 1/71.[1]

(U) Course 2/71 was held on 21-28 June; 14 of the 15 authorized U.S. spaces were used because of an unforeseen operational commitment by a CINCPAC nominee. The JCS was not represented at 2/71. One member of CINCPAC's planning staff provided a briefing on the situation in South Vietnam.[2]

(U) Course 3/71 was held on 8-15 November with 15 U.S. attendees, 6 of which were from CINCPAC. The course consisted of briefings and visits to U.S. and Thai military and SEATO civil facilities at Bangkok, U-Tapao/Sattahip, Korat, Nakhon Phanom, Phitsanulok, and Chieng Mai.[3]

Change in Chief, MPO

(S) In 1970, the New Zealand MILAD advised CINCPAC (U.S. MILAD) that the scheduled replacement as CMPO from New Zealand would be unable to accept because of medical reasons. Subsequently, New Zealand requested Australia to fill the

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[1] J5141 HistSum, Feb 71; J554 HistSum, Jan 71; CINCPAC 290016Z Jan 71.
[2] J5142 HistSum, Jun 71; CINCPAC 162351Z Jun 71; J554 HistSum, Jun 71; CINCPAC 040006Z Jun 71.
[3] J514 HistSum, Nov 71.

post with the understanding that New Zealand would fill the next term. In the interim between July 1970 and January 1971, New Zealand recommended that the Deputy CMPO, BGEN Felix Pestana of the Philippines serve as acting CMPO. CINCPAC and the other MILADS approved the procedure, and Ausralia nominated MGEN R.A. Hay as CMPO. This nomination was approved, and General Hay assumed the post of CMPO on 12 January 1971, for a two year tour of duty.[1]

(U) The tour of the Deputy CMPO, General Pestana was initially scheduled to end in February 1972. As previously related, the MILADS discussed an extention of his tour, contingent upon ROP approval, during MA34C. In July 1971, the ROP approved the extension through November 1972. On 21 July, CINCPAC, as U.S. MILAD, reconfirmed the offer to provide a replacement for Pestana in November 1972.[2]

Transfer of SEATO Functions

(TS) On 4 October 1971, COMUSMACV had recommended to CINCPAC that MACV be relieved of certain planning functions as it reduced in size and converted to Headquarters, Vietnam Assistance Command (VAC). On 18 November, CINCPAC replied, directing that all contingency plans would be maintained by MACV/VAC as long as it was a major CINCPAC subordinate headquarters in RVN. However, CINCPAC acknowledged the need for realignments in SEATO planning, and advised COMUSMACV that a study was under way on that subject.[3]

(TS) On 11 December, CINCPAC notified COMUSMACV that a review of SEATO planning responsibilities had been completed in coordination with CINCUSARPAC. Close coordination was required between MACV and its subordinates concerning unilateral U.S. actions/deployments which impacted on SEATO planning. Therefore, SEATO Field forces planning responsibilities would remain at MACV/VAC until that organization and its subordinate commands was disestablished. At that time, a transfer of functions would require a 60 to 90 day transition period.[4]

Ratification of Standardization Agreement

(S) In November 1971, CMPO proposed that the ratification requirement for the SEATO Standardization Agreement (SEASTAG) be changed from six to five nations.

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[1] J5142 HistSum, Jan 71; USMILADREP SEATO 260945Z May 70; CINCPAC 021315Z Jun 70; USMILADREP SEATO 140330Z Sep 70; CINCPAC 162235Z Sep 70.

[2] J5142 HistSum, Jul 71; USMILADREP SEATO 160300Z Jul 71; CINCPAC 212317Z Jul 71.

[3] J5141 HistSum, Dec71; CINCPAC 180041Z Nov 71.

[4] CINCPAC 111005Z Dec 71.

SEASTAG ratification, as specified in SEATO Publication (SEAP)1C, was originally based on an eight nation membership. Because of the defection of France and Pakistan from participation in standardization matters, the requirement for a six nation concurrence amounted to unanimous agreement of the active members, and often resulted in excessive delay.[1]

(C) CINCPAC agreed with the CMPO proposal and requested the JCS to authorize his concurrence with the reduction to five nations. The JCS approved, and, on 15 December, CINCPAC notified the CMPO of U.S. MILAD concurrence.[2]

SEATO Exercises

(S) SEATO Exercise SUBOK (PX-43) was an amphibious, airborne, air landed exercise conducted on 5-7 April 1971 in the Lingayen Gulf area of Luzon, ROP. The scenario envisioned the activation of SEATO Plan 4, in which aggressor forces had advanced into SEATO territory. An offensive was launched by SEATO air and naval forces to gain air superiority, delay the enemy advance, and interdict lines of communication. SUBOK was the largest SEATO exercise held in several years. Some 12,000 personnel (about 5,100 U.S.) and 29 ships representing five nations participated. The exercise surfaced some communication and coordination problems resulting from inexperience on the part of small member nations and incompatibility of land-based communications equipment. Insofar as one objective of such exercises was to identify problem areas, and another was to exercise a multi-national force, Exercise SUBOK was considered a success.[3]

(S) SEATO Exercise Px-44 was approved by the MILADS at MA34C and MA35C, and scheduled for February 1972. Australia was to provide the exercise director and the U.S. the deputy director. The preliminary planning conference was held in August 1971 in Canberra, Australia. The South China Sea was to provide the setting, with naval forces deploying from Philippine waters and terminating at Sattahip, Thailand.[4]

(S) SEATO Exercise PX-42 was planned as a ground-air command post exercise (CPX). The objectives were to test and examine selected aspects of initial deployment, defensive operations, and logistics support operations of Plan 4 in Thailand. PX-42 was scheduled for June 1972 with exercise head-quarters

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1 J5141 HistSum, Dec 71.

2 Ibid.; CINCPAC 022035Z Dec 71; JCS 8419/110031Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 150632Z Dec 71.

3 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, p. 26; J3B16 HistSum, Apr 71.

4 J514 Point Paper, 30 Aug 71, Subj: SEATO Maritime and Naval Control of Shipping Exercise (SMPO PX-44).

programmed for Korat, Thailand. The preliminary planning conference was held at Bangkok from 29 November to 3 December 1971.[1]

Cooperation in Southeast Asia

(TS) CINCPAC, as the senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific, had taken the initiative, in 1970, toward regional coordinating mechanisms between RVN, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia in the effort to repel the communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Past efforts against this threat had been fragmented, and the threat was countered in different ways, depending upon the political parameters for the country involved. On 29 June 1970, CINCPAC chaired a meeting in Bangkok of senior representatives from the U.S. Missions in the four countries. The primary purpose was to develop a regional approach to the encouragement of mutual cooperation by the countries concerned. CINCPAC proposed a Tripartite Joint Information Center (JIC) to include Cambodia, RVN, and Thai armed forces participation, with the U.S. Defense Attache in Phnom Penh as coordinator. Ethnic and regional animosities precluded the formal establishment of the JIC. In August and December 1970, CINCPAC continued to press for regional participation in the protection of Cambodia. In January 1971, Tripartite Deputies Meetings began, with senior military representatives of the U.S., RVN, and Cambodia participating.[2]

(TS) By the end of 1971, there were indications that the RVN, Cambodia, Thailand, and covertly, Laos were beginning to work together in their military efforts. In addition to the Tripartite Deputy meetings, a Combined Interdiction Coordinating Committee had been formed between the U.S. and RVN; Royal Thai Air Force liaison teams were deployed in Cambodia (Thai air had already been committed in Laos); and the Special Operations Group of MACV (U.S. and RVN) had established a good working relationship with the U.S. - directed Lao and Thai irregular forces in northern Laos. However, the increasing limitations on direct U.S. involvement in ground operations dictated that planning focus more directly on operations within the capability of allied resources. The coordination of military efforts continued to be accomplished through decentralized planning and coordinating agencies. After a November 1971 meeting between CINCPAC, MACV, and the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, at which the imperative of indigenous regional cooperation was stressed, CINCPAC planned another such meeting in 1972.[3]

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[1] J3B13 Point Paper, 1 Mar 72, Subj: SEATO Land/Air Exercise PX-42.

[2] J5532 Point Paper, 10 May 71, Subj: Regional Management Aspects of Current Political/Military Situation in Southeast Asia; J5542 Point Paper, 23 Feb 72, Subj: Tripartite Deputies Meetings.

[3] J5553 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: SEAsia Coordinating Mechanisms.

ANZUS

(S) The Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Treaty, which was to become a bulwark of Free World security in the Pacific, had an almost casual beginning. After World War II, when China had become a communist state, Washington began to look upon Japan as its chief Asian ally. As a result, a much friendlier peace treaty had to be negotiated than was usual for an ex-enemy. To get approval for the treaty--which would greatly strengthen Japan--the U.S. had to give guarantees to both Australia and New Zealand, which feared Japanese military resurgence. Thus, on 1 September 1951, one week before the peace pact with Japan was signed, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. signed the ANZUS Treaty. The ANZUS Council was composed of the foreign ministers of the three signatories, who met annually. There was no formal or permanent mechanism or staff within the Treaty framework, but CINCPAC was accredited to the other governments as the U.S. Military Representative to the ANZUS Council.[1]

21st ANZUS Council Meeting

(S) On 18 September 1971, the Secretary of State announced that the 21st ANZUS Council Meeting would take place on 2 October in New York, and invited CINCPAC to attend. The U.S. delegation would be lead by Secretary Rogers; Foreign Minister Bowen and Minister Of Finance Muldoon would lead the Australia and New Zealand delegation respectively. CINCPAC accepted the invitation and stated that his party would consist of Mr. O. V. Armstrong, CINCPAC Political Adviser, and RADM L. R. Vasey. CINCPAC also requested thirty minutes to be allocated to him for a presentation on the threat to the ANZUS Area of the Pacific.

(S) The short (2 1/2 hours) 2 October meeting provided a good opportunity for the U.S. to exchange views with its allies. The principal topics of converation included:[2]

- Chinese Representation in the United Nations - Secretary Rogers explained that the Republic of China (ROC) had come to accept the fact that the PRC would eventually be seated in the United Nations. The Secretary reported that the U. S. was optimistic about the chances of keeping the ROC in the United Nations along with PRC.

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[1] J5141 Point Paper, 4 Jan 72, Subj: ANZUS Background.

[2] J5141 HistSum, Oct 71; SECSTATE 172162/180241Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 2503522Z Sep 71; BULLETIN, State Dept, Vol. LXV, No. 1687 of 25 Oct 71, p. 463.

- President Nixon's Upcoming Trip to Peking - Secretary Rogers believed that the PRC wanted to improve relations with the U.S. because of its difficulties with the Soviets; however, he expected no abrupt change in the PRC policy. He reported that there will be no abrupt shift in U.S. policy in the Pacific either.

- U.S./Japanese Relations - Assistant Secretary Marshall Green reported that President Nixon's Peking trip and economic policies had shaken the Japanese, and that Prime Minister Sato's political base had been badly eroded. Secretary Rogers commented that our problems with Japan should be manageable as long as we keep Japan's importance in mind.

- Indian Ocean - Australia questioned the U. S. capability to meet the increased Soviet Indian Ocean presence. Admiral McCain responded by referring to the coordinated U. S./AUST/U. K. aerial reconnaissance, U. S. ship visits in the area and plans for the continued U. S. use of naval and aircraft repair facilities in Singapore.

- South Pacific Forum - The New Zealand representation referred to the progress in regional cooperation made at the recent meeting in Wellington of the South Pacific Forum (SPF). The SPF was composed of independent and self-governing States in the South Pacific which had convened to discuss mutual cooperation and economic development.

ANZUS Military Representatives Meeting

(C) While attending the 21st ANZUS Council meeting in New York, Admiral McCain decided that it would be worthwhile to resume periodic meetings of ANZUS military representatives (MILREPs), the last of which was held in 1956. CINCPAC requested the approval of the JCS, noting that the changing of U. S. posture in the Far East and Southeast Asia had caused Australia, in particular, to re-examine its defense policies. He considered it important to maintain a suitable level of interest in the ANZUS Treaty, to reassure the treaty partners, and to inject new vitality into the organization. The JCS approved the MILREP meeting, with the proviso that the meeting not suggest that the U.S. Government had extended, nor was willing to extend, its current commitments under the treaty. In particular, the JCS advised that the part of the treaty specifying

consultations or actions in response to threats pertained only to the Pacific Ocean area. In order to avoid emphasis being given to the Indian Ocean or Malaysia-Singapore areas by the treaty partners, the JCS suggested that CINCPAC not propose agenda items relating to those areas.[1]

(C) On 17 December 1971, CINCPAC invited the Australian MILREP, ADM Sir Victor Smith, and the New Zealand MILREP, LGEN Richard J. H. Webb, to attend a meeting in Hawaii in early 1972. At the end of 1971, General Webb had accepted; Admiral Smith had reserved his decision pending further discussion, and no date had been set.[2]

ASEAN

(S) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 to promote economic growth, social progress, and cultural development of the member nations. These were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Disputes such as the Philippines claim to Sabah, a Malaysian possession, hampered the progress of the group until late 1969.[3]

(C) On 25 November 1971, the ASEAN meeting of foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia approved a declaration of neutrality for Southeast Asia. The declaration was a compromise version which, in effect, established neutralization as a long range goal. Subsequent statements by ASEAN members stipulated that neutralization was not to be achieved quickly at the expense of bi-lateral or multi-lateral arrangements then in effect, Although the ASEAN declaration had a potentially adverse political impact on the U.S. domestic scene, the fact remained that the member nations were willing to stand together on a major policy decision which affected the entire region. CINCPAC supported the ASEAN initiatives toward regional cooperation, but questioned whether the declaration would help or hinder the attainment of security for Southeast Asia.[4]

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[1] CINCPAC 270410Z Nov 71; JCS 7030/092157Z Dec 71.
[2] J5141 Point Paper, 7 Jan 72, Subj: Status of ANZUS MILREP Meeting Invitations (S); CINCPAC 172225Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 172226 Dec 71; Defense Canberra 240315Z Dec 71; NZ DEF Wellington 240001Z Dec 71.
[3] J5141 Point Paper, 12 Apr 71, Subj: ASEAN.
[4] J5122 Point Paper, 6 Dec 71, Subj: ASEAN Neutralization Declaration.

SECTION III -- COUNTRY RELATIONSHIPS

Cambodia

(C) In addition to CINCPAC's initiatives toward regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, he played a key personal role, with markedly political overtones, in the improvement of U.S.-Cambodian relationships. As a result of the bad health of Prime Minister Lon Nol, the medical facilities of the U.S. were offered and accepted by the Cambodian Government. The Prime Minister arrived in Hawaii in February 1971 for treatment at the Tripler U.S. Army General Hospital. After his release from the hospital, Lon Nol spent several recuperative weeks as the guest of CINCPAC. In April, upon Lon Nol's return to Cambodia, the U.S. Ambassador advised CINCPAC of the Prime Minister's reaction:[1]

* * * * *

> When I greeted him, Lon Nol told me how much he feels indebted to the USG and especially to you and your staff for the invaluable help and service you gave him. I would like to add my own expression of gratitude for your diplomatic and effective handling of the General and his entourage in a situation requiring tact and imagination. I cannot help but believe that his stay in Hawaii and the excellent care he received there have made an important contribution to our relations, and will be gratefully remembered by the General and the Khmer.

(TS) Later in the year, CINCPAC also hosted a visit from LGEN Sirik Matak, who was Prime Minister Designate of Cambodia during a period of resurgent ill health suffered by Lon Nol in August. During the visit, CINCPAC discussed some of the major problems faced by Cambodia. Among them was the continuing need for cooperation between Cambodia and the RVN. Sirik Matak told CINCPAC that a very good spirit of cooperation existed between the two governments, and between the major armed forces headquarters. However, he had received many complaints concerning the reprehensible conduct of Vietnamese troops, and he was attempting to find a formula to reduce the number of incidents involving the Vietnamese troops and the Cambodian populace. Sirik Matak believed that the key to the problem was command attention and strong discipline, which remedies he intended to discuss at the next Tripartite Deputies meeting. CINCPAC and Sirik Matak also discussed, on an informal basis, President Nixon's forthcoming trip to the

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[1] AMEMB Phnom Penh 1740/120615Z Apr 71.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER U. S. FORCES IN THE PACOM



* As to these Specific Programs:
OPERATIONS IN ANTARTICA
AEROSPACE DISTURBANCES
AND TRACKING STATION

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 90.

SECRET

PRC, the political situation in the PRC, and the then-current problems pertaining to the election in Vietnam.[1]

Republic of China

(TS) Changes in the U.S. policies toward Asia, and especially U.S. moves toward normalizing relations with the PRC, caused the Republic of China (ROC) to reassess the future value of its historically close alliance with the U.S. Particularly sensitive politically was the possibility that U.S. military strength on Taiwan would be reduced or removed completely. The impact of such a withdrawal was discussed throughout 1971 by the JCS, DOD, and CINCPAC in response to a National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 106) development of "political maneuvering room" in U.S. policy toward the ROC. In CINCPAC's appraisal of the military and political implications of total withdrawal, he advised the JCS that the political repercussions throughout Asia could be severe, and recommended against such a move.[2]

(C) The foregoing considerations were in the context of U.S. national strategy and foreign policy. On the local level, military problems concerning various provisions of the SOFA were also politically oriented. Many, but not all, of the irritants stemmed from the exercise of ROC jurisdiction over offenses committed by U.S. military and civilian personnel. One which did not was the abrupt ROC demand, in March 1971, to conduct customs inspections of household effects (HHE) inbound to U.S. personnel in Taiwan. This demand was made without notice, and was contrary to established precedent before the SOFA became effective, and for the six years since. COMUSTDC advised CINCPAC that, according to a ROC official, the decision was not politically motivated, but founded on ROC concern over security and blackmarketing. The official cited Paragraph 2, Article VIII of the SOFA, which stipulated that, unless contrarily expressed elsewhere in the agreement, "...members of United States Armed Forces...shall be subject to the laws and regulations administered by the customs authorities of the Republic of China." Since there were no other conflicting provisions, this official believed that Chinese customs authorities were fully entitled and authorized to inspect goods imported to Taiwan by SOFA personnel for their personal use.[3]

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[1] CINCPAC 200244Z Aug 71 (EX).

[2] J5125 Point Paper, 7 Jan 72, Subj: GRC - U.S. Relations; J5155 Point Paper, 17 Jan 72, Subj: Implication of Reduction or Removal of U.S. Military Presence on Taiwan (NSSN 106) (C).

[3] J73 HistSum, Apr 71; COMUSTDC 150810Z Apr 71; COMUSTDC 230450Z Apr 71.

(C) The U.S. Embassy and the State Department expressed strong disagreement with the ROC position, and COMUSTDC explained to the ROC that HHE for SOFA personnel was shipped by Government Bills of Lading (GBL), and that inventory forms were prepared under U.S. Government supervision at the points of origin. Nevertheless, by 5 May, 57 shipments of the HHE under GBL had been impounded by the ROC pending resolution of its right to inspect. By 29 April, agreement had been reached on an interim solution which specified that copies of the HHE inventory forms would be provided to the ROC, and that ROC officials could "observe" inspections of the cargo performed by U.S. military personnel. The final resolution of the right to conduct customs inspections was referred to the SOFA Joint Committee (military subcommittee) for negotiation of "procedures involving the entry of household effects into the agreement area for the private use of SOFA personnel." This wording carefully avoided direct confrontation on the "right" of the ROC to inspect. The ROC agreed to release the impounded shipments pending the outcome of SOFA committee recommendations, and the shipments were released on 16 May 1971. No other action occurred on this issue during 1971.[1]

(U) Another issue which developed as a result of the conviction by ROC courts of U.S. military personnel for criminal offenses was the lack of adequate facilities for confinement. On 4 November 1970, State and DOD had stressed the need for an agreement on confinement facilities in the event that sentences then awaiting appeal decisions were executed. On 13 August 1971, the ROC and the U.S. entered into an agreement in accordance with SOFA Article XIV, designating Taipei prison as the place of incarceration or detention for members of the U.S. military, the civilian component, and dependents. The agreement contained ten clauses ranging from dental treatment to items of health and comfort.[2]

(U) The Chinese SOFA provided for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the ROC over U.S. personnel only by recalling the waiver, agreed to in the SOFA, and only for certain specified offenses. Waiver recall had been exercised, the offenders charged and tried, and appeals lodged in three cases, two of which originated in 1969 and one in 1970. All three continued to generate official U.S. concern and copious correspondence during 1971.[3]

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[1] Ibid.; COMUSTDC 050450Z May 71; J5125 Point Paper, 20 May 71, Subj: Customs Inpsection of Household Effects - Taiwan.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, p. 47; COMUSTDC 250008Z Aug 71.

[3] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 42-52; Action on these cases during 1971 is summarized in this narrative. Complete documentation provided by the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate is filed in the CINCPAC History Archives.

Bohnenberger - Kennedy - LeBouef

(U) The above named U.S. military personnel were alleged to have robbed a Chinese taxi driver on 8 November 1968. They were tried for taking by intimidation and assault in April and May 1969, convicted, and sentenced to two years imprisonment. They appealed the judgment to a higher court, where they were convicted, on 18 September 1969, of robbery and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. They then appealed to the Taiwan Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment on 4 March 1970 and ordered a rehearing. The charge was intimidation, which was analogous to a new proceeding, but no further action on the case transpired in 1970.[1]

(C) On 19 January 1971, COMUSTDC notified CINCPAC that LeBouef had been reported absent without leave on 15 January. On 8 April, LeBouef was apprehended by military authorities and was placed in pretrial confinement pending court martial proceedings. In May, the ROC agreed that the three men could submit letters requesting "temporary" departure from Taiwan for humanitarian reasons. The U.S. would be required to use every effort to return the men if recalled to Taiwan, and additional sum would be paid the victim, and the men would be required to post bail. CINCPAC, State, and DOD agreed to this procedure.[2]

(C) On 2 June, the victim was paid a $125 solatium and signed a statement agreeing to withdraw his complaint of bodily harm. Under Chinese criminal law, however, this did not negate the criminal resonsibility of the men. On 18 June, the court set bail of $1,500 for each man, and, upon approval of fund expenditure by CSAF, the bail was posted on 23 June. Kennedy and LeBouef paid $500 of the bail, and Bohnenberger $135 out of personal funds. The U.S. paid $3,365.[3]

(C) On the next day, 24 June, the men cleared ROC immigration and departed by aircraft for Clark Air Base, Philippines.[4]

Baio - Tipton

(C) On 19 January 1971, COMUSTDC notified CINCPAC that LeBouef had been reported absent without leave on 15 January. On 23 April, LeBouef was apprehended

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 45-48.

[2] J73 HistSum, Jan-May 71; COMUSTDC 190455Z Jan 71; ADMIN COMUSTDC 210950Z May 71; CINCPAC 220419Z May 71; ADMIN COMUSTDC 250744Z May 71; CSAF 261747Z May 71.

[3] J73 HistSum, Jun 71; 374 CSG 020645Z Jun 71; COMUSTDC 030830Z Jun 71; CINCPAC 162313Z Jun 71; 374 CSG 180600Z Jun 71; CSAF 182248Z Jun 71; 374 CSG 210320Z Jun 71; 374 CSG 240515Z Jun 71.

[4] Ibid., COMUSTDC 240850Z Jun 71.

offense under SOFA, was punishable under Chinese martial law. U.S. officials informed the ROC that the waiver recall could not be considered if the trial was to be conducted under Chinese martial law, in which robbery carried a maximum sentence of death. In September 1970, the two men were convicted of attempted homicide, which was not under martial law and carried a penalty of five years to life imprisonment. The sentence for Biao and Tipton was three years, which was appealed.[1]

(U) On 21 January 1971, the Baio-Tipton appeal was denied by the Taiwan High Court, and the two men were reported absent without leave on 25 January. On 10 February, they surrendered themselves to Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) air base authorities, and the High Court judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court on 22 February. On 25 June, the CCK authorities were notified that the Supreme Court had rejected the appeal, and, on 16 August, petitions for executive clemency were delivered to ROC authorities.[2]

(C) On 15 October, the CCK authorities were notified that the request for clemency could not be considered, but that the accused could be eligible for reduction of sentence under an amnesty decree issued by the ROC President Chiang. The reduction of sentence was affirmed by the Taichung High Court on 16 October, and sentence was reduced to 18 months. On 3 December, Baio and Tipton submitted letters to the ROC requesting that they be allowed to return to the U.S. -- Baio for drug rehabilitation and Tipton for psychiatric treatment -- and that their sentences be commuted to fines. No reply was received to the letters, and, on 17 December 1971, Baio and Tipton were taken into custody by ROC officials to begin serving their sentences.[3]

Starks - Sweat - Eaton

(C) The case involving the above named military personnel began on 1 May 1970, when they were apprehended at their off-base house where marijuana and opium were allegedly found. There was no evidence at that time that Chinese or other third country nationals were involved. Narcotics offenses were recallable under the SOFA unless the offense was "directed against" U.S. citizens. The ROC issued a recall of waiver on 5 August 1970, and a preliminary hearing

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 42-45.

[2] J73 HistSum, Jan-Aug 71; COMUSTDC 260105Z Jan 71; COMUSTDC 120225Z Feb 71; COMUSTDC 250827Z Feb 71; COMUSTDC 290109Z Jun 71; COMUSTDC 191602Z Aug 71.

[3] J73 HistSum , Oct-Dec 71; COMUSTDC 180221Z Oct 71; COMUSTDC 090845Z Nov 71; COMUSTDC 180155Z Oct 71; COMUSTDC 040250Z Dec 71; Joint COMUSTDC/AMEMB Taipei 170848Z Dec 71.

was held on 18 September in the Taichung District Court on charges of possession of narcotics.[1]

(C) The charges, and the circumstances of the arrest, prompted much discussion among COMUSTDC, CINCPAC, PACAF, CSAF, the U.S. Embassy in Taipei, and the State Department. At issue was how the phrase "directed against" was interpreted; the inter se provisions of the SOFA, since only U.S. personnel had been accused or involved; the definition of marijuana as a narcotic in the charges; and the dismissal of court martial charges against the men based on insufficient evidence and improper search procedures. Further complicating the case was the fact that one defendant, Sweat, had been medically evacuated to the Clark Air Base hospital in the Philippines and had not been present at the preliminary hearing. Sweat was diagnosed at Clark as a severe schizophrenic, and the ROC had been approached in an attempt to have Sweat excused from Chinese jurisdiction based on incompetence to defend himself.[2]

(C) Although 1970 passed with no further judicial action on the indictment, other developments during December 1970 bore on the possible outcome. On 11 December, Eaton departed Taiwan with forged travel orders and identification papers. His departure, via USAF C-130 aircraft from CCK, raised the question of port-of-entry and egress procedures for personnel assigned in Taiwan. The USAF initiated an intensive examination of administrative hold procedures and other controls over personnel awaiting foreign judicial action. The fugitive, Eaton, attempted suicide in California on 23 December, after surrendering voluntarily at Norton Air Force Base on 21 December. On 27 December, he was returned to Taiwan and placed in confinement. Starks, meanwhile, had declared that, on advice of his civilian attorney, he would not re-enlist, thus becoming eligible for discharge on 1 February 1971.[3]

(C) In January 1971, the commander of the USAF organization to which the accused men were assigned voiced the opposite side of the sensitivity coin. He advised his Air Force superiors that the dilatory practices of the ROC Government in processing this and other cases were harmful to the morale and discipline of his command. On 16 January, the CCK unit reported that Starks and Eaton had been formally indicted by the Taichung District Court. The notice of indictment stated that Sweat was under medical treatment "possessing an acute schizophrenia and is insane." His case would proceed when he was available. The U.S. Ambassador, State Department, COMUSTDC, CINCPAC, and USAF commands up to CSAF debated the consequences and legalities of Starks refusal to re-enlist, possible discharge either in the U.S. or in Taiwan, and means

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 48-52.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.

to convince Starks that he should voluntarily extend his tour. The USAF finally, on 29 January, authorized Starks' commander to discharge him in Taiwan. The next day, on the advice of his counsel in Milwaukee, Stark extended his enlistment for 30 days.[1]

(C) On 6 February, Starks and Eaton were found guilty of possession of narcotics and sentenced to two years imprisonment. Meanwhile, on 29 January, a U.S. Federal District Court in Milwaukee dismissed a petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO) filed by Starks' counsel. The TRO sought to prohibit the USAF from releasing Starks to the custody of the ROC. On 1 February, Starks' attorneys filed a petition in the U.S. Supreme Court, with Justice Thurgood Marshall, to prohibit the Air Force from releasing custody of Starks. On 28 January, Starks' attorneys had filed another U.S. District Court suit to enjoin the Air Force from releasing custody, and to compel Starks' discharge in the U.S. The complaint also sought general damages of $5,000 and special damages of $545.00. On 27 February, Starks re-enlisted for an additional 30 day period, and declared his intention to do so until his case was concluded.[2]

(C) In March 1971, evidence of the political pressure being executed in the U.S. by the parents of Starks was conveyed to CINCPAC and COMUSDTC. Starks' parents had sent letters to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and had circulated petitions addressed to them, Senators Proxmire and Nelson, and Representatives Zablocki and Reuss. The petitions alleged that Starks had been railroaded on charges that had been dismissed by court martial for insufficient evidence.[3]

(C) The political pressure from the U.S. continued in April, with personal letters and messages between COMUSTDC, Admiral Baumberger, Secretary of the Air Force Seamans, and Representative Henry Reuss of Wisconsin, Starks' home state. On 29 April, the appeal hearing on Starks and Eaton began, but was continued so the court could visit the scene of the alleged offense. Another date for resumption was postponed when the Chinese attorney for the defendents became ill. The appeal hearing was convened on 29 July, and, on 5 August, the Taiching High Court denied the appeal and confirmed the two year sentence.[4]

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[1] J73 HistSum, Jan 71; CINCPACAF 040045Z Jan 71; COMUSTDC 230327Z Jan 71; AMEMB Taipei 312/220948Z Jan 71; USAFMPC 292255Z Jan 71; AMEMB Taipei 416/300521Z Jan 71.

[2] J73 HistSum, Feb 71, with 14 attached documents.

[3] J73 HistSum, Mar 71; CSAF 102135Z Mar 71.

[4] J73 HistSum, Apr-Aug 71; COMUSTDC 151115Z Apr 71; Ltr. Henry Reuss, Member of Congress, to Robert Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, 20 APr 71, n.s.; Ltr Seamans to Reuss, 27 Apr 71; 6217 CSG 290830Z Apr 71; COMUSTDC 241040Z Jun 71; COMUSTDC 301610Z Jul 71; COMUSTDC 060301Z Aug 71.

(U) On 24 September, CCK authorities notified CSAF and CINCPAC that the Chinese lawyer for Starks and Eaton did not believe the case could be appealed to the Supreme Court, but that an application for retrial was warranted. Petitions for executive clemency were forwarded to COMUSTDC for delivery to the U.S. Embassy for examination before delivery to the ROC. On 14 October, Representative Reuss requested to examine a copy of the clemency request before it was submitted, and, on 15 October, the CSAF was advised that the petition for executive clemency had been submitted to ROC authorities by the U.S. Embassy on 5 October. On 3 November, CCK received notice, directed to Starks and Eaton, and referring to their "statements" of 5 October, that the accused could request commutation of the two year sentences to one year in accordance with the amnesty statute. On 20 November, CCK reported receipt of a denial of retrial based on improper procedure. The ROC notice of decision was dated 4 October.[1]

(U) On 23 November, the USAF Military Personnel Center authorized Air Force authorities to discharge Eaton unless he voluntarily extended his enlistment on or before 30 November. Thus, both Starks and Eaton risked discharge in Taiwan unless they extended. COMUSTDC advised CINCPAC that requests to post bond, as had been done with Bohnenberger, Kennedy, and LeBouef, had been denied. On 13 December, the CCK base commander was personally served a request that Starks, Eaton, Baio, and Tipton be delivered to ROC custody in Taipei by 21 December, later changed to 17 December. The CCK base commander also advised CSAF that the sentences for Starks and Eaton had been reduced to one year.[2]

(C) On 16 December, the U.S. Ambassador in Taipei was informed by the State Department of a restraining order issued on 15 December in U.S. District Court. The order prohibited the U.S. from physically releasing Starks to the custody of the ROC. The Ambassador was directed to assure that Starks was not released, but the order did not prohibit delivery of Eaton, Baio, or Tinton. On 17 December, COMUSTDC notified CINCPAC that Eaton, Baio, and Tipton had been taken into custody by the ROC. The Chinese were informed of the court order pertaining to Starks, who remained in U.S. custody. In response to CSAF query, COMUSTDC confirmed that these were the first U.S. military personnel ever incarcerated in Taiwan. On 24 December, the ROC indicated its displeasure over

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[1] J73 HistSum, Sep-Nov 71; 374 CSG 240715Z Sep 71; CSAF 142116Z Oct 71; 374 CSG 150800Z Oct 71; 374 CSG 180300 Oct 71; 374 CSG 200200Z Oct 71.

[2] J73 HistSum, Nov, Dec 71; USAFPC 232204Z Nov 71; COMUSTDC 240240Z Nov 71; ADMIN COMUSTDC 150103Z Dec 71.

the failure to release Starks, citing his conviction under due process and the custom of international law. The issue was resolved when the restraining order was withdrawn, Justice Marshall denied a petition for further relief, and Starks was remanded to the custody of the warden of the new Taipei prison.[1]

Sweat Status Unresolved[2]

(C) In the foregoing narrative, the last mention of A1C Dennis Sweat was his medical evacuation to Clark Air Base, where he was diagnosed as schizophrenic. In August 1971, Sweat departed Clark Air Base on forged emergency leave orders to the U.S. In September, while Sweat was still absent without leave, the ROC informally stated that Sweat would be required to return to Taiwan and appear for a court review of his medical history. If his condition was confirmed as continuing to require medical treatment, he would be allowed to post bail and return to the U.S. for further treatment. The U.S. would be required to provide periodic reports on Sweat's condition and guarantee his return to Taiwan if he recovered.

(C) After Sweat's apprehension in the U.S., he was placed in Malcolm Grow USAF hospital at Andrews Air Force Base for psychiatric examination. His condition was confirmed as being mentally unfit for further military service. On 31 December, after the clinical findings had been sent to COMUSTDC, the concurrence of the ROC was sought to release Sweat from active military duty. If the ROC agreed, the inability of the DOD to return Sweat to Taiwan would have been tacitly acknowledged; however, should the ROC insist upon his return in compliance with previous conditions, CINCPAC supported the intention of the USAF to comply.

JAPAN

(U) On 21 December 1970, the 12th meeting of the joint U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee was held in Tokyo. Attending for Japan were Mr. Kiichi Aichi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone, Director General of the Japan Self Defense Agency (JSDA). The U.S. was represented by Mr. Armin H. Meyer, Ambassador to Japan, and Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC. The committee made an overall review of U.S. military forces and facilities realignments and consolidations in Japan as proposed by the U.S. The proposed actions

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[1] J73 HistSum, Dec 71; SECSTATE 226265/162153Z Dec 71; Joint COMUSTDC/AMEMB Taipei 170848Z Dec 71; COMUSTDC 200615Z Dec 71; COMUSTDC 280832Z Dec 71; CSAF 301613Z Dec 71; COMUSTDC 310552Z Dec 71.

[2] J73 HistSum, Aug-Dec 71, with 30 attached documents; J732 Point Paper, 7 Jan 72, Subj: Sgt Dennis Sweat Foreign Command Jurisdiction Case in Republic of China.

represented a streamlining of operational capabilities, in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, without significantly impairing the capability of the U.S. to meet its security commitments to Japan and other Asian countries. The projected overall PACOM force posture for the 1970s, as related to the security and defense of Japan, was discussed, and the importance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in that context was reaffirmed. The committee then endorsed the realignment and consolidation plans, which described actions relating to Misawa Air Base, Yokota Air Base, Itazuka Air Base, Atsugi Naval Air Station, and the naval areas of Yokosuka and Yokohama. The latter were scheduled for substantial reductions in operational and logistics activities. The proposed realignments affected about 12,000 U.S. military personnel, plus U.S. civilian employees and dependents. About 10,000 Japanese employees of the U.S. forces were also affected. On 30 March 1971, a joint U.S.-Japan statement announced that the actions planned for Yokosuka and Yokohama had been postponed or modified. Consequently, about 4,000 Japanese employees in the area would continue to be employed past the originally determined 30 June 1971 separation date.[1]

(C) The 13th Security Consultative Committee meeting was held in Tokyo on 29 June 1971, with CINCPAC, Ambassador Meyer, and Japanese representatives in attendance. The meeting was devoted solely to approving the agreement by which the JSDA assumed certain responsibilities for the defense of Okinawa after reversion. Although actual reversion was not scheduled until 1972, the agreement had been signed by the U.S. and Japan on 17 June 1971, and would be effective upon ratification by the U.S. Senate and the Japanese Diet. Thus, CINCPAC was concerned with U.S.-Japan relationships pertaining to U.S. forces in Japan proper, as well as those bearing on the negotiations for the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands.[2]

Administrative Hold Procedures

(U) On 23 June 1970, a USAF civilian school teacher in Japan, Robert A. Muskie, was involved in a motor vehicle accident in which two Japanese nationals were killed. Muskie subsequently left Japan by commercial air and refused to return for court proceedings. Efforts to convince Muskie to return, based upon Japanese assurances that he would be fined and released, were initially unsuccessful. After numerous appeals to reconsider, he changed his mind. In

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[1] BULLETIN, Dept. of State, Vol. LXIV, Nos. 1647, 1660, dated 18 Jan 71 and 19 Apr 71, pp. 77-79 and 528 resp.; CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, p. 57.

[2] J5124 HistSum, Jun 71, which cites CINCPAC 300615Z Jun 71 (EX); Pamphlet, Okinawa Reversion Agreement of 1971 and Related Documents, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 1 July 1971.

June 1971, he returned to Japan under USAF auspices, was fined 50,000 yen ($138.89), and returned to the U.S. the following day, 23 June.[1]

(C) On 26 June, a U.S. navy man, Forrest W. Henderson, was involved in an accident and placed on administrative hold. Henderson was nevertheless, allowed to leave Japan on official orders. Upon his return, he stated that he had reported to the local police and completed a written accident report, and also had informed his insurance company. Although he had been scheduled for an interview regarding the accident on 16 July, he was allowed to depart that day. As a result of this incident, U.S. Navy authorities included a requirement, in their administrative hold procedures, that judge advocates personally notify superior officers.[2]

NEW ZEALAND

(U) The DCO for New Zealand, as specified in CINCPACINST 5820.1D, was the Commander, U.S. Naval Support Forces, Antarctica (COMNAVSUPFORANTARCTICA), whose in-country headquarters was at Christchurch, New Zealand. In April 1971, the COMNAVSUPFORANTARCTICA, RADM D.F. Welch, suggested to CINCPAC that CINCPAC's interests in New Zealand could be better served by a DCO who was permanently stationed in or near New Zealand. Admiral Welch noted that he and his staff deployed annually to his advance headquarters in Christchurch for only five months, and that he was stationed in Washington, D.C. for the remainder of the year. He also informed CINCPAC that, on 1 July 1971, the National Science Foundation assumed budgetary responsibility for logistic support of Operation DEEP FREEZE, including the U.S. Navy participation therein. Admiral Welch acknowledged that the duties connected with DCO representation were not onerous so long as he and his legal officer were in New Zealand. However, if on-scene supervision or representation were required, prohibitive expenses could result if he or his legal officer were required to travel from Washington to New Zealand.[3]

(U) In June, CINCPAC requested the views of The Judge Advocate General (Navy), on the feasibility of changing the DCO in New Zealand to the Officer in Charge, U.S. State Sending Office (USSSO), Australia. The Navy JAG agreed to the change in designation and to JAG funding of any budgetary increase necessary. On 8 July, CINCPAC published Change 1 to CINCPACINST 5820.1D,

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[1] J73 HistSum, Jan-Jun 71; COMUSJAPAN 230507Z Jun 71.

[2] J73 HistSum, Jul 71; ADMIN CINCPACFLT 5800/230233Z Jul 71; COMFAIRWESTPACTO/CINCPACFLT 5800/260753Z Jul 71.

[3] J73 HistSum, May 71; J73 Memo for Record, 4 Mar 71, Subj: RADM David F. Welch, Visit to CINCPAC; Ltr, COMNAVSUPFORANTARCTICA, Ser W-155 of 28 Apr 71.

officially naming the Officer in Charge, USSSO, Canberra, Australia as DCO for New Zealand.[1]

Republic of the Philippines

Renegotiation of the MBA

(S) The Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947, as amended, was the agreement which authorized the U.S. to maintain military installations in the Republic of the Philippines (ROP). The original agreement was for 99 years, modified to 25 years in 1966. Because of the political turbulence and recurring issues regarding criminal jurisdiction, the ROP had requested that the MBA be renogiated, The U.S. immediately agreed, and, in 1970, work was begun on revision. The dominant theme in negotiating with Filipinos was stated by CINCPAC's Staff Judge Advocate early in 1970:[2]

> ....In any negotiations with the Philippines, it will be absolutely essential for the Philippine negotiating team to obtain concessions in addition to those initially offered by the U.S. It is therefore imperative that the U.S. open any negotiations with a very strong initial position, regardless of the fall-back position we may be willing to accept.

(S) By January 1971, a draft SOFA had been produced by close coordination between the Embassy in Manila, CINCPACREPPHIL, CINCPAC, and the Service component commanders in preparation for the working level negotiations. However, CINCPAC had not concurred in the draft fall-back positions pertaining to the tenure of the MBA. CINCPAC believed the issue of tenure to be of vital importance to the future U.S. position in the ROP. The Embassy had proposed a second fall-back position which would agree that the ROP could terminate the MBA after an undefined period of "adequate notice" without cotermination of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). CINCPAC did not concur with this fall-back position, which could allow termination of the MBA by the ROP without cotermination of the MDT, and without a specific number of years of advance notice of MBA termination. CINCPAC also did not agree with a sentence relating to taxation by the ROP of goods purchased by the U.S. for resale to U.S. personnel.[3]

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[1] J73 HistSum, Jun 71; CINCPAC 062148Z Jun 71; JAG 1210/222019Z Jun 71; Ch. 1, CINCPACINST 5820.1D dated 8 Jul 71, Subj: Status of Forces Policies and Information.

[2] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 63-66.

[3] J73 HistSum, Jan 71; COMNAVPHIL 5700/270836Z Jan 71; J73 Memo, 001-71 of 30 Jan 71, Subj Renegotiation of U.S.-Philippines MBA (S).

(S) In February, the MBA working group of U.S. and Filipino negotiators began discussions on reversion. The initial emphasis, because it had been a major bone of contention over the years, was on criminal jurisdiction, especially pertaining to waiver and custody provisions. However, the draft proposal had not been released by the State Department for use by U.S. negotiators, and, in fact, the existence of a CINCPAC-Embassy draft MBA was still classified pending authorization for its use from the State Department.[1]

(S) In April, CINCPAC commented on draft position papers proposed by the Embassy on criminal jurisdiction. He suggested to DOD that the Embassy proposals receive detailed study and coordination because of substantive changes embodied therein which did not appear to be viable in the ROP political climate. The Ambassador took exception to the, "...general negative tone..." of CINCPAC's remarks, remarking that the U.S. record in complying with the MBA had not been spotless. The State Department supported CINCPAC in principle, and suggested to the Ambassador that the subject of criminal jurisdiction be side-tracked in the discussions pending development of an agreed joint State-Defense position.[2]

(S) The State Department, CINCPAC, and the Embassy continued to suggest acceptable wording in the revised MBA, based on ROP reactions and counterproposals. Most of the divergent views between the U.S. and the ROP pertained to the criminal jurisdiction provisions of Article XIII. On 5 November, the Embassy legal officer forwarded a "clean text" of the Article XIII wording to date, noting ROP non-concurrences relating to the handling of physical evidence and suitability of confinement facilities. Agreement had not been reached on the exercise by the ROP of jurisdiction over Philippine nationals employed by, or dependents of, the U.S. Government. Also, the procedure governing the determination of official duty status had not been resolved, and the ROP had been informed that such agreement was essential, either in the MBA or in a separate note exchange, before the U.S. would accept Article XIII.[3]

(S) On 5 December, CINCPAC presented his views to the JCS and DOD concerning the tenure of the MBA. He noted that, within the past year, changes in the long-range planning concepts of the ROP had become perceptible--for example, in closer contact and relations with Russia, and the reaction of some ROP

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[1] J73 HistSum, Feb, Mar 71; AMEMB Manila 1894/021021Z Mar 71; AMEMB Manila 2061/060415Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 090243Z Mar 71.

[2] J73 HistSum, Apr 71; CINCPAC 100552Z Apr 71; AMEMB Manila 3241/090703Z Apr 71; SECSTATE 065683/170147Z Apr 71.

[3] J73 HistSum, May-Nov 71, with attached documents; Transmittal Form: AMEMB Manila to CINCPAC (SJA), 5 Nov 71 with 1 atch.

officials to the ASEAN declaration of neutralization in Southeast Asia. It was conceivable that, at some not too distant date, the ROP would want to terminate the MDT or the MBA. Such a decision could be hastened by reduction or elimination of U.S. security assistance. From the PACOM standpoint, CINCPAC stated, the U.S. bases in the ROP were assuming ever greater importance. The withdrawal fron RVN, the base rights problems with Japan and Okinawa, the political developments concerning Taiwan, and the uncertain status of the Trust Territory, when weighed against the strategic location of the ROP bases, were ample evidence of this growing importance. Therefore, CINCPAC once again stated his opposition to a tenure for the MBA of less than five years, which would allow time to adjust force deployments in the PACOM if the MBA were terminated.[1]

(S) CINCPAC reasserted his position on MBA tenure in a message to JCS and DOD on 23 December. He conveyed his agreement with the Embassy text on tenure which specified MDT and MBA cotermination requiring one year's notice to terminate amd a "reasonable period of time" for withdrawal of U.S. forces. However, he stipulated that a separate, concurrent exchange of notes be executed--classified if necessary--stating that the "reasonable period" for the withdrawal would be up to four years, or less if the U.S. could reposition in an orderly manner in a shorter period. Negotiations continued at the end of the year.[2]

Custody Receipt Problems

(C) As related previously in this chapter, guidance had been disseminated to assure the avoidance of "guarantees" to produce persons accused of foreign law violations. This was especially hazardous in the case of civilians under foreign criminal jurisdiction, because civilians could not be restrained or confined by military authority under U.S. domestic law. CINCPAC had issued a directive which required foreign officials to be informed of U.S. Government limitations relating to availability of accused personnel whenever a custody receipt was issued. When CINCPACREPPHIL instructed U.S. military units in the ROP to abide by this directive, the Embassy in Manila expressed concern. It was noted that the procedure placed U.S. civilians in jeopardy if a ROP official did not accept a custody receipt tendered with the verbal disclaimer. The result would be that such people would be confined, "in Philippine jails, all of which are characterized by overcrowding, filth, violence, and inadequate food." The Embassy suggested that the limitations on U.S. ability to control civilians be reviewed once again with ROP officials, and that the requirement to do so in each individual case be reconsidered. CINCPAC agreed that a one-time approach

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[1] J73 HistSum, Dec 71; CINCPAC 052131Z Dec 71.
[2] CINCPAC 231058Z Dec 71.

at diplomatic level would meet his requirement, and authorized CINCPACREPPHIL to so instruct the U.S. commanders in the ROP, which was done on 18 January 1971.[1]

(C) In February, the Embassy proposed to change the wording of custody receipts to avoid the question of personal liability of base commanders and to reflect U.S. Government responsibility for the accused. A revised receipt was submitted to the ROP Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), which countered with wording essentially the same in content, but slanted toward phrases in the MBA amendment of 1965. Because the proposal had been submitted by DFA, the new custody receipt was likely to be more readily acceptable to ROP legal officers, and, on 26 February, the State Department approved it.[2]

(C) On 1 March, the Embassy notified the DFA that its new custody receipt had been accepted by the U.S. Although the matter of responsibility for custody had been more clearly delineated, the new form did not solve the problem of "guarantees". Local ROP judges began to refuse to accept custody receipts in lieu of confinement by the ROP. CINCPAC advised DOD that this trend, which not only derogated the rights of the U.S. Government, but could effect MBA negotiations, should be protested officially at the diplomatic level. During June and July, custody receipts had been refused by Judge Gaddi, Court of First Instance, Angeles City (Clark Air Base) in several cases, and he had threatened to refuse all future custody receipts.[3]

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction Cases

(C) In 1970, several cases of accused U.S. personnel attracted considerable public notice. Even more inflammatory to Filipino public opinion was the citation by Judge Gaddi of a base commander, a base staff judge advocate, and finally the commander of Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Base, for contempt of court. The first two were ordered to be jailed, and the third was "severely censured".[4]

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[1] J73 HistSum, Jan 71; CINCPACREPPHIL 5820/040936Z Jan 71; AMEMB Manila 154/060931Z Jan 71; ADMIN CINCPAC 062132Z Jan 71; AMEMB Manila 442/150854Z Jan 71; CINCPACREPPHIL 5820/180314Z Jan 71.

[2] J73 HistSum, Feb 71; AMEMB Manila 993/020928Z Feb 71; AMEMB Manila 1691/240943Z Feb 71; SECSTATE 32530/260116Z Feb 71.

[3] AMEMB Manila 1820/010815Z Mar 71; CINCPAC 101909Z Jul 71; CINCPACAF 090300Z Jul 71; 6200 ABW 141006Z Jul 71; 6200 ABW 141036Z Jul 71.

[4] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 71-76.

The Williams Case

(C) Williams, a USAF member assigned to Clark Air Base, was charged with rape in August 1969. He had been released to Clark officials on a custody receipt which stated he would be produced in court, along with two co-defendents, McDaniels and Lane. Through administrative error, Williams was allowed to depart on PCS orders before the trial. CINCPAC had strongly supported the efforts of the Embassy to secure his return. In 1970, the Deputy SECDEF directed the USAF to reassign Williams from his new station to the Philippines, and Willians obtained a Federal District Court restraining order. In December 1970, the three defendents were subpoenaed to appear in Judge Gaddi's court, and, when Lane and McDaniel appeared, the Judge and the fiscal suggested that Williams failure to appear could be construed as a waiver of his presence.[1]

(C) The hearing continued on 7 January 1971, and, when McDaniel began to testify, the fiscal moved that his testimony be applied to Williams. The defense attorney argued that he did not have the authority to waive Williams' presence. The defense attorney submitted a court-directed memorandum requesting the court to consider the future proceedings as a separate trial for Lane and McDaniel, but, on 26 January, the court ruled that Williams had waived his presence at the trial, and that the court would consider the evidence to be against all three defendents. However, since ROP law required a defendent to be present at the rendering of judgment, Clark Air Base officials did not expect the court to promulgate judgment against Williams until he was actually present.[2]

(C) In June, the Embassy summed up the developments in the case againt Williams' co-defendents. Although the trial had ended in March, Judge Gaddi had gone on a three month vacation. He was compelled by the ROP Justice Department to return to work, which resulted in his strong reaction against accepting custody receipts. Subsequently, he was directed by the ROP Justice Department to submit a report on all cases pending in his court against Americans, and to account for the delay in those cases. In October, Clark officials noted that no judgment had been rendered in the case, and speculated that none would be until Williams had been returned to the Philippines. They stressed, however, that the long delay by the U.S. in returning Williams placed them in a poor position to demand expeditious action from Gaddi.[3]

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1 CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 71-72.
2 J73 HistSum, Jan 71; 6200 ABW 090117Z Jan 71; 6200 ABW 160326Z Jan 71; 13AF 010925Z Jun 71.
3 AMEMB Manila 6064/280929Z Jun 71; 6400 ABW 131022Z Oct 71.

(C) On 28 October, the court convened in the ROP to promulgate a judement, but instead, stated that no judgment would be rendered until Williams was returned. Judge Gaddi revealed in court that his transfer to another jurisdiction was imminent, and based his refusal on the grounds that Williams would soon return and an injustice could result if two separate judges promulgated separate judgments. On 7 December, Gaddi reaffirmed that he would not render judgment, because, although he had expected Williams to be returned by that time, this had not happened. He had been informed that Williams had taken his case to the U.S. Supreme Court, and that no further action on Williams' return could be expected until early 1972.[1]

Stevens - Ramsey - Bobbit - Brown

(U) Many cases involving U.S. personnel in the ROP were accompanied by political and public furor. Regardless of the offense charged, haggling over the exercise of jurisdiction, official duty certificates, custody receipts, and delays of judicial proceedings were common to many. The Williams case had been the impetus for contempt of court findings against the commanding general of Thirteenth Air Force, the Clark Air Base commander, and Williams' air force unit commander. In June 1971, a case against two airmen charged with possession of dangerous drugs developed into a cause celebre similar to the Williams case. On 3 June, Larry D. Stephens and Gregory Ramsey were charged, and warrants for their arrest were issued on 4 June. Custody receipts for the two men were signed by their squadron commander, LCOL Thomas E. Brown. The information, which had been filed in Angeles City Court, was refiled in the Court of First Instance (Judge Gaddi's Court), and the warrant and custody receipt processes were repeated. On 24 June, subpoenas were issued for an arraignment hearing to be held on 30 June, but, through administrative error on base, the defendents were not notified. When they did not appear for the arraignment, Judge Gaddi ordered the custody receipts cancelled, the arrest of the accused, and the appearance of LCOL Brown to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Base officials planned to produce the defendents and request revocation of the show cause order, and they did not expect adverse publicity to result.[2]

(C) When the base judge advocate and staff attorney, accompanied by the defendents, went to the court to explain the situation the next day, the defendents were immediately arrested and confined. The judge presented the base officials with an amendment to his show cause order, adding the name of the base commander, COL Aubrey M. Bobbit. The same day, Stevens and Ramsey were

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[1] 6200 ABW 280850Z Oct 71; CSAF 162122Z Nov 71; 6200 ABW 070806Z Dec 71.

[2] J73 HistSum, Jun 71; 6200 ABW 301222Z Jun 71; See 1970 History for details of Holman-Hodges case.

arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and released under new custody receipts. After the hearing, the judge was asked whether Brown and Bobbit could appear on the show cause hearing through counsel rather than personally. The judge replied that they must appear personally, or "we will have another Holman-Hodges case." Thus, the question of court jurisdiction, which was the crux of the Holman-Hodges case, had again surfaced. Further, base officials had begun to anticipate "full news coverage."[1]

(C) On 2 July, the day following the arraignment, CINCPAC advised the SECDEF of the potential complications in the case. He noted that the Holman-Hodges case had ultimately been resolved through diplomatic channels, and that Judge Gaddi had once again ignored the 1965 Amendment to the MBA regarding the honoring of custody receipts. He recommended that the case immediately be placed in diplomatic channels, that the Clark officers be directed not to appear in court, and that, if the judge held them in contempt, duty certificates be issued in their behalf. Simultaneously with CINCPAC's message, CINCPACAF pointed out to CSAF the implications involved. The judge was apparently seeking a confrontation on the specific issues of the validity of custody receipts and the binding effect of official duty certificates. These were two of the key criminal jurisdiction issues then deadlocking the MBA renegotiating panel. PACAF also recommended that the case be placed in diplomatic channels by the Embassy in Manila, based on violation of the MBA, and that Bobbit and Brown be directed not to appear in court. On 3 July, a joint State-Defense message authorized the Embassy to bring the case to the attention of the ROP Department of Foreign Affairs, and instructed Bobbit and Brown not to appear in court.[2]

(C) When neither officer appeared at the 7 July show cause hearing, the judge took the case under advisement. The day before, after a personal visit by COL Bobbit to the judge had produced no results, the Embassy delivered a diplomatic note to the DFA. The DFA replied with a note requesting reconsideration of the U.S. Government order that Bobbit and Brown not appear. On 10 July, the court found Bobbit and Brown guilty of contempt, and fined each 1,000 pesos. If the fines were not paid within five days, they were to be jailed for six months. Also, the custody receipts for Stevens and Ramsey were cancelled.[3]

(C) After extensive discussion between U.S. military, Embassy, and Washinton officials, the local Sycip and Company law firm was engaged to represent

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[1] 6200 ABW 011011Z Jul 71.

[2] CINCPAC 020617Z Jul 71; CINCPACAF 020230Z Jul 71; SECSTATE 120500/031531Z Jul 71.

[3] AMEMB Manila 6366/070925Z Jul 71; AMEMB Manila 6367/070926Z Jul 71; 6200 ABW 100829Z Jul 71.

the U.S. Government. The law firm filed a motion in Gaddi's court on behalf of Bobbit and Brown requesting that the court's contempt order be suspended to allow presentation of evidence on the question of jurisdiction. The motion was denied, and on 27 July, the court denied a motion for reconsideration of his 10 July order directing the delivery of Stevens and Ramsey to the court. On 31 July, the Embassy reported that the ROP Supreme court had issued a summons to Judge Gaddi requiring him to answer U.S. petition for certiorari. Although the Supreme Court did not issue a restraining order, it was the judgment of the Sycip firm that Gaddi would not enforce the contempt order or move to arrest Stevens and Ramsey while the case was before the Supreme Court.[1]

(C) On 19 August, Judge Gaddi filed his answer to the Supreme Court, and also filed a motion requesting the court to order Bobbit and Brown to post bail, ostensibly to prevent them from leaving the country. Ten days later, on 29 August, the Clark Air Base commander, COL Bobbit, died of a heart attack. Prior to his death, the Supreme Court had delivered to the Sycip firm an order tentatively setting 17 September for the hearing of Gaddi's motion. After Bobbit's death, the law firm recommended that the new base commander be immediately substituted as a petitioner in the Supreme Court case. The Supreme Court granted a petition for the substitution of COL John R. Geyer on 15 September.[2]

(C) On 11 October, the Stevens-Ramsey trial on the original charges resumed. Both defendents appeared in court, and an Air Force special agent who was brought back from the U.S. to testify for the prosecution was heard. No further progress on the Stevens-Ramsey trial was made during the balance of 1971, nor was a decision forthcoming on the Geyer-Brown Supreme Court case. In December, another show cause order was issued by Judge Gaddi to Geyer and Brown in connection with the non-appearance of another airman, James L. Chavis. Chavis had been arraigned on a rape charge in July, but had absented himself without leave from Clark on 19 November. When the case was called for trial on 13 December, and the defendant failed to appear, the court issued the show cause order and also ordered the immediate arrest and confinement of Chavis. On 26 December, Chavis surrendered to base officials and was confined in the base stockade pending court-martial action.[3]

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[1] J73 HistSum, Jul 71; 6400 ABW 190943Z Jul 71; 6200 ABW 280837Z Jul 71; AMEMB Manila 7198/310506Z Jul 71.

[2] AMEMB Manila 8062/260908Z Aug 71; J73 HistSum, Sep 71; AMEMB Manila 8357/040532Z Sep 71; AMEMB Manila 8962/230533Z Sep 71.

[3] CSAF 012141Z Oct 71; 6200 ABW 110455Z Oct 71; J73 HistSum, Dec 71; 6400 ABW 101436 Z Dec 71; 6200 ABW 130527Z Dec 71; 6200 ABW 270907Z Dec 71.

(U) The foregoing narrative was constructed to reflect basic action relating to the two cases discussed. The political connection with military command and administration was sketched in general terms, but the intense and volatile environment which existed in the ROP was difficult to project within the scope of this history. Perhaps the most graphic illustration was contained in a mimeographed handbill which was distributed to Filipino employees of the Clark Air Base Exchange on 21 October 1971. The named author was unknown, and was apparently a pseudonym:[1]

> IS COL BOBBITT REALLY DEAD? BY: PABLO S RAMOS. COL AUBREY BOBBITT, FORMER CLARK AIR BASE COMMANDER, WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE DIED SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1971, ACCORDING TO NEWS REPORT. HOW TRUE THIS IS, NO ONE CAN TELL. EXCEPT A NUMBER OF 'INSIDERS', NOBODY HAD SEEN THE 'CORPSE'. THE OTHERS WHO CLAIMED THAT THEY SAW IT COULD NOT PROVE IF IT WAS THE REAL BOBBITT. AMAZINGLY, EVERYTHING HAD BEEN SKILLFULLY DONE TO MAKE HIS 'DEATH' REAL, FROM THE MEMORIAL SERVICES TO THE RAISING OF THE AMERICAN FLAG INSIDE CLARK AT HALF MAST. A THOROUGH AND COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PRECIPITATED THAT 'TIMELY DEMISE' OF BOBBITT, DISCLOSED A SURPRISING REALITY THAT BELIED THE NEWS REPORT. AS KNOWN TO EVERYBODY, THERE WAS A WARRANT OF ARREST FOR BOBBITT ISSUED BY JUDGE CEFERINO GADDI OF ANGELES CITY COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE FOR HIS (BOBBITT) CONTEMPT (SIC) OF COURT. IT IS ALSO A KNOWN FACT THAT AMERICAN SERVICEMEN TREAD AN ESCAPE ROUTE IN ELUDING PHILIPPINE LAWS. AMERICAN SERVICEMEN CHARGED OR CONVICTED BY PHILIPPINE COURTS ARE SECRETLY FLOWN OUT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERTLY DONE TO COL AVERILL HOLMAN. THIS MAKES CLOWNS OF THE PHILIPPINE COURTS FISCALS AND JUDGES, WHO SEEM TO WELCOME AND ENJOY SUCH DIRTY TRICKS. BUT THIS DID NOT ESCAPE THE ANGRY PROTEST AND DENUNCIATION OF THE OTHER SECTOR OF OUR SOCIETY. SEVERAL TIMES HAD STUDENTS, WORKERS AND PROFESSIONALS DEMONSTRATED AGAINST THIS LOATHSOME TACTICS OF AMERICAN LEECHES (SUCKERS OF PHILIPPINE NATURAL RESOURCES). THESE RESULTED IN A GRADUAL EROSION AND IMMINENT COLLAPSE OF U.S. INTEGRITY (IF THERE'S ANY). IT WAS THEIR DESIRE TO CHECK THIS WANING INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. THAT THEY (C.I.A. AND BASE AUTHORITIES) DECIDED TO DEVISE A NEW SYSTEM OF ESCAPE ROUTE. SO THAT IT IS TO BE EXPECTED IN THE FUTURE THAT AMERICANS CHARGED OR CONVICTED BY PHILIPPINE COURTS WILL ALL DIE. ALSO ONE OF THE MAIN CAUSES OF BOBBITT'S

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[1] 3200 ABW 210852Z Oct 71.

'DEATH' WAS HIS BEING SYMPATHETIC WITH LABOR CAUSE. HAD THERE BEEN NO PRESSURE FROM THE HIGHER AUTHORITIES, HE WOULD HAVE GRANTED ALL THE DEMANDS OF THE STRIKERS LAST JULY. DUE TO THIS, THE U.S. MILITARY AUTHORITIES DECIDED TO TAKE BOBBITT OUT OF THE BASE FOR WHATEVER CONSEQUENCES THAT MAY ENSUE AND INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT HE JUST ASSUMED THE POSITION BEFORE THE JULY STRIKE. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT WITHOUT THEIR KNOWLEDGE THAT THEY WOULD BE THE LAUGHING STOCK, IF THE TURN OVER WOULD TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY. THIS TIME THEY WERE VERY CAUTIOUS KNOWING THAT ANOTHER FALSE MOVE WOULD COMPLETELY RUIN THEIR ALREADY DAMAGED IMAGE. ONE COULD NOT JUST MAGINE THE U.S. HAVING ALL THE MILITARY EXPERTS NEEDED, GOOFING TWICE IN A ROW (OF COURSE THEY WOULD NOT ADMIT IT) IN CHOOSING OF THE BASE COMMANDERS OF THE BIGGEST MILITARY INSTALLATION IN THE FAR EAST. COL. MARET WAS GIVEN THE POST AFTER HOLMAN, BOBBITT WAS REPLACED BY GEYER, AND THESE WERE DONE IN SO SHORT A TIME THAT THEY HAD TO SAVE THEIR FACES BY GIVING A GRACEFUL..ERR..DISGRACEFUL EXIT. (THIS INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO US BY THE 'INSIDERS')

Thailand

(C) As mentioned elsewhere in this history, no SOFA or other formal agreement existed between the U.S. Government and the RTG relating to the jurisdiction of U.S. military and civilian personnel. Each case was handled on an ad hoc basis by the officials of both countries. Two cases involving the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the RTG over U.S. personnel in capital offenses were concluded in 1971. The older of the two began in 1969; the other in 1970.

The Walker Case

(C) On 1 January 1969, Thai police arrested MSGT Eugene M. Walker on suspicion of murdering his 16 month old adopted daughter of Thai nationality. Walker was initially found guilty of premeditated murder and sentenced to death. Upon appeal, the offense was reduced to causing death without intent and the sentence changed to five years imprisonment. On 3 December 1970, Walker appealed to the Thai Supreme Court.[1]

(S) Oral arguments were heard for the accused on 12 May 1971, and a decision was expected within 90 days. Before the decision was rendered, the possibility of Walker either forfeiting bail or being evacuated for psychiatric reasons was

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[1] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 78, 79.

discussed. In response to a PACAF query, the base judge advocate at Udorn had described Walker as being unstable and suicidal when intoxicated. He had attempted suicide and had exhibited violence toward his associates on several occasions. Added to that, a Thai judicial official at Udorn had suggested that the best solution for all concerned was for Walker to forfeit bail and leave the country. PACAF, after coordination with the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate, had requested comments from COMUSMACTHAI, the Deputy Commander 7/13 AF, and the U.S. Embassy. All took exception to any prospect that Walker not be present when the Supreme Court decision was announced.[1]

(S) On 9 August, CINCPAC's Deputy Staff Judge Advocate discussed the Walker case with counter-parts at COMUSMACTHAI. CINCPAC was told that the Thai official who had suggested forfeiture of bail was a very junior official whose advice could not be considered reliable. Also, the Walker case had become enmeshed in high level RTG power politics, and was, consequently, a highly sensitive topic. If Walker were to jump bail, it would be considered insulting to the Thai Supreme Court. Complicating the entire affair was the question of DCO (COMUSMACTHAI) responsibility and relationships with the Air Force units in the field. CINCPAC coordinated with all concerned and stated the position that, if hospitalization of Walker was necessary, it should be in-country, and not by medical evacuation.[2]

(S) On 28 October, Walker appeared at the Udorn Provincial Court for the reading of the Supreme Court judgment. The sentence of the appellate court was upheld, the five year sentence was confirmed, and Walker was imprisoned on the same day. Ensuing correspondence indicated that a request for a royal pardon was being prepared, but no immediate plans to press for pardon were underway because a denial would commit the requestor to serve a minimum of two more years before another request would be considered.[3]

The Mills Case

(S) On 27 December 1970, Mrs. Georgetta Mills was charged by the Thai police with the murder of her husband, TSGT Charles A. Mills, USAF. At that time, Mrs. Mills was in Thailand on a tourist passport. Her Thailand visa had expired. She was employed by the U.S. Army Procurement Office in Bangkok. At her first hearing, on 30 December 1970, her case was bound over to 8 January 1971.[4]

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[1] J73 HistSum, Apr, Aug 71; 7.13 AF 140805Z Apr 71; CINCPACAF 022030Z Aug 71; CINCPACAF 022035Z Aug 71; CINCPACAF 022040Z Aug 71; 7/13 AF 050907Z Aug 71; COMUSMACTHAI 051016Z Aug 71; CINCPACAF 060200Z Aug 71.

[2] J73 Memo, 19 Aug 71, Subj: Walker Case.

[3] J73 HistSum, Oct 71; 432 CSG 280952Z Oct 71; J73 HistSum, Nov 71; 7/13 AF 030831Z Nov 71.

[4] CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 81,82.

(C) Because Mrs. Mills was not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), questions arose regarding the desirability of U.S. Government-funded bail bond. At the 30 December hearing, Mrs. Mills had posted part of the bail and the MACTHAI legal advisor had posted the remainder because of the up-coming holiday recess and his assumption that the U.S. would post bail as in military cases. The Embassy, COMUSMACTHAI, and USAF officials in Thailand recommended that the U.S. provide that portion of the bail bond not funded by the accused to avoid the possibility that a U.S. female citizen be confined in a Thai jail. PACAF, in a summary to CSAF, noted that Mrs. Mills was not a command-sponsored dependent, but was in Thailand under tourist status. Normally, tourists were a State Department responsibility. Also, PACAF noted that she had not personally initiated a request for funds; that she owned real estate in the U.S.; and, that a risk existed that Mrs. Mills would attempt to depart Thailand prior to completion of the trial if she became overwrought or discouraged. Nevertheless, PACAF supported the provision of contingency funds from U.S. sources if the MACTHAI legal advisor withdrew his support and Mrs. Mills was financially unable to post the entire bond.[1]

(C) On 8 January, Mrs. Mills appeared in court. The MACTHAI legal advisor was released as surety and additional security for her release was provided by a professional bondsman, apparently paid by the defendant. Present at the hearing were the Staff Judge Advocate of the Deputy Commander, 7/13 AF, the Thai legal advisor to COMUSMACTHAI, and a U.S. Embassy representative. Also present as observers were two representatives of the Afro American Women's Society. The day after the hearing, Mrs. Mills formally requested the 7/13 AF Staff Judge Advocate to obtain $5,000 from U.S. Government sources to assist in her trial.[2]

(C) On 15 January, PACAF passed to CINCPAC the information that, although Mrs. Mills had stated her intention to give power of attorney to her sister in the U.S. in order to borrow money on her property, she had not yet done so. Also, a legal point had arisen as to whether Mrs. Mills was the legal widow and whether she and TSGT Mills had been lawfully married. Later information was provided which supported Mrs. Mills' position as the legal widow. Two marriage ceremonies were on record, the second following the final date of a divorce decree. On 27 January, the Thai attorney for Mrs. Mills stated that he had been paid $1,000 cash, with an additional $2,000 contingent upon acquital. The U.S. had not yet provided any funds for use by the defendent.[3]

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[1] J73 HistSum, Jan 71; CINCPACAF 010010Z Jan 71; 7/13AF 041130Z Jan 71; CINCPACAF 050330Z Jan 71.

[2] 7/13AF 090200Z Jan 71.

[3] CINCPACAF 151930Z Jan 71; CINCPACAF 182031Z Jan 71; 7/13AF 160240Z Jan 71; 7/13AF 280310Z Jan 71.

(C) In February, the fourth, fifth, and sixth continuation hearings were held, all attended by U.S. official observers and members of the Afro American Woman's Society. On 23 March, Mrs. Mills was charged with murder and unauthorized possession of a gun, and ordered into confinement. After twice being denied, she was released on bail on 30 March. Under Thai law, the murder charge was punishable by death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for 15-20 years. The gun violation penalty was five years confinement and a fine of $500.[1]

(C) The first trial session was held on 17 May, the case was continued to 30 June, and further continued to 5 July, during which session the prosecution concluded its case. After two sessions for the defense, the court rendered its verdict on 13 August. Mrs. Mills was found not guilty of murder, but guilty of unauthorized possesstion of a gun. She was sentenced to six months imprisonment, reduced to three months because she had admitted that charge in court. The three month sentence was suspended for two years. When no appeal of the murder aquittal was filed by the prosecution the case was considered closed.[2]

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[1] J73 HistSum, Feb, Mar 71; 631CSG 031025Z Feb 71; 631CSG 260935Z Feb 71; 631CSG 241015Z Mar 71; 7/13AF 290620Z Mar 71; 631 CSG 310931Z Mar 71.

[2] J73 HistSum, May-Aug 71; 7/13AF 130900Z Aug 71; COMUSMACTHAI 310631Z Aug 71.

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CHAPTER XII

OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

First CINCPAC Conference on Preventive Medicine

(U) The first CINCPAC-sponsored Joint Service Conference on Preventive Medicine was held at Camp H. M. Smith, Honolulu, Hawaii, 18-22 January 1971. Forty-five physicians and specialists in the allied sciences representing the three military Services and the U.S. Public Health Service attended.

(U) The conference was convened for the purpose of addressing Preventive Medicine problems and activities. Numerous papers were presented covering such areas as Intelligence of Potential Preventive Medicine Value; Abstracts of Diseases of Preventive Medicine Interest; Immunization Information; Retrograde Cargo Processing; Entomological Intelligence; Water/Wastewater problems; Food Service; Drug Abuse; Training of Preventive Medicine Technicians; and Radiation Hazards/Lazer Usage. Over 1,500 copies of the proceedings of the conference were made available to military and civilian medical libraries throughout the free world.[1]

Spectacle Fabrication in the PACOM

(U) As a result of a review of the optical fabrication capabilities in the PACOM, the CINCPAC Surgeon determined that there was an excess of resources within the PACOM, while at the same time large numbers of orders for spectacles were being sent to CONUS for fabrication. On 2 February 1971 a proposed realignment of optical fabrication responsibilities, to eliminate duplication and make optimum use of available resources, was addressed to the Component Services.[2]

(U) As a result of comments and concurrences from the components, CINCPAC on 16 March 1971 directed the following changes in optical fabrication procedures within the PACOM:

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[1] J76 HistSum, Jan-Mar 71.
[2] CINCPAC ltr Ser 798 of 2 Feb 71, Subj: Spectacle Fabrication in PACOM.

--USARPAC:

(1) Eliminate multi-vision spectacle fabrication in Korea and transfer that responsibility to Okinawa. Equipment made excess by this change should be offered to COMUSMACV to assist in the establishment of an optical facility within the RVNAF.

(2) Be prepared to process all PACOM Navy multi-vision spectacle orders in Okinawa as of 1 July 1971, except aviation spectacles and requirements originating in Hawaii. The increased workload from Navy fleet and shore activities was estimated at approximately 200 pairs of multi-vision spectacle orders per month.

--PACFLT:

(1) Issue necessary instruction to fleet and shore activities throughout the PACOM (less Hawaii) to submit multi-vision spectacle (except aviation) orders effective 1 July 1971 to the Optical Laboratory, US Army Medical Depot, Ryukyus.

(2) Assume responsibility for fabricating single-vision spectacles (except aviation) for all Services in Guam and the Philippines effective 1 July 1971.

--PACAF:

Issue necessary instructions to Air Force facilities in Guam and the Philippines to submit single-vision spectacle orders to the appropriate Navy fabricating activity effective 1 July 1971.

(U) CINCPAC encouraged coordination among the Components on this subject, and recommended that CINCPACFLT consider participating in the existing Joint Army/AF PACOM Regulation on Optical Support (USARPAC Reg 40-17, PACAF Reg 167-1).[1]

CINCPAC Conference on War Surgery

(U) The fifth of the series of conferences on war surgery sponsored by CINCPAC was held 29 March - 2 April 1971 in Tokyo, Japan. The largest group of surgeons to participate in any of these conferences met and further refined the professional surgical guidance promulgated by previous conferences. Surgeons

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[1] CINCPAC 160105Z Mar 71.

from the three geographic echelons of hospitals where extensively wounded casualties received care exchanged information concerning results and complications attendant upon required surgical procedures. All conferees were actively engaged in the surgical care of Vietnam casualties. Over 2,000 copies of the proceedings of the conference were made available to military and civilian medical libraries and surgeons throughout the free world.[1]

Visit of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment)

(U) Dr. Richard S. Wilbur, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment), visited the PACOM during the period 29 August - 13 September 1971. The purpose of his official visit was to familiarize himself with the PACOM Drug and Alcohol Abuse Programs, the medical and environmental aspects of the herbicide program in the RVN, and the environmental aspects of the Kahoolawe Island (Hawaii) Bombing Range, and to determine if the Services were properly utilizing medical personnel and facilities. During his visit Dr. Wilbur visited many of the subordinate medical and non-medical commands of the following headquarters: CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, and COMUSJAPAN.

(U) A summary of Dr. Wilbur's observations, based upon his debrief at CINCPAC Headquarters, is as follows:

--Drug and Alcohol Abuse Program:

(1) Education. Education may be divided into two types: general information, i.e., newspaper articles, TV, radio, etc.; and unit education, generally conducted by unit personnel and consisting of verbal, written, and poster material. Both of these programs have reached the saturation point, at which it is inconceivable that servicemen do not have adequate information concerning the hazard of drug usage. Indications are that the programs were successful. Survey findings indicate that the majority of drug abuse begins within 30 days of arrival in Vietnam. Innovative programs to increase drug education prior to arrival require further exploration, which could take the form of increased educational programs at CONUS base plus concentrated lectures, slides, and movie presentations during travel to RVN. While answers from drug users are notoriously unreliable, there seems little question from surveys in Vietnam that a high percentage of those who abuse drugs in Southeast Asia also have had previous experience before joining the military and in the military prior to coming to Southeast Asia.

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[1] J76 HistSum, Jan-Mar 71.

(2) Identification. Prior to the formal testing program, identification came from either the individual's application to an amnesty program or through some incident. The urinalysis testing program initiated in June 1971 has developed sufficient experience so that the present identification may be relied upon. Present laboratory capabilities are inadequate to screen all personnel satisfactorily as frequently as is desired. The plans for developing a testing capability at SEATO Laboratory, Bangkok; Clark AB, RPI; and the 406th Medical Laboratory in Japan will help solve the problem. The current systems of utilizing laboratories in the CONUS for urinalysis is undesirable and will seriously reduce testing efficiency. Delayed reporting may be tolerable in large unit screening, but it will seriously hinder detoxification and rehabilitation efforts which require rapid reporting. Absolute identification of the urine sample as being one from the individual being screened has been a problem. Reliable unit testing in small units will require additional medical resources as well as a concerted effort on the part of unit commanders and other unit personnel. To avoid duplication of facilities and to expedite reporting, laboratories to do drug testing on urines should be on an area rather than a Service basis. A tri-Service committee will be established at the Departmental levels to accomplish this.

(3) Drug Suppression. In general commanders understand this problem and are working vigorously with other U.S. Government agencies and local authorities to reduce the availability of drugs; however, due to the availability of heroin in Southeast Asia, the ease of smuggling, and general acceptance by the population, the overall success of these programs is doubtful. These efforts should be continued if only to make drugs more difficult to obtain.

(4) Detoxification. Detoxification of patients regardless of the technique employed requires a completely drug-free atmosphere. This has been a problem, but security precautions and the testing of patients and staff have greatly reduced this problem. Detoxification varies between Services with the Army considering a patient detoxified once he has a drug free urine. At this time the patient may well be free of drugs in his urine, and over acute withdrawal symptoms but he is unstable, anxious, tense, and psychologically susceptible to going back on drugs. Medical crews on Aeromedical Evacuation Flights state the Navy patients who have undergone approximately two weeks detoxification are far more "normal" and easier to deal with than those rushed through the Army Centers. Lengthening the detoxification of all patients to 7-14 days and including some rehabilitation should be considered.

(5) Rehabilitation. A large variety of rehabilitation programs are being used. Those programs conducted at unit level and emphasizing the individual appear to have the best results. It is too early to standardize all these programs but certain general recommendations can be made: (a) a drug-free

atmosphere must exist; (b) program must last at least two weeks; (c) employ follow-up by return visits to rehabilitation center; (d) involve commanders and other unit personnel. Rehabilitations of personnel leaving RVN who are returning to CONUS can best be done in the CONUS. Those remaining in the service can best be rehabilitated in centers where their care can be coordinated with their new unit of assignment. Those leaving the service can best be served by a period of inpatient rehabilitation followed by follow-up programs conducted by the VA.



Dr. Richard S. Wilbur, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment), meeting with RADM C. L. Waite, CINCPAC Surgeon, and CINCPACFLT medical personnel on 30 August 1971.

(6) Future of Drug Abuse Programs in SEA. As the military capability of dealing with drug abuse continues to expand and the announced withdrawal programs are implemented, the susceptible population at risk will be minimized by the end of FY 71; therefore, it would seem that there is little need for massive new attacks upon the problem in RVN. Currently there is evidence that a disproportionate amount of time of both medical and line personnel is being devoted to the relatively small number of drug abusers. Education programs and unannounced surprise urinalysis testing seem to be having an effect upon those who previously took drugs early in their stay in Vietnam. The extension of these efforts should permit a lengthening of detoxification without a

concomitant increase in facilities and personnel. Long-range plans for rehabilitation centers must take into account the reduction of patients over the next year. Personnel presumed to remain in RVN in future years will be those with a relatively low incidence of drug usage. The problem of some kind of drug abuse among members of the military is age-old and must be expected to continue. The nature of the drugs, opiate, marijuana, LSD, alcohol, amphetamine, barbituates, etc., may change from place to place and time to time, but certain individuals will remain prone to abuse whatever is available. Therefore, education, concern of commanders, efforts of suppression, identification and rehabilitation will always be necessary.

--Utilization of Medical Personnel:

The current drawdown situation and the current replacement of hospitals and dispensaries is inefficient and ineffective, resulting in underutilization of some medical personnel while others are strained. Plans to cope with this situation are under study and do not seem to require any new programs. The future use of Physicians' Assistants (PAs) instead of physicians as Battalion Surgeons and below should be successful, based on the high degree of success accredited the experimental utilization of Clinical Technicians in noncommissioned officer grades in that capacity in the RVN. This visit has shown the values of an ongoing analysis of the need for physicians in many positions, and the possibility of their replacement by Medical Service Corps Officers, PAs, or other health professionals. A related problem exists in the use of medical facilities. To avoid duplication of facilities, and provide greater utilization of specialties the assignment of medical support by area rather than service will enhance efficiency.

As a general statement, Dr. Wilbur observed that the command was doing a much better job in controlling the drug problem than civilian agencies. He was heartened, he said, over the military effort.

(U) CINCPAC made the following observations based on the above statements:

a. That he fully supported the establishment of urinalysis testing laboratories on an area basis rather than a Service basis, for reasons of efficiency and to expedite service, and he would continue to do everything possible to bring this about.

b. That he would immediately initiate action to request a re-evaluation of the current period of detoxification with a view toward increasing the period to a minimum of seven days.

c. That the concept of area utilization and joint utilization of available medical resources continues to receive his personal emphasis and

support; a proposal is currently being coordinated with the Components which will further expand this concept within the PACOM.[1]

Medical Support in the CCK/Taichung Area of Taiwan

(U) It came to the attention of CINCPAC in June 1971 that the small U.S. Navy outpatient dispensary in the town of Taichung, Taiwan, which supported essentially Air Force dependents, was to be returned to the ROC Army for disposal of its land, and that the Navy had programmed a new dispensary for construction, at a cost of $68,000, as soon as funds became available. CINCPAC felt that any such new construction was unnecessary, as the Air Force already operated a permanent 35-bed hospital at Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) Air Base, some 14 miles from Taichung.

(U) CINCPAC prepared and forwarded to CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF for concurrence a study which reached the following conclusions:

a. The Navy dispensary located in Taichung is no longer essential to provide medical care for beneficiaries who live in Taichung. Transportation available between Taichung and CCK and time to travel would not create any greater burden on the personnel there than is experienced elsewhere under similar conditions if they were required to go to CCK for their medical support.

b. The existing facility is marginal and must be relocated due to site availability. Construction of a new facility would constitute an unnecessary duplication and uneconomical use of medical resources. Therefore, the project (P005) for construction of a new Navy dispensary should be discontinued and the Navy dispensary closed on 1 January 1972.

c. The Air Force hospital at CCK should be assigned the mission of providing all medical support for beneficiaries in the Taichung area effective 1 January 1972. The question of whether an ambulance should be stationed in the city of Taichung should be evaluated by the local authorities.[2]

(U) The CINCPAC recommendation, in which the Components concurred, was that the Navy construction project be cancelled and that the existing Navy dispensary be closed on 1 January 1972, on which date the Air Force hospital at CCK would assume the mission of providing all medical support for authorized personnel in

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[1] J76 HistSum, Sep 71.

[2] CINCPAC ltr Ser 2878 of 19 Jul 71, Subj: Medical Support in the CCK/Taichung Area.

the Taichung area. The CINCPAC directive to this effect was dispatched on 15 September 1971.[1]

Medical Support for Thai SGU

(S) Following the deployment of Thai Special Guerrilla Units (SGU) into Laos in 1971, it was found during the dry season that medical support plans for casualties were not adequate. Patients were of necessity being brought to the 50-bed USAF hospital at Udorn, which had to be augmented by a 100-bed tent hospital. Department of Defense approved the use of U.S. military resources only through June 1971, and directed CINCPAC to plan for subsequent support from other sources. The CINCPAC plan provided for facilities support by CAS and the Royal Thai Army, including a 200-bed hospital currently operational at Nam Phong, the Korat Hospital (transferred from U.S. to Thai control), and agreements for support from various Thai provincial hospitals. Only in extreme emergency would U.S. sources provide support, and then only with DoD approval. Support of recent operations under this plan have been adequate and no major problems have developed.[2]

Venereal Disease in the PACOM

(U) Venereal disease in the PACOM is a continuing medical condition, characterized by high rates in unaccompanied tour areas. The diseases themselves break down into gonorrhea, the most prevalent, and all others of vastly less quantity. Gonorrhea is emminently treatable, though not eradicable as long as the source of infection, i.e., the bar girls and brothels, are outside of strict medical supervision. Given the public health conditions in most of the PACOM, the rates as compared to CONUS can be expected to be high as long as U.S. troops are present. The military effect of these rates is negligible as almost all are treated by one or two outpatient visits. The most recently reported figures show an increase in gonorrhea in RVN, Thailand, and Korea compared to averages for the immediate prior periods. This increase shows that education efforts and preventive measures should be redoubled in these areas.

(U) In the RVN for the month of November 1971 (latest available), rates were as follows: (cases per 1,000 strength per annum)

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[1] CINCPACFLT ltr Ser 5808 of 13 Sep 71; CINCPACAF ltr SGAXP, 10 Sep 71; CINCPAC 152000Z Sep 71.

[2] J76A Point Paper, 7 Jan 72, Subj: Medical Support for Thai SGU.

	Army	Navy/Marine	AF	Total
Syphillis	1.0	1.2	0.0	0.9
Gonorrhea	367.9	368.0	242.0	346.5
Other Venereal Diseases	36.9	142.3	22.5	40.1

(The category "Other Venereal Diseases" covers lymphogranuloma venereum, chancroid, and granuloma inquinale.)

(U) For other areas of the PACOM for November 1971, Army and Air Force rates for all venereal diseases were as follows:

	Japan	Korea	Okinawa	Hawaii	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Overall
Army	34.1	755.5	134.1	6.3	---	---	332.4	485.0
Air Force	292.0	653.3	102.2	7.3	299.3	178.8	591.3	306.6.

(U) For comparison, the Morbidity and Mortality Annual Supplement for 1970, published by U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, reports over 600,000 cases of gonorrhea reported in the U.S. in 1970, which is estimated to be only one-fourth or less of the real incidence of this disease. The reported disease rates for gonorrhea and syphilis have shown steep upward trends since 1969.[1]

Reduction in Medical Support

(U) During 1971 there was almost exactly a 50 percent reduction in the total U.S. hospital beds within the PACOM available for area support or dedicated to support of Southeast Asia. This reduction, from 7,523 on 1 January to 3,812 on 31 December, was made possible by continuing troop withdrawals, a general reduction in the level of hostilities, and continuation in the CINCPAC-directed policy of direct evacuation from the RVN to CONUS in those cases where return to duty within a reasonable period was unlikely.

(U) During 1971 the following medical facilities were closed:

93rd Evac Hosp, Long Binh, RVN
249th Gen Hosp, Camp Drake, Japan
27th Surg Hosp, Chu Lai, RVN
18th Surg Hosp, Quang Tri, RVN
8th Field Hosp, An Khe, RVN
91st Evac Hosp, Chu Lai, RVN.

(U) The continuing reduction in the number of hospital beds available

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[1] J762 Point Paper, 21 Jan 72, Subj: Venereal Disease in PACOM.

during 1971 was temporarily reversed on two occasions: The number of beds at the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan was increased from 100 to 150 when Yokosuka was designated home port for additional Seventh Fleet ships; and the number of beds at the Army's 6th Convalescent Center, Cam Ranh Bay, RVN was increased from 300 to 400 as part of the emphasis on the urine-testing program of the Drug Abuse Counteroffensive.[1]

(U) For a more detailed treatment of the Drug Abuse Counteroffensive within the PACOM, see Section I of Chapter IX (Personnel Activities).

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[1] J76 HistSums, Jan-Dec 71.

SECTION II--COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

Airlift of U.S. Currency

(U) In November 1970 Headquarters U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS) had reported to CINCPAC what were considered possibly unsafe practices in connection with the air shipment of U.S. currency to finance officers in the WESTPAC area. In view of the fact that approximately $35 million was being shipped monthly, USARYIS recommended in particular that the aircraft arrive at its destination during daylight hours, to avoid transporting currency by road during darkness, and that because of the sensitivity of the cargo, no additional passengers or cargo be loaded aboard the aircraft on a space-available basis.[1]

(U) CINCPAC referred the USARYIS recommendation to CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF, both of whom concurred in the necessity for revising existing procedures. CINCPAC on 13 January 1971 advised the commands concerned that pending formal publication of changes to CINCPACINST 7200.1E, the following changes would be made effective 15 January:

a. Aircraft would be directed to arrive at designated locations in sufficient time to allow ground transshipment of U.S. currency during daylight hours.

b. Aircraft would be dedicated to the airlift of U.S. currency; only under extreme circumstances would space-available passengers or cargo be authorized aboard currency-carrying aircraft.[2]

Third Annual PACOM Military Banking Conference

(U) The Third Annual PACOM Military Banking Conference was held in Hawaii 10-12 May 1971 to discuss subjects relating to banking operations in the PACOM. The CINCPAC Comptroller hosted the conference, which was jointly chaired by the Treasury Department and the Department of Defense (Comptroller). Approximately 75 representatives from 31 separate governmental and commercial organizations participated in the conference, during which the following major topics were highlighted and thoroughly discussed:

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[1] USARYIS ltr of 19 Nov 70, Subj: Funding WESTPAC Disbursing Officers; J72 HistSum, Jan 71.

[2] CINCPAC 130336Z Jan 71. The formal change (Ch 2) to CINCPACINST 7200.1E was promulgated 16 Jan 71.

a. The refinement of Special Banking Arrangements (five percent Interest Bearing Checking Accounts) with respect to rates of interest and service charges in conjunction with changing economic trends.

b. Expanded use of AUTODIN for bank transactions.

c. Annual review of Military Banking Facility (MBF) operations by base commanders.

d. Clarification of MBFs as Instrumentalities of the U.S. Government.

e. Control and recoupment of bad checks.

f. Standardization of logistical support furnished by military to MBFs.

g. Individual country items.

(U) The paramount objective of the MBF program is excellence in furnishing banking service to Defense personnel, and the consensus of the conferees was that the conference would materially advance this objective.[1]

Changes in Purchase Rate of Vietnamese Piasters

(S) In January 1971 the American Embassy Saigon, jointly with USAID and COMUSMACV, proposed to Department of Defense that the exchange rate for most official U.S. purchases of piasters be raised from 118 to 275 piasters to the dollar, effective 1 May 1971. It was estimated that some $105 million would be saved during CY 71 if the proposal were adopted.[2]

(S) Consultations among interested agencies were held on the subject during early February, as a result of which Department of Defense nonconcurred in the proposal. The MACV DC/S for Economic Affairs, who had participated in the discussions, briefed the CINCPAC staff on 10 February and indicated that the Defense nonconcurrence had been on political grounds. He also indicated that a change in the exchange rate could be expected later in the year, after the GVN elections and the start of the U.S. Congressional hearings on the FY 72 budget.[3]

(U) On 15 November 1971 the GVN announced that effective the following day

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[1] J72 HistSum, May 71.
[2] J722 HistSum, Dec 71.
[3] SECDEF 110021Z Feb 71; J72 HistSum, Feb 71.

the personal accommodation rate for piasters would rise from 275 to 410 per dollar, and would be a floating rather than a fixed rate. The official rate remained at 118 to the dollar.

(U) The subsequent loss incurred by Disbursing Officers and MBFs will be covered by the U.S. Treasury. The amounts of piasters on hand on the conversion date were as follows: USARV 293,159,779; 7th AF 4,034,525; NAVFORV 46,946,464. MBF holdings were: Chase Manhattan 21,077,394; Bank of America 40,247,911; American Express 14,701. The total combined official loss of 199,054,197 piasters, computed at the 410 rate, amounted to $485,498.04.[1]

Funding Conditions, 1971

(U) The administrative requirements of the Command and its subordinate headquarters were fully supported in FY 71 with funds from both the Operations and Maintenance, Navy and the MAP appropriations. The funding programs that were established for the new fiscal year (FY 72) also were fully adequate. A comparison of these programs for the two years is as follows (amounts in thousands):

Appropriation	FY 1971 Obligations	FY 1972 Program
O&M (N)		
Program 2 General Purpose Forces	$21,628.4	$18,839.0
Program 3 Intelligence & Comm.	1,798.3	1,979.0
Program 10 Support of Other Nations	21,918.4	21,614.4
Total O&M (N):	$45,345.1	$42,432.4
Military Assistance Executive		
L-30 Housing JUSMAGKOREA	$ 608.3	$ 674.2
L-60 Logistics Mgmt Expense	170.4	192.8
N-50 Training, U.S. MAP Pers.	24.7	39.8
T-10 Administrative Expense	189.3	211.6
T-20 Military Mission Expense	1,516.4	1,850.6
N-40 MAAG & Cmd Training Exp.	4,039.8	3,465.4
Total MAE:	$ 6,548.9	$ 6,434.4
Grand Total:	$51,894.0	$48,866.8.

[1] J722 HistSum, Dec 71.

The above figures represent funds provided direct to CINCPAC, exclusive of military pay and related costs of the Components and of the Shared Administrative Support (SAS) provided CINCPAC subordinates by the U.S. Embassies. These military pay and related costs were programmed at approximately $75,775,600, and the Shared Administrative costs which are billed the Department of Defense by the State Department were programmed at $1,667,400 for FY 72.[1]

(C) In general, the CINCPAC costs reflect an approximate $3,000,000 O&M (N) saving due to the drawdown in Vietnam, and lowered MAE costs by approximately $450,000 due to the reorganization of MAAG China. These decreases were somewhat offset by substantial new requirements for the Military Equipment Delivery Team in Cambodia (MEDTC) and a moderate increase for the Defense Liaison Group in Indonesia associated with increased MAP activity in that country. The previously unprogrammed buildup of the MEDTC in Saigon and Phnom Penh required an unusual amount of funding attention. Organized in January 1971, the team existed modestly through March on $28,900 O&M (N) support for temporary duty travel. In April funding was transferred to MAE and the three month requirement through June was $51,900. The FY 72 approved MAE program was $423,000. Because the 50 team members in Phnom Penh were to rely solely on the U.S. Embassy for housing and other support, the SAS costs projected for FY 72 climbed to $569,200. Approximately $225,500 of this amount supported a leased housing plan of nine team houses and an apartment building, including one-time renovation and furniture costs. To keep the costs down the plan provided that each team member, including the team chief, would be assigned a bedroom and would share living and dining facilities. Bedrooms not assigned to PCS personnel would house military personnel on temporary duty.[2]

Comptroller Reorganization

(U) On 1 October 1971 the Comptroller's Office was reorganized from three to two branches. The Management Branch and Special Programs Branch were combined into a single Management and Programs Branch. The office of Deputy Comptroller also was deleted, and that position established as the Chief of the Budget Branch. These actions were in response to the overall Command reduction-in-force in the fall of 1971 in which the Comptroller's personnel strength was reduced from 24 to 20. Subsequently, on 10 December 1971 the Comptroller was assigned CINCPAC staff responsibility for the audit response and General Accounting Office review functions previously assigned to the Performance

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[1] J721 HistSum, Dec 71.
[2] Ibid.

Evaluation Group of J8. This new mission was further assigned by the Comptroller to the Management and Programs Branch without increase in strength.[1]

U.S. Dollar Flotation

(U) The Presidential announcement of 15 August 1971 provided for stabilization of prices, rents, wages, and salaries at home, and indicated that the United States would no longer exchange gold to foreign central banks for U.S. dollars. The U.S. dollar thus "floated" in foreign money exchange markets, and as a result the currencies of some PACOM countries were affected. The Bank of Japan closed from 16-27 August, after which the yen was revalued; the old rate of 360 yen to the dollar fell to approximately 341 yen, on a floating basis. By the end of CY 71 the floating rate of exchange was about 314 yen to the dollar. This floating of the dollar resulted in increased operating costs for military commands and increased costs of individual personal expenditures throughout the PACOM, particularly in Japan.[2]

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[1] CINCPACSTAFFNOTE 7500 of 8 Dec 71, Subj: Realignment of the CINCPAC Staff Point of Contact for Audit and IG Matters; J721 HistSum, Dec 71.

[2] J722 HistSum, Dec 71.

SECTION III--PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Official Activities of the Commander in Chief

(U) Philippines-Vietnam Trip, 3-9 January--The highlight of Admiral McCain's visit to the Philippines was an audience with President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 6 January. During his stay he also called on Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile and General Manuel T. Yan, Chief of Staff, Philippine Armed Forces. While in Manila the Admiral was the guest of U.S. Ambassador Henry Byroade. On 7 January Admiral McCain met with LT GEN Marvin L. McNickle, Commander, 13th Air Force, and was given a briefing and tour of Clark Air Force Base. Later the same day, the Admiral met with VADM Frederic A. Bardshar, Commander Attack Carrier Striking Force, Seventh Fleet, at Subic Bay Naval Base. On 8 January Admiral McCain arrived in Saigon for a top-level strategy conference with Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the JCS; U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth C. Bunker; General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, and other officials at MACV Headquarters. The worsening situation in Cambodia and threat of a major Communist offensive were two of the reasons for the meeting.[1]

(U) Pacific Transportation Seminar, 8 February--Admiral McCain addressed 250 delegates of the Fifth International Transportation Seminar-Pacific at the Ilikai Hotel. Sponsored by the National Defense Transportation Association (Aloha Chapter) and the University of Hawaii College of Business Administration, the seminar was attended by representatives of private industry, government agencies and military organizations concerned with transportation. The theme of this year's seminar was "The Human Element in Transportation."

(U) Malaysia-Indonesia-Saigon Trip, 12-19 February--The Admiral arrived in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 13 February for a three-day visit that included calls on top Malaysian defense officials. On 14 February he called on General Tan Sri Ibrahim Bin Ismail, Chief of the Armed Forces Staff. Later the same day he toured the University of Malaysia. On 15 February the Admiral placed a wreath at the Malaysian National Monument and later called on Commodore Dato Thanabalasingam s/o Karalasingam, Secretary General for Defense. He was given a briefing on rural economic development plans, and also called on Tun Abdul Razak, Minister of Defense. Admiral McCain arrived in Djakarta, Indonesia on 16 February for a three-day visit highlighted by a call on the President of the Republic of Indonesia. The Admiral also called on General Panggabean, Deputy Commander in Chief, Indonesian Armed Forces, and the heads of the Army, Navy,

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[1] All entries in this section are based on J74 HistSums, Jan-Dec 71.

Air Force, and National Police. Before returning to Hawaii, the Admiral stopped off in Saigon for discussions with General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, and other government and military officials.

(U) New York-Washington Trip, 23-25 February--Admiral McCain spent 23 February in New York where he spoke to 140 members of the Calvin Bullock Forum and addressed a dinner meeting of the Society of the Cincinnati. The next day he spoke to students at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. That afternoon the Admiral arrived at the Pentagon for a call on Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird. On 25 February he called on Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, and other Defense officials.

(U) Washington-Colorado Springs-San Diego Trip, 14-17 March--On 14 March the Admiral underwent his annual physical examination at Bethesda Naval Hospital. While in the capital he also met with top military and civilian officials including Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the JCS; Honorable Frank P. Sanders, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics); and General John C. Meyer, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. On 16 March the Admiral flew to Colorado Springs, Colorado. After a tour of the U.S. Air Force Academy, he delivered a classified briefing on collective security in Asia to the faculty, cadets, and staff members. The talk was not open to the public, but the Admiral held a press conference beforehand and reporters were given copies of the unclassified parts of the briefing. He reminded the press that the war in Southeast Asia will not be settled until American POWs are released. After the address, the Admiral flew to San Diego, where he rested overnight before returning to Hawaii.

(U) Los Angeles Trip, 27-28 March--Admiral McCain flew to Los Angeles on 27 March to address members of the Air Force Association attending the California State Convention at Pasadena. In the Keynote Address of the Convention Banquet, Admiral McCain warned that we must not lose sight of an urgent necessity to help nations we expect to shoulder more of the burden of their own defense. He also reminded the audience that the leaders of Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam represent the most formidable problem Free World diplomacy has ever faced.

(U) Alabama-Washington-Rhode Island Trip, 1-2 April--On 1 April Admiral McCain flew to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where he addressed 213 students of the Air University. After the speech he flew to Washington, where he spent the remainder of the day. While at the Pentagon, he called on Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the JCS. He also met with Daniel Z. Henkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and LT GEN Julian J. Ewell, USA, Military Adviser to the U.S. Peace Delegation, Paris. On 2 April the Admiral flew to

Quonset Point, Rhode Island, where he addressed 200 students of the Naval War College. While there he also held discussions with Naval War College foreign students. After the speech he returned to Hawaii.

(U) SEATO Military Advisers Meeting, London, 22-23 April--Admiral McCain attended a two-day meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Military Advisers in London, which paved the way for the annual SEATO Council Meeting on 17-28 April attended by Secretary of State William P. Rogers and allied foreign ministers. In a communique issued at the conclusion of the military advisers session, Admiral McCain emphasized the recent RVNAF operations in Laos and Cambodia, noting that the cross-border excursions against previously inviolate enemy sanctuary areas and lines of communication had dealt crippling blows to the enemy's capability to conduct significant operations in South Vietnam and to their long-range goals in Southeast Asia. The Admiral also stressed that the President's recent announcement of additional troop redeployments was a reflection of the success of the Pacification and Vietnamization programs.



Admiral McCain fielding questions from the floor during one of his many speaking engagements.

(U) Australia-Saigon Trip, 1-9 May:

2 May--Admiral McCain arrived in Sydney, Australia as part of a delegation headed by State Department Chief of Protocol, Ambassador Emil Mosbacher, to

represent the United States in the Coral Sea Week activities throughout the country.

3 May--The Admiral called on Sir Roden Cutler, Governor of New South Wales, and attended a civic reception at the Town Hall in the morning. He was a guest at a private luncheon party hosted by Sir Ernest White, Federal Vice President and Founder of the Australian-American Association, at the American National Club. In the evening he attended a reception in honor of U.S. Coral Sea delegates hosted by the Australian-American Association.

4 May--After a call on Rear Admiral G. J. B. Crabb, Flag Officer in Charge, East Australia Area, Admiral McCain laid a wreath at the Cenotaph in Martin Place. In the afternoon, the Admiral departed for Canberra. A press conference was held on his arrival at Fairbairn RAAFB.

5 May--The Admiral called on William McMahon, Federal Minister representing the Prime Minister of Australia, and took part in a wreath-laying ceremony at the American War Memorial. He then flew to Williamtown to address a Coral Sea Luncheon at Newcastle. After the luncheon he flew to Brisbane, where media representatives were on hand for a press conference upon his arrival.

6 May--The Admiral laid a wreath at the Shrine of Remembrance in Anzac Square and inspected a detachment of Australian and U.S. Naval personnel. The U.S. personnel were from the Destroyer USS O'BRIEN on a goodwill visit to Brisbane for Coral Sea Week.

7 May--After two press conferences, the Admiral departed for Perth. On arrival a press conference was held with TV and news media representatives. About 30 anti-war demonstrators picketed the Parmelia Hotel when Admiral McCain arrived and about 30 demonstrators were also at the U.S. Consul's residence when CINCPAC called on American Consul John Lacey.

8 May--The Admiral called on MAJ GEN Sir Douglas Kendrew, Governor of Western Australia. He then attended a wreath-laying ceremony at Fremantle War Memorial and spoke at a reception given by Sir Frederick Samson, Mayor of Fremantle. While in Fremantle, the Admiral cruised to the Australian Naval Support Facility at Cockburn Sound, where U.S. Naval ships might call for repairs in the future. Admiral McCain had discussed the use of the base with RADM Crabb while in Sydney on 4 May. The Admiral said in a press conference on 4 May that Cockburn Sound is strategically as important a point as the proposed British-American base on Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean. After a stopover for a briefing and discussion with CAPT Jess L. Carriker, USN, Commander Naval Communications Station H. E. Holt, the Admiral flew to Saigon.

9 May--The Admiral met with Ambassador Ellsworth C. Bunker and General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, before returning to Hawaii.

(U) Chiefs of Mission Conference, 17-20 May--Admiral McCain joined chiefs of American diplomatic missions in Asia and a Washington delegation headed by Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin for a four-day conference at Camp John Hay, Baguio, Republic of the Philippines. The conference was under the chairmanship of Mr. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State (East Asia and Pacific Affairs). Among the subjects discussed at the conference were the Nixon Doctrine and Narcotics Smuggling in East Asia.

(U) House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, 25 May--Admiral McCain presented a review of the countries in the PACOM area to the House Foreign Affairs Committee during a closed session in Washington. The Admiral warned the committee that while the United States pursues a new method of aid for emerging nations, it is facing a grave threat in a Russian naval buildup in the Indian Ocean that could result in complete control of the Red Sea. He also stressed that increased aid to Indonesia is "absolutely essential." Testifying on the fiscal year 1972 international security assistance program, the Admiral said that South Korea is the testing ground for the new program to give a boost to nations which are emerging industrially and technologically. The Admiral reported that the Vietnamization program "is progressing well," and that during the past seven months the Vietnamese air force had activated three tactical fighter squadrons and eight UH-1 helicopter squadrons, as well as their first heavy-lift Chinook helicopter squadron and first class C-123 airlift squadron.

(U) Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board Meeting, 28 May--Admiral McCain flew to Manila 27 May to attend the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board, hosted by Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines. Admiral McCain is Co-Chairman of the Defense Board with General Manuel T. Yan, Chief of Staff, Philippine Air Force. Established on 15 May 1958, the board serves as a forum for consultation and coordination on military problems of joint concern between the armed forces of the Philippines and the United States. Problems range from the delimitation of the U.S. bases to matters of relationship between the bases and local civilian authorities.

(U) Mississippi Press Association, 4 June--Admiral McCain delivered the keynote speech at the Mississippi Press Association's annual convention in Biloxi, Mississippi.

(U) Delaware Legislature, 9 June--The Admiral addressed the Delaware State Legislature and department heads on "Collective Security in Asia" during a meeting in Dover. Later, at a press conference, the Admiral estimated that the

training of 1,900 VNAF pilots would be completed within a year and that after the RVN takes over air operations there would be no further role for U.S. troops in the RVN. The Admiral lunched with the Governor of Delaware, Russell W. Peterson.

(U) Drug Abuse Meeting, Bangkok, 18 June--Admiral McCain addressed delegates to a Regional Ambassadorial Meeting on International Drug Trafficking, in Bangkok, Thailand. Ambassador Leonard Unger (Thailand) hosted the meeting, which was attended by Ambassadors Arthur W. Hummel (Burma), Francis J. Galbraith (Indonesia), G. McMurtrie Godley (Laos), Kenneth Franzheim II (New Zealand), and Charles T. Cross (Singapore). Representatives from Australia, Republic of China, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Republic of Vietnam also attended.

(U) Taiwan Visit, 21 June--Admiral McCain arrived in Taipei for a two-day visit. While there, he called on Chinese and American officials including Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, Minister of National Defense Huang Chien, and General Lai Ming-tang, Chief of the General Staff. He also presented the U.S. Legion of Merit, Degree of Commander, to General Kao Kuei-yuan, personal Chief of Staff to President Chiang Kai-shek and former Chief of the General Staff.

(U) Bangkok-Tokyo-Seoul Trip, 28 June-1 July--On 28 June Admiral McCain called on General Jesus Vargas, Secretary General of SEATO, and met with U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger during a one-day stop in Thailand. The following day the Admiral flew to Tokyo, where he attended a Security Consultative Conference Meeting at the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Prior to the meeting he met with U.S. Ambassador Armin H. Meyer and Honorable David M. Kennedy, Presidential Ambassador-at-Large. On 30 June Admiral McCain arrived in Seoul, ROK, to attend the inauguration of President Chung Hee Park as part of a U.S. delegation headed by Vice President Spiro T. Agnew. On 1 July the Admiral attended the Presidential inauguration ceremony and was a guest of President and Mrs. Park at a dinner held in honor of Vice President Agnew and delegates.

(U) Saigon-Korea Trip, 10-13 July--Admiral McCain stopped over in Saigon for two hours on 10 July to talk with General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV. On 11 July he met Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird at Kimpo Airport near Seoul, ROK. Both immediately departed on a three-hour helicopter tour of U.S. and ROK installations near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The following day Defense officials of the ROK and the U.S. began a two-day Security Consultative Meeting. The U.S. delegation was headed by Defense Secretary Laird; Minister of Defense Jung Nae-hiuk led the ROK side. After an exchange of opening remarks, Admiral McCain presented his analysis of the threat facing the two nations. The Koreans then gave a detailed account of the military threat from North Korea.

(U) Washington-Detroit-Dallas Trip, 16-18 August--Admiral McCain arrived at the Pentagon on 16 August for a round of talks with Defense and government officials including Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the JCS. The following day he flew to Detroit, where he spoke to 24 civic and business leaders at a dinner sponsored by Martin S. Heyden, Editor, Detroit News. On 18 August CINCPAC addressed the 72nd Annual National Convention of the VFW in Dallas, Texas. He also accepted, for the Department of Defense, the VFW's 1971 Armed Forces Gold Medal and Citation Award presented in absentia to prisoners of war and military men missing in action in Indochina.

(U) Houston Trip, 31 August--Admiral McCain spoke to a dinner audience of approximately 1,900 members of the American Legion and guests in Houston, Texas during the Legion's 53d National Convention. Admiral McCain briefed the Legionaires on Collective Security in Asia.

(U) Singapore-Saigon-Phnom Penh-Hong Kong Trip, 6-13 September:

6 September--Admiral McCain arrived in Singapore for a round of talks with government and military officials, including calls on President Benjamin H. Sheares and Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew. On 7 September the Admiral met with Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian K. Burnett, Commander in Chief Far East; RADM Troup, Commander Far Eastern Fleet; and Air Commodore Siegert, Chief of Staff Designate, ANZUK. He also called on U.S. Ambassador Charles T. Cross.

8 September--The Admiral flew to Saigon for discussions with General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV. While in Saigon, the Admiral was interviewed by Michael Parks, correspondent for the Baltimore Sun.

9 September--Admiral McCain arrived in Phnom Penh to confer with Cambodian leaders on American military aid. During the three-day visit, the Admiral visited Kompong Som where he was briefed and given a tour of the city. Before the Admiral left Cambodia, Premier Lon Nol presented him with a 20-year-old bull elephant, one of the highest honors that can be rendered to a foreign dignitary. (The elephant was later flown to the United States and presented to the Los Angeles Zoo.)

11 September--In Hong Kong, Admiral McCain met with British and American officials and was given a helicopter tour of the harbor and the new territories. Before departing on 13 September he called on Sir David Trench, Governor of Hong Kong.

(U) Minneapolis-Washington-Norfolk Trip, 20-23 September--On 21 September the Admiral spoke at a banquet meeting of the National Business Aircraft

Association in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The following day he flew to Washington, D. C. for discussions with Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the JCS, and other Pentagon officials. On 23 September Admiral McCain spoke to students at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. The speech was followed by a question and answer session and a press conference.

(U) Bangkok-New York Trip, 26 September-3 October--On 27 September Admiral McCain arrived in Bangkok to attend the 35th Conference of the Military Advisers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Admiral McCain, the U.S. Military Adviser to SEATO, told the conference that Vietnamization was progressing ahead of schedule while enemy capabilities have declined steadily. He reassured the conference that in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine, the United States will continue to remain a Pacific power, will continue to provide aid programs, and will honor treaty commitments with Pacific allies. During his stay in Thailand, Admiral McCain also visited military installations in the northern part of the country and called on Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn. On 2 October, on completion of the SEATO conference, Admiral McCain flew to New York for the ANZUS Council Meeting at the U.N. Mission.

(U) Washington-Dallas Trip, 12-17 October--On 13 October Admiral McCain arrived in Washington, D. C. for a three-day round of talks with Defense and government officials, including Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Senator John Stennis (D-Miss.) and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, CNO. While in Washington, Admiral McCain also spoke to the Association of the U.S. Army and received an award from the Freedom Foundation. He was interviewed by Roger Peterson of ABC News at the Pentagon. On 16 October the Admiral flew to Dallas, Texas, where he spoke to the National Convention of the Naval Reserve Association (NRA). During the meeting the Association presented him with NRA's National Distinguished Service Award for 1971.

(U) Tokyo-Saigon Trip, 28 October-5 November--Arriving on 30 October, Admiral McCain spent four days in Tokyo conferring with top Japanese defense officials, including Naomi Nishimura, Director General of the Japan Defense Agency. He also met with U.S. Ambassador Armin H. Meyer and LT GEN Gordon M. Graham, USAF, Commander of U.S. Forces, Japan. On 31 October the Admiral attended a military parade in Tokyo National Stadium, held to celebrate the 21st Anniversary of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. On 3 November the Admiral flew to Saigon where he met with Defense Secretary Laird; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the JCS; General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, and U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.

(U) Los Angeles Trip, 17-18 November--On 17 November Admiral McCain formally presented the Cambodian elephant to Mayor Sam Yorty for the Los Angeles City Zoo. The elephant was given to the U.S. through Admiral McCain by Premier

Lon Nol of Cambodia last September. On 18 November Admiral McCain joined Defense Secretary Laird at Camp Pendleton, California for a ceremony during which the Presidential Unit Citation was presented to the First Marine Regiment.



Admiral McCain and Mayor Sam Yorty providing a light snack to Chamroeun ("Prosperity"), the Cambodian elephant, on the occasion of his presentation to the Los Angeles City Zoo.

(U) Taiwan-Indonesia Trip, 21-27 November--On 21 November Admiral McCain arrived at Taipei for a three-day visit which included talks with Chiang Ching-kuo, Vice Premier of the Republic of China; Huang Chieh, Minister of National Defense; Lai Ming-kuo, Vice Premier of the Republic of China; Huang Chieh, Minister of National Defense; Lai Ming-tang, Chief of the General Staff, and U.S. Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy. On 23 November the Admiral flew to Bali for a two-day stopover that included talks with local military officials and a tour of the Malang Facility, including a visit to the F-51 Project and jet-engine rebuild facility. Admiral McCain continued his journey with a visit to Djakarta, Indonesia on 25 November which included courtesy calls on local military officials.

(U) Washington-San Francisco Trip, 28-30 November--On 29 November the Admiral spoke at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington, D.C. He called on Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the JCS, and conferred with other Pentagon officials. The following day Admiral McCain flew to Alameda, California to the change-of-command ceremony for Commander Western Sea Frontier at Treasure Island Naval Station.

(U) Saigon-Manila Trip, 10-15 December--Admiral McCain arrived in Saigon on 11 December to attend the Southeast Asia Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (SEACORDS) Meeting. During the conference, attended by the U.S. Ambassadors to Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, as well as other top government and military officials, the Admiral presented a briefing on the security situation in the Pacific Command. On 12 December the Admiral flew to Manila to attend a meeting of the Philippine-American Mutual Defense Board at Camp Aguinaldo. President Ferdinand E. Marcos attended the meeting and was briefed by Admiral McCain on the military situation in Southeast Asia. The board, which is composed of President Marcos, Secretary Carlos P. Romulo, U.S. Ambassador Henry Byroade, and military leaders of both countries, met to assess the Philippine Defense Program under the R.P.-U.S. military defense agreement. On 14 December Admiral McCain returned to Saigon to attend the Troop Contributing Countries Conference at the National Defense College.

(U) Laos-Vietnam Christmas Trip, 20-26 December--On 21 December Admiral McCain began his annual holiday inspection tour with a stopover in Vientiane, Laos, where he was the guest of U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley. Proceeding to the RVN, Admiral McCain delivered a Christmas message to GIs on 24 December during the Bob Hope Show at Camp Eagle near Da Nang and spent the next two days touring military units and installations throughout South Vietnam, including visits to Fire Base Birmingham, Fire Base Arsenal, Hill 327, and Camp Faulkner.



Admiral McCain talking informally to Army troops in Vietnam on Christmas Day 1971.



Distinguished Visitors to the Command

(U) On 11 January Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird arrived in Honolulu for a five-day rest after an around-the-world trip that included meetings with top U.S. officials in Southeast Asia. While in Hawaii he met with Admiral McCain, and spent some time preparing his report to the President.



Secretary of Defense Laird arrives in Honolulu at the end of his around-the-world trip.

(U) Cambodian Premier Lon Nol, suffering from a stroke which reportedly paralyzed half his body, arrived at Tripler General Hospital on 13 February for diagnosis and treatment. LT GEN Corcoran was on hand at Hickam Air Force Base to meet the ailing Premier. Hospital officials estimated that Lon Nol would be at Tripler for at least "a few weeks."

(U) Eighteen members of the Japan Defense Society (JDS) on a tour of the U.S. were hosted by CINCPAC during a three-day stay (13-16 March) in Hawaii. On 15 March the group was given the CINCPAC Command Briefing by LT GEN Corcoran, Chief of Staff. Other activities included a luncheon in the CINCPAC flag mess hosted by General Corcoran, a tour of Pearl Harbor, a wreath-laying ceremony at the Arizona Memorial, and a reception hosted by the JDS. Society members

include economic and industrial leaders of Japan who are concerned about national defense problems.

(U) On 5 August Cambodia's Acting Premier LT GEN Sisowath Sirik Matak stopped in Honolulu on the first leg of a ten-day visit to the United States. Admiral McCain met with General Matak at Honolulu International Airport during the stopover. Premier Matak again visited Honolulu for a two-day stopover following a visit to the United States that included a meeting with President Nixon.

(U) On 8 August Admiral McCain joined Governor John A. Burns, U.S. House Speaker Carl Albert, Senator Daniel K. Inouye, and Senator Hiram L. Fong at Hickam Air Force Base to welcome the APOLLO 15 astronauts back from the Moon.

(U) Admiral McCain joined Governor John Burns of Hawaii and other local dignitaries on 18 September in welcoming Their Highnesses Prince and Princess Hitachi of Japan on their arrival at Honolulu International Airport. The royal couple were on their way to the mainland for a one-week visit. Prince Hitachi is the second eldest son of the Emperor of Japan. On 27 October Admiral McCain joined Governor John Burns and other local officials in greeting William McMahon, the Prime Minister of Australia, during a stopover at Hawaii International Airport. The Prime Minister was enroute to the mainland to visit President Nixon at the White House.

(U) Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Deputy Secretary David Packard stopped over in Hawaii during the period 6-9 November, en route to Washington from a top-level meeting in Saigon. The Admiral greeted both officials on their separate arrivals.

(U) On 16 December Admiral McCain joined Bob Hope and his troup of performers in extending holiday greetings to more than 20,000 GIs gathered at Schofield Barracks, where the first show of the famed comedian's 21st annual Christmas tour of U.S. military bases overseas was staged. At the end of the show, Admiral McCain presented Hope with a ceramic sculpture of the comic. Hope was the Admiral's guest at Quarters "A" during the entertainer's one-day stop in Hawaii.

(U) Other important visitors to the Command who called on Admiral McCain during 1971 included the following:

13 January--Representative Bob Wilson (R-Calif.), member of the House Armed Services Committee.

18 January--Representatives Ogden Reid (R-New York) and G. Elliot Hogan

(D-Georgia); and MAJ GEN Trygve P. Sjolin, Senior Member, Swedish delegation to the United Nations Armistice Commission, Korea.



Admiral McCain gives an informal briefing to Representative Ogden Reid (R-New York).

19 January--VADM Kleber Masterson, USN (Ret), President, Navy Relief Society.

21 January--General Leonard F. Chapman, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.

22 January--Prince M. R. Teparit, Director in the Thailand Ministry of Agriculture; John W. Warner, Under Secretary of the Navy.

23 January--RADM Lawrence R. Geis, USN, Chief of Information; Benjamin Forman, Assistant General Counsel, International Affairs, Defense Department; John Eisenhower, Assistant for Thailand/Burma/SEATO, OASD(ISA); John Dexter, Country Director (Thailand and Burma), State Department.

26 January--Henry A. Byroade, U.S. Ambassador, Republic of the Philippines.

27 January--MAJ GEN Winant Sidle, USA, Army Chief of Information.

29 January--RADM Kenneth R. Wheeler, USN, Commander Naval Supply

Systems Command; George F. Muller, Counselor for Politico-Military Affairs, American Embassy, Bangkok.

30 January--VADM Francis J. Blouin, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy).

1 February--General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret).

8 February--William Kelly Hope (Bob Hope's son); Dr. A. E. Hayward, Acting Deputy Director (Research and Technology), Office of Director, Defense Research and Engineering.

20 February--Cambodian Ambassador to the United States, Sonn Voeunsai; Cambodian Ambassador to the United Nations, Khim Tit.

22 February--Air Chief Marshal Sir John Grady, Chief of Staff, RAF.

2 March--RADM "Rafe" Bates, USN (Ret), Vice President, Naval War College Foundation; Samuel D. Berger, Deputy U.S. Ambassador, Republic of Vietnam.

3 March--VADM Harold G. Bowen, Jr., USN, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).

4 March--VADM Louis LeBailly, RN, Director, Service Intelligence, Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom; Mr. Brian Stewart, Secretary, Cabinet Joint Intelligence Committee, United Kingdom; General Jack G. Merrell, USAF, Commander, Air Force Logistics Command.

5 March--General John L. Throckmorton, USA, CINCSTRIKE; Dr. John S. McLucus, Under Secretary of the Air Force; Mr. Herb Cornuelle, President, Dillingham Corp.

10 March--RADM Robert H. Weeks, Vice Director, Defense Communications Agency.

11 March--Vice Admiral Carlos Valenzuela, Mexican Navy, Senior Representative of CNO Foreign Naval Attaches Tour; MAJ GEN Nils Gunnar Holmstedt, Swedish delegate, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Korea.

12 March--Minister Ichiro Yoshioka, Alternate Representative to the Preparatory Commission on Okinawa.

13 March--Honorable Carlos G. Camacho, Governor of Guam.

18 March--Mr. Don Cotter, Director, Overseas Defense Research, Advanced Research Projects Agency.

25 March--General Lai Ming-tang, Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China; RADM Henri Lauri, Commander French Forces, Polynesia.

29 March--VADM Chick Heyward, USN (Ret), Vice President, General Dynamics.

8 April--LT GEN Thomas S. McGehee, USAF, Commander Air Defense Command; VADM Walter L. Curtis, Jr., USN, Senior U.S. Military Representative, Okinawa Negotiating Team.

9 April--General Hunter Harris, USAF (Ret), former CINCPACAF.

12 April--Frank W. Render, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity); Judge L. Howard Bennett.

13 April--LT GEN Samuel C. Phillips, USAF, Commander, Space and Missile Systems Organization, Air Force Systems Command.

14 April--Mrs. Charles C. Shaw, National President, American Legion Auxiliary.

15 April--Peter Knaur, Special Assistant for Congressional Relations, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

10 May--General Raymond G. Davis, Assistant Commandant, USMC.

12 May--Ambassador Kew Sung Lee, Korean Consul General.

14 May--Barry J. Shillito, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics); Frank Sanders, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics); John E. Ingersoll, Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

22 May--Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, USN (Ret), former CINCPAC.

26 May--Mrs. Sybil Stockdale, POW Wives President; LT GEN Michael S. Davison, USA, Prospective CINC, U.S. Army Europe; RADM Liu Ho-chien, Commander, Midshipman Training Group 60, Republic of China Navy; Edward Wu, Consul General, Republic of China.

31 May--Representatives Burt L. Talcott (R-Calif.), Clarence J. Brown

(R-Ohio), and Pierre S. DuPont (R-Del.), members of Congressional Task Force on Revenue and Sharing and Government Reorganization.



Admiral McCain holding informal briefings with Secretary of the Air Force Seamans (left) and Secretary of the Navy Chafee (below).



12 June--Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force.

14 June--Admiral Takaichi Itaya, Chairman, Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency; RADM Tang Mou-sung, Comptroller, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China; RADM William Thompson, Chief of Information, USN (designate).

23 June--Royston C. Hughes, Acting Deputy Assistant for Territorial Affairs, Department of the Interior.

6 July--Irving G. Cheslaw, incoming Deputy Chief of Mission, Kuala Lumpur.

7 July--Frank Carpenter, Special Assistant, Asia-Pacific, United Bible Society; G. McMurtrie Godley, U.S. Ambassador to Laos.

8 July--J. Fredric Ladd, Political-Military Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Phnom Penh; Leonard Sullivan, Deputy Director for Southeast Asia, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

15 July--John G. Chafee, Secretary of the Navy.

17 July--Representative George E. Danielson (D-Calif.), House Veterans Affairs Committee.

19 July--MAJ GEN John S. Morrison, USAF, Assistant Director, National Security Agency; BGEN Gordon Hill, USA, incoming MACV Chief of Information.

20 July--Ambassador Lee, incoming Republic of Korea Consul General, Honolulu.

21 July--John Howell, President, Howell Instrument Co.

26 July--John Lehman, Staff Member, National Security Council.

29 July--LT GEN Gordon M. Graham, USAF, Commander, U.S. Forces Japan; General Jack J. Catton, USAF, Commander, Military Airlift Command; James F. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); Robert H. Willey, Director, Office of Civilian Manpower Management.

30 July--General Leonard F. Chapman, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

31 July--General Bruce Holloway, USAF, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command; VADM Frederick H. Michaelis, USN, Deputy Director, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

2 August--VADM Teji Nakamura, JMSDF, Head of Operations Division, Japan Maritime Staff Office.

3 August--Jerry Hammock, NASA, APOLLO 15 Project Manager.

4 August--Alfred Chamie, National Commander, American Legion.

5 August--David G. Barr, incoming British Consul General in Honolulu.



Admiral McCain discusses Pacific naval problems with VADM Nakamura of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

6 August--Representatives Paul Rogers (D-Fla.), David Satterfield (D-Va.), Richardson Preyer (D-N.C.), and Peter Kyros (D-Maine).

7 August--Representatives John Murphy (D-N.Y.) and James H. Scheuer (D-N.Y.).

9 August--MAJ GEN Verne Bowers, The Adjutant General, USA.

10 August--Representatives Sonny Montgomery (D-Miss.) and John Hammershmidt (R-Ark.).

12 August--James Holcombe, Vice President, Northrop Corporation; VADM Frederick H. Schneider, prospective Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet.

13 August--Emory C. Swank, U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia.

14 August--Clifford Myers, Vice President, Lockheed Corporation.

20 August--Representative Charles H. Wilson (D-Calif.).

23 August--General Manuel T. Yan, PAF, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines.

24 August--Mayor Sam Yorty of Los Angeles, California.

25 August--Senator Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.).

30 August--Naka Funada, Speaker, House of Representatives, Japan; Dr. Richard Wilbur, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health & Environment).

3 September--General Chen A. Fan, Commander in Chief, Republic of China Air Force.

16 September--LT GEN George Seignious, USA, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency.

18 September--Edwin W. Martin, U.S. Ambassador to Burma; Mrs. William Orrall, National President, Navy Wives Club of America.

20 September--LT GEN W. R. Peers, Chief of the Office of Reserve Components, USA.

24 September--General Lai Ming-tang, Chief of the General Staff, Republic of China.

7 October--Carl W. Clewlow, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy); Teh-chieh Poo, Consul General, Republic of China.

8 October--Philip C. Habib, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.



Admiral McCain greets Miss Linda Byroade and her father, the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines.

12 October--Leonard Sullivan, Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering (Southeast Asia Matters).

19 October--RADM Imai, Commander, Japanese Self-Defense Training Squadron; VADM F. H. Michaelis, Deputy Director, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

20 October--Henry A. Byroade, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines.

21 October--Admiral Soong, Chief of Naval Operations, Republic of China.

22 October--S. J. Nuzzo, President, Hazeltine Corp.



Admiral McCain conferring with Australia's Prime Minister McMahon.

27 October--Air Marshal Sir John Lapsley, British Attache in Washington, D. C.; General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

7 November--VADM Kitamura, JMSDF, Commandant, Yokosuka Regional District.

12 November--LT GEN Hal Jennings, USA, Surgeon General; General Howell M. Estes, Jr., USAF (Ret).

15 November--Prime Minister William McMahon of Australia, returning from Washington.

16 November--LT GEN James B. Lampert, USA, High Commissioner to the Ryukyu Islands.

6 December--Barry Shillito, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations & Logistics); Senator Frank E. Moss (D-Utah).

7 December--Mac McCulley, National President, Fleet Reserve Association.

9 December--Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force.

16 December--Representative Robert H. Mollohan (D-W.Va.).

17 December--Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo.).



Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) listens intently as Admiral McCain discusses the PACOM posture.

30 December--Robert Whiting, Representative of the National Council for Prevention of Drug Abuse.

(U) The following media representatives called on and were briefed by Admiral McCain during the year:

12 January--Craig Whitney, New York Times, Southeast Asia correspondent.

28 January--James Sterba, New York Times, Indonesia correspondent.

30 January--Jerry Cahill, Washington correspondent for the New York Daily News.

20 February--John G. Hubbell, Roving Editor of Reader's Digest magazine.

9 March--Dr. Tom McKnew, National Geographic Society.

11 March--Mr. Nicholas Proffitt, Newsweek, Saigon Bureau.

12 March--Mr. Robert L. Jones, President, Copley News Service.

13 March--Mr. Nick George, ABC, Chief, Saigon Bureau; Mr. Richard Tregaskis, Author.

19 March--Mr. Keyes Beech, Chicago Daily News; Mr. Richard Levine, Wall Street Journal.

20 March--CAPT Charles S. Rowe, USNR, Editor, Free Lance Star, Fredericksburg, Virginia.

1 April--Tatsuo Saitoh, Kyodo News Service representative in Hawaii.

18 April--Roger Carroll, KMPC Radio.

20 April--David Otis, Gannet Newspapers.

12 June--Dr. Lothar Rheul, Deputy Editor, Die Welt, Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany.

5 July--Diane Kalas, KTAR-TV, Phoenix, Arizona.

20 July--Vern Haughland, Aviation Writer, Associated Press; 22 women members of Theta Sigma Phi Journalism and Communications Society, Hawaii Chapter.

26 July--Maynard Parker, Hong Kong Bureau Chief, Newsweek.

11 August--COL William Koch, USA, Editor Pacific Stars and Stripes.

17 September--Harold Grumhaus, Publisher, and Clayton Kirkpatrick, Editor, Chicago Tribune.



Admiral McCain and LT GEN Corcoran discuss Pacific affairs with Harold Grumhaus and Clayton Kirkpatrick of the Chicago Tribune.

22 October--Richard Oliver, Los Angeles Times photographer.

11 November--James Bassett, Associate Editor, Los Angeles Times; COL R. D. Heinl, USMC (Ret), Detroit News.

8 December--Serge Fliegers, Head Foreign Correspondent, Hearst Newspapers.

17 December--Dick Paulicka, Honolulu Advertiser.

30 December--Ron Rockwell, KHVH-TV, Honolulu.

APPENDIX

Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia[1]

Goal I
Assist the Government of Vietnam (GVN) to Improve and Modernize the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to Enhance RVNAF Effectiveness

RVN Intelligence Summary

(S) During 1971 the enemy's policy of conserving his forces continued to result in a generally low level of activity throughout the RVN. Although intermittent short periods of increased tactical activity were noted on about a monthly basis, the enemy's main emphasis continued to be placed on the expanded use of sapper, guerrilla, and local force elements. This was accomplished in a number of areas by disbanding several main force units and resubordinating their elements to local force and provincial control. This strategy was prompted by the large number of casualties being inflicted on enemy forces, the continued success of Vietnamization/pacification efforts, and by the numerous logistic problems incurred as a result of Allied incursions into enemy sanctuaries in the RVN, Laos, and Cambodia.

(S) Despite the enemy's unresolved problems and reduced main force strength, his overall military structure was still intact, including his command and control apparatus. Enemy strength oriented against RVN in 1971 was estimated at about 197,420. An estimated 93,850 were regular combat troops (66,597 North Vietnamese Army (NVA); 27,253 Viet Cong (VC)), 77,115 were administrative services, and approximately 26,455 were guerrilla forces. Of this total, 10,850 were in adjacent areas of Laos, and 49,165 were operating in Cambodia.

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[1] Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia had been the subject of special CINCPAC quarterly reports, which were discontinued in 1971. These had provided a statement of CINCPAC goals for operations in Southeast Asia for each calendar year and a summary of progress toward achievement of those goals. On 9 July the JCS (in JCS 4834/090054Z Jul 71) authorized discontinuation of the quarterly reports provided that the Command History contained a summary of goals and achievements, as it had in the past. The text and charts on this subject were provided by the Operations Division in J3/Memo/00520-72, 24 Mar 72, Subj: Measurement of Progress (MOP) Input to the CINCPAC Command History.

Communist regular forces were divided into four major front areas, nine division headquarters, 54 regimental headquarters, 348 battalions, 327 separate companies, and 62 separate platoons. The total known VC/NVA order of battle distribution is shown below:

Military Region	Fronts	Divisions	Regiments	Battalions	Separate Companies	Separate Platoons
I	3	4	23	112	66	8
II	1	1	7	67	109	40
III	0	4	17	113	45	5
IV	0	0	7	56	107	9
Total	4	9	54	348	327	62

(S) Compared to the 1968-70 period, the enemy's main force offensive capability had been reduced. However, by introducing forces from outside the RVN the enemy could still conduct localized offensive action. The areas most vulnerable to this type of activity continued to be northern MR I, western MR II, and the Cambodian border area of MR III. Late in 1971 evidence of enemy buildups in the western highlands of MR II and in northwestern MR I indicated those could be the main areas in which the Communists would conduct a 1972 dry season offensive.

Personnel

RVNAF Force Structure

(S) Steady progress was realized throughout 1971 toward the attainment of the authorized RVNAF force structure. Target dates for activations of the new units were met or bettered throughout the year. The major changes included the addition of one ARVN division for a total of 12, the turnover of 14 logistic and intermediate support bases and six major ships to the VNN, and four squadrons to the VNAF. Force structure objectives and target dates for completion were:

	Objective	Target Date for Completion
Vietnamese Army (ARVN)	12 divisions	FY 72
Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF)	54 squadrons	FY 75
Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC)	1 division	completed
Vietnamese Navy (VNN)	1,623 craft	FY 72
Regional Forces (RF)	1,679 companies	completed
Popular Forces (PF)	8,493 platoons	completed

RVNAF Strengths

(S) RVNAF Regular, Regional, and Popular Forces assigned strengths remained nearly constant during the year varying between 1,054,125 in January to 1,046,254 on 31 December, approximately 50,000 below the authorized strength of 1,100,000. Strengths as of 31 December were:

	Authorized	Assigned
ARVN	444,237	407,963
VNN	40,681	42,267
VNAF	46,998	49,475
VNMC	14,072	14,312
RF	295,985	283,680
PF	258,027	248,557
Total	1,100,000	1,046,254

Shortfalls were attributed to lack of volunteers and inadequate implementation of conscription laws. In late 1971 the GVN issued a series of directives designed to strengthen the conscription system and those directives, plus other personnel and morale actions, appeared to have effected an improvement at year's end.

U.S. and Free World Forces Strengths

(S) U.S. and Free World Forces strengths declined significantly during the year, in line with the goals of the Vietnamization program.

	31 Dec 70	31 Dec 71
U.S. Forces	360,536	156,975
Free World Forces	68,897	54,497

ARVN Maneuver Battalions

(S) The combat strength of ARVN maneuver battalions became a matter of primary concern to the Secretary of Defense during 1971 as the percentage of personnel present for duty versus the authorized strength gradually dropped from 67 percent in January to 50 percent in November. Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams reported several programs underway to alleviate the problem, primarily the issuance of GVN directives to increase the number of conscripts, the main source of lower ranking maneuver battalion personnel; a pay increase, effective 15 November, which included incentive pay for personnel assigned to maneuver

battalions; and continued progress in the dependent shelter and food supplement programs.

RVNAF Desertions

(S) Desertions continued to be the largest single drain on manpower during the year, although a slight downward trend was evident in the third and fourth quarters. The average net desertion rate for 1971 was 11.1 per thousand compared to 10.3 in 1970. The increase was slight considering the shift of major combat responsibility to the RVNAF during this two-year period. The pay increase and dependent shelter program listed above were also expected to reduce the desertion rate in 1972. Efforts to reduce the desertion rate included programs in the areas of leadership and morale, discussed below.

RVNAF Leadership

(S) In general, leadership within the RVNAF continued to improve, with the most serious deficiency remaining a shortage of "middle managers" both in the officer and enlisted ranks. In June 1971 the Secretary of Defense noted some apparent failures in leadership during the Snoul campaign and requested that Admiral McCain and General Abrams provide an assessment of RVNAF leadership. Replies included the following points:

a. With few exceptions, GVN officials had taken action on General Abrams' recommendations for removal of ineffective leaders.

b. Rapid expansion of the RVNAF and requirements to use military personnel to supervise civil agencies had depleted the base of experienced leaders.

c. The RVNAF promotion system was revised in late 1968 to insure promotion of the best qualified personnel and prevent favoritism. In addition, there had lately been increased emphasis on special "battlefield" promotions. During 1971 grade levels improved both quantitatively and qualitatively. General Abrams noted, "The current policy of rapid promotions of the best leaders, coupled with other leadership programs, offer the best solution, although a long term one."

Leadership Training

(S) MACV reported an increase in the ratio of Vietnamese National Military Academy graduates assigned duty with combat units (128 of 245). RVNAF training goals were primarily oriented toward emphasis on professionalism and leadership courses.

Morale

(S) The most significant action taken to improve morale of the RVNAF was implementation of pay increases in November 1971. Preliminary reports for December indicated an encouraging rise in the number of conscripts and volunteers, hopefully as a result of the pay raise, but it was too early to judge whether a trend had been established. The dependent shelter and food supplement programs continued as scheduled but information regarding their effect on improvement of morale was still being studied. One long delayed program in morale enhancement was progressing at year's end as the ARVN reported a significant increase in the number of combat experienced personnel being rotated to training center positions. During the year, major and increasing emphasis was placed on motivational training to increase the RVNAF soldier's sense of duty and will to fight. Considerable effort was made by the joint Morale and Motivation Board to increase the quality and scope of motivational training at unit level. Government programs such as veterans' benefits and dependent education also had a positive effect on morale of the RVNAF soldier.

Equipment

RVNAF Material

(S) ARVN Material: Of 21 major end items of Army equipment critical to the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program that were intensively managed, 14 had exceeded 90 percent of the end FY 72 requirement. This was substantially due to a major effort during the last half of CY 71 to accelerate all material deliveries. For the most part, those shortages that remained consisted of items to be provided from USARV assets as U.S. Forces were withdrawn. Maximum utilization of U.S. excesses was being pursued to obviate the requirement for cross-shipment (i.e., delivery of materiel from off-shore sources that would later be available from in-country assets and have to be retrograded). This had not only saved millions in procurement, processing, and shipping costs, but had the vital corollary effect of reducing the amount of equipment to be retrograded, thereby saving valuable manpower and shipping space.

(S) VNN Material: As a direct result of accelerated delivery actions during the last half of 1971, the VNN had received virtually all ships and craft scheduled for delivery under the Improvement and Modernization Program. Status as of 31 December 1971 was as follows:

Ship/Craft	On hand 31 Dec 70	Delivered in 1971	To be Delivered	Total
Coastal Patrol Craft (PCF/WPB)	41	92	0	133
River Patrol Craft (PBR)	83	210	0	293
River Assault Craft (6 types)	108	116	0	224
Logistic Ships/Craft (21 types)	44	134	19	197
Combatant Ships (DE, WHEC, PCE)	9	4	0*	13

*Possible additions being considered.

The few logistical craft remaining for delivery were all small craft. Additions to the "blue water" fleet were being considered to increase VNN MARKET TIME capabilities. Additional ships would not be delivered, however, until the VNN trained manpower base expanded sufficiently to accommodate them.

(S) VNAF Material: As in the case of the other Services, the VNAF aircraft inventory also increased substantially in 1971. With the exception of some aircraft for advance attrition and 1971 activations, all deliveries were made and the unit/equipment requirements of all squadrons met. Status as of 31 December 1971 was as follows:

Aircraft	On hand 31 Dec 70	On hand 31 Dec 71	Net Gain	Authorized 31 Dec 71	CRIMP Authorization
UH-1	262	489	227	469	500
CH-47	16	20	4	16	32
A-1	61	70	9	60	96
A-37	100	108	8	90	144
F/RF-5	26	23	-3	24	26
O-1	105	268	163	155	200
C-119	16	19	3	16	16
C-123	0	48	48	48	48
AC-119	0	24	24	18	18

RVNAF Supply

(S) ARVN Supply: The ARVN supply system, which also provided common supply support to the other armed forces, operated from five technical service base depots. Functioning under independent, largely manual systems, the base depots were hard pressed to keep up with the substantial augmentation to the RVNAF that had occurred during 1971. Progress in improving fill rates remained relatively static, although some individual breakthroughs were noted. Substantial improvement should occur in CY 72, however, with the implementation of RAMMS. The

Computer Science Corporation was under contract to develop the RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS), a computer supported and integrated supply system. The system design has been completed and was being tested in preparation for a command post exercise scheduled for the third quarter of FY 72, prior to RVNAF assumption of control. The development of the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) was being performed concurrently. Supported by the RVNAF Logistics Data Processing Center, which would operate the RAMMS computer programs, the NMMA was to centralize the RVNAF logistics management functions that had been fragmented among five ARVN technical services. This was expected to aid effective management of the supply system, enhance the protection of the large U.S. and RVNAF equipment investment, and insure interface with the U.S. logistics systems.

(S) VNN Supply: The VNN supply system completed a very erratic year. At the beginning of the year, the system was characterized by auditors as being "in danger of foundering." This was particularly true at the many support bases scattered along the coast and throughout the delta. A massive effort by the Naval Advisory Group, with augmentation from PACFLT and Chief of Naval Operations sources, substantially reconstructed the system and a period of gradual improvement set in.

(S) VNAF Supply: The effectiveness of the VNAF supply system has been difficult to track due to the fact that the VNAF Air Logistics Command (ALC) provided supply support only to the VNAF fixed-wing fleet. Helicopters, accounting for half the aircraft in the VNAF inventory, continued to draw their repair parts support from the U.S. Army Aviation Materiel Management Center (AAMMC) whose performance was almost 100 percent throughout the year. The ALC began the year at substantially less than a satisfactory level, but since mid-year had shown a continuous record of improvement, although the desired effectiveness rate of 65 percent had yet to be attained. The addition of new and complex aircraft types to the VNAF inventory as well as the already noted substantial quantitative increase had mashed many of the gains that would otherwise have been achieved. The early months of CY 72 should show a continuation of the improved trend, although again substantial increases are projected in the inventory (to include the first C-7s) which will impede some qualitative progress.

RVNAF Maintenance

(S) ARVN Maintenance: Progress in ARVN equipment maintenance had been categorized in two ways. The first was the operational readiness (O/R) rate achieved, which reflected on unit and direct support/general support maintenance support. The second was the extent to which the ARVN Base Depots were achieving self-sufficiency in the depot level rebuild of equipment. The reported O/R rates achieved by the ARVN were extremely high throughout the year. Although

much ARVN equipment was relatively new and therefore free of the serious maintenance problems brought on by age and wear, the trend was encouraging.

(S) The depot rebuild program was just getting underway following completion of the Base Depot Upgrade Program (Project LSY). Project LSY had been initiated by COMUSMACV in the second quarter of FY 70 for the purpose of upgrading the in-country rebuild facilities and capabilities at the 40th Engineer Depot and Annex, the 60th Signal Depot, and the 80th Ordnance Depot. The project included construction work on roads, buildings, and power and water distribution systems at each of the depots. Included as well were 496 items of capital equipment which had been installed. This equipment was obtained from CONUS. This plant equipment had original acquisition value of $3.2 million, but the actual Military Assistance Service Funded cost was limited to $1.4 million. Some 21 million dollars had been expended in the upgrade program. Construction and rehabilitation of the three depot complexes were complete. Capital equipment had been installed and small quantity production had begun. As a result of Project LSY, in-country/out-of-country rebuild programs had been revised to reflect self-sufficiency for nearly all items of equipment by the end of FY 74. Items that would continue to be built out-of-country included hydropneumatic recoil mechanisms, night vision devices, some communications equipment modules, and certain weapon fire control equipment.

(S) VNN Maintenance: As had been the case of their supply system, the VNN maintenance system was slow in getting off the ground. Ostensibly the system operated in two segments with the VNN Shipyard maintaining the "Blue Water Navy" or ships, and a network of intermediate and logistic support bases maintaining the craft. In practice, however, the Shipyard, which had existed for a century, maintained small craft as well as ships while the intermediate and logistic support base complex was being developed. This had forced a great deal of the overhaul work into off-shore facilities, generally the U.S. Navy Ship Repair Facility, Guam.

(S) VNAF Maintenance: As measured against an O/R standard of 71 percent, the VNAF continued to display a satisfactory level of readiness in spite of the impact of large numbers of new aircraft and substantially increased flying programs as they increasingly replaced the USAF in mission support of the RVNAF. The depot rebuild facility at the Air Logistic Command, Bien Hoa had undergone an upgrade program similar to that provided the ARVN Base Depots and was performing an ever increasing portion of depot level maintenance on the VNAF high density aircraft such as the UH-1, A-1, and A-37. At the same time that the ALC had been expanding, Air-Vietnam had also begun to perform substantial quantities of work for the VNAF under contract. Major contracts involving A-1 and CH-47A aircraft were awarded during 1971.

RVNAF Logistical Movement Capability

(S) Terminal Service Operations: The RVNAF continued to make steady progress in terminal and water operations. There were four terminal commands, each with a terminal service company, a medium boat company, and one or two tug detachments authorized. The Saigon Transportation Terminal Command (B) had heavier augmentation with two terminal service companies, a heavy and a medium boat company, four tug detachments, and a floating crane detachment assigned. Another terminal service company and five terminal service detachments were activated during fourth quarter FY 71. Some of the 20 barge teams scheduled for activation had been equipped. All 44 cargo barges scheduled for transfer were turned over by August 1971. In addition, the transfer of ten authorized tugs had been completed by 7 October 1971. Since the turnover of equipment began in 1969, an extensive on-the-job training program had been conducted to qualify both ARVN soldiers and local national civilians in the hard skills of terminal service and harbor craft operations. ARVN or ARVN-controlled stevedores performed 71 percent of the total RVNAF terminal workload in the fourth quarter of 1971, compared to 69 percent in the fourth quarter of 1970. The workload itself, however, had increased by over 40 percent.

(S) VNAF Airlift: During 1971 the VNAF share of the total RVNAF airlift workload rose drastically to an all-time high of 80 percent by the end of the calendar year, with the VNAF share of the total passenger workload trailing closely behind with a record high of nearly 60 percent being achieved. VNAF fixed wing capabilities improved with the C-123 squadrons being declared operationally ready in December. VNAF fixed wing airlift capability consisted of one C-119 squadron, one C-47 squadron, and one C-123 squadron. VNAF rotary wing airlift capability consisted of 13 UH-1 squadrons and one CH-47 squadron.

(S) Highway Operations: Full self-sufficiency had been attained in highway operations with RVNAF motor transport units or RVNAF-supervised contractors meeting 100 percent of the RVNAF highway movement requirement. There were six ARVN truck groups, each with a total of five light and one medium truck companies authorized. The exception was the 10th Transportation Group, which was authorized two medium truck companies. All but one company were activated.

(S) Railway Operations: The government-operated Vietnam Railway Service (VNRS) was making a steady comeback after near destruction by the VC/NVA in the mid-1960's. Though substantial tonnages and passengers were being moved, 63 percent of the total tonnage moved was in support of U.S. operations. A recap of the past two years of VNAF operations follows:

Net metric tons 1970	594,774	Passenger Traffic 1970	2,600,921
Net metric tons 1971	521,205	Passenger Traffic 1971	2,826,187

(S) Railroad Reconstruction: Informal information received in late 1970 from MACV indicated that all railroad construction would cease in 1971. CINCPAC requested clarification from MACV and pointed out the critical importance of keeping the railroad open. Construction was resumed in late March 1971, but progress since that time was sporadic. Much effort had to be expended on repairing sections of the line damaged by weather and enemy action.

(S) Vietnamization of U.S. Ports: The concept for turnover of U.S. ports to the RVNAF was approved by COMUSMACV in May 1969. By August of that year a joint U.S. MACV Committee had been formed with local committees organized in each Area Logistic Command. The first port to be turned over was the shallow draft facility at Can Tho. Then the Saigon port was turned over to the ARVN in early 1970. Other ports turned over during the next two years included Nha Trang and Cat Lai.

(S) Water Movements: The RVNAF steadily increased water movement self-sufficiency during 1971. During the third quarter of 1971, the RVNAF moved an all-time high of 70.6 percent of their total water movement requirements. A shipment drop to 68.2 percent occurred in the fourth quarter. The remainder of the RVNAF water movement requirements were met by the U.S. or ROK Navies or by U.S.-funded contractors, e.g., Alaska Barge and Transport.

RVNAF Training

(S) Training played a large part in the qualitative improvement of the RVNAF during 1971, a trend that was expected to continue. The rapid expansion of forces and equipment had created a shortage of skilled technicians, middle managers, and leaders in all of the components. To alleviate this problem, the emphasis during 1971 was placed on improving force professionalism through recruit, motivation, and leadership training, upgrading skill levels by intensive formal schooling and on-the-job training, and the improvement of the overall RVNAF training system facilities. With training self-sufficiency as the ultimate goal, much of the groundwork toward this end was laid in 1971 with the publication of a master training directive for standardization, the initiation of an RVNAF training inspection system, and the approval of a comprehensive five-year training plan.

Operations

ARVN/VNMC Operations

(S) The experience gained in the conduct of large-scale operations highlighted the year for the RVNAF ground forces. The impact of these operations on operational effectiveness and confidence was considerable. From the initiation

of LAMSON 719 into Laos, through the late 1971 campaign into Cambodia, each operation was subjected to a critical review to determine weak areas requiring improvement and strong points to be exploited. As an example, the need for improved combined arms doctrine was identified early in the year as a result of LAMSON 719. By early December, an RVNAF Combined Arms Doctrinal Handbook had been produced and implemented in schools and training centers. Similar emphasis was placed on other areas such as support coordination, individual motivation, training, and leadership. LAMSON 810 demonstrated the professional skills of the Vietnamese commanders in the development and employment of units and the coordination of supporting assets.

(S) Despite the reduction of U.S. advisors, increased confidence, aggressiveness, and professionalism of ARVN/VNMC units was evident. The cross-border operations of 1971 demonstrated the ability of the ARVN units to operate effectively without advisor support. In the divisions, U.S. advisor strength was reduced and tailored to meet the requirements of the ARVN. Division Advisor Teams were reduced in size by approximately 36 percent. Based on increased ARVN proficiency at lower tactical levels, advisors were withdrawn from most ARVN battalions. The withdrawal of considerable U.S. air and artillery support increased the use, effectiveness, and reliance on Vietnamize support assets.

(S) Ground operations increased significantly from January through December. Battalion days on large operations were three times greater in December than the first of the year. Operational results, expressed in terms of kill ratios, weapons exchange ratios, and friendly and enemy losses, favored the RVNAF throughout the year, and in each case bettered the level of 1970.

VNAF Operations

(S) The year was one of major expansion for the VNAF with a 40 percent increase in the number of activated squadrons. The increased assets resulted in VNAF assumption of a greater share of the air role, both in-country and out. By the end of 1971 the VNAF conducted over 63 percent of the in-country combat sorties and 39 percent of those in Cambodia. Three additional squadrons, two UH-1 helicopter and one C-123 transport, were activated for a total of 42. The UH-1 squadrons were activated four months ahead of schedule. Of the 42 squadrons activated, 36 had been declared operationally ready. Over 163,000 flying hours were logged in the fourth quarter by VNAF, an increase of over 11,000 hours. Fixed wing and helicopter sorties were up 27 and 11 percent, respectively, for the same period.

(S) The operationally ready rate for the entire aircraft fleet improved from 73 to 75.8 percent. Hours flown increased by 56 percent and sorties by 69.8 percent over 1970. The increases in operational statistics coincided with

the reduction of U.S. support, resulting in more reliance on VNAF assets by the naval and ground forces. Improving the VNAF flexibility and responsiveness to meet these demands received a great deal of emphasis during 1971. The support functions turned over to VNAF were no less important than the combat missions, and included a multitude of responsibilities in the areas of base defense, civil engineering, communications, and logistics. The assumption of these functions placed great demands on the VNAF training system, particularly for the production of adequate middle management and technically qualified personnel. Aggressive training programs had been implemented in all in-country training facilities and on-the-job training had also been used extensively to alleviate this situation.

VNN Operations

(S) Effectiveness in conducting riverine operations and coastal surveillance improved during 1971. The VNN assumed responsibility for all riverine operations and the inner MARKET TIME barriers. The VNN report that the number of junks boarded and searched averaged 137,014 per month. Day and night searches of coastal traffic increased during the fourth quarter. Task units continued to demonstrate the feasibility of working with visual aerial reconnaissance and surveillance (VARS) aircraft to locate zone violators or suspicious craft. Seven of 16 planned coastal surveillance radar stations were in operation by 31 December, an increase of four from the third quarter. Turnover of the entire network was scheduled for no later than 30 April 1972 with the system scheduled to be in full operation by 31 May 1972. The VNN continued to refine operational command and control procedures for the complex task of coordinating the functioning of the radar stations, surveillance centers, and patrol units. In addition, plans were made for a formal training course for VNN radar system officers to commence in February 1972.

(S) Improvements in VNAF support to VNN operations continued with the implementation of procedures to request both pre-planned and quick reaction air strikes and indoctrination of VNAF crews in the requirements and peculiarities of riverine operations. Logistics, primarily supply and maintenance, were major problems during 1971 and received a high priority for advisor assistance. The lack of trained personnel and a shortage of middle management personnel remained the major barriers to greater progress in this area. By year's end, the VNN had on board 83 percent of its authorized officers and 59 percent of authorized NCOs. Of the officers, 82 percent were in grades O-2 and below.

Summary

(S) The progress made by the RVNAF in 1971 could be described as improved professionalism with a consequent beneficial impact on overall unit

effectiveness. The force structure remained relatively stable. Although improvements and refinements continued to be made, the major emphasis shifted to molding the RVNAF components into more effective forces, not only in the field but also in the multitude of tasks associated with operating and maintaining a large and well-equipped military organization. Training at all levels was intensified to provide more properly motivated and skilled leaders and technicians. The resultant increase in operational effectiveness had been steady but not spectacular. Improvements in both operations and logistics had been noted in each of the RVNAF components, but the key to further progress rested in more training and more experience. Much of the experience gained in 1971 in the face of continued reductions in U.S. advisors and combat support was instrumental in the overall improvement of the RVNAF.

Goal II

Assist the GVN to Defeat the Subversion and Aggression and Develop a Secure Environment That Will Promote Self Government Within the RVN

Community Defense and Local Development

(U) The 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan (1 March 1971 - 29 February 1972) was the fourth in a series of comprehensive pacification and development plans that had begun with the Accelerated Pacification Plan of 1968-69. The organization, programming, and goals had been consistent from year to year, thus providing a continuity of effort. The preparation of national plans had become progressively a Vietnamese operation with less U.S. advice and assistance required each year. The number of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) advisors was being greatly reduced, and the Vietnamization of Community Defense and Local Development was progressing well.

(U) Despite the withdrawal of 204,000 U.S. military personnel, security within the populated areas of the RVN was enhanced in 1971. As measured by the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), the percentage of the population with a high level of security (A and B levels) rose during the year from 72.8 percent at the end of February to 84 percent as of 31 December.

(U) The overall increase in security was the result of many factors, but the improved performance of the Territorial Forces, operating behind the shield of the ARVN regulars, weighed heavily. Programs for the Regional and Popular Forces, People's Self-Defense Forces, National Police, Phung Hoang, and Chieu Hoi also contributed directly to the GVN's security effort. In addition, the GVN continued to promote improved local government, to extend central government services to an increased number of citizens, to take economic reform measures, and to improve the actual and prospective incomes and level of living of the populace.

Self-Defense

(S) The most significant problem confronting Territorial Forces during 1971 was the need to redeploy Territorial Forces to fill the voids resulting from the departure of Free World Military Assistance Forces and the subsequent repositioning of regular RVNAF units. A Transition Concept, applicable to both Regional and Popular Forces, was jointly developed and adopted by MACV and the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. The concept, which utilized the principles of redeployment, reallocation, and redistribution to insure that optimum employment of Territorial Forces was achieved, was beginning to be implemented throughout Vietnam. By the end of 1971 over 1,000 additional Popular Forces platoons had been formed through the application of unit strength reductions from 35 to 32-man units and, subsequently, to the 29-man unit level.

People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF)

(U) The PSDF also showed progress in 1971. Over four million unpaid citizens made up the two branches, combat and support, of the PSDF. The most pressing, continuing deficiencies were in the areas of military skills, motivation, and leadership. The GVN was taking steps to improve training through the use of Regional and Popular Force Mobile Training Teams and improving leadership by training leaders at the national and inter-provincial training centers.

Phung Hoang Program

(S) The Phung Hoang Program, aimed at eliminating the VC infrastructure, generally met its goals of 1,200 neutralizations per month, but the number of high-ranking VCI neutralized was disappointing. However, Phung Hoang began to move away from mass neutralizations based primarily on military operations, and more emphasis was placed on the specific targeting of key members of the VC political infrastructure. In the short run, this shift in operational technique resulted, as expected, in an overall decline in the average number of monthly neutralizations. Also contributing to this decline were reduced emphasis on Phung Hoang during the national election and tightened procedures in the legal processing of subversives. The majority of neutralizations continued to occur among lower-level VCI, with the number of district-level, or higher, cadre neutralized each month averaging 24 percent of the total, as it had in 1970. There were indications that the VCI suffered a leadership crisis in 1971 and were hard pressed to replace highly motivated, hard-core members or to motivate marginal sympathizers to produce for the VC cause.

(C) Phasedown of Phung Hoang Advisory Effort: In 20 of 241 districts the Phung Hoang advisory effort (either officer and counterintelligence NCO or the officer alone) had been withdrawn. The primary reasons for these phasedowns

were the pacification status and/or the ability of the Vietnamese to pursue the Phung Hoang Program without advisory assistance. These actions were in accordance with Phung Hoang guidance, which was to turn the program over to the Vietnamese in those areas where they had demonstrated the capability to take control.

National Police

(C) For the National Police 1971 was a period of continuing transition. On 12 January the police received a new commander, with the rank of major general. On 1 March the Police Directorate was designated the National Police Command. Both actions greatly improved its public and official status. On 1 September, all French-based police ranks were converted to military-type ranks. These necessary and beneficial changes created the anticipated administrative and operational turbulence, and this turbulence plus political factors led to the replacement of the police commander. On 4 September Colonel Binh of the Central Intelligence Organization was placed in command of the National Police.

(C) The overall police manpower goal was reconfirmed at 122,000. In January 1971 the force level was 87,844, but it rose to 116,000 by July. By the end of the year, the force level was reduced to 113,686 through attrition. Recruitment was temporarily suspended in April, but on 1 January 1972 authority was to be granted to recruit an additional 5,000 personnel. By the end of 1971 the majority of new personnel had received their basic police training and were deployed in large numbers to the village police stations in rural areas. In January 1971 there were 11,374 police assigned to 1,818 villages; by January 1972, 31,618 were assigned to 2,102 villages with over 50 percent of the province police, exclusive of field police and marine police, assigned to district level and below.

(C) There was a major acceleration of narcotics suppression in 1971 and the first steps were taken to develop Police Operations Centers on a nationwide basis. During 1971 the police adequately handled many provocative student and political demonstrations in urban areas, with minumum injury to demonstrators and little adverse public reaction. However, heavy police involvement in pre-election and inauguration security, coupled with the change in commanders, created a three-month hiatus in operational and other development efforts.

Chieu Hoi Returnees

(C) The Chieu Hoi Program goal for 1971 was 25,000. The number of returnees for the year was 20,344, or 81 percent of the goal. Failure to meet the goal could be attributed to several factors, including the declining enemy military and infrastructure strength in the RVN, the higher proportion of North

Vietnamese in combat units, and the overall decline in combat activity which reduced the opportunity to rally.

Hoi Chanh

	Military	Political	Other	Total
Jan	779	676	274	1,729
Feb	1,545	1,209	316	3,070
Mar	1,231	1,101	268	2,600
Apr	497	441	192	1,130
May	531	445	153	1,129
Jun	697	578	311	1,586
Jul	701	463	218	1,382
Aug	498	356	199	1,053
Sep	403	318	148	869
Oct	811	294	377	1,482
Nov	2,789	401	192	3,382
Dec	419	363	150	932
Total	10,901	6,645	2,798	20,344

(C) Prior to 1971 several small increments of prisoners-of-war of South Vietnamese origin were offered amnesty by the GVN through conversion to Chieu Hoi status. Application of this concept was considerably expanded on the occasion of President Thieu's inauguration, when over 2,000 converted prisoners were granted Hoi Chanh status. Although this large, sudden influx taxed the logistic and administrative systems of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi, all problems were resolved quickly and efficiently.

Self Development

(C) The improved security experienced in rural areas during 1971 led to the reorganization of the Rural Development (RD) Cadre into smaller units, placing more emphasis on development programs such as Village Self Development, Land Reform, Resettlement of Refugees, and War Victims. The resulting 10-man teams proved themselves to be very effective. As part of the overall Vietnamization program, the RD Cadre also experienced its first reduction of U.S. support on 1 July 1971. The authorized strengths of 48,804 RD and 7,800 Montagnard Cadre were reduced to 37,250 and 5,200 respectively, and funding was reduced accordingly. This was the first of four incremental reductions in U.S. financial support of the RD Cadre programmed to take place through 1 July 1974, when all U.S. support was expected to be withdrawn. The GVN had plans to continue a permanent RD Cadre Program, at a strength of 12,000 to 15,000, for which they were to provide support after U.S. funding was phased out.

Refugees

(U) Steady progress in assisting refugees was made in 1971 by the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW). The return of refugees to their home village--the solution preferred by most of the refugees themselves--continued to be emphasized. From 1 March to 1 December 1971, 233,336 refugees received the full return-to-village allowance. During the same period 109,573 refugees who were unable to return home received assistance in settling elsewhere (without losing eligibility for assistance in returning to their home villages at a later date). The GVN showed ever-increasing skill in providing return-to-village and resettlement assistance.

Self Government

(U) Progress in local administration was good in 1971. Significant progress was made in achieving democratic objectives at both the national and local levels. By the end of the year, free elections had been held in 98 percent of the villages. Elections for the Lower House and the Presidency were held during the year, with some 79 percent of the eligible voters casting their ballots in the House election and a turn out of almost 88 percent of the registered voters in the Presidential referendum.

Enemy Activity

Infiltration

(S) More (69,300) personnel were infiltrated into the RVN and Cambodia in 1971 than in 1970 (57,000), but fewer than in 1969 (100,000). The enemy had to rely more heavily during 1971 on replacements from NVN as recruiting in the south was seriously curtailed by government programs in the RVN. Additionally, 10,000 personnel were sent through the infiltration pipeline destined for southern Laos. This was an increase over previous years and showed enemy concern for the operation and security of his lines of communication. Personnel in special purpose infiltration groups increased from about 2,000 in 1970 to over 3,500 in 1971. These groups were made up of specialists and technicians, and this significant increase during 1971 revealed the emphasis on protracted warfare and the countering of GVN programs.

In-Country Recruitment

(S) The following table shows the enemy's in-country recruitment for 1970 and 1971. The 31 percent reduction was most probably attributable to increased pacification effectiveness and progress made on the political and economic fronts:

In-Country Recruitment

	1970	1971
Jan	3,100	2,000
Feb	3,200	2,000
Mar	3,100	2,000
Apr	3,000	1,700
May	2,900	3,400
Jun	2,800	1,900
Jul	2,700	1,700
Aug	2,400	1,700
Sep	2,400	1,700
Oct	2,300	1,600
Nov	2,800	1,600
Dec	2,800	1,600
Total	33,500	22,900

VC/NVA Killed in Action (KIA)

(S) The table below shows the number of enemy KIA by month since January 1970. During 1971 there were 116,639 VC/NVA KIA (body count), which was slightly below the 118,614 figure established in 1970. These figures include enemy KIA from RVNAF operations in Cambodia and Laos. The large number of casualties reflected for February through May 1971 was attributed to LAMSON 719 in Laos, TOAN THANG 1-71 in Cambodia, and operations around Fire Support Base 5/6 in the highlands of Military Region II:

	1970	1971
Jan	9,980	7,068
Feb	9,230	12,919
Mar	11,450	18,397
Apr	14,810	12,282
May	20,504	10,112
Jun	11,380	9,838
Jul	7,910	7,495
Aug	7,390	7,557
Sep	6,810	6,669
Oct	5,680	6,863
Nov	6,200	6,458
Dec	7,270	10,981
Total	118,614	116,639

Caches

(S) The number of enemy caches found during 1971 decreased substantially from previous years. The fourth quarter yielded only 45 discoveries as opposed to the 342 caches found during the first quarter. Some portion of this down-trend could be attributed to the continuing interdiction program, erosion of secure enemy base areas, and a general reduction in enemy activity.

Terrorist Incidents

(S) The number of enemy incidents directed against the civilian populace continued to diminish into the fourth quarter. As a result the 1971 totals for assassinations and abductions fell below the corresponding 1970 figures by 31 and 20 percent respectively.

Enemy Initiated Incidents

(S) The general decline in enemy activity during 1971 was reflected in the downward trend in enemy incidents directed against military personnel and property. Attacks by fire decreased by 53 percent and assaults by 28 percent. Ambushes increased by 17 percent.

Summary

(S) A general decrease in the level of enemy activity was noted throughout the year and in this environment, the GVN was able to continue the expansion of government control over the population and countryside. This expansion was accomplished through a series of programs designed to improve the effectiveness of security forces, both territorial and civil, and to extend their activities into the less secure areas. Greater responsibilities for security and civil law and order were assigned to the civil forces in order to release a portion of the territorial forces from static security missions. The operational effectiveness of the security forces showed some improvement, although the shortage of effective leadership remained a problem.

Goal III

Assist the GVN to Protect and Further Develop National Resources, With Emphasis on Economic Stabilization, Economic Growth, and Improvement of Social Conditions to Provide a Better Life for the People and Win Support of the People for GVN

Lines of Communication

(C) The Combined Campaign Plan, AB 146, designated specific roads and

waterways to be opened or secured during 1971. Of the 4,602 KM of designated roads, 14 percent were to be opened and 86 percent secured. By 31 December, 17.2 percent were opened, 80.7 percent secured, and 2.1 percent remained closed. Waterways ended the year with 25 percent open and 75 percent secure, with no change reported during the last six months of 1971. The accompanying charts show the status of the lines of communication as of 31 December 1971.

Economic Stability

(U) The highlight of 1971 for the RVN was attainment of reasonable price stability. As measured by the Saigon retail price index, prices rose 14.3 percent, which compared most favorably with price increases of 30 percent or more per year since 1966. Economic growth continued with the real gross national product growing at an impressive rate of 9 percent. Despite a continuing reduction in employment by U.S. Government agencies, no significant unemployment resulted in the RVN. On the contrary, significant employment increases were experienced in the following industries: fabrication of metal parts, basic iron and steel, industrial chemicals, structural clay products, and canning. The GVN set new highs in both expenditures and tax revenues in 1971. Expenditures reached above $VN 265 billion as compared to 190 billion in 1970, with defense expenditures rising from $VN 135 billion to 154 billion. A most dramatic increase in non-defense expenditures, from $VN 56 billion to 112 billion, also occurred. Tax revenues reached about $VN 198 billion as compared to 153 billion in 1970. The resulting GVN deficit was about $VN 67 billion. Inflation was not higher, a situation partially explained by the fact that private savings doubled in 1971. Although the money supply in the RVN increased by about $VN 46 billion in 1971, the much larger potential increase was reduced by continuing effective programs of banking system expansion and commercial bank interest rates. In 1971, 21 new banking facilities were established. Private savings increased by about $VN 29 billion in 1971. On 15 November 1971 the GVN announced a sweeping economic reform program. Although the official exchange remained at 118:1, imports funded through GVN foreign exchange were increased to 400:1, imports funded through USAID programs were increased to 275:1, and personal accommodation purchases were increased to 410:1. It was GVN policy for these rates to be flexible. Regarding the effectiveness of this rationalization of the exchange rate, at the end of 1971 the black market rate for U.S. dollars was equal to the legal rate of 410:1 and the black market rate for Military Payment Certificates was six percent below the legal rate. A proposed new investment law was introduced for legislative action, designed to stimulate economic development through its very favorable treatment of foreign capital.

Socio-Economic Development

(C) Many programs were pursued in 1971 in an effort to provide a better

MILITARY REGIONS 1 AND 2 ESSENTIAL ROADS
AS OF 31 DEC 1971



MILITARY REGIONS 3 AND 4 ESSENTIAL ROADS
AS OF 31 DEC 1971



MILITARY REGION 1 WATERWAYS
AS OF 31 DEC 1971



MILITARY REGION 3 WATERWAYS
AS OF 31 DEC 1971



MILITARY REGION 4 WATERWAYS
AS OF 31 DEC 1971



STATUS OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION*

1971	Railroads			Roads			Waterways		
	Secure (Green)	Open (Amber)	Closed (Red)	Secure (Green)	Open (Amber)	Closed (Red)	Secure (Green)	Open (Amber)	Closed (Red)
Jan	648.5	26.7	428.0	3,307.0	1,087.5	207.5	1,712.0	347.0	0
Feb	Data not available			3,307.0	1,087.5	207.5	1,712.0	347.0	0
Mar	(see Source note)			3,320.0	1,103.5	178.5	1,530.0	529.0	0
Apr				3,305.0	1,188.5	108.5	1,530.0	529.0	0
May				3,325.0	1,172.5	104.5	1,522.0	537.0	0
Jun				3,356.0	1,141.5	104.5	1,522.0	537.0	0
Jul				3,346.0	1,192.5	63.5	1,551.0	508.0	0
Aug				3,070.0	1,468.5	63.5	1,551.0	508.0	0
Sep				3,149.0	1,389.5	63.5	1,551.0	508.0	0
Oct				3,779.0	731.5	91.5	1,551.0	508.0	0
Nov				3,838.0	676.0	88.0	1,551.0	508.0	0
Dec				3,714.0	791.0	97.0	1,551.0	508.0	0

*Includes only Lines of Communication listed in AB 146.

Total Kilometers:

Railroads	1,103.2
Roads	4,602
Waterways	2,059

Source: Security status of operational and designated roads and waterways furnished by field units at the Military Region level. Information on railroads furnished by the Railroad Security Advisory Detachment until the deactivation of that unit.

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life for the people. Among the more prominent were those involving land redistribution and refugee assistance. The emphasis placed on the "land-to-the-tiller" program continued to counter successfully the VC "farm your own land" appeal. During 1971 over 336,000 hectares of riceland were distributed to more than 200,000 farmers. The goal of distributing 600,000 hectares by 1 March 1972 was 57 percent complete at year's end. Eventually, this program was expected to provide better economic and social opportunities to more than one million Vietnamese farm families. Refugee assistance to those people whose lives had been seriously disrupted by the hostilities maintained a high priority during the year, although the number of refugees was on the decline. By December the case load of temporary refugees and refugees in settlement process had dropped to about 158,000. The major objective of the refugee assistance program remained the return of the maximum number of refugees to their former homes. The GVN local self-development program provided the framework for much of the government assistance in social and economic improvements. The projects encompassed by this program included improvements in education and public health; land reform; village projects ranging from wells and bridges to classrooms and market places; the training and development of manpower resources; and government loans to assist in local agricultural and economic development. For the most part, these programs were long-term in nature, but through 1971 they demonstrated satisfactory progress.

Summary

(U) A marked increase in economic growth and continuation of major social programs contributed to the overall improvement of the lives of the Vietnamese people. As the security situation improved and gains continued in this area, better economic and social opportunities provided through government programs continued to strengthen the will of the people and increase their support for the government.

Goal IV
As Authorized, Assist Allied Nations of Southeast Asia to Improve Their Capability to Defend Themselves Against Internal Subversion and External Aggression

Laos

[redacted]

[redacted]

Personnel

(C) Personnel strength of the Laotian Armed Forces was as follows:

Royal Armed Forces (FAR)	54,000
Neutralist Armed Forces (FAN)	6,000
Total	60,000
Irregulars	36,000
Total Ground Forces	96,000
Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF)	1,600
Royal Lao River Flotilla	400

Equipment

(S) The Royal Laotian Army had been equipped to conduct larger combat operations; this included replacement of the M-1 Rifle with the M-16 Rifle to increase the firepower of the forces. Early losses of equipment were expeditiously replaced and equipping of training units was vastly improved by the end of 1971.

(S) The RLAF received timely replacement of equipment losses. The aircraft authorized and possessed at the close of 1971 were as follows:

Type	Authorized	Possessed
T-28	86	79[redacted]
UH-34 D/G	43	54**
C-47 A/D	16	23
AC-47D	8	10
O-1A/F/U-17	23	20
T-41	6	6
U-4	1	1***
U-6A	1	1

[redacted] **21 operated by contractor, 16 in storage; ***operated by contractor.

RLAF Training

(C) A significant milestone in training efforts occurred in December 1971 when the C/AC-47 Mobile Training Team (MTT) [redacted] was terminated. Future training efforts were to be conducted in-country at Savannakket by an all-Lao (RLAF) instructor cadre that had been qualified by the MTT. Planning continued toward the goal of moving H-34 training in-country in FY 73. RLAF O-1 Forward Air Controller training began in-country on 1 December 1971 and the first strike mission resulted in good bomb damage assessment. These training shifts to self-sufficiency were expected to result in the nucleous for further expansion. Trainees' confidence in their own instructors would have to be firmly established if momentum was to continue.

RLAF Maintenance

(C) The T-28 aircraft maintenance capability had progressed to the point that trouble shooting and component removal and replacement (including engine changes) were being accomplished in-country. All phase inspection and IRAN (inspect and repair as necessary) were still accomplished by Detachment 1, 56th Special Operations Wing (USAF), and Air America at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand.

(C) The AC-47 aircraft maintenance capability was confined to flight line (organizational) maintenance, but, approximately 90 percent of the flight line maintenance was accomplished by Air Continental due to high priority and the extreme need for these aircraft. Air Continental also accomplished all phase inspection and aircraft IRAN, primarily at Vientiane. Component and engine overhaul was still accomplished in the Continental United States (CONUS).

(C) The C-47 aircraft and OH-34 helicopter maintenance capability in-country consisted of flight line (organizational) maintenance to include systems/subsystems trouble shooting, component removal and replacement, engine changes, and almost all phase inspections. Engine build-up was being accomplished by the RLAF in the field on C-47 aircraft and at Udorn Air America for UH-34 helicopters. Again engine and systems component overhaul was accomplished in the CONUS.

Readiness Assessment

(S) The FAR was the largest single friendly force in Laos. It included the Air Force and River Flotilla. The country was divided into five military regions that were presumably controlled by the CINC, FAR. While the command structure and territorial organization were relatively simple on paper, in practice they were extremely complex. With few exceptions, military commanders in the FAR were actually "war lords," whose power was based on family connections, personal political control, and wealth.

(C) Despite repeated FAR efforts for unification of all forces that opposed the communist-controlled Pathet Lao, the Neutralist Army (FAN) was still directly subordinate only to the Prime Minister, who as titular head of the Neutralist faction insisted on maintaining the appearance of tripartisanship. However, the FAN was increasingly responsive to FAR requirements. RLG ground forces were considered an equal or even superior force against the Pathet Lao but were no match for NVA main force units.

RLAF

(C) The RLAF was subordinate to the ground force and to the FAR General Staff. The RLAF had a single commander with a general staff following the usual FAR staff structure. It was formerly organized under the French concept of one composite squadron, but it was being reorganized into commands, wings, and squadrons. Although these components would not approximate the aircraft and personnel strength of USAF commands, wings, and squadrons, this organization was designed to provide an opportunity for RLAF commanders to build unit pride and morale. The five commands of the RLAF were the Tactical Air Command, Military Airlift Command, Air Training Command, Air Materiel Command, and Air Communication Command. The majority of RLAF personnel were to be assigned to the Tactical Air Command and Military Airlift Command.

River Flotilla

(S) The FAR River Flotilla was the water-borne arm of the FAR and considered an integral part of the ground forces. The mission of the River Flotilla was to support army troop movements and logistical operations. The flotilla had a variety of watercraft consisting of river gunboats, LCMs, light cargo craft, and one floating drydock. The organization, command structure, and types of watercraft available were often dictated by the Mekong's rapids and water level, more than by the military situation. It was estimated that the flotilla had a lift capability of 250 tons per month. If provided the needed assistance in experienced supervisory and technical personnel and materiel support, the Royal Lao River Flotilla had a potential to contribute much more to the Royal Lao Government war effort. Lacking experienced personnel, materiel support, aggressive leadership, and adequate repair facilities, however, the effectiveness of the River Flotilla was at best considered only fair.

Irregulars

(S) Lao Irregulars comprised a major portion of the armed forces of the Royal Laotian Government. They were generally the best trained, most highly motivated, and most effective of the friendly units. They were located throughout the country, but concentrated primarily in Military Region II under the

command of MAJ GEN Vang Pao. [redacted] Special Guerrilla Unit (SGU) operations in Military Regions III and IV of the Laotian Panhandle were designed to harass and interdict enemy lines of communication in the lower panhandle and clear the enemy from guerrilla launch bases along the eastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau. The SGU were employed in more conventional operations in Military Region II and were operating in defense of Vang Pao's major bases in Sam Thong and Long Tieng.

Summary

(S) The threat of internal subversion remained high in Laos, with increased external aggression occurring in late 1971. The Laotian Armed Forces remained understrength, and morale was a constant problem. The mixture of forces under numerous commanders did not lend itself to an efficient or effective military operation. By the end of 1971, Laos had improved its capability to defend itself against internal subversion, but third country help was still essential. Training of Laotian Armed Forces had increased significantly during 1971 and their ability to defend themselves against external aggression had increased as a result. Their ability to retake and hold major positions lost in late 1970 indicated an increased capability. The need for outside help continued; such aid was expected to be required for some time to come.

Cambodia

Intelligence Estimate

(S) Indigenous forces opposing the government of Cambodia expanded during 1971 as both material and organizational support were provided by North Vietnam. By the end of the year the Khmer Communist military strength had probably grown to over 15,000 men. External aggression continued in the form of over 60,000 VC/NVA on Cambodian soil, some 30,000 of which were combat troops. One additional NVA regiment deployed from North Vietnam during the year and normal infiltration appeared sufficient to offset enemy losses.

MAP Assistance

(S) Since President Nixon reinstated the Cambodian Military Assistance Program (MAP) in April 1970, the United States had invested approximately $186 million for military assistance in Cambodia. During this period the Forces Armees Nationale Khmer (FANK)--the Cambodian Army--had expanded from a force of approximately 35,000 to over 200,000. This had contributed significantly to U.S. objectives in that Cambodia had maintained its independent neutrality and assisted in Vietnamization by forcing the VC/NVA to divert approximately four

divisions to Cambodia in order to secure and maintain their lines of communication.

Self-Improvement Efforts

(S) The Government of the Khmer Republic depended upon the United States to provide a major portion of its military and economic aid. In an attempt to partially fulfill some of its requirements from in-country assets, the Cambodian government had developed a capability to manufacture 12,600 combat rations per day for issue to troops on combat operations, developed a capability to manufacture up to three tons of barbed wire daily, and developed a limited in-country capability to manufacture FANK uniforms.

Equipment

(S) The following is a list of significant items of equipment delivered during 1971:

T-28 Aircraft	10
C-47 Aircraft	17
T-41 Aircraft	10
Helicopters UH-1H	12
Patrol Craft (PBR)	33
Assault Patrol Boat (ASPB)	4
Landing Craft Medium	16
Individual Weapons	160,008
Crew-Served Weapons	3,420
M-113 Personnel Carriers	21
Vehicles (less than 5 tons)	281
Vehicles (over 5 tons)	1,096

Training

(S) Second only to producing sufficient trained personnel to meet immediate operational needs, the primary effort in security assistance training for Cambodia was to produce, as rapidly as possible, an in-country training base capable of ultimately handling all of Cambodia's military training requirements. As of 30 November 1971, a total of 53,648 Khmer personnel had received out-of-country training under MAP auspices. Of these, 51,331 including 350 members of the Khmer Navy, were trained in the RVN. Most of the remainder represented 24 territorial companies trained in Thailand under bilateral Thai-Khmer agreements. These were trained at no MAP "training" expense, but were equipped from MAP "material" funds. In addition to these companies, 140 FANK Special Forces troops were trained in Thailand in FY 71, as were 48 Khmer Air Force pilots.

Thailand

Intelligence Estimate

(C) The communist insurgent threat intensified during 1971, but the threat of external aggression remained relatively stable. The Ministry of Defense directed a reserve call-up of 10,759 officers and men for the Royal Thai Army (RTA) that began 15 March 1971. The other Thai services were manned at near-authorized levels. Major items of equipment continued to be delivered to the Thai Armed Forces. Training in Thailand was improving, with Thai training assets available to train other countries' personnel. Readiness of Thai Forces continued to improve. Operations included increased counterinsurgency actions and redeployment of half of the RTA Volunteer Force from Vietnam.

Equipment

(S) During 1971 MAP equipment continued to be delivered to the Royal Thai Forces, including such major items as trucks, tanks, maintenance and repair equipment, and aircraft. The equipment serviceability rates were high in view of the Thai's relative inexperience in modern machinery, but Thai serviceability criteria were somewhat below those established for U.S. forces. In general the delivery, serviceability, and use of equipment delivered to the Thai Armed Forces showed some improvement. Progress has been made to transfer operations and maintenance and investment costs to the Thai defense budget. The Thai had initiated use of two computers, reflecting the first major steps toward modern management procedures. Progress continued in developing self-sufficiency in manufacturing ammunition, batteries, and tires, and in aircraft overhaul and vehicle rebuild and repair.

Training

(S) RTA training at the company and battalion levels emphasized unit training tests. Throughout the Thai Armed Forces, advisor emphasis was placed on the middle management level of command. The Royal Thai Air Force created a mobile Air Ground Operations School. The MAP Evaluation Team, Thailand (a joint effort) continued its agressive program of evaluation and assistance to units located throughout the country.

Counterinsurgency Operations

(C) Military action in north Thailand was characterized by small unit actions against Communist Terrorist (CT) forces. The exception was a two company operation in Chiang Rai Province in July 1971. CT activity consisted of psychological operations, goods collection, and organizational activities designed to consolidate past efforts. The bulk of CT military activity was

directed against isolated police posts, coupled with ambush of small RTA reaction forces.

(S) The Thai fiscal year, beginning 1 October, was opened with a new plan for north Thailand--a plan designed to attain more balanced participation in the counterinsurgency effort by assigning specific responsibilities to various Thai Government agencies. This new plan is designed around a geographical breakdown of northern Thailand into areas designated as "secure," "consolidated," and "striking." The geographical designations were based on the degree of CT influence in each of the areas. In 1972 the responsibility for the zones was to be assigned to civilian, police, and military agencies respectively, with the RTA charged with operations into the striking zones. This new plan reflected a more realistic approach to the problem and made optimum use of limited assets. The limiting factor appeared to be the ability of the logistical base to respond to increased efforts; implementation was in the embryonic stage and a qualitative analysis of results would be premature. The plan appeared sound, coordination was being undertaken by the various agencies involved. and initial steps were being taken to initiate full implementation.

(S) Military operations in the northeast were slowed by the rainy season. The RTA concentrated on psychological operations, civic action, and local security to separate the CT from the population. Fifteen CT were killed in action, mainly by paramilitary forces such as Village Defense Corps (led by Special Forces and Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol cadre) and small unit patrols. Over 300 defectors turned themselves in, indicating at least partial success in the political offensive and in disrupting CT support by the population. As the rainy season ended in October, operations continued as units were redeployed into the dry season campaign areas, generally the same target areas. Military operations in the south continued to stress joint operations. The 5th Military Circle was writing a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan for the entire area down to the district level.

Summary

(S) Significant progress toward accomplishment of CINCPAC goals and objectives was achieved in 1971. Royal Thai Armed Forces capabilities to deal with internal subversion and to participate in the defense of Thailand against external aggression were improved significantly during the year.

Goal V

Maintain an Assessment of Enemy War Supporting Capabilities and, as Authorized, Assist Allied Nations in Reducing Enemy Capabilities in SEA

War Supporting Targets in North Vietnam (ROLLING THUNDER Target List)

(S) Except for limited protective reaction operations such as PROUD DEEP ALFA, air strikes had not been authorized against North Vietnamese targets since November 1968. Nevertheless, the ROLLING THUNDER Target List (RTTL) was reviewed continually to reflect the current status of North Vietnamese target systems should air strikes against them again be authorized and to indicate target regeneration efforts. In July 1971 a number of targets were dropped from the RTTL so that efforts could be devoted to identifying worthwhile new targets.

(S) As of 31 December 1971 there were 340 targets worthy of strike. This figure included 24 air defense, 115 electrical power, 68 military complex, 23 POL storage, 93 transportation, and 17 war-supporting facilities. The continued development and increased use of Bai Thoung, Quan Lang, Vinh, and Dong Hoi airfields, south of 20 degrees North latitude, was the most significant item pertaining to air defense. Reconstruction of the Hai Phong Thermal Power Plant East and the beginning of operations at the Lang Chi Hydroelectric Power Plant Thac Ba were the most significant changes in the power system. The Trai Hoi RR/HWY Bridge, a 510 x 20 foot, steel, deck/through-type bridge, which had been destroyed, also was rebuilt. Several installations that had reverted to civilian use were deleted from the RTTL.

POL Pipeline

(S) During 1971 the North Vietnamese made significant progress in construction of the POL pipeline. In the north, the pipeline extending from the Bai Chay area toward Hanoi was extended to within 32 nautical miles of Hanoi and construction activity continued. At the end of 1970 there was no pipeline between Hanoi and Vinh. During 1971 a major effort was begun to link Hanoi with the POL pipeline at Vinh and by year's end only 44 nautical miles remained to be completed. Farther south, the pipeline extending through the Ban Ravine Pass had been completed to a point some 42 nautical miles into Laos.

Operation PROUD DEEP ALFA

(S) Operation PROUD DEEP ALFA was conducted during the period 26-30 December 1971 in North Vietnam south of 20 degrees North. The objectives of this operation were to destroy MIGs on the ground, inhibit further use of selected airfields, and destroy logistical and other military targets. The first two objectives were not achieved, primarily because of inclement weather. The third objective was partially satisfied when air strikes were launched in adverse weather against 12 POL storage areas, six military complexes, 12 truck parks, two airfields, and seven transshipment points. The most significant bomb damage resulting from these strikes was the more than 31,000 barrels of POL destroyed or damaged.

Laos Air Results (Truck Activity)

(S) The number of trucks destroyed during 1971 was significantly greater than that of 1970, when a record high had been established. In comparing the two years, the number of trucks destroyed or damaged rose from 12,933 to 26,455 more than double the record set the previous year. Each succeeding month during the first quarter of 1971 established a new high in terms of trucks destroyed in Laos. The North Vietnamese logistic effort to counter LAMSON 719 operations in the Tchepone area during February and March was a contributing factor to the increase in bomb damage. The chart below provides data on damage and destruction of enemy trucks in Laos during 1971:

	Destroyed	Damaged
January	2,881	912
February	3,490	1,019
March	4,520	1,098
April	4,424	1,305
May	1,103	1,285
June	245	287
July	77	167
August	36	64
September	81	161
October	66	99
November	471	512
December	983	1,169
Total:	18,377	8,078

Laos Logistics Analysis

(S) The most significant factors influencing enemy logistic operations in the STEEL TIGER area during 1971 were the air interdiction campaign and ARVN ground operations in Laos in support of LAMSON 719. In addition, unusually poor weather that persisted through December delayed the start of the enemy 1971-72 campaign. Input, however, reached a record high with over 63,000 tons entering Laos during the year. Due to the factors given above, output decreased to less than 10,000 tons, or approximately one half the 1970 effort. Input was measured by a comparision of sensor-detected movers, visually observed trucks, and all-source intelligence indications of pipeline and waterway traffic. Output was computed by analyzing visually observed and sensor-detected movers reported along exit routes, including watercraft on Waterway 4D, and subtracting bomb damage occurring between output gates and the borders. Of the supplies brought into Laos, less than 15 percent reached the RVN and Cambodian borders.

Cambodia Air Results

(S) Cambodia bomb damage remained relatively light for 1971. There were no significant trends and no special operations requiring massive U.S. air support. However, FANK and ARVN ground operations in Cambodia forced the enemy to adjust his logistical efforts. With the denial of the port of Kompong Som to the VC/NVA, the enemy was forced to establish an overland logistics/infiltration route from southern Laos to Military Regions III and IV of the RVN.

Summary

(S) Although the enemy made significant progress in POL pipeline construction during the year and managed to keep the lines of communication in the Laos panhandle open a good percentage of the time, severe losses were suffered from the air interdiction effort, especially in truck attrition. The 26,455 destroyed and damaged trucks more than doubled the previous year's record. A record amount of supplies (63,000 tons) was input into Laos during the year, but less than 10,000 tons reached the RVN or Cambodia borders. From the above, it was apparent that the enemy's overall capabilities in Southeast Asia were reduced during 1971.

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GLOSSARY

Rank equivalents and abbreviations and Navy ship listings are separate at the end of this glossary.

A

AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
AAO	AUTOVON Assistance Operator
AAT	Additional Assistance to Thailand
AB	Air Base
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
ACC	Air Control Center
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
AC/S	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACS/I	Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DA)
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
AD	Air Defense
ADD	Agency for Defense Development
ADIC	Address Data Interface Controller
Admin	Administration
ADMIN	Administrative Office
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AFB	Air Force Base
AFCS	Air Force Communications Systems
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFR	Air Force Regulation
AFSCC	Air Force Special Communications Center
AGE	Associated Ground Equipment
AID	Agency for International Development
AIZ	Air Interdiction Zone
ALC	Air Logistics Command
ALCOM	Alaska Command
ALG	Advisory Labor Group
ALOC	Air Lines of Communication
AMEMB	American Embassy
AMT	aerial mail terminals
ANZUS	Autralia, New Zealand, United States
APO	Army Post Office
AP-T	Armor Piercing-Tracer
AR	Army Regulation
ARDF	Airborne radio direction finding
ARG/SLF	Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam

ASC	Automatic Switching Center
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD/I&L	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASIC	All-Source Information Center
ASICOM	All-Source Information Center Communications Network
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
AURI	Indonesian Air Force
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AW	All weather

B

BADGE	Base Air Defense Ground Environment (Japan)
BARCAP	Barrier Combat Air Patrol
BDP	Base Development Plan
BLA	Base Labor Agreement
BLT	battalion landing team
BN	Battalion; Burmese Navy
BOM	By Other Means (electrical transmissions)
BSC	Chief, BSW Team
BSW	Battle Staff Watch

C

C	Confidential
CAAG	Civil Aviation Assistance Group
CALCOM	California Computer Co.
CAMRA	Consolidated Air Mission Results Analysis; Conventional Air Mission Results Analysis
CAS	Controlled American Source
CAX	Civic Action Exercise
CCAF	Chinese Communist Air Force
CCINC	Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control
CCK	Ching Chuan Kang
CCO/HRCD	Controlled Collection Objective/Human Resources Collection Directive
CCRT	command and control relays, Thailand
CCRV	command and control relays, Vietnam
CCU	crypto control unit; Common Control Unit
C-E	Communications-Electronics

CEIMP	Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Program
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CGFMFPAC	Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces Pacific
CGUSARV	Commanding General U.S. Army Vietnam
CGUSARYIS	Commanding General U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands
CGUSASTRATCOM	Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command
CHICOM	Chinese Communists
CHJUSMAGK	Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea
CHJUSMAGPHIL	Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines
CHMAAG	Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CHMEDT	Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team (Burma)
CHMEDTC	Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
CHUSDLG	Chief U.S. Defense Liaison Group
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCAL	Commander in Chief Alaska
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCONAD	Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCPACINST	Commander in Chief Pacific Instruction
CINCPACREP	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative
CINCPACREPPHIL	CINCPAC Representative, Philippines
CINCPACREPRY	CINCPAC Representative, Ryukyus
CINCPACSTAFFNOTE	CINCPAC Staff Notice
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command
CINCSTRIKE	Commander in Chief U.S. Strike Command
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMA	Communications Management Agency
CMC	Commandant U.S. Marine Corps
CMPO	Chief, Military Planning Office
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COACT	Combat Activities Report
COIN	counterinsurgency
COINS	Community On-line Intelligence Network Systems
COLOGS	Consolidated Logistics System
COMAFK	Commander, Air Forces Korea
ComdHist	Command Historian

COMFAIRDAK	Commander Fleet Air Station, Adak
COMFOURTEEN	Commandant, 14th Naval District
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMIREX	Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
Comm	Communications
COMNAVCOMM	(Commander) Naval Communications Command
COMNAVFORV	Commander Naval Forces Vietnam
COMNAVINTCOM	Commander, Naval Intelligence Command
COMSEVENTHFLT	Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet
COMTETS	Contractor Operated and Maintained Thailand Engineering and Training Service
COMUS	Commander, United States Forces
COMUSK	Commander U.S. Forces Korea
COMUSKOREA	Commander U.S. Forces Korea
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSSEASIA	Commander, United States Forces, Southeast Asia (Designate)
COMUSTDC	Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
CONAD	Continental Air Defense Command
CONEX	Container exchange
CONPLAN	concept plan
CONUS	Continental United States
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
CORD	Civil Operations and Rural Development
CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
CPAF	Cost Plus Award Fee
CPFL	Contingency Planning Facilities List File
CPIC	Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRA	Continuing Resolution Appropriations
CRIMP	Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program
CRITICOMM	Critical Intelligence Communications Network
CS	A riot control agent
C/S	Chief of Staff
CSA	Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
CSAF	Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
CSF	Combined Service Force
CT	Communist Terrorist
CTA	Combined Telecommunications Agency
CVAN	CINCPAC Voice Alert Network

CW	Chemical Warfare
CY	Calendar Year

D

DA	Department of the Army
DAC/S	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff
DART	Disaster Assistance and Relief Team
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCA-PAC	Defense Communications Agency Pacific
DCH	Deputy Chief
DCO	Designated Commanding Officer
DCPG	Defense Communications Planning Group
DCS	Defense Communications System
DCS/I	Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
DEFT	Drug Education Field Team
DEPCH	Deputy Chief
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI	Deputy Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DEROS	Date Eligible for Return from Overseas
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DLG	Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia)
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DLSC	Defense Logistics Supply Center
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DoDPRO	Department of Defense Pacific Research Office
DPIF	Detailed Photo Index File
DSA	Defense Supply Agency
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
DSSCS	Defense Special Security Communications System
DSTE	Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment
DTS	Diplomatic Telecommunications System

E

ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
ECP	Engineering Change Proposal
EDA	excess defense articles

E&E	Evasion and Escape
EF&L	Engineer, Furnish and Install
Elect	Electronics
ELINT	Electronics Intelligence
E&ML	Environmental & Morale Leave
EMP	Electro-magnetic pulse
EO	electro-optical
EOB	Electronic Order of Battle
ERCS	Emergency Rocket Communications System
ERSAFL	Emergency Relocation Site Afloat
EUCOM	European Command
EW	Electronic Warfare
EWMTT	Electronic Warfare Mobile Training Team

F

FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAAPAC	Federal Aviation Agency, Pacific
FAG	Field Activities Group
FAN	Neutralist Armed Forces, Laos
FANK	Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres (Cambodia)
FAR	Forces Armees Royales (Laos)
FAS	Field Activities Squadron
FE	Far East
FICPAC	Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FOCCPAC	Fleet Operation Control Center, Pacific
FORSTAT	Force Status & Identity
FOT	Follow-on Operational Test
FPDA	Five Power Defense Arrangement
FPO	Fleet Post Office
FSIO	Foreign Service Information Officer
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
FY	Fiscal Year

G

GATEWAY	Guam Assessment to Ensure Westernmost Appropriate Yield
GBL	Government Bills of Lading
GENSER	General Service (electrical transmission)
GFE	government furnished equipment
GKR	Government of Khmer Republic

GNZ	Government of New Zealand
GOA	Government of Australia
GOB	Government of Burma
GOJ	Government of Japan
GOP	Government of the Philippines
GOS	Government of Singapore
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
GRI	Government of the Ryukyu Islands
GS	General Schedule; general support
GSA	General Services Administration
GT&E	General Telephone and Electronics Corporation
GVN	Government of the Republic of Vietnam

H

HALO	High Altitude - Low Opening
HANKAM	Indonesian Department of Defense and Security
HAWTELCO	Hawaiian Telephone Company
HEH	NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. Holt
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
HEW	Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare
HF	high frequency
HHE	household effects
HICOMRY	High Commissioner, Ryukyus
HistSum	Historical Summary
HRCD	Human Resources Collection Directives
HUMINT	Human Resources Intelligence; Human Intelligence

I

ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
IDHSC	Intelligence Data Handling Systems Communications
IFA	international fighter aircraft
IFF	Identification, Friend or Foe
IG	Inspector General
IGGI	International Group for the Government of Indonesia
IIR	Intelligence Information Report
ILA	International Longshoremen's Association
ILWU	International Longshoremen and Warehousemen Union

INTELSAT	Intelligence Satellite
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
ISG	Interagency Study Group

J

JAGC	Judge Advocate General's Corps
JAOCK	Joint Air Operations Center Korea
JCG	Joint Customs Group
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDS	Japan Defense Society
JGS	Joint General Staff (Vietnam)
JIC	Joint Information Center
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JOCC	Joint Operations Control Center
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JOSS	Joint Overseas Switching System
JPO	Joint Petroleum Office
JPRC	Joint Personnel Recovery Center
JPRTF	Joint Personnel Recovery Task Force
JRCC	Joint Rescue Coordination Center
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSDA	Japan Self Defense Agency
JSIPS	Joint Continental Defense Systems Integrated Planning Staff
JSLC	Joint Services Labor Committee
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JTB	Joint Transportation Board
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
JUSMAGK	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea
JUSMAGPHIL	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines
JUSMAGTHAI	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand
JUSPAO	Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office

K

KIA	Killed in Action
KIP	Key Indigenous Persons
Km	Kilometer

L

LAMP	Laos Ammunition Procedures
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
LGB	Laser Guided Bombs
LN	Local national
LOC	Line(s) of Communication
LOCCAP	Line of Communication Capabilities/Capacities Data System
Log	Logistics
LSS	Logistic Support System

M

MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACCORDS	COMUSMACV's ACofS for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
MACSOG	MACV's Studies and Observation Group
MACTHAI	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAE	Military Assistance Executive (Appropriation)
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAPEX	Military Assistance Program (Excess Program)
MAPT	Military Assistance Program Training
MARS	Military Affiliate Radio System
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit
MBA	Military Base Agreement
MBF	Military Banking Facility
MC	Medical Corps
MCA	Military Construction, Army
MCLAOS	Military Assistance Coordinator for Laos
MDAO	Mutual Defense Assistance Office
MDB	Mutual Defense Board U.S. - Philippines
MDT	Mutual Defense Treaty
MEAFSA	Middle East, Southern Asia, and Africa South of the Sahara
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MEDT	Military Equipment Delivery Team (Burma)
MEDTC	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
MIA	Missing in Action
MiG	Soviet aircraft (also MIG)

MIGp	Military Intelligence Group
MIJI	Meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion
MILAD	Military Advisors
MILCON	Military Construction
MILREP	Military representative
MIMEX	Major item excess program
MIRV	multiple independent reentry vehicle
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MOGAS	automotive gasoline
MOP	Measurement of Progress
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOVECAP	Strategic Movement Capabilities Study
MPO	Military Planning Office (SEATO)
MR	Military Region
M&RA	Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MRDC	Military Research and Development Center
MRP	Minimum Reaction Posture
MSC	Military Sealift Command; Medical Service Corps
MTNV	Military Telecommunications Network Vietnam
MTT	Mobile Training Team

N

NAC	net additional costs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCOMMSTA	Naval Communications Station
NAVFORV	Naval Forces Vietnam
NAVSEEAPAC	Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific
NEMVAC	Non-combatant Emergency and Evacuation
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NMMA	National Materiel Management Agency
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NPW	nulcear-powered warship
NRA	Naval Reserve Association
NSA	National Security Agency
NSD	Naval Suuply Depot
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
NWG	Narcotics Working Group

O

OACS/I	Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
OASD(H&E)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment
OASD/ISA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ODRI	Office of the Defense Representative, India
ODRP	Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan
OIC	Officer-in-charge
OICC	Officer-in-Charge of Construction
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
O&M (N)	Operations and Maintenance, Navy
OPCON	Operational Control
OPlan	Operation Plan
OPNAVINST	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
OPREP	Operational reporting
OPSEC	Operations Security
OR	Operational Readiness
ORE	Okinawa Regional Exchange
ORTC	Overseas Replacement Training Center
OSAP	Ocean Surveillance Air Patrol
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSIS	Ocean Surveillance Intelligence System
OVOP	Overt Operational Proposal

P

PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACFLT	United States Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAF	Philippine Air Force
PAL	Permissive Action Link
PALOS	Pacific Logistic Operations Streamline
PAMEX	PACOM excesses program
PARPRO	Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program
PATF	PACOM Automated Targets File
PATMA	Pacific Command Transportation Management Agency
PC	Philippine Constabulary
PCH&T	packing, crating, handling, and transportation
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PD	Presidential Determination
PDO	Property Disposal Office

PDO/DLSC	Property Disposal Office/Defense Logistics Supply Center
PEC	PACOM ELINT Center
PEG	Performance Evaluation Group
PF	Popular Forces
PG	Patrol Gunboats
PHOTINT	Photographic Intelligence
PICFMS	PACOM IDHS Command File Management System
PIROP	PACOM Imagery Reconnaissance Objectives Program
PL	Public Law
PMA	Pacific Maritime Association
POD	Port of Debarkation
POL	Petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POLO	PACOM Operations and Liaison Office
POLWAR	Political Warfare
PRC	People's Republic of China
PR/CSI	personnel recovery/crash site inspection
PRERECPAC	Preplanned Reconnaissance Pacific
PROVMAAG-K	Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (Provisional)
PSDF	People's Self-Defense Force
PSYOP	Psychological Operation
PURA	Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency
PW	Prisoner of War
PWRS	Pre-positioned war reserve stock

R

RAF	Royal Air Force
RAMMS	RVNAF Automated Material Management System
RCS	Reports Control Symbol
RCVW	Attack carrier air wing
R&D	research and development
RD	Rural Development (formerly Revolutionary Development)
RDC-T	Research and Development Center - Thailand
RDT&E	reserach, development, test, and evaluation
RECCA	Reconnaissance Coverage File
Recce	Reconnaissance
Recon	Reconnaissance
RF	Regional Forces
RFICC	Radio Frequency Interference Control Center
RI	routing indicators
RIF	Reduction in Force
RIIOC	Regional Interagency Intelligence and Operations Center
RLAF	Royal Laotian Air Force

RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RLGAF	Royal Laotian Government Armed Forces
RO	Requirements Office
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
ROCA	Republic of China Army
ROCAF	Republic of China Air Force
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
ROKAF	Republic of Korea Air Force
ROKF	Republic of Korea Forces
ROKFV	Republic of Korea Forces in Vietnam
ROKG	Government of the Republic of Korea
ROKN	Republic of Korea Navy
ROP	Republic of the Philippines
RO/USAID	Requirements Office of the U.S. Agency for International Development
RP	Republic of the Philippines
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
RRFS	Radio Research Field Station
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTAFB	Royal Thai Air Force Base
RTAFV	Royal Thai Armed Forces, Vietnam
RTARF	Royal Thai Armed Forces
RTAVF	Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces
RTG	Royal Thai Government; Reconnaissance Technical Group
RTN	Royal Thai Navy
RTTL	ROLLING THUNDER Target List
RTSL	Recce Targets Summary List
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S

S	Secret
SAAM	Special Assignment Airlift Mission
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACRECONCEN	SAC Reconnaissance Center
SAFASIA	Special Action Force Asia
SAG	Special Activities Group
SAILS	Standard Army Intermediate Level System
SALS	Single Ammunition Logistic System
SAPO	Sub-Area Petroleum Office

SAR	Search and Rescue
SAS	Shared Administrative Support
SATG	Special Action Task Group
SC	Supply Corps (N)
SCC	Security Consultative Committee (Japan)
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEADAB	Southesat Asia Data Base
SEAP	SEATO Publication
SEASIA	Southeast Asia
SEASTAG	SEATO Standardization Agreement
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SFGA	Special Forces Group Airborne
SFOD-A	Special Forces Operational Detachments "A"
SGU	Special Guerrilla Units
SI	Special Intelligence
SICR	Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIMEX	Secondary Item Express Program
SIMS	Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System
SIOP	Single Integrated Operation Plan
SITREP	Situation Report
SITS-K	Single Integrated Telecommunications System - Korea
SLF	Special Landing Force
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SOS	Special Operations Squadron
SPF	South Pacific Forum
SPINTCOMM	Special Intelligence Communications
SRMA	Special CINCPAC Representative for Military Assistance
SS	Steamship; spread spectrum
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSMR	Single Senior Military Representative
STFD	Strengthening Thailand for Defense
STOL	short take-off and landing
STRATCOM	Strategic Communications Command (USA)

T

TAC	Tactical Air Command
TAM	Teletypewriter Adapter Module
TAT	Technical Assistance Team
TDC	Taiwan Defense Command

TDY/TAD	Temporary Duty/Temporary Additional Duty
TEWS	Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
TF	Task Force
TFEES	Territorial Forces Evaluation System
THINEXAG	Thailand Information Exchange Agreement
TMA	Transportation Management Agency; Taiwan Materiel Agency
TO	Table of Organization
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Telephone Organization of Thailand
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment lists
TRO	temporary restraining order
TROC	Terrain Objective Camera
TS	Top Secret
TS-NF	top secret - not releaseable to foreign nationals
TSO	telecommunications service order
TSV	Tactical Secure Voice
TTPI	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
TTY	Teletype

U

U	Unclassified
UHF	ultra high frequency
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFP&CS	U.S. Air Force Postal and Courier Service
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARPAC	United States Army Pacific
USARPACINTS	U.S. Army Intelligence School, Pacific
USARSUPTHAI	U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand
USARYIS	U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands
USASATCOMA	U.S. Army Satellite Communications Agency
USASTRATCOM	U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command
USBRO	U.S. Base Requirements Overseas
USCAR	U.S. Civil Administration Ryukyus
USCINEUR	U.S. Commander in Chief Europe
USCINCMEAFSA	U.S. Commander in Chief Middle East, Southern Asia, and Africa South of the Sahara
USCINCSO	Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command
USCINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command

USDAO	United States Defense Attache Office
USF	U.S. Forces
USFJ	United States Forces, Japan
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIB	U.S. Intelligence Board
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMILAD	U.S. Military Advisor
USN	United States Navy
USOM	United States Operations Mission
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSSO	U.S. State Sending Office
UW	Unconventional Warfare

V

VAMP	Vietnam Ammunition Procedures
VARS	Visual aerial reconnaissance and surveillance
VC	Viet Cong
VCI	Viet Cong Infrastructure
VEV	Voice Excited Vocoder
VLF	Very low frequency
VNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force
VNMC	Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps
VNN	Republic of Vietnam Navy
VNRS	Vietnamese National Railway System
VOA	Voice of America
VUNC	Voice of the United Nations Command

W

WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WESTPACNORTH	Western Pacific North
WPN	WESTPACNORTH
WRM	War Readiness Materiel
WWMCCS	World-Wide Military Command and Control System

RANK EQUIVALENTS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ARMY	MARINES	NAVY	AIR FORCE
COMMISSIONED			
General of the Army (GA)		Fleet Admiral (FADM)	General of the Air Force (GenAF)
General (GEN)	General (GEN)	Admiral (ADM)	General (Gen)
Lieutenant General (LTG)	Lieutenant General (LtGen)	Vice Admiral (VADM)	Lieutenant General (LtGen)
Major General (MG)	Major General (MajGen)	Rear Admiral (RADM)	Major General (MajGen)
Brigadier General (BG)	Brigadier General (BGen)	Commodore (Commodore)	Brigadier General (BrigGen)
Colonel (COL)	Colonel (Col)	Captain (CAPT)	Colonel (Col)
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC)	Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol)	Commander (CDR)	Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol)
Major (MAJ)	Major (Maj)	Lieutenant Commander (LCDR)	Major (Maj)
Captain (CPT)	Captain (Capt)	Lieutenant (LT)	Captain (Capt)
First Lieutenant (1LT)	First Lieutenant (1stLt)	Lieutenant, Junior Grade (LTJG)	First Lieutenant (1stLt)
Second Lieutenant (2LT)	Second Lieutenant (2dLt)	Ensign (ENS)	Second Lieutenant (2dLt)
WARRANT			
Chief Warrant Officer, W-4 (CW4)	Chief Warrant Officer, W-4 (CWO4)	Chief Warrant Officer, W-4 (CWO4)	Chief Warrant Officer, W-4 (CWO-4)
Chief Warrant Officer, W-3 (CW3)	Chief Warrant Officer, W-3 (CWO3)	Chief Warrant Officer, W-3 (CWO3)	Chief Warrant Officer, W-3 (CWO-3)
Chief Warrant Officer, W-2 (CW2)	Chief Warrant Officer, W-2 (CWO2)	Chief Warrant Officer, W-2 (CWO2)	Chief Warrant Officer, W-2 (CWO-2)
Warrant Officer, W-1 (WO1)	Warrant Officer, W-1 (WO)	Warrant Officer, W-1 (WO1)	Warrant Officer, W-1 (WO)
ENLISTED			
Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA)	Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps (SgtMaj)	Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON)	Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (CMSAF)
Command Sergeant Major (CSM) and Sergeant Major (SGM)	Sergeant Major (SgtMaj) and Master Gunnery Sergeant (MGySgt)	Master Chief Petty Officer (MCPO)	Chief Master Sergeant (CMSgt)
First Sergeant (1SG) and Master Sergeant (MSG)	First Sergeant (1stSgt) and Master Sergeant (MSgt)	Senior Chief Petty Officer (SCPO)	Senior Master Sergeant (SMSgt)
Platoon Sergeant (PSG) or Sergeant First Class (SFC) and Specialist 7 (SP7)	Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt)	Chief Petty Officer (CPO)	Master Sergeant (MSgt)
Staff Sergeant (SSG) and Specialist 6 (SP6)	Staff Sergeant (SSgt)	Petty Officer First Class (PO1)	Technical Sergeant (TSgt)
Sergeant (SGT) and Specialist 5 (SP5)	Sergeant (Sgt)	Petty Officer Second Class (PO2)	Staff Sergeant (SSgt)
Corporal (CPL) and Specialist 4 (SP4)	Corporal (Cpl)	Petty Officer Third Class (PO3)	Sergeant (Sgt)
Private First Class (PFC)	Lance Corporal (LCpl)	Seaman (SN)	Airman First Class (A1C)
Private, E-2 (PV2)	Private First Class (PFC)	Seaman Apprentice (SA)	Airman (Amn)
Private, E-1 (PV1)	Private (Pvt)	Seaman Recruit (SR)	Airman Basic (AB)

Abbreviations of officer ranks for use by the CINCPAC staff are as follows:

Admiral - (not abbreviated)
General - (not abbreviated)
Vice Admiral - VADM
Lieutenant General - LT GEN
Major General - MAJ GEN
Rear Admiral - RADM
Brigadier General BGEN
Colonel - COL
Captain (USN) - CAPT
Commander - CDR
Lieutenant Colonel - LCOL
Lieutenant Commander - LCDR
Major - MAJ
Captain (USA,USAF,USMC) - CAPT
Lieutenant (USN) - LT
First Lieutenant - 1LT
Lieutenant, Junior Grade - LTJG
Second Lieutenant - 2LT
Ensign - ENS
Chief Warrant Officer W4 - CWO4
Chief Warrant Officer W3 - CWO3
Chief Warrant Officer W2 - CWO2
Warrant Officer W1 - WO1

US NAVY SHIPS AND SERVICE CRAFT

Navy combatant ships, auxiliary ships, and service craft are listed below, alphabetically by designation.

AD	Destroyer Tender
ADG	Degaussing Ship
AE	Ammunition Ship
AF	Store Ship
AFS	Combat Store Ship
AG	Miscellaneous Ship
AGDE	Escort Research Ship
AGEH	Hydrofoil Research Ship
AGER	Environmental Research Ship
AGF	Miscellaneous Command Ship
AGM	Missile Range Instrumentation Ship
AGMR	Major Communications Relay Ship
AGOR	Oceanographic Research Ship
AGS	Surveying Ship
AGSS	Auxiliary Submarine
AGTR	Technical Research Ship
AH	Hospital Ship
AK	Cargo Ship
AKD	Cargo Ship, Dock
AKL	Light Cargo Ship
AKR	Vehicle Cargo Ship
AKS	Stores Issue Ship
AKV	Cargo Ship and Aircraft Ferry
ANL	Net Laying Ship
AO	Oiler
AOE	Fast Combat Support Ship
AOG	Gasoline Tanker
AOR	Replenishment Oiler
AP	Transport Ship
APB	Self-propelled Barracks Ship
AR	Repair Ship
ARB	Battle Damage Repair Ship
ARC	Cable Repairing Ship
ARG	Internal Combustion Engine Repair Ship
ARL	Landing Craft Repair Ship
ARS	Salvage Ship

ARSD	Salvage Lifting Ship
ARST	Salvage Craft Tender
ARVA	Aircraft Repair Ship (Aircraft)
ARVE	Aircraft Repair Ship (Engine)
ARVH	Aircraft Repair Ship (Helicopter)
AS	Submarine Tender
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat
ASR	Submarine Rescue Ship
ATA	Auxiliary Ocean Tug
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
ATF	Fleet Ocean Tug
ATS	Salvage and Rescue Ship
AV	Seaplane Tender
AVM	Guided Missile Ship
AVT	Auxiliary Aircraft Transport
AW	Distilling Ship
BB	Battleship
CA	Heavy Cruiser
CC	Command Ship
CCB	Command and Control Boat
CG	Guided Missile Cruiser
CGN	Guided Missile Cruiser (nuclear propulsion)
CL	Light Cruiser
CLG	Guide Missile Light Cruiser
CVA	Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVAN	Attack Aircraft Carrier (nuclear propulsion)
CVS	Antisubmarine Warfare Support Aircraft Carrier
CVT	Training Aircraft Carrier
DD	Destroyer
DDG	Guided Missile Destroyer
DE	Escort Ship
DEG	Guided Missile Escort Ship
DER	Radar Picket Escort Ship
DL	Frigate
DLG	Guided Missile Frigate
DLGN	Guided Missile Frigate (nuclear propulsion)
IX	Unclassified Miscellaneous

LCA	Landing Craft, Assault
LCC	Amphibious Command Ship
LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized
LCPL	Landing Craft, Personnel, Large
LCPR	Landing Craft, Personnel, Ramped
LCU	Landing Craft, Utility
LCVP	Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel
LFR	Inshore Fire Support Ship
LFS	Amphibious Fire Support Ship
LHA	Amphibious Assault Ship (general purpose)
LKA	Amphibious Cargo Ship
LPA	Amphibious Transport
LPD	Amphibious Transport Dock
LPH	Amphibious Assault Ship
LPR	Amphibious Transport (small)
LPSS	Amphibious Transport Submarine
LSD	Dock Landing Ship
LST	Tank Landing Ship
LWT	Amphibious Warping Tug
MCS	Mine Countermeasures Ship
MHA	Minehunter, Auxiliary
MHC	Minehunter, Coastal
MMC	Minelayer, Coaster
MMD	Minelayer, Fast
MMF	Minelayer, Fleet
MON	Monitor
MSA	Minesweeper, Auxiliary
MSB	Minesweeping Boat
MSC	Minesweeper, Coastal (non-magnetic)
MSCO	Minesweeper, Coastal (old)
MSD	Minesweeper, Drone
MSF	Minesweeper, Fleet (steel hulled)
MSI	Minesweeper, Inshore
MSL	Minesweeping Launch
MSM	Minesweeper, River
MSO	Minesweeper, Ocean (non-magnetic)
MSR	Minesweeper, Patrol
MSS	Minesweeper, Special (device)
NR	Submersible Research Vehicle (nuclear propulsion)

PACV	Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle
PBR	River Patrol Boat
PCE	Patrol Escort
PCER	Patrol Rescue Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft, Inshore
PCH	Patrol Craft (hydrofoil)
PCS	Patrol Craft, Submarine
PG	Patrol Gunboat
PGH	Patrol Gunboat (hydrofoil)
PTF	Fast Patrol Craft
RPC	River Patrol Craft
SS	Submarine
SSBN	Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine (nuclear propulsion)
SSG	Guided Missile Submarine
SSN	Submarine (nuclear propulsion)
SST	Target and Training Submarine
X	Submersible Craft
YAG	Miscellaneous Auxiliary
YF	Covered Lighter (self-propelled)
YFB	Ferryboat or launch
YFR	Refrigerated Covered Lighter (self-propelled)
YFRT	Covered Lighter (Range Tender)
YFU	Harbor Utility Craft
YG	Garbage Lighter (self-propelled)
YLLC	Salvage Lift Craft, Light (self-propelled)
YM	Dredge
YO	Fuel Oil Barge (self-propelled)
YOG	Gasoline Barge (self-propelled)
YP	Patrol Craft
YSD	Seaplane Wrecking Derrick
YTB	Large Harbor Tug
YTL	Small Harbor Tug
YTM	Medium Harbor Tug
YV	Drone Aircraft Catapult Control Craft
YW	Water Barge (self-propelled)

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